Title: State v. Debrow
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2021AP001732-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 23, 2023

2023 WI 54 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP1732-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Eric J. Debrow, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 404 Wis. 2d 511, 979 N.W.2d 817 
(2022 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 23, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 17, 2023   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
John D. Hyland   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN, 
JJ., joined. ROGGENSACK, J., filed a concurring opinion in which 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by John A. Blimling, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by John A. Blimling, assistant attorney general.  
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Megan Lyneis, assistant state public defender. There was an oral 
argument by Megan Lyneis, assistant state public defender.  
 
 
2023 WI 54 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2021AP1732-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2018CF202) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Eric J. Debrow, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JUN 23, 2023 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN, 
JJ., joined. ROGGENSACK, J., filed a concurring opinion in which 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   Here we are asked to decide 
whether the circuit court1 erroneously exercised its discretion 
when it denied Eric J. Debrow's motion for a mistrial after a 
witness, who was testifying about his suspicion of Debrow, 
                                                 
1 The Honorable John D. Hyland of the Dane County Circuit 
Court presided. 
No. 
2021AP1732-CR   
 
2 
 
stated that he "looked on CCAP."2  Debrow believed this testimony 
implicated his prior sexual assault conviction, which the 
circuit court had already ruled inadmissible.  The court of 
appeals held that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion and reversed Debrow's conviction.  The State seeks 
review of the court of appeals' decision.  We conclude that the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when 
it denied Debrow's request for a mistrial.  Therefore, we 
reverse the court of appeals' decision and affirm the judgment 
of conviction. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
Debrow was charged with second-degree sexual assault 
of a child under the age of 16 as a persistent repeater3 after 
Mary,4 his girlfriend's daughter, reported that Debrow sexually 
assaulted her in January 2018.  Later, Debrow was additionally 
charged with first-degree sexual assault of a child under the 
age of 135 for the sexual assault of Nancy, Mary's sister.  The 
cases were consolidated for trial. 
                                                 
2 CCAP, which stands for Consolidated Court Automation 
Programs, makes certain information about circuit court and 
appellate court cases available to the public. 
3 See Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02(2) & 939.62(2m)(2017-18). 
4 To protect the privacy and dignity of the victims in this 
case, we refer to them using pseudonyms.  Wis. Stat. § 809.86 
(2021-22). 
5 See Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(e) (2017-18). 
No. 
2021AP1732-CR   
 
3 
 
¶3 
Prior to trial, Debrow sought to exclude evidence of 
his 2004 child sexual assault conviction on the grounds that its 
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice.  The State agreed, and the circuit court 
granted Debrow's motion to exclude the evidence. 
¶4 
At trial, the State first called Mary, who testified 
that Debrow was her mother's boyfriend and lived with the family 
in January 2018.  She reported that she awoke early in the 
morning on January 17, 2018 to a person "touching [her] butt and 
thigh," and that she was "100 percent" sure that person was 
Debrow.  Mary testified that she screamed, the dogs in the house 
started barking, and Debrow left her room. 
¶5 
When asked whether she had awoken to Debrow in her 
room before, Mary testified that she had once woken up to Debrow 
sitting on her bed, at which point Debrow told her, "shh, it's 
just a game," and directed her not to tell her mother.  Mary 
also testified that she had a conversation with her mother about 
what to do if "anything were to happen" in her room in the 
middle of the night, and that "the general consensus was that I 
would scream." 
¶6 
The State then called its second witness——Isaac, 
Mary's brother.  Isaac testified that as he was lying awake in 
bed on January 17th, he saw Debrow enter Mary's bedroom.  Five 
to ten minutes later, Isaac heard his sister scream and saw 
Debrow exit the room immediately after.  Isaac testified that he 
"had the feeling of something that was going on" and that he 
called the police after he got home from school that same day. 
No. 
2021AP1732-CR   
 
4 
 
¶7 
During 
Isaac's 
redirect 
examination, 
the 
State 
requested a sidebar.  During the sidebar, the State sought to 
ask Isaac leading questions about why he thought "something 
strange was going on inside of [Mary's] room."  The State 
explained that it wanted to rebut the idea that Isaac was 
"jumping to conclusions based on absolutely nothing."  According 
to the State, Isaac knew about Debrow's prior conviction, but he 
would avoid discussing it in accordance with the court's ruling.  
Instead, Isaac would testify as to why he was vigilant about 
Debrow and his sisters.  Debrow's counsel expressed concern that 
the proposed line of questioning would elicit inadmissible 
evidence concerning the 2004 conviction and indicated that he 
would move for a mistrial if Isaac gave "the wrong answer."  The 
court said it would allow the State to pursue its proposed line 
of questioning "in not a directly leading fashion but in a very 
direct or indirect but not leading manner."  The court also 
noted that it would be "on pins and needles as well to jump in" 
if Isaac began to reference the prior conviction. 
¶8 
Soon after the State's redirect of Isaac resumed, the 
following exchange occurred: 
[Prosecutor]: . . . At any point . . . had you learned 
anything or heard anything that led you to be on alert 
that night on January 17th of 2018? 
[Isaac]: Yes. 
Q And were those based on things your sisters had 
mentioned?  
A No.  
No. 
2021AP1732-CR   
 
