Title: Eric Reed d/b/a Analytical Testing Group v. City of Birmingham
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2022-0583
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 12, 2023

Rel: May 12, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2022-0675 
_________________________ 
 
Hyundai Construction Equipment Americas, Inc., and Hyundai 
Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.  
 
v.  
 
Southern Lift Trucks, LLC 
 
 
 
Appeal from Washington Circuit Court 
(CV-22-900029) 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2022-0676 
_________________________ 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
2 
 
 
Hyundai Construction Equipment Americas, Inc., and Hyundai 
Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.  
 
v.  
 
Southern Lift Trucks, LLC 
 
 
 
Appeal from Washington Circuit Court 
(CV-22-900029) 
 
COOK, Justice. 
 
These consolidated appeals arise out of a commercial dispute 
between Southern Lift Trucks, LLC ("Southern"), and Hyundai 
Construction Equipment Americas, Inc. ("Hyundai Construction") -- an 
alleged subsidiary of Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. ("Hyundai 
Heavy Industries").1 Southern is a heavy-equipment dealer for Hyundai 
Construction. Southern filed suit against Hyundai Construction and 
Hyundai Heavy Industries (collectively referred to as "Hyundai") 
asserting various claims, including claims under the Alabama Heavy 
Equipment Dealer Act ("the AHEDA"), § 8-21B-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. 
 
1Although Hyundai Heavy Industries is alleged to be a parent of 
Hyundai Construction, it was not a signatory to the dealer agreements 
at issue in these appeals.  
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
3 
 
Southern also sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Hyundai (1) 
from unlawfully terminating one of the dealer agreements at issue in 
these appeals and (2) from unlawfully adding a second dealer in the 
territory that was covered under another dealer agreement at issue. In 
response, Hyundai moved to compel arbitration. The Washington Circuit 
Court granted Southern's request for a preliminary injunction and 
denied Hyundai's motion to compel arbitration.  
 
In appeal no. SC-2022-0675, Hyundai appeals the trial court's order 
granting Southern's request for a preliminary injunction. For the reasons 
provided herein, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's 
order and remand the cause for the trial court to enter an order consistent 
with this opinion.  
 
In appeal no. SC-2022-0676, Hyundai appeals the trial court's order 
denying its motion to compel arbitration. For the reasons provided 
herein, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's order and 
remand the cause for the trial court to enter an order consistent with this 
opinion.  
Facts and Procedural History 
Southern is a heavy-equipment dealer based in Mobile. In 2019, it 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
4 
 
entered into a dealer agreement with Hyundai Construction to serve as 
a dealer of lift trucks manufactured by Hyundai Construction ("the 
forklift agreement"). A year later, in 2020, it entered into a second dealer 
agreement to serve as a dealer of construction equipment manufactured 
by Hyundai Construction ("the construction-equipment agreement").  
Among other things, the forklift agreement covered the sales, 
service, and distribution of forklifts and other "lift trucks." The 
construction-equipment agreement covered the sales, service, and rental 
of the provision of parts for, and warranties regarding earth-moving 
equipment used in the construction industry, such as excavators, wheel 
loaders, rollers, and breakers.  
The territories covered by the dealer agreements overlapped, but 
were not identical.   Specifically, the territory covered under the forklift 
agreement included Washington, Clarke, Choctaw, Sumter, Marengo, 
Wilcox, Baldwin, Conecuh, Escambia, Mobile, and Monroe Counties in 
Alabama, as well as certain counties in Mississippi and Florida. The 
territory covered under the construction-equipment agreement included 
only Washington, Choctaw, Clarke, Baldwin, Conecuh, Escambia, 
Mobile, and Monroe Counties in Alabama.   
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
5 
 
When the parties entered into the dealer agreements, Southern was 
the only dealer of lift trucks and construction equipment for Hyundai 
Construction within those territories. However, neither agreement was 
exclusive by its terms.   
According to Southern, since entering into the dealer agreements, 
it has incurred significant expenditures building its business location, 
acquiring inventory and hiring and training full-time sales and mechanic 
staff to promote, sell, and service Hyundai Construction's products in the 
territories covered by the agreements. Southern provided evidence 
indicating that it employed 6 salespeople (including 1 customer-service 
specialist) -- having an average of 35 years' experience -- to handle 
Hyundai Construction's products. In addition, Southern provided 
evidence indicating that it maintained, on a full-time basis, 
approximately 3 road and shop technicians, each with 10-20 years' 
experience, who have been "Hyundai Factory Trained" to service 
Hyundai Construction's product.  
In both dealer agreements, Southern agreed to arbitrate any and 
all disputes that it had with Hyundai Construction. For example, in the 
forklift agreement, the parties agreed to the following:  
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
6 
 
 
"In order to effectively resolve disputes between the 
parties efficiently and at the least cost and inconvenience, the 
parties agree to resolve their disputes pursuant to the terms 
set forth in this Section 25. All disputes between the parties 
relating to or arising out of this Agreement or the making, 
performance or breach thereof, or the subject matter hereof, 
shall be resolved by arbitration in the following manner:  
 
 
"(a) The arbitration shall be conducted in 
accordance 
with 
the 
American 
Arbitration 
Association arbitration rules as in force on the 
date this agreement is executed. The parties 
hereby 
submit 
to 
the 
exclusive 
personal 
jurisdiction of such arbitrators for all matters 
unless such matters are required by law to be 
submitted to a court or other venue; provided that 
either party may apply to any court of competent 
jurisdiction 
to 
seek 
an 
order 
compelling 
arbitration or a declaratory judgment with respect 
to the enforceability of any provision of this 
Agreement.  
 
