Title: STEPHEN W WARDA V FLUSHING CITY COUNCIL
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 125561
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 18, 2005

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 18, 2005 
STEPHEN W. WARDA, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 125561 
CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF 
FLUSHING AND CITY OF FLUSHING, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
_______________________________ 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
MARKMAN, J.  
The question presented in this case is whether, 
pursuant to MCL 691.1408(2), Michigan courts possess the 
authority to review a city council’s discretionary decision 
to grant or deny reimbursement of private attorney fees 
incurred by a city police officer. 
Because the city 
council’s 
decision 
under 
this 
statute 
constitutes 
a 
discretionary act of a separate branch of government, the 
judiciary is without authority to review it. 
Accordingly, 
we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
this matter to the circuit court for entry of an order 
dismissing plaintiff’s claims. 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
Plaintiff 
was 
a 
Flushing 
police 
officer 
for 
approximately twenty years. 
Early in his career, at the 
suggestion of the chief of police, plaintiff obtained 
special training from the Secretary of State that certified 
him to inspect "salvage vehicles."1
 Plaintiff's employer 
paid for the training, and plaintiff received his regular 
pay while he attended the salvage vehicle inspection 
course. 
At all times relevant to this case, an inspection fee 
of $25 was established by statute. 
MCL 257.217c(7). 
On 
the occasions that plaintiff conducted inspections in 
Flushing, plaintiff turned over this fee to the city, which 
deducted taxes and then remitted the balance to plaintiff 
along with his regular pay. 
On those occasions plaintiff 
conducted inspections outside Flushing, neither the police 
department nor the city of Flushing received any part of 
1 MCL 257.217c concerns the acquisition and transfer of
distressed vehicles. 
In general, a seriously damaged 
vehicle (i.e., a “distressed vehicle” as defined by MCL
257.12a) must be issued a salvage certificate of title.
The 
process 
of 
obtaining 
such 
a 
title 
requires 
an 
inspection and certification of certain matters by a 
specially trained officer. The specially trained officer
must be a police officer and must be certified by the
Secretary of State. MCL 257.217c(25), (26). The Secretary
of State is responsible for overseeing the conduct of
specially trained officers, and may suspend, revoke, or
deny an officer's certification. MCL 257.217c(26).
2 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
the associated fees. Plaintiff conducted the vast majority 
of his inspections outside his regular duty shift hours. 
Plaintiff 
characterized 
his 
inspection 
work 
as 
"moonlighting" and as providing "supplementary income." 
On March 2, 1992, plaintiff completed two inspection 
reports related to salvage vehicle inspections he conducted 
in Macomb County.2
 In these reports, plaintiff verified 
that certain repairs had been made when in fact they had 
not, and declared that the vehicles were roadworthy when in 
fact they were not. 
Following a criminal investigation, 
plaintiff 
was 
charged 
in 
April 
1994 
with 
false 
certification, a felony. MCL 257.903. The city discharged 
plaintiff on May 25, 1994, for violating department rules 
and regulations, including misconduct and lying about the 
inspections to a Michigan State Police investigator. 
However, in June 1997, a jury in Macomb County acquitted 
plaintiff of the criminal charge of false certification. 
Subsequently, plaintiff requested payment of $205,000 
from defendant for attorney fees incurred in defending the 
criminal charges. 
Plaintiff cited MCL 691.1408(2) as a 
basis for the city to reimburse such fees. By a resolution 
adopted at a meeting on September 8, 1997, the city council 
denied this request; it reiterated its position in a 
resolution adopted on June 22, 1998. 
The two resolutions 
2 The city of Flushing is located in Genesee County. 
3 
 
