Title: City of Detroit v. Qualls
Citation: 434 Mich. 340, 454 N.W.2d 374
Docket Number: 
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: April 3, 1990

Decided April 3, 1990. Donald Pailen, Corporation Counsel, Harnetha Jarrett, Assistant Corporation Counsel, and David L. Rose, Pro Hac Vice, for the City of Detroit. Hugh M. Davis, Jr., for the defendant. BOYLE, J. An issue regarding the validity of a provision in an ordinance may be resolved in a forfeiture proceeding on a summary disposition motion for purposes of collateral estoppel. We find, however, that the city failed to persuade this Court that the ruling holding the storage provision valid was necessary to the 1982 judgment concerning forfeiture of fireworks seized in 1979. Therefore, we hold that the defendant was not precluded from raising the issue as an affirmative defense when prosecuted in 1984 in 36th District Court. In addition, we conclude that the state did not preempt local communities from regulating the quantity of fireworks a retailer can store within its boundaries and that the storage provision in the *344 ordinance[1] does not conflict with the statutory scheme.[2] Having found that the state has not preempted this area of regulation, we address the issue whether there is any rational basis for the storage provision in the ordinance. We conclude that the storage limitation provision is a valid and reasonable exercise of the city's police power within the ambit of due process and equal protection. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals holding that the storage provision in the ordinance did not conflict with state law, and vacate that part of the Court of Appeals decision which addresses the collateral estoppel issue. Further, we reverse the panel's decision affirming the 36th District Court's dismissal of the misdemeanor charge on the basis of its determination that the storage provision in the ordinance was unconstitutional.[3] However, we stay entry of judgment in this case pending resolution of the remaining cases involving these parties in the Court of Appeals.[4] *345 I Defendant Qualls operates a retail fireworks business in the City of Detroit and has been engaged in litigation with the plaintiff city since he began operations in 1978. A review of the background and prior litigation between the parties is pertinent to resolution of the issues in this case. In 1981 the city brought a suit in Wayne Circuit Court against defendant for forfeiture of fireworks seized from the defendant's premises in 1979, alleging defendant's license only permitted him to sell and store legal fireworks in amounts of one hundred pounds or less, and that the confiscated fireworks were over one hundred pounds of illegal fireworks which were stored on defendant's premises in violation of the ordinance.[5] In his answer defendant argued that the city was not entitled to forfeiture of the confiscated fireworks because the ordinance conflicted with state law, under which no limit was stipulated as to the amounts of class C or class B fireworks a retailer could sell and store, and that the one-hundred-pound limitation was unreasonable.[6] At the hearing, defendant argued that the storage limitation was unreasonable and that the ordinance conflicted with state law and was not a *346 valid exercise of the city's police power.[7] In response, the city claimed the provision of the ordinance governing the storage of fireworks was not preempted by the state statutory scheme in MCL 750.243d; MSA 28.440(4), and that the provision was reasonable and clearly addressed a local concern, providing limitations consistent with the statutory language. The court found that the state had not preempted local communities from regulating the storage of fireworks for retailers within their boundaries, that the ordinance did not conflict with the statute, and that the storage provision in the ordinance was a valid and reasonable exercise of the city's police power.[8] The order, issued *347 May 14, 1982, adjudging the Detroit fireworks ordinance valid, provided: [T]he City of Detroit Ordinance No. 314-H, Chapter 23, as it relates to the storage for retail sale of fireworks, is a valid exercise of the City's power, and the State of Michigan has not preempted this area of legislation and regulation, and the ordinance in that respect is valid and enforceable. [Detroit v Qualls, No XX-XXXXXX CZ.][[9]] The defendant never appealed the judge's ruling that the storage provision in the ordinance was valid and that the state had not preempted this area of regulation.[10] The case now before the Court began on July 2, 1984, when the city charged the defendant in the 36th District Court with three misdemeanor violations concerning the storage provision in the fireworks ordinance.