Title: New Jersey v. Johnson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: May 30, 2019

New Jersey v. Johnson Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary This appeal arose from defendant Davon Johnson’s unsuccessful application for pretrial intervention (PTI), filed in anticipation of his indictment for third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) within 1000 feet of a school zone. In May 2014, defendant was charged with motor vehicle and CDS offenses, including violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a). He applied for PTI and included a statement of compelling reasons supporting his admission. The prosecutor rejected defendant’s application. The prosecutor relied on New Jersey v. Caliguiri, 158 N.J. 28 (1999), which permitted prosecutors to treat an N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 offense as a second-degree offense, thereby triggering the presumption against admission into PTI. And, quoting PTI Guideline 3(i), the prosecutor found defendant presumptively ineligible for PTI because he was charged with the “sale or dispensing” of a Schedule I or II narcotic and was not drug dependent. Following the denial of his application, a grand jury indicted defendant. Defendant appealed the denial to the trial court, which refused to disturb the prosecutor’s determination. Defendant then entered a guilty plea to third-degree possession of heroin. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing the prosecutor incorrectly applied the two presumptions against PTI. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted review and found that the 2009 amendments to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7’s sentencing structure reflected a more flexible sentencing policy that rendered Caliguiri’s reasoning no longer viable. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held the presumption against PTI for second-degree offenders could not be applied to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a) offenders. The Court also found that the presumption against PTI for the “sale” of narcotics was not applicable here because defendant was charged with possession with intent to “distribute” and there was no allegation or evidence that he sold the narcotics. The matter was remanded so that the prosecutor could reassess defendant’s application without consideration of the presumptions. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. Davon M. Johnson (A-58-17) (080394)Argued March 11, 2019 -- Decided May 30, 2019TIMPONE, J., writing for the Court. This appeal arises from defendant Davon M. Johnson’s unsuccessful application for pretrial intervention (PTI), filed in anticipation of his indictment for third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) within 1000 feet of a school zone, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a). Both the presumption against PTI for second-degree offenses and the presumption against PTI for the sale of narcotics were cited in the denial of his application. The Court considers whether those presumptions should have been applied in this case. In May 2014, defendant was charged with motor vehicle and CDS offenses, including violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a). He applied for PTI and included a statement of compelling reasons supporting his admission. The prosecutor rejected defendant’s application. She relied on State v. Caliguiri, 158 N.J. 28, 43 (1999), which permitted prosecutors to treat an N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 offense as a second-degree offense, thereby triggering the presumption against admission into PTI. And, quoting PTI Guideline 3(i), the prosecutor found defendant presumptively ineligible for PTI because he was charged with the “sale or dispensing” of a Schedule I or II narcotic and was not drug dependent. Following the denial of his application, a grand jury indicted defendant. Defendant appealed the denial to the trial court, which refused to disturb the prosecutor’s determination. Defendant then entered a guilty plea to third-degree possession of heroin. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing the prosecutor incorrectly applied the two presumptions against PTI. When that appeal was unsuccessful, defendant petitioned for certification, which the Court granted. 233 N.J. 23 (2018).HELD: The 2009 amendments to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7’s sentencing structure reflect a more flexible sentencing policy that renders Caliguiri’s reasoning no longer viable. The presumption against PTI for second-degree offenders cannot be applied to N.J.S.A. 2C:35- 7(a) offenders. And the presumption against PTI for the “sale” of narcotics was not applicable here because defendant was charged with possession with intent to “distribute” and there is no allegation or evidence that he sold the narcotics. The decision to deny defendant’s application must be reevaluated. 