Title: Duncan v. Asset Recovery Specialists, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2019AP001365
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 6, 2022

2022 WI 1 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP1365 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Danelle Duncan, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Asset Recovery Specialists, Inc., Greg Strandlie 
and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 393 Wis. 2d 814,948 N.W.2d 419 
PDC No:2020 WI App 54 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 6, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 15, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Stephen E. Ehlke   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to all parts except ¶¶29, 31-34, in which ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined, and an opinion 
with respect to ¶¶29, 31-34, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and 
HAGEDORN, JJ., joined.  KAROFSKY, J., filed a concurring 
opinion.  ROGGENSACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which 
ZIEGLER, C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by William W. Ehrke, Micaela Haggenjos, and 
Crivello Carlson S.C., Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by 
William W. Ehrke. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Briane F. Pagel and Lawton & Cates, S.C., Madison. There was an 
oral argument by Briane F. Pagel. 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Bankers Association by James E. Bartzen and Boardman & Clark 
LLP, Madison. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of The Wisconsin 
Credit Union League and American Financial Services Association 
by Lisa M. Lawless and Husch Blackwell LLP, Milwaukee; and Marci 
V. Kawski, Lauren C. Capitini and Husch Blackwell LLP, Madison. 
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 1 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP1365 
(L.C. No. 
2017cv1704) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Danelle Duncan, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Asset Recovery Specialists, Inc., Greg 
Strandlie and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
FILED 
 
JAN 6, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to all parts except ¶¶29, 31-34, in which ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined, and an opinion 
with respect to ¶¶29, 31-34, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and 
HAGEDORN, JJ., joined.  KAROFSKY, J., filed a concurring 
opinion.  ROGGENSACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which 
ZIEGLER, C.J., and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Modified and 
affirmed and, as modified, cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   Danelle Duncan left her car 
in her parking spot in the garage on the ground floor of her 
apartment building.  When she returned a short time later, the 
car was gone.  She later learned that Defendants——Asset Recovery 
Specialists, Inc.; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.; and Greg Strandlie——
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
2 
 
had entered the garage without her consent and repossessed the 
car.   
¶2 
Duncan alleges that Defendants violated the Wisconsin 
Consumer Act by "[e]ntering a dwelling used by the customer as a 
residence except at the voluntary request of a customer" during 
the repossession.  See Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b) (2017-18).1  We 
agree and hold that "dwelling used by the customer as a 
residence" in § 425.206(2)(b) includes a garage attached to the 
residential building in which the customer lives.  In her 
complaint, Duncan also alleged that Defendants' conduct during 
and after the repossession was unconscionable in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 425.107.  We hold that claims of unconscionability 
under § 425.107 
are 
available 
only 
in 
"actions 
or 
other 
proceedings brought by a creditor to enforce rights arising from 
consumer credit transactions," see Wis. Stat. § 425.102, and 
that a non-judicial repossession under § 425.206(1)(d), like the 
one Defendants performed in this case, is not such an action or 
other proceeding.  As a result, Duncan's unconscionability claim 
must be dismissed.  We therefore affirm the decision of the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
as 
modified 
by 
our 
conclusion 
on 
unconscionability, and remand to the circuit court for further 
proceedings.   
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
3 
 
I 
¶3 
Duncan bought her car from a dealership and financed 
the purchase with a loan.  The loan, which created a security 
interest in the car, was later assigned to Wells Fargo Bank.  
After Duncan defaulted on the loan, the Wisconsin Consumer Act 
(Wis. Stat. chs. 421-427) provided the bank with two ways to 
take possession of the car.  It could either obtain a judgment 
for return of the car by filing a replevin action under Wis. 
Stat. § 425.205 or follow the statutory process for a non-
judicial 
repossession 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 425.205(1g)(a) 
and 425.206(1)(d).  Wells Fargo pursued the latter option,2 and 
hired Asset Recovery Specialists, owned by Greg Strandlie, to 
repossess Duncan's car.   
¶4 
At that time, Duncan lived in a multi-story, multi-
unit apartment building.  The ground floor of the building is 
made up entirely of parking for residents and includes at least 
56 parking spaces.  Duncan leased a parking space in the garage 
under an agreement separate from her apartment lease.  To access 
the residential floors and apartments from the garage, or to 
                                                 
2 It is undisputed that Wells Fargo met the statutory 
requirements to proceed with a non-judicial repossession under 
Wis. Stat. § 425.206(1)(d).  Specifically, Wells Fargo provided 
notice to Duncan, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 425.205(1g)(a), 
including notice of Duncan's right to demand that Wells Fargo 
proceed by filing a replevin action.  See § 425.205(1g)(a)3.  
Had Duncan made such a demand, § 425.206(1)(d) would have barred 
Wells Fargo from repossessing the car without first obtaining 
judgment in a replevin action brought under § 425.205.  The 
parties agree that Duncan made no such demand, and therefore no 
replevin action was required.   
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
4 
 
enter the garage on foot from the outside, residents must use 
keys.  To drive into the garage, residents must use a garage 
door opener.3   
¶5 
When Strandlie and one of his employees arrived to 
repossess Duncan's car, however, they found the garage door 
open.  They went in, located Duncan's car, and towed it away.  
Neither Strandlie nor the employee interacted with Duncan at the 
time.  A maintenance worker was in the garage at the time of the 
repossession and did not object.   
¶6 
Duncan filed this case in circuit court4 alleging, 
among 
other 
things, 
that 
Defendants 
violated 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 425.206(2)(b) 
when 
they 
entered 
the 
parking 
garage 
to 
repossess her car and that Defendants' conduct during and after 
the repossession was unconscionable in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 425.107(1).5   
                                                 
3 As the court of appeals noted, the parties dispute other 
facts about the garage, including whether signs were posted 
restricting entry.  See Duncan v. Asset Recovery Specialists, 
Inc., 2020 WI App 54, ¶5 n.3, 393 Wis. 2d 814, 948 N.W.2d 419.  
Like the court of appeals, we conclude that these factual 
disputes are immaterial to our interpretation and application of 
Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b).  See id.   
4 The Honorable Stephen E. Ehlke of the Dane County Circuit 
Court presided. 
5 Duncan initially brought these claims in an action in 
federal court alongside other claims under state and federal 
law.  See Duncan v. Asset Recovery Specialists, Inc., No. 16-cv-
530-WMC, 2017 WL 2870520 (W.D. Wis. July 5, 2017), aff'd 907 
F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 2018).  The federal court dismissed the 
claims at issue in this case without prejudice.  See id. at *6-
7.    
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
5 
 
¶7 
The 
circuit 
court 
granted 
summary 
judgment 
to 
Defendants on all claims, concluding that entering the garage to 
repossess the car did not violate Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b) and 
that Duncan's unconscionability claim failed as a result.  The 
circuit court reasoned that § 425.206(2)(b) did not apply 
because Duncan had no right to exclude all others from the 
garage and that the garage "offers no use that is primarily or 
intimately tied to the use of her apartment, for example, 
sleeping, eating or conducting her private life."   
¶8 
The court of appeals reversed.  Duncan v. Asset 
Recovery Specialists, Inc., 2020 WI App 54, 393 Wis. 2d 814, 948 
N.W.2d 419.  The court of appeals reasoned that "dwelling used 
by [Duncan] as a residence" included the parking garage, relying 
on the language of Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b); another part of 
the Wisconsin Consumer Act, Wis. Stat. § 422.419(1)(a); and an 
administrative rule interpreting § 422.419(1)(a), Wis. Admin. 
Code § DFI-WCA 1.392 (July 2007)6.  See Duncan, 393 Wis. 2d 814, 
¶2.  Based on its reading of those provisions, the court of 
appeals also rejected any interpretation of the phrase "dwelling 
used 
by 
the 
customer 
as 
a 
residence" 
that 
"turns 
on 
considerations of ownership or the right to exclude" or the 
would-be repossessors' subjective evaluation of whether a 
particular location showed some "indicia of residential use."  
Id., ¶¶33-35 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Because the 
                                                 
6 All subsequent references to the Wis. Admin. Code ch. DFI-
WCA 1 are to the July 2007 register date unless otherwise 
indicated. 
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
6 
 
circuit court dismissed the unconscionability claim on the same 
grounds as the repossession claim, the court of appeals remanded 
to give the parties and the circuit court the opportunity to 
address in the first instance whether the unconscionability 
claim should be dismissed for other reasons. 
II 
¶9 
At issue in this case is the interpretation and 
application of Wis. Stat. §§ 425.206(2)(b) and 425.107(1).  
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de 
novo.  See, e.g., Clean Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 2021 WI 72, ¶10, 398 
Wis. 2d 433, 961 N.W.2d 611.  "When interpreting statutes, we 
start with the text, and if its meaning is plain on its face, we 
stop there."  Id.  We also consider the broader statutory 
context, interpreting language consistently with how it is used 
in closely related statutes.  Id.  Our analysis is further 
informed by the legislature's explicit statements of legislative 
purpose 
and 
those 
reflected 
in 
a 
statute's 
context 
and 
structure.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶49, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
III 
¶10 We begin with Duncan's claim that Defendants violated 
Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b) by entering the parking garage of her 
apartment building to repossess her car.  Section 425.206(2) 
states as follows:  
In taking possession of collateral or leased goods, no 
merchant may do any of the following:  
(a) Commit a breach of the peace.  
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
7 
 
(b) Enter a dwelling used by the customer as a 
residence except at the voluntary request of a 
customer. 
 
It is undisputed that Defendants are "merchant[s]," that Duncan 
is "the customer," and that Duncan made no "voluntary request" 
for 
Defendants 
to 
enter 
the 
garage. 
 
See 
id.; 
Wis. 
Stat. § 421.301(17), (25). 
 
