Title: People v. Willis
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 97454
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: June 3, 2005

Docket No. 97454-Agenda 2-January 2005.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ROY 							M. WILLIS, Appellee.
Opinion filed June 3, 2005.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures, and consequently prohibits an unreasonable delay between
a warrantless arrest and a probable cause determination. The fifth
amendment prohibits involuntary self-incrimination, and consequently
prohibits the admission of an involuntary confession into evidence at
trial. When the defendant makes a confession during such a delay, the
protections provided by these amendments intersect. The central issue
in this case is whether a confession that may comport with the fifth
amendment must be suppressed because it was obtained after a delay
that violated the fourth amendment.
	The appellate court decided that the proper test for the
admissibility of such a confession is whether it was attenuated from
the taint of the delay and that the defendant's confession failed that
test. The appellate court reversed the defendant's felony criminal
damage to property conviction. 344 Ill. App. 3d 868. We conclude
that the proper test for the admissibility of such a confession is
whether it was voluntary and that the defendant's confession passed
that test. We reverse the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	On the night of June 14, 1999, a fire started on the second-floor
rear porch of a Chicago Heights apartment building. Morgan
Beauchamp, a 70-year-old resident of the building, died of smoke
inhalation. The next day, the Chicago Heights police department
assigned the fire investigation to Detective Michael Lueser.
	Detective Lueser first spoke with Ralph Lawson, Beauchamp's
next-door neighbor. On the night of the fire between 8 and 9 p.m.,
Lawson saw Kimbery Broadnex, the defendant's girlfriend and
Beauchamp's reported paramour, retrieving a sweater from an area
where she kept some clothes on Beauchamp's rear porch. Lawson
saw Broadnex leave and less than an hour later, between 9:30 and
9:45 p.m., saw the defendant looking for her. The defendant appeared
angry and asked Lawson if he had seen Broadnex. Lawson answered
that he had seen her, but that she had left. The defendant walked to
the rear of Beauchamp's apartment building and disappeared from
Lawson's view. The defendant then reappeared a short time later and
walked away from the rear of the building. Lawson soon smelled
smoke and noticed a fire on the second-floor rear porch. Lawson saw
Beauchamp standing on his front porch and told him to leave the
building, but Beauchamp went inside. Lawson did not see him again.
	Detective Lueser then spoke with Broadnex. Broadnex had been
living with the defendant until the day of the fire, when she moved her
belongings from the defendant's apartment to Beauchamp's rear
porch. She was not near Beauchamp's apartment building when the
fire started. Broadnex had a criminal case pending against the
defendant for beating her, but, after talking to Lawson about his
encounter with the defendant, she visited the defendant the next
morning. The defendant told Broadnex that he was looking for her the
night before. She detected a burning odor emanating from under the
defendant's bed, but did not inquire about it.
	Detective Lueser reviewed the fire marshal's reports. In an initial
report, the fire marshal stated that the fire started on the second-floor
rear porch, but could not determine its origin or cause. In the official
report, the fire marshal again concluded that the fire started on the
second-floor rear porch. It was intentionally set with an open flame,
but without an accelerant.
	Almost a month later, on July 13, 1999, Detective Lueser finally
located the defendant. Lueser and another officer asked the defendant
to accompany them to the Chicago Heights police department; the
defendant agreed. He was not handcuffed and rode to the station in an
unmarked squad car. At approximately 4 p.m., the defendant was
placed in an interview room. Detective Lueser read Miranda warnings
to the defendant from a preprinted form. The defendant said he
understood his rights and signed the form. Over the course of several
hours, the defendant spoke with Lueser and his superiors, Sergeant
Gary Miller and Sergeant Jeff Bohlen. The defendant denied any
involvement in the fire and denied going to the apartment building on
the night of the fire. At 8:30 p.m., when the defendant requested to
leave, Detective Lueser refused and instead placed him under arrest.
The defendant was moved to the lockup. According to Lueser, the
defendant was held pending further investigation. Detective Lueser
left work at 9 p.m. In his absence, no other officer worked on the case
against the defendant.
