Title: Cox, Jr. v. Parrish
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1170391
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 21, 2019

REL: June 21, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2018-2019
_________________________
1170391
_________________________
Perry Eugene Cox, Jr.
v.
Jennie Jo Cox Parrish, Debra Cox McCurdy, and
Shirley Cox Wise, as coexecutors of the Estate of 
Perry Eugene Cox, Sr.
Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court
(CV-16-900052)
MITCHELL, Justice.
This is an estate-administration case that is only
partially before us.  Perry Eugene Cox, Jr. ("Cox"), appeals
1170391
a judgment made final by the Shelby Circuit Court ("the trial
court") under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Specifically, the
trial court held that Cox's counterclaim against his sisters,
Jennie Jo Cox Parrish, Debra Cox McCurdy, and Shirley Cox
Wise, as coexecutors of the estate of their father, Perry
Eugene Cox, Sr. ("the decedent"), was time-barred by 
Alabama's
nonclaims statute, § 43-2-350, Ala. Code 1975 ("the nonclaims
statute").  The trial court dismissed Cox's counterclaim and
certified its judgment as final and appealable.  Cox appealed. 
Because the trial court exceeded its discretion in certifying
its dismissal of Cox's counterclaim under Rule 54(b), no final
judgment exists and we lack jurisdiction to decide this
appeal.  Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
Facts and Procedural History
Cox, the decedent, and Richard H. McCurdy formed Country
Hills Estate, a general partnership ("the partnership"), in
1986.1  In doing so, the partners executed a written
partnership agreement.  McCurdy withdrew as a partner shortly
after the partnership was formed, leaving only Cox and the
1According 
to 
the 
complaint, 
the 
partnership has 
also 
done
business under the names "Country Hills," "Country Hills
Farm," and "The Farm."
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decedent as partners. Although the partnership acquired
various assets such as livestock, vehicles, buildings,
equipment, and real property through the years, its principal
asset was approximately 260 acres of real estate in Shelby
County ("the farm").  
The decedent died testate on March 22, 2013, and the
Shelby Probate Court issued letters testamentary on April 18,
2013.  On January 19, 2016, after removing the probate action
to the trial court, the coexecutors of the decedent's estate
sued Cox, seeking, among other things, a judgment declaring 1)
that the partnership was dissolved by operation of law in
1999; 2) that the partnership agreement became void in 1999
upon the dissolution of the partnership; 3) that Cox is
estopped from claiming any interest in the partnership, the
farm, or any partnership assets based on positions Cox took in
prior judicial proceedings; 4) that the farm is an asset of
the estate, not the partnership; 5) that the estate holds
title to the farm; 6) that any partnership assets remaining at
the decedent's death are assets of the estate; and 7) that
ownership of those assets is vested with the estate.2  Cox
2The coexecutors asserted other claims in addition to the
declaratory-judgment claim.  All of the coexecutors' other
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answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim on February
25, 2016, asking the trial court to require the coexecutors to
convey to Cox the decedent's partnership interest at book
value pursuant to a buyout provision contained in the
partnership agreement.  The coexecutors subsequently filed a
motion for a partial summary judgment on the dissolution of
the partnership and the ownership of the partnership assets,
including the farm.
The trial court, in ruling on the coexecutors' motion for
a partial summary judgment, dismissed Cox's counterclaim,
holding that the partnership was dissolved in 1999 by
operation of law and that at that time the partnership
agreement became void.3  The trial court, however, also
granted Cox leave to amend his counterclaim.  On March 13,
2017, Cox filed an amended counterclaim alleging that,
regardless of whether the partnership was dissolved by
operation of law in 1999, the partnership was subsequently
revived, or, in the alternative, a new partnership was formed
claims remain pending in the trial court.
3The trial court also entered a summary judgment in favor
of the coexecutors on several, but not all, of Cox's
affirmative defenses.
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between Cox and the decedent following the dissolution of the
original partnership, or, in the further alternative,
dissolution of the partnership had been waived by the
decedent.  Based on these theories, Cox asked for a judgment
declaring that he was entitled to 62.5% of the assets of the
purported partnership.
