Title: Commonwealth v. Alcide
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-10342
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 13, 2015

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SJC-10342 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JIMMY ALCIDE. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     March 6, 2015. - July 13, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Assistance of counsel, 
Identification of defendant in courtroom.  Identification.  
Evidence, Third-party culprit, Identification. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 21, 2006. 
 
 
The case was tried before S. Jane Haggerty, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on October 26, 2011, was heard by 
her. 
 
 
 
Matthew A. Kamholtz for the defendant. 
 
Kevin J. Curtin, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  Sharif Shaheed was shot and killed in the 
aftermath of an argument between two groups of friends outside a 
Lowell pub.  The defendant, charged with Shaheed's murder, 
posited at trial that a third party had been the shooter.  A 
2 
 
Superior Court jury returned a conviction of murder in the first 
degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation.  The defendant 
filed a motion for a new trial, asserting, among other things, 
that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective 
assistance.  The motion was denied by the judge who had presided 
at trial.  Before us is a consolidated appeal from the 
defendant's conviction and from the denial of his motion for a 
new trial. 
 
There is no dispute that the defendant's counsel did not 
prepare for trial in an adequate manner.  Among other things, 
defense counsel did not familiarize himself with the 
Commonwealth's discovery file, did not examine the physical 
evidence collected by police, did not conduct any independent 
investigation of the case, and did not consider seeking 
exclusion of any of the Commonwealth's evidence.  Because of 
counsel's inadequate preparation, significant pieces of evidence 
supporting a third-party culprit defense were not introduced at 
trial.  In addition, two in-court identifications of the 
defendant were admitted that, if objected to, could have been 
excluded.  Although the case against the defendant was a strong 
one, it was not overwhelming, and we are persuaded that "better 
work might have accomplished something material for the 
defense."  Commonwealth v. Bell, 460 Mass. 294, 303 (2011), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 435 Mass. 113, 123 (2001).  In 
3 
 
essence, the defense available to the defendant was aired so 
inadequately at trial as to create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Accordingly, we vacate the defendant's 
conviction and remand for a new trial. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Shooting and trial.  The evidence at 
trial centered on an incident that occurred outside a pub in 
Lowell one night in July, 2006.1 
 
Two separate groups of friends visited the pub that night.  
One group included the victim; his fiancée, Arlene Cruz; his 
cousin, Keash Hardin; and two of their friends, Luis Parella and 
                     
 
1 For ease of reference, we provide a nearly-complete list 
of the individuals involved in this case. 
 
 
Friends and relatives of the victim: 
 
 
 
Arlene Cruz, the victim's fiancée; 
 
 
Keash Hardin, the victim's cousin; 
 
 
Luis Parella, known as "Orel"; 
 
 
Tammi, last name unknown; 
 
 
Leslie Berube; and 
 
 
Benjamin Jones. 
 
 
Friends and relatives of the defendant: 
 
 
Oriol Kedgy Dor, known as "Kedgy"; 
 
 
Estevenson Etienne, known as "Smoke"; 
 
 
Fritzgerald St. Preux, known as "Spike"; 
 
 
Robenson Brinville, known as "Son-Son"; and 
 
 
Jimmy Semextant, known as "Big Jimmy." 
 
 
And other friends and neighbors of Dor: 
 
 
 
Hipolita Gabin, known as "Josie," Dor's girl friend; 
 
 
Crispina Mangual, a friend of Dor; 
 
 
Sanyph Pierre-Louis, Mangual's boy friend; 
 
 
Heidi McLean, Dor's neighbor; and 
 
 
Stephanie McLean, Heidi McLean's sister. 
4 
 
a woman named Tammi.  This group was planning to attend a 
birthday party at a house located across the street from the 
pub.  Other partygoers, including Leslie Berube and Benjamin 
Jones, witnessed the victim's killing from the area of that 
house. 
 
The other, larger group included the defendant; five of his 
friends:  Oriol Kedgy Dor, Estevenson Etienne, Fritzgerald St. 
Preux, Robenson Brinville, and Jimmy Semextant; and at least 
four unidentified individuals, who met with Dor in Boston that 
day and followed him back to Lowell. 
 
The group that included the victim entered the pub briefly.  
So did several members of the group that included the defendant.  
The rest of the defendant's group remained outside, near the pub 
door.  All of the individuals who had gone into the pub trickled 
back out, beginning with the victim's group.  When the victim's 
group was again outside, by the door, and as the remaining 
members of the defendant's group were exiting, the two groups 
began arguing.  Dor asked, "Who's Keash?" or "Are you Keash?" or 
words to that effect.  Hardin, the victim's cousin (who was, in 
fact, Keash), answered that he was not.  The victim then asked, 
according to Hardin's testimony, "If it was Keash, what would 
have happened?" 
 
Semextant, another member of the defendant's group, told 
Hardin and the victim not to ask any questions.  Hardin 
5 
 
responded by punching Semextant in the face.  The crowd 
dispersed in a frenzy of running, perhaps (as Hardin testified) 
after a man standing next to Semextant brandished a gun.2 
 
The victim ran away from the pub, and later circled back 
around toward it.  Semextant was heard calling out, in Haitian 
Creole, "Shoot!  Shoot!"  Two shots were fired.  One bullet hit 
the victim in the back of his head, killing him.  Two casings 
from a .380 automatic caliber weapon were later found at the 
scene. 
 
The background to this encounter remained murky at trial.  
Estevenson Etienne (one of the defendant's friends) testified 
that Dor (another friend) had initiated the visit to the pub 
because Dor had been "arguing with a guy in there."  According 
to Etienne, he and Dor knew that "there could be a fight" that 
night.  Another member of the defendant's group, Fritzgerald St. 
Preux, said that Dor had traveled to Boston that day in order to 
"pick up some of" [Dor's] boys."  Both St. Preux and Dor 
reported that Dor had been in a squabble at the pub on some 
earlier date, but they both said that that argument was resolved 
on the spot, and that it involved neither the victim nor Hardin. 
 
