Title: Riner v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 031299
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 17, 2004

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
CHARLES DOUGLAS RINER 
 
v. Record No. 031299  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 17, 2004 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Charles Douglas Riner (“Riner”) was convicted by a 
jury of the first degree murder of his wife, Karen Denise 
Riner (“Denise”), in violation of Code § 18.2-32; of arson, 
in violation of Code § 18.2-77; and of petit larceny in 
violation of Code § 18.2-96.  The Court of Appeals of 
Virginia affirmed the convictions and the judgment of the 
Circuit Court of Wise County (“the trial court”).  Riner v. 
Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 440, 479, 579 S.E.2d 671, 691 
(2003). 
We awarded Riner this appeal on six assignments of 
error.1  He challenges the denial of his motion for a change 
of venue, the denial of his motion for a mistrial because 
of alleged jury misconduct, the use of a “private 
prosecutor,” the admission of double hearsay testimony 
concerning a threat he made to his wife, the admission of 
certain business records because the Commonwealth failed to 
                     
1 The petit larceny conviction is not before us in this 
appeal. 
 
2
show that the entrant was unavailable to testify, and the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the arson 
conviction.  We also awarded an appeal on the 
Commonwealth’s two assignments of cross-error.  Finding no 
error, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
I. RELEVANT FACTS2 
 
In accordance with established principles of appellate 
review, we state the facts in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.  
We also accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all 
inferences fairly deducible from the evidence.  Armstrong 
v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 573, 576, 562 S.E.2d 139, 140 
(2002); Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 
S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975).  Circumstantial evidence, when 
sufficiently convincing, is entitled to the same weight as 
direct evidence.  Derr v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 413, 424, 
410 S.E.2d 662, 668 (1991); Epperly v. Commonwealth, 224 
Va. 214, 228, 294 S.E.2d 882, 890 (1982). 
A. THE FIRE 
 
In the early morning hours of August 12, 1998, Larry 
Odle, who lived next to the Riners in the Town of Coeburn 
in Wise County, saw flames coming from the Riner house.  
                     
2 We will recite additional facts relevant to 
particular assignments of error. 
 
3
Odle walked outside to investigate the fire and observed a 
“shadow or reflection . . . peek around the [left] corner” 
of the Riner house three or four times.  A person then 
emerged from that corner and yelled “help, help, my house 
is on fire.”  Odle returned to his house and called the 
“911” emergency number.  He then went back to the site of 
the fire and saw Riner walk from the same left corner of 
the burning house carrying two of the Riner children.3 
 
One of the first three police officers to arrive at 
the scene stated that, when he got there, the fire was 
“basically still in the lower part of the house . . . and 
it was crawling across the [front] porch area and coming 
out the other side where the top part of the house was on 
fire.”  When that officer exited his police vehicle, he 
observed Riner and two small children coming around the 
left corner of the house.4  The officer approached Riner and 
asked if anyone else was in the home.  Riner did not 
respond and, in the officer’s opinion, “[s]eemed surprised 
that someone was there.”  The officer repeated his 
                     
3 During their eight-year marriage, the Riners had 
three children.  Denise also had a son by a previous 
marriage.  That son was not at the Riner house when the 
fire occurred. 
 
4 The Riners’ third child was already out of the house.  
Riner told one of the police officers that he had sent that 
child to call the fire department. 
 
4
question, but Riner again did not answer.  Only after two 
of the officers approached the burning house did Riner 
inform the third officer that his wife was still inside 
their home.  Two of the officers then kicked opened a door 
on the rear of the house, but they could not go inside more 
than two or three feet because of the intense smoke and 
heat. 
 
The fire consumed the second floor and roof of the 
Riner house as well as the front porch, including the floor 
and the “uprights” of the porch.  There was also extensive 
damage throughout the interior of the first floor, 
including the master bedroom where Denise’s body was found.5  
There and elsewhere on the first floor of the house, fire 
investigators discovered piles of paper that had been torn 
apart lengthwise.  Some of the torn paper came from 
correspondence or publications belonging to Riner. 
 
According to the forensic pathologist who performed an 
autopsy on Denise’s body, Denise died from smoke 
inhalation, which is determined by looking in the airways 
for “soot” and “black material” and measuring the carbon 
monoxide level in the blood.  The forensic pathologist 
stated that Denise’s body had been “incinerated.”  Her 
                     
5 The master bedroom was located at the front of the 
house on the right, as viewed from the main road. 
 
5
skin, muscles, facial features, scalp, arms and legs had 
been burned.  Because of the extensive burning of her body, 
the forensic pathologist could not determine whether Denise 
had suffered other injuries or had been rendered 
unconscious by some other trauma before her death.  
However, the forensic pathologist did not find any evidence 
of blunt force or penetrating injuries to Denise’s body.  
Although a partially burned baseball bat was found near her 
body, the forensic pathologist could not put that bat “in 
or on the body.” 
On the night of the fire, Riner claimed that he was 
upstairs, asleep in a room with the three Riner children.  
However, the family’s housekeeper testified that she did 
not remember anytime that all three children had slept 
upstairs or in the same bed with Riner.  Riner also 
admitted that the children normally slept downstairs in a 
bed with Denise. 
 
Riner testified that, when he awoke and smelled smoke, 
he looked toward the rear of the house and saw smoke coming 
up the steps.  He stated that the smoke was so intense that 
he could barely breathe and that his eyes were burning so 
badly that he could not see.  However, he was able to find 
the three children, help them out a window onto the rear 
porch roof, and then lower them to the ground.  Although 
 
6
Denise died from smoke inhalation, Riner did not have any 
symptoms consistent with carbon monoxide intoxication or 
carbon monoxide poisoning upon examination at a local 
emergency room on the morning of the fire.  The forensic 
pathologist testified that, if smoke from a fire is very 
dense, a person could breathe in a lethal level of carbon 
monoxide within seconds.  Additionally, a nurse who checked 
Riner in the emergency room did not observe any soot on him 
or smell any smoke about his body.  Riner did, however, 
have a low oxygen level based on an arterial blood gas 
study, which was consistent with a sudden or acute injury 
to his airway from inhaling smoke. 
B. RINER’S ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO AND AFTER THE FIRE 
 
Two issues caused recurring disagreements between the 
Riners during their marriage.  One of those issues 
concerned Riner’s discipline of Denise’s son by her 
previous marriage.  In the early part of August 1998, 
Denise learned that Riner had choked and slapped her son at 
a family reunion.  That incident exacerbated the Riners’ 
already existing marital difficulties, causing Denise to 
meet with an attorney on August 4 to obtain information 
about divorce proceedings.  The next day she opened a 
checking account in her own name.  On August 7, she 
confronted Riner with her knowledge about his abuse of her 
 
7
son and demanded that he move out of the marital residence.  
Riner apparently agreed to move on the following weekend, 
which would have been the weekend immediately after the 
fire.  However, he told one of the fire investigators that 
Tuesday night, August 11, 1998, was to be his last night in 
the marital home. 
The other subject causing disagreement was the 
couple’s financial condition.  Within a week after the 
Riners were married in 1990, Riner quit his job.  
Throughout the marriage, Denise, a nurse, provided the 
primary financial support for the family. 
By mid-1998, Riner had pressing financial 
difficulties.  He had incurred several substantial debts 
and was delinquent in some of his financial obligations.  
In particular, Riner had agreed to make restitution in the 
amount of approximately $5,400 by October 1998 as a 
condition of probation in a federal pre-trial diversion 
program in which he was participating.  Due to his failure 
to pay the restitution as scheduled, Riner still owed about 
$2,900 as of June 1998 and was therefore facing the 
possibility of being prosecuted on federal bank fraud 
charges.  In fact, he was scheduled to meet with his 
federal probation officer on August 12, 1998, the day of 
the fire.  The probation officer had also learned that 
 
8
Riner had two outstanding criminal charges, one a 
misdemeanor and one a felony, for having issued two checks 
for which there were insufficient funds to pay the checks. 
After Denise’s death, Riner collected approximately 
$8,500 from Denise’s employer and then paid the restitution 
in full.  Riner insisted, however, that he paid the federal 
restitution with money he had received from selling two 
vehicles.  He also paid the indebtedness owed to a local 
merchant for the two checks that were returned for 
insufficient funds. 
Riner also filed two insurance claims.  One was a fire 
insurance claim in the amount of $186,820.24, of which the 
sum of $116,453.00 was for personal property.  The second 
claim was on a group life insurance policy provided to 
Denise by her employer.  In anticipation of receiving funds 
from those claims, Riner purchased a used Mercedes 
automobile by borrowing $9,000 on a 30-day single payment 
note.  He also relocated himself and the three Riner 
children to eastern Tennessee and made an offer to purchase 
a house there for the price of $169,000. 
The day before the fire, a neighbor observed Riner 
storing three trash bags in a building located apart from 
the Riner house.  In March 1999, Riner sold jewelry at a 
pawn shop located in Bristol, Tennessee.  Denise’s sisters 
 
9
subsequently accompanied a police officer to the pawn shop 
and identified three rings found there as belonging to 
Denise.  The rings were part of the jewelry Riner sold, and 
the Commonwealth introduced evidence showing that the rings 
would have been damaged or destroyed if they had been in 
the Riner house during the fire.  One of the rings came 
from Denise’s great-grandmother.  Another ring was a 
diamond anniversary band that Denise wore daily and was, in 
fact, wearing on the day prior to her death.  The third 
ring was a pearl ring that Denise had received as a 
birthday gift from her co-workers at her place of 
employment. 
C. RINER’S ARREST 
In November 1999, Riner told his employer and 
personnel at his children’s schools that he and the 
children would be traveling to Pennsylvania to attend a 
funeral.  Instead, Riner spent about 19 days traveling 
around to different destinations in the United States and 
then flying to Panama.  The flight out of the country 
occurred at a time when the police investigation into the 
fire and death of Denise was nearing completion and Riner 
remained a prime suspect.  In fact, Riner was indicted for 
 
10
first degree murder and arson on January 18, 2000.6  Riner 
was arrested in Panama on January 21, 2000.  At that time, 
he had in his possession clothes, documents, and luggage 
that had been in the house prior to the fire. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. CHANGE OF VENUE 
Prior to trial, Riner moved for a change of venue, 
asserting that he could not receive a fair trial in Wise 
County because of prejudicial pre-trial media coverage of 
the case.  After an ore tenus hearing, the trial court took 
the motion under advisement and allowed the parties to 
submit affidavits from Wise County citizens regarding the 
change of venue issue.  After hearing additional argument 
on Riner’s motion, the trial court again took the motion 
under advisement, stating from the bench that, if selecting 
a jury “becomes a problem, then we will change the venue.”  
Riner did not object to the court’s decision to do so. 
 
