Title: Bullock v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 277, 1999
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
LESTER R. BULLOCK,
)
)  No. 277, 1999
Defendant Below,
)
Appellant,
)  Court Below – Superior Court
)  of the State of Delaware
v.
)  in and for New Castle County
)
STATE OF DELAWARE,
)  Cr. A. No. IN98-03-2071
)
Plaintiff Below,
)
Appellee.
)
Submitted:  November 28, 2000
Decided:  June 27, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE,
Justices.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED.
Raymond M. Radulski and James D. Nutter [argued], Office of the Public
Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant.
Kim Ayvazian, Department of Justice, Georgetown, Delaware, for Appellee.
STEELE, Justice for the Majority:
2
On October 22, 1998, a jury convicted Lester B. Bullock of manslaughter
arising from a collision between Jennifer Alleger’s car and Bullock’s truck at the
intersection of Rt. 40 and Pleasant Valley Road.  The State charged Bullock with
manslaughter for recklessly causing the death of Alleger “by driving at an
excessive speed while impaired by alcohol which resulted in a collision with
another car.”1  At trial, at the conclusion of the State’s case, Bullock moved for a
judgment of acquittal and argued that the State’s evidence showed that Alleger’s
disregard of a red light as he entered the intersection on a yellow light primarily
caused the collision that resulted in her death.  The Superior Court denied the
motion.  The jury, following the Court’s instructions, convicted Bullock of
manslaughter and the Court sentenced him to five years at Level V, suspended
after one year for declining levels of probation.  Bullock filed a timely notice of
appeal.
On appeal, Bullock argues that no reasonable juror could conclude that he
proximately caused the accident because Alleger became the sole proximate cause
of the accident when she disregarded a red light and drove her car into his path
after his truck had entered the intersection controlled by a yellow light.  Bullock
also argues that the Superior Court erred by giving the jury an “unavoidable
                                          
1 Appx. to Appellant’s Op. Br. at A-4.
3
accident” instruction instead of an “accident” instruction and by failing to instruct
the jury properly on reckless causation in accordance with 11 Del. C. § 263.2  We
conclude:  (1) that the failure to instruct the jury in accordance with Section 263
deprived Bullock of an instruction that contained an essential principle of law
necessary to decide the factual issue presented to them; and (2)  that the Superior
Court erred in giving an “unavoidable accident” instruction that was not supported
by the facts of the case and that undermined the jury’s ability to intelligently
perform its duty.  Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment of the Superior Court
and REMAND this case for a new trial.
I
On December 8, 1997 at approximately 6:25 p.m., Bullock drove his pick-up
truck westward on Route 40 in New Castle County.  As he approached the
intersection of Route 40 and Pleasant Valley Road, the traffic control signal in
front of him at the intersection turned yellow.  At the same time, Alleger waited in
                                          
2 Section 263 states in pertinent part:  Reckless or negligent causation; different result from that
expected or overlooked:
The element of reckless or negligent causation is not established if the actual
result is outside the risk of which the defendant is aware or, in the case of
negligence, of which the defendant should be aware unless:
(1) The actual result differs from the probable result only in the respect that a
different person or different property is injured or affected or that the probable
injury or harm would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused;
or
(2) The actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probable
result and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a bearing on the
actor's liability or on the gravity of the offense.
4
a turn lane on eastbound Route 40, facing a solid red arrow, preparing to cross the
westbound lanes of Route 40 and turn north onto Pleasant Valley Road.  Bullock
increased his speed through the intersection.  As he drove through the intersection,
Alleger entered the intersection against the red signal and collided with Bullock’s
truck.
Delaware State Police Trooper Raymond Shatley responded to the accident.
He found Alleger’s car on Route 40 approximately 100 feet west of the
intersection.  He found Bullock’s truck on Route 40 farther west of the intersection
than Alleger’s car.  Shatley determined that Alleger was dead at the scene.
Shatley questioned Bullock.  He detected an odor of alcohol on Bullock and
noticed that Bullock’s eyes were glassy.  Bullock told Shatley that he had
consumed three beers earlier that afternoon.  Although Bullock passed several field
sobriety tests including a portable breathalizer test, his performance on other tests
led Shatley to believe that Bullock was impaired by alcohol.  Bullock slurred the
letters of the alphabet beyond recognition and failed the one-leg-stand and finger-
to-nose tests.  Shatley also administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus and the
walk-and-turn.  The results of these tests supported Shatley’s suspicion that
Bullock was impaired by alcohol.
Paramedics transported Bullock to the Christiana Emergency Room to draw
a blood sample to determine his blood-alcohol level.  Approximately two hours
5
after the accident, Bullock’s blood-alcohol level registered .079 grams per
deciliter, a reading below the legal level for intoxication.  Shatley did not cite
Bullock for driving under the influence of alcohol.  The State, however, arrested
Bullock for criminally negligent homicide and then sought an indictment for
manslaughter.3
Delaware State Police Officer Philip Strohm, Jr., an accident reconstruction
expert, arrived at the accident scene approximately one hour after the accident.
Strohm testified that Bullock faced a yellow light when he proceeded through the
intersection and that Alleger faced a solid red arrow.  He opined that Alleger
attempted to cross Route 40 onto Pleasant Valley Road.  Strohm determined that
Bullock clearly had the right of way at the time of the accident.  Strohm
determined that only 300 feet separated the two vehicles when Alleger initially
pulled out onto Route 40 and that Bullock spanned this distance in three seconds.
According to Strohm, a normal person can perceive and react to a danger in 1½
seconds.  At fifty-five mph, a driver would travel 120 feet before perceiving and
                                          
3 See 11 Del C.  § 632.  An arrest warrant issued on February 27, 1998, charged Bullock with
criminally negligent homicide, a class E felony.  A grand jury indicted Bullock on March 30,
1998 for manslaughter, a class C felony.  The State then entered a nolle prosequi on the
criminally negligent homicide charge.  Interestingly, 11 Del. C. § 630A, Delaware’s vehicular
homicide statute, a class E felony, applies to a person who drives criminally negligently under
the influence of alcohol as defined by 11 Del. C. § 4177 and who thereby causes the death of
another.  Ironically the State’s inability to prove driving under the influence resulted in an
indictment and conviction for a more serious crime.  This process allowed the State to use
alcohol consumption on an “impairment” theory to support the mens rea of reckless conduct
without the burden of proving driving under the influence.
6
reacting to a danger and would travel another 260 feet before the car could come to
a complete stop.  He determined that at the point of impact, Alleger was travelling
slightly above 11 mph while Bullock was traveling approximately 77 mph.
Markings on the road indicated that Bullock steered right in an attempt to avoid the
collision.  Strohm concluded that, while Bullock’s speed and consumption of
alcohol may have contributed to the accident, “the primary contributing
circumstance of the collision was Ms. Alleger passing a red light.”4
II
The primary issue in this case is whether the Superior Court properly
instructed the jury on reckless causation.  A secondary issue is whether the
Superior Court erred when it instructed the jury on “unavoidable accident.”
Bullock’s counsel, however, did not object to the unavoidable accident instruction
given or proffer an instruction based upon Section 263.  Therefore, we review for
plain error.  Plain error exists when the error was “so clearly prejudicial to [a
defendant’s] substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the
trial process.”5
                                          
