Title: Thomas Strasser v. Transtech Mobile Fleet Service, Inc.
Citation: 2000 WI 87
Docket Number: 1998AP001581
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 7, 2000

2000 WI 87 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-1581 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Thomas Strasser and Sandra R. Strasser,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
Transtech Mobile Fleet Service, Inc. and  
Heritage Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
Defendants-Respondents.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  230 Wis. 2d 185, 603 N.W.2d 748 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 7, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
May 2, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Patricia D. McMahon 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
CROOKS, J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there 
were briefs by Louis E. Baureis, Robert B. Erdmann and Daniel P. 
Kondos, S.C. Law Offices, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Robert 
B. Erdmann. 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief 
by Arthur P. Simpson and Simpson & Deardorff, S.C., Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by Arthur P. Simpson. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by David J. 
Hanus and  Hannan, Siesennop & Sullivan, Milwaukee, on behalf of 
the Civil Trial Counsel of Wisconsin. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by D.J. Weis, 
Diane Hubler, and Habush, Habush, Davis & Rottier, S.C., 
Rhinelander, on behalf of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
2000 WI 87 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No.  98-1581 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Thomas Strasser and Sandra R. Strasser,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Transtech Mobile Fleet Service, Inc. and  
Heritage Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   Thomas and Sandra R. Strasser 
(Strasser) seek review of an unpublished decision of the court 
of appeals1 that affirmed a decision of the Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County, Patricia D. McMahon, Judge.  The circuit court 
granted summary judgment to Transtech Mobile Fleet Service, Inc. 
                     
1 Strasser v. Transtech Mobile Fleet Serv. Inc., No. 98-
1581, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 1999).  
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
2 
and 
its 
insurer, 
Heritage 
Mutual 
Insurance 
(collectively 
Transtech), in a personal injury action brought by Strasser 
after he slipped and fell from a crane ladder that Transtech 
fabricated and installed. 
¶2 
Strasser 
alleged 
Transtech 
negligently 
failed 
to 
install safety step treads on the ladder rungs and negligently 
failed to warn him about the danger the ladder posed.  In 
granting summary judgment to Transtech, the circuit court relied 
on this court's decision in Rolph v. EBI Cos., 159 Wis. 2d 518, 
464 N.W.2d 667 (1991) and held that as a "reconditioner," 
Transtech was under no duty to bring the ladder into compliance 
with specific safety standards.  The court also concluded that 
Transtech was under no duty to warn Strasser about an open and 
obvious danger. 
¶3 
The court of appeals affirmed, adopting a different 
theory. Strasser v. Transtech Mobile Fleet Serv. Inc., No. 98-
1581, unpublished slip op. at 6, 2 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 
1999).  The court held that Transtech was entitled to summary 
judgment because Strasser confronted an open and obvious danger. 
 Id. at 8-9.  Judge Curley concurred in the result but disagreed 
with the majority's reliance on the open and obvious danger 
doctrine.  She instead found the holding of Rolph dispositive 
and declared that Transtech could not be held strictly liable 
for the repair of a product that it did not place into the 
stream of commerce.  Strasser, unpublished slip op. at 1-2 
(Curley, J., concurring).  Judge Curley also concluded that 
Transtech could not be negligent for failure to warn because 
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
3 
Rolph absolves reconditioners from the duty to warn about 
defects in original products.  Id. at 2. 
¶4 
Strasser presents two issues for our review.  First, 
does the open and obvious danger doctrine bar recovery in this 
case?  Second, does our holding in Rolph, relating to the 
limited liability of reconditioners, preclude relief for this 
claim? 
¶5 
We frame our decision around the two claims Strasser 
presented in his pleadings, namely whether Transtech was 
negligent in its fabrication of the ladders, and whether 
Transtech was negligent in failing to warn Strasser about the 
condition of the ladders.  We hold that summary judgment was 
inappropriate because our holding in Rolph does not apply to the 
particular facts of this case, and this case presents questions 
of material fact that require resolution by a factfinder.  We 
also conclude that the claim for failure to warn cannot go 
forward because Transtech was not negligent in failing to warn 
Strasser about a condition known to be dangerous.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand the 
case to the circuit court for trial or further proceedings 
consistent with this decision. 
FACTS 
 
¶6 
Some of the facts in this case are in dispute.  
Strasser began working at Recycled Fibers in January 1993.  
Recycled Fibers is a Milwaukee company that collects bales of 
cardboard boxes from various locations, such as grocery stores, 
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
4 
and recycles them at its plant.  Strasser was a truck driver and 
crane operator for the company. 
¶7 
Strasser 
loaded 
large quantities 
of 
heavy 
baled 
cardboard using a crane mounted on the flatbed trailer of a 
truck.  The trailer-mounted crane assembly was manufactured by a 
company that is not a party in this action, Transcraft.  The 
crane featured two ladders, one mounted on each side.  To 
operate the crane, Strasser, who weighed 180 pounds, would climb 
up one of the ladders.  Upon reaching the top, he positioned 
himself on a seat situated about 13 feet in the air.  From this 
seat, Strasser controlled the crane and collected the bales of 
cardboard boxes.  During the course of this work, he climbed up 
and down the crane ladders about 30 times each day. 
 
¶8 
The crane Strasser used was maintained and repaired by 
Transtech, a mobile fleet repair service.  In 1994, Transtech 
employed four to five people and had accounts with approximately 
25 businesses, including Recycled Fibers.  Transtech did not 
sell trailers, cranes, or parts to Recycled Fibers or any other 
business.  Between 1993 and 1994, Transtech's owner and 
operator, 
Darryl Frick (Frick), personally 
supervised the 
Recycled Fibers account, providing services "constantly" by 
making several daily visits to the plant.  
¶9 
Frick was responsible for all the maintenance work, 
including the checking of hydraulic lines, hoses, brakes, and 
lights, and anything else requested to be repaired.  At his 
deposition, Frick testified that he often made repairs at the 
request of the drivers and not always with the authorization of 
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
5 
Recycled Fibers' regional or district manager, Tom Marzo 
(Marzo).  
¶10 Frick and his employees frequently straightened and 
rebolted the crane ladders on several of the trailers Recycled 
Fibers owned.  The rickety ladders often bent and twisted 
because the bolts that attached the ladders at the top and 
bottom to the crane assembly came out as the bales bumped and 
hit them.  Although Frick wanted to make his repairs safe, he 
stated that Recycled Fibers "didn't give me a standard or I 
didn't give them a safety standard to keep up with."   
 