At the conclusion of juror voir dire, the trial court 
asked, “Any motions by counsel before we take a short break 
and come back and select the jury?”  Counsel for Riner 
responded, “No, Your Honor.”  However, before the parties 
exercised their peremptory strikes, a dispute arose 
                     
6  A September 1, 2000 superseding indictment charged 
Riner with capital murder, arson, and robbery. 
 
11
concerning whether the Commonwealth would introduce the 
fact of Riner’s trip to Panama as evidence of flight.  
Riner indicated that he wished to counter any such evidence 
suggesting flight by mentioning in opening statement and by 
introducing into evidence the fact that he had passed a 
polygraph test.  Riner asserted that the successful 
polygraph result directly influenced his decision to travel 
to Panama.  Riner took the position that, by introducing 
evidence about the trip and the polygraph test, he could 
demonstrate that he had a legitimate reason for going to 
Panama, which would rebut adverse media publicity about the 
trip.  During the course of the colloquy with the trial 
court about these issues, the court stated: 
Well, you know, there’s no proof that these 
jurors know about the flight, but down deep in my 
little heart and my conscience, I know dang good and 
well they probably know or some of them, if not all of 
them, some of them know about it and I have a hard 
time ignoring that fact.  I can’t ignore it. 
 
In response to the trial court’s comment and out of 
concern that a ruling by the court to admit the polygraph 
evidence would be tantamount to a finding that the jury was 
not impartial, the Commonwealth stated that, if the trial 
court intended to admit evidence about the polygraph 
because of its perceived “taint in the community,” then the 
Commonwealth was prepared to join in Riner’s motion for a 
 
12
change of venue.  Riner initially disagreed with the basis 
of the Commonwealth’s motion, but he ultimately joined in 
the motion.  At no point during the discussion about the 
Commonwealth’s motion for a change of venue or when Riner 
joined in that motion did he reiterate or rely upon his 
previously stated reasons for a change of venue.  The trial 
court overruled the motion. 
The parties then exercised their peremptory strikes 
without any further motions or discussion.  The next 
morning before the jurors selected to hear the case were 
sworn, the trial court asked, “Any preliminary motions 
before we bring in the [j]ury?”  Counsel for Riner stated, 
“None from the defense.”  The 12 jurors and 3 alternates 
were then sworn to try the issues joined between the 
Commonwealth and Riner. 
As presented on appeal, Riner’s assignment of error 
challenging the trial court’s denial of a change of venue 
is three-fold.  He argues that the trial court applied an 
improper legal standard because it considered only the fact 
that a jury had been selected rather than “the ease of 
seating the jury” as required by our decision in Thomas v. 
Commonwealth, 263 Va. 216, 232, 559 S.E.2d 652, 661 (2002).  
Next, he asserts that prejudicial pre-trial publicity 
prevented the selection of an impartial jury and that the 
 
13
trial court therefore erred in denying his change of venue 
motion.  Finally, he says that the trial court erred in 
denying the Commonwealth’s change of venue motion, joined 
in by Riner, because the court itself questioned the 
impartiality of the jury. 
With regard to Riner’s assertion that the trial court 
applied an incorrect legal standard, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that Riner had defaulted this portion of his 
argument.  Riner, 40 Va. App. at 457, 579 S.E.2d at 679.  
Riner did not argue before the trial court that it had 
applied an improper legal standard when considering the 
change of venue motion nor did he object when the court 
stated, “I hate to say that I told you so, but we got a 
jury now.”  Applying Rule 5A:18, the Court of Appeals thus 
held that this aspect of his challenge to the trial court’s 
refusal to change venue was barred.  Id. at 456-57, 579 
S.E.2d at 679. 
 
In his assignment of error to this Court with regard 
to the change of venue issue, Riner states only that the 
“Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s 
erroneous denial [of] Riner’s motion for change of venue 
and a joint motion for change of venue.”  Riner does not 
challenge that portion of the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals barring his argument that the trial court used the 
 
14
wrong legal standard.  Thus, under Rule 5:17(c), we do not 
consider the issue.  See Burlile v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 
501, 507-08, 544 S.E.2d 360, 363 (2001).  We also find no 
reason to apply the “ends of justice” exception as 
requested by Riner. 
 
We further conclude that Riner defaulted his challenge 
to the trial court’s denial of his change of venue motion 
in which he asserted that he could not receive a fair trial 
because of adverse pre-trial media coverage of the case.  
When voir dire of the jury was completed, the trial court 
asked counsel for the parties whether there were any 
motions.  Riner’s counsel specifically stated, “No, Your 
Honor.”  Riner did not renew his change of venue motion at 
that point or remind the trial court that it previously had 
taken the motion under advisement.  Nor did he do so before 
the parties exercised their peremptory strikes or before 
the 12 jurors and 3 alternates selected to hear the case 
were sworn. 
 
The posture of Riner’s change of venue motion is 
analogous to the situation in Green v. Commonwealth, 266 
Va. 81, 580 S.E.2d 834 (2003).  There, the defendant, like 
Riner, had filed a pre-trial change of venue motion.  Id. 
at 93, 580 S.E.2d at 841.  The trial court took the motion 
under advisement, and the defendant did not object to the 
 
15
court’s doing so.  Id.  The defendant did not renew the 
motion or remind the court that it was still pending at any 
time, including after the jury panel had been qualified or 
before the parties exercised their peremptory strikes.  Id. 
at 93-94, 580 S.E.2d at 841-42.  Because the defendant did 
not object to the trial court’s decision to take the change 
of venue motion under advisement pending outcome of voir 
dire, we held that it was “incumbent upon [the defendant] 
to renew the motion before the jury was empanelled and 
sworn, or at least remind the court that it was still 
pending and that he wanted the court to rule on it.”  Id. 
at 94, 580 S.E.2d at 842.  Thus, we held that the defendant 
had waived his change of venue argument under Rule 5:25.  
Id. at 95, 580 S.E.2d at 842. 
 
We reach the same conclusion here.  Like the defendant 
in Green, Riner did not object to the trial court’s 
decision to take the change of venue motion under 
advisement.  Thus, it was incumbent upon him to renew that 
motion or remind the court that it was still pending at 
some point before the jurors selected to hear the case were 
sworn.  Since he failed to do so, Riner’s argument for a 
change of venue because of pre-trial publicity is waived.  
See Rule 5:25. 
 
16
Consequently, the only aspect of the change of venue 
issue properly before this Court is Riner’s challenge to 
the trial court’s denial of the Commonwealth’s change of 
venue motion joined in by Riner.  However, the reason for 
that motion was narrow.  The Commonwealth wanted a change 
of venue only if the trial court, concerned that some of 
the jurors probably knew about Riner’s trip to Panama, 
intended to allow Riner to introduce evidence that he had 
passed a polygraph test.  In other words, the Commonwealth 
was amenable to a change of venue for the sole purpose of 
eliminating the trial court’s rationale for allowing Riner 
to introduce evidence about the polygraph test.  Riner 
initially objected to the basis of the Commonwealth’s 
motion but eventually decided to join it.  During the 
discussion on the Commonwealth’s motion, Riner did not 
present any other reasons for joining in the motion nor did 
he reiterate his prior argument concerning pre-trial 
publicity.  Thus, we consider only whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in refusing the Commonwealth’s 
specific motion. 
Contrary to Riner’s argument, the trial court’s 
statement that at least some of the jurors probably knew 
about Riner’s trip to Panama cannot be understood as a 
question in the court’s mind about the jurors’ 
 
17
impartiality.  Instead, the trial court merely indicated 
that, when deciding whether Riner could introduce evidence 
that he had passed the polygraph test, it could not ignore 
the fact that some jurors probably knew about the Panama 
trip.  The trial court’s statement was not a finding that 
the jurors in fact had this knowledge and could not ignore 
it, or that the jury was not impartial. 
“[T]here is a presumption that a defendant can receive 
a fair trial from the citizens of the jurisdiction in which 
the offense occurred.”  Mueller v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 
386, 398, 422 S.E.2d 380, 388 (1992).  Only when that 
presumption is overcome by evidence “demonstrating that the 
feeling of prejudice on the part of the citizenry is 
widespread and is such that would ‘be reasonably certain to 
prevent a fair trial’ ” is a change of venue warranted.  
Id. (quoting Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 137, 
314 S.E.2d 371, 380 (1984)).  The Commonwealth’s reason for 
requesting a change of venue was to avoid an anticipated 
evidentiary ruling it did not like.  That reason was not 
sufficient to overcome the presumption that Riner could 
receive a fair trial from the citizens of Wise County.  
Thus, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the Commonwealth’s motion for a 
 
18
change of venue, that motion having been joined in by 
Riner.  See id. 
B. JUROR MISCONDUCT 
On the 16th day of trial, the trial court dismissed 
juror Gibson from jury service because of his failure to 
abide by the court’s instructions concerning discussion of 
the case among jurors while the trial was ongoing.  Riner 
made several motions for a mistrial based on this juror’s 
misconduct, all of which the trial court denied.  The Court 
of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Riner’s motions for a mistrial.  See 
Riner, 40 Va. App. at 465-70, 579 S.E.2d at 684-86.  We 
agree. 
The problems with juror Gibson began on day eight of 
the trial.  That morning, before trial commenced, juror 
Gibson went to the office of the Commonwealth’s Attorney to 
ask a question about one of the Commonwealth’s exhibits, 
the medical examiner’s report.  The juror spoke with the 
secretary of the Commonwealth’s Attorney and stated that 
the exhibit indicated that Riner found his wife’s body but 
that other evidence showed that Riner was at the hospital 
when Denise’s body was found at the fire scene.7  The 
                     
7 The parties stipulated that the information in the 
exhibit was incorrect because Riner was in fact at the 
 
19
Commonwealth’s Attorney did not talk to juror Gibson and 
immediately reported the incident to the trial court.  
Riner moved for a mistrial on the grounds that juror Gibson 
had ignored the court’s instructions and had conducted, or 
attempted to conduct, an independent investigation.  The 
trial court denied the motion, finding no prejudice to 
Riner. 
 