4 Appx. to Appellant’s Op. Br. at A-34.
5 See Dutton v. State, Del. Supr., 452 A.2d 127, 146 (1982).
7
“The primary purpose of jury instructions is to define with substantial
particularity the factual issues and clearly to instruct the jury as to the principles of
law [that] they are to apply in deciding the factual issues presented in the case
before them.”6  “A trial court must give instructions to a jury as required by
evidence and law whether the parties request the instruction or not.”7  Indeed,
“[t]he trial judge is charged with the responsibility for instructing the jury.  This is
not controlled by the parties as their function and duty is to bring to the court's
attention the instructions they consider applicable and the reasons why they should
be given.”8  “As a general rule, a defendant is not entitled to a particular
instruction, but he does have the unqualified right to a correct statement of the
substance of the law.”9  And “[w]hile ‘some inaccuracies and inaptness in
statement are to be expected in any charge,’ this Court will reverse if the alleged
deficiency in the jury instructions ‘undermined … the jury’s ability to intelligently
perform its duty in returning a verdict.’”10
At trial, the Superior Court instructed the jury that:
The indictment charges … that Lester Bullock … did recklessly
cause the death of Jennifer Alleger by driving at an excessive speed
while impaired by alcohol and which resulted in a collision with
another car.
                                          
6 See Zimmerman v. State, Del. Supr., 565 A.2d 887, 890 (1989).
7 Zimmerman, at 891 (citing United States v. Cooper, 10th Cir., 812 F.2d 1283, 1286 (1987)).
8 Cooper, at 1286.
9 Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 490 A.2d 104, 128 (1983) (citations omitted).
10 Id. (citations omitted).
8
Delaware defines the offense of manslaughter in pertinent part
as follows:  A person is guilty of manslaughter when he recklessly
causes the death of another person.  In order to find the defendant
guilty of manslaughter, you must find that each of the following
elements have been established beyond a reasonable doubt:  One, the
defendant caused the death of Jennifer Alleger.
By this I mean the defendant must have brought about this
death which would not have occurred but for such act.  And two, the
defendant acted recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to death when he is aware
of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
death will result from his conduct.  The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that the person’s disregard of it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would
observe in the situation.
You must find that the person was aware of and consciously
disregarded the risk that his conduct would cause death and also that
the risk was so great that a reasonable person under the circumstances
would have acted otherwise to avoid the risk.
And three, the defendant was driving at an excessive speed
while impaired by alcohol which resulted in a collision with another
car.11
Bullock argues that while this instruction includes the definition of causation found
in 11 Del. C. § 261,12 the instruction is incomplete because the trial court should
have instructed the jury that “reckless causation is not established if the actual
result [Alleger’s death] is outside the risk of which [Bullock] was aware [Alleger
illegally disregarding a red arrow] . . .” and that a failure to include this instruction
constituted plain error.
                                          
11 Appx. to Appellee’s Answering Br. at B-22.
12 Section 261 states: “Conduct is the cause of a result when it is an antecedent but for which the
result in question would not have occurred.”
9
Bullock argues that under Delaware law, when recklessness is an element of
the crime, the State must prove that the defendant was a proximate cause of an
injury.  Bullock argues that no reasonable juror could conclude that he proximately
caused the collision because Alleger’s negligence was an intervening and
superceding cause of the collision.  Therefore according to Bullock, Alleger
became the sole proximate cause of the accident when she disregarded a red arrow,
entered the intersection and collided with Bullock’s truck.  To support his
argument that he cannot be a proximate cause of the collision Bullock notes that
the State’s expert, by concluding that Alleger was the primary cause of the
collision, in effect, concluded that Alleger, not Bullock, was the proximate cause
of the accident.
The State argues that the Superior Court properly instructed the jury because
“the jury was fully instructed on the elements of manslaughter.”13  The State argues
that Bullock acted recklessly because he was speeding and impaired by alcohol.
The State reasons that “but for” his speed and “impairment” his truck would not
have collided with Alleger’s car and she would not have died.  Because Bullock
should have foreseen that a collision with Alleger could have resulted from his
speeding while impaired by alcohol, the State argues, Bullock should be criminally
liable for the consequences of his actions.  The State argues that it proved that
                                          
13 Appellee’s Op. Br. at 21.
10
Bullock was aware of and consciously disregarded the risk that his conduct would
cause death and that a reasonable person would have acted otherwise, and that “but
for” his conduct, the death would not have occurred.  The State maintains that the
Superior Court’s instruction contained all the elements required or at least charged
the jury sufficiently so that it could intelligently perform its duty.
The State further argues that Bullock misstates the issue by arguing that
Alleger was a superceding cause of the accident, maintaining that Bullock confuses
civil law concepts of causation with the Model Penal Code’s analytical framework
for imposition of criminal liability.  The State argues that “[t]here is no question
that Bullock caused [Alleger’s] death by colliding with her car.  The issue at trial
was not whether Alleger was negligent but whether Bullock should be held
criminally liable for his reckless conduct.  Since there was more than legally
sufficient evidence that Bullock’s conduct in driving at an excessive speed while
impaired by alcohol was reckless, the trial court did not err in denying his motion
for judgment of acquittal.”14  There is, however, a distinction between the Superior
Court’s assessment of a motion for a judgment of acquittal and its formulation of
an instruction to the jury that clearly instructs the jury on statutory principles of
law that apply to the facts of a case.
                                          
14 Appellee’s Op. Br. at 8-9.
11
It is correct that the revised Delaware Criminal Code, enacted in 1973,
eliminated the doctrine of proximate cause from Delaware criminal law and
replaced it with 11 Del. C. §§ 261 – 264, a statutory scheme defining the
circumstances under which causation may be established for offenses where
causing a particular result is an element.15  This Court, however, has not interpreted
Section 263, which discusses circumstances under which reckless or negligent
causation may not be established.  Thus, this is a case of first impression.16  The
issue here is whether, without an instruction containing the language contained in
Section 263, the jury would understand that on these facts that they could conclude
that the element of reckless causation required for a conviction of manslaughter “is
not established” if the actual result is outside the risk of which the defendant is
aware . . .” and the actual result is not too remote to have a bearing on Bullock’s
liability.  Could they know, under the instruction as given, that Bullock could act
recklessly as the State described yet not be criminally responsible for the collision
                                          
