Title: P. v. Carter
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S023000
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 15, 2005

1
Filed 8/15/05 (this opn. should follow companion case, S014021, also filed 8/15) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S023000 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
DEAN PHILLIP CARTER, 
) 
 
) 
San Diego County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 90280 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
Following the guilt phase of the trial, a San Diego County jury found 
defendant Dean Phillip Carter guilty of the murder of Janette Cullins.  (Pen. Code, 
§ 187, subd. (a).) 1 The jury also found defendant guilty of the burglary of 
Cullins’s inhabited residence (§§ 459, 460) and the robbery of Cullins  (§§ 211, 
213.5), finding that during the course of the burglary and the robbery, defendant 
personally inflicted great bodily injury (§12022.7).  The jury found true the special 
circumstances that the murder was committed while lying in wait, in the course of 
a robbery, and in the course of a burglary, and that defendant previously had been 
convicted of the murders of Susan Knoll, Jillette Mills, and Bonnie Guthrie.  
(§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(2), (15), (17)(i), (vii), as amended by Prop. 115, § 10, as 
approved by voters, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990).) 
                                              
1 
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
2
 
The jury further found defendant guilty of forcible rape (§ 261) and forcible 
oral copulation (§ 288, subd. (c)) arising out of his attack on Barbara S. on 
March 25, 1984 (approximately 18 days prior to the murder of Janette Cullins).  
The jury found defendant guilty of burglary of an inhabited residence (§§ 459, 
460) and robbery (§§ 211, 213.5) in connection with the attack on Barbara S.  As 
to each of the crimes committed against Barbara S., the jury found that defendant 
had used a deadly weapon, a knife.  (§§ 12022, subd. (b), 12022.3, subd. (a).) 
 
At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death.  
The court sentenced defendant to death for the murder of Janette Cullins, in 
addition to imposing a consecutive sentence of  21 years, 8 months, for the crimes 
committed against Barbara S.  This appeal is automatic.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, 
§ 11; § 1239, subd. (b).)2 
 
We set aside the special circumstance of lying in wait, but otherwise affirm 
the judgment in its entirety as to both guilt and penalty. 
FACTS 
I. 
GUILT PHASE EVIDENCE 
A. 
The Prosecution’s Case 
1. 
Overview 
 
The prosecution’s theory of the case was that defendant, spurned by a 
number of women who had rejected his clumsy, unwanted advances, embarked 
upon a crime spree that spanned approximately three weeks in the early spring of 
                                              
2  
As explained more fully in People v. Carter (Aug. 15, 2005, S014021) ___ 
Cal.4th ___, ___ [at pp. 12-13, fn. 5], the Ventura County Superior Court 
sentenced defendant to a sentence of 56 years for crimes he committed against 
Jennifer S. 
 
3
1984, and consisted of sexually assaulting, robbing, and fatally strangling various 
women whom he previously had befriended. 
 
On March 24, 1984, defendant, who was then 28 years of age, telephoned 
an acquaintance of approximately one month, Cathleen Tiner, who declined his 
invitation to “run off to Mexico and get married.”  That evening, he telephoned  
another acquaintance, Polly Haisha, then 18 years of age, informing her that he 
would be arriving in San Diego the next day.  Haisha, who had declined 
defendant’s invitation to “quit school and come sail to France,” and had cancelled 
several dates with defendant, asked him never to call her again.  Like Tiner and 
Haisha, Janette Cullins in the weeks leading up to her death also had spurned 
defendant’s advances. 
 
On March 25, 1984, Susan Loyland, with whom defendant had maintained 
a sexual relationship, traveled to Mexico without defendant, notwithstanding the 
circumstance that she previously had made plans to travel with him that day.  In 
the evening, defendant broke into Loyland’s San Diego residence, raped at 
knifepoint Barbara S., Loyland’s housemate, and also stole money from Loyland’s 
tip cache.  Loyland never heard from defendant again. 
 
On March 27, 1984, defendant, having befriended Jennifer S. in the 
preceding few days, raped her at knifepoint in her Ventura County apartment.  He 
strangled her to the point at which she lost consciousness, and stole her tip money. 
 
Defendant thereafter traveled north to the San Francisco Bay Area, and on 
April 1, 1984, encountered Tok Kim at a bar located in Lafayette.  They 
commenced a relationship over the next several days, during which period several 
witnesses observed them together.  Kim’s decomposed body was discovered on 
April 13, 1984.  Although the cause of her death could not be determined, 
strangulation could not be excluded as the cause.  Kim’s vehicle and various 
personal items were missing. 
 
4
 
Kim’s vehicle was discovered several hundred miles away in Los Angeles 
County, parked in front of the Culver City apartment in which the bodies of Susan 
Knoll and Jillette Mills were found stacked in a closed bedroom closet on 
April 12, 1984.  Mills had been sexually assaulted, and each victim had died from 
asphyxia caused by strangulation.  Knoll’s vehicle was discovered one block from 
the apartment.  Mills’s distinctive Datsun 280 ZX automobile, as well as personal 
items belonging to both victims, were missing.  
 
On April 12, 1984, the body of Bonnie Guthrie was discovered on the 
bedroom floor of her Culver City apartment.  She had been sexually assaulted and 
died from asphyxia caused by strangulation.  Personal items were missing from 
her apartment.  Later that same day, defendant made an unexpected visit to 
Cathleen Tiner at her residence in San Diego; Tiner and Janette Cullins had met 
defendant at a San Diego bar in February 1984.  Tiner told defendant she was 
expecting her date for the evening momentarily and could not see him.  Defendant 
departed.  
 
On April 14, 1984, the body of Janette Cullins was found lying in the 
closed bedroom closet of her San Diego apartment.  The cause of her death was 
asphyxia caused by strangulation.  Near the front door, the presence of wood chips 
on the floor indicated that someone had broken into her apartment.  Cullins had 
died approximately one to two days earlier.  A neighbor had observed that the 
preceding evening, Jillette Mills’s vehicle had been parked in front of Cullins’s 
residence and had departed suddenly and loudly.  Cullins’s vehicle subsequently 
was discovered several blocks away.  A videocamera at a bank automated teller 
machine on April 13 recorded a man resembling defendant retrieving money from 
Cullins’s bank account.    
 
On April 17, 1984, an Arizona highway patrol officer observed Mills’s 
vehicle traveling erratically near Ashfork, Arizona.  The officer effected a traffic 
 
5
stop and arrested defendant.  Inside the vehicle, investigators recovered numerous 
personal items linking defendant to each one of the deceased women. 
 
In order to explain certain factual differences in the crime scenes at the 
various residences where the deceased women were found, the prosecution 
theorized that the reason defendant did not conceal the bodies of Tok Kim or 
Bonnie Guthrie was that neither victim had a roommate who might discover the 
body.  With respect to the killings of Susan Knoll and Jillette Mills, the 
prosecution theorized that defendant first murdered Knoll, placing her body in the 
closet, moved her vehicle to make it appear she was not at home, and then waited 
until Jillette Mills arrived and murdered her.  The prosecution further theorized 
when defendant broke into Janette Cullins’s apartment, murdered her, concealed 
her body in the closet, and then moved her vehicle, defendant similarly may have 
intended to kill two women.  Cullins’s new roommate, Cheri Phinney, whom 
defendant had met earlier that day, was not yet in possession of an apartment key, 
however, and did not return to the apartment that evening. 
2. 
The Rape of Barbara S.  
The prosecution presented the testimony of a number of witnesses to 
establish that on March 25, 1984, defendant raped Barbara S. at the residence she 
shared with Susan Loyland in the marina area of Bay Park, located in San Diego. 3 
                                              
3  
Prior to the preliminary hearing in this case, Barbara S. suffered severe 
strokes, and at the time of trial she was relegated to setting forth her answers to 
counsel’s examination by typing them on a typewriter.  The court appointed a 
court intern as a “neutral interpreter.”  As Barbara S. typed responses to the 
questions posed, the intern read them aloud to the jury.  The court admonished the 
jury that Barbara S.’s “physical condition was unrelated to the events of March 
25[, 1984].”  
 
Outside the presence of the jury, through the proffered testimony of 
Barbara S.’ s tenant and housemate, Susan Loyland, the defense sought to 
establish that Barbara S. had been a heavy drinker at the time of the attack.  
 (footnote continued on next page) 
 
6
Barbara S. testified that on that date, she performed yard work at her 
residence for most of the day, ate dinner, then fell asleep while watching 
60 Minutes on television in her bedroom.  She awakened to find a man grabbing 
her and dragging her from her bed.  The man held at her throat a “sturdy knife” 
with a blade about six inches in length.  The man repeatedly demanded money and 
held her while he rummaged through her purse.  When he sought more money, 
Barbara S. directed him to the dresser, where she had $200.  That money was 
missing after the attack. 
The man then pushed Barbara S. to her knees and repeatedly told her not to 
look at him.  While he still held the knife, the man forced her to orally copulate 
him.  Barbara S. complied because she was frightened.  She recalled that 
notwithstanding her compliance, the man’s penis was “semi-flaccid” and “nothing 
to write home about.” 
Shortly thereafter, the man bent Barbara S. over the bed facedown and 
raped her;  the man never attained a full erection, and the incident lasted “maybe a 
very short time.”  
The man then “hog-tied” Barbara S.’s hands and feet behind her with her 
pantyhose, and she heard her car keys being removed from her purse. The man 
departed, telling Barbara S. that “you shouldn’t sleep with the TV on.”  Thereafter, 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
Barbara S. acknowledged having had “two drinks before and during supper, but 
was not impaired or drunk.”  The defense noted that in her testimony given at the 
preliminary hearing, Barbara S. recalled the number of drinks of “scotch and 
water” she had consumed prior to the attack as “about three,” and that she had 
started drinking in the late afternoon.  Barbara S. denied suffering from alcoholism 
in March 1984.  The trial court disallowed the introduction of the proffered 
evidence relating to her drinking habits. 
 
7
she heard “[a] motor sound, and he screeched off.”  She partially freed herself by 
hobbling to the dishwasher, extracting a knife with her teeth, and using the knife to 
cut the ligature that bound her feet and hands. 
Helen McGirr, a neighbor who was a retired registered nurse, testified that 
she heard Barbara S.’s cries for help and directed her husband to contact the 
police, who arrived at the scene approximately 10 minutes later.  McGirr found 
Barbara S. “laying in kind of a curled-up position unclothed at the front door right 
in the doorway” and noticed that Barbara S.’s hands were “dark blue, almost 
black” from having been tied up.  McGirr was certain Barbara S. was not under 
the influence of alcohol.  
San Diego Police Department Detective Ken Creese testified that in his  
interview with Barbara S. shortly after the attack, the victim appeared “to be upset, 
shaken, somewhat traumatized,” and was unable to identify her assailant. 
Susan Loyland testified that she rented a room in Barbara S.’s residence at 
the time of the attack, and had maintained a sexual relationship with defendant in 
the weeks immediately prior to the attack.  Loyland had discussed traveling with 
defendant to Rosarito Beach, Mexico, on March 25, 1984, but left without him 
that morning when she was unable to locate him.  Loyland suspected defendant 
might have been Barbara S.’s assailant, and so informed the police on the night of 
the attack.4   
                                              
4  
Loyland worked as a bartender at The Lost Knight Bar, which she 
described as “ a cocktail lounge, kind of a dive,” where she met defendant.  She 
testified that she had been “pretty high [on alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine] most 
of the time” she spent with defendant, had brought him to her bedroom on several 
occasions in February and March 1984, and recalled that on at least one occasion, 
defendant had met the owner of the house, Barbara S.  Barbara S. testified to 
having previously met defendant early one morning:  “I saved him from getting 
the hell beat out of him by [Loyland’s] regular boyfriend by waking him up.” 
 
8
Based upon information supplied by Loyland, police investigators placed 
defendant’s photograph in a photo lineup.  Barbara S. was unable to identify the 
perpetrator from the lineup, but told one detective that the voice of her attacker 
sounded similar to that of defendant’s.  She testified that during the attack, she 
thought she recognized her assailant’s voice but could not identify it, and after 
seeing news reports of defendant’s arrest several weeks later, “it came together 
like a ton of bricks” that the man’s voice was defendant’s.  At trial, Barbara S. 
identified defendant as the man who had attacked her.  
Following the attack, Barbara S. noticed her kitchen and bedroom 
telephone lines had been cut, and that a window screen in Loyland’s room was 
“bent out at a 45-degree angle.”  Loyland determined that some tip money was 
missing from a concealed location near the window.  She testified:  “nobody 
would look in the place that I had it . . . . you’d have to know that the coins were 
in there.”  Defendant occasionally had accompanied her home after work, and had 
seen her conceal her tip money, usually “between 10 and 20 bucks a night in 
coins.”  Loyland never saw or heard from defendant after March 25, 1984.  
Barbara S.’s next-door neighbor, Janell Barksdale, testified that 
approximately 6:00 p.m. on March 25, she observed a man whom she did not 
recognize walk toward Barbara S.’s residence.  The man had dark hair, a 
moustache, an olive complexion, and “was attractive . . . nice to look at.”  Upon 
learning of the attack upon Barbara S., Barksdale told investigators of having seen 
a man in the area that evening.  Three years later, upon seeing a photograph of 
defendant in the newspaper, Barksdale contacted investigators to inform them that 
she recognized the person in the newspaper photograph as the man she had 
observed.  At trial, she identified defendant as the man she saw that night. 
 
9
3. 
The Rape of Jennifer S. 
Over defendant’s objection, the prosecution commenced its case by 
presenting, under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), substantially the 
same evidence pertaining to the March 29, 1984 attack on Jennifer S. in Ventura, 
as is summarized in People v. Carter, supra, ___ Cal.4th at page ___ [at 
pp. 12-13].  
4. 
The Death of Tok Kim  
The prosecution introduced evidence pertaining to the Alameda County 
death of Tok Kim in early April 1984.  With two exceptions, the evidence was 
substantially similar to that summarized in People v. Carter, supra, ___ Cal.4th at 
page ___ [at pp. 2-4]. 
The first exception involved the testimony of Eddis Jeffrey, who did not 
testify in defendant’s Los Angles County murder trial.   Jeffrey, an apartment 
maintenance worker at the building in which Kim resided, testified that he saw 
defendant and Kim arrive at her apartment building on the afternoon of April 9 
and leave shortly thereafter in the same vehicle.  That was the last time Jeffrey saw 
Kim.  Jeffrey acknowledged that prior to trial, he had identified in a police photo 
lineup prior to trial an individual other than defendant as the person he had seen 
with Kim. 
The second exception involved the testimony of Dr. Byron Blackbourne, a 
forensic pathologist employed by the San Diego County Medical Examiner.  Over 
defendant’s objection, Dr. Blackbourne stated that after reviewing the Kim 
autopsy and crime scene photographs, he believed that her death possibly could 
have been caused by asphyxiation due to ligature strangulation. 
 
10
5. 
The Fatal Strangulations of Susan Knoll and Jillette 
Mills 
The prosecution introduced evidence pertaining to the fatal strangulations 
on or about April 10-11, 1984, of roommates Susan Knoll and Jillette Mills in Los 
Angeles County.  The evidence was substantially similar to that summarized in 
People v. Carter, supra, ___ Cal.4th at page ___ [at pp. 5-7]. 
6. 
The Fatal Strangulation of Bonnie Guthrie  
The prosecution introduced evidence pertaining to the fatal strangulation on 
or about April 11, 1984, of Bonnie Guthrie in Los Angeles County.  The evidence 
was substantially similar to that summarized in People v. Carter, supra, ___ 
Cal.4th at page ___ [at pp. 7-8]. 
7. 
The Fatal Strangulation of Janette Cullins  
The prosecution presented evidence, summarized below, establishing that 
defendant and Janette Cullins had been casually acquainted during the several 
weeks preceding Cullins’s death on April 12 or 13, 1984, and that defendant 
fatally strangled her.  
a. Cullins’s acquaintance with defendant in early 1984  
 
On Saturday evening, February 25, 1984, Janette Cullins and a friend, 
Cathleen Tiner, went to Jose Murphy’s, a Pacific Beach nightclub that was 
featuring Cullins’s and Tiner’s favorite band.  The band stopped playing at 1:30 
a.m. (February 26), and the women walked across the street to the Old Pacific 
Beach Café.  They were hungry and knew the café served breakfast until 3:00 a.m. 
 
Cathleen Tiner testified:  “When we got into the restaurant there was still a 
real good crowd, so we decided, let’s have a drink, let’s go over to the bar and see 
if we can get a drink before we go over to breakfast. . . .  [¶]  [However, t]here was 
a very large crowd there.  We were getting bumped around a lot.  We could not get 
to the bar at all.  We were far away from it. . . .  [¶]  Mr. Carter came up to us and, 
 
11
at that time, we didn’t know his name, and . . . said my friend’s at the bar, would 
you like me to order some drinks for you?  [¶]  We said yes, and he said what 
would you like?  [¶]  We said two Harvey Wallbangers.  [¶]  And so he yelled at 
this friend who was standing over to the bar, [‘]hey Antoine [whose last name was  
Masure], two Harvey Wallbangers.[’] ” 
 
Tiner added:  “Very shortly thereafter, [defendant’s] friend came through 
the crowd with our drinks and with their drinks.  I offered to pay for the drinks.  I 
kept trying to pay for them.  [¶]  [Masure] kept saying no, no, no.   [¶]  . . . I kept 
insisting on paying for the drinks.  He wouldn’t take the money. . . .  [¶]  [Masure] 
just took our drinks and walked over to a table and sat them down on a table, and 
we ended up sitting down with them. . . .  [¶]  We talked briefly.  Dean asked 
Janette ⎯ I heard Dean ask Janette for her phone number.”  Tiner testified that 
Cullins eventually gave defendant her telephone number, and that defendant asked 
the two women whether they had roommates or lived alone.  Tiner gave Masure a 
card with her own telephone number on it. 
 
Tiner further testified that defendant and Masure wanted the women to 
accompany them “someplace else,” but the men did not provide a further 
description.  The women declined:  “Well, we said the right way for you to do it 
would be to call us and ask us out rather than try for us to go out with you now.  
[¶]  Antoine said we’ll go into the twin phone booths and you stand in the other 
and we’ll call you.  Then everything will be okay.  [¶]  We didn’t agree with that 
idea, so Dean Carter said how about dinner. . . .  [¶]  I said when.  He said 
Antoine’s a great cook, how about dinner.  I said when, and they said we’ll call 
you. . . .  [¶]  We left shortly thereafter. I would say we were there less than an 
hour. . . .  [¶]  Mr. Carter said we’ll walk you to your car because we don’t want 
anyone to get you, or attack you in the parking lot.  So they walked us to my car 
and we drove off.” 
 
12
 
A few days later, defendant and Masure invited the women to have dinner 
with them on March 2, 1984, on their “yacht” named the Sea Quest, which was 
docked near Harbor Drive.5  The four had dinner on the vessel without incident, 
with the exception that Cullins’s vehicle did not start immediately when the 
women departed that evening.  Defendant and Masure, together with a third party 
who arrived with cables, assisted the women in “jump-starting” the vehicle.  On 
the way home, Tiner and Cullins discussed the evening.  Tiner related Masure’s 
observation that he thought Cullins had not been ready to leave and wanted to stay 
with defendant. Cullins replied:  “No way.  I had no intentions of spending the 
night with him, and if he ever calls me again, I will tell him that.” 
 
