Title: People v. Perez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S248730
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: February 27, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JOSE LUIS PEREZ et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
S248730 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Two 
E060438 
 
San Bernardino County Superior Court 
FV1901482 
 
 
February 27, 2020 
 
This opinion precedes companion case S249872,  
also filed on February 27, 2020.  
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, and Kruger concurred. 
 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. PEREZ 
S248730 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez) held that 
an expert cannot relate case-specific hearsay to explain the basis 
for his or her opinion unless the facts are independently proven 
or fall within a hearsay exception.  We concluded that if the 
prosecution expert seeks to relate testimonial hearsay, the 
confrontation clause is violated unless there is a showing of 
unavailability and the defendant had a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination or forfeited that right.  We granted review in 
this case to determine whether a defendant’s failure to object at 
trial, before Sanchez was decided, forfeited a claim that a gang 
expert’s testimony related case-specific hearsay in violation of 
the confrontation clause.  We now conclude that a defense 
counsel’s failure to object under such circumstances does not 
forfeit a claim based upon Sanchez.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal here, which reached the 
opposite conclusion. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
On June 23, 2009, a motorist driving on U.S. Highway 395 
near Victorville encountered a man walking on the road and 
bleeding from gunshot wounds to his face and abdomen.  Police 
arrived on the scene and followed a trail of blood to a pickup 
truck parked a few blocks away.  There, the police found two 
other men, who had both died from gunshot wounds. 
PEOPLE v. PEREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
2 
The surviving victim told police that he had been 
kidnapped a few days earlier in the city of South Gate, near Los 
Angeles.  He was visiting a house on Center Street when a group 
of men held him at gunpoint and tied him up with zip ties.  The 
group forced the victim to call two other acquaintances and 
summon them to the house.  Upon their arrival, the group then 
bound the other two as well.  The group forced the three victims 
to arrange for deliveries of money and drugs, which the group 
then took.  The group put the victims into vehicles and drove 
them away from the house.  The three victims were eventually 
shot and left for dead near Victorville.  The survivor identified a 
person named “Lalo” as the shooter. 
In police interviews, defendant Jose Luis Perez admitted 
that he was present during the crimes up to just before the 
shooting and that his participation consisted of duct-taping a 
sock over the eyes of one of the victims and then putting him in 
zip ties.  Perez stated that he got into a vehicle when the group 
left the house with the victims, but that the vehicle he was in 
lost track of the other vehicles.  Perez incriminated his 
codefendants Edgar Ivan Chavez Navarro (“Chavez”) and Pablo 
Sandoval, as well as Sabas Iniguez, Caesar Rodriguez, and 
Eduardo Alvarado (nicknamed “Lalo”).  Perez admitted he heard 
the plan was to rob the victims and kill them but claimed that 
he was not supposed to be present and that the others simply 
showed up earlier than expected at the house on Center Street 
while he was there.  Perez claimed that Sandoval threatened to 
kill him and his family if he talked. 
Chavez, Perez, and Sandoval were all tried together, but 
Perez had a separate jury.  Iniguez testified against them 
pursuant to plea bargain.  He testified that a drug dealer named 
“Max” owed a debt to other drug dealers (the victims here) for 
PEOPLE v. PEREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
3 
methamphetamine.  Max was a cartel member and Sandoval 
reported to him.  Alvarado was also a cartel member and Chavez 
reported to him.  One of the victims who died was a cartel 
member and reported to “Nacho,” i.e., the “big boss” in 
Guadalajara.  The surviving victim reported to that decedent 
victim.  Max planned to ambush his creditors and rob them of 
drugs and money.  Iniguez, Sandoval, Chavez, Perez, Alvarado, 
Rodriguez, and three unknown persons all assisted in carrying 
out the plan. 
