Title: Nelson v. Texarkana Historical Society and Museum
Citation: 516 S.W.2d 882
Docket Number: 74-182
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: December 16, 1974

516 S.W.2d 882 (1974) Gayle Ramage NELSON and William Robert Ramage, Appellants, v. TEXARKANA HISTORICAL SOCIETY AND MUSEUM et al., Appellees. No. 74-182. Supreme Court of Arkansas. December 16, 1974. Rehearing Denied January 20, 1975. Atchley, Russell, Waldrop &amp; Hlavinka by Stephen Oden, Texarkana, for appellants. Autrey &amp; Weisenberger by LeRoy Autrey, Texarkana, for appellees. BROWN, Justice. This is a will contest case. The appellants are Gayle Ramage Nelson and William Robert Ramage, niece and nephew, and sole heirs at law of the testatrix, Maye Elizabeth Ramage Davis; the appellees are Texarkana Historical Society and Museum and State First National Bank of Texarkana, the special administrator. The probate court admitted to probate an instrument purporting to be the will of Maye Elizabeth Ramage Davis, a widow 78 years of age. The holographic instrument was not signed; the only place in the purported will where her name appeared was in the body thereof. Appellants contend that decedent's name appearing in the body of the instrument was not written with the intent of authenticating or executing such instrument and therefore it was error to admit it to probate. Appellees contend the signature in the body of the will satisfied the requirements for validity, and (2) the court correctly considered extrinsic evidence to show decedent's testamentary intent. The instrument admitted to probate reads as follows: I am in my sane mind today. Witness Nell Phillips, an antique dealer, testified as to her business dealings and many personal visits with the testatrix; that on December 18, 1973 the testatrix produced the will and asked Mrs. Phillips to witness it; and that she recognized the handwriting as that of the testatrix. Another antique dealer, Jack Cunningham, testified he saw the testatrix frequently; that he could identify the instrument as having been written in her handwriting; and that he discussed with testatrix the desirability of her leaving her valuable collection of antiques to the museum. Cora Cook Thomas testified she and the testatrix had been good friends since high school days; that she could identify the will as being in testatrix's handwriting; that testatrix had discussed with the witness the subject of a will and she told testatrix to have two witnesses. Catheline Cunningham, another friend of many years standing, testified she was aware that testatrix intended to leave her antiques to the museum; and that the will was entirely in the handwriting of Maye Elizabeth Ramage Davis. Appellant Gayle Ramage Nelson, niece and close neighbor of testatrix, testified that she had not been in the latter's home for several years, conceding that she and testatrix were not very close, in fact indicated there was some feeling of animosity. Elnora Edwards, who is mentioned in the will, cooked breakfast for the testatrix during the last eighteen months of the latter's life; she said she was made aware that she would be remembered in the will; and that on the morning of December 20, testatrix said she had made her will and it was on top of the piano along with a list of pallbearers. Samantha Washington said she had worked for Mrs. Davis for some fifteen years. She said she witnessed the will on December 18; that Mrs. Phillips came in and witnessed it; and that testatrix told Ms. Washington to put the will on top of the piano. Under the provisions of our probate code of 1949, the signature of a testator need not be written at the end of the will. "Where the entire body of the will and the signature thereto shall be written in the proper handwriting of the testator, such will may be established by the evidence of at least three credible disinterested witnesses to the handwriting and signature of the testator, notwithstanding there may be no attesting witnesses to such will." Ark.Stat.Ann. § 60-404 (Repl.1971). Smith v. MacDonald, 252 Ark. 931, 481 S.W.2d 741 (1972). If the testator's name is written in or upon some part of the will other than at the end thereof, to be a valid signature it must be shown that the testator wrote his name where he did with the intention of authenticating or executing the instrument as his will. 2 Bowd-Parker: Page on Wills, § 20.9; Estate of Kinney, 16 Cal. 2d 50, 104 P.2d 782 (1940). Thus our problem is to determine whether the name Maye Elizabeth Ramage Davis was placed in the body of the will with the intent that *884 it constitute a signature in addition to the intention of creating a memorial. In the second paragraph of the will we find the only mention of testatrix's name: "And I am leaving all my antiques ... in memory of my mother and father, W. R. Ramage and brother Robert Ramage and Maye Elizabeth Ramage Davis." Appellees rely heavily on our case of Smith v. MacDonald, supra. But the facts in that case are far different from the facts in the case at bar. The first line in that will describes the instrument as the "Will of Julian Leland Rutherford." The first paragraph recites: "I, Julian Leland Rutherford ... do hereby make, publish and declare this to be my last will and testament." The last line of the instrument then recites: "Witness my hand and seal this 11 day of July, 1970." We have abstracted at some length the testimony of the witnesses. The most that evidence shows is that the instrument was in the handwriting of the testatrix and that she considered it as her will. It would be sheer speculation to assume that those circumstances indicated that she intended her name in the body of the will to be her signature thereto. Cited at length by appellees is the California case of In re Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal. 2d 570, 248 P.2d 21 (1952). In that case the single location of the name of the deceased was in the body of the will; in disposing of some bonds the testatrix there referred to "Bonds belonging solely to Helene I. Bloch." The court held that reference to constitute a signature. We discussed Bloch in our case of Smith v. MacDonald. We