Title: State v. Decello
Citation: 111 Ariz. 46, 523 P.2d 74
Docket Number: 2892
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: September 17, 1974

111 Ariz. 46 (1974) 523 P.2d 74 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Gene Vincent DECELLO, Appellant. No. 2892. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. June 3, 1974. Rehearing Denied June 26, 1974. Motion Granted September 17, 1974. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Cleon M. Duke, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender, by H. Allen Gerhardt, Jr., Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant. *47 CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal from a judgment of the court following a trial without a jury finding the defendant guilty of first degree murder, §§ 13-451, -452, -453 A.R.S., and a sentence thereon of life imprisonment. We are asked to answer the following questions on appeal: The facts necessary for a determination of the matter on appeal are as follows. On the norning of 12 May 1973, the body of John Sutter was found by his landlord in the room that he rented. The body contained numerous stab wounds. Both before and after the discovery of the body, defendant stated to several witnesses that he had killed the deceased. Jeanie Johnston, for example, testified: And Esther McCluer testified: When arrested the defendant was in possession of the deceased's automobile. The defendant testified, as did his wife, that they had borrowed the deceased's car before and that the deceased had loaned the car to him this time. Defendant also testified that he had found John Sutter's body early in the morning of 12 May on the floor of the rented room and that he later put the body on the bed. He stated he did not call the police because of fear and shock and because he had the deceased's automobile which he felt would make him a prime murder suspect. From a trial to the court without a jury and a verdict of guilty and sentence of life imprisonment, the defendant appeals. WAS THE DEFENDANT COMPETENT TO WAIVE THE JURY? In Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150, 86 S. Ct. 1320, 16 L. Ed. 2d 429 (1966), the United States Supreme Court, in reversing the decision of this court in State v. Westbrook, 99 Ariz. 30, 406 P.2d 388 (1965), held that even though the court has properly found that the defendant was competent to stand trial, the court must also find further that the defendant was competent to waive his right to an attorney. The United States Supreme Court stated: The matter of defendant's competency in the instant case was presented to the trial court upon the written reports of two psychiatrists who had examined the defendant, and a written report of the Arizona State Hospital where defendant was held for observation. The report of Dr. Otto Bendheim concluded: And Dr. Paul Bindelglas stated: The report of the Arizona State Hospital read: The minute entries recite: A defendant who waives the assistance of counsel in a criminal trial is by that very act doing something that calls into question his rationality, and the United States Supreme Court has indicated that greater care must be taken in allowing a person to waive his right to an attorney *49 than it does in finding him competent to stand trial. Westbrook, supra. We do not believe, however, that the United States Supreme Court in Westbrook, supra, mandates that a defendant who is represented by counsel and is competent to stand trial must be given, absent other facts, a further hearing by the court as to his competency to waive his right to a jury. The right to a jury trial is admittedly a precious constitutional right, but its waiver is more often than not a question of trial strategy in which the subjective evaluations of the attorney for the defendant play a more important role than the discretion of the defendant. Unlike the waiver of assistance of counsel or plea of guilty, the waiver of a jury may well be in the defendant's best interests. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has indicated, however, that waiver of the right to jury stands on the same level as a waiver of assistance of counsel as far as competency of the defendant to waive is concerned: We believe that the facts in the Sieling case may be distinguished from the facts in the instant case. In Sieling, supra, there was a definite conflict in the psychiatrists' testimony which not only put the defendant's sanity "in issue," but raised a "substantial question" as to his mental capacity. In the instant case, even though psychiatrists were appointed and the defendant was sent to the hospital for evaluation, the reports were in agreement as to defendant's mental capacity. Admittedly, the trial court did not specifically direct its findings to defendant's specific competency to waive his constitutional right to a jury. We believe, however, that the record before us is able to support such a finding on appeal and we so find. We find no error. Defendant contends further that even if he was competent to waive the jury, the record does not reflect such a waiver. We agree. The record before this court is void of such fact, and this *50 matter will have to be remanded to the trial court for a finding to determine whether or not the defendant did, in fact, waive his right to a jury. The defendant contends that there is no showing that the stab wounds did, in fact, cause the death of the deceased. The pathologist testified: The pathologist did not testify directly that the stab wounds caused the death. Circumstances surrounding a death may be sufficient to support a finding of the cause of a death without expert opinion as to the cause: Despite the advanced state of the cancer of the lung, we have no difficulty in finding that the testimony presented was sufficient from which the trial court could find that the stab wounds were, in fact, the cause of the death. The evidence was sufficient to link the defendant to said stab wounds and support a conviction for first degree murder. State v. Drury, 110 Ariz. 447, 520 P.2d 495 (1974). The matter is remanded to the trial court for a hearing to determine if the defendant did, in fact, waive the right to a jury trial. The court shall make findings of fact and certify to this court said findings together with the reporter's transcript of any hearing held thereon within thirty days of the date of the issuance of the mandate in this case. HAYS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, LOCKWOOD and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur. On Motion Granted Ordered: Motion to Set Aside Conviction Granted. Further ordered: Remanding this cause for a new trial.