Title: Olson v. Farrar
Citation: 2012 WI 3
Docket Number: 2009AP002385
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 31, 2012

2012 WI 3 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP2385 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Todd Olson, 
          Plaintiff, 
     v. 
Robert Farrar, 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
Mt. Morris Mutual Insurance Company, 
          Intervenor-Defendant-Respondent-
Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2010 WI App 165 
Reported at: 330 Wis 2d 611, 794 N.W. 2d 245 
(Ct. App. 2010 – Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 31, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 6, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Monroe 
 
JUDGE: 
Todd L. Ziegler  
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
intervenor-defendant-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by Stacy Kay Luell, Jeffrey T. Nichols, Daniel K. 
Mullin and Crivello Carlson, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument 
by Stacy Kay Luell. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Joseph G. 
Veenstra, Cheryl M. Gill and Johns, Flaherty & Collins S.C., La 
Crosse and oral argument by Joseph G. Veenstra. 
 
 
2012 WI 3
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP2385 
(L.C. No. 
2008CV339) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Todd Olson, 
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert Farrar, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
Mt. Morris Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
          Intervenor-Defendant-Respondent-
Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 31, 2012 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  Mt. Morris Mutual Insurance 
Company seeks review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals reversing the circuit court's grant of a declaratory and 
summary judgment in its favor.1  Todd Olson filed suit against 
                                                 
1 Olson v. Farrar, 2010 WI App 165, 330 Wis. 2d 611, 794 
N.W.2d 245, reversing a decision of the circuit court for Monroe 
County, Todd L. Ziegler, Judge.   
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
2 
 
Robert Farrar, alleging he was liable for property damage to 
Olson's trailer home and vehicle.  Farrar's insurer, Mt. Morris, 
sought a declaration that it had neither a duty to defend nor a 
duty to indemnify Farrar under the terms of its insurance 
policy.   
¶2 
Mt. Morris contends that under the four-corners rule, 
the court should resolve this dispute with reference to the 
language contained solely within the four corners of the 
insurance policy and the factual allegations of the complaint.  
In addition, it asserts that the language of the policy does not 
give rise to a duty to defend because of certain coverage 
exclusions: (1) the property damage did not "result from" a 
"mobile home trailer"; (2) the "mobile home trailer" was 
attached to a "motor vehicle"; and (3) the "mobile home trailer" 
was "used by, or in the care" of Farrar, the insured, at the 
time of the accident.  Because the duty to defend is broader 
than the duty to indemnify, Mt. Morris asserts that there is no 
duty to indemnify here. 
¶3 
Given that Mt. Morris made an initial determination to 
appoint counsel for Farrar's defense until the question of 
coverage could be finally resolved by the court, we determine 
that the purpose of the four-corners rule has been served.  It 
is not further implicated in this case.    
¶4 
Turning to the policy language of the exclusions, we 
apply a well-settled canon of insurance policy interpretation.  
We determine that the phrase "results from" is susceptible to 
more than one reasonable interpretation.  We likewise determine 
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
3 
 
that the definition of "motor vehicle" is susceptible to more 
than one reasonable interpretation.  Accordingly, both of these 
policy provisions are ambiguous, and we construe them in favor 
of coverage.     
¶5 
Finally, although the factual record has not been well 
developed, it appears that there may be genuine issues of 
material fact regarding whether Olson's trailer home was "used 
by, or in the care of an insured" when it sustained property 
damage.  Because the circuit court did not address this 
exclusion when it granted judgment, we remand to the circuit 
court for a determination on this issue.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court for further 
proceedings.        
I 
¶6 
Although there are disputes of fact, the following 
facts are undisputed.  The plaintiff, Todd Olson, purchased a 
trailer home with the intention of moving it to a new location.  
Olson was acquainted with Robert Farrar, who owned a farm 
tractor.  It is undisputed Olson asked Farrar to provide some 
assistance with the move.2       
¶7 
Farrar hitched Olson's trailer home to his tractor and 
proceeded to drive to the new location, towing Olson's trailer 
home behind him.  At one point during the eight-mile journey, 
                                                 
2 The parties dispute the precise nature of Olson's request.  
According to Olson, he asked Farrar to rotate the trailer home 
so that it could be easily accessed by a moving company.  By 
contrast, Farrar asserts that Olson asked him to tow the trailer 
home all the way to its new location, a distance of eight miles.  
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
4 
 