 
 
explained that plaintiff's request for fees was denied 
because plaintiff's actions that had resulted in the fees 
were not for any "public purpose" of the city of Flushing 
and fell outside the scope of plaintiff's employment with 
the city. 
Plaintiff filed the instant complaint for declaratory 
relief and a motion for summary disposition, contending 
that the city abused its discretion in denying his request 
for attorney fees. 
Following a two-day bench trial in 
October 2001, the trial court found that: (1) while 
performing 
salvage 
vehicle 
inspections, 
plaintiff 
was 
acting in the course of his duties as a Flushing police 
officer; (2) the city council did not "offer one credible 
or acceptable reason" for denying plaintiff's fee request; 
and (3) a reasonable attorney fee was $109,200. 
In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued December 23, 2003 
(Docket No. 241188). 
The majority concluded that the 
circuit court had not clearly erred in finding that 
plaintiff acted within the scope of his employment when he 
inspected salvage vehicles, or in finding that the city 
abused 
its 
discretion 
when 
it 
denied 
plaintiff 
reimbursement of his attorney fees. 
The dissenting judge 
would have reversed, concluding that the circuit court had 
clearly erred in finding that plaintiff's work as a salvage 
4  
 
 
vehicle inspector fell within the scope of his employment 
as a Flushing police officer. 
We 
granted 
oral 
argument 
on 
whether 
to 
grant 
defendants’ application for leave to appeal pursuant to MCR 
7.302(G)(1), and directed the parties to include among the 
issues briefed “whether the city council's decision is 
subject to judicial review.” 
Warda v Flushing City 
Council, 471 Mich 907 (2004). 
II. Standard of Review 
This dispute requires us to determine whether the 
judiciary has the authority pursuant to the Constitution 
and MCL 691.1408(2) to review the city council’s denial of 
plaintiff’s request for reimbursement. 
We review these 
issues de novo. 
Lapeer Co Clerk v Lapeer Circuit Judges, 
465 Mich 559, 566; 640 NW2d 567 (2002); Jeffrey v Rapid 
American Corp, 448 Mich 178, 184; 529 NW2d 644 (1995). 
III. Analysis 
The question presented here concerns the extent to 
which the decision of a municipality to deny reimbursement 
for attorney fees under MCL 691.1408(2) is subject to 
judicial review. 
Michigan has long recognized that a 
municipality may indemnify a police officer for costs, 
including attorney fees, incurred because of the discharge 
of the officer's official duties. 
Messmore v Kracht, 172 
Mich 120, 122; 137 NW 549 (1912). 
This principle is 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reflected in § 8 of the governmental immunity act, MCL 
691.1408. 
As for the costs incurred by an officer in 
defending a criminal action based on conduct of the officer 
in the course of his employment, MCL 691.1408(2) provides: 
When a criminal action is commenced against
an officer or employee of a governmental agency
based upon the conduct of the officer or employee
in the course of employment, if the employee or
officer had a reasonable basis for believing that
he or she was acting within the scope of his or
her authority at the time of the alleged conduct,
the governmental agency may pay for, engage, or
furnish the services of an attorney to advise the
officer or employee as to the action, and to
appear for and represent the officer or employee
in the action. 
An officer or employee who has
incurred legal expenses after December 31, 1975
for conduct prescribed in this subsection may
obtain reimbursement for those expenses under 
this subsection. [Emphasis added.] 
For purposes of the statute, “governmental agency” is 
defined as “the state or a political subdivision.” 
MCL 
691.1401(d). “Political subdivision” is further defined: 
“Political subdivision” means a municipal 
corporation, 
county, 
county 
road 
commission,
school district, community college district, port
district, 
metropolitan 
district, 
or 
transportation authority or a combination of 2 or
more of these when acting jointly; a district or
authority authorized by law or formed by 1 or
more 
political 
subdivisions; 
or 
an 
agency,
department, 
court, 
board, 
or 
council 
of 
a 
political 
subdivision. 
[MCL 
691.1401(b)
(emphasis added).] 
Thus, the Flushing city council constitutes a “governmental 
agency” for purposes of the governmental immunity act. 
The use of the word “may” in § 8 makes clear that the 
decision to pay an officer's attorney fees is a matter left
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to the discretion of the municipality. 
Further, we note 
that the statute does not limit or qualify the word “may” 
(with, for instance, a requirement of reasonableness) or 
provide any other standards by which that discretion is to 
be exercised. 
As such, the Flushing city council had full 
discretion under MCL 691.1408(2) in choosing whether to 
reimburse plaintiff’s attorney fees. 
The question, then, is the nature of this Court's 
power to review a purely discretionary action taken by a 
governmental agency. 
In Veldman v Grand Rapids, 275 Mich 
100; 265 NW 790 (1936), we were faced with the question 
whether the plaintiffs, a group of Grand Rapids taxpayers, 
could sue to prevent the city’s purchase of a power plant, 
where such purchase had been approved by that city’s 
legislative 
body, 
the 
city 
commission. 
This 
Court 
observed: 
If the city commission had legal authority
to do what it did do, that ends the matter. The
question 
of 
whether 
the 
commissioners 
acted 
wisely or unwisely is not for the consideration
or determination of this court. 
* * * 
If the charter of the city of Grand Rapids
