Title: State Ex Rel. Leffingwell v. SUPERIOR COURT NO. 2
Citation: 321 N.E.2d 568
Docket Number: 874S153
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: December 31, 1974

321 N.E.2d 568 (1974)
STATE of Indiana On the Relation of Martha Leffingwell, Individually and As Clerk of the Blackford Circuit Court, Relatrix,
v.
SUPERIOR COURT NO. 2 of Grant County, Indiana and the Honorable Thomas G. Wright As Judge Thereof, Respondent.
No. 874S153.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
December 31, 1974.
*569 Bonham &amp; Wilson, Max C. Peterson, Peterson, Ervin &amp; Barry, Hartford City, for appellant.
Thomas G. Wright, Judge in pro per.
GIVAN, Chief Justice.
Relatrix is the clerk of the Blackford Circuit Court. She has been cited for contempt in the Respondent court for refusing to obey the order of that court requiring her to issue a marriage license. She brings this original action for a permanent writ of prohibition commanding Respondents to refrain from making any findings, orders or entries in the matter of the contempt against her.
This Court conducted an emergency hearing on August 13, 1974, and granted a temporary writ against the Respondents.
The record presents the following facts: On July 22, 1974, a fifteen year old girl and an eighteen year old boy, both residents of Blackford County, applied to the Blackford County judge, The Honorable Orville A. Pursley, for a waiver of the minimum age requirement for marriage. Judge Pursley denied the application. Subsequently, the couple applied to the Respondent judge for waiver of the minimum age for marriage. The couple informed Respondent judge of their respective ages and stated that the girl was not then pregnant, but had already given birth to a child fathered by the boy. On July 26, 1974, Respondent ordered Relatrix to issue a marriage license to the couple. Relatrix refused to comply with Respondent's order. On July 31, 1974, Respondent ordered Relatrix to appear in the Grant Circuit Court to show cause why she should not be held in contempt of court for disobeying the order.
It has long been the law in Indiana that a person cannot be held in contempt of court for failure to obey an order if the issuing court had no jurisdiction to give the order. See Hofmann v. State (1935), 207 Ind. 695, 194 N.E. 331. See also 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contempt, § 42.
The entry made by the Respondent court reads in part as follows:
As above indicated, the Respondent court specifically found that both of the parties were residents of Blackford County. The statute regarding the minimum age for marriage reads as follows:
The statute regarding parental consent reads as follows:
From the facts in this case, it is clear that Respondent court erred in the statement that the parties were making application *571 in his court pursuant to IC 31-1-1-4. They were in fact making application under 31-1-1-1 for the reason that the girl had not yet reached her seventeenth birthday. Therefore, it was necessary that she come within the exceptions stated in 31-1-1-1.
A reading of the two statutes involved leads this Court to the conclusion that parties who have reached their seventeenth birthday, but have not yet reached their eighteenth birthday, may apply for a marriage license in either the county of the residence of one of them, or in an adjoining county. However, if the female is under seventeen, but is at least fifteen years of age, the application must be made in the county of the residence of either party and it must be established that the female is pregnant before the license will issue.
Although the Respondent judge in his order recited that each of the parties was a resident of Blackford County, he states in his response in this cause that the girl was a resident of Grant County because of the fact that she was "living with her grandmother in Grant County, Indiana." However, the record shows that at the time she was in legal custody of her mother, who lived in Blackford County. The residence of an unemancipated child is that of his parents. 11 I.L.E., Domicile § 3.
Even if we would assume for the sake of argument that the girl was a resident of Grant County at the time of the application, the fact that she was not pregnant at the time of the application removes her from the stated exceptions of the statute. It is argued that the word "pregnant" in the statute should be interpreted to include a mother with a child already born. Pregnancy is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (4th Ed.) at 1342:
The legislative intent in this statute is clear. This Court is not at liberty to interpret the word "pregnant" to include a mother of a child already born. It is within the exclusive province of the legislature to establish public policy as to who may marry, the age at which they may marry and the procedure to be followed. Sweigart v. State (1938), 213 Ind. 157, 12 N.E.2d 134. This Court will not invade the legislative prerogative.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that the Respondent, had no jurisdiction to issue the order to Relatrix that she issue a marriage license to the parties. The temporary writ heretofore issued is now made permanent and Respondent court is mandated to dismiss the charge of contempt against the Relatrix.
ATERBURN, DeBRULER, HUNTER and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.