Title: Abel v. Johnson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC20436
State: Connecticut
Issuer: Connecticut Supreme Court
Date: December 14, 2021

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MICHAEL ABEL ET AL. v. CELESTE M. JOHNSON
(SC 20436)
Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Kahn and Ecker, Js.*
Syllabus
The plaintiff property owners sought to enjoin the defendant, who owned
abutting property on which she operated a landscaping business, from
violating a restrictive covenant that limited the use of the defendant’s
property to residential purposes only. The restrictive covenant was
contained in a 1956 deed by which the original grantors conveyed a
tract of real property to a housing developer, E Co. The 1956 deed,
which was recorded in the land records of the city in which the property
is located, provided that the covenants contained therein ‘‘shall run with
the land . . . be binding upon the grantee, its successors and assigns,’’
and inure to the benefit of original grantors’ ‘‘remaining land . . . lying
westerly of the premises’’ conveyed. In 1961, E Co. recorded in the land
records a declaration of restrictions, which included prohibitions against
the keeping of poultry and the parking of commercial vehicles outside.
E Co. thereafter subdivided the property and conveyed two of the lots
to the parties’ predecessors in title. The deeds in the parties’ chains of
title contained language providing that the lots were being conveyed
‘‘subject to’’ the restrictive covenants contained in the 1956 deed and
the declaration. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had violated
those restrictive covenants by operating a landscaping business and
maintaining chickens on her property. At trial, the deeds to twenty-four
homes located in the subdivision were admitted into evidence. The
deeds to all of the homes located on the parties’ street contained the
same ‘‘subject to’’ language, and the remaining deeds in evidence all
contained residential use restrictions, although two of them lacked the
same ‘‘subject to’’ language. Relying on this evidence, the trial court
concluded that the parties’ properties were part of a common develop-
ment scheme, which gave the plaintiffs standing to enforce the deed
restrictions against the defendant. The trial court rendered judgment
for the plaintiffs and ordered the defendant to cease and desist from
violating the restrictive covenants, and the defendant appealed to the
Appellate Court. Observing that the restrictive covenants set forth in
the 1956 deed were intended to inure to the benefit of the original
grantors’ remaining, ‘‘westerly’’ land and that there was no language
therein indicating that the covenants were meant to benefit the original
or subsequent grantees of the 1956 deed, such as the plaintiffs, the
Appellate Court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to enforce
the residential use covenant because there was no allegation that the
plaintiffs were the original grantors or their successors in interest.
Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s judgment to
the extent that the trial court enforced the residential use restrictive
covenant contained in the 1956 deed and vacated that court’s orders of
injunctive relief related to that covenant. On the granting of certification,
the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held that, because the language
in the E Co. deeds conveying the properties to the parties and their
predecessors in title ‘‘subject to’’ the original grantors’ 1956 deed created
a general development scheme, the Appellate Court incorrectly con-
cluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to enforce the residential use
restriction, and, accordingly, this court reversed in part the judgment
of the Appellate Court and remanded the case with direction to affirm
the judgment of the trial court enforcing the restrictive covenant: when
a common grantor, under a general development scheme, divides its
property into lots that are to be sold and the deeds thereto contain
substantially uniform restrictions, any grantee may enforce the restric-
tions against any other grantee, and whether a common grantor intended
to establish a uniform plan of development is determined by the language
of the relevant conveyance instruments in light of the surrounding cir-
cumstances; in the present case, the language of the deeds by which E
Co. subdivided and conveyed its property, as well as the surrounding
circumstances, strongly supported the conclusion that E Co. intended
to establish a general plan of development limited to residential use
through the use of the ‘‘subject to’’ language, as those deeds effectuated
a new subdivision, a map of which was contemporaneously recorded
in the land records of the city in which the property was located and
referenced in the deeds, and the declaration expressly indicated that it
was intended to ‘‘protect property values’’ and restricted the use and
keeping of commercial vehicles, suggesting that E Co. had intended to
eliminate commercial activity on the property; moreover, those restric-
tions were all recorded in the land records of the city in which the
property was located, they were available for any searcher to find, and
all of the deeds admitted into evidence contained either the same ‘‘sub-
ject to’’ language or another residential use restriction; furthermore,
contrary to the conclusion of the Appellate Court, the fact that the 1956
deed, by its express terms, inured to the benefit of the original grantors’
land ‘‘lying westerly’’ to the premises they conveyed did not render the
residential use restriction unenforceable by subsequent grantees of E
Co., such as the plaintiffs, because, even though there was no evidence
that the original grantors desired to create a general development
scheme, this court was aware of no authority that stood for the proposi-
tion that a particular restriction cannot be a grantor retained restriction
enforceable by one party, and part of a common scheme of development
enforceable as a matter of equity by another.
Argued March 29—officially released August 20, 2021**
Procedural History
Action for, inter alia, injunctive relief barring the
defendant from violating restrictive covenants on cer-
tain of the defendant’s real property, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Nor-
walk and tried to the court, Hon. Edward R. Karazin,
Jr., judge trial referee, who, exercising the powers of
the Superior Court, rendered judgment for the plaintiffs,
from which the defendant appealed to the Appellate
Court, Keller and Moll, Js., with Beach, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part, which reversed in part and
vacated in part the trial court’s judgment; thereafter,
the plaintiffs, on the granting of certification, appealed
to this court. Reversed in part; judgment directed.
John R. Harness, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Austin S. Brown, with whom was Heather M. Brown
Olsen, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
ROBINSON, C. J. In this certified appeal, we consider
whether deed language providing that the grantees took
title ‘‘subject to’’ an earlier deed, which established a
residential use restriction for the benefit of the original
grantor’s retained property, rendered that restriction
enforceable against those grantees by adjoining prop-
erty owners whose deeds contain similar ‘‘subject to’’
language, pursuant to a common plan of development
theory. The plaintiffs, Michael Abel and Carol Abel,
appeal, upon our grant of their petition for certification,1
from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing in
part the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a
court trial, granting injunctive relief against the defen-
dant, Celeste M. Johnson, enforcing one restrictive cov-
enant limiting the use of the property to residential use,
which was contained in a deed that was executed by
the original grantors of the parties’ real properties, and
two other use restrictions that appeared in a separate
declaration that applied to the properties. See Abel v.
Johnson, 194 Conn. App. 120, 142–43, 156, 220 A.3d 843
(2019). On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the Appellate
Court incorrectly concluded that they lacked standing
to enforce the residential use restriction. We agree and,
accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the Appel-
late Court.
The record reveals the following facts and procedural
history, much of which are aptly set forth in the opinion
of the Appellate Court. The plaintiffs own real property
located at 37 Mill Stream Road in Stamford, where they
reside, and the defendant owns abutting real property
located at 59 Mill Stream Road in Stamford, where she
resides with her husband. The parties’ properties are
in an area of Stamford known as the Saw Mill neighbor-
hood, where some of the properties are served by a
voluntary neighborhood association known as the Saw
Mill Association. See footnote 6 of this opinion.