15 See Delaware Criminal Code with Commentary, § 261 (1973).
16 Our research reveals only one case in which a Delaware court gave a Section 263 instruction.
In State v. Witherspoon, Del. Super., No. 9610003447, Silverman, J. 1999 (July 30, 1999) aff’d,
Witherspoon v. State, Del. Supr., No. 460, 1999 Steele, J. (Feb. 14, 2001), the State charged the
defendant, Witherspoon, with second-degree murder after inciting a gun battle in which an
innocent bystander was killed by another shooter.  In Witherspoon, the State conceded that the
defendant had not fired the fatal shot; however, the evidence showed that the defendant began
the gun battle in a crowded area and repeatedly fired his gun into the air.  The Superior Court
instructed the jury on reckless/negligent causation and provided an instruction including the
language of Section 263.  The defendant was found guilty after the jury had explained to them
that they should consider whether the defendant was aware of, and intended, the likely outcome
that someone would be shot and killed.
12
and death?  Did the jury understand that they were to assess the probability that he
would be aware that another driver might disregard a red signal and collide with
his truck and that they could conclude that that fact was improbable or too remote
and therefore outside the risk of which he was aware?
In criminal prosecutions, the State need only show a “but-for” relationship
between an action and a result to establish causation.17  This “but-for” causation,
however, is subject to limitation when the charged conduct is reckless or negligent
instead of intentional.  Section 263, the State agrees, modifies the strict application
of the “but-for” causation test where the actual and probable results of conduct are
different.  In this case, the State argues that there was no difference in the actual
and probable results – an automobile collision causing a death – of Bullock driving
at an excessive speed while impaired by alcohol.  Thus, the State argues that
despite Bullock’s contention that Alleger’s actions were a superceding cause of the
collision, Alleger’s negligence, in fact, is not at issue: “While [Alleger’s]
contributory negligence may bar a civil action against the person [(Bullock)]
whose acts cause the death, it does not relieve the latter from criminal
responsibility for having caused the death.”18  Implicit in the State’s argument, of
                                          
17Delaware modeled §§ 261-264 after the Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Part I, § 2.03,
which the State relies upon.  The Model Penal Code describes “the minimum requirement for a
finding of causation” as “conduct causing a particular result.”
18 Appellee’s Op. Br. at 11 (citing 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide § 107 at 574 (1999)).  It seems
counter intuitive that Alleger’s negligence would bar her from recovery against Bullock in a civil
action yet he can be subjected to a conviction for manslaughter in a criminal prosecution.
13
course, is the position that the charge given on causation was sufficient.  The
problem we have with that contention is twofold:  (1)  it overly simplifies fact
situations that involve multiple actors who contributed to the result and ignores the
purpose of Section 263; and, (2)  it focuses solely upon the defendant’s role and
minimizes the importance of his awareness of the risk of his actions and his
individual ability to avoid the risk before imposing criminal liability.  The State
puts the issue far too facilely.  Alleger’s conduct must be, as a matter of fact,
incorporated into the instruction in order to allow the jury to assess intelligently its
bearing upon the defendant’s awareness that death could result from his presence
in the intersection on a yellow light and at the speed that he traveled.  They must
assess, as well, the remoteness or the probability that at that very same instant
Alleger would disregard a red signal and put her vehicle in his path.  Put more
plainly, were these odds so great that this chain of events would occur that the jury
could conclude that the events had “a bearing on [Bullock’s] liability or on the
gravity of the offense?”  Nowhere does the instruction, unlike the language of
Section 263 contemplates, speak to the need to weigh his actual awareness of the
risk against the improbable actions of another actor, which unarguably contributed
to the result.
Section 263, contrary to the State’s argument, was designed for difficult
cases such as this one where a defendant contends that the actual result of his
14
conduct is outside the risk of which he is aware.  According to the commentary to
the Model Penal Code, on which the Delaware Criminal Code is based, the
comparison of actual and probable results must take the specific facts into
account.19  Here the instructions given decidedly did not.
Accordingly, the actual result should not be defined generally, as “death by
collision” but more specifically, as a death which resulted in part from Alleger
disregarding a red light and by entering the intersection illegally (where Bullock
had the right to be) and crossing Bullock’s lane of travel as well as from Bullock’s
actions.
Bullock concedes that he acted recklessly when he drove through the
intersection at a speed nearly thirty miles per hour over the speed limit.  He argues,
however, that the actual result in this case of Alleger dying from a collision after
Alleger disregarded a red light, differs from the probable result of Bullock
speeding through an intersection on a yellow light.  Bullock argues that because he
had the right of way facing a yellow light, he had no duty to anticipate nor could he
foresee that Alleger would fail to remain stopped at the red light.  A jury could
conclude, if properly charged, that the State had not established the element of
reckless causation if the collision that resulted from Alleger disregarding the red
                                          
19 See Commentary at 260 n. 13. (“The term ‘actual result’ is meant to be contrasted with the …
probable result in terms of its specific character and manner of occurrence.”).
15
light was outside the risk of which the defendant was aware and so improbable that
it would occur that it would not be expected.
The State cites Story v. Castner 20 for the proposition that there is a higher
standard of care and diligence required of a motorist entering an intersection
regulated by what the State chooses to characterize as a “cautionary signal.”
In Story, this Court held that “in the absence of circumstances which put a
reasonable man on notice of impending danger, a driver on a dual highway with a
green light in his favor has the right to assume that he could traverse the
intersection safely and that cross traffic would stop in obedience to the red light.”21
The Storey Court continued, stating that “This Court has heretofore recognized that
a higher standard of care and diligence is required of favored motorists who enter
an uncontrolled intersection,22 or who enter an intersection regulated by a
cautionary signal.23  In such cases, a motorist is under a duty to proceed more
warily.”24
The State concedes that Bullock had the right of way but argues that when
the “light had turned yellow [Bullock] had notice of impending danger.”25  The
State cites Storey for the proposition that when the light turned yellow Bullock had
                                          
20 Del. Supr., 314 A.2d 187 (1973).
21 Id. at 191 (citing Nolan v. Sullivan, 3rd Cir., 372 F.2d 776, 780 (1967)).
22 Id. (citing Wooten v. Kiger, Del. Supr., 226 A.2d 238 (1967)).
23 Id. (citing Carnes v. Winslow, Del. Super., 182 A.2d 19, 21 (1962)).
24 Id.
25 Appellee’s Op. Br. at 13 (citing Storey, at 191).
16
a “higher standard of care and diligence [that is] required when entering an
intersection regulated by a cautionary signal.”26  Thus, the State argues that when
the light at an intersection controlled by a traffic control signal turns from green to
yellow, a motorist is placed under a higher standard of care to be aware of
impending danger.
The State, however, misstates the holding of Storey.  Delaware’s motor
vehicle code distinguishes intersections regulated by traffic control signals, not by
the color of the light at any given moment, but by whether the lights are solid or
flashing.27  In Story, this Court stated that a motorist entering an intersection
regulated by a cautionary signal has a higher standard of care and diligence, citing
Carnes v. Winslow.28  A cautionary signal, however, as made clear in Storey, does
not mean a solid yellow light.  It means an intersection regulated by a flashing red
light or a flashing yellow light.29  Indeed, 21 Del. C. § 4110(a)(2) states that
“When a yellow or green lens is illuminated with intermittent flashes, drivers of
vehicles may proceed through the intersection or pass such signals only with
                                          
