Title: State v. White
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S055672
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 2009

FILED: June 18, 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON, 
Respondent
on Review, 
v. 
RICKY LASHAWN WHITE,
aka Ricky Leshawn Booker,
aka Ricky Leshawn White,
aka Jermaine Marcell, 
Petitioner
on Review.
(CC
041136028; CA A128491; SC S055672)
En Banc
On review from the
Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted
November 12, 2008.
Robin A. Jones, Senior
Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for
petitioner on review.  With her on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services.
Janet A. Metcalf,
Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent
on review.  With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary
H. Williams, Solicitor General.
BALMER, J.
The decision of the
Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The judgment of the
circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for
further proceedings.
Kistler, J., concurred
and filed an opinion in which Walters and Linder, JJ., joined.
*Appeal from Multnomah
County Circuit Court, Christopher J.
Marshall, Judge. 217 Or App 214, 175
P3d 504 (2007).
BALMER, J.
The issue in this criminal case is
whether, under ORS 161.067(1), the trial court should have merged defendant's guilty
verdicts for two counts of second-degree robbery that arose out of the same
criminal episode.  One count was based on ORS 164.405(1)(a) (robbery while
purporting to be armed with a dangerous weapon), and the other was based on ORS
164.405(1)(b) (robbery when aided by the actual presence of another person).  The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision not to merge the guilty
verdicts on the two counts.  State v. White, 217 Or App 214, 175 P3d 504
(2007).  We allowed defendant's petition for review and now reverse and remand
for further proceedings.
We take the relevant facts from the
Court of Appeals opinion:
"Fender, a loss prevention employee at the Hollywood
West Fred Meyer in Portland, saw Sims, who was with defendant, select a watch
from a display and remove its packaging.  Neither Sims nor defendant paid for
the watch.  After requesting back-up from other loss prevention employees,
Fender followed Sims and defendant as they left the store with the watch. 
Fender approached Sims, who had the watch in his hand, and inquired about the
unpaid merchandise.  Sims told Fender that he would stab him if he touched
him.  Boyce, another loss prevention employee, approached defendant and told
him that the store does not apprehend shoplifting accomplices and that he
should leave.  Defendant did not leave the scene.  Around that time, several
other loss prevention employees also approached Sims and defendant.  Sims
continued to threaten the group with the use of a weapon, although neither Sims
nor defendant ever produced a weapon.  Fender called 9-1-1.
"The group of employees followed Sims and
defendant into the parking lot.  Boyce followed defendant as he moved slightly
away from the group and placed his sweatshirt on top of a parked car.  When
Boyce took defendant's sweatshirt off of the car, defendant took the sweatshirt
back and told Boyce not to touch it.  While Boyce and defendant were among the
parked cars, defendant told Boyce that he would stab Boyce if he touched him.
"The car on which defendant had placed his
sweatshirt pulled up next to Sims, and Sims, who was still holding the watch,
got into the car.  The car drove away, leaving defendant behind.  The employees
continued to follow defendant to the edge of the parking lot.  As defendant
left the parking lot, Officer Helzer, who was responding to Fender's 9-1-1
call, arrested defendant for robbery.  Helzer conducted a search of defendant
incident to that arrest and found no weapon.
"After a jury trial, defendant was
convicted of two counts of second-degree robbery, both on the basis of his
conduct toward Boyce.  One count charged defendant with violating ORS
164.405(1)(a), which elevates third-degree robbery to second-degree robbery if
the person '[r]epresents by word or conduct that the person is armed with what
purports to be a dangerous or deadly weapon.'  The other count charged
defendant with violating ORS 164.405(1)(b), which elevates third-degree robbery
to second-degree robbery if the person '[i]s aided by another person actually
present.'
"At sentencing, defendant argued that those
convictions should merge because they were based on the same criminal episode
with respect to a single victim.  The prosecutor responded that the two
convictions should not merge because each was based on a paragraph of the
statute that requires proof of an element that the other paragraph does not. 
The sentencing court entered separate convictions."
State v. White, 217 Or App at 216-17.
On appeal, defendant assigned as
error the trial court's failure to merge the robbery counts.(1) 
The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the two statutory provisions that
defendant had violated -- robbery purporting to be armed and robbery aided by the
presence of another person -- addressed "separate and distinct legislative
concerns" and therefore constituted "separately punishable
offenses" under Oregon's anti-merger statute, ORS 161.067(1).(2)
White, 217 Or App at 224-25.
ORS 161.067(1) -- the
"anti-merger" statute -- provides, in part:
"When the same conduct or criminal episode
violates two or more statutory provisions and each provision requires proof of
an element that the others do not, there are as many separately punishable
offenses as there are separate statutory violations."  
ORS 161.067(1).(3) 
A court will apply that statute and find separately punishable offenses if (1)
the defendant engaged in acts that constituted "the same conduct or
criminal episode"; (2) the defendant's acts violated "two or more
statutory provisions"; and (3) each statutory provision requires
"proof of an element that the others do not."  State v. Crotsley,
308 Or 272, 278, 779 P2d 600 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The
parties do not dispute that defendant engaged in a single criminal episode or
that ORS 164.405(1)(a) and (b) contain different elements.  The remaining
issue, which the parties do dispute, is whether defendant's acts violated
"two or more statutory provisions."  ORS 161.067(1).  Defendant
argues that second-degree robbery is a single statutory provision and,
therefore, his guilty verdicts under ORS 164.405(1)(a) and (b) merge.  The
state responds that the Court of Appeals correctly decided that paragraphs (a)
and (b) of ORS 164.405(1) are separate "statutory provisions" and
that the guilty verdicts do not merge.(4)
As an initial matter, we note that determining
whether a defendant violated one statutory provision or two statutory
provisions does not depend entirely on the structural form that the criminal statute
takes.  "Statutory provision" is not defined as "a section, subsection,
or paragraph"; it instead means "any provision defining a 'single
crime,' whatever visual form the provision is given."  State v. Kizer,
308 Or 238, 243, 779 P2d 604 (1989).  Thus, to determine whether an action
violates two statutory provisions, we must determine whether the legislature
intended to create two crimes or only one.  Of course, one indicator of legislative
intent is the visual form that the statute takes.  See State v. Barrett,
331 Or 27, 35, 10 P3d 901 (2000) ("[T]he use of a
single section * * * is some indication that the legislature intended to define
a single crime.").  But, because that factor is not dispositive, we
also consider other aspects of the text and context of the statute to help
determine whether it creates two crimes or only one.  
