Title: Commonwealth v. Ortiz
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12975
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 2021

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12975 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KEVIN ORTIZ. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     February 1, 2021. - June 8, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, 
Probable cause.  Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle, 
Probable cause.  Probable Cause.  Identification.  
Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Identification of 
defendant in courtroom, Instructions to jury, Duplicative 
convictions. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 23, 2018. 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress was heard by Michael K. 
Callan, J., and the cases were tried before John S. Ferrara, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. 
David L. Sheppard-Brick, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  The defendant, Kevin Ortiz, and two 
codefendants were indicted on charges of multiple narcotics 
2 
 
offenses stemming from the same underlying events.  After a 
joint trial in the Superior Court, the defendant was convicted 
of unlawful distribution of heroin, as a subsequent offender, in 
violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32 (a); and unlawful possession of 
heroin with intent to distribute, as a subsequent offender, in 
violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32 (a).  One codefendant, Rey 
Ortiz,1 the defendant's brother, was convicted of unlawful 
possession of heroin with intent to distribute and unlawful 
possession of cocaine.  The other codefendant, Jose Vargas, was 
acquitted of unlawful distribution of heroin. 
On appeal, the defendant challenges a Superior Court 
judge's denial of his motion to suppress evidence found during a 
warrantless search of a motor vehicle, the admissibility at 
trial of an in-court identification made by a police officer, 
and purported errors in the jury instructions on possession and 
distribution of narcotics. 
 
For the reasons explained infra, we affirm the order 
denying the defendant's motion to suppress and his convictions. 
 
Background.  1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts the jury 
could have found, in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, reserving certain facts for later discussion. 
 
 
1 Because the defendant and his brother Rey Ortiz share a 
surname, we refer to Rey by his first name. 
3 
 
In February of 2018, Detective Jamie Bruno of the 
Springfield police department was investigating the sale of 
illegal narcotics from a base of operations at an apartment 
building on Niagara Street in Springfield, in particular from a 
single unit in that building.2  As part of the investigation, 
Officer Nicholas Mancinone, working undercover, participated in 
a controlled purchase of narcotics from the defendant on 
February 15, 2018. 
On the morning of the purchase, investigating officers were 
conducting surveillance of several locations near the Niagara 
Street apartment building.  Specifically, Bruno set up 
surveillance of the building itself, Officer Felix Aguirre was 
surveilling a gasoline station two blocks from the apartment 
building, and Detective Aristedis Casillas was conducting 
surveillance at an intersection where he had a clear view of a 
black Acura of interest in the investigation, which was parked 
near the building. 
 
Mancinone called the defendant to arrange to purchase a 
particular amount of heroin.  The defendant agreed to the 
transaction and ultimately directed him to the gasoline station 
 
 
2 At the pretrial hearing on the motion to suppress, Bruno 
explained that police had initiated the investigation after 
receiving complaints from residents of the building, as well as 
from information provided to Bruno by a reliable confidential 
informant. 
4 
 
that was under surveillance by Aguirre.  Meanwhile, Casillas, 
whose attention was focused on the Acura, saw the defendant 
drive up in a white Honda, which he parked across the street 
from the Acura.  The defendant, with nothing in his hands, got 
out of the Honda and walked across the street toward the Acura.  
As he approached the vehicle, its rear lights flashed. 
 
Casillas then saw the defendant open the driver's side door 
of the Acura, reach under the driver's seat to flip it forward, 
and then reach toward the rear passenger area, from which he 
retrieved a traffic vest.  As the defendant walked away from the 
Acura holding the vest, its lights flashed again.  The defendant 
then returned to the Honda and drove away. 
 
Shortly after the defendant had retrieved the vest and 
driven away, Aguirre saw him drive a Honda into the parking area 
of the same gasoline station where Mancinone had been waiting.  
Mancinone telephoned the defendant, who told him to get into the 
defendant's vehicle.  After Mancinone was seated in the Honda, 
the defendant drove it away.  During the short, two- to three-
minute drive, Mancinone placed money in a cup holder and the 
defendant handed him what Mancinone believed was heroin. 
 
