Title: People v. Marcum
Citation: 2024 IL 128687
Docket Number: 128687
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: March 21, 2024

2024 IL 128687 
 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 
 
(Docket No. 128687) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee,  
v. CLAYTON T. MARCUM, Appellant. 
 
 
Opinion filed March 21, 2024. 
 
 
JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
 
Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White, 
Cunningham, and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
Defendant, Clayton T. Marcum, was convicted in the circuit court of Ford 
County of two counts of aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a) (West 
2018)). Defendant was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of seven years on 
each count. Defendant appealed, arguing that his right to a speedy trial had been 
violated, he did not knowingly waive his right to counsel, the State failed to prove 
 
 
 
 
 
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him guilty of aggravated domestic battery, and the circuit court violated his right to 
remain silent when it ordered him to participate in the preparation of his presentence 
investigation report. 2022 IL App (4th) 200656-U. 
¶ 2 
 
The appellate court agreed that the evidence was insufficient to prove defendant 
guilty of aggravated domestic battery. The appellate court therefore reduced 
defendant’s convictions to Class 3 aggravated batteries and remanded to the trial 
court for resentencing. The appellate court rejected defendant’s remaining 
arguments. In this court, defendant appeals only his speedy trial and waiver of 
counsel claim. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate 
court. 
 
¶ 3 
 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 4 
 
On September 1, 2019, police officer Brandon Ryan of the Paxton Police 
Department received a report of a naked man outside some apartments. When 
Officer Ryan arrived on the scene, he observed a man, later identified as Greg 
Rudin, lying in an alley outside the apartments with various injuries. Rudin was 
taken to a hospital, where he was diagnosed with a subarachnoid hemorrhage and 
broken ribs.  
¶ 5 
 
Bystanders told Officer Ryan that they had seen Rudin with defendant. Officer 
Ryan then spoke with defendant. Defendant said that he and Rudin drank together 
at defendant’s apartment until Rudin left at 10 p.m. Officer Ryan noted that 
defendant had dried blood on his clothing. Defendant then clarified that he and 
Rudin had wrestled and that he assisted Rudin down the stairs. Defendant 
eventually stated that Rudin fell down the stairs. 
¶ 6 
 
Officer Ryan returned to defendant’s apartment with a search warrant. Officers 
found blood on a mattress in the apartment and in a stairwell outside the apartment. 
Defendant stated that Rudin was bleeding prior to leaving the apartment. The 
officers arrested defendant on charges of aggravated battery and obstruction of 
justice.  
¶ 7 
 
Five days after defendant’s arrest, investigating officers met with defendant at 
the county jail, where he made a videotaped confession. Defendant told the officers 
 
 
 
 
 
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that he met Rudin several days prior to September 1, 2019, and had a sexual 
encounter with Rudin. On September 1, defendant and Rudin were drinking and 
began to wrestle and engage in consensual horseplay. Defendant admitted that he 
struck Rudin while they were wrestling. The wrestling stopped when Rudin began 
bleeding. Defendant and Rudin then left defendant’s apartment to walk to a bar. 
While on their way to the bar, Rudin fell down the stairs. Defendant tried to help 
Rudin walk outside, but Rudin kept falling. When Rudin fell the last time, 
defendant stomped on Rudin. Defendant told Rudin to stay there, to sleep it off, and 
to take himself home in the morning.  
¶ 8 
 
On September 27, 2019, the State charged defendant with one count of 
aggravated battery, a Class 3 felony, for striking Rudin on the head and body and 
knowingly causing Rudin great bodily harm. The information stated that, if 
defendant was convicted of the charged offense, he could be sentenced to an 
extended term of 5 to 10 years in prison based upon a prior residential burglary 
conviction in Iroquois County. The public defender’s office was appointed to 
represent defendant.  
¶ 9 
 
At the preliminary hearing on September 30, 2019, Officer Ryan testified that, 
when he spoke to defendant at the scene, defendant had dried blood on his shirt and 
jeans. Officer Ryan also testified that, in defendant’s videotaped statement 
following his arrest, defendant admitted that he struck Rudin’s head and saw blood 
coming out of his mouth. Defendant also demonstrated how he stomped on Rudin 
after he fell. Rudin suffered broken ribs, a punctured lung, and three brain 
hematomas. Officer Ryan said that Rudin had recently awakened from a coma and 
was unable to speak. Officer Ryan also testified that he learned during his 
investigation that defendant and Rudin were in a dating relationship. The trial court 
found probable cause to support the aggravated battery charge and suggested an 
October 2019 trial date. Defense counsel objected and, after consulting with 
defendant, proposed a January 2020 trial date. The trial court granted defendant’s 
request. 
¶ 10 
 
