Title: State v. John W. Campbell
Citation: 2006 WI 99
Docket Number: 2004AP000803-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2006

2006 WI 99 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP803-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
John W. Campbell, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 11, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert J. Kennedy 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs in part, dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins the concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs and oral 
argument by Charles Bennett Vetzner, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by James 
M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
 2006 WI 99
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP803-CR 
(L.C. No. 
1998CF29) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
John W. Campbell, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Circuit Court for 
Walworth County, Robert J. Kennedy, Judge.  Affirmed and cause 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case is before the court 
on 
certification 
by 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2003-04).1  The appellant, John 
Campbell (Campbell), was convicted of felony bail jumping as 
well as two counts of parental interference with the custody of 
a child.  On the bail jumping charge, Campbell was accused of 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version, unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
2 
 
committing two crimes while he was on pretrial release for other 
felony offenses.  The two crimes were the two counts of parental 
interference with the custody of a child.  The interference 
crimes involved alleged violations of an order granted to 
Campbell's then-wife, Denise Hladish-Campbell (Denise), for 
temporary custody and primary placement of their two sons. 
¶2 
On appeal, Campbell seeks to reverse one of the two 
interference with custody charges and the bail jumping charge.  
He claims that the circuit court erred when it prevented him 
from collaterally attacking the validity of the custody order on 
grounds that his wife procured that order by fraud. 
¶3 
This appeal presents two issues.  First, did the 
circuit court err in preventing Campbell from collaterally 
attacking the validity of the family court's custody order in 
his criminal trial, even though Campbell alleged that the order 
was obtained by fraud?  Second, under what conditions, if any, 
may a circuit court impose attorney fees for standby counsel as 
a condition of a defendant's probation? 
¶4 
We conclude that a court may permit a collateral 
attack on a judgment or order procured by fraud if the fraud is 
jurisdictional, making the judgment or order void, thereby 
negating an element of a crime, or if the fraud raises an 
affirmative 
defense 
to 
the 
crime. 
 
Because 
Campbell's 
allegations of fraud do not tend to negate any element of a 
crime and do not constitute an affirmative defense, the circuit 
court properly excluded evidence of the alleged fraud and 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
3 
 
prevented Campbell from collaterally attacking the custody 
order. 
¶5 
We also conclude that in exercising its discretion to 
appoint standby counsel, a circuit court may impose the attorney 
fees of standby counsel upon a defendant as a condition of 
probation where either (1) the defendant agrees to reimburse the 
county for the attorney fees; or (2) the court informs the 
defendant of his potential liability for the fees and the 
defendant uses standby counsel so extensively that he or she 
functions 
as 
traditional 
defense 
counsel. 
 
Under 
both 
alternatives, however, before imposing fees the court must 
determine 
the 
defendant's 
ability 
to 
pay 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 973.20(13)(a)2. to 5.  Because that determination 
was not made in this case, we remand to the circuit court to 
evaluate Campbell's ability to pay. 
¶6 
Accordingly, we affirm Campbell's convictions, hold 
that the circuit court had the authority, under these facts, to 
impose the attorney fees of standby counsel as a condition of 
probation, but remand for the circuit court to determine whether 
the full amount of attorney fees should have been imposed. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶7 
The facts in this case are complex.  Campbell married 
Denise 
James 
(formerly 
Denise 
Hladish-Campbell) 
in 
1986.  
Sometime circa 1990, Vickie Prushing (Vickie), became involved 
with the couple, and she lived with them for substantial periods 
of time between 1990 and 1997. 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
4 
 
¶8 
On September 17, 1990, Vickie gave birth to a son, 
Randy, in Kansas.  Campbell is listed as the biological father 
on Randy's birth certificate, but he may not be the biological 
father.  In any event, Campbell and Denise adopted Randy in 
Kansas on August 30, 1994.  This fact is not in dispute. 
¶9 
On November 11, 1995, Vickie gave birth to a second 
son, Cody, in Missouri.  Again, Campbell is listed as the 
biological father on the birth certificate.  Moreover, in 1996 a 
Missouri court issued an order recognizing Campbell's paternity.2  
A few months later, on September 23, 1996, Campbell and Denise 
filed a petition in Missouri to adopt Cody.  The petition was 
granted on March 14, 1997, by a Missouri circuit court.  The 
order recognized Campbell as the natural father and declared 
Denise the adoptive mother of Cody. 
¶10 Between the time that Campbell and Denise petitioned 
for the adoption of Cody and the Missouri court's March 14, 
1997, adoption decree, the Campbells moved to Wisconsin.  By 
November 1996 they were living in Walworth County, but they 
failed to share this information with the Missouri court.  
Campbell and Denise did return to Missouri on two occasions for 
court hearings.  The second time, they brought Cody with them to 
court, at which time the Missouri court declared Denise the 
adoptive mother of Cody. 
                                                 
2 In 2001 Vickie testified that the father of Cody might be 
someone other than Campbell.  Also, at the sentencing hearing in 
this case, Campbell himself acknowledged that he is probably not 
Cody's biological father. 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
5 
 
¶11 Sometime after they moved to Wisconsin, the Campbells' 
relationship began to deteriorate.  Matters came to a head on 
September 10, 1997, when Campbell physically assaulted Denise.  
On September 12 he was charged with second-degree reckless 
endangering of safety and false imprisonment, both felonies, and 
battery and disorderly conduct, misdemeanors.  Four years later, 
he pled guilty to battery and disorderly conduct, with the two 
other charges being dismissed. 
¶12 The September 12 charges are significant because, 
after they were filed, Campbell was released on bond with the 
standard condition that he not commit any crime on release. 
¶13 Denise petitioned for divorce on September 16, 1997.  
On September 22, 1997, a family court commissioner issued a 
temporary order giving legal custody and primary placement of 
Randy and Cody to Denise.  The custody order gave alternate 
periods of placement to Campbell.  On December 23, 1997, the 
commissioner entered an order giving Campbell placement of Randy 
and Cody on alternate weekends from 4:00 p.m. Friday to 6:00 
p.m. Sunday. 
¶14 Prior to entry of the temporary order, Campbell 
challenged the validity of Denise's adoption of Cody.  Campbell 
told the family court commissioner that the adoption decree was 
void for fraud.  Campbell explained that at the time the 
Missouri court granted the adoption, he and Denise represented 
to the court that they resided in Missouri, when in fact they 
did not.  Campbell raised the issue with the family court more 
than once.  Ultimately, the family court commissioner rejected 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
6 
 
Campbell's challenge to the validity of the adoption, ruling 
that Campbell had to attack the validity of the adoption in 
Missouri. 
 
¶15 Campbell then filed a motion challenging the validity 
of the custody order, contending the family court lacked 
jurisdiction and that Denise had secured custody and primary 
placement by fraudulently representing to the family court 
commissioner that she was Cody's adoptive mother.  Campbell 
requested and received a de novo hearing from the circuit court.  
At the hearing on January 22, 1998, the circuit court determined 
that Campbell could attack the validity of Denise's adoption of 
Cody but that additional briefing was necessary to decide the 
matter. 
 
¶16 Campbell never filed a brief or appeared again in 
court for the divorce and custody proceedings.  On January 30, 
1998, he picked up Randy and Cody for his scheduled weekend with 
the boys.  Instead of returning the children to Denise by 6:00 
p.m. on February 1, he fled with Vickie to Mexico, where he 
planned to live indefinitely and deprive his wife of custody. 
¶17 Hours after Campbell was supposed to return the boys, 
Denise called the police.  On February 4, Campbell was charged 
with two counts of interference with child custody in violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 948.31(1)(b) (1997-98), and one count of felony 
bail jumping in violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.49(1)(b) (1997-
98).  Also on February 4, the circuit court found Campbell in 
contempt of court for failing to abide by the temporary custody 
order. 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
7 
 
¶18 Within days of arriving in Mexico, Campbell was 
detained.  Vickie crossed the border back to El Paso with the 
boys, and on February 8, 1998, Randy and Cody were reunited with 
Denise in Texas. 
 
¶19 In due course, Campbell was released from Mexican 
custody, and from February 1998 until January 3, 2001, he evaded 
the law.  He spent time in various states before settling down 
with Vickie in California.3  In January 2001 he was arrested.  In 
June he was extradited to Wisconsin. 
¶20 On June 19, 2001, the circuit court held the initial 
appearance in this case, and Campbell advised the court that he 
wished to proceed pro se.  Concerned with the complexity of the 
case, Walworth County Circuit Judge James L. Carlson asked 
Campbell whether he wished assistance from standby counsel.  
Campbell consented and agreed to reimburse Walworth County for 
the attorney fees of standby counsel.  Thereafter, the circuit 
court appointed Attorney James Martin as standby counsel. 
 
¶21 Campbell's next court appearance, the preliminary 
hearing, occurred on June 26, 2001.  The State called Denise as 
a witness, and both Campbell and Attorney Martin cross-examined 
                                                 
3 While in California, Campbell and Vickie started a family 
together; they had one child and were expecting a second child 
at the time Campbell was arrested.  Campbell and Vickie's second 
child was born on July 27, 2001.  Both children entered the 
foster care system in California. 
In Campbell's absence Denise secured sole legal custody and 
physical placement of Randy and Cody and finalized her divorce 
with Campbell. 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
8 
 
her to try to establish the invalidity of her adoption of Cody.  
At this time, Circuit Judge Robert J. Kennedy ruled that 
Campbell could challenge the validity of the adoption at trial 
but that he would have to introduce independent evidence of the 
adoption's invalidity. 
 
¶22 Following the preliminary hearing, the State filed a 
motion in limine requesting that Campbell not be allowed to 
collaterally attack the custody order by challenging the 
validity of Denise's adoption of Cody.  On October 4, 2001, 
Judge Kennedy granted the State's motion, concluding that the 
custody order could not be collaterally attacked in this 
criminal proceeding.  He also ruled that "Ms. Denise Hladish-
Campbell had legal custody of [Cody] during the times charged in 
the criminal complaint and information" as a matter of law.  The 
circuit court did allow Campbell to make an offer of proof of 
the evidence he would have presented at trial. 
 
¶23 The circuit court held a four-day trial from November 
13 to November 16, 2001.  A jury found Campbell guilty of both 
counts of interference with legal custody of a child and felony 
bail jumping.  On January 9 and 11, 2002, the circuit court held 
a sentencing hearing and sentenced Campbell to an indeterminate 
prison sentence not to exceed five years for bail jumping, and 
withheld sentence and imposed probation of 13 years, consecutive 
to Campbell's prison sentence, on the two counts of interfering 
with legal custody.  Additionally, the circuit court required as 
a condition of probation that Campbell reimburse Walworth County 
for the attorney fees of standby counsel.  The circuit court 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
9 
 
determined that Campbell had to pay $17,585.35 in attorney fees 
and costs. 
 
¶24 Campbell filed a postconviction motion.  He requested 
a new trial on grounds that he should have been allowed to 
present evidence that Denise's adoption of Cody was invalid.  He 
also challenged the condition of probation that required him to 
reimburse the County for the attorney fees of standby counsel.  
The circuit court upheld the imposition of attorney fees as a 
condition of probation and its decision to prevent Campbell from 
challenging the validity of the family court's order in the 
criminal trial.4 
 
¶25 Campbell appealed his convictions and the denial of 
his postconviction motion.  The court of appeals certified 
Campbell's appeal, which we accepted. 
 
¶26 The court of appeals certified the following issues: 
                                                 
4 The circuit court stated: 
I agree that a question of fraud can be raised under 
certain circumstances, but the question of fraud in 
the case like this is clearly something that applies 
to the question of . . . equity.  And in this 
particular case for the defendant to be allowed to 
raise 
an 
attack 
upon 
[the 
temporary 
order 
for 
placement and custody in the family proceeding], after 
he——instead of exercising his rights in the civil 
action to contest that and make his point, violated 
the court order and fled; and then after the children 
was collected, hid out for three plus years before he 
was re-apprehended means to this court that he cannot 
in the criminal case subsequent raise that issue.  It 
may——he may be raising the question of fraud, but he 
had the full opportunity to develop that fraud 
argument in the civil case. 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
10 
 
Is the holding of State v. Bouzek, 168 Wis. 2d 642, 
484 N.W.2d 362 (Ct. App. 1992), correct in recognizing 
a fraud exception to the general rule which bars a 
collateral attack against an order or judgment of 
another judicial body in the context of a criminal 
proceeding?  If Bouzek does correctly state the law: 
(1) is the fraud exception properly limited to 
jurisdictional fraud; (2) does the "clean hands" 
doctrine apply; and (3) what are the respective roles 
of the trial court and the jury when addressing a 
fraud exception? 
State v. Campbell, No. 2004AP803-CR, unpublished certification 
(Wis. Ct. App. May 4, 2005).  In addition to accepting the 
certified question, we also assumed jurisdiction over the 
question of whether the circuit court properly imposed the 
attorney fees of standby counsel as a condition of Campbell's 
probation. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶27 The first issue requires us to review the circuit 
court's decision to exclude evidence to support a collateral 
attack upon the custody and placement order.  A determination as 
to the admissibility of evidence is within the discretion of the 
circuit court and will be reversed only if the court erroneously 
exercised its discretion.  Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶28, 
246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698.  A circuit court's discretionary 
decision is upheld as long as the court "examined the relevant 
facts, 
applied 
a 
proper 
legal 
standard, 
and, 
using 
a 
demonstrated rational process, reached a reasonable conclusion."  
Id.  Since Campbell contends the circuit court applied an 
improper standard of law when it prevented him from collaterally 
attacking the custody order, we review the circuit court's 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
11 
 
decision to exclude evidence pertaining to the validity of the 
order independent of the circuit court. 
 
¶28 The second issue, whether the circuit court had the 
authority to impose the attorney fees of standby counsel on 
Campbell as a condition of probation, is a question of statutory 
interpretation we review de novo.  State v. Ferguson, 202 
Wis. 2d 233, 237, 549 N.W.2d 718 (1996). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. 
Conviction on Count I 
 
¶29 Campbell was convicted of interfering with the legal 
custody of Randy, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.31(1)(b) (1997-
98).  This conviction is not in dispute.  It is important 
because of its relationship to Count III. 
B. 
Conviction on Count III 
 
¶30 Campbell was convicted of bail jumping, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 946.49(1)(b) (1997-98).  This statute provides that 
whoever, having been released from custody on a criminal charge 
under Chapter 969, intentionally fails to comply with the terms 
of his bond, is guilty of a felony if the offense with which he 
was charged was a felony.  Wisconsin Stat. § 969.02(4) provides 
that, "As a condition of release in all cases, a person released 
under this section shall not commit any crime."  (Emphasis 
added.)  Campbell stipulated that he was on release for a felony 
at the time he allegedly violated § 946.49(1)(b), and he was 
convicted at trial of Count I.  Campbell does not appeal his 
conviction on Count I for interfering with Denise's legal 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
12 
 
custody of Randy.  Thus, we see no plausible challenge to 
Campbell's conviction for bail jumping. 
C. 
Conviction on Count II 
 
¶31 The heart of this case is Campbell's challenge to 
Count II, parental interference with the legal custody of Cody.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 948.31(1)(b) (1997-98) reads: 
[W]hoever intentionally . . . takes a child away or 
withholds a child for more than 12 hours beyond the 
court-approved 
period 
of 
physical 
placement 
or 
visitation period from a legal custodian with intent 
to deprive the custodian of his or her custody rights 
without the consent of the custodian is guilty of a 
Class C felony. 
¶32 In 1997 Campbell repeatedly challenged the validity of 
his wife's standing as the adoptive mother of Cody before the 
Walworth County Family Court.  He claimed the Missouri adoption 
was invalid because it had been obtained by fraud.  He also 
claimed that Vickie's rights to Cody had never been terminated.  
Hence, he claimed that Denise misrepresented her status as 
Cody's adoptive mother when she petitioned the court for a 
divorce, sought sole custody and primary placement of Cody, and 
alleged that "[t]wo children have been born or adopted by the 
parties to the marriage[.]"  In effect, Campbell claimed that 
every time Denise said she was the adoptive mother of Cody, she 
was committing a fraud on the court, thereby invalidating the 
family court's custody order and custody determinations of 
September 22, November 11, and December 23, 1997.  Thus, 
Campbell contends that when the circuit court excluded evidence 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
13 
 
of Denise's fraud, the court infringed upon his right to present 
a defense. 
¶33 The Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause right to 
present a defense requires that a defendant be allowed to 
introduce relevant evidence, subject to reasonable restrictions.  
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998).  A 
defendant's right to present a defense is not absolute.  Id.; 
see also Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1731 (2006).  
So long as the rule under which a court excludes evidence is not 
arbitrary and serves a legitimate state interest, the right to 
present a defense is not abridged.  Holmes, 126 S. Ct. at 1731. 
¶34 The right to present a defense does not require that a 
defendant be allowed to present irrelevant evidence.  State v. 
Robinson, 
146 
Wis. 2d 315, 
332, 
431 
N.W.2d 165 
(1988).  
"Relevant evidence" means "evidence having any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 904.01.  
Evidence 
that 
is 
not 
relevant 
is 
not 
admissible.  
Wis. Stat. § 904.02. 
¶35 In this case, before Campbell can collaterally attack 
the family court's custody order for fraud, it must appear that 
Campbell's collateral attack, if successful, would tend to 
negate an element of a crime or raise an affirmative defense.  
In other words, the evidence adduced by the collateral attack 
must be relevant. 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
14 
 