Upon getting out of the defendant's Honda, Mancinone 
relayed to Bruno that he had successfully purchased twenty bags 
of heroin from the defendant.  The defendant was stopped by 
police a short distance from the gasoline station, in the 
5 
 
parking lot of a nearby coffee shop.  Among the officers 
assisting in the arrest were Aguirre and Casillas.  A subsequent 
search of the Honda revealed a driver's license belonging to 
Rey, but no remote key for the Acura. 
 
Following the defendant's arrest, Bruno and other members 
of the Springfield police department returned to the Acura the 
defendant had accessed prior to the transaction with Mancinone, 
and found it to be locked.  While the officers were examining 
the Acura, Rey approached to inquire what they were doing; he 
said that he had been informed that someone was attempting to 
break into his vehicle.  Police arrested Rey and seized the 
remote key for the Acura, which he was holding.  Using the 
remote key, the officers unlocked and searched the vehicle; they 
recovered one bag of cocaine "in a construction type glove . . . 
in the passenger's side of the vehicle" and 199 bags of heroin 
"[u]nder the driver's seat." 
 
2.  Prior proceedings.  A grand jury returned indictments 
against the defendant charging him with distribution of a class 
A controlled substance (heroin) as a subsequent offender, G. L. 
c. 94C, § 32 (a); possession with intent to distribute a class A 
controlled substance (heroin) as a subsequent offender, G. L. 
c. 94C, § 32 (a); and possession with intent to distribute a 
class B controlled substance (cocaine), G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c). 
6 
 
 
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from 
the Acura on the ground that the warrantless search was 
unlawful.  A Superior Court judge (motion judge), who was not 
the trial judge, determined that police had probable cause to 
believe the Acura contained contraband, and denied the motion.  
A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of the underlying 
heroin-related offenses, but acquitted him of the charge of 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.  At a jury-
waived trial, the trial judge then convicted the defendant of 
the subsequent offender portions of the indictments.  The 
defendant timely appealed from his convictions, and we allowed 
his application for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Denial of motion to suppress.  The 
defendant argues that the motion judge erred in denying his 
motion to suppress the evidence seized from the Acura because 
police lacked probable cause to search the vehicle at the time 
they did so.  The defendant contends that his "single" and 
"enigmatic" stop at the Acura -- which was not the location of 
the suspected base of narcotic operations -- did not provide 
police with a reasonable basis for believing that contraband 
would be found in the vehicle.  The Commonwealth maintains that 
police had probable cause to search the Acura because the 
defendant reached into its interior just before selling the 
7 
 
heroin to Mancinone, thus giving rise to a reasonable inference 
that the defendant had retrieved the drugs from the Acura. 
 
a.  Standard of review.  When reviewing a decision on a 
motion to suppress, we "accept the judge's subsidiary findings 
of fact absent clear error and leave to the judge the 
responsibility of determining the weight and credibility to be 
given oral testimony presented at the motion hearing," 
Commonwealth v. Mauricio, 477 Mass. 588, 591 (2017), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 441 Mass. 390, 393 (2004), but "conduct 
an independent review of [his or her] ultimate findings and 
conclusions of law" (citation omitted),  Commonwealth v. Rosa-
Roman, 485 Mass. 617, 620 (2020).  "A finding is 'clearly 
erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 655 n.7 
(2018). 
 
b.  Warrantless searches.  Warrantless searches are 
presumptively unreasonable under both the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  See Commonwealth v. Viriyahiranpaiboon, 
412 Mass. 224, 226 (1992).  This presumption "reflects the 
importance of the warrant requirement to our democratic 
society."  Commonwealth v. Arias, 481 Mass. 604, 609 (2019), 
8 
 
quoting Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 683 (2010).  
Warrantless searches, however, "may be justifiable . . . if the 
circumstances of the search fall within an established exception 
to the warrant requirement."  Arias, supra at 610, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Tuschall, 476 Mass. 581, 584 (2017).  Because 
"the inherent mobility of automobiles creates an exigency that 
they, and the contraband there is probable cause to believe they 
contain, can quickly be moved away while a warrant is being 
sought," Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 117, 123 (1997), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 904 (1990), "less 
stringent warrant requirements have been applied to vehicles," 
Motta, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 366 Mass. 277, 
282 (1974). 
 
