Title: Rosenberg v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12973
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 11, 2021

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12973 
 
JOHAN ROSENBERG1  vs.  JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. & others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 6, 2021. - May 11, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Massachusetts False Claims Act.  Fraud.  Bonds.  Practice, 
Civil, Motion to dismiss.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
October 23, 2014. 
 
A motion to dismiss, filed on June 5, 2019, was heard by 
Mitchell H. Kaplan, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
1 On behalf of the Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.; J.P. Morgan Securities LLC; 
JPMorgan Securities, Inc.; Citigroup, Inc.; Citigroup Global 
Markets Inc.; Citibank N.A.; Citigroup Financial Products Inc.; 
Citigroup Global Markets Holdings Inc.; Bank of America 
Corporation; Bank of America N.A.; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith Incorporated; Morgan Stanley; Morgan Stanley Smith 
Barney LLC; Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC; Morgan Stanley Capital 
Group Inc.; Morgan Stanley Bank, N.A.; and Morgan Stanley 
Capital Services Inc. 
2 
 
Tejinder Singh, of Maryland, for the plaintiff. 
Robert N. Hochman, of Illinois (David G. Jorgensen & Holly 
A. Harrison, of Illinois, Susanna Buergel, of New York, Matthew 
D. Benedetto, of California, Paul J. Murphy, Carol A. Starkey, 
Megan E. Barriger, & Kathryn L. Alessi also present) for the 
defendants. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Ben Robbins & Martin J. Newhouse for New England Legal 
Foundation. 
Ian D. Roffman, Thomas J. Carey, Jr., & David K. Bastian 
for Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce. 
Sheri Littlefield, of New York, Patrick T. Egan, Justin N. 
Saif, & Corey W. Silva for CFA Institute. 
Jacklyn DeMar, of the District of Columbia, & Sonya A. Rao 
for Taxpayers Against Fraud Education. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  The Massachusetts False Claims Act, G. L. 
c. 12, §§ 5A-5O (MFCA), authorizes a private party to bring an 
action alleging that a person has committed a fraud on the 
Commonwealth in connection with a claim for payment under a 
government program.  Such an action may be a valuable tool to 
shine a light on fraudulent behavior that otherwise might remain 
undiscovered.  In return, the private party (known as a 
"relator") is rewarded a portion of the recovery from the 
misfeasors.  Where the essential features of an individual's 
purported chicanery already have been illuminated, by contrast, 
affording a private party an incentive to bring suit is 
unwarranted, as it would add nothing to the Commonwealth's 
knowledge; in such circumstances, the MFCA prohibits such suits 
unless the Commonwealth intervenes.  Specifically, the MFCA 
contains a public disclosure bar that generally requires 
3 
 
dismissal of an action "if substantially the same allegations or 
transactions as alleged in the action . . . [previously have 
been] publicly disclosed" through certain enumerated sources.  
G. L. c. 12, § 5G (c).  Applying this public disclosure bar to 
the complaint at issue here, a Superior Court judge dismissed 
the complaint.  Because the complaint rested on information that 
already had been exposed to the light of day, we affirm.3 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts as set forth in the 
complaint, viewing all of the allegations as true and drawing 
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff relator's favor.  See 
Magliacane v. Gardner, 483 Mass. 842, 844 (2020), citing Revere 
v. Massachusetts Gaming Comm'n, 476 Mass. 591, 595 (2017). 
a.  Relator's claims.  The relator, Johan Rosenberg, 
commenced this action on behalf of the Commonwealth against the 
defendants -– certain financial institutions and their 
subsidiaries, see note 2, supra -- alleging that the defendants 
collectively engaged in and conspired to engage in fraud in 
connection with resetting interest rates for certain municipal 
bonds, referred to as variable rate demand obligations (VRDOs).  
VRDOs are long-term, tax-exempt, variable rate bonds.  The 
 
 
3 We recognize the amicus briefs submitted by CFA Institute 
and Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund in support of the 
plaintiff, and the amicus briefs submitted by the Greater Boston 
Chamber of Commerce and the New England Legal Foundation in 
support of the defendants. 
4 
 
Commonwealth and its subdivisions4 issue VRDOs to finance long-
term public projects or infrastructure, such as airports, ports, 
roads and bridges, and affordable housing.  Because interest 
rates on the bonds are reset on a periodic basis, often weekly, 
by the remarketing agent, the bonds allow issuers, like the 
Commonwealth, to borrow money for long periods of time while 
paying short-term interest rates.  The Commonwealth retained the 
defendants as remarketing agents to perform the requisite 
periodic resetting of the VRDO interest rates.  According to the 
complaint, the contracts between the Commonwealth and the 
defendants required that the defendants "actively and 
individually market and price these bonds at the lowest possible 
interest rates" that would permit the sale of the VRDOs on a 
given rate determination date.5 
 
4 For simplicity, in our discussion of the MFCA, our 
references to the Commonwealth also will include its 
subdivisions. 
 
5 The relator frequently summarizes the defendants' 
obligation as to obtain "the lowest possible interest rate"; the 
obligation, as set forth in the official statements for the 
VRDOs, however, is that defendants were "required to determine 
the applicable rate of interest that, in its judgment, is the 
lowest rate that would permit the sale of the [VRDO] bearing 
interest at the Weekly Rate at par plus accrued interest, if 
any, on and as of the Rate Determination Date.  The interest 
rate will reflect, among other factors, the level of market 
demand for the [VRDO] (including whether the Remarketing Agent 
is willing to purchase [the VRDO] for its own account)."  
Likewise, the model disclosure obligations, for which the 
relator argues the defendants were responsible, were "to set the 
interest rate at the rate necessary, in its judgment, as the 
5 
 
 
The relator maintains that the defendants did not perform 
these services as promised; instead, the defendants engaged in a 
rate setting scheme, which he refers to as "robo-resetting," 
whereby the defendants "mechanically set the rates en masse 
without any consideration of the individual characteristics of 
the bonds, the associated market conditions[,] or investor 
demand."  The relator, who states that he has over twenty years 
of experience in advising municipalities on issuing securities, 
asserts that he confirmed his suspicions of this "bucket" rate-
setting scheme through a forensic analysis of published interest 
rate data for these types of bonds.  The interest rates for 
VRDOs are published daily on a publicly available website, 
Electronic Municipal Market Access (EMMA).6  The relator's 
analysis revealed that, for certain groups of VRDOs,7 the 
 
lowest rate that permits the sale of the VRDOs at [one hundred 
percent] of their principal amount (par) on the interest reset 
date."  In our analysis of the claims regarding the "lowest 
interest rate," we rely upon this contractual explanation of the 
defendants' responsibilities. 
 
