Title: Sharris v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12165
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 17, 2018

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SJC-12165 
 
STANLEY V. SHARRIS, JR.  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 7, 2017. - September 17, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Due Process of Law, Competency to stand trial.  Incompetent 
Person, Criminal charges.  Practice, Criminal, Indictment, 
Dismissal, Competency to stand trial, Defendant's 
competency.  Homicide. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on May 17, 2016. 
 
 
The case was considered by Hines, J. 
 
 
 
Paul R. Rudof, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
Heidi M. Ohrt-Gaskill, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Crystal L. Lyons, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
District Attorney for the Northern District, was present but did 
not argue. 
 
Kevin S. Prussia, Matthew C. Tymann, & Annaleigh E. Curtis, 
for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  General Laws c. 123, § 16 (f), provides for 
the dismissal of criminal charges when an individual is found 
2 
 
 
 
incompetent to stand trial.  The statute requires mandatory 
dismissal of charges at the time when the individual would have 
been eligible for parole if he or she had been convicted and had 
been sentenced to the maximum statutory sentence.  See id.  The 
statute also provides courts with the discretion to dismiss 
criminal charges "prior to the expiration of such period."  Id. 
 
The defendant,1 who is now seventy-four years old, was 
charged with murder in the first degree and interfering with a 
fire fighter in 1994, when he was fifty-one years old.  At that 
time, he was deemed incompetent to stand trial.  Since then, he 
continually has been deemed incompetent, and at this point, the 
Commonwealth has conceded that he is permanently incompetent.  
The nature of the defendant's mental impairment, a form of 
alcohol-induced dementia, is such that it is permanent, 
degenerative, and not amenable to any form of treatment.  
Additionally, his physical condition is deteriorating, and he is 
now physically frail, nourished through a feeding tube, and 
bedridden.  It is likely that his physical condition also will 
continue to worsen.  Due to the level of medical care he 
requires, in August, 2015, the defendant was released on bail, 
with conditions, so he could be placed in a hospital setting.  
He is civilly committed to the Department of Mental Health 
                     
 
1 Although the petitioner commenced this action by filing a 
petition in the county court, for convenience, we refer to him 
as "the defendant." 
3 
 
 
 
(DMH), and is being cared for in an unlocked wing of a public 
hospital operated by the Department of Public Health (DPH). 
 
Although G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f), does not explicitly 
exclude murder in the first degree from its provisions for 
dismissal, it does so effectively, because the statute is based 
on the date of parole eligibility, and there is no parole 
eligibility date for the offense of murder in the first degree.  
The defendant contends that the charges against him nonetheless 
should be dismissed, either under the provision allowing 
discretionary release or on constitutional grounds.  Beginning 
in 2001, through May, 2016, the defendant has filed motions to 
dismiss, and motions for reconsideration, arguing that G. L. 
c. 123, § 16 (f), violates his right to substantive due process 
because it restricts his fundamental right to liberty and is not 
narrowly tailored to achieve compelling State interests.  See 
Commonwealth v. Calvaire, 476 Mass. 242, 246 (2017).  All of 
these motions have been denied.  In May, 2016, the defendant 
sought relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, from the denial of 
his most recent motion for reconsideration.  He thereafter 
appealed to this court from the denial of his petition. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that maintaining  
pending charges against an incompetent defendant in those rare 
circumstances, such as here, where a defendant will never regain 
competency, and where maintaining the charges does not serve the 
4 
 
 
 
compelling State interest of protecting the public, is a 
violation of the defendant's substantive due process rights.2 
 
1.  Background.  The essential facts are uncontested.  On 
December 25, 1994, the defendant was arrested for the beating 
death of his father; he also was charged with attempting to 
obstruct fire fighters who were responding to smoke coming from 
the house where the defendant and his father lived.  In January, 
1995, a grand jury indicted the defendant on one charge of 
murder in the first degree and one charge of interfering with a 
fire fighter. 
 
Prior to his arraignment, the defendant was examined for 
competency to stand trial, pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a).  
In December, 1994, he was found to be incompetent to stand trial 
and committed to Bridgewater State Hospital (Bridgewater) for a 
period of six months.  See G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b).  Since then, 
he repeatedly has been reexamined and recommitted, for most of 
that period pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), and remains 
incompetent. 
 