is constitutional, and of this there seems to be
no question, and the State has thus conferred
upon the city commission the power which it 
exercised and left the exercise of it to the 
judgment and discretion of the commissioners,
then their action is conclusive. [Id. at 112­
113.] 
7  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
In the instant case, the state, through § 8 (the 
constitutionality of which has not been challenged), has 
clearly “conferred upon the city [council] the power which 
it exercised and left the exercise of it to the judgment 
and discretion” of the city council. 
Veldman, supra at 
113. 
While the statute affords the city council the 
discretion to decide whether to reimburse a claim for 
attorney fees, the statute says nothing about the 
limits 
within which that discretion is to be exercised, let alone 
by which an appellate court would be guided in its review 
of a decision made pursuant to that discretion. 
As such, 
the Flushing city council’s action to deny reimbursement of 
attorney fees is conclusive. 
Whether the council acted 
wisely or unwisely, prudently or imprudently, is not for 
the consideration or determination of this Court.3 
3 We stress that this opinion only precludes the
judiciary from reviewing the discretionary decision-making
of legislative and executive agencies. 
Where decision­
making falls outside the scope of such discretion, such
decision-making would be fully subject to judicial review. 
For instance, MCL 691.1408(2) confers discretionary
decision-making authority on a governmental agency if three
criteria are met: (1) a criminal action has been commenced
against an employee; (2) the criminal action is based on
the conduct of the employee occurring in the course of
employment; and (3) the employee has a reasonable basis for
believing that he or she was acting within the scope of his
or her authority at the time of the conduct. 
If any of
these three criteria are not satisfied, a legislative or
executive agency would lack the statutory discretion to
award attorney fees. 
Therefore, if a legislative or 
executive agency chose to award attorney fees to a 
nonemployee, for example, the discretion afforded the 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
As a result, we see no need to take sides in the 
matter addressed and resolved, both by the trial court and 
the Court of Appeals, regarding whether plaintiff's work as 
a salvage vehicle inspector fell within the scope of his 
employment as a Flushing police officer. 
The following passage from People v Gardner, 143 Mich 
104, 106; 106 NW 541 (1906), succinctly summarizes both 
the role of the judiciary and the appropriate form of 
relief available to a plaintiff in a matter of this sort:4 
“The general rule is well established that
courts will not inquire into the motives of 
legislators where they possess the power to do 
the act, and it has been exercised as prescribed
by the organic law. In such case the doctrine is 
that the legislators are responsible alone to the
people who elect them. And this principle is
generally applied to purely legislative acts of
municipal corporations.” [Citation omitted.] 
agency under MCL 691.1408(2) would not preclude the courts
from reviewing such a decision, because the preconditions
giving rise to the discretionary authority would not have
been met. 
4 In the past this Court has considered whether such
discretionary actions are subject to judicial review and 
have concluded that they are not. 
See, e.g., Schwartz v 
City of Flint, 426 Mich 295, 305-313; 395 NW2d 678 (1986).
These cases are predicated on the doctrine of separation of
powers that is set forth in Const 1963, art 3, § 2, which
provides that “[t]he powers of government are divided into
three branches: legislative, executive and judicial,” and
further provides that “[n]o person exercising powers of one
branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another
branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.”
We have recognized that the doctrine of the separation of
powers applies to municipalities when exercising the powers
delegated to them by the Legislature pursuant to Const
1963, art 7, §§ 21 and 22. 
9 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
So long as the power to govern the city and control 
its affairs is vested by the people of Flushing in an 
elected city council, neither this Court nor any other may 
assume to direct the local policy of the city of Flushing. 
See Veldman, supra at 111; Huse v East China Twp Bd, 330 
Mich 465, 470-471; 47 NW2d 696 (1951). 
Here, the city 
council concluded that the reimbursement of plaintiff’s 
attorney fees would not serve the “public purposes” of the 
city of Flushing, and chose not to reimburse such fees. 
While such a decision might be one with which reasonable 
people would disagree, its wisdom is ultimately to be 
judged by the voters of the city of Flushing, and not by 
the judiciary of this state. 
Accordingly, because the 
statute provides no limits within which the city council’s 
discretion is to be exercised, let alone by which an 
appellate court would be guided in its review of an 
exercise of that discretion, MCL 691.1408(2) affords 
plaintiff no basis for relief.5 
Moreover, in enacting MCL 691.1408(3), which precludes 
governmental liability under this act, the Legislature 
demonstrated an appreciation of this limitation on judicial 
5 Plaintiff here does not identify any other statute
pertinent to defendants that would render their conduct
either illegal or ultra vires.  See People v Ford, 417 Mich
66, 91; 331 NW2d 878 (1982). 
Obviously, the fact that one
statute does not render conduct unlawful does not mean that 
another statute may not do so. 
10  
 