 
"(b) The arbitration tribunal shall be formed 
of three arbitrators. The arbitrators shall be 
persons who are familiar with the commercial and 
manufacturing practices of heavy construction 
equipment business.  In the event of incapacity, 
death or resignation of an arbitrator during the 
course of the arbitration proceedings, a substitute 
arbitrator shall be appointed or chosen pursuant 
to procedures set forth above. 
 
 
"(c) The arbitration shall take place in 
Gwinnett County, Georgia or at such other 
location as the parties may agree and shall be 
conducted in the English language. 
 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
7 
 
 
"(d) The arbitration award shall be final, 
binding on the parties, not subject to any appeal 
and shall deal with question of cost of arbitration 
and all matters related thereto. 
 
 
"(e) Judgment upon the award rendered may 
be entered by any court having jurisdiction, or 
application may be made to such court for a 
judicial recognition of the award or any order of 
enforcement thereof."   
 
(Emphasis added.) Likewise, the construction-equipment agreement 
contained a virtually identical arbitration provision.   
Immediately after Southern entered into the construction- 
equipment agreement in 2020, Southern sold four pieces of construction 
equipment.  However, Southern made no sales of construction equipment 
in 2021 or in 2022.  
According to Southern, in August of 2021, Hyundai began efforts to 
"oust Southern as a dealer," including by threatening to reduce 
Southern's line of credit unless it agreed to stock a large inventory of 
equipment that it was not contractually required to stock.  Southern 
claims that this was part of a plan to "create an environment in which it 
would not be feasible for Southern to continue as a Hyundai dealer so 
Hyundai could 'push out' Southern and install other dealers." Southern's 
brief at 11. However, Hyundai explained that its offer was intended as 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
8 
 
an effort to help rectify Southern's lack of construction-equipment sales 
and noted that, despite factory supply shortages and supply-chain delays, 
its other construction-equipment dealers across the country were 
recording record sales and profits. In the end, Southern did not agree 
with Hyundai's demands. 
On March 2, 2022, Hyundai Construction notified Southern of its 
intent to terminate the construction-equipment agreement.  Hyundai 
Construction's correspondence to Southern informed Southern that it 
had a cure period of 90 days from the date of the notice and that, if it did 
not make corrective efforts during that cure period, the construction-
equipment agreement would officially terminate on June 30, 2022 -- or 
120 days from the date of its March 2, 2022, notice.  
Southern responded to the termination notice on March 5, 2022, 
requesting information regarding Hyundai Construction's inventory of 
construction equipment and sales of construction equipment in 
Southern's territory before the construction-equipment agreement was 
entered into.  
In response to Southern's request, on March 8, 2022, Hyundai 
Construction informed Southern that it was being terminated as a dealer 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
9 
 
because Southern had failed to adequately stock construction equipment 
and had failed to take advantage of opportunities to place stock orders to 
build an inventory.  Southern disputes both of these justifications and 
points to documents and testimony of Hyundai witnesses that cast doubt 
on these proffered reasons.   
 That same day, Hyundai Construction granted a portion of 
Southern's territory under the construction-equipment agreement to 
another dealer located in southern Alabama -- Taylor Machine Works, 
Inc., d/b/a Taylor Construction Equipment ("Taylor").   A few weeks later, 
Hyundai Construction issued a press release stating that its construction 
equipment was now being offered by Taylor through new "Hyundai-
authorized" locations in Southern's territory. Hyundai Construction then 
listed Taylor as a dealer in that territory on its Web site.  Likewise, 
Taylor issued an advertisement announcing that it was proud to be a 
dealer 
of 
construction 
equipment 
manufactured 
by 
Hyundai 
Construction. 
Hyundai Construction's actions, however, were not limited solely to 
its construction equipment. On April 11, 2022, Hyundai Construction 
sent a correspondence to Southern notifying Southern that it intended to 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
10 
 
assign an additional dealer -- Thompson Tractor Company ("Thompson") 
-- to serve as a lift-truck dealer in the Alabama territory covered by 
Southern under the forklift agreement. Hyundai Construction's 
correspondence also advised Southern that it intended for this 
arrangement to take effect after 60 days had passed and that it intended 
for the new dealer and Southern to work together as Hyundai 
Construction dealers.  
Specifically, Hyundai Construction's correspondence stated:  
"1. The cause of overlay of the territory is warranted due to 
market conditions including anticipated future changes with 
the competition.  
 
"2. The past, present and anticipated retail sales and service 
business transacted by Thompson that would improve 
Hyundai Construction's market position within the assigned 
territory.  
 
"3. Overall market coverage with head-count to improve the 
level of support of current and future customers." 
 
Hyundai Construction informed Southern that it intended to add 
Thompson as another lift-truck dealer in Southern's territory because of 
an expected upcoming market opportunity.  According to Hyundai 
Construction, effective July 1, 2022, one of its major competitors, 
Mitsubishi Logisnext Americas, canceled its relationship with Thompson 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
11 
 
and replaced Thompson with another heavy-equipment dealer.  As a 
result, Hyundai Construction believed that all of Thompson's customers 
would be looking for a new lift-truck dealer and that this served as a good 
reason to add Thompson to the territory.  
Hyundai Construction framed the addition of this new dealer as 
beneficial for Southern because, it explained, Southern would receive the 
benefit of Thompson's infrastructure and servicing capabilities while 
being able to continue to purchase and sell lift trucks manufactured by 
Hyundai Construction. Not surprisingly, Southern did not see it the same 
way.  
It is undisputed that Southern's lift-truck sales, unlike its 
construction-equipment sales, had been thriving during the previous two 
years. Southern had often met or exceeded its sales goals, and, in the first 
quarter of 2022 alone, its sales were 240% of its sales goals.  
Nevertheless, Hyundai Construction alleged that Southern was not 
fulfilling its duties as a lift-truck dealer because Southern did not have 
the infrastructure to service the equipment sold. In support of its 
contention, Hyundai Construction noted that Southern had failed to meet 
its goals for parts sales and that none of its employees had ever been fully 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
12 
 
