Title: State v. Larry J. Sprosty
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP003524
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-3524 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Larry J. Sprosty: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Larry J. Sprosty,  
 
Respondent-Appellant.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  221 Wis. 2d 401, 585 N.W.2d 637 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 30, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 9, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Crawford 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Kirchman 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Abrahamson, C.J., concurs 
 
 
(opinion filed)  
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: Prosser, J., did not participate 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner the 
cause was argued by Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney 
general. 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant there was a brief by 
T. Christopher Kelly and Thomas, Kelly, Habermehl & Mays, S.C., 
Madison and oral argument by T. Christopher Kelly. 
 
No. 97-3524 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-3524 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Larry J. Sprosty: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent- 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Larry J. Sprosty,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   The State seeks review of a 
decision of the court of appeals1 reversing an order of the 
circuit 
court 
for 
Crawford 
County, 
Honorable 
Michael 
T. 
Kirchman.  The circuit court initially ordered supervised 
release of the defendant, Larry Sprosty, under Wis. Stat. ch. 
980 (1995-96),2 the sexual predator law.  However, when the 
county submitted its plan to not release Sprosty because of 
inadequate resources, the circuit court denied his supervised 
release.  The court of appeals reversed.  
                     
1 State v. Sprosty, 221 Wis. 2d 401, 585 N.W.2d 637 (Ct. 
App. 1998). 
2  All statutory references are to the 1995-96 version of 
the statutes unless otherwise noted. 
No. 97-3524 
 
2 
¶2 
The State has presented four issues for our review:  
(1) is the availability of a facility within the community an 
appropriate factor for the circuit court to consider under Wis. 
Stat. §§ 980.06(2)(b) or 980.08(4)3; (2) does the circuit court 
have authority to order a county department or the Department of 
Health and Family Services (DHFS) to create whatever programs or 
facilities are deemed necessary to accommodate an order for 
supervised release; (3) does the circuit court have authority to 
reconsider an earlier decision to order supervised release upon 
obtaining more complete information on available facilities; and 
(4) who bears the burden of the cost of the necessary programs 
and facilities, the county department or DHFS.   
¶3 
We conclude that a circuit court, in its discretion, 
may consider the availability of facilities to house or to treat 
a sexual predator under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4).  However, any 
such consideration must be in keeping with the purpose of 
providing the “least restrictive” means to accomplish the 
treatment of the person while also protecting the public.  We 
further conclude that once a circuit court has made a finding 
and ordered supervised release under § 980.08(4), it is required 
to order a treatment plan under § 980.08(5) and to ensure that 
the person is placed on supervised release in accordance with 
                     
3 The language of Wis. Stat. §§ 980.06(2)(b) and 980.08(4) 
is identical, except that § 980.06(2)(b) governs placement in 
the initial commitment order, and § 980.08(4) governs placement 
in a petition for supervised release.  For purposes of this 
decision, we will only refer to § 980.08(4); however, our 
decision is applicable to § 980.06(2)(b) as well. 
No. 97-3524 
 
3 
the plan.  In some cases, the creation of facilities and 
services to provide the requisite treatment and to protect the 
public while a person is on supervised release in the community 
may be necessary, for which DHFS is responsible.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.12(1).  In this case, the circuit court granted the 
petition for supervised release, but failed to order Sprosty’s 
release.  This was in error.  Accordingly, we remand the matter 
to the circuit court for a determination consistent with this 
opinion. 
I. 
¶4 
The facts are not in dispute.  Sprosty was committed 
as a sexual predator under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 in 1995.  In 1996, 
Sprosty filed petitions for supervised release, Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.08, and/or for discharge, Wis. Stat. § 980.09.  At the 
evidentiary hearing, experts testified that although Sprosty 
needed to continue participation in sex offender and substance 
abuse treatment programs, he could benefit from such treatment 
on an outpatient basis while living in the community under close 
supervision.  The circuit court agreed and granted Sprosty’s 
petition for supervised release.  In its October 18, 1996, order 
granting the petition, the court required that a treatment plan 
be developed, and that Sprosty remain in custody until further 
order of the court.   
¶5 
From late 1996 to early 1997, a social worker for the 
Wisconsin Resource Center (WRC), Heather Leach, corresponded 
with the circuit court about an appropriate release and 
treatment service plan for Sprosty.  The WRC clinical staff 
No. 97-3524 
 
