Title: Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718, Internat'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO v. City of Boston
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13347
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 30, 2023

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13347 
 
BOSTON FIREFIGHTERS UNION, LOCAL 718, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF FIRE FIGHTERS, AFL-CIO, & others1  vs.  CITY OF BOSTON 
& another.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 6, 2023. - March 30, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Injunction.  Practice, Civil, Preliminary injunction, Injunctive 
relief.  Labor, Collective bargaining, Public employment, 
Police, Fire fighters.  Municipal Corporations, Collective 
bargaining, Mayor, Police, Fire department.  Public 
Employment, Collective bargaining. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
January 3, 2022. 
 
 
A motion for a preliminary injunction was heard by Jeffrey 
A. Locke, J. 
 
 
A proceeding for interlocutory review was heard in the 
Appeals Court by Sabita Singh, J.  The Supreme Judicial Court on 
its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
John Foskett for the defendants. 
 
1 Boston Police Superior Officers Federation and Boston 
Police Detectives Benevolent Society.   
 
2 Mayor of Boston.   
2 
 
Patrick N. Bryant for Boston Police Superior Officers 
Federation. 
Leah M. Barrault for Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718, 
International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO. 
Scott W. Dunlap, for Boston Police Detectives Benevolent 
Society, was present but did not argue. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Larry H. James, of Ohio, & Joseph G. Donnellan for National 
Fraternal Order of Police. 
John M. Becker & Ian M. Collins for Massachusetts Coalition 
of Police. 
Matthew D. Watts for International Association of Fire 
Fighters. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The plaintiffs, the Boston Firefighters Union, 
Local 718, International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO 
(Local 718); the Boston Police Detectives Benevolent Society 
(BPDBS); and the Boston Police Superior Officers Federation 
(federation), filed a verified complaint in the Superior Court, 
challenging the defendants' unilateral amendment of the COVID-19 
vaccination policy for all city of Boston (city) employees.  In 
the complaint, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief for the defendants' alleged violations of both the prior 
memoranda of agreement between the parties, and the defendants' 
collective bargaining obligations as public employers, pursuant 
to G. L. c. 150E.  The plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief 
was denied by a judge of the Superior Court.  The plaintiffs 
appealed, pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, to a single justice 
of the Appeals Court, who reversed the judge's denial of the 
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and ordered the 
3 
 
entry of a preliminary injunction restraining the defendants 
from enforcing their December 2021 amended COVID-19 vaccination 
policy.  The defendants appealed from the order of the single 
justice to this court.  This case now presents the question 
whether the single justice of the Appeals Court abused her 
discretion in reversing the denial of the plaintiffs' motion for 
a preliminary injunction.  For the reasons stated below, we 
conclude that the single justice abused her discretion in 
enjoining the defendants from enforcing their December 2021 
amended COVID-19 vaccination policy, and we reverse the order of 
the single justice of the Appeals Court and vacate the 
injunction.3   
 
Background.  Each of the three plaintiffs is an employee 
organization within the meaning of G. L. c. 150E, § 1, serving 
as the exclusive bargaining representative for various police 
officers and firefighters employed by the defendants, the city 
and Michelle Wu, in her official capacity as mayor of the city.4  
The federation is the exclusive bargaining representative of 250 
sworn sergeants, lieutenants, and captains of the Boston police 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the National 
Fraternal Order of Police, the Massachusetts Coalition of 
Police, and the International Association of Fire Fighters in 
support of the plaintiffs.  
  
4 The defendants are public employers within the meaning of 
G. L. c. 150E, § 1. 
4 
 
department (BPD).  BPDBS serves as the exclusive bargaining 
representative of all BPD patrol detectives, detective 
superiors, and those assigned to the forensic unit within BPD.  
Local 718 is the exclusive bargaining representative for all 
uniformed employees of the city's fire department.   
 
