Title: State Ex Rel. BS v. Hill
Citation: 294 S.E.2d 126
Docket Number: 15469-15471
State: west-virginia
Issuer: west-virginia Supreme Court
Date: July 1, 1982

294 S.E.2d 126 (1982) STATE ex rel. B. S., an Infant v. Karen HILL, Director, Russell Daugherty Status Offense Facility, et al. STATE ex rel. H. E. J., an Infant v. Karen HILL, Director, Russell Daugherty Status Offense Facility, et al. STATE ex rel. P. C., an Infant v. Karen HILL, Director, Russell Daugherty Status Offense Facility, et al. Nos. 15469-15471. Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. July 1, 1982. *127 Paul Mones, Morgantown, for relator. Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Janet F. Steele, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents. George Castelle, Charleston, as Guardian. HARSHBARGER, Justice: B. S., a fifteen-year-old male, was incarcerated in the Russell L. Daugherty[1] Status Offense Facility at Ona, West Virginia, on December 9, 1981, for incorrigibility and truancy, status offenses. His habeas corpus petition alleged his confinement violated his statutory and constitutional rights. W.Va. Const. art. III, §§ 5 and 10; W.Va.Code, 49-5B-1 et seq. He objected to staff use of passive physical restraint on him, and to the State's failure to accord him the least restrictive alternative at his dispositional hearing. The facility was opened in 1981, licensed by the Department of Welfare for housing status offenders, W.Va.Code, 49-5B-5. Status offenders may not be housed in secure, prisonlike facilities. Syllabus Points 4 and 5, State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, W.Va., 233 S.E.2d 318 (1977). W.Va.Code, 49-5B-3(7) and (8) define secure and nonsecure facilities: There are no locks on residents' bedroom doors at Daugherty. The front and side doors are locked to the outside at night to prevent intruders, but residents are not locked in. Window screens have alarms that ring if removed. No fences or physical barriers surround the facility. There are only three staff persons on duty at nightone male, one female and one supervisor, and they do not control exits and entrances. We find that Daugherty is a nonsecure facility, and housing status offenders therein does not violate our Constitution, statutes and case law. W.Va.Const. art. III, §§ 5 and 10; W.Va.Code, 49-5-13(b)(6); 49-5-16(a); State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, supra. The Department of Welfare has published regulations and commentaries for management of juvenile residential facilities, and we include in the margin Regulations 5.25 through 5.32[2] which are in effect at *129 Daugherty. Its staff have been trained by Braley and Thompson, consultants, in crisis management and passive physical restraint, and in his affidavit, Braley explained passive physical restraint: We understand that status offenders may occasionally lose control in even a most attentive environment. In State ex rel. K. W. v. Werner, W.Va., 242 S.E.2d 907, 916 (1978), we permitted occasional incidents of solitary confinement for a juvenile offender, "but only in instances when physical restraint and isolation of a juvenile are absolutely necessary to enable him to gain personal control of himself." A noninjurious, passive physical restraint carefully applied by two trained child care workers is acceptable for those times when reason and other techniques are unsuccessful. B. S. is entitled to another dispositional hearing because the trial court and the child's counsel did not follow procedures required by our cases and statutes. State ex rel. R. S. v. Trent, W.Va., 289 S.E.2d 166 (1982); State ex rel. S. J. C. v. Fox, W.Va., 268 S.E.2d 56, 58-59 (1980); Syllabus Point 3, State ex rel. D. D. H. v. Dostert, W.Va., 269 S.E.2d 401 (1980); Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. C. A. H. v. Strickler, W.Va., 251 S.E.2d 222 (1979). This Court has previously held that with respect to proceedings to transfer a juvenile to the criminal jurisdiction of the circuit court, the failure of the juvenile court to make express findings as required by statute renders the transfer order void. State ex rel. E. D. v. Aldredge, W.Va., 245 S.E.2d 849 (1978). We find this principle to be equally applicable to dispositional orders.... The failure to set forth such a finding on the record deprives the court of authority to order such a commitment. (Emphasis added.) These requirements apply to status and nonstatus juvenile offenders. State ex rel. R. S. v. Trent, supra; State ex rel. H. K. v. Taylor, W.Va., 289 S.E.2d 673 (1982). Transcripts of B. S.'s adjudicatory and dispositional hearings are in an appendix for our readers. There was no recitation of facts in the court's order or in the record, mentioning alternatives explored or reasons for their rejection; no case histories, reports, records, psychiatric, psychological, educational or social evaluations; and most importantly, no individualized treatment plan. We reiterate the requirement set forth in Syllabus Points 1, 2, 6 and 7 of State ex rel. R. S. v. Trent, supra: There is simply no record to enable us to determine whether incarceration in Daugherty was the least restrictive appropriate alternative for B. S. We understand