Title: STATE v OWENS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14416
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: June 29, 1979

No. 14416 m THE SPREME m u m ' O F THE S T m O F M3m"ANA 1979 THE S T - OF PDYI'ANA, Plaintiff and Fkspondent, ALFRED V E R N m C P E N S , a/k/a AZ; O W E N S , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal fran: D i s t r i c t Court of the Thirteenth Judicial D i s t r i c t , Honorable C. B. Sande, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: John L. Adams, Billings, Mntana Leonard Haxby argued, Butte, Mntana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, H e l e n a , PJbntana Sheri Sprigg argued, A s s i s t a n t Attomey General, Helena, Mntana Harold Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Mntana Submitted: June 5, 1979 Decided: Filed : JUN ? 9 1979 . - JUN 2 3 M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l delivered t h e Opinion of the Court. Defendant Alfred Owens w a s convicted of t h e crimesf of mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide and robbery i n t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court of Yellowstone County following a jury trial. Defen- d a n t appeals. The information charged defendant Alfred Owens and h i s brother, L. D. Owens, with four counts: Count I charged t h e codefendants with d e l i b e r a t e homicide committed purposely o r knowingly. Alternatively, Count I1 charged t h e codefendants with d e l i b e r a t e homicide while engaged i n t h e commission of a felony. Count I11 charged t h e codefendants with robbery. Count I V charged t h e codefendants with aggravated kidnap- ping. L. D. Owens pleaded g u i l t y t o Counts I1 and 111. Counts I and I V w e r e dismissed as t o him. Commencing May 8, 1978, defendant Alfred Owens w a s t r i e d . The jury found him g u i l t y of mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide, a lesser included offense of Counts I and 11, and of robbery. I t found him n o t g u i l t y of aggravated kidnap- ping. On June 1 4 , 1978, defendant w a s sentenced. Some con- fusion r e s u l t e d , as t h e c o u r t minutes s t a t e defendant was sentenced t o 40 years on each count t o run consecutively, while t h e judgment states t h e sentences a r e t o run concur- r e n t l y . Defendant Alfred Owens appeals. The f a c t s leading t o t h i s appeal are a s follows. I n late 1977 defendant Alfred Owens, h i s older brother, L. D . Owens, and h i s b r o t h e r ' s g i r l f r i e n d , Betty Shipes, l e f t C a l i f o r n i a heading f o r Texas. By a c i r c u i t o u s r o u t e , t h e t r i o a r r i v e d i n Laurel, Montana, i n t h e afternoon of November 27, 1977, and rented a motel room. Sometime during t h e afternoon of t h e i r a r r i v a l , defen- dant, accompanied by h i s brother, purchased and signed f o r a box of .410 shotgun s h e l l s , ostensibly t o do some b i r d hunting and t a r g e t shooting. Neither defendant nor h i s brother purchased a hunting license. After dropping Shipes o f f a t a laundromat near t h e motel, defendant and L. D. went t o town where they s t a r t e d drinking i n various bars. About midnight, defendant, who estimated he had drunk a case of beer during t h e day, returned t o t h e motel room t o go t o bed. L. D . , a f t e r accompanying defendant back t o t h e room, l e f t again t o go eat breakfast. While o u t t h i s second t i m e , L. D. m e t Kenneth Olson and subsequently i n v i t e d him back t o t h e motel. Once there, a f t e r a s h o r t conversation, L. D. decided t o rob Olson, and drew t h e shotgun on him. Apparently, it w a s t h e sound of L. D. loading t h e gun t h a t woke defendant. During the robbery Shipes, who was feigning s l e e p , heard defendant t e l l Olson t h a t he had b e t t e r do what L. D. said. After emptying Olson's pockets, L. D . , defendant, and Olson l e f t t h e motel room. There i s some d i s p u t e over whether L. D. ordered defendant t o accompany him o r threatened him i n any manner. According t o Shipes, however, L. D. did n o t t h r e