Title: Emil E. Jankee v. Clark County
Citation: 2000 WI 64
Docket Number: 1995AP002136
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 22, 2000

2000 WI 64 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-2136 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Emil E. Jankee and Mary Jankee,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Clark County, Wisconsin Health Care  
Liability Insurance Plan,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Cross-Appellants-
 
Petitioners, 
Continental Casualty Co., Hammel, Green &  
Abrahamson, Inc.,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Cross-Appellants-
 
Cross-Respondents, 
Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., J.P. Cullen  
& Sons, Inc., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.  
Co., and Wausau Metal Corp. d/b/a Milco,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Cross-Respondents, 
Wisconsin Department of Health and Social  
Services,  
 
Defendant.  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  222 Wis. 2d 151, 585 N.W.2d 913 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 22, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 5, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Clark 
 
JUDGE: 
Duane Polivka 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there 
were briefs by Ronald G. Tays, Hope K. Olson and Previant, 
Goldberg, Uelmen, Gratz, Miller & Brueggeman, S.C., Milwaukee and 
oral argument by Ronald G. Tays. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents-cross appellants-
petitioners there were briefs by Timothy F. Mentkowski, Mary E. 
Nelson and Crivello, Carlson, Mentkowski & Steeves, S.C., 
Milwaukee and oral argument by Timothy F. Mentkowski. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents-cross appellants-
cross respondents there was a brief by Timothy R. Murphy and 
Askegaard, Robinson, Murphy & Schweich, P.A., Brainerd, MN and 
oral argument by Timothy R. Murphy. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents-cross respondents, 
Wausau Underwriters Insurance Co. & J.P. Cullen & Sons, Inc., 
there was a brief by Wayne R. Luck and Law Offices of Stilp and 
Cotton, Appelton and oral argument by Wayne R. Luck. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents-cross respondents, 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. & Wausau Metals Corporation, 
d/b/a Milco, there was a brief by John P. Richie and Misfeldt, 
Stark, Richie, Wickstrom & Wachs, Eau Claire and oral argument by 
John P. Richie. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by W. Wayne Siesennop, 
Mary Susan Maloney and Hannan, Siesennop & Sullivan, Milwaukee 
for the Wisconsin Association of Consulting Engineers and the 
Wisconsin Society of Architects, Inc., doing business as AIA 
Wisconsin. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Charles V. Sweeney, 
Raymond P. Taffora, Nia Enemuoh-Trammell and Michael Best & 
Friedrich, LLP, Madison for the Wisconsin Transportation Builders 
Association. 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Alan E. Gesler and 
Slattery & Hausman, Ltd., Waukesha for the Wisconsin Academy of 
Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
 
2000 WI 64 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No.  95-2136 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Emil E. Jankee and Mary Jankee,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Clark County, Wisconsin Health Care  
Liability Insurance Plan,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross- 
          Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
Continental Casualty Co., Hammel, Green &  
Abrahamson, Inc.,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross- 
          Appellants-Cross-Respondents, 
 
Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., J.P. Cullen  
& Sons, Inc., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.  
Co., and Wausau Metal Corp. d/b/a Milco,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross- 
          Respondents, 
 
Wisconsin Department of Health and Social  
Services,  
 
          Defendant. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
FILED 
 
JUN 22, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
2 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   Emil and Mary Jankee and Clark 
County seek review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals, Jankee v. Clark County, 222 Wis. 2d 151, 585 N.W.2d 913 
(Ct. App. 1998), affirming in part and reversing in part an 
order of the Circuit Court for Clark County, Duane Polivka, 
Judge. 
¶2 
Emil Jankee (Jankee) sustained paralyzing injuries 
during an attempt to escape from Clark County Health Care Center 
(CCHCC), after he squeezed through an opening in a third-floor 
window and then fell from the roof, fracturing his back.  Emil 
and Mary Jankee (Jankees) filed a complaint against Clark County 
and 
against 
three 
other 
parties, 
namely 
the 
architect, 
contractor, and subcontractor responsible for designing and 
implementing CCHCC's building renovations several years earlier.  
¶3 
The Jankees sued Clark County for negligently failing 
to supervise Jankee adequately while he was in the County's 
custody and control.  They also pursued negligence claims 
against the architectural firm of Hammel, Green & Abrahamson, 
Inc. (HGA), building contractor J.P. Cullen & Sons, Inc. 
(Cullen), and Cullen's subcontractor, Wausau Metals Corporation, 
doing business as MILCO, alleging that the selection and 
installation of defective and dangerous windows caused Jankee's 
injuries.  In addition, the Jankees initiated a strict liability 
action against MILCO, the manufacturer of the CCHCC windows, for 
failure to design and manufacture a reasonably safe product. 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
3 
¶4 
The circuit court granted summary judgment to HGA, 
Cullen, and MILCO, finding that the government contractor 
immunity 
doctrine 
rendered 
those 
defendants 
immune 
from 
liability.  The court also granted the summary judgment motion 
of Clark County, holding that the doctrine of contributory 
negligence precluded recovery as a matter of law because 
Jankee's negligence was greater than the negligence of each of 
the four defendants. 
¶5 
The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment 
motions granted to the three contractor defendants, holding that 
the defense of government contractor immunity entitled them to 
immunity as a matter of law.  Jankee, 222 Wis. 2d at 154-55.  
The court reversed the circuit court, however, on the claim 
against Clark County, concluding that if Jankee were incapable 
of controlling or appreciating his conduct, he could not be held 
contributorily negligent.  Id. at 155.  Because the court of 
appeals ruled that Jankee's conduct should be gauged under a 
subjective standard of care, the court discerned disputed issues 
of fact relating to Jankee's capacity.  The court of appeals 
therefore found that the circuit court had erred in dismissing 
the claim against Clark County, and it remanded the issue of 
contributory negligence.  Id. at 178. 
¶6 
Jankee petitioned this court seeking review of the 
decision of the court of appeals to affirm the summary judgment 
motions granted to the three contractors on the governmental 
contractor immunity issue.  Clark County cross-petitioned this 
court, asking us to review the court of appeals decision to 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
4 
extend governmental immunity to the defendant contractors and 
the decision to apply a reasonable person standard to evaluate 
Jankee's conduct. 
¶7 
In our review, we do not address the strict liability 
cause of action.  The court of appeals did not reach the strict 
liability claim against MILCO because it found MILCO, like the 
other two contractor defendants, immune from liability.  Jankee, 
222 Wis. 2d at 155 n.2.  Jankee did not raise the strict 
liability issue in his petition for review, and we decline to 
address it here.  See State v. Bodoh, 226 Wis. 2d 718, 722, 595 
N.W.2d 330 (1999).  Generally, a petitioner cannot raise or 
argue issues not set forth in the petition for review unless 
this court orders otherwise.  Wis. Stat. § 809.62(6).1  If an 
issue is not raised in the petition for review or in a cross 
petition, "the issue is not before us."  State v. Weber, 164 
Wis. 2d 788, 791 n.2, 476 N.W.2d 867 (1991) (Abrahamson, J., 
dissenting) (citing Betchkal v. Willis, 127 Wis. 2d 177, 183 
n.4, 378 N.W.2d 684 (1985)). 
¶8 
Two issues are before the court.  The first is whether 
a mentally disabled plaintiff who is involuntarily committed to 
a mental health facility can be held contributorily negligent 
for injuries sustained during an escape attempt from that 
facility.  The second issue is whether architects, contractors, 
and subcontractors engaged to work for the government in the 
                     
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1987-
88 statutes unless indicated otherwise.  
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
5 
renovation of a public mental health facility can invoke the 
defense of government contractor immunity. 
¶9 
We 
hold 
that 
Wisconsin's 
contributory 
negligence 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.045,2 bars the Jankees' claim against 
each of the defendants because Jankee's own negligence exceeded 
the negligence of the defendants as a matter of law.  When a 
plaintiff's negligence is greater than the negligence of any 
defendant, it is our duty to find that the plaintiff's 
contributory 
negligence 
bars 
recovery. 
 
Johnson 
v. 
Grzadzielewski, 159 Wis. 2d 601, 608-09, 465 N.W.2d 503 (Ct. 
App. 1990) (citing Gross v. Denow, 61 Wis. 2d 40, 49, 212 N.W.2d 
2 (1973)).  Jankee was more responsible than the defendants for 
his injuries for two reasons.  First, Jankee's hospitalization 
resulted from his failure to comply with a medication program 
that controlled his mental disability.  Under a reasonable 
person standard of care, a reasonable person would understand 
that he was required to maintain his prescribed medication in 
order to avoid the potential ramifications of his mental 
disability.  Second, under the reasonable person standard of 
                     
2  
At 
the 
time 
of 
Jankee's 
accident, 
Wisconsin's 
contributory negligence statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.045, read: 
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an 
action by any person or his legal representative to 
recover damages for negligence resulting in death or 
in injury to person or property, if such negligence 
was not greater than the negligence of the person 
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages 
allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the 
amount of 
negligence 
attributable to 
the 
person 
recovering. 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
6 
care, Jankee was bound to exercise the duty of ordinary care 
when he tried to escape from CCHCC.  We do not decide whether 
government contractor immunity shields HGA, Cullen, and MILCO 
from liability, because we uphold the circuit court's summary 
judgment on the ground that the quantum of Jankee's contributory 
negligence disqualified him under § 895.045.3  Accordingly, we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
FACTS 
¶10 The facts in this case are complex, and the record is 
extensive.  The circuit court did not address every undisputed 
fact detailed in the many pleadings, depositions, answers, and 
affidavits.  Nonetheless, the court made findings of fact for 
the government contractor immunity issue and based its decision 
to find Jankee contributorily negligent to a disqualifying 
degree as a matter of law expressly on Jankee's actions as 
documented in the entire record.  Although an appellate court 
cannot make its own findings of fact, Wurtz v. Fleischman, 97 
Wis. 2d 100, 108, 293 N.W.2d 155 (1980), this court searches the 
record to support the circuit court's findings of fact.  In 
Matter of Estate of Becker, 76 Wis. 2d 336, 347, 251 N.W.2d 431 
(1977).  Where, as here, a circuit court has relied on a 
                     
3 "As a general rule, when our resolution of one issue 
disposes of a case, we will not address additional issues."  
Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 640 
n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998).  The parties agreed at oral argument 
that if we were to find Jankee contributorily negligent and this 
negligence exceeded the causal negligence, if any, of the 
defendants, we would not have to reach the government contractor 
immunity issue. 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
7 
voluminous record as its basis for findings of fact, we turn to 
that record to set forth the pertinent facts. 
¶11 Emil Jankee suffers from bipolar affective disorder, 
more commonly known as manic depressive illness.  He attempted 
suicide at the age of 12 or 13 by taking an overdose of aspirin. 
 Between March 5 and April 17, 1984, at the age of 26, Jankee 
was hospitalized voluntarily for manic depressive illness at 
Norwood Health Care Center (Norwood) in Marshfield, Wisconsin.  
His 
behavior 
included 
sleep 
disturbances, 
intrusiveness, 
religiosity, assaultiveness, and an inability to cooperate.  
Consequently, Jankee spent part of the time at Norwood in a 
locked security area.  Norwood treated Jankee with lithium and 
haldol.  On April 1, 1984, Jankee insisted on leaving Norwood 
and threatened either to break a window to get out or to hang 
himself.   
¶12 By April 17, 1984, Jankee's condition had improved.  
Jankee, 
however, 
experienced 
problems 
with 
"medication 
compliance."  Norwood physicians warned that his continued 
improvement hinged upon ongoing compliance with the treatment 
program.  Doctors recorded that Jankee understood that he would 
progress only if he stayed on the medication, but they warned 
that Jankee could relapse easily if he suspended his treatment.  
¶13 Within six weeks of his April 1984 discharge, Jankee 
ceased taking the medications, convinced that he no longer 
needed them.  Even Jankee's medical expert in this case, 
psychiatrist Melvin J. Soo Hoo, M.D., conceded that Jankee's 
personal decision to stop taking the medications contradicted 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
8 
doctors' advice.  When Jankee unilaterally suspended the 
medications, physicians urged him to resume the treatment, but 
he did not.  Jankee experienced a relapse, much as predicted, 
and he was rehospitalized voluntarily at Norwood on July 19, 
1984.  
¶14 At the time of his July 1984 hospitalization, Jankee 
admitted that he had contemplated suicide but added that he had 
made no recent attempts to kill himself.  He denied feeling 
suicidal at the time of admission.  Norwood evaluated Jankee's 
condition as somewhat, but not especially, depressed, and 
doctors found him rational, organized, and in control.  Jankee 
had accumulated some debts, including the purchase of a 
Cadillac.  He had no means by which to keep up payments for 
these debts.  The treating physician, Dr. W. Warren Garitano, 
noted that although Jankee was in good control, Jankee despaired 
and searched for an easy solution to his self-created problems. 
 Dr. Garitano formally noted in Jankee's record on two occasions 
that "one certainly must entertain the idea that he may be 
deliberately provoking illness to avoid [his] responsibilities."  
¶15 Norwood records for this second hospitalization, like 
those from the previous confinement, remark that Jankee's 
condition was good with medication compliance.  Staff once more 
instructed Jankee to continue with the medication and to seek 
psychiatric follow-up.  Although he commented that he should be 
well enough to suspend the lithium within a month or two, Jankee 
conceded that his treatment was "just like insulin, [ ] take it 
for life."  A nurse noted in Jankee's chart that despite his 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
9 
realization about the positive effects of the medication, Jankee 
ignored those benefits and instead counted "on himself to cure 
all."  At his discharge, a social worker recommended that Jankee 
be situated in a halfway house if medication noncompliance were 
to spark a deterioration.   
¶16 Dr. Soo Hoo testified that patients like Jankee, if 
not treated with medication, are prone to future episodes of 
decompensation.4  Had Jankee stayed on his medication in 1984, 
Dr. Soo Hoo observed, in all likelihood he would have been in an 
improved condition, and his risk of another flare-up would have 
been reduced.  Nonetheless, following his second release, Jankee 
suspended his haldol treatment, apparently because of side 
effects, and he also discontinued taking lithium.  At his 1993 
deposition, Jankee testified that he prefers not to take 
medication.  
¶17 Jankee experienced another relapse in July 1989, 11 
days after he married Mary Gwozd.  On the evening of July 13, 
1989, he and his wife engaged in a violent domestic altercation. 
 After the dispute, Jankee left his home and began walking down 
the highway, where police picked him up after his wife reported 
the incident.  Jankee spent the night in jail, and the next 
morning, the court detained him for a 30-day evaluation to 
determine whether he was competent to stand trial for domestic 
abuse.  Jankee was given the choice of confinement at Norwood or 
                     