1. 
Does Campbell's Fraud Allegation Negate The Element of 
Legal Custody? 
¶36 To evaluate whether Denise's alleged fraud negates an 
element of interfering with legal custody of a child, we first 
examine the elements of the crime. 
¶37 For Campbell to be convicted of interfering with 
custody of Cody, the State had to prove five elements: (1) Cody 
was younger than 18 years; (2) Denise had legal custody of Cody 
under a court order in an action for divorce; (3) Campbell took 
Cody from Denise and withheld him from Denise without her 
consent for more than 12 hours past the time allowed by the 
custody 
order; 
(4) 
Campbell 
took 
Cody 
away 
from 
Denise 
intentionally; and (5) Campbell knew that Denise had legal 
custody of Cody under a court order and knew that Denise had not 
consented to him withholding Cody.  See Wis JI——Criminal 2166.  
Campbell asserts Denise never had legal custody of Cody, which 
implicates the second and fifth elements. 
¶38 Campbell challenges the exclusion of evidence that 
Denise lied to the family court commissioner and procured the 
custody order through fraud.  Specifically, he claims that 
Denise misrepresented to the court that she was Cody's adoptive 
mother.  This alleged misrepresentation, in turn, originated in 
an alleged fraud perpetrated on a court in Missouri.  Campbell 
contends that although Denise presented the family court with 
Missouri adoption papers that declared her the adoptive mother 
of Cody, these adoption papers were void because Denise and 
Campbell lived in Wisconsin at the time of the adoption.  
No.  2004AP803-CR 
15 
 
Campbell posits that if Denise is not Cody's adoptive mother, 
then the family court commissioner erred in giving her custody 
and primary placement of Cody.  Thus, he argues, if the custody 
order is invalid, Denise did not have legal custody of Cody, and 
Campbell did not violate the statute by taking Cody.  In short, 
Campbell insists that the Walworth County custody order was void 
because of fraud. 
¶39 The State responds that if Denise committed any fraud, 
it did not negate an element of the crime of interference with 
custody unless the fraud was jurisdictional fraud that deprived 
the family court of subject matter jurisdiction over the action 
or personal jurisdiction over Campbell.  We agree with the State 
and conclude that since the family court had both subject matter 
jurisdiction to make the custody determination and personal 
jurisdiction over Campbell, there was no jurisdictional fraud. 
¶40 Our analysis begins with the meaning of "legal 
custody."  Once again, Wis. Stat. § 948.31(1)(b) (1997-98), 
states in part: 
[W]hoever intentionally causes a child to leave, takes 
a child away or withholds a child for more than 12 
hours beyond the court-approved period of physical 
placement or visitation period from a legal custodian 
with intent to deprive the custodian of his or her 
custody rights without the consent of the custodian is 
guilty of a Class C felony. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 948.31(1)(a)1. defines "legal custodian of a 
child" as "[a] parent or other person having legal custody of 
the child under an order or judgment in an action for 
divorce . . . ."  "Legal custody" is defined in part as "the 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
16 
 
right and responsibility to make major decisions concerning the 
child . . . ."  Wis. Stat. §§ 948.01(1r) & 767.001(2)(a). 
 
¶41 Because Denise had custody of Cody pursuant to a court 
order, the only way Campbell could negate the second element is 
if he could show that the order was void and did not need to be 
obeyed. 
¶42 Where a valid order or judgment is a necessary 
condition for one of the elements of a crime, a collateral 
attack upon the order or judgment can negate an element of the 
crime if the order or judgment is void.  See State v. Orethun, 
84 
Wis. 2d 487, 
490-91, 
267 
N.W.2d 318 
(1978); 
State 
v. 
Jankowski, 173 Wis. 2d 522, 528, 496 N.W.2d 215 (Ct. App. 1992).  
A void judgment is a nullity and cannot create a right or 
obligation.  Kett v. Cmty. Credit Plan, 222 Wis. 2d 117, 127-28, 
568 N.W.2d 68 (Ct. App. 1998) (affirmed 228 Wis. 2d 1, 596 
N.W.2d 786) (citing Fischbeck v. Mielenz, 162 Wis. 12, 17-18, 
154 N.W. 701 (1916)).  It is not binding upon anyone.  Id.  On 
the other hand, a voidable judgment has the same force and 
effect as a valid judgment until it has been set aside.  Id. at 
128 (citing Slabosheske v. Chikowske, 273 Wis. 144, 150, 77 
N.W.2d 497 (1956)); Stimson v. Munson, 251 Wis. 41, 44, 27 
N.W.2d 896 (1947) ("The order or judgment, however erroneous, 
must stand until reversed, modified, or set aside . . . .  It is 
not subject to collateral attack merely because it is erroneous, 
nor is it void for that reason.") (quoting Pugh v. Fowlie, 225 
Wis. 455, 471, 274 N.W. 247 (1937)). 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
17 
 
¶43 As a general rule, a judgment or order is valid——i.e., 
not void——when the following elements are present: (1) the court 
has subject matter jurisdiction;5 (2) the court has personal 
jurisdiction;6 and (3) adequate notice has been afforded the 
affected persons.7  See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 1 
(1982) (setting forth the requisites for a valid judgment). 
¶44 Article VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the 
circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil 
and 
criminal 
within 
this 
state." 
 
This 
provision 
recognizes very broad subject matter jurisdiction in circuit 
courts.  Nonetheless, the validity of judgments in these courts 
is complicated by our concept of "competency," which refers to 
"the 
power 
of 
a 
court 
to 
exercise 
its 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction in a particular case."  See State v. Smith, 2005 WI 
104, ¶18, 283 Wis. 2d 57, 699 N.W.2d 508; Kohler Co. v. Wixen, 
204 Wis. 2d 327, 336, 555 N.W.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1996).  In 
                                                 
5 Slabosheske v. Chikowske, 273 Wis. 144, 150, 77 N.W.2d 497 
(1956); Newcomb v. Ingram, 211 Wis. 88, 98, 243 N.W. 209 (1933); 
State ex rel. R.G. v. W.M.B., 159 Wis. 2d 662, 666, 465 
N.W.2d 221 (Ct. App. 1990); see also State v. Bush, 2005 WI 103, 
¶¶17-18, 283 Wis. 2d 90, 699 N.W.2d 80 (noting that a court 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to enforce a statute that is 
unconstitutional on its face).   
6 Slabosheske, 273 Wis. at 150; State v. Moline, 170 
Wis. 2d 531, 539, 489 N.W.2d 667 (1992). 
7 William B. Tanner Co. v. Estate of Earl W. Fessler, 100 
Wis. 2d 437, 446-47, 302 N.W.2d 414 (1981) (abrogated on other 
grounds); Wengerd v. Rinehart, 114 Wis. 2d 575, 587, 338 
N.W.2d 861 (Ct. App. 1983). 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
18 
 
Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis. 2d 171, 178, 313 N.W.2d 790 (1982), 
the court stated that "[i]f a court truly lacks only competency, 
its judgment is invalid only if the invalidity of the judgment 
is raised on direct appeal."  Mueller, 105 Wis. 2d at 178.  
Village of Trempealeau 
v. 
Mikrut, 
2004 WI 
79, ¶8, 273 
Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190, went well beyond Mueller, stating 
that "a lack of competency does not negate subject matter 
jurisdiction or nullify the judgment.  Lack of competency is not 
'jurisdictional' and does not result in a void judgment."  
Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶34 (citation omitted). 
¶45 There are exceptions to these principles about subject 
matter 
jurisdiction 
and 
competency. 
 