c.  Probable cause.  Probable cause exists if the 
information available to police "provide[s] a substantial basis 
for concluding that evidence connected to the crime will be 
found [in] the specified [location]."  Commonwealth v. Escalera, 
462 Mass. 636, 642 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 
Mass. 710, 712 (2000).  "Strong reason to suspect is not 
adequate."  Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 370 (1985).  
Nonetheless, in considering the existence of probable cause, "as 
the very name implies, we deal with probabilities[,] . . . the 
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent [individuals], not legal technicians, 
9 
 
act."  Commonwealth v. Agogo, 481 Mass. 633, 637 (2019), quoting 
Cast, 407 Mass. at 895-896.  Thus, "[r]easonable inferences and 
common knowledge are appropriate considerations in determining 
probable cause."  Commonwealth v. Alessio, 377 Mass. 76, 82 
(1979).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Beckett, 373 Mass. 329, 341 (1977) 
("An inference [drawn from circumstantial evidence] . . . need 
only be reasonable and possible; it need not be necessary or 
inescapable"). 
 
In determining whether probable cause is supported, we have 
asked whether a sufficient nexus exists between the activities 
at issue and the location police expect to find contraband.  See 
Commonwealth v. Sheridan, 470 Mass. 752, 757 (2015) ("police 
[must] establish probable cause to believe that a criminal 
amount of contraband [is] present in the car" [quotation and 
citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 302 
(2003) (sufficient nexus existed between drug-selling activity 
and residence to establish probable cause to search).  While a 
nexus between the crime alleged and the place to be searched 
must be established, the nexus "need not be based on direct 
observation."  Donahue, 430 Mass. at 712, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197, 213, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 860 
(1983).  Indeed, in making this determination, we have looked to 
factors such as "the type of crime, the nature of the missing 
items, the extent of the suspect's opportunity for concealment, 
10 
 
and normal inferences as to where a criminal would be likely to 
hide" contraband.  O'Day, supra, quoting Cinelli, supra. 
The defendant argues that there was not a sufficient nexus 
between the suspected, apartment-based drug-selling operation 
and the Acura to provide probable cause to search it.  In the 
defendant's view, because police believed that the illegal 
activity was confined to a single apartment in the Niagara 
Street apartment building, they had "nothing . . . to suggest 
the alleged operation utilized an off-premises stash spot" so as 
to justify searching the Acura.  We do not agree. 
d.  Evidentiary hearing.  After an evidentiary hearing, the 
motion judge found as follows.  Investigating officers were 
aware that the defendant and his brother Rey were known to sell 
illicit narcotics together.  Once the defendant agreed to sell 
narcotics to Mancinone, the defendant directed Mancinone through 
some intermediate, circuitous instructions, and then, finally, 
to a gasoline station only a few blocks from the suspect 
apartment building.  The defendant had Mancinone wait in his 
vehicle for approximately ten minutes, and then told Mancinone 
to leave his own vehicle and to get into the defendant's Honda.  
Prior to meeting Mancinone, the defendant had driven a Honda to 
a location across the street from his brother Rey's Acura.  The 
defendant parked the Honda and walked across the street to the 
Acura.  After it was unlocked, seemingly remotely, the defendant 
11 
 
