Title: Sausen v. Town of Black Creek Bd. of Review
Citation: 2014 WI 9
Docket Number: 2010AP003015
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 19, 2014

2014 WI 9 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP3015   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Frank J. Sausen, 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Town of Black Creek Board of Review, 
          Respondent-Respondent.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(No cite)  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 19, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 4, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Outagamie 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael W. Gage 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.) 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by R. George Burnett, T. Wickham Schmidt, and Conway, Olejniczak 
& Jerry, S.C., Green Bay, and oral argument by R. George 
Burnett. 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief by Michael 
C. Menghini and Herrling Clark Law Firm Ltd., Appleton, and oral 
argument by Michael C. Menghini.  
 
 
 
2014 WI  9
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP3015 
(L.C. No. 
2010CV396) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Frank J. Sausen, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Town of Black Creek Board of Review, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 19, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming an order 
of the circuit court for Outagamie County, Michael W. Gage, 
Judge.1  In a certiorari review, the circuit court affirmed the 
Town of Black Creek Board of Review's assessment of taxpayer 
Frank J. Sausen's real property for purposes of real estate 
                                                 
1 Sausen v. Town of Black Creek Bd. of Review, No. 
2010AP3015, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2012).  
No. 
2010AP3015   
 
 
2 
 
 
taxation.2  The court of appeals summarily affirmed the order of 
the circuit court.  We affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
¶2 
The issue presented is whether the town board of 
review erred in refusing to lower the assessment of the 
taxpayer's real property.  The town assessor valued the property 
at $27,500, classified the property as "productive forest land," 
and assessed the property at $27,500.  The taxpayer does not 
challenge the assessor's valuation of the property.  The 
taxpayer challenges the assessment on the ground that the 
assessor's classification of the property is erroneous.     
¶3 
The assessor's classification of the property directly 
affects the assessment in the present case:  Property classified 
as "productive forest land" under Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(a) and 
(c)2. (2011-12)3 is assessed at full value; property classified 
as "undeveloped land" is assessed at 50 percent of its full 
value.4  The taxpayer claims that the board should change the 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13) ("Except as provided in this 
subsection and in ss. 70.85 and 74.37, appeal from the 
determination of the board of review shall be by an action for 
certiorari . . . ."). 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to  
the 2011-2012 version unless otherwise noted. 
4 Wis. Stat. § 70.32(4) ("[U]ndeveloped land shall be 
assessed at 50% of its full value . . . .").  
The Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual at 12-2 (rev. eff. 
1/09) advises:  "After determining the full value of the 
'Undeveloped land' in accordance with sec. 70.32(1), state case 
law, and professionally accepted appraisal practices, the value 
is reduced by 50% under sec. 70.32(4)." 
No. 
2010AP3015   
 
 
3 
 
 
classification of the property to "undeveloped land" under Wis. 
Stat. § 70.32(2)(c)4. and that the property, properly classified 
as undeveloped land, should be assessed at $13,750, that is, at 
50 percent of the full value of $27,500.   
¶4 
The 
taxpayer 
in 
the 
present 
case 
appeals 
a 
determination 
of 
the 
board 
of 
review 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.47(13), 
which 
provides 
that 
an 
"appeal 
from 
the 
determination of the board of review shall be for an action for 
certiorari . . . ."5  Accordingly, this court's review of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
The Manual is relevant to our discussion because the 
legislature 
has 
instructed 
that 
the 
Manual 
sets 
forth 
"guidelines" and is published by the Department of Revenue to 
"discuss and illustrate accepted assessment methods, techniques 
and practices with a view to more nearly uniform and more 
consistent assessments of property at the local level."  Wis. 
Stat. § 73.03(2a).   
The Manual is cited for its persuasive value; it cannot 
supersede the statute.  
5 A taxpayer may challenge an assessment under other 
statutes.   
Section 70.85 allows a taxpayer to challenge an assessment 
by filing with the Department of Revenue.  "Appeal of a 
determination of the department of revenue shall be by an action 
for certiorari in the circuit court . . . ."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.85(4)(c). 
Section 74.37 governs a taxpayer's claim in court to 
recover a general property tax imposed because the assessment of 
property was excessive.  The court proceeding is not a 
certiorari review; it is a de novo proceeding.  In a Wis. Stat. 
§ 74.37 court proceeding, "the assessor's assessment is presumed 
correct if the challenging party does not present significant 
contrary evidence."  Bloomer Housing Ltd. P'ship v. City of 
Bloomer, 2002 WI App 252, ¶11, 257 Wis. 2d 883, 653 N.W.2d 309.  
No. 
2010AP3015   
 
 
4 
 
 
board's determination of the assessment and classification of 
the property is by certiorari review.  
¶5 
In certiorari review, this court reviews a decision of 
the board of review under Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13), not the 
decisions of the circuit court or court of appeals.  This court 
reviews a decision of the board of review in the same manner as 
the circuit court and court of appeals, benefiting from their 
analyses.  Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc. v. Kenosha Cty. Bd. of 
Review, 184 Wis. 2d 541, 554, 516 N.W.2d 695 (1994). 
¶6 
In a certiorari review, the court is confined to 
determining whether the board's actions were: 
(1) 
within its jurisdiction; 
(2) 
according to law; 
(3) 
arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable and represented 
its will and not its judgment; and   
(4) 
supported by evidence such that the board might 
reasonably 
make 
the 
order 
or 
determination 
in 
question.6 
¶7 
The taxpayer's argument in the present case centers on 
the fourth element of certiorari review, namely that the board's 
determination to adopt the assessor's classification of the 
property is not supported by evidence such that the board might 
reasonably make the determination in question.    
                                                 
6 State ex rel. Stupar River LLC v. Town of Linwood Portage 
Cnty. Bd. of Review, 2011 WI 82, ¶16, 336 Wis. 2d 562, 800 
N.W.2d 468. 
No. 
2010AP3015   
 
 
5 
 
 
¶8 
The taxpayer argues that he does not have the burden 
to prove the classification and by extension, the assessment, 
erroneous; that the board, the circuit court, and the court of 
appeals imposed that burden of proof on him, erroneously 
according a presumption of correctness to the assessor's 
classification of the property; and that the board erroneously 
concluded that the taxpayer did not carry his burden at the 
board hearing.  The taxpayer asks the court to remand the matter 
to the board so that it can determine the correct assessment 
without imposing on the taxpayer the burden of proving the 
classification erroneous.  
¶9 
The statutes do not state whether the taxpayer 
challenging an assessment (or classification) has the burden of 
proving 
at 
the 
board 
hearing 
that 
the 
assessment 
(or 
classification) is incorrect.   
¶10 Upon considering the general rule of law regarding 
burden of proof, the statutes, and the case law, we conclude 
that the taxpayer challenging an assessment and classification 
has the burden of proving at the board hearing that the 
assessment and classification of property are erroneous; that 
the taxpayer did not meet his burden of proof; and that the 
board's determination to maintain the assessment is supported by 
a reasonable view of the evidence.  We therefore affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
¶11  The following facts are not in dispute for purposes of 
this review.  Frank Sausen, the taxpayer, owned a 10-acre plot 
No. 
2010AP3015   
 
 
6 
 
 
of property at W5930 County Road A, parcel number 010064400, in 
the Town of Black Creek, Outagamie County, Wisconsin.  He used 
the property for occasional hunting.  The property has not been 
used to produce commercial forest products.   
¶12 In early November 2009, the taxpayer was notified that 
the assessment of his property had increased from $11,000 in 
2008 to $27,500 in 2009.  The increase in assessment in 2009 
resulted from an increase in the assessor's valuation of the 
property, not a change in classification.7   
¶13 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 70.32, the 2009 assessment 
roll included the assessor's valuation of the property at 
$27,500 as well as the assessor's classification of the property 
as "low grade woods."   
¶14 According to the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual, 
"low grade woods" is a permissible subset of "productive forest 
land."8  "Productive forest land" is defined in Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
7 The assessment notice sent to the taxpayer states that the 
"reason for change" was "[i]ncrease due to revaluation."  Town 
of Black Creek Board of Review, Notice of Assessment——Frank 
Sausen, W5930 County Rd A, Black Creek WI 54106 (Nov. 4, 2009). 
Additionally, the prior assessment of $11,000 is congruent with 
the prior Town of Black Creek Land Values, which valued low-
grade forest at $1,100 per acre.  The 2009 Town of Black Creek 
Land Values valued low-grade forest at $2,750 per acre. 
8 Within the classification of "productive forest land," as 
provided by Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(c)2., the Wisconsin Property 
Assessment 
Manual 
advises 
assessors 
to 
further 
create 
subclassifications of productive forest land based on the 
species, size, volume, and stocking density of trees on the 
property.  See 1 Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual at 12-3 to 
12-10 (rev. eff. 1/09).  
No. 
2010AP3015   
 
 
7 
 
 
§ 70.32(2)(c)2. as "land that is producing or is capable of 
producing commercial forest products and is not otherwise 
classified under this subsection."9  
¶15 Before we examine the issues of burden of proof and 
the 
presumption 
of 
the 
correctness 
of 
the 
assessor's 
classification of the property, we describe the statutory 
methodology for creating an assessment for real estate taxation.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 70.32 establishes a three-part methodology for 
creating an assessment:  First, an assessor assigns the property 
a "valuation"——a value of the property to be assessed based on 
the statutory requirements in Wis. Stat. § 70.32 and the 
Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual.10  The Wisconsin Property 
Assessment 
Manual 
at 
7-7 
through 
7-8 
explains 
that 
the 
legislature has established value standards for different 
classes of properties.  Value may thus be affected by the 
classification of the property.11  
                                                 
9 The Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual notes that 
"[f]orested areas primarily held for hunting, trapping, or in 
the operation of game preserves, should be classified as forest 
unless clearly operated as commercial enterprise or exempt." 1 
Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual, 5-45 (rev. eff. 1/09). 
 
10 "Real property shall be valued by the assessor in the 
manner specified in the Wisconsin property assessment manual 
provided under s. 73.03(2a) . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1). 
11 For example, the value standard for agricultural land is 
use value.  1 Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 7-6 to 7-7 
(rev. eff. 1/09). 
No. 
2010AP3015   
 
 
8 
 
 
¶16 Second, 
"the 
assessor, 
having 
fixed 
a 
value," 
"segregates" the property into a "class" under the statutes.12  
The legislature has established eight classes: residential, 
commercial, 
manufacturing, 
agricultural, 
undeveloped, 
agricultural forest, productive forest land, and other.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2).   
¶17 Third, certain classes, notably agricultural forest 
land and undeveloped land, are assessed at a percentage of full 
value.  Undeveloped land "shall be assessed at 50% of its full 
value," with the value determined as set forth in the first step 
described above.  See Wis. Stat. § 70.32(4).   
¶18 This case involves a challenge to an assessment, based 
on a challenge to classification.  Although Wis. Stat. § 70.32 
sets forth a methodology for determining an assessment and uses 
the word "assessment" often, the word is not defined.  The words 
"assessment" and "assessed value" are set forth in the glossary 
of terminology in the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual to 
mean "a dollar amount assigned to the taxable property . . . by 
the assessor for the purpose of taxation." The Manual states 
that "the levy is applied directly against it [the assessment] 
to determine the tax due."13  
¶19 We begin our discussion of whether the taxpayer has 
the burden of proof regarding the classification of property by 
                                                 
12 Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(a). 
13 1 Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual G-1 (rev. eff. 
1/09). 
No. 
2010AP3015   
 
 
9 
 
 
enunciating the general rule of law that "a party seeking 
judicial process to advance his position carries the burden of 
proof."14  A board of review is a quasi-judicial body to which 
this general rule governing burden of proof applies.15  Applying 
this rule to the present case means the taxpayer has the burden 
of proof.   
¶20 The taxpayer argues that this general rule governing 
the burden of proof does not apply to him because the statute is 
silent about the burden of proof and the statutes accord a 
presumption of correctness only to the assessor's valuation, not 
to the assessor's classification or assessment.  The taxpayer 
recognizes, as we do, that the concepts of burden of proof and 
presumption of correctness are intertwined.  "The concept of a 
'presumption' is very familiar in the law, and it is closely 
related to the concept of a 'burden.'"  Ottman v. Town of 
Primrose, 2011 WI 18, ¶50, 332 Wis. 2d 3, 796 N.W.2d 411. 
¶21 Although our initial impression is that the general 
rule assigning the challenging party the burden of proof applies 
in the present case, we examine the statutes and the case law to 
inform us further.  
                                                 
14 Loeb v. Bd. of Regents, 29 Wis. 2d 159, 164, 138 
N.W.2d 227 (1965).    
15 "A Board of Review is a quasi-judicial body that hears 
evidence to adduce whether an assessor's valuation is correct."  
Metro. Assocs. v. City of Milwaukee, 2011 WI 20, ¶7, 332 
Wis. 2d 85, 796 N.W.2d 717 (2011) (citing Nankin v. Vill. of 
Shorewood, 2001 WI 92, ¶18, 245 Wis. 2d 86, 630 N.W.2d 141).   
No. 
2010AP3015   
 
 
10 
 
 
¶22 Support for applying this general rule allocating the 
burden of proof to the taxpayer challenger is found in Wis. 
Stat. § 70.47(7).  The statute places a burden on a taxpayer who 
objects to a valuation to present evidence to the board in 
support of the objection.  This provision adopts the general 
rule placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer to put on an 
affirmative case in his or her favor before the board:  
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.47(7)(a) 
Objections 
to 
valuations. . . .  No person shall be allowed in any 
action or proceedings to question the amount16 or 
valuation of property unless such written objection 
has been filed and such person in good faith presented 
evidence to such board in support of such objections 
and made full disclosure before said board, under oath 
of all of that person's property liable to assessment 
in such district and the value thereof (footnote 
added). 
¶23 We 
acknowledge 
that 
the 
title 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.47(7)(a) is "Objections to valuations" and that (7)(a) 
addresses a taxpayer's objection to a valuation.  Nevertheless, 
several subsections of § 70.47(7) refer to and govern challenges 
to assessments. It is apparent from reading § 70.47(7) in its 
entirety that the words "valuation" and "assessment" are being 
used interchangeably in several instances.   
¶24 Section 70.47 is a long statute with many subsections.  
The section is entitled "Board of review proceedings" and 
addresses board proceedings that involve both objections to the 
                                                 
16 The word "amount" has been interpreted to refer to the 
amount of property, that is, part or all of the property.  Clear 
Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2011 WI App 117, ¶8, 
336 Wis. 2d 707, 805 N.W.2d 582. 
No. 
2010AP3015   
 
 
11 
 
 
valuation and objections to the assessment.  Nothing in 
§ 70.47(7) specifically addresses a board's proceedings when an 
objection is made to a classification of property.  Because an 
assessment involves a classification as well as a valuation, it 
makes 
sense 
to 
treat 
§ 70.47(7) 
as 
governing 
a 
board's 
proceedings 
regarding 
challenges 
to 
the 
valuation, 
classification, 
or 
assessment 
unless 
the 
substance 
of 
a 
provision requires a different approach.  There is no apparent 
reason to treat the taxpayer's burden of proof in a challenge to 
classification differently from the taxpayer's burden of proof 
in a challenge to a valuation or an assessment. 
¶25 Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 70.47(8) governing a hearing 
before the board "in relation to the assessment" informs our 
decision about the taxpayer's burden of proof on the issue of 
classification.  Section 70.47(8)(b) provides that the taxpayer 
shall be heard first at the board hearing.  The party with the 
burden 
of 
proof 
ordinarily 
presents 
first. 
 
Because 
an 
assessment is based on the classification, this provision in 
§ 70.47(8) applying to a challenge to an assessment should be 
read to apply to an objection to a classification.   
¶26 In addition, § 70.47(8)(i) explicitly provides that a 
board shall presume that the assessor's valuation is correct but 
that the presumption may be rebutted by a sufficient showing by 
the objector that the valuation is incorrect.  Again the 
statutory language is limited to valuations and is silent about 
a 
presumption 
of 
correctness 
regarding 
the 
assessor's 
No. 
2010AP3015   
 
 
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classification:  "The board shall presume that the assessor's 
valuation is correct.  That presumption may be rebutted by a 
sufficient showing by the objector that the valuation is 
incorrect."  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(8)(i).   
¶27 This presumption language was added to Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(8)(i) in 1997.17  Although the presumption language in 
Wis. Stat. § 70.47(8)(i) limits the presumption of correctness 
to the assessor's valuation, we must read § 70.47(8)(i) in the 
context of the contemporaneous amendment adding § 70.47(8)(h) 
requiring the assessor to "provide to the board specific 
information about the validity of the valuation . . . and 
information that the assessor used to determine that valuation."  
The presumption in § 70.47(8)(i) reinforces the burden of proof 
imposed in § 70.47(7) on the taxpayer who objects to valuation 
to show at the board hearing that the valuation is erroneous.  
Even though the assessor must provide specific information to 
the board regarding the valuation, the burden of proof to show 
error in the assessor's valuation remains on the taxpayer.  
¶28 Our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7) and (8) to 
support imposing the burden of proof on the taxpayer challenging 
the assessment or classification at the board is reinforced by 
§ 70.47(9), which directs the board how and when to correct an 
assessment.  Section 70.47(9) provides that a board shall raise 
or lower an assessment "if the assessment is too high or too 
low" and "shall state on the record the correct assessment and 
                                                 
17 1997 Wis. Act 237, § 279m. 
No. 
2010AP3015   
 
 
13 
 
 
that that assessment is reasonable in light of all the relevant 
evidence the board received."  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(9)(a).   
¶29 Although Wis. Stat. § 70.47(9)(a) is silent about 
whether the taxpayer has the burden of proof in challenging the 
correctness of the classification, Wis. Stat. § 70.47(9)(a) 
explicitly states that if the vote at the board is a tie vote on 
the objection to the assessment, the assessment will be 
sustained.  The legislature has thus declared that if the party 
who seeks to raise or lower the assessment fails to persuade a 
majority of the board that the assessment is incorrect, that 
party loses.  In this way, § 70.47(9)(a) makes it absolutely 
clear that the burden of persuasion is on the taxpayer to show 
that an assessor's assessment is erroneous.  Because an 
assessment depends on a valuation and a classification, it makes 
sense to apply the same burden of proof to a taxpayer's 
challenge to a classification as is applied to a taxpayer's 
challenge to an assessment.   
¶30 Finally, our position is supported by Wis. Stat. 
§ 74.37.  Under this statute, when a taxpayer uses this 
procedure in circuit court to challenge an assessment as 
excessive, the circuit court reviews the board's determination 
de novo, giving "no deference to the Board of Review's 
decision."18  Nevertheless, "the underlying assessment still 
                                                 
18 Metro. Assocs. v. City of Milwaukee, 2011 WI 20, ¶10, 332 
Wis. 2d 85, 796 N.W.2d 717. 
No. 
2010AP3015   
 
 
14 
 
 
carries a presumption of correctness."19  When the legislature 
provides that an underlying assessment carries a presumption of 
correctness when the board's determination is reviewed de novo 
by a court, it seems logical to infer that when a more limited 
certiorari judicial review of a board's determination takes 
place, the burden is on the taxpayer to prove that an assessor's 
assessment is erroneous.     
¶31 The 
historical 
understanding 
of 
earlier, 
similar 
versions of the statutes bolsters our interpretation of the 
present statutes as placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer 
to prove that the assessor's classification is erroneous.  
¶32 As far back as 1883, the court declared that under the 
statutes then in effect a person objecting to an assessment had 
to take the initiative and produce testimony showing that the 
assessment was too high.  See Shove v. City of Manitowoc, 57 
Wis. 5, 7, 8, 14 N.W. 829 (1883).  Furthermore, the court noted 
that the statute provided that a board of review was authorized 
to increase or lessen the assessment "only upon being 'satisfied 
from the evidence taken' that it is too high or too low."  
Shove, 57 Wis. at 8.  The Shove court concluded that the statute 
was enacted to prevent the board from arbitrarily increasing or 
decreasing an assessment "without evidence or testimony and 
merely to satisfy their own notions of justice or some opinions 
based, perchance, upon some casual statement made by some 
citizen in good faith or otherwise."  Shove, 57 Wis. at 8. 
                                                 
19 Id. (citing Wis. Stat. § 70.49(2)). 
No. 
2010AP3015   
 
 
15 
 
 
¶33 The 
Shove 
case 
has 
since 
been 
cited 
for 
the 
proposition that, absent sufficient evidence, a board cannot 
change an assessment.  
¶34 State ex rel. Giroux v. Lien, 108 Wis. 316, 317-18, 84 
N.W. 422 (1900), cited Shove as supporting the proposition that 
an assessor's valuation stands before the board as prima facie 
correct and declared that "the assessment needs no support by 
evidence in the first instance, but must stand, unless shown to 
be incorrect by reasonably direct and unambiguous evidence" 
(emphasis added). 
¶35 Subsequently, State ex rel. Foster v. Williams, 123 
Wis. 73, 75, 100 N.W. 1052 (1904), cited Giroux for the 
proposition that an objecting taxpayer "had no right to have 
[the true assessment] reduced, except upon evidence reasonably 
tending to show that it was excessive . . . ."20 
¶36 The court has stated that a landowner must overcome 
"the 
prima 
facie 
presumption 
in 
favor 
of 
the 
original 
assessment."  State ex rel. Vilas v. Wharton, 117 Wis. 558, 562, 
94 N.W. 359 (1903) (emphasis added).  In State ex rel. Kimberly-
Clark Co. v. Williams, 160 Wis. 648, 651, 152 N.W. 450 (1915), 
the court declared that "[t]he assessment of the relator's 
                                                 
20 Shove v. City of Manitowoc, 57 Wis. 5, 14 N.W. 829 
(1883), and State ex rel. Foster v. Williams, 123 Wis. 73, 75, 
100 N.W. 105 (1904), involved a tax on personal property, but 
the principles stated therein are applicable to taxation of real 
property.  Fond du Lac Water Co. v. City of Fond du Lac, 82 Wis. 
322, 52 N.W. 439 (1892) (holding that, both as to real and 
personal property, a board of review cannot arbitrarily increase 
the valuation of the assessor without proof being furnished). 
No. 
2010AP3015   
 
 
16 
 
 
property made by the assessor was prima facie correct and was 
binding on the board of review in the absence of evidence 
showing it to be incorrect" (emphasis added).  The court has 
also noted that "it is . . . the law that the assessment made by 
the local assessor is prima facie correct."  Peninsular Power 
Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, 195 Wis. 231, 234, 218 N.W. 371 
(1928).    
¶37 Thus, on the basis of the general principle regarding 
which party has the burden of proof; the text of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 70.47(7)(a), 70.47(8)(i), 70.47(9), and 74.32; and the case 
law, we conclude that a taxpayer who objects to an assessment on 
the basis of the classification of the property has the burden 
of proving that the classification is erroneous.   
¶38 We now examine the record before the board to 
determine whether the board erred in refusing to reduce the 
assessment.  In reviewing a determination of a board of review, 
"[t]he presumptions are all in favor of the rightful action of 
the board."  Darcel v. Manitowoc Bd. Of Review, 137 Wis. 2d 623, 
626, 405 N.W.2d 344 (1987) (quoting State ex rel. Boostrom v. 
Bd. of Review, 42 Wis. 2d 149, 155, 166 N.W.2d 184 (1969)).21       
                                                 
21 In reviewing a municipality's decision on certiorari, 
Wisconsin courts have repeatedly stated that there is a 
presumption of correctness and validity to a municipality's 
decision.  Nowell v. City of Wausau, 2013 WI 88, ¶24, 351 
Wis. 2d 1, 838 N.W.2d 852.   
The person challenging the municipality's decision, here 
the taxpayer, bears the burden to overcome the presumption of 
correctness of the board's decision.  Ottman v. Town of 
Primrose, 2011 WI 18, ¶50, 332 Wis. 2d 3, 796 N.W.2d 411. 
No. 
2010AP3015   
 
 
17 
 
 
¶39 To support his argument that the board erred in 
refusing to reduce the assessment and his contention that the 
classification 
of 
the 
property 
should 
be 
changed 
from 
"productive forest land" to "undeveloped land," the taxpayer 
produced and relied on two maps:  one issued by the Wisconsin 
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and the other issued by 
the United States Department of the Interior Geological Survey. 
"Undeveloped land" is defined by Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(c)4. as 
"bog, 
marsh, 
lowland 
brush, 
uncultivated 
land 
zoned 
as 
shoreland . . . or 
other 
nonproductive 
lands 
not 
otherwise 
classified under this section."  
¶40 The DNR map shows an aerial view of the property in 
question with different shading for different geographical 
descriptions; the property at issue is described as "forested 
wetlands."     
¶41 On the basis of these maps, the taxpayer argued that 
the assessor's classification was erroneous and that the maps 
supported his view that the property's being "marsh," "swamp," 
or "wetlands" prevented the property from being classified as 
"productive forest land."  He asserted that the maps more 
accurately described his property as "undeveloped land" than as 
"productive forest land."  
¶42 The town assessor disputed the taxpayer's assertions 
at the hearing, claiming that the aerial map showed that the 
property was "pretty much all trees."  The town assessor stated 
that both maps described the property as "forested" or "wooded," 
No. 
2010AP3015   
 
 
18 
 
 
supporting the classification of the property as "low-grade 
woods."  
¶43 The burden fell on the taxpayer to show that the board 
erred and that the property was undeveloped land and not 
"productive forest land."  The taxpayer failed to submit 
evidence 
that 
the 
property 
is 
not 
capable 
of 
producing 
commercial forest products or that the property failed to 
qualify as low-grade woods. The taxpayer relied entirely on the 
two maps to show that the property was "undeveloped land."  The 
maps supported none of the taxpayer's contentions.  The maps did 
not support the taxpayer's contentions that the board erred; 
that the property was improperly classified as productive forest 
land; or that the property should be reclassified as undeveloped 
land.  The Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual notes that an 
aerial photograph showing the presence of trees can indicate 
forest classification and the presence of constantly wet soil 
can indicate undeveloped land classification.22  The taxpayer 
thus furnished no evidence that the assessment was not fixed 
upon the statutory basis. 
¶44 In their discussion, members of the board noted that 
some of the property was "swampland," but that the property had 
"a lot of trees on it."  The members of the board concluded that 
the classification should be maintained as-is.   
                                                 
22 1 Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual at 11-33 (eff. 
1/09).  
No. 
2010AP3015   
 
 
19 
 
 
¶45 The circuit court held that the evidence provided by 
the taxpayer was insufficient to meet his burden of proof.  
Rather, the totality of the evidence was such "that it might 
reasonably sustain the Board's determination."  The court of 
appeals also held that the taxpayer failed to make a record 
showing that the classification was incorrect.   
¶46 On certiorari review, a court does not retry the facts 
and an assessment must be upheld if it can be supported by any 
reasonable view of the evidence.23  This court "will review the 
evidence only so far as to ascertain if there is reasonable 
ground for belief that the decision [of the board of review] is 
the result of honest judgment, in which case it will not be 
disturbed."24   
¶47 The taxpayer's argument in the present case centers on 
the fourth element of certiorari review, namely that the board's 
determination to adopt the assessor's classification of the 
property is not supported by evidence such that the board might 
reasonably make the determination in question.  We conclude that 
the board's determination is supported by a reasonable view of 
the evidence.  The taxpayer here failed to meet his burden to 
present 
evidence 
justifying 
the 
board's 
overturning 
the 
assessment.  In light of all relevant evidence that the board 
                                                 
23 ABKA Ltd. P'ship v. Bd. of Review, 231 Wis. 2d 328, 335, 
603 N.W.2d 217 (1999). 
24 State ex rel. Boostrom v. Bd. of Review, 42 Wis. 2d 149, 
155, 166 N.W.2d 184 (1969) (quoting State ex rel. N.C. Foster 
Lumber Co. v. Williams, 123 Wis. 61, 64, 100 N.W. 1048 (1904)). 
No. 
2010AP3015   
 
 
20 
 
 
received, the board could reasonably conclude that the taxpayer 
did not demonstrate that the classification was incorrect and 
that the assessment should be lowered.   
¶48 For the reasons set forth, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals.  
¶49 By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2010AP3015.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶50 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion but write separately to provide additional 
background and analysis for disputes about the classification of 
real property. 
I 
¶51 In this case, the taxpayer appeared before the Town of 
Black Creek Board of Review (the Board).  He testified about his 
position, and he supported his position with "two maps: one 
issued by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) 
and the other issued by the United States Department of the 
Interior Geological Survey."  Majority op., ¶39.  When the 
taxpayer did not prevail before the Board, he filed for 
certiorari review in the Outagamie County Circuit Court.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13).  He lost in the circuit court and on 
appeal. 
¶52 When a taxpayer appears before a board of review, the 
taxpayer should proffer all the evidence available because he 
will ordinarily be limited to that evidence on certiorari 
review.  If the taxpayer is able to gather additional evidence 
after the board of review——often with the assistance of an 
attorney——he should seek de novo review under Wis. Stat. 
§ 74.37.  De novo review will not shift the burden of proof from 
the taxpayer to the board, but it will permit the taxpayer to 
buttress his case with more and different evidence challenging 
the correctness of the board's decision, which is normally based 
on the assessor's determination. 
No.  2010AP3015.dtp 
 
2 
 
¶53 In this case, the taxpayer did not dispute the 
assessor's revaluation of his property.  Rather, the taxpayer 
contended that his property was improperly classified.1 
¶54 In my view, the taxpayer would have been in a stronger 
position with the board if the assessor had reclassified the 
property and the resulting reclassification had produced a 
higher assessment.  In that case, the taxpayer could at least 
point to the classification prior to the change to support his 
position.  Here, it was the taxpayer, not the assessor, who was 
seeking to reclassify the property.  Surely the taxpayer had the 
burden in these circumstances. 
¶55 This court does not know when the taxpayer's property 
was first classified as "productive forest land" because that 
evidence was never offered.  The record shows that the taxpayer 
acquired the property in 1977 with a farm, but it does not show 
how the property was classified over the ensuing decades.  The 
taxpayer did not provide evidence of how his land had changed, 
if at all, during his ownership.2  For instance, did he plant 
trees on the property?  Did he ever harvest trees from the 
property for "commercial forest products"?  If he never 
harvested trees, was his failure to do so (1) because he did not 
                                                 
1 All reviewing courts concluded that he did not meet his 
burden to accomplish this objective. 
2 The record contains an "Objection Form For Real Property 
Assessment."  The form includes the following question: "Have 
you improved, remodeled, added to, or changed this property 
since acquiring it?"  The taxpayer answered "No."  The question 
is sufficiently general that it does not really explore whether 
the taxpayer did anything to the trees on the property. 
No.  2010AP3015.dtp 
 
3 
 
want to harvest trees; (2) because the trees were of such poor 
quality 
that 
they 
could 
not 
produce 
"commercial 
forest 
products"; or (3) because the law would not allow him to harvest 
trees from land designated as wetlands?  Detailed information on 
these matters might have helped or hurt the taxpayer's case, but 
the absence of detailed information did not help his case. 
¶56 This justice would have liked to have had a better 
explanation of "low grade woods" than what was provided and 
evidence of whether the "low grade woods"——here "low grade 
cedar"——were capable of producing "commercial forest products."  
This justice would have liked to have known whether all ten 
acres of the taxpayer's property were designated "wetlands," as 
well as when they were so designated and by whom.  Finally, this 
justice would have liked information on whether environmental 
law prevents the harvesting of trees from officially designated 
wetlands so that the forested land was not able to produce 
"commercial forest products."  On certiorari review, of course, 
this court is not able to consider information that was not part 
of the record of proceedings before the Board. 
¶57 In sum, the taxpayer failed to offer sufficient 
evidence 
to 
establish 
that 
his 
property 
required 
reclassification.  Because the Town of Black Creek (the Town) 
had classified similar property the same way, the taxpayer was 
effectively seeking a reclassification that could affect the 
classification of other property in the Town.  The taxpayer 
should have realized that the Board would be disinclined to 
No.  2010AP3015.dtp 
 
4 
 
adopt the taxpayer's position on anything less than compelling 
evidence.  The taxpayer did not provide such evidence. 
II 
¶58 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.32(2) establishes the procedure 
for the classification of property: 
(2) The assessor, having fixed a value, shall 
enter the same opposite the proper tract or lot in the 
assessment roll, following the instruction prescribed 
therein. 
(a) The assessor shall segregate into the 
following classes on the basis of use and set 
down separately in proper columns the values of 
the land, exclusive of improvements, and, except 
for subds. 5., 5m., and 6., the improvements in 
each class: 
 
1. 
Residential. 
2. 
Commercial. 
3. 
Manufacturing. 
4. 
Agricultural. 
5. 
Undeveloped. 
5m. Agricultural forest. 
6. 
Productive forest land. 
7. 
Other. 
¶59 Paragraph 
(c) 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.32(2) 
lists 
definitions of "agricultural forest land," "agricultural land," 
"other," 
"productive 
forest 
land," 
"residential," 
and 
"undeveloped land." 
¶60 For 
purposes 
of 
this 
case, 
the 
definitions 
of 
"agricultural forest land," "productive forest land," and 
"undeveloped land" are relevant: 
1d. "Agricultural forest land" means land that 
is producing or is capable of producing commercial 
forest products, if the land satisfies any of the 
following conditions:  
No.  2010AP3015.dtp 
 
5 
 
a. 
It is contiguous to a parcel that has been 
classified in whole as agricultural land under this 
subsection, if the contiguous parcel is owned by the 
same person that owns the land that is producing or is 
capable of producing commercial forest products. In 
this subdivision, "contiguous" includes separated only 
by a road.  
b. 
It is located on a parcel that contains land 
that is classified as agricultural land in the 
property tax assessment on January 1, 2004, and on 
January 1 of the year of assessment.  
c. 
It is located on a parcel at least 50 
percent of which, by acreage, was converted to land 
that is classified as agricultural land in the 
property tax assessment on January 1, 2005, or 
thereafter.  
. . . . 
2. 
"Productive forest land" means land that is 
producing or is capable of producing commercial forest 
products and is not otherwise classified under this 
subsection. 
. . . . 
4. 
"Undeveloped land" means bog, marsh, lowland 
brush, uncultivated land zoned as shoreland under s. 
59.692 and shown as a wetland on a final map under s. 
23.32 or other nonproductive lands not otherwise 
classified under this subsection. 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(c). 
¶61 As noted above, the taxpayer did not offer any 
evidence of how the classification of his property had changed——
if it had——since the property was acquired in 1977. 
III 
¶62 Wisconsin did not require assessors to classify 
property, in the manner described in Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2), 
until 1931.  See § 2, ch. 427, Laws of 1931. 
No.  2010AP3015.dtp 
 
6 
 
¶63 There were several reasons for the development of 
classifications at that time.  First, Article VIII, § 1 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution——the so-called uniformity clause——was 
amended in 1927.  This constitutional provision had read in 
part, "The rule of taxation shall be uniform, and taxes shall be 
levied upon such property as the legislature shall prescribe."  
Wis. Const. art. VIII, § 1 (amended 1927).  The 1927 amendment 
changed this sentence to read, "The rule of taxation shall be 
uniform, and taxes shall be levied upon such property with such 
classifications as to forests and minerals, including or 
separate or severed from the land, as the legislature shall 
prescribe."3 
¶64 Second, the legislature followed up the 1927 amendment 
by creating Chapter 77 of the statutes relating to forest crop 
lands.  Ch. 454, Laws of 1927.  The original law permitted the 
owner of a tract of land that was at least 160 acres to petition 
                                                 
3 Wis. Const. art. VIII, § 1 (amended 1941) (emphasis 
added).  In the 1941 amendment, the language changed slightly 
but remained largely the same:  
The rule of taxation shall be uniform but the 
legislature may empower cities, villages or towns to 
collect and return taxes on real estate located 
therein by optional methods. Taxes shall be levied 
upon such property with such classifications as to 
forests and minerals including or separate or severed 
from the land, as the legislature shall prescribe. 
Wis. Const. art. VIII, § 1. 
In 
1974 
the 
people 
approved 
another 
constitutional 
amendment adding the following sentence to Article VIII, § 1: 
"Taxation of agricultural land and undeveloped land, both as 
defined by law, need not be uniform with the taxation of each 
other nor with the taxation of other real property." 
No.  2010AP3015.dtp 
 
7 
 
the "conservation commission" to designate the land as "forest 
crop land," "more useful for growing timber and other forest 
crops than for any other purpose."  Wis. Stat. § 77.02(1) 
(1927).  Approval of the petition by the commission subjected 
the property to certain "forestry" practices as well as 
substantial tax benefits.  See generally Wis. Stat. ch. 77 
(1927).  The constitutional amendment contemplated that at least 
some forest land would be classified differently from other 
land,4 but it did not require that all forest land be classified 
differently. 
¶65 Third, the legislature was in the midst of giving 
municipalities extensive planning and zoning authority.  See, 
for example, Wis. Stat. § 59.97 (1929), setting out the "zoning 
power" of counties, which read in part, "(1) The county board of 
any county may by ordinance regulate, restrict and determine the 
areas within which agriculture, forestry and recreation may be 
conducted, 
the 
location 
of 
roads, 
schools, 
trades 
and 
industries, and the location of buildings designed for specified 
uses . . . ."5  Zoning and the classification of property for 
                                                 
4 The "Woodland Tax Law," set out in Wis. Stat. § 77.16, was 
not created until 1953.  See § 2, ch. 384, Laws of 1953.  The 
Woodland Tax Law stated that "the owner of any tract of land of 
less than 40 acres may file with the conservation director an 
application setting forth a description of the property which he 
desires to place under the woodland tax law and on which land he 
will practice forestry."  Id.  If the conservation director 
determined that the land was suitable for growing trees of 
commercial quality, the application would be approved.  Id.  The 
woodland would then be taxed at 20 cents per acre, and the owner 
would be obligated to "promote the growth of trees."  Id. 
5 See also chs. 279 and 356, Laws of 1929; ch. 375, Laws of 
1927; ch. 388, Laws of 1923.   
No.  2010AP3015.dtp 
 
8 
 
taxation appear to overlap, even if that overlap may not be 
wholly consistent. 
¶66 The 1931 legislature6 repealed the existing Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.32(2) and replaced it with the following: 
(2) The assessor, having fixed a value, shall 
enter the same opposite the proper tract or lot in the 
assessment roll, following the instructions prescribed 
therein.  In cities and villages, he shall segregate 
into the following classes on the basis of use and set 
down separately in proper columns the values of the 
land, exclusive of improvements, and the improvements 
in each class: 
 
A. 
Residential, 
B. 
Mercantile, 
C. 
Manufacturing, 
D. 
Agricultural. 
In towns, he shall segregate into the following 
classes on the basis of use and set down separately in 
proper columns the acreage and the value of the parts 
of 
land, 
exclusive 
of 
improvements, 
and 
the 
improvements which fall within each class: 
 
D. 
Agricultural, 
E. 
Marsh, cut-over, or waste, 
F. 
Timber, 
A. 
Residential, including also mercantile and 
manufacturing. 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2) (1931).  The listed classes contained no 
statutory definitions. 
 
¶67 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.32(2) remained intact until 1959, 
when the legislature amended § 70.32(2), relating to towns, to 
include the following classes of property in Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.32(2)(b): 
 
A. 
Residential, 
                                                 
6 Ch. 427, Laws of 1931. 
No.  2010AP3015.dtp 
 
9 
 
B. 
Mercantile, 
C. 
Manufacturing, 
D. 
Agricultural, 
E. 
Marsh, cut-over, or waste, 
F. 
Timber.7 
¶68 Chapter 213, Laws of 1963 changed the listing in 
§ 70.32(2)(b) to read: 
 
A. 
Residential, 
B. 
Mercantile, 
C. 
Manufacturing, 
D. 
Agricultural, 
E. 
Swamp, or waste, 
F.1 Productive forest land, 
F.2 Nonproductive forest land. 
¶69 Chapter 213 then added paragraph (c) containing 
several definitions: 
70.32(2)(c) For the purpose of this subsection 
"swamp or waste" means bog, marsh, lowland brush or 
other nonproductive lands not otherwise classified 
under this subsection; "productive forest land" means 
land which is producing or is capable of producing 
commercial forest products and is not otherwise 
classified 
under 
this 
subsection; 
"nonproductive 
forest land" means land which because of soil or site 
conditions is not producing or is not capable of 
producing commercial forest products and which is not 
otherwise classified under this subsection. 
§ 2, ch. 213, Laws of 1963. 
¶70 In 1981 the legislature deleted "Nonproductive forest 
land" from § 70.32(2)(b) as well as its definition in (2)(c), so 
that "Swamp, or waste" and "Productive forest land" were the 
classifications that remained at the bottom of the list.  
§§ 1059-60, ch. 20, Laws of 1981.  The deletion was not 
accompanied by any change in the definitions.  "Swamp, or waste" 
                                                 
7 § 27, ch. 19, Laws of 1959. 
No.  2010AP3015.dtp 
 
10 
 
continued to be defined, in part, as "other nonproductive lands 
not otherwise classified."  Id. 
¶71 In 1984 the legislature changed the word "mercantile" 
to "commercial," 1983 Wis. Act 275, § 15(8), explaining in a 
Note that "'[c]ommercial' is more readily understood and clearly 
indicates that this classification includes all property devoted 
to business uses." 
¶72 In 1986 the legislature modified the definitions in 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(c), especially "Swampland or wasteland," 
which 
was 
defined 
to 
mean 
"bog, 
marsh, 
lowland 
brush, 
uncultivated land zoned as shoreland under s. 59.971 and shown 
as a wetland on a final map under s. 23.32 or other 
nonproductive 
lands 
not 
otherwise 
classified 
under 
this 
subsection."  1985 Wis. Act 153, § 12 (emphasis added).   
¶73 In 1995 the legislature added "other" to the list.  
1995 Wis. Act 27, § 3362d.  However, "other" was not defined 
until 2002.  2001 Wis. Act 109, § 156d. 
¶74 Finally, 2003 Wis. Act 33 created a new category in 
the 
listing, 
"Agricultural 
forest 
land," 
and 
it 
changed 
"Swampland or wasteland" to "Undeveloped land."  See 2003 Wis. 
Act 33, §§ 1536h-1536i.  The legislature created the following 
definition of "Agricultural forest land": 
"Agricultural forest land" means land that is 
producing or is capable of producing commercial forest 
products and is included on a parcel that has been 
classified in part as agricultural land under this 
subsection or is contiguous to a parcel that has been 
classified in whole or in part as agricultural land 
under this subsection, if the contiguous parcel is 
owned by the same person that owns the land that is 
producing or is capable of producing commercial forest 
No.  2010AP3015.dtp 
 
11 
 
products.  In this subdivision, "contiguous" includes 
separated only by a road. 
2003 Wis. Act 33, § 1536h. 
¶75 The underlined words were vetoed by the governor.  
However, 2003 Wis. Act 230 was devoted entirely to the 
definition of "agricultural forest land" and created the 
definition, quoted above in paragraph 60, that exists today.  
See Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(c)1d. 
IV 
¶76 In this case, the taxpayer had the burden of proving 
that his ten acres were not properly classified as "productive 
forest land."  The obvious argument to be made was that even 
though the taxpayer's ten acres were forested, his land was not 
producing and was not capable of producing commercial forest 
products.  If the taxpayer had succeeded with this argument, he 
could then have argued that his land was "undeveloped land," 
defined in part as "other nonproductive lands not otherwise 
classified 
under 
this 
subsection." 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.32(2)(c)4. 
¶77 If the taxpayer had made the argument above but not 
succeeded with it, he could have explored whether the land 
qualified as "agricultural forest land" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.32(2)(a)5m., 
as 
defined 
in 
§ 70.32(2)(c)1d., 
because 
No.  2010AP3015.dtp 
 
12 
 
"agricultural forest land" includes land capable of producing 
commercial forest products.8 
¶78 The fact that the taxpayer's land was designated as 
wetlands did not necessarily mean that it met the definition for 
undeveloped land, which is "uncultivated land zoned as shoreland 
under 59.692 and shown as wetland on a final map under s. 
23.32."  Wis. Stat. § 70.32 (2)(c)4. (emphasis added).  The land 
would have to be "bog, marsh, lowland brush . . . or other 
nonproductive 
land 
not 
otherwise 
classified 
under 
this 
subsection" to be classified as "Undeveloped land."  Id. 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
The 
land 
would 
have 
been 
"otherwise 
classified" if the land were "capable of producing commercial 
forest products." 
¶79 Forest land "capable of producing commercial forest 
products" will likely be classified as either "agricultural 
forest 
land" 
or 
"productive 
forest 
land." 
 
However, 
if 
environmental law somehow prevents the trees from ever being 
harvested so that the land is not actually "capable of producing 
commercial forest products," it would seem that the "productive 
forest land" or "agricultural forest land" classifications would 
be improper.  The latter point poses an unanswered statutory 
interpretation question. 
                                                 
8 Although the record is unclear as to the precise nature of 
the taxpayer's total property, the "Objection Form For Real 
Property Assessment" indicates that the parcel at issue was 
purchased with a farm and that the parcel is "land locked."  
Thus, it is possible that the "farm" was agricultural land, and 
the taxpayer might have been able to claim that the parcel at 
issue was "agricultural forest land." 
No.  2010AP3015.dtp 
 
13 
 
¶80 To sum up, the taxpayer may, in fact, have been 
entitled to reclassification of his property, but not on the 
evidence he provided. 
¶81 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2010AP3015.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶82 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J. 
(concurring).   The 
majority opinion correctly upholds the Town of Black Creek Board 
of Review's assessment of Frank Sausen's real property for 
purposes of real estate taxation.  I write in concurrence to 
complete the certiorari review that applies when a board of 
review's decision is examined on appeal.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶83 Sausen owns real property in the Town of Black Creek, 
Outagamie County, Wisconsin.  He filed an objection to the 
assessment of his property with the Town's board of review when 
his assessment increased from $11,000 in 2008 to $27,500 in 
2009.  He claimed that his property had been incorrectly 
classified as "productive forest land."  He asserted that the 
correct property classification was "undeveloped land," as 
defined in Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(c)4., which would then be 
assessed at 50 percent of its value pursuant to § 70.32(4).  The 
board of review denied his request to reclassify his property, 
thereby affirming the $27,500 valuation for his assessment.   
¶84 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13), Sausen petitioned 
for a writ of certiorari in regard to the board of review's 
classification of his property as "productive forest land."1  
                                                 
1 If he had paid the taxes assessed, Sausen could have 
appealed the assessment pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d) 
wherein he would have commenced an independent action in circuit 
court subsequent to the board of review's decision.  See Nankin 
v. Vill. of Shorewood, 2001 WI 92, ¶3, 245 Wis. 2d 86, 630 
N.W.2d 141 (explaining that with real property located outside 
Milwaukee County, a property owner could employ § 74.37(3)(d) to 
recover taxes paid on an excessive assessment).   
No.  2010AP3015.pdr 
 
2 
 
Upon certiorari review, the circuit court affirmed the board of 
review.  The court of appeals affirmed as well.2   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶85 Petitions under Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13) proceed by 
certiorari review, wherein we independently review the board of 
review's decision while benefitting from the analyses of the 
circuit court and court of appeals.  State ex rel. Stupar River 
LLC v. Town of Linwood Portage Cnty. Bd. of Review, 2011 WI 82, 
¶16, 336 Wis. 2d 562, 800 N.W.2d 468.  We look for "any error in 
the proceedings of the board which renders the assessment or the 
proceedings void."  § 70.47(13); Northland Whitehall Apartments 
Ltd. P'ship v. City of Whitehall Bd. of Review, 2006 WI App 60, 
¶13, 290 Wis. 2d 488, 713 N.W.2d 646.   
B.  Certiorari Review 
¶86 The scope of certiorari review under Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(13) is limited to considering whether the board of 
review's actions were:  (1) within its jurisdiction; (2) 
according to law; (3) arbitrary, oppressive or unreasonable and 
represented its will, not its judgment; and (4) supported by 
evidence 
such 
that 
the 
board 
might 
reasonably 
make 
the 
determination under review.  Joyce v. Town of Tainter, 232 
Wis. 2d 349, 353, 606 N.W.2d 284 (Ct. App. 1999).  "Certiorari 
review under [] § 70.47(13) is limited to [] the record made 
                                                 
2 Sausen v. Town of Black Creek Bd. of Review, No. 
2010AP3015, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2012).   
No.  2010AP3015.pdr 
 
3 
 
before the board of review."3  Nankin v. Vill. of Shorewood, 2001 
WI 92, ¶20, 245 Wis. 2d 86, 630 N.W.2d 141.   
¶87 I note that the board of review had jurisdiction to 
hear Sausen's objection to the classification of his property.  
The classification of real property bears on the amount of the 
property's assessment.  Wis. Stat. § 70.32(4).  The board of 
review has statutory authority to review and evaluate the 
assessor's decision and other evidence submitted to it when an 
objection is made.  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7).  Accordingly, the 
decision of the board of review was within its jurisdiction.  
See Anic v. Bd. of Review of the Town of Wilson, 2008 WI App 71, 
¶19, 311 Wis. 2d 701, 751 N.W.2d 870 (explaining that the board 
of review kept within its jurisdiction when it determined the 
"probity and credibility of the witnesses").  
¶88 In order for the board of review's decision to be made 
according to law, the board's denial of Sausen's objections to 
the assessment of his property would have involved consideration 
of whether appropriate statutory criteria were followed in 
arriving at the assessment.  Johnson v. City of Greenfield Bd. 
of Review, 2005 WI App 156, ¶6, 284 Wis. 2d 805, 702 N.W.2d 460.  
The assessment includes the valuation of the real estate, as 
well as its classification.  Wis. Stat. § 70.32.  Valuation is 
governed by § 70.32(1), (1g) and (1m).  Section § 70.32(1) is 
                                                 
3 Under Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d), the action proceeds as do 
other civil actions.  Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶22.  Such an 
action permits a full trial on the assessment, unlike the 
limited review accorded in certiorari review.  Id., ¶24. 
No.  2010AP3015.pdr 
 
4 
 
most relevant to the assessment of Sausen's property.  It 
provides that valuation shall proceed: 
in the manner specified in the Wisconsin property 
assessment manual provided under s. 73.03(2a) from 
actual view or from the best information that the 
assessor can practicably obtain, at the full value 
which could ordinarily be obtained therefor at private 
sale.  In determining the value, the assessor shall 
consider recent arm's–length sales of the property to 
be assessed if according to professionally acceptable 
appraisal practices those sales conform to recent 
arm's—length sales of reasonably comparable property; 
. . . 
and 
all 
factors 
that, 
according 
to 
professionally acceptable appraisal practices, affect 
the value of the property to be assessed. 
¶89 The board of review considered recent arm's—length 
sales of other property that were reasonably comparable to 
Sausen's property.  The board noted, "We have wood swampland 
that was sold in the township parcel number 260 that was sold 
for $2,750 per acre and also section 13 parcel 249 was also sold 
for $2,750, they are very similar, similar type of woods on the 
map."   
¶90 Sausen's parcel contained ten acres.  With a per acre 
value of $2,750, the assessed value of $27,500 is consistent 
with other comparable property that had a recent sale.   
¶91 The board of review also considered Sausen's argument 
that the property should be classified as "undeveloped land" and 
decided that the assessor's description of low grade woods was 
more appropriate due to all the trees.  "Forested areas 
primarily held for hunting" are generally given a forested 
classification such as "[p]roductive forest land" described in 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(c)2.  See Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 
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Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 2013, 5-55 – 5-56 (rev'd 
12/11).  The board of review then affirmed the classification of 
"productive forest land" and the valuation of $27,500 given by 
the assessor.  In so doing, the board of review followed the 
directive of § 70.32(1) and acted "according to law."  See 
Johnson, 284 Wis. 2d 805, ¶6 (explaining that assessments made 
according the statutory criteria are made according to the law).  
¶92 The 
board 
of 
review 
did 
not 
approach 
Sausen's 
objection to the classification of his property in an arbitrary, 
oppressive or unreasonable manner.  It excluded no evidence that 
Sausen sought to present.  Rather, it considered the maps that 
he 
submitted, 
his 
argument 
that 
his 
property 
should 
be 
classified as "undeveloped land," other wooded hunting lands and 
how they were assessed, and the assessor's professional opinion 
that the property was correctly classified as "productive forest 
land" because it contained low grade woods.  See Whitecaps 
Homes, Inc. v. Kenosha Cnty. Bd. of Review, 212 Wis. 2d 714, 
722-23, 569 N.W.2d 714 (Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that so long 
as there is a reasonable ground for the exercise of the board of 
review's judgment, it will not be held to be arbitrary or 
oppressive). 
¶93 Sausen provided two maps as evidence:  one from the 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR map) and one from 
the United States Department of the Interior Geological Survey 
(US Survey map).  Both maps are aerial photographs of Sausen's 
property, and both maps described the property in ways other 
than as "productive forest land," the classification the 
No.  2010AP3015.pdr 
 
6 
 
assessor assigned to Sausen's property.  However, neither map 
described the land depicted as "undeveloped land."  The DNR map 
described the property as "forested" and "wetlands."  The US 
Survey map does not use descriptive labels for Sausen's 
property.   
¶94 Sausen represented himself before the board of review 
and argued that the descriptions on the two maps confirmed his 
belief that his property should have been classified as 
"undeveloped land."  However, Sausen did not provide expert 
testimony from a real estate appraiser who may have been able to 
link 
the 
descriptions 
on 
the 
maps 
to 
the 
statutory 
classifications set out in Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2)(a)5. and 6.  
Sausen did not have the expertise to make the necessary 
connection.  Accordingly, the assessor's opinion that the 
property was correctly classified as "productive forest land" 
pursuant to § 70.32(2)(a)6. was uncontroverted before the board 
of review.  Therefore, the evidence was such that the board of 
review might reasonably make the determination that it made.  
See Stupar River, 336 Wis. 2d 562, ¶¶25-27 (concluding that the 
board of review's decision must be upheld if it is reasonable 
under the evidence submitted).   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶95 Certiorari review of the board of review's decision 
shows that the board:  kept within its jurisdiction; acted 
according to law; was not arbitrary, oppressive or unreasonable 
in its decision-making; and heard evidence that reasonably 
supported its decision.  Accordingly, I concur with the majority 
No.  2010AP3015.pdr 
 
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opinion and conclude that the board of review's decision must be 
upheld.   
 
 
 
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