Farrar's tractor stalled on a hill, and the trailer home rolled 
backwards.  As it rolled backwards, Olson's trailer home crashed 
into Olson's vehicle.3     
¶8 
Olson filed suit against Farrar, alleging that Farrar 
did not have permission to move the trailer home more than a 
couple of feet.  Olson alleged that Farrar was negligent because 
he "knew, or should have known, that his tractor was incapable 
of pulling [Olson's] trailer home for the approximately 8 miles 
up and down hills and around sharp corners."  According to the 
complaint, Farrar was liable for the "extensive damage" to 
Olson's trailer home and vehicle.  
¶9 
Farrar tendered the defense of the suit to Mt. Morris 
Mutual Insurance Company, which had issued Farrar a farmowners 
policy.  In addition to first-party coverage for direct physical 
loss to Farrar's property, the policy provides third-party 
coverage for liability incurred by Farrar, subject to the 
relevant exclusions.       
¶10 Mt. Morris elected to provide an initial defense for 
Farrar pursuant to a reservation of rights.  It then moved to 
intervene, bifurcate the coverage issues from the issues related 
to liability and damages, and stay all proceedings on liability 
and damages.  The circuit court granted this motion.     
                                                 
3 Apparently, Olson was following behind Farrar's tractor in 
his own vehicle.  This fact is not stated in the complaint.  
However, it is stated in Farrar's answer and the affidavit he 
subsequently filed with the court.   
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
5 
 
¶11 Mt. Morris moved next for "declaratory and summary 
judgment."  It sought a declaration that "Mt. Morris owes no 
coverage" and an order "dismissing it from this action."  It 
relied on two separate exclusions: an exclusion for liability 
resulting from the use of a motorized vehicle, and an exclusion 
for damage to property that is used by or in the care of an 
insured.  
¶12 The 
first 
exclusion 
relied 
upon 
by 
Mt. 
Morris 
specifically excludes "'property damage' which results from the 
ownership, 
operation, 
maintenance, 
use . . . of 
motorized 
vehicles . . . owned and operated by . . . an insured."  An 
exception to that exclusion reasserts coverage if "coverage is 
provided by an Incidental Motorized Vehicle . . . Coverage."   
¶13 The 
Incidental 
Coverage 
for 
Motorized 
Vehicles 
provides coverage for "property damage" that "results from" a 
"mobile home trailer," unless the mobile home trailer is 
attached to a "motor vehicle".4  The policy defines "motor 
vehicle" as "a 'motorized vehicle,' . . . and all attached 
machinery or equipment if: a. it is subject to 'motor vehicle' 
registration; or b. it is designed for use on public roads."           
¶14 The second exclusion relied upon by Mt. Morris is 
found in paragraph 2.d. of the exclusion section of the policy.  
It provides: "Coverage L does not apply to: . . . damage to 
                                                 
4  For the purposes of this opinion, we assume that Olson's 
trailer home is a "mobile home trailer," within the meaning of 
the policy language.  Mt. Morris advances no developed argument 
to the contrary in this court.        
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
6 
 
property that is rented to, occupied by, used by, or in the care 
of an 'insured' . . . ."   
¶15 Mt. Morris contended that in the court's summary 
judgment determination, extrinsic evidence was not admissible 
under the "four-corners" rule, and the court should decide the 
coverage question based only on the factual allegations in the 
complaint and the language of the policy.  It asserted that 
under a four-corners analysis, it had no duty to defend Farrar.  
It further contended that because there was no duty to defend 
and because the duty to defend is broader than the duty to 
indemnify, there likewise could be no duty to indemnify Farrar.   
¶16 Farrar contended that the policy provided coverage for 
the property damage.  He argued that the Incidental Coverage for 
Motorized Vehicles was an applicable exception to the motorized 
vehicle exclusion, and it reasserted coverage for Olson's 
claims.  Farrar further argued that the exclusion for property 
that is used by or in the care of an insured did not apply to 
the facts of the case.       
¶17 In support of his arguments, Farrar submitted an 
affidavit setting forth his version of the accident as well as 
information about the tractor.  He stated that the tractor was a 
Massey Ferguson Model Number 1130, that it was equipped with 
field tires, and that it was not equipped with brake lights, 
tail lights, turn signals, or other safety devices for highway 
use.    
¶18 Mt. Morris reasserted its argument that the four-
corners rule precluded consideration of Farrar's affidavit.  In 
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
7 
 
