Title: State v. Clark
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2020AP001058-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 2022

2022 WI 21 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP1058-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Teresa L. Clark, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 20, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 15, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Ashland   
 
JUDGE: 
John P. Anderson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., 
joined. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which DALLET and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Michael C. Sanders, assistant attorney general; with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Michael C. Sanders. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Garrett M. Gondik and Gondik Law, S.C., Superior. There was an 
oral argument by Garrett M. Gondik. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin State 
Public Defender by Katie R. York, appellate division director; 
 
 
2 
with whom on the brief was Kelli S. Thompson, state public 
defender.
 
 
 
2022 WI 21 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2020AP1058-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2018CF171) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Teresa L. Clark, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
APR 20, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which 
ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined. 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DALLET 
and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Ashland County.  
Reversed and cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   A defendant charged with operating 
while intoxicated (OWI) faces an escalating set of penalties 
depending on the number of prior convictions.  As part of a defense 
to an OWI charge, a defendant may challenge a prior conviction——
known as a collateral attack——when the defendant was not 
represented and did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waive the right to counsel.  This court has created a procedure to 
No. 
2020AP1058-CR 
 
2 
 
facilitate these challenges.  First, by pointing to evidence in 
the record, a defendant must establish a prima facie case that the 
defendant did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive 
the right to counsel.  Once established, the burden shifts to the 
State to prove that the waiver was nonetheless valid. 
¶2 
The question presented here is whether this same burden-
shifting procedure should apply when the relevant hearing 
transcript from the prior conviction is unavailable.  We conclude 
it should not, and hold that in these circumstances, the defendant 
retains the burden to demonstrate the right to counsel was 
violated. 
¶3 
In this case, the circuit court granted Teresa Clark's 
motion collaterally attacking two prior convictions, despite the 
absence of the relevant transcript.  The court explicitly based 
its ruling on the burden-shifting regime and the State's failure 
to meet its burden to rebut Clark's testimony.  In light of our 
conclusion that the burden should not shift to the State when no 
transcript is available, we reverse the circuit court's order and 
remand to the circuit court to allow Clark an opportunity to 
satisfy her burden. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
In 2018, Clark was charged in Ashland County with fourth-
offense counts for both OWI and prohibited alcohol concentration 
No. 
2020AP1058-CR 
 
3 
 
(PAC).1  Her driving record showed three prior OWI convictions:  
one in Chippewa County from 1994, and two in Eau Claire County 
from 1995 and 2002.  Before the circuit court,2 Clark collaterally 
attacked her two Eau Claire County convictions claiming she did 
not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive her right to 
counsel.  To support her motion, Clark submitted an affidavit 
alleging that in both cases she was unrepresented and the Eau 
Claire County Circuit Court did not conduct a colloquy with her 
regarding the difficulties and dangers of proceeding pro se.  The 
State acknowledged that Clark's sworn statement entitled her to an 
evidentiary hearing. 
¶5 
Clark's 
counsel 
submitted 
a 
separate 
affidavit, 
explaining that the relevant documents from both Eau Claire County 
convictions no longer existed.  The file for the 1995 conviction 
was destroyed because 20 years passed since the conviction, and 
the transcript for the 2002 case could not be prepared because the 
reporter's notes were destroyed 10 years after the conviction.  
Both Clark and the State agree that destruction of these records 
was consistent with the applicable document retention rules.  See 
SCR 72.01(18), (47).3 
                                                 
1 Clark was also charged with OWI causing injury and PAC 
causing injury, both as second or subsequent offenses. 
2 The Honorable John P. Anderson of the Ashland County Circuit 
Court presided. 
3 SCR 72.01 provides: 
No. 
2020AP1058-CR 
 
4 
 
¶6 
Consequently, the State could not produce transcripts 
from either the 1995 or 2002 cases at the motion hearing.  Instead, 
it submitted the only documents available:  a complaint, a bond 
sheet, a plea hearing minutes sheet, and a sentencing hearing 
minutes sheet——all from the 2002 case.  Both the plea hearing 
minutes sheet and the sentencing hearing minutes sheet had boxes 
checked indicating that Clark appeared "Without counsel" and "Def. 
advised of his right to attorney/constitutional rights."4  In her 
testimony, Clark acknowledged the information in those documents, 
but nevertheless maintained that the judges in those cases did not 
sufficiently advise her of her right to an attorney. 
¶7 
The circuit court was skeptical.  It stated that Clark's 
credibility 
was 
"somewhat 
lacking," 
and 
expressed 
its 
                                                 