a t e n defendant i n any manner and merely s a i d " l e t ' s go" before a l l t h r e e l e f t . The t h r e e l e f t t h e motel room and g o t i n t o Shipes' c a r . Defendant was driving with Olson on t h e f r o n t s e a t next t o him and L. D. i n t h e back holding t h e shotgun. ~ l t h o u g h L. D. i n i t i a l l y indicated t h a t he intended only t o take Olson o u t somewhere and t i e him up, defendant conceded t h a t \ it soon became c l e a r t h a t L. D. intended t o k i l l Olson. ~ f t e r a running argument between defendant and L. D. while driving i n t o t h e country, defendant stopped t h e c a r , g o t o u t , and began walking back t o town. L. D. then drove t h e c a r a s h o r t distance, s t i l l holding t h e shotgun on Olson i n t h e f r o n t seat next t o him. L. D. then ordered Olson t o g e t o u t of t h e c a r and t o l i e face down on t h e ground, and then s h o t him a t l e a s t twice. Olson, s h o t i n t h e back of t h e head and lower back, died within minutes. L . D. turned t h e c a r around and on h i s way back i n t o town picked up defendant. I t is disputed whether, a f t e r L. D. had picked him up, defendant handed L. D. another s h e l l , saying t h a t they should shoot Olson again t o be sure. It i s a l s o disputed as t o what happened next. Both defendant's and L. D . ' s testimony a t t r i a l was i n t e r n a l l y contradictory and tended t o be i l l o g i c a l i n p o s i t i n g t h e next sequence of events. According t o t h e reading of t h a t testimony most favorable t o defendant, he dropped L. D. off downtown where t h e l a t t e r g o t Olson's v e h i c l e and drove it t o t h e Yellowstone River. After ransacking the v e h i c l e and stashing t h e s t o l e n goods under some bushes, L. D. then drove it i n t o t h e r i v e r and walked back t o t h e motel. Upon a r r i v i n g a t t h e motel, L. D. g o t Shipes' c a r , drove back t o t h e r i v e r alone, and packed t h e s t o l e n goods i n t h e trunk. H e then returned t o t h e motel where he met defendant who had been o u t walking t o c l e a r h i s head. According t o t h e testimony of t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r ar- r e s t i n g defendant, however, defendant t o l d him t h a t he had followed L. D. o u t t o t h e r i v e r where they had both ran- sacked Olson's truck and then returned t o t h e motel. L o D. too t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l (and i n an e a r l i e r statement) t h a t defendant helped ransack Olson's vehicle. A s noted, both L. D . ' S and defendant's testimony a t t r i a l tended t o be unclear as t o defendant's r o l e i n ransacking Olson's truck, e s p e c i a l l y on such points as L. D. walking t h e one and one- half o r two m i l e s back t o town from t h e site where he drove t h e v e h i c l e i n t o t h e r i v e r , and how L. D. managed t o d r i v e Shipes' c a r back t o pick up t h e goods when apparently de- fendant had one set of keys with him and Shipes had t h e o t h e r set i n her purse. I n any event, both L. D. and defendant returned a t t h e same t i m e t o t h e motel where they and Shipes packed up and l e f t town, headed f o r Texas. En route, according t o Shipes, defendant d i c t a t e d t o her a list of t h e r i f l e s taken from Olson's truck which she took down on her C a l i f o r n i a motor v e h i c l e code book. This book w a s eventually introduced i n t o evidence. Shipes f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t defendant and L. D. p e r i o d i c a l l y discussed t h e i n c i d e n t after they had l e f t Montana. Along t h e way t h e p a r t i e s apparently pawned o r sold various r i f l e s and o t h e r i t e m s taken from Olson's truck. Although defendant denied t h a t he received any money from t h e sale of these i t e m s , he d i d concede " t h e money went i n t o t h e gas tank and such as that." Defendant a l s o admitted he wore Olson's wristwatch which L. D. had given him. The t h r e e stayed together u n t i l Kansas where, a f t e r L. D. and defendant had an argument, defendant separated from L o D. and Shipes. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , Shipes t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e reason defendant gave her f o r leaving w a s t h a t he (defendant) was a f r a i d he would h u r t L. D. Eventually L. D. was a r r e s t e d i n Texas and gave a statement implicating defendant, i n order, he s a i d a t t r i a l , t o keep Shipes from incarceration. I n t h i s statement, which w a s used a t t r i a l t o impeach h i s testimony, L. D. s t a t e d t h a t defendant had, i n f a c t , accompanied L. D. and Olson t o t h e s p o t where t h e latter w a s s h o t and had ordered Olson t o l i e down j u s t before L. D. s h o t him. L. D. f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t while he, defendant, and Olson w e r e d r i v i n g o u t t o t h e country, he and defendant had robbed Olson again, apparently g e t t i n g h i s r i n g s and watch. Shipes, i n c i d e n t a l l y , was never charged i n t h i s matter. Defendant was subsequently a r r e s t e d i n Tucson, Arizona, where he too gave a statement t o a u t h o r i t i e s a s noted above. Upon t h e i r r e t u r n t o Montana, L. D. Owens pleaded g u i l t y t o charges of d e l i b e r a t e homicide and robbery and received a sentence of 140 years. Defendant Alfred Owens was t r i e d and found g u i l t y of mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide and robbery and received a sentence of 40 years on each count. Because of a c o n f l i c t between t h e c o u r t minute e n t r y and t h e judgment, it i s unclear as t o whether these sen- tences a r e t o run consecutively o r concurrently. Defendant appeals. The i s s u e s presented f o r review are: 1. W a s t h e r e s u f f i c i e n t corroboration of t h e testimony of L. D. Owens t o connect defendant t o t h e commission of t h e crimes? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court admit improper hearsay testimony? 3 . W a s t h e D i s t r i c t Court's r e f u s a l of defendant's offered i n s t r u c t i o n concerning compulsion r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r ? 4 . Was t h e D i s t r i c t Court's r e f u s a l of defendant's o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n concerning accountability r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r ? 5. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court sentence defendant t o two forty-year t e r m s t o run consecutively o r concurrently? ~ e f e n d a n t ' s f i r s t i s s u e concerns t h e requirement t h a t t h e testimony of an accomplice i n a criminal a c t must be corroborated by o t h e r independent testimony o r evidence which connects t h e defendant t o t h e commission of t h e crime before t h e defendant can be convicted of t h e crime. This requirement i s c o d i f i e d a s s e c t i o n 95-3012, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 46-16-213 MCA: "A conviction cannot be had on t h e testimony of one responsible o r l e g a l l y accountable f o r t h e same offense, as defined i n 94-2-106, unless t h e testimony is corroborated by o t h e r evidence which i n i t s e l f and without t h e a i d of t h e testimony of t h e one responsible o r l e g a l l y accountable f o r t h e s a m e o f f e n s e tends t o connect t h e defendant with t h e commission of t h e offense. The corrobo- r a t i o n i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t i f it merely shows t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e o r t h e circumstances t h e r e o f . " Defendant's argument b a s i c a l l y i s t h a t t h e r e w a s no evidence, o t h e r than t h e testimony of L. D. Owens, h i s convicted accomplice, t o connect him t o t h e commission of t h e offenses f o r which he was convicted. W e disagree. W e discussed t h e nature and q u a l i t y of t h e required corroborative evidence i n S t a t e v. Coleman (1978) , Mont. , 579 P.2d 732, 748, 35 St.Rep. 560, 576-77: "The r u l e on corroboration i s s t a t e d i n