Title: Ex parte Greenetrack, Inc. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Joe Estano v. Greenetrack, Inc., et al.)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1061768
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 12, 2009

Rel: 06/12/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1061768
____________________
Ex parte Greenetrack, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Joe Estano
v.
Greenetrack, Inc., et al.)
(Pickens Circuit Court, CV-06-900005)
PARKER, Justice.
Greenetrack, Inc., petitions for a writ of mandamus
directing the Pickens Circuit Court to vacate its order
1061768
2
denying Greenetrack's motion to transfer to the Greene Circuit
Court an action filed against it by Joe Estano. Estano seeks
restitution for moneys he and a putative class of others
allegedly lost at the Greenetrack gaming facility.  We grant
the petition and issue the writ.
Background
Greenetrack operates "both paper and electronic video
bingo" at its facility in Greene County for "80 nonprofit
organizations licensed by the Sheriff of Greene County."
Amendment No. 743, Ala. Const. 1901 (Local Amendments, Greene
County, 
§ 
1 
(Off. 
Recomp.)), 
authorizes 
nonprofit
organizations to operate "bingo games for prizes or money" in
Greene County. Estano filed a complaint in December 2006,
alleging that the gaming operation at the Greenetrack facility
is illegal because, he argues, it exceeds the authority
granted by the local amendment. Section 8-1-150, Ala. Code
1975, provides that a person may recover losses incurred as
the result of an illegal gambling operation. Estano filed the
complaint in his county of residence, Pickens County. The
complaint stated that venue is proper in Pickens County
because Greenetrack, the defendant, does business there and
1061768
The petition does not address the trial court's denial
1
of Greenetrack's motion to dismiss the complaint.
3
because Estano, the plaintiff, resides there. 
On February 9, 2007, Greenetrack filed a motion to
dismiss Estano's complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(3) and
12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Alternatively, Greenetrack moved
the trial court to transfer the case to Greene County pursuant
to § 6-3-7, Ala. Code 1975, which governs venue as to
corporations, or under the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
§ 
6-3-21.1, 
Ala. 
Code 
1975. 
The 
trial 
court 
denied
Greenetrack's motion. Greenetrack has petitioned for a writ of
mandamus alleging that the trial court exceeded its discretion
by refusing the transfer of the case to Greene County.1
Analysis 
"'The proper method for obtaining review of a
denial of a motion for a change of venue in a civil
action is to petition for the writ of mandamus.' Ex
parte Alabama Great Southern R.R., 788 So. 2d 886,
888 (Ala. 2000). 'Mandamus is a drastic and
extraordinary writ, to be issued only where there is
(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the
order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to
do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and
(4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.' Ex
parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala.
1995). Moreover, our review is limited to those
facts that were before the trial court. Ex parte
National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d 788, 789 (Ala.
1061768
4
1998).
"'The burden of proving improper venue is on the
party raising the issue and on review of an order
transferring or refusing to transfer, a writ of
mandamus will not be granted unless there is a clear
showing of error on the part of the trial judge.' Ex
parte Finance America Corp., 507 So. 2d 458, 460
(Ala. 1987). In addition, this Court is bound by the
record, and it cannot consider a statement or
evidence in a party's brief that was not before the
trial court. Ex parte American Res. Ins. Co., 663
So. 2d 932, 936 (Ala. 1995)."
Ex parte Pike Fabrication, Inc., 859 So. 2d 1089, 1091 (Ala.
2002).
In its motion for a change of venue, Greenetrack argued
that venue in Pickens County was not proper, and it asked the
trial court to transfer the action to Greene County pursuant
to § 6-3-7, Ala. Code 1975, or, in the alternative, under § 6-
3-21.1, Ala. Code 1975, the forum non conveniens statute, for
the convenience of the parties. Because the writ will issue on
the authority of § 6-3-7, we need not reach the issue whether
Greene County is a more convenient forum under § 6-3-21.1,
Ala. Code 1975.
Section 6-3-7(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides, in part, that
"[a]ll civil actions against corporations may be brought ...
(3) [i]n the county in which the plaintiff resided ... at the
1061768
Greenetrack discontinued the bus service to Columbus,
2
Mississippi, including the stops in Aliceville and Reform, in
February 2007 because the service was not being used.