[T]he original paper records of any court shall be 
retained in the custody of the court for the following 
minimum time periods: 
. . . 
(18) Misdemeanor case files.  All papers deposited with 
the clerk of courts in every proceeding commenced under 
chapter 968 of the statutes for misdemeanor offenses, 
including criminal traffic offenses:  20 years after 
entry of final judgment. 
. . . 
(47) Court reporter notes.  Verbatim stenographic, 
shorthand, audio or video notes produced by a court 
reporter or any other verbatim record of in-court 
proceedings:  10 years after the hearing. 
4 Clark contended that the use of masculine pronouns on both 
hearing minutes sheets rendered their reliability suspect because 
Clark is a woman. 
No. 
2020AP1058-CR 
 
5 
 
"suspicion . . . that the chances of what the defense is asking me 
to believe [are] not terribly great."  Still, the circuit court 
determined it had no choice but to grant Clark's motion 
collaterally attacking the two convictions.  The circuit court 
concluded Clark's testimony shifted the burden to the State, which 
submitted insufficient evidence to refute Clark's testimony.  
Clark's successful collateral attacks effectively reduced her OWI 
and PAC charges from fourth-offenses to first-offenses.5 
¶8 
The State sought and received leave to file an 
interlocutory appeal.  It then filed a petition for bypass, which 
we granted. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶9 
In Wisconsin, the penalty for an OWI or PAC offense 
depends on the defendant's number of prior OWI/PAC convictions.6  
For a defendant's first offense, the penalty is a civil forfeiture.  
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)1.  Second and third offenses are 
                                                 
5 Clark collaterally attacked only two of her three prior OWI 
convictions.  However, the State may charge second-offense OWI 
only if the first and second offenses occurred within a ten-year 
span.  Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)2. (2019-20).  So, although 
Clark's 1994 conviction could count toward a fourth-offense OWI 
charge, it cannot count toward a second-offense charge.  Compare 
§ 346.65(2)(am)4. with § 346.65(2)(am)2. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version. 
6 Wisconsin's OWI and PAC crimes are defined at Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(a) & (b). 
No. 
2020AP1058-CR 
 
6 
 
misdemeanors.  § 346.65(2)(am)2.-3.  Fourth offenses and above are 
escalating classes of felonies.  § 346.65(2)(am)4.-7. 
¶10 The United States Supreme Court has held that when a 
crime uses prior convictions as a penalty enhancer in this manner, 
the defendant has a limited constitutional right to challenge the 
underlying convictions.  Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114-15 
(1967); Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 66-67 (1980).  This 
constitutional right to "collaterally attack" prior convictions 
applies when the defendant alleges that the prior proceedings 
involved certain violations of the defendant's right to counsel.7  
Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487, 496 (1994); see also 
State v. Hahn, 2000 WI 118, ¶28, 238 Wis. 2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528.  
In the OWI and PAC context, this means that a defendant has a right 
to collaterally attack a prior conviction when the defendant was 
not represented and did not knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waive the right to counsel.  State v. Ernst, 2005 
WI 107, ¶25, 283 Wis. 2d 300, 699 N.W.2d 92. 
¶11 At times, we have employed our superintending authority 
in an effort to ensure a defendant's right to counsel is protected.  
Most notably, in State v. Klessig, we mandated the use of a 
colloquy before a defendant may proceed pro se.  211 Wis. 2d 194, 
                                                 
7 The right to counsel is protected by both the United States 
and Wisconsin constitutions.  The Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution provides in part:  "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defense."  And Article I, Section 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution provides in part:  "In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by 
himself and counsel . . . ." 
No. 
2020AP1058-CR 
 