¶11 After the two crane ladders on the trailer Strasser 
operated were destroyed, either by being hit by a bale or piece 
of machinery, Strasser's boss, Marzo, asked Frick to put better 
ladders on the crane.  Frick never acted as a seller, 
distributor, or dealer for any type of ladder.  
¶12 Both Strasser and Marzo told Frick they wanted a 
sturdier ladder and asked Frick to install "safety steps" or an 
"expanded metal step."  Strasser described these steps as "stair 
treads" featuring U-shaped pieces of metal with holes punched 
through that "left prickers sticking out the top" to prevent 
slipping.  Frick acknowledged that safety steps were important 
because hydraulic fluid sometimes leaked onto the steps.  The 
existing rungs on the ladders had grooves cut into them, 
creating what Strasser called a "non-slip bar," not safety 
steps.2 
                     
2 Frick stated that the old rungs had no grooves and were 
completely smooth.  
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
6 
¶13 Frick interpreted the discussion about safety steps as 
"more of a request. . . .   They said, 'if you can get this on 
there, that's what we'd like.'"  Marzo told Frick, "It would be 
really nice to have steps like they put on the newer crane."  
Frick informed Strasser and Marzo he would not be able to meet 
the request:  He did not have the materials and would not be 
able to obtain them in the time frame allotted for the job 
because his supplier did not stock them.3  Frick said Marzo told 
him that Recycled Fibers had materials for the safety steps in 
its mill.  When Frick went to the mill as Marzo suggested, he 
found no one there willing to give him the material. 
¶14 Strasser testified that Frick never verbally made any 
representations that he could bring the trailer into compliance 
with any safety standards.  Moreover, Strasser never asked Frick 
to have the ladders comply with any government safety standards 
or be "up to code" with any specific safety rules.  Similarly, 
Frick stated that Recycled Fibers made no demands to bring the 
ladders in line with any safety standards.   
¶15 A March 29, 1994, invoice indicates that Transtech 
fabricated and installed ladders for the crane on Strasser's 
trailer.  To Frick, "fabricate and install" meant that he was 
building new ladders to replace the old ones on the trailer, 
thus repairing the machine as a whole, not providing the machine 
                     
3 Strasser testified that Frick worked on the trailer for a 
"[c]ouple of hours" and stated that he waited for it while Frick 
did the work.  Frick expected the crane to be dropped off at 
Transtech on Friday and returned Sunday night.   
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
7 
with new parts.  Strasser testified that Frick "built new 
uprights and put rungs in between."  
¶16 The rungs on the new ladders were made from cut "U 
bolts" consisting of threaded metal.  The threaded metal created 
grooves running about three-quarters of the way across the ten-
inch long rungs.  Thus, about two-and-one-half inches of each 
rung was smooth.  
¶17 Strasser picked up the crane from Frick.  Frick 
testified that Strasser told him "how great [the ladders] 
looked" and made no mention of the request for safety steps.  
Moreover, Frick did not remember any complaints directed to him 
about the ladders or requests for further modifications after he 
completed the work.  
¶18 Strasser disputes Frick's account, stating that he 
telephoned Frick and told him to install non-slip stair treads 
on the rungs on "[t]he day he built the ladder."  Strasser 
testified that Frick did not have the treads and did not know 
where to obtain them.  Although Strasser knew the treads could 
be found at the Recycled Fibers power house, he conceded that he 
did not tell Frick to procure them there.  
¶19 According to Strasser, the fabricated ladders had 
completely smooth treads.  He stated that the new rungs provided 
a wider footing.  But after he began using the ladders, Strasser 
found the steps slippery and attributed that condition to the 
lack of non-slip stair treads on the rungs.  Within a few days 
after Frick did the work, Strasser slipped twice.  Strasser did 
not return the ladder to Frick.  But Strasser told Marzo about 
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
8 
the slipperiness, and Strasser instructed a dispatcher to call 
Frick "and tell him to make it right."  Frick did not recall 
being contacted by the dispatcher, but he stated that it was 
possible that Strasser may have mentioned that he nearly fell 
off the ladder.   
¶20 On June 7, 1994, Strasser was picking up baled 
cardboard in cloudy, drizzling midday weather in an alley behind 
a Piggly Wiggly store.  Strasser had only one stop left after 
this supermarket, and he already had been to 25 or 30 sites.  He 
experienced no difficulties going up the ladder.  On his way 
down, however, both of Strasser's feet slipped on the bottom 
rung.  When his feet slipped, Strasser lost his grip on the 
ladder with both hands and, instead of landing on the bed of the 
trailer, fell about four and one-half feet to the concrete 
pavement below.  
¶21 Strasser injured his right knee in the accident.  
Although the injury initially was diagnosed as a sprain, 
Strasser later learned that he suffered torn ligaments and 
tendons.  After surgery, Strasser found that it hurt to walk, 
and he testified that he has no feeling in the front of his leg. 
 At the time of his 1997 deposition, Strasser still was working 
at Recycled Fibers as a truck driver and crane operator. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
¶22 On June 5, 1997, Strasser filed suit against Frick and 
Transtech, presenting three causes of action.  First, the 
complaint 
alleged 
that 
Transtech 
negligently 
designed, 
manufactured, constructed, assembled, and installed the ladders. 
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
9 
 Second, the complaint stated that Transtech negligently failed 
to provide Strasser with reasonable warnings about the defects 
it knew, or should have known, were present in the ladders.  
Third, Strasser submitted a derivative claim, contending that 
Sandra Strasser suffered loss of consortium because of her 
husband's injuries.  
 
¶23 The parties entered a stipulation on January 16, 1998, 
dismissing Frick as a defendant.4  Transtech moved for summary 
judgment on January 30 on the grounds that:  (1) as a 
reconditioner it owed no duty to bring the trailer-mounted crane 
assembly into compliance with applicable safety standards, and 
(2) it owed Strasser no duty to warn about the open and obvious 
condition of the ladders on the crane assembly. 
 
¶24 The circuit court granted Transtech's summary judgment 
motion, holding that the controversy presented no genuine issue 
                     
4 On January 26, 1998, Marzo met with a notary public and 
recorded an affidavit in which he explained that Strasser fell 
from a ladder recently repaired by Frick at his orders.  Marzo 
indicated that Frick was "to install ladder tread on the crane" 
and stated that he complained to Frick after Frick failed to 
make the modification.  Marzo believed that Strasser also 
complained about the tread.  
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
10
of material fact.5  The court based its rationale on three 
factors.  First, Transtech could not be held liable under Rolph. 
 The court stated that as a reconditioner, "Transtech did not 
sell the ladders.  They didn't know of any specific industry or 
government safety standards.  They did not represent that they 
could bring the trailer in compliance with any standards, and 
there is no evidence of a request for those standards."   
¶25 Second, the circuit court reasoned that Rolph requires 
expert testimony about current safety standards.  Although the 
court found that "there was a request that safety steps" be 
installed, Strasser provided no evidence that the steps would 
have complied with a specific standard or that the safety steps 
would have prevented the accident.  Third, the court held that 
Transtech was under no duty to warn Strasser about an open and 
obvious condition of the ladders. 
 