The prosecution’s gang expert Jeff Moran testified that the 
Sinaloa 
drug 
cartel 
produces 
large 
amounts 
of 
methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana and transports 
them to the United States to sell.  The cartel operates as a 
franchise and is divided into territories, which are subdivided 
into cells.  Each cell connects to someone in the cartel, but each 
cell works independently of the other cells.  At the time of trial, 
“El Chapo” Guzman was the head of the Sinaloa cartel.  “Nacho” 
was Ignacio Coronel, who was killed in 2010.  At the time of the 
offenses, Coronel worked in Guadalajara and was number three 
in the Sinaloa drug cartel.  In Moran’s opinion, Iniguez, 
Sandoval, Chavez, Perez, Alvarado, and Rodriguez were all 
members or associates of the Sinaloa drug cartel.  He testified 
that the group’s coordinated efforts are consistent with members 
or associates of a criminal street gang acting in association or in 
concert with each other.  He testified that he formed his opinions 
based upon his training, experiences, and information obtained 
from this investigation.  This included information obtained 
from interviews he and other detectives conducted, Perez’s 
statements to police, trial testimony, classes, Internet research, 
reports, articles about the Guzman cartel, and regular 
discussions with Drug Enforcement Administration agents 
PEOPLE v. PEREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
4 
about cartels.  Defense counsel did not object to Moran’s 
testimony on hearsay, confrontation clause, or Evidence Code 
section 352 grounds.  To establish the pattern of criminal gang 
activity, the court took judicial notice that Alvarado, Iniguez, 
and Rodriguez had been convicted of murder, attempted 
murder, and kidnapping, based upon the same events charged 
in the present case.1  
On October 31 and November 1, 2013, the juries convicted 
Chavez, Sandoval, and Perez each of two counts of first degree 
special circumstance murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 
190.2, subd. (a)),2 one count of attempted premeditated murder 
(§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), three counts of kidnapping for ransom (§ 
209, subd. (a)), three counts of kidnapping to commit robbery (§ 
209, subd. (b)(1)), and one count of street terrorism (§ 186.22, 
subd. (a)).  The jury found true gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) and 
firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)) enhancements.  The 
trial court sentenced each defendant to five terms of life without 
the possibility of parole. 
Defendants appealed.  In 2016, before the appeals were 
resolved, we issued our opinion in Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 
665.  In supplemental briefing, Chavez argued in the Court of 
Appeal that the gang expert’s testimony was hearsay and had 
been presented to the jury in violation of the confrontation 
clause.  Chavez claimed that the gang expert testified to case-
                                       
1 
Alvarado and Rodriguez were tried separately and were 
convicted of similar offenses as the defendants in this matter.  
Perez was originally tried jointly with Iniguez on the same 
charges here but with different juries.  Iniguez’s jury convicted 
him on all counts, but Perez’s hung on all counts. 
2 
All further unspecified statutory references refer to the 
Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. PEREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
5 
specific hearsay in the following ways:  (1) Iniguez admitting he 
was a cartel member; (2) Sandoval’s activities showed that he 
was a cartel member; (3) sources told Moran that Sandoval was 
the one who had direct contact with Max, who was calling the 
shots; (4) based on his “involvement and participation in this 
investigation,” Moran believed Chavez was a cartel associate 
who worked directly for Lalo; (5) Moran’s investigation, 
including Perez’s admission to law enforcement, led Moran to 
believe Perez was a low-level associate who wanted to work for 
Sandoval and his involvement in this case was an audition; and 
(6) sources told Moran and other investigators that the crimes 
in this case were part of a cartel-ordered hit. 
The Court of Appeal held that Chavez’s failure to object to 
case-specific hearsay in expert testimony at trial forfeited any 
Sanchez claim on appeal.  The Court of Appeal found that 
“[e]ven though this case was tried before Sanchez was decided, 
previous cases had already indicated that an expert’s testimony 
to hearsay was objectionable.  If anything, Sanchez narrowed 
the scope of a meritorious objection by limiting it to case-specific 
hearsay.”  Therefore, “such objections would not have been 
futile.” 
Defendants petitioned for review.  We granted the 
petitions and transferred the matter for the Court of Appeal to 
reconsider the cause in light of recent amendments to the 
firearm enhancement statutes.  (See § 12022.53, subd. (h), 
added by Stats. 2017, ch. 682, § 1.)  On our own motion, we also 
directed the Reporter of Decisions not to publish the opinion.  
Upon the case’s return, as relevant here, the Court of Appeal 
again held that Chavez’s counsel’s failure to object in the trial 
court forfeited any objection to expert testimony to case-specific 
PEOPLE v. PEREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
6 
hearsay under Sanchez.  (People v. Perez (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 
201, 212.) 