4 
believed, and the circuit court concurred, that an appropriate 
plan for Sprosty would include halfway house placement followed 
by 
placement 
in 
the 
community 
on 
electronic 
monitoring, 
intensive and long-term sex offender treatment with a qualified 
and 
experienced 
provider, 
AODA 
treatment, 
and 
high 
risk 
supervision by a Sex Offender Intensive Supervision Program 
Agent through the Division of Community Corrections.  Leach 
indicated, however, that she was having difficulty locating the 
requisite treatment and facilities.  Crawford County, Sprosty’s 
county of residence, lacked these resources.  At the court’s 
request that there be no geographical limits, Leach located four 
counties, Dane, Milwaukee, La Crosse, and Portage, which had the 
breadth and depth of resources necessary to appropriately and 
adequately supervise Sprosty; however, at least some of the 
facilities were unwilling or unable to admit him for placement 
or services.   
¶6 
In April 1997, the circuit court held a status 
conference and ordered Crawford County to prepare a plan to 
provide supervised release under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(5).  
¶7 
In June 1997, the circuit court held two additional 
hearings regarding Sprosty’s community treatment plan.  At the 
hearings, the Crawford County district attorney stated that the 
county, in conjunction with DHFS, developed a plan that 
addressed the statutory criteria, and determined that Sprosty 
could not be released because the county did not have the 
appropriate resources to address his treatment needs in a 
community setting.   
No. 97-3524 
 
5 
¶8 
The circuit court agreed that the programs and 
facilities necessary for Sprosty’s treatment and supervision, as 
well as for the protection of the community, were not available 
in Crawford County or in other counties.  The court concluded 
that it could not compel private agencies to accept Sprosty, nor 
would it require the state to build facilities in order to 
provide supervised release.  Because the court would not release 
Sprosty under conditions that were less than necessary to ensure 
his treatment and the protection of the public, it denied his 
supervised release and returned Sprosty to secure confinement.  
Sprosty appealed. 
¶9 
The court of appeals reversed.  The court determined 
that 
the 
unambiguous 
statutory 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.08(5) does not allow a circuit court to refuse to order 
release once it has determined that release is appropriate.  
State v. Sprosty, 221 Wis. 2d 401, 409, 585 N.W.2d 637 (Ct. App. 
1998).  Rather, the court reasoned that § 980.08(5) requires 
that if the person’s county of residence is unable or unwilling 
to prepare a plan, and no other counties agree to prepare a plan 
or accept the person into their program, the committing court 
must designate a county for placement.  Sprosty, 221 Wis. 2d at 
408-09.  The court of appeals remanded the case with directions 
to the circuit court to order a county to do what is necessary 
for Sprosty’s release.  Id. at 409.  The State appeals. 
 
II. 
No. 97-3524 
 
6 
¶10 The first issue we address is whether the circuit 
court 
may 
consider 
the 
availability 
of 
facilities, 
the 
feasibility of creating facilities if they do not exist, and the 
cost of such creation when deciding whether to place a sexually 
violent 
person 
on 
supervised 
release 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.08(4).4  To resolve this issue, we must interpret Wis. 
Stat. § 980.08(4).  Statutory interpretation presents a question 
of law that we review independent of the circuit court and the 
court of appeals.  State v. Szulczewski, 216 Wis.2d 495, 499, 
574 N.W.2d 660 (1998). 
¶11 When 
construing 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.08(4), we 
must 
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.  
State ex rel. Reiman v. Circuit Court, 214 Wis.2d 605, 613, 571 
N.W.2d 385 (1997).  To identify the legislative intent, we first 
examine the statutory language itself. State v. Martin, 162 
Wis.2d 883, 893, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991).  If the meaning of the 
statute is clear, we will not look outside of the language of 
the statute to discern legislative intent.  Id. at 893-94. 
¶12 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.08(4) provides in part: 
The court shall grant the petition unless the state 
proves by clear and convincing evidence that the 
person is still a sexually violent person and that it 
is still substantially probable that the person will 
                     
