Title: Owens v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 59, 2013
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 9, 2013

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KARL OWENS, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 59, 2013 
 
Defendant Below- 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
ID No. 1109022416 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted: October 21, 2013 
Decided:  December 9, 2013 
 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
On this 9th day of December 2013, it appears to the Court that:  
(1)  Defendant-Below/Appellant Karl Owens appeals from a Superior Court 
sentencing order following a guilty plea to one count of Possession of a Firearm by 
a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”).  After a direct appeal and remand by this Court, 
Owens was sentenced to eight years at Level V incarceration, suspended after 
eighteen months without the benefit of any form of early release pursuant to 
11 Del. C. § 4204(k), followed by eighteen months of Level III supervision.  
Owens argues that this final sentence was made in error because it expanded his 
original sentence to include an additional eighteen months of probation.  He also 
2 
contends that the trial court violated rule 35(c) by altering his sentence more than 
seven days after it was handed down.  We find no merit to Owens’ appeal and 
affirm.     
(2)  Owens was indicted with Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited 
and three counts of Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited.  Owens 
pled guilty to the PFBPP charge, and the State entered a nolle prosequi on the 
remaining charges.  Immediately thereafter, the Superior Court sentenced Owens 
to eighteen months at Level V incarceration.  Pursuant to the Delaware Code, the 
court’s order provided that the sentence “shall be served without the benefit of any 
form of early release.”1  Owens filed a motion under Superior Court Criminal Rule 
35(a)2 claiming that the sentence was illegal because Section 4204(k) could only be 
applied to a Level V sentence of one year or less or to a Level V sentence equal to 
the statutory maximum available for that crime.  The statutory maximum sentence 
for a Class D PFBPP felony charge is eight years at Level V supervision.3  The 
State conceded that the sentence was illegal but argued that the trial court needed 
only modify the sentence, imposing eight years at Level V and suspending all but 
                                          
 
1 Appellant’s Opening Br. Appendix at A18 (quoting 11 Del. C. § 4204(k)).  
2 “The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence imposed in 
an illegal manner within the time provided herein for the reduction of sentence.”  Super. Ct. 
Crim. R. 35(a). 
3 11 Del. C. §§ 1448(c), 4205(b)(4). 
3 
eighteen months of the sentence. Thereafter, the Superior Court issued a modified 
sentencing order implementing the State’s recommendation.  
(3)  Owens appealed to this Court, and we found that because the modified 
sentencing hearing “substantively changed the sentence imposed [in March], 
Owens had a right to be present with counsel.”4  Accordingly, we vacated the 
sentence and ordered it be remanded for a new hearing.5  In January 2013, the 
Superior Court held a new sentencing hearing at which both Owens and his 
attorney were present.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the court sentenced 
Owens to eight years at Level V incarceration, suspended after eighteen months 
without the benefit of any form of early release pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4204(k), 
followed by an eighteen month period of Level III supervision.  This appeal 
followed.  
(4)  Owens contends that his new sentence unjustly expands his original 
sentence to include an additional eighteen months of probation, which puts him at 
risk of receiving an additional six and a half years of prison time if he were to 
violate that probation.  He further argues that the sentencing court may only correct 
a sentence within seven days of its imposition under Superior Court Rule 35(c).  
“Appellate review of a sentence is limited to whether the sentence is within the 
statutory limits prescribed by the General Assembly and whether it is based on 
                                          
 
4 Owens v. State, 2013 WL 85185, at *1 (Del. Jan. 7, 2013).  
5 Id.  
4 
factual predicates which are false, impermissible, or lack minimal reliability, 
judicial vindictiveness or bias, or a closed mind.”6  This Court reviews questions of 
law and statutory construction de novo.7  If the sentence is within the statutory 
limits, we will not find an abuse of discretion unless the “sentence has been 
imposed on the basis of demonstrably false information or information lacking a 
minimal indicium of reliability.”8   
(5)  Owens’ sentence was within the statutory limits of 11 Del. C. § 4204 
and did not constitute an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.  In 
relevant part, 11 Del. C. § 4204(k) provides:  
(1) Except as provided in this subsection, notwithstanding any 
statute, rule, regulation or guideline to the contrary, the court 
may direct as a condition to a sentence of imprisonment to be 
served at Level V or otherwise that all or a specified portion of 
said sentence shall be served without benefit of any form of 
early release, good time, furlough, work release, supervised 
custody or any other form of reduction or diminution of 
sentence. 
. . . .  
(3) The provisions of this subsection shall be applicable only to 
sentences of imprisonment at Level V for 1 year or less, or to 
sentences of imprisonment at Level V which are equal to the 
                                          
 
6 Cruz v. State, 990 A.2d 409, 416 (Del. 2010) (quoting Weston v. State, 832 A.2d 742, 746 (Del. 
2003)).  
7 Cordero v. Gulfstream Dev. Corp., 56 A.3d 1030, 1035 (Del. 2012). 
8 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 843 (Del. 1992) (citing United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 
1040 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
5 
statutory maximum Level V sentence available for the crime or 
offense.9 
Read together, subsections 4204(k)(1) and (3) allow a trial court to suspend a 
portion of the maximum sentence and refuse to award specified benefits that would 
effectively diminish the unsuspended portion of the sentence.  Here, the trial court 
took exactly such action by sentencing Owens to the maximum sentence of eight 
years at Level V, suspended after eighteen months.  In lieu of serving the 
remaining six and a half years of his sentence, Owens was required to serve only 
eighteen months of probation concurrent with other his probation sentences for 
separate convictions.  The trial court did no more than what was permitted by the 
plain language of section 4204 and thus remained soundly within its statutory 
limits. 
 
(6)  Further, 11 Del. C. § 4204(l) requires a court to include a probationary 
period of no less than six months whenever it imposes a period of incarceration at 
Level V custody for an offense that totals more than a year.10  Accordingly, the trial 
court’s failure to include a period of probation in Owens’ original sentence was an 
error.  But this error was cured on resentencing by including a period of eighteen 
months probation in Owens’ new sentence.  It is also relevant to note that Owens 
                                          
 
9 11 Del. C. § 4204(k)(1), (3).   
10 Id. § 4204(l).   
6 
will be serving the eighteen-month probation period concurrent with his probation 
in another case.  Thus, he will not be subjected to any additional loss of liberties.   
 
(7)  Finally, Owens argues that pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 
35(c), a sentencing correction can only be made within seven days of the 
imposition of the sentence.  Owens’ argument is meritless.  Superior Court Rule 
35(c) limits only the court’s authority to “correct a sentence that was imposed as a 
result of arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.”11  In contrast, Superior Court 
Rule 35(a) provides that “[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.”12  
Because the original sentence was illegal and there is no suggestion that the 
sentence was imposed as a result of an arithmetical or technical error, the trial 
court could correct Owens’ sentence at any time.  Thus, the trial court’s 
resentencing was proper and not an abuse of discretion.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.    
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                          
 
11 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(c).   
12 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a).