	When Detective Lueser returned to work the next day at 1 p.m.,
he attempted to track down Lawson, Broadnex, and any other
possible witnesses to the fire. Although Lueser spent "more than half"
of his eight-hour shift working on the defendant's case, he did not
speak to the defendant on July 14; nor did any other officers. Lueser
left work at 9 p.m. On July 15, 1999, while Detective Lueser again
attempted to locate witnesses, Sergeant Miller asked the defendant if
he would take a polygraph test. The defendant consented. Sergeant
Miller and another officer transported the defendant to the Chicago
police department for the test. The polygraph examiner read Miranda
warnings to the defendant and administered the test. After the test, the
polygraph examiner told the defendant that he had failed and that he
was not telling the truth about his involvement in the fire. The
defendant insisted the test was inaccurate. The officers took the
defendant back to the Chicago Heights police department, where
Detective Lueser spoke briefly with him around 8 p.m. about the
results of the polygraph test. The defendant continued to deny any
involvement in the fire.
	On July 16, 1999, the police located Lawson and Broadnex and
brought them to the station. Around 5 p.m., Lueser again interviewed
the defendant. Detective Lueser repeated Miranda warnings to the
defendant. The defendant said he understood his rights, signed the
preprinted form, and spoke with Lueser for 20 minutes.
Approximately 73 hours after his detention began, the defendant
admitted his involvement in the fire and agreed to make a written
inculpatory statement. In this statement, the defendant acknowledged
that on the night of the fire he went to Beauchamp's rear porch to
look for Broadnex. The defendant did not find Broadnex, but noticed
some of her clothing hanging from a shelf and stuffed into pillow
cases, as well as several boxes of her belongings. The defendant
became upset and flicked a cigarette near the pillow cases because he
"wanted to start some of her clothing on fire." According to the
defendant,
		"My sole intention was to burn some of her property ***. I
knew that the cigarette would light everything on fire but I
didn't think it would spread beyond the storage room. After
I threw the cigarette, I shut the storage door and then I
walked outside ***."
Lawson later identified the defendant in a lineup. The next day at 7:30
a.m., more than 87 hours after his detention began, the police
presented the defendant to a judge for a bond hearing.
	The defendant was indicted on five counts of first degree murder.
See 720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 1998). He filed a motion to quash his
arrest. The circuit court of Cook County denied this motion, finding
that the police had probable cause to arrest him. The defendant also
filed a motion to suppress his inculpatory statement, arguing, inter
alia, that his confession was involuntary. The trial court denied this
motion as well, stating:
			"It seems clear to me that Mr. Willis was kept at the police
station so that they could question him and try to get a
statement from him. The issue though is whether given the
amount of time involved and the totality of the circumstances
the statement made was involuntary.
			I find that the statement made-the State has met their
burden of showing that the statement was voluntary based on
defendant's age, education, his intelligence. Even though the
amount of time was long, that the totality of the
circumstances, for instance, he voluntarily went and took the
polygraph after 48 hours, and they were at adding another 24
[hours]. There is no indication that he was otherwise coerced
or attacked or anything during the subsequent 24 hours. So
that will be the finding of the Court."
After a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of felony criminal
damage to property (see 720 ILCS 5/21-1 (West 1998)) and
sentenced to three years' imprisonment. He appealed.
	The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling on the motion
to quash, but reversed its ruling on the motion to suppress. 344 Ill.
App. 3d 868. Following Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975), and County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
500 U.S. 44, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991), the appellate
court stated that the defendant's "lawful detention became unlawful
in violation of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
after the passage of 48 hours." 344 Ill. App. 3d at 878. The appellate
court turned to the appropriate remedy for the fourth amendment
violation and decided that the exclusionary rule should apply. 344 Ill.
App. 3d at 884.
	The appellate court then concluded that, under Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 95 S. Ct. 2254 (1975), the
defendant's inculpatory statement was not sufficiently attenuated from
his illegal detention and should have been suppressed: "We find no
intervening circumstances to explain defendant's decision to confess
after twice denying involvement, which leads us to believe the
inherently coercive nature of the 73-hour detention produced a
confession that was not sufficiently an act of free will, purged of
primary taint." 344 Ill. App. 3d at 886. Because the remaining
evidence against the defendant did not provide proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, the appellate court reversed the defendant's
conviction. 344 Ill. App. 3d at 887.
	We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.
315(a). On the legal issues in this appeal, our review is de novo. See
People v. Burdunice, 211 Ill. 2d 264, 267 (2004).

