Title: Fabiano v. Philip Morris USA Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13282, SJC-13346
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 2023

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-13282 
SJC-13346 
 
GRACE FABIANO, personal representative,1  vs.  PHILIP MORRIS USA 
INC. & others.2 
 
MARY FULLER, personal representative,3  vs.  R.J. REYNOLDS 
TOBACCO COMPANY & another.4 
 
 
 
Suffolk.  Barnstable.     March 6, 2023. - July 6, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Wrongful Death.  Negligence, Wrongful death.  Limitations, 
Statute of. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 14, 2017. 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Brian A. Davis, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
1 Of the estate of Ralph Fabiano. 
 
2 Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc.; and Garber Bros., Inc. 
 
3 Of the estate of John Fuller. 
 
4 Cumberland Farms, Inc. 
2 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
March 21, 2016. 
 
A motion for partial judgment on the pleadings was heard by 
Thomas J. Perrino, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Shea T. Moxon, of Florida, for Grace Fabiano. 
Andrew Rainer for Mary Fuller. 
Scott A. Chesin (Elliott M. Davis also present) for Philip 
Morris USA Inc. & another. 
Victoria Cuneo Powell, of Georgia (Jason T. Burnette, of 
Georgia, also present) for R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company & 
another. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Kevin W. Buono for Massachusetts Defense Lawyers 
Association. 
Samuel Goldblatt & Kurt M. Mullen for Product Liability 
Advisory Council. 
Peter J. Ainsworth, Thomas R. Murphy, Kevin J. Powers, 
Elizabeth N. Mulvey, & J. Michael Conley for Massachusetts 
Academy of Trial Attorneys. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  In GGNSC Admin. Servs., LLC v. Schrader, 484 
Mass. 181, 191 (2020) (GGNSC), we held that wrongful death 
actions brought under G. L. c. 229, § 2, are derivative of a 
decedent's own cause of action for personal injury, and unless 
the decedent "could have brought an action for the injuries that 
caused [his or her] death," a wrongful death action cannot be 
maintained by the personal representative of the decedent's 
estate for the benefit of the decedent's statutory 
beneficiaries.  The question in these paired cases is whether 
this principle yields where the decedent could not have brought 
3 
 
claims for the injuries that caused his or her death, had the 
decedent survived, by reason of the expiration of the statute of 
limitations applicable to those claims. 
 
Grace Fabiano, as personal representative of the estate of 
Ralph Fabiano, and Mary Fuller, as personal representative of 
the estate of John Fuller5 (collectively, plaintiffs), commenced 
these separate actions for wrongful death under G. L. c. 229, 
§ 2, alleging breach of warranty, negligence, and conspiracy.  
It is undisputed that, if Ralph or John (collectively, 
decedents) had survived, they could not have brought direct 
claims at the time of their deaths due to the expiration of the 
three-year statute of limitations.  The plaintiffs argue, 
however, that, because G. L. c. 229, § 2, has its own three-year 
statute of limitations for commencement of a wrongful death 
action that begins to run on the date of death, the statute of 
limitations applicable to personal injury claims, which begins 
to run on the date of injury, does not apply to wrongful death 
actions. 
 
In light of the derivative character of wrongful death 
claims, for a representative of the decedent's estate to have a 
right to bring a wrongful death action, the decedent must have 
 
 
5 Because the plaintiffs share their surnames with the 
decedents whose estates they represent, we refer to each by 
their first name. 
4 
 
had the continued right to bring a cause of action for the 
injuries that caused his or her death.  Where a decedent has 
such a right at the time of death, a cause of action for 
wrongful death vests in the personal representative of the 
decedent's estate, and the three-year statute of limitations for 
the wrongful death action begins to run from the date of death.  
Where a decedent could not maintain a personal injury action at 
the time of death, the representative of the decedent's estate 
has no right to bring an action for wrongful death for the 
benefit of the beneficiaries.  Thus, the three-year statute of 
limitations for wrongful death actions is not implicated. 
 
In these cases, because the decedents had no right to bring 
a cause of action for the injuries that caused their deaths at 
the time that they died as a result of the running of the 
statute of limitations on the decedents' underlying tort and 
breach of warranty claims, the plaintiffs, as personal 
representatives of the decedents' estates, had no right to bring 
wrongful death actions based on those injuries.6  We affirm the 
judgments dismissing those claims. 
 
6 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Defense Lawyers Association, the Massachusetts 
Academy of Trial Attorneys, and Product Liability Advisory 
Council, Inc., in the Fabiano case. 
 
5 
 
 
Background.  1.  Fabiano case.7  Ralph began smoking 
cigarettes at the age of fifteen when he received free samples 
of cigarettes, including "L&M" brand cigarettes manufactured by 
Philip Morris USA Inc.  Ralph became addicted to smoking and 
continued to buy and smoke L&M cigarettes for the next fifty 
years.  Ralph regularly purchased L&M cigarettes from Shaw's 
Supermarkets, Inc.  In 2004, Ralph was diagnosed with emphysema, 
a form of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), caused 
by long-term cigarette smoking.  He died of COPD on July 22, 
2014.  Just under three years later, on July 14, 2017, Grace, as 
personal representative of Ralph's estate, brought this wrongful 
death suit against Philip Morris USA Inc. and Shaw's 
Supermarkets, Inc. (collectively, Fabiano defendants).8  Grace's 
amended complaint asserted wrongful death claims based on breach 
of warranty, negligence, and conspiracy.  See G. L. c. 229, § 2. 
 
2.  Fuller case.  John began smoking "Camel" brand 
cigarettes manufactured by R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company at the 
age of seventeen and continued to do so for over forty years.  
 
 
7 Michael Cuddy was named special representative of the 
estate of Ralph Fabiano in the original complaint.  Grace was 
subsequently appointed as personal representative; she filed an 
amended complaint substituting herself for Cuddy.  Cuddy is no 
longer an active party in the case. 
 
 
8 Garber Bros, Inc., was also originally named as a 
defendant.  The company filed for bankruptcy shortly before the 
case was brought, and all actions against it were stayed. 
6 
 
John frequently purchased Camel cigarettes from Cumberland 
Farms, Inc.  In 2012, John was diagnosed with lung cancer caused 
by long-term cigarette smoking.  On March 21, 2016, Mary and 
John brought a suit against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and 
Cumberland Farms, Inc.9 (collectively, Fuller defendants), 
alleging liability under G. L. c. 93A.  John subsequently died 
from lung cancer on November 13, 2016.  On September 11, 2017, 
Mary, as personal representative of John's estate, amended the 
complaint, adding wrongful death claims based on breach of 
warranty, negligence, and conspiracy.10 
 
3.  Motions disposing of wrongful death claims.  In the 
respective cases, the Fabiano defendants moved to dismiss the 
amended complaint and the Fuller defendants moved for partial 
judgment on the pleadings with respect to the wrongful death 
claims.  In each motion, the defendants relied on our decision 
in GGNSC, 484 Mass. at 191, to argue that the wrongful death 
claims were barred because the statute of limitations had lapsed 
on the decedent's underlying claims at the time of the 
decedent's death.  See G. L. c. 106, § 2-318 (three-year statute 
 
 
9 Garber Bros, Inc., was also named as a defendant in the 
Fuller case.  The parties, however, stipulated to dismiss the 
claim against the company after it declared bankruptcy.  See 
note 8, supra. 
 
 
10 Mary also individually asserted a claim of loss of 
consortium against all defendants, the dismissal of which she 
does not challenge on appeal. 
7 
 
of limitations for breach of warranty actions); G. L. c. 260, 
§ 2A (three-year statute of limitations for tort actions). 
 
The motions were allowed by different judges in the 
Superior Court.  Both judges ruled that, because wrongful death 
recovery is derivative of a decedent's own cause of action, the 
wrongful death claims were precluded because each decedent could 
not have brought claims based on the injuries that caused his 
death had he survived.  Grace and Mary both appealed.11  We 
allowed their applications for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Right to wrongful death recovery.  The 
right to recover for wrongful death finds its origin in the 
common law.  See Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 71 (1972).  
Despite the common-law nature of wrongful death actions, we have 
interpreted the wrongful death statute as establishing certain 
requirements applicable to such actions, including 
"(a) requiring that damages recoverable for wrongful death 
be based upon the degree of the defendant's culpability; 
(b) prescribing the range of the damages recoverable 
against each defendant; (c) requiring that any action for 
wrongful death be brought by a personal representative on 
behalf of the designated categories of beneficiaries; and 
(d) requiring that the action be commenced within the 
specified period of time, as a limitation upon the remedy 
and not upon the right." 
 
 
 
11 Following the allowance of the Fuller defendants' motion 
for judgment on the pleadings, trial commenced on Mary's G. L. 
c. 93A claim.  After trial, the judge concluded that the c. 93A 
claim was time barred.  Mary does not challenge that portion of 
the judgment on appeal. 
8 
 
Id.  In determining the parameters of recovery for wrongful 
death, we begin first with the language of the statute, and "if 
the language does not resolve the question, [we look] to the 
common law for guidance."  GGNSC, 484 Mass. at 186-187. 
 
2.  Derivative nature of wrongful death claims.  In GGNSC, 
we were called to determine whether G. L. c. 229, § 2, provided 
rights to a decedent's statutory beneficiaries derivative of or 
independent from the decedent's own cause of action for the 
injuries that caused the decedent's death.  GGNSC, 484 Mass. at 
184.  We concluded that wrongful death claims are derivative 
based on the language of the wrongful death statute, augmented 
by our interpretation of common-law wrongful death actions in 
the Commonwealth over time and persuasive authority from other 
jurisdictions.  Id. at 184, 187-191. 
 
In relevant part, G. L. c. 229, § 2 -- as it currently 
stands -- provides for wrongful death liability where 
"[a] person who (1) by his negligence causes the death of a 
person, or (2) by willful, wanton or reckless act causes 
the death of a person under such circumstances that the 
deceased could have recovered damages for personal injuries 
if his death had not resulted, . . . or (5) is responsible 
for a breach of warranty arising under [art. 2 of G. L. 
c. 106] which results in injury to a person that causes 
death." 
 
In 1958, the Legislature amended a previous iteration of the 
statute by adding the language that, in part, undergirded our 
conclusion in GGNSC that wrongful death claims are derivative.  
9 
 
GGNSC, 484 Mass. at 187-188.  Specifically, the "Legislature 
amended G. L. c. 229, § 2, to permit compensation only 'under 
such circumstances that the deceased could have recovered 
damages for personal injuries if his death had not resulted.'"  
Id., quoting St. 1958, c. 238, § 1. 
 
In GGNSC, we noted that the "under such circumstances" 
clause in the statute demonstrated the Legislature's intent to 
"expressly tether[] a wrongful death claim to tortious conduct 
that caused the decedent's personal injury."12  GGNSC, 484 Mass. 
 
 
12 At oral argument, counsel for the Fuller defendants 
argued for the first time that the Legislature did not intend to 
make wrongful death claims derivative when it included the 
"under such circumstances" clause in the 1958 version of the 
wrongful death statute, but rather included the clause to 
capture the categories of circumstances giving rise to wrongful 
death enumerated in various sections of the 1949 version of the 
statute.  St. 1949, c. 427, § 2.  The "under such circumstances" 
clause, however, was not necessary to fulfill this purpose.  
Indeed, the "under such circumstances" language (or a nearly 
identical iteration thereof) predated the 1958 version of the 
statute.  See St. 1883, c. 243.  We interpreted that language -- 
prior to the 1958 amendment -- as creating a right of recovery 
derivative of the rights of the deceased.  See Dacey v. Old 
Colony R.R., 153 Mass. 112, 117 (1891) ("The purpose of the 
statute is to permit the administrator to maintain an action for 
the death when the intestate could have maintained an action if 
he had recovered, and not otherwise.  When his action would have 
been defeated by the defence of common employment if he had 
sued, the action of his administrator will be barred in the same 
way in a suit brought on account of his death.  This seems the 
only reasonable interpretation of the statute").  We presume 
that the Legislature was aware of our interpretation of this 
language when it included nearly identical language in the 1958 
version of the wrongful death statute.  See Commonwealth v. 
Colturi, 448 Mass. 809, 812 (2007).  Thus, we see no reason to 
revisit the interpretation we afforded the "under such 
circumstances" clause in GGNSC, 484 Mass. at 187-188. 
10 
 
at 188.  And we concluded specifically that the clause applied 
to wrongful death actions caused by willful, wanton, or reckless 
conduct, and by negligence.  Id.  But only wrongful death 
actions based on negligence were at issue in that case.  Id.  
Accordingly, we acknowledged that the statute permits wrongful 
death recovery based on breach of warranty, but we did not 
address explicitly that the "under such circumstances" clause 
does not also follow the clause permitting wrongful death 
recovery based on breach of warranty.  See id. at 188 n.14. 
 
The plaintiffs contend that, as a result, in GGNSC, 484 
Mass. at 191, we left open the question whether wrongful death 
actions based on breach of warranty are derivative.  We did not.  
Our conclusion that wrongful death recovery as a whole is 
derivative did not rely exclusively on the "under such 
circumstances" clause.  Id. at 188-191.  Rather, by looking at 
the language and structure of the wrongful death statute, we 
discerned the Legislature's intent that any claim brought under 
it "remain tied to the decedent's action."  See id. at 187-188 
(considering "plain language of the section at issue by 
analyzing the statute as a whole").13  In particular, this intent 
 
 
13 In analyzing whether wrongful death actions under G. L. 
c. 229, § 2, based on negligence were derivative, we also 
considered that "the elements of our wrongful death action based 
on negligence mirror those of an ordinary negligence claim."  
GGNSC, 484 Mass. at 188.  Notably, the same is true of actions 
for wrongful death and claims for personal injury based on 
11 
 
is demonstrated, in part, by the Legislature affording the 
decedent's executor or administrator the exclusive right to 
initiate a wrongful death suit under G. L. c. 229, § 2.  
Although § 1 of the wrongful death statute identifies the 
permissible beneficiaries of a wrongful death suit, the statute 
does not permit those beneficiaries to bring suit, demonstrating 
that an action for wrongful death belongs to the estate and that 
the decedent's beneficiaries do not have a separate assertable 
legal right in the decedent's life under the statute.  See 
GGNSC, supra; G. L. c. 229, § 1.  This is true of all claims 
brought under the wrongful death statue, including those based 
on breach of warranty. 
 
In determining that wrongful death claims are derivative, 
we also drew support from "'trend[s] in [our] law against 
allowing' claims under G. L. c. 229, § 2, to be independent of 
the decedent's own cause of action."  GGNSC, 484 Mass. at 190, 
and cases cited.  Further, we joined the majority of States, 
which "conclude that where an action for the injuries causing 
the decedent's death 'could not have been brought by the 
deceased, had he survived, . . . no right of action [for 
wrongful death] . . . can vest in the deceased's administrator 
or representative for the benefit of the beneficiaries.'"  Id., 
 
breach of warranty.  See Haglund v. Philip Morris Inc., 446 
Mass. 741, 743-745 (2006). 
12 
 
quoting 12 Am. Jur. Trials, Wrongful Death Actions § 16, at 344-
345 (1966). 
 
3.  Statute of limitations in wrongful death statute.  With 
wrongful death liability being derivative, the parties now 
disagree over the time at which a wrongful death action may be 
brought.  The dispute here arises primarily from the statute of 
limitations set forth in G. L. c. 229, § 2, for commencement of 
a wrongful death action.  The plaintiffs also rely on prior 
amendments to the wrongful death statute to support their 
position. 
a.  Language of statute.  Section 2 of G. L. c. 229 
provides:  "An action to recover damages under this section 
shall be commenced within three years from the date of death 
. . . ."14  The plaintiffs contend that this language 
unambiguously demonstrates the Legislature's intent to permit a 
decedent's representative to bring a wrongful death action 
within three years of the decedent's death, regardless of the 
date of injury or whether the decedent's claim was time barred 
at the time of death.  Their arguments misconstrue the reason 
that their claims are barred. 
 
 
14 The wrongful death statute also contains a discovery rule 
permitting an action to be commenced "within three years from 
the date when the deceased's executor or administrator knew, or 
in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of 
the factual basis for a cause of action," G. L. c. 229, § 2, 
which is not at issue or applicable in these cases. 
13 
 
 
"A statute of limitations is a limitation on liability that 
defines the time period within which a cause of action may be 
brought.  A statute of limitations does not create a cause of 
action that does not otherwise exist."  Sullivan v. Rich, 71 
Mass. App. Ct. 16, 20 (2007).  Although the statute of 
limitations in G. L. c. 229, § 2, sets the time period in which 
a wrongful death action may be brought, it does not confer an 
independent right to bring one.  See Gaudette, 362 Mass. at 71.  
The right to bring a wrongful death action, being derivative, is 
"dependent on the continuance of a right in the decedent to 
maintain an action for his injury up to the time of his death" 
(citation omitted).  GGNSC, 484 Mass. at 185, 190-191. 
 
Where a decedent had no right on the date of his or her 
death to bring suit for the injury that caused his or her death, 
no cause of action for wrongful death based on the death-causing 
injury ever vests in the decedent's representative for the 
benefit of the beneficiaries.  GGNSC, 484 Mass. at 190-191.  
Because a cause of action for wrongful death never comes into 
existence for the decedent's representative, it never accrues, 
and the three-year statute of limitations designated by the 
Legislature for wrongful death actions is never triggered.  See 
McGuinness v. Cotter, 412 Mass. 617, 621 (1992), quoting Klein 
v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 702 (1982) ("A statute of 
limitations is a procedural measure which 'normally governs the 
14 
 
time within which legal proceedings must be commenced after the 
cause of action accrues'"); Doe No. 4 v. Levine, 77 Mass. App. 
Ct. 117, 119 (2010), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 23 (9th ed. 
2009) ("'Accrue' means '[t]o come into existence as an 
enforceable claim or right'").  Thus, it is not the statute of 
limitations for wrongful death that bars the plaintiffs' claims, 
but the absence of any claim vested in them because the 
decedents were unable to bring claims for their injuries at the 
time of their deaths. 
 
b.  Statutory amendments.  Previous amendments to G. L. 
c. 229, § 2, are inapposite and do not support the plaintiffs' 
position.  Prior to 1981, the wrongful death statute, in 
addition to providing a time period in which a cause of action 
must be commenced, also provided that "[n]o recovery shall be 
had . . . for a death which does not occur within two years 
after the injury which caused the death."  G. L. c. 229, § 2, as 
amended through St. 1979, c. 164, § 1.  In 1981, the Legislature 
amended the statute by striking out the latter sentence limiting 
recovery.  St. 1981, c. 493, § 1.  While the plaintiffs contend 
that by doing so the Legislature clearly intended the statute of 
limitations for wrongful death claims to be unaffected by the 
date of the decedent's injury, the 1981 amendment did not 
address the statute of limitations for wrongful death.  Nor did 
15 
 
it have any impact on the derivative nature of the cause of 
action. 
 
The amendment that the plaintiffs rely on left undisturbed 
the three-year limitations period for commencement of an action 
for wrongful death.  See G. L. c. 229, § 2, as amended through 
St. 1981, c. 493, § 1.  The sentence that the amendment deleted 
operated as a bar to recovery for wrongful death, regardless of 
when a cause of action accrued or whether a complaint was filed 
within the limitations period.  In that regard, the deleted 
provision resembled a statute of repose.  See Bridgwood v. A.J. 
Wood Constr., Inc., 480 Mass. 349, 352 (2018) ("A statute of 
repose eliminates a cause of action at a specified time, 
regardless of whether an injury has occurred or a cause of 
action has accrued as of that date"). 
 
The plaintiffs conflate these differing concepts.  Each of 
these three particulars -- whether there is a cause of action 
that has accrued, whether the limitations period has run (or 
begun to run), and whether any statutory restrictions bar 
recovery -- is separate and distinct from the others.  The 
following example illustrates the distinction.  Suppose a 
decedent was injured two and one-half years before dying from 
that injury.  The applicable statute of limitations for her 
personal injury claim would not have run at the time of her 
death (six months remained on the claim), and so long as her 
16 
 
claim was otherwise viable, a cause of action for wrongful death 
would then vest in her representative upon her death.  The 
wrongful death action having fallen to the representative, the 
statute of limitations would accordingly begin to run for that 
action on the date of death and would run for three years.  
However, prior to 1981, no recovery would be permitted for such 
an action under G. L. c. 229, § 2, as amended through St. 1979, 
c. 164, § 1, because the decedent died more than two years after 
the injury that caused her death. 
 
By contrast, in these cases, because the decedents both 
died over three years after the injuries that caused their 
deaths, by virtue of the running of the underlying statute of 
limitations, they had no right to bring personal injury claims 
for those injuries at the time that they died.  Thus, no right 
of wrongful death ever fell to their representatives.  While, 
given the timing of their deaths, the pre-1981 restriction on 
recovery would have also precluded their representatives' 
wrongful death actions, the elimination of the pre-1981 
restriction -– which functioned as a statute of repose -- in no 
way created a right in the decedents' representatives to bring a 
wrongful death action that did not otherwise exist.  The statute 
of limitations for wrongful death was therefore never implicated 
in these cases. 
17 
 
 
The plaintiffs contend that our conclusion creates a rule 
that a decedent's death must occur within three years of the 
injury that caused it, and that this conclusion cannot be 
reconciled with the 1981 amendment eliminating any bar to 
recovery tied to the date of injury.  But the particular reason 
why a decedent's personal injury claim is precluded at the time 
of death –- here, the expiration of the statute of limitations 
on the decedents' personal injury claims -- is not our focus 
when determining whether a wrongful death action exists.  
Rather, because a wrongful death claim is derivative, the same 
outcome would result regardless of the reason that the 
decedent's own claims were barred, whether it be because of an 
arbitration agreement, a release from liability, or, as is the 
circumstance in these cases, the statute of limitations. 
 
4.  Other jurisdictions.  Of the jurisdictions where 
wrongful death liability is derivative, the vast majority that 
have weighed in on this issue agree that, if the decedent's 
underlying personal injury claim is barred by the statute of 
limitations at the time of death, no right of wrongful death is 
created in the representative of the decedent's estate for the 
benefit of the beneficiaries.  See, e.g., Curtis v. Quality 
Floors, Inc., 653 So. 2d 963, 964 (Ala. 1995) ("if a decedent's 
cause of action is time-barred at his or her death, then the 
decedent's personal representative cannot bring a wrongful death 
18 
 
action"); Drake v. St. Francis Hosp., 560 A.2d 1059, 1062-1063 
(Del. 1989) ("[wrongful death statute] imposes a condition 
precedent to the accrual of a wrongful death cause of action 
. . . , i.e., the decedent's ability to have maintained an 
action and recovered damages, if death had not ensued.  [Where] 
the decedent's medical malpractice action was time barred 
. . . , no cause of action for wrongful death ever 'accrued' in 
his survivors"); Mason v. Gerin Corp., 231 Kan. 718, 725 (1982) 
("where the injured party could not have brought an action for 
his personal injuries because the statute of limitations had run 
against his claim prior to his death, a wrongful death action 
cannot be maintained"); Estate of Stokes v. Pee Dee Family 
Physicians, L.L.P., 389 S.C. 343, 349 (2010) ("a claim under 
[the wrongful death statute] lies in the decedent's estate only 
when the decedent possessed the right of recovery at his death.  
. . . [T]he wrongful death statute of limitations does not serve 
to revive a previously barred claim"); Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand 
Co., 841 S.W.2d 343, 348-349 (Tex. 1992) ("if a decedent may not 
maintain suit because of some defense -- release, res judicata, 
limitations, etc. -- which may be properly interposed by 
defendants, there is no wrongful death action to accrue.  The 
action is not barred by limitations before it accrues; it never 
accrues because the decedent could not maintain an action at his 
death"); Edwards v. Fogarty, 962 P.2d 879, 883 (Wyo. 1998) 
19 
 
("Where the statute of limitations has run on the underlying 
cause of action and the injured party does not have a viable 
claim at the time of his death, a wrongful death action by his 
survivors is also barred").15 
 
The jurisdictions that permit wrongful death recovery 
despite the expiration of the statute of limitations on the 
decedent's underlying personal injury claims "tend to interpret 
their wrongful death statute . . . as creating a new and 
independent cause of action," see Mummert v. Alizadeh, 435 Md. 
207, 224-225 (2013), and cases cited, or at least have been 
unclear about the derivative nature of wrongful death liability.  
For example, Colorado, to which the plaintiffs point for 
support, has treated wrongful death actions as derivative in 
some sense, see Stamp v. Vail Corp., 172 P.3d 437, 447 (2017), 
but also has described such actions as "separate and distinct 
from a cause of action the deceased could have maintained had he 
survived," Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375, 379 (Colo. 2003), 
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1212 (2004) (arbitration agreement 
 
 
15 See also Estate of Hull v. Union Pac. R.R., 355 Ark. 547, 
553 (2004); Toombs v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 833 So. 2d 109, 
115-117 (Fla. 2002); Wyness v. Armstrong World Indus., 131 Ill. 
2d 403, 408 (1989); Ogden v. Berry, 572 A.2d 1082, 1083-1084 
(Me. 1990); Dunn v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 129, 
132-134 (1992); Deggs v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd., 186 Wash. 2d 716, 
732 (2016). 
20 
 
covered wrongful death action because of language in agreement, 
rather than derivative nature of action). 
 
Under Colorado's reasoning, so long as a decedent, at some 
point, had the right to maintain a cause of action for the 
decedent's personal injuries, the condition precedent to having 
a wrongful death action is satisfied, even if the decedent could 
not have maintained such an action as of the date of death.  See 
Rowell v. Clifford, 976 P.2d 363, 364-365 (Colo. App. 1998) 
(recognizing interpretation of wrongful death statute differs 
from other jurisdictions).  West Virginia, which has similarly 
been unclear about whether it considers wrongful death liability 
to be derivative, follows the same approach.  See Stonerise 
Healthcare, LLC vs. Oates, W. Va. Sup. Ct. App., No. 19-0215 
(June 16, 2020) (Workman, J., dissenting) (lack of clarity in 
West Virginia whether wrongful death recovery is derivative).  
But see Davis v. Foley, 193 W. Va. 595, 600 (1995) ("a wrongful 
death action [is] a derivative claim"); Hoover's Adm'x v. 
Chesapeake & O. Ry., 46 W. Va. 268, 270 (1899) ("if the 
character of injury is such that the injured party could have at 
any time maintained a suit in relation thereto, his 
administrator could sue after his death," even where statute of 
limitations for decedent's claims expired before death).16 
 
 
16 To the extent that the parties on both sides rely on 
cases from Mississippi and Connecticut to support their 
21 
 
 
In GGNSC, 484 Mass. 190-191, we were unequivocal that, in 
Massachusetts, we follow the majority rule that wrongful death 
liability is derivative.  Accordingly, we follow the majority 
approach precluding recovery for wrongful death where the 
statute of limitations on the decedent's underlying claims ran 
before the decedent's death.17 
 
positions, their reliance is misplaced.  Both jurisdictions 
treat wrongful death actions differently from how we do.  In 
Mississippi, for instance, where a wrongful death action is 
based on personal injury to the decedent, as opposed to injuries 
that the decedent's death caused to others, such as a loss of 
consortium claim, the wrongful death action must be brought 
within the statute of limitations associated with the underlying 
personal injury claim.  Caves v. Yarbrough, 991 So. 2d 142, 148-
150 (Miss. 2008).  In Connecticut, similarly, where the basis of 
a wrongful death action is a statutory action that did not exist 
at common law, the wrongful death action is subject to the 
statute of limitations associated with the underlying statutory 
action, rather than the statute of limitations set out in the 
wrongful death statute.  Harvey v. Department of Correction, 337 
Conn. 291, 298-300 (2020). 
 
 
By contrast, as we have stated, our conclusion is not that 
wrongful death actions must be brought within the time permitted 
by the statute of limitations for the underlying claim.  Rather, 
we conclude merely that the statute of limitations for the 
underlying claim must not have expired at the time of the 
decedent's death.  In other words, the claim must be viable at 
the time of the decedent's death for a wrongful death cause of 
action to exist.  If such an action exists, the statute of 
limitations for wrongful death actions -- not the statute of 
limitations for the underlying claim -- governs when a wrongful 
death action may be brought. 
 
 
17 While the plaintiffs argue that our conclusion produces 
fundamental unfairness by forcing those suffering from life-
threating illnesses to make the untenable choice of filing suit 
while they are suffering from the illness or forfeiting their 
heirs' right to recovery in the event that the statute of 
limitations runs before their death, our decision in no way 
22 
 
 
Conclusion.  We affirm the judgments in both cases 
dismissing the plaintiffs' wrongful death claims.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
changes what has long been true of persons suffering from 
serious injuries.  Once those injuries are knowable, plaintiffs 
must assert their rights within a specified period of time or 
lose their ability to recover for their injuries.  See Klein, 
386 Mass. at 702.  Because the right to recover for wrongful 
death is derivative of a decedent's right to recover for his or 
her injuries, if the decedent, during his or her life, loses or 
otherwise forfeits the ability to recover, no right to recover 
exists in his or her beneficiaries. 
 
 
18 The requests for costs by both Grace and Philip Morris 
USA Inc. are denied.