certified to service Hyundai Construction equipment.  Hyundai 
Construction also noted that Southern had only a single service facility 
and that it was not sufficient in size. Southern vigorously disputed those 
assertions.   
It is undisputed that the AHEDA requires 60 days' notice before the 
overlay of an additional dealer can occur and that Hyundai 
Construction's notice that Thompson would be added as a dealer stated 
that it would be effective as of June 13, 2022, i.e., after 60 days had 
passed. However, shortly after receiving the notice regarding the 
addition of Thompson, Southern became aware that some of its customers 
had already been contacted and provided quotes and/or had been 
informed that Thompson was the new lift-truck dealer for Hyundai 
Construction in Southern's territory.    
As a result, on May 26, 2022, Southern filed suit against both 
Hyundai Construction and Hyundai Heavy Industries, alleging claims 
under multiple provisions of the AHEDA, breach of contract, multiple 
tort claims, and a claim of conspiracy. Southern also moved to 
preliminarily enjoin Hyundai from (1) terminating either of the dealer 
agreements with Southern and (2) permitting other dealers to market or 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
13 
 
sell construction equipment or lift trucks in Southern's territories under 
those agreements. Finally, Southern sought a judgment declaring that 
"all provisions of the Dealer Agreements that are inconsistent 
with the AHEDA are unenforceable, null and void pursuant 
to Ala. Code § 8-21B-9; all provisions of the Dealer 
Agreements that are not 'reasonable' as defined by the 
AHEDA are unenforceable, null and void pursuant to Ala. 
Code § 8-21B-10; Hyundai violated the provisions of § 8-21B-
8(c) and, by extension, the Dealer Agreements, by entering 
into a duplicative dealer agreement with Taylor for the same 
Equipment 
Territory 
serviced 
by 
[Southern] 
without 
providing [Southern] written notice at least 60-days prior 
thereto; Hyundai violated the provisions of § 8-21B-8(c) and, 
by extension, the Dealer Agreements, by deciding to enter into 
agreements with Thompson and Taylor within [Southern's] 
Territories without a reasonable basis; Hyundai violated the 
provisions of § 8-21B-8(b) and, by extension, the Dealer 
Agreements, because its actions with respect to [Southern] 
were arbitrary, in bad faith, or unconscionable; Hyundai 
unlawfully terminated or cancelled the Equipment Dealer 
Agreements without good cause in violation of § 8-21B-4; and 
Hyundai violated the provisions of § 8-21B-8(e) and, by 
extension, the Dealer Agreements, by discriminating between 
dealers with regards to price, programs, or terms of sale." 
 
The trial court entered a temporary restraining order ("TRO") that 
same day, granting Southern's request for injunctive relief. Hyundai then 
moved to dissolve the TRO, moved to dismiss the action or, in the 
alternative, to change venue, and moved to compel arbitration.  
Following a hearing, on June 10, 2022, the trial court granted 
Southern's motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining Hyundai from 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
14 
 
(1) terminating the dealer agreements with Southern; (2) "entering into 
agreements or otherwise permitting other dealers to sell Hyundai 
Construction's Construction Equipment or Forklift Equipment" in 
Southern's territories; and (3) "advertising or marketing (via website or 
otherwise) that other dealers are authorized to sell" the equipment at 
issue in Southern's territories. Hyundai appeals that decision in appeal 
no. SC-2022-0675. See Rule 4(a)(1)(B), Ala. R. App. P. 
On June 16, 2022, the trial court denied Hyundai's motion to compel 
arbitration. Hyundai appeals that decision in appeal no. SC-2022-0676. 
See Rule 4(d), Ala. R. App. P.  
Standard of Review 
First, "[w]hen this Court reviews the grant or denial of a 
preliminary injunction, '"[w]e review the ... [c]ourt's legal rulings de novo 
and its ultimate decision to issue the preliminary injunction for [an 
excess] of discretion."'" Monte Sano Rsch. Corp. v. Kratos Def. & Sec. 
Sols., Inc., 99 So. 3d 855, 861-62 (Ala. 2012) (quoting Holiday Isle, LLC 
v. Adkins, 12 So. 3d 1173, 1176 (Ala. 2008), quoting in turn Gonzales v. 
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428 
(2006)). When the trial court, without a jury, receives ore tenus evidence, 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
15 
 
it "'determines the weight and credibility of the testimony, and its 
findings are presumed correct and will not be disturbed on appeal unless 
the record reveals the [findings] to be plainly and palpably wrong or 
manifestly unjust.'" Cadle Co. v. Friedman, 631 So. 2d 962, 964 (Ala. 
1994) (quoting Wheeler v. Marvin's, Inc., 593 So. 2d 61, 63 (Ala. 1991)).  
Next, with regard to the denial of a motion to compel arbitration, 
this Court's standard of review is well settled: 
 
"'"'This Court reviews de novo the denial of 
a motion to compel arbitration. Parkway Dodge, 
Inc. v. Yarbrough, 779 So. 2d 1205 (Ala. 2000). A 
motion to compel arbitration is analogous to a 
motion for a summary judgment. TranSouth Fin. 
Corp. v. Bell, 739 So. 2d 1110, 1114 (Ala. 1999). 
The party seeking to compel arbitration has the 
burden of proving the existence of a contract 
calling for arbitration and proving that the 
contract 
evidences 
a 
transaction 
affecting 
interstate commerce. Id. "[A]fter a motion to 
compel arbitration has been made and supported, 
the burden is on the non-movant to present 
evidence that the supposed arbitration agreement 
is not valid or does not apply to the dispute in 
question." Jim Burke Automotive, Inc. v. Beavers, 
674 So. 2d 1260, 1265 n.1 (Ala. 1995) (opinion on 
application for rehearing).'"' 
 
