Title: Oregon v. DeJong
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S068065
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: November 4, 2021

640	
November 4, 2021	
No. 42
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
KRISTI DEJONG,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 16CR52264) (CA A165504) (SC S068065)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted June 22, 2021.
Mark Kimbrell, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public 
Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed the 
briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs was Ernest 
G. Lannet, Chief Defender.
Christopher R. Page, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on 
review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney 
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
WALTERS, C. J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The 
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is 
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
______________
	
*  On appeal from Baker County Circuit Court, Erin K. Landis, Judge (motion 
to suppress) and Gregory L. Baxter, Judge (judgment). 305 Or App 325, 469 P3d 
253 (2020).
Cite as 368 Or 640 (2021)	
641
642	
State v. DeJong
	
WALTERS, C. J.
	
Officers unlawfully seized defendant’s residence. 
Based, in part, on information learned during the seizure, 
they obtained a warrant to search the residence where they 
discovered evidence of unlawful delivery of methamphet-
amine. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained 
in the warranted search, contending that it was inadmissi-
ble under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.1 
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress that 
evidence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on this 
court’s decision in State v. Johnson, 335 Or 511, 73 P3d 282 
(2003).
	
In Johnson, this court adopted a burden-shifting 
framework that applies when a defendant challenges the 
admission of evidence obtained in a warranted search that 
is preceded by an illegality. Under that framework, the 
defendant has the initial burden to establish a minimal fac-
tual nexus between the illegality and the challenged evi-
dence. Id. at 520-21. If the defendant does so, the burden 
shifts to the state to establish that the challenged evidence 
was untainted by the illegality. Id. In this case, the Court 
of Appeals concluded that defendant’s challenge failed at 
the first step—that is, that defendant failed to establish the 
requisite factual nexus between the unlawful seizure of her 
residence and the evidence the state discovered during the 
warranted search. State v. DeJong, 305 Or App 325, 469 P3d 
253 (2020). For reasons we will explain, we disagree with 
that conclusion and hold that defendant established the nec-
essary factual nexus. We further conclude that the record 
in this case is legally insufficient to support a finding that 
the state met its burden at the second step of the Johnson 
analysis. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of 
Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court and remand 
the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.
	
1  Article I, section 9, provides:
	
“No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or 
thing to be seized.”
Cite as 368 Or 640 (2021)	
643
	
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to sup-
press for errors of law and are bound by the court’s factual 
findings if there is constitutionally sufficient evidence to 
support them. State v. Maciel-Figueroa, 361 Or 163, 165-66, 
389 P3d 1121 (2017) (citing State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 75, 854 
P2d 421 (1993)). If the trial court did not make express find-
ings as to all pertinent issues and there is evidence from 
which the court could have found a fact in more than one 
way, we will presume that the court found the fact that is 
consistent with its ultimate conclusion. Id. at 166. With that 
standard in mind, we set out the most basic facts and later 
add those necessary to address the state’s argument that it 
satisfied its burden under Johnson.
	
Officer Daniel Pelayo had been investigating defen-
dant’s involvement in an “illegal drug enterprise” for approx-
imately 18 months when an informant, Tiffany Williams, 
contacted him. Williams told Pelayo that defendant was 
selling methamphetamine, that Williams had been at defen-
dant’s residence earlier that day to purchase marijuana, and 
that, while Williams was there, she had observed defendant 
sell methamphetamine to Flora Penrod. Pelayo knew that 
Penrod lived in the basement of defendant’s residence, and 
he had Williams arrange to meet defendant at her residence 
to make a purchase.
	
Shortly thereafter, Pelayo and several other officers 
went to defendant’s residence. Pelayo knocked on the door, 
and defendant answered. She told Pelayo that Penrod was 
in the residence but otherwise refused to speak with him. 
Defendant was arrested and eventually taken to the county 
jail.
	
Officers “secured” the residence. In the course of 
doing so, they found Penrod in the basement and inter-
viewed her, first just outside the residence and later at 
the police station. During those interviews, Penrod gave a 
detailed account of her purchase of methamphetamine from 
defendant earlier that day and disclosed that defendant had 
given and sold methamphetamine to her in the past.
	
Later that evening, Pelayo prepared an affidavit 
and search warrant application. Among other things, the 
644	
State v. DeJong
affidavit included the information that Williams had pro-
vided about defendant’s drug activities, the text messages 
that Williams had exchanged with defendant arranging 
to purchase methamphetamine, and the information that 
Penrod had provided during her interviews with Pelayo. The 
search warrant was issued and, in the subsequent search of 
the residence, officers located and seized evidence, including 
a bindle bag with methamphetamine, digital scales, a meth-
amphetamine pipe, a glass pipe and small bottle with resi-
due, half of a white pill, a cell phone, and a black sunglasses 
bag with “syringes and meth baggies” and a pipe. Among 
other crimes, defendant was charged with unlawful delivery 
of methamphetamine.
	