In State v. White, 341 Or 624,
147 P3d 313 (2006), for example, this court examined the first-degree burglary
statute, ORS 164.225,(5)
and determined, based on the text of the statute, that the legislature had
intended to create only one crime.  After an incident in which the defendant
had entered his former girlfriend's apartment and assaulted her, the defendant
was convicted of two counts of first-degree burglary for (1) entering and
remaining in a building with the intent to commit assault; and (2) entering and
remaining in a building with the intent to commit menacing.  White, 341
Or at 627.  Looking at the "clear words of the statute," the court
noted that the burglary statutes require "intent to commit a
crime" -- that is "any crime"; it is irrelevant what crime the
defendant intends to commit.  Id. at 640.  For that reason, the court
determined that the text of the statute did not "suggest a legislative
intent to treat a single unlawful entry or remainder as violating more than one
'statutory provision' based on the burglar's intent to commit more than one
crime inside the building."  Id. 
Similarly, in Barrett, 331 Or
27, this court looked at the aggravated murder statute in considering whether a
sentencing court could impose multiple life sentences on a defendant for three
counts of aggravated murder under ORS 163.095,(6)
each of which was based on a different aggravating circumstance.  After
examining the text and context of the statute, the court determined that the legislature
had intended to set out the various theories that could be used to prove a
single element, namely "aggravation," of a single crime, aggravated
murder.  As to the text of the statute, ORS 163.095 defined aggravated murder
as murder accompanied by "any" of the listed aggravating
circumstances.  Because "any" means "one or more," the
court determined that the wording of the first sentence of ORS 163.095 "suggest[ed]
that any or all the enumerated circumstances simply serve to prove the single
essential element of 'aggravation.'"  Barrett, 331 Or at
35.  For context, the court then looked to the statutes defining the penalties
for murder and aggravated murder.  If a murder is committed with one of the 18
aggravating circumstances described in ORS 163.095, then the penalty is greater
than that for "simple murder."  That sentencing scheme
"suggest[ed] a single legislative intent to punish more
severely certain murders that the legislature deems to be particularly heinous." 
Id. at 35-36.  Because the court determined that the legislature had
intended to create a single crime when it enacted the aggravated murder statute,
the court concluded that the defendant's guilty verdicts should have merged.    
Some of this court's prior cases
have examined the legislative history of the substantive criminal statutes at
issue in those cases for assistance in determining whether the legislature
intended to create a single crime or multiple crimes.  In Kizer, 308 Or
238, for example, the legislative history indicated that the legislature had
intended to create only one crime, despite the fact that it had divided the
statute into two sections.  In Kizer, the issue was whether, under ORS
165.007(1), uttering a forged document and falsely making a written instrument
should be treated as two crimes or as only a single instance of forgery.(7) 
The court looked to the Commentary to ORS 165.007, which stated that the
legislature had intended forgery to be "a single crime that may be
committed by falsely making, completing, or altering a written instrument or by
uttering a forged instrument with knowledge of its forged character."  Kizer,
308 Or at 242 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Because the
legislative history demonstrated that the legislature had intended to create only
a single crime, the court concluded that "the terms 'falsely makes,
completes or alters a written instrument or utters a written instrument which
the person knows to be forged' constituted a single 'provision' * * * only made
easier to read by inserting the letters (a) and (b)."  Id. at 243. 
Despite the foregoing case law, there
has been some confusion as to the proper analysis for determining whether guilty
verdicts merge under ORS 161.067(1), in part attributable to statements in this
court's opinion in Crotsley, 308 Or 272.  In Crotsley, the issue
was whether a defendant could be convicted and punished separately for first-
and third-degree rape(8)
based on the same criminal conduct.  The defendant had forced the 14-year-old
victim in that case to engage in sexual acts by threatening her with a knife, thus
violating both the third-degree rape statute, which prohibited sexual
intercourse with a female under the age of 16, ORS 163.355(1), and the
first-degree rape statute, which prohibited sexual intercourse by forcible
compulsion.  ORS 163.375(1)(a).  In explaining its analysis, the court focused
on whether the two statutes addressed "separate and distinct legislative
concerns."  Crotsley, 308 Or at 278.  The court noted that
the latter provision, which required forcible compulsion, was "a clear
statutory prohibition against forcing sex on any female."  Id. at
279.  In contrast, "[a]ll other variations of first degree rape (as well
as all variations of second and third degree rape) are similar to each other in
that they accord special protection to specified groups of females by making
sexual intercourse with one of them a crime even with 'consent.'"  Id. 
Because the two provisions addressed "separate and distinct legislative concerns"
-- preventing forcible rape and preventing sexual intercourse with certain
classes of victims -- the court determined that the defendant had violated two
statutory "provisions."  
