Title: Blumenthal v. Brewer
Citation: 2016 IL 118781
Docket Number: 118781
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 20, 2016

2016 IL 118781 
 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 
(Docket No. 118781) 
JANE E. BLUMENTHAL, Appellant, v. EILEEN M. BREWER, Appellee. 
 
Opinion filed August 18, 2016—Rehearing denied October 20, 2016. 
 
 
JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
 
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, and Kilbride concurred in 
the judgment and opinion.  
 
Justice Theis concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion, joined by 
Justice Burke. 
 
Justice Theis dissented upon denial of rehearing, with opinion, joined by Justice 
Burke. 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
In this case we are called on to consider the continued viability and applicability 
of our decision in Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49 (1979), which held that Illinois 
public policy, as set forth in this State’s statutory prohibition against common-law 
marriage, precludes unmarried cohabitants from bringing claims against one 
another to enforce mutual property rights where the rights asserted are rooted in a 
marriage-like relationship between the parties. 
¶ 2 
 
The issue has arisen here in the context of an action brought by Dr. Jane E. 
Blumenthal for partition of the family home she shared and jointly owned with 
 
 
- 2 - 
 
Judge Eileen M. Brewer. The couple had maintained a long-term, domestic 
relationship and raised a family together but had never married. Blumenthal sought 
partition of the residence when the relationship ended and she moved out. 
¶ 3 
 
The partition action itself presented no question under Hewitt. The problem 
arose when Brewer counterclaimed for various common-law remedies, including 
sole title to the home as well as an interest in Blumenthal’s ownership share in a 
medical group so that the couple’s overall assets would be equalized now that the 
couple had ended their relationship. Blumenthal moved to dismiss, asserting that 
the various counts of the counterclaim should fail as a matter of law under Hewitt, 
which rejected a woman’s suit to divide assets she accumulated with a man during a 
long-term relationship in which they lived together, had three children together, but 
never married. The circuit court agreed, and the counterclaim was dismissed in full. 
¶ 4 
 
The underlying partition action between Blumenthal and Brewer proceeded to 
final judgment. No appeal was or has been taken from that judgment. While the 
partition proceeding was following its course, however, Brewer pursued an appeal 
of the dismissal of her counterclaim pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) 
(eff. Mar. 8, 2016), arguing that Hewitt should be rejected and should not bar any of 
the relief she sought.  
¶ 5 
 
The appellate court agreed with Brewer’s position. It rebuffed Hewitt’s holding 
as outmoded and ill-considered, undertook its own public policy analysis, and held 
that the public policy of prohibiting unmarried domestic partners from bringing 
common-law claims against one another no longer exists in current law. 
Accordingly, it vacated the circuit court’s dismissal of Brewer’s counterclaim and 
remanded the matter to the circuit court to consider additional arguments raised by 
the parties. 2014 IL App (1st) 132250, ¶ 40.  
¶ 6 
 
This court allowed Blumenthal’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 
(eff. July 1, 2013). We also granted the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois 
and Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., leave to file a friend of the 
court brief in support of Brewer. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). For the 
reasons that follow, we now vacate in part and reverse in part the judgment of the 
appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
 
 
 
 
- 3 - 
 
¶ 7 
 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 8 
 
This litigation began in 2010 when Blumenthal filed her verified complaint for 
partition pursuant to section 17-101 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 
5/17-101 et seq. (West 2012)) in the circuit court of Cook County. The portion of 
the partition action relevant here was directed at the parties’ South Kimbark 
residence (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Chicago home), which 
Blumenthal jointly owned with Brewer, who had been her domestic partner since 
approximately 1981. Blumenthal’s complaint requested that “a fair division and 
partition of [the] property be made between the parties *** according to their 
respective rights and interests.” The complaint further requested, in the alternative, 
that if the property could not be divided without manifest injustice to the parties in 
interest, then it should be sold by or under direction of the court, with the proceeds 
of the sale to be divided among the parties “according to their respective rights or 
interests in such proceeds as ascertained and declared” by the court. 
¶ 9 
 
Brewer’s counterclaim, which is the focus of this appeal, was premised on the 
couple’s domestic relationship, which Brewer characterized as “identical in every 
essential way to that of a married couple.” As finally amended, the counterclaim 
contained five counts. Counts I, II, IV, and V all pertained directly to the 
disposition of the parties’ home in the underlying partition action. Specifically, 
they sought to guide the court with respect to how the party’s respective rights and 
interests in that property should be ascertained and valued and how the property 
should be divided. Count I sought imposition of a constructive trust based on unjust 
enrichment. Court II argued that the house should be divided based on principles of 
equitable division. Count IV asserted that in allocating the value of the house, the 
court should factor in amounts expended by Brewer to maintain it after a certain 
date. Invoking principles of quantum meruit, count V claimed that apportionment 
of the home’s value should take into account the value of Brewer’s time in making 
sure the property was adequately secured, maintained, and repaired. Count III 
sought a constructive trust over the annual net earnings or the sale of Blumenthal’s 
share of her medical practice, or in the alternative, restitution of funds that 
Blumenthal used from the couple’s joint account to purchase the medical practice. 
¶ 10 
 
In the circuit court, Blumenthal successfully argued that all counts of Brewer’s 
counterclaim were barred as a matter of law by this court’s decision in Hewitt v. 
Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49 (1979). As noted earlier, Hewitt held that Illinois public policy, 
as set forth in this state’s statutory prohibition against common-law marriage, 
 
 
- 4 - 
 
precludes knowingly unmarried cohabitants from bringing claims against one 
another to enforce mutual property rights where those rights are rooted in a 
marriage-like relationship between the parties.  
¶ 11 
 
On appeal to the appellate court, Brewer contended that dramatic shifts in 
public policy had rendered this court’s decision in Hewitt obsolete and that Hewitt 
no longer represented an accurate view of how Illinois law should treat such a claim 
today. Brewer contended that at the time Hewitt was decided, it was public policy 
to treat unmarried relationships as illicit, but in the decades since Hewitt, the 
Illinois legislature had repealed the criminal prohibition on nonmarital 
cohabitation, prohibited differential treatment of marital and nonmarital children, 
adopted no-fault divorce, established civil unions for both opposite-sex and 
same-sex partners, and extended other significant protections to nonmarital 
families. Thus, Brewer maintained that in light of these profound changes, Hewitt’s 
restriction on common-law claims being brought by unmarried partners has been 
implicitly overruled and that continued application of Hewitt would directly 
contravene the current policy of this state. 
¶ 12 
 
Blumenthal responded that Hewitt was not based on a legislative policy to 
stigmatize or penalize cohabitants for their relationship, but was instead based on a 
statute that abolished common-law marriage in this jurisdiction and is now known 
as section 214 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage 
and Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/214 (West 2010) (“Common law marriages 
contracted in this State after June 30, 1905 are invalid.”)). Blumenthal contended 
that Hewitt remains good law because it gives effect to Illinois’s ongoing public 
policy that individuals acting privately by themselves cannot create a marriage 
relationship and that the government must be involved in the creation of that bond. 
In Blumenthal’s view, reversing the circuit court’s dismissal order would require 
the appellate court to overrule Hewitt and its progeny, something it had no authority 
to do, and, in effect, resurrect common-law marriage in Illinois. 
¶ 13 
 
In a detailed discussion, the appellate court found some merit in both parties’ 
arguments, but ultimately agreed with Brewer’s claims finding that the primary 
basis for the result in Hewitt “ceased to exist.” 2014 IL App (1st) 132250, ¶¶ 18, 25. 
To support its claim that Hewitt is now obsolete, the appellate court adopted 
Brewer’s list of post-Hewitt policy changes and laws that relate to property rights of 
married or unmarried couples. Id. ¶¶ 30, 33-34. In particular, the appellate court 
gave considerable weight to the fact that in the decades since Hewitt was decided, 
 
 
- 5 - 
 
the Illinois legislature has repealed the criminal prohibition on nonmarital 
cohabitation, prohibited differential treatment of marital and nonmarital children, 
adopted no-fault divorce, established civil unions for both opposite-sex and 
same-sex partners, and extended other significant protections to nonmarital 
families. Id. ¶¶ 23-27, 33-34.  
¶ 14 
 
The appellate court also disagreed with the policy finding in Hewitt, arguing 
that Hewitt “may have the contrary effect [of discouraging cohabitation and 
encouraging marriage because] refusing to hear claims between unmarried 
cohabitants creates an incentive for some to not marry.” Id. ¶ 32. Thus, the 
appellate court believed that “[a] cohabitant who by happenstance or design takes 
possession or title to jointly acquired assets is able to retain them without 
consequence when their ‘financially vulnerable’ counterpart is turned away by the 
courts.” Id.  
¶ 15 
 
Finding that Hewitt’s common-law ban was misplaced, the appellate court 
determined that Brewer’s counterclaim was not an attempt to retroactively redefine 
the parties’ relation in order to claim the benefits of a legal marriage, but rather a 
claim to have similar common-law property rights as others that were not in a 
cohabiting, unmarried relationship. Id. ¶ 38. Accordingly, the appellate court 
vacated the circuit court’s Hewitt-based dismissal of the counterclaim and 
remanded the matter to the circuit court to consider additional arguments raised by 
the parties. Id. ¶ 40. 
¶ 16 
 
We will discuss the remaining relevant facts of this case within our discussion. 
 
¶ 17 
 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 18 
 
Blumenthal’s central argument on this appeal is that the circuit court’s order 
dismissing Brewer’s counterclaim was proper and should not have been disturbed 
because it was mandated by this court’s decision in Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49 
(1979), and the prohibition against common-law marriage set forth in section 214 
of the Marriage and Dissolution Act (750 ILCS 5/214 (West 2010)). Blumenthal 
asserts that in reversing the circuit court and remanding for further proceedings, the 
appellate court misread Hewitt, improperly reinstated common-law marriage in 
contravention of Illinois law, and usurped public policy determinations that 
 
 
- 6 - 
 
properly belong to the legislature. Blumenthal also criticizes the appellate court’s 
decision for improperly extending principles of unjust enrichment. 
¶ 19 
 
In undertaking our review, we begin by noting that the circuit court’s rejection 
of Brewer’s counterclaim was made in the context of a motion to dismiss under 
section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2010)). 
Such motions challenge the legal sufficiency of a pleading based on defects 
apparent on its face. Simpkins v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 2012 IL 110662, ¶ 13. 
In ruling on a section 2-615 motion, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded 
facts and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts. Beacham v. 
Walker, 231 Ill. 2d 51, 57-58 (2008). It is well understood that the critical inquiry is 
whether the allegations of the complaint, when construed in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to establish a cause of action upon which 
relief may be granted. Such orders granting motions to dismiss under section 2-615 
are reviewed de novo. Bonhomme v. St. James, 2012 IL 112393, ¶ 34. 
 
¶ 20 
 
 
 
 
 
Counterclaim Counts I, II, IV, and V 
¶ 21 
 
As a preliminary matter, Blumenthal contends the issue of whether counts I, II, 
IV, and V of Brewer’s counterclaim are viable under Hewitt should not have been 
addressed by the appellate court and is not properly before us. We agree. As to 
those four counts, the appellate court’s judgment is fatally flawed for two 
fundamental reasons unrelated to Hewitt.  
¶ 22 
 
First, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal from 
dismissal of those counts. The Illinois Constitution confers on the appellate court 
jurisdiction to hear appeals from all final judgments entered in the circuit court. See 
Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6 (providing that appeals “from final judgments of a 
Circuit Court are a matter of right to the Appellate Court”). The constitution also 
grants this court the right to “provide by rule for appeals to the Appellate Court 
from other than final judgments.” Id. Accordingly, absent a supreme court rule, the 
appellate court is without jurisdiction to review judgments, orders, or decrees that 
are not final. EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Kemp, 2012 IL 113419, ¶ 9. 
¶ 23 
 
The ruling at issue here was brought before the appellate court based on Illinois 
Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010), which authorizes appeals from 
final judgments that do not dispose of an entire proceeding “if the trial court has 
 
 
- 7 - 
 
made an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying either 
enforcement or appeal or both.” An order or judgment is considered to be final and 
appealable for purposes of this rule if it terminates the litigation between the parties 
on the merits or disposes of the rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy 
or a separate part thereof. In re Marriage of Gutman, 232 Ill. 2d 145, 151 (2008). 
The purpose of the rule is “ ‘to discourage piecemeal appeals in the absence of a 
just reason and to remove the uncertainty which existed when a final judgment was 
entered on fewer than all of the matters in controversy.’ ” Id. (quoting Marsh v. 
Evangelical Covenant Church of Hinsdale, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 465 (1990)). 
¶ 24 
 
Although the circuit court in this case made the written finding required by Rule 
304(a), that finding is not dispositive. By its terms, Rule 304(a) applies only to final 
judgments or orders. The special finding contemplated by the rule will make a final 
order appealable, but it can have no effect on a nonfinal order. Kellerman v. Crowe, 
119 Ill. 2d 111, 115 (1987). If the order is in fact not final, inclusion of the special 
finding in the trial court’s order cannot confer appellate jurisdiction. EMC 
Mortgage Corp., 2012 IL 113419, ¶ 14. 
¶ 25 
 
The circuit court’s action dismissing counts I, II, IV, and V of Brewer’s 
counterclaim did not qualify as a final judgment or order. As mentioned above, to 
be considered final and appealable for purposes of Rule 304(a), a judgment or order 
must terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits of the cause, so that, 
if affirmed, the trial court only has to proceed with execution of the judgment. 
Kellerman, 119 Ill. 2d at 115. While the order need not dispose of all the issues 
presented by the pleadings, it must be final in the sense that it disposes of the rights 
of the parties, either upon the entire controversy or upon some definite and separate 
part thereof. Id. The circuit court’s dismissal of counts I, II, IV, and V did not meet 
that requirement.  
¶ 26 
 
Counts I, II, IV, and V arose from the same set of operative facts and sought 
precisely the same thing as the underlying cause of action asserted by Blumenthal: 
division of the value of the parties’ Chicago home. Rather than being distinct and 
separate from Blumenthal’s action, these counts merely advanced different 
analytical approaches for determining how the home or its proceeds should be 
allocated between the parties. They were, in effect, different iterations of the very 
same claim. When they were dismissed, the ultimate question—how the value of 
the residence should be split—remained unresolved. The dismissal served only to 
narrow the criteria applicable to that decision. 
 
 
- 8 - 
 
¶ 27 
 
Although we have found no cases directly on point, our appellate court has 
recognized that where one claim based on the same operative facts is stated 
differently in multiple counts, the dismissal of fewer than all counts is not a final 
judgment as to any of the party’s claims as required by Rule 304(a). See Davis v. 
Loftus, 334 Ill. App. 3d 761, 766 (2002). Similarly, we have held that where an 
order disposes only of certain issues relating to the same basic claim, such a ruling 
is not subject to review under Rule 304(a). To the contrary, permitting separate 
appeals of such orders promotes precisely the type of piecemeal appeals Rule 
304(a) was designed to discourage. See In re Marriage of Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d 114, 
119-20 (1983). Based on this reasoning, the portion of the circuit court’s order 
dismissing counts I, II, IV, and V of Brewer’s counterclaim was not appealable 
under Rule 304(a). 
¶ 28 
 
Second, even if the appellate court had jurisdiction to review the dismissal of 
counts I, II, IV, and V, its resolution of the appeal was improper and cannot stand. 
As discussed, the appellate court’s conclusion that the circuit court erred in 
dismissing those counts was predicated on its repudiation of this court’s decision in 
Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49 (1979). The appellate court’s rejection of Hewitt was 
tantamount to overruling that decision. However, overruling a decision by the 
Illinois Supreme Court is an action the appellate court has no authority to take. 
People v. Artis, 232 Ill. 2d 156, 164 (2009) (“The appellate court lacks authority to 
overrule decisions of this court, which are binding on all lower courts.”). While the 
appellate court was free to question Hewitt and recommend that we revisit our 
holding in the case, under the judicial system created by the Illinois Constitution, it 
could not, itself, declare that one of our decisions was no longer controlling 
authority. As we have recently explained, 
“The judicial article of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, like its predecessor in 
the constitution of 1870, creates a three-tiered court system, with the appellate 
court sitting in review of the circuit courts, and the supreme court sitting in 
review of the appellate and circuit courts. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI. A 
fundamental principle flows from this hierarchical structure: ‘Where the 
Supreme Court has declared the law on any point, it alone can overrule and 
modify its previous opinion, and the lower judicial tribunals are bound by such 
decision and it is the duty of such lower tribunals to follow such decision in 
similar cases.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 2015 IL 
117687, ¶ 38 (quoting Agricultural Transportation Ass’n v. Carpentier, 2 Ill. 
2d 19, 27 (1953)). 
 
 
- 9 - 
 
¶ 29 
 
Accordingly, even if the appellate court disagreed with Hewitt, it remained 
bound by that decision and should have left it to this court to reassess the decision’s 
validity.  
¶ 30 
 
Because the appellate court’s reversal of the dismissal of counts I, II, IV, and V 
of Brewer’s counterclaim was predicated on the exercise of jurisdiction it did not 
possess and the repudiation of legal precedent it had no authority to overrule, we 
would normally be inclined to simply vacate its ruling as to those counts and 
remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. In this case, however, a remand 
would serve no purpose. That is so because while Brewer was pursuing this appeal, 
she and Blumenthal continued to litigate the underlying partition action. The matter 
of how the home should be divided has now been finally determined by the circuit 
court.  
¶ 31 
 
Initially, Brewer recognized that resolution of the underlying partition action 
could affect her counterclaim and therefore moved for a stay of the proceedings on 
the partition until appeal of the dismissal of her counterclaim was resolved. 
Although the circuit court denied the stay, it indicated that the question of a stay 
could be revisited if Brewer posted an appeal bond. From the record, it appears that 
Brewer elected not to exercise that option. Instead, the partition action proceeded to 
trial on the merits in August 2014.  
¶ 32 
 
The partition trial was conducted over a three-day period. In the course of the 
trial, testimony was presented regarding when the home was purchased, who 
contributed to the earnest money and down payment for the purchase, which of the 
parties and their children lived in the home and when, the cost of upkeep and 
repairs and who paid those costs, how and when certain other personal and real 
property was divided by the parties, the disposition of inheritances Brewer received 
from her parents, and how Brewer and Blumenthal handled their respective 
finances, including joint investment accounts. The court heard the circumstances of 
the parties’ breakup; listened to analyses of real estate values and market conditions 
in the neighborhood; and received evidence regarding the parties’ income taxes and 
the source and amounts of mortgage payments, insurance, utilities and taxes on the 
property. The circuit court then took the matter under advisement.  
¶ 33 
 
On October 9, 2014, the circuit court reconvened to share its findings with the 
parties. After dealing with some minor issues regarding various items of personal 
property, including photographs and skis, the court turned to the issue of the home. 
 
 
- 10 - 
 
It concluded that the parties had held the property as tenants in common; that its 
current market value was $1 million; that Blumenthal had paid the earnest money 
and down payment for the purchase of the home, an amount which totaled 
$235,000; and that Blumenthal was entitled to return of that sum. 
¶ 34 
 
Subtracting the $235,000 from the home’s $1 million value left $765,000. The 
court held that this sum should be split evenly between the parties, giving each of 
them a claim to $382,500 of the home’s value. The court further held, however, that 
this distribution was subject to various adjustments. Noting that this had been a 
romantic domestic relationship that had gone sour, the court rejected Blumenthal’s 
argument that Brewer should have to pay her rent for the time she remained in the 
home after Blumenthal decided to move out. At the same time, the court thought it 
inappropriate to compensate Brewer for the value of the work she did on the home 
herself. On the other hand, the court opined that Brewer should receive credits for 
mortgage payments, taxes, and insurance, as well as for various maintenance and 
repair expenses incurred by her that were necessary for the home’s proper upkeep. 
The court computed these credits to total $151,700.55, which it believed should be 
deducted from Blumenthal’s $382,500 share of the home’s net value after 
subtraction of the down payment and earnest money, and added to Brewer’s share. 
This left Blumenthal with $230,799.45 of what the court referred to as the home’s 
“equity” and Brewer with $534,200.55. Finally, the court indicated that it would 
give Brewer the option of buying out Blumenthal’s share of the Chicago home. If 
Brewer declined to exercise that option, the property would be put on the market 
and sold. A written order to that effect was entered by the court after the hearing 
concluded. 
¶ 35 
 
Neither party appealed. Instead, Brewer elected to buy out Blumenthal’s share 
in accordance with the valuations made by the circuit court. According to public 
records of which we can take judicial notice, Blumenthal and Blumenthal’s civil 
union partner issued a quitclaim deed to Brewer in January 2015. Brewer 
subsequently conveyed her interest in the home to a trust.  
¶ 36 
 
Because no appeal was taken from the court’s judgment setting the value of the 
home and allocating the home’s equity between the parties and because the 
property has now been conveyed in a manner chosen by the parties in accordance 
with the court’s judgment, Brewer’s arguments regarding the legal sufficiency of 
counts I, II, IV, and V of her counterclaims have been rendered moot. A matter 
becomes moot on review when, because of events occurring after the appeal was 
 
 
- 11 - 
 
filed, there is no longer an actual controversy or the reviewing court cannot grant 
the complaining party effectual relief. In re Marriage of Donald B., 2014 IL 
115463, ¶ 23. Such is the case here.  
¶ 37 
 
Whatever our view might be of the merits of Brewer’s legal theories on which 
counts I, II, IV, and V of her counterclaim are based, the outcome of the case would 
not change. As noted earlier, those theories were all directed at how the value of the 
home should be divided. That division has now been made and is final. Brewer 
obtained financing, the trust she established now owns the house, and Blumenthal 
has been paid for her interest in it. The deal is done. The object of the controversy 
has been settled. 
¶ 38 
 
Brewer has suggested that the matter is not moot because if we ruled in her 
favor, the circuit court could undo its final judgment, set aside the partition, and 
consider anew how the value of the home should be divided. Pressed at oral 
arguments, Brewer did not explain (and we still do not see) how this could possibly 
be so.  
¶ 39 
 
The finality of the judgment in the underlying partition action was not affected 
by Brewer’s election to seek review of the dismissal of her counterclaim by means 
of Rule 304(a). Had Brewer wanted to avoid that result and defer final resolution of 
how the value of the home should be allocated until the viability of her alternate 
theories was resolved, she could have immediately appealed the circuit court’s 
denial of her motion to stay the underlying case. Under established Illinois law, the 
denial of a stay of trial court proceedings is treated as a denial of a request for a 
preliminary injunction and is appealable as a matter of right under Illinois Supreme 
Court Rule 307(a)(1) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). See, e.g., Cholipski v. Bovis Lend Lease, 
Inc., 2014 IL App (1st) 132842, ¶¶ 32-33; Estate of Bass v. Katten, 375 Ill. App. 3d 
62, 69-70 (2007).  
¶ 40 
 
In addition, and more importantly, if Brewer believed that the circuit court’s 
subsequent ruling disposing of the home was legally deficient for failing to take 
into account the theories advanced in her counterclaim, she could have appealed the 
circuit court’s final judgment in the underlying case pursuant to Illinois Supreme 
Court Rules 301 and 303 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994); R. 303 (eff. Jan. 1, 
2015)). She did not do that either. Rather, she accepted the circuit court’s partition 
ruling, bought out Blumenthal’s share of the property for the amount specified by 
the court, and continued to reside there, as the court gave her the option of doing.  
 
 
- 12 - 
 
¶ 41 
 
Having pursued this strategy, Brewer would be foreclosed from pursuing 
counts I, II, IV, and V of her counterclaim even if we agreed that those counts 
should not have been dismissed based on Hewitt. Because the partition action 
proceeded to final judgment and no appeal from that judgment was taken, 
reinstatement of counts I, II, IV, and V of the counterclaim would be tantamount to 
permitting Brewer to proceed with a new and separate action with respect to 
division of the home’s value. That is impermissible.  
¶ 42 
 
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits rendered by a 
court of competent jurisdiction acts as a bar to a subsequent suit between the parties 
involving the same cause of action. River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 
Ill. 2d 290, 302 (1998). A cause of action is defined by the facts which give rise to a 
right to relief. Wilson v. Edward Hospital, 2012 IL 112898, ¶ 10. “ ‘[S]eparate 
claims will be considered the same cause of action for purposes of res judicata if 
they arise from a single group of operative facts, regardless of whether they assert 
different theories of relief.’ ” Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & 
Professional Regulation, 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 46 (quoting River Park, Inc. v. City of 
Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d at 311). These principles extend to claims arising from 
the same operative facts as the plaintiff’s claim that were or could have been raised 
by the defendant, and it has been held that res judicata bars a subsequent action if 
successful prosecution of that action would, in effect, nullify the judgment entered 
in the original action. See Corcoran-Hakala v. Dowd, 362 Ill. App. 3d 523, 530-31 
(2005). That, of course, is precisely what would happen if the appellate court’s 
reinstatement of counts I, II, IV, and V were upheld by this court and Brewer 
ultimately prevailed. 
¶ 43 
 
Moreover, even if resuscitation of counts I, II, IV, and V of the counterclaim 
were viewed as a mere continuation of the same proceeding rather than 
commencement of a new action, revisiting the merits of those counts would still be 
foreclosed. As previously indicated, Brewer could have sought an immediate 
appeal of the circuit court’s denial of her request for a stay of the partition action or 
filed an appeal from the circuit court’s judgment finally disposing of the partition 
action on the merits. She did neither. Instead, Brewer permitted that judgment to 
stand unchallenged, accepted the court’s division of the home’s value and 
purchased Blumenthal’s interest in the property in accordance with the circuit 
court’s ruling. Where, as here, a party fails to challenge a legal decision when it has 
the opportunity to do so, that decision, as a general rule, becomes “the law of the 
case for future stages of the same litigation, and [that party is] deemed to have 
 
 
- 13 - 
 
waived the right to challenge that decision at a later time. [Citations.]” (Internal 
quotation marks omitted.) Liccardi v. Stolt Terminals, Inc., 178 Ill. 2d 540, 547 
(1997). The law-of-the-case doctrine bars relitigation of issues of both law and fact. 
Radwill v. Manor Care of Westmont, IL, LLC, 2013 IL App (2d) 120957, ¶ 8. 
Similarly, it is well established that if a party proceeds to trial and voluntarily 
accepts the benefit of a judgment in his or her favor with respect to the disposition 
of property, that party is precluded from later challenging that judgment, including 
sufficiency of the property’s valuation. See County of Cook v. Malysa, 39 Ill. 2d 
376, 379 (1968). Brewer, therefore, is precluded from further litigating the 
disposition of the parties’ home. Accordingly, the appellate court should not have 
entertained her appeal from the dismissal of counts I, II, IV, and V of her 
counterclaim, and its ruling as to the viability of those counts must be vacated. 
 
¶ 44 
 
 
 
 
 
Counterclaim Count III 
¶ 45 
 
Unlike counts I, II, IV, and V, count III of Brewer’s counterclaim asserts a 
separate and distinct claim that does not concern the partition or value of the 
Chicago home. Instead, count III requests that the court impose a “Constructive 
Trust on Blumenthal’s Medical Practice to Remedy Unjust Enrichment Or, in the 
Alternative, for Restitution.” Therefore, the portion of the circuit court’s order 
dismissing count III of Brewer’s counterclaim was final and appealable under Rule 
304(a). See Kellerman v. Crowe, 119 Ill. 2d 111, 115 (1987).  
¶ 46 
 
According to count III, “[t]hroughout the course of their relationship, Brewer 
and Blumenthal commingled their savings and investments.” It was the funds from 
this joint account that went toward the purchase of Blumenthal’s ownership interest 
in her medical practice group, Gynecologic Specialists of Northwestern, S.C. 
(GSN). Brewer contends that she allowed Blumenthal to use their joint account for 
this investment with the reasonable understanding and expectation that she, 
Brewer, would continue to benefit from the earnings derived from GSN. Once the 
couple ended their relationship in 2008, these financial benefits ceased, and 
Blumenthal retained the entire interest in the medical group, thereby keeping all of 
the earnings from the medical practice. Based on these allegations, Brewer claims 
that Blumenthal is unjustly enriched. Therefore, Brewer requests that this court 
create a constructive trust from Blumenthal’s share of the annual net earnings of the 
medical group or any portion of the proceeds from any sale of Blumenthal’s interest 
 
 
- 14 - 
 
in the group that was attributable to Brewer’s earnings or inheritance during their 
relationship and that this court award her the annual net earnings of GSN 
attributable to her as well as award her this portion of the proceeds from any sale of 
Blumenthal’s interest in GSN. 
 
¶ 47 
 
“ ‘A constructive trust is one raised by operation of law as distinguished from a 
trust created by express agreement between the settlor and the trustee.’ ” Suttles v. 
Vogel, 126 Ill. 2d 186, 193 (1988) (quoting Perry v. Wyeth, 25 Ill. 2d 250, 253 
(1962)). A constructive trust is an equitable remedy, which may be imposed where 
the person in possession of the property would be unjustly enriched if he or she 
were permitted to retain that property. In re Liquidation of Security Casualty Co., 
127 Ill. 2d 434, 447 (1989). The sole duty of the constructive trustee is to transfer 
title and possession of the wrongfully acquired property to the beneficiary. 
Smithberg v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 192 Ill. 2d 291, 299 (2000). 
¶ 48 
 
Blumenthal argues that the Medical Corporation Act (805 ILCS 15/1 et seq. 
(West 2010)) and the Medical Practice Act of 1987 (225 ILCS 60/1 et seq. (West 
2010)) prohibit Brewer, a licensed attorney, from being a beneficiary of a 
constructive trust created on her ownership interest in GSN, unless Brewer is also a 
licensed doctor. Under the Medical Corporation Act, anyone who is not licensed 
pursuant to the Medical Practice Act is prohibited from having any part in the 
“ownership, management, or control” of a medical corporation. 805 ILCS 15/13 
(West 2010). In addition, fee-splitting arrangements between a licensed medical 
doctor and a nonlicensed medical doctor are likewise prohibited under the Medical 
Practice Act. 225 ILCS 60/22.2 (West 2010). 
¶ 49 
 
Brewer’s counterclaim explains that GSN is an Illinois corporation that 
characterizes itself as an all-woman practice of experienced physicians dedicated to 
providing comprehensive health care to women. Blumenthal is licensed under the 
Medical Corporation Act as a medical doctor, which allowed her to be one of the 
six owners of GSN. The statutory rule is clear: As an owner of the medical group, 
Blumenthal is prohibited from transferring any of her ownership interest or any 
proceeds from a sale of her interest in GSN to a nonlicensed medical doctor. These 
prohibitions are similar to the prohibitions of a lawyer forming a partnership with a 
nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law 
(Ill. R. Prof’l Conduct (2010) R. 5.4(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2010)) or the prohibition of 
sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer (Ill. R. Prof’l Conduct (2010) R. 5.4(a) (eff. 
Jan. 1, 2010)). Because Brewer is not a licensed medical doctor, transferring title 
 
 
- 15 - 
 
and possession of Blumenthal’s interest in GSN through a constructive trust to 
Brewer is unattainable due to the prohibitions of the Medical Corporation Act and 
the Medical Practice Act.  
¶ 50 
 
In the alternative, Brewer requests the common-law remedy of restitution for an 
undisclosed amount of funds she deposited into the couple’s joint account since the 
year 2000, which was used to purchase Blumenthal’s ownership interest in GSN. 
Brewer raises the same arguments she made before the appellate court, which ruled 
in her favor, permitting her to bring common-law remedies against Blumenthal. 
Therefore, Brewer requests this court uphold the appellate court’s review of the 
longstanding public policy in Illinois barring unmarried, cohabiting partners from 
seeking common-law property rights if the claims are not independent from the 
parties’ relationship. 
¶ 51 
 
To understand Illinois’s public policy concerning the common-law rights of 
unmarried, cohabiting couples, we must begin with a review of the history in 
Illinois concerning the matter—a history the parties and amici have extensively 
outlined in their briefs. One thing is certain as argued in the briefs: Illinois’s 
statutory prohibition of common-law marriage and this court’s prior decision in 
Hewitt are imperative to resolving the issue before this court. We therefore turn to 
that matter. 
¶ 52 
 
Common-law marriages are invalid in Illinois and have been since the early 
part of the last century. The prohibition is statutory and unequivocal. Section 214 of 
the Marriage and Dissolution Act (750 ILCS 5/214 (West 2010)) expressly 
provides that “[c]ommon law marriages contracted in this State after June 30, 1905 
are invalid.” 
¶ 53 
 
Prior to this legislative enactment, the doctrine of common-law marriage was a 
judicially sanctioned alternative to formal marriage. People v. Shaw, 259 Ill. 544, 
548 (1913). In Hewitt, decided in 1979, this court undertook an extensive and 
in-depth public policy analysis with respect to the statutory change by which 
common-law marriages were abolished. 
¶ 54 
 
At issue in Hewitt was whether public policy barred the granting of 
common-law relief to plaintiff Victoria Hewitt, who was in a cohabiting, 
marriage-like relationship with the defendant, Robert Hewitt. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 
52. Victoria and Robert commenced their relationship in 1960, while they were 
attending college in Iowa. Id. at 53. After Victoria became pregnant, Robert 
 
 
- 16 - 
 
proclaimed to Victoria “that they were husband and wife and would live as such, no 
formal ceremony being necessary, and that he would ‘share his life, his future, his 
earnings and his property’ with her.” Id. The parties immediately began holding 
themselves out as a married couple. Id. Relying on Robert’s promises, Victoria 
began to assist in paying for Robert’s education and establishing a dental practice, 
helping him earn more than $80,000 annually and accumulate large amounts of 
property, owned either jointly with Victoria or separately. Id. at 53-54.  
¶ 55 
 
After several years together, the relationship became sour, and Victoria filed for 
divorce, which the circuit court dismissed because the parties were never married. 
Id. at 52. Victoria filed an amended complaint that sought an equitable one-half 
share of the parties’ assets, based upon theories of implied contract, constructive 
trust, and unjust enrichment, which resulted from their “family relationship.” Id. at 
53. The circuit court dismissed the amended complaint, “finding that Illinois law 
and public policy require such claims to be based on a valid marriage.” Id. at 54.  
¶ 56 
 
The appellate court reversed, giving considerable weight to the fact that the 
parties had held themselves out as a couple for over 15 years and lived “a most 
conventional, respectable and ordinary family life.” Hewitt v. Hewitt, 62 Ill. App. 
3d 861, 863 (1978). The appellate court noted that the “single flaw” of Robert’s and 
Victoria’s relationship was the lack of a valid marriage. Id. The appellate court 
concluded that Victoria should not be denied relief based on public policy grounds. 
Id. at 867, 869. Adopting the reasoning of the “widely publicized” case of Marvin 
v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976), the appellate court held that the amended 
complaint stated a cause of action on an express oral contract. Hewitt, 62 Ill. App.  
at 868. In Marvin, Michelle Marvin and actor Lee Marvin cohabited for seven years 
before Michelle sought, by way of a contract action, to enforce Lee’s oral promise 
that they would share earnings and property for life. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110. In 
resolving her claim for one-half the property accumulated in defendant’s name 
during that period, the California court held that nonmarital cohabitants should be 
treated “as any other persons” and that contracts between them are valid and 
enforceable so long as they are not solely and exclusively based on sexual services, 
i.e., prostitution. Id. at 116. Consequently, the appellate court reversed and 
remanded the case. Hewitt, 62 Ill. App. 3d at 869.  
¶ 57 
 
On appeal to this court, we unanimously reversed the appellate court’s decision. 
Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 66. Addressing the issue of whether the granting of 
 
 
- 17 - 
 
common-law relief to the plaintiff, an unmarried cohabitant, was barred by public 
policy, we began by acknowledging that: 
“The issue of unmarried cohabitants’ mutual property rights *** cannot 
appropriately be characterized solely in terms of contract law, nor is it limited 
to considerations of equity or fairness as between the parties to such 
relationships. There are major public policy questions involved in determining 
whether, under what circumstances, and to what extent it is desirable to accord 
some type of legal status to claims arising from such relationships. Of 
substantially greater importance than the rights of the immediate parties is the 
impact of such recognition upon our society and the institution of marriage.” Id. 
at 57-58.  
¶ 58 
 
In our view, the legislature intended marriage to be the only legally protected 
family relationship under Illinois law, and permitting unmarried partners to enforce 
mutual property rights might “encourage formation of such relationships and 
weaken marriage as the foundation of our family-based society.” Id. at 58. This 
court was concerned that permitting such claims might raise questions about 
support, inheritance rights, and custody of nonmarital children.1 Id. We noted that 
the situation between the unmarried couple was “not the kind of arm’s length 
bargain envisioned by traditional contract principles, but an intimate arrangement 
of a fundamentally different kind.” Id. at 61. Because the question concerned 
changing the law governing the rights of parties in the delicate area of marriage-like 
relationships, which involves evaluations of sociological data and alternatives, this 
court decided that the underlying issue was best suited to the superior investigative 
and fact-finding facilities of the legislative branch in the exercise of its traditional 
authority to declare public policy in the domestic relations field. Id. Accordingly, 
this court held that Victoria’s claims were “unenforceable for the reason that they 
contravene the public policy, implicit in the statutory scheme of the Illinois 
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, disfavoring the grant of mutually 
                                                 
 
1The Hewitt court also questioned and considered the history of whether granting legal 
rights to cohabiting adults would encourage “what have heretofore been commonly 
referred to as ‘illicit’ or ‘meretricious’ relationships” which could weaken the institution of 
marriage. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 58. Today, this court does not share the same concern or 
characterization of domestic partners who cohabit, nor do we condone such comparisons. 
Nonetheless, as explained herein, a thorough reading of Hewitt makes clear that the core 
reasoning and ultimate holding of the case did not rely nor was dependent on the morality 
of cohabiting adults. 
 
 
- 18 - 
 
enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants.” Id. at 66. We 
reasoned that an opposite outcome of judicially recognizing mutual property rights 
between knowingly unmarried cohabitants—where the claim is based upon or 
intimately related to the cohabitation of the parties—would effectively reinstate 
common-law marriage and violate the public policy of this state since 1905, when 
the legislature abolished common-law marriage. Id. at 65-66.  
¶ 59 
 
Notably, based on our understanding of the public policy in Illinois and the 
legislative prohibition of common-law marriage, we emphatically rejected the 
holding in Marvin on which the appellate court relied. Id. In doing so, we found that 
provisions of the Marriage and Dissolution Act—retaining fault as grounds for 
dissolution of marriage and allowing an unmarried person to acquire the rights of a 
legal spouse only if he or she goes through a marriage ceremony and cohabits with 
another in the good-faith belief that he is validly married—indicated the public 
policy and the judgment of the legislature disfavoring private contractual 
alternatives to marriage or the grant of property rights to unmarried cohabitants. Id. 
at 64. In rejecting Victoria’s public policy arguments, this court recognized that 
cohabitation by the unmarried parties may not prevent them from forming valid 
contracts about independent matters, for which sexual relations do not form part of 
the consideration and do not closely resemble those arising from conventional 
marriages. Id. at 59. However, that was not the type of claim Victoria brought; thus, 
her claim failed. 
¶ 60 
 
The facts of the present case are almost indistinguishable from Hewitt, except, 
in this case, the parties were in a same-sex relationship. During the course of their 
long-term, domestic relationship, Brewer alleges that she and Blumenthal had a 
relationship that was “identical in every essential way to that of a married couple.” 
Although the parties were not legally married, they acted like a married couple and 
held themselves out as such. For example, the former domestic partners exchanged 
rings as a symbol of their commitment to each other, executed wills and trusts, each 
naming the other as the sole beneficiary of her assets, and appointed each other as 
fiduciary for financial and medical decision making. Blumenthal and Brewer also 
began to commingle their personal and financial assets, which allowed them to 
purchase investment property as well as the Chicago home where they raised their 
three children. Much like in Hewitt, Brewer alleges that she contributed to 
Blumenthal’s purchase of an ownership interest in the medical group GSN, helping 
Blumenthal earn the majority of income for the parties and “thereby guaranteeing 
the family’s financial security.” Because Blumenthal was able to earn a high 
 
 
- 19 - 
 
income, Brewer was able to devote more time to raising the couple’s children and 
to attend to other domestic duties. Once Blumenthal’s and Brewer’s relationship 
ended, Brewer, like Victoria Hewitt, brought suit seeking various common-law 
remedies to equalize their assets and receive an interest in Blumenthal’s business. 
¶ 61 
 
As explained supra, our decision in Hewitt did no more than follow the 
statutory provision abolishing common-law marriage, which embodied the public 
policy of Illinois that individuals acting privately by themselves, without the 
involvement of the State, cannot create marriage-like benefits. Hewitt clearly 
declared the law on the very issue in this case. Yet, the appellate court in this case 
declined to follow our ruling, despite the facts being almost identical to Hewitt. 
This was improper. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, when this court “has 
declared the law on any point, it alone can overrule and modify its previous 
opinion, and the lower judicial tribunals are bound by such decision and it is the 
duty of such lower tribunals to follow such decision in similar cases.” (Emphasis in 
original.) (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 2015 IL 
117687, ¶ 38. The appellate court had no authority to depart from our decision. It 
could question Hewitt and recommend that we revisit our holding in the case, but it 
could not overrule it.  
¶ 62 
 
The appellate court was also ill-advised to adopt the reasoning in Marvin (2014 
IL App (1st) 132250, ¶ 31), given that in Hewitt we unquestionably rejected 
Marvin. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 65-66. Determining that the legislature deliberately 
declined to follow the reasoning in Marvin, this court noted that during the time 
Marvin was being decided the Illinois legislature adopted the civil-law concept of 
the putative spouse, which involves a situation where a person goes through a 
marriage ceremony and cohabits with another in the good-faith belief that he or she 
is validly married. Id. at 64. Once the putative spouse learns that the marriage is not 
valid, his status as a putative spouse terminates because “common law marriages 
are expressly excluded.” Id. This enactment was essential to Hewitt’s holding 
because it provided specific evidence of the General Assembly’s intent to depart 
from Marvin’s pure contract theory. In light of our legislative review, we felt 
judicial policy making in this area to be inappropriate in light of the “recent and 
unmistakeable legislative judgment disfavoring the grant of mutual property rights 
to knowingly unmarried cohabitants.” Id. It was our judgment that granting relief 
under the facts of the case would be contrary to the legislative intent at the time and 
would have the practical effect of reinstating common-law marriage in Illinois. Id. 
at 65.  
 
 
- 20 - 
 
¶ 63 
 
When considering the property rights of unmarried cohabitants, our view of 
Hewitt’s holding has not changed. As in Hewitt, the issue before this court cannot 
appropriately be characterized solely in terms of contract law, nor is it limited to 
considerations of equity or fairness as between the parties in such marriage-like 
relationships. Id. at 57-58. These questions undoubtedly involve some of the most 
fundamental policy concerns in our society. Permitting such claims, as sought by 
Brewer, would not only impact the institution of marriage but also raise questions 
pertaining to other family-related issues. See id. at 58. Moreover, Brewer’s 
argument that her relationship with Blumenthal should not be viewed differently 
from others who cohabit, like roommates or siblings living together, ignores the 
fact that their relationship—which lasted almost three decades and involved raising 
three children—was different from other forms of cohabitation. Brewer herself 
identified in her counterclaim that her relationship with Blumenthal was not that of 
roommates or siblings living together but was “identical in every essential way to 
that of a married couple.”  
¶ 64 
 
Because rejection of Hewitt is essential to her counterclaim, Brewer requests 
that we revisit the decision and overrule it. The rationale, analysis, or distinctions 
that can be drawn from the following appellate court cases are helpful in explaining 
why we reject Brewer’s invitation to overrule Hewitt and hold that it remains good 
law.  
¶ 65 
 
Shortly after Hewitt was decided, in Spafford v. Coats, 118 Ill. App. 3d 566 
(1983), a decision not mentioned by the appellate court below, plaintiff Donna 
Spafford filed a complaint against defendant Richard Coats for the creation of a 
constructive trust, alleging that she purchased or paid the down payment from her 
own funds for various vehicles. Id. at 568. The problem, however, was that the 
vehicles purchased by Spafford were titled in Coats’s name because insurance 
premiums would be less. Id. Spafford and Coats were never married, but they 
cohabited for more than six years. Id. at 568-69. Using Hewitt as the basis for its 
decision, the circuit court directed a verdict in favor of Coats, finding that Spafford 
failed to state a cause of action. Id. at 569-70.  
¶ 66 
 
On review, the appellate court reversed, holding that in this particular situation, 
the nonmarital, cohabiting relationship did not preclude equitable relief on the 
vehicles purchased primarily by Spafford but titled in Coats’s name. Id. at 572-73. 
The Spafford court distinguished the case from Hewitt, finding that plaintiff’s 
claims were based on evidence that she furnished substantially all of the 
 
 
- 21 - 
 
consideration for the purchase of several vehicles that defendant retained. Id. at 
572. Instead, the appellate court found Spafford’s claims were substantially 
independent of the nonmarital relationship between the parties and not based on 
rights arising from their cohabitation, i.e., Spafford had actually paid for the motor 
vehicles herself. Id. Because Spafford’s claims had an economic basis independent 
of the nonmarital, cohabiting relationship, she was permitted to recover those 
independent contributions. Id. at 572-73. 
¶ 67 
 
The appellate court in Ayala v. Fox, 206 Ill. App. 3d 538 (1990), was faced with 
a similar situation as in Spafford. Anita Ayala and Lawrence Fox began their 
long-term relationship in 1976. Id. at 539. At Fox’s suggestion, they obtained a 
$48,000 loan to build a home. Id. Fox promised Ayala that title to the property 
would be transferred to them as joint tenants and that Ayala would receive one-half 
of the equity in the property if they stopped residing together. Id. For three years, 
Ayala made the majority of the loan, tax, and insurance payments; for the next 
seven years, Ayala and Fox jointly made the payments. Id. During the relationship, 
Fox never transferred title to the couple as joint tenants, nor did he pay Ayala half 
of the equity in the property. Id. Rather, he placed the property in a land trust and 
kept personal property purchased with the parties’ joint funds during the 
cohabitation. Id. After the parties ended their relationship, Ayala filed suit for a 
one-half interest in the realty and half of the personal property. Id. Dismissing the 
complaint, the circuit court found that Hewitt barred claims based on property 
disputes between cohabitants. Id. at 540.  
¶ 68 
 
The appellate court affirmed, holding that Ayala was not entitled to an interest 
in the property because she was seeking recovery based on rights “closely 
resembling those arising from a conventional marriage,” namely an equitable 
interest in the “marital” residence. Id. at 541. The appellate court distinguished the 
facts of its case from Spafford, finding Ayala’s claim was intimately related to her 
nonmarital cohabitation with Fox and, therefore, Hewitt barred plaintiff’s claims 
for equitable relief. Id. at 541-42. 
¶ 69 
 
Hewitt’s rationale was also pivotal in Costa v. Oliven (365 Ill. App. 3d 244, 245 
(2006), appeal denied, 221 Ill. 2d 633 (2006) (table)), which involved a case where 
plaintiff Eugene Costa sued defendant Catherine Oliven, with whom he had lived 
for 24 years in a “ ‘quasi-marital’ relationship, with ‘all the indicia of a marital type 
relationship, including love, trust, mutual responsibilities and intimacy.’ ” In this 
case, Costa alleged that he assumed the role of stay-at-home dad, nurturing and 
 
 
- 22 - 
 
home-schooling their daughter and routinely performing all of the usual activities 
associated with maintaining an efficient household in order to enable the defendant 
to work full time. Id. In addition, he alleged that during their years together, Oliven 
took sole title to almost every asset and possession that was acquired through the 
couple’s joint efforts and labor. Id. Based on these allegations, Costa requested the 
imposition of a constructive trust upon real, personal, and intellectual property 
owned by Oliven as well as an accounting of all income and assets in Oliven’s 
possession and an award of punitive damages in the amount of $250,000. Id. at 
245-46. Oliven moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claims, arguing that his claims were 
unenforceable based on section 214 of the Marriage and Dissolution Act (750 ILCS 
5/214 (West 2004)), which prohibits common-law marriage, and based on this 
court’s decision in Hewitt. Costa, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 246. Following the holding in 
Hewitt, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of Costa’s 
complaint, noting that until the legislature enacted changes, this type of complaint 
would continue to fail. Id. 
¶ 70 
 
We find that the facts of the case before us today are not only factually similar 
to Hewitt, but also similar to Ayala and Costa. According to Brewer’s 
counterclaim, one of the ways Blumenthal and Brewer’s domestic relationship was 
identical to that of a married couple was, among other things, their decision to 
“commingle[ ] their personal property and their finances.” Beginning around the 
year 2000, Blumenthal and Brewer, like the parties in Ayala, pooled their assets and 
finances, which were used to make purchases including the arrangement to 
purchase an ownership interest in GSN. According to Brewer, these purchases were 
made for the benefit of providing the “family’s financial security” and to allow 
Brewer to devote a substantial amount of her time raising the couple’s children. 
The decision between Blumenthal and Brewer to commingle their finances and use 
those joint funds to make property and financial investments demonstrates that the 
funds were economically dependent on the parties’ marriage-like relationship. 
¶ 71 
 
For about eight years, Brewer never objected to the arrangement, nor does the 
counterclaim allege that she tried to earmark or record which funds of hers were 
going specifically toward the purchase of GSN, as if she were a business partner. 
This was unquestionably because Blumenthal and Brewer wanted to live like a 
married couple. Both parties voluntarily contributed to the joint account because 
that is typical of a married couple. The parties’ arrangement was made possible 
because Brewer, like the plaintiff in Costa, agreed to forgo advancing her own legal 
career in order for Blumenthal to pursue entrepreneurial endeavors including the 
 
 
- 23 - 
 
purchase of an ownership interest in GSN. Indeed, Brewer is correct in labeling 
Blumenthal’s and her purchase of GSN as an investment. But it was an investment 
for the family, which included Blumenthal, Brewer, and their children. It was not 
an investment between business partners. Nor was it the kind of arm’s-length 
bargain envisioned by traditional contract principles. Rather, the arrangement to 
use the parties’ commingled funds was an arrangement of a fundamentally different 
kind, which, like the arrangement in Ayala and Costa, is intimately related and 
dependent on Brewer’s marriage-like relationship with Blumenthal.  
¶ 72 
 
Additionally, Brewer’s claim for restitution in count III is distinguishable from 
Spafford. Unlike the plaintiff in Spafford, Brewer does not allege that she 
contributed substantially all of the funds for the purchase of GSN. In fact, Brewer’s 
counterclaim does not provide a specific amount of funds she contributed to 
Blumenthal’s ownership interest in GSN, nor does Brewer allege that she and 
Blumenthal somehow attempted to keep their contributions separate. Rather, the 
purchase came after many years of the former domestic partners living together, 
raising a family, and depositing funds in their joint account as well as making 
certain family purchases out of the joint account. It is undeniable that the purchase 
of Blumenthal’s ownership interest in GSN was dependent on the parties’ 
relationship, because the purchase was made for the family’s financial security. 
That was not the situation in Spafford. 
¶ 73 
 
While we acknowledge that restitution may be a remedy available to a party 
who has cohabited with another (see Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 55-56), that is not the 
circumstance concerning Brewer’s restitution claim in count III of her 
counterclaim. We find that Brewer failed to make a showing that count III of her 
counterclaim has an independent economic basis apart from the parties’ 
relationship. The joint account used by Blumenthal and Brewer to purchase an 
ownership interest in GSN was dependent on their desire to live in a marriage-like 
relationship and make purchases out of this account to better their family situation. 
Therefore, the purchase of Blumenthal’s ownership interest in GSN from the joint 
account is intimately related to the parties’ relationship. Our decision in Hewitt bars 
such relief if the claim is not independent from the parties’ living in a marriage-like 
relationship for the reason it contravenes the public policy, implicit in the statutory 
scheme of the Marriage and Dissolution Act, disfavoring the grant of mutually 
enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants. Id. at 66.  
 
 
- 24 - 
 
¶ 74 
 
Next, Brewer respectfully asks this court to affirm the appellate court’s 
decision, which held in her favor that former cohabitants who live outside the 
bonds of marriage, but live in a marriage-like relationship, may bring common-law 
property claims. Central to Brewer’s argument are various post-Hewitt legislative 
enactments in Illinois, which she claims indicate that the state’s public policy has 
shifted dramatically in regards to unmarried couples and their children. According 
to Brewer, the following legislative enactments reveal that the application of Hewitt 
is no longer justified and that the state’s evolving public policy now contradicts 
Hewitt’s rule. We disagree. 
¶ 75 
 
Since this court’s decision in Hewitt, the General Assembly has enacted, 
repealed, and amended numerous family-related statutes. In 1984, the legislature 
adopted a no-fault ground of divorce based on irreconcilable differences to the 
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. Pub. Act 83-954 (eff. July 1, 
1984) (codified at 750 ILCS 5/401(a)(2) (West 2012)). Then in 1985, the Illinois 
Parentage Act of 1984 provided that “[t]he parent and child relationship, including 
support obligations, extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless 
of the marital status of the parents.” Pub. Act 83-1372 (eff. July 1, 1985) (codified 
at 750 ILCS 45/3 (West 2012)). Additionally, since Hewitt, there has been an 
amendment to the Probate Act of 1975 extending intestate inheritance rights to 
children of unmarried parents (Pub. Act 80-1429 (eff. Sept. 12, 1978) (codified at 
755 ILCS 5/2-2 (West 2012))), and a similar amendment to the Illinois Pension 
Code, which indicates that children born to unmarried parents are entitled to the 
same survivor’s benefits as other children (Pub. Act 84-1028 (eff. Nov. 18, 1985) 
(codified at 40 ILCS 5/1-104.2 (West 2012))). Further, Illinois also recognizes the 
rights of unmarried couples (and individuals) to adopt children. Pub. Act 96-328 
(eff. Aug. 11, 2009) (codified at 750 ILCS 50/2 (West 2010)). In 2011, the 
legislature enacted the Illinois Religious Freedom and Civil Union Act, gave legal 
status to civil unions, and made such status available to both opposite-sex and 
same-sex couples. Pub. Act 96-1513 (eff. June 1, 2011) (adding 750 ILCS 75/1 
et seq. (West 2010)). As of 2014, under the Religious Freedom and Marriage 
Fairness Act, same-sex couples are now able to marry in Illinois. Pub. Act 98-597 
(eff. June 1, 2014) (adding 750 ILCS 80/1 et seq. (West 2014)). More recently, the 
Parentage Act of 1984 was repealed (in its entirety) by the 2015 enactment of 
Public Act 99-85, which replaced it with the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015. 750 
ILCS 45/1 et seq. (West 2014) (repealed by Pub. Act 99-85 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) 
(adding 750 ILCS 46/101 et seq.)). In addition, the Marriage and Dissolution Act, 
 
 
- 25 - 
 
which incorporates the statute prohibiting common-law marriages, underwent a 
major overhaul this year. Pub. Act 99-90 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (amending 750 ILCS 
5/101 et seq. (West 2014)). 
¶ 76 
 
These post-Hewitt amendments demonstrate that the legislature knows how to 
alter family-related statutes and does not hesitate to do so when and if it believes 
public policy so requires. Nothing in these post-Hewitt changes, however, can be 
interpreted as evincing an intention by the legislature to change the public policy 
concerning the situation presently before this court. To the contrary, the claim that 
our legislature is moving toward granting additional property rights to unmarried 
cohabitants in derogation of the prohibition against common-law marriage is flatly 
contradicted by the undeniable fact that for almost four decades since Hewitt, and 
despite all of these numerous changes to other family-related statutes, the statutory 
prohibition against common-law marriage set forth in section 214 of the Marriage 
and Dissolution Act (750 ILCS 5/214 (West 2014)) has remained completely 
untouched and unqualified. That is so even though this court in Hewitt explicitly 
deferred any policy change to the legislature. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 66 (When 
deciding complex public-policy considerations, such “ ‘questions are appropriately 
within the province of the legislature, and *** if there is to be a change in the law of 
this State on this matter, it is for the legislature and not the courts to bring about that 
change.’ ” (quoting Mogged v. Mogged, 55 Ill. 2d 221, 225 (1973))).  
¶ 77 
 
It is well-understood that when the legislature chooses not to amend a statute to 
reverse a judicial construction, it is presumed that the legislature has acquiesced in 
the court’s statement of the legislative intent. Wakulich v. Mraz, 203 Ill. 2d 223, 
233 (2003) (quoting Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 49-50 (1998)). 
Based on this principle, we can presume that the legislature has acquiesced in 
Hewitt’s judicial interpretation of the statute prohibiting marriage-like rights to 
those outside of marriage. If this court were to recognize the legal status desired by 
Brewer, we would infringe on the duty of the legislature to set policy in the area of 
domestic relations. As mentioned in Hewitt, the legislative branch is far better 
suited to declare public policy in the domestic relations field due to its superior 
investigative and fact-finding facilities, as declaring public policy requires 
evaluation of sociological data and alternatives. Therefore, we do not find a 
compelling reason to reverse course now and depart from our earlier legislative 
interpretation, especially in light of almost two score years of legislative inaction 
on the matter.  
 
 
- 26 - 
 
¶ 78 
 
Brewer’s argument that we should recognize new public policy justifications to 
support her counterclaim is further undermined by the fact that all of the public 
policy changes to which she cites resulted not from judicial action but from the 
legislature. In each example, it was the legislature, not the courts, that determined 
what Illinois public policy was (or was not) to be.  
¶ 79 
 
We also reject Brewer’s argument that changes in law since Hewitt demonstrate 
that the “legislature no longer considers withholding protection from nonmarital 
families to be a legitimate means of advancing the state’s interest in marriage.” To 
the contrary, this court finds that the current legislative and judicial trend is to 
uphold the institution of marriage. Most notably, within the past year, the United 
States Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2604-05 (2015), held that same-sex couples cannot be denied the right to marry. In 
doing so, the Court found that “new insights [from the developments in the 
institution of marriage over the past centuries] have strengthened, not weakened, 
the institution of marriage.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2596. For the institution of 
marriage has been a keystone of our social order and “remains a building block of 
our national community.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2601. Accordingly, the Court 
invalidated any state legislation prohibiting same-sex marriage because excluding 
same-sex couples from marriage would be excluding them “from one of 
civilization’s oldest institutions.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.  
¶ 80 
 
While the United States Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]he Constitution 
*** does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same 
terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex” (id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2607), 
nothing in that holding can fairly be construed as requiring states to confer on 
non-married, same-sex couples common-law rights or remedies not shared by 
similarly situated non-married couples of the opposite sex. Legislatures may, of 
course, decide that matters of public policy do warrant special consideration for 
non-married, same-sex couples under certain circumstances, notwithstanding the 
fact that the institution of marriage is available to all couples equally. What is 
important for the purposes of this discussion is that the balancing of the relevant 
public policy considerations is for the legislature, not the courts. Indeed, now that 
the centrality of the marriage has been recognized as a fundamental right for all, it 
is perhaps more imperative than before that we leave it to the legislative branch to 
determine whether and under what circumstances a change in the public policy 
governing the rights of parties in nonmarital relationships is necessary. 
 
 
- 27 - 
 
¶ 81 
 
It is well settled that the policy of the Marriage and Dissolution Act gives the 
state a strong continuing interest in the institution of marriage and the ability to 
prevent marriage from becoming in effect a private contract terminable at will, by 
disfavoring the grant of mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly 
unmarried cohabitants. See Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 65-66. As explained in Hewitt, such 
policy was set forth by the enactment of section 214 of the Marriage and 
Dissolution Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, ¶ 214 (codified at 750 ILCS 5/214 
(West 2010)). Until the legislature sees fit to change our interpretation of the public 
policy in Illinois, under the circumstances of this case, Brewer’s claim for 
restitution is prohibited, as it contravenes the public policy implicit in the Marriage 
and Dissolution Act.  
¶ 82 
 
Lastly, we note that Brewer, the supporting amici, and the partial dissent cite to 
numerous cases from our sister state courts and other secondary sources that 
support Brewer’s public policy arguments. However, decisions from other state 
courts and secondary sources are not binding on this court and, in this particular 
situation, are unpersuasive for the reason they do not adequately consider the 
deeply rooted public policy in Illinois. In re Parentage of Scarlett Z.-D., 2015 IL 
117904, ¶ 55 (citing Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 131 Ill. 2d 
478, 489 (1989)). Additionally, it should be noted that these cases and secondary 
sources were written prior to, and therefore did not consider, the fundamental 
change the United States Supreme Court decision in Obergefell had on legal rights 
of same-sex partners. 
 
¶ 83 
 
 
 
 
 
Due Process and Equal Protection Claims 
¶ 84 
 
The determination that the trial court did not err in dismissing Brewer’s 
counterclaim does not end this appeal, for Brewer argues that the continued 
application of Hewitt’s rule would violate the Illinois and federal constitutional 
guarantees of due process and equal protection. See U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1; 
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 12. Brewer claims that Hewitt’s rule preventing 
unmarried domestic partners the ability to bring common-law claims available to 
all other persons, solely because they are in a marriage-like relationship, does not 
rationally advance a legitimate governmental purpose and that it deliberately seeks 
to penalize unmarried partners for exercising their constitutionally protected right 
to enter into an intimate relationship. Although the appellate court did not address 
 
 
- 28 - 
 
this issue, the issue has been raised and fully briefed by both parties. Therefore, we 
will address this issue on appeal. Chavda v. Wolak, 188 Ill. 2d 394, 400 (1999).  
¶ 85 
 
We disagree with Brewer’s claim that Hewitt’s holding denies unmarried 
domestic partners the ability to bring common-law claims solely because they are 
in an intimate relationship with another. See supra ¶¶ 65-73. This court’s decision 
in Hewitt only disallows unmarried cohabitants who live in a marriage-like 
relationship from accessing, under the guise of an implied contract, the rights and 
protections specified in the Marriage and Dissolution Act. In other words, 
individuals can enter into an intimate relationship, but the relationship itself cannot 
form the basis to bring common-law claims. Thus, Hewitt’s holding does not 
prevent or penalize unmarried partners from entering into intimate relationships. 
Rather, it acknowledges the legislative intent to provide certain rights and benefits 
to those who participate in the institution of marriage.  
¶ 86 
 
The State’s interest in the creation, regulation, and dissolution of the marriage 
relationship is beyond question. Over one hundred years ago, the United States 
Supreme Court in Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888), recognized that 
marriage “is the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would 
be neither civilization nor progress.” Throughout history, states have contributed to 
the fundamental character of the marriage right by placing that institution at the 
center of so many facets of the legal and social order. See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 
___, 135 S. Ct. at 2601. In Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942), 
the Court noted that “[e]ach state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate 
concern in the marital status of persons domiciled within its borders.” This is so 
because “[t]he definition of marriage is the foundation of the State’s broader 
authority to regulate the subject of domestic relations with respect to the 
‘[p]rotection of offspring, property interests, and the enforcement of marital 
responsibilities.’ ” United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 
2691 (2013) (quoting Williams, 317 U.S. at 298). In enacting the Marriage and 
Dissolution Act (Pub. Act 80-923 (eff. Oct. 1, 1977) (codified at 750 ILCS 5/101 
et seq. (West 2014))), the Illinois legislature has shown its rightful interest in 
defining and regulating domestic relationships.  
¶ 87 
 
Since marriage is a legal relationship that all individuals may or may not enter 
into, Illinois does not act irrationally or discriminatorily in refusing to grant 
benefits and protections under the Marriage and Dissolution Act to those who do 
not participate in the institution of marriage. As noted in Hewitt and the line of 
 
 
- 29 - 
 
cases that follow its holding, unmarried individuals may make express or implied 
contracts with one another, and such contracts will be enforceable if they are not 
based on a relationship indistinguishable from marriage. Indeed, Hewitt did nothing 
more than effectuate the policy established by the legislature to prevent knowingly 
unmarried cohabitants from evading the statutory abolition of common-law 
marriage under section 214 of the Marriage and Dissolution Act (750 ILCS 5/214 
(West 2010)) by employing theories of implied contract to achieve the same result 
that would occur if common-law marriage were recognized. We, therefore, reject 
Brewer’s claims. 
 
¶ 88 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 89 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the appellate court should not have considered 
Brewer’s appeal with respect to that portion of the circuit court’s order disposing of 
counts I, II, IV, and V of Brewer’s counterclaim, and it erred when it reversed and 
remanded the cause with respect to count III of Brewer’s counterclaim. The 
judgment of the appellate court is therefore vacated in part and reversed in part. The 
judgment of the circuit court dismissing Brewer’s counterclaim in full is affirmed. 
 
¶ 90 
 
Appellate court judgment vacated in part and reversed in part. 
¶ 91 
 
Circuit court judgment affirmed. 
 
¶ 92 
 
JUSTICE THEIS, concurring in part and dissenting in part:  
¶ 93 
 
I agree with the majority’s disposition of counts I, II, IV, and V of Judge 
Brewer’s counterclaim against Dr. Blumenthal. I further agree with the majority’s 
holding that count III of the counterclaim cannot proceed on a constructive trust 
theory. I disagree with the majority’s holding that count III cannot proceed on a 
restitution theory. 
¶ 94 
 
The trial court dismissed Brewer’s amended complaint in its entirety because it 
felt bound to Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49 (1979). The appellate court did not feel 
similarly bound, but, as the majority notes, that court should have followed that 
 
 
- 30 - 
 
case. Supra ¶ 61 (quoting Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 2015 IL 117687, ¶ 38). The 
central question for us to decide here is whether we should do so. 
¶ 95 
 
The doctrine of stare decisis is not an inexorable command (Chicago Bar Ass’n 
v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 161 Ill. 2d 502, 510 (1994)), and this court will 
depart from it and discard a prior case when there is good cause to do so (Moehle v. 
Chrysler Motors Corp., 93 Ill. 2d 299, 304 (1982)). Good cause exists when an 
earlier ruling has proven to be unworkable or poorly reasoned. People v. Sharpe, 
216 Ill. 2d 481, 520 (2005) (citing People v. Jones, 207 Ill. 2d 122, 134 (2003)); see 
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986) (stating that “any detours from the 
straight path of stare decisis in our past have occurred for articulable reasons, and 
only when the Court has felt obliged to bring its opinions into agreement with 
experience and with facts newly ascertained” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
In my view, there is good cause to overrule Hewitt. The court’s decision in that case 
was clouded by an inappropriate and moralistic view of domestic partners who 
cohabit and founded upon legal principles that have changed significantly. 
¶ 96 
 
According to the majority, Hewitt “did no more than follow the statutory 
provision abolishing common-law marriage, which embodied the public policy of 
Illinois that individuals acting privately by themselves, without the involvement of 
the State, cannot create marriage-like benefits.” Supra ¶ 61. In fact, Hewitt did 
much more. It etched into the Illinois Reports the arcane view that domestic 
partners who choose to cohabit, but not marry, are engaged in “illicit” or 
“meretricious” behavior at odds with foundational values of “our family-based 
society.” Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 58. “Meretricious” means “of or relating to a 
prostitute” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1413 (1986)), so this 
court labeled such people as prostitutes. 
¶ 97 
 
The majority’s attempt to distance itself from Hewitt’s sweeping and 
near-defamatory statement is unconvincing. Though the majority assures that “this 
court does not share the same concern or characterization of domestic partners who 
cohabit, nor do we condone such comparisons” (supra ¶ 58 n.1), its disavowal of 
Hewitt is literally subtextual, occurring only in a footnote. Elsewhere, the majority 
borrows troubling language from that case. In Hewitt, the court stated that “the 
situation” between the parties was “not the kind of arm’s length bargain envisioned 
by traditional contract principles, but an intimate arrangement of a fundamentally 
different kind.” Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 61. Here, the majority states that the parties’ 
investment into Blumenthal’s medical practice was not “the kind of arm’s-length 
 
 
- 31 - 
 
bargain envisioned by traditional contract principles,” but rather “an arrangement 
of a fundamentally different kind, which *** is intimately related and dependent on 
Brewer’s marriage-like relationship with Blumenthal.” Supra ¶ 71. The majority 
cleverly tries to cloak the real meaning of Hewitt, but what makes these 
“arrangements” fundamentally different is the same for the Hewitt court and the 
majority. 
¶ 98 
 
To state uncategorically that “our view of Hewitt’s holding has not changed” 
(supra ¶ 63) and insist that “it remains good law” (supra ¶ 64) is to reaffirm an 
oddly myopic and moralistic view of cohabitation. The majority assertion that 
Hewitt’s “core reasoning and ultimate holding *** did not rely nor was dependent 
on the morality of cohabiting adults” (supra ¶ 58 n.1) is plainly incorrect because 
the court’s discussion of the role of the legislature in setting public policy on 
domestic relations and the prohibition of common-law marriage comes as an 
even-if afterthought. See Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 60. Insulating the institution of 
marriage from the “changing mores of our society” was the clear impetus for our 
holding in that case. Id. at 58. 
¶ 99 
 
To begin its analysis, the Hewitt court discussed at length the so-called rule of 
illegality. The court quoted the first Restatement of Contracts, which stated, “ ‘A 
bargain in whole or in part for or in consideration of illicit sexual intercourse or of a 
promise thereof is illegal.’ ” Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 59 (quoting Restatement of 
Contracts § 589 (1932)). And the court cited the well-known contract law treatise 
by Arthur Corbin, the reporter of the First Restatement, as further support for the 
traditional rule. Id. (citing 6A Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1476 
(1962)). The Hewitt court acknowledged that “cohabitation by the parties may not 
prevent them from forming valid contracts about independent matters, for which it 
is said the sexual relations do not form part of the consideration” (id.), but rejected 
the “real thrust” of the argument that the rule of illegality should be abandoned (id. 
at 60). The court decried “the naivete *** involved in the assertion that there are 
involved in these relationships contracts separate and independent from the sexual 
activity, and the assumption that those contracts would have been entered into or 
would continue without that activity.” Id. 
¶ 100 
 
Hewitt’s support for the rule of illegality has disappeared. In 1979, Illinois still 
criminalized cohabitation. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 38, ¶ 11-8 (a “person who 
cohabits *** commits fornication if the behavior is open and notorious”). The 
Hewitt court did not cite that statute, but quoted Wallace v. Rappleye, 103 Ill. 229, 
 
 
- 32 - 
 
249 (1882), which held, “ ‘An agreement in consideration of future illicit 
cohabitation between the [parties] is void.’ ” Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 58-59. When the 
prohibition against cohabitation was repealed in 1990 (see Pub. Act 86-490 (eff. 
Jan. 1, 1990) (codified at 720 ILCS 5/11-40 (West 2010))), Wallace was, in effect, 
superseded. 
¶ 101 
 
The Second Restatement of Contracts, which was completed in 1979 and 
published in 1981, deleted the section of the First Restatement quoted in Hewitt and 
ceased to define all bargains between people in intimate relationships as illegal. 
The section of the Corbin treatise cited in Hewitt has been dropped in the current 
version. Today, the treatise recognizes that cohabiting adults are a family and notes, 
“The courts' treatment of contracts entered into by cohabiting parties evolved in the 
last part of the twentieth century and is clear evidence of how the courts’ view of 
what might be against public policy varies with changes in society’s views.” 15 
Grace McLane Giesel, Corbin on Contracts § 81.4, at 205 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 
rev. ed. 2003) (hereinafter Corbin). According to the treatise, courts across the 
country no longer perceive a conflict between the public policies of protecting and 
encouraging marriage and discouraging any exchange of sexual activity for value 
and enforcing agreements between former cohabitants. Corbin, supra, § 81.4, at 
207-08.  
¶ 102 
 
The treatise also refers to the landmark “palimony” case of Marvin v. Marvin, 
557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (en banc), remarking: 
 
“Whereas cases decided [prior to] Marvin may have presumed that the 
sexual relationship was the substance of the agreement, cases after Marvin 
seem to presume that the relationship is not the substance of the agreement. 
These cases are not concerned that the agreement exists in the context of a 
sexual relationship, but rather are concerned only if the contract’s ‘primary’ 
reason is sexual relations for value.” Corbin, supra, § 81.4, at 219. 
Brewer and the amici supporting her cite many of those cases, but the majority 
declines to follow them because they are not binding authority and “do not 
adequately consider the deeply rooted public policy in Illinois.” Supra ¶ 82. That 
policy, presumably, is the one mentioned earlier by the majority that individuals 
acting privately cannot create marriage-like benefits without the involvement of the 
State. Supra ¶ 61. According to the majority, that policy is embodied in prohibition 
 
 
- 33 - 
 
of common-law marriage that “has remained completely untouched and 
unqualified” in the nearly four decades since Hewitt. Supra ¶ 76.  
¶ 103 
 
Obviously, Illinois’s common-law marriage ban is still in effect. See 750 ILCS 
5/214 (West 2010). Parallel statutes are in effect across the country,2 but only 
Georgia and Louisiana have rulings similar to Hewitt. See Long v. Marino, 441 
S.E.2d 475 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316 (La. 
Ct. App. 1983). Courts in a vast majority of the remaining states, as well as the 
District of Columbia, that have chosen not to recognize common-law marriages 
also have chosen to recognize claims between former domestic partners like 
Blumenthal and Brewer. See, e.g., Bishop v. Clark, 54 P.3d 804 (Alaska 2002); 
Cook v. Cook, 691 P.2d 664 (Ariz. 1984); Bramlett v. Selman, 597 S.W.2d 80 (Ark. 
1980); Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976); Boland v. Catalano, 521 A.2d 
142 (Conn. 1987); Mason v. Rostad, 476 A.2d 662 (D.C. 1984); Poe v. Estate of 
Levy, 411 So. 2d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Simmons v. Samulewicz, 304 P.3d 
648 (Haw. Ct. App. 2013); Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1980); Donovan v. Scuderi, 443 A.2d 121 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982); Wilcox v. 
Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141 (Mass. 1998); Featherston v. Steinhoff, 575 N.W.2d 6 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1997); In re Estate of Eriksen, 337 N.W.2d 671 (Minn. 1983); 
Cates v. Swain, No. 2010-CT-01939-SCT, 2013 WL 1831783 (Miss. May 2, 2013); 
Hudson v. DeLonjay, 732 S.W.2d 922 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Kinkenon v. Hue, 301 
N.W.2d 77 (Neb. 1981); Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672 (Nev. 1984); Dominguez v. 
Cruz, 617 P.2d 1322 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154 
(N.Y. 1980); Collins v. Davis, 315 S.E.2d 759 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), aff’d per 
curiam, 321 S.E.2d 892 (N.C. 1984); McKechnie v. Berg, 667 N.W.2d 628 (N.D. 
2003); Beal v. Beal, 577 P.2d 507 (Or. 1978) (en banc); Knauer v. Knauer, 470 
A.2d 553 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); Bracken v. Bracken, 217 N.W. 192 (S.D. 1927); 
Leek v. Powell, 884 S.W.2d 118 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); Belcher v. Kirkwood, 383 
S.E.2d 729 (Va. 1989); In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328 (Wash. 1984) 
(en banc); Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430 (W. Va. 1990); Watts v. Watts, 405 
N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987); Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594 (Wy. 1981).  
                                                 
 
2According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, only Alabama, Colorado, 
Iowa, Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and 
Texas 
still 
recognize 
common-law 
marriage. 
Http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
human-services/common-law-marriage.aspx (updated August 4, 2014). 
 
 
- 34 - 
 
¶ 104 
 
The recognition of claims between domestic partners has not revived the 
doctrine of common-law marriage in jurisdictions that have abolished it. See 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution § 6.01 cmt. a (2002) (hereinafter 
Principles). That is, “the history of common law marriage in this country” (Hewitt, 
77 Ill. 2d at 64)—or, more precisely, its widespread prohibition—has not prevented 
courts across the country from allowing such claims to proceed. See Glasgo, 410 
N.E.2d at 1330 (“We do not find that recognition of a claim for a declaration of 
property rights in specific property to be a claim which reinstates common law 
marriages.”); Hay, 678 P.2d at 674 (“We hasten to point out that Nevada does not 
recognize common law marriage. [Citation.] We recognize that the state has a 
strong public policy interest in encouraging legal marriage. We do not, however, 
believe that policy is well served by allowing one participant in a meretricious 
relationship to abscond with the bulk of the couple’s acquisitions.”); Goode, 396 
S.E.2d at 438 (“This Court *** recognizes that the state has a strong policy interest 
in encouraging legally valid marriages. [Citation.] However, we *** also recognize 
that this policy must not defeat a person’s equitable interests, nor a person’s rights 
based upon a valid agreement, expressed or implied.”); Kinnison, 627 P.2d at 595 
(“While repeatedly rejecting the doctrine of common-law marriage, this court has 
never held, however, that the fact that a man and a woman live together out of 
wedlock and engage in a sexual relationship in any way invalidates agreements 
between them or, because of the relationship, renders them incapable of contracting 
with one another.”); see also Boland, 521 A.2d at 145; Wilcox, 693 N.E.2d at 146; 
Hudson, 732 S.W.2d at 926; Dominguez, 617 P.2d at 1322-23; Knauer, 470 A.2d at 
564. 
¶ 105 
 
In light of this wave of authority, the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment now contains a new section that provides former domestic 
partners with an avenue “to prevent unjust enrichment upon the dissolution of the 
relationship.” Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 28(1) 
(2011). 
¶ 106 
 
Illinois is a clear outlier on this issue. See Principles, supra, § 6.03, Reporter’s 
Notes, cmt. b (“Although Hewitt is not entirely isolated [citation] its approach is 
distinctly a minority view, and has been explicitly rejected by many courts ***.”). 
Hewitt must be overruled because it is outmoded and out of touch with 
contemporary experience and opinions on cohabitation. 
 
 
- 35 - 
 
¶ 107 
 
Additionally, Hewitt must be overruled because the legal landscape that formed 
the background for our decision has changed significantly. The Hewitt court was 
puzzled by the impact that recognizing claims arising from the relationships of 
unmarried cohabitants would have on society. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 58. Specifically, 
the court queried, “[W]hat of the children born of such relationships? What are 
their support and inheritance rights and by what standards are custody questions 
resolved? What of the sociological and psychological effects upon them of that 
type of environment?” Id. That court was the same one that decided Jarrett v. 
Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d 337, 345 (1979), which affirmed a trial court ruling transferring 
custody of three children to their father because their mother was cohabiting with 
another man. Four years later in In re Marriage of Thompson, 96 Ill. 2d 67, 78 
(1983), the court changed course and held that, in Illinois, there is no “conclusive 
presumption that, because a custodial parent cohabits with a member of the 
opposite sex, the child is harmed.” See also In re Marriage of R.S., 286 Ill. App. 3d 
1046, 1055 (1996) (“the clear import of the Thompson opinion is that Illinois courts 
should not adopt absolute rules that require a change in custody based on conduct 
of the custodial parent that does not impact the children”). Unmarried couples may 
now adopt children. See 750 ILCS 50/2 (West 2010). 
¶ 108 
 
As for support and inheritance, the Probate Act of 1975 was amended in 1978 to 
extend intestate inheritance rights to children of unmarried parents. See Pub. Act 
80-1429 (eff. Sept. 12, 1978) (codified at 755 ILCS 5/2-2 (West 2010)). Similarly, 
the Illinois Pension Code was amended in 1985 to extend survivor benefits to such 
children. See Pub. Act 84-1028 (eff. Nov. 18, 1995) (codified at 40 ILCS 5/1-104.2 
(West 2010)). And the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, which also went into effect in 
1985, specifically provided that “[t]he parent and child relationship, including 
support obligations, extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless 
of the marital status of the parents.” Pub. Act 83-1372 (eff. July 1, 1985) (codified 
at 750 ILCS 45/3 (West 2010)). That statute has since been repealed and replaced 
by the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015. 750 ILCS 46 et seq. (West Supp. 2015). 
¶ 109 
 
To bolster its holding, Hewitt relied upon Illinois’s rejection of so-called 
no-fault divorce. See Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 63 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, 
¶ 401). The court took the legislature’s decision to retain fault grounds for divorce 
as a “significantly stronger promarriage policy” that reaffirmed “the traditional 
doctrine that marriage is a civil contract between three parties[: ]the husband, the 
wife[,] and the State” and prevented “the marriage relation from becoming in effect 
a private contract terminable at will.” Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 63-64.  
 
 
- 36 - 
 
¶ 110 
 
The Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act was amended in 1984, and since 
then Illinois has had no-fault divorce. See 750 ILCS 5/401(a)(2) (West 2010); see 
also Karbin v. Karbin, 2012 IL 112815, ¶ 39 (stating that the no-fault divorce 
provisions of the Act signaled a shift in policy that “reflected a dissatisfaction with 
the traditional requirements of proving fault to obtain a divorce” and “allowed 
people to part with dignity” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And the Illinois 
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act was enacted in 1990. See 750 ILCS 10/1 et seq. 
(West 2010); see also In re Marriage of Barnes, 324 Ill. App. 3d 514, 517 (2001) 
(indicating that, historically, premarital agreements that limited spousal 
maintenance or distributed property upon divorce were invalidated on public policy 
grounds because they were said to be conducive to divorce, but it is now “clear that 
there is no longer any general public policy opposed to agreements contemplating 
divorce”). Those statutes answer the Hewitt court’s concern about “the marriage 
relation *** becoming in effect a private contract terminable at will.” Hewitt, 77 Ill. 
2d at 64.  
¶ 111 
 
Notably, Hewitt’s paternalistic reference to only opposite-gender marriages has 
been superseded by the Religious Freedom and Marriage Fairness Act (Pub. Act 
98-597 (eff. June 1, 2014) (adding, inter alia, 750 ILCS 80/5 (West Supp. 2013))), 
which provides “same-sex and different-sex couples and their children equal access 
to the status, benefits, protections, rights, and responsibilities of civil marriage.” 
The legislature, in an earlier statute, extended the rights and burdens of marriage to 
domestic partners who enter civil unions (see 750 ILCS 75/1 et seq. (West 2010)), 
and many public and private employers provide benefits to domestic partners who 
cohabit.  
¶ 112 
 
The majority, however, refuses to give these statutory amendments much 
weight. According to the majority, “[t]hese post-Hewitt amendments demonstrate 
that the legislature knows how to alter family-related statutes and does not hesitate 
to do so when and if it believes public policy so requires.” Supra ¶ 76. The 
implication is that, in light of the many statutory changes since Hewitt, the 
legislature’s silence on the rights of cohabitants somehow indicates its rejection of 
claims like those brought by Brewer. I interpret that silence differently. Simply 
because the legislature has taken some action in the domestic relations arena does 
not mean that this court cannot act as well. See In re Parentage of M.J., 203 Ill. 2d 
526, 540 (2003). The legislature is undoubtedly well equipped to declare public 
policy on domestic relations. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 61, 66; supra ¶ 77. Courts, 
however, are better equipped than the legislature to help parties divide joint assets 
 
 
- 37 - 
 
using familiar legal and equitable rules. See Watts, 405 N.W.2d at 311 (“Courts 
have traditionally developed principles of contract and property law through the 
case-by-case method of the common law. While ultimately the legislature may 
resolve the problems raised by unmarried cohabiting parties, we are not persuaded 
that the court should refrain from resolving such disputes until the legislature gives 
us direction.”).  
¶ 113 
 
For more than a century and a half, Illinois courts have adjudicated property 
disputes between family members. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 16 Ill. 296, 298-99 
(1855); Collar v. Patterson, 137 Ill. 403, 407 (1891); Heffron v. Brown, 155 Ill. 
322, 326 (1895); Finch v. Green, 225 Ill. 304, 312 (1907); Legate v. Legate, 249 Ill. 
359, 364 (1911). Generally, courts have held that, when people live together in a 
family setting, contributions between them are presumed gratuitous and not 
compensable absent an express or implied contract. See In re Estate of Milborn, 
122 Ill. App. 3d 688, 692 (1984) (“The rule rests on the idea of mutual dependence 
between those who are members of one immediate family ***.” (Emphasis 
omitted.)). Thus, seen in the light of established Illinois law, claims like Brewer’s 
claim are nothing new.  
¶ 114 
 
More importantly, claims like Brewer’s claim do not implicate the Marriage 
and Dissolution of Marriage Act and, thus, do not undermine the public policy of 
Illinois, as expressed in the prohibition of common-law marriage, that individuals 
themselves cannot create marriage-like benefits. See supra ¶ 61. Although the 
parties had what the majority terms a “marriage-like relationship” (supra ¶ 1), 
Brewer does not seek “marriage-like benefits” (supra ¶ 61) or “marriage-like 
rights” (supra ¶ 77) in count III. She simply asks to bring the same common-law 
claims available to other people. She should be allowed to do so. The fact that 
Brewer and Blumenthal were once domestic partners should be no impediment. 
See Mason, 476 A.2d at 666 (“the position that the courts will not participate in 
resolving the disputes in accordance with general principles of law and, thus, will 
leave the parties to their own devices, to be unrealistic and unresponsive to social 
need”); Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263, 1268-69 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) 
(“cohabitation and sexual relations alone do not suspend contract and equity 
principles”). Admittedly, such claims may be difficult to plead and prove (see 
Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal 
Regulation, 42 Fam. L.Q. 309, 321 (2008)), but that is a matter for the trial court. 
 
 
- 38 - 
 
¶ 115 
 
Hewitt’s flaws, both linguistic and legal, have become more apparent with time. 
Our holding there is a court-made rule that this court should overrule. I believe that 
count III of Brewer’s amended complaint should be remanded for the trial court to 
determine whether she has pleaded a cognizable cause of action. For these reasons, 
I dissent. 
¶ 116 
 
 
JUSTICE BURKE joins in this partial concurrence, partial dissent. 
 
DISSENT UPON DENIAL OF REHEARING 
 
¶ 117 
 
 
JUSTICE THEIS, dissenting upon denial of rehearing: 
¶ 118 
 
I continue to believe that the majority was wrong to reaffirm Hewitt v. Hewitt, 
77 Ill. 2d 49 (1979). That case should be overruled, and Brewer should be allowed 
to pursue her restitution claim for the reasons that I stated in my dissent. Supra ¶ 96 
(Theis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Burke, J.). Further, 
this court should grant rehearing because the majority mischaracterized Brewer’s 
restitution claim and ignored a key aspect of her constitutional challenge. 
¶ 119 
 
The majority opinion rejected that challenge, explaining that Hewitt 
“disallows unmarried cohabitants who live in a marriage-like relationship from 
accessing, under the guise of an implied contract, the rights and protections 
specified in the Marriage and Dissolution Act. In other words, individuals can 
enter into an intimate relationship, but the relationship itself cannot form the 
basis to bring common-law claims.” Supra ¶ 85. 
According to the majority, “Hewitt did nothing more than effectuate the policy 
established by the legislature to prevent knowingly unmarried cohabitants from 
evading the statutory abolition of common-law marriage *** by employing 
theories of implied contract to achieve the same result that would occur if 
common-law marriage were recognized.” Supra ¶ 87. The majority then concluded 
that because “marriage is a legal relationship that all individuals may or may not 
enter into, Illinois does not act irrationally or discriminatorily in refusing to grant 
benefits and protections under the Marriage and Dissolution Act to those who do 
not participate in the institution of marriage.” Supra ¶ 87.  
 
 
- 39 - 
 
¶ 120 
 
That conclusion is suspect for two reasons. First, the majority mischaracterized 
Brewer’s restitution claim. The majority intimated that Brewer makes a claim 
under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. She does not. As I 
stated in my dissent,  
“[C]laims like Brewer’s claim do not implicate the Marriage and Dissolution of 
Marriage Act and, thus, do not undermine the public policy of Illinois, as 
expressed in the prohibition of common-law marriage, that individuals 
themselves cannot create marriage-like benefits. See supra ¶ 61. Although the 
parties had what the majority terms a ‘marriage-like relationship’ (supra ¶ 1), 
Brewer does not seek ‘marriage-like benefits’ (supra ¶ 61) or ‘marriage-like 
rights’ (supra ¶ 77) in count III. She simply asks to bring the same common-law 
claims available to other people.” Supra ¶ 114. 
Brewer has not employed an implied contract theory to achieve the same result that 
she would obtain under section 503 of the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage 
Act (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 2014)). She has employed an equitable theory to 
achieve a just result. Claims like Brewer’s claim have long been recognized in 
Illinois. Supra ¶ 113 (Theis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by 
Burke, J.). 
¶ 121 
 
Second, the majority ignored the key aspect of Brewer’s constitutional 
challenge. In her response brief, Brewer asserted that applying Hewitt to bar her 
restitution claim would violate due process and equal protection because our 
holding in that case effectively penalizes unmarried domestic partners who 
cohabitate for exercising their right to an intimate relationship, as recognized by the 
United States Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
Consequently, Hewitt’s holding is not rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental interest. Brewer added that it would be “particularly irrational” to 
expand Hewitt from its fact context of opposite-sex domestic partners who could 
have married, but chose not to do so, to the fact context here of same-sex domestic 
partners who could not have married. According to Brewer, she and Blumenthal 
“did not choose not to marry; they were barred from it” by a law, like those 
declared unconstitutional in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015), that has since been repealed and replaced. 
¶ 122 
 
The majority overlooked that point, relying on a false version of history in 
which all Illinoisans could marry as the justification for its application of Hewitt. 
 
 
- 40 - 
 
Of course, it is not irrational or discriminatory to deny the protections of the Act’s 
dissolution provisions to persons who never used its marriage provisions. A 
question remains whether it is irrational and discriminatory to deny the protections 
of the common law to persons who never could have used the marriage provisions 
because of their sexual orientation. 
¶ 123 
 
The majority assumed that all domestic partners who cohabitate are the same. 
They are not. Some domestic partners have always enjoyed the right to marry, and 
consequently have always had the option of exercising that right and resorting to 
the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act in the event of divorce. Others have 
not always enjoyed that right and have not always been able to resort to the Act. 
Until Illinois extended the Act to domestic partners who enter civil unions in 2010, 
all domestic partners who cohabitated without marrying did so knowingly, but not 
all of them did so willingly. During the entire 26 years that Brewer and Blumenthal 
were together, marriage was not a legal relationship for them. 
¶ 124 
 
In her rehearing petition, Brewer contends that the majority’s adherence to 
Hewitt repeated and compounded unconstitutional discrimination against same-sex 
domestic partners by barring Brewer’s restitution claim simply because she did not 
do what the law prevented her from doing. According to Brewer, “it is irrational to 
prevent same-sex couples from marrying and, at the same time, exclude them from 
common law property protections on the ground that, if they wished to have any 
property protections, they should have married.” Brewer asserts that application of 
Hewitt to same-sex domestic partners who separated before they could legally 
marry creates “an untenable double bind” because it “conditions an important 
right—the ability to seek an equitable division of property when a relationship 
ends—on marriage, and then applies that restriction even to couples [who] were 
legally barred from marriage during the entire duration of their relationship, and 
even though that legal prohibition has now been ruled unconstitutional by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.” 
¶ 125 
 
That double bind and its accompanying constitutional issues are a result of the 
majority’s flawed reasoning. The majority stated that Hewitt “did no more than 
follow the statutory provision abolishing common-law marriage, which embodied 
the public policy of Illinois that individuals acting privately by themselves, without 
the involvement of the State, cannot create marriage-like benefits.” Supra ¶ 61. 
Again, Brewer does not seek marriage-like benefits. It defies logic, however, to 
insist that Brewer could not create marriage-like benefits without state involvement 
 
 
- 41 - 
 
when she could not have created a marriage with state involvement. Indeed, the 
state refused to be involved because Illinois did not allow same-sex marriage while 
she and Blumenthal were together. The parties’ relationship may have been 
identical in every essential way to that of a married couple (supra ¶ 63), but those 
similarities did not create a legal marriage. 
¶ 126 
 
The problems created by the majority opinion could be easily solved by 
discarding Hewitt as an outmoded and unfair rule for all domestic partners. Short of 
that, rehearing should be allowed to consider not the majority’s version of Brewer’s 
constitutional challenge, but her actual argument that Hewitt’s rule, as applied to 
same-sex domestic partners like herself and Blumenthal, whose relationships ended 
before they were permitted to marry in Illinois, violates due process and equal 
protection. I dissent from the denial of rehearing.  
¶ 127 
 
JUSTICE BURKE joins in this dissent upon denial of rehearing.