Title: Krivanek v. State
Citation: 247 N.E.2d 505, 252 Ind. 277
Docket Number: 767S47
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: May 19, 1969

252 Ind. 277 (1969)
247 N.E.2d 505
KRIVANEK
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 767S47.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed May 19, 1969.
Sam Mirkin, South Bend, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, Murray West, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
No petition for rehearing filed.
JACKSON, J.
Appellant was during the September Term, 1966, of the St. Joseph Circuit Court, charged by indictment filed therein with the crime of Murder in the First Degree. Such indictment was filed September 15, 1966, a warrant for the arrest of appellant on such charge was ordered issued to the Sheriff of that county. On the same day appellant, in the custody of the Sheriff appeared in open court, with counsel, and requested that arraignment on the charge be continued until September 16, 1966; the request for the continuance was granted.
*278 On September 16, 1966, appellant, with counsel, appeared and, before arraignment, filed a Motion to Quash the Indictment.
The indictment herein, omitting formal parts and names of witnesses, reads as follows:
The Motion to Quash, omitting heading and signature, in pertinent part reads as follows:
The above motion was submitted without argument on September 16, 1966, was at once overruled and appellant, at his request, was formally arraigned, following which he entered a plea of "Not guilty" and then filed an affidavit for a change of venue from the judge.
The ruling on the affidavit for change of venue from the judge reads as follows:
Thereafter, the cause was tried by a jury which found appellant guilty of murder in the first degree. The verdict of the jury reads as follows, to-wit:
The verdict was signed by
On the 16th day of February, 1967, at the conclusion of presentation of the State's evidence and after the State rested appellant filed a motion for a directed verdict. The record, transcript p. 74, reads as follows:
On March 21, 1967, appellant filed his motion for a new trial, which motion, omitting formal parts, reads as follows, to-wit:
(T. 92-95)
(T. 96-97)
On May 11, 1967, the court overruled appellant's motion for a new trial.
Appellant's Assignment of Errors is the single specification:
Grounds 2 and 3 of appellant's motion for a new trial are not before the court in this appeal for two reasons. First, appellant makes no attempt to illustrate how the evidence was insufficient or in what manner the jury's verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Appellant neglected to set out in the brief any of the evidence adduced at the trial. Second, appellant did not argue either ground 2 or 3. It is a long standing rule that, on appeal, it is incumbent upon the appellant to affirmatively show harmful error by both argument and citation of authorities, and failure to do so results in waiver of the alleged errors; Wright v. State (1958), 237 Ind. 593, 147 N.E.2d 551.
It is apparent appellant on appeal is relying on ground No. 4 of his motion for new trial, and the affidavits, including his own, attached thereto. We have, in view of the seriousness of the charge of which appellant was convicted, the fact that he received a life sentence and the reliance appellant places on said ground, set out in toto his motion for new trial and the memorandum in support thereof as well as the exhibits attached thereto.
*291 The crux of appellant's argument is that the interjection of extraneous and improper evidence by jury foreman Towner during the course of the jury's deliberations was highly prejudicial to appellant, and should have resulted in the sustaining of appellant's motion for a new trial.
With this we cannot agree. The revelation as to the alleged jury misconduct is the product of an affidavit by a juror in which the juror attempts to impeach the verdict that she reached. However, it is well settled law that affidavits by jurors may not be received for the purpose of impeaching their verdict. Widup v. State (1967), 250 Ind. 1, 230 N.E.2d 767; Groover v. State (1959), 239 Ind. 271, 156 N.E.2d 307; White v. State (1955), 234 Ind. 193, 125 N.E.2d 442.
Even without the long established rule that a juror's affidavit will not be received to impeach his verdict, the affidavit in question is not sufficient to establish the jury misconduct and resulting prejudice of which the appellant complains. In order for the extraneous evidence interjected by juror Towner to have prejudiced the jury, it must appear that the evidence was interjected into the deliberations prior to the time the entire jury reached a verdict. It is obvious that if the information was divulged after the jury had reached its verdict, and not while the jury was deliberating, it could not have effected the verdict since the jury would not have known of the information prior to arriving at its verdict. From juror Zimmer's affidavit it is clear that she was the last juror to arrive at the verdict. It is also apparent from juror Zimmer's affidavit that the questionable information was not divulged until after she arrived at her verdict. Therefore, since she reached a verdict before hearing the information, the information could not have had any influence on the verdict she reached. Neither could the information have influenced the other jurors since it is clear that they, too, had arrived at their verdict prior to hearing the information.
*292 Appellant cites Hutchins v. State (1894), 140 Ind. 78, 39 N.E. 243, for the proposition that the affidavit of a juror may be considered by the court in determining whether the accused was given a fair trial. However, the conduct complained of in Hutchins was that the jury foreman prevented free and open discussion by the jury of the merits of the case. Here there was no such stifling of debate, but, based on the affidavit, a vigorous exchange of opinions.
Finally, appellant fails to show how juror Towner's information colored the verdict that he reached. The event of which juror Towner had knowledge did not involve appellant, but appellant's sister, and occurred approximately twenty years prior to trial. As was mentioned above, the affidavit clearly establishes that none of the other jurors knew of the information prior to reaching their verdicts, and thus it could not have influenced their verdicts. Further, there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that juror Towner's knowledge in any way affected his verdict. On the contrary, there is juror Towner's statement during voir dire that he would attempt to be a fair and impartial juror in the case.
Thus, we cannot say that appellant has presented us with such a case of jury misconduct as to deprive him of a fair and impartial trial by his peers. As was stated above, the law is clear and well established that a juror's affidavit cannot be used to impeach the jury's verdict, and appellant has failed to persuade us that the rule should not be applied to the present case.
We postponed discussion of ground 1 of appellant's motion for a new trial until we had considered all of the allegations of ground 4 of such motion. Our reason for doing so was to eliminate the possibility that some one of the grounds set out at ground 4 would lend support to ground 1. Having thoroughly considered the motion for new trial we now find that ground 1 thereof presents no question on appeal.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
*293 DeBruler, C.J., and Hunter and Givan, JJ., concur; Arterburn, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 247 N.E.2d 505.