Title: Commonwealth v. Escobar
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13252
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 12, 2022

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SJC-13252 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROLAND F. ESCOBAR, JR. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     May 4, 2022. - August 12, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Bail.  Pretrial Detention.  Statute, Construction.  Wanton or 
Reckless Conduct.  Homicide.  Motor Vehicle, Homicide.  
Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on September 17, 2021. 
 
After transfer to the Appeals Court, a petition for 
interlocutory review was heard by Amy L. Blake, J., and the 
appeal was reported by her.  The Supreme Judicial Court on its 
own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Mary Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  While driving in Taunton, the defendant struck 
multiple parked and moving vehicles and a pedestrian, who died 
as a result of the collision.  The Commonwealth charged the 
2 
 
defendant with a number of offenses relating to the incident, 
including manslaughter and assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury.  On the basis of 
these two offenses, the Commonwealth moved for pretrial 
detention pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A, the dangerousness 
statute. 
 
The dangerousness statute permits the Commonwealth to hold 
a criminal defendant without bail pending trial where the 
defendant is charged with any one among an enumerated list of 
predicate offenses set forth in G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1).  
Included in this list is any "felony offense that has as an 
element of the offense the use, attempted use or threatened use 
of physical force against the person of another."  Id.  At issue 
in this case is whether this so-called "force clause" includes 
the crimes of manslaughter and assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury.  The defendant 
argues that it does not, because the force clause does not 
extend to crimes that can be committed recklessly or wantonly.  
The Commonwealth maintains that offenses resulting in death or 
serious bodily injury necessarily require the use of physical 
force against another person, but contends, in the alternative, 
that if we do interpret the force clause to exclude reckless or 
wanton conduct, we could adopt a "modified categorical approach" 
in analyzing whether a crime is a predicate offense under the 
3 
 
force clause.  Under this approach, a court considers the facts 
of each case individually rather than considering the statutory 
elements of the offense.  The Commonwealth contends that, 
employing this approach, the facts here show that the defendant 
intentionally used physical force against others. 
 
We conclude that a crime that may be committed with a mens 
rea of recklessness does not fall within the ambit of the force 
clause in G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1).  Nor do we accept the 
Commonwealth's suggestion that we adopt a modified categorical 
approach to the force clause in the context of pretrial 
detention.  Applying our well-established categorical approach, 
we conclude that, because both offenses may be committed 
recklessly, manslaughter and assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon (a motor vehicle) causing serious bodily injury 
are not predicate offenses under the force clause of G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A (1). 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts based on the evidence 
proffered at the hearings on the defendant's petition for bail 
review.  On August 3, 2021, the defendant was driving a sport 
utility vehicle (SUV) on Main Street in Taunton.  After his SUV 
collided with the rear of a moving vehicle, the defendant side-
swiped multiple parked vehicles on the right-hand side of the 
road.  He continued driving, traveling in a lane that ordinarily 
was reserved for parking.  A pedestrian who was walking toward 
4 
 
the driver's side of her parked vehicle was struck by the front 
of the SUV.  Following these collisions, the defendant continued 
driving along Main Street, collided with the passenger's side of 
a pick-up truck, and turned right onto Summer Street.  There, 
the defendant's SUV rear-ended another moving vehicle, causing 
the SUV to roll onto its side and strike a number of other 
vehicles before coming to a stop.  In total, approximately 
twelve vehicles were involved in these collisions.  The 
pedestrian who had been hit suffered serious injuries to her 
head and internal organs.  She was taken to a hospital, where 
she died shortly thereafter. 
 
When police arrived at the scene, they found the defendant 
unconscious in the SUV.  They determined that the SUV was 
registered to the defendant.  After observing signs that he had 
suffered an opiate overdose, first responders treated the 
defendant with nalaxone and transported him to a hospital in 
Brockton.  Once the defendant regained consciousness, he was 
given the Miranda warnings and agreed to speak with a State 
police trooper in the emergency room.  The defendant told the 
trooper that he had been cut off by another vehicle and "blacked 
out," and then woke up later inside an ambulance.  The defendant 
also said that, before the crash, he had consumed two shots of 
whiskey and two or three different prescription drugs, at least 
5 
 
one opiate and one anticonvulsant (that he had not been 
prescribed).  After the interview, the defendant was arrested. 
 