Defendants Chavez and Perez petitioned for review.  We 
granted Chavez’s petition to consider the limited issue of 
whether defendant’s failure to object at trial, before Sanchez 
was decided, forfeited his claim that a gang expert’s testimony 
related case-specific hearsay in violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation.   We denied Perez’s petition. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Chavez argues that, even though he did not raise a 
confrontation clause objection to the gang expert’s testimony at 
the time of trial, he did not forfeit the claim because Sanchez 
had not yet been decided and such an objection would therefore 
have been futile.  We agree. 
Ordinarily, “the failure to object to the admission of expert 
testimony or hearsay at trial forfeits an appellate claim that 
such evidence was improperly admitted.”  (People v. Stevens 
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 325, 333; accord, Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).)  
“ ‘The reason for the [objection] requirement is manifest: a 
specifically grounded objection to a defined body of evidence 
serves to prevent error.  It allows the trial judge to consider 
excluding the evidence or limiting its admission to avoid 
possible prejudice.  It also allows the proponent of the evidence 
to lay additional foundation, modify the offer of proof, or take 
other steps designed to minimize the prospect of reversal.’ ”  
(People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434.)  Even when not 
required under our forfeiture doctrine, an objection can still 
serve these important purposes and can be crucial to developing 
the law. 
PEOPLE v. PEREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
7 
Nevertheless, “[a]s this court has explained, ‘[r]eviewing 
courts have traditionally excused parties for failing to raise an 
issue at trial where an objection would have been futile or wholly 
unsupported by substantive law then in existence.’ ”  (People v. 
Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 92, quoting People v. Welch (1993) 5 
Cal.4th 228, 237.)  Indeed, “ ‘ “[w]e have excused a failure to 
object where to require defense counsel to raise an objection 
‘would place an unreasonable burden on defendants to 
anticipate unforeseen changes in the law and encourage 
fruitless objections in other situations where defendants might 
hope that an established rule of evidence would be changed on 
appeal.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 705 
(Edwards).)  “In determining whether the significance of a 
change in the law excuses counsel’s failure to object at trial, we 
consider the ‘state of the law as it would have appeared to 
competent and knowledgeable counsel at the time of the trial.’ ”  
(People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 811 (Black), quoting 
People v. De Santiago (1969) 71 Cal.2d 18, 23.)  “The 
circumstance that some attorneys may have had the foresight to 
raise th[e] issue does not mean that competent and 
knowledgeable counsel reasonably could have been expected to 
have anticipated the high court’s decision . . . .”  (Black, at p. 
812.) 
At the time of Chavez’s trial, People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 
Cal.4th 605 and People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 919 
(Montiel) were controlling authority on expert testimony.  
Gardeley permitted a qualified expert witness to testify on direct 
examination to any sufficiently reliable hearsay sources used in 
formulation of the expert’s opinion.  (See Gardeley, at p. 618.)  
Consequently, “[c]ourts created a two-pronged approach to 
balancing ‘an expert’s need to consider extrajudicial matters, 
PEOPLE v. PEREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
8 
and a jury’s need for information sufficient to evaluate an expert 
opinion’ so as not to ‘conflict with an accused’s interest in 
avoiding substantive use of unreliable hearsay.’ ”  (Sanchez, 
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 679, quoting Montiel, at p. 919.)  “Most 
often, hearsay problems [were] cured by an instruction that 
matters admitted through an expert go only to [the] basis of the 
opinion and should not be considered for their truth.  [Citation.]  
[¶]  Sometimes a limiting instruction [was] not . . . enough.  In 
such cases, Evidence Code section 352 authorize[d] the court to 
exclude from an expert’s testimony any hearsay matter whose 
irrelevance, unreliability, or potential for prejudice outweighs 
its proper probative value.”  (Montiel, at p. 919.) 
After Chavez’s trial, Sanchez found that “this paradigm is 
no longer tenable because an expert’s testimony regarding the 
basis for an opinion must be considered for its truth by the jury.”  
(Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 679.)  Sanchez explained that 
“[w]hen any expert relates to the jury case-specific out-of-court 
statements, and treats the content of those statements as true 
and accurate to support the expert’s opinion, the statements are 
hearsay.  It cannot logically be maintained that the statements 
are not being admitted for their truth.”  (Id. at p. 686.)  “If an 
expert testifies to case-specific out-of-court statements to 
explain the bases for his [or her] opinion, those statements are 
necessarily considered by the jury for their truth, thus rendering 
them hearsay.  Like any other hearsay evidence, it must be 
properly admitted through an applicable hearsay exception.  
Alternatively, the evidence can be admitted through an 
appropriate witness and the expert may assume its truth in a 
properly worded hypothetical question in the traditional 
manner.”  (Id. at p. 684, fn. omitted.)  Sanchez clarified that an 
“expert may still rely on hearsay in forming an opinion, and may 
PEOPLE v. PEREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
9 
tell the jury in general terms that he did so” (id. at p. 685), that 
is, the expert may “relate generally” the “kind and source of the 
‘matter’ upon which his opinion rests” (id. at p. 686). 
Sanchez consequently disapproved Gardeley “to the extent 
it suggested an expert may properly testify regarding case-
specific out-of-court statements without satisfying hearsay 
rules.”  (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 686, fn. 13.)  Sanchez 
also disapproved “prior decisions concluding that an expert’s 
basis testimony is not offered for its truth, or that a limiting 
instruction, coupled with a trial court’s evaluation of the 
potential prejudicial impact of the evidence under Evidence 
Code 
section 
352, 
sufficiently 
addresses 
hearsay 
and 
confrontation concerns.”  (Ibid.)  Specifically, Sanchez 
disapproved People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 608; Montiel, 
supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 918–919; People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 
Cal.3d 984, 1012; People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 238–
240; and People v. Coleman (1985) 38 Cal.3d 69, 91–93. 
Sanchez thus expressly changed the law previously 
established by Gardeley and Montiel.  “ ‘ “[W]e have excused a 
failure to object where to require defense counsel to raise an 
objection ‘would place an unreasonable burden on defendants to 
anticipate unforeseen changes in the law and encourage 
fruitless objections in other situations where defendants might 
hope that an established rule of evidence would be changed on 
appeal.’ ” ’ ”  (Edwards, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 705.)  We 
therefore hold that the failure of Chavez’s counsel to object at 
trial before Sanchez was decided did not forfeit a claim on appeal 
based upon Sanchez.  The great weight of authority below is 
consistent with this ruling.  (See, e.g., People v. Flint (2018) 22 
Cal.App.5th 983, 996–997; People v. Hall (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 
576, 602, fn. 10; Conservatorship of K.W. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 
PEOPLE v. PEREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
10 
1274, 1283; People v. Jeffrey G. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 501, 507–
508; People v. Meraz (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1162, 1170, fn. 7.) 
This ruling is also consistent with our numerous decisions 
holding that a defendant need not predict subsequent 
substantive changes in law in order to preserve objections.  (See 
People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334, 350, fn. 5 [failure to object 
to the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements did not 
forfeit claim because a number of appellate cases had upheld the 
admissibility of such statements in the face of similar 
challenges]; In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 861 [failure to 
object to trial court’s reading of social services report prior to the 
jurisdictional hearing in a juvenile court proceeding did not 
forfeit issue because a subsequent appellate decision interpreted 
the controlling statutes “in a manner contrary to the apparently 
prevalent contemporaneous interpretation”].) 
The Attorney General, however, argues that three 
confrontation clause cases decided before Chavez’s trial, 
Williams v. Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. 50 (Williams), People v. 
Dungo (2012) 55 Cal.4th 608 (Dungo), and People v. Lopez (2012) 
55 Cal.4th 569 (Lopez), provided grounds for objection, and 
therefore objection at trial would not have been futile. 
By its terms, the confrontation clause provides that “[i]n 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”  (U.S. Const., 
6th Amend.)  In 2004, the high court “adopted a fundamentally 
new interpretation of the confrontation right” (Williams, supra, 
567 U.S. at p. 64) and held that “[w]here testimonial evidence is 
at issue,” the confrontation clause “demands what the common 
law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination.”  (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 
PEOPLE v. PEREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
11 
36, 68.)  Relevant here, statements that are not offered for their 
truth do not implicate the confrontation clause.  (Id. at p. 59, 
fn. 9; accord, People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 808, fn. 