6 EMMA is the "official repository for information on all 
municipal bonds."  It is a freely accessible, public website and 
"serves as the venue for public access to variable rate security 
information, transaction data, primary market disclosures and 
continuing disclosures . . . , as well as market statistics and 
investor education." 
 
 
7 For example, the relator explains that, "with respect to 
the 1,083 VRDOs in [one bank's] largest bucket, 941 of them had 
the identical interest rate change (at least [eighty percent] of 
the time) for a full year."  Moreover, he argues, his analysis 
6 
 
interest rates moved in lock step; the relator labels these 
groups "buckets"8 of VRDOs.  This collective interest rate 
setting, he maintains, had no business justification, and 
demonstrates a lack of individualized judgment as to the lowest 
interest rate that would permit the sale of a given VRDO at the 
time the interest rate was reset.  He argues that this 
collective rate setting thereby resulted in "artificially high 
interest rates on Massachusetts VRDOs," and violated the 
defendants' obligations to the Commonwealth to market the VRDOs 
at the lowest interest rate that would permit sale on a given 
rate determination date.  Thus, the relator contends, the 
defendants fraudulently collected fees for services as 
remarketing agents that they did not perform. 
 
The relator argues that the defendants also benefited in 
another manner from their approach to resetting interest rates.  
Specifically, the artificially high interest rates resulting 
from the defendants' scheme caused VRDO investors to hold the 
bonds rather than to exercise their "put" options.  A put option 
allows an investor in a VRDO to redeem the VRDO at face value 
 
showed that the VRDO rates moved together across institutions, 
suggesting collusion among the defendants. 
 
 
8 The relator identified a particular VRDO as falling into a 
bucket if, for eighty percent of the time over a period of 
twenty-six weeks, the change in its interest rate was identical 
to that of other interest rate changes of VRDOs in the bucket. 
7 
 
plus interest earned.  When a put option is exercised, a 
remarketing agent becomes responsible for reselling the redeemed 
securities to new investors.  If a remarketing agent is unable 
to find another investor, a liquidity provider must step in and 
purchase the VRDO from the redeeming investor.  For this reason, 
VRDOs are backed by liquidity agreements, often letters of 
credit, to finance redemptions where no new investor is found.  
The same financial institution (here, the defendants) may serve 
as both the remarketing agent and the issuer of the letter of 
credit for a particular VRDO.  According to the complaint, the 
defendants were paid fees by the Commonwealth to provide letter 
of credit services.  By setting the interest rates for VRDOs 
artificially high, the defendants assured that the holders of 
the bonds would not exercise their put options and the 
defendants would not have to find other investors to purchase 
the bonds or to buy the bonds themselves. 
 
As a result of these actions, the relator contends, the 
defendants collected millions of dollars in fees from the 
Commonwealth for remarketing services that they did not provide.  
He maintains that the defendants also extracted millions of 
dollars in fees as liquidity providers even though the chance of 
needing to draw on the letters of credit services was very low 
("rarely, if ever, called upon") because bond holders were 
unlikely to exercise their put options in view of the 
8 
 
artificially high interest rates.  Because the interest rates 
were artificially high, the relator asserts, the Commonwealth 
paid extra interest on its VRDOs (some of which were owned by 
the defendants).9 
 
b.  Procedural history.  The relator filed his initial 
complaint in 2014; the Commonwealth declined to intervene.10  In 
2017, the relator filed an amended complaint, and, in 2019, he 
filed a second amended complaint, now at issue before us. 
 
 
9 The complaint asserts that VRDO investors "typically" are 
tax-exempt money market funds, which the defendants "in many 
instances own or manage." 
 
10 The relator also has commenced similar suits in other 
jurisdictions, including Illinois, California, and New York.  
While in Massachusetts the relator is proceeding as an 
individual, in other jurisdictions he has brought suit through 
Edelweiss Fund, LLC.  See State ex rel. Edelweiss Fund, LLC vs. 
JP Morgan Chase & Co., Cal. Super. Ct., No. CGC-14-540777, slip 
op. at 1, 11-12 (San Francisco County Aug. 7, 2019) (Edelweiss 
Fund) (denying defendants demurrer on ground that under 
California precedent no public disclosure occurred); State ex 
rel. Edelweiss Fund LLC vs. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Ill. Cir. Ct., 
No. 2017-L-000289, slip op. at 1, 12 (Cook County Feb. 1, 2019) 
(denying defendants' motion to dismiss on ground that relator 
was original source); State ex rel. Edelweiss Fund, LLC vs. 
JPMorgan Chase & Co., Supreme Ct. of N.Y., No. 100559/2014 (N.Y. 
County Mar. 27, 2020), aff'd, 189 A.D.3d 723 (N.Y. 2020) 
(denying defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state 
claim with requisite particularity, and not reaching whether 
case should be dismissed pursuant to public disclosure bar, 
noting that State Attorney General asserted it would exercise 
State's right to object to dismissal under public disclosure 
bar).  See notes 23 & 31, infra. 
9 
 
 
The defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss, which the 
Commonwealth did not oppose.  The judge allowed the motion,11 and 
the relator appealed.  We then transferred the appeal to this 
court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  We review the 
allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo.  Goodwin v. Lee Pub. 
Sch., 475 Mass. 280, 284 (2016), citing Curtis v. Herb Chambers 
I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011).  We "accept as true the 
factual allegations in the complaint and the attached exhibits, 
draw all reasonable inferences in the [relator's] favor, and 
determine whether the allegations 'plausibly suggest' that the 
[relator] is entitled to relief on that legal claim."  Buffalo-
Water 1, LLC v. Fidelity Real Estate Co., 481 Mass. 13, 17 
(2018).  See Revere, 476 Mass. at 595.  "[M]atters of public 
record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and 
exhibits attached to the complaint, also may be taken into 
account" (quotation and citation omitted).  Iannacchino v. Ford 
Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 631 n.14 (2008).  See Golchin v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 224 (2011), S.C., 466 
Mass. 156 (2013), quoting Marram v. Kobrick Offshore Fund, Ltd., 
442 Mass. 43, 45 n.4 (2004) ("Where . . . the [relator] had 
 