‘‘In 1956, Horace Havemeyer and Harry Waldron
Havemeyer (original grantors) conveyed to a housing
developer, Empire Estates, Inc. (Empire Estates),
166.1229 acres of real property in Stamford. The deed
related to this conveyance is recorded in volume 792,
page 118, of the Stamford land records. In relevant part,
the deed provides: ‘This deed is given and accepted
upon the following express covenants and agreements
which shall run with the land herein conveyed and
shall be binding upon the grantee, its successors and
assigns, and shall [i]nure to the benefit of the
remaining land of the grantors lying westerly of the
premises herein conveyed:
‘‘ ‘(1) Said premises shall be used for private residen-
tial purposes only (except that a doctor or dentist hav-
ing a home on said premises may locate his office
therein if such use is permitted by the applicable zoning
regulations), and no buildings shall be erected or main-
tained upon said premises except single-family dwell-
ing houses and appropriate outbuildings.
‘‘ ‘(2) Said tract shall not be subdivided for building
purposes into plots containing less than one (1) acre
in area, and not more than one (1) such dwelling house
shall be erected or maintained on any such plot.’2
‘‘In 1961, Empire Estates, through its trustees, Harry
E. Terhune and Gordon R. Paterson, executed a declara-
tion of restrictions (declaration) that was recorded in
volume 917, page 114, of the Stamford land records.
The declaration, which included thirty-five articles and
set forth a wide variety of restrictions, did not contain
a provision restricting the applicable tracts to private
residential use only. In relevant part, the declaration
states: ‘Witnesseth, that said trustees hereby place upon
the land records the following restrictions, covenants,
agreements, reservations, easements and information
which shall govern the use of any tract of land whenever
imposed in a deed of conveyance, by reference to this
declaration, from any person or corporation authorized
by either of the said trustees or their successors, by
instrument recorded in the land records, to impose the
terms hereof on portions of land owned by such person
or corporation and shall run with the land so conveyed
and shall [i]nure to the benefit of the owners of tracts
of land affected by the terms hereof, to the person or
corporation authorized to impose the terms hereof and,
where applicable, to the municipality . . . .’
‘‘Article 2 of the declaration provides: ‘No animals,
poultry or water fowl, except usual pets quartered
within the family dwelling at night, shall be kept on a
[t]ract.3 Exceptions to this provision may be made for
not over two year periods if consented to in writing by
the [p]urchaser4 of each [t]ract within two hundred
(200) feet of the [t]ract where the exception is pro-
posed.’ . . .
‘‘Article 8 of the declaration provides: ‘Any commer-
cial vehicle used by an occupant of a [t]ract shall be
kept within a garage with doors closed, except for brief
periods required for loading or unloading.’
‘‘The final article of the declaration, [a]rticle 35, pro-
vides in relevant part: ‘The intent of this [d]eclaration
is to protect property values. [The] [d]eveloper5 intends
to enforce the provisions of this [d]eclaration whenever
it feels its interest may be threatened. Enforcement
action may be taken, with or without [the] [d]eveloper’s
participation, by any aggrieved [p]urchaser of a [t]ract,
or by any group of aggrieved [p]urchasers represented
by a [p]roperty [o]wner’s [a]ssociation, or otherwise.
‘‘ ‘Enforcement of this [d]eclaration or any part thereof
shall be by proceedings at law or in equity against any
person or persons violating or attempting to violate any
right herein contained, and said proceedings may be
either to restrain any violation thereof, to recover dam-
ages therefor, or to require corrective measures to
accomplish compliance with the intent of this [d]eclara-
tion.’ . . .
‘‘The deed conveying the property known as 37 Mill
Stream Road to the plaintiffs, which was recorded on
September 26, 1977, in volume 1680, page 100, of the
Stamford land records, provides in relevant part: ‘Said
premises are conveyed subject to any restrictions or
limitations imposed or to be imposed by governmental
authority, including the zoning and planning and wet-
lands rules and regulations of the [c]ity of Stamford;
restrictive covenants and agreements contained in a
certain deed from Harry Waldron Havemeyer et al to
Empire Estates, Incorporated dated August 14, 1956
and recorded in said records in [b]ook 792 at [p]age
118, as modified by an [a]greement dated March 27,
1957 and recorded in said records in [b]ook 808 at
[p]age 355; a declaration made by Harry E. Terhune
and Gordon R. Paterson, as trustees, dated March 15,
1961 and recorded in said records in [b]ook 917 at
[p]age 114 . . . .’
‘‘Materially similar language appears in the defen-
dant’s chain of title, as well.6 In a deed conveying the
property known as 59 Mill Stream Road and recorded
on September 30, 1983, in volume 2296, page 146, of the
Stamford land records, the following language appears:
‘Said premises are conveyed subject to planning and
zoning rules and regulations of the [c]ity of Stamford
and any other [f]ederal, [s]tate or local regulations,
taxes and assessments of the [c]ity of Stamford becom-
ing due and payable hereinafter, restrictive covenants
and agreements as contained in a deed from Harry
Waldron Havemeyer, et al to Empire Estates, Incorpo-
rated dated August 14, 1956 and recorded in the land
records of said Stamford in book 792 at page 118,
except as the same are modified by an agreement dated
March 27, 1957 and recorded in said records in book
808 at page 355, the terms of a declaration made by
Harry E. Terhune and Gordon R. Paterson, as [t]rust-
ees, dated March 14, 1961 and recorded in said records
in book 917 at page 114, the rights of others, including
the [c]ity of Stamford, in and to any brook, river, stream
or water flowage easement crossing and bounding said
tract of land.’ This 1983 deed is referred to in the 2006
deed conveying the property to the defendant, which
is recorded in volume 8602, page 54, of the Stamford
land records.’’ (Emphasis added; footnote altered; foot-
notes in original.) Abel v. Johnson, supra, 194 Conn.
App. 131–35.
The plaintiffs brought a one count complaint, alleging
that, ‘‘by conducting a landscaping business’’ and ‘‘main-
taining chickens and chicken coops’’ on her property,
the defendant had violated three restrictive covenants
to which both of their properties are subject, and that
are ‘‘common to all tracts or parcels of land located
within the area or subdivision known as the Saw Mill
Association.’’ The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
had ‘‘not obtained consent from the Saw Mill Associa-
tion . . . the plaintiffs or any neighboring property
owner to maintain chickens . . . or to conduct a land-
scaping business from the defendant’s property.’’ The
plaintiffs further ‘‘alleged that they had demanded that
the defendant cease and desist the activities at issue,
but the defendant had failed to comply with their
demand. The plaintiffs alleged that they had suffered
and would continue to suffer irreparable harm as a
result of the activities at issue, and that they lacked an
adequate remedy at law. The plaintiffs sought injunctive
relief ordering the defendant to immediately cease and
desist from violating the restrictive covenants and such
other relief as the court deemed equitable and proper.’’