Based on those statements in Crotsley,
the state argues that, whenever a statute addresses two distinct
legislative concerns, then the legislature has created two
"provisions" for purposes of ORS 161.067(1).  That interpretation is
incorrect for two reasons.  First, as discussed above and as articulated by
this court in White and Barrett, the appropriate inquiry is
whether the legislature intended to create a single crime or two crimes; the
fact that a statute addresses two legislative concerns may be a useful guide
when analyzing the legislature's intent, but it is not dispositive.  Second,
every statutory section that "requires proof of an element that the others
do not," ORS 161.067(1), necessarily involves a distinct legislative
concern -- otherwise there would be no need for the additional element.  And,
we know from Crotsley, 308 Or at 278, and Barrett, 331 Or at 32,
that whether an additional element must be proved and whether there are
"two or more statutory provisions" are separate inquiries under ORS
161.067(1).  As a result, we cannot focus solely on the fact that the
legislature may have had separate reasons for enacting each section of a
statute.  Instead, we view the statute as a whole, looking to the text, context,
and, when appropriate, legislative history of the statute.  That analysis
includes consideration of whether the sections, although addressing different
concerns, also may address, on a more general level, one unified legislative
objective.                       
Having identified the appropriate
analysis, we turn to the robbery statutes at issue here to determine whether the
legislature intended to define a single crime of second-degree robbery or two separate
crimes.  ORS 164.405(1) contains two paragraphs defining the crime of
second-degree robbery -- a robbery in which the robber represents that he or
she is armed (paragraph (a)) and a robbery in which the robber is aided by
another person who is actually present (paragraph (b)).(9) 
Defendant argues that those two paragraphs are simply alternative ways of
proving a single crime and that his guilty verdicts under the two counts therefore
should be merged into a single conviction for second-degree robbery.  The state
counters that, under ORS 161.067(1), the issue is whether ORS 164.405(1)(a) and
ORS 164.405(1)(b) reflect the intent of the legislature to establish two
"separately punishable offenses" and that, as Crotsley states,
that inquiry focuses on whether the text and the legislative history of that
statute demonstrate that the paragraphs "address separate and distinct
legislative concerns."  Moreover, the state argues, even if the focus is
on the text and context of the robbery statutes, the legislature's intent is
clear that the two different ways of committing second-degree robbery are
"separate provisions" and "separately punishable
offenses."  The state points out that those provisions are set out in
separate paragraphs of the second-degree robbery statute and that, under ORS
161.067(1), "each provision requires proof of an element that the other[]
do[es] not."  
The state's argument, relying on the
legislature's use of two separate paragraphs and the fact that each paragraph
requires proof of different elements, however, ignores this court's focus, in applying
the anti-merger statute, on a separate and more fundamental inquiry:  Whether
the text, context, and legislative history of the second-degree robbery statute
demonstrate that "the legislature intended to define a single or two
separate crimes," White, 341 Or at 638-39, when it enacted that statute. 
See Kizer, 308 Or at 242-43 (using legislative history); White,
341 Or at 640 (using statutory text); Barrett, 331 Or at 35-36 (using
text and context of statute).(10)
We begin with the text and context of
the statute.  ORS 164.405 is one of three statutes that, together, make up the
statutory scheme respecting robbery.  In those statutes, the legislature has
provided an incrementally graded set of standards for determining the
seriousness of different forms of robbery and has divided those standards into
three groups -- third-degree robbery, second-degree robbery, and first-degree
robbery.  Third-degree robbery is the least serious and describes the basic
crime of robbery:  taking or attempting to take property from another, while
preventing or overcoming the victim's resistance to giving up the property by
using or threatening to use physical force.  ORS 164.395.(11) 
The crimes of second- and first-degree robbery then use third-degree robbery as
a foundation and build on its elements by identifying additional elements that,
if present, make the crime a more serious one.  The highest level of robbery, first-degree
robbery, is a robbery in which the robber is armed or actually causes or
attempts to cause the victim serious injury.  ORS 164.415.(12)
 Second-degree robbery -- the crime that concerns us here -- is the
intermediate level of robbery.  The legislature apparently determined that the additional
circumstances of (1) the robber representing that he or she is armed (even if he
or she is not), and (2) the robber having the potential assistance of another
person, are similar in seriousness to each other, and that both lie between the
greater seriousness of the robber being armed and the lesser seriousness of
unarmed threats by a single robber.  The legislature chose the same
intermediate designation -- second-degree robbery, a Class B felony -- to apply
to a robbery that is committed with either one of those enhancing elements.  In
contrast, first-degree robbery is a Class A felony, and third-degree robbery is
a Class C felony.  The legislature's creation of the crime of second-degree
robbery thus reflects concern with the increased threat of violence from a
purported weapon (even if it is a threat that the robber cannot make good on) and
from the presence of an accomplice with the robber.
By its terms, ORS 164.405 defines a single
crime -- second-degree robbery.  The only question is whether the fact that
there are two different circumstances that, individually, can elevate
third-degree robbery to second-degree robbery means that the legislature
intended there to be two separately punishable offenses.  That the two
circumstances are in the same statutory section might mean that -- although they
involve proof of different facts -- they are related in the same way to first-degree
and third-degree robbery, in that they both lie between armed and unarmed
threats of violence in terms of seriousness.  Or, because the legislature
divided the section into two paragraphs and each paragraph requires proof of an
element that the other does not, the legislature may have intended to define
two separate crimes.  The definition of the crime here is susceptible of two
plausible meanings, and we turn to the legislative history for more specific guidance. 
See State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (following that
approach).  
The robbery statutes at issue here are
the product of the comprehensive revision of the state criminal code in 1971. 
The Commentary to the criminal code revision explains that those statutes
"provide[] * * * three ascending degrees of robbery."  Commentary to
Criminal Law Revision Commission Proposed Oregon Criminal Code, Final Draft and
Report § 150, 154 (July 1970).  The text of ORS 164.395 "contains the
basic statement of the crime," with the texts of ORS 164.405 and ORS
164.415 "adding one or more of certain aggravating factors to the
crime."  Commentary at 154.  The text of ORS 164.405 "raises the
crime to robbery in the second degree if the robber creates the impression that
he is armed" or if he is "aided by another person actually
present."  Id. at 155 (emphasis omitted).
