Title: City of Chicago v. Roman
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 84268
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 17, 1998

Chicago v. Roman, No. 84268 (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket No. 84268-Agenda 
30-September 1998.
Opinion filed December 17, 
1998.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of 
the court:
Following a bench trial in the circuit court of 
Cook County, defendant, Edwin Roman, was convicted of the Chicago municipal 
offense of assault against the elderly. Chicago Municipal Code §8-4-080 (1990). 
The circuit court imposed a sentence that was less than the mandatory minimum 
sentence prescribed by the ordinance. The City appealed. The appellate court 
reversed and remanded for resentencing consistent with the ordinance. 292 Ill. 
App. 3d 546. We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 
315) and now affirm the appellate court.
BACKGROUND
The City's evidence at trial was essentially as 
follows. On August 23, 1994, Anthony Pupius (also spelled "Puprus" in the 
record) was 60 years old. On that day, he and a visitor, Violeta Valaityte, saw 
a rental truck enter an alley (also referred to as an "unpaved street" in the 
record) near his home in Chicago. They came out from his house, and saw 
defendant and Ricardo Diaz removing packing material, i.e., cardboard 
cartons and styrofoam, and dumping it in the alley.
Pupius approached defendant and told him to stop 
dumping garbage. Using abusive language, defendant told Pupius that what they 
were doing was none of his business, and that he should leave.
Pupius returned to his house and telephoned 
"911." He went back to the alley with a camera and took pictures of defendant. 
When defendant saw Pupius photographing him, he, according to Pupius, "became 
very violent." Defendant, while swearing at Pupius, picked up a stick or tree 
branch approximately four feet long and two fingers wide and tried to hit 
Pupius, who was standing four or five feet away from defendant.
Pupius, fearful that defendant would hit him 
with the stick, backed away from defendant and retreated into his house. He 
again telephoned "911." During this time, defendant returned some of the packing 
material to the truck. Pupius again came outside with his camera, hoping to take 
more pictures. By then, defendant had backed the truck around to the front of 
Pupius' house. The truck stopped as Pupius approached. Defendant and Diaz exited 
the truck. Defendant approached Pupius, who was backing off; Diaz stood by the 
truck. Defendant swore at and threatened Pupius, saying that defendant knew what 
Pupius looked like and where he lived.
Eventually, defendant and Diaz reentered the 
truck and drove approximately one block down the street, where they stopped and 
rearranged their cargo. Chicago police arrived, spoke with Pupius, and then 
stopped defendant and Diaz.
Defendant and Diaz were arrested and charged 
with dumping garbage in violation of section 221b of the Criminal Jurisprudence 
Act (740 ILCS 55/221b (West 1992)). Defendant was also charged with assault 
against the elderly, i.e., Pupius, in violation of section 8-4-080 of 
the Municipal Code of Chicago. Chicago Municipal Code §8-4-080 
(1990).
The defense case was essentially as follows. 
Defendant and Diaz were delivering home furnishings for Harlem Furniture. They 
made a delivery on Pupius' street. Defendant admitted placing the packing 
material in the alley. However, he intended to cut it down in size, return it to 
the truck, and rearrange it with the remaining furniture. Harlem Furniture was 
paid for returning and recycling the packaging.
After defendant had put the packing material in 
the alley, and as he was getting his utility knife, Pupius came out of his house 
with a camera and accused defendant of dumping garbage. Defendant approached 
Pupius to explain his actions, but Pupius warned defendant that if he touched 
Pupius, defendant would be arrested.
Defendant told Diaz that Pupius was acting 
crazy, and that they should quickly reload the truck with the packing material. 
They would do their cutting in front of the customer's house. As they began 
driving, Pupius jumped in front of the truck. Defendant admitted that he exited 
the truck and exchanged words with Pupius. However, defendant denied ever 
threatening Pupius either verbally or with a stick.
At the close of the evidence, the circuit court 
found defendant and Diaz not guilty of garbage dumping, but found defendant 
guilty of assault against the elderly.
The circuit court subsequently denied 
defendant's motion to reconsider the finding of guilty on the assault charge. 
Also, the court denied defendant's motion to declare Chicago Municipal Code 
section 8-4-080 unconstitutional in its entirety. However, the court ruled that 
the mandatory minimum sentence that the ordinance prescribes-imprisonment for 90 
days-exceeds the City's home rule authority. At the close of the sentencing 
hearing, the circuit court sentenced defendant to 10 days of community service 
and to one year of probation.
The City appealed. After finding jurisdiction, 
the appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the 
cause for resentencing. The appellate court initially determined that it had 
jurisdiction to hear the City's appeal. 292 Ill. App. 3d at 550. Addressing the 
merits, the appellate court concluded that (1) it was within the City's 
constitutional powers as a home rule unit to have a sentencing scheme different 
from that of the state, and (2) state law does not prevent or restrict the City 
from prescribing mandatory imprisonment as a penalty in the ordinance. 292 Ill. 
App. 3d at 550-53.
Defendant appeals to this court. We note that we 
allowed the Illinois Municipal League leave to file an amicus curiae 
brief in support of the City (155 Ill. 2d R. 345).
DISCUSSION
I. Preliminary Matters
Prior to reaching the merits, we must first 
determine whether: (A) the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the City's 
appeal from defendant's sentence, and (B) the appeal placed defendant in double 
jeopardy.
A. The City's 
Appeal
Defendant first contends that the appellate 
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the City's appeal from his sentence. He argues 
that a municipality lacks the authority to appeal from a sentence imposed on a 
criminal ordinance violation.
Defendant invokes Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) 
as a bar to the City's appeal. That rule provides in pertinent part:
See People v. 
DeJesus, 127 Ill. 2d 486, 494-96 (1989). This rule does not allow the State 
to contest the propriety of a sentence imposed on a criminal defendant. 
People v. Hatfield, 257 Ill. App. 3d 707, 711 (1994); People v. 
Davilla, 236 Ill. App. 3d 367, 389 (1992).
This case, however, involves a void judgment. A 
void judgment is one entered by a court that lacks, inter alia, the 
inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved. A void judgment 
may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally. People v. 
Wade, 116 Ill. 2d 1, 5 (1987).
In Illinois, a trial court, upon determination 
of guilt, must impose the criminal penalties that the legislature mandated, and 
has no authority to impose punishment other than that provided by statute. The 
court exceeds its authority if it orders a lesser sentence than what the statute 
mandates. Wade, 116 Ill. 2d  at 6.
In the present case, section 8-4-080 mandates a 
minimum term of imprisonment of 90 days. The circuit court sentenced defendant 
to 10 days of community service and to one year of probation. Thus, defendant's 
sentence was illegal and void. Consequently, "the appellate court had the 
authority to correct it at any time [citation], and the actions of the appellate 
court were not barred by our rules which limit the State's right to appeal." 
People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995).
B. Double 
Jeopardy
Incidental to the question of whether the City 
can appeal defendant's sentence is the question of whether the constitutional 
prohibition of double jeopardy (U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, 
art. I, §10) bars a new sentencing hearing for defendant. Defendant and the City 
agree that double jeopardy principles apply to municipal ordinance prosecutions 
where imprisonment is the penalty. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 44 L. Ed. 2d 346, 95 S. Ct. 1779 (1975); Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 
25 L. Ed. 2d 435, 90 S. Ct. 1184 (1970).
We conclude that this appeal does not present a 
double jeopardy problem. We have previously concluded that defendant's sentence 
was illegal and void.
It is settled that "[t]here is no double 
jeopardy prohibition against resentencing a defendant to correct an illegal 
sentence. [Citations.] Double jeopardy rights are not implicated even if the 
correction of the illegal sentence increases the punishment." People v. 
Woolsey, 278 Ill. App. 3d 708, 710 (1996); accord United States v. 
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 132-38, 66 L. Ed. 2d 328, 342-46, 101 S. Ct. 426, 434-38 (1980); Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166-67, 91 L. Ed. 818, 821-22, 67 S. Ct. 645, 648-49 (1947).
Defendant attempts to avoid these principles and 
their necessary result. He argues that these principles apply only to statutes 
and not to municipal ordinances. We cannot accept this argument. A municipal 
ordinance has the force of law over the community in which it is adopted and, 
within the corporate limits, operates as effectively as a law passed by the 
legislature. Hope v. City of Alton, 214 Ill. 102, 105 (1905); accord 5 
McQuillen on Municipal Corporations §15.14, at 92 (3d rev. ed. 1996). We agree 
with the appellate court that the City could appeal from defendant's sentence, 
which appeal could not place defendant in double jeopardy.