S t a t e v. Cobb (1926), 76 Mont. 89, 245 P. 265. I n t h a t case, w e held t h a t t h e corroborating evi- dence may be supplied by t h e defendant o r h i s witnesses; it may be c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence; it need n o t be s u f f i c i e n t t o s u s t a i n a conviction o r e s t a b l i s h a prima f a c i e c a s e of g u i l t ; and it need n o t be s u f f i c i e n t t o connect t h e defendant with t h e crime b u t must tend t o connect him with t h e crime. I n S t a t e v. Keckonen (1938), 107 Mont. 253, 84 P.2d 341, we held t h a t where t h e a l l e g e d corrobative evidence i s equally consonant w i t h a reasonable explanation pointing toward in- nocent conduct on t h e p a r t of defendant, then such evidence does n o t tend t o connect him with t h e commission of t h e offense and i s i n t h e realm of speculation, not corroboration. Where t h e claimed corroboration shows no more than an op- portunity t o commit a crime and simply proves sus- picion, it i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t corroboration t o j u s t i f y a conviction upon t h e testimony of an ac- complice. S t a t e v. Jones (1933), 9 5 Mont. 317, 26 P.2d 341." Applying t h e s e r u l e s , w e conclude t h a t t h e corroborating evidence presented a t t r i a l i s s u f f i c i e n t t o s u s t a i n defen- d a n t ' s conviction. From Brenda Dennis, a c l e r k i n a s t o r e i n Laurel, t h e jury heard t h a t on t h e afternoon before Olson was k i l l e d , defendant purchased and signed f o r a box of .410 shotgun s h e l l s of t h e type used t o k i l l Olson. Defendant's argument t h a t t h e lack of defendant's f i n g e r p r i n t s on t h e s h e l l s found a t t h e murder scene eliminates any corroborative value i s completely unpersuasive. L. D . ' s f i n g e r p r i n t s were not found on these s h e l l s e i t h e r , y e t he admitted t h a t he had used them t o k i l l Olson. From Betty Shipes, who was n o t an accomplice t o t h e crimes, t h e jury heard t h a t the defendant i n s t r u c t e d Olson t o do a s L. D. d i r e c t e d during t h e robbery i n t h e motel room; t h a t defendant made no attempt t o s t o p L. D. from robbing Olson; and t h a t L. D. never threatened o r ordered defendant t o a s s i s t him i n t h e robbery. Shipes a l s o testi- f i e d t h a t she heard defendant, L. D., and Olson leave t h e motel together; t h a t only L. D. and defendant returned, again together; and t h a t upon t h e i r r e t u r n , t h e p a r t y h a s t i l y packed up and l e f t town. She f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t , a f t e r t h e group had l e f t town, defendant d i c t a t e d t o her a list of weapons t h a t had been taken from Olson's vehicle. From Robert Lough, t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r who a r r e s t e d defendant i n Arizona, t h e jury heard during t h e S t a t e ' s re- b u t t a l t h a t defendant had admitted t h a t he had aided L. D. i n robbing t h e v i c t i m i n t h e motel room and t h a t he had l e f t t h e scene of t h e homicide only because he believed it w a s an inappropriate p l a c e as he thought they had stopped i n some- o n e ' s driveway, n o t because he n e c e s s a r i l y believed t h e a c t i t s e l f w a s wrong. Lough f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t defendant s t a t e d t o him t h a t he had helped ransack and dispose of Olson's v e h i c l e and t h a t he had himself sold one of t h e shotguns taken from Olson's vehicle. F i n a l l y , from defendant himself, t h e jury heard t h a t he d i d purchase t h e shotgun s h e l l s used t o k i l l Olson. De- fendant a l s o admitted t h a t during t h e robbery of Olson i n t h e motel room, he had t o l d Olson t o do as L. D. d i r e c t e d . Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t he drove L. D. and Olson o u t i n t o t h e country almost t o t h e site where Olson was k i l l e d ; t h a t a f t e r hearing Olson being s h o t , he drove L. D. back i n t o town; and t h a t later he, L. D. and Shipes packed up hur- r i e d l y and l e f t town. Although defendant denied r e c e i v i n g any s p o i l s from t h e robbery, he d i d concede t h a t t h e money received from t h e sale of t h e s t o l e n i t e m s financed t h e group's journey toward Texas and t h a t , a f t e r t h e group had l e f t Montana, he w a s given Olson's wristwatch by L. D. A person may be convicted of d e l i b e r a t e homicide i f such homicide " i s committed while t h e offender i s . . . an accomplice i n t h e commission of . . . o r f l i g h t a f t e r com- m i t t i n g . . . any o t h e r felony which involves t h e use o r t h r e a t of physical f o r c e o r violence a g a i n s t any i n d i v i - dual." Section 94-5-102 (1) (b) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 45- 5-102 MCA. C l e a r l y , t h i s evidence tends t o connect defendant with t h e of t h e offenses of robbery and homicide as a participant in the actual robbery and as an accomplice in the commission of and flight after the deliberate homicide of Kenneth Olson after the robbery. The second issue presented for review concerns the introduction through the testimony of one witness of a prior inconsistent statement made by another witness. The State correctly states that, as defendant made no objection at trial to the introduction of any of the testimony he now claims was improperly admitted hearsay, he is barred from predicating error on its admission on appeal, and therefore this Court need not consider the issue. Rule 103 (a) (1) , Mont.R.Evid.; State v. Armstrong (1977), Mont . I 562 P.2d 1129, 1132, 34 St.Rep. 213, 216. In a recent case presenting very similar circumstances, we stated: " . . . At any rate, defendants never objected to Wicks' testifying to the Peterson statement nor did they move to strike it from the record. They may not now object to its introduction." State v. Cripps (1978), Mont . , 582 P.2d 312, 317, 35 St.Rep. 967, 972. The same rule applies to the instant case. In any event, were we to examine defendant's contention on the merits, our ultimate conclusion would be unchanged. See State v. Longacre (1975), 168 Mont. 311, 312, 542 P.2d 1221, 1222; State v. Mally (1961), 139 Mont. 599, 609, 366 P.2d The third issue presented for review concerns the re- fusal of the District Court to give defendant's requested instruction on the defense of compulsion which read: "You are instructed that a person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense punishable with death, by reason of conduct which he per- forms under the compulsion of threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or serious bodily harm, if he reasonably believes that death or serious bodily harm will be inflicted upon him if he does not perform such conduct." Defendant i s c o r r e c t i n s t a t i n g t h a t where t h e r e i s evidence i n support of any defense o f f e r e d by an accused which r a i s e s an i s s u e of f a c t f a v o r a b l e t o him, t h e t r i a l c o u r t should p r e s e n t t h e i s s u e by an a f f i r m a t i v e i n s t r u c t i o n which e x p l a i n s t h e p e r t i n e n t law. S t a t e v. Azure (1977), Mont. 573 P.2d 179, 182, 34 St.Rep. 1569, 1573. However, "[wlhere t h e r e i s no evidence i n t h e record sup- p o r t i n g each element of t h e [compulsion] defense, t h e c o u r t may p r o p e r l y r e f u s e t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on t h e defense." S t a t e v. GallaNher (1978), Mont . , 580 P.2d 930, 935, 35 St.Rep. 848, 855. (Emphasis added.) The elements of t h e compulsion d e f e n s e a r e found i n s e c t i o n 94-3-110, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 45-2-212 MCA. Under t h a t s t a t u t e , f o r a defendant t o a v a i l himself of t h e defense of compulsion, he must show t h a t : (1) he was compelled t o perform t h e o f f e n s i v e conduct (2) by t h e t h r e a t o r menace (3) of t h e imminent i n f l i c t i o n ( 4 ) of d e a t h o r s e r i o u s b o d i l y harm, and t h a t ( 5 ) he b e l i e v e d t h a t d e a