retrieved a vest from the Acura and drove off in the Honda, 
while the Acura was relocked remotely. 
As the defendant argues, there was no police observation of 
his actions or where he went after he drove off in the Honda and 
before he entered the gasoline station parking lot.  The 
evidence, however, establishes that he entered the parking lot 
only a few minutes after having retrieved the vest.  At the time 
of his arrest, the defendant had no remote key for the Acura, 
and none was discovered in the Honda.  When the defendant's 
brother Rey approached the officers, who were examining the 
parked Acura, however, Rey was holding a remote key for the 
vehicle. 
Based on the sum of the evidence before the motion judge, 
it was not clearly erroneous for him to conclude that the 
defendant retrieved the narcotics from the Acura after Rey used 
the key to open the vehicle and provide the defendant access to 
its interior.  To the contrary, the record at the hearing fully 
supports the motion judge's findings.  Accordingly, when the 
defendant was stopped shortly after he left the gasoline 
station, police had probable cause to search the Acura, and 
there was no error in the denial of the motion to suppress.3 
 
3 The parties agree that the motion judge erred in finding 
that the defendant had been at the Niagara Street apartment 
building before stopping at the Acura.  Indeed, no evidence was 
 
12 
 
 
2.  In-court identification.  The defendant also argues 
that the trial judge erred in permitting Mancinone to offer an 
in-court identification of the defendant at trial, without first 
having participated in a pretrial out-of-court identification, 
and that the in-court identification prejudiced the defendant.  
Because the defendant objected, we review to determine whether 
there was error and, if so, whether the error prejudiced the 
defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Harris, 481 Mass. 767, 777 
(2019).  If there was error in the introduction of the 
identification testimony, the defendant is entitled to a new 
trial unless we are convinced that the identification here "did 
not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect."  
Commonwealth v. Chalue, 486 Mass. 847, 858 (2021), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994). 
 
a.  "Good reason."  In-court identifications have been 
recognized as a type of "showup" identification that is 
inherently suggestive because "the prosecutor asks the 
eyewitness if the person who committed the crime is in the court 
room," and "the eyewitness knows that the defendant has been 
charged and is being tried for that crime."  Commonwealth v. 
 
introduced at the hearing with respect to the defendant's 
location before he stopped across the street from the Acura.  
Nonetheless, this error was not crucial to the finding of 
probable cause; the motion judge concluded that the contraband 
ultimately delivered to Mancinone was retrieved from the Acura, 
and not from the apartment building. 
13 
 
Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 237 (2014).  To lessen the unfairness of 
suggestive in-court identification testimony, "[w]here an 
eyewitness has not participated before trial in an 
identification procedure," a subsequent in-court identification 
by that witness is permissible "only where there is 'good 
reason' for its admission."  Id. at 241.  "Good reason" may 
subsume instances where "the witness is an arresting officer who 
was also an eyewitness to the commission of the crime, and the 
identification merely confirms that the defendant is the person 
who was arrested for the charged crime."  Id. at 242.  Such an 
identification is not impermissibly suggestive because, rather 
than "identifying the defendant based solely on his or her 
memory of witnessing the defendant at the time of the crime," 
the witness's identification is "understood by the jury as 
confirmation that the defendant sitting in the court room is the 
person whose conduct is at issue rather than as identification 
evidence."  Id. at 242-243.  An officer who did not participate 
in the arrest of a defendant cannot make such an assertion, and 
thus good reason does not exist to justify the risk of 
misidentification that may result from the suggestive in-court 
showup. 
The Commonwealth argues that Mancinone's in-court 
identification was proper because he had been involved in the 
ongoing investigation that culminated in the defendant's arrest.  
14 
 
At the same time, the Commonwealth urges us to revisit our 
decision in Crayton, 470 Mass. at 241-243, and to hold 
explicitly that in-court identifications by investigating 
officers are proper, even when those officers neither 
participated in the arrest of a defendant nor made a prior, 
nonsuggestive out-of-court identification.  We conclude that 
Mancinone's in-court identification was improper and should not 
have been permitted, and we decline the Commonwealth's 
invitation to adopt a revised standard of admissibility. 
Here, there was no "good reason" for Mancinone's suggestive 
in-court identification of the defendant.  Testimony at trial 
indicated that Mancinone did not participate in the defendant's 
arrest.  Rather, Mancinone's involvement in the defendant's 
arrest was limited to his role in the investigation, by acting 
as an undercover officer, and making a purchase of narcotics 
from the defendant while the two were together in the 
defendant's Honda.  Immediately after Mancinone left the vehicle 
and informed Bruno that the sale had been completed, Mancinone 
returned to the police station.  Thus, Mancinone's in-court 
identification could not be viewed as identifying the defendant 
as the person whose conduct was at issue but, rather, served to 
identify the defendant as the individual who entered into the 
heroin transaction with Mancinone. 
15 
 
 
Additionally, the testimony at trial does not demonstrate 
any other good reason for the in-court identification.  There 
was no evidence, for example, that Mancinone had any knowledge 
of the defendant before the commission of the offense, nor 
evidence that Mancinone had any continued interactions with the 
defendant throughout the booking process.  See Crayton, 470 
Mass. at 242-243.  Therefore, the trial judge erred in allowing 
the admission of Mancinone's in-court identification. 
 
b.  Prejudice to the defendant.  Given that the defendant 
objected to the erroneous admission of Mancinone's in-court 
identification, we must determine whether that error prejudiced 
the defendant.  See Harris, 481 Mass. at 777. 
"An error is nonprejudicial only '[i]f . . . the conviction 
is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had 
but very slight effect. . . .  But if one cannot say, with 
fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without 
stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the 
judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is 
impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not 
affected.'" 
 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 456 Mass. 708, 725-726 (2010), S.C., 
466 Mass. 1007 (2013), quoting Flebotte, 417 Mass. at 353. 
 
In addition to Mancinone's improper identification, there 
was extensive other evidence at trial that the defendant was the 
individual who had participated in the sale of heroin to 
Mancinone.  See Commonwealth v. Collins, 470 Mass. 255, 266 
(2014) (no risk of prejudice where other evidence identifying 
16 
 
defendant was compelling).  This included multiple 
identifications of the defendant by other police officers, 
together with other compelling evidence.  Therefore, Mancinone's 
in-court identification likely would have had little if any 
impact on the jury. 
 
Specifically, Casillas testified to having seen the 
defendant parking a white Honda across the street from the black 
Acura, crossing the street to the Acura, and opening the 
driver's door.  Casillas testified that, after moving the 
driver's seat forward and reaching under the seat toward the 
rear of the vehicle, the defendant retrieved a yellow vest, shut 
the door, walked back to the Honda in which he had arrived, and 
drove away.  Police later recovered 199 bags of heroin from 
under the driver's seat in the Acura.  Aguirre testified that he 
saw the defendant arrive at the gasoline station, where 
Mancinone got into the defendant's Honda.  After a two- to 
three-minute drive, and after Mancinone got out of the Honda and 
relayed the information that he had completed the transaction, 
other officers followed the defendant to a nearby coffee shop 
and arrested him.  Both Casillas and Aguirre, the arresting 
officers, identified the defendant at trial as the driver and 
sole occupant of the Honda.  See Crayton, 470 Mass. at 241-243. 
 
Simply put, because the improper identification evidence 
was cumulative of other substantial evidence of identification, 
17 
 
we conclude that it would have "had minimal, if any, effects on 
the jury such that the error was non-prejudicial."  Commonwealth 
v. Wilson, 486 Mass. 328, 339 (2020).4 
 
3.  Jury instructions.  The defendant contends that his 
heroin-related convictions of distribution and possession with 
intent to distribute are potentially duplicative because the 
judge specifically did not instruct the jury that convictions of 
these offenses had to be based on their finding separate and 
distinct caches of narcotics.  In the defendant's view, this 
omission, along with language the judge added to his 
instructions on the charge of possession with intent to 
distribute, could have permitted the jury to infer that they 
could convict the defendant of both heroin-related charges based 
solely on the heroin sold to Mancinone.  We are not persuaded. 
 
a.  Standard of review.  Where, as here, "the defendant did 
not object at trial to the judge's jury instructions, we 
determine if any of the alleged errors 'created a substantial 
 
4 The defendant points out that Mancinone was not permitted 
to offer an in-court identification of codefendant Vargas.  
Because Vargas was acquitted of the charge of heroin 
distribution, based on allegedly acting as lookout during the 
transaction, while the defendant was convicted of distribution, 
the defendant argues that the difference indicates prejudicial 
error.  We are not convinced.  The Commonwealth presented 
differing evidence regarding the two codefendants' roles in the 
sale; Vargas was not contacted to make a purchase, did not agree 
to sell to Mancinone, and did not go on a drive with Mancinone 
in his vehicle. 
18 
 
risk of a miscarriage of justice.'"  Commonwealth v. Shea, 467 
Mass. 788, 790-791 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 
Mass. 8, 13-14 (1999).  A substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice exists if we have "a serious doubt whether the result of 
the trial might have been different had the error not been 
made."  Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002), S.C., 
444 Mass. 72 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. LeFave, 430 Mass. 
169, 174 (1999). 
 
In making this determination, "we review the judge's final 
charge to the jury as a whole in the context of the totality of 
the evidence," Shea, 467 Mass. at 796, and interpret the 
instructions "as would a reasonable juror," Commonwealth v. 
Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 697 (2015).  Trial judges have 
"considerable discretion in framing jury instructions, both in 
determining the precise phraseology used and the appropriate 
degree of elaboration."  Id. at 688, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Newell, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 119, 131 (2002).  "The adequacy of 
instructions must be determined in light of their over-all 
impact on the jury" (alteration omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Blanchette, 409 Mass. 99, 103 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Sellon, 380 Mass. 220, 231-232 (1980). 
 
b.  Duplicative convictions.  Both the United States 
Constitution and Massachusetts common law prohibit the 
imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense.  See 
19 
 
Commonwealth v. Rivas, 466 Mass. 184, 187 (2013).  Thus, a 
defendant may not be convicted of both a greater and lesser 
included offense as a result of the same act.  See Commonwealth 
v. Porro, 458 Mass. 526, 531 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. 
D'Amour, 428 Mass. 725, 748 (1999) ("lesser included offense is 
one which is necessarily accomplished on commission of the 
greater crime").  We previously have pointed to decisions in 
other jurisdictions where courts have held that, "where the 
accused, being in possession of a particular packet or quantum 
of a drug, passes it to a buyer or other recipient, and this is 
sought to be charged as both distribution and possession with 
intent," "the possession with intent [to distribute] is incident 
to, and inherent in, the very distribution, and double charges 
would appear to be an artificial and unconstitutional cumulation 
of crimes and punishments."  Commonwealth v. Diaz, 383 Mass. 73, 
83 & n.19 (1981), and cases cited.  The risk of duplicative 
convictions, however, does not arise where "separate items are 
involved in the respective charges:  the defendant had completed 
one heroin sale, and was holding a separate cache of the drug 
for future distributions."  Id. at 84. 
During the course of the prosecutor's closing argument, he 
highlighted that the two heroin-related charges were predicated 
on two separate and distinct caches of narcotics.  Specifically, 
the prosecutor asked the jury "[t]o find . . . [the defendant] 
20 
 
guilty of distribution of heroin for the undercover sale to 
. . . Mancinone" and "guilty for possession with intent to 
distribute heroin for the 199 bags that were recovered and . . . 
found in the Acura."  The judge then went on to instruct on the 
two heroin-related charges as part of his final instructions.  
The defendant does not challenge these instructions, which are a 
useful starting point for our analysis. 
When the judge instructed the jury on the heroin-related 
charges, he began with the unlawful distribution of heroin.  The 
judge informed the jury that the Commonwealth had to prove three 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt:  "First, that the substance 
in question is a [c]lass A controlled substance, namely heroin; 
[s]econd, that the defendant participated in the distribution of 
some perceptible amount of that substance to another person or 
persons; [a]nd third, that the defendant did so knowingly or 
intentionally."  With respect to the second element, the judge 
explained that "[t]he term 'distribute' means to actually 
deliver a controlled substance to another person." 
The judge then instructed on possession with intent to 
distribute.  He explained that the Commonwealth had to prove 
four elements beyond a reasonable doubt:  first, "that the 
defendant possessed a certain substance"; second, "that the 
substance was a controlled substance, namely heroin"; third, 
"that the defendant possess that controlled substance knowingly 
21 
 
or intentionally"; and fourth, "that the defendant had the 
specific intent to distribute, manufacture, or dispense the 
controlled substance.  In this case, it's alleged that there was 
a distribution" (emphasis supplied). 
The defendant argues that the highlighted statement must 
have confused the jury, and that, in conjunction with the 
absence of explicit instructions that they had to find that each 
of the two offenses was committed with different quantities of 
heroin, the instructions created a risk that the jury 
impermissibly reached its verdicts based on the same cache of 
drugs.  We disagree.  While the highlighted language in the 
judge's instructions was error, any resulting prejudice did not 
materially affect the verdicts, nor did it result in a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.5 
When the judge instructed on unlawful distribution, he told 
the jury that the term "distribute" meant "to actually deliver a 
controlled substance to another person."  Subsequently, when he 
explained the first element (possession) of the offense of 
 
5 We assume that the judge meant to instruct that the 
Commonwealth alleges that the defendant had the specific intent 
to distribute the drugs recovered from the Acura, not that there 
"was" a distribution.  The judge should have instructed the 
jury:  "In this case, it's alleged that the defendant's intent 
was to distribute."  See Commonwealth v. Tavernier, 76 Mass. 
App. Ct. 351, 355 (2010) ("The two basic elements for conviction 
of possession with the intent to distribute [a controlled 
substance] are [1] knowingly possessing the drug and [2] 
intending to transfer it physically to another person"). 
22 
 
unlawful possession of heroin with intent to distribute, the 
judge instructed the jury on the two types of possession -- 
actual and constructive.  Regarding constructive possession, the 
judge explained, "A person who, although not in actual 
possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention at 
any given time to exercise dominion, power, or control over an 
object . . . is in constructive possession of the object.  Thus, 
constructive possession means knowledge of the location of an 
object combined with the ability and the intention to exercise 
dominion and control over it." 
Here, the judge's instructions would have allowed the jury 
to differentiate between the different amounts of heroin 
possessed by the defendant not only by their location, but also 
by their purpose.  The evidence would have allowed the jury to 
find that the defendant possessed an amount of heroin that he 
distributed to another person, Mancinone.  At the same time, the 
jury could have found that the defendant possessed the heroin 
recovered from the Acura, and that the 199 bags stored there 
were intended for future sales.  Indeed, in order to convict the 
defendant with respect to the drugs that formed the basis for 
the distribution charge, the jury must have found that the 
defendant distributed the drugs "to another person," whereas to 
convict of the offense of possession with intent to distribute, 
23 
 
they did not have to find an actual transfer of drugs to any 
third person. 
 
Moreover, although the judge added the additional, improper 
language that "there was a distribution" when instructing on the 
offense of possession with intent to distribute, he also 
properly instructed the jury on the required elements of the 
charge.  Considering the evidence at trial that police recovered 
199 bags of heroin from the Acura, that Rey, not the defendant, 
possessed the Acura's remote key, in combination with the trial 
judge's instruction on constructive possession, militates the 
conclusion that the jury predicated the conviction of possession 
with intent to distribute on the heroin recovered from the Acura 
on a theory of constructive possession.  Indeed, the evidence 
supports the inference that the defendant had both the ability 
and intention to exercise control over the drugs recovered from 
the Acura. 
We conclude, therefore, that the instructions, taken as a 
whole, would not have confused a reasonable juror regarding 
whether convictions of the two heroin-related charges had to be 
predicated on two separate and distinct caches of drugs.  
Accordingly, there was no substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.