5 
 
Q Are those things that you heard from your mom?  
A It's things that I --  
Q -- I don't want to get into that --  
(Unreportable simultaneous interjections by Counsel.)  
. . . .  
[Defense]: -- Objection, Your Honor. Objection, move 
to strike. Another motion in a minute. 
THE COURT: I'll -- I'll move to strike.  The question 
was were those things you heard from your mother, and 
if you can just give yes or no . . . .  We can't get 
into what they are, because that's hearsay. 
[Isaac]: Well, my mom did tell me --  
THE 
COURT: 
-- 
all 
right, 
that's 
fine. 
That's 
all . . . We can't -- we can't put her words into your 
mouth in front of the jury. That's why she's a witness 
if she testifies. 
[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, I have no further questions. 
The court then addressed the jury and gave the following 
curative instruction:  
THE COURT: . . . And -- and to the extent that -- as 
the State was -- was raising an interjection the 
answer beyond what he gave just now will be -- I'll 
direct the jury to strike anything else that they -- 
they heard beyond the witness's statement that he 
heard from his mother but not the content of anything. 
¶9 
After this exchange, the jury was excused, and the 
parties met to discuss Isaac's testimony.  Although the court 
reporter was unable to record Isaac's response to the State's 
question about why he was on alert, the parties and the court 
agreed that he said, "I looked on CCAP." 
¶10  Debrow moved for a mistrial on the grounds that 
Isaac's statement was inadmissible as it pertained to Debrow's 
No. 
2021AP1732-CR   
 
6 
 
prior sexual assault conviction.  More specifically, Debrow 
argued that the jury would assume that Isaac's reference to CCAP 
meant that Isaac had learned about Debrow's criminal record and 
that "it's going to be an easy assumption and leap to the idea 
that -- that what he found on CCAP was a sexual assault."  
Debrow argued that no curative instruction would be adequate to 
remedy the situation because the jury is "not going to unlearn 
what they learned."  In response, the State argued that the jury 
may not have heard the reference to CCAP over the interjection 
by the court and the attorneys, that the State had attempted to 
characterize the problem as a hearsay issue to draw the jury's 
attention away from the substance of the statement, and that a 
curative instruction would be "probably the most drastic thing 
that is necessary." 
¶11   The circuit court denied the motion for mistrial.  
It explained that the jury may not be familiar with CCAP, saying 
"to them, it might mean nothing," and emphasized that Isaac did 
not say what he found on CCAP.  The court continued "if any 
juror is thinking to themselves, well, I know on CCAP you can 
find out about any public court record, then they may be 
presuming criminal, they may be presuming small claims, they may 
be presuming civil, whatever –- divorce, whatever."  The circuit 
court concluded that "on this record with that minimal bit of 
information that the jury picked up upon if they were listening 
carefully . . . certainly doesn't say for example, well, I knew 
he had a prior conviction, I knew he had done this before." 
No. 
2021AP1732-CR   
 
7 
 
¶12 The circuit court further mentioned that the jury's 
attention was quickly directed to a possible hearsay issue 
rather than the substance of Isaac's statement, saying: "it was 
stopped based upon people pointing out that you can't get into 
hearsay, and not saying you can't say that, you can't say that 
part, but just -- but directing it towards a hearsay that can't 
be brought before the jury."  Finally, the circuit court then 
discussed available remedies, saying "we're open to striking, I 
already told them to strike anything, we're open to giving the 
instruction on striking, we're open to curative instructions 
that don't redirect their attention to it two days from now." 
¶13 The trial proceeded to its conclusion, and Debrow did 
not renew his motion for mistrial.  Debrow requested the 
standard jury instruction regarding stricken testimony at the 
close of trial, which was given, but he did not request any 
additional jury instructions specifically related to Isaac's 
testimony.  The jury convicted Debrow of second-degree sexual 
assault of Mary and acquitted him of the charges related to 
Nancy.  Consistent with the persistent repeater enhancer, the 
court 
sentenced 
Debrow 
to 
life 
imprisonment 
without 
the 
possibility of extended supervision.   
¶14 Debrow appealed the circuit court's denial of his 
mistrial motion.  In granting Debrow's request for a new trial, 
the court of appeals held that the circuit court's attempt at a 
curative instruction for Isaac's statement regarding CCAP was 
insufficient and therefore that "the circuit court erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
in 
denying 
Debrow's 
motion 
for 
No. 
2021AP1732-CR   
 