4 Sprosty insists Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4) has no bearing on 
this appeal because the circuit court determined that supervised 
release was appropriate under § 980.08(5).  However, the issues 
before this court are the issues presented in the petition for 
review.  State v. Weber, 164 Wis. 2d 788, 789, 476 N.W.2d 867 
(1991).  This was one of four issues submitted in the petition 
for review. 
No. 97-3524 
 
7 
engage in acts of sexual violence if the person is not 
confined in a secure mental health unit or facility.  
In making a decision under this subsection, the court 
may 
consider, 
without 
limitation 
because 
of 
enumeration, the nature and circumstances of the 
behavior that was the basis of the allegation in the 
petition . . . , 
the 
person’s 
mental 
history 
and 
present mental condition, where the person will live, 
how the person will support himself or herself and 
what arrangements are available to ensure that the 
person has access to and will participate in necessary 
treatment.  [Emphasis added.] 
¶13 The general rule in interpreting statutory language is 
that “the word ‘shall’ is presumed mandatory when it appears in 
a statute.”  Karow v. Milwaukee Co. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 82 Wis. 
2d 565, 570, 263 N.W.2d 214 (1978).  “Further support is given 
to a mandatory interpretation of ‘shall’ when the legislature 
uses the words ‘shall’ and ‘may’ in a particular statutory 
section, indicating the legislature was aware of the distinct 
meanings of the words.”  GMAC Mortgage Corp. v. Gisvold, 215 
Wis. 2d 459, 478, 572 N.W.2d 466 (1998).   
¶14 The legislature used the words “shall” and “may” in 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4).  The court shall grant the petition for 
supervisory release unless the state proves that the person is 
still sexually violent and that it is still substantially 
probable the person will engage in acts of sexual violence if 
not in secure institutional care.  § 980.08(4).  In making its 
decision, the court may consider, without limitation because of 
enumeration, such things as where the person will live and how 
the person will support himself or herself.  Id.  Therefore, we 
“can infer that the legislature was aware of the different 
No. 97-3524 
 
8 
denotations and intended the words to have their precise 
meanings.”  Karow, 82 Wis. 2d at 571.   
¶15 We conclude that the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.08(4) requires the circuit court to grant the petition for 
supervisory release unless the state proves its case by clear 
and convincing evidence.  We also conclude, as other courts 
have, that the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4) permits, 
but does not require, the circuit court to consider the 
statutory factors in making its decision on whether supervisory 
release is appropriate.  State v. Seibert, 220 Wis. 2d 308, 314, 
582 N.W.2d 745 (Ct. App. 1998); see also State v. Keding, 214 
Wis. 2d 363, 367, 571 N.W.2d 459 (Ct. App. 1997).5   
¶16 The State does not contest the mandatory nature of 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4) if it fails to prove its case.  Nor does 
it question the court’s broad discretion in determining the 
appropriateness of supervisory release.   
¶17 Nevertheless, 
the 
State 
argues 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.08(4) is ambiguous because it is unclear whether in making 
its 
determination, 
the 
circuit 
court 
may 
factor 
in 
the 
availability of facilities with the necessary security or the 
cost in creating the necessary facilities.  The State insists 
that the language “where the person will live” means that the 
circuit court should consider whether facilities which possess 
                     
5 While the word “shall” can be construed as directory in 
order to carry out the legislature’s clear intent, GMAC Mortgage 
Corp. v. Gisvold, 215 Wis. 2d 459, 479, 572 N.W.2d 466 (1998), 
the parties do not appear to argue that the legislature intended 
its command to be directory.   
No. 97-3524 
 
9 
the necessary security for the individual are available and 
willing to undertake the person’s supervision before supervised 
release can be ordered.  We do not agree with either premise. 
¶18 It is undisputed that the committing court has broad 
discretion when determining if the person is appropriate for 
supervised release under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4).  Seibert, 220 
Wis. 2d at 314; see also Keding, 214 Wis. 2d at 367.  In making 
its decision on supervisory release, a circuit court may 
consider without limitation because of enumeration several 
factors, such as “where the person will live” and what 
arrangements for treatment are available.  § 980.08(4).  We 
construe the listed statutory factors contained in § 980.08(4), 
not as limitations on what can be considered in determining 
supervisory release, but as several examples of factors that may 
be considered in determining whether supervisory release is 
appropriate.  In the context of where the person may live and 
what arrangements for treatment are available such things as the 
availability of facilities, security, and cost considerations 
may, in the court’s discretion, factor into the court’s decision 
on the appropriateness of supervisory release.   
¶19 This does not mean, however, that the circuit court 
can or should consider whether the available facilities are 
willing to undertake the person’s supervision before ordering 
supervised release.  This places the proverbial cart before the 
horse.  As stated above, the petition must be granted “unless 
the state proves by clear and convincing evidence that the 
person is still a sexually violent person and that it is still 
No. 97-3524 
 
10
substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of 
sexual violence if not confined” in a secure mental health unit 
or facility.  Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4).  While the court can 
include in its order conditions which it considers necessary for 
placement, prior acceptance of the person into those facilities 
or programs is an inappropriate consideration at the hearing on 
the petition for supervisory release.  See Keding, 214 Wis. 2d 
at 371.  If the court concludes that supervisory release is 
appropriate, it is then DHFS’s statutory duty to “arrange for 
control, care and treatment of the person in the least 
restrictive manner consistent with the requirements of the 
person and in accordance with the court’s commitment order.”  
Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(b) and (d); Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6); see 
Keding, 214 Wis. 2d at 370-71.   
¶20 Any 
consideration 
of 
costs 
or 
availability 
of 
facilities must be in keeping with providing the “least 
restrictive” means to accomplish treatment of the person and the 
protection of the public.  See State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 
313, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995); State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 
271, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995).  In addition, such considerations 
should not ultimately trump the granting of a petition for 
supervised release when the state has failed to prove its case. 
 Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4). 
III. 
¶21 The next issue we consider is whether the circuit 
court has the authority under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(5) to order a 
county department or DHFS to create whatever programs or 
No. 97-3524 
 
11
facilities are necessary, regardless of cost, to accommodate an 
order for supervised release.  Whether § 980.08(5) requires 
release, even creating facilities necessary for release, once 
the court has determined supervised release is appropriate 
involves 
the 
interpretation 
of 
the 
statute. 
 
Statutory 
construction presents a question of law which we review de novo. 
 Szulczewski, 216 Wis. 2d at 499.   
¶22 Our goal, in statutory interpretation, is to discern 
and to give effect to the intent of the legislature.  State v. 
Cardenas-Hernandez, 219 Wis. 2d 516, 538, 579 N.W.2d 678 (1998). 
 To achieve this, we first look to the plain language of the 
statute.  Id.  If a statute is unambiguous, this court will 
apply the ordinary and accepted meaning of the language of the 
statute to the facts before it.  Id.   
¶23 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.08(5) provides the procedural 
framework for a committing court to follow once the court has 
determined 
that 
supervised 
release 
is 
appropriate 
under 
§ 980.08(4).  Section 980.08(5) provides in part:   
If the court finds that the person is appropriate for 
supervised 
release, 
the 
court 
shall 
notify 
the 
department.  The department and the county department 
under s. 51.42 in the county of residence of the 
person . . . shall 
prepare 
a 
plan . . . .The 
plan 
shall address the person’s need[s] . . . .The plan 
shall specify who will be responsible for providing 
the 
treatment 
and 
services 
identified 
in 
the 
plan . . . .The plan shall be presented to the court 
for its approval . . . .If the county department of 
the person’s county of residence declines to prepare a 
plan, the department may arrange for another county to 
prepare the plan if that county agrees to prepare the 
plan and if the person will be living in that county. 
 If the department is unable to arrange for another 
No. 97-3524 
 
12
county to prepare a plan, the court shall designate a 
county department to prepare the plan, order the 
county department to prepare the plan and place the 
person on supervised release in that county. . . .  
¶24 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 980.08(5) is clear and 
unambiguous.  The use of the word “shall” is mandatory.  See 
Karow, 82 Wis. 2d at 570.  If supervised release is appropriate, 
the court shall notify DHFS, DHFS and a county department shall 
prepare a plan, the plan shall address the person’s needs, the 
plan shall specify who is responsible for providing treatment 
and services, and the plan shall be presented to the court.  
§ 980.08(5).  If DHFS is unable to arrange for a county to 
prepare a plan, the court shall designate and order a county 
through DHFS to prepare a plan, and place the person on 
supervised release in that county.  Id.   
¶25 According 
to 
the 
State, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
incorrectly read the language in Wis. Stat. § 980.08(5) that the 
court “shall designate a county department to prepare the 
plan . . . and place the person on supervised release in that 
county” as requiring the person’s release once the court has 
determined that supervised release is appropriate.  The State 
contends 
that 
when 
§ 980.08(5) 
is 
read 
together 
with 
§ 980.08(4), it is clear that the legislature intended the 
circuit court to consider the cost of any placement together 
with all of the other factors in determining whether supervised 
release is appropriate.  In the case of sexually violent 
persons, the State maintains that the legislature did not intend 
No. 97-3524 
 
13
DHFS to build whatever was necessary to create a placement for 
supervised release.   
¶26 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.08(4) deals exclusively with 
whether the committing court shall grant a petition for 
supervised release.  The circuit court is required under sub. 
(4) to grant the petition for supervised release unless the 
state proves it case.  § 980.08(4).  As explained in the 
previous section, in the context of where the sexually violent 
person 
may 
live 
or 
what 
arrangements 
for 
treatment 
are 
available, the availability of facilities, security, and cost 
considerations may factor into the court’s decision on the 
appropriateness of supervised release.  Section 980.08(5), on 
the other hand, sets forth the procedures to be followed after 
supervised release under § 980.08(4) is deemed appropriate.   
¶27 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.08(5) is unambiguous even when 
read in conjunction with subsec. (4).  Procedurally, once a 
committing court determines a person should be released and has 
imposed its commitment order under subsec. (4),6 subsec. (5) 
requires that a treatment plan be developed and that the person 
be released in accordance with that plan.  Section 980.08(5) is 
mandatory and it requires strict compliance.  Keding, 214 Wis. 
2d at 371.   
¶28 Wisconsin’s 
sexual 
predator 
law 
survived 
constitutional challenge, in part, because the nature and 
                     
6 The court may include in its order those conditions which 
it considers necessary for placement.  State v. Keding, 214 Wis. 
2d 363, 371, 571 N.W.2d 450 (Ct. App. 1997). 
No. 97-3524 
 
14
duration of ch. 980 commitments are to be reasonably related to 
the purposes for those commitments.  Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 314-
16.  The principle purposes of ch. 980 are the protection of the 
community and the treatment of sexually violent persons.  Post, 
197 Wis. 2d at 313; Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 271.  The control, 
care and treatment of the committed person is to be in “the 
least restrictive manner consistent with the requirements of the 
person and in accordance with the court’s commitment order.”  
Wis. Stat. § 980.06(1) and (2)(b).  
¶29 In creating the sexual predator law, the legislature 
sought to protect the community from sexual predators, to 
provide treatment for sexually violent persons, and when 
appropriate, 
to 
provide 
this 
treatment 
under 
supervised 
circumstances within the community.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 980.07(1) 
and 980.08.  In Carpenter and Post, this court accepted the 
state’s affirmation that “[it] is prepared to provide specific 
treatment to those committed under ch. 980 and not simply 
warehouse them,”  Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 267, and that “the 
legislature will proceed in good faith and fund the treatment 
programs necessary for those committed under chapter 980.”  
Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 308.  The creation of facilities and 
services to provide treatment under supervised conditions within 
the community is not contrary to these stated purposes.   
¶30 Accordingly, we hold that a circuit court has the 
authority under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(5) to order a county, 
through DHFS, to create whatever programs or facilities are 
necessary to accommodate an order for supervised release.   
No. 97-3524 
 
