Title: William Wentzel v.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1995AP000304-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: October 31, 1996

No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  95-0304-D 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against WILLIAM A. WENTZEL, Attorney at Law. 
 
FILED 
 
OCT 31, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
 
                                                                
   
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding. 
 
Attorney's 
license 
suspended. 
 
PER CURIAM.   William A. Wentzel appealed from the report of 
the referee in respect to several findings and conclusions 
concerning his professional misconduct.  Attorney Wentzel did not 
appeal from the referee's recommendation that his license to 
practice law be suspended for two years as discipline for the 
professional 
misconduct 
established 
in 
this 
proceeding but 
contended that the suspension should be made retroactive to the 
end of the six-month period of a prior disciplinary license 
suspension, which remains pending.  The Board of Attorneys 
Professional Responsibility (Board) had asked the referee to 
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
2 
recommend a three-year license suspension for the misconduct 
established in this proceeding but did not appeal from the 
referee's disciplinary recommendation.   
 
We 
determine 
that 
the 
seriousness 
of 
the 
misconduct 
established here calls for discipline more severe than the two-
year license suspension recommended by the referee.  That 
misconduct includes Attorney Wentzel's failure to file income tax 
returns or estimated tax vouchers for ten years, for which he was 
convicted of two misdemeanor counts, his agreeing to represent 
clients and accepting retainers without informing the clients that 
his license to practice law would soon be suspended and 
subsequently refusing to return the retainers, failing to act 
promptly and diligently in a client's matter and misrepresenting 
to clients his work on their matters, continuing to render legal 
services to a client after his license was suspended, and refusing 
to refund a client's advance payment of fees he had not earned.  
In light of the number and nature of the incidents of misconduct 
and in view of Attorney Wentzel's having been disciplined for 
professional misconduct twice previously, we suspend Attorney 
Wentzel's license to practice law for three years and, as the 
referee has recommended, require him to make restitution to those 
clients whose retainers he refused to return and whose advance fee 
he neither earned nor returned.   
 
Attorney Wentzel was admitted to practice law in Wisconsin in 
1973 and practiced in Milwaukee.  In 1987, the court suspended his 
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
3 
license for 90 days as discipline for the following:  failing to 
return a security deposit to a couple who wanted to lease his 
home, using client trust account funds for personal use and 
permitting the account to become overdrawn, failing to provide 
information to a judge in support of his claim of illness to 
obtain an adjournment of a trial date, and misrepresenting to a 
client that her personal injury claim had been settled, failing to 
give notice of her automobile accident promptly after being 
retained and failing to communicate with her concerning the 
progress of the matter.  Disciplinary Proceedings Against Wentzel, 
142 Wis. 2d 1, 416 N.W.2d 287.  In 1993, the court imposed a six-
month license suspension, commencing June 21, 1993, for the 
following:  failing to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in pursing two clients' legal matters, misrepresenting 
to a client that he had commenced an action on the client's 
behalf, failing to deposit a client's advance of costs into his 
trust account, failing to comply with clients' reasonable requests 
for information concerning the status of their legal matters, 
failing to turn over two clients' files upon demand and refund 
unearned fees, and failing to cooperate with the Board in its 
investigation of client grievances.  Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Wentzel, 176 Wis. 2d 40, 499 N.W.2d 166.   
 
Toward the end of the 1993 suspension, Attorney Wentzel 
petitioned for reinstatement of his license, and the matter was 
referred to the district professional responsibility committee for 
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
4 
investigation and hearing.  While that petition was pending, the 
Board received grievances against Attorney Wentzel for conduct 
that previously had not been considered, and witnesses involved in 
two of those matters testified at the reinstatement hearing.  The 
district committee recommended to the Board that the reinstatement 
petition be denied, primarily because of Attorney Wentzel's 
demonstrated lack of organization in the conduct of his office, 
his failure to express any remorse for harm caused his clients by 
his misconduct, his failure to return all client files following 
his suspension, and his continuing to practice law during the 
period of suspension.   
 