"Hoover Gen. Contractors-Homewood, Inc. v. Key, 201 So. 3d 
550, 552 (Ala. 2016) (quoting Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v. 
Gantt, 882 So. 2d 313, 315 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn 
Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Bruno, 784 So. 2d 277, 280 (Ala. 
2000))." 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
16 
 
 
Performance Builders, LLC v. Lopas, 341 So. 3d 1084, 1088-89 (Ala. 
2021). 
Discussion 
I. Appeal No. SC-2022-0676 -- Motion to Compel Arbitration 
 
Hyundai argues that the parties are bound by valid contracts 
calling for arbitration of Southern's claims. It contends, therefore, that it 
has met its burden of demonstrating that arbitration is applicable and 
that Southern has not provided any reason to deny arbitration in this 
case.   
A party seeking to compel arbitration must show the existence of a 
contract calling for arbitration and that the contract evidences a 
transaction involving interstate commerce. STV One Nineteen Senior 
Living, LLC v. Boyd, 258 So. 3d 322, 324 (Ala. 2018). Specifically, the 
party seeking to compel arbitration "must '"produce some evidence which 
tends to establish its claim"'" for arbitration. Wolff Motor Co. v. White, 
869 So. 2d 1129, 1131 (Ala. 2003) (citations omitted). "'Once the moving 
party meets that initial burden, the party opposing arbitration has the 
burden of presenting evidence tending to show that the arbitration 
agreement is invalid or that it does not apply to the dispute in question.'" 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
17 
 
STV, 258 So. 3d at 324 (quoting Alabama Title Loans, Inc. v. White, 80 
So. 3d 887, 891 (Ala. 2011), citing in turn Bowen v. Security Pest Control, 
Inc., 879 So. 2d 1139, 1141 (Ala. 2003)).  
Hyundai, the party seeking to compel arbitration, met its initial 
burden of proving the existence of two agreements calling for arbitration 
and that the agreements involved interstate commerce. Specifically, it is 
undisputed -- even by Southern -- that the dealer agreements between 
Hyundai Construction and Southern contained nearly identical 
arbitration provisions that expressly stated that the parties agreed to 
arbitrate "[a]ll disputes between the parties relating to or arising out of" 
those agreements. (Emphasis added.) It is also undisputed that the 
agreements involved interstate commerce -- i.e., sales, service, and 
distribution of construction equipment and lift trucks in Alabama and in 
other southern states. Accordingly, the burden then shifted to Southern 
to show that the arbitration provisions in the dealer agreements were 
invalid or did not apply to the present dispute.  
Southern argues that the arbitration provisions in the dealer 
agreements contain express "carve-out" exceptions for matters that are 
required by law to be "submitted to a court or other venue" and for certain 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
18 
 
declaratory-judgment actions. It further argues that the arbitration 
provisions in the dealer agreements are not enforceable because Hyundai 
has waived them. Finally, Southern contends that any arbitration 
proceedings in the present case should not include Hyundai Heavy 
Industries because the arbitration provisions, by their very terms, apply 
only to disputes "between the parties" and Hyundai Heavy Industries 
was not a party to the dealer agreements. We will address each argument 
in turn.  
A. Carve-outs 
First, Southern argues that the arbitration provisions in the dealer 
agreements are not broad enough to cover this dispute because the 
arbitration provisions contain an "express carve-out." That "express 
carve-out," Southern says, provides an exception to arbitration for 
matters that " 'are required by law to be submitted to a court or other 
venue.' " Southern's brief at 26. 
We note, however, that Southern not only has quoted this clause 
out of context, but also has quoted only a part of the sentence containing 
the clause.  To begin with, the scope of the arbitration provisions is stated 
much earlier in the arbitration provisions, in clear and unambiguous 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
19 
 
language providing as follows: "All disputes between the parties relating 
to or arising out of this Agreement or the making, performance or breach 
thereof, or the subject matter hereof, shall be resolved by arbitration in 
the following manner …."  (Emphasis added).  " 'This Court has held 
[that] where a contract signed by the parties contains a valid arbitration 
clause that refers only to claims "arising out of or relating to" the 
contract, that clause has a broader application than an arbitration clause 
that refers only to claims "arising from" the agreement.' " STV, 258 So. 
3d at 325 (quoting Reynolds & Reynolds Co. v. King Autos., Inc., 689 So. 
2d 1, 2-3 (Ala. 1996)) (emphasis omitted).  
In contrast, the carve-out clause quoted by Southern is in subpart 
(a) of each arbitration provision, which follows the paragraph containing 
this unambiguous language stating the scope of the arbitration provision. 
Immediately before subpart (a) are these words: "in the following 
manner."   In other words, the clause quoted by Southern is in a subpart 
that relates to the "manner" of the arbitration and not the scope of the 
arbitration provision.  For instance, subpart (a) includes text about the 
use of the procedural rules of the American Arbitration Association and 
about personal jurisdiction.  Likewise, the remaining subparts in that 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
20 
 
