Title: State v. Christopher S. Hoppe
Citation: 2009 WI 41
Docket Number: 2007AP000905-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 29, 2009

2009 WI 41 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP905-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Christopher S. Hoppe, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2008 WI App 89 
Reported at: 312 Wis. 2d 765, 754 N.W.2d 203 
(Ct. App. 2008-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 29, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 3, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert J. Kennedy and John R. Race   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Martha K. Askins, assistant state public 
defender, with whom on the briefs was Steven D. Grunder, 
assistant state public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Eileen 
W. Pray, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Michele M. LaVigne and 
Keith A. Findley, on behalf of the Frank J. Remington Center, 
and oral argument by Michele M. LaVinge. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 41
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.  2007AP905-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2002CF532) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Christopher S. Hoppe, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 29, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   The 
defendant, 
Christopher S. Hoppe, seeks review of a published decision of 
the court of appeals affirming a judgment convicting the 
defendant of 12 counts of possessing child pornography contrary 
to Wis. Stat. § 948.12(1m) and an order denying the defendant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.1  Judge Robert J. Kennedy of 
the Circuit Court for Walworth County entered the judgment of 
conviction; Judge John R. Race of the Circuit Court for Walworth 
                                                 
1 State v. Hoppe, 2008 WI App 89, 312 Wis. 2d 765, 754 
N.W.2d 203.  
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
2 
 
County entered the order denying the defendant's motion to 
withdraw the plea of guilty.2   
¶2 
The defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the 
ground that defects in the plea colloquy as well as factors 
extrinsic to the plea colloquy prevented him from entering his 
plea 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily. 
 
After 
conducting an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied the 
defendant's post-conviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
¶3 
The defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
effectively functions as a dual-purpose motion: a "Bangert 
motion" and a "Nelson/Bentley motion."3  The motion may be viewed 
                                                 
2 The judgment of conviction states that the defendant's 
offenses occurred on or around October 25, 2002.  On that date, 
Wis. Stat. § 948.12(1m) provided in relevant part as follows: 
Whoever possesses any undeveloped film, photographic 
negative, photograph, motion picture, videotape, or 
other recording of a child engaged in sexually 
explicit 
conduct 
under 
all 
of 
the 
following 
circumstances is guilty of a Class E felony: 
(a) The person knows that he or she possesses the 
material. 
(b) The person knows the character and content of the 
sexually explicit conduct in the material. 
(c) The person knows or reasonably should know that 
the child engaged in sexually explicit conduct has not 
attained the age of 18 years. 
3 See State v. Howell, 2007 WI 75, ¶¶73-74, 301 Wis. 2d 350, 
734 
N.W.2d 48 
(discussing 
dual-purpose 
Bangert 
and 
Nelson/Bentley motions); State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶42, 293 
Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906 (same). 
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
3 
 
as a Bangert motion insofar as it is based on defects in the 
plea colloquy and as a Nelson/Bentley motion insofar as it is 
based on factors extrinsic to the plea colloquy.4   The parties, 
the circuit court, and the court of appeals have properly 
treated the motion as two separate motions.  We do the same.   
¶4 
Two issues are presented for our review with respect 
to the defendant's Bangert motion:  
I. Is the plea colloquy deficient on its face so that 
the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing 
on the basis of his Bangert motion?  In other words, 
did the defendant's Bangert motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea make a prima facie showing of "a violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) or other court-mandated 
duties by pointing to passages or gaps in the plea 
hearing transcript"?5 
II. Is the defendant entitled to withdraw his guilty 
plea on the basis of his Bangert motion because the 
State failed to meet its burden of proving at the 
                                                                                                                                                             
A "Bangert motion" invokes the line of cases including 
State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).  A 
"Nelson/Bentley motion" invokes the line of cases including 
Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 195 N.W.2d 629 (1972), and 
State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).   
4 See Howell, 301 Wis. 2d 350, ¶74 ("The Bangert and 
Nelson/Bentley motions . . . are applicable to different factual 
circumstances.  A defendant invokes Bangert when the plea 
colloquy is defective; a defendant invokes Nelson/Bentley when 
the defendant alleges that some factor extrinsic to the plea 
colloquy, like ineffective assistance of counsel or coercion, 
renders a plea infirm."). 
5 Brown, 
293 
Wis. 2d 594, 
¶39 
(citing 
Bangert, 
131 
Wis. 2d at 274).  A Bangert motion must also allege that the 
defendant did not know or understand the information that should 
have been provided at the plea hearing.  No one disputes that 
the defendant's motion meets the second requirement imposed upon 
Bangert motions. 
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
4 
 
evidentiary hearing that the defendant entered a 
knowing, 
intelligent, 
and 
voluntary 
plea 
notwithstanding defects in the plea colloquy?  
¶5 
A third issue is presented for review with respect to 
the defendant's Nelson/Bentley motion:  
III. Is the defendant entitled to withdraw his guilty 
plea on the basis of his Nelson/Bentley motion because 
the defendant carried his burden at the evidentiary 
hearing of proving on the basis of factors extrinsic 
to the plea colloquy that the defendant did not enter 
a knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea?   
¶6 
The court of appeals answered all three questions in 
the negative and affirmed the order of the circuit court denying 
the defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea.   
¶7 
We conclude as follows:  
I. The plea colloquy is deficient on its face, and the 
defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on 
the basis of his Bangert motion. The defendant's 
Bangert motion to withdraw the guilty plea makes a 
prima facie showing "of a violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(1) or other court-mandated duties" at the 
plea hearing.6 
II. The defendant is not entitled to withdraw his 
guilty plea on the basis of his Bangert motion.  The 
State met its burden at the evidentiary hearing of 
proving 
that 
the 
defendant 
entered 
a 
knowing, 
intelligent, 
and 
voluntary 
plea 
notwithstanding 
defects in the plea colloquy.  
III. The defendant is not entitled to withdraw his 
guilty plea on the basis of his Nelson/Bentley motion. 
The defendant failed to carry his burden at the 
evidentiary hearing of proving on the basis of factors 
extrinsic to the plea colloquy that the defendant did 
not enter a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea.   
                                                 
6 Brown, 
293 
Wis. 2d 594, 
¶39 
(citing 
Bangert, 
131 
Wis. 2d at 274).  
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
5 
 
¶8 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals, although on different grounds. 
 
