Title: State v. Bentdahl
Citation: 2013 WI 106
Docket Number: 2012AP001426
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 27, 2013

2013 WI 106 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP1426   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the matter of the refusal of Brandon H. 
Bentdahl: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Brandon H. Bentdahl, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 345 Wis. 2d 848, 826 N.W.2d 123 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Unpublished)  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 27, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 15, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Michael C. Sanders, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general, and 
oral argument by Michael C. Sanders.  
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief by Barry S. 
Cohen, and Barry S. Cohen, S.C., Elkhart Lake, and oral argument 
by Barry S. Cohen.  
 
 
 
2013 WI 106
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2012AP1426 
(L.C. No. 
2010TR8034R) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of the refusal of Brandon H. 
Bentdahl: 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Brandon H. Bentdahl, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 27, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Modified and 
affirmed and, as modified, cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished court of appeals' decision that reversed the circuit 
court.1  The petitioner, the State, asks this court to determine 
                                                 
1 State v. Bentdahl, No. 2012AP1426, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2012). 
No. 
2012AP1426   
 
2 
 
whether State v. Brooks2 applies when a defendant fails to 
request a refusal hearing within the statutory ten-day time 
limit and chooses to plead not guilty to the underlying 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) or OWI-related 
offense.  The State further asks this court to determine whether 
Brooks continues to be good law considering Wisconsin's implied 
consent statute, Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (2009-10).3 
¶2 
 This case arises from Brandon H. Bentdahl's refusal 
to consent to chemical testing to determine his blood alcohol 
level at the time of his November 17, 2010, arrest for OWI and 
operating 
with 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration 
(PAC).  
Bentdahl pleaded not guilty to the OWI and PAC charges; he did 
not request a hearing on the refusal charge within the ten-day 
time limit. 
¶3 
After a jury acquitted Bentdahl of the OWI and PAC 
charges, the Columbia County Circuit Court, the Honorable Alan 
J. White, presiding, granted Bentdahl's motion to dismiss the 
refusal charge.  It held that an alleged sloppily written date 
on the notice informing Bentdahl of the State's intent to revoke 
his operating privileges for his refusal, which he received at 
the time of his OWI/PAC arrest, both deprived him of proper 
                                                 
2 State v. Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d 347, 335 N.W.2d 354 (1983).  
In Brooks, this court upheld a circuit court's discretionary 
decision to dismiss a refusal charge when the defendant had 
already pleaded guilty to the underlying OWI charge by the time 
of his refusal hearing.  Id. at 348. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
2012AP1426   
 
3 
 
notice and deprived the circuit court of proper jurisdiction.  
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's finding of 
improper notice, but remanded the case to the circuit court for 
that court to exercise its discretion as to whether to dismiss 
the refusal charge.   
¶4 
The State appealed, arguing that the court of appeals 
improperly extended the holding in Brooks when, relying on 
Brooks, it instructed the circuit court to determine whether it 
would exercise its discretion to dismiss the refusal charge.  
The State asks this court to hold that Brooks does not extend to 
situations where a defendant is acquitted of the underlying OWI 
and OWI-related charge at trial.  In addition, the State asks 
this court to clarify whether Brooks is still good law. 
¶5 
Bentdahl argues that these questions are not properly 
before this court.  He maintains that the court of appeals' 
decision was not adverse to the State and the State cannot 
appeal such a decision.  As we will address, we conclude that 
the court of appeals' decision was, in part, adverse to the 
State; therefore, the State may appeal.  In addition, Bentdahl 
argues that this case is not ripe for review and that the unique 
facts of this case make review unnecessary; however, these 
arguments are both undeveloped.  Typically, this court does not 
address undeveloped arguments, State v. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶28, 
n.13, 345 Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87, and we decline to do so in 
this instance.     
¶6 
We do not review the court of appeals' decision that 
notice was proper in this case, since that issue is not before 
No. 
2012AP1426   
 
