Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Benjamin J. Harris
Citation: 2013 WI 8
Docket Number: 2011AP000478-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 23, 2013

2013 WI 8 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP478-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Benjamin J. Harris, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Benjamin J. Harris, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HARRIS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 23, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
September 21, 2012   
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Benjamin J. Harris, Monte E. Weiss, and Charles W. Kramer and 
Deutch & Weiss, LLC, Milwaukee.  
For the Office of Lawyer Regulation, there was a brief 
filed by Robert G. Krohn and Roethe, Pope, Roethe, LLP, 
Edgerton.  
 
 
 
 
2013 WI 8
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP478-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Benjamin J. Harris, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Benjamin J. Harris, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JAN 23, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Benjamin J. Harris has appealed 
from 
a 
referee's 
report 
concluding 
that 
he 
engaged 
in 
professional misconduct and recommending that his license to 
practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for six months.   
¶2 
We conclude that the referee's findings of fact are 
supported by satisfactory and convincing evidence.  We further 
conclude that a five-month suspension is an appropriate sanction 
for Attorney Harris's misconduct.  We also agree with the 
referee's recommendation that Attorney Harris should be required 
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
2 
 
to continue counseling for his depression, and we conclude that 
the full costs of the proceeding, which were $19,293.88 as of 
October 3, 2012, should be assessed against Attorney Harris. 
¶3 
Attorney Harris was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1996 and practices in Milwaukee.  He has been 
previously disciplined on three prior occasions.  In 2007 he 
received a private reprimand in two client matters involving 
failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness and 
failure to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of 
a matter and comply with requests for information.  In 2008 he 
was issued a public reprimand in three client matters for 
failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client; entering into a business transaction with 
a client or knowingly acquiring a pecuniary interest adverse to 
a client; failing to keep a client informed about the status of 
a matter and comply with requests for information; and failing 
to take reasonable steps to protect a client's interests upon 
termination of representation.  In 2010 Attorney Harris's 
license was suspended for 60 days for failure to keep a client 
informed as to the status of a matter and failing to keep a 
client 
informed 
and 
respond 
to 
a 
client's 
request 
for 
information.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harris, 
2010 WI 9, 322 Wis. 2d 364, 778 N.W.2d 154.   
¶4 
On March 4, 2011, the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR) filed a complaint alleging 14 counts of misconduct.  
Counts One and Two involved Attorney Harris's representation of 
N.D. in a divorce action filed in June of 2008 in Milwaukee 
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
3 
 
County.  The parties signed a marital settlement agreement and 
obtained a judgment of divorce on March 6, 2009.  As attorney 
for the petitioner, Attorney Harris was to complete the findings 
of fact, conclusions of law and judgment of divorce and file 
them with the court. 
¶5 
Following the divorce, N.D. needed to refinance her 
house to remove her spouse's name from the title and pay him an 
initial settlement of $30,000.  In order to do this, she needed 
Attorney Harris to complete a Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
(QDRO) in order to move $23,527 from one of her retirement funds 
to her ex-spouse's retirement fund.  N.D. applied for a mortgage 
and locked in an interest rate giving her until May 17, 2009, 
before that interest rate expired.  If she did not close by that 
date, she would have to set up a new loan and pay additional 
loan origination fees.  
¶6 
N.D. e-mailed Attorney Harris on March 26, 2009, 
informing him of the refinancing and asking what it would take 
to prepare the necessary documents.  In April, May, and June, 
2009, N.D. e-mailed and telephoned Attorney Harris numerous 
times inquiring about the status of his preparation of the QDRO 
and findings.  On April 2 Attorney Harris sent opposing counsel 
the findings.  They were returned to him the next day.  
¶7 
Attorney Harris did not respond to N.D.'s numerous e-
mails and phone calls until May 11, 2009, when he asked her 
about information regarding the loan.  The information was sent 
to Attorney Harris on May 12.  N.D. again reminded Attorney 
Harris she could not close until he supplied the needed 
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
4 
 
information regarding the QDRO and the findings.  Attorney 
Harris did not file the findings with the court until June 11, 
2009.   
¶8 
N.D. hired successor counsel on June 24, 2009, to help 
her complete the QDRO.  She had to pay a new loan origination 
fee, had to pay successor counsel to finish the work Attorney 
Harris started, and had to pay additional interest because she 
failed to meet the deadline for refinancing.  The OLR's 
complaint alleged the following counts of misconduct with 
respect to Attorney Harris's representation of N.D.: 
 
COUNT ONE:  By failing to timely file a Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment of Divorce 
in [N.D.'s] divorce matter and by failing to promptly 
prepare the Qualified Domestic Relations Order on her 
behalf, despite his client's numerous requests and 
despite the fact that he was informed that time was of 
the essence, Harris violated SCR 20:1.3.1 
 
COUNT TWO:  By failing to respond to [N.D.'s] 
numerous emails and telephone calls regarding the 
status of the drafting and filing Findings and the 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order, Harris violated 
SCR 20:1.4(a)(3).2 
¶9 
Attorney Harris stipulated that he violated SCR 20:1.3 
by failing to timely prepare the QDRO.   
¶10 Counts Three, Four, and Five of the complaint arose 
out of Attorney Harris's representation of P.B.  P.B. hired 
Attorney Harris on August 31, 2006, and paid him $1,000 to 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.3 states "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
2 SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) states a lawyer shall "keep the client 
reasonably informed about the status of the matter; . . . ." 
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
5 
 
handle the estate of P.B.'s late mother, M.B., who had passed 
away on July 15, 2006.  In July of 2008 Attorney Harris provided 
P.B. with consent forms for each of M.B.'s six children to sign.  
P.B. obtained the signatures and returned the completed waiver 
forms to Attorney Harris.  Attorney Harris prepared a draft 
Application for Informal Administration of M.B.'s estate, but 
the document was never filed. 
¶11 In February 2009 Attorney Harris set up a meeting at 
his office with all six of M.B.'s children, but he failed to 
show up.  In October 2009 P.B. called Attorney Harris to check 
on the status of the case.  Attorney Harris said he would send 
out a status letter, but no letter was ever sent. 
¶12 As previously noted, Attorney Harris's license to 
practice law was suspended for 60 days, effective March 8, 2010.  
Attorney Harris never notified P.B. of the suspension, nor did 
he advise P.B. to seek representation elsewhere.  In September 
2010 Attorney Harris provided P.B. a full refund of $1,000.  The 
OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of misconduct with 
respect to Attorney Harris's representation of P.B.: 
 
COUNT THREE:  By failing to timely advance the 
matter of M.B.'s estate, including by failing to ever 
file an application for informal probate, Harris 
violated SCR 20:1.3.  
 
COUNT FOUR:  By failing to respond to P.B.'s 
numerous telephonic requests for a status update on 
the M.B. estate, Harris violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(4).3 
                                                 
3 SCR 20:1.4(a)(4) provides that a lawyer shall "promptly 
comply 
with 
reasonable 
requests 
by 
the 
client 
for 
information; . . . ."   
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
6 
 
 
COUNT FIVE:  By failing to notify P.B. of his 
license suspension and/or advise him to seek legal 
advice elsewhere, Harris violated SCR 22.26(1)(a) and 
(b).4 
¶13 Attorney Harris subsequently stipulated to all three 
counts of misconduct. 
¶14 Counts Six, Seven, Eight, and Nine of the complaint 
arose out of Attorney Harris's representation of J.K.  A 
judgment in the amount of $562,000 was entered against J.K. and 
her husband, D.K., in Waukesha County following a jury trial.  
J.K. and her husband had been represented in that case by 
Attorney Jeremy Przybyla.  After the trial, Mr. and Mrs. K. 
hired Attorney Harris.  Attorney Harris filed an appeal which 
resulted in a portion of the verdict being overturned and the 
matter being re-tried.  After re-trial, a judgment of $412,000 
was entered against Mr. and Mrs. K. 
¶15 During Attorney Harris's representation, his firm was 
hired by Mr. and Mrs. K. to represent them in a legal 
malpractice case against Attorney Przybyla.  Mr. and Mrs. K. and 
                                                 
4 SCR 22.26(1)(a) and (b) states as follows:  
 
(1) On or before the effective date of license 
suspension or revocation, an attorney whose license is 
suspended or revoked shall do all of the following: 
 
(a) Notify by certified mail all clients being 
represented in pending matters of the suspension or 
revocation and of the attorney's consequent inability 
to act as an attorney following the effective date of 
the suspension or revocation. 
 
(b) Advise the clients to seek legal advice of 
their choice elsewhere.  
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
7 
 
Attorney Harris initially believed the malpractice case should 
be placed on hold pending a resolution of the Waukesha County 
judgment entered against Mr. and Mrs. K. 
¶16 On March 1, 2007, Attorney Harris filed a summons and 
complaint on behalf of J.K. against Attorney Przybyla in Ozaukee 
County.  In December of 2007, a motion to dismiss was filed by 
Przybyla.  Attorney Harris was aware of the pending motion to 
dismiss and made the unilateral decision not to oppose it.  His 
strategy was to allow dismissal of the malpractice suit under 
the theory that it would allow him to better be able to resolve 
the Waukesha County judgment.  The case against Attorney 
Przybyla was dismissed on March 12, 2008.   
¶17 Prior to the dismissal, Attorney Harris did not tell 
J.K. about his strategy and the potential dismissal of her legal 
malpractice case.  Attorney Harris testified at the hearing 
before the referee that he did not tell J.K. about the motion to 
dismiss so that she would have an easier time reopening the case 
based on the fact she had no personal knowledge of the motion to 
dismiss.   
¶18 J.K. discovered her legal malpractice suit had been 
dismissed in November of 2008.  Attorney Harris said he 
permitted dismissal of the case in an effort to obtain leverage 
in his negotiations on the outstanding money judgment and to 
conceal the existence of a possible malpractice claim from a 
creditor.  J.K. hired another attorney to represent her in April 
of 2009.  That attorney moved to reopen the malpractice suit on 
May 1, 2009, more than one year after the dismissal.  The motion 
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
8 
 
was denied.  The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to Attorney Harris's representation of 
J.K.: 
 
COUNT SIX:  By failing to consult with [J.K.] and 
instead 
unilaterally 
deciding 
not 
to 
prosecute 
[J.K.'s] legal malpractice claim, knowing this would 
result in a waiver of the claim, and by failing to 
know or learn the appropriate statute of limitations, 
Harris violated SCR 20:1.1.5 
 
COUNT SEVEN:  By failing to consult with [J.K.] 
concerning the method and means of pursuing her claims 
and by failing to discuss with [J.K.] the potential 
dismissal of the legal malpractice claim in order to 
proceed with resolution of a judgment against her, 
Harris violated SCR 20:1.2(a).6 
 
COUNT EIGHT:  By failing to discuss and reveal 
his strategy with [J.K.], which included allowing a 
legal malpractice claim to be dismissed under the 
theory it would allow him to better be able to resolve 
                                                 
5 SCR 20:1.1 states, "A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client.  Competent representation requires 
the 
legal 
knowledge, 
skill, 
thoroughness 
and 
preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation." 
6 SCR 20:1.2(a) provides as follows:   
 
Subject to pars. (c) and (d), a lawyer shall 
abide 
by 
a 
client's 
decisions 
concerning 
the 
objectives of representation and, as required by 
SCR 20:1.4, shall consult with the client as to the 
means by which they are to be pursued.  A lawyer may 
take such action on behalf of the client as is 
impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.  
A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to 
settle a matter.  In a criminal case or any proceeding 
that could result in deprivation of liberty, the 
lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after 
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be 
entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the 
client will testify. 
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
9 
 
a 
judgment 
against 
his 
client, 
Harris 
violated 
SCR 20:1.4(a)(2)7 and (3). 
 
COUNT NINE:  By failing to advise [J.K.] about 
the dismissal of the legal malpractice case, by 
advising [J.K.] that the action was pending after he 
knew it had been dismissed, and by intentionally 
allowing the dismissal to occur in order to mislead a 
creditor of his clients and gain advantage for his 
clients, Harris violated SCR 20:8.4(c).8 
¶19 Counts Ten and Eleven of the complaint arose out of 
Attorney Harris's representation of M.B.  In September of 2008, 
M.B. hired Attorney Harris to represent her in a divorce.  She 
paid him an advance fee of $700.  Attorney Harris filed the 
petition for divorce on October 15, 2008.  Around the time the 
divorce was filed, M.B. moved to New York State.   
¶20 M.B. spoke with Attorney Harris in October and 
November 2008 and again in January and February 2009.  Attorney 
Harris 
told 
her 
the 
court 
would 
issue 
the 
divorce 
on 
February 18, 2009. 
¶21 Attorney Harris claims he received a voice message on 
his answering machine, from a woman who sounded like M.B., 
asking him to dismiss the divorce action.  Based on this voice 
message, he let the divorce action be dismissed.  In fact, M.B. 
did not leave any such message.  Attorney Harris took no action 
to communicate directly with M.B. to confirm her wish to dismiss 
                                                 
7 SCR 20:1.4(a)(2) provides that a lawyer shall "reasonably 
consult with the client about the means by which the client's 
objectives are to be accomplished; . . . ." 
8 SCR 20:8.4(c) states it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation; . . . ." 
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
10 
 
her divorce case, and once the action had been dismissed, he did 
not advise her of that fact.   
¶22 M.B. had believed her divorce would be finalized on 
February 18, 2009.  Beginning in February 2009 she left numerous 
messages for Attorney Harris, but he never returned her calls.  
She filed a grievance against him in July 2009. 
¶23 On September 8, 2009, the OLR sent Attorney Harris an 
investigative letter with regard to M.B.'s grievance and 
requested him to respond by October 2.  Attorney Harris failed 
to respond.  The OLR sent a second letter on October 5, 
requesting a response by October 15.  Attorney Harris again 
failed to respond.  On October 26, 2009, Attorney Harris sent 
the OLR a letter purportedly responding to M.B.'s grievance, but 
he failed to respond to several enumerated questions.   
¶24 On October 29, 2009, the OLR sent Attorney Harris 
another letter advising that more specific responses were 
required by November 12.  Attorney Harris sent several letters 
indicating a date by which he would respond, but no response was 
ever sent.  On January 9, 2010, the OLR filed a motion with this 
court seeking a suspension of Attorney Harris's license for 
failure to cooperate in an OLR investigation.  This court issued 
an order to show cause.  Attorney Harris then sent the OLR 
letters responsive to its earlier inquiries and document 
requests, and the OLR withdrew its request for a suspension of 
Attorney Harris's license. 
¶25 The OLR's complaint alleged: 
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
11 
 
 
COUNT TEN:  By failing to contact [M.B.] between 
February 2009 and August 2009 regarding the dismissal 
of her divorce case and by failing to respond to 
[M.B.'s] numerous telephone calls seeking the status 
of the divorce case, Harris violated SCRs 20:1.4(a)(3) 
and (4). 
 
COUNT ELEVEN:  By failing to respond timely to 
OLR's 
multiple 
written 
requests 
for 
information 
regarding 
this 
investigation, 
Harris 
violated 
SCR 22.03(2) 
and 
22.03(6),9 
enforceable 
via 
SCR 20:8.4(h).10 
                                                 
9 SCRs 22.03(2) and (6) state as follows: 
 
(2) Upon 
commencing 
an 
investigation, 
the 
director shall notify the respondent of the matter 
being investigated unless in the opinion of the 
director the investigation of the matter requires 
otherwise.  The respondent shall fully and fairly 
disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to the 
alleged misconduct within 20 days after being served 
by ordinary mail a request for a written response.  
The director may allow additional time to respond.  
Following receipt of the response, the director may 
conduct further investigation and may compel the 
respondent to answer questions, furnish documents, and 
present 
any 
information 
deemed 
relevant 
to 
the 
investigation. 
 
. . .  
 
(6) In the course of the investigation, the 
respondent's 
wilful 
failure 
to 
provide 
relevant 
information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a 
disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of 
the matters asserted in the grievance.  
10 SCR 20:8.4(h) states it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "fail to cooperate in the investigation of a grievance 
filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required by 
SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), or 
SCR 22.04(1); . . . ." 
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
12 
 
¶26 Counts Twelve, Thirteen, and Fourteen arose out of 
Attorney Harris's representation of J.H.  J.H. and her husband, 
S.H., filed a joint petition for divorce in January of 2006.  
Attorney Harris did not represent either party.  Mr. and Mrs. H. 
sought to end their marriage by way of a collaborative divorce. 
¶27 Mr. and Mrs. H. owned a marital residence in Erin, 
Wisconsin.  Prospective buyers failed to close on the purchase 
of the property.  S.H. wanted to pursue litigation for breach of 
contract.  J.H. did not want to do so since she had moved out of 
state and did not want to have to return to Wisconsin for the 
litigation.  She also did not want to be responsible for the 
cost of the litigation. 
¶28 S.H. met with Attorney Harris about the property 
claim.  S.H. told Attorney Harris that he and J.H. had reached 
an understanding whereby S.H. could commence the breach of 
contract litigation as long as he was solely responsible for all 
costs and J.H. would not have to return to Wisconsin.  Attorney 
Harris believed S.H. had authority from J.H. to begin the 
litigation.  On April 23, 2008, without contacting either J.H. 
or her divorce attorney, and without contacting S.H.'s divorce 
attorney, Attorney Harris filed suit against the prospective 
buyers.  The complaint named the plaintiffs as "S. and J. H.," 
and Attorney Harris signed the complaint as "Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs."  He initially did not send J.H. a copy of the 
summons and complaint or any other documents.  Attorney Harris 
believed S.H. was keeping J.H. advised of the progress of the 
case. 
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
13 
 
¶29 On or about August 29, 2008, J.H.'s divorce attorney 
learned of the suit online through CCAP.  She contacted Attorney 
Harris and told him J.H. had no knowledge of the lawsuit and was 
unwilling to participate in it.  J.H. and S.H. were divorced on 
September 26, 2008.  As part of the divorce judgment, J.H. 
agreed and was ordered to cooperate in the pending breach of 
contract suit as long as the litigation was financed entirely by 
S.H.  Despite the divorce agreement, J.H. filed a grievance 
against Attorney Harris claiming she had not given him authority 
to file the litigation.  The civil litigation was ultimately 
settled through mediation in April 2009. 
¶30 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 
misconduct with respect to the J.H. and S.H. matter: 
 
COUNT TWELVE:  By failing to advise [J.H.] that 
he had filed a lawsuit on her behalf as her attorney 
and by failing to consult with her regarding the 
nature of the lawsuit, its objectives, and the status 
of 
the 
case, 
Harris 
violated 
SCR 
20:1.2(a), 
SCR 20:1.4(a), and SCR 20:1.4(b).11 
                                                 
11 SCRs 20:1.4(a) and (b) state: 
 
A lawyer shall: 
 
(1) Promptly inform the client of any decision or 
circumstance with respect to which the client's 
informed consent, as defined in SCR 20:1.0(f), is 
required by these rules;  
 
(2) reasonably consult with the client about the 
means by which the client's objectives are to be 
accomplished; 
 
(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the 
status of the matter;  
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
14 
 
 
COUNT THIRTEEN:  By naming [J.H.] as plaintiff 
and by falsely representing to the Court in the case 
that he was the attorney representing [J.H.] when she 
had never met him and she had never agreed to such 
representation, Harris violated SCR 20:3.3(a)(1)12 and 
SCR 20:8.4(c).  
 
COUNT FOURTEEN:  By naming [J.H.] as plaintiff 
and by falsely representing to the opposing party in 
the case that he was the attorney representing [J.H.] 
when he had never met her and she had never agreed to 
such representation, Harris violated SCR 20:4.1(a)13 
and SCR 20:8.4(c). 
¶31 Attorney Harris filed an answer to the complaint on 
April 19, 2011.  James Winiarski was appointed referee.  A 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests by 
the client for information; and 
 
(5) consult with the client about any relevant 
limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer 
knows that the client expects assistance not permitted 
by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 
 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make 
informed decisions regarding the representation. 
12 SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) provides that a lawyer shall not 
knowingly "make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal 
or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law 
previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; . . . ." 
13 SCR 20:4.1(a) states as follows: 
 
In the course of representing a client a lawyer 
shall not knowingly:  
 
(1) make a false statement of a material fact or 
law to a 3rd person; or  
 
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a 3rd 
person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting 
a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless 
disclosure is prohibited by SCR 20:1.6.  
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
15 
 
hearing was held before the referee on February 20 and 21, 2012.  
The referee issued his report and recommendation on May 11, 
2012.  The referee found that the OLR had met its burden of 
proof as to Counts One through Five (the N.D. and P.B. matters).  
The referee found the OLR failed to meet its burden of proof as 
to Count Six (the first count alleged with respect to Attorney 
Harris's representation of J.K.).  The referee further found the 
OLR did meet its burden of proof with respect to Counts Seven 
through Nine (the remainder of the J.K. counts) and Ten and 
Eleven (the counts arising out of the M.B. matter).  The referee 
found the OLR failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to 
Counts Twelve through Fourteen (all arising out of the J.H. 
matter). 
¶32 With 
respect to the appropriate discipline, the 
referee noted that the OLR proved ten out of the 14 counts 
charged.  The referee said the common thread running through 
many of the proven counts was lack of diligence and failure to 
respond to client communications.  The referee noted the same 
problems also existed in Attorney Harris's prior disciplinary 
cases.   
¶33 The referee noted that Attorney Harris asserted both 
the prior disciplinary cases as well as the counts charged in 
the instant matter all had their origin in the years 2007 
through 2010, a time during which he maintained he was 
experiencing considerable personal problems.  The referee noted 
that Attorney Harris eventually decided to see a psychologist.   
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
16 
 
¶34 The psychologist testified at the evidentiary hearing 
and noted Attorney Harris's use of a "bottom left drawer" in his 
desk where he would place or hide correspondence and other 
materials he did not want to deal with in an appropriate 
fashion.  The psychologist testified that with therapy Attorney 
Harris has recognized the impropriety of that conduct and is now 
dealing with such issues in a better fashion.  The psychologist 
testified Attorney Harris suffers from depression.  However, the 
psychologist 
said 
the 
depression 
was 
not 
an 
excuse 
for 
professional misconduct.   
¶35 The 
referee 
said 
while 
Attorney 
Harris 
had 
no 
inappropriate motives, the discipline imposed in this case must 
discourage Attorney Harris from engaging in similar conduct in 
the future and must also serve to deter similar misconduct by 
other attorneys.  The referee said he did not doubt Attorney 
Harris has made progress and has learned from his mistakes, but 
the potential existed for Attorney Harris to relapse and fall 
into the same sort of conduct in the future. 
¶36 The referee identified as mitigating factors Attorney 
Harris's acknowledgement of his depression and his need for 
psychological help; the restructuring of his office protocols to 
avoid similar problems in the future; his acknowledgment of some 
of the misconduct here; and his hardworking and zealous 
representation of clients as shown in the J.K. matter.  The 
referee identified as aggravating factors Attorney Harris's 
three 
prior 
disciplinary 
proceedings 
involving 
similar 
misconduct. 
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
17 
 
¶37 The referee noted this court has followed a pattern of 
progressive discipline.  He noted the OLR had sought a one-year 
suspension 
while 
Attorney 
Harris 
believed 
another 
public 
reprimand was appropriate.  Given the past disciplinary history 
and the misconduct proven in this case, the referee recommended 
Attorney Harris be suspended for six months and be required to 
continue psychological counseling for his depression.  The 
referee recommended that Attorney Harris be responsible for 80 
percent of the costs in the case and said, "I do find total 
costs would not have been much different even if the counts 
recommended for dismissal had not been charged." 
¶38 Attorney Harris has appealed.  He identifies the 
following issues: 
 
1. 
Did the Referee err in concluding Attorney 
Harris violated the Rules of Professional conduct when 
he failed to reasonably communicate with what he 
thought was former client after he thought the client 
had instructed him to dismiss a divorce matter?  
 
2. 
Did the Referee err in concluding that 
Attorney Harris violated the rules of professional 
conduct by failing to communicate the choice of 
tactics with [J.K.] when she had given him carte 
blanche to resolve an outstanding judgment and put 
another matter on hold until that judgment was 
resolved?  
 
3. 
Did the Referee err in concluding that 
Attorney Harris violated the rules of professional 
conduct by misrepresenting the status of a matter when 
there is no evidence that Attorney Harris ever told 
client that it was pending when it was not?  
 
4. 
Did the Referee err in recommending a six 
month 
suspension 
when 
Attorney 
Harris 
has 
made 
significant changes to prevent a reoccurrence of past 
bad conduct, has practiced violation free for two 
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
18 
 
years and his conduct is not as serious as other cases 
calling for a six month suspension? 
¶39 Attorney Harris's opening brief on appeal states that 
he appeals only from the referee's finding of fact contained in 
paragraph 32 and the referee's conclusions of law with respect 
to Counts Seven, Eight, Nine (in part), Ten, and Eleven.  He 
also objects to the level of discipline recommended by the 
referee and continues to believe that a public reprimand would 
be appropriate. 
¶40 Finding of fact 32 states, "Harris deliberately led 
[J.K.] to believe that the action was still pending, after he 
knew it had been dismissed."   
¶41 In discussing the J.K. matter, the referee said the 
evidence shows that Attorney Harris permitted the dismissal of 
the malpractice case without discussing the dismissal and its 
consequences with J.K.  The referee said the dismissal of the 
malpractice case and its relation to the judgment previously 
taken against J.K. and her husband were significant events which 
required input from Attorney Harris's client.   
¶42 With respect to the M.B. matter, the referee noted 
Attorney Harris maintains he received a voice message from M.B. 
indicating she wanted to drop her divorce action.  The referee 
said, "[T]he reasonable approach to the alleged voice message 
required confirmation of his client's desire to drop the divorce 
action."  
¶43 Attorney Harris argues the referee erred in failing to 
recommend 
the 
dismissal 
of 
Count 
Ten 
involving 
the 
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
19 
 
representation 
of 
M.B. because Attorney Harris reasonably 
believed his representation of M.B. had ended.  Attorney Harris 
claims he was the victim of an intentional deception, and 
because of this he believed his client wanted the divorce case 
dismissed.   
¶44 Attorney Harris also argues that the referee erred in 
concluding he violated the rules of professional conduct with 
respect to his representation of J.K.  He says the only evidence 
in the record is that he did consult with J.K. on the method and 
means of pursuing her malpractice claim.  He argues the evidence 
established that J.K. gave him carte blanche to do what he could 
to resolve the judgment so long as the malpractice action 
remained "viable."  He asserts the record shows the malpractice 
action was always viable because the statute of limitations had 
not run and it could always be re-filed.  He says, "The day 
after the action was dismissed in March of 2008, it was just as 
viable as the day Attorney Harris filed it."   
¶45 Attorney Harris argues there is no showing that J.K. 
wanted to be apprised of each and every step taken in the 
malpractice case.  He says the only testimony in the record is 
that J.K. gave him a goal (resolution of the judgment) and 
directed him to do everything he could to get rid of the 
judgment.  Attorney Harris asserts given that the malpractice 
action was capable of being pursued even after it was dismissed, 
there was no harm to J.K. and no violation of supreme court 
rules. 
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
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¶46 Attorney 
Harris 
also 
asserts 
the 
referee's 
recommendation of a six-month suspension is excessive.  He says 
it is important to place his misconduct in a time perspective.  
He says generally the events at issue in this case occurred from 
late 2006 or early 2007 to sometime in 2009.  He points to a 
series of unfortunate events during that time period in both his 
personal and professional life.  He says the onslaught of these 
problems and pressures exacerbated his personality trait of 
avoiding problems by placing unopened envelopes that he thought 
contained bad news into a desk drawer and trying to ignore the 
problem.   
¶47 Attorney Harris says he is not the same person now who 
committed the acts and violated the rules at issue in this case. 
He says the events in his life that caused him to spiral 
downward are now over.  He says the cases in which he failed to 
respond to clients in a timely manner (N.D. and P.B.) occurred 
in 
2006 
through 2009, the same timeframe as the other 
disciplinary matters in which he has already been sanctioned.  
Attorney Harris suggests that if the OLR had presented the N.D. 
and P.B. cases at the same time as the prior disciplinary 
matters, all of those matters could have been considered 
together.  He says although he acknowledges the seriousness of 
his failings, "one can question the fairness of separating out 
matters that could have been handled together and using the 
first resolved matter as the basis of 'progressive' discipline." 
¶48 Attorney Harris asserts that since he was last 
disciplined in 2010 he has made significant changes in the way 
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
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he practices law.  He says he has not and will not forget the 
seriousness of his past actions and he says in this electronic 
age his previous missteps will never be forgotten. 
¶49 The OLR argues that the referee's findings and 
conclusions should be upheld in all respects.  The OLR says 
Attorney Harris's defense to the count involving M.B. is based 
on an unsubstantiated claim that he received an anonymous call 
from somebody purporting to be M.B. indicating she did not want 
to proceed with her divorce case.  The OLR says the issue turns 
on the credibility of Attorney Harris and M.B., and it says the 
referee's determination of credibility is not to be second 
guessed by this court.  The OLR says the referee chose to 
believe M.B. when she testified she never left any such message 
directing the dismissal of her divorce case.  The OLR notes 
Attorney Harris admits he never corroborated the message by 
contacting M.B. or anyone else on her behalf, nor did he confirm 
by letter or in any other way that the divorce case should be 
cancelled.  The OLR says there is ample evidence to support the 
referee's finding of misconduct on Count Ten. 
¶50 The OLR goes on to argue that by failing to consult 
with J.K. about the strategy used pertaining to her legal 
malpractice claim, Attorney Harris violated SCRs 20:1.2(a) and 
SCR 20:1.4(a)(2) and (3).  The OLR says Attorney Harris made the 
unilateral decision to allow the malpractice case to be 
dismissed in order to be in a better bargaining position against 
J.K.'s judgment creditor.  The OLR notes Attorney Harris admits 
he never told J.K. the malpractice suit had been dismissed.  The 
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
22 
 
OLR says even assuming Attorney Harris's strategy for dismissing 
the legal malpractice claim had some strategic merit (which the 
OLR terms "very questionable"), he is not relieved of his duty 
to consult with his client and abide by her decision.  Attorney 
Harris never gave his client the chance to consider alternatives 
when he placed her malpractice claim in jeopardy without her 
consent.  The OLR says the referee's factual findings leading to 
the conclusion of violations of Counts Six and Seven are not 
clearly erroneous. 
¶51 The OLR argues that by failing to advise J.K. about 
the dismissal of her legal malpractice suit and by leading her 
to believe the case was still pending after he knew it had been 
dismissed, Attorney Harris violated SCR 20:8.4(c), as alleged in 
Count Nine of the complaint.  The OLR says Attorney Harris's 
stated goal was to withhold information from his client in order 
to preserve some "plausible deniability" on her behalf should 
she later have to testify about her assets in the money judgment 
case.  The OLR says, "In sum, Harris planned to use his own 
deceit of his client to conceal the legal malpractice claim from 
her judgment creditors.  None of these claimed strategies were 
admittedly reviewed with [J.K.]."  
¶52 The OLR notes that SCR 20:8.4(c) is stated in the 
disjunctive and prohibits conduct which involves any one of the 
four 
acts 
described: 
 
dishonest, 
deceit, 
fraud, 
or 
misrepresentation.  The OLR says the conduct here best fits the 
category of misrepresentation which is defined in SCR 20:1.0(h) 
as "an untruth, either knowingly or with reckless disregard, 
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
23 
 
whether by statement or omission, which if accepted would lead 
another to believe a condition exists that does not actually 
exist."  The OLR says Attorney Harris's comments to J.K. 
certainly led her to believe a condition existed that did not 
actually exist, i.e., that there remained pending a viable legal 
malpractice claim. 
¶53 As to the appropriate sanction, the OLR says Attorney 
Harris's multiple rule violations and disciplinary history 
warrant a six-month suspension.  The OLR says there are many 
aggravating circumstances in this case, the most dramatic of 
which is Attorney Harris's prior disciplinary history, including 
the same rule violations with respect to other clients.   
¶54 The OLR says Attorney Harris appears to argue that if 
all of his past disciplinary violations had been bundled 
together into one case, he would have received a lighter 
sanction.  The OLR says it processes disciplinary matters in the 
sequence in which they are filed, and it says it is "rank 
speculation to presume a sanction would be any different had the 
sequencing of disciplinary prosecutions been any different."    
¶55 A referee's findings of fact will not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are reviewed de 
novo.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 
2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  This court is 
free to impose whatever discipline it deems appropriate, 
regardless 
of 
the 
referee's 
recommendation. 
 
See 
In 
re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 
Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.   
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
24 
 
¶56 After careful review of the record and having had the 
benefit of briefs and oral arguments by the parties, we conclude 
that the record supports all of the referee's findings of fact, 
including finding of fact 32.  We also agree with all of the 
referee's conclusions of law which flow from the findings of 
fact. 
¶57 We specifically agree with the referee that the 
reasonable approach to the alleged voicemail message left by 
M.B. required that Attorney Harris confirm his client's desire 
to drop the divorce action.  We also specifically agree with the 
referee that Attorney Harris had a duty to disclose and discuss 
with J.K. his strategy regarding her legal malpractice suit, and 
we agree with the referee that no reasonable attorney would 
assume that she or he had the authority to dismiss a pending 
malpractice case without first discussing that strategy with his 
or her client.  Although it may be true that Attorney Harris 
never explicitly told J.K. that the malpractice suit was still 
"pending" after he allowed it to be dismissed, he admits that he 
told J.K. the malpractice action remained "viable."  We conclude 
that Attorney Harris's comments to J.K. that her malpractice 
suit remained "viable" after he knew it had been dismissed 
constituted 
a 
misrepresentation 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
SCR 20:8.4(c).   
¶58 Turning to the appropriate sanction, the referee is 
correct that we generally adhere to a pattern of progressive 
discipline.  Attorney Harris's disciplinary history consists of 
a 
private 
reprimand, 
a 
public 
reprimand, 
and 
a 
60-day 
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
25 
 
suspension.  After careful consideration, we conclude that the 
appropriate level of discipline is a five-month suspension of 
Attorney Harris's license to practice law. 
¶59 We note that all of the client matters at issue here 
had their genesis in the 2007-2009 timeframe, which is the same 
time period at issue in the matters that led to Attorney 
Harris's suspension in 2010.  Attorney Harris has stated that 
since that time, he has made substantial progress in handling 
the way he practices law.  He now shares office space with a 
well-respected local attorney and consults with him on various 
cases.  That attorney serves as Attorney Harris's mentor.  
Attorney Harris has downsized his practice, prioritizes his 
existing clients over attempting to obtain new ones, and no 
longer puts anything in his lower left-hand desk drawer.  
Attorney Harris's psychologist has confirmed these positive 
changes. 
¶60 There is no way of knowing what sanction would have 
been imposed in the event all of the counts at issue in this 
matter had been brought in conjunction with the counts contained 
in the complaint that led to Attorney Harris's 60-day suspension 
in 2010.  The counts of misconduct at issue in this case are 
serious failings.  Nevertheless, we deem it appropriate to 
impose a five-month suspension, whereby Attorney Harris will be 
able to be reinstated by affidavit, see SCR 22.28(2), rather 
than a six-month suspension which would necessitate a full 
reinstatement 
proceeding, see SCRs 22.29-22.33, and would 
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
26 
 
increase the actual time Attorney Harris was without a license 
to practice law. 
¶61 We agree with the referee that Attorney Harris should 
be required to continue psychological counseling for his 
depression.  We also deem it appropriate to assess Attorney 
Harris the full costs of the proceeding.  Supreme court rule 
22.24(1m) provides that the court's general policy is that upon 
a finding of misconduct it is appropriate to impose all costs 
upon 
the 
respondent. 
 
In 
cases 
involving 
extraordinary 
circumstances, the court may, in the exercise of its discretion, 
reduce the amount 
of costs.  We find no extraordinary 
circumstances in this case that would warrant a deviation from 
the court's general policy.  Indeed, the referee commented that 
the total costs would not have been much different even if the 
counts on which the referee found the OLR did not meet its 
burden of proof had not been charged. 
¶62 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Benjamin J. Harris 
to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of five 
months, effective February 25, 2013. 
¶63 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that for a period of two years 
from 
the 
date of 
this order, Benjamin J. Harris shall 
participate in psychological counseling for his depression and 
shall submit quarterly reports from his psychologist to the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation. 
¶64 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Benjamin J. Harris shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding. 
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
27 
 
¶65 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.28(2). 
 
No. 
2011AP478-D   
 
 
 
1