t h o r s e r i o u s bodily harm would be i n f l i c t e d upon him i f h e d i d n o t perform such conduct, and ( 6 ) h i s b e l i e f was reasonable. W e have examined t h e t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t and conclude t h a t defendant f a i l e d t o produce evidence i n s u p p o r t of s e v e r a l of t h e s e elements. There was a b s o l u t e l y no testimony t h a t L. D. Owens t h r e a t e n e d defendant a t any t i m e with t h e i m m i - n e n t i n f l i c t i o n of d e a t h o r s e r i o u s b o d i l y harm; defendant d i d n o t t e s t i f y h e believed h i s o l d e r b r o t h e r would have s h o t him had he r e f u s e d t o comply w i t h h i s d i r e c t i o n s . L. D . ' s statement when he, defendant, and Olson l e f t t h e motel room, according t o B e t t y Shipes, was simply " l e t ' s go." P r i o r t o t h a t t i m e , defendant himself had d i r e c t e d Olson t o comply w i t h L. D.'s o r d e r s , doing s o under abso- l u t e l y no t h r e a t from L. D. Although defendant contends t h a t during t h e d r i v e o u t t o Olson's execution s i t e L. D. repeatedly t o l d defendant t o be q u i e t and keep d r i v i n g , he admitted t h a t L. D. never pointed t h e shotgun a t him. Defendant eventually g o t o u t of t h e car and s t a r t e d walking back t o town, apparently without f e a r of any physical harm. Shortly t h e r e a f t e r , he volun- t a r i l y g o t back i n t o t h e car and drove L. D. back t o Laurel where he a l l e g e d l y dropped him o f f t o pick up Olson's ve- h i c l e . A f t e r t h i s p o i n t , defendant had t h e shotgun i n h i s possession i n Shipes' c a r and L. D. w a s n o t around. Yet de- fendant f a i l e d t o inform any a u t h o r i t i e s a s t o t h e i n c i d e n t involving Olson and i n f a c t v o l u n t a r i l y continued h i s as- s o c i a t i o n with L. D. by helping him pack up and then leaving town with him. These a r e hardly t h e a c t i o n s of a person who has j u s t been compelled t o perform an odious criminal act by t h e t h r e a t of imminent i n f l i c t i o n of s e r i o u s bodily harm o r death. I n f a c t , it appears from defendant's testimony t h a t he w a s more frightened of t h e s i t u a t i o n because he had never p a r t i c i p a t e d i n anything l i k e it before r a t h e r than of anything L. D. might have done. Indeed, it appears t h a t defendant w a s n o t a f r a i d of L. D. a t a l l - - t h e reason he l e f t L. D. and Shipes i n Kansas w a s t h a t he was a f r a i d t h a t he - might end up hurting L. D. The compulsion defense i s a narrow defense. A s t h e Commission Comment t o s e c t i o n 94-3-110 s t a t e s : "The j u s t i f i c a t i o n does not extend t o a c t i o n under t h r e a t of damage t o property, o r of i n j u r y less than s e r i o u s bodily harm o r even of death o r s e r i o u s bodily harm which i s n o t imminent; b u t t h e person's reasonable f e a r of imminent death o r s e r i o u s bodily harm i f mistaken, i s within t h e p r i n c i p l e . (See 1 Bishop on Criminal Law ( 9 t h ed.) 1 1 1 1 3 4 6 t o 348.) "This e s t a b l i s h e d type of formulation has been c r i t i c i z e d . However, t o broaden t h e defense t o accord completely with t h e ' f r e e w i l l ' theory would be t o i n v i t e r o u t i n e contentions of some kind of pressure, such as ' t h r e a t s of harm t o property, r e p u t a t i o n , h e a l t h , general s a f e t y , and t o a c t s done under t h e o r d e r s , ' with accom- panying a s s e r t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n a l i t y weak- ness. (Newman and Weitzer, supra, a t 334.) Prof. Wharton, a f t e r s t a t i n g t h e e s t a b l i s h e d r e s t r i c t i o n s upon t h e defense, comments: 'It would be a most dangerous r u l e i f a defendant could s h i e l d himself from prosecution f o r crime by merely s e t t i n g up a f e a r from o r because of t h r e a t of a t h i r d person.' (1 Wharton's C r i m i - n a l Law (19th e d . ) , 