Title: Daniel Ely Perez v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC03-1651
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 27, 2005

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-1651 
____________ 
 
DANIEL ELY PEREZ,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[October 27, 2005] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have on appeal a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a 
sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the 
reasons that follow, we affirm the appellant's conviction but vacate the death 
sentence, and remand for a new penalty phase proceeding. 
Facts and Procedural History 
On October 1, 2004, the grand jury indicted appellant, Daniel Ely Perez, and 
Calvin Cedric Green for the first-degree murder of Perez's wife's aunt, Susan 
 
 
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Martin,1 for burglary of Martin's home during which an assault or battery upon 
Martin was committed while the assailant was armed with a dangerous weapon, 
and for robbery with a deadly weapon.  The charges against Perez and Green 
resulted from the stabbing of Martin and removal of certain property from her 
residence.  On August 29, 2001, Martin's body was found lying in a large amount 
of blood in the front entrance of her home in Port St. Lucie.  The cases of Green 
and Perez were severed prior to trial pursuant to a Stipulated Motion for 
Severance.  Perez's trial began on April 28, 2003, and on May 8, 2003, he was 
found guilty of all three counts of the indictment as charged.   
 
At trial, Officer James Weinart of the Port St. Lucie Police Department 
testified that on August 29, 2001, at approximately 1:45 p.m., he responded to a 
911 call requesting that a welfare check be conducted at Martin’s residence.  Upon 
arriving at Martin's residence, Officer Weinart knocked on the front door and rang 
the doorbell but received no response.  After several unsuccessful attempts to make 
contact with the occupant, the officer opened the front door, which was unlocked, 
and found Martin lying "on her back with several stab wounds, head trauma and 
blood all over the floor.”  The officer immediately closed the door and notified 
                                          
 
 
1.  The language of the indictment indicates that Perez was charged with 
"unlawfully, with a premeditated design to effect the death of any human being," 
killing Martin.  The indictment also charged Perez with violating section 
782.04(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes, which encompasses both felony and 
premeditated first-degree murder.  See § 782.041(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001). 
 
 
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police headquarters.  Subsequently, Detective Anthony Sakala, a police detective 
who had previously investigated a theft that was reported by Martin in July of 
2001, was called to the crime scene to identify the victim.   
 
The lead detective on the case, Michael Beath, requested the phone records 
for both of the land lines registered to Martin as well as her cell phone.  Detective 
Beath discovered that Martin had called Bell South from her cell phone at 1:07 
a.m. on the morning of the crime.  Bell South operator Vanlesha Gaskins testified 
that Martin had called to report that her house phone was not working.  Gaskins 
testified that in response to the call she conducted several tests that led her to 
conclude that a phone line may have been cut.  Gaskins stated that Martin was 
talking in a low whisper and ended the call in a low tone sounding somewhat 
scared and simply stating that she "had to go."  David Gose, a service technician 
for Bell South, was dispatched to Martin's residence on August 29, 2001, and 
ascertained that both the phone line going from the street to Martin's house and the 
line connecting the phone box on the outside of the house to the inside of the house 
had been cut.   
 
At trial, several witnesses for the State testified with regard to evidence 
discovered at the crime scene.  Ron Schoener, a crime scene investigator for the 
Port St. Lucie Police Department, testified that a side entrance door leading into 
the garage of Martin's house was ajar and that the screen to a window in the door 
 
 
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was cut in two pieces and removed.  The investigator further testified that the glass 
of the window had also been removed and was leaning against some boxes just 
inside this side entrance door.  The molding from a window adjacent to the garage 
had also been removed and was found lying in the grass, and the light bulbs of two 
spotlights on the exterior of the house had been disabled.    
The interior of the house appeared to have been ransacked because drawers 
were opened with the contents dumped out and strewn about.  Martin's body was 
found directly inside the front door of the house, with her head approximately 
seven feet from the door, and her body was lying on the back with the hands above 
her head in a large amount of blood.  A white sock was on the floor near the head 
of the body.  A shoeprint was discovered in the blood near Martin's body, and there 
were several additional shoeprints that led from the body toward the bathroom 
area.  A cane with a large brass duck head was found in the bathroom and a gray or 
silver sock was recovered from the area between the master bedroom and the 
bathroom.  No fingerprints of any value were found inside the house, which was 
consistent with the conclusion that any assailant was wearing something over his 
or her hands and corresponded with the socks found at the scene.   
The medical examiner, Dr. Roger Mittleman, described Martin's injuries in 
detail.  Her autopsy revealed that she had suffered a blunt force injury to the left 
side of the head resulting in bruising and a laceration of the scalp but which did not 
 
 
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result in a skull fracture or any damage to her brain.  The bruising underlying the 
laceration indicated that Martin was alive when she was struck, and Mittleman 
opined that Martin most likely survived the blow.  In total, Martin suffered ninety-
four stab wounds, which averaged one-half inch in length with a penetration depth 
from one-half inch to one-and-one-half inches indicating that one weapon made all 
of the wounds.  The wounds included eight stab wounds to the left side of her 
neck, four striking the jugular vein; twenty-four stab wounds to the right lateral 
torso, several of which punctured the liver and right lung resulting in hemorrhaging 
into the right lung cavity, which indicated she was alive at the time these wounds 
were inflicted; twenty stab wounds on the left side of her body; twenty-four stab 
wounds to her middle and lower back; and eighteen stab wounds to her abdominal 
area.  Red marks on Martin's neck indicated that something had been pulled against 
her neck, such as a thin necklace.  There were also defensive wounds to Martin's 
hand area indicating that she had been attempting to ward off an attack.   
The medical examiner testified that although he could not definitively 
conclude the exact sequence of the wounds, it was his opinion that the wounds to 
the abdominal area and back occurred after the wounds to the neck and the right 
side of the body.  Four of the wounds to Martin's neck were determined to have 
been of a character to be lethal, as were several to the right side torso, where the 
weapon entered her liver.  Mittleman testified that Martin would have lost 
 
 
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consciousness within seconds to a minute or two as a result of the wounds inflicted 
to her neck, but that she could have survived ten to fifteen minutes from the 
wounds inflicted to her right torso area.  He was unable to determine whether the 
stabber was right or left-handed.   
Detective Beath's investigation included three separate interviews with 
Perez.  Beath initially interviewed Perez on August 29, 2001, the same day he was 
called to the scene to investigate the crime.  Beath testified that he met with Perez 
at the police department, where Perez arrived voluntarily upon request.  
Subsequently, on August 31, 2001, Beath again interviewed Perez on a voluntary 
basis.  At this point, Beath knew through Detective Sakala that Perez had been 
implicated by Martin in the previous jewelry theft from her residence and that 
Perez was aware of this fact.  During these initial interviews, Perez denied any 
involvement in the earlier theft.  Additionally, when Perez was asked whether he 
was in the habit of carrying a knife he responded that he carried one while at work.  
Beath noted that Perez was wearing new shoes during these interviews.  
Subsequently, it was discovered that Perez had pawned the ring and earrings 
Martin had previously reported stolen during the prior theft.  The police also 
discovered that Perez had sold some of Martin's missing coins.   
Beath again interviewed Perez at the police department when he arrived 
looking for his wife, who was being interviewed at the time.  During this interview, 
 
 
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Beath confronted Perez with the evidence of his possession of the previously stolen 
jewelry.  Perez's initial story, denying any involvement, changed several times 
during the interview from stating that a drug addict gave him the jewelry, to stating 
that he had taken a pill bottle from Martin's house and gave it to the owner of a 
pawn shop to sell its contents, to ultimately admitting that he had removed a pill 
bottle from the home and discovered jewelry inside that he later pawned.  After 
Perez was advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966), he told the police he wanted to continue the interview.  Perez was 
subsequently advised that he was under arrest for the prior jewelry theft.  
After further questioning with regard to Martin’s stabbing, Perez revealed a 
plan that he had with Gary Reed and Calvin Green to steal Martin's car.  Initially, 
Perez admitted that he provided Reed and Green with directions to Martin's house 
to steal the car on the night of the murder but denied that he was ever present at the 
scene.  Perez admitted that he came into possession of the coins taken from the 
house in return for giving Reed and Green directions to Martin's house.  Thereafter, 
Perez changed his story, admitting that he actually drove to Martin's house in his 
sister's car and that Reed and Green followed him in another vehicle.  Perez told 
the police that after sitting in his car and waiting for ten to fifteen minutes, he 
drove by the house and saw the front door wide open.  Perez stated that Reed and 
Green ran out of the front door, that Green was covered in blood, and that all three 
 
 
- 8 -
went their separate ways.  Changing his story again, Perez next told the police that 
he actually opened the front door and saw Green on top of Martin with a six-inch 
switchblade punching her in the head and then Perez ran away.   
When the police confronted Perez with evidence of the shoe prints that were 
discovered inside the house, Perez again revised his story, telling the police that he 
actually entered the house to attempt to remove Green off of Martin and then left.  
Later, Perez changed his story again, telling the police that he actually ran through 
the house looking for Reed and when he did not see him he fled the scene with 
Green in his car.  Perez stated that when he came upon Green and Martin she was 
not screaming but that he heard her gargling on blood in her throat.  Perez's final 
version of the events was that only one car was driven to the scene and that Reed 
was never actually present at the house.  In this final version, Perez admitted that 
he witnessed Green stabbing Martin and heard her gargling on blood.  Perez then 
ran through the house two steps behind Green while Green was grabbing things 
and placing them into a bag.  Perez also stated that while inside the house, the 
contents of Martin's purse were dumped out.  The key to her car was located and 
both he and Green went outside to the car and unlocked the door but fled the scene 
before actually taking the car.  Perez told the police that both he and Green had 
socks on their hands when entering the house.  The police videotaped the 
interviews conducted on the fifth and the sixth of September during which all of 
 
 
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these details were revealed and the tape was played to the jury.  No other 
eyewitness testimony was produced at trial. 
During the morning of September 6, 2001, Perez accompanied the police on 
a drive-around to show them where he and Green disposed of various pieces of 
evidence from the crime.  During this period, the police recovered several items of 
evidence:  a bag that was removed from Martin’s house on the night of the crime; 
the key to Martin's car; Martin's watch; a "doo-rag"; and a pen allegedly belonging 
to Martin.  Perez showed the police the canal where he alleged the murder weapon 
was thrown, although the weapon was never recovered.  Perez directed the police 
to an area where he alleged that Green had dumped his bloody clothes, but no 
clothes were ever recovered.  Perez also took the police to a dumpster where he 
allegedly discarded his bloody shoes, but they were never recovered.   
Subsequent to the interview of Perez on September 5 and 6, Beath attempted 
to find a pair of shoes that matched the shoe prints found at the crime scene.  Beath 
found a pair of shoes that appeared to have a similar pattern.  Beath testified that 
Perez's father-in-law, Joe Burns, went to the store where Beath had found the 
shoes, and Burns picked out the same pair as resembling sneakers that he had seen 
Perez wearing around the time of the crime.  Later, a forensic firearm and tool 
mark examiner compared the shoes from the store to the shoeprint found at the 
crime scene and determined that the patterns of the two matched.   
 