8 
 
mistrial."  State v. Debrow, No. 2021AP1732-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶36 (Wis. Ct. App. July 21, 2022).  We granted the State's 
petition for review and reverse the court of appeals' decision. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
¶15 When faced with a motion for mistrial, "the circuit 
court 
must 
decide, 
in 
light 
of 
the 
entire 
facts 
and 
circumstances, whether . . . the claimed error is sufficiently 
prejudicial to warrant a mistrial."  State v. Ford, 2007 WI 138, 
¶29, 306 Wis. 2d 1, 742 N.W.2d 61.  We review a circuit court's 
decision to grant or deny a motion for mistrial for an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  Id.  "An erroneous exercise of 
discretion may arise from an error in law or from the failure of 
the circuit court to base its decisions on the facts in the 
record."  Id., ¶28 (quoting State v. Raye, 2005 WI 68, ¶16, 281 
Wis. 2d 339, 697 N.W.2d 407).  "Discretion is not synonymous 
with decision-making.  Rather, the term contemplates a process 
of reasoning."  State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶3, 270 Wis. 2d 
535, 678 N.W.2d 197 (quoting McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 
277, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971)). 
¶16 Here, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise 
its discretion when it determined, in light of the facts and 
circumstances of the case, that Isaac's statement regarding CCAP 
was not so prejudicial as to warrant a mistrial.  Before the 
circuit 
court 
denied 
Debrow's 
mistrial 
motion, 
it 
first 
considered arguments and counterarguments from both parties, 
allowing each attorney ample time to make their case outside the 
presence of the jury.  The circuit court then considered the 
No. 
2021AP1732-CR   
 
9 
 
possible extent of prejudice to the defendant.  In finding the 
error was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial, 
the court highlighted two things.  First, it was not reasonable 
to assume that Isaac's statement regarding CCAP would lead a 
juror to infer that Debrow had a prior sexual assault 
conviction.  Second, Isaac's statement was mitigated when the 
circuit court immediately struck the testimony and drew the 
jury's attention away from the substance of Isaac's statement 
and towards a hearsay issue. 
¶17 The 
circuit 
court 
also 
considered 
the 
various 
alternatives to what it correctly deemed the "most serious of 
remedies," a mistrial.  It concluded that striking the testimony 
was appropriate, which it had already done.  The circuit court 
also invited the defense to request an appropriate jury 
instruction.  However, the defense requested only the standard 
jury instruction regarding stricken testimony at the close of 
trial. 
¶18 All 
of 
this 
evinces 
an 
appropriate 
process 
of 
reasoning. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
considered 
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances in the record, heard arguments from both parties, 
assessed available remedies, and concluded that the error was 
not so prejudicial as to warrant a mistrial.  No error of law is 
evident.  As such, we conclude that the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion in denying Debrow's request for 
mistrial. 
¶19 The court of appeals reached a different result and 
erroneously focused on the sufficiency of the court's curative 
No. 
2021AP1732-CR   
 
10 
 
instruction to "strike anything else that they [the jury] -- 
they heard beyond the witness's statement that he heard from his 
mother but not the content of anything," rather than whether the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in denying 
Debrow's mistrial motion.  See Debrow, No. 2021AP1732-CR, at ¶36 
(Wis. Ct. App. July 21, 2022) ("The court's attempts to cure the 
prejudicial effect of this testimony were insufficient and did 
not properly instruct the jury to disregard that testimony when 
deliberating.").  The question of whether the court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in denying the mistrial is separate 
from the question of whether its instruction actually cured the 
error.  Debrow challenged the court's decision to deny a 
mistrial.  He did not alternatively challenge the adequacy of 
the court's curative instruction, so that issue is not before us 
today. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶20 The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in denying Debrow's mistrial motion.  It considered 
the facts and circumstances of the case, heard arguments from 
both sides, considered alternative remedies, and determined that 
the error was not so prejudicial as to warrant a mistrial.  
Accordingly, the court of appeals' decision is reversed.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
  
No.  2021AP1732-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶21 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   (concurring).  A jury 
convicted Eric J. Debrow of second-degree sexual assault of a 
child under the age of 16 at the conclusion of a three-day 
trial.1  Debrow moved for a mistrial following the second 
witness's testimony, which the circuit court denied.  The court 
of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that the 
jury instruction given was insufficient to address the prejudice 
caused by the second witness's statement.2   
¶22 I conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in denying Debrow's mistrial motion when 
reviewed in light of the entire trial, including the sufficiency 
of the jury instruction.  Accordingly, I would reverse the court 
of appeals decision and conclude that Debrow is not entitled to 
a new trial.   
¶23 I concur in the result reached by the majority 
opinion, but I do not join the opinion.  It lacks a full 
analysis of the entire proceeding, which is necessary in 
addressing the court of appeals' reversal of the circuit court.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶24 On January 17, 2018, officers from the City of Madison 
Police Department responded to Debrow's residence to investigate 
the sexual assault of a child that Debrow reportedly committed 
earlier that day.  At the time of his arrest, Debrow resided 
                                                 