Two days later, on March 4, defendant telephoned Tiner, informing her that 
he had spent the day sightseeing with Cullins, and wanted to know whether Tiner 
“wanted to go out and do something with him that night.”  Tiner declined. 
 
Defendant telephoned Tiner again on March 24, 1984, indicating that he 
wanted to see Cullins “one time before he went back to Alaska.”  Tiner falsely 
informed defendant that she was unaware of Cullins’s whereabouts.  “He said to 
me, why don’t I come down there and we can run off to Mexico and get married.”  
Tiner declined that offer, as well as defendant’s invitation to go out with him on 
the following evening.6  
                                              
5 
At a foundational hearing conducted outside the jury’s presence, Tiner 
testified that the Sea Quest was neither a yacht, nor a sailboat, but actually a metal 
vessel that she characterized as rusty, greasy, and cluttered ⎯ a platform for large 
cranes, littered with junk all over the deck ⎯ not a pleasure boat that one would 
use for sailing on the bay.  
6  
March 25, 1984, was the date on which defendant attacked Barbara S.  
(Ante, at pp. 5-8.)  
 
13
 
Tiner then telephoned Cullins to inform her that defendant was looking for 
her.  Cullins replied:  “I thought I’d gotten rid of him.  Now I won’t be able to 
answer the phone.”  Tiner further testified:  “[Cullins] was angry.  She was upset 
about it that he was calling again.”  Nancy McEachern, Cullins’s former 
roommate, testified that when she had shared an apartment with Cullins and the 
telephone rang, Cullins on multiple occasions had informed her:  “If that’s Dean, I 
don’t want to talk to him.”7  
b. The events leading to the discovery of Janette Cullins’s 
body  
 
Janette Cullins resided in apartment B, located at 3972 Kendall Street in the 
Pacific Beach neighborhood of San Diego.  In search of a new roommate, Cullins 
placed an advertisement in The Reader, a local free newspaper.  Cheri Phinney 
responded to the ad and began moving into the apartment during the second week 
of April 1984. 
 
On Thursday, April 12, 1984, Phinney and Cullins spent the day at the 
apartment.  Phinney painted her new bedroom and bathroom, while Cullins kept 
her company, vacuumed the carpet, and performed other housekeeping chores.  
Approximately midafternoon, Cullins responded to a knock at her door.  The 
visitor was defendant, and Cullins returned to Phinney, asking her “to come 
through the living room so that he [defendant] would be aware that there was 
someone else in the house.”  Defendant stayed for approximately one hour, asking 
                                              
7  
Nancy’s McEachern’s testimony on this point was illuminated by Tiner’s 
testimony that one reason Jeanette Cullins was not interested in becoming 
involved with defendant was that “he was a drug user” and Cullins was 
“completely antidrug.” 
 
14
questions such as how long she planned to continue painting.  Shortly thereafter 
Cullins informed Phinney that defendant had departed.8 
 
At approximately 6:30 p.m., Cullins left the apartment, informing Phinney 
that Cullins was planning to attend the symphony with her friend, Cathleen Tiner.9  
Shortly thereafter, Phinney answered a telephone call and wrote down a message 
on a piece of paper.  The paper was whole when Phinney wrote the message, and 
she left blank the top portion of the paper.  When Phinney left the apartment at 
approximately 7:15 p.m., the drapes and blinds were open.  As she locked the door 
upon leaving, Phinney did not notice any damage to the front door frame. 
 
Cathleen Tiner testified that after she and Cullins attended the symphony, 
the two women went to a restaurant and then returned to Tiner’s apartment, where 
they watched television until 11:00 p.m.  Cullins informed Tiner that defendant 
was back in town.  After watching television with Tiner, Cullins left to return to 
her own apartment.  Tiner never saw Cullins alive again.  
 
Leanne Johnson, who resided across the street from Cullins’s apartment, 
testified that at approximately 11:15 p.m. on April 12, she heard the engine of a 
                                              
8  
David Susi testified that at approximately 4:00 p.m., on April 12, 1984,  
defendant, driving a vehicle with the license plate “PHANTM Z,” pulled up next 
to Susi’s vehicle at an intersection in Pacific Beach and asked for directions to 
Mission Beach.  Subsequently shown a police photo lineup, Susi selected 
defendant’s photograph as depicting the man whom he saw driving the car, stating, 
“I think that’s him, but I can’t be sure.”  Susi acknowledged on cross-examination 
that during an interview with investigators conducted on June 1, 1984, Susi 
recalled that the date on which he saw the vehicle was either April 11 or 12, 1984. 
9  
There is a discrepancy in the testimony pertaining to the precise time that 
Cullins departed from the apartment.  Phinney fixed the time of Cullins’s 
departure at approximately 6:30 p.m.  Tiner testified that Cullins arrived at Tiner’s 
apartment, an approximate 20-minute drive from Cullins’s residence, at 6:10 p.m.  
The discrepancy does not appear to have any significance. 
 
15
vehicle running for about 10 minutes. Johnson peered through her drapes and 
observed a white vehicle that she identified as matching the white Datsun 280 ZX 
that defendant was driving when later arrested.  Johnson testified:  “It was 
probably 11:30 just before the news went off that I heard the car move out of the 
parking space and make a U-turn and it almost hit a pickup truck at the house next 
to mine.  [¶]  It just went up the street.  It didn’t stop at the stop sign . . . .  [¶]  . . . I 
mean whoever was in the car sort of pulled out fast, and it was a big loud noise 
and I did look out and I did see him make a U-turn and almost hit the pickup 
truck.” 
 
Throughout the next day, Cheri Phinney attempted to contact Cullins 
without success.  Nancy McEachern testified that on April 13, she was 
unsuccessful several times in attempting to contact Cullins by telephone.  Cullins’s 
telephone answering machine, which usually was switched on, was not activated.  
Concerned, McEachern drove to Cullins’s apartment around midday.  When she 
arrived, “another car pulled up on the opposite side of the street from me, and a 
man got out of the car and asked me if Jan was home. . . .  [¶]  I said no, it doesn’t 
look like she’s home, her car is not here, I assume she’s not.  This person had 
identified himself as Dean. . . .  [¶]  He was driving a white [Datsun] Z with a 
black bra on the front of the car.”  McEachern identified the individual who spoke 
with her as defendant.  
 
McEachern had moved out of the apartment on April 6, but had retained a 
key in order to return on the morning of April 14 for the purpose of conducting a 
yard sale.  McEachern entered the apartment (alone), stayed less than 15 minutes, 
left a message for Cullins, and departed.  McEachern testified: “The apartment 
was closed up.  Everything was pretty dark.  The blinds were drawn, were closed 
very tightly, and all the windows, especially the window in the kitchen, which is a 
place we never close them in [sic].”  McEachern explained that the living room 
 
16
drapes also were drawn, an unusual circumstance, adding that when she and 
Cullins shared the apartment, they never adjusted the window coverings to their 
completely closed position.  Although McEachern entered Cullins’s bedroom, the 
closet doors were shut, and she did not look inside the closet. 
 
Shortly after 6:00 p.m. on the evening of April 13, as Cathleen Tiner was 
preparing to attend a San Diego Padres baseball game with a friend, defendant 
arrived unexpectedly at Tiner’s front door, “better groomed than I had ever seen 
him before.”  He wore a beige sweater with a brown windowpane check.10  Tiner 
testified:  “I was very surprised. . . .  [¶]  I said Dean, I’m sorry I can’t invite you 
in.  I have company coming over.  You should have called. . . .  [¶]  And he said 
[‘][W]ell, I was here in the neighborhood, I just thought I’d stop by.[’]  [¶]  He 
said, [‘]Did Jan [Cullins] tell you I was in town?[’]  [¶]  And I said yes, she did.  
[¶]  And he said, [‘]I told her not to tell you that.[’]  [¶]  I said, well, she did.  I’m 
sorry I can’t invite you in.  You have to leave.  I have . . . company coming over.  I 
have to go.  [¶]  And then [defendant] put his chin up like this, and said, [‘]Do you 
know she stood me up today?[’]  [¶]  I said, no, I didn’t.”  Tiner shut the door, 
unsuccessfully attempted to reach Cullins by telephone, and then attended the 
baseball game.  
 
On the morning of April 14, Cheri Phinney again attempted to contact 
Cullins, and Nancy McEachern answered the telephone.  McEachern informed 
Phinney that Cullins was not at home.  Phinney drove to the apartment, arriving at 
                                              
10  
The sweater had been knitted by murder victim Bonnie Guthrie, whom 
defendant had fatally strangled two days earlier.  
 
17
about 8:30 a.m.  McEachern was there with her fiancé.  The drapes and curtains 
were closed.  Phinney noticed wood chips on the floor by the front door.11   
 
Because Phinney and McEachern had expected Cullins to be at the 
apartment, they began to search for a note from her, or a document with her 
license plate number in the event they needed that information to ascertain from 
local authorities whether Cullins had been involved in a traffic accident.  In the 
course of searching for this information, McEachern opened a bedroom closet 
door and discovered the partially clothed body of Janette Cullins, lying on some 
boxes.  McEachern’s fiancé contacted the police. 
c. The police investigation 
 
Richard Thwing, a San Diego police officer assigned to the police 
department’s homicide division, testified that the front door of Janette Cullins’s 
apartment displayed signs that a forced entry had been made.  Cullins’s body was 
lying in the bedroom closet.  Her neck bore what appeared to be a ligature mark. 
 
Adolph Romero III testified that on the morning of April 14, 1984, as he 
was walking to work near the Point Loma piers by North Harbor Drive in San 
Diego, he retrieved a wallet he noticed in some bushes near the sidewalk.  The 
wallet contained a driver’s license and other identification items and credit cards 
in the name of Janette Cullins.  Cullins’s father later identified the wallet as having 
belonged to her.  Because Romero had an important appointment that morning, he 
                                              
11  
On cross-examination, the defense partially impeached Phinney insofar as 
having seen wood chips by the front door on the morning that Cullins’s body was 
discovered.  Phinney acknowledged she had not recalled seeing the wood chips 
until police mentioned this detail during one of their interviews with her several 
months later.  On redirect examination, Phinney testified that she told investigators 
on April 14 that when she departed from the apartment two days earlier, she had 
not noticed any damage to the doorjamb. 
 
18
gave the wallet to a friend, Robert Pack, who gave the wallet to the police.  During 
the same week that Romero found the wallet, he also had seen parked within one 
block of that location a white Datsun 280 ZX. 
 
Dannis Nuckolls, who worked as a San Diego Police Department evidence 
technician in April 1984, testified that in conducting an inventory of the contents 
of Cullins’s wallet, he found a driver’s license and various identification cards, all 
in the name of Bonnie Guthrie.  On April 14, 1984, San Diego police officers 
recovered Guthrie’s purse from the same North Harbor Drive area. 
 
Hormez Guard, a forensic pathologist, performed an autopsy on Janette 
Cullins at 9:00 a.m. on April 15, 1984.  Dr. Guard testified that the cause of 
Cullins’s death was asphyxia due to ligature strangulation, adding that he found 
evidence the victim had suffered “a sharply cutting incised wound” inflicted “after 
death, or . . . when the person was dying,” consistent with the use of a sharp knife.  
There was no evidence of sexual assault.  On cross-examination, Dr. Guard stated 
that the time of Cullins’s death was between 24 and 48 hours prior to the time that 
he performed the autopsy. 
 
George Cullins, Janette’s father, testified that he had purchased a Triumph 
TR 7 for Janette in 1980 or 1981.  At the time of purchase, the vehicle bore a 
personalized license plate that read “SHYLAS,” which she ultimately replaced.12 
 
Susan Seminoff, a friend of Cullins’s, testified that in December 1980 she 
and Janette went together to open checking accounts at San Diego Federal Bank, 
which subsequently changed its name to Great American Bank (and later, after 
Cullins’s murder, to Wells Fargo Bank.)  Seminoff recalled that in selecting an 
                                              
12  
On April 14, 1984, Janette Cullins’s father noticed her car parked about one 
and one-half blocks from her apartment.  She usually parked her vehicle directly in 
front of her apartment. 
 
19
ATM card password, Cullins picked the word from her license plate, “SHYLAS.”  
The word “SHYLAS” was written on the back of a torn Alpha Beta Supermarket 
receipt recovered by investigators from the “Members Only” brand jacket found in 
the Datsun 280 ZX that defendant was driving when he was arrested. 
 
Sandra Homewood, an examiner of questioned documents employed by the 
San Diego County District Attorney’s Office, testified that in comparing 
exemplars of defendant’s handwriting with entries found in his address book, 
Homewood discerned several “unique and conspicuous characteristics” and made 
a “positive identification” that defendant had written in his address book the 
names Susan Loyland (rape victim Barbara S.’s tenant, see pp. 5-8, ante), Janette 
Cullins, Cathleen Tiner, and Susan Knoll.  With regard to the slip of paper that 
read “SHYLAS,” Homewood was unable to eliminate defendant or identify him as 
the writer.  In comparing the note to an exemplar of Janette Cullins’s handwriting, 
Homewood indicated there existed “very strong indications” that Cullins had 
written it. 
 
Great American Bank records revealed that on April 13, 1984, a withdrawal 
from Janette Cullins’s account in the amount of $60.00 (leaving an account 
balance of $4.06) was made from an automatic teller machine located at the bank’s 
Point Loma branch.  A four-minute videotape of the transaction was introduced 
into evidence and shown to the jury.  The tape depicted a man wearing a sweater 
(identified as having been knitted by Bonnie Guthrie) and a black jacket. 
8. 
Defendant’s Arrest 
 
The prosecution introduced evidence pertaining to defendant’s April 17, 
1984 arrest in Arizona that was substantially similar to that summarized in 
People v. Carter, supra, ___ Cal.4th at page ___ [at pp. 10-11], with one 
noteworthy addition, as follows.  In the trial conducted in the present case, the 
 
20
prosecution introduced the testimony of Jerald McKeand, a Deputy Sheriff 
employed by Yavapai County, Arizona, who recalled that at the time of 
defendant’s arrest, defendant wore cutoff jeans, a gray sweatshirt, tennis shoes, 
and green socks.  Defendant also wore a gold necklace that had belonged to Tok 
Kim and a workout shirt that had belonged to Jillette Mills.  
9. 
The Contents of the Datsun 280 ZX 
 
The prosecution introduced evidence pertaining to the contents of the 
Datsun 280 ZX that defendant was driving when he was stopped and arrested in 
Arizona.  The evidence was substantially similar to that summarized in People v. 
Carter, supra, ___ Cal.4th at page ___ [at pp. 11-12]. 
B. 
The Defense Case 
 
Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court informed defendant that he 
had the right either to testify or not to testify.  Defendant replied that he was not 
going to testify.   
 
Unlike defendant’s trial in Los Angeles County, in which the defense did 
not present any evidence at the guilt phase (see  People v. Carter, supra, ___ 
Cal.4th at page ___ [at p. 12]), the defense at this trial introduced the testimony of 
witnesses  pertaining to the Los Angles County murders of Susan Knoll, Jillette 
Mills, and Bonnie Guthrie, the San Diego County murder of Janette Cullins, and 
the San Diego rape of Barbara S. 
1. 
The Los Angeles County Murders  
 
The defense introduced the testimony of Ronald C. Tulio, an employee of 
the United States Postal Service, who had been Susan Knoll’s boyfriend and also 
was acquainted with Knoll’s roommate, Jillette Mills, and their friend, Bonnie 
Guthrie.  Tulio testified that he and Knoll had lived together from July 1983 to 
February 1984, after which Knoll moved in with Mills.  In the immediate 
 
21
aftermath of the Los Angeles County murders, members of the Culver City Police 
Department interviewed Tulio. 
 
On cross-examination, Tulio acknowledged that his breakup with Knoll had 
been an emotional one, and that on the afternoon of April 12, 1984, Culver City 
Police Department officers investigating the Los Angeles County murders arrested 
him and detained him at the Culver City jail for four days.  On the night of April 
12, 1984, when Janette Cullins was murdered in San Diego County, Tulio was in 
police custody. 
 
When asked on cross-examination what defense counsel had told Tulio he 
(Tulio) might testify about, Tulio recalled counsel stating:  “He [defense counsel] 
said all he wanted to do was have me say that obviously the Culver City Police 
Department made a mistake in arresting me, saying that San Diego [Police 
Department] could make the same mistake arresting the wrong guy.” 
 
Culver City Police Officer Craig Bloor testified that at the time of the Los 
Angeles County murders, he resided in an apartment building adjacent to the 
building in which the bodies of Susan Knoll and Jillette Mills were discovered. 
April 10, 1984, at approximately 8:30 p.m., Officer Bloor noticed someone he did 
not recognize walking from the next-door apartments to the street.  Upon learning 
several days later of the double homicide that had occurred in the adjacent 
building, Officer Bloor identified a photograph of Ronald Tulio as depicting the 
man he saw on April 10. 
 
On cross-examination, however, Officer Bloor testified that when he 
observed Tulio at the police station, he recognized some similarities to the person 
he saw on April 10 but also noticed several differences, and concluded Tulio was 
not the man he had seen on that date.  Instead, Officer Bloor identified defendant 
in court as the man he noticed on April 10, adding that the man was wearing a 
“ ‘Members Only’ style cut jacket that was popular then.” 
 
22
 
On cross-examination, Officer Bloor acknowledged having spoken with 
defendant on April 10:  “I asked him what he was doing in the area, and he said he 
was looking for a friend’s house . . . .  [¶] . . . [¶] Then he says[,] ‘[W]hy, do I look 
suspicious[?’]  [¶]  I said yeah, you could.  Then he said[, ‘]It’s good that you 
check.[’]  Then he left.”  Defendant held “some kind of blue folder or something 
like that” that Officer Bloor recalled was “very similar” to a blue folder the 
prosecution previously had introduced into evidence.  The folder, which contained 
a photograph of defendant, was among the items that investigators recovered from 
Jillette Mills’s Datsun 280 ZX.  
2. 
The Murder of Janette Cullins 
 
The defense presented the testimony of Michael T. Palermo, who in 1984 
was employed as a San Diego Police Department latent print examiner.  Palermo 
testified that as part of the Cullins murder investigation, he examined latent 
fingerprint impressions recovered from Cullins’s apartment, but none matched 
defendant’s. 
 
The defense also presented the testimony of William W. Loznycky, Jr., 
who in 1984 worked as a San Diego Police Department criminalist.  Loznycky 
testified that neither fibers found on the hand of Janette Cullins, nor head or pubic 
hairs recovered from a blanket and sheets found in her residence, could be 
matched to defendant or his clothing.  On cross-examination, Loznycky testified 
that he also examined an “O-type” bloodstain taken from the crime scene that did 
not match the victim’s blood, but could have been left by defendant, whom 
Loznycky characterized as having an “O” blood type. 
 