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained 
following the seizure of her residence. Relying on Article I, 
section 9, she argued that, because exigent circumstances 
did not exist, the warrantless seizure of her residence was 
unlawful and that the subsequently discovered evidence 
should be suppressed.2
	
The trial court agreed with defendant that exigent 
circumstances did not justify the warrantless seizure, and 
that, “[i]f the officers had not illegally seized the residence, 
cleared the residence[,] and located Penrod[,] the state would 
not have her statements.” But the trial court did not grant 
defendant’s motion in its entirety. Instead, the trial court 
suppressed Penrod’s statements and excised them from the 
search warrant affidavit.3 The court then reexamined the 
affidavit, concluded that what remained still established 
probable cause to issue the warrant, and denied defendant’s 
motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the warranted 
search.
	
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to 
unlawful delivery of methamphetamine, reserving the 
right on appeal to challenge, among other rulings, the trial 
	
2  Defendant also moved to controvert Pelayo’s affidavit submitted in support 
of the warrant application. The trial court denied that motion, and that ruling is 
not at issue.
	
3  The trial court also excised statements attributed to unnamed individuals 
that failed to establish their basis of knowledge. That ruling is not at issue.
Cite as 368 Or 640 (2021)	
645
court’s denial of her motion to suppress.4 After accepting 
defendant’s plea, the trial court entered a judgment convict-
ing defendant of unlawful delivery of methamphetamine 
and dismissing all other charges as indicated in the plea 
agreement.
	
On appeal, defendant assigned error to the denial of 
her motion to suppress, contending that the evidence discov-
ered in the warranted search was tainted by the unlawful 
seizure that preceded it. DeJong, 305 Or App at 330. Both 
defendant and the state acknowledged that our decision in 
Johnson established the controlling framework for resolv-
ing the case. Id. at 330-31. Defendant did not challenge the 
trial court’s conclusion that, after excising Penrod’s state-
ments and other information, the search warrant affidavit 
established probable cause. Id. at 331 n 2. And the state did 
not challenge the trial court’s ruling that the warrantless 
seizure of defendant’s residence was unlawful because it 
was not justified by exigent circumstances. Id. at 331 & n 3. 
Thus, the issue on appeal was a narrow one—viz., whether, 
under Johnson, defendant had established a minimal fac-
tual nexus between the unlawful seizure of her residence 
and the evidence discovered in the warranted search so as 
to shift the burden to the state to establish that the chal-
lenged evidence was untainted by the preceding illegality. 
Defendant contended that she had satisfied her burden, and 
the state disagreed.
	
The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant had 
failed to establish the requisite factual nexus and, therefore, 
that the trial court had not erred in denying defendant’s 
motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the warranted 
search. In reaching that conclusion, the court specifically 
rejected two arguments that defendant had made.
	
In her first argument, defendant had asserted that 
“the inclusion of Penrod’s statements in the search warrant 
affidavit contributed to the issuing judge’s probable cause 
determination, thereby establishing the required nexus.” 
 
	
4  See ORS 135.335(3) (providing, in part, that, “[w]ith the consent of the court 
and the state, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty * 
* 
* reserving, in 
writing, the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of an adverse deter-
mination of any specified pretrial motion”).
646	
State v. DeJong
Id. at 335. In rejecting that argument, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that the trial court’s remedy of excising the tainted 
information from the affidavit and assessing whether the 
balance of the affidavit established probable cause was suf-
ficient. Id. at 336.
	
In her second argument, defendant had asserted 
that the challenged evidence was tainted by the preceding 
illegality because, as a result of the unlawful seizure, the 
evidence remained in place at the time of the search. Id. at 
331. Defendant argued that the state had failed to demon-
strate that the evidence would have remained in place even 
if the officers had not seized her residence. Id. at 330-31. 
In rejecting that argument, the Court of Appeals reasoned 
that defendant had the burden to establish the necessary 
nexus and to produce evidence that the challenged evidence 
“might have been removed had the house not been seized.” 
Id. at 337. Without such a showing, the court concluded, 
defendant had not “established the requisite minimal fac-
tual nexus between the unlawful seizure of her house and 
the ensuing warrant search.” Id. at 338. The court further 
concluded that, “[w]ithout that nexus, the state was under 
no obligation to establish that the police had not exploited 
their unlawful conduct when they searched defendant’s 
home pursuant to [the] warrant.” Id.
	
