Title: Cappaert v. Junker
Citation: 413 So. 2d 378
Docket Number: 53352
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 1982

413 So. 2d 378 (1982) F.L. CAPPAERT v. DeEtte JUNKER. No. 53352. Supreme Court of Mississippi. April 21, 1982. Rehearing Denied May 19, 1982. Ramsey, Bodron, Robinson, Andrews &amp; Yoste, H.M. Yoste, Jr., Vicksburg, for appellant. Teller, Chaney &amp; Rector, Landman Teller, Jr., Vicksburg, for appellee. Before SUGG, P.J., and BROOM and BOWLING, JJ. SUGG, Presiding Justice, for the Court: The narrow question in this case is whether an exculpatory provision in a residential *379 lease is void as being against public policy. The lessor sought to immunize himself against damages caused by his negligence in maintaining a common area on the leased premises. Appellee leased an apartment from appellant in the Pecan Ridge Apartment complex which, at the time of the trial consisted of six completed buildings with each building containing twelve apartments. Appellee's apartment was upstairs and she and the tenants in two other apartments used a common stairway for access to their apartments. Appellee slipped, fell on the stairway, was injured, and sued appellant for negligently maintaining the stairway. Appellee recovered a judgment against appellant for $20,000. Appellee's lease contained the following exculpatory provisions: Appellant attempted to introduce the lease containing the exculpatory provisions in evidence, but the trial judge refused to admit it into evidence holding that exculpatory provisions in residential leases are void as against public policy. Leases are considered as a conveyance of the property for a specified period of time. Hurst v. English, 357 So. 2d 132 (Miss. 1978); Standard Fruit &amp; Steamship Co. v. Putnam, 290 So. 2d 612 (Miss. 1974); Rich v. Swalm, 161 Miss. 505, 137 So. 325 (1931); Crowell v. N.O. and N.E.R.R. Co., 61 Miss. 631 (1884). Since a lease is considered as a conveyance of an interest in land, the common law doctrine of caveat emptor applies between the lessor and the lessee. In Jones v. Millsaps, 71 Miss. 10, 14 So. 440 (1893) this Court recognized the common law rule and concluded there was no implied covenant of fitness in a commercial lease in the following language: The rule has been applied consistently to commercial leases and has been extended to residential leases. Loflin v. Thornton, 394 So. 2d 905 (Miss. 1981); Kassis v. Perronne, 209 So. 2d 444 (Miss. 1968); Turnipseed v. McGee, 236 Miss. 159, 109 So. 2d 551 (1959). However, a significant exception with regard to common areas or approaches under the control of the lessor has been recognized in our cases. In Hiller v. Wiley, 192 Miss. 488, 6 So. 2d 317 (1942) the exception was first stated in the following language: Accord: Turnipseed v. McGee, 236 Miss. 159, 109 So. 2d 551 (1959). The following is firmly established by the above cases. A lessee takes lease premises as he finds them with no implied covenant of fitness. Lessor is not obligated to make repairs to leased premises. In leases involving residential property leased to multiple tenants, the lessor, with respect to common areas, has the duty to use reasonable care to keep the common areas reasonably safe and is liable for damages for failure to perform the duty. In determining whether contracts should be invalidated on the ground that they violate public policy, we have held that this should not be done unless the contract is prohibited by the Constitution, a statute, or condemned by some decision of the courts construing the subject matter. This was expressed in State ex rel Knox v. Hines Lbr. Co., 150 Miss. 1, 115 So. 598 (1928) in the following language: In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Harris, 108 Miss. 574, 67 So. 54 (1914) this Court held a contract between a railroad company and its employees void because it violated public policy. The railroad company required its employees to sign a contract which released the company from every conceivable act of negligence of any other employee of the company before one could secure employment with the company. In declaring the contract void the Court stated: Furthermore, we held in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Bassett, 111 Miss. 468, 71 So. 750 (1916), that exculpatory provisions in common carrier contracts are void as against public policy. The narrow question pertaining to the exculpatory provision in the lease contract in this case is one of first impression in Mississippi. In a recent annotation, Validity of Exculpatory Clause in Lease Exempting Lessor From Liability, 49 A.L.R.3rd 321 (1972) exculpatory clauses have been upheld in many states on the theory that freedom to contract is the dominant public policy, and since the contracts relate to the private business of the parties, they are not a matter of public concern. However, at least four states by statute,[1] seven states and the District of Columbia[2] by judicial decision, have declared exculpatory clauses void as against public policy under the facts developed in those cases. The rationale of the jurisdictions which have held exculpatory clauses in residential leases void as against public policy is perhaps best expressed in McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wash. 2d 443, 486 P.2d 1093 (1971). The Court stated: In this case appellant had the duty to maintain the common area in a reasonably safe condition and his duty had been imposed on appellant and other lessors in the cases of Hiller and Turnipseed. In some of the cases from other jurisdictions upholding the validity of exculpatory clauses, the clauses did not deal with any common law or statutory duty of the lessor to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. However, this case involves a positive duty on the part of the appellant as lessor to maintain the common area in a reasonably safe condition. We therefore hold that the exculpatory clause, insofar as it seeks to immunize appellant against damages caused by his negligence in maintaining the common area on the leased premises, namely, the stairway in question, is void as against public policy. We express no opinion as to the validity of the exculpatory provisions as they pertain to the apartment leased by appellee, because the question of the validity of the exculpatory provisions pertaining to the apartment is not before the Court. Although not cited in any of the briefs, we note our recent case of Smith v. Smith, 375 So. 2d 1041 (Miss. 1979), in which we held that the exculpatory clause in that lease was not void as against public policy. In that case appellant was the assignee of the original lessee in a commercial lease contract covering a building in a shopping center. Appellant sued appellee, the lessor, for damages to merchandise and fixtures and for cost of removal from the premises on order of the appellees before the end of the contract term. The order to move resulted from appellant's persistent requests that the roof be repaired. Appellant alleged that the damages were caused by a leak in the roof which was not repaired by the appellee after notice was given. There was no common law duty on the part of the appellee to maintain the roof. In holding the exculpatory provision in the lease valid, we noted that it represented a division of the risk involved, fully understandable because the landlord reserved no control over the type and value of the inventory of the tenant. The present case is entirely different from Smith because, in the present case the lessor was under a duty to maintain the common area. In Smith the lessor was not under any common law duty to maintain the roof, so the exculpatory clause did not deal with any common law or statutory duty of the lessor. We therefore distinguish Smith from the case under consideration, and affirm. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER, P.J., and BROOM, ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING, HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE and DARDEN, JJ., concur. [1] Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts and New York. [2] Tenants' Council of Tiber Island-Carrollsburg Square v. DeFranceaux, 305 F. Supp. 560 (D.C. 1969); Kinkaid v. Avis Rent-a-Car Systems, 281 So. 2d 223 (Fla.App. 1973); Old Town Development Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. App. 1976); Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d 377 (1941); Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, Inc., 33 N.J. Super. 575, 111 A.2d 425 (1955); Crowell v. Housing Authority of the City of Dallas, 495 S.W.2d 887 (Texas 1973); McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wash. 2d 443, 486 P.2d 1093 (1971); College Mobile Home Park and Sales, Inc. v. Hoffmann, 72 Wis.2d 514, 241 N.W.2d 174 (1976).