To 
determine 
whether 
the 
repossession was proper, we must therefore answer a single 
question:  Did Defendants enter "a dwelling used by [Duncan] as 
a residence" when they repossessed her car from the first-floor 
parking garage of her apartment building?  In answering that 
question, we first determine the meaning of "dwelling" as it is 
used 
in § 425.206(2)(b) 
before 
analyzing 
the 
phrase 
that 
modifies it, "used by the customer as a residence."   
A 
¶11 Although "dwelling" is undefined in the Wisconsin 
Consumer Act, it is a common word and the parties generally 
agree 
on 
its 
ordinary, 
dictionary 
definition. 
"Dwelling" 
typically refers to "a building or other shelter in which people 
live."  See, e.g., Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 
259 (16th ed. 1967); American Heritage Dictionary 406 (6th ed. 
1976) (defining "dwelling" as "[a] place to live in; residence; 
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
8 
 
abode").7  In other words, a dwelling is a building in which at 
least one person lives.   
¶12 That 
definition 
is 
consistent 
with 
the 
use 
of 
"dwelling" elsewhere in the statutes at the time the Wisconsin 
Consumer Act was adopted in 1971.  See Spielmann v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 236 Wis. 240, 250, 295 N.W. 1 (1940) (explaining that 
statutory terms should be interpreted consistently with the 
"definition contained in the statutes in force at the time the 
act was passed").  For example, Wis. Stat. § 990.01(13)(a) 
(1971-72) defined "homestead" to mean "the dwelling and so much 
of the land surrounding it as is reasonably necessary for use of 
the dwelling as a home, but not less than one-fourth acre (if 
available) and not exceeding 40 acres."  Id.  Similarly, Wis. 
Stat. § 852.09(2) (1971-72) defined "home" as "any dwelling in 
the estate of the decedent which at the time of his death the 
                                                 
7 Black's Law Dictionary contains similar definitions.  At 
the time the Wisconsin Consumer Act was adopted, Black's defined 
"dwelling house" as "[t]he house in which a man lives with his 
family; a residence; abode; habitation; the apartment or 
building or group of buildings, occupied by a family as a place 
of residence."  Dwelling House, Black's Law Dictionary 596 (4th 
rev. ed. 1968).  The subsequent edition of Black's included a 
very similar definition of "dwelling," which is nearly identical 
to the current edition's definition:  "The house or other 
structure in which a person or persons live; a residence; abode; 
habitation; the apartment or building, or group of buildings, 
occupied by a family as a place of residence.  Structure used as 
place of habitation."  Dwelling, Black's Law Dictionary 454 (5th 
ed. 1979); see also Dwelling House, Black's Law Dictionary 641 
(11th ed. 2019).  These definitions accord with the ordinary 
dictionary definition of "dwelling" and reinforce our ultimate 
conclusion that "dwelling" in Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b) refers 
to a building in which at least one person lives.     
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
9 
 
surviving 
spouse 
occupies 
or 
intends 
to 
occupy." 
 
Id.  
Section 852.09(2) further explained that this language included 
"a house, a mobile home, a duplex or multiple apartment building 
one unit of which is occupied by the surviving spouse, or a 
building used in part for a dwelling and in part for commercial 
or business purposes."  Id.  Thus, at the time the Wisconsin 
Consumer Act was adopted, "dwelling" meant, at a minimum, a 
building in which at least one person lived.  The term referred 
to the entire building, not just the parts of the building in 
which the residents might eat, sleep, or shower.   
¶13 Aside from Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b), the Wisconsin 
Consumer 
Act 
uses 
"dwelling" 
twice, 
both 
times 
in 
ways 
consistent with the ordinary understanding of the word and its 
usage elsewhere in the statutes.  
See Clean Wis., 398 
Wis. 2d 433, ¶10 (noting that we interpret statutory language 
"consistent with how it is used in closely related statutes").  
"Dwelling" appears first in Wis. Stat. § 422.409(2), which 
imposes requirements on certain payment-assignment notices.  See 
id. (requiring that such notices include the total of payments 
"except in the case of a transaction secured by a first lien 
mortgage or equivalent security interest for the purpose of the 
acquisition of a dwelling").  It is clear from the language of 
§ 422.409(2)——particularly its reference to a "mortgage or 
equivalent security interest"——that "dwelling" refers to a 
building in which at least one person lives and not just certain 
rooms within a building.   
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
10 
 
¶14 The second time "dwelling" appears in the Act is in 
Wis. Stat. § 422.419(1)(a), which prohibits consumer credit 
contracts from allowing "[t]he merchant or other person acting 
on the merchant's behalf . . . to enter the customer's dwelling 
or to commit any breach of the peace in the course of taking 
possession of collateral securing the transaction."  This 
statute is the subject of an administrative rule adopted shortly 
after the Act took effect.  See 210 Wis. Admin. Reg. 72 (June 1, 
1973); see also Wis. Stat. § 426.104(1)(e) (authorizing the 
Department 
of 
Financial 
Institutions' 
administrator 
to 
"adopt . . . rules to carry out the policies of chs. 421 to 427 
and 429").  That rule, Wis. Admin. Code § DFI-WCA 1.392, 
specifies that, for purposes of § 422.419(1)(a), "dwelling" 
includes "any garage, shed, barn or other building on the 
premises whether attached or unattached."   
¶15 In 
light 
of 
the 
relationship 
between 
Wis. 
Stat. §§ 425.206(2) and 422.419(1)(a), the Department's rule 
reinforces our reading of "dwelling" in § 425.206(2)(b).  As 
discussed above, § 425.206(2) prohibits merchants from breaching 
the peace or entering a dwelling used by the customer as a 
residence during a repossession.  And § 422.419(1)(a) prohibits 
merchants from contracting around that prohibition.  As the 
court of appeals put it in this case, these statutes "appear to 
be two sides of the same coin."  Duncan, 393 Wis. 2d 814, ¶28.  
Because "dwelling" in § 422.419(1)(a) includes any garage on the 
premises, see Wis. Admin. Code § DFI-WCA 1.392, Defendants could 
not have contracted for the right to repossess Duncan's car from 
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
11 
 
her apartment building's parking garage.  We see no reason why 
"dwelling" in § 425.206(2)(b) should exclude that same garage, 
especially since both statutes prevent merchants from entering a 
dwelling to repossess property.       
¶16 To be clear, we do not adopt the administrative 
definition of "dwelling" as the statutory definition under Wis. 
Stat. § 425.206(2)(b).  Rather, we rely on the administrative 
definition only as further support for our conclusion that 
"dwelling" in § 425.206(2)(b) means, at a minimum, a building in 
which at least one person lives.  Based on that definition, 
Duncan's "dwelling" includes the parking garage, because it is 
located in the building in which she lives.  The remaining 
question then is whether the phrase "used by the customer as a 
residence" nevertheless excludes the garage. 
B 
¶17 Despite the parties' general agreement on the common 
meaning of "dwelling," they offer competing readings of the 
phrase "used by the customer as a residence."  Defendants assert 
that a "residence" is the place where a person "actually lives."  
They conclude that "used by the customer as a residence" limits 
"dwelling" to only the parts of the building that are also 
"integral parts" of a residence; for example, the areas in which 
a person might sleep, eat, cook, or shower.  Because Duncan did 
not sleep, eat, cook, or shower in the garage, Defendants claim 
that they could lawfully enter the garage because it was not 
used by Duncan as a residence.  In contrast, Duncan suggests 
that "used by the customer as a residence" simply distinguishes 
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
12 
 
her particular dwelling from all other dwellings.  She therefore 
acknowledges that Defendants would not have violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 425.206(2)(b) if they had repossessed her car from the parking 
garage of a different apartment building, or while it was parked 
in a friend's open garage.   
¶18 We agree with Duncan's interpretation and conclude 
that "used by the customer as a residence" distinguishes the 
customer's dwelling from all other dwellings.  To begin with, 
this is the more natural reading of the language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 425.206(2)(b).  As we have already explained, "dwelling" 
generally refers to an entire building in which people live.  
The modifier "used by the customer as a residence" is best 
understood 
as 
imposing 
a 
limitation 
on 
which 
dwelling 
§ 425.206(2)(b) protects——the dwelling this customer uses as a 
residence——not what parts of the dwelling it protects.  Nothing 
in the language "dwelling used by the customer as a residence" 
suggests that the protections in § 425.206(2)(b) are limited to 
only the "integral parts" of a residence or the areas with 
"indicia of residential use."  Indeed, the best evidence against 
those interpretations is that neither phrase appears in the 
statute.   
¶19 Additionally, reading "used by the customer as a 
residence" as distinguishing the customer's dwelling from all 
other dwellings provides simple, clear guidance to parties to 
consumer credit transactions.  This interpretation makes clear 
to merchants that "dwelling used by the customer as a residence" 
refers to the customer's entire dwelling, the full structure in 
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
13 
 
which she lives.  In this respect, our interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 425.206(2)(b) 
furthers 
one 
of 
the 
legislatively 
expressed purposes of the Wisconsin Consumer Act,8 namely 
"simplify[ing], 
clarify[ing], 
and 
moderniz[ing] 
the 
law 
governing 
consumer 
transactions." 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 421.102(2)(a); see also § 421.102(1) (directing courts to 
"liberally construe[] and appl[y]" the Wisconsin Consumer Act in 
furtherance of its expressed purposes and policies); Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶49 (explaining that when the legislature states 
the purposes of a statute, we interpret the statute in light of 
those purposes).     
¶20 In contrast, Defendants' reading of "used by the 
customer as a residence" is unworkable.  See Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (explaining that we should read statutes to 
avoid 
"unreasonable 
results"). 
 