The disputed question at trial was whether the defendant 
was the man who shot the victim.  The murder weapon was not 
                     
 
2 Hardin ultimately identified that man as the defendant.  
His identification is discussed infra. 
6 
 
recovered, and no forensic evidence identified the defendant as 
the shooter.  The Commonwealth's case thus relied heavily on the 
incriminating, and generally consistent, testimony of the 
defendant's friends, Etienne, St. Preux, Robenson Brinville, and 
Dor.3  Close ties were shown between these friends; in 
particular, Dor's sister and the defendant's brother have two 
children together.  All four of the defendant's friends 
described statements in which he admitted to shooting the gun.  
In addition, Etienne testified that he witnessed the defendant 
lift his hand just before a gunshot rang out and the victim 
fell; Brinville testified that Semextant had given the defendant 
a gun earlier that night; and both Etienne and Dor testified 
that Semextant was addressing the defendant when he said, 
"Shoot! Shoot!" 
 
Two other eyewitnesses identified the defendant as the 
gunman:  Hardin, and Howard Jewell, who was checking 
identification documents at the pub door that night.  Hardin 
testified, on direct examination, that he had been unable to 
                     
 
3 Robenson Brinville's and Estevenson Etienne's accounts 
also were consistent in that they both described Etienne running 
toward the defendant's vehicle after the shooting, but 
ultimately deciding not to enter that vehicle.  In addition, 
Fritzgerald St. Preux's account of the defendant's confession, 
according to which the defendant stated that he had shot the 
victim "[b]ehind the ears," was consistent with the medical 
examiner's testimony that the victim had a bullet wound 
approximately three inches behind his right ear.  Jimmy 
Semextant did not testify. 
7 
 
pick the defendant out of a photographic array approximately one 
week after the shooting.  Subsequently, however, according to 
Hardin, he saw the defendant's photograph in a newspaper, and he 
then recognized the defendant as the shooter.  Hardin's cross-
examination revealed that the newspaper article he had seen was 
about the shooting, and that the only photograph included in the 
article was of the defendant.  Jewell, on cross-examination, 
revealed that the background to his identification was similar:  
at a photographic array conducted soon after the shooting, 
Jewell picked out the photograph of the defendant, but wrote on 
the back of the photograph only that the man "[l]ooks familiar.  
Was there."  Jewell also initialed a second photograph in the 
array, of a person who was never identified.  By the time Jewell 
testified at trial, he had seen a photograph of the defendant in 
a newspaper.  Unlike Hardin, Jewell testified also that, about 
two weeks before the trial, he was shown a single photograph of 
the defendant at the district attorney's office. 
 
Benjamin Jones, one of the friends of the victim who 
witnessed the incident from across the street, did not identify 
the defendant.  Jones stated, however, that the shooter had a 
"low, tight, bald haircut."  According to several witnesses, the 
defendant had short hair at the time of the shooting, whereas 
Etienne, St. Preux, and Dor reported that they had each then 
8 
 
worn dreadlocks or braids.4  Jones testified also that the 
shooter ran to a light- or tan-colored Honda Accord.  The 
defendant's vehicle was a blue-grey Dodge sedan.  The other 
vehicle in which friends of the defendant traveled that night 
was a van. 
 
Leslie Berube, another friend of the victim who was 
standing across the street when the shots were fired, was eighty 
per cent confident that the defendant's photograph in a 
photographic array was that of the shooter.  Berube also 
testified, however, that the shooter dropped a cellular 
telephone while running; other evidence revealed that the man 
who dropped his telephone during the incident was Dor, not the 
defendant.5  Berube acknowledged that, immediately after the 
shooting, her attention was focused on locating her fiancé, Eric 
Wilkins, who also was at the pub that night. 
 
Finally, evidence was introduced to suggest a consciousness 
of guilt on the defendant's part.  The defendant changed his 
telephone number two days after the shooting.  Additionally, an 
                     
 
4 Brinville's and Semextant's hairstyles were not discussed.  
Hardin testified that the man who asked, "Who's Keash?" -- 
apparently Oriol Kedgy Dor -- had short hair. 
 
 
5 Dor's cellular telephone was recovered approximately 
thirty feet down the street from where the shooting occurred.  
St. Preux's testimony indicated that Dor had dropped his 
telephone before the shots were fired.  This testimony, if 
accurate, suggested that Dor could have been the shooter only 
if, after dropping his telephone, he ran back toward the pub. 
9 
 
officer testified to statements that the defendant made to 
police following his arrest, approximately nine days after the 
shooting.  While sitting in a police cruiser, after being read 
the Miranda rights, the defendant was told that he was being 
charged with murder for a shooting in Lowell.  At first, the 
defendant responded that he did not know anything about the 
shooting.  After he was informed that he had been identified as 
the shooter, the defendant said that he had been in Lowell a 
week or two earlier, but that nothing had happened.  The 
defendant initially denied any memory of the names of the 
friends with whom he had been on that occasion.  He stated also 
that there had been a "problem" that night, but that he himself 
had not been involved.6 
 
At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, the defendant 
moved for a required finding of not guilty.  The judge allowed 
the motion only as to the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, 
and otherwise denied it.  The defendant did not present 
evidence.  The theory of the defense was that a third party, 
probably Dor, had been the shooter.  Defense counsel's closing 
argument focused on Berube's testimony that the shooter was the 
same man who had dropped his cellular telephone, namely Dor, and 
on certain inconsistencies between the versions of events 
                     
