Title: Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc., Etc., Et Al. v. Leslie Reid, Et Al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC04-2443
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 27, 2006

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC04-2443 
_____________ 
 
 
SAIA MOTOR FREIGHT LINE, INC., etc., et al., 
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
LESLIE REID, et al.,  
Respondents. 
 
[May 11, 2006] 
 
WELLS, J. 
 
We have for review the decision in Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid, 
888 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).  In this case, the Third District held that “the 
trial court may award costs pursuant to a final judgment’s reservation of 
jurisdiction despite a party’s failure to comply with the 30-day time period set forth 
in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525.”  Id. at 104.  The Third District agreed 
with the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Fisher v. John Carter & 
Associates, Inc., 864 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).  The Third District certified 
conflict with the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision in Gulf Landings 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Hershberger, 845 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and the Fifth 
 
 
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District Court of Appeal’s decision in Wentworth v. Johnson, 845 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 
5th DCA 2003).  The Third District’s decision is also in conflict with the decision 
of the First District Court of Appeal in State Department of Transportation v. 
Southtrust Bank, 886 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).  We have jurisdiction.  See 
art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
This case arises out of a request for attorney fees and costs in a wrongful 
death action.  Respondents Leslie Reid and Keichan Lewis filed a wrongful death 
action as personal representatives of the estate of Joan Bryan against petitioner 
Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc.  See Saia, 888 So. 2d at 102.  The trial court entered 
a first amended final judgment on January 2, 2003,1 in the amount of $1,805,000 in 
favor of respondents and “reserve[d] jurisdiction to award the Plaintiff costs and to 
consider Plaintiff’s claim for attorneys’ fees upon a determination of entitlement 
thereto.”  Reid v. Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc., No. 01-28040 CA 06 at 1-2 (Fla. 
11th Cir. Ct. order filed Jan. 3, 2003). 
                                          
 
 
1.  The trial court originally entered a final judgment on November 15, 2002, 
but subsequently vacated this order on November 26, 2002, and substituted an 
amended final judgment.  See Reid v. Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc., No. 01-28040 
CA 06 at 3 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. order filed Nov. 26, 2002).  Pursuant to an agreement 
between the parties, the trial court then vacated the amended final judgment on 
January 2, 2003, and entered a first amended final judgment.  A reservation of 
jurisdiction to consider attorney fees and costs was included in each of the final 
judgments. 
 
 
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On March 17, 2003, more than thirty days after entry of the judgment, 
respondents filed a verified motion to tax costs.  The trial court awarded 
respondents attorney fees in the amount of $68,567.14 and costs in the amount of 
$66,429.79.  Saia appealed the award of attorney fees and costs; however, only the 
award of costs is at issue in this case because the award of attorney fees was 
reversed by the Third District.2 
ANALYSIS 
 
The certified conflict issue involves the interpretation of the Court’s rules 
and is a question of law subject to de novo review.  See Smith v. Smith, 902 So. 2d 
859, 861 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (“The standard of review regarding the trial court’s 
construction of the rules [of civil procedure] is de novo.”)  It is well settled that the 
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure are construed in accordance with the principles of 
statutory construction.  See generally Brown v. State, 715 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. 
1998) (“Our courts have long recognized that the rules of construction applicable 
to statutes also apply to the construction of rules.”). 
 
We resolve the conflict by approving the decisions of the Second District in 
Gulf Landings, the Fifth District in Wentworth, and the First District in Southtrust 
Bank.  We quash the decision of the Third District in the present case and 
disapprove that of the Fourth District in Fisher in respect to the conflict issue.  In 
                                          
 
 
2.  The Third District determined that the offer of settlement was invalid 
because it was not submitted jointly by the co-personal representatives. 
 
 
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resolving the conflict, we apply the plain language of Florida Rule of Civil 
Procedure 1.525. 
 
The Civil Procedure Rules Committee of The Florida Bar recommended the 
adoption of rule 1.525 in 2000.  We adopted that rule, effective January 1, 2001.  
Amendments to Fla. Rules of Civil Pro., 773 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2000).  Rule 1.525 
provides: 
 
Any party seeking a judgment taxing costs, attorneys’ fees, or 
both shall serve a motion within 30 days after filing of the judgment, 
including a judgment of dismissal, or the service of a notice of 
voluntary dismissal. 
The Committee Note to the rule states:  “2000 Adoption.  This rule is intended to 
establish a time requirement to serve motions for costs and attorneys’ fees.”  In 
adopting the proposed rule, we stated: 
 
Rule 1.525 is adopted, establishing the time for serving motions 
for attorneys’ fees and costs.  We add a court commentary clarifying 
that this rule only establishes time requirements for serving such 
motions, and in no way affects or overrules the pleading requirements 
outlined by this Court in Stockman v. Downs, 573 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 
1991). 
Amendments to Fla. Rules of Civil Pro., 773 So. 2d at 1098-99. 
 