Defendant’s trial was set for January 6, 2020, but on that date, the circuit court 
granted the State’s motion to extend the speedy trial term by no more than 20 days 
in order to complete DNA testing, over defendant’s objection. The trial court set 
the trial for April 2020. 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 11 
 
At a hearing on March 19, 2020, the State indicated that it had received and 
provided defense counsel with the DNA test results and that the State was ready for 
trial. In March 2020, the State also made an offer of an eight-year sentencing cap 
in exchange for a guilty plea from defendant. After consulting with his attorney, 
defendant rejected the State’s offer. Defendant also stated that he wanted his 
attorney removed from the case.  
¶ 12 
 
On April 13, 2020, the case was continued to July 2020 due to this court’s 
COVID-19 administrative orders. At a May 15, 2020, hearing, defendant again 
informed the court that he wanted his attorney removed. The trial court continued 
the case for a hearing on defendant’s request. On May 22, 2020, the trial court told 
defendant the nature of the charge, admonished defendant of his rights under 
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401 (eff. July 1, 1984), and discussed with defendant 
his right to counsel and the consequences of proceeding pro se. Defendant affirmed 
that he wished to proceed pro se. 
¶ 13 
 
On July 6, 2020, the State dismissed the aggravated battery count and filed a 
two-count information charging defendant with two counts of aggravated domestic 
battery, a Class 2 felony. Count I alleged that defendant struck Rudin with his fist, 
causing a subarachnoid hemorrhage, that defendant caused great bodily harm to 
Rudin, and that Rudin was defendant’s family or household member. Count II 
alleged that defendant stomped on Rudin with his foot, causing rib fractures, that 
defendant knowingly caused great bodily harm to Rudin, and that Rudin was 
defendant’s family or household member. Both counts averred that defendant was 
eligible for extended term sentencing due to defendant’s prior residential burglary 
conviction.  
¶ 14 
 
The new counts proceeded to arraignment. At the arraignment, the trial court 
read the new information to defendant. The trial court admonished defendant that 
he was facing a sentence of 7 to 14 years on each charge, rather than the usual 
sentence of 3 to 7 years, due to his prior residential burglary conviction. The trial 
court also informed defendant that a mandatory supervised release (MSR) term 
would be added to any prison sentence and that probation and conditional discharge 
were available sentences. Defendant sought clarification of the charges. The trial 
court repeated the charges and the possible penalties and also told defendant that 
 
 
 
 
 
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he would need to serve 85% of any prison sentence and would be ineligible for day-
for-day credit. Defendant responded that he understood.  
¶ 15 
 
The trial court then confirmed that defendant still wished to represent himself. 
The trial court asked defendant if he understood the charges; defendant responded, 
“Yeah.” The trial court then asked defendant if he understood the minimum and 
maximum penalties, including extended term eligibility, the MSR range, and the 
applicable financial obligations. Defendant responded, “Uh-huh.” The trial court 
next told defendant that he had the right to represent himself but that counsel could 
be appointed for him if he was indigent. When asked if he understood that, 
defendant said “Yeah.” The trial court asked defendant if he wished to waive his 
right to counsel, and the defendant said he did. 
¶ 16 
 
Defendant then asked the court about spending 120 days in custody and whether 
the speedy trial limitation was “completely out the window.” The trial court stated 
that the speedy trial limitation was tolled by this court’s COVID-19 order. 
Defendant responded, “So I have to start all over again? Like be here, like be here 
over a year ago or three more months or four more months?” The trial court 
answered that defendant’s case was continued by agreement and due to COVID-
19. Defendant replied, “[y]ou can see I been here for about a year, and this ain’t a 
murder charge. I been here for about a year.” The trial court again responded that 
the case was continued by agreement and that the speedy trial period starts over 
every time the case is continued by agreement. Defendant asked the court if there 
were “anymore curve balls I need to be aware of?” The trial court denied there was 
a curve ball and informed defendant that the State simply “elected to file a different 
charge.”  
¶ 17 
 
