Title: R.K. Chevrolet Inc. v. Hayden
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 960943
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 10, 1997

Present:  All the Justices 
 
R.K. CHEVROLET, INC. 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
v.  Record No. 960943 
                                       January 10, 1997 
JAMES J. HAYDEN, JR. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
 
John K. Moore, Judge 
 
 
The principal issue in this appeal is whether the trial 
court erred in striking the plaintiff's evidence.  We also 
consider whether the court erred in limiting the testimony of the 
plaintiff's expert witness. 
 
I 
 
R.K. Chevrolet, Inc. (R.K.) sued James J. Hayden, Jr., 
seeking, inter alia, damages for breach of contract.  The case 
was tried to a jury, and, after R.K. had rested its case, the 
trial court struck R.K.'s evidence and entered judgment in favor 
of Hayden.  In doing so, the court ruled that, as a matter of 
law, the alleged contract was invalid and unenforceable because 
it lacked consideration and was incomplete and indefinite.  The 
court further ruled that, assuming a contract existed, R.K. had 
failed to prove any recoverable damages because the damages 
claimed were speculative and unforeseeable as a matter of law.  
We awarded R.K. this appeal. 
 
II 
 
When, as here, a trial court strikes a plaintiff's evidence, 
we must view that evidence and all reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.   
 
In the summer of 1990, R.K., a Virginia Beach automobile 
 
 
 
 
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dealership, employed Hayden as a salesperson.  Shortly 
thereafter, Robert S. Kline, R.K.'s president, learned that 
Hayden was interested in obtaining a management position with 
R.K.  Such a position required special training and allowed 
access to certain confidential information.  Kline had concern 
about employing Hayden in a management position because, over the 
years, Hayden's family had owned a number of competing automobile 
dealerships.  Specifically, Kline was concerned that, if R.K. 
employed Hayden in a used car management position, Hayden might 
suddenly leave R.K. to work for his father.  According to Kline, 
such a departure by Hayden would be very disruptive to R.K.'s 
used car business.  Kline explained that a dealership's used car 
manager is a key employee and that a used car manager must have 
greater competence than a dealership's new car manager. 
 
Consequently, before R.K. employed Hayden as an assistant 
used car manager, R.K. and Hayden entered into a written contract 
whereby Hayden agreed to stay with R.K. for a period of no less 
than one year from August 10, 1990.  Hayden honored that contract 
and continued in his position as used car manager. 
 
When the written contract expired, Hayden became an 
employee-at-will.  While Hayden was so employed, Kline learned 
that Hayden's father had purchased an automobile dealership in 
northeastern North Carolina, known as "Coastal Chevrolet."  Kline 
considered Coastal Chevrolet to be a competitor and, therefore, 
wanted to make certain that Hayden did not leave abruptly to work 
 
 
 
 
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for his father.  Hayden understood and appreciated Kline's 
concern.  Consequently, R.K. and Hayden executed the following 
document which formed the basis for the present litigation: 
 
 
 
 
 
Contract Between James J. Hayden & 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R. K. Chevrolet, GEO 
 
May 12, 1992 
 
 
I, James J. Hayden, willingly enter into a two year 
contract of employment with R. K. Chevrolet, Inc., GEO. 
 The only reason allowable for Mr. Hayden to leave in 
this time frame, under this contract, is the untimely 
death of his father. 
 
 
Therefore, with the above exception, James J. Hayden 
agrees to work continuously at R. K. Chevrolet, Inc., 
Geo for at least two years in good faith. 
 
This document was signed on May 12, 1992, by Hayden, as R.K.'s 
used car manager, and by Kline and Thomas M. Bates, as R.K.'s 
president and general manager, respectively. 
 
In July 1993, Hayden, without prior notice, quit his 
employment with R.K.  According to Kline, July is one of the 
busiest months for used car sales, and Hayden's departure caused 
a "catastrophic problem" because R.K. did not have a qualified 
person to replace Hayden. 
 
At trial, R.K. called, as an expert witness, a certified 
public accountant who specializes in the "automotive practice"  
area in order to prove the extent and cause of R.K.'s damages.  
The accountant testified that, during the five-month period 
following Hayden's departure, R.K. lost expected profits of 
$348,832.  The accountant had examined R.K.'s financial 
statements and had found no decline in gross profits during that 
 
 
 
 
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time period in any of R.K.'s other departments, including the new 
vehicle sales department, the service department, and the body 
shop department.  R.K.'s entire loss, according to the 
accountant, was in the used car department. 
 
R.K. sought to have the accountant testify that, "with a 
reasonable degree of professional certainty," Hayden's sudden 
departure from R.K.'s employ caused R.K.'s loss in profits during 
the five-month period.  The trial court, however, sustained 
Hayden's objection and excluded this testimony.  R.K. then 
proffered this testimony for the record. 
 
III 
 
We first consider whether there was sufficient consideration 
for the alleged May 12 contract.  The trial court concluded that 
there was no consideration because R.K. "basically agree[d] to do 
nothing."  We do not agree. 
 
Generally, a slight advantage to the party promising or a 
trifling inconvenience to the party to whom the promise is made 
is sufficient consideration for a promise.  GSHH-Richmond, Inc. 
v. Imperial Associates, 253 Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ 
(1997) (this day decided); Sager v. Basham, 241 Va. 227, 229-30, 
401 S.E.2d 676, 677 (1991); Brewer v. Bank of Danville, 202 Va. 
807, 815, 120 S.E.2d 273, 279 (1961).  In the present case, prior 
to executing the document in issue, Hayden was merely an 
employee-at-will, serving as R.K.'s used car manager.  R.K., 
therefore, could have discharged Hayden for any or no reason.  
 
 
 
 
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After the document was executed, however, Hayden became an 
employee for a two-year term, and, during that term, R.K. could 
not discharge Hayden except for good cause.  Clearly, therefore, 
this advantage to Hayden and inconvenience to R.K. supplied a 
sufficient consideration to support the May 12 contract. 
 
IV 
 
We next consider whether the alleged contract was certain 
and definite as to its essential terms.  A contract will be 
enforced if its obligations are reasonably certain.  Allen v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety, 222 Va. 361, 363, 281 S.E.2d 818, 819 
(1981).  Even if some terms of a contract are uncertain, it may 
be read in the light of the surrounding circumstances, and, if 
from such reading, its meaning may be determined, the contract 
will be enforced.  Smith v. Farrell, 199 Va. 121, 128, 98 S.E.2d 
3, 7 (1957).  Further, when the entire agreement has not been 
reduced to writing, parol evidence is admissible, not to vary or 
contradict the terms of the written instrument, but to show other 
facts agreed upon in order to establish the parties' entire 
contract.  High Knob, Inc. v. Allen, 205 Va. 503, 506, 138 S.E. 
2d 49, 52 (1964). 
 
The trial court concluded that a number of terms were 
missing from the alleged contract.  The court stated that "[t]he 
document is dated on May the 12th of 1992, but it does not say 
that it will continue until May the 12th of 1994."  The document 
does state, however, that Hayden agreed to work continuously at 
 
 
 
 
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R.K. "for at least two years."  We think a jury, in the light of 
the surrounding circumstances, reasonably could conclude that the 
two-year period commenced on the date the document was executed. 
 
The trial court also stated that there was nothing in the 
document to indicate what Hayden's position would be.  Hayden, 
however, signed the document as the used car manager, and it is 
clear from the evidence adduced that he intended to serve in that 
capacity for the two-year term. 
 
The court further noted that the document did not specify 
the amount of time Hayden was to work.  Again, Hayden was already 
working as the used car manager when he signed the document, and 
a jury reasonably could find that he would continue to work the 
hours in a day and the days in a week that he had been working. 
 
Finally, the trial court stated that the document made no 
mention of what Hayden's compensation would be.  From the 
surrounding circumstances, however, a jury reasonably could have 
concluded that Hayden's salary would be that which he was 
receiving at the time he signed the document. 
 
When the document is read in the context of the surrounding 
circumstances and the evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to R.K., we hold that the trial court erred in ruling 
that the contract was so indefinite and incomplete as to be 
unenforceable. 
 
V 
 
We next consider whether the trial court erred in its 
 
 
 
 
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rulings regarding R.K.'s damages.   
 
A 
 
The court first ruled that, as a matter of law, R.K.'s 
damages were not foreseeable because they were not within the 
contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into the 
contract.  There are two broad categories of contract damages:  
direct damages and consequential damages.  Washington & O.D. Ry. 
v. Westinghouse Co., 120 Va. 620, 627, 89 S.E. 131, 133 (1916).  
Direct damages are those that flow "naturally" from a breach of 
contract; i.e., those that, in the ordinary course of human 
experience, can be expected to result from the breach, and are 
compensable.  Consequential damages arise from the intervention 
of "special circumstances" not ordinarily predictable and are 
compensable only if it is determined that the special 
circumstances were within the contemplation of the parties to the 
contract.  Roanoke Hospital v. Doyle and Russell, 215 Va. 796, 
801, 214 S.E.2d 155, 160 (1975).  Whether damages are direct or 
consequential is a question of law.  The determination whether 
special circumstances were within the parties' contemplation is a 
question of fact for a jury.  Id. 
 
In the present case, the trial court correctly ruled that 
R.K.'s claimed lost profits are consequential damages, and R.K. 
does not challenge that ruling.  R.K. does contend, however, that 
the trial court erred in refusing to allow the jury to consider 
whether the consequential damages were within the contemplation 
 
 
 
 
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of R.K. and Hayden when they executed the contract.  We agree. 
 
The evidence makes clear that R.K.'s principal concern in 
securing the contract was to make certain that Hayden did not 
leave abruptly and that the purpose of the contract was to assure 
R.K. that Hayden would remain at R.K. for a period of two years. 
  Hayden understood R.K.'s concern and recognized the potential 
of R.K.'s losing business if he left suddenly.  A jury reasonably 
could conclude that the sole purpose of the contract was to 
prevent a loss of business and the resulting damages to R.K. and 
that both parties contemplated the potential for such damages at 
the time they entered into the contract.  Consequently, we hold 
that the trial court erred in striking R.K.'s evidence on this 
ground. 
 
B 
 
The trial court also ruled that, as a matter of law, R.K.'s 
claim for lost profits was speculative.  In Mullen v. Brantley, 
213 Va. 765, 768, 195 S.E.2d 696, 699-700 (1973), we stated the 
method for proving lost profits: 
 
 
When an established business, with an established 
earning capacity, is interrupted and there is no other 
practical way to estimate the damages thereby caused, 
evidence of the prior and subsequent record of the 
business has been held admissible to permit an 
intelligent and probable estimate of damages. 
 
Accord Krikorian v. Dailey, 171 Va. 16, 30, 197 S.E. 442, 448 
(1938); Forbes v. Wyatt, 143 Va. 802, 809, 129 S.E. 491, 493 
(1925); Manss-Owens Co. v. Owens & Son, 129 Va. 183, 205, 105 
S.E. 543, 550 (1921). 
 
 
 
 
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In the present case, R.K. presented evidence of its profits 
both before and after Hayden's departure from the business.  
According to its financial statements, R.K. experienced a 
dramatic decline in its gross profits for the five-month period 
following Hayden's departure.  This decline in profits was 
recorded only in the used car department--there was no such 
decline recorded in R.K.'s other departments.  Moreover, neither 
other dealerships in the area nor the automotive industry in 
general experienced a similar profit decline.  We conclude, 
therefore, that this evidence of lost profits is not speculative 
as a matter of law and is sufficient to present a jury issue.  
Consequently, we hold that the trial court erred in striking 
R.K.'s evidence on this ground. 
 
C 
 
Finally, because the issue may arise upon remand, we 
consider the trial court's refusing to allow R.K.'s expert 
witness to express his opinion concerning the cause of R.K.'s 
lost profits.  As noted earlier, the accountant would have 
testified that, to a reasonable degree of professional certainty, 
R.K.'s loss resulted from Hayden's departure. 
 
We think this issue is resolved by the provisions of Code 
§ 8.01-401.3(B), enacted in 1993, which reads, in pertinent part, 
as follows: 
 
 
No expert or lay witness while testifying in a 
civil proceeding shall be prohibited from expressing an 
otherwise admissible opinion or conclusion as to any 
matter of fact solely because that fact is the ultimate 
issue or critical to the resolution of the case. 
 
 
 
 
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Under the facts of the present case, we think it was error 
to prohibit the accountant from expressing his opinion regarding 
causation.  As previously discussed, he had analyzed R.K.'s 
financial statements and had considered the records of other 
dealerships in the area and of the industry in general.  
Therefore, he had laid a proper foundation for the formation of 
his opinion, and the trial court erred in refusing this expert 
testimony. 
 
VI 
 
In sum, we hold that the trial court erred in striking 
R.K.'s evidence and in refusing to allow R.K.'s expert to testify 
concerning causation.  Accordingly, we will reverse and vacate 
the trial court's judgment and remand the case for a new trial 
consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. 
 
Reversed and remanded.