4 Decompensation is "[t]he appearance or exacerbation of a 
mental 
disorder 
due 
to 
failure 
of 
defense 
mechanisms."  
Stedman's Medical Dictionary (1976).  
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
10
CCHCC.  Jankee chose the latter facility because of CCHCC's 
proximity to his home and to the home of his parents,5 making it 
easier for his wife and family to visit him.  CCHCC admitted 
Jankee to its New Horizons Unit, a locked, long-term care ward 
for the chronically mentally disabled.  
¶18 CCHCC 
has 
been 
serving 
Clark 
County 
and 
its 
surrounding areas continuously since 1922.  In the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, it operated as a nursing home for the mentally 
disabled and elderly.  In 1980, CCHCC embarked on a renovation 
to bring the facility in compliance with applicable nursing home 
and hospital regulations.  CCHCC had been plagued by numerous 
building code violations and was in jeopardy of losing its 
license if the building were not updated.  Clark County hired 
HGA as the project architect, and it selected Cullen as the 
general contractor for the refurbishment.  
¶19 Window design was one of the factors Clark County 
considered in planning the renovation.  CCHCC intended to 
provide its patients with as normal an environment as possible 
and sought to create a healing, therapeutic atmosphere free from 
prison-like overtones.  Thus, CCHCC administrators ruled out the 
installation of window bars.  Thirty years earlier, the facility 
had employed security-screened windows.  On the eve of the 
renovation, however, CCHCC determined that such windows were an 
                     
5 CCHCC is ten miles from Jankee's house and two miles from 
his parents' residence.  
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
11
outdated concept that counteracted the rehabilitative nature of 
the institution.  
¶20 State regulations also came into play in the selection 
of window design at CCHCC.  No part of the building featured air 
conditioning prior to the renovation.  Clark County expressed 
concern about state regulations requiring adequate ventilation. 
 Air 
conditioning 
was 
thought 
cost 
prohibitive, 
and 
the 
Wisconsin Administrative Code forbade the use of fans.6  If a 
facility has no air conditioning, regulations require windows to 
open a specific percentage, based on the square footage of an 
area, to allow air circulation.  In addition, the State of 
Wisconsin already had cited CCHCC because "[s]everal resident 
sleeping rooms have locked windows or security screens.  Unless 
a waiver (federal) and variance (state) is requested and 
granted, windows shall be operable and openable without tools or 
keys."  
¶21 CCHCC administrators and other personnel met with HGA 
to discuss solutions to these design concerns.  HGA drafted 
specifications that called for MILCO aluminum frame windows that 
slid horizontally to open.  The proposed windows were to include 
standard-type sash hardware and a removable stop to prevent 
their opening to a width of more than five inches.  HGA 
recommended a five-inch opening because state building codes 
                     
6 Robert J. Young, a licensed architect who testified as 
Jankee's expert witness, referred to the Administrative Code in 
his deposition but did not cite the sections that address these 
regulations.  
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
12
permitted no more than a six-inch opening on balcony guardrails. 
 HGA's principal architect for the project, Daniel Swedberg, 
reasoned that if guardrail openings of six inches were, under 
state law, sufficient to prevent someone from squeezing through, 
then a window opening that was one inch narrower would meet 
CCHCC's needs.   
¶22 Cullen subcontracted MILCO to design, manufacture, and 
install the windows.  MILCO designed a cube stop that served 
simultaneously as a locking device and a removable stop.  The 
cube stop consisted of an approximately one-and-one-half inch 
metal cube that inserted into the top of the window's frame head 
and screwed into place with an Allen wrench to prevent the 
window from sliding entirely open.  The cube stop functioned so 
that: (1) the window could be locked in place at only five 
inches, or alternatively any other distance as the window slid 
to the fully open position; or (2) the window could be opened 
unhindered to any distance if the cube stop were removed with an 
Allen wrench; or (3) the window would be sealed in a closed 
position by locking the cube stop in place.  HGA approved 
MILCO's shop drawings for this proposal.  A CCHCC administrator 
explained that Clark County had relied upon HGA's expertise in 
the choice of this design, and the County therefore did not 
review the window specifications.   
¶23 During the period when the window installation was 
under way, in the spring of 1984, a patient housed on CCHCC's 
first floor managed to remove a cube stop and open a window 
completely. 
 
Clark 
County 
contacted 
HGA 
and 
requested 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
13
modifications to reinforce the barrier to a complete opening.  
MILCO offered to remedy the problem by adding channel stops to 
the existing design.  The channel stops were non-removable, 15-
1/2-inch long pieces of metal installed into the upper track of 
the frame, extending from the jamb of the window to the point at 
which the possible maximum window opening would be fixed.  The 
channel stops were designed to allow for the window to travel no 
more than four inches, thereby restricting the opening to three 
inches.  
¶24 Cullen relayed MILCO's proposed design modification in 
a letter to HGA, but the letter did not specify that the maximum 
window opening width would be changed from the contracted five 
inches to the revised three inches.  Thus, Clark County approved 
installation of the channel stops apparently unaware that the 
addition of channel stops permitted only the narrower, three-
inch opening.  
¶25 After the windows had been installed, HGA carried out 
an inspection of the CCHCC project in November 1984.  HGA 
noticed the windows opened only three inches, not the five 
inches originally specified in the agreement with Clark County. 
 HGA contacted MILCO about the discrepancy, and MILCO responded 
that it had never been notified that the channel stops must 
allow the wider, five-inch opening.  MILCO offered to modify the 
channel stops at an additional cost.  
¶26 The window openings allowed by the channel stops were 
widened, but the record does not reveal with certainty which 
parties, or whether any of the parties to this lawsuit, 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
14
ultimately implemented the modifications.  The modifications 
consisted of shortening the length of the channel stops to 13 
inches.  After the channel stops were shortened, the cube stops 
were reinstalled between the window and the channel stops; the 
two stops thus were positioned in the top track of the window.  
MILCO's design engineer later observed that this placement 
rendered the cube stop ineffective.  If the window sash were 
rocked back and forth against the channel stop, the cube stop 
could be forced to slide out of place.  
¶27 In 1987 a patient made an escape attempt from CCHCC by 
removing a screw that held the channel stop in place.  This 
removal allowed the patient to open the window to a width that 
permitted exit.  Clark County conducted an investigation of this 
incident and concluded that the channel stops still offered the 
facility sufficient security protections.  CCHCC administrator 
Aryln Mills later testified that the particular patient had been 
able to escape because he "had basically been a very unique type 
of individual that had skills beyond that which would be 
expected to be possessed by another patient."  Consequently, 
Clark County left the stop system in place unchanged.  Until 
Jankee arrived at CCHCC in July 1989, there had been no 
subsequent successful elopements from the facility.   
¶28 A CCHCC physician believed that under the law, 
medication could not be administered in a voluntary confinement 
without a patient's consent.  The physician therefore contacted 
the district attorney, and after some discussion, Chapter 51 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
15
proceedings were initiated.  A Chapter 51 commitment would 
ensure that Jankee received treatment with medication. 
¶29 Early in his admission, Jankee displayed threatening 
and destructive behavior.  Consequently, CCHCC placed Jankee 
under an emergency 72-hour detention.  Instructions for that 
detention directed staff to contact a nurse and a physician if 
Jankee's behavior became aggressive or if he were a danger to 
himself or others.  Although hospital records fail to reveal 
that Jankee ever threatened to harm himself, the long-term goal 
for the detention period was that Jankee "not harm [him]self or 
others."  Between July 15, 1989, and July 21, 1989, Jankee 
remained in an isolation room, and staff checked on him at first 
every five minutes and then every fifteen minutes.  CCHCC staff 
recorded Jankee's condition on its Flow Sheet for patients 
monitored 
for 
suicide 
checks, 
seclusion, 
restraint, 
and 
wandering.7  By July 21, Jankee was quiet, cooperative with 
staff, and no longer destroying property.  CCHCC then switched 
him from isolation to "the south room," a corner room on the 
third floor of the locked New Horizons Unit.  
¶30 During the course of his entire hospitalization at 
CCHCC, Jankee voiced no thoughts of self-destruction.  At no 
                     