The Board recommended to the court that Attorney Wentzel's 
reinstatement petition be denied on the grounds that he had not 
complied with the court's suspension order in that he conducted 
legal research for a client while his license was suspended, he 
admitted at the reinstatement hearing that he continued to drive 
after his license was revoked following a DUI conviction some two 
months prior to the suspension, he had not turned over two or 
three files requested by former clients, he failed to respond 
promptly to Board requests for information in the reinstatement 
proceeding, necessitating five letters from the Board before a 
complete response was produced, he did not promptly refund 
unearned fees to two clients, he misrepresented to the district 
committee that he had not practiced law during the period of 
suspension, and he failed to notify at least two clients of his 
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
5 
license suspension either shortly before it was to commence or 
once it had.  Acting on the Board's adverse recommendation, the 
court denied Attorney Wentzel's reinstatement petition October 12, 
1994.  Reinstatement of Wentzel, 187 Wis. 2d 297, 522 N.W.2d 216. 
  
 
In the instant proceeding, Attorney Wentzel stipulated to the 
misconduct allegations of six of the eight counts set forth in the 
Board's complaint, and a disciplinary hearing was held on the 
remaining two counts.  Based on the parties' stipulation and the 
evidence presented at the hearing, the referee, Attorney Charles 
Herro, made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law 
concerning Attorney Wentzel's professional misconduct in the 
following matters.   
 
(1) In March, 1994, the Wisconsin Department of Revenue 
informed the Board of Attorney Wentzel's failure to file income 
tax returns or estimated tax vouchers for ten years -- 1982 to 
1992.  In October, 1995, Attorney Wentzel was convicted by a jury 
of two misdemeanor counts of wilfully failing to file state income 
tax returns and make estimated payments for 1990 and 1991, and he 
was sentenced to 90 days in jail for each count, concurrent.  The 
sentence was stayed and he was placed on two years' probation.   
 
The referee concluded that by wilfully failing to file state 
and federal income tax returns for calendar years 1982 through 
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
6 
1992, Attorney Wentzel engaged in misconduct, defined in SCR 
20:8.4(f)1 to include violation of a statute.   
 
(2) Toward the end of April, 1993, while the previous 
disciplinary proceeding was pending and two weeks before the court 
issued its order suspending his license, a client retained 
Attorney Wentzel to represent him in a divorce action and paid him 
a $500 retainer.  Prior to the effective date of the suspension, 
Attorney Wentzel met with the client and prepared a summons and 
divorce petition but never filed the action.  He did not tell the 
client of the suspension and that the client would have to obtain 
other counsel once the suspension began on June 21, 1993.   
 
During June and July of 1993, the client made numerous 
attempts to contact Attorney Wentzel by telephone, by leaving 
messages and by going to his office, but Attorney Wentzel did not 
respond to any of those efforts.  In August, 1993, the client 
retained another attorney to represent him in the divorce action, 
and that attorney asked Attorney Wentzel to return the client's 
$500 retainer.  Attorney Wentzel did not respond or refund the 
retainer.   
 
In 
February, 
1994, 
the 
Board 
wrote 
Attorney 
Wentzel 
requesting a response to a number of misconduct allegations in the 
                     
     1 SCR 20:8.4 provides, in pertinent part:  Misconduct 
 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:   
 
. . . 
 
(f)  violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme court 
order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of lawyers;  
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
7 
client's grievance, including his failure to return the client's 
retainer upon his license suspension, but Attorney Wentzel did not 
respond to that letter.  He did respond to a second letter from 
the Board, stating that he intended to refund a portion of the 
retainer, as he had not filed the summons and petition in the 
client's divorce matter.  During the district committee's 
investigation on his reinstatement petition, Attorney Wentzel did 
not timely and fully respond to the committee's inquiry and did 
not refund any portion of the divorce client's retainer.   
 
