Title: PEOPLE OF MI V KATHERINE SUE DENDEL
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 132042
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 28, 2008

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 28, 2008 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 132042 
KATHERINE SUE DENDEL, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CORRIGAN, J. 
Defendant, an insulin-dependent diabetic, was convicted of second-degree 
murder for injecting the victim, her live-in partner, with a lethal dose of insulin. 
The Court of Appeals reversed her conviction and remanded for a new trial after 
concluding that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to produce an expert to 
refute the testimony of the prosecution’s experts that the victim died from an 
insulin overdose.  We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate 
defendant’s conviction. Defense counsel was not ineffective under the test of 
Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984), 
because defendant did not prove that she was prejudiced by her counsel’s failure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to produce an expert witness.  The Court of Appeals erred in holding that defense 
counsel could have presented an expert witness who would have refuted the 
testimony of the prosecution’s experts to the extent that defendant’s acquittal 
would have been reasonably probable.  Further, the trial court correctly held that, 
in light of the strong circumstantial evidence of defendant’s guilt, it was not 
reasonably probable that the outcome would have been different had a defense 
expert testified. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Defendant and the victim, Paul Michael Burley, were in a long-term 
relationship and had lived together for years.  Burley had been taking numerous 
medications for several serious illnesses, including an infection with human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV), herpes, hepatitis B and C, epilepsy, ataxia, 
neuropathy, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, severely impaired vision, 
dementia, lymphoma, and throat cancer.  Burley was not, however, diabetic. By 
defendant’s own account, Burley was a difficult person to care for.  Defendant 
was solely responsible for making sure that Burley took his medications and for 
tending to his everyday needs. 
Defendant’s relationship with Burley’s family was strained, partly by what 
she perceived as the family’s failure to help with Burley’s care.  Before Burley’s 
death, defendant had told his sister that “if something happens to your brother, 
your family won’t know what hit you.”  About one week before Burley’s death, 
defendant, frustrated with Burley’s demands, also told Burley’s sister, “I can’t 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
take this” and “I feel like giving him a shot of insulin.”  As an insulin-dependent 
diabetic, defendant had access to insulin and knew how to inject it.  Defendant 
also knew how insulin metabolizes and that no trace of insulin would remain in 
Burley’s blood after an insulin injection. 
Defendant had expressed her frustration with caring for Burley to a Family 
Independence Agency (FIA) employee. Less than a week before Burley’s death, 
defendant e-mailed the FIA employee to seek help with caring for Burley. 
Defendant told the employee that she could not manage all of Burley’s demands 
on her own. During a subsequent telephone conversation, defendant again stated 
that she was frustrated and concerned that the situation was deteriorating and that 
she no longer knew how to manage Burley.  The FIA employee suggested that 
defendant have Burley evaluated at a mental-health facility or have him placed in 
respite or hospice care.1  The FIA employee testified that defendant had never 
before expressed any problems with caring for Burley. 
During the week leading up to Burley’s death, defendant sought help from 
the Department on Aging.  The department representative told defendant that she 
did not qualify for help because both she and Burley were not 60 years old.  The 
representative suggested that defendant instead contact hospice services. 
1 The FIA employee testified that as long as Burley was competent, the FIA 
could not compel defendant to put Burley in a nursing home. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant replied that hospice services would not help because Burley was not 
yet near death. 
Defendant’s caregiving situation took another turn for the worse the day 
before he died. On March 14, 2002, a visiting nurse had been assigned to assist 
defendant and educate her in the proper methods of care.  She visited five times, 
but, on the day before Burley’s death, the nurse terminated her services because 
Burley had been uncooperative.  When the nurse told defendant that she was 
terminating her services, defendant became “quite tearful and upset.”  Defendant 
told the nurse that she did not know how long she could continue caring for 
Burley. 
At 3:00 a.m. on the day of Burley’s death, defendant called 911, reporting 
that Burley had been hallucinating and running around with a butter knife. 
Defendant asked the police to come take Burley to a mental institution.  When the 
police arrived, Burley was sitting calmly in a chair.  He told the officers that he 
was fine and that there was no problem.  The police decided to leave Burley at 
home because he was not a threat to himself or others.  One officer testified that 
defendant was visibly upset with Burley and the police.  Defendant also later 
admitted that she was frustrated with the officers’ decision and that she was 
hoping for relief because she was at her “wit’s end.” 
Defendant contended that later that day she discovered Burley slumped 
over on the couch and unresponsive.  She testified that, because Burley was cold 
and covered with purple blotches, she thought he might be dead.  Rather than 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
calling 911, however, she instead called a friend, who arrived and contacted 911. 
While the police and emergency personnel were removing Burley’s body from 
the house, one of Burley’s sisters telephoned.  Defendant answered the phone, but 
quickly ended the conversation without telling her that Burley had died. 
During the next several days, defendant spoke with several of Burley’s 
siblings. She never informed them of his death, but instead falsely told them that 
he had been hospitalized.  One of the victim’s sisters described a 74-minute 
conversation with defendant two days after Burley’s death.  She testified that 
defendant was “very upbeat” and “nonchalant” in her discussion of topics ranging 
from Burley’s health to antique jewelry.  During this conversation, defendant 
laughed while describing an alleged incident when Burley had wandered away 
from the apartment complex and become lost.  Yet defendant never mentioned 
Burley’s death. 
Defendant wanted Burley’s body cremated without an autopsy being 
performed. Although an autopsy was performed despite defendant’s wishes, 
defendant had Burley’s body cremated before his family learned about his death. 
When a police detective incorrectly told defendant that the medical examiner had 
detected insulin in Burley’s body, defendant called him a liar and explained that 
insulin could not be detected in the human body after death because it breaks 
down and depletes naturally. 
After defendant’s arrest, she told police detectives that Burley had injected 
himself with insulin. During a later interview with a police detective, defendant 
5  
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
said, “That poor dear, he killed himself for me.”  She told the detective that 
despite Burley’s severely impaired vision and problems with holding things, he 
could inject himself with insulin.2  Defendant also told defense counsel that 
Burley had killed himself by an insulin injection and that she wanted him to 
pursue this theory of defense at trial.  Defendant also testified that Burley had 
mental problems and that he had “talked suicide for 10, 15 years.”  She had 
informed two of Burley’s doctors of his suicidal intentions. 
Defendant was charged with first-degree murder.  The prosecution 
theorized at the bench trial that defendant injected the victim with a lethal dose of 
insulin on April 2, 2002. The prosecution presented two expert witnesses, Dr. 
Bernardino Pacris3 and Dr. Michael Evans,4 who testified that the evidence 
supported the theory that Burley had died from an insulin injection rather than 
from natural causes or an overdose of one of his medications.5  Defense counsel 
Joseph Filip argued that Burley had died either by injecting himself with insulin 
2 Defendant also suggested the unlikely scenario that if Burley had not 
injected the insulin himself, perhaps someone had broken into her apartment, 
found her insulin and syringe, and given Burley the shot. 