In 1997, before the adoption of rule 1.525, we decided Gulliver Academy, 
Inc. v. Bodek, 694 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1997).  At the time that we decided Gulliver 
Academy, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure did not have a rule setting time 
requirements within which motions for costs and attorney fees were required to be 
 
 
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served.  In Gulliver Academy, we held that a reservation of jurisdiction in a final 
judgment allowed the trial court to consider further proceedings on the issue of 
attorney fees even though a motion for fees was filed more than thirty days after 
the entry of the judgment.  We further held that the reservation of jurisdiction in 
the final judgment was an enlargement of time pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil 
Procedure 1.090(b). 
 
The Third District in the present case and the Fourth District in Fisher relied 
on Gulliver Academy in deciding that when the final judgment contained a 
reservation of jurisdiction, the time requirement of rule 1.525 did not apply.  
Fisher, 864 So. 2d at 496.  We do not agree. 
 
When we adopted rule 1.525, effective January 1, 2001, we established a 
bright-line time requirement for motions for costs and attorney fees which the 
Rules of Civil Procedure had not previously contained.3  Judge Altenbernd 
correctly made this point stating, in Diaz v. Bowen, 832 So. 2d 200, 201 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2002), that “[r]ule 1.525 was created to establish a bright-line rule to resolve 
the uncertainty surrounding the timing of these posttrial motions,” and in Gulf 
Landings, 845 So. 2d at 346, “It is no longer enough for parties to plead a basis for 
fees in their pretrial pleadings.”  We agree.  Rule 1.525 provided the time 
                                          
 
 
3.  Following the adoption of rule 1.525, the time requirements could be 
enlarged in accord with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090, as explained in 
Southtrust Bank. 
 
 
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requirement which the rules did not have at the time Gulliver Academy was 
decided, and the rule applies to all cases pending on or filed after January 1, 2001. 
CONCLUSION 
 
We therefore quash the Third District’s decision in this case and remand for 
further proceedings in accord with this decision. 
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD and LEWIS, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
PARIENTE, C.J., dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent.  By holding that a reservation of jurisdiction in a 
judgment to consider attorneys’ fees and costs is not the procedural equivalent of 
an order extending the time to file a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant 
to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090(b), the majority has reached a conclusion 
contrary to Gulliver Academy, Inc. v. Bodek, 694 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1997).   
In Gulliver Academy, we held that “a reservation of jurisdiction in a final 
judgment is procedurally an enlargement of time under rule 1.090(b),” and 
observed that “[a]ny other interpretation would make the trial court’s reservation in 
the final judgment not only a nullity but a procedural trap.”  Id. at 677.  The 
 
 
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majority’s holding in this case has the effect of transforming a reservation of 
jurisdiction into the “nullity” and “procedural trap” we condemned in Gulliver 
Academy.  Id.  And to what end?  In this case, neither party was surprised and 
neither party was prejudiced by the filing of the motion for attorneys’ fees and 
costs beyond the time period set forth in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525.4  If 
the majority concludes that it is best to recede from the reasoning of Gulliver 
Academy and strictly interpret the civil rules in all circumstances, this 
interpretation should be applied prospectively to ensure that all litigants are put on 
notice.  We have on occasion determined that our interpretation of the rules of 
procedure applicable to the appeal of a civil action filed in this state should be 
applied prospectively.  See Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 326 
So. 2d 177, 181 & n.10 (Fla. 1976) (“[T]he time for taking an appeal should be 
governed by the rendition of a formal document of judgment by the trial judge, 
pursuant to Fla. App. Rule 1.3, rather than by the signed entry in a minute book,” 
                                          
 
4.  In this case, the plaintiffs had previously filed a timely motion seeking 
attorneys’ fees based on the offer of settlement statute and Florida Rule of Civil 
Procedure 1.442 on December 16, 2002, after the amended final judgment was 
entered on November 26, 2002.  On February 10, 2003, the plaintiffs filed an 
amended motion for attorneys’ fees after the first amended final judgment was 
entered on January 2, 2003.   Both of these motions had also requested costs as part 
of the request for attorneys’ fees.  On March 17, 2003, the plaintiffs filed a verified 
motion to tax costs based on their prevailing party status.  It appears that the 
plaintiffs diligently pursued the motion for attorneys’ fees and costs but apparently 
relied on the reservation of jurisdiction in the final judgment as extending the time 
for filing a motion under rule 1.525. 
 