the alternative, it submitted portions of the manufacturer's 
manual by affidavit.  In relevant part, the section on safety 
precautions stated: "Use safety lights and [Slow Moving Vehicle] 
Emblem when equipment is being driven on the road or highway.  
(Check with local authorities for possible legal limitations.)"    
¶19 During the hearing in the circuit court, Olson's 
attorney offered to amend the complaint to conform to the terms 
of the insurance policy.  It appears that the circuit court 
concluded that an amendment was unnecessary.  Although the court 
made 
reference 
to 
the 
extrinsic 
evidence, 
it 
did 
not 
specifically determine whether the four-corners rule applied.    
¶20 The 
dispositive question during the hearing was 
whether Farrar's tractor was a "motor vehicle" within the terms 
of the policy.  The circuit court acknowledged that "this is a 
very close issue."  It nevertheless concluded that the tractor 
was a "motor vehicle" and therefore, there was no coverage under 
the policy.  The circuit court did not address the exclusion for 
damage to property "used by, or in the care of an insured."      
¶21 The court of appeals reversed.  Olson v. Farrar, 2010 
WI App 165, 330 Wis. 2d 611, 794 N.W.2d 245.  It concluded, "we 
are beyond the initial duty to defend stage of the proceedings 
and are not constrained by the four-corners rule."  Id., ¶11.  
It further determined that the property damage "resulted from" a 
mobile home trailer and the property that was damaged was not 
"used by, or in the care of" Farrar.  Id., ¶29.  Finally, it 
concluded that "Mt. Morris has not pointed to any undisputed 
facts showing that Farrar's tractor was 'designed for use on 
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
8 
 
public roads.'"  Id. The court of appeals remanded to the 
circuit court for further proceedings.    
II 
¶22 In this case, we are asked to determine whether the 
four-corners rule applies.  The proper application of the four-
corners rule presents a question of law, which we decide 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.  See Estate of Sustache v. 
American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 87, ¶¶27-29, 311 
Wis. 2d 548, 751 N.W.2d 845. 
¶23 We are also asked to determine whether the circuit 
court properly granted Mt. Morris's motion for declaratory and 
summary judgment.  Whether summary judgment is properly granted 
is a question of law.  Id., ¶17.  Summary judgment is 
appropriate when the record demonstrates that no genuine issue 
as to any material fact exists and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.  Id., ¶17. 
¶24 The grant or denial of a declaratory judgment is 
addressed to the circuit court's discretion.  Jones v. Secura 
Ins. Co., 2002 WI 11, ¶19, 249 Wis. 2d 623, 638 N.W.2d 575.  
However, when the exercise of such discretion turns upon a 
question of law, we review the question independently of the 
circuit court's determination.  Bellile v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. 
Co., 2004 WI App 72, ¶6, 272 Wis. 2d 324, 679 N.W.2d 827.  Here, 
the circuit court's grant of declaratory judgment turned upon 
its interpretation of an insurance policy, which presents a 
question of law.  Sustache, 311 Wis. 2d 548, ¶18.    
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
9 
 
¶25 We begin by addressing the application of the four-
corners rule.  Then, we turn to the relevant policy language to 
determine whether there is coverage for any alleged liability 
incurred by Farrar for the damage to Olson's vehicle and trailer 
home and whether summary and declaratory judgment were properly 
granted. 
III 
¶26 In this case, Mt. Morris provided an initial defense 
for Farrar pursuant to its reservation of rights.  It then moved 
to intervene, bifurcate the coverage issues from the issues 
related to liability and damages, and stay all proceedings on 
liability and damages.  Mt. Morris sought a no-coverage 
declaration.  We are asked to provide guidance on whether the 
four-corners rule would prevent consideration of extrinsic 
evidence in this coverage dispute.  As a threshold matter, we 
must determine whether the four-corners rule is implicated in 
this no-coverage inquiry.     
¶27 To understand the role of the four-corners rule, it is 
essential to distinguish between the insurer's duty to indemnify 
and its duty to defend.  Contracts for insurance typically 
impose two main duties: the duty to indemnify the insured 
against damages or losses, and the duty to defend against claims 
for damages.  Johnson Controls, Inc. v. London Mkt., 2010 WI 52, 
¶28, 325 Wis. 2d 176, 784 N.W.2d 579.   
¶28 The duty to indemnify is fairly straightforward.  An 
insurer must indemnify an insured against losses that are 
covered under the terms of the policy.  
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
10 
 
¶29 The insurer's duty to defend is more complicated 
because it is broader than its duty to indemnify.  "The duty of 
defense depends on the nature of the claim and has nothing to do 
with the merits of the claim."  Elliott v. Donahue, 169 
Wis. 2d 310, 321, 485 N.W.2d 403 (1992).  "The insurer is under 
an obligation to defend only if it could be held bound to 
indemnify the insured, assuming that the injured person proved 
the allegations of the complaint, regardless of the actual 
outcome of the case."  Grieb v. Citizens Cas. Co., 33 
Wis. 2d 552, 558, 148 N.W.2d 103 (1967).  Accordingly, an 
insurer must defend all suits where there would be coverage if 
the allegations were proven, even if the allegations are 
"utterly specious."  Smith v. Katz, 226 Wis. 2d 798, 807, 595 
N.W.2d 345 (1999).  "If there is any doubt about the duty to 
defend, it must be resolved in favor of the insured."5  Elliott, 
169 Wis. 2d at 321.    
¶30 Wisconsin policy is clear.  If the allegations in the 
complaint, construed liberally, appear to give rise to coverage, 
insurers are required to provide a defense until the final 
resolution of the coverage question by a court.  Insurers who 
refuse to provide an initial defense do so at their own peril.  
                                                 