For 
instance, 
the 
legislature may try to provide subject matter jurisdiction to 
the courts but fail by enacting an unconstitutional statute.  
Thus, if a statute is unconstitutional on its face, any judgment 
premised upon that statute is void.  See State v. Bush, 2005 WI 
103, ¶¶14-19, 283 Wis. 2d 90, 699 N.W.2d 80; State ex rel. 
Skinkis v. Treffert, 90 Wis. 2d 528, 538-39, 280 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. 
App. 1979).  In addition, a criminal complaint that fails to 
allege any offense known at law is jurisdictionally defective 
and void.  Bush, 283 Wis. 2d 90, ¶18 (citing Champlain v. State, 
53 Wis. 2d 751, 754, 193 N.W.2d 868 (1972); State v. Lampe, 26 
Wis. 2d 646, 648, 133 N.W.2d 349 (1965)). 
¶46 There may be other exceptions to the principles about 
subject matter jurisdiction and competency.  But none of this 
helps Campbell.  In this case, for the custody order to be void, 
the family court would have had to lack subject matter 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
19 
 
jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction, or Campbell would have 
had to receive inadequate notice of the divorce proceedings.  
Nothing of this nature has been alleged.  Even if we assume 
arguendo that Denise misrepresented her status as the adoptive 
mother of Cody, her misrepresentation would not have deprived 
the family court of subject matter jurisdiction or personal 
jurisdiction. 
 
¶47 The family court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 767.23(1)(a) and (am) (granting a 
circuit court commissioner authority to award legal custody and 
physical 
placement), 767.015 
(requiring 
all 
child custody 
proceedings to comply with Wis. Stat. ch. 822), and 822.03(1)(a) 
(granting any court jurisdiction to decide child custody matters 
where Wisconsin "is the home state of the child at the time of 
commencement of the proceeding").8  The record reveals that 
Denise filed for divorce on September 16, 1997, and the family 
court commissioner issued the temporary custody order on 
September 22, 1997.  As early as November 5, 1996, Denise and 
Campbell had established residency in Wisconsin.  By the time 
Denise filed for divorce, Cody had been living in Wisconsin for 
more than six months, making Wisconsin Cody's home state.  
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 822.02(5) defines "home state" as "the 
state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved 
lived with the child's parents, a parent, or a person acting as 
parent, for at least 6 consecutive months . . . ." 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
20 
 
Therefore, the family court commissioner had authority to enter 
the custody order.9  Wis. Stat. § 767.23(1)(a) and (am). 
 
¶48 The family court also had personal jurisdiction over 
Campbell.  A deputy sheriff of Walworth County served the 
summons and petition for divorce upon Campbell on September 16, 
1997.  Campbell does not dispute that the family court 
commissioner had personal jurisdiction over him or that he 
received adequate notice of the proceedings.  Because the family 
court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction and because 
Campbell received adequate notice, there was no jurisdictional 
fraud, and the custody order was not void.  Denise, therefore, 
had legal custody of Cody.  This is precisely what the circuit 
court ruled. 
 
¶49 Even if the family court commissioner erred in 
granting custody and primary placement to Denise, Campbell had 
to abide by the terms of the custody order until he succeeded in 
reversing it through the applicable review process.  See 
Orethun, 84 Wis. 2d at 490 ("Where a court has jurisdiction over 
the subject matter and the parties, the fact that an order or 
judgment is erroneously or improvidently rendered does not 
justify a person in failing to abide by its terms."); Anderson 
v. Anderson, 82 Wis. 2d 115, 118-19, 261 N.W.2d 817 (1978); cf. 
                                                 
9 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (2000) (the Parental Kidnapping 
Prevention Act, by means of the Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution, constrains the situations in which a state 
court may exercise jurisdiction in proceedings that affect child 
custody); Wis. Stat. § 822.02(5); Michalik v. Michalik, 172 
Wis. 2d 640, 654, 494 N.W.2d 391 (1993). 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
21 
 
Kett, 222 Wis. 2d at 128 ("A voidable judgment . . . has the 
same effect and force as a valid judgment until it has been set 
aside."). 
¶50 Since Campbell's allegation of fraud, even if true, 
cannot deprive the family court of subject matter jurisdiction 
or personal jurisdiction, and cannot render the custody order 
void, evidence of Denise's alleged fraud cannot negate an 
element of interference with custody. 
2. 
Does Campbell's Fraud Allegation Raise an Affirmative 
Defense? 
¶51 Campbell also contends he should have been allowed to 
present evidence at trial of Denise's alleged misrepresentation 
as part of an affirmative defense.10  Campbell argues that, 
similar to the now-abrogated common law privilege to resist an 
unlawful arrest,  see State v. Hobson, 218 Wis. 2d 350, 577 
N.W.2d 825 (1998), Wisconsin allows a defendant to disregard an 
order procured by fraud and then collaterally attack the 
fraudulently obtained judgment when the judgment supplies the 
basis for a criminal prosecution.  He relies on Boots v. Boots, 
73 Wis. 2d 207, 243 N.W.2d 225 (1976); Zrimsek v. American 
Automobile Insurance Company, 8 Wis. 2d 1, 98 N.W.2d 383 (1959); 
                                                 
10 An affirmative defense is "a defendant's assertion 
raising new facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the 
plaintiff's or prosecution's claim even if all allegations in 
the complaint are true."  State v. Watkins, 2002 WI 101, ¶39, 
255 Wis. 2d 265, 647 N.W.2d 244 (emphasis omitted).  In contrast 
to a "negative defense," an affirmative defense does not 
implicate proof of any of the elements of the crime  Id., ¶40. 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
22 
 
State v. Bouzek, 168 Wis. 2d 642, 484 N.W.2d 362 (Ct. App. 
1992); Schramek v. Bohren, 145 Wis. 2d 695, 429 N.W.2d 501 (Ct. 
App. 
1988); 
and 
State 
v. 
Madison, 
120 
Wis. 2d 150, 
353 
N.W.2d 835 (Ct. App. 1984), as authority for his collateral 
attack on the custody order. 
¶52 A party's ability to collaterally attack a judgment 
for fraud has had a checkered history in Wisconsin.  Early in 
Wisconsin jurisprudence, a judgment could not be collaterally 
attacked for fraud.  Werner v. Riemer, 255 Wis. 386, 403, 39 
N.W.2d 457 (1949) (citing Cody v. Cody, 98 Wis. 445, 452, 74 
N.W. 217 (1898)).  In Cody this court held that a judgment could 
be collaterally attacked only if the court that rendered the 
judgment lacked jurisdiction.  Id. 
¶53 Subsequently, this court revised the Cody rule to 
permit a party to collaterally attack a judgment that was 
procured by fraud.  See Boots, 73 Wis. 2d at 215-16 (discussing 
the evolution away from the rule in Cody).  Now, Wisconsin 
courts may exercise their equitable powers to relieve an 
aggrieved party from a judgment procured by fraud in a 
collateral attack if the party "acts seasonably and was without 
excusable negligence in the action," and where refusing to 
afford relief would subject the party to an unconscionable 
judgment.  Weber v. Weber, 260 Wis. 420, 430-31, 51 N.W.2d 18 
(1952); see also State Cent. Credit Union v. Bayley, 33 
Wis. 2d 367, 373, 147 N.W.2d 265 (1967); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. 
v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244-45, 248 (1944) 
(overruled on other grounds).  Thus, "[e]quitable relief against 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
23 
 
fraudulent 
judgments . . . is 
a 
judicially 
devised 
remedy 
fashioned to relieve hardships which, from time to time, arise 
from a hard and fast adherence to another court-made rule, the 
general rule that judgments should not be disturbed . . . ."  
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 248. 
¶54 In Bouzek, the court quoted at length from Schramek: 
 
A collateral attack is an "attempt to avoid, 
evade or deny the force and effect of a judgment in an 
indirect manner and not in a direct proceeding 
prescribed by law and instituted for the purpose of 
vacating, 
reviewing, 
or 
annulling 
it. . . .  
For 
[plaintiff] to . . . request consideration in separate 
proceedings of any cause of action [based on the 
invalidity of the domestic abuse injunction] would be 
sanctioning a collateral attack on the order of 
another [ ] judicial body.  [Her] only basis for [an] 
attack [on the injunction would be] if she had 
demonstrated 
fraud 
in 
the 
procurement 
of 
the 
injunctive order. 
Bouzek, 168 Wis. 2d at 644-45 (quoting Schramek, 145 Wis. 2d at 
713). 
¶55 In an earlier criminal case, the court of appeals 
said: "As a general rule a judgment is binding on the parties 
and may not be attacked in a collateral action unless it was 
procured by fraud."  Madison, 120 Wis. 2d at 154 (citing Boots, 
73 Wis. 2d at 216).  Though the court of appeals has stated in 
criminal cases that a judgment or order may be collaterally 
attacked if procured by fraud, the court of appeals has never 
applied the rule in these cases.  See Madison, 120 Wis. 2d at 
154; Bouzek, 168 Wis. 2d at 645. 
¶56 There are good reasons not to recognize a common law 
affirmative defense of fraud to interference with child custody. 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
24 
 
¶57 One species of affirmative defense——exemplified by 
self-defense and the now-abrogated privilege to resist unlawful 
arrest——that courts recognize arises where a person is faced 
with the difficult decision whether to commit a crime or suffer 
an injury not otherwise susceptible to effective redress.  See 
Hobson, 218 Wis. 2d at 373-80.  In Hobson the court recognized 
that the privilege to resist unlawful arrest developed at a time 
when arrest was likely to lead to illness, torture, or prolonged 
detention without an opportunity for a hearing.  Id. at 374.  
Hobson, however, abrogated this privilege because judicial 
process had advanced to the point that it offered a more 
effective response to unlawful arrest than physical resistance.  
Id. at 375-76. 
¶58 For similar reasons, no affirmative defense for fraud 
can justify interference with legal custody of a child unless 
there 
is 
a 
credible 
threat 
of 
physical 
harm. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 948.31(4)(a); State v. McCoy, 143 Wis. 2d 274, 295-
96, 421 N.W.2d 107 (1988).  Adequate judicial processes exist to 
attack an order or judgment for fraud.  In this case, Campbell 
received a de novo hearing on the family court order in the 
circuit court.  See Wis. Stat. § 757.69(8).  If he had fully 
pursued the de novo hearing, he would have received a decision, 
and he could have sought an appeal of an adverse determination.  
In addition, he could have attacked the order for fraud after 
the appeal period lapsed.  See Wis. Stat. § 806.07.11  "It is in 
                                                 
11 In relevant part, Wis. Stat. § 806.07 provides: 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
25 
 
the courts that disputes [over the custody of children] should 
be resolved except in those situations where action is required 
by one parent to protect a child from imminent physical harm."  
McCoy, 143 Wis. 2d at 296. 
¶59 Recognition of an affirmative defense entails the 
balancing of competing policy considerations.  We believe the 
legislature properly balanced the competing policies when it 
established four affirmative defenses to interference with legal 
custody 
of 
a 
child. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 948.31(4)(a).  
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court, subject to subs. (2) and (3), may relieve a 
party or legal representative from a judgment, order 
or stipulation for the following reasons: 
. . . .  
(c) Fraud, 
misrepresentation, 
or 
other 
misconduct of an adverse party; 
(d) The judgment is void; 
. . . .  
(g) It is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application; or 
(h) Any other reasons justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. 
(2) The motion shall be made within a reasonable 
time, and, if based on sub. (1)(a) or (c), not more 
than one year after the judgment was entered or the 
order or stipulation was made. . . .  This section 
does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from judgment, 
order, or proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for 
fraud on the court.  (Emphasis added.) 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
26 
 
Interference with legal custody will not result in a conviction 
where the action: 
1. 
Is taken by a parent or by a person 
authorized by a parent to protect his or her child in 
a situation in which the parent or authorized person 
reasonably believes that there is a threat of physical 
harm or sexual assault to the child; 
2. 
Is taken by a parent fleeing in a situation 
in which the parent reasonably believes that there is 
a threat of physical harm or sexual assault to himself 
or herself; 
3. 
Is consented to by the other parent or any 
other person or agency having legal custody of the 
child; or 
4. 
Is otherwise authorized by law. 
Wis. Stat. § 948.31(4)(a). 
 
¶60 None 
of 
these 
legislatively 
created 
affirmative 
defenses applies in this case.  There is no suggestion in the 
record that Denise posed a threat either to the boys or to 
Campbell; Denise did not consent to Campbell taking the boys to 
Mexico; and Campbell's actions were not authorized by law.  The 
family court commissioner's custody order was a valid order, 
with which Campbell was obligated to comply.  See Orethun, 84 
Wis. 2d at 490-91.  Campbell's position would require us to 
overrule cases like Orethun and Anderson, which held that an 
injunctive order must be obeyed even if erroneous.  See Orethun, 
84 Wis. 2d at 490. 
¶61 Furthermore, even if we were inclined to recognize an 
affirmative defense to interference with legal custody for 
fraud, the facts of this case would not warrant relief.  
No.  2004AP803-CR 
27 
 
Requiring Campbell to obey the custody order does not shock the 
conscience.  Campbell not only raised the question of fraud 
before 
the 
family 
court 
commissioner, 
but 
also 
had 
the 
opportunity to contest the validity of the custody order at the 
1998 de novo hearing in circuit court.  Instead of pursuing the 
de novo hearing, he abandoned judicial process in favor of 
absconding to Mexico with Randy and Cody in contravention of a 
valid court order.  In short, Campbell should be precluded from 
litigating 
the 
alleged 
fraud 
since 
he 
already 
had 
the 
opportunity to do so.  Cf. Smith, 283 Wis. 2d 57, ¶22. 
¶62 Under the facts of this case, we refuse to recognize a 
common law affirmative defense of fraud.12  Therefore, the 
circuit court properly prevented Campbell from collaterally 
attacking the underlying custody order despite his allegations 
of fraud.  This holding does not eviscerate the Bouzek rule; it 
helps define and give substance to the Bouzek rule.  Were we to 
hold otherwise, we would be rewriting decades of law on the 
operative effect of voidable judgments. 
D. 
Standby Counsel 
 
¶63 The second issue we must decide is, under what 
conditions, if any, may a circuit court impose attorney fees for 
standby counsel as a condition of a defendant's probation? 
                                                 
12 Because we have decided that Campbell's fraud allegations 
cannot establish that the family court lacked jurisdiction, and 
therefore any evidence he would have presented is not relevant 
to either negating an element of the crime or establishing an 
affirmative defense, we need not reach the question of whether 
the doctrine of unclean hands applies in a criminal proceeding. 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
28 
 
¶64 In its purest form, standby counsel is primarily an 
aid to the circuit court.  State v. Lehman, 137 Wis. 2d 65, 78, 
403 N.W.2d 438 (1987).  When a defendant chooses to exercise his 
right to self-representation and relinquish his right to be 
represented by counsel, the circuit court, acting in its 
discretion, has the authority to appoint an attorney to act as 
standby counsel.  Id. (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 
184 (1984)).  Even if the defendant objects, the circuit court 
may appoint standby counsel.  Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 184; Faretta 
v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-35 n.46 (1975).  When the 
circuit court appoints standby counsel over the objection of the 
defendant, it naturally follows that standby counsel functions 
primarily for the benefit of the circuit court.  See Lehman, 137 
Wis. 2d at 78. 
¶65 Sometimes——as in this case——a defendant may embrace 
the appointment of standby counsel.  At his initial appearance, 
Campbell welcomed the appointment of standby counsel, even 
agreeing to repay the attorney fees of standby counsel.13 
                                                 
13 The following exchange occurred between Circuit Judge 
James L. Carlson and Campbell: 
THE DEFENDANT: I understand, because I am pro se, I 
don't 
have 
the 
advantage 
of 
an 
appropriate counsel. 
THE COURT: 
If——you want a backup attorney? 
THE DEFENDANT: A backup attorney would be great if the 
Court would allow that. 
. . . .  
No.  2004AP803-CR 
29 
 
¶66 The role of standby counsel can vary over a wide 
spectrum, ranging from a warm body sitting beside the defendant 
throughout trial to participation that is tantamount to that of 
defense counsel.  See Anne Bowen Poulin, The Role of Standby 
Counsel in Criminal Cases: In the Twilight Zone of the Criminal 
Justice System, 75 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 676, 676 (2000).  In the 
present case, Attorney Martin's role was much closer to full-
fledged defense counsel than passive observer.  Commenting on 
Attorney Martin's role as standby counsel, the circuit court 
said: 
I do not know what Judge Carlson had in mind.  I 
many times during the course of my involvement with 
the 
Campbell 
case . . . wished . . . devoutly 
that 
Judge Carlson had decided not to appoint stand-by 
counsel. 
There is no way that Mr. Martin was doing 
anything this court felt was in the court's interest.  
In fact, he was——[I] literally felt . . . that he had 
to do just everything for the defendant that the 
defendant wanted, and he did, um, to an extensive 
                                                                                                                                                             
THE DEFENDANT: The idea then would be to go pro se 
with counsel.  Simply because there is 
a very, very specific way that you have 
to address questions. 
 
. . . .  
THE COURT: 
All right, you just heard the ruling.  
I'll appoint a court-appointed lawyer.  
You are subject to repaying that.  Do 
you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: I understand that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: 
To the best of your ability.  I will 
set $50 a month at this time. 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
30 
 
degree where sometimes I felt there's no way I felt 
Mr. Martin would have raised those issues as a 
competent counsel.  The only reason he was raising 
them is because he was at the direction of the 
defendant who was telling him do it. 
 . . . I make the specific finding that if Mr. 
Campbell initially said he didn't want counsel, he 
certainly accepted stand-by counsel; and then instead 
of saying, okay, you've got him, but I'm not going to 
use him or I'll use him only a little, he's used him 
so 
extensively 
that 
the 
court 
was 
literally 
flabbergasted by that use, and used him in ways that 
no legitimate counsel would have decided independently 
to do. 
There is, thus, no question in my mind that the 
appointment of Mr. Martin did not serve the interest 
of the court exceptionally except to the small degree 
that Mr. Campbell should have at least somebody to 
handle——to talk to him about fine points of law. 
Martin went way beyond that, way, way beyond 
that; he served the defendant's interest virtually 
entirely and followed the directions of the defendant, 
and a number of times in court literally pointed out 
to the court that, hey, he's [Campbell] the boss, 
that's what I have to do.  That is a defense counsel. 
. . . He 
prepared 
motions. 
 
He 
did 
legal 
research.  He filed motions.  He interviewed and 
located witnesses.  He reviewed files and transcripts.  
He filed a petition for supervisory writ with the 
Court of Appeals.  He advised evidentiary objections 
and himself cross-examined a witness as was recalled. 
Based on the functional role played by Attorney Martin, the 
circuit court imposed standby counsel attorney fees upon 
Campbell 
as 
a 
condition 
of 
probation, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(e). 
 
¶67 On appeal, Campbell contends a circuit court lacks 
statutory authority to impose attorney fees of standby counsel 
as a condition of probation.  We disagree.  Two statutes——
No.  2004AP803-CR 
31 
 
Wis. Stat. §§ 973.06 and 973.09——confer upon circuit courts the 
authority to impose attorney fees of standby counsel upon a 
defendant in certain situations as a condition of probation.  
 
¶68 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.06 authorizes a court to impose 
certain costs, fees, and surcharges upon a defendant as part of 
his sentence.  Section 973.06(1) provides, in part: "[T]he 
costs, fees, and surcharges taxable against the defendant shall 
consist of the following items and no others: . . . (e) Attorney 
fees payable to the defense attorney by the county or the 
state." 
 
¶69 Another statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.09, authorizes a 
court to impose the payment of costs and restitution, upon a 
defendant, as a condition of probation.  Section 973.09(1) 
provides in part that "[t]he court may impose any conditions 
which appear to be reasonable and appropriate."  Then, more 
specifically, § 973.09(1g) reads: 
If the court places the person on probation, the 
court may require, upon consideration of the factors 
specified in s. 973.20(13)(a)2. to 5., that the 
probationer reimburse the county or the state, as 
applicable, for any costs for legal representation to 
the county or the state for the defense of the case.  
In order to receive this reimbursement, the county or 
the state public defender shall provide a statement of 
its costs of legal representation to the defendant and 
court within the time period set by the court. 
 
¶70 In considering the relationship between these two 
statutes, the list of costs authorized in Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1) 
circumscribes the costs a circuit court may impose as a 
condition of probation under Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1g).  Thus, the 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
32 
 
court of appeals concluded that it was error for the court to 
impose one-half the cost of a special prosecutor as a condition 
of probation.  See State v. Amato, 126 Wis. 2d 212, 217-18, 376 
N.W.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1985).  The court noted that § 973.06 
replaced statutes that permitted the imposition of the costs of 
prosecution.  Id. at 215.  The gist of the Amato decision is 
that the specific language of § 973.06(1)(e)——"[a]ttorney fees 
payable to the defense attorney"——should prevail over the more 
general language——"costs for legal representation . . . for the 
defense 
of 
the 
case"——in § 973.09(1g). 
 
As 
a 
general 
proposition, we agree with this analysis. 
 
¶71 Nonetheless, other cases indicate that neither a 
defendant nor his attorney can expect to run up the public costs 
of the court system without consequence.  In State v. Foster, 
100 Wis. 2d 103, 301 N.W.2d 192 (1981), the court imposed the 
costs of one day's jury fees, using Wis. Stat. § 814.51, upon a 
defendant who decided to enter a plea "at six o'clock in the 
evening" on the night before trial.  Id. at 104.  In House v. 
Circuit 
Court 
for 
Marinette 
County, 
112 
Wis. 2d 14, 
331 
N.W.2d 859 (1983), the court imposed jury costs on an attorney 
who failed to show up at a scheduled trial.  The first of these 
cases relied upon a specific statute, Foster, 100 Wis. 2d at 
108-10, the second relied upon the court's inherent authority to 
assure the orderly administration of justice.  House, 112 
Wis. 2d at 16.  The present case does not implicate these 
authorities, 
but 
the 
policy 
embodied 
in 
these 
cases 
is 
definitely relevant. 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
33 
 
 
¶72 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.06 permits the court to impose a 
lengthy list of costs upon an unsuccessful defendant.  At 
sentencing, the court may require a probationer to reimburse the 
county or the state, as applicable, "for any costs for legal 
representation . . . for 
the 
defense 
of 
the 
case."  
Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09(1g) and 977.07(2m).  We think the term 
"defense attorney" in § 973.06 is broad enough to cover standby 
counsel in certain situations.  
 
¶73 A circuit court may impose the attorney fees of 
standby counsel upon a defendant as a condition of probation 
where either (1) the defendant agrees to reimburse the county 
for the attorney fees; or (2) the court informs the defendant of 
his potential liability for the fees and the defendant uses 
standby counsel so extensively that he or she functions as 
traditional defense counsel.  By requiring one of these two 
prerequisites to be present, a court will achieve the proper 
balance between a defendant's right to represent himself and the 
public's right to the orderly and efficient administration of 
justice. 
 
¶74 There 
is 
no 
dispute 
that 
a 
defendant 
has 
a 
constitutional right to defend himself.  Faretta, 422 U.S. at 
817.  A defendant also has a right to an attorney at public 
expense if he cannot afford an attorney.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Carpenter v. County of Dane, 9 Wis. 274 
(1859). In Moore v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 285, 300, 265 N.W.2d 540 
(1978), this court held that a defendant "has no constitutional 
right to be actively represented in the courtroom both by 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
34 
 
counsel and by himself."  Id. (emphasis added).  When this 
double-barrel representation occurs, however, the circuit court 
cannot be deprived of the ability to attempt to recoup some of 
the public costs.  If the court were deprived of the ability to 
hold an unsuccessful defendant accountable for this sort of dual 
representation, some defendants who could afford to pay for 
their own attorney would resort to the same tactics employed by 
Campbell in an effort to dodge financial responsibility. 
¶75 In this case, the circuit court appointed Attorney 
Martin much as a court would appoint traditional defense 
counsel.  After Campbell asserted he was indigent, and after the 
circuit court decided to appoint standby counsel, the circuit 
court informed Campbell of his obligation to pay the attorney 
fees, 
subject 
to 
his 
ability 
to 
pay. 
 
Cf. 
Wis. Stat. § 977.07(2m). 
 
¶76 Campbell welcomed the court-appointed standby counsel 
and agreed to pay his attorney fees.  By welcoming court-
appointed standby counsel and heavily utilizing him throughout 
the proceedings, Campbell effectively converted Attorney Martin 
into his co-counsel.  Although we have recognized that the 
"chief purpose" of standby counsel in most cases is to "serve 
the interests of the trial court," Lehman, 137 Wis. 2d at 78, 
this is not always the case and it was not the case here.  As 
the circuit court's summary of Martin's performance indicates, 
while 
Martin 
may 
have 
been 
appointed 
initially 
for 
the 
assistance of the circuit court, he became Campbell's agent 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
35 
 
almost immediately.  Thus, although nominally acting as standby 
counsel, Campbell functioned as an attorney for the defendant.   
¶77 Where a defendant agrees to reimburse the county for 
the attorney fees of standby counsel or the circuit court 
informs the defendant of his potential liability for the fees 
and the defendant uses standby counsel so extensively that he or 
she 
functions 
as 
traditional 
defense 
counsel, 
Wis. Stat. §§ 973.06(1)(e) and 973.09(1g) give a circuit court 
the authority to impose the attorney fees of standby counsel as 
a condition of probation.  Cf. Mincey v. Florida, 684 So.2d 236 
(Fla. 1996).  Where, however, a defendant does not agree to 
reimburse the county for the attorney fees, or is not informed 
of his potential obligation to pay the attorney fees of standby 
counsel, a circuit court may not impose attorney fees as a 
condition 
of 
probation, 
under 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(e).  When standby counsel acts primarily 
for the benefit of the court rather than as an attorney serving 
the 
defendant, 
attorney 
fees 
for 
standby 
counsel 
are 
inappropriate. 
¶78 In this case, Campbell agreed to pay the attorney fees 
of standby counsel, satisfying the first test.  In addition, the 
court informed Campbell of his obligation to reimburse the 
county for the fees and he made extensive use of Attorney 
Martin, satisfying the second test.  Under either test, 
therefore, Campbell is responsible for Attorney Martin's fees, 
subject only to his ability to pay. 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
36 
 
¶79 Both this court and the United States Supreme Court 
have found that as a condition of probation a defendant may be 
required to pay the attorney fees of a public defender.  Fuller 
v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 53-54 (1974); State v. Gerard, 57 
Wis. 2d 611, 626, 205 N.W.2d 374 (1973).  Before doing so, 
however, a circuit court must evaluate the defendant's ability 
to pay.  Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09(1g) and 973.20(13)(a)2. to 5. 
¶80 A court should do no less before imposing the attorney 
fees of standby counsel upon a defendant.  Thus, the circuit 
court must consider (1) "[t]he financial resources of the 
defendant[;]" (2) [t]he present and future earning ability of 
the defendant[;]" (3) "[t]he needs and earning ability of the 
defendant's dependents[;]" and (4) "[a]ny other factors which 
the court deems appropriate[,]" before imposing attorney fees of 
standby counsel.  See § 973.20(13)(a)2. to 5.  Because the 
circuit court imposed the full amount of Attorney Martin's fees, 
$17,585.35, upon Campbell without determining his ability to 
pay, we remand this matter to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this proceeding. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶81 We affirm Campbell's convictions for interference with 
Denise's legal custody of Cody and bail jumping.  The circuit 
court properly prevented Campbell from collaterally attacking 
the custody order that awarded Denise legal custody.  Because 
Campbell's allegations of fraud do not tend to negate any 
element of a crime and do not constitute an affirmative defense, 
the circuit court properly excluded evidence of the alleged 
No.  2004AP803-CR 
37 
 
fraud and prevented Campbell from collaterally attacking the 
custody order. 
¶82 Furthermore, 
because 
Campbell's 
conviction 
for 
interference with Denise's legal custody of Randy——a conviction 
he does not challenge——is sufficient to support his conviction 
for bail jumping, we affirm his conviction for bail jumping. 
¶83 We also conclude that in exercising its discretion to 
appoint standby counsel, a circuit court may impose the attorney 
fees of standby counsel upon a defendant as a condition of 
probation where either (1) the defendant agrees to reimburse the 
county for the attorney fees; or (2) the court informs the 
defendant of his potential liability for the fees and the 
defendant uses standby counsel so extensively that he or she 
functions 
as 
traditional 
defense 
counsel. 
 
Under 
both 
alternatives, however, before imposing fees the court must 
determine 
the 
defendant's 
ability 
to 
pay 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 973.20(13)(a)2. to 5.  Because that determination 
was not made in this case, we remand to the circuit court to 
evaluate Campbell's ability to pay. 
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court 
are affirmed and the cause is remanded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2004AP803-CR.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
¶84 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  I join that portion of the majority 
opinion which affirms the judgments of conviction in this case.  
I write separately because I strongly disagree with the 
majority's conclusion that a circuit court has the authority to 
impose attorney fees for standby counsel as a condition of a 
defendant's probation.  Majority op., part III D, ¶¶63-80.  I 
therefore dissent from that portion of the opinion. 
I 
¶85 During his continued initial appearance on June 19, 
2001,1 defendant John Campbell (Campbell) appeared pro se, having 
filed a request to appear pro se.  Campbell also filed a signed 
"Waiver of Right to Attorney" form.2  At the continued initial 
appearance, the trial court asked Campbell if he had ever 
studied evidence, civil procedure, or criminal procedure, to 
which Campbell responded that he had not, but noted that the 
defendant in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), had the 
same problem.  The circuit court judge agreed that Campbell had 
a right to represent himself.  The court then stated as follows: 
                                                 
1 The record does not contain any transcript of the earlier 
proceeding that was apparently adjourned. 
2 On the waiver form, Campbell indicated that he was a 48-
year-old 
youth 
pastor 
with 
some 
college 
education, 
who 
understood that an attorney could be of assistance to him in 
regards 
to 
preparing 
a 
defense, 
presenting 
motions, 
or 
negotiating with the prosecutor.  While he indicated that he did 
have questions that he would like to ask the court, he 
nevertheless signed the form on June 18, 2001, the day before 
the continued initial appearance.     
No.  2004AP803-CR.lbb 
 
2 
 
I want to make sure that you have a fundamental 
understanding of the Rules of Procedure, because you 
have to follow them.  And you have to select the jury.  
We have a jury trial:  Make your strikes; ask the 
appropriate questions.  You can't just get away with 
asking questions in a free-lance way and get in 
evidence people using attorneys do and following the 
rule would get in, and – 
¶86 Campbell noted that because he was pro se, he did not 
"have the advantage of an appropriate counsel."  The circuit 
court then asked if he wanted a "backup attorney?"  Campbell 
responded that "[a] backup attorney would be great if the court 
would allow that."  The following colloquy then took place: 
 
THE COURT:  Well, I've done that in the past.  
Are you – I don't know if you've asked for an 
attorney.  I don't know if you're indigent. 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  I am indigent, Your Honor.  I'm a 
minister.  We don't make a hundred dollars a week.  
And 
that's 
doing 
a 
couple 
of 
funerals 
in 
California. . . .  
 
THE COURT:  Did you, did you fill out a form here 
that shows your indigency? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 . . . .  
 
THE DEFENDANT:  The idea then would be to go pro 
se with counsel.  Simply because there is a very, very 
specific way that you have to address questions. 
 
THE COURT:  I just had a trial that way.  And, 
first of all, the defendant used the defense counsel 
and used their law books and their lawyer's ability to 
help them do the research, and handle the case 
themselves.  So that's a possibility. 
¶87 The circuit court engaged Campbell in a dialogue that 
appears to have discussed the indigency form filled out by 
Campbell.  The court then determined that Campbell wanted to 
represent himself and stated, "I will appoint a court-appointed 
No.  2004AP803-CR.lbb 
 
3 
 
lawyer. . . . I don't know, you might qualify for [a] Public 
Defender.  I think he would – you should give the Public 
Defender a call."  A public defender then responded, "[j]udge, 
public defenders don't do backups."  Following a discussion off 
the record, the circuit court appointed "a court-appointed 
lawyer[,]" subject to repayment.   
¶88 According to the transcript, the circuit court never 
determined whether Campbell was indigent,3 never made a finding 
that Campbell freely, voluntarily, and understandingly waived 
counsel, and never determined that Campbell was competent to 
represent himself at trial.4  See State v. Klessig, 211 
Wis. 2d 194, ¶14, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997).  The circuit court 
order for standby representation, filed June 19, 2001, provides 
as follows: 
 
WHEREAS, this court has determined that the 
interests of justice and efficient operation of the 
                                                 
3 According to the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services, Campbell's 2001 income was less than half of the 
federal poverty guidelines for that year.  66 Federal Register 
10695-10697 (February 16, 2001). 
4 The parties have not raised these issues.  I mention them 
because it is not clear what the court meant when it ordered 
that Campbell be "represented by standby counsel."  In the 
absence of a clear finding of waiver of the right to counsel or 
a determination of Campbell's competence to represent himself, 
was the circuit court appointing Attorney Martin to represent 
Campbell?  If so, was Campbell deprived of his right to 
represent himself?  Should the majority engage a Wiggins 
analysis to determine whether Campbell was truly in control of 
his defense?  McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).  If, on 
the other hand, the circuit court appointed Attorney Martin to 
merely act as standby counsel, then how can the circuit court 
order the payment of standby counsel fees when the cost statute 
prohibits such an order?  See Part III, infra.     
No.  2004AP803-CR.lbb 
 
4 
 
court 
require 
that 
[Campbell] be 
represented by 
standby counsel; 
 
THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that James Martin 
[] be, and is, appointed to represent the defendant as 
standby counsel  . . .  
¶89 There is no such thing as a "backup attorney."  This 
court has already held that a defendant "has no constitutional 
right to be actively represented in the courtroom both by 
counsel and himself."  Moore v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 285, 300, 265 
N.W.2d 540 (1978).  Counsel could either represent Campbell, or 
counsel could assist Campbell in representing himself.  Counsel 
could not do both. 
¶90 Here is the problem: if the court appointed standby 
counsel to "represent" Campbell, as stated in the order, then 
his 
constitutional 
right 
to 
represent 
himself 
has 
been 
interfered with.  If, on the other hand, the court appointed 
counsel 
to 
act 
as 
"standby 
counsel" 
for 
Campbell, 
then 
Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1) precludes repayment for the cost of 
counsel.   
II 
¶91 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, § 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution give a criminal 
defendant the right to conduct his or her own defense.  Klessig, 
211 Wis. 2d at 203.  That right "exists to affirm the accused's 
individual dignity and autonomy."  McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 
168, 176-77 (1984).  "The pro se defendant must be allowed to 
control the organization and content of his own defense, to make 
motions, to argue points of law, to participate in voir dire, to 
No.  2004AP803-CR.lbb 
 
5 
 
question witnesses, and to address the court and the jury at 
appropriate points in the trial."  Id. at 174.   
¶92 As the majority notes, when a defendant chooses to 
exercise his or her right to self-representation and relinquish 
the right to be represented by counsel, the circuit court, 
acting in its discretion, has the authority to appoint an 
attorney to act as standby counsel.  Majority op., ¶64.  
Contrary to the majority's assertions, that appointment is for 
the purpose of assisting the court.  Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 184; 
State v. Lehman, 137 Wis. 2d 65, 83, 403 N.W.2d 438 (1987).  
Compare majority op., ¶¶65-66.  Such a decision must be based on 
a determination that the needs of the trial court, and not the 
defendant, would be best served by doing so.  Lehman, 137 
Wis. 2d at 77. 
¶93 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
expressly 
recognized that standby counsel can have a very active role in 
the conduct of criminal proceedings when defendant and standby 
counsel disagree, as well as when the defendant embraces the 
actions of standby counsel.  In Wiggins, the Court noted that 
during the trial outside the presence of the jury, "[o]n several 
occasions 
Wiggins 
expressly 
adopted 
standby 
counsel's 
initiatives. . . . On several other occasions Wiggins strongly 
opposed the initiatives of counsel."  Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 180.  
Conflicts were resolved in favor of the defendant, thereby 
leaving him in control over his defense.  Id. at 181.   
¶94 Of more concern to the Wiggins Court was standby 
counsel's participation during the trial in the presence of the 
No.  2004AP803-CR.lbb 
 
6 
 
jury.  Id.  The Court recognized that the right of self-
representation is not infringed when standby counsel assists the 
pro se defendant in overcoming procedural or evidentiary 
obstacles 
at 
trial, 
or 
helps 
to 
ensure 
the 
defendant's 
compliance with basic rules of courtroom protocol and procedure.  
Id. at 183.  Accordingly, the court concluded as follows: 
A defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are not violated 
when a trial judge appoints standby counsel——even over 
the defendant's objection——to relieve the judge of the 
need to explain and enforce basic rules of courtroom 
protocol or to assist the defendant in overcoming 
routine obstacles that stand in the way of the 
defendant's achievement of his own clearly indicated 
goals. 
Id. at 184. 
¶95 The 
majority 
in 
this 
action 
construes 
Attorney 
Martin's role in this case as being "much closer to full-fledged 
defense counsel than passive observer."  Majority op. at ¶66.  
The majority concludes that by welcoming court-appointed standby 
counsel and heavily using him throughout the proceedings, 
Attorney Martin became a defense attorney for Campbell.  Id., 
¶76.  If the majority is correct, then Campbell may have been 
deprived of his right of self-representation.  Campbell either 
represented himself, or he didn't.  The majority cannot have it 
both ways.   
¶96 If the circuit court appointed Attorney Martin to 
"represent" Campbell without telling him, then this court must 
explore a Wiggins analysis to determine whether Campbell was in 
control of his defense.  If he was, then Attorney Martin truly 
acted as standby counsel.  If, on the other hand, counsel took 
No.  2004AP803-CR.lbb 
 
7 
 
control over the defense, then Campbell has been deprived of his 
right of self-representation.  Attorney Martin cannot fulfill 
both roles, and the circuit court did not (and could not) 
appoint Attorney Martin to act as co-counsel.  Because I 
conclude that the role played by Attorney Martin was consistent 
with the role of standby counsel recognized in Wiggins, I 
therefore conclude that standby counsel here was just that, 
standby counsel.  To conclude otherwise would require that the 
defendant receive a new trial, as a violation of the right of 
self-representation is not subject to the harmless error rule.  
Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 177 n.8. 
III 
¶97 The 
majority 
correctly 
concludes 
that 
Wis. Stat. §§ 973.06(1) and 973.09(1g) must be read together to 
determine whether a circuit court has the authority to order 
Campbell to pay as a condition of probation the costs of standby 
counsel.  Majority op., ¶¶67-70.  The court of appeals has 
already held, and the majority agrees, as a general proposition, 
that 
the 
exclusive 
list 
for 
costs 
authorized 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1) circumscribes the costs a circuit court 
may impose as a condition of probation.  Id., ¶70 (citing State 
v. Amato, 126 Wis. 2d 212, 217-18, 376 N.W.2d 75 (Ct. App. 
1985)).  The reason for such a rule is expressly set forth by 
the statute; "Except as provided in s. 93.20,5 the costs, fees, 
and surcharges taxable against the defendant shall consist of 
the following items and no others[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1).  
                                                 
5 This section is not applicable. 
No.  2004AP803-CR.lbb 
 
8 
 
See also State v. Neave, 220 Wis. 2d 786, 790, 585 N.W.2d 169 
(Ct. App. 1998).  Thus, the decision on this issue hinges upon 
this court's interpretation of § 973.06(1)(e): "[a]ttorney fees 
payable to the defense attorney by the county or the state."   
¶98 The 
majority 
concludes 
that 
"the 
term 
'defense 
attorney' in § 973.06 is broad enough to cover standby counsel 
in certain situations."  Majority op., ¶72.  I respectfully 
disagree.  As previously noted, the decision to appoint standby 
counsel should be based on a determination that the needs of the 
trial court and not the defendant would be best served by doing 
so.  Lehman, 137 Wis. 2d at 77.  Indeed, that was done in this 
case.  The circuit court appointed Attorney Martin for Campbell 
in "the interests of justice and efficient operation of the 
court[.]"  The Lehman court used the term "assist" the defendant 
to describe the role of standby counsel, and used that term 
broadly.  Id. at 79-80.  As Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(e) provides 
for "attorney fees payable to the defense attorney[,]" "and no 
others[,]"6 no statutory provision exists that authorizes the 
payment of costs by the defendant for standby counsel appointed 
to assist the court by assisting the defendant.   
¶99 The question of who pays for standby counsel has 
already been addressed and decided by this court.  In Lehman, 
this 
court 
agreed 
that, 
with 
the 
exception 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 753.19,7 no other statutory provision provides for 
                                                 
6 Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1). 
7 Wisconsin Stats. § 753.19 reads as follows:   
No.  2004AP803-CR.lbb 
 
9 
 
the payment of the fees for standby counsel.  Id. at 83.  That 
statute provides that "[t]he cost of operation of the circuit 
court for each county . . . except as otherwise provided, shall 
be paid by the county."  Wis. Stat. § 753.19.  This court 
reasoned that "the services rendered by the standby counsel are 
actually services to the court."  Lehman, 137 Wis. 2d at 83.  
This court stated that since the "trial judge determined that 
the appointment of standby counsel was essential, . . . the 
resulting fees were a 'necessary cost of the operation of the 
court. . . . '"  Id.  The court thus concluded that the duty of 
payment fell upon the county under Wis. Stat. § 753.19.  Id.  
¶100 For the reasons stated, Attorney Martin was not the 
defense attorney in this matter.  As such, the circuit court 
lacks the authority to order Campbell to pay for the costs of 
standby counsel as a condition of probation.  Other than 
Wis. Stat. § 753.19, no other statutory provision provides for 
the payment of the cost of standby counsel.  Consequently, the 
circuit court erred in ordering Campbell to pay for Attorney 
Martin's services as a condition of probation. 
¶101 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from that portion 
of the majority opinion dealing with costs.                 
                                                                                                                                                             
The cost of operation of the circuit court for each 
county, except for the salaries of judges and court 
reporters provided to be paid by the state, and except 
for the cost assumed by the state under this chapter 
and chs. 40 and 230, and except as otherwise provided, 
shall be paid by the county.   
 
No.  2004AP803-CR.lbb 
 
10 
 
¶102 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurring in part, dissenting in part 
opinion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2004AP803-CR.lbb 
 
 
 
1