 
11 As did the motion judge, because of the result we reach, 
we do not address the other arguments raised by the defendants 
in support of their motion to dismiss. 
10 
 
notice of [the extrinsic] documents and relied on them in 
framing the complaint, the attachment of such documents to a 
motion to dismiss does not convert the motion to one for summary 
judgment . . ."). 
In their motion to dismiss, the defendants argued that 
dismissal was required pursuant to the public disclosure bar of 
the MFCA because the transactions at issue previously had been 
disclosed to the public through news media and the relator was 
not an original source of the information concerning the fraud.  
This motion requires construction of the public disclosure bar, 
a matter of statutory interpretation that we review de novo.  
See Ortiz v. Examworks, Inc., 470 Mass. 784, 788 (2015), citing 
Commerce Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 447 Mass. 478, 481 
(2006). 
 
b.  Statutory background.  The MFCA prohibits making 
fraudulent claims against the Commonwealth and its 
municipalities.  See G. L. c. 12, §§ 5A-5O.  The statute also 
permits enforcement of that prohibition by means of qui tam 
actions, in which "[a]n individual, hereafter referred to as a 
relator, may bring a civil action . . . on behalf of the relator 
and the [C]ommonwealth or any political subdivision thereof."  
G. L. c. 12, §§ 5A, 5C (2).  The Commonwealth may intervene and 
take over the case.  G. L. c. 12, §§ 5C (3), 5D.  Successful 
11 
 
relators are awarded a percentage of the funds recovered by the 
Commonwealth.  G. L. c. 12, § 5F. 
 
Qui tam actions have the "salutary purpose of encouraging 
the disclosure of fraudulent schemes."  See United States ex. 
rel. Winkelman v. CVS Caremark Corp., 827 F.3d 201, 206 (1st 
Cir. 2016) (Winkelman).  At the same time, "this statutory 
paradigm . . . creates perverse incentives for opportunists to 
seek compensation based on fraud already apparent from 
information in the public domain."  Id.  As does its 
counterpart, the Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(e)(4)(A) (FFCA), the MFCA therefore includes a "public 
disclosure bar," G. L. c. 12, § 5G (c), which provides:12 
"The court shall dismiss an action or claim pursuant to 
[G. L. c. 12, §§ 5A-5O], inclusive, unless opposed by the 
[C]ommonwealth or any political subdivision thereof, if 
substantially the same allegations or transactions as 
alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed:  
(1) in a Massachusetts criminal, civil or administrative 
hearing in which the [C]ommonwealth is a party; (2) in a 
Massachusetts legislative, administrative, auditor's or 
inspector general's report, hearing, audit or 
investigation; or (3) from the news media, unless the 
action is brought by the attorney general, or the relator 
is an original source of the information." 
 
 
12 Because the MFCA mirrors the FFCA, we look to Federal 
decisions for guidance in analyzing the MFCA.  See Packaging 
Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 611 (1980) ("Where 
the Legislature in enacting a statute follows a Federal statute, 
we follow the adjudged construction of the Federal statute by 
the Federal courts"). 
12 
 
The bar seeks to prevent "parasitic" suits, United States ex 
rel. Ondis v. Woonsocket, 587 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(Ondis), where a relator, "instead of plowing new ground, 
attempts to free-ride by merely repastinating previously 
disclosed badges of fraud," id., citing United States ex rel. 
Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 26-27 (1st 
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1005 (2010). 
Where, as here, the Commonwealth chooses not to intervene, 
a multipart inquiry governs whether the public disclosure bar 
applies.13  "The first three parts of this inquiry ask:  
(1) whether there has been a prior, public disclosure of fraud; 
(2) whether that prior disclosure of fraud emanated from a 
source specified in the statute's public disclosure provision; 
and (3) whether the relator's qui tam action is [substantially 
the same as] that prior disclosure of fraud."  United States ex 
rel. Poteet v. Bahler Med., Inc., 619 F.3d 104, 109 (1st Cir. 
2010) (Poteet).  See United States ex rel. Reed v. KeyPoint 
Gov't Solutions, 923 F.3d 729, 741 (10th Cir. 2019) (Reed); 
Ondis, 587 F.3d at 53.  Where "all three questions are answered 
in the affirmative, the public disclosure bar applies unless the 
 
13 The Attorney General's decision not to intervene in this 
case distinguishes it from the parallel litigation in New York.  
See Edelweiss Fund, LLC, Supreme Ct. of N.Y., No. 100559/2014, 
supra; note 10, supra. 
13 
 
relator qualifies under the 'original source' exception."14  
Poteet, supra at 109-110, quoting Ondis, supra at 53-54. 
 
c.  Application of the public disclosure bar.  i.  Prior 
public disclosure.  We first consider whether the allegations or 
transactions identified in the complaint previously had been 
publicly disclosed at the time the complaint was filed.  See 
Winkelman, 827 F.3d at 208.  As discussed, a prior public 
disclosure occurs when the essential elements exposing the fraud 
are in the public domain.  Poteet, 619 F.3d at 110.  The 
disclosure must constitute either (a) a direct allegation of 
fraud or (b) a transaction from which readers or listeners may 
infer fraud.  Id.  See United States ex rel. Springfield 
Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(Springfield).  Here, the defendants argued only that the latter 
theory was applicable, contending that the critical elements of 
the purported fraudulent transactions were in the public domain.  
Thus, to prevail on their motion to dismiss, the defendants must 
 
 
14 Pursuant to G. L. c. 12, § 5A, an "original source" is 
"an individual who:  (1) prior to a public disclosure under 
paragraph (3) of [§] 5G, has voluntarily disclosed to the 
[C]ommonwealth or any political subdivision thereof the 
information on which allegations or transactions in a claim 
are based; or (2) has knowledge that is independent of and 
materially adds to the publicly-disclosed allegations or 
transactions, and who has voluntarily provided the 
information to the [C]ommonwealth or any political 
subdivision thereof before filing a false claims actions." 
14 
 
show a disclosure of the two critical elements of the 
transactions; specifically, the defendants must establish that 
"both [the] misrepresented state of facts and [the] true state 
of facts so that the listener or reader may infer fraud" were in 
the public domain when the intervener filed his claims.  Poteet, 
supra.  See Winkelman, supra; Springfield, supra ("[I]f X + Y = 
Z, Z represents the allegation of fraud and X and Y represent 
its essential elements.  In order to disclose the fraudulent 
transaction publicly, the combination of X and Y must be 
revealed, from which readers or listeners may infer Z, i.e., the 
conclusion that fraud has been committed"). 
 