A preliminary hearing on the new charges was held on August 4, 2020. Officer 
Ryan testified consistently with his testimony at the prior preliminary hearing. 
Officer Ryan also told the court that Rudin was now confined to an assisted living 
facility, was unable to care for himself, and would require assistance for the rest of 
his life. The trial court found probable cause to support the charges and set 
defendant’s trial for October 2020. Defendant then indicated that he was confused 
concerning the nature of the charges, asking “is this still aggravated battery with 
 
 
 
 
 
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intent at any time to do bodily harm?” The trial court responded that the charge was 
“a straight domestic battery, which is a Class 2.”1  
¶ 18 
 
Prior to jury selection, the trial court again asked defendant if he understood the 
nature of the charges, what he was charged with, and the possible penalties for those 
charges. The defendant acknowledged he was charged with aggravated domestic 
battery. The trial court clarified that defendant was charged with two counts of 
aggravated domestic battery. The trial court also confirmed that defendant knew he 
was facing a sentence of 7 to 14 years. Defendant then asked the court if he “would 
be charged with two charges” if he was found guilty. The prosecutor responded 
that, if defendant was found guilty, he was “going to be sentenced to one sentence.” 
The trial court then stated, “[y]ou will not be sentenced twice.” Defendant replied, 
“Oh, so I would be looking at seven to 14 years?” The trial court answered, “[y]es.” 
After further admonishments from the trial court, defendant reaffirmed that he 
wished to proceed pro se.  
¶ 19 
 
On the last day of trial, the prosecutor informed the court that there was an error 
in the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System (LEADS) sheet concerning 
defendant. The prosecutor determined that the residential burglary charge listed 
under defendant’s name was not defendant’s case. Defendant confirmed that he had 
never been convicted of residential burglary. The prosecutor told the court that 
defendant was no longer subject to extended term sentencing but rather faced a 
sentencing range of three to seven years’ imprisonment.  
¶ 20 
 
At the close of trial, the jury found defendant guilty of both counts of aggravated 
domestic battery. At defendant’s sentencing hearing, the State asked that 
defendant’s sentences be served consecutively. When defendant asked what that 
meant, the trial court explained that the State was asking for two separate terms of 
seven years, to be served one after the other. Defendant responded, “[l]ike 14 
years?” The trial court confirmed it was 14 years. Following the sentencing hearing, 
the trial court sentenced defendant to a seven-year prison term on each conviction, 
to be served consecutively. Defendant did not file a posttrial motion. 
 
 
1The charges were aggravated domestic battery. 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 21 
 
On appeal, the appellate court agreed with defendant that the evidence was 
insufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendant was in a dating relationship with Rudin. 2022 IL App (4th) 200656-U, 
¶ 68. The appellate court therefore reduced defendant’s convictions to aggravated 
battery and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. Id. ¶ 69. Relevant 
to the instant appeal, the appellate court found that defendant’s statutory right to a 
speedy trial had been violated but that the error was not subject to plain-error 
review. Id. ¶¶ 44, 51. Accordingly, defendant waived his speedy trial claim when 
he failed to file a motion for discharge pursuant to section 114-1(b) of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/114-1(b) (West 2018)). 2022 IL 
App (4th) 200656-U, ¶ 51. The appellate court also found that defendant knowingly 
waived his right to counsel. Id. ¶¶ 60-61. 
¶ 22 
 
This court allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 
(eff. Oct. 1, 2021). 
 
¶ 23 
 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 24 
 
On appeal, defendant first argues that, despite correctly finding that the State 
violated his statutory right to a speedy trial when it filed the aggravated domestic 
battery charges, the appellate court erred in finding that the violation was not 
subject to plain-error review. The State does not dispute that defendant’s statutory 
right to a speedy trial was violated but disagrees that the violation is subject to 
plain-error review. 
¶ 25 
 
The people of the State of Illinois possess a constitutional right to a speedy trial 
under both the United States and the Illinois Constitutions. See U.S. Const., 
amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. Both this court and the United States 
Supreme Court have recognized that the right to a speedy trial cannot be defined in 
terms of a precise or absolute standard of time. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 
(1972); People v. Henry, 47 Ill. 2d 312, 316 (1970). Given the imprecise nature of 
the constitutional right to a speedy trial, the Illinois legislature has historically 
provided that an accused in custody shall be tried within a certain time. See People 
ex rel. Nagel v. Heider, 225 Ill. 347, 350 (1907) (statute provided that, with certain 
exceptions, accused not admitted to bail shall be tried within four months of his 
date of commitment). The current speedy trial statute is set forth in section 103-5 
 
 
 
 
 