 
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but the “application of this decision with respect to the time for taking appeals 
shall be prospective only, and it shall not affect appeals pending on the date this 
decision becomes final.”); see also Boyett v. State, 688 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1996) 
(“Unless we explicitly state otherwise, a rule of law which is to be given 
prospective application does not apply to those cases which have been tried before 
the rule is announced;” therefore, it was error in Coney v. State, 653 So. 2d 1009 
(Fla. 1995), for the Court to apply the definition of “presence” articulated therein 
to the facts of that case); Coney, 653 So. 2d at 1013 (clarifying that “presence” as 
used in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.180 means that a defendant has a 
right under rule 3.180 to be physically present at the immediate site where juror 
challenges are exercised, but stating that “our ruling today clarifying this issue is 
prospective only”).  
 
It is not surprising that both the Third District in this case and the Fourth 
District in Fisher v. John Carter & Associates, Inc., 864 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2004), believed that the reasoning of Gulliver Academy applied in determining the 
timeliness of a motion filed pursuant to rule 1.525.  In Gulliver Academy, the 
Court addressed the procedural effect of a trial court’s reservation of jurisdiction to 
consider attorneys’ fees and costs in the context of a motion filed under the offer of 
judgment statutes, which provide that a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs must 
be filed within thirty days of entry of judgment.  See 694 So. 2d at 677-78.  The 
 
 
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precise issue was whether a reservation of jurisdiction in a judgment to consider 
attorneys’ fees and costs was an enlargement of time under rule 1.090(b), which 
delineates the procedure for enlarging prescribed time periods.  As stated above, 
we held in Gulliver Academy that “a reservation of jurisdiction in a final judgment 
is procedurally an enlargement of time under rule 1.090(b),” which may allow a 
party to file a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs beyond the thirty-day time 
period prescribed in the offer of judgment statutes.  See id. at 677.   More 
significantly, we observed that any other interpretation would render the trial 
court’s reservation of jurisdiction in the final judgment meaningless.  See id. 
 
It is true that at the time of Gulliver Academy, rule 1.525 had not been 
adopted.  But the Court in Gulliver Academy did not end its analysis with the 
interpretation of the offer of judgment statutes.  The Court elaborated by discussing 
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(g), which had been recently adopted to 
impose a specific thirty-day time limit on motions for attorneys’ fees and costs 
filed pursuant to the offer of judgment statutes.  See id.5  In no uncertain terms, we 
                                          
 
 
5.  Rule 1.442(g) was adopted in 1996.  See In re Amendments to Fla. Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 682 So. 2d 105, 107 (Fla. 1996).  At that time, the rule 
provided: 
 
Sanctions.  Any party seeking sanctions pursuant to applicable 
Florida law, based on the failure of the proposal’s recipient to accept a 
proposal, shall do so by service of an appropriate motion within 30 
days after the entry of judgment in a nonjury action, the return of the 
 
 
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determined that in the context of rule 1.442(g), a trial court’s reservation of 
jurisdiction to consider attorneys’ fees and costs constitutes an enlargement of time 
under rule 1.090(b).  See Gulliver Academy, 694 So. 2d at 677.  We reasoned that 
the trial court should have discretion to extend the time for filing a rule 1.442(g) 
motion by reserving jurisdiction in the judgment because “[i]ssues related to the 
setting of fees under [the offer of judgment statutes] are not fully adjudicated until 
the disposal of posttrial motions.”  Id. at 678.  However, we also concluded that 
absent a reservation of jurisdiction, a motion seeking attorneys’ fees and costs must 
be filed within thirty days as provided in rule 1.442(g) or the entitlement to fees 
and costs is waived, unless there is a basis for relief under rule 1.090(b)(2).  See id.   
 
Both the version of rule 1.442(g) construed in Gulliver Academy6 and rule 
1.525 contain mandatory language requiring that a motion for attorneys’ fees and 
costs be filed within thirty days of entry of judgment.  Yet, the majority eschews 
the effect given to the reservation of jurisdiction in Gulliver Academy.  The 
majority does not even mention the Court’s conclusion in Gulliver Academy as it 
                                                                                                                                        
verdict in a jury action, or the entry of a voluntary or involuntary 
dismissal.  
 
