Title: Cole-Randazzo v. Ryan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 92443
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: November 28, 2001

Docket No. 92443-Agenda 17-November 2001.
DIEDRA L. COLE-RANDAZZO et al., Plaintiffs, v. JIM RYAN,
Illinois Attorney General, et al., Defendants.
Opinion filed November 28, 2001
	This is an original action under article IV, section 3 of the
Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §3)
challenging the validity of the redistricting plan approved by the
Illinois Legislative Redistricting Commission and filed with the
Secretary of State following the federal decennial census
conducted in the year 2000. Plaintiffs are three registered Illinois
voters, Diedra L. Cole-Randazzo of Rochester, Harry R. Walton
of Decatur, and Kamela S. Wood of Springfield. Defendants are
the Attorney General of Illinois, the Illinois Secretary of State, the
members of the Illinois State Board of Elections, and the Illinois
Legislative Redistricting Commission (the Commission) and its
members.
	Plaintiffs initiated this proceeding by filing a motion for leave
to file a complaint in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 382
(155 Ill. 2d R. 382). Plaintiffs' motion was granted and a briefing
schedule was established. The matter was subsequently set for oral
argument. Plaintiffs were allowed to file an amended complaint.
The court also permitted additional parties to intervene. James
"Pate" Philip, President of the Illinois Senate, and Lee Daniels,
Minority Leader in the Illinois House, were allowed to intervene
as additional plaintiffs. Emil Jones, Jr., the Minority Leader of the
Illinois Senate, and John Tully, a registered voter, were allowed to
intervene as additional defendants.
	In their complaint, as amended, plaintiffs challenge the
boundaries established by the Commission for the 51st Legislative
(Senate) District, which encompasses the 101st and 102nd
Representative Districts. They also challenge the boundaries fixed
by the Commission for the 99th and 100th Representative (House)
Districts. Intervenors Philip and Daniels attack the Commission's
redistricting plan as a whole, as well as various specific legislative
and representative districts, including Legislative Districts 29, 38,
51 and 55 and Representative Districts 15, 18, 35, 36, 75, 113 and
114.
	Legislative redistricting maps approved and filed under
section 3 of article IV of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. IV, §3) must meet four requirements. First, the
districts formed must be substantially equal in population. Second,
the districts must be configured in such a way as to provide
adequate representation to minorities and other special interests
protected by state and federal law. Third, the districts must be
compact and contiguous. Fourth, the maps must meet all legal
requirements regarding political fairness. People ex rel. Burris v.
Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d 270, 296 (1992); Schrage v. State Board of
Elections, 88 Ill. 2d 87, 92 (1981).
	The challengers to the redistricting plan at issue in this case
make no claim that the districts fail to meet the requirement of
equality of population or that the configuration of those districts
denies adequate representation to any minorities and other special
interests protected by state and federal law. The contiguity of the
districts is unquestioned. The legal requirements regarding
political fairness are not alleged to have been infringed. The only
dispute concerns whether the various districts identified by the
original and intervening plaintiffs meet our state's "compactness"
requirement.
	The arguments presented by the original and intervening
plaintiffs are essentially the same. They contend that by
reconfiguring various districts, the map could be improved to
make certain legislative and representative districts more compact
than they are under the plan adopted by the Commission and filed
with the Secretary of State. The intervening plaintiffs have
attempted to quantify the potential enhancement in compactness
using mathematical tests based on geographical measurements and
district shapes. The original plaintiffs rely solely on visual
observation.
	Based on visual observation, the compactness of the districts
formed under the plan before us today is not discernibly different
from the compactness of the districts established under the plan
approved by this court 10 years ago in People ex rel. Burris v.
Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d 270, 296 (1992). While some of the new districts
are certainly more elongated than others, the same was true of
districts drawn under the old map. Overall, the level of
compactness has changed little.
	The data submitted by the intervening plaintiffs confirm this
observation. The various representative and legislative districts
were analyzed by the intervening plaintiffs' experts using two
different tests. The first, known as the dispersion test, compared
a district's area to the area of the smallest circle that circumscribed
that area. The second, called the perimeter test, measured
irregularities in the boundaries of districts. The highest score a
district could receive was one. The lowest was zero. The mean
dispersion score for representative districts under the old map and
the mean dispersion score for representative districts under the
map challenged here differed by only one one-hundreth of a point
(0.01). That was also the case with the mean dispersion score for
legislative districts.