A.  Misrepresented state of facts.  According to the 
complaint, the asserted misrepresented state of facts comprised 
the defendants' representations that they would comply with 
their obligations as remarketing agents, as set forth in their 
agreements with the Commonwealth.  Specifically, the relator 
alleges that the defendants misrepresented that they would 
"determine the applicable rate of interest that, in [their] 
judgment, is the lowest rate that would permit the sale of the 
[VRDOs] bearing interest at the applicable interest rate at par 
plus accrued interest, if any, on and as of the applicable Rate 
Determination Date."15  See, e.g., Winkelman, 827 F.3d at 209 
 
 
15 The "Rate Determination Date" is the date that the 
interest rate is reset. 
15 
 
(purported misrepresented state of facts comprised defendants' 
asserted compliance with requirement in Federal regulation that 
pharmacies charge generic drug prices equal to lowest prices 
charged to customers when in fact charged price was higher); 
Ondis, 587 F.3d at 52, 54 (asserted misrepresentation was 
statements in city's Federal grant applications that it would 
promote development of public housing when it planned to 
discourage such development). 
 
The defendants' representations that they would comply with 
the obligations in their agreements with the VRDO issuers are 
set forth in several publicly available sources, including 
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB)16 rules that address 
remarketing agents' duties to VRDO issuers; Securities Industry 
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)17 model disclosures; and 
the remarketing agreements, including remarketing circulars and 
 
 
16 The MSRB is "a Congressionally-chartered, self-regulatory 
organization governed by a [twenty-one]-member board of 
directors that has a majority of public members, in addition to 
representatives of regulated entities.  The MSRB is subject to 
oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)." 
 
 
17 The SIFMA model disclosures set forth the disclosures 
that SIFMA advises remarketing agents to make to VRDO issuers in 
order to comply with the obligation to deal fairly and honestly 
with issuers under MSRB Rule G-17.  In relevant part, the model 
disclosures provide that a remarketing agent is "required to set 
the interest rate at the rate necessary, in its judgment, as the 
lowest rate that permits the sale of the VRDOs at [one hundred 
percent] of their principal amount (par) on the interest reset 
date." 
16 
 
official statements, reached between the defendants and the 
Commonwealth.  See Poteet, 619 F.3d at 110, citing United States 
ex rel. Maxwell v. Kerr–McGee Oil & Gas Corp., 540 F.3d 1180, 
1185 (10th Cir. 2008) (disclosure "is 'public' if it is 
generally available to the public").  These sources disclose 
that the defendants undertook (purportedly falsely) to comply 
with their obligations to obtain the lowest possible interest 
rates that would have permitted a sale on the market on a given 
rate determination date.  Thus, the defendants have shown a 
prior public disclosure of the misrepresented state of facts 
alleged in the complaint. 
 
B.  True state of facts.  Accordingly, we turn to whether 
the second element of fraud was disclosed, namely, whether there 
was a public disclosure of the "true state of facts so that the 
listener or reader may infer fraud."  See Poteet, 619 F.3d 
at 110.  The truth, according to the complaint, was that the 
defendants did not obtain the lowest interest rates that would 
have permitted the sale of the VRDOs, and instead "engaged in a 
practice of setting their VRDO rates mechanically and 
collectively, without any consideration of the unique attributes 
of each particular bond."  See, e.g., Winkelman, 827 F.3d at 209 
(true state of affairs was that defendant was not in fact 
billing correctly); Ondis, 587 F.3d at 52, 54 (true state of 
affairs was city's plan to oppose public housing while obtaining 
17 
 
grants for its purported public housing projects on 
representation that it would promote public housing). 
 
The information reflecting this asserted truth was 
discernable through the published EMMA data18 available to the 
public via the Internet.  Indeed, the relator used the same data 
as that disclosed on the EMMA website to conclude that the 
defendants were not setting the lowest interest rates on the 
VRDOs because, his analysis showed, they were grouping unrelated 
bonds rather than setting the rate for each bond individually.  
See Winkleman, 827 F.3d at 209 ("Enough was revealed in 
the . . . disclosures to put the government on notice of the 
potential fraud without the aid of these relators").  Contrary 
to the relator's contention, neither the need to perform 
analysis on the publicly available information nor the benefit 
of his expertise renders the true state of affairs hidden.  See 
Poteet, 619 F.3d at 111 ("If the materials necessary to ground 
an inference of fraud are generally available to the 
public, . . . there is nothing to prevent the government from 
detecting it.  Concomitantly, the likelihood of parasitic qui 
tam actions in such circumstances is high, providing a reason 
for the public disclosure bar"); United States ex rel. Findley 
v. FPC–Boron Employees' Club, 105 F.3d 675, 688 (D.C. Cir.), 
 
 
18 EMMA is a free, open-access website that publishes 
information on all municipal bonds.  See note 6, supra. 
18 
 
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 865 (1997) (Findley), citing Springfield, 
14 F.3d at 655 ("[I]f a relator merely uses his or her unique 
expertise or training to conclude that the material elements 
already in the public domain constitute a false claim, then a 
qui tam action cannot proceed").  "[T]he only question is 
whether the material facts exposing the alleged fraud are 
already in the public domain, not whether they are difficult to 
recognize."  United States ex rel. Conrad vs. Abbott Lab., Inc., 
U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 02-11738-RWZ (D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2013), 
citing Ondis, 587 F.3d at 59-60.  Thus, it suffices that other 
members of the public, albeit with sufficient expertise and 
after having conducted some analysis, could have identified the 
true state of affairs by conducting the same data-crunching 
exercise as did the relator, using the data publicly available 
on the EMMA website.  See Findley, supra, citing Springfield, 
supra. 
 
ii.  Statutorily enumerated sources.  Having determined 
that there was a public disclosure of the essential elements of 
the fraud, we turn to consider the second prong of the public 
disclosure bar:  whether the prior disclosure "emanated from a 
source specified in the statute's public disclosure provision."  
Poteet, 619 F.3d at 109.  "By its plain terms, the public 
disclosure bar applies to some methods of public disclosure and 
not to others."  Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex 
19 
 
rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401, 414 (2011) (Schindler).  Specifically, 
we must decide whether the forum in which the public disclosure 
was made falls within any of three sources enumerated in the 
statute -- (1) "a Massachusetts criminal, civil or 
administrative hearing in which the [C]ommonwealth is a party"; 
(2) "a Massachusetts legislative, administrative, auditor's or 
inspector general's report, hearing, audit or investigation"; or 
(3) "the news media."  See G. L. c. 12, § 5G (c).  We turn to 
consider each of the critical elements of the public disclosure 
set forth under the first prong of the public disclosure bar 
test -- first, the misrepresented state of affairs and, second, 
the true state of the facts. 
 
