Title: In re McVey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 125499
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 2023

1 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 125,499 
 
In the Matter of JEFF L. MCVEY, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed April 21, 2023. One-year suspension.  
 
Gayle B. Larkin, Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause and was on the formal complaint 
for the petitioner. 
 
Thomas J. Berscheidt, of Berscheidt Law Office, of Great Bend, argued the cause, and Jeff Lee 
McVey, respondent, argued the cause pro se. 
 
PER CURIAM:  This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the Office of the 
Disciplinary Administrator (ODA) against the respondent, Jeff L. McVey, of Great Bend, 
an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1993. This matter involves the 
filing of a formal complaint, a hearing on the complaint, and findings of the hearing 
panel. The following summarizes the history of this case before the court. 
 
After the ODA filed a formal complaint against respondent alleging violations of 
the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC), McVey timely responded. In due 
course, respondent filed a proposed probation plan. An appointed panel held a formal 
hearing on the complaint, during which respondent personally appeared and was 
represented by counsel. The hearing panel determined the respondent violated KRPC 
1.15 (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 372) (safekeeping property); KRPC 8.4(c) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. 
 
 
2 
 
 
R. at 434) (professional misconduct); and Rule 210 (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 263) (duty to 
cooperate). 
 
More specifically, the panel made the following findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, together with its recommendation to this court: 
 
"Findings of Fact 
 
 
. . . . 
 
"20. 
The hearing panel finds the following facts, by clear and convincing 
evidence:  
 
"21. 
From 1993 until May 29, 2020, the respondent practiced with the firm 
McPherson Law Offices, Chtd. From 1993 to 1997, the respondent was an associate 
attorney of McPherson Law Offices. In 1997, the respondent became a shareholder of the 
firm. The respondent paid attorney Brock McPherson $25,000 for the ownership interest 
in McPherson Law Offices.  
 
"22. 
The $25,000 the respondent paid for his ownership interest in McPherson 
Law Offices was paid in $2,500 installments. The respondent received a salary of 
$52,500 per year every year from 1998 until he left the firm, and a $2,500 annual bonus 
plus accrued interest. After receiving the bonus, the respondent wrote a check back to Mr. 
McPherson for $2,500 plus accrued interest to go toward the $25,000 owed for his 
ownership interest in the firm. The interest purchased was to be ninety-five percent of the 
stock.  
 
"23. 
Mr. McPherson never assigned any stock to respondent. Respondent 
believed this violated the agreement but never pressed Mr. McPherson on the issue. 
When the respondent left McPherson Law Offices on May 29, 2020, Mr. McPherson did 
not buy back the respondent's ownership interest. The respondent's name was removed 
 
 
3 
 
 
from annual filings for McPherson Law Offices with the Kansas Secretary of State in 
2019.  
 
"B.G. Domestic Matter 
 
"24. 
On March 13, 2020, B.G. retained the respondent and paid him $1,000 in 
cash as an advanced fee to represent B.G. in Russell County District Court case number 
2019-DM-000051.  
 
"25. 
The respondent placed the $1,000 cash from B.G. into his desk drawer. 
The respondent failed to deposit the $1,000 into the firm's trust account, or give the funds 
to the firm at all, at any point. The respondent did not note this payment from B.G. in the 
firm's records.  
 
"26. 
The respondent memorialized the $1,000 payment from B.G. on the back 
of a 'McPherson & McVey Law Offices, Chartered' business card.  
 
"27. 
The respondent was to bill against the $1,000 advanced funds from B.G. 
at a rate of $200 per hour. The $1,000 was not earned when the respondent received it 
from B.G.  
 
"28. 
The respondent testified that after he put this cash in his desk drawer, 'it 
got commingled with other funds and deposited somewhere else.' The respondent further 
testified, 'frankly, I don't know for sure where it went.'  
 
"29. 
The respondent did not repay the $1,000 because the firm owed the 
respondent more than that amount when the respondent left the firm on May 29, 2020. 
The respondent was owed $1,009.61 for his last week's wages, the amount of his 
ownership interest in the firm, and some unreimbursed mileage expenses. The respondent 
believed that by May 29, 2020, he had earned the full $1,000. 
 