ANALYSIS
	Recently, in People v. Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d 151 (2002), we
touched upon the principles involved in this case. In discussing
statutory rules of presentment, we quoted the committee comments
to article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. Ballard,
206 Ill. 2d  at 176. Because they succinctly frame the problem before
us, we return to these comments:
			"The most tedious and perplexing problem in the area is
what happens between arrest and taking before a judicial
officer (magistrate) for a judicial hearing on probable cause.
In practice, the time between arrest and hearing is that in
which police officers question the accused and obtain, if
possible, a confession. If the case is weak, there is a tendency
to delay. If a confession is obtained during such delay, should
it be admissible in evidence at the trial?
			Illinois continues to look at the confession cases solely in
the light of the voluntary-involuntary test. This basis is
grounded in the historical fact that involuntary confessions
are untrustworthy and should not be admissible [citation]. In
1936 the federal courts began to exercise an influence in this
area. [Citation.] This influence increased with the holding that
unnecessary detention alone between arrest and hearing
before a commissioner was sufficient to render inadmissible
in evidence a confession obtained during such period, even
though voluntary. [Citations.] Illinois, along with most states,
has refused to follow the federal exclusionary rule in this area
and still tests the confession against all factors and applies the
voluntary-involuntary test [citation]." 725 ILCS Ann., art.
109, Committee Comments-1963, at 3 (Smith-Hurd 1992)
(revised in 1970).
The committee comments predicted that, because the United States
Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule for fourth amendment
violations in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961), "it may not be long before the federal rule is extended
to the states in unnecessary delay cases, and it is not too inconceivable
that mere unnecessary delay, without a confession to consider, will be
held to be a violation of Due Process under the 14th Amendment."
725 ILCS Ann., art. 109, Committee Comments-1963, at 3 (Smith-Hurd 1992) (revised in 1970).
	This forecast proved too dire in one respect. The Court never
imposed the federal exclusionary rule-the so-called McNabb-Mallory
rule(1)-on the states. Instead, it remained a rule of evidence in federal
court because it lacked a constitutional source. See People v. Jackson,
23 Ill. 2d 274, 277 (1961), citing Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55,
63-64, 96 L. Ed. 86, 93-94, 72 S. Ct. 141, 146-47 (1951). However,
the Court did eventually address the constitutionality of "mere
unnecessary delay," five years after the committee comments were
revised, in Gerstein.
	The Gerstein Court observed, "To implement the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unfounded invasions of liberty and
privacy, the Court has required that the existence of probable cause be
decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible."
Gerstein, 420 U.S.  at 112, 43 L. Ed. 2d  at 64, 95 S. Ct.  at 862. The
Court then conceded that warrantless arrests are a practical
compromise in which
			"a policeman's on-the-scene assessment of probable cause
provides legal justification for arresting a person suspected of
crime, and for a brief period of detention to take the
administrative steps incident to arrest. Once the suspect is in
custody, however, the reasons that justify dispensing with the
magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is
any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further
crimes while the police submit their evidence to a magistrate.
And, while the State's reasons for taking summary action
subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determination of
probable cause increases significantly." Gerstein, 420 U.S.  at
113-14, 43 L. Ed. 2d  at 65, 95 S. Ct.  at 863.
Accordingly, the Court held that a judicial determination of probable
cause must precede an "extended restraint of liberty following arrest."
Gerstein, 420 U.S.  at 114, 43 L. Ed. 2d  at 65, 95 S. Ct.  at 863. The
Court left the states free to fashion appropriate procedures, provided
they afford a fair and reliable judicial determination of probable cause
either before or "promptly" after an arrest. Gerstein, 420 U.S.  at 125,
43 L. Ed. 2d  at 71-72, 95 S. Ct.  at 868-69.
	The Court defined "promptly" in McLaughlin. The Court initially
observed, "Gerstein held that probable cause determinations must be
prompt-not immediate." McLaughlin, 500 U.S.  at 54, 114 L. Ed. 2d 
at 61, 111 S. Ct.  at 1669. Noting that this flexibility proved
problematic for lower courts left to grapple with systematic challenges
to state procedures that tried to meet this vague standard, the Court
stated:
			"Our task in this case is to articulate more clearly the
boundaries of what is permissible under the Fourth
Amendment. Although we hesitate to announce that the
Constitution compels a specific time limit, it is important to
provide some degree of certainty so that States and counties
may establish procedures with confidence that they fall within
constitutional bounds. Taking into account the competing
interests articulated in Gerstein, we believe that a jurisdiction
that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within
48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the
promptness requirement of Gerstein. For this reason, such
jurisdictions will be immune from systematic challenges."
McLaughlin, 500 U.S.  at 56, 114 L. Ed. 2d  at 62-63, 111 S. Ct.  at 1670.
	The Court further stated that even if a probable cause hearing is
held within this 48-hour window, the State may still violate Gerstein
if the defendant can prove unreasonable delay-for example, delay to
gather additional evidence to justify retroactively the defendant's
arrest, delay to show ill will toward the defendant, or delay for its own
sake. McLaughlin, 500 U.S.  at 56, 114 L. Ed. 2d  at 63, 111 S. Ct.  at
1670. The Court continued:
			"Where an arrested individual does not receive a probable
cause determination within 48 hours, the calculus changes. In
such a case, the arrested individual does not bear the burden
of proving an unreasonable delay. Rather, the burden shifts to
the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide
emergency or other extraordinary circumstance."
McLaughlin, 500 U.S.  at 57, 114 L. Ed. 2d  at 63, 111 S. Ct. 
at 1670.
	Here, the defendant was held for more than 87 hours after his
warrantless arrest before he was presented to a judge for a probable
cause determination. He confessed after 73 hours. The appellate court
was correct: the State has never contended or attempted to show that
this delay was defensible due to an emergency or extraordinary
circumstance. 344 Ill. App. 3d at 878. The defendant's detention thus
ran afoul of Gerstein and McLaughlin, and we must decide the proper
remedy. Since McLaughlin, the Supreme Court has remained silent on
this issue, declining to answer whether an inculpatory statement
obtained during an unreasonably long delay must, for that reason, be
suppressed. See Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 84-85, 128 L. Ed. 2d 1, 7-8, 114 S. Ct. 1280, 1283-84 (1994).
	The vast majority of jurisdictions have approached this problem,
like the trial court did here, as a simple matter of voluntariness. See 2
W. LaFave, Criminal Procedure §6.3(c), at 475 (2d ed. 1999). In
these jurisdictions, an inculpatory statement obtained during an
unreasonably long delay between a warrantless arrest and a probable
cause hearing must be suppressed only if it was involuntary. See, e.g.,
Bush v. Alabama, 695 So. 2d 70, 124 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995); Riney
v. Alaska, 935 P.2d 828, 834-35 (Alaska App. 1997); Peterson v.
Indiana, 674 N.E.2d 528, 538-39 (Ind. 1996); Michigan v. Manning,
243 Mich. App. 615, 642, 624 N.W.2d 746, 759 (2000); Nebraska v.
Nissen, 252 Neb. 51, 68, 560 N.W.2d 157, 171 (1997); New Jersey
v. Tucker, 137 N.J. 259, 272, 645 A.2d 111, 117 (1994); accord West
v. Johnson, 92 F.3d 1385, 1404 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Perez-Bustamante, 963 F.2d 48, 53 (5th Cir. 1992). See generally R.
Eclavea, Annotation, Admissibility of Confession or Other Statement
Made by Defendant as Affected by Delay in Arraignment-Modern
State Cases, 28 A.L.R.4th 1121, §6 (1984 &amp; Supp. 2005) ("Broad
view that delay is merely a factor in determining admissibility of
confession").
	Other jurisdictions have approached this problem, like the
appellate court here did, as a matter of attenuation. In these
jurisdictions, an inculpatory statement obtained during such a delay
must be suppressed unless it was attenuated from the taint of the
Gerstein/McLaughlin violation. See, e.g., Chavez v. Florida, 832 So. 2d 730, 756-57 (Fla. 2002); Powell v. Nevada, 113 Nev. 41, 46, 930 P.2d 1123, 1126 (1997); Tennessee v. Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d 666,
674 (Tenn. 1996); accord Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053,
1071 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds, Bittaker v.
Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003); but see Shope v. Maryland,
41 Md. App. 161, 171, 396 A.2d 282, 288 (Ct. Spec. App. 1979)
(suppressing the defendant's confession after an unreasonably long
delay, but characterizing that decision as "burning the barn to get rid
of the mice"). In effect, these courts have fashioned what could be
termed a "fruit of the poisonous illegal detention" rule. See G.
