Title: Houser v. Heider
Citation: 221 Or. 7, 350 P.2d 422
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: March 16, 1960

Reversed and remanded March 16, 1960.
*8 John E. Walker, Portland, argued the cause for appellants. On the briefs was William E. Dougherty, Portland.
Otto R. Skopil, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Williams &amp; Skopil, Salem.
*9 Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, WARNER, PERRY and HARRIS, Justices.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HARRIS, J. (Pro Tempore)
This is an action for damages in the nature of trespass to real property, brought by the plaintiffs, Elizabeth C. Houser and Doris H. Brown, against the defendants, Otto Heider, Wallace Heider and Callie B. Heider.
Elizabeth C. Houser is the wife of Sam Houser, and Doris H. Brown is his sister. Otto Heider and Callie B. Heider are husband and wife and are the parents of Wallace Heider.
The jury returned a verdict against all the defendants for $23,800 general damages and $35,000 punitive damages. From the ensuing judgment, the defendants appeal.
The defendants were jointly charged in the complaint with willful, wanton and malicious entry upon plaintiff's real property and with ejecting and ousting plaintiffs therefrom and keeping and maintaining possession thereof for more than a year, despite repeated demands that plaintiffs be restored to possession and enjoyment of their property. In a portion of the real property involved Sam Houser maintained a garage business. In other portions of the property each plaintiff maintained a separate business of her own.
The evidence indicated that on August 11, 1955, prior to the entry of defendants upon plaintiff's property, the plaintiffs, in consideration of $6,000, executed a second mortgage on the property in question to Callie B. Heider. It was under the alleged rights claimed to be covered by this mortgage, in addition to *10 the alleged authorization of Sam Houser, that defendants sought to justify their entry upon and their retention of possession of plaintiffs' property.
The evidence discloses that defendants Otto Heider and Wallace Heider entered and took possession of the real property involved on August 23, 1955, prior to the time that the first payment was due on the second mortgage executed in favor of Callie B. Heider. Prior to the execution of this second mortgage in favor of Callie B. Heider, the plaintiffs had placed a first mortgage on the premises involved in favor of a bank. This first mortgage at the time of the execution of the second mortgage was in arrears for four monthly payments. Such default was also in effect when the defendants Otto Heider and Wallace Heider entered and took possession of the premises on August 23, 1955. The arrearage was paid by the plaintiffs on August 27, 1955.
Defendants' assignments of error, ten in number, complain principally of the rulings of the court in the giving of certain instructions, in connection with the admissibility of evidence and of other rulings of the court which denied their motions for mistrial.
Defendants' assignment of error No. 1 reads as follows:
It will be noted that paragraph 3 of defendants' affirmative defense, the removal of which from the consideration of the jury is complained of as error under this assignment, sets forth defendants' contention that defendant Callie B. Heider was a mortgagee in possession of the premises, under which assertion defendants claim their possession was lawful. It will be observed that defendants allege that such possession was obtained "while the obligation due on said mortgage from plaintiffs remained unpaid." This allegation is a recognition on the part of the defendants that to become a mortgagee in possession there first must have been condition of the mortgage broken by the mortgagor. Caro v. Wollenberg, 68 Or 420, 428, 136 P 866, and cases therein cited.
Moreover, the record indicates the only condition of the mortgage which defendants claim was broken was one to the effect that payments on the first mortgages to the bank would be kept up. The instant Heider mortgage provides that:
In other words, failure to maintain the payments on the prior first mortgages accelerates and matures the instant junior mortgage.
1. However, as is apparent from our statement of the facts, the default in the monthly payments on the first mortgage upon which defendants rely to prove condition broken was already in existence at the time of the giving and execution of the second mortgage. Therefore, such existing default may not be relied upon to accelerate the maturity of the Heider mortgage in the absence of an express provision in the mortgage that the failure to cure such default shall be ground for acceleration. Consequently, on August 23, 1955, when Otto and Wallace Heider took possession of the instant premises, there was no condition broken in relation to the Heider mortgage.
The Nebraska court in People's State Bank v. *13 Smith, 120 Neb 29, 32, 231 NW 141, 143, has ruled as follows:
Assignment of error No. 1 is without merit.
Assignment of error No. 2 is stated thus:
2. We do not believe that the instructions of the court, considered as a whole, authorized the jury to make an allowance for any damages to the separate businesses which the two plaintiffs conducted on the premises. However, since this case must be retried because of error which becomes manifest later in this opinion, the court should make it clear to the jury upon retrial that the plaintiffs can recover only for such damage as is common to their interests in the property as tenants in common. Again, we point out that the defendants requested no instructions whatsoever upon the measure of damages nor upon any other phase of this case.
Assignment of error No. 3 is as follows:
3. Since the defendants made no offer of proof in connection with the ruling complained of, this assignment brings nothing to the attention of this court for review.
