Title: Jackson v. Cook
Citation: 153 So. 2d 229
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 9, 1963

153 So. 2d 229 (1963)
Christine M. JACKSON
v.
Maggie COOK.
7 Div. 538.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 9, 1963.
*230 London, Yancey, Clark &amp; Allen, Birmingham, and Ralph Gaines, Jr., Talladega, for appellant.
Thos. Reuben Bell, Sylacauga, for appellee.
COLEMAN, Justice.
This is an appeal by defendant from judgment for plaintiff in action for personal injury allegedly sustained by plaintiff while she was a guest in an automobile operated by defendant.
The complaint contains one count wherein plaintiff alleges that defendant wantonly injured plaintiff.
The error assigned is refusal of the affirmative charge with hypothesis requested in writing by defendant.
Plaintiff and defendant are sisters. The time was Sunday afternoon. The automobile was parked near a church. The ground probably sloped to the rear of the parked vehicle.
Plaintiff's mother, daughter, and niece got on the back seat. Defendant got in under the steering wheel. Plaintiff, apparently, got in the front seat of the car, but got out for the purpose of helping defendant let down the emergency brake. Defendant was able to let the brake down and plaintiff proceeded to enter the car again. During this re-entry by plaintiff, the car shot backward and plaintiff was injured. She describes the occurrence as follows:
Defendant testified as follows:
The question for decision is: Can the jury find that defendant was guilty of wantonness where defendant is the operator of a parked automobile and is in the driver's seat, plaintiff is in the act of getting into the front seat beside defendant, plaintiff is in the act of closing the right door through which she is entering or has entered and the door is partially open or not completely closed, defendant starts the engine and presses "the button to put it in reverse," the automobile suddenly moves backward at fifty-five miles per hour, and plaintiff is thrown out of and is run over by the automobile, which quickly moves back twenty to fifty feet and hits a tree which stops the automobile?
"In considering the question of the sufficiency of the evidence of wantonness to be submitted to the jury, this court must accept the adduced evidence most favorable to the plaintiff as true, and indulge such reasonable inferences as the jury was free to draw from the evidence. * * *" English v. Jacobs, 263 Ala. 376, 377, 82 So. 2d 542, 543; McNickle v. Stripling, 259 Ala. 576, 67 So. 2d 832. Where from the evidence a reasonable inference may be drawn adverse to party requesting affirmative charge, the charge is properly refused. Aircraft Sales &amp; Service v. Gantt, 255 Ala. 508, 52 So. 2d 388.
In wantonness, the party doing the act, or failing to act, is conscious of his conduct, and, without having the intent to injure, is conscious, from his knowledge of existing circumstances and conditions, that his conduct will likely or probably result in injury. Birmingham Railway &amp; Electric Co. v. Bowers, 110 Ala. 328, 20 So. 345.
*233 Wantonness is a conscious doing of some act or omission of some duty under knowledge of existing conditions and conscious that from the doing of such act or omission of such duty injury will likely or probably result. First National Bank of Dothan v. Sanders, 227 Ala. 313, 149 So. 848; Schuler v. Nelson Weaver Companies, 270 Ala. 727, 121 So. 2d 908.
Defendant contends that there is no evidence from which it can be inferred that defendant consciously and intentionally did some act or omitted some known duty which produced the injury. Defendant states in brief:
It is true that there is no direct evidence that defendant acted consciously in causing or permitting the automobile to move backward. There is, however, testimony that the defendant was in the driver's seat and manipulating the push-button controls of the automobile when the car started backward.
With reference to plaintiff, defendant testified: "And then she came back around to get in the car, started backing up as she I can remember she looked like getting, you know, a portion of herself in the car. * * *"
Certainly, we think, the jury could find that the defendant had knowledge of plaintiff's situation and that defendant, while possessed of that knowledge, caused or permitted the automobile to move backward. Whether defendant acted consciously or inadvertently was for the jury to decide.
In a personal injury action, this court considered the correctness of refusing affirmative instructions requested by defendant to a count in the complaint which charged that plaintiff's injury was "* * `proximately caused by the wanton, willful, or intentional conduct of the defendant's servants or agents * * * which willful, wanton, or intentional conduct consisted in this: The servant or agent aforesaid (in that case the conductor) wantonly, willfully, or intentionally caused a car to be set in motion, with the knowledge that plaintiff would probably be injured thereby, and with reckless disregard of the consequences.'" (Par. Added.)
This court held that the affirmative instructions were refused without error and said:
So in the case at bar, if the jury concluded, as they might have done, that defendant saw plaintiff's situation as plaintiff asserts it was, when defendant started the automobile, then the next condition to the imputation of wanton misconduct to defendant in her act of starting the automobile was likewise a jury question.
The question for decision is answered in the affirmative. The jury could find defendant guilty of wantonness under the stated circumstances.
*234 The court did not err in refusing affirmative instructions for defendant, and the judgment is due to be affirmed.
Affirmed.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.