	The results yielded by the perimeter test were comparable.
Under that test, the difference in mean scores for representative
districts under the new map and representative districts under the
previous map was three one-hundredths of a point (0.03). For the
old and new legislative districts, the difference in mean scores was
four one-hundredths of a point (0.04).
	The original and intervening plaintiffs suggest alternatives to
the present map which would yield some increases in compactness
both visually and under the dispersion and perimeter tests. The fact
that more compact formulations can be devised is not, however, a
sufficient basis for invalidating a map duly approved and filed
according to law. That is so for two reasons. First, as indicated
earlier in this opinion, compactness is only one of several factors
that must be taken into consideration in setting the boundaries for
legislative and representative districts. No matter how compact
proposed districts may be geographically, those districts will not
suffice under the law unless they comply with each of the
additional factors we have enumerated.
	The need to take the additional factors into account was
specifically acknowledged in the affidavit of Professor Richard
Niemi, one of the intervening plaintiffs' experts. Significantly,
however, neither the original nor the intervening plaintiffs have
addressed the implications of their proposed alternatives with
respect to those factors. The materials they have submitted are
silent on the question of how the proposed alternatives would
compare in terms of equality of population, the provision of
adequate representation to any minorities and other special
interests protected by state and federal law, or adherence to the
legal requirements regarding political fairness. Accordingly, we
have no basis for assessing whether the proposed alternatives
would be legally acceptable and, if so, whether they would be
superior, on balance, to the plan approved and filed by the
Commission. 
	Second, a redistricting plan approved and filed by the
Commission is presumed to be valid. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV,
§3(b). Schrage, 88 Ill. 2d  at 92. Even if a proposed alternative map
would meet the other legal requirements, in addition to the
requirement of compactness, parties opposing a redistricting plan
approved and filed by the Commission must establish not only that
their map is superior, but that the map approved by the
Commission is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People
ex rel. Burris, 147 Ill. 2d  at 296. The original and intervening
plaintiffs have made no such showing. Indeed, the question of how
well or poorly the redistricting map approved and filed by the
Commission advances requirements beyond compactness is an
issue the challengers do not even address.
	For the foregoing reasons, the requests by the original and
intervening plaintiffs for a declaratory judgment invalidating the
redistricting plan approved and filed by the Commission and for
an order requiring reconfiguration of districts formulated under
that plan are hereby denied. Judgment is entered for defendants.
The mandate of this court shall issue immediately.
So ordered.
	JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting:
	The last time a challenge to the validity of the redistricting
plan approved by the Illinois Legislative Redistricting
Commission (Commission) was raised in this court, this court
initially remanded the matter to the Commission for further
proceedings because the Commission did not hold a hearing on the
approved map. See People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d 270,
284 (1991). We noted that both sides in the case had submitted
their plans and amendments on the last two days, "thereby
thwarting any type of hearing, whether for expert testimony or
public criticism." Burris, 147 Ill. 2d  at 284-85. We recognized
that, although there is a presumption that an approved redistricting
plan filed with the Secretary of State is valid, the presumption of
validity does not attach to any process which is completely at
variance with the constitutional mandate. Burris, 147 Ill. 2d  at
284. Finally, in remanding the matter to the Commission for
further proceedings, we directed that the Commission's hearing
address questions with regard to certain enumerated districts that
did not appear to meet the constitutionally mandated requirements
of compactness and of free and equal elections. Burris, 147 Ill. 2d 
at 285-86. It was only after the matter was returned to this court
following remand that this court accorded the map a presumption
of validity and reviewed the map under a manifest weight of the
evidence standard. Burris, 147 Ill. 2d  at 296. 
	Here, the majority does not address the process that led to the
adoption of the map at issue. Rather, the majority notes the
presumption of validity accorded a redistricting plan approved and
filed by the Commission. The majority then concludes that the
plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs have failed to establish that the
map is against the manifest weight of the evidence. I do not agree
with this analysis. I find this case to be indistinguishable from
Burris. Consequently, I believe this matter must be remanded to
the Commission for further proceedings before this court can
address the validity of this map.
	The process through which the redistricting map in this case
was approved was at variance with the constitutional mandate. As
in Burris, the map in this case was presented in the last few days,
thereby thwarting any type of hearing that would ensure that
constitutional requirements were met. As intervening plaintiffs
Philip and Daniels observe, the Democratic Commission members
filed a map styled Currie I on September 17, 2001, and set a
hearing for September 18, 2001. At the September 18 hearing, the
Republican Commission members proposed certain amendments
to the Commission's rules, including allowing public comment on
any redistricting proposal for at least seven days after its
submission, requiring the Commission to state its reason for
approving or not approving each redistricting proposal, and
including findings on compactness, contiguity and population
equality. The Commission rejected the proposed amendments.
Also on September 18, the Democratic Commission members
called a series of expert witnesses to testify concerning the Currie
I map. Plaintiffs allege that the Republican Commission members
had no advance notice that expert witnesses would testify. The
Democratic Commission members rejected a request made by the
Republican Commission members for a 24-hour recess to prepare
to cross-examine the expert witnesses. The Commission also
declined a request to disclose their time table to pass a map. The
next day, September 19, 2001, the Democratic Commission
members proposed that votes on all maps be taken by September
21, 2001, including votes on Currie I, which had been introduced
on September 17, and a vote on the Alternate Plan that was to be
proposed by the Republican Commission members on September
20, 2001.
	No vote was taken on September 21, 2001. On September 24,
2001, the Democratic Commission members proposed an
amendment to Currie I, known as the Bilandic amendment, which
was filed with the Commission clerk. The next day, September 25,
the Currie I map was amended pursuant to the Bilandic
amendment, thereby creating the map at issue in this case, known
as Currie II. The intervening plaintiffs contend that the Democratic
commission members refused to call witnesses or allow analysis
or debate on Currie II. On September 24, 2001, the Republican
Commission members' expert witness, Richard Niemi, Ph.D., was
allowed to testify that Currie II was less compact than the map
approved in 1991 and also was less compact than the Alternate
Plan. Niemi further testified that the Alternate Plan was more
compact than Currie II as well as the 1991 plan. Nonetheless, on
September 25, 2001, the Commission adopted the Currie II map
by a 5-4 vote, and forwarded the Currie II map to the Secretary of
State.
	Intervening defendant John Tully responds that the Currie II
map is the result of "the most extensive, deliberative and
accommodating process that this State has seen in the redistricting
of the Illinois House and Senate." Tully contends that the record
of proceedings is 10,557 pages and that the General Assembly
redistricting committees heard more than 500 live witness
presentations. The majority of the record of proceedings and the
500 live witness presentations, however, do not address the
constitutional validity of the specific map at issue in this case.
With regard to Currie I, Tully asserts that the Commission met for
more than six hours and heard testimony, including testimony
from two expert witnesses, Dr. Allan J. Lichtman and Dr. Janet
Box-Steffensmeier. As noted, however, the intervening plaintiffs
argue that the expert witnesses were presented without any
advance notice and without affording the Republican Commission
members a 24-hour recess to prepare to cross-examine those
witnesses. Notably, although there was testimony concerning the
compactness of Currie I and Currie II, that testimony concerned
the compactness of the maps as a whole, not the compactness of
individual districts. 
	As in Burris, the process through which the Currie II map was
adopted does not present sufficient facts for this court to determine
with certainty whether the district lines in Currie II meet legal
guidelines. Absent those facts, I believe this case must be
remanded to the Commission for further proceedings. Further, I
believe that the Commission should be directed to address the
questions raised by the plaintiffs and the intervening plaintiffs
concerning the compactness of the specified districts: Legislative
districts 29, 38, 51 and 55 and Representative districts 15, 18, 35,
36, 75, 99, 100, 113 and 114. 
	In Burris, this court found that certain districts did not appear
to meet the constitutionally mandated requirements. Burris, 147 Ill. 2d  at 285. Here too, the specified districts do not appear to
meet the constitutionally mandated requirements. Those districts
certainly do not appear compact based upon a visual inspection,
and do not appear compact based upon the mathematic
calculations testified to by Richard Niemi, Ph.D. Defendants and
intervening defendants respond that any shapes departing from a
compactness norm are justified by the influence of other neutral
redistricting criteria, including the irregular state, county and
municipal boundaries within the State of Illinois, adherence to
natural boundaries such as rivers, the preservation of political
subdivision and precinct lines and the cores of existing districts,
protecting incumbencies, and maintaining communities of interest. 