5 When 
conducting 
a 
duty 
to 
defend 
analysis, 
"the 
allegations in the complaint are construed liberally," "all 
reasonable inferences in the allegations of a complaint" must be 
assumed, and "any doubt regarding the duty to defend [must be 
resolved] in favor of the insured."  Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. 
Bradley Corp., 2003 WI 33, ¶20, 261 Wis. 2d 4, 660 N.W.2d 666. 
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
11 
 
Id.; see also 2 Arnold Anderson, Wisconsin Insurance Law § 7.41 
(6th ed. 2011).   
¶31 The four-corners rule furthers this policy.  In 
Sustache, we explained the four-corners rule as follows: "[W]hen 
a complaint alleges facts that, if proven, would constitute a 
covered claim, the insurer must appoint defense counsel for its 
insured without looking beyond the complaint's four corners.  
That 
is 
the 
substance of the four-corners rule."  311 
Wis. 2d 548, ¶27.     
¶32 The four-corners rule "ensure[s] that insurers do not 
frustrate the expectations of their insureds by [prematurely] 
resolving the coverage issue in their own favor[.]"  Baumann v. 
Elliott, 2005 WI App 186, ¶10, 286 Wis. 2d 667, 704 N.W.2d 361.  
As the Seventh Circuit has noted, without the four-corners rule, 
"the duty to defend would often be empty.  The insurance company 
could refuse to defend in the hope that the facts as they 
emerged in the litigation that its insured had asked it to 
defend would reveal that there was no coverage."  Guaranty Bank 
v. Chubb Corp., 538 F.3d 587, 593 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing 
Wisconsin law).  
¶33 Accordingly, the four-corners rule is implicated when 
the insurer makes an initial determination about whether it will 
defend its insured.  The four-corners rule is also implicated in 
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
12 
 
situations where it is asserted that the insurer breached the 
contract by wrongly refusing to provide a defense.6     
¶34 However, the purpose of the four-corners rule has been 
served once the insurer has elected to provide a defense pending 
a final determination on coverage.  At that point, the insurer 
has protected its insured by providing a defense.  The insurer 
has also protected itself from liability for a breach of 
contract.  The four-corners rule is not further implicated, and 
the court proceeds to a determination of coverage.    
¶35 "Both the insurer and the insured have the right to 
have the court resolve the issue of coverage separate from any 
trial on liability."  Sustache, 311 Wis. 2d 548, ¶26.  At a 
coverage trial, extrinsic evidence may be introduced "where 
appropriate to the resolution of the coverage question."  
Lucterhand v. Granite Microsystems, 564 F.3d 809, 812 n.2 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (discussing the application of Sustache under 
Wisconsin law).   
¶36 Sometimes, the question of coverage is purely a matter 
of insurance policy interpretation, and it can be decided by a 
court as a matter of law in accordance with the well-established 
rules for interpreting insurance policies.  However, at other 
times, the facts bearing on coverage are disputed, and coverage 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Newhouse v. Citizens Security Mut. Ins. Co., 
176 Wis. 2d 824, 501 N.W.2d 1 (1993) (evaluating the four-
corners of the complaint to determine whether an insurer 
breached its duty to defend). 
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
13 
 
cannot be determined until these factual disputes are resolved 
in the circuit court.7     
¶37 The right to a determination on coverage in the 
circuit court would often be empty if, as Mt. Morris suggests, 
the court's inquiry were limited by the four-corners rule.  If 
the coverage determination were constrained by the four-corners 
rule, then what evidence could ever be presented at a coverage 
trial? 
¶38 Accordingly, in Sustache, we held: "Where the insurer 
has provided a defense to its insured, a party has provided 
extrinsic evidence to the court [that is relevant to the 
question of coverage], and the court has focused in a coverage 
hearing on whether the insured's policy provides coverage for 
the plaintiff's claim, it cannot be said that the proceedings 
                                                 