[11] The defendant moved to suppress *348 and for dismissal, arguing that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it conflicted with state law,[12] and that by enacting comprehensive legislation in the area, the state Legislature preempted local ordinances in conflict with the state law. Further, defendant argued that the municipality prohibited that which the state allowed, the storage of reasonable amounts of US DOT class C common fireworks[13] and that a limitation of one hundred pounds was not rationally related to public safety. The city responded that Judge Hausner's 1982 order ruling that the storage provision in the *349 ordinance was valid was final,[14] and that pursuant to that ruling the defendant was in violation of the city ordinance as interpreted in 1982 when he stored more than one hundred pounds of fireworks. Further, the city noted that the municipal ordinance was clothed with the presumption of constitutionality, By virtue of the police powers, the Michigan Home Rule Statute and the Michigan Constitution which allows cities like Detroit to regulate in areas that relate to their municipal concern, and certainly the lives and protection and health and safety of our citizens is a municipal concern. Explosives are a municipal concern and by virtue of the police powers we are permitted to regulate in this area. The defendant argued that there was evidence which proved that there was no danger from an explosion of any amount of US DOT class C common fireworks under any conditions. Defendant's expert, Dr. Conklin, testified at the hearing concerning the hazards associated with the storage of ten types of US DOT class C common fireworks when loaded into tubes, the means by which they are sold commercially. He stated that storage of these types of fireworks in tubes, in amounts over one hundred pounds, did not pose a mass explosive hazard. *350 The city asked defendant's expert whether he was aware that defendant's license allowed him to have not only class C fireworks on the premises but also class B materials and whether, if class B fireworks were stored in the same facility, his opinion would be different concerning the hazards associated with storing amounts in excess of one hundred pounds. The expert acknowledged that there would be a greater hazard in the storage of class B fireworks. The 36th District Court judge dismissed the misdemeanor charge for failure to limit storage of fireworks to under one hundred pounds[15] on the basis that the ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to defendant in that he stored only US DOT class C common fireworks and the limitation was not rationally related to any interest in the safety and health of the citizens of Detroit: I find ... the City's interpretation of the ordinance limiting the amount stored to 100 pounds gross weight is not reasonably related to the City's interest in the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. And, as such, is an arbitrary and unreasonable deprivation of the defendant's property. The court did not reach the issue of preemption on the basis of its belief that that issue, in and of itself, was not dispositive. *351 At a contempt hearing held the following day in Wayne Circuit Court, defense counsel urged Judge Hausner to reconsider his 1982 decision and the record adopted in the 36th District Court.[16] The judge stated that his prior order was the law in Wayne County until reversed by a higher court, and held that his 1982 decision that the storage limitation in the ordinance was valid was final.[17] In 1986, Judge Hausner conducted hearings in response to defendant's complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. He addressed the issue whether the city's refusal to issue a license for the sale and storage of fireworks, which under state law can be sold and stored without a permit, was reasonable.[18] In addition, the city appealed the dismissal of the citation in the 36th District Court, claiming that the storage provision in the ordinance was valid and that the district court was bound by Judge Hausner's 1982 determination in circuit *352 court to that effect.[19] The Recorder's Court overturned the decision invalidating the ordinance.[20] On December 11, 1984 the trial court granted the defendant motions dismissing each of the plaintiff's actions. The court found Ordinance 314-H Chapter 23 unconstitutional. * * * As the Wayne County Circuit Court is a superior court in relation to the 36th District, the latter court was bound by the determination of constitutionality. This court, not being one which is superior to the Circuit Court, is likewise bound by that determination. Initially, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Detroit Recorder's Court to remand the case to district court for trial on the charge of storing excess fireworks. People v Qualls, 157 Mich App 552; 403 NW2d 594 (1987). The panel rejected the defendant's arguments that the storage limitation in the ordinance conflicted with the state statute or that the storage provision in the ordinance was not rationally related to public safety.[21] *353 The defendant appealed, and, in lieu of granting leave, this Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals,[22] where the panel reversed its earlier decision and affirmed the holding of the 36th *354 District Court. People v Qualls (On Remand), 166 Mich App 587, 592-593; 421 NW2d 248 (1988). The panel decided that the Detroit Recorder's Court erred in holding that the circuit court's judgment operated as binding precedent because of the superiority of that court,[23] and, in view of the essentially unrebutted testimony of defendant's expert witness, that the storage limitation in the fireworks ordinance was not rationally related to public safety, and that the enactment of the ordinance did not represent an exercise of the city's police power within the ambit of due process and equal protection.[24]Id., p 593. The panel also found Judge Hausner's 1982 ruling[25] not to be significant to the resolution of the issue whether the ordinance was a reasonable and valid exercise of the city's police power because *355 at that time the defendant failed to present any evidence which supported his claim that the ordinance was invalid. Id., pp 599-601. In addition, the panel found that Judge Hausner's 1986 decision, Case No. 85-515546 CZ, was not significant to resolution of the present case because it addressed only whether the ordinance conflicted with the statute, an issue not before the panel on remand. However, the panel did note that it adhered to its previously expressed view that the fireworks ordinance did not conflict with, nor was it preempted by, state law: [T]he Detroit fireworks ordinance at issue was not in direct conflict with either state statute, MCL 750.243d; MSA 28.440(4), or the national standards found in the National Fire Protection Association Code, No. 1124 (formerly 44A), because, unlike the state and federal provisions, the ordinance specifically applies to retail stores. 157 Mich App 555-556. [166 Mich App 601.] This Court granted leave to appeal,[26] and the issues briefed and addressed at oral arguments were: 1) whether the constitutional challenge was precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because of the final judgment in the 1982 civil case that involved the same parties, 2) whether the fireworks ordinance is consistent with the Michigan fireworks act, and 3) whether there is a rational basis for the ordinance. II While we agree with the dissent that the defendant *356 was not precluded from raising the issue whether the ordinance was valid in 1984, we disagree with the basis for the dissent's conclusion, that is, that a ruling made on a summary disposition motion[27] in a forfeiture proceeding, by its very nature, cannot have a binding effect.[28] There is no support for the application in this case of the proposition that the nature of the prior proceedings *357 prevents application of estoppel in the subsequent suit.[29] Appropriate resolution of the collateral estoppel question turns not on whether the inquiring court characterizes the first proceeding as summary, but rather upon a finding that in the prior proceeding the issue of fact or law was actually litigated and actually determined by a valid and final judgment, and that the determination was essential to the final judgment.[30] 1 Restatement Judgments, 2d, § 27, p 250. Among the requirements courts have set out in order that collateral estoppel may apply are the following: The issue to be concluded must be the same as that involved in the prior action. In the prior action, the issue must have been raised and litigated, and actually adjudged. The issue must have been material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action. The determination made of the issue in the prior action must have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment. [1B Moore, Federal Practice, ¶ 0.443[1], p 759.] The city is asserting collateral estoppel as a defense, and therefore, it is its burden to persuade the Court that the defendant was precluded from *358 raising the issue that the storage provision in the ordinance was invalid as an affirmative defense in 1984 in the 36th District Court.[31] The issue in 1982 concerned forfeiture of fireworks seized by the city in 1979, which the city alleged were sold illegally at defendant's place of business. The court ruled that the ordinance, insofar as it related to the sale and storage of fireworks for retail sale, was valid. The court also issued an order that the storage provision should be construed to mean that a retailer could store up to one hundred pounds of fireworks in any combination of class B and class C. It has never been established whether the fireworks which were confiscated in 1979 were class B or C, or whether the determination that the storage provision in the ordinance was valid was essential to the final judgment. In fact, the record indicates that some of the fireworks were returned to the defendant on the basis of what types of fireworks the items were and how they were classified under state law, and not on the basis that the amounts did not exceed the storage limitation. In 1984, the city cited the defendant for violating the one-hundred-pound storage provision in the ordinance. The defendant asserted that the storage provision was invalid in that he stored only us DOT class C common fireworks and that there was no rational reason for a one-hundred-pound storage limitation. Thus, the determination whether the city was authorized to issue a citation for exceeding the storage limitation in the ordinance was necessary to the judgment whether the *359 defendant could be prosecuted for violation of the ordinance. The issue whether the storage provision in the ordinance was valid was raised in 1982. However, the city has failed to persuade this Court that the ruling that the storage provision in the ordinance did not conflict with statutory language and that the limitation was reasonable and a valid exercise of the city's police power[32] was actually litigated and determined and that that determination was necessary and essential to the resulting judgment concerning forfeiture.[33] Therefore, we hold that the defendant was not precluded from raising the issue as an affirmative defense when prosecuted in 1984 in 36th District Court. Accordingly, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Judge Hausner's ruling in 1982 was not significant to resolution of the present case because in 1982 the defendant failed to present any evidence which supported his claim that the ordinance was invalid. If an issue is raised, and the party who has the burden fails in his proof and the issue is decided against him, he is just as much bound by collateral estoppel as though he had presented an abundance of evidence.