Title: Lillard v. Southern Railway Company
Citation: 330 S.W.2d 335
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: December 11, 1959

330 S.W.2d 335 (1959) William M. LILLARD v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY. Supreme Court of Tennessee. December 11, 1959. C.T. Ziegler, Athens, Virgil F. Carmichael, Cleveland, for appellant. Frank N. Bratton, Athens, for appellee. PREWITT, Justice. The defendant below, Lillard, filed suit for damages to real property in Circuit Court for McMinn County, against defendant, Southern Railway Company, seeking damages for the taking of certain real estate near the tracks of the Railway Company. The Circuit Judge sustained the demurrer to the declaration and this appeal resulted. The question before us is did the deed from Lewis Ross to Hiwassee Railroad Company, convey an easement or right-of-way therein described or did the instrument convey a fee simple title? The effect of the ruling of the Circuit Judge is that the instrument only conveyed an easement in the right of way therein described. The instrument in question reads as follows: We are of the opinion that the instrument above conveys an easement only and does not purport to convey the fee. It is quite evident that the grantor undertook to convey a right of way or so much of the footage that was necessary for railroad purposes. The plaintiff below relies upon Southern Railway Co. v. Forrest, 13 Tenn. App. 547; Burnett v. Nashville &amp; Chattanooga Railroad Co., 36 Tenn. 528, and Nashville, Chattanooga &amp; St. Louis Railroad v. Bell, 162 Tenn. 661, 39 S.W.2d 1026. In those cases the conveyances were made to the Railway Company for the land itself. In 17 Am.Jur. 923, Section 2, an easement is defined: In 44 Amer.Jur. page 316, Section 102 it is said: The Charter of Incorporation of Hiwassee Railroad Company provided that the Hiwassee Railroad Company was granted the power to acquire by purchase or Eminent Domain a right of way two hundred feet in width for the construction and operation of a railroad, or any less breadth that the directors might accept as being necessary for such right of way. In McLemore v. Charleston &amp; Memphis Railroad Co., 111 Tenn. 639, 69 S.W. 338, 342, it was said: See also Southern Railway Company v. Vann, 142 Tenn. 76, 216 S.W. 727. In the case at Bar no attempt was made in the granting clause to convey the land but only conveyed the right of way. In the cases relied upon by the plaintiff below the deed was made to the land and not to the right of way. This being our view of the case we find no error in the judgment of the lower court dismissing the suit and it is affirmed.