On review, defendant begins by asking us to disavow 
the burden-shifting framework established in Johnson.5 
Specifically, defendant asks us to hold, as we do with war-
rantless consent searches, that when the search is preceded 
by unlawful police conduct, the defendant need not establish 
a causal relationship between the unlawful conduct and the 
evidence obtained in the search and the burden is on the 
state to demonstrate that the evidence is untainted by the 
prior illegality. Alternatively, defendant argues that, even if 
Johnson’s burden-shifting framework applies, she met her 
	
5  As noted, in the Court of Appeals, defendant acknowledged that Johnson 
established the controlling framework. Any contrary argument in that court 
would have been futile, because the Court of Appeals cannot overrule this court’s 
precedent. See Farmers Ins. Co. v. Mowry, 350 Or 686, 694, 261 P3d 1 (2011) 
(explaining that this court is “the body with the ultimate responsibility for con-
struing our constitution, and if we err, no other reviewing body can remedy that 
error” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Cite as 368 Or 640 (2021)	
647
burden—that is, she demonstrated the necessary factual 
nexus and shifted the burden to the state to demonstrate 
that the challenged evidence was untainted by the prior 
unlawful seizure.
	
The state responds that principles of stare decisis 
counsel adherence to the Johnson framework.6 The state 
contends that, under that framework, the Court of Appeals 
correctly concluded that defendant did not make the nec-
essary showing of a factual nexus between the seizure of 
her residence and the evidence obtained in the warranted 
search and, alternatively, that, if defendant made the show-
ing necessary to shift the burden to the state, then the state 
produced evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the chal-
lenged evidence was not tainted by the seizure. The state 
argues that, even without the seizure, officers inevitably 
would have discovered the challenged evidence during the 
warranted search.
	
We take each argument in turn, beginning with 
defendant’s request that we disavow the analytic framework 
that we adopted in Johnson. In doing so, “we begin with the 
assumption that issues considered in our prior cases are cor-
rectly decided, and the party seeking to change a precedent 
must assume responsibility for affirmatively persuading us 
that we should abandon that precedent.” Farmers Ins. Co. v. 
Mowry, 350 Or 686, 698, 261 P3d 1 (2011) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
	
Defendant gives two reasons for her request. First, 
she contends that we adopted the factual nexus require-
ment in Johnson without considering the purpose of 
Oregon’s exclusionary rule, which is to vindicate a defen-
dant’s personal right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 327 Or 366, 379, 
963 P2d 642 (1998) (so stating). We reject that argument. 
By the time we decided Johnson, that purpose was clearly 
 
	
6  “[S]tare decisis is a prudential doctrine that is defined by the competing 
needs for stability and flexibility in Oregon law.” Farmers Ins. Co., 350 Or at 
 
697-98. “[W]hether a case should be overruled cannot be reduced to the mechan-
ical application of a formula but requires instead an exercise of judgment that 
takes all appropriate factors into consideration.” Horton v. OHSU, 359 Or 168, 
187, 376 P3d 998 (2016).
648	
State v. DeJong
established.7 Moreover, as we understand Johnson, its ana-
lytic framework protects, and does not burden, a defendant’s 
right to be free from the use of evidence obtained in viola-
tion of that constitutional provision.
	
To explain our reasoning, it is helpful to set out our 
decision in Johnson in more detail and to home in on the 
application of the Johnson analysis to the facts of this case. 
Doing so demonstrates that that decision reflects an under-
standing of and adherence to the purpose of Oregon’s exclu-
sionary rule.
	
Johnson concerned whether evidence seized during 
a warranted search was tainted by the prior unlawful sei-
zure of the same evidence. 335 Or at 513. In that case, the 
police became interested in the defendant as a suspect in 
an aggravated murder investigation. Id. When the defen-
dant was arrested for an unrelated probation violation, an 
officer noticed that he wore a pair of boots consistent with a 
boot print found at the murder scene. Id. at 514. Detectives 
interviewed the defendant at the police station and, without 
a warrant, seized his clothing and boots and secured them 
in an evidence locker. Id. Thereafter, as the defendant was 
being released in the probation matter, he was arrested for 
the murder. Id.
	
7  Before we decided Johnson, we had decided three cases addressing whether 
to suppress evidence obtained during a valid warranted search that was preceded 
by unlawful police conduct: State v. Hansen, 295 Or 78, 664 P2d 1095 (1983); 
State v. Sargent, 323 Or 455, 918 P2d 819 (1996); and Smith, 327 Or 366. Those 
cases reflected an evolution from the use of federal, deterrence based-principles 
in Hansen to the use of vindication-of-rights principles in Smith that further the 
purpose of Article I, section 9. As we explained in Smith,
	
“[t]hat we no longer adhere to the view in Hansen should not be surpris-
ing. Hansen was decided in an era when this court made little effort to evalu-
ate Oregon’s constitutional guarantees as separate from those in the United 
States Constitution. Hansen thus appears to have been an attempt to vindi-
cate the ‘police deterrence’ rationale of the Fourth Amendment—that is, to 
prevent the police from deriving any benefit from the unlawful practice of 
seizing a residence in mere anticipation of obtaining a warrant to search for 
evidence of suspected crimes. This court since clearly has rejected that deter-
rence rationale as foreign to the Oregon search and seizure provision, hold-
ing, instead, that the Oregon exclusionary rule exists to vindicate a personal 
right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures. See * 
* 
* Sargent, 323 Or 
at 462 n 4 [(so stating)]. To support that purpose, it is sufficient to suppress 
only evidence that is actually obtained out of an illegal search or seizure.”
327 Or at 379 (emphases in original).
Cite as 368 Or 640 (2021)	
649
	