On March 10, 2020, the Governor declared a state of 
emergency in response to the spread of COVID-19.  Christie v. 
Commonwealth, 484 Mass. 397, 398 (2020).  The next day, COVID-19 
was declared a global pandemic by the World Health Organization 
(WHO).  Id. at 398-399.  To date, according to the WHO, COVID-19 
remains a pandemic, and continues to be "a dangerous infectious 
disease with the capacity to cause substantial damage to health 
and health systems."  See World Health Organization, Statement 
on the fourteenth meeting of the International Health 
Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee regarding the coronavirus 
disease (COVID-19) pandemic (Jan. 30, 2023), https://www.who.int 
/news/item/30-01-2023-statement-on-the-fourteenth-meeting-of-
the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-
regarding-the-coronavirus-disease-(covid-19)-pandemic 
[https://perma.cc/3YL8-8FAN].  Vaccination against COVID-19, 
however, has served as an important tool in achieving higher 
levels of immunity among the population as the pandemic 
continues, see id., because individuals who are vaccinated 
5 
 
against COVID-19 are significantly less likely to develop 
serious health complications from COVID-19.   
On August 12, 2021, in an effort to combat the spread of 
COVID-19, the defendants announced the "Vaccine Verification or 
Required Testing for COVID-19 Policy" (COVID-19 policy), 
generally requiring all city employees either to verify they are 
vaccinated against COVID-19, or, alternatively, to submit proof 
of a negative COVID-19 test every seven days.  The city executed 
a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with both the federation and 
Local 718 memorializing this policy.5   
Throughout the lifespan of the pandemic, however, COVID-19 
has continued to evolve genetically, giving rise to numerous 
variants of concern.  Among the COVID-19 variants of concern was 
the Omicron variant during the fall and winter of 2021.  
According to Dr. Bisola Ojikutu, the executive director of the 
city's public health commission, the Omicron variant likely was 
to spread so significantly and rapidly that the continued 
practice of allowing employees to go through weekly testing, as 
an alternative to vaccination, was insufficient to combat the 
spread of COVID-19.   
 
5 At the time of the MOA with the federation and Local 718, 
the city also was involved in negotiations with BPDBS. 
   
6 
 
Thus, on December 20, 2021, Mayor Wu unilaterally amended 
the COVID-19 policy for the city's employees, to mandate that 
all city employees be vaccinated against COVID-19 as a condition 
of employment (amended COVID-19 policy).6  The failure to verify 
one's vaccination status resulted in discipline for city 
employees, beginning with unpaid leave from employment, and 
ultimately progressing to termination for those employees who 
refused to comply with the new amended COVID-19 policy.  The 
amended policy required unvaccinated city employees to verify 
that they had received at least one dose of the COVID-19 vaccine 
by January 15, 2022, and verify full vaccination status by 
February 15, 2022.7   
Each plaintiff objected to the defendants' unilateral 
amendment of the COVID-19 policy.  Local 718 contacted Mayor Wu, 
asking her to consider a continuation of the in-station testing 
program under the previous COVID-19 policy; its efforts were 
unsuccessful.  The federation demanded the defendants adhere to 
the existing MOA and met with the defendants to discuss the 
defendants' bargaining obligations related to the vaccination 
 
6 The defendants notified the plaintiffs of the policy 
change in the days prior to December 20, 2021, when Mayor Wu 
unilaterally amended the policy.   
 
7 The defendants extended the effective date of the policy 
by two weeks.   
 
7 
 
policy.  Finally, BPDBS requested that the defendants refrain 
both from implementing the amended COVID-19 policy and from 
making further unilateral changes to the COVID-19 policy.   
When Mayor Wu declined to acquiesce to the plaintiffs' 
requests, after the unilateral implementation of the amended 
COVID-19 policy, the plaintiffs filed prohibited practice 
charges with the Department of Labor Relations, alleging that 
the defendants violated G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (1), (5).8  The 
federation also filed a grievance, alleging that the amended 
vaccination policy violated the MOA with the city.  Most 
importantly for the purposes of this appeal, the plaintiffs also 
filed a verified complaint in the Superior Court seeking both 
declaratory and injunctive relief as a result of the defendants' 
unilateral amendment of the COVID-19 policy.  The plaintiffs 
alleged that the defendants' actions repudiated the MOAs and 
 
8 All but one of the allegations in these charges were 
dismissed by a Department of Labor Relations investigator.  See 
City of Boston & Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n, 
Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd. (CERB), Nos. MUP-21-9008, 
MUP-22-9238, at 1 & n.1 (Dec. 29, 2022).  The plaintiffs timely 
requested review of the dismissals by CERB.  Id. at 1 n.1, 2.  
CERB recently affirmed the dismissal of the repudiation and 
decision bargaining allegations but remanded the matters on a 
limited issue concerning the defendants' alleged violation of 
their impact bargaining obligations.  See id.  See also City of 
Boston & Boston Police Detective Benevolent Soc'y, CERB, No. 
MUP-21-9004, at 2 (Dec. 29, 2022); City of Boston & Boston 
Firefighters, IAFF Local 718, CERB, Nos. MUP-21-9002, MUP-22-
9310, at 2 (Dec. 29, 2022). 
 
8 
 
violated the bargaining obligations of G. L. c. 150E.9  Following 
a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary 
injunction, the judge denied their request for injunctive 
relief.  The plaintiffs filed a petition pursuant to G. L. 
c. 231, § 118, for a single justice of the Appeals Court to 
review the denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction.   
In her decision, the single justice reversed the denial of 
the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and enjoined 
the defendants from implementing the amended COVID-19 policy, 
pending a final resolution of the matter.  The single justice 
held that the defendants' failure to bargain on the decision to 
implement the amended COVID-19 policy, prior to its 
implementation, was sufficient for the plaintiffs to have 
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of the case.  
 
9 The parties dispute whether the defendants fulfilled their 
bargaining obligations after the announcement of the amended 
COVID-19 policy.  The defendants met separately with the 
plaintiffs' bargaining teams on January 5, 6, and 7, 2022, 
before the Department of Labor Relations mediation hearing that 
was scheduled on January 11, 2022, for the plaintiffs' 
prohibited practice charges.  The plaintiffs take issue with the 
fact that this was more than three weeks after the amended 
COVID-19 policy was announced, and only one week before the 
initial deadline for employees to comply with the amended COVID-
19 policy's first dose requirement.  At the hearing for a 
preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs reported that the city 
only agreed to one hour of mediation at the January 11 mediation 
session and sent a representative with no decision-making 
authority.   
9 
 
Moreover, the single justice disagreed with the motion judge 
that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.   
The single justice recognized that potential termination 
from employment generally does not satisfy the element of 
irreparable harm.  See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 91-92 
(1974).  See also Hull Mun. Lighting Plant v. Massachusetts Mun. 
Wholesale Elec. Co., 399 Mass. 640, 643 (1987) (economic loss 
alone generally insufficient for irreparable harm).  However, 
where the plaintiffs alleged that the COVID-19 vaccine involved 
issues of bodily integrity and self-determination, the single 
justice held that this case was distinguishable from the more 
common case where an employee seeks to enjoin termination from 
employment.  Furthermore, where there were only 450 remaining 
unvaccinated union members, who could continue to be tested 
regularly under the existing policy, the enjoinment of the 
amended COVID-19 policy still would provide the defendants with 
the ability to effect public health measures to minimize the 
spread of COVID-19.  Thus, the single justice held that the 
balance of harms favored the plaintiffs.10 
 
10 The order enjoins the defendants from enacting their 
amended COVID-19 policy only as to employees represented by the 
plaintiff unions.  However, the defendants have represented to 
this court that the policy has been suspended for all city 
employees pending the final resolution of this matter. 
 