¶26 Strasser appealed.  In a majority opinion authored by 
Judge Schudson, the court of appeals affirmed but declined to 
                     
5 At the motion hearing, the court refused to admit Marzo's 
handwritten affidavit as evidence.  The court reasoned that the 
affidavit presented no "indicia of formality:"  It had no date, 
did not indicate where the statement was made, and did not state 
whether it was taken under oath.  The court also suggested that 
the affidavit was taken after the discovery period had closed.  
The circuit court noted that the affidavit speaks to the fact in 
dispute in this case, namely whether Strasser actually asked 
Frick to install the safety treads:  "[I]f you believe Marzo, if 
you accept the affidavit, Transtech was asked to put certain 
items on, they didn't do it, and so they didn't fulfill their 
request."  The circuit court found, however, that even if 
Marzo's statement were accepted, it provided no basis for 
deciding against the summary judgment motion because other legal 
arguments weighed in Transtech's favor.   
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
11
follow the circuit court's reasoning.  The court rejected the 
Rolph analysis for two reasons.  First, it found that Transtech 
was not a "reconditioner" because Transtech built and installed 
new ladders.  Strasser, unpublished slip op. at 7-8.  Second, 
the court found that expert testimony about safety standards was 
not necessary because an average juror understands that ladder 
rungs with treads are safer.  Id. at 7.  Instead, the court of 
appeals affirmed the decision on the basis of the open and 
obvious danger doctrine.6 
¶27 Judge Curley wrote separately to express disagreement 
with the majority's analysis.  Strasser, unpublished slip op. at 
1 (Curley, J., concurring).  Noting that the open and obvious 
danger doctrine is "merely an element to be considered by the 
jury in apportioning negligence," Judge Curley concluded that 
Rolph provides the basis for affirming the circuit court's 
decision.  Id. at 3-4, 1.  Under Rolph, "a reconditioner who 
does not manufacture, distribute, or sell the products it 
reconditions is not liable in strict products liability for the 
                     
6 The court reasoned: 
Strasser knew exactly what he was receiving and 
whether it provided the safety he desired.  Nothing 
could have been more open and obvious, thus erasing 
any possible duty Transtech otherwise might have had 
to warn of any danger.  Strasser accepted the crane 
with the new ladders.  He "can't have it both ways."  
Thus, according to the undisputed facts, Strasser 
cannot support the allegation in his complaint that 
Transtech "failed to provide . . . reasonable warning 
of defects and hazards . . . in the ladder." 
 
Unpublished slip op. at 9. 
 
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
12
defects in the machines it reconditions."  159 Wis. 2d at 524.  
Because Transtech did not manufacture, distribute, or sell 
laddersnor place them into the stream of commerceJudge Curley 
found that it was a reconditioner 
that 
fell 
under the 
protections of Rolph.  Id. at 1-2.  Moreover, Judge Curley 
concluded that under ordinary negligence principles, Transtech 
cannot be responsible for failure to warn about the dangers of 
the ladder because Rolph absolves reconditioners from the duty 
to warn about a defect in the original product.  Id. at 2. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶28 This case requires the court to review the circuit 
court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 802.08 (1997-98) sets forth the procedure for summary 
judgment.  The purpose of summary judgment is to determine 
whether a controversy can be resolved without a trial.  Summary 
judgment "shall be rendered" if:  (1) there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact, and (2) the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  A circuit 
court's decision not to grant summary judgment is often treated 
with latitude on review, Lyons v. Menominee Enterp., Inc., 67 
Wis. 2d 504, 506-07, 227 N.W.2d 208 (1975); but a circuit 
court's decision to grant summary judgment is a question of law 
that the court reviews independently.  Gaertner v. Holcka, 219 
Wis. 2d 436, 445-46, 580 N.W.2d 271 (1998).   
¶29 Summary judgment is a drastic remedy because it 
deprives the losing party of a trial or even an evidentiary 
hearing.  Still, the law recognizes the cost and inconvenience 
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
13
of litigation, and it requires a party to plead and support its 
claims or defenses in a timely manner to avoid wasting 
resources.  When the court is faced with a controversy in which 
no material facts are in dispute and a party's position cannot 
prevail as a matter of law, it has no obligation to delay 
judgment and thereby consume additional court time.   
¶30 In reviewing a decision on summary judgment, we 
utilize the same methodology as that applied by the circuit 
court.  Riccitelli v. Broekhuizen, 227 Wis. 2d 100, 110, 595 
N.W.2d 392 (1999).  A reviewing court thus will not reverse a 
summary judgment decision unless the record reveals that one or 
more genuine issues of material fact are in dispute or the 
moving party is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
See Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 
816 (1987). 
¶31 The moving party bears the burden of establishing the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.  If the moving 
party makes a prima facie case for summary judgment, the 
reviewing court then examines the pleadings, affidavits, and 
depositions to determine whether any material facts are in 
dispute that would entitle the opposing party to a trial.  See 
In re Cherokee Park Plat, 113 Wis. 2d 112, 115-16, 334 N.W.2d 
580 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338, 
294 N.W.2d 473 (1980)). 
 
¶32 Not every factual dispute merits litigation.  The 
dispute must center on a "genuine issue of material fact."  A 
factual issue is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a 
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
14
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 
 Baxter v. DNR, 165 Wis. 2d 298, 312, 477 N.W.2d 648 (Ct. App. 
1991).  A "material fact" is one that impacts the resolution of 
the controversy.  Interest of Michael R.B., 175 Wis. 2d 713, 
724, 499 N.W.2d 641 (1993).  In analyzing whether there are 
genuine issues of material fact, we draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.  Grams, 97 Wis. 2d 
at 339. 
 
¶33 In this case, there is a factual dispute about whether 
Strasser directed Frick to install safety steps.  Under the 
summary judgment methodology, we will assume, as did the circuit 
court, that there was a request for safety steps. 
ANALYSIS 
¶34 We begin our analysis by focusing the nature of our 
review.  As presented to the circuit court, this case centered 
on two negligence claims.7  The complaint did not make a strict 
liability claim or a contract claim.  In its briefs to this 
court and at oral argument, however, Strasser contoured the 
                     
7 First, Strasser contended that Transtech was negligent in 
the 
design, 
manufacture, 
construction, 
assembly, 
and 
installation of the ladder by failing to install safety steps on 
the ladder rungs.  Second, Strasser alleged that Transtech was 
negligent because it failed to warn about the dangerous 
condition of the ladder.   
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
15
controversy as a cause of action sounding in contract.8  We 
decline 
to 
review 
the 
circuit 
court's 
summary 
judgment 
determination under principles governing contract law.  When 
reviewing summary judgment, this court analyzes the pleadings, 
depositions, and affidavits by employing the same methodology as 
the circuit court.  We confine our review to the proofs that 
were before the circuit court and do not consider issues raised 
for the first time on appeal. 
¶35 We therefore turn to Strasser's underlying theory of 
liability, negligence.  In one sense, this is a routine case of 
ordinary negligence.  At trial, Strasser would be required to 
prove four elements:  "1) A duty of care on the part of the 
defendant; 2) a breach of that duty; 3) a causal connection 
between the conduct and the injury; and 4) an actual loss or 
damage as a result of the injury."  Peters v. Menard, Inc., 224 
Wis. 2d 174, 192, 589 N.W.2d 395 (1999) (quoting Rockweit v. 
                     
