Title: McLean Hospital Corp. v. Town of Lincoln
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12675
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 23, 2019

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12675 
 
THE McLEAN HOSPITAL CORPORATION  vs.  TOWN OF LINCOLN & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 2, 2019. - September 23, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Zoning, Educational use.  Education, Zoning.  Words, 
"Educational purpose." 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on 
November 15, 2016. 
 
 
The case was heard by Karyn F. Scheier, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Diane C. Tillotson (M. Patrick Moore, Jr., also present) 
for the plaintiff. 
 
Jason R. Talerman for town of Lincoln & others. 
 
Michael C. Fee, for Arthur Anthony & others, was present 
but did not argue. 
                     
 
1 Building commissioner of Lincoln, zoning board of appeals 
of Lincoln, Arthur Anthony, Lara Anthony, Edwin David, Nandini 
David, Douglas Elder, Lisa Elder, Jay Gregory, Lisa Gurrie, 
Michael Gurrie, Beverly Peirce, and Daniel Peirce; and Linda 
Kanner, Steven Kanner, Robyn Laukien, Daniel McCarthy, and 
Donald McCarthy, interveners. 
2 
 
 
 
Benjamin Fierro, III, for Association for Behavioral 
Healthcare, Inc., & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Felicia H. Ellsworth & Julia Prochazka, for Disability Law 
Center & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
LENK, J.  The question before us is whether the plaintiff's 
proposed residential program for adolescent males falls within 
the meaning of the Dover Amendment, G. L. c. 40A, § 3, second 
par.  If so, it is exempt from certain zoning restrictions 
because the land and buildings would be used for "educational 
purposes."  The plaintiff, The McLean Hospital Corporation 
(McLean), purchased 5.5 acres of land in the town of Lincoln 
(town), intending to develop a residential life skills program 
for fifteen to twenty-one year old males who exhibit extreme 
"emotional dysregulation."  The program would allow these 
adolescents to develop the emotional and social skills necessary 
to return to their communities to lead useful, productive lives. 
Before purchasing the property, McLean, a nonprofit 
institution, wrote to the town's building commissioner 
explaining the proposed use, and seeking a determination whether 
the project could proceed as of right, pursuant to the Dover 
Amendment, see G. L. c. 40A, § 3, second par., and its local 
analog, section 6.1(i) of the town's bylaw.  The building 
commissioner replied in writing that the proposed use was 
educational, and that McLean could proceed under the Dover 
Amendment and the bylaw.  After the purchase, however, a number 
3 
 
 
of nearby residents challenged the decision before the town's 
zoning board of appeals (board).  The board decided that the 
program was medical or therapeutic, as opposed to educational, 
and reversed the building commissioner's determination.  McLean 
initiated an action in the Land Court challenging the board's 
decision.  After a four-day trial, a Land Court judge determined 
that the proposed use was not primarily "for educational 
purposes," under a novel theory that attempted to distinguish 
between life skills that are "focused outward" and those that 
"look inward."  McLean appealed, and we allowed McLean's 
petition for direct appellate review. 
We conclude that, although not a conventional educational 
curriculum offered to high school or college students, the 
proposed facility and its skills-based curriculum fall well 
within the "broad and comprehensive" meaning of "educational 
purposes" under the Dover Amendment.  See Regis College v. 
Weston, 462 Mass. 280, 286, 291 (2012).  Accordingly, the 
decision of the Land Court judge must be vacated, and the matter 
remanded for entry of a judgment in favor of McLean.2 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Disability Law Center and the Mental Health Legal Advisors 
Committee; and by the Association for Behavioral Healthcare, 
Inc., the Association of Developmental Disabilities Providers, 
Inc., the Massachusetts Association of 766 Approved Private 
Schools, Inc., and the Massachusetts Council of Human Service 
Providers, Inc. 
4 
 
 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the essentially undisputed facts 
found by the trial judge, supplemented occasionally with 
uncontroverted facts in the record.  See Vaiarella v. Hanover 
Ins. Co., 409 Mass. 523, 524 (1991). 
 
