Title: In re Care & Protection of Rashida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13072
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 7, 2022

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13072 
 
CARE AND PROTECTION OF RASHIDA.1 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     December 8, 2021. - February 7, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Department of Children & Families.  Minor, Custody, Temporary 
custody.  Parent and Child, Custody of minor. 
 
 
 
Petition filed in the Norfolk County Division of the 
Juvenile Court Department on February 3, 2020. 
 
Following review by this court, 488 Mass. 217 (2021), the 
parties filed a joint motion for clarification. 
 
 
Ann Balmelli O'Connor, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, for the mother. 
William A. Comeau for the child. 
Jeremy Bayless for Department of Children and Families. 
 
Jonathan M. Albano, Michael C. Polovich, & Emma Coffey, for 
Lawyers for Civil Rights, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Jessica Berry & Thomas J. Carey, Jr., for Jessica Berry & 
others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
1 A pseudonym. 
 
 
 
2 
 
KAFKER, J.  We are presented here with a sequel to our 
decision in Care & Protection of Rashida, 488 Mass. 217 (2021) 
(Rashida I).  There, we addressed several issues concerning the 
requirement under G. L. c. 119, § 29C, that, when a child has 
previously been removed from his or her home and committed to 
the custody of the Department of Children and Families 
(department), a Juvenile Court judge must determine "not less 
than annually" whether the department has made ongoing 
"reasonable efforts to make it possible for the child to return 
safely to his [or her] parent or guardian." 
We interpreted this provision to give the Juvenile Court 
discretion to make reasonable efforts determinations more than 
once a year.  Rashida I, 485 Mass. at 226, 230.  Accordingly, we 
recognized that a party may file a motion seeking a reasonable 
efforts determination outside of the required annual review, 
which the motion judge has discretion to grant if the moving 
party has met its burden of production.  Id. at 230-232.  If the 
motion is granted, the burden then shifts to the department to 
prove that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify the child 
with his or her family.  Id. at 234.  We did not, however, 
specify the standard by which the department would have to prove 
that it has made reasonable efforts. 
The parties in Rashida I -- the department, the child, and 
the child's mother -- thereafter jointly petitioned for 
 
 
 
3 
clarification of this standard.  Originally, all parties 
proposed a fair preponderance of the evidence standard.  The 
court thereafter requested additional briefing on the issue, as 
the original briefing on the question was minimal.  In its 
subsequent filing, the department continues to argue that the 
standard of proof should be fair preponderance of the evidence.  
The child and the mother now argue for the more demanding clear 
and convincing evidence standard.  After consideration of the 
additional briefing, we conclude that the appropriate standard 
is proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence. 
Discussion.  1.  The statutory scheme.  Although the 
parties have asked this court to clarify the standard of proof 
that applies at a reasonable efforts hearing conducted on a 
parent's or child's motion, the statute requires reasonable 
efforts determinations at numerous stages in a care and 
protection case.  "[I]n the absence of a plain contrary 
indication, a word used in one part of a statute in a definite 
sense should be given the same meaning in another part of the 
same statute" (citation omitted).  Care & Protection of Robert, 
408 Mass. 52, 64 (1990) (Robert).  Accordingly, we hold that 
absent a clear statutory indication to the contrary, the same 
standard of proof applies at every stage in a care and 
protection case where a reasonable efforts determination is 
required or permitted by statute.  We therefore begin by briefly 
 
 
 
4 
reviewing the statutory scheme governing care and protection 
proceedings and the place of reasonable efforts determinations 
within that scheme. 
As we explained in Rashida I, 488 Mass. at 219-220, quoting 
G. L. c. 119, § 29C, "[a] judge is required by statute to 
determine whether the department has made reasonable efforts at 
the emergency hearing, the seventy-two hour hearing, and 'not 
less than annually' thereafter."  At both the emergency hearing 
and the seventy-two hour hearing, the judge is required to 
determine that the department "has made reasonable efforts prior 
to the placement of a child with the department to prevent or 
eliminate the need for removal from the home."  Rashida I, supra 
at 220, quoting G. L. c. 119, § 29C.  See Care & Protection of 
Walt, 478 Mass. 212, 213 (2017) (Walt).  "The department's 
obligation to make reasonable efforts does not end once the 
department takes temporary custody of a child," although the 
"purpose of those efforts shifts" toward "making it 'possible 
for the child to return safely to his parent or guardian.'" 
Walt, supra at 221, quoting G. L. c. 119, § 29C.  See Rashida I, 
supra.  Accordingly, "[s]o long as the child remains in the care 
of the department," the Juvenile Court "must hold an annual 
permanency hearing," where the judge will, inter alia, determine 
whether the department has made reasonable efforts toward 
reuniting the child with his or her family.  Rashida I, supra, 
 