1 1. PTI is a diversionary program through which certain offenders are able to avoid criminal prosecution by receiving early rehabilitative services expected to deter future criminal behavior. At the time defendant’s PTI application was denied, Guideline 3 to Rule 3:28 included a list of mandatory factors to be considered in addition to those enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e). Of particular relevance here, Guideline 3(i) then provided that “[a] defendant charged with a first or second degree offense or sale or dispensing of Schedule I or II narcotic drugs . . . should ordinarily not be considered for enrollment in a PTI program.” Guideline 3(i) to Rule 3:28 (2014). (pp. 9-11)2. The penalty structure for violations of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, which is part of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987 (CDRA), is similar to that for second-degree offenses for which admission to PTI is presumptively unavailable. In Caliguiri, the Court found the “especially stern punishments” for N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 offenders, “[i]n light of the general tenor of the CDRA and the goals of the PTI Guidelines,” countenanced allowing prosecutors to apply the presumption against PTI to second-degree offenders. 158 N.J. at 43. But that decision was based on a sentencing structure that has since evolved. In 2009, the Legislature altered N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 by enacting a new subsection (b), which authorizes courts to “waive or reduce the minimum term of parole ineligibility required under subsection a.,” or to “place the defendant on probation.” Caliguiri’s determination that the presumption against PTI for first- and second-degree offenses should encompass third-degree school zone offenses, although well-reasoned at the time, is no longer consistent with the Legislature’s intent. Based on the changed statutory language and the Legislature’s clear intent in amending N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, the presumption against PTI for first- and second-degree offenders can no longer be applied to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a) offenders. Because the prosecutor relied, in part, on that presumption, the Court remands to the prosecutor to reconsider defendant’s application. The Court disturbs no other portion of Caliguiri. (pp. 12-15)3. The presumption against PTI for the “sale or dispensing” of a Schedule I or II narcotic, as it was set forth in Guideline 3(i), is also inapplicable. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a) uses the terms “distribute” and “dispense” but does not use the term “sale.” Possession with intent to distribute is not technically a sale, nor is it “dispensing.” Defendant was not charged with selling or dispensing narcotics because there was no evidence that he sold or dispensed narcotics. Imputing a presumption against PTI for a “sale” to defendant, who was charged with “possession with intent to distribute,” was improper. Because the prosecutor considered two inapplicable presumptions, the decision to deny defendant’s application must be reevaluated. The Court remands to the prosecutor and, if need be, to the trial court for appropriate action following the prosecutor’s review. (pp. 15-16) The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the matter is remanded.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’S opinion. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 58 September Term 2017 080394 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Davon M. Johnson, Defendant-Appellant. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided March 11, 2019 May 30, 2019Peter T. Blum, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Peter T. Blum, of counsel and on the briefs).Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, of counsel and on the briefs).JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 This appeal arises from defendant Davon M. Johnson’s unsuccessfulapplication for pretrial intervention (PTI), filed in anticipation of hisindictment for third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance(CDS) within 1000 feet of a school zone, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a). The significantquestion before us is whether the presumption against PTI for second-degreeoffenses or the presumption against PTI for the sale of narcotics should havebeen applied in this case. In State v. Caliguiri, we recognized the presumption against PTI forsecond-degree offenses could be applied to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 offendersbecause, at the time, a school-zone conviction required the imposition of aperiod of parole ineligibility. 