4 
 
us.  The State's petition for review asked this court to address 
two issues related to State v. Brooks.  While Bentdahl opposed 
the State's petition for review, he did not ask this court to 
review the portion of the court of appeals' decision that found 
proper notice.  Additionally, neither party sets forth any 
argument regarding notice in the briefing to this court.   
¶7 
We conclude that the court of appeals improperly 
extended the holding of Brooks, when it held that a circuit 
court could dismiss a refusal charge under the circumstances 
presented by this case.  Under Brooks, a circuit court has the 
discretionary authority to dismiss a refusal charge only if the 
defendant has already pleaded guilty to the underlying OWI or 
OWI-related charge by the time of his or her refusal hearing, 
which was timely requested.  Extending Brooks to allow circuit 
courts the discretionary authority to dismiss refusal charges in 
cases where a defendant has pleaded not guilty to the underlying 
OWI, PAC, or other related charge would contravene the purpose 
of Wis. Stat. § 343.305, Wisconsin's implied consent statute.  
In other words, Brooks, which is longstanding precedent of this 
court, applies only when a defendant meets two requirements.  
Namely, a defendant must request a refusal hearing within the 
statutory ten-day time limit and must plead guilty to the 
underlying OWI or OWI-related charge.   
¶8 
The language of Wis. Stat. § 343.305(10) and our 
recent interpretation of that language in Vill. of Elm Grove v. 
No. 
2012AP1426   
 
5 
 
Brefka4  make clear that a circuit court has no discretionary 
authority to dismiss a refusal charge when a defendant fails to 
request a refusal hearing within the statutory ten-day time 
period.  Therefore we remand this case to the circuit court with 
instructions to impose the applicable penalties, including 
revocation of Bentdahl's operating privileges, due to his 
refusal to consent to chemical testing at the time of his 
OWI/PAC arrest, and his failure to request a refusal hearing 
within the statutory time period.  
I. 
Background 
¶9 
The facts of this case are undisputed.  On November 
17, 2010, a Portage police officer arrested Bentdahl for OWI and 
PAC violations.  
The officer read Bentdahl all of the 
information required by Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4),5  by using what 
is known as the "Informing the Accused" form.  Bentdahl refused 
the officer's request that he consent to a blood test, which is 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2).6  The officer transported 
                                                 
4 Vill. of Elm Grove v. Brefka, 2013 WI 54, 348 Wis. 2d 282, 
832 N.W.2d 121 (2013). 
5 Section 343.305(4) provides, in part, "If you refuse to 
take any test that this agency requests, your operating 
privilege will be revoked and you will be subject to other 
penalties." 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(2) provides: 
No. 
2012AP1426   
 
6 
 
Bentdahl to a local hospital, where hospital staff obtained a 
blood sample without incident. 
¶10 Following the blood draw, the officer gave Bentdahl 
notice of intent to revoke his operating privileges as required 
by Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9).7  Bentdahl did not request a hearing 
on the refusal charge within the ten-day time limit set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)-(10).  Therefore, the circuit court 
revoked his operating privileges on December 17, 2010. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Implied consent. Any person who is on duty time with 
respect to a commercial motor vehicle or drives or 
operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of 
this state, or in those areas enumerated in s. 346.61, 
is deemed to have given consent to one or more tests 
of his or her breath, blood or urine, for the purpose 
of determining the presence or quantity in his or her 
blood or breath, of alcohol, controlled substances, 
controlled substance analogs or other drugs, or any 
combination 
of 
alcohol, 
controlled 
substances, 
controlled substance analogs and other drugs, when 
requested to do so by a law enforcement officer under 
sub. (3) (a) or (am) or when required to do so under 
sub. (3) (ar) or (b). Any such tests shall be 
administered upon the request of a law enforcement 
officer. The law enforcement agency by which the 
officer is employed shall be prepared to administer, 
either at its agency or any other agency or facility, 
2 of the 3 tests under sub. (3) (a), (am), or (ar), 
and may designate which of the tests shall be 
administered first. 
7 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)4., part of the notice 
given to Bentdahl contains the following language: 
That 
the 
person 
may 
request 
a 
hearing 
on 
the 
revocation within 10 days by mailing or delivering a 
written 
request 
to 
the 
court 
whose 
address 
is 
specified in the notice.  If no request for a hearing 
is received within the 10-day period, the revocation 
period commences 30 days after the notice is issued.   
No. 
2012AP1426   
 
