Title: Gilliard v. State
Citation: 462 So. 2d 710
Docket Number: 55566
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: January 9, 1985

462 So. 2d 710 (1985) Robert C. GILLIARD, Jr. v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 55566. Supreme Court of Mississippi. January 9, 1985. Rehearing Denied February 13, 1985. *712 Lionel R. Barrett, Jr., Nashville, Tenn., for appellant. Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen. by William S. Boyd, III and Charles W. Maris, Jr., Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. En Banc. ROY NOBLE LEE, Presiding Justice, for the Court: This Court affirmed the capital murder death sentence of Robert C. Gilliard, Jr. on February 16, 1983. Gilliard v. State, 428 So. 2d 576 (Miss. 1983). The United States Supreme Court denied petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Mississippi on October 3, 1983. Application for leave to file petition for writ of error coram nobis was filed in this Court November 7, 1983, setting out twenty-nine (29) grounds for relief. We granted the application on two questions and remanded the cause to the Circuit Court of Jones County, Mississippi, for that purpose, 446 So. 2d 590. The questions follow: The Circuit Court of Jones County conducted an evidentiary hearing on the two questions and resolved them against the petitioner, viz, that the petitioner's guilty plea was free and voluntary and the guilty plea and proceedings in connection therewith were not violative of petitioner's constitutional rights, and that petitioner was not denied the effective assistance of counsel at his guilt and sentencing trials in violation of the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The petitioner has appealed to this Court from the decision of the Jones County Circuit Court on those questions. Did the lower court err in concluding that the guilty plea, and the proceedings surrounding such plea, were constitutionally sufficient? In order to meet constitutional standards, a guilty plea must be freely and voluntarily entered. It is essential that an accused have knowledge of the critical elements of the charge against him, that he fully understand the charge, how it involves him, the effects of a guilty plea to the charge, and what might happen to him in the sentencing phase as a result of having entered the plea of guilty. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S. Ct. 2253, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1976). The petitioner expressed his desire to enter a plea of guilty to capital murder at the guilt phase of his trial. Before determining whether the guilty plea should be accepted, the trial judge conducted a lengthy interrogation of the petitioner for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not petitioner fully understood the charge against him, the critical elements of the charge, the possible adverse effects of a guilty plea and that, if the guilty plea were accepted by the court, a jury would then be impaneled and the jury could fix his punishment at death. The interrogation and answers of the petitioner consumed eight (8) pages in the trial record. The expressions and answers of the petitioner appear from the record to be clear, lucid, and knowledgeable. At one point in the interrogation, petitioner stated that he did not wilfully kill Grady Chance. That part of the interrogation is set forth: The petitioner was called by his own counsel and he was the only witness who testified at the coram nobis hearing. The State offered no witnesses. Petitioner stated that he repeatedly told his attorney the gun went off accidentally, but that his attorney advised him to plead guilty anyway. His position on this question is that he entered the plea of guilty because his attorney told him to do so. The coram nobis record reflects that petitioner and his attorney discussed the guilty plea at length and on more than one occasion before it was entered; he and his attorney met with petitioner's three sisters and discussed the guilty plea and trial strategy with them; two of the sisters were in favor of pleading guilty, while one of them opposed it. Apparently the petitioner and his attorney discussed the overwhelming evidence against petitioner, viz, testimony of an accomplice, an eyewitness (Mrs. Grady Chance), and petitioner's own confession. Also, it appears that the strategy was for petitioner to be frank with the jury, and hope to arouse their sympathy. Further, there was considered the possibility of excluding certain evidence. We are of the opinion that the petitioner had full knowledge of the charge against him, the elements of that charge, and the consequences which might result from entering a plea of guilty, and we are of the opinion that the finding of the lower court that the plea of guilty was free and voluntary and was not constitutionally infirm does not constitute error. Did the lower court err in deciding that the petitioner received effective assistance *714 of counsel in view of Strickland v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)? Strickland, decided May 14, 1984, is the most recent case of the United States Supreme Court addressing the question of ineffective assistance of counsel. That Court, speaking through Justice O'Connor, set forth the following important principles dealing with this troublesome question: (1) There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. (2) The two-prong test to determine whether or not defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective is Strickland states the standard: "The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." ___ U.S. at ___, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698. Applying the standard set forth in Strickland to the effectiveness of petitioner's counsel, we now consider the nine (9) alleged errors in the original trial, which petitioner claims rendered his trial counsel ineffective in violation of his Sixth Amendment right. (1) The trial counsel improperly assisted the petitioner to have a preliminary hearing granted in this case. The petitioner has put on no proof that the failure to have a preliminary hearing was not a strategic move. Also, he has shown no prejudice from the failure to have a preliminary hearing. Further, petitioner