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of the Code (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2020)). Section 103-5(a) provides that, with 
certain exceptions, “[e]very person in custody in this State for an alleged offense 
shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he or 
she was taken into custody.” Id. § 103-5(a). Section 103-5 implements the 
constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial; however, the statute is not equivalent to, 
or coextensive with, the constitutional right to a speedy trial. People v. Crane, 195 
Ill. 2d 42, 48 (2001).  
¶ 26 
 
To claim a violation of the statutory right to a speedy trial, section 114-1 of the 
Code provides: 
 
“(a) Upon the written motion of the defendant made prior to trial before or 
after a plea has been entered the court may dismiss the indictment, information 
or complaint upon any of the following grounds: 
 
(1) The defendant has not been placed on trial in compliance with 
Section 103-5 of this Code. 
 
 
 
 
 
* * * 
 
(b) The court shall require any motion to dismiss to be filed within a 
reasonable time after the defendant has been arraigned. Any motion not filed 
within such time or an extension thereof shall not be considered by the court 
and the grounds therefor *** are waived.” 725 ILCS 5/114-1(a)(1), (b) (West 
2020). 
¶ 27 
 
Defendant concedes that he did not file a pretrial motion to dismiss on statutory 
speedy trial grounds but argues that this court should review the issue as plain error. 
It is well settled that a defendant must object at trial and raise a purported error in 
a posttrial motion in order to preserve the error for review. People v. Williams, 2022 
IL 126918, ¶ 48. Failure to do either results in forfeiture of the error, but the 
forfeiture may be excused where the error is plain error. Id. Illinois Supreme Court 
Rule 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) memorializes the plain-error doctrine. Rule 615(a) 
provides, in pertinent part, that “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights 
may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.” 
Id.  
 
 
 
 
 
- 9 - 
¶ 28 
 
The plain-error rule does not allow for review of all forfeited errors. People v. 
Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 19. A court will review a forfeited error in two 
circumstances: (1) where the evidence is so closely balanced that the jury’s verdict 
may have resulted from the error and not the evidence or (2) when the error is so 
serious that it affected the fairness of the trial and challenged the integrity of the 
judicial process. Id. Whether there is plain error is a question of law that this court 
reviews de novo. Williams, 2022 IL 126918, ¶ 48. 
¶ 29 
 
Defendant argues that the violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial was 
so serious that it affected the fairness of his trial and challenged the integrity of the 
judicial process. Therefore, defendant maintains that the error may be reviewed 
under the second prong of the plain-error rule. 
¶ 30 
 
This court has not had the opportunity to directly address whether a statutory 
speedy trial violation constitutes plain error. The argument was raised in both 
People v. Staake, 2017 IL 121755, and People v. Hartfield, 2022 IL 126729, but 
this court found no error occurred in either case and, therefore, did not reach the 
issue. 
¶ 31 
 
This court did discuss section 103-5 in People v. Pearson, 88 Ill. 2d 210 (1981), 
in the context of whether a speedy trial violation may be raised for the first time in 
a posttrial motion. Pearson found that it could not, holding that a motion for 
discharge for a speedy trial violation must be brought to the trial court’s attention 
before trial, based upon the express language of section 114-1 of the Code. Id. at 
219. Pearson noted that the right conferred by section 103-5 was “not absolute in 
the sense that the mere passage of time ousts the court of jurisdiction to try the 
accused and makes his release mandatory.” Id. at 216. Pearson explained that “it 
was long ago established that the right to discharge granted by the statute was 
waived if not asserted by the defendant prior to conviction.” (Emphasis added.) Id. 
Further, section 114-1 specifically provided that a “violation of the provisions of 
section 103-5 of the Code relating to speedy trial is waived unless a motion for 
discharge is made prior to trial.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 217. 
¶ 32 
 
Defendant distinguishes Pearson on the ground that there was no indication in 
that case that the defendant invoked the plain-error doctrine to excuse his 
procedural default. Defendant finds support for his argument in several appellate 
court decisions holding that a violation of the speedy trial statute qualifies for 
 
 
 
 
 
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review under the second prong of plain-error review. See People v. Mosley, 2016 
IL App (5th) 130223; People v. Smith, 2016 IL App (3d) 140235; People v. 
McKinney, 2011 IL App (1st) 100317; People v. Gay, 376 Ill. App. 3d 796 (2007).  
¶ 33 
 
The appellate court in this case declined to follow the case law cited by 
defendant. The appellate court pointed out that those decisions lacked any analysis 
in finding plain error based upon statutory speedy trial violations. 2022 IL App 
(4th) 200656-U, ¶ 48. The appellate court instead observed that, in section 114-
1(b), the legislature provided for the “forfeiture” of a statutory speedy trial violation 
if the speedy trial violation was not timely raised. Id. ¶ 51. The appellate court 
therefore concluded that, if a statutory speedy trial violation alone constituted plain 
error, the legislature would not have provided for its waiver in section 114-1(b). Id.  
¶ 34 
 
At the outset, we note that the appellate court used the terms “waiver” and 
“forfeiture” interchangeably. Section 114-1(b), however, expressly provides that 
the right to a speedy trial is waived if not filed “within a reasonable time after the 
defendant has been arraigned.” 725 ILCS 5/114-1(b) (West 2020). Accordingly, the 
issue is whether defendant can claim plain error when he has waived his right to a 
speedy trial. We find that he cannot. 
¶ 35 
 
In each of the cases relied upon by defendant, the courts conflated a defendant’s 
constitutional right to a speedy trial with his statutory right to a speedy trial. The 
court in Gay originated the error. Without further analysis, Gay stated that a 
“speedy trial is a substantial fundamental right (People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 46, 
743 N.E.2d 555, 559 (2001)); thus, we will review defendant’s claim under the 
plain-error doctrine despite defendant’s failure to file a motion to dismiss the 
charges or file a posttrial motion.” Gay, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 799. Gay’s reliance on 
Crane was misplaced. Crane was referencing an accused’s constitutional right to a 
speedy trial, not his statutory right to a speedy trial. See Crane, 195 Ill. 2d at 46 
(“[t]he sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is fundamental”).  
¶ 36 
 
The McKinney court simply repeated Gay’s misstatement. The defendant in 
McKinney claimed a violation of his statutory speedy trial right and conceded that 
he had failed to properly preserve the issue for review. 2011 IL App (1st) 100317, 
¶ 27. The defendant argued that the court should nonetheless consider the issue 
under the plain-error doctrine. Id. The appellate court, citing Gay, agreed that, 
“despite the defendant’s failure to include this issue in the motion for a new trial, it 
 
 
 
 
 
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is subject to plain error review because a speedy trial implicates fundamental 
constitutional concerns.” Id. ¶ 29.  
¶ 37 
 
Mosley also repeated Gay’s misstatement that a speedy trial is a substantial 
fundamental right, without distinguishing between statutory and constitutional 
speedy trial rights. Mosley, 2016 IL App (5th) 130223, ¶ 9. The defendant in Mosley 
claimed he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial. Id. Although the 
defendant failed to raise the issue in the trial court, the Mosley court cited Gay in 
electing to “address the issue under the plain-error doctrine because a speedy trial 
is a substantial fundamental right.” Id. 
¶ 38 
 
Similarly, the defendant in Smith claimed a violation of the speedy trial statute 
and failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Citing McKinney, the Smith court stated 
that it would “accept defendant’s request to consider his argument under the plain 
error doctrine.” Smith, 2016 IL App (3d) 140235, ¶ 10. Smith found that the trial 
court had erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss on speedy trial 
grounds because the defendant’s trial was held outside the 120-day statutory speedy 
trial limit. Id. ¶ 20. Smith concluded that the defendant was entitled to relief under 
the plain-error doctrine. Id. ¶ 21.  
¶ 39 
 
As noted, the speedy trial statute was designed to implement the constitutional 
right to a speedy trial, but the constitutional right to a speedy trial is not coextensive 
with the statutorily prescribed period. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d at 48. We observed in 
Pearson, 88 Ill. 2d at 216, that, even prior to the enactment of section 114-1, case 
law had long established that the right to discharge under section 103-5 was waived 
if the claim had not been raised by the defendant prior to his conviction.  
¶ 40 
 
For example, in People v. Morris, 3 Ill. 2d 437, 441-43 (1954), the court 
rejected the defendant’s postconviction claim he had a constitutional right to 
discharge because he was not tried within four months from the time of his 
commitment, as set forth in the statutory speedy trial statute in effect at the time 
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, ch. 38, ¶ 748). The Morris court rejected that claim, pointing 
out that the right to discharge could be waived, and is waived, when the accused 
fails to raise the question prior to conviction. Morris, 3 Ill. 2d at 442. Morris stated, 
“[i]n a case where the question concerns whether there has been a waiver of the 
statute, this court has held the case does not involve the denial of a constitutional 
right, and the defendant cannot raise the issue in a petition under the Post-
 