7 
 
206, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997).  Under Klessig, the circuit court must 
conduct a colloquy to ensure that the defendant understands the 
right to counsel and the drawbacks to proceeding pro se.  Id.  If 
challenged postconviction, the State is required to demonstrate by 
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant properly waived 
the right to counsel.  Id. at 207.  If the circuit court conducts 
the Klessig colloquy and the defendant expresses a continued desire 
to proceed pro se, that will ordinarily suffice.  Id.  Absent the 
colloquy, the State has the burden to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant properly waived the right to counsel.  
Id.  The Klessig colloquy is not required by the constitution 
itself; it is "a court-made procedural rule" aimed at protecting 
the right to counsel.  Ernst, 283 Wis. 2d 300, ¶18. 
¶12 But what happens when a defendant alleges, after the 
conviction is final as a matter of law, that no Klessig colloquy 
occurred?  Our cases discussing the burden of proof in the 
collateral attack context have expressly drawn on our plea 
withdrawal jurisprudence.  Ernst, 283 Wis. 2d 300, ¶31 & n.11.  So 
we turn there to provide necessary context for the rules we have 
adopted and the issue before us in this case. 
¶13 When a defendant raises a postconviction challenge to a 
guilty or no contest plea, we have adopted a default procedure and 
an alternate procedure.  See generally State v. Negrete, 2012 
WI 92, ¶¶16-19, 343 Wis. 2d 1, 819 N.W.2d 749.  The default 
procedure, articulated in State v. Bentley, places the burden on 
No. 
2020AP1058-CR 
 
8 
 
the defendant to prove a plea's deficiency.8  201 Wis. 2d 303, 309-
10, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).  This makes sense.  Once judgment is 
entered, the conviction is afforded a "presumption of regularity," 
and the defendant faces a heavy burden to overcome that 
presumption.9  Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992).  The Bentley 
procedure "embodies the general rule that a defendant seeking to 
withdraw a guilty or no contest plea after sentencing must prove 
manifest injustice by clear and convincing evidence."  Negrete, 
343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶29.  It is therefore "the starting point from which 
we may determine whether any other pleading standards apply."  Id. 
¶14 The alternate procedure, articulated in State v. 
Bangert, applies when the defendant identifies a defect in the 
relevant proceeding's record.10  131 Wis. 2d 246, 274-75, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986).  Specifically, the Bangert procedure applies 
when "a defendant mak[es] 'a pointed showing' of an error in the 
plea colloquy by reference to the plea colloquy transcript."  
                                                 
8 This procedure is often given the Bentley label, though it 
predates our decision in that case.  See Nelson v. State, 54 
Wis. 2d 489, 497-98, 195 N.W.2d 629 (1972); Levesque v. State, 63 
Wis. 2d 412, 420-21, 217 N.W.2d 317 (1974). 
9 Assigning this burden to the defendant bringing the 
collateral attack is consistent with due process.  In Parke v. 
Raley, the Court explained that "even when a collateral attack on 
a 
final 
conviction 
rests 
on 
constitutional 
grounds, 
the 
presumption of regularity that attaches to final judgments makes 
it appropriate to assign a proof burden to the defendant."  506 
U.S. 20, 31 (1992). 
10 We created Bangert's burden-shifting procedure "[a]s a 
function of our superintending and administrative authority"; it 
is not required by our constitution or statutes.  State v. Bangert, 
131 Wis. 2d 246, 267, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986). 
No. 
2020AP1058-CR 
 
9 
 
Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20 (quoting another source).  Under that 
procedure, after the defendant identifies a deficiency, the burden 
shifts to the State to prove the conviction's sufficiency.11  Id., 
¶19.  Unless the State shows "by clear and convincing evidence 
that the defendant's plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily," the defendant's plea withdrawal motion will succeed.  
Id. 
¶15 In Negrete, we explained that Bangert's procedure is not 
warranted when the circumstances justifying its application are 
not present: 
Where the transcript of the plea hearing is unavailable, 
however, Bangert's burden shifting procedure does not 
apply, because:  (1) the defendant will not be able to 
make the requisite showing from the transcript that the 
circuit court erred in the plea colloquy, and (2) the 
rationale underlying Bangert's burden shifting rule does 
not support extending that rule to situations where a 
violation is not evident from the transcript.  Instead, 
the policy of finality counsels that a party seeking to 
disrupt a final judgment by withdrawing his plea must 
first allege facts which, if true, demonstrate that 
manifest injustice has occurred and that relief is 
therefore warranted. 
Id., ¶31.  Thus, in the plea withdrawal context, "where a defendant 
is unable to point to a defect evident on the face of a plea 
colloquy transcript because such transcript is unavailable, the 
more appropriate review . . . is that set forth in Bentley."  Id., 
¶33. 
                                                 
