Title: In re Maurer
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S064901
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: December 13, 2018

190	
December 13, 2018	
No. 67
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
STEVEN L. MAURER, 
OSB No. 752437,
Respondent.
(OSB 16-04) (S064901)
En Banc
On review of the decision of a trial panel of the Disciplinary 
Board.
Argued and submitted June 27, 2018.
Theodore W. Reuter, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, 
Tigard, argued the cause and filed the briefs for the Oregon 
State Bar.
Lawrence K. Peterson, Glazer, Maurer & Peterson, 
PC, Lake Oswego, argued the cause and filed the brief for 
respondent.
PER CURIAM
Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for 30 
days, commencing 60 days from the date of filing of this 
decision.
Case Summary: The Oregon State Bar brought a disciplinary action against 
the accused lawyer, a former judge, alleging two violations of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, based on his representation of an individual in connection 
with a matter in which he had earlier participated personally and substantially 
as a judge. A trial panel of the Disciplinary Board found that the respondent had 
not committed the charged violations, because, it concluded, the representation 
giving rise to the Bar proceeding was not the same matter that the lawyer had 
earlier participated in as a judge. Held: On de novo review, the Court concluded 
that there was clear and convincing evidence that the respondent violated RPC 
1.12(a), which prohibits a lawyer from representing a person in connection with 
a matter in which the lawyer had personally and substantially participated as 
a judge, but that the respondent had not violated RPC 8.4(a)(4), which prohibits 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
The respondent is suspended from the practice of law for 30 days, commenc­
ing 60 days from the date of this decision.
Cite as 364 Or 190 (2018)	
191
	
PER CURIAM
	
In this lawyer discipline case, the Oregon State 
Bar charged Steven L. Maurer, a retired judge who is now 
a practicing lawyer, with violating two disciplinary rules: 
(1) RPC 1.12(a), which prohibits a lawyer from representing 
a person in connection with a matter in which the lawyer 
participated personally and substantially as a judge with­
out the informed written consent of all parties; and (2) RPC 
8.4(a)(4), which prohibits conduct prejudicial to the admin­
istration of justice. A trial panel of the Disciplinary Board 
conducted a hearing and found that respondent had not 
committed the charged offenses, because the proceeding 
in which he represented his client as a lawyer was not the 
same matter in which he had participated as a judge. For 
the reasons that follow, we find that respondent’s conduct 
violated RPC 1.12(a), that it did not violate RPC 8.4(a)(4), 
and that the appropriate sanction for respondent’s miscon­
duct is a 30-day suspension from the practice of law.
	
We review decisions of the trial panel de novo. ORS 
9.536(2); BR 10.6.  We find the following facts by clear and 
convincing evidence. BR 5.2 (Bar has burden of establishing 
alleged misconduct by clear and convincing evidence).
I.  FACTUAL OVERVIEW
	
From 2007 to 2008, respondent, then the Presiding 
Judge of the Clackamas County Circuit Court, presided over 
the dissolution of the marriage of husband and wife.1 The 
dissolution proceeding was acrimonious, and, at one point, 
wife accused husband of sexually abusing the couple’s daugh­
ter. She did not provide proof of that allegation, and DHS 
determined that the allegation was unfounded. Respondent 
agreed and ordered wife to undergo a mental health evalua­
tion and treatment. Ultimately, however, respondent issued 
a general judgment in September 2008, ordering the couple’s 
daughter to be placed in wife’s legal and physical custody. 
The judgment included a parenting plan that provided for 
regular, consistent, unsupervised visitation with husband 
	
1  Although the parties to the underlying proceeding have long been divorced, 
for simplicity’s sake, we to refer to them throughout this opinion as “husband” 
and “wife.” 
192	
In re Maurer
and included various conditions. Respondent later issued 
orders in a modification proceeding between the parties in 
2011.
	
Respondent retired from the bench in February 
2013 and returned to private practice in Lake Oswego.
	
In February 2014, wife and husband appeared in 
Clackamas County Circuit Court before Judge Anderly to 
address wife’s concern that the daughter’s pet allergies were 
inflamed during her visitation with husband. Both wife and 
husband were unrepresented in that proceeding. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, Judge Anderly issued an order 
stating that “both parents shall immediately take action to 
reduce and eliminate the child’s exposure to dogs and cats 
when she is in their care.”
	
In April 2015, wife moved pro se for an order 
requiring husband to show cause why he should not be 
held in contempt for failing to comply with the February 
2014 order. Wife alleged, among other things, that hus­
band still had a cat that was causing the daughter to have 
allergic reactions. Wife also requested an order requiring 
husband to pay $80,000 for the child’s loss of “health and 
well-being” and requiring previsitation home inspections to 
ensure there were no cats in or around the house. Husband 
retained respondent to represent him in that contempt 

proceeding.
	
In June 2015, respondent communicated with 
wife to reschedule the contempt hearing. He identified 
himself as a retired judge, but he did not mention that he 
was the judge who had presided over wife’s and husband’s 
dissolution proceeding. Respondent neither requested nor 
received consent in writing from wife to represent husband 
in the contempt matter. As respondent later explained 
to the Bar, he had determined that no such consent was 
required, because (1) the contempt matter was brought 
under ORS chapter 33 and was a separate matter from 
the dissolution proceeding brought under ORS chapter 107 
seven years earlier; (2) the contempt matter involved new 
claims and issues presented in a different and narrow legal 
context; and (3) respondent had not been “personally and 
Cite as 364 Or 190 (2018)	
193
substantially” involved in the entry of the February 2014 
order addressing the daughter’s allergies. Respondent rea­
soned that there was nothing in the contempt proceeding 
that required reference to, or examination of, or evaluation 
of the prior dissolution proceeding. He also concluded that 
the judge presiding over the contempt proceeding would 
have no jurisdiction to revisit, reexamine, modify, or seek 
to enforce any part of respondent’s decision as a judge in 
the underlying dissolution.
	
In August 2015, respondent appeared in court before 
Judge Darling on husband’s behalf at the hearing on wife’s 
contempt motion. Wife appeared pro se and testified on her 
own behalf. In respondent’s opening remarks, he referred to 
“the original dissolution back in 2008.” Respondent asserted 
that, in the dissolution proceeding, wife had made accusa­
tions of sexual abuse against husband that were determined 
by DHS and the court to have been unfounded. He argued 
that the present contempt proceeding was an “outgrowth of 
that,” insofar as the allegation that the child was suffering 
allergic reactions to husband’s cat was “simply made up” and 
no symptoms had ever been observed by husband, who is a 
physician. During those remarks, respondent did not men­
tion that he was the judge who had determined that the sex­
ual abuse allegations were unfounded.
	
Toward the end of wife’s case, in which wife 
attempted to introduce photos taken on the daughter’s 
mobile phone of cats in husband’s home, the court engaged 
in an extended discussion with wife about the proper pro­
cess for introducing documents into the record. That process 
included, among other things, handing the documents to 
respondent for his examination. Wife became upset during 
that colloquy and began to cry. The court ordered a brief 
recess for wife to regain her composure. After a few min­
utes, the hearing resumed.
	
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court deter­
mined that wife had failed to prove that husband was in 
contempt of the February 2014 order and granted husband’s 
motion to dismiss the contempt charge. In so ruling, the 
court also rejected wife’s request for the sanction of previs­
itation home inspections for the presence of cats, a remedy 
194	
In re Maurer
that would have required modification of the dissolution 
judgment, which was not properly before the court.2
II.  THE CHARGES AGAINST RESPONDENT AND 
THE TRIAL PANEL’S DECISION
	
The Bar charged respondent with violating RPC 
1.12 and RPC 8.4(a)(4). RPC 1.12(a) provides:
“Except as stated in [parts of the rules not relevant here], 
a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a 
matter in which the lawyer participated personally and 
substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or law 
clerk to such a person or as an arbitrator, mediator or other 
third-party neutral, unless all parties to the proceeding 
give informed consent, confirmed in writing.”
RPC 8.4(a)(4) provides:
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to * 
* 
* engage 
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice[.]”
	
The Bar argued that respondent violated RPC 
1.12(a), because wife’s motion to hold husband in contempt 
was the same “matter” that respondent personally and sub­
stantially participated in when he presided over the couple’s 
dissolution. Respondent contended that the contempt pro­
ceeding was not the same “matter” as the dissolution because, 
in the contempt proceeding, wife was seeking to enforce a 
different judge’s ruling on a factual matter unknown to the 
parties at the time of the dissolution. Respondent argued 
that the parties in the contempt proceeding did not seek 
modification of the dissolution judgment and the dissolu­
tion proceeding did not address pets or allergies. Therefore, 
respondent argued, there was no material factual or legal 
overlap between the two proceedings.
	
The trial panel agreed with respondent. It acknowl­
edged that the dissolution “matter” involved, among other 
	
2  Wife did not pursue modification of the judgment. However, about a week 
later, wife filed an “Objection to Petitioner’s Attorney,” based, among other 
things, on the fact that respondent had presided over the dissolution but had not 
obtained her consent to represent husband in the contempt matter. The court did 
not acknowledge that objection.
Cite as 364 Or 190 (2018)	
195
things, the well-being of the child and, to that end, estab­
lished a parenting plan, which could be modified in the 
future, but the trial panel ultimately concluded that
“in no reasonable sense can it be said that a contempt 
motion for violation of another Judge’s Order concerning 
allergies not at issue and unknown to the Court in the 
divorce proceedings constitutes the same ‘matter.’ 
”
For that reason, the trial panel ruled that respondent had 
not violated RPC 1.12(a). And, because the Bar’s argument 
that respondent had engaged in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice in violation of RPC 8.4(a)(4) was 
solely based on the rejected contention that respondent had 
violated RPC 1.12(a), the trial panel also concluded that 
respondent had not violated RPC 8.4(a)(4).
	
The Bar seeks review of the trial panel’s determina­
tion that respondent did not violate either rule.
III.  ANALYSIS
	
As noted, RPC 1.12(a) provides that “a lawyer shall 
not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which 
the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a 
judge[.]” All parties agree that respondent participated per­
sonally and substantially as a judge in husband’s and wife’s 
marital dissolution proceeding. Thus, whether respondent 
violated RPC 1.12(a) turns on whether his representation 
of husband in the contempt proceeding was “in connection 
with” the matter—the dissolution proceeding—that he had 
participated in as a judge.
	
In answering that question, the parties focus on 
the definition of “matter.” The Rules of Professional Conduct 
define “matter” as follows:
	
“ 
‘Matter’ includes any judicial or other proceeding, 
application, request for a ruling or other determination, 
contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusa­
tion, arrest or other particular matter involving a specific 
party or parties; and any other matter covered by the con­
flict of interest rules of a government agency.”
RPC 1.0(i). The Bar contends that the contempt hearing and 
the dissolution trial were parts of the same matter, insofar 
196	
In re Maurer
as they presented common issues of law and fact, had the 
same case number, and involved the same parties, and the 
contempt proceeding grew out of authority derived from 
respondent’s original ruling in the dissolution proceeding. 
The Bar alternatively contends that the term “matter” in 
RPC 1.12(a) should be interpreted to mean what that term 
means in RPC 1.9(a), which deals with a lawyer’s duties to 
former clients and, for conflicts purposes, requires only that 
matters be “substantially related.” RPC 1.9(a) provides:
“A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter 
shall not thereafter represent another person in the same 
or a substantially related matter in which that person’s 
interests are materially adverse to the interests of the for­
mer client unless each affected client gives informed con­
sent, confirmed in writing.”
The Bar argues that, because parenting was an issue in 
both the underlying dissolution and the subsequent con­
tempt hearing, the two matters were substantially related 
and, therefore, the accused violated RPC 1.12(a).
	
Respondent counters that the dissolution proceed­
ing and the contempt proceeding were not the same matter. 
That is so, in respondent’s view, because the two proceed­
ings had separate and distinct purposes, they were brought 
under different statutes, the facts in each proceeding were 
different, and the contempt proceeding arose out of another 
judge’s order in a proceeding in which respondent did not 
participate personally and substantially.
	
The parties’ arguments thus involve a parsing of 
the characteristics and context of the dissolution proceed­
ing and the contempt proceeding to determine whether they 
were the same matter. We conclude that the parties’ focus on 
whether the dissolution proceeding and the contempt pro­
ceeding were the same matter for purposes of RPC 1.12(a) 
is misplaced. The narrow examination into what is a “mat­
ter” ignores the rule’s prohibition on a former judge repre­
senting anyone “in connection with a matter” in which that 
former judge previously had participated personally and 
substantially as a judge. Thus, the question presented is, 
more precisely, whether respondent represented husband 
“in connection with” the earlier dissolution proceeding when 
Cite as 364 Or 190 (2018)	
197
he represented husband in the contempt proceeding. We 
conclude that he did.
	
Judge Anderly’s authority to rule on wife’s 2014 
motion to impose conditions on husband’s parenting time 
to address wife’s concern about the daughter’s pet allergies 
derived directly from the court’s jurisdiction over the disso­
lution proceeding. The dissolution judgment recited,
“The Department of the Honorable Steven L. Maurer will 
maintain jurisdiction over this matter and hear future 
reviews and modifications.”
And, in fact, as noted, respondent issued orders in a 
2011 modification proceeding between the parties. Judge 
Anderly’s February 2014 order, alleged to have been violated 
in the contempt proceeding, imposed further conditions on 
visitation and thus was a modification of respondent’s order 
in the dissolution proceeding.
	
The contempt proceeding was “in connection with” 
that matter. The contempt proceeding, the 2014 modifica­
tion proceeding, and the original dissolution proceeding all 
involved the same parties litigating in the same court, and 
all three generally related to the imposition of conditions 
on husband’s parenting time. That is, the issue in the con­
tempt proceeding was whether husband complied with the 
modified terms of the dissolution judgment pertaining to 
his parenting time. Respondent’s representation of husband 
with respect to that issue was “in connection with” the dis­
solution proceeding.
	
Two other considerations bolster our conclusion that 
respondent’s representation of husband in the contempt pro­
ceeding was “in connection with” the dissolution proceed­
ing. First, wife sought modification of the dissolution judg­
ment in the contempt proceeding. Specifically, in addition to 
seeking remedial sanctions for husband’s alleged violation 
of Judge Anderly’s order, wife sought to modify the disso­
lution judgment to require husband’s home to be inspected 
for cats before the daughter’s visits there and to require cer­
tain changes in the daughter’s health insurance coverage. 
Judge Darling ultimately rejected the modification request; 
it was not properly before the court, because wife, appearing 

198	
In re Maurer
pro se, had failed to comply with the rules governing motions 
to modify a dissolution judgment. Respondent conceded 
below and in this court that RPC 1.12(a) would have prohib­
ited him from representing husband in the contempt pro­
ceeding if wife had properly brought her modification request 
before Judge Darling, because, in that circumstance, wife 
would have been seeking to modify his original dissolution 

order.
	
However, whether wife’s request was properly before 
the trial court is not determinative. Regardless of proce­
dural deficiencies, wife brought a request for modification 
of the original dissolution judgment signed by respondent 
before Judge Darling in the contempt proceeding. And, as 
we have already explained, a proceeding to modify a dissolu­
tion judgment is in connection with the dissolution proceed­
ing itself. We do not suggest that wife’s improper request 
for modification of the dissolution judgment transformed the 
contempt proceeding into a modification proceeding, or that 
a party could unilaterally expand the scope of a matter by 
seeking relief on an unrelated issue. But wife’s request for 
modification, which was related to her contempt motion and 
to the underlying dissolution proceeding, supports our con­
clusion that respondent’s representation of husband in the 
contempt proceeding was representation in connection with 
the earlier dissolution proceeding.
	
Second, respondent’s own statement to the court 
on behalf of husband during the contempt proceeding sug­
gests that he, too, viewed the two matters as connected. 
Respondent, in his opening remarks, referred to “the orig­
inal divorce back in 2008.” He asserted that, in the disso­
lution proceeding, wife had made unfounded accusations 
of sexual abuse against husband, and he argued that the 
present contempt proceeding was an “outgrowth of that.” We 
agree. Wife’s contempt motion, in which she complained of 
husband’s failure to adhere to the terms of a modification of 
a dissolution judgment that respondent earlier had signed, 
is an “outgrowth” of the dissolution proceeding.
	
Respondent argues that the 2014 modification pro­
ceeding was a “superseding intervening proceeding between 
the dissolution proceeding and the contempt proceeding,” 
Cite as 364 Or 190 (2018)	
199
because, essentially, no issue pertaining to pets arose in the 
dissolution proceeding. That narrow focus on the precise 
disputes resolved in the dissolution proceeding is misplaced. 
It is unsurprising that a modification proceeding addresses 
a matter that the parties did not specifically foresee at the 
time of the dissolution. That fact does not alter the conclu­
sion that the modification proceeding was the same matter 
as the original dissolution. Respondent’s representation of 
husband in the contempt proceeding, which arose out of the 
modification proceeding and involved the same parties and, 
generally, the same issues of conditions of parenting and 
visitation, was “in connection with” the dissolution proceed­
ing in which he participated personally and substantially 
as a judge. We therefore conclude that respondent’s conduct 
in representing husband in that proceeding without wife’s 
written consent violated RPC 1.12(a).
	
We turn to consider whether respondent’s violation 
of RPC 1.12(a) also violated RPC 8.4(a)(4), which prohib­
its conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. To 
establish a violation of RPC 8.4(a)(4), this court has stated 
that the Bar must show: (1) that the accused lawyer engaged 
in “conduct” by doing something that the lawyer should not 
have done or by failing to do something that the lawyer was 
supposed to do; (2) that the conduct occurred during the 
course of a judicial proceeding or another proceeding that 
has the trappings of a judicial proceeding; and (3) that the 
conduct was prejudicial, because it involved several acts 
that caused or could have caused some harm to the admin­
istration of justice or because it involved a single act that 
caused substantial harm to the administration of justice. 

In re Lawrence, 350 Or 480, 485-86, 489, 256 P3d 1070 (2011) 
(to prove violation of RPC 8.4(a)(4), court requires “proof by 
clear and convincing evidence that an accused’s conduct in a 
specific judicial proceeding caused actual or potential harm 
to the administration of justice and, when only one wrong­
ful act is charged, that actual or potential harm must be 
‘substantial’ 
”). Prejudice to the administration of justice can 
occur when the lawyer’s conduct harms (or has the potential 
to harm) either the substantive rights of a party to the pro­
ceeding or the procedural functioning of a case or hearing. 
Id. at 486.
200	
In re Maurer
	
The first two elements of a violation of RPC 8.4
(a)(4) are satisfied in this case: we have found that respon­
dent engaged in misconduct, and it is undisputed that the 
misconduct occurred during the course of a judicial proceed­
ing. It is with respect to the third element that the parties 
differ. During oral argument, the Bar argued that this case 
involves a single act that caused substantial harm to the 
integrity of the judicial system and the perception of fair­
ness. Respondent, by contrast, argued that neither wife nor 
the judicial system was actually harmed at all, nor was 
there potential for substantial harm.
	
As a preliminary matter, we agree that respon­
dent’s representation of husband without wife’s written 
consent amounted to one continuous course of conduct. His 
interactions with wife and the trial court were limited to 
one email to wife regarding scheduling and his appearance 
at the contempt hearing. In these circumstances, we view 
respondent’s conduct as a single act. See In re Lawrence, 
337 Or 450, 467-68, 98 P3d 366 (2004) (lawyer’s misconduct 
occurred in one in-chambers conference with judge, and Bar 
did not point to other acts that, taken together with that 
one instance of misconduct, would constitute repeated con­
duct causing some harm to the administration of justice). 
The question, then, is whether respondent’s representation 
of husband in the contempt proceeding caused or could have 
caused substantial harm, either to wife or to the procedural 
functioning of the case.
	
The Bar contends that respondent’s representation 
of husband in the contempt proceeding had the potential to 
improperly influence Judge Darling, because, as the judge 
in the underlying case, respondent’s advocacy carried addi­
tional weight. Additionally, the Bar argues that respon­
dent’s knowledge of wife’s behavior in the dissolution pro­
ceeding provided him with special insight in how to seek to 
undermine her credibility at the contempt hearing. Finally, 
respecting harm to wife, the Bar argues that
“it is clear from the record of the contempt hearing that 
[wife] felt personal animosity towards [respondent] and 
that his presence at the hearing unnerved her. It is reason­
able to conclude that her breakdown during the contempt 
hearing was due, in part to his advocacy against her.”
Cite as 364 Or 190 (2018)	
201
	
On de novo review, we find that respondent’s con­
duct caused potential harm to the functioning of the pro­
ceeding because respondent’s status as the judge in the ear­
lier proceeding could have given his pronouncements undue 
weight. However, Judge Darling did not appear to have been 
swayed by respondent’s effort to relate the present contempt 
proceeding to wife’s conduct in the earlier dissolution pro­
ceeding. Rather, she cut him short, stating,
“I don’t think we’re here on that Mr. Maurer. What we’re 
here on is a court order that required your client to do 
something and whether or not he’s violated it. Specifically, 
related to animals.”
We conclude that the potential for harm to the functioning 
of the proceeding resulting from a former judge’s undue 
influence over the proceeding is not “substantial.” As Judge 
Darling demonstrated, judges are not especially susceptible 
to pressure to rule a certain way simply because the advo­
cate is a former judge.
	
We also find that respondent’s representation of 
husband caused actual harm to wife. Wife suffered actual 
injury, in the form of unwarranted additional anxiety, 
because she was forced to litigate the contempt proceeding 
against an opposing counsel who, as a judge, had previously 
ruled that her previous concerns lacked merit and who had 
insight into her mental state. However, the Bar has failed 
to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the 
harm to wife was substantial.
	
On this record, we conclude that neither the actual 
nor the potential harm to either the functioning of the court 
or to wife was “substantial.” In the absence of clear and con­
vincing evidence of substantial harm—actual or potential—
caused by respondent’s misconduct, we conclude that that 
the Bar has failed to establish that respondent engaged in 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in viola­
tion of RPC 8.4(a)(4).
IV.  SANCTION
	
We turn to consider the appropriate sanction for 
respondent’s misconduct. The Bar urges this court to sus­
pend respondent for 30 days. For the following reasons, we 
202	
In re Maurer
agree that a 30-day suspension is an appropriate sanction 
for respondent’s misconduct.
	
In considering the appropriate sanction, this court 
follows the analytical framework set out in the American 
Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
(1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards). In re Webb, 363 Or 
42, 50, 418 P3d 2 (2018). Under that framework, the court 
first considers three factors that point us to a preliminary 
determination of the appropriate sanction: (1) the ethical 
duty violated; (2) the respondent’s mental state at the time 
of the misconduct; and (3) the potential or actual injury 
caused by the respondent’s misconduct. Id.; ABA Standard 
3.0. Next, we consider whether any aggravating or mitigat­
ing circumstances are relevant to our determination of the 
appropriate sanction. Id. Finally, we determine the appro­
priate sanction in light of this court’s case law. Webb, 363 Or 
at 50.
A.  Duty Violated
	
Respondent’s representation of husband violated 
his duty to avoid a conflict of interest. ABA Standard 4.3.
B.  Mental State
	
Respondent knew that he had previously presided 
over the dissolution proceeding involving husband and wife; 
that Judge Anderly’s February 2014 order, out of which the 
contempt proceeding arose, was a modification of the dis­
solution judgment; that the contempt proceeding involved 
the identical parties litigating in the same court and gen­
erally related to the same issue—the imposition of condi­
tions on husband’s parenting time; and that he had not 
obtained wife’s written consent to his representation of hus­
band. That is, respondent had a conscious awareness of the 
nature and attendant circumstances of the facts constitut­
ing his misconduct. However, because respondent believed 
that the contempt proceeding was not the same “matter” as 
the dissolution proceeding, he lacked the conscious objective 
or purpose to accomplish a particular result. We therefore 
conclude that respondent’s conduct in representing husband 
in the contempt proceeding was “knowing.” ABA Standards 
Cite as 364 Or 190 (2018)	
203
at 7 (defining “knowledge” as “the conscious awareness of 
the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but 
without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a 
particular result”).
C.  Injury
	
Turning to the issue of injury, we note that the ABA 
Standards define “injury” as “harm to a client, the public, the 
legal system, or the profession which results from a lawyer’s 
misconduct.” Id. The standards recognize “potential injury,” 
which is injury “that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of 
the lawyer’s misconduct.” Id. As we have already explained, 
respondent’s misconduct caused actual injury to wife and 
potential injury to the functioning of the proceeding, but 
neither the actual nor the potential injury was substantial.
D.  Presumptive Sanction
	
Based on the duty that respondent violated by his 
conduct, his mental state in engaging in that conduct, and 
the potential and actual injury that the conduct caused, the 
ABA standards identify a suspension as the presumptive 
sanction. See ABA Standard 4.32 (“Suspension is generally 
appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and 
does not fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that 
conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.”).3
E.  Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
	
The Bar argues that three aggravating circum­
stances apply. We agree that two of those aggravating factors 
apply. First, wife was a “vulnerable victim.” ABA Standard 
9.22(h). She appeared at the contempt proceeding pro se and 
respondent characterized her during the disciplinary pro­
ceeding as having a “somewhat fragile personality.” Second, 
respondent has been licensed to practice law in Oregon con­
tinuously since 1975 and thus has substantial experience in 
the practice of law. ABA Standard 9.22(i).
	
3  We recognize that ABA Standard 4.32 is, strictly speaking, inapposite, 
insofar as respondent’s misconduct was not in knowingly failing to disclose the 
possible effect of a conflict to his client, but in failing to obtain wife’s consent to 
his representation of husband. However, this standard comes closest to address­
ing the situation presented here. 
204	
In re Maurer
	
The Bar also argues that respondent’s refusal to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct is a third 
aggravating factor. ABA Standard 9.22(g). As this court has 
stated, accused lawyers have the right to vigorously defend 
themselves against all charges and may refuse to concede 
the Bar’s factual allegations without reprisal for doing so. 
In re McGraw, 362 Or 667, 695-96, 414 P3d 841 (2018) (so 
stating); In re Davenport, 334 Or 298, 321, 49 P3d 91 (2002) 
(lawyer’s refusal to admit Bar’s factual allegations is not 
an aggravating factor). However, when a lawyer admits 
the Bar’s factual allegations in nearly all material respects 
but continues to claim that his conduct was not blamewor­
thy or detrimental, the lawyer has failed to acknowledge 
the wrongful nature of his conduct. McGraw, 362 Or at 
696; In re Strickland, 339 Or 595, 605 n 9, 124 P3d 1225 
(2005). In this case, the Bar argues, respondent has consis­
tently acknowledged that he knew that he previously had 
presided over husband’s and wife’s dissolution proceeding 
before undertaking to represent husband and that he had 
not obtained wife’s written consent to that representation. 
The Bar contends that he refuses, however, to recognize 
that that representation violated the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, and he has denied that that conduct caused 
harm or potential harm to the judicial proceeding or to 

wife.
	
This case is distinguishable from McGraw and 
Strickland in an important respect: In each of those cases, 
the lawyer’s insistence that the conduct did not violate the 
rule was unreasonable. In McGraw, this court found that 
the lawyer’s refusal to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his 
conduct was an aggravating circumstance, because the law­
yer admitted, among other things, that he had charged his 
client fees higher than those agreed for the type of work 
performed, but he nonetheless claimed that his conduct did 
not violate the disciplinary rule prohibiting charging exces­
sive fees. In Strickland, this court found that the lawyer’s 
refusal to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his conduct was 
an aggravating circumstance, because he admitted the fac­
tual accuracy of the Bar’s allegations that he had committed 
several criminal acts involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation, but he still claimed that his conduct did 
Cite as 364 Or 190 (2018)	
205
not violate the disciplinary rule prohibiting such conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
	
In this case, on the other hand, respondent has 
made a plausible legal argument that the conduct that he 
admitted to—representing husband in a contempt proceed­
ing after having presided over the dissolution proceeding—
did not violate the Rules of Professional Responsibility, 
because the contempt proceeding and the dissolution pro­
ceeding were not the “same matter.” Although we have con­
cluded that the contempt proceeding was in connection with 
the dissolution and that respondent’s representation of hus­
band therefore violated RPC 1.12(a), respondent’s position 
was not unreasonable. In fact, as discussed, the trial panel 
agreed with respondent and concluded that he had not vio­
lated the rule. A lawyer does not refuse to acknowledge the 
wrongfulness of his or her conduct when he or she makes a 
plausible legal argument that the admitted conduct does not 
violate the disciplinary rules.
	
We also find that the following mitigating factors 
apply in this case. Respondent does not have a prior disci­
plinary record. ABA Standard 9.32(a). Respondent did not 
have a dishonest or selfish motive. ABA Standard 9.32(b). 
Respondent displayed a cooperative attitude toward the pro­
ceedings. ABA Standard 9.32(e). And respondent is of good 
character and has a good reputation in the community. ABA 
Standard 9.32(g).
	
We find that the aggravating factors and the miti­
gating factors are essentially in equipoise.
F.  Case Law
	
Having made a preliminary determination that a 
suspension of some term is appropriate based on the ABA 
Standards and the aggravating and mitigating factors, 
we turn to this court’s case law to help us determine the 
duration of that suspension.  As we have noted in the past, 
case-matching in the context of disciplinary proceedings “is 
an inexact science.” In re Sanai, 360 Or 497, 541, 383 P3d 
821 (2016). That is particularly true in this case; this is a 
matter of first impression, insofar as this court has not pre­
viously decided a case involving a violation of RPC 1.12(a) or 
206	
In re Maurer
its predecessor rule, former DR 5-109(A) (2004).4 However, 
RPC 1.12(a) is a species of conflict rule, and, as such, our 
cases involving former and current client conflicts of inter­
est provide us with some guidance. In that context, this 
court has repeatedly stated that a finding that a lawyer has 
violated the rule prohibiting current or former client con­
flicts of interest, “standing alone, typically justifies a 30-day 
suspension.” In re Hostetter, 348 Or 574, 603, 238 P3d 13 
(2010); In re Campbell, 345 Or 670, 689, 202 P3d 871 (2009) 
(same); In re Hockett, 303 Or 150, 164, 734 P2d 877 (1987) 
(“By itself, the violation of the conflicts rule * 
* 
* would jus­
tify a 30-day suspension.”). We think a 30-day suspension is 
appropriate in this case as well.
	
Respondent is suspended from the practice of law 
for 30 days, commencing 60 days from the date of filing of 
this decision.
	
4  Former DR 5-109(A) (2004) provided, 
“A lawyer shall not represent a client in connection with a matter in which 
the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adju­
dicative officer, arbitrator, or law clerk to such a person, unless all parties to 
the proceeding consent after full disclosure.”