Title: State v. Gary A. Johnson
Citation: 2007 WI 32
Docket Number: 2005AP000573-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 21, 2007

2007 WI 32 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP573-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Gary A. Johnson, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 15 
Reported at: 288 Wis. 2d 718, 709 N.W.2d 491 
(Ct. App. 2005—Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 21, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 13, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Racine   
 
JUDGE: 
Allan B. Torhorst 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX, J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Mark A. Neuser and Sally L. Wellman, assistant attorneys 
general, with whom on the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, 
attorney general, and there was oral argument by Sally L. 
Wellman. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Eileen A. Hirsch, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
2007 WI 32
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2005AP573-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2003CF1232) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Gary A. Johnson, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 21, 2007 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.  
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   The State seeks review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals reversing a judgment 
of conviction against Gary A. Johnson for possession of cocaine 
with 
intent 
to 
deliver 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.41(1m)(cm)1r. (2003-04).1  Johnson contends the circuit 
court erred in denying his motion to suppress contraband seized 
during a protective search of his vehicle and his person 
following a traffic stop.  Because we conclude the search was 
not justified by specific, articulable facts supporting a 
                                                 
1 All references are to the 2003-04 version of the statutes 
unless otherwise noted.   
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
2 
 
reasonable suspicion that Johnson posed a threat to the 
officers' safety or that of others, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
I 
 
¶2 
The following facts are undisputed and taken from 
testimony given at the hearing on Johnson's suppression motion.  
On November 2, 2003, City of Racine Police Officer Chad Stillman 
stopped a 1989 black Cadillac and discovered that the car's 
registration had been suspended for an emissions violation.  
Because the driver2 was not the person to whom the car was 
registered, Stillman did not issue a citation for the emissions 
violation at that time. Late in the afternoon of November 5, 
2003, Stillman spotted the car again while on squad patrol with 
Officer Michael Dummer. The officers followed the vehicle for a 
short distance when Dummer observed it fail to signal for a 
turn.    
¶3 
The officers stopped the car with the squad car's 
emergency lights and siren engaged.  It was dark, but the area 
was illuminated by street lamps.  The officers observed two 
persons in the car.  Officer Dummer testified that he saw the 
driver of the car, later identified as Gary Johnson, "lean 
forward, which appeared to be reaching underneath his front 
seat."  On cross-examination, Dummer confirmed that he could not 
see Johnson's hands but stated that the driver's head was 
"pretty close" to disappearing from view. Officer Stillman 
                                                 
2 Gary Johnson was not driving the vehicle on November 2. 
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
3 
 
testified that he "observed [Johnson] make a strong furtive 
movement bending down as if he was reaching . . . underneath the 
seat. . . ." Stillman confirmed that he saw a portion of 
Johnson's head and shoulders disappear from view.  Stillman 
later stated that "[t]he furtive movement was under the seat, 
his head and shoulders disappearing."  Both officers testified 
that, in light of their experience and training, they believed 
that Johnson's movement was consistent with an attempt to 
conceal contraband or weapons. 
¶4 
The officers approached the car.  Stillman advised 
Johnson that he was being stopped for an emissions violation.  
Johnson provided Stillman with paperwork indicating that the 
emissions problem had been corrected.  Stillman was satisfied 
that the paperwork was "adequate" to show "that the vehicle had 
passed emissions within the past couple days so that those 
circumstances were cleared up."  Stillman did not ask Johnson 
about the hidden movement that he and Dummer had observed 
Johnson make earlier.   
¶5 
Stillman asked Johnson to step out of the car.  
Johnson complied and told Stillman that he had a bad leg. 
Stillman informed Johnson he was being asked to exit the car 
because of Johnson's movement inside the car after he pulled 
over.  Dummer testified that Johnson was asked to step out of 
the car "just for officer safety, not knowing what maybe he had 
been reaching for to either grab or to put down thinking it 
could possibly be a weapon that could injure us." Neither 
officer had had any prior police contact with Johnson.     
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
4 
 