Finally, the defense presented the testimony of Lauren Carville, who 
resided in the apartment one floor below the one occupied by Cullins.  Carville 
testified that she and Cullins had sunbathed in their shared backyard during the 
 
23
afternoon of April 12, during which time an acquaintance of Cullins visited with 
Cullins for about 15 minutes.  Carville saw Cullins depart in her vehicle that 
evening at approximately 7:00 p.m., after which Carville went out.  Returning at 
approximately midnight, Carville noticed that Cullins’s vehicle was not parked in 
front of their apartment building, where Cullins normally parked her car. 
3. 
The Rape of Barbara S. 
 
The defense presented the testimony of San Diego Police Department 
Officer Gene Loucks, who interviewed Barbara S. shortly after she was attacked.  
Officer Loucks testified that Barbara S. was unable to recall several physical 
attributes of her assailant.  
II. Penalty Phase Evidence 
A. 
The Prosecution’s Case 
 
The prosecution introduced into evidence the abstracts of judgment from 
defendant’s prior burglary convictions in Oregon and Alaska and, over 
defendant’s objection, his prior rape conviction in Ventura County.  (See People v. 
Carter, supra, ___ Cal.4th at page ___ [at pp. 12-14].) 
 
The prosecution also introduced evidence that a deputy sheriff discovered 
in defendant’s San Diego County jail cell a homemade knife or “shank” wrapped 
in masking tape, as well as a 22-inch pipe.  San Diego Police Department Sergeant 
Carlos Chacon testified over defendant’s objection that weapons such as those 
seized from defendant’s cell could have been smuggled into the jail in parts and 
assembled, and that the shank found in defendant’s cell was designed as an 
offensive weapon to inflict serious bodily injury. 
B. 
The Defense Case 
 
The defense introduced extensive evidence pertaining to defendant’s 
difficult childhood and upbringing in Alaska (defendant is part Eskimo), as well as 
 
24
evidence that he was an accomplished and cooperative television cameraman and 
a good father and friend.  The evidence was substantially similar to that 
summarized in People v. Carter, supra, ___ Cal.4th at page ___ [at pp. 14-16].13 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
PRETRIAL ISSUES 
A. 
Double Jeopardy and Multiple Punishment 
 
Several weeks prior to the commencement of jury selection, defendant filed 
motions to dismiss the proceedings against him on the grounds of double jeopardy, 
collateral estoppel, and the statutory prohibition against multiple punishment.  In 
the alternative, defendant moved “to sever the trial of the issues raised by his pleas 
of once in jeopardy and former conviction . . . from the trial of his guilt or 
innocence of the crimes charged in the information.”  Defendant asserted that he 
previously had been placed in jeopardy in the Los Angeles County proceedings, 
and that during those proceedings the jury heard and considered both evidence and 
argument suggesting defendant was responsible for the murder of Janette Cullins.  
Having been sentenced to death in those proceedings, defendant sought, on state 
and federal constitutional grounds, the dismissal of the San Diego County charge 
that he murdered Cullins. 
 
The trial court denied defendant’s motions, stating, among its reasons:  “A 
legal analysis based on the statutes, case law and facts of this case as presented to 
                                              
13 
In their brief, the People observe that certain passages set forth in 
defendant’s summary of the mitigation evidence contained in the appellant’s 
opening brief were proffered but were not presented to the jury.  The People 
contend the proffered testimony is irrelevant and should be stricken from the brief 
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 436.  The point is a minor one, and in 
fact the brief observes, albeit indirectly, that the evidence was not presented to the 
jury.  We therefore deny the People’s request. 
 
25
the court for purposes of these motions shows there is no legal basis for a finding 
by the court of once in jeopardy. . . .  [¶]  The double jeopardy argument is 
meritless under the law and this fact situation, and therefore, the motion to dismiss 
would be denied.  [¶] . . . [¶]  This motion is so meritless that in all honesty I don’t 
see how anyone could call it incompetence of counsel not to enter the double 
jeopardy plea at the arraignment.  [¶] . . . . [¶] . . . I’m not going to allow the plea.  
I can’t do that because in my discretion there’s no legal basis for it.” 
 
On appeal, defendant reiterates the contentions he made in the trial court.  
As we shall explain, defendant’s position is procedurally barred by his own 
successful motion in the Los Angeles County proceedings to dismiss the Cullins 
murder charge.  (See People v. Carter, supra, ___ Cal.4th at p. ___ [at pp. 45-46].)  
Even were we to ignore that procedural flaw, the trial court correctly determined 
that neither double jeopardy, collateral estoppel, or section 654 considerations 
barred the San Diego proceedings, and therefore properly rejected defendant’s 
motions.14 
1. 
The Procedural Bar Based upon Defendant’s Successful 
Motion in the Los Angeles Proceedings to Sever the San 
Diego Charges 
 
As we have explained in the companion appeal, People v. Carter, supra, 
___ Cal.4th at page ___ [at p. 45], “the complaint against defendant charged all of 
                                              
14  
As we noted in another case:  “With regard both to this claim and to every 
other claim raised in his brief, defendant asserts that each alleged error violates not 
only state law but multiple provisions of the federal and California Constitutions.  
In addressing each claim discussed in this opinion, we have considered 
defendant’s contention that the alleged error violates the federal and California 
Constitutions, and our rejection of each claim of reversible error includes a 
determination that the alleged error does not warrant reversal under the state or 
federal Constitution.”  (People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1199, fn. 2.)  
 
26
the crimes allegedly committed in Alameda, Los Angeles, and San Diego Counties 
in a single pleading.  Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the charges arising 
from the Alameda and San Diego crimes committed against Tok Kim and Janette 
Cullins, respectively.  The prosecution did not oppose the motion, instead 
informing defendant that if the motion were granted, the crimes committed in 
Alameda and San Diego Counties would form the basis for a refiling of the 
charges against defendant in those counties.”  The trial court in Los Angeles 
County thereafter granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges involving the 
crimes committed in Alameda and San Diego Counties. 
 
Because defendant previously sought and obtained in Los Angeles County 
the dismissal of the San Diego charges, knowing that the dismissal would compel 
the San Diego County prosecutor to file separate charges in that county for the 
crimes defendant was alleged to have committed in that jurisdiction, defendant’s 
contention that proceeding with the San Diego County prosecution was 
fundamentally unfair or violative of his rights under the state and federal 
Constitutions is not well-taken or worthy of extensive discussion.  In view of the 
evidence linking defendant to the murder of Janette Cullins, San Diego County 
was entitled to prosecute defendant for that crime (as well as other crimes alleged 
to have been committed by defendant within that jurisdiction).  (§§ 777, 790;15 
People v. Carpenter, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 1038-1039; People v. Bradford 
(1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, 15.)  Having moved in Los Angeles County for dismissal of 
the charges involving crimes committed in San Diego, notwithstanding the 
                                              
15  
Several years after defendant’s trials, section 790 was amended to permit in 
certain circumstances the joint trial of murders committed in different counties.  
(See now § 790, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 1998, ch. 549, § 1; People v. 
Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1039, fn. 4.)  These statutory revisions are not 
material to our analysis. 
 
27
prosecutor’s representation that the motion, if granted, would effect a severance of 
the charges against defendant and a refiling in the respective counties in which the 
crimes occurred, defendant cannot now complain that severance led to a second 
murder prosecution. 
2. 
Defendant’s Jeopardy, Section 654, and Collateral 
Estoppel Claims 
 
Even if we were to assume that these claims are not barred, we would 
conclude that defendant’s contentions based upon double jeopardy principles, 
section 654, and collateral estoppel, lack merit. 
a. Double jeopardy 
 
The state and federal Constitutions declare that no person shall twice be 
placed in jeopardy for the same offense.  (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; Cal. Const., 
art. I, sect. 15.)  In Los Angeles County, defendant was placed in jeopardy for the 
murders of Susan Knoll, Jillette Mills, and Bonnie Guthrie.  In those proceedings, 
he was neither charged with, nor convicted of, any crimes pertaining to the murder 
of Janette Cullins or the rape of Barbara S.  Accordingly, jeopardy never attached 
to defendant in the Los Angeles County proceedings for the crimes committed in 
San Diego County.  (See People v. Carpenter, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1039, fn. 4.  
[“ ‘ “[T]he murder of two persons, even by the same act, constitutes two offenses, 
for each of which a separate prosecution will lie, and . . . a conviction or acquittal 
in one case does not bar a prosecution in the other.” ’  [Citations.]”]; People v. 
Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 765 [rejecting the defendant’s contention that 
double jeopardy principles should apply where the defendant already once had 
defended against the charges at the penalty phase of the earlier trial]; see also 
United States v. Watts (1997) 519 U.S. 148, 154-155.)  Accordingly, defendant’s 
double jeopardy argument must fail. 
 
28
b. Section 654 
 
Defendant’s assertion that section 654 barred the San Diego County 
prosecutor from proceeding against him is deficient for reasons analogous to those 
noted immediately above.  At the time of defendant’s trial, section 654 prescribed:  
“An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different 
provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no 
case can it be punished under more than one; an acquittal or conviction and 
sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under 
any other.”  (Stats. 1977, ch. 165, § 11, p. 644, italics added.) 
 
Because defendant was neither acquitted nor convicted of the murder of 
Janette Cullins or the rape of Barbara S. in Los Angeles County, section 654 did 
not bar the San Diego County proceedings instituted against him for those crimes.  
(People v. Carpenter, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 1038-1039 [rejecting the 
defendant’s contention that section 654 barred separate prosecutions in Marin 
County and Santa Cruz County for the crimes committed in each county]; see also 
People v. Bradford, supra, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 13-17 [where criminal behavior began 
in one county and, following a police chase, terminated in another, the crimes 
committed in each county properly were tried separately in the respective 
counties].) 
c. Collateral estoppel  
 
Defendant contends the prosecutor was barred by collateral estoppel 
principles from trying defendant in San Diego County for the murder of Janette 
Cullins and the rape of Barbara S.  We observe:  “Traditionally, collateral estoppel 
has been found to bar relitigation of an issue decided at a previous proceeding ‘if 
(1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous [proceeding] is identical to the 
one which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the previous [proceeding] resulted in a 
final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is 
 
29
asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the prior [proceeding].’  [¶]  It is 
implicit in this three-prong test that only issues actually litigated in the initial 
action may be precluded from the second proceeding under the collateral estoppel 
doctrine.  [Citation.]  An issue is actually litigated ‘[w]hen [it] is properly raised, 
by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is 
determined . . . .’ ”  (People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 484, fn. omitted; see 
also People v. Taylor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 686, 695 [the doctrine’s purposes are:  
“(1) to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation; (2) to 
prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial 
system; and (3) to provide repose by preventing a person from being harassed by 
vexatious litigation.”].)   
 
Here, the circumstance that the jury in the Los Angeles County proceedings 
never was asked to determine, and did not determine, defendant’s guilt or 
innocence of the murder of Janette Cullins and the rape of Barbara S. defeats 
defendant’s claim of collateral estoppel.  Nor would any of the purposes of the 
doctrine noted above be served by its application here. 
B. 
Motion to Disqualify the Trial Court Judge 
 
On November 5, 1990, several months prior to the commencement of trial, 
defendant filed a motion pursuant to Code of Civil procedure section 170.1, 
subdivision (a)(6), to disqualify San Diego County Superior Court Judge 
Melinda J. Lasater from presiding at his trial.16 
                                              
16  
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent 
part: 
 
“(a) A judge shall be disqualified if any one or more of the following is 
true: 
 
“[¶]  . . .  [¶] 
 
“(6) For any reason (A) the judge believes his or her recusal would further 
 (footnote continued on next page) 
 
30
 
The basis for defendant’s motion was that Judge Lasater had maintained a 
“working relationship and a friendship with the prosecutor in this case [San Diego 
County Deputy District Attorney James Pippin] such that a person aware of the 
facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be 
impartial.”17 
 
Judge Lasater thereafter conducted a hearing in which she reviewed her 
contacts with Mr. Pippin that spanned a period of approximately 16 years, noting 
the dates when they had worked together and general information pertaining to 
their social contacts.  During the hearing, Judge Lasater recalled, among other 
things, that she and Mr. Pippin had worked together in the San Diego County 
District Attorney’s Office until she left that office in 1987, that her family and his 
had gone camping with other families, that her husband had purchased his son’s 
dirt bike approximately 10 years prior to the hearing, that there had been sporadic 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
the interests of justice, (B) the judge believes there is a substantial doubt as to his 
or her capacity to be impartial, or (C) a person aware of the facts might reasonably 
entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial.  Bias or prejudice 
toward a lawyer in the proceeding may be grounds for disqualification.”  
17  
In defendant’s statement of disqualification, one of his attorneys, Josephine 
Dedina, declared:  “I accompanied Deputy District Attorney James Pippin to his 
office to arrange a telephone call to Judge Lasater to set a schedule for hearings.  
Mr. Pippin stated that he had known Judge Lasater for a long time.  He had been 
her supervisor when she worked as a Deputy District Attorney.  Mr. Pippin 
informed me that Judge Lasater had participated in his daughter’s wedding in the 
summer of 1990.  Mr. Pippin also stated that if the defense in this case filed the 
usual defense motions to declare the death penalty unconstitutional, he knew 
Judge Lasater would immediately deny them.  [¶]  This past working relationship, 
where the judge was the subordinate to the prosecutor, together with a relationship 
where Judge Lasater participated in the prosecutor’s daughter’s wedding several 
months ago, constitute facts that a person aware of those facts might reasonably 
entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial.”  
 
31
social contacts at parties, that she had performed the wedding of Mr. Pippin’s 
daughter at his daughter’s request in August 1990, that his daughter gave her a 
necklace similar to necklaces given to the bridesmaids, and that Mr. Pippin’s 
daughter had “house sat” for her approximately one year earlier, for which his 
daughter had been paid a “minimal amount.”  Judge Lasater attached a copy of the 
hearing transcript to her answer.18 
                                              
18  
Judge Lasater’s answer, in pertinent part, declared:  “The defendant in this 
case has expressed concern over my ability to be impartial due to a perceived 
personal relationship with the prosecutor in this case, Mr. James Pippin.  After 
reviewing the statement of disqualification, I conducted a hearing with all parties 
and their counsel present in which I detailed the contacts I could remember with 
Mr. Pippin over the last 17 years. . . .  [¶]  Although I was with the district 
attorney’s office for almost 13 years, I have had relatively few contacts with Mr. 
Pippin.  He was my supervisor for only four months in 1974, more than 15 years 
ago.  During my last five years with the district attorney’s office, I was a division 
chief assigned to the Juvenile Division and Mr. Pippin was assigned as a division 
chief in the Superior Court division.  We were essentially equals in this capacity 
and had very little contact.  [¶]  The social functions we both attended were 
incidental to our professional responsibilities with the district attorney’s office, 
rather than a reflection of any close personal friendship.  Our social interaction 
over the years has been no different than that of any other member of the legal 
community who occasionally engages in social activities with members of the 
profession.  [¶]  It is common practice for judges of this Court to perform wedding 
ceremonies for members of the legal community and their families.  My 
agreement to perform the wedding ceremony for Mr. Pippin’s daughter was such 
an arrangement and was done at his daughter’s request, rather than Mr. Pippin’s.  I 
was not paid to perform the ceremony and specifically indicated that no fee should 
be paid.  [¶]  Mr. Pippin’s alleged comments regarding my predilection in ruling 
on motions dealing with constitutional challenges to the death penalty, are also 
unfounded.  As I stated at the time of the hearing referenced above, I have never 
seen such a motion and would consider it premature to assume such a posture until 
I had been presented with the issue and reviewed it.  [¶]  I am neither biased nor 
prejudiced for or against Mr. Pippin, the defendant or his counsel, and am satisfied 
that I can perform my duty to decide the issues presented fairly and impartially in 
this case.” 
 
32
 
On November 30, 1990, Judge Allen J. Preckle, selected by agreement of 
the parties, conducted a hearing on defendant’s motion.  Relying on United Farm 
Workers of America v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 97, 104, and Leland 
Stanford Junior University v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 403, 408, the 
court observed that “[t]he standard [for disqualification set forth in Code of Civil 
Procedure, section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)] is fundamentally an objective one.”  
Reviewing the nature of the professional and social contacts between Judge 
Lasater and Mr. Pippin, the court viewed “as weightless, particularly given the 
substantial passage of time, the assertion that a reasonable person would doubt 
Judge Lasater’s impartiality because of her past association with Mr. Pippin . . . .  
[¶]  . . .  [¶]  This court is further satisfied that any, albeit unreasonable doubt, 
concerning Judge Lasater’s impartiality in this case would be erased by a 
reasonable person’s being apprised of Judge Lasater’s excellent reputation for 
integrity and fierce independence.  [¶]  This court, therefore, finds that a 
reasonable person, aware of all the facts, would not reasonably entertain a doubt 
that Judge Lasater will be able to be impartial in this case.”  The court thereafter 
denied defendant’s motion. 
 
Defendant did not seek review in the Court of Appeal by way of a petition 
for writ of mandate, the procedure required by Code of Civil Procedure section 
170.3, subdivision (d).19 
 
In his appeal to this court, defendant contends that the superior court below 
erred in denying his motion to disqualify Judge Lasater.  Acknowledging his 
                                              
19  
Code of Civil Procedure, section 170.3, subdivision (d), provides:  “The 
determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable 
order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court 
of appeal sought within 10 days of notice to the parties of the decision and only by 
the parties to the proceeding.”   
 
33
failure to comply with the writ review requirement set forth in Code of Civil 
Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d), defendant nevertheless asserts as a 
“structural defect” reviewable on appeal the “deni[al of] due process of law in 
violation of [the] state and federal Constitutions because the judge who presided 
over his case and who rendered the sentence of death was not impartial.” 
 
We find no merit in defendant’s position.  His failure to comply with the 
requirements of Code of Civil Procedure, section 170.3, subdivision (d), precludes 
him from challenging the denial of his statutory disqualification motion on appeal 
from the judgment rendered in the trial court.  (People v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 
322, 333 (Brown).) 
 
Even if we were to overlook the procedural deficiency inherent in 
defendant’s challenge to the denial of his disqualification motion, we would find 
no merit in the assertion, implicit in defendant’s argument, that Judge Lasater had 
a responsibility to recuse herself in view of her prior professional and casual social 
relationship with Mr. Pippin.  Defendant provides no statutory or case law 
authority in support of that position, and we are aware of none.  Because virtually 
all judges are drawn from the ranks of the legal profession, such prior relationships 
are neither unusual nor dispositive.  (See United Farm Workers of America v. 
Superior Court, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d 97, 100 [“[T]he proper performance of 
judicial duties does not require a judge to withdraw from society and live an 
ascetic, antiseptic and socially sterile life.  Judicial responsibility does not require 
shrinking every time an advocate asserts the objective and fair judge appears to be 
biased.  The duty of a judge to sit where not disqualified is equally as strong as the 
duty not to sit when disqualified.”].) 
 
In our view, Judge Preckle correctly determined that on the facts presented 
in the pleadings below, a reasonable person would not entertain a doubt as to 
Judge Lasater’s impartiality.  (See United Farm Workers of America v. Superior 
 
34
Court, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at pp. 105-106; cf. Sincavage v. Superior Court 
(1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 224, 230-231 [disqualification proper where, 13 years 
earlier, judge had been a prosecutor representing the People in other proceedings 
against the defendant].)  Accordingly, disqualification was not mandated in the 
present case.  
 