23.)  While Gardeley was decided before Crawford, every Court 
of Appeal to address the issue in a published decision after 
Crawford, but before Sanchez, continued to rely on Gardeley to 
reject a confrontation clause challenge.  Each of these decisions 
found, contrary to our subsequent decision in Sanchez, that 
expert basis evidence was not offered for its truth.  (See People 
v. Hill (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1127–1128 (Hill); People v. 
Sisneros (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 142, 153–154; People v. Cooper 
(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 731, 746–747; People v. Fulcher (2006) 
136 Cal.App.4th 41, 57; People v. Thomas (2005) 130 
Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209–1210.)   
Subsequently, in Williams, the high court held in a four-
one-four decision that a lab technician’s testimony regarding 
work performed by another lab was not admitted to prove the 
truth of the matter and, alternatively, the underlying outside 
lab report, which was not admitted into evidence, was not 
testimonial.  (Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at pp. 57–58, 62, 69–86 
(plur. opn. of Alito, J.).)  However, while the plurality opinion 
found that the testimony did not violate the confrontation 
clause, Williams “called into question the continuing validity of 
relying on a not-for-the-truth analysis in the expert witness 
context,” because between the concurrence and the dissent 
“[f]ive justices . . . specifically rejected this approach.”  (Sanchez, 
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 682.)  Justice Thomas concurred 
narrowly in the judgment on the ground the outside lab report 
was not testimonial, but he “share[d] the dissent’s view of the 
plurality’s flawed analysis.”  (Williams, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 104 
(conc. opn. of Thomas, J.); see id. at pp. 109–118.)  Notably, he 
PEOPLE v. PEREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
12 
found that the challenged testimony was admitted for its truth.  
(Id. at pp. 104–109.)  Justice Kagan, joined by three other 
justices in dissent, found both that the statements were 
testimonial and that the challenged testimony was admitted for 
its truth.  (Id. at pp. 125–132 (dis. opn. of Kagan, J.).) 
Our court then applied Williams in the companion cases 
of Dungo and Lopez.  Dungo held the confrontation clause was 
not violated when an expert testified about objective facts 
concerning the condition of the victim’s body as recorded in an 
autopsy report and autopsy photos.  (Dungo, supra, 55 Cal.4th 
at pp. 612–615, 621.)  Neither the autopsy report, which a 
nontestifying pathologist had prepared, nor the photographs 
were admitted into evidence.  (Id. at p. 612.)  Justice Kennard, 
in the majority opinion, reasoned that the evidence was not 
testimonial, but she did not discuss whether the expert’s basis 
testimony was offered for its truth.  (Id. at p. 621.)  Justice 
Werdegar, in a concurring opinion that three other justices 
joined, also opined that physical observations from the autopsy 
report were not testimonial.  (Id. at p. 627 (conc. opn. of 
Werdegar, J.).)  In the process, she commented that those 
“observations were introduced for their truth.”  (Id. at p. 627.)  
In dissent, Justice Corrigan, joined by Justice Liu, concluded 
that the expert’s “description of [the victim’s] body, drawn from 
the hearsay contained in [the] autopsy report, violated 
defendant’s right to confront and cross-examine [the autopsy 
doctor].”  (Id. at p. 647 (dis. opn. of Corrigan, J.).)  Justice 
Corrigan noted that “[f]ive justices explicitly repudiated th[e] 
analysis” in the Williams plurality that “[the outside lab] report 
was not hearsay at all because its contents were not admitted 
for their truth.”  (Id. at p. 635.)   
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
13 
Lopez held that a lab report with defendant’s blood alcohol 
concentration results did not violate the confrontation clause.  
(Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 582–585.)  The analyst who 
prepared the report did not testify, but a colleague testified 
about it and the report was admitted into evidence.  (Id. at 
pp. 573–574.)  Justice Kennard for the majority reasoned that 
while a notation in the report linking defendant’s name to a 
particular blood sample “was admitted for its truth,” the 
notation was not testimonial.  (Id. at p. 584.)  Justice Kennard 
observed that in Williams, “[l]ike Justice Thomas in his 
concurrence, the dissent rejected the Williams plurality’s 
conclusion that [the expert’s] testimony about the report was not 
admitted for the truth of the matters asserted in the report.”  
(Id. at p. 580.)  In dissent, Justice Liu found that “the records at 
issue here, including the analyst’s notations linking defendant 
to the lab record in question, are testimonial.  [Citation.]  