3 Dr. Pacris is an Oakland County medical examiner and a former Jackson 
County forensic pathologist who has been qualified as an expert witness in more 
than 100 trials. 
4 Dr. Evans is the president and chief executive officer of AIT Laboratories, 
the former state toxicologist for Indiana, and a professor of toxicology who has 
testified as an expert in 35 states. 
5 We discuss Dr. Pacris’s and Dr. Evans’s trial testimony in detail in part 
III(A) of this opinion. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
or from the side effects of numerous medications prescribed for him.  Defense 
counsel did not present any expert testimony to rebut the testimony of the 
prosecution’s experts. 
The trial court found defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of 
second-degree murder.  Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that Filip had 
deprived her of a fair trial by failing to conduct a reasonable investigation into the 
cause of Burley’s death. The trial court denied the motion.  The Court of Appeals 
remanded for a Ginther6 hearing to determine whether Filip had provided 
ineffective assistance. 
At the Ginther hearing, appellate defense counsel called Dr. Laurence 
Simson,7 who testified that the evidence did not support the view that defendant 
had died from an insulin overdose.  Dr. Pacris defended his trial testimony that 
Burley had died of hypoglycemic shock caused by insulin.8  The trial court 
rejected defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Instead, it found 
that defense counsel’s performance had been objectively reasonable.  The court 
concluded that defendant had not been prejudiced by Filip’s failure to call an 
expert forensic pathologist to rebut the opinions of the prosecution’s experts.  The 
6 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 
7 Dr. Simson is a forensic pathology consultant and a former professor of 
pathology, an Ingham County pathologist, and a national consultant in forensic 
pathology to the Surgeon General of the United States Air Force. 
8 We discuss Dr. Simson’s and Dr. Pacris’s Ginther hearing testimony in 
detail in part III(A) of this opinion. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
court explained why the outcome of the trial would not have been different if the 
defense had offered Dr. Simson’s testimony: 
And if the case was just, . . . the police had a dead body and 
you have Dr. Pacris and Dr. Simson, that would be one thing.  It 
wasn’t that. If there was a lot of other testimony, of statements and 
other witnesses and other things that pointed in that direction, it 
would have made the testimony of Dr. Evans and Dr. Pacris not as . . 
. clear. But I don’t know that I can say that there’s a reasonable 
probability that the outcome would have been different.  There was 
still—there was other evidence, . . . admittedly all circumstantial, but 
there was a lot of other evidence. I am not convinced that that has 
been established, that it’s reasonably probable that the outcome 
would have been different . . . . 
A divided Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial.  The 
majority summarized its holding as follows: 
Defense counsel’s failure to consult with and present the 
testimony of appropriate medical experts to address the central issue 
in this case, the cause of Burley’s death, was clearly deficient in 
light of prevailing professional norms and, but for that deficiency, 
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of defendant’s trial 
would have been different. [People v Dendel, unpublished opinion 
per curiam, issued July 18, 2006 (Docket No. 247391), p 3.] 
The Court of Appeals majority explained that, despite Dr. Pacris’s testimony that 
Burley had died from insulin shock, Filip failed to consult a forensic pathologist 
or Burley’s doctors regarding the cause of Burley’s death.  The majority held that 
Filip’s failure to consult an informed expert who could have refuted Dr. Pacris’s 
conclusions essentially amounted to a concession that Burley had died from 
insulin shock. Because it was unlikely that Burley administered the insulin 
himself, in light of his physical limitations, the trial court was left to conclude 
that defendant administered the insulin that caused Burley’s death.  The majority 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
noted that the Ginther hearing had demonstrated that a qualified pathologist (Dr. 
Simson) would have (1) refuted Dr. Pacris’s conclusion that Burley died from 
insulin shock and (2) provided an alternative, noncriminal explanation for 
Burley’s death. 
The majority concluded: “Trial counsel’s failure deprived 
defendant of a substantial defense, and there is a reasonable probability that this 
would have made a difference in the outcome of the trial.”  Dendel, supra at 4. 
Judge Wilder dissented, rejecting the conclusion that defendant had been 
prejudiced by counsel’s performance.  He relied on the trial court’s conclusion 
that even if Filip had introduced Dr. Simson’s testimony, the court would 
nonetheless have found defendant guilty in light of the weight of the evidence. 
This evidence supporting defendant’s guilt included the following: defendant had 
the opportunity to inject the insulin, defendant admitted being aware that no trace 
of insulin would be found in Burley’s blood after his death, defendant was under 
considerable stress in trying to care for Burley by herself, and defendant not only 
failed to inform Burley’s family of his death, but she apparently hid it from the 
family.  Judge Wilder also noted that nothing established that Dr. Simson was 
more credible than Dr. Pacris.  Moreover, Dr. Simson concededly could not rule 
out insulin shock as the cause of death.  Judge Wilder stated that the effect of 
expert testimony depends on the fact-finder’s evaluation of credibility, and the 
fact-finder in this case had expressly determined that Dr. Simson’s testimony 
would not have changed the result of the trial. 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The prosecution appealed, arguing that the Court of Appeals had erred in 
holding that defendant was entitled to a new trial on the basis of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. This Court heard oral argument on whether to grant the 
application or take other peremptory action. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“Whether a person has been denied effective assistance of counsel is a 
mixed question of fact and constitutional law.  A judge first must find the facts, 
and then must decide whether those facts constitute a violation of the defendant’s 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.” People v LeBlanc, 465 
Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002).  This Court reviews a trial court’s factual 
findings for clear error and reviews de novo questions of constitutional law.  Id. 
III. ANALYSIS 
In People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001), this 
Court explained the test for determining whether a defendant has been denied the 
effective assistance of counsel: 
A defendant seeking a new trial on the ground that trial 
counsel was ineffective bears a heavy burden.  To justify reversal 
under either the federal or state constitutions, a convicted defendant 
must satisfy the two-part test articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 
2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984).  See People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 
302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).  “First, the defendant must show 
that counsel’s performance was deficient.  This requires showing 
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not performing 
as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.”  Strickland, 
supra at 687. In so doing, the defendant must overcome a strong 
presumption that counsel’s performance constituted sound trial 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
 
strategy. Id. at 690. “Second, the defendant must show that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”  Id. at 687. 
To 
demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show the existence of a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  Id. at 694. “A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”  Id.  Because the defendant bears the burden of 
demonstrating both deficient performance and prejudice, the 
defendant necessarily bears the burden of establishing the factual 
predicate for his claim. See People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 
NW2d 57 (1999).[9] 
We conclude that defendant has failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced by 
Filip’s performance.10 
9 The dissent accuses us of misunderstanding defendant’s burden under the 
prejudice prong of Strickland. Yet, ironically, it is the dissent, not us, that applies 
the wrong standard. The dissent states: “Because defendant has shown that her 
trial counsel’s performance deprived her of a substantial defense, she has met her 
burden of showing prejudice, unless other evidence rendered this defense 
unbelievable.”  Post at 9. The dissent fails to recognize that to demonstrate 
prejudice, a defendant “must show the existence of a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 
Carbin, supra at 600. Instead, the dissent erroneously suggests that prejudice is 
presumed if defendant was deprived of one of several theories of defense. 
Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, that a defense attorney performed deficiently in 
presenting a viable defense does not automatically require the conclusion that 
there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been 
different absent counsel’s deficient performance.  The dissent does not explain 
why there is a reasonable probability that she would have been acquitted had 
defense counsel presented expert testimony to support the theory that Burley died 
of a morphine or multiple-drug overdose. Justice Kelly also mentions repeatedly 
that she thinks that defendant might be innocent.  But the guilt or innocence of the 
accused is a matter to be decided by the fact-finder, not the appellate courts. 
Defendant is not entitled to relief unless she satisfies Strickland’s test for 
prejudice. 
10 The dissent argues that Filip’s performance was deficient because he 
failed to present an expert to challenge the prosecution’s theory regarding the 
cause of death. The dissent’s argument is misplaced.  The majority does not 
conclude that defendant failed to show that counsel’s performance was deficient. 
(continued…) 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
A. THE EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Dr. Pacris testified at trial that he performed an autopsy on Burley on 
April 3, 2002. Dr. Pacris initially concluded that Burley had died from natural 
causes. But because a police officer told Dr. Pacris that he suspected that Burley 
might have been injected with insulin, which can be fatal to a nondiabetic, Dr. 
Pacris sent Burley’s fluids to AIT Laboratories to be tested for insulin, glucose, 
and C-peptide levels. The tests revealed that Burley’s glucose level was zero and 
that his insulin and C-peptide levels were normal.  Dr. Pacris explained that, 
although the glucose levels in a person’s bodily fluids drop immediately after the 
person dies, the complete lack of glucose in Burley’s vitreous fluids was 
consistent with a finding that Burley had been injected with insulin.11  He found 
acute tubular necrosis in the kidneys and dead cells in the proximal tubules of the 
brain, which are usually seen in people who have suffered hypoglycemic shock. 
Dr. Pacris ultimately concluded that the cause of death was complications from 
(…continued) 
Rather, the majority concludes only that defendant was not denied the effective 
assistance of counsel, because she failed to show that she was prejudiced by 
counsel’s performance. This aspect of the dissent’s argument appears directed at 
the concurrence, not the majority opinion. 
11 An insulin injection causes a nondiabetic’s glucose level to drop to a 
dangerous level, depriving the brain of necessary glucose.  The person’s brain will 
then shut down, and the person will become comatose. 
12  
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
hypoglycemia, which can be caused by an insulin injection.12  In reaching this 
conclusion, he relied more on his anatomical findings and the circumstances 
surrounding the death rather than on the toxicological findings.  Specifically, he 
relied on microscopic hypoxic13 changes in Burley’s brain in concluding that 
Burley must have been comatose for at least 12 hours before he died at 4:00 p.m. 
on April 2, 2002. He testified that hypoxic changes to the brain, including red 
neurons on the hippocampus, are only manifested if the person has been 
comatose for about 12 hours.  Because this conclusion was inconsistent with 
defendant’s story that Burley had been alive and conscious at noon on that day, 
Dr. Pacris concluded that defendant’s story “doesn’t jive.” 
Dr. Evans also testified at trial for the prosecution.  He testified that if 
glucose had been present in Burley’s system, it would have disproved death by 
insulin injection. The lack of any glucose in Burley’s vitreous fluids supported 
the theory that Burley had been injected with insulin.  Further, although the level 
of morphine in Burley’s blood was very high, it might not be lethal to someone 
who had built up a tolerance for it. 
12 Although Dr. Pacris did not find a needle mark on Burley’s body, he 
explained that insulin is injected by means of a hypodermic needle, which 
normally does not leave a visible mark on the body. 
13 “Hypoxic” is defined as “[d]enoting or characterized by hypoxia.” 
Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (26th ed). “Hypoxia” refers to a “[d]ecrease below 
normal levels of oxygen in inspired gases, arterial blood, or tissue . . . .”  Id. 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
At the Ginther hearing, Dr. Simson disagreed with the conclusions of Dr. 
Pacris and Dr. Evans. He testified that Burley’s vitreous and blood glucose levels 
had been confused in the reports and in the testimony introduced at trial.  Dr. 
Simson opined that the pathological and toxicological findings did not support 
the view that Burley had died of hypoglycemic shock caused by an insulin 
overdose. He opined that because a person’s vitreous glucose level can drop to 
zero after he dies, the lack of glucose in Burley’s vitreous fluids did not prove 
that he died of hypoglycemic shock.  Dr. Simson further opined that the necrosis 
of the proximal tubules in Burley’s brain and the acute tubular necrosis in the 
kidneys could be attributed to postmortem changes rather than hypoglycemic 
shock. 
That is, Dr. Simson responded to Dr. Pacris by arguing that the 
anatomical changes observed in Burley’s body may have been attributable to 
decomposition, rather than an insulin overdose.  Dr. Simson also testified that the 
normal reddish-brown color of the kidneys was inconsistent with kidneys that had 
undergone hypoglycemic shock.  Dr. Simson opined that he would have 
concluded that Burley had died of a multiple-drug overdose, primarily caused by 
a high level of morphine.  He explained that Burley’s morphine level at the 
autopsy was approximately three times the therapeutic limit, meaning that his 
morphine level would have been even higher if, as Dr. Pacris testified, Burley 
had been comatose for 12 hours before his death.  Dr. Simson conceded, 
14  
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                              
 
however, that he had seen cases of much higher levels of morphine in the blood.14 
Dr. Simson also acknowledged that the evidence was “not inconsistent with 
hypoglycemic shock” and that he could not rule out the possibility that insulin 
overdose was the cause of death. 
Dr. Pacris defended his trial testimony that Burley had died of 
hypoglycemic shock caused by insulin.  In response to Dr. Simson’s Ginther 
hearing testimony, Dr. Pacris first testified that, in reaching the conclusion that 
Burley died from an insulin injection, he had principally relied on the changes 
observed in the brain and kidneys, rather than Burley’s low glucose level.  Dr. 
Pacris then testified that the necrosis of the proximal tubules in Burley’s brain 
and the acute tubular necrosis in the kidneys could not be attributed to 
postmortem changes because there was no evidence that the body was 
decomposing.15  Dr. Pacris noted that the necrosis in Burley’s brain had occurred 
solely in the third and fourth layers of the cortex and that the remainder of the 
cortex had not yet decomposed. This difference indicated that the changes in the 
third and fourth layers of the cortex were not caused by general decomposition, 
14 The therapeutic level for morphine is 30 to 100 nanograms per milliliter 
of blood.  The laboratory report stated that Burley had a morphine level of 328 
nanograms per milliliter. Dr. Simson testified that he had seen cases as high as 
800 to 900 nanograms of morphine per milliliter.  The laboratory report listed the 
lethal level of morphine at 200 to 2,300 nanograms per milliliter, indicating that 
there have been cases of morphine levels up to 2,300 nanograms per milliliter. 
15 Dr. Pacris referred to the decomposition of the body tissues as 
“autolysis.” 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
as suggested by Dr. Simson, because some necrosis would have been found in the 
remainder of the cortex if the changes observed were due to general 
decomposition. 
Moreover, Dr. Pacris noted that there are microscopic 
differences between cells that are simply decomposing and cells that have been 
altered before death by changes due to lack of glucose in the body.  According to 
Dr. Pacris, the microscopic changes observed in Burley’s kidneys reflected a lack 
of glucose in the blood before death, rather than general decay after death.  In 
short, Dr. Pacris responded to Dr. Simson by arguing that the specific changes 
observed in Burley’s body were incompatible with Dr. Simson’s theory that the 
changes were caused simply by decomposition.  Moreover, Dr. Pacris explained 
that the normal reddish-brown color of the kidneys, which Dr. Simson had found 
important, was not inconsistent with Dr, Pacris’s microscopic finding that the 
kidneys had acute tubular necrosis caused by hypoglycemic shock.  Furthermore, 
Dr. Pacris testified that although Burley had a high level of morphine in his 
system, he could not have died from a morphine overdose.  He explained that 
death from a morphine overdose is instantaneous.  The person does not initially 
become comatose.  A morphine overdose was inconsistent with the hypoxic 
changes in Burley’s brain that indicated he had been comatose for 12 hours 
before death. Although Burley’s morphine level was three times the therapeutic 
limit, this amount of morphine might not be fatal to a person who had developed 
a tolerance to the drug, as Burley had. 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
After hearing the testimony of Dr. Simson and Dr. Pacris, the trial court 
concluded that Dr. Simson’s testimony would not have changed the outcome of 
the trial. By declining to conclude that Dr. Simson’s testimony had effectively 
refuted the testimony of Dr. Pacris, the trial court implicitly held that Dr. Simson 
was not more credible than the prosecution’s experts.  “[R]egard shall be given to 
the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses 
who appeared before it.” 
MCR 2.613(C).  We review a trial court’s 
determination of credibility for clear error.  People v Knight, 473 Mich 324, 344; 
701 NW2d 715 (2005). “A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is 
evidence to support it, the reviewing court, on the whole record, is left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”  Bynum v EASB 
Group, Inc, 467 Mich 280, 285; 651 NW2d 383 (2002). 
The Court of Appeals stated that Dr. Simson’s testimony would have 
“refuted [Dr. Pacris’s] conclusions that Burley died as a result of an insulin 
overdose . . . .” Dendel, supra at 4. Hence, the Court of Appeals implicitly 
concluded that the trial court had committed clear error by failing to find Dr. 
Simson more credible than Dr. Pacris and Dr. Evans.  However, unlike the Court 
of Appeals panel, we see no reason to disturb the trial court’s implicit finding on 
the credibility of the expert witnesses; the testimony does not clearly demonstrate 
that one expert witness was more credible than another.  Although Dr. Simson 
opined that the pathological and toxicological findings did not support the view 
that Burley had died of hypoglycemic shock, Dr. Pacris defended his position at 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
the Ginther hearing by offering legitimate reasons for his findings and for 
discounting Dr. Simson’s theory that the relevant changes in Burley’s body were 
due simply to general decomposition.  Dr. Simson did not respond to Dr. Pacris’s 
rebuttal of his testimony.  It is also significant that Dr. Simson conceded the 
possibility that Burley had died from insulin overdose.  Thus, Dr. Simson did not 
conclusively refute Dr. Pacris’s testimony that Burley had died of an insulin 
overdose. We are not “left with the definite and firm conviction” that the trial 
court erred in finding that Dr. Simson was not more credible than Dr. Pacris and 
Dr. Evans. 
Further, defendant’s own statements supported the theory of the 
prosecution’s experts regarding the cause of Burley’s death. After defendant’s 
arrest, she told both police detectives and defense counsel that Burley had 
injected himself with insulin.  These statements were inconsistent with Dr. 
Simson’s theory of death, but were consistent with the testimony of the 
prosecution’s experts that Burley had died of an insulin overdose.16 
For all these reasons, we have no cause to believe that if Dr. Simson had 
testified at trial, the trial court would have given more weight to his testimony 
16 The dissent argues that the defense theory that Burley killed himself by 
an insulin injection is “a highly unlikely occurrence given his debilitated physical 
condition . . . .” Post at 7. Although this may or may not be true, defendant 
herself, who presumably knew Burley’s physical capabilities better than anyone 
else, told the police detectives that Burley was physically able to inject himself 
with insulin and had in her opinion done so.  Thus, it was reasonable for defense 
counsel to argue that Burley had injected himself with insulin. 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
than that of the prosecution’s experts.  We conclude that defendant did not 
establish a “reasonable probability” that the outcome of the trial would have been 
different had Dr. Simson testified. Strickland, supra at 694 (emphasis added).17 
B. OTHER CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
We also conclude that the trial court did not err when it held at the Ginther 
hearing that, even if Filip had called an expert to rebut the testimony of Dr. Pacris 
and Dr. Evans, “there was a lot of other evidence” supporting defendant’s 
conviction and that the outcome of the trial would have been the same.  Even if 
Dr. Simson had testified, the strong circumstantial evidence supported the theory 
that defendant had given Burley an insulin injection. 
Burley was difficult to care for because of his multiple health problems, 
which included dementia. Defendant was under a great deal of stress as Burley’s 
sole caregiver.18  Frustrated by Burley’s demands, defendant had considered 
17 As discussed, the trial court, which was the finder of fact at the bench 
trial, stated at the Ginther hearing that the outcome of the trial would not have 
changed if Dr. Simson had testified. Because we review de novo the trial court’s 
determination of prejudice, however, the fact-finder’s determination on that issue 
at the Ginther hearing is not binding on the appellate courts.  We underscore that 
the test for prejudice is an objective test and that appellate courts should not 
simply defer to the trial court’s judgment regarding prejudice, even if the trial 
court was the fact-finder at the original trial, as in this case. 
18 The dissent supports its assertion that defendant does not have “the 
behavioral profile of a cold-blooded killer,” post at 10, by stating that defendant 
financially supported Burley while he was ill.  The dissent mischaracterizes the 
couple’s financial situation. In fact, defendant received $730 monthly from the 
FIA to care for Burley and Burley’s social security disability benefits of $530 
monthly. As Burley’s caregiver, she was entitled to live in government-subsidized 
(continued…) 
19  
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
giving him a shot of insulin, which she knew could be lethal and would be 
difficult to detect in a deceased person.  When her caregiving situation became 
worse, defendant unsuccessfully attempted to obtain assistance in caring for 
Burley from several sources.  Less than 24 hours before Burley’s death, 
defendant became “quite tearful and upset” when the nurse assisting defendant 
terminated her services because Burley had been uncooperative.  Defendant 
admitted that she was at her “wit’s end” in the middle of that night when the 
police declined to take Burley away after he caused a disturbance.  In light of the 
facts leading up to Burley’s death, the trier of fact could reasonably conclude that 
this nighttime incident caused defendant to finally snap and follow through with 
her idea to inject Burley with insulin.  This finding would be consistent with Dr. 
Pacris’s testimony that hypoxic changes in Burley’s brain indicated that he had 
fallen into a coma from insulin-induced hypoglycemic shock at about 4:00 a.m., 
shortly after the police left. 
(…continued) 
housing. Although Burley’s family and the FIA urged defendant to place Burley 
into a nursing home, hospice care, or some other program that would furnish 
Burley with better medical care, defendant declined to do so, explaining to 
Burley’s sister that if she were to put Burley into a nursing home, she would lose 
her housing, the FIA benefits, and Burley’s income.  On the other hand, if Burley 
were to die, defendant would gain some financial security: defendant was the sole 
beneficiary of six life insurance policies that she had taken out on Burley, worth 
approximately $25,000 at the time of Burley’s death.  Thus, the evidence suggests 
that defendant may have had financial motivations for rendering care to Burley. 
20  
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
The trier of fact could also infer that defendant’s actions after Burley’s 
death demonstrated her guilty state of mind and her attempt to cover up the 
crime. Defendant testified that when she suspected that Burley might be dead, 
she did not contact 911, but instead called a friend to come over.  Defendant lied 
to Burley’s family about his condition and hid his death from the only persons 
who might have questioned the cause of death and recalled her threat to inject 
him with insulin.19  Moreover, defendant managed to have Burley’s body 
cremated before Burley’s family could question the cause of death.  She had also 
wanted Burley’s body cremated without an autopsy being performed,20 but was 
unable to prevent the autopsy.  This circumstantial evidence regarding 
defendant’s state of mind further supports the prosecution’s theory that defendant 
murdered Burley. 
Considering all this strong circumstantial evidence of defendant’s guilt, 
we hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that defendant would have 
19 The dissent suggests that defendant did not tell Burley’s family about his 
death because she, not Burley’s family members, had cared for Burley toward the 
end of his life. Although we cannot know with certainty defendant’s motives, 
defendant’s failure to inform Burley’s family of his death was sufficiently unusual 
to support an inference that defendant acted with a guilty state of mind. 
20 We do not disagree with the dissent’s assertion that a decision to cremate 
a loved one, by itself, is not unusual.  But the decision to have a loved one 
cremated before the victim’s family knows about the death and before an autopsy 
can be performed supports an inference of a guilty state of mind. 
21  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
been convicted of second-degree murder even if Dr. Simson had challenged the 
conclusions of the expert witnesses for the prosecution.21 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to produce an expert at trial 
who would rebut the testimony of the prosecution’s experts that Burley died from 
an insulin overdose.  Defendant was not prejudiced by Filip’s failure to produce 
an expert witness because there is no indication that the trial court would have 
accepted the testimony of defendant’s expert over that of the prosecution’s 
experts and there was other strong circumstantial evidence to support defendant’s 
guilt. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate 
the trial court’s verdict. 
 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Clifford W. Taylor 
 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
21 The dissent states: 
[H]ad defense counsel challenged the cause of death, the 
finder of fact would have been left with two reasonable alternatives: 
(1) to decide that the evidence showed that defendant killed Burley 
or (2) to conclude that Burley killed himself, intentionally or 
accidentally, possibly to spare his loving companion of nearly 30 
years the burden of his continuing care.  [Post at 11.] 
Yet Filip’s decision not to present an expert witness challenging the conclusions of 
the prosecution’s expert witnesses regarding the cause of death left the fact-finder 
with the same reasonable alternatives.  The only difference is that Filip chose to 
argue that Burley killed himself with insulin, not morphine or some other drug. 
This was a viable defense that Filip energetically pursued. 
22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 
SUPREME COURT 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 132042 
KATHERINE SUE DENDEL, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CORRIGAN, J. (concurring). 
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that defendant was not denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because she failed to show that she was prejudiced 
by counsel’s performance. I write separately because, in my opinion, defendant 
also failed to satisfy the other requirement of an ineffective-assistance claim: to 
show that counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient.  Strickland v 
Washington, 466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984).  Defense 
counsel Joseph Filip reasonably decided to advance the theory that the victim, 
Paul Michael Burley, died from injecting himself with insulin.  Filip’s decision to 
pursue a suicide defense was not deficient because it logically flowed from 
defendant’s statements to the detectives and to counsel.  In light of this defense, 
defense counsel did not need to challenge the testimony of the prosecution’s 
experts that Burley died of hypoglycemic shock caused by insulin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“‘[T]he reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or 
substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions.’” 
Johnston v Singletary, 162 F3d 630, 642 (CA 11, 1998) (citation omitted).  A 
defense counsel’s decision regarding trial strategy is not demonstrably deficient if 
the defendant directed that strategy.  Keith v Mitchell, 455 F3d 662, 672 (CA 6, 
2006). “[The Sixth Amendment] speaks of the ‘assistance’ of counsel, and an 
assistant, however expert, is still an assistant.”  Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 
820; 95 S Ct 2525; 45 L Ed 2d 562 (1975).  In United States v Wellington, 417 
F3d 284, 289 (CA 2, 2005), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
explained that the lawyer’s role is to advocate for his client and follow his 
client’s wishes if possible: 
It is the “role of the lawyer [to be] a professional advisor and 
advocate,” Lefcourt v. United States, 125 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir.1997) 
(quoting In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 62-63 (2d Cir.1984)), not to 
usurp his “‘client’s decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation,’” see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 753 n. 6, 103 
S.Ct. 3308, 77 L Ed.2d 987 (1983) (recognizing that, where ethically 
and legally possible, “‘[a] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions 
concerning the objectives of representation’”) (quoting ABA Model 
Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2(a)); Wallace [v Davis, 362 F3d 914, 
920 (CA 7, 2004)] (“By respecting [his client’s] wishes, counsel not 
only abided by ethical requirements (lawyers are agents, after all) 
but also furnished the quality of assistance that the Constitution 
demands.”) (emphasis in original); cf. Faretta v. California, 422 
U.S. 806, 820, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (“The language 
and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the 
other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to 
a willing defendant—not an organ of the State interposed between 
an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally.”). 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
In Wellington, the Second Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that his trial 
counsel was ineffective because, as a result of counsel’s following the 
defendant’s instructions, counsel pursued a strategy that, in the absence of the 
defendant’s instructions, might have constituted professional error.  The Court 
explained: 
[T]o the extent that defendant instructed his counsel to pursue 
a course of action that defendant now complains of, there was no 
abridgement—constructive or otherwise—of defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.  See Roe v. 
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 
(2000) (“[A] defendant who explicitly tells his attorney not to file an 
appeal plainly cannot later complain that, by following his 
instructions, his counsel performed deficiently.”) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis in the original); see also Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 
417, 448 n. 16 (6th Cir.2001) (“[C]ounsel was not ineffective for 
following the defendant’s clear and informed instruction.”)[1]; Frye 
v. Lee, 235 F.3d 897, 906-07 (4th Cir. 2000) (observing that if the 
Court were to hold that defense counsel “rendered ineffective 
assistance [by acceding to the defendant’s instructions not to 
present] . . . mitigation evidence, [the Court] would be forcing 
defense lawyers in future cases to choose between Scylla and 
Charybdis”); Autry v. McKaskle, 727 F.2d 358, 360-61 (5th Cir. 
1984) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure 
to investigate and present evidence at sentencing phase where 
1 In Coleman v Mitchell, 268 F3d 417, 448 (CA 6, 2001), the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held: 
If the record indicated a clear, informed assertion by 
Petitioner that he did not wish his counsel to present any mitigation 
evidence in Petitioner’s behalf, case law may have supported the 
district court’s conclusion that counsel, merely respecting the 
informed wishes of a client, need not have investigated or presented 
any evidence in connection with Petitioner’s background at the 
penalty phase of the trial.  [Emphasis added.] 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
defendant had instructed his attorney not to fight the death penalty) . 
. . . [Wellington, supra at 289.] 
By arguing that Burley had injected himself with insulin, Filip reasonably 
pursued a theory of defense that was consistent with defendant’s wishes and her 
previous statements to the police regarding Burley’s death.  Specifically, 
defendant told the police detectives that Burley had injected himself with insulin. 
She also stated at a later interview: “That poor dear, he killed himself for me.” 
Defendant, the person who knew Burley’s physical capabilities the best, told a 
detective that despite Burley’s severely impaired vision and problems with 
holding things, he could inject himself with insulin.  Before trial, defendant told 
Filip that Burley had killed himself by an insulin injection and that she wanted 
him to pursue this defense theory at trial.  Defendant also testified that Burley had 
mental problems and that he had “talked suicide for 10, 15 years.”  She testified 
that she had informed two of Burley’s doctors of his suicidal intentions.  In light 
of defendant’s statements and wishes, it was reasonable for Filip to argue at trial 
that Burley had died by a self-administered insulin injection, rather than by a 
morphine overdose. This is especially so when Filip knew that the prosecution 
had two well-qualified expert witnesses, Dr. Bernardino Pacris and Dr. Michael 
Evans, whose anticipated testimony supported the theory that Burley died from 
an insulin overdose. As Filip testified at the Ginther2 hearing, his primary theory 
2 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
of defense, that Burley took his own life by taking insulin, did not require him to 
dispute the opinions of the prosecution’s experts.  Thus, Filip’s decision not to 
present an expert was reasonable in light of his theory of defense. 
Second, even though defendant wanted Filip to pursue a defense theory 
that avoided challenging the conclusions of the prosecution’s experts, Filip 
nonetheless had consulted two doctors regarding the cause of Burley’s death.  He 
first talked to a local general practitioner, who referred him to an 
endocrinologist,3 Dr. Halsey.4  Dr. Halsey’s views did not refute Dr. Pacris’s 
opinion that Burley died from an insulin overdose.  Because consultation with 
two doctors revealed nothing that would cause Filip to question the conclusions 
of the prosecution’s experts, he reasonably ended the investigation at that point. 
He had no reason to believe that further investigation would lead to the discovery 
of an expert who might question Burley’s cause of death. 
[S]trategic 
choices 
made 
after 
less 
than 
complete 
investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable 
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. . . . 
In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate 
must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, 
applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments. 
[Strickland, supra at 690-691.] 
3 Endocrinology is the study of the glands and hormones of the body and 
their related disorders. Thus, an endocrinologist would be familiar with insulin 
shock as a cause of death. 
4 Dr. Halsey’s first name is not mentioned in the transcript of the Ginther 
hearing. 
5  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Defendant, in appellate hindsight, essentially faults Filip for failing to find the 
“right” expert. A defense attorney is not required to repeatedly consult experts 
until he finds one who will support a certain theory.  “Although attorneys can 
always do more in preparation for a trial,” the failure to do so does not mean that 
they are ineffective. Mason v Mitchell, 320 F3d 604, 618 (CA 6, 2003). 
“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential” 
and should refrain from second-guessing counsel’s chosen trial strategy. 
Strickland, supra at 689 (emphasis added).  “[A] court deciding an actual 
ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged 
conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s 
conduct.” Id. at 690 (emphasis added).  “A reviewing court must not evaluate 
counsel’s decisions with the benefit of hindsight.”  People v Grant, 470 Mich 
477, 485; 684 NW2d 686 (2004), citing Strickland, supra at 689. Defense 
counsel’s strategic choices were constrained by defendant’s actions.  Defendant 
has failed to show that, given what Filip knew at the time, Filip’s decision not to 
challenge the testimony of the prosecution’s experts that Burley had died from an 
insulin overdose was not a matter of sound trial strategy.  See People v Mitchell, 
454 Mich 145, 156; 560 NW2d 600 (1997), quoting Strickland, supra at 689 
(stating that a defendant must “‘overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action “might be considered sound trial 
strategy”’”). Because Filip’s representation was adequate at the time and under 
the circumstances known to him, it was sufficient to pass constitutional muster. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In sum, I conclude in the majority opinion that defense counsel was not 
ineffective because his performance did not prejudice defendant, and four other 
justices support that conclusion.  I separately conclude that counsel was not 
ineffective because his performance was not constitutionally deficient for failing 
to produce an expert to refute the prosecution’s experts.  Filip had no reason to 
challenge the testimony of the prosecution’s experts, given defendant’s theory of 
defense and her own prior statements to the police regarding the cause of death. 
Moreover, Filip sufficiently investigated other theories. 
Accordingly, I conclude that defendant has not established a Sixth 
Amendment ineffective-assistance claim. 
 
Maura D. Corrigan 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 
SUPREME COURT 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 132042 
KATHERINE SUE DENDEL, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
The majority reverses the Court of Appeals decision and reinstates 
defendant’s conviction after concluding that defendant failed to demonstrate that 
her trial counsel’s performance prejudiced her.  Because there is a reasonable 
possibility that defendant is innocent and her counsel’s performance deprived her 
of her only viable defense, I believe she is entitled to a new trial.  Accordingly, I 
dissent from the majority’s reinstatement of the guilty verdict. 
THE FACTS 
This case involves the death of a gravely ill man.  At the time of his death, 
Paul Burley had been involved in a relationship with defendant, Katherine Dendel, 
since 1975. 
Burley had suffered from many illnesses including hepatitis B, 
hepatitis C, herpes, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, throat cancer, an 
infection with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), neuropathy, and epilepsy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Due to his poor health, Burley was frequently hospitalized and required constant 
care while at home, care that defendant provided. 
The day of Burley’s death began with a phone call to the police.  At 
approximately 3:00 a.m., defendant called to report that Burley was running back 
and forth in the house with a knife.  But by the time the police arrived, all was 
calm. Defendant told the police that she was not concerned that Burley would 
injure her, but was concerned that, given his impaired mental state, he might injure 
himself. Concluding that Burley was not a threat to himself or to anyone else at 
that time, the police took no action. 