 
6 The defendant's conversation with police was not recorded.  
The jury were instructed in accordance with Commonwealth v. 
DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 447-448 (2004). 
10 
 
provided by the defendant's friends.  Counsel suggested that 
Etienne, St. Preux, and Brinville -- who had gone to speak to 
police of their own volition -- falsely incriminated the 
defendant, presumably in order to protect Dor.  The prosecutor 
did not argue the case as a joint venture, and no jury 
instructions on joint venture were given.  On their fourth day 
of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of 
murder in the first degree. 
 
b.  Postconviction proceedings.  Represented by new 
counsel, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which we 
remanded to the Superior Court.  The primary argument made in 
the motion was that the assistance provided by the defendant's 
trial attorney was constitutionally ineffective.  The defendant 
maintained also that the prosecutor erred by eliciting false 
evidence and by arguing in his closing facts not in evidence. 
 
The defendant's ineffective assistance claim relied on 
materials from the Commonwealth's pretrial discovery and on an 
affidavit of his trial counsel.  According to that affidavit, 
the defendant's trial was counsel's first murder trial.  Counsel 
was paid approximately $12,000 for his services.  He averred 
that, at the time of the trial, he was unaware of much of the 
contents of the Commonwealth's discovery file.  He did not visit 
the Lowell police department to examine the physical evidence 
collected in the course of the investigation.  He rarely, if 
11 
 
ever, "engage[d] experts or investigators to assist in the 
defense."  He did "not independently investigate this case 
and . . . did not attempt to contact and interview any of the 
witnesses identified in the discovery materials."  In addition, 
it was "not [counsel's] habit to engage in motion practice," 
including motions to suppress.7 
 
The defendant argued that the discovery materials produced 
to his attorney included potential evidence that would have 
supported the theory that Dor was the shooter.  This evidence 
included:  (a) a description of Dor's clothing on the day of the 
shooting provided to police by his neighbor, Heidi McLean,8 
coupled with a matching description of the clothing worn by the 
shooter provided to police by Luis Parella, one of the victim's 
friends; (b) a statement to police by the same neighbor, Heidi, 
that she had been told by Hipolita Gabin, Dor's girl friend, 
that "[Gabin's] man shot somebody"; (c) accounts by Dor's 
friends and neighbors, contained in police reports and grand 
jury testimony, about prior incidents at the pub, and about 
statements made by Dor after those incidents, indicating that 
Dor intended to harm Hardin and his friends; and (d) information 
                     
 
7 The defendant's trial attorney has since been disbarred.  
See Matter of Kelly, No. BD-2009-006 (Mar. 22, 2010).  The 
defendant has not suggested that counsel's disbarment was 
related in any way to the present case. 
 
 
8 Because she shares a last name with her sister, Stephanie, 
we refer to Heidi McLean by her first name. 
12 
 
that police found a nine millimeter bullet while searching Dor's 
apartment.  The defendant argued also that his attorney should 
have sought the exclusion of the in-court identifications of the 
defendant by Hardin and Jewell. 
 
The trial judge did not grant the defendant's request for 
an evidentiary hearing.  After receiving memoranda and hearing 
argument, she denied the motion for a new trial in a detailed 
written decision.  Focusing implicitly on whether trial 
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant, the judge 
concluded, first, that some of the potential testimony on which 
the defendant relied would not have been admissible, given the 
restrictions on the admissibility of third-party culprit 
evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 
800-801 (2009) (Silva-Santiago).  Other testimony, according to 
the judge, "suggest[ed] that [Dor] was the shooter."  But the 
judge concluded, relying on Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 
Mass. 188, 204 (2006), that this evidence was "not 'so 
overwhelming' to affect the sufficiency of the evidence."  The 
judge reasoned that any motions to suppress the identifications 
by Hardin and Jewell would have been denied under the then 
prevailing case law.  Finally, the judge discerned no 
impropriety in the evidence presented by the Commonwealth or in 
the prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant appealed from 
13 
 
both his conviction and the denial of his motion for a new 
trial. 
 
2.  Applicable standards.  We focus our analysis on the 
defendant's primary claim, that he received constitutionally 
ineffective assistance from his trial counsel.9  Ordinarily, a 
defendant asserting a claim of this kind must show "that 'there 
has been serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of 
counsel -- behavior of counsel falling measurably below that 
which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer,' and 
that, as a result, the defendant was 'likely deprived . . . of 
an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence.'"  
Commonwealth v. Boria, 460 Mass. 249, 252 (2011), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  When an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is made on direct appeal 
from a conviction of murder in the first degree, however, we 
apply the standard "more favorable to a defendant" of whether 
there is a substantial likelihood that a miscarriage of justice 
occurred.  See Commonwealth v. Marrero, 459 Mass. 235, 244 
(2011), citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 453 Mass. 203, 204–205 
(2009).  Under this standard, "[i]f we conclude 'that counsel 
erred by failing to raise a substantial defense, "a new trial is 
                     
 
9 Because we conclude that the defendant's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim warrants a new trial, we need not 
address his assertions that the prosecutor misstated the 
evidence and solicited false testimony, other than to note that 
we find little merit in them. 
14 
 
called for unless we are substantially confident that, if the 
error had not been made, the jury verdict would have been the 
same."'"  Commonwealth v. Spray, 467 Mass. 456, 472 (2014), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Sena, 429 Mass. 590, 595 (1999), S.C., 
441 Mass. 822 (2004). 
 
In our review for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice due to ineffective assistance of counsel, we consider 
whether the defendant has made "some showing that better work 
might have accomplished something material for the defense."  
See Commonwealth v. Bell, 460 Mass. 294, 303 (2011), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 435 Mass. 113, 123 (2001).  One type of 
situation in which such a showing may be made is where counsel 
neglected "evidence that another person committed the crime," 
Commonwealth v. Phinney, 446 Mass. 155, 163 (2006), S.C., 448 
Mass. 621 (2007), and that evidence, "if developed, might have 
raised a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant or someone 
else had killed the victim."  Commonwealth v. Farley, 432 Mass. 
153, 156 (2000), S.C., 443 Mass. 740, cert denied, 546 U.S. 1035 
(2005). 
 
We review a judge's denial of a motion for a new trial for 
"a significant error of law or other abuse of discretion," 
granting "special deference to the rulings of a motion judge who 
was also the trial judge."  Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 
469, 488 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 
15 
 
307 (1986).  When we review such a decision in the context of an 
appeal from a conviction of murder in the first degree, the 
defendant nevertheless "has the benefit of our independent 
review, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E . . . of the entire 
record."  Commonwealth v. Carter, 423 Mass. 506, 513 (1996). 
 
In the current case, we cannot defer in the usual manner to 
the trial judge's assessment of the defendant's claims against 
the backdrop of the evidence heard at trial.  Throughout her 
decision denying the defendant's motion for a new trial, and 
intertwined with her discussion whether the information offered 
by the defendant would have been admissible as third-party 
culprit evidence, the judge indicated that she was guided by the 
standard described in Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. at 
204.10  The defendant in that case was convicted of burglary and 
                     
 
10 Although the judge correctly recited the requirements 
that third-party culprit evidence must satisfy, see Commonwealth 
v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 800-801 (2009), her analysis 
wove into those requirements the inapt standard of Commonwealth 
v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 204 (2006).  The judge wrote, for 
instance, that contradictions between the third-party culprit 
evidence and the Commonwealth's evidence at trial were "not so 
'powerful' or 'overwhelming' to overcome the sufficiency of the 
Commonwealth's case," and that a proffered statement by Heidi, 
Dor's neighbor, was "not 'so overwhelming' to affect the 
sufficiency of the evidence establishing that the defendant was 
the shooter."  In the concluding portion of her discussion of 
the third-party culprit evidence, the judge stated that "the 
fact that the defendant has presented evidence that he did not 
[commit the crime] does not affect the sufficiency of the 
evidence," and that the third-party culprit evidence was not 
"overwhelming" but rather "simply tended to contradict the 
Commonwealth's evidence."  As the judge has retired, the 
16 
 
other offenses.  See id. at 189.  Circumstantial evidence was 
presented "of motive, opportunity, and means, as well as 
consciousness of guilt."  Id. at 199.  The defendant argued that 
the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, relying in 
part on evidence suggesting that a third party had been the 
culprit.  See id. at 203.  We held, however, that, "if the 
Commonwealth has presented sufficient evidence that the 
defendant committed the crime, the fact that the defendant has 
presented evidence that he did not does not affect the 
sufficiency of the evidence unless the contrary evidence is so 
overwhelming that no rational jury could conclude that the 
defendant was guilty."  Id. at 204. 
 
The defendant in the current case presents a claim of a 
different nature, namely that his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance.  The defendant does not assert that the 
Commonwealth's evidence at trial was insufficient to support the 
verdict, or even that the evidence would have been insufficient 
if the defendant had received effective assistance from his 
attorney.  The standards that govern the defendant's ineffective 
assistance claim do not demand evidence "so overwhelming that no 
rational jury could conclude that the defendant was guilty."  
Id.  Because the defendant's claim was not assessed by the judge 
                                                                  
defendant's motion for a new trial cannot be remanded for 
reconsideration in light of the applicable standards. 
17 
 
against the appropriate standards, we are constrained to rest 
our analysis on our independent review of the record. 
 
3.  Analysis.  Our examination of the defendant's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, in light of the 
foregoing principles, proceeds in three parts.  At the outset, 
we comment on the practices of the defendant's attorney in 
preparation for trial.  We then scrutinize the missteps that, as 
a result of counsel's practices, occurred at trial.  With those 
foundations in hand, we evaluate whether there is a substantial 
likelihood that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. 
 
a.  Counsel's practices in preparation for trial.  We begin 
by stating plainly what was implicit in the judge's decision 
denying the motion for a new trial:  the practices of the 
defendant's counsel in preparing for trial, as counsel has 
described them, were unacceptably remiss.  Appropriately, the 
Commonwealth has so conceded.  We do not undertake here an in-
depth analysis of the professional obligations of defense 
attorneys.  Suffice it to say that a reasonably competent 
attorney representing the defendant would have been expected to 
become familiar with the discovery materials produced by the 
Commonwealth; to examine the physical evidence available for 
inspection at the police station; to independently investigate 
at least certain aspects of the case, if necessary drawing on 
experts or investigators for help; and, barring strategic 
18 
 
reasons to the contrary, to file any motions to suppress 
evidence reasonably likely to succeed.  See, e.g., Committee for 
Public Counsel Services, Assigned Counsel Manual, c. 4, at 10-13 
(Oct. 2011).  The defendant's attorney, who failed to perform 
any of these tasks, did not arrive at trial prepared to provide 
the quality of assistance that would be expected of a reasonably 
effective attorney.  See Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. at 
97 ("dependence on improvised cross-examination alone, even if 
it will surely be of virtuosic quality, is not to be 
recommended"). 
 
b.  Specific lapses by counsel at trial.  A question more 
crucial to our analysis is whether defense counsel's careless 
practices compromised the defense ultimately presented at trial.  
For the reasons we explain, we conclude that the defendant "was 
denied a fair trial due to trial counsel's . . . failure to 
investigate and develop the evidence which could have supported 
the defendant's defense," Commonwealth v. Farley, 432 Mass. at 
157, coupled with counsel's failure to challenge important 
inculpatory evidence of questionable reliability. 
 