[34] In addition, the panel erred in concluding that Judge Hausner's 1986 decision was not significant to resolution of the present case because the ruling addressed only whether the ordinance conflicted with the statute, an issue not before the panel on *360 remand.[35] In 1986, Judge Hausner conducted hearings for the purpose of determining whether the provision in the ordinance which required a license to sell and store fireworks which are unrestricted for use in Michigan conflicted with the statutory scheme. MCL 750.243a(3)(a)-(f); MSA 28.440(1)(3)(a)-(f).[36] Thus, that ruling is not significant to resolution of the present case because the court addressed an issue which had never been raised or litigated by the parties in the 1982 proceeding, and not for the reason stated by the panel. In this case, the city asserted that the defendant was precluded from raising the issue concerning the validity of the storage provision in 1984 by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We find that the city has not persuaded this Court that the ruling holding the storage provision valid was necessary to the 1982 judgment and, thus, that relitigation of the issue was precluded. Accordingly, we vacate that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which addresses the collateral estoppel issue. *361 III We also disagree with the dissent that the storage provision in the ordinance conflicts with or is preempted by state law. The dissent reasons that the state impliedly permits what it does not prohibit, and thus, since the statute does not prohibit retailers from storing over a specified amount of fireworks, a retailer should be permitted to store any amounts of class C or class B fireworks and any regulation concerning the storage of fireworks by the city would conflict with state law.[37] What the dissent appears to be saying is that because the state allows storage of greater than one hundred pounds of class C or class B fireworks upon compliance with all of the requirements under the statute, i.e., local approval for storage buildings, distance requirements from railways, highways and inhabited buildings,[38] the city could not limit the amount of fireworks a retailer kept at his place of business, which in this case was a building located less than twenty-five feet from the highway, next to a residential home, and across the street from a gas station. The conclusion reached by the dissent is not supported in law or in fact. Absent a showing that state law expressly provides that the state's authority to regulate is exclusive,[39] that the nature of the subject matter regulated calls for a uniform *362 state regulatory scheme,[40] or that the ordinance permits what the statute prohibits or prohibits what the state permits,[41] The mere fact that the state, in the exercise of the police power, has made certain regulations does not prohibit a municipality from exacting additional requirements.... The fact that an ordinance enlarges upon the provisions of a statute by requiring more than the statute requires creates no conflict therewith unless the statute limits the requirement for all cases to its own prescription. Thus, where both an ordinance and a statute are prohibitory, and the only difference between them is that the ordinance goes further in its prohibition but not counter to the prohibition under the statute, and the municipality does not attempt to authorize by the ordinance what the legislature has forbidden or forbid what the legislature has expressly licensed, authorized, or required, there is nothing contradictory between the provisions of the statute and the ordinance because of which they cannot coexist and be effective. *363 [56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations, § 374, pp 408-409.] The only requirement under state law, in regard to the amount of fireworks a retailer may maintain on the premises, is that it be a reasonable amount. In other words, the municipality retains reasonable control of fireworks which is such control as cannot be said to be unreasonable and inconsistent with regulations established by state law.[42]People v McGraw, 184 Mich 233, 238; 150 NW 836 (1915). This construction allows a municipality to recognize local conditions and enact rules and regulations peculiarly adapted to such conditions. It would be a strange rule indeed were it otherwise. While general problems with reference to fireworks, i.e., wholesale storage of fireworks for shipment within or out of state, regulation of shipment within and out of state, and the use of different classes of fireworks within the state, are statewide concerns, the retail sale and storage of fireworks raise concerns that are local in character, i.e., the location of retailers with respect to densely populated areas, the number of retailers in an area, the amount of use of the materials, and the conflict between the dangers of fireworks and the use of these materials in the community. As hazardous materials, the very nature of fireworks lends itself unquestionably to regulation adapted to local conditions.