Abel v. Johnson, supra, 194 Conn. App. 124.
The case was tried to the court over two days. The
trial court rejected the defendant’s argument that the
1956 ‘‘deed restrictions on her property are the result
of covenants exacted by the original landowner from
the developer of the Saw Mill Association for the benefit
and protection of his adjoining land [that] he retains,
and, as a result, the [plaintiffs] cannot enforce the [1956]
deed restrictions.’’ Relying on the plaintiffs’ submission
of ‘‘multiple deeds from various properties of the Saw
Mill Association that contained the restrictive cove-
nant[s] [that] they seek to enforce,’’ the trial court con-
cluded that the parties’ properties were part of a com-
mon plan or scheme of development, which gave the
plaintiffs standing to ‘‘enforce the deed restrictions
against the defendant.’’ After rejecting the special
defenses raised by the defendant,7 the trial court found
that the defendant had violated the restrictive cove-
nants8 and rendered judgment for the plaintiffs, order-
ing the defendant, inter alia, to ‘‘immediately cease and
desist from violating the restrictive covenants . . . .’’9
The defendant appealed from the judgment of the
trial court to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia,
that the trial court incorrectly ‘‘concluded that the plain-
tiffs had standing to enforce the restrictive covenant
in the 1956 deed, as modified in 1957, which generally
prohibits commercial activity on the property.’’ Abel v.
Johnson, supra, 194 Conn. App. 136. In a divided opin-
ion, the Appellate Court examined the language of the
1956 deed from the original grantors and relied on the
‘‘following language [that] precedes reference to the
two restrictive covenants: ‘This deed is given and
accepted upon the following express covenants and
agreements which shall run with the land herein con-
veyed and shall be binding upon the grantee, its succes-
sors and assigns, and shall [i]nure to the benefit of the
remaining land of the grantors lying westerly of the
premises herein conveyed . . . .’ ’’ (Emphasis in origi-
nal.) Id., 141. The Appellate Court concluded that the
‘‘emphasized language reflects’’ that ‘‘the restrictive
covenants set forth in the 1956 deed were expressly
intended to inure to the benefit of the remaining land
of the original grantors that lies west of the premises
conveyed in the 1956 deed. The premises conveyed
included tracts that were subsequently conveyed to the
plaintiffs and the defendant. . . . In the present case,
the original grantors, for their benefit, extracted cove-
nants from the grantees of the 1956 deed. Nothing in
the unequivocal language of the deed either suggests
that the restrictive covenant at issue was intended to
benefit the original or subsequent grantees of the 1956
deed, or that the original grantors were dividing their
property into building lots, thus imposing the restrictive
covenant upon grantees as part of a general develop-
ment scheme. Instead, the covenants unmistakably fall
within the class of covenants exacted by a grantor from
his grantee presumptively or actually for the benefit
and protection of his adjoining land which he retains.’’
(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id. The Appellate Court majority then concluded
that, ‘‘[b]ecause there is no allegation or evidence that
the plaintiffs are the original grantors of the 1956 deed,
or their successors in interest . . . they lacked stand-
ing to enforce the restrictive covenant in the deed that
limited the use of the defendant’s property to residential
purposes.’’ Id., 142.
After addressing the merits of the defendant’s
remaining claims on appeal,10 the Appellate Court ren-
dered judgment (1) reversing the judgment of the trial
court ‘‘enforcing the restrictive covenants . . . to the
extent that the [trial] court enforced a restrictive cove-
nant that appears in the 1956 deed and the restrictive
covenant that appears in [a]rticle 8 of the declaration,’’
(2) vacating ‘‘[t]he orders of injunctive relief related to
these restrictive covenants,’’ (3) vacating the order of
the trial court ‘‘prohibiting the defendant from keeping
any chickens or roosters on her property,’’ and (4)
remanding the case ‘‘to the trial court with direction to
order appropriate relief that is consistent with [a]rticle
2 of the declaration.’’11 Id., 156. This certified appeal
followed. See footnote 1 of this opinion.
On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the Appellate
Court incorrectly concluded that they lacked standing
to enforce the 1956 restrictive covenant. They describe
as ‘‘obtuse’’ the defendant’s position, which was
embraced by the Appellate Court, that, although both
parties’ properties are bound by the restriction against
commercial activity, only the owners of the ‘‘land lying
westerly to the premises’’ may enforce that restriction.
The plaintiffs emphasize that Empire Estates made
‘‘ ‘residential purposes only’ a part of its uniform plan
of development by agreeing to the restriction with [the
original grantors] and then referring to it in all of the
deeds to its subsequent purchasers,’’ which was shown
by the admission into evidence of twenty-two deeds
of homes located in the area served by the Saw Mill
Association, each with the same restrictions. Citing well
established principles of law concerning restrictive cov-
enants—as explained in, for example, the Appellate
Court’s decision in Contegni v. Payne, 18 Conn. App.
47, 51, 557 A.2d 122, cert. denied, 211 Conn. 806, 559
A.2d 1140 (1989), and cert. denied, 211 Conn. 806, 559
A.2d 1140 (1989)—and relying heavily on Judge Beach’s
opinion dissenting in part from the judgment of the
Appellate Court; see footnote 11 of this opinion; the
plaintiffs argue that this evidence, and the use of the
language ‘‘subject to’’ in Empire Estates’ deeds to the
parties’ predecessors in title, demonstrates a common
grantor’s intention to establish a uniform plan of devel-
opment, which would afford the plaintiffs standing to
enforce the restrictive covenants as a matter of equity.
The plaintiffs posit that the ‘‘only reasonable way to
read the deed from Empire [Estates] into the grantees
of Empire [Estates] is to harmonize the other obvious,
very specific, multiple residential requirements con-
tained therein with the other reference in the deeds
that they are also being subject to only residential devel-
opment as referenced to . . . the original grantors’
deed into Empire [Estates].’’ Ultimately, the plaintiffs’
arguments boil down to the point that, ‘‘[j]ust because
the restriction as to private residential purposes also
[i]nures to the benefit of the owners of the land of the
grantors lying westerly, does not make those owners
the only people that can enforce the restrictive covenant
under Connecticut law.’’
In response, the defendant contends that the ‘‘subject
to’’ language in the Empire Estates deeds was for notice
purposes only and ‘‘should not have the substantive
effect of creating new obligations on grantees and their
successors.’’ The defendant posits that the ‘‘subject to’’
language in the Empire Estates deeds is ambiguous
and should be construed narrowly in accordance with
established law governing the construction of real
estate instruments.12 See, e.g., Bueno v. Firgeleski, 180
Conn. App. 384, 411, 183 A.3d 1176 (2018). They rely
on the Appellate Court majority’s observation that the
1956 restriction is included with a host of other restric-
tions, such as obligations to pay taxes and to obey
Stamford zoning regulations, which ‘‘it cannot reason-
ably be suggested that the plaintiffs have the right to
enforce . . . .’’ Abel v. Johnson, supra, 194 Conn. App.