"Subsection (1)(a) is intended to cover the type of
robbery in which the actor is, in fact, unarmed, but conveys to the victim the
impression that he has a weapon.  While such a threat may not create any
greater risk to the person of the victim, it does heighten the terror in the
victim's mind and also, is persuasive in overcoming resistance to the robbery."
Id.  As to the presence of an accomplice, "[t]he
primary rationale behind paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of [ORS 164.405] is
the increased danger of an assault on the victim when the robber is reinforced
by another criminal who is actually present."  Id.
What the statutes and the legislative
history indicate is an incremental classification, not of levels of actual violence
during the commission of a robbery, but of levels of the potential for violence,
including its potential extent.  Neither of the two factors identified in the
second-degree robbery statute -- purporting to have a weapon and having an
accomplice present -- requires actual or attempted violence.  Obviously, the
absent weapon cannot be used against the victim, and the other statutory
element is met if the "accomplice is in such proximity of the victim that he
is in a position to assist in exerting force upon the victim," id.
(emphasis added), even if no force is used.  Rather, the Commentary focuses on
the degree of perceived or actual threat to the victim, which is increased by the
presence of either or both of those two factors, and which increases the
likelihood that the victim will comply with the robber's demands.  Taken
together, the three robbery statutes indicate that the lowest level is the use
or threat of the use of unarmed physical force; at the highest level is the more
persuasive threat of an actual weapon, the use or attempted use of a weapon, or
the use or attempted use of force to cause serious physical injury.  In the
middle, there is the threat of a weapon that may, in fact, be an empty threat
or the heightened threat of unarmed physical force (but no actual use of force)
because of the presence of an additional person.  
The Court of Appeals focused on the differences
between the two elements discussed above:
"The official legislative commentary to the
second-degree robbery statute clearly demonstrates that ORS 164.405(1)(a) and
(b) were enacted to address separate and distinct legislative concerns.  The
commentary confirms that paragraph (1)(a) was enacted to address only the risk
of psychological harm to victims who have the subjective belief that they are
confronted with an armed robber.  By comparison, paragraph (1)(b) was enacted
to address concerns about the physical safety of a victim when more than one
robber is present."
217 Or App at 224-25 (citation omitted).  The Court of
Appeals thus juxtaposed "psychological harm to victims" with
"concerns about the physical safety of a victim" and reasoned that those
considerations differ.  The Court of Appeals, of course, was correct in noting
the "separate and distinct legislative concerns," id. at
223-25, and, if that were the only consideration in applying the anti-merger
statute, then there might not be merger here.  
However, as discussed above, and
notwithstanding our reference to that factor in Crotsley, the more
central question under ORS 161.067(1) is not whether ORS 164.405(1)(a) and (b)
address separate legislative concerns, but whether the legislature intended those
two paragraphs to define a single crime of second-degree robbery or two
separate crimes.  White, 341 Or at 638-39.  Examined in that light, it
appears that the Court of Appeals' analysis focused too narrowly on the
Commentary's distinctions between the two ways in which a third-degree robbery
could be elevated to second-degree robbery.  The Commentary, of course, was
intended to explain the origins of the various provisions of the revised
criminal code, the elements of each crime, and the distinctions between
different crimes.  In this case, the Commentary usefully describes the legislative
intent behind the two different "aggravating factors" in ORS
164.405(1).  However, the Commentary sheds no particular light on whether the
legislature intended that statute "to define a single crime or two
separate crimes."  In our view, the comparison of the psychological harm
to victims that is the apparent focus of paragraph (1)(a) and the threat to
physical safety reflected in paragraph (1)(b) misses the more general thrust of
the statutory scheme.(13)
The crime of robbery is not only, or
even primarily, about punishing a defendant for inflicting violence or
psychological injury on the victim.  The three robbery statutes reflect, as
their common concern, the threat or likelihood of violence to the victim, but
the threat of violence (or actual violence) is part of the crime of robbery
only when it is used "in the course of committing or attempting to commit
theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle."  ORS 164.395(1).  Actual or
threatened violence, of course, is punishable under other statutes, but, in the
context of robbery, it is a secondary consideration to the coercive effect of
potential violence in the course of theft.  Robbery is the taking of property
using threats of violence or otherwise creating a sense of fear in the victim, thus
forcing the victim to hand over property.  It is the concept of fear or threat
of violence that separates robbery from mere theft.  See Black's Law
Dictionary 924 (6th ed 1991) (robbery defined as "[f]elonious taking
of money * * * in the possession of another * * * and against his will,
accomplished by means of force or fear" (emphasis added)); 4
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 241 (1769)
("Open and violent larciny [sic] from the person, or robbery, * * *
is the felonious and forcible taking, from the person of another, of goods or
money to any value, by putting him in fear." (Original emphasis
omitted; emphasis added.)).  The use or threat of violence is what causes the
victim to part with property, and that coercive effect is what each of the
robbery statutes addresses.    
As the three robbery statutes
indicate, the nature of the threat of violence --whether actual or perceived --
aggravates the crime of robbery and raises the crime from the third degree to
the second or first degree.  If the robber is alone or one of many, unarmed or
armed with a deadly or dangerous weapon, the effect of the specific
circumstance results in different levels of threat that may persuade the victim
to part with his or her property with more or less reluctance.  The legislature
determined that the threat of violence when a robber purports to have a weapon or
when he or she has an accomplice lies somewhere between the threat of violence
involved in a confrontation with a lone unarmed robber who threatens but does
not use violence and a confrontation with an indisputably armed robber or one
who actually uses or attempts to use violence to cause serious injury.  In that
sense, the three robbery statutes reflect the legislature's judgment regarding
the aggravating elements that elevate third-degree robbery to second- or
first-degree robbery.  See Barrett, 331 Or at 36 (aggravating
circumstances relating to murder).  Paragraphs (a) and (b) of ORS 164.405(1) both
address the same coercive effect on the victim of the threat of violence, even
though they do so in different ways.  The legislature determined that either a
purported weapon or the presence of an accomplice, or both, would elevate the
crime of third-degree robbery to the crime of second-degree robbery.  In our
view, the legislature created a single crime of second-degree robbery.(14) 
The fact that the alternative circumstances that elevate third-degree robbery to
second-degree robbery appear in two different paragraphs in ORS 164.405(1) does
not make them (or the crime of second-degree robbery) "two * * * statutory
provisions."  Accordingly, ORS 161.067(1) does not apply here, and the
trial court erred in failing to merge defendant's guilty verdicts on the two counts
of second-degree robbery.