[43] Therefore, we reject the rationale employed by *364 the dissent that that which the Legislature does not prohibit, it impliedly permits, and instead find that the storage limitation provision for retailers in the ordinance did not conflict with state law. Accordingly, we affirm that part of the Court of Appeals decision which held the storage provision of the ordinance to be a valid exercise of the police powers of the City of Detroit. IV Having found that the state has not preempted this area of regulation, we address the issue whether the storage provision in the ordinance is unconstitutional. It is well established in Michigan that ordinances are presumed valid and the burden is on the person challenging the ordinance to rebut the presumption. People v Sell, 310 Mich 305; 17 NW2d 193 (1945); 1426 Woodward Ave Corp v Wolff, 312 Mich 352, 357; 20 NW2d 217 (1945). In this case, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the fireworks ordinance[44] after he was charged with violating the storage limitation in 1984, admitting he had approximately four hundred pounds of explosives on the premises, but arguing that he stored only class C common fireworks and the ordinance as related to the storage of these fireworks was not reasonably related to the city's interest in the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.[45] *365 In analyzing claims involving due process and equal protection challenges to statutory schemes, courts first determine the type of matters to which the governmental action relates. When the action relates to matters of economics or general social welfare, the test to determine whether the law comports with due process is whether it bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate governmental purpose. In this case, the defendant's claim is that the ordinance interferes with his business, and, thus, because it regulates an economic matter, the ordinance need only rationally relate to a legitimate governmental purpose.[46] The city asserts that the purpose of the storage limitation is to prevent fire and explosions and, thus, to protect the safety of the people, homes, and businesses in the city. This is clearly a legitimate purpose, and a limitation on the amounts of fireworks which a retail establishment can store within a city bears a rational relationship to public safety. The defendant does not argue that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face. Instead, the defendant asserts that it is unconstitutional as applied to him on the basis that he stores only US DOT class C common fireworks on the premises and that there is no danger in storing those types of fireworks in amounts exceeding one hundred pounds. The 36th District Court agreed with the defendant that the ordinance was unconstitutional as it applied to him because the city could not rebut the defendant's expert's testimony that class C fireworks stored alone were not dangerous, nor could it prove that the defendant stored both class B and *366 class C fireworks. The court concluded the storage limitation, indeed, was "not reasonably related to the City's interest in the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens," and was "an arbitrary and unreasonable deprivation of the defendant's property."[47] However, the lower court erred in failing to recognize that it was defendant's burden to rebut the presumption that there was a rational basis for the storage provision in the fireworks ordinance which limited retailers, who under state law need a permit to sell and store class B fireworks for shipment directly out of state, to storage of one hundred pounds of fireworks, in any combination or class,[48] and that in the face of a due process or equal protection challenge, "where the legislative judgment is drawn in question," a court's inquiry "must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it." United States v Carolene Products Co, 304 US 144, 154; 58 S Ct 778; 82 L Ed 1234 (1938). A corollary to this rule is that where the legislative judgment is supported by "any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed," although such facts may be "debatable," the legislative judgment must be accepted. Carolene Products Co v Thompson, 276 Mich 172, 178; 267 NW 608 (1936). [Shavers, supra, pp 613-614. Emphasis in original.][[49]] *367 Thus, whether the defendant did, or did not, store class B fireworks was not determinative of the constitutional question. When asked whether amounts over one hundred pounds represented a danger from fire or explosion to persons outside the building, the expert testified, that if [p]roperly situated within the building, that quantity of material could be stored without posing any hazard to people external.... I would strongly recommend that if one had a thousand pounds of gross weight, ... to separate the cases so not all ... would be involved in a fire at any one time.... [Emphasis added.] Further, the danger of storing mixed fireworks in amounts over one hundred pounds was sufficient justification for the storage limitation in the ordinance. The record supports the city's claim that it was not unusual for dealers to mix class B and class C fireworks and that, when mixed, the fireworks are more likely to explode. The defendant's expert testified that there is a greater hazard involved in the storage of class B fireworks, and also that his assumption that the defendant stored only class C fireworks was based on information from the defendant. In fact, the defendant's expert testified he saw items which looked like class B fireworks when he was on the defendant's premises. In fact, contrary to the defendant's claims, the expert witness did not state that the storage of only class C fireworks in any amounts stored alone was not dangerous. Thus, the city's storage limitation of one hundred *368 pounds was rationally related to a legitimate objective in light of the following: state law permitted the sale and storage of class B fireworks without a permit, it was not uncommon for retailers to store both class C and B fireworks, the defendant himself admitted he sometimes had both types on the premises, and the expert witness testified that storage in amounts over one hundred pounds is hazardous if fireworks are mixed. Thus, on the basis of the "facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed" the city's judgment must be accepted, and, therefore, we find the storage provision in the ordinance is rationally related to public safety. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the 36th District Court's finding that the ordinance was unconstitutional. CONCLUSION The defendant was not precluded from relitigating in 1984 the issue whether the ordinance was valid, insofar as it restricted the storage of fireworks by retailers to one hundred pounds or less, because the city has not persuaded this Court that the ruling that the ordinance was valid was actually litigated and determined in the prior proceeding and was essential to the judgment issued in 1982. The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that the storage provision in the ordinance did not conflict with the storage limitations in the statute. However, we find that the Court erred in affirming the decision in 36th District Court that the ordinance was not rationally related to public safety and thus was unconstitutional. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals that the storage provision in the ordinance *369 did not conflict with the Michigan fireworks act. We vacate that portion of the opinion which addresses the collateral estoppel issue and the decision affirming the 36th District Court's dismissal of the misdemeanor charge upon the basis of its determination that the ordinance was unconstitutional. This legal tug of war has generated a decade of litigation between these parties. It may well be that the Court of Appeals will sustain the ruling of the able trial judge who has lived with this situation for years, but we do not yet know that that is so. To avoid the possibility of setting off another round of fireworks below, we stay the effect of judgment in this case pending resolution of the cases now pending in the Court of Appeals. RILEY, C.J., and BRICKLEY, ARCHER, and GRIFFIN, JJ., concurred with BOYLE, J. LEVIN, J. (dissenting). Glen R. Qualls was charged on July 2, 1984, with the misdemeanor of violating a Detroit fireworks ordinance requiring that "[t]he storage of fireworks in a place of retail sales shall be limited to gross weight of less than one hundred (100) pounds...."[1] *370 The district court dismissed the charge on December 11, 1984, after an evidentiary hearing at which an expert witness testified concerning the danger of explosion of various quantities of class B and class C fireworks, on the ground that the one-hundred-pound limitation is not reasonably related to the city's interest in the health, safety, and welfare of the citizenry. The charge was reinstated by the Detroit Recorder's Court on the ground that the district court was bound by a 1982 judgment of the Wayne Circuit Court declaring that the one-hundred-pound limitation was constitutional. The Court of Appeals, on further appeal,[2] rejected Qualls' argument that the storage provision of the ordinance was in conflict with the storage provision of the state fireworks statute which provides that "[t]he storage of fireworks at the site of a wholesaler, dealer or jobber, except for a retailer who has goods on hand for sale to the public in a supervised display area, shall be as" thereafter set forth in the ordinance.[3] (Emphasis added.) *371 This Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the cause to that Court for an expanded opinion.[4] *372 On remand, the Court of Appeals said that it could not, after review of the evidentiary record made in the district court, find clear error in the district judge's finding that the storage provision of the ordinance was unconstitutional because it was "`not rationally related to any interest in the safety and health to the citizens of Detroit.'"[5] The Court of Appeals, as required by the order of remand, considered the significance of the 1982 Wayne Circuit Court proceedings. It said that the Recorder's Court had erred in holding that the district court was bound by the Wayne Circuit Court judgment sustaining the validity of the one-hundred-pound limitation.[6] It concluded that those "abbreviated proceedings" were of "no significance" in the resolution of "the constitutional issue at bar."[7] *373 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court dismissing the charge. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the decision of the Court of Appeals in the 1982 Wayne Circuit Court litigation does not control the disposition of this appeal. Qualls is not precluded from defending, on the basis that the one-hundred-pound storage requirement is invalid, against the charge that he committed a misdemeanor in storing more than one hundred pounds of fireworks. We conclude that there is conflict between the one-hundred-pound storage limitation of the ordinance and the storage provision of the statute. We, therefore, agree, although on different grounds, with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the one-hundred-pound limitation is invalid. There is, therefore, no need to consider whether there is a rational relationship between the one-hundred-pound limitation and public safety, health, and welfare. *374 I The fireworks statute, before it was amended in 1980 by the addition of the words "except for a retailer who has goods on hand for sale to the public in a supervised display area," required the storage of fireworks at the site of a wholesaler, dealer, or jobber to be in accordance with provisions there set forth.