¶9 
We briefly summarize the facts relevant to the 
defendant's motions for plea withdrawal and provide additional 
facts later in the opinion discussing the plea colloquy.   
 
¶10 In a third amended information filed in July 2004, the 
State charged the defendant with two counts of first-degree 
sexual assault of a child contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1), 
one count of intentional physical abuse of a child contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 948.03(2)(b), 66 counts of possessing child 
pornography contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.12(1m), and one count 
of bail jumping contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.49(1)(b). 
 
¶11 The State and the defendant agreed that the defendant 
would plead guilty to 12 of the 66 counts of possessing child 
pornography; that all remaining charges, with the possible 
exception of the bail jumping charge,7 would be dismissed and 
read in for sentencing purposes; that the parties would request 
a presentence investigation; and that each side would be free to 
argue for any sentence at the sentencing hearing.  The circuit 
court accepted this plea agreement.   
 
¶12 The defendant was represented by two attorneys.  The 
defendant's lead counsel was an out-of-state attorney whom the 
circuit court permitted to appear in the matter pro hac vice.  
                                                 
7 The circuit court record is not clear about what became of 
the bail jumping charge.   
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
6 
 
The second attorney, whom we refer to as "local counsel" in this 
opinion, is a Wisconsin attorney.   
¶13 The 
circuit 
court 
held 
a 
sentencing 
hearing 
approximately three months later.  The defendant was sentenced 
to a total of 12 years' initial confinement, 18 years' extended 
supervision, 
and 
17 
years' 
probation, 
all 
to 
be 
served 
consecutively. 
¶14 The defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea.  The 
circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing, at which the 
defendant and his local trial counsel each testified.  After 
receiving supplemental briefs from the parties, the circuit 
court then denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea.  
¶15 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court partly 
on the ground that the plea colloquy was adequate under Bangert 
and partly on the ground that the evidence introduced at the 
evidentiary hearing, along with the circuit court's factual 
findings, demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to 
withdraw his guilty plea.8   
I 
¶16 We address the first issue on review, namely whether 
the defendant's Bangert motion to withdraw the guilty plea makes 
a prima facie showing "of a violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) 
                                                 
8 See Hoppe, 312 Wis. 2d 765, ¶¶9-34. 
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
7 
 
or other court-mandated duties by pointing to passages or gaps 
in the plea hearing transcript."9   
¶17 This court determines the sufficiency of the plea 
colloquy and the necessity of an evidentiary hearing, questions 
of law, independently of the circuit court and court of appeals 
but benefiting from their analyses.10 
¶18 This court recently summarized the mandatory duties, 
including the duties under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1),11 that a 
                                                 
9 Brown, 
293 
Wis. 2d 594, 
¶39 
(citing 
Bangert, 
131 
Wis. 2d at 274).  
10 See Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶21. 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08 (2007-08) provides in relevant 
part as follows: 
(1) Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or no 
contest, it shall do all of the following: 
(a) Address the defendant personally and determine 
that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding 
of the nature of the charge and the potential 
punishment if convicted. 
(b) Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the 
defendant in fact committed the crime charged. 
(c) Address the defendant personally and advise the 
defendant as follows: "If you are not a citizen of the 
United States of America, you are advised that a plea 
of guilty or no contest for the offense with which you 
are charged may result in deportation, the exclusion 
from admission to this country or the denial of 
naturalization, under federal law." 
(d) Inquire of the district attorney whether he or she 
has complied with s. 971.095(2). 
(2) If a court fails to advise a defendant as required 
by sub. (1) (c) and a defendant later shows that the 
plea 
is 
likely 
to 
result 
in 
the 
defendant's 
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
8 
 
circuit court must discharge during a plea hearing.  In State v. 
Brown, 2006 WI 100, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906, we stated: 
During the course of a plea hearing, the [circuit] 
court must address the defendant personally and: 
(1) Determine the extent of the defendant's education 
and 
general 
comprehension 
so 
as 
to 
assess 
the 
defendant's capacity to understand the issues at the 
hearing; 
(2) Ascertain whether any promises, agreements, or 
threats were made in connection with the defendant's 
anticipated plea, his appearance at the hearing, or 
any decision to forgo an attorney;  
(3) Alert the defendant to the possibility that an 
attorney 
may 
discover 
defenses 
or 
mitigating 
circumstances that would not be apparent to a layman 
such as the defendant;  
(4) Ensure the defendant understands that if he is 
indigent and cannot afford an attorney, an attorney 
will be provided at no expense to him;  
(5) Establish the defendant's understanding of the 
nature of the crime with which he is charged and the 
range of punishments to which he is subjecting himself 
by entering a plea;  
(6) Ascertain personally whether a factual basis 
exists to support the plea;  
                                                                                                                                                             
deportation, exclusion from admission to this country 
or 
denial 
of 
naturalization, 
the 
court 
on 
the 
defendant's 
motion 
shall 
vacate 
any 
applicable 
judgment 
against 
the 
defendant 
and 
permit 
the 
defendant to withdraw the plea and enter another plea. 
This subsection does not limit the ability to withdraw 
a plea of guilty or no contest on any other 
grounds. . . . 
At the time of the plea hearing, this statute was identical 
to its current form. 
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
9 
 
(7) Inform the defendant of the constitutional rights 
he waives by entering a plea and verify that the 
defendant understands he is giving up these rights;  
(8) 
Establish 
personally 
that 
the 
defendant 
understands that the court is not bound by the terms 
of any plea agreement, including recommendations from 
the district attorney, in every case where there has 
been a plea agreement;  
(9) Notify the defendant of the direct consequences of 
his plea; and 
(10) Advise the defendant that "If you are not a 
citizen of the United States of America, you are 
advised that a plea of guilty or no contest for the 
offense [or offenses] with which you are charged may 
result in deportation, the exclusion from admission to 
this country or the denial of naturalization, under 
federal 
law," 
as 
provided 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(c).12  
 
¶19 The defendant's Bangert motion targets four of the 
mandatory duties outlined in Brown and alleges that the 
defendant did not know or understand the information that should 
have been provided at the plea hearing.  Bangert, 131 Wis.2d at 
274. 
¶20 First, the defendant's motion states that "[t]he court 
failed to ascertain that [the defendant] had not been threatened 
or promised anything when he entered his pleas."  The motion 
further alleges that "[i]n fact, [the defendant] had been 
promised 
a 
sentence 
no 
greater 
than 
two 
years 
of 
imprisonment[.]"  The motion also alleges that "[the defendant] 
believed that he had to waive his right to a trial because [his 
lead counsel] was completely unprepared for trial."  The motion 
                                                 
12 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶35 (footnotes omitted). 
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
10 
 
appears to present lead counsel's alleged lack of preparation as 
a threat (namely the threat of poor representation at trial) 
compelling the defendant's decision to enter a plea.   
¶21 Second, the defendant's motion alleges that the 
circuit court failed to establish the defendant's understanding 
of the range of punishments to which the defendant subjected 
himself by entering a plea.  The motion states that "[t]he court 
failed to inform [the defendant] of the maximum penalties for 
his crimes" and failed to inform the defendant that "the 
sentences could be imposed consecutively or concurrently[.]"  It 
further alleges that "[the defendant] did not . . . know the 
maximum penalties" and "was not aware that the sentences imposed 
could be concurrent or consecutive." 
¶22 Third, the defendant's motion states that the circuit 
court "did not inform [the defendant] of the constitutional 
rights being waived by entry of his guilty pleas" and that "[i]n 
fact, [the defendant] did not understand the rights being waived 
by pleading guilty[.]"  In particular, the motion alleges that 
although the defendant knew that he had the right to remain 
silent, he did not know that his silence could not be used 
against him at trial; that the defendant did not know that he 
had the right to a jury trial where all 12 jurors (as opposed to 
a majority of the jurors) would need to agree as to the 
defendant's guilt; and that the defendant erroneously believed 
that he was not waiving his right to confront the witnesses 
against him by virtue of pleading guilty.  
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
11 
 
¶23 Fourth, the defendant's motion states that the circuit 
court failed to notify the defendant of a direct consequence of 
his plea, namely that "[the circuit court] could consider the 
offenses that were dismissed and read-in when deciding on what 
sentence to impose."  The motion also alleges that "[the 
defendant] was not otherwise aware of this information[.]" 
 
¶24  We therefore turn to the plea colloquy to gauge 
whether the plea colloquy satisfies the duties mandated by Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08(1) or the court.  At the plea hearing the circuit 
court was presented with the defendant's completed and signed 
"Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights" Form, using the standard 
court Form adopted by the Judicial Conference pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 758.18.13  Local counsel supplied most of the writing 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 758.18(1) 
(2007-08) 
provides 
in 
relevant part that "[t]he judicial conference shall adopt 
standard court forms for use by parties and court officials in 
all civil and criminal actions and proceedings in the circuit 
court as provided in ss. 807.001 (1) and 971.025 (1)." 
Wisconsin Stat. § 807.001(1) (2007-08) provides in relevant 
part that "[i]n all civil actions and proceedings in circuit 
court, the parties and court officials shall use the standard 
court forms adopted by the judicial conference under s. 758.18 
(1), commencing the date on which the forms are adopted."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 971.025 (2007-08) provides in relevant 
part as follows: 
(1) In all criminal actions and proceedings and 
actions and proceedings under chapters 48 and 938 in 
circuit court, the parties and court officials shall 
use the standard court forms adopted by the judicial 
conference under s. 758.18(1), commencing the date on 
which the forms are adopted. . . .  
(2) A party or court official may supplement a court 
form with additional material. . . . 
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
12 
 
required by the Form, although some of the writing, including 
the defendant's signature, belongs to the defendant. The Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form indisputably states that the 
defendant understands the mandatory information to which the 
defendant's motion is addressed.14   
¶25 In 
addition 
to 
examining 
the 
completed 
Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form, the circuit court addressed 
the defendant personally, as well as the defendant's two 
attorneys, about the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form.  
                                                 
14 In relevant part, the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights 
Form contains the following statements: 
(1) "I [the defendant] have not been threatened or 
forced to enter this plea.  No promises have been made 
to me [the defendant] other than those contained in 
the plea agreement."  
(2) "The maximum penalty I [the defendant] face upon 
conviction is: EACH COUNT CONSECUTIVE: 5 YEARS PRISON 
AND A $10,000.00 FINE (60y 120,000 TOTAL)[.]" 
(3) "I [the defendant] understand that by entering 
this plea, I give up the following constitutional 
rights: . . . I give up my right to remain silent and 
I understand that my silence could not be used against 
me at trial. . . .  I give up my right to a jury 
trial, where all 12 jurors would have to agree that I 
am either guilty or not guilty.  I give up my right to 
confront in the court the people who testify against 
me and cross-examine them. . . ." 
(4) "I [the defendant] understand that if any charges 
are read-in as part of a plea agreement they have the 
following 
effects: . . . although 
the 
judge 
may 
consider read-in charges when imposing sentence, the 
maximum penalty will not be increased. . . ." 
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
13 
 
This colloquy, set forth below, constitutes the entire relevant 
plea colloquy: 
THE 
COURT: 
[H]ave 
you 
gone 
over 
this 
plea 
questionnaire and waiver of rights form with your 
attorneys -- and by the way, which one did you go over 
it with, [local counsel] or [lead counsel]? 
THE DEFENDANT: Both, sir. 
THE COURT: Both, excellent. Are you satisfied you 
understand everything in the questionnaire and waiver 
of rights [form] and the elements of the charges 
you're going to be pleading to, a copy of which 
elements are attached hereto? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I am. 
THE COURT: In your opinion, are you going to be -- 
first I guess, do you understand everything else in 
the questionnaire and waiver of rights form?  
THE DEFENDANT: I understand it fully, sir. 
THE COURT: Fully. In your opinion are you going to be 
freely, knowingly, and voluntarily entering your pleas 
pursuant to the agreement with all your rights in 
mind? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I am. 
THE COURT: Counsels, [local counsel] first and then 
[lead counsel], are you both so satisfied? [Local 
counsel]? 
[Local counsel]: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: [Lead counsel]? 
[Lead counsel]: Yes, your honor. 
THE COURT: Based on that, I find that it will be a 
free, knowing and voluntary plea, or set of pleas. I'm 
now going to turn to, bear with me, Counts 4 through 
15 [all relating to possessing of child pornography], 
of the third amended information. 
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
14 
 
And what I'm going to do is read those jointly with 
some slight variation.  In other words, they're all 
the same charges except that they involve different 
images.  
. . . . 
You have the third amended information in front of you 
and you can see what I'm referring to as those 
entries? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I see it. 
THE COURT: Very well. Then, continuing on, all of 
those charges are contrary to [Section 948.12(1m)(a)], 
Wisconsin Statutes.  How do you plead to all of those 
counts, 4 through 15 . . . ? 
THE DEFENDANT: I plead guilty, sir. 
THE COURT: Counsels, do you . . . both agree, along 
with your client, that there is a factual basis? 
Meaning not necessarily that he agrees that . . . the 
facts are as claimed, but that if a jury accepted 
these facts, they could, based upon that, find the 
defendant guilty. Do both attorneys and the defendant 
agree that there is a factual basis in that light? 
[Local counsel]: Correct. 
[Lead counsel]: Yes, your honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. Based upon that, I find a 
factual basis. I adjudge the defendant guilty.  Counts 
1 through 3 and 16 through 19 . . . are all dismissed 
and read in for purposes of sentencing.   
I'll order a presentence investigation. The parties 
will be free to argue. We'll set that up at this time. 
. . . . 
[Local 
counsel]: 
I'm 
sorry, 
judge, 
that 
was 
. . . through Count 69, correct? 
THE COURT: [Counts] 16 through 69 [all relating to 
possession of child pornography] are dismissed and 
read in, plus 1 through 3 [the two counts of first-
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
15 
 
degree sexual assault of a child and the single count 
of intentional physical abuse of a child]. 
[Local counsel]: Okay. 
. . . . 
THE COURT: All right. Now I'm going to cover one thing 
that I don't think has to be covered, but I'm doing it 
as an excess of caution. 
There is no real plea agreement other than this 
dismissal, and that's, nothing you can do about it. 
The parties are free to argue. So this language really 
doesn't mean a whole lot. But do you understand that 
the judge is not bound by any plea agreement or 
recommendations and may impose the maximum penalty; do 
you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I do. 
THE COURT: And you . . . talked that over with your 
attorneys, as well as the rest? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have. 
. . . . 
THE COURT: All right. Then I am . . . all set to 
proceed to set a sentencing date.   
¶26  As is evident in the colloquy, the circuit court 
specifically invoked the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights 
Form, ascertained that the defendant's counsel had helped the 
defendant to review the Form, and further ascertained that the 
defendant generally understood the Form's contents.  In effect 
the circuit court in the present case did little more than 
incorporate the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form into 
the plea colloquy.  Aside from noting the existence of the Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form, the circuit court did 
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
16 
 
little else to provide to the defendant, or to elicit from him, 
the information required during the plea colloquy.  
¶27 To conclude that the circuit court complied with its 
plea colloquy duties the court of appeals looked outside the 
transcript 
of 
the 
plea 
hearing 
to 
the 
completed 
Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form referenced at the plea 
colloquy hearing.  Considering the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of 
Rights Form as an integral part of the plea colloquy, the court 
of appeals concluded that the defendant had failed to make a 
prima facie showing that the plea colloquy was defective.  
¶28 The court of appeals concluded that "the contents of 
the plea questionnaire [are] an intrinsic part of [the plea] 
colloquy" because the circuit court "specifically invoked the 
plea questionnaire [that the defendant] had completed" and then 
"ascertained 
that 
[the 
defendant] 
had 
gone 
over 
the 
questionnaire 
with 
both 
[his] 
attorneys" 
and 
"that 
[the 
defendant] understood everything in the questionnaire[.]"15  In 
essence, the court of appeals treated all the statements in the 
Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form as if those statements 
had been uttered by the circuit court judge or the defendant on 
the record during the plea hearing.   
 
¶29 The issue before this court is whether a circuit 
court's reference to a completed Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of 
Rights Form complies with the requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(1) or other court-mandated duties. 
                                                 
15 Hoppe, 312 Wis. 2d 765, ¶¶14, 17. 
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
17 
 
¶30 A 
circuit 
court 
may 
use 
the 
completed 
Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form when discharging its plea 
colloquy duties.  "A circuit court has significant discretion in 
how it conducts a plea hearing" and may, "[w]ithin its 
discretion, . . . incorporate 
into 
the 
plea 
colloquy 
the 
information 
contained 
in 
the 
plea 
questionnaire, 
relying 
substantially on that questionnaire to establish the defendant's 
understanding[.]"16  Indeed, we stated in Bangert that one way 
for 
the 
circuit 
court 
to 
inform 
the 
defendant 
of 
the 
constitutional rights that he is waiving and to verify the 
defendant's understanding that he is waiving these rights is for 
the circuit court to "specifically refer to some portion of the 
record or communication between defense counsel and [the] 
defendant 
which 
affirmatively 
exhibits 
[the] 
defendant's 
knowledge of the constitutional rights he will be waiving" and 
then to "ascertain whether the defendant understands he will be 
waiving certain constitutional rights by virtue of his guilty or 
no contest plea[.]"17   
¶31 A circuit court may not, however, rely entirely on the 
Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form as a substitute for a 
substantive in-court plea colloquy.  Although a circuit court 
may refer to and use a Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form 
at 
the 
plea 
hearing, 
the 
plea 
hearing 
transcript 
must 
                                                 
16 State v. Brandt, 226 Wis. 2d 610, 621, 594 N.W.2d 759 
(1999). 
17 Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 271-72.   
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
18 
 
demonstrate that the circuit court used a substantive colloquy 
to satisfy each of the duties listed in Brown.  The point of the 
substantive in-court plea colloquy is to ensure that the 
defendant's 
guilty 
plea 
comports 
with 
the 
constitutional 
requirements for a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea.   
¶32 The Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form provides 
a defendant and counsel the opportunity to review together a 
written statement of the information a defendant should know 
before entering a guilty plea.  A completed Form can therefore 
be 
a 
very useful 
instrument to help ensure a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary plea.  The plea colloquy cannot, 
however, be reduced to determining whether the defendant has 
read and filled out the Form.  Although we do not require a 
circuit court to follow inflexible guidelines when conducting a 
plea hearing,18 the Form cannot substitute for a personal, in-
court, on-the-record plea colloquy between the circuit court and 
a defendant.   
¶33 We conclude that in the present case the circuit court 
incorporated the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form into 
the plea colloquy and that the circuit court's reliance on the 
Form was so great that the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights 
Form substituted for an in-court colloquy.  We do not agree with 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 267 (stating that "we 
have not established inflexible guidelines which a trial court 
must follow in ascertaining a defendant's understanding of the 
nature of the charge").   
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
19 
 
the court of appeals or the State that the circuit court in the 
present case fulfilled the mandatory requirements.   
¶34 At least with respect to the first two allegations in 
the defendant's Bangert motion, we therefore agree with the 
defendant that his motion does make a prima facie showing of a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) or other court-mandated 
duties by pointing to passages or gaps in the plea hearing 
transcript.  As the defendant asserts, the plea hearing 
transcript shows that neither the circuit court nor the 
defendant made any statements during the plea hearing relating 
to promises or threats made in connection with the defendant's 
plea or any statements relating to the range of punishments to 
which the defendant subjected himself by entering his plea.  The 
plea hearing transcript is completely silent on these matters.  
¶35 Our view of the plea colloquy in the present case 
comports with State v. Hansen, 168 Wis. 2d 749, 485 N.W.2d 74 
(Ct. App. 1992). 
¶36 In Hansen, the circuit court conducted a colloquy with 
Hansen that proceeded in relevant part as follows:  
THE 
COURT: 
Mr. 
Hansen, 
did 
you 
go 
over 
this 
questionnaire and waiver of rights form with your 
attorney? 
[HANSEN]: Yes, I did. 
THE COURT: Did you sign it? 
[HANSEN]: Yes. 
THE COURT: Did you understand it when you signed it? 
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
20 
 
[HANSEN]: Yes, I did.19 
¶37 Hansen contended that the circuit court had failed to 
verify Hansen's understanding that he was waiving constitutional 
rights by entering his plea.  The court of appeals agreed.  The 
Hansen court of appeals concluded that the plea colloquy was 
defective because it "establishe[d] only that Hansen had read 
and understood the [Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights] form" 
and "[did] not establish that Hansen understood that by entering 
his no contest plea he was waiving his applicable constitutional 
rights."20  The Hansen court of appeals concluded that "such 
limited personal colloquy is not the substantive kind of 
personal exchange between the trial court and the defendant" 
that is required under Wisconsin law.21   
¶38 The Hansen decision is incompatible with the position 
taken by the court of appeals in the instant case that when the 
circuit court ascertains during the plea hearing that the 
defendant generally understands the contents of the Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form, the Form's contents thereby 
become an intrinsic part of the plea colloquy and may substitute 
for an in-court personal colloquy between the circuit court and 
the defendant.  Hansen demonstrates that it is not enough for 
the circuit court to ascertain that a defendant generally 
                                                 
19 State v. Hansen, 168 Wis. 2d 749, 752, 485 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. 
App. 1992). 
20 Id. at 756.   
21 Id. at 755.   
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
21 
 
understands the contents of the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of 
Rights Form.  
¶39 The court of appeals relied primarily upon State v. 
Moederndorfer, 141 Wis. 2d 823, 416 N.W.2d 627 (Ct. App. 1987), 
in support of its conclusion that when the circuit court 
ascertains during the plea hearing that the defendant generally 
understands the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form, the 
Form's 
contents 
are 
intrinsic 
to 
the 
plea 
colloquy.  
Moederndorfer, however, does not support the position adopted by 
the court of appeals.  Moederndorfer illustrates the need for a 
more substantive colloquy than provided in the instant case.   
¶40 In the Moederndorfer case, Moederndorfer argued that 
the circuit court had erred in failing during the plea hearing 
to "read each of the constitutional rights contained on the 
[Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver 
of 
Rights] 
form 
to 
confirm 
[Moederndorfer's] 
understanding."22 
 
In 
order 
to 
inform 
Moederndorfer of the constitutional rights he was waiving and to 
verify Moederndorfer's understanding that he was waiving these 
rights, the circuit court had informed Moederndorfer that he 
would give up the constitutional rights listed in the Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form by virtue of pleading guilty 
and then had ascertained that Moederndorfer understood the 
Form's 
contents. 
 
Before 
establishing 
that 
Moederndorfer 
understood the Form, the circuit court had stated: "By entering 
                                                 
22 State 
v. 
Moederndorfer, 
141 
Wis. 2d 823, 
826, 
416 
N.W.2d 627 (Ct. App. 1987).   
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
22 
 
that plea of guilty, Mr. Moederndorfer, you give up rights, and 
these rights have been detailed in this three-page waiver of 
rights form."23  
The circuit court had not specifically 
enumerated each constitutional right that Moederndorfer was 
giving up.   
¶41 The court of appeals rejected Moederndorfer's attack 
on the plea colloquy.  It relied upon the language in Bangert 
stating 
that 
in 
order 
to 
inform 
the 
defendant 
of 
the 
constitutional rights that he is waiving and to verify the 
defendant's understanding that he is waiving these rights, the 
circuit court may "specifically refer to some portion of the 
record or communication between defense counsel and [the] 
defendant 
which 
affirmatively 
exhibits 
[the] 
defendant's 
knowledge of the constitutional rights he will be waiving" and 
then "ascertain whether the defendant understands he will be 
waiving certain constitutional rights by virtue of his guilty of 
no contest plea[.]"24  The court of appeals concluded that the 
circuit court had followed this procedure in its colloquy with 
Moederndorfer.   
¶42 Moederndorfer does not support the position that so 
long as the circuit court ascertains that the defendant 
generally understands the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights 
Form, the contents of that Form may be viewed as intrinsic to 
                                                 
23 Id. at 828-29 n.1. 
24 Id. at 827 (quoting Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 271-72) 
(emphasis omitted). 
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
23 
 
the plea colloquy.  The circuit court in Moederndorfer used 
substantive colloquy during the plea hearing to establish 
Moederndorfer's 
understanding 
of 
the 
information 
that 
Moederndorfer claimed on appeal not to understand.  As the court 
of appeals explained in Hansen, the Moederndorfer decision is 
properly interpreted to mean that although use of the Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form "lessen[s] the extent and 
degree of the colloquy otherwise required between the trial 
court and the defendant," the Form is "not intended to eliminate 
the need for the court to make a record demonstrating the 
defendant's 
understanding" 
of 
the 
particular 
information 
contained therein.25   
¶43 We therefore conclude that the defendant was entitled 
to an evidentiary hearing on the basis of his Bangert motion and 
turn to the evidentiary hearing.   
II 
¶44 Once the defendant files a Bangert motion entitling 
him to an evidentiary hearing, the burden shifts to the State to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's plea 
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary despite the identified 
                                                 
25 Hansen, 168 Wis. 2d at 756 (interpreting Moederndorfer).   
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
24 
 
defects in the plea colloquy.26  If the State carries its burden 
of proof that the guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary, the plea remains valid.  Otherwise, the defendant may 
withdraw the guilty plea.  "When a guilty plea is not knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary, a defendant is entitled to withdraw 
the plea as a matter of right because such a plea 'violates 
fundamental due process.'"27   
¶45 We must now determine whether the State met its burden 
of showing that the defendant's guilty plea was entered 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.28  In making this 
determination, we accept the circuit court's findings of 
historical 
and 
evidentiary 
fact 
unless 
they 
are 
clearly 
erroneous.29  We independently determine whether those facts 
demonstrate that the defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary.30   
                                                 
26 See Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶40 ("If the [Bangert] motion 
establishes a prima facie violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or 
other court-mandated duties and makes the requisite allegations, 
the court must hold a postconviction evidentiary hearing at 
which the state is given an opportunity to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant's plea was knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary despite the identified inadequacy of 
the plea colloquy." (footnote omitted)). 
27 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶19 (quoting State v. Van Camp, 
213 Wis. 2d 131, 139, 569 N.W.2d 577 (1997)). 
28 Id., ¶19.   
29 Id.   
30 Id.   
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
25 
 
¶46 For purposes of this part of the opinion, we assume 
without deciding that all four plea colloquy defects that the 
defendant identifies in his Bangert motion do exist.  We 
therefore assume without deciding that it was the State's burden 
to prove that the defendant did not enter his plea in response 
to threats or promises outside the plea agreement; that the 
defendant understood the range of punishments to which he 
subjected himself by entering a plea; that the defendant was 
informed of his constitutional rights and understood that he 
would be waiving those rights by entering a plea; and that the 
defendant was informed that the circuit court could consider 
dismissed but read-in charges for purposes of sentencing.  
¶47 The State may "rely on the totality of the evidence, 
much of which will be found outside the plea hearing record."31  
The State, for example, "may present the testimony of the 
defendant and defense counsel to establish the defendant's 
understanding."32  
"The state may also utilize the plea 
questionnaire and waiver of rights form, documentary evidence, 
recorded statements, and transcripts of prior hearings to 
satisfy its burden."33 
¶48 In the present case, it is not completely clear 
whether the circuit court intended its evidentiary hearing to 
cover the issues raised in the defendant's Bangert motion.  
                                                 
31 Id., ¶40 (quotation marks and citation omitted).   
32 Id. (citation omitted).   
33 Id.   
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
26 
 
Early in the hearing, the circuit court appeared to limit the 
hearing's 
scope 
to 
issues 
relating 
to 
the 
defendant's 
Nelson/Bentley motion.34  Much of the evidence presented at the 
evidentiary 
hearing, 
however, 
clearly 
pertains 
to 
the 
defendant's Bangert motion.  Indeed, at the end of the 
evidentiary hearing, appellate defense counsel acknowledged 
confusion about the scope of the proceeding.35  The circuit court 
also requested supplemental briefs from the parties without 
stating whether those briefs should be limited to issues 
relating 
to 
the 
defendant's 
Nelson/Bentley 
motion. 
 
The 
defendant filed a brief that almost exclusively supported his 
Bangert motion.   
                                                 
34 The transcript of the evidentiary hearing reveals the 
following exchange between the circuit court and appellate 
defense counsel: 
THE COURT: . . . I believe that you failed to make 
your prima facie case.  You may proceed. 
[Defense counsel]: In that regard then, Judge, the way 
I will proceed is not pursuant to Bangert but pursuant 
to the Nelson and Bentley standard where I'll put my 
client on the stand.  I will bear the burden of proof 
if Your Honor has as I think you have just stated that 
I have not established a prima facie case. 
THE COURT: Please proceed.  Whatever you wish, of 
course. 
35 Appellate defense counsel stated that "the hearing that 
we've had . . . could be viewed as either a Bangert hearing or 
as I think has been referred to a Bentley hearing on whether or 
not there is a reason that [the defendant] should be permitted 
to withdraw his plea . . . ." 
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
27 
 
¶49 The circuit court's written decision does not fully 
clarify the scope of the evidentiary hearing.  The decision 
states that the circuit court's inquiry is guided by the Bangert 
line of cases and makes no reference to the Nelson/Bentley line 
of cases.  The decision does not, however, explicitly decide any 
of the issues relevant to a Bangert motion.  It does not state 
whether the defendant's Bangert motion met the conditions 
necessary to trigger the defendant's right to an evidentiary 
hearing.  It also seems to assign the burden of proof at the 
evidentiary hearing to the defendant, whereas in a Bangert-style 
evidentiary hearing it is the State's burden to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that the defendant's plea was entered 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily despite the identified 
defects in the plea colloquy.   
¶50 Despite 
these 
irregularities 
in 
the 
evidentiary 
hearing, we conclude that under the circumstances of the present 
case we need not remand the matter to the circuit court for 
further evidentiary proceedings under Bangert in order to 
determine whether the State carried its burden of proof at the 
evidentiary hearing.  The circuit court record permits only one 
result in this case.  The transcript of the evidentiary hearing 
is replete with evidence relating to the defendant's Bangert 
motion.  The circuit court considered this evidence and made 
findings of historical or evidentiary fact that this court 
accepts; they are not clearly erroneous.  The evidence in the 
record and the circuit court's findings are sufficient for this 
court to determine as a matter of law that the State proved by 
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
28 
 
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's guilty plea 
was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily despite 
the defects in the plea colloquy.   
¶51 The defendant appeared as a witness at the evidentiary 
hearing.  The defendant testified in relevant part that although 
he signed the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form, he was 
unaware of the Form's contents and did not recall whether local 
counsel had read the Form to him; that his trial counsel 
erroneously told him that he would receive no more than two 
years' imprisonment; that he did not recall whether either of 
his trial attorneys told him that he faced a potential penalty 
much more severe than two years' imprisonment; that he would not 
have entered his plea if he had known the actual maximum penalty 
that he was facing; that he mistakenly believed at the time of 
the plea hearing that if he went to trial he would be convicted 
if a majority of the jurors concluded that he was guilty; that 
he mistakenly believed that if he went to trial, the prosecutor 
could call the defendant as a witness and could use the 
defendant's silence against him; that he mistakenly believed 
that if he entered a plea, he would still have an opportunity to 
confront the witnesses against him at the sentencing hearing; 
that he did not understand what it meant that many of his 
charges would be dismissed and read-in for sentencing purposes; 
that he entered his plea because local counsel told him that 
lead counsel was not adequately prepared to go to trial; that 
neither of his trial attorneys asked him whether he was on 
medication on the day he entered his plea; and that he was in 
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
29 
 
fact on pain medication, which prevented him from understanding 
what was happening during the plea hearing and during his 
meeting with counsel prior to the hearing.   
¶52 The defendant's local trial counsel also testified 
about his interactions with the defendant around the time the 
defendant entered his plea.  Local counsel's testimony was on 
many points inconsistent with the defendant's testimony.  Local 
counsel testified that he went over the form with the defendant 
before the defendant entered his plea; that he explained to the 
defendant the maximum penalty that he was facing; that no one 
promised the defendant that he would be sentenced for only two 
years, although lead counsel may have stated that the defendant 
could hope to receive a sentence of that length; that he read 
the defendant the section of the Form relating to waiver of 
constitutional rights; that he read to the defendant the part of 
the Form stating that the defendant had the right to remain 
silent, that his silence could not be used against him, and that 
he was waiving his right to remain silent by pleading guilty; 
that he explained the right to remain silent in layman's terms 
to the defendant; that he read the part of the Form stating that 
the defendant had the right to be tried by a jury of 12 persons, 
all of whom would need to agree that he was guilty in order to 
produce a conviction; that he also read the part of the Form 
stating that the defendant had the right to confront the 
witnesses against him and that the defendant was giving up this 
right by pleading guilty; that he explained the meaning of read-
in charges to the defendant; that although he was not confident 
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
30 
 
that lead counsel was adequately prepared for a trial, he 
believed that lead counsel met the minimum standards for 
competence and professionalism; that although he knew that the 
defendant had been taking medication in the recent past, he 
asked the defendant whether he had taken any medication in the 
last 24 hours and the defendant said that he had not; that the 
defendant appeared to understand everything that was said to him 
and did nothing to suggest that his understanding was impaired 
in any way; that he gave the defendant an opportunity to ask 
questions if he was confused about anything; and finally that he 
had communicated with the defendant between the plea hearing and 
the sentencing hearing, during which time the defendant never 
suggested that he was confused about what had happened at the 
plea hearing.  
¶53 During the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court also 
examined documentary evidence in the record.   
¶54 Finally, the circuit court considered evidence of the 
defendant's general characteristics.  At the time of the plea 
hearing the defendant was 45 years old, had 15½ years of formal 
schooling, and had worked as a non-commissioned officer for the 
United 
States 
Marine 
Corps. 
 
Local 
counsel 
supplied 
uncontroverted testimony that the defendant possesses above-
average intelligence.   
 
¶55 In its written decision, the circuit court made 
findings of historical or evidentiary fact relevant to the 
defendant's Bangert motion.  The upshot of the circuit court's 
findings was that the circuit court disbelieved the defendant's 
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
31 
 
claims that he did not receive and did not understand the 
information that was provided in the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver 
of Rights Form but that was not provided to the defendant during 
the plea colloquy.  The circuit court found that "[i]t is clear 
the defendant was informed and understood his rights," that the 
defendant "was aware of the maximum penalties," and that "[t]he 
defendant's taking of painkillers clearly had no effect on his 
understanding[.]"  The circuit court explicitly adopted the 
State's position that "[the defendant's] testimony demonstrates 
that he is an intelligent man who is both eloquent and 
manipulative" and that, as a general matter, "[the defendant's] 
claims simply are not credible."  
¶56 The circuit court's findings of historical fact are 
not clearly erroneous.  They are supported by evidence in the 
circuit court record, including the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of 
Rights Form signed by the defendant, as well as by the testimony 
of local trial counsel.   
¶57 In light of the circuit court's findings of historical 
fact and the evidence supporting them, we conclude as a matter 
of law that the State carried its burden at the evidentiary 
hearing of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant 
entered 
his 
plea 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily despite identified defects in the plea colloquy.   
¶58 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea on the basis of 
his Bangert motion.   
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
32 
 
 
III 
 
¶59 The final issue presented for our review is whether 
the defendant is entitled to withdraw his plea on the basis of 
his Nelson/Bentley motion.  We treat the defendant's motion as a 
Nelson/Bentley motion insofar as the motion alleges that the 
defendant's failure to understand certain information resulted 
from problems extrinsic to the plea colloquy.36  The defendant's 
Nelson/Bentley motion overlaps substantially with his Bangert 
motion.  Each motion raises in the present case the same 
ultimate issue of constitutional fact: whether the defendant's 
guilty 
plea 
was 
entered 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily. 
                                                 
36 A Nelson/Bentley motion entitles the defendant to an 
evidentiary hearing if (1) the motion "allege[s] sufficient, 
nonconclusory facts . . . that, if true, would entitle [the 
defendant] to relief"; and (2) the circuit court record as a 
whole does not conclusively demonstrate that the defendant is 
entitled to no relief.  See Howell, 301 Wis. 2d 350, ¶¶76-77.  
"[I]f the defendant fails to allege sufficient facts in his 
motion 
to 
raise 
a 
question 
of 
fact, 
or 
presents 
only 
conclusionary 
allegations, 
or 
if 
the 
record 
conclusively 
demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief, the 
trial court may in the exercise of its legal discretion deny the 
motion without a hearing."  Howell, 301 Wis. 2d 350, ¶75 
(quoting Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 497-98). 
The circuit court in the present case conducted an 
evidentiary hearing related to the defendant's Nelson/Bentley 
motion.  Because the defendant got an evidentiary hearing, we 
need not, and do not, determine the need for the circuit court 
to grant the defendant an evidentiary hearing.  We decide only 
whether the defendant is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea. 
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
33 
 
 
¶60 The defendant is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea 
if the circuit court's refusal to allow withdrawal of the plea 
would result in a manifest injustice.37  The burden at a 
Nelson/Bentley evidentiary hearing is on the defendant.38  The 
defendant must prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
withdrawal of the guilty plea is necessary to avoid a manifest 
injustice.39  A defendant may demonstrate a manifest injustice by 
showing 
that 
his 
guilty 
plea 
was 
not 
made 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily.40 
¶61 As we stated above, whether a plea was entered 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily is a question of 
constitutional fact.41  We accept the circuit court's findings of 
historical 
and 
evidentiary 
fact 
unless 
they 
are 
clearly 
erroneous.42  We independently determine whether those facts 
demonstrate that the defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary.43   
                                                 
37 State v. Straszkowski, 2008 WI 65, ¶28, 310 Wis. 2d 259, 
750 N.W.2d 835 (citing State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶16, 232 
Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836).   
38 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶42. 
39 Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 311. 
40 Straszkowski, 310 Wis. 2d 259, ¶28 (citing Brown, 293 
Wis. 2d 594, ¶18).   
41 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶19.   
42 Id.   
43 Id.   
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
34 
 
¶62 The Nelson/Bentley motion, like the Bangert motion, 
depends largely upon the claim that the defendant did not 
understand the maximum penalties that he was facing, the 
constitutional rights that he was waiving, or the meaning of the 
agreement to read in dismissed charges.  The defendant's motion 
alleges 
that 
the 
defendant's 
comprehension 
was 
generally 
impaired by pain medication and that the defendant's attorneys 
mistakenly communicated to him that he was facing no more than 
two years' imprisonment.   
¶63 We also view the motion as a Nelson/Bentley motion 
insofar as it alleges that the defendant felt compelled to enter 
a plea because lead trial counsel was unprepared to defend him 
at trial.  Lead counsel's alleged lack of preparation is also a 
problem extrinsic to the plea colloquy.44   
¶64 The 
circuit 
court's 
findings 
relating 
to 
the 
defendant's Bangert motion are applicable to the Nelson/Bentley 
motion as well.  The circuit court specifically found that 
"[t]he defendant's taking of painkillers clearly had no effect 
on his understanding," that the defendant "was aware of the 
maximum penalties" that he was facing, and that "[i]t is clear 
the defendant was informed and understood his rights[.]"  
Although the circuit court did not make any specific finding 
                                                 
44 We note that although the motion disparages lead trial 
counsel, it does not allege that the defendant was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel.  "[T]he manifest injustice test 
is met if the defendant was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel."  Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 311 (quotation marks & quoted 
source omitted). 
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
35 
 
relating to whether the defendant felt compelled to enter a plea 
because lead trial counsel was unprepared to defend him at 
trial, the circuit court found as a general matter that "[the 
defendant's] claims simply are not credible."  The circuit court 
clearly did not accept the defendant's testimony about his 
motivation in entering the guilty plea.   
¶65 The 
circuit 
court's 
findings 
of 
historical 
and 
evidentiary fact are supported by evidence in the record and are 
not clearly erroneous.  Based upon the circuit court's findings 
and the evidence supporting them, we further determine as a 
matter of law that the defendant failed to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that withdrawal of his plea is necessary to 
avoid a manifest injustice. 
¶66 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea on the basis of 
his Nelson/Bentley motion. 
* * * * 
¶67 We conclude that the defendant was entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on the basis of his Bangert motion and that 
the defendant is not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea on the 
basis 
of 
his 
Bangert 
motion 
or 
on 
the 
basis 
of 
his 
Nelson/Bentley motion.   
¶68 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals, although on different grounds, affirming the circuit 
court's judgment and order. 
By the Court.—The decision of the Court of Appeals is 
affirmed.   
No. 
2007AP905-CR   
 
 
 
1