a.  Other programs.  The plaintiff currently operates a 
smaller version of the planned program, known as the "3East 
program," at its campus in Belmont, as well as a similar program 
for girls.  McLean also operates a program for adults with 
emotional disorders, who are transitioning back into the 
community from a hospital setting, at another location in the 
town; that facility is a protected educational facility under 
the Dover Amendment, G. L. c. 40A, § 3, second par.  McLean 
wants to move the 3East program from its already cramped 
quarters in Belmont to the newly purchased land in Lincoln so 
that it can increase the number of adolescents that the program 
serves, from six to twelve at any given time. 
 
b.  3East program.  The 3East program's curriculum is 
designed to instill fundamental life, social, and emotional 
skills in adolescent males who are deficient in these skills, 
who experience severe emotional dysregulation, and who have been 
unable to succeed in a traditional academic setting.  Many of 
the residents have been diagnosed with borderline personality 
disorder; all have varying degrees of emotional dysregulation.  
Some have a co-occurring condition such as attention deficit 
5 
 
 
disorder, anxiety, or depression, and some have no official 
diagnosis. 
 
Regardless of their diagnosis, all of the residents at 
McLean share difficulties in identifying and regulating their 
emotions, and therefore may react to ordinary, day-to-day 
events, which they perceive as stressful situations, with 
outbursts of fear, anger, or self-loathing.  Overwhelmed by 
emotions they cannot identify or control, these individuals have 
difficulty concentrating in school, following directions, 
responding appropriately to others, and maintaining 
interpersonal relationships.  They tend to view situations as 
juxtapositions of diametrically opposite positions (from 
"opposite sides of the Grand Canyon"), with no middle ground.  
Slight disappointments (i.e., "can we meet at 5:15 rather than 
5:00?") may be viewed as negative statements about themselves, 
and can lead to increased feelings of abandonment, shame, 
"emptiness," anger, and resentment. 
 
The 3East program uses a highly structured, nationally 
recognized, dialectical behavior therapy (DBT) approach to 
attempt to develop social and emotional skills in students with 
severe deficits in these skills.  To do so, the program teaches 
students to notice and identify their emotions, to slow down and 
consider alternatives rather than simply reacting, and to 
interact constructively with other people.  It teaches 
6 
 
 
fundamental behavioral skills so that the students, whose 
difficulties in emotional regulation interfere with an ability 
to learn in a more traditional setting, may acquire skills to 
respond more productively to the challenges that confront them 
in their day-to-day lives.  The goal of the program is to enable 
the students to return to their communities and their families, 
to succeed in traditional educational programs, and to become 
able to lead productive lives. 
 
Entrance to the 3East program is selective.  The admissions 
process screens out any individual who is unstable or requires 
hospitalization.  Prospective residents also must demonstrate 
that they are ready and willing to devote themselves to learning 
these behavioral and cognitive skills, with the expectation that 
they will be able to function in their respective communities in 
the future.  Once selected, participation in the immersive 
residential program generally lasts for sixty to 120 days; 
residents who complete the program successfully receive a 
graduation certificate. 
 
During their time at the 3East program, residents receive 
approximately eleven hours per day of instruction and practice 
in social and emotional skills, focused in five well-established 
areas where prior research has shown that training can be very 
effective:  mindfulness and ability to pay attention; emotional 
7 
 
 
regulation; development and maintenance of interpersonal 
relationships; distress tolerance; and validation. 
 
According to Alan Fruzzetti, the director of the program 
and the only individual explicitly credited by the judge, 
mindfulness "in DBT is defined as being able to pay attention on 
purpose in the present moment and without being judgmental."  It 
is considered the "core skill in DBT," and involves emotional 
control and focus, which, the director pointed out, are 
essential "for learning anything."  Emotional regulation teaches 
individuals how to identify the specific emotion "they are 
feeling, so as to enjoy positive emotions and 'reduce their 
reactivity to a whole host of different stimuli in the world.'"  
Distress tolerance is "a set of skills" that helps people "get[] 
through an apparent crisis" without making it "worse."  
Validation skills allow individuals to recognize and accept 
their own feelings and those of others without "judgments [that] 
tend to fuel negative emotion" toward oneself and others. 
 
A typical day at the 3East program begins at 8:30 A.M., 
with group mindfulness exercises, followed by classroom 
instruction from 9 A.M until 4 P.M.3  After classroom work is 
over, there are one and one-half hours for structured athletic 
time or family therapy, followed by dinner and a final group 
                     
 
3 The students have a forty-five minute break for lunch, and 
fifteen minutes of group mindfulness exercises. 
8 
 
 
mindfulness exercise.  After a forty-five minute period of 
skills practice and homework worksheets, the students have a 
period of free time until lights out at 10 P.M. 
 