11 The defendant also "must allege that he did not know or 
understand the information that should have been presented at the 
plea hearing."  State v. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, ¶30, 343 Wis. 2d 1, 
819 N.W.2d 749. 
No. 
2020AP1058-CR 
 
10 
 
¶16 To summarize, under both the default procedure and the 
exception, the defendant seeking to withdraw a plea bears the 
initial burden to demonstrate a plea's invalidity.  However, if 
the defendant points to a defect within the plea colloquy 
transcript, such as the absence of a proper colloquy, the defendant 
has stated a prima facie challenge to the plea and Bangert's 
burden-shifting procedure applies. 
¶17 This summary in hand, we return to the burden of proof 
for a collateral attack on the grounds that the right to counsel 
was violated.  In State v. Ernst, we held that a circuit court's 
failure to conduct a Klessig colloquy in a prior proceeding could 
serve as the basis for a collateral attack.  283 Wis. 2d 300, ¶¶22-
25.  In doing so, we expressly adopted the Bangert procedure for 
these collateral attack proceedings, concluding there was "no 
reason to apply a different procedure" in the collateral attack 
context than we would "on a direct attack against a prior 
conviction."  Id., ¶31.  Importantly, Ernst's collateral attack 
involved a conviction for which there was a transcript in the 
record.  See id., ¶6.  We did not discuss what our analysis would 
look like if no transcript of the prior proceeding was available.  
Nevertheless, courts interpreted Ernst to require application of 
the 
burden-shifting 
procedure 
in 
all 
collateral 
attack 
proceedings.  See, e.g., State v. Bohlinger, 2013 WI App 39, ¶¶16, 
20-21, 346 Wis. 2d 549, 828 N.W.2d 900. 
¶18 We now clarify that the Bangert–type burden-shifting 
procedure should apply only where it is most appropriate——i.e., 
where there is a transcript.  As we explained in Negrete, without 
No. 
2020AP1058-CR 
 
11 
 
a transcript, the burden-shifting procedure is unworkable and its 
rationale inapplicable.  343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶31-32.  Whether on direct 
appeal or collateral attack, the showing Bangert requires——a 
deficiency apparent on the face of a transcript——cannot be made 
without a transcript.  See id., ¶32.  Moreover, automatically 
shifting the burden to the State in the absence of a transcript 
would put the State "in an untenable position."  See State v. 
Drexler, 
2003 
WI App 169, 
¶11 
n.6, 
266 
Wis. 2d 438, 
669 
N.W.2d 182.  Notwithstanding the document retention rules we 
provided under SCR 72.01(18) and (47), it would require the State 
to retain criminal case records and transcripts indefinitely or 
risk being caught short-handed in a later OWI prosecution.12  In 
Ernst, we said we could not see why "we should apply different 
procedures on a direct attack than we do on a collateral attack," 
since doing so "would make the State's burden in a collateral 
attack more difficult than in a direct attack."  283 Wis. 2d 300, 
¶31 n.11.  Because we would not apply Bangert's burden-shifting 
procedure without a transcript in the plea withdrawal context, 
                                                 
12 In State v. Drexler, the court of appeals identified this 
problem, noting the "practical difficulties . . . that ensue when 
a defendant can meet his or her burden of establishing a prima 
facie case simply by filing an affidavit providing a self-serving 
rendition of events that transpired in court five, ten or even 
twenty years earlier."  2003 WI App 169, ¶11 n.6, 266 Wis. 2d 438, 
669 N.W.2d 182. 
No. 
2020AP1058-CR 
 
12 
 
consistency requires that we not apply it without a transcript in 
the context of a right to counsel collateral attack either.13 
¶19 Clark responds that under State v. Baker, the burden 
should automatically shift to the State anytime a defendant makes 
a prima facie showing of a constitutional violation in a prior 
proceeding, even without a transcript.  169 Wis. 2d 49, 77, 485 
N.W.2d 237 (1992).  This area of law has developed since Baker was 
decided, however.  And such a blanket rule conflicts with the 
reasoning of our subsequent cases.  Baker predated the United 
States Supreme Court's direction that it is "appropriate to assign 
a proof burden to the defendant" in the collateral attack context.14  
Parke, 506 U.S. at 31.  It came before we created Klessig's 
colloquy requirement.  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206.  And it 
preceded Ernst, where we held that an insufficient or absent 
Klessig colloquy is grounds for collateral attack, adopted the 
Bangert procedure for this kind of collateral attack, and explained 
that "the State's burden in a collateral attack" should not be 
                                                 