"30. 
At the time, the respondent was under extreme stress and was taking 
medication for depression and anxiety that affected his memory and alertness.  
 
 
4 
 
 
 
"M.K. Escrow Matter 
 
"31. 
In addition to practicing law, the respondent ran a rental management 
business out of the McPherson Law Offices building.  
 
"32. 
A separate receipt book was provided to the firm's receptionist to utilize 
for receiving rental management business payments.  
 
"33. 
The respondent began managing rental properties for M.K. around 2010. 
The respondent would list the properties, locate tenants, collect rent, address minor 
repairs, and disburse the rental income to M.K. on a monthly basis.  
 
"34. 
The respondent opened a checking account with Community Bank to use 
for the rental management business in 2007. The checking account was a personal 
checking account in the name of the respondent and the respondent's wife.  
 
"35. 
The respondent testified that he had a separate written agreement with 
M.K. for managing M.K.'s rental properties informing M.K. that the respondent was not 
managing the rentals as part of the firm's law practice. However, when asked during the 
disciplinary investigation to provide a copy of the written agreement, the respondent did 
not provide a copy.  
 
"36. 
The respondent had also at times represented M.K. as her attorney. In 
2012, M.K. asked the respondent to draft a buy-sell agreement for real property M.K. 
owned on Odell Street.  
 
"37. 
The respondent did not manage the Odell Street property as he had the 
rental properties.  
 
"38. 
After drafting the buy-sell agreement for M.K.'s Odell Street property, 
the respondent served as an escrow agent for payments made by the buyers of the Odell 
Street property to M.K.  
 
 
5 
 
 
 
"39. 
In July 2015, M.K. sold all of her rental properties.  
 
"40. 
The respondent testified that during the time he managed the escrow for 
the Odell Street property, M.K. was elderly.  
 
"41. 
The respondent continued to serve as escrow agent for receiving 
payments from the buyers of the Odell Street property. The respondent deposited the 
monthly cash payments from the buyers into the Community Bank personal checking 
account under his name and his wife's name that was used for his rental management 
business. The respondent also paid expenses such as real estate taxes and insurance for 
the Odell Street property from this personal checking account.  
 
"42. 
M.K. expected to receive monthly disbursements from the respondent for 
the payments to M.K. from the escrow but would typically wait five to six months before 
receiving a disbursement from the respondent. M.K. relied in part on these payments to 
pay her living expenses.  
 
"43. 
M.K. told law enforcement that she received letters from the respondent 
on the McPherson law firm letterhead, but the checks she received from the respondent 
for the escrow disbursements came from a personal checking account in the respondent's 
name and his wife's name.  
 
"44. 
In January 2020, February 2020, and March 2020, the respondent 
received three payments—the January, February, and March payments—from the Odell 
Street property buyers. At that time, the payments were between $400 and $450 per 
month. These three payments had not yet been disbursed to M.K. Thus, when the April 
21, 2020, Community Bank statement was issued, the balance in the account should have 
been at least $1,200.  
 
"45. 
The April 21, 2020, Community Bank statement shows an ending 
balance of $138.44.  
 
 
 
6 
 
 
"46. 
In April 2020, the respondent received the April payment from the Odell 
property buyers. By then, four payments for January through April had not yet been 
disbursed to M.K. Thus, the balance in the Community Bank account should have been at 
least $1,600. The May 19, 2020, Community Bank statement shows an ending balance of 
$122.36.  
 
"47. 
The unredacted portions of the bank statements in Exhibit 6 show several 
debits made from this account to Dillons and Wal-Mart. The respondent testified that the 
redactions were incomplete and he failed to redact these Dillons and Wal-Mart 
transactions.  
 
"48. 
The respondent testified that he used M.K.'s funds to pay for personal 
expenses.  
 
"49. 
The respondent did not distribute the January 2020, February 2020, 
March 2020, or April 2020 payments to M.K. until August 6, 2020, when he gave M.K. a 
cashier's check for $1,700, as discussed further below.  
 
"50. 
The August 6, 2020, payment to M.K. was not made from Community 
Bank, but via a cashier's check issued from Bank of the West.  
 
"51. 
The respondent had commingled the Odell Street property buyers' cash 
payments with other cash and had to deposit other funds in order to cover the $1,700 
payment the respondent made to M.K. on August 6, 2020.  
 