 
 
 
power. MCL 691.1408(3), then, is not inharmonious with the 
separation of powers considerations that we have set forth. 
However, while we conclude that there is no statutory 
basis for our review of the city council’s decision, that 
conclusion does not end the inquiry. 
Even a discretionary 
action of a governmental agency must still comport with the 
constitutions of this state and the United States. 
As we 
have noted elsewhere: 
[T]he power of judicial review does not 
extend 
only 
to 
invalidating 
unconstitutional 
statutes or other legislative enactments, but 
also 
to 
declaring 
other 
governmental 
action 
invalid if it violates the state or federal 
constitution. [Sharp v City of Lansing, 464 Mich
792, 810-811; 629 NW2d 873 (2001).] 
The decisions of a governmental agency, for example, 
to award attorney fees on the basis of race, religion, or 
nationality might implicate the equal protection guarantees 
of the federal and state constitutions, while decisions 
influenced by corruption might implicate the due process 
guarantees of these same constitutions. See Huse, supra at 
470-471. 
However, plaintiff here does not suggest that the city 
council’s decision was unconstitutional in any way. Nor is 
there any evidence in the record that would suggest such 
unconstitutionality. 
Rather, the record reflects that the 
city council was faced with a discretionary decision that 
required it to choose among several permissible outcomes, 
11  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and it chose accordingly. 
The gravamen of plaintiff’s 
argument is simply that he is unhappy with the option the 
city council selected. 
Yet his dissatisfaction, however 
reasonable to this Court, does not call into question an 
otherwise valid decision of a governmental agency.6  Where, 
6 While the exercise of discretion at issue here (a
city council resolution) was legislative in nature, our
holding extends equally to encompass discretionary actions
undertaken by the executive branch in the absence of a
guiding standard. 
In Sutherland v Governor, 29 Mich 320,
321 (1874), the Governor was empowered by statute to issue
a certificate of approval “when he shall be satisfied that
certain work has been done in conformity with the law.”
The parties performing the work brought a mandamus action
to compel the Governor to issue such a certificate. 
This 
Court declined, for lack of jurisdiction, to entertain the
application for mandamus. We observed: 
The law must leave the final decision upon
every claim and every controversy somewhere, and
when that decision has been made, it must be
accepted as correct. The presumption is just as
conclusive in favor of executive action as in 
favor of judicial. 
The party applying for 
action, which, under the constitution and laws,
depends on the executive discretion, or is to be
determined by the executive judgment, if he fails
to obtain it, has sought the proper remedy and
must submit to the decision. [Id. at 330-331.] 
See also Midland Co Bd of Supervisors v Auditor General, 27
Mich 165, 166 (1873) (“the exercise of an official 
discretion belonging to an executive department of the
State government, is not subject to review judicially, and
cannot, therefore, be examined upon certiorari from this 
Court”). 
Where the executive carries out a function that is 
part of the inherent executive power and for which there
are no constitutional or other standards, the judiciary is
equally without power to review executive action. 
See, 
e.g., United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, 299 US
304, 320; 57 S Ct 216; 81 L Ed 255 (1936) (noting that the
President’s 
inherent 
power 
to 
handle 
international 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
as here, a statute empowers a governmental agency to 
undertake a discretionary decision, and provides no limits 
to guide either the agency’s exercise of that discretion or 
the judiciary’s review of that exercise, the decision is 
not subject to judicial review absent an allegation that 
the exercise of that discretion was unconstitutional. 
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of 
Appeals relied on Exeter Twp Clerk v Exeter Twp Bd, 108 
Mich App 262; 310 NW2d 357 (1981), and Bowens v City of 
Pontiac, 165 Mich App 416; 419 NW2d 24 (1988). 
In Exeter, 
a township clerk hired private counsel in connection with a 
primary election after the township attorney declined to 
advise her on the legality of certain nominating petitions. 
When the township board refused to reimburse the clerk for 
relations “does not require as a basis for its exercise an
act of Congress, but . . . must be exercised in 
subordination 
to 
the 
applicable 
provisions 
of 
the 
Constitution”); Cunningham v Neagle, 135 US 1; 10 S Ct 658;
34 L Ed 55 (1890). 
Where an executive branch action constitutes action 
taken pursuant to a legislative grant of authority and in
accordance with standards set forth by the Legislature—a 
realm 
of 
action 
that 
encompasses 
virtually 
all 
administrative agency actions—it would normally be subject
to judicial review. 
In such cases, there would be a
legislatively set standard that a court of law would apply
in reviewing such an action. 
See Dep't of Natural 
Resources v Seaman, 396 Mich 299, 308-309; 240 NW2d 206
(1976). 
13  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
her attorney fees and costs, she filed a mandamus action to 
obtain reimbursement under MCL 691.1408.7 
The Exeter panel recognized that there were “no 
statutory guidelines demonstrating any legislative intent 
to answer the question of legal fee indemnification or 
reimbursement,” and no cases directly on point. 
Exeter, 
supra at 268. 
The panel also recognized the wide 
discretion afforded to a municipality under the statute: 
[A] municipality, such as a township, in
general possesses the discretion to determine 
whether (1) counsel for the township shall 
represent a township official sued in his or her
capacity, (2) to approve retention of private
counsel 
paid 
for 
by 
the 
township, 
(3) 
to 
indemnify the official for expenses incurred in
defending the action, including attorneys fees,
or (4) the township board may decline to provide
legal representation or indemnification for such
official. [Id. at 269.] 
However, in spite of this recognition, the Exeter 
panel disregarded the latitude statutorily afforded to the 
7 We note that while plaintiff in the instant case did
not label his complaint as one for mandamus, he was in
essence seeking a writ of mandamus from the circuit court
to compel the city council to pay him his attorney fees.
However, a writ of mandamus will be issued only where a
plaintiff can prove that he has a “‘clear legal right to
performance of the specific duty sought to be compelled’ 
and that the defendant has a ‘clear legal duty to perform 
such act . . . .’” In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich
396, 442-443; 596 NW2d 164 (1999) (citation omitted). 
While this rule may have prompted the Court in Exeter to 
create its “pressing necessity” exception, there is simply
no statutory basis for such an exception. 
Accordingly,
because MCL 691.1408(2) provides only that a governmental
agency “may” reimburse attorney fees, plaintiff has not
shown that he had a “clear legal right” to reimbursement,
nor that the city council had a “clear legal duty” to 
reimburse him. In re MCI, supra. 
14 
 
 
   
 
 
municipality. 
The panel overlooked the fact that MCL 
691.1408 provided no guidance regarding what standards an 
appellate court might employ in reviewing the township's 
decision; instead, it simply reviewed the decision for an 
abuse of discretion. Id. 
The Exeter panel then proceeded to create a “pressing 
necessity” exception from statutory language, MCL 691.1408, 
that contained no such exception: 
Where it is factually demonstrated that 
pressing 
necessity 
or 
emergency 
conditions 
warrant a municipal official in employing legal
counsel in a matter of official, public concern
and legal services are provided without consent
of the governing body, the courts may hold a
municipal 
corporation 
liable 
for 
such 
legal
services. [Exeter, supra at 269-270.] 
The Court of Appeals later extended this exception to 
apply to legal expenses incurred in the course of defending 
criminal charges. 
In Bowens, supra, a city councilman who 
went “undercover” to investigate illegal gambling within 
his 
district 
was 
wrongly 
implicated 
in 
a 
gambling 
enterprise, and incurred legal expenses defending against 
the resulting criminal charges. 
The Court of Appeals 
concluded that the plaintiff acted reasonably, in good 
faith, and for a public purpose in doing what he did, and 
that the Exeter exception applied because the “plaintiff 
had been faced with an emergency in immediately requiring 
the services of a skilled criminal attorney.” 
Bowens, 
supra at 420. 
15  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
We believe that the Court of Appeals panels in Exeter 
and Bowens misapprehended the limited role afforded to the 
judiciary in cases involving discretionary decisions of a 
governmental agency. 
To the extent that MCL 691.1408(2) 
sets forth no limits on the exercise of a governmental 
agency’s 
discretion 
to 
reimburse 
attorney 
fees, 
it 
concomitantly sets forth no standards by which the decision 
of such agency can be reviewed meaningfully by the 
judiciary. 
The exercise of the "judicial power" by this 
Court, Const 1963, art 6, § 1, contemplates that there will 
be standards—legally comprehensible standards—on the basis 
of which agency decisions can be reviewed. 
Whether such 
standards consist of the provisions of the constitution, or 
the provisions of other pertinent laws, a judicially 
comprehensible standard is required in order to enable 
judicial review.8  Here, there is no such standard. 
As a 
result, there is no basis upon which a court of law can 
properly review the actions of defendants under MCL 
691.1408(2). 
Absent a comprehensible standard, judicial 
review cannot be undertaken in pursuit of the rule of law, 
but only in pursuit of the personal preferences of 
8 Cf. Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 217; 82 S Ct 691; 7 L
Ed 2d 663 (1962)(referring in the context of the political
question doctrine to the impropriety of courts resolving 
matters 
in 
which 
there 
is 
a 
“lack 
of 
judicially
discoverable and manageable standards”).
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
individual judges. 
The latter pursuit falls outside the 
“judicial power” in Michigan. 
The Court of Appeals, relying on Exeter and Bowens, 
erred in concluding that decisions made pursuant to MCL 
691.1408(2) are reviewable under an abuse of discretion 
standard. 
Absent a showing that the governmental agency 
exercised its discretion in an unconstitutional manner, the 
courts are without the power to review such decisions. 
Accordingly, we overrule Exeter and Bowens. 
Because the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing the 
discretionary decisions involved in Exeter and Bowens, it 
follows that the exceptions to MCL 691.1408(2) the Court 
invented as a product of such review are also erroneous. 
However, even if the governmental agency decisions in those 
cases had been properly subject to judicial review, the 
exceptions invented therein still cannot stand. 
MCL 
691.1408(2) specifies that a “governmental agency may pay 
for, engage, or furnish the services of an attorney 
. . . .”  It says nothing about “pressing necessity” or 
“emergency.” 
Where statutory language is clear, “‘no 
further judicial construction is required or permitted, and 
the statute must be enforced as written.’” 
Gladych v New 
Family Homes, Inc, 468 Mich 594, 597; 664 NW2d 705 
(2003)(citation omitted). 
Because the exceptions adopted 
in Exeter and Bowens not only lack a statutory basis but 
17  
 
 
 
 
also violate the clear language of MCL 691.1408(2) that a 
government agency “may” reimburse attorney fees, those 
exceptions cannot stand. 
IV. Conclusion 
Because MCL 691.1408(2) places the decision whether to 
reimburse the attorney fees at issue within the discretion 
of the Flushing city council, the legislative branch of the 
local government, the judiciary is not empowered to review 
such decision absent a constitutional violation or other 
illegality. 
Where a statute permits a governmental agency 
to undertake a discretionary decision, and provides no 
limits to guide either the agency’s exercise of that 
discretion or the judiciary’s review of that exercise, the 
decision is not subject to judicial review absent an 
allegation that the exercise of discretion was in some way 
unconstitutional. 
To the extent that they are contrary to 
this rule, the Court of Appeals decisions in Exeter and 
Bowens are overruled. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
This matter is remanded to the circuit court for entry of 
an order dismissing plaintiff’s claims. 
Stephen J. Markman
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
STEPHEN W. WARDA, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 125561 
CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF 
FLUSHING AND CITY OF FLUSHING, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
WEAVER, J. (dissenting). 
I would grant leave to appeal in this case rather than 
issue a final opinion at this time. This case is currently 
before the Court on an application for leave to appeal. 
The Court ordered oral arguments to help it decide if it 
should grant leave, deny leave, or take some peremptory 
action. 
In its opinion, the majority addresses the broad 
question of judicial power, an issue raised by the Court, 
not the parties. 
Such an important and far-reaching 
question should not be decided without granting leave to 
appeal and receiving the benefit of full oral argument and 
full briefing, including inviting amicus briefing. 
In granting leave to appeal, I would also ask the 
parties to address whether the plaintiff has a legal remedy 
 
 
 
 
under MCL 691.1408, or whether subsection 3 of the statute 
prohibits the imposition of liability on a governmental 
agency for a decision made pursuant to subsection 2. 
MCL 
691.1408, at the time applicable here, stated in relevant 
part: 
(2) When a criminal action is commenced 
against an officer or employee of a governmental
agency based upon the conduct of the officer or
employee in the course of employment, if the
employee or officer had a reasonable basis for
believing that he or she was acting within the
scope of his or her authority at the time of the
alleged conduct, the governmental agency may pay
for, engage, or furnish the services of an 
attorney to advise the officer or employee as to
the action, and to appear for and represent the
officer or employee in the action. An officer or
employee who has incurred legal expenses after
December 31, 1975 for conduct prescribed in this
subsection may obtain reimbursement for those 
expenses under this subsection. 
(3) 
This section shall not impose any
liability on a governmental agency. 
[Emphasis
added.] 
Thus, the question would be whether the Legislature has 
specifically provided that a suit seeking to impose on a 
governmental agency liability based on MCL 691.1408, such 
as the suit here, could not be brought. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
2