Thomas, The Poisoned Fruit of Pretrial Detention, 61 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 413 (1986).
	The appellate court here noted this split in authority, then turned
to our opinion in People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186 (2000).
According to the appellate court, "When faced with an alleged
McLaughlin violation, the Illinois Supreme Court *** did not limit its
analysis to the issue of voluntariness." 344 Ill. App. 3d at 880. The
appellate court continued: "After finding the defendant's statement
was voluntary, the court went on to determine suppression was not
necessary under the fourth amendment because an emergency ***
justified the delay in presentment." 344 Ill. App. 3d at 880.
	The appellate court mischaracterized our holding in Chapman. In
Chapman, we addressed the defendant's argument that a 29-hour
delay between his warrantless arrest and his preliminary hearing
violated the fourth amendment per Gerstein and McLaughlin.
Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d  at 215. We briefly discussed McLaughlin and
its holding that a delay of more than 48 hours in the absence of a bona
fide emergency or extraordinary circumstance violates the fourth
amendment. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d  at 215. We concluded that an
emergency justified the delay and, as a result, there was no fourth
amendment violation. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d  at 215-16. We did not
reach the question of a proper remedy.
	The appellate court further observed that, in Chapman, this court
recognized the difference between an exclusion analysis under the
fourth amendment and one under the fifth amendment: "Otherwise,
there would have been no reason for a separate examination of facts
that justified the delay in taking the defendant before a judge for a
probable cause decision." 344 Ill. App. 3d at 880. Quoting Brown,
422 U.S.  at 601-02, 45 L. Ed. 2d  at 426, 95 S. Ct.  at 2260-61, and
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222, 230, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1291 (1985), the appellate court explained that the taint of
a fourth amendment violation is not dissipated merely because an
inculpatory statement passes the fifth amendment test for
voluntariness. 344 Ill. App. 3d at 880-81, citing People v. White, 117 Ill. 2d 194, 223 (1987). The appellate court concluded:
			"The exclusionary rule cannot adequately deter police
from violating Fourth Amendment rights if its application is
limited to involuntary statements. Under the voluntariness
approach ***, the exclusionary rule holds police accountable
for the treatment a suspect receives during an illegal
detention, but does nothing to deter them from illegally
detaining a suspect in the first place. The approach creates no
incentive to comply with McLaughlin and Gerstein.
			We are persuaded the decisions we have cited require us
to maintain a distinction between the interests served by the
fourth and fifth amendments. We deal with the kind of
unlawful detention held unlawful in McLaughlin. This is a
fourth amendment issue. ***
			The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule would be
well served by suppression of statements that are unpurged
of the primary taint created by a McLaughlin violation.
Suppression would discourage police officers from parking
an arrestee in a jail cell for more than 48 hours without good
reason. It would deprive them of any benefit gained by their
violation of the fourth amendment's guarantee that it will
'furnish meaningful protection from unfounded interference
with liberty.' " 344 Ill. App. 3d at 883-84, quoting Gerstein,
420 U.S.  at 114, 43 L. Ed. 2d  at 65, 95 S. Ct.  at 863.
Thus, the appellate court, in the name of maintaining a sharp
distinction between fourth and fifth amendment doctrines, held that an
inculpatory statement obtained during a delay which violates
Gerstein/McLaughlin must be suppressed if it is the fruit of that delay,
regardless of whether it was voluntary.
	The State does not violate the fourth amendment when it
introduces evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation &amp; Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357,
362, 141 L. Ed. 2d 344, 351, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2019 (1998). Rather,
a fourth amendment violation is "fully accomplished" by the illegal
search or seizure, and excluding evidence cannot undo the invasion of
the defendant's rights. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 687, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3411-12 (1984). Like the
McNabb-Mallory rule, the exclusionary rule that accompanies the
fourth amendment has no constitutional footing. Instead, it is a
judicially created, prudential remedy that prospectively protects fourth
amendment rights by deterring future police misconduct. United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 571, 94 S. Ct. 613, 620 (1974); accord People v. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d 231, 241
(2003). Its application has been trimmed to instances where its
remedial objectives will be most effectively served. Arizona v. Evans,
514 U.S. 1, 11, 131 L. Ed. 2d 34, 44, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1191 (1995).
That is, it applies only where its deterrent benefits outweigh its
substantial social costs. See Leon, 468 U.S.  at 907, 82 L. Ed. 2d  at
688, 104 S. Ct.  at 3412; United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-54,
49 L. Ed. 2d 1046, 1060, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3032 (1976). Our inquiry in
this case thus becomes whether the benefit of excluding a putatively
voluntary confession in order to deter police from violating Gerstein
and McLaughlin outweighs the steep social costs of such a rule. We
conclude that it does not for three reasons.
