Title: Matter of JLH
Citation: 316 N.W.2d 650
Docket Number: 13416
State: south-dakota
Issuer: south-dakota Supreme Court
Date: March 3, 1982

316 N.W.2d 650 (1982) In the Matter of J.L.H. and P.L.L.H. Neglected or Dependent Children. No. 13416. Supreme Court of South Dakota. Submitted on Briefs October 20, 1981. Decided March 3, 1982. Michael J. Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for appellee State; Mark V. Meierhenry, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on the brief. C. J. Bormann of Bormann, Buckmeier &amp; Bormann, Mobridge, for appellant mother. MORGAN, Justice. In this appeal, appellant mother is attacking the decree terminating her parental rights on the ground of insufficient evidence under the Indian Child Welfare Act, particularly section 1912(f) and, alternatively, as unrepresentative of the least restrictive alternative. We previously reviewed this case and remanded it in Matter of J.L.H., 299 N.W.2d 812 (S.D.1980). Upon remand, the trial court took additional testimony and again entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law and dispositional decree terminating appellant mother's parental rights. The mother appeals and we affirm. *651 The parties agree that our scope of review on questions of sufficiency of the evidence is as set out in Matter of A.M., 292 N.W.2d 103, 105 (S.D.1980); Section 1912(f) of the Indian Child Welfare Act provides, Appellant raises three questions which arise from this provision. First, she contends that the record lacks evidence that the continued custody of the child by the parent is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. The trial court specifically concluded, Our review of the record reveals evidence of conduct by appellant and other persons in and about the residence which supports the trial court's findings. Second, appellant contends that the trial court erred as to the burden of proof which the Act requires to be beyond a reasonable doubt. The case was originally remanded upon the grounds that the trial court had erroneously applied the standard of clear and convincing evidence. Appellant's brief specifically states, "on remittitur from the Supreme Court, the parties concurred that the parties understood that the trial court had made its prior decision using the standard required by the Indian Child Welfare Act." The trial court's decree specifically ordered termination based on the standard of evidence "beyond a reasonable doubt." It also concluded, In view of the decree's language and the trial court's conclusion this issue is frivolous. Third, appellant urges that the testimony of Virginia Pearson, a social worker involved throughout the case, was inadequate to qualify her as an expert witness under section 1912(f). The educational qualifications of the social worker included a bachelor of science degree in business and "about fifteen hours in graduate study," most of which was in psychology or sociology. Appellant points out that she had no graduate degree in psychology, sociology or social work. South Dakota Codified Laws 19-15-2 permits qualification as an expert to be based on knowledge, skill, experience, training or education. The statute is drawn in the disjunctive. The trial court could and did take into consideration the witness' educational background coupled with her eleven years of experience in the field and ruled that she was qualified to testify as an expert. We recently held in Buckley v. Fredericks, 291 N.W.2d 770, 771 (S.D.1980), "The admissibility of a claimed expert's opinion is within the discretion of the trial court. . . . The trial court's ruling will be disturbed only in case of a clear abuse of discretion." The record reflects that the trial court took great pains to elicit the witness' experience and education to determine her qualifications to testify. We are of the opinion that the admission of expert testimony was clearly within the province of the trial court and was not an abuse of discretion on his part. Because we find *652 sufficient evidence in the record and sustain the burden of proof and evidentiary rulings, the evidence satisfied the requirements of section 1912(f). We next consider appellant's argument that the trial court failed to employ the least restrictive alternative by terminating her parental rights. Admittedly, termination is the most restrictive alternative. Appellant's argument is rather ingenious. In essence, she argues that because the trial court did not terminate her rights under the standard of proof "by a preponderance," it cannot now terminate those rights under the standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" where appellant's behavior had not changed substantially. This argument has two defects. It assumes that the evidence in the prior hearings only met the lesser requirement of preponderance and not the higher requirement of beyond a reasonable doubt. It was the same trial judge in all instances. Further, if a trial court was lenient by employing less restrictive alternatives on earlier occasions, this posture should not prohibit the court from imposing more restrictive alternatives when the course of conduct continues and thwarts the effectiveness of the lesser alternatives. See, e.g., Matter of A.I., 289 N.W.2d 247 (S.D.1980); Matter of R.Z.F., 284 N.W.2d 879 (S.D.1979); Matter of C.E., 283 N.W.2d 554 (S.D.1979); See also People in Interest of T.L.J., 303 N.W.2d 800, 806 (S.D.1981); Cf. Matter of J.L.H., 299 N.W.2d at 815. To rule otherwise would lock the trial court into a position that when a lesser alternative was employed to improve the situation, that a more restrictive alternative would be unavailable, even though additional complaints demonstrated that the earlier dispositions were ineffective to protect the child. This would discourage trial courts from using less restrictive alternatives. We affirm the decree. All the Justices concur.