8 Strasser states that the complaint alleged "claims of 
product liability, common negligence and breach of agreement."  
According to Strasser, "Transtech is not liable simply because 
it reconditioned or disassembled the ladder:  it is liable 
because it specifically agreed to provide non-slip rungs but 
failed to do so."  Stated otherwise, Strasser argues it "is not 
seeking to recover from Transtech as a reconditioner for its 
failure to make the rungs 'more safe', but rather because 
Transtech breached its contractual duty to install non-slip 
rungs."  Strasser summarizes:  "Rolph does not bar Strasser's 
ordinary negligence claim sounding in contract."   
In her concurrence, Judge Curley noted that "Strasser never 
pled a breach of warranty cause of action, nor could he, since 
he had no privity of contract with Transtech."  Strasser, 
unpublished slip op. at 3 (Curley, J., concurring). 
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
16
Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 418, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995)).  A 
factfinder would decide whether Transtech exercised ordinary 
care in fabricating the two ladders. 
¶36 In another sense, however, this is an important case 
involving critical issues of policy and law.  Arguably, 
Transtech fits into the special category of "reconditioner."  In 
Rolph, this court took pains to relieve "reconditioners" from 
liability in certain circumstances as a matter of public policy. 
 We recognized that in some circumstances "reconditioners" are 
in a difficult position that affects their duty of care. 
¶37 Because Rolph is vital to the resolution of this case, 
we restate its facts and holding.  Kevin Rolph (Rolph) filed a 
personal injury action against the manufacturer of a bending 
roll machine in which Rolph caught and seriously injured his 
hand.  Rolph, 159 Wis. 2d at 523.  The manufacturer, in turn, 
sued J. C. Busch (Busch), a company that had been hired by the 
owner of the machine to recondition the machine by disassembling 
it, cleaning it, inspecting it for wear, and replacing certain 
parts.  Id. at 523, 530.  The owner had not asked Busch to 
evaluate the safety of the machine, or to correct any safety 
problems with the machine, or to warn it if the machine were in 
an unsafe condition or if new safety devices were available.  
Id. at 537.  Busch was not in the business of manufacturing, 
distributing, or selling machines like the one it reconditioned. 
 It did not place the machine in the stream of commerce.  Id. at 
530.  It did not represent that the machine was safe.  Busch 
worked on many different kinds of machines in its business, so 
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
17
it did not keep abreast of all new safety devices or safety 
standards.  Id. at 531.  Two expert witnesses, however, gave 
deposition testimony about current safety standards for bending 
roll machines and concluded that installation of an emergency 
stop device would have prevented Rolph's injury.  Id. at 526-27. 
¶38 In Rolph, the manufacturer of the machine, in an 
effort to obtain third party contribution for damages, argued 
that Busch had a duty to correct a dangerous condition in the 
machine or at least to warn users of the machine that it was 
dangerous or failed to meet current safety standards. 
¶39 This court sustained a summary judgment in favor of 
Busch on strict liability.  Id. at 532.  It ruled that a 
reconditioner who does not manufacture, distribute, or sell the 
products it reconditions is not liable in strict liability for 
the machines it reconditions.  Id. at 524.   
 
¶40 The court also supported Busch on a distinct, second 
issue, a claim of ordinary negligence.  Id. at 532.  The court 
ruled that a reconditioner does not have a duty to bring the 
machines it reconditions into compliance with applicable safety 
standards, except:  (1) when it holds itself out as bringing 
machines into compliance with safety standards, and (2) when it 
is requested to do so by the machine's owner.  Id. at 524.  The 
court explained that imposing liability on the reconditioner for 
"failing 
to 
correct 
a 
design 
defect 
simply 
because 
it 
reconditioned 
the 
machine 
would 
make 
all 
repairers 
who 
disassemble a product in order to repair it insurers against 
design defects created by manufacturers."  Id. at 535. 
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
18
 
¶41 This 
examination 
shows 
that 
under 
Rolph, 
a 
"reconditioner" who does not change a machine, who simply 
restores a machine to an earlier condition by repairing it, 
renovating it, or rebuilding it may not be held liable for 
defects in the original machine or for failing to alert its 
customer about dangers, particularly hidden dangers, in the 
original machine.  A "reconditioner" may, however, be held 
liable for negligence in its own work.  As an example, if a 
reconditioner were to disassemble a machine with 10 parts and 
then negligently reassemble it with only eight parts, thereby 
causing injury, the reconditioner could be held liable under a 
theory of ordinary negligence. 
 
¶42 This case requires us to apply the principles of Rolph 
to a different set of facts.  The circuit court determined that 
Transtech was a reconditioner that did not have a duty to 
install ladder treads.  Judge Curley, in her concurrence in the 
court of appeals, reached the same conclusion.  The court of 
appeals majority came to a different conclusion.  It noted that 
although Transtech "may have been a reconditioner of the crane 
by virtue of its work on the ladders, it was not a reconditioner 
of the ladders; rather, it built and installed new ones."  
Strasser, unpublished slip op. at 7-8.  This difference, the 
majority 
indicated, 
put 
the 
applicability 
of 
Rolph 
into 
question. 
 
¶43 Both conclusions are understandable.  On the one hand, 
Transtech was indisputably a reconditioner of the trailer-
mounted cranes.  More generally, it was in the business of 
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
19
maintaining 
and 
repairing 
trucks. 
 
Transtech 
was 
not 
a 
manufacturer of ladders.  It did not distribute or sell ladders. 
 It had no particular expertise in building ladders.  It was not 
familiar with the safety standards for ladders.  It made no 
representation that it was.  Transtech was asked to replace two 
ladders that were a component of the crane assembly, with 
requests for improvement.  Transtech was not given the time to 
design, test, and build completely safe ladders.  It was not 
supplied directions, designs, or safety standards.  It told 
Recycled Fibers that it did not have the materials suggested 
that might have made the ladders safer.  It said that it could 
not deliver everything that Recycled Fibers requested. 
 
¶44 On the other hand, Transtech did build two ladders.  
It did not merely disassemble parts and then put them back 
together.  It did not replace parts with fungible generic parts. 
 It made new parts.  Hence, if there were any defects in the new 
ladders, it was Transtech that created them, not the original 
manufacturer.  Transtech fabricated two ladders that were 
sturdier than the original ladders and had wider rungs.  It 
changed the design.  As part of this change, the new rungs were 
deeper than the old rungs, did not have what Strasser described 
as the "non-slip bars" that were on the old rungs, and were 
smoother than the old rungs.9  The circuit court acknowledged 
"that Mr. Strasser [ ] could give a lay opinion based upon his 
                     
9 The smoothness is a disputed fact.  On summary judgment, 
we accept Strasser's version of the factual dispute.  
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
20
experience in the field as to the usefulness of the ladder 
treads" that he requested.  Strasser argued:  "A jury need not 
hear from an 'expert' to know that a non-slip rung is safer than 
a smooth bolt rung."  The court of appeals accepted this 
argument. 
 
¶45 This case, then, presents a more difficult fact 
situation than Rolph.  In Rolph, the reconditioner was charged 
with not addressing and correcting a defect in the product that 
the manufacturer had created.  Here, the reconditioner is 
accused of creating a defect in the parts it fabricated. 
 
¶46 The real issue is whether fabricating replacement 
parts 
for 
a 
machine 
is 
the 
functional 
equivalent 
of 
reconditioning the machine when the replacement parts are not 
the same. 
 
¶47 We 
conclude 
that 
vocationally, 
Transtech 
was 
a 
reconditioner, but functionally it was not.  Transtech did not 
manufacture, distribute, or sell crane assemblies or ladders.  
It reconditioned one crane assembly by fabricating two ladders 
to replace the other ladders.  It did not hold itself out as 
having special expertise to perform this repair work. 
 
¶48 If Transtech had 
remained 
a pure 
reconditioner, 
Transtech would have had no duty to go beyond restoring the 
crane to its original condition.  It would have had no duty on 
its own to put safety treads on the ladders because safety 
treads were not part of the original ladders.  Transtech would 
have been required to use ordinary care in its work restoring, 
renovating, and rebuilding the crane ladders, nothing more.   
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
21
 
¶49 But Transtech assumed a new role.  It ceased to be a 
functional reconditioner.  The circuit court accepted as fact 
that Recycled Fibers directed Transtech to install safety treads 
on the new ladders.  Recycled Fibers also asked for ladders that 
were stronger and sturdier than the old ladders.  There is no 
dispute that Transtech made new ladders that were different from 
the old ladders to accommodate, in part, Recycled Fibers' 
requests.  In some respects, the new ladders were better than 
the old ladders, even though the new rungs may have been 
smoother than the old rungs.  That is a fact in dispute.  In 
fabricating 
new 
ladders, 
Transtech 
was 
no 
longer 
"reconditioning" a manufacturer's product.  It was building 
"parts" that were its own product.  The facts changed, and 
therefore the rules have to change with them.  Whether Transtech 
exercised ordinary care when it assumed its new role is 
quintessentially a jury question. 
¶50 Transtech's new duty should be put in context.  
Wisconsin follows the rule that every person owes a duty of care 
to the world at large to refrain from conduct that could cause 
foreseeable harms to others.  Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
219 Wis. 2d 250, 260, 500 N.W.2d 233 (1998).  The duty of a 
defendant 
is 
established 
when it 
is 
clear 
that it was 
foreseeable that the defendant's act or omission to act might 
cause harm to someone.  Rolph, 159 Wis. 2d at 532 (quoting 
Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 235, 424 N.W.2d 159 
(1988)).   
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
22
¶51 Duty pivots on foreseeability.  Morden v. Continental 
AG, 2000 WI 51, ¶ 46, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___N.W.2d ___.  It is not 
necessary for a plaintiff to prove that a particular injury is 
foreseeable; rather, it is sufficient to show that some injury 
to some person is foreseeable.  Id. at ¶ 47.  It is not 
unforeseeable that a person who uses a ladder 30 times per day, 
five days per week, approximately 50 weeks per year, sometimes 
in rain, potentially in snow, could slip off the ladder, and 
that ladders designed for such a person must be crafted with 
ordinary care to prevent slipping.  Thus, a jury might find that 
a traditional manufacturer of the kind of ladders provided to 
Strasser designed or built them with a lack of ordinary care 
because there were established ways to make the ladders less 
slippery. 
¶52 Transtech, 
however, 
was 
not 
a 
traditional 
manufacturer.  It was a reconditioner called upon to undertake 
an additional service.  If this case goes to trial, Transtech 
should not be treated as a traditional manufacturer unless the 
facts prove different from how we understand them. 
¶53 The Civil Jury Instructions for Negligence:  Duty of 
Manufacturer provide: 
 
It is the duty of a manufacturer to exercise ordinary 
care in the design, construction, and manufacture of 
its product so as to render such product safe for its 
intended use.   
 
It is the further duty of the manufacturer, in the 
exercise of ordinary care, to make all reasonable and 
adequate tests and inspections of its product so as to 
guard against any defective condition which would 
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
23
render such product unsafe when used as it is intended 
to be used (emphasis added). 
Wis JICivil 3240. 
¶54 These instructions do not apply to Transtech because 
Transtech was not in the business of manufacturing ladders.  On 
the facts at hand, there was no chance for Transtech to make 
"reasonable and adequate tests and inspections" of the two 
ladders so as to guard against any defective condition.  The 
record suggests that Recycled Fibers did not want its crane 
assembly out of circulation very long.  It wanted a speedy 
repair.  Strasser apparently waited for the crane ladders while 
Transtech worked on them.  Recycled Fibers did not ask for an 
exact duplicate of the old ladders.  It wanted Transtech to 
improvise and to produce new ladders that would be stronger and 
sturdier than the old ladders. 
 
¶55 The test-and-inspect standard in the jury instructions 
is a standard that a reconditioner pushed to do more may not be 
able to meet, at least in a short time frame.  Hence, there may 
be situations in which an entity like Transtech does not have 
the same "duty of care" as a manufacturer, even though it is 
"fabricating" a "product." 
 
¶56 We must remand this case to the circuit court because 
there are genuine issues of material fact:  What exactly did 
Strasser and Marzo request from Transtech, and when did they 
request it?  How much time did Transtech have to design and 
build the ladders?  How did the new ladders compare with the old 
ladders?  On a motion for summary judgment, the court is 
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
24
required to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party.  When we do that here, we are unable to hold for 
Transtech as a matter of law.  Whether Transtech exercised 
ordinary care in designing and building the ladders, under the 
special circumstances of this case, is a question of fact for a 
jury. 
¶57 We next discuss Strasser's second cause of action.  
Strasser contends Transtech negligently failed to provide him 
with warnings about defects it knew or should have known were 
present in the ladders.  This claim does not have merit.   
¶58 Each individual is held, at the very least, to a 
standard of ordinary care in all activities.  Where the parties 
agree upon the facts, the existence of a duty presents a 
question of law.  Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 419.  The standard of 
care for a "manufacturer" of a product is to warn of dangers 
that he or she knows or should know are associated with the 
proper use of the product.  This duty exists whether or not the 
product was properly designed.  The jury instructions for 
Negligence:  Duty of Manufacturer [ ] to Warn, provide in part: 
 
A manufacturer [ ] of a product has a duty to exercise 
ordinary care to warn of dangers which he or she 
knows, or should know, are associated with the proper 
use of a product.  This duty exists whether or not the 
product was properly designed.  "Proper use" means a 
use which is intended by the manufacturer [ ].  In 
addition, a manufacturer [ ] has the duty to warn of 
dangers inherent in a use not intended by the 
manufacturer [ ] if such unintended use is reasonably 
foreseeable by the manufacturer [ ]. 
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
25
Wis JICivil 3242.  These jury instructions reflect our adoption 
of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965).  See Westphal v. 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 192 Wis. 2d 347, 365, 531 N.W.2d 386 
(1995) (citing Vogt v. S.M. Byrne Constr. Co., 17 Wis. 2d 96, 
99, 115 N.W.2d 485 (1962), modified, 17 Wis. 2d 96, 117 N.W.2d 
362 (1962)).  Section 388 of the Restatement addresses the duty 
of a manufacturer to warn in negligence actions: 
 
One who supplies directly or through a third person a 
chattel for another to use is subject to liability to 
those whom the supplier should expect to use the 
chattel with the consent of the other or to be 
endangered by its probable use, for physical harm 
caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for 
which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if 
the supplier 
 
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is 
likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is 
supplied, and 
 
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use 
the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous 
condition, and  
 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them 
of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make 
it likely to be dangerous. 
Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388) (emphasis 
added).  Comment (c) clarifies that this rule "also appl[ies] to 
one who undertakes the repair of a chattel and who delivers it 
back with knowledge that it is defective because of the work 
which he is employed to do upon it."  Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 388, cmt. c.  Subsection (b) of § 388 expressly provides 
that manufacturers are under a duty to warn only if the 
manufacturer as "no reason to believe" that the user "will 
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
26
realize" the item's dangerous condition.  Comment (k) further 
clarifies this point: 
 
When warning of defects unnecessary.  One who supplies 
a chattel to others to use for any purpose is under a 
duty to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its 
dangerous character in so far as it is known to him, 
or of facts which to his knowledge make it likely to 
be dangerous, if, but only if, he has no reason to 
expect that those for whose use the chattel is 
supplied will discover its condition and realize the 
danger involved.  It is not necessary for the supplier 
to inform those for whose use the chattel is supplied 
of a condition which a mere casual looking over will 
disclose, unless the circumstances under which the 
chattel is supplied are such as to make it likely that 
even so casual an inspection will not be made.   
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388, cmt. k (emphasis added); 
see also Estate of Schilling v. Blount, 152 Wis. 2d 608, 619-20, 
449 N.W.2d 56 (Ct. App. 1989).  As the court of appeals noted in 
Schilling, many jurisdictions have adopted comment (k) and do 
not require manufacturers to warn about commonly known dangers. 
 Schilling, 152 Wis. 2d at 620 n.28.  This exception recognizes 
that a warning is not necessary to satisfy the standard of 
ordinary care when the condition at issue is known to the user.  
 
¶59 In this case Transtech need not have warned Strasser 
as a matter of law because Transtech had reason to believe that 
Strasser realized that the ladders had no safety treads.  Here 
there is no dispute about Strasser's knowledge.  Strasser knew 
the day he picked up the repaired crane assembly that the crane 
ladders did not have stair treads.  He discussed the absence of 
stair treads with others.  He slipped twice on the ladders over 
the ten-week period in which he had the ladders before his 
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
27
injury.  In short, Strasser knew everything that Transtech could 
have told him.  It was not necessary for Transtech to inform 
Strasser about the absence of stair treads because Strasser's 
actions made clear that "a mere casual looking over" or "casual 
inspection" disclosed that the treads were not there.  In the 
circumstances of this case, Transtech's failure to warn Strasser 
about the absence of safety treads in the new ladders was not 
negligence. 
 
¶60 Strasser argues that the question whether ordinary 
care required Transtech to warn him about the ladders should be 
presented to a jury because whether a plaintiff confronted an 
"open and obvious danger" is an element to be considered by the 
factfinder in apportioning negligence and will not entirely 
preclude the plaintiff's recovery.  See also Rockweit, 197 
Wis. 2d at 423.  We disagree.  As our courts consistently 
recognize: 
 
Where the facts alleged to give rise to a duty are 
agreed upon, the question of the existence of a duty 
is one of law.  This question is closely related to 
the question of whether a defendant is not negligent 
as a matter of law, i.e., based on the facts 
presented, no properly instructed, reasonable jury 
could find the defendant failed to exercise ordinary 
care. 
Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 419 (quoting Olson v. Ratzel, 89 
Wis. 2d 227, 251-52, 278 N.W.2d 238 (Ct. App. 1979)).  The issue 
of ordinary care, which is the claim Strasser set forth in the 
pleadings, is distinct from the open and obvious danger 
doctrine.  The doctrine operates as an affirmative defense that 
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
28
allows a jury to allocate a plaintiff's contributory negligence. 
 Whether Transtech failed to exercise ordinary care in the first 
place is a question of law to be decided in this case by a 
court.  When, as here, we find that no negligence exists, the 
analysis ceases and the issue does not go before a jury. 
 
¶61 We add, however, that if this case reaches a jury on 
the first issue, namely whether Transtech was liable under 
principles of ordinary negligence in its fabrication of the 
ladders, then it would be permissible for the factfinder to 
consider whether Strasser confronted an open and obvious danger 
in its negligence allocation. 
¶62 We therefore hold that Transtech was not negligent in 
failing to warn Strasser about the condition of the new ladders 
because Strasser knew about the dangerous condition of the 
ladders.  
CONCLUSION 
¶63 We find that this case presents issues of material 
fact that make summary judgment inappropriate.  We hold that 
Strasser's claim of ordinary negligence in its fabrication of 
the ladders should be presented to a factfinder for resolution. 
 We conclude, however, that the claim for failure to warn cannot 
proceed because Transtech was not negligent as a matter of law 
in failing to warn Strasser about a condition known to be 
dangerous.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the case to the circuit court for trial or 
further proceedings consistent with this decision. 
 