	First, other remedies, such as the civil rights suits anchoring both
Gerstein and McLaughlin, are available to persons subject to
unreasonably long delays. See 42 U.S.C. §1983 (2000); Manning, 243
Mich. App. at 638, 624 N.W.2d  at 757.
	Second, we must "carefully balance the legitimate aims of law
enforcement against the right of our citizens to be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion." People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 245 (1984). The police need latitude to conduct investigations,
and a strict exclusionary rule for Gerstein/McLaughlin violations
would inject courts into not only the details of police work, but also
the details of police staffing and pay decisions. Further, the United
States Supreme Court has long counseled against expanding the
exclusionary rule beyond the contexts where it currently applies. See
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488-89, 30 L. Ed. 2d 618, 627, 92 S. Ct. 619, 626 (1972). Though the exclusionary rule, through its
deterrent effect, laudably secures constitutional rights, it also deflects
criminal trials from their basic focus by erecting barriers between the
jury and truthful, probative evidence. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473, 484, 107 S. Ct. 515, 521 (1986);
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734, 65 L. Ed. 2d 468, 476,
100 S. Ct. 2439, 2445 (1980) ("unbending application of the
exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude
would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and
jury").
	In fact, the constitutional case for excluding statements obtained
during an unreasonably long delay is less substantial than it once was
because, since fashioning the McNabb-Mallory rule, the Supreme
Court has provided "other effective means for safeguarding the vital
Fourth and Fifth Amendment interests" at stake-namely, cases such
as Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 99 S. Ct. 2248 (1979), where the Court held that statements which are the fruit
of an illegal arrest must be suppressed, and Miranda. See 2 W.
LaFave, Criminal Procedure §6.3(c), at 475-76 (2d ed. 1999); People
v. Cipriano, 431 Mich. 315, 330-31, 429 N.W.2d 781, 788 (1988). It
would be incongruous to apply a newly minted constitutional version
of the McNabb-Mallory rule in order to exclude an inculpatory
statement, when neither the McNabb-Mallory rule nor the
exclusionary rule are constitutionally required and the defendant's
rights are otherwise protected.
	Third, and relatedly, the delay in presenting a defendant to a
judge for a probable-cause determination will not be ignored if the
confession is not excluded under the fourth amendment. We have
repeatedly held, both before and after Gerstein and McLaughlin, that
such a delay remains a factor to consider in determining whether a
confession was voluntary. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d  at 214; accord
Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d  at 176. In People v. Dees, 85 Ill. 2d 233, 237
(1981), we discussed Gerstein and then stated, "Delay alone *** has
not heretofore been considered sufficient cause to penalize the
prosecution to the extent of excluding confessions obtained during the
period between arrest and appearance before a judge." Again, in
People v. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323, 380 (1990), we repeated that delay
in presenting the defendant to a judge for a probable-cause
determination "does not of itself vitiate a confession but is merely a
factor to be considered on the question of voluntariness." See People
v. Williams, 303 Ill. App. 3d 33, 43 (1999) (citing Gerstein for its
constitutional rule and House for its holding that "[f]ailure to promptly
present defendant before a magistrate does not invalidate a confession
per se, but it is a factor to consider in determining the voluntariness
of a statement"); People v. Groves, 294 Ill. App. 3d 570, 577 (1998)
(citing McLaughlin for its constitutional rule and House for its holding
that "delay is a factor to be considered when determining whether the
confession was voluntary"); People v. Goree, 115 Ill. App. 3d 157,
161 (1983) ("We find nothing in Gerstein *** to cast doubt on the
statements in the Illinois cases that a confession obtained during
detention in violation of constitutional or statutory prompt
presentment requirements will not be suppressed unless involuntary").