A.  Source of public disclosure of misrepresented state of 
affairs.  According to the complaint, the first publicly 
disclosed element of the asserted fraud -- namely, the 
misrepresentation that the defendants would undertake to obtain 
the lowest interest rates that, in their judgment, would permit 
the sale of the VRDOs -- was disclosed in the governing 
remarketing agreements, including in the official statements.19  
 
 
19 As defined by the MSRB, an official statement is 
 
"[a] document prepared by or on behalf of the issuer of 
municipal securities in connection with a primary offering 
that discloses material information on the offering of such 
securities.  Official statements typically include 
information regarding the purposes of the issue, how the 
securities will be repaid, and the financial and economic 
20 
 
These official statements comprise Massachusetts "reports,"20 one 
of the statutorily enumerated sources. 
 
B.  Source of public disclosure of the true state of 
affairs.  The second publicly disclosed element of the fraud -- 
namely, the assertion that the defendants were not obtaining the 
lowest interest rate that would permit the sale of the VRDOs, 
and instead were remarketing the bonds en masse in a way that 
did not obtain the lowest rates -– was disclosed on the EMMA 
website.  The defendants argue that EMMA constitutes "news 
media," the third enumerated source in the MFCA.  The relator 
contends that because EMMA does not have editorial content, 
narrative, exposition, or analysis of the financial data it 
reports, it cannot constitute news media. 
 
characteristics of the issuer, conduit borrower or other 
obligated person with respect to the offered securities.  
Investors and market intermediaries may use this 
information to evaluate the credit quality of the 
securities and potential risks of the primary offering." 
 
See MSRB, Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms, http://msrb 
.org/Glossary/Definition/OFFICIAL-STATEMENT-_OS_.aspx. 
 
20 A report is "something that gives information."  
Schindler, 563 U.S. at 407 (responses to Freedom of Information 
Act requests are reports).  See Ondis, 587 F.3d at 56.  Each 
VRDO's official statement details the terms of the VRDO and 
enumerates the remarketing agents' obligations; thus, the 
official statements constitute something that gives information.  
Further, official statements are prepared on behalf of the 
issuer. 
21 
 
 
"A fundamental principle of statutory interpretation 'is 
that a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of 
the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the 
ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in 
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be 
effectuated."  Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of 
Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006), quoting Hanlon v. 
Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934).  See Sullivan v. Brookline, 
435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001).  If the meaning of the "statutory 
language is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ends."  
Commonwealth v. Garvey, 477 Mass. 59, 62 (2017). 
 
Where, as here, a statutory term is undefined, we look to 
its ordinary meaning.  See Ten Local Citizens Group v. New 
England Wind, LLC, 457 Mass. 222, 229 (2010).  See Schindler, 
563 U.S. at 407 (enumerated sources in FFCA take "ordinary 
meaning" of words).  In ordinary usage, "news" is defined as 
(1) "a report of a recent event; intelligence; information"; 
(2) "the presentation of a report on recent or new events in a 
newspaper or other periodical or on radio or television"; and 
(3) "such reports taken collectively; information reported."  
Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 1295 (2003).  
"Media" is defined as "[t]he means of communication, as radio 
22 
 
and television, newspapers, and magazines, that reach or 
influence people widely."  Id. at 1193.  Thus, the ordinary 
meaning of the words "news media" is quite broad and includes 
information shared through means of communication that reach or 
influence people widely.  See United States ex rel. Osheroff v. 
Humana, Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 813 (11th Cir. 2015) (Osheroff) 
(court determined that "news media" includes newspaper articles 
and advertisements of clinical services). 
Considering the public disclosure bar in the context of the 
statute as a whole confirms that "news media" is a broad 
category, albeit not unlimited.  See Schindler, 563 U.S. at 408 
("to determine the meaning of one word in the public disclosure 
bar, we [also] must consider the provision's 'entire text,' read 
as an 'integrated whole'" [citation omitted]).  On the one hand, 
unlike the other two sources of public disclosures in the MFCA, 
Massachusetts government reports and hearings, the term "news 
media" is not limited to Massachusetts-based knowledge.  On the 
other hand, construing "news media" as a broad catch-all would 
eviscerate the plain language of the public disclosure bar, 
which applies only to disclosures from three enumerated sources.  
See id. at 414. 
Because the breadth of the term "news media" –- in 
particular, whether it covers a publicly available website like 
EMMA -- is ambiguous based on the statutory language and the 
23 
 
statutory scheme as a whole, "we turn to the history of the 
statute" to assist us in discerning the Legislature's intent in 
using these words.  See Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 459 Mass. 422, 
433 (2011).  The history of the FFCA21 reflects decades of 
adjustments to the limitations on qui tam suits in "an effort to 
strike a balance between encouraging private persons to root out 
fraud and stifling parasitic lawsuits."  Schindler, 563 U.S. 
at 413, quoting Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 295 (2010).  The 
MFCA, originally enacted in 2000, largely has tracked the 
developments of the FFCA, including amendments in 2012 to follow 
the Federal amendments of 2010.  See St. 2000, c. 159, § 18, 
inserting G. L. c. 12, §§ 5A-5O (originating as 2000 House Doc. 
 
21 "As originally enacted in 1863, the [FFCA] placed no 
restriction on the sources from which a qui tam relator could 
acquire information on which to base a lawsuit."  Schindler, 563 
U.S. at 412.  See Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. 
v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 294–295 (2010); 
id. at 294, citing United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 
U.S. 537, 545-548 (1943) (upholding "relator's recovery even 
though he had discovered the fraud by reading a [F]ederal 
criminal indictment -- a quintessential 'parasitic' suit").  
Since then, Congress has revised the FFCA and the public 
disclosure ban several times, including most recently in 2009 
and 2010, to balance the two statutory purposes of encouraging 
the disclosure of fraud while at the same time discouraging 
parasitic suits.  See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009); Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1313, 
124 Stat. 184 (2010); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 3301, 124 Stat. 2079 
(2010). 
24 
 
No. 5100); St. 2012, c. 139, § 22-34, amending G. L. c. 12, 
§§ 5A-5C, 5F, 5G, 5I-5K, 5N.  See also Makalusky, Blowing the 
Whistle on the Need to Clarify and Correct the Massachusetts 
False Claims Act, 94 Mass. L. Rev. 41, 41 (2012).  These changes 
made the public disclosure bar at the same time both more and 
less exacting.  Thus, the MFCA, as with the FFCA, reflects the 
Legislature's efforts to balance the promotion of qui tam 
actions while also discouraging parasitic suits.  This 
legislative history further demonstrates the Legislature's 
intent that "news media" be given a broad but balanced 
construction.  See Hamilton, 459 Mass. at 433. 
 