1 The Honorable John D. Hyland of the Dane County Circuit 
Court presided. 
2 State v. Debrow, No. 2021AP1732-CR, unpublished slip op., 
¶4 (Wis. Ct. App. July 21, 2022). 
No.  2021AP1732-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
with his girlfriend, Kathy,3 and her three children:  Isaac, 17; 
Mary, 13; and Nancy, 11.   
¶25 Debrow was charged with second-degree sexual assault 
of a child under the age of 16 based on the report that he had 
touched Mary's buttocks in the early morning.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(2).  Due to a prior 2004 conviction for child sexual 
assault, Debrow also was charged as a persistent repeater 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m)(a) and (b), which imposes a 
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of 
parole.  The State later charged Debrow in a separate case with 
first-degree sexual assault of a child under the age of 13 as a 
persistent 
repeater 
contrary 
to 
§§ 948.02(1)(e) 
and 
939.62(2m)(a) and (b) for sexual assault of Nancy.  The two 
cases were consolidated for trial.4  Debrow pled not guilty to 
all charges. 
¶26 The circuit court ruled on a number of motions in 
limine prior to the jury trial.  Relevant to our review, the 
court granted Debrow's motion to exclude evidence of his 2004 
conviction 
of 
child 
sexual 
assault 
on 
grounds 
that 
the 
                                                 