"52. 
During the lunch hour, on May 29, 2020, one of the buyers came to 
McPherson Law Offices to make the May 2020 payment under the buy-sell agreement. 
The respondent was away for lunch and an employee of the firm received the payment 
and provided a receipt.  
 
"53. 
Later in the day on May 29, 2020, Mr. McPherson terminated the firm's 
business relationship with the respondent. Mr. McPherson asked the respondent to clean 
out his desk and leave that day. The respondent did not receive the May 2020 payment 
 
 
7 
 
 
for the Odell Street property, and this payment was apparently provided by McPherson 
Law Offices to M.K. The record does not reflect respondent asserted any objection to Mr. 
McPherson's authority to terminate him, even though respondent believed he owned 
ninety-five percent of the corporation. 
 
"54. 
On June 9, 2020, R.A., one of the buyers making payments for the Odell 
Street property, reported to law enforcement that she paid $450 to the respondent in 
January, February, March, and April 2020, but that the respondent had not forwarded the 
payments to M.K. The matter was referred to the Kansas Bureau of Investigation for 
criminal investigation.  
 
"55. 
The respondent and M.K. were interviewed by the KBI.  
 
"56. 
The respondent informed the buyers by letter that he was no longer at 
McPherson Law Offices. Although M.K. was cc'd on the letter to the buyers, M.K. did 
not receive a copy of the letter. The buyers were told in the letter to continue making 
payments for the Odell Street property to the respondent at a new address.  
 
"57. 
M.K. never received notice from the respondent that he had left the 
McPherson Law Offices.  
 
"58. 
M.K. called the respondent's phone number to ask for the four January 
through April 2020 payments. The respondent's wife answered the phone and told M.K. 
she would go get the respondent, but after M.K. waited for several minutes the phone 
would disconnect and M.K. never got to talk to the respondent. 
 
"59. 
M.K. also drove to the respondent's house and although there were 
several vehicles at the respondent's home, no one answered the door.  
 
"60. 
M.K. also wrote the respondent a letter that she sent via registered mail 
to try to collect the January through April escrow payments the respondent should have 
been holding on her behalf.  
 
 
 
8 
 
 
"61. 
Because she was unable to contact the respondent, M.K. called the 
respondent's mother B.M. M.K. told B.M. that M.K. could not reach the respondent. At 
one point, M.K. went to B.M.'s house to speak to B.M. and B.M. slammed the door in her 
face. B.M. told M.K. that M.K. ruined the respondent's life.  
 
"62. 
The respondent was not ultimately charged with a criminal offense.  
 
"63. 
The respondent provided M.K. with a cashier's check from Bank of the 
West, dated August 6, 2020, for $1,700. The memo line of the check read 'Paid in Full'.  
 
"64. 
In an email to disciplinary investigator Gerald O. Schultz dated 
September 17, 2020, the respondent wrote that the reason he paid M.K. $1,700 is because 
that is the amount M.K. stated she was owed.  
 
"Disciplinary Investigation 
 
"65. 
On July 10, 2020, now retired deputy disciplinary administrator Kate F. 
Baird sent a letter to the respondent notifying the respondent that the complaint in this 
matter had been docketed for investigation and directing the respondent to provide a 
written response within 20 days.  
 
"66. 
The respondent provided a timely response.  
 
"67. 
Gerald O. Schultz was assigned to investigate the complaint against the 
respondent. Mr. Schultz requested additional information from the respondent, including 
a copy of the written agreement between the respondent and M.K. regarding management 
of the Odell Street property escrow as well as documentation of payments made by the 
buyers and how those payments were distributed. The respondent did not provide a 
written agreement or sufficient documentation of the payments and how those payments 
were distributed.  
 
"68. 
On October 12, 2020, the respondent sent an email to Mr. Schultz 
attaching PDF copies of bank statements that the respondent stated reflected the 
 
 
9 
 
 
payments for real estate taxes and insurance for the Odell Street property. The attached 
bank statements were for a personal checking account at Community Bank, in the 
respondent's name and the respondent's wife's name.  
 