Later in the morning, defendant left the house to perform errands.  She also 
made inquiries about placing Burley in a nursing home.  She had made numerous 
similar inquiries before. Defendant returned home, fed Burley his lunch, and 
performed other errands, including inquiring further about placing Burley in a 
nursing home. At approximately 5:00 p.m., she checked on Burley and found him 
in a comatose state. She telephoned Aida Winters, her friend, for assistance and 
moments later, having ascertained that Burley was dead, summoned the police. 
Defendant was hysterical and continued in that state while the police and 
ambulance workers took away Burley’s body. 
Initially, the Oakland County medical examiner, Dr. Bernardino Pacris, 
concluded that Burley died of natural causes.  However, after he spoke with the 
police officers who were investigating the death, Dr. Pacris revisited his findings. 
He then concluded that the cause of death was an insulin injection, although he 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
found no needle mark. Burley did not have a prescription for insulin.  It should be 
noted, however, that defendant was a diabetic.  The process by which Dr. Pacris 
determined the cause of death was founded on an anatomical basis and the 
circumstances surrounding the death rather than on toxicological findings. 
Defendant was charged with first-degree murder.  At trial, Dr. Pacris and 
Dr. Michael Evans1 testified for the prosecution. Both Drs. Pacris and Evans 
concluded that the evidence supported a theory that Burley died of an insulin 
overdose.  In closing argument, the prosecutor argued that, given Burley’s 
numerous physical ailments, he was unable to prepare insulin for administration 
and inject himself with it. The prosecution also attempted to show that the 
circumstances surrounding the death gave rise to a suspicion of murder. 
Defense counsel argued, on the other hand, that Burley either took his own 
life or died from natural causes. However, counsel did not present evidence to 
counter the prosecution’s medical experts, who concluded that Burley died of an 
insulin overdose. 
This was despite the fact that counsel had successfully 
petitioned for the appointment of an expert for the defense. 
Ultimately, the court convicted defendant of second-degree murder. 
Relying on the prosecution’s medical testimony, the court found that Burley died 
of an insulin overdose. The court credited the prosecution’s argument and found it 
1 Dr. Evans was a professor of toxicology and is the president and chief 
executive officer of AIT Laboratories. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
not believable that the gravely ill Burley was physically capable of injecting 
himself with a lethal dose of insulin. 
Defendant appealed her conviction in the Court of Appeals.  On its own 
motion, the Court appointed new counsel for her and remanded the case for a 
Ginther2 hearing to determine whether defendant had received effective assistance 
of counsel at trial. Among the witnesses at the hearing were defendant’s former 
counsel and a forensic pathologist, Dr. Laurence Simson,3 who was an expert 
witness brought in by defendant’s newly appointed appellant counsel. 
Defendant’s former counsel testified that he (1) never consulted an 
independent forensic pathologist, (2) never had the body tested for the presence of 
insulin, (3) spoke only briefly with his own general practitioner regarding the 
cause of death and was referred to an endocrinologist, Dr. Halsey, (4) spoke with 
Dr. Halsey but took no notes of the conversation, (5) did no research into Dr. 
Halsey’s expertise, (6) did not give either the general practitioner or the 
endocrinologist Burley’s medical records to review, and (7) did not speak to the 
physician who treated Burley during his last hospitalization. 
The forensic pathologist, Dr. Simson, testified that there was a lack of 
significant evidence that Burley died of an insulin overdose.  Instead, he 
2 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 
3 Dr. Simson is a forensic pathology consultant, a former professor of 
pathology, an Ingham County pathologist, and a national consultant in forensic 
pathology to the Surgeon General of the United States Air Force. 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
concluded that Burley died of a multiple-drug overdose. He based his conclusion 
on the fact that Burley had a lethal level of morphine in his system along with 
therapeutic levels of several other drugs. 
 
At the Ginther hearing, Dr. Pacris was questioned about his trial testimony 
that Burley died of an insulin overdose.  He was asked if he had considered that a 
lethal dose of morphine was found in Burley’s body.  He testified that he had 
based his conclusion that Burley did not die of a morphine overdose on his 
assumption that Burley had developed a tolerance to the drug.  But he admitted 
that he had not checked to learn how much morphine Burley had been using. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Chad C. Schmucker, who also 
presided at the bench trial, found that defense counsel had not provided ineffective 
assistance.  He found that counsel’s brief consultations with Drs. Burgess and 
Halsey were all that was required of him.  He also concluded that, even if 
counsel’s performance had been deficient, defendant could not show prejudice. 
In a split, unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals reversed defendant’s 
conviction.4  The majority determined that, in light of the pivotal nature of the 
medical evidence, it was unreasonable for defense counsel to have consulted only 
briefly with the two doctors. It was unreasonable for him not to have furnished the 
physicians with documentation regarding Burley’s medical history or the 
4 People v Dendel, unpublished opinion per curiam, issued July 18, 2006 
(Docket No. 247391). 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
circumstances surrounding his death.  And because defense counsel’s deficient 
performance deprived defendant of a substantial defense, the majority held that 
there was a reasonable probability that it adversely affected the outcome of the 
trial. 
The dissenting judge emphasized the prejudice prong of the test for 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  He found no reason to conclude that the trial 
judge had clearly erred in concluding that defendant could not show prejudice.    
The prosecution applied for leave to appeal in this Court.  We heard oral 
argument on the application on October 3, 2007.5 
THE SUFFICIENCY OF DEFENSE COUNSEL’S LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
The standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is the same under both 
the Michigan and federal constitutions.6  A defendant must show that defense 
counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and that this performance 
prejudiced the defense.7  In this case, the majority reinstates defendant’s 
conviction after deciding that defendant cannot show prejudice. 
To demonstrate prejudice, one must establish “a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
5 477 Mich 1012 (2007).  
6 People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 326; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).  
7 Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d  
674 (1984). 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”8 
Here, the prosecution’s case hinged on the cause of death.  The prosecution 
contended that defendant died of an insulin overdose, and it presented evidence to 
support this theory. 
The prosecutor argued that defendant was physically 
incapable of injecting himself with insulin.  By failing to counter this theory, 
defense counsel left the finder of fact with two choices: It could find (1) that 
Burley killed himself by insulin overdose, a highly unlikely occurrence given his 
debilitated physical condition, or (2) that defendant killed Burley by administering 
a fatal dose of insulin. Thus, by failing to counter the prosecution’s theory of the 
cause of death, defense counsel left defendant with no viable defense. 
By contrast, defense counsel could have challenged the prosecution’s 
theory of the cause of death, providing the trier of fact with a meaningful choice. 
Evidence could have been presented that Burley died from a different cause, such 
as a multiple-drug overdose, as Dr. Simson concluded.  This would have been 
particularly effective in light of the fact that Dr. Pacris did not immediately 
identify the cause of death as an insulin overdose. Dr. Pacris considered the 
possibility of an insulin overdose only after the police informed him that they 
suspected Burley might have died from an insulin injection.  Furthermore, Dr. 
Pacris did not check into Burley’s use of morphine, despite the fact that Burley 
8 Id. at 694. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
died with a large amount of morphine in his system.  Importantly, unlike insulin, 
which is injected, morphine is available in pill form, and there was evidence that 
Burley had access to morphine pills. 
Burley could have self-administered a fatal dose of morphine, either 
accidentally or intentionally.9  Thus, had defense counsel challenged the cause of 
death, the finder of fact could have concluded that Burley died of a noncriminal 
act. Defendant’s appellate counsel demonstrated that trial counsel easily could 
have found an expert witness to refute the prosecution’s theory regarding the cause 
of death. It follows that the trial attorney’s failure to adequately investigate and 
pursue the viable theory that Burley died of a noncriminal act deprived defendant 
of a substantial defense.10 
9 At oral argument, I specifically inquired whether it is easier to self­
administer morphine than it is to self-administer insulin.  My concern was this: If 
it is unreasonable to conclude that defendant self-administered a fatal dose of 
insulin, why would it be reasonable to conclude that he self-administered a fatal 
dose of morphine?  The answer that defendant’s counsel gave was that it is much 
easier to administer morphine because, unlike insulin, Burley’s “morphine was 
pills, and there was testimony that [Burley] had a large number of pills available to 
him and that he had access to those pills.” It is this difference that makes a self­
administered overdose of morphine believable but a self-administered overdose of 
insulin by a man in Burley’s condition unbelievable. 
10 The majority criticizes me for explaining how trial counsel’s 
performance was deficient. 
It claims that this portion of my argument is 
“misplaced.”  Ante at 11 n 10. I disagree.  In this case, the two prongs of the test 
for ineffective assistance of counsel are inextricably linked.  I cannot explain how 
defendant was prejudiced without explaining how defense counsel’s performance 
was deficient. 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
Because defendant has shown that her trial counsel’s performance deprived 
her of a substantial defense, she has met her burden of showing prejudice, unless 
other evidence rendered this defense unbelievable.11  The record reveals that, had 
defendant presented Dr. Simson’s testimony at trial, the evidence would have 
supported either of two competing theories of the cause of death.  As the majority 
points out, there was circumstantial evidence that tended to show a guilty mind. 
The majority discusses only this evidence.  But it ignores the evidence that tends 
to show that Burley died of a noncriminal act. 
This evidence is that defendant and Burley had a relationship that had 
lasted nearly 30 years. During this period, Burley suffered from many illnesses, 
including an HIV infection.  As Burley battled these ailments, defendant stood by 
his side, providing him with needed care.  Defendant was not only Burley’s 
companion and caregiver during this period, she was his financial support.  He had 
11 The majority claims that I apply the wrong standard by presuming 
prejudice. I do no such thing.  In order to meet her burden of showing prejudice, 
defendant had to show that defense counsel’s deficient performance undermined 
confidence in the outcome.  Accordingly, if defendant shows that counsel’s 
performance deprived her of a viable defense, she has shown prejudice.  This is 
because a viable defense equates to a reasonable chance at acquittal.  Thus, I do 
not presume prejudice.  Rather, I consider whether her counsel’s performance 
deprived defendant of a viable defense.  If so, a new trial is required because there 
is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different.”  Strickland, 466 US at 694.  On the 
other hand, if the defense defendant was deprived of was unbelievable, she would 
not be entitled to a new trial because she could not show prejudice. 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
not been gainfully employed since the mid-1980s.12  Hers is hardly the behavioral 
profile of a cold-blooded killer. 
The evidence also tended to show that Burley’s mental health had 
deteriorated and that he was possibly abusing morphine and other drugs.  In fact, 
defendant had to call the police on the day Burley died because he was 
brandishing a knife, arousing her concern that he might hurt himself.  And there 
was evidence that defendant had hidden drugs from Burley to prevent him from 
overdosing himself. Also, she had contacted numerous sources in the period 
before Burley’s death in an attempt to get him the 24-hour, 7 day-a-week care he 
required. 
There are also innocent explanations for the acts to which the majority 
attributes sinister motives. Because defendant, not Burley’s family members, 
tended Burley toward the end of his life, it is not surprising that defendant was not 
eager to inform his family of his death.  This is especially likely in light of the fact 
that, as defendant testified, she felt the family had turned its back on Burley.13 
12 The majority suggests that I ignore evidence that defendant may have had 
an improper motive in caring for Burley.  That is not true.  I recognize that the 
circumstantial evidence pointed in different directions. I focus on the evidence 
that tended to show that Burley died of a noncriminal act because the majority 
fails to address this evidence at all.  This is error because, when considering 
whether defendant was prejudiced, it is necessary to consider the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding Burley’s death. 
13 There was evidence that Burley’s family intentionally avoided him after 
he contracted an HIV infection. For example, he was no longer invited to family 
gatherings, such as Easter celebrations and Super Bowl parties. 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nor does the fact that defendant was exasperated with providing Burley 
constant care render her a murderer. And defendant’s decision to call a friend 
before summoning the police after discovering Burley in a comatose state is 
understandable. Defendant could have been overwhelmed by shock and sadness at 
discovering her longtime companion near death.  It is even more reasonable to 
attribute an innocent explanation to this behavior when one considers that 
defendant had prearranged for the friend to assist her if Burley died.  Nor was 
defendant’s decision to cremate Burley unusual, since cremation is a common 
alternative to burial in this country, especially for those who have suffered from 
debilitating ailments. Finally, the fact that defendant understood insulin’s effect 
on the body is not surprising in light of the fact that she is a diabetic. 
The nonmedical evidence surrounding the death could support a finding 
that Burley died of a noncriminal act.  Accordingly, had defense counsel 
challenged the cause of death, the finder of fact would have been left with two 
reasonable alternatives: (1) to decide that the evidence showed that defendant 
killed Burley or (2) to conclude that Burley killed himself, intentionally or 
accidentally, possibly to spare his loving companion of nearly 30 years the burden 
of his continuing care. The strategy employed by defense counsel left defendant 
with no viable defense, whereas another strategy could have resulted in an 
acquittal. Hence, confidence in the outcome has been undermined sufficiently to 
require a new trial. Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision. 
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The majority disagrees with me and reinstates defendant’s conviction.  In 
so doing, the majority opinion seems to misapprehend defendant’s burden.  It 
would seem to require defendant to prove that she is actually innocent of the crime 
in order to be entitled to relief.  Even though defendant might be innocent, this is 
not the standard. 
The standard is “a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”14  Because defense counsel’s performance deprived 
defendant of a viable, reasonable, and believable defense, the standard was met in 
this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals decision to vacate defendant’s conviction did not 
hang on what some people term “a legal technicality.”  Instead, there is a very real 
possibility that defendant is innocent of the crime of which she has been 
convicted. Yet her counsel never gave the finder of fact a realistic option of 
returning a verdict of not guilty.  By effectively conceding the cause of death, 
counsel deprived defendant of her only viable defense.  The Court of Appeals 
correctly reversed defendant’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.  I 
would affirm its judgment. 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
14 Strickland, 466 US at 694. 
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