has failed to show any advantage or benefit he could have gained from having a preliminary hearing, therefore, we are of the opinion that petitioner has not met the Strickland test. (2) Petitioner's counsel did not comply with the Mississippi statute concerning the raising of the question of change of venue. At the trial, petitioner's counsel made a motion for change of venue, but the motion did not follow the statute and counsel did not pursue the change of venue. Again, petitioner has not shown prejudice and there is no indication that a change of venue would have effected a different result in the trial. (3) The trial counsel failed to request individual sequestered voir dire during the selection of the jury for the sentence trial. This Court has approved questioning the jury as a panel provided the defense is given adequate opportunity to question individual jurors. Peters v. State, 314 So. 2d 724 (Miss. 1975). Petitioner did not show, or attempt to show, anything different he could have learned through individual voir dire that would have resulted in a different jury panel in the trial of the case. No case has been cited holding the denial of individual voir dire to be error. Prejudice was not shown on the coram nobis hearing in the lower court. (4) The trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance of counsel by failing to introduce proof that the State systematically excluded blacks not only from this trial, but from other trials. Petitioner complains that his trial counsel failed to introduce proof to show the systematic exclusion of black jurors. However, on the coram nobis hearing, petitioner did not make any attempt to show a systematic exclusion of black jurors and he has not indicated any such exclusion. Neither has he introduced any testimony or evidence that there was a probability of systematic exclusion of such jurors. The *715 claim or allegation of systematic exclusion stands alone and is not sufficient to meet the test. Booker v. State, 449 So. 2d 209 (Miss. 1984). (5) The defense counsel permitted the petitioner to plead guilty to deliberate, intentional murder when, prior to the plea of guilty, there had been elicited from his client a statement that contradicted the plea. (6) The defense counsel should not have allowed his client to enter a plea of guilty to the first count of the indictment of capital murder in view of the recent decision of Enmund v. Florida. We have held, supra, that the guilty plea entered by petitioner was free and voluntary. Petitioner now contends that, since he admitted he wilfully killed Mr. Chance, petitioner's credibility was destroyed when he testified in the sentencing trial that the gun was accidentally discharged. The plea of guilty and the conduct of the sentencing trial appear to be strategic decisions on the part of petitioner and his trial counsel. On the coram nobis hearing, the trial judge found that the cross-examination on this point was not as harmful as the petitioner giving different accounts of his part in the crime. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1982), held that the death penalty cannot be imposed on a defendant who aided and abetted a felony in which a murder was committed, but did not himself kill, attempt to kill, intend to kill, or contemplate that life would be taken. In the present case, petitioner voluntarily armed himself and was the trigger man in the crime. We are of the opinion that Enmund does not afford petitioner any relief. (7) The defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by allowing the District Attorney to point out that a sentenced life inmate could be eligible for parole in ten years. Petitioner contends that remarks in his attorney's closing argument at trial invited highly prejudicial remarks from the district attorney; that this Court so held in the opinion affirming his death penalty; and that his trial counsel was ineffective because of those remarks. Remarks of petitioner's counsel and the district attorney at trial follow: 428 So. 2d at 583-84. Petitioner states in his brief that the language of the Mississippi Supreme Court, in holding that the district attorney's answer did not constitute reversible error, was a prima facie showing of ineffective counsel. However, those remarks are taken in isolation. The full comment of the Court appears in 428 So.2d at 584: 428 So. 2d at 584. Petitioner's attorney at trial argued that, if he was sent to the penitentiary for life, he would not be a threat to society; that the jury should spare his life, because in prison he would no longer be such a threat to society; and that petitioner was basically a good person who fell in with a bad crowd. Applying the two-prong test and standards of Strickland, the strategy argument of petitioner's counsel does not render him ineffective counsel. (8) The petitioner was denied effective assistance as no competent counsel would fail to take advantage of the right to make an opening statement in a death penalty case. The decision whether to make an opening statement was a strategic one. The district attorney did not make an opening statement, and it is probable that both parties agreed not to make them. Petitioner's attorney may have felt that he had nothing to gain by making a statement. At any rate, we are of the opinion that no prejudice resulted from a failure to do so. (9) The fact that the inducement or deal made by the co-defendant was not instructed on by the court was directly the responsibility of ineffective assistance of counsel on behalf of the defense counsel. An accomplice, who testified for the State, claimed that the State had not promised him he would not be indicted for capital murder, if he testified. However, such promise had been made. Petitioner's trial counsel requested the trial judge to inform the jury about the bargain, but this request was refused as a comment on the evidence. No further request was made, even though the trial judge indicated he would consider a different instruction. Petitioner's trial counsel stated at the trial that he intended to do more research before requesting an instruction on this issue. It, therefore, seems that the decision not to request an instruction was not strategic, but probably inadvertent. However, in his closing