140 n.9. As a factual matter, the defendant also argues
that there is not a common plan of development because
(1) not all of the properties in the Saw Mill neighbor-
hood were developed by Empire Estates, (2) the Saw
Mill neighborhood contains numerous ‘‘properties that
are subject to substantially different encumbrances
than’’ those in the parties’ deeds, at least one of which
does not include a reference to the 1956 deed, and
(3) membership in the Saw Mill Association itself is
voluntary. See footnote 6 of this opinion. Ultimately, the
defendant argues that the 1956 restriction was nothing
more than a grantor retained interest that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to enforce, with their standing limited
to the ‘‘no chickens’’ clause in article 2 of the declara-
tion. We, however, agree with the plaintiffs and con-
clude that they had standing to enforce the 1956 deed’s
restrictive covenant.
We begin our discussion by identifying what is and
what is not in dispute. It is undisputed—indeed, the
defendant conceded both in her brief and at oral argu-
ment before this court—that both of the parties’ proper-
ties are bound by the residential use restriction con-
tained in the 1956 deed from the Havemeyers, as the
original grantors. It is also undisputed that the restric-
tion in the 1956 deed, standing alone, was intended to
inure to the exclusive benefit of the original grantors.
What is in dispute is whether the ‘‘subject to’’ language
in the deeds in the parties’ chain of title from Empire
Estates,13 when read in the context of the language of
the restrictions in the recorded declaration, rendered
the residential use restriction enforceable by the grant-
ees of Empire Estates against each other.
We now turn to the standard of review and well
established principles governing the construction of
deeds and restrictive covenants. Whether the plaintiffs
have the standing to enforce the 1956 deed’s restrictive
covenant ‘‘rests on the intent of the common grantor
of the lots, as expressed in the language of the relevant
deeds, considered in light of the surrounding circum-
stances.’’ DaSilva v. Barone, 83 Conn. App. 365, 370,
849 A.2d 902, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 908, 859 A.2d 560
(2004). ‘‘Although in most contexts the issue of intent
is a factual question on which our scope of review is
limited . . . the determination of the intent behind lan-
guage in a deed, considered in the light of all the sur-
rounding circumstances, presents a question of law on
which our scope of review is plenary. . . . Thus, when
faced with a question regarding the construction of
language in deeds, the reviewing court does not give
the customary deference to the trial court’s factual
inferences. . . . Intent is determined by the language
of the particular conveyance in light of all the circum-
stances and is a question of law.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see, e.g., Contegni
v. Payne, supra, 18 Conn. App. 51.
‘‘Restrictive covenants generally fall into one of three
categories: (1) mutual covenants in deeds exchanged
by adjoining landowners; (2) uniform covenants con-
tained in deeds executed by the owner of property who
is dividing his property into building lots under a general
development scheme; and (3) covenants exacted by a
grantor from his grantee presumptively or actually for
the benefit and protection of his adjoining land [that] he
retains.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DaSilva
v. Barone, supra, 83 Conn. App. 371–72. In this appeal,
we consider whether the language of the Empire Estates
deeds; see footnote 13 of this opinion; conveying the
properties to the parties and their predecessors in title,
‘‘subject to’’ the original grantors’ 1956 deed, which fits
into the third category, nevertheless created a general
development scheme, which fits into the second cate-
gory. See DaSilva v. Barone, supra, 370–71 (noting that
‘‘[a] subsidiary question to be resolved first is’’ which
common grantor’s ‘‘intent . . . is relevant’’).
With respect to the second category, under which
the plaintiffs claim standing, ‘‘[r]estrictive covenants
should be enforced when they are reflective of a com-
mon plan of development. . . . The factors that help
to establish the existence of an intent by a grantor to
develop a common plan are: (1) a common grantor sells
or expresses an intent to put an entire tract on the
market subject to the plan; (2) a map of the entire tract
exists at the time of the sale of one of the parcels; (3)
actual development according to the plan has occurred;
and (4) substantial uniformity exists in the restrictions
imposed in the deeds executed by the grantor. . . .
‘‘The factors that help to negate the presence of a devel-
op ment scheme are: (1) the grantor retains unrestricted
adjoining land; (2) there is no plot of the entire tract
with notice on it of the restrictions; and (3) the common
grantor did not impose similar restrictions on other
lots. . . .
‘‘Early Connecticut case law acknowledges the power
of property holders with substantially uniform restric-
tive covenants obtained by deeds in a chain of title from
a common grantor to enforce the restrictions against
other owners with similar restrictive covenants. When,
under a general development scheme, the owner of
property divides it into building lots to be sold by deeds
containing substantially uniform restrictions, any grantee
may enforce the restrictions against any other grantee.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 372–73; see Whitton v. Clark, 112 Conn. 28, 36, 151
A. 305 (1930); Stamford v. Vuono, 108 Conn. 359, 364,
143 A. 245 (1928); Contegni v. Payne, supra, 18 Conn.
App. 53; Grady v. Schmitz, 16 Conn. App. 292, 296, 547
A.2d 563, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 822, 551 A.2d 755
(1988); Marion Road Assn. v. Harlow, 1 Conn. App.
329, 333, 472 A.2d 785 (1984).
We begin with the language of the instruments at
issue. The deeds at issue provide in relevant part: ‘‘Said
premises are conveyed subject to . . . restrictive cove-
nants and agreements contained in a certain deed from
Harry Waldron Havemeyer et al to Empire Estates . . .
dated August 14, 1956 . . . [and] a declaration made by
Harry E. Terhune and Gordon R. Paterson, as trustees,
dated March 15, 1961 . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) The
dictionary definition of the phrase ‘‘subject to,’’ standing
by itself, is ambiguous because it defines the term as
‘‘affected by or possibly affected by (something) . . . .’’
(Emphasis added.) Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,
available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction
ary/subject%20to (last visited August 18, 2021). The use
of the term ‘‘subject to’’ has been described as language
of ‘‘qualification and not of contract,’’ which renders it
a provision of notice that will not by itself create an
encumbrance in the absence of other circumstances.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Teal Trading &
Development, LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Prop-
erty Owners Assn., 432 S.W.3d 381, 390 (Tex. App.
2014), review denied, Texas Supreme Court, Docket
No. 04-12-00623-CV (August 22, 2014). When construing
the term to determine whether it evinces an intent to
create a common scheme of development, considera-
tions include, for example, the recording of a plat, map
or declarations, along with the presence of substantial
uniformity as to the restrictions. See Bon Aventure,
LLC v. Craig Dyas, LLC, 3 So. 3d 859, 864–65 (Ala.