On the 11th day of trial, the bailiff delivered a note 
from a juror to the trial court.  The note was directed to 
the Commonwealth’s Attorney and asked, “It has been 
established that the floor under the body was unburnt; what 
type of clothing, if any, was under the body.”  Although 
Riner now asserts that juror Gibson was the author of this 
note, he presented no evidence to establish that fact.  Nor 
did he move for a mistrial when the note was brought to the 
trial court’s attention. 
During Riner’s testimony on day 16 of the trial, his 
counsel moved for a mistrial because of juror Gibson’s 
“distractions, inattentiveness, and . . . misconduct.”  
Counsel noted that this juror had been talking to two 
fellow jurors during the presentation of evidence.  Riner’s 
counsel stated to the trial court, “I don’t know what’s 
                                                             
hospital when his wife’s body was found in the burned 
house, and the trial court so instructed the jury. 
 
20
going on in the jury room, but if he’s . . . doing that 
publicly in the courtroom, my common sense tells me that 
he’s engaging in similar conduct . . . in other places.”  
The trial court and the Commonwealth’s Attorney 
acknowledged that they had also noticed some of the 
behavior pointed out by Riner’s counsel. 
The trial court decided to question under oath juror 
Gibson as well as the two jurors to whom he had been 
speaking in the jury box.  During the questioning of juror 
Gibson, he admitted commenting to two jurors about exhibits 
while witnesses were testifying.  One of those exhibits was 
a picture showing Denise’s pearl ring.  Juror Gibson had 
pointed out to another juror that “it looks like that pearl 
ring that [Denise] got and [Riner] said he didn’t recognize 
any of the rings.”  Juror Gibson also admitted that he had 
sometimes watched for audience or lawyer reaction to 
certain evidence rather than looking at the witnesses who 
were testifying.  The two jurors who were questioned 
confirmed that juror Gibson had made comments to them about 
certain exhibits.  However, they both stated that they had 
not been influenced by juror Gibson’s comments and still 
had an open mind about the case. 
Riner then moved for a mistrial, not because of any 
concern about the two jurors to whom juror Gibson had made 
 
21
comments in the jury box, but because of “the kind of 
unknown comments he’s made in the jury room.”  In the 
alternative, Riner asked the trial court to excuse juror 
Gibson.  The trial court denied the mistrial motion but did 
dismiss juror Gibson from jury service. 
The trial court subsequently advised the remaining 14 
jurors that it had released juror Gibson and asked en masse 
whether juror Gibson had commented to any of them about the 
facts, exhibits, or evidence in the case.  Eight jurors 
answered affirmatively by raising their hands.  The trial 
court then questioned those eight jurors individually under 
oath. 
That questioning revealed that juror Gibson had indeed 
made comments about the evidence.  For example, he had 
speculated that, if Denise was not clothed, she might have 
been raped, and he had discussed a witness’s testimony 
about the terms “flammable” and “combustible.”  Juror 
Gibson also had made inappropriate sexual comments to a 
juror.  All the jurors who were questioned expressed their 
annoyance with juror Gibson and his behavior.  They told 
the trial court that they had repeatedly asked him to 
refrain from discussing the evidence, and some admitted 
that they had attempted to avoid him.  They were also 
adamant that they had not been influenced by juror Gibson’s 
 
22
behavior and comments, still had open minds about the case, 
and could be fair to both sides.  In one juror’s words, 
“[Y]ou could tell he was kind of a blow bag.” 
Several jurors also reported that juror Gibson had 
frequently contacted his wife during the lunch break in 
order to learn what the newspaper headlines said about the 
trial.  He had then attempted to share that information 
with the jury.  However, only one juror remembered anything 
specific that he had said about the newspaper reports.  
That juror recalled that juror Gibson had mentioned that a 
newspaper article reported that the defense had moved for a 
mistrial because jurors were taking notes. 
After the juror questioning was completed, Riner 
renewed his motion for a mistrial on three specific 
grounds:  (1) the comment to a juror in the jury box about 
the exhibit showing the pearl ring; (2) the speculation 
that Denise might have been raped if she was not clothed; 
and (3) the newspaper report about the defense mistrial 
motion.  The trial court overruled Riner’s motion.8  The 
trial court did, however, give the jury a cautionary 
instruction with regard to juror Gibson’s behavior and 
comments: 
 
23
 
The Court instructs you jurors that Mr. . . . 
Gibson, one of your jurors yesterday, throughout the 
trial until yesterday, made certain assertions and the 
Court admonishes you and warns you that you cannot 
believe and you should not and you shall not believe 
any assertions that he, Mr. . . . Gibson, made while 
in the courtroom, in the jury box or in the jury room, 
when we took breaks.  Some of his assertions were not 
correct and you are to ignore and disregard what 
Mr. . . . Gibson has said.  I want you to rely upon 
your independent recollection of the facts, as they, 
facts, exhibits and law as it will come out and has 
come out already in this trial, in this courtroom. You 
should not consider and again, I advise you and order 
you to disregard anything, any assertions that 
Mr. . . . Gibson has said in your presence. 
 
On appeal, Riner separates juror Gibson’s activities 
and comments into two categories, “Third Party Contact” and 
“Other Misconduct.”  He argues that he was prejudiced by 
juror Gibson’s third-party contact and/or other misconduct 
and, therefore, did not receive a fair trial.  We do not 
agree and will address these categories in that order. 
1. THIRD PARTY CONTACT 
Riner asserts that juror Gibson’s contact with his 
wife regarding the newspaper headlines about the case was 
unauthorized third party contact.  Citing Remmer v. United 
States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954), Riner argues that such 
contact was presumptively prejudicial, thereby shifting the 
burden to the Commonwealth to establish that it was 
                                                             
8 Riner also filed a post-trial motion to set aside the 
verdict in which he challenged the trial court’s denial of 
this mistrial motion based on juror misconduct. 
 
24
harmless to the defendant.  We agree that the legal 
standard for evaluating a claim of extraneous jury contact 
requires that “ ‘any private communication, contact or 
tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a 
trial about the matter pending before the jury . . . [be] 
deemed presumptively prejudicial’ ” unless the contact was 
pursuant to the directions and instructions of the trial 
court with complete knowledge by both parties.  Lenz v. 
Warden, 267 Va. 318, 328, 593 S.E.2d 292, 298 (2004) 
(quoting Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229). 
This presumption, however, is not conclusive.  Id.  
The prosecution has the burden “to establish, after notice 
to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the 
juror was harmless to the defendant.”  Id.  We explained in 
Lenz that “[t]he Remmer presumption of prejudice arises 
upon a showing of two elements: that an extraneous contact 
with or by a member of the jury took place and that such 
contact was ‘about the matter pending before the jury.’ ”  
267 Va. at 329, 593 S.E.2d at 298 (quoting Remmer, 347 U.S. 
at 229). 
Clearly, juror Gibson’s communication with his wife 
about the headlines in the newspaper was an improper 
contact with a third party about the matter pending before 
the jury.  However, it is debatable whether his 
 
25
communication, or attempted communication, of the content 
of the newspaper headlines to the other jurors constituted 
extraneous jury contact.  Instead, it is analogous to 
jurors’ reading or hearing news media reports about the 
criminal trial in which they are sitting. 
In Thompson v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 498, 502-03, 247 
S.E.2d 707, 709 (1978), we addressed an incident in which 
two jurors in a criminal trial admitted that they had read 
a newspaper article concerning the evidence and the 
defendant.  We enumerated the following principles for 
resolving whether that kind of jury conduct denied a 
defendant of a fair trial: 
First, the influence of newspaper articles or 
other publicity during a criminal trial may be of such 
a nature as to deprive a defendant of a fair trial.  
Second, jurors serving in a criminal case may not, 
during the trial, properly read newspaper stories or 
listen to media reports discussing the proceedings.  
The basis for this elementary proposition is that a 
juror’s information about the case should come only 
from the evidence presented at trial and not from any 
extraneous source.  Third, upon a showing that such 
jurors have read or heard news accounts of the 
proceedings, the test to be used by the trial court in 
determining if a mistrial or a new trial should be 
ordered is whether under the circumstances there has 
been interference with a fair trial.  Fourth, mere 
reading or hearing news accounts of the trial while it 
is in progress does not in every case amount to 
prejudicial misconduct by the jury as a matter of law.  
Some publicity to which jurors have been exposed may 
be inherently prejudicial while in other cases inquiry 
will be necessary to ascertain whether the information 
“may have effectively prejudiced the jury in its 
deliberation.”  Fifth, the decision whether such media 
 
26
information brought to the jury’s attention results in 
prejudice to the defendant rests in the sound 
discretion of the trial court.  And, sixth, because 
there can be no fixed rule which defines what 
constitutes prejudicial interference with a fair 
trial, each case must be decided on its special facts. 
 
Id. at 500, 247 S.E.2d at 708 (internal citations omitted). 
Our holding in Thompson requires a trial court to 
determine whether a juror’s exposure to media coverage of 
the proceedings interfered with a fair trial.  Unlike 
extraneous juror contact, a juror’s reading or hearing news 
accounts about a criminal trial is not presumptively 
prejudicial.  For purposes of this case, we will, however, 
apply the test set out in Remmer and Lenz and assume, as 
did the Court of Appeals, that juror Gibson’s contact with 
his wife about the newspaper article reporting that the 
defense had moved for a mistrial because the jurors were 
taking notes, as well as his communication, or attempted 
communication, of that information to other jurors, was 
“sufficient to shift the burden to the Commonwealth” to 
prove the contact was harmless to Riner.  Riner, 40 Va. 
App. at 468, 579 S.E.2d at 685. 
We conclude that the Commonwealth carried its burden.  
First, juror Gibson was discharged from jury service; so he 
did not participate in the deliberations that resulted in 
the guilty verdict.  See Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 
 
27
339, 356 S.E.2d 157, 171 (1987) (finding no prejudice where 
an alternate juror who failed to respond to voir dire 
question about family members employed in law enforcement 
was released from the panel before the case was submitted 
to the jury and did not participate in the jury’s 
deliberations).  That is a significant fact distinguishing 
the present case from many other cases involving juror 
misconduct.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 
178, 197, 590 S.E.2d 520, 531 (2004) (after conclusion of 
trial, alternate juror stated that she had heard jurors 
discussing the case before the close of the evidence); 
Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 460, 423 S.E.2d 360, 
370 (1992) (post-trial interview of jury foreman revealed 
that jurors had discussed defendant’s parole eligibility if 
he received a life sentence); Haddad v. Commonwealth, 229 
Va. 325, 327, 329 S.E.2d 17, 18 (1985) (misconduct during 
lunch break by juror who later became foreman of the jury). 
Second, only one juror heard or remembered juror 
Gibson’s comment about the specific newspaper article 
discussing a defense motion for a mistrial.  Next, the 
questioning of the jurors revealed that they were not 
influenced by juror Gibson, actually attempted to avoid him 
so they would not hear his comments, and still had open 
minds about the case.  Finally, after releasing juror 
 
