Title: GREATER BIBLE WAY TEMPLE OF JACKSON V CITY OF JACKSON
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 130194
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 2007

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 27, 2007 
THE GREATER BIBLE WAY TEMPLE OF 
JACKSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
Nos. 130194, 130196 
CITY OF JACKSON, JACKSON PLANNING 
COMMISSION, AND JACKSON CITY COUNCIL, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
MARKMAN, J. 
We granted leave to appeal to consider whether the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 USC 2000cc et seq., entitles 
plaintiff to the rezoning of its property from single-family residential to multiple­
family residential to allow plaintiff to build an apartment complex.  The lower 
courts held that RLUIPA does entitle plaintiff to the rezoning of its property.  We 
conclude that a refusal to rezone does not constitute an “individualized 
assessment,” and, thus, that RLUIPA is inapplicable.  Further, even if RLUIPA is 
 
applicable, the building of an apartment complex does not constitute a “religious 
exercise,” and even if it does constitute a “religious exercise,” the city of 
Jackson’s refusal to rezone plaintiff’s property did not substantially burden 
plaintiff’s religious exercise, and even if it did substantially burden plaintiff’s 
religious exercise, the imposition of that burden is in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest and constitutes the least restrictive means of furthering that 
interest. Therefore, even assuming that RLUIPA is applicable, it has not been 
violated. For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
remand this case to the trial court for the entry of a judgment in favor of 
defendants. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiff wants to build an apartment complex across the street from its 
church on property that it owns in the city of Jackson. The property consists of 
eight lots totaling 1.13 acres. The property is zoned single-family residential (R­
1). One of the lots contains a single-family residence, and the remaining lots are 
vacant. There are single-family residences on each side of the property. Plaintiff 
petitioned the city to change the zoning of the property to multiple-family 
residential (R-3) so that it could construct an apartment complex.   
The Region 2 Planning Commission recommended denying plaintiff’s 
rezoning petition. After a public hearing, the city planning commission also voted 
to recommend that the city council deny plaintiff’s rezoning petition.  Pursuant to 
2  
 
 
 
these recommendations, and following another public hearing, the city council 
voted to deny plaintiff’s rezoning petition. 
Plaintiff then filed a complaint against defendants, containing two counts: 
count one directly challenged the city’s zoning decision and count two alleged a 
violation of RLUIPA. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary 
disposition with regard to count one, which decision was not appealed.  With 
regard to count two, the trial court denied defendants’ motion for summary 
disposition and granted plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition in part. 
Specifically, the trial court ruled that RLUIPA did apply because the city’s zoning 
decision constituted an “individualized assessment,” and the refusal to rezone 
plaintiff’s property imposed a “substantial burden” on the exercise of religion. 
The trial court then ordered a trial on the issue whether the city had a compelling 
interest for its refusal to rezone.  After a bench trial, the trial court ruled that 
defendants had failed to demonstrate such an interest.  Therefore, it determined 
that defendants had violated RLUIPA and that plaintiff was entitled to the 
requested rezoning of its property.  The trial court enjoined defendant from 
interfering in any manner with plaintiff’s efforts to construct an apartment 
complex on its property.  After the final order was issued, plaintiff filed a motion 
for attorney fees and costs and the trial court awarded plaintiff over $30,000 in 
attorney fees and costs. 
3  
 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in all respects.  268 Mich App 
673; 708 NW2d 756 (2005). The Court of Appeals also held that the application 
of RLUIPA to compel the requested rezoning did not render the statute 
unconstitutional. We granted defendants’ application for leave to appeal.  474 
Mich 1133 (2006). 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court’s ruling on a summary disposition motion is a question of law 
that this Court reviews de novo. Haynes v Neshewat, 477 Mich 29, 34; 729 NW2d 
488 (2007). Questions of statutory interpretation are also questions of law that 
that this Court reviews de novo. Id. 
III. ORIGINS OF RLUIPA 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in 
pertinent part, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”  US Const, Am I. The 
second clause of this amendment is commonly known as the Free Exercise Clause.  
The protections provided by the First Amendment, including the Free Exercise 
Clause, have been “incorporated” and extended to the states and to their political 
subdivisions by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296, 
303; 60 S Ct 900; 84 L Ed 1213 (1940); Santa Fe Independent School Dist v Doe, 
530 US 290, 301; 120 S Ct 2266; 147 L Ed 2d 295 (2000). 
4  
 
In Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398; 83 S Ct 1790; 10 L Ed 2d 965 (1963), 
the plaintiff, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church was discharged by 
her employer because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her 
faith. She was unable to obtain other employment because she would not work on 
Saturdays. The South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act, SC Code, Tit 
68, § 68-1 et seq., provided that a claimant was ineligible for benefits if the 
claimant had failed “without good cause” to accept available suitable work.  The 
Employment Security Commission determined that the plaintiff’s religious belief 
against working on Saturdays did not constitute “good cause.”  The United States 
Supreme Court held that denying the plaintiff unemployment compensation 
benefits solely because of her refusal to accept employment in which she would 
have to work on Saturdays contrary to her religious belief imposed a substantial 
burden on her exercise of her religion that was not justified by a compelling state 
interest, and, thus, violated the Free Exercise Clause. 
In Employment Div, Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith, 494 US 
872; 110 S Ct 1595; 108 L Ed 2d 876 (1990), the United States Supreme Court 
held that Oregon’s prohibition of the use of peyote in religious ceremonies, and 
the denial of unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use, does not 
violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  The Court explained 
that generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a 
5  
 
   
                                                 
 
 
  
 
particular religious practice need not be justified, under the Free Exercise Clause, 
by a compelling governmental interest.1 
In response to Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1993 (RFRA),2 prohibiting the government from substantially burdening a 
person’s exercise of religion, even by means of a generally applicable, religion­
neutral law, unless the government could demonstrate that the burden imposed 
furthers a compelling governmental interest and that it constitutes the least 
restrictive means of furthering such interest. 
1 Smith, supra at 884, held that Sherbert was distinguishable because 
Sherbert involved an “individualized governmental assessment”; that is, the “good 
cause” standard at issue in Sherbert allowed the government to consider the 
plaintiff’s “particular circumstances.” See pp 15-17 infra. That is, Smith held that 
while the “compelling governmental interest” test may be applicable to laws 
allowing for an “individualized governmental assessment,” it is not applicable to 
generally applicable laws that do not allow for an “individualized governmental 
assessment.” 
2 RFRA provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) In general. Government shall not substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of 
general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b).  
(b) Exception. Government may substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application 
of the burden to the person--
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest. [42 USC 2000bb-1.] 
6  
 
 
 
                                                 
However, in City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507; 117 S Ct 2157; 138 L Ed 
2d 624 (1997), the United States Supreme Court held that Congress, in enacting 
RFRA, had exceeded its powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact 
legislation enforcing the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because 
RFRA proscribes state conduct that the First Amendment itself does not 
proscribe.3  The Court explained: 
Congress’ power under § 5, however, extends only to 
“enforcing” the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
Court has described this power as “remedial . . . .”  The design of the 
Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion 
that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.  Legislation 
which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said 
to be enforcing the Clause. 
Congress does not enforce a 
constitutional right by changing what the right is.  It has been given 
the power “to enforce,” not the power to determine what constitutes 
a constitutional violation. Were it not so, what Congress would be 
enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the 
“provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].” 
While the line between measures that remedy or prevent 
unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive 
change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress 
must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the distinction 
exists and must be observed. There must be a congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and 
the means adopted to that end.  Lacking such a connection, 
legislation may become substantive in operation and effect.  [Id. at 
519-520.] 
3 Section 5, the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
provides: 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.  [US Const, Am XIV, § 5.] 
7  
 
 
    
                                                 
The Supreme Court then concluded that the substantial costs that RFRA exacted 
through its “compelling governmental interest” test “far exceed any pattern or 
practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted 
in Smith.” Id. at 534. Thus, “the Court invalidated RFRA as applied to the states, 
finding it an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ Enforcement Clause powers 
because Congress had not shown a pattern of religious discrimination meriting 
such a far-reaching remedy . . . .”  Galvan, Beyond worship: The Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 and religious institutions’ auxiliary 
uses, 24 Yale L & Policy R 207, 218 (2006).4 
In response to City of Boerne, Congress enacted RLUIPA.  Unlike RFRA, 
RLUIPA does not attempt to bar all laws that substantially burden religious 
exercise. Instead, it focuses on land use regulations5 and provides, in pertinent 
part: 
4 Although RFRA no longer applies to the states, it still applies to the 
federal government. See Gonzales v O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do 
Vegetal, 546 US 418; 126 S Ct 1211; 163 L Ed 2d 1017 (2006) (holding that, 
under RFRA, the Controlled Substances Act, 21 USC 801 et seq., cannot prohibit 
a religious sect from receiving communion by drinking hoasca, a tea that contains 
a hallucinogen). 
5 RLUIPA also focuses on regulations pertaining to institutionalized 
persons, but that portion of RLUIPA is not applicable here. 
8  
 
                                                 
 
 
(a) Substantial burdens. 
(1) General rule. No government[6] shall impose or implement 
a land use regulation[7] in a manner that imposes a substantial burden 
on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly 
or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of 
the burden on that person, assembly, or institution-- 
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and 
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest. 
6 “Government” is defined as: 
(i) a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity 
created under the authority of a State; 
(ii) any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or 
official of an entity listed in clause (i); and 
(iii) any other person acting under color of State law; and 
(B) for the purposes of sections 4(b) and 5 [42 USC 2000cc­
2(b) and 2000cc-3], includes the United States, a branch, 
department, agency, instrumentality, or official of the United States, 
and any other person acting under color of Federal law.  [42 USC 
2000cc-5(4).] 
7 “Land use regulation” is defined as a 
zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that 
limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development of land (including 
a structure affixed to land), if the claimant has an ownership, 
leasehold, easement, servitude, or other property interest in the 
regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such an interest.  [42 
USC 2000cc-5(5).] 
That the city’s denial of plaintiff’s petition to rezone its property here constitutes a 
“land use regulation” is uncontested. 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
(2) Scope of application. This subsection applies in any case 
in which--
* * * 
(C) the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation 
of a land use regulation or system of land use regulations, under 
which a government makes, or has in place formal or informal 
procedures or practices that permit the government to make, 
individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property 
involved. [42 USC 2000cc(a).][8] 
“Religious exercise” is defined as “any exercise of religion, whether or not 
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”  42 USC 2000cc-
5(7)(A). RLUIPA specifically provides that “[t]he use, building, or conversion of 
8 RLUIPA further provides: 
(b) Discrimination and exclusion. 
(1) Equal terms. No government shall impose or implement a 
land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or 
institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or 
institution. 
(2) Nondiscrimination. No government shall impose or 
implement a land use regulation that discriminates against any 
assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious 
denomination. 
(3) Exclusions and limits. No government shall impose or 
implement a land use regulation that--
(A) totally excludes religious assemblies from a jurisdiction; 
or 
(B) unreasonably limits religious assemblies, institutions, or 
structures within a jurisdiction.  [42 USC 2000cc(b).] 
Plaintiff does not argue that 42 USC 2000cc(b) was violated. 
10  
 
                                                 
 
real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered to be 
religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or intends to use the property for 
that purpose.” 42 USC 2000cc-5(7)(B). A plaintiff asserting a RLUIPA violation 
has the burden of presenting prima facie evidence to support the assertion.  42 
USC 2000cc-2(b).9  That is, the plaintiff has the burden to prove that RLUIPA is 
applicable and that the government has implemented a land use regulation that 
imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of religion.  Id.  Once the plaintiff has 
proven this, the burden shifts to the government to prove that the imposition of 
such burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and 
constitutes the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.  Id. As the United 
States Supreme Court has explained, “RLUIPA is [a] congressional effort[] to 
accord religious exercise heightened protection from government-imposed 
burdens, consistent with this Court’s precedents.” Cutter v Wilkinson, 544 US 
709, 714; 125 S Ct 2113; 161 L Ed 2d 1020 (2005).  Therefore, it is clearly 
9 RLUIPA provides, in pertinent part: 
If a plaintiff produces prima facie evidence to support a claim 
alleging a violation of the Free Exercise Clause or a violation of 
section 2 [42 USC 2000cc], the government shall bear the burden of 
persuasion on any element of the claim, except that the plaintiff shall 
bear the burden of persuasion on whether the law (including a 
regulation) or government practice that is challenged by the claim 
substantially burdens the plaintiff’s exercise of religion.  [42 USC 
2000cc-2(b).] 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
appropriate to examine the United States Supreme Court’s precedents when 
analyzing RLUIPA. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. INDIVIDUALIZED ASSESSMENT 
The threshold question is whether RLUIPA is applicable to this dispute. 
The burden is on plaintiff to prove that RLUIPA is applicable.  42 USC 2000cc­
2(b). RLUIPA “applies only if one of three jurisdictional tests is first met . . . .” 
Midrash Sephardi, Inc v Town of Surfside, 366 F3d 1214, 1225 (CA 11, 2004); 
see also Prater v City of Burnside, 289 F3d 417, 433 (CA 6, 2002) (“the Church 
may not rely upon RLUIPA unless it first demonstrates that the facts of the present 
case trigger one of the bases for jurisdiction provided in that statute”); Shepherd 
Montessori Ctr Milan v Ann Arbor Charter Twp, 259 Mich App 315, 326-327; 
627 NW2d 271 (2003) (“[i]n order to establish a claim under RLUIPA, a party 
must establish that at least one of these three jurisdictional elements exists”). 
RLUIPA states that it “applies in any case in which,” 
(C) the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation 
of a land use regulation or system of land use regulations, under 
which a government makes, or has in place formal or informal 
procedures or practices that permit the government to make, 
individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property 
involved. [42 USC 2000cc(a)(2) (emphasis added).][10] 
10 RLUIPA also “applies in any case in which,” 
(continued…) 
12  
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
Therefore, the issue is whether a substantial burden has been imposed in the 
implementation of a land use regulation under which a government is permitted to 
make an individualized assessment of the proposed uses for the property involved.   
This is not the first time that the phrase “individualized assessment” has 
been employed.  The United States Supreme Court distinguished its decision in 
Bowen v Roy, 476 US 693; 106 S Ct 2147; 90 L Ed 2d 735 (1986), from its 
decisions in Sherbert and Thomas v Review Bd of Indiana Employment Security 
Div, 450 US 707; 101 S Ct 1425; 67 L Ed 2d 624 (1981), on the basis that the 
latter decisions, unlike Bowen, involved “individualized assessments.”11  “The  
(…continued) 
(A) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity 
that receives Federal financial assistance, even if the burden results 
from a rule of general applicability; 
(B) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that 
substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, 
among the several States, or with Indian tribes, even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability . . . .  [42 USC 
2000cc(a)(2).] 
However, it is uncontested that A and B are not applicable to the instant case. 
11 In Sherbert, as discussed above, the United States Supreme Court held 
that South Carolina’s denial of unemployment compensation benefits to a member 
of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church who could not find work because her 
religious convictions prevented her from working on Saturdays abridged her right 
to the free exercise of her religion.  In Thomas, the United States Supreme Court 
held that Indiana’s denial of unemployment compensation benefits to a Jehovah’s 
Witness who terminated his employment because his religious beliefs prevented 
him from participating in the production of weapons abridged his right to the free 
exercise of his religion. 
13  
 
 
  
   
 
 
statutory conditions at issue in [Sherbert and Thomas] provided that a person was 
not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits if, ‘without good cause,’ he 
had quit work or refused available work.  The ‘good cause’ standard created a 
mechanism for individualized exemptions.”  Roy, supra at 708. In Sherbert and 
Thomas, the Court held that when the government applies individualized 
exemptions, but refuses to extend an exemption to an instance of genuine 
“religious hardship,” the government must demonstrate a compelling reason for 
denying the requested exemption.  Id. 
In Smith, supra at 884, the United States Supreme Court again emphasized 
the distinction between governmental action requiring and not requiring 
individualized assessments.   
The Sherbert test, it must be recalled, was developed in a 
context that lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of 
the reasons for the relevant conduct. . . .  [A] distinctive feature of 
unemployment compensation programs is that their eligibility 
criteria invite consideration of the particular circumstances behind 
an applicant’s unemployment. . . . 
[O]ur decisions in the 
unemployment cases stand for the proposition that where the State 
has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to 
extend that system to cases of “religious hardship” without 
compelling reason. [Id., quoting Bowen, supra at 708.]
 
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc v City of Hialeah, 508 US 520, 
527; 113 S Ct 2217; 124 L Ed 2d 472 (1993), the United States Supreme Court, 
against the backdrop of a ritualistic practice of animal sacrifice by practitioners of 
the Santerian faith, held that a city ordinance that prohibits a person from 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
“unnecessarily . . . kill[ing] . . . an animal” violates the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment.  The Court explained: 
[B]ecause it requires an evaluation of the particular 
justification for the killing, this ordinance represents a system of 
“individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the 
relevant conduct . . . .”  As we noted in Smith, in circumstances in 
which individualized exemptions from a general requirement are 
available, the government “may not refuse to extend that system to 
cases of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.”  [Id. at 537  
(citations omitted).]  
“Individualize” is defined as “to . . . consider individually; specify;  
particularize.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1991). Therefore, 
an “individualized assessment” is an assessment based on one’s particular 
circumstances. Accordingly, RLUIPA applies when the government makes an 
assessment based on one’s particular or specific circumstances or has in place 
procedures or practices that would allow the government to make an assessment 
based on one’s particular or specific circumstances.  As the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals recently held, “RLUIPA applies when the government may take into 
account the particular details of an applicant’s proposed use of land when deciding 
to permit or deny that use.”  Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v Sutter Co, 
456 F3d 978, 986 (CA 9, 2006). 
In the instant case, the city adopted a zoning ordinance that applied to the 
entire community, not just to plaintiff.  See West v City of Portage, 392 Mich 458, 
469; 221 NW2d 303 (1974) (“‘[Z]oning ordinances . . . are classified as general 
policy decisions which apply to the entire community.’”) (Citation omitted.) 
15  
 
                                                 
Concomitantly, if the city had granted plaintiff’s request to rezone the property, 
such rezoning would also have applied to the entire community, not just 
plaintiff.12  A decision whether to rezone property does not involve consideration 
of only a particular or specific user or only a particular or specific project; rather, 
it involves the enactment of a new rule of general applicability, a new rule that 
governs all persons and all projects. See Sherrill v Town of Wrightsville Beach, 81 
NC App 369, 373; 344 SE2d 357 (1986) (“it is the duty of the zoning authority to 
consider the needs of the entire community when voting on a rezoning, and not 
just the needs of the individual petitioner”).  Thus, if the city had granted 
plaintiff’s request to rezone the property from single-family residential to 
multiple-family residential, plaintiff could then have sold the property to any third 
party and that third party could have sold the property to any other third party and 
any of these parties could have built an apartment complex or any other 
conforming building on that property.  Therefore, the city’s decision whether to 
rezone the property would not have been predicated on plaintiff’s particular 
circumstances or plaintiff’s particular project.13  Even if the city had affirmatively 
12 Although a request to rezone a particular piece of property “‘may be 
differentiated on the basis that such a determination is narrowly confined to a 
particular piece of property,’” West, supra at 469 (citation omitted), it still applies 
to the “entire community.”  That is, the “entire community” would be bound by 
the city’s decision to rezone or not rezone the property. 
13 Plaintiff’s counsel told the trial court that “even at the planning 
commission level, they don’t care what’s being built”; “they don’t consider a site 
(continued…) 
16  
 
                                              
wanted plaintiff to build an apartment complex on its property, it could not have 
granted the requested zoning change unless it was also prepared to accommodate 
all projects falling within the scope of the rezoning.  Plaintiff’s particular 
circumstances were simply not determinative of the city’s decision whether to 
rezone, and, thus, the city’s decision did not constitute an “individualized 
assessment” within the meaning of that term.14  Plaintiff has cited no cases in 
support of its position that a refusal to rezone property constitutes an 
“individualized assessment,” and we have found none. 
Moreover, plaintiff has presented no evidence to suggest that the city has in 
place procedures or practices that would permit the city to make “individualized 
assessments” when determining whether to rezone property. 
(…continued)  
plan”; “the site plan itself is irrelevant when it comes to requesting rezoning from  
R-1 to R-3.” Appellant’s appendix at 238a, 523a.  
14 Possibly, if plaintiff had requested a variance and the city had refused 
that request, this might constitute an “individualized assessment.”  See Shepherd, 
supra at 320 (holding that “[w]hen the Ann Arbor Charter Township Zoning 
Board of Appeals examined and subsequently denied plaintiff’s petition for a 
variance, an individualized assessment pursuant to 42 USC 2000cc(a)(2)(C) 
occurred”). A request for a variance is significantly different from a request to 
rezone. When one requests a variance, one is requesting permission to use the 
property for a specific use. By contrast, when one requests a rezoning, one is 
asking the city for permission to use the property for any use that would be 
permitted under the new classification. Therefore, when the city considers a 
request for a variance, it does consider the specific site plan proposed by the 
landowner. But, when the city considers a request for rezoning, it considers the 
numerous different uses that would be permitted under the new classification, and 
it does not consider a specific site plan. 
17  
 
 
Because the city’s refusal to rezone the property did not constitute an 
“individualized assessment,” and because there is no evidence that the city has in 
place procedures or practices that would permit it to make “individualized 
assessments” when determining whether to grant requests to rezone property, 
RLUIPA is not applicable here. 
B. RELIGIOUS EXERCISE 
Assuming that RLUIPA is applicable here, the next question is whether the 
building of an apartment complex constitutes a “religious exercise.”  The burden is 
on plaintiff to prove that the building of an apartment complex constitutes a 
“religious exercise.” 42 USC 2000cc-2(b). RLUIPA provides in pertinent part: 
No government shall impose or implement a land use 
regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the 
religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or 
institution, unless . . . . [42 USC 2000cc(a)(1) (emphasis added).] 
“Religious exercise” is defined as “any exercise of religion, whether or not 
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”  42 USC 2000cc-
5(7)(A). RLUIPA specifically provides that “[t]he use, building, or conversion of 
real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered to be 
religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or intends to use the property for 
that purpose.” 42 USC 2000cc-5(7)(B). A “religious exercise” consists of a 
specific type of exercise, an exercise of religion, and this is not the equivalent of 
an exercise-- any exercise-- by a religious body.  “The term ‘religion’ has 
reference to one’s views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they 
18  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will.” 
Davis v Beason, 133 US 333, 342; 10 S Ct 299; 33 L Ed 637 (1890), overruled on 
other grounds in Romer v Evans, 517 US 620, 634; 116 S Ct 1620; 134 L Ed 2d 
855 (1996).  The United States Supreme Court has explained that “‘[t]he “exercise 
of religion” often involves not only belief and profession but the performance of . . 
. physical acts [such as] assembling with others for a worship service [or] 
participating in sacramental use of bread and wine . . . .’”  Cutter, supra at 720, 
quoting Smith, supra at 877.15  The Supreme Court has further held that 
“[a]lthough RLUIPA bars inquiry into whether a particular belief or practice is 
‘central’ to a prisoner’s religion, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A), the Act does not 
preclude inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner’s professed religiosity.  Cf. Gillette 
v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 457, 91 S. Ct. 828, 28 L. Ed. 2d 168, (1971) (‘“The 
‘truth’ of a belief is not open to question”; rather, the question is whether the 
objector’s beliefs are “truly held.”’ (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 
185, 85 S. Ct. 850, 13 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1965))).” Cutter, supra at 725 n 13. Nor, 
obviously, does RLUIPA bar inquiry into whether a particular belief or practice 
constitutes an aspect, central or otherwise, of a person’s religion.    
15 In Cutter, supra at 718, the United States Supreme Court held that 
“RLUIPA’s institutionalized-persons provision, § 3 of the Act, is consistent with 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”  The Court also made clear 
that “Section 2 of RLUIPA [the land use regulation provision] is not at issue here. 
We therefore express no view on the validity of that part of the Act.”  Id. at 716 n 
3. 
19  
 
 
 
                                                 
The question that we must answer is whether plaintiff is seeking to use its 
property for the purpose of religious exercise.16  Obviously, not everything that a 
religious institution does constitutes a “religious exercise.”  Plaintiff bears the 
burden of establishing that its proposed use of the property constitutes a “religious 
exercise.” 42 USC 2000cc-2(b). In the instant case, the only evidence that 
plaintiff has presented to establish that its proposed use of the property constitutes 
a “religious exercise” is an affidavit signed by the bishop of the Greater Bible Way 
Temple. The affidavit states that plaintiff’s mission is set forth in its letterhead as 
follows: 
The Greater Bible Way Temple stands for truth, the 
promotion of the Gospel of Jesus Christ through the Apostolic 
Doctrine, and an exceptional level of service to the community. 
This includes housing, employment, consulting and supports as 
determined appropriate in fulfilling our Mission. 
16 Notwithstanding the inquiry required by RLUIPA into what constitutes a 
“religious exercise,” this Court is extremely cognizant of the difficulties inherent 
in a judicial body’s evaluating the practices of particular religious faiths or 
assessing the “centrality” of particular religious precepts.  In accord, Smith, supra 
at 890 (“It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process 
will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely 
engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be 
preferred to a system in which each . . . judge[] weigh[s] the social importance of 
all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.”); Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 
US 602, 613; 91 S Ct 2105; 29 L Ed 2d 745 (1971) (expressing concern about 
fostering an “‘excessive government entanglement with religion’”) (citation 
omitted). 
20  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The affidavit further states that plaintiff “wishes to further the teachings of Jesus 
Christ by providing housing and living assistance to the citizens of Jackson.”17 
No evidence has been presented to establish that the proposed apartment 
complex would be used for religious worship or for any other religious activity. 
Instead, it appears that the only connection between the proposed apartment 
complex and “religious exercise” is the fact that the apartment complex would be 
owned by a religious institution. Generally, the building of an apartment complex 
would be considered a commercial exercise, not a religious exercise.  The fact that 
the apartment complex would be owned by a religious institution does not 
transform the building of an apartment complex into a “religious exercise,” unless 
the term is to be deprived of all practical meaning.  Something does not become a 
“religious exercise” just because it is performed by a religious institution. 
Because plaintiff has not shown that the building of the apartment complex 
constitutes an exercise in religion, the city’s decision not to rezone the property 
cannot be said to have burdened plaintiff’s “religious exercise,” and, thus, 
RLUIPA has not been violated. 
17 The bishop’s affidavit proceeds to state that “there is a substantial need in 
the City of Jackson for clean and affordable housing, especially for the elderly and 
disabled.” However, because there is no evidence that the proposed complex 
would either be limited to housing elderly and disabled persons or be designed to 
accommodate elderly and disabled persons to any particular extent, it is 
unnecessary to address whether the building of such a complex would constitute a 
“religious exercise.” 
21  
 
 
C. SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN  
Assuming, however, that the building of an apartment complex does 
constitute a “religious exercise,” the next question is whether the city’s refusal to 
rezone the property to allow the apartment complex constitutes a “substantial 
burden” on that “religious exercise.” The burden is on plaintiff to prove that the 
city’s refusal to rezone the property constitutes a “substantial burden” on 
plaintiff’s exercise of religion. 
42 USC 2000cc-2(b).  RLUIPA provides in 
pertinent part: 
No government shall impose or implement a land use 
regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the 
religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or 
institution, unless . . . . [42 USC 2000cc(a)(1) (emphasis added).] 
RLUIPA does not define the phrase “substantial burden.”  However, this is not the 
first time that the phrase “substantial burden” has been used.   
Before deciding Smith, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
“substantial burden” on one’s religious exercise that was not justified by a 
compelling governmental interest violated the Free Exercise Clause.  Jimmy 
Swaggart Ministries v Bd of Equalization of California, 493 US 378, 384-385; 
110 S Ct 688; 107 L Ed 2d 796 (1990), quoting Hernandez v Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue, 490 US 680, 699; 109 S Ct 2136; 104 L Ed 2d 766 (1989) (“Our cases 
have established that ‘the free exercise inquiry asks whether government has 
placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or 
practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the 
22  
 
  
                                                 
 
burden.’”). The United States Supreme Court’s definition of “substantial burden” 
in its free exercise cases is instructive in determining what Congress understood 
“substantial burden” to mean in RLUIPA.     
In Sherbert, supra at 404, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
“substantial burden” exists when an individual is “force[d] . . . to choose between 
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and 
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion . . . on the other hand.” 
In Thomas, supra at 717-718, the Supreme Court explained: 
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit 
upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such 
a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby 
putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior 
and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists.  While the 
compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is 
nonetheless substantial. 
In Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 US 439, 450; 
108 S Ct 1319; 99 L Ed 2d 534 (1988), the United States Supreme Court 
explained that “incidental effects of government programs, which may make it 
more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce 
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs” do not constitute 
“substantial burdens.”18 
18 Relying on Lyng, our Court of Appeals held that “for a burden on 
religion to be substantial, the government regulation must compel action or 
inaction with respect to the sincerely held belief; mere inconvenience to the 
religious institution or adherent is insufficient.”  Shepherd, supra at 330. 
23  
 
 
   
                                                 
 
Several federal circuit courts of appeal have also defined the term 
“substantial burden.” Although we are not bound by these decisions, Abela v Gen 
Motors Corp, 469 Mich 603, 606; 677 NW2d 325 (2004), we find them 
persuasive. 
In Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v Chicago, 342 F3d 752 (CA 7, 
2003), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Chicago zoning ordinance 
that allows churches as a matter of right in residential zones, but requires them to 
obtain special use permits in other zones, does not violate RLUIPA.  That court 
explained: 
Application of the substantial burden provision to a regulation 
inhibiting or constraining any religious exercise, including the use of 
property for religious purposes, would render meaningless the word 
“substantial,” because the slightest obstacle to religious exercise 
incidental to the regulation of land use-- however minor the burden 
it were to impose-- could then constitute a burden sufficient to 
trigger RLUIPA’s requirement that the regulation advance a 
compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means.  We 
therefore hold that, in the context of RLUIPA’s broad definition of 
religious exercise, a land-use regulation that imposes a substantial 
burden on religious exercise is one that necessarily bears direct, 
primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious 
exercise-- including the use of real property for the purpose thereof 
within 
the 
regulated 
jurisdiction 
generally--
effectively 
impracticable.[19] 
While [the ordinance] may contribute to the ordinary 
difficulties associated with location (by any person or entity, 
religious or nonreligious) in a large city, [it does] not render 
19 In Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism Inc v City of Long Branch, 100 
Fed Appx 70 (CA 3, 2004), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals adopted this same 
definition of “substantial burden.” 
24  
 
 
                                                 
 
impracticable the use of real property in Chicago for religious 
exercise, much less discourage churches from locating or attempting 
to locate in Chicago. See, e.g., Love Church v. City of Evanston, 
896 F.2d 1082, 1086 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Whatever specific difficulties 
[plaintiff church] claims to have encountered, they are the same ones 
that face all [land users]. The harsh reality of the marketplace 
sometimes dictates that certain facilities are not available to those 
who desire them”) . . . . Otherwise, compliance with RLUIPA 
would require municipal governments not merely to treat religious 
land uses on an equal footing with nonreligious land uses, but rather 
to favor them in the form of an outright exemption from land-use 
regulations. Unfortunately for Appellants, no such free pass for 
religious land uses masquerades among the legitimate protections 
RLUIPA affords to religious exercise.  [Id. at 761-762 (emphasis in 
the original).] 
In San Jose Christian College v City of Morgan Hill, 360 F3d 1024 (CA 9, 
2004), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was no RLUIPA 
violation where the city denied the plaintiff’s rezoning application.20  That court 
explained: 
A “burden” is “something that is oppressive.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 190 (7th ed. 1999). “Substantial,” in turn, is 
defined as “considerable in quantity” or “significantly great.” 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1170 
(10th ed. 2002). 
Thus, for a land use regulation to impose a 
“substantial burden,” it must be “oppressive” to a “significantly 
great” extent. That is, a “substantial burden” on “religious exercise” 
must impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon such 
exercise. 
20 We note that the court did not address the preliminary question whether 
RLUIPA was even applicable to the denial of the rezoning application.  
25  
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
                                                 
* * * 
[W]hile the PUD ordinance may have rendered College 
unable to provide education and/or worship at the Property, there is 
no evidence in the record demonstrating that College was precluded 
from using other sites within the city.  Nor is there any evidence that 
the City would not impose the same requirements on any other entity 
seeking to build something other than a hospital[21] on the Property. 
[Id. at 1034, 1035.] 
In Midrash Sephardi, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that an 
ordinance that prohibits churches and synagogues in the town’s business district 
does not impose a “substantial burden” on the exercise of religion.  That court 
explained: 
[A] “substantial burden” must place more than an 
inconvenience on religious exercise; a “substantial burden” is akin to 
significant pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to 
conform his or her behavior accordingly.  Thus, a substantial burden 
can result from pressure that tends to force adherents to forego 
religious precepts or from pressure that mandates religious conduct. 
[Midrash Sephardi, supra at 1227.] 
In Adkins v Kaspar, 393 F3d 559 (CA 5, 2004), the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that requiring the presence of a qualified outside volunteer at prison 
congregations did not impose a “substantial burden” on the plaintiff’s exercise of 
religion. That court explained: 
[A] government action or regulation creates a “substantial 
burden” on a religious exercise if it truly pressures the adherent to 
21 A city task force concluded that the city urgently needed a hospital and 
this particular piece of property was the only suitable location in the city for a 
hospital. 
26  
 
 
 
  
 
significantly modify his religious behavior and significantly violates 
his religious beliefs. 
[T]he effect of a government action or 
regulation is significant when it either (1) influences the adherent to 
act in a way that violates his religious beliefs, or (2) forces the 
adherent to choose between, on the one hand, enjoying some 
generally available, non-trivial benefit, and, on the other hand, 
following his religious beliefs. On the opposite end of the spectrum, 
however, a government action or regulation does not rise to the level 
of a substantial burden on religious exercise if it merely prevents the 
adherent from either enjoying some benefit that is not otherwise 
generally available or acting in a way that is not otherwise generally 
allowed. [Id. at 570.] 
In Spratt v Rhode Island Dep’t of Corrections, 482 F3d 33 (CA 1, 2007), 
which involved a blanket ban against all preaching activities by prison inmates, 
the First Circuit Court of Appeals asserted: 
The district court decided that a “substantial burden” is one 
that “put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his 
behavior and to violate his beliefs,” citing Thomas v. Review Board 
of Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 718, 101 S. 
Ct. 1425, 67 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1981); see also Lovelace v. Lee, 472 
F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006) (applying the Thomas standard in a 
RLUIPA case). Assuming arguendo that Thomas applies, . . . Spratt 
has made a prima facie showing that his religious exercise has been 
substantially burdened. [Id. at 38.] 
In Grace United Methodist Church v City of Cheyenne, 451 F3d 643 (CA 
10, 2006), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the city’s denial of the 
plaintiff church’s request for a variance from an ordinance prohibiting any entity 
from operating a commercial day care center in a residential zone did not violate 
RLUIPA. That court explained: 
[T]he incidental effects of otherwise lawful government 
programs “which may make it more difficult to practice certain 
religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into 
27  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
acting contrary to their religious beliefs” do not constitute 
substantial burdens on the exercise of religion.  [Id. at 662 (citation 
omitted).][22] 
After reviewing the above decisions, we believe that it is clear that a 
“substantial burden” on one’s “religious exercise” exists where there is 
governmental action that coerces one into acting contrary to one’s religious beliefs 
by way of doing something that one’s religion prohibits or refraining from doing 
something that one’s religion requires. That is, a “substantial burden” exists when 
one is forced to choose between violating a law (or forfeiting an important benefit) 
and violating one’s religious tenets.  A mere inconvenience or irritation does not 
constitute a “substantial burden.” Similarly, something that simply makes it more 
difficult in some respect to practice one’s religion does not constitute a 
22 In Murphy v Missouri Dep’t of Corrections, 372 F3d 979, 988 (CA 8, 
2004), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, to constitute a substantial 
burden, the government policy or actions 
must “significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or expression that 
manifests some central tenet of a [person’s] individual [religious] 
beliefs; must meaningfully curtail a [person’s] ability to express 
adherence to his or her faith; or must deny a [person] reasonable 
opportunities to engage in those activities that are fundamental to a 
[person’s] religion.” [Citation omitted.] 
Although the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the same test when 
applying RFRA, Miller-Bey v Schultz, 1996 US App LEXIS 6541 (CA 6, 1996), it 
has not yet addressed the meaning of “substantial burden” under RLUIPA.  The 
Murphy definition of “substantial burden” seems inconsistent with RLUIPA 
because RLUIPA specifically defines “religious exercise” as “any exercise of 
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 
42 USC 2000cc-5(7)(A). 
28  
 
 
                                                 
“substantial burden.” Rather, a “substantial burden” is something that “coerce[s] 
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs . . . .”  Lyng, supra at 
450.23 
In the instant case, plaintiff argues that the city’s refusal to rezone its 
property to allow it to build an apartment complex constitutes a “substantial 
burden” on its “religious exercise.” 
Even assuming that the building of an 
apartment complex constitutes a “religious exercise,” the city’s refusal to rezone 
the property so plaintiff can build an apartment complex does not constitute a 
“substantial burden” on that exercise. The city is not forbidding plaintiff from 
building an apartment complex; it is simply regulating where that apartment 
complex can be built. If plaintiff wants to build an apartment complex, it can do 
so; it just has to build it on property that is zoned for apartment complexes.  If 
plaintiff wants to use the property for housing, then it can build single-family 
23 We recognize that some courts have held that a “substantial burden” 
exists where there is “delay, uncertainty, and expense.”  See, for example, Sts 
Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church v City of New Berlin, 396 F3d 895, 
901 (CA 7, 2005), and Living Water Church of God v Meridian Charter Twp, 384 
F Supp 2d 1123, 1134 (WD Mich, 2005). However, we reject this definition of 
“substantial burden” both because it is inconsistent with the United States 
Supreme Court’s definition of the phrase and because it is inconsistent with the 
common understanding of the phrase “substantial burden.” 
29  
 
     
 
   
                                                 
residences on the property. In other words, in the realm of building apartments, 
plaintiff has to follow the law like everyone else.24 
“While [the zoning ordinance] may contribute to the ordinary difficulties 
associated with location (by any person or entity, religious or nonreligious) in a 
large city,” Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, supra at 761, it does not prohibit 
plaintiff from providing housing. “Whatever specific difficulties [plaintiff church] 
claims to have encountered, they are the same ones that face all [land users].”  Id., 
quoting Love Church, supra at 1086. The city has not done anything to coerce 
plaintiff into acting contrary to its religious beliefs, and, thus, it has not 
substantially burdened plaintiff’s exercise of religion.  Lyng, supra at 450.25 
D. COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST 
Assuming that the city’s refusal to rezone the property constitutes a 
“substantial burden” on plaintiff’s “religious exercise,” the next question is 
whether it is “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest.”  The burden 
is on defendant to prove that the imposition of the burden on plaintiff is in 
24 Plaintiff was aware when it purchased the property that it was zoned 
single-family residential. Thus, plaintiff’s claim that the city’s refusal to rezone 
the property will cause it to lose the money that it invested in the property is 
meritless. 
25 We note that the lower courts’ interpretation of the “substantial burden” 
provision of RLUIPA would seem to render the “discrimination and exclusion” 
provision of RLUIPA effectively meaningless because it will almost always be 
easier to prove a “substantial burden” on one’s “religious exercise,” as those terms 
(continued…) 
30  
 
 
 
 
                                              
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest.  42 USC 2000cc-2(b). 
RLUIPA provides in pertinent part: 
No government shall impose or implement a land use 
regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the 
religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or 
institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of 
the burden on that person, assembly, or institution-- 
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
interest . . . . [42 USC 2000cc(a)(1) (emphasis added).] 
After a bench trial on this issue, the trial court held that “this mere concern 
over zoning [does not] establish[] a compelling State interest.”  We respectfully 
disagree. It has long been recognized that “local governments have a compelling 
interest in protecting the health and safety of their communities through the 
enforcement of the local zoning regulations.”  Murphy v Zoning Comm of the 
Town of New Milford, 148 F Supp 2d 173, 190 (D Conn, 2001). “‘All property is 
held subject to the right of the government to regulate its use in the exercise of the 
police power so that it shall not be injurious to the rights of the community or so 
that it may promote its health, morals, safety and welfare.’”  Austin v Older, 283 
Mich 667, 677; 278 NW 727 (1938), quoting State v Hillman, 110 Conn 92, 105; 
147 A 294 (1929). Therefore, a municipal body “clearly has a compelling interest 
in enacting and enforcing fair and reasonable zoning regulations.”  First Baptist 
(…continued)  
are defined by the lower courts, than it will be to prove discrimination or  
exclusion. See n 8 supra.  
31  
 
 
Church of Perrine v Miami-Dade Co, 768 So 2d 1114, 1118 (Fla App, 2000).  “A 
government’s interest in zoning is indeed compelling.”  Konikov v Orange Co, 
302 F Supp 2d 1328, 1343 (MD Fla, 2004); see also Midrash Sephardi v Town of 
Surfside, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 22629, *51 (SD Fla, 2000) (holding that “the 
zoning interests of Surfside may properly be characterized as compelling”).  “The 
compelling state interest and, hence, the municipal concern served by zoning 
regulation of land use is promotion of health, safety, morals or general welfare.” 
Home Bldg Co v Kansas City, 609 SW2d 168, 171 (Mo App, 1980). “[T]he 
ordinance serves a compelling state interest; the City[’s] . . . police power to 
regulate the private use of the land.” Lyons, supra at 5-6. “The city has a 
cognizable compelling interest to enforce its zoning laws. . . .  Reserving areas for 
commercial activity both protects residential areas from commercial intrusion and 
fosters economic stability and growth.” Chicago Hts v Living Word Outreach Full 
Gospel Church and Ministries, Inc, 302 Ill App 3d 564, 572; 707 NE2d 53 (1998); 
see also Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc v City of Daytona Beach, 885 F Supp 1554, 
1560 (MD Fla, 1995) (holding that “the City’s interest in regulating homeless 
shelters and food banks is a compelling interest”). 
In the instant case, the city has a compelling interest in regulating where 
apartment complexes can be built within the city.  As the United States Supreme 
Court has explained: 
The matter of zoning has received much attention at the hands 
of commissions and experts, and the results of their investigations 
32  
 
  
 
have been set forth in comprehensive reports.  These reports, which 
bear every evidence of painstaking consideration, concur in the view 
that the segregation of residential, business, and industrial buildings 
will make it easier to provide fire apparatus suitable for the character 
and intensity of the development in each section; that it will increase 
the safety and security of home life; greatly tend to prevent street 
accidents, especially to children, by reducing the traffic and resulting 
confusion in residential sections; decrease noise and other conditions 
which produce or intensify nervous disorders; preserve a more 
favorable environment in which to rear children, etc.  With particular 
reference to apartment houses, it is pointed out that the development 
of detached house sections is greatly retarded by the coming of 
apartment houses, which has sometimes resulted in destroying the 
entire section for private house purposes; that in such sections very 
often the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in order to 
take advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings 
created by the residential character of the district.  Moreover, the 
coming of one apartment house is followed by others, interfering by 
their height and bulk with the free circulation of air and 
monopolizing the rays of the sun which otherwise would fall upon 
the smaller homes, and bringing, as their necessary accompaniments, 
the disturbing noises incident to increased traffic and business, and 
the occupation, by means of moving and parked automobiles, of 
larger portions of the streets, thus detracting from their safety and 
depriving children of the privilege of quiet and open spaces for play, 
enjoyed by those in more favored localities-- until, finally, the 
residential character of the neighborhood and its desirability as a 
place of detached residences are utterly destroyed.  Under these 
circumstances, apartment houses, which in a different environment 
would be not only entirely unobjectionable but highly desirable, 
come very near to being nuisances. [Village of Euclid v Ambler 
Realty Co, 272 US 365, 394-395; 47 S Ct 114; 71 L Ed 303 (1926).] 
See also Kropf v Sterling Hts, 391 Mich 139, 159-160; 215 NW2d 179 (1974) 
(adopting the above analysis in addressing “why the local zoning board could 
reasonably restrict multiple dwellings in a residential area”).  That a court will 
defer to zoning authorities and will only overturn a zoning ordinance excluding 
other uses from a single-family residential area if it is arbitrary or capricious is 
33  
 
 
 
evidence of the magnitude of the municipalities’ interest in such zoning 
ordinances. Kropf, supra at 161 (holding that “[i]t is not for this Court to second 
guess the local governing bodies in the absence of a showing that that body was 
arbitrary or capricious in its exclusion of other uses from a single-family 
residential district”). 
In this case, much testimony was presented regarding the city’s interest in 
preserving single-family neighborhoods. Charles Reisdorf, the Executive Director 
of the Regional Planning Commission, testified: 
[I]n an area where you have a large number of single-family 
residences, people have made purchases with the expectation that 
there will be some stability in the neighborhood.  For most of us, the 
purchase of a home is the major expense of our life . . . .  And so 
when you–-
when you have something that’s incompatible 
interjected into a neighborhood area, it creates problems and often 
results in a blighting situation . . . . 
Dennis Diffenderfer, a planner who has been with the city’s Department of 
Community Development for nearly 20 years, testified: 
[A]ny time you even add a duplex or a three- or four-unit or a 
number of buildings that convert to rental, it does have a negative 
effect on the adjoining neighbors. I can speak not only as a housing 
professional, but from experiences. 
Charles Aymond, who has served as the chairman of the Jackson Planning 
Commission for over ten years, testified: 
[T]he City has experienced a great deal of blight and 
destabilization as the result of commercial enterprises . . . or 
different residential uses coming into what is generally referred to as 
a higher residential use. 
34  
 
 
Plaintiff’s own architect, James Pappas, testified that if the property was 
rezoned multiple-family residential, as the plaintiff desires, a 45-foot apartment 
complex would be permitted and this would be “inappropriate with that 
neighborhood.” 
Given the city’s general interest in zoning, and the city’s specific interest in 
maintaining the character of this single-family residential neighborhood, we 
conclude that the city has a compelling interest in maintaining single-family 
residential zoning and in not rezoning this area of the city. 
E. LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS 
Given that the imposition of the burden on plaintiff is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest, the final question is whether a particular 
governmental action constitutes the “least restrictive” means of furthering that 
interest. 42 USC 2000cc(a)(1)(B). The burden is on defendant to prove that an 
action constitutes the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling 
governmental interest. 42 USC 2000cc-2(b). RLUIPA provides in pertinent part: 
No government shall impose or implement a land use 
regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the 
religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or 
institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of 
the burden on that person, assembly, or institution-- 
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and 
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest. [42 USC 2000cc(a)(1) (emphasis added).] 
35  
 
 
                                                 
 
In the instant case, plaintiff asked the city to rezone the property from 
single-family residential to multiple-family residential.  In response, the city could 
have done one of two things-- it could have granted or it could have denied 
plaintiff’s request to rezone the property.  The city decided to deny plaintiff’s 
request to rezone the property. That is, the city decided to maintain the single­
family residential zoning. There do not appear to be any less restrictive means of 
maintaining the single-family residential zoning. 
For these reasons, we conclude that any burden placed on plaintiff’s 
exercise of religion is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and 
constitutes the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.26  Therefore, even assuming that RLUIPA is applicable in the instant 
case, it has not been violated.27 
26 42 USC 1988(b) provides, “In any action or proceeding to enforce a 
provision of . . . the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 
. . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the 
United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .”  For the 
reasons discussed herein, plaintiff is not a “prevailing party,” and, therefore, is not 
entitled to attorney fees. 
27 As discussed above, in City of Boerne, the United States Supreme Court 
held that Congress, in enacting RFRA, had exceeded its power under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to enact legislation enforcing the Free Exercise Clause 
because RFRA proscribes state conduct that the First Amendment itself does not. 
In Smith, the United States Supreme Court held that generally applicable, religion­
neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need 
not be justified under the Free Exercise Clause by a compelling governmental 
interest. 
However, “where the State has in place a system of individual 
exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious hardship’ 
(continued…) 
36  
 
                                              
 
V. CONCLUSION  
RLUIPA applies to burdens imposed by governmental bodies on “religious 
exercises” in the course of implementing land use regulations under which 
“individualized assessments” may be made of the proposed uses for the land.  An 
“individualized assessment” is an assessment based on one’s particular or specific 
circumstances. A decision concerning a request to rezone property does not 
involve an “individualized assessment.” Therefore, RLUIPA is not applicable 
here. 
A “religious exercise” constitutes “any exercise of religion, whether or not 
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”  42 USC 2000cc-
5(7)(A). However, something does not become a “religious exercise” just because 
it is carried out by a religious institution.  Because the only connection between 
religion and the construction of the apartment complex in this case is the fact that 
(…continued) 
without compelling reason.” Smith, supra at 884. Proponents of RLUIPA argue 
that Congress has the authority to enact RLUIPA because it merely codifies Smith. 
However, the lower courts in the instant case held that, under RLUIPA, a religious 
institution need not abide by a generally applicable, religion-neutral zoning 
ordinance unless it is justified by a compelling governmental interest.  This seems 
inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith, which, held that 
a generally applicable, religion-neutral law does not have to be justified by such 
an interest. Whenever possible, courts should construe statutes in a manner that 
renders them constitutional. People v Bricker, 389 Mich 524, 528; 208 NW2d 172 
(1973). 
Because the lower courts’ interpretation of RLUIPA would render 
RLUIPA unconstitutional, we reject their interpretation and instead adopt the 
interpretation set forth in this opinion. 
37  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the apartment complex would be owned by a religious institution, the building of 
the apartment complex does not constitute a “religious exercise.” 
A “substantial burden” on one’s “religious exercise” exists where there is 
governmental action that coerces one into acting contrary to one’s religious beliefs 
by way of doing something that one’s religion prohibits or refraining from doing 
something that one’s religion requires. A mere inconvenience or irritation does 
not constitute a “substantial burden”; similarly, something that simply makes it 
more difficult in some respect to practice one’s religion does not constitute a 
“substantial burden.”  Because the city has not done anything to coerce plaintiff 
into acting contrary to its religious beliefs, the city has not substantially burdened 
plaintiff’s religious exercise. 
Even if the city did substantially burden plaintiff’s religious exercise, 
imposition of that burden here is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
interest, namely, the enforcement of local zoning ordinances, and constitutes the 
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 
Therefore, even assuming that RLUIPA is applicable, RLUIPA was not violated. 
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand 
this case to the trial court for the entry of a judgment in favor of defendants.  
Stephen J. Markman 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
38  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
THE GREATER BIBLE WAY TEMPLE OF 
JACKSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
Nos. 130194, 130196 
CITY OF JACKSON, JACKSON PLANNING 
COMMISSION, AND JACKSON CITY COUNCIL, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring). 
I agree with part IV(B) of the majority opinion.  I write separately because 
I believe it is unnecessary to determine whether defendants made an 
individualized assessment in this case or whether the statutory test of strict 
scrutiny was met, because plaintiff failed to show that its petition for rezoning 
was related to plaintiff’s exercise of religion.  Thus, I would reverse the Court of 
Appeals judgment on that basis and remand to the trial court for dismissal of 
plaintiff’s claim. 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
THE GREATER BIBLE WAY TEMPLE OF 
JACKSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
Nos. 130194, 130196 
CITY OF JACKSON, JACKSON PLANNING 
COMMISSION, AND JACKSON CITY COUNCIL, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
KELLY, J. (concurring). 
I agree with the order in which the majority opinion interprets the relevant 
provisions of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 USC 
2000cc et seq. I concur in the majority’s holding that there was no individualized 
assessment in this case and therefore that RLUIPA is not applicable.   
I write separately because I believe it is unnecessary to discuss (1) whether 
the building of an apartment complex was a religious exercise, (2) whether the 
refusal to rezone plaintiff’s property substantially burdened the alleged religious 
exercise, and (3) whether the alleged burden was in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest and constituted the least restrictive means of furthering that 
interest. The majority’s discussion of these issues is mere dicta. 
 
 
 
I would reverse the Court of Appeals judgment because RLUIPA is 
inapplicable in the instant case. 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
2