 
 
5 
citing Rule 8 of the Uniform Rules for Permanency Hearings, 
Trial Court Rule VI.  The minimum annual reasonable efforts 
determination required by G. L. c. 119, § 29C, usually coincides 
with the annual permanency hearing.  Rashida I, supra. 
In addition to holding a permanency hearing every year that 
a child is in the department's care, "within twelve to fifteen 
months" of the filing of the care and protection petition, the 
Juvenile Court will adjudicate that petition on the merits, 
determining whether the child is in need of care and protection.  
Id.  At this merits hearing, the court must again make a 
reasonable efforts determination.  Id.  In Rashida I, we also 
clarified that a party may move for a reasonable efforts 
determination at other times than at the permanency and merits 
hearings.  See id. at 230. 
 
Despite the numerous occurrences of reasonable efforts 
determinations within the life of a care and protection case, 
there is no statutory specification of the applicable standard 
of proof at any of these different stages.  This court has 
likewise not expressly articulated the standard by which the 
department must demonstrate that it has made reasonable efforts. 
2.  The original briefing on the issue of the standard of 
proof.  In its brief in Rashida I, the department argued that in 
reasonable efforts determinations, it should be required to 
prove its reasonable efforts by a preponderance of the evidence, 
 
 
 
6 
because reasonable efforts determinations are properly 
characterized as subsidiary findings of fact.  The department's 
argument drew on the distinction set out in our case law between 
the ultimate determination in a care and protection proceeding 
to terminate parental rights, which must be established by clear 
and convincing evidence, and subsidiary facts, which must be 
proved by a preponderance of evidence.  The mother's original 
brief adopted the same approach. 
We have indeed held that in any proceeding to commit a 
child permanently to the custody of the department, "the 
department bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that a parent is currently unfit to further the best 
interests of a child and, therefore, the child is in need of 
care and protection."  Care & Protection of Erin, 443 Mass. 567, 
570 (2005), citing Care & Protection of Stephen, 401 Mass. 144, 
150–151 (1987).  In contrast, where a judge makes findings 
regarding "subsidiary facts," which inform the judge's decision 
on "the ultimate question of parental unfitness," those 
subsidiary factual findings "need only be supported by a 
preponderance of the evidence."  Care & Protection of Laura, 414 
Mass. 788, 794 (1993), citing Custody of Two Minors, 396 Mass. 
610, 619 (1986).  See Adoption of Quentin, 424 Mass. 882, 886 
(1997) (in proceedings to dispense with parental consent to 
 
 
 
7 
adoption, "subsidiary findings must be proved by a fair 
preponderance of the evidence"). 
 
We requested supplemental briefing because, in our view, 
reasonable efforts determinations do not fall neatly into either 
of the two well-defined categories with established burdens of 
proof.  Although a reasonable efforts determination is a 
subsidiary aspect of the over-all adjudication of a care and 
protection or termination proceeding, it is not just a specific 
factual determination.  A judge who makes a reasonable efforts 
determination is not tasked only with establishing the 
historical facts regarding the services that the department has 
offered to the parents of a child in its care.  The judge must 
also interpret the "reasonable efforts" standard set out in 
G. L. c. 119, § 29C, and determine whether the services offered 
by the department satisfy that statutory standard.  Whether the 
department has made reasonable efforts is therefore a mixed 
question of law and fact.  See Pullman–Standard v. Swint, 456 
U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982) (characterizing as mixed questions of 
law and fact issues concerning whether facts found satisfy given 
statutory standard).  Because reasonable efforts determinations 
neither are properly categorized as subsidiary factual findings, 
nor do they control the ultimate inquiry into parental 
unfitness, further analysis is required to determine the 
appropriate standard of proof. 
 
 
 
8 
3.  Discerning burden of proof requirements in the absence 
of express statutory direction.  For guidance on how to discern 
the burden of proof in care and protection proceedings in the 
absence of express statutory direction, we turn to our decision 
in Robert, 408 Mass. 52, which addressed the standard of proof 
required to maintain the department's temporary custody over a 
child at the seventy-two hour hearing.  The parent in that case, 
as in this one, contended that clear and convincing evidence was 
required.  The court concluded otherwise, employing an approach 
that we adopt here as well. 
In Robert, 408 Mass. at 57, the court began "with an 
examination of the language of G. L. c. 119, § 24, to determine 
which standard of proof, if any, the Legislature intended to be 
applied to a seventy-two hour hearing."  Observing that 
"[n]either [the statute] nor our previous decisions shed any 
light on the standard of proof which is to be applied to the 
seventy-two hour hearing," the court held that "where no 
standard of proof is provided for a proceeding which is required 
by statute, due process demands application of a standard 
appropriate to the 'particular situation' which is presented."  
Id. at 58, quoting Andrews, petitioner, 368 Mass. 468, 486 
(1975). 
The court further clarified that in determining what 
standard of proof due process requires in a particular context, 
 
 
 
9 
courts are to apply the test articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) 
(Eldridge), which requires consideration of (1) "the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action"; (2) "the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional 
or substitute procedural safeguards"; and (3) "the Government's 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail." 
 
As previously explained, in the instant case, as in Robert, 
the statute does not expressly provide for a particular standard 
of proof.  Unlike in Robert, 408 Mass. at 58, however, where 
there was no case law that "shed any light on the standard of 
proof which is to be applied," here our decision in Robert 
itself provides substantial guidance.  There, we decided that 
preponderance of evidence, not clear and convincing evidence, is 
the standard of proof applicable at the seventy-two hour 
hearing, on the ground that this standard is appropriate to meet 
the constitutional requirements of procedural due process.  Id. 
at 68.  We are guided by the reasoning of the Robert court, 
including its application of the Eldridge balancing test, in 
discerning what standard of proof applies in reasonable efforts 
determinations in the absence of express statutory instructions. 
 
 
 
10 
The most significant difference between this case and 
Robert is that the private interests at stake in a reasonable 
efforts determination are less substantial than those at stake 
in a seventy-two hour hearing.  The latter involves a decision 
that may deprive parents of custody, even if only temporarily, 
and therefore implicates an interest that "has been deemed 
fundamental, and is constitutionally protected."  Robert, 408 
Mass. at 60, quoting Department of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 379 
Mass. 1, 3 (1979).  See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 
(1982) (recognizing "fundamental liberty interest of natural 
parents in the care, custody, and management of their child"). 
In contrast, reasonable efforts determinations are 
"separate and distinct from [a] judge's certification regarding 
the child's best interests that decides whether the child should 
remain in the custody of the department."  Walt, 478 Mass. at 
228.  A determination that the department has made reasonable 
efforts does not necessitate a child's removal from the home or 
maintenance in the department's care.  Conversely, a 
determination that reasonable efforts were not made does not 
preclude removal or confirmation of the department's temporary 
custody, or even the ultimate termination of parental rights.  
See G. L. c. 119, § 29C ("A determination by the court that 
reasonable efforts were not made shall not preclude the court 
from making any appropriate order conducive to the child's best 
 
 
 
11 
interest"); Walt, supra ("regardless of whether the department 
made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for 
removal from the home, no child should remain in the custody of 
the parents if his or her immediate removal is necessary to 
protect the child from serious abuse or neglect"); Adoption of 
Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 61 (2011) (in deciding whether to terminate 
parental rights, "[a] judge may consider the department's 
failure to make reasonable efforts in deciding whether a 
parent's unfitness is merely temporary," but "even where the 
department has failed to [make reasonable efforts], a trial 
judge must still rule in the child's best interest") 
To be sure, a parent or a child each have a considerable 
interest in receiving the services that constitute the 
department's reasonable efforts -- services "designed to improve 
the capacity of families to provide safe and stable homes for 
their children" (citation omitted).  Rashida I, 488 Mass. at 
219.  Nevertheless, this interest is less weighty than a 
parent's fundamental interest in the care and custody of his or 
her child.  It would therefore be incongruous to apply a higher 
standard of proof in reasonable efforts determinations than in 
the temporary custody determinations made in the context of a 
seventy-two hour hearing, as the former does not directly 
address custody rights, while the latter does. 
 
 
 
12 
In another respect, the private interest at stake in a 
seventy-two hour hearing and the private interest implicated in 
a reasonable efforts determination are similar, and hence the 
private interest component of the due process analysis in Robert 
is directly applicable here.  We have recognized that "for 
purposes of due process analysis, a significant consideration is 
'the permanency of the threatened loss.'"  Robert, 408 Mass. at 
60, quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758.  Thus, when we addressed 
the question of the standard of proof to be applied at the 
seventy-two hour hearing in Robert, we concluded that because 
any deprivation of custody rights threatened by that hearing 
would be a "reversible" and "temporary," proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to satisfy due 
process rather than the more demanding clear and convincing 
evidence standard required when parental custody is permanently 
terminated.  Robert, supra at 60-61. 
With reasonable efforts determinations, any failure to 
obtain remedial orders will likewise be temporary and 
reversible.  After the reasonable efforts determination 
conducted at the emergency hearing, the next such determination 
must be done within seventy-two hours.  After the determination 
made at the seventy-two hour hearing, the next determination 
must be made within a year.  While the child remains in the care 
of the department, there will never be more than a year's span 
 
 
 
13 
between one reasonable efforts determination and the next.  
Moreover, a parent or child may move for a renewed reasonable 
efforts determination even before the annual review, provided he 
or she can meet the burden of production.  Rashida I, 488 Mass. 
at 230. 
The temporary and reversible nature of the deprivation 
threatened at a reasonable efforts determination, together with 
the fact that reasonable efforts determinations do not directly 
determine custody rights, points toward the sufficiency of a 
preponderance of the evidence standard for purposes of 
procedural due process. 
Turning to the risk of erroneous deprivation component of 
the due process analysis, we again consider the Robert court's 
analysis relevant.  In particular, the court recognized that 
where the same inquiry will be repeated at a number of 
successive hearings, the risk of erroneous deprivation at any 
given hearing is thereby diminished.  This is so because any 
errors that arise in earlier hearings "can be discovered and 
corrected in subsequent proceedings."  Robert, 408 Mass. at 64.  
As we have indicated earlier, by statute reasonable efforts 
determinations must occur at multiple points in a care and 
protection case.  The court in Rashida I further provided for 
additional motions and determinations.  Consequently, there are 
repeated opportunities for judicial review of the department's 
 
 
 
14 
provision of services to facilitate family reunification.  This 
greatly diminishes the risk of erroneous deprivation at any 
given reasonable efforts determination. 
We are also conscious of the practical realities that a 
reasonable efforts determination must be conducted at the 
emergency hearing and at the seventy-two hour hearing.  See 
Rashida I, 488 Mass. at 219.  These hearings must be held within 
a very short time period after the filing of a care and 
protection petition.  Given the tight time frames and 
"abbreviated nature" of these hearings, it appears somewhat 
unrealistic to require that the department prove its reasonable 
efforts by the more demanding clear and convincing standard.  
See Robert, 408 Mass. at 67.  Because we have determined that 
the same standard of proof should apply at every point where the 
Juvenile Court will determine the department's reasonable 
efforts, this constraint of practicality points toward the 
application of the less demanding preponderance of the evidence 
standard to all reasonable efforts determinations.  Although we 
recognize that applying this less stringent standard of proof 
presents some risk of error, we are confident that the framework 
of ongoing judicial oversight of the department's reasonable 
efforts sufficiently mitigates any such risk.  We therefore 
conclude that the fair preponderance of the evidence provides 
 
 
 
15 
sufficient protection against the risk of error in reasonable 
efforts determinations. 
The Robert court's discussion of the final factor in the 
Eldridge test requires further analysis.  The court's definition 
of the governmental interest in temporary removal proceedings is 
multifaceted.  The court explained that "[t]he Commonwealth's 
interest . . . extends initially to the maintenance of a stable 
family environment and, if this is not present, to the provision 
of adequate care and protection for the child."  Robert, 408 
Mass. at 66.  At least the part of the court's analysis relating 
to the governmental interest in a stable family environment is 
directly applicable to reasonable efforts determinations, which 
are designed to strengthen the family relationship.2 
Also applicable is the Robert court's discussion of the 
fiscal and administrative burden, particularly the additional 
fiscal and administrative burden related to the Commonwealth 
 
2 The department's regulations declare that its policy is 
"to strengthen and encourage family life so that every family 
can care for and protect its children."  See, e.g., 110 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.01 (2008).  To that end, the department's avowed 
aim is to "make every reasonable effort to encourage and assist 
families to use all available resources to maintain the family 
unit intact."  Id.  This declaration reflects the care and 
protection statute's express statement of Massachusetts's 
policy, which is the "strengthening and encouragement of family 
life for the care and protection of children," particularly by 
"assist[ing] and encourag[ing]" the use by families of "all 
available resources" that may enable them to provide for the 
care and protection of their children.  G. L. c. 119, § 1. 
 
 
 
16 
proving its case for continued temporary custody by clear and 
convincing evidence versus by a preponderance of the evidence.  
The court described that additional burden as limited and thus 
inconsequential.  See id.  We likewise deem this burden 
inconsequential to our analysis of the standard of proof of 
reasonable efforts here. 
In Robert, however, the court also emphasized that "the 
adoption of a very rigorous standard of proof [at the temporary 
custody hearing] might put at serious risk the Commonwealth's 
and the child's interests in protecting children from abusive or 
neglectful parents."  Id.  As a reasonable efforts determination 
is separate, or at least separable, from decisions about 
custody, this consideration regarding the risk of abuse and 
neglect is only indirectly applicable.  The State's interest and 
the parent's interests in reasonable efforts determinations are 
thus more closely aligned than they are in a proceeding directly 
affecting custody rights.  The Commonwealth's separate, 
divergent interests are therefore less strong in reasonable 
efforts determinations than at the seventy-two hour hearing on 
temporary custody.  This difference arguably cuts in favor of 
imposing a higher standard of proof on the department in a 
reasonable efforts determination.  We conclude, however, that 
the over-all balancing of interests supports the same and not a 
higher standard of proof. 
 
 
 
17 
Although the State's separate and divergent interest is 
less strong in a reasonable efforts determination, as the 
child's removal from the home or maintenance in the department's 
care is not directly at issue, the same is true for the 
corresponding private interest:  as we explained earlier, the 
stakes are less high for parents and the child as well, because 
custody is not directly at issue.  We therefore do not think 
these corresponding and relatively counterbalancing differences 
make a different standard of proof appropriate for a reasonable 
efforts determination from that for temporary custody decisions. 
Taking the three Eldridge factors together, we conclude 
that proof by a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to 
satisfy procedural due process in reasonable efforts 
determinations.  Particularly important to, and ultimately 
dispositive of, our over-all balancing of the Eldridge factors 
is the availability of multiple opportunities for judicial 
review of the reasonable efforts being made by the department. 
Conclusion.  As informed by our prior case law, 
particularly Robert, 408 Mass. 52, procedural due process 
requires that when a Juvenile Court judge determines whether the 
department has made reasonable efforts, on either a child's or a 
parent's motion or at the various points in the life of a care 
and protection case where reasonable efforts determinations are 
required by statute, the department must meet its burden by at 
 
 
 
18 
least a fair preponderance of the evidence.  Applying a higher 
standard of proof in reasonable efforts determinations would be 
incongruent with our determination in Robert that, at a seventy-
two hour hearing, proof of parental unfitness by a preponderance 
of the evidence is appropriate, as a matter of due process, to 
maintain a child's removal from the home and maintenance in the 
department's custody.  We therefore declare that, at a 
reasonable efforts hearing, the department's burden is to prove 
that it has made reasonable efforts by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.