Assignment of error No. 4 reads as follows:
The motion for mistrial which is the basis of this assignment of error purports to renew "repeated motions *17 for mistrial." The record fails to disclose such prior motions. The motion under consideration was made after a motion for nonsuit had been denied and long after the rulings complained of had been made. Assuming it was timely, the motion complains principally of rulings which allegedly erroneously admitted certain evidence. Since this evidence was eventually rejected by the trial court, and the questions raised in relation thereto will probably not occur upon retrial, it is not necessary for us to further consider this assignment of error.
Assignment of error No. 5 is stated as follows:
Since the plea of "former judgment" mentioned in this assignment was removed from the jury's consideration and from the pleadings, this matter need not be considered further.
Assignment of error No. 6 reads as follows:
The matters contained in this assignment of error were also removed from the consideration of the jury and need not be considered.
Assignment of error No. 7 reads as follows:
4. It will be noted that counsel for defendants stated no ground whatsoever for the objection mentioned in this assignment of error, nor was any request made to limit the answer to certain purposes. We believe the evidence challenged under this assignment of error was relevant upon the issue of the alleged agency between Callie B. Heider, who was not present when the alleged unlawful entry was made, and Otto Heider.
Assignments of error Nos. 8, 9 and 10 all relate to the same subject matter and will be considered together. These assignments read as follows:
On direct examination inquiry was made of defendant Otto Heider, relative to the conversation he had on August 20 or 21, 1955, with Sam Houser in which it was claimed Mr. Houser told Mr. Heider to take the property over. Mr. Heider then gave his testimony concerning the conversation, such testimony in part being as follows:
*21 Later, on cross-examination, counsel for plaintiffs inquired as follows:
Later plaintiffs produced Sheriff Jones, and the court permitted him to testify with reference to Mr. Heider's alleged statement as follows:
Subsequently, in final argument counsel for plaintiffs was permitted to address the jury as follows:
5. We hold it was entirely improper for counsel for the plaintiffs to interject in cross-examination an entirely collateral, irrelevant and immaterial matter, highly inflammatory in nature, which in effect was an accusation claimed to have been made by the defendant Otto Heider accusing plaintiffs' counsel of the crime of bribery. The principal and main accusation was directed toward plaintiffs' counsel rather than toward Sam Houser.
This alleged statement was entirely unrelated to defendant Heider's direct examination. Neither was it related to any issue involved in the case, but to a wholly collateral matter.
6. Moreover, since the witness Heider denied making the accusatory statement upon this collateral matter, such denial necessarily bound the party cross-examining him. Thus the resulting prejudice was compounded by allowing Sheriff Jones to contradict the witness upon this subject, and still further intensified by allowing counsel for the plaintiff to argue the matter before the jury and thus exonerate himself from the prejudicial and inflammatory charge against him and his law partner. In State v. Elliott, 206 Or 82, 97, 289 P2d 1075, Mr. Justice LUSK, speaking for the court, said:
In State v. Winfree, 136 Or 531, 539-540, 299 P 1005, the court ruled as follows:
7. Plaintiffs claim the testimony referred to was proper since it tended to show defendant Heider's bias and hostility. We believe that the statement under consideration attributed to defendant Heider would merely be an attempt to show a justification of his hostility rather than evidence tending to prove hostility on his part, and that it was, therefore, not competent under the following general rule:
8. Moreover, the statement claimed to show hostility was principally and mainly directed against plaintiffs' attorneys and, perhaps incidentally, toward a witness but not a party to the case; to-wit, Sam Houser. The applicable rule in this situation is that it is competent on cross-examination of a witness to elicit facts which tend to show the hostility of the witness toward the party against whom he is called. See 58 Am Jur 386, 387, Witnesses §§ 715, 716. It will be noted that the attempt in this case was to show hostility on the part of the witness, not toward a party to the case but toward *25 counsel for plaintiffs and a witness for the plaintiffs. In their brief plaintiffs cite upon this subject the cases of State v. Weston, 102 Or 102, 133, 201 P 1083; and State v. Ellsworth, 30 Or 145, 47 P 199. It will be noted that in each of these cases the question involved was the hostility of the witness toward a party, and not toward a witness or toward a party's counsel.
9. We believe the interjection of the inflammatory matter discussed under these three assignments of error was prejudicial to the rights of the defendants to a fair and impartial trial upon the real issues involved in the case. The interjection of this collateral matter, we believe, would divert the jury from the real and proper issues in the case. Questions which relate to inflammatory or scandalous matter, entirely collateral to the issues involved and which are likely to affect a jury improperly, clearly have no proper place in a fair investigation of the issues.
Defendants' assignments of error 8, 9 and 10 are sustained; the judgment appealed from is reversed and the cause is remanded for new trial.