Title: Waldrop v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 970160
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 9, 1998

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Stephenson, Senior Justice 
 
JOHN A. WALDROP, JR. 
                                        OPINION BY 
 
SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
v.  Record No. 970160                       January 9, 1998 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the statutory 
requirement that an election candidate report all campaign 
"contributions" applies to money received by the candidate after 
the election to defray legal expenses associated with a recount 
proceeding. 
 
I 
 
John A. Waldrop, Jr., was charged in the Circuit Court of 
Henrico County with three counts of perjury resulting from his 
failure to disclose three payments he received from supporters in 
connection with his 1991 election to the Board of Supervisors of 
Henrico County (the Board).  A jury acquitted Waldrop on one 
charge, convicted him on the other two, and imposed two $2,500 
fines, and the trial court entered judgment on the verdicts.  The 
Court of Appeals, in an opinion rendered December 17, 1996, 
affirmed the judgment, Waldrop v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 614, 
478 S.E.2d 723 (1996), and we awarded Waldrop this appeal. 
 
II 
 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  On November 5, 1991, 
Waldrop was re-elected to his fifth term on the Board.  Due to 
Waldrop's slight margin of victory, however, his opponent 
instituted a recount proceeding pursuant to former Code §§ 24.1-
 
 
 
 
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249 and -250 (now Code §§ 24.2-800 through -802).  The recount 
proceeding was conducted in December 1991. 
 
Waldrop retained Edward E. Willey, Jr., an attorney-at-law, 
to represent him in the recount proceeding.
1  According to 
Waldrop, Willey advised him that monies received to defray 
expenses pertaining to the recount were not campaign 
contributions and, therefore, were not required to be reported 
under the campaign finance disclosure requirements of the former 
Fair Elections Practices Act, former Code §§ 24.1-251 et seq. 
(the Act).
2
 
Waldrop received from Kenny Graham a check for $1,000, dated 
December 2, 1991, and payable to the "John Waldrop Defense Fund." 
 Graham testified that the money was given to Waldrop to defray 
his legal expenses related to the recount.  Willey had asked 
Graham for the money and told Graham how to make out the check.  
Graham did not consider the check to be a "campaign 
contribution." 
 
On December 13, 1991, Waldrop received from E. Carlton 
Wilton, Sr., a $500 check, payable to "John Waldrop."  Wilton 
testified that, after the campaign, the money had been solicited, 
by someone other than Waldrop, for attorney's fees. 
 
Acting upon Willey's advice, Waldrop deposited the two 
                     
     
1At the time of Waldrop's trial, Willey was deceased. 
     
2In 1993, the Act was recodified in Title 24.2.  1993 Va. 
Acts ch. 641. 
 
 
 
 
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checks in a personal checking account he maintained jointly with 
his wife.  Waldrop was using this bank account, rather than a 
separate account, as his "defense fund."  
 
Willey's legal fees for representing Waldrop in the recount 
proceeding were $10,000.  On November 24, 1991, pursuant to 
Willey's request, Waldrop paid Willey $1,000 in cash.  Waldrop 
reimbursed himself therefor by keeping the $1,000 he had received 
from Graham.  Using the money he had received from Wilton, 
Waldrop made other cash payments to Willey for out-of-pocket 
expenses.  On December 24, 1991, Waldrop gave Willey a check for 
$9,000 and received a receipt from Willey showing that Waldrop 
had paid $10,000 for professional services rendered. 
 
On January 15, 1992, Waldrop filed his campaign finance 
disclosure form for the period November 26 through December 31, 
1991, as required by the Act (the Report).  The Report, in 
Schedule A, required Waldrop to list all "contributions" over 
$100.  By his signature on the Report, Waldrop affirmed that, 
"[u]nder penalty of perjury," he had examined the Report and 
that, "to the best of [his] knowledge and belief, it [was] true, 
correct and complete."  Waldrop did not list the checks received 
from Graham and Wilton.   
 
III 
 
Waldrop contends that the requirement that a candidate 
report all campaign contributions does not include a requirement 
that he report contributions related to a recount proceeding.  
 
 
 
 
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Conversely, the Attorney General contends that Waldrop was 
required to report all contributions, including those received 
relating to the recount. 
 
The present case is governed by the law in effect in 1991.  
In 1991, the Act required a candidate to file periodic reports 
disclosing "all contributions and expenditures, except the 
payment of a filing fee."  Former Code §§ 24.1-257.2(C) and -258 
(now Code §§ 24.2-916 and -914).  The Act, however, did not 
expressly define the term "contribution." 
 
In pertinent part, former Code § 24.1-255 (now Code § 24.2-
907) provided that it was unlawful for a candidate to fail to 
report "every . . . collection" of "money, services, or other 
things of value over $100 in relation to his candidacy."  The 
Act, however, expressly referred to "campaign contributions."  
Former Code §§ 24.1-251 and -252 (now Code §§ 24.2-900 and -903) 
(emphasis added).  The Act also provided for the disposition of 
contributions that were in excess of the amount necessary to 
defray a candidate's "campaign expenditures."  Former Code 
§ 24.1-258.1 (now Code § 24.2-921) (emphasis added). 
 
In 1993, the Act was recodified as the Campaign Finance 
Disclosure Act, Code §§ 24.2-900 et seq. (the Recodified Act).  
The Recodified Act defines the term "contribution," in pertinent 
part, as "money and services of any amount, and any other thing 
of value over $100, given . . . to a candidate . . . for the 
purpose of influencing the outcome of an election."  Code § 24.2-
 
 
 
 
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901 (emphasis added).
3
 
Generally, there is a presumption that a recodified statute 
does not make substantive changes in the former statute unless a 
contrary intent plainly appears in the recodified statute.  State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Major, 239 Va. 375, 378, 389 S.E.2d 307, 
309 (1990); Chapman v. Richardson, 123 Va. 388, 391, 96 S.E. 776, 
777 (1918).  In the present case, nothing in the Recodified Act 
suggests an intent to make substantive changes in the Act.  To 
the contrary, we are told that "[t]he goal of [the] 
recodification is a clearer, more easily understood set of 
election laws and the elimination of ambiguities in the present 
law rather than substantive changes in the law."  Report of the 
Virginia Code Commission on The Recodification of Title 24.1 of 
the Code of Virginia (1993). 
 
Analyzing the Act in the light of the Recodified Act, we 
cannot say that Waldrop was required to report the Graham and 
Wilton checks which Waldrop received to defray the expenses of 
the recount proceeding.  When those checks were delivered, the 
election had been held and the campaign had been concluded.  
Clearly, therefore, those contributions could not have 
"influenc[ed] the outcome of [the] election."   
 
At the very least, the Act was unclear and ambiguous with 
respect to whether recount contributions had to be reported.  
                     
     
3Interestingly, this emphasized language is also found in 
the Act.  Former Code § 24.1-255(C). 
 
 
 
 
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When a penal statute
4 is unclear, the statute must be strictly 
construed against the Commonwealth and in favor of an accused's 
liberty, and the accused is entitled to the benefit of any 
reasonable doubt concerning the statute's construction.  Harward 
v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 363, 365, 330 S.E.2d 89, 90 (1985); 
Martin v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 298, 300-01, 295 S.E.2d 890, 892 
(1982).  Indeed, before the accused can be punished, "`his case 
must be plainly and unmistakably within the statute.'"  Harward, 
229 Va. at 365, 330 S.E.2d at 90 (quoting United States v. 
Lacher, 134 U.S. 624, 628 (1890)).  Additionally, in a perjury 
prosecution, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt not only that the statements made under oath by 
the accused were false, but also that he knew they were false 
when made.  Holz v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 876, 880, 263 S.E.2d 
426, 428 (1980); Rothfuss v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 461, 466, 94 
S.E.2d 532, 535 (1956). 
 
IV 
 
In view of the foregoing principles of law, we hold that the 
Commonwealth failed to prove that Waldrop wilfully and knowingly 
committed perjury.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals, annul the convictions, and dismiss the 
indictments. 
                     
     
4Former Code § 24.1-279 (now Code § 24.2-1016) provided, in 
pertinent part, that "[a]ny wilfully false, fraudulent, or 
misleading statement or entry made by any person in any statement 
or account under oath required by [Title 24.1], shall constitute 
the crime of perjury." 
 
 
 
 
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Reversed and dismissed.