7 
 
¶11 Bentdahl pleaded not guilty to the underlying OWI and 
PAC charges.  On January 5, 2012, a jury acquitted him of both 
charges.   
¶12 Approximately two weeks later, Bentdahl's counsel 
approached the State to discuss what he claimed was a sloppily 
written date on the notice Bentdahl received at the time of his 
OWI/PAC arrest.  After viewing the date of notice and agreeing 
that the officer wrote out the date in a somewhat confusing 
fashion, the State agreed not to oppose Bentdahl's motion to 
vacate the refusal conviction.  The circuit court later granted 
Bentdahl's motion, vacated the refusal conviction, and scheduled 
a date for a hearing on the refusal charge. 
¶13 The circuit court held a hearing on the refusal 
charge.  Bentdahl argued that the refusal charge should be 
dismissed based on a lack of proper notice or, alternatively, 
under Brooks, at the circuit court's discretion.  The circuit 
court determined that the officer's poor penmanship denied 
Bentdahl proper notice; therefore, the circuit court did not 
have jurisdiction.  Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed the 
refusal charge without reaching Bentdahl's alternative argument 
regarding the circuit court's discretion. 
¶14 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court, 
reasoning that Bentdahl had proper notice.  The court of appeals 
held, "[t]he officer's writing the date as '111710' with a messy 
'0' did not make the notice defective."    State v. Bentdahl, 
No. 2012AP1426, unpublished slip op., ¶11 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 
2012).  It reasoned that "[i]t did not make sense to disregard 
No. 
2012AP1426   
 
8 
 
the ten-day and thirty-day deadlines in the notice by inserting 
slashes so as to come up with a date that was ten days before 
the incident, when the date without slashes matched the date of 
the incident."  Id., ¶10.   
¶15 The court of appeals, relying on Brooks, then remanded 
the case to the circuit court to address Bentdahl's alternative 
argument and determine whether that court would exercise its 
discretion to dismiss the refusal charge.  In Brooks, this court 
held that a circuit court properly exercised its discretion in 
dismissing a refusal charge, 
when it based the dismissal upon the fact that Brooks 
had pleaded guilty to the underlying charge of 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
an 
intoxicant 
and, 
hence, 
the 
reason 
for 
the 
proceedings to impose sanctions for the refusal to 
take the intoxication test had been accomplished. 
Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d at 348.  From our holding in Brooks, the 
court of appeals reasoned that "[t]hese same purposes may be 
served where a court dismisses a refusal charge against a 
defendant who was acquitted before the refusal hearing, in a 
trial where intoxication evidence was presented, depending on 
all of the pertinent facts."  State v. Bentdahl, No. 2012AP1426, 
unpublished slip op., ¶12 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2012). 
¶16 The State asks this court to determine two issues 
related to Brooks.  First, whether circuit courts can dismiss 
refusal charges when the defendant pleads not guilty to the 
underlying OWI, PAC, or other OWI-related charges.  Second, 
whether the discretionary authority granted to circuit courts 
No. 
2012AP1426   
 
9 
 
under Brooks' holding is consistent with the mandatory language 
of Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)-(10). 
II. 
Standard of Review 
¶17  This case requires us to interpret the meaning of 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305, Wisconsin's implied consent statute.  "The 
interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, which we 
review de novo."  Meriter Hosp., Inc. v. Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 
145, ¶12, 277 Wis. 2d 1, 689 N.W.2d 627.  "Although we consider 
this question independent of the decisions of the circuit court 
and the court of appeals, we nevertheless benefit from their 
analyses."  Id.  
III. Analysis 
A.  
¶18 We are asked to interpret Wisconsin's implied consent 
statute and determine whether circuit courts have discretionary 
authority to dismiss refusal charges under different factual 
circumstances from those we previously addressed in Brooks. 
Wisconsin's implied consent statute provides that, by driving on 
Wisconsin's public roads, drivers give consent to "one or more 
tests of his or her breath, blood or urine" to identify the 
presence of intoxicating substances in his or her system if 
requested 
by 
law 
enforcement. 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(2).  
Recently, we explained Wis. Stat. § 343.305 succinctly: 
Upon arrest of a person for violation of an OWI-
related statute, a law enforcement officer may request 
the person to provide a blood, breath, or urine sample 
for chemical testing. Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(a). At 
the time of the request for a sample, the officer must 
read to the person certain information set forth in  
No. 
2012AP1426   
 