Defendants' 
proposed 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b) requires merchants 
to perform a case-by-case analysis of how the customer uses 
certain parts of her dwelling to decide whether a repossession 
is permitted.  But Defendants offer no principled way to decide 
when "indicia of residential use" or "residential activities" 
                                                 
8 There are four legislatively expressed purposes of the 
Wisconsin Consumer Act: (1) "[t]o simplify, clarify, and 
modernize the law governing consumer transactions"; (2) "[t]o 
protect consumers against unfair, deceptive, false, misleading 
and unconscionable practices by merchants"; (3) "[t]o permit and 
encourage the development of fair and economically sound 
consumer practices in consumer transactions"; and (4) "[t]o 
coordinate the regulation of consumer credit transactions with 
the policies of the federal consumer credit protection act."  
Wis. Stat. § 421.102(2)(a)-(d). 
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
14 
 
are prevalent or frequent enough such that a particular part of 
a dwelling is "used by the customer as a residence."  Even more 
to the point, Defendants fail to explain how a would-be 
repossessor would know, without entering the building first, 
whether a customer sometimes sleeps, eats, cooks, or showers in 
a particular part of her dwelling.   
¶21 Like the court of appeals, we also reject any 
definition of "dwelling used by the customer as a residence" 
that depends on whether the customer has the right to exclude 
others from a particular area or whether the customer has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular area under the 
Fourth Amendment.9  For one thing, there is no basis in the text 
of Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b) for either notion.  The statute's 
protections apply to a building——the "dwelling"——that the 
customer uses in a particular way——"as a residence."  Its 
protections turn on neither who owns the building nor what level 
of privacy a resident might reasonably expect.  Additionally, 
the Wisconsin Consumer Act reflects a balance the legislature 
struck between customers' and merchants' interests in certain 
transactions.  That courts have struck a different balance 
between citizens and law enforcement in the Fourth Amendment 
context 
says 
nothing 
about 
how 
we 
should 
interpret 
§ 425.206(2)(b).   
                                                 
9 See, e.g., State v. Dumstrey, 2016 WI 3, ¶51, 366 
Wis. 2d 64, 873 N.W.2d 502 (concluding that a parking garage 
under the defendant's apartment building was not curtilage and 
that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy 
there). 
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
15 
 
¶22 Similarly, 
it 
is 
irrelevant 
whether 
Defendants 
breached the peace by entering Duncan's garage.  The text and 
structure 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 425.206(2)(b) 
make 
clear 
that 
"[e]nter[ing] a dwelling used by the customer as a residence" is 
not synonymous with breaching the peace.  Section 425.206(2)(a) 
codifies the rule in the Uniform Commercial Code prohibiting 
repossessions in breach of the peace.  
See 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 409.609(2)(b); see also Hollibush v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 
179 Wis. 2d 799, 806, 508 N.W.2d 449 (Ct. App. 1993) (concluding 
that "breach of the peace" in § 425.206(2)(a) has the same 
meaning as in the Uniform Commercial Code).  And § 425.206(2)(b) 
separately prohibits merchants from repossessing collateral by 
either breaching the peace or "enter[ing] a dwelling used by the 
customer as a residence," a distinction that would make little 
sense if both prohibitions meant the same thing.  See Augsburger 
v. Homestead Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 133, ¶17, 359 Wis. 2d 385, 
856 N.W.2d 874.   
¶23 In sum, we conclude that "dwelling used by the 
customer as a residence" in Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b) includes 
a garage attached to the residential building in which the 
customer lives.  Defendants therefore violated § 425.206(2)(b) 
when they repossessed Duncan's car from the parking garage of 
her apartment building without her consent.   
IV 
¶24 We turn next to Duncan's claim of unconscionability 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 425.107(1).  We begin with the language 
of the statute:  
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
16 
 
With respect to a consumer credit transaction, if the 
court as a matter of law finds that any aspect of the 
transaction, any conduct directed against the customer 
by a party to the transaction, or any result of the 
transaction is unconscionable, the court shall, in 
addition to the remedy and penalty authorized in sub. 
(5), either refuse to enforce the transaction against 
the customer, or so limit the application of any 
unconscionable 
aspect 
or 
conduct 
to 
avoid 
any 
unconscionable result.   
§ 425.107(1).  The statute enumerates a number of different 
factors the court may consider pertinent to determining whether 
a transaction, conduct directed against the customer, or the 
result 
of 
the 
transaction 
are 
unconscionable. 
 
See 
§ 425.107(3)(a)-(i).  In addition to the remedies specified in 
subsec. (1), upon a finding of unconscionability a customer may 
recover statutory and actual damages pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 425.303.  See § 425.107(5).   
¶25 The general rule in the Wisconsin Consumer Act is that 
"[a]ny right or obligation declared" in the Act "is enforceable 
by action unless the provision declaring it specifies a 
different and limited effect."  Wis. Stat. § 425.301(2).  But 
Wis. 
Stat. § 425.102 
states 
that 
the 
provisions 
of 
that 
subchapter, including the unconscionability provision in Wis. 
Stat. § 425.107, "appl[y] to actions or other proceedings 
brought by a creditor to enforce rights arising from consumer 
credit transactions and to extortionate extensions of credit 
under 
s. 
425.108."10 
 
We 
are 
therefore 
left 
with 
two 
                                                 
10 Duncan does not allege a violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 425.108, which prohibits extortionate extensions of credit.  
As a result, we do not address the implications of Wis. Stat. 
§ 425.102 on the available remedies for violations of § 425.108.   
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
17 
 
questions:  (1) can customers bring claims of unconscionability 
under § 425.107 only in "actions or other proceedings brought by 
a creditor to enforce rights arising from consumer credit 
transactions"?; and (2) is a non-judicial repossession pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 425.206(1)(d) 
such 
an 
action 
or 
other 
proceeding? 
A 
¶26 Although we have not previously addressed the first 
question, several federal district courts have, and all have 
concluded that a consumer may raise an unconscionability claim 
under Wis. Stat. § 425.107 only in response to an action or 
other proceeding brought by a creditor.  In Riel v. Navient 
Sols., Inc., No. 16-CV-1191-JPS, 2017 WL 168900 (E.D. Wis. 
Jan. 17, 2017), the court concluded that the scope statement in 
Wis. Stat. § 425.102 meant that consumers could not enforce 
"[s]ection 425.107's prohibitions on unconscionability via a 
separate civil lawsuit."  Id. at *3 (citing Tammi v. Porsche 
Cars N.A., Inc., 2009 WI 83, ¶27, 320 Wis. 2d 45, 768 
N.W.2d 783).  The court held that, because § 425.107(1) applied 
only to actions or other proceedings brought by a creditor, the 
statute implied "that [customers] must raise unconscionability 
in the form of an affirmative defense to [a creditor's] lawsuit 
to collect the loans, if one is filed."  Id.  Other federal 
district courts have followed Riel's reasoning.  See, e.g., 
Gable v. Universal Acceptance Corp., 338 F. Supp. 3d 943, 956-57 
(E.D. Wis. 2018); VanHuss v. Rausch, Sturm, Israel, Enerson & 
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
18 
 
Hornik,  No. 16-cv-372-slc, 2017 WL 1379402, at *10 (W.D. Wis. 
Apr. 14, 2017).   
¶27 We agree with the federal courts that the scope 
language of Wis. Stat. § 425.102 bars a customer from bringing a 
claim of unconscionability under Wis. Stat. § 425.107 except in 
response 
to 
"actions 
or 
other 
proceedings 
brought 
by 
a 
creditor."  Although the protections of the Wisconsin Consumer 
Act are generally enforceable in actions brought by consumers, 
§ 425.102 makes statutory unconscionability claims available in 
a more limited set of circumstances.  These limitations are in 
line with the common law doctrine of unconscionability, which is 
a defense to contract enforcement, not an affirmative claim 
available outside a contract-enforcement or breach-of-contract 
action.  See Rosecky v. Schissel, 2013 WI 66, ¶57, 349 
Wis. 2d 84, 833 N.W.2d 634.   
¶28 We therefore hold that a consumer may assert a claim 
of unconscionability under Wis. Stat. § 425.107 only in response 
to "actions or other proceedings brought by a creditor to 
enforce rights arising from consumer credit transactions."  See 
Wis. Stat. § 425.102.   
B 
¶29 On the second question, we conclude that a non-
judicial repossession pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 425.206(1)(d) is 
not one of the "actions or other proceedings brought by a 
creditor" contemplated by Wis. Stat. § 425.102.11  Although 
                                                 
11 There are multiple ways a creditor can obtain the right 
to non-judicially repossess a vehicle.  The creditor may, as in 
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
19 
 
neither "actions" nor "other proceedings" is defined in the 
Wisconsin Consumer Act, the context of the Act reveals that 
these terms refer to creditor-initiated litigation or other 
legal processes akin to litigation pursued by a creditor.    
¶30 Taking 
the 
word 
"actions" 
first, 
this 
term 
is 
consistently used throughout the Wisconsin Consumer Act to refer 
to litigation.  For example, Wis. Stat. § 425.205, titled 
"Action to recover collateral," explains that "a creditor 
seeking to obtain possession of collateral or goods subject to a 
consumer lease shall commence an action for replevin of the 
collateral or leased goods."  § 425.205(1) (emphasis added).  
The statute goes on to describe the process a creditor must 
follow in filing a replevin action, and it specifies the form 
and contents of the summons and complaint "in such actions."  
See § 425.205(1)-(3).  Several other statutes similarly use 
                                                                                                                                                             
this case, follow the notice process laid out in Wis. 
Stat. §§ 425.205(1g) and 425.206(1)(d); or a creditor may, after 
obtaining a judgment in a replevin action, non-judicially 
repossess the vehicle.  See § 425.205(5)(b).  In the latter 
case, "non-judicial" is something of a misnomer, since that 
remedy is available only after a creditor files and prevails in 
a replevin case.  Section 425.205(5)(b) nevertheless refers to 
this as a "nonjudicial recovery" of collateral distinct from the 
creditor's right after obtaining judgment in a replevin action 
to "[h]ave execution issue to require the sheriff of the county 
where the collateral or leased goods may be to take the same 
from 
the 
defendant 
and 
deliver 
it 
to 
the 
plaintiff."  
§ 425.205(5)(a).   
 
