Title: Dunbar v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC10-2296
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 3, 2012

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-2296 
____________ 
 
ANDRE ISAIAH DUNBAR,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[May 3, 2012] 
 
POLSTON, J. 
 
Andre Isaiah Dunbar seeks review of the decision of the Fifth District Court 
of Appeal in Dunbar v. State, 46 So. 3d 81 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (en banc), on the 
ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district 
court of appeal, Gardner v. State, 30 So. 3d 629 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), on a question 
of law.1  For the reasons that follow, we approve of the Fifth District‟s double 
jeopardy analysis but remand for resentencing with Dunbar present. 
 
 
                                         
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
Following a jury trial in 2009, Andre Isaiah Dunbar was found guilty of 
robbery with a firearm, two counts of aggravated assault with a firearm, and grand 
theft.  Dunbar, 46 So. 3d at 82.  The jury made special findings that Dunbar 
actually possessed the firearm in committing the robbery and in both instances of 
aggravated assault. 
At sentencing, the trial court orally pronounced a life sentence for robbery 
with a firearm.  However, the trial court failed to include in its oral pronouncement 
the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for robbery with a firearm required by 
section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (2008).  46 So. 2d at 82-83.  Later that day and 
without the parties present, the trial court entered a written sentencing order 
including the mandatory minimum term.  See id. at 82. 
On appeal to the Fifth District, Dunbar argued that the mandatory minimum 
term must be stricken from the written sentence because it did not conform to the 
sentence as orally rendered.  Id.  In affirming Dunbar‟s written sentence, the Fifth 
District reasoned that, because “imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence 
under section 775.087(2) . . . is a nondiscretionary duty of a trial court when the 
record indicates that the defendant qualifies for mandatory minimum sentencing,” 
the oral sentence in Dunbar‟s case was properly subject to the trial court‟s 
correction.  Id.   
 
 
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Furthermore, the Fifth District in Dunbar explained that, because the original 
sentence was invalid, double jeopardy principles were not implicated by the later 
addition of harsher terms.  Id. at 83.  In reaching its conclusion that there was no 
double jeopardy violation, the Fifth District reaffirmed the law as set forth in a 
prior decision, Allen v. State, 853 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), where it 
held that a similar correction did not violate double jeopardy protections because 
the original sentence was “illegal” and “subject to correction” under Florida Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) “at any time.” 
In contrast to the Fifth District‟s decision in Dunbar, the Second District in 
Gardner, 30 So. 3d at 632, held that double jeopardy considerations precluded the 
later addition of a ten-year mandatory minimum term, even where the trial court 
had no discretion to withhold the term.  In Gardner, the trial court originally failed 
to orally pronounce the term required by section 775.087(2), then recalled Gardner 
after the prosecution belatedly objected to the mistake.  Id. at 630-31.  When 
Gardner had been returned to the courtroom, the trial court orally pronounced the 
correct sentence, including the mandatory minimum term.  Id. at 631.   
On appeal to the Second District, Gardner sought reversal of the sentence 
ultimately imposed, arguing that correction of his original sentence violated double 
jeopardy principles.  Id. at 630.  The Second District acknowledged that the 
original sentence was “apparently erroneous” but still agreed with Gardner that the 
 
 
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trial court “had no authority to reopen the proceedings once the hearing had 
concluded and double jeopardy had attached” because “Florida law generally 
accords a level of finality to a sentence once it has been orally pronounced and the 
defendant has begun to serve the sentence.”  Id. at 632 (quoting Delemos v. State, 
969 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)).   
Judge Altenbernd dissented from the Second District‟s decision in Gardner, 
reasoning as follows: 
In Delemos v. State, 969 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), I 
suggested that the Florida law on the issue of when a sentence 
becomes final for purposes of double jeopardy may be overly 
restrictive and that the U.S. Constitution may permit a longer window 
of time in which courts could correct errors made during oral 
pronouncement.  I continue to believe that our case law does not 
reflect the extent to which simple human error is inevitable in oral 
pronouncements and that the constitutional doctrine of double 
jeopardy was never intended to make sentencing a game in which 
mental errors by judges and attorneys are irreparable even when the 
error is discovered minutes later.  See United States v. DiFrancesco, 
449 U.S. 117, 135 (1980) (quoting Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 
160, 166-67 (1947), for the principle that “[t]he Constitution does not 
require that sentencing should be a game in which a wrong move by 
the judge means immunity for the prisoner”). 
           . . . . 
So long as a trial judge is not exercising his or her discretion to 
increase the severity of the overall sentence that the trial judge 
intended to impose at the oral pronouncement, I believe we could and 
should have a procedural mechanism by which trial judges are 
allowed to correct misstatements and confusions in sentences and to 
impose mandated sentencing conditions that were overlooked at oral 
pronouncement.  When a judge inadvertently imposes a fifteen-year 
sentence on a third-degree felony and a five-year sentence on a 
second-degree felony, for example, I do not understand why 
constitutional double jeopardy should bar the judge from imposing the 
 