10 
 
§ 343.305(4), referred to as the Informing the Accused 
form.  
If the person submits to chemical testing and the test 
reveals the presence of a detectable amount of a 
restricted 
controlled 
substance 
or 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol concentration, the person is subjected to an 
administrative suspension of his operating privileges. 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(7)(a). The person has the right 
to an administrative hearing and to judicial review. 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(8). The administrative hearing is 
limited to certain issues that are set forth by 
statute. Wis. Stat. § 343.305(8)(b)2.   
If, on the other hand, the person refuses to submit to 
chemical testing, he is informed of the State's intent 
to immediately revoke his operating privileges. Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(9)(a). The person is also informed 
that he may request a refusal hearing in court. Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)4. 
State v. Anagnos, 2012 WI 64, ¶¶22-24, 341 Wis. 2d 576, 815 
N.W.2d 675 (footnote omitted) (describing the 2009-10 
version of Wis. Stat. § 343.305). 
B.  
¶19 We note that, although the facts of this case involve 
a 
warrantless 
blood 
draw 
to 
determine 
blood 
alcohol 
concentration, the Fourth Amendment is not at issue in this 
case.  Just last term, the United States Supreme Court 
considered whether a warrantless blood draw from a suspected 
drunk driver could be upheld under the Fourth Amendment.  
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).  The warrantless 
blood draw in this case occurred on November 17, 2010, before 
the April 17, 2013, McNeely decision and we reiterate that our 
decision 
today 
does 
not 
consider 
any 
issues 
related 
to 
warrantless blood draws.   
No. 
2012AP1426   
 
11 
 
¶20 Bentdahl challenges whether this case is properly 
before this court.  Specifically, Bentdahl argues that the court 
of appeals' decision was not adverse to the State and, 
therefore, the State cannot appeal that determination.  The 
State contends that the court of appeals determination was 
adverse, in part, to its position. 
¶21 As a preliminary matter, we hold that the court of 
appeals issued a decision that was partially adverse to the 
State, which is sufficient to allow the State to appeal.  A 
party may appeal "an adverse decision of the court of appeals" 
to this court.  Wis. Stat. § 809.62(1m)(a).  The Wisconsin 
statutes define an adverse decision as "a final order or 
decision of the court of appeals, the result of which is 
contrary, in whole or in part, to the result sought in that 
court by any party seeking review."  Wis. Stat. § 806.62(1g)(a) 
(emphasis added).  Furthermore, an adverse decision "includes 
the court of appeals' denial of or failure to grant the full 
relief sought or the court of appeals' denial of the preferred 
form of relief."8  Wis. Stat. § 806.62(1g)(b).  Here, the court 
                                                 
8 We have previously clarified the meaning of an adverse 
decision in both Neely v. State, 89 Wis. 2d 755, 279 N.W.2d 255 
(1979) and State v. Castillo, 213 Wis. 2d 488, 570 N.W.2d 44 
(1997).  In Neely, we determined that the meaning of "decision" 
is properly considered as the result reached by the deciding 
court and we held that "a party to whom the result is favorable 
may not petition for review of the decision simply because that 
party disagrees with the rationale expressed in the opinion."  
Neely, 89 Wis. 2d at 758.  In Castillo, we further clarified 
that an adverse decision does not result merely because the 
court of appeals determined that certain issues were unnecessary 
to reach.  Castillo, 213 Wis. 2d at 492. 
No. 
2012AP1426   
 