28
Gibson, the trial court not only instructed the jurors to 
disregard anything that juror Gibson had said but also told 
them that some of his comments were not correct.  Unless 
the record shows otherwise, and it does not in this case, 
we presume that a jury follows an explicit cautionary 
instruction given by the trial court.  See LeVasseur v. 
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 589, 304 S.E.2d 644, 657 (1983).  
In summary, the extraneous juror contact was harmless to 
Riner.  Thus the trial court did not err in denying Riner’s 
motion for a mistrial based on “unauthorized third party 
contact.” 
2. OTHER MISCONDUCT 
Before determining whether juror Gibson’s “other 
misconduct” warranted a mistrial, we reiterate several 
applicable principles.  “[T]he mere fact of juror 
misconduct does not automatically entitle either litigant 
to a mistrial.”  Robertson v. Metropolitan Washington 
Airport Auth., 249 Va. 72, 76, 452 S.E.2d 845, 847 (1995) 
(citing Haddad, 229 Va. at 330, 329 S.E.2d at 20); see also 
Jackson, 267 Va. at 199, 590 S.E.2d at 532.  As the party 
moving for a mistrial, Riner had the burden to establish 
that juror misconduct “probably resulted in prejudice.”  
Robertson, 249 Va. at 76, 452 S.E.2d at 847.  The trial 
court, in the exercise of its discretion, makes that 
 
29
determination.  Id.  Here, the trial court properly 
investigated the misconduct when it was brought to its 
attention.  See id. (trial court abuses its discretion by 
ruling on motion for mistrial without investigating the 
alleged misconduct when it is discovered after the jury is 
discharged).  Finally, we have generally limited findings 
of prejudicial juror misconduct to events that occurred 
outside the jury room and that interjected information 
about the case that was not admitted into evidence.  
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Hulvey, 233 Va. 77, 83, 353 
S.E.2d 747, 751 (1987). 
Applying these principles, we conclude that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Riner’s 
motions for a mistrial based on the “other misconduct” by 
juror Gibson.  First, as the Court of Appeals noted, there 
is no evidence that any juror was aware of juror Gibson’s 
brief contact with the office of the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney or his efforts to resolve an apparent conflict in 
the evidence.  Riner, 40 Va. App. at 465, 579 S.E.2d at 
684.  Thus, Riner has not shown how he was prejudiced by 
that incident since juror Gibson did not participate in the 
jury deliberations. 
Next, after learning about the anonymous note directed 
to the Commonwealth’s Attorney, Riner did not move for a 
 
30
mistrial.  Thus, he cannot now be heard to complain about 
that incident.  Rule 5:25. 
Continuing, when Riner moved for a mistrial after 
juror Gibson was released from jury service, Riner was not 
concerned about the two jurors to whom juror Gibson had 
been making comments while in the jury box.  Instead, Riner 
based his motion on unknown comments that juror Gibson 
might have been making in the jury room.  At that point, 
the nature of those comments was not known and the trial 
court had discharged juror Gibson.  Thus, Riner failed to 
demonstrate how he was prejudiced. 
Finally, when Riner renewed his motion for a mistrial 
after the eight additional jurors had been questioned, he 
offered only three reasons in support of the motion: (1) 
juror Gibson’s comment about the exhibit showing the pearl 
ring; (2) juror Gibson’s speculation that Denise might have 
been raped; and (3) the newspaper article about the defense 
mistrial motion.9  We have already dealt with the third 
reason.  As to the first reason, Riner voiced no concern 
about the juror who heard the comment about the pearl ring 
when he moved for a mistrial after juror Gibson had been 
questioned.  Nevertheless, upon considering the nature of 
                     
9 We do not consider grounds for a mistrial that were 
not raised before the trial court.  See Rule 5:25. 
 
31
that comment as well as juror Gibson’s speculation that 
Denise might have been raped, we conclude that Riner did 
not establish that juror Gibson’s misconduct probably 
resulted in prejudice to Riner.  See Haddad, 229 Va. at 
330, 329 S.E.2d at 20.  As we previously explained, the 
trial court discharged juror Gibson before the jurors began 
their deliberations; the jurors were not influenced by 
juror Gibson but found him annoying; they remained able to 
listen to the evidence with open minds; and the trial court 
carefully instructed the jurors to disregard anything juror 
Gibson had said to them about the case. 
C. PRIVATE PROSECUTOR 
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth moved the trial court 
to allow a private attorney, hired by Denise’s family, to 
assist in the prosecution of the charges against Riner.  
Over Riner’s objection, the trial court granted the motion.  
Riner renewed his objection prior to trial and again in a 
post-trial motion to set aside the verdict.  He now assigns 
error to the trial court’s permitting a private attorney to 
participate and assist in the prosecution of the case.  
Riner asserts that the attorney should have been barred 
from serving as a private prosecutor because of an alleged 
conflict of interest and because the attorney improperly 
became “de facto lead counsel” for the Commonwealth.  He 
 
32
also urges this Court to abolish the use of private 
prosecutors. 
The private prosecutor had a conflict of interest, 
according to Riner, because the law firm in which he was a 
partner represented the parent company of the life 
insurance company issuing the policy on Denise’s life.  
Riner based that assertion on information contained in the 
2000 edition of a publication listing law firms and their 
representative clients.  The private prosecutor, however, 
avowed to the trial court that he had performed a conflict-
of-interest check and that neither he nor his firm 
currently represented either the parent company or its 
subsidiary, despite the listing in the publication.  The 
company issuing the life insurance policy had initiated an 
interpleader action in federal court regarding the life 
insurance proceeds, but the private prosecutor’s law firm 
did not represent the parent company or any other party in 
that proceeding.  The private prosecutor acknowledged that 
his firm may represent insureds of the parent company but 
argued the client, in that situation, is the insured, not 
the insurance company.  He also admitted that his firm had 
represented the parent company about 10 years prior to the 
present trial. 
 
In Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 387, 392, 329 
 
33
S.E.2d 22, 26 (1985), we stated that “[t]he common-law 
right of a crime victim, or of [the victim’s] family, to 
assist the prosecution with privately employed counsel is 
not absolute, but lies within the discretion and continuing 
control of the trial court.”  However, a private prosecutor 
who has “a civil interest in the case so infects the 
prosecution with the possibility that private vengeance has 
been substituted for impartial application of the criminal 
law, that prejudice to the defendant need not be shown.”  
Id. at 394, 329 S.E.2d at 26.  In that situation, a 
defendant’s due process rights under Article I, § 11 of the 
Constitution of Virginia are violated.  Id. at 394, 329 
S.E.2d at 26-27. 
 
The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, 
must determine whether the private prosecutor had a 
conflict of interest.  That determination in this case was 
factual and depended on whether the private prosecutor 
and/or his law firm represented either the parent company 
of the insurance company issuing the life insurance policy 
on Denise’s life or the insuring company itself.  The trial 
court accepted the representations of the private 
prosecutor that he had checked for any conflict of interest 
and found none.  We agree with the Court of Appeals that 
the trial court “was entitled to credit [the private 
 
34
prosecutor’s] representations” over the information 
contained in a publication entry listing the parent company 
as a representative client of the firm.  Riner, 40 Va. App. 
at 473, 579 S.E.2d at 687.  We reach this conclusion even 
though, as Riner demonstrated at a post-trial hearing, the 
2001 version of the publication contained the same 
information.  The trial court’s factual findings on this 
issue were not plainly wrong or without evidence to support 
them.  Thus, they are binding on appeal.  Mercer v. 
Commonwealth, 259 Va. 235, 243, 523 S.E.2d 213, 217 (2000). 
 
Riner further argues that the private prosecutor 
became the “de facto lead counsel” by delivering the 
opening statement; actively participating in objections, 
motions, and bench conferences; conducting the direct 
examination or cross-examination of expert witnesses; and 
presenting argument on jury instructions.  He claims that 
the private prosecutor controlled the presentation of the 
Commonwealth’s evidence of arson, which was the means by 
which it proved the murder charge.  In other words, Riner 
contends that the public prosecutor did not remain in 
control of the case. 
 
In Cantrell, we explained the role of a private 
prosecutor: 
 
35
His role is more limited than that of the public 
prosecutor.  By the weight of authority, he may not 
initiate a prosecution or appear before the grand 
jury; he may appear only by leave of the trial court; 
he may participate only with the express consent of 
the public prosecutor; he may make a closing jury 
argument only in the court’s discretion; and he may 
take no part in a decision to engage in plea 
bargaining, deciding the terms of a plea bargain, or a 
decision to accept a plea of guilty to a lesser crime 
or to enter a nolle prosequi.  Although there is no 
arbitrary limitation as to the proportion of work 
which may be done by a private prosecutor, the public 
prosecutor must remain in continuous control of the 
case. 
 
229 Va. at 393, 329 S.E.2d at 26 (internal citations  
omitted). 
 
Riner does not suggest that the private prosecutor 
engaged in any prohibited activities but only that he 
dominated the case.  However, upon reviewing the record, we 
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion with 
regard to the level of participation by the private 
prosecutor.  It is true that his efforts focused on proving 
the arson charge; indeed arson was one of the areas in 
which he had considerable experience in the practice of 
law.  However, we agree with the Court of Appeals, 
“[p]ermitting private prosecutors to handle only innocuous 
witnesses and evidentiary matters would effectively 
abrogate the common-law principle that still permits their 
appointment.”  Riner, 40 Va. App. at 474, 579 S.E.2d at 
688.  We conclude that the public prosecutor, not the 
 
36
private prosecutor, “remain[ed] in continuous control of 
the case.”  Cantrell, 229 Va. at 393, 329 S.E.2d at 26. 
Finally, we reiterate that “[t]he policy arguments 
advanced by [Riner] for a total prohibition of privately 
employed prosecutors may have a sound basis in 
considerations of public policy, but we think it advisable 
to leave to the General Assembly such a basic change in the 
long-established common law of Virginia.”  Id. at 392, 329 
S.E.2d at 25.  Nor do we believe that the General 
Assembly’s amendment of Code § 19.2-155 in 1996 reflects 
any preference on the part of the General Assembly to 
restrict the private bar from appearing as prosecutors.  
Contrary to Riner’s assertion, the statute cannot be viewed 
as a change in the common law allowing the use of private 
prosecutors.  Accordingly, we decline Riner’s suggestion 
that we should overrule Cantrell and abolish the right of a 
crime victim, or the victim’s family, to employ private 
prosecutors to assist the Commonwealth.  Such a change in 
our common law is for the General Assembly to make, rather 
than the courts. 
For all these reasons, we conclude that the trial 
court did not err in permitting the private attorney to 
assist in the preparation and prosecution of the charges 
against Riner nor in the level of his participation allowed 
 
37
by the court.  Both matters were within the discretion and 
continuous control of the trial court.  See Cantrell, 229 
Va. at 393, 329 S.E.2d at 26. 
D.  HEARSAY EVIDENCE 
Two of Riner’s assignments of error concern the trial 
court’s admitting hearsay statements into evidence.  The 
trial court allowed the admission of double hearsay by 
permitting a witness to testify about a threat made by 
Riner to Denise, as related by Denise to the witness.  The 
other hearsay evidence about which Riner complains 
concerned an entry in a pawn shop journal that the trial 
court admitted without any testimony from the employee who 
made the entry. 
 