argument, the district attorney told the jury that he had made a deal with the witness. In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court said: ___ U.S. at ___, 104 S. Ct. at 2069, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699. Applying the Strickland test, we are of the opinion that Point # 9 does not render petitioner's trial counsel ineffective. After carefully considering the trial record, the coram nobis hearing, the trial judge's findings on the coram nobis hearing, and the briefs of the parties, we are of the opinion that the guilty plea of petitioner was free and voluntary and that under Strickland v. Washington, supra, the nine lapses argued by petitioner's counsel, taken individually and in combination, did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the judgment of the lower court on those matters remanded to it for evidentiary hearing from this Court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER, P.J., and DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON and SULLIVAN, JJ., concur. HAWKINS, J., dissents. HAWKINS, Justice, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Gilliard complains of a number of deficiencies in his representation by counsel, and many of them certainly raise eyebrows.[1] Any resultant prejudice therefrom, however, can only be conjectural. Under the guidelines of Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S. Ct. 2253, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1976); and Strickland v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), one contended dereliction, in my view, was clearly prejudicial. Unquestionably, while Gilliard was engaged in the commission of a robbery, he shot and killed Mr. Grady Chance, for which he was guilty of capital murder under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e). Under this subsection it is not necessary that the killing be intentional in order to constitute the crime of capital murder. Gilliard has never denied this, and knowingly pleaded guilty to it. The only defense he had, which was in mitigation, was his contention he accidentally shot Mr. Chance in the chest when the shotgun with which he was armed fell from his shoulder and the butt end struck a store counter and discharged. (Original opinion 428 So. 2d 576, p. 578) That was his only defense on the facts in the circuit court of the Second Judicial District of Jones County and before this Court on his appeal. The public defender emasculated that one mitigating circumstance, which might have caused the sentencing jury to spare his life. The majority sets forth at length the questioning of Gilliard by the circuit judge prior to his guilty plea. I re-quote a portion: Three things are apparent from this questioning: First, Gilliard told the Court he did not willfully kill Mr. Chance. Next, there was a conference between Gilliard and his public defender. Third, the trial judge did not repeat his initial inquiry to Gilliard as to whether he had "willfully killed" Mr. Chance, but rather asked him if he "feloniously killed him, with malice aforethought." Later, at the sentencing phase of the trial, Gilliard on direct examination testified the shooting of Mr. Chance was accidental, whereupon the prosecuting attorney on cross-examination thoroughly discredited this claim by the fact he had just freely and voluntarily pleaded guilty to intentionally and deliberately killing Mr. Chance. The prosecuting attorney made mincemeat of the one contention which stood a chance of saving his life. To me, Gilliard was prejudicially denied effective assistance of counsel for the following reasons: I would sustain the petition and grant Gilliard a trial. The prosecution and defense of capital murder cases, while always serious, used to be relatively simple for judges and attorneys. The U.S. Supreme Court has changed all this. That Court has rendered a number of landmark decisions of such subtlety and complexity they tax the minds of the best of legal scholars to comprehend, and even that Court's own members have sharp disagreement as to their meaning. I endeavored to make this point in a review of U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hill v. State, 432 So. 2d 427, pp. 452-462 (Miss. 1983). In interpreting U.S. Supreme Court decisions, our U.S. Court of Appeals in lengthy, complex opinions has super-imposed additional difficult requirements for all death penalty cases, which bind this Court as well. Our Legislature, following the Federal Courts' requirements, has enacted detailed death penalty statutes, constantly being revised. The trial of capital murder cases is now a specialized, difficult field of criminal law. It is, therefore, foolhardy for any circuit judge or attorney to participate in a capital murder case without protracted study and preparation. Even the most skilled trial *719 attorney needs special, lengthy preparation before undertaking one of these cases. I make these observations to stress the importance of circuit judges, prosecuting attorneys and defense attorneys familiarizing themselves with this turbulent specialized area of criminal law before participation in such a case. If the circuit judge assures himself that the attorney he is appointing in a capital murder case will be familiar with the law on this subject, he will not only insure a better and fairer trial. He will also markedly lessen the chance for reversals and avoidable heart-rending delay in the judicial process. Any other course is penny wise and pound foolish. [1] Failure of counsel to properly request a change of venue, failure to request individual sequestered voir dire, failure to object to closing argument, failure to make opening statement in argument. [2] The indictment charged Gilliard and Edwin T. Darby with murder under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e). As above noted, under this subsection, a killing perpetrated while in commission of a robbery is capital murder even though not intentional. Thus, on advice of counsel, Gilliard admitted a fact unnecessary to a plea of guilty to capital murder under this subsection. While this admission was unnecessary to constitute a valid plea of guilty, it wreaked havoc with the one reason Gilliard had to give the jury under the facts to spare his life.