Thus, "news media" is broad enough to encompass the many 
ways in which people in the modern world obtain financial news, 
including from publicly available websites on the Internet.  
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Repko vs. Guthrie Clinic, P.C., 
U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 3:04CV1556 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2011), aff'd, 
490 Fed. Appx. 502 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 2012) (online commercial 
financial software and Internet programs providing summaries or 
analysis of trends in market transactions were news media 
because "[t]hough they are not traditional news sources, they 
serve the same purpose as newspapers or radio broadcasts, to 
provide the general public with access to information").22 
 
22 Neither the plain meaning of "news media" nor the 
legislative history of the MFCA supports the relator's 
25 
 
 
As discussed, see note 6, supra, EMMA is the "official 
repository for information on all municipal bonds."  It provides 
updates to bond market information by means of the Internet.  It 
is publicly available and widely disseminated.  "The EMMA 
website was established to increase the transparency of the 
municipal securities market by providing free public access to 
municipal securities disclosures and data.  EMMA provides 
investors, [S]tate and local governments and other market 
participants with key information and tools to put that 
information into context."  EMMA, Overview, https://emma.msrb 
.org/AboutEmma/Overview [https://perma.cc/F78C-KQ8X].  In this 
respect, EMMA is much like traditional news sources that report 
market data and fall within the scope of the term.  See Poteet, 
619 F.3d at 110 (national newspaper falls within definition of 
 
contention that "news media" is limited to sources with 
editorial analysis.  Compare United States ex rel. Kraxberger v. 
Kansas City Power & Light Co., 756 F.3d, 1075, 1079-1080 (8th 
Cir. 2014) (Kraxberger) (publicly available website that 
disseminates information, even simply by reproducing it verbatim 
in transcript without commentary, was news media).  Moreover, 
contrary to the relator's argument, the niche nature of the 
municipal bond rates published on the EMMA website does not 
exclude it from the broad scope of the meaning of news media.  
See United States ex rel. Alcohol Found., Inc. v. Kalmanovitz 
Charitable Found., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 458, 463 (S.D.N.Y.), 
aff'd, 53 Fed. Appx. 153 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 
949 (2003) (that "the ordinary meaning of the statutory term 
'news media,' would encompass the publication of information in 
scholarly or scientific periodicals" is "[n]o different from 
newspaper reporters, [whose] scholarly and scientific authors 
also disseminate information to the public in a periodic 
manner"). 
26 
 
news media).  Accordingly, we conclude that the term "news 
media" in the public disclosure bar includes within its scope 
the EMMA website, which consists of publicly accessible 
financial data.23  See Osheroff, 776 F.3d at 813 ("Because the 
term 'news media' has a broad sweep, we conclude that the 
newspaper advertisements and the clinics' publicly available 
websites, which are intended to disseminate information about 
the clinics' programs, qualify as news media for purposes of the 
public disclosure provision").24 
 
23 We note that, in parallel litigation, the Superior Court 
of California determined that EMMA was not news media for 
purposes of the public disclosure bar under the California false 
claims act.  See Edelweiss Fund, Cal. Super. Ct., No. CGC-14-
540777, supra at 8-9, citing State ex rel. Bartlett v. Miller, 
243 Cal. App. 4th 1398, 1414 (2016); note 10, supra.  There, 
unlike here, the court was bound by State appellate precedent 
that summarily held, without reference to the plain meaning of 
the words "news media," the statutory scheme as a whole, or the 
legislative history, that the Securities and Exchange Commission 
online database Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and 
Retrieval (EDGAR) was not news media; the Superior Court then 
analogized EMMA to the EDGAR database.  See Edelweiss Fund, Cal. 
Super. Ct., No. CGC-14-540777, supra at 7-9. 
 
24 We need not address the question whether all public 
websites are encompassed within the meaning of "news media."  
See Osheroff, 776 F.3d at 813 (publicly available websites 
intended to disseminate information qualify as "news media" for 
purposes of public disclosure); Kraxberger, 756 F.3d at 1078–
1079 (transcript that was publicly available on website was 
considered disclosed through news media); United States ex rel. 
Green v. Service Contract Educ. & Training Trust Fund, 843 F. 
Supp. 2d 20, 32 (D.D.C. 2012) (collecting cases; "courts that 
have considered the issue have construed the term to include 
readily accessible websites").  Compare United States ex rel. 
Hong v. Newport Sensors, Inc., 728 Fed. Appx. 660, 662-663 (9th 
Cir. 2018) (declining to hold that most public websites 
27 
 
 
iii.  Disclosure of substantially the same allegations or 
transactions.  The third prong of the public disclosure inquiry 
is whether the public disclosure includes "substantially the 
same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or 
claim."  See G. L. c. 12, § 5G (c).25  "[W]e must compare the 
substance of the prior disclosures with the substance of the 
relator's complaint."  Poteet, 619 F.3d at 114.  "The operative 
question is whether the public disclosures were sufficient to 
set the government 'on the trail of the alleged fraud without 
 
generally fall within category of news media); United States ex 
rel. Integra Med Analytics LLC vs. Providence Health & Servs., 
U.S. Dist. Ct., CV 17-1694 PSG (SSx) (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2019) 
("applying the news media provision to anything ever published 
publicly on the [I]nternet is contrary to the ordinary meaning 
of the term 'news media' and has the potential to eviscerate the 
balance Congress struck between encouraging private parties to 
bring forth evidence of fraud and preventing parasitic suits"). 
 
 
25 The 2010 and 2012 amendments to the FFCA and the MFCA, 
respectively, amended the public disclosure bar from precluding 
claims "based upon" public disclosure to banning those 
"substantially the same" as the assertions already publicly 
disclosed.  This change codified then-existing Federal 
jurisprudence that interpreted "based upon" to mean 
"substantially the same."  See Bellevue v. Universal Health 
Servs. of Hartgrove, Inc., 867 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2017), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1284 (2018) (amendment "expressly 
incorporates the 'substantially similar' standard in accordance 
with the interpretation of this circuit and most other 
circuits").  Therefore, in considering whether the claims at 
issue are substantially the same, we rely on cases both before 
and after these amendments.  See Reed, 923 F.3d at 743-744 ("the 
2010 amendment confirms the vitality of our pre-2010 standard"); 
United States ex rel. Mateski v. Raytheon Co., 816 F.3d 565, 569 
n.7 (9th Cir. 2016) ("our analysis of the issue of substantial 
similarity would be the same under either version [of the 
provision establishing the public disclosure bar]"). 
28 
 
[the relator's] assistance.'"  Reed, 923 F.3d at 744, quoting 
United States ex rel. Fine v. Sandia Corp., 70 F.3d 568, 571 
(10th Cir. 1995).  "'Substantially the same' . . . connotes a 
standard that requires only the essentials of the relator's 
allegations to be identical to or of an identical type as those 
disclosed publicly."  Reed, supra at 748 n.12.  See United 
States ex rel. Boothe v. Sun Healthcare Group, Inc., 496 F.3d 
1169, 1174 (10th Cir. 2007) ("complete identity of allegations" 
is unnecessary; it is enough for "essence" of relator's 
allegations to be "'derived from' a prior public disclosure").  
A "complaint that targets a scheme previously revealed through 
public disclosures is barred even if it offers greater detail 
about the underlying conduct."  Winkelman, 827 F.3d at 210, 
citing Poteet, 619 F.3d at 115. 
 