Our holding that "actions or other proceedings" does not 
encompass non-judicial repossessions is limited to non-judicial 
repossessions pursuant to § 425.206(1)(d), since a non-judicial 
repossession pursuant to § 425.205(5)(b) is possible only after 
a creditor prevails in an "action[] or other proceeding[]"——that 
is, a replevin action.  See § 425.205(1).   
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
20 
 
"action" to refer to a lawsuit or other judicial proceeding.  
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 425.111(1) ("Prior to entry of judgment 
in an action subject to this subchapter, no process, . . . shall 
issue" except under certain circumstances (emphases added)); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 425.203(1) 
(explaining 
that, 
after 
certain 
conditions are met, "a merchant may commence an action to 
recover collateral . . . or reduce the claim to a judgment by 
any available judicial procedure" (emphases added)).  Unlike 
these 
actions, 
non-judicial 
repossession 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. § 425.206(1)(d) is an explicit alternative to litigation 
that does not require a creditor to assert its rights in court.  
Non-judicial 
repossession 
is 
available 
to 
a 
creditor 
under § 425.206(1)(d) only if the customer fails to demand that 
the creditor file a replevin action.  See § 425.206(1)(b), (d).  
As a result, a non-judicial repossession under § 425.206(1)(d) 
is not an "action[]" described in § 425.102.   
¶31 As for "other proceedings," we know from the phrase 
"actions or other proceedings," that it, too, refers to 
something like litigation.  Wis. Stat. § 425.102.  After all, 
"actions or other proceedings" implies that "actions" (i.e. 
litigation) are one type of "proceedings."  Id. (emphasis 
added); see Stroede v. Soc'y Ins., 2021 WI 43, ¶¶13, 15, 397 
Wis. 2d 17, 959 N.W.2d 305 (explaining that in the list "owner, 
lessee, tenant, or other lawful occupant," an "other lawful 
occupant" covered only those persons who had the same type of 
control over property as did owners, lessees, and tenants).  
Other sections in ch. 425 provide further contextual support for 
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
21 
 
that conclusion.  For example, Wis. Stat. § 425.110(1) prevents 
employers from firing an employee because "a merchant has 
subjected or attempted to subject unpaid earnings of the 
employee to garnishment or like proceeding directed to the 
employer for the purpose of paying a judgment arising from a 
consumer credit transaction."  Id. (emphasis added).  The 
earnings-garnishment 
statutes 
use 
the 
terms 
"action" 
and 
"proceeding" synonymously, and set forth a process different in 
some respects from ordinary civil litigation.  See, e.g., Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 812.31(3) 
(referring 
to 
an 
"earnings 
garnishment 
action"); § 812.31(4) (describing the form of pleadings in "an 
earnings garnishment proceeding"); see also Wis. Stat. § 812.35 
(laying 
out 
the 
process 
for 
"commenc[ing] 
an 
earnings 
garnishment proceeding").  Similarly, Wis. Stat. § 425.203(3)(b) 
refers to "a proceeding for a deficiency judgment pursuant to 
s. 425.209(1)," which occurs in court following repossessions 
performed 
pursuant 
to 
a 
replevin 
judgment. 
 
See 
also 
§ 425.203(3)(a).  In other words, "other proceedings" are formal 
legal processes similar to litigation that allow a creditor to 
enforce its rights.12   
                                                 
12 At the time the Wisconsin Consumer Act was adopted, 
Black's Law Dictionary used the term "proceeding" almost 
identically with "action."  Proceeding, Black's Law Dictionary 
1368 (4th rev. ed. 1968) ("In a general sense, the form and 
manner of conducting juridical business before a court or 
judicial officer; regular and orderly progress in form of law; 
including all possible steps in an action from its commencement 
to the execution of judgment.").  A subsequent edition included 
a slightly different definition, but not one that suggests that 
non-judicial 
repossession 
is 
an 
action 
or 
proceeding.  
"Proceeding" included "action and special proceedings before 
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
22 
 
¶32 Other scope provisions in the Wisconsin Consumer Act 
demonstrate that "actions or other proceedings" refers to a 
narrow subset of things a creditor might do to enforce its 
rights.  For example, Wis. Stat. § 427.102 demonstrates that 
when the legislature wants a statute's scope to encompass the 
full range of steps a creditor might take in recovering debts, 
it knows how to write a sufficiently broad statement: "This 
chapter applies to conduct and practices in connection with the 
collection of obligations arising from consumer transactions."  
Id. 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
Slightly 
narrower 
is 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 425.201, which provides that subchapter II of Chapter 425 
"applies to the enforcement by a creditor of security interests 
in collateral."  The general "enforcement . . . of security 
interests" 
is 
broad 
enough 
to 
encompass 
non-judicial 
repossessions, because that is a means by which a creditor may 
enforce a security interest in collateral.  But "actions or 
other proceedings" is narrower than "conduct and practices" and 
"enforcement . . . of security interests."  "Actions or other 
proceedings" includes only a limited subset of ways a creditor 
might enforce its rights, namely through litigation or similar 
formal legal processes.   
                                                                                                                                                             
judicial tribunals as well as proceedings pending before quasi-
judicial officers and boards," and "any action, hearing, 
investigation, inquest, or inquiry (whether conducted by a 
court, 
administrative 
agency, 
hearing 
officer, 
arbitrator, 
legislative body, or any other person authorized by law) in 
which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given."  
Proceeding, Black's Law Dictionary 1083-84 (5th ed. 1979).   
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
23 
 
¶33 Non-judicial 
repossessions 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. § 425.206(1)(d), however, are unlike litigation.  For one 
thing, the non-judicial repossession process is highly informal.  
Indeed, all a merchant has to do prior to non-judicially 
repossessing a car is send the customer a notice containing the 
disclosures required by Wis. Stat. § 425.205(1g)(a).  If the 
customer does nothing for 15 days, then the merchant may 
repossess the car, no additional process or procedures required.  
See § 425.206(1)(d). 
 
For 
another 
thing, 
non-judicial 
repossessions under § 425.206(1)(d) are non-adversarial, and 
require no third-party involvement at all, let alone that of a 
neutral third party like a judge.  Indeed, aside from curing the 
default under Wis. Stat. § 425.105, a customer's only way of 
contesting a non-judicial repossession is by demanding the 
merchant 
instead 
file 
a 
replevin 
action 
in 
the 
circuit 
court.  §§ 425.205(1g)(a)3.; 425.206(1)(d).  In other words, 
non-judicial repossession is permitted only after the customer 
fails to demand the creditor file an "action[] or other 
proceeding[]."  See §§ 425.206(1)(d); 425.102.   
¶34 We therefore conclude that non-judicial repossessions 
under Wis. Stat. § 425.206(1)(d) are not "actions or other 
proceedings brought by a creditor."  As a result, a claim of 
unconscionability under Wis. Stat. § 425.107(1) is unavailable 
in this case.  See Wis. Stat. § 425.102.   
V 
¶35 We conclude that "dwelling used by the customer as a 
residence" in Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b) includes a garage 
No. 
2019AP1365   
 
24 
 
attached to the residential building in which the customer 
lives.  Defendants therefore violated § 425.206(2)(b) when they 
repossessed Duncan's car from the parking garage in her 
apartment 
building. 
 
We 
also 
conclude 
that 
Duncan's 
unconscionability claim under Wis. Stat. § 425.107 fails because 
such claims are available only in response to "actions or other 
proceedings brought by a creditor," Wis. Stat. § 425.102, and 
Defendants' non-judicial repossession of Duncan's car under Wis. 
Stat. § 425.206(1)(d) was not an action or other proceeding.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' decision as 
modified by our conclusion on unconscionability and remand to 
the circuit court for further proceedings.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
modified and affirmed and, as modified, the cause remanded 
to the 
circuit 
court.
No.  2019AP1365.jjk 
 
1 
 
¶36 JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   (concurring).  I agree that 
Defendants violated Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b) by entering 
Duncan's "dwelling" and concur in the court's ultimate mandate.  
I disagree, however, with the conclusion that a customer can 
never raise unconscionability as a defense to a non-judicial 
repossession.  Because the applicable statutes plainly permit an 
unconscionability defense, I respectfully concur. 
I 
¶37 A creditor may repossess a motor vehicle that serves 
as collateral through either a judicial or a non-judicial 
process.  Judicial repossession follows a creditor's successful 
replevin action.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 425.205 & 425.206(1)(b).  
Non-judicial repossession requires no court order, but the 
creditor must still adhere to the legally prescribed process 
under § 425.206(1)(d)-(2).  That non-judicial process includes: 
 Providing the customer detailed notice per § 425.205(1g); 
 Taking no action for at least 15 days after that notice 
is given, § 425.206(1)(d); 
 Committing no "breach of the peace" when repossessing the 
car, § 425.206(2)(a); and 
 Abstaining from entering "a dwelling used by the customer 
as a residence" absent the customer's voluntary request, 
§ 425.206(2)(b). 
Failure to follow these steps exposes the creditor to legal 
sanctions.  See § 425.206(3). 
¶38 Here, in response to the non-judicial repossession of 
her car, Duncan alleges that Defendants acted unconscionably 
No.  2019AP1365.jjk 
 
2 
 
both during and after the repossession, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 425.107. 
 
The 
question 
is, 
may 
she 
raise 
this 
unconscionability defense?  To answer that question, I first 
look 
to 
the 
plain 
meaning 
of 
the 
statutes 
governing 
unconscionability.  I then explain why we should give the 
operative statutory text at issue its common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning.  I conclude by applying that meaning to 
Duncan's circumstances and determine that she and customers like 
her may raise an unconscionability defense, regardless of which 
repossession alternative a creditor brings. 
A 
¶39 The unconscionability defense codified in Wis. Stat. 
§ 425.107 entitles a customer to additional relief "if the court 
as a matter of law finds that any aspect of the transaction, any 
conduct directed against the customer by a party to the 
transaction, 
or 
any 
result 
of 
the 
transaction 
is 
unconscionable."  § 425.107(1).  I agree with my colleagues that 
this defense is subject to the scope provision at Wis. Stat. 
§ 425.102, and as such is only available in response "to actions 
or other proceedings brought by a creditor to enforce rights 
arising from consumer credit transactions" (emphasis added).  I 
further agree that a non-judicial repossession is not an 
"action."  We diverge, however, on whether a non-judicial 
repossession constitutes a "proceeding." 
¶40 "Proceeding" 
is 
neither 
specially 
defined 
nor 
technical and therefore carries its "common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning."  See, e.g., Stroede v. Soc'y Ins., 2021 
No.  2019AP1365.jjk 
 
3 
 
WI 43, ¶11, 397 Wis. 2d 17, 959 N.W.2d 305; see also Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.01(1).  To discern that common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning the court often looks to dictionaries as well as the 
word's usage in common parlance.  See, e.g., Stroede, 397 
Wis. 2d 17, ¶12; Topolski v. Topolski, 2011 WI 59, ¶42, 335 
Wis. 2d 327, 802 N.W.2d 482; State ex rel. McManus v. Bd. of 
Trs. of Policemen's Pension Fund, 138 Wis. 133, 136, 119 
N.W. 806 (1909) (adopting a word's broader "ordinary modern 
usage" as used in "common parlance" over a dated common-law 
meaning). 
 
Here, 
dictionary 
and 
judicial 
definitions 
of 
"proceeding," as well as its usage in common parlance, all 
confirm that "proceeding" means any legally prescribed process 
for enforcing a legal right. 
¶41 The 
Oxford 
English 
Dictionary's 
leading 
"Law" 
definition for "proceeding" broadly includes "[a] legal action 
or process."  Proceeding, Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 
2007) (emphasis added).  That breadth is mirrored in another 
dictionary's "proceeding" definition:  "A course of action; a 
procedure."  Proceeding, American Heritage Dictionary 1444 (3d 
ed. 
1992). 
 
These 
broad 
dictionary 
definitions 
match 
comprehensive judicial definitions of "proceeding."  Several 
courts have recited the Words and Phrases definition that 
"proceeding" is "a very comprehensive term" generally meaning "a 
prescribed course of action for enforcing a legal right."  See, 
e.g., Wash. Ry. & Elec. Co. v. D.C., 77 F.2d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir. 
1935) (quoting Hyattsville Bldg. Ass'n v. Bouic, 44 App. D.C. 
408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1916)); Borough of Jamesburg v. Hubbs, 80 
No.  2019AP1365.jjk 
 
4 
 
A.2d 100, 102 (N.J. 1951) (quoting Words and Phrases at 83).  As 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit aptly 
summarized:  "'Proceeding' is a comprehensive term meaning the 
action of proceeding——a particular step or series of steps, 
adopted for accomplishing something.  This is the dictionary 
definition as well as the meaning of the term in common 
parlance."  Rice v. United States, 356 F.2d 709, 712 (8th 
Cir. 1966). 
¶42 Indeed, in common parlance "proceeding" regularly 
describes a legally prescribed process for enforcing rights that 
occurs 
without 
any 
litigation 
before 
a 
judicial 
or 
administrative tribunal.  For example, under the United States 
Code the federal government may execute a civil forfeiture of 
certain 
contraband 
via 
a 
"nonjudicial 
civil 
forfeiture 
proceeding."  18 U.S.C. § 983 (2018).1  The United State Supreme 
Court has dubbed similar non-judicial forfeitures permitted 
under 19 U.S.C. §§ 1607-09 as "nonjudicial, summary forfeiture 
proceedings."  See United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. 242, 
244 n.4 (1986); United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & 
Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 557 n.2 
(1983).  More recently, the Court referred to Colorado's non-
judicial 
foreclosure 
procedure 
as 
"nonjudicial 
foreclosure 
proceedings," as did the Tenth Circuit opinion the Court was 
                                                 
1 Courts interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 983 similarly use the 
"nonjudicial 
civil 
forfeiture 
proceeding" 
or 
"nonjudicial 
forfeiture proceeding" moniker.  See, e.g., Omidi v. United 
States, 851 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2017); Langbord v. U.S. Dep't of 
Treasury, 832 F.3d 170, 182 (3d Cir. 2016).  All references to 
the United States Code are to the 2018 version. 
No.  2019AP1365.jjk 
 
5 
 
reviewing. 
 
See 
Obduskey 
v. 
McCarthy 
& 
Holthus 
LLP, 
___ U.S. ____, 139 S. Ct. 1029 (2019), aff'g Obduskey v. Wells 
Fargo, 879 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2018).  State courts speak 
similarly, such as the California Supreme Court discussing that 
state's "nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings."  Dreyfuss v. 
Union Bank of Cal., 11 P.3d 383, 385-86, 390 (Cal. 2000).  Other 
examples abound.2 
¶43 Taken 
together, 
the 
dictionary 
and 
judicial 
definitions of "proceeding" as well as that word's usage in 
common parlance converge on one, comprehensive common, ordinary, 
and accepted meaning:  a legally prescribed process for 
enforcing a legal right. 
B 
¶44 I would simply give "proceeding" its common, ordinary, 
and accepted meaning here.  I see nothing in the statutory 
context that requires a different result.  True, context and a 
word's relationship "to the language of surrounding or closely-
related 
statutes" 
can 
affect 
a 
word's 
otherwise 
common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning.  See, e.g., Stroede, 397 Wis. 2d 
17, ¶11.  It is also true that in the statutes surrounding Wis. 
Stat. § 425.102, "proceeding" is most often used to connote 
"something like litigation."  But that fact does not in and of 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 707 F.2d 853 (5th 
Cir. 
1983); 
Bryan 
E. 
Meek, 
Mortgage 
Foreclosure 
Proceedings:  Where We Have Been and Where We Need to Go, 48 
Akron L. Rev. 129 (2015); Stefan D. Cassella, The Civil Asset 
Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, 27 J. Legis. 97 (2001); Jaime 
Marie Nies, 15A Cyc. of Fed. Proc. § 88:45 (3d ed.). 
No.  2019AP1365.jjk 
 
6 
 
itself override the word's otherwise common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning. 
¶45 Rather, the legislature instructs that we must apply 
an undefined, non-technical word's "common and approved usage," 
except in the limited circumstance where it "would produce a 
result 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
manifest 
intent 
of 
the 
legislature." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 990.01(1). 
 
Thus, 
only 
if 
"proceeding" as used in related or nearby provisions evinces a 
real conflict between that word's common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning and those provisions' "manifest [legislative] intent" 
may this court depart from the common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning.  But nothing in how "proceeding" is used in neighboring 
provisions causes such a conflict. 
¶46 To the contrary, the comprehensive common, ordinary, 
and accepted meaning of "proceeding" harmonizes that word's 
varied use across the two neighboring provisions cited by the 
majority/lead opinion.  The first, Wis. Stat. § 425.110(1), 
discusses "garnishment or like proceedings directed to the 
employer for the purpose of paying a judgment arising from a 
consumer credit transaction."  Garnishment is a type of legal 
action, see Wis. Stat. §§ 812.30-812.44, so a "proceeding" like 
garnishment is something like a legal action.  In other words, 
"proceeding" is used as a synonym for a legal action.  That 
usage fits the common, ordinary, and accepted meaning of 
"proceeding" because a legal action——such as a garnishment 
proceeding——is a statutorily prescribed process for enforcing a 
legal right.  See, e.g., id. 
No.  2019AP1365.jjk 
 
7 
 
¶47 A slightly different meaning of "proceeding" appears 
in Wis. Stat. § 425.203(3)(b).  Section 425.203(3)(b) declares 
that for certain consumer transactions, a judicial hearing to 
confirm a creditor's sale of repossessed collateral "shall be 
considered a proceeding for a deficiency judgment."  Here, 
"proceeding" refers to a specific procedure within a larger 
action rather than the action itself.  And, consistent with the 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning of "proceeding," this 
intra-action procedure is also a statutorily prescribed process 
for enforcing a legal right.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 425.209-425.210.  
The varied meaning of "proceeding" across these two nearby 
provisions——a synonym of legal action in the former and a 
particular procedure within an action in the latter——verifies 
that in this statutory chapter, "proceeding" is used as 
comprehensively as its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning.  
See Int'l Wire Works v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 230 Wis. 72, 74-
75, 283 N.W. 292 (1939) (concluding that different statutes' 
particular uses of a word that "do not conflict with [its] 
common meaning . . . indicate[s] that the legislature of this 
state has adopted th[at] definition"). 
¶48 Similarly, nothing in other nearby scope provisions 
calls for a departure from the common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning of "proceeding."  In contrast to the "actions or other 
proceedings" phrase at issue here, the nearby "Debt Collection" 
chapter's scope extends to "conduct and practices."  See Wis. 
Stat. § 427.102.  "[C]onduct and practices" might very well 
encompass a non-judicial repossession.  But just because 
No.  2019AP1365.jjk 
 
8 
 
"conduct 
and 
practices" 
could 
include 
non-judicial 
repossessions, does not mean the legislature is forever bound to 
use that exact language each and every time it intends for a 
statute to cover such repossessions.  That logic unduly hampers 
the legislature's freedom to use different but overlapping 
language to accomplish valid policy distinctions.  Distinct 
scopes can harmoniously overlap without any conflict.  As such, 
the legislature's chosen phrasing in a different, apparently 
overlapping——but non-conflicting——scope provision has no bearing 
on whether "proceeding" in this scope provision should carry its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning.  In sum, I find no 
evidence of a conflicting "manifest [legislative] intent" in the 
statutory context that Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1) requires to 
justify a departure from the common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning of "proceeding." 
¶49 Beyond lacking contextual support, the "something like 
litigation" limitation produces two results at odds with the 
Wisconsin Consumer Act's textually expressed purposes.  First, 
it sets a trap for an unwary customer subjected to a creditor's 
unconscionable conduct.  A savvy customer who within 15 days of 
the notice makes a written demand that a creditor instead file a 
replevin action, see Wis. Stat. § 425.206(1)(d), preserves her 
unconscionability defense.  But an unwary customer who misses 
that tight demand deadline would lose even a meritorious claim 
against 
a 
creditor's 
unconscionable 
conduct——giving 
an 
unconscionable creditor a free pass.  Second, an interpretation 
narrower than the common, ordinary, and accepted meaning renders 
No.  2019AP1365.jjk 
 
9 
 
the unconscionability defense a nullity in situations where, as 
alleged here, a creditor's unconscionable conduct first occurs 
during or after the actual repossession, well beyond the 15-day 
demand deadline.  Even a savvy customer, who simply preferred 
the efficiency of the non-judicial route, would suddenly be 
without recourse for a creditor's post-repossession conduct, 
despite the unconscionability provision applying to "any conduct 
directed against the customer."  See Wis. Stat. § 425.107(1) 
(emphasis added).  Both results conflict with the legislature's 
textually expressed directive that we "liberally construe[] and 
appl[y]" the Act "to promote" the "protect[ion of] customers 
against unfair, deceptive, false, misleading and unconscionable 
practices by merchants."  Wis. Stat. § 421.102(1), (2)(b). 
¶50 At bottom, "proceeding" should carry its common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning in Wis. Stat. § 425.102.  The 
legislature and our case law require it to because nothing in 
the 
surrounding 
context 
justifies 
a 
departure 
from 
that 
interpretation. 
 
And, 
importantly, 
applying 
the 
common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning here offers the additional 
benefit of satisfying the "cardinal rule" that we "favor an 
interpretation that will fulfill the [textually expressed] 
purpose of the statute over an interpretation that defeats the 
manifest objective of the act."  See, e.g., State v. Davis, 2001 
WI 136, ¶13, 248 Wis. 2d 986, 637 N.W.2d 62. 
C 
¶51 Applying the common, ordinary, and accepted meaning of 
"proceeding," I conclude that "other proceedings" includes a 
No.  2019AP1365.jjk 
 
10 
 
non-judicial repossession.  A non-judicial repossession is a 
legally prescribed process for enforcing a legal right.  The 
statute prescribes the initiating notice, the 15-day wait 
period, and the prohibitions against both "breach[ing] of the 
peace" and entering "a dwelling used by the customer as a 
residence."  Wis. Stat. § 425.206(1)(d)-(2).  It matters not 
that the legislature made a policy decision to cut out the 
expense and time of litigation.  Nothing in that policy choice 
indicates a simultaneous desire to foreclose a customer in 
Duncan's position from even requesting judicial scrutiny of 
unconscionable creditor conduct.  Quite the opposite.  The 
legislature directs us to "liberally construe[] and appl[y]" the 
entire Act to "protect customers against . . . unconscionable 
practices by merchants."  See Wis. Stat. § 421.102(1), (2)(b).  
Put simply, the statutorily prescribed non-judicial repossession 
process to enforce a creditor's right to collateral plainly 
constitutes an "other proceeding[] brought by a creditor to 
enforce rights arising from [a] consumer credit transaction[]" 
under Wis. Stat. § 425.102. 
¶52 Before 
concluding 
that 
Duncan 
can 
bring 
her 
unconscionability claim here, I address one last wrinkle.  At 
common law, unconscionability claims arose defensively.  That is 
precisely the posture Duncan is in here, albeit not in the 
traditional sense.  Duncan raises unconscionability as a defense 
to Defendants enforcing their right to repossess her car.  Had 
that repossession commenced via a replevin action, Defendants 
would 
have 
filed 
a 
complaint 
and 
Duncan 
would 
raise 
No.  2019AP1365.jjk 
 
11 
 
unconscionability in her answer or some post-judgment filing if 
the 
unconscionable 
conduct 
occurred 
during 
or 
after 
the 
repossession.  But a non-judicial repossession dispenses with 
these traditional pleadings.  Therefore, Duncan can raise 
unconscionability only in her own complaint.  That is of no 
moment because when it comes to pleadings, this court considers 
not their form or title but their substance.  See, e.g., Wis. 
Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Arby Const., Inc., 2012 WI 87, ¶37, 342 
Wis. 2d 544, 818 N.W.2d 863 (observing that this court looks 
"beyond 'hypertechnical'" labels to the pleading's actual 
"substance").  Accordingly, Duncan may raise unconscionability 
even under a pleading technically labeled "complaint" because 
its substance remains a defense to a creditor's non-judicial 
repossession. 
II 
¶53 I 
conclude 
that 
Duncan 
could 
raise 
an 
unconscionability 
defense 
to 
Defendants' 
non-judicial 
repossession.  Here, however, her allegations do not as a matter 
No.  2019AP1365.jjk 
 
12 
 
of law rise to the level of unconscionable.3  Therefore, I concur 
in the court's ultimate mandate and join all but ¶29 and ¶¶31–34 
of the majority/lead opinion. 
 
                                                 
3 The court decides unconscionability claims "as a matter of 
law."  Wis. Stat. § 425.107(1).  Duncan alleges that in addition 
to unlawfully entering her "dwelling," Defendants engaged in 
unconscionable behavior by obfuscating and misleading her as to 
the cost to redeem her car; charging her nearly one-sixth of the 
car's original value to redeem it; providing her limited time to 
pay the redemption fee; vaguely referencing the possibility of 
additional fees; denying Duncan an opportunity to inspect the 
car's post-repossession condition before redeeming it; and 
communicating with Duncan in a manner that was "rude and 
aggressive," so much so that Duncan eventually contacted the 
police.  Accepting these statement as true and upon considering 
the factors listed in § 425.107(3), I conclude that the 
Defendants' conduct, while very troubling, did not rise to the 
level of unconscionable as a matter of law.  Therefore, I agree 
that on remand the circuit court need not address Duncan's 
unconscionability claim. 
No.  2019AP1365.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶54 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   (dissenting).  The 
court of appeals defined "dwelling," as employed in Wis. Stat. 
§ 425.206(2)(b), by choosing an administrative rule definition 
that by the definition's explicit terms applies only to Wis. 
Stat. § 422.419(1)(a).  In so doing, the court of appeals 
avoided a plain-meaning analysis of § 425.206(2)(b) and the 
rules of statutory interpretation that we have repeated and 
repeated in countless cases since 2004.   
¶55 The majority opinion follows the errant lead of the 
court of appeals.1  Instead of interpreting "dwelling" within the 
structure of the statute in which it appears, e.g., "used by the 
customer as a residence," and instead of relying on Danelle 
Duncan's own statements that she never lived or resided in the 
apartment building's garage, the majority opinion ignores a 
plain-meaning analysis of Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b).  Rather, 
it patches together a hodgepodge of theories in order to affirm 
the court of appeals.  Because I conclude that the plain meaning 
of § 425.206(2)(b) does not apply to the apartment building's 
garage, which Duncan shared with many others and has said in two 
court proceedings that she has never lived or resided in, I 
would reverse the court of appeals and affirm the summary 
judgment 
granted 
by 
the 
circuit 
court. 
 
Therefore, 
I 
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶56 Duncan purchased a vehicle that she financed with an 
installment sales contract with the dealership.  The dealership 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶¶14-16. 
No.  2019AP1365.pdr 
 
2 
 
assigned the contract to Wells Fargo, and Wells Fargo then 
became the lien holder for Duncan's vehicle.   
¶57 Duncan defaulted on her loan, and on February 26, 
2015, Wells Fargo gave her notice of the right to cure the 
default by paying $887.15.  Duncan did not exercise her right to 
cure the default.  On July 30, 2015, Wells Fargo gave Duncan a 
second notice of right to cure, this time by paying $1,907.76.  
Again, Duncan did not cure the default.  Wells Fargo sent her a 
third notice of right to cure by paying $1,372.70.  Once again, 
Duncan did not cure the default.   
¶58 Therefore, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 425.205(1g)(a), 
Wells Fargo gave notice to Duncan that it intended to repossess 
her vehicle.  The notice told Duncan that she had the right to 
demand that Wells Fargo proceed through a court action for 
replevin, and that if she did so, Wells Fargo would not proceed 
with repossession until after a court judgment was issued.  
Duncan made no response to the statutory notice of intent to 
repossess that Wells Fargo had provided.   
¶59 Wells Fargo then retained Greg Strandlie's company, 
Asset Recovery Specialists ("ARS"), to proceed with non-judicial 
repossession of the vehicle.  Duncan lived in a large, multi-
story apartment building, where she rented an apartment and also 
separately rented a space in the apartment building's garage 
that was located under the building.   
¶60 On January 27, 2016, ARS went to the apartment 
building where Duncan lived to locate the vehicle.  ARS found 
Duncan's vehicle in the large multi-vehicle garage under the 
No.  2019AP1365.pdr 
 
3 
 
apartment building.  There was no sign at the entrance of the 
garage indicating that access was restricted, and the vehicle 
entry door was open when ARS arrived.2  A maintenance man was 
present during the process of repossessing the vehicle, and he 
never spoke with ARS personnel or raised any objection.  
Accordingly, ARS towed Duncan's vehicle out of the apartment 
building's garage.  The garage door remained open when ARS left.   
¶61 On February 3, 2016, Duncan contacted the City of 
Madison's West Police District, saying that she wanted to have 
criminal charges filed against the repossession company that 
took her car.  She "felt her underground apartment parking 
garage was part of her dwelling."  Upon investigation, the 
officer visually verified that there were no signs or postings 
indicating "no trespassing" at the apartment building's garage 
and that a maintenance man saw the repossession from the open 
garage on January 27, 2016.   
¶62 After checking with the city attorney's office in 
Madison, where the officer was told that no Madison Ordinance 
applied to ARS's entry into the apartment building's garage, the 
criminal investigation that Duncan requested was closed.   
¶63 Duncan then brought suit in the federal court for the 
Western District of Wisconsin against ARS, Greg Strandlie and 
                                                 
2 There is a photo of a sign at the front of the building 
that said "Resident Parking Only Unauthorized Violators Will Be 
Towed at Vehicle Owner or Operator's Expense."  The record does 
not disclose the purpose of that sign, but it is likely that it 
applied to the out-of-doors parking that tenants had available 
too.  The photo of the car door at the rear of the building, has 
no sign of any type. 
No.  2019AP1365.pdr 
 
4 
 
Wells Fargo.  As part of its proceedings, the district court 
found there "are no living quarters, places to sleep, cook, eat, 
watch television, use a restroom or bathe or shower in the 
garage area, [and that] Duncan admits that she has never lived 
or resided in the garage."3  The court made various other 
findings relative to her federal claim and then granted the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment in part.4  It dismissed 
her federal claim and any portion of her state claims against 
Wells Fargo that was based on alleged unlawful retention of 
Duncan's personal property.5   
¶64 Duncan then filed suit in Dane County Circuit Court.6  
The circuit court found that Duncan did not dispute the facts as 
found by Judge Conley in district court, but that the "real" 
issue was a question of law.7  The circuit court focused its 
efforts 
on 
whether 
ARS 
complied 
with 
the 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 425.206(2)(b) 
directive 
that 
in 
taking 
possession 
of 
collateral a merchant may not "[e]nter a dwelling used by the 
customer as a residence except at the voluntary request of a 
customer."  After noting that ch. 425 does not define 
"dwelling," the court recognized that "dwelling" has various 
                                                 
3 Duncan v. Asset Recovery Specialists, Inc., No. 16-cv-530, 
2017 WL 2870520, at *3 (W.D. July 5, 2017), aff'd, 907 F.3d 1016 
(7th Cir. 2018). 
4 Id., at *7. 
5 Id. 
6 The Honorable Stephen E. Ehlke presided.   
7 Duncan v. Asset Recovery Specialists, Inc., No. 17CV1704, 
at 3 (op. issued June 19, 2019).    
No.  2019AP1365.pdr 
 
5 
 
statutory definitions.8  For example, the circuit court noted 
that Wis. Stat. § 101.71 defines dwelling as: 
[A]ny building that contains one or more dwelling 
units.  "Dwelling unit" means a structure or that part 
of a structure which is used or intended to be used as 
a home, residence or sleeping place by one person or 
by two or more persons maintaining a common household 
to the exclusion of all others.[9]   
The court also considered part of the criminal code, Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.13, "Trespass to Land," that defines "dwelling unit" as "a 
structure or that part of a structure which is used or intended 
to be used as a home, residence or sleeping place by one person 
or by two or more persons maintaining a common household to the 
exclusion of all others."10   
¶65 The circuit court then found that "it is undisputed 
that Ms. Duncan did not have a right to exclude others from her 
apartment building's garage.  Rather, the garage has over 50 
parking spaces for use by the building's tenants with no tenant 
having a right to exclude any other tenant or person from the 
area.  This is in contrast to, for example, single-family homes 
where owners do have exclusive control over their garage."11  The 
circuit court further found that the "parking garage was remote 
and on a different floor than her apartment [and that] the 
garage offers no use that is primarily or intimately tied to the 
use 
of 
her 
apartment, 
for 
example, 
sleeping, 
eating 
or 
                                                 
8 Id. at 8. 
9 Id. at 9. 
10 Id. at 9-10. 
11 Id. at 10-11.   
No.  2019AP1365.pdr 
 
6 
 
conducting her private life."12  The circuit court concluded that 
the apartment building's garage did not come within the 
statutory term, "dwelling," in Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b).  
Accordingly, it granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, 
and dismissed the amended complaint.13   
¶66 Duncan appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.  
The court of appeals acknowledged that "dwelling" is not defined 
in the statutory text of the Wisconsin Consumer Act of which 
Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b) is a part.14  The court of appeals 
also concluded that Wis. Stat. § 422.419(1)(a), which precludes 
certain covenants in consumer agreements, was not at issue here.  
However, the court of appeals nevertheless concluded that the 
garage in Duncan's apartment building was part of a dwelling she 
used as a residence based on Wis. Admin. Code § DFI-WCA 1.392 
(July 
2007). 
 
It 
provides, 
"For 
the 
purposes 
of 
s. 422.419(1)(a), Stats., the term 'dwelling' shall include, any 
garage, shed, barn or other building on the premises whether 
attached or unattached."   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶67 This matter involves a review of summary judgment.  We 
independently review a grant or denial of summary judgment as a 
question of law.  Applegate-Bader Farm, LLC v. DOR, 2021 WI 26, 
                                                 
12 Id. at 14.  
13 Id. at 14-15. 
14 Duncan v. Asset Recovery Specialists, Inc., 2020 WI App 
54, ¶22, 393 Wis. 2d 814, 948 N.W.2d 419.   
No.  2019AP1365.pdr 
 
7 
 
¶15, 396 Wis. 2d 69, 955 N.W.2d 793 (citing Sands v. Menard, 
2017 WI 110, ¶28, 379 Wis. 2d 1, 904 N.W.2d 789).   
¶68 In order to evaluate the summary judgment decision 
made by the circuit court, we independently interpret and apply 
Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b).  In so doing, we determine whether 
Duncan's vehicle was lawfully repossessed from the apartment 
building's garage.  As we evaluate the court of appeals' 
decision, we also interpret and assess the applicability of Wis. 
Stat. § 422.419 and Wis. Admin. Code § DFI-WCA 1.392 relative to 
whether ARS's repossession violated § 425.206(2)(b).   
¶69 Statutory 
interpretation 
and 
application 
present 
questions of law for our independent review.  Wisconsin 
Legislature v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, ¶14, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 
N.W.2d 900 (citing Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 
2018 WI 86, ¶17, 383 Wis. 2d 247, 914 N.W.2d 597).  Furthermore, 
statutory interpretations grounded in undisputed material facts 
provide questions of law for our independent review.  Westmas v. 
Creekside Tree Serv., Inc., 2018 WI 12, ¶17, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 
907 
N.W.2d 
68. 
 
We 
are 
assisted 
in 
our 
independent 
interpretation by decisions of the district court, the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.  Marder v. Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 
N.W.2d 110.  
¶70 In the matter before us, we also interpret provisions 
of Wisconsin's Administrative Code independently, as questions 
of law.  Orion Flight Servs., Inc. v. Basler Flight Serv., 2006 
WI 51, ¶18, 290 Wis. 2d 421, 714 N.W.2d 130.  
No.  2019AP1365.pdr 
 
8 
 
B.  Statutory Interpretation 
1.  General principles 
¶71 Statutory interpretation always begins with reading 
the words the legislature chose to enact in order to apply them 
and give the statute its full effect.  Townsend v. ChartSwap, 
LLC, 2021 WI 86, ¶12, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __, 2021 
WL 5538667 (citing State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110).  
Statutory words are given their "'common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or 
phrases are given their technical or special definitional 
meaning.'"  Id. (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45); Wis. 
Stat. § 990.01(1).15   
¶72 Context also is important to determining statutory 
meaning, as is "'the structure of the statute in which the 
operative language appears.'"  Id., ¶13 (quoting Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46).  If the statute's meaning is plain we usually 
stop our inquiry.  However, as we determine a statute's meaning, 
we assess whether the statute is ambiguous.  A statute is 
ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably 
well-informed persons in two or more senses.  Voces De La 
Frontera, Inc. v. Clarke, 2017 WI 16, ¶15, 373 Wis. 2d 348, 891 
N.W.2d 803.  Generally, we do not consult secondary sources such 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 990.01 
provides 
in 
relevant 
part:  "(1) General rule.  All words and phrases shall be 
construed according to common and approved usage; but technical 
words and phrases and others that have a peculiar meaning in the 
law shall be construed according to such meaning."   
No.  2019AP1365.pdr 
 
9 
 
as legislative history unless the language of the statute is 
ambiguous.  Id.  
2.  Wisconsin Stat. 425.206(2)(b) 
¶73 The initial focus of my inquiry is Wis. Stat. 
§ 425.206(2)(b) because the terms, "dwelling used by the 
customer 
as 
a 
residence," 
are 
central 
to 
this 
dispute.  
"Dwelling" is not defined in ch. 425.  It also is not defined in 
the general definitional section, Wis. Stat. § 421.301, which 
would then apply to § 425.206.   
¶74 However "dwelling" is defined in many other places in 
Wisconsin 
statutes, 
some 
of 
the 
definitions 
contain 
similarities.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 943.14(1),16 which defines 
"dwelling" as "a structure or part of a structure that is used 
or intended to be used as a home or residence by one or more 
persons to the exclusion of all others."  (Emphasis added.)  
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 943.13(1e)(ar)17 
similarly 
states 
that 
"'Dwelling unit' means a structure or that part of a structure 
which is used or intended to be used as a home, residence or 
sleeping place by one person or by 2 or more persons maintaining 
a common household, to the exclusion of all others."  (Emphasis 
added.) 
¶75 Wisconsin Stat. § 75.195(1)(a)18 defines "[d]welling" 
as "any building that contains one or 2 dwelling units and any 
                                                 
16 Criminal trespass to dwellings, Wis. Stat. § 943.14. 
17 Trespass to land, Wis. Stat. § 943.13.   
18 Extended time for beginning tax foreclosure, Wis. Stat. 
§ 75.195. 
No.  2019AP1365.pdr 
 