In response to Greenetrack's motion for a change of
3
venue, Estano provided affidavits from four persons saying
5
time of the accrual of the cause of action, if such
corporation does business by agent in the county of the
plaintiff's residence ...." The crux of the issue presented by
Greenetrack's petition is whether Greenetrack "does business
by agent" in Pickens County, the county of Estano's residence.
Greenetrack argued in its motion for a change of venue that
all Greenetrack's business functions occur at its facility,
which is located in Greene County; that its principal place of
business and its offices are located exclusively in Greene
County; and that it has not purchased any newspaper, radio, or
billboard advertisements in Pickens County.   
Estano argued in his opposition to Greenetrack's motion
for a change of venue that because Greenetrack operated a bus
that  ran on a regular schedule from its facility in Greene
County to Columbus, Mississippi, with scheduled stops in
Pickens County at Aliceville and Reform,  Greenetrack did
2
business by agent in Pickens County. The bus provided free
transportation to and from Greenetrack.  Estano also argued
3
1061768
that they had ridden the Greenetrack bus from Pickens County
to the Greenetrack facility sometime after December 2006.
Greenetrack responded with affidavits showing that there had
been no passenger pick-ups in Pickens County from November
2006 through February 2007 and that the bus route was
discontinued in February 2007.
In his brief to this Court, Estano challenges the
timeliness of the filing of Greenetrack's affidavits, Estano's
brief, at 15 n.5, but he made no objections to the affidavits
in the trial court. "The failure to object to the admission of
evidence results in a waiver on appeal of argument on that
point." Ex parte Williamson,  907 So. 2d 407, 416 (Ala. 2004).
6
that Greenetrack targets business from Pickens County through
"advertisements over television, radio, billboards and other
mass media." In a footnote to his opposition to Greenetrack's
motion, Estano indicated that Greenetrack also had 10
employees who reside in Pickens County who presumably travel
to and from Greene County daily. 
To 
support 
his 
argument, 
made 
in 
opposition 
to
Greenetrack's motion, that the operation of the bus service
between Greene County, Alabama, and Columbus, Mississippi,
with stops in Pickens County, constituted conducting  business
by agent in Pickens County, Estano first defined the
terminology by quoting from Ex parte Pike Fabrication, 859 So.
2d at 1093: "'"[A] corporation 'does business' in a county for
the purposes of § 6-3-7 if, with some regularity, it performs
1061768
7
there some of the business functions for which it was
created."'" (Quoting Ex parte Wiginton, 743 So. 2d 1071, 1074-
75 (Ala. 1999), quoting in turn Ex parte SouthTrust Bank of
Tuscaloosa, N.A., 619 So. 2d 1356, 1358 (Ala. 1993).)   In his
opposition to Greenetrack's motion, Estano then argued:
"The Alabama Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that a corporation does business by agent in a
County when it performs business functions which
relate to its core business. For example, in Ex
parte Scott Bridge Co., 834 So. 2d 79, 81-82 (Ala.
2002), a former employee living in Chambers County
filed a retaliatory discharge action in Chambers
County against his employer, Scott Bridge, a bridge-
building company in Lee County. Scott Bridge moved
to dismiss or transfer, claiming that venue was
improper under Section 6-3-7(a)(3) because it was
not doing business in Chambers County, in that it
had never constructed a bridge there. The evidence
however showed that Scott Bridge had bought some
supplies 
for 
bridge-building 
from 
vendors 
in
Chambers County. The Supreme Court held that Scott
Bridges's purchase of supplies in Chambers County
rendered it to be doing business there.
"Also instructive 
is 
Ex 
parte 
Perfection 
Siding,
Inc., 882 So. 2d 307 (Ala. 2003). In that case,
Plaintiff (an employee of a siding contractor) sued
the subcontractor and general contractor in Hale
County, seeking damages resulting from a fall from
a roof occurring at a jobsite in Tuscaloosa County.
Defendants sought dismissal or transfer, claiming
that venue was improper because the subcontractor
(Perfection Siding) was not doing business in Hale
County. Particularly, Perfection Siding claimed that
it had only performed two (2) jobs in Hale County in
the year prior to the lawsuit, a minuscule fraction
of its approximately 1,000 total jobs performed that
1061768
8
year. The Supreme Court held that Perfection Siding
was doing business in Hale County because its
'physical presence [and] performance of services
within the county.' Perfection Siding, 882 So. 2d at
311." 