 
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Perez presented no evidence at trial.  The jury found Perez guilty of felony 
murder.  The jury's verdict was entered on a special verdict form that provided 
space for the jury to indicate whether they had found Perez guilty of first-degree 
murder as charged.  The verdict form also contained a space for the jury to 
designate whether they found Perez guilty under the theory of premeditated 
murder, felony murder, or both.  As noted, the jury indicated on the verdict form 
that they found Perez guilty of felony murder but declined to find him guilty of 
premeditated murder.       
During the penalty phase, the State presented four witnesses.  State witness 
Wes Starling, a Lieutenant with the Martin County Sheriff's Office, testified with 
regard to his investigation of Perez in 1995 for a stabbing incident, which resulted 
in Perez being convicted of attempted second-degree murder.  The State also 
presented Margie Ann Barnes and Grace Burns, relatives of Martin, who read 
prepared statements regarding their interactions with Martin.  During rebuttal, the 
State presented Dr. Gregory Landrum to testify with regard to Perez's mental 
condition in general and at the time of the crime.  Landrum had previously 
evaluated Perez in relation to his previous second-degree murder charge and had 
also reviewed various documents relating to the present case, including Perez's 
videotaped interview.  Landrum essentially agreed with Perez's mental health 
 
 
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expert's diagnosis, but added that Perez displayed features of antisocial personality 
disorder.     
Perez presented five family members and one mental health expert during 
the penalty phase.  Perez's sister, wife, mother, father, and grandmother all testified 
with regard to Perez's upbringing and past mental health conditions that were 
present throughout his childhood and teenage years and his history of 
hospitalization, medication, and treatment.  It was revealed that when Perez was 
nine his mother had left him with a male neighbor, whom she later discovered had 
sexually molested him.  Perez's father and mother were divorced when Perez was 
four or five and the father had little contact with him during his younger years.   
Dr. Michael Riordan testified on Perez's behalf regarding his mental 
condition in general and at the time of the offense.  In evaluating Perez, Riordan 
reviewed Perez's medical history and school records, interviewed his wife, mother, 
and sister, and administered a number of tests to Perez.  Riordan did not review 
Perez's videotaped interview.  Riordan noted that Perez became suicidal as a result 
of the sexual abuse he suffered and had made four suicide attempts.  Riordan's 
diagnosis was that Perez was suffering from bipolar disorder, attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder, and borderline personality disorder.  On cross-examination, 
Riordan noted that Perez had also been diagnosed with oppositional defiant 
disorder in 1993 accompanied by a history of acting aggressively towards peers 
 
 
- 12 -
and authority figures, having hostile impulses, losing his temper, acting defiantly, 
and using a weapon against others.  Perez declined to testify at his penalty phase.   
On May 13, 2003, the jury returned a recommendation of death by a vote of 
nine to three.  During the Spencer2 hearing, the State presented Martin's sister, who 
read a statement expressing the pain caused by her sister's death but also 
expressing her family's distaste for the death penalty.  Perez presented additional 
testimony of his sister, mother, and wife on the issue of mitigation along with 
letters written to the trial court from Perez's niece and nephew.  On July 21, 2003, 
the trial judge sentenced Perez to death for the felony murder of Martin and to life 
imprisonment for both the burglary with an assault or battery while armed 
conviction and robbery with a deadly weapon conviction.  In pronouncing Perez's 
sentence, the trial court determined that the State had proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt the existence of four statutory aggravators:  (1) Perez had previously been 
convicted of another capital felony or a felony involving a threat of violence to the 
person; (2) Perez committed the murder in this case while he was engaged, or was 
an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit or in flight after 
committing or attempting to commit a robbery or a burglary of a dwelling; (3) the 
murder was committed for pecuniary gain; and (4) the murder was committed in an 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel fashion (HAC).  The trial court determined 
                                          
 
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
 
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that two of the aggravators, pecuniary gain and in the commission of robbery or 
burglary, merged, resulting in a total of three aggravating circumstances.  The trial 
court further determined that one statutory mitigating circumstance existed, that 
Perez was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the crime, 
which the court accorded little weight.  The trial court found a total of fourteen 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, three of which the trial court assigned 
moderate weight, two of which the trial court assigned some weight, and nine to 
which the trial court assigned little weight.3  This direct appeal followed. 
ANALYSIS 
GUILT PHASE 
I.  Juror Disqualification 
                                          
 
 
3.  The trial court found the following nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances:  (1) unstable upbringing and family history (little weight); (2) 
sexually abused as a child (little weight); (3) loving father, husband, son, and 
brother, and his family loves him (moderate weight); (4) long term mental health 
difficulties (little weight); (5) gainfully employed (moderate weight); (6) 
incarceration in an adult facility as a juvenile, even though the crime occurred 
when he was a juvenile (little weight); (7) drug addiction (little weight); (8) 
recipient of Boy Scout merit badges (some weight); (9) obtained GED in prison 
(some weight); (10) failure of jury to render unanimous verdict on premeditated 
murder (little weight); (11) cold, calculating and mitigating factor absent (little 
weight); (12) cooperation with police (little weight); (13) good attitude and 
conduct during trial (little weight); and (14) impact of death penalty on defendant’s 
family (some weight).  Additionally, the trial court considered the following 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances but found that they had not been established 
by the evidence presented:  (1) that Perez was remorseful; and (2) any plea 
agreement offer to Perez’s codefendant as relevant to proportionality review. 
 
 
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Perez asserts that he is entitled to a new trial as a result of the trial court 
denying his motion to disqualify a juror because the juror failed to disclose her 
relationship with a State witness during voir dire when the State read its witness 
list to the jury pool.  During Perez's trial, juror Nicosia wrote a note to the trial 
court explaining that she had knowledge of a witness for the State, Beasely, 
through having submitted a bid to do paint work for Beasely and an introduction 
through friends.  Perez's trial counsel immediately requested that Nicosia be 
discharged, and the trial court initially denied that request, finding that Nicosia's 
ability to render a fair and impartial verdict was not impaired by her contact with 
Beasely.  Just prior to closing arguments the trial court addressed the matter again, 
at which time the State suggested that "if the defense is still asking that she be 
disqualified, . . . we would rather go that route and disqualify her . . . so there is no 
issue on that."  When faced with this opportunity to obtain the relief initially 
sought by the defense, Perez's trial counsel affirmatively rejected the opportunity 
and stated "that if there is no cause challenge then nothing should change," thereby 
waiving any objection to Nicosia serving on this jury.4  Based on the foregoing, we 
conclude that this issue was waived and is not properly preserved for review by 
this Court and we therefore decline to address this issue on appeal. 
                                          
 
 
4.  We note that Nicosia's response to a question on the juror questionnaire 
with regard to her position on the death penalty reflected that her view was that it 
was "[a]ppropriate in some cases, inappropriate in some cases." 
 
 
- 15 -
II.  Motion to Suppress 
Perez asserts the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his 
statements given to the police on September 5 and 6, thereby entitling him to a new 
trial in which the statements should be excluded from evidence.  In Perez's motion 
to suppress, he asserted that his statements were obtained illegally because he was 
"coerced/forced or under duress at the times of the statements," and that he made 
the statements "without a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights and without 
the benefit of counsel."  During the hearing on Perez's motion, his counsel made 
two specific assertions to the trial court:  (1) that the statement "was given through 
misleading or confusing statements of Perez's rights" by the police in that he was 
misled regarding his custody status; and (2) "that the statement was obtained 
through coercive measures, duress due to the time period involved."   
"For an issue to be preserved for appeal, . . . it 'must be presented to the 
lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal must 
be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved.'"  Archer v. State, 
613 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. 1993) (quoting Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 
1985)); see also Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 338 (Fla. 1982).  We have 
determined that several points that Perez now presents on appeal before this Court 
were not properly preserved and, therefore, we decline to address the merits of 
those claims.  Specifically, Perez's assertion that Detective Beath's recitation of the 
 
 
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Miranda warnings was incomplete because he was not advised of his right to have 
an attorney present during questioning was never presented to the trial court in 
Perez's motion or in the corresponding hearing, and therefore was not properly 
preserved for appellate review.  See Archer, 613 So. 2d at 448; Steinhorst, 412 So. 
2d at 338.  Additionally, Perez's claims––that he was denied a phone call,5 that he 
was physically uncomfortable during the interrogation, that the overall tenor of the 
questioning was inappropriate, and that he was told the police would protect his 
family if he gave a statement––were also not presented to the trial court below and 
therefore are not properly before this Court for consideration.   
With regard to Perez's assertions that have been properly preserved for 
appellate review, we conclude that the trial court's disposition of these claims is 
supported by the record and that the trial court appropriately denied the motion to 
suppress.  We reach our conclusion guided by the principle of law in Florida that  
[a] trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is clothed with a 
presumption of correctness with regard to the trial court's 
determination of historical facts.  Appellate courts, however, 
independently review mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately 
determine constitutional issues arising in the context of the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments. 
Davis v. State, 859 So. 2d 465, 471 (Fla. 2003).   
                                          
 
 
5.  Perez's assertion that the officers held him incommunicado is refuted by 
the transcript of the interview, which establishes that Perez was allowed to speak 
with his wife in person upon request. 
 
 
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The first properly preserved basis that Perez alleges as grounds for 
suppression is that Detective Beath improperly implied that he was free to leave 
when Beath knew that there was an outstanding felony arrest warrant for Perez at 
the time of the interview and, therefore, under Florida law, Beath had a duty to 
arrest him.  Perez further contends that by implying that he was free to leave, Beath 
intended to and in fact did mislead him as to his true position during the interview, 
which tainted any waiver of rights he provided.   
 
In support of this contention, Perez directs our attention to our opinion in 
Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1999).  In Ramirez, a juvenile offender was 
implicated in a murder by an associate, Grimshaw.  See id. at 572.  Grimshaw 
placed a sheriff-monitored phone call to Ramirez during which items of physical 
evidence related to the crime were discussed.  See id.  Subsequently, Ramirez, who 
was seventeen at the time, was visited at home by a sheriff's deputy and turned 
over evidence relating to the crime.  See id.  Ramirez also took the deputy to 
retrieve other items and agreed to accompany the deputy to the station for 
questioning.  See id.  At the station, Ramirez was interrogated and eventually 
admitted to breaking into the victim's house.  See id.  Subsequent to his admission 
and prior to any Miranda warning, a detective stated: 
Why don't you let Nate [Ramirez] know about his rights.  I mean, he's 
already told us about going in the house and whatever.  I don't think 
that's going to change Nate's desire to cooperate with us. 
 
 
- 18 -
Id.  At this point, Ramirez asked if he was being placed under arrest and the 
detective responded, "No, no, I'm just reading your rights at this time."  Id.  Later, 
Ramirez admitted his involvement in the murder and after he had fully confessed, 
the detectives obtained a written waiver of his Miranda rights.  Id. 
 
In Ramirez, we concluded that the defendant's statement should have been 
suppressed.  See id. at 578.  In so holding, we stressed that Ramirez was never told 
he was free to leave, that he was a juvenile (just turning seventeen), and that the 
detectives exploited his prior unwarned statements in an effort to downplay the 
significance of the Miranda warnings when they suggested that the warnings would 
not change Ramirez's desire to cooperate.  See id. at 574, 576.  Additionally, we 
noted that when the detectives responded negatively to Ramirez's question 
pertaining to whether he was under arrest,  
Ramirez had already implicated himself in the crime and the 
detectives had independent corroboration of his involvement and 
ample probable cause to arrest him for murder[,] . . . [and that] [i]t 
[was] simply inappropriate for the police to make a representation 
intended to lull a young defendant into a false sense of security and 
calculated to delude him as to his true position at the very moment 
that the Miranda warnings [were] about to be administered.  
Id. at 576-77 (emphasis supplied). 
 
Perez's reliance on Ramirez is misplaced.  The defendant in Ramirez was a 
juvenile, a fact that we stressed throughout our opinion, see id. at 571, 574-78, 
unlike Perez who was twenty-three at the time of the interview at issue here.  
 
 
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Another distinguishing factor is that the defendant in Ramirez was not told he was 
free to leave, see id. at 574, but in the instant case Perez arrived at the police 
station of his own accord and was explicitly made aware that he was there on a 
voluntary basis and was free to leave at any time.   
 