7 It appears from the record that this Flow Sheet is a 
standard form CCHCC uses to monitor patients.  Although entitled 
"Suicide Precautions" on its face side, on its reverse the form 
explains the behavior codes staff are to note not only for 
suicide, but also for patients in seclusion, in restraint, or 
wandering.  The record indicates that Jankee was on 15-minute 
checks for aggressive behavior toward others.  
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
16
time did a psychiatrist or other professional staff determine 
that he was either suicidal or an elopement risk.  Hospital 
policies require staff to address patients who present an 
elopement risk; Jankee's records contain no such notations.  A 
July 18, 1989, psychiatric evaluation indicated Jankee was not 
suicidal.  A July 20 Physician's Report to Clark County Circuit 
Court reported that "[t]here is substantial risk of harm to 
others," but it remained silent on whether Jankee was inclined 
to harm himself.  Later, on July 25, another Physician's Report 
to the court remarked that "[p]atient is more likely to be a 
danger to his wife, though 10 years ago he did take an overdose 
of aspirin in order to die."  
¶31 Dr. Soo Hoo noted that Jankee's discharge summary 
suggested he was under a considerable influence of delusions and 
exercised poor judgment, but remarked that Jankee was not 
someone 
"imminently 
engrossed 
in 
suicidal 
preoccupations."  
Jankee expressed to CCHCC that he was "looking very much forward 
to getting his life and relationship with his new wife back in 
order," and he stressed that his religious faith prevented him 
from harming his wife or himself.  Similarly, Dr. Soo Hoo 
testified that Jankee "is very sensitive to wanting to survive. 
 This is not someone who is intent on harming himself."  
¶32 Jankee's new room had three windows: one faced south, 
and two looked east.  The windows to the east were situated 
three stories above the ground.  The south window, on the other 
hand, overlooked the roof of the building's second story, a flat 
surface about 20 feet wide and situated two or three feet below 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
17
Jankee's windowsill.  Jankee noted that the south window located 
in his room was "just far enough so somebody couldn't see [it] 
from the door area." 
¶33 The south window was equipped with one of the modified 
channel stops that allowed for an opening greater than three 
inches.  Several days before making his escape attempt, Jankee 
took note that the windows in his room opened about four inches. 
 The windows were not locked shut.  Both Jankee and the staff 
would open the windows for ventilation.   
¶34 On the evening of July 25, 1989, Jankee's wife visited 
him at about 6:00 or 7:00, bringing pizza and cheesecake.  
Jankee told her he "wanted to get out."  At about 8:40 p.m., 
while his wife was still at CCHCC, Jankee walked to the nurses' 
station and announced "I'm tired of being used for a guinea pig 
around here.  Why don't you kick my ass out of here instead of 
giving me a bunch of medicine."  Jankee's wife departed at 10:30 
p.m.  At his deposition, Jankee testified that he decided to 
leave CCHCC about 30 minutes later, after watching Johnny 
Carson.   
¶35 Jankee testified about the motivations behind his 
escape plan at his deposition.  During his hospitalization, 
Jankee believed that "God or Satan or someone" directed his 
activities, including the escape.  Jankee also indicated that he 
wanted to leave because he was tired of being at CCHCC, missed 
his wife and family, and was anxious to finish his plans to move 
and renovate a house.  He planned to depart from CCHCC that 
evening, see his wife, and return to the facility before 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
18
breakfast, "with nobody being the wiser."  He did not plan to 
kill himself.  
¶36 It is not clear exactly when Jankee attempted to 
escape.  At about 11:30 p.m., Jankee walked to the nursing 
station and asked for a drink of water.  Nurses did not notice 
any agitation or anxiety.  He apparently visited the station 
again between 12:15 a.m. and 12:30 a.m., and nurses gave him 
another glass of water at 1:00 a.m.   
¶37 In executing his plan, Jankee hoped to "fool" staff 
into thinking that he was still in his room.  He anticipated a 
bed check, so he "covered his tracks."  Jankee fluffed up some 
pillows on his bed and put them under blankets to make it appear 
as if he were in the room.  He drew closed the curtain at south 
window.  That way, Jankee reasoned, the window would be covered 
from the view of those who peered into his room, and "they 
couldn't see that it was open."  He then began working on the 
window from behind the curtain.  Jankee turned off his room 
light and relied on a yard light situated just outside his 
window.  He bent a toothbrush to a 45-degree angle so he could 
use it for turning, and he pried off the cube stop.  Without the 
cube stop, the window could be jammed open an additional two 
inches, wide enough at the bottom for Jankee's head to get 
through and allow him to squeeze through the window.  Before he 
exited, Jankee removed his cotton shirt to give himself more 
clearance.  The process took between 15 and 20 minutes.   
¶38 Jankee selected the south window for his elopement 
because the flat, brick roof, situated a few feet beneath his 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
19
window, offered a safer way to exit than either of the two east 
windows.  He acknowledged that he would "probably get killed" 
were he to fall three stories from an east window.  Even though 
Jankee "felt protected" and was not worried about falling, he 
did not jump the full three stories because he "knew that would 
be definitely suicide."  At his deposition, Jankee agreed that 
he "knew [it] was dangerous" to jump out the east window from 
the third story.  He also "could appreciate that would not be 
using good judgment," and he testified that he sought to "lower 
the risk of injury to" himself.  Dr. Soo Hoo agreed that Jankee 
appeared to be exercising caution for his own safety.  
¶39 From the south window, Jankee was able to step out of 
his room onto the roof.  He planned to move hand-over-hand from 
one window ledge to the next and then to scale the two stories 
down one side of the building, until he was a safe jumping 
distance from the ground.  While on the roof, Jankee noticed a 
carved stone figure protruding from the brick façade between two 
east windows on the second floor.  He shimmied on his stomach 
and, holding on to a masonry cap atop the wall surrounding the 
roof, slid over the edge of the roof until his feet touched the 
stone figure.  From there, Jankee began moving along the brick 
ledge, just above the figure.  While scaling the brick ledge, 
Jankee lost his fingerhold because of dew or other moisture, and 
fell to the ground.  
¶40 CCHCC policy required staff to check patient rooms 
every two hours.  At 3:00 a.m., a nurse conducted a bed check of 
Jankee's room.  The nurse did not see Jankee's face, but he 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
20
noticed respirations.  One hour later, another nurse opened the 
door of Jankee's room and thought she saw him in bed.  At 5:55 
a.m. on the morning of July 26, 1989, CCHCC security found 
Jankee lying on the ground about five or six feet from the 
southeast side of the building.  Jankee complained of not being 
able to move his legs, and he had abrasions on his forehead and 
eyebrow.  He told a nurse, "I'm sorry [ ], I had to get out of 
there."  An ambulance transferred Jankee to St. Joseph's 
hospital in Marshfield.  Sometime between 6:30 and 6:40 a.m., 
Jankee's wife called and asked:  "Is Emil there?"   
¶41 The fall fractured Jankee's back.  If Jankee uses leg 
braces, he can be on his feet between 30 minutes and one hour; 
otherwise, he uses a wheelchair.   
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶42 The Jankees filed a negligence claim against Clark 
County, contending that CCHCC failed to supervise and restrain 
Jankee properly and provide him with a safe place while Jankee 
was in Clark County's custody and control.  The Jankees also 
sought recovery from HGA, Cullen, and MILCO, claiming those 
defendants negligently failed to design and construct a safe 
psychiatric unit window and neglected to warn Jankee about its 
defective and dangerous condition.  In addition, the Jankees 
pursued relief from MILCO under a strict liability theory, 
arguing that the subcontractor failed to design and manufacture 
a 
reasonably 
safe 
product 
suitable 
for 
use 
in 
mental 
institutions.  
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
21
¶43 Each 
of 
the 
four 
defendants 
moved 
for 
summary 
judgment.  Initially, the circuit court granted only the motion 
of MILCO, finding that with respect to the strict liability 
claim, MILCO could not be liable because Jankee confronted an 
open and obvious danger.  Following that dismissal, the Jankees, 
Clark County, and HGA pursued appeals.  While the appeal was 
pending, MILCO asked the court of appeals for permission to 
address a new issue, the defense of government contractor 
immunity, based on the then-recent decision in Lyons v. CNA Ins. 
Co., 
207 
Wis. 2d 
446, 558 
N.W.2d 
658 (Ct. App. 
1996).  
Subsequently, HGA and Cullen also advanced the government 
contractor immunity defense.  The court of appeals remanded the 
case to the circuit court for additional proceedings with 
respect to the Lyons government contractor immunity issue.  
Jankee v. Clark County, No. 95-2136, unpublished slip op. at 5 
(Wis. Ct. App. May 9, 1997).  The court also noted two other 
recent cases, Gould v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 198 
Wis. 2d 450, 543 N.W.2d 282 (1996), and Burch v. American Family 
Mut. Ins. Co., 198 Wis. 2d 465, 543 N.W.2d 277 (1996), might 
impact the issue of Jankee's capacity.  Id. at 6 n.1. 
¶44 On remand, the circuit court heard arguments from 
Clark County, HGA, Cullen, and MILCO about the application of 
the government contractor immunity defense.  Under Lyons, 207 
Wis. 2d 446, governmental contractors are entitled to immunity 
in these circumstances:  
 
An independent professional contractor who follows 
official directives is an "agent" for the purposes of 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
22
§ 893.80(4), STATS., or is entitled to common law 
immunity when: 
 
(1) the governmental authority approved reasonably 
precise specifications; 
 
(2) 
the 
contractor's 
actions conformed 
to 
those 
specifications; and 
 
(3) the contractor warned the supervising governmental 
authority about the possible dangers associated with 
those specifications that were known to the contractor 
but not to the governmental officials. 
Id. at 457-58.  Clark County disputed application of the second 
prong of the Lyons test to HGA, Cullen, and MILCO.8  The County 
maintained that the case presented an issue of material fact 
because the three-inch opening that resulted from the window 
design modification did not meet its contract specifications, 
which required a five-inch opening.  The circuit court, however, 
made a finding of fact and determined that the windows met the 
specifications because Clark County did not reject the modified 
opening and approved the window installation.  Having addressed 
Clark County's concerns about the second Lyons prong, the 
                     
8 At the first circuit court summary judgment motion 
hearing, Clark County had advanced a defense of governmental 
immunity.  The circuit court declined to grant summary judgment 
motion on that theory because it found material facts in dispute 
about whether Clark County had fulfilled its ministerial duties 
while Jankee was in CCHCC's custody during the night of the 
accident.  The court also reasoned that the modification of the 
window openings was not made on a policy or planning level, but 
on an operational level, and therefore the decision to modify 
the windows was not a decision protected by governmental 
immunity.  The court therefore determined that the decision to 
modify the window openings was not a decision protected by 
discretionary policy law.  Clark County did not readvance the 
governmental immunity argument after the court of appeals 
remanded the case to the circuit court.  
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
23
circuit court found no disputed facts and held that HGA, Cullen, 
and MILCO satisfied each prong of the Lyons test because: (1) 
the 
governmental 
authority, 
Clark 
County, 
had 
approved 
reasonably precise specifications for the windows; (2) the 
windows met those specifications; and (3) HGA, Cullen, and MILCO 
knew of no possible danger in the windows that would require 
them to warn Clark County.  Consequently, the court granted the 
summary judgment motions of HGA, Cullen, and MILCO. 
¶45 The circuit court also found that the degree of 
Jankee's contributory negligence precluded his recovery against 
each of the four defendants as a matter of law.  The court ruled 
that Jankee's conduct must be assessed under the reasonable 
person standard of care because the exception to that standard 
articulated by this court in Gould, 198 Wis. 2d 450, could not 
apply to Jankee.  The circuit court applied the reasonable 
person standard and observed that Jankee's elopement was not an 
impulsive act, but rather "carefully and thoughtfully planned," 
showing "cleverness and forethought."  The court held that under 
the reasonable person standard, Jankee's negligence exceeded the 
negligence of each of the four defendants.  Consequently, the 
court granted summary judgment to Clark County, HGA, Cullen, and 
MILCO on this second issue.  
¶46 The Jankees appealed the decision.  Jankee, 222 
Wis. 2d at 154.  Clark County cross appealed the circuit court's 
holding that the defense of government contractor immunity 
shields HGA, Cullen, and MILCO from liability.  Id. 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
24
¶47 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's 
summary judgments for HGA, Cullen, and MILCO.  The court held 
that under Lyons, government contractor immunity offered those 
three defendants immunity.  Jankee, 222 Wis. 2d at 172.  The 
court of appeals reversed the summary judgment motion granted to 
Clark County on the contributory negligence issue.  The court 
concluded 
that Jankee's 
contributory 
negligence 
should be 
assessed under a subjective standard of care, not the reasonable 
person standard.  Id. at 173, 177.  The court declared that the 
exception to the reasonable person standard created in Gould 
should apply to Jankee because Jankee may have lacked the 
capacity to appreciate or control his conduct.  Id. at 177.  
Having concluded that Jankee's capacity should be at issue under 
the subjective standard of care, the court decided that facts 
relating to capacity were in dispute.  Id. at 178.  Therefore, 
the court remanded the case to the circuit court for a factual 
finding to determine whether Jankee possessed the capacity to 
control and appreciate his conduct.  Id. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶48 The review of a summary judgment motion is a question 
of law that this court considers de novo.  Gaertner v. Holcka, 
219 Wis. 2d 436, 445-46, 580 N.W.2d 271 (1998).  In our review 
of the granting of a summary judgment motion, we employ the same 
methodology as that applied by the circuit court.  Riccitelli v. 
Broekhuizen, 227 Wis. 2d 100, 110, 595 N.W.2d 392 (1999).  
Summary judgment must be entered when a court is satisfied that 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
25
admissions, and affidavits show that no genuine issues of 
material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2); Firstar Trust Co. 
v. First Nat'l Bank of Kenosha, 197 Wis. 2d 484, 492, 541 N.W.2d 
467 (1995).  Hence, an appellate court will reverse a summary 
judgment only if the record reveals that material facts are in 
dispute or if the circuit court misapplied the law.  See 
Grzadzielewski, 159 Wis. 2d at 608. 
¶49 The pivotal issue here is whether Jankee's conduct 
should be assessed under the reasonable person standard of care, 
or under the subjective, or capacity-based, standard of care.  
We find that no facts relating to Jankee's contributory 
negligence are in dispute because, as set forth below, we hold 
that Jankee's conduct must be measured against the reasonable 
person standard of care.  The reasonable person standard is an 
objective test that takes no account of an individual's 
capacity.  Hence, any issues of fact related to Jankee's 
capacity to control or appreciate his conduct are not genuine 
issues material to a resolution here. 
¶50 Because there are no genuine issues of material fact, 
we must determine whether the four defendants were entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law.  Under Wisconsin law, a 
plaintiff cannot recover damages if the plaintiff's negligence 
exceeds the negligence of the party against whom relief is 
sought.  Wis. Stat. § 895.045.  Thus, although in other contexts 
negligence allocation usually is a question for the trier of 
fact, under the contributory negligence statute it is our duty 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
26
to bar recovery against a defendant when, as a matter of law, 
the plaintiff's negligence is greater than the negligence of 
that particular defendant.  Peters v. Menard, Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 
174, 193, 589 N.W.2d 395 (1999).  If we find, from the 
undisputed facts, that Jankee's negligence was "so clear and the 
quantum so great" as to exceed the negligence of the defendants, 
Grzadzielewski, 159 Wis. 2d at 608, we are required to affirm 
the summary judgment decisions of the circuit court as a matter 
of law. 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
¶51 We first address whether the granting of the summary 
judgment motions by the circuit court can be upheld as a matter 
of law.  Wisconsin's contributory negligence statute operates as 
a form of comparative negligence, barring recovery if the 
negligence of a plaintiff exceeds that of the party from whom 
the plaintiff seeks recovery.  Wis. Stat. § 895.045; Tucker v. 
Marcus, 142 Wis. 2d 425, 432-33, 418 N.W.2d 818 (1988); Burch, 
198 Wis. 2d at 476.  Therefore, if we find that Jankee's 
negligence was greater than that of the defendants, Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.045 requires us to reverse the court of appeals as a 
matter of law. 
¶52 Plaintiffs seeking to maintain a negligence action 
must prove four elements:  "(1) A duty of care on the part of 
the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal 
connection between the conduct and the injury; and (4) an actual 
loss or damage as a result of the injury."  Rockweit v. Senecal, 
197 Wis. 2d 409, 418, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995).  The analysis of a 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
27
negligence claim thus begins with a consideration of the duty of 
care and the standard to which persons are held in the exercise 
of that duty. 
¶53 This court has long recognized that every person owes 
a duty to the world at large to protect others from foreseeable 
harm.  Id. at 420 (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 
339, 350, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)).  The 
doctrine of contributory negligence acknowledges that the same 
duty of care obligates persons to exercise ordinary care for 
their own safety.  Peters, 224 Wis. 2d at 192 (quoting Wis 
JICivil 1007).  "Ordinary care is the degree of care which the 
great mass of mankind ordinarily exercises under the same or 
similar circumstances."  Bodoh, 226 Wis. 2d at 732 (quoting Wis 
JICriminal 1260).  A person fails to exercise ordinary care for 
his or her own safety: 
 
[W]hen, without intending to do any harm, he or she 
does 
something 
or 
fails 
to 
do 
something 
under 
circumstances in which a reasonable person would 
foresee that by his or her action or failure to act, 
he or she will subject a person or property to an 
unreasonable risk of injury or damage. 
Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 424 n.7 (quoting Wis JICivil 1005).  
Thus, when a reasonable person knows or should know that a 
course of conduct poses substantial, inherent risks to him or 
her, yet the person persists in the conduct voluntarily and 
suffers injury as a result, the person is negligent and will not 
be permitted to recover from someone who is less negligent.  
Peters, 224 Wis. 2d at 196-97. 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
28
¶54 Having set forth our general approach to negligence 
claims, we next consider whether mentally disabled persons can 
be held to the reasonable person, or objective, standard of 
care.  To date, our decisions primarily have explored the 
standard to which our law holds mentally disabled defendants, 
not mentally disabled plaintiffs.9  Wisconsin, like the majority 
                     
9 Current Wisconsin jury instructions that address mental 
disability in the negligence context expressly prohibit jurors 
from considering mental condition.  These instructions are, 
however, phrased for those situations in which the mentally 
disabled party is a defendant: 
Evidence 
has 
been 
received 
(it 
appears 
without 
dispute) that the defendant at the time of (collision, 
accident, fire, or other alleged tort) was mentally 
disabled.  A person who is mentally disabled is held 
to the same standard of care as one who has normal 
mentality, and in your determination of the question 
of negligence, you will give no consideration to the 
defendant's mental condition. 
 
Wis JICivil 1021.  The jury instructions for the definition of 
negligence creates no distinction for the mentally disabled and 
holds all persons to the same standard of care: 
A person is negligent when (he) (she) fails to 
exercise ordinary care.  Ordinary care is the care 
which a reasonable person would use in similar 
circumstances.  A person is not using ordinary care 
and is negligent, if the person, without intending to 
do harm, does something (or fails to do something) 
that a reasonable person would recognize as creating 
an unreasonable risk of injury or damage to another 
person or property. 
 
Wis JICivil 1005.  Similarly, the jury instruction that defines 
contributory negligence makes no exceptions for the mentally 
disabled: 
Every person in all situations has a duty to exercise 
ordinary care for his or her own safety.  This does 
not mean that a person is required at all hazards to 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
29
of states, holds mentally disabled defendants to the reasonable 
person standard of care.  Gould, 198 Wis. 2d at 456.  The 
general rule is that tortfeasors cannot invoke mental capacity 
as a defense.  Burch, 198 Wis. 2d at 474.  This rule, which 
holds the mentally disabled liable for their torts, emerged from 
Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616), a 17th-Century 
trespass case sounding in the theory of strict liability.  
Gould, 198 Wis. 2d at 456 (citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser 
and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 135 (5th ed. 1984)). 
¶55 This court's policy rationales for embracing the rule 
trace their origins to the 1930s, when we observed that the 
imposition of liability on the mentally disabled: (1) better 
apportions loss between two innocent persons to the one who 
caused the loss, (2) encourages restraint of the disabled, and 
(3) prevents tortfeasors from feigning incapacity to avoid 
liability.  Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co., 45 Wis. 2d 536, 
542, 173 N.W.2d 619 (1970) (citing Guardianship of Meyer, 218 
Wis. 381, 261 N.W. 211 (1935)).10   
¶56 As we describe below, the application of some of these 
storied rationales to modern society is strained.  Nonetheless, 
                                                                  
avoid 
injury; 
a 
person 
must, 
however, 
exercise 
ordinary care to take precautions to avoid injury to 
himself or herself. 
 
Wis JICivil 1007. 
10 See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283B cmt. b 
(1965); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of 
Torts § 32 (1984). 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
30
observers today find more contemporary justifications for the 
general rule.  For instance, in an era in which society is less 
inclined 
to 
institutionalize 
the 
mentally 
disabled, 
the 
reasonable person standard of care obligates the mentally 
disabled to conform their behavior to the expectations of the 
communities 
in 
which 
they 
live. 
 
More 
practically, 
the 
reasonable person standard of care allows courts and juries to 
bypass the imprecise task of distinguishing among variations in 
character, emotional equilibrium, and intellect.11 
¶57 Despite our endorsement of the general rule, this 
court fashioned limited defenses for the mentally disabled on 
two occasions.  In the first case, Breunig, we concluded that a 
defendant cannot be found negligent when he or she is suddenly 
overcome without forewarning by a mental disability or disorder 
that makes it impossible for the defendant to appreciate the 
duty to exercise ordinary care or act in an ordinarily prudent 
manner.  Breunig, 45 Wis. 2d at 541, 543.  This rare exception 
thus applies only when two conditions are met: (1) the person 
has no prior notice or forewarning of his or her potential for 
becoming disabled, and (2) the disability renders the person 
incapable of conforming to the standards of ordinary care.  Id. 
 We expressly limited the Breunig rule:  "All we hold is that a 
                     
11 See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283B cmt. 
b; Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §§ 32 and 135; James 
W. Ellis, Tort Responsibility of Mentally Disabled Persons, 1981 
Am. B. Found. Res. 1079, 1083-84; Harry J.F. Korrell, The 
Liability of Mentally Disabled Tort Defendants, 19 Law & 
Psychol. Rev. 1, 26-29 (1995).  
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
31
sudden mental incapacity equivalent in its effect to such 
physical causes as a sudden heart attack, epileptic seizure, 
stroke, or fainting should be treated alike and not under the 
general rule of insanity."  Id. at 544.  We later observed that 
the Breunig exception applies only to sudden mental disability, 
not 
to 
more 
generalized 
situations 
in 
which 
a 
person's 
disability prevents him from controlling his conduct.  Gould, 
198 Wis. 2d at 459. 
¶58 Although we acknowledged an exception in Breunig, we 
held that the exception did not apply to the defendant in that 
case, Erma Veith.  Mrs. Veith argued that she could not be held 
liable for an accident because, just prior to the collision, she 
suffered a sudden aberration that caused her to believe that her 
car could fly because Batman's vehicle could fly.  Breunig, 45 
Wis. 2d at 539.  We found that she had forewarning of her 
condition.  One year earlier, Mrs. Veith had experienced 
delusional visions.  Id. at 544-45.  Consequently, this court 
concluded that Mrs. Veith should have appreciated the risk she 
posed to others if she drove.  Id. at 545.  As a result, under 
the first of the two conditions that must coexist for the 
exception to apply, Mrs. Veith's prior notice of her potential 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
32
for becoming disabled left the Breunig exception inapplicable to 
her defense.12 
¶59 In the second case, Gould, we created an exception for 
the liability of mentally disabled persons in institutionalized 
settings who do not have the capacity to control or appreciate 
                     
12 This level of forewarning is acutely apparent for persons 
who are under the treatment of medication.  For instance, 
epileptics and diabetics are negligent if a foreseeable seizure 
or incapacitation leads them to cause an accident.  See Breunig 
v. American Family Ins. Co., 45 Wis. 2d 536, 541-42, 173 N.W.2d 
619 (1970) (citing Eleason v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 254 Wis. 
134, 135 N.W.2d 301 (1948) and Wisconsin Natural Gas Co. v. 
Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 263 Wis. 633, 58 N.W.2d 424 
(1953)). 
A case from another jurisdiction is even more illustrative. 
 In Stuyvesant Assoc. v. John Doe, 534 A.2d 448 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1987), a New Jersey appellate court assessed the 
liability of a schizophrenic man who committed vandalism during 
a psychotic episode.  The patient had been receiving injections 
of prolixin decanate every other week.  Id. at 449.  The 
medication permitted him to function well enough to live alone. 
 Id.  His psychiatrist testified that if the patient missed the 
dose, within ten days he would become delusional, "driven by 
inner voices," and unable to control his behavior.  Id.  
Moreover, the patient knew deterioration would result from a 
skipped injection, and he was aware of the risks he posed when 
he fell into a psychotic state.  Id.  The patient missed an 
appointment for the medication, and he caused the damage at 
issue during the subsequent decompensation.  Id.  The court held 
the defendant to an objective standard of care and found him 
liable, reasoning that the patient was cognizant of his 
condition and the risks posed by refraining from the medication: 
A reasonable person under the same circumstances as 
this defendant would be expected to get the injections 
as scheduled.  Not having done so, he allowed himself 
to become psychotic, with the resulting damage done by 
his own hands.  He is liable for the consequences of 
that conduct. 
 
Id. at 450.   
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
33
their conduct when they cause injury to caretakers employed for 
financial compensation.  Gould, 198 Wis. 2d at 453.  The Gould 
exception is narrow.  It was articulated for a severely disabled 
defendant suffering from Alzheimer's Disease who injured a nurse 
in a health care facility.  We did not design the exception to 
apply broadly in a variety of settings against a variety of 
plaintiffs.  See Burch, 198 Wis. 2d at 473.  Thus, on the same 
day this court decided Gould, we stressed in Burch that the 
mentally disabled generally are held to the reasonable person 
standard of care.  Id. 
¶60 The 
Gould 
exception 
consists 
of 
structured 
requirements.  The person must be institutionalized, the person 
must have a mental disability, the person must lack the capacity 
to control or appreciate his or her conduct, and the person must 
have committed an injury to a caretaker employed for financial 
compensation.  Gould, 198 Wis. 2d at 453.  In the present case, 
the court of appeals eliminated one of the parts of the four-
part Gould test, namely injury to a caretaker.13  Moreover, it 
focused on the "capacity" element, despite Jankee's forewarning 
of incapacitation if he did not take his medication and his 
undisputed history of medication noncompliance. 
                     
13 In limiting the Gould exception to cases involving paid 
caretaker plaintiffs, the court explained that Mrs. Gould was 
employed as a caretaker specifically for dementia patients and 
knowingly 
encountered 
the 
dangers 
associated 
with 
such 
employment.  The court analogized her position to that of a 
firefighter who is injured when called to extinguish a fire 
caused by negligence.  Gould, 198 Wis. 2d at 461-62 (citing Hass 
v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 48 Wis. 2d 321, 179 N.W.2d 885 (1970)). 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
34
¶61 We explicitly observed in Gould that the exception 
created therein does not apply to more expansive situations in 
which a person generally is unable to control his or her 
conduct.  Gould, 198 Wis. 2d at 459.  In both Breunig and Gould, 
this court chose not to adopt broader exceptions to the general 
rule that holds the mentally disabled defendant to an objective 
standard of care.   
¶62 Expansion of the narrow Gould exception to other 
circumstances based on a party's capacity to control or 
appreciate conduct would eviscerate the common law rule.14  We 
reject an extension of the Gould exception in a manner that 
would allow the mentally disabled to raise a defense based on a 
more generalized capacity to control conduct.  A truncated rule 
of this sort would invite parties suffering from varying degrees 
of permanent or temporary impairment to escape responsibility 
while concurrently compelling the trier of fact to assume the 
role of expert, able to distinguish among discrete, complex 
behaviors.  Gould, 198 Wis. 2d at 459-60. 
¶63 The Breunig and Gould exceptions, we stress, are 
limited.  In those situations in which conduct does not fall 
within those precise exceptions, we continue to hold defendants 
to the reasonable person standard of care.  See Burch, 198 
Wis. 2d at 473. 
                     