In determining whether venue in Pickens County is proper
in this case, we must look to whether Greenetrack was, in
Pickens County, "perform[ing] some of the business functions
for which it was created," Ex parte Pike Fabrication, 859 So.
2d 
at 
1093, 
as 
Estano 
argued 
in 
his 
opposition 
to
Greenetrack's motion for a change of venue. When Greenetrack
made its prima facie case that it did not do business in
Pickens County, the burden then shifted to Estano to prove
that Greenetrack did, in fact, conduct in Pickens County the
business for which it was created.
Estano cited Ex parte Scott Bridge Co., 834 So. 2d 79
(Ala. 2002), for the holding that Scott Bridge was doing
business in Chambers County even though it had not built a
bridge there but had merely purchased some supplies there.
Estano argued that this activity by Scott Bridge is analogous
to Greenetrack's running a bus service to pick up potential
customers in Pickens County and transport them to Greene
County. But this Court in Scott Bridge reasoned:
1061768
9
"'A corporation "does business" in a county for
purposes of § 6-3-7 if, with some regularity, it
performs there some of the business functions for
which 
it 
was 
created. 
Ex 
parte 
Real 
Estate
Financing, Inc., 450 So. 2d 461 (Ala. 1984); Ex
parte Southtrust Bank of Tuskegee, 469 So. 2d 103
(Ala. 1985).' Ex parte SouthTrust Bank of Tuscaloosa
County, N.A., 619 So. 2d 1356, 1358 (Ala. 1993).
This Court has made the following distinction
between those corporate business functions for which
a corporation was created and the exercise of
corporate powers incidental to those corporate
business functions:
"'It should be noted that not every
act done within the corporate powers of a
foreign corporation will constitute doing
business within the meaning of the statute.
We recognized in International Cotton-Seed
Oil Co. [v. Wheelock], 124 Ala. [367,] at
370-371, 27 So. [517,] at 518 [(1899)],
that in applying the test for doing
business "it may not always be easy to
distinguish between acts done in the
exercise of corporate functions and those
done merely within corporate powers."'
"Ex parte Charter Retreat Hosp., Inc., 538 So. 2d
787, 790 (Ala. 1989).
"....
"While this Court has not been provided with as
detailed 
a 
description 
of 
Scott 
Bridge's
interactions with its parts supplier in Chambers
County as the Court of Civil Appeals was provided
with of GTE's relationship with its parts supplier
in Ex parte GTE Automatic Electric, Inc., [448 So.
2d 385, 387 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984),] the information
that this Court does have regarding Scott Bridge's
interactions with its supplier in Chambers County is
that Scott Bridge 'purchased handrail pipe, handrail
1061768
10
posts, protection anchors, supports, and shoes which
are used in Scott Bridge's business [of bridge
building].' (Trial court's order denying the motion
for 
a 
change 
of 
venue.) 
Scott 
Bridge 
could
presumably have purchased these materials elsewhere,
and thus fulfilled its corporate purpose entirely
outside of Chambers County, but spending more than
$50,000 per year in Chambers County on materials
necessary to bridge construction is sufficient to
constitute 'doing business' in Chambers County.
"Scott Bridge's purchases of bridge parts from
suppliers in Chambers County can be distinguished
from other, more tangential relationships that this
Court has deemed insufficient to constitute 'doing
business.' Specifically, this Court held in Ex parte
Parsons & Whittemore Alabama Pine Construction
Corp., 658 So. 2d 414 (Ala. 1995), and in Ex parte
Real Estate Financing, Inc., 450 So. 2d 461 (Ala.
1984), that retaining the services of an attorney in
the forum county on a case-by-case basis did not
constitute 'doing business' in that county, where
the businesses of the companies were construction
and real estate financing, respectively. Hiring an
attorney 
was 
tangential 
to 
the 
companies'
fulfillment of their primary business functions.
Scott Bridge's primary business function of building
bridges, however, immediately and directly depends
upon the transactions it has with its Chambers
County suppliers."