 
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intended fifteen-year sentence for the second-degree felony even a 
few days after the mistake in the oral pronouncement. 
A defendant has a right to a legal sentence.  This defendant is 
about to receive the benefit of an illegal sentence, in all likelihood 
because a judge and several lawyers were anxious to go to lunch.  
Somehow, Florida‟s technical approach to double jeopardy allows 
inadvertent mistakes to give defendants the right not to legal 
sentences, but to sentences that are often more like half jeopardy.   
 
Gardner, 30 So. 2d at 634-35 (Altenbernd, J., dissenting).   
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Double Jeopardy 
Dunbar argues that the later addition of a mandatory minimum term violated 
his double jeopardy rights under both the federal and state constitutions because he 
was subjected to multiple punishments for the same offense.2  We disagree.3   
As it relates to barring multiple punishments for the same offense in the 
noncapital sentencing context, 
the application of the double jeopardy clause . . . turns on the extent 
and legitimacy of a defendant‟s expectation of finality in that 
sentence.  If a defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality, then 
an increase in that sentence is prohibited by the double jeopardy 
clause.  If, however, there is some circumstance which undermines the 
                                         
 
2.  “The scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause is the same in both the federal 
constitution and the Florida Constitution.”  Hall v. State, 823 So. 2d 757, 761 (Fla. 
2002). 
 
3.  “A double jeopardy claim based upon undisputed facts presents a pure 
question of law and is reviewed de novo.”  Pizzo v. State, 945 So. 2d 1203, 1206 
(Fla. 2006). 
 
 
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legitimacy of that expectation, then a court may permissibly increase 
the sentence. 
United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  In other words, the later 
imposition of more onerous terms “violates the double jeopardy clause only when 
it disrupts the defendant‟s legitimate expectations of finality.”  United States v. 
Young, 953 F.2d 1288, 1291 n.3 (11th Cir. 1992); see Goene v. State, 577 So. 2d 
1306, 1309 (Fla. 1991) (“Goene therefore had no legitimate expectation of finality 
in the sentence originally imposed and there is no double jeopardy prohibition 
against reimposition of a correct sentence.”).   
For example, the United States Supreme Court held in Bozza, 330 U.S. 160, 
that there was no violation of double jeopardy principles where the sentencing 
court later increased an original sentence that it had no discretion to impose.  See 
also DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 137 (“Bozza . . . demonstrate[s] that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause does not require that a sentence be given a degree of finality that 
prevents its later increase.”).  The defendant in Bozza was convicted of a federal 
crime that carried a mandatory minimum sentence of $100 and imprisonment, but 
the original oral pronouncement imposed only imprisonment.  330 U.S. at 165.  
Five hours later, the sentencing court recalled Bozza and pronounced a sentence 
including the mandatory fine.  Id.  In holding that the sentencing court had not 
violated Bozza‟s double jeopardy rights, the Supreme Court reasoned as follows:   
 
