Title: A.T. v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 49S02-1201-JV-26
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: January 18, 2012

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE  
Patricia Caress McMath 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ryan D. Johanningsmeier 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S02-1201-JV-26 
 
A.T., 
 
Appellant (Respondent below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
Appellee (Petitioner below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49D09-1004-JD-1002 
The Honorable Gary Chavers, Judge Pro Tempore 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-1012-JV-1394 
_________________________________ 
 
January 18, 2012 
 
 
Per Curiam. 
 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Jan 18 2012, 10:58 am
 
 
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A.T. was adjudicated delinquent for an act that would be felony murder if committed by 
an adult, and the juvenile court ordered both a determinate and an indeterminate commitment to 
the Department of Correction.  A.T. appealed his determinate commitment only, and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed.  A.T. v. State, 953 N.E.2d 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).   
 
 
A.T.’s determinate commitment was imposed pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-37-19-
9(b) (“section 9”), which we recently explained is “a determinate commitment statute that is 
applicable to juvenile offenders who are sex or violent offenders and who fit certain other 
criteria.”  D.C. v. State, 958 N.E.2d 757, 761 (Ind. 2011).  Section 9 provides that “[a]fter a 
juvenile court makes a determination under IC 11-8-8-5,” a determinate commitment may be 
imposed for juveniles of certain ages who commit certain offenses.  Section 11-8-8-5, in turn, 
involves sex and violent offender registrations.  It is undisputed in this case that A.T.’s age and 
his delinquent act meet the criteria of section 9, but it also is undisputed that A.T. has not been 
determined to be a sex or violent offender under section 11-8-8-5.   
 
 
The Court of Appeals, following its decision in B.K.C. v. State, 781 N.E.2d 1157 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2003), trans. not sought, interpreted section 9 in a manner that chose to ignore the 
introductory phrase “[a]fter a juvenile court makes a determination under IC 11-8-8-5,” which 
the Court of Appeals opined was necessary “to give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature 
and to avoid a construction that would be an absurdity.”  A.T., 953 N.E.2d at 494 (quoting 
B.K.C., 781 N.E.2d at 1167). 
 
 
We recently addressed a similar issue in D.C.  There, while acknowledging that the 
applicable statutes, as written, seemed antithetical to the purpose of the statutes, we emphasized 
that we were bound by the clear and unambiguous statutory language.  D.C., 958 N.E.2d at 764 
(“We leave it to the legislature to change the statutes, if it deems necessary.”)   
 
 
Although D.C. involved a determinate commitment imposed under a different section, the 
same rationale applies here.  A determinate commitment may be imposed under section 9 only 
“[a]fter a juvenile court makes a determination under IC 11-8-8-5[.]”  This language is plain and 
 
 
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unambiguous.  Because A.T. does not meet the criteria of section 9, a determinate commitment 
under that section may not be imposed. 
 
 
Transfer having been granted by separate order, we reverse the trial court’s dispositional 
order and remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate that portion of its order committing 
A.T. to the Department of Correction until his eighteenth birthday. 
 
  
All Justices concur.