	The holdings in these cases track our holdings in pre-Gerstein
cases. See Howell, 60 Ill. 2d  at 122 ("We have heretofore considered
delay in presenting a defendant to a judge following his arrest only as
a circumstance to be considered by the court in determining the
voluntariness of any statement given by the defendant during this
delay"); People v. Johnson, 44 Ill. 2d 463, 469 (1970) ("an
unreasonable delay in presenting a defendant before a magistrate is a
circumstance to be taken into consideration in determining whether or
not his confession was voluntary"); People v. Nicholls, 42 Ill. 2d 91,
101 (1969) ("[i]f any unlawfulness of detention be assumed, such
detention does not of itself invalidate a confession but it was a
circumstance to be considered in determining if a confession was
voluntary"); People v. Novak, 33 Ill. 2d 343, 348 (1965) ("it is the law
of this State that illegal detention in an of itself does not render
inadmissible a confession given during the period of illegal detention
if the confession is voluntarily given"); People v. Miller, 13 Ill. 2d 84,
100-01 (1958) ("detention without process does not itself render a
confession inadmissible if it was otherwise shown to be voluntary").
See also People v. Brooks, 51 Ill. 2d 156 (1972); People v. Higgins,
50 Ill. 2d 221 (1972); People v. Stone, 45 Ill. 2d 100 (1970); People
v. Kelley, 44 Ill. 2d 315 (1970); People v. Underhill, 38 Ill. 2d 245
(1967); People v. Carter, 39 Ill. 2d 31 (1968); People v. Taylor, 33 Ill. 2d 417 (1965); People v. Harper, 36 Ill. 2d 398 (1967).
	The great weight of Illinois authority rests with the State, and we
refuse to depart from it. We return to our statement more than 50
years ago in People v. Hall, 413 Ill. 615, 623-24 (1953):
		"A voluntary confession by a competent person of the guilt
of a crime is the highest type of evidence-an involuntary
confession obtained by brutality or coercion is wholly
unreliable and is the most flagrant violation of the principles
of freedom and justice. The decisions of this court have
always been guided by these principles and until some sound
reasoning appears showing a better test for the admissibility
of confessions we shall adhere to those principles."
See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1037,
1057-58, 81 S. Ct. 1860, 1879 (1961) ("The ultimate test [for
admissibility] remains that which has been the only clearly established
test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of
voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker?"). When faced with a
Gerstein/McLaughlin violation, we ask simply whether the confession
was voluntary-whether the inherently coercive atmosphere of the
police station was the impetus for the confession or whether it was the
product of free will. See People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 437
(2001). If so, it is admissible. If not, it is inadmissible. While we
appreciate the appellate court's well-reasoned scholarship, the
voluntariness test and the flexibility it offers in responding to factual
nuance more appropriately balance the rights of the accused with the
requirements of law enforcement.(2)
	To determine whether the defendant's confession was voluntary,
we consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding it, including
the defendant's age, intelligence, education, experience, and physical
condition at the time of the detention and interrogation; the duration
of the interrogation; the presence of Miranda warnings; the presence
of any physical or mental abuse; and the legality and duration of the
detention. See Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d  at 177, citing People v. Gilliam,
172 Ill. 2d 484, 500-01 (1996). We will not disturb the trial court's
decision on this issue unless it was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d  at 177. Here, the trial court skillfully
examined all of these factors and concluded that the defendant's
inculpatory statement was indeed voluntary. This finding was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
	The defendant's presentence investigation report reveals that in
1999 he was 45 years old. He graduated from Oakwood College in
Huntsville, Alabama, and later received a Masters Degree in Divinity
from Andrews University in Berrien Springs, Michigan. In 1971, at
age 17, he was sentenced to five years' imprisonment in Georgia for
burglary. In 1975, at age 21, he was sentenced to five years'
imprisonment in Georgia for robbery. The defendant stated that he
was in good health with no need for ongoing medical treatment.
	The defendant was interrogated three times in the 73 hours
before his confession-twice at the Chicago Heights police department
and once at the Chicago police department during a polygraph test.
He received Miranda warnings each time he was questioned. The
record contains preprinted forms with the warnings for each of the
two interrogations at the Chicago Heights police department. The
defendant initialed both forms next to each of the five warnings and
signed both forms at the bottom to indicate that he understood his
rights. Sergeant Miller testified that prior to leaving for the polygraph
examination, he asked the defendant "if he understood what we were
doing and that we were going to the Chicago Police Department for
[a] polygraph exam. And he said he knew that and he wanted to go."
According to the polygraph examiner, the defendant signed a
"polygraph subject consent form," which included Miranda warnings
as well as a statement that the test was voluntary.
	The first interrogation, immediately after the defendant's arrest
on July 13, 1999, was the longest; it lasted more than four hours. The
record does not indicate how long the polygraph test lasted. The third
interrogation lasted approximately 20 minutes, until the defendant
confessed. Detective Lueser reduced the defendant's inculpatory
statement to writing. The preprinted statement form asked, "Was this
statement made of your own free will and not through fear, through
inducements or promises of reward of any kind?" The defendant
wrote, "Yes."
	The defendant never indicated that he was mistreated physically
or psychologically. He never complained about not receiving food or
drink, and he told Assistant State's Attorney Jason Danielian that the
police provided him food, drink, and cigarettes. The defendant also
told Danielian that he had slept in the lockup and that he had no
complaints other than a chronically stiff back. According to Danielian,
the defendant provided an explanation regarding his decision to
confess:
		"His transformation, if you will, from his lack of veracity
about the incident which he characterized as not being
truthful about the incident to his truthfulness was a result of
him undergoing a sense of feeling guilty about not being
honest about what had-what he had done and how he had
approached the detectives about what had happened."
	The police had probable cause to arrest the defendant, and his
detention was initially legal. After 48 hours, it violated Gerstein and
McLaughlin. Sergeant Bohlen testified that officers were attempting
to locate Lawson and Broadnex to satisfy the demands of the State's
Attorney's Felony Review Unit: "The process with the Felony Review
Unit is if you have two people that say a certain person committed a
crime, you just conduct a physical line-up." Bohlen's explanation does
not excuse or justify the delay (see Kyle v. Patterson, 957 F. Supp. 1031, 1034 (N.D. Ill. 1997)), but it does indicate that the police were
more engaged in the investigation than the appellate court's charges
of "studied indifference to defendant's jail cell presence" and "wilful
disregard of McLaughlin" (344 Ill. App. 3d at 887) would indicate.
	As we were in House, we are again troubled by the delay in
presenting the defendant before a judge for a probable cause
determination. We agree with the State and advise police that an
extraordinarily long delay which itself raises the inference of police
misconduct could, at some point, render any confession involuntary.
See White, 117 Ill. 2d  at 224 ("a long and illegal detention may in
itself impel the defendant to confess"); Manning, 243 Mich. App. at
643, 624 N.W.2d  at 759 ("The longer the delay, the greater the
probability that the confession will be held involuntary. At some point,
a delay will become so long that it alone is enough to make a
confession involuntary"). This case approaches, but does not cross,
that line.

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons that we have discussed, the judgment of the
appellate court is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed.

Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
1. The McNabb-Mallory rule derives from two United States 
Supreme Court cases: McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 87 L. Ed. 819, 63 S. Ct. 608 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1479, 77 S. Ct. 1356 (1957). In these cases, the Court held that a defendant's right to a 
prompt arraignment should be enforced by a strict exclusionary rule, barring the 
prosecution from offering into evidence any inculpatory statement obtained 
during an unnecessary postarrest delay, regardless of whether the statement was 
involuntary. Congress undermined the McNabb-Mallory rule in 1968 when it enacted 
18 U.S.C. §3501, which used voluntariness as the real gauge of admissibility.

We have uniformly rejected the McNabb-Mallory rule. See, e.g., People v. Howell, 
60 Ill. 2d 117, 122 (1975); People v. Brooks, 51 Ill. 2d 156, 165 (1972); People 
v. Nicholls, 44 Ill. 2d 533, 538 (1970); People v. Kees, 32 Ill. 2d 299 (1965); 
People v. Reader, 26 Ill. 2d 210 (1962); People v. Melquist, 26 Ill. 2d 22 
(1962).
2. People v. Nicholas, 351 Ill. App. 3d 433 (2004), 
and People v. Mitchell, 354 Ill. App. 3d 396 (2004), which track the analysis of 
the appellate court opinion here, are overruled to the extent that they employ 
any analysis except voluntariness in evaluating the admissibility of confessions 
obtained during an unreasonably long delay.