The curriculum is taught in an experiential manner by 
specialists in clinical education.  Each day, the students learn 
multiple skills in forty-five minute classroom sessions, as well 
as how to apply them to the complex problems in life that they 
may encounter at home, school, or work.  The process involves 
formal training sessions, demonstrations and examples by the 
instructors, group practice, and individualized practice 
sessions for each student, as well as daily worksheets and 
homework.  Although a part-time registered nurse is available to 
treat any medical issues that arise for staff or students, no 
medical interventions are included as part of the program. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The parties generally accept the judge's 
findings of fact; they dispute only her determination that the 
primary purpose of the proposed facility cannot be characterized 
as "educational" under G. L. c. 40A, § 3, second par.  "The 
central issue in this case," then, "is one of law, not of fact."4  
                     
 
4 In Fitchburg Hous. Auth. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of 
Fitchburg, 380 Mass. 869, 873 (1980), the court concluded:  "If 
the judge's characterization of the proposed facility as a 
'medical facility' is a conclusion that, as a matter of law, the 
proposed use would not be 'educational,' it must be reversed as 
an error of law."  See id., citing New England Canteen Serv., 
Inc. v. Ashley, 372 Mass. 671, 674 (1977).  "To the extent that 
it is a finding of fact, it must be set aside as 'clearly 
9 
 
 
See Fitchburg Hous. Auth. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of 
Fitchburg, 380 Mass. 869, 872 (1980).  We must ascertain, based 
upon the facts found by the trial judge, to which we afford 
appropriate deference absent clear error, whether McLean's 
proposed use of the property qualifies as having "educational 
purposes" within the meaning of the Dover Amendment.  See id. at 
872-873.  See also Kurz v. Board of Appeals of N. Reading, 341 
Mass. 110, 112 (1960) (meaning of "educational use" in local 
bylaw "is a question of law for the court"). 
a.  Dover Amendment.  The Dover Amendment exempts from 
local zoning laws those uses of land and structures that are for 
"educational purposes."  See G. L. c. 40A, § 3, second par.  The 
Dover Amendment provides, in relevant part, 
"No zoning ordinance or by-law shall . . . prohibit, 
regulate or restrict the use of land or structures for 
religious purposes or for educational purposes on land 
owned or leased by the commonwealth or any of its 
agencies, subdivisions or bodies politic or by a 
religious sect or denomination, or by a nonprofit 
educational corporation; provided, however, that such 
land or structures may be subject to reasonable 
regulations concerning the bulk and height of 
structures and determining yard sizes, lot area, 
setbacks, open space, parking and building coverage 
requirements" (emphasis added). 
 
 
In Regis College, 462 Mass. at 285-291, we articulated a 
two-pronged test to determine whether a proposed use falls 
                     
erroneous.'"  Fitchburg Hous. Auth., supra, quoting Mass. Civ. 
P. 52 (a), 365 Mass. 816 (1974). 
10 
 
 
within the protections of the Dover Amendment.  First, the use 
must have as its "bona fide goal something that can reasonably 
be described as 'educationally significant.'"  Id. at 285, 
quoting Whitinsville Retirement Soc'y, Inc. v. Northbridge, 394 
Mass. 757, 761 n.3 (1985).  Second, the educationally 
significant goal must be the "'primary or dominant' purpose for 
which the land or structures will be used."  Regis College, 
supra, quoting Whitinsville Retirement Soc'y, Inc., supra at 
760.  The primary or dominant purpose requirement "helps ensure 
that a party invoking Dover Amendment protection does so without 
engrafting an educational component onto a project in order to 
obtain favorable treatment under the statute."  Regis College, 
supra at 290. 
 
b.  Whether the proposed 3East program has an educationally 
significant goal.  The word "educational," as used in the Dover 
Amendment, has been construed on numerous occasions, for more 
than 120 years, as a "broad and comprehensive" term.  See Regis 
College, 462 Mass. at 285, quoting Mount Hermon Boys' Sch. v. 
Gill, 145 Mass. 139, 146 (1887).  Over time, we have made clear 
that the protections of the Dover Amendment are not to be 
"limited only to those facilities closely analogous to 
traditional schools and colleges."  See Regis College, supra at 
286.  Rather, the term "educational" encompasses that which is 
"the process of developing and training the powers and 
11 
 
 
capabilities of human beings."  Mount Hermon Boys' Sch., supra.  
Thus, the Dover Amendment embraces fully "the idea that 
education is the process of preparing persons for activity and 
usefulness in life" (quotation and citation omitted).  See 
Fitchburg Hous. Auth., 380 Mass. at 875. 
 
Based on our long-standing jurisprudence, it appears 
relatively undisputed that the 3East program includes an 
educationally significant component.  Indeed, we repeatedly have 
held that a program that instills "a basic understanding of how 
to cope with everyday problems and to maintain oneself in 
society is incontestably an educational process" within the 
meaning of the Dover Amendment (emphasis added).  See Fitchburg 
Hous. Auth., 380 Mass. at 875.  See also Gardner-Athol Area 
Mental Health Ass'n, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Gardner, 
401 Mass. 12, 14 (1987) (proposed use educational where program 
taught "daily living, as well as vocational skills, with the 
goal of preparing [its residents] for more independent living"). 
 
That the 3East program encompasses an educationally 
significant component, however, is not sufficient for the 
program to fall within the ambit of the Dover Amendment.  To do 
so, the educationally significant goal of the program also must 
be the predominant purpose for which the land and structures 
will be used.  See Regis College, 462 Mass. at 285. 
12 
 
 
 
c.  Whether the primary or dominant purpose is educational.  
The defendants contend that any educational components of the 
3East program merely are ancillary to the predominant purpose 
for which the facility would be established, that is, to provide 
medical treatment for a particular psychological condition.  
McLean responds that the educationally significant goal of the 
3East program is also its dominant or primary purpose, and that 
the Land Court judge erred in determining that the purpose is 
predominantly "therapeutic." 
 
This court has not held, as the defendants ask us to do, 
that a skills development program loses its primary educational 
purpose when the particular competencies taught also may be 
therapeutic, rehabilitative, or remedial of an underlying 
condition.  To the contrary, courts in the Commonwealth have 
concluded that "'education' and 'rehabilitation' do not denote 
functions so distinct that [a local zoning authority or a court] 
could be required to quantify them relative to each other."  
Harbor Sch., Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Haverhill, 5 Mass. App. 
Ct. 600, 604 (1977).  See Gardner-Athol Area Mental Health 
Ass'n, Inc., 401 Mass. at 15 ("Rehabilitation surely falls 
within the meaning of education").  Indeed, those concepts "are 
not mutually exclusive."  See Harbor Sch., Inc., supra.  Rather, 
education encompasses that which is "particularly directed to 
either the mental, moral, or physical powers and faculties, but 
13 
 
 
in its broadest and best sense it relates to them all."  
Whitinsville Retirement Soc'y, Inc., 394 Mass. at 759. 
 
A determination whether the land and structures at issue 
here would be used for a predominantly educational purpose also 
does not, and should not, turn on an assessment of the 
population it serves.  Although "emotional or psychiatric 
programs may determine the character of the training furnished 
to residents of the proposed facility," they certainly "do not 
mark the facility as 'medical' or render it any less 
educational."  See Fitchburg Hous. Auth., 380 Mass. at 873, 875 
("The fact that many of the residents of the facility . . . will 
be taking prescription drugs does not negate its educational 
purpose or make its dominant purpose medical").  Such 
programming, rather, exists to "serve[] nontraditional 
communities of learners in a manner tailored to their individual 
needs and capabilities."  See Regis College, 462 Mass. at 285-
286 (Dover Amendment applies to "facilities for the disabled or 
the infirm"); Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health & Retardation 
Ass'n, Inc., 421 Mass. 106, 108, 115-116 (1995) (Dover Amendment 
applies to residential education facility for adults with mental 
disability). 
 
Thus, although the 3East program's facility and its 
curriculum will be tailored to serve participants who previously 
may have been inpatients at a psychiatric facility, that fact 
14 
 
 
alone does not serve to brand the 3East program as a medical 
program.  Nor does having been a patient at a psychiatric 
facility in the past preclude an individual from participating 
in a specialized form of education to learn the complex 
emotional, social, and daily living skills necessary to 
participate actively and succeed in life. 
 