II. Section 8-4-080
Turning to the merits, defendant contends that 
the penalty prescribed in section 8-4-080 exceeds the authority granted the City 
as a home rule unit. Section 8-4-080 provides as follows:
Defendant asserts 
that it is beyond the power of a home rule unit to enact an ordinance imposing 
mandatory minimum imprisonment.
A. Power
The City is a home rule unit of local government 
under the 1970 Illinois Constitution. The " `concept of home rule adopted 
under the provisions of the 1970 constitution was designed to drastically alter 
the relationship which previously existed between the local and State 
government.' " City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d 101, 
107 (1981), quoting Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 Ill. 2d 161, 166 
(1972); accord Triple A Services, Inc. v. Rice, 131 Ill. 2d 217, 230 
(1989). Article VII, section 6(a), of the Illinois Constitution provides in 
pertinent part:
"Except as limited by this Section, a home rule 
unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its 
government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for 
the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to 
tax; and to incur debt." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §6(a).
As a result of section 6(a), Chicago draws its 
power to regulate for the protection of public safety directly from the 
constitution. This power does not depend on any grant of authority by the 
General Assembly, as was the case prior to 1970. Triple A Services, 131 Ill. 2d  at 230. Section 6(a) gives home rule units the broadest powers possible. 
Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill. 2d 164, 174 (1992).
Section 6(i) provides:
Also, section 6(m) 
provides that "[p]owers and functions of home rule units shall be construed 
liberally." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §6(m). As a result of these 
constitutional provisions, "[h]ome rule units thus have the same powers as the 
sovereign, except where such powers are limited by the General Assembly." 
Triple A Services, 131 Ill. 2d  at 230.
Defendant agrees with the City "that it has the 
power to define the offense" of assault against the elderly. However, defendant 
contends that the City's home rule power is limited to defining that offense and 
does not extend to prescribing a mandatory minimum punishment.
This contention lacks merit. Inherent in 
defining a crime is prescribing a penalty. A crime consists of two parts: 
prohibited conduct and a penalty for an infraction. In other words, a prescribed 
penalty is as necessary to constitute a crime as its definition. A statute that 
prohibits conduct without a penalty is a nullity. People v. Graf, 93 
Ill. App. 2d 43, 48, 50 (1968); accord 1 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law 
§1.2(d), at 12-13 (1986); 1 W. Burdick, The Law of Crime §70, at 69-70 
(1946).
Article VII, section 6(d)(2), of the Illinois 
Constitution specifically provides that "[a] home rule unit does not have the 
power *** (2) to define and provide for the punishment of a felony." Ill. Const. 
1970, art. VII, §6(d)(2). The Committee on Local Government of the 1970 Illinois 
Constitutional Convention explained that this provision "specifically withholds 
from home-rule units the power to define and punish felonies, but leaves them 
free to impose fines and jail sentences for less serious offenses." 7 Record of 
Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1602 (hereinafter cited as 
Proceedings).
Additionally, article VII, section 6(e), 
specifically provides that "[a] home rule unit shall have only the power that 
the General Assembly may provide by law (1) to punish by imprisonment for more 
than six months." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §6(e). "It would seem that 
implicit in the Constitutional limitation, taken together with the grant of 
power in the last sentence of Subsection 6(a), is the power of home rule units, 
without statutory authority, to punish by imprisonment for less than six 
months." Ill. Ann. Stat., 1970 Const., art. VII, §6(e), Constitutional 
Commentary, at 515 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
Implicit in the power of a home rule unit to 
establish a term of incarceration for less than six months is the power to 
establish a mandatory minimum term. Unquestionably, the nature, character, and 
extent of the penalties for a particular criminal offense are matters for the 
legislature, which may describe definite terms of imprisonment or fix the 
minimum and maximum limits thereof (People v. Smith, 14 Ill. 2d 95, 97 
(1958)), notwithstanding a court's finding that a penalty is unwise or absurd. 
People v. Landers, 329 Ill. 453, 457 (1927). Based on these principles, 
this court has regularly upheld various statutes that prescribe mandatory 
minimum sentences. See People ex rel. Daley v. Strayhorn, 119 Ill. 2d 331, 336 (1988); People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 Ill. 2d 537, 
542-44 (1981). Since the legislature is so empowered, then a home rule 
municipality has the same power.
We note that this case does not involve local 
regulation of a state institution. See, e.g., Ampersand, Inc. v. 
