Title: In re A.M.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 380A20
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: April 23, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-42 
No. 380A20 
Filed 23 April 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: A.M. and E.M. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 15 May 
2020 by Judge V.A. Davidian III in District Court, Wake County. This matter was 
calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 19 March 2021, but determined on 
the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North 
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Mary Boyce Wells, Senior County Attorney, for petitioner-appellee Wake County 
Human Services. 
 
Coats+Bennett, PLLC, by Gavin B. Parsons, for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Dorothy Hairston Mitchell for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
MORGAN, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent-mother appeals the order terminating her parental rights to her 
minor children “Adam,” born in October 2011, and “Efia,” born in March 2014.1 
Because clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supported at least one ground for the 
termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights, and because it was not an abuse 
of discretion for the trial court to determine that termination of respondent-mother’s 
                                            
1 We use pseudonyms to protect the identities of the minor children and for ease of 
reading. 
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
parental rights was in the best interests of the children, we affirm the trial court’s 
order. 
I. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
¶ 2 
 
Respondent-mother, the father, and their son Adam have been involved with 
Wake County Human Services (WCHS) since 2012. In 2013 and 2014, WCHS received 
reports which detailed the parents’ instances of substance abuse, as well as 
respondent-mother’s physical confrontations with the childcare providers for Adam 
and Efia. When Efia was born in 2014, both she and respondent-mother tested 
positive for marijuana. In April 2015, WCHS received a report that the parents were 
homeless and that the children’s maternal grandparents, who themselves had been 
the subject of several prior child protective services (CPS) reports regarding the care 
of Efia, were allowing Adam and Efia to reside with them. The parties agreed that 
the children would continue to reside with the maternal grandparents pursuant to a 
safety assessment, and WCHS closed the case in May 2015 with services 
recommended. 
¶ 3 
 
In March 2016, WCHS received a report indicating that respondent-mother 
was arrested and charged with assault after she “drunkenly confronted the father 
with a knife while pushing [Efia] in a stroller.” Respondent-mother had failed to 
comply with a medication regimen prescribed for her depression and had expressed 
thoughts of suicidal ideation. WCHS initiated in-home services for the family and 
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
requested that respondent-mother comply with a substance abuse assessment. While 
respondent-mother initially engaged in residential substance abuse treatment with 
the children, she was discharged from the program for noncompliance in September 
2016. Following the discharge, a maternal relative came forward to provide support 
for the juveniles, and WCHS closed its case in November 2016.  
¶ 4 
 
WCHS received a report on 20 April 2017 that respondent-mother and the 
maternal grandmother had physically assaulted each other in front of Adam and Efia, 
prompting respondent-mother and the children to move into a Salvation Army shelter 
with the assistance of CPS. Shortly thereafter, respondent-mother and the father 
participated in another affray which occurred in front of the children. This fracas 
resulted in respondent-mother’s arrest. While respondent-mother was incarcerated, 
the children resided with the father for a few days before returning to their maternal 
grandmother’s home. 
¶ 5 
 
Following respondent-mother’s release from incarceration, a social worker met 
with respondent-mother and the children at the home of the maternal grandmother. 
Respondent-mother was “visibly impaired and smelled of alcohol,” and “accused the 
[maternal] grandmother of substance abuse” before producing drug paraphernalia 
from the maternal grandmother’s cigarette pack. WCHS removed the juveniles from 
the home, as efforts to consult with the parents concerning a proper familial 
placement for the children were unsuccessful. WCHS filed juvenile petitions on 19 
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
June 2017 alleging that the children were neglected juveniles, and WCHS 
subsequently filed an amended juvenile petition regarding both children on 28 June 
2017. The trial court entered orders granting nonsecure custody of the children to 
WCHS on 19 June 2017 pursuant to the first juvenile petitions and authorizing 
WCHS to place the children in a licensed foster care home. 
¶ 6 
 