Indeed, the emotional and behavioral skills that would be 
taught at the 3East program increasingly are becoming a 
component of the educational curriculum in many traditional 
public school settings across the Commonwealth.  See, e.g., 
G. L. c. 69, § 1P (enacting framework for schools to help 
students "regulate their emotions and behavior" and to integrate 
"social and emotional learning," "children's mental health," and 
"positive behavioral approaches"); Department of Elementary and 
Secondary Education, Strategic Plan, at 1, 9 (rev. Feb. 2019) 
(core strategy of public schools is "supporting the social, 
emotional, and health needs" of students).  See also J.J. Mazza, 
E.T. Dexter-Mazza, A.L. Miller, J.H. Rathus, & H.E. Murphy, DBT 
Skills in Schools:  Skills Training for Emotional Problem 
Solving for Adolescents, at 3-4, 26-33 (2016) (noting use of DBT 
curriculum in both traditional and nontraditional academic 
settings). 
 
The defendants contend that the 3East program is 
distinguishable from the facility in Fitchburg Hous. Auth., 
15 
 
 
because the 3East program has a psychiatrist on staff, and the 
participants may be a threat to themselves or others, in light 
of some of their histories of thoughts of suicide or self-
injurious behaviors.  Cf. Fitchburg Hous. Auth., 380 Mass. at 
873, 875.  Should we conclude that the 3East program has a 
predominantly educational purpose, the defendants caution 
against a slippery slope in which every therapist's or doctor's 
office or hospital could become a facility afforded protection 
under the Dover Amendment.  This, of course, is not the case. 
 
While the presence or absence of medical personnel on staff 
may be one factor in the calculus, it certainly does not alone 
create the bright-line rule that the defendants suggest and, 
without more, render a program medical and not educational.  As 
McLean points out, ordinary public schools often have registered 
nurses or other medical personnel on staff.  Nor does the 
involvement of an individual therapist assigned to each 
adolescent, for twice-weekly sessions throughout the course of 
the program, transform the program into a medical treatment 
plan.  The students engage in what might equate to an 
individualized therapy appointment for two hours of the roughly 
seventy-hour week of structured skills training and group and 
individual practice. 
 
Moreover, the structure of the 3East program is distinct 
from a medical appointment or an inpatient placement at a 
16 
 
 
psychiatric hospital.  As stated, the full-time program includes 
an admissions process, instruction on social and emotional 
skills development, group and individual sessions, exercises to 
practice the skills learned, structured social and athletic time 
with classmates and peers, and homework and worksheets to 
complete each evening.  Compare Harbor Schools, Inc., 5 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 600, 605 (residential facility for children with 
emotional regulation issues was educational and not medical). 
 
The teachers and therapists who form the staff at the 3East 
program are not doctors.  They are required to have a Bachelor's 
degree, not unlike the teachers in schools across the 
Commonwealth.  They also have specialized training in areas such 
as education theory, coaching, and DBT.  Notably, the trial 
judge explicitly found that no medical interventions are used in 
the 3East program. 
 
The defendants' argument that the 3East program exemplifies 
our previously expressed concern that a purely residential 
facility may not add an informal educational component merely as 
a smokescreen in order to obtain favorable protections under the 
Dover Amendment also is unavailing.  See Regis College, 462 
Mass. at 287 (optional coursework cannot be mere "window 
dressing" for luxury condominium complex); Whitinsville 
Retirement Soc'y, Inc., 394 Mass. at 760 (informal arts and 
crafts program did not render nursing home educational).  The 
17 
 
 
3East program includes a full-time, highly structured, mandatory 
curriculum taught by formally and specially trained staff, upon 
graduation from which the students ideally will return to their 
respective high schools, colleges, and communities. 
 
Finally, in an effort to distinguish the 3East program from 
the programs at issue in Gardner-Athol Area Mental Health Ass'n, 
Inc., 401 Mass. at 14, and Fitchburg Hous. Auth., 380 Mass. at 
871-872, the defendants and the Land Court judge rely on a 
purported dichotomy between "outward"-facing skills (i.e., those 
that help assimilate individuals into their respective 
communities) and "inward"-facing skills (i.e., those that help 
address any internal manifestations or symptoms of a mental 
disorder).  We have not previously endorsed such a distinction, 
nor do the parties identify any case law or scientific research 
that would support such a concept.  As the plaintiff indicates, 
inward-facing skills, which presumably would encompass the 
mindfulness, emotional regulation, distress tolerance, and 
validation components of the program, also have an enormous 
impact on an individual's ability to engage in work or study, 
and to interact outwardly with others.  See Fitchburg Hous. 
Auth., supra at 875 (baseline skills to "cope with everyday 
problems and to maintain oneself in society" deemed 
educational).  Moreover, the "development and maintenance of 
interpersonal relationships," one of the five core program 
18 
 
 
components, is explicitly limited to outward-facing skills.  The 
gym activities and group mindfulness activities also incorporate 
mandatory group and interpersonal components. 
 
Both inward-facing and outward-facing types of skills, even 
assuming they can be meaningfully parsed in this manner, are 
part of "the idea that education is the process of preparing 
persons 'for activity and usefulness in life'" (citation 
omitted), Fitchburg Hous. Auth., 380 Mass. at 875, and thus 
protected as a significant educational purpose under the Dover 
Amendment.  While we have made clear that "a basic understanding 
of how to cope with everyday problems and to maintain oneself in 
society is incontestably an educational process" within the 
ambit of the Dover Amendment, id., it also would be impossible 
to exclude the acquisition of these skills from serving a 
"therapeutic" purpose. 
 
We accordingly agree with McLean that, in situations of 
this type, an attempt to sever that which is educational from 
that which is therapeutic is ordinarily a rather futile 
exercise.  Focusing on the "therapeutic" aspects of a program 
such as the one at issue shifts the analysis from the program's 
educational purposes, and whether education is a significant 
part of the program, to the type of student who is participating 
in the program, which is precisely what, as we have said, should 
not be the foundation of an analysis under the Dover Amendment.  
19 
 
 
We decline once again to adopt as dispositive a distinction 
between education with a therapeutic purpose -- to teach how to 
live in society, cope with daily tasks, and interact with 
others -- and education with a traditional academic purpose.  
See Regis College, 462 Mass. at 285-286, 291.  We also decline 
to adopt the judge's parsing of distinctions between a 
"therapeutic" program to teach inward-facing life skills and an 
"educational" program to teach outward-facing life skills.  See 
Mount Hermon Boys' Sch., 145 Mass. at 146 ("educational" purpose 
encompasses "the process of developing and training the powers 
and capabilities of human beings"). 
 
In sum, that the curriculum of the 3East program may 
encompass elements of teaching emotional regulation, and allows 
two percent of the weekly program hours to be devoted to 
individual therapy, or that some of the skills are taught by 
clinical professionals, does not negate the fact that the 
predominant purpose of the 3East program is educational.  Cf. 
Watros, 421 Mass. at 108, 115-116 (residential facility for 
adults with mental disability was educational within meaning of 
Dover Amendment notwithstanding therapeutic aspect).  To the 
contrary, these features indicate that the 3East program is a 
specialized form of education, with therapeutic aspects, that 
ultimately teaches its participants the skills necessary for 
20 
 
 
their success, "activity and usefulness in life" (citation 
omitted).5  See Mount Hermon Boys' Sch., 145 Mass. at 146. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgment is vacated and set aside, and 
the case is remanded to the Land Court for entry of judgment in 
favor of McLean. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
5 Our conclusion in this regard comports with the 
legislative history of the Dover Amendment, which we have had 
considerable occasion to examine in the context of educational 
programs.  See, e.g., Regis College v. Weston, 462 Mass. 280, 
286 (2012); Trustees of Tufts College v. Medford, 415 Mass. 753, 
757-758 (1993).  In so doing, we have noted that, although the 
Department of Community Affairs had proposed "that Dover 
Amendment protection be limited to 'school[s]' or analogous 
'place[s] or facilit[ies],'" see 1972 House Doc. No. 5009, at 
84, the Legislature rejected this language.  See Regis College, 
supra.  It thus opted not to adopt "a statutory test that would 
limit Dover Amendment protection only to projects similar to 
'schools.'"  See id.  The Dover Amendment also exists, in part, 
to protect educational institutions from a municipality's 
exercise of preferences as to what kind of educational 
facilities it will welcome, "the very kind of restrictive 
attitude which the Dover Amendment was intended to foreclose."  
See The Bible Speaks v. Board of Appeals of Lenox, 8 Mass. App. 
Ct. 19, 33 (1979).  The use of land for nontraditional 
educational accordingly was anticipated by the drafters of the 
Dover Amendment.