The referee concluded that by failing to refund a fee paid to 
him in advance for representation in a divorce proceeding when the 
fee 
had 
not 
been 
earned, 
Attorney 
Wentzel 
violated 
SCR 
20:1.16(d).2  He violated SCR 22.26(1)(a)3 by failing to notify his 
                     
     2  SCR 20:1.16 provides, in pertinent part:  Declining or 
terminating representation 
 
. . . 
 
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take 
steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's 
interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, 
allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers 
and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any 
advance payment of fee that has not been earned.  The lawyer may 
retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by 
other law.  
     3 SCR 22.26 provides, in pertinent part:  Activities on 
revocation or suspension of license. 
 
(1)(a) A disbarred or suspended attorney on or before the 
effective date of disbarment or suspension shall:   
 
1.  Notify, by certified mail, all clients being represented 
in pending matters of the disbarment or suspension and consequent 
inability to act as an attorney after the effective date of the 
disbarment or suspension.   
 
2.  Advise the clients to seek legal advice of the client's 
own choice elsewhere.   
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
8 
client of the license suspension and of his consequent inability 
to represent him following the effective date of that suspension. 
 By failing to respond to the Board's initial inquiry regarding 
the client's grievance and promptly and fully respond to the 
district committee, Attorney Wentzel violated SCR 21.03(4)4 and 
22.07(2) and (3).5   
 
(3) In May, 1993, several days after the court ordered the 
suspension of his license commencing June 21, 1993, a client 
retained Attorney Wentzel to represent him in a divorce proceeding 
and paid him a $500 retainer.  Attorney Wentzel did not tell the 
client of his impending license suspension and did not file the 
                     
     4 SCR 21.03 provides, in pertinent part:  General principles. 
 
. . . 
 
(4) Every attorney shall cooperate with the board and the 
administrator in the investigation, prosecution and disposition of 
grievances and complaints filed with or by the board or 
administrator.   
     5 SCR 22.07 provides, in pertinent part:  Investigation. 
 
. . . 
 
(2) During the course of an investigation, the administrator 
or a committee may notify the respondent of the subject being 
investigated.  The respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all 
facts and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct or 
medical incapacity within 20 days of being served by ordinary mail 
a request for response to a grievance.  The administrator in his 
or her discretion may allow additional time to respond.  Failure 
to provide information or misrepresentation in a disclosure is 
misconduct.  The administrator or committee may make a further 
investigation before making a recommendation to the board.   
 
(3) The administrator or committee may compel the respondent 
to answer questions, furnish documents and present any information 
deemed relevant to the investigation.  Failure of the respondent 
to answer questions, furnish documents or present relevant 
information is misconduct.  The administrator or a committee may 
compel any other person to produce pertinent books, papers and 
documents under SCR 22.22.   
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
9 
divorce action.  He also did not notify the client of the 
suspension after it began or tell him he needed to obtain other 
counsel.   
 
During June and July of 1993, the client left numerous 
messages inquiring into the status of his case, but Attorney 
Wentzel did not respond.  When the client learned from another 
source in July, 1993 that Attorney Wentzel's license was 
suspended, he went to Attorney Wentzel's home to ask him about the 
suspension and have his file and retainer returned.  Attorney 
Wentzel did not return the file or any portion of the retainer but 
advised the client that the suspension would not be a problem.   
 
When the client reported his failure to return the file and 
retainer, the Board wrote to Attorney Wentzel in July, 1993 asking 
him to return them.  Attorney Wentzel did not do so.  In his 
response to a second letter from the Board, Attorney Wentzel 
stated that the retainer fee barely covered the preparation of the 
summons and petition and the filing fee, even though in fact he 
had not filed any pleading.  He did, however, return the client's 
file and $350 of the $500 retainer.   
 
The referee concluded that Attorney Wentzel's failure to 
commence the client's divorce action constituted a failure to act 
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client, 
in violation of SCR 20:1.3.6  His failure to communicate with the 
                     
     6 SCR 20:1.3 provides:  Diligence 
 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness 
in representing a client.   
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
10 
client and keep him informed of the status of the matter and 
promptly respond to reasonable requests for information violated 
SCR 20:1.4(a).7  His failure to return the client's file and 
retainer upon request violated SCR 20:1.16(d), and his failure to 
tell the client of the impending license suspension when he was 
retained constituted conduct involving dishonesty, deceit or 
misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).8  Attorney 
Wentzel's misrepresentation to the Board that the retainer paid by 
the client barely covered the filing fee and preparation of 
documents, when in fact he did not file any documents, violated 
SCR 20:8.1(a)9 and 22.07(2).  Finally, his failure to notify the 
client of his license suspension once it commenced and of his 
consequent 
inability 
to 
act 
as 
an 
attorney 
violated 
SCR 
22.26(1)(a).   
 
(4) In July, 1990, a client retained Attorney Wentzel to 
pursue a collection matter.  Although retained on a contingency 
                     
     7 SCR 20:1.4 provides, in pertinent part:  Communication 
 
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about 
the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable 
requests for information.   
     8 SCR 20:8.4 provides, in pertinent part:  Misconduct 
 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:   
 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation; 
     9 SCR 20:8.1 provides, in pertinent part:  Bar admission and 
disciplinary matters 
 
An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in 
connection with a bar admission application or in connection with 
a disciplinary matter, shall not:   
 
(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact;  
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
11 
basis, Attorney Wentzel never prepared a written contingent fee 
agreement required by SCR 20:1.5(c).10  Attorney Wentzel told the 
client he would commence an action and that it would take up to 
six months to get a court date.  When the client contacted him 
some six months later regarding the status of the matter, Attorney 
Wentzel misrepresented to him that the case was going well and 
that the courts were "booked up" for a year and a half.  The 
client contacted Attorney Wentzel every six months thereafter and, 
when able to reach him, was assured that the case was going well. 
 In fact, however, Attorney Wentzel never filed an action.   
 
The referee concluded that Attorney Wentzel's failure to 
pursue litigation or take other significant action regarding the 
collection matter from July, 1990 to February, 1993, Attorney 
Wentzel failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing the client, in violation of SCR 20:1.3.  His failure 
to have a written contingent fee agreement violated SCR 20:1.5(c). 
                     
     10 SCR 20:1.5 provides, in pertinent part:  Fees 
 
. . . 
 
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for 
which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a 
contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law.  A 
contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the 
method by which the fee is to be determined, including the 
percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the 
event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other 
expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such 
expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is 
calculated.  Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the 
lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating 
the outcome of the matter and if there is a recovery, showing the 
remittance to the client and the method of its determination.   
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
12 
 His misleading the client into believing that an action had been 
filed and that the court system was backlogged for a period of up 
to 
one 
and 
one-half 
years 
constituted 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, deceit and misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 
20:8.4(c).   
 
(5) In mid-February, 1992, a client retained Attorney Wentzel 
to represent him in several matters, including a theft claim the 
client had filed with his homeowner's insurer.  The client paid 
Attorney Wentzel $650 and gave him the written materials relating 
to each of the matters.  Prior to retaining Attorney Wentzel, the 
client had submitted a $38,000 claim to his insurer in the theft 
matter and was offered a settlement of $3800, which he rejected.  
  
When the client first consulted Attorney Wentzel, the one-
year period of limitation on the theft claim under the insurance 
contract had not yet expired.  Attorney Wentzel did not pursue the 
matter timely, did not commence litigation, and allowed the period 
of limitation to expire.  Despite Attorney Wentzel's insistence 
that he never agreed to represent the client on the insurance 
claim, the referee found that the client reasonably believed 
Attorney Wentzel was acting as his counsel because he had asked 
him to try to obtain a more satisfactory resolution of the matter 
than he was able to achieve on his own, he gave him all of the 
documents relating to his claim, and Attorney Wentzel accepted 
those documents and said he would contact the insurer.    
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
13 
 
Attorney Wentzel told the client he had contacted the insurer 
and that his claim had been denied.  However, the insurer had no 
record of Attorney Wentzel's ever having contacted the claims 
adjuster regarding the client's claim or the attorney representing 
the insurer in the matter.  During the Board's investigation of 
this matter, Attorney Wentzel asserted that he had not been 
retained to represent the client on the insurance claim but had 
contacted the insurer as a personal favor.    
 
Starting in February, 1993, the client began making regular 
calls to Attorney Wentzel regarding the status of his claim, and 
the calls continued until September, 1993.  On August 19, 1993, 
the client contacted the insurer's attorney regarding his claim 
and was told that the time to file an action had expired August 
11, 1992.  In August and September, 1993, the client tape recorded 
several telephone conversations with Attorney Wentzel during which 
Attorney Wentzel read him the language of a statute indicating 
that there was a six-year statute of limitations on the client's 
claim and agreed to review and research a court decision the 
insurer's counsel had cited to the client.  The client then 
contacted the insurer's attorney and reported what Attorney 
Wentzel had told him.   
In one of those conversations with his 
client, Attorney Wentzel asked for another copy of the client's 
insurance policy.  The client obtained a copy from the insurer's 
attorney and gave it to Attorney Wentzel in September, 1993.  
Attorney Wentzel then discussed the policy with the client and 
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
14 
told him that it contained a one year limitation on the client's 
claim, which already had expired.   When these conversations took 
place, Attorney Wentzel's license to practice law was suspended.   
 
The referee concluded that Attorney Wentzel failed to act 
with reasonable diligence and promptness in the client's matter, 
in violation of SCR 20:1.3, by not pursuing any contact with the 
insurance company after receiving and accepting documents from the 
client concerning his claim and by not commencing litigation prior 
to the expiration of the applicable period of limitation.  His 
misrepresentation to the client that he had contacted the insurer 
when 
he 
had 
not 
done 
so 
violated 
SCR 
20:8.4(c). 
 
His 
misrepresentation to the Board that he had not been retained to 
handle the client's insurance claim and that he had contacted the 
insurer violated SCR 20:8.1(a) and 22.07(2).  By conducting legal 
research and giving advice to the client following the effective 
date of his license suspension, Attorney Wentzel violated SCR 
22.26(2).11   
 
In this appeal, Attorney Wentzel first contended that the 
referee improperly concluded that he failed to act with reasonable 
diligence in regard to his client's theft claim, arguing that his 
                     
     11 SCR 22.26 provides, in pertinent part:  Activities on 
revocation or suspension of license.   
 
. . . 
 
(2) A suspended or disbarred attorney may not engage in the 
practice of law or in any law work activity customarily done by 
law students, law clerks or other paralegal personnel, except that 
he or she may engage in law related work for a commercial employer 
not itself engaged in the practice of law.   
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
15 
client had not given him any documentation on the claim until 
after the period of limitation specified in the insurance policy 
had expired and the claim was barred.  That contention has no 
merit.  The referee's finding that the client had given Attorney 
Wentzel the paperwork relating to the theft claim when he retained 
him in the matter nine months before the claim was barred is not 
clearly erroneous, and the referee properly rejected Attorney 
Wentzel's contention that he was never retained to represent the 
client on the theft claim.   
 
Attorney Wentzel also argued that the referee improperly 
found that he had engaged in the practice of law while his license 
was suspended by doing research and advising his client in respect 
to the applicable statute of limitations on the theft claim.  That 
argument is based on Attorney Wentzel's contention that the only 
evidence supporting that finding was the transcripts of alleged 
phone conversations between him and his client taped by the client 
without his knowledge or permission, evidence he contends was 
inadmissible.  Contrary to that contention, the record contains 
sufficient evidence in addition to the transcripts to support the 
referee's finding, including the client's testimony at the hearing 
and Attorney Wentzel's own testimony at a deposition that he had 
advised 
his 
client 
concerning 
the 
applicable 
statute 
of 
limitations, reviewed the insurance policy and researched the case 
cited to the client by the insurer's attorney.  The referee noted 
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
16 
in his report that he had considered that deposition testimony in 
making his findings.   
 
(6) In July of 1991, a client retained Attorney Wentzel and 
paid him a $250 retainer to handle a civil claim against a former 
employee.  Between then and October 20, 1992, Attorney Wentzel did 
nothing of substance regarding the client's claim and did not 
return his client's numerous calls or correspondence.   
 
On October 20, 1992, the client wrote Attorney Wentzel that 
he would file a complaint against him with the Board unless his 
file were returned within the week.  Attorney Wentzel did not 
reply to that letter and did not return the client's file.  When 
he did produce it during the Board's investigation of the client's 
grievance, the file contained no evidence that he had done any 
work in the matter.  Attorney Wentzel did not file a claim or 
commence any legal action on behalf of the client.   
 
The referee concluded that by failing to notify his client of 
the merits of his claim or take action on the claim for 15 months, 
Attorney Wentzel failed to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing the client, in violation of SCR 20:1.3. 
 By failing to respond to the client's calls concerning his claim 
and by failing to advise the client of the results of his review 
of the file, Attorney Wentzel did not keep his client reasonably 
informed or respond to reasonable requests for information, in 
violation of SCR 20:1.4(a).  His failure to return the client's 
file upon request violated SCR 20:1.16(d).   
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
17 
 
(7) In September, 1992, Attorney Wentzel filed a request for 
mediation of a client's medical malpractice claim against a 
hospital and two doctors.  A month later the mediation panel 
administrator informed him that he needed to file a statement of 
the case, but he did not respond and did not file that statement. 
 He again was advised in mid-November, 1992 that the information 
was needed, but he did not respond or file a statement of the 
case.  He also failed to respond to a third letter from the 
administrator in early December, 1992.  The period for mediation 
expired on or about December 20, 1992, and when Attorney Wentzel 
filed a statement of the case on February 24, 1993, the mediation 
panel's jurisdiction had terminated and the request for mediation 
was dismissed.  Attorney Wentzel never commenced any further 
action on behalf of the client regarding the claim.   
 
Attorney Wentzel represented the same client on another 
personal injury matter from April, 1990 and assumed there was a 
contingency agreement because he obtained the case from another 
attorney who had represented the client on a contingency.  
Attorney Wentzel did not prepare a written contingent fee 
agreement, as required by rule.   
 
The referee concluded that Attorney Wentzel failed to act 
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing this 
client on his malpractice claim, in violation of SCR 20:1.3.  His 
failure to provide the client a written contingent fee agreement 
violated SCR 20:1.5(c).   
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
18 
 
(8) On February 13, 1993, a couple retained Attorney Wentzel 
to represent the husband in a bankruptcy, agreeing to a fee of 
$700.  Attorney Wentzel accepted an initial payment of $300 and 
gave the couple a blank bankruptcy petition on which they were to 
list their debts and return it to him.  The couple told Attorney 
Wentzel the bankruptcy filing was urgent because of an ongoing 
garnishment of the husband's wages.   
 
The clients also discussed with Attorney Wentzel a child 
support matter that was pending against the husband, and Attorney 
Wentzel agreed to telephone the child support agency to obtain a 
reduction in the amount of support.  Attorney Wentzel made that 
telephone call but did not make an appearance or communicate with 
the agency in writing.  Later that month, the husband appeared at 
the court hearing without counsel and reached a stipulation on the 
amount of child support, but the stipulation was not based on the 
telephone call Attorney Wentzel had made to the agency.   
 
On February 19, 1993, six days after they retained him, the 
couple met with Attorney Wentzel and paid him the remaining $400 
of his fee and returned the completed bankruptcy forms to prepare 
and file.  From that date until June, 1993, the couple made 
repeated telephone calls to Attorney Wentzel regarding the filing 
of the bankruptcy petition.  The woman called him two or three 
times per week and left messages indicating the urgency of the 
matter because of the $100 per week garnishments.   
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
19 
 
In May, 1993, the husband went to Attorney Wentzel's home and 
signed undated bankruptcy papers.  Attorney Wentzel subsequently 
dated them June 7, 1993, two weeks prior to the commencement of 
his six-month license suspension, and had the petition filed four 
days after the suspension commenced.  Unbeknownst to the clients, 
the petition set forth that it was being filed by the bankrupt pro 
se.  The couple did not learn of Attorney Wentzel's license 
suspension until almost two years later.    
 
After the petition was filed, the couple was informed by the 
bankruptcy trustee that some of the schedules Attorney Wentzel had 
prepared needed to be amended and that a change of address form 
had to be filed.  Because of Attorney Wentzel's suspension and the 
need to revise the schedules, the couple retained another attorney 
and paid him $500 to handle the bankruptcy.  That attorney had to 
revise completely the bankruptcy schedules in order to conclude 
the matter.  Attorney Wentzel did not refund any of the unearned 
fees he had collected from the clients for his incompetent 
representation or reimburse them for the cost of successor 
counsel.   
The referee concluded that by failing to prepare 
complete and accurate schedules, provide his clients' accurate 
address 
to 
the 
bankruptcy 
court 
and 
identify 
appropriate 
exemptions, 
Attorney 
Wentzel 
failed 
to 
provide 
competent 
representation to these clients, in violation of SCR 20:1.1.12  By 
                     
     12 SCR 20:1.1 provides:  Competence 
 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. 
 Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
20 
his failure to file a bankruptcy petition until June 25, 1993, 
after being told by his clients that the filing was urgent because 
of an ongoing garnishment, Attorney Wentzel failed to act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in his representation of these 
clients, in violation of SCR 20:1.3.  His failure to respond to 
numerous telephone calls from the clients for more than four 
months regarding the status of the bankruptcy violated SCR 
20:1.4(a).  His failure to refund to the clients the advance 
payment of fees that he had not earned violated SCR 20:1.16(d).   
 
On appeal, Attorney Wentzel contended that the referee 
improperly concluded that he failed to act with reasonable 
diligence in representing his bankruptcy clients, asserting that 
the evidence established that the papers and documentation in the 
matter were not provided to him until shortly before he filed the 
bankruptcy schedules.  That argument has no merit.  The referee's 
finding was based on his assessment of the credibility of 
conflicting testimony, and the referee accepted the testimony of 
the clients that they had completed the forms Attorney Wentzel had 
given them and returned them to him a week later, at which time 
they paid him the balance of his retainer and advised him of the 
urgency of filing the petition.   
 
As discipline for the totality of his misconduct, the referee 
recommended that Attorney Wentzel's license to practice law be 
(..continued) 
thoroughness 
and 
preparation 
reasonably 
necessary 
for 
the 
representation.   
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
21 
suspended for two years, rejecting the Board's position that the 
misconduct warrants a three-year license suspension.  In making 
that 
recommendation, 
the 
referee 
explicitly 
considered 
the 
extended period during which Attorney Wentzel's license has 
remained suspended beyond the six-month period that commenced in 
June, 1993, noting that five of the eight matters considered here 
had been raised in the unsuccessful reinstatement proceeding that 
resulted in the continuation of the suspension.  In addition to 
the license suspension, the referee recommended that Attorney 
Wentzel be required to settle all claims for unearned fees in 
three of the matters, as well as the claims of any other persons 
harmed by his misconduct, and pay the costs of this proceeding.   
 
While 
conceding 
that 
the 
two-year 
license 
suspension 
recommended by the referee is appropriate discipline for his 
professional misconduct, Attorney Wentzel urged on appeal that the 
suspension be made retroactive to the end of the six-month period 
for which his license was suspended in 1993.  He argued that the 
continuation of that suspension beyond those six months resulted 
from the denial of his reinstatement petition, which was based in 
large part on the matters considered in this proceeding.   
 
In support of his position, Attorney Wentzel cited prior 
cases in which the court made license suspensions retroactive to 
the end of a prior suspension period or included them in 
suspensions already being served.  In Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Bengston, 124 Wis. 2d 770, 370 N.W.2d 269 (1985), the 
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
22 
court imposed no additional discipline for the attorney's 
misconduct because it had occurred during the same period as 
earlier misconduct for which a suspension had been imposed and, 
had it been considered in the prior proceeding, the totality of 
the misconduct would not have warranted a suspension longer than 
that originally imposed.  In a subsequent Bengston case, 127 Wis. 
2d 456, 380 N.W.2d 673 (1986), the court, acting on the referee's 
recommendation, made a one-year license suspension retroactive to 
the date on which a prior six-month suspension would have ended, 
partly because the misconduct had occurred some 13 years earlier 
and because the new proceeding resulted in the attorney's license 
suspension continuing for more than 15 months beyond the original 
period.   
 
In addition to determining that the seriousness of Attorney 
Wentzel's misconduct established in this proceeding warrants 
discipline more severe than the two-year license suspension 
recommended by the referee, we determine that the three-year 
license suspension we impose for it should not be made retroactive 
but should commence the date of the order imposing it.  A 
substantial portion of the misconduct considered for the first 
time in this proceeding occurred after the 1993 license suspension 
and some of it was directly related to that suspension.  In 
addition to conducting legal research and advising a client while 
his license was suspended, Attorney Wentzel accepted retainers 
from other clients knowing his license would be suspended and did 
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
23 
not tell his clients that fact and advise them that he would not 
be able to complete their legal matters.  In the bankruptcy 
matter, he continued to act after the effective date of the 
suspension, attempting to conceal that fact by setting forth on 
the bankruptcy petition he filed that his clients were appearing 
pro se, which he did without his clients' knowledge or consent.  
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that if the misconduct 
that occurred prior to the 1993 suspension had been included in 
the earlier disciplinary proceeding, more severe discipline would 
not have been imposed.   
 
We adopt the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and suspend Attorney Wentzel's license to practice law for 
three years, effective the date of this order, as discipline for 
professional misconduct.  In addition, we order Attorney Wentzel 
to make restitution as specified by the referee to clients from 
whom he accepted retainers but failed to promptly and competently 
complete their legal work, including reimbursement of his 
bankruptcy clients for the attorney fee they incurred to have 
their matter completed by successor counsel.   
 
IT IS ORDERED that the license of William A. Wentzel to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of three 
years, effective the date of this order.   
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of this 
order William A. Wentzel make restitution as specified in the 
report of the referee and as set forth herein.   
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
24 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of this 
order William A. 
Wentzel 
pay to the 
Board 
of Attorneys 
Professional Responsibility the costs of this proceeding, provided 
that if the costs are not paid within the time specified and 
absent a showing to this court of his inability to pay the costs 
within that time, the license of William A. Wentzel to practice 
law in Wisconsin shall remain suspended until further order of the 
court.   
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that William A. Wentzel comply with the 
provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose 
license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended.   
  
 
No. 95-0304-D 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
95-0304-D 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary 
 
 
 
Proceedings Against 
 
 
 
William Wentzel, 
 
 
 
Attorney at Law. 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST WENTZEL 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
October 31, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
September 10, 1996 
Oral Argument: 
 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For William A. Wentzel there were briefs by William 
A. Wentzel, Nashotah. 
 
 
For the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility there 
was a brief by Celia M. Jackson, counsel, Milwaukee.