did not adopt the decision but merely referred to it as a "very interesting case". In fact we quoted with apparent approval from the dissenting opinion in that case of Justice Traynor: The legislature had a sound basis for requiring that a holographic will be signed by the testator, because that signature is the best and most reliable indication that the signer means for the instrument to be his will. We think, and so hold, that to adopt the majority rule in Bloch would amount to writing the word "signature" out of the statute. Reversed and remanded. FOGLEMAN, J., dissents. FOGLEMAN, Justice (dissenting). The majority opinion seems to be hinged, at least in part, upon Justice Traynor's dissent in In re Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal. 2d 570, 248 P.2d 21 (1952). I respectfully submit that we did not cite this dissent with approval in Smith v. MacDonald, 252 Ark. 931, 481 S.W.2d 741. We commented that Bloch was an interesting case, and that the dissenting opinion was of value in pointing out distinctions. We were discussing the California rule as set out in In re Manchester's Estate, 174 Cal. 417, 163 P. 358 (1917), which we had been *885 urged to adopt by the unsuccessful appellant. The Manchester rule was quoted as follows: From the discussion of these cases in the opinion in Smith v. MacDonald, supra, it is clear that California does not permit extrinsic evidence to show surrounding circumstances as an aid to the court in determining whether a testator who wrote his name in the body of a will intended to do so as a signature. The concluding language in Smith v. MacDonald, supra, clearly shows that we did not adopt either the majority or dissenting opinion in Bloch and that we rejected in toto the California rule we were being urged to adopt. That language is: This clearly put us in accord with the weight of authority, but it seems to me that the majority is now willing to adopt the California rule. I concede that under the California rule the Davis will should not have been admitted to probate, even though the Bloch majority would have required that it be. I submit also that the Bloch will would have been subject to probate if extrinsic evidence such as that presented here had been admitted. I would not recede from the rule obviously adopted by us in the rather recent case above cited and would examine this instrument in the light of the prevailing circumstances. First, we must consider the findings and conclusions of the probate court. Those significant are: Unless appellees failed to meet their burden of proof or these findings are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, we should affirm the judgment. What then were the surrounding circumstances shown by the extrinsic evidence? The entire instrument was written in the handwriting of Mrs. Davis. Its entire content is testamentary in nature. It is a complete testamentary document. It contains at the end the words "Signed and witnessed by", not the words "signed by and witnessed by". The testamentary provisions are all in the first person. Mrs. Davis was the only surviving child of the person named by her in the instrument as her father. Her brother was Robert Ramage and he was named by her as such in the document. She had a dog named Petite. She had a friend named Waneeta Corzine, an employee of a veterinarian, and this friend frequently bathed and brushed the dog for her. She had indicated her total dependence upon Ms. Corzine for this care of the pet. Under this instrument this friend would not only get the dog, but a fund for the maintenance of this pet. Mrs. Davis recorded in the written instrument the telephone numbers by which Ms. Corzine could be reached. When she was lonely, she called this friend to talk about dogs. Mrs. Davis was very interested and knowledgeable about antiques and would not dispose of any she owned unless she had run out of money. On the day the instrument was dated, she told Nell Phillips that she had made her will and asked Mrs. Phillips to sign it as a witness. She related to Mrs. Phillips that she was ill and her state of health was getting worse and that she wanted to make the will before she died or went to the hospital. Mrs. Phillips, an antique dealer, had previously suggested that Mrs. Davis leave her property to the Texarkana Museum. Approximately three weeks prior to the date of the instrument, Mrs. Davis, by telephone, discussed making a will with Jack Cunningham, another antique dealer. He also suggested that she leave her property to the Texarkana Museum, rather than her church. Cora Cook Thomas, a lawyer's daughter and longtime friend, had written her own will and had advised Mrs. Davis that it was in longhand. She also told Mrs. Davis what she should say in a will and to have two witnesses. On December 20, when Leola (Elnora) Edwards came to prepare breakfast, Mrs. Davis said she had made out her will and Mrs. Phillips and Samantha Washington, another servant, had signed it. Both of these servants were legatees under the will. This instrument, a list of pallbearers, and a statement about the writing of an obituary were kept together in the place where Mrs. Davis specifically directed that the testamentary document be placed and left. Mrs. Davis was estranged from appellants, her only heirs at law, and had specifically stated that she did not want to leave her property to them because they had not done anything for her. The admitted facts show there was considerable justification for this feeling. This was not an unnatural will, but a very natural one. Evidence of surrounding circumstances will inevitably be circumstantial as to the *887 ultimate facts in a case such as this. The testimony about the circumstances in this case are undisputed. They lead to the logical inference that Mrs. Davis did treat her name in the body of the instrument as her signature to her will. If she had not so intended, it is highly unlikely that she would have written her full name instead of using the simple pronoun "me" or the word "myself". Under all the circumstances, it seems to me that the trial court drew the only logical inference. I would affirm the judgment.