Title: Timmons v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 102, 2003
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 23, 2003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
HUEY TIMMONS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 102, 2003 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN01-10-1404  
§                   IN01-10-1407  
§                   
 
Submitted: July 11, 2003 
Decided:  September 23, 2003 
 
Before HOLLAND, STEELE and JACOBS, Justices 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 23rd day of September 2003, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Huey Timmons, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s January 23, 2003 order denying his motion for postconviction 
relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 and his motion for correction of 
an illegal sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35.  We find no merit 
to the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 
 
(2) 
In October 2001, Timmons was indicted on three counts of Robbery 
in the Second Degree and one count of Wearing a Disguise During the 
Commission of a Felony.  In June 2002, Timmons pleaded guilty to a single count 
 
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each of second degree robbery and wearing a disguise.  He was sentenced on those 
charges to a total of 8 years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after 6 years 
for decreasing levels of probation.1   
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Timmons claims that: a) his sentence is illegal because 
it exceeds the sentence agreed to in the plea agreement as well as the Truth in 
Sentencing (“TIS”) guidelines; b) his guilty plea was coerced because the 
prosecutor and defense counsel led him to believe the TIS guidelines would be 
followed and the judge failed to establish that he understood the nature of the plea 
and its consequences; and c) his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing 
to investigate mitigating evidence with respect to his character and background and 
by failing to explain fully the nature of the charges to which he was pleading 
guilty. 
 
(4) 
Rule 35(a) permits the Superior Court to correct an illegal sentence 
“at any time.”  “The ‘narrow function of Rule 35 is to permit correction of an 
illegal sentence, not to re-examine errors occurring at the trial or other proceedings 
prior to the imposition of sentence.’”
2  “Relief under Rule 35(a) is available ‘when 
the sentence imposed exceeds the statutorily-imposed limits, [or] violates the 
                                                                 
1The sentencing order reflects that, at that time, Timmons was also given a 2
-year Level V 
sentence for Driving Under the Influence (IN02-05-0659). 
2Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
 
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Double Jeopardy Clause . . . .’”
3  “A sentence is also illegal if it ‘is ambiguous with 
respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally 
contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to the 
substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which the judgment of conviction did 
not authorize.’”4 
 
(5) 
Timmons does not contend that his sentences exceed the statutorily-
imposed limits, violate double jeopardy, or are ambiguous or contradictory.  All of 
his claims regarding his sentences implicate the proceedings leading up to the 
imposition of the sentences.  As such, he is not entitled to relief pursuant to Rule 
35(a).  Even if viewed on their merits, Timmons’ claims regarding his sentences 
are unavailing, since the TIS guidelines are voluntary and non-binding5 and the 
record does not reflect that the State breached any promise with respect to 
Timmons’ sentences.  
 
(6) 
Timmons’ next claim, that his plea was involuntary, is refuted by the 
record.  While Timmons checked the box on his guilty plea form indicating that  
he had been promised a specific sentence, the transcript of the plea colloquy 
clearly reflects that Timmons understood that the State had made no promise 
                                                                 
3Id. 
4Id. 
5Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 845 (Del. 1992). 
 
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concerning his sentence, that the State was not recommending any particular 
sentence, that he was facing two possible 5-year sentences, and that neither a 
sentence recommendation by the State nor the TIS guidelines would bind the Court 
in passing sentence.6 The transcript reflects that Timmons understood the nature of 
the plea and its consequences, understood that he was waiving his right to an 
appeal, was satisfied with the representation provided by his counsel, and he 
knowingly and intelligently entered the plea.  Absent clear and convincing 
evidence to the contrary, Timmons is bound by the representations he made at the 
time the plea was entered.7  To the extent Timmons’ claims implicate events that 
occurred prior to the entry of the plea, his voluntary guilty plea serves as a waiver 
of any such claims.8 
 
(7) 
In order for Timmons to prevail on his final claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, he must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would 
                                                                 
6The transcript reflects that Timmons responded “No, sir” when the Superior Court asked him if 
the State had made any promises to induce him to enter the plea.  The transcript also reflects that 
he twice responded “Yes, sir” when the Superior Court asked him if he understood that “ [he 
was] facing a total of ten years in prison,” “the State has not said what it is going to 
recommend,” and “the Court will not be bound by the [TIS] Guidelines and the Court will not be 
bound by the State’s recommendation.”
 
7Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
8Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 312-13 (Del. 1988). 
 
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have been different. 9  In order to prevail on his claim that his counsel was 
ineffective in connection with the entry of his guilty plea, Timmons must show 
that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 
but would have insisted on proceeding to trial. 10 
 
(8) 
Timmons’ claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit.  
In exchange for Timmons’ guilty plea, the State dismissed two serious felony 
charges against him, thereby providing him with a substantial benefit. There is no 
evidence that, but for errors on the part of his counsel, Timmons would not have 
pleaded guilty but would have insisted on proceeding to trial.  There is, moreover, 
no evidence in the record that any action on the part of Timmons’ counsel, either in 
connection with the guilty plea or otherwise, resulted in prejudice to Timmons. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
9Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
10Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d at 631. 
 
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