2008); Smith v. Second Church of Christ, Scientist,
Phoenix, 87 Ariz. 400, 407–408, 351 P.2d 1104 (1960);
Wahrendorff v. Moore, 93 So. 2d 720, 721–22 (Fla. 1957);
Mayer v. BMR Properties, LLC, 830 N.E.2d 971, 980–81
(Ind. App. 2005); Patch v. Springfield School District,
187 Vt. 21, 31–32, 989 A.2d 500 (2009); Armstrong v.
Stribling, 192 W. Va. 280, 284, 452 S.E.2d 83 (1994); 23
Am. Jur. 2d 254, Deeds § 247 (2013); cf. Teal Trading &
Development,
LP
v.
Champee
Springs
Ranches Property Owners Assn., supra, 392–93 (‘‘sub-
ject to’’ language is ‘‘contextual,’’ dependent on place-
ment in deed and may affect warranty if placed in war-
ranty clause, or create restriction, if used in granting
clause).
The commentary to § 2.2 of the Restatement (Third)
of Property, Servitudes,14 provides a greater elucidation
of how to interpret the term ‘‘subject to,’’ as used in
deeds. After observing that ‘‘[n]o particular verbal for-
mula is required’’ and that ‘‘some formulas . . . may
express the intent to create a servitude,’’ the commen-
tary explains in detail that the phrase ‘‘subject to’’ may
‘‘be used either to create a servitude or to disclose
the fact that land conveyed is already burdened by a
servitude. Since the term is ambiguous, courts must
look to the surrounding circumstances to determine
whether the parties used it with intent to create a servi-
tude. If no previous servitude of the type described
burdened the land, the inference is normally justified
that the parties used the ‘subject to’ language to create
a servitude. If the land conveyed was already burdened
by such a servitude, the ‘subject to’ language is often
included to qualify the grantor’s covenant against
encumbrances, rather than to create a new servitude.
However, the circumstance that the property was
already burdened by a servitude of the type described
is not determinative. Other circumstances, such as the
fact that the language is used in conveyances that
effectuate a new subdivision of the land, may justify
the inference that the parties intended to create new
servitudes for the benefit of the other lot owners in
the subdivision.’’ (Emphasis altered.) 1 Restatement
(Third), Property, Servitudes § 2.2, comment (d), pp.
63–64 (2000).
Illustration (3) to the commentary is particularly
instructive.15 It posits: ‘‘Developer acquired a [forty
acre] parcel ‘subject to’ a restriction to residential uses
only. The parcel had been burdened with such a servi-
tude restriction [ten] years earlier. In the absence of
circumstances indicating a different intent, the conclu-
sion is justified that the conveyance to [d]eveloper was
not intended to create a new servitude. Developer then
subdivides the parcel into [forty] lots, according to a
recorded plat map, and conveys each lot ‘subject to’ a
restriction to residential uses only. The circumstances
justify the conclusion that the conveyances of the sub-
divided lots are intended to create new servitudes bene-
fiting the other lot owners in the subdivision.’’ (Empha-
sis added.) Id., § 2.2, illustration (3), p. 64.
We also find persuasive sister state case law that,
consistent with the Restatement (Third) of Property,
indicates that a residential use restriction that is incor-
porated into a deed by ‘‘subject to’’ language is rendered
enforceable by evidence of a common plan of develop-
ment. Particularly instructive is the West Virginia
Supreme Court’s decision in Armstrong v. Stribling,
supra, 192 W. Va. 280. In Armstrong, the court held
that a property was bound by a restriction that prohib-
ited ‘‘the construction of more than one dwelling on
any lot’’; id., 282; when its deed provided that it was
‘‘subject to’’ certain previously recorded restrictive cov-
enants. Id., 284. The court emphasized that a general
plan of development existed because the deeds to the
thirty homes in the development contained the refer-
ence to the restrictive covenants and were built in com-
pliance with them. Id.; see Wahrendorff v. Moore, supra,
93 So. 2d 721–22 (conveyance ‘‘subject to restrictions
of record’’ means that deed must be read together with
plat of subdivision, rendering ‘‘whatever properly
appears on the plat . . . a part of the deed’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Mayer v. BMR Properties,
LLC, supra, 830 N.E.2d 980 (facts that developer estab-
lished ‘‘particular tracts . . . in a piecemeal fashion
and did not prescribe to any common scheme or plan,’’
failed to record ‘‘a supplementary declaration sub-
jecting the remaining tracts . . . to the restrictions and
covenants,’’ and ‘‘never recorded a plat,’’ as well as facts
that ‘‘no homeowner’s association was ever formed, and
[that] the various deeds do not reflect the conveyance
of tracts within a subdivision or development that has
been platted, organized or identified by a common plan
or scheme,’’ meant that ‘‘ ‘subject to’ ’’ language in deeds
did ‘‘not constitute an assurance that encumbrances
either run with the land or that successors or assigns are
bound by them’’); Patch v. Springfield School District,
supra, 187 Vt. 31–32 (‘‘subject to’’ language will bind
property by reference to other deed if other evidence
supports finding of general plan of development, given
equivocation of language stating that ‘‘conveyance was
made subject to such conditions and restrictions, if
any there are which are legally binding’’ (emphasis in
original; internal quotation marks omitted)).