10 
 
The defendants appealed from the order of the single 
justice, and we transferred the case to this court sua sponte. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  Where a single 
justice of the Appeals Court reverses the decision of a motion 
judge, and issues a preliminary injunction following a petition 
pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, we review the single justice's 
decision to issue the injunction for an abuse of discretion, as 
if it were an identical order by the motion judge considering 
the matter in the first instance.11  See Aspinall v. Philip 
Morris Cos., 442 Mass. 381, 389-390 (2004), citing Jet-Line 
Servs., Inc. v. Selectmen of Stoughton, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 645, 
646 (1988).  See also King v. Shank, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 837, 839 
n.3, S.C., 480 Mass. 7 (2018) (reviewing single justice's order 
 
11 In her order, the single justice stated that her review 
of the motion judge's denial of the motion for injunctive relief 
was for an abuse of discretion.  Her order does not reflect 
review for an abuse of discretion; instead, the single justice's 
decision more closely reflects de novo review.  The single 
justice had the right to review the denial of the preliminary 
injunction de novo, as she could review the same factors as the 
motion judge, see Lieber v. President & Fellows of Harvard 
College (No. 2), 488 Mass. 816, 821 (2022), and draw her own 
conclusions from the record, where the motion judge's order "was 
predicated solely on documentary evidence,"  Packaging Indus. 
Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 616 (1980).  See Manfrates 
v. Lawrence Plaza Ltd. Partnership, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 409, 412 
n.4 (1996) (single justice may review order concerning 
preliminary injunction de novo).  Whether the single justice 
reviewed the motion judge's denial of injunctive relief for an 
abuse of discretion, or de novo, does not alter our holding 
because, for the reasons discussed infra, the issuance of the 
preliminary injunction was erroneous.   
11 
 
to issue preliminary injunction "in the same manner as if it 
were an identical order by the trial judge considering the 
matter in the first instance).  Cf. Fordyce v. Hanover, 457 
Mass. 248, 256 (2010) (where single justice vacates motion 
judge's decision to issue preliminary injunction, pursuant to 
G. L. c. 231, § 118, appellate court reviews for whether motion 
judge abused discretion in issuing preliminary injunction).  In 
making this determination, "we decide 'whether the judge applied 
proper legal standards and whether there was reasonable support 
for his [or her] evaluation of factual questions.'"  Id., 
quoting Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 452 Mass. 733, 741 
(2008).  Any such conclusions of law, however, "are subject to 
broad review and will be reversed if incorrect."  Fordyce, 
supra, quoting Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 
609, 616 (1980). 
 
"[A] party seeking a preliminary injunction must show '(1) 
a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable harm 
will result from denial of the injunction; and (3) that, in 
light of the [moving party's] likelihood of success on the 
merits, the risk of irreparable harm to the [moving party] 
outweighs the potential harm to the [nonmoving party] in 
granting the injunction.'"  Garcia v. Department of Hous. & 
Community Dev., 480 Mass. 736, 747 (2018), quoting Loyal Order 
of Moose, Inc., Yarmouth Lodge # 2270 v. Board of Health of 
12 
 
Yarmouth, 439 Mass. 597, 601 (2003).  "Where a party seeks to 
enjoin government action, the judge also must determine that the 
requested order promotes the public interest, or, alternatively, 
that the equitable relief will not adversely affect the public."  
Foster v. Commissioner of Correction, 488 Mass. 643, 650 (2021), 
quoting Garcia, supra.   
2.  Decision bargaining.  The city and the mayor argue that 
the single justice abused her discretion in holding that the 
plaintiffs had established a likelihood of success on the merits 
of their claim, i.e., that the amended COVID-19 policy violated 
the defendants' mandatory decision bargaining obligations and 
prior MOAs between the parties.  We agree.   
"Pursuant to G. L. c. 150E, § 6, public employers must 
negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, standards 
or productivity and performance, and any other terms and 
conditions of employment" (quotation omitted).  Worcester v. 
Labor Relations Comm'n, 438 Mass. 177, 180 (2002).  The single 
justice held that the plaintiffs' claim revolves around the 
city's duty to bargain over the vaccine mandate policy.  Where 
it failed to bargain over the decision to amend the COVID-19 
policy to eliminate the testing alternative to vaccination and 
require vaccination against COVID-19 as a condition of 
employment, the single justice held that the plaintiffs have 
established a strong likelihood of success on their essential 
13 
 
claim, i.e., that the defendants likely violated both their 
decision and impact bargaining obligations under G. L. c. 150E, 
as well as the MOAs with Local 718 and the federation.   
Contrary to the decision of the single justice, the 
defendants need not have bargained over the decision to amend 
the COVID-19 policy to remove COVID-19 testing as an alternative 
to vaccination.  Certain managerial decisions are exempted from 
collective bargaining obligations where such decisions, as a 
matter of public policy, must be reserved to the public 
employer's discretion.  Worcester, 438 Mass. at 180.  "The 
crucial factor in determining whether a given issue is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining is whether resolution of the 
issue at the bargaining table is deemed to conflict with 
perceived requirements of public policy" (alteration and 
citation omitted).  Id. at 181.  Such inquiry aims to define 
"the boundary between subjects that by statute, by tradition, or 
by common sense must be reserved to the sole discretion of the 
public employer so as to preserve the intended role of the 
governmental agency and its accountability in the political 
process."  Id., quoting Lynn v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 43 Mass. 
App. Ct. 172, 178 (1997).  See Local 346, Int'l Bhd. of Police 
Officers v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 391 Mass. 429, 437 (1984) 
("in instances where a negotiation requirement would unduly 
impinge on a public employer's freedom to perform its public 
14 
 
functions, G. L. c. 150E, § 6, does not mandate bargaining over 
a decision directly affecting the employment relationship").   
In December 2021, as the Omicron variant ran rampant 
throughout the Commonwealth, vaccination against COVID-19 was 
viewed as the only effective means by which the city and the 
mayor could combat the virus while still performing their public 
functions.  According to the executive director of the city's 
public health commission, the continued practice of testing as 
an alternative to vaccination against COVID-19 would be 
insufficient to contain the spread of COVID-19 following the 
emergence of the Omicron variant.  The defendants' policy 
decision to amend the COVID-19 policy was based on concerns not 
only for the health of their employees, but also for the 
residents of the city, for whom the defendants were obligated to 
provide continued access to public safety services.   
Given the unique circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic and 
its threat to the health and safety of the public, the decision 
to remove the testing alternative in the defendants' COVID-19 
policy constituted a nondelegable policy decision that could not 
be the subject of decision bargaining because any such 
requirement would have impinged directly on the defendants' 
ability to provide essential public safety services to city 
residents.  See Boston v. Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n, 
29 Mass. App. Ct. 907, 908 (1990) (certain core managerial 
15 
 
decisions, affecting city's ability to provide essential safety 
services, exceed bounds of mandatory bargaining because "[t]he 
demands of public safety and a disciplined police force 
underscore the importance of management control over matters 
such as staffing levels, assignments, uniforms, weapons, and 
definition of duties" [citation omitted]).  See also Local 346, 
Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers, 391 Mass. at 439-440 (police 
chief may require officers suspected of criminal conduct to take 
polygraph examination without mandatory bargaining because 
integrity and credibility of police departments is indispensable 
to effective public law enforcement); Framingham v. Framingham 
Police Officers Union, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 537, 543 (2018) (police 
chief's authority to assign officers to particular duties 
concerns public safety and constitutes policy judgment in 
allocation and deployment of law enforcement resources); Saugus 
v. Saugus Police Superior Officers Union, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 916, 
916-917 (2005) (police chief's involuntary assignment of 
officers to overtime shifts, which were required for public 
safety, was within his core managerial prerogatives and was not 
subject to mandatory bargaining).  
Whether there were possible alternatives to the amended 
COVID-19 policy that could have allowed the defendants to 
maintain the ability to provide these essential safety services 
to city residents without going so far as mandating vaccination 
16 
 
against COVID-19 for all city employees, such as continued 
testing for COVID-19 for unvaccinated employees, is not the 
issue when identifying core managerial prerogatives.  See 
Worcester, 438 Mass. at 183 ("A public employer need not defend 
the wisdom of a policy choice that it has made in order to have 
that choice recognized as a core managerial prerogative.  It is 
the fact that the public employer's choice is one of policy, not 
the merits of the choice the employer makes, that renders the 
choice an inappropriate subject of mandatory bargaining").  
Where the decision to remove weekly testing as an alternative to 
vaccination against COVID-19 constituted a core managerial 
prerogative, we hold that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a 
likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that the 
defendants have violated their decision bargaining obligations 
under G. L. c. 150E.   
Notwithstanding the defendants' bargaining obligations 
under G. L. c. 150E, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' 
unilateral decision to remove the testing alternative to 
vaccination against COVID-19 repudiated the MOAs between the 
parties.12  In arguing that the defendants have repudiated the 
MOAs, the plaintiffs point to paragraph seven of the MOA with 
 
12 Only two of the unions, Local 718 and the federation, 
actually entered into an MOA with the defendants to memorialize 
the COVID-19 policy. 
17 
 
Local 718, where the defendants stated their intent "to 
periodically review the Policy" and agreed to "fulfill any 
impact bargaining obligations associated with any proposed 
substantive changes" (emphasis added).  The plaintiffs also 
alleged that the defendants violated paragraph four of the MOA 
with the federation, where the defendants agreed that nothing in 
the MOA concerning the COVID-19 policy shall "demonstrate a 
practice or create a precedent for any other matter" or diminish 
any of the parties' other collective bargaining rights.   
 
Neither paragraph in the MOAs contains express language 
demonstrating an agreement between the parties as to mandatory 
collective bargaining on any potential future decision to 
require mandatory vaccination against COVID-19.  Furthermore, 
any agreement to mandatory collective bargaining on an issue of 
public health and safety, in light of the emergency of the 
Omicron variant of COVID-19, likely would not have been 
enforceable as the defendants are "not free to bargain away 
certain elements of [their] nondelegable authority and 
responsibility to act for the public health, safety, and 
welfare," because "the public interest . . . impose[s] a 
necessary limitation upon the collective bargaining process."  
Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court v. 
Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 79 Mass. App. Ct. 374, 
381 (2011).  Thus, we hold that the plaintiffs have failed to 
18 
 
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim 
that the defendants have repudiated the MOAs, insofar as the 
MOAs require mandatory collective bargaining on any decision to 
eliminate the testing alternative in the amended COVID-19 
policy. 
3.  Impact bargaining.  Even where an employer's decision 
is not the subject of mandatory collective bargaining, if any 
such decision by the employer "has [an] impact upon or affects a 
mandatory topic of bargaining, negotiation over the impact is 
[still] required" (citation omitted).  Worcester, 438 Mass. at 
185.  In seeking injunctive relief from the implementation of 
the amended COVID-19 policy, the plaintiffs alleged that they 
have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of the 
defendants' alleged violations of their impact bargaining 
obligations under both the MOAs and G. L. c. 150E.13   
 
Exigent circumstances permit an employer to set a deadline 
for concluding impact bargaining and implementing a change in 
the conditions of employment, so long as the employer continues 
to bargain over the impacts of such change thereafter.14  See 
 
13 Paragraph seven of the MOA between the defendants and 
Local 718 states:  "The City . . . shall fulfill any impact 
bargaining obligations associated with any proposed substantive 
changes."   
 
14 The parties agree that an exigency defense exists for an 
employer with respect to impact bargaining obligations.  We note 
 
19 
 
City of Boston & Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n, 
Commonwealth Employment Relations Board (CERB), Nos. MUP-21-
9008, MUP-22-9238, at 14 (Dec. 29, 2022).  An employer relying 
on an exigency defense for impact bargaining has the burden of 
establishing that (1) circumstances beyond the employer's 
control require the imposition of a deadline for negotiations; 
(2) the bargaining representative of the union was notified of 
these circumstances and the employer's deadline; and (3) the 
deadline was reasonable and necessary.  Id.  See Secretary of 
Admin. & Fin. v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 74 Mass. 
App. Ct. 91, 98 (2009) ("If the Commonwealth had agreed to 
bargain and no resolution or impasse was in sight as the 
implementation deadline approached, under longstanding 
commission precedent, the Commonwealth could have imposed a 
reasonable negotiation deadline, implemented the withholding, 
and continued post-implementation bargaining without running 
afoul of its obligations under G. L. c. 150E").   
 
that CERB precedent has acknowledged such a defense, and while 
we discern no published appellate court case of this 
Commonwealth directly on point on the issue, the parties rely on 
this CERB precedent in their briefs.  See City of New Bedford, 
38 M.L.C. 239, 251 (2012).  This precedent also has been relied 
on by the Appeals Court, albeit in an unpublished decision.  See 
New Bedford v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 90 Mass. 
App. Ct. 1103 (2016).  We owe deference to the special expertise 
of CERB in this area of law.  See Somerville v. Commonwealth 
Employment Relations Bd., 470 Mass. 563, 567-568 (2015).  
20 
 
Here, according to Dr. Ojikutu, the emergence of the 
Omicron variant presented a circumstance outside of the 
defendants' control, which threatened the defendants' ability to 
continue to provide essential public safety services to city 
residents.  Testing, as an alternative to mandatory vaccination 
for city employees, was no longer considered to be a viable 
alternative by medical officials like Dr. Ojikutu.  In light of 
the evolving circumstances with the Omicron variant, and the 
belief that testing was no longer a viable alternative to 
vaccination against COVID-19, the defendants notified the 
plaintiffs of their intent to amend the COVID-19 policy, 
mandating vaccination against COVID-19 for all city employees.  
Per the amended COVID-19 policy, all city employees were 
required to have at least one dose of the COVID-19 vaccine by 
January 15, 2022, and verify full vaccination status by February 
15, 2022.  This deadline initially was extended by two weeks, 
and the defendants suspended the implementation of the policy 
pending the resolution of this matter.  See note 10, supra. 
The plaintiffs argue that where the deadline for mandatory 
vaccination was pushed back multiple times, the implementation 
of the amended COVID-19 policy was stayed pending resolution of 
this matter, and the city permitted thousands of other 
unvaccinated employees to continue to provide services to its 
residents, no such exigent circumstances existed to relieve the 
21 
 
defendants of their impact bargaining obligations.  Because the 
Omicron variant of COVID-19 was thought to spread significantly 
and rapidly throughout the city's workforce, however, the 
defendants' claim, that the exigency of the COVID-19 pandemic 
necessitated the swift removal of the testing alternative to 
mandatory vaccination against COVID-19, was reasonable given the 
expert opinions of medical officials such as Dr. Ojikutu.   
Whether the initial, approximate three-week deadline 
imposed by the defendants was a reasonable and necessary 
deadline in light of the emergence of the Omicron variant is 
less clear.  The record is devoid of sufficient facts to 
determine this fact-intensive issue, one that has already been 
presented to CERB.  See City of Boston & Boston Police Superior 
Officers Fed'n, CERB, Nos. MUP-21-9008, MUP-22-9238, at 14-15.  
While CERB has yet to denounce the approximate three-week 
deadline as an unreasonable deadline, it did acknowledge that 
the defendants' deadline was less than one-half of a comparable 
two-month deadline imposed by the Commonwealth in nearly 
identical circumstances, in a dispute over mandatory vaccination 
against COVID-19 between the Commonwealth and the State Police 
Association of Massachusetts.  Id.  
Whether the deadline for compliance with the defendants' 
amended COVID-19 policy in fact was reasonable and necessary is 
still the subject of a pending matter before an investigator of 
22 
 
the Department of Labor Relations, following a remand by CERB.  
Id. at 14-15 & n.10.  Nonetheless, given CERB's acknowledgement 
that the defendants' initial deadline more than halved that of 
another employer in similar circumstances, we conclude that the 
plaintiffs have demonstrated at least some likelihood of success 
on the merits of their impact bargaining claim.   
 
4.  Irreparable harm and the harm to the public.  Assuming 
that the plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on 
the merits of their impact bargaining claim, i.e., that the 
initial deadline for implementation of the amended COVID-19 
policy in fact was neither a reasonable nor a necessary deadline 
in the circumstances, the plaintiffs still were required to 
demonstrate irreparable harm from the failure to enjoin the 
implementation of the amended COVID-19 policy.  See Garcia, 480 
Mass. at 747.   
The motion judge and single justice disagreed on whether 
the plaintiffs had demonstrated irreparable harm.  The motion 
judge held that, where the failure to grant the injunction would 
result in solely economic harm in the form of adverse employment 
consequences including suspension without pay and eventual 
termination, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated irreparable 
harm.  See Sampson, 415 U.S. at 92 n.68 (generally termination 
from employment falls short of irreparable harm).  See also Hull 
Mun. Lighting Plant, 399 Mass. at 643 (economic damages alone 
23 
 
insufficient for irreparable harm).  The single justice, 
however, held that while potential termination from employment 
ordinarily does not give rise to irreparable harm, the 
circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic and the mandate of 
vaccination against COVID-19 as a condition of employment 
constituted a "genuinely extraordinary situation," implicating 
issues of "bodily integrity and self-determination."  Thus, 
according to the single justice, the plaintiffs sufficiently had 
demonstrated irreparable harm warranting injunctive relief.   
While the circumstances giving rise to the threat of 
discharge from employment were extraordinary, i.e., the COVID-19 
pandemic and mandatory vaccination against COVID-19, we conclude 
that the motion judge, and not the single justice, was correct:  
the harm to the plaintiffs -- the loss of employment -- is still 
economic, see Hull Mun. Lighting Plant, 399 Mass. at 643, as 
they could have continued to refuse to become vaccinated and 
instead challenged the decision both in court and before CERB, 
see Commonwealth v. Mass. CRINC, 392 Mass. 79, 87 (1984) 
(irreparable harm must rise to level such that no adequate 
remedy at law exists).  See also G. L. c. 150E, § 11 (d) (where 
employer commits prohibited practice under public employee 
collective bargaining agreement, discharged employee shall be 
reinstated with potential for back pay); Pittsfield v. Local 447 
Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers, 480 Mass. 634, 644 (2018) 
24 
 
(officers wrongfully terminated have possibility of 
reinstatement and can be made whole through back pay and 
compensation for lost income from overtime, lost benefits under 
collective bargaining agreement, etc.). 
We must also consider the potential harm to the city and 
the public in granting an injunction.  Garcia, 480 Mass. at 747.  
The risk of irreparable harm to the plaintiffs must outweigh 
this potential harm to the city and the public.  Id.  Where the 
plaintiffs seek to enjoin government action, the award of a 
preliminary injunction must "promote[] the public interest, or, 
alternatively, . . . [must] not adversely affect the public" 
(citation omitted).  Id.   
As explained by Dr. Ojikutu, health officials at the time 
had a scientific basis to believe that continuing to allow 
testing as an alternative to vaccination against COVID-19 likely 
was insufficient to combat the surge of the Omicron variant in 
December 2021.  Dr. Ojikutu opined that requiring vaccination 
against COVID-19 instead of the testing alternative would reduce 
the likelihood of the spread of COVID-19 to those city residents 
who need emergency public safety services.  In doing so, 
vaccination against COVID-19 not only protected the health of 
city residents, but also protected the defendants' ability to 
continue to maintain a sufficiently healthy workforce during the 
Omicron surge, as would be needed to deliver emergency public 
25 
 
safety services to the residents of the city.  Therefore, where 
awarding injunctive relief does not promote the public interest, 
the single justice abused her discretion in issuing the 
preliminary injunction because the potential harm to the city 
and the public resulting from the spread of COVID-19 clearly 
outweighed the economic harm to the employees.  See LeClair v. 
Norwell, 430 Mass. 328, 337-339 (1999) (where enjoining 
important school construction project would harm public 
interest, no error in failure to award preliminary injunction 
despite plaintiffs' meritorious allegations that town violated 
public construction statute and town bylaw).     
Conclusion.  Accordingly, we reverse the order of the 
single justice of the Appeals Court, and we vacate the 
preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from enacting 
the amended COVID-19 policy.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.