Following a competency examination of the defendant in 
February, 2013, the director of forensic services at Bridgewater 
filed a report concluding that the defendant was then 
incompetent to stand trial, and in his opinion would never be 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the 
district attorney for the Northern District. 
5 
 
 
 
competent; the director has reaffirmed that conclusion in 
subsequent reports.  In April, 2014, Bridgewater filed a 
petition for authorization for medical treatment of the 
defendant.  That motion was allowed.  In May, 2014, Bridgewater 
filed a motion that the defendant be treated by DMH.  The 
Commonwealth's motion for an independent medical examination was 
allowed, and the defendant's medical records were produced to 
the Commonwealth.  Thereafter, in June, 2014, an evidentiary 
hearing, at which testimony was taken, was conducted on 
Bridgewater's motion that the defendant be treated at a DMH 
facility.  The hearing was continued, and the motion was denied 
on July 31, 2014.  On the same day, the Commonwealth's petition 
for a renewal of the defendant's commitment, under G. L. c. 123, 
§ 8, and request that all subsequent hearings be conducted in 
accordance with G. L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8, was allowed, and the 
defendant was civilly committed to Bridgewater for one year. 
 
In July, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a motion to extend 
the defendant's prior commitment, originally ordered under G. L. 
c. 123, § 16 (b), and seeking that all subsequent hearings 
proceed under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8.  In August, 2015, upon a 
motion by Bridgewater, the defendant was transferred to the 
custody of DMH and held on bail.  He was transferred to a joint 
DMH-DPH facility, where both DPH and DMH services are offered 
and where DPH operates hospital wards.  On September 15, 2015, a 
6 
 
 
 
competency hearing was held in the Brockton Division of the 
District Court Department.  The defendant was found incompetent 
and was civilly committed to Bridgewater for one year, pursuant 
to G. L. c. 123, § 8.  After a judge of the District Court 
visited the defendant at his bedside in the DPH hospital, the 
judge allowed Bridgewater's motion that DMH hold the defendant 
for one year.  The Commonwealth "does not dispute . . . [the] 
assessment [by the director of forensic services at 
Bridgewater]" that the defendant "will never be competent to 
stand trial."  At a hearing before a Superior Court judge in 
December, 2015, the Commonwealth conceded that the defendant 
will never be competent to stand trial. 
 
During the course of his commitment to Bridgewater, the 
defendant repeatedly exhibited violent and assaultive behavior 
against health care staff, other patients, and correction 
officers.  In addition to physical assaults, he was frequently 
verbally combative and engaged in numerous outbursts of yelling.  
He made sexually inappropriate comments and gestures towards 
female staff.  In 2005, he attempted to strangle his roommate 
and thereafter was placed in a single-occupancy room. 
 
In the last three years of the defendant's time at 
Bridgewater, however, his doctors noted that the defendant 
demonstrated "sustained improvement in his aggressive behavior" 
and that he was no longer engaging in the sexually aggressive 
7 
 
 
 
speech and behavior he had previously exhibited.  The most 
recent competency evaluation in the record, from 2015, indicated 
that the defendant's "infrequent aggression without injury" is 
typical for a person with the defendant's level of dementia, and 
that his behavior was "not at the level of seriousness of 
assaults in previous years."  "[H]is last serious assault of 
another patient occurred in November 2011."  Between 2012 and 
June, 2015, the defendant committed four assaults that caused no 
serious injuries or did not result in any injury. 
 
The improvement in the defendant's behavior was partially 
attributable to his worsening physical and mental condition.  
According to the evaluations in the record, over the past 
twenty-two years, the defendant has been examined by eight 
forensic psychologists and psychiatrists.  Their general 
consensus is that the defendant suffers from Korsakoff syndrome, 
which is a form of substance-induced persisting dementia caused 
by the defendant's prior alcohol use.  The defendant's medical 
records indicate that he began exhibiting symptoms of mental 
impairment and certain physical difficulties at least as early 
as 1992, and doctors suspected that these were related to brain 
damage from alcohol abuse.  He also has a history in the 
records, from at least 1985 onward, of a head injury.  In 
addition, he has an ongoing seizure disorder, and brain scans 
have shown noticeable abnormalities.  During his commitment to 
8 
 
 
 
Bridgewater, the defendant's cognitive and physical capacities 
have significantly deteriorated, and they are not expected to 
improve. 
 
Since 2013, the defendant "has become progressively 
physically weaker, and currently is bedridden and very weak 
physically."  According to his most recent medical records, the 
defendant has a permanent feeding tube implanted in his stomach 
through which he receives all of his nutrition and medications, 
cannot walk on his own, and spends his time either in a hospital 
bed or a geriatric chair.  He is so weak that an average adult 
could hold both of his hands with one hand, and he would not be 
able to pull away.  The Commonwealth agreed that the defendant 
has been "physically frail" since at least 2015.  In 2015, in 
the most recent medical evaluation in the records, the director 
of forensic services at Bridgewater opined that the defendant 
could "be managed in a less secure setting, such as a facility 
of [DMH], a medical unit at the [Lemuel] Shattuck Hospital, or a 
long-term care facility." 
 
In August, 2015, the Commonwealth did not dispute 
Bridgewater's motion for the release of the defendant, on bail 
and with conditions, pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 17 (c); 
Bridgewater's motion to transfer the defendant to the custody of 
DMH, so that he could be treated at a DMH facility, particularly 
for management of his feeding tube, was allowed.  Shortly 
9 
 
 
 
thereafter, the Commonwealth assented to Bridgewater's motion to 
amend the special conditions of release so that the defendant 
could be moved to the medical unit of a DPH hospital ward, in a 
jointly operated facility, so that he could receive more 
appropriate medical care; that motion was allowed. 
 
Since the motion to hold the defendant in the DPH hospital 
ward, under DMH custody, was allowed, the defendant has been 
held on that ward.  He remains civilly committed to the custody 
of DMH, and DMH continues to follow his care, which is provided 
day-to-day by DPH staff.  DMH has indicated that, if the charges 
are dismissed, it could seek the defendant's placement in a 
long-term care facility that could more appropriately manage his 
care. 
 
2.  Prior proceedings.  In May, 2001, citing due process 
considerations, the defendant moved pursuant to G. L. c. 123, 
§ 16 (f), to dismiss the charges.  In August, 2002, a Superior 
Court judge denied the motion; he determined that the defendant 
had not been denied due process and that G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f), 
is not applicable to charges of murder in the first degree.  In 
March, 2013, the defendant filed another motion to dismiss, 
again pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f).  In April, 2013, a 
different Superior Court judge denied that motion.  The judge 
concluded that the statute is not applicable to charges of 
murder in the first degree and that, even if it is, he did not 
10 
 
 
 
believe it was in the interest of justice to dismiss the 
charges.  In July, 2015, the defendant again moved to dismiss 
the indictments.  That motion was denied in March, 2016, by a 
third Superior Court judge.  In April, 2016, the defendant filed 
a motion for reconsideration of his motion to dismiss; he argued 
that the denial of his motion resulted in a violation of 
substantive due process.  The motion was denied one week later.  
The judge concluded that due process is satisfied by the 
provisions of G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), which requires annual 
reviews of competency for defendants who have been found 
incompetent to stand trial. 
 
In May, 2016, the defendant filed a petition in the county 
court seeking relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, from the 
denial of his motion for reconsideration.  The defendant argued 
that review under G. L. c. 211, § 3, was appropriate, because he 
is permanently incompetent to stand trial, and would never have 
an adverse final judgment from which to appeal.  The single 
justice concluded that the defendant had other avenues by which 
to seek relief and denied the motion without a hearing.  In 
September, 2016, the defendant appealed to this court, pursuant 
to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001).  In 
December, 2016, we issued an order allowing the defendant's 
appeal to proceed in the full court. 
11 
 
 
 
 
3.  Discussion.  The defendant argues that due process 
prohibits the Commonwealth from maintaining pending criminal 
charges indefinitely against a defendant who is permanently 
incompetent, and, therefore, that there must be some means of 
obtaining dismissal of a charge of murder in the first degree.  
The defendant contends that his charges may be dismissed either 
pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f), which contains provisions 
for both mandatory dismissal and dismissal in the interest of 
justice, or by the inherent power of the courts to remedy 
violations of due process.  See Department of Mental Retardation 
v. Kendrew, 418 Mass. 50, 55 (1994) ("We recognize that the 
courts of the Commonwealth have certain inherent and implied 
powers in addition to those powers expressly enumerated in 
various statutes"). 
 
The defendant argues, first, that the court should conclude 
that a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of 
parole is unconstitutional when applied to permanently 
incompetent defendants, and should sever that portion of the 
murder statute, as applied to incompetent defendants, which 
prohibits parole.  Severance of the statute in such a manner 
would result in eligibility for parole for permanently 
incompetent defendants charged with murder in the first degree 
in a similar manner to those incompetent defendants who are 
12 
 
 
 
charged with murder in the second degree.3  See Diatchenko v. 
District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 672-673 
(2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015) (holding that sentence of life 
in prison without possibility of parole is unconstitutional when 
applied to juvenile defendants, and therefore severing that 
portion of murder statute).  Alternatively, the defendant argues 
that G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f), which permits dismissal in the 
interest of justice, could be interpreted to apply to all 
crimes, regardless of parole eligibility.  Lastly, the defendant 
suggests that this court could create a remedy to resolve any 
due process violation. 
 
The Commonwealth contends, however, that there is no due 
process violation, and that G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f), is narrowly 
tailored to serve the compelling State interest of protecting 
public safety.  In this view, the Legislature implicitly 
excluded defendants charged with murder in the first degree by 
hinging the dismissal of charges on eligibility for parole.4  
                     
 
3 At the time of the defendant's arrest, defendants 
convicted of murder in the second degree were eligible for 
parole after fifteen years.  After the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the 
Legislature revised the murder statute.  Currently, defendants 
who are convicted of murder in the second degree are eligible 
for parole at a period of from fifteen to twenty-five years 
after sentencing, to be determined by the sentencing judge.  See 
G. L. c. 127, § 133A; G. L. c. 279, § 24. 
 
 
4 All other offenses which permit a life sentence also have 
a statutory parole date that follows a fixed number of years; 
13 
 
 
 
Such an exclusion is justified, the Commonwealth suggests, 
because murder in the first degree is different in kind from 
other crimes.  See G. L. c. 277, § 63 (no statute of limitations 
for murder).  See also Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 
135 (2007), S.C., 477 Mass. 582 (2017) ("It is reasonable for 
the Legislature to treat defendants facing a charge of murder in 
the first degree differently from other defendants"). 
 
Although the language of G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f), read in 
conjunction with G. L. c. 265, § 1, excludes defendants charged 
with murder in the first degree from being eligible for 
dismissal of charges under that provision, substantive due 
process requires a statute affecting a fundamental right to be 
narrowly tailored to achieve compelling government interests.  
See Calvaire, 476 Mass. at 246.  While murder in the first 
degree is the gravest of charges, we conclude that substantive 
due process requires dismissal of the charges where a defendant 
will never regain competency and maintaining the charges does 
not serve the compelling State interest of protecting the 
public. 
 
a.  General Laws c. 123, § 16 (f).  General Laws c. 123, 
§ 16 (f), is intended to ensure that criminal defendants who are 
incompetent to stand trial are not left facing the indefinite 
                                                                  
for no offense is this period greater than that for a conviction 
of murder in the second degree.  See G. L. c. 127, § 133A; G. L. 
c. 279, § 24. 
14 
 
 
 
pendency of criminal charges.5  See Calvaire, 476 Mass. at 244, 
citing Foss v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 584, 589 (2002).  The 
statute requires dismissal of criminal charges on "the date of 
the expiration of the period of time equal to the time of 
imprisonment which the person would have had to serve prior to 
becoming eligible for parole if he had been convicted of the 
most serious crime with which he was charged in court and 
sentenced to the maximum sentence he could have received."  
G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f).  Alternatively, a court may, in the 
interest of justice, dismiss pending charges "prior to the 
expiration of such period," i.e., during the period before a 
convicted defendant would be eligible for parole under the 
provision requiring mandatory dismissal.  Id. 
                     
 
5 General Laws c. 123, § 16 (f), provides: 
 
 
"If a person is found incompetent to stand trial, the 
court shall send notice to the department of correction 
which shall compute the date of the expiration of the 
period of time equal to the time of imprisonment which the 
person would have had to serve prior to becoming eligible 
for parole if he had been convicted of the most serious 
crime with which he was charged in court and sentenced to 
the maximum sentence he could have received, if so 
convicted.  For purposes of the computation of parole 
eligibility, the minimum sentence shall be regarded as one 
half of the maximum sentence potential sentence.  Where 
applicable, the provisions of [G. L. c. 127, §§ 129, 129A, 
129B, and 129C,] shall be applied to reduce such period of 
time.  On the final date of such period, the court shall 
dismiss the criminal charges against such person, or the 
court in the interest of justice may dismiss the criminal 
charges against such person prior to the expiration of such 
period." 
15 
 
 
 
 
"Our primary duty in interpreting a statute is 'to 
effectuate the intent of the Legislature in enacting it.'"  
Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 Mass. 734, 737 (2014), quoting Water 
Dep't of Fairhaven v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 455 Mass. 
740, 744 (2010).  "Ordinarily, where the language of a statute 
is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative 
intent."  Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 444 (2008).  
That said, "[w]e will not adopt a literal construction of a 
statute if the consequences of such construction are absurd or 
unreasonable."  Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, 387 
Mass. 326, 336 (1982).  See Black's Law Dictionary 11-12 (10th 
ed. 2014) (defining "absurdity" as "being grossly unreasonable" 
and "[a]n interpretation that would lead to an unconscionable 
result, esp. one that . . . the drafters could not have 
intended"). 
 
Taken in conjunction with the provisions on murder in the 
first degree that exclude anyone convicted under G. L. c. 265, 
§ 1, from eligibility for parole, G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f), 
implicitly excludes dismissal of charges for which a defendant 
who is convicted and sentenced to the maximum sentence would 
never be eligible for parole.  This is so because, where it is 
not possible to compute the date on which a person would become 
eligible for parole on a charge, the charge cannot be dismissed 
16 
 
 
 
on that date, and a court cannot, in the interest of justice, 
dismiss the charge prior to that date. 
 
Here, the most serious crime with which the defendant was 
charged is murder in the first degree.  If he had been convicted 
of that offense, he would have been sentenced to the mandatory 
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.  
Under the plain language of G. L. c. 265, § 1, therefore, a 
defendant charged with that offense is never eligible for 
dismissal of pending charges in accordance with G. L. c. 123, 
§ 16 (f). 
 
b.  Substantive due process.  The defendant contends that 
the plain meaning of G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f), as discussed supra, 
violates the due process clauses of art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution when applied to permanently incompetent 
defendants charged with murder in the first degree.  We analyze 
his claim on substantive due process grounds.  See Calvaire, 476 
Mass. at 246.  Accordingly, where the statute interferes with a 
fundamental liberty interest, we apply strict scrutiny analysis 
to the defendant's claim to determine whether G. L. c. 123, 
§ 16 (f), is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling State 
interest.  See Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 673 (1993). 
 
i.  The defendant's liberty interest.  In August, 2015, on 
a motion by Bridgewater that was unopposed by the Commonwealth, 
17 
 
 
 
the defendant was released on bail, on conditions, and was 
transferred from the custody of Bridgewater to the custody of 
DMH, pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 17 (c), so that he could 
receive more appropriate medical care.  He remains civilly 
committed pursuant to G. L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8, in continuation of 
his commitment under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c).  The defendant 
claims, however, that his liberty interest is impaired by the 
pendency of criminal charges against him.  Although he is able 
to reside in an unlocked medical unit at Lemuel Shattuck 
Hospital, the pending charges prevent him from being able to 
seek care in a long-term care facility that could better suit 
his medical and mental health needs.  Furthermore, pending 
criminal charges may cause "anxiety, forfeiture of opportunity, 
and damage to reputation, among other conceivable injuries."  
Williams, petitioner, 378 Mass. 623, 626 (1979). 
 
In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972), the United 
States Supreme Court held that an incompetent defendant cannot 
be committed based solely on his incompetency for longer than 
"the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether 
there is a substantial probability that he will attain 
[competency] in the foreseeable future."  Indefinite commitment 
of a defendant who is unlikely to regain competency intrudes on 
the defendant's substantial right of liberty.  Id. at 731-733.  
The Court explained: 
18 
 
 
 
 
"We hold, consequently, that a person charged by a 
State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on 
account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be 
held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to 
determine whether there is a substantial probability that 
he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.  If 
it is determined that this is not the case, then the State 
must either institute the customary civil commitment 
proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely 
any other citizen, or release the defendant.  Furthermore, 
even if it is determined that the defendant probably soon 
will be able to stand trial, his continued commitment must 
be justified by progress toward that goal.  In light of 
differing [S]tate facilities and procedures and a lack of 
evidence in this record, we do not think it appropriate for 
us to attempt to prescribe arbitrary time limits.  We note, 
however, that petitioner Jackson has now been confined for 
three and one-half years on a record that sufficiently 
establishes the lack of a substantial probability that he 
will ever be able to participate fully in a trial."  
(Footnote omitted.) 
 
Id. at 738. 
 
The Court declined, however, to decide whether due process 
requires dismissal of criminal charges against an incompetent 
person.  See id. at 740 ("Dismissal of charges against an 
incompetent accused has usually been thought to be justified on 
grounds not squarely presented here:  particularly, . . . the 
denial of due process inherent in holding pending criminal 
charges indefinitely over the head of one who will never have a 
chance to prove his innocence. . . .  We think . . . that the 
Indiana courts should have the first opportunity to determine 
these issues").6 
                     
 
6 Very few State courts have addressed this issue.  This may 
be a result of statutes in many States having been modified in 
19 
 
 
 
                                                                  
light of Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972), to permit 
broader dismissal of charges against incompetent individuals.  
Indeed, many State statutes employ the specific language from 
Jackson of "substantial probability that [a defendant] will 
attain that capacity [to proceed to trial] in the foreseeable 
future" to determine whether charges should be dismissed.  See 
id.  Thirty-two States appear to require or explicitly to allow 
dismissal of charges of murder in the first degree.  See Alaska 
Stat. § 12.47.110; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-310; Cal. Penal Code 
§ 1370.01; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-8.5-116; Fla. Stat. § 916.145; 
Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-130; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 704-406; Idaho Code 
Ann. § 18-212; 725 Ill. Comp. Stat § 5/104-23; 15 Me. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 101-D; Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 3-107; Mich. Comp. 
Laws § 330.2044; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 552.020; Mont. Code Ann. § 46-
14-221; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.460; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 135:17-a; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:4-6; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-9-
1.4; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1008; N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-04-08; 
Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1175.6a; Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.370; 50 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 7403; R.I. Gen. Laws § 40.1-5.3-3; S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 44-23-420; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 46B.071, 46B.151; 
Wash. Rev. Code §§ 10.77.084, 10.77.086; W. Va. Code § 27-6A-3; 
Wis. Stat. § 971.14; Ala. R. Crim. P. 11.6; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 
11.6; State v. Davis, 898 N.E.2d 281, 286 (Ind. 2008). 
 
 
Of those, twenty States require dismissal of charges of 
murder in the first degree after a defendant has been 
incompetent for a specific period of time.  See Ala. R. Crim. P. 
11.6; Alaska Stat. § 12.47.110; Fla. Stat. § 916.145; 725 Ill. 
Comp. Stat § 5/104-23; 15 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 101-D; Md. Code 
Ann., Crim. Proc. § 3-107; Mich. Comp. Laws § 330.2044; Mo. Rev. 
Stat. § 552.020; Mont. Code Ann. § 46-14-221; Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§ 178.460; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 135:17-a; N.M. Stat. Ann. 
§ 31-9-1.4 (when defendant is also not dangerous); N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 15A-1008; N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-04-08; Okla. Stat. tit. 
22, § 1175.6a; Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.370; 50 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 7403 (proceedings for murder in first degree or murder in 
second degree may not be stayed if there is no probability 
defendant will regain competency); R.I. Gen. Laws § 40.1-5.3-3; 
Wash. Rev. Code §§ 10.77.084, 10.77.086; Wis. Stat. § 971.14. 
 
 
Other States exclude murder in the first degree -- and, in 
some instances, other serious crimes -- from their dismissal 
provisions, often explicitly.  See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-56d; 
D.C. Code §§ 24-531.04, 24-531.08; Iowa Code § 812.9; La. Code 
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 648; N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 730.50; S.D. 
Codified Laws §§ 23A-10A-14, 23A-10A-15; Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-7-
20 
 
 
 
 
Nonetheless, in a series of opinions related to the right 
to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has determined 
that a defendant's liberty interest may be restricted simply by 
the pendency of criminal charges, even where the defendant is 
not held in custody.  Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 
221-222 (1967) ("The petitioner is not relieved of the 
limitations placed upon his liberty by this prosecution merely 
because its suspension permits him to go 'whithersoever he 
will.'  The pendency of the indictment may subject him to public 
scorn and deprive him of employment, and almost certainly will 
force curtailment of his speech, associations and participation 
in unpopular causes").  See United States v. McDonald, 456 U.S. 
1, 8-9 (1982) (same); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 
(1971) (same).  See also State v. Davis, 898 N.E.2d 281, 290 
(Ind. 2008) (quoting Klopfer, supra, in context of due process 
claim).  The liberty interests of a defendant who has pending 
                                                                  
301; Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-169.3; Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01.  The 
remaining States either do not have provisions related to 
dismissal of charges against incompetent defendants or allow 
dismissal only after proceedings similar to a hearing pursuant 
to G. L. c. 123, § 17 (b).  See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 403-
404; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3303; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 504.110, 
504.150; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1823; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 2945.38; Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, 
§§ 4820, 4822; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303; Miss. R. Crim. P. 
12.5, 12.6. 
21 
 
 
 
charges are as fundamental in the due process context of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as they are in the Sixth Amendment context. 
 
In other cases involving the essentially indefinite 
commitment of incompetent defendants, we have held that a 
defendant's liberty interests during the pendency of a criminal 
trial are fundamental rights.  See Foss v. Commonwealth, 437 
Mass. 584, 589 (2002) ("Among many other problems studied and 
addressed in the new mental health laws was the pretrial 
commitment of incompetent criminal defendants.  A major thrust 
was to eliminate the highly questionable practice of committing 
incompetent criminal defendants indefinitely, while awaiting 
their unlikely restoration to competency, and also eliminating 
the indefinite pendency of criminal charges that, most often, 
significantly limited the incompetent criminal defendant's 
access to treatment by more effective civil means" [emphasis 
added]).  See also Calvaire, 476 Mass. at 246 (applying strict 
scrutiny analysis in determining that G. L. c. 123, § 16 [f], 
does not violate due process because it allows Commonwealth 
"some time to pursue the legitimate and proper purpose of 
prosecuting charged crimes, but not for a period of time longer 
than is reasonably necessary to ascertain the defendant's 
chances of regaining competency"); Commonwealth v. Nieves, 446 
Mass. 583, 590 (2006) (applying strict scrutiny in analyzing 
liberty interests of incompetent defendant in sexually dangerous 
22 
 
 
 
person hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 123A).  The defendant's 
claims, therefore, are subject to strict scrutiny analysis.  See 
Aime, 414 Mass. at 673.  The Commonwealth does not contest that 
the defendant's asserted liberty interest is a fundamental 
right. 
 
ii.  Strict scrutiny analysis.  To satisfy strict scrutiny, 
a statute "must be narrowly tailored to further a legitimate and 
compelling governmental interest and be the least restrictive 
means available to vindicate that interest."  Commonwealth v. 
Weston W., 455 Mass. 24, 35 (2009).  The "requirements for 
minimum due process may vary depending on the context."  See 
Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 Mass. 366, 372 (2008), and cases 
cited. 
 
In Calvaire, 476 Mass. at 246, we concluded that G. L. 
c. 123, § 16 (f), was narrowly tailored to achieve the two 
compelling State interests of "protecting mentally ill 
defendants from the indefinite pendency of criminal charges as a 
result of their incompetency" and "protecting the public from 
potentially dangerous persons."  We noted that the statute 
affords the Commonwealth sufficient time to prosecute crimes, 
"but not for a period of time longer than is reasonably 
necessary to ascertain the defendant's chances of regaining 
competency."  Id.  The statute provides a method for calculating 
a maximum period of time prior to dismissal of charges against 
23 
 
 
 
all defendants except those charged with crimes that do not 
permit eligibility for parole, e.g., all crimes other than the 
offense of murder in the first degree.  We also noted the 
additional statutory safeguard that allows, in the interest of 
justice, the dismissal of pending charges before the expiration 
of the computed period of time.  Id.  Use of that "safety valve" 
may be warranted, we concluded, where "the defendant's chances 
of being restored to competency are slim."  Id. at 247. 
 
In its opposition to the dismissal of charges in this case, 
the Commonwealth relies on the compelling government interest of 
public safety.  It describes in detail the defendant's history 
of violence prior to his father's murder and during his 
commitment to Bridgewater.  There is considerable evidence from 
competency evaluations, however, including the opinion of the 
director of forensic services at Bridgewater, that the defendant 
is now too physically weak to pose a danger to public safety.  
Since 2013, the defendant "has become progressively physically 
weaker, and currently is bedridden and very weak physically."  
He has a permanent feeding tube, cannot walk on his own, and 
spends his time either in a hospital bed or a geriatric chair.  
He is so weak that another person could control both of his 
hands with one hand, and he would not be able to pull away.  The 
Commonwealth has acknowledged that the defendant was "physically 
frail" as of at least 2015; while it opposes the dismissal of 
24 
 
 
 
the pending charges, it did not oppose Bridgewater's motion in 
August, 2015, to transfer the defendant to DMH for a period of 
one year, as it had in prior years. 
 
In addition to its assertion that incompetency is not 
evidence of a lack of guilt, the Commonwealth contends that the 
charges should not be dismissed because dismissal would prevent 
the district attorney from being notified of the defendant's 
location or any hearing related to his competency.  This 
argument is unavailing.  Pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 16 (d), the 
district attorney must continue to be notified of any hearings 
conducted pursuant to any section of G. L. c. 123 for a person 
who was initially committed under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b).7  The 
requirement of notification includes any future hearings on 
petitions for civil commitment or an extension of civil 
commitment pursuant to G. L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8.  See Matter of 
E.C., 479 Mass. 113, 122-123 (2018).  Moreover, any dismissal of 
charges pursuant to G. L. c. 123, 16 (f), is without prejudice, 
so in the unlikely event that a defendant whose charges had been 
dismissed were to regain competency, the Commonwealth would be 
                     
 
7 General Laws c. 123, § 16 (d), provides: 
 
 
"The district attorney for the district within which 
the alleged crime or crimes occurred shall be notified of 
any hearing conducted for a person under the provisions of 
this section or any subsequent hearing for such person 
conducted under the provisions of this chapter relative to 
the commitment of the mentally ill and shall have the right 
to be heard at such hearings." 
25 
 
 
 
able to reinstate the charges.  See Commonwealth v. Hatch, 
438 Mass. 618, 624 (2003) (dismissal of charges pursuant to 
G. L. c. 123, § 17 [b], is without prejudice). 
 
The Commonwealth also emphasizes that the Legislature has 
legitimate reasons for treating charges of murder in the first 
degree differently from other offenses.  See G. L. c. 277, § 63 
(no statute of limitations for murder).  See also Francis, 450 
Mass. at 135 ("It is reasonable for the Legislature to treat 
defendants facing a charge of murder in the first degree 
differently from other defendants"). 
 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the exclusion of defendants 
charged with murder in the first degree from eligibility for 
dismissal of charges under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f), the 
Commonwealth contends that other statutory provisions provide 
additional safeguards to prevent indefinite commitment and 
afford incompetent defendants an alternative avenue for 
dismissal of charges.  General Laws c. 123, § 17 (c), allows a 
court to release a defendant, with or without bail, at any stage 
of a criminal proceeding,8 and G. L. c. 123, § 17 (b), permits a 
                     
 
8 General Laws c. 123, § 17 (c), provides: 
 
 
"Notwithstanding any finding of incompetence to stand 
trial under the provisions of this chapter, the court 
having jurisdiction may, at any appropriate stage of the 
criminal proceedings, allow a defendant to be released with 
or without bail." 
 