12 
 
of appeals ruled in favor of the State on the issue of notice.  
However, the court of appeals also remanded the case to the 
circuit court for that court to exercise its discretion as to 
whether to dismiss Bentdahl's refusal charge.  This is not the 
relief requested by the State.  Instead the State had requested 
that the court of appeals instruct the circuit court to enter a 
refusal conviction against Bentdahl.  The court of appeals' 
instructions were a part of its decision, which denied the State 
the full relief that it sought; therefore, the State may appeal. 
C.  
¶22 We next consider several issues related to Brooks.  
First, we consider whether Brooks grants discretionary authority 
to circuit courts to dismiss refusal charges when the defendant 
chooses to plead not guilty to the underlying OWI or OWI-related 
charge.  Second, we determine whether Brooks applies when a 
defendant does not request a refusal hearing within the ten-day 
time limit.  Finally, we consider whether Brooks should be 
overruled.    
¶23 The State argues that the court of appeals improperly 
extended the holding of Brooks when it remanded this case to the 
circuit court with instructions to decide whether or not it 
would choose to exercise its discretion to dismiss the refusal 
charge.  The State asserts that the purpose of the implied 
consent statute is to gather evidence to secure convictions and 
remove drunk drivers from Wisconsin roads.  It concludes that an 
extension of Brooks to the facts of this case does not achieve 
No. 
2012AP1426   
 
13 
 
the purpose of the implied consent statute, but rather, would 
encourage drivers to refuse to consent to chemical testing.   
¶24 Furthermore, the State contends that that language of 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)-(10), as interpreted by Brefka, 348 Wis. 
2d 282, ¶4, does not allow a circuit court any discretionary 
authority, and that we must either overturn Brooks or limit its 
application to the 1979-80 version of the Wisconsin statutes, 
which that case considered.  For these reasons, the State 
contends that the court of appeals should have remanded this 
case to the circuit court with instructions to impose the 
applicable penalties against Bentdahl on the refusal charge. 
¶25 In contrast, Bentdahl asks this court to affirm the 
court of appeals' instructions to the circuit court.  Under 
Bentdahl's interpretation, Brooks grants circuit courts broad 
discretionary authority to dismiss refusal charges regardless of 
the way the related OWI charges are resolved.  This discretion, 
Bentdahl argues, is not limited to the factual circumstances 
contemplated 
in 
Brooks. 
 
Finally, 
Bentdahl 
argues 
that 
overturning 
Brooks 
and 
eliminating 
a 
circuit 
court's 
discretionary authority to dismiss refusal charges entirely 
would unnecessarily clog courts by discouraging guilty pleas to 
OWI-related offenses. 
¶26 We agree with the State that the court of appeals 
improperly extended the holding of Brooks when it applied it to 
the facts of this case.  We hold that circuit courts have no 
discretionary authority to dismiss refusal charges when the 
defendant chooses to plead not guilty to the underlying OWI or 
No. 
2012AP1426   
 
14 
 
OWI-related charge.  We further hold that a circuit court has no 
discretionary authority to dismiss refusal charges when the 
defendant fails to request a refusal hearing within the ten-day 
time limit.  However, as we will explain, we decline the State's 
invitation to overrule Brooks. 
¶27 In Brooks, this court considered whether a circuit 
court had abused its discretion when it dismissed a refusal 
charge against a defendant who had already pleaded guilty to the 
underlying OWI charge at the time of his refusal hearing, which 
he had timely requested.  Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d at 348-49; Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(3)(b)4. (1979-80) (requiring that a refusal 
hearing be requested "on or prior to the citation return date").    
In that case, we held that the circuit court "appropriately 
exercised its discretion."  Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d at 348.  Our 
analysis focused on the purpose of the implied consent statute 
and the fact that the defendant in Brooks had pleaded guilty to 
the underlying OWI charge.  See id. at 348-49. 
¶28 The purpose of Wisconsin's implied consent statute is 
to encourage drivers, upon a request by law enforcement, to 
submit to chemical testing.  Id. at 348.  This allows for the 
efficient gathering of evidence that may be used to secure 
drunk-driving convictions.  Id.; State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 
191, 203, 289 N.W.2d 828 (1980). 
¶29 Having established the purpose of the implied consent 
statute, to secure OWI-related convictions, our reasoning in 
Brooks then turned to whether this purpose was met when a 
defendant had already pleaded guilty to the underlying OWI 
No. 
2012AP1426   
 