158 N.J. 28, 37-38, 42-43 (1999). We observedthat “[t]he penalty structure for this type of offense [was] similar to that forsecond-degree offenses for which admission to PTI is presumptivelyunavailable.” Id. at 43 (quoting State v. Baynes, 148 N.J. 434, 449 (1997)).Since Caliguiri was decided, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7,modifying and relaxing the statute’s sentencing structure. See L. 2009, c. 192,§ 1. While maintaining the statute’s mandatory-minimum sentencingstructure, the Legislature granted courts the latitude to waive or reduce theperiod of parole ineligibility or impose a term of probation under certaincircumstances. Ibid. 2 We find that the 2009 amendments to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7’s sentencingstructure reflect a more flexible sentencing policy that renders Caliguiri’sreasoning no longer viable. Accordingly, we hold the presumption against PTIfor second-degree offenders cannot be applied to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a)offenders. We also find that the presumption against PTI for the “sale” of narcoticswas not applicable here because defendant was charged with possession withintent to “distribute” and there is no allegation or evidence that he sold thenarcotics. Despite the prosecutor’s dutiful consideration of defendant’s applicationfor PTI, including the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e), bothpresumptions were cited in the denial of his application. We remand so thatthe prosecutor can reassess defendant’s application without consideration ofthe presumptions. I. A. We distill the following facts from the record in the PTI proceedings.On May 18, 2014, defendant was driving through Newark when he wasstopped by a Newark police officer for running a red light. As defendantreached into the glove compartment for his credentials, three bricks of heroin 3 fell to the floor. Each brick contained 150 individual bags of heroin.Defendant was charged with third-degree possession of heroin, N.J.S.A.2C:35-10(a)(1), third-degree possession of heroin with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3), and third-degree possession of heroin with intent todistribute within 1000 feet of a school zone, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. He was alsocharged with two motor vehicle violations for his failure to observe the redlight, N.J.S.A. 39:4-81, and for the possession of a CDS in a motor vehicle, N.J.S.A. 39:4-49.1. On July 10, 2014, defendant applied for PTI and included a two-pagestatement of compelling reasons supporting his admission in accord withGuideline 2 to Rule 3:28 (2014). Since the Guidelines were eliminated in2018, Rule 3:28-3(b)(1) now provides for the submission of a statement ofcompelling reasons. As defendant’s letter explained, defendant, who wastwenty-one years old at the time of his arrest, had no prior criminal history,graduated from high school, matriculated into Bloomfield College where hestudied accounting, worked on a cabin maintenance and cleaning team atNewark Liberty International Airport, and spent time with his younger sisters,nieces, and nephews. In the statement, defendant asserted PTI would besufficient to deter any future unlawful conduct, and an indictable conviction 4 would cause a substantial hardship to him and his family by inhibiting hischances of completing college and obtaining employment. After reviewing defendant’s application and statement, the ProbationOffice recommended defendant’s application for PTI be denied. Highlightingthat defendant was found with 150 glassine envelopes of heroin and reportedno history of substance abuse, the Probation Office reasoned his applicationshould be denied “[b]ased on the facts of the case and the likelihood of thepresent offense being a part of an organized criminal activity as well as apattern of anti-social activity.” On November 7, 2014, the prosecutor rejected defendant’s applicationfor PTI. She found five of the N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e) factors to be aggravatingfactors. In particular, the prosecutor found defendant presumptively ineligiblefor PTI under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(1) based on the nature of the offense. Sherelied on our decision in Caliguiri, 158 N.J. at 43, permitting prosecutors, forPTI evaluation purposes, to treat an N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 offense as a second-degree offense, thereby triggering the presumption against admission into PTI.And, quoting Guideline 3(i), the prosecutor found defendant was alsopresumptively ineligible for PTI because he was charged with the “sale ordispensing” of a Schedule I or II narcotic and was not drug dependent. 5 The prosecutor found several mitigating factors present in defendant’scase, including defendant’s age; his lack of criminal history; the absence ofviolence in commission of the crime; the absence of evidence suggestingdefendant’s involvement with organized crime; and the absence of otherdefendants. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(3), (9), (10), (13), and (16). Weighingthe factors, the prosecutor determined that defendant had “not presentedsufficient compelling reasons justifying admission into PTI,” and that he hadfailed to “overcome his heavy burden of rebutting the presumptions against hisadmission.” Following the denial of his application, an Essex County GrandJury indicted defendant on January 9, 2015, on the charges contained in theoriginal compliant. B. On March 23, 2015, before trial, defendant filed an untimely appeal tothe Law Division, seeking review of the denial of his PTI application. Thetrial court refused to disturb the prosecutor’s determination. In addition tofinding the appeal procedurally barred under the then-existing Rule 3:28(h),which required an appeal of the denial of PTI to be filed within ten days (nowcodified in Rule 3:28-6(a)), the court found defendant did not establish that theprosecutor failed to conduct an individualized analysis of his PTI application.The court also found the prosecutor correctly applied the presumption against 6 PTI because the prosecutor charged defendant under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(possession of controlled dangerous substances near or on school property) .The court reasoned defendant’s application was properly denied because hefailed to show compelling reasons demonstrating his amenability torehabilitation or something idiosyncratic in his background that wouldovercome the presumption against admission. Three months later, defendant entered a guilty plea to third-degreepossession of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1). The court sentenced defendantto two years’ probation and 190 hours of community service. C. Defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing the prosecutorincorrectly applied the two presumptions against admission into PTI.Defendant asserted that the presumption against PTI for N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7offenders was no longer viable in light of amendments made to that statute in2009. He also disputed the prosecutor’s application of the presumption againstPTI for the “sale or dispensing” of narcotics because he was not engaged in orcharged with the sale of heroin. Despite finding defendant’s arguments procedurally barred because hedid not raise them below, the appellate panel commented on the merits of hisclaim. Relying on the Appellate Division’s recent decision in State v. 7 Coursey, 445 N.J. Super. 506, 511 (App. Div. 2016), which recognizedCaliguiri as providing guidance on how to interpret Guideline 3(i), the paneldetermined that the presumption against PTI had not been eroded by theamendments to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. The panel dismissed defendant’s secondargument as meritless, reasoning that the presumption against PTI was appliedin Caliguiri, where the defendant was also charged with possession in a schoolzone under similar circumstances. We granted Defendant’s petition for certification. 233 N.J. 23 (2018). II. A. Defendant reasserts that the 2009 amendments significantly relaxedN.J.S.A. 2C:35-7’s sentencing structure and that the typical offender “shouldbe treated like an ordinary third-degree offender.” Defendant also resubmitsthat the presumption against PTI for the “sale” of narcotics should not havebeen applied because he was charged with possession with intent to distribute,and the term “distribute” used in the statute is broader than the term “sale” thatwas used in the Guidelines. Lastly, defendant contends the prosecutor abusedher discretion in denying his application. 8 B. The State disputes that the 2009 amendments overrode the presumptionagainst PTI articulated in Caliguiri. The State contends that the 2009amendments in no way suggest that the Legislature no longer views possessionof heroin with intent to distribute it in a school zone as a serious offense,highlighting that the Legislature maintained the presumption of incarceration. Next, the State asserts the facts of this case are clear and show defendantintended to sell the heroin. The State insists that defendant should not be freedfrom the presumption against PTI merely because he was arrested before hecould complete the sale. Finally, the State argues that it is in the prosecutor’s discretion whetherto recommend a defendant for PTI and that, in denying defendant’s applicationin this case, the prosecutor carefully considered all relevant factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e). III. A. “PTI is a 'diversionary program through which certain offenders are ableto avoid criminal prosecution by receiving early rehabilitative servicesexpected to deter future criminal behavior.’” State v. Roseman, 221 N.J. 611,621 (2015) (quoting State v. Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236, 240 (1995)). Prosecutors 9 are tasked with making individualized assessments of each defendant,particularly his or her “amenability to correction” and likely “responsivenessto rehabilitation.” State v. Watkins, 193 N.J. 507, 520 (2008) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(b)(1)). Until recently, “[t]he assessment of a defendant’s suitability for PTImust be conducted under the Guidelines for PTI provided in Rule 3:28, alongwith consideration of factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e).” Roseman, 221 N.J. at 621. Following changes to Rule 3:28, however, the Guidelines wereeliminated. Now, many of their prescriptions -- with significant variations --are contained in Rules 3:28-1 to -10. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e) sets forth a list ofseventeen nonexclusive factors that prosecutors must consider in connectionwith a PTI application. At the time defendant’s PTI application was denied,Guideline 3 to Rule 3:28 then included a list of eleven (later twelve)mandatory factors to be considered “in addition to” those enumerated in thestatute. Of particular relevance here, Guideline 3(i) provided that “[a]defendant charged with a first or second degree offense or sale or dispensingof Schedule I or II narcotic drugs . . . by persons not drug dependent, shouldordinarily not be considered for enrollment in a PTI program except on jointapplication by the defendant and the prosecutor.” Guideline 3(i) to Rule 3:28(2014). We note that there is no similar provision dealing with the sale of 10 narcotics in the post-amendment rules governing the Pretrial InterventionProgram. “To overcome 'the presumption against PTI, defendant mustestablish “compelling reasons” for admission’ to the program.” Watkins, 193 N.J. at 520 (quoting Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 252). “PTI is essentially an extension of the charging decision, therefore thedecision to grant or deny PTI is a 'quintessentially prosecutorial function.’”Roseman, 221 N.J. at 624 (quoting State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 582(1996)). “As a result, the prosecutor’s decision to accept or reject adefendant’s PTI application is entitled to a great deal of deference.” Ibid. Acourt reviewing a prosecutor’s decision to deny PTI may overturn that decisiononly if the defendant “clearly and convincingly” establishes the decision was a“patent and gross abuse of discretion.” Wallace, 146 N.J. at 583. Ordinarily, an abuse of discretion will be manifest if defendant can show that a prosecutorial veto (a) was not premised upon a consideration of all relevant factors, (b) was based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or (c) amounted to a clear error in judgement. In order for such an abuse of discretion to rise to the level of “patent and gross,” it must further be shown that the prosecutorial error complained of will clearly subvert the goals underlying Pretrial Intervention. [Roseman, 221 N.J. at 625 (quoting State v. Bender, 80 N.J. 84, 93 (1979) (citation omitted)).] 11 When a defendant convincingly demonstrates a patent and gross abuse ofdiscretion, a court may admit the defendant into PTI over the prosecutor’sobjection. Id. at 624-25. In cases concerning legal error by the prosecutor, however, “there is arelatively low threshold for judicial intervention because '[t]hese instancesraise issues akin to questions of law, concerning which courts should exerciseindependent judgment in fulfilling their responsibility to maintain the integrityand proper functioning of PTI as a whole.’” Watkins, 193 N.J. at 520-21(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Dalglish, 86 N.J. 503, 510 (1981)). Insuch cases, a remand to the prosecutor may be appropriate so she or he mayrightly reconsider the application. Dalglish, 86 N.J. at 509-10. B. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a) criminalizes “distributing, dispensing or possessingwith intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance . . . within 1,000 feetof . . . school property.” The statute is part of the Comprehensive DrugReform Act of 1987 (CDRA), which “was designed to create a coordinatedstrategy to combat illegal drug use in New Jersey.” Caliguiri, 158 N.J. at 37(citing W. Cary Edwards, An Overview of the Comprehensive Drug ReformAct of 1987, 13 Seton Hall Legis. J. 5, 5 (1989)). Although violators of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a) are guilty of a third-degree crime -- which usually carries 12 a presumption of non-incarceration for first-time offenders, see N.J.S.A.2C:44-1(e) -- N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a) prescribes a mandatory-minimum sentenceof one year of imprisonment for offenders caught possessing less than oneounce of marijuana and three years of imprisonment in all other cases. Theseverity of the penalty structure reflects the CDRA’s policy “to afford specialprotection to children from the perils of drug trafficking, to ensure that allschools and areas adjacent to schools are kept free from drug distributionactivities, and to provide especially stern punishment for those drug offenderswho operate on or near schools.” N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1.1(c). In Baynes, we recognized that “[t]he penalty structure for [violations ofN.J.S.A. 2C:35-7] [wa]s similar to that for second-degree offenses for whichadmission to PTI is presumptively unavailable.” 148 N.J. at 449. And , inCaliguiri, we found the “especially stern punishments” for N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7offenders, “[i]n light of the general tenor of the CDRA and the goals of the PTIGuidelines,” countenanced allowing prosecutors to apply the presumptionagainst PTI to second-degree offenders. 158 N.J. at 43. But our decision then was based on a sentencing structure that has sinceevolved. In 2009, the Legislature altered N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 by enacting a newsubsection (b). L. 2009, c. 192, § 1. Even though the mandatory minimumswere maintained, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(b) now authorizes courts to “waive or 13 reduce the minimum term of parole ineligibility required under subsection a.,”or to “place the defendant on probation pursuant to paragraph (2) of subsectionb.” Before waiving or reducing the period of parole ineligibility, courts mustconsider four enumerated factors: 1. The extent and seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(b)(1)(a); 2. The proximity to school property and “the reasonable likelihood of exposing children to drug-related activities,” id. § 7(b)(1)(b); 3. “[W]hether school was in session at the time of the offense,” id. § 7(b)(1)(c); and 4. “[W]hether children were present at or in the immediate vicinity” of the offense, id. § 7(b)(1)(d). N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(b)(2) bars courts from waiving or reducing the minimumterm of imprisonment, or imposing probation, if the offense occurred while onschool property or involved the threat or use of violence or a firearm. N.J.S.A.2C:35-7(b)(2)(a)-(b). Caliguiri’s determination that the presumption against PTI for first- andsecond-degree offenses should encompass third-degree school zone offenses,although well-reasoned at the time, is no longer consistent with theLegislature’s intent. Based on the changed statutory language and the 14 Legislature’s clear intent in amending N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, we hold thepresumption against PTI for first- and second-degree offenders can no longerbe applied to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a) offenders. Because the prosecutor relied, inpart, on the presumption against PTI for second-degree offenses, we believe itappropriate to remand defendant’s application to the prosecutor to reconsiderdefendant’s application. We disturb no other portion of Caliguiri. IV. Additionally, we find inapplicable the presumption against PTI for the“sale or dispensing” of a Schedule I or II narcotic, as it was set forth inGuideline 3(i). N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a) uses the terms “distribute” and “dispense”but does not use the term “sale.” A “sale” is “[t]he transfer of property or title for a price.” Black’s LawDictionary 1454 (9th ed. 2009). Whereas “distribute” is broader and can mean“[t]o apportion,” “divide among several,” “spread out,” or “disperse.” Id. at543. As the Appellate Division noted in Coursey, “Guideline 3(i) does nottrack the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), because it only refers to 'sale,’which is a subset of 'distribute,’ and it does not list possession with intent.” 445 N.J. Super. at 511 n.1. The Coursey panel concluded that “possessionwith intent to distribute is not technically a sale, nor is it 'dispensing’ asdefined in N.J.S.A. 24:21-2 (defining to 'dispense’ as to deliver a CDS 15 'subject by or pursuant to the lawful order of a practitioner’).” Id. at 510-11 &n.1. Defendant was not charged with selling or dispensing narcotics becausethere was no evidence that he sold or dispensed narcotics. Imputing apresumption against PTI for a “sale” to defendant, who was charged with“possession with intent to distribute,” was improper. V. The record before us makes clear that the prosecutor faithfullyconsidered the factors found in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(1) to (17), findingseveral militated against acceptance of defendant’s application for PTI.Nevertheless, because the prosecutor considered two inapplicablepresumptions found in then-Guideline 3(i), the decision to deny defendant’sapplication must be reevaluated. We reverse the judgment of the AppellateDivision and remand to the prosecutor for a fresh review of defendant’sapplication and, if need be, to the trial court for appropriate action followingthe prosecutor’s review. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’S opinion. 16