6.  Subsequent to the adoption of rule 1.525 in 2000, rule 1.442(g) was 
amended to conform it to rule 1.525.  Thus, rule 1.442(g) now provides: 
 
Any party seeking sanctions pursuant to applicable Florida law, based 
on the failure of the proposal’s recipient to accept a proposal, shall do 
so by serving a motion in accordance with rule 1.525.    
 
 
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relates to rule 1.442(g).  In fact, the reason we gave in Gulliver Academy for 
treating a reservation of jurisdiction in a final judgment as the equivalent of an 
order extending the time to file a motion for attorneys’ fees is equally applicable in 
this case.   
 
After judgment has been entered in a case, parties often file posttrial 
motions.  As we recognized in Gulliver Academy, issues relating to the setting of 
attorneys’ fees and costs may not be adjudicated fully until the disposition of 
posttrial motions.  See 694 So. 2d at 678.  Judicial efficiency and economy is 
furthered by allowing the trial court “discretion to extend the time for filing the 
motions by reserving jurisdiction in the final judgment.”  Id.  Moreover, a 
reservation of jurisdiction to consider attorneys’ fees and costs allows the trial 
court to conduct further proceedings on this issue.   
Although the Court today states that the use of mandatory language in rule 
1.525 overrules or limits our decision in Gulliver Academy, the Court’s 
commentary to rule 1.525 does not refer to the rule’s effect on the continuing 
validity of Gulliver Academy.  If we intended to overrule or limit Gulliver 
Academy by adopting rule 1.525, we should have said so directly.  As explained in 
Puryear v. State, 810 So. 2d 901, 905 (Fla. 2002), “this Court does not 
intentionally overrule itself sub silentio.”  Thus, Gulliver Academy should remain 
 
 
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good law as to the effect of reservations of jurisdiction to consider attorneys’ fees 
or costs.  At the very least, litigants were justified in relying on our decision. 
I do not quarrel with the purpose of adopting rule 1.525:  to remove the 
uncertainty created by the “reasonable time” standard, which was previously used 
to determine the timeliness of a motion seeking attorneys’ fees and costs; to put 
parties on notice; and to prescribe a time certain for filing motions for attorneys’ 
fees and costs.  Yet, the fact is that the rule did create confusion as to the 
continuing effect of a reservation of jurisdiction as demonstrated by the various 
conflict cases.   
In fact, in 2005, subsequent to the adoption of rule 1.525, the Court adopted 
Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.525, which states that rule 1.525 does 
not apply in family law proceedings.  See Amendments to the Fla. Family Law 
Rules of Procedure (Rule 12.525), 897 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 2005).  Rule 12.525 was 
adopted at the request of the Family Law Rules Committee because the Committee 
stated that “rule 1.525 is ill-fitting to family law matters.”  Id. at 467.  The Court 
accepted the argument that “the application of rule 1.525 in family law cases could 
be creating confusion among the courts, and [that] there already is a well-
established body of statutory and case law authority regarding the award of 
attorneys’ fees and costs in family law matters.”  Id. at 468.  The confusion cited in 
the opinion referred to the very conflict we resolve today; that is, whether a 
 
 
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reservation of jurisdiction to assess attorneys’ fees and costs is equivalent to an 
extension of time.   
While strict time limits in our procedural rules can serve an important 
purpose, even the majority acknowledges that if a motion to enlarge time had been 
filed and granted, the thirty-day time limit would have been extended.  Entry of an 
order granting a motion to extend time, like a reservation of jurisdiction in a 
judgment, recognizes that often posttrial motions must be resolved before 
entitlement to fees and costs can be determined.   
Based on the reasoning of Gulliver Academy, which remains good law, and 
the fact that a reservation of jurisdiction in a judgment affords notice to all parties 
involved in the litigation, I conclude that a reservation of jurisdiction in a judgment 
to consider attorneys’ fees and costs amounts procedurally to an enlargement of 
time under rule 1.090(b).  For the future, parties will be on notice that motions 
must be filed within thirty days as provided in rule 1.525 unless a motion for 
extension of time is filed in accordance with the requirements of rule 1.090(b) and 
granted by the court.  But for today, litigants who relied on Gulliver Academy will 
have found themselves the victims of the very trap the Court sought to avoid in that 
case.   
ANSTEAD and LEWIS, JJ., concur. 
 
 
 
 
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D03-2140 and 3D03-2713 
 
 
(Dade County) 
 
Hinda Klein of Conroy, Simberg, Canon, Krevans and Abel, P.A., Hollywood, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Barbara A. Silverman and Ervin A. Gonzalez of Colson, Hicks and Eidson, Coral 
Gables, Florida 
 
 
for Respondent