In the trial court, the defendant moved to suppress 
the clothing and boots under Article I, section 9. Id. After 
the trial court granted that motion, the state appealed and 
simultaneously applied for and obtained a search warrant 
authorizing the seizure of the evidence. Id. at 515. The Court 
of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s suppression order, and 
the state did not seek review of that decision. Id. at 515-16. 
Instead, the state sought to again admit the evidence in the 
trial court on the theory that it had been legally seized pur-
suant to the warrant. Id. at 516. The defendant again moved 
to suppress, contending that “the evidence was tainted by 
the first, unlawful seizure and that the belated warrant did 
not purge that taint because it was not a genuinely indepen-
dent source of the evidence.” Id. The trial court determined 
that the seizure of the evidence pursuant to the warrant was 
not independent of the unlawful seizure because “[t]he State 
* 
* 
* failed to prove that if the State had not seized defen-
dant’s property that the State would have been able to locate 
and seize defendant’s property pursuant to a valid search 
warrant.” Id at 518 (internal quotation marks omitted).
	
On direct appeal to this court, the state contended 
that, “under Oregon law, defendant’s clothes would not be 
subject to suppression if, after the initial illegal seizure, 
they were reseized pursuant to a lawful warrant that was 
entirely independent of, and was not obtained by exploita-
tion of, the previous illegality.” Id. at 519. In considering the 
state’s contention, we addressed an issue of first impression 
in Oregon—that is, “which party carries the burden of proof” 
when “the evidence in question first was seized unlawfully 
and without a warrant and the defendant asserts that a 
later, warranted ‘reseizure’ is tainted by the unlawful, war-
rantless seizure.” Id. at 520. We acknowledged that placing 
the burden of persuasion on the state in those circumstances 
“might seem contrary to the oft-cited rule that, when state 
agents have acted under authority of a warrant, the bur-
den is on the party seeking suppression (i.e., the defen-
dant) to prove the unlawfulness of a search or seizure.” Id. 
However, noting a similar approach taken by federal courts 
that was not inconsistent with the presumption of regular-
ity that arises in a warranted search where an independent 
magistrate has determined that probable cause exists, we 
650	
State v. DeJong
ultimately established the burden-shifting framework that 
defendant challenges in this case:
“[E]ven assuming that the issuance of the warrant was 
proper, if the defendant is able to show that the evidence 
obtained therefrom is connected to some prior governmen-
tal misconduct, the presumption of regularity is under-
mined and the burden of proof fairly may be shifted to the 
government to show that the evidence is not tainted by the 
misconduct.”
Id. at 521.
	
Applying that construct in Johnson, we held that 
the defendant had satisfied his burden of showing a fac-
tual nexus between the challenged evidence and the prior 
unlawful conduct:
	
“In so holding, we rely on the fact that the police used 
information derived from that earlier unlawful seizure, viz., 
the fact that the clothes could be found in a police evidence 
locker, when they later applied for a search warrant. The 
existence of that factual connection is sufficient to shift the 
burden of persuasion regarding taint to the state.”
Id. Turning to whether the state had satisfied its burden of 
showing that the challenged evidence was not tainted, the 
issue reduced to whether the state had established that it 
was more likely than not that it “would have obtained the 
[evidence] in any event.” Id. at 522. We concluded that evi-
dence in the record supported the trial court’s ruling that 
the state had not carried its burden, and we affirmed the 
court’s suppression order. Id at 526.
	
Thus, in Johnson, the defendant met the factual 
nexus requirement by showing that “the police used infor-
mation derived from that earlier unlawful seizure * 
* 
* 
when they later applied for a search warrant.” 335 Or at 
521. In this case, defendant submits that she met her bur-
den by doing the same—that is, by showing that the officers 
used information that they obtained during the seizure of 
her residence when they applied for a warrant to search it. 
In defendant’s view, that showing is sufficient to shift the 
burden to the state to demonstrate that the officers would 
have obtained the challenged evidence even if they had 
not unlawfully seized the residence. The state disagrees; it 
Cite as 368 Or 640 (2021)	
651
contends that defendant was required to establish that “but 
for the unlawful seizure of the residence the officers would 
not have obtained the drug evidence.”8
	