Finley, 61 Ill. 2d 537 (1975) (court system). Also, the possibility that 
different home rule units may adopt similar ordinances with differing mandatory 
minimum sentences should be of no concern. "The grant of home rule powers 
contemplates that different communities which perceive a problem differently may 
adopt different measures to address the problem, provided that the legislature 
has taken no affirmative steps to circumscribe the measures that may be taken 
and that the measures taken are reasonable." Kalodimos v. Village of Morton 
Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 504-05 (1984).
B. Total Exclusion or 
Preemption
Now that we have determined that the City has 
the power to prescribe the 90-day mandatory minimum sentence in section 8-4-080, 
we must next determine whether the legislature has specifically limited the 
concurrent exercise of this power or specifically declared that the state's 
exercise of this power is exclusive. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §§6(h), 
(i).
Defendant points to, inter alia, the 
Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 1992)) and the 
Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/1-1-1 et seq. (West 1992)). 
Defendant notes that section 5-1-15 of the Code of Corrections defines an 
"offense" as conduct for which a penalty is provided by any State law or, 
inter alia, "by any law, local law or ordinance of a political 
subdivision of this State." 730 ILCS 5/5-1-15 (West 1992). Defendant cites 
several provisions of the Code of Corrections that regulate the character, 
nature, and extent of punishment under the Code. One such provision is section 
5-5-3, which lists authorized dispositions for "[e]very person convicted of an 
offense." 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(a) (West 1992). The list of sentencing options 
include probation, conditional discharge, fine, an order to clean up and repair 
damage, and restitution to the victim. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(b) (West 1992). 
According to defendant, state legislation specifically defines the offense of 
assault against the elderly in the form of aggravated assault and defines the 
offense as a Class A misdemeanor (720 ILCS 5/12-2(a)(12), (b) (West 1992)), 
which is punishable by imprisonment for up to 364 days (730 ILCS 5/5-8-3(a)(1) 
(West 1992)) and also by a sentence of probation or conditional discharge (730 
ILCS 5/5-6-1 (West 1992)). Describing these statutes as "comprehensive," 
defendant contends that state criminal law evinces the legislative intent to 
preempt the City's home rule power to establish a mandatory minimum sentence for 
an ordinance violation.
We cannot accept defendant's contention. Section 
6(h) of the Illinois Constitution states: "The General Assembly may provide 
specifically by law for the exclusive exercise by the State of any power or 
function of a home rule unit ***." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §6(h). Section 
6(i), previously quoted, provides that home rule units may exercise any power of 
the sovereign concurrently with the state "to the extent that the General 
Assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or 
specifically declare the State's exercise to be exclusive." Ill. Const. 1970, 
art. VII, §6(i).
In Scadron, this court 
observed:
The court in 
Scadron held:
Further, 
"comprehensive" legislation is insufficient to declare the state's exercise of 
power to be exclusive. To "meet the requirements of section 6(h), legislation 
must contain express language that the area covered by the legislation is to be 
exclusively controlled by the State. [Citations.] It is not enough that the 
State comprehensively regulates an area which otherwise would fall into home 
rule power." Village of Bolingbrook v. Citizens Utilities Co., 158 Ill. 2d 133, 138 (1994). After Citizens Utilities, "comprehensive scheme" 
preemption is "no longer the law of this state." Board of Trustees of the 
Barrington Police Pension Fund v. Village of Barrington Ethics Board, 287 
Ill. App. 3d 614, 619 (1997). "The General Assembly cannot express an intent to 
exercise exclusive control over a subject through coincidental comprehensive 
regulation." American Health Care Providers, Inc. v. County of Cook, 
265 Ill. App. 3d 919, 928 (1994).
When the General Assembly intends to preempt or 
exclude home rule units from exercising power over a matter, that body knows how 
to do so. In many statutes that touch on countless areas of our lives, the 
legislature has expressly stated that, pursuant to section 6(h), 6(i), or both, 
of article VII of the Illinois Constitution, a statute is declared to be an 
exclusive exercise of power by the state and that such power shall not be 
exercised by home rule units. E.g., 20 ILCS 3960/17 (West 1992) 
(Illinois Health Facilities Planning Act); 215 ILCS 5/2.1 (West 1992) (Illinois 
Insurance Code); 220 ILCS 10/21 (West 1992) (Citizens Utility Board Act); 225 
ILCS 60/6 (West 1992) (Medical Practice Act of 1987); 235 ILCS 5/6-18 (West 
1992) (Liquor Control Act of 1934); 325 ILCS 55/7 (West 1992) (Missing Children 
Registration Law); 410 ILCS 5/2 (West 1992) (Burial of Dead Bodies Act); 410 
ILCS 80/11 (West 1992) (Illinois Clean Indoor Air Act); 520 ILCS 5/2.1 (West 
1992) (Wildlife Code); 625 ILCS 5/11-208.2 (West 1992) (Illinois Vehicle Code); 