On 13 September 2017, respondent-mother and the father consented to an 
adjudication that the children were “neglected juveniles” as defined by N.C.G.S. § 7B-
101(15). In its consent order on adjudication and disposition which was issued on the 
same date as the adjudication, the trial court allowed WCHS to retain legal custody 
of the children and ordered respondent-mother to: (1) follow all recommendations of 
a substance abuse assessment; (2) refrain from the use of illegal or impairing 
substances and submit to random drug screens; (3) obtain and maintain housing 
sufficient for herself and her children that is free of transient household members 
and substance abuse, and provide proof of such housing; (4) obtain and maintain legal 
income sufficient to meet her needs and the needs of her children, and provide proof 
of such income to WCHS on at least a monthly basis; (5) engage in a domestic violence 
assessment through Interact and follow all recommendations; (6) complete a 
psychological evaluation and follow all recommendations; (7) follow the terms of her 
probation and refrain from further illegal activity; (8) comply with a visitation 
agreement during her visits with the children; and (9) maintain regular contact with 
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
the social worker at WCHS, notifying WCHS of any change in situation or 
circumstances within five business days. The trial court further ordered WCHS to 
continue to make reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for placement of the 
children outside of the home. 
¶ 7 
 
Following an April 2018 permanency planning hearing, the trial court entered 
a 24 May 2018 order in which it found that respondent-mother and the father had 
been incarcerated from February to mid-March 2018. The trial court acknowledged 
that respondent-mother was pregnant at the time of the hearing, and determined 
that after respondent-mother and the father’s respective releases from incarceration, 
the parents were residing together in a boarding house that was not appropriate for 
the children. Respondent-mother had been diagnosed with severe alcohol use disorder 
and severe cannabis use disorder in early remission, as well as post-traumatic stress 
disorder, anxiety, and depression. While respondent-mother denied using marijuana 
since her release from incarceration and upon learning that she was pregnant, the 
trial court noted that she had tested positive for marijuana twice in April 2018 and 
had admitted to consuming alcohol since her release from jail. The trial court 
established that “[n]either parent has consistently demonstrated a willingness to 
address the chronic substance abuse and domestic violence that has dominated their 
family for quite some time.” As for the children’s current placements, the trial court 
found that the placements were appropriate and were meeting the needs of the 
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
juveniles. The tribunal also found that the children had bonded with their caregivers, 
who were willing to provide long-term care for both children. The trial court concluded 
that a primary plan of adoption with a secondary plan of reunification would serve 
the children’s best interests. 
¶ 8 
 
On 3 July 2018, WCHS filed a motion to terminate the parental rights of 
respondent-mother and the father to the children, asserting, under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1), (2), and (3), the grounds of (1) neglect, (2) failure to show reasonable 
progress in correcting the conditions which initially led to the removal of the children 
from the home, and (3) willfully failing to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care 
for the children despite the ability to do so. 
¶ 9 
 
Following an April 2019 permanency planning hearing, the trial court entered 
a 2 May 2019 order in which it found that respondent-mother had acquired a 
residence which was structurally sufficient for a child. However, a GAL volunteer 
visiting the residence observed a person in the living room who was visibly impaired 
to the point of unconsciousness, and the GAL volunteer likewise noticed that the 
parents also appeared to be impaired. Nevertheless, the family exhibited a strong 
bond during visitations with the children, and the parents exhibited an ability to 
provide appropriate care for the juveniles for short periods of time in structured, 
supervised settings. The trial court changed the primary plan for the children from 
adoption to guardianship with the secondary plan remaining reunification. 
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 10 
 
In a 19 September 2019 order which was entered following a July 2019 
permanency planning hearing, the trial court found that respondent-mother 
maintained adequate housing, did not receive consistent income, attended weekly 
therapy sessions and met with a psychiatrist to receive treatment for her mental 
health issues, and missed three random drug screens in March and May 2019. On 14 
April 2019, law enforcement officers responded twice to reports of domestic violence 
at respondent-mother’s residence, which resulted in law enforcement officers 
removing the father from the home. The trial court also found that “any progress 
made by either parent [wa]s generally short-lived. Neither parent ha[d] made 
adequate progress in a reasonable period of time to alleviate the conditions that led 
to the children’s initial removal from the home.” The trial court further found that 
Adam was doing well in his placement, that Efia was receiving services appropriate 
for her needs, and that each child’s respective caregiver intended to adopt when 
possible. The trial court changed the primary plan for the children from guardianship 
back to adoption with the secondary plan remaining reunification. 
¶ 11 
 
On 9 January and 4 February 2020, the trial court conducted a hearing on 
WCHS’s motion to terminate respondent-mother’s and the father’s parental rights to 
the children. In an order entered 15 May 2020, the trial court found the existence of 
grounds to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1), (2), and (3), and further concluded that it was in the children’s best 
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
interests to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a) (2019).2 Accordingly, the trial court granted WCHS’s motion to terminate 
respondent-mother’s parental rights to the juveniles in the 15 May 2020 order, from 
which respondent-mother appeals to this Court. 
¶ 12 
 
On appeal, respondent-mother challenges each of the three grounds which 
were found to exist by the trial court as a basis upon which to terminate her parental 
rights. Respondent-mother likewise opposes the trial court’s conclusion that 
termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. 
II. 
Legal Standard 
¶ 13 
 
The North Carolina General Statutes set forth a two-step process for the 
termination of parental rights. After the filing of a petition for the termination of 
parental rights, a trial court conducts a hearing to adjudicate the existence or 
nonexistence of any grounds alleged in the petition as set forth under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e) (2019). Then, following an adjudication that at least one 
ground exists to terminate the parental rights of a respondent-parent, the trial court 
will determine whether terminating the parental rights of the respondent-parent is 
in the child’s best interests. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). 
¶ 14 
 
We review a trial court’s adjudication that a ground exists to terminate 
                                            
2 The father relinquished his parental rights to the children and is not a party to this 
appeal. 
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 “to determine whether the findings are 
supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the 
conclusions of law.” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 392 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery, 
311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984)). “Unchallenged findings of fact ‘are deemed supported by 
competent evidence and are binding on appeal.’ ” In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811, 814 (2020) 
(quoting In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407 (2019)). “[A]n adjudication of any single 
ground for terminating a parent’s rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) will suffice to 
support a termination order.” Id. at 815 (first citing In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 380 
(2019); then citing In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404 (1982)).  
¶ 15 
 
In the present case, the trial court concluded that clear, cogent, and convincing 
evidence established the existence of all three alleged grounds to terminate 
respondent-mother’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(3). 
¶ 16 
 
Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), a trial court may terminate parental 
rights upon a finding that “[t]he parent has willfully left the [child] in foster care or 
placement outside the home for more than 12 months without showing to the 
satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been 
made in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the [child].” N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(2) (2019). “Only reasonable progress in correcting the conditions must 
be shown.” In re J.S., 374 N.C. at 819 (quoting In re L.C.R., 226 N.C. App. 249, 252 
(2013)). “[T]he nature and extent of the parent’s reasonable progress . . . is evaluated 
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
for the duration leading up to the hearing on the motion or petition to terminate 
parental rights.” Id. at 815 (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re A.C.F., 176 N.C. App. 
520, 528 (2006)); see also In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715 (1984) (“The determinative 
factors must be the best interests of the child and the fitness of the parent to care for 
the child at the time of the termination proceeding.”).  
¶ 17 
 
A factor consistently recognized as relevant in the determination of whether 
grounds exist for the termination of parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2) is whether a parent has complied with a judicially adopted case plan. See 
In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. at 384. Generally speaking, we have held that “a trial judge 
should refrain from finding that a parent has failed to make reasonable progress . . . 
in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile simply because 
of his or her failure to fully satisfy all elements of the case plan goals.” In re S.M., 375 
N.C. 673, 685 (2020) (extraneity omitted) (quoting In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. at 385). 
However, a respondent-parent’s “ ‘extremely limited progress’ in correcting the 
conditions leading to removal” of the children from their care in the first place, 
especially when the remedy for such conditions is memorialized in the respondent-
parent’s case plan, will support a trial court’s ultimate determination that grounds 
exist to terminate that parent’s rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). In re A.B.C., 
374 N.C. 752, 760 (2020) (quoting In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. at 385).  
¶ 18 
 
“If [the trial court] determines that one or more grounds listed in section 7B-
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
1111 are present, the court proceeds to the dispositional stage, at which the court 
must consider whether it is in the best interests of the juvenile to terminate parental 
rights.” In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 194 (2019) (extraneity omitted) (quoting In re 
D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 842 (2016)). We review the trial court’s assessment of a child’s 
best interests for abuse of discretion. In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 199. A trial court’s 
determination will remain undisturbed under an abuse of discretion standard so long 
as that determination is not “manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that 
it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 6–
7 (2019) (quoting In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 107 (2015)). 
III. 
Adjudication 
¶ 19 
 
Respondent-mother does not challenge any of the findings of fact made by the 
trial court in its determination that grounds existed for the termination of 
respondent-mother’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). On the 
other hand, respondent-mother argues that although she “did not correct all the 
conditions that led to the children’s removal, she . . . made ‘reasonable progress under 
the circumstances.’ ” We disagree with respondent-mother’s depiction of her 
compliance with her case plan.  
¶ 20 
 
In its unchallenged Findings of Fact 15–22, the trial court detailed the 
conditions which led to the children’s removal from the home; namely, “substance 
abuse, domestic violence and homelessness.” In its 13 September 2017 consent order, 
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
the trial court ordered respondent-mother to comply with a case plan referred to as 
the “Out of Home Family Services Agreement” to address the reasons for the 
children’s removal from her care. In unchallenged Finding of Fact 27, the trial court 
delineated the terms of the Agreement relating to the conditions which led to the 
removal of the juveniles from respondent-mother’s home:  
27. 
[In its 13 September 2017 consent order,] [t]he 
[court] ordered [respondent-]mother to comply with the 
following conditions: 
a. 
Follow all recommendations from a substance abuse 
assessment through [WCHS]. 
b. 
Refrain from using illegal or impairing substances 
and submit to random drug screens. 
c. 
Obtain and maintain housing sufficient for herself 
and the children free of transient household members and 
substance use. 
. . . . 
e.  
Complete a domestic violence assessment through 
Interact and follow recommendations. 
A review of the record convinces us of the nexus between the court-ordered conditions 
and the bases for the children’s removal. See In re E.B., 375 N.C. 310, 323–24 (2020) 
(“There must be a nexus between the components of the court-approved case plan 
with which respondent failed to comply and the conditions which led to the juvenile’s 
removal from the parental home.” (extraneity omitted) (quoting In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 
at 385)).  
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 21 
 
The trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact also describe respondent-
mother’s failures to comply with the conditions set forth in the 13 September 2017 
consent order during the almost twenty-eight-month period between entry of the 
order and the 9 January 2020 hearing on WCHS’s motion to terminate respondent-
mother’s parental rights:  
30. 
. . . . [Respondent-]mother twice tested positive for 
marijuana in April [2018] while pregnant [with a third 
child] and admitted that she continued to drink alcohol. 
. . . . 
32. 
Throughout 2018, [respondent-]mother did not 
consistently comply with random drug screens or provide 
information to WCHS to verify her treatment progress or 
participation in . . . domestic violence education. . . .  
. . . . 
35. 
[Respondent-]mother moved into an apartment . . . 
in March 2019. . . . [But] during a home visit in 2019, the 
GAL volunteer observed a person in the home that was 
visibly impaired to the point of unconsciousness while 
[respondent-]mother . . . w[as] present. 
36. 
. . . . [Respondent-]mother continued to attend 
therapy sessions, but consistently refused to comply with 
random drug screens. 
37. 
On April 14, 2019, Raleigh police responded to two 
domestic violence calls at [respondent-]mother’s home. . . .  
38. 
On August 5, 2019, [respondent-]mother was 
involved in a physical altercation with the children’s 
maternal grandmother . . . . 
39. 
On September 14, 2019, Raleigh police again 
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
responded to a report of domestic violence at [respondent-
]mother’s residence . . . . Tellingly, [respondent-]mother 
was openly drinking alcohol while talking to the police. 
When asked about the alcohol by the police officer, 
[respondent-]mother simply explained that she could hold 
her liquor. 
. . . . 
42. 
On September 19, 2019, [respondent-]mother 
completed another substance abuse assessment. During 
the interview with the assessor, [respondent-]mother 
insisted that she had not used drugs or alcohol for three 
years despite testing positive for marijuana the month 
prior. [Respondent-]mother had refused to comply with any 
additional drug screens. . . .  
42.[3]  On December 11, 2019, Raleigh police once again 
responded 
to 
[respondent-]mother’s 
home 
after 
[respondent-]mother reported that she had been physically 
assaulted 
by 
her 
houseguest. 
[Respondent-]mother 
knowingly allowed a male gang member to stay in her 
home for a few days. After drinking some amount of 
alcohol, she confronted the guy and demanded that he 
leave the home.  [Respondent-]mother stated that the man 
became upset when she asked him to leave and jumped on 
top of her while holding a knife to her cheek. She hit him 
in the head with a glass bottle and was able to call 911. The 
houseguest, on the other hand, told police that 
[respondent-]mother pulled a knife on him and bit him in 
the face. 
. . . . 
44. 
[Respondent-]mother 
has 
not 
complied 
with 
domestic violence counseling or educational programs . . . 
as previously ordered by the [c]ourt. Additionally, there is 
no evidence before the [c]ourt that [respondent-]mother 
                                            
3 The trial court’s order reflects two findings of fact numbered 42. 
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
has completed substance abuse treatment . . . . 
¶ 22 
 
While the trial court recognized that respondent-mother was able to acquire a 
structurally safe and appropriate residence, the trial court simultaneously found that 
the father—who was a frequent focus of the domestic violence issues within the 
family—“spent a significant amount of time in the home” and that both parents 
continued to “exhibit concerning judgment and behaviors” within that environment, 
as evidenced by the aforementioned GAL volunteer who discovered an unidentified, 
unconscious, and impaired person in respondent-mother’s apartment. Further, law 
enforcement officers responded to respondent-mother’s apartment on three occasions 
for domestic violence incidents involving the father after respondent-mother’s 
acquisition of the structurally appropriate housing. Just one month prior to the 
termination hearing, respondent-mother allowed a male gang member to reside with 
her, precipitating yet another domestic violence incident when respondent-mother 
became intoxicated and asked the male to leave. 
¶ 23 
 
Although respondent-mother testified that she had participated in substance 
abuse support groups and had abstained from marijuana use for at least a year, the 
trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact detail respondent-mother’s multiple 
positive tests for marijuana, her consistent refusal to comply with drug screens, her 
failure to complete substance abuse treatment and domestic violence counseling 
programs, and repeated acts of domestic violence involving her which incorporated 
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
the consumption of alcohol.  
¶ 24 
 
Despite respondent-mother’s contention on appeal that “it is clear that [she] 
made reasonable progress in correcting the conditions that led to the children’s 
removal,” the recounted findings of fact of the trial court support the conclusion that, 
even crediting respondent-mother’s inconsistent engagement with a few court-
ordered resources, she failed to make reasonable progress toward correcting the 
substance abuse and domestic violence issues which led to the removal of the children 
from her care. See In re J.S., 374 N.C. at 815 (“A respondent’s prolonged inability to 
improve her situation, despite some efforts in that direction, will support a finding of 
lack of progress sufficient to warrant termination of parental rights under section 7B-
1111(a)(2).” (extraneity omitted) (quoting In re J.W., 173 N.C. App. 450, 465–66 
(2005), aff’d per curiam, 360 N.C. 361 (2006))); In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 88, 99 (2020) 
(upholding a termination of parental rights based on N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) when 
“viewing the evidence as a whole, it appear[ed] that the trial court correctly concluded 
that respondent-father’s three-month period of sobriety was outweighed by his 
continuous pattern of relapse” over a twenty-two-month period). Therefore, the trial 
court’s adjudication that the ground exists, as embodied in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), 
that respondent-mother has willfully left her children in foster care or placement 
outside the home for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the 
court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting 
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
those conditions which led to the removal of the juveniles is supported by clear, 
cogent, and convincing evidence. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s determination 
as to the existence of at least one ground upon which to terminate respondent-
mother’s parental rights. 
¶ 25 
 
“In light of our conclusion that the trial court properly adjudicated a ground 
for terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), 
we deem it unnecessary to address respondent-mother’s contentions” regarding the 
grounds of neglect and failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (3), respectively. In re S.M., 375 N.C. at 687 (citing In 
re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 194). 
IV. 
Disposition 
¶ 26 
 
Respondent-mother also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that 
termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. In her sole 
argument before this Court concerning the best interests determination, respondent-
mother contends that the trial court “completely disregarded the strong bond between 
[her] and the children in favor of the alleged bond between the children and their 
foster parents.” In support of this contention, respondent-mother directs our 
attention to portions of the trial court’s Findings of Fact 53 and 55 which state that 
“the children are bonded with their mother” and “love their mother,” along with 
several examples in the record which acknowledge the positive reactions of the 
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
children upon their reunions with respondent-mother during visitation sessions. 
¶ 27 
 
If a trial court adjudicates the existence of one or more grounds for terminating 
parental rights, it then progresses to the dispositional phase of the proceedings where 
it “shall determine whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best 
interest[s]” and shall consider the following criteria: 
(1) The age of the juvenile. 
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile. 
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in 
the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile. 
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent. 
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and 
the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other 
permanent placement. 
(6) Any relevant consideration. 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). The trial court shall then make written findings of fact as to 
those criteria which are relevant to its determination. In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. at 99. 
We review a trial court’s assessment of a child’s best interests for abuse of discretion. 
See In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 199. “[A]buse of discretion results where the court’s 
ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have 
been the result of a reasoned decision.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re 
T.L.H., 368 N.C. at 107). 
¶ 28 
 
In making its best interests determination, the trial court must consider all of 
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
the factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), even though it is not required to expressly make 
written findings as to each. See In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 199 (“It is clear that a district 
court must consider all of the factors in section 7B-1110(a). The statute does not, 
however, explicitly require written findings as to each factor.” (extraneity omitted) 
(quoting In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. at 10)).  
¶ 29 
 
At the conclusion of the termination of parental rights hearing on 4 February 
2020, the trial court acknowledged each of the six factors set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a) and reasoned that the matter would be resolved by its evaluation of the 
quality of the bond between the children and respondent-mother, and the quality of 
the bond between the children and the proposed adoptive parents. In its subsequent 
15 May 2020 order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights, the trial court 
made findings of fact which addressed individually the six factors enumerated in 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(1)–(6). Once again, respondent-mother fails to challenge the 
trial court’s findings of fact, which are therefore deemed to be supported by competent 
evidence and hence are binding on appeal. See In re J.S., 374 N.C. at 814. 
¶ 30 
 
While respondent-mother argues that the trial court disregarded the bond 
between herself and the children in favor of the bond between the children and their 
foster parents, “the bond between parent and child is just one of the factors to be 
considered under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), and the trial court is permitted to give 
greater weight to other factors.” In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. 432, 437 (2019); see also In re 
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
A.J.T., 374 N.C. 504, 512 (2020) (upholding a trial court’s decision to terminate the 
respondent-parent’s parental rights to a child despite the trial court’s finding that the 
child “is very bonded” with respondent-mother when “[i]t [wa]s clear . . . [the trial 
court] considered several factors in making the best interests determination”).  
¶ 31 
 
Here, in accordance with its requirement to consider the bond between the 
children and respondent-mother as a relevant factor in the determination of the 
juveniles’ best interests regarding the issue of the termination of respondent-mother’s 
parental rights, the trial court found that “[b]oth children acknowledge and love their 
mother, but both children have stated that they feel safe and secure in their current 
placements.” The trial court also found that, despite the existence of a bond between 
respondent-mother and the children, “[respondent-]mother does not provide healthy 
parental boundaries” as evidenced by threats of physical violence which were made 
by respondent-mother during her visitation sessions with the juveniles. Contrary to 
respondent-mother’s contention that the trial court “completely disregarded” this 
factor which is contained in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(4), it appears that the trial court 
weighed the evidence in the record which it considered to be relevant to the factor, 
recognized the bond between respondent-mother and the children through 
referencing the bond in its findings of fact, and ultimately assigned greater weight to 
other factors identified in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) in concluding that the termination 
of respondent-mother’s parental rights would serve the best interests of the children. 
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
This evaluation of the factors which are listed in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) has been 
recognized by this Court to properly be within the purview of the trial court. See In 
re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. at 437; In re A.J.T., 374 N.C. at 512.  
¶ 32 
 
Notably, the trial court addressed N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(1)–(2) by recognizing 
the age of each child and finding that there was “a high likelihood that both children 
w[ould] be adopted” because Adam and Efia were placed with a caregiver who 
“intend[ed] to adopt as soon as possible.” In conformance with N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a)(3), the trial court found that “[t]erminating the rights of [respondent-]mother 
w[ould] help accomplish the primary plan of adoption for these children and help 
achieve permanence . . . following years of uncertainty and instability.” As to the 
quality of the relationship between the children and their proposed adoptive parents 
which is the factor embodied in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(5), the trial court found that 
“[Efia] ha[d] developed a strong bond with her [caregiver] and the other children in 
the home and [wa]s considered a part of the family.” Adam was also seen as thriving 
in his placement, and despite being placed in separate homes, the children were able 
to spend significant time together due to the efforts of their respective families. As to 
other relevant considerations, the trial court found, in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a)(6), that between October 2019 and the termination of parental rights hearing 
on 9 January and 4 February 2020, respondent-mother missed several visits with the 
children without explanation. Within its fact-finding responsibility, the trial court 
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
determined that despite respondent-mother’s testimony that she would not use drugs 
or consume alcohol if the children were returned to her care, “her actions speak 
volumes louder than her words and the [trial court] finds that her pronouncements 
are not credible.” See In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843 (“The trial judge had the 
responsibility to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given 
their testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” (extraneity 
omitted) (quoting Knutton v. Cofield, 273 N.C. 355, 359 (1968))). Consequently, we 
are not inclined to view the trial court’s conclusion that the best interests of the 
juveniles were served by the termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights as 
an outcome which was arbitrary or manifestly unsupported by reason. See In re 
A.U.D., 373 N.C. at 6. In our analysis, the trial court appropriately exercised its 
discretion to weigh the statutory factors contained in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) in order 
to properly conclude that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the 
parental rights of respondent-mother. 
V. 
Conclusion 
¶ 33 
 
We are satisfied that the trial court’s determination that grounds existed to 
terminate the parental rights of respondent-mother under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) 
was supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Further, we are convinced 
that the trial court’s conclusion that the termination of the parental rights of 
respondent-mother was in the best interests of the children was neither arbitrary nor 
IN RE A.M. AND E.M. 
2021-NCSC-42 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
manifestly unsupported by reason. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s 15 May 2020 
order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights. 
AFFIRMED.