As discussed, the complaint at issue here relies upon the 
defendants' obligations, disclosed in the official statements, 
and the interest rates, which are disclosed on EMMA, and which 
the relator analyzed to reveal the asserted failure of the 
defendants to meet their obligation individually to set interest 
rates for each VRDO.  The relator contends that these are not 
substantially the same as his allegations because, he asserts, 
the rates were set through a mechanical, algorithmic approach 
that the relator has coined "robo-resetting."  Yet defining 
"how" the rates were set does not change the essential shared 
29 
 
substance between the public disclosures and the complaint.  The 
crux of the alleged fraud is the failure individually to set 
rates and instead setting rates by grouping disparate VRDOs, a 
conclusion deciphered and decipherable from the public 
disclosures of the rates themselves.  See Repko, U.S. Dist. Ct., 
No. 3:04CV1556 (M.D. Pa.), supra ("though not identical to [the] 
relator's complaint, the information publicly disclosed is 
substantially similar to the complaint").  In sum, the publicly 
disclosed information was sufficient to put the Commonwealth "on 
the trail of the alleged fraud" without the relator's 
assistance.  See Reed, 923 F.3d at 744, citing Fine, 70 F.3d at 
571. 
 
d.  Original source exception.  Because the public 
disclosure bar is applicable in this case, the complaint must be 
dismissed unless the relator was an "original source."  See 
Poteet, 619 F.3d at 109-110; Springfield, 14 F.3d at 656.  
General Laws c. 12, § 5A, defines two types of relators who may 
qualify as original sources: 
"an individual who:  (1) prior to a public disclosure under 
paragraph (3) of [§] 5G, has voluntarily disclosed to the 
[C]ommonwealth or any political subdivision thereof the 
information on which allegations or transactions in a claim 
are based; or (2) has knowledge that is independent of and 
materially adds to the publicly-disclosed allegations or 
transactions, and who has voluntarily provided the 
30 
 
information to the [C]ommonwealth or any political 
subdivision thereof before filing a false claims actions."26 
 
The relator argues that he qualifies as the second type of 
original source because, he contends, he has knowledge that both 
is "independent of" and "materially adds" to the publicly 
disclosed allegations or transactions. 
 
The independent source exception is a "narrow category."  
See Winkelman, 827 F.3d at 211.  The relator contends that his 
knowledge is "independent of" EMMA because the complaint does 
not allege that he relied on that website to obtain the data 
underlying his analysis; it suffices to defeat the defendants' 
motion, he argues, that the complaint alleges that his forensic 
analysis also used nonpublic, proprietary sources 
notwithstanding that the same data were available from EMMA.  
 
 
26 Prior to the 2012 amendments to the MFCA, an original 
source was required to have direct and independent knowledge.  
See G. L. c. 12, § 5A, inserted by St. 2000, c. 159, § 18 
(original source was defined "as individual who has direct and 
independent knowledge of the information on which the 
allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the 
information to the attorney general, without public disclosure, 
before filing an action").  Thereafter, original sources need 
not have direct knowledge, but, rather, must have knowledge that 
"is independent of and materially adds to the publicly-disclosed 
allegations or transactions."  See G. L. c. 12, § 5A.  The 
change makes it more feasible for relators who are not insiders 
to bring suit.  See United States ex rel. Hagerty v. Cyberonics 
Inc., 95 F. Supp. 3d 240, 261-262 (D. Mass. 2015), aff'd, 844 
F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2016); Makalusky, Blowing the Whistle on the 
Need to Clarify and Correct the Massachusetts False Claims Act, 
94 Mass. L. Rev. 41, 59 (2012). 
31 
 
The relator cites no authority for the proposition that a 
relator may take advantage of the original source exception by 
using a nonpublic source to access the exact same data readily 
available from public sources.  To the contrary, "when a 
relator's qui tam action is based solely on material elements 
already in the public domain, that relator is not an original 
source."  Kennard v. Comstock Resources, Inc., 363 F.3d 1039, 
1045 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1139 (2005).  See 
United States ex rel. Fried v. West Indep. Sch. Dist., 527 F.3d 
439, 443 (5th Cir. 2008) (Fried) (relator did not satisfy 
independent knowledge requirement despite his independent 
"sleuthing" that confirmed precise information already publicly 
disclosed through congressional investigation).  Contrast United 
States ex rel. Hagerty v. Cyberonics Inc., 95 F. Supp. 3d 240, 
260 (D. Mass. 2015), aff'd, 844 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2016) (relator 
satisfied independent knowledge requirement where he was source 
of information, later publicized in government report, regarding 
defendants' fraudulent sales practices).  Nothing in the 
legislative history suggests a legislative intent to expand the 
scope of the original source exception as the relator suggests.  
Indeed, the history of the public disclosure bar, which exhibits 
a careful balance between encouraging individuals with 
previously unknown information to come forward and discouraging 
parasitic suits that add little to the information already in 
32 
 
the public domain, see note 21, supra, supports the opposite 
conclusion. 
The EMMA website publicly reported the same data upon which 
the relator relied, and the relator's analysis depended entirely 
on the interest rate data, which were available on EMMA.  Thus, 
the relator's analysis cannot be said to be "independent of" the 
publicly disclosed transaction discussed supra.27  See Ondis, 587 
F.3d at 59 ("Virtually by definition, a relator whose knowledge 
is dependent upon the public disclosure of allegedly fraudulent 
transactions cannot be said to have independent knowledge of the 
fraud").  Although the relator asserts that he spent 
considerable time analyzing the publicly available data to 
confirm his suspicions that the defendants were committing 
fraud, and that his endeavor was aided by his expertise in the 
field, this does not suffice to render his knowledge independent 
 
27 The relator also argues that his knowledge was 
independent because it was based on "interviews with witnesses 
and industry participants."  In his complaint, however, the 
relator alleges that he conducted one interview with a single 
employee of one of the defendants; the motion judge correctly 
concluded that this interview was irrelevant to the relator's 
theory of fraud, as it did not concern the defendants' conduct 
as remarketing agents.  On appeal, the relator asserts that he 
conducted "additional private interviews," but as these 
interviews are not mentioned in the complaint (and also are not 
in the record before us), they do not constitute independent 
knowledge. 
 
33 
 
of the publicly disclosed transactions.28  See id. at 59-60, 
citing Fried, 527 F.3d at 443 ("Expertise that enables a relator 
to understand the significance of publicly disclosed 
information, without more, is insufficient to qualify him [or 
her] as an original source"); United States ex rel. Doghramji 
vs. Community Health Sys., Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., Nos. 3:11 C 
442, 3:14 C 2160, 3:15 C 110, 3:14 C 2195 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 1, 
2020) (performing "unique statistical analysis," even if "proven 
helpful," cannot survive public disclosure bar).29 
The relator also argues that he materially added to the 
public disclosures because his investigation revealed the robo-
resetting scheme -– that is, a mechanical, algorithmic approach 
to resetting rates.  A relator "materially adds" to the public 
disclosure when his knowledge "is sufficiently important to 
influence the behavior of the recipient."  Winkelman, 827 F.3d 
at 211.  See United States ex rel. Advocates for Basic Legal 
Equality, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 816 F.3d 428, 431 (6th Cir. 
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2180 (2017) ("Materiality in 
 
28 The relator argues that the motion judge erred in relying 
on cases decided before the amendment to the public disclosure 
bar in 2010, see note 25, supra.  Because the "independent" 
requirement was retained, however, preamendment cases analyzing 
this prong remain instructive. 
 
29 The relator's assertions regarding collusion, which are 
based on the same analysis, similarly fail to qualify as 
"independent of" the publicly disclosed transactions.  See 
Ondis, 587 F.3d at 59. 
34 
 
this setting requires the claimant to show it had information 
'[o]f such a nature that knowledge of the item would affect a 
person's decision-making,' is 'significant,' or is 'essential'" 
[citation omitted]).30 
 
30 The relator points to the arguably broader standard for 
materiality set forth in United States ex rel. Moore & Co. v. 
Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(Moore), where the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit applied the pleading requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) 
to hold that a relator's information "materially adds" when it 
"adds in a significant way to the essential factual background:  
'the who, what, when, where and how of the events at issue'" 
(citation omitted).  Like the United States Courts of Appeals 
for the Sixth and Tenth Circuits, we decline to adopt this 
standard. 
 
Instead, we agree with the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit that whether a relator's knowledge 
"materially adds" to the publicly disclosed information depends 
on "whether a piece of information is sufficiently important to 
influence the behavior of the recipient."  Winkelman, 827 F.3d 
at 211, citing Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex 
rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2004 (2016).  See United States 
v. Medtronic, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 3d 831, 851 (E.D. Pa. 2018) 
(contrasting Moore's "relatively broad definition of 
materiality" with Winkelman's "narrower definition").  See also 
United States ex rel. Maur v. Hage-Korban, 981 F.3d 516, 528 
(6th Cir. 2020) (citing Winkelman standard); Reed, 923 F.3d 
at 758-759 (expressing concern that Moore's broader standard 
could "swallow the public disclosure bar" and instead following 
principles set forth in Winkelman).  The Winkelman standard is 
tied to the plain and ordinary meaning of the term "materially 
adds."  Winkelman, supra.  See Ten Local Citizens Group v. New 
England Wind, LLC, 457 Mass. 222, 229 (2010).  We do not 
determine that details regarding the who, what, when, where, and 
how of the events at issue required by rule 9(b) would never 
suffice such that a relator "materially added" to the public 
disclosure, see Reed, supra at 758 (determination depended on 
facts and circumstances of particular case), but the fact that a 
complaint meets the particularized pleading requirements for 
fraud, alone, is unlikely to do so. 
35 
 
Here, the explanation that the defendants used "robo-
resetting" in order to avoid their obligations to set the 
interest rates for each VRDO individually was not material in 
the sense required by the MFCA; the salient information was that 
the defendants promised they would reset rates individually and 
failed to do so.  How the defendants conducted the fraud -- 
purportedly in order to discourage holders of VRDOs from selling 
those bonds -- here through what the relator coins "robo-
resetting," is a detail that would not influence the behavior of 
a recipient who already was armed with the knowledge of the 
salient elements of the fraud.31  See, e.g., Osheroff, 776 F.3d 
at 815 (addition of details on type of free services clinics 
were providing, i.e., manner in which fraud was committed, did 
not materially add to public information).  See also Reed, 923 
F.3d at 758 (whether "the . . . [question] how [the fraud was 
 
 
31 Because we follow the standard set forth in Winkelman, 
827 F.3d at 208-209, 211, we depart from the Illinois Circuit 
Court, which, in parallel litigation involving the same parties 
as in this case, determined that it could not "conclude that the 
'original source' exception does not apply because nothing in 
the available raw data indicate fraudulent conduct by the 
defendants as alleged."  See note 10, supra.  The court focused 
on the relator's allegation concerning the defendants' use of an 
"algorithmic mechanical system" -- the how -- which it stated 
was not disclosed by the raw data.  Therefore, the court 
concluded, the relator had knowledge that was independent of, 
and materially added to, the publicly disclosed information.  
Although the court did not cite Moore, its reasoning is 
consistent with that standard, by contrast to the narrower 
Winkelman standard that we adopt here. 
36 
 
perpetrated] actually should be considered sufficiently 
significant or important to affect the government's actions 
regarding the fraudulent scheme" depends on facts and 
circumstances of case).32 
While the manner in which a defendant accomplished a 
particular fraud might aid the Commonwealth in its efforts to 
avert similar fraudulent schemes in the future, or might be 
material in some other circumstances, the allegation that the 
defendants used a mechanical, algorithmic mechanism here does 
nothing to bring to the Commonwealth's attention the existence 
of the purported fraud, namely, the defendants' asserted failure 
to set interest rates to the lowest rates the market would bear.  
Thus, the relator does not qualify as an "original source" for 
purposes of the MFCA's exception to the public disclosure bar. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
32 The relator's assertion of collusion also did not 
materially add to the public discourse because it lacked detail 
beyond his assertion that the defendants must have colluded in 
order for the interest rates to have changed as they did.  The 
only addition beyond this deduction from the data -- the single 
interview -- was not relevant to the purported fraud, see note 
27, supra, and, in the relator's words, merely "confirmed" the 
patterns he already had discerned from the data.  Compare Reed, 
587 F.3d at 761-762 (relator materially added to public 
disclosure on issue of scienter where her "complaint offer[ed] 
pages of details describing how [company's] managers knowingly 
schemed to defraud the government by covering up systemic 
violations").