"69. 
The bank statements attached to the respondent's emails were for 
statement dates:  May 19, 2020, April 21, 2020, December 17, 2019, April 16, 2019, May 
15, 2018, April 17, 2018, March 20, 2018, February 20, 2018, January 16, 2018, October 
17, 2017, and March 15, 2016. The bank statements provided had significant redactions 
done with a dark marker, which did not completely conceal the typed information 
underneath.  
 
"70. 
The respondent testified that he made the redactions on these bank 
statements. He said he did not recall why he made these redactions.  
 
"71. 
The unredacted portions of the bank statements in Exhibit 6 show several 
debits made from this account to Dillons and Wal-Mart. The respondent testified that the 
redactions were incomplete and he failed to redact these Dillons and Wal-Mart 
transactions.  
 
"72. 
The respondent did not provide a full accounting of the income and 
disbursements for the Odell Street property escrow account to Mr. Schultz, even though 
Mr. Schultz asked for them two or three times.  
 
"73. 
The respondent obtained the bank statements that he did provide through 
the Community Bank website. The respondent testified that he did not print off all of the 
statements because he 'printed off what [he] believed was relevant at the time.'  
 
"74. 
In addition, retired disciplinary administrator Stanton Hazlett contacted 
counsel for the respondent requesting an accounting of the buyers' payments and how 
those payments were distributed. The respondent did not provide an accounting.  
 
 
"75. 
On August 2, 2021, the respondent wrote a letter to Mr. Hazlett 
providing some peripheral information about the Odell Property escrow arrangement and 
 
 
10 
 
 
his leaving McPherson Law Offices. However, the respondent did not provide an 
accounting as requested by Mr. Hazlett.  
 
 
"76. 
The respondent told the disciplinary investigators and also asserted 
during the formal hearing that Mr. McPherson kept the respondent's file containing the 
Odell Street property escrow management. The respondent admitted that he took no 
action to request or obtain those records from Mr. McPherson.  
 
"Conclusions of Law 
 
"77. 
Based upon the findings of fact, the hearing panel concludes as a matter 
of law that the respondent violated KRPC 1.15 (safekeeping property), KRPC 8.4(c) 
(professional misconduct), and Rule 210 (duty to cooperate). 
 
"78. 
During the formal hearing, the disciplinary administrator argued that the 
evidence presented during the hearing showed that the respondent also violated KRPC 
1.16 (declining or terminating representation) by failing to take proper steps to withdraw 
from representing B.G. The amended formal complaint did not specify KRPC 1.16 as a 
rule violated by the respondent. 
 
"79. 
When the formal complaint alleges facts that would support findings of 
violations of additional rules, the hearing panel is allowed to consider additional 
violations. See State v. Caenen, 235 Kan. 451, 681 P.2d 639 (1984) ('It is not incumbent 
on the board to notify the respondent of charges of specific acts of misconduct as long as 
proper notice is given of the basic factual situation out of which the charges might result.' 
[Internal citations omitted.]).  
 
"80. 
However, even if the hearing panel determined that proper notice was 
given of the basic facts supporting a KRPC 1.16 violation, the hearing panel concludes 
there was not clear and convincing evidence of a KRPC 1.16 violation.  
 
"81. 
On July 27, 2022, the parties filed a joint stipulation to the following 
fact:  'After the respondent's employment was terminated by Brock McPherson on May 
 
 
11 
 
 
29, 2020, Mr. McPherson represented [B.G.] in case number 2019-DM-000051 in Russell 
County District Court.'  
 
"82. 
The parties' stipulation establishes that McPherson Law Offices 
continued to represent B.G. in the Russell County District Court matter, which negated 
the need to allow time for employment of other counsel or surrendering B.G.'s papers and 
other property (which McPherson Law Offices still held). Further, the respondent 
testified that by May 29, 2020, the $1,000 advanced fee paid by B.G. had been earned, 
and clear and convincing evidence was not presented to contradict this assertion.  
 
"83. 
Accordingly, the hearing panel does not conclude that the respondent 
violated KRPC 1.16 (declining or terminating representation). 
 
"84. 
The hearing panel does, however, conclude that the respondent violated 
KRPC 1.15 (safekeeping property), KRPC 8.4(c) (professional misconduct), and Rule 
210 (duty to cooperate), as detailed below. 
 