3 I use pseudonyms for the victims and their family members 
in this case pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 950.04(dr) and § (Rule) 
809.86 (2021-22).  For consistency, I use the same pseudonyms 
the parties used before this court.   
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 Because Debrow challenges his conviction on charges 
relevant to Mary alone, I do not address the merits or evidence 
related to Debrow's charges related to Nancy.   
No.  2021AP1732-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
conviction was more prejudicial than probative.  The State 
agreed the conviction was "too prejudicial."  
¶27 Trial commenced, and Mary was the first witness.  She 
testified that Debrow came into the bedroom she shared with 
Nancy early one morning.  Mary disclosed that she woke to Debrow 
massaging or gripping her buttocks over her clothes, and that he 
rubbed her thighs as she slept on her stomach.  Mary stated she 
screamed at Debrow to get out "numerous times at the top of 
[her] lungs," and the dogs started barking.  After she screamed, 
Debrow stopped touching her and left her bedroom.  She explained 
she knew Debrow rather than Isaac was the person in her bedroom 
because of identifiable physical differences between the two 
men.   
¶28 Mary also testified that on an earlier occasion she 
woke to find Debrow sitting on her bed, and Debrow said, "[S]hh, 
it's just a game . . . you don't have to tell your mom about 
it."  She did not tell her mom that Debrow was in her bedroom 
that first time.  However, based on conversations with her 
mother, Mary testified that she was instructed to scream "if 
anything were to happen" in her bedroom.  The defense cross-
examined Mary about interviews she gave as part of the 
investigation, and she admitted that she had told Debrow many 
times that she "did not like him."  Mary stated that she did not 
want to be thinking about Debrow touching her.  
¶29 Isaac testified next.  Although Isaac knew Debrow had 
been convicted of child sexual assault in 2004, Isaac also was 
aware that he could not testify about Debrow's prior conviction 
No.  2021AP1732-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
"unless and until" the court allowed the prosecutor to bring it 
up.  Isaac testified he lay awake in bed early one morning with 
his bedroom door open, and he saw Debrow enter the girls' room.  
Five to ten minutes later, Isaac heard Mary repeatedly scream 
"get out," the dogs began to bark, and Isaac saw Debrow leave 
his sisters' bedroom.   
¶30 Isaac testified that he called the police later that 
afternoon to report Debrow, even though he did not hear anything 
from the room besides Mary yelling "get out," and his sisters 
did not mention anything to him.  Isaac stated he "wanted to 
call the police the whole day when [he] was at school" and that 
he "had the feeling of something that was going on."  Isaac said 
that when he got home from school he told his mom and Debrow 
that he was going to call police, and Debrow told him not to 
call the police.  Isaac testified that Debrow was like "a father 
figure until all this stuff happened," after which Isaac did not 
like Debrow anymore.  Isaac stated he and Debrow had gotten into 
physical altercations on six occasions.  
¶31 During Isaac's re-direct, the State requested a 
sidebar in which it expressed its desire to provide the jury an 
explanation for why Isaac thought "something strange was going 
on inside of [his sisters'] room," and why he later called the 
police; the prosecution wanted to show that Isaac did not 
"jump[] to conclusions based on absolutely nothing."   
¶32 Subsequent to a lengthy sidebar, in which Debrow 
contended the State's proposed inquiry would surely bring out 
"evidence that had already been ruled inadmissible," the court 
No.  2021AP1732-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
allowed the State to pursue its proposed line of questioning "in 
a very direct or indirect but not leading manner."  The court 
noted the State should be cautious, and that it would sustain 
any defense objections because the defense already opposed the 
line of questioning.  The court stated it would be on "pins and 
needles [and would] jump in" if Isaac started to testify about 
the 2004 conviction.  The defense made its intent clear to move 
for a mistrial if Isaac gave the "wrong answer."   
¶33 After three questions, defense counsel objected:   
[Prosecutor]: . . . At any point . . . had you learned 
anything or heard anything that led you to be on alert 
that night on January 17th of 2018? 
[Isaac]:  Yes. 
Q  And were those based on things your sisters had 
mentioned? 
A  No. 
Q  Are those things that you heard from your mom? 
A  It's things that I –- 
Q  -- I don't want to get into that –- 
(Unreportable 
simultaneous 
interjections 
by 
Counsel.) 
. . . .  
[Defense]:  -- Objection, Your Honor.  Objection, 
move to strike.  Another motion in a minute. 
THE COURT:  I'll – I'll move to strike.  
. . . . 
[Isaac]:  Well, my mom did tell me –-  
THE COURT:  -- all right, that's fine.  That's 
all.   
No.  2021AP1732-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
. . . . 
We can't -– we can't put her words into your 
mouth in front of the jury.  That's why she's a 
witness if she testifies. 
. . . . 
[Prosecutor]:  Your Honor, I have no further 
questions. 
THE COURT:  . . .  And –- and to the extent that 
–- as the State was –- was raising an interjection the 
answer beyond what he gave just now will be –- I'll 
direct the jury to strike anything else that they –- 
they heard beyond the witness's statement that he 
heard from his mother but not the content of anything. 
The jury was excused for the day.  
¶34 Outside 
the 
presence 
of 
the 
jury, 
the 
parties 
discussed what occurred.  Although the court reporter did not 
catch what Isaac said, the parties agreed they heard Isaac say 
"I looked on CCAP," which is the Consolidated Court Automation 
Programs.  Among other things, CCAP enables the public to access 
some information about circuit court and appellate cases.  The 
court stated "the jury couldn't possibly have heard anything 
else."   
¶35 Debrow moved for a mistrial.  He argued that the jury 
would assume Isaac found information about a prior sexual 
assault on CCAP, and that the assumption would be so "damaging" 
that "there's no way around it," the jury cannot "unlearn what 
they learned."  Debrow asserted striking the statement or a 
curative instruction would be insufficient to remedy Isaac's 
statement.   
¶36 The State argued that it was hard to know "what, if 
any, of that the jury could have heard and made out."  
No.  2021AP1732-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
Accordingly, the State's position was that the statement did not 
require a mistrial or even a curative instruction; striking the 
statement would sufficiently cure any error.   
¶37 Following a lengthy colloquy in which both parties 
developed their positions, the court acknowledged that mistrial 
is "the most serious of remedies."  In initially denying 
Debrow's motion for mistrial, the circuit court placed its 
reasons for denial on the record, which I discuss below.  The 
court stated that, upon Debrow's request, it was "open to giving 
the instruction on striking" and "open to curative instructions 
that don't redirect [the jury's] attention to it two days from 
now."   
¶38 The trial proceeded for two more days, during which 
Nancy, Kathy, two officers, and two detectives testified for the 
State.  Nancy testified that on January 17, 2018, her sister 
woke her up because she screamed "get out," and Nancy saw a 
"shadow go outside the room and the door closed."  Nancy 
identified the shadow as Debrow because of physical differences 
between Debrow and Isaac.   
¶39 Kathy testified she had a "ground rule" that the boys 
and girls were not allowed in each others' bedrooms, and Kathy 
instructed the girls to be loud enough to "wake all of Madison 
up" if something were to happen.  The State read and published 
to the jury text messages between Kathy and Debrow.  The State 
also played a recorded phone call Debrow made to Kathy from 
jail.  In both the text messages and the phone call, Kathy 
confronted Debrow about a pornographic video he had watched, the 
No.  2021AP1732-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
graphic title of which implied a stepfather sexually abusing a 
stepdaughter while his wife was asleep. 
¶40 An officer testified he informed Debrow of probable 
cause to charge him with second-degree sexual assault of a child 
as he arrested Debrow.  Debrow asked the officer why it "had to 
be 
second-degree . . . and 
not 
just 
fourth 
degree 
sexual 
assault," which the officer clarified for the jury is a 
misdemeanor 
involving 
nonconsensual 
sexual 
contact 
between 
adults.   
¶41 A 
detective 
testified 
that 
she 
knew 
Mary 
from 
occasions prior to Debrow's arrest, and that she responded to 
the apartment on January 17, 2018.  The detective stated that 
once Mary recognized her, Mary "put[] her head in [the 
detective's] chest and cried for about a minute-and-a-half."  
Another detective testified that the girls each had a Safe 
Harbor interview.5   
¶42 Debrow did not testify, and the defense did not call 
any witnesses.  Debrow did not renew his motion for mistrial at 
the circuit court; however, he appealed contending that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in denying 
his motion for mistrial.  The defense also did not challenge or 
request a specially drafted jury instruction related to Isaac's 
testimony.  The jury convicted Debrow of second-degree sexual 
                                                 
5 Safe Harbor is a child advocacy center that provides for 
the forensic interviewing of children who are victims of sexual 
and physical abuse.  Safe Harbor forensic interviews are video-
recorded for court use, though children are still required to 
testify. 
No.  2021AP1732-CR.pdr 
 
9 
 
assault of Mary, but acquitted him for the charges related to 
Nancy.  Consistent with the persistent repeater enhancer, the 
court 
sentenced 
Debrow 
to 
life 
imprisonment 
without 
the 
possibility of parole.   
¶43 Relevant to our review, the court of appeals concluded 
Isaac's statement, "I looked on CCAP," was unfairly prejudicial 
to Debrow, and that the court's instruction relevant to Isaac's 
testimony was insufficient.  It therefore concluded that "the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in denying 
Debrow's motion for a mistrial."6  The court of appeals granted 
Debrow a new trial.  The State petitioned us for review.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶44 "A motion for mistrial is committed to the sound 
discretion of the circuit court."  State v. Ford, 2007 WI 138, 
¶28, 306 Wis. 2d 1, 742 N.W.2d 61.  In ruling on a motion for 
mistrial, a circuit court determines "in light of the whole 
proceeding, 
whether 
the 
claimed 
error 
was 
sufficiently 
prejudicial" to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.  State v. 
Ross, 2003 WI App 27, ¶47, 260 Wis. 2d 291, 659 N.W.2d 122; 
State v. Sigarroa, 2004 WI App 16, ¶24, 269 Wis. 2d 234, 674 
N.W.2d 894.  See also Ford, 306 Wis. 2d 1, ¶29; State v. Doss, 
2008 WI 93, ¶¶69-71, 312 Wis. 2d 570, 754 N.W.2d 150.  "An 
erroneous exercise of discretion may arise from an error in law 
or from the failure of the circuit court to base its decisions 
                                                 
6 State v. Debrow, No. 2021AP1732-CR, ¶36. 
No.  2021AP1732-CR.pdr 
 
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on the facts in the record."  State v. Raye, 2005 WI 68, ¶16, 
281 Wis. 2d 339, 697 N.W.2d 407.   
B.  Debrow's Motion for Mistrial 
¶45 The Constitution does not guarantee an error-free 
trial, United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1983), 
and not all errors warrant a mistrial.  In order to preserve 
review of a claimed evidentiary error, the disadvantaged party 
must make a contemporaneous objection and move for a mistrial.  
State v. Guzman, 2001 WI App 54, ¶25, 241 Wis. 2d 310, 624 
N.W.717.  When improper evidence comes before the jury, the 
circuit 
court 
decides 
whether 
a 
curative 
instruction 
is 
necessary as part of the exercise of its discretion in ruling on 
a mistrial motion.  Sigarroa, 269 Wis. 2d 234, ¶¶24-26.  "[T]he 
law prefers less drastic alternatives [than mistrials], if 
available and practical."  State v. Adams, 221 Wis. 2d 1, 17, 
584 N.W.2d 695 (Ct. App. 1998).  
¶46 Accordingly, I review 
whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in determining that Isaac's 
statement fell short of the high prejudicial bar to warrant a 
mistrial.7  Sigarroa, 269 Wis. 2d 234, ¶27.  As part of this 
review, I examine the sufficiency of the jury instructions 
relative to the objected-to testimony.  Hardison v. State, 61 
Wis. 2d 262, 273, 212 N.W.2d 103 (1973).   
                                                 
7 Neither party argues that Isaac's statement rises to 
structural 
error; 
therefore, 
automatic 
reversal 
is 
not 
appropriate.  State v. Ford, 2007 WI 138, ¶42, 306 Wis. 2d 1, 
742 N.W.2d (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 
(1999)). 
No.  2021AP1732-CR.pdr 
 
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¶47 We previously have explained that sound discretion 
includes "acting in a deliberate manner taking sufficient time" 
to 
respond 
to 
a 
request, 
giving 
both 
parties 
a 
"full 
opportunity" 
to 
argue 
their 
positions, 
and 
"considering 
alternatives such as a curative instruction or sanctioning 
counsel."  State v. Seefeldt, 2003 WI 47, ¶36, 261 Wis. 2d 383, 
661 N.W.2d 822.  A court that "reason[s] its way to a rational 
conclusion" while considering the relevant law and facts 
exercises sound discretion.  Id.  See generally State v. Moeck, 
2005 WI 57, ¶¶43, 72, 280 Wis. 2d 277, 695 N.W.2d 783.  The 
question is not whether we would have reasoned identically to 
the circuit court, but rather, whether the court arrived at its 
conclusion "by the consideration of the relevant law, the facts, 
and a process of logical reasoning."  Hartung v. Hartung, 102 
Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981).   
¶48 Directly following Debrow's mistrial motion, both 
parties argued their positions at length outside the presence of 
the jury, with considerable counterargument from both sides.  In 
short, both parties had a "full opportunity" to advance their 
arguments, and the court devoted sufficient time to the issue.  
It also weighed "less drastic" alternatives to address the 
"blurted out" and "stopped" statement.  The court noted 
striking, which it had done, and a curative instruction were 
available alternatives.   
¶49 The circuit court further reasoned there was no way to 
know whether any of the jurors were familiar with CCAP.  A juror 
who was familiar with CCAP may have had familiarity due to small 
No.  2021AP1732-CR.pdr 
 
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claims, civil, divorce, or other court record, not necessarily a 
criminal 
conviction. 
 
In 
addition, 
Isaac's 
response 
was 
overridden 
by 
directing 
the 
jury's 
attention 
to 
hearsay 
concerns.  All of those reasons "lessen[ed] the necessity of 
granting" Debrow's mistrial motion.  Lastly, the circuit court 
stated it could not grant a mistrial for "that minimal bit of 
information" that the jury may have heard.   
¶50 The court correctly noted that Isaac's interrupted 
testimony did not state anything about a prior criminal 
conviction, let alone a conviction for sexual assault of a 
child.  Although Debrow argues the phrase "I looked on CCAP" 
leads to a string of inferences necessarily culminating in the 
most prejudicial assumption, we have said before that "this 
court cannot assume that more specific information of a 
prejudicial nature was involved."  Johnson v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 
344, 366, 249 N.W.2d 593 (1977).  Instead, the focus must remain 
on whether the error was so prejudicial that the only remedy 
capable of addressing it is granting a mistrial.  See generally 
Lobermeier v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Wis., 119 Wis. 2d 129, 136, 349 
N.W.2d 466 (1984).  See also McClinton v. State, 464 S.W.3d 913, 
914 (Ark. 2015) ("Declaring a mistrial is proper only where the 
error is beyond repair and cannot be corrected by any curative 
relief.").  Here, the court properly exercised its discretion by 
unpacking the string of potential inferences to conclude Isaac's 
comment was capable of remedy by less drastic means. 
¶51 The circuit court appropriately, but narrowly, based 
its decision on the record before it.  Factually, all we have 
No.  2021AP1732-CR.pdr 
 
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here is the statement, "I looked on CCAP."  The court reporter 
did not capture this statement because of "[u]nreportable 
simultaneous interjections by Counsel."  That is a far cry from 
disclosure that in 2004 Debrow was convicted of sexual assault 
of a child.  
¶52 However, more analysis is needed because whether the 
circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion when 
denying a motion for mistrial includes assessing whether the 
circuit court gave reasoned consideration to the possibility of 
a curative instruction relative to the claimed error.  State v. 
Williams, 2004 WI App 56, ¶31 n.3, 270 Wis. 2d 761, 677 N.W.2d 
691.  In Moeck, 280 Wis. 2d 277, we again addressed the 
importance of cures other than mistrial for errors during trial.  
We concluded that "the circuit court did not exercise sound 
discretion in declaring a mistrial when it failed to give 
adequate consideration to the State's ability to refer to the 
defendant's silence and to the effectiveness of a curative jury 
instruction."  Id., ¶71.   
¶53 In Debrow's trial, I conclude that review of the 
complained-of statement in the context of the whole proceeding 
confirms that the statement was not so prejudicial as to affect 
the fairness of his trial.  One central question with mistrials 
"is 
to 
determine 
under 
the 
facts 
if 
the 
error 
is 
prejudicial . . . in light of the whole proceeding.  If the 
evidence presented in a case was extremely weak and the same 
error occurred, it could justifiably be deemed grounds for a 
mistrial."  Oseman v. State, 32 Wis. 2d 523, 528-29, 145 N.W.2d 
No.  2021AP1732-CR.pdr 
 