26 
 
 
 
defendant to request a hearing that could result in dismissal of 
charges if there is insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction on those charges.9 
 
The slim possibility that a judge in his or her own 
discretion might decide to release a particular defendant 
charged with murder on bail pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 17 (c), 
however, does not address the fundamental liberty interest at 
issue here.  See Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 221-222 ("The petitioner 
is not relieved of the limitations placed upon his liberty by 
this prosecution merely because its suspension permits him to go 
'whithersoever he will'"). 
 
General Laws c. 123, § 17 (b), as the Commonwealth notes, 
does allow incompetent defendants to petition for a hearing to 
have their charges dismissed, if they can "establish a defense 
                     
 
9 General Laws c. 123, § 17 (b), provides: 
 
 
"If either a person or counsel of a person who has 
been found to be incompetent to stand trial believes that 
he can establish a defense of not guilty to the charges 
pending against the person other than the defense of not 
guilty by reason of mental illness or mental defect, he may 
request an opportunity to offer a defense thereto on the 
merits before the court which has criminal jurisdiction.  
The court may require counsel for the defendant to support 
the request by affidavit or other evidence.  If the court 
in its discretion grants such a request, the evidence of 
the defendant and of the commonwealth shall be heard by the 
court sitting without a jury.  If after hearing such 
petition the court finds a lack of substantial evidence to 
support a conviction it shall dismiss the indictment or 
other charges or find them defective or insufficient and 
order the release of the defendant from criminal custody." 
27 
 
 
 
of not guilty to the charges pending against [them] other than 
the defense of not guilty by reason of mental illness or mental 
defect."  This statute permits incompetent defendants to request 
a hearing at any time on the ground that they did not commit the 
crime charged; that the Commonwealth never had or no longer has 
sufficient evidence to prove that they committed the charged 
crime; or that a defense other than mental illness or mental 
defect, such as self-defense, applies.  Furthermore, incompetent 
defendants could seek to disprove the elements that elevate 
murder from murder in the second degree to murder in the first 
degree.  If, at a hearing on a motion under G. L. c. 123, 
§ 17 (b), a defendant is able to demonstrate that the act was 
not committed with deliberate premeditation or extreme atrocity 
or cruelty -- depending on how the defendant was charged -- the 
most severe crime of which the defendant could be convicted 
should the defendant later become competent would be murder in 
the second degree.  Defendants who are convicted of murder in 
the second degree are eligible for parole after a period of from 
fifteen to twenty-five years that is determined by the 
sentencing judge.  See G. L. c. 265, § 2; G. L. c. 279, § 24.  
Accordingly, incompetent defendants who face a charge of murder 
in the second degree qualify for dismissal of charges pursuant 
to G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f). 
28 
 
 
 
 
The existence of this alternative avenue for dismissal of 
charges in specific circumstances does not, however, prevent a 
conclusion that G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f), violates substantive due 
process in the circumstances in this case.10  Because it is 
undisputed that the defendant will never become competent, 
allowing charges that can never be resolved at a trial to remain 
pending indefinitely is inconsistent with his right to 
substantive due process.  Compare Calvaire, 476 Mass. at 246 
("The statute is narrowly tailored to allow the Commonwealth 
some time to pursue the legitimate and proper purpose of 
prosecuting charged crimes, but not for a period of time longer 
than is reasonably necessary to ascertain the defendant's 
chances of regaining competency").  A statute is not narrowly 
tailored to achieve a compelling government interest where the 
stated interest is not at stake.  See Curtis v. State, 948 
N.E.2d 1143, 1154 (Ind. 2011) ("Of course, the State's interests 
cannot be realized if there is a finding that a defendant cannot 
be restored to competency").  See also Commonwealth v. G.F., 479 
Mass. 180, 196 (2018) ("[C]onfinement without legal 
                     
 
10 The Legislature recently enacted a criminal justice 
reform bill that allows a prisoner who suffers from a terminal 
illness or permanent incapacitation "that is so debilitating 
that the prisoner does not pose a public safety risk" to be 
released on medical parole.  See G. L. c. 127, § 119A, inserted 
by St. 2018, c. 69, § 97.  This compassionate release program is 
available to all prisoners, including those convicted of murder 
in the first degree. 
29 
 
 
 
justification is never innocuous, . . . and the legal 
justification for confinement weakens after [a sexually 
dangerous person] trial is concluded without a finding of sexual 
dangerousness" [quotation and citation omitted]). 
 
General Laws c. 123, § 16 (f), therefore satisfies the 
requirement of substantive due process only insofar as it is 
understood to allow the dismissal of charges, in the interest of 
justice, in circumstances such as these, where the defendant 
will never regain competency and does not pose a risk to public 
safety. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The matter is remanded to the county court 
for entry of an order allowing the defendant's petition pursuant 
to G. L. c. 211, § 3, and remanding the matter to the Superior 
Court for entry of an order allowing the defendant's motion to 
dismiss. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.