"KRPC 1.15(a) 
 
"85. 
Lawyers must properly safeguard the property of their clients and third 
persons. Properly safeguarding the property of others necessarily requires lawyers to 
deposit unearned fees into an attorney trust account. KRPC 1.15(a) specifically provides, 
in part, that lawyers 'shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's 
possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property. 
Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained in the state of Kansas. Other 
property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded.' 
 
"86. 
The respondent failed to utilize an attorney trust account to deposit the 
$1,000 advance fee paid by B.G. Instead, the respondent placed the $1,000 cash payment 
into his desk drawer where it became commingled with other cash placed in the drawer 
and eventually was lost or spent. As a result, the respondent failed to adequately 
safeguard B.G.'s $1,000 advanced fee. 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
"87. 
Further, the respondent received the four January through April 2020 
payments belonging to M.K. from the buyers of the Odell Street property and failed to 
properly safeguard those funds or keep them separate from the respondent's own 
property.  
 
"88. 
The respondent either held onto the January through April 2020 
payments in cash and commingled it with other cash belonging to himself or third 
persons, or the respondent deposited the funds into the Community Bank personal 
checking account in the name of himself and his wife and spent it on personal 
expenditures. 
 
"89. 
The Community Bank statements show that on more than one occasion 
the account dropped below the amount that the respondent should have been holding at 
the time on M.K.'s behalf for the Odell Street property escrow. 
 
"90. 
Further, the bank statements in Exhibit 6 show many redacted entries 
plus several unredacted debits made from the Community Bank checking account to 
Dillons and Wal-Mart. The respondent testified that he used M.K.'s funds to pay for 
personal expenses.  
 
"91. 
Further, it is clear that the respondent held the funds in connection with 
his representation of M.K. First, M.K. hired the respondent to draft the buy-sell contract 
between M.K. and the buyers of the Odell Street property. Second, while he stated he had 
a separate written agreement with M.K. to manage her rental properties, the respondent 
did not produce a copy of the agreement when requested during the disciplinary 
investigation. The respondent's assertion that a separate agreement existed lacks 
credibility. Also, there was no evidence that the respondent had any agreement with M.K. 
establishing a relationship that was not an attorney-client relationship for the escrow 
management under the buy-sell contract. Third, when the respondent communicated with 
M.K. about the Odell Street escrow, he wrote to her from the McPherson law office. 
Finally, M.K. told law enforcement that it was because the respondent was an attorney 
that she elected to have the respondent manage the escrow as opposed to having a bank 
manage the escrow. Respondent admitted that M.K. could have rightfully believed 
 
 
13 
 
 
respondent was acting as her attorney in providing the escrow-like services, and that the 
situation blurred the lines between legal representation and property management. Even if 
respondent was an escrow agent he had a fiduciary duty to safeguard M.K.'s funds. 
 
"92. 
It is clear that without the respondent's attorney-client relationship with 
M.K., M.K. would not have selected the respondent to manage the escrow for the 
transaction.  
 
"93. 
The hearing panel concludes that the respondent managed the Odell 
Street escrow for M.K. in connection with his representation of M.K. 
 
"94. 
In his answer to the amended formal complaint, the respondent admitted 
he violated KRPC 1.15. 
 
"95. 
Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated 
KRPC 1.15(a) by failing to properly safeguard funds belonging to B.G. and M.K. and 
keep their property separate from the respondent's own property.  
 
"KRPC 1.15(b) 
 
"96 
Lawyers must deal properly with the property of their clients. 
Specifically, KRPC 1.15(b) provides:  'Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 
client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third 
person.' Further, 'a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or 
other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the 
client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.' 
KRPC 1.15(b). 
 
"97. 
The respondent violated KRPC 1.15(b) when he failed to promptly notify 
M.K. that he had received payments from the Odell Street property buyers for January, 
February, March, and April 2020 and failed to promptly deliver those funds to M.K. that 
M.K. was entitled to receive.  
 
 
 
14 
 
 
"98. 
In his answer to the amended formal complaint, the respondent admitted 
he violated KRPC 1.15. 
 
"99. 
Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated 
KRPC 1.15(b) by failing to promptly notify M.K. of funds he held on her behalf and by 
failing to promptly distribute those funds to M.K.  
 