The coexecutors moved for a judgment on the pleadings as
to Cox's amended counterclaim, arguing that the counterclaim
was barred by the nonclaims statute.4  The trial court agreed
and accordingly entered a judgment for the coexecutors as to
Cox's counterclaim. In the introduction to its order granting
the coexecutors' motion for a judgment on the pleadings, the
trial court stated that the coexecutors were "entitled to
judgment as a matter of law in their favor on" their
declaratory-judgment count concerning the partnership and its
assets and on their count seeking to eject Cox from the farm. 
The body of the order, however, discussed only whether the
4Section 43-2-350(b) of the nonclaims statute, which
applies to claimants other than personal representatives and
their assignees or transferees,  requires that "[a]ll claims
against the estate of a decedent ... be presented within six
months after the grant of letters, or within five months from
the date of the first publication of notice, whichever is the
later to occur ...."  
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nonclaims statute barred Cox's counterclaim and did not
address any of the coexecutors' claims.  In the conclusion of
its order, the trial court, among other things: 1) granted the
coexecutors' motion for a judgment on the pleadings, which
requested a judgment only as to Cox's counterclaim; 2)
dismissed Cox's counterclaim; and 3) certified its 
judgment as
final 
under 
Rule 
54(b). 
 
The 
coexecutors' 
declaratory-judgment
claim and their additional claims remain pending in the trial
court. 
Standard of Review
In Centennial Assocs. v. Guthrie, 20 So. 3d 1277, 1279
(Ala. 2009), this Court explained the appropriate standard for
reviewing a Rule 54(b) certification:  
"'If a trial court certifies a judgment as final
pursuant to Rule 54(b), an appeal will generally lie
from that judgment.'  Baugus v. City of Florence,
968 So. 2d 529, 531 (Ala. 2007).
"Although the order made the basis of the Rule
54(b) certification disposes of the entire claim
against Guthrie [the defendant], thus satisfying the
requirements of Rule 54(b) dealing with eligibility
for consideration as a final judgment, there remains
the additional requirement that there be no just
reason for delay.  A trial court's conclusion to
that effect is subject to review by this Court to
determine whether the trial court exceeded its
discretion in so concluding."
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Discussion
No party contests this Court's jurisdiction to decide
this appeal.  This Court is not limited, however, by the
parties' jurisdictional arguments or the lack thereof. See
Crutcher v. Williams, 12 So. 3d 631, 635 (Ala. 2008); Reynolds
v. Colonial Bank, 874 So. 2d 497, 503 (Ala. 2003).  The
question of whether an order or judgment is final and
therefore can support an appeal is jurisdictional.  Crutcher,
12 So. 3d at 636.    
With few exceptions not applicable here, this Court does
not have subject-matter jurisdiction to decide a case in which
a final judgment has not been entered. See, e.g., Ex parte
Wharfhouse Rest. & Oyster Bar, Inc., 796 So. 2d 316, 320 (Ala.
2001); Cates v. Bush, 307 So. 2d 6, 8 (Ala. 1975).  A judgment
is generally not final unless it disposes of all claims as to
all parties.  Dickerson v. Alabama State Univ., 852 So. 2d
704, 705 (Ala. 2002).  Rule 54(b) creates a limited exception
to this rule, stating, in relevant part: 
"When more than one claim for relief is presented in
an action, ... the court may direct the entry of a
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all
of the claims ... only upon an express determination
that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment."
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(Emphasis added.)  
Because this Court disfavors piecemeal appellate review,
we 
have 
consistently 
cautioned 
trial 
courts 
that
certifications under Rule 54(b) should be entered only in
exceptional cases.  See Schlarb v. Lee, 955 So. 2d 418, 419
(Ala. 2006); Dzwonkowski v. Sonitrol of Mobile, Inc., 892 So.