Defendant asserts a nonstatutory due process claim based upon evidence of 
bias adduced at trial.  We need not decide whether defendant has forfeited this 
claim by failing to file a writ petition on this ground (see generally Brown, supra, 
6 Cal.4th at p. 336), because his claim lacks merit.  Specifically, defendant cites 
Judge Lasater’s contempt order, issued on the eve of the penalty phase (June 3, 
1991), against defense counsel and defendant for failure to provide penalty phase 
discovery to the prosecution, as well as Judge Lasater’s observation, made in 
considering defendant’s application to modify the death sentence rendered by the 
jury, that defendant “frankly had no intention of testifying in Los Angeles.”20 
 
Neither of the actions cited by defendant, extracted from a trial court record 
in excess of 9,000 pages, remotely approaches the threshold required to establish 
the existence of judicial bias.  (See People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 143 [“The 
question for us to decide is whether the judge ‘officiously and unnecessarily 
usurp[ed] the duties of the prosecutor . . . and in so doing create[d] the impression 
that he [was] allying himself with the prosecution . . . .’ ”].)  Moreover, our 
                                              
20  
Far from exhibiting bias, Judge Lasater’s comment in fact was made while 
explaining the basis for the court’s denial of defendant’s claim that he had been 
denied his right to testify in the Los Angeles proceedings.  Her comment was 
based upon her review of the transcripts of both proceedings as well as her 
discussions with defendant under seal, and was made in the specific context of 
expressing the view that defendant “was using [the denial of the right to testify] 
issue as a tactical means for obtaining a reversal . . . .”  
 
35
independent review of the entire record reveals a trial court judge who was 
scrupulously fair and courteous to each side, and whose rulings exhibited neither 
bias nor prejudice.  We therefore reject defendant’s claim.   
C. 
Motion to Exclude Evidence of Wood Chips 
 
At the preliminary hearing, Cheri Phinney testified that in April 1984, she 
decided to move into the apartment occupied by Janette Cullins.  On April 12, 
Phinney was at the apartment, painting her new bedroom and bathroom.  Phinney 
recalled that the carpet area in the living room near the front door had been 
vacuumed.  At the time Phinney departed from the apartment, between 7:00 and 
7:15 p.m., she did not notice any damage to the doorjamb surrounding the front 
door or any wood chips on the carpet beneath the door latch.  When Phinney 
returned to the apartment on the morning of April 14, shortly before the discovery 
of Janette Cullins’s body, she noticed wood chips on the floor, as depicted in a 
photograph introduced by the prosecution.  On cross-examination, Phinney 
acknowledged that on April 14, she did not mention the wood chips to the 
investigating detective and she also failed to mention the wood chips during her 
testimony at defendant’s trial in Los Angeles County. 
 
San Diego Police Department Homicide Detective James Shively testified 
that as part of his investigation of the crime scene on April 14, he directed that the 
wood chips be photographed.  On cross-examination, Detective Shively 
acknowledged he did not mention the wood chips in the crime scene report that he 
prepared.  He further acknowledged that under his direction, evidence technician 
 
36
[Dannis] Nuckolls removed a portion of the doorjamb.  Detective Shively did not 
recall whether he directed anyone to collect the wood chips.21 
 
San Diego Police Department Sergeant Douglas Naliboff testified that 
when he responded to the crime scene on the morning of April 14, the doorjamb 
“appeared that it had been pried open.  There were wood chips separated from the 
doorjamb itself and laying on the floor.”  He identified the prosecution’s  
photographs as depicting the doorjamb and wood chips that he observed. 
 
Defendant moved to exclude all evidence related to the condition of the 
front door of Janette Cullins’s apartment, including testimony regarding the 
doorjamb and the wood chips, and photographs of the wood chips.  The basis for 
his motion was that the prosecution assertedly had “failed to preserve the wood 
debris, and carelessly removed the door and doorjamb removed and photographed 
[sic].”  Defendant asserted that the prosecution’s failure to preserve the 
“potentially exculpatory wood chips” violated defendant’s constitutional rights to 
a fair trial and due process of law, and that pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 
the testimonial or photographic evidence was not admissible in the absence of the 
wood chips themselves. 
 
The trial court denied defendant’s motion, finding:  “Defendant’s . . . 
motion to exclude . . . the wood chips evidence and doorjam[b] is denied.  There is 
an insufficient showing of bad faith by law enforcement as shown in [Arizona v.] 
Youngblood [(1988) 488 U.S. 51].  In addition, the probative value of the 
evidence more than substantially outweighs any prejudice of the failure to 
preserve the wood chips.  [¶]  The record should reflect that law enforcement took 
                                              
21  
At trial, Nuckolls testified that he took photographs of the doorjamb and the 
wood chips and subsequently removed a portion of the doorjamb, but did not 
retain the wood chips and did not know what happened to them. 
 
37
pictures of the evidence from several angles and preserved the door jam[b], itself.  
They apparently did not actually preserve the wood chips which are reflected in 
the pictures.” 
 
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
exclude this evidence.  He argues that because the charge of burglary, as well as 
the burglary and lying-in-wait special circumstances, each depended upon the 
prosecution establishing that defendant unlawfully entered Cullins’s apartment, 
“the government[’s] fail[ure] to preserve evidence which was material and 
potential[ly] exculpatory” deprived him of a myriad of state and federal 
constitutional rights.  Defendant further asserts that the photographs of the wood 
chips could have been taken after the door jamb was removed, and thus the failure 
to preserve the wood chips deprived defendant of the opportunity to demonstrate 
that the presence of the chips “may have been the result of Nuckolls’s post-crime 
removal of wood.”  Defendant maintains that the trial court’s denial of his motion 
to exclude evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and requires 
reversal, and further that the trial court’s ruling constituted an abuse of discretion 
under Evidence Code section 352. 
 
For the reasons that follow, defendant’s position lacks merit. 
 
“Law enforcement agencies have a duty, under the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, to preserve evidence ‘that might be expected to play a 
significant role in the suspect’s defense.’  (California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 
U.S. 479, 488 [104 S.Ct. 2528, 2534, 81 L.Ed2d 413]; accord, People v. Beeler 
(1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 976 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 6076, 891 P.2d 153].)  To fall within 
the scope of this duty, the evidence ‘must both possess an exculpatory value that 
was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the 
defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably 
available means.’  (California v. Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 489 [104 S.Ct. 
 
38
at p. 2534]; People v. Beeler, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 976).  The state’s 
responsibility is further limited when the defendant’s challenge is to ‘the failure of 
the State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it 
could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the 
defendant.’  (Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51, 57 [109 S.Ct 333, 337, 
102 L.Ed.2d 281].)  In such case, ‘unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith 
on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not 
constitute a denial of due process of law.’  (Id. at p. 58 [109 S.Ct. at p. 337]; 
accord, People v. Beeler, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 976.)   
 
“On review, we must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the superior court’s finding, there was substantial evidence to 
support its ruling.  (People v. Griffin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1011, 1022 [251 Cal.Rptr. 
643, 761 P.2d 103].)”  (People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 509-510; see also 
People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 71, 810.)   
 
Under this standard, the court below did not err in concluding there was no 
showing of bad faith by law enforcement in failing to preserve the evidence; none 
of the testimony at the preliminary hearing (or trial) suggested otherwise.  
Similarly, nothing in the record suggests that the court below erred in determining 
that the wood chips did not have an exculpatory value that was apparent prior to 
their disappearance, or that the wood chip evidence was of such a nature that 
defendant was unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available 
means.  (See People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d 771, 810.) 
 
Nor do we find any abuse of discretion in the court’s determination that the 
probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed any prejudice that could 
be attributed to the failure to preserve the wood chips that had been observed by 
Cheri Phinney and Sergeant Naliboff.  Investigators photographed the wood chip 
evidence.  The photographic evidence indicated that someone had forced an entry 
 
39
into Janette Cullins’s apartment, and therefore was probative as to the burglary 
charge and the burglary special circumstance.  Defendant does not demonstrate 
how, in the absence of the wood chips themselves, the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony and 
photographs of the wood chips.  Defendant’s assertion that removal of a portion of 
the doorjamb during the investigation might have created the wood chips is 
speculative and has no bearing on whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying defendant’s motion to exclude the evidence.  
II. JURY SELECTION ISSUES  
 
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously prohibited sequestered voir 
dire examination of prospective jurors, unfairly restricted the examination of the 
prospective jurors by counsel, conducted voir dire in an oppressive atmosphere, 
improperly instructed prospective jurors, and applied an incorrect standard to 
exclude persons from the jury.  In view of these asserted errors, defendant 
contends he was denied a myriad of rights guaranteed to him under the state and 
federal Constitutions and therefore his conviction and sentence must be reversed.  
As we shall explain, none of defendant’s contentions has merit. 
A. 
Defendant’s Motion for Sequestered Voir Dire 
 
At the commencement of jury selection, defendant moved for sequestered 
voir dire of prospective jurors pursuant to Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 
Cal.3d 1.  The prosecution joined in the request.  The trial court denied the motion, 
stating that “Proposition 115 is the law and is applicable. . . .  [¶]  And I intend to 
follow Proposition 115, and that includes, at this particular point in time, I’m not 
going to be using a sequestered inquiry of the jurors.  [¶]  In making that decision, 
I’m exercising my discretion as well as requested by the People.”  When defendant 
renewed his request, the trial court repeated its denial. 
 
40
 
On appeal, defendant contends he was “denied meaningful voir dire by the 
court’s improper procedures,” including the trial court’s denial of sequestered voir 
dire.  He is mistaken.  Proposition 115, which took effect on June 6, 1990 
(approximately eight months prior to jury selection here), enacted Code of Civil 
Procedure section 223, which in relevant part provided (prior to its amendment in 
2000):  “In a criminal case, the court shall conduct the examination of prospective 
jurors[, and such examination] . . . . shall, where practicable, occur in the presence 
of other jurors in all criminal cases, including death penalty cases.”  (Stats. 1990, 
p. A-245.)22 
 
Moreover, we repeatedly have rejected contentions similar to those 
advanced by defendant.  (See, e.g. People v. San Nicholas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 
633-634; People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 513-515; People v. Slaughter 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1199; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1180-1181; 
see also People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713 [Proposition 115 
“abrogates” the requirement found in Hovey v. Superior Court, supra, 28 Cal.3d at 
                                              
22  
At the time of defendant’s trial, Code of Civil Procedure section 223 in full 
provided as follows (Prop. 115, § 7, as approved by voters, Primary Elec. (June 5, 
1990)): 
 
“In a criminal case, the court shall conduct the examination of prospective 
jurors.  However, the court may permit the parties, upon a showing of good cause, 
to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or shall 
itself submit to the prospective jurors upon such a showing, such additional 
questions by the parties as it deems proper.  Voir dire of any prospective jurors 
shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the other jurors in all criminal 
cases, including death penalty cases. 
 
“Examination of prospective jurors shall be conducted only in aid of the 
exercise of challenges for cause. 
 
“The trial court’s exercise of its discretion in the manner in which voir dire 
is conducted shall not cause any conviction to be reversed unless the exercise of 
that discretion has resulted in a miscarriage of justice, as specified in Section 13 of 
Article VI of the California Constitution.”  (Stats. 1990, p. A-245.) 
 
41
page 115, of individual sequestered voir dire examination of prospective jurors 
during the death qualification portion of jury selection in a capital case]; Tapia v. 
Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 288 [applying Proposition 115 to crimes 
committed prior to enactment of the new statute, where (as here), the trial is 
conducted after its enactment].)  Defendant has not provided us with any 
persuasive basis for revisiting the holdings in those decisions, and we decline to do 
so. 
 
The trial court made clear that its ruling was guided by the provisions set 
forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 223.  The court also explained at length  
the basis for its exercise of discretion in denying the requests for sequestered voir 
dire.  No error or abuse of discretion appears. 
B. 
The Trial Court’s Imposition of Time Limits on Voir Dire 
 
The trial court permitted counsel for each party to have 60 minutes to 
conduct voir dire of the first 20 prospective jurors, and gave 30 minutes to each 
side for each additional group of 9 jurors.  The defense and prosecution each 
protested vociferously that the court’s limits were unduly restrictive.23  The parties 
                                              
23  
In seeking additional time in which to conduct the voir dire examination, 
defense counsel argued:  “I would like more time than 60 minutes for the first 20 
[jurors], and more time than 30 minutes with the fill-in jurors.  [¶]  Since it appears 
to me that the time being set is more or less arbitrary, in other words, Your Honor 
is just picking a figure sort of out of the air, 60 minutes, it could just as well be 90, 
120, something like that.  [¶]  Sixty minutes is only an average of three minutes 
per juror, and that simply is not enough in a capital case.”  
 
Defense cocounsel added:  “No disrespect to the court, the speed of this, I 
don’t have time to reflect. . . .  I do not have time to consider[,] to reflect, to 
confer.  One of the purposes to hav[ing] two attorney[s] is to be able to confer, and 
I don’t have the time to reflect and think this is the right decision.  And I would 
appreciate the time to do that after the questions to be able to confer with [lead 
defense counsel] . . . . [¶] . . . I don’t want to be . . . speeded along on this without 
making the right objections for the record.  And I feel at some points that I’m not 
 (footnote continued on next page) 
 
42
repeatedly moved the court to reconsider its ruling, each side citing the difficulty 
of ascertaining a prospective juror’s views during group voir dire within the time 
allotted by the trial court.  The court denied these requests, expressing confidence 
that the process would afford counsel an adequate amount of time in which to 
conduct the voir dire examination.24  
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
thinking swiftly enough because of the time constraints.”  
 
The prosecutor similarly argued:  “To tell us that you only get an average of 
three minutes per juror to decide a case I think is unfair, and I don’t think there is a 
legitimate reason for it.” 
24  
The trial court informed the parties in relevant part as follows: 
 
“You’ll be permitted to ask [prospective] jurors questions which are 
properly phrased and not repetitive of what is in the questionnaire directly 
yourselves. . . . 
 
“[¶] . . . [¶] 
 
“Now, let me give you a caveat on that:  I don’t want to be going back over 
what’s in the questionnaires with them. 
 
“[¶] . . .  [¶] 
 
“[K]eep in mind if it’s truly a follow-up question, something that’s in the 
questionnaire, you should be giving it to me. 
 
“[¶] . . . [¶] 
 
“You can go to L.A. where they don’t allow any inquiry [by counsel on 
voir dire], in some instances, even on capital cases. 
 
“[¶] . . . [¶] 
 
“But logic would dictate that if your main concern happens to be someone’s 
reaction to sexual assault, or you have a particular [prospective] juror who you 
think you have got a problem with . . . a particular issue, or if your main concern 
with a particular witness is their belief on the death penalty, then you’re going to 
want to ask to spend more time on that particular [prospective] juror on those 
areas. 
 
“What you’re going to want to do is ask some of your general questions . . . 
as a whole of the panel, and then to spot-check certain people who you’re not 
really comfortable with. 
 
“I mean there are different techniques of voir dire. 
 
“If you decide that you want to go through each [prospective] juror one by 
one and ask the same set of questions, you’re going to end up with three minutes 
 (footnote continued on next page) 
 
43
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
per [prospective] juror. 
 
“That’s a decision that each side is going to have to make. 
 
“But that is going to be the decision that you’re going to make, because I 
believe that based upon my experience in using this technique and watching 
attorneys inquire, that you can cover more than adequately with 20 [prospective] 
jurors in 60 minutes what I have told you that you could cover. 
 
“[¶] . . . [¶] 
 
“When I initially g[a]ve you the time periods, I believe I said . . . :  that you 
would have the opportunity to . . . give me follow-up questions on the 
questionnaire. 
 
“This is in addition to any questions I may decide to ask. 
 
“Second of all, that if I didn’t follow-up on an area in a questionnaire 
adequately and you want me to ask some more questions on a particular subject on 
a particular [prospective] juror, that I would be giving you that opportunity to ask 
me to do that. 
 
“This is all prior to you asking questions. 
 
“Finally, I said that each . . . side would have one hour to inquire on those 
limited subjects without repeating questions in the questionnaire. 
 
“I also said that if there was a response from a particular [prospective] juror 
that needed additional follow-up that seemed to be out of the ordinary, that I 
would be taking that into consideration in looking at the time period which you 
have. 
 
“Now, if I feel, after I have done the inquiry of the [prospective] jurors, that 
there are some problem [prospective] jurors that you’re going to need additional 
time with, I’m going to give you the time up front before you start your hour. 
 
“If you hit upon something that hasn’t surfaced, then what you need to do is 
prior to your hour[’s] expiration say to me[,] [‘]Judge, I need some additional 
time.  I think, I’m concerned about this particular area.[’] 
 
“I’ll let you know at that time, but for your planning purposes . . . I’m not 
going to change the hour and [the] 30 minute [time periods], because I think you 
can . . . more than adequately cover the subjects that you have if you are 
concentrating on those particular subjects. 
 
“If it appears based upon the inquiry that it’s not working, I’m going to 
make a modification on the spot. 
 
“[¶] . . . [¶] 
 
“But I am still comfortable in light of your positions, and I can understand 
your trepidation at trying to do the inquiry in one hour, but in the long run an hour 
efficiently used can be very effective, and more effective than if you were to spend 
two or three hours and felt as if you had all the additional time. 
 (footnote continued on next page) 
 
44
 
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court’s restriction of the amount of 
time permitted each side in obtaining answers to questions was improper and 
resulted in a denial of meaningful voir dire.  We have observed that the adequacy 
of voir dire is a matter “ ‘ “not easily subject to appellate review.  The trial judge’s 
function at this point in the trial is not unlike that of the jurors later on in the trial.  
Both must reach conclusions as to impartiality and credibility by relying on their 
own evaluations of demeanor evidence and responses to questions.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 661, quoting Mu’Min v. Virginia (1991) 500 U.S. 415, 
424; see also People v. Cardenas (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 240, 247 [“ ‘The exercise 
of discretion by trial judges under the new system of court-conducted voir dire is 
accorded considerable deference by appellate courts.’ ”]; People v. Taylor (1992) 
5 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1313 [same].) The applicable standard is a demanding one:  
“Unless the voir dire by a court is so inadequate that the reviewing court can say 
that the resulting trial was fundamentally unfair, the manner in which voir dire is 
conducted is not a basis for reversal.  [Citation.]  A fortiori, the same standard of 
reversible error applies when both the court and counsel participate in the voir 
dire.”  (People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 661; see also People v. Bolden 
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 538 [same].)  
 
Our review of the record reveals the voir dire examination conducted here 
was more than adequate.  The trial court informed the parties that if, in addition to 
the initial questions posed by the court and by each side, counsel desired that 
further inquiries be made of a prospective juror, counsel would be given the 
opportunity to request that the court ask follow-up questions directed to those 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
“But if we run into a problem, you know, I’m going to be watching for it, 
and I’m willing to listen to your positions on it.” 
 