Defendant is correct in her understanding of the 
“minimal factual nexus” required by Johnson. As noted, 
this court required that the defendant show only that the 
evidence obtained “is connected to some prior governmental 
misconduct.” Johnson, 335 Or at 521 (emphasis added). We 
explained that it was “reasonable” to require that a defen-
dant establish that connection to rebut the presumption of 
regularity attendant to warranted searches, id., but we did 
not place a burden on the defendant to show, as the state 
contends the defendant must, that “but for the unlawful [act] 
the [government] would not have obtained the [challenged] 
evidence.” Johnson places the obverse burden—the burden 
to show that “the evidence is not tainted by the misconduct,” 
id.—on the state, and, if we were to accept the state’s argu-
ment, we would be shifting that burden to the defendant. 
So understood, Johnson is consistent with the purpose of 
Article I, section 9, to protect a defendant’s right to be free 
from the use of evidence obtained in violation of that consti-
tutional provision. See Smith, 327 Or at 379 (discussing the 
nature of a defendant’s Article I, section 9, rights).
	
Defendant’s second argument is that the “minimal 
factual nexus” analysis in Johnson cannot be reconciled 
with our reasoning in State v. Unger, 356 Or 59, 333 P3d 
1009 (2014), a case in which we considered the effect of a 
preceding illegality on a warrantless search conducted pur-
suant to the defendant’s voluntary consent, and, in that con-
text, disavowed the burden-shifting framework.
	
In Unger, the defendant sought to suppress evidence 
obtained in a warrantless search to which he voluntarily 
	
8  In support of its argument, the state cites U.S. v. DeLuca, 269 F3d 1128 
(10th Cir 2001), a federal case cited in Johnson. In DeLuca, the court said that 
the demonstration of a factual nexus requires, at a minimum, that a defendant 
“adduce evidence at the suppression hearing showing the evidence sought to 
be suppressed would not have come to light but for the government’s unconsti-
tutional conduct.” 269 F3d at 1132 (internal quotation marks omitted). We do 
not understand Johnson as having adopted the heightened factual nexus test 
described by the state; in fact, that test would subvert the framework established 
in Johnson. 
652	
State v. DeJong
consented, contending that the search had been tainted by 
preceding unlawful police conduct. In an earlier case, State 
v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 115 P3d 908 (2005), we had “described a 
two-step analysis to determine whether evidence obtained 
pursuant to voluntary consent must nonetheless be sup-
pressed.” Unger, 356 Or at 64. Under Hall, a defendant was 
required to establish a “minimal factual nexus” between 
the prior unlawful police conduct and the evidence that the 
defendant sought to suppress. Unger, 356 Or at 64. If the 
defendant made that showing, then the state was required 
to show that the search was not tainted by the preceding 
conduct. Id. In Unger, the state urged us to overrule Hall by 
eliminating the exploitation analysis and to hold, instead, 
that evidence obtained during a voluntary consent search is 
admissible despite prior unlawful police conduct. Id. at 65. 
Although we rejected the state’s argument, we agreed that 
Hall’s exploitation analysis was “flawed in some respects” 
and required “refinement.” Id. at 70. As relevant here, we 
disavowed the first step in the Hall analysis—that the 
defendant establish a “minimal factual nexus” between the 
illegality and the challenged evidence—because that step 
in the analysis was “drawn from a case that arose in a sig-
nificantly different procedural context,” failed to consider a 
relevant statute, had been unevenly applied, and had proved 
to be confusing. Id. at 74.
	
The case that we referenced in Unger as the case 
from which the Hall analysis was drawn was Johnson. In 
Unger, we distinguished Johnson and held that our reliance 
on it in Hall had been misplaced because warranted and 
warrantless searches are governed by different principles: 
By statute, when a defendant challenges a warrantless 
search (e.g., Hall and Unger), the state bears the burden of 
proving the validity of the search.9 Unger, 356 Or at 75. In 
contrast, when a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant 
(e.g., Johnson), the presumption of regularity—arising from 
an independent magistrate’s determination that probable 
cause supports the issuance of the warrant—applies and 
the defendant must establish the requisite factual nexus 
	
9  See ORS 133.693(4) (“Where the motion to suppress challenges evidence 
seized as the result of a warrantless search, the burden of proving by a prepon-
derance of the evidence the validity of the search is on the prosecution.”).
Cite as 368 Or 640 (2021)	
653
before the burden shifts to the state to prove the validity of 
the search. Id. at 75 (describing Johnson). As we explained 
in Unger, when police search without a warrant, “there is no 
presumption of regularity to overcome” and, therefore, “no 
need for a threshold showing by the defendant to shift the 
burden to the state.” Id. In addition, we explained that, in 
that context, the “minimal factual nexus” test is not analyt-
ically significant. We said that the
“exploitation analysis already considers the existence of a 
‘minimal factual nexus,’ because determining whether the 
police exploited their unlawful conduct to gain the disputed 
evidence necessarily requires an examination of the causal 
connection between the police conduct and the defendant’s 
consent. Accordingly, the ‘minimal factual nexus’ test is 
not analytically significant in determining whether the 
consent to search was the product of the illegal police con-
duct, such that evidence obtained pursuant to that search 
must be suppressed.”
Id. at 76.
	
Defendant acknowledges that the statute that 
applies to warrantless searches and that places the burden 
on the state to prove the validity of such a search does not 
apply to warranted searches. Nevertheless, she contends, 
the same analysis should apply where a warranted search is 
preceded by an illegality—here, the warrantless seizure of 
defendant’s residence. Defendant argues that, when police 
officers engage in unlawful conduct, evidence obtained in a 
subsequent warranted search should be suppressed, unless 
the state establishes that the evidence obtained was not 
tainted by the prior unlawful conduct.
	
Defendant also acknowledges that the issuance of a 
warrant gives rise to a presumption of regularity. However, 
she contends that the presumption of regularity “does not 
and cannot speak to whether the warrant or the warrant 
search is tainted by prior police misconduct.”
	
Finally, defendant acknowledges that, in Unger, we 
disavowed Hall, and not Johnson. Nevertheless, defendant 
argues, the reasons that persuaded the court to eliminate the 
“minimal factual nexus” test in Unger are equally applica-
ble in the present context. In defendant’s view, determining 
654	
State v. DeJong
whether police officers exploited their unlawful conduct to 
gain disputed evidence necessarily requires an examination 
of the causal connection between the police conduct and the 
evidence obtained.
	
Defendant’s arguments have some merit. Defendant 
is correct that, when police officers engage in illegal conduct, 
it is the effect of that illegality on the subsequent discovery of 
evidence that is at issue. In some instances, the illegal con-
duct may be followed by an act that provides lawful author-
ity to search (e.g., obtaining voluntary consent to search or 
obtaining a valid warrant to search). When a defendant 
seeks to suppress evidence discovered in a legally autho-
rized search on the basis of a prior illegality, the focus of the 
inquiry is not on the legality of the act providing authority 
to search, it is on the effect that the prior illegality may have 
had on the authorized search. That is true whether or not 
a statute addresses the requisite burden, and it is also true 
even if we presume that the issuance of a warrant gives rise 
to a presumption of regularity. Defendant’s final argument, 
though, cuts in favor of our retention of the Johnson frame-
work. In Unger we recognized, in the context of a warrant-
less search, that the showing that is necessary at the first 
step of the burden-shifting analysis is so minimal that it 
may be analytically insignificant and ultimately subsumed 
in the exploitation analysis. Even if the same may be true in 
the present context, the minimal nature of the requirement 
weighs against its disavowal here.
	
In Johnson, we held that a defendant who seeks to 
exclude evidence that was obtained in a warranted search 
must establish a minimal factual connection between the 
illegality asserted as a basis for suppression and the chal-
lenged evidence. 335 Or at 521. Given our understanding 
of the nature of that connection and the fact that we had 
the opportunity, in Unger, to disavow Johnson as well as 
Hall, and did not do so, we decline defendant’s invitation to 
act now. Instead, we turn briefly to the question of whether 
defendant in this case successfully established the minimal 
factual nexus required by Johnson.
	
For reasons already stated, resolution of that issue 
requires little discussion. Defendant’s burden of establishing 
Cite as 368 Or 640 (2021)	
655
a factual nexus is minimal and intended merely to rebut the 
presumption of regularity attendant to warranted searches. 
Contrary to the state’s assertions, satisfying that minimal 
standard does not require a defendant to identify and pro-
duce evidence related to discrete factual theories connecting 
the unlawful conduct with the challenged evidence. Here, 
defendant established that, as a result of the unlawful sei-
zure of her residence, Pelayo obtained Penrod’s statements 
and used them to obtain the warrant. As in Johnson, that 
is sufficient to establish defendant’s burden and to shift 
the burden to the state to prove that the evidence obtained 
during the warranted search was untainted by the prior 
unlawful seizure of defendant’s residence. See Johnson, 335 
Or at 521 (stating that, in holding that the defendant estab-
lished the burden of showing a factual nexus, “we rely on 
the fact that the police used information derived from that 
earlier unlawful seizure * 
* 
* when they later applied for a 
search warrant” and that “[t]he existence of that factual 
connection is sufficient to shift the burden of persuasion 
regarding taint to the state”).
	
The Court of Appeals reached a contrary result, 
holding that defendant failed to establish the requisite fac-
tual nexus because (1) the balance of the warrant affidavit 
established probable cause to search defendant’s residence 
even after the trial court suppressed and excised Penrod’s 
statements, among others; and (2) defendant failed to pro-
duce evidence to support her theory that, if the police had 
not unlawfully seized the residence, there was no assurance 
that the challenged evidence would have been there during 
the warranted search. DeJong, 305 Or App at 336-37.
	
We disagree with that analysis. Whether the war-
rant was ultimately determined to be valid and supported 
by probable cause to search is immaterial to whether defen-
dant satisfied her burden to connect the preceding illegal-
ity with the issuance of the warrant and thereby with the 
discovery of the challenged evidence. And, by requiring 
defendant to produce evidence proving that the challenged 
evidence would not have been found during the warranted 
search, the court essentially required defendant to dis-
prove that the state inevitably would have discovered the 
656	
State v. DeJong
challenged evidence, thus misallocating the state’s burden 
to defendant.
	
The final question for our consideration is whether, 
as the state contends, it established that the evidence dis-
covered during the warranted search was untainted by the 
preceding unlawful seizure of defendant’s residence. The 
state argues that, absent the unlawful seizure, officers inev-
itably would have discovered the challenged evidence. See 
State v. Miller, 300 Or 203, 225, 709 P2d 225 (1985), cert den, 
475 US 1141 (1986) (explaining that “[t]he inevitable discov-
ery doctrine permits the prosecution to purge the taint of 
illegally obtained evidence by proving, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that such evidence inevitably would have 
been discovered, absent the illegality, by proper and pre-
dictable police investigatory procedures”); see also id. at 227 
(explaining that, “[i]n the case of a warrantless entry into 
premises,” the court should consider “the possibility, that, 
if police had not made the illegal entry into the premises, 
evidence might have been disposed of or hidden”).
	
As both parties acknowledge, the crux of their dis-
pute on this issue is whether the challenged evidence would 
have been discovered during the warranted search if the 
officers had not unlawfully seized defendant’s residence. The 
trial court did not make express or implied factual findings 
on that question.10 Thus, the proper resolution of this case 
depends on whether there is sufficient evidence from which 
	
10  As noted, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evi-
dence seized pursuant to the warranted search after suppressing and excising 
Penrod’s statements from the warrant affidavit and concluding that the warrant 
was nonetheless supported by probable cause. Given that analysis and disposi-
tion, we do not understand the trial court to have determined whether, despite 
the ultimate validity of the warrant, the state would have inevitably discovered 
the challenged evidence absent the unlawful seizure of defendant’s residence. 
Accordingly, we do not agree with the state that, in ruling that exigent circum-
stances did not justify the warrantless seizure of defendant’s residence, the trial 
court implicitly found that “Penrod would not have disposed of or otherwise pre-
vented the officers from finding the drug evidence.” We also do not agree with 
defendant that, when the trial court stated that “[l]aw enforcement created fur-
ther exigency by going to the defendant’s door and confronting [her],” it implicitly 
found that “the drug evidence was at risk of being moved or destroyed following 
defendant’s arrest.” See Pereida-Alba v. Coursey, 356 Or 654, 671, 342 P3d 70 
(2015) (reasoning that a reviewing court will not presume that a trial court made 
implicit factual findings when such findings are not necessary to the trial court’s 
ultimate conclusion or the record does not support them).
Cite as 368 Or 640 (2021)	
657
the trial court, as a reasonable factfinder, could have found 
that no one would have removed or destroyed the drug evi-
dence even absent the seizure. See Johnson, 335 Or 521-26 
(examining whether, absent the unlawful conduct, evidence 
would have been available later for seizure pursuant to a 
valid warrant); Smith, 327 Or at 379-80 (same).
	
If there is legally sufficient evidence in the record 
to support such a finding, the proper disposition would be 
to remand to the trial court to engage in the necessary fact 
finding in the first instance. See State v. Ryan, 361 Or 602, 
624-25, 396 P3d 867 (2017) (remanding to the trial court to 
make factual findings in the first instance where there was 
an indication that the court misapprehended the import of 
the defendant’s argument and, as a consequence, failed to 
make related factual findings); State v. Blair, 361 Or 527, 
542, 396 P3d 908 (2017) (remanding case to the trial court to 
make factual findings in the first instance under the correct 
legal standard). Thus, we turn to the evidentiary record.
	
As noted above, Pelayo had been investigating 
defendant’s involvement in an “illegal drug enterprise” for 
approximately 18 months. On the day the residence was 
secured, there had been high-volume, short-stay bicycle and 
vehicle traffic there. Pelayo and several other officers went 
to defendant’s residence with the intention to contact her 
and, if she did not want to cooperate, to remove any occu-
pants and secure the residence while obtaining a warrant. 
Following defendant’s arrest, the residence was secured 
with caution tape placed around its perimeter and officers 
posted around it to ensure that no one entered. According to 
Pelayo, following an arrest such as this, “it’s pretty common” 
for the arrestee’s friends to “come and clean them out.”
	