2d 354, 363 (Ala. 2004); State v. Lawhorn, 830 So. 2d 720, 725
(Ala. 2002); Baker v. Bennett, 644 So. 2d 901, 903 (Ala.
1994); Branch v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, N.A., 514 So. 2d
1373 (Ala. 1987).  This Court has held that a trial court
exceeds its discretion when it certifies a judgment as final
pursuant to Rule 54(b) while claims remain pending before the
trial court that, once decided, could render moot the
necessity for appellate review of the claim on appeal.  See
Richardson v. Chambless, 266 So. 3d 684, 688 (Ala. 2018)
(concluding that trial court exceeded its discretion by
certifying a partial summary judgment as final under Rule
54(b) "because there was a '"'possibility that the need for
review [of that judgment] might ... be mooted by future
developments in the [trial] court'"'" (quoting Lighting Fair,
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Inc. v. Rosenberg, 63 So. 3d 1256, 1264 (Ala. 2010) (quoting
in turn other cases) (alterations added in Richardson))).
In Richardson, a plaintiff brought a fraudulent-transfer
claim against a husband and wife under the Alabama Fraudulent
Transfer Act, § 8-9A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("AFTA"), as
well as related claims.  266 So. 3d at 685-86, 690 n.6.  The
plaintiff alleged that the husband had transferred his
interest in his residence to his wife to avoid paying a
judgment on separate claims pending against the husband.  The
trial court entered a judgment in favor of the wife on all
claims against her and certified its order as final under Rule
54(b).  On appeal, this Court noted that AFTA provided
remedies only for creditors and that the final disposition of
the plaintiff's claims against the husband could possibly
deprive the plaintiff of his creditor status.  266 So. 3d at
689-90.  If the plaintiff lost his creditor status, his AFTA
and related claims against the wife, the judgment on which he
had appealed, would be mooted.  Id.  "That possibility,
coupled with the disfavor with which this court views Rule
54(b) certifications," led the Court to dismiss the appeal.
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In 
Lighting 
Fair, 
materialmen 
plaintiffs 
sued 
a
construction company, a bank, and homeowners in connection
with a failure to pay for home-construction materials.  63 So.
3d at 1260.  The homeowners thereafter brought cross-claims
against the construction company and the bank.  In accordance
with an arbitration provision contained in the construction
agreement, the trial court ordered the homeowners' claims
against the construction company to be sent to arbitration. 
While that court-ordered arbitration was pending, the court
entered a summary judgment for the bank and the homeowners on
all claims brought by the materialmen and for the bank on all
claims brought by the homeowners.  The court certified its
judgment as final under Rule 54(b).  The materialmen and the
homeowners separately appealed, but this Court dismissed both
appeals.  Notably, this Court determined that the outcome of
the pending arbitration between the homeowners and the
construction company could render moot some of the claims
presented by the appeals.  See id. at 1265-68.5  That
5Some portions of the appeals in Lighting Fair were
dismissed because they involved claims that were so closely
intertwined 
with 
claims 
pending 
in 
the 
court-ordered
arbitration 
that 
separate 
adjudication 
would 
pose 
an
unreasonable risk of inconsistent results. 63 So. 3d at 1266-
67.  A risk of inconsistent results constitutes an independent
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determination led this Court to conclude that the trial court
had exceeded its discretion in invoking Rule 54(b).
Based on the record before us, the coexecutors' pending
claim for a declaratory judgment could possibly render Cox's
appeal moot.  The coexecutors request below that the trial
court declare the farm, and all other assets at issue, to be
assets of the estate.  In the claim presented on appeal, Cox
seeks a judgment declaring that he is entitled to 62.5% of the
assets of the purported partnership. Thus, both the
coexecutors' claim and Cox's counterclaim ask the trial court
to determine the disposition of the decedent's assets.  A
resolution of either claim would likely require the trial
court to determine whether the assets at issue are assets of
a partnership between Cox and the decedent.  Because the trial
court is currently obligated to adjudicate the coexecutors'
declaratory-judgment claim, it is possible that it will, in
the course of doing so, necessarily resolve the issues at the
reason to conclude that a trial court exceeded its discretion
in certifying a judgment as final under Rule 54(b), but that
does not appear to be an issue in this appeal. 
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heart of Cox's counterclaim.6  Accordingly, Cox may have no
reason to press the claim that is the subject of this appeal.
Cox, who brought this appeal, appears to agree that the
trial court's resolution of the coexecutors' claim would
necessarily resolve his claim as well.  At a September 8,
2017, hearing on the coexecutors' motion for a judgment on the
pleadings, Cox's counsel said:
"Whether [Cox's counterclaim is] a defense to [the
coexecutors' declaratory-judgment claim] or whether
it's couched in terms of a counterclaim the issue is
the same.  Who owns the property?  Okay.  So even if
we didn't even consider the counterclaim as a
defense we are saying no, no [the estate  does not]
own it.  So either way ... the Court has got to
determine –- I mean even if we didn't consider it as
a counterclaim we could have said no counterclaim at
all and then the Court would just have to decide who
owns this property .... [T]he bottom line is
ownership of this property is the matter in issue. 
Whether we couch it in a counterclaim or whether we
just look at it as a defense to the original
complaint, either way that's the issue, who owns the
property."
6The coexecutors' count seeking to eject Cox from the farm
is also pending before the trial court.  As a basis for that
count, the coexecutors contend that the estate owns the farm. 
We recognize that a determination of who owns the farm is very
closely related to Cox's request for a determination that he
owns 62.5% of the assets of the purported partnership. 
Because the coexecutors' claim for a declaratory judgment as
to all partnership assets will possibly moot the claim
presented on appeal, we need not determine if resolution of
the ejectment count could possibly moot Cox's claim as well. 
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(Emphasis added.)  At a later hearing on October 31, 2017,
Cox's counsel made the same point:
"Think about it this way, Judge, what if we didn't
even have a counterclaim?  They file a lawsuit to
declare a partnership asset as a part of [the
estate].  The burden is on them to prove that this
is not a partnership asset but it is ... an estate
asset.  So they filed a claim –- I could just ride
on my answer which denies that they have a right to
claim this as an asset ....  So you can ignore the
counterclaim and they would still have the burden
[of proof] ...."
(Emphasis added.)  Additionally, in his reply brief to this
Court, Cox states:  "The core issue of both the [coexecutors']
initial 
complaint 
and 
Cox's 
Amended 
Counterclaim 
is
essentially the same.  Both sides seek to determine who has an
interest in the 
Partnership assets."  Those statements further
suggest that Cox's declaratory-judgment counterclaim could
just as well be litigated as a defense to the coexecutors'
pending declaratory-judgment claim.7  There is thus more than
a mere possibility that a determination of the coexecutors'
7Nothing in this opinion should be construed to disturb
the trial court's partial summary judgment in favor of the
coexecutors, in which it held that Cox's affirmative defenses
of laches, waiver, and estoppel were insufficient against the
coexecutors' claims.  See note 3, supra.
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declaratory-judgment claim will render moot Cox's request for
a declaratory judgment.8  
Conclusion
Because 
resolution 
of 
the 
coexecutors' 
pending
declaratory-judgment 
claim 
will 
possibly 
moot 
Cox's
declaratory-judgment counterclaim, the trial court exceeded
its discretion when it certified its dismissal of Cox's
counterclaim as final under Rule 54(b).  Absent a final
judgment, we lack jurisdiction to decide the issues presented
in this case, and we dismiss the appeal.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, and Mendheim, JJ., concur.
8The coexecutors contend that if Cox's counterclaim is
barred by the nonclaims statute, the trial court would have
nothing left to adjudicate as far as the partnership is
concerned, because Cox would be "forever barred" from claiming
an interest in the partnership.  This argument ignores the
fact that it is the coexecutors, not Cox, who initiated the
declaratory-judgment claim that remains pending below.  The
nonclaims statute does not prevent Cox from mounting a defense
to that claim.    
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