10 
 
land included with that building in the same entry on the tax 
roll."  With subsec. (1)(b) further providing detail that 
"'[d]welling unit' means a structure or that part of a structure 
used as a home, residence or sleeping place by one person or by 
2 or more persons maintaining a common household, to the 
exclusion of all others."  (Emphasis added.)  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 101.61(1)19 similarly defines dwelling:  "'Dwelling' means any 
building that contains one or 2 dwelling units.  'Dwelling unit' 
means a structure or that part of a structure which is used or 
intended to be used as a home, residence or sleeping place by 
one person or by 2 or more persons maintaining a common 
household, to the exclusion of all others."  (Emphasis added.)  
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 101.71(2)20 
defines 
dwelling 
similarly:  "'Dwelling' means any building that contains one or 
more dwelling units.  'Dwelling unit' means a structure or that 
part of a structure which is used or intended to be used as a 
home, residence or sleeping place by one person or by 2 or more 
persons maintaining a common household, to the exclusion of all 
others."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶76 Wisconsin Stat. § 425.206 appears in Subchapter II of 
ch. 425, Enforcement of Security Interests in Collateral.  
Section 425.206 applies to the non-judicial enforcement of lien 
rights.  I begin by reviewing the term, "dwelling," in the 
structure of § 425.206 in which "dwelling" appears.  It provides 
in relevant part: 
                                                 
19 Definitions for ch. 101, Wis. Stat. § 101.61. 
20 Definitions for ch. 101 subchapter, Wis. Stat. § 101.71. 
No.  2019AP1365.pdr 
 
11 
 
(2) In taking possession of collateral or leased 
goods, no merchant may do any of the following: 
(a) Commit a breach of the peace. 
(b) Enter a dwelling used by the customer as a 
residence except at the voluntary request of a 
customer.   
§ 425.206(2).  Although, "dwelling" is not defined in regard to 
portions of statutes that set out provisions that relate to 
Wisconsin consumer transactions, I note that findings of the 
earlier trial courts who considered this dispute provide the 
factual context in which we interpret "dwelling," as that term 
appears in § 425.206(2)(b).    
¶77 For 
example, 
the 
circuit 
court 
found 
that 
the 
apartment building's garage contained spaces for more than 50 
cars, with no tenant having a right to exclude others, which the 
circuit court also found was in contrast to single-family homes 
where there is a right to exclusive control over the garage.  
Duncan agreed that she did not have the right to exclude others 
from the apartment building's garage.  Therefore, she could not 
bring suit for criminal trespass to dwellings, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 943.14 or for trespass to land pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.13, which she tried to do before filing in federal 
district court.   
¶78 It is undisputed that Duncan does not sleep in the 
garage.  The district court found that there "are no living 
quarters, places to sleep, cook, eat, watch television, use a 
restroom or bathe or shower in the garage area, [and that] 
No.  2019AP1365.pdr 
 
12 
 
Duncan admits that she has never lived or resided in the 
garage."21 
¶79 In addition, the "dwelling" identified in Wis. Stat. 
§ 425.206(2)(b) is at least partially defined by the structure 
of § 425.206(2)(b), which qualifies the "dwelling" as one "used 
by the customer as a residence."  That is, "dwelling" is limited 
by the use to which the customer puts the dwelling.  Stated 
otherwise, the customer must use the "dwelling" referenced in 
§ 425.206(2)(b) as a residence in order to come within the plain 
meaning of § 425.206(2)(b).   
¶80 Customer is an often utilized term.  See, e.g., Wis. 
Stat. § 421.301(9) (addressing a "[c]onsumer credit sale" 
wherein a "customer" enters into such a transaction).  Duncan 
purchased the vehicle in a consumer credit sale; therefore, she 
is a "customer."   
¶81 "Residence" is undefined, but it has a commonly 
understood meaning as the place where one actually lives.22  
Here, "dwelling" must be the place used by the customer, Duncan, 
as a residence.  Therefore, in order to fit within the structure 
of Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b), the apartment building's garage 
must be the place where Duncan actually lives——where she 
resides.  She has admitted that she never lived or resided in 
the apartment building's garage, and the district court and the 
                                                 
21 Duncan, 2017 WL 2870520, at *3.   
22 Residence:  "the place where one actually lives as 
distinguished from his domicile or a place of temporary 
sojourn."  Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 984 (1974).   
No.  2019AP1365.pdr 
 
13 
 
circuit court both so found.  Instead, she rented a parking 
space in a garage shared by other residents and maintained by a 
third-party apartment owner.  Therefore, based on the plain 
meaning of the statute that the legislature enacted, and 
undisputed material facts, I conclude that the apartment 
building's garage where Duncan parked her car is not a 
"dwelling" within the meaning of § 425.206(2)(b).   
3.  Wisconsin Stat. § 422.419(1)(a) 
¶82 The majority opinion and the court of appeals brought 
Wis. Stat. § 422.419 into this controversy.  It provides:   
(1) No 
contract 
evidencing 
a 
consumer 
credit 
transaction may contain any provision by which: 
(a) The merchant or other person acting on the 
merchant's behalf is given authority to enter the 
customer's dwelling or to commit any breach of the 
peace in the course of taking possession of collateral 
securing the transaction; 
(b) The customer waives any right of action 
against the merchant, or other person acting on the 
merchant's behalf, for any breach of the peace or 
other illegal act committed in the course of taking 
possession of such collateral; or 
(c) The customer executes a power of attorney or 
similar instrument appointing the merchant, or other 
person acting on the merchant's behalf, as the 
customer's agent in the taking of possession of such 
collateral. 
§ 442.419(1). 
¶83 It is undisputed that Wis. Stat. § 422.419 has 
absolutely no relevance to the contract by which Duncan 
purchased the vehicle.  All parties agree that the consumer 
credit sales contract Duncan entered into was lawful in all 
respects.   
No.  2019AP1365.pdr 
 
14 
 
¶84 Then why did the court of appeals and the majority 
opinion bring Wis. Stat. § 422.419(1)(a) into their decision 
making?  It appears that they did so for two reasons:  First, to 
avoid a plain-meaning statutory interpretation analysis, which 
we have directed be employed in countless decisions since Kalal 
was issued in 2004; and second, to insert Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DFI-WCA 1.392 into their discussions of "dwelling" and reach a 
result that would not occur if they had undertaken a plain 
meaning analysis of Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b).   
¶85 As I have explained above, a plain meaning analysis of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 425.206(2)(b) 
unambiguously 
demonstrates 
that 
"dwelling" is restricted by the use to which Duncan put the 
apartment building's garage.  She never resided or lived there.  
Furthermore, a common meaning of dwelling is a place where one 
sleeps and from which one can exclude all others.  The 
undisputed testimony shows that the apartment building's garage 
does 
not 
meet 
the 
restrictive 
statutory 
structure 
of 
§ 425.206(2)(b) 
nor 
does 
it 
meet 
common 
definitions 
of 
"dwelling."   
¶86 Let's look at Wis. Admin. Code § DFI-WCA 1.392.  It 
provides, "For the purposes of s. 422.419(1)(a), Stats., the 
term 'dwelling' shall include, any garage, shed, barn or other 
building on the premises whether attached or unattached."  
(Emphasis added.)  Note that, in addition to expressly limiting 
the rule's application to Wis. Stat. § 422.419(1)(a), "dwelling" 
within Wis. Admin. Code § DFI-WCA 1.392 is not restricted by the 
manner in which a customer uses it, as "dwelling" is by the 
No.  2019AP1365.pdr 
 
15 
 
structure of Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b).  Stated otherwise, 
Duncan would not have to live or reside in the shed or barn to 
cause it to be a "dwelling" within Wis. Admin. Code § DFI-WCA 
1.392.   
¶87 The court of appeals' decision23 avoids a plain-meaning 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b) to seek a different 
result than a plain-meaning interpretation will permit.  The 
majority opinion's use of Wis. Admin. Code § DFI-WCA 1.392 is 
less direct than that of the court of appeals, but nevertheless 
it employs Wis. Admin. Code § DFI-WCA 1.392 to support its 
analysis.24  Furthermore, the majority opinion's hodgepodge of 
definitions totally ignores the structure of § 425.206(2)(b) 
which limits "dwelling" according to how the customer uses that 
space.  Again, it appears the majority opinion did so to avoid 
the plain meaning of § 425.206(2)(b) and to obtain a result that 
the plain meaning of the words the legislature enacted will not 
permit.   
¶88 Our directives on statutory interpretation assist 
judges in keeping their personal policy preferences out of their 
decisions.  They provide certainty in the law based on the words 
the legislature chose to enact.  When courts avoid our 
directives, they take away those protections and replace them 
with personal policy preferences that then drive decisions that 
follow.   
                                                 
23 Duncan, 393 Wis. 2d 814, ¶¶27, 28. 
24 Majority op., ¶¶14-16. 
No.  2019AP1365.pdr 
 
16 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶89 The court of appeals defined "dwelling," as employed 
in Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b), by choosing an administrative 
rule definition that by the definition's explicit terms applies 
only to Wis. Stat. § 422.419(1)(a).  In so doing, the court of 
appeals avoided a plain-meaning analysis of § 425.206(2)(b) and 
the rules of statutory interpretation that we have repeated and 
repeated in countless cases since 2004. 
¶90 The majority opinion follows the errant lead of the 
court of appeals.25  Instead of interpreting "dwelling" within 
the structure of the statute in which it appears, e.g., "used by 
the customer as a residence," and instead of relying on Duncan's 
own statements that she never lived or resided in the apartment 
building's garage, the majority opinion ignores a plain-meaning 
analysis of Wis. Stat. § 425.206(2)(b).  Rather, it patches 
together a hodgepodge of theories in order to affirm the court 
of appeals.  Because I conclude that the plain meaning of 
§ 425.206(2)(b) does not apply to the apartment building's 
garage, which Duncan shared with many others and has said in two 
court proceedings that she has never lived or resided in, I 
would reverse the court of appeals and affirm the summary 
judgment 
granted 
by 
the 
circuit 
court. 
 
Therefore, 
I 
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. 
¶91 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this 
dissent. 
                                                 
25 Majority op., ¶¶14-16. 
No.  2019AP1365.pdr 
 
 
 
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