11384.)" Defendant f a i l e d t o introduce any evidence t h a t he f e a r e d t h e imminent i n f l i c t i o n of death o r s e r i o u s bodily i n j u r y o r t h a t he reasonably believed t h a t , i f he f a i l e d t o do as L. D. d i r e c t e d , such i n j u r y o r death would be i n f l i c t e d . The proposed i n s t r u c t i o n was properly refused. The f o u r t h i s s u e f o r review concerns t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o give defendant's proposed i n s t r u c t i o n on a c c o u n t a b i l i t y which s t a t e d : "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t some evidence has been introduced tending t o show t h a t a person o t h e r than t h e defendant, Alfred Owens, i s responsible f o r t h e crimes here charged. I f , a f t e r a con- s i d e r a t i o n of a l l t h e evidence, t h e r e remains i n your minds a reasonable doubt a s t o who i s respon- s i b l e f o r t h e crimes, then it i s your duty t o ac- q u i t . " The t r i a l c o u r t d i d g i v e t h e following i n s t r u c t i o n : "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t a person i s l e g a l l y ac- countable f o r t h e conduct of another when e i t h e r before o r during t h e commission of an offense, and with t h e purpose t o promote o r f a c i l i t a t e such commission, he s o l i c i t s , a i d s , a b e t s , agrees o r attempts t o a i d such person i n t h e planning o r commission of t h e offense." Sections 94-2-106 and 94-2-107, R.C.M. 1947, now sec- t i o n s 45-2-301 and 45-2-302 MCA, t h e s t a t u t e s on account- a b i l i t y , s t a t e i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "94-2-106. Accountability for conduct of another. A person i s responsible f o r conduct w h i z i s an element of an offense, i f t h e conduct i s e i t h e r t h a t of t h e person himself, o r t h a t of another and he i s l e g a l l y accountable f o r such conduct as provided i n s e c t i o n 94-2-107, o r both. "94-2-107. When a c c o u n t a b i l i t y e x i s t s . A person i s l e g a l l y accountable f o r t h e conduct of another when: " ( 3 ) e i t h e r before o r during t h e commission of an o f f e n s e , and w i t h t h e purpose t o promote o r f a c i - l i t a t e such commission, he s o l i c i t s , a i d s , a b e t s , a g r e e s o r a t t e m p t s t o a i d , such o t h e r person i n t h e planning o r commission of t h e o f f e n s e . " From a comparison of t h e s t a t u t e s w i t h d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n , it i s c l e a r t h a t t h e proposed i n s t r u c - t i o n i s an i n c o r r e c t statement of t h e law. I t c r e a t e s t h e d i s t i n c t impression t h a t t h e defendant could n o t be held r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e crimes charged i f somebody else a c t u a l l y performed t h e o f f e n s i v e conduct. This i s c o n t r a r y t o t h e s t a t u t e and has been r e j e c t e d by t h i s Court a t l e a s t s i n c e 1914. S t a t e v. Chevigny (1914), 48 Mont. 382, 385-86, 138 P. 257, 258. The law on a c c o u n t a b i l i t y was c o r r e c t l y pre- sented i n t h e g i v e n i n s t r u c t i o n . Defendant's proposed i n s t r u c t i o n was p r o p e r l y refused. The l a s t i s s u e presented f o r review is n o t r e a l l y an i s s u e a t a l l . The S t a t e concedes t h a t t h e two forty-year sentences given defendant a r e t o r u n c o n c u r r e n t l y a s speci- f i e d i n t h e judgment r a t h e r than consecutively a s s t a t e d i n t h e minute book e n t r y . Absent s p e c i a l circumstances i n d i - c a t i n g otherwise, t h e f i n a l formal judgment a s e n t e r e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o n t r o l s over an i n c o n s i s t e n t minute e n t r y . See, s e c t i o n 95-2404, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 46-20-104 MCA; S t a t e v. Herndon (1965), 1 Ariz.App. 180, 400 P.2d 851, 852. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed. %AS@- Chief J u s t i c e We concur: