Title: Commonwealth v. Monteiro
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13305
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 26, 2023

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SJC-13305 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOHN V. MONTEIRO. 
 
 
May 26, 2023. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Conflict of Interest.  Attorney at Law, Conflict of 
interest, Disqualification. 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth appeals from a judgment of the county 
court denying its petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  
In its petition, the Commonwealth sought relief from the denial, 
by a judge in the Superior Court, of its motion to disqualify 
John V. Monteiro's appellate counsel, Rosemary Scapicchio, on 
the ground that she has a conflict of interest due to her 
representation of both Monteiro and Michael Barros.1  We affirm 
the judgment. 
 
 
Background.  After a jury trial in 2016, Monteiro was 
convicted of murder in the first degree and other offenses.  His 
appeal from his convictions is pending in this court.  In August 
2020, represented by Scapicchio, Monteiro filed a motion for a 
new trial in this court, which was shortly thereafter 
transferred to the Superior Court.  In the motion for a new 
trial, Monteiro argued, among other things, that trial counsel 
deprived him of effective assistance by failing to use evidence 
suggesting that Barros was a third-party culprit.  That motion 
remains pending in the Superior Court. 
 
 
Barros is the defendant in an unrelated criminal case in 
the Superior Court.  On August 5, 2020, a hearing took place in 
that case at which Scapicchio represented Barros.  At that 
 
1 Scapicchio did not represent Monteiro in the proceedings 
in the county court and does not represent him in this appeal. 
2 
 
hearing, the Commonwealth raised a concern that Scapicchio had a 
conflict of interest due to her representation of both Barros 
and Monteiro.  Scapicchio stated that she had discussed the 
matter with both Barros and Monteiro, that they had both waived 
any conflict in writing, and that she had provided the waivers 
to the Commonwealth.  The judge conducted a colloquy with 
Barros, after which she stated that she was satisfied with 
Barros's waiver.  The hearing proceeded without further 
objection from the Commonwealth. 
 
 
In Monteiro's case in the Superior Court, a hearing was 
scheduled for August 31, 2021.  On August 26, 2021, the 
Commonwealth filed a motion to disqualify Scapicchio on the 
ground that her representation of both Monteiro and Barros gave 
rise to a conflict of interest that could not be waived.  A 
judge in the Superior Court denied the motion on December 31, 
2021. 
 
 
On February 23, 2022, the Commonwealth filed its G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, petition in the county court.  The single justice 
denied relief on June 6, 2022, and the Commonwealth appealed.  A 
motion hearing was scheduled in the Superior Court for June 22, 
2022, but on June 17, 2022, the Commonwealth moved to stay the 
Superior Court proceedings.  The single justice denied the 
motion to stay that same day.  On June 21, 2022, the 
Commonwealth filed an emergency motion to stay in the full 
court.2  We temporarily stayed the Superior Court proceedings and 
directed that the parties submit further briefing.  On July 1, 
2022, we ruled that the single justice neither erred nor abused 
his discretion by denying a stay.  Accordingly, we lifted the 
temporary stay that we had imposed. 
 
 
Discussion.  "As we have explained, '[a] single justice 
considering a petition filed pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
performs a two-step inquiry. . . . The first step requires the 
single justice to decide "whether to employ the court's power of 
general superintendence to become involved in the matter," . . . 
or, stated differently, to "decide, in his or her discretion, 
whether to review 'the substantive merits of the . . . 
petition.'"'"  Commonwealth v. Brown, 487 Mass. 1007, 1008 
(2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Dilworth, 485 Mass. 1001, 1002 
 
2 As we noted in our July 1 decision on the motion to stay, 
the Commonwealth should have appealed from the single justice's 
denial of the motion to stay, rather than filing a new motion to 
stay in the full court.  See Commonwealth v. Nash, 486 Mass. 
394, 411-412 (2020). 
3 
 
(2020).  See Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 24 (2019).  
"The single justice need not take the second step (which is to 
resolve the petition on its substantive merits) 'if the 
petitioner has an adequate alternative remedy or if the single 
justice determines, in his or her discretion, that the subject 
of the petition is not sufficiently important and extraordinary 
as to require general superintendence intervention.'" Brown, 
supra, quoting Dilworth, supra.  "Our role on appeal . . . is to 
determine whether [the single justice] abused [his] discretion 
by declining to intervene. . . . We give considerable deference 
to the single justice's exercise of discretion, and it is not 
for us to substitute our judgment for that of the single 
justice."  Brown, supra, quoting Dilworth, supra.  Where, as 
here, the single justice denied relief without reaching the 
substantive merits of the Commonwealth's petition, "it is 
incumbent on the Commonwealth to show that on the record before 
him, the single justice was required to exercise the court's 
superintendence power:  that is, that the Commonwealth had no 
adequate alternative remedy and that the single justice abused 
his discretion by failing to reach the merits of its petition 
. . ."  Brown, supra.  This the Commonwealth has not done. 
 
 
First, the Commonwealth has not shown that it lacks an 
adequate alternative remedy.3  In its petition, the Commonwealth 
suggested that the Appeals Court's decision in Commonwealth v. 
Delnegro, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 337 (2017), establishes that the 
Commonwealth's sole remedy is relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  
We do not agree with this reading of Delnegro.  In that case, 
the Commonwealth's motion to disqualify a criminal defendant's 
counsel was allowed, and the defendant attempted to take an 
immediate interlocutory appeal pursuant to the doctrine of 
present execution.  Delnegro, supra at 339-340.  The Appeals 
Court held that no interlocutory appeal lay in those 
circumstances, even though the doctrine permits such an appeal 
in civil litigation where a party's counsel is disqualified.  
Id. at 341-342.  The court reasoned that in a civil case, an 
improper disqualification of counsel could not effectively be 
remedied on appeal from a final judgment due to the difficulty 
 
3 The denial of the Commonwealth's motion to disqualify was 
an interlocutory ruling of the trial court.  The Commonwealth 
therefore should have filed a memorandum and appendix pursuant 
to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which 
requires an appellant in the Commonwealth's position to "set 
forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot 
be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the 
trial court or by other available means."  It did not do so. 
4 
 
in establishing prejudice, but in a criminal case, "prejudice is 
presumed, and the defendant will automatically receive a new 
trial upon a showing that the disqualification was improper."  
Id. at 342, citing Commonwealth v. Rondeau, 378 Mass. 408, 415 
(1979).  The doctrine of present execution thus did not permit 
an immediate interlocutory appeal; the defendant's sole avenue 
for immediate interlocutory relief was to file a petition under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3.4  Delnegro, supra at 342-343. 
 
 
For the Commonwealth, however, Delnegro does not resolve 
the question.  The court in Delnegro said nothing about whether 
the Commonwealth has an adequate remedy from the denial of its 
motion to disqualify defense counsel.  In a civil case, an order 
denying a motion to disqualify can be remedied on appeal from a 
final judgment.  Farahani v. Hingham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 445 
Mass. 1024, 1024-1025 (2006).  See Masiello v. Perini Corp., 394 
Mass. 842, 850 (1985) ("in the absence of authorization by a 
single justice of this court or the Appeals Court to seek review 
of an order denying disqualification counsel, . . . that order 
is not subject to appellate review until after final judgment on 
the merits of the underlying case").  Such a remedy appears to 
be available to the Commonwealth in this case.  If Monteiro's 
motion for a new trial is allowed, the Commonwealth will have 
the right to appeal.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b) (8), as 
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  The Commonwealth has 
offered no reason why the denial of its motion to disqualify, if 
improper, could not be remedied in that appeal, just as such an 
order can be remedied in civil litigation. 
 
 
Second, even if the Commonwealth has no adequate 
alternative remedy, it has not shown that the single justice 
abused his discretion by failing to reach the merits of its 
petition.  The Commonwealth was clearly aware that Scapicchio 
represented both Monteiro and Barros and was concerned about the 
possible conflict of interest at least as early as August 5, 
2020, when it raised the matter at the hearing in Barros's case.  
Yet it did not move to disqualify her from representing Monteiro 
until more than one year later, on August 26, 2021.  This was 
just a few days before a scheduled hearing in Monteiro's case.  
 
4 Of course, because a criminal defendant would be able to 
obtain relief on appeal from a conviction, that would be reason 
enough for a single justice to deny relief under G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3.  Nevertheless, a single justice potentially could, in the 
exercise of his or her discretion, determine that a particular 
case presented exceptional circumstances warranting either 
immediate relief or a reservation and report to the full court. 
5 
 
Then, when the motion was denied, the Commonwealth did not file 
its G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition until nearly two months later.  
Where the Commonwealth failed to act promptly on its concerns 
that Scapicchio had a nonwaivable conflict of interest, the 
single justice could properly conclude that there was no 
extraordinary circumstance warranting exercise of the court's 
superintendence power.  Cf. Masiello, supra at 850 ("eleventh 
hour maneuvers" to disqualify counsel "are disruptive to the 
administration of justice and are costly"; "[j]udges have the 
authority and discretion to discourage such tactics").  The 
single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion by 
denying the Commonwealth's petition without reaching its merits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
Carolyn A. Burbine, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Eduardo Masferrer (Danya Fullerton also present) for the 
defendant.