Because the statements were introduced through a surrogate 
with no personal knowledge of those facts, they were offered in 
violation of the confrontation clause.”  (Id. at pp. 602–603 (dis. 
opn. of Liu, J.).) 
Based upon these decisions, the Attorney General 
contends that counsel had grounds to object to Gardeley before 
we decided Sanchez because a majority of the justices on our 
court and the high court had reasoned that, at least in certain 
circumstances, testimony concerning the factual basis of an 
expert’s opinion was considered for its truth.  The Attorney 
General argues that even before we issued Sanchez, Courts of 
Appeal found that if our court or the high court “were called 
upon to resolve this issue, it seems likely” that cases finding 
“out-of-court statements offered as expert basis evidence are not 
offered for their truth for confrontation purposes will be 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
14 
significantly undermined.”  (People v. Valadez (2013) 220 
Cal.App.4th 16, 32 (Valadez); accord, People v. Landau (2016) 
246 Cal.App.4th 850, 869; People v. Miller (2014) 231 
Cal.App.4th 1301, 1311–1312; People v. Mercado (2013) 216 
Cal.App.4th 67, 89 & fn. 6; Hill, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1132, fn. 18.) 
Nevertheless, we did not expressly hold until Sanchez that 
“[w]hen any expert relates to the jury case-specific out-of-court 
statements, and treats the content of those statements as true 
and accurate to support the expert’s opinion, the statements are 
hearsay.”  (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 686.)  And Sanchez 
marked a “paradigm” shift in that a limiting instruction was no 
longer an effective method of avoiding hearsay problems in an 
expert’s basis testimony.  (Id. at p. 679.)  Indeed, no justice 
expressly disapproved Gardeley in either Dungo or Lopez, 
despite it being a staple of our decisional law.  (See In re Ruedas 
(2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 777, 801, fn. 9 [“Gardeley alone was cited 
in over 2,000 appellate decisions between the time it was 
decided in 1996 and the time Sanchez was decided in 2016”].)  
We then continued to cite Gardeley with approval after Dungo 
and Lopez.  (See People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 89 (conc. 
& dis. opn. of Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.) [“A witness testifying in the 
form of an opinion may state on direct examination the basis for 
his or her opinion”]; People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 951 
[“expert testimony can be based on a wide variety of information 
so long as it is reliable”].)  Furthermore, at the time of Chavez’s 
trial, Edwards was our most recent decision regarding expert 
testimony relating case-specific hearsay.  (See Edwards, supra, 
57 Cal.4th at pp. 706–707.)  Edwards, like Dungo and Lopez, did 
not overrule Gardeley, and the Edwards majority stressed that 
PEOPLE v. PEREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
15 
it was not persuaded by the Dungo dissent.  (Id. at p. 707, fn. 
13.) 
“The decisions of this court are binding upon and must be 
followed by all the state courts of California.”  (Auto Equity 
Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)  Until 
we overruled Gardeley, a lower court applying precedent would 
have, under that case, overruled a case-specific hearsay 
objection to expert basis testimony.  Indeed, our colleagues in 
the Courts of Appeal repeatedly and expressly stated that they 
were bound to follow Gardeley in the years leading up to 
Sanchez.  (See, e.g., Hill, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1131 [“our 
position in the judicial hierarchy precludes [rejecting Gardeley]; 
we must follow Gardeley and the other California Supreme 
Court cases in the same line of authority”]; accord, In re Thomas 
(2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 774, 763; People v. Leon (2016) 243 
Cal.App.4th 1003, 1016; Valadez, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 32, fn. 13.)  Such a request in a trial court would therefore 
have been futile.  (See, e.g., People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 
825, 837, fn. 4 [request for a jury trial on aggravating 
circumstances 
“clearly 
would 
have 
been 
futile” 
when 
then-existing law required the trial court to deny the request 
and “was binding on the lower courts until it was overruled by 
the high court”]; People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, 128 [in 
dicta questioning “whether defendant should be made to bear 
the burden of anticipating potential changes in the law based on 
the reasoning of a United States Supreme Court opinion 
addressed to the proper interpretation of a federal statute not at 
issue here”].) 
The Attorney General suggests forfeiture can occur 
whenever the argument is not “legally foreclosed,” or the law is 
“unsettled,” in an “odd state of flux,” or when the high court has 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
16 
not “squarely held as much in a majority opinion,” or when it is 
just a “ ‘restoration’ [citation] of a legal principle that over the 
years had become ‘blurred.’ ”  The Attorney General cites cases 
that said this court might be prepared to overrule Gardeley in 
the future.  (See, e.g., Valadez, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 32.)  
The Attorney General cites cases from other states to show 
where the law was trending.  The Attorney General argues that 
counsel was required to object because the grounds for objection 
were “not foreclosed by existing law.”  
This, however, is beyond what we have required and too 
amorphous a standard to place on trial counsel.  “The 
circumstance that some attorneys may have had the foresight to 
raise this issue does not mean that competent and 
knowledgeable counsel reasonably could have been expected to 
have anticipated the high court’s decision . . . .”  (Black, supra, 
41 Cal.4th at p. 812.)  Asking attorneys at the trial level to 
predict that our court might in the future overrule its prior 
precedent — or risk forfeiting constitutional claims of their 
clients — simply requires too much.  (See People v. Champion 
(1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908, fn. 6 [“Because the question whether 
defendants have preserved their right to raise this issue on 
appeal is close and difficult, we assume [they] have preserved 
their right, and proceed to the merits”].)  It likewise burdens 
trial courts with ruling on objections they have little power to 
sustain unless and until contrary authority is overruled.  If 
objection would be futile under current precedent, counsel is not 
obligated to object on pain of forfeiture simply because a future 
change in the law might be foreseeable.  Here, Gardeley was still 
binding on lower courts at the time of Chavez’s trial and 
therefore, a trial court applying this precedent would have 
overruled the objection.   
PEOPLE v. PEREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
17 
In an alternative argument, the Attorney General 
contends that even before Sanchez, litigants could “seek to 
exclude testimony by an expert that would have impermissibly 
related case-specific hearsay to juries, relying both on the 
hearsay rule and on section 352 of the Evidence Code.”  It is 
undoubtedly true that Chavez could have objected under 
Evidence Code section 352 based on “whether the jury could 
properly follow the court’s limiting instruction in light of the 
nature and amount of the out-of-court statements admitted.”  
(Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 679.)  However, an objection 
under Evidence Code section 352 is completely different from a 
Sanchez objection that the expert has “relate[d] as true case-
specific facts asserted in hearsay statements.”  (Sanchez, at p. 
686.)  Thus, the specific objection Sanchez contemplated would 
have been futile under Gardeley and its progeny unless a 
defendant could additionally show that the statements the 
expert related were excessive, inflammatory, or confusing, 
regardless of whether they were case-specific.  (See, e.g., People 
v. Coleman (1985) 38 Cal.3d 69, 93 [court abused its discretion 
by allowing “extensive questioning of the expert witnesses” 
regarding letters written by the victim].)  Our decision in 
Sanchez therefore meant that, for the first time, it was no longer 
futile to object to case-specific expert basis testimony that was 
not excessive, inflammatory, or confusing. 
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the Court 
of Appeal improperly found that Chavez forfeited his claim on 
appeal based upon Sanchez by failing to object at a trial 
occurring before Sanchez was decided.  The Court of Appeal here 
reached the same conclusion as People v. Blessett (2018) 22 
Cal.App.5th 903, 925–941.  We disapprove Blessett to the extent 
that it is inconsistent with this decision. 
PEOPLE v. PEREZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
18 
III. DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the 
cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Perez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XXX 22 Cal.App.5th 201 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S248730 
Date Filed:  February 27, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  San Bernardino 
Judge:  John M. Tomberlin 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Raymond Mark DiGuiseppe, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Jose 
Luis Perez. 
 
Rebecca P. Jones, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Edgar Ivan 
Chavez Navarro. 
 
Randall Bookout, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Henry Russell Halpern for Defendant and 
Appellant Pablo Sandoval. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Edward DuMont, State Solicitor General, Gerald 
A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. 
Johnsen and Joshua Patashnik, Deputy State Solicitors General, Scott C. Taylor and Kristen Kinnaird 
Chenelia, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Rebecca P. Jones 
3549 Camino del Rio S., Suite D 
San Diego, CA 92108 
(619) 269-7872 
 
Joshua Patashnik 
Deputy Solicitor General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 
(415) 510-3896