[8] The Attorney General provided an opinion in August, 1979, that the storage requirements of the statute applied to a person who sells goods at retail because a person who sells goods at retail is a "dealer" within the meaning of that term as used in the statute. The Attorney General went on to say that "the display of fireworks for sale at retail" need not "be made in a facility which meets the stringent requirements for the storage of fireworks" because the term "storage" did not apply to "goods or merchandise on hand for immediate sale and disposition." (Emphasis supplied.) He concluded that the provisions of the statute concerning the storage of fireworks did not apply "to the displaying of fireworks for sale by a retailer," but "observed that the quantity which is displayed for retail sale should be limited to a reasonable amount so as not to constitute the storage of fireworks."[9] The enactment of the 1980 amendment of the fireworks statute, excepting from the storage requirements of the statute a retailer who has "goods on hand for sale to the public in a supervised display area," was prompted by continued efforts in some counties, despite the opinion of the Attorney General, to apply the storage requirements *375 to fireworks on display for sale at retail.[10] The purpose of the 1980 amendment was to expressly set forth that retailers of fireworks were relieved from complying with the storage requirements of the statute in respect to fireworks displayed for sale at retail. The city contends that there is no inconsistency between the storage requirements of the ordinance and of the statute "because state law [statute] pertains to limits on wholesale dealers, while the Ordinance applies to retail dealers." The 1980 amendment, excepting from the storage provisions of the statute only goods held by a retailer on hand for sale to the public in a supervised display area, appears to confirm the view expressed by the Attorney General that the storage provisions of the statute apply to retailers when they "store" fireworks and are not displaying them for sale at retail. *376 The statute[11] thus permits the "storage" by retailers of class B and class C fireworks in quantities exceeding one hundred pounds upon compliance with the provisions of the statute. The ordinance, however, provides that the storage of fireworks in a place of retail sales is limited to a gross weight of less than one hundred pounds.[12] The one-hundred-pound limitation is therefore preempted by the statute and is invalid.[13] The city's argument ignores that the purpose of the 1980 amendment was to relieve retailers of what some regarded as the "unreasonable hardships"[14] posed by the storage requirements set forth in the statute when applied with respect to fireworks on hand for sale to the public in a supervised display area. II In an action commenced by the city against Qualls in July, 1981, a Wayne circuit judge entered a judgment in 1982, two years before the charges in the instant case were lodged,[15] declaring that "the storage for retail sale of fireworks, is a valid exercise of the City's power, and the State of Michigan has not preempted this area of legislation and regulation, and the ordinance in that respect is valid and enforceable."[16] Qualls did not appeal. Ordinarily, the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel would bar Qualls from relitigating *377 in another civil action the question decided in the 1982 action. The Court of Appeals held that Qualls was not precluded because the 1982 decision "was premised on the failure of defendant to present any testimonial or other evidence to establish the invalidity of the fireworks ordinance," and subsequently an extensive record had been generated by Qualls' expert witness regarding the safety of the retail storage of more than one hundred pounds gross weight of class C or common fireworks. The Court of Appeals concluded on that basis that the "abbreviated" 1982 proceedings should be of no significance in the resolution of the "constitutional issue at bar."[17] Because we agree with the Court of Appeals that the storage requirement is invalid, not on the basis that there is not a rational relationship between the one-hundred-pound storage requirement and the protection of public health, safety, and welfare, but on the basis that the storage requirement of the ordinance conflicts with the statute, as amended in 1980, the basis on which the Court of Appeals found that the 1982 judgment was not controlling is not in point. We conclude, however, that the 1982 judgment, entered following the "abbreviated proceedings," should not, as a matter of policy,[18] preclude Qualls from defending on the ground that the ordinance is invalid because it conflicts with the statute, as amended, against the *378 charge that he committed a misdemeanor[19] when he violated the ordinance. A question of public importance is presented for the first time in this Court concerning the validity of an ordinance imposing limitations on the storage of fireworks in light of a state fireworks statute imposing different limitations on the storage of fireworks. The question having been presented, pursuant to this Court's grant of leave to appeal, it should be addressed on the merits in recognition of the difficulty faced by any litigant who might seek *379 a ruling by this Court, particularly in regard to a determination, on summary disposition following abbreviated proceedings respecting the validity of an ordinance, entered in the context of litigation concerning the forfeiture of a relatively small quantity of fireworks.[20] CAVANAGH, J., concurred with LEVIN, J.