These authorities, when viewed in the context of the
Empire Estates deeds and the 1961 declaration, article
35 of which expresses the intent to ‘‘protect property
values,’’ strongly support the plaintiffs’ reading of the
‘‘subject to’’ language in the Empire Estates deeds as
establishing a general plan of development limited to
residential use. First, those deeds effectuated a new
subdivision of the land, which was contemporaneously
written on a map that was recorded in the Stamford land
records and referenced in the deeds. Second, article 8
of the contemporaneously executed 1961 declaration
strongly restricts the use and keeping of commercial
vehicles in a manner that is wholly inconsistent with
commercial use of the property. It provides: ‘‘Any com-
mercial vehicle used by an occupant of a [t]ract shall
be kept within a garage with doors closed, except for
brief periods required for loading or unloading.’’ The
inclusion of this clause supports a conclusion that
Empire Estates intended to eliminate commercial activ-
ity, while accommodating those property owners who
might keep their commercial vehicles at home for pur-
poses of convenience.16 These restrictions, all of which
were recorded on the land records and available for
any searcher to find, ineluctably lead to a conclusion
that there was a common scheme of development lim-
ited to residential properties, as shown by a review of
the twenty-four deeds and property cards admitted into
evidence. Specifically, all of the deeds for Mill Stream
Road, where the parties reside, were admitted into evi-
dence and contain the ‘‘subject to’’ language at issue
in this appeal. Other deeds for properties located else-
where in the Saw Mill neighborhood contain a residen-
tial use restriction, albeit with two of the twenty-four
lacking the specific ‘‘subject to’’ language at issue in
this appeal and referencing a different declaration to
establish that restriction.17
Moreover, although ‘‘subject to’’ requires us to con-
sider the language of the original grantors’ 1956 deed
to which the Empire Estates deeds refer in order to
determine its applicability, this inquiry brings us back
to whether the Appellate Court correctly determined
that the language of the restrictive covenant in the 1956
deed, which, ‘‘by its terms, inured to the benefit of the
original grantors,’’ namely, the Havemeyers ‘‘and their
successors’’; (emphasis omitted) Abel v. Johnson, supra,
194 Conn. App. 136; rendered it unenforceable by a
party not a successor to the original grantors as a matter
of law, given the apparent lack of evidence that the
original grantors desired to create a general develop-
ment scheme. See id., 141. Contrary to the reading of
the Appellate Court, the addition of the phrase that it
‘‘shall [i]nure to the benefit of the remaining land of
the grantors lying westerly of the premises herein con-
veyed’’ does not render the covenant unenforceable by
the subsequent grantees of Empire Estates. (Emphasis
added.) Although punctuation is not determinative in
the construction of a legal instrument, the use of a
comma to set off that clause grammatically indicates
that the original grantors’ land to the west remains
a separate and independent beneficiary, which would
afford the original grantee—Empire Estates, a devel-
oper—and its successors and assigns standing to
enforce the residential use restriction. Nothing in that
language suggests that the standing of the original grant-
ors, or their successors, operates to the exclusion of
the grantee and its successors and assigns, namely,
property owners like the plaintiffs in this case.18 See,
e.g., Indian Spring Land Co. v. Inland Wetlands &
Watercourses Agency, 322 Conn. 1, 14, 145 A.3d 851
(2016). Put differently, the three categories of restrictive
covenants are ‘‘general’’ principles, and neither the
defendant, the Appellate Court, nor our independent
research has located any legal authority standing for
the proposition that a particular restriction cannot be
a grantor retained restriction enforceable by one party,
and part of a common scheme of development enforce-
able as a matter of equity by another.
Indeed, such a principle would be drastically at odds
with the equitable nature of the common plan of devel-
opment theory. It is well settled that the ‘‘doctrine of
the enforceability of uniform restrictive covenants is
of equitable origin. The equity springs from the pre-
sumption that each purchaser has paid a premium for
the property in reliance [on] the uniform development
plan being carried out. [Although] that purchaser is
bound by and observes the covenant, it would be inequi-
table to allow any other landowner, who is also subject
to the same restriction, to violate it.’’ Contegni v. Payne,
supra, 18 Conn. App. 52; see Whitton v. Clark, supra,
112 Conn. 35.
Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiffs had
standing to enforce the restrictive covenant limiting the
use of the properties to residential purposes only. The
Appellate Court, therefore, improperly reversed the
judgment of the trial court to the extent that it enforced
the residential use restriction.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed inso-
far as that court reversed the trial court’s judgment
enforcing the restrictive covenant that appears in the
1956 deed and the case is remanded to that court with
the direction to affirm the judgment of the trial court
enforcing that restrictive covenant; the judgment of the
Appellate Court is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
* This case originally was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this
court consisting of Chief Justice Robinson, and Justices McDonald, D’Auria,
Kahn and Ecker. Although Justice D’Auria was not present at oral argument,
he has read the briefs and appendices, and listened to a recording of the
oral argument prior to participating in this decision.
** August 20, 2021, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
1 We granted the plaintiffs’ petition for certification to appeal, limited to
the following issues: (1) ‘‘Does the ‘subject to’ language in the deeds only
provide notice of prior restrictions or does it have the substantive effect of
creating new obligations on the grantees and their successors?’’ And (2) ‘‘Did
the Appellate Court correctly determine that the plaintiffs lacked standing
to enforce the restrictive covenant in the original deed that limited the use
of the defendant’s property for residential purposes only?’’ Abel v. Johnson,
334 Conn. 917, 222 A.3d 104 (2020).
We note that the first certified question is encompassed topically within
the broader, second certified question. Accordingly, we do not treat them
as separate certified issues. See, e.g., State v. Raynor, 334 Conn. 264, 266
n.1, 221 A.3d 401 (2019) (court may rephrase certified question to more
accurately reflect issue).
2 ‘‘In 1957, an agreement between the original grantors, Empire Estates,
and Country Lands, Inc., to whom a portion of the land at issue had been
conveyed by Empire Estates, was recorded in volume 808, page 355, of the
Stamford land records.’’ Abel v. Johnson, supra, 194 Conn. App. 132 n.4.
‘‘[T]he agreement modified the first restrictive covenant in the 1956 deed,
set forth previously, as follows: ‘[T]hat portion of [the] restrictive covenant
. . . which is contained within parentheses shall be of no further force and
effect and there shall be substituted in lieu of the language contained within
parentheses, effective from the date hereof, the following language: (except
that a residence may be used for professional purposes by a member of a
profession occupying the same as his home to the extent that such use is
permitted from time to time by the applicable zoning regulations of the city
of Stamford).’ ’’ Id. The Appellate Court’s conclusion that the 1957 agreement
‘‘does not affect [the] analysis of the present claim’’ is undisputed. Id.
3 ‘‘The declaration defines a ‘[t]ract’ as ‘[a] parcel of land shown and
delineated on a map filed in the land records of the MUNICIPALITY which
has been conveyed by the DEVELOPER to a PURCHASER.’ ’’ Abel v. John-
son, supra, 194 Conn. App. 133 n.5.
4 ‘‘The declaration defines a ‘[p]urchaser’ as ‘[a]ny [p]urchaser of a TRACT
upon which this [d]eclaration has been imposed, and his, her or its succes-
sors in title.’ ’’ Abel v. Johnson, supra, 194 Conn. App. 133 n.6.
5 ‘‘The declaration defines a ‘[d]eveloper’ as ‘[t]he person or corporation
authorized by either of the trustees executing this [d]eclaration or their
successors to make subject to this [d]eclaration any property conveyed by
said person or corporation.’ ’’ Abel v. Johnson, supra, 194 Conn. App. 133 n.7.
6 As we noted previously, it ‘‘does not appear to be in dispute that the
parties’ properties are located in the Saw Mill Association, a ‘neighborhood
association’ that encompasses 142 properties on eight contiguous streets
in Stamford. The plaintiffs presented evidence that the restrictive covenants
that appear in the chain of title of the parties’ properties are found in the
chain of title of several other property owners in the Saw Mill Association.’’
Abel v. Johnson, supra, 194 Conn. App. 134 n.8.
7 The defendant denied the plaintiffs’ allegations and ‘‘raised four special
defenses sounding in the following legal theories: (1) equitable estoppel
and waiver; (2) unclean hands; (3) ripeness, mootness, and frustration of
purpose; and (4) a claim that the action was time barred pursuant to General
Statutes § 52-575a in that the plaintiffs did not commence the action within
three years from the time that they had actual or constructive knowledge
of the alleged violations of the restrictive covenants. By way of a reply, the
plaintiffs denied all of the special defenses.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Abel v.
Johnson, supra, 194 Conn. App. 124–25.
8 The trial court determined that the removal of the chickens from the
defendant’s property had not rendered that claim moot, despite the defen-
dant’s testimony that she ‘‘does not have plans to return them to her property
. . . .’’ The trial court concluded that the issue was not moot because ‘‘an
injunction against the defendant regarding the enforcement of the 1961
covenant would provide practical relief to the [plaintiffs] and would resolve
any ambiguity about whether the chickens could be returned to the property
. . . .’’ The Appellate Court agreed with this analysis as to mootness, which
is not at issue in this certified appeal. See Abel v. Johnson, supra, 194 Conn.
App. 154–55.
9 The trial court’s injunction also ordered the defendant (1) to refrain
‘‘from keeping any chickens or roosters [on her] property,’’ (2) to keep a
certain Dodge pickup truck ‘‘within a garage with the doors closed except
for brief periods required for loading or unloading,’’ (3) ‘‘not to receive and/
or store supplies, such as mulch and sod, at [her] property for resale to
customers of the landscaping business,’’ (4) ‘‘not to allow parking of employ-
ees or independent contractor vehicles [on her] property while the employee
or independent contractor is working for the landscaping business,’’ (5) ‘‘to
stop performing chipping of tree branches from the landscaping business
[on her] property’’; and (6) ‘‘to stop performing repairs of equipment used
in connection with the landscaping business [on her] property.’’
10 With respect to the merits, the Appellate Court concluded that (1) the
trial court improperly granted the plaintiffs injunctive relief as to article 8
of the declaration pertaining to the keeping and use of a Dodge pickup
truck because they had failed to set forth an applicable claim for relief in
their complaint; see Abel v. Johnson, supra, 194 Conn. App. 146–47; and (2)
the trial court properly enforced article 2 of the declaration but granted
relief that was overbroad under the terms of the declaration insofar as it
imposed a blanket prohibition on the defendant from ‘‘keeping any chickens
or roosters on her property . . . .’’ (Emphasis in original. ) Id., 155–56.
11 We note that Judge Beach dissented in part from the judgment of the
Appellate Court and concluded that the Appellate Court majority had improp-
erly restricted its analysis to ‘‘the conveyance from the original grantors
. . . .’’ Abel v. Johnson, supra, 194 Conn. App. 156 (Beach, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Judge Beach agreed with the majority ‘‘that
the plaintiffs have no standing to enforce restrictive covenants in the capacity
of successor to any party to the transaction between the original grantors
and Empire [Estates]; the covenant between the original grantors and Empire
[Estates] restricting the conveyed property to residential use was exacted
by a grantor from his grantee presumptively or actually for the benefit and
protection of his adjoining land [that] he [retained].’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 157 (Beach, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Judge Beach nevertheless relied on Empire Estates’ subsequent subdi-
vision of its property, with a recorded ‘‘map of the subdivision,’’ in which
‘‘every newly created lot was subject to identical, or substantially identical,
restrictions’’ that ‘‘provided that the lots were ‘conveyed subject to . . .
restrictive covenants and agreements as contained in a deed from . . .
[the original grantors] . . . to Empire Estates,’ ’’ including that prohibiting
commercial use of the properties. (Emphasis added.) Id. (Beach, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). Relying on the discussion of the phrase
‘‘subject to’’ in the commentary to § 2.2 of the Restatement (Third) of Prop-
erty, Servitudes, as it relates to the creation of new subdivisions, along
with consistent restrictions contained in the 1961 declaration, Judge Beach
concluded that ‘‘Empire [Estates] intended to create a common scheme of
development, maintaining the restriction that only residential uses were
allowed . . . .’’ Id., 158–59 (Beach, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see 1 Restatement (Third), Property, Servitudes § 2, comment (d), pp.
63–64 (2000). Emphasizing the substantial uniformity ‘‘as to the lots in the
subdivision,’’ with ‘‘each lot . . . conveyed subject to the original grantors’
restriction,’’ Judge Beach observed that, ‘‘[r]egardless of the genesis of the
first restrictive covenant, all of the owners in the subdivision were obligated
to abide by it, and equity favors their ability to enforce it.’’ Abel v. Johnson,
supra, 160–61 (Beach, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Accord-
ingly, Judge Beach concluded that ‘‘the plaintiffs had standing to enforce the
restriction regarding residential use . . . .’’ Id., 161 (Beach, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
12 The defendant argues that the plaintiffs’ analysis asks us to ‘‘enforc[e]
deed restrictions by implication, which [is an] equitable analysis [that] inher-
ently requires the use of extrinsic facts, circumstances and evidence outside
the four corners of the respective real property instrument . . . .’’ The
defendant criticizes this approach as ‘‘detrimental to the general public’s
ability to rely on explicit notice in the land records,’’ which have served as
the ‘‘authentic oracle of title in Connecticut for hundreds of years.’’ See
Safford v. McNeil, 102 Conn. 684, 687, 129 A. 721 (1925).
13 We note that the deeds to the parties’ properties that are admitted into
evidence do not constitute a complete chain of title starting from the initial
conveyances by Empire Estates. The defendant does not contend, however,
that this apparent gap affects our determination as to Empire Estates’ intent,
as reflected in the language of the conveyances that are before us. Rather,
the defendant contends that the ‘‘subject to’’ language is for notice purposes
only, rather than to create a new servitude.
14 Section 2.2 of the Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes, provides:
‘‘The intent to create a servitude may be express or implied. No particular
form of expression is required.’’ 1 Restatement (Third), Property, Servitudes
§ 2.2, p. 62 (2000).
15 By way of comparison, the first two illustrations are: (1) ‘‘O, the owner
of Blackacre, a parcel of land burdened by an easement created [twenty]
years earlier for ingress and egress in favor of Whiteacre, conveys Blackacre
to A, ‘subject to’ an easement of ingress and egress in favor of Whiteacre.
In the absence of circumstances indicating a different intent, the conclusion
is justified that the conveyance to A was not intended to create a new
easement.’’ 1 Restatement (Third), supra, § 2.2, illustration (1), p. 64. And
(2) ‘‘O, the owner of Blackacre, a lot in a subdivision restricted by the
recorded plat map to residential uses only, conveys Blackacre to A, ‘subject
to’ a restriction to residential uses only. In the absence of circumstances
indicating a different intent, the conclusion is justified that the conveyance
to A was not intended to create a new servitude.’’ Id., § 2.2, illustration (2),
p. 64.