Ex parte Scott Bridge Co.,  834 So. 2d at 81-82. Greenetrack's
providing bus service to solicit potential customers is not
analogous to the purchase of over $50,000 per year of parts
used in a corporation's primary business. Greenetrack's
principal business, the business for which it was created and
authorized, is to run the Greenetrack gaming facility in
1061768
11
Greene County, providing gaming services to patrons who come
to the facility. Greenetrack's providing a bus route through
Pickens County was "the exercise of corporate powers
incidental to [its] corporate business functions"; it was
"tangential to the compan[y]'s fulfillment of [its] primary
business functions." 834 So. 2d at 81-82. 
Less convincing than his reliance on Scott Bridge is
Estano's reliance on Ex parte Perfection Siding, Inc., 882 So.
2d 307 (Ala. 2003). In that case, venue for an action
involving a company formed to install siding was found to be
proper in a county in which the company had installed siding
on two occasions within the prior year. To be analogous,
Greenetrack would have had to have conducted a gaming
operation within Pickens County on two occasions within the
year before Estano's action was filed.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that Greenetrack was not
"doing business" in Pickens County; consequently, Pickens
County was not a proper venue for Estano's action. Because a
case may be transferred for reasons of forum non conveniens
only if it was initially filed in a proper venue, we do not
reach that aspect of the petition.
1061768
12
Because Greenetrack was not "doing business" in Pickens
County, § 6-3-7(c) requires that the action be transferred to
Greene County, the county in which Greenetrack does do
business. 
Conclusion
Greenetrack has demonstrated a clear legal right to the
transfer and a clear error on the part of the trial court in
refusing the transfer. We, therefore, grant the petition and
issue the writ. The trial court is directed to vacate its
order denying Greenetrack's motion for a change of venue and
to enter an order transferring the action to Greene County.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Woodall and Bolin, JJ., concur.
Stuart, Smith, and Shaw, JJ., concur specially.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons and Murdock, JJ., dissent.
1061768
13
STUART, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur fully in the determination that Greenetrack,
Inc., was not doing business by agent in Pickens County so as
to make venue in that county proper.  I dissented from this
Court's decision in Ex parte Scott Bridge Co., 834 So. 2d 79
(Ala. 2002), and I continue to maintain that that case  was
erroneously decided.  By purchasing more than $50,000 in
construction materials in Chambers County, Scott Bridge
Company was not doing business by agent in Chambers County.
Likewise, by operating a bus that picked up potential patrons
in 
Pickens County 
and 
transported 
them to Greenetrack's gaming
facility in Greene County, Greenetrack was not doing business
by agent in Pickens County.  Such activities are tangential to
the business of each of those corporations.
1061768
14
SHAW, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the main opinion.  I write separately only to
emphasize that, to me, the dispositive issue in this case is
whether the transporting of a handful of patrons by
Greenetrack, Inc., from Pickens County to Greenetrack's
facility in Greene County was necessary in order to fulfill
Greenetrack's principal corporate function, or, instead,
whether it constituted the exercise of a corporate power
incidental to its principal corporate function.
Greenetrack operates a gaming facility that, by law, must
be operated exclusively in Greene County. In the period
between May 2005 and February 2007, Greenetrack sent a bus or
a van to various locations surrounding Greene County to pick
up and transport patrons to its gaming facility.  This service
was free, and the riders were not obligated to patronize the
Greenetrack facility.  According to the materials before this
Court, the bus or van had regularly scheduled stops in two
communities in Pickens County and, during the period the
shuttle service was running, picked up between one and four
patrons in that county.  
Under Ala. Code 1975, § 6-3-7(a)(3), venue for this
1061768
15
action is proper in Pickens County if, at the time of the
accrual of the cause of action, Greenetrack did business by
agent in Pickens County.  As the main opinion notes, whether
relief is due to be granted based on this petition hinges on
the meaning of the phrase "does business by agent."  In
applying this phrase, the courts of this State have looked to
whether the corporation performed in the county in question,
with some regularity, some of the business functions for which
it was created.  Ex parte Pike Fabrication, Inc., 859 So. 2d
1089, 1093 (Ala. 2002).  A distinction has consistently been
made between those business functions for which a corporation
was created and the exercise of corporate powers that are
incidental to those business functions.  Ex parte Scott Bridge
Co., 834 So. 2d 79, 81 (Ala. 2002).   Not every act performed
within the corporate powers of a corporation constitutes
"doing business."  Id.
In Scott Bridge, this Court analyzed whether Scott Bridge
Company, whose principal business was building bridges, was,
for venue purposes, "doing business by agent" in Chambers
County, where it purchased approximately $50,000 of supplies
and equipment per year.  834 So. 2d at 81.  In holding that
1061768
16
Scott Bridge was doing business in Chambers County, this Court
took a broad view of what it meant to be "doing business,"
stating:
"Scott Bridge notes that it is in the business
of constructing bridges and it argues that because
it has not built a bridge in Chambers County, it has
not 'done business by agent' there. The business of
Scott Bridge, however, should not be considered so
narrowly. 
To 
fulfill 
its 
principal 
corporate
function of building bridges, Scott Bridge must
purchase parts, tools, and equipment with which to
perform that principal corporate function. [The
plaintiff] asserts, and Scott Bridge does not
refute, that Scott Bridge buys from businesses
located in Chambers County supplies that cost in
excess of $50,000 a year."
834 So. 2d at 81 (emphasis added).  This Court further noted
that Scott Bridge "could presumably have purchased these
materials elsewhere, and thus fulfilled its corporate purpose
entirely outside of Chambers County, but spending more than
$50,000 per year in Chambers County on materials necessary to
bridge construction is sufficient to constitute 'doing
business' in Chambers County," and that "Scott Bridge's
primary business function of building bridges ... immediately
and directly depends upon the transactions it has with its
Chambers County suppliers."  834 So. 2d at 82 (emphasis
added).  As I read Scott Bridge, this Court essentially held
1061768
I question the conclusion reached in Scott Bridge that
4
a corporation's mere purchase of materials necessary to
fulfill a principal corporate function actually equates, for
purposes of § 6-3-7(a)(3), to the performance of the principal
corporate function for which the corporation was created;
however, this Court is not asked in the instant case to
overrule Scott Bridge. 
17
that even though Scott Bridge had not performed in Chambers
County, with some regularity, some of the business functions
for which it was created (i.e., building bridges), venue was
nonetheless proper in Chambers County because Scott Bridge was
"doing business" there by engaging in an activity (i.e., the
purchase of bridge-building supplies and equipment) that was
absolutely essential to its ability to perform its principal
corporate function (i.e., building bridges).4
In the present case, I see no indication that Greenetrack
ever performed in Pickens County, with some regularity, some
of the corporate functions for which it was created.
Furthermore, application of the analysis in Scott Bridge does
not, in my view, dictate that we hold here that venue in
Pickens County is proper.  Although it is correct that
Greenetrack must have patrons come to its facility in Greene
County in order for it to perform its principal corporate
function of operating a gaming facility, I see nothing to
1061768
18
suggest that Greenetrack must itself transport patrons to its
facility in order to perform its principal corporate function.
A company cannot build bridges without the supplies and
equipment necessary for bridge construction.  However, a
company can operate a stationary gaming facility without
providing transportation to the facility.  It certainly cannot
be said, given the negligible number of persons transported to
the Greenetrack facility from Pickens County (one to four),
that Greenetrack must transport patrons from Pickens County in
order to fulfill its principal corporate function.  Although,
as this Court noted in Scott Bridge, it may not always be easy
to distinguish between acts done in the exercise of corporate
functions and those done merely as an exercise of corporate
powers incidental to those functions, I am satisfied that
Greenetrack's activities in Pickens County were, at best, the
exercise of a corporate power incidental to the performance of
its principal corporate function -- operating a gaming
facility in Greene County.  Therefore, I concur to grant the
petition and issue the writ.  
Smith, J., concurs.
1061768
19
LYONS, Justice (dissenting).
I joined the majority opinion in Ex parte Scott Bridge
Co., 834 So. 2d 79 (Ala. 2002), authored by Justice See, and
I must respectfully dissent from the main opinion's strained
attempt to distinguish it.  
Section 6-3-7(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides in part that
"[a]ll civil actions against corporations may be brought ...
(3) [i]n the county in which the plaintiff resided ... at the
time of the accrual of the cause of action, if such
corporation does business by agent in the county of the
plaintiff's residence ...."  (Emphasis added.)  The defendant
in Scott Bridge, a bridge-building company, never built a
bridge 
in 
Chambers 
County, 
just 
as 
Greenetrack 
never 
conducted
gaming operations in Pickens County.  Nevertheless, we held,
correctly I submit, that venue was proper in Chambers County
in Scott Bridge where the defendant, acting through its agent,
purchased materials in that county with which to build bridges
in another county.  On the same rationale, we should hold that
venue is proper in Pickens County where Greenetrack sends its
agent, operating a bus for the purpose of picking up customers
and transporting them to its facility in Greene County.  The
1061768
20
absence of a gaming operation in Pickens County is analogous
to the absence in Scott Bridge of any bridge construction in
Chambers County.  
The main opinion analogizes Greenetrack's activities in
Pickens County to sporadic retention of an attorney on a case-
by-case basis, 
a 
circumstance this 
Court 
has deemed tangential
to a corporation's primary business function.  See Ex parte
Parsons & Whittemore Alabama Pine Constr. Corp., 658 So. 2d
414 (Ala. 1995); Ex parte Real Estate Fin., Inc., 450 So. 2d
461 (Ala. 1984).  Fetching customers is hardly a tangential
activity of a business that must turn a profit to keep its
doors open.  Nor can we point to the high dollar volume of
activity in Chambers County in Scott Bridge as a basis on
which to distinguish it without judicially rewriting § 6-3-7
to create a requirement of "doing substantial business by
agent."  
Justice Murdock in his dissenting opinion attempts to
distinguish Scott Bridge.  He states:
"In Ex parte Scott Bridge, 834 So. 2d 79 (Ala.
2002), the sale and purchase of supplies in Chambers
County appears to me to have been activity by which
the sellers of those supplies did their business.
I question whether the fact that Scott Bridge was
the purchaser in those transactions meant that it
1061768
See Scott Bridge, 834 So. 2d at 81 ("To fulfill its
5
principal corporate function of building bridges, Scott Bridge
must purchase parts, tools, and equipment with which to
perform that principal corporate function.").
21
was 'do[ing] business by agent in [Chambers County]'
within the meaning of § 6-3-7(3) intended by the
legislature.  In particular, I question whether
Scott Bridge was doing its business by making the
purchases it made."
___ So. 3d at ___.  
So, according to Justice Murdock's dissent, the sellers
of supplies to the defendant in Scott Bridge were doing
"their" business while the 
defendant, 
an 
entity whose business
is acquiring raw materials and making bridges out of those
materials,  was somehow not doing its business by purchasing
5
such materials through the acts of agents in Chambers County,
and this Court should therefore have found venue in Chambers
County defective.  Suffice it to say that had this rationale
been presented during this Court's consideration of Scott
Bridge I would have rejected it and stayed with my vote to
deny the petition for mandamus.
   
I would affirm the trial court's rejection of the
challenge to venue under § 6-3-7 and address the secondary
issue of availability of a transfer "for the convenience of
1061768
22
parties and witnesses, or in the interest of justice," under
§ 6-3-21.1, Ala. Code 1975. 
Cobb, C.J., concurs.
1061768
23
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.  Although I agree to an extent
with Justice Lyons's reasoning as it relates to the facts of
this case, my view of a situation like the one presented in Ex
parte Scott Bridge Co., 834 So. 2d 79 (Ala. 2002), does not
coincide with his view of that case.  I therefore write
separately in order to explain my position.
In Ex parte Scott Bridge Co., supra, the sale and
purchase of supplies in Chambers County appear to me to have
been activities by which the sellers of those supplies did
their business.  I question whether the fact that Scott Bridge
was the purchaser in those transactions meant that it was
"do[ing] business by agent in [Chambers County]" within the
meaning of § 6-3-7(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, intended by the
legislature.  Specifically, I question whether Scott Bridge
was doing its business by making the purchases it made. 
Meaningful authority exists for drawing the foregoing
distinction.  For example, in Frees v. Southern Michigan Cold
Storage Co., 43 Mich. App. 756, 757, 204 N.W.2d 782, 783
(1972), the court explained:  "[T]he defendant's business is
that of storing fruits and vegetables.  The farmers and
1061768
In Hartung v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 110
6
Ill. App. 3d 816, 443 N.E.2d 16, 66 Ill. Dec. 493 (1982), the
court reasoned:
 "The evidence further revealed that defendant
consummated 
commercial 
transactions 
with 
10
different Madison County residents which totaled
nearly $4.4 million in 1979[, including purchases of
approximately $1 million of parts and supplies from
numerous vendors]. ...
"Plaintiff maintained that these commercial
transactions contributed directly to defendant's
production and marketing of its principal consumer
product, electricity.  Plaintiff further contends
that these transactions were done systematically and
continuously thus establishing that defendant was
'doing business' within Madison County within the
meaning of the venue statute.
24
processors bring their fruits and vegetables to defendant's
warehouse in Hart, Oceana County for storage.  Defendant's
contacts with Muskegon County are limited to the purchasing of
equipment 
and 
material 
for 
the 
maintenance 
of 
its
refrigeration equipment," except for one customer that the
court noted actually brought its produce to Oceana County for
storage.  (Emphasis added.)  Under these facts, the court held
that the defendant "was not doing business in Muskegon County
by purchasing equipment and materials in Muskegon County to
maintain its refrigeration equipment."  43 Mich. App. at 758,
204 N.W.2d at 783-84.6
1061768
"....
"'...[I]n order to establish that a defendant is
doing business within a county for purposes of
venue, quantitatively more business activity within
the county must be demonstrated than where the
question is whether the defendant has transacted any
business within the State for purposes of service of
process pursuant to section 17.  The defendant must,
in short, be conducting its usual and customary
business within the county in which venue is
sought.' [Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Mosele,] 67 Ill.
2d 321, 329-330, 368 N.E.2d 88, 92 [(1977)].
"...  [W]e believe the evidence does not support
the trial court's finding of venue in Madison County
in the present case. Defendant's business is the
production and marketing of electricity which is not
carried on by defendant in Madison County."
110 Ill. App. 3d at 818-20, 443 N.E.2d at 17-19, 66 Ill. Dec.
at 495-96 (emphasis added).  Similarly, in Gardner v.
International Harvester Co., 113 Ill. 2d 535, 541, 499 N.E.2d
430, 433, 101 Ill. Dec. 842, 845 (1986), the Illinois Supreme
Court rejected an argument that purchases of materials by a
manufacturer constituted doing business for venue purposes:
Nor do we believe that Harvester's purchases from St. Clair
County suppliers show that the company is engaged in business
there.  Harvester buys the materials for use in its business
of designing, manufacturing, and marketing tractors, trucks,
and other machines, and the purchases are but a necessary
incident of that."  See also Saturn Sys., Inc. v. Saturn
Corp., 659 F. Supp. 865 (D. Minn. 1987);  Westinghouse
Electric Corp. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 259, 270, 551
P.2d 847, 855, 131 Cal. Rptr. 231, 239 (1976) (also noting
that "[t]he change of venue issue is directed at completely
different 
policy 
considerations" 
and 
that 
"[i]t 
is
inappropriate to apply a 'minimum contacts' test to determine
whether defendants are doing business" in a given county for
venue purposes).
25
Consequently, had I been a member of this Court when
1061768
This is not to say that, where activity of the nature at
7
issue in Scott Bridge actually gives rise to the claim
asserted, venue in the county of that activity would not be
appropriate. See § 6-3-7(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975.  That was not
the case in Scott Bridge, however.
26
Scott Bridge was decided, I might well have dissented from the
holding that venue in that case was proper in Chambers
County.   
7
In contrast, I believe Greenetrack, Inc., was doing its
business when it sent its own employee and a bus into Pickens
County on a regular basis to transport residents of Pickens
County to Greenetrack's facility so they could serve as
customers of its business.  True, the plaintiff here utilized
his own transportation to travel from his home in Pickens
County 
to 
Greenetrack's 
facility 
in 
Greene 
County.
Nonetheless, the purpose of the legislature in enacting the
venue statute was to establish, as best it could, where, in
all fairness, a corporate defendant should be expected to
defend itself if its activities cause harm to another.  I do
not think that Greenetrack can protest that it is unexpected
or unfair that it be held to account in Pickens County under
a statute that sets venue in the county of the plaintiff's
residence, provided the defendant regularly does business by
1061768
Certainly, however, if Scott Bridge reflects the law in
8
Alabama, the present case involves activity that, in my view,
is no less the doing of business for which the defendant was
created than was the activity in Scott Bridge.
27
agent there, for an injury it has caused to a Pickens County
resident when it has purposefully and regularly engaged in
activity by agent in Pickens County to bring Pickens County
residents to its facility to be its customers.  
8