"KRPC 1.15(d) 
 
"100. 
KRPC 1.15(d) requires an attorney to preserve 'the identity of funds and 
property of a client.'  
 
"101. 
The respondent violated KRPC 1.15(d) by placing the $1,000 cash 
advanced fee paid by B.G. into his desk drawer where other cash was kept by the 
respondent. The respondent testified that after he put this cash in his desk drawer, 'it got 
commingled with other funds and deposited somewhere else.' The respondent further 
testified, 'frankly, I don't know for sure where it went.'  
 
"102. 
The respondent also violated KRPC 1.15(d) by failing to deposit and/or 
failing to properly account for the January through April 2020 payments from the Odell 
Street property buyers that belonged to M.K. The respondent was unable to recall 
whether he deposited all of the buyers' cash payments into the Community Bank account, 
and even if he had, acknowledged that he failed to properly account for those deposits 
and spent M.K.'s money on the respondent's personal expenditures.  
 
"103. 
The respondent was responsible for properly accounting for and 
identifying M.K.'s funds. However, the respondent was not certain how much of M.K.'s 
money he was supposed to be holding. The respondent paid $1,700 to M.K. on August 6, 
2020, simply because that was the amount M.K. said she was owed.  
 
"104. 
In his answer to the amended formal complaint, the respondent admitted 
he violated KRPC 1.15. 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
"105. 
The respondent violated KRPC 1.15(d) by comingling B.G.'s funds with 
his own and/or third person's funds by placing the $1,000 cash advanced fee into his desk 
drawer, not depositing the cash into the firm's trust account, failing to account for the 
cash, and eventually not being aware of where the cash went. The respondent also 
violated KRPC 1.15(d) by commingling M.K.'s funds with his own funds, not depositing 
and/or accounting for M.K.'s funds, and eventually spending M.K.'s funds on his own 
personal expenditures. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated 
KRPC 1.15(d). 
 
"KRPC 8.4(c) 
 
"106. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.' KRPC 8.4(c).  
 
"107. 
The respondent also engaged in conduct that involved dishonesty, deceit, 
and misrepresentation when he represented to M.K. that he was managing the escrow 
funds for the Odell Street property as a professional fiduciary but instead was spending 
M.K.'s escrow funds on his own personal expenditures.  
 
"108. 
Further, M.K. had to go to great efforts to find the respondent to get her 
funds back from him. 
 
"109. 
When the respondent finally provided M.K. a cashier's check on August 
6, 2020, the amount paid was not based on a proper accounting by the respondent of what 
M.K. was owed but instead was based on the amount M.K. demanded. 
 
"110. 
The respondent converted M.K.'s funds to his own use, and it is not clear 
whether M.K. has been fully paid what she is owed. 
 
"111. 
Finally, the respondent redacted bank statements he provided to the 
disciplinary administrator without any legitimate explanation. The respondent stated he 
intended to redact several Dillons and Wal-Mart transactions on one of the pages, but 
 
 
16 
 
 
missed them. These transactions show the respondent spent funds deposited into the 
account he used to manage rental businesses for his own personal expenditures.  
 
"112. 
As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 
8.4(c).  
 
"[Rule] 210 
 
"113. 
Lawyers must cooperate in disciplinary investigations. Rule 210 provides 
the requirements in this regard: 
 
'(b) Duty to Respond. An attorney must timely respond to a request from the 
disciplinary administrator for information during an investigation and 
prosecution of an initial complaint or a report, a docketed complaint, and a 
formal complaint.' 
 
"114. 
The respondent was asked two or three times by investigator Schultz and 
on at least one occasion by Mr. Hazlett to provide an accounting of the Odell Street 
property escrow funds. The respondent provided a few bank statements, but what was 
provided was heavily redacted, covered only two months of the most relevant time 
period, and did not contain enough information to provide an accounting. 
 
"115. 
The respondent failed to request or do anything to try to obtain the Odell 
Street property escrow file from McPherson Law Offices, where the respondent claimed 
the file remained after he left in May 2020. 
 
"116. 
The Community Bank statements the respondent did provide were 
obtained from the Community Bank website, which the respondent testified contained 
additional statements that he did not print and provide to the disciplinary investigator. 
 
"117. 
Because the respondent knowingly failed to provide bank statements 
available to him, failed to provide an accounting with the information available to him, 
 
 
17 
 
 
and failed to make any attempt to request or obtain his Odell Street property file from Mr. 
McPherson, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated Rule 210.  
 
"American Bar Association 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
 
"118. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors.  
 
"119. 
Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to his clients and to the 
public.  
 
"120. 
Mental State. The respondent knowingly violated his duties. 
 
"121. 
Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused 
potential injury to M.K. and B.G. Evidence presented at the hearing indicated that the 
respondent may have earned the $1,000 advanced fee paid by B.G. soon after it was 
accepted, however, the best practice to protect an advanced fee is to deposit it into a trust 
account as soon as reasonably practicable. Further, the respondent caused actual injury to 
the public by failing to maintain his personal honesty and integrity. 
 
"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
"122. 
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
aggravating factors present: 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
"123. 
Dishonest or Selfish Motive. The respondent's conduct exhibited 
dishonest and selfish motive. The respondent was dishonest in his handling of M.K.'s 
funds by not depositing them in an appropriate account by a reasonable time and by 
spending the funds on his own personal expenditures while maintaining the appearance 
that the funds were safeguarded. The respondent was selfish in spending the funds on his 
own personal expenditures. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent's misconduct was motivated by dishonesty and selfishness. 
 
"124. 
Bad Faith Obstruction of the Disciplinary Proceeding by Intentionally 
Failing to Comply with Rules or Orders of the Disciplinary Process. Despite multiple 
requests, the respondent failed to provide documentation, including a written agreement 
with M.K. that he claimed existed for the Odell Street property escrow arrangement, bank 
statements covering additional periods, and an accounting of M.K.'s escrow funds. The 
respondent's repeated failure to provide this documentation amounts to bad faith 
obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules 
and orders of the disciplinary process.  
 
"125. 
Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas Supreme 
Court admitted the respondent to practice law in the State of Kansas in 1993. At the time 
of the misconduct, the respondent has been practicing law for around 27 years.  
 
"126. 
Indifference to Making Restitution. The respondent eventually paid M.K. 
the $1,700 she requested on August 6, 2020. However, M.K. told law enforcement that 
she had to go to great lengths to find the respondent to collect the money owed to her, 
and still the respondent has not provided information to confirm that the $1,700 paid was 
the full amount owed to M.K. The hearing panel concludes the respondent showed 
indifference to making restitution to M.K.  
 
"127. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
mitigating circumstances present: 
 
 
 
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"128. 
Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record. The respondent has not 
previously been disciplined. The hearing panel concludes this is a mitigating factor. 
 
"129. 
Personal or Emotional Problems if Such Misfortunes Have Contributed 
to Violation of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. The evidence during the formal 
hearing indicated a volatile working relationship between the respondent and Mr. 
McPherson by 2019 and 2020. The respondent had been removed from the official 
documents for the business filed with the secretary of state in 2019 without his interest in 
the company having been bought out. The respondent testified that Mr. McPherson told 
him to leave the office on May 29, 2020, and that his files would be provided for him to 
pick up at a later time. The respondent also testified he was taking medication to manage 
the stress that affected his memory and alertness at the time. The hearing panel concludes 
that the respondent's personal and emotional problems contributed to his misconduct. 
 
"130. 
In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards:  
 
"4.11 'Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts 
client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.' 
 
"4.12 'Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or should know 
that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury or potential 
injury to a client.' 
 
"4.13 'Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in dealing 
with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.' 
 
"4.62 'Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a 
client, and causes injury or potential injury to the client.' 
 
"4.63 'Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently fails to 
provide a client with accurate or complete information, and causes injury or 
potential injury to the client.' 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
"5.12 'Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in 
criminal conduct which does not contain the elements listed in Standard 5.11 and 
that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice.'  
 
"5.13 'Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in 
any other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation 
and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.' 
 
"7.2 
'Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in 
conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes injury or 
potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.'  
 
"7.3 
'Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently engages in 
conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes injury or 
potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.'  
 
"Recommendations of the Parties 
 
"131. 
The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent be 
suspended for one year and that the respondent be required to undergo a reinstatement 
hearing pursuant to Rule 232. 
 