 
 
 
 
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Conviction Hearing Act.” Id. Further, quoting People v. Farley, 408 Ill. 288, 295 
(1951), the Morris court explained,  
“ ‘[i]f a defendant is afforded the basic right of a trial, and the question arises 
as to whether he has waived the requirements of the statute as to the time within 
which he must be tried, *** the decision of such questions does not involve the 
denial of constitutional rights, but only the manner of asserting, waiving or 
enforcing them.’ ” Morris, 3 Ill. 2d at 442.  
Morris concluded that the defendant’s postconviction petition did not raise a 
constitutional question but, rather, raised a question concerning the statutory 
procedure implementing a constitutional right. Id. at 443. 
¶ 41 
 
Consistent with the long-held application of waiver in our case law, section 
114-1 of the Code expressly states that a violation of section 103-5 is waived unless 
a motion for discharge is made prior to trial. As the appellate court noted, the 
legislature would not have provided for waiver of the speedy trial statute if a 
violation of that statute alone resulted in an unfair trial or challenged the integrity 
of the judicial process. 2022 IL App (4th) 200656-U, ¶ 51. We therefore hold that 
a violation of section 103-5 does not alone constitute plain error. To the extent that 
the decisions in Gay, McKinney, Mosley, and Smith held to the contrary, those 
decisions are hereby overruled. We therefore affirm the appellate court’s finding 
that defendant waived his right to claim a violation of the speedy trial act in this 
case. 
¶ 42 
 
Defendant next argues that he did not knowingly waive his right to counsel 
because the trial court failed to substantially comply with Illinois Supreme Court 
Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984).  
¶ 43 
 
This court has recognized that an accused has a right to self-representation that 
is “ ‘as basic and fundamental as [the] right to be represented by counsel.’ ” People 
v. Wright, 2017 IL 119561, ¶ 39 (quoting People v. Nelson, 47 Ill. 2d 570, 574 
(1971)). Thus, as long as a defendant’s waiver of his constitutional right to counsel 
is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, he may waive that right. Id.  
¶ 44 
 
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984) governs an accused’s 
waiver of his right to counsel. Rule 401(a) provides: 
 
 
 
 
 
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“Any waiver of counsel shall be in open court. The court shall not permit a 
waiver of counsel by a person accused of an offense punishable by 
imprisonment without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open 
court, informing him of and determining that he understands the following: 
 
(1) the nature of the charge; 
 
(2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including, 
when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected 
because of prior convictions or consecutive sentences; and 
 
(3) that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel 
appointed for him by the court.” Id. 
Compliance with Rule 401(a) is required for an effective waiver of counsel. Wright, 
2017 IL 119561, ¶ 41.  
¶ 45 
 
Defendant claims that the trial court failed to comply with the second 
admonition, that the court inform him of the possible penalties he was facing. 
Defendant points out that he was initially told that he was eligible for extended term 
sentencing based upon a prior residential burglary conviction and faced a sentence 
of 7 to 14 years’ imprisonment on each count of aggravated domestic battery. In 
fact, defendant did not have a prior residential burglary conviction, so he was not 
eligible for extended term sentencing. Defendant instead was subject to a term of 
three to seven years’ imprisonment on each count. Defendant also states that the 
trial court did not advise him that he could receive a prison sentence on each 
conviction or that he could be ordered to serve those convictions consecutively. In 
addition, defendant was instructed that he faced an MSR term of four years to life, 
when in fact he was subject to an MSR term of four years. Defendant argues that 
the trial court’s admonishments fell far short of what Rule 401(a) requires and that 
the appellate court erred in finding substantial compliance with the rule.  
¶ 46 
 
Although this court has held that compliance with Rule 401(a) is required for 
an effective waiver of counsel, this court has also recognized that strict, technical 
compliance with Rule 401(a) is not always required. People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 
204, 236 (1996). Substantial compliance with Rule 401(a) will effectuate a valid 
waiver “if the record indicates that the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, 
 
 
 
 
 
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and the admonishment the defendant received did not prejudice his rights.” Id. Each 
waiver of trial counsel must be assessed on the particular facts of the case. People 
v. Reese, 2017 IL 120011, ¶ 62.  
¶ 47 
 
In addressing this issue, the appellate court noted that defendant did not raise 
the issue in a posttrial motion. 2022 IL App (4th) 200656-U, ¶ 54. The appellate 
court stated it would first address whether an error occurred before considering 
whether defendant preserved the error for review or whether plain-error review was 
appropriate. Id. The appellate court found no error, concluding that the trial court 
substantially complied with Rule 401(a) and that defendant’s waiver of counsel was 
valid. Id. ¶ 59.  
¶ 48 
 
The appellate court is correct that, in addressing a defendant’s claim under the 
plain-error doctrine, we must first determine whether any error occurred. People v. 
Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613 (2010). In finding substantial compliance, the 
appellate court pointed out that the information provided to the trial court at the 
time the trial court gave the Rule 401(a) admonishments did indicate that defendant 
was eligible for extended term sentencing. 2022 IL App (4th) 200656-U , ¶ 58. The 
error was not discovered until defendant’s trial had begun. Id. In addition, the trial 
court’s admonishments concerning the MSR term were greater than the actual MSR 
term, so defendant could not claim prejudice in his decision to waive counsel based 
upon the MSR term. Id. The trial court also admonished defendant that he could 
receive a prison sentence of up to 14 years. Id. Given the fact that defendant knew 
he could receive a prison sentence of up to 14 years, the appellate court stated it 
could not see how an admonishment that defendant faced a maximum of 7 years on 
each count, which could run consecutively, would have affected defendant’s 
decision to proceed pro se. Id. ¶ 59.  
¶ 49 
 
The appellate court next rejected defendant’s claim that the trial court should 
have readmonished him prior to sentencing. Id. ¶ 60. The defendant claimed that 
the discovery that defendant was not eligible for extended term sentencing 
constituted a change in circumstances that required the trial court to readmonish 
him. The appellate court again pointed out that the discovery that defendant was 
not eligible for extended term sentencing did not alter the maximum penalty 
defendant faced, and defendant did not indicate how a correct explanation of why 
defendant would receive a sentence of up to 14 years would have affected his 
 
 
 
 
 
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decision to proceed pro se. Id. The appellate court therefore found that defendant’s 
right to counsel was not violated. Id. ¶ 61. 
¶ 50 
 
In this court, defendant concedes that he agreed to proceed pro se knowing that 
he faced the possibility of 14 years in prison on each of the aggravated battery 
counts under the extended term provisions. Defendant claims, however, that he may 
have considered it unlikely that he would receive an extended term sentence 
because he knew he had never been convicted of a residential burglary and, for that 
reason, may have elected to proceed without counsel. Defendant also argues there 
is a difference between being subject to a 14-year sentence on each count versus 
facing a 14-year sentence only if he was convicted on both counts and was 
sentenced to a term of 7 years on each count, to be served consecutively. Defendant 
further points to the trial court’s error in admonishing him that he faced an MSR 
term of four years to life, when he only faced an MSR term of four years.  
¶ 51 
 
According to defendant, the trial court’s misstatements prejudiced him in his 
decision to reject counsel. Defendant notes that he was dissatisfied with appointed 
counsel’s temperament and counsel’s refusal to file certain motions on his behalf. 
Defendant claims that, with accurate admonishments, he may have been more likely 
to countenance appointed counsel’s ill temperament. For that reason, defendant 
maintains that any errors in the trial court’s attempts to comply with Rule 401(a) 
were not harmless. 
¶ 52 
 
This court has consistently found substantial compliance with Rule 401(a) when 
the trial court accurately stated the maximum sentence prescribed by law. For 
example, in People v. Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d 321, 331 (1989), the trial court 
admonished the defendant that the maximum sentence prescribed by law was the 
death penalty and that the minimum sentence was a 20-year term of imprisonment. 
In fact, the minimum sentence was natural life imprisonment. Id. at 332. Coleman 
stated that, “[w]here a defendant knows the nature of the charges against him and 
understands that as a result of those charges he may receive the death penalty, his 
knowledge and understanding that he may be eligible to receive a lesser sentence 
pales in comparison.” Id. at 333-34; see also Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204 (court found 
substantial compliance with Rule 401(a) where the defendant was admonished that 
he faced the possibility of the death penalty but was not admonished of the 
minimum and maximum penalties for a burglary charge); People v. Johnson, 119 
 
 
 
 
 
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Ill. 2d 119 (1987) (court found substantial compliance with Rule 401(a) where the 
defendant was admonished that he faced the possibility of the death penalty but was 
erroneously told that the minimum sentence was a number of years rather than life 
imprisonment).  
¶ 53 
 
This court has found substantial compliance even where the trial court 
understated the maximum term prescribed by law in its admonishment. In Wright, 
2017 IL 119561, the trial court incorrectly admonished the defendant that he faced 
a 60-year maximum sentence, rather than the correct, 75-year maximum sentence. 
Wright found that the trial court had substantially complied with Rule 401(a) and 
that the defendant made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of counsel 
prior to being allowed to proceed pro se, despite the trial court’s incorrect 
admonishment concerning the maximum sentence. Id. ¶¶ 54-55. Wright noted that 
the defendant’s reason for proceeding pro se was due to speedy trial concerns and 
did not hinge on the maximum sentence for the charged offenses. Id. ¶ 55.  
¶ 54 
 
In this case, defendant was correctly admonished concerning the maximum 
sentence he could face. The trial court’s error was in admonishing defendant how 
he would serve that sentence and in overstating the MSR term. Defendant’s 
explanation to the court for proceeding pro se was that appointed counsel “has been 
abusive and aggressive toward me and forced papers in my hand, as well as using 
foul language when I asked him, at least, four times, to go to Court for a bond 
reduction, and he wouldn’t do that along with many other things.” As in Wright, 
the defendant’s reason for proceeding pro se did not hinge upon how defendant 
might serve the 14-year maximum penalty for the charges against him. Defendant’s 
speculation that he might not have proceeded pro se had he known how the 14-year 
penalty might be imposed is not supported by the record. Further, as the appellate 
court found, defendant chose to proceed pro se believing he potentially could face 
an MSR term of four years to life. Under the circumstances, we see no prejudice to 
defendant’s right to waive counsel when he was in fact subject to a significantly 
lower MSR term. 
¶ 55 
 
Defendant next argues that, even if he waived his right to counsel at trial, the 
appellate court erred in finding that he knowingly waived his right to sentencing 
counsel. Defendant claims that the discovery that he was not subject to extended 
 
 
 
 
 
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term sentencing was a substantial change of circumstances 
requiring 
readmonishment prior to sentencing.  
¶ 56 
 
This court applies the “continuing waiver” rule regarding a defendant’s waiver 
of counsel. People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117, 138 (1996). The continuing waiver 
rule provides that, “absent significantly changed circumstances or a later request 
for counsel, an intelligently and knowingly made waiver of counsel applies to all 
phases of trial.” Id. Circumstances that require a trial court to readmonish the 
defendant before sentencing “include lengthy delays between trial phases, newly 
discovered evidence which might require or justify advice of counsel, new charges 
brought, or a request from defendant.” Id.  
¶ 57 
 
Defendant argues that the discovery that he was not subject to extended term 
sentencing was a substantial change in circumstances requiring readmonishment. 
The appellate court rejected this claim, holding that the discovery that “defendant 
was not extended-term eligible[ ] did not alter the true maximum penalty defendant 
was facing.” 2022 IL App (4th) 200656-U, ¶ 60. Nor did defendant give any 
indication that he wanted the assistance of counsel at sentencing. Id. 
¶ 58 
 
The appellate court was correct. Defendant characterizes the finding that he was 
not eligible for extended term sentencing as an amendment to the information. It 
was not. As the appellate court found, defendant was always on notice that he faced 
a maximum sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment. A change in how the 14-year 
sentence might be imposed did not constitute a significant change in circumstances 
requiring the trial court to readmonish defendant of his right to counsel at 
sentencing.  
¶ 59 
 
As the appellate court found, the trial court substantially complied with Rule 
401(a) in admonishing defendant. Defendant therefore effectively waived his right 
to counsel at trial and continuing through sentencing. Because the trial court 
substantially complied with Rule 401(a), defendant has failed to establish a clear or 
obvious error as required to obtain relief under the plain-error doctrine. The 
appellate court correctly rejected defendant’s claim that he did not knowingly waive 
his right to counsel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 60 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 61 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court’s finding that defendant 
waived any claim that his statutory right to a speedy trial was violated. We also 
affirm the appellate court’s determination that defendant’s waiver of his right to 
counsel at trial and sentencing was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent based upon 
the trial court’s substantial compliance with Rule 401(a). We therefore affirm the 
appellate court’s judgment on those issues. We remand the case to the trial court 
for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s order remanding the 
case to the trial court for resentencing on the reduced convictions for aggravated 
battery. 
 
¶ 62 
 
Appellate court judgment affirmed. 
¶ 63 
 
Cause remanded.