On August 4, 2021, the defendant was arraigned in the 
District Court.  He was charged with manslaughter, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13; assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing 
serious bodily injury, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (c) (i); misdemeanor 
and felony motor vehicle homicide by means of operating while 
under the influence of drugs and negligent operation, G. L. 
c. 90, § 24G (a), (b); operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of drugs, second offense, G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (a) (1); leaving the scene of personal injury with 
death resulting, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a 1/2) (2); leaving the 
scene of property damage, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a); and 
operation of an uninsured motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 34J.  
The prosecutor moved for pretrial detention pursuant to G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A, on the ground that the crimes of manslaughter and 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing 
serious bodily injury are predicate offenses under the force 
clause. 
 
Following a hearing, a District Court judge allowed the 
motion for pretrial detention and ordered the defendant held 
without bail.  The defendant then filed a petition for bail 
review in the Superior Court; he argued that the offenses of 
manslaughter and assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
6 
 
weapon causing serious bodily injury are not predicate offenses 
under the force clause of G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  A Superior Court 
judge held two hearings on the petition; the judge thereafter 
allowed the petition and ordered the defendant released on 
$10,000 bail with conditions.  Seeking to vacate the order 
allowing bail, the Commonwealth sought extraordinary relief in 
the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking to have 
the order allowing bail vacated.  Citing the emergency COVID-19 
orders by this court regarding transfers of bail cases, the 
single justice granted the Commonwealth leave to bring an 
interlocutory appeal in the Appeals Court from the order 
allowing the defendant's petition for bail review.  We then 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court on our own motion.1 
 
 
1 While this case was pending on appellate review, the 
Commonwealth indicted the defendant, dismissed the charges in 
the District Court, and arraigned him in the Superior Court on 
charges of manslaughter, G. L. c. 265, § 13; manslaughter by 
means of operating while under the influence of drugs, G. L. 
c. 265, § 13 1/2; leaving the scene of personal injury with 
death resulting, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a 1/2) (2); two counts 
of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. 
c. 265, § 15A (b); two counts of leaving the scene of property 
damage, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a); misdemeanor motor vehicle 
homicide by means of operating while under the influence of 
drugs and negligent operation, G. L. c. 90, § 24G (b); and 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs, 
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1).  The Commonwealth also moved for 
pretrial detention in the Superior Court.  A Superior Court 
judge declined to conduct a dangerousness hearing pending 
resolution of this appeal. 
7 
 
 
2.  Statutory scheme.  The dangerousness statute, G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A, sets forth "a comprehensive scheme of measures 
available with respect to arrested persons charged with crime."  
Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771, 774 (1996).  "Among the 
measures described in [G. L. c. 276, § 58A,] is pretrial 
detention."  Commonwealth v. Young, 453 Mass. 707, 709 (2009).  
The purpose of the statute is "systematically to identify those 
who may present a danger to society and to incapacitate them 
before that danger may be realized" (citation omitted).  Scione 
v. Commonwealth, 481 Mass. 225, 226 (2019). 
 
The ability to detain an individual who has not been 
convicted pending trial is subject to crucial constitutional 
limits.  "[I]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention 
prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited 
exception."  Brangan v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 691, 704, S.C., 
478 Mass. 361 (2017), quoting Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 
667, 677 (1993).  "Prior to conviction, a criminal defendant is 
presumed not to have committed the crimes charged."  
Commonwealth v. Vieira, 483 Mass. 417, 420 (2019).  Thus, 
"[p]retrial detention is a measure of last resort."  Id.  "The 
practice of pretrial detention on the basis of dangerousness has 
been upheld as constitutional in part because the Legislature 
'carefully limit[ed] the circumstances under which detention may 
be sought to the most serious of crimes,' e.g., a 'specific 
8 
 
category of extremely serious offenses.'"  Id. at 421, quoting 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747, 750 (1987). 
 