7 See Mowry v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 129 Wis. 2d 496, 
385 N.W.2d 171 (1986) (involving a coverage trial on whether the 
insured owned the vehicle); Elliott v. Donahue, 169 Wis. 2d 310, 
321, 485 N.W.2d 403 (1992) (discussing a coverage trial on 
permissive use); Siebert v. Wisconsin Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 WI 
35, ¶16, 333 Wis. 2d 546, 797 N.W.2d 484 (discussing a coverage 
trial on permissive use); Gross v. Joecks, 72 Wis. 2d 583, 241 
N.W.2d 727 (1976) (reviewing a coverage trial to the court on 
permissive use); Neff v. Pierzina, 2001 WI 95, ¶27, 245 
Wis. 2d 285, 629 N.W.2d 177 (discussing a coverage trial on 
whether the insured provided timely notice of a claim).  See 
also Kenefick v. Hitchcock, 187 Wis. 2d 218, 522 N.W.2d 261 (Ct. 
App. 1994) (concluding that summary judgment on the coverage 
question was properly granted because there was no evidence 
suggesting that the property damage occurred within the policy 
period); Barber v. Nylund, 158 Wis. 2d 192, 461 N.W.2d 809 (Ct. 
App. 1990) (discussing the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment during the coverage phase because the facts showed that 
the vehicle involved in the accident was not owned by the 
insured and therefore not a replacement vehicle). 
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
14 
 
are governed by the four-corners rule.  The insurer's duty to 
continue to defend is contingent upon the court's determination 
that the insured has coverage if the plaintiff proves his case."  
311 Wis. 2d 548, ¶29 (emphasis omitted). 
¶39 Mt. Morris appointed counsel for Farrar's defense 
until the question of coverage could be finally resolved by the 
court.  To that end, Mt. Morris filed a motion for summary and 
declaratory judgment, requesting that the court provide a final 
determination on coverage.  If extrinsic evidence is relevant to 
that inquiry, it is admissible.        
IV 
¶40 We turn to determining whether there is coverage for 
this 
accident. 
 
There 
is 
an 
established 
framework 
for 
determining whether coverage is provided under the terms of an 
insurance policy.   
¶41 First, 
the 
court 
examines 
whether 
the 
policy's 
insuring agreement makes an initial grant of coverage.  Varda v. 
Acuity, 2005 WI App 167, ¶9, 284 Wis. 2d 552, 702 N.W.2d 65.  If 
the initial grant of coverage is triggered by the claim, the 
court examines the various exclusions to determine whether any 
exclusion precludes coverage.  Id.  If so, the court then 
determines whether there is an exception to the exclusion which 
reinstates coverage.  Sass v. Acuity, 2009 WI App 32, ¶5, 316 
Wis. 2d 752, 765 N.W.2d 582. 
¶42 "Of primary importance is that the language of an 
insurance policy should be interpreted to mean what a reasonable 
person in the position of the insured would have understood the 
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
15 
 
words 
to 
mean." 
 
Sprangers 
v. 
Greatway 
Ins. 
Co., 
182 
Wis. 2d 521, 536, 514 N.W.2d 1 (1994).  If a word or phrase is 
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is 
ambiguous. 
 
Folkman 
v. 
Quamme, 
2003 
WI 
116, 
¶13, 
264 
Wis. 2d 617, 665 N.W.2d 857.  "[B]ecause the insurer is in a 
position to write its insurance contracts with the exact 
language it chooses——so long as the language conforms to 
statutory and administrative law——ambiguity in that language is 
construed in favor of an insured seeking coverage."  Froedtert 
Mem'l Lutheran Hosp. v. Nat'l States Ins. Co., 2009 WI 33, ¶43, 
317 Wis. 2d 54, 765 N.W.2d 251.    
¶43 Here, the insuring agreement provides that Mt. Morris 
will pay "all sums for which an 'insured' is liable by law 
because of . . . 'property damage' caused by an 'occurrence' to 
which this coverage applies."  However, the policy excludes 
"'property damage' which results from the ownership, operation, 
maintenance, use, [or] occupancy . . . of 'motorized vehicles'" 
or trailers unless "coverage is provided by an Incidental 
Motorized Vehicle . . . Coverage."  The parties agree that the 
tractor falls within the definition of a "motorized vehicle,"8 
and that there is no coverage for the property damage unless the 
exception to the motorized vehicle exclusion, found in the 
Incidental Motorized Vehicle Coverage, applies to reinstate 
coverage.   
                                                 
8 "Motorized vehicle" is defined in the policy as "a self-
propelled land or amphibious vehicle regardless of method of 
surface contact."     
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
16 
 