Before addressing the hearsay issues before us, we 
note that, subsequent to oral argument before this Court, 
the Supreme Court of the United States decided Crawford v. 
Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004).  In that 
case, the prosecution had played for the jury the tape-
recorded statement made to the police by defendant’s wife, 
who was at the scene of the crime, but the defendant had 
not had an opportunity for cross-examination because the 
defendant’s wife was unavailable as a trial witness due to 
the invocation of marital privilege.  Id. at ___, 124 S.Ct. 
at 1357.  For purposes of determining when a prior 
 
38
statement by an unavailable declarant may be admitted into 
evidence without violating the Confrontation Clause, the 
Supreme Court drew a distinction between hearsay statements 
that are “testimonial” and those that are “non-
testimonial.”  Id. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 1374.  The Court 
held that, “[w]here testimonial evidence is at issue, . . . 
the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: 
unavailability [of the declarant] and a prior opportunity 
for cross-examination [by the defendant].”  Id.  The Court 
declined to provide a comprehensive definition of 
“testimonial” hearsay but offered some examples of the 
“core class of ‘testimonial’ statements”: ex parte 
testimony at a preliminary hearing, statements obtained 
during custodial police interrogations, affidavits, and 
“ ‘statements that were made under circumstances which 
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that 
the statement would be available for use at a later 
trial.’ ”  Id. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 1364. 
 
In light of the decision in Crawford and its potential 
impact on the hearsay issues in this appeal, we requested 
letter briefs from the parties addressing whether the 
decision applied to or affected the hearsay issues.  In 
response, both Riner and the Commonwealth agreed that 
Crawford has no bearing on whether the trial court properly 
 
39
admitted the pawn shop journal because, as a business 
record, it was not “testimonial” hearsay.  Indeed, the 
Court in Crawford indicated that business records are a 
type of hearsay “that by their nature [are] not 
testimonial.”  Id. at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 1367.  With regard 
to the double hearsay concerning the threat, Riner stated 
that, “[a]t the time [the witness] testified, there was no 
reason to probe whether, in the context of Denise’s 
statement to [the witness], Denise (the declarant) would 
reasonably have expected her statement to be used 
prosecutorially.”  In the absence of such evidence, Riner 
admitted that he cannot assert that Denise’s statement to 
the witness was “testimonial” hearsay within the rule 
announced in Crawford.  Thus, in light of the parties’ 
admissions, we conclude that the decision in Crawford is 
not relevant to the hearsay issues before us.  We turn now 
to those specific issues. 
1. DOUBLE HEARSAY 
The Commonwealth called several witnesses to testify 
about the relationship between Riner and Denise and to show 
that Riner had threatened to take the children and never 
let Denise see them if Denise separated from him.  When the 
Commonwealth called Donna Brickey to provide such 
testimony, Riner objected and asked for a bench conference.  
 
40
Based on information obtained from an insurance 
investigator’s notes, Riner believed Brickey would testify 
that Denise had told her about an incident in the early 
1990s when Riner told Denise he would kill her if she ever 
attempted to take the children away from him. 
Riner first objected on the basis that the incident 
was too remote in time, but the Commonwealth proffered that 
Riner had made the threat within the year before the fire.  
Riner then stated, “It’s double hearsay; . . . [i]t doesn’t 
show [Denise’s] state of mind.”  The Commonwealth 
responded, “[A]ny threats made by the defendant that [were] 
communicated to the decedent [are] admissible to show the 
relationship of the parties, show his motive and his 
intent.”  After hearing further argument on the issue, the 
trial court admitted the testimony, ruling that “[i]t 
certainly shows threats of violence in the relationship 
between the parties; state of mind of the accused.” 
Brickey then testified, and the Commonwealth asked 
whether Denise ever expressed any concerns about separating 
from Riner.  Brickey responded, “Well, [Denise] did say 
that [Riner] had told her that if she tried to leave him 
that he would take the kids away and she would never see 
them again.”  The Commonwealth then asked Brickey whether 
Denise had told her about any threats by Riner.  Brickey 
 
41
answered, “[Denise] said that [Riner] told her that if she 
tried to leave him and take the kids that he would kill 
her.” 
On appeal, Riner asserts that the trial court erred in 
admitting Brickey’s testimony about his threat to kill 
Denise.  He argues that the testimony contained double 
hearsay and that, to be admissible, “both the primary 
hearsay declaration and each hearsay declaration included 
within it must conform to a recognized exception to the 
hearsay rule.”  West v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 906, 910, 
407 S.E.2d 22, 24 (1991).  We agree that the testimony 
contained double hearsay and with the principle stated in 
West.  However, we find that Riner waived this claim. 
During argument on his objection to Brickey’s double 
hearsay testimony, Riner asserted that the statement at 
issue was inadmissible because Denise’s telling Brickey 
about the threat did not show Denise’s state of mind.  That 
objection obviously addressed the second level of hearsay, 
i.e., when Denise repeated the threat to Brickey.  The 
trial court admitted the testimony, ruling that “[i]t 
certainly shows threats of violence in the relationship 
between the parties; state of mind of the accused.”10  At 
                     
10 To the extent that the Court of Appeals found that 
the trial court had ruled that Brickey’s statement was 
 
42
that point, Riner asked the trial court, “What about the 
second part, Judge, the stuff from the early 90’s?”  Riner 
was referring to portions of Brickey’s anticipated 
testimony that pertained to threats allegedly made by Riner 
to Denise many years ago.  The trial court concluded that 
those statements were not admissible because of their 
remoteness. 
Significant to this appeal is the fact that Riner did 
not at that juncture in the trial remind the court that it 
had not ruled on the admissibility of both levels of the 
double hearsay contained in Brickey’s testimony.  
Specifically, the trial court never decided whether the 
second level of hearsay fell within a recognized exception 
to the hearsay rule.  The trial court dealt with only the 
first level of hearsay and concluded that Riner’s threat to 
Denise was admissible because it demonstrated his state of 
mind. 
 
Riner’s failure to renew his objection or bring to the 
trial court’s attention the fact that it had not ruled on 
his objection challenging the second level of hearsay is 
analogous to the situation addressed by this Court in 
Green, 266 Va. 81, 580 S.E.2d 834.  As already explained, 
                                                             
admissible to show Denise’s state of mind, that finding was 
in error.  The trial court did not make such a ruling. 
 
43
the defendant there did not renew his change of venue 
motion, previously taken under advisement by the trial 
court, before the jury was empanelled and sworn, nor did he 
remind the court that it had not ruled on the motion.  Id. 
at 94, 580 S.E.2d at 842.  We refused to address the 
defendant’s assignment of error that the trial court had 
erred in refusing to grant a change of venue because the 
defendant had waived the issue.  Id. at 95, 580 S.E.2d at 
842. 
We reach the same result here.  Riner’s objection to 
Brickey’s testimony focused on the second level of the 
hearsay.  He claimed that Denise’s repeating the threat to 
Brickey did not fall within an exception to the hearsay 
rule, thus making the entire statement inadmissible.  See 
West, 12 Va. App. at 910, 407 S.E.2d at 24.  Riner did not 
challenge both levels of the hearsay nor did he need to do 
so.  However, by failing to bring to the trial court’s 
attention the fact that it had ruled only on the 
admissibility of the primary hearsay in the statement, 
Riner did not afford the trial court the opportunity to 
rule intelligently on the issue now before us.  See Johnson 
v. Raviotta, 264 Va. 27, 33, 563 S.E.2d 727, 731 (2002) 
(trial court must have “an opportunity to rule 
intelligently on a party’s objections,” thereby “avoid[ing] 
 
44
unnecessary mistrials or reversals”).  In that 
circumstance, the issue is waived on appeal.11  See Rule 
5:25; Lenz, 261 Va. at 463, 544 S.E.2d at 306 (failure to 
request ruling on pretrial motion waived issue on appeal); 
Hoke v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 303, 306, 377 S.E.2d 595, 597 
(1989) (failure to renew change of venue motion waived the 
issue under Rule 5:25); cf. Horner v. Dep’t of Mental 
Health, 268 Va. 187, 194, 597 S.E.2d 202, 206 (2004) 
(failure to assign cross-error on an issue the Court of 
Appeals did not address waives further appellate review of 
the issue). 
2. PAWN SHOP JOURNAL 
As already stated, Riner sold jewelry belonging to 
Denise after the fire.  The Commonwealth called Cheryl A. 
Brown, manager of the pawn shop where Riner sold the items, 
                     
11 In the letter brief, Riner also argues that 
Brickey’s hearsay testimony violated his rights under the 
Confrontation Clause because the hearsay neither fell 
within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” nor bore 
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” as required 
by Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).  We conclude 
that Riner waived the constitutional argument he now makes.  
When he objected to Brickey’s testimony at trial, he relied 
only on state law hearsay grounds in support of his 
objection.  Riner did not mention the Sixth Amendment or 
the Confrontation Clause.  Under this Court’s 
contemporaneous objection rule, see Rule 5:25, we do not 
consider a constitutional argument raised for the first 
time on appeal.  See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 53, 
71, 591 S.E.2d 47, 57 (2004); Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 
Va. 292, 308 n.3, 513 S.E.2d 642, 652 n.3 (1999). 
 
45
to testify about the transaction.  Brown remembered an 
occasion when an investigator from the Wise County 
Sheriff’s Department came to the shop in search of some 
jewelry.  The investigator was accompanied by some 
individuals that Brown later learned were Denise’s sisters.  
According to Brown, Denise’s sisters “immediately” 
identified three of Denise’s rings in a glass case 
containing “maybe a thousand” rings. 
Brown explained the legal requirements in Tennessee 
for pawn shop transactions.  The seller or pawnor must 
present valid photographic identification, and the pawn 
shop must record the name, address, and other information 
about the pawnor as well as information about the items 
pawned or sold.  Continuing, Brown testified that an entry 
in a journal kept in the regular course of the pawn shop’s 
business showed that, on March 11, 1999, an individual by 
the name of Charles Douglas Riner, with a Tennessee 
driver’s license bearing an address of 159 Bear Drive, 
Bluff City, Tennessee, sold three rings, four pocket 
watches, and other assorted merchandise for the sum of 
$230.  The number assigned to that transaction corresponded 
to the number on the rings identified by Denise’s sisters. 
Upon learning during Brown’s testimony that she had 
not personally handled the transaction at issue, Riner 
 
46
moved to strike her testimony and objected to the 
introduction of the journal into evidence.  With regard to 
the hearsay issue before us, Riner stated that the journal 
was not admissible because Brown only approved the amount 
to pay Riner for the jewelry and did not make the entry 
into the journal, and because the Commonwealth had not 
established that the actual entrant was unavailable to 
testify.  After hearing Riner’s objection, the trial court 
allowed Brown to testify in more detail about the entrant.  
Brown stated that the employee who made the relevant entry 
in the pawn shop journal was 79 years of age and was “off 
on sick leave” because she had “suffered a back injury” and 
was “unable to get up right now.”  After hearing this 
additional evidence, Riner renewed his hearsay objection.12  
Although the trial court stated, “I don’t know whether 
she’s in the hospital or is available or not,” it 
ultimately allowed the introduction of the pawn shop 
journal.  The Court gave the following explanation for its 
ruling: 
I think it’s relevant, I’m going to allow it and 
overrule your motion and find it to be an exception to 
the hearsay rule under the Shopbook Rule, the business 
records kept.  I think the fact that this is even 
                     
12 Riner also objected to the admission of the journal 
on grounds of relevancy, but that issue in not before us on 
appeal. 
 
 
47
overwhelmingly better because of the fact that this 
woman . . .  Apparently, they, in Tennessee they put a 
lot of requirements and restrictions and legal 
requirements on them in order to keep their records 
correct and I think the records show total 
trustworthiness and total . . .  Tennessee is looking 
over their shoulder very carefully at these pawn shops 
and loan shops. 
 
Later, during Riner’s testimony, he admitted that he 
had sold a bag of what he described as “scrap jewelry” to 
the pawn shop in Bristol, Tennessee and used his driver’s 
license as identification during the transaction.  
According to Riner, he found the jewelry, after moving to 
Bluff City, Tennessee, in a zippered bag that he had 
salvaged out of a safe kept in the basement of the burned 
house in Coeburn.  Riner denied having ever seen the three 
rings that Denise’s sisters identified.  He did not, 
however, deny that the three rings were part of the items 
he had sold to the pawn shop; instead, he stated, “I can’t 
say they were or weren’t.”  He also admitted that an 
employee at the pawn shop “went through each individual 
item separately.” 
On appeal, Riner argues that the trial court erred in 
admitting the pawn shop journal because the Commonwealth 
failed to prove that the individual who entered the 
relevant information in the journal was unavailable to 
 
48
testify at trial.13  The Court of Appeals rejected this 
argument, finding that the “evidence in the record supports 
a finding that the employee who made the entry in the pawn 
shop’s records was unavailable because she was out of work 
with a back injury that left her ‘unable to get up’ at the 
time of trial.”  Riner, 40 Va. App. at 478, 579 S.E.2d at 
690.  We agree with that conclusion.  Because the trial 
court’s factual finding that the entrant was not available 
to testify is supported by the evidence, we conclude that 
the court did not err in admitting the pawn shop journal.14 
E. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
To prove arson, as with any criminal charge, the 
Commonwealth must establish beyond a reasonable doubt both 
the corpus delicti and criminal agency.  Cook v. 
Commonwealth, 226 Va. 427, 431, 309 S.E.2d 325, 328 (1983) 
                     
13 Riner also asserts on brief that he was denied the 
right to cross-examine the entrant.  However, he did not 
make a constitutional objection at trial with regard to the 
admission of the pawn shop journal.  We will not consider a 
constitutional argument raised for the first time on 
appeal.  See Johnson, 267 Va. at 71, 591 S.E.2d at 57; 
Cherrix, 257 Va. at 308 n.3, 513 S.E.2d at 652 n.3. 
 
14 The parties, the trial court, and the Court of 
Appeals viewed the unavailability of the entrant as a 
requirement for admission of the pawn shop journal under 
the business records exception to the hearsay rule.  For 
that reason, we treat the unavailability requirement as the 
“law of the case.”  However, we intimate no view in today’s 
decision whether unavailability of the entrant is indeed a 
requirement under the business records exception. 
 
49
(citing Jones v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 1012, 1021, 49 S.E. 
663, 666 (1905)).  The corpus delicti of arson “must 
consist of proof that the fire was of incendiary, rather 
than of accidental origin.” Id.  Here, Riner challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence only with regard to the corpus 
delicti, i.e., whether the fire was of incendiary origin.  
Notably, Riner does not challenge on appeal the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support the jury’s determination that he 
was the criminal agent.  In other words, Riner implicitly 
agrees that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence 
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that, if the fire 
was of incendiary origin, he was the criminal agent who 
started the fire. 
With regard to the corpus delicti, a defendant has the 
benefit of a presumption that the fire was caused by 
accident.  Id. (citing Simmons v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 
778, 782, 160 S.E.2d 569, 572-73 (1968)).  That presumption 
is, however, rebuttable.  Knight v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 
85, 89, 300 S.E.2d 600, 602 (1983).  “Whether the origin of 
a fire was accidental or incendiary is a question of fact, 
and resolution of that question may, and often must, turn 
upon the weight of circumstantial evidence.”  Id.  Such is 
the present case. 
 
50
The Commonwealth’s evidence regarding the incendiary 
origin of the fire came primarily from two individuals, 
Clark D. Davenport and John D. Walker, both of whom 
testified as experts in the field of investigating the 
origin and cause of fires.  Davenport and Walker each 
inspected the Riner home after the fire and concluded that 
the fire was of incendiary origin. 
Specifically, Walker opined that the “fire started at 
the south end of the home” where the living room and master 
bedroom were located, and that it “was caused by an 
intentional human act meaning it was an incendiary or an 
arson fire.”  In his opinion, the fact that the floor of 
the front porch and the “uprights” in the porch were 
completely consumed by the fire was unusual and indicated 
“a tremendous amount of fire at the whole front end of that 
home.”  Because of the extent of burning on the floor of 
the Riner house and the burn patterns there, Walker further 
opined that “liquid accelerant” had been poured on the fire 
and that the liquid “ignited and burned the floor first 
before everything else fell down on top of the floor.”  
Walker testified that he eliminated any potential 
accidental cause of the fire and found no indication that 
the fire started in the electrical panel box because there 
was no evidence of arcing there.  Even though an analysis 
 
51
of debris samples that Walker had collected from the fire 
scene contained no evidence of liquid accelerant residue, 
Walker did not alter his conclusions. 
Similarly, Davenport opined that “deep seated charring 
of burn patterns in areas on the floor of the master 
bedroom” were caused by “burning of an ignitable liquid 
that had been poured on the floor.”  During his 
investigation of the fire, Davenport found evidence of 
newspaper strips in several areas of the house, including 
the floor in the master bedroom where Denise’s body was 
found.  Davenport opined that the newspapers were “used as 
an accelerant to spread the fire.”  He stated that “the 
newspapers in conjunction with an ignitable liquid were 
spread throughout the first floor of the dwelling in the 
areas where [he] determined that a flammable liquid or 
ignitable liquid patterns were discovered.” 
Davenport further testified that he found no evidence 
that would cause him to conclude that the origin of the 
fire could not be determined or was accidental.  He also 
discounted a theory advanced by one of the defense’s expert 
witnesses that the fire had been caused by a short circuit 
in a baseboard heater.  In Davenport’s opinion, the 
evidence of short-circuiting that he found in the wiring 
that remained in the house was the result of the fire and 
 
52
not the cause of it.  When asked what kind of analysis he 
performed to eliminate other possible sources of ignition, 
Davenport responded, “In conjunction with Mr. Riner’s 
statements to me, as far as the condition of the house, 
smoking habits, electrical problems, coupled with what I 
observed at the scene, I was able to eliminate the natural 
or accidental fire causes verses [sic] what I saw; glaring 
evidence of an ignitable liquid poured and burned.” 
It is true, as Riner argues, that other expert 
witnesses who investigated the fire, some of whom testified 
on behalf of the Commonwealth, opined that the origin of 
the fire could not be determined.  It is also true that 
Riner introduced evidence showing that the fire had been 
caused by a short circuit in a baseboard heater.  But, as 
Riner conceded during oral argument, the conflicting 
evidence created a “credibility battle” among the experts.  
“ ‘Conflicting expert opinions constitute a question of 
fact . . . .’ ”  Mercer, 259 Va. at 242, 523 S.E.2d at 217 
(quoting McCaskey v. Patrick Henry Hospital, 225 Va. 413, 
415, 304 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1983)).  In that situation, it is 
within the province of the finder of fact, in this case the 
jury, “ ‘to assess the credibility of the witnesses and the 
probative value to be given their testimony.’ ”  Id. 
 
53
(quoting Richardson v. Richardson, 242 Va. 242, 246, 409 
S.E.2d 148, 151 (1991)). 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, as we must since it was the prevailing 
party in the trial court, see Higginbotham, 216 Va. at 352, 
218 S.E.2d at 537, we conclude that there was sufficient 
evidence from which the jury reasonably could have inferred 
that the fire was incendiary in origin.  “When a fact-
finder has accepted the testimony of a qualified expert 
witness, which negates every reasonable possibility that a 
fire was of accidental origin, we cannot hold the evidence 
insufficient, as a matter of law, to support a finding that 
the fire was of incendiary origin.”  Cook, 226 Va. at 432, 
309 S.E.2d at 328.  Accordingly, we hold that the trial 
court did not err in finding the evidence of arson 
sufficient to support the jury verdict. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated with regard to each of Riner’s 
assignments of error, we find no error in the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals.  Thus, we will affirm that judgment 
and Riner’s convictions.15 
Affirmed. 
                     
15 In light of our decision, it is not necessary to 
address the Commonwealth’s assignments of cross-error. 
 
54
JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE HASSELL and JUSTICE 
KEENAN join, dissenting. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent.  In my view, the record in 
this case does not support the majority’s conclusion that 
Charles Douglas Riner waived his objection to the admission 
of the double hearsay testimony of Donna Brickey at issue 
in this appeal.  In the absence of such waiver, the record 
clearly establishes that the erroneous admission of this 
evidence was not harmless error.  It is axiomatic that 
under such circumstances Riner was denied a fair trial and 
his convictions for the first degree murder of his wife, 
Karen Denise Riner, and for arson must be reversed. 
The majority correctly relates the context in which 
the hearsay issue arose at Riner’s trial and the substance 
of the testimony of Brickey, who was called as a witness by 
the Commonwealth to relate the purported statements made to 
her by Denise, prior to Denise’s death in the fire that 
destroyed the Riners’ home.  The Commonwealth sought to 
establish the tempestuous relationship between Riner and 
his wife in support of its theory of the case that the fire 
was not accidental.  Over Riner’s objection, Brickey was 
permitted to testify that Denise had told her that Riner 
had said that “if [Denise] tried to leave him and take the 
kids that he would kill her.”  Beyond question, Brickey’s 
 
55
testimony was “double hearsay and thus doubly suspect” 
because her testimony concerned a statement made by Denise, 
one level of hearsay, recounting a statement made by Riner, 
another level of hearsay.  Service Steel Erectors Co. v. 
International Union of Operating Engineers, 219 Va. 227, 
236, 247 S.E.2d 370, 376 (1978).  To be admissible, both 
levels of hearsay must fall within a recognized exception 
to the hearsay rule.  West v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 
906, 909-10, 407 S.E.2d 22, 24 (1991).  The majority agrees 
that Brickey’s testimony constituted double hearsay and 
that the principle established in West restricts the 
admissibility of such testimony. 
Riner objected to the admission of Brickey’s testimony 
on the ground that “[i]t’s double hearsay; . . . [i]t 
doesn’t show [Denise’s] state of mind.”  Rule 5:25 requires 
that an objection be made “with reasonable certainty” in 
order to enable the trial judge to rule on the objection 
intelligently and, thus, to avoid unnecessary reversal on 
appeal.  While admittedly Riner’s objection could have been 
stated more precisely to assert that both levels of the 
hearsay did not fall within a recognized exception to the 
hearsay rule as required by West, the objection as stated 
substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 5:25.  
Overton v. Slaughter, 190 Va. 172, 179, 56 S.E.2d 358, 362 
 
56
(1949) (“substantial compliance” with contemporaneous 
objection rule found where objection was “sufficiently 
broad to have given the trial court notice of the substance 
of the objection”); Levine v. Levine, 144 Va. 330, 336-37, 
132 S.E. 320, 322 (1926) (explaining that “it was not 
intended that a strict compliance with the letter of the 
[contemporaneous objection] rule should be necessary to 
enable a litigant to ask [for] the consideration . . . of 
an objection or exception which was plainly and manifestly 
made in the trial court, and the grounds of which appear 
from the ruling thereon by the trial court”).  See also 
Conquest v. Mitchell, 618 F.2d 1053, 1056 (4th Cir. 1980) 
(finding that, under Virginia law, “if an objection is 
raised in such a manner so as to give the trial court 
notice of its substance, the rule will be deemed complied 
with even though the objection could have been more 
definitively given”). 
In this case, the trial judge was not called upon to 
rule upon the objection in a vacuum or without the 
opportunity to rule intelligently.  Riner’s objection 
clearly called to the trial judge’s attention that 
Brickey’s testimony contained “double hearsay” and that at 
least one level, concerning Denise’s state of mind, was 
inadmissible because it did not fall within a recognized 
 
57
exception to the hearsay rule.  While the trial judge did 
not expressly rule on the admissibility of both levels of 
hearsay contained in Brickey’s testimony, the judge 
admitted Brickey’s entire testimony on the ground that her 
testimony “shows threats of violence in the relationship 
between the parties, state of mind of [Riner].” 
The majority acknowledges that Riner did not need to 
challenge both levels of hearsay contained in Brickey’s 
testimony in order to invoke the principle stated in West 
regarding the admission of double hearsay.  And, indeed, 
but for the double hearsay context in which it was 
presented by Brickey’s testimony, Riner does not dispute 
that one level of hearsay, the statement that he had 
threatened to kill Denise if she left him and took the 
couple’s children, would have been admissible as relevant 
to show his state of mind and potential motive.  
Nevertheless, the majority concludes that Riner waived his 
objection to Brickey’s testimony because he failed to renew 
his objection or “bring to the trial court’s attention” the 
fact that it had not ruled on his objection challenging 
Denise’s statement to Brickey.  In effect, the majority 
treats Brickey’s testimony as if it were divisible or 
consisted of discrete parts, apparently because it 
contained “double hearsay.”  Brickey’s testimony that was 
 
58
the subject of Riner’s objection, however, was not 
susceptible to division.  Brickey’s knowledge of Riner’s 
purported threats of violence against Denise came to her 
solely from Denise’s purported statement to her.  Thus, it 
was necessary that Brickey’s testimony include both levels 
of hearsay in order for her testimony to convey anything 
intelligible and relevant to the jury.  The trial judge’s 
ruling then necessarily resolved the issue of both levels 
of hearsay contained in Brickey’s testimony by ruling that 
her entire testimony was admissible. 
The majority expressly and principally relies upon an 
analogy it draws from the situation we addressed in Green 
v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 81, 93-95, 580 S.E.2d 834, 841-42 
(2003), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1448 (2004), 
to support its conclusion that Riner has waived his 
objection to Brickey’s testimony.  I respectfully disagree 
with that analogy.  In Green, the defendant’s change of 
venue motion was taken under advisement.  The defendant 
subsequently did not renew his motion before the jury was 
empanelled and sworn or remind the trial court that the 
motion was still pending and that he wanted the court to 
rule on it.  Id. at 93-94, 580 S.E.2d at 841-42.  We 
concluded that the defendant had waived the issue regarding 
the change of venue.  Id. at 95, 580 S.E.2d at 842. 
 
59
In the present case, however, the question whether to 
admit Brickey’s double hearsay testimony was not the 
subject of a pre-trial motion that Riner failed to renew at 
the time Brickey testified.  Rather, the objection was made 
at the point at which the evidence was to be admitted at 
Riner’s trial.  There can be no doubt that Riner objected 
to the admission of Brickey’s testimony on the ground that 
Denise’s out-of-court statement to Brickey did not fall 
within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.  When 
the trial court ruled that Brickey’s entire testimony was 
admissible, there was no need or occasion for Riner to 
“renew” the objection just made.  Indeed, Code § 8.01-384, 
and cases construing it, not only expressly make such 
objection “unnecessary,” but also indicate that the 
objection was sufficient to preserve Riner’s right to 
contest the trial court’s admission of the “double hearsay” 
testimony on appeal. 
In relevant part, subsection (A) of Code § 8.01-384 
provides that: 
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the 
[trial] court shall be unnecessary . . . [and] it 
shall be sufficient that a party, at the time the 
ruling or order of the court is made or sought, 
makes known to the court the action which he 
desires the court to take or his objections to 
the action of the court and his grounds 
therefore; and, if a party has no opportunity to 
object to a ruling or order at the time it is 
 
60
made, the absence of an objection shall not 
thereafter prejudice him on motion for a new 
trial or on appeal. 
 
Code § 8.01-384(A).  Significantly, the statute also 
expressly states that: 
No party, after having made an objection or 
motion known to the court, shall be required to 
make such objection or motion again in order to 
preserve his right to appeal, challenge, or move 
for reconsideration of, a ruling, order, or 
action of the court. 
 
Id. 
 
Cases applying this language clearly indicate that 
once a party makes the trial court aware of its objection 
to a particular ruling, there is no need for that party, as 
a means of preserving its appeal rights, to subsequently 
repeat the substance of its objections by noting a formal 
exception.  See, e.g., Ward v. Insurance Co. of North 
America, 253 Va. 232, 233 n.1, 482 S.E.2d 795, 795 n.1 
(1997) (citing Code § 8.01-384); Richmond Dept. of Soc. 
Servs. v. Carter, 28 Va. App. 494, 497, 507 S.E.2d 87, 88 
(1998) (plaintiff’s claim that defendant failed to preserve 
standard of proof issue for appeal held “meritless” because 
“[o]nce the objection was made at trial, the [defendant] 
was not required to make it again to preserve the issue” 
under Code § 8.01-384(A)); Brown v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. 
App. 225, 229-30, 475 S.E.2d 836, 838-39 (1996) (where 
 
61
arguments of defense counsel concerning admissibility of 
hearsay evidence alerted the trial court to the possibility 
of error and gave it the opportunity to take corrective 
actions, arguments held sufficient as an objection to 
preserve admissibility issue for appeal under Code § 8.01-
384). 
 
In addition, the majority’s approach ignores the burden 
of proof on a hearsay objection.  When an objector draws the 
trial court’s attention to the fact that the form of 
proposed proof is hearsay, “the party attempting to 
introduce a hearsay statement has the burden of showing the 
statement falls within one of the exceptions.”  Robinson v. 
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 3, 6, 516 S.E.2d 475, 476 (1999);  Doe 
v. Thomas, 227 Va. 466, 472, 318 S.E.2d  382, 386 (1984) 
(“ ‘One seeking to have hearsay declarations of a witness 
admitted as an exception to the general rule must clearly 
show that they are within the exception.’ ”), quoting 
Skillen and Son, Inc. v. Rosen, 359 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Tex. 
1962).  Thus, once Riner made the hearsay objection it was 
the Commonwealth’s burden to demonstrate the admissibility 
of each “level” of hearsay involved. 
In general it has been this Court’s practice to 
recognize that a hearsay objection that is not fully argued 
below before a ruling admitting proof is made will be 
 
62
sufficient to bring the merits of the hearsay issue before 
us.  Thus, in Frank Shop, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum 
Corp., 261 Va. 169, 174, 540 S.E.2d 897, 900 (2001), the 
opponent raised a hearsay objection, the proponent 
suggested that there were four theories involved, and the 
trial court ruled to allow the putative hearsay into 
evidence before the admission theories were even argued by 
counsel.  This Court proceeded to assess the evidence and 
hold it inadmissible under the hearsay rule.  Id. at 176, 
540 S.E.2d at 901.  See also Code § 8.01-384(A); Ward, 253 
Va. at 233 n.1, 482 S.E.2d at 795 n.1; Carter, 28 Va. App. 
at 497, 507 S.E.2d at 88; Brown, 23 Va. App. at 229-30, 475 
S.E. 2d at 838-39. 
While the trial court’s ruling expressly addressed 
only the hearsay statement made by Riner to Denise, I am 
unwilling to conclude that the trial court was unaware that 
the effect of the ruling was to admit the hearsay statement 
made by Denise to Brickey.  The trial court surely 
understood the significance of Riner’s “double hearsay” 
objection.  To require Riner to reiterate the argument 
already made on the admissibility of the hearsay as between 
Denise and Brickey and demand an express ruling from the 
trial court on that issue was just as surely unnecessary.  
Additionally, the view taken by the majority would place 
 
63
every criminal defendant in the position of having to 
request full and express rulings from the trial court on 
every objection in order to avoid the waiver applied in 
this case, a practice that is wholly impractical. 
Though differing from the reasoning applied by the 
majority, the Commonwealth contends that Riner has waived 
his objection to the double hearsay evidence at issue on 
two grounds.  First, the Commonwealth asserts a waiver 
because Riner did not object to the testimony of two 
witnesses showing the discord in the Riners’ marital 
relationship, and he had cross-examined one of those 
witnesses regarding whether Denise had ever complained of 
being physically abused by Riner.  Second, the Commonwealth 
asserts that Riner has not challenged the actual ruling of 
the trial court, which was that the hearsay evidence was 
admissible under an exception to show the state of mind of 
Riner rather than Denise.  Both assertions of waiver are 
without merit. 
With regard to the first, none of the other evidence 
elicited by the Commonwealth or by Riner upon cross-
examination included the direct assertion that Riner had 
ever threatened to kill Denise.  There was no evidence of 
physical abuse suffered by her.  A death threat manifestly 
 
64
is not the same character as a threat to withhold the 
couple’s children in the event of a divorce. 
With regard to the Commonwealth’s second assertion of 
waiver, failure to challenge one level of hearsay within a 
double hearsay statement would not constitute a waiver 
because when a party objects that a proffered statement is 
hearsay it is the burden of the proponent of the statement 
to show that it is admissible.  Where the notion that the 
statement has two levels of hearsay has been presented to 
the trial judge, it is the burden of the proponent of the 
evidence to demonstrate to the judge that there is an 
exception warranting receipt of both levels of the hearsay.  
In this case, it is clear that at trial, in the Court of 
Appeals, and presently in this appeal, Riner has not 
focused on the fact that Brickey’s statement quotes Riner 
(theoretically admissible as party admission or a statement 
of Riner’s state of mind) but has pursued the objection to 
the fact that Brickey’s testimony recounts an out-of-court 
statement by Denise that does not fit a hearsay exception 
(not an “excited utterance,” not within the admissible 
state of mind doctrine in Virginia). 
For these reasons, I am of opinion that a finding of 
waiver of the issue regarding whether the trial court erred 
in admitting the double hearsay testimony of Brickey is not 
 
65
warranted and that the issue is properly before this Court 
in this appeal.  Accordingly, I will address the merits of 
Riner’s assertion that Brickey’s testimony was erroneously 
admitted against him at his trial. 
 
In general terms, “hearsay is an out-of-court 
statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted 
and . . . hearsay includes testimony by a witness who 
relates not what he knows personally but what others have 
told him or what he has read.”  Robinson v. Commonwealth, 
258 Va. 3, 6, 516 S.E.2d 475, 476 (1999).  “[H]earsay 
evidence is inadmissible unless it falls within one of the 
recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule, and . . . the 
party attempting to introduce a hearsay statement has the 
burden of showing the statement falls within one of the 
exceptions.”  Id., 516 S.E.2d at 476-77 (internal citation 
omitted).  Pertinent to the present case, we have stated 
that “[g]enerally, [hearsay] statements made by a crime 
victim that show the victim’s state of mind are admissible 
as an exception to the hearsay rule, provided the 
statements are relevant and probative of some material 
issue in the case.”  Clay v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 
257, 546 S.E.2d 728, 730 (2001).  “Evidence is relevant if 
it tends to prove or disprove, or is pertinent to, matters 
in issue.”  Id.  In the specific circumstance of a hearsay 
 
66
statement purporting to show the state of mind regarding 
the fear of a victim with respect to a death threat or 
threat of violence made to the victim by the accused, the 
hearsay statement of the victim is admissible to rebut 
claims by the defense that the victim’s death was the 
result of suicide, or where the defense admits some role in 
the events causing the victim’s death, but contends that 
the death was the result of an accident or an act of self-
defense.  Id.; United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 770-71 
(D.C. Cir. 1973).  “When those defenses are not in issue 
. . . the statement would become relevant only through ‘a 
circuitous series of inferences.’ ”  Hanson v. 
Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 173, 188, 416 S.E.2d 14, 23 
(1992) (quoting Brown, 490 F.2d at 771). 
Riner’s asserted theory of the case was that the fire 
was accidental and that Denise’s death in that fire was 
also accidental.  This defense excludes an admission that 
he accidentally caused the fire and obviously does not 
involve a claim of suicide or self-defense.  As previously 
noted herein, but for the double hearsay context in which 
it was presented by Brickey’s testimony, Riner does not 
dispute that one level of the hearsay, the purported 
statement that he had threatened to kill Denise if she left 
him and took the children, was relevant to show his state 
 
67
of mind and potential motive to commit the crimes for which 
he was on trial.  Rather, the thrust of Riner’s contention 
is that the second level of hearsay, Denise’s statement to 
Brickey, could only show that Denise’s state of mind was 
fear and that state of mind was not relevant to any issue 
in the case.  Riner contends that Denise’s state of mind 
was not probative of Riner’s state of mind because had 
Riner possessed the motive and intent to kill her, “either 
would have existed independent of [Denise’s] fear of him or 
any other state of mind.”  West, 12 Va. App. at 910, 407 
S.E.2d at 24.  Riner also finds support for his contentions 
in Evans-Smith v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 188, 211, 361 
S.E.2d 436, 449 (1987).  Noting that West and Evans-Smith 
are factually similar to the present case, Riner asserts 
that Denise’s statement did not comply with the 
requirements of the state of mind exception to the hearsay 
rule and was inadmissible. 
 
In response, the Commonwealth contends that the trial 
court properly admitted the statement to show Denise’s 
state of mind under the state of mind exception to the 
hearsay rule as enunciated in Clay.  The Commonwealth 
asserts that Brickey’s testimony showed a motive for Riner 
to kill his wife once she declared her intent to divorce 
him and to use his abuse of his step-son to prevent him 
 
68
from obtaining custody of the couple’s children.  The 
Commonwealth further contends that the statement “showed 
that Riner viewed the loss of his children on an equal 
footing with the need to rectify his financial problems.”  
The Commonwealth interprets Clay broadly and argues that 
our holding there was not limited to cases in which there 
is an asserted defense of self-defense, suicide, or 
accidental death in which the accused admittedly played 
some role.  The Commonwealth’s position would essentially 
permit the state of mind exception to consume the hearsay 
rule.  Denise’s fear of Riner, if such were the case, was 
not relevant because Riner would have had the motives 
suggested by the Commonwealth in this case regardless of 
that state of mind on her part.  Moreover, under Clay, 
Denise’s statement recounting Riner’s threat was not 
admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay 
rule to rebut Riner’s assertion of accidental death because 
Riner was not contending that the fire was the result of 
his actions.  Accordingly, the trial court erred in 
admitting Brickey’s testimony. 
Where, as here, the erroneous admission of evidence is 
not of constitutional dimension, the standard for reviewing 
the harm to the defendant, if any, is to consider whether 
 
69
“when all is said and done, the conviction is 
sure that the error did not influence the jury, 
or had but slight effect, the verdict and the 
judgment should stand . . . .  But if one cannot 
say, with fair assurance, after pondering all 
that happened without stripping the erroneous 
action from the whole, that the judgment was not 
substantially swayed by the error, it is 
impossible to conclude that substantial rights 
were not affected . . . .  If so, or if one is 
left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot 
stand.” 
 
Clay, 262 Va. at 260, 546 S.E.2d at 731-32 (quoting 
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946).  
See Code § 8.01-678 (providing the statutory standard for 
harmless error involving nonconstitutional error). 
The record does not support the Commonwealth’s 
assertion that Brickey’s testimony “was only a fraction of 
the motive evidence against Riner” and, thus, any error in 
admitting this testimony was harmless.  To the contrary, 
despite other evidence that the Riner’s marriage was 
discordant, no other witness testified that Riner had ever 
been physically abusive to Denise or had threatened her 
with physical violence.  Nor was the evidence of Riner’s 
financial difficulties in itself indicative that he would 
seek to profit from her death.  Thus, the evidence that 
Riner had once threatened to kill Denise if, as actually 
transpired, she sought to end their marriage and separate 
 
70
him from their children, was not merely cumulative of other 
motive evidence. 
It is a regrettable but well acknowledged fact that 
numerous marriages in this Commonwealth terminate in 
divorce.  The suggested reasons for that fact are also 
numerous.  In such cases it is also regrettable but not 
uncommon that the actual separation and divorce of a couple 
is preceded by arguments and even threats of violence.  In 
this context, prior threats of violence or death become 
especially significant where a spouse anticipating a 
divorce is the alleged victim of a homicide.  Indeed, 
where, as here, such a spouse has related to another a 
death threat made by her husband, and the specifics of that 
threat comport with the subsequent events leading up to the 
alleged victim’s death, the death threat essentially 
becomes a lens through which the jury will focus on the 
evidence and assess the rest of the prosecution’s case 
against the accused.  Under such circumstances, far from 
having slight or no effect on the verdict, it “ ‘cannot [be 
said], with fair assurance . . . that the judgment was not 
substantially swayed by the error.’ ”  Clay, 262 Va. at 
260, 546 S.E.2d at 731-32 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 
765).  At the very least, in this case the error creates a 
 
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“grave doubt” and, accordingly, “the conviction cannot 
stand.”  Id. 
For these reasons, I would hold that the trial court’s 
erroneous admission of Brickey’s double hearsay testimony 
concerning the death threat Riner allegedly made to Denise 
was not harmless.  Accordingly, I would reverse Riner’s 
convictions for first degree murder and arson on this 
ground and remand the case for a new trial if the 
Commonwealth be so advised.