13 We do not address whether the burden should remain on the 
defendant if the missing transcript was a result of governmental 
misconduct. 
14 In State v. Baker, we stated that on collateral attack, the 
presumption against waiver of counsel conflicts with the 
presumption of regularity that attaches to final convictions.  169 
Wis. 2d 49, 76-77, 485 N.W.2d 237 (1992).  Baker adopted a burden-
shifting framework to "resolve this apparent conflict."  Id. at 
77.  In Parke, however, the Supreme Court rejected Baker's 
balancing approach.  506 U.S. at 29-30.  The Court expressly 
declined to "import" the presumption against waiver into 
collateral 
attack 
proceedings, 
holding 
instead 
that 
the 
"presumption of regularity that attaches to final judgments" 
controls.  Id. at 29 (quotation marks omitted). 
No. 
2020AP1058-CR 
 
13 
 
"more difficult than in a direct attack."  283 Wis. 2d 300, ¶¶22-
25, ¶31 n.11.  Finally, Baker came before our holding in Negrete 
that the Bangert procedure requires a transcript.  Negrete, 343 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶16-21.  To the extent it is contended Baker stands for 
the broad rule Clark advances, that approach is erroneous.  It is 
inconsistent with subsequent cases and cannot control.15  See 
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emps. Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶98, 
264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257 (explaining that departing from 
precedent is warranted when "changes or developments in the law 
have undermined the rationale behind a decision" and when "the 
precedent has become detrimental to coherence and consistency in 
the law"). 
¶20 To recap, if a defendant collaterally attacking a prior 
OWI/PAC conviction cannot point to a defect in the relevant 
transcript, the burden-shifting procedure does not apply.  
Instead, the defendant must carry the burden to demonstrate that 
a violation occurred. 
¶21 In the case before us, Clark claims that the Eau Claire 
County Circuit Court in 1995 and 2002 failed to conduct the Klessig 
colloquy for two of her prior convictions.  But the transcript 
necessary to substantiate that claim does not exist.  Under the 
standard we articulate here, the lack of a transcript means that 
Clark retains the burden to prove a violation of her right to 
counsel occurred.  The circuit court shifted the burden to the 
                                                 
15 The same is true for Drexler, 266 Wis. 2d 438, ¶¶10-11, to 
the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion. 
No. 
2020AP1058-CR 
 
14 
 
State, however, so we reverse its order granting Clark's motion 
collaterally attacking her 1995 and 2002 convictions.  We remand 
with instructions for the circuit court to afford Clark an 
opportunity to satisfy her burden.16 
By the Court.——The order of the circuit court is reversed and 
the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
                                                 
16 In briefing, Clark requested a remand for a new evidentiary 
hearing in the event we reversed the circuit court's application 
of Bangert's burden-shifting procedure.  The State did not object 
to Clark's request. 
No.  2020AP1058-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶22 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  In State v. 
Baker, this court carefully balanced two presumptions:  (1) the 
presumption of regularity that attaches to a judgment, and (2) the 
presumption against waiver of counsel.  169 Wis. 2d 49, 76, 485 
N.W.2d 237 (1992).  Weighing the concerns attendant to each of 
these presumptions and providing direction to future courts in a 
case such as this, the court fashioned a procedure on how to 
allocate the burden of proof.  Namely, the Baker court adopted a 
burden-shifting structure.  
¶23 Initially, the burden is on the defendant to make a prima 
facie showing and then it shifts to the State.  "Because the 
defendant must overcome the presumption of regularity attached to 
the prior conviction, the defendant bears the initial burden of 
coming forward with evidence to make a prima facie showing of a 
constitutional deprivation in the prior proceeding."  Id. at 77.   
¶24 If such a showing is made, the burden then shifts to the 
State:  "If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of a 
violation of the right to counsel, the state must overcome the 
presumption against waiver of counsel and prove that the defendant 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived the right to 
counsel in the prior proceeding."  Id. 
¶25 Casting Baker aside, the majority leaves in its stead a 
hurdle that is nigh insurmountable for a defendant.  The majority 
dismisses the presumption against waiver of counsel with a wave of 
the hand, tucking it away in a footnote, and failing to weigh it 
against the competing presumption of regularity. 
No.  2020AP1058-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
¶26 The majority's error is twofold.  First, it tries to put 
a square peg in a round hole, applying the law of plea withdrawal 
to a collateral attack without the careful balancing of interests 
the Baker court conducted, and that remains required.  Second, the 
majority foists upon Clark and similarly situated defendants a 
nearly impossible burden where a transcript is unavailable through 
no fault of their own. 
¶27 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶28 In 2018, Teresa Clark was charged with OWI and PAC, both 
as a fourth offense.  Majority op., ¶4.  She sought to collaterally 
attack two of her prior convictions, from 1995 and 2002, asserting 
that each of those convictions occurred without counsel and that 
she did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the 
right to counsel.  Id. 
¶29 To support her motion to collaterally attack these prior 
convictions, Clark submitted an affidavit.  Id.  In the affidavit, 
Clark averred that she was unrepresented in the two cases subject 
to her collateral attack, and that at no time did the judge perform 
a colloquy regarding the disadvantages of proceeding pro se, the 
seriousness of the charges, or the range of penalties to which she 
was subject.  She further alleged that at no point did the judge 
perform a colloquy to ensure that she was making a deliberate 
choice to proceed without counsel. 
¶30 However, the relevant files and transcripts for Clark's 
prior convictions no longer exist.  Id., ¶5.  The file for the 
1995 conviction has been destroyed because 20 years have elapsed 
No.  2020AP1058-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
since the conviction, and the court reporter's notes for the 2002 
case have likewise been destroyed because 10 years have passed 
since that conviction.  Id.   
¶31 There is no allegation that the destruction of these 
records demonstrates anything untoward.  Indeed, Clark and the 
State agree that the destruction of these records was consistent 
with supreme court rules regarding document retention.  Id.; see 
SCR 72.01(18), (47). 
¶32 In response to Clark's motion, the State submitted 
several documents from the 2002 case that had not been destroyed:  
a complaint, bond sheet, plea hearing minutes sheet, and sentencing 
hearing minutes sheet.  Majority op., ¶6.  The minutes sheets from 
both the plea hearing and sentencing hearing had boxes checked 
indicating that Clark appeared without counsel and had been 
"advised of his right to attorney/constitutional rights."  Id.1 
¶33 After an evidentiary hearing at which Clark testified, 
the circuit court granted Clark's motion to collaterally attack 
her prior convictions.  It concluded that Clark's testimony that 
she did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive her 
right to counsel shifted the burden to the State, and that the 
State submitted insufficient evidence to refute Clark's testimony.  
Id., ¶7.   
¶34 The majority now reverses the circuit court, determining 
that the usual burden-shifting procedure does not apply when a 
                                                 
1 As the majority observes, "Clark contended that the use of 
masculine pronouns on both hearing minutes sheets rendered their 
reliability suspect because Clark is a woman."  Majority op., ¶6 
n.4. 
No.  2020AP1058-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
transcript of a prior conviction is unavailable.  Id., ¶2.  
Instead, "in these circumstances, the defendant retains the burden 
to demonstrate the right to counsel was violated."  Id. 
¶35 In the majority's view, the usual "burden-shifting 
procedure should apply only where it is most appropriate——i.e., 
where there is a transcript."  Id., ¶18.  It posits that "without 
a transcript, the burden-shifting procedure is unworkable and its 
rationale inapplicable" and that "automatically shifting the 
burden to the State in the absence of a transcript would put the 
State 'in an untenable position.'"  Id. (citing State v. Drexler, 
2003 WI App 169, ¶11 n.6, 266 Wis. 2d 438, 669 N.W.2d 182). 
II 
¶36 The majority's first error is in applying the law of 
plea withdrawal to a collateral attack while neglecting the careful 
balancing of interests that is necessary to resolve this case, and 
which the Baker court conducted.  From 1992 until today, Baker 
established the burdens on various parties in the case of a 
collateral attack.  169 Wis. 2d at 77.  Baker, like this case, 
involved a missing transcript——the court there noted that the 
transcript had been "lost."  Id. at 58. 
¶37 At the outset of its analysis, the Baker court observed 
that there are two competing presumptions at work when a defendant 
collaterally attacks a prior conviction on the basis of a violation 
of the right to counsel:  the presumption of regularity of a 
No.  2020AP1058-CR.awb 
 
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judgment2 and the presumption against waiver of counsel.3  Id. at 
76.   
¶38 To resolve this "apparent conflict of presumptions," the 
court adopted the following allocation of the burdens of production 
and persuasion.  "Because the defendant must overcome the 
presumption of regularity attached to the prior conviction, the 
defendant bears the initial burden of coming forward with evidence 
to make a prima facie showing of a constitutional deprivation in 
the prior proceeding."  Id. at 77.  In the event the defendant 
makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the State:  "If the 
defendant makes a prima facie showing of a violation of the right 
to counsel, the state must overcome the presumption against waiver 
of counsel and prove that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, 
and intelligently waived the right to counsel in the prior 
proceeding."  Id. 
¶39 Paying little mind to the presumption against the waiver 
of counsel, the majority jettisons this careful balancing, and 
instead erroneously applies the law of plea withdrawal to 
collateral attacks based on a violation of the right to counsel.  
                                                 
2 "[U]pon collateral attack a judgment carries with it a 
presumption of regularity."  State v. Baker, 169 Wis. 2d 49, 76, 
485 N.W.2d 237 (1992); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 
(1992) (indicating that such a presumption, which attaches to final 
judgments, is "deeply rooted in our jurisprudence").   
3 Courts are to "indulge in every reasonable presumption 
against waiver of counsel."  Baker, 169 Wis. 2d at 76 (citing 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938)).  Waiver may not 
be presumed from a silent record, but rather "the record must 
disclose unequivocal, express waiver."  Spencer v. State, 85 
Wis. 2d 565, 571, 271 N.W.2d 25 (1978). 
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In doing so, it declares that Baker "cannot control."  Majority 
op., ¶19.   
¶40 The 
majority 
mistakenly 
discounts 
the 
important 
presumption against waiver of counsel.  Yet, it is the presumption 
against waiver of counsel that distinguishes a collateral attack 
based on a violation of the right to counsel from a run-of-the-
mill plea withdrawal. 
¶41 In this case and for future collateral attacks where a 
transcript is missing, the majority adopts the procedure outlined 
in State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).  But 
Bentley is not a good fit because it did not consider the 
presumption against waiver of counsel. 
¶42 Indeed, the Bentley court had no need to consider the 
presumption against waiver of counsel and to balance the competing 
presumptions as the court in Baker did.  Which makes sense, for 
the simple reason that a claim that the right to counsel was not 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived would never arise 
in a Bentley case.   
¶43 The Bentley framework applies when an error extrinsic to 
the plea colloquy is raised.  State v. Howell, 2007 WI 75, ¶74, 
301 Wis. 2d 350, 734 N.W.2d 48.  Examples of such an error are a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or an assertion of 
coercion.  Id.  A claim that the right to counsel was not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived generally involves a defect 
in the colloquy itself and follows a completely different 
framework——if the defendant makes a prima facie case of a defective 
colloquy, then the burden is shifted to the State to demonstrate 
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that the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
entered despite the inadequacy of the record at the time of the 
plea's acceptance.  State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 274, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986). 
¶44 The presumption against waiver of counsel should retain 
vitality and should apply equally to defendants whose transcripts 
still exist and to those whose transcripts have been destroyed.4  
But without any modicum of analysis of the presumption against 
waiver of counsel, the majority changes its operation with regard 
to the subset of defendants who no longer have access to 
transcripts from their previous cases.  The Baker court got it 
right, and we should not be so cavalierly departing from that 
decision. 
                                                 