14 See Ellis, Tort Responsibility of Mentally Disabled 
Persons at 1084 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283B 
cmt. b.1).  
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
35
¶64 Our inquiry about the standard of care does not end at 
this point, however, because this case is distinguishable from 
Breunig and Gould in one critical respect.  Unlike either of the 
defendants in Breunig or Gould, Jankee appeared before the 
circuit court as a plaintiff in a negligence claim.  The court 
of appeals acknowledged this distinction when it noted that the 
Gould court had addressed the liability of a tortfeasor, not the 
contributory negligence of a plaintiff.  Jankee, 222 Wis. 2d at 
175.  We therefore next address the standard of care to which a 
mentally disabled plaintiff must be held when a defendant raises 
an affirmative defense of contributory negligence. 
¶65 The court of appeals in this case relied on Wright v. 
Mercy Hospital of Janesville, Wisconsin, Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 449, 
557 N.W.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1996), for its analysis of the 
contributory negligence of a mentally disabled plaintiff.  In 
Wright, a psychiatric patient pursued a medical malpractice 
claim against a health care facility after she and a caregiver 
engaged in a sexual relationship during the course of her 
treatment.  At trial, the hospital asked the court to submit a 
jury question about the plaintiff's contributory negligence.  
Id. at 463.  The circuit court refused, and on appeal, the court 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
36
of appeals invoked the Gould exception to affirm the circuit 
court.  Id. at 463-64.15  
¶66 The Wright court applied the Gould exception without 
addressing the difference in the standard of care to which 
mentally disabled persons must be held when they appear before a 
court as defendants and when they are postured as plaintiffs.  
Id.  In the present case, the court of appeals recognized the 
significance of the distinction, Jankee, 222 Wis. 2d at 177, but 
it relied on Wright without undertaking its own analysis to 
explore the standard to which the mentally disabled are held.  
Thus, although Jankee and Wright both focus on the contributory 
negligence of the mentally disabled, neither case fully develops 
the distinction between the contributory negligence of a 
plaintiff and the liability of a defendant. 
¶67 The distinction is not immaterial.  Although the 
general 
rule 
holds 
mentally 
disabled 
defendants 
to 
the 
reasonable person standard of care, some jurisdictions apply a 
                     
15 The court of appeals reasoned that Gould applied because 
the Wright plaintiff was an institutionalized person with a 
mental disability unable to control or appreciate her conduct 
and therefore was not liable for injuries she sustained while 
the hospital was employed as her caregiver.  The court agreed 
with the circuit judge who asked:  "How can a patient 
negligently receive treatment?"  Wright v. Mercy Hosp. of 
Janesville, Wis., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 449, 463-64, 557 N.W.2d 846 
(Ct. App. 1996).  
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
37
subjective standard of care when the mentally disabled person 
seeks recovery as a plaintiff.16 
¶68 Before the court of appeals decision in this case, 
Wisconsin had not recognized a difference in the standard of 
care to which our law holds mentally disabled plaintiffs and 
mentally disabled defendants.  We did not reach the issue of the 
contributory negligence of a mentally disabled person in 
Breunig, 45 Wis. 2d at 544.  In other jurisdictions, however, 
two distinct standards have emerged for mentally disabled 
plaintiffs. 
 
In 
some 
jurisdictions, 
a 
mentally 
disabled 
plaintiff is assessed under the subjective, or capacity-based, 
standard of care; in other jurisdictions, a mentally disabled 
plaintiff is held to the reasonable, or objective, standard of 
care.  See generally James W. Ellis, Tort Responsibility of 
Mentally Disabled Persons, 1981 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 1079, 
1090-91 (1981). 
¶69 The subjective standard may have emerged as an attempt 
to modify the historically harsh results of contributory 
negligence, which operated as a total bar to recovery for 
plaintiffs found even partially responsible for their own 
injuries.  Id. at 1091-92; Stephanie I. Splane, Note, Tort 
                     
16 Section 464 of the Restatement, "Standard of Conduct 
Defined," takes no position on this question:  "The Institute 
expresses no opinion as to whether insane persons are or are not 
required to conform for their own protection to the standard of 
conduct which society demands of sane persons."  Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, Caveat to § 464.  See also Prosser and Keeton 
on the Law of Torts § 135. 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
38
Liability of the Mentally Ill in Negligence Actions, 93 Yale L. 
J. 153, 157 (1983).  Strict application of a contributory 
negligence rule that precludes relief to plaintiffs who have 
shown minimal fault can appear inequitable when applied to 
persons who lack average intelligence and capacity.  Ellis, Tort 
Responsibility of Mentally Disabled Persons at 1990-91.  Thus, 
the 
subjective 
standard 
of 
care 
is 
highly 
suited 
to 
jurisdictions that still apply the pure, rather than the 
comparative, form 
of contributory 
negligence, 
because the 
subjective standard allows juries to apply equitable principles 
to set a plaintiff's recovery.  Alison P. Raney, Stacy v. Jedco 
Construction, Inc.: North Carolina Adopts a Diminished Capacity 
Standard for Contributory Negligence, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 
1215, 1234 (1996). 
¶70 Some courts have applied the subjective standard of 
care to mentally disabled plaintiffs, concluding that the policy 
rationales that underlie the reasonable person standard for 
mentally 
disabled 
defendants 
do 
not 
mesh 
with 
cases 
of 
contributory negligence.17  For instance, the first rationale for 
a reasonable person standard for mentally disabled defendants is 
that "where a loss must be borne by one of two innocent persons, 
it shall be borne by him who occasioned it."  Gould, 198 Wis. 2d 
at 461 (quoting Meyer, 218 Wis. at 385).  In a negligence suit, 
                     
17 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 464 cmt. g; Prosser and 
Keeton on the Law of Torts § 32; Ellis, Tort Responsibility of 
Mentally Disabled Persons at 1091; Stephanie I. Splane, Tort 
Liability of the Mentally Ill in Negligence Actions, 93 Yale 
L.J. 153, 157-58, 169 (1983).  
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
39
however, the mentally disabled plaintiff alleges that the 
defendant is not "innocent."  When the defendant answers that 
the plaintiff contributed to his own injury, the defendant 
asserts, in effect, that neither party is "innocent."  Hence, 
the first rationale appears not to apply.  Nevertheless, this 
rationale rests on the theory that the mentally disabled should 
compensate victims for the harms they cause.  Splane, Tort 
Liability of the Mentally Ill at 156.  In a contributory 
negligence context, the mentally disabled plaintiff is at least 
one cause of his or her own injury.  The modern comparative 
contributory negligence scheme allocates damages by determining 
the extent to which the parties are at fault.  A subjective 
standard for contributory negligence complicates the work of the 
fact finder in allocating fault for one party is being assessed 
by an objective standard while the other is being judged by a 
subjective standard which attempts to discern the plaintiff's 
capacity. 
¶71 The second rationale imposes liability so that "those 
interested in the estate of the insane person, as relatives or 
otherwise, may be under inducement to restrain him."  Gould, 198 
Wis. 2d at 462 (quoting Meyer, 218 Wis. at 385).  This rationale 
encourages relatives and guardians to take measures to protect 
the mentally disabled's assets, and thus their inheritance, from 
the effects of tort liability.  Ellis, Tort Responsibility of 
Mentally Disabled Persons at 1084.  The "caretaker" rationale 
has been widely criticized as an anachronism originating in an 
eugenical era because it promoted incentives for relatives and 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
40
guardians to isolate the mentally disabled in institutions.18  
This second rationale should not serve as the foundation for any 
modern policy decisions.  Ironically, however, the subjective 
standard creates incentives for potential defendants such as 
CCHCC, to intensify security considerations for the mentally 
disabled, not to protect the disabled but rather to protect 
themselves from liability.  As an example, one way for CCHCC to 
reduce the threat of liability for a patient's attempted escape 
would be to restore bars to all windows in the facility.  This 
response might reduce the risk of liability but would not 
represent sound therapeutic policy for patients.19 
¶72 The 
third 
rationale 
holds 
the mentally disabled 
accountable 
for 
their 
torts 
to 
prevent 
defendants 
"from 
                     
18 Ellis, Tort Responsibility of Mentally Disabled Persons 
at 1084-85; Splane, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill at 156 
n.20.  
19 In Payne v. Milwaukee Sanitarium Found., Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 
264, 270, 260 N.W.2d 386 (1977), the court said:  
It was not too long ago that hospitals for the 
mentally ill were known as asylums for the insane.  
Emphasis 
was 
upon 
the 
custodial 
aspect 
of 
the 
institutionalizationbarred 
windows, 
locked 
doors, 
straitjackets 
and 
physical 
restraint 
to 
prevent 
inmates from harming themselves or others. 
 
Today, with more known about the cause and cure of 
mental 
illness, 
the 
mental 
hospital 
has 
become 
primarily 
a 
treatment 
facility. 
 
While 
maximum 
security units are retained, the primary emphasis is 
now upon therapy and rehabilitation.  An attending 
psychiatrist's order that a particular patient be 
assigned to an open or closed unit represents a 
balance of both protection and treatment. 
 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
41
simulat[ing] or pretend[ing] insanity to defend their wrongful 
acts."  Gould, 198 Wis. 2d at 462 (quoting Meyer, 218 Wis. at 
385).  This rationale implies conscious strategy.  It is 
unlikely that a person would consciously put himself or herself 
in harm's way with the notion that, if injured, the person could 
later invoke incapacity to control conduct as a defense.  Both 
the injury itself and the stigma attached to mental illness 
would probably deter such a strategy.  Therefore, this rationale 
does not support an objective standard in a contributory 
negligence context.  There is, however, a counter-argument.  
Scientists increasingly acknowledge the imprecision inherent in 
the diagnosis of mental disability.20  Although it is unlikely 
that a mentally disabled person will simulate insanity before an 
injury, it is not unlikely that a mentally disabled plaintiff 
will try to overstate the extent of his or her disability to 
avoid the ramifications of his or her contributory negligence.  
Because of the imprecision of diagnosis, such a strategy may 
succeed, especially in a setting in which the fact finder may 
look upon the injured plaintiff with heightened sympathy. 
¶73 The 
common law 
does 
not 
automatically 
exonerate 
mentally disabled plaintiffs from contributory negligence.  Only 
a plaintiff "who is so insane or devoid of intelligence as to be 
totally unable to apprehend danger and avoid exposure to it is 
not a responsible human agency and cannot be guilty of 
                     
20 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283B cmt. b(2); Ellis, 
Tort Responsibility of Mentally Disabled Persons at 1086-87; 
Splane, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill at 156, n.19.  
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
42
contributory negligence."  57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 954 
(1989); see also 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 141 (1966).  The 
mentally disabled whose impairments fall short of insanity still 
can be found contributorily negligent.  Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, § 464 cmt. g.  Consequently, some jurisdictions apply the 
reasonable 
person 
standard 
of 
care 
to 
mentally 
disabled 
plaintiffs who are not absolutely incapable of appreciating 
danger.21  Other jurisdictions acknowledge that plaintiffs cannot 
invoke mental disability to extinguish a defense of contributory 
negligence, but nonetheless allow the jury to weigh degrees of 
mental capacity in assessing whether an injured plaintiff was 
                     
21 See Hobart v. Shin, 705 N.E.2d 907, 912-13 (Ill. 1998) 
(holding mentally disabled suicide victim to reasonable person 
standard); Cooper v. County of Florence, 385 S.E.2d 44, 46 (S.C. 
Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 412 S.E.2d 417 (S.C. 
1991) (observing that for subjective standard to apply, the 
plaintiff's mental capacity must be diminished to a degree that 
makes the plaintiff totally unable to appreciate danger); 
Galindo v. TMT Transp., Inc., 733 P.2d 631 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) 
(holding that ordinary standard of care determines whether a 
mentally disabled plaintiff can be contributorily negligent);  
Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Appleton, 181 S.E.2d 522 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1971) (finding that plaintiff who had received 
treatment for mental disturbance should be held to reasonable 
person standard for injuries sustained during fall from seventh 
floor during an escape attempt because plaintiff was aware of 
the grave peril); Wright v. Tate, 156 S.E.2d 562, 565 (Va. 1967) 
(adopting the Restatement approach and holding that a plaintiff 
with some diminished mental capacity should be held to the 
reasonable person standard); see also Ellis, Tort Responsibility 
of Mentally Disabled Persons at 1092-96.  
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
43
contributorily negligent.22  This latter, majority group of 
states favors a subjective standard of care.  The subjective 
standard is well suited for situations in which a tortfeasor is 
aware of the plaintiff's diminished mental capacity and can take 
precautions against the disability.  Prosser and Keeton on the 
Law of Torts §§ 32, 135.  
¶74 Nonetheless, several arguments support the objective 
standard of care for mentally disabled plaintiffs.  Prosser and 
Keeton 
note 
that 
the 
policy 
rationales 
underpinning 
the 
                     
22  Stacy v. Jedco Constr., Inc., 457 S.E.2d 875, 879 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1995) (holding that an injured plaintiff with a 
diminished mental capacity that does not amount to total 
insanity can be found contributorily negligent, but nonetheless 
should be held to a subjective standard of care);  Birkner v. 
Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Ut. 1989);  Cowan v. 
Doering, 545 A.2d 159, 163 (N.J. 1988) (adopting a capacity-
based standard and comparing it to the standard applied to 
infants);  Mochen v. State, 43 A.D.2d 484, 487-88 (N.Y. 1974) 
(mentally disabled plaintiff who sustained injuries when she 
fell from a window during an escape attempt should be held to 
subjective standard that measures the degree to which he or she 
can exercise the duty of self-care);  De Martini v. Alexander 
Sanitarium, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 442, 447 (1961) (allowing 
jury instruction for contributory negligence of a patient 
injured while climbing over and falling from a wall surrounding 
the hospital during an escape attempt);  See also Prosser and 
Keeton on the Law of Torts § 135 (noting that "[a]t least in 
cases in which the defendant knows he is dealing with a person 
of defective mental capacity, a more beneficent standard has 
been 
applied"); 
W.C. 
Crais 
III, 
Annotation, 
Comment 
NoteContributory Negligence of Mentally Incompetent or Mentally 
or Emotionally Disturbed Person, 91 A.L.R.2d 392, § 4[b] (1963); 
57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence §  956 (1989); Splane, Tort Liability 
of the Mentally Ill at 155-58;  Alison P. Raney, Stacy v. Jedco 
Construction, Inc.: North Carolina Adopts a Diminished Capacity 
Standard for Contributory Negligence, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 
1215, 1226-31 (1996).  
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
44
subjective standard of care are not as evident as those for the 
reasonable person standard.  Id. at § 32; Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 464 cmt. g.23  Application of a subjective standard 
for partially disabled individuals whose capacity falls short of 
total insanity presents administrative difficulties.  Gould, 198 
Wis. 2d at 459-60.  These difficulties include the possibility 
of fraudulent claims that result from feigned insanity, problems 
defining the degree of disability sufficient to qualify for the 
subjective standard, and issues similar to those that have 
arisen for the criminal insanity defense.24  Ellis, Tort 
Responsibility of Mentally Disabled Persons at 1091, 1095-96. 
Some commentators suggest that the objective standard is better 
suited 
to 
situations 
in 
which 
the 
mental 
disability 
is 
foreseeable and treatable.25 
                     
23 See also Ellis, Tort Responsibility of Mentally Disabled 
Persons at 1091-92; Splane, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill 
at 157-58. 
24 At oral argument, counsel for Clark County explained that 
this case raises the policy question of whether Jankee feigned 
insanity.  Counsel suggested Jankee and his wife may have 
planned the escape together. Jankee's wife called CCHCC before 
6:45 the morning Jankee was found and, instead of asking how 
Jankee was doing, asked "Is Emil there?"  Because we find Jankee 
contributorily negligent under the reasonable person standard of 
care, we do not address whether the possibility of feigned 
insanity should prevent us from applying the subjective standard 
of care to Jankee. 
25 Elizabeth J. Goldstein, Asking the Impossible: The 
Negligence Liability of the Mentally Ill, 12 J. Contemp. Health 
L. & Pol'y 67, 85-88 (1995) (citing William M. Landes & Richard 
A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 130 (1987)).  
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
45
¶75 Other assessments clarify how the reasonable person 
standard of care better comports with the role of the mentally 
disabled in contemporary society.  The objective standard 
promotes the integration of the mentally disabled into the 
community: 
 
By 
informing 
the 
mentally 
disabled 
that 
a 
foreseeable illness will not absolve liability, society will 
encourage the mentally disabled to make full use of the mental 
health system.26  This integration is particularly desirable in a 
culture that 
favors deinstitutionalization. 
 
Splane, 
Tort 
Liability of the Mentally Ill at 166. 
¶76 We are not persuaded that this is the case in which to 
adopt a subjective standard of care for mentally disabled 
plaintiffs.  We acknowledge that the subjective standard may be 
appropriate for a plaintiff who is suddenly and unpredictably 
overcome with a mental disorder and was never able to foresee or 
appreciate risk.  See Breunig, 45 Wis. 2d at 541, 543-44.27  The 
subjective standard is not appropriate, however, for cases in 
which a person's decompensation is predictable, for cases in 
which a plaintiff can modify his or her conduct and prevent 
injury by pursuing and maintaining a course of medication and 
treatment.   
                     
26 Goldstein, Asking the Impossible: at 88-89 (citing 
Splane, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill at 162-63); Daniel W. 
Schuman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Tort Law: A Limited 
Subjective Standard of Care, 46 SMU L. Rev. 409, 419-20 (1992).  
27 See also Goldstein, Asking the Impossible at 86 (citing 
Landes & Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law at 130). 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
46
¶77 Emil Jankee suffered from a foreseeable and treatable 
illness.  He is not like Roland Monicken, the Alzheimer's 
patient in Gould, whose dementia was permanent and digressive.  
Jankee's situation is tragic, but it does not warrant a 
fundamental change in Wisconsin law.   
¶78 Because we have determined not to adopt new law, we 
review Jankee's situation in the light of the two previously 
recognized exceptions to the objective standard, namely the 
exceptions allowed by Gould and Breunig.  The Gould exception 
cannot apply here because Jankee did not injure a caretaker 
employed for financial compensation.  The Gould case is simply 
inapplicable. 
¶79 The 
Breunig exception to 
the 
objective standard 
requires that two conditions be met:  (1) the person had no 
prior notice or forewarning of his or her potential for becoming 
disabled, and (2) the disability renders the person incapable of 
conforming to the standards of ordinary care.  These conditions 
are clearly pertinent in assessing the contributory negligence 
of a plaintiff. 
¶80 We first examine whether Jankee had forewarning of the 
potential for becoming disabled.  Jankee had forewarning.  He 
had received warnings during the two 1984 hospitalizations and 
subsequent outpatient visits that medication noncompliance would 
spark an episode of disability.  He nonetheless voluntarily 
suspended the treatments.  At both hospitalizations, doctors 
stressed that his continued improvement was contingent upon 
compliance with medication.  Jankee understood that failure to 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
47
continue the treatment would cause a relapse.  Jankee himself 
observed that he must take the medication for life, and he 
likened lithium to the insulin a diabetic receives.  At Jankee's 
discharge from the second hospitalization, staff once more 
warned that Jankee's condition would deteriorate in the event of 
medication noncompliance. 
¶81 Medication made it possible for Jankee to control his 
conduct.  Norwood records remarked that Jankee's condition was 
good when he complied with the medication.  Jankee's medical 
expert, Dr. Soo Hoo, testified that had Jankee taken the 
medication, 
he 
probably 
would 
have 
been 
in 
an 
improved 
condition.  The proper medication could control Jankee's 
condition, and had he maintained the recommended treatments, 
Jankee would not have been as likely to have been hospitalized 
at CCHCC.   
¶82 Allowing Jankee to recover would frustrate the policy 
of encouraging the mentally disabled to seek and maintain a 
course of medication and treatment.  The introduction of modern 
psychiatric medications and therapies makes it possible for the 
mentally disabled to control their conduct, rendering it less 
tenable to conclude that the mentally disabled are incapable of 
gauging harmful behavior.  Splane, Tort Liability of the 
Mentally Ill at 168.  Like Mrs. Veith, the mentally disabled 
defendant in Breunig, a patient who is aware of his or her 
illness knows the risks presented by the condition.   
¶83 Jankee understood, since at least 1984, that failure 
to comply with his prescribed medications would be dangerous and 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
48
detrimental to his mental heath.  We favor a policy that 
encourages 
the 
mentally 
disabled 
to 
seek, 
not 
reject, 
treatment.28  Were Jankee to prevail here, we would be promoting 
an environment that allows the mentally disabled to cease 
treatment for foreseeable illnesses and then to pursue recovery 
for self-inflicted injuries under an insulating theory that 
effectively excuses them from the consequences of their own 
negligence.  We decline to reward a plaintiff for choosing this 
course of action. 
¶84 We now turn to the second Breunig condition, namely 
whether the disability made it impossible to appreciate the duty 
of ordinary care or to act in an ordinarily prudent manner.  
Even if we were to find that Jankee lacked prior notice of his 
illness, 
leading 
us 
to 
analyze 
this 
second 
conjunctive 
condition, Jankee still would be found contributorily negligent 
to a disqualifying degree if we concluded that the disability 
did not render him incapable of conforming his conduct to the 
standards of ordinary care.  
                     
28 Studies increasingly show that mental illnesses like 
bipolar 
disorder 
respond 
predictably 
well 
to 
psychopharmacological treatment.  Bruce J. Winick, Ambiguities 
in the Legal Meaning and Significance of Mental Illness, 1 
Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 534, 559 (1995).  Moreover, "[m]any 
people suffering from mental illness, even psychosis, are still 
able to make their own hospitalization and treatment decisions." 
 Id. 
at 
586. 
 
"Clinical 
evidence 
suggests 
that 
despite 
alterations in thinking and mood, psychiatric patients are not 
automatically less capable than others of making health care 
decisions."  Id. at 586 n.212 (quoting Karen McKinnon et al., 
Rivers 
in 
Practice, 
Clinicians' 
Assessments 
of 
Patients' 
Decision-Making Capacity, 40 Hosp. & Community Psychiatry 1159, 
1159 (1989)). 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
49
¶85 Jankee's 
conduct 
reveals 
that 
he 
did 
in 
fact 
appreciate the duty of ordinary care.  Jankee was not so 
incapacitated as to be "totally unable to apprehend danger and 
avoid exposure to it."  See 57A Am. Jr. 2d Negligence § 954.29  
On the contrary, Jankee took measures to ensure his own safety, 
and he actively apprehended the danger.  Jankee's CCHCC room had 
three windows.  He chose to elope from the south window 
overlooking a flat roof, a landing only about two or three feet 
below the windowsill.  This choice, Jankee conceded, lowered the 
risk of injury because it provided a safer way to exit than the 
three-story 
drop 
from 
the 
other 
two 
windows. 
 
Jankee 
acknowledged that a jump from an east window would be dangerous 
and probably kill him.  After all, he remarked, "That would be 
suicide."  Once on the roof, he planned to move along a ledge to 
a height from which he could jump to the ground safely.  Jankee 
knew the substantial risk of a three-story fall, and he should 
have known that attempting to scale down a building could 
provoke serious injury or even death.  
¶86 Furthermore, Jankee took measures like those of an 
ordinarily prudent person acting to conceal an illicit activity, 
and he evinced a piqued level of planning and cognizant 
dexterity.  As a whole, Jankee's conduct suggests his impairment 
                     
29 Again, even states that apply the subjective standard to 
mentally disabled plaintiffs refuse to absolve them from 
contributory negligence unless the plaintiff can show "that he 
could not have taken the actions necessary for his protection." 
 Ellis, Tort Responsibility of Mentally Disabled Persons at 
1094. 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
50
fell "short of insanity," and indicates he was not "devoid of 
intelligence."  See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 464 cmt. g; 
57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 954; see also 65A C.J.S. Negligence 
§ 141.  Jankee noticed that the south window opened about four 
inches several days before he eloped.  On the day of the escape 
attempt, he made efforts not to arouse the suspicion of CCHCC 
staff.  He anticipated a bed check and testified that he wanted 
to "fool" staff and "cover[] his tracks" by adjusting the 
pillows on his bed so that it would appear as if he were in his 
room.  He drew the divider curtain closed and turned off his 
room light.  He transformed a toothbrush into a wrench with 
which to turn the cube stop.  Jankee worked on this plan for 15 
to 20 minutes.  He removed his shirt to make it easier for him 
to slide through the window. 
¶87 Finally, Jankee's reaction to and description of the 
accident indicate Jankee appreciated the duty of ordinary care. 
 When he was found lying on the ground, Jankee apologized to the 
nurse.  At his 1993 deposition, Jankee explained his motivations 
and the execution of his escape plan with a clarity that 
suggests the incident was the product of a lucid plan.  Jankee's 
behavior, his remorse for the conduct, and his effective 
recollection of events that occurred four years earlier belie 
the conclusion that the escape was the product of a sudden 
mental illness. 
¶88 We hold, therefore, that under the reasonable person, 
objective standard of care, Jankee's own negligence exceeded 
that of any of the defendants as a matter of law for two 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
51
reasons.  First, Jankee was contributorily negligent because he 
failed to comply with his medication program.  Modern medicine 
encourages the mentally disabled to pursue treatment programs 
that can result in long-term recovery.  Under the reasonable 
person standard of care, a person who understands that ceasing 
medication will spark a relapse should be accountable for his or 
her own contributory fault and should not be rewarded for 
stopping the treatment. 
¶89 Second, under the reasonable person standard of care, 
Jankee was the major cause of his own injuries.  Our courts deny 
recovery to parties who are the major cause of their own 
injuries.  Peters, 224 Wis. 2d at 195 (quoting Grzadzielewski, 
159 Wis. 2d at 610).  The circuit court found Jankee's conduct 
clever and thoughtfully planned, and the court concluded that 
"there is no doubt that he placed himself in considerable risk." 
 We agree.  Jankee appreciated the duty to exercise ordinary 
care.  He foresaw the inherent risk of his actions, and he 
apprehended that the conduct was dangerous.  The degree of 
planning and careful execution demonstrates that although this 
may have been an impulsive act, as Jankee himself contends, it 
was not the result of sudden mental incapacity. 
¶90 We 
therefore 
hold 
that 
Wisconsin's 
contributory 
negligence statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.045, bars Jankee's recovery 
as a matter of law because his negligence exceeded the 
negligence of each of the defendants.   
CUSTODY AND CONTROL 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
52
¶91 We next consider whether Clark County's custody and 
control of Jankee created a duty for the County that overrode 
Jankee's duty to exercise ordinary care for his own safety.  The 
Jankees do not explicitly argue that Jankee's confinement gave 
rise to a special relationship between Clark County and Jankee. 
 They submit, however, that CCHCC inadequately policed Jankee's 
ward, failed to maintain close observation over him, and 
neglected to perform its routine, custodial duties in the course 
of caring for Jankee.  Were we to find that Clark County owed 
Jankee a heightened duty of care to prevent a foreseeable escape 
attempt, Jankee still could recover from Clark County despite 
our holding that his contributory negligence exceeded the 
negligence of Clark County and other defendants as a matter of 
law.  We do not come to this conclusion, however, because 
although Clark County had a special, protective relationship 
with Jankee, CCHCC had no reason to know that Jankee was an 
elopement risk. 
¶92 As a general rule, Wisconsin, like most jurisdictions, 
does not impose a duty on a person to stop a third person from 
committing harm to another or to himself or herself.  Schuster 
v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 238 n.3, 424 N.W.2d 159 (1988).  
Nonetheless, certain caregivers, such as hospitals and prisons, 
assume enhanced responsibilities in protective or custodial 
situations.  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315.30  This 
                     
30 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 provides: 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
53
increased duty obligates the caregiver to shield the protected 
person from the foreseeable consequences of injurious conduct.  
See McMahon v. St. Croix Falls Sch. Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 215, 226, 
596 N.W.2d 875 (Ct. App. 1999).  When such a special 
relationship exists, the caregiver assumes the duty to provide 
reasonable care of the protected person to prevent harm.  
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319.31  This assumption of duty 
may absolve the protected person from the ordinary obligation of 
                                                                  
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third 
person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to 
another unless 
 
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and 
the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor 
to control the third person's conduct, or 
 
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and 
the other which gives to the other a right to 
protection.  
 
See also Wis. Stat. § 940.295 (1997-98).  This statute, first 
enacted in 1994 and modified twice thereafter, authorized 
criminal penalties for the negligent "neglect" of a patient in 
an inpatient health care facility. 
 
31  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319 provides: 
One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows 
or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to 
others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to control the third person to prevent 
him from doing such harm. 
 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
54
self-care, shift responsibility to the caregiver, and thereby 
expunge the affirmative defense of contributory negligence.32   
¶93 Under this approach, therefore, a plaintiff must show 
that:  (1) a special relationship existed, giving rise to a 
heightened duty of care; and (2) the defendant caregiver could 
have foreseen the particular injury that is the source of the 
claim.33  If the special relationship existed but the defendant 
caregiver could not have foreseen the particular injury, the 
affirmative defense of contributory negligence reenters the 
equation.  Even if the particular injury were foreseeable, the 
defense of contributory negligence should not be expunged if the 
defendant's exercise of care was not only reasonable but also 
fully responsive to the heightened duty with which the caregiver 
was charged.   
¶94 We first consider whether Clark County established a 
special relationship with Jankee.  A person owes no duty to aid 
or protect a third party unless the person stands in a special 
relationship to the foreseeable victim.  Schuster, 144 Wis. 2d 
at 238 n.3.  This general rule reflects our adoption of § 314A 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.34  Subsection (4) provides: 
                     
32 See Charles J. Williams, Fault and the Suicide Victim: 
When Third Parties Assume a Suicide Victim's Duty of Self-Care, 
76 Neb. L. Rev. 301, 305-06 n. 25 (1997). 
33 See generally Williams, Fault and the Suicide Victim at 
304. 
34 Section 314A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) 
provides that special relations giving rise to a duty to aid or 
protect arise in the following situations: 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
55
 "One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes 
the custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive 
the other of his normal opportunities for protection is under a 
similar duty to the other."  Hospital and prison settings often 
fall 
under 
§ 314A 
because 
they 
alter 
expectations 
of 
responsibility for safety and frequently deprive people of their 
normal 
opportunities 
for 
protection. 
 
Thus, 
a 
special 
relationship exists between an involuntarily committed person 
and the state.  Kara B. v. Dane County, 198 Wis. 2d 24, 36 n.3, 
542 N.W.2d 777 (Ct. App. 1995), aff'd 205 Wis. 2d 140, 150, 555 
N.W.2d 630 (1996) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 
(1982)).  In this case, a special relationship arose because the 
court confined Jankee involuntarily to CCHCC. 
                                                                  
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers 
to take reasonable action  
 
(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of 
physical harm, and  
 
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or has 
reason to know that they are ill or injured, and to 
care for them until they can be cared for by others.  
 
(2) An innkeeper is under a similar duty to his 
guests.  
 
(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the 
public is under a similar duty to members of the 
public who enter in response to his invitation.  
 
(4) One who is required by law to take or who 
voluntarily 
takes 
the 
custody 
of 
another 
under 
circumstances such as to deprive the other of his 
normal opportunities for protection is under a similar 
duty to the other. 
 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
56
¶95 Having concluded that Clark County established a 
special relationship with Jankee, we next address whether CCHCC 
could have foreseen Jankee's escape attempt.  A hospital "is not 
an 
insurer 
of 
its 
patients 
against 
injury 
inflicted 
by 
themselves," Dahlberg v. Jones, 232 Wis. 6, 11, 285 N.W. 841 
(1939), but is only required to use such means to restrain and 
guard its patients as would seem reasonably sufficient to 
prevent foreseeable harms.  Id.  Thus, the duty of a hospital is 
to exercise such ordinary care as the hospital knows, or should 
know, the patient's mental or physical condition requires.  
Kujawski v. Arbor View Health Care Ctr., 139 Wis. 2d 455, 462-
63, 407 N.W.2d 249 (1987).   
¶96 The duty of a hospital to take special precautions for 
particular patients arises in only certain situations.  After 
all, modern hospitals treating persons with mental disabilities 
focus on therapy and rehabilitation, not maximum security.  
Payne v. Milwaukee Sanitarium Found., 81 Wis. 2d 264, 270, 260 
N.W.2d 386 (1977).  A duty to restrain or guard a specific 
patient emerges only when a hospital has "knowledge of the 
propensity or inclination of the patient to injure (himself) 
(herself) or escape."  Wis JICivil 1385.5; see also Wis 
JICivil 1385.   
¶97 No cause of action arises unless the hospital has 
notice of an individual patient's disposition to inflict self-
injury.  Bogust v. Iverson, 10 Wis. 2d 129, 136-37, 139-40, 102 
N.W.2d 228 (1960).  Thus, a hospital is under no duty to take 
special precautions when there is no reason to anticipate one 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
57
patient's escape or suicide.  Dahlberg, 232 Wis. at 11.  If a 
caregiver is unaware of a patient's propensity for self-injury, 
the caregiver cannot assume the patient's duty of self-care.35   
¶98 This court has found in the past that hospitals cannot 
be liable for the unforeseeable actions of their patients.  For 
example, we upheld a directed verdict for a defendant hospital 
when a voluntarily committed woman with no history of escape or 
suicide suffered injuries after she fled the facility by exiting 
through a window.  Id. at 11-12.36  Absent notice that a 
particular patient is inclined to execute a suicide attempt, a 
hospital is not negligent, as a matter of law, if the patient, 
                     
35 Williams, Fault and the Suicide Victim at 311.  
36 Distinctions 
exist 
between 
those 
persons 
who 
are 
committed because they are dangerous to themselves, and those 
who risk causing danger to others.  See Winick, Ambiguities in 
the Legal Meaning and Significance of Mental Illness at 585-86. 
 When hospitals admit patients with suicidal tendencies, they 
assume the duty of care those patients otherwise owe to 
themselves to prevent harm.  See Williams, Fault and the Suicide 
Victim at 305-06.  Similarly, "where immediately prior to an 
attempted suicide the patient had spent a sleepless night, 
exhibited 
bizarre 
behavior, 
including 
delusions, 
and 
had 
repeatedly stated that she must leave the hospital and would not 
obey the nurse's orders," hospital staff were under a heightened 
duty of care to place the patient under constant supervision.  
Payne, 81 Wis. 2d at 274-75 (citing Mounds Park Hosp. v. Von 
Eye, 245 F.2d 756 (8th Cir. 1957)).  Suicide cases represent a 
subcategory 
of 
custodial 
relationships, 
because 
hospitals 
undertake the duty of confining patients for the purpose of 
preventing the particular act of suicide.  See generally Myers 
v. County of Lake, Ind., 30 F.3d 847, 853 (7th Cir. 1994); 
Sauders v. County of Steuben, 693 N.E.2d 16, 19-20 (Ind. 1998); 
DeMontiney v. Desert Manor Convalescent Ctr., Inc., 695 P.2d 255 
(Ariz. 1985); Cole v. Multnomah County, 592 P.2d 221 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1979).  
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
58
after being ordered to be left unattended, uses that freedom to 
exit a ward and harm himself or herself.  Payne, 81 Wis. 2d at 
274. 
¶99 We therefore must focus on whether CCHCC could have 
foreseen that Jankee would attempt to escape.  CCHCC took 
measures consistent with the standard of ordinary care that 
hospitals owe to their patients.  The New Horizons Unit was a 
locked ward.  The renovation of the facility balanced safety 
measures with the goal of providing a therapeutic environment.  
CCHCC had a policy in place for patients that presented a 
suicide or elopement risk.  To find that CCHCC owed a heightened 
duty to Jankee in particular, however, we must answer the 
question whether CCHCC had notice of Jankee's disposition to 
escape or commit suicide.  See Dahlberg, 232 Wis. 2d at 11; 
Bogust, 10 Wis. 2d at 139-40. 
¶100 Like 
other 
mentally 
disabled 
patients, 
Jankee's 
history was complicated.  He apparently attempted suicide as an 
adolescent.  Although Jankee had threatened escape or suicide 
during his first 1984 hospitalization at Norwood, he denied 
feeling suicidal when he was again admitted to Norwood in July 
1984.  During that confinement, Jankee admitted to having had 
suicidal thoughts, but countered that suicide was not an option, 
adding that he could not follow through with such an act.   
¶101 CCHCC viewed Jankee as neither a suicide nor an 
elopement 
risk 
during 
any 
part 
of 
the 
July 
1989 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
59
hospitalization.37  Jankee was, according to his own medical 
expert, "sensitive to wanting to survive," and he was "not 
someone [ ] intent on harming himself."  Jankee made no threats 
of self-injury or escape while at CCHCC.  The hospitalization at 
CCHCC was the product of a domestic abuse incidentnot because 
Jankee was a danger to himself.  The emergency detention was 
designed to monitor his aggressive behavior towards others.  
Physician reports show that Jankee posed a danger to his wife, 
not to himself.  On the contrary, Jankee expressed anticipation 
about resuming his life and his new marriage, and he asserted 
                     
37 The dissent suggests that Jankee could have proved at 
trial that the County was negligent in failing to protect Jankee 
from acting out his irrational impulses.  Dissent at ¶ 110.  We 
respectfully disagree.  Requiring a facility to be liable for 
any irrational behavior would impose an unreasonable burden on 
the County and frustrate the objective of providing patients 
with 
a 
therapeutic 
environment 
free 
from 
prison-like 
restrictions.  Although the County, as the dissent points out, 
was aware of Jankee's general history, the County had before it 
information to suggest that Jankee was no longer a suicide risk 
or an elopement risk.  By contrast, in Fatuck v. Hillside Hosp., 
45 A.D.2d 708 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), aff'd without op., 328 
N.E.2d 791 (N.Y. 1975), one of the cases upon which the dissent 
relies, there were notations in the hospital records that the 
patient expressed suicide threats.  Moreover, the patient had 
been placed on 15-minute checks, and there is no indication that 
the defendant hospital carried out those checks.  Similarly, in 
Mounds Park Hosp. v. Von Eye, 245 F.2d 756, 760-61 (8th Cir. 
1957), the court noted that persons with that patient's 
condition "are subject to unpredictable sudden impulses, such as 
jumping from windows in escape reactions."  Moreover, the 
patient in Mounds Park grew increasingly hostile in the days 
before her escape.  Id. at 761.  Finally, when the patient 
escaped, she walked from her room through a corridor in which no 
nurses stood watch and entered an unsecured obstetrics ward from 
which she escaped. 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
60
that because of his religious faith, he could not harm either 
his wife or himself.   
¶102 Jankee had no history of escape attempts, and he 
expressed no thoughts of elopement during his confinement at 
CCHCC.  CCHCC evaluated Jankee and found no reason to presume 
that he was likely to escape.  CCHCC has a system in place to 
check on patients who were an elopement risk, and records fail 
to show that that risk applied to Jankee.  Although Jankee told 
staff the night of his escape, "I'm tired of being used for a 
guinea pig around here.  Why don't you kick my ass out of here 
instead of giving me a bunch of medication," the statement did 
not serve to alert CCHCC that Jankee would injure himself in an 
attempted elopement from a third floor window. 
¶103 Therefore, we cannot bind Clark County to assume 
Jankee's 
own 
duty 
of 
self-care. 
 
Although 
Clark 
County 
established a special relationship with Jankee when the court 
confined Jankee to the facility in an involuntary commitment, 
there is no cause of action here because CCHCC did not have 
notice about Jankee's disposition toward escaping.  Accordingly, 
we hold that Clark County was not negligent during the course of 
its custodial care of Jankee. 
CONCLUSION 
¶104 We hold that Jankee was, as a matter of law, 
contributorily negligent for the injuries he sustained during 
his escape attempt from CCHCC and that his negligence exceeded 
the negligence of any defendant.  First, Jankee's illness was 
treatable and foreseeable, not the product of sudden mental 
No. 
95-2136  
 
 
61
illness.  Second, Jankee was able to appreciate the duty of 
ordinary care when he made his escape, and he was the major 
cause of his own injuries. 
¶105 We further observe that although Clark County entered 
into a special relationship with Jankee during his confinement, 
it cannot be held negligent for the harm resulting from the 
elopement because Jankee's escape was not foreseeable.  We do 
not reach the issue of whether the government contractor 
immunity defense protects HGA, Cullen, and MILCO from liability 
because we find the contributory negligence issue dispositive in 
this case. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No. 95-2136.ssa 
 
1 
¶106 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  
Courts and commentators continue to struggle to develop an 
appropriate standard of care for persons with mental illness or 
mental 
disabilities. 
 
No 
proposed 
standard 
is 
free 
of 
difficulties. 
¶107 I first address the liability of Clark County.  This 
case presents a recurring fact pattern: A plaintiff, here Emil 
Jankee, is diagnosed with a mental illness or mental disability 
and poses a danger to himself or to others.  The plaintiff is 
involuntarily institutionalized in a county facility.  The 
plaintiff is injured while he is institutionalized and claims 
that the County's negligence caused his injury.  
¶108 As the majority 
correctly 
explains, 
under 
these 
circumstances, 
Clark 
County 
assumed 
the 
duty 
to 
provide 
reasonable care to shield the plaintiff — the protected person — 
from foreseeable harm while he was at the county facility.  
Majority op. at ¶¶ 91, 92.38  The majority opinion makes clear 
that the County's assumption of this duty may absolve Jankee, 
the protected person, from the ordinary obligation of self-care, 
and to shift responsibility to the County, thereby expunging the 
affirmative defense of contributory negligence.  Majority op. at 
¶ 92.  The reason for this rule is that "[t]he improper or 
inappropriate 
imposition 
of 
the 
defense 
of 
contributory 
                     
38 See Kujawski v. Arbor View Ctr., 139 Wis. 2d 455, 462-63, 
407 N.W.2d 249 (1987) ("The general rule in Wisconsin is that a 
hospital must exercise such ordinary care as the mental and 
physical condition of its patients, known or should have been 
known, may require."). 
No. 95-2136.ssa 
 
2 
negligence can lead to the dilution or diminution of a duty of 
care."39   
¶109 I agree with the majority's analysis up to this point. 
 But the majority then goes too far in the present case, which 
is here 
on summary judgment.  The 
majority 
weighs the 
conflicting evidence and concludes that the County was not 
negligent during its custodial care of Jankee because it could 
not have foreseen that Jankee would attempt to escape.  Majority 
op. at ¶¶ 99-103, 105.  I disagree with the majority's 
conclusion.  Given Jankee's extensive history of mental illness, 
                     
39 Cowan v. Doering, 545 A.2d 159, 167 (N.J. 1988) (adopting 
a capacity-based standard for evaluating contributory negligence 
but holding that contributory negligence could not be asserted 
in this case because the hospital's duty of care included the 
prevention of the kind of self-damaging acts that caused 
plaintiff's 
injuries, 
thus, 
"the 
plaintiff's 
actions 
and 
capacity were subsumed within the defendant's scope of duty"). 
See W.C. Crais III, Annotation, Contributory Negligence of 
Mentally 
Incompetent or 
Mentally 
or 
Emotionally 
Disturbed 
Persons, 91 A.L.R. 2d 392 at 397 (1963 & 2000 Supp.), stating 
that: 
In these cases, [where the plaintiff is in an 
institution 
for 
the 
mentally 
ill] 
considerable 
emphasis is placed on the overriding duty arising from 
the hospital-patient relationship, resulting in a good 
deal more lenience toward the plaintiff insofar as his 
duty to himself is concerned (discussing cases). 
 
See also James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, Hospital's 
Liability for Patient's Injury or Death Resulting from Escape or 
Attempted Escape, 37 A.L.R. 4th 200 at 274-77 (1985 & 1999 
Supp.) (discussing cases allowing the jury to decide whether a 
mentally ill patient injured in an escape or suicide attempt was 
contributorily negligent according to a subjective standard of 
plaintiff's capacity). 
No. 95-2136.ssa 
 
3 
including his violent and irrational tendencies, which were 
known to the County, it is entirely possible that Jankee could 
prove at trial that the County was negligent in failing to 
protect 
Jankee 
from 
acting 
out 
his 
irrational 
impulses, 
including trying to escape.40  
¶110 Even if the facts and the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from the facts were not in dispute, foreseeability and 
negligence are ordinarily questions for a fact-finder, not for a 
                     
40 See James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, Hospital's 
Liability for Patient's Injury or Death Resulting from Escape or 
Attempted Escape, 37 A.L.R. 4th 200 at § 3.a (1985 & 1999 Supp.) 
(discussing cases allowing jury to decide whether hospital was 
negligent in its treatment and supervision of mentally ill 
patients injured when attempting to escape).  
A case strikingly similar to the present case is Fatuck v. 
Hillside Hospital, 45 A.D.2d 708 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), aff’d 
without op., 328 N.E.2d 791 (N.Y. 1975).  In Fatuck the court 
held that there was sufficient evidence to establish prima facie 
negligence on the part of a hospital when plaintiff claimed that 
the hospital was negligent in failing to prevent the decedent 
from "escaping" from the hospital.  The court pointed out that 
the patient had more than a 14-year history of mental problems 
and had been admitted to and released from several hospitals in 
the 
past. 
 
However, 
at 
no 
time 
during 
any 
of 
the 
hospitalizations did the patient exhibit any escapist behavior 
or attempt to commit suicide.  
See also Mounds Park Hosp. v. Von Eye, 245 F.2d 756 (8th 
Cir. 1957) (a hospital on notice that mentally ill plaintiff 
resented her confinement and had expressed her desire to get 
away was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's finding of 
the hospital's negligence when mentally ill plaintiff injured 
herself in an escape attempt).    
No. 95-2136.ssa 
 
4 
court on summary judgment.  Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 63 
Wis. 2d 728, 744, 218 N.W.2d 279 (1974).41  
¶111 Therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate in this 
case.  The determination of the County's negligence should be 
made by the trier of fact, and the cause should be remanded to 
the circuit court. 
¶112 Because the majority holds that Clark County was not 
negligent as a matter of law, Jankee's contributory negligence 
is of no import in determining the County's liability.   
¶113 As to the other defendants, the majority opinion does 
not determine each defendant's individual causal negligence.  
Perhaps like the County, each of the other defendants was not 
causally negligent.  The majority looks only to Jankee's 
negligence and concludes that Jankee's contributory negligence 
outweighs the negligence of each of the defendants.  
¶114 The 
majority 
uses 
an 
objective 
standard 
for 
determining 
Jankee's 
contributory 
negligence: 
Jankee, 
an 
institutionalized injured person suing the institution and 
                     
41 See also Kull v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 49 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 
181 N.W.2d 393 (1970) ("the issue of contributory negligence is 
peculiarly one for the jury, and it normally cannot be said as a 
matter of law that a plaintiff was or was not guilty of 
contributory negligence once the issue is raised"); Davis v. 
Skille, 12 Wis. 2d 482, 489, 107 N.W.2d 458 (1961) ("The 
comparison of negligence is peculiarly within the jury's 
province. . . .  While this court has in a number of cases 
determined as a matter of law that the negligence of a plaintiff 
equaled or exceeded that of one or more defendants, it has also 
stated that the instances in which a court can so rule will be 
extremely rare."). 
No. 95-2136.ssa 
 
5 
others for negligence, is held to a reasonable-person standard 
of care in determining his contributory negligence.42   
¶115 The majority's treatment of the mentally ill or 
mentally disabled is in stark contrast with the law's treatment 
of physically disabled defendants: When a person "is ill or 
otherwise physically disabled, the standard of conduct to which 
he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable 
person under like disability."  Restatement of Torts (Second) 
§ 283C (1965).43   
¶116 The majority opinion acknowledges that the objective 
standard is a minority view.  Most states allow a jury to weigh 
degrees of mental capacity in assessing whether an injured 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent.  Majority op. at ¶ 73 
                     
42 The court of appeals in the present case adopted the 
following rule barring contributory negligence under limited 
circumstances: A person who is involuntarily institutionalized 
with a mental illness or mental disability on the ground that he 
or she is dangerous to himself or herself and others and who 
does not have the capacity to control or appreciate his or her 
conduct because of that illness or disability is not barred by 
contributory negligence when that person claims that the 
institution's failure to maintain a safe place and negligent 
supervision caused the institutionalized person injury.  The 
court of appeals remanded the cause to the circuit court for a 
factual finding to determine whether Jankee possessed the 
capacity to control and appreciate his conduct.  Jankee v. Clark 
County, 222 Wis. 2d 151, 177-78, 588 N.W.2d 913 (Ct. App. 1998). 
43 The standard of care ordinarily applied to children is to 
measure the child's conduct against what would be reasonable to 
expect of a child of like age, intelligence, discretion, 
knowledge 
and 
experience 
under 
the 
same 
or 
similar 
circumstances.  Restatement of Torts (Second) §§ 283A, 464(2) 
(1965); Wis JI-Civil 1010. 
No. 95-2136.ssa 
 
6 
and n.21.44  Case law from other states and several commentators 
agree that a subjective standard of care is particularly well 
suited in cases like this one, where the defendant is aware of 
                     
44 Birkner v. Salt Lake Cty., 771 P.2d 1053, 1060-61 (Ut. 
1989) ("In contrast to the use of an objective standard in cases 
of primary negligence, the majority of courts have adopted a 
more compassionate stance regarding the contributory negligence 
of the mentally impaired.  Those who are insane are incapable of 
contributory negligence, 
whereas lesser 
degrees 
of 
mental 
impairment should be considered by the jury in determining 
whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. . . .  This 
rule 
has 
also 
been 
applied 
in 
comparative 
negligence 
jurisdictions. . . .  A patient seeking professional help for a 
certain kind of disorder may be more or less negligent depending 
on the nature and extent of the disorder. . . .  To apply a 
categorical rule that no patient seeking therapy for a mental or 
emotional disorder can be charged with negligence would be 
unrealistic and cause damage to the principle of comparative 
negligence") (citing cases). 
See also Mochen v. State of New York, 43 A.D.2d 484, 487-88 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (a plaintiff with mental illness or mental 
disability should be held to exercise his or her own faculties; 
with the present state of medical knowledge "it is possible and 
practical to evaluate the degrees of mental acuity and correlate 
them with legal responsibility"). 
See W.C. Crais III, Annotation, Contributory Negligence of 
Mentally 
Incompetent or 
Mentally 
or 
Emotionally 
Disturbed 
Persons, 91 A.L.R. 2d 392 at 397-98 (1963 & 2000 Supp.) stating 
that "a majority of courts have adopted the . . . view, however, 
that a plaintiff should be held to exercise only that degree of 
care for his own safety consonant with the faculties and 
capacities bestowed upon him by nature."  The author also 
states: 
Under the weight of scientific opinion, however, the 
view that only total insanity may be considered is 
buckling.  Most successful in overcoming the argument 
that it is impracticable to consider the lesser 
deficiencies 
is 
the 
argument 
that 
insanity 
is 
analogous to infancy and should be treated similarly 
by the courts (citing cases). 
 
No. 95-2136.ssa 
 
7 
the 
plaintiff's 
mental 
illness 
and 
can 
take 
appropriate 
precautions.  See Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 32 at 
138, § 135 at 1073 (5th ed. 1984).  
¶117 The majority fully and fairly presents reasons for and 
against the objective and subjective standards.  I need not 
repeat them.  I am persuaded by the case law and the 
commentators that recognize that the policy arguments employed 
to justify holding an institutionalized mentally ill or mentally 
disabled person to an objective reasonable person standard when 
that person sues the institution for negligent care "lose much 
of their force" when applied to the institutionalized person in 
the contributory negligence arena.  W. Page Keeton et al., 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 32, at 178 (5th ed. 
1984).45 
¶118 For the reasons stated, I dissent. 
¶119 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
                     
45 I do not address the issue of the government contractors' 
immunity because such a discussion is of limited value under the 
circumstances of the present case.  The majority does not 
address the issue of immunity, and the precedential value of a 
decision of the court of appeals which this court has reviewed 
is an open question. 
No. 95-2136.ssa 
 
1