15 
 
charge at the time of his or her refusal hearing.  Brooks, 113 
Wis. 2d at 353-57.  We found "[i]f the person who is charged 
with OWI . . . subsequently pleads guilty, there no longer 
remains a need for penalties for failure to submit to a test 
which has become unnecessary in the particular case."  Id. at 
348-49.      
¶30 The 
reasoning 
in 
Brooks 
did 
not 
broadly 
grant 
discretionary authority to circuit courts.  See id. at 359.  
Instead the specific reasoning in Brooks was tied to the fact 
that the defendant pleaded guilty to the underlying OWI charge 
by the time of his refusal hearing, which he timely requested.  
See id.  In Brooks, this court repeatedly reasoned that the 
purpose of the implied consent statute, to gather evidence to 
convict drunk drivers, was served when the defendant pleaded 
guilty to the underlying OWI charge.  Id.  In Brooks we stated: 
Accordingly, we conclude that the general purpose 
behind the laws relating to operating while under the 
influence of intoxicants and implied consent to take 
alcohol tests—to get drunk drivers off the road as 
expeditiously as possible and with as little possible 
disruption of the court's calendar—is best served by 
the exercise of discretion in the dismissal of a 
refusal case once there has been a plea of guilty to 
the OWI charge. 
Id. 
¶31 The reasoning in Brooks applies only when a defendant 
enters a guilty plea to the underlying OWI or OWI-related charge 
and when the defendant complies with the statutory time limit to 
request a refusal hearing.  Unlike Brooks, Bentdahl did not 
plead guilty to the underlying OWI or PAC charges, and unlike 
No. 
2012AP1426   
 
16 
 
Brooks, Bentdahl did not request a refusal hearing within the 
ten-day time limit set forth in Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)-(10).  
The policy reasons for allowing circuit courts discretionary 
authority to dismiss refusal charges simply do not apply when a 
defendant chooses to plead not guilty.  This is especially true 
when a defendant, like Bentdahl, is acquitted of the underlying 
OWI-related charges.  In other words, giving circuit courts 
discretionary authority to dismiss refusal charges when a 
defendant pleads not guilty to the underlying OWI-related charge 
would eliminate a great deal of the incentive to comply with the 
implied consent statute.   
¶32 Furthermore, the language of the implied consent 
statute governing court-ordered penalties for refusal does not 
grant discretionary authority to circuit courts.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(9)-(10).  Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(10) provides, in 
part, "[i]f no hearing was requested, the revocation period 
shall begin 30 days after the date of the refusal."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(10) (emphasis added).  Per the statutory language, if 
no hearing is requested within the ten-day time period, then 
revocation is mandatory.   
¶33 This court recently interpreted the language of Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a) and held that the ten-day 
time limit to request a refusal hearing is mandatory and not 
subject to excusable neglect.  Brefka, 348 Wis. 2d 282, ¶4.   
Therefore, a circuit court has no competency to hear a 
defendant's request to extend the ten-day time period.  Id. 
No. 
2012AP1426   
 
17 
 
¶34 Although Brefka considered the narrow question of 
whether a defendant could extend the ten-day time limit to 
request a refusal hearing due to excusable neglect, our decision 
in Brefka is instructive to our decision today.  First, Brefka 
considered the meaning of "shall" in Wis. Stat. § 343.305(10)(a)9 
and 
concluded 
that 
the 
word 
is 
"mandatory" 
rather 
than 
"discretionary."  Id., ¶34.  Therefore, in Brefka, we concluded 
that "Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a) impose a 
mandatory requirement that the refusal hearing must be requested 
within ten days of service of the Notice of Intent.  Id., ¶39.  
Second, we stated in Brefka that "[t]he penalty for a refusal 
followed by a failure to request a refusal hearing within ten 
days is also mandatory in requiring that '[i]f no hearing was 
requested, the revocation period shall begin 30 days after the 
date 
of 
the 
refusal.'" 
 
Id. 
(quoting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(10)(a)). 
 