45
particular jurors.  “The right to voir dire, like the right to peremptorily challenge 
[citation], is not a constitutional right but a means to achieve the end of an 
impartial jury.  [Citation.]  . . . [I]t is the duty of the trial judge to restrict the 
examination of the prospective jurors within reasonable bounds so as to expedite 
the trial.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 419; see also 
People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1086.) 
 
In view of the circumstance that the parties clearly were given the 
opportunity to elicit information on voir dire, we conclude, consistent with our 
foregoing pronouncements, that the time limits of which defendant complains did 
not prevent defense counsel from making reasonable inquiries into the fitness of 
prospective jurors to serve on the jury.  No error or abuse of discretion appears.  
(See e.g., People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 353-354; People v. Lucas 
(1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 480.) 25   
 
Moreover, even were we to assume that the trial court abused its discretion 
in restricting voir dire, defendant has failed to establish prejudice.  (See People v. 
                                              
25  
We also observe that, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 205,  the 
trial court permitted the use of written juror questionnaires, and that each of the 
questionnaires employed was comprised of 135 questions that spanned 30 pages.  
(See fn. 24, ante.)  
 
Defendant contends the trial court improperly restricted the scope of the 
questions used in the questionnaire, and specifically notes the trial court’s refusal 
to permit questions “that might suggest ‘substantial impairment’ under 
Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, deciding instead that the questionnaire 
should only inquire whether a juror would ‘automatically’ refuse or vote for death 
or life imprisonment.”  The trial court was not required to ensure that a particular 
question regarding a specific legal doctrine would be asked.  (See People v. 
Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 194, 1224.)  In any event, in passing, we observe that 
nine questions (including numerous subquestions) spanning five pages of the very 
thorough questionnaire were aimed directly at eliciting the views of prospective 
jurors regarding the death penalty. 
 
46
Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 354; see also People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 
Cal.3d at p. 1082 [no abuse of discretion where the court formulated four specific 
questions to ask prospective jurors during the death-qualifying process, and 
refused to permit further questions from counsel].)  The trial court’s rulings were 
minimally restrictive, and the circumstance that both parties passionately argued 
against them suggests that the court’s restrictions did not disproportionately 
impact one side to the advantage of the other.  Jury selection required eight court 
days, a period of time hardly indicative of an unduly rapid proceeding. 
C. 
The Atmosphere in the Courtroom 
 
At certain points during the voir dire examination, defense counsel 
complained about the overcrowded conditions occasioned by the large number of 
prospective jurors who had been directed into the courtroom.  At one point, 
counsel declared:  “There is a carnival atmosphere in here not fitting for this kind 
of case.  We’ve got a hundred and I don’t know how many people jammed into 
this one courtroom.  Jurors are complaining.  It is extremely uncomfortable, not 
only for the jurors, but for counsel.  And the whole . . .  atmosphere militates 
against the calm deliberation which we ought to be applying to this case.”  On 
another occasion, the court informed the jury venire:  “I don’t want you to think 
that since all these chairs are so close up here that I’m just doing that to harass 
you, because given the way the last few days have gone for most of us, I wouldn’t 
be surprised if you thought that.”  On yet another occasion, the court indicated that 
it had received a note from a prospective juror that read, “Can you lower the room 
temperature, it’s too stuffy, etc.,” to which the court responded, “We didn’t need 
to have him tell us.”  
 
Defendant characterizes the atmosphere in the courtroom during the voir 
dire examination as having been “oppressive,” a circumstance that he contends ⎯ 
 
47
when viewed either singly or together with the trial court’s other asserted errors ⎯ 
warrants reversal.  We disagree.  The panel was comprised of 140 prospective 
jurors.  Although the warm, crowded conditions in the courtroom undoubtedly 
were neither optimum nor particularly comfortable, they did not deprive defendant 
of any rights to which he was entitled.  To the extent defendant’s claim is directed 
at the difficult “working conditions” under which the defense was forced to 
operate during voir dire, the prosecution was compelled to perform under the 
identical challenging conditions.  To the extent defendant’s claim is directed at the 
potentially adverse impact the conditions may have had upon prospective jurors, 
we observe that defendant was entitled to an impartial jury, not a contented one.  
Although defendant’s representations as to the nature of the courtroom atmosphere 
portray a challenging environment for all concerned, we observe that the eight-day 
duration of these conditions was not inordinately lengthy. 
 
Significantly, the defense had six peremptory challenges remaining when it 
accepted the jury ⎯ a circumstance indicating that, notwithstanding defendant’s 
arguments regarding the “oppressive” nature of the courtroom atmosphere, the 
defense was not dissatisfied with the jury as sworn.  Indeed, the defense requested 
that the jury be sworn.  “ ‘When the jury was finally selected, defendant did not 
claim that any juror was incompetent, or was not impartial.  We therefore find no 
prejudicial error.’ ”  (People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 354.)26   
                                              
26  
The trial court denied the parties’ joint request to increase the number of 
their respective peremptory challenges from 20, the amount specified under Code 
of Civil Procedure section 231, subdivision (a), to 26. 
 
48
D. 
The Trial Court’s Voir Dire Examination of Prospective 
Jurors 
 
Defendant contends the trial court misled prospective jurors, some of whom 
eventually were sworn as jurors in the case, by conducting an “improper and 
misleading voir dire examination [that] left the defense guessing at bias or 
prejudice,” and by misstating the law related to the penalty phase of the 
proceedings.  Defendant refers to assertedly imprecise questions posed by the trial 
court, and its repeated use during voir dire of inquiries such as, “would you 
hesitate to vote for the death penalty, and would you have a tendency to vote for 
the death penalty?”  (Italics added.)  Further, in response to questions posed by 
prospective jurors as to whether the “weighing process” described by the court 
would involve a “moral decision,” the trial court answered in the negative.  
Defendant contends that this response by the court conflicted with CALJIC No. 
8.88 (1989 rev.), which specifically instructed jurors that “You are free to assign 
whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the 
various factors you are permitted to consider.” (Italics added.)  Defendant further 
asserts that “the record does not demonstrate adequate bases for trial court rulings 
on challenges for cause, in large part because it is not clear the views of 
prospective jurors would have prevented or substantially impaired performance of 
their duties as jurors.” 
 
Our review of the trial court’s voir dire examination reveals that although 
defendant is correct that certain statements made by the court lacked precision, 
may have been overly simplistic, and contained technical misstatements of law, 
the court made clear that its comments were “not instructions on the law which 
I’m giving you at this time.  You’ll receive, if you’re selected as a juror, the actual 
instructions on the law in their full detail later.”  We believe the court’s 
admonition made clear that its comments were directed toward generally 
 
49
familiarizing the prospective jurors with the tasks ahead in order to elicit responses 
from them that would assist the parties in determining whether or not to exercise 
their available challenges.  Significantly, counsel were given the opportunity to 
ask follow-up questions of prospective jurors. 
E. 
Trial Court’s Rulings on Challenges for Cause   
 
In considering defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in ruling on 
challenges for cause, we are guided by well-established principles.  If, as occurred 
in the present case, a defendant has unused peremptory challenges available when 
the trial court impanels the jury, and the defendant does not express dissatisfaction 
with the jury ultimately selected, his or her claim is not preserved on appeal.  
(People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 444.)  Even were defendant’s claim 
properly preserved, we would reject it on the merits because he has failed to 
identify any prospective juror who he contends was improperly retained on the 
jury despite a valid challenge for cause, or one who erroneously was removed for 
cause.  In view of defendant’s failure to establish specific reversible error, his 
contention must fail. 
III. GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A. 
Testimony of Polly Haisha 
 
Over defendant’s objection on the ground of lack of relevancy, the 
prosecution introduced the testimony of Polly Haisha, an acquaintance of 
defendant’s, who, as a senior in high school, met defendant at a party in February 
1984.  Haisha testified that she accepted defendant’s invitation at the party to go 
sailing with him, gave him her telephone number, but subsequently cancelled the 
date because she “just felt really uncomfortable about the whole thing.  I had a 
weird feeling about it.  I ca[lled] him up and canceled.  I made up an excuse why I 
couldn’t go . . . .”  Haisha and defendant spoke several times in the ensuing weeks; 
 
50
the two repeatedly rescheduled their date but, in Haisha’s words, “I would always 
cancel out shortly before we were supposed to meet.”  Haisha identified defendant 
in court and in photographic exhibits.  She also verified that an entry in 
defendant’s address book was her telephone number at the time (observing, 
however, that her name had been misspelled).27 
 
Haisha further testified that upon informing defendant during one of their 
initial conversations of her plans to attend college, he responded:  “You know, 
that’s just a waste.  He said why don’t you quiet [sic] school and come sail to 
France with me.  You’ll get a better experience of life there than you could in 
school.  [¶]  I said, well, you know, that might be so, but I plan on going to 
college.  I barely know you.  I’m not going to give up my life so I can sail to 
France with you.” 
 
In response to the prosecutor’s inquiry regarding defendant’s demeanor on 
the telephone, Haisha testified:  “Well, the very first time I talked to him the next 
day after I met him at the party, he was really nice and very open to what we could 
do, and anything that I wanted to ⎯ whenever we wanted to meet after that.  [¶]  It 
got ⎯ he got more and more aggressive.  Like the time I said I wouldn’t go to 
France with him, he acted like I was making fun of him; somehow that was a 
stupid idea or something.  [¶]  He would get kind of mean and when I would 
cancel on dates, he would get kind of irritated, like he had to change his whole 
schedule for me.  Yet, again, he wasn’t happy.  [¶]  It kind of scared me, but he 
would always tone it down towards the end so I wouldn’t be afraid to talk with 
him the next time.  [¶] . . . [¶]  Later on, towards the end of our phone 
                                              
27  
In addition to Polly Haisha’s name, the address book contained the names 
of murder victims Susan Knoll and Janette Cullins. 
 
51
conversations, he mentioned his ex-wife . . . and at that time he was really bitter 
about it and, you know, would call her names and said he was happy that part of 
his life was over.  He was happy to get away from her.  [¶]  He called her a bitch.” 
 
Haisha also testified that in the evening of March 24, 1984, defendant 
contacted her by telephone and informed her he would be in San Diego on the 
following day.  In response, Haisha “asked him at the end of our phone call never 
to call me again, and that I didn’t want to talk to him anymore.  [¶]  I certainly 
didn’t want to see him, and he became very irritated and said why all of a sudden 
this change, we haven’t even gone out yet.  [¶]  I said well, I don’t feel 
comfortable about talking to you or seeing you.  I would rather this ended right 
now, and would you please just never call this number again. . . .  [¶]  He was very 
irritated and he started getting mad and almost hostile.  That’s when I knew for 
sure I made the right choice, because at previous times in phone conversations he 
had gotten that way.”  She added that she did not remember defendant ever 
contacting her again after that. 
 
On cross-examination, Haisha testified that during the time period in which 
defendant was on trial (April 1991), she was a law student who, in the previous 
year, had worked as an intern in the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office, 
and that she planned to return to that office again to work as an intern after taking 
the bar examination that upcoming summer. 
 
On appeal, defendant reiterates his contention at trial that Haisha’s 
testimony was irrelevant and that it warranted exclusion for that reason, 
additionally asserting on appeal that the testimony was highly prejudicial, 
“designed to inflame the jury,” and constituted improperly admitted character 
evidence (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b)), and that the trial court erred in failing to 
exercise its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude this evidence.  
 
52
Defendant adds that the trial court’s admission of Haisha’s testimony violated a 
panoply of defendant’s state and federal Constitutional rights.  
 
Preliminarily, we observe that defendant did not object at trial based upon 
Evidence Code sections 352 or 1101 ⎯ a point acknowledged by defendant but 
apparently overlooked by the People ⎯ and therefore has not preserved this claim 
for our review.  (See, e.g., People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 424.) 
 
With regard to the substance of defendant’s contentions, we conclude they 
are without merit for reasons similar to those set forth in response to defendant’s 
challenge to the admission of other evidence introduced in the Los Angeles 
proceedings.  (See People v. Carter, supra, ___ Cal.4th at pp. ___ [at pp. 56-66].)  
In view of our more extensive summary of the applicable legal principles 
involving relevancy and prejudice in the companion appeal, the brief analysis that 
follows shall suffice. 
 
The prosecution met its burden of establishing that the testimony of Polly 
Haisha was relevant under Evidence Code section 210.  Haisha’s testimony 
corroborated the testimony of Susan Loyland that defendant intended to be in San 
Diego on March 25, 1984, the date on which Loyland’s housemate, Barbara S., 
was raped in San Diego, and after which neither Haisha nor Loyland ever heard 
from defendant again.  Haisha’s testimony also bolstered the prosecution’s theory 
of the case that defendant embarked upon his murderous crime spree in the 
immediate aftermath of being spurned by a number of women, including Haisha.  
(See ante, pp. 2-5.)  Implicit in the prosecution’s theory is that these rejections 
comprised a “trigger” that, once pulled, propelled defendant to rape and murder 
women whom he recently had befriended.  Accordingly, defendant’s demeanor 
during his conversations with Haisha ― including his frustration and anger when 
Haisha cancelled their scheduled dates ― in the weeks leading up to the murders 
and other crimes appears relevant. 
 
53
 
The evidence was not unduly prejudicial.  It merely described Haisha’s 
initial encounter with defendant at a party and his subsequent fruitless efforts to 
meet her again, causing him to become irritated or angry.  The testimony was not 
altogether uncomplimentary, as Haisha recalled that during their first telephone 
conversation, defendant “was really nice.” 
 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to 
exclude Haisha’s testimony.  Further, viewed in the context of defendant’s trial, in 
which the prosecution’s evidence overwhelmingly established that defendant 
committed multiple brutal murders and vicious rapes, the testimony of Polly 
Haisha ⎯ a woman whom defendant did not physically attack, and who had only 
minimal personal contact with him ⎯ was not even remotely prejudicial. 
 
Citing Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), defendant also 
contends Haisha’s testimony was “improperly admitted character evidence, and no 
doubt carried over to penalty phase as non-statutory aggravation evidence.”28  
Defendant’s argument fails because, as noted, it was not presented at the trial 
court, nor did admission of the evidence violate Evidence Code section 1101, 
subdivision (a), because the prosecution did not offer Haisha’s testimony to prove 
defendant’s conduct on a specific occasion.  Finally, it is not reasonably possible 
that the evidence “carried over” as an aggravating circumstance to the penalty 
phase, or that in the absence of the evidence defendant would have received a 
more favorable penalty verdict.  As noted above, a massive amount of other, far 
                                              
28  
Subject to certain exceptions not relevant to our discussion, Evidence Code 
section 1101, subdivision (a), provides:  “[E]vidence of a person’s character or a 
trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of 
reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible 
when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.” 
 
54
more damaging evidence was introduced against defendant at the guilt and penalty 
phases of the trial. 
 
Considered as guilt phase evidence, even if we were to determine under any 
theory that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of Polly 
Haisha, such error would have been harmless under the applicable Watson 
standard, because it is not reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a 
different result in the absence of Haisha’s testimony.  (People v. Watson (1956) 46 
Cal.2d 818, 836.)29 
B. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction 
of the crimes committed against Barbara S. and Janette Cullins, as well as the prior 
murder and lying-in-wait special-circumstance findings.  “In reviewing a criminal 
conviction challenged as lacking evidentiary support, ‘ “the court must review the 
whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine 
whether it discloses substantial evidence ⎯ that is, evidence which is reasonable, 
credible, and of solid value ⎯ such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  [Citation.]’  (People v. Hillhouse 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 496 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754].)  The same 
standard of review applies to special circumstance allegations.  (People v. Maury 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1].)  An appellate court 
must accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the evidence 
                                              
29  
In view of our conclusion that the trial court properly admitted the 
testimony of Polly Haisha, defendant’s contention that his trial counsel’s “failure 
to assert the proper objection [under Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101, 
subdivision (a)] constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel” necessarily fails. 
(See, e.g., People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 834; People v. Frierson (1991) 
53 Cal.3d 730, 747.) 
 
55
even if the court would have concluded otherwise.  (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 
20 Cal.4th 1, 11 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 971 P.2d 618].)”  (People v. Combs (2004) 
34 Cal.4th 821, 849.) 
1. 
The Crimes Committed Against Barbara S.  
 
Defendant contends his conviction of the crimes committed against Barbara 
S. is not supported by sufficient evidence.  He is mistaken.  
 
As we have noted (pp. 2-8, ante), one day after having been rejected by 
Polly Haisha and Cathleen Tiner, defendant arrived in San Diego on March 25, 
1984, having made plans to travel to Mexico that day with Susan Loyland, who 
departed from San Diego without him.  Janell Barksdale, the next-door neighbor 
of Barbara S. and Susan Loyland, observed defendant approaching the victims’  
residence on the evening of March 25.  That evening, defendant broke into 
Loyland’s residence, stole some of her tip money from a concealed location that 
previously had been revealed to him, and raped at knifepoint Barbara S., 
Loyland’s housemate.   
Barbara S. provided details of the rape, oral copulation, robbery, and 
burglary, including the circumstances that her assailant’s voice sounded familiar to 
her and that weeks later she recognized the voice as defendant’s.  At trial, she 
identified defendant as the man who attacked her.  Susan Loyland established that 
defendant had seen the location where she had concealed the money determined to 
have been taken from her bedroom, and explained why she suspected defendant 
might have been Barbara S.’s assailant.  
 
Defendant glosses over the foregoing highly incriminating evidence, 
instead emphasizing Barbara S.’s general uncertainty and inability to identify her 
assailant in the immediate aftermath of the attack.  Defendant also asserts the 
prosecution “clearly bootstrapped” its case in the Barbara S. sexual assault to the 
 
56
“other crimes” evidence implicating defendant in the murders of Susan Knoll, 
Jillette Mills, Bonnie Guthrie, and Janette Cullins, the death of Tok Kim, and the 
sexual assault of Jennifer S.  He further asserts that the evidence supporting the 
convictions was undermined by the fact that the trial court excluded evidence 
indicating that Barbara S. suffered from alcoholism in the spring of 1984.30    
 
None of defendant’s points is persuasive.  Barbara S.’s identification of  
defendant as the man who assaulted and robbed her at knifepoint in her residence 
was supported by her housemate’s testimony that money was stolen from a 
concealed location known to defendant, and by a neighbor’s testimony that 
defendant walked toward the residence on the night of the attack.  Thus, the 
prosecution’s evidence implicating defendant in the attack on Barbara S. more 
                                              
30  
Defendant assigns error to the trial court’s ruling, made pursuant to 
Evidence Code section 352, excluding the proffered testimony of Susan Loyland 
that Barbara S. suffered from alcoholism.  
 
After conducting a foundational hearing at the People’s request, outside the 
presence of the jury, in which Loyland described her own alcoholism and daily 
drug usage in the spring of 1984, the trial court explained at length its reasons for 
excluding Loyland’s proffered testimony, stating that although the evidence 
“could be relevant,” its admission “is going to take us in a circle of evidence that 
is . . . going to be nonproductive and [cause] undue consumption of time.”  The 
court added:  “I’m not precluding that subject of [Barbara. S.] being an alcoholic 
being raised by other witnesses if the foundation can be laid.” 
 