4 The majority posits that Parke, 506 U.S. 20, rejected the 
idea that the presumption against waiver of counsel applies to a 
collateral attack.  Majority op., ¶19 n.14.  
Parke is 
distinguishable.   
The defendant in Parke admitted that he was represented by 
counsel at the proceedings subject to collateral attack and 
presented no evidence in support of his motion other than his 
statement on the stand that he "could not remember whether he was 
specifically told about the rights he waived by pleading guilty."  
Parke, 506 U.S. at 24.  He accordingly argued that "imposing even 
a burden of production on him is fundamentally unfair because a 
constitutionally protected right is in question."  Id. at 31 
(internal quotation omitted).  The Parke court determined:  "On 
collateral review, we think it defies logic to presume from the 
mere unavailability of a transcript (assuming no allegation that 
the unavailability is due to governmental misconduct) that the 
defendant was not advised of his rights."  Id. at 30. 
Clark is not asking this court to engage in a similar 
presumption.  In contrast here, rather than contesting the burden, 
Clark accepts her burden of production, and indeed met it with an 
affidavit and testimony that establish a prima facie violation of 
the right to counsel. 
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III 
¶45 The majority's second error lies in foisting upon Clark 
and similarly situated defendants a nearly impossible burden.  
Making things worse is the fact that defendants are saddled with 
this burden due to no fault of their own but merely because of the 
operation of document retention rules which likely are outdated 
given the reality of today's electronic filing and storage.  
Indeed, given the vast amounts of electronic data that can be 
stored in a relatively small physical area and the complications 
that may arise due to the destruction of case files, it may be 
time for this court to consider revisiting the record retention 
rules that caused the scenario we face here. 
¶46 Decrying the hardship that would be placed on the State 
by applying the usual burden-shifting framework, the majority 
laments that "automatically shifting the burden to the State in 
the absence of a transcript would put the State 'in an untenable 
position.'"  Majority op., ¶18 (citing Drexler, 266 Wis. 2d 438, 
¶11 n.6).  But what about the defendant?  The majority's position 
puts the defendant in a similarly untenable position.   
¶47 The State contends, and the majority apparently agrees, 
that Clark should be required to "show" that she did not waive 
counsel in the prior proceeding and that it is not enough for her 
to merely "say" it.  But how is she supposed to "show" it without 
a transcript?  Paying no mind, the majority besets a burden that 
is nearly impossible for a defendant to overcome.   
¶48 Admittedly, Clark's testimony and affidavit are "self-
serving."  But in this type of case that is all we have.  Assuming 
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that Clark is telling the truth (as apparently the circuit court 
determined) and that she did not validly waive her right to counsel 
in the prior proceeding, how else is she to convey that to the 
court other than by affidavit and her testimony?  Yet the 
majority's approach casts aspersions on a defendant's testimony 
simply because of its source, in effect per se discounting the 
testimony of a defendant who may be vindicated by the transcript's 
corroboration of the defendant's memory. 
¶49 And what did Clark do to have this steep hill placed in 
front of her?  Nothing.  The documents she needs to prove her case 
were destroyed not because of anything Clark did, but because of 
the passage of time and the force of somewhat arbitrary rules of 
government regulation.   
¶50 Chief Justice Abrahamson placed a fine point on the 
problem with such a procedure in her dissent in State v. Negrete, 
2012 WI 92, ¶58, 343 Wis. 2d 1, 819 N.W.2d 749 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
dissenting).  There, Chief Justice Abrahamson wrote: 
Everyone agrees that it is unfortunate that there is no 
transcript of Negrete's 1992 plea hearing.  But whose 
fault is that?  If there is "fault," it lies somewhere 
in the judicial system, not with Negrete.  Yet, the 
majority opinion places the burden caused by the missing 
transcript entirely on Negrete.  Negrete is asked to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the warnings 
were not given despite not having had the opportunity to 
put forth any evidence beyond his written assertions 
that the required warnings were not given and he did not 
know the consequences of his plea.  The majority places 
an insurmountable hurdle in front of Negrete. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
¶51 The same is true of Clark in this case, and of other 
defendants who will encounter destroyed files and deleted court 
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reporter's notes.  A defendant should not be made to bear the 
burden of a problem created by document retention rules, and a 
defendant's testimony should not be immediately discounted just 
because the usual procedure would be too difficult for the State. 
¶52 It is not hard to imagine the procedure the majority 
adopts today potentially visiting fundamental injustice upon a 
defendant who was denied the right to counsel in a previous 
proceeding.  Without a transcript to provide corroboration and 
unable to demonstrate the violation of the right to counsel with 
anything other than the defendant's testimony, such a defendant is 
left only to hope in vain that anyone will listen.  And the majority 
fosters summary dismissal of such fundamental entreaties. 
¶53 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶54 I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA FRANK 
DALLET and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this dissent. 
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