"132. 
The respondent did not offer a recommendation, but counsel for the 
respondent offered some argument that public censure or probation would be appropriate 
under the circumstances. 
 
"Recommendation of the Hearing Panel 
 
"133. 
Based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the Standards 
listed above, the hearing panel unanimously recommends that the respondent be 
suspended for a period of one year. The hearing panel further recommends that prior to 
reinstatement, the respondent be required to undergo a hearing pursuant to Rule 232. 
 
 
21 
 
 
 
"134. 
When a respondent requests probation, the hearing panel is required to 
consider Rule 227, which provides:  
 
'(d) 
Restrictions on Recommendation of Probation. A hearing panel may not 
recommend that the respondent be placed on probation unless the following 
requirements are met: 
(1) the respondent complies with subsections (a) and (c) and the 
proposed probation plan satisfies the requirements in subsection (b); 
(2) the misconduct can be corrected by probation; and 
(3) placing the respondent on probation is in the best interests of the 
legal profession and the public.' 
 
"135. 
On June 14, 2022, the respondent filed and served the hearing panel and 
the disciplinary administrator a probation plan. The probation plan proposed by the 
respondent is not substantial or detailed and does not contain adequate safeguards to 
protect the public and ensure the respondent's compliance with the Kansas Rules of 
Professional Conduct, the Rules Relating to Discipline of Attorneys, or the respondent's 
oath of office. Further, the respondent engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, 
and misrepresentation, which renders probation ineffective to guard against future 
misconduct. See In re Stockwell, 296 Kan. 860, 868, 295 P.3d 572 (2013) ('this court is 
generally reluctant to grant probation where the misconduct involves fraud or dishonesty 
because supervision, even the most diligent, often cannot effectively guard against 
dishonest acts'). 
 
"136. 
Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by 
the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator." 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the 
hearing panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of 
 
 
22 
 
 
KRPC exist and, if they do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 
258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 226(a)(1)(A) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 281). 
"Clear and convincing evidence is 'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the 
truth of the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 
610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]). 
 
The respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint and timely 
responded. The respondent was also given adequate notice of the hearing before the panel 
and the hearing before this court. The respondent timely filed a proposed probation plan 
that was provided to the Disciplinary Administrator and each member of the hearing 
panel. He did not file exceptions to the hearing panel's final hearing report.  
 
With no exceptions before us, the panel's factual findings and conclusions of law 
are deemed admitted by the respondent and ODA. Supreme Court Rule 228(g)(1), (2) 
(2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 288). We hold that the facts found by the hearing panel were 
established by clear and convincing evidence. We agree with the panel in holding that 
respondent violated KRPC 1.15 (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 372) (safekeeping property); and 
KRPC 8.4(c) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 434) (professional misconduct). A majority of the 
court finds that respondent also violated Rule 210 (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 263) (duty to 
cooperate), although a minority of the court disagrees and would find that respondent 
fulfilled at least the minimum requirements of Rule 210 in his efforts to cooperate with 
ODA and this court during the course of investigation. 
 
 
The only remaining issue is to decide the appropriate discipline for these 
violations. This court is not bound by any recommendations. In re Long, 315 Kan. 842, 
853, 511 P.3d 952 (2022). The court is cognizant that "'[o]ur primary concern must 
remain protection of the public interest and maintenance of the confidence of the public 
 
 
23 
 
 
and the integrity of the Bar.' [Citation omitted.]" In re Jones, 252 Kan. 236, 241, 843 P.2d 
709 (1992). 
 
After considering the evidence presented and all recommendations, we conclude 
appropriate discipline is respondent's suspension for one year from the practice of law. 
After completing his term of suspension, respondent may apply for reinstatement. A 
minority of the court would impose a lesser penalty. 
 
Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by the 
Office of the Disciplinary Administrator. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Jeff L. McVey is suspended for one year from the 
practice of law in the state of Kansas, effective the date of this opinion, in accordance 
with Supreme Court Rule 225(a)(3) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 281) for violations of KRPC 
1.15, 8.4(c), and Rule 210.  
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent shall comply with Supreme Court Rule 
231 (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 292). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if respondent applies for reinstatement, he shall 
comply with Supreme Court Rule 232 (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 293) and be required to 
undergo a reinstatement hearing. 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports.