Title: STATE v MALDONADO
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13883
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 11, 1978

No. 13883 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- JOHNNY MALDONADO, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial, District, Honorable Robert Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Johnny Maldonado, Pro Se, Deer Lodge, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana Submitted on briefs R R i 2 1978 Filed: - Submitted: November 15, 1977 Decided: 1 2 , 9 7 8 - M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. ~ e f e n d a n t , ~ o h n n y J o e Maldonado, appeals from an order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court, Yellowstone County, denying h i s p e t i t i o n f o r post-conviction r e l i e f . O n September 11, 1970, defendant entered a g u i l t y p l e a t o a charge of second degree a s s a u l t , a felony under s e c t i o n s 94-602(5) and 94-114, R.C.M. 1947. The d i s t r i c t judge deferred imposition of sentence f o r a period of t h r e e years. O n August 25, 1971, t h e S t a t e f i l e d a p e t i t i o n t o revoke defendant's d e f e r r e d imposition of sentence, a l l e g i n g t h a t during t h e period of h i s probation, defendant had been charged with t h e crime of receiving s t o l e n property, had l e f t t h e s t a t e and absconded from supervision, and had f a i l e d t o r e p o r t t o h i s probation o f f i c e r as required. A t t h e September 22, 1971, hearing on t h e p e t i t i o n t o revoke, defendant admitted t h e second and t h i r d a l l e g a t i o n s i n t h e p e t i t i o n , b u t denied he had been charged with receiving s t o l e n property. The D i s t r i c t Court ordered t h a t t h e t e r m s of t h e deferred imposition of sentence remain i n e f f e c t , except t h a t defendant was required t o s e r v e s i x months i n t h e county j a i l on a work-release program. The c o u r t order was modified on November 29, 1971, t o provide t h a t defendant s e r v e only weekends i n j a i l . O n December 8, 1972, t h e S t a t e f i l e d a second p e t i t i o n t o revoke defendant's deferred imposition of sentence, a l l e g i n g defendant committed t h e offenses of burglary and criminal possession of dangerous drugs on October 25, 1972. A t t h e revocation hearing held on January 25, 1973, t h e S t a t e presented evidence t h a t when p o l i c e responded t o a burglary alarm a t a l o c a l hardware s t o r e a t about 2:00 a.m., October 25, 1972, defendant w a s found i n s i d e t h e s t o r e with another i n d i v i d u a l , near a gun c a s e which was broken and s e v e r a l guns removed. Upon receiving t h i s evidence a t t h e January 25, 1973, revocation hearing, t h e D i s t r i c t Court revoked t h e o r i g i n a l l y deferred imposition of sentence on t h e second degree a s s a u l t conviction, and sentenced defend- a n t t o f i v e years and n i n e months i n t h e Montana s t a t e prison. O n J u l y 25, 1975, a f t e r serving approximately one-half of h i s sentence on t h e second degree a s s a u l t charge, defendant was paroled. While s t i l l on parole, on A p r i l 4 , 1976, a B i l l i n g s p o l i c e o f f i c e r a r r e s t e d defendant i n a l o c a l bar on a charge of carrying a concealed weapon. The D i s t r i c t Court granted t h e Yellowstone County a t t o r n e y leave t o f i l e an Information, charging defendant with carrying a concealed weapon w i t h i n t h e c i t y l i m i t s of B i l l i n g s , Montana, i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 94-8-210, R.C.M. 1947. The county a t t o r n e y f i l e d a n o t i c e t o i n c r e a s e punishment pursuant t o s e c t i o n 95-1506, R.C.M. 1947, a l l e g i n g defendant was a p r i o r convicted f e l o n under s e c t i o n 95-1507, R.C.M. 1947, due t o h i s previous conviction f o r second degree a s s a u l t . I n h i s a f f i d a v i t i n support of t h e Information charging defendant with carrying a concealed weapon, t h e deputy county a t t o r n e y a l l e g e d t h a t a t approximately 12:30 a.m., A p r i l 4 , 1976, O f f i c e r Hatfield of t h e B i l l i n g s P o l i c e Department was flagged down by an anonymous person and informed t h a t defendant was i n s i d e t h e Empire Bar i n B i l l i n g s , carrying a concealed weapon. A f f i a n t s t a t e d O f f i c e r H a t f i e l d and O f f i c e r Trimbo entered t h e bar and observed defendant; upon searching defendant t h e o f f i c e r s discovered and seized a .38 c a l i b e r Smith & Wesson p i s t o l with a two inch b a r r e l , which defendant was c a r r y i n g i n a shoulder h o l s t e r concealed by h i s brown l e a t h e r jacket. These f a c t s a l l e g e d i n t h e a f f i d a v i t w e r e l a r g e l y corroborated by defendant himself a t h i s arraignment on t h e concealed weapon charge. Defendant admitted he was carrying a concealed and loaded .38 c a l i b e r Smith & Wesson revolver i n a shoulder h o l s t e r while he was i n t h e Empire Bar. Defendant s t a t e d t h a t he understood he was s u b j e c t , a s a p e r s i s t e n t felony offender, t o increased punishment up t o 100 years imprisonment. Defendant pleaded g u i l t y and t h e D i s t r i c t Court sentenced defendant t o s e r v e twenty years i n t h e s t a t e prison. O n October 1 2 , 1976, defendant f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r post-conviction r e l i e f , pursuant t o s e c t i o n 95-2601, R.C.M. 1947, i n D i s t r i c t Court, Yellowstone County. Defendant r a i s e s t h e following i s s u e s on h i s appeal from t h e D i s t r i c t Court's A p r i l 26, 1977, order denying post-conviction r e l i e f : 1. Did s e c t i o n 95-1507, R.C.M. 1947, t h e p e r s i s t e n t felony offender s t a t u t e , as applied t o defendant, v i o l a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l safeguards dealing with ex p o s t f a c t o laws and equal protection? 2. Is s e c t i o n 95-1507 u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under A r t i c l e 11, Section 28, 1972 Montana Constitution? 3 . Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n revoking defendant's deferred imposition of sentence on t h e second degree a s s a u l t conviction? 4. Did t h e c o u r t ' s mistaken b e l i e f i n sentencing t h a t defendant had entered h i s g u i l t y p l e a t o t h e second degree a s s a u l t charge on January 25, 1973 r a t h e r than on September 11, 1970, c o n s t i t u t e r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r ? 5. Was s e c t i o n 94-8-210, R.C.M. 1947, as i n e f f e c t when defendant committed t h e crime of carrying a concealed weapon, an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague s t a t u t e ? 6. Was defendant s u f f i c i e n t l y informed, p r i o r t o e n t e r i n g h i s p l e a , of t h e p o s s i b l e sentences he could re- c e i v e a s a p e r s i s t e n t felony offender upon conviction of carrying a concealed weapon? 7. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n finding t h a t defendant was n o t denied e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel? 8. W a s t h e twenty year sentence defendant received s o excessive and d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o t h e offense a s t o c o n s t i - t u t e c r u e l and unusual punishment? O n September 11, 1970, when defendant plead g u i l t y t o second degree a s s a u l t , a felony, Montana's p e r s i s t e n t felony offender s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 94-4713, R.C.M. 1947, allowed a d i s t r i c t judge t o sentence a defendant t o a maximum sentence of t e n y e a r s imprisonment f o r a subsequent felony conviction of carrying a concealed weapon. Section 94-4713, was repealed by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n 1973 and replaced with t h e p r e s e n t s e c t i o n 95-1507. Defendant committed t h e carrying of a concealed weapon o f f e n s e on A p r i l 4 , 1976, when s e c t i o n 95- 1507, was i n e f f e c t . The D i s t r i c t Court judge sentenced defendant t o twenty y e a r s i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n a s a p e r s i s t e n t felony offender under s e c t i o n 95-1507. Under s e c t i o n 95- 1 5 0 7 ( 2 ) , t h e maximum penalty f o r conviction of t h e felony of carrying a concealed weapon, f o r one who has "previously been convicted of a felony" is 100 years i n t h e s t a t e prison. Defendant a l l e g e s t h a t , because t h e felony second degree a s s a u l t conviction occurred p r i o r t o t h e enactment of s e c t i o n 95-1507, t h e D i s t r i c t Court's use of t h e a s s a u l t conviction t o i n c r e a s e punishment under s e c t i o n 95-1507 on t h e felony of carrying a concealed weapon charge c o n s t i t u t e d an ex p o s t f a c t o law. Defendant contends he could be c o n s t i - t u t i o n a l l y sentenced only under s e c t i o n 94-4713, t h e p e r s i s t e n t felony offender s t a t u t e i n e f f e c t when he committed t h e second degree a s s a u l t . Defendant misconstrues t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n s a g a i n s t ex p o s t f a c t o laws. Both t h e United S t a t e s and Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n s p r o h i b i t t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e from passing ex p o s t f a c t o laws. A r t i c l e I, Section 10, United S t a t e s . Constitution; A r t i c l e 11, Section 31, 1972 Montana Constitution. Ex p o s t f a c t o laws a r e prohibited on t h e theory no one should be punished f o r conduct which t h e law d i d n o t g i v e him advance warning was criminal. Section 95-1507, was enacted i n 1973 p r i o r t o defendant's commission of t h e carrying a concealed weapon felony i n 1976. The law d i d n o t punish defendant f o r p a s t conduct, b u t merely n o t i - f i e d defendant he was s u b j e c t t o increased punishment, i f he i n t h e f u t u r e committed an a d d i t i o n a l felony crime. I n r e j e c t i n g a claim s i m i l a r t o defendant's, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court s t a t e d : "Nor do we t h i n k t h e f a c t t h a t one of t h e convictions t h a t entered i n t o t h e calcula- t i o n s by which p e t i t i o n e r became a f o u r t h offender occurred before t h e Act w a s passed, makes t h e Act i n v a l i d l y r e t r o a c t i v e * * * . The sentence a s a * * * h a b i t u a l criminal is n o t t o be viewed as e i t h e r a new jeopardy o r a d d i t i o n a l penalty f o r t h e e a r l i e r crimes. It i s a s t i f f e n e d penalty f o r t h e l a t e s t crime, which i s considered t o be an aggravated of- fense because a r e p e t i t i v e one." Gryger v. Burke, (1948), 334 U.S. 728, 732, 68 S.Ct. 1256, 92 L.ed. 1683. See a l s o : McDonald v. Massachusetts, (1901), 180 U.S. 311, Defendant contends s e c t i o n 95-1507 v i o l a t e s t h e equal p r o t e c t i o n and due process c l a u s e s of t h e Fourteenth Amendment because only a minority of r e p e a t felony offenders a r e prosecuted under t h e p e r s i s t e n t felony offender s t a t u t e . Defendant a l l e g e s t h a t s e c t i o n 95-1507 i s i n general uncon- s t i t u t i o n a l l y s e l e c t i v e l y applied, and w a s s e l e c t i v e l y applied i n t h e i n s t a n t case, due t o t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s animosity toward defendant and defendant's counsel. Nothing i n t h e record supports defendant's a s s e r t i o n t h a t he w a s singled o u t f o r p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y p r o s e c u t i o n d u e t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s f e e l i n g s of personal enmity. Nor does a showing of s e l e c t i v e enforcement of a criminal law, without more, c o n s t i t u t e a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n . " * * * t h e conscious e x e r c i s e of some s e l e c t i v i t y i n enforcement is n o t i n i t s e l f a f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n " absent an a l l e g a t i o n and showing t h a t " * * * t h e s e l e c t i o n w a s d e l i b e r a t e l y based upon an u n j u s t i f i a b l e standard such a s r a c e , r e l i g i o n , o r o t h e r a r b i t r a r y c l a s s i f i c a t i o n * * *" such a s sex, o r t h e e x e r c i s e of t h e F i r s t Amendment r i g h t t o f r e e speech. Oyler v. Boles, (1962), 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7 L ed 2d 446, 453. Defendant next claims t h a t , because s e c t i o n 95-1507 s u b j e c t s r e p e a t felony offenders t o p o t e n t i a l l y s t i f f e r sentences than f i r s t time felony offenders, t h e law v i o l a t e s t h a t p o r t i o n of A r t i c l e 11, Section 28, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , which provides t h a t " F u l l r i g h t s a r e r e s t o r e d by termination of s t a t e supervision f o r any offense a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e . " The success of defendant's argument n e c e s s a r i l y depends upon whether t h e r e f e r e n c e i n A r t i c l e 11, Section 28, t o " f u l l r i g h t s " includes a " r i g h t " of a p r i o r felony offender t o n o t have h i s p r i o r o f f e n s e considered, when sentencing him on a subsequent felony. The t r a n s c r i p t of proceedings of t h e Montana c o n s t i t u t i o n a l convention c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h e Committee of t h e whole, i n recommending t h e A r t i c l e 11, Section 28 c l a u s e on r e s t o r a - t i o n of f u l l p r i s o n e r ' s r i g h t s , w a s concerned t h a t no o b s t a c l e s prevent t h e ex-convict from becoming a contributing and p a r t i c i p a t i n g member of t h e community. Speaking on behalf of t h e committee, one delegate s t a t e d t h a t t h e ex-prisoner, no longer under s t a t e supervision, " * * * should be e n t i t l e d t o t h e r e s t o r a t i o n of a l l c i v i l and p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s , including t h e r i g h t t o vote, hold o f f i c e , and e n t e r occupations which r e q u i r e s t a t e licensing." Vol. 7, Const. Convention Transcript 5550 (remarks of Delegate James). A main concern of t h e delegates was t h a t ex-convicts n o t automatically be precluded from p r a c t i c i n g state-licensed professions. Vol. 7, Const. Convention Transcript 5624-26 (remarks of Delegates Habedank and Campbell). See also: M i l l e r v. Carter, (7th C i r . 1977), 547 F.2d 1314, 1328-29, a f f ' d . (1978), U.S. , 98 S.Ct. 786, 54 L ed 2d 603. The " f u l l r i g h t s " language of A r t i c l e 11, Section 28 does n o t include a " r i g h t " t o be sentenced f o r a felony without regard t o p r i o r felony convictions. Having a p r i o r felony conviction with t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r increasing punish- ment on a subsequent felony conviction does not hamper r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of t h e ex-convict o r diminish h i s c i v i l o r p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s . I f t h e ex-convict obeys t h e l a w , a s a l l c i t i z e n s a r e required t o do, f o r f i v e years subsequent t o h i s felony conviction o r r e l e a s e from prison, t h e p r i o r felony may n o t be used t o increase punishment under s e c t i o n 95-1507 f o r a subsequent felony. Rather than involving any c i v i l o r p o l i t i c a l " r i g h t " , increasing t h e sentence of a p e r s i s t e n t felony offender i s e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t with t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l mandate t h a t "Laws f o r t h e punishment of crime s h a l l be founded on t h e p r i n c i p l e s of prevention and reformation.* * *" A r t i c l e 11, Section 28, 1972 Montana Constitution. "* * * P e r s i s t e n c e i n crime and f a i l u r e of e a r l i e r d i s c i p l i n e e f f e c t i v e l y t o d e t e r o r reform j u s t i f y more d r a s t i c treatment. * * * For t h e determination of sentences, j u s t i c e generally r e q u i r e s consideration of more than t h e p a r t i c u l a r a c t s by which t h e crime was committed and t h a t t h e r e be taken i n t o account t h e circumstances of t h e o f f e n s e together with t h e c h a r a c t e r and p r o p e n s i t i e s of t h e offender. H i s p a s t may be taken t o i n d i c a t e h i s p r e s e n t purposes and tendencies and s i g n i f i c a n t l y t o suggest t h e period of r e s t r a i n t and t h e kind of d i s c i p l i n e t h a t ought t o be imposed upon him." Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, (1937), 302 U.S. 51, 54-55, 58 S.Ct. 59, 82 L.ed. 43. Defendant a l s o a s s e r t s t h a t no proper cause was shown t o revoke t h e deferred imposition on t h e second degree a s s a u l t charge, and t h e a s s a u l t conviction could t h e r e f o r e n o t be considered a s a p r i o r felony t o i n c r e a s e h i s punish- ment on t h e carrying a concealed weapon charge. The f a c t s adduced a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court hearing on t h e S t a t e ' s second p e t i t i o n t o revoke t h e deferred sentence show t h a t on October 25, 1972, a t 2:00 a . m . , t h e p o l i c e apprehended defendant and another i n d i v i d u a l i n s i d e a hardware s t o r e , where a gun case was broken and s e v e r a l guns removed. The D i s t r i c t Court had ample cause t o revoke t h e deferred imposi- t i o n of sentence. Defendant i s n o t c o r r e c t i n h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court had no a u t h o r i t y a f t e r t h e f i r s t revocation hearing t o impose a j a i l term a s an a d d i t i o n a l condition of h i s continued deferred imposition of sentence. Defendant contends t h i s Court's holding i n S t a t e v. Drew, (1971), 158 Mont. 2 1 4 , 490 P.2d 230, e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t a t e r m i n j a i l may never be imposed a s a condition of a d e f e r r e d sentence. However, t h i s Court i n D r e w merely s t a t e d t h a t a t r i a l judge may n o t a c t u a l l y impose a sentence and d e f e r t h e imposition of p a r t of t h a t sentence. The d i s t r i c t judge may, however, d e f e r imposition of sentence and make a j a i l t e r m a condi- t i o n of probation. " * * * There i s a v a l i d d i s t i n c t i o n under t h e law i n granting a deferred imposition upon conditions, r a t h e r than imposing a j a i l sentence with conditions." S t a t e ex rel. Woodbury v. District Court, (1972), 159 Mont. 128, 136, 495 P.2d 1119. See a l s o : S t a t e v. Thorsness, (1974), 165 Mont. 321, 528 P.2d 692. Defendant next contends t h a t h i s p e r s i s t e n t felony offender sentence is i n v a l i d because t h e d i s t r i c t judge sentenced him under t h e misapprehension t h a t defendant plead g u i l t y on January 25, 1973, t o second degree a s s a u l t . Defendant d i d , however, on September 11, 1970, plead g u i l t y t o second degree a s s a u l t . Although defendant emphasizes t h a t he d i d not on January 25, 1973, plead g u i l t y t o a burglary charge, t h e f a c t t h a t he was found by p o l i c e a t 2:00 a.m. i n a hardware s t o r e where t h e burglar alarm had sounded and guns had been removed from a broken d i s p l a y case, w a s s u f f i c i e n t cause t o revoke defendant's d e f e r r e d sentence on t h e second degree a s s a u l t conviction and was v a l i d l y used t o i n c r e a s e defendant's punishment f o r h i s subsequent felony conviction. Defendant a l s o asserts t h a t s e c t i o n 94-8-210 t h e carrying a concealed weapon s t a t u t e a s i n e f f e c t when he committed t h e crime, gave prosecutors d i s c r e t i o n t o charge t h e t r a n s a c t i o n a s a felony o r a misdemeanor, gave no judi- c i a l g u i d e l i n e s as t o when t h e charges should be felony o r misdemeanor, and t h e r e f o r e , was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague. Defendants c i t e s Olsen v. Delmore, (1956), 48 ~ a s h . 2 d 545, 295 P.2d 324, 325, and S t a t e v. Pirkey, (1955), 203 O r . 697, 281 P.2d 698, where t h e Supreme Courts of both washington and Oregon declared u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t u t e s which d i d n o t d i s t i n g u i s h when i d e n t i c a l conduct should be charged by prosecutors as f e l o n i e s o r misdemeanors. I n 1976 when defendant was charged a s a p e r s i s t e n t felony offender, s e c t i o n 94-8-210 provided t h a t a person convicted of carrying a concealed weapon " * * * s h a l l be punished by a f i n e n o t exceeding f i v e hundred d o l l a r s o r by imprisonment i n t h e county j a i l f o r a period not exceeding s i x months, o r by both such f i n e and imprisonment, o r may be punished by imprisonment i n t h e s t a t e p e n i t e n t i a r y f o r a period n o t exceeding f i v e years." Defendant contends t h a t because t h e same o f f e n s e may be punished a s e i t h e r a felony o r a misdemeanor, t h e r u l e and r a t i o n a l e of Olsen, Pirkey and s i m i l a r cases r e q u i r e t h i s Court t o r u l e t h a t s e c t i o n 94-8-210 i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . The defendant i n Olsen was convicted under a carrying a concealed weapon s t a t u t e which contained a penalty c l a u s e worded very s i m i l a r l y t o t h e penalty c l a u s e of s e c t i o n 94-8- 210. The crime i n Olsen was "* * * punishable by a f i n e of n o t more than f i v e hundred d o l l a r s o r imprisonment i n t h e county j a i l f o r n o t more than one year o r both, - o r by imprisonment i n t h e p e n i t e n t i a r y f o r n o t less than one year nor more than t e n years." Olsen v. Delmore, 295 P.2d 325. I n Washington, t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of a crime a s a felony o r a misdemeanor was dependent upon t h e p o t e n t i a l punishment, and n o t upon t h e punishment which t h e offender a c t u a l l y received upon conviction. C r i m e s punishable by d e a t h o r imprisonment i n t h e s t a t e p e n i t e n t i a r y were f e l o n i e s ; crimes punishable by f i n e s of l e s s than $250, O r by imprisonment i n a county j a i l f o r n o t more than ninety days, were misdemeanors. The v i c e of t h e s t a t u t e i n Olsen, and of a s i m i l a r s t a t u t e i n Pirkey, was t h a t it authorized prosecuting o f f i c i a l s t o charge i d e n t i c a l conduct by d i f f e r e n t persons a s e i t h e r a felony o r a misdemeanor. This unbridled p r o s e c u t o r i a l d i s c r e t i o n v i o l a t e s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantee of equal p r o t e c t i o n of t h e laws. "* * * t h e s t a t u t e i t s e l f f u r n i s h e s no c r i t e r i o n by which t o determine when an accused i s t o be charged with felony, and when with a misdemeanor * * *." (Emphasis added.) S t a t e v. Pirkey, 281 P.2d 702. Although t h e s e c t i o n 94-8-210 penalty c l a u s e i n e f f e c t when defendant committed t h e crime was worded s i m i l a r l y t o t h e Washington s t a t u t e i n Olsen, Montana's law does n o t s u f f e r from t h e same c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f i r m i t y . I n Montana, t h e d i s c r e t i o n t o c l a s s i f y an offense a s a felony o r a misdemeanor belongs t o t h e sentencing c o u r t and n o t t o t h e prosecuting o f f i c i a l . Except f o r t h e l i m i t e d j u r i s d i c t i o n a l and s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n purposes of s e c t i o n 94-1-105, R.C.M. 1947, t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of an o f f e n s e a s a felony o r a s a misdemeanor depends e n t i r e l y upon t h e a c t u a l sentence imposed by t h e t r i a l c o u r t upon conviction. Section 94-2-101 (15) ( 3 1 ) , i n 1975, read: " ( 1 5 ) 'Felony' means a n offense i n which - t h e sentence imposed upon conviction i s d e a t h o r imprisonment i n t h e s t a t e prison f o r any t e r m exceeding one (1) year." (Emphasis added. ) " ( 3 1 ) 'Misdemeanor' means an o f f e n s e i n which t h e sentence imposed upon conviction is imprisonment i n t h e county j a i l f o r any term, - o r f i n e , o r both, o r t h e sentence imposed is imprisonment i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r any term of one year o r l e s s . " (Emphasis added.) Where t h e power t o c l a s s i f y a crime a s a felony o r a misdemeanor i s given t o t h e judge, through t h e sentence he imposes, r a t h e r than t o t h e prosecutor, t h e r e i s no equal p r o t e c t i o n v i o l a t i o n . Gibson v. D e l l , ( 9 t h C i r . 1971), 443 F.2d 75. See: Daloia v. Rhay ( 9 t h C i r . 1958), 252 F.2d 768, 770. The r a t i o n a l e f o r t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n was set f o r t h by M r . J u s t i c e Black i n h i s d i s s e n t i n Berra v. United S t a t e s , (1956), 351 U.S. 131, 1 4 0 , 76 S.Ct. 685, 100 L.ed. 1013: " * * * O f course it i s t r u e t h a t under our system Congress may v e s t t h e judge and jury with broad power t o say how much punishment s h a l l be imposed f o r a p a r t i c u l a r offense. But it i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t t o v e s t such powers i n a prosecuting attorney. A judge and jury a c t under procedural r u l e s c a r e f u l l y pre- scribed t o p r o t e c t t h e l i b e r t y of t h e i n d i - vidual. Their judgments and v e r d i c t s are reached a f t e r a public t r i a l i n which a defend- a n t has t h e r i g h t t o be represented by an attorney. N o such p r o t e c t i o n s a r e thrown around d e c i s i o n s by a prosecuting attorney." * *" 351 U.S. 140. Nor w a s t h e s t a t u t e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague because t h e judge could sentence t h e offense a s e i t h e r a felony o r a misdemeanor, without s t a t u t o r y g u i d e l i n e s a s t o when each grade of sentence should be imposed. One of t h e purposes of t h e 1973 Montana Criminal Code was t o v e s t wide sentencing d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e t r i a l judge who i s f a m i l i a r with t h e c h a r a c t e r and p a s t record of t h e defendant, and with t h e circumstances of t h e p a r t i c u l a r case. Although t h e penalty provision of t h e carrying a concealed weapon s t a t u t e , a s it was i n e f f e c t when defendant committed t h e crime, was not a r t f u l l y phrased, it meant no more than t h a t one found g u i l t y of t h e s e c t i o n could be sentenced t o imprisonment i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r a term not t o exceed f i v e years. The sentencing c l a u s e , t h e r e f o r e , was no d i f f e r e n t from o t h e r s e c t i o n s of t h e criminal code which likewise v e s t t h e - sentencing judge with t h e d i s c r e t i o n t o impose a misdemeanor o r a felony sentence, a s t h e circumstances of t h e case warrant. See, e.g., s e c t i o n 94-6-104, R.C.M. 1947 (arson sentence n o t t o exceed twenty years imprisonment); s e c t i o n 94-6-204, R.C.M. 1947 (burglary sentence n o t t o exceed t e n years imprisonment); s e c t i o n 94-7-202, R.C.M. 1947 ( p e r j u r y sentence n o t t o exceed t e n years imprisonment). Defendant contends he w a s n o t informed t h a t , upon conviction of c a r r y i n g a concealed weapon, he might have received a misdemeanor r a t h e r than a felony sentence. Defendant a s s e r t s had he r e a l i z e d t h a t he might have been convicted of only a misdemeanor, he would have stood t r i a l r a t h e r than plead g u i l t y . To be v a l i d , defendant's g u i l t y p l e a must have been entered v o l u n t a r i l y and understandingly. Boykin v. Alabama, (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L ed 2d 274; S t a t e v. Doty, (1977), Mont. , 566 P.2d 1388, 1391, 34 St.Rep. 731. A p l e a of g u i l t y is i n v a l i d as n o t having been understandingly entered i f t h e defendant was n o t informed of t h e maximum p o t e n t i a l penalty upon conviction. Tucker v. United S t a t e s , ( 5 t h C i r . 1969), 409 F.2d 1291, 1295. I n t h i s case, defendant was properly informed of t h e maximum p o t e n t i a l sentence upon a g u i l t y plea. A g u i l t y p l e a i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y i n v a l i d i f a defendant is n o t informed of minimum p e n a l t i e s upon conviction. Defendant misconstrues Montana law when he s t a t e s t h a t he d i d n o t r e a l i z e he might have been convicted of a misdemeanor r a t h e r than a felony. Defendant could have been convicted a t t r i a l i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court only of t h e offense of carrying a concealed weapon. A s previously discussed, t h e offense assumes t h e c h a r a c t e r of misdemeanor o r felony only a f t e r t h e judge has imposed sentence. A conviction a f t e r t r i a l o r a conviction due t o a g u i l t y p l e a t h e r e f o r e had no e f f e c t upon whether t h e o f f e n s e would subsequently be c l a s s i f i e d a s a misdemeanor o r a felony, and t h e f a i l u r e t o inform defendant of t h e minimum sentence d i d n o t a f f e c t t h e voluntariness of h i s g u i l t y plea. Defendant next a l l e g e s he was denied e f f e c t i v e a s s i s - tance of counsel when he entered h i s p l e a of g u i l t y t o t h e charge of carrying a concealed weapon. This Court has s t a t e d t h e standard f o r evaluating an inadequacy of counsel claim i s t h e " f a r c e and sham t e s t " . S t a t e v . McElveen, (1975), 168 Mont. 500, 504, 544 P.2d 820; S t a t e v. M i l l e r , (1977) I Mont. , 568 P.2d 130, 34 St.Rep. 838. I n explaining t h e s p e c i f i c s of t h i s test, t h i s Court has held t h a t t o render e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e within t h e requirements of t h e S i x t h Amendment, United S t a t e s Consti- t u t i o n , and A r t i c l e 11, Section 24, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , counsel must attempt t o "discover a l l t h e f a c t s and circum- stances of t h e crime" through "thorough i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h e persons and events involved i n t h e crime." S t a t e v. McElveen, 168 Mont. 506. The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by counsel must a l s o include adequate preparation and conference with h i s c l i e n t . S t a t e v. McElveen, 168 Mont. 504, quoting Williams v. Beto, ( 5 t h C i r . 1965), 354 F.2d 698, 704. Adequate conference with t h e c l i e n t includes advising t h e c l i e n t of h i s r i g h t s and e l i c i t i n g from t h e c l i e n t a l l m a t t e r s of defense, o r a s c e r t a i n i n g t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s no defense. See: Coles v. Peyton, ( 4 t h C i r . 1968), 389 F.2d 2 2 4 , 226, cert.den., 393 U.S. 849, 89 S.Ct. 80, 2 1 L ed 2d120 (1968). Defendant claims t h a t counsel was i n e f f e c t i v e because counsel d i d not attempt t o suppress t h e evidence obtained i n a search of defendant, because counsel d i d n o t make any i n v e s t i g a t i o n t o determine t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e concealed weapons s t a t u t e , and because counsel made no i n v e s t i g a t i o n a s t o why defendant was carrying a concealed weapon. The d e c i s i o n s of whether t o challenge t h e c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l i t y of a s t a t u t e o r t o move t o suppress evidence a r e matters of l e g a l judgment. I n t h i s c a s e , we hold t h e c a r r y i n g a concealed weapon s t a t u t e was c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . Defendant's attorney s t a t e d i n an a f f i d a v i t t h a t defendant had explained t h a t t h e p o l i c e had a u t h o r i t y t o search defendant a s a condition of defendant's parole on t h e second degree a s s a u l t charge. Defendant claims he had no criminal i n t e n t because t h e reason he w a s carrying a concealed weapon was t o p r o t e c t himself from a t t a c k i n t h e bar t h a t he w a s i n . Concealing a p i s t o l o r revolver on h i s person within t h e c i t y l i m i t s , however, was s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o convict under s e c t i o n 94-8-210. The reasons f o r defendant's concealing t h e weapon were i n t h i s case i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e of criminal i n t e n t , though those reasons might have been a r e l e v a n t consideration i n sentencing. Defendant's counsel, i n an a f f i d a v i t , swore t h a t he consulted with defendant a s t o the f a c t s of t h e case and p o s s i b l e defenses, arranged t o take statements from prospec- t i v e witnesses, had conversations with various persons involved i n t h e case, considered and r e j e c t e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of submitting a motion t o suppress, determined t h a t t h e r e w a s no sound defense, and f i n a l l y advised defendant t h e r e was almost no chance of success a t t r i a l . Defense counsel then plea bargained with t h e county attorney and advised defendant t o e n t e r a g u i l t y plea i n exchange f o r a prosecu- t i o n request f o r a twenty year sentence. Subsequent t o sentencing, defendant's attorney made a motion t o vacate t h e twenty year sentence, supported by a memorandum of law. The representation of defendant by h i s attorney was e f f e c t i v e within t h e standards set f o r t h i n S t a t e v. McElveen, supra. The f i n a l contention of defendant i s t h a t t h e twenty year sentence he received was c r u e l and unusual punishment proscribed by t h e Eighth Amendment, United S t a t e s ~ o n s t i t u t i o n , and by A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 22, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . Defendant contends t h e sentence i s excessive and d i s p r o - p o r t i o n a t e t o t h e c r i m e of c a r r y i n g a concealed weapon, a crime which he a l l e g e s u s u a l l y b r i n g s only a f i n e , a s h o r t j a i l sentence, o r b o t h such f i n e and j a i l sentence. Defendant n o t e s t h a t t h e maximum sentence under s e c t i o n 94-8-210 f o r t h e o f f e n s e of c a r r y i n g a concealed weapon is f i v e y e a r s . Defendant misconstrues t h e o f f e n s e f o r which he was charged. Although he w a s a r r e s t e d and convicted of c a r r y i n g a concealed weapon, he w a s sentenced n o t a s a f i r s t - t i m e f e l o n y v i o l a t o r of t h e c r i m i n a l l a w s , b u t a s a p e r s i s t e n t felony offender. It i s i n d i s p u t a b l e t h a t a sentence, though it be w i t h i n t h e maximum sentence allowed by s t a t u t e , may be s o excessive and d i s p r o p r o t i o n a t e t o t h e circumstances of t h e o f f e n s e a s t o c o n s t i t u t e c r u e l and unusual punishment. Weems v. United S t a t e s , (1910), 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.ed. 793; O ' N e i l v . Vermont, (1892), 1 4 4 U.S. 323, 12 S.Ct. 693, 36 L.ed. 450 ( F i e l d , J., d i s s e n t i n g ) . " * * * t h e Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause * * * p r o s c r i b e s punishment g r o s s l y d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o t h e s e v e r i t y of t h e crime* * * ." Ingraham v . Wright, (1977), 430 U.S. 651, 667, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L ed 2d 711, 727, 728. Mindful of t h i s l i m i t a t i o n , w e n o t e , however " * * * t h e g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t a sentence w i t h i n t h e maximum a u t h o r i z e d by s t a t u t e is n o t c r u e l and unusual punishment." S t a t e v . i Karahthos, (1972), 158 Mont. 461, 468, 493 P.2d 326. C The twenty year sentence which defendant received was w e l l w i t h i n t h e one hundred year maximum sentence a u t h o r i z e d by s e c t i o n 95-1507, t h e p e r s i s t e n t felony o f f e n d e r s t a t u t e under which defendant was sentenced. The punishment proscribed was n o t g r o s s l y d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o t h e s e v e r i t y of t h e offense. Though the maximum penalty for the first felony offense of carrying a concealed weapon is five years imprison- ment, defendant had previously been convicted of another felony. Persistent felony offender statutes " * * * prescribe such penalties as may be deemed appropriate in view of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender, taking in view his past conduct * * * taking into considera- tion past offenses committed by the accused as a circumstance of aggravation * * * ." Carlesi v. New York, (1914), 233 u.S. 51, 59, 34 S.Ct. 576, 58 L.ed. 843, 849. In this case, defendant's previous felony conviction was for second degree assault, a violent crime against another human being. Defendant's second felony conviction was for carrying a concealed weapon in a shoulder holster concealed by a leather jacket. The concealed weapon was a .38 caliber pistol with a two inch barrel, a weapon which if used on another individual could likely cause serious bodily injury or death. Defendant committed the carrying a con- cealed weapon offense less than nine months after being paroled on the felony assault crime. Given these circum- stances, we cannot say the twenty year sentence was so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The order of the District Court denying defendant's petition for post-conviction relief is affirmed. We Concur: