Title: Commonwealth v. Stevenson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11962
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 25, 2016

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SJC-11962 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CARLOS G. STEVENSON. 
 
 
 
Dukes.     February 11, 2016. - May 25, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, 
JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Indictment, Dismissal, Grand jury 
proceedings.  Grand Jury.  Evidence, Grand jury 
proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 6, 2014. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss the indictments was heard by Cornelius 
J. Moriarty, II, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Elizabeth A. Sweeney, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Janice Bassil (John E. Oh with her) for the defendant. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Wendy J. Murphy for Women's and Children's Advocacy Project 
at New England Law|Boston. 
 
Kevin J. Curtin, Assistant District Attorney, for District 
Attorneys for the Berkshire, Bristol, Eastern, Middle, Norfolk, 
Northern, Northwestern, Plymouth, Suffolk, and Western 
Districts. 
2 
 
 
John J. Barter & Chauncey B. Wood for Committee for Public 
Counsel Services & another. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  On October 6, 2014, a grand jury returned six 
indictments against the defendant, Carlos Stevenson:  one 
charging aggravated rape of a child with force, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 22B; and five charging indecent assault and battery on a child 
under the age of fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13B.1  The defendant 
filed a motion to dismiss the indictments, arguing, as is 
relevant to this appeal, that the evidence presented to the 
grand jury was insufficient because the Commonwealth offered 
only hearsay testimony from a single witness, the investigating 
officer. 
 
After a hearing, a judge of the Superior Court allowed the 
defendant's motion to dismiss without prejudice.  The judge 
concluded that, while an indictment generally may be based 
solely on hearsay, the Commonwealth's exclusive reliance on such 
testimony in the present case constituted "extraordinary 
circumstances" that justified dismissal of the indictments.  In 
particular, the judge determined that "there was no good reason 
for [the complainant] not to testify," and the prosecutor's 
                                                          
 
 
1 Various portions of the case were either impounded or 
under seal.  The seal and impoundment are lifted as to the 
information in the opinion, to the extent necessary in resolving 
the case.  See Adams v. Adams, 459 Mass. 361, 362 n.1 (2011), 
S.C., 466 Mass. 1015 (2013). 
3 
 
decision not to seek her testimony deprived the defendant of the 
opportunity to obtain pretrial discovery.2 
 
The Commonwealth appealed the dismissal, and we granted the 
defendant's application for direct appellate review.  We 
conclude that this case does not present an extraordinary 
circumstance warranting a variance from our general approval of 
indictments that are returned on the basis of hearsay testimony.  
Therefore, the order of the Superior Court is reversed.3 
 
1.  Evidence presented at the grand jury proceedings.  The 
testimony presented before the grand jury came exclusively 
through one witness:  the lead investigating officer on the 
case, Detective Mark Santon of the Tisbury police department.  
That evidence included the following. 
 
On May 22, 2014, a lieutenant with the West Tisbury police 
department contacted Santon.  The lieutenant informed Santon 
that the complainant's boy friend reported to the West Tisbury 
police that the complainant had, years before, been a victim of 
sexual assault.  Santon interviewed the complainant on multiple 
                                                          
 
 
2 The complainant has been referred to by various 
pseudonyms; we identify her only as the complainant. 
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Women's 
and Children's Advocacy Project at New England Law|Boston; the 
District Attorneys for the Berkshire, Bristol, Eastern, Middle, 
Norfolk, Northern, Northwestern, Plymouth, Suffolk, and Western 
Districts; and the Committee for Public Counsel Services and the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
4 
 
occasions and relayed the contents of those interviews to the 
grand jury. 
 
The complainant described to Santon a series of sexual 
assaults at the hands of the defendant, beginning in 2000, when 
she began babysitting the defendant's children, and continuing 
until the fall of 2003.  These included an assault by the 
defendant occurring when she was catsitting at another 
neighbor's home.  The alleged episodes ranged from inappropriate 
comments to groping to forcible digital rape. 
 
The complainant's boy friend was not the first person she 
had told about the attacks.  During her senior year in high 
school, a friend of the complainant's was conducting a class 
project on sexual assault.  The complainant filled out a survey 
describing her contacts with the defendant, which the classmate 
compiled as part of a PowerPoint presentation.  Officer Santon 
interviewed the friend, and obtained from her the survey that 
had been filled out by the complainant.  The portion of the 
presentation applicable to the complainant was introduced as an 
exhibit before the grand jury. 
 
Santon further testified about his interview with the 
complainant's parents and the neighbor for whom the complainant 
was catsitting when one of the assaults was alleged to have 
occurred.  After Santon testified and the grand jury had an 
opportunity to ask him questions regarding whether he had been 
5 
 
able to further confirm the complainant's allegations, the grand 
jury returned six indictments, which the defendant moved to 
dismiss.  The judge allowed the motion without prejudice, ruling 
that, "in a case such as this, the exclusive use of hearsay in 
the presentation of the case to the grand jury destroys the 
historical function of the grand jury in assessing the 
likelihood of prosecutorial success and diminishes the 
protections that the grand jury is supposed to afford to the 
innocent." 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant asserts two arguments in 
support of the proposition that the judge properly dismissed the 
indictments.  First, he argues that indictments supported by 
hearsay evidence never meet the due process standards of art. 12 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and such evidence 
should therefore not be admissible before the grand jury.  In 
the alternative, the defendant asserts that the use of hearsay 
testimony under the circumstances presented in this case 
impaired the function of the grand jury to a degree that 
warranted the dismissal of the indictments.  We address the two 
arguments in turn. 
 
a.  The presentation of hearsay testimony to the grand 
jury, exclusively or otherwise, is supported by our case law.  
Grand juries in the Commonwealth act as "an informing and 
accusing body," (citation omitted).  Lataille v. District Court 
6 
 
of E. Hampden, 366 Mass. 525, 532 (1974).  They perform the 
"dual function of determining whether there is probable cause to 
believe a crime has been committed and of protecting citizens 
against unfounded criminal prosecutions."  Id. 
 
The right to a grand jury indictment for State crimes is 
not guaranteed by the United States Constitution.  See 
Commonwealth v. McCravy, 430 Mass. 758, 761 n.5 (2000).  It is, 
however, "one of the great securities of private right, handed 
down to us as among the liberties and privileges which our 
ancestors enjoyed at the time of their emigration, and claimed 
to hold and retain as their birthright."  Jones v. Robbins, 8 
Gray 329, 342 (1857).  Consequently, in the Commonwealth, it is, 
with respect to "crimes of great magnitude," a right that is 
firmly rooted in and protected by art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  Id. at 347. 
 
While jealously guarding the grand jury's role as an 
independent investigative body, our courts have exercised a 
somewhat greater supervisory role over the substance of their 
proceedings than Federal courts have over those of Federal grand 
juries.  Compare United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 50 
(1992) ("any power [F]ederal courts may have to fashion, on 
their own initiative, rules of grand jury procedures is a very 
limited one"; to permit challenge to facially valid indictment 
on grounds that there was inadequate or incompetent evidence 
7 
 
before grand jury would run counter to history of institution), 
with Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808, 810 (2012) 
(requiring prosecutor to instruct grand jury on elements of 
murder and on significance of mitigating circumstances and 
defenses [other than lack of criminal responsibility] where 
Commonwealth seeks to indict juvenile for murder and where there 
is substantial evidence of mitigating circumstances or 
defenses), Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 398 Mass. 615, 634 (1986) 
(integrity of grand jury proceeding would be impaired if 
defendant is "put to trial on an indictment which the 
Commonwealth knows is based in whole or in part on false 
testimony"), Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 445, 446-447 
(1984) (dismissing indictment where grand jury impaired when 
presented with portion of statement attributed to defendant, 
seemingly inculpating him, without exculpatory portion of 
purported statement that had been excised), and Commonwealth v. 
McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 163 (1982) (announcing rule that "at 
the very least the grand jury must hear sufficient evidence to 
establish the identity of the accused . . . and probable cause 
to arrest him").4 
                                                          
 
 
4 The Commonwealth's statutes and common law are likewise 
protective of defendants and witnesses during grand jury 
proceedings.  See Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 709, 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2855 (2014) ("targets, or those 
reasonably likely to become targets, of the investigation" are 
entitled to warnings that they can exercise their privilege 
8 
 
 
Those protections, however, are limited by the grand jury's 
independence, and generally we "will not inquire into the 
competency or sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Robinson, 373 Mass. 591, 
592 (1977).  See McCarthy, supra at 161-162.  Therefore, the 
heavy burden to show impairment of the grand jury proceeding is 
borne by the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. LaVelle, 414 Mass. 
146, 150 (1993). 
 
We have consistently and without notable exception held 
that "an indictment may be based solely on hearsay."  O'Dell, 
392 Mass. at 450-451 (in McCarthy, "we did not depart from the 
rule that an indictment may be based solely on hearsay").  See 
Commonwealth v. McGahee, 393 Mass. 743, 746 (1985), quoting 
Commonwealth v. St. Pierre, 377 Mass. 650, 655 (1979) 
("indictment may stand which is based in part or altogether on 
hearsay"); LaVelle, supra at 149, quoting St. Pierre, supra ("it 
is not enough to justify dismissal of an indictment that the 
jurors received hearsay or hearsay exclusively, and this is so 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
against self-incrimination under Fifth Amendment to United 
States Constitution); G. L. c. 277, § 14A ("Any person shall 
have the right to consult with counsel and to have counsel 
present at . . . examination before the grand jury; provided, 
however, that such counsel . . . shall make no objections or 
arguments or otherwise address the grand jury or the district 
attorney").  In contrast, counsel for an unindicted witness is 
not permitted to be present in the room when the witness is 
testifying before a Federal grand jury.  See United States v. 
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976) 
9 
 
even when better testimony was available for presentation to the 
grand jury"); Mass. R. Crim. P. 4 (c), 378 Mass. 849 (1978) ("An 
indictment shall not be dismissed on the grounds that the 
evidence presented before the grand jury consisted in whole or 
in part of the record from the defendant's probable cause 
hearing or that other hearsay evidence was presented before the 
grand jury").  The defendant acknowledges that no appellate 
court in the Commonwealth has affirmed the dismissal of an 
indictment solely because it was based on hearsay, and we do not 
perceive a need to alter our long-standing general rule.5   
                                                          
 
 
5 Our affirmation of the policy that allows for indictments 
before the grand jury to rely solely on hearsay evidence dates 
back more than a century, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Woodward, 
157 Mass. 516, 518 (1893), and is supported by recent case law, 
see Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808, 845 (2012) (Spina, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Commonwealth v. 
Washington W., 462 Mass. 204, 210 (2012); Commonwealth v. 
McGahee, 393 Mass. 743, 746 (1985); Commonwealth v. St. Pierre, 
377 Mass. 650, 655 (1979), as well as commentary about the 
generally accepted standards of review for such proceedings.  
See 1 Wigmore, Evidence, § 4, at 53-54 (Tillers rev. ed. 1983) 
("Proceedings before a grand jury are both ex parte and 
interlocutory; moreover, the grand jury only seeks for a 
'probable cause.'  Hence, on all principles, the jury trial 
rules of evidence should not apply" [footnote omitted]); 4 W.R. 
LaFave, J.H. Israel, N.J. King, & O.S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure 
§ 15.5(c), at 652 (4th ed. 2015).  Federal grand jury 
proceedings likewise allow the use of hearsay evidence.  See 
United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 50, 54 n.8 (1992); 
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-364 (1956).  
Indeed, we remain unaware of any jurisdiction in which the 
common law prohibits hearsay evidence before the grand jury 
absent a statute or rule of criminal procedure.  See 
Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 445, 452 n.2 (1984).  A 
handful of States prohibit hearsay at the grand jury stage by 
statute or court rule.  See, e.g., Alaska R. Crim. P. 6(r); Cal. 
10 
 
 
We proceed, then, to consider whether the specific facts of 
this case present an exception to that general rule. 
 
b.  The exclusive use of hearsay before the grand jury may 
be a ground for the dismissal of an indictment, but only under 
extraordinary circumstances.  Despite our general approval of 
indictments based on hearsay, we have on occasion repeated the 
admonition that "sound policy dictates a preference for the use 
of direct testimony before grand juries."  St. Pierre, 377 Mass. 
at 655-656.  See McCarthy, 385 Mass. at 162 n.4.  See also 
Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169, 174 (1993); LaVelle, 414 
Mass. at 149; O'Dell, 392 Mass. at 451 n.1.  Consistent with 
that proposition, we have stated that, under "extraordinary 
circumstances," the prosecution's reliance on hearsay might 
impair "the integrity of [the] grand jury proceedings" to a 
degree that warrants dismissal.  McGahee, 393 Mass. at 747.  See 
St. Pierre, supra.  The defendant urges us to affirm the motion 
judge's conclusion that this case presented such circumstances. 
 
The motion judge did not find that the evidence considered 
by the grand jury was insufficient to satisfy the probable cause 
standard, or that the grand jury were presented with false 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Penal Code § 939.6(b) (1959); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. (1928) 
art. 442; Minn. R. Crim. P. § 18.05, subd. 1 (West 2010); Nev. 
Rev. Stat. § 172.135(2) (1967); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-11(A) 
(1969); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 190.30(1) (McKinney's 1970); 
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 132.320(1) (1973); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. 
§ 23A-5-15 (1939).  The Legislature has not enacted a cognate 
statute in the Commonwealth. 
11 
 
evidence or evidence so misleading and distorted as to impair 
the grand jury proceedings.  Rather, he concluded that the use 
of hearsay was pernicious for three reasons, all of which stem 
from the fact that the complainant did not testify.  First, 
Santon, an experienced witness, was able consistently and 
smoothly to articulate the facts to the grand jury, belying any 
potential contradictions or misstatements in the complainant's 
story.  Second, the grand jury were unable to observe the 
complainant's demeanor and appearance, and could not assess her 
credibility.  Finally, the presentment of the case through one 
witness denied the defendant his opportunity to obtain pretrial 
discovery, which the judge concluded was a tactic by the 
Commonwealth to avoid the possibility that grand jury testimony 
could be used to impeach the complainant at trial.  The judge 
credited one further factor that informed his decision, 
suggesting that a higher standard of evidence ought to be 
required when charges of sexual assault are at issue because of 
the serious damage to one's reputation caused by such an 
indictment. 
 
There is, however, nothing that differentiates the facts 
and circumstances presented here from those in McCarthy, 385 
Mass. at 162 n.4 (indictment based on hearsay testimony from 
investigating officer in sexual assault case permissible where 
complainant was available to testify at grand jury), and St. 
12 
 
Pierre, 377 Mass. at 655-657 (indictment based on double hearsay 
testimony permissible), except that the indictments in this case 
were brought fourteen years after the purported crimes began.  
Our inquiry is, then, whether it is an "extraordinary 
circumstance" when sexual assault charges are brought many years 
after the alleged underlying crime was committed, such that 
hearsay testimony is an unacceptable substitute for direct 
testimony.  We conclude that it is not. 
 
There are characteristics inherent in the presentation of 
sexual assault charges before a grand jury that may require 
greater attention in certain circumstances.  For instance, 
sexual assault cases often involve a credibility contest between 
the complainant and the defendant.  And, with the passage of 
time and the absence of other witnesses, corroborating evidence, 
or admissions of guilt, the importance and details of the 
complainant's story are heightened.  Accurately relaying the 
complainant's memory of those details to the grand jury through 
hearsay testimony can be less than perfect.  These 
considerations, to some degree, came to fruition in the present 
case.  At various times during the grand jury proceedings, 
Santon indicated that he and the complainant had trouble 
identifying the particular dates on which certain events had 
occurred, and the defendant points out various portions of 
13 
 
Santon's testimony that do not match squarely with his police 
report of the complainant's interviews.6 
 
This problem may become more salient now that the 
Legislature has eliminated the statute of limitations as to 
indictments and criminal complaints charging violations of the 
statutes at issue here.  See G. L. c. 277, § 63, as amended 
through St. 2006, c. 303, § 9, and St. 2010, c. 267, § 68.  The 
fact that sexual assault cases under these statutes are now 
capable of being prosecuted decades after the commission of the 
crimes may exacerbate concerns regarding the reliability of 
hearsay evidence presented in a nonadversary setting such as the 
grand jury.  But the Legislature contemplated the inevitability 
of such cases being brought under G. L. c. 277, § 63, and 
provided for additional protections when such charges are 
sought.  Specifically, the statute explicitly provides that 
"indictments . . . filed more than [twenty-seven] years after 
the date of commission of such offense shall be supported by 
independent evidence that corroborates the victim's allegation" 
                                                          
 
 
6 The defendant does not assert, nor did the judge below 
find, that the prosecutor intentionally sought to introduce 
false testimony.  As we have indicated before, "inaccurate 
statements made in good faith do not require dismissal of an 
indictment."  Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 398 Mass. 615, 620 
(1986).  The inconsistencies in Santon's testimony identified by 
the defendant do not warrant dismissal, as "dismissal of an 
indictment as a prophylactic measure to discourage intentional 
wrongdoing [has] no application."  Id. 
14 
 
(emphasis added).  Id.  Such corroboration was not required 
here. 
 
This case does not present any circumstances that would 
qualify it as extraordinary so as to impair "the integrity of 
the grand jury proceedings" to a degree that warrants dismissal 
of the defendant's indictments.  McGahee, 393 Mass. at 747.  
Santon testified in great detail about what the complainant had 
told him.  He was able to respond substantively to questions 
posed by the grand jurors,7 and he informed the grand jury about 
the other potential prosecution witnesses he had interviewed and 
the information they had provided him.8 
 
Further, there is no evidence that the prosecution acted to 
subvert the defendant's right to discovery in the present case, 
or in effect did subvert any discovery.  The defendant was 
                                                          
 
 
7 One juror asked:  "So, just to be clear, this is the 
entire body of evidence?"  Another queried whether Detective 
Mark Santon "had experience interviewing victims who [had] 
waited periods of time . . . before reporting."  This juror 
followed up by asking whether Santon believed that the 
complainant's recollection sounded like those of other victims.  
Another asked why there was never a police inquiry regarding the 
survey conducted in 2009, and why the police never interviewed 
the defendant's children or wife.  Finally, a grand juror asked, 
"[I]s there any other corroborating evidence that we should be 
aware of that these incidents happened?" 
 
 
8 We do not agree that the defendant's indictments based on 
hearsay raise concerns because of the stigma associated with 
being charged with sexual assault violations.  We have never 
held that the level of stigma that may attach to the nature of 
the crime charged changes either the standard of proof or the 
evidentiary requirements applicable to a grand jury proceeding, 
and decline to do so in this case. 
15 
 
provided with a detailed report of what the complainant told 
Santon, and of Santon's follow-up interviews with potential 
witnesses.  The defendant has no right to require the 
Commonwealth to call witnesses to testify before the grand jury 
so that he might have transcripts of their testimony to use at 
trial, and the Commonwealth has no obligation to call such 
witnesses. 
 
The grand jury in the present case heard all the 
information available to the police at the time of the grand 
jury proceedings, and were able to render an informed decision 
as to the indictments.  If members of the grand jury had been 
uncertain about returning indictments based on the hearsay 
testimony regarding a case that was fourteen years old, they 
could have requested the presentation of further evidence.  See 
Commonwealth v. McNary, 246 Mass. 46, 51 (1923) ("[I]f, in the 
course of such investigation, it appears that there are other 
witnesses than those produced for the prosecution, and the grand 
jury are actually convinced that their testimony may be material 
and pertinent, and of such a nature as would elucidate or 
explain the evidence for the government, and lead them to a more 
perfect knowledge of the merits of the case, it is said they may 
require the testimony of such witnesses").  See also 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 Mass. 678, 683 (2003) (grand jury 
possess "broad powers to 'inquire into all information that 
16 
 
might possibly bear on [their] investigation'" [citation 
omitted]).9 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the order 
dismissing the defendant's indictments is reversed, and the case 
is remanded to the Superior Court, where the indictments are to 
be reinstated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                                                          
 
 
9 The defendant argues that the grand jury may never have 
been instructed as to their ability to call additional 
witnesses.  The record does not reflect what the grand jurors 
were instructed.  The record does reflect, however, that the 
grand jurors asked extensive questions of Santon, and understood 
the limited nature of the evidence they were receiving. 
 
 
It would be helpful if the Superior Court would craft a 
model instruction for use by judges who are empanelling grand 
jurors.  Among other things, the instruction could inform them 
that they may request the production of additional witnesses if 
they find it necessary to their full consideration of a case 
presented to them by the prosecutor, in accord with Commonwealth 
v. McNary, 246 Mass. 46, 51 (1923).