625 ILCS 5/13A-114 (West 1992) (Vehicle Emissions Inspection Law).
Applying these principles to the present case, 
neither the Criminal Code nor the Unified Code of Corrections specifically 
excludes home rule units from establishing criminal penalties. Further, the 
comprehensiveness of these codes is irrelevant to this conclusion. Certainly, 
the Code of Corrections is, and was intended to be, comprehensive. Section 
5-1-15 promotes this comprehensiveness by including municipal ordinance 
violations within the scope of the Code. However, as this court held in 
Citizens Utilities, and as the legislature has repeatedly shown, even a 
high degree of comprehensiveness does not equal an express statement that home 
rule units are excluded from exercising power. Such a statement is lacking in 
the Code of Corrections. Therefore, home rule units may act concurrently with 
the state.
Some might believe that the courts play an 
important role in invalidating home rule ordinances that are inconsistent with 
statutes or that invade a field fully occupied by state legislation. By applying 
judicial doctrines relating to conflict, inconsistency, and occupation of the 
field, the courts can, inter alia, promote uniformity of law. However, 
for several reasons, the 1970 Constitutional Convention was strongly opposed to 
"judicial `preemption' " and sought a means to reduce its importance. 1972 
U. Ill. L.F. at 572.
Of course, home rule as provided in the Illinois 
Constitution will not remove all disagreements between state government and home 
rule units. As Professor Baum explained:
We hold that the 
Unified Code of Corrections does not preempt section 8-4-080 of the Chicago 
Municipal Code.
C. Partial Exclusion or 
Conformity
If the Code of Corrections does not totally 
exclude or preempt the City's home rule power to establish a mandatory minimum 
sentence for an ordinance violation, then does the Code at least limit or 
partially exclude such power to the extent that it is inconsistent with the 
Code? It does not.
The General Assembly can not only specifically 
declare the state's exercise of power to be exclusive, but it can also 
specifically limit by law the home rule unit's concurrent exercise of power. 
Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §6(i). The Committee on Local Government explained 
that the legislature can "permit concurrent local legislation, but only within 
limits that are consistent with the state statutory scheme. Surely if the state 
is permitted to exclude local governments from areas where the state has acted, 
it also should be able to restrict the nature and extent of concurrent local 
activity." 7 Proceedings at 1644; accord 1972 U. Ill. L.F. at 574.
Again, however, the General Assembly must 
specifically so limit a home rule unit's concurrent exercise of power. Accord 
Citizens Utilities, 158 Ill. 2d  at 138. Again, the General Assembly 
knows how to accomplish this, and has done so countless times, expressly stating 
that, pursuant to article VII, section 6(i), of the Illinois Constitution, a 
statute constitutes a limitation on the power of home rule units to enact 
ordinances that are contrary to or inconsistent with the statute. E.g., 
605 ILCS 5/5-919 (West 1992) (Illinois Highway Code); 510 ILCS 45/8 (West 1992) 
(Carrier and Racing Pigeon Act of 1984).
Again, in the present case, the Corrections 
Code, although quite comprehensive, does not expressly limit the concurrent 
exercise of the City's home rule power or require such exercise to conform to or 
be consistent with the Code. We repeat that " `[t]he Illinois approach [to 
home rule] places almost exclusive reliance on the legislature rather than the 
courts to keep home rule units in line.' 1972 U. Ill. L.F. at 579." 
Scadron, 153 Ill. 2d  at 188. We hold that the Unified Code of 
Corrections does not partially preempt Chicago Municipal Code section 8-4-080 or 
require that the ordinance conform to the Code.
CONCLUSION
Since the City had the home rule authority to 
establish a 90-day mandatory minimum sentence, and since the General Assembly 
has not specifically preempted or limited that authority, then the prescribed 
penalty in section 8-4-080 constitutes a valid exercise of the City's home rule 
power. Thus, the circuit court was without authority to impose a sentence below 
what the ordinance prescribes.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
appellate court is affirmed.
Affirmed.