 
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This Court has rejected the “doctrine that a prisoner, whose guilt is 
established, by a regular verdict, is to escape punishment altogether, 
because the court committed an error in passing the sentence.”  The 
Constitution does not require that sentencing should be a game in 
which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the prisoner.  
In this case the court “only set aside what it had no authority to do and 
substitute[d] directions required by the law to be done upon the 
conviction of the offender.”  It did not twice put petitioner in jeopardy 
for the same offense.  The sentence, as corrected, imposes a valid 
punishment for an offense instead of an invalid punishment for that 
offense. 
Id. at 166-67 (citations and footnote omitted) (quoting In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 
260 (1894)).   
This Court has also stated that “[t]he Constitution does not require that 
sentencing should be a game in which a wrong move by the judge means immunity 
for the prisoner.”  Harris v. State, 645 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. 1994) (quoting 
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 135).  In Harris, the sentencing court originally sentenced 
Harris and failed to pronounce terms required by the habitual offender statute.  Id. 
at 387 & n.1.  Harris appealed from his convictions on other grounds, and, in the 
meantime, this Court issued a decision in another case4 clearly indicating that 
habitualization should have applied in Harris‟s case.  Id. at 387 n.1.  Therefore, on 
remand from Harris‟s successful appeal on other grounds, the sentencing court 
imposed the term.  Id.  Harris again appealed, this time arguing that double 
jeopardy protections precluded a more onerous sentence on remand.  Id.  In 
                                         
 
4.  Burdick v. State, 594 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1992). 
 
 
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rejecting his argument, this Court reasoned that “Harris had no expectation of 
finality regarding his sentence where he opened the door to the district court‟s 
appellate jurisdiction on an issue of law that was clarified while his case was still 
pending.”  Id. at 388; see also Goene, 577 So. 2d at 1309 (concluding that, because 
Goene had intentionally hidden information that would have resulted in a higher 
sentence, he “had no legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence originally 
imposed”).   
Here, in Dunbar, the trial court initially imposed a life sentence without the 
ten-year mandatory minimum sentencing term for robbery with a firearm under 
section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes.  The trial court initially pronounced a 
sentence it had no discretion to impose, realized its error later that day, and added 
the nondiscretionary mandatory minimum terms to the sentence.  We conclude that 
under these facts,5 Dunbar had no legitimate expectation of finality in his sentence 
                                         
 
5.  These facts are distinguishable from those prompting the general rule we 
announced in Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265, 1267 (Fla. 2003), that a sentence 
may not be increased after service has begun without violating double jeopardy 
protections.  Unlike the initial sentence in Dunbar, which the trial court had no 
discretion to impose, the initial sentence in Ashley was valid.  See Ashley, 850 So. 
2d at 1266-67.  The trial court in Ashley pronounced a sentence and later added 
terms of habitualization and imposed mandatory minimum terms, neither of which 
were required by law.  See § 775.084(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999) (“ „Habitual violent 
felony offender‟ means a defendant for whom the court may impose an extended 
term of imprisonment . . . .”) (emphasis added); § 775.084(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999) 
(“The court . . . may sentence the habitual violent felony offender as follows . . . .”) 
(emphasis added); State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345, 349 (Fla. 2000) (“[P]ursuant to 
that statute, trial judges have the discretion not to sentence a qualifying defendant 
 
 
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as orally pronounced and that the trial court did not violate double jeopardy 
principles by adding the term. 
The parties do not dispute that if the prosecution had properly appealed the 
sentence as orally pronounced, the sentence would have been reversed and 
remanded with instructions to impose the term.  See, e.g., State v. Scanes, 973 So. 
2d 659, 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); State v. Couch, 896 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2005); State v. Strazdins, 890 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); State v. Brendell, 
656 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).  In fact, the parties agree that defendants may 
receive increased sentences under that procedural framework without a violation of 
their double jeopardy rights.  We see no distinction for double jeopardy purposes 
between an increase in the sentence following remand and an increase in the 
sentence within the time allowed for filing an appeal.  See DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 
at 135-36 (“While Pearce dealt with the imposition of a new sentence after retrial 
rather than, as here, after appeal, that difference is no more than a „conceptual 
nicety.‟ ”) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 722 (1969)).  When a 
trial court fails to pronounce nondiscretionary sentencing terms, the defendant has 
                                                                                                                                   
as a habitual felony offender.”).  In contrast, no discretion is given to trial courts in 
deciding whether to impose mandatory minimum terms under section 775.087(2), 
which provides that “such person . . . shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 
imprisonment of 10 years.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
 
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no legitimate expectation in the finality of that sentence, at least until the reviewing 
court has issued a mandate or the time for filing an appeal has run. 
Accordingly, the trial court did not violate double jeopardy principles in 
adding the mandatory minimum term to Dunbar‟s sentence on the same day as oral 
pronouncement.  Dunbar had no legitimate expectation of finality in the initial 
sentence as orally pronounced because it did not include the nondiscretionary 
mandatory minimum term.   
B.  Due Process 
Dunbar also argues that he had a due process right to be present when the 
terms of his sentence were increased.  We agree.     
 