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is
reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
KISTLER, J., concurring.
Defendant took a watch from Fred
Meyer.  In the course of doing so, he threatened to stab a store employee with
a knife and was assisted by another person who was present.  That conduct, the
jury found, violated two alternative means of committing second-degree robbery,
and the question in this case is whether defendant may be punished for only one
offense or two.  The answer to that question turns, as the majority recognizes,
on whether each alternative means of committing second-degree robbery is a
separate "statutory provision" for the purposes of ORS 161.067(1),
which defines when the same conduct or criminal episode will give rise to
separately punishable offenses.(15)
In a series of decisions over the
past 20 years, this court has interpreted the phrase "statutory
provision" that the legislature used in ORS 161.067(1), and the majority
attempts to reconcile and refine those decisions in the course of determining
whether each alternative means of committing second-degree robbery is a
separate statutory provision.  Those decisions, the majority concludes, require
the court to determine, based on the text, context, and the legislative history
of the robbery statutes, whether the "legislature intended to create a
single crime or two crimes."  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 9).  The majority
explains that, among other things, that inquiry "includes consideration of
whether [two different statutory] sections, although addressing different
[legislative] concerns, may also address, on a more general level, one unified
legislative objective."  Id.  Applying that test, the majority
determines that, in providing alternative means of committing second-degree
robbery, the legislature intended to create only one crime.
The majority appropriately
synthesizes and follows our precedents, and I join its opinion.  I write
separately because, in my view, focusing solely on what our past decisions have
said about a statute can sometimes cause us to lose sight of the statutory text
that underlies those decisions, and it is occasionally helpful to return to the
text, context, and history of a statute to determine whether our decisions have
drifted away from the legislature's intent.(16) 
In my view, an examination of the text, context, and history of ORS 161.067
leads to a simpler and less subjective interpretation of the phrase
"statutory provision" than a synthesis of our cases yields.  Those
sources demonstrate that each crime identified as such in the criminal code
constitutes a separate statutory provision and the fact that there are alternative
means of committing those crimes does not make each alternative means a
separate provision within the meaning of ORS 161.067(1).
ORS 161.067 has three subsections. 
The first subsection, which is at issue in this case, identifies the number of
separately punishable offenses that exist when the same conduct or criminal
episode violates "two or more statutory provisions."  ORS
161.067(1).  The second subsection identifies the number of separately
punishable offenses that exist when the same conduct or criminal episode
violates one statutory provision but involves two or more victims.  ORS
161.067(2).  Finally, the third subsection identifies the number of separately
punishable offenses that exist when the same conduct or criminal episode
violates one statutory provision, involves one victim, "but nevertheless
involves repeated violations of the same statutory provision against the same
victim."  ORS 161.067(3).
Each subsection of ORS 161.067 refers
to violating one or more "statutory provisions."  However, neither
the criminal code generally nor the text of ORS 161.067 specifically defines
what constitutes a "statutory provision," and the word
"provision" is broad enough to include either a section defining a
crime or a single clause within that section.  Cf. Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary 1827 (unabridged ed 2002) (defining "provision" as
"a stipulation (as a clause in a statute or contract) made in advance:
PROVISO  * * * ").  The text, in short, is of little help.  The legislature appears
to have assumed that the phrase had such a well-understood meaning that no
definition was necessary.
Two separate contextual sources,
however, provide a clearer picture of the legislature's intent.  The first
contextual source is an exception to ORS 161.067(3), which illustrates the
legislature's understanding of the phrase "statutory provision." 
After identifying how many separately punishable offenses exist when the same
criminal episode violates one statutory provision, involves one victim, but also
involves multiple violations of the same provision against the same victim, ORS
161.067(3) sets out the following exception:
"Each method of engaging in deviate sexual intercourse as
defined in ORS 163.305, and each method of engaging in unlawful sexual
penetration as defined in ORS 163.408 and 163.411 shall constitute separate
violations of their respective statutory provisions for purposes of determining
the number of statutory violations."
The exception is telling in three
respects.  First, it identifies ORS 163.408 and ORS 163.411 as "statutory
provisions."  The first statute (ORS 163.408) defines the crime of
unlawful sexual penetration in the second degree, and the second statute (ORS
163.411) defines the crime of unlawful sexual penetration in the first degree. 
That context suggests that each crime identified as such in the criminal code
constitutes a separate statutory provision and that, as a general rule, the
fact that there may be alternative methods of committing each of those crimes
does not make each alternative method of commission a separate statutory
provision.  Were the general rule otherwise, there would have been no need to
add a caveat to ORS 161.067(3) and state that each method of committing
unlawful sexual penetration "shall constitute separate violations of their
respective statutory provisions for purposes of determining the number of
statutory violations."
The texts of the two unlawful sexual
penetration statutes shed further light on the meaning of the phrase
"statutory provision" in ORS 161.067.  Both unlawful sexual
penetration statutes identify multiple methods of committing that crime.  A
person commits the crime of unlawful sexual penetration in the second degree
"if the person penetrates the vagina, anus or penis of another with [a
foreign object] * * * and the victim is under 14 years of age."  ORS
163.408(1).  A person commits the crime of unlawful sexual penetration in the
first degree "if the person penetrates the vagina, anus or penis of
another with [a foreign object]" and 
"(a) The victim is subjected to forcible
compulsion;
"(b) The victim is under 12 years of age;
or
"(c) The victim is incapable of consent by
reason of mental defect, mental incapacitation or physical helplessness."
ORS 161.411(1).
Those two statutes and the statement
in ORS 161.067(3) that each of those statutes is a statutory provision lead to
two additional conclusions regarding the meaning of the phrase "statutory
provision."  First, when the legislature creates two crimes with different
degrees of seriousness (first-degree unlawful sexual penetration, second-degree
unlawful sexual penetration, and the like), each statutorily designated degree
of a crime is a separate statutory provision.  And, when one act violates two
statutory provisions, the only question under ORS 161.067(1) is whether each
provision, as charged, requires proof of an element that the other does not. 
If it does, then there are as many separately punishable offenses as there are
separate statutory violations.  ORS 161.067(1).
Second, the fact that a crime, such
as first-degree unlawful sexual penetration, identifies multiple ways in which
the crime may be committed does not mean that one act will give rise to
multiple statutory violations.  For example, in addition to identifying
multiple methods (insertion of a foreign object into a victim's vagina, anus,
or penis) of committing unlawful sexual penetration, ORS 161.411(1) also
identifies multiple ways in which a person can come within the class of victims
whose injury elevates those acts to first-degree unlawful sexual penetration --
forcible compulsion, being under the age of 12, or being incapable of consent
by reason of mental defect, mental incapacitation, or physical helplessness. 
Yet, ORS 161.067(3) makes clear that the legislature understood that
first-degree unlawful sexual penetration was a single statutory provision and
that only multiple methods of committing unlawful penetration would result in
multiple statutory violations (and even that was an exception to the general
rule).  It follows that, for the crime of first-degree unlawful sexual
penetration, the fact that the victim was under 12 and also subjected to
forcible compulsion does not mean that a single act of penetration would
violate two statutory provisions within the meaning of ORS 161.067(1).
Not only does the exception in ORS
161.067(3) provide insight into the meaning of the phrase "statutory
provision," but two cases that preceded the enactment of ORS 161.067
provide additional context.  In State v. Woolard, 259 Or 232, 484 P2d
314, on reh'g, 485 P2d 1194 (1971), and in State v. Cloutier, 286
Or 579, 596 P2d 1278 (1979), the court held that a defendant who committed
burglary and theft (when theft was the intended crime on entry into the house)
could be punished for only one offense.  In Woolard, the court inferred
from the fact that burglary carried a greater sentence than theft from a
dwelling that the legislature intended that the former offense would subsume
the latter.  259 Or at 237-38.  In Cloutier, the court looked to whether
the defendant had a single criminal objective in deciding whether the two
crimes constituted only one punishable offense.  286 Or at 596-97.  Justice
Tongue dissented in Cloutier.  He explained that, before Woolard
and Cloutier, the rule was clear:  When one act violated two separate
statutes, such as burglary and theft, and each contained an element that the
other did not, there were two separately punishable offenses.  Id. at
605 (Tongue, J., dissenting).  In his view, the court erred in Woolard
and again in Cloutier in departing from that rule.(17)
ORS 161.067(1) reinstates the rule
that Justice Tongue advocated in Cloutier.  It reverses the rule from Woolard
and Cloutier that a single act that violates two criminal statutes,
such as burglary and theft, will result in only one punishable offense if the
two violations are in furtherance of a single criminal objective.  There is no
reason, however, to think that the legislature intended to go farther than that
in reversing the rule in Woolard and Cloutier and make alternative
ways of committing a single crime separately punishable offenses; rather, the
most natural interpretation of the phrase "two or more statutory
provisions" is that it refers to the sort of statutes defining separate
criminal offenses, such as burglary and theft, that were at issue in Woolard
and Cloutier.
The legislative history supports that
understanding.  See State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 172, 206 P3d 1042
(2009) ("Legislative history may be used to confirm seemingly plain
meaning and even to illuminate it * * *.").  The legislative
history of ORS 161.067 is unique because, as the court noted in State v.
Crotsley, 308 Or 272, 779 P2d 600 (1989), the legislature enacted one
version of the statute in 1985 and the people reenacted by initiative a second,
almost identical version of the statute in 1986.  Id. at 276 n 3.  The
two versions differ in one respect.  The 1985 statute provided, as does the
1986 reenactment, that, when the same conduct or criminal episode violated two
or more statutory provisions, there were as many separately punishable offenses
as there were separate statutory violations.  Or Laws 1985, ch 722, § 4(1); Or
Laws 1987, ch 2, § 13(1).  The 1985 statute then added the following exception,
which the 1986 reenactment omitted:
"However, when one of the statutory provisions violated
is burglary in any degree, and the other statutory provision violated is theft
or criminal mischief in any degree, and the theft or criminal mischief was
pleaded as the intended crime of the burglary, the burglary and the theft or
criminal mischief shall constitute only one punishable offense."
Or Laws 1985, ch 722, § 4(1).  The 1985 exception preserves
the specific holding in Woolard and Cloutier, while the 1986
reenactment omits that exception and thus "overrules" the holdings in
those cases.(18) 
But more importantly for the purposes of this case, the 1985 exception equates
the phrase "statutory provision" with the crimes of "burglary in
any degree" and "theft or criminal mischief in any degree."  Put
differently, the exception makes clear that the 1985 legislature understood
that each degree of burglary, theft, and criminal mischief constituted a
separate statutory provision, in much the same way that the exception to ORS
161.067(3) makes that same understanding clear.
Finally, the explanation to the
legislature of the 1985 bill leads to the same conclusion.  A spokesperson for the
Oregon District Attorneys Association explained that the 1985 counterpart to
what is now codified as ORS 161.067(1) "adopts the federal rule first
announced in U.S. v. Blockburger, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), permitting
separate convictions for each proven statutory violation, provided that each
statute requires proof of an element not required by others."  Testimony,
Senate Judiciary Committee, SB 257, May 15, 1985, Ex G (statement of Peter F.
Sandrock, Jr.).(19)
Beyond identifying Blockburger as
the apparent source of what is now ORS 161.067(1), Sandrock's letter does not
explain what, in his view, constitutes a "statutory provision." 
However, in Blockburger, the Court used the phrase consistently with the
definition set out above.  Specifically, the Court explained in Blockburger that
the Harrison Narcotic Act, Pub L No 223, 38 Stat 785 (1914) (repealed 1970),
created two separate criminal offenses.  One offense made it unlawful to sell
narcotics except in the original stamped package.  284 US at 203-04.  The other
offense made it unlawful to sell narcotics without a written order.  Id. 
The Court described the two crimes as "distinct statutory provisions"
and ruled that, because a single sale of narcotics violated both provisions and
because each provision required proof of a fact that the other did not, the
defendant's single sale gave rise to two separate offenses.  284 US at 304.  As
the Court used the phrase "statutory provision" in Blockburger,
that phrase means nothing more or less than what the legislature has defined as
a crime.(20)
In my view, the text, context, and
history of ORS 161.067 reveal that the phrase "statutory provision"
has a more straightforward meaning than our cases have given it.  When the
legislature makes it a crime to commit certain acts, each statutorily defined
crime is a separate statutory provision, and each degree of that crime is a
statutory provision.  The fact that the legislature identifies alternative ways
to commit a crime does not mean that the legislature has created more than one
statutory provision, however.
Not only is that interpretation truer
to the legislature's intent than the test that the majority draws from our
cases, but it also is more certain in its application (both for the courts and
the legislature when it drafts criminal statutes).  Beyond that, it is
consistent with the results in this court's decisions.  When, as in Crotsley,
the state charges a defendant with first- and third-degree rape, each degree of
the crime is a separate statutory provision that will give rise to separately
punishable offenses, provided that each provision requires proof of an element
that the other does not.  Cf. Crotsley, 308 Or at 278-79 (holding that
the two offenses were separate statutory provisions because they addressed
separate and distinct legislative concerns).  Conversely, when the legislature
provides alternative means of committing a specified crime, there is only one
statutory provision.  It follows that, when in State v. Kizer, 308 Or
238, 779 P2d 604 (1989), State v. Barrett, 331 Or 27, 10 P3d 901 (2000),
State v. White, 341 Or 624, 147 P3d 313 (2006), and this case, the state
charges and proves both alternative means, only one statutory provision has
been violated and there is only one separately punishable offense (assuming of
course that there are not multiple victims or repeated violations of the same
provision).  Because I agree with the result that the majority reaches and because
I cannot disagree with its reliance on precedent, I concur in the majority's
opinion.
Walters and Linder, JJ., join in this
opinion.
1. Defendant
also assigned error to the trial court's use of defendant's juvenile record in
determining his sentence.  We decline to address that issue.  See ORAP
9.20(2) (court need not address all questions presented for review).
2. Although
the anti-merger statute mandates that certain offenses are "separately
punishable," the issue whether the defendant receives consecutive or
concurrent sentences is resolved under a different statute, ORS 137.123.  The
only issue presented in this case is whether the trial court should have merged
the jury's guilty verdicts on the two different robbery counts; defendant does
not challenge his sentence.  
3. The
anti-merger statute has other subsections that set out when separately
punishable offenses will be found based on criminal conduct that involves more
than one victim, ORS 161.067(2), and when the conduct "violates only one
statutory provision and involves only one victim," but nevertheless
involves "repeated violations" of the same provision involving the
same victim.  ORS 161.067(3).  Neither party suggests that those provisions of
the anti-merger statute apply here. 
4. The
parties and the courts below often refer to the issue in this case as being
whether defendant's "convictions" merge.  However, neither ORS
161.067 nor the statutes respecting the procedures for entry of judgment in a
criminal case use the term "conviction" to describe any event or
status prior to the trial court's entry of judgment following trial and
sentencing.  See ORS 137.071(2)(g) ("judgment" shall include
determination of each charge, which may include "determination * * * of
conviction").  Rather, the jury (or, in a bench trial, the court) finds a
defendant "guilty" or "not guilty" on each offense charged
in the accusatory instrument, see ORS 136.455 (so providing), and the
defendant is not formally "convicted" on any charge until the trial
court enters a judgment.  Thus, a trial court applies the merger statute to
guilty verdicts on particular counts, rather than to "convictions."
5. The
relevant statutory wording comes from ORS 164.215 and is incorporated by
reference into ORS 164.225:  "[A] person commits the crime of burglary * *
* if the person enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to
commit a crime therein." 
6. Under
ORS 163.095, aggravated murder is "murder as defined in ORS 163.115 which
is committed under, or accompanied by, any of" 18 different aggravating
circumstances.  The defendant in Barrett was charged with three counts
of aggravated murder:  Count 1, for intentionally killing the victim during the
commission of a robbery; Count 2, for intentionally killing the victim during
the commission of a kidnapping; and Count 3, for killing the victim to conceal
the defendant's identity.  State v. Barrett, 331 Or 27, 29, 10 P3d 901
(2000).
7. ORS
165.007(1) provides:
"A person commits the crime of forgery in
the second degree if, with intent to injure or defraud, the person:
"(a) Falsely
makes, completes or alters a written instrument; or 
"(b) Utters
a written instrument which the person knows to be forged." 
To "falsely make" a written instrument means
"to make or draw a complete written instrument in its entirety * * * which
purports to be an authentic creation of its ostensible maker, but which is not
* * * because * * * the ostensible maker did not authorize the making or
drawing thereof."  ORS 165.002(4).  To "utter" a written
instrument means "to issue, deliver, publish, circulate, disseminate,
transfer or tender a written instrument * * * to another."  ORS
165.002(7).
8. The
defendant also was convicted of first- and third-degree sodomy, but because the
wording and legislative history of the rape and sodomy statutes demonstrated
that "the statutory schemes for grading the various rape and sodomy
offenses were intended to be identical," the court applied the same
analysis to the rape and sodomy statutes.State v. Crotsley,
308 Or 272, 279, 779 P2d 600 (1989).  
9. ORS
164.405 provides:
"(1) A person commits the crime of robbery
in the second degree if the person [commits third-degree robbery] and the
person:
"(a) Represents by word or conduct that the
person is armed with what purports to be a dangerous or deadly weapon; or
"(b) Is aided by another person actually
present.
"(2) Robbery in the second degree is a
Class B felony." 
10. Even
if we were to put to one side this court's decisions interpreting the
anti-merger statute, including Kizer, White, and Barrett,
it is not at all clear that the state's construction of that statute is
supportable.  Justice Kistler's concurring opinion argues that the legislative
history of ORS 161.067(1) demonstrates that the phrase "statutory
provision" in that statute refers to a separately defined statutory crime
or separate degree of crime -- and not to alternative ways of committing that
crime.  ___ Or at ___ (Kistler, J. concurring) (slip op at 7-10).  Our holding
today is based on ORS 161.067(1) as we have interpreted that statute in cases
decided over the last 20 years, but there is no inconsistency between the
results in those cases and the concurring opinion.
11. ORS
164.395 provides:
"(1) A person commits the crime of robbery
in the third degree if in the course of committing or attempting to commit
theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle as defined in ORS 164.135 the person
uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon another person with
the intent of:
"(a) Preventing or overcoming resistance to
the taking of the property or to retention thereof immediately after the
taking; or
"(b) Compelling the owner of such property
or another person to deliver the property or to engage in other conduct which
might aid in the commission of the theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle.
"(2) Robbery in the third degree is a Class
C felony."
12. ORS
164.415 provides:
"(1) A person commits the crime of robbery
in the first degree if the person [commits third-degree robbery] and the person:
"(a) Is armed with a deadly weapon;
"(b) Uses or attempts to use a dangerous
weapon; or
"(c) Causes or attempts to cause serious
physical injury to any person.
"(2) Robbery in the first degree is a Class
A felony."
13. The
Court of Appeals correctly perceived the issue that we address here, noting
that one could "identify the legislative concern addressed by the
second-degree robbery statute" in a "general way -- that is, as
overcoming the resistance of the victim." State v. White, 217 Or
App 214, 225, 175 P3d 504 (2007).  The court rejected that way of identifying
the legislature's intent, reasoning that "it would eliminate any
distinction between the varying degrees of robbery," id., and the
court pointed out that the use or threat of force to overcome the victim's
resistance is what distinguishes the crime of robbery from the crime of theft. 
Id.  That analysis, however, gives insufficient weight to the fact that
the legislature did, in fact, distinguish between the different degrees of
robbery, creating an ascending scale of different degrees of one crime,
each of which it classified as a different level of felony and enacted as a
different statute.  Identifying a common legislative concern in the two means
of proving second-degree robbery -- which is similar to the concerns underlying
all the robbery statutes, but greater in magnitude than third-degree robbery
and less than first-degree robbery -- does not eliminate the statutory
distinctions, but, rather, gives effect to the legislature's statutory
structure.
14. If
the legislature determines that the two different ways of elevating
third-degree robbery to second-degree robbery, when committed in the course of
a single criminal episode, nevertheless should be punished separately, it may
indicate its intent in that regard by enacting those two paragraphs as separate
criminal offenses.  See Crotsley, 308 Or at 279-80 (no merger where
legislature established crimes of first-degree rape and third-degree rape as
"separate offenses").
15. ORS
161.067(1) provides:
"When the same conduct or criminal episode
violates two or more statutory provisions and each provision requires proof of
an element that the others do not, there are as many separately punishable
offenses as there are separate statutory violations."
16. An
examination of those sources is particularly appropriate in this case because
the two seminal cases that we have spent the last 20 years interpreting did not
engage in a textual and contextual analysis of ORS 161.067(1).  In State v.
Crotsley, 308 Or 272, 779 P2d 600 (1989), the court posited, without
further explanation, that the phrase "'two or more statutory provisions' *
* * include[s] prohibitions such as those in this case that address separate
and distinct legislative concerns," id. at 278, a statement that
the majority today disavows as an answer to the meaning of that phrase, ___ Or
at ___ (slip op at 16).  In State v. Kizer, 308 Or 238, 779 P2d 604
(1989), the court found it unnecessary to engage in any analysis of ORS
161.067(1), resting its decision instead on the legislature's statement that
uttering a forged instrument and making one were a single crime.  Id. at
242-43.
17. Justice
Howell concurred in the result in Cloutier.  286 Or at 603.  He noted
that he had dissented in Woolard and that "[a]ny further expression
of dissent would be a futility."  Id. (Howell, J., specially
concurring). 
18. The
1985 legislative bill was codified as ORS 161.062, and the 1986 initiated
measure was codified as ORS 161.067.  Initially, both statutes "remain[ed]
on the books."  Crotsley, 308 Or at 276 n 3.  However, in 1999, the
legislature repealed ORS 161.062, leaving ORS 161.067 in place.  Or Laws 1999,
ch 136, § 1.
19. The
Court explained in Blockburger:
"The applicable rule is that where the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the
test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is
whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not."

284 US at 304.
20. As
noted, the people reenacted the 1985 statute in 1986 but omitted the exception
discussed above.  The official explanation for the measure states that that
part of the measure "[s]lightly expand[s] the circumstances under which a person
may be convicted of separate offenses."  Voters' Pamphlet, General
Election, Nov 4, 1986, 52.  That explanation accurately describes the
difference between the 1986 measure and the 1985 statute but sheds no
additional light on the meaning of the phrase "statutory provision."