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766 (1966).  See also Ford, 306 Wis. 2d 1, ¶50; Adams, 221 
Wis. 2d at 17.  Therefore, I consider the strength of the 
State's evidence against Debrow and the sufficiency of the 
instruction given to the jury that relates to Isaac's testimony.  
¶54 Mary, Isaac, Nancy, and Kathy consistently testified 
that on the morning of January 17, 2018, Mary repeatedly 
screamed "get out," which caused the dogs to bark.  Mary, Nancy, 
and Isaac all identified Debrow as in the girls' bedroom when 
that happened, and the sisters both explained how they knew the 
person in their room was Debrow.  Testimony from officers and 
detectives who interviewed Mary as part of the investigation 
confirmed that Mary's account of Debrow's actions had been 
consistent. 
¶55 The jury heard Mary testify that she woke to find 
Debrow in her room on a prior occasion, but that he told her 
"it's just a game, [so] you don't have to tell your mom."  Mary 
did not tell Kathy.  Mary and Kathy both testified that Kathy 
had instructed her daughters to scream if anything of concern 
were to happen in their bedroom.  Kathy testified that there was 
a "rule" in the home prohibiting the girls and boys from 
entering one another's bedrooms.   
¶56 The jury heard a phone recording in which Debrow told 
Kathy, "I got something in my mind that I need help," and in 
which Kathy confronted Debrow about a pornographic video he had 
watched, the graphic title of which implied a stepfather 
sexually abusing a stepdaughter while his wife was asleep.  
Jurors saw text messages about the same conversations.   
No.  2021AP1732-CR.pdr 
 
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¶57 An 
officer 
testified 
that 
Debrow 
specifically 
questioned the degree of sexual assault for which he was 
arrested——asking why it was second-degree and not fourth.   
¶58 Jurors also heard impeachment evidence.  For instance, 
they heard Mary and Isaac state they did not like Debrow.  Isaac 
disclosed that he and Debrow had gotten into multiple physical 
altercations, and Kathy testified that she and Debrow got back 
together briefly some weeks after the January 2018 incident, 
although they were not together at the time of trial.  
¶59 The circuit court offered to consider a specially 
drafted curative instruction that Debrow did not request when 
counsel and the court had their instructions conference.  The 
court also offered standard Civil Jury Instruction 150, which 
was given and provided:  "During the trial, the Court has 
ordered certain testimony to be stricken.  Disregard all 
stricken testimony."  This instruction 
directly addressed 
Isaac's testimony which was stricken as soon as it was given.   
¶60 Last, the jury simultaneously convicted Debrow for 
assaulting Mary while it acquitted him of assaulting Nancy.  
Accordingly, when considered in the context of the "whole 
proceeding," it is "quite clear" that whatever prejudice the 
statement "I looked on CCAP" may have caused Debrow, it fell 
short of the high bar to warrant a mistrial.  Oseman, 32 Wis. 2d 
at 529.  "[N]o reasonable jury could have fairly come to any 
other decision."  Id. at 530.   
C.  Court of Appeals Decision 
No.  2021AP1732-CR.pdr 
 
16 
 
¶61 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
the 
jury 
instruction was insufficient to ameliorate Isaac's statement and 
therefore Debrow was entitled to a new trial.  See State v. 
Debrow, 
No. 2021AP1732-CR, 
unpublished 
slip 
op., 
¶36 
(Wis. Ct. App. July 21, 2022) ("The court's attempts to cure the 
prejudicial effect of this testimony were insufficient and did 
not properly instruct the jury to disregard that testimony when 
deliberating.").  Debrow did request standard Civil Jury 
Instruction 150, which was given and focuses on Isaac's 
testimony because his statement was stricken immediately on 
Debrow's objection and motion for a mistrial.  I conclude under 
the entire proceedings, Instruction 150 was sufficient. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶62 A jury convicted Debrow of second-degree sexual 
assault of a child under the age of 16 following a three-day 
trial.  Debrow moved for a mistrial at the conclusion of the 
second witness's testimony, which the circuit court denied.  I 
conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in denying Debrow's mistrial motion when reviewed in 
light of the entire trial, including the sufficiency of the jury 
instruction.  Accordingly, I would reverse the court of appeals 
decision and conclude that Debrow is not entitled to a new 
trial.   
¶63 I concur in the result reached by the majority 
opinion, but I do not join the opinion.  It lacks a full 
analysis of the entire proceeding, which is necessary in 
addressing the court of appeals reversal of the circuit court. 
No.  2021AP1732-CR.pdr 
 
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¶64 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2021AP1732-CR.pdr 
 
 
 
1