“ „One of the most basic tenets of Florida law is the requirement that all 
proceedings affecting life, liberty, or property must be conducted according to due 
process,‟ which includes a „reasonable opportunity to be heard.‟ ”  Jackson v. 
State, 767 So. 2d 1156, 1159 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Scull v. State, 569 So. 2d 1251, 
1252 (Fla. 1990)).  Therefore, “[c]riminal defendants have a due process right to be 
physically present in all critical stages of trial.”  Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 
343, 351 (Fla. 2001).  Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has determined 
that “a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal 
proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the 
fairness of the procedure.”  Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987).  A 
 
 
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violation of the right to presence is “subject to harmless error analysis and the 
proceeding will only be reversed on this basis if „fundamental fairness has been 
thwarted.‟ ”  Smithers v. State, 826 So. 2d 916, 927 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Kearse v. 
State, 770 So. 2d 1119, 1124 (Fla. 2000)); see Kormondy v. State, 983 So. 2d 418, 
429 (Fla. 2007) (“We hold that Kormondy‟s failure to be at these particular 
[pretrial] conferences did not affect the validity of the trial itself to the extent that 
the verdict could not have been obtained.”). 
We have held that a defendant‟s “right to be present extends to the hearing 
where her sentence will be reconsidered” because sentencing is “a critical stage of 
every criminal proceeding.”  Jackson, 767 So. 2d at 1160.  In fact, the right to be 
present at sentencing is “explicitly provided in the Florida Rules of Criminal 
Procedure,” id., which requires that “[i]n all prosecutions for crime the defendant 
shall be present . . . at the pronouncement of judgment and the imposition of 
sentence.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.180(a).   
In this case, Dunbar was entitled to be present when his sentence was 
increased because a sentencing proceeding in which a sentence is increased is a 
critical stage of trial at which the defendant‟s presence “would contribute to the 
fairness of the procedure.”  Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745.  Therefore, Dunbar‟s due 
process rights were violated.  A defendant‟s absence at resentencing constitutes 
 
 
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reversible error regardless of a defendant‟s opportunity to present additional 
evidence.  See Jackson, 767 So. 2d at 1160.       
Accordingly, the trial court erred in imposing mandatory minimum terms 
without Dunbar present. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Because double jeopardy does not bar imposition of the mandatory 
minimum term in this case, we approve of the Fifth District‟s double jeopardy 
analysis in Dunbar and disapprove of the Second District‟s decision in Gardner.  
Yet, because Dunbar had a right to be present when the mandatory minimum term 
was added to his sentence, we quash the decision of the Fifth District and remand 
for resentencing with Dunbar present.    
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur in result. 
QUINCE, J., concurs in result only. 
CANADY, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
CANADY, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I would approve the decision of the Fifth District that is on review.  
Although I fully concur in Justice Polston‟s opinion with respect to the double 
 
 
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jeopardy issue, I dissent from the decision to quash the Fifth District‟s decision and 
to remand for a sentencing proceeding with Dunbar present. 
 
I conclude that Dunbar has not established that fundamental error arose from 
the court‟s failure to impose the corrected sentence with Dunbar present.  The error 
here was not harmful, much less fundamental.  Given the mandatory duty of the 
sentencing court, there is no way in which Dunbar‟s presence “would contribute to 
the fairness of the procedure.”  Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987).  On 
the contrary, in the circumstances existing here, Dunbar‟s presence at a 
resentencing would be a prime example of a situation “when presence would be 
useless, or the benefit but a shadow.”  Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 
U.S. 97, 106-07 (1934)). 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D09-1903 
 
 
(Orange County) 
 
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and David Stewart Morgan, Assistant Public 
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Ann M. Phillips and 
Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
 
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