Title: Yancey v. Yancey
Citation: 356 S.W.2d 649
Docket Number: 5-2664
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: April 23, 1962

356 S.W.2d 649 (1962) Andrew Vernon YANCEY, Appellant, v. Pauline Marie YANCEY, Appellee. No. 5-2664. Supreme Court of Arkansas. April 23, 1962. Rehearing Denied May 21, 1962. W. S. Atkins, Hope, for appellant. Weisenberger &amp; Wilson, Hope, for appellee. HARRIS, Chief Justice. Appellant, Andrew Vernon Yancey, instituted suit against appellee, Pauline Marie Yancey, for divorce, alleging indignities. Mrs. Yancey filed an answer and cross-complaint alleging indignities. The parties had married in 1957, and had subsequently purchased a home, which had been deeded to them, and which was held, as an estate by the entirety. On trial, the court granted appellee an absolute divorce, and inter alia, made the following findings: From the decree so entered, appellant brings this appeal, the appeal relating only to the findings and order entered relative to property rights. Appellee cross-appeals from that portion of the decree divesting her of any interest in the personal property of appellant, directing her to pay the amounts, heretofore set out, to Mrs. Stovall and Mrs. Irby, failing to allow judgment for an amount of money in her savings account allegedly turned over to appellant, and failing to allow an additional attorney's fee. It is necessary that this decree be reversed, because the court exceeded its authority in directing appellant to give appellee a quitclaim deed to his interest in the home held as an estate by the entirety. The Chancellor was evidently undertaking to arrive at an equitable solution relative to property rights in making his findings, and we find nothing erroneous purely from the standpoint of equity; however, we have stated on several occasions that in event of a divorce, property held as an estate by the entirety shall be treated as a tenancy in common. The court may then do one of two things; it may place one of the parties in possession of the premises, or it may order the property sold and the proceeds divided. As to the first choice, this Court, in McClain v. McClain, 222 Ark. 729, 263 S.W.2d 911, 264 S.W.2d 595, said: As to the second choice, in Brimson v. Brimson, 227 Ark. 1045, 304 S.W.2d 935, we said: See also Carr v. Carr, 226 Ark. 355, 289 S.W.2d 899, where this Court stated: "The couple's home was owned as a tenancy by the entirety and was correctly ordered sold, the proceeds to be divided equally. Ark.Stats.1947, § 34-1215." Since, in determining the equities between the parties, the court's findings as to personal property may well have been influenced and affected by its disposition of the real estate, we remand the case with directions that the trial court render anew its findings relative to the property rights of the parties, in the light of our holding as to the real estate. This disposition precludes our passing upon the cross-appeal. Appellee's attorney complains that the fee awarded by the lower court was inadequate, and asks that we increase the amount allowed; an additional fee for services rendered on appeal is likewise requested. Taking into consideration appellant's handicap (he was afflicted with polio at age eight and cannot walk without braces and crutches), the fact that his income is very limited and amounts to quite a bit less than that of his ex-wife, and the fact that this case is being reversed, we do not feel that an additional amount for services on appeal should be awarded. On remand, the court may give further consideration to the amount of fee awarded, if it so desires. McFADDIN, J., not participating. [1] The property was valued at $6,000.00.