No. 
98-1581  
 
 
29
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded. 
 
 
 
 
No. 98-1581.jpw 
 
1 
¶64 JON P. WILCOX, J. (dissenting).  I agree with the 
majority that Strasser's claim for negligent failure to warn 
must fail because Transtech had reason to believe that Strasser 
knew that the ladders did not have safety treads.   
¶65 However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion 
that 
Strasser's 
claim 
for 
negligent 
design, 
manufacture, 
construction, assembly, and installation of the ladders is 
viable.  I would hold that Rolph v. EBI Cos., 159 Wis. 2d 518, 
464 N.W.2d 667 (1991) bars such a claim.  Therefore I dissent on 
that issue. 
I 
¶66 This court reviews a grant of summary judgment by 
applying the same methodology as the circuit court, namely, the 
standards set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (1995-96).10  
Rolph, 159 Wis. 2d at 527.  Under this methodology, the court 
first examines the pleadings and decides whether a claim for 
relief has been stated.  Id.  If so, the court then examines the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, 
and 
admissions on file to determine whether there are issues of 
material fact that preclude summary judgment.  Id.  If no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should 
be granted.  Id.   
                     
10 All future references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 volumes unless otherwise noted. 
No. 98-1581.jpw 
 
2 
¶67 The pleadings state a claim for relief.  The complaint 
alleges that Strasser was seriously injured when he fell off of 
a ladder that had been constructed and installed by Transtech.  
The complaint further alleges that these injuries were caused by 
Transtech's 
negligent 
design, 
manufacture, 
construction, 
assembly, and installation of the ladder.  Based on the same 
facts, the complaint also seeks to hold Transtech liable for 
negligently failing to warn Strasser about the defects and 
hazards present in the ladder.   
¶68 In 
its 
responsive 
pleading, 
Transtech 
denies 
Strasser's allegations.  However, Wisconsin recognizes a claim 
for negligent design or manufacture of a product.  See, e.g., 
Sharp v. Case Corp., 227 Wis. 2d 1, 18-19, 595 N.W.2d 380 
(1999).  See also Wis JI-Civil 3240.  Wisconsin also recognizes 
a claim for negligent failure of a manufacturer or supplier of a 
product to warn of dangerous conditions in the product.  See Wis 
JI-Civil 3242.  Thus, the pleadings state claims for relief. 
¶69 The 
next 
step 
is 
to 
examine 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and 
affidavits to determine whether there exist genuine issues of 
material fact that preclude summary judgment.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2).  We view the facts in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff and ask whether under these facts the moving party 
has demonstrated that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Morris v. Juneau County, 219 Wis. 2d 543, 550, 579 N.W.2d 
690 (1998). 
No. 98-1581.jpw 
 
3 
¶70 The facts viewed in the light most favorable to 
Strasser are these.  Recycled Fibers was a recycler that used 
cranes mounted onto trailers to pick up and move bales of 
cardboard and other paper materials for recycling.  Strasser 
worked for Recycled Fibers as a truck driver and crane operator. 
 Strasser operated the crane at issue from a seat about 13 feet 
in the air.  Two ladders were mounted on the sides of the crane 
to enable the operator to reach the seat.   
¶71 The ladders mounted on the crane before the accident 
(the "old ladders") had rungs that consisted of one and one-half 
inch steel plate.  The pieces of steel were positioned so that 
the narrow edge, which was approximately one-quarter inch in 
width, pointed up.  Grooves were cut into the top of the rung.  
In other words, a person looking at the old ladders from the 
front would see the wide, flat side of the steel plate, but a 
person climbing the ladder would step on a flat, narrow edge 
with grooves. 
¶72 The old ladders were not strong enough to sustain the 
recycling work.  They often bent and twisted and became detached 
from the crane assembly.  One of the old ladders on the crane in 
question had been removed completely.  The other was so damaged 
that it was beyond repair.  Although the old ladders were 
rickety, Strasser testified that he had never slipped on them. 
¶73 Darryl Frick was the president of Transtech, a mobile 
fleet maintenance and repair company that had contracted to do 
certain maintenance and repair work for Recycled Fibers, 
including maintenance and repair of the company's trailers and 
No. 98-1581.jpw 
 
4 
cranes.  Frick was familiar with the crane in question because 
Transtech regularly maintained the crane and trailer.  
¶74 Recycled Fibers asked Frick to put new, sturdier 
ladders on the crane in question.  Recycled Fibers told Frick 
that it wanted sturdier ladders and that it wanted safety treads 
on the rungs.  Frick knew that it was important that the steps 
not be slippery, because hydraulic fluid from the crane 
sometimes leaked onto the steps and because the operators 
sometimes had to climb the ladder in the rain.  However, Frick 
specifically informed Recycled Fibers that he did not have the 
material to make safety treads and did not know where to get it.  
¶75 On approximately March 29, 1994, Frick fabricated new 
ladders for the crane, without stair treads.  He fabricated new 
uprights from three-inch square tubing.  He constructed new 
rungs made out of trailer U-bolts, which are large threaded 
bolts in the shape of a "U".  Frick cut the "U" off of each 
bolt, leaving two straight sections.  When these sections were 
installed into the new ladders as rungs, about three-quarters of 
each rung was covered with threaded grooves.  Approximately two 
and one-half inches of each rung was smooth.   
¶76 It is undisputed that Recycled Fibers took the 
completed crane and began using it, despite the fact that Frick 
had been unable to install safety treads on the ladder rungs. In 
addition, Strasser admits that the new ladders were stronger and 
sturdier than the old ones and that the new rungs provided a 
wider footing. 
No. 98-1581.jpw 
 
5 
¶77 Strasser's complaint is that the new ladders were more 
slippery than the old ones.  He claims that after Frick 
installed 
the 
new 
ladders, 
he 
experienced 
problems 
with 
slipperiness.  He alleges that he told his supervisor and a 
dispatcher at Recycled Fibers about these problems.  In 
addition, Frick could not rule out the possibility that Strasser 
mentioned having slipped on the new ladder.  However, it is 
undisputed that Recycled Fibers did not return the ladder to 
Frick for installation of safety treads. 
¶78 On June 7, 1994, a drizzly day, Strasser slipped on 
the bottom rung as he was climbing down the ladder.  He fell 
four and one-half feet to the pavement and seriously injured his 
right knee.  He seeks to hold Transtech liable for his injury on 
the theory that Transtech negligently designed and manufactured 
the ladder. 
¶79 As already noted, Wisconsin recognizes a claim for 
ordinary negligence in design, construction, and manufacture of 
a product.  See Sharp, 227 Wis. 2d at 18-19 (discussing causes 
of 
action 
for 
negligent 
manufacture 
and 
strict 
products 
liability).  See also Wis JI-Civil 3240.  Moreover, a person who 
negligently completes a repair may be liable under ordinary 
principles of negligence.  Colton v. Foulkes, 259 Wis. 142, 147-
48, 47 N.W.2d 901 (1951). 
¶80 However, 
this 
court 
may 
preclude 
an 
ordinary 
negligence claim when public policy considerations lead to the 
conclusion that liability "'"would shock the conscience of 
society."'"  Rolph, 159 Wis. 2d at 534 (citations omitted).  The 
No. 98-1581.jpw 
 
6 
public policy considerations include: (1) whether the injury is 
too remote from the negligence, (2) whether the injury is too 
wholly out of proportion to the tortfeasor's culpability, 
(3) whether in retrospect it seems too extraordinary that the 
negligence would have resulted in the harm, (4) whether allowing 
recovery 
would 
place 
too 
unreasonable 
a 
burden 
on 
the 
tortfeasor, (5) whether allowing recovery would open the way for 
fraudulent claims, and (6) whether allowing recovery would enter 
a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.  Id. at 534 
(quoting Coffey v. Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 541, 247 N.W.2d 
132 (1976)). 
¶81 Based on these public policy concerns, this court held 
in Rolph that a reconditioner of machinery has no duty to bring 
machines into compliance with applicable safety standards unless 
the reconditioner holds itself out as bringing machines into 
compliance with safety standards or is requested to do so by the 
machine's owner.  Rolph, 159 Wis. 2d at 524.  Transtech argues 
that Rolph bars Strasser's claims.  
¶82 The plaintiff in Rolph was injured when his hand got 
caught in a "bending roll" machine.  Id. at 523-25.  The 
plaintiff brought claims against the manufacturer of the machine 
for strict products liability, negligent design and manufacture, 
and negligent failure to warn.  Id. at 525.  The manufacturer 
brought a third-party action against a company that had 
reconditioned the machine approximately two years before the 
plaintiff's injury.  Id.  Reconditioning of the machine was 
understood to mean "disassembly, cleaning, inspecting parts for 
No. 98-1581.jpw 
 
7 
wear, and replacing certain parts."  Id. at 526 (emphasis 
added). 
¶83 This court held that strict products liability could 
not be imposed on the reconditioner because a reconditioner is 
not a manufacturer.  Id. at 532.   
¶84 Furthermore, 
this 
court 
rejected 
the 
ordinary 
negligence claim against the reconditioner, on grounds of public 
policy.  Id. at 535.  We explained that "[i]mposing liability on 
[the reconditioner] for failing to correct a design defect 
simply because it reconditioned the machine would make all 
repairers who disassemble a product in order to repair it 
insurers against design defects created by manufacturers."  Id. 
 Recovery would contravene public policy because it would enter 
a field with no sensible or just stopping point.  Id. at 535-36. 
Therefore there was no duty on the part of the reconditioner to 
correct design flaws in a machine unless the reconditioner 
either held itself out as a business that would bring machines 
into compliance with specific safety standards, or was requested 
to bring the machine into compliance with such standards.  Id. 
at 536-37. 
¶85 Like the reconditioner in Rolph, Transtech was not a 
manufacturer, 
seller, 
or 
supplier 
of 
cranes 
or 
ladders.  
Transtech was merely a repairer or reconditioner.  Recycled 
Fibers asked Transtech to construct replacement ladders for the 
crane assembly in a limited period of time.  Although Recycled 
Fibers asked for stair treads, there were no such treads on the 
No. 98-1581.jpw 
 
8 
old ladders, and Frick informed Recycled Fibers that he did not 
have any material with which to make such treads.   
¶86 Under these circumstances, as in Rolph, public policy 
should bar Strasser's claim.  Imposing liability on Transtech 
under these circumstances runs the risk of exposing every 
business that repairs equipment to liability if parts must be 
fabricated to complete the repair.  See Rolph, 159 Wis. 2d at 
535-36 ("Every business that services equipment would be exposed 
to 
liability 
if 
the 
repair 
required 
disassembly 
of 
the 
product.").  Repairers would be exposed to an unreasonable 
burden and would be discouraged from engaging in preventative 
maintenance and repair.  As in Rolph, "[s]uch liability would 
shock the conscience of society because it would have no 
sensible or just stopping point."  Id. at 536.   
¶87 The majority contends that Rolph is distinguishable 
because while the reconditioner in Rolph only restored a machine 
to its original condition, Transtech built new ladders for the 
crane with different rungs.  Majority op. at ¶¶ 45-49.  However, 
as Judge Curley stated in her concurrence in the unpublished 
decision of the court of appeals,  
 
Frick's role in replacing the ladders on the crane is 
similar to that of the machine repairman in Rolph who 
disassembled, cleaned, inspected parts for wear and 
replaced 
certain 
parts. 
 
The 
only 
significant 
difference in the facts here and the Rolph scenario is 
the 
size 
of 
the 
products 
fixed 
by 
the 
repairmen . . . .11 
                     
11 Strasser v. Transtech Mobile Fleet Serv. Inc., No. 98-
1581, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Aug 31, 1999)(Curley, 
J., concurring). 
No. 98-1581.jpw 
 
9 
It seems likely that repairers are often unable to obtain 
original parts for equipment and therefore fabricate replacement 
parts.  For example, a bicycle repair shop that is unable to 
obtain 
an 
original 
replacement 
part 
might 
fabricate 
a 
replacement.  If the replacement part failed and resulted in 
damages, under the majority's theory the shop could be held 
liable for "negligent manufacture" or "negligent design" of the 
replacement part, even if the bicycle owner took delivery of the 
bicycle with full knowledge that a fabricated part had been 
installed to make do in a pinch.   
¶88 The majority itself admits that the line between 
"reconditioning" and "manufacture" is quite a narrow one.  
Majority op. at ¶ 43 (admitting that it is "understandable" to 
conclude that Transtech was a reconditioner that did not have a 
duty to install ladder treads).  Liability should not turn on 
such a fine distinction. 
¶89 It is clear that neither of the exceptions set forth 
in Rolph apply to this case.  Transtech did not hold itself out 
as a business that could bring equipment into compliance with 
safety standards, and Recycled Fibers did not request that 
Transtech make the ladders compliant with any particular 
standards.  See Rolph, 159 Wis. 2d at 537 (explaining that 
failure to meet specific safety standards may provide a basis 
for negligence if the reconditioner holds itself out as bringing 
machines into compliance with present engineering standards, or 
is requested to bring a particular machine into compliance with 
such standards).   
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¶90 Under these conditions, this court should adhere to 
precedent 
and 
hold 
that 
Rolph 
bars 
Transtech's 
claim.  
Accordingly, I dissent. 
¶91 I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins this dissent. 
 
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