i.  Exculpatory evidence not presented.  The defense 
offered at trial, that a third party had been the shooter, 
relied wholly on portions of the evidence put on by the 
Commonwealth.  Predominantly, the defense focused on Berube's 
testimony that the man who shot the victim was the same man who 
19 
 
dropped his cellular telephone (i.e., Dor).  Standing in 
isolation, this piece of testimony was vulnerable to the 
suggestion, made by the prosecutor in closing, that Berube -- 
who later identified the defendant from a photographic array 
with eighty per cent assurance -- was merely confused and 
distracted immediately after the shooting.  Because defense 
counsel neglected to explore the potential for a third-party 
culprit defense in advance of trial, he did not identify, 
investigate, assemble, and present additional evidence that 
would have buttressed the theory that Dor was the shooter.  That 
evidence, "if developed, might have raised a reasonable doubt 
about whether the defendant or someone else had killed the 
victim."  Commonwealth v. Farley, 432 Mass. at 156.  See 
Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 400 Mass. 437, 441 (1987) (new trial 
warranted by counsel's "failure to investigate fully and pursue" 
defense raised at trial).  Two pieces of information provided in 
the Commonwealth's discovery, in particular, could have added 
heft to the defense's hypothesis that Dor was the shooter. 
 
The first of these was a description of the shooter 
provided to police by Parella, one of the victim's friends.  
Parella stated, first, that the shooter was wearing a red T-
shirt, with gold print, and blue jeans.  Dor, according to his 
neighbor, Heidi, was wearing a red shirt and blue jeans on the 
20 
 
day of the shooting.11  Parella also stated that the shooter had 
"short dread locks."  This description fit Dor's hair, not the 
defendant's; while the defendant's haircut at the time of the 
shooting was reportedly a "Caesar" or a "fuzzy head,"  Dor 
testified that, at that time, he had braids that "were hanging 
down," but "not long."12 
 
The second piece of information that could have fortified 
the third-party defense was that, also according to Heidi, Gabin 
(Dor's girl friend) said after the shooting that "[her] man shot 
somebody."  Whether or not Gabin herself might have been called 
to testify at trial, a reasonably effective attorney would have 
endeavored to call Heidi to recount Gabin's statement.  Like all 
third-party culprit evidence, this testimony would have been 
admissible if the judge determined that it had "a rational 
                     
 
11 The witnesses who knew the defendant did not describe his 
clothing on the day of the shooting.  Benjamin Jones testified 
that the shooter wore a light colored shirt, probably white.  
Hardin thought that the shooter's shirt had been tan.  Leslie 
Berube's recollection was that the shooter was wearing a hooded 
sweatshirt. 
 
 
12 Luis Parella also told police that he had been chased by 
a different man, who had short hair and was wearing a red and 
white striped shirt.  While chasing Parella, that man said, "Why 
you running, why you running?"  The judge, who focused on this 
portion of Parella's statement, apparently concluded that 
Parella's account would have been undermined by the testimony of 
Arlene Cruz, the victim's fiancée, that a man who asked her, 
"Why are you running now?" was not the defendant.  In the 
stampede that followed the shooting, however, Cruz and Parella 
may have encountered different men asking similar questions, 
they both may have encountered a man who was not the defendant, 
or Cruz may have been mistaken. 
21 
 
tendency to prove the issue the defense raises" and was not "too 
remote or speculative."  Silva–Santiago, supra at 801, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 22 (1996).  In addition, 
because Gabin's statement would have been hearsay, its 
admissibility would have turned on the judge's assessment 
whether it was "otherwise relevant," whether it would "tend to 
prejudice or confuse the jury," and whether there were "other 
'substantial connecting links' to the crime."  Silva–Santiago, 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Rice, 441 Mass. 291, 305 (2004).13 
 
Here, there were other links between Dor and the shooting, 
namely Berube's testimony that the shooter was the man who 
dropped his cellular telephone and Parella's description of the 
shooter, coupled with Heidi's description of Dor's clothing.  
And considering that Berube's testimony already implicated Dor, 
it is difficult to say that Gabin's statement to the same effect 
would have confused the jury.  We have stressed that "[i]f the 
evidence is 'of substantial probative value, and will not tend 
to prejudice or confuse, all doubt should be resolved in favor 
of admissibility.'"  Silva–Santiago, supra, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Conkey, 443 Mass. 60, 66 (2004).  Accordingly, we assume, for 
purposes of our analysis of the defendant's ineffective 
                     
 
13 A more complete examination of these factors might have 
been made possible by an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's 
motion for a new trial. 
 
22 
 
assistance claim,14 that Heidi would have been permitted to 
testify to Gabin's statement incriminating Dor.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Phinney, 446 Mass. at 163-164 (concluding that 
third-party culprit evidence not offered by trial counsel would 
have been admitted from judge's treatment of other such 
evidence).15 
 
Other potential testimony identified by the defendant, 
while less directly probative of the third-party culprit 
defense, might have enhanced it by establishing that Dor had 
both a motive and an intent to engage in violence toward the 
victim's group of friends.  This testimony could have been 
provided by Crispina Mangual, Sanyph Pierre-Louis (Mangual's boy 
friend), and Stephanie McLean (Heidi's sister), all friends and 
neighbors of Dor.  According to their pretrial statements, these 
                     
 
14 Our analysis focuses on the question whether, because of 
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
defendant is entitled to a new trial.  Nothing said here is 
concerned with, and we accordingly do not address, how 
evidentiary issues, such as the admission of particular third-
party culprit evidence or the exclusion of certain eyewitness 
identification testimony, should be resolved at a new trial.  
Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence, resting 
largely within the trial judge's sound discretion, are to be 
addressed on retrial in the usual course. 
 
 
15 Indeed, the judge below, while concluding that other 
information likely would not have been admitted as third-party 
culprit evidence, stated that "Heidi's statement to the police 
suggests that [Dor] was the shooter," and dismissed the 
importance of this potential testimony only for the misplaced 
reason that it was "not 'so overwhelming' to affect the 
sufficiency of the evidence." 
23 
 
individuals could have testified that, a week or two before the 
shooting, Hardin and an unidentified man harassed Gabin, Dor's 
girl friend, while Dor and St. Preux were outside the same pub 
smoking.16  Dor was enraged, and he told his friends, "They're 
lucky I didn't have a piece on me."  Closer in time to the 
shooting, the same friends and neighbors heard from Dor and 
Gabin that Dor intended to go back to the pub to show "[t]hese 
niggas from Lowell . . . who's a gangster" and to "shoot 
[Hardin]." 
 
At least some of this information likely would have been 
admissible as third-party culprit evidence, namely evidence that 
tended to show that Dor "had the motive, intent, and opportunity 
to commit [the crime]."  Silva-Santiago, supra at 800, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 404 Mass. 378, 387 (1989).  Like 
Gabin's statement that "her man shot somebody," this information 
was supported by additional "connecting links" between Dor and 
the crime, and it is difficult to say that this information 
would have confused the jury.  See Silva-Santiago, supra at 801, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Rice, 441 Mass. at 305.  Moreover, the 
observations of Dor's friends and neighbors about earlier goings 
on at the pub would not have been hearsay. 
                     
 
16 Hardin was not questioned about this incident at trial, 
presumably because defense counsel was not aware of it. 
24 
 
 
The potential testimony of Dor's friends and neighbors 
would not have been contrary to the evidence, presented by the 
Commonwealth, that Dor and his friends were at the pub because 
(in Etienne's words) Dor had been "arguing with a guy in there," 
knowing that "there could be a fight."  Still, evidence of Dor's 
personal involvement in earlier hostilities, and of his personal 
desire for revenge, could have given form to the other 
indications that Dor was the shooter, by suggesting why Dor 
himself might have taken out a gun and fired it.  By contrast, 
the only explanation offered at trial as to why the defendant 
might have shot the victim was that the defendant was part of 
Dor's group and was at the pub to support Dor's efforts.  
Especially given that the case was not put to the jury on a 
joint venture theory, this final set of information, unheeded by 
defense counsel, would have bolstered the prospect of a 
successful third-party culprit defense.17 
                     
 
17 By contrast, we agree with the judge that information 
about yet another confrontation at the pub, approximately three 
weeks before the shooting, probably would not have been 
admitted, as that incident did not involve Dor.  We agree also 
that the defendant's ineffective assistance claim gains little 
support from defense counsel's failure to make use of 
information that police located a nine millimeter bullet in 
Dor's apartment.  The defendant argues that this information 
would have shown, contrary to Dor's testimony, that Dor was 
familiar with weapons.  Apart from serious questions about the 
admissibility of this information, however, see Commonwealth v. 
Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 122 (2012), we are not convinced that an 
effective attorney would have sought to introduce it in 
evidence.  The defendant has not disputed the Commonwealth's 
25 
 
 
ii.  Inculpatory evidence not challenged.  The other side 
of the evidentiary ledger, namely the evidence of the 
defendant's guilt, also could have looked different if the 
defendant had received reasonably effective assistance from his 
counsel.  The key issue at trial was the identity of the 
shooter.  Dor, Etienne, St. Preux, and Brinville all provided 
incriminating testimony on this issue, describing either the 
shooting itself or subsequent confessions by the defendant.  The 
defense was unlikely to succeed unless there were reason to 
think that these witnesses were lying to protect Dor.  The 
challenge of generating such a doubt was made all the more 
difficult by the identifications of the defendant as the gunman 
by Jewell and Hardin, who knew neither Dor nor the defendant.18  
Exclusion of these identifications would have made a real 
difference, therefore, to the defense's prospects. 
                                                                  
assertion, supported by an affidavit of a firearms examiner 
introduced below, that a nine millimeter firearm could not fire 
.380 automatic caliber bullets such as those that left the 
casings found at the scene of the shooting.  Evidence that Dor 
had access to a nine millimeter firearm might have harmed the 
defense, therefore, by suggesting that, if Dor had been the 
culprit, he would not have used .380 automatic caliber bullets. 
 
 
18 If Howard Jewell's and Hardin's identifications were 
excluded, the remaining identification evidence by strangers to 
Dor and the defendant would have been the testimony of Berube, 
which pointed at Dor as well, and that of Jones, who described 
only the shooter's hairstyle and the vehicle to which he ran 
(which, as described by Jones, resembled the defendant's vehicle 
but was not identical to it). 
26 
 
 
These identifications suffered from serious weaknesses.  At 
photographic arrays conducted soon after the shooting, both 
Hardin and Jewell failed to pick out the defendant as the 
shooter.  Jewell, who thought that the defendant looked 
"familiar" and had been at the scene (a point not disputed), 
also marked his initials on another photograph of an 
unidentified individual.  By the time of the trial, Hardin and 
Jewell each had seen the defendant's photograph in a newspaper 
article about the shooting.  Jewell testified also that, at the 
district attorney's office, about two weeks before trial, he was 
shown a photograph of the defendant unaccompanied by other 
photographs.  In court, both Hardin and Jewell identified the 
defendant as the gunman without objection.19 
 
We recently have held that, in the future, in-court 
identifications generally will not be permitted where a witness 
has participated in a pretrial identification procedure that 
"produced something less than an unequivocal positive 
identification."  See Commonwealth v. Collins, 470 Mass. 255, 
                     
 
19 Counsel's failure to challenge these identifications 
apparently resulted from a combination of his inadequate trial 
preparation and his policy against motion practice.  The 
photographic arrays administered to Hardin and Jewell were 
included in the Commonwealth's discovery, as was the fact that 
Hardin saw a photograph of the defendant in a newspaper.  The 
fact of Jewell's encounter(s) with the defendant after 
participating in a photographic array was not revealed in the 
Commonwealth's discovery, although it may have been disclosed 
orally sometime before trial. 
27 
 
262 (2014).  Our most up-to-date jurisprudence is not the 
applicable standard, however, because an attorney "[i]s not 
ineffective for failing to make an objection that would have 
been futile under the prevailing case law."  Id. at 261, citing 
Commonwealth v. Conceicao, 388 Mass. 255, 264 (1983).  See 
Commonwealth v. Boria, 460 Mass. 249, 253 (2011); Commonwealth 
v. Holliday, 450 Mass. 794, 813 (2008).  We must therefore 
inquire whether, under the prevailing law, it would have been 
"futile" for the defendant's attorney to have objected to 
Hardin's and Jewell's in-court identifications.  In the 
circumstances, we cannot conclude that such an objection would 
have been futile.20 
 
To begin with, the law has long been settled that "an in-
court identification is excluded if it is tainted by an out-of-
court confrontation arranged by the Commonwealth that is 'so 
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Bol Choeurn, 446 Mass. 510, 520 (2006), overruled on another 
ground by Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228 (2014), quoting 
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).  Jewell's 
in-court identification could have been challenged as "tainted" 
in this sense, given his testimony that, before trial, he was 
                     
 
20 See note 14, supra. 
 
28 
 
shown a single photograph of the defendant at the district 
attorney's office.21  The defendant's attorney presented no such 
claim.  When, at a sidebar conference, the judge offered to 
permit a voir dire of Jewell, so that defense counsel could 
inquire further into the circumstances of Jewell's 
identification, defense counsel declined repeatedly, stating 
that he would "let it go."  The Commonwealth has not identified 
a reasonable strategic reason that might have supported this 
decision, and none is suggested in trial counsel's affidavit.  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Dougan, 377 Mass. 303, 316-317 (1979), 
citing Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 372 Mass. 783, 789 (1977), 
abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Paulding, 438 
Mass. 1 (2002) (stating that "full exploration of the 
circumstances surrounding eyewitness identification is necessary 
to ensure a fair trial").  There is thus no reason to conclude 
that a motion to exclude Jewell's identification would have been 
futile. 
 
In addition, the identifications made by both Jewell and 
Hardin could have been challenged under our common-law rule 
that, "in some circumstances[,] an identification that has been 
tainted, but not by the government, may become so unreliable 
                     
 
21 In the proceedings on the defendant's motion for a new 
trial, the Commonwealth submitted an affidavit of the trial 
prosecutor, who stated that neither he nor his cocounsel showed 
Jewell a photograph of the defendant.  The motion judge did not 
hear oral testimony or make findings about this matter. 
29 
 
that its introduction in[] evidence is unfair."  Commonwealth v. 
Odware, 429 Mass. 231, 236 (1999).  See Commonwealth v. Jules, 
464 Mass. 478, 490 (2013); Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 Mass. 
590, 605 (2011); Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 456 Mass. 182, 190 
(2010); Commonwealth v. Bly, 448 Mass. 473, 494 (2007); 
Commonwealth v. Castro, 438 Mass. 160, 171 (2002); Commonwealth 
v. Horton, 434 Mass. 823, 835 (2001); Commonwealth v. Jones, 423 
Mass. 99, 103-105 (1996).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Dougan, 377 Mass. 
at 317-318, and cases cited (trial judge may grant requests for 
"in-court lineup" or "photographic spread" and may "seat [the 
defendant] among the spectators at trial" to increase 
reliability of in-court identification).  A judge's authority to 
exclude severely unreliable identification testimony is closely 
related to his or her more general "discretion to exclude 
evidence that is more prejudicial than probative."  Commonwealth 
v. Jones, supra at 107.  See Commonwealth v. Bonds, 445 Mass. 
821, 831 (2006), and cases cited; Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2015). 
 
We have stated that "a casual confrontation in neutral 
surroundings, such as those that occur through the media" 
ordinarily does not warrant the exclusion of identification 
testimony.  See Commonwealth v. Jones, 423 Mass. at 109-110, 
citing Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. 533, 542 (1990).  
See also Commonwealth v. Jules, 464 Mass. at 490; Commonwealth 
v. Sylvia, 456 Mass. at 190; Commonwealth v. Bly, 448 Mass. at 
30 
 
495.  But the cases in which we have so stated did not involve 
the additional problem with the reliability of the 
identifications presented here -- namely that, before seeing the 
defendant's photograph in the media, Jewell and Hardin failed to 
pick him out as the gunman in photographic arrays.22  This factor 
would have provided further support for an argument that 
Jewell's and Hardin's identifications of the defendant were not, 
in fact, based on their recollections of the night of the 
shooting.  Given this additional reason to consider the 
identifications "so unreliable as to require exclusion," 
Commonwealth v. Jones, supra at 108, we cannot conclude that 
efforts to exclude them would have been futile. 
 
c.  Review for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that the 
defendant's counsel did not seek to introduce certain readily 
available pieces of evidence supporting the defendant's third-
party culprit defense; and failed, too, to challenge the 
                     
 
22 Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. 533 (1990), is not 
to the contrary even though it, too, involved an unsuccessful 
pretrial photographic array.  The array administered there did 
not include a photograph of the defendant; the in-court 
identification was not solicited by the prosecution, id. at 541-
542,; and that case predated Commonwealth v. Jones, 423 Mass. 99 
(1996), in which we departed from the jurisprudence of the 
United States Supreme Court by "rel[ying] on common-law 
principles of fairness to suppress an identification . . . even 
where the circumstances did not result from improper police 
activity."  See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 235 
(2014), comparing Commonwealth v. Jones, supra at 109, with 
Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 720–721 (2012). 
31 
 
admission of potentially excludable eyewitness testimony.  We 
are persuaded that the cumulative effect of these errors created 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.23 
 
"This is not a case where 'arguably reasoned tactical or 
strategic judgments . . . are called into question . . . .'  
Rather, in this case, defense counsel did not investigate the 
only realistic defense the defendant had to the charge of murder 
in the first degree."  Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 400 Mass. at 
441, quoting Commonwealth v. Rondeau, 378 Mass. 408, 413 (1979).  
This also is not a case in which the defendant failed "to point 
out . . . some issue of fact . . . that could have been but was 
not exploited . . . in the original proceedings."  Commonwealth 
                     
 
23 As noted earlier, the rules announced in our recent 
decisions concerning certain eyewitness testimony are 
prospective only, see Commonwealth v. Collins, 470 Mass. 255, 
265 (2014), and Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. at 241-242, 
and we do not apply them in considering whether trial counsel 
here rendered ineffective assistance.  Nonetheless, we are not 
unmindful of the concerns that prompted those rules.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Pring–Wilson, 448 Mass. 718, 736–737 (2007) 
(grant of new trial in light of concerns underlying subsequent 
prospective doctrine was not abuse of discretion); Commonwealth 
v. Phinney, 446 Mass. 155, 166-167 (2006), S.C., 448 Mass. 621 
(2007).  In those recent decisions, we recognized that "[t]he 
danger of unfairness arising from an in-court showup . . . is 
considerable" where, among other circumstances, a pretrial 
identification procedure produced less than an unequivocal 
positive identification.  See Commonwealth v. Collins, supra at 
262.  See also Commonwealth v. Crayton, supra at 238-242.  Given 
this, when discharging our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and 
assessing whether, upon plenary review that takes into account 
the totality of the circumstances, relief may be warranted "for 
any . . . reason that justice may require," id., we need not 
blind ourselves to the unfairness that may be created by in-
court show-up identifications in certain circumstances. 
32 
 
v. Saferian, 366 Mass. at 98.  Instead, for the reasons 
described supra, the substandard assistance provided by defense 
counsel deprived the defendant of an opportunity to put a 
reasonable version of the defense available to him before the 
jury.  See Commonwealth v. Phinney, 446 Mass. at 157, 164 
(affirming grant of new trial for failure to develop third-party 
culprit defense where evidence of two other third-party culprits 
had been presented at trial). 
 
Counsel's failure even to look into the Commonwealth's 
discovery required him to rely almost entirely, in support of 
the third-party culprit defense, on a portion of the testimony 
of a prosecution witness, Berube.  On the evidence presented at 
trial, it would not have been difficult for the jury to discard 
Berube's testimony as the product of her confusion in the wake 
of the shooting.  With the benefit of reasonably effective 
assistance from defense counsel, on the other hand, the defense 
could have combined Berube's testimony that the shooter was the 
man who had dropped his cellular telephone with Parella's 
description of the shooter, which matched a description fitting 
Dor and not the defendant; with Gabin's reported statement that 
her boy friend, Dor, shot somebody; and with accounts from Dor's 
friends and neighbors indicating that, because of a previous 
incident at the pub, Dor intended to hurt the victim's group of 
friends.  These multiple suggestions of Dor's guilt, from 
33 
 
different sources, would have been harder to dismiss as 
incidental errors.  Their combined force would have made 
exponentially stronger the argument that reasonable doubt of the 
defendant's guilt remained.  On the other side of the scale, 
counsel's failure to challenge the identification testimony of 
Jewell and Hardin seriously compromised the viability of the 
hypothesis, upon which a successful defense depended, that Dor, 
Etienne, St. Preux, and Brinville were lying on Dor's behalf.  
"[B]etter work" thus might have accomplished "something material 
for the defense."  Commonwealth v. Bell, 460 Mass. 294, 303 
(2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 435 Mass. 113, 123 
(2001). 
 
The case against the defendant would have been powerful in 
any scenario.  "But the point is that the defendant was denied 
the opportunity to present the evidence . . . to the jury so 
they could weigh it against the testimony concerning the 
defendant's [guilt]."  Commonwealth v. Phinney, 446 Mass. at 
167, citing Commonwealth v. Miller, 435 Mass. 274, 279 (2001).  
Defense counsel's seriatim inexcusable failures to familiarize 
himself with discovery materials, to conduct an independent 
investigation, to present available third-party culprit 
evidence, and to challenge vulnerable identification testimony 
were laden with consequence.  The evidentiary picture put to the 
jury in the wake of counsel's desultory efforts was sufficiently 
34 
 
different from what it would have been under the direction of a 
reasonably effective attorney that we cannot say with the 
requisite substantial confidence that, in the absence of 
counsel's errors, the verdict would have been the same.  See 
Commonwealth v. Spray, 467 Mass. 456, 472 (2014), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Sena, 429 Mass. 590, 595 (2004).  Otherwise put, 
it would be unfair for the defendant's conviction of murder in 
the first degree to rest on a trial at which his defense was 
presented so poorly and incompletely.  See Commonwealth v. 
Mahar, 442 Mass. 11, 20-21 (2004) (Sosman, J., concurring), 
quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) ("the 
purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth 
Amendment is . . . to ensure that criminal defendants receive a 
fair trial"). 
 
4.  Conclusion.  The judgment of conviction is vacated and 
set aside, and the matter is remanded to the Superior Court for 
a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.