When the Commonwealth seeks the pretrial detention of a 
defendant under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, the "threshold question in 
every case is whether the defendant has committed a predicate 
offense."  Young, 453 Mass. at 711.  As discussed, these 
offenses are enumerated in G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1), beginning 
with the force clause,2 and continuing with an extensive list of 
specific violent offenses.3  If a defendant has been charged with 
 
 
2 After the force clause, G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1), also 
includes a so-called "residual clause," which purports to 
encompass "any other felony that, by its nature, involves a 
substantial risk that physical force against the person of 
another may result."  In Scione v. Commonwealth, 481 Mass. 225, 
232 (2019), this court determined that the residual clause was 
unconstitutionally vague and did not comport with art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
 
 
3 These offenses include "the crimes of burglary and arson 
whether or not a person has been placed at risk thereof, or a 
violation of an order pursuant to [G. L. c. 208, § 18, 34B, or 
34C; G. L. c. 209, § 32; G. L. c. 209A, § 3, 4, or 5; or G. L. 
c. 209C, § 15 or 20], or arrested and charged with a misdemeanor 
or felony involving abuse as defined in [G. L. c. 209A, § 1,] or 
while an [abuse prevention order] was in effect against said 
person, an offense for which a mandatory minimum term of [three] 
years or more is prescribed in [the Controlled Substances Act], 
arrested and charged with a violation of [G. L. c. 268, § 13B,] 
or a charge of a third or subsequent violation of [G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24,] within [ten] years of the previous conviction for such 
violation, or convicted of a violent crime as defined in [G. L. 
c. 140, § 121,] for which a term of imprisonment was served and 
arrested and charged with a second or subsequent offense of 
felony possession of a weapon or machine gun as defined in 
[G. L. c. 140, § 121], or arrested and charged with a violation 
of [G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), (c), or (m)], [G. L. c. 266, § 112,] 
9 
 
a predicate offense, the Commonwealth may move, on that basis, 
for pretrial detention under G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  A hearing on 
the motion must be held on the defendant's first appearance 
before the court or, if the Commonwealth seeks a continuance, 
within three business days.  G. L. c. 276, § 58A (4).  At that 
hearing, the Commonwealth must establish by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant is dangerous and, if so, that no 
conditions of release reasonably would assure the safety of any 
other person or the community.  See G. L. c. 276, § 58A (3); 
Mendoza, 423 Mass. at 788-789. 
 
3.  Discussion.  It is undisputed that the offenses of 
manslaughter and assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon causing serious bodily injury are not specifically 
enumerated predicate offenses in G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1).  The 
Commonwealth maintains, however, that both offenses fall within 
the meaning of the force clause because each has "as an element 
of the offense the use, attempted use or threatened use of 
physical force against the person of another."  See G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A (1).  The Commonwealth argues, in the alternative, 
that if this court were to determine that the force clause only 
encompasses crimes in which a defendant intended to use force 
against another person, the court could employ a modified 
 
or [G. L. c. 272, § 77 or 94,] . . . or arrested and charged 
with a violation of [G. L. c. 269, § 10G]." 
10 
 
categorical approach to determine whether the charged offense is 
a predicate offense.  Under this approach, the motion judge at a 
dangerousness hearing would consider the specific facts and 
circumstances of the case to determine whether the offense 
charged involved the intentional use of force against another 
person, rather than reckless or wanton conduct. 
 
The defendant contends that the force clause does not 
include crimes that, in some circumstances, can be committed 
recklessly or wantonly.  He argues that the court should 
continue to employ the categorical approach, under which a judge 
considers the elements of the offense charged to determine 
whether the offense always involves the intentional use of force 
against another.  Because both manslaughter and assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily 
injury can be committed recklessly, the defendant argues, they 
are not predicate offenses under G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1). 
 
a.  Statutory interpretation.  We review questions of 
statutory interpretation de novo.  See Commonwealth v. Tinsley, 
487 Mass. 380, 385 (2021). 
 
In every question of statutory interpretation, we begin our 
analysis with the plain language of the statute.  Anderson v. 
National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg PA, 476 Mass. 377, 381 
(2017).  Where the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, it is indicative of legislative intent, and a 
11 
 
reviewing court relies upon that statutory language, unless to 
do so would create an absurd result.  See Providence & Worcester 
R.R. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 453 Mass. 135, 142 (2009); 
Commissioner of Revenue v. Cargill, Inc., 429 Mass. 79, 82 
(1999).  Where a statute does not define a term, "[w]e derive 
the words' usual and accepted meanings from sources presumably 
known to the statute's enactors, such as their use in other 
legal contexts and dictionary definitions."  Commonwealth v. 
Morasse, 446 Mass. 113, 116 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Bell, 442 Mass. 118, 124 (2004).  Where the statutory language 
"does not provide a definite answer to the question," we 
consider other sources, including legislative history, to obtain 
a resolution.  Matter of the Liquidation of Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. 
Co., 440 Mass. 796, 801-802 (2004), quoting Boylston v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, 434 Mass. 398, 401 (2001).  "A 
fundamental principle of statutory interpretation 'is that a 
statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the 
Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the 
ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in 
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be 
effectuated."  Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of 
12 
 
Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006), quoting Hanlon v. 
Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934). 
 
b.  The force clause.  In determining whether the force 
clause encompasses offenses that can be committed recklessly or 
wantonly, we begin with the plain statutory language.  See 
Cargill, Inc., 429 Mass. at 82.  As stated, the clause defines 
as a predicate offense "a felony offense that has as an element 
of the offense the use, attempted use or threatened use of 
physical force against the person of another."  G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58A (1). 
 
The defendant asserts that this language can be viewed as 
two distinct phrases describing the required element of the 
offense, one mandating the "use of physical force," and the 
other explaining that the force must be used "against the person 
of another."  Specifically, the defendant emphasizes that the 
phrase the "use of force," when combined with the word 
"against," means that the physical force used must be 
intentionally directed at another person. 
 
We agree that the phrase "against the person of another" 
requires the physical force to be intentionally directed at 
another.  The word "against," which ties the "use of physical 
force" to the "person of another," is critical to this 
understanding.  "Against," in common usage, means "[i]n a 
direction or course opposite to."  American Heritage Dictionary 
13 
 
of the English Language 32 (3d ed. 1992).  "[W]hen modifying the 
'use of force,'" the word against "demands that the perpetrator 
direct his [or her] action at, or target, another individual."  
Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1825 (2021).  "And the 
pairing of volitional action with the word 'against' supports 
that word's oppositional, or targeted, definition"; "the 
'against' phrase reveals at whom the conduct is consciously 
directed.  Id. at 1826.  See Commonwealth v. Ashford, 486 Mass. 
450, 459-460 (2020) ("[the] use of physical force" means 
"actively to employ" such force).  "While one may, in theory, 
actively employ something in an accidental manner, it is much 
less natural to say that a person actively employs physical 
force against another person by accident" (emphasis added).  
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004). 
 
Unlike intent, which requires "a conscious act with the 
determination of the mind to do an act," Commonwealth v. 
Nickerson, 388 Mass. 246, 253-254 (1983), "wanton or reckless 
conduct does not require that the actor intended the specific 
result of [his or] her conduct," Commonwealth v. Hardy, 482 
Mass. 416, 421 (2019).  See Commonwealth v. Blow, 370 Mass. 401, 
407 (1976) (intent "is the purpose or objective of the defendant 
at the time the crime was committed").  For instance, compare a 
driver who "drives his car straight at a reviled neighbor, 
desiring to hit him," Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1826, with a driver 
14 
 
who weaves through traffic and follows other vehicles too 
closely, ultimately mistakenly striking another vehicle, 
Commonwealth v. DeSimone, 349 Mass. 770, 770-771 (1965).  While 
both drivers used physical force by actively driving their 
vehicles, only the first directed such force toward another 
person.  As this example suggests, although the language of the 
force clause reaches a defendant who intends to use force 
against another person, it does not reach a defendant who 
recklessly uses force, and in the course of doing so, 
inadvertently causes another person to be struck.  See Ashford, 
486 Mass. at 467. 
 
The Legislature's purpose in adopting G. L. c. 276, § 58A, 
supports the conclusion that reckless or wanton conduct does not 
fall within the ambit of the force clause.  General laws c. 276, 
§ 58A, was adopted in 1994, see St. 1994, c. 68, § 6, following 
our conclusion in Aime, 414 Mass. at 681-683, that its 
predecessor statute, G. L. c. 276, § 58, as amended through 
St. 1992, c. 201, § 3, did not comport with due process.  We 
concluded that the predecessor statute was constitutionally 
defective because, inter alia, it "applied to all persons 
arrested or subject to arrest, regardless of the seriousness of 
the offense charged."  Commonwealth v. Diggs, 475 Mass. 79, 83 
n.5 (2016), citing Aime, supra at 682.  In enacting a new 
dangerousness statute, St. 1994, c. 68, § 6, the Legislature 
15 
 
limited its scope to "a specified set of offenses," explicitly 
enumerated in G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1).  See Diggs, supra at 83. 
 
Accordingly, in light of the Legislature's subsequent, 
constitutionally mandated enumeration in G. L. c. 276, § 58A, of 
a narrow set of specific violent offenses, "we cannot rewrite or 
torture the statute's language," Young, 453 Mass. at 717, to 
include within the ambit of the force clause offenses that can 
be committed recklessly.  To do so effectively would transform 
the force clause into a vehicle essentially for the reanimation 
of the residual clause, which included as predicate offenses 
"any other felony that, by its nature, involves a substantial 
risk that physical force against the person of another may 
result."  G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1).  We previously deemed the 
residual clause unconstitutionally vague under art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  See Scione, 481 Mass. 
at 232.  We cannot adopt an interpretation of the force clause 
that mirrors the language of a clause we already have determined 
is unconstitutional.  See Bellalta v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of 
Brookline, 481 Mass. 372, 378 (2019) (court avoids statutory 
interpretations that lead to absurd results). 
 
c.  Categorical or modified categorical approach.  The 
Commonwealth asserts that, if we conclude that the force clause 
does not encompass reckless or wanton conduct, we can use a 
modified categorical approach to support a conclusion that 
16 
 
manslaughter and assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon causing serious bodily injury are predicate offenses 
under the force clause. 
 
In our prior cases, we have explained that the proper 
approach to determining whether a crime falls within the meaning 
of the force clause of G. L. c. 276, § 58A, was the categorical 
approach, and we consistently have employed that approach.  See, 
e.g., Vieira, 483 Mass. at 422.  Under the categorical approach, 
a reviewing court focuses on the "elements of the offense," 
Scione, 481 Mass. at 228, "rather than the facts of or 
circumstances surrounding the alleged conduct.'"  Id.  See 
Young, 453 Mass. at 712.  An offense is a predicate offense 
under the categorical approach if, and only if, the elements of 
the offense always fall within the ambit of the force clause.  
See Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1822.  See also Commonwealth v. Perez, 
100 Mass. App. Ct. 7, 12 (2021) (crime fits categorically within 
force clause "if proof of the required elements will always 
satisfy the statutory definition").  This high bar reflects the 
underlying purpose of the categorical approach, which helps to 
ensure, as constitutionally required, that a defendant will not 
be deprived of his or her liberty "on the basis of facts that 
were not found by a jury."  Commonwealth v. Wentworth, 482 Mass. 
664, 676 (2019), citing Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 
269-270 (2013). 
17 
 
 
Moreover, as we previously have observed, G. L. c. 278, 
§ 58A, "is similar in most respects to the Federal Bail Reform 
Act."  Young, 453 Mass. at 712 n.8, quoting Mendonza, 423 Mass. 
at 773.  "[T]he force clause of the dangerousness statute, G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A, was modeled on that in the Federal Bail Reform 
Act of 1984."  Vieira, 483 Mass. at 427.  A strict elements-
based approach "comports with the analysis utilized under the 
Federal Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142."  Young, supra, 
citing United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7, 10-12 (D.C. Cir. 
1999), and other cases. 
 
Rather than considering the elements of the offense 
charged, the Commonwealth urges us to adopt a modified 
categorical approach, which would require a reviewing court to 
examine for each offense individually the relevant facts and 
circumstances of that offense to determine whether the 
particular conduct qualified as a predicate offense under G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A.  See Ashford, 486 Mass. at 460.  In support of 
this argument, the Commonwealth relies upon our decision in 
Ashford, supra at 467-468, where we used a modified categorical 
approach to determine whether an offense was a "violent crime" 
within the meaning of the Massachusetts armed career criminal 
act (ACCA).  The Commonwealth emphasizes that the definition of 
"violent crime" in the ACCA mirrors the language of the force 
clause in the dangerousness statute, and argues that, because we 
18 
 
adopted the use of a modified categorical approach in the 
specific context of the ACCA, the same approach can be used in 
interpreting the dangerousness statute. 
 
The ACCA, G. L. c. 269, § 10G, "imposes harsher sentences 
based on the number of times that the individual previously has 
been convicted of a serious drug offense or 'violent crime.'"  
Ashford, 486 Mass. at 456.  As the Commonwealth asserts, the 
ACCA defines a "violent crime" using language similar to the 
force clause.  G. L. c. 140, § 121.  In relevant part, "violent 
crime" under the ACCA is defined as "any crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that:  (i) has 
as an element the use, attempted use or threatened use of 
physical force or a deadly weapon against the person of 
another."  Id.  "[A] defendant is entitled to a jury trial to 
determine whether a sentence enhancement under the ACCA is 
applicable."  Wentworth, 482 Mass. at 675. 
 
The Commonwealth's argument overlooks our statute-specific 
rationale for applying the modified categorical approach in the 
context of the ACCA.  In those cases, the jury are available to 
examine the underlying facts and circumstances of a crime, 
ensuring that the defendant will not be deprived of his or her 
liberty on the basis of facts found by a judge.  Wentworth, 482 
Mass. at 675.  See Commonwealth v. Gebo, 489 Mass. 757, 764 
(2022), quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965) 
19 
 
("Trial by jury is the 'normal . . . and preferable mode of 
disposing of issues of fact in criminal cases'").  Dangerousness 
hearings, however, are "pretrial determinations conducted by a 
judge in the Superior Court," without the involvement of a jury.  
Wentworth, supra at 671 n.4.  Accordingly, we decline the 
Commonwealth's suggestion that we adopt the modified categorical 
approach when analyzing whether an offense is a predicate 
offense under the force clause of G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  
Consistent with our well-established precedent, see Scione, 481 
Mass. at 228; Young, 453 Mass. at 712, we will continue to 
employ the categorical approach.4  If any version of the offense 
would allow a conviction of the offense based on wanton or 
reckless conduct, it does not qualify as a predicate offense 
under the categorical approach. 
 
 
4 In Scione, 481 Mass. at 237, we held, for purposes of the 
abuse clause of G. L. c. 276, § 58A, that "a judge may look 
beyond the elements of a crime to the surrounding circumstances 
of the alleged offense to determine whether it is [a] 
'misdemeanor or felony involving abuse.'"  We expressly limited 
our holding to the abuse clause and noted that the force clause 
requires a "categorical approach."  Id. at 228.  We reasoned 
that the abuse clause, unlike the force clause, did not include 
the language, "has as an element of the offense," and therefore 
a strict elements-based approach was not necessary.  Id. at 235-
237.  Thus, our decision in Scione, which diverges from the 
categorical approach, is inapposite here. 
 
20 
 
 
d.  Analysis.5  We turn to consideration whether the 
offenses of manslaughter and assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury can be committed 
recklessly or wantonly, thus placing them outside the meaning of 
the force clause in the dangerousness statute. 
 
Massachusetts has two forms of manslaughter, voluntary and 
involuntary.  See Commonwealth v. Lugo, 482 Mass. 94, 103-104 
(2019).  "Voluntary manslaughter is 'a killing from a sudden 
transport of passion or heat of blood, upon a reasonable 
provocation and without malice, or upon sudden combat.'"  Id. 
at 104, quoting Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 724, 727 
(1980).  "Involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional killing 
occurring while a defendant is engaged in wanton or reckless 
 
 
5 The Commonwealth argues that manslaughter and assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily 
injury fit within the reach of the force clause because both 
crimes necessarily involve the infliction of serious injuries 
and, therefore, the use of force against the person of another.  
The Commonwealth acknowledges that, in some cases, the nexus 
between the physical force involved and the serious injury 
sustained may be attenuated.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Carrillo, 483 Mass. 269, 283 (2019); Commonwealth v. Carter, 481 
Mass. 352, 364 (2019); Commonwealth v. Levesque, 436 Mass. 443, 
454 (2002); Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 416 Mass. 114, 117 
(1993). 
 
 
This argument does not address the question whether charged 
offenses, which can be committed recklessly or wantonly, fall 
within the ambit of the force clause.  Because we conclude that 
such offenses are not predicate offenses, the Commonwealth's 
emphasis on the nature of the force applied in cases involving 
manslaughter and assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon causing serious bodily injury is immaterial. 
21 
 
conduct that creates a high degree of likelihood that 
substantial harm will result to another."  Lugo, supra at 103.  
Because proof of the offense of involuntary manslaughter 
requires only reckless or wanton conduct, rather than 
intentional conduct, the crime of manslaughter does not qualify 
as a predicate offense under the force clause of the 
dangerousness statute.  Accordingly, as the defendant was 
charged with "manslaughter," unspecified, the offense charged 
does not fall within the force clause of G. L. c. 276, § 58A. 
 
With respect to the charge of assault and battery by means 
of a dangerous weapon, the crime of assault and battery may be 
prosecuted under two discrete theories concerning a defendant's 
mental state.  "An intentional assault and battery is 'the 
intentional and unjustified use of force upon the person of 
another, however slight.'"  Commonwealth v. Porro, 458 Mass. 
526, 529 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. McCan, 277 Mass. 199, 
203 (1931).  "A reckless assault and battery is committed when 
an individual engages in reckless conduct that results in a 
touching producing physical injury to another person; an 
unconsented touching is not sufficient."  Porro, supra at 529-
530. 
 
Similarly, aggravated assault and battery, where the 
offense involves a dangerous weapon, may be prosecuted under 
either a theory of intent or a theory of recklessness.  See 
22 
 
Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 303, 306-307 (1980).  
See also Gebo, 489 Mass. at 773 ("An object may be dangerous as 
used even if ordinarily it is innocuous").  For example, an 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon might occur 
where an individual intentionally used a lit cigarette to burn 
someone.  See Commonwealth v. Farrell, 322 Mass. 606, 611, 618-
619 (1948).  This crime also might occur, however, where an 
individual recklessly punches through a glass window, causing 
glass shards to eject and seriously injure bystanders.  See 
Commonwealth v. McIntosh, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 827, 829-831 (2002).  
Thus, because assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon 
causing serious bodily injury may be committed recklessly or 
wantonly, it does not categorically have as an element "the 
use . . . of physical force against the person of another."  
Accordingly, it is not a predicate offense under the force 
clause of G. L. c. 276, § 58A. 
Order allowing petition for 
  review of bail affirmed.