This case more closely resembles the facts of Davis v. State, 698 So. 2d 
1182 (Fla. 1997), than Ramirez.  In Davis, the defendant, as did Perez, voluntarily 
agreed to go to the police station for questioning on three occasions regarding the 
death of a former girlfriend's daughter.  See id. at 1186.  At the time of the third 
interview the police had a warrant for Davis's arrest, but he was not informed of 
this status prior to questioning.  See id.  In holding that the statements made by 
Davis during this third interview were admissible, we noted:  
[T]he sole fact that police had a warrant for Davis's arrest at the time 
he went to the station does not conclusively establish that he was in 
custody.  Rather, there must exist a "restraint on freedom of 
movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest."  Roman v. 
State, 475 So. 2d 1228, 1231 (Fla. 1985).  The proper inquiry is not 
the unarticulated plan of the police, but rather how a reasonable 
person in the suspect's position would have perceived the situation.  
Id.  
Davis, 698 So. 2d at 1188. 
 
The Third District utilized an approach similar to Davis in State v. Manning, 
506 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).  There, the defendant had voluntarily 
submitted to two police interviews after being informed that he was a suspect.  See 
id. at 1095.  Subsequently, the police obtained a warrant for his arrest and 
 
 
- 20 -
requested that Manning grant them a third interview without informing him of the 
existence of the warrant.  See id.  In concluding that the statements made by 
Manning at this third interview were admissible, the district court noted:  
The fact that Manning was not immediately informed that he was 
under arrest is insufficient to find that his waiver was not voluntary. . . 
. There is no question that Manning was read his rights many times. . . 
. Just as an undercover investigation may continue, notwithstanding 
the fact that a search warrant has been issued, United States v. 
Alvarez, 812 F.2d 668 (11th Cir. 1987), if all other criteria have been 
satisfied, an interrogation may take place notwithstanding the fact that 
an arrest warrant has been issued. 
Id. at 1096-97.  See also State v. Wallace, 673 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).  
The facts of this case, similar to the cases cited above, support the trial court's 
determination that any waiver was voluntary and that Perez's statement to the 
police was not procured through deception sufficient to preclude its admission at 
trial.  Therefore, we hold that the trial court properly denied this claim.   
Perez also asserted below that the length of the interview, approximately 
twenty-five hours, per se required suppression of his statement by the trial court.  
In denying this claim, the trial court found that "[Perez] was given opportunities to 
nap during the interview process," that “Perez never expressed being tired to the 
point that he wanted to discontinue the interview process," and that "[a]t no time 
did Perez express a desire to stop the interview process."  We conclude that the 
record supports these findings.  The transcript of Perez’s interview, in addition to 
Beath's testimony at the hearing on Perez's motion to suppress, which was not 
 
 
- 21 -
refuted by any testimony offered by the defense, reveals that Perez was given the 
opportunity to take smoking and restroom breaks during the interview; Perez was 
given snacks and drinks when requested; Perez left the investigating officer's 
custody for approximately two hours to take a voluntary polygraph test; Perez was 
provided breakfast and lunch on September 6; and Perez was provided the 
opportunity to sleep for approximately six to eight hours. 
 
In Chavez v. State, 832 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 2002), this Court determined that a 
lengthy interrogation period with intermittent breaks alone was "not so coercive as 
to render Chavez's confession involuntary."  Id. at 749.  In so holding, we noted:  
Although Chavez was questioned over the course of several 
days, he was provided with food, drink, and cigarettes (as requested) 
at appropriate times, and permitted to have frequent breaks.  His 
interrogation was also interspersed with time away from the police 
facilities for visits to various properties, a six-hour rest period (where 
Chavez was offered a blanket and a pillow), and times when he was 
left alone for quiet reflection.  He was repeatedly given Miranda 
warnings, in Spanish, and indicated each time that he fully understood 
them. 
Id.  The circumstances surrounding the interrogation by the police in Chavez are 
strikingly similar to the facts of the present case.  Moreover, the interrogation at 
issue here was of less duration than that in Chavez.  Perez attempts to distinguish 
Chavez by noting that Chavez was repeatedly read his rights and indicated he fully 
understood them whereas here, Perez was given only a partial recitation of his 
 
 
- 22 -
rights.  However, this issue was not presented to the trial court below and was 
therefore waived, rendering this attempt at distinguishing Chavez moot. 
Given the similarities between the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
the interrogations in this case and Chavez, along with the time element involved 
here, we conclude that the length of the officers’ interview of Perez was not so 
great as to per se render his statements or waiver or both involuntary.  See also 
Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 951-52 (Fla. 2003) (holding confession by 
defendant was not rendered involuntary by separate interrogation periods lasting 
approximately twelve and thirteen hours each and ending past 2:30 a.m. on each 
occasion when defendant "was provided food, drink, access to restrooms, the 
opportunity to place phone calls, and at least eleven hours away from the 
detectives at a place where he could rest"); Walker v. State, 707 So. 2d 300, 311 
(Fla. 1997) (upholding voluntariness of confession where defendant was 
questioned for six hours, provided drinks, and allowed use of restroom, and 
detectives never threatened capital punishment or promised more than to tell 
prosecutor defendant cooperated). 
 
Based on the foregoing analysis of the issues properly preserved for 
appellate review in the trial court below, we hold that the trial court properly 
denied the motion to suppress and correctly admitted Perez’s statements into 
evidence.  
 
 
 
- 23 -
III.  Prejudicial Comments at Trial 
 
In its opening statement to the jury, the State made the following comment: 
One month later - we go to August 27, 2001.  That was a Monday.  
That Monday night the defendant just after midnight which would be 
the morning of the 28th, drove up from Martin county where he lived 
and he went to Ms. Martin's house.  He went there armed with a very 
small knife that he always carried and he went there, ladies and 
gentlemen, for two reasons. 
Perez's trial counsel objected to the comment that Perez always carried a knife as 
irrelevant and moved for a mistrial.  In response, the State argued to the judge that 
Perez had acknowledged that he carried a knife.  The trial court overruled the 
objection and denied the motion, reasoning that the statement was not overly 
prejudicial and that the information was relevant to the issue of whether the crime 
was committed with a switchblade, consistent with Perez's statement, or another 
type of knife.  Perez claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a 
mistrial because he asserts that whether he personally carried a knife was a major 
issue as to both guilt and penalty.  Thus, the prosecutor's comment with regard to a 
knife was unduly prejudicial to him.  Moreover, Perez contends that the curative 
instruction given was not likely to clear any confusion caused by that which had 
transpired.   
"[A] trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial is subject to an abuse of 
discretion standard of review."  Goodwin v. State, 751 So. 2d 537, 546 (Fla. 1999).  
Moreover, "[w]ide latitude is permitted in arguing to a jury. . . . The control of 
 
 
- 24 -
comments is within the trial court's discretion, and an appellate court will not 
interfere unless an abuse of discretion is shown."  Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1, 
8 (Fla. 1982) (citations omitted).  Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial 
court's ruling will be upheld unless the "judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or 
unreasonable, . . . .  discretion is abused only where no reasonable [person] would 
take the view adopted by the trial court."  Trease v. State, 768 So. 2d 1050, 1053 
n.2 (Fla. 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247, 
1249 (Fla. 1990)).  
The comments challenged by Perez were made during opening statements, 
the purpose of which was for counsel to outline what he in good faith expected to 
be established by the evidence presented at trial.  See Conahan v. State, 844 So. 2d 
629, 640 (Fla. 2003); Occhicone v. State, 570 So. 2d 902, 904 (Fla. 1990).  Perez 
has failed to demonstrate that the statements at issue here were misleading or made 
in bad faith.  Rather, we conclude that the attorney for the State made the 
comments in good faith with the expectation that they would be established by 
evidence he anticipated presenting during trial.  Although the transcript of Perez's 
interview with the police reveals that Perez did not indicate that he always carried 
a knife, it was clear that he did admit that he carried a knife.  Additionally, 
although the trial court ruled it inadmissible, the State proffered testimony from 
Perez's brother-in-law that he knew Perez to carry knives.  Based on the foregoing, 
 
 
- 25 -
Perez's reliance on Jackson v. State, 818 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (holding 
that it was error to deny motion for mistrial where prosecutor extensively recited 
damaging testimony in opening that was never presented at trial), Gore v. State, 
719 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1998) (holding that latitude permitted in opening does not 
extend to permit comment on evidence ruled inadmissible prior to trial), and Mills 
v. State, 875 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that it was error to deny 
mistrial where prosecutor improperly suggested the existence of corroborating 
evidence that was never presented at trial), is misplaced.  Additionally, Perez's 
objection to the comments as irrelevant was properly rejected by the trial court.  
The indictment charging Perez indicated that he, "in the course of committing the 
robbery[,] carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, to wit:  a knife."  Therefore, 
whether Perez owned a knife or carried a knife was relevant at trial, and therefore 
the relevancy objection was properly denied.  Given the evidence that the State 
anticipated presenting at trial and the overall nature of the single isolated comment 
made by the prosecutor, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Perez's 
motion for a mistrial.  
Perez also challenges a statement made by Detective Beath during his 
testimony at trial, specifically, Beath's testimony that Perez had indicated to Beath 
that "[Perez] did carry a knife on a regular basis."  Perez's trial counsel objected 
and moved for a mistrial, claiming that a habit had not been established and 
 
 
- 26 -
therefore the testimony was irrelevant.  At this point, the State conceded that 
Beath's testimony did not reflect precisely what Perez had said with regard to 
carrying a small blade knife.  The trial court overruled the objection and denied the 
motion for a mistrial but gave the following curative instruction to the jury at the 
defense’s request: 
Members of the jury, the exhibit 52 admitted into evidence is the 
videotape of portions of the interview with Mr. Perez.  It is the best 
evidence of what Mr. Perez said so you need to rely on your 
determinations about what is said off that videotape.   
(Emphasis supplied.) 
 
The transcript of Perez's interview with the police, which the jury had while 
viewing the videotape of the interview, reveals the following exchange between 
Beath and Perez regarding Perez's knife: 
BEATH:  Do you normally carry a pocketknife or anything like that?  
PEREZ:  When I’m at work. 
 
BEATH:  Okay.  Any other times you normally carry knives or 
anything like that?  Do you have collections of knives, or anything? 
 
PEREZ:  I have one.  Um, as far as carrying it all over the place all the 
time?  No.  There’s occasions where I, I have it in my pocket, like 
after I get off of work or something, I’ll have it in my pocket.  But 
it’s, it’s a little, the one I have now?  It’s a, it’s a little lock blade, it’s 
like a, not even a, a 3" blade. 
BEATH:  You have it on you?  
PEREZ:  No. 
 
. . . .  
BEATH:  You use it for work? 
PEREZ:  Yeah, it's for cuttin' open wardrobe boxes. 
BEATH:  So, it's pretty sharp to, I mean you could take it and (cutting 
motion through paper)? 
PEREZ:  Yeah, when I sharpen it. 
 
 
- 27 -
. . . . 
BEATH  Okay.  So, do you keep it, I mean, is it a knife that you keep 
it, well maintained? 
PEREZ:  Yeah. 
BEATH:  Okay.  All right.  Um, you take it to work with you?  
PEREZ:  Yeah. 
 
BEATH:  You still do?  
PEREZ:  Yeah. 
 
In light of the curative instruction given by the trial court, we hold that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Perez's motion for mistrial 
based on Beath's testimony.  A motion for mistrial is properly denied where the 
matter on which the motion is based is rendered harmless by a curative instruction.  
See Buenoano v. State, 527 So. 2d 194, 198 (Fla. 1988); Ferguson v. State, 417 So. 
2d 639 (Fla. 1982); Johnsen v. State, 332 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1976); Rivera v. State, 
745 So. 2d 343, 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); see also 55A Fla. Jur. 2d Trial § 284 
(2000).  The comment made by Beath was a short one-sentence statement during a 
lengthy direct examination.  Moreover, when the statement was made, Perez's trial 
counsel objected and the trial court immediately gave a curative instruction at the 
defense's request in which the jury was instructed that the videotape of Perez's 
interview was “the best evidence” of what Mr. Perez had stated and the jury should 
“rely on your determinations about what is said off that videotape.”   Given the 
above, Perez's motion for a mistrial was properly denied. 
 
Notwithstanding our conclusion above, we also note that the error, if any, 
resulting from the prosecutor's opening statement and the detective's testimony was 
 
 
- 28 -
harmless because we “can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not 
affect the verdict.”  Mansfield v. State, 758 So. 2d 636, 644 (Fla. 2000).  In relation 
to the prosecutor's comments during opening statement, we note that the trial judge 
specifically instructed the jury on five separate occasions that the comments of the 
attorneys did not constitute evidence.  Just subsequent to empanelling the jury, the 
trial court properly instructed and cautioned the jury as follows:  
[T]he attorneys will have an opportunity to make an opening 
statement.  The opening statement gives the attorneys a chance to tell 
you what evidence they believe will be presented during the trial.  
What the lawyers say is not evidence and you're not to consider it as 
such. 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Again, prior to both the opening statement and closing 
argument, during closing arguments themselves, and again during the trial court's 
final instructions, the jury was reminded that the attorneys’ words and arguments 
did not constitute evidence.  Additionally, as we previously stated, any harm 
resulting from the detective's comment was rendered harmless by the trial court's 
instruction to the jury that the videotape was "the best evidence” of what Mr. Perez 
said for purposes of jury consideration.  Based on the foregoing, we conclude that 
any error, if any, that resulted from these comments was harmless and therefore 
Perez’s motion for mistrial was properly denied. 
PENALTY PHASE 
I.  Enmund/Tison 
 
 
- 29 -
In Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), the United States Supreme 
Court overturned Enmund's death sentence for felony murder because this Court 
"affirmed the death penalty in th[e] case in the absence of proof that Enmund killed 
or attempted to kill, and regardless of whether Enmund intended or contemplated 
that life would be taken."  Id. at 801.  The High Court revisited its holding in 
Enmund in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).  In Tison, the High Court held 
that "major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless 
indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability 
requirement."  Tison, 481 U.S. at 158.  Although the United States Supreme Court 
held in Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986), overruled in part on other grounds 
by, Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987), that “the Constitution does not require a 
specific jury finding on the Enmund issue [and that it] requires only that the 
‘requisite findings are made in an adequate proceeding before some appropriate 
tribunal––be it an appellate court, a trial judge, or a jury,’” we have determined 
that the issue should be submitted to the jury.  Jackson v. State, 502 So. 2d 409 
(Fla. 1986) (quoting Cabana, 474 U.S. at 392).  In Jackson v. State, 502 So. 2d 409 
(Fla. 1986), we announced procedures for trial courts to use to comply with 
Enmund.  The procedures we outlined in Jackson were modified in Diaz v. State, 
513 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 1987), to reflect the United States Supreme Court's decision 
in Tison wherein the High Court expanded upon the criteria which would satisfy 
 
 
- 30 -
the Enmund culpability requirement.  Diaz, 513 So. 2d at 1048 n.2.  After Jackson 
and Diaz, trial courts in Florida have been directed to instruct the jury "before its 
penalty phase deliberations that in order to recommend a sentence of death, the 
jury must," Jackson, 502 So. 2d at 413, "make findings satisfying Enmund and . . . 
Tison."   Diaz, 513 So. 2d at 1048 n.2.  "Further [the Court] reiterate[ed] that the 
trial courts shall include in their sentencing orders findings supporting the 
Enmund/Tison culpability requirement."  Id.  
 
The trial court below properly followed the procedures outlined by our 
opinion in Jackson as modified by Diaz when it instructed the jury at the penalty 
phase that "in order for you to recommend a sentence of death in this case you 
must find [Perez] was a major participant in the crime of robbery or burglary and 
that [Perez's] state of mind at the time amounted to wreckless [sic] indifference to 
human life."  Subsequent to being given this instruction, the jury rendered a verdict 
recommending the death penalty by a vote of nine to three.    
 
Perez contends that the guilty verdict in this case did not encompass the 
necessary facts to justify a sentence of death because the jury did not make a 
specific finding that he actually committed the stabbings or that he was a major 
participant in the felony and acted with a reckless indifference for human life.  
These claims lack merit.  The jury's verdict finding Perez guilty of felony murder 
was not required to include a separate and distinct Enmund/Tison determination.  
 
 
- 31 -
The Enmund/Tison finding is to be made during the penalty phase of a murder trial 
to determine if the sentence of death may be constitutionally imposed.  See 
Jackson, 502 So. 2d at 413.  During the penalty phase here, the trial court properly 
instructed the jury with regard to the Enmund/Tison issue.  Whether Perez was 
eligible to be sentenced to death at all was appropriately determined at the guilt 
phase when the jury unanimously found him guilty of first-degree felony murder, 
which is classified in Florida as a capital felony with the maximum penalty 
authorized by statute being death.  See Shere v. Moore, 830 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 2002). 
 
Moreover, there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to support 
the determination that the jury found Perez to have been a major participant in the 
felonies committed and that he acted with a reckless indifference to human life.  
The jury found Perez guilty of the following crimes:  first-degree felony murder; 
burglary of a dwelling in the course of which he made an assault or battery upon a 
person and was armed or armed himself with a dangerous weapon; and robbery in 
the course of which he was carrying a deadly weapon, a knife.  Additionally, the 
jury was instructed that if they found that the crimes at issue were the independent 
acts of another, then Perez should not be found guilty of those crimes.  Based on 
the verdicts, the jury obviously determined that Perez was a major participant in 
the burglary, during the commission of which he committed an assault or battery 
while armed, and the robbery, during the course of which he carried a deadly 
 
 
- 32 -
weapon, and that these crimes were not the independent acts of another.  By virtue 
of these verdicts, it is clear that the jury found Perez to have acted with a reckless 
disregard for human life.  See Jackson, 502 So. 2d at 412 ("[B]y being a major 
participant in the armed robbery, appellant, at the very least, contemplated that life 
would be taken."). 
Perez's contention that the jury could have found him guilty vicariously 
through the acts of Green does not vitiate the conclusion that he was a major 
participant in these crimes.  The instruction given by the trial court regarding 
principal responsibility was as follows:  
If the Defendant helped another person or persons commit or attempt 
to commit a crime, the Defendant as [sic] a principal and must be 
treated as if he had done all the things the other person or persons did 
if the Defendant had a conscious intent that the criminal act be done 
and the Defendant did some act or said some word which was 
intended to and which did incite, cause, encourage, assist, or advise 
the other person or persons to actually commit or attempt to commit 
the crime. 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Satisfaction of these criteria alone would indicate major 
participation in the commission of a crime.  Therefore, the mere fact that the jury 
may have found Perez guilty as a principal does not, as Perez asserts, prevent a 
finding that he was a major participant in the crimes.   
 
Perez next asserts that his penalty phase proceeding was unconstitutional 
because the jury's determination of the Enmund/Tison issue was not unanimous.  
We have previously addressed such a claim and denied relief.  In James v. State, 
 
 
- 33 -
453 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1984), we denied relief on a claim identical to that which 
Perez now asserts by noting that "the United States Supreme Court has never held 
that jury unanimity is a requisite of due process, and in Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 
533 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923 (1976), this Court held that the jury in a 
capital case could recommend an advisory sentence by a simple majority vote.  We 
do not find that unanimity is necessary when the jury considers this issue."  James, 
453 So. 2d at 792 (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied).  See also  Parker v. 
State, 904 So. 2d 370, 383 (Fla. 2005) (“This Court has repeatedly held that it is 
not unconstitutional for a jury to recommend death on a simple majority vote.  
Moreover, this Court has rejected claims that Ring v. Arizona, requires aggravating 
circumstances to be individually found by a unanimous jury verdict.”) (citations 
omitted); Israel v. State, 837 So. 2d 381, 392 (Fla. 2002) (rejecting appellant’s 
assertion, post-Ring, that his death sentence was unconstitutional based on the jury 
recommending death by a split vote). 
Perez also alleges infirmity in the penalty phase because the jury was not 
instructed that it was required to make the Enmund/Tison finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  This claim was not preserved at the trial level because Perez did 
not object to the jury instruction when the language was proposed or object 
anytime thereafter prior to the jury retiring to deliberate.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.390(d) ("No party may raise on appeal the giving or failure to give an instruction 
 
 
- 34 -
unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating 
distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection.").  
In fact, defense counsel expressly agreed to the language of the instruction that the 
trial court read on this issue: 
THE COURT:  . . . Give me the language you're proposing. 
[THE STATE]:  In order to recommend a sentence of death in this 
case you must find that the Defendant was a major participant in the 
crime of burglary or robbery and the Defendant's state of mind 
amounted to a reckless indifference to human life. 
[THE DEFENSE]:  We don't have an objection to that language. 
. . . . 
THE COURT:  Defense agrees with that language? 
[THE DEFENSE]:  No objection to that language. 
(Emphasis supplied.)  This argument was not preserved for review and is therefore 
not properly before the Court. 
 
Procedural bar notwithstanding, this claim lacks merit.  There is no authority 
in Florida that requires that the jury again be separately and independently 
instructed that the Enmund/Tison elements must be established beyond all 
reasonable doubt.  The jury here was properly instructed and, by voting to 
recommend the death penalty, concluded that the Enmund/Tison culpability 
requirement was satisfied.  Additionally, the trial court provided a detailed analysis 
of the evidence presented at trial in support of its finding that the requirement had 
been established beyond a reasonable doubt.6 
                                          
 
 
6.  See infra note 7, pp. 42-43 (quoting sentencing order). 
 
 
- 35 -
 
Perez also claims that indications made by the State and the trial court to the 
jury that their penalty phase verdict was advisory and not binding renders his 
penalty phase unconstitutional.  This Court has addressed claims of this nature and 
has repeatedly denied relief.  See Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 2001) 
(holding that claim that instructions "that refer to the jury as advisory and that refer 
to the jury's verdict as a recommendation violate Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 
320 (1985)" was without merit); Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 283 (Fla. 1998) 
(holding that the standard jury instructions fully advise the jury of the importance 
of its role, correctly state the law, do not denigrate the role of the jury, and do not 
violate Caldwell); Rose v. State, 617 So. 2d 291, 297 (Fla. 1993) (same); Robinson 
v. State, 574 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1991) (same); Combs v. State, 525 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 
1988) (same). 
 
Perez's assertion that his penalty phase proceeding was constitutionally 
infirm because the trial court allowed the State to admit victim impact evidence 
was also properly denied by the trial judge.  This claim has been denied by both the 
United States Supreme Court and this Court.  See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808 (1991) (determining that a state may properly decide that a jury should have 
before it victim impact evidence at sentencing); Windom v. State, 656 So. 2d 432, 
438 (Fla. 1995) ("We do not believe that the procedure for addressing victim 
impact evidence, as set forth in the statute, impermissibly affects the weighing of 
 
 
- 36 -
the aggravators and mitigators . . . or otherwise interferes with the constitutional 
rights of the defendant.  Therefore, we reject the argument which classifies victim 
impact evidence as a nonstatutory aggravator in an attempt to exclude it during the 
sentencing phase of a capital case."); Allen v. State, 662 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1995) 
(same).  Additionally, Perez's contention that because the rules of evidence 
precluding the admissibility of hearsay do not apply to penalty phase proceedings 
pursuant to section 921.141(1) of the Florida Statutes, those proceeding are 
constitutionally inadequate also lacks merit.  See Mendoza v. State, 700 So. 2d 
670, 675 (Fla. 1997) ("We have recognized that hearsay evidence may be 
admissible in a penalty-phase proceeding if there is an opportunity to rebut."); 
Lawrence v. State, 691 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 1997) (same); Chandler v. State, 534 So. 
2d 701 (Fla. 1988) (holding that admission in sentencing proceeding of hearsay 
testimony did not render subsection (1) of section 921.141 of the Florida Statutes 
unconstitutional).  We do recognize that, pursuant to Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004), out-of-court statements by witnesses that are testimonial in nature 
are barred under the Confrontation Clause, unless witnesses are unavailable and 
the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them.  See id. at 1374.  
However, Perez does not direct our attention to any specific statements in the 
record that he contends are testimonial in nature and, therefore, the holding in 
Crawford is inapplicable to Perez’s current claim.  Instead, Perez specifically 
 
 
- 37 -
asserts that section 921.141 of the Florida Statutes cannot pass constitutional 
muster because it allows for the admission of hearsay statements in penalty phase 
proceedings.  As previously noted, we have rejected such a blanket attack on the 
constitutionality of this statutory provision in the past, and do so again in this case.  
Moreover, consistent with our prior decisions, we note that the United States 
Supreme Court has also expressed that “[w]here nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, 
it is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in 
their development of hearsay law.”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that Perez has failed to 
establish that the death penalty was inappropriate here where the trial court 
properly instructed the jury that to impose the death penalty they were required to 
make the Enmund/Tison finding and the trial court performed a detailed analysis of 
the evidence supporting that finding in its sentencing order. 
Perez next alleges that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to 
establish that he either killed Martin or was a major participant in the felonies 
committed and acted with a reckless disregard for human life.  Therefore, Perez 
asserts, the death penalty is disproportionate under the law established in Enmund 
and Tison.  For Perez's death sentence to stand, the finding required by Enmund 
and Tison must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Tison v. Arizona, 
481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).  Perez cites to 
 
 
- 38 -
several cases as support for his contention that the facts in the present case do not 
sustain the trial court's finding that his conduct satisfied the Enmund/Tison 
culpability requirement.   
 
Initially, Perez refers to this Court's decisions in Jackson v. State, 575 So. 2d 
181 (Fla. 1991), and Benedith v. State, 717 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1998).  These cases 
are distinguishable from the instant case.  In Jackson, there was no evidence 
presented at trial that placed the defendant, Clinton Jackson, at the scene of the 
crime.  See Jackson, 575 So. 2d at 184-86.  In Jackson, Clinton "denied any 
involvement in or knowledge of the shooting."  Id. at 184.  No fingerprints of 
Clinton's were found at the crime scene and gunpowder residue tests proved 
inconclusive.  See id. at 185.  The only evidence presented that connected Clinton 
with the crime was the testimony of two inmates.  One inmate testified that he saw 
Clinton driving a truck in the vicinity of the crime scene that was identified as a 
vehicle seen fleeing the crime scene, and that Clinton told him several days before 
the crime of his intentions to rob the store where the murder took place.  The 
second inmate testified that he overheard Clinton tell his mother:  "[W]e had to do 
it because he had bucked the jack," and "to tell Nate, [the defendant's brother,] if 
they picked up Nate, to tell him that he hadn't––he hadn't been nowhere around the 
hardware store and get rid of the gun."  Id. at 185.  In reversing the death penalty 
this Court noted:  
 
 
- 39 -
There was no evidence that [Clinton] carried a weapon or intended to 
harm anybody when he walked into the store, or that he expected 
violence to erupt during the robbery.  There was no real opportunity 
for [Clinton] to prevent the murder since the crime took only seconds 
to occur, and the sudden, single gunshot was a reflexive reaction to 
the victim's resistance. 
Id. at 192-93. 
 
Here, unlike Jackson, Perez's own statement directly placed him at the scene 
of the crime, a bloody shoeprint next to the body was determined to match shoes 
that Perez was known to be wearing at the time of the crime, and he admitted to 
disposing of his shoes on the night of the crime because there was blood on them.  
Also, there was sufficient planning to cut Martin's phone lines and disable security 
lights, and there was evidence that Perez was armed with his knife that he carried 
home from work on occasions.  Perez admitted that he helped dispose of the 
murder weapon and other evidence from the crime and he pawned items taken 
during the crime.  The deadly attack here involved inflicting a blunt force trauma 
followed by the delivery of ninety-four stab wounds, which is a far cry from the 
single gunshot resulting from the reflexive reaction that was present in Jackson.   
The facts revealed in Jackson v. State, 502 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1986), in which 
we affirmed the death sentence for Clinton Jackson's brother, Nathaniel, based on 
the same crime at issue in Clinton's case is more relevant to our analysis of Perez’s 
sentence in the instant matter.  The significant difference between Clinton 
Jackson’s case and Nathaniel Jackson's is found in the facts that Nathaniel’s 
 
 
- 40 -
fingerprints were discovered at the crime scene (similar to Perez's footprint), and 
the admission at trial of a statement made by Nathaniel in which he admitted being 
present at the robbery but alleged that it was his brother, Clinton, who actually shot 
the victim (similar to Perez's statement to the police in the instance case).  We 
conclude that Nathaniel Jackson's case is more analogous to the facts here and 
provides support for the trial court's finding that the culpability required by 
Enmund and Tison was established beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence 
presented at trial. 
 
The facts of Benedith v. State, 717 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1998), are also 
distinguishable from the present case.  In Benedith, the only eyewitness testimony 
at trial placed Benedith at the location of the murder four to five minutes prior to 
the eyewitness hearing gunshots.  See id. at 474.  The eyewitness further noted that 
immediately after hearing the gunshots, he looked in the direction of where the 
sound originated and saw the victim's body lying on the ground and Benedith's 
codefendant, Taylor, quickly entering a car and speeding away.  See id.  In our 
opinion, we specifically noted that the eyewitness did not testify to seeing Benedith 
in the area from which the gunshots originated after the eyewitness heard the shots 
and looked in that direction.  See id.  There simply was no evidence presented at 
trial that Benedith was present at the actual time of the murder.  In the instant case 
by contrast, Perez's own statement placed him at the crime scene during the 
 
 
- 41 -
commission of the murder.  Moreover, the facts of the present case with regard to 
Martin's phone lines being cut, a security light disabled, and Perez knowing Martin 
was awake watching television when he entered the house and would recognize 
him all demonstrate a higher level of culpability on the part of Perez than was 
present in Benedith. 
 
Perez's reliance on the Supreme Court of Mississippi's decision in White v. 
State, 532 So. 2d 1207 (Miss. 1988), is similarly misplaced.  White applied the 
Enmund standard prior to the High Court's opinion in Tison, and accordingly 
determined that the death sentence "may be upheld only if we have before us a 
record which contains evidence legally sufficient that the jury may have found that 
Willie Lee White, Jr., killed, attempted to kill, intended that a killing take place, or 
contemplated that lethal force would be employed."  Id. at 1219 (emphasis 
supplied).  This majority opinion does not even mention the "major participant" 
and "reckless indifference" standards enunciated in Tison.  Perez's reliance on 
other state court cases is also misplaced.  See State v. Lacy, 929 P.2d 1288 (Ariz. 
1996) (holding Enmund/Tison not satisfied by "mere presence" during homicide); 
State v. Rodriguez, 656 A.2d 262 (Del. 1994) (reversing death sentence under 
standard requiring a showing of a "fully-formed conscious purpose to kill" and 
where there was no evidence that defendant expected violence).    
 
 
- 42 -
 
By recommending that Perez be sentenced to death, the jury in the present 
case found that "Perez was a major participant in the crime of robbery or burglary 
and that Daniel Perez' state of mind at that time amounted to a wreckless [sic] 
indifference to human life."  Moreover, the trial court's sentencing order included a 
detailed and thorough analysis of the evidence presented at trial that supported its 
finding that Perez was a major participant in the burglary and robbery and acted 
with a reckless indifference to human life.7 
                                          
 
 
7.  The trial court’s sentencing order, in pertinent part, stated: 
 
Perez admitted to law enforcement that he planned to commit a 
crime against Susan Martin the night she was killed, and he is the one 
who took himself and his co-defendant, Calvin Green, to her 
residence.  In other words, it is Daniel Perez who selected the target of 
the criminal activity.  The evidence further showed beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Susan Martin's residence was entered by stealth.  
The telephone lines into the home were cut and a security light which 
reacts to motion was unscrewed before entry was made.  The evidence 
also showed beyond a reasonable doubt that a screen to an outside 
door to her garage was cut at the time of the burglary.  In statements 
made by Daniel Perez to law enforcement, Perez admitted Susan 
Martin was watching an infomercial on television at the time entry 
was made into her home.  Perez also admitted that he put socks on his 
hands before entering her house.  Perez admitted Susan Martin was 
stabbed numerous times with a knife.  He also admitted to helping 
dispose of the knife after the murder.  Bloody footprints matching 
shoes Perez was known to wear at the time of the murder were found 
next to the body of Susan Martin.  Perez admitted to throwing away 
the shoes in a dumpster the same night of the murder.  Only one other 
identifiable bloody footprint was found at the scene of the crime in a 
hallway some distance away from the body, and that footprint was 
inadvertently made by law enforcement while the crime scene was 
being processed. 
 
 
- 43 -
                                                                                                                                        
 
The evidence at trial also proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that prior to being murdered, Susan Martin accused Daniel Perez of 
burglarizing her home and stealing from her approximately one month 
earlier.  Perez knew prior to the date Susan Martin was murdered that 
she had made that accusation to law enforcement. 
 
The evidence at trial also proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that on a prior occasion Perez had used a knife to attempt to kill 
someone by stabbing him, and he had a personal awareness of the 
lethality of a knife and the high probability of danger when a knife is 
used to confront someone. 
 
The evidence further showed beyond a reasonable doubt that at 
a minimum he knew the high probability of danger that a life was in 
jeopardy when he entered Susan Martin's house knowing she was 
awake, knowing she knew who he was, knowing that either himself or 
his co-defendant was armed with a knife used to cut the telephone 
lines and the screen, and knowing that after entry was made, she 
sustained a serious blow to the head by a cane. 
 
The only evidence presented at trial which connected Perez's 
co-defendant, Calvin Green, to the crimes committed was Perez's 
statements to law enforcement.  The only eyewitness version of the 
events presented at trial were the statements made by Perez to law 
enforcement, in which Perez emphatically denied being the one who 
stabbed Susan Martin to death.  However, the description of events 
given by Perez changed several times as he was confronted by law 
enforcement with various pieces of physical evidence.  The various 
permutations in his statements of his involvement in the crimes 
committed against Susan Martin do not make his final version 
credible. 
 
By interrogatory responses on the verdict form, the jury 
unanimously decided beyond a reasonable doubt that in the course of 
committing the burglary, Perez made an assault or battery upon Susan 
Martin.  The jury also unanimously decided that Perez was armed or 
armed himself with a deadly weapon in the course of committing the 
burglary.  The only two deadly weapons described in the evidence 
were the knife used to stab Susan Martin, and the duck head cane used 
to strike her on the head. 
 
 
- 44 -
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that the 
Enmund/Tison culpability requirement was established by the State at trial beyond 
a reasonable doubt is supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record, 
thereby justifying a sentence of death. 
II.  Mitigating Circumstances 
A.  Statutory Mitigation 
A trial court's decision with regard to the weight to be assigned to a 
mitigating circumstance that it determines has been established is "within the trial 
court's discretion, and its decision is subject to the abuse-of-discretion standard."  
Kearse v. State, 770 So. 2d 1119, 1133 (Fla. 2000); see also Trease, 768 So. 2d at 
1055; Cole v. State, 701 So. 2d 845, 852 (Fla. 1997).  Under the abuse of 
discretion standard, a trial court's ruling will be upheld unless the "judicial action is 
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, . . . discretion is abused only where no 
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court."  Trease, 768 
So. 2d at 1053 n.2 (alteration in original) (quoting Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247, 
1249 (Fla. 1990)). 
Perez asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it assigned little 
weight to the statutory mitigating circumstance that the crime at issue here was 
committed while Perez was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance.  In its assessment of this statutory mitigator, the trial court noted the 
 
 
- 45 -
largely convergent views of the defense and State mental health experts with 
regard to the mental conditions suffered by Perez.  Namely, both mental health 
experts agreed that Perez suffered from bipolar and borderline personality disorder.  
The expert for the State, however, noted that he would add to the defense expert's 
diagnosis that Perez was also suffering from antisocial personality disorder.   
On the basis of this evidence, the trial court concluded: 
The Court is reasonably convinced from the evidence that at the 
time of Susan Martin's murder Daniel Perez was under the influence 
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  However, the mental or 
emotional disturbance Perez suffered from is one of the most 
dangerous types.  The most significant and disturbing components of 
Perez's bipolar disorder is the antisocial and borderline personality 
features.  The indifference to hurting others and the willingness to 
violate the rights of others to get what one wants are a deadly 
combination. . . . 
. . . There was no evidence presented in this case that Daniel 
Perez is not able to conform his conduct to the requirements of the 
law.  Thus, while the Court finds that the mitigating circumstance of 
Daniel Perez participating in a murder while he was under extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance has been adequately proven, the 
Court gives little weight to this mitigating circumstance because there 
is no showing that Perez is unable to conform his behavior to the 
requirements of law and because the antisocial personality and 
borderline personality features of Perez’s bipolar disorder make him 
dangerous. 
 
Perez analogizes the trial court's logic in the instant case to the logic 
condemned by this Court in Mines v. State, 390 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1980).  A review 
of Mines, however, demonstrates that it is distinguishable from the present case.  
In Mines, we determined that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing the 
 
 
- 46 -
defendant to death when it refused to even consider the statutory mitigating factors 
concerning the defendant’s mental condition simply because the expert testimony 
established that the defendant was legally sane.  See id. at 337.  Unlike Mines, the 
trial court in the instant case specifically acknowledged and weighed the fact that 
Perez was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the 
time of the crime.  Therefore, Mines is distinguishable from the instant matter. 
 
Perez also asserts that the trial court improperly distinguished cases cited by 
the defense for the proposition that extreme mental or emotional disturbance is one 
of the weightiest mitigating circumstances.  The trial court determined that Rose v. 
State, 675 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1996), Hildwin v. Dugger, 654 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1995), 
and Santos v. State, 629 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1994), were distinguishable because they 
involved a finding that the defendant was unable to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law, which was absent in the instant case.  While this trio of 
cases does suggest that the mental or emotional disturbance mitigating 
circumstance is of the most "weighty order," Rose, 675 So. 2d at 573, none 
suggests that a trial court is required to assign any certain weight to the mitigating 
circumstance in the abstract if it is found to exist without reference or a nexus to 
the particular defendant.   
Further, all of the cases are distinguishable for reasons in addition to those 
expressed by the trial court.  Rose and Hildwin both addressed ineffective 
 
 
- 47 -
assistance of counsel claims for failure to investigate and present evidence 
surrounding this mitigating circumstance, see Rose, 675 So. 2d at 573-74; Hildwin, 
654 So. 2d at 110, and in Santos we merely determined that the trial court abused 
its discretion when it determined that this mitigating circumstance was not 
supported by the evidence even though the State had conceded that it existed.  See 
Santos, 629 So. 2d at 840.  None of these cases addressed the weight to be assigned 
to this mitigator if found to exist.  Moreover, we have not been inclined to find 
error in other cases where this mitigating circumstance has been given little weight 
in the trial court's sentencing order.  See Dennis v. State, 817 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 
2002); Howell v. State, 707 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1998); Pooler v. State, 704 So. 2d 
1375 (Fla. 1997). 
Perez also challenges that which he perceives as the trial court discounting 
the weight assigned to the extreme mental or emotional disturbance mitigating 
circumstance based in part on its finding that the “inability to conform” mitigating 
factor had not also been established.  Although we deem it unnecessary to address 
the merits of this claim based on our ultimate disposition of this case, we write to 
remind the trial court below that each mitigating circumstance is to be analyzed 
and weighed individually and that the written findings chronicling the trial court’s 
analysis and reasons for the weight assigned by it should be “unmistakably clear” 
 
 
- 48 -
to ensure that a defendant is afforded a full appellate review in cases where the 
ultimate sentence is death.  See Peterka v. State, 640 So. 2d 59, 70 (Fla. 1994).   
 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the trial court's finding 
that the extreme mental or emotional disturbance statutory mitigating circumstance 
was established is supported by competent, substantial evidence.  Additionally, we 
hold that the trial court’s assignment of little weight to this mitigating circumstance 
did not amount to an abuse of its discretion, and we deny Perez’s claim. 
Perez next challenges the trial court’s finding that his ability to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law was not impaired.  A trial court's finding 
that a mitigating circumstance has not been established should be upheld if there is 
competent, substantial evidence supporting that finding.  See Nibert v. State, 574 
So. 2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. 1990) (holding that a trial court's finding that a mitigating 
circumstance is not established should be upheld so long as there is competent and 
substantial evidence supporting that finding); Kight v. State, 512 So. 2d 922, 933 
(Fla. 1987) (same).  Initially, Perez relies on this Court’s opinion in Stewart v. 
State, 558 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1990), as support for this argument.  In Stewart, this 
Court determined that the failure of the trial judge to instruct the jury on the 
impaired capacity mitigating circumstance constituted reversible error when there 
was evidence presented with regard to that circumstance and the instruction was 
requested.  See id. at 420-21.  The record in the present case demonstrates that the 
 
 
- 49 -
trial judge followed the law as announced in Stewart and instructed the jury on the 
“inability to conform” mitigating circumstance.  Therefore, we conclude that the 
trial court's actions did not violate the rule established in Stewart and that Perez’s 
claim has no merit. 
 
Perez also contends that the trial judge rejected the “inability to conform” 
mitigating circumstance based on the erroneous view that there must be specific 
testimony describing the mitigating circumstance which uses the precise statutory 
language.  However, the trial court's sentencing order does not recite this premise 
as the basis for the rejection of this mitigating circumstance.  Rather, the trial court 
merely stated that although the defense mental health expert, Dr. Riordan, "opined 
that Daniel Perez was acting under extreme mental and emotional disturbance," the 
doctor "offered no evidence that the capacity of Daniel Perez to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to confirm his conduct to the requirements of the law 
was substantially impaired."  Additionally, the trial court noted that there was "no 
evidence of such impairment in the record."  Based on the foregoing, we conclude 
that Perez's claim regarding the basis for the trial court’s rejection of this 
mitigating circumstance is not supported by the record. 
Moreover, the record demonstrates competent and substantial evidence in 
support of the trial court's finding that the mitigating circumstance with regard to 
the inability to conform conduct to the requirements of the law was not established.  
 
 
- 50 -
Neither mental health expert testified whether this mitigating circumstance was 
applicable in Perez's case.  Moreover, Dr. Riordan's report, which was admitted 
into evidence at the Spencer hearing, contained the following statements: 
While [Perez's] disorders are believed to have been present at the time 
of his alleged offenses, these disorders are not, however, believed to 
have caused him not to know that the acts involved in the alleged 
offenses . . . were wrong, not to appreciate what he was doing and not 
appreciate the consequences of his actions.  While the defendant was 
found to be suffering from mental infirmity, his infirmity was not 
found to have caused him to commit his alleged offenses. . . . As a 
result of his mental infirmities, however, he was not found to be under 
such a defect of the mind so as he was unable to distinguish right from 
wrong, appreciate what he was doing, not know that what he was 
doing was wrong and not fully appreciate the consequences of his 
actions. 
Given the lack of testimony in support of this mitigating factor and the statements 
contained in the defense mental health expert's report negating its existence, we 
conclude that the trial court's finding that this mitigating circumstance was not 
established is supported by competent, substantial evidence and therefore was not 
improper.  Accordingly, Perez’s claim is denied.  See Nibert, 574 So. 2d at 1062; 
Kight, 512 So. 2d at 933. 
B.  NonStatutory Mitigation 
Perez also contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it assigned 
little weight to the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances of his bad upbringing and 
sexual abuse based on the conclusion that these aspects of Perez’s life "contributed 
to a combination of antisocial personality features and borderline personality 
 
 
- 51 -
features which [had] coalesced over time into a conduct disorder that now makes 
Daniel Perez a dangerous person."  Perez asserts that it was improper for the trial 
court to essentially utilize his disorder as "anti-mitigation" to reduce the weight of 
the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances the trial court found existed. 
As support, Perez relies on this Court's opinion in Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 
882 (Fla. 1979).  In Miller, this Court vacated the trial court's sentence of death 
where it "considered as an aggravating factor the defendant's allegedly incurable 
and dangerous mental illness."  Id. at 885 (emphasis supplied).  Although the trial 
court in Miller properly conducted its individual analysis of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, we determined that in the final weighing of the 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances established, the trial court's "use of this 
nonstatutory aggravating factor as a controlling circumstance tipping the balance in 
favor of the death penalty was improper."  Id.  Miller is distinguishable from the 
instant case.  In the present case, the trial court merely properly evaluated Perez's 
mental condition in its assessment of the weight to be assigned to the nonstatutory 
mitigation, not in determining that aggravating circumstances were present to 
justify a sentence of death.  Thus, under Miller, the trial court's actions do not 
constitute an abuse of discretion.  Cf. Sanchez-Velasco v. State, 570 So. 2d 908, 
916 (Fla. 1990) (rejecting defendant's claim that trial court improperly used a 
nonstatutory aggravating circumstance when it commented on defendant's "evil 
 
 
- 52 -
mind, superego, and tendency to lash out others" in its discussion of the reason it 
found that certain mitigating factors had not been established and where the trial 
court did not make a finding that the death penalty was required to protect the 
public based on defendant's "dangerous mental state"). 
Although a trial court may not use evidence of a defendant's mental illness 
and a resulting propensity to commit violent acts in the future as aggravating 
factors to tip the scales in favor of death, see Miller, 373 So. 2d at 885-86, a trial 
court's use of a defendant's mental condition in the evaluation of the weight to be 
afforded a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance found to exist has not been 
specifically rejected by this Court.  Here, the trial court accorded little weight to 
these nonstatutory mitigating circumstances by noting that they "contributed to a 
combination of antisocial personality features and borderline personality features 
which have coalesced over time into a conduct disorder that now makes Daniel 
Perez a dangerous person."  While the trial court did not use Perez's mental 
condition as a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance, a practice condemned by 
Miller, the sentencing order does seem to imply that the trial court considered 
Perez's potential for future dangerousness in the weighing process.  The trial 
court's statement here was clearly made in its assessment of the weight to be 
accorded a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance.  Moreover, the sentencing order 
reveals that Perez's mental conditions were in fact considered by the trial court in 
 
 
- 53 -
its analysis of statutory mitigation.  Given the deference a trial court's 
determination of the weight to be assigned to mitigating circumstances is afforded, 
see Trease, 768 So. 2d at 1053 n.2, we conclude that the trial court below did not 
abuse its discretion when it assigned little weight to these nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances because we cannot conclude that "no reasonable person would 
[have] give[n] this circumstance [little] weight."  Elledge v. State, 706 So. 2d 1340, 
1347 (Fla. 1997).   
Walker v. State, 707 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1997), upon which Perez also relies, is 
similiarly distinguishable from the case at bar.  In Walker, this Court held that it 
was improper for the State to interject the probability of recurring violent acts by 
the defendant in the future, noting that such a fact is "not a proper aggravating 
circumstance."  Id. at 314.8  Although the Court found that these comments were 
harmless, the Court reiterated its holding in Miller that it is improper to "attach 
aggravating labels to factors that actually should militate in favor of a lesser 
penalty––like . . . the defendant's mental impairment."  Id.  The facts of Walker are 
entirely distinguishable from the facts of the instant case because here the State in 
fact conceded that Perez's mental conditions were mitigating, and the trial court 
indeed considered them as such.  Based on the foregoing, we deny Perez’s claim.   
                                          
 
 
8.  In Walker, the State asked the mental health expert:  "Well, do you think 
also that [Walker] may kill again?"  Walker, 707 So. 2d at 314 (alteration in 
original). 
 
 
- 54 -
III.  Victim Impact Evidence 
Perez contends that the trial court erred when it refused to allow the defense 
to present evidence that Martin and the entire family opposed the death penalty.  
This claim is meritless.  Section 921.141(7) of the Florida Statutes (2001) 
provides: 
Once the prosecution has provided evidence of the existence of one or 
more aggravating circumstances as described in subsection (5), the 
prosecution may introduce, and subsequently argue, victim impact 
evidence.  Such evidence shall be designed to demonstrate the victim's 
uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the 
community's members by the victim's death.  Characterizations and 
opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence 
shall not be permitted as a part of victim impact evidence. 
§ 921.141(7), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis supplied).  This Court has expressly held 
that witness testimony during the presentation of victim impact evidence should 
not include testimony with regard to witnesses’ opposition to the death penalty.  
See Floyd v. State, 569 So. 2d 1225, 1230 (Fla. 1990) (holding trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it prevented victim's daughter from testifying to her 
preference that defendant should not receive the death penalty); see also Card v. 
State, 803 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 2001) (noting witness's testimony concerning proper 
punishment was outside the bounds of proper impact evidence).9     
                                          
 
 
9.  Perez's reliance on the general evidentiary rule that character evidence of 
the defendant may be presented by the State when the accused places his character 
at issue is inapposite.  See Butler v. State, 842 So. 2d 817, 827 (Fla. 2003); Gore v. 
 
 
- 55 -
IV.  Constitutionality of Florida’s Death Penalty 
Perez asserts that Florida's capital sentencing scheme violates his Sixth 
Amendment right and his right to due process under the holding of Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  This Court addressed the contention that Florida's 
capital sentencing scheme violates the United States Constitution under Apprendi 
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring, in Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 
693 (Fla. 2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 2002), and denied relief.  
See also Jones v. State, 845 So. 2d 55, 74 (Fla. 2003).  Perez is likewise not 
entitled to relief on this claim.  Furthermore, one of the aggravating circumstances 
found by the trial court in this case was a prior conviction of a violent felony, "a 
factor which under Apprendi and Ring need not be found by the jury."  Jones v. 
State, 855 So. 2d 611, 619 (Fla. 2003); see also Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 
963 (Fla.) (rejecting Ring claim where one of the aggravating circumstances found 
by the trial judge was defendant's prior conviction for a violent felony), cert. 
denied, 539 U.S. 962 (2003).   
Perez's assertion that Florida's death sentencing scheme is unconstitutional 
pursuant to the Eight Amendment and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), 
has not been preserved for review.  A review of the record demonstrates that the 
specific grounds asserted by Perez in his claim before this Court were not 
                                                                                                                                        
State, 784 So. 2d 418, 433 (Fla. 2001); Carter v. State, 687 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1997); Lusk v. State, 531 So. 2d 1377, 1382 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). 
 
 
- 56 -
presented in the trial court below.  See Steinhorst, 412 So. 2d at 338 ("[I]n order 
for an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific contention 
asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or motion below.").  
Procedural bar notwithstanding, Perez's assertion is meritless.  See Proffitt v. 
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251 (1976) (holding that Florida's capital sentencing scheme 
does not violate the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by Furman).10 
V.  Aggravating Circumstances 
 
In sentencing Perez to death, the trial court found that the following 
aggravating circumstances were established:  (1) Perez had previously been 
convicted of a another capital felony or a felony involving a threat of violence to 
the person; (2) Perez committed the murder in this case while he was engaged, or 
was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit or in flight after 
committing or attempting to commit a robbery or a burglary of a dwelling; (3) the 
murder was committed for pecuniary gain; and (4) the murder was committed in an 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel fashion.11  Perez asserts that the trial court 
erred in finding that the evidence presented supported the application of the HAC 
aggravating circumstance.  We outlined the standard for evaluating a trial court's 
                                          
 
 
10.  The remaining aspect of Perez’s claim implicates the Enmund/Tison 
analysis, see discussion supra pp. 29-43, along with the HAC question discussed 
infra pp. 57-66. 
 
 
11.  The trial court merged the pecuniary gain and in the commission of a 
robbery aggravators, considering them as a single aggravating circumstance. 
 
 
- 57 -
finding of an aggravating circumstance in Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 
1997): 
[I]t is not this Court's function to reweigh the evidence to determine 
whether the State proved each aggravating circumstance beyond a 
reasonable doubt––that is the trial court's job.  Rather, our task on 
appeal is to review the record to determine whether the trial court 
applied the right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance and, if 
so, whether competent substantial evidence supports its finding.          
Id. at 695 (footnote omitted).   
The trial court's sentencing order outlined the evidence that it considered in 
finding that HAC applied to Martin’s murder: 
The evidence at trial presented by the medical examiner proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Susan Martin was stabbed to death.   
Altogether she was stabbed ninety-four times.  There were eight stab 
wounds to the left side of her neck, four of which cut her jugular vein.   
There were twenty-four stab wounds to the right side of her abdomen, 
some of which were lethal because they cut her liver and her right 
lung.  There were twenty stab wounds to the left side of her abdomen, 
some of which were lethal because they cut her left lung.  There were 
twenty four stab wounds on the backside of her abdomen and eighteen 
stab wounds on the front side of her abdomen.  There was one 
defensive wound to a finger on her left hand.  She also sustained a 
blunt trauma injury over her left eye causing a V-shaped laceration 
and bruising and there were scratches on her neck.  The blow to her 
head did not cause brain damage or skull fracture and was not a fatal 
blow. The bruising on her forehead and the hemorrhaging to her right 
lung cavity showed she was still alive at the time she was hit on the 
head and her right lung was punctured.  
 
 
The medical examiner could not conclude with a reasonable 
degree of certainty what was the sequence of the stab wounds, but 
more likely than not the stab wounds to the neck and the right 
abdomen were inflicted first, given where the blood went as Susan 
Martin died.  As to the fatal stab wounds to the neck, the medical 
examiner concluded that she would have lost consciousness within a 
 
 
- 58 -
matter of a few seconds to as much as two minutes.  As to the stab 
wounds to the right abdomen Susan Martin could have lived as long 
as fifteen minutes.  In his statements to law enforcement, Perez 
admitted to hearing Susan Martin gurgling in her blood.  
 
Based on the medical evidence and the defensive wound to 
Susan Martin's hand, as well as the admissions by Perez, the Court 
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Susan Martin was alive and 
conscious during some of the multiple stab wounds, and the State has 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that her murder was unnecessarily 
torturous, conscienceless, and pitiless.  Davis v. State, 620 So. 2d 152 
(Fla. 1993); Pittmann v. State, 646 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1994); Francis v. 
State, 808 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 2002). 
The evidence presented at trial through the admission of the medical examiner's 
testimony and Perez's statement to the police supports the above findings of the 
trial court and the trial court’s conclusion that Martin’s murder was carried out in a 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner.  
 
Perez contends that HAC is inapplicable because there was evidence that 
Martin lost consciousness quickly and therefore the prolonged suffering associated 
with HAC is not present in this case.  Perez further asserts that even if Martin was 
conscious during some of the stab wounds HAC is still not applicable.  As support, 
Perez directs our attention to Elam v. State, 636 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1994), in which 
we struck the trial court's application of HAC to a bludgeoning murder where,  
[a]lthough the defendant was bludgeoned and had defensive wounds, 
the medical examiner testified that the attack took place in a very 
short period of time ("could have been less than a minute, maybe even 
half a minute"), the defendant was unconscious at the end of this 
period, and never regained consciousness. 
 
 
- 59 -
Id. at 1314.  Elam is clearly distinguishable from the instant case.  Here the 
evidence established that Martin was stabbed no fewer than ninety-four times and 
also suffered defensive wounds and blunt force trauma to the head.  Moreover, the 
outer bounds of consciousness established by the medical testimony in the instant 
case exceeded that established in Elam.  The other cases relied on by Perez are 
similarly inapposite.  Cf. Zakrzewski v. State, 717 So. 2d 488, 493 (Fla. 1998) 
(holding HAC inapplicable where evidence established that the victim "may have 
been rendered unconscious upon receiving the first blow from the crowbar, and as 
a result she was unaware of her impending death"); Rhodes v. State, 547 So. 2d 
1201 (Fla. 1989) (holding HAC inapplicable in strangulation murder where 
evidence indicated that victim was likely semiconscious at the beginning of the 
attack).  
 
We have repeatedly upheld the HAC aggravating circumstance in cases 
where the victim has been viciously stabbed numerous times.  See, e.g., Guzman v. 
State, 721 So. 2d 1155, 1159-60 (Fla. 1998); Mahn v. State, 714 So. 2d 391, 399 
(Fla. 1998); Rolling v. State, 695 So. 2d 278, 296 (Fla. 1997); Williamson v. State, 
681 So. 2d 688, 698 (Fla. 1996); Finney v. State, 660 So. 2d 674, 685 (Fla. 1995); 
Barwick v. State, 660 So. 2d 685, 696 (Fla. 1995); Pittman v. State, 646 So. 2d 
167, 173 (Fla. 1994); Hardwick v. State, 521 So. 2d 1071, 1076 (Fla. 1988); Nibert 
v. State, 508 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1987); Johnston v. State, 497 So. 2d 863, 871 (Fla. 
 
 
- 60 -
1986); Peavy v. State, 442 So. 2d 200, 202 (Fla. 1983).  In Francis v. State, 808 So. 
2d 110, 134-35 (Fla. 2002), this Court noted that it has upheld the application of 
HAC even when the "medical examiner determined that the victim was conscious 
for merely seconds."  Id. at 135.  In Rolling, we upheld the application of the HAC 
aggravating circumstance even when the medical examiner testified that the 
"victim would have remained alive for a period of thirty to sixty seconds."  
Rolling, 695 So. 2d at 296.  Additionally, in Peavy the Court determined that the 
application of HAC was not improper when the medical examiner testified the 
victim would have lost consciousness within seconds.  See 442 So. 2d at 202-03.  
Based on the evidence presented and detailed in the trial court’s sentencing order, 
we conclude that there was competent, substantial evidence supporting the trial 
court’s finding that HAC applied to the murder of Martin.  Moreover, the trial 
court here applied the correct rule of law when it read the standard jury instruction 
on the HAC aggravator.  See Cave v. State, 727 So. 2d 227, 229 (Fla. 1998) 
(finding that trial court applied the correct rule of law in a felony murder case 
where it gave the standard jury instruction on HAC).  Given the above analysis, we 
determine that the evidence supports the trial court’s finding of HAC in the instant 
matter. 
 
In addition to the above assertions, Perez also contends that there was a lack 
of competent and substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that the 
 
 
- 61 -
HAC aggravating circumstance could be applied to him.  We agree with Perez that 
the trial court improperly found the HAC aggravator applicable to him.  In Omelus 
v. State, 584 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1991), this Court reversed a trial court's sentence of 
death and remanded for resentencing in a felony murder case where there was no 
evidence  
that Omelus knew how Jones would carry out the murder of Mitchell, 
and, . . . no evidence to show that Omelus directed Jones to kill 
Mitchell in the manner in which this murder was accomplished.  
Under these circumstances, where there is no evidence of knowledge 
of how the murder would be accomplished, we find that the heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel aggravating factor cannot be applied vicariously. 
Id. at 566.  Again, in Williams v. State, 622 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1993), this Court 
determined that HAC "cannot be applied vicariously, absent a showing by the State 
that the defendant directed or knew how the victim would be killed."  Id. at 463.  In 
Archer v. State, 613 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1993), we determined that "a defendant who 
arranges for a killing but who is not present and who does not know how the 
murder will be accomplished cannot be subjected vicariously to the heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel aggravator."  Id. at 448 (emphasis supplied). 
 
The State asserts that Perez's case is distinguishable from Archer and other 
cases applying Omelus because Perez was present at the scene of the murder.  
Initially, we note that the language quoted above from Archer, alluding to the 
defendant not being present, merely refers to the facts that were before the Court in 
Archer.  This language in Archer was not intended to modify the standard with 
 
 
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regard to “directing or knowing” that the Court announced in Omelus to only apply 
to those defendants who were not present at the scene.  The State also relies on two 
of our previous opinions in which we upheld the vicarious application of HAC to 
defendants found guilty of felony murder.  See Cave v. State, 727 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 
1998); Copeland v. State, 457 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1984).  However, a review of the 
facts in those cases cited by the State reveals that the conduct by the defendant in 
each case was more culpable than the only conduct established by the record in the 
instant matter on the part of Perez.  For example, in Cave, this Court upheld the 
application of HAC where the trial court found that the  
Defendant personally removed the victim from the convenience store 
at gun point, placed her in the back seat of the car in which he and a 
co-defendant were seated, heard her pleas for her life during a fifteen 
to eighteen minute ride to an isolated area, removed her from the car 
and turned her over to Bush and Parker who stabbed and then shot 
her.  At some point her panties were wet with urine.  The terror she 
experienced must have been horrible and meets the definition of 
especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. 
727 So. 2d. at 229.  Copeland v. State, the second case to which the State refers, is 
also inapplicable to the instant matter.  Initially, Copeland was decided seven years 
before our decision in Omelus.  Moreover, in affirming the trial court’s application 
of HAC to the defendant in Copeland, we noted that the defendant was an equal 
participant in the hours-long ordeal that involved the defendant initially 
confronting the victim at gunpoint, the kidnapping of the victim, and ending with 
her eventual rape and execution-style murder carried out with the defendant’s gun.  
 
 
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See 457 So. 2d at 1015, 1019.  Based on the foregoing, we conclude that these 
cases are distinguishable from the instant matter because they all involved conduct 
on the part of the defendant that established a significantly higher level of 
culpability than that which is attributable to Perez here and, therefore, do not 
support the application of the HAC aggravator to Perez. 
 
Additionally, the lack of any indication by the trial court in its sentencing 
order indicating that the trial court even considered the law as outlined by Omelus 
and its progeny gives us great concern with regard to whether the trial court 
appropriately applied this aggravating circumstance to Perez.  In its sentencing 
order finding HAC applicable to Perez, the trial court merely stated that  
[b]ased on the medical evidence presented and the defensive wound to 
Susan Martin's hand, as well as the admissions by Perez, the Court 
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Susan Martin was alive and 
conscious during some of the multiple stab wounds, and . . . that her 
murder was unnecessarily torturous, conscienceless, and pitiless.  
However, the only eyewitness evidence presented at trial was the statement of 
Perez in which he never admitted striking Martin, and he consistently stated that 
Green committed the murder of his own accord and without prior discussion with 
or notice to Perez.  Given the trial court's failure to make the findings required by 
Omelus to apply the HAC aggravator vicariously to Perez, and the lack of any 
evidence establishing that Perez directed or otherwise knew that Martin would be 
killed or the manner of death, we conclude that the trial court erred in applying the 
 
 
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HAC aggravator to Perez.  Although the record clearly demonstrates that the 
manner in which Susan Martin was murdered may qualify as HAC under our 
previous case law, we conclude that the evidence does not support the application 
of that aggravating circumstance vicariously to Perez under the only evidence in 
this record.   
 
Given our conclusion that HAC was erroneously applied to Perez, we must 
now determine whether resentencing is required or if the error was harmless and 
the death penalty still appropriate based on the remaining valid aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances.  See Hill v. State, 643 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1994) 
("When this Court strikes one or more aggravating circumstances relied upon by a 
trial judge in sentencing a defendant to death, we may conduct a harmless error 
analysis based on what the sentencer actually found in determining whether the 
sentence of death is still appropriate.").  Under this analysis we are required to 
determine whether there is any reasonable probability that the trial court’s error in 
applying HAC to Perez contributed to the sentence of death entered in this case.  
See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla. 1986).  With the striking of the 
HAC aggravator, two aggravating circumstances remain––prior violent felony 
conviction, see § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat (2001); and the merged aggravators of 
commission while engaged, or an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt 
to commit or in flight after committing or attempting to commit a robbery or a 
 
 
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burglary of a dwelling, see § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2001), and commission for 
pecuniary gain, see § 921.141(5)(f), Fla. Stat. (2001).  The trial court also found 
that one statutory mitigating circumstance had been established, extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance, see § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001), along with fourteen 
nonstatutory mitigating factors.  See supra note 3.  Given the State's emphasis on 
the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating factor during the sentencing phase 
before the jury and the fact that the trial court found one statutory mitigating factor 
along with fourteen nonstatutory mitigators, we cannot say that the consideration 
by the jury and the trial judge of this aggravating factor was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The dissent contends that all that is necessary in this case is for 
the Court to remand the instant matter for a new sentencing proceeding before the 
trial judge.  See concurring in part and dissenting in part op. at 70.  However, given 
the significant weight that has historically been accorded to the HAC aggravator, 
see Morton v. State, 789 So. 2d 324, 331 (Fla. 2001) (“CCP and HAC . . . ‘are two 
of the most serious aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme.’”) 
(quoting Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999)), we conclude that a new 
penalty phase proceeding is required because we cannot say beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the penalty phase jury's improper consideration of the HAC aggravator 
did not contribute to the recommended sentence of death.  For the reasons stated 
 
 
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herein, we affirm Perez’s convictions, reverse the sentence of death, and remand 
this case for a new penalty phase proceeding.12 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and LEWIS, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, C.J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J., 
concurs. 
WELLS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
QUINCE, J., concurs. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only with an opinion. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
PARIENTE, C.J., concurring specially. 
 
I agree that a new penalty phase is required in this case.  I would go further 
and caution the trial court on remand against discounting Perez’s mitigation based 
on mental illness and victimization by sexual abuse as a child on grounds that these 
factors make him dangerous.  In its sentencing order, the trial court assigned little 
weight to both the statutory mitigator of extreme mental or emotional disturbance 
and the nonstatutory mitigator of sexual victimization as a child on grounds that 
Perez’s background and personality disorders make him a dangerous person.  
Because future dangerousness is a prohibited nonstatutory aggravating 
                                          
 
 
12.  Given our disposition of this case, it is unnecessary for us to conduct a 
proportionality review at this time. 
 
 
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circumstance, the trial court should not factor this determination into its assessment 
of the weight assigned to these mitigating circumstances on remand. 
 
A sentencing court is limited to the statutory aggravating circumstances 
listed in section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes.  See Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882, 
885 (Fla. 1979).  Future dangerousness is not on the list.  We have stated that we 
“must guard against any unauthorized aggravating factor going into the equation 
which might tip the scales of the weighing process in favor of death.”  Elledge v. 
State, 346 So. 2d 998, 1003 (Fla. 1977).  By factoring future dangerousness into 
the weight given a mitigating factor, the sentencing court runs the risk of 
converting mitigation into prohibited nonstatutory aggravation.   
 
Mitigating factors weigh against imposition of death because they reduce or 
extenuate an offender’s moral culpability for the crime.  See Merck v. State, 763 
So. 2d 295, 298 (Fla. 2000); Wickham v. State, 593 So. 2d 191, 194 (Fla. 1991).  If 
a mental illness or childhood trauma makes a defendant dangerous, that 
dangerousness should not detract from the weight given to the mitigating factor.  
On the contrary, the fact that an immutable aspect of the defendant’s character or 
background has contributed to making him or her dangerous is precisely why the 
factor mitigates responsibility in the calculus of capital punishment.  In our recent 
decision reversing a death sentence on proportionality grounds in Crook v. State, 
908 So. 2d 350, 358-59 (Fla. 2005), we noted that mental health testimony related 
 
 
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the rage and brutal conduct in the murder to the defendant’s brain damage and 
mental deficiencies.  As we stated in Crook, “our case law has consistently held 
that these substantial mental deficiencies merit great consideration in evaluating a 
defendant’s culpability in a proportionality assessment.”  Id. at 358. 
 
In Miller, this Court vacated a sentence of death because of improper 
consideration of future dangerousness in making the sentencing decision.  We 
stated: 
The legislature has not authorized consideration of the probability of 
recurring violent acts by the defendant if he is released on parole in 
the distant future. To the contrary, a large number of the statutory 
mitigating factors reflect a legislative determination to mitigate the 
death penalty in favor of a life sentence for those persons whose 
responsibility for their violent actions has been substantially 
diminished as a result of a mental illness, uncontrolled emotional state 
of mind, or drug abuse. 
Miller, 373 So. 2d at 886.  The trial court’s concern in Miller was that the 
defendant would kill again if released on parole after twenty-five years under the 
sentencing structure then in place.  See also Norris v. State, 429 So. 2d 688, 690 
(Fla. 1983) (stating that concern voiced by sentencing judge over possibility that 
defendant could be paroled someday is “an improper consideration by judge or 
jury”).  Future dangerousness remains improper nonstatutory aggravation under the 
current statutory scheme in which parole is foreclosed for a sentence of life 
imprisonment for first-degree murder.  There is even less justification for future 
 
 
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dangerousness weighing in favor of death where the danger remains within prison 
walls. 
 
Accordingly, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s 
determination of future dangerousness did not taint its assessment of the weight 
given these mitigating factors.  I would caution the trial court on remand against 
reducing the weight given to proven mitigation on grounds that the defendant’s 
mental disorders or childhood trauma have made him dangerous to others.   
ANSTEAD, J., concurs. 
 
 
 
 
WELLS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur in affirming the conviction.  I dissent from the determination that 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) was not an aggravator.  I would affirm the 
finding of HAC on the basis of Cave v. State, 727 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 1998). 
 
Moreover, I believe that the majority errs in remanding this case for a new 
penalty phase.  At most, there should only be a new sentencing before the trial 
judge. 
QUINCE, J., concurs. 
 
 
 
ANSTEAD, J., concurring in result only. 
 
 
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I concur in the result of the majority’s holding, and I also concur in Chief 
Justice Pariente’s observations in her separate opinion. 
 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for St. Lucie County,  
Burton C. Conner, Judge - Case No. 56 2001 CF003058A 
 
Diamond R. Litty, Public Defender and Gary Lee Caldwell, Assistant Public 
Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Mitchell Egber and 
Leslie T. Campbell, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee