Title: Commonwealth v. Philbrook
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11615
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 28, 2016

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SJC-11615 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  GEORGE PHILBROOK. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     December 11, 2015. - July 28, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, 
JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Prior violent conduct, State of mind, 
Intent.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Argument by 
prosecutor, Mistrial, Jury and jurors, Conduct of juror.  
Jury and Jurors. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 27, 2007. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Kathe M. Tuttman, J. 
 
 
 
Elizabeth Caddick for the defendant. 
 
Bethany Stevens, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  The defendant was convicted of murder in the 
first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation in the 
                                                 
 
1 Justice Duffly participated in the deliberation on this 
case and authored this opinion prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
shooting death of his former wife, Dorothy Philbrook.2  The 
defendant and his former wife were divorced in 1975, but had 
been living together for many years when, on August 17, 2007, 
the defendant shot her five times on the street in front of 
their house in Everett, in view of some of their neighbors.  The 
defendant does not dispute that he was the shooter.  His defense 
at trial was that he was not criminally responsible because the 
prescription medications that he was taking exacerbated an 
underlying brain disease, creating a mental disease or defect 
that caused him to be unable to conform his actions to the law.3 
On appeal, the defendant contends that the judge abused her 
discretion in allowing the admission of evidence of prior bad 
acts shortly prior to and immediately following the killing.  
The defendant also claims that the judge erred in denying his 
motion for a mistrial after learning that three jurors had 
discussed the case before deliberations began.  Finally, while 
conceding that the evidence was sufficient to support his 
                                                 
2 The defendant also was convicted of possession of a 
firearm with a defaced serial number during the commission of a 
felony, G. L. c. 269, § 11B; unlawful possession of a firearm, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); and unlawful possession of ammunition, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h). 
 
3 A "defendant is not criminally responsible for his actions 
-- and therefore entitled to a verdict of not guilty -- if, at 
the relevant time and due to a mental illness (mental disease or 
defect), he lacks the substantial capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of an action or to act in conformity with the law."  
Commonwealth v. DiPadova, 460 Mass. 424, 431 (2011), citing 
Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 546-547 (1967). 
3 
 
conviction of murder in the first degree, the defendant argues 
that a reduction in the verdict would be more consonant with 
justice, and asks that we exercise our power pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict of murder in the first 
degree to a lesser degree of guilt. 
We affirm the convictions, and discern no reason to 
exercise our power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
1.  Background.  a.  Commonwealth's case.  We summarize the 
facts the jury could have found.  The defendant and the victim, 
who had divorced in 1975, renewed their relationship in 1980.  
They did not remarry, but lived together in a house in Everett.  
Their relationship was tumultuous, and they "constantly" fought 
about money.  In the week prior to the shooting, the defendant 
told his granddaughter that he believed the victim had stolen 
$50,000 from him and had spent the money on lottery tickets.  He 
said that if he learned his suspicions were correct, he would 
shoot and kill her.4  On August 15, 2007, two days before the 
shooting, the defendant went to an athletic club where he worked 
as a janitor and struck one of the club patrons with a baseball 
bat.  He told police he had done so because he believed that the 
                                                 
4 The defendant's granddaughter, who was a young adult at 
the time of trial, but was a minor at the time of the shooting, 
had lived with him and the victim until approximately two weeks 
before the shooting.  She testified in response to questions 
regarding the victim's purchase of lottery tickets that the 
victim "would play the daily numbers once or twice a day," but 
spent only small amounts of money on each purchase. 
4 
 
patron had stolen $700 from him.5  Following this incident, the 
defendant was fired from his job at the club. 
At 8:16 P.M. on August 17, 2007, the victim telephoned her 
adult son from her cordless home telephone and spoke with him as 
she stood outside her house.  She was upset and said she was 
"fed up" with the defendant and was going to call the police.  
The son heard the defendant pick up another telephone, located 
inside the house, enabling him to hear the conversation on that 
extension.  The defendant was "very angry," and began "yelling" 
and swearing, "[Y]ou're going to call the fucking police?" 
Several neighbors saw or heard the events leading up to the 
shooting, the shooting itself, and its immediate aftermath.  At 
approximately 8:20 P.M., the victim ran across the street away 
from her house, screaming.  The defendant followed her, walking 
calmly, his arm extended and holding a gun in his hand.  As the 
victim continued running, she tripped on the curb and turned 
toward the defendant, who began shooting at her, repeating "take 
that," after each of the first three shots.  The victim fell 
face down on the ground.  Standing over her, the defendant said, 
"Go ahead.  Call the fucking police," then walked away.  In all, 
the defendant fired six shots; the victim was struck by five of 
the bullets.  Four of the bullets penetrated her body, in her 
                                                 
5 The defendant was charged with assault and battery, G. L. 
c. 265, § 15A (b), as a result of this attack; trial on that 
charge was severed from the defendant's murder trial. 
5 
 
left arm, left torso, the back of her neck, and the left side of 
her head, and a fifth grazed the back of her neck.  She died as 
a result of the gunshot wounds.6 
Neighbors telephoned 911, and police arrived within minutes 
of the shooting.  Shortly after the shooting, a neighbor saw the 
defendant standing on the corner of his street, craning his neck 
and looking in the direction of his house.  He then turned 
around and "took off" away from the scene. 
Approximately one-half hour later, the defendant approached 
a couple who were sitting on the steps of their apartment 
building listening to a police scanner and spoke to them.  The 
man had just heard that police were looking for a suspect with a 
gun.  When he noticed that the defendant was carrying a gun in 
his pants, the woman telephoned 911.  The defendant was 
apprehended in a liquor store shortly thereafter, while 
attempting to purchase a six-pack of beer, cigarettes, and 
candy. 
b.  Defendant's case.  The defendant's trial took place in 
February, 2013.  The roughly six-year period between the 
shooting and the trial was due in part to several continuances 
for competency evaluations by different experts. 
The defendant introduced testimony by three psychiatric 
                                                 
6 It could not be determined which of the shots caused the 
victim's death. 
6 
 
experts who opined that he suffered from an organic brain 
disease that had resulted in shrinkage of his frontal lobe.7  One 
of the experts, a clinical professor of psychiatry at Harvard 
Medical School, testified that the defendant had "organic brain 
syndrome" as a result of brain injuries and the combined side 
effects of the prescription medications he was taking at the 
time of the shooting,8 in conjunction with chronic alcohol and 
illegal drug abuse (cocaine), which exacerbated the organic 
brain disease.  The expert testified that "compulsive behavior" 
is a known side effect of the most recently prescribed of the 
defendant's medications, Requip.  He opined that, in combination 
with the defendant's brain disease and the other prescription 
medications the defendant was taking, Requip had caused an 
"acute" side effect, such that the defendant was "tipped . . . 
over into a compulsive behavior . . . [and] unable to control 
                                                 
7 Experts for the Commonwealth and the defendant disputed  
whether "organic brain syndrome" was at that time an accepted 
diagnosis under the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV).  
It was undisputed, however, that the symptoms previously 
associated with that syndrome continued to be recognized under 
other diagnostic names.  It was also undisputed that magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) tests performed on the defendant in 
2008, soon after the shooting, revealed some shrinkage of his 
frontal lobe, which is one of the symptoms of what had been 
called "organic brain syndrome."  The contested issue centered 
on the extent to which this physical defect had resulted in 
cognitive or emotional impairments in the defendant's mental 
state at the time of the shooting. 
 
8 These medications included: Cymbalta, alprazolam (Xanax), 
mirtazapine (Remeron), gabapentin (Neurontin), ropinirole 
(Requip), tramadol (Ultram), and propoxy (Darvocet). 
7 
 
his behavior."  This expert also testified that, at the time of 
the shooting, the defendant's brain disease, exacerbated by the 
medications he was taking, caused him to develop a delusional 
belief that his former wife was stealing money from him.  
Because of the compulsive side effects from the defendant's 
medication, this delusional belief was "translated . . . into an 
action"; as his behavior was compulsive, the defendant had been 
unable to conform his conduct to the law.9 
Another expert testified that the defendant had 
difficulties with executive function, or "thinking in an 
organized way."  Such functions are controlled by the frontal 
lobe, which plays an important role in an individual's ability 
to control emotions and behavior.  The third expert opined that 
the defendant appeared to have memory deficits and it was 
likely, based on the defendant's speech and vocabulary, that he 
had below-average intelligence; this expert did not opine 
whether these deficits were as a result of the defendant's brain 
injury.  Two of the defendant's experts also testified that 
long-term substance abuse or alcohol abuse could have aggravated 
the symptoms of his brain disease. 
A neighbor who witnessed the shooting testified that after 
                                                 
9 While the expert opined that the defendant could not 
conform his conduct to the law, he was not able to form an 
opinion as to whether the defendant could appreciate the 
consequences of his actions. 
8 
 
shooting the victim the defendant had a "blank look," that he 
thought was similar to "tunnel vision."10  In addition, a witness 
who had known the defendant for thirty years testified that, 
during the month before the shooting, the defendant was "very, 
very moody" and "paranoid" about the possibility that he would 
lose his job, and was irritable and angry.11  The defendant also 
introduced evidence concerning his prior abuse of cocaine, 
marijuana, and alcohol.12 
                                                 
10 The defendant does not assert that he was intoxicated by 
alcohol at the time of the shooting.  In his recorded police 
interview, which was played for the jury, the defendant stated 
that he had consumed somewhere between one and four beers the 
morning of the murder, but had consumed his last beer more than 
eight hours before the shooting occurred. 
 
11 To show the extent of his delusion, the defendant 
introduced the testimony of a neighbor who said that, at 
approximately 7 P.M. on August 17, 2007, he overheard the 
defendant arguing with the victim and yelling, "[W]here's my 
money?  You spent all my money on scratch tickets?" 
 
12 At the close of the defendant's case, the Commonwealth 
introduced rebuttal testimony from two of its own experts.  One 
expert testified that the prescription drug Requip can heighten 
the already addictive nature of pleasurable activities, creating 
a "compulsive" need to engage in those activities, but that he 
was aware of "no research that indicates that [Requip] causes 
someone to lose control . . . in an aggressive or violent way."  
That expert opined that the defendant was not acting 
compulsively, could appreciate the consequences of his actions, 
and had the ability to conform his conduct to the law.  He also 
testified that, in his opinion, the defendant was not suffering 
from any psychotic delusions at the time of the shooting, and 
that the defendant's prescription "medications did not have an 
acute impact on his mental state on that date."  If the 
defendant had been experiencing significant side effects from 
Requip, which he had been prescribed for three months, those 
side effects "would have been observable over that period of 
9 
 
c.  Defendant's trial motions.  During the Commonwealth's 
case-in-chief, the defendant moved for a mistrial on the basis 
of juror misconduct.  That motion was denied.  The defendant's 
motions for a directed verdict, made at the close of the 
Commonwealth's case and renewed at the close of all of the 
evidence, also were denied.  The jury convicted the defendant on 
all counts, and this appeal followed. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Prior bad acts evidence.  The 
Commonwealth filed a motion in limine seeking to admit testimony 
of a previous assault by the defendant on a fellow club member 
at an athletic club to establish his motive and state of mind.  
The proposed testimony was to the effect that, two days before 
the shooting, the defendant struck the club member with a 
baseball bat because he believed the individual owed him $700, 
and consequently, the defendant had been prohibited from 
returning to the club.  The judge allowed the Commonwealth's 
motion to admit this evidence, over the defendant's objection 
that the evidence was impermissible evidence of prior bad acts; 
the defendant renewed his objection prior to introduction of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
time and wouldn't have suddenly switched on in some way without 
precedent." The Commonwealth's other expert testified that the 
defendant's performance on standard tests did not exhibit 
cognitive impairments linked to frontal lobe shrinkage.  She 
stated that any difficulties the defendant experienced had to do 
with symptoms of "withdrawal from his daily chronic abuse of 
multiple substances," and the stress of being in prison and 
charged with a serious offense. 
10 
 
evidence at trial.  On appeal, the defendant argues that the 
judge abused her discretion by allowing the admission of the 
prior bad act evidence, and that, even if it were deemed 
probative, the evidence was unfairly prejudicial. 
Although evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts is not 
admissible to show a propensity to commit such acts, it may be 
admissible if relevant for another purpose, "such as to show a 
common scheme, pattern of operation, absence of accident or 
mistake, identity, intent, motive, or state of mind."  See 
Commonwealth v. Howard, 469 Mass. 721, 738 (2014), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 224-225 (1986).  When 
the Commonwealth seeks to use prior bad act evidence for such a 
permissible purpose, the evidence is admissible if its probative 
value outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice.  Commonwealth v. 
Anestal, 463 Mass. 655, 665 (2012).  Questions of admissibility, 
probative value, and unfair prejudice are left to the sound 
discretion of the trial judge, and will not be overturned absent 
clear error.  See Commonwealth v. Morgan, 460 Mass. 277, 289 
(2011). 
The evidence of the defendant's attack on his fellow club 
member supported the Commonwealth's theory of the defendant's 
motive and intent that, during the days preceding the shooting, 
the defendant had been preoccupied with financial worries, which 
intensified the day before the shooting, when he lost his job, 
11 
 
resulting in an escalation of his arguments with the victim 
about the money he accused her of taking from him.  See 
Commonwealth v. Mendes, 441 Mass. 459, 464-467 (2004) 
(defendant's drug use and need for money relevant to defendant's 
motive for murder to gain inheritance).  The defendant's son and 
granddaughter both testified that, in the days before the 
shooting, the defendant was increasingly worried about money, 
and preoccupied with thoughts that others owed him money they 
had stolen from him.  The granddaughter testified that, during 
the week before the shooting, the defendant was angry with the 
victim, expressing his belief that she had stolen his money and 
had spent it on lottery tickets, and stating that if his 
suspicions were proved to be accurate, he would kill her.  The 
son testified that, in the days immediately preceding the 
shooting, the defendant was angry at someone he knew from the 
athletic club for stealing money from him.  Thus, the evidence 
that the defendant was preoccupied with concerns about money 
supported his motive to kill the victim because he believed the 
victim was taking and spending his money.  This evidence also 
provided context for the shooting.  Without such context, "the 
killing could have appeared to the jury as an essentially 
inexplicable act of violence."  Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 
Mass. 244, 269 (1982).  See also Commonwealth v. Scott, 408 
Mass. 811, 818-819 (1990). 
12 
 
In addition, the defendant had notified the Commonwealth 
prior to trial that he intended to offer a defense of lack of 
criminal responsibility, based on his pre-existing brain disease 
and the prescription medications he had been taking in the weeks 
before the shooting.  The defendant's mental state in the days 
before the shooting was relevant to whether his conduct was 
intentional, and not the result of compulsive or illogical 
thoughts brought on by brain disease that had been exacerbated 
by his medications.  See Commonwealth v. Anestal, supra at 655 
(prior bad act evidence admissible to rebut defense).  While 
possibly harmful to the defendant, the judge did not abuse her 
discretion in concluding that the evidence was more probative 
than prejudicial, and was admissible to show the defendant's 
motive and state of mind.  See Commonwealth v. Howard, supra at 
740 (in prosecution for murder in first degree of coworker, 
admission of prior bad acts showing defendant's state of mind 
toward another coworker "was arguably probative of [the 
defendant's] state of mind and intent toward the victim"). 
Witnesses to the defendant's attack on the club member 
testified that the defendant arrived at the club on his bicycle, 
with a baseball bat.  The defendant appeared calm and collected 
and asked for the club member by name.  He socialized with 
approximately twenty patrons on the club's patio while he waited 
for the individual.  Responding to a question from one patron 
13 
 
about why he was carrying a baseball bat, the defendant replied, 
"I'm an old man.  I need to protect myself."  When the person he 
believed owed him money came outside, the defendant hit him with 
the baseball bat and threatened him with further violence if he 
did not pay the defendant what he owed.  During the attack, the 
defendant accidently knocked over a table with some drinks.  
When he noticed the table was knocked over, he apologized to 
those whose drinks he had spilled, and stated that the attack 
did not involve them.  The individual he had attacked testified 
at trial that the defendant remembered the attack the following 
day, and was still angry.  The testimony was that the defendant 
told him that he had been following his movements and knew his 
routine, and then accurately related to him the events of the 
previous day. 
The jury could infer from this evidence that the attack was 
planned in advance and was executed in a deliberate manner.  The 
evidence was relevant to the defendant's mental state, and was 
offered to show that, in the days before the shooting, the 
defendant "was not delusional but quite rational and well 
oriented."  Commonwealth v. Johnston, 467 Mass. 674, 686 (2014).  
See Commonwealth v. Howard, supra, citing Commonwealth v. 
Maimoni, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 321, 327-328 (1996) (prior bad acts 
admissible as illustrative of defendant's mental state at time, 
and "to rebut defendant's testimony"); Commonwealth v. Adams, 
14 
 
434 Mass. 805, 818 (2001) (evidence of defendant's deliberate 
and rational actions after crime relevant to rebut defense of 
delusional thinking). 
The defendant argues that, even if relevant, the evidence 
was nonetheless overly prejudicial because it was not 
"necessary" to rebut his defense.  We previously have considered 
and rejected a similar argument.  In Commonwealth v. Copney, 468 
Mass. 405, 413 (2014), we stated "that the Commonwealth was not 
required to show that it needed the prior bad act evidence to 
prove its case, and . . . the judge was not obligated to 
consider whether . . . there was some alternative means by which 
the Commonwealth could prove its case."  There was no abuse of 
discretion in allowing the admission of the prior bad act 
evidence. 
b.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant maintains 
that the prosecutor misused the prior bad act evidence in his 
closing, arguing that the defendant was an angry person and 
prone to act out of anger, and asserting also that, at the time 
of his arrest, the defendant had been on his way to shoot the 
club patron he had assaulted with a baseball bat.  Because the 
defendant objected to these portions of the prosecutor's closing 
argument,  we "review to determine whether the remark was 
improper and, if so, whether it was harmless."  Commonwealth v. 
Sylvia, 456 Mass. 182, 193-194 (2010).  We conclude that there 
15 
 
was no error. 
"Remarks made during closing arguments are considered in 
context of the whole argument, the evidence admitted at trial, 
and the judge's instructions to the jury" (citation omitted).  
Id. at 193.  The prosecutor's reference to statements that the 
defendant was "angry" at the time of the shooting was not an 
impermissible reference to propensity evidence.  The prosecutor 
was not asking the jury to infer that, because the defendant was 
an angry person and was on his way to kill a different 
individual at the athletic club, the defendant must also have 
been the person who killed the victim.  Rather, the prosecutor 
was drawing a distinction between deliberate actions fueled by 
anger (the Commonwealth's theory of the case) and compulsive 
acts fueled by "delusional beliefs" resulting from a mental 
disease or defect (the defense).  Thus, the prosecutor properly 
sought to tie evidence of the defendant's anger to evidence of 
his conscious and deliberate decisions which, the prosecutor 
argued, were the result of that anger.  The prosecutor argued, 
"He decided to shoot her because he was angry at her.  It was a 
decision, not a delusion."  "The defendant was angry, and it was 
anger, not some sort of mental disease or defect or intoxicant, 
that caused him to act the way that he did that day.  It was 
anger that caused him to make the decisions that he did."  In 
this context, the prosecutor's references were a permissible use 
16 
 
of the prior bad act evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Carlson, 448 
Mass. 501, 508-509 (2007) (prior bad act evidence related to 
defendant's hostility admissible to show hostility generated 
motive or intent for crime). 
The defendant also challenges the prosecutor's statement in 
closing that the defendant "decided to reload the firearm and 
decided to go the route that headed towards the club and decided 
to stop at a liquor store that's en route with that, and we know 
that those are decisions as opposed to delusions because he told 
the police that's why he was going there because he was going to 
shoot [the club member he attacked with a bat]."  The prosecutor 
was not thereby asking the jury to infer that the defendant must 
have planned to shoot his former wife because he also might have 
planned a future assault on someone else.  Rather, the 
prosecutor was rebutting the defense that the defendant was not 
acting intentionally or rationally when he shot the victim.  The 
prosecutor pointed to evidence that the defendant had made a 
series of "deliberate" and conscious decisions immediately after 
the shooting, and argued that this supported a conclusion that 
the defendant's thoughts and actions at the time of the murder 
were not delusional or involuntary.  See generally Commonwealth 
v. Mendes, 441 Mass. 459, 466 (2004); Commonwealth v. Simpson, 
434 Mass. 570, 578-579 (2001) (statement made immediately after 
killing, that defendant would shoot police officer if he had 
17 
 
bullet, admissible to prove defendant's aggressive and 
threatening behavior to rebut state of mind defense for the 
killing). 
c.  Juror misconduct.  i.  Motion for a mistrial.  On the 
seventh day of trial, juror no. 12 sent a note to the judge 
stating that, during a break in the proceedings the previous 
day, she had overheard a discussion between some jurors that 
sounded as though they were discussing "issues related to the 
case," and she was "unsure if what they were discussing was 
allowed."  The judge conducted a voir dire of juror no. 12, and 
determined that the overheard conversation was between jurors 
nos. 2, 6, and 9.  The discussion related primarily to each of 
the jurors' feelings about defense counsel and the defendant's 
demeanor, but also had involved off-color jokes about the 
defendant's actions during his arrest, and speculation about why 
a crime that took place in 2007 had not been tried until 2013. 
The judge thereafter conducted individual voir dire, during 
which one juror said that she thought that juror no. 6 appeared 
to have made up his mind about the case, based on his comment 
that there was no need for further witnesses and it was clear 
what had happened.  The judge dismissed juror no. 6.  Following 
extensive voir dire of the remaining jurors, the judge concluded 
that they had not been tainted by juror no. 6's comments and 
remained impartial, and that any exposure to the comments "was 
18 
 
relatively de minimis . . . [and] did not infect any of the 
other jurors in any way that is prejudicial to any party." 
During deliberations, after the judge had renewed her 
instruction to the jury not to speak with anyone connected to 
the case, or about the case, the court reporter told the judge 
that while she and juror no. 9 had been in a court house 
elevator, juror no. 9 had apologized to her for a comment in 
which he said that the court reporter's mask made her look like 
"Darth Vader"; the comment had come to light during the judge's 
voir dire of the jurors.  The judge denied the defendant's 
requested that juror no. 9 be dismissed. 
Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee 
a criminal defendant the right to a trial before an impartial 
jury.  Commonwealth v. Seabrooks, 433 Mass. 439, 442 (2001).  
Prohibiting premature jury deliberations, and extraneous 
influences on jurors, safeguards a defendant's right to trial 
before an impartial jury.  See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 
107, 126-127 (1987); United States v. Jadlowe, 628 F.3d 1, 15 
(1st Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 926 (2011).  
Nonetheless, "not all premature jury discussion about a case 
will compromise a defendant's fair trial rights."  United States 
v. Jadlowe, supra at 18.  See Commonwealth v. Smith, 461 Mass. 
438, 443 n.10 (2012) (jurors' comments that they were bored by 
19 
 
one of Commonwealth's witnesses did not reflect impermissible 
deliberation on substance of case).  A judge's "determination of 
a juror's impartiality 'is essentially one of credibility, and 
therefore largely one of demeanor' . . . .  In such 
circumstances, we give a trial judge's determination of 
impartiality great deference."  Commonwealth v. Alicea, 464 
Mass. 837, 849 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 425 
Mass. 349, 352-353 (1997). 
As the defendant suggests, the comments made by jurors nos. 
2, 6, and 9 related to their feelings about "the strength of 
evidence or his or her opinion of the defendant's guilt" and not 
to "extraneous matter[s]."  Commonwealth v. Guisti, 434 Mass. 
245, 251-252 (2001), S.C., 449 Mass. 1018 (2007).  The comments 
also hinted at extraneous information regarding the personal 
experiences of some jurors that potentially could have 
influenced their deliberations, such as one juror's experience 
as a fire fighter.  Under either view of the comments, we give 
deference to the judge's conclusion, arrived at following 
extensive individual voir dire, that the remaining jurors had 
not been influenced by the comments and continued to be 
impartial.  See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 429 Mass. 502, 506-
507 (1999) (no abuse of discretion when, after learning of 
extraneous influence on jury discovered during trial, judge 
removed offending juror but found that rest of jury remained 
20 
 
impartial and gave curative instruction).  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Ferguson, supra at 353-354; Commonwealth v. 
Kamara, 422 Mass. 614, 616 (1996); Commonwealth v. Urena, 417 
Mass. 692, 700 (1994) (no prejudice to defendant from juror's 
question of witness, made during trial, where record did not 
disclose improper influence on remaining jurors). 
Jurors "inevitably formulate impressions as they hear 
evidence.  This is natural and cannot be prevented. . . .  The 
question is whether jurors can suspend final judgment and keep 
their minds open to other evidence that they hear."  
Commonwealth v. Guisti, supra at 254.  During voir dire, each 
juror asserted a belief that the joking tone and content of the 
comments was not intended to violate the judge's instruction not 
to talk about the case, and that the comments had only a 
tangential relationship to the case.  No juror believed the 
comments were intended to, or did, influence his or her views 
regarding the evidence presented.  Each testified that he or she 
continued to have an open mind, and would not consider the 
extraneous comments before or during deliberation.  The judge 
gave a pointed curative instruction that the jury were to 
disregard any extraneous information that they had heard, and 
should not discuss the case before deliberations began.  Given 
these curative efforts after dismissal of juror no. 6, there was 
no abuse of discretion in the denial of the defendant's motions 
21 
 
for a mistrial with regard to the juror comments during trial or 
juror no. 9's comment during deliberations. 
ii.  Motion for a juror to be made an alternate.  Prior to 
deliberations, the defendant requested that the judge make juror 
no. 9 a nonrandom selection as an alternate because the 
defendant believed, on the basis of the juror's prior comments, 
that the juror already had made up his mind against the 
defendant.  We reject, as without basis in the law, the 
defendant's argument that the judge should have designated juror 
no. 9 as an alternate.  Having concluded that the juror remained 
impartial, and finding no evidence to overcome the presumption 
that jurors follow the instructions they are given, see 
Commonwealth v. Watkins, 425 Mass. 830, 840 (1997), the judge 
had no basis upon which to take the irregular step of 
designating juror no. 9 a nonrandom selection as an alternate.13  
See Commonwealth v. The Ngoc Tran, 471 Mass. 179, 189-191 (2015) 
(analyzing nonrandom selection of alternate juror as irregular). 
d.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  While conceding that 
the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction, the 
defendant maintains that the weight of the evidence supports a 
                                                 
13 The judge concluded that juror no. 9's comment to the 
court reporter did not violate the judge's instructions because 
"while it was inappropriate for him to initiate conversation," 
the comment to the court reporter "could have been easily 
perceived by [juror no. 9] as outside the realm of my 
instructions because his conversation with the court reporter 
had nothing whatsoever to do with the case." 
22 
 
verdict of manslaughter or murder in the second degree, and 
urges us to reduce the verdict pursuant to our authority under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We may reduce a verdict to a lesser degree 
of guilt if we are satisfied "that the verdict was against the 
law or the weight of the evidence . . . or for any other reason 
that justice may require."  G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
The defendant argues that a lesser degree of guilt is 
appropriate here because the evidence at trial established that 
the killing resulted from a "compulsive act and a delusional 
thought."  The defendant contends that the evidence supports a 
conclusion that, at the time of the killing, he suffered from a 
brain disease that resulted in cognitive and emotional 
impairments that were exacerbated by prescription medications 
that affected his impulse control and caused paranoid thinking.  
He argues that this combination of factors caused him to engage 
in the "compulsive act" of killing the victim, and also to 
suffer from the "delusional belief" (her stealing money) that 
provided the motive for her killing. 
We have carefully reviewed the record, and decline to 
reduce the verdict pursuant to our authority under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E. 
Judgments affirmed.