portion of each arbitration provision deal with similar "manner" or 
procedural issues -- i.e., the number and qualifications of arbitrators; the 
location of arbitration proceedings and the language to be used; the 
finality of the arbitration award and the apportionment of costs; and the 
judicial-recognition procedure for any arbitration award. 
Further, we do not read the language quoted by Southern as an 
"exception" to the mandatory language found in each arbitration 
provision. As noted above, Southern omits key language from the 
sentence containing the clause that makes clear that the sentence is 
describing the parties' agreement to submit to the personal jurisdiction 
of the arbitrators -- an issue not in dispute here -- and is, therefore, not 
describing the scope of the arbitration provision.  The full text of the 
relevant portion of the sentence containing the clause in each dealer 
agreement is as follows: "The parties hereby submit to the exclusive 
personal jurisdiction of such arbitrators for all matters unless such 
matters are required by law to be submitted to a court or other venue." 
(Emphasis added.) It is simply not possible to read this as an "exception" 
to the mandatory, unambiguous, and broad language regarding the scope 
of the arbitration provision discussed above. When reviewing an 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
21 
 
agreement, we must review the entire agreement and not simply a 
portion of one sentence of a subpart of a paragraph. See, e.g.,  State v. 
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 1 So. 3d 1, 7 (Ala. 2008) ("In construing an 
arbitration agreement, a court must construe the contract 'as a whole; 
detached words or clauses standing alone are not controlling on the 
question of interpretation, each being viewed in relation to the agreement 
as an entity.' " (citation omitted)).2 
Southern also argues that the following clause constitutes a second 
"express carve-out" exception to the arbitration provisions at issue: "The 
parties hereby submit to the exclusive personal jurisdiction of such 
 
2Even if we were willing to read the clause quoted by Southern as 
creating an exception to arbitration, we would still hold that the dealer 
agreements require arbitration of the parties' dispute.  Southern argues 
that the AHEDA mandates that any contract provision that requires a 
dealer to waive its rights to a jury trial is "void and unenforceable," citing 
Ex parte Terex USA, LLC, 260 So. 3d 813, 822 (Ala. 2018), which barred 
the application of an outbound-forum-selection clause because of the 
applicability of the AHEDA.  Thus, Southern concludes, this dispute is a 
matter "required by law to be submitted to a court."  The problem is that 
Southern is claiming that the parties' dispute is required by Alabama law 
to be submitted to a court.  This argument ignores long-standing federal 
law.  The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., clearly preempts 
a state law prohibiting arbitration of a particular cause of action.  See 
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996).  Such 
federal preemption did not exist in Terex, which dealt with a forum-
selection clause.  Thus, the parties' dispute is not one "required by law to 
be submitted to a court."   
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
22 
 
arbitrators for all matters unless such matters are required by law to be 
submitted to a court or other venue; provided that either party may apply 
to any court of competent jurisdiction to seek an order compelling 
arbitration or a declaratory judgment with respect to the enforceability 
of any provision of this Agreement."  (Emphasis added.) 
Unlike the language discussed earlier, the emphasized language 
does appear to provide an "express carve-out" exception to the arbitration 
provisions at issue ("provided that either party may …."). However, as 
Hyundai correctly notes, the scope of that exception is limited because it 
applies only "to a declaratory judgment" concerning the "enforceability of 
any provision of this Agreement." Thus, those portions of Southern's 
declaratory-judgment claim relating to the "enforceability of any 
provision" of the dealer agreements are subject to this express carve-out.    
B. Waiver 
Next, Southern argues that the arbitration provisions in the dealer 
agreements are not enforceable because, it says, Hyundai has waived 
them.  Specifically, Southern argues that Hyundai's motion to dismiss 
merely mentioned arbitration in passing in a single sentence and did not 
make a full-throated argument for arbitration until it filed its motion to 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
23 
 
compel arbitration on the eve of the hearing set for all motions.   
"'A party seeking to prove a waiver of a right to arbitrate carries a 
heavy burden, and the courts will not lightly infer a waiver of the right 
to compel arbitration.'" Conseco Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Salter, 846 So. 2d 
1077, 1081 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Lee v. YES of Russellville, Inc., 784 So. 
2d 1022, 1028-29 (Ala. 2000)). This Court will find a waiver of the right 
to compel arbitration only when "'"the party seeking arbitration has so 
substantially invoked the litigation process that to compel arbitration 
will substantially prejudice the party opposing it."'" Id. (citations 
omitted; emphasis added); see also Crews v. National Boat Owners Ass'n 
Marine Ins. Agency, Inc., 46 So. 3d 933, 941 (Ala. 2010).  
A party's reference to the arbitrability of a plaintiff's claims in 
judicial filings before it has moved the trial court to compel arbitration 
evidences just the opposite of waiver -- that is, it evidences an intent not 
to waive its right to arbitration.  See ClimaStor IV, L.L.C. v. Marshall 
Constr., L.L.C., 4 So. 3d 452, 457-58 (Ala. 2008); U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. 
v. Curren, 779 So. 2d 1171 (Ala. 2000) (holding that, by asserting a right 
to arbitration in its answer, the defendant preserved its right, which it 
later sought to enforce by filing a motion to compel arbitration). See also 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
24 
 
O'Neal v. Bama Exterminating Co., 147 So. 3d 403 (Ala. 2013) (finding 
no waiver even though defendant waited 16 months after complaint was 
filed to file motion to compel arbitration and had answered and 
participated in discovery and had filed a motion for partial judgment on 
the pleadings); Mutual Assurance, Inc. v. Wilson, 716 So. 2d 1160, 1164 
(Ala. 1998)("'"'Merely answering on the merits, asserting a counterclaim 
(or cross-claim) or participating in discovery, without more, will not 
constitute a waiver.' … [T]he earliest point at which waiver of the right 
to arbitration may be found is 'when the other party files an answer on 
the merits.'"'") (citations omitted).  
This action was commenced on May 26, 2022. Hyundai filed its 
motion to dismiss 6 days later on June 1, 2022, and then filed its motion 
to compel arbitration 5 days after that on June 6, 2022 -- 11 calendar 
days after the complaint was filed. Hyundai's motion was filed before any 
hearings of any kind.  The facts here do not support a finding of a waiver 
of its arbitration rights by Hyundai. This is especially true when a 
preliminary injunction is being sought, sharply increasing the demands 
on all counsel.  Thus, we are unpersuaded by Southern's waiver 
argument.      
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
25 
 
C. Hyundai Heavy Industries 
Finally, we note that Southern correctly points out that Hyundai 
Heavy Industries is not a signatory to either dealer agreement and, thus, 
is not technically a party to either arbitration provision at issue. 
Southern argues that any arbitration proceedings in the present case 
should not include Hyundai Heavy Industries because, it says, the 
arbitration provisions -- by their terms -- apply only to disputes "between 
the parties." Southern's brief at 36-39 (citing Daphne Auto., LLC v. 
Eastern Shore Neurology Clinic, Inc., 245 So. 3d 599, 606 (Ala. 2017), and 
Cook's Pest Control, Inc. v. Boykin, 807 So. 2d 524, 527 (Ala. 2001)). It 
also argues that Hyundai Heavy Industries is actively disputing in the 
trial court whether it is a third-party beneficiary of the dealer 
agreements and therefore cannot claim such status for the purpose of 
arbitration.  
Hyundai Heavy Industries argues, however, that it is Southern that 
is claiming that Hyundai Heavy Industries is a third-party beneficiary of 
the entire dealer agreements and that, as a result, Southern is equitably 
estopped from disputing that the arbitration provisions apply to it in the 
present case. Hyundai Heavy Industries also argues that the claims 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
26 
 
against it are "intertwined" with Southern's claims against Hyundai 
Construction and that Southern has alleged both a conspiracy and an 
agency relationship between both entities. As a result, Hyundai Heavy 
Industries contends that the arbitration provisions apply to it and that 
arbitration must be compelled in this case.  
It is undisputed that Southern asserted in its complaint that the 
allegedly wrongful actions taken by Hyundai Construction "at all 
relevant times … described herein were taken at the direction of and/or 
for the benefit of [Hyundai Heavy Industries] in an agency capacity." 
(Emphasis added.)  Further, Southern specifically alleged in its 
complaint that Hyundai Construction and Hyundai Heavy Industries 
"conspired together via concerted action to achieve an unlawful purpose 
and/or to achieve their purposes by unlawful means, including via direct 
and flagrant violations of the AHEDA, as set forth more fully herein." 
Southern also alleged in its complaint that Hyundai Heavy Industries 
was the parent company of Hyundai Construction.3    
 
3Southern also argues to this Court that the preliminary injunction 
should apply to Hyundai Heavy Industries based on these very 
allegations and argues that an injunction would be "meaningless" if it did 
not apply to Hyundai Heavy Industries. Southern's brief at 43.  
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
27 
 
In Assurant, Inc. v. Mitchell, 26 So. 3d 1171 (Ala. 2009), the 
plaintiff sued an insurer and its parent company asserting breach-of- 
contract, bad-faith, and other tort claims.  The trial court denied the 
motion of the parent company to compel arbitration.  In that case, the 
arbitration agreement contained language indicating that it applied only 
to disputes "between" the contracting parties.  It stated that arbitration 
applied to disputes "between YOU and US," with "US" being the insurer. 
Id. at 1172. Nevertheless, this Court reversed the trial court's order 
denying the parent company's motion to compel arbitration and ordered 
arbitration because the plaintiff had "alleged an agency or alter ego 
relationship" by alleging that the parent company was acting "by and 
through" the insurer to commit the alleged wrongs.  Id. at 1175.  This 
Court cited a number of cases in support of its holding. See Jim Walter 
Homes, Inc. v. Spraggins, 853 So. 2d 913, 919-20 (Ala. 2002) (recognizing 
that a nonsignatory parent company was entitled to invoke right to 
arbitration); Ex parte Gray, 686 So. 2d 250 (Ala. 1996) (recognizing that 
a nonsignatory "agent" was allowed to invoke right to arbitration); 
Stevens v. Phillips 852 So. 2d 123, 131 (Ala. 2002) (recognizing that an 
agent "stands in the shoes" of her principal). See also McDougle v. 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
28 
 
Silvernell, 738 So. 2d 806, 809 (Ala. 1999) (recognizing that a closing 
attorney, as agent of title insurer, had standing to enforce an arbitration 
provision even though the attorney was not a party to the agreement 
containing arbitration provision).   
The same is true here.  Southern has expressly alleged an "agency 
capacity" between Hyundai Construction and Hyundai Heavy Industries 
and has specifically alleged that the parent -- Hyundai Heavy Industries 
-- was acting by and through the subsidiary -- Hyundai Construction.  In 
fact, there are no allegations that any actions taken in this case were 
taken by Hyundai Heavy Industries alone.  Instead, the actions taken 
were alleged to have been taken by Hyundai Construction as the agent 
and co-conspirator of Hyundai Heavy Industries. Under these 
circumstances, we are unpersuaded by Southern's argument and hold 
that any arbitration proceedings held in this dispute must include both 
Hyundai Construction and Hyundai Heavy Industries.  
D. Summary 
"'In interpreting an arbitration provision, "any doubts concerning 
the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, 
whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
29 
 
itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability."'" 
STV, 258 So. 3d at 325 (citations omitted; emphasis altered). "'"Thus, a 
motion to compel arbitration should not be denied unless it may be said 
with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of 
an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute."'" Id. (citations 
omitted; emphasis altered). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that 
Southern met its burden by demonstrating that the arbitration 
provisions do not apply only to portions of its declaratory-judgment claim. 
However, it failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that the arbitration 
provisions do not apply to its other claims. For these reasons, we affirm 
the trial court's order denying Hyundai's motion to compel arbitration as 
to any portions of Southern's declaratory-judgment claim relating to the 
"enforceability of any provision" of the dealer agreements, but we reverse 
the trial court's order denying Hyundai's motion as to all of Southern's 
other claims. 
II. Appeal No. SC-2022-0675 -- The Preliminary Injunction 
Next, Hyundai contends that the trial court erred in issuing a 
preliminary injunction. Specifically, Hyundai argues that the trial court 
was without jurisdiction to issue the preliminary injunction in the 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
30 
 
present case and that the evidence presented during the hearing on the 
motion below did not support a finding that Southern was entitled to 
injunctive relief.  
Alabama caselaw provides that a trial court has jurisdiction to 
enter preliminary injunctive relief to maintain the status quo between 
the parties, even when the dispute should be sent to arbitration. See 
Spinks v. Automation Pers. Servs., Inc., 49 So. 3d 186, 190 (Ala. 2010) 
("[W]e conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to issue a preliminary 
injunction to preserve the status quo pending completion of the 
arbitration proceeding." (emphasis added)); and Holiday Isle, 12 So. 3d 
at 1177 (stating that the "trial court had jurisdiction to enter a 
preliminary injunction to order equitable relief to preserve the status 
quo" and reasoning that the American Arbitration Association 
Commercial Rules recognize such an option).  A trial court may grant 
such equitable relief "'where an arbitral award could not return the 
parties substantially to the status quo.'" Holiday Isle, 12 So. 3d at 1177 
(quoting Drago v. Holiday Isle, L.L.C., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1222 (S.D. 
Ala. 2007)). 
As explained previously, Southern is the dealer for two separate 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
31 
 
lines of equipment and is a party to two separate dealer agreements. We 
must, therefore, analyze each agreement separately.  
As to the construction-equipment agreement, the preliminary 
injunction was not necessary "to preserve the status quo."  The status quo 
as to the construction equipment was no sales taking place. The 
undisputed facts are that Southern had not sold a single piece of 
construction equipment since 2020.  Even if there are any sales in the 
future by the new dealer -- Taylor -- and even if liability is found, 
damages would appear simple to calculate. Likewise, it is difficult to 
understand how there could be irreparable harm given the complete lack 
of sales of construction equipment, and Southern has not provided such 
an explanation in its briefing.4 We, thus, reverse the trial court's order 
insofar as it granted Southern's motion for a preliminary injunction as to 
the construction-equipment agreement. 
Whether the trial court erred in granting a preliminary injunction 
as to the forklift agreement is a closer call.  First, Southern has provided 
 
4Although Southern argues that the lack of sales could be attributed 
to failures and problems of Hyundai (for instance, supply-chain issues), 
it remains true that there have not been any such sales for two years.  
That is the status quo.     
 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
32 
 
evidence of both significant and consistent sales of lift trucks and other 
equipment subject to the forklift agreement. It has also provided 
significant evidence indicating that it has invested a great deal in its 
efforts to serve as a dealer of Hyundai Construction's lift-truck 
equipment, including hiring staff dedicated to selling and servicing the 
equipment, training such staff, and building a reputation and a client 
base.5 Southern also argues that § 8-21B-13, Ala. Code 1975, a part of the 
AHEDA, specifically provides that any party who has suffered "bodily 
injury, loss of profit, or property damage as a result of a violation of" the 
provisions of the AHEDA "may bring a civil action … to enjoin further 
violations." 
Hyundai argues, however, that there would be no irreparable harm, 
noting that money damages would be adequate and that such damages 
can be easily calculated by reviewing historical sales numbers.  Hyundai 
 
5For example, Southern provided evidence indicating that it 
employs 6 salespeople (including 1 customer-service specialist) -- having 
an average of 35 years' experience -- to handle Hyundai Construction's 
products. In addition, Southern provided evidence indicating that it 
maintained, on a full-time basis, approximately 3 road and shop 
technicians, each with 10-20 years' experience, who have been "Hyundai 
Factory Trained" to service Hyundai Construction's products. 
  
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
33 
 
further argues the forklift agreement is nonexclusive and that the 
"unending" injunction provides Southern with more relief than it is 
entitled to under either the forklift agreement or the AHEDA.  It further 
argues that it did not terminate the forklift agreement but merely added 
another dealer in the same territory and that the additional dealer will 
actually benefit Southern. 
First, although it is true that the AHEDA provides that it may be 
enforced by injunction, § 8-21B-13 does not dictate the result here 
because it provides for a final injunction, not a preliminary injunction.    
However, we agree that such express statutory provisions bear on 
whether a trial court should enter a preliminary injunction, given that 
the legislature has made an affirmative decision to provide the remedy of 
injunction.  For instance, if we reverse the preliminary injunction on this 
record of significant sales and significant investment by Southern in 
people, marketing, training, and relationships, we risk providing a 
hollow victory should Southern ultimately prevail, thereby eviscerating 
the remedy that the legislature has provided. Strong sales numbers are 
the status quo today.  Our ruling is confined to this record at this time, 
and we emphasize that we do not intend to announce a bright-line rule 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
34 
 
that a preliminary injunction should be granted in all AHEDA cases (or 
in all cases in which the legislature has listed an injunction as a possible 
remedy for a statutory violation).     
Second, Southern has provided evidence of harm to its reputation 
and goodwill, as well as evidence of customer attrition, and the trial court 
found that such harm was occurring. In other words, Southern not only 
has provided evidence of potential harm, but has provided actual 
evidence that the status quo was changing.  As noted above, shortly after 
the notice regarding the addition of Thompson as a dealer, Southern 
became aware that some of its customers had already been contacted and 
provided quotes and/or had been informed that Thompson was the new 
Hyundai Construction dealer for lift-truck equipment in Southern's 
territory.  In other words, the status quo was changing and was changing 
before the expiration of the 60 days' notice period required under the 
AHEDA.   
Third, Southern contends that the preliminary injunction as to the 
forklift agreement is not "indefinite." We agree. As it currently stands, 
the preliminary injunction will last for the duration of the action -- or 
until otherwise dissolved upon a motion from one of the parties.  It is not 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
35 
 
unlimited in time.   
Finally, the nonexclusive nature of the forklift agreement does not 
dictate the result here; the AHEDA is part of Alabama law, and, as long 
as it is constitutional, it supersedes applicable provisions of the forklift 
agreement.  Ex parte Terex USA, LLC, 260 So. 3d 813, 822 (Ala. 2018).  
It is not our role to question the wisdom of the legislature's choices.   
Ultimately, this is a close call in this case. However, based upon the 
evidence provided in the record and the trial court's findings, we cannot 
say that the trial court exceeded its discretion in enjoining the overlay of 
Thompson as a dealer in Southern's territory under the forklift 
agreement. 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's order insofar as 
it granted Southern's motion for a preliminary injunction as to the 
forklift agreement. However, we reverse the trial court's order insofar as 
it granted a preliminary injunction related to the construction- 
equipment agreement.  
Conclusion 
In appeal no. SC-2022-0675, we affirm the trial court's order insofar 
as it granted Southern's motion for a preliminary injunction as to the 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
36 
 
forklift agreement. However, we reverse the trial court's order insofar as 
it issued a preliminary injunction related to the construction-equipment 
agreement, and we remand the cause for the trial court to enter an order 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
In case no. SC-2022-0676, we affirm the trial court's order insofar 
as it denied Hyundai's motion to compel arbitration as to any provisions 
of Southern's declaratory-judgment claim relating to the "enforceability 
of any provision" of the dealer agreement. However, we reverse the trial 
court's order insofar as it denied Hyundai's motion to compel arbitration 
as to Southern's other claims, and we remand the cause for the trial court 
to enter an order consistent with this opinion. 
   
SC-2022-0675 -- AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; 
AND REMANDED. 
 
SC-2022-0676 -- AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; 
AND REMANDED. 
 
Wise, Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.  
 
Parker, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.  
 
Shaw, Bryan, Sellers, and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result. 
 
 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
37 
 
PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
In appeal number SC-2022-0676, I concur in affirming the circuit 
court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration filed by Hyundai 
Construction Equipment Americas, Inc., and Hyundai Heavy Industries, 
Co., Ltd. (collectively "Hyundai"), as to portions of the declaratory-
judgment claim asserted against them by Southern Lift Trucks, LLC 
("Southern"). And I concur in reversing the denial of the arbitration 
motion as to Southern's other claims that were not based on the Alabama 
Heavy Equipment Dealer Act ("AHEDA"), § 8-21B-1 et seq., Ala. Code 
1975. But I would affirm that denial as to Southern's other claims that 
were based on AHEDA, because those claims were within the arbitration 
provisions' exception for "matters … required by law to be submitted to a 
court …."  
"'Agreements to arbitrate are essentially creatures of contract,' and 
ordinary contract rules govern the interpretation of arbitration 
provisions." Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Larkin, 857 So. 2d 97, 103 (Ala. 
2003) (citation omitted). "When interpreting a contract, a court should 
give the terms of the contract their clear and plain meaning …." 
Brewbaker Motors, Inc. v. Belser, 776 So. 2d 110, 112 (Ala. 2000). Here, 
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
38 
 
the arbitration provisions expressly exempt from arbitration matters 
that are "required by law to be submitted to a court." Section 8-21B-13 of 
AHEDA provides: "Notwithstanding the terms, provisions, or conditions 
of any dealer agreement, any person who suffers bodily injury, loss of 
profit, or property damage as a result of a violation of [AHEDA] may 
bring a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction in this state …." 
With that language, AHEDA guarantees heavy-equipment dealers "the 
right to bring an action under the AHEDA in this State, and no contrary 
provision in a dealer agreement will foreclose the dealer's right to do so." 
Ex parte Terex USA, LLC, 260 So. 3d 813, 822 (Ala. 2018) (emphasis 
omitted) (dispute regarding in-state versus out-of-state venue). That is, 
AHEDA claims are conditionally "required by law to be submitted to a 
court": If a dealer chooses to bring the action in State court, it must be 
adjudicated there rather than by arbitration.  
Here, Southern exercised its right to bring AHEDA claims in court, 
so those claims were "required by law to be submitted to a court." 
Accordingly, the arbitration provisions' language does not require 
arbitration of Southern's AHEDA claims.  
SC-2022-0675 and SC-2022-0676 
39 
 
 
In appeal number SC-2022-0675, I concur in reversing the 
preliminary injunction prohibiting Hyundai from terminating the 
construction-equipment agreement. Southern has not demonstrated that 
it had no adequate remedy at law via a damages judgment at the end of 
the case. But I would also reverse the preliminary injunction prohibiting 
Hyundai from adding another forklift dealer, because Southern has not 
demonstrated that it satisfied the elements necessary to obtain a 
preliminary injunction. See State ex rel. Marshall v. TY Green's Massage 
Therapy, Inc., 332 So. 3d 413, 427 (Ala. 2021) (Parker, C.J., concurring 
in result) ("To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that (1) without the injunction, the plaintiff will suffer an 
irreparable injury; (2) the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law; (3) 
the plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits 
(sometimes stated as a 'reasonable chance'); and (4) the hardship that the 
injunction will impose on the defendant will not unreasonably outweigh 
the benefit to the plaintiff."); Capmark Bank v. RGR, LLC, 81 So. 3d 
1258, 1267 (Ala. 2011) (listing elements).