16 The defendant argues, however, that article 8 of the declaration, which
requires that commercial vehicles kept on the property be garaged, contra-
dicts the plaintiffs’ argument that Empire Estates intended to create a resi-
dential use restriction because it would be unnecessary to include ‘‘if com-
mercial activity was entirely impermissible in the first instance . . . .’’ We
disagree. This clause supports a conclusion that Empire Estates intended
to preclude commercial activity because it indicates a desire to preserve
aesthetics while accommodating those property owners who might keep
commercial vehicles at home for purposes of convenience, along with
avoiding the difficult question of whether simply parking a commercial
vehicle on a property is an activity that is consistent with a residential use.
Cf. Roberts v. Lee, 289 Ga. App. 714, 716, 658 S.E.2d 258 (2008) (‘‘[The
defendant] was using his residential property to advance his business inter-
ests by consistently parking a dump truck and other [commercial use]
vehicles in his driveway. This finding was supported by photographic evi-
dence demonstrating that [the defendant’s] activities directly undermined
the residential character of the property intended to be preserved by the
[c]ovenants.’’); Roberts v. Bridges, Docket No. M2010-01356-COA-R3-CV,
2011 WL 1884614, *9 (Tenn. App. May 17, 2011) (parking of large tour bus
and panel trucks on defendant homeowners’ property ‘‘in the furtherance
of [their] music business constituted use of the property for commercial
purposes,’’ given frequency and disruptive nature of activity); Fowler v.
Loucks, Docket No. 32845-3-II, 2006 WL 1633708, *4 (Wn. App. June 14,
2006) (decision without published opinion, 133 Wn. App. 1020) (concluding
that ‘‘parking a work vehicle at a residence does not violate the residential
use restriction because it is merely incidental to the use as a residence’’
when record showed that ‘‘[t]he business use for the truck occurs at other
locations’’).
17 We note that the Appellate Court did not consider the factual underpin-
nings for the trial court’s conclusion that a uniform plan of development
was established by the facts of this case, choosing instead to distinguish
those cases establishing the existence of such a plan by focusing on the
language of the 1956 deed purportedly limiting the benefit of the residential
use restriction to the original grantors. See Abel v. Johnson, supra, 194
Conn. App. 142–43 n.10. In her brief to this court, the defendant argues that
‘‘extension by implication is . . . not supported by the record,’’ contending
that ‘‘the record does not support the conclusion that [Empire Estates]
subdivided all of its property and that newly created lots were subject to
identical or substantially identical restrictions.’’ The defendant notes lan-
guage differences in some of the deeds that are part of the record, observing
that they have ‘‘substantially different encumbrances than [those] of the
plaintiffs’ deed and the defendant’s deed,’’ particularly one, the Hollenberg
deed, which does not refer to the 1956 deed restrictions or the declaration
restrictions. We disagree with the defendant’s assessment of the record.
Although there are some differences in the deeds, the Hollenberg deed refers
to a different declaration of covenants recorded by Empire Estates’ trustee,
and, as admitted by Julie Hollenberg in her testimony at trial, her property
is subject to the same residential use restriction as the other twenty-three
properties considered by the trial court. Accordingly, as the trial court found,
the record demonstrates the requisite ‘‘substantial uniformity’’ necessary to
establish a common plan of development limited to residential use. Contegni
v. Payne, supra, 18 Conn. App. 53; see Whitton v. Clark, supra, 112 Conn.
37 (twenty of fifty-four lots with restrictions does not show common plan);
DaSilva v. Barone, supra, 83 Conn. App. 367–71 (plaintiff could not enforce
restriction on keeping horses against defendant because no uniform plan
of development prohibiting keeping of horses was established when twenty-
two lot subdivision map ‘‘contains no mention of any restrictive covenants,
and [the developer] did not record any separate agreement or declaration
relating to restrictive covenants that would apply to the lots delineated on
the map,’’ restriction was not contained in any deed from original grantor
to any subsequent developer, and developer included that restriction in only
ten out of fifteen deeds); Mannweiler v. LaFlamme, 46 Conn. App. 525,
541, 700 A.2d 57 (restriction in developer’s first thirty conveyances limiting
lots to single private residence was sufficient ‘‘substantial uniformity’’ to
create common scheme of development), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 934, 702
A.2d 641 (1997); Contegni v. Payne, supra, 60–61 (there was no uniform
plan of development when map was ambiguous and ‘‘[a] thorough search
of the record, transcripts and exhibits fails to reveal a single characteristic
that was both unique to the lots within the claimed area of uniform develop-
ment and applicable to all or substantially all the lots within the area’’
(emphasis in original)); Marion Road Assn v. Harlow, supra, 1 Conn. App.
333–34 (grantor did not intend to create general scheme of residential devel-
opment when first lot conveyed lacked restrictions, and eighteen of forty-
two lots were unrestricted, with other deeds having language ‘‘absolving
her remaining lots from any such restrictions’’).
18 As we have stated in the construction of other legal instruments, includ-
ing statutes and contracts, punctuation, although not ‘‘immutable,’’ is a
‘‘useful tool’’ for determining the intent of the instrument’s drafter. (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Indian Spring Land Co. v. Inland Wetlands &
Watercourses Agency, 322 Conn. 1, 14, 145 A.3d 851 (2016); see, e.g., Connect-
icut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Drown, 314 Conn. 161, 189–90, 101 A.3d 200
(2014) (applying principles to contract interpretation); Stop & Shop Super-
market Co. v. Urstadt Biddle Properties, Inc., 433 Mass. 285, 289–90, 740
N.E.2d 1286 (2001) (punctuation, including placement of commas, is relevant
in construction of deed, with phrase after comma serving as limitation).
Thus, the ‘‘idea that we should entirely ignore punctuation would make
English teachers cringe. . . . [S]tuffing punctuation to the bottom of the
interpretive toolbox would run the risk of distorting the meaning of statutory
language . . . and one component of written language is grammar, includ-
ing punctuation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Indian Spring Land
Co. v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, supra, 15.
‘‘Under the recognized precepts of English usage and grammar, a comma
is usually employed to separate distinct items in a list. See generally W.
Strunk & E. White, The Elements of Style (Pearson 4th Ed. 2000) pp. 2–3.’’
Indian Spring Land Co. v. Inland Wetlands Commission, supra, 322 Conn.
15; see id., 15–16 (concluding that modifying phrase in General Statutes
§ 22a-40 (a) (1), ‘‘not directly related to farming operation,’’ ‘‘applies with
equal force to both ‘road construction’ and ‘the erection of buildings’ ’’
because, ‘‘[h]ad the legislature intended all road construction, and not just
that unrelated to agricultural activity, to be regulated, it could have included
a comma after ‘road construction,’ thus setting road construction apart as
its own separate category subject to regulation’’); Connecticut Ins. Guaranty
Assn. v. Drown, supra, 314 Conn. 190–92 (discussing application of last
antecedent rule plus use of comma to limit application of vicarious liability
exclusion in professional liability insurance policy).