The trial court’s ruling conformed to the requirements of Evidence Code 
section 352.  The proffered testimony regarding Barbara S.’s alleged alcoholism  
was marginally relevant and likely would have consumed an undue amount of 
court time.  No abuse of discretion appears. 
 
Moreover, even were we to conclude that the trial court ruled incorrectly, 
any such error plainly would have been harmless in view of the overwhelming 
evidence that defendant broke into the residence shared by Barbara S. and Susan 
Loyland, stole money belonging to each, and sexually assaulted Barbara S.  
 
57
than adequately meets the substantial evidence standard summarized above.  
(People v. Combs, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 849.)31 
2. 
The Crimes Committed Against Janette Cullins 
 
Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction of 
murder, robbery, and burglary stemming from crimes committed at the residence 
of Janette Cullins on or about April 12, 1984.  He challenges on similar grounds 
the jury’s true findings as to the burglary, robbery, and lying-in-wait special 
circumstances.  With the exception of the last special circumstance, we find 
unpersuasive each of these assertions. 
 
The evidence adduced at trial established that defendant visited Janette 
Cullins’s apartment on the afternoon of April 12, 1984, asking her new roommate, 
Cheri Phinney, how long Phinney planned to be there.  That evening, Cullins 
attended the symphony with her friend, Cathleen Tiner, who last saw Cullins at 
approximately 11:00 p.m., when Cullins departed to return to her apartment.  A 
neighbor of Cullins observed the distinctive white Datsun 280 ZX in which 
defendant subsequently was arrested, parked with its engine running for several 
minutes late that evening.  A number of Cullins’s friends unsuccessfully attempted 
to contact Cullins on April 13. 
 
A visitor to Cullins’s apartment on April 14 noticed wood chips on the 
floor by the front door ⎯ evidence consistent with a forced entry.  Cullins’s body 
                                              
31  
In view of our holding, above, we reject as without merit defendant’s 
related claim that the “insufficiency of the evidence” supporting the sexual assault 
crimes perpetrated against Barbara S. led to error at the penalty phase when the 
trial court admitted this evidence in aggravation pursuant to section 190.3, 
factor (b) (“criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted 
use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence”).  
As noted, the evidence was sufficient; therefore defendant’s argument fails. 
 
58
was found partially clothed in the bedroom closet, and her neck bore a ligature 
mark.  The concealment of the body in a closet and the cause of Cullins’s death ⎯ 
asphyxia due to strangulation ⎯ bore a strong resemblance to the circumstances of 
the Susan Knoll/Jillette Mills murders in Culver City three days earlier.  
 
Cullins’s wallet containing her various items of identification was 
recovered from a location near where the distinctive Datsun 280 ZX was parked 
that same week.  The wallet also contained Bonnie Guthrie’s identification, 
strongly suggesting that one person had murdered and robbed both women. 
 
On April 13, 1984, a man wearing a dark jacket made a withdrawal from 
Cullins’s bank account.  Four days later, in Arizona, a paper bearing the word 
“SHYLAS,” a bankpass card bearing Cullins’s name, and a black jacket were 
among the items found in defendant’s possession at the time of his arrest.  
 
The foregoing evidence amply supports the jury’s conclusions that late in 
the evening of April 12, 1984, defendant with the requisite felonious intent forced 
his way into Cullins’s apartment, encountered Cullins, compelled her to disclose 
her bank password, then fatally strangled her, concealed her body in her bedroom 
closet, took her wallet, and subsequently depleted her bank account.  The evidence 
thus established the elements of the charged offenses ⎯ burglary, robbery, and 
murder ⎯ as well as the elements of the burglary and robbery special 
circumstances. 
 
In reaching our conclusion, we reject defendant’s contention that the 
prosecution failed to establish that defendant acted with felonious intent.  Nor do 
we find persuasive his related contention that the robbery and burglary special-
circumstance findings were improper because the crimes were merely incidental to 
the murder or intended to facilitate or conceal the murder.  (See People v. Zapien 
(1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 984-985.)  The requisite intent for each crime, and 
supporting each of these special circumstances, readily may be inferred from the 
 
59
evidence.  (See People v. Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35, 41 [“Although the People 
must show that a defendant charged with burglary entered the premises with 
felonious intent, such intent must usually be inferred from all of the facts and 
circumstances disclosed by the evidence, rarely being directly provable.  
[Citations.]  When the evidence justifies a reasonable inference of felonious intent, 
the verdict may not be disturbed on appeal.”]; see also People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 
Cal.4th at pp. 413-414 [In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence as to special 
circumstance findings, “ ‘ “we must determine ‘whether, after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the [allegations] beyond a reasonable 
doubt.’ ” ’  [Citation.]”].)  
 
The requisite intent and all essential elements were present here.  Cullins’s 
apartment showed signs of a forced entry consistent with an intent to commit a 
felony.  The evidence that the doorjamb had been pried, producing a scattering of 
wood chips near the front door, supported the burglary charge and the burglary 
special circumstance. 
 
The circumstance that defendant harbored an intent to rob Cullins ⎯ quite 
independent of his intent to murder her ⎯ may be inferred from the evidence that 
he obtained her bank account password prior to fatally strangling her.  The 
circumstances of the break-in, murder, robbery, and theft, together with 
defendant’s hurried, loud, and dramatic departure in the stolen vehicle consistent 
with a perpetrator’s escape from a crime scene, amply support the inference of 
defendant’s intent to commit burglary.  (People v. Moody (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 
357, 363.) 
 
With regard to defendant’s contention that the lying-in-wait special 
circumstance was not supported by substantial evidence, the People contend the 
evidence adduced at trial suggested that defendant accomplished his entry prior to 
 
60
Cullins’s arrival home.  The People urge that no other explanation for the forcible 
entry, indicated by the presence of the wood chips, was adduced at trial, and that it 
reasonably could be inferred that defendant was lying in wait for his victim from 
the forced entry, as well as from the presence of Jillette Mills’s stolen vehicle, 
with its engine running for several minutes, at the approximate time Cullins likely 
returned to her apartment.  (See People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 500-
501; People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 516-517.) 
 
We reject the People’s position on this point.  The evidence in support of 
the lying-in-wait special circumstance ⎯ essentially, the wood chips and the car 
with its engine running ⎯ appears unduly reliant upon the inference suggested by 
the prosecution that defendant arrived prior to Cullins’s return home in order to 
attack her by surprise.  The wood chip evidence tended to show forced entry, not 
that the entry occurred prior to Cullins’s arrival.  Cullins may have arrived at her 
apartment before defendant did, and he may have forced his way in while she was 
undressing elsewhere in the apartment.  Under the latter scenario, the lying-in-wait 
special circumstance would rely upon the neighbor who heard the car engine 
running, and the time of that event cannot be pinpointed.  Moreover, the car idling, 
besides occurring at an uncertain time, does not strongly imply that defendant was 
waiting in the car to attack Cullins; if defendant had planned a home invasion 
when Cullins arrived home, he likely would have turned off the engine so as not to 
attract attention.  We therefore set aside the special circumstance of lying in wait. 
 
At the time of defendant’s arrest, he was fleeing California in a vehicle that 
had belonged to murder victim Jillette Mills, and was in possession of personal 
property that linked him to each one of the murdered women, including the murder 
victim in the present case.  As noted, Janette Cullins’s body was concealed in a 
manner similar to that used to hide the bodies of Susan Knoll and Jillette Mills.  
Each of these women, and Bonnie Guthrie, had been fatally strangled.  No 
 
61
reasonable explanation, other than defendant’s culpability for the charged 
offenses, presented itself at trial.  Indeed, the evidence in support of the charged 
crimes and burglary and robbery special circumstances was overwhelming.32   
3. 
The Prior Murder Special Circumstance 
 
Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error when it 
denied his motion to strike the prior-murder special circumstance allegations 
derived from the murders of Susan Knoll, Jillette Mills, and Bonnie Guthrie, 
reflected in the Los Angeles County judgment rendered against defendant on 
January 30, 1990.  Defendant challenged the prior convictions on the ground they 
were “constitutionally defective,” because defendant “was denied the right to 
effective assistance of counsel” and “denied his constitutional right to testify at the 
guilt phase of the Los Angeles trial; he was erroneously denied his constitutional 
right to present a defense at the guilt phase of that trial; and the Los Angeles trial 
court erroneously failed to afford him a hearing on conflict of interest allegations 
between him and his attorneys, in violation of his right to counsel.”  Defendant 
further asserts that “failure to dismiss [the prior murder] special circumstances . . . 
would deny [him] a fair trial and due process of law . . . and would deny him 
protection against cruel and unusual punishment” in violation of the applicable 
state and federal constitutional guarantees. 
                                              
32  
In view of our conclusion that substantial evidence supports defendant’s 
convictions and the burglary and robbery special-circumstance findings, we find 
no merit in defendant’s related contention that the trial court erred in denying his 
pretrial motion to dismiss the substantive charges and strike those special 
circumstance allegations.  For the same reason, we reject defendant’s contention 
that the trial court erred in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal made 
during and at the conclusion of the prosecution’s case-in-chief. 
 
62
 
In the companion case, People v. Carter, supra, ___ Cal.4th ___, we have 
upheld the judgment of death against defendant for the murders of Susan Knoll, 
Jillette Mills, and Bonnie Guthrie.  In so doing, we have rejected contentions that 
are substantially similar to those made in support of defendant’s motion at the trial 
of the present case to strike the prior murder special-circumstance allegations ⎯ 
contentions that, by his own acknowledgment, he has included “to a large extent” 
here.  (Id. at pp. ___ [at pp. 42-44].)  As we have explained in that decision, the 
Los Angeles County murder convictions were valid, and therefore the San Diego 
trial court properly denied the motion to strike.  Insofar as defendant’s arguments 
regarding the validity of the prior murder convictions forming the basis for the 
prior murder special circumstance differ from the arguments made in his 
automatic appeal from the Los Angeles County judgment convicting him of those 
murders, we reject those arguments. 
C. 
Prosecutorial Misconduct  
 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct, 
requiring reversal of the judgment, based upon the following asserted 
transgressions:  (1) “misstatements of fact and deceptive practices to gain 
favorable rulings,” (2) “comments disparaging of defense counsel,” and 
(3) “prosecutorial misconduct during opening and rebuttal arguments, including 
adverse comment upon defendant’s right against self-incrimination, improper 
shifting of the burden of proof, and misstatements of law.” 
 
“ ‘The applicable federal and state standards regarding prosecutorial 
misconduct are well established.  “ ‘A prosecutor’s . . . intemperate behavior 
violates the federal Constitution when it comprises a pattern of conduct “so 
egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a 
denial of due process.” ’ ”  [Citations.]  Conduct by a prosecutor that does not 
 
63
render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state 
law only if it involves “ ‘ “the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to 
attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.” ’ ”  [Citation.]  As a general rule a 
defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a 
timely fashion — and on the same ground — the defendant [requested] an 
assignment of misconduct and [also] requested that the jury be admonished to 
disregard the impropriety.  [Citation.]  Additionally, when the claim focuses upon 
comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the question is whether there is 
a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of 
remarks in an objectionable fashion.’  (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 
841.)”  (People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 427; see also People v. Box, 
supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 1207-1208 [rejecting claim of prosecutorial misconduct 
where the defendant “failed to satisfy the general rule requiring assignment of 
misconduct and request for admonition as to the prosecutor’s comment of which 
he now complains”].)  
Here, defendant failed to request an assignment of misconduct or an 
admonition with regard to any of the conduct he now challenges as improper.  
Accordingly, he has not preserved his claims on appeal. 
 
Even assuming defendant’s claims properly were before us, we would 
reject them on the merits, as follows. 
1. 
Alleged Misstatements of Fact and Deceptive Practices 
 
Defendant contends that prior to trial, the prosecution misled the trial court 
into believing that a key found in defendant’s possession was a key to Barbara S.’s 
business office.  Defendant implies the prosecution acted in bad faith in light of its 
subsequent disclosure that the key could not be located.  No misconduct appears.  
 
64
 
Defendant faults the prosecution for declining to stipulate to certain facts 
supporting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from the Datsun 
280 ZX.  Defendant contends the prosecution’s position was characterized by 
“obfuscation and gamesmanship.”  The prosecution’s reluctance to accept a 
stipulation was not improper.  (See People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 182.) 
 
Defendant contends the prosecution misrepresented the significance of the 
testimony of witness Polly Haisha.  Defendant argues that the prosecution on the 
first day of trial deceptively suggested that Haisha was a potential witness who 
was unlikely to be called unless the defense denied ownership of the address book 
that included her name.  Defendant also complains that Haisha, a law student, was 
permitted to remain in the courtroom during a portion of the opening statements, 
until the defense objected that her presence violated the court’s order excluding 
witnesses from observing the proceedings. 
 
At trial, defendant objected to Haisha’s testimony on relevancy grounds, 
which the trial court properly overruled, as we previously have explained.  (See, 
ante, pp. 49-54.)  Defendant did not object to Haisha’s testimony on the ground 
that the prosecution had violated discovery rules or had engaged in misconduct.  
Therefore, he has waived any such claim on appeal.  (People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 
Cal.4th at p. 427.)  Even if we assume prosecutorial misconduct, it is not 
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have occurred 
in the absence of Haisha’s testimony.  (People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 
866.)  As we previously have noted, Haisha was a minor witness whose testimony 
was peripheral to the central events underlying defendant’s crime spree.  Neither 
her presence during a portion of the prosecutor’s opening statement, in violation of 
the court’s order excluding witnesses, nor her eventual testimony at trial, could 
have made any possible difference in the outcome of the trial, in view of the 
compelling evidence that linked defendant to the charged offenses. 
 
65
2. 
The Prosecutor’s Comments Regarding Defense Counsel 
 
Defendant contends the prosecution made disparaging comments regarding 
defense counsel. Again, defendant did not object to the comments of which he 
now complains, and thereby has waived his claim. (People v. Gionis (1995) 9 
Cal.4th 1196, 1215.)  Even if defendant’s contention properly were before us, we 
would reject it.  With one exception, the comments were not made in the presence 
of the jury, and defendant fails to demonstrate how these comments outside the 
jury’s presence, which were of the sort one might expect to encounter during a 
vigorously contested capital trial, prejudiced the proceedings below.  With regard 
to the one comment made before the jury ⎯ at the commencement of the 
prosecution’s guilt phase rebuttal argument ⎯ we note that it was fleeting, 
imprecisely attributed to a member of the United States Supreme Court, and not 
remotely similar in degree of impropriety to the comments we have held to 
constitute prejudicial misconduct.  (See, e.g., People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 
800.)33 
                                              
33  
The prosecutor argued on rebuttal as follows: 
 
“Good morning.  [Defense counsel] suggested that the prosecution, or law 
enforcement developed a theory about Dean Carter’s guilt and then suggested that 
perhaps the witnesses changed their testimony to fit that theory.  Suggested 
perhaps that by the way we ask questions and the way we presented evidence, that 
we were somehow trying to manipulate the evidence to fit a theory about his guilt. 
 
“I suggest to you that would be improper for the prosecution to do. 
 
“[Defense counsel] likes to talk about age[-]old traditions in our system, he 
likes to talk about the Constitution, and he likes to talk about the rules, so I’m 
going to do that for a minute. 
 
“I’m going to tell you what a United States Supreme Court  [justice] ⎯ he 
likes to do that on occasion, to, quote the United States Supreme Court ⎯ said 
about the relative duties between prosecutors and defense attorneys. 
 
“ ‘Law enforcement officers have an obligation to convict the guilty and to 
make sure they do not convict the innocent.’ 
 
“It would be improper for the prosecution to try to manipulate a case to 
convict somebody who wasn’t guilty.  And if we tried to do that, he wouldn’t 
 (footnote continued on next page) 
 
66
3. 
Other Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
Immediately after making the comment noted in the margin (fn. 33, ante), 
the prosecutor commented upon the failure of the defense to present evidence as to 
“why defendant was in that car with all that property.  They could do that if they 
wanted to.”34  Defendant interposed an objection that the prosecutor improperly 
was “suggesting that the defendant should have testified, and [is] drawing 
attention to the fact that he did not.”  (See Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 
609 (Griffin)).  In view of the arguable ambiguity inherent in the prosecutor’s 
comments, the trial court declined to rule as to their propriety, and instead acceded 
to defendant’s request to reinstruct the jury at that time pursuant to CALJIC Nos. 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
stand still for it, and the court wouldn’t stand still for it. 
 
“That hasn’t happened. 
 
“That same United States Supreme Court Justice says, ‘Defense counsel 
have no comparable obligation to ascertain or present the truth.’ 
 
“They don’t have to tell you what’s true.  We do.”  (Italics added.)   
 
The prosecutor’s comments, of which defendant now complains, are 
derived from United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 256-257 (conc. & dis. 
opn. of White, J.) 
34  
The prosecutor argued as follows: 
 
“Defense counsel talked a lot about the presumption of innocence.  He says 
you carry that with you into the jury room.  I don’t want to play a word game.  The 
instruction says, ‘The defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent 
until the contrary is proved.’ 
 
“That happened some time ago.  The contrary was proved.  His innocence 
was disproved a long time ago in this case.  It doesn’t exist anymore.  The 
evidence took that away from him. 
 
“The rules are that the defense doesn’t have to present any evidence in a 
case.  They can if they want to.  No one prevents them from presenting any 
evidence to you.  No one prevents them from telling you what happened.  No one 
prevents them from bringing forth witnesses to explain why the defendant was in 
that car with all of that property.  They could do that if they wanted to.” 
 
67
2.60, and 2.61, which recognized defendant’s constitutional right not to testify and 
his option to rely on the state of the evidence. 
 
On appeal, defendant contends that the prosecutor’s comments constituted 
Griffin error.  (People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 527-529.) 
 
“ ‘Pursuant to Griffin, it is error for a prosecutor to state that certain 
evidence is uncontradicted or unrefuted when that evidence could not be 
contradicted or refuted by anyone other than the defendant testifying on his or her 
own behalf.’  (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 371 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 
401,39 P.3d 432].)  We also have said ‘it is error for the prosecution to refer to the 
absence of evidence that only the defendant’s testimony could provide.’  (Id. at 
p. 372, citing People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 757 & fn. 19 [175 
Cal.Rptr. 738, 631 P.2d 446].)  Griffin’s prohibition against ‘ “direct or indirect 
comment upon the failure of the defendant to take the witness stand,” ’ however, 
‘ “does not extend to comments on the state of the evidence or on the failure of the 
defense to introduce material evidence or to call logical witnesses.” ’  (People v. 
Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 572 [244 Cal.Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776], quoting 
People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 304 [168 Cal.Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149].)”  
(People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 257; see also People v. Stewart (2004) 
33 Cal.4th 425, 505-506; People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 554; People v. 
Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1339.) 
 
In this case, we need not decide whether the prosecutor’s comments 
constituted error under Griffin, because even if we assume (without deciding) that 
error occurred, in view of the indirect nature of the prosecutor’s comment, the 
court’s timely reinstruction of the jury, and the strength of the evidence against 
defendant, it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned 
a verdict of guilty” (United States v. Hasting (1983) 461 U.S. 499, 511) even if the 
 
68
prosecutor had not made the comment at issue.  Accordingly, no prejudicial error 
occurred. 
 
Defendant also characterizes as improper argument certain additional 
remarks made by the prosecutor during summation:  “There are people among us 
who murder other people because they like to murder other people.  [¶]  There are 
evil people among us.  [¶]. . . [¶]  [Defense counsel] stresses that you are the 
conscience of the community, and you are.  People in the community have 
emotions.  It’s . . . improper for you to have your verdict influenced by emotion.  
But it is proper for you to express through a verdict how you feel about this case, 
to tell the defendant Dean Carter, what you did, you murdered Janette Cullins, was 
evil, was senseless, it was vicious, it was unforgivable, and it was first degree 
murder.”  Elsewhere during his summation, the prosecutor argued similarly.  
 
Defendant did not interpose an objection, and thus waived his claim.  But 
even if the issue properly had been preserved, we would reject defendant’s claim 
of error.  The  prosecutor’s comments were not, as defendant asserts, references to 
“improper[] character propensity,” but instead came “within the range of 
permissible comment regarding egregious conduct on defendant’s part. 
[Citation.]”  (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 537 [rejecting a challenge to 
the prosecutor’s characterization of the defendant as a “ ‘mass murderer, rapist,’ ” 
“ ‘a perverted murderous cancer,’ ” and a “ ‘walking depraved cancer’ ”]; see also 
People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 961 [upholding prosecutor’s 
characterization of the defendant as “ ‘coiled like a snake’ ” and a “ ‘rabid 
dog’ ”].)  Moreover, in view of the overwhelming evidence that connected 
defendant to the charged crimes, the prosecutor’s remarks “could not have carried 
such an emotional impact as to make it likely the jury’s decision was rooted in 
passion rather than evidence.”  (People v. Thomas, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 537.) 
 
69
D. 
Alleged Instructional Error 
 
Prior to instructing the jury, the trial court reviewed with counsel the 
instructions to be given.  Defendant objected to the trial court giving CALJIC No. 
17.20, an instruction that directed the jury to determine whether, if the jury found 
defendant guilty of robbery and/or burglary, defendant in the commission of those 
crimes committed great bodily injury on Janette Cullins.35 
 
Defense counsel argued:  “[T]here [are] all kinds of results that could 
follow from this.  [¶]  I don’t know if it’s a [section] 654 issue or not, but for the 
[great bodily injury allegation,] if the [great bodily injury] is the killing, and you 
could have some absurd results in this, one is that, for example, the defendant was 
found guilty of the robbery and the burglary, and not the murder and then the 
intentional [great bodily injury,] so I’m wondering if this instruction should be 
given at all.” 
                                              
35  
Pursuant to CALJIC No. 17.20 (1991 rev.), the trial court instructed the 
jury as follows: 
 
“It is alleged in Counts Two [robbery] and Three [burglary] that in the 
commission of the crimes therein described, the defendant, Dean Phillip Carter, 
with the specific intent to inflict injury, personally inflicted great bodily injury on 
Janette Ann Cullins. 
 
“If you find the defendant guilty of robbery and or burglary, you must 
determine whether or not the defendant, with the specific intent to inflict such 
injury, did personally inflict great bodily injury on Janette Ann Cullins in the 
commission of robbery and/or burglary. 
 
“ ‘Great bodily injury’ as used in this instruction means a substantial 
physical injury.  Minor or moderate injuries of a temporary nature do not 
constitute great bodily injury and are not sufficient. 
 
“The People have the burden of proving the truth of this allegation.  If you 
have a reasonable doubt that it is true, you must find it to be not true. 
 
“You will include a special finding on that question in your verdict, using a 
form that will be supplied for that purpose.” 
 
70
 
The prosecutor responded:  “I think [the instruction] should be given.  I 
mean the issue in this case is who did the crime.  The same person that robbed her 
killed her, and counsel expresses the possibility of bizarre results; that they could 
find him guilty of robbery with the intention of inflicting [great bodily injury], and 
not the murder.  [¶]  I can’t imagine that happening.  I imagine Mr. Carter would 
be happy as a clam if that happened, but that’s not going to happen.” 
 
The trial court acknowledged the possibility of “an unexpected result under 
the facts as we know them,” but concluded:  “I don’t see where it would be 
prejudicial or confusing to give the instruction.”  The trial court thereafter 
instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 17.20.  Upon returning verdicts of 
guilty as to robbery and burglary, the jury found “true” the allegations that 
defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on Cullins with regard to both of 
those offenses.  The court imposed sentencing enhancements of three years’ 
imprisonment for each of the special allegations, which the court stayed pursuant 
to section 654. 
 
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in giving the instruction, 
citing section 12022.7, subdivision (g), which provides that a sentencing 
enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury “shall not apply to murder or 
manslaughter.”  Defendant further contends that reversal of the judgment is 
required “because as a matter of law criminal sanctions were imposed upon 
insufficient proof and double punishment is prohibited by law.”  He also 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the great bodily injury 
findings. 
 
We reject defendant’s argument in all respects.  The jury was properly 
instructed, because the allegations of great bodily injury clearly and specifically 
enhanced each of the robbery and burglary counts, not the murder count.  The 
jury’s verdicts specifically found defendant guilty of robbery and burglary, with a 
 
71
great bodily injury finding enhancing each of those two crimes.  Nothing 
contained in the jury’s verdicts or in the record as a whole indicates that the jury 
misunderstood its function in this regard or was confused by the challenged 
instruction.  With regard to defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to 
sustain the findings as to the enhancements, the fatal strangulation of Janette 
Cullins provides the evidentiary support for the allegations that in committing the 
robbery and the burglary, defendant inflicted great bodily injury.  The 
circumstance that the trial court stayed the three-year enhancements that were 
imposed based upon the jury’s findings that defendant inflicted great bodily injury 
means that defendant was not subject to double punishment.  No error appears.36  
E. 
Miscellaneous Contentions 
 
Defendant raises a number of contentions that are either virtually identical  
or substantially similar to certain claims raised on appeal from the Los Angeles 
County death judgment rendered against him for the murders of Susan Knoll, 
Jillette Mills, and Bonnie Guthrie ⎯ contentions that we have rejected in the 
companion appeal in People v. Carter, supra, ___ Cal.4th ___.  These contentions 
are as follows:  1) defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from his 
person and from the stolen Datsun 280 ZX improperly was denied; 2) defendant’s 
motion to exclude other-crimes evidence involving the death of Tok Kim, and the 
murders of Susan Knoll, Jillette Mills, and Bonnie Guthrie, improperly was 
denied; 3) the photographic lineup procedures used by the Oakland Police 
                                              
36  
The question whether section 654 applies to enhancements is before us in 
People v. Palacios (review granted, May 11, 2005, S132144).  Because, as noted 
in the text, the enhancements imposed here were stayed and defendant therefore 
was not subject to double punishment, we need not and do not address the section 
654 issue here. 
 
72
Department in the investigation of Tok Kim’s death in Alameda County were 
impermissibly suggestive, and therefore the trial court erred in denying the motion 
to exclude the Alameda County witness identifications of defendant; 
4) defendant’s motion to exclude the preliminary hearing testimony of Alameda 
County witness Ray Blevins (who had died prior to trial) improperly was denied; 
and 5) defendant’s motion to sever his trial for the murder of Janette Cullins from 
the charge of rape involving Barbara S. improperly was denied. 37 
 
For the reasons we have set forth more extensively in the companion 
matter, People v. Carter, supra, ___ Cal.4th ___, we reject defendant’s 
contentions.  Insofar as defendant’s claims do not precisely mirror those set forth 
                                              
37  
With regard to defendant’s contention that the trial court erroneously 
denied his motion to sever his trial for the murder of Janette Cullins from the 
charged rape of Barbara S., we rely upon the analysis of section 954 and our 
decisions interpreting that statute as set forth in People v. Carter, supra, __ 
Cal.4th at pp. ___ [at pp. 38-40], and which need not be repeated here, except to 
observe that the distinctions between defendant’s motion to sever the Susan Knoll 
and Jillette Mills murder charges from the Bonnie Guthrie murder charge in the 
Los Angeles proceedings (see id. at pp. ___ [at pp. 37-42], and defendant’s motion 
to sever the Janette Cullins murder charge from the Barbara. S. rape charge in the 
San Diego proceedings, do not persuade us that the trial court below abused its 
discretion.  To the contrary, the court reviewed in exhaustive detail the basis for its 
conclusion that severance was improper, observing, among other things, that the 
rape and murder charges were of the same class under section 954, each crime 
involved a forced entry into a residence, each involved evidence that a knife had 
been used, each involved theft, and each victim previously had been acquainted 
with defendant.  Strong evidence linked defendant independently to the death of 
Janette Cullins and to the rape of Barbara S.  Accordingly, the likelihood that the 
jury might convict defendant of having committed one of the charged crimes 
based on the evidence that he committed the other was virtually nonexistent.  No 
abuse of discretion in denying defendant’s motion to sever appears.  Nor has 
defendant demonstrated that prejudice actually resulted from the joinder of the 
murder and rape charges at trial.  (See People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 
p. 1318.) 
 
73
in the companion appeal, neither defendant’s additional arguments nor the variants 
in their phrasing persuade us that the trial court committed an error or abuse of 
discretion prejudicial to defendant’s case.  Indeed, these claims are not deserving 
of additional discussion.  (People v. Laursen (1972) 8 Cal.3d 192, 205.) 
IV. PENALTY PHASE 
A. 
Evidence of Defendant’s Sexual Assault on Jennifer S. 
 
At the conclusion of the People’s case in aggravation, the prosecutor over 
defendant’s objection offered abstracts of judgment as proof that defendant had 
been convicted of:  (1) sexual assault crimes committed against Jennifer S. in 
Ventura County in March 1984, (2) burglary in Alaska in 1978, and (3) burglary in 
Oregon in 1974.  Defendant argued against the introduction of defendant’s 
Ventura County convictions on the basis that because the judgments were 
rendered in October 1984, they postdated the April 1984 murder of Janette Cullins 
and therefore were inadmissible as prior felony convictions under section 190.3, 
factor (c).  (See, e.g., People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 453; People v. 
Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 201-202.) 
 
The trial court agreed with defendant’s interpretation of the temporal 
requirements of section 190.3, factor (c), but pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b), 
correctly recognized that “the evidence of crimes of violence can occur before or 
after the murder, and the [Jennifer S.] rape is a crime of violence.”  (See, e.g., 
People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 47.)  The trial court thereafter admitted 
evidence of defendant’s sexual assault upon Jennifer S. 
 
74
 
On appeal, defendant reiterates his contention that the trial court improperly 
admitted this evidence.  For the reasons aptly noted by the trial court, no error 
appears.38  
 
Even if the trial court had failed to recognize the distinction between 
section 190.3, factors (b) and (c), and admitted evidence of defendant’s crimes 
against Jennifer S. under subdivision (c), the error would have been harmless, 
“because the evidence was admissible as evidence of violent criminal activity 
under [section 190.3] factor (b).”  (People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 
p.1374.) 
 
Defendant further contends the trial court improperly instructed the jury 
that it could double-count the crimes committed against Jennifer S. under section 
190.3, factors (b) and (c).  His citation to the record, however, is to an inapposite 
instruction (CALJIC No. 2.82⎯Concerning Hypothetical Questions), and our 
review of the other instructions given to the jury has not revealed any such 
“double-counting” instruction. 
B. 
 Exclusion of Proffered Evidence in Mitigation 
 
The defense introduced evidence of defendant’s troubled childhood 
growing up in Alaska.  Several witnesses testified that defendant spent 
considerable portions of his childhood and adolescence in orphanages, juvenile 
institutions, and foster homes, and was incarcerated in penal institutions during 
much of his early adulthood. 
 
Defendant sought to introduce additional evidence in mitigation, including 
testimony of defendant’s older brother, Jerry Carter, regarding the particulars of 
                                              
38  
Insofar as defendant’s argument can be read to incorporate his pretrial 
efforts to strike evidence of his sexual assault upon Jennifer S., his claim fails for 
the same reasons as those noted above. 
 
75
defendant’s upbringing and family life, the testimony of university professor 
Linda Ellana regarding cultural conditions experienced by the Native Alaskan 
population living in the Nome area, and the testimony of James Park, a California 
correctional officer and expert on prison operations and classifications. Defendant 
also moved for allocution.  The trial court denied each of these requests. 
 
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error in 
excluding the proffered evidence.  As we shall explain, we disagree. 
1. 
The Proffered Testimony of Jerry Carter 
 
On direct examination, Jerry Carter testified regarding defendant’s difficult 
childhood in a manner generally consistent with the testimony he gave at 
defendant’s trial for the murders of Susan Knoll, Jillette Mills, and Bonnie 
Guthrie.  (See People v. Carter, supra, ___ Cal.4th at p. ___ [at pp. 14-15].)  In 
the course of presenting this testimony, however, defense counsel asked Jerry 
Carter several questions concerning subjects about which the witness lacked 
personal knowledge.  These topics included where defendant would go as a child 
when he ran away; where defendant found food on those excursions; defendant’s 
efforts as a child to stow away on airplanes; and information regarding where 
defendant went when he was sent away from Nome by his mother and his 
stepfather.  The trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objections to these lines of 
inquiry on foundational and hearsay grounds. 
 
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court’s rulings improperly 
foreclosed the defense from presenting certain aspects of the case in mitigation. 
We are unpersuaded.  In view of Jerry Carter’s lack of personal knowledge as to 
certain aspects of his proposed testimony, the trial court ruled correctly.  Similarly, 
insofar as the witness attempted to testify as to statements made to him that were 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, the proffered testimony was hearsay 
 
76
that was not subject to any recognized exception, and properly was excluded by 
the trial court.  (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a); People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 
620, 642-643.) 
 
Moreover, even if we were to agree with defendant that the trial court ruled 
improperly, we observe that the defense succeeded in introducing the gist of the 
incidents through other testimony of Jerry Carter and of other witnesses.  In the 
context of that testimony, much of which graphically described the abuse 
defendant suffered as a child, as well as defendant’s institutionalization, the 
excluded testimony was of marginal significance.  Thus, there is not a reasonable 
possibility that the jury would have rendered a different verdict had the trial court 
not excluded the challenged testimony.  (People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 
447-448.) 
2. 
The Proffered Testimony of Linda Ellana 
 
Outside the presence of the jury, Dr. Linda Ellana, a professor of cultural 
anthropology at the University of Alaska, testified regarding cultural conditions 
experienced by the Native Alaskan population living in the Nome area. 
 
A resident of Nome for 15 years, Dr. Ellana recalled the rampant 
alcoholism and depression suffered by the Native Alaskan population, as well as 
the racial and ethnic discrimination directed toward them by the Caucasian 
minority.  She testified: “I would say that not only are natives discriminated 
against, but more importantly, people who are half-breeds, or quarter breeds, are 
neither accepted very well either by the . . . native community in Nome.  [¶] . . . [¶]  
Alcohol abuse is extreme in Nome.  It is not limited to the native community, 
though it is most noticeably focused on the native communities . . . . [Incidents 
that accompany the alcohol abuse in Nome include] many assaults.  Assaults are 
 
77
the [most] common.  Assaults, suicides, and homicides, assaults including, and not 
including rape.” 
 
Dr. Ellana also testified to having been acquainted with James Carter, 
defendant’s stepfather, recalling that James Carter was negatively disposed toward 
the young Native Alaskans ⎯ colloquially known in the area as “bush 
students” ⎯ and that he called them “worthless, lazy, trouble causers.” 
 
Dr. Ellana acknowledged, however, that she had no specific knowledge 
regarding defendant, his background, or the criminal charges filed against him.  
She never had met or spoken with defendant, although she recalled seeing him 
“once or twice” when he was a child.  She knew nothing of the problems that the 
Carter family experienced raising defendant.  She never heard James Carter speak 
of defendant or of the other members of his family. 
 
The prosecution argued against the introduction of the proffered testimony 
on the ground of relevancy.  The defense countered that Dr. Ellana was 
experienced in the problems encountered by residents of the Nome area, including 
mixed-race individuals, had some knowledge of the disparaging attitude 
defendant’s stepfather portrayed toward Native and part-Native Alaskans, and that 
the significance of the testimony was “a question for the jury to decide.” 
 
The trial court rejected the proffered testimony on the ground of relevancy 
and under Evidence Code section 352, explaining at some length the court’s 
reasoning.39 
                                              
39  
The trial court ruled as follows: 
 
“. . . . I was trying real[ly] hard with [Dr. Ellana] to figure out some way for 
her to be able to testify before the jury for a variety of reasons.  But a number of 
things came up during the course of this discussion that cause me a great deal of 
concern in terms of relevance, as well as under [Evidence Code section] 352, 
getting into her own biases that began to crop up at certain points. 
 
“Now, the areas that I made note that the defense asked questions on had to 
 (footnote continued on next page) 
 
78
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
do with prejudice by Jim Carter, the defendant’s father, prejudice in general, in the 
community of Nome, alcoholism in that area, [‘]bush kids[’] and that phrase, and 
the negative connotation that goes with it, and the despair. . . . 
 
“[Dr. Ellana] is a very qualified person for her particular occupation, but 
that doesn’t mean that she is automatically an expert who is . . . appropriate for 
this particular case. 
 
“First of all, foundationally, her testimony concerning Jim Carter relates to 
a time period when the defendant is probably about 12 years old, give or take a 
little, at that point. 
 
“ [¶] . . . [¶]  
 
“She has seen the defendant with his father two times, and obviously there 
was nothing inappropriate that was expressed or seen at that particular stage. 
 
“Her foundation for her opinion about Jim Carter is based upon these staff 
meetings, is what she said. 
 
“[¶] . . . [¶]  
 
“[T]here is no showing at this particular stage, that the defendant, himself, 
was experiencing prejudice on the part of his stepfather, and it is very speculative.  
I mean I’ve allowed a lot to come in on this issue of prejudice, and I think the jury 
is well aware that prejudice exists in Nome now, and it did then.  And therefore, 
the defendant may have been subjected to, and probably was subjected to some of 
the prejudice.  And that, you know, I think ought to be there, and is there, as well 
as the alcoholism. 
 
“But to allow her to testify as to her opinion as to whether Mr. Carter is 
prejudice[d] when her own statements about a desire to have native people, you 
know, employed in the school, and she probably wouldn’t have hired him if she 
had known he was in law enforcement, does not sound to me like we are getting 
into an area where its truly an expert opinion being expressed. 
 
“ [¶] . . . [¶]  
 
“. . . The other comments lead me to believe under [Evidence Code section] 
352 we are going to get into a lot of things that are going to be very time-
consuming, nonproductive in an area I’m determining at this stage, although 
relevant, is not compellingly relevant in light of the state that we know about any 
impact or prejudice on Dean Carter himself. 
 
“In other words, we don’t have any psychiatric testimony, and the 
defendant hasn’t testified, and I haven’t seen it come in any other way at this 
particular stage, except perhaps that his mother, not the father, didn’t bring him 
cookies when she brought cookies to the older boy. 
 
“And I think it is necessary to lay the record on this, so I apologize for 
keeping you, because there is a real balancing that has to be done under [Evidence 
 (footnote continued on next page) 
 
79
 
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in excluding the 
testimony in question.  Although certain aspects of Dr. Ellana’s testimony clearly 
fell outside the bounds of relevancy (for example, cultural attitudes and problems 
in Nome at the time of defendant’s 1991 trial, seven years after he was 
incarcerated in California), and other aspects were cumulative (for example, the 
harsh living conditions experienced by residents of Nome), the question whether 
her testimony ought to have been excluded in its entirety is closer.  Dr. Ellana did 
have firsthand knowledge of the rigid and prejudicial attitudes regarding “half-
breeds” expressed by defendant’s stepfather; as noted earlier, defendant is part 
Eskimo.  Consistent with the principles set forth in Evidence Code sections 210 
and 352, we believe that the trial court could have set certain limits as to the areas 
in which Dr. Ellana could testify. 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
Code section] 352.  The probative value on these particular points, because a good 
portion of it is duplicative, as well, or cumulative ⎯ not just duplicative but 
cumulative ⎯ is also a part of what I’m weighing. 
 
“ [¶] . . . [¶] 
 
“ [‘]Bush kids[’] is not relevant at this point.  And as far as the despair is 
concerned, it is purely speculative based upon her particular knowledge of the area 
at that particular time. . . . I did not get the feeling, based upon the qualifications, 
that this is where her expertise truly lies. 
 
“So for those reasons, . . . I just want to make it real clear, there is no 
evidence in terms of how Jim Carter treated Dean Carter directly as a result of any 
potential prejudice in that regard. 
 
“And also the timing of it is a problem.  I’m not going to allow it, is the 
bottom line. 
 
 “[¶] . . . [¶]  
 
“I think the probative value is minimal and the prejudicial effect in terms of 
getting into issues which are going to create a great deal of confusion in terms of 
timing and the cumulative effect of bringing her back is just ⎯ the probative value 
is minimal and the prejudicial effect is high, and I’m not going to allow it.” 
 
80
 
We need not decide whether the trial court’s ruling to exclude Dr. Ellana’s 
testimony in its entirety was erroneous, however, because even if we assume that 
error occurred, defendant suffered no prejudice.  The jury heard a considerable 
amount of other testimony regarding Nome’s harsh conditions and defendant’s 
troubled childhood.  Viewed in the context of the comprehensive case in 
mitigation presented by the defense, Dr. Ellana’s testimony was of marginal 
significance and unlikely to have swayed the jury.  Defendant fails to persuade us 
that it is reasonably possible a more favorable result would have been reached in 
the absence of the trial court’s ruling excluding this testimony.  (People v. Brown, 
supra, 46 Cal.3d 432, 447-448.)  
3. 
The Proffered Testimony of James W. L. Park 
 
Outside the presence of the jury, the defense offered the testimony of James 
W. L. Park, an expert in prison operations, prison construction, and prisoner 
classification who had lengthy experience working in the California Department of 
Corrections.  Park testified that prisons use audio-visual  equipment, and that a 
prisoner with experience in this field would be a benefit to the prison system.  
Based upon his review of defendant’s records of incarceration, Park stated that in 
his opinion defendant would make “an above[-]average adjustment” to living in a 
maximum security prison.  Park further testified that defendant “would not be a 
danger to staff or to prisoners.” 
 
The trial court ruled that Park could testify before the jury as to his opinion 
that defendant would adjust to life in prison, but also that if Park so testified, the 
prosecution would be permitted to cross-examine Park with regard to defendant’s 
psychological testing results and history of violence and criminal behavior.40 
                                              
40  
The trial court’s ruling included the following: 
 
“[Defendant’s] status as a death row inmate will not come in. 
 (footnote continued on next page) 
 
81
 
Defense counsel thereafter informed the court that the defense would not 
call Park as a witness. 
 
On appeal, defendant contends “[t]he trial court’s improper ruling 
effectively precluded the expert’s testimony in violation of [defendant’s] 
constitutional rights.”  We disagree.  The proffered testimony sought to introduce 
into evidence certain experience and character traits of defendant that suggested he 
would adjust well to prison life and probably would not be dangerous to other 
inmates and staff.  Had the defense introduced that evidence, the prosecution 
would have been entitled to cross-examine Park regarding defendant’s 
psychological propensities and prior criminal record.  (See People v. Daniels 
(1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 882-883.)  The trial court did not preclude Park from 
testifying, nor unduly restrict the areas of inquiry pertaining to his proposed 
testimony, but instead simply made clear that if the defense offered evidence of 
defendant’s character related to the likelihood of his adjustment to life in prison, 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
“. . . [Park] may not testify to what it’s like to be . . . a prisoner under a life 
without possibility of parole [LWOP] sentence in and of itself. . . .  
 
“He may testify that based upon his experience, that an LWOP prisoner 
could utilize a trade as a video operator. 
 
“He will be allowed to testify as to his opinion that the defendant will make 
an adequate adjustment to state prison, but if that question is asked, the People 
may cross-examine him, including cross-examining him on his history of any 
violence or any criminal behavior. 
 
“[¶] . . . [¶]  
 
“And [defendant’s] entire record, and any psychological testing results that 
the people have can be raised by way of cross-examination of this particular 
witness, because that’s information that that witness should have in forming such 
an opinion. 
 
“[The People] also [will] be allowed to cross-examine the witness and 
make it clear to the jury that this witness has not examined this defendant.” 
 
82
the prosecution would be entitled to cross-examine the witness and seek to rebut 
his testimony.  Under these circumstances, the defense for obvious tactical reasons 
declined to introduce Park’s testimony.  No error or abuse of discretion appears.  
4. 
The Trial Court’s Ruling Prohibiting Allocution 
 
Although acknowledging that the right of allocution is not recognized in 
California, defendant nevertheless contends the trial court erred in refusing his 
request to plead for mercy without being subject to cross-examination.  No error 
appears.  (See, e.g., People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1209; People v. 
Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 989.) 
C. 
Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct  
 
Defendant contends the prosecution committed misconduct at the penalty 
phase by “propound[ing] questions to witnesses in bad faith,” interposing 
objections on the ground of hearsay, propounding “arguments . . . designed to 
improperly invoke non-statutory aggravation evidence in violation of [s]ection 
190.3 and [defendant’s] constitutional rights,” and by improperly commenting 
upon defendant’s failure to testify in violation of Griffin v. California, supra, 380 
U.S. 609.  Defendant further contends the prosecution improperly “used every 
means available to curtail testimony regarding [defendant’s] childhood ⎯ or 
other ⎯ socio-medico information and history that were legitimately proffered for 
a sentence less than death.” 
 
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that defendant greatly 
overstates his position.  Although a prosecutor is not permitted to comment “either 
directly or indirectly, on the defendant’s failure to testify in his defense,” the 
prosecutor may comment “ ‘on the state of the evidence, or on the failure of the 
defense to introduce material evidence or call logical witnesses . . . .’ ”  (People v. 
Turner (2004) 34 Cal.4th 406, 419; quoting People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 
 
83
694, 755.)  For the most part, the prosecution’s handling of its penalty phase 
responsibilities fell within the range of appropriate behavior.  The prosecution was 
vigorous in its cross-examination and summation, and in interposing objections 
(most of which clearly were well-founded).  Even were we to assume that the 
isolated incidents of which defendant now complains constituted misconduct, they 
were trivial in the context of defendant’s trial and did not resemble or even 
approach the sort of misconduct that we have held to be prejudicial.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th 800.)  We therefore reject defendant’s claim of 
prejudicial error.  
D. 
Miscellaneous Contentions 
 
Defendant raises a number of contentions that are virtually identical or 
substantially similar to claims raised on appeal from the Los Angeles County 
death judgment rendered against him for the murders of Susan Knoll, Jillette 
Mills, and Bonnie Guthrie, and which we have rejected in the companion case of 
People v. Carter, supra. ___ Cal.4th ___.  These contentions are as follows:  1) the 
trial court’s pattern jury instructions to the jury were inappropriate; 2) the delay 
between the pronouncement of defendant’s death sentence and his execution 
renders the entire process unconstitutional; and 3) the use of lethal gas as a method 
of execution is unconstitutional. 
 
For the reasons we have set forth more extensively in the companion 
matter, People v. Carter, supra, ___ Cal.4th at pages ___ [at pp. 107-128], we 
reject defendant’s contentions.  Insofar as defendant’s claims do not precisely 
mirror those set forth in the companion appeal, neither defendant’s additional 
arguments nor the variants in their phrasing persuade us that the trial court 
committed an error or abuse of discretion prejudicial to defendant’s case.  Indeed, 
 
84
these contentions are not deserving of additional discussion.  (People v. Laursen, 
supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 205.) 
E. 
Challenges to the Death Penalty Law 
 
Defendant contends that many features of California’s capital sentencing 
scheme, singly and in combination, violate the federal Constitution.  We 
previously have rejected similar challenges, and because defendant has not 
presented any persuasive reason for us to reconsider those rulings, we decline to 
do so. 
 
The 1978 death penalty law does not violate the Eighth Amendment by  
failing to distinguish between death-eligible and non-death-eligible murders in a 
meaningful and nonarbitrary way.  (See, e.g., People v. Combs, supra, 34 Cal.4th 
821, 868; People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 729; People v. San Nicholas 
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 676-677; People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 884 & 
fn. 7; People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1179; People v. Jones (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 119, 196; People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 60-61; People v. Stanley 
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 842-843.)  The special circumstances set forth in the statute 
are not overinclusive by their number or by their terms, nor have these categories 
been construed in an overly inclusive manner.  (People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 
313, 356.) 
 
Section 190.3, factor (a) does not bias the determination of penalty in favor 
of death, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, as defendant acknowledges.41   
                                              
41  
Section 190.3 provides in relevant part: 
 
“In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account any of 
the following factors if relevant:  [¶] (a) The circumstances of the crime of which 
the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any 
special circumstances found to be true pursuant to Section 190.1.”   
 
85
(See People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979; People v. Murtishaw 
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 1001, 1020.) 
 
The use in section 190.3, factor (d) of the adjective “extreme” does not act 
as a barrier to the jury’s proper consideration of defendant’s evidence in 
mitigation.42  (See People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th 698, 729.)  Nor was it 
reasonably probable that, because of factor (d), the jury failed properly to weigh 
defendant’s evidence in mitigation.  To the contrary, we observe that the trial court 
in the instant case instructed the jury pursuant to section 190.3, factor (k) (factor 
(k)) as reflected in CALJIC No. 8.85, which provided the jury wide latitude to 
consider any extenuating circumstance in determining penalty.43  (See People v. 
Holt, supra, 15 Cal. 4th  at p. 698 [upholding the validity of factor (d), in view of 
factor (k)]; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 804 [“[T]here is no reasonable 
likelihood that the jury would have inferred from [CALJIC No. 8.85, subd. (k)] 
that they could not consider mental or emotional disturbance of any degree 
whatever in mitigation of penalty”].) 
                                              
42  
Under factor (d), the trier of fact may, in determining the penalty to be 
imposed, take into account “[w]hether or not the offense was committed while the 
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”   
43  
Pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.85, the trial court instructed the jury:  “In 
determining which penalty is to be imposed on the defendant, you shall consider 
all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case, 
except as you may be hereafter instructed.  You shall consider, take into account 
and be guided by the following factors, if applicable:  [¶] . . . [¶]  (k) Any other 
circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a 
legal excuse for the crime and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s 
character, background, social history or record that the defendant offers as a basis 
for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is 
on trial. . . .” 
 
86
 
Notwithstanding defendant’s assertion that the factor (k) instruction is the 
least accurately understood of California’s sentencing factors, contributing to 
“pronounced” “constitutional harm,” we repeatedly have rejected challenges to its 
validity.  (See, e.g., People v. San Nicholas, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 675-676; see 
also Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 381 [upholding a predecessor 
version of factor (k)].)  We do so again here.  We also observe that defendant does 
not demonstrate that the jury misunderstood its function in the present case. 
 
CALJIC No. 8.88 (1989 rev.) is not inconsistent with the requirement set 
forth in section 190.3 that “If the trier of fact determines that the mitigating 
circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances[,] the trier of fact shall 
impose a sentence of confinement in state prison for a term of life without the 
possibility of parole.”44  (See People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1194 
[rejecting a similar contention].) 
 
The trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury (or otherwise 
require) that the jury must agree unanimously as to aggravating circumstances, 
that all aggravating factors must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
aggravation must outweigh mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, and that death 
must be found to be the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. 
Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 421; People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 
1101-1102.)  
 
The trial court’s failure to delete inapplicable factors from the instructions 
given to the jury did not violate defendant’s rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
                                              
44  
Pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.80 (1989 rev.), the trial court instructed the jury:  
“To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the 
aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating 
circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole.” 
 
87
or Fourteenth Amendments.  (People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 421.)  
Moreover, as defendant acknowledges, the trial court instructed the jury pursuant 
to CALJIC No. 8.85 that “only those factors that are applicable on the evidence 
adduced at trial are to be taken into account in the penalty determination in the 
individual case.”  We therefore reject defendant’s contention that he was deprived 
of his right to an individualized sentencing determination based upon permissible 
factors relating to him and the crimes he committed. 
 
The circumstance that under California law an individual prosecutor has 
discretion whether to seek the death penalty in a particular case did not deny 
defendant his constitutional rights to equal protection of the laws or to due process 
of law.  (People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1179; People v. Ray, supra, 13 
Cal.4th 313, 359; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 152; see also Gregg v. 
Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 225 (conc. opn. of White, J.) [“Absent facts to the 
contrary, it cannot be assumed that prosecutors will be motivated in their charging 
decisions by factors other than the strength of their case and the likelihood that a 
jury would impose the death penalty if it convicts.”].)  Moreover, nothing in the 
present case even remotely suggests that defendant’s constitutional rights were 
denied by the decision of the San Diego County prosecutor to seek the death 
penalty.  To the contrary, the evidence of defendant’s penchant for overpowering 
young women and strangling them to death amply demonstrates that the 
prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty was neither arbitrary nor 
capricious, but rather an appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion in 
response to defendant’s criminal rampage across California.  Defendant, an 
apparently unremorseful serial killer and rapist, is precisely the type of individual 
against whom virtually any California prosecutor would seek the death penalty.  
Defendant is totally unconvincing in suggesting otherwise.  
 
88
F. 
Cumulative Error 
 
Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the asserted errors 
committed at his trial led to a miscarriage of justice, requiring reversal of the guilt 
and penalty phase judgments.  Having determined that defendant’s trial was nearly 
free of error, and that, to the extent error was committed, it clearly was harmless, 
we conclude that defendant’s claim of cumulative error lacks merit. 
DISPOSITION 
The special circumstance of lying in wait is set aside.  In all other respects, 
we affirm the judgment as to both guilt and penalty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
I concur in the majority opinion, which I have signed.  I write separately to 
address the merits of defendant’s claim that the prosecutor improperly commented 
on defendant’s invocation of his right not to testify at trial. 
Defendant was charged with the murder of Janette Cullins.  In its case-in-
chief, the prosecution presented evidence that defendant had also murdered four 
other women:  Tok Kim, Susan Knoll, Jillette Mills, and Bonnie Guthrie.  When 
defendant was arrested for the murders, he was driving a car belonging to murder 
victim Mills.  In the car, the police found a key ring that belonged to victim 
Cullins; a kitchen knife, rubber gloves, and a gold chain, belonging to victim Kim; 
a supermarket CASHEX card that belonged to victim Knoll; towels, athletic wear, 
and photographic equipment that belonged to victim Mills; and three handwoven 
sweaters that belonged to victim Guthrie.   
In his rebuttal argument to the jury, the prosecutor said:  “No one prevents 
[the defense] from telling you what happened.  No one prevents them from 
bringing forth witnesses to explain why the defendant was in the car with all that 
property.  They could do that if they wanted to.”  Defense counsel objected, 
asserting the prosecutor was in essence commenting on defendant’s invocation of 
the privilege against self-incrimination.  Without ruling on the objection, the trial 
court instructed the jury that defendant had a constitutional right not to testify. 
The majority does not decide whether the prosecutor’s comment was 
proper, concluding that any error was harmless.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 67.)  In my 
view, the comment violated the rule established in Griffin v. California (1965) 380 
U.S. 609.  There, the United States Supreme Court held that a prosecutor who 
 
2 
comments on a defendant’s failure to testify at trial violates the defendant’s 
privilege against self-incrimination, as protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the federal Constitution.  The court explained that such a 
comment “solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence against him,” and 
thus “cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly.”  (Id. at p. 614; 
see also Portuonodo v. Agard (2000) 529 U.S. 61, 65.)  
This court has explained that, as a general rule, Griffin v. California, supra, 
380 U.S. 609, does not prevent prosecutors from commenting on the failure of the 
defense to introduce relevant evidence or to call logical witnesses.  (People 
v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 572.)  But Griffin does not allow a prosecutor to 
argue to the jury “that certain testimony or evidence is uncontradicted, if such 
contradiction or denial could be provided only by the defendant, who therefore 
would be required to take the witness stand.”  (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 1229, 1339; see also People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1229 [“a 
prosecutor errs by referring to evidence as ‘uncontradicted’ when the defendant, 
who elects not to testify, is the only person who could have refuted it”]; People 
v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 757-758.)  Similarly, “a prosecutor may not 
comment on a defendant’s failure to present evidence to contradict the 
government’s case if ‘the defendant alone had the information to do so.’ ”  (U.S. v. 
Triplett (8th Cir. 1999) 195 F.3d 990, 995.)  To determine whether a prosecutor’s 
comment violated Griffin, a reviewing court must decide whether there is a 
“reasonable likelihood” that the jury construed the remark as a commentary on the 
defendant’s failure to testify.  (People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 514; 
People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663.) 
Here, the evidence presented to the jury at trial did not disclose the 
existence of any living person other than defendant who could have testified as to 
how defendant had acquired a car that belonged to one of the murder victims and 
 
3 
that contained property belonging to each of the other murder victims.  Nor would 
there necessarily be such a person if defendant were innocent of the murders.  
Thus, there is a “reasonable likelihood” (People v. Roybal, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 
p. 514; People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663) that the prosecutor’s assertion 
that nothing prevented the defense from “bringing forth witnesses to explain why 
the defendant was in the car with all that property” was construed by the jury as a 
commentary on defendant’s failure to testify in his own defense. 
The prosecutor’s improper comment does not, however, require reversal of 
the judgment.  As the majority correctly explains, any error was harmless “in view 
of the indirect nature of the prosecutor’s comment, the court’s timely reinstruction 
of the jury, and the strength of the evidence against defendant.”  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 67.)  Thus, it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have 
returned a verdict of guilty” (United States v. Hasting (1983) 461 U.S. 499, 511) 
even if the prosecutor had not made the comment at issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
 
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Carter 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S023000 
Date Filed: August 15, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Melinda J. Lasater 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Phillip H. Cherney, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, 
Assistant Attorney General, Carl H. Horst and Jeffrey J. Koch, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Phillip H. Cherney 
214 South Johnson Street 
Visalia, CA  93291 
(559) 732-6852 
 
Jeffrey J. Koch 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street. Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2213