26 Storey, at 191.
27 See Title 21 Del. C. § 4108 and § 4110.
28 See supra n. 23.
29 See Carnes, at 540 (stating that the favored driver was not “entitled to rely blindly … on the
red light” especially “because the yellow blinker imposed caution”).
17
caution.”  There is no such condition of caution placed on an intersection
controlled by a solid yellow light.30
The Storey Court focused on the time in which the favored motorist was put
on notice of impending danger: “The crucial point here is not so much the speed of
the [favored motorist’s] vehicle but, instead, the time when [the favored motorist]
was put on notice of the impending danger.”31  The Court concluded that “[t]he
speed of the [favored motorist’s] car is then significant for the limited purpose of
determining whether plaintiff had sufficient time, considering speed and distance,
to take reasonable steps to avert the accident.”32  In this case, the State’s own
expert testified that only 300 feet separated the two vehicles when Alleger initially
pulled out onto Route 40 and that Bullock spanned this distance in three seconds.
According to Strohm, a normal person can perceive and react to a danger in 1½
seconds.  At fifty-five mph, a driver would travel 120 feet before perceiving and
reacting to a danger and would travel another 260 feet before the car could come to
a complete stop.  Based on the State’s own expert, Bullock would not have been
able to stop in time to avoid colliding with Alleger even if he had been traveling
within the speed limit.  While the State points out that Bullock was looking in his
                                          
30 See 21 Del. C. § 4108(a)(2)a. stating “Vehicular traffic facing the circular yellow signal is
thereby warned that a red signal for the previously permitted movement will be exhibited
immediately thereafter.”
31 Storey, at 190.
32 Id.
18
rearview mirror just before he entered the intersection, there is no nexus between
that alleged fact and anything Bullock could have done to increase his awareness
that Alleger would disregard the red light or to avoid the collision.
Storey does not impose a higher standard of care on Bullock when he
entered the intersection on a solid yellow light than if he entered on a solid green
light.  Under these conditions, there is neither a greater nor a lesser risk that
another motorist will disregard a red light and enter the intersection.  Bullock had
no duty to be aware of an increased risk that someone would disregard a red light
just because he entered the intersection on a yellow light.  He had no duty to
anticipate Alleger’s negligence nor to be aware or conscious of it as those terms
are meant for the purpose of criminal liability.  Because Bullock had no duty to
anticipate Alleger’s negligence, no reason to foresee it, and no time to avoid the
consequences of it, a question arose whether, despite Bullock’s speed and alleged
impairment, the State had established the element of reckless causation and could
thus hold Bullock criminally liable for Alleger’s death.  An instruction that did not
include the language of Section 263 failed to provide the jury with the proper
framework in which to assess whether under the facts in this case reckless
causation had not been established.  The trial court’s duty included, regardless of
what trial counsel requested or submitted, the obligation to supply the jury with a
correct statement of the law in accordance with the facts of this case.
19
In sum, the Superior Court committed plain error by not including Section
263 in the jury instruction.  Had the jury received an instruction based on  Section
263, they may have concluded that despite Bullock’s actions, that he could not be
found to have recklessly caused Alleger’s death because the result of her actions
could not be expected and were outside the risk “of which [he] was aware.”
Without that instruction the jury was denied the opportunity to analyze the facts
fully in this case and accurately apply the law.
III
Bullock argues that the Superior Court erred by giving the jury an
“unavoidable accident” instruction instead of an “accident” instruction.  At the
prayer conference held to discuss proposed jury instructions, the Superior Court
proposed to the parties an “accident” instruction that defined “accident” as a
“sudden and unexpected event occurring without intention, due to carelessness,
unawareness, ignorance, or a combination of these, which produces an unfortunate
result.  It is an unforeseen unplanned fortuitous event.”33  Bullock agreed to this
instruction.  The State, however, requested that if the Superior Court intended to
provide an “accident” instruction, then it should be an “unavoidable accident”
instruction.  Bullock’s counsel did not object to the “unavoidable accident”
                                          
33 Appx. to Appellant’s Op. Br. at A-38.
20
instruction, which the court ultimately provided the jury.34  In fact, during the
prayer conference, Bullock’s counsel, referring to the State’s proposed instruction
stated, “It’s got more instructions that are more attractive than the Court’s
[instruction].”35
Bullock now argues that it was plain error for the Superior Court to give the
jury an “unavoidable accident” instruction.  The State argues that Bullock’s
acceptance of the instruction precludes any argument that the instruction was
erroneous.
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that unavoidable accident
was inapplicable in this case because the accident, in fact, could have been avoided
if Bullock had not been speeding.  That is, Bullock could have avoided the
accident if he had not sped through the intersection of Route 40 and Pleasant
Valley Road while impaired by alcohol.  As the State’s own expert opined,
however, even if Bullock had not been speeding he would have been unable to
                                          
34 The court instructed the jury on unavoidable accident that:
The mere fact that a death or injury occurred does not mean that the
defendant was reckless or criminally negligent in his conduct.  The law
recognizes that there may be an unavoidable accident for which no person is
criminally responsible.  Such an accident is one which could not have been
avoided through the exercise of proper care.  If the defendant exercised the care
and skill which the law require, then in truth the accident is unavoidable and the
defendant is not guilty.  However, the fact that you may find that the defendant
failed to exercise the care and skill required does not mean the defendant is guilty
unless you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in a
reckless or criminally negligent manner.  Appx. to Appellant’s Op. Br. at A-39.
35 Appx. to Appellee’s Op. Br. at 20.
21
avoid the collision as a result of Alleger disregarding the red arrow.  In fact the
accident could have been avoided if Alleger had remained stopped at the red signal
as she was legally charged to do.  Bullock argues that the “unavoidable accident”
instruction incorrectly placed a higher standard of care on him because an
unavoidable accident is “one which could not have been avoided through the
exercise of proper care.  If the defendant exercised the care and skill which the law
require, then in truth the accident is unavoidable and the defendant is not guilty.”36
Bullock argues that the “accident” instruction should have been given because it
“correctly recognized that even if [Bullock] had not been acting as a reasonable
person, the accidental circumstances of the collision could negate either or both the
culpable state of mind and the voluntariness of the act.”37
In this case, based on the facts of the accident as reconstructed by the State’s
own expert, there can be no intelligent basis for an “unavoidable accident” theory.
The instruction distorted the focus of the case away from the two drivers’ negligent
and reckless actions, respectively.  It inappropriately suggested that a collision in
which two drivers actively participated carelessly and recklessly, respectively,
could somehow have been avoided instead of focusing the jury’s attention on the
                                          
36 See supra  n. 35.
37 Appellant’s Op. Br. at 21 (citing Hall v. State, Del. Supr., 431 A.2d 1258 (1981)).
22
extent to which the result of their respective conduct could be so readily
foreseeable that it would warrant criminal liability.
One cannot doubt that a jury would find Bullock guilty based on the
unavoidable accident instruction given.  The State’s argument that Bullock’s
acceptance of the unavoidable accident instruction obviates any argument that the
instruction was incorrect is unpersuasive.  Implicit in every jury instruction is the
fundamental principle that the instruction applies to the specific facts in that
particular case and contains an accurate statement of the law.  Simply because the
parties in a case agree on a particular set of instructions, does not excuse the trial
judge’s duty to give proper instructions.  Contrary to the State’s argument, an
improper jury instruction may amount to plain error despite a defendant’s
acceptance of it.38  The deficiency of this instruction is so glaring that it clearly
deprived the jury of a chance to intelligently perform its duty and, thus, amounted
to plain error.
CONCLUSION
The failure to give an instruction based upon Section 263 undermined the
jury’s ability to assess whether, given Bullock’s actions, reckless causation was
nonetheless not established and to conclude that he should not be held criminally
liable because he was unaware of the risk that Alleger would disregard a red arrow
                                          
38 See Wainwright v. State, Del. Supr., 504 A.2d 1096, 1099-1100 (1986) (en banc).
23
and collide with his truck while he was properly in the intersection.  Without that
instruction, the jury lacked the proper framework in which to analyze the facts in
this case.  The jury could well have found that Bullock had been speeding, been
impaired and entered the intersection on a yellow signal but nevertheless was not
aware of the probability that or should not be charged with anticipating that
Alleger would disregard a red arrow and collide with his truck.  Further the
unavoidable accident instruction inappropriately and improperly shifted the jury’s
focus from causation, the heart of the case, to an examination of whether a
negligently operated vehicle’s collision with a recklessly operated vehicle could be
unavoidable.  Given the complex issue of causation in this case, it was crucial that
the jury receive a proper, clear and complete instruction on reckless causation
consistent with the framework for analysis described in 11 Del. C. §§ 261-263.
Therefore the judgment of the Superior Court is reversed and this case is remanded
for a new trial.
24
Veasey, Chief Justice, concurring:
I concur in the holding of the majority that there was plain error in the
failure of the trial court to provide the jury with a correct statement of the law in
accordance with 11 Del. C. § 263.  Accordingly, I vote to reverse.39
Nevertheless, I share the dissent’s concern regarding undue expansion of
the plain error rule.   I write separately to explain why the result in this case does
not expand plain error review beyond the circumscribed limits set forth in our
plain error jurisprudence.
If objection is not made at trial, we will not grant relief unless an appellant
shows plain error.40  That error must be obvious to the appellate court and must
result in fundamental prejudice to the defendant.  Accordingly, not all errors
                                          
39 I am inclined to the view, however, that the defendant affirmatively acquiesced in the
unavoidable accident jury instruction.  That instruction, which is internally unexceptionable, may
not have correctly fit the facts of this case.  But the defendant requested it and would be barred
from appealing it.  But, in view of the reversal and the ordering of a new trial this issue is moot.
40 See Super. Ct. R. 52(b) (“Plain Error.  Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may
be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”); Barnett v. State, Del.
Supr., 691 A.2d 614, 616 (1997) (referring to the “plain error ‘interest of justice’ exception
provided for in Supreme Court Rule 8”).
25
amount to plain error.41  In Wainwright v. State,42 we explained the plain error
standard as follows:
Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained
of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to
jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.
Furthermore, the doctrine of plain error is limited to material
defects which are apparent on the face of the record; which
are basic, serious and fundamental in their character, and
which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or
which clearly show manifest injustice.
The burden of showing plain error lies with the appellant.43  Even when an
appellant has carried this burden, under the terms of Supreme Court Rule 8, we
                                          
41 See, e.g., Trump v. State, Del. Supr., 753 A.2d 963, 970 (2000) (“…some members of the
defense bar still fail to assert timely objections to prosecutorial misconduct.  Such failures hinder
the trial judge’s ability to address the alleged misconduct during the trial and ultimately limit a
defendant’s chance of succeeding on appeal because counsel’s failure to object leaves this Court
with the more restricted plain error standard of review.”); id. at 968 (“Yet, had there been an
objection, these phrases should have been found to be improper vouching.”).  See also Brown v.
State, Del. Supr., 729 A.2d 259, 265 (1999) (“We have assumed arguendo that the Superior
Court should have given a specific unanimity instruction to the jury, if it had been requested by
Brown’s attorney at trial.  We have concluded, nevertheless, that the verdict in Brown’s case
demonstrates that the jury was not confused and that Brown’s substantial rights were unaffected
by that omission.”); id. at 266 (“Although there was not plain error in Brown’s case, the
disjunctive joinder of two distinct offenses in an indictment is not advisable.”).
42 Del. Supr., 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (1986) (citations omitted).
43 See Brown, 729 A.2d at 265 (“Therefore, in this appeal, Brown has the burden of
demonstrating that plain error occurred and affected his substantial rights.  Supr. Ct. R. 8; Super.
Ct. Crim. R. 52(b).) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-35(1993)); Stevenson v.
State, Del. Supr., 709 A.2d 619, 633 (1998) ("To establish plain error ... [Stevenson] has the
burden of showing that the improper arguments by the prosecutor not only created the possibility
of prejudice, but that the errors worked to his actual substantial disadvantage.”) (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
Under federal jurisprudence, the difference between harmless error and plain error is that
for plain error, “it is the defendant who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.”
Olano, 113 S.Ct. at 1778.  See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 52(a) (“Harmless Error.  Any error, defect,
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”).
26
may exercise our discretion to decline to grant relief.44  We must eschew the
temptation to exercise the clarity of vision that comes with 20/20 hindsight to
say—except with extreme reluctance—that the trial judge must jump in, sua
sponte, and do this or do that to save a litigant or a lawyer from allowing error to
seep into a trial.
This is one of those rare cases where the judge had a heightened duty to
“get it right” when settling on what to tell the jury about the law.  The plain
error jurisprudence has limits.  I do not say that in every case a materially
incorrect jury charge will constitute plain error per se.  But certainly this is a
case where we must find plain error.
Our plain error review must be applied in conjunction with the imperative
that a jury be given clear and correct guidance.  A defendant is “entitled” to a
“correct statement of the substance of the law.”45  We have stated that “[t]he
primary purpose of jury instructions is to define with particularity the factual
issues, and clearly to instruct the jury as to the principles of law which they are
to apply in deciding the factual issues involved in the case before them.”46
Moreover, “jury instructions must be adapted to the factual situation of each
                                          
44 See Supr. Ct. R. 8; Super. Ct. Crim. R. 52(b).  Cf. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735-36; Johnson v.
United States, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1550 (1997).
45 Grace v. State, Del. Supr., 658 A.2d 1011, 1014 (1995).
46 Zimmerman v. State, Del. Supr., 565 A.2d 887, 890 (1989).
27
case.  In any criminal case, it is the duty of the jury to examine facts and assign
to or eliminate criminal responsibility for specific individuals.  The applicable
principles of law and the identity of the persons involved must not be
confused.”47
In Culver v. Bennett,48 a tort action, the appellants argued for the first time
on appeal that the jury instructions had erroneously and confusingly “presented
the jury with two separate and conflicting rules of legal causation”:  the
”substantial factor rule” and the “but for” rule.49  Analyzing whether it was plain
error to use the term “substantial factor” notwithstanding Delaware’s “common
law adherence to the ‘but for’ rule of proximate cause,” this Court noted that
“this case presents questions of first impression concerning the proper
construction of Delaware’s modified comparative negligence statute.”50  The
                                                                                                                                       
47 Del. Supr., 547 A.2d 114, 120 (1988) (citations omitted).  Instructions must be substantially
correct not flawless:
In undertaking this evaluation, the jury instructions must be viewed as a whole. See Flamer v.
State, Del. Supr., 490 A.2d 104, 128 (1984). Although some inaccuracies may appear in the jury
instructions, this Court will reverse only if such deficiency undermined the ability of the jury "to
intelligently perform its duty in returning a verdict." Storey v. Castner, Del. Supr., 314 A.2d 187,
194 (1973), quoted in Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d at 128.  See also Newnam v. Swetland, Del.
Supr., 338 A.2d 560, 562 (1975).  A trial court's charge to the jury will not serve as grounds for
reversible error if it is "reasonably informative and not misleading, judged by common practices
and standards of verbal communication." Baker v. Reid, Del. Supr., 57 A.2d 103, 109 (1947),
quoted in Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d at 128.
Id. at 119 (footnote omitted).
48 Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1094, 1095 (1991).
49 Id. at 1096.
50 Id. at 1098, 1099.
28
Court determined that under Delaware law “the use of the term ‘substantial
factor’ was erroneous and a deficiency which undoubtedly undermined the jury’s
ability to intelligently perform its duty….”51  Similarly, in Probst v. State,52 the
appellant argued for the first time on appeal that the jury instruction was
inadequate because it confusingly used male pronouns to refer to a female
defendant in a case in which the actions of the defendant’s brother were also
critical.53  Under plain error review, we found that the “jury instructions were
erroneous as a matter of law.”54
There is tension between the plain error rule, which limits our review of
objections not made at trial, and the principle that a defendant is entitled to a
correct statement of the law.55  Application of the plain error rule will continue to
                                          
51 Id.; see also id. at 1098 (“Since the issue of proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact to
be submitted to the jury, it is not only appropriate but necessary for the trial judge to properly
instruct upon that concept.”) (citation omitted).
52 Del. Supr., 547 A.2d 114 (1988)
53 See id. at 118-20.
54 Id. at 120.  See also Taylor v. State, Del. Supr., 464 A.2d 897, 899 (1983) (“Having found the
instant instruction erroneous we must now determine whether it constitutes plain error since the
defendant offered no objection to it at trial.  Superior Court Criminal Rules 30(a) and 52(b)…. It
is our view that it is plain error to fail to instruct the jury on the necessary elements of the
crime.”).
55 See also Superior Court Criminal Rule 30.  Rule 30 provides in relevant part: “No party may
assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless that party objects
thereto… stating distinctly the matter to which that party objects and the grounds of the
objection.”  Although this language seemingly prohibits review of objections not made in
compliance with the rule, the plain error rule “limits the otherwise absolute bar in Rule 30.”
United States v. Ismel, 4th Cir., 153 F.3d 723, 1998 WL 486356 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished
opinion).  Thus an objection to a jury instruction raised for the first time on appeal may be
reviewed for plain error.  See, e.g., Stansbury v. State, Del. Supr., 591 A.2d 188, 191 (1991);
United States v. Sotmayor-Vazquez, 1st Cir., __ F.3d __, 2001 WL 487962, * 13 (2001)
29
rest on the specific facts and circumstances of each case.56  It is pertinent to note,
however, as the majority does, that the trial judge has an “obligation to research
the law and craft an appropriate charge.”57  This obligation is independent of a
party’s obligation to request instructions or make specific objections.58
An additional consideration exists when the legal issue presented for the
first time on appeal is one of first impression.  Our plain error review has been
sensitive to the desirability of addressing such issues in order to provide guidance
to future litigants59 and to the related consideration of relieving the appellant from
forfeiture arising in part from lack of clarity in the law, assuming that all
elements of the plain error standard are satisfied.60
                                                                                                                                       
(“Because neither defendant objected to the instruction in accordance with Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 30, we review for plain error.”)
56 See Ayers v. State, Del. Supr., No. 300, 2000, 2001 WL 292610, Veasey, C.J. (March 16,
2001) (ORDER), Order at ¶ 6.
57 United States v. Davis, 3d Cir., 183 F.3d 231, 252 (1999).
58 See Hall v. State, Del. Supr., No. 380, 1989, 1989 WL 27783, Horsey, J. (March 3, 1989)
(ORDER), Order at ¶ 4 (“Regardless of requests from the parties, the Superior Court has an
obligation to charge the jury concerning the law in relation to the facts presented at trial.”)
(citation omitted); 9A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §
2556 (2d ed. 1995) (“It is the inescapable duty of the trial judge to instruct jurors, fully and
correctly, on the applicable law of the case, and to guide, direct, and assist them toward an
intelligent understanding of the legal and factual issues involved in their search their truth.  The
court must instruct the jury properly on the controlling issues in the case even though there has
been no request for an instruction or the instruction requested is defective.”).
59 See McBride v. State, Del. Supr., 477 A.2d 174, 184 (1984) (“However, as the question of the
effect of the 1977 amendment is one of first impression, we will waive Rule 8 in the interests of
justice to provide guidance to the trial courts and future litigants….”).
60 See Monroe v. State, Del. Supr., 652 A.2d 560, 564 (1995) (reversing judgment of conviction
based on finding of plain error; noting that “we have not previously addressed the question
before the Court in this case”); Culver, 588 A.2d at 1098 (noting that “this case presents
questions of first impression,” and that “‘there is perhaps nothing in the field of law which has
30
These considerations are present in this case involving jury instructions on
a very complex and potentially confusing substantive law issue not previously
addressed by this Court.  Moreover, this is a very serious homicide case
involving this defendant’s conviction of a class C felony and his sentence to five
years at Level V, suspended after one year for declining levels of probation.  As
noted in the majority opinion, this Court has not decided any cases concerning
the correct application of 11 Del. C. § 263, and there appears to be only one
Delaware case to have instructed the jury on Section 263.61
Section 263 is based on Section 2.03 of the Model Penal Code.62  The
Model Penal Code commentary underscores the necessity, explained in the
majority opinion, of instructing the jury under Section 263 in cases such as this.
                                                                                                                                       
called forth more disagreement’ or confusion in judicial opinions than attempts to clarify the
concept of proximate cause”) (citation omitted).  Cf. Shelton v. State, Del. Supr., 744 A.2d 465,
497 n. 142 (2000) (“Because the right to allocution is arguably a ‘substantial right’ of a capital
defendant, and the law of allocution is ambiguous in Delaware, we waive the waiver rule and
consider the merits of Shelton’s argument.”) (citation omitted).
61 State v. Witherspoon, Del. Super., No. 9610003447, Silverman, J. (July 30, 1999), aff’d,
Witherspoon v. State, Del. Supr., No. 460, 1999, Steele, J. (Feb. 14, 2001) (ORDER).  There is a
paucity of authority from other jurisdictions.
62 See Comment to §1.02, Delaware Criminal Code with Commentary (1973).  The genesis of the
present Delaware Criminal Code is set forth in the introductory section of the Delaware Criminal
Code with Commentary.  See Introduction, Delaware Criminal Code with Commentary (1973).
The Model Penal Code, which was the work of the American Law Institute, was published in
final form in 1962.  In August 1965, Governor Charles L. Terry, Jr., appointed the Governor’s
Committee for Revision of the Criminal Law  (on which committee I was honored to serve as co-
chair) “to study the need for criminal law reform in Delaware and to produce a draft of a new
criminal code.”  The Committee issued a Proposed Delaware Criminal Code in 1967.  See
Governor’s Committee for Revision of the Criminal Law, Proposed Delaware Criminal Code
(1967).  The Code was first introduced in the House of Representatives in December 1967.  After
31
Importantly, the commentary also frankly acknowledges the difficult nature of the
problems of causation and culpability and the inchoate manner in which the Code
addresses them:
These problems are currently dealt with as issues of
“proximate causation” and present enormous difficulty
(especially in homicide) because of the obscurity of that
concept.  Rather than seeking to systematize the varying and
sometimes inconsistent rules in the numerous areas in which
the problem has arisen, the section undertakes a fresh
approach to the central issues.
* * *
[This section] deals with situations in which the actual result
involves the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or
contemplated, but in which the precise injury inflicted was
different or occurred in a different way.  Here the Code makes
no attempt to catalogue the possibilities—intervening or
concurrent causes, natural or human, unexpected physical
conditions; distinctions between mortal and nonmortal
wounds; and so on.  It deals only with the ultimate criterion
by which the significance of such factors ought to be judged—
whether the actual result is too remote to have a [just] bearing
on the actor’s liability or the gravity of his offense.
* * *
In general, the infinite variety of contexts in which the issue
can arise precludes an advance catalogue of premises that can
be used mechanically to deduce a solution.  The issue should
be put to the jury in terms of a general principle that
articulates the ultimate basis of judgment.
* * *
                                                                                                                                       
some revisions, it was reintroduced in the Senate in May 1971, and was signed into law by the
Governor on July 6, 1972.  58 Del. Laws, c. 497, §1.
32
While it is true that the Model Code’s formulation does not
give a definitive resolution to most difficult cases, it has the
twofold advantage of avoiding the confusing language of
“proximate causation” and presenting clearly to the  jurors the
issues they should properly consider.  It also casts aside the
sometimes arbitrary distinctions of the common law.  Hence,
while one should not expect too much of the Code’s general
statutory formulation in an area as complex as this, such a
formulation has significant advantages over no formulation at
all….
Commentary to Section 2.03 of the Model Penal Code at 255-56, 261, 262, 265-
66.
In my view, the “enormous difficulty” sometimes engendered by this
issue, combined with the fact that it is one of first impression in this Court in a
serious criminal case, tips the balance toward a finding of plain error in this case
because the instruction lacked essential clarity and was not a correct statement of
the law.
33
WALSH, Justice, with whom BERGER, Justice, joins, dissenting:
The majority concludes that the trial court erred: (i) in failing, sua sponte, to
instruct the jury concerning the application of 11 Del. C. ' 263 and (ii) in giving an
incorrect instruction on unavoidable accident.  Acknowledging that the defendant
did not request a ' 263 instruction, (nor object to its absence), while affirmatively
seeking the unavoidable accident instruction, the majority nevertheless reverses the
conviction on the basis of plain error.  Because I believe the majority holding
extends the doctrine of plain error to unacceptable limits and creates an unfortunate
precedent, I respectfully dissent.
The facts surrounding this fatal accident are relatively uncomplicated.  The
State presented evidence that Bullock, who had  been drinking and exceeding the
speed limit, accelerated while approaching an intersection where a traffic device
displayed a yellow warning signal.  The victim was making an illegal left turn in
the face of a red light when her vehicle was struck by Bullock=s vehicle.  The State
conceded that the decedent was partially at fault,63 but claimed that Bullock=s
conduct was reckless and that such recklessness was a proximate cause of the
accident.  The defendant argued that the decedent=s conduct was the sole proximate
cause of the accident.  The jury was instructed on Abut-for@ causation, recklessness
                                          
63In his jury summation, the prosecutor commented: AWithout doubt in this particular case you
cannot deny, the State concedes, that Jennifer Alleger was partially a cause of her own death.
The fact that she pulled in front of him, that helped to cause her death.@ (A-35)
34
and criminal negligence.  Specifically, the jury was instructed that in order to find
the defendant guilty of manslaughter it must be satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that he Awas aware of and consciously disregarded the risk that his conduct
would cause death and also that the risk was so great that a reasonable person
under the circumstances would have acted otherwise to avoid the risk.@  The jury
found Bullock guilty of manslaughter and implicit in that verdict was the
determination that the actual result of his conduct was foreseeable and that
Alleger=s conduct did not affect that foreseeability.  The majority decision nullifies
the verdict on the ground that the jury did not Areceive proper, clear and complete
instructions on reckless causation.@  But the content of those instructions were
never disputed at trial.  The trial judge conferred with counsel, prior to argument to
the jury for the purpose of receiving requests for specific instructions, as required
by Super. Ct. Crim. R. 30.64  Bullock=s counsel did not make a request for an
                                          
64Rule 30.  Instructions.
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the
court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct
the jury on the law as set forth in the requests.  At the same time copies of such
requests shall be furnished to all parties.  The court shall inform counsel of its
proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury.  The court
may instruct the jury before or after the arguments are completed or at both times.
All instructions shall be given by the court orally.  In capital cases the court shall,
and in other cases the court may, give the jury a copy of the instructions for use
during deliberations.  No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or
omission therefrom unless that party objects thereto before or at a time set by the
court immediately after the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly
the matter to which that party objects and the grounds of the objection.
Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury
35
instruction on any aspect of the elements of the offenses of either manslaughter or
the lesser included offense of criminally negligent homicide.  Defense counsel did
request that the Court give an accident instruction in the following colloquy:
THE COURT: The jury may not buy into the accident defense,
but the question is has enough evidence been adduced to warrant the
giving of an accident instruction
MR. RADULSKI:   I believe so, Your Honor.  I don=t really
think it matters how fast he was going.  If she runs a red light, the jury
could conclude that, hey, there=s no way he could have avoided that.
THE COURT: I think it does matter how fast he=s going, but I
think we=ll hear about that in closing arguments.  The slower the
movement the more avoidable the accident.
The prosecutor commented that the court=s proposed instruction was Aincredibly
confusing@ and offered a form of instruction on unavoidable accident that had been
developed by a jury instruction study group of Superior Court practitioners.  The
trial judge, noting that the State=s proposed instruction was more appropriate for a
motor vehicle type accident, inquired of defense counsel whether he had any
objection to the State=s proposed instruction.  Defense counsel stated that not only
did he not have an objection but commented that it was Amore attractive than the
Court=s.@    In reliance upon that representation, the trial court so instructed the
                                                                                                                                       
and, on the request of any party, out of the presence of the jury. (emphasis
supplied)
36
jury.  Neither the defendant nor the State thereafter raised an objection to the
court=s jury instructions.
Following conviction, Bullock filed a Amotion for judgment of acquittal/new
trial@ asserting that the jury=s verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
Again, Bullock alleged no error in the court=s instruction to the jury nor sought any
relief in that respect.  To put the present claims of error in perspective, the
appellant seeks the intervention of this Court for alleged errors in jury instruction
that, contrary to the requirements of Super. Ct. Crim. R. 30, he either failed to
request or affirmatively sought and never brought to the attention of the court at
trial or in a post-trial motion for a new trial.  Thus, we are being asked to review
claims that the defendant had the opportunity to present, but did not, on three
occasions to the trial judge: (i) at the instruction conference, (ii) before the jury
deliberated and (iii) in a post-trial motion for a new trial.  This Court=s definition of
plain error was articulated in Wainwright v. State, Del. Supr., 504 A.2d 1096,
1100 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869.65
Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained
of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize
the fairness and integrity of the trial process . . . . [T]he doctrine of
plain error is limited to material defects which are apparent on the
                                          
65The majority cites Wainwright as authority for its holding that Aan improper jury instruction
may amount to plain error despite a defendant=s acceptance of it.@  Wainwright, of course, did
not involve a claim of plain error directed to jury instructions but to the admissibility of the
defendant=s incriminating statement secured in violation of constitutional safeguards announced
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
37
face of the record; which are basic, serious and fundamental in their
character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right,
or which clearly show manifest injustice.
Since our holding in Wainright, we have reserved the plain error standard to
claims affecting substantial rights, i.e. of constitutional dimension, because only
such claims can be said to Ajeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial
process.@  Such errors, though forfeited for failure to assert them at trial, are
nevertheless reviewable because of their seriousness and demonstrated effect on
the trial result.  See, e.g., Smith v. State, Del. Supr., 647 A.2d 1083, 1086 (1994)
(admissibility of statement in violation of confrontation clause reviewed under
plain error standard despite absence of objection).  There is a conceptual difference
between reviewing a forfeited error and an error that has been waived.  That
distinction has been well formulated by the United States Supreme Court and
implemented by subsequent federal decisions.  In United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725 (1993), the Supreme Court considered the question of whether the presence of
alternate jurors during jury deliberations, an admitted irregularity, could be
reviewed under a plain error standard.66  In determining that the claimed error did
not affect substantial rights, the court noted that the plain error standard is intended
                                          
66 The federal plain error standard, a limitation on the reviewing authority of the federal courts of
appeals, is found in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) which provides: APlain error or
defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the
attention of the court.@  Delaware=s statutory counterpart is substantially the same as the federal
rule.  See Supr. Ct. Crim. R. 52(b).
38
to correct errors that are forfeited, not those that are waived: AIf a legal rule was
violated during the district court proceedings, and if the defendant did not waive
the rule, then there has been an >error= within the meaning of Rule 52(b) despite the
absence of a timely objection.@  Id. at 733-34.  Decisions following Olano have
made clear that only forfeited errors are reviewable for plain error.   United States
v. Perez, 9th Cir., 116 F.3d 840, 845 (1997); United States v. Lakich, 7th Cir., 23
F.3d 1205,1207 (1994) (stating that Aif there has been a valid waiver, there is no
Aerror@ for [the court] to correct@).
In cases involving a defendant=s failure to object to jury instructions, it has
been held that the defendant=s approval or submission of the instruction constitutes
a waiver.  See United States v. Griffin, 7th Cir., 84 F.3d 912, 924 (1996) (stating
that waiver must arise out of voluntary affirmative conduct and finding waiver
where defendant=s attorney approved the claimed improper instruction); Lakich, 23
F.3d at 1207 (finding that submission of jury  instruction by defendant=s counsel
was insufficient to preserve issue and holding that  counsel=s express agreement
with the instruction constituted waiver); but see United States v. Bailey, 7th Cir.,
227 F.3d 792 (2000) (finding no intentional relinquishment of right to object to
jury instruction on appeal where defense counsel made an objection at trial to
proposed instruction but argued on appeal the instruction was improper for reasons
different from  those previously cited).
39
This Court has also made clear that the failure of counsel to object to a jury
instruction cannot be the basis for plain error as long as the jury instruction is a
correct statement Aof the substance of the law.@  Grace v. State, Del. Supr., 658
A.2d 1011 (1995).  In Grace, we noted that the fact that the court=s instruction
Adiffered from the desired instruction is irrelevant@ and emphasized that it was the
defendant=s Aresponsibility to object to the instructions@ and the failure to do so
constitutes waiver.  Id. at 1014.  Again, in Chance v. State, Del. Supr., 685 A.2d
351, 360 (1996) this Court ruled that the omission of an accomplice liability
instruction which Ashould have@ been included in the jury charge, but the absence
of which was not raised at trial, was not plain error.
A practical consequence of today=s ruling will be that a trial judge
attempting to craft jury instructions acceptable to the parties, and reflecting a
correct statement of the law, will be at a serious disadvantage.  Counsel=s
acquiescence in proposed instructions and failure to object before the jury retires
will not serve to insulate the result from a claim of plain error.  Not only will Rule
30 become meaningless but its violation, as here, will provide the very basis for
appeal.  Reversing a trial judge on the basis of an issue he or she did not have an
opportunity to consider should be limited to egregious errors, not those involving
the omitted subtleties of jury instructions or the giving of an instruction in the
precise form requested by counsel. As one court noted:
40
 
In our adversarial system, so long as the proceeding is
conducted within the bounds of fundamental fairness, it is not the duty
of the trial court to anticipate and evaluate every possible error that
might be alleged.  Rather, it is the role of counsel to bring such maters
to the court=s attention.
United States v. Thornberg, 8th Cir., 844 F.2d 573, 575 (1988).
While arguably 11 Del. C. ' 263 might have had a bearing on the result in
this case had there been a genuine issue of transferred recklessness, its application
here is, at best, tenuous.  As the Commentary to ' 263 makes clear, the concept of
transferred recklessness is consistent with the theory of transferred intent embraced
in ' 262, which, in turn, finds support in earlier Delaware cases.  The jury was
instructed that a person acts recklessly with respect to death when he or she is
aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death
will result from his or her conduct.  Bullock did not claim at trial that the actual
result in his situation was Aoutside@ the risk of which he was aware.  He thus cannot
demonstrate that his substantial rights were prejudiced by the trial court=s failure,
sua sponte, to instruct the jury pursuant to 11 Del. C. ' 263.
I recognize that there may be unusual situations where the absence of a
constitutionally-required portion of a jury instruction cannot be deemed as waived
by counsel=s action or inaction.  But the remedy for such egregious error may be  a
claim of plain error in a direct appeal or a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
under Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61.  An expansive application of the doctrine of plain
41
error, however, to accommodate arguably insufficient jury instructions, as is this
case, is not the answer.  Accordingly, I dissent.
oc:
Clerk of the Court
c:
Hon. Richard R. Cooch
Raymond M. Radulsk
James D. Nutter
Kim Ayvazian
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