Title: Fairfax County Dept. of Human Dev. v. Donald
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 950827
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 1, 1996

Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and 
Keenan, JJ., and Cochran, Retired Justice 
 
FAIRFAX COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
v.  Record No. 950827 
                                     March 1, 1996 
FELICIA L. DONALD 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of 
Appeals erred in ruling that, under the facts of this case, the 
trial court had the authority to award attorney's fees. 
 
The proceedings and relevant facts are undisputed.  On 
October 23, 1991, the Fairfax County Department of Human 
Development (the County) filed a petition in the Fairfax County 
Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court, alleging that 
Felicia L. Donald "abused and/or neglected" her two minor 
children.  Following an ore tenus hearing, the district court, by 
order entered November 18, 1991, dismissed the petition with 
prejudice. 
 
On December 20, 1991, the County appealed the case to the 
Circuit Court of Fairfax County for a de novo hearing.  Following 
an extensive trial, the circuit court, by order entered July 8, 
1993, ruled that the County's appeal was untimely and dismissed 
the petition.  By the same order, the circuit court also denied 
Donald's request for attorney's fees, reasoning that an award of 
fees was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
 
Donald appealed the denial of attorney's fees to the Court 
of Appeals, and, on August 23, 1994, a three-judge panel of the 
Court of Appeals, by memorandum opinion, affirmed the circuit 
 
 
 
 
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court's judgment.  The Court of Appeals granted a rehearing en 
banc and, thereafter, reversed the circuit court's judgment and 
remanded the case to the circuit court "for a determination of 
reasonable attorney fees to be fixed together with costs."  
Donald v. Fairfax County, 20 Va. App. 155, 162, 455 S.E.2d 740, 
744 (1995).  We awarded the County an appeal, having determined 
that the decision of the Court of Appeals involves matters of 
significant precedential value.  Code § 17-116.07(B). 
 
The jurisdiction, practice, and procedure of juvenile and 
domestic relations district courts are wholly statutory and are 
set forth in Title 16.1, Chapter 11 of the Code (Code § 16.1-226 
et seq.).  Walker v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 223 Va. 557, 562, 
290 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1982).  An appeal from a district court to a 
circuit court may be taken within ten days from the entry of a 
final judgment or order of the district court, Code §§ 16.1-132 
and -296, and shall be heard de novo in the circuit court, Code 
§§ 16.1-136 and -296.  The circuit court, in all such cases on 
appeal, shall have all the powers and authority granted by 
Chapter 11 to the district court.  Code § 16.1-296. 
 
In 1991, the General Assembly specifically addressed 
district courts' authority to award attorney's fees.  Acts 1991, 
c. 534.  Code § 16.1-278.19 provides that, "[i]n any matter 
properly before the [district] court, the court may award 
attorneys' fees and costs on behalf of any party as the court 
deems appropriate based on the relative financial ability of the 
 
 
 
 
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parties."  This Code section is the sole authority granted to  
district courts for awarding attorney's fees.
1
 
Circuit courts have those powers and authority that are 
granted to district courts, but district courts are empowered to 
award attorney's fees only in matters "properly before [them]."  
We read the statutes to apply the same jurisdictional 
prerequisite to a circuit court's authority to award attorney's 
fees as applies to a district court's authority to award fees.  A 
matter may not be properly before a circuit court, and thus 
ineligible for an award of attorney's fees, even though it 
originally was properly before the district court.   
 
In the present case, the appeal was not taken within ten 
days from the district court's final order; therefore, the 
circuit court was without jurisdiction, and the matter was not 
"properly before" the circuit court.  Thus, the circuit court 
lacked authority to award attorney's fees.  Consequently, we hold 
that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the circuit court's 
judgment and in remanding the case to the circuit court for an 
award of reasonable attorney's fees.
2
 
     
1Donald relies on Code § 16.1-296 as authority for awarding 
attorney's fees.  That section states that "[c]osts, taxes and 
fees on appealed cases shall be assessed only in those cases in 
which a trial fee could have been assessed in juvenile and 
domestic relations court and shall be collected in the circuit 
court."  Donald's reliance is misplaced because Code § 16.1-296 
does not relate to attorney's fees. 
     
2In view of the decision we reach, we express no opinion 
with respect to the circuit court's reliance upon the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity for its refusal to award attorney's fees. 
 
 
 
 
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Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and enter final judgment in favor of the County. 
 
Reversed and final judgment.