The 
plain 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat.  
§ 343.305(9)(a)4. 
and 
(10)(a) 
along 
with 
our 
recent 
interpretation of that language in Brefka leads us to conclude 
that a circuit court has no discretionary authority to dismiss a 
                                                 
9 The relevant portion of Wis. Stat. § 343.305(10)(a) 
provides: "If no hearing was requested, the revocation period 
shall begin 30 days after the date of the refusal." (emphasis 
added). 
No. 
2012AP1426   
 
18 
 
refusal charge if the defendant does not request a refusal 
hearing within the statutory ten-day time limit.10   
¶35 Finally, we decline the State's invitation to overrule 
Brooks.  As previously discussed, Brooks is not applicable to 
this case since it presented a totally different fact situation. 
We see no reason to disturb the holding in Brooks.  Our decision 
in Brooks is longstanding precedent that fosters plea agreements 
in OWI and OWI-related cases.  As we stated in Brooks, when a 
defendant has pleaded guilty to the underlying OWI charge or 
charges by the time of the refusal hearing, "the exercise of 
discretion . . . by the trial court may well have the tendency 
to increase OWI convictions as well as to conserve limited 
judicial resources by encouraging guilty pleas and reducing the 
number of time consuming refusal hearings."  Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d 
                                                 
10 Although under Wis. Stat. § 967.055(2) a prosecutor may 
petition the court for a dismissal of a refusal charge, which a 
court seemingly could grant upon a finding that dismissal is in 
the 
public 
interest, 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(9)(a)4. 
and 
(10)(a) 
along 
with 
our 
recent 
interpretation of those statutory provisions in Brekfa lead us 
to conclude that a circuit court has no discretionary authority 
to dismiss a refusal charge if the defendant does not request a 
refusal hearing within the statutory ten-day time limit.  
Compare Wis. Stat. § 967.055 with Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)4. 
and (10)(a) and Brefka, 348 Wis. 2d 282, ¶¶4, 39.  In addition, 
the defendant must also plead guilty to the underlying OWI or 
OWI-related charge. 
We do recognize, however, that factual circumstances 
distinct from those at issue today may arise, which make a 
request for a refusal hearing within the ten-day time limit or 
entry of a plea of guilty impossible.  We do not decide what the 
discretionary authority of the circuit court would be under such 
circumstances. 
No. 
2012AP1426   
 
19 
 
at 357.  Brooks continues to grant circuit courts discretionary 
authority to dismiss refusal charges when a defendant requests a 
hearing within the statutory ten-day time period and pleads 
guilty to the underlying OWI or OWI-related offense. 
IV. 
Conclusion 
¶36 We do not review the court of appeals' decision that 
notice was proper in this case, since that issue is not before 
us.  We conclude, however, that the court of appeals improperly 
extended the holding of Brooks, when it held that a circuit 
court could dismiss a refusal charge under the circumstances 
presented by this case.  Under Brooks, a circuit court has the 
discretionary authority to dismiss a refusal charge only if the 
defendant has already pleaded guilty to the underlying OWI or 
OWI-related charge at the time of his or her refusal hearing, 
which was requested timely.  Extending Brooks to allow circuit 
courts the discretionary authority to dismiss refusal charges in 
cases where a defendant has pleaded not guilty to the underlying 
OWI, PAC, or other related charge would contravene the purpose 
of Wis. Stat. § 343.305, Wisconsin's implied consent statute.  
In other words, Brooks, which is longstanding precedent of this 
court, applies only when a defendant meets two requirements.  
Namely, a defendant must request a refusal hearing within the 
statutory ten-day time limit and must plead guilty to the 
underlying OWI or OWI-related charge. 
¶37 The language of Wis. Stat. § 343.305(10) and our 
recent interpretation of that language in Brefka make clear that 
a circuit court has no discretionary authority to dismiss a 
No. 
2012AP1426   
 
20 
 
refusal charge when a defendant fails to request a refusal 
hearing within the statutory ten-day time period.  Therefore we 
remand this case to the circuit court with instructions to 
impose 
the 
applicable 
penalties, 
including 
revocation 
of 
Bentdahl's operating privileges, due to his refusal to consent 
to chemical testing at the time of his OWI/PAC arrest, and his 
failure to request a refusal hearing within the statutory time 
period. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is modified 
and affirmed and, as modified, the cause remanded to the circuit 
court. 
No. 
2012AP1426   
 
 
 
1