	While it is true that departures from the constitutional
requirement of compactness possibly may be justified (see
Schrage v. State Board of Elections, 88 Ill. 2d 87, 98 (1981)),
there is no evidence that any such "neutral" criteria were presented
to, considered, or accepted by the Commission with regard to
those districts in Currie II that do not appear compact. Such
evidence must be presented to and considered by the Commission
before this court can presume that departures from the
constitutional requirement of compactness are valid. 
	The voters of this state deserve-indeed, demand-fair play.
Gone forever are the procedural safeguards, such as notice and
cross-examination, that were so strictly enforced in Burris. And
gone forever is the Illinois voter's confidence that, while a coin
toss might decide which party will draw the map, the highest court
of this State will ensure that the process of approving and adopting
that map will be equitable, balanced, and fair. We all should
expect the party who wins the coin toss to be constrained by basic
notions of due process and fundamental fairness, so that a
democratically devised compromise does not deteriorate into
partisan tyranny.
	I respectfully dissent.
	JUSTICE GARMAN joins in this dissent.
	Today this court comes remarkably close to sounding the
death knell to the constitutional requirement of compactness. The
majority concludes that "on visual observation, the compactness
of the districts formed under the plan before us today is not
discernibly different from the compactness of the districts
established under the plan approved by this court 10 years ago in
People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d 270, 296 (1992). While
some of the new districts are certainly more elongated than others,
the same was true of districts drawn under the old map. Overall,
the level of compactness has changed little." Slip op. at 2-3. This
court may have eliminated the compactness requirement
altogether. The Illinois Constitution of 1970 mandates that
legislative and representative districts "be compact, contiguous
and substantially equal in population." Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV,
§3(a). While the compactness requirement may be subservient to
the requirement of equality of population, it "cannot be ignored[,]
*** written out or replaced by another requirement short of
redrafting or amending our present constitution." Schrage v. State
Board of Elections, 88 Ill. 2d 87, 96 (1981). Surely, the legislature
is capable of drawing a redistricting plan in which the districts
meet all four requirements noted by the majority in that they have
substantially equal population, provide fairness to minorities, are
compact, and meet all legal requirements regarding political
fairness. See People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d 270, 296
(1992) (Ryan II).    
	The compactness requirement, along with the other
requirements of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, ensures "fair and
effective representation for all citizens." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506, 529, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1383
(1964). Compactness guards against political gerrymandering and
facilitates constituent-representative communication. Schrage, 88 Ill. 2d  at 96, 100. In upholding the constitutionality of the
Commission's redistricting plan against plaintiffs' and plaintiff
intervenors' compactness challenge, the majority fails even to
define the term "compact," which this court has previously defined
as meaning " 'closely united, territorially.' " Schrage, 88 Ill. 2d  at
95, quotting People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451,
478 (1895). 
	At the very least, certain districts in the Commission's
redistricting plan appear, on their face, to violate the compactness
standard of article IV, section 3(a), of the 1970 Illinois
Constitution. For example, Legislative District 51, which contains
Representative Districts 101 and 102, is an extremely elongated L-shaped district that extends from Macon County in central Illinois
to the metro east suburbs of St. Louis in Madison and St. Clair
Counties. Plaintiff characterizes this district as a "meandering
stream," and the Attorney General concedes that the 51st
Legislative District is "probably the closest visual approximation
to a classic gerrymander." Further, Legislative District 51 ignores
communities of interest by joining urban and rural areas with
vastly different and divergent concerns. 
	Although I am aware that this court must determine the
validity of the Commission's plan standing alone, I note that
plaintiff intervenors, in their alternate redistricting plan, have
taken the counties included in Commission's Legislative District
51 (Moultrie, Bond, parts of Macon, Shelby, Fayette, Effingham,
Clinton, Madison, and St. Clair Counties), and divided them,
along with other counties, into two legislative districts that are
substantially more compact. Both Legislative District 51 in the
Commission's plan, and the plaintiff intervenors' legislative
districts, have zero population deviation.(1)

 Although I recognize
that partisan politics plays a role in the redistricting process, article
IV, section 3, of the 1970 Constitution is intended to constrain the
political impulse. It is possible, despite its political nature, for the
Redistricting Commission to submit a map that meets all
constitutional requirements. As Justice Clark ap tly noted in his
1992 dissent: "while politics and political considerations
unfortunately have had more than a subtle influence on [the 1991]
proposed map, the resulting analysis conducted by this court must
set aside the partisan and special interest bickering and stress the
mandate of our State Constitution that the legislative and
representative '[d]istricts shall be compact, contiguous, and
substantially equal in population.' " Ryan II, 147 Ill. 2d  at 306
(Clark, J., dissenting), quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §3(a).
	 Representative District 114 also appears, on its face, to
violate the compactness requirement. It is a bizarrely drawn U-shaped district that substantially wraps around Representative
District 113. Similarly, Representative District 100 wraps around
the 99th Representative District on three sides. Clearly, these
districts were severely gerrymandered.
	These districts are just a few of the problematic districts in the
Commission's redistricting plan. As indicated in Justice Thomas'
dissent and as demonstrated by a single cursory glance at the
Commission's plan, it is clear this list is not exhaustive.
	The majority opinion also fails to address the larger problem
that pervades legislative redistricting in the State of Illinois. The
process that gave rise to this redistricting plan is fundamentally
flawed. Plaintiff intervenors, in both their brief and oral argument,
contend that the Commission failed to provide meaningful analysis
or discussion of proposed amendments to the redistricting plan
which resulted in the creation of the Commission's final plan.
	In 1991, in People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d 270
(1991) (Ryan I), this court remanded the redistricting proposal to
the Commission based on its perception that to affirm the
proceedings of the Commission would "circumvent the spirit and
purpose of the Illinois Constitution." Ryan I, 147 Ill. 2d  at 285.
Despite defendants' arguments to the contrary, the 2001
Redistricting Commission proceedings appear fraught with similar
procedural vacuity.
	Prior to the adoption of the Commission's final plan, entitled
Currie II, alternate plans were before the Commission. In fact, a
feasible alternate plan is before this court. As in 1991, it appears
that the 2001 final plan was proposed and passed within a 24-hour
period. In addition, plaintiff intervenors assert that the proceedings
included surprise expert witnesses, witness lists were kept secret,
meaningful cross-examination was thwarted, and findings of fact
and conclusions of law were minimized. Defenders of the
Commission's map contend that ample evidence supported the
findings of the Commission. However, after-the-fact
rationalization regarding alleged "swing districts" or thin
assertions of communities of interest within proposed districts do
little to bring the process back in line with the constitutional
principles from which it has strayed.
	Apparently, it is implied that once the name is drawn to
determine which party shall have the tie-breaking vote on the
Commission, the process is, for all intents and purposes, complete.
See Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §3(b). The intimation is that the
losing party should resign itself to the fact that it is out of the
process and that partisanship takes precedent. However, "[a]n
artificially weighted map may ensure a political party's dominance
of a legislative body for a decade or more, but it does not ensure
that a citizen's right to elect officials who will represent him
effectively is protected." Ryan II, 147 Ill. 2d  at 307 (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
	In any action involving redistricting, much more is at stake
than simply who will control the legislature for the next 10 years.
"If any fundamental principle underlies our American system of
government, it is the notion that government exists only to serve
the governed." Ryan II, 147 Ill. 2d  at 307 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Today, that fundamental principle is dealt a serious blow.
	A redistricting plan approved and filed by the Commission is
presumed to be valid. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §3(b); Schrage, 88 Ill. 2d  at 92. However, the procedures that resulted in the approval
of this plan should not be open to the same presumption.
Deference to the Commission's findings does not equate to blind
adherence to its final product.
	Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion
and recommend that this plan be remanded to the Redistricting
Commission for further action with instructions to submit a map
that meets all constitutional requirements, including compactness,
and to carry forth its duties in a fair and meaningful manner.
	JUSTICE THOMAS joins in this dissent.
  				
1.      Although defendant and defendant intervenors stress the fact
that the Commission's map achieves exact population equality
plus one person in some districts, this is not constitutionally
mandated. This court noted in Schrage that deviations in
population equality are permitted to accommodate the interests of
political subdivisions and to provide for compact districts.
Schrage, 88 Ill. 2d  at 104. There is a need to consider other
interests to "obviate the potential for gerrymandering present in
blind adherence to the standard of equality of population.
Gerrymandering can be as invidious as malapportionment of
population in depriving voters of an equal voice in choosing their
representatives. The goal of 'one man, one vote' cannot be
achieved without eliminating the use of the gerrymandering as a
device to dilute group voting strength." Schrage, 88 Ill. 2d  at 105,
citing J. Edwards, The Gerrymander and "One Man, One Vote,"
46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 879 (1971).