No one entered the residence during the approxi-
mately five hours that it was secured, and the officers did 
not permit anyone to do so. Penrod was in an RV on the 
property caring for her dogs; however, Pelayo testified that 
she was not and would not have been allowed in the resi-
dence. Another man, who Pelayo suspected of involvement 
“in the drug trade,” stopped in a vehicle that had been pre-
viously seen at the residence to inquire about the circum-
stances, despite the officers’ presence and the caution tape 
658	
State v. DeJong
surrounding the residence. He left after Pelayo asked him 
about whether he possessed drugs. Finally, a second man 
“came and wanted a bicycle that he said was his.” Pelayo 
“ran the guy,” and another officer arrested him on an out-
standing warrant. Pelayo testified that that man would not 
have been allowed in the house, because Pelayo did not know 
whether the bicycle belonged to him and he was not going to 
let the man “take [defendant’s] stuff, potentially.”
	
Against that evidentiary backdrop, the state con-
tends that, as in Smith and State v. Sargent, 323 Or 455, 
918 P2d 819 (1996), “the evidence showed that no one would 
have removed or destroyed the drug evidence if there were 
no seizure.”11 Specifically, the state argues that, even though 
Pelayo expressed concern that someone would enter defen-
dant’s residence and steal her property after her arrest, the 
state’s obligation was to demonstrate that those “concerns 
were unfounded because the four individuals who could 
have accessed the house would not have removed the drug 
evidence.” To that end, the state argued:
“Defendant could not access the drug evidence. The first 
unidentified man did not say or do anything suggesting 
that he wanted to access the house. The second unidenti-
fied man sought to access an outbuilding on the property 
to retrieve a bicycle, not the drug evidence or something 
within its vicinity in the house, before he was arrested. 
And finally, the evidence of * 
* 
* Penrod’s cooperation with 
* 
* 
* Pelayo during questioning and the absence of any indi-
cation that she would have removed or destroyed the drug 
evidence showed that she would not have made unavailable 
the drug evidence.”
	
11  In both Smith and Sargent we concluded that evidence obtained during 
a warranted search that was preceded by unlawful police conduct was not sub-
ject to suppression. In Smith, after a drug-sniffing dog alerted at the defendant’s 
storage unit, the manager of the storage facility put a padlock on the unit at 
the request of the officers. 327 Or at 369. In concluding that suppression was 
not required, we reasoned that “[n]o one attempted to gain access to the unit to 
remove the evidence before the search warrant was executed”; thus, “the pad-
lock, although unlawful, was irrelevant” because “[t]he evidence would have been 
obtained even in the absence of the unlawful police conduct.” Id. at 380. Similarly, 
in Sargent, we assumed that an unlawful seizure of the defendant’s apartment 
had occurred but concluded that suppression of the evidence found during the 
subsequent warranted search was not required where no one attempted to enter 
the apartment between the time that the defendant had left and the time that the 
warranted search began. 323 Or at 459, 462-63.
Cite as 368 Or 640 (2021)	
659
	
The fundamental problem with the state’s posi-
tion is that this case is not like Smith, in which no one had 
approached the defendant’s storage unit before the war-
ranted search, or Sargent, in which no one had attempted 
to enter the apartment before the warranted search began. 
Instead, during the unlawful seizure of defendant’s resi-
dence, “the second unidentified man” sought to access the 
residence. At least as to him, the record is devoid of any 
evidence that he would not have removed or destroyed the 
challenged evidence, and the state, which has the burden 
of proof on that issue, bears the consequence of that omis-
sion. Although the state contends that this individual did 
not seek access to the house but only access to an “outbuild-
ing,” it relies for that argument on statements included in 
Pelayo’s affidavit and those statements were suppressed.
	
Accordingly, we conclude that the record in this case 
is legally insufficient to support a finding that the officers 
would have inevitably discovered the challenged evidence 
during the warranted search absent the unlawful seizure 
of defendant’s residence. See Miller, 300 Or at 226 (“It is not 
enough to show that the evidence ‘might’ or ‘could have been’ 
otherwise obtained.”). Thus, remanding this case to the trial 
court for that purpose is unnecessary. Cf. Pereida-Alba v. 
Coursey, 356 Or 654, 673, 342 P3d 70 (2015) (reasoning that, 
where there is evidence in the record that would permit a 
trial court to make a factual finding, a remand for that pur-
pose is appropriate).
	
Nonetheless, we conclude, for an independent rea-
son, that the appropriate disposition of this case is to remand 
it to the trial court for further proceedings. As noted, defen-
dant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving her right 
to challenge the trial court’s denial of her motion to sup-
press. ORS 135.335(3) provides that a defendant who enters 
such a plea and prevails on appeal “may withdraw the 
plea.” Because we agree with defendant that the trial court 
erred in denying her motion to suppress the evidence seized 
during the warranted search, she has prevailed on appeal 
and may withdraw her plea. We remand to the trial court 
to allow her the opportunity to do so. See State v. Tannehill, 
341 Or 205, 212, 141 P3d 584 (2006) (concluding that ORS 
660	
State v. DeJong
135.335(3) “permits the defendant to withdraw the entire 
plea and rescind the agreement if one of the premises on 
which the parties entered into the plea agreement is no lon-
ger valid”).
	
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case 
is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.