that trial judges who must deal with juveniles, often, and we believe commendably, develop a personal rapport and great concern about the children with whom they workthat they care about them. We understand that in this laudatory relationship, manifested by thoughtful, even tender, counselling and admonition, interruption for "making a record" is a reversion to officialdom and stark authority that may seem to jeopardize the very trust, confidence, and reliance that a good judge seeks to gain from a youngster. But we must have those findings and conclusions. We remand B. S. for another dispositional hearing. The record must show findings of fact, conclusions of law, an individualized treatment plan, and efforts made by all court officers and welfare department officials to arrive at a least restrictive alternative for B. S.[3] Writ granted as moulded. BY THE COURT: [1] The Honorable Russell L. Daugherty, a Judge of the Circuit court of Cabell County, contended with this scrivener when they both practiced law, and was a friend, and was a sensitive and wise judge. He died February 11, 1975. [2] PROBLEM MANAGEMENT Limitations on Potentially Damaging Responses R5.25 A residential facility shall have written, comprehensive policies and procedures regarding discipline and control, which shall be explained to all children, families, staff and placing agencies. These policies shall include measures for positive responses to appropriate behavior. (See R4.3.3) R5.26 A residential facility shall prohibit all cruel and unusual punishments, including, but not limited to, the following: R5.26.1 Punishments including any type of physical hitting or any type of physical punishment inflicted in any manner upon the body; R5.26.1 Physical exercises such as running laps or any performing of push-ups, when used solely as a means of punishment, except in accordance with a child's service plan when such activities are approved by a physician and carefully supervised by the facility administration; R5.26.3 Requiring or forcing the child to take an uncomfortable position, such as squatting or bending, or requiring or forcing the child to repeat physical movements when used solely as a means of punishment; R5.26.4 Group punishments for misbehaviors of individuals except in accordance with the facility's written policy; R5.26.5 Punishment which subjects the child to verbal abuse, ridicule or humiliation; R5.26.6 Excessive denial of on-grounds program services or denial of any essential program service solely for disciplinary purposes; R5.26.7 Withholding of any meal; R5.26.8 Denial of visiting or communication privileges with family solely as a means of punishment; R5.26.9 Denial of sufficient sleep; R5.26.10 Requiring the child to remain silent for long periods of time; R5.26.11 Denial of shelter, clothing or bedding; R5.26.12 Extensive withholding of emotional response or stimulation; R5.26.13 Chemical, mechanical or excessive physical restraint; R5.26.14 Exclusion of the child from entry to the residence; R5.26.15 Assignment of unduly physically strenuous or harsh work. R5.27 Children in care of a residential facility shall not punish other residents except as part of an organized therapeutic self-government program that is conducted in accordance with written policy and is supervised directly by staff. R5.28 A residential facility shall ensure that administering of the discipline is not delegated to persons who are not known to the child. R5.29 A residential facility shall ensure that disciplinary measures are administered as soon after the offensive behavior as possible and that these measures are reasonably related to the nature of the offense and are not excessive. Passive Physical Restraint R5.30 A residential facility shall ensure that all direct service staff members are trained in crisis management, the appropriate use of passive physical restraint methods and after management. Any use of passive, physical restraint shall be documented in the child's case record. R5.31 A residential facility shall not use any form of restraint other than passive physical restraint without the prior approval of the regulatory body. Time-Out Procedures R5.32 A residential facility shall only use time-out procedures (forced separation from the group in a confined area) when these procedures are in accordance with written policies of the facility. These policies shall include procedures for recording each incident involving the use of time-out. Facility policies shall outline other less restrictive responses to be used prior to the use of time-out. R5.32.1 Each use of time-out procedures shall be directly supervised by supervisory staff. R5.32.2 The facility's chief administrative officer shall approve any use of time-out procedures exceeding 30 minutes in duration. [3] We are advised that State ex rel. H. E. J. v. Karen Hill, Director, Russell Daugherty Status Offense Facility, No. 15470 and State ex rel. P. C. v. Karen Hill, Director, Russell Daugherty Status Offense Facility, No. 15471, that involved essentially the same problems as State ex rel. B. S. v. Karen Hill, Director, Russell Daugherty Status Offense Facility, No. 15469, are moot and need no further treatment by this Court.