¶44 In relevant part, the Incidental Motorized Vehicle 
Coverage provides that Mt. Morris will pay for property damage 
that "results from" a "mobile home trailer," unless the mobile 
home trailer was "towed by, or attached to a 'motor vehicle'":  
5. Motorized Vehicles - "We" pay for the "bodily 
injury" or the "property damage" which: 
. . . .   
b. results from:  
. . . .  
2) a utility, boat, camp, or mobile home trailer.  
However, this coverage does not apply to "bodily 
injury" or "property damage" resulting from a trailer 
which:  
a) is carried on, towed by, or attached to a "motor 
vehicle" . . . .   
¶45 The parties agree that Olson's trailer home was towed 
by Farrar's tractor, but disagree whether the tractor falls 
within the definition of a "motor vehicle."  The policy defines 
"motor vehicle" as follows: "'Motor vehicle' means a 'motorized 
vehicle,' . . . and all attached machinery or equipment if: a. 
it is subject to 'motor vehicle' registration; or b. it is 
designed for use on public roads."     
¶46 The parties agree that Farrar's tractor was not 
subject to motor vehicle registration.  They dispute whether the 
tractor was designed for use on public roads.  
¶47 The final exclusion relevant to our analysis is the 
"used by or in the care of" exclusion.  It is found in paragraph 
2.d. of the policy's exclusion section, and it provides: 
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
17 
 
"Coverage L does not apply to: . . . damage to property that is 
rented to, occupied by, used by, or in the care of an 
'insured' . . . ."   
¶48 Considering together the relevant policy language, 
three conditions must be met for there to be coverage for the 
damage to Olson's trailer home and vehicle: (A) the property 
damage must "result[] from" a mobile home trailer; (B) the 
mobile home trailer must not be attached to a "motor vehicle" 
(meaning a motorized vehicle that was "designed for use on 
public roads"); and (C) the damaged property must not be 
"occupied by, used by, or in the care of" Farrar.  We address 
each of these conditions in turn.   
A 
¶49 As noted above, the first condition that must be met 
is that the property damage must "result[] from" the mobile home 
trailer.  Accordingly, if the property damage resulted from both 
the tractor and the trailer home, there is coverage.  However, 
if the property damage resulted exclusively from the tractor and 
did not result from the trailer home, there is no coverage under 
the terms of the policy.     
¶50 The phrase "results from" is not defined in the 
policy.  To determine its meaning, we resort to the well-
established canons of insurance policy interpretation. 
¶51 Mt. Morris contends that the phrase "results from" is 
unambiguous, encompassing only "the cause of the accident or 
damage."  Mt. Morris argues that the property damage "did not 
result from a mobile home trailer, but rather the failure of the 
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
18 
 
tractor to pull the trailer up a hill."  It asserts that the 
stalling of the tractor was the cause of the property damage.  
¶52 By contrast, Farrar asserts that the phrase "results 
from" is broad enough to include any factor that was a 
contributing cause of the property damage.  Here, he contends, 
the property damage was a direct result of the trailer home 
crashing into Olson's truck.  Further, Farrar argues that the 
weight of the trailer home was likely a contributing factor——and 
maybe the only factor——that caused the tractor to stall, causing 
the trailer home to roll down the hill.    
¶53 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
phrase 
"results 
from" 
is 
susceptible to more than one reasonable construction.  Although 
the phrase could be interpreted narrowly to mean the cause of 
the property damage, it could just as easily be interpreted to 
encompass any factor that contributed to the property damage.  
Because we conclude that the phrase "results from" is ambiguous, 
we construe it in favor of coverage.9     
B 
¶54 We turn next to the definition of "motor vehicle" 
found in the policy.  As stated above, if Farrar's tractor is a 
"motor vehicle," then the policy does not provide coverage for 
the property damage.  Citing Snorek v. Boyle, 18 Wis. 2d 202, 
118 N.W.2d 132 (1962), Mt. Morris suggests that the well-
                                                 
9 At oral argument, a question was asked about whether the 
damage to the mobile home trailer "result[ed] from" the "mobile 
home trailer."  There was no adequate response to the question, 
and we do not address it further. 
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
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established definition of motor vehicle includes farm tractors 
when they are being used on public roads.   
¶55 To the extent that Mt. Morris contends that Snorek 
resolves this case, it misreads Snorek.  That case did not 
establish a definition of motor vehicle that applies uniformly 
throughout Wisconsin law.  On the contrary, in Snorek, the court 
defined the term "motor vehicle" as it was used in the direct 
action statute, Wis. Stat. §§ 240.30(4) and 260.11(1) (1957).10  
The Snorek court acknowledged that there are various statutory 
definitions of the term "motor vehicle."  Some of the statutory 
definitions include farm tractors, and others do not.11    
¶56 Resolution of whether Farrar's tractor is a "motor 
vehicle" depends not on how the term "motor vehicle" is defined 
in various conflicting statutes, but rather, how the term is 
defined in Mt. Morris's policy.  Here, the relevant question is 
whether the tractor was "designed for use on public roads." 
                                                 
10 See Hakes v. Paul, 34 Wis. 2d 209, 213, 148 N.W.2d 699 
(1967) ("A farm tractor being operated on a public highway is a 
motor 
vehicle 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
the 
direct-action 
statutes. . . . This 
court 
indicated 
in 
Snorek 
v. 
Boyle 
. . . that 
a 
'motor 
vehicle' 
under 
secs. 
240.30(4) 
and 
260.11(1), Stats., is one which is self-propelled."). 
11 The Snorek court cited the Vehicle Code's general 
definition, "a vehicle which is self-propelled," and concluded 
that it "unquestionably includes a farm tractor."  Snorek v. 
Boyle, 18 Wis. 2d 202, 210, 118 N.W.2d 132 (1962) (citing Wis. 
Stat. § 340.01(35) (1957)).  Nevertheless, the court recognized 
that other statutory definitions of "motor vehicle," such as the 
definition found in Wis. Stat. § 344.01(2)(b), expressly exclude 
farm tractors.  Id. at 209.  That statute provided: "'Motor 
vehicle means a self-propelled vehicle . . . except that 'motor 
vehicle' does not include farm tractors . . . ." 
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
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¶57 Mt. Morris contends that it is common knowledge in 
Wisconsin that farm tractors are occasionally used on public 
roads.  It contends that the court of appeals has interpreted 
the phrase "designed . . . for use on public roads" to mean the 
"intended use or purpose [of the vehicle] at the time of the 
accident."  Schleusner v. IMT Ins. Co., 2006 WI App 240, 297 
Wis. 2d 368, 724 N.W.2d 430.  Mt. Morris asserts that the 
tractor was being used on a public road at the time of the 
accident, and therefore, under Schleusner, the tractor was 
designed for use on public roads.12     
¶58 Although we acknowledge that farm tractors may be used 
on public roads, that fact has little bearing on the proper 
analysis.  The policy definition of motor vehicle does not ask 
whether the vehicle "is used" on public roads.  Rather, the 
question is for what use the vehicle was "designed."  Mt. 
                                                 
12 The Schleusner case does not support Mt. Morris's 
argument.  In that case, a vehicle was initially designed for 
use on public roads.  Schleusner v. IMT Ins. Co., 2006 WI App 
240, ¶4, 297 Wis. 2d 368, 724 N.W.2d 430.  Subsequently, the 
vehicle was redesigned for use in a demolition derby, making it 
unsuitable for use on public roads.  Id., ¶3.  The question in 
Schleusner was which design controlled——the initial design or 
the subsequent redesign. 
The court of appeals concluded, in effect, that the 
subsequent redesign controlled.  Id., ¶16 ("Vehicles whose 
intended use or purpose is on public highways as of the time of 
the accident would be covered, regardless of any previous design 
for another purpose. On the other hand, there would be no 
coverage for injuries caused by vehicles retrofitted for use as 
monster trucks, flowerbeds, or coral reefs.").  The court did 
not hold that a vehicle is designed for a particular use simply 
because it is actually being used in that manner at the time the 
accident occurred.     
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
21 
 
Morris' interpretation would read the word "designed" out of the 
policy definition.    
¶59 The word "designed" is not defined in the policy.  To 
determine its common and ordinary meaning, it is helpful to 
consult a dictionary.  The American Heritage Dictionary defines 
the verb "design" as "to conceive or fashion in the mind; 
invent" and "to create or contrive for a particular purpose or 
effect."  American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
506 (3d ed. 1992).  The Random House Unabridged Dictionary 
defines "designed" as "made or done intentionally; intended, 
planned."  Random House Unabridged Dictionary 539 (2d ed. 1993).   
¶60 We conclude that the definition of "motor vehicle" is 
susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning.  The phrase 
"designed for use" could refer to any conceivable purpose to 
which a vehicle could be put, and one conceivable purpose for a 
farm tractor is use on a public road.  By contrast, the phrase 
"designed for use" could refer more narrowly to the particular 
purpose for which the vehicle is contrived.  The particular 
purpose for which a farm tractor is contrived is use on a farm, 
not a public road.13   
¶61 Because 
the 
definition 
of 
"motor 
vehicle" 
is 
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, we 
construe it in favor of coverage.  We conclude that Farrar's 
                                                 
13 Similarly, in Varda v. Acuity, 2005 WI App 167, ¶16, 284 
Wis. 2d 552, 702 N.W.2d 65, the court of appeals concluded that 
"[a] riding lawn mower is not, in the ordinary meaning of the 
words, . . . designed for use on highways or public roads."   
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
22 
 
tractor is not a "motor vehicle" within the terms of this 
policy.    
C 
¶62 Finally, we address the exclusion for "damage to 
property that is rented to, occupied by, used by, or in the care 
of an 'insured' . . . ."  Whether damaged property was "rented 
to, occupied by, used by, or in the care of an 'insured'" is a 
factual determination.   
¶63 In his complaint, Olson seeks to recover damages to 
his vehicle and his trailer home.  It is undisputed that Olson's 
vehicle was not "used by, or in the care of" Farrar at the time 
of the accident.  Accordingly, this exclusion would not preclude 
coverage for the damage to Olson's vehicle.     
¶64 The 
more 
challenging 
question 
is 
whether 
this 
exclusion precludes coverage for the trailer home because it was 
"used by, or in the care of" Farrar.  The court of appeals 
construed the exclusion to apply only to property that was "in 
the sole possession of the insured[]."  Olson, 330 Wis. 2d 611, 
¶27 (emphasis added).  It explained: "[T]he undisputed facts 
show that Olson's mobile home had not been left in Farrar's sole 
possession.  The mobile home was being towed by Farrar, but 
Olson was also present——he apparently assisted in the moving of 
the mobile home by following behind Olson's trailer as it towed 
the mobile home."  Id.    
¶65 We are not persuaded by the court of appeals' 
analysis.  Although we construe exclusions narrowly in favor of 
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
23 
 
coverage, the phrase "sole possession" is not found in the 
exclusion. 
¶66 Similarly, we are not persuaded by Farrar's assertion 
that because the exclusion is a variation on a standard "care, 
custody or control" exclusion, we should look to the purpose of 
those exclusions when interpreting the language of the policy.14  
However, it is the language of an exclusion, not the asserted 
purpose 
underlying 
the 
exclusion, 
that 
controls 
our 
determination of whether the exclusion unambiguously precludes 
coverage for a claim.  Day v. Allstate Indem. Co., 2011 WI 24, 
¶35, 332 Wis. 2d 571, 798 N.W.2d 199.       
¶67 Nevertheless, we conclude that at this time, there are 
unresolved factual issues precluding the entry of summary 
judgment in either party's favor.  As stated above, whether the 
trailer home was "used by, or in the care of" Farrar is a 
factual determination.  The circuit court did not make any 
findings of fact, and the relevant facts are scarcely developed. 
¶68 In the complaint, Olson alleged that Farrar did not 
have permission to tow the trailer home to its new location.  
Farrar contests that allegation.  In his affidavit, he contended 
that "the tractor was attached to the mobile home by the man 
selling the mobile home, Todd Olson, and me.  We then proceeded 
                                                 
14 Farrar asserts that the purpose of "care, custody or 
control" exclusions is to "prevent a general liability policy 
from providing first-party benefits to the insured and to insure 
that the policy covers liability only to injured third parties." 
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
24 
 
onto the highway where we had a caravan of 3 vehicles involved 
in moving the mobile home."   
¶69 Although 
the 
factual 
record 
has 
not 
been 
well 
developed, it appears that there may be genuine issues of 
material fact regarding whether Olson's trailer home was "used 
by, or in the care of an insured" when it sustained property 
damage.  Because the circuit court granted summary judgment 
based on its determination that the tractor was a "motor 
vehicle," 
it 
did 
not 
need 
to 
address 
this 
exclusion. 
Accordingly, we remand to the circuit court to address the 
exclusion for damage to property "used by, or in the care of an 
insured."  
V 
¶70 In sum, given that Mt. Morris made an initial 
determination to appoint counsel for Farrar's defense until the 
question of coverage could be finally resolved by the court, we 
determine that the purpose of the four-corners rule has been 
served.  It is not further implicated in this case.    
¶71 Turning to the policy language of the exclusions, we 
apply a well-settled canon of insurance policy interpretation.  
We determine that the phrase "results from" is susceptible to 
more than one reasonable interpretation.  We likewise determine 
that the definition of "motor vehicle" is susceptible to more 
than one reasonable interpretation.  Accordingly, both of these 
policy provisions are ambiguous, and we construe them in favor 
of coverage.     
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
25 
 
¶72 Finally, although the factual record has not been well 
developed, it appears that there may be genuine issues of 
material fact regarding whether Olson's trailer home was "used 
by, or in the care of an insured" when it sustained property 
damage.  Because the circuit court did not address this 
exclusion when it granted judgment, we remand to the circuit 
court for a determination on this issue.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court for further 
proceedings.    
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.    
 
No. 
2009AP2385   
 
 
 
1