15
 
IV. 
¶31 We must next address whether the circuit court has the 
authority to reconsider an earlier decision to order supervised 
release upon obtaining more complete information on available 
facilities.  The State argues that because the circuit court had 
the discretion to consider the availability of facilities and 
their costs in the first instance, it had the inherent power to 
reconsider its initial decision when confronted with more 
complete information.  We disagree. 
¶32 Wisconsin Stat. §  980.08(5) sets forth the procedures 
to be followed if supervisory release is deemed appropriate.  
Section 980.08(5) provides in relevant part: 
(5) If the court finds that the person is appropriate 
for supervised release, the court shall notify the 
department. . . . If the county department of the 
person’s county of residence declines to prepare a 
plan, the department may arrange for another county to 
prepare the plan if that county agrees to prepare the 
plan and if the person will be living in that county. 
 If the department is unable to arrange for another 
county to prepare a plan, the court shall designate a 
county department to prepare the plan, order the 
county department to prepare the plan and place the 
person 
on 
supervised 
release 
in 
that 
county. . . . [Emphasis added.] 
¶33 The language of Wis. Stat. § 980.08(5) is clear.  
Supervised release has been deemed appropriate; all that remains 
is the development and implementation of a treatment plan.  If 
DHFS is unable to arrange for a county through DHFS to prepare a 
plan, then the circuit court shall designate a county to prepare 
a plan, it shall order the county to prepare a plan, and it 
No. 97-3524 
 
16
shall place the person on supervised release in that county 
after the plan has been completed.  Id.  The statute places 
these mandatory duties on the circuit court.  See Keding, 214 
Wis. 2d at 371.  Nothing in § 980.08(5) allows the court to 
reconsider its decision on supervisory release because of 
inadequate facilities; rather, it must order a county to develop 
a plan, and it must place the person on supervised release 
pursuant to the plan in that county.  § 980.08(5).   
¶34 The State relies on State v. Brady, 130 Wis. 2d 443, 
388 N.W.2d 151 (1986) and State v. Castillo, 205 Wis. 2d 599, 
606, 556 N.W.2d 425 (Ct. App. 1996), for the proposition that a 
court can reconsider a commitment order for a sexually violent 
person after the original commitment order becomes unworkable.   
¶35 Brady is inapplicable.  In Brady, the state sought 
reconsideration of a suppression order based on a recently 
released United States Supreme Court decision.  Brady, 130 Wis. 
2d at 446.  This court determined that a circuit court has the 
discretion, in some circumstances, but is not compelled to 
reconsider an order under these circumstances.  Id. at 448. 
¶36 In this case, the State never sought reconsideration 
of the order for supervised release.  In fact, the circuit court 
was reviewing the proposed treatment plan for Sprosty under Wis. 
Stat. § 980.08(5); it was not reconsidering whether the State 
had proved its case for continued secure confinement under Wis. 
Stat. § 980.08(4).  Brady simply does not support the State’s 
position. 
No. 97-3524 
 
17
¶37 Castillo is distinguishable as well.  In Castillo, the 
defendant agreed to admit to the allegations in the petition for 
commitment as a sexually violent person in exchange for 
community placement.  Castillo, 205 Wis. 2d at 605.  The state 
later filed a motion to reopen and to modify the dispositional 
order because it was unable to fulfill the agreed-upon community 
placement.  Id. at 605-06.  The court of appeals held that 
because the state was unable to keep its part of the plea 
agreement that the defendant be placed under community-based 
supervision, the defendant must be allowed to withdraw his no 
contest plea to the allegations in the petition.  Id. at 610-11. 
  
¶38 Here, the State never filed a motion to reopen and 
modify the order for supervised release.  Instead, it presented 
a treatment plan that proposed not releasing Sprosty into the 
community contrary to the court’s commitment order.  Moreover, 
the 
court 
did 
not 
conduct 
a 
second 
hearing 
on 
the 
appropriateness of supervised release.  Instead, the court 
determined that it could not order a private agency to admit 
Sprosty, nor would it require the state to build facilities to 
accommodate him.  However, Wis. Stat. § 980.08(5) requires the 
court to do just that—the court must order a county to develop a 
plan and it must place the person on supervised release in that 
county once it has determined that supervised release is 
appropriate under § 980.08(4).  § 980.08(5). 
No. 97-3524 
 
18
¶39 The State seems to suggest that DHFS and the county’s 
plan to return Sprosty to secure institutional care constituted 
a satisfactory treatment plan.  We disagree. 
¶40 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 980.08(5), 
which 
governs 
the 
procedures to be followed if supervisory release is deemed 
appropriate, directs DHFS and the county department to prepare a 
plan that identifies the treatment and services, if any, that 
the person will receive in the community.  Id.  “The plan shall 
address the person’s need, if any, for supervision, counseling, 
medication, community support services, residential services, 
vocational services, and alcohol or other drug abuse treatment.” 
 Id.  The plan is to specify who is responsible for providing 
the treatment and services, and the plan must be presented to 
the court for approval within 60 days after the court finding 
that the person is appropriate for supervised release.  Id.   
¶41 A 
proposal 
to 
return 
the 
person 
to 
a 
secure 
institutional 
facility 
does 
not 
comport 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.08(5).  Section 980.08(5) directs that the plan identify 
treatment and services the person will receive in the community, 
not upon return to a secure institutional facility such as WRC. 
 We do not accept the State’s position that a “plan” to do 
No. 97-3524 
 
19
nothing constitutes a “plan” or complies with the mandatory 
directives of § 980.08(5).7   
¶42 In this case, the circuit court determined that 
Sprosty was appropriate for supervised release and treatment in 
the community.  Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 980.08(5) 
unambiguously 
directs that when supervised release is considered appropriate, 
the circuit court order a plan be developed that will achieve 
release and treatment in the community while also protecting the 
public.  The court’s order to return Sprosty to a secure 
facility was erroneous; the court should have designated and 
then ordered a county to develop a treatment plan, and ordered 
Sprosty’s supervised release in accordance with that plan.  We, 
therefore, remand the matter to the circuit court to designate 
and order 
a 
county to 
develop a 
plan, 
consistent 
with 
§ 980.08(5), that provides for Sprosty’s supervised release and 
treatment in the community.8  
V. 
                     
7 Sprosty argues that the letter from the Crawford County 
social worker, Heather Leach, to Judge Kirchman, dated March 13, 
1997, does not constitute a “plan” under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(5) 
because the “report” simply summarizes Leach’s reasons against a 
release plan.  Because we conclude that the State’s proposal to 
return Sprosty to secure institutional care does not comply with 
§ 980.08(5), we need not decide whether Leach’s letters to Judge 
Kirchman were adequate or were in the requisite form of a 
“plan.”  
8 Placement options are not limited to the county of 
residence.  Keding, 214 Wis. 2d at 370.  If the county of 
residence lacks the facilities to provide appropriate treatment, 
the circuit court may consider treatment facility options in any 
community in the state.  Id. 
No. 97-3524 
 
20
¶43 The final issue for our review is to decide who bears 
the burden of the cost of the necessary programs and facilities 
under Wis. Stat. ch. 980, the county department or DHFS.  The 
State argues that the court of appeals decision calls into 
question whether the county department or DHFS has the financial 
burden for creating the programs or facilities necessary to 
place a sexually violent person on supervised release.  The 
State maintains that Wis. Stat. ch. 980 places the financial 
burden of providing the appropriate treatment and facilities on 
DHFS.  Sprosty counters that costs are not an issue on this 
appeal because no government entity has been ordered to finance 
Sprosty’s supervised release.  Because the issue is likely to 
arise on remand, we address the question in the interest of 
judicial efficiency. 
¶44 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.12 states that DHFS “shall pay 
from the appropriations . . . for all costs relating to the 
evaluation, treatment and care of persons evaluated or committed 
under this chapter.”  Any possible questions raised by the court 
of appeals decision have been answered by the legislature. 
¶45 This position is further supported by our decision in 
Rolo v. Goers, 174 Wis. 2d 709, 497 N.W.2d 724 (1993).  In Rolo, 
we held that DHSS (now DHFS) was financially responsible to fund 
conditions of release for an indigent person committed under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.17 (1987-88) because DHSS was charged with the 
responsibility for “custody care and treatment” of such persons. 
 Rolo, 173 Wis. 2d at 
723. 
 We 
distinguished § 971.17 
commitments from county-funded treatments for civil commitments, 
No. 97-3524 
 
21
Wis. Stat. § 51.42(1)(b)(1987-88).  Rolo, 174 Wis. 2d at 722-23. 
  
¶46 Similarly, Wis. Stat. § 980.06(1) provides that a 
person found to be sexually violent “be committed to the custody 
of [DHFS] for control, care and treatment until such time as the 
person is no longer a sexually violent person.”  Section 
980.06(1) is not a form of county-funded treatments for civil 
commitments either. 
¶47 Thus, we agree with the State that the responsibility 
to find, arrange and plan for necessary programs and facilities 
is shared between DHFS and the county where the person will 
live, or such other designated county.  Wis. Stat. § 980.08(5). 
 And as requested by the State, we now hold that DHFS has the 
financial burden of paying for necessary programs and facilities 
for those persons who are evaluated or committed under Wis. 
Stat. ch. 980. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed and the cause remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
¶48 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
No. 97-3524.ssa 
 
1 
¶49 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).  I 
do not join Part V of the opinion.  I agree that the county must 
develop the plan.  Majority op. at 15-16, 19.  That's settled. 
¶50 There is no dispute in this case about who will pay 
for the programs and facilities.  No adverse parties are 
debating this issue.  This court should not be rendering an 
advisory opinion.   
¶51 The following exchange between Justice Crooks and 
defense counsel at oral argument clearly demonstrates that the 
issue of who will pay for the programs and facilities is not 
before this court.  
 
JUSTICE CROOKS:  Mr. Kelly [defense counsel], why 
shouldn't we reach the issue of who has the financial 
responsibility? 
 
MR. KELLY [defense counsel]:  Whether it's the 
state or the county?  Basically because Mr. Sprosty 
doesn't care; he wants to be released to a community 
setting.  I'm an advocate for Mr. Sprosty.  I don't 
represent the county.  We don't have a situation in 
which a county has been ordered to pay anything.  In 
fact, nobody has been ordered to do anything. 
 
JUSTICE CROOKS:  But don't you think it would 
help your client's position if indeed this court said 
the responsibility is with the state rather than with 
the county?  Don't you think that would speed things 
along a bit? 
 
MR. KELLY:  Maybe in the sense that the state has 
more money than counties do.  I could take that 
position.  But I don't think Mr. Sprosty's freedom 
should hinge on who pays, and I don't think that's the 
issue which is ripe for consideration by this court.  
Nobody raised the issue in the trial court as to 
whether the state was going to pay or whether the 
county was going to pay.  That wasn't something that 
Judge Kirchman was asked to decide.  Nobody raised 
No. 97-3524.ssa 
 
2 
that issue in the court of appeals and I don't read 
the court of appeals decision as making a decision on 
that issue.  I think what the court of appeals told 
Judge Kirchman was that he has to require a county to 
prepare a release plan and if there isn't a facility 
that is currently available then it's up to the county 
to 
create 
some 
kind 
of 
a 
release 
plan 
that 
accomplishes the goal of the statute.  The court of 
appeals didn't say who has to pay for it.  So at this 
point there hasn't been any kind of adversarial 
relationship in this case that would squarely put that 
issue before the court. 
 
JUSTICE CROOKS:  But I was just going to say that 
in telling the county that the county is to prepare 
that plan, it seems to me that impliedly the court of 
appeals is saying "County, you better have a facility 
available."  In other words, I think you can read the 
approach taken by the court of appeals as putting the 
burden on the county, and that's why it seems to me 
that you would want to take a position on behalf of 
your client.  Otherwise the next battle is going to be 
which agency, the state or the county or governmental 
organization has the 
responsibility to 
meet the 
requirement. 
 
MR. KELLY:  I'm not sure that's going to be a 
battle because I hear the state saying in this case 
that we agree we ought to pay for it. 
 
JUSTICE 
CROOKS: 
 
I 
think 
that's 
what 
Dr. 
Weinstein is saying.  I don't know if he's really able 
to speak clearly for the state in that regard. 
 
MR. KELLY:  I would hope he does but unless we 
get to a position where a county says "We have been 
ordered to pay for this and we think the state should 
pay for it" and the state then says, "No, we don't 
have 
to 
pay 
for 
it; 
it's 
the 
county's 
responsibility"until that happens there isn't any 
kind of an adversarial battle that will ripen into a 
dispute that this court should decide.  At this point, 
that issue just hasn't come up in the case because 
nobody has askedor nobody has ordered, rathera 
county to spend any money on anything. 
No. 97-3524.ssa 
 
3 
¶52 For the reasons set forth, I do not join Part V of the 
opinion.   
No. 97-3524.ssa 
 
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