¶6 
Dummer testified that "once [Johnson] was towards the 
back of the vehicle, Officer Stillman advised him that he was 
going to do a pat down for weapons just for our safety."  Dummer 
testified that when Stillman reached Johnson's left pant leg 
during the pat down, Johnson fell to the ground.  Johnson told 
the officers that he felt pain in that area.  The officers 
helped him up, and Stillman attempted to resume patting down 
Johnson's left pant leg, but Johnson again fell to the ground.   
Stillman testified that when the officers did the weapons pat 
down Johnson "acted like he fell down.  He didn't completely 
make it to the ground because I had held him up, but yes, he did 
fall down, or attempted to."  Dummer testified that he and 
Stillman then "helped [Johnson] over to the curb and just had 
him sit . . . hoping that that would ease his leg."     
¶7 
Stillman asked Johnson if there was anything illegal 
in the car.  According to Dummer, "Stillman advised Mr. Johnson 
due to his movements that we were going to search the vehicle," 
and Johnson responded, "'I don't have a problem with that.'" 
Both officers indicated that they intended to search the vehicle 
with or without Johnson's assent.   
¶8 
Stillman searched the vehicle and found a baggie of 
marijuana underneath the driver's seat.  Stillman informed 
Johnson that he was under arrest, and conducted a search of 
Johnson's person incident to arrest.  Johnson put his hand in 
his left pant pocket during the search and would not remove it 
on Stillman's request.  Stillman conducted a "focus strike"——a 
hit to a specific area intended to stun or stop a certain 
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
5 
 
movement——to Johnson's left arm to get him to remove his hand 
from his pocket.  The strike was successful, and Stillman 
recovered a baggie from Johnson's pocket that contained several 
grams of crack cocaine.    
¶9 
Johnson was charged with possession of cocaine with 
intent to deliver more than five grams but not more than 15 
grams, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(cm)2., and possession 
of tetrahydrocannabinols (THC), commonly known as marijuana, 
contrary 
to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(e).  Johnson moved to 
suppress evidence obtained during the search of his person and 
vehicle on grounds that they were the product of an illegal stop 
and arrest.   
¶10  The Racine County Circuit Court, the Honorable Allan 
B. Torhorst, denied Johnson's motion following a suppression 
hearing, holding that information about a possible emissions 
violation and Dummer's observation that the car failed to signal 
for a turn gave officers reasonable suspicion to stop Johnson's 
car.  The court did not address whether the officers were 
justified in conducting a protective search of Johnson's car and 
person, stating that Stillman had "obtained Johnson's consent to 
search the vehicle."    
¶11 Johnson eventually accepted a plea agreement in which 
he pled no contest to a reduced charge of cocaine possession 
with intent to deliver more than one gram but not more than five 
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
6 
 
grams, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(cm)1r.3  Johnson was 
convicted on the reduced charge and was sentenced to a three-
year term of imprisonment, consisting of one-and-one-half years' 
initial 
confinement 
and 
one-and-one-half 
years' 
extended 
supervision.  Johnson appealed his conviction.  
¶12 The court of appeals reversed Johnson's conviction.  
State v. Johnson, 2006 WI App 15, 288 Wis. 2d 718, 709 N.W.2d 
491.  On appeal, the State conceded that Johnson did not consent 
to the protective search of his vehicle.  Id., ¶9.  The court of 
appeals focused its inquiry on whether Stillman had reasonable 
suspicion to justify the search of Johnson's vehicle.  Id.  The 
court held that "'furtive' or suspicious movements do not 
automatically give rise to an objectively reasonable suspicion 
that the occupant of the vehicle is armed and dangerous."  Id., 
¶17, (citing State v. Kyles, 2004 WI 15, ¶¶48-50, 269 Wis. 2d 1, 
675 N.W.2d 449).  The court concluded that Johnson's furtive 
movement in the car and his falling down during the pat down, 
when considered under the totality of the circumstances, did not 
give rise to an objectively reasonable suspicion that Johnson 
was armed and presented a threat to the safety of the officers.  
Id., ¶18.  Consequently, the court of appeals reversed the 
judgment of conviction.  The State appeals the court of appeals' 
reversal of Johnson's conviction.  We accepted review.   
II 
                                                 
3 The possession of marijuana (THC) charge was dismissed as 
part of the plea bargain, but read in for purposes of sentencing 
on the conviction for possession with intent to deliver cocaine.  
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
7 
 
 
¶13 "Whether evidence should be suppressed is a question 
of constitutional fact."  State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶19, 285 
Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899 (quotation and citation omitted).  A 
finding of constitutional fact consists of the circuit court's 
findings of historical fact, and its application of these 
historical facts to constitutional principles.  State v. Turner, 
136 Wis. 2d 333, 343-44, 401 N.W.2d 827 (1987).  We review the 
former under the clearly erroneous standard, and the latter 
independently.  Id.   
III 
¶14 As a preliminary matter, we begin with the circuit 
court's determination that Stillman received Johnson's consent 
to search the car.  The State concedes before this court, as it 
did in the court of appeals, that Johnson did not freely consent 
to the search of his vehicle.4  We have reviewed the record and 
                                                 
4 The dissent faults the State for making this concession.  
Dissent, ¶60 n.2.  It also takes Johnson to task for not raising 
the issue of whether his consent was voluntarily given.  Id.  It 
asserts that, due to the State's concession, this court "must 
raise and decide the issue of consent to search Johnson's 
vehicle with no assistance to this court from either party."  
Id. 
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
8 
 
agree with the State that the circuit court's finding that 
Stillman obtained Johnson's consent to conduct a search of the 
car was clearly erroneous.   
¶15 Whether a suspect freely consented to an otherwise 
unlawful search is a question of constitutional fact, which 
presents a mixed question of fact and law.  Turner, 136 Wis. 2d 
at 343-44.  As we indicated earlier, constitutional facts 
consist of a circuit court's findings of historical fact, which 
we review under the clearly erroneous standard, and its 
application 
of 
these 
historical 
facts 
to 
constitutional 
principles, which we review de novo.  Id.5   
                                                                                                                                                             
We 
note, 
however, 
that 
an 
attorney 
has 
an 
ethical 
obligation not to make arguments before the tribunal that the 
attorney believes to be frivolous.  Compare SCR 20:3.1(a) with 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05.  Cf. State v. Parent, 2006 WI 132, 
¶19, ___Wis. 2d ___, 725 N.W.2d 915.  Thus, even when a 
concession of law is not accepted by a court, a prosecutor 
should be commended, not condemned, for exercising careful 
judgment and attempting to conform to our rules.  Of course, a 
concession of law does not bind the court.  The court determines 
the law, not the parties.  Bergmann v. McCaughtry, 211 
Wis. 2d 1, 7, 564 N.W.2d 712 (1997).  We further note that the 
dissent is incorrect in suggesting that Johnson failed to raise 
the issue that his consent was not voluntarily given.  This was 
the principal issue raised by Johnson in his brief to the court 
of appeals.  This was the issue that was addressed and conceded 
by the State in the court of appeals and in this court.  The 
dissent simply disagrees with the conclusion reached by both 
parties and by this court.   
5 Here, the circuit court's five-page decision contains no 
discussion whatsoever of the testimony that is relevant to the 
question of whether Johnson freely consented to the search, and, 
notwithstanding 
the 
dissent's 
assertion 
to 
the 
contrary 
(dissent, ¶64), makes no findings of historical fact that are 
relevant to the question of consent.  The circuit court points 
out, while discussing the parties' positions:  "As a result of 
Johnson's situation Stillman abandoned his pat-down and obtained 
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
9 
 
¶16   When the purported legality of a warrantless search 
is based on the consent of the defendant, that consent must be 
freely and voluntarily given.  State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 
180, 197, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998) (citations omitted).  "When a 
prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness 
of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, 
in fact, freely and voluntarily given."  Bumper v. North 
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).  "Acquiescence to an 
unlawful assertion of police authority is not equivalent to 
consent."  State v. Wilson, 229 Wis. 2d 256, 269, 600 N.W.2d 14 
(Ct. App. 1999) (citing Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-49).  This 
includes when the police incorrectly assert that they have a 
right to conduct a warrantless search, or indicate that they are 
                                                                                                                                                             
Johnson's consent to search the vehicle."  The only findings of 
historical fact made by the circuit court, however, are as 
follows: 
First, the Johnson vehicle was the subject of an 
emissions suspension in August. 
Second, 
the 
vehicle 
successfully 
passed 
an 
emissions test in October. 
Third, the Motor Vehicle Department's records did 
not reflect the emissions suspension satisfied until 
November 7, after Johnson's arrest on 5 November. 
The 
evidence 
also 
fairly 
establishes 
that 
Stillman did not independently nor subsequently after 
his arrest of Hicks check on the suspension of the 
Johnson vehicle's registration and prior to the 
Johnson arrest.  A DOT check would have resulted in 
Stillman 
confirming 
the 
registration 
was 
still 
suspended on November 5th.    
 
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
10 
 
going to search absent legal authority to do so, as opposed to 
asking for permission to search.6   
¶17 The testimony of Officers Dummer and Stillman shows 
that Johnson merely acquiesced to the search.  Johnson did not 
freely and voluntarily give his consent.  Stillman testified 
during direct examination that he "sat [Johnson] down, asked him 
if there was anything illegal in the car.  He said there wasn't.  
Went ahead and looked under the seat for the furtive movement 
that 
I 
saw . . . 
." 
 
During 
cross-examination, 
Stillman 
testified that because of the "strong furtive movements" he 
                                                 
6 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 12-13 (1948) 
(officer did not gain defendant's consent to enter defendant's 
home when the officer knocked on the door, asserted that he 
wanted to talk to the defendant, the defendant stepped back from 
the door and the officer walked in, as entry was granted in 
submission to authority as opposed to an understanding and 
intentional waiver of a constitutional right); See also United 
States 
v. 
Morales, 
171 
F.3d 
978, 
982-83 
(5th 
Cir. 
1999)(suspects' opening door upon an order of officers did not 
constitute consent to search premises); United States v. Pena-
Saiz, 161 F.3d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir. 1998) (where suspect 
believed that she was under arrest, her submission to a request 
to conduct a pat-down search was not consent); United States v. 
Baro, 15 F.3d 563, 566-67 (6th Cir. 1994); (suspect did not 
consent to seizure of his person and of suspected drug money 
when officer, who lacked probable cause to execute a seizure, 
informed suspect that he was being taken to a DEA office and 
suspect acquiesced to the seizure); State v. Wuest, 190 Wis. 
251, 255, 208 N.W. 899 (1926) (an otherwise illegal search of a 
suspect was not authorized when suspect failed to object to an 
officer's assertion of authority); State v. Johnson, 177 
Wis. 2d 224, 
228, 
234, 
501 
N.W.2d 876 
(Ct. 
App. 
1993) 
(defendant's failure to object to officer's entry into home did 
not constitute consent to search, noting that "consent cannot be 
found by a showing of mere acquiescence") (citation omitted); 4 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(a), at 58-59 (4th ed. 
2004).  
 
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
11 
 
observed in the car, he intended to conduct the search with or 
without Johnson's consent.  Stillman's police report of the 
incident did not indicate that Stillman obtained Johnson's 
consent to search the vehicle.  Stillman testified: "I don't 
remember asking [Johnson for his consent] and I don't see in the 
report if I asked him for consent."  Stillman acknowledged that 
if he had obtained Johnson's consent he probably would have 
noted this fact in his report.   
¶18 Dummer testified that Johnson went along with the 
search after "Stillman advised Mr. Johnson due to his movements 
that we were going to search the vehicle.  Mr. Johnson didn't 
have a problem with that, gave consent."  On cross-examination, 
however, Dummer clarified: 
Q: 
And 
it's 
your 
testimony 
here 
that 
Officer 
Stillman was the officer that asked Mr. Johnson for 
consent to search his car; is that correct? 
A: 
Correct. Well, actually, Officer Stillman advised 
Mr. Johnson due to his movements that we were going to 
search the vehicle. 
Q: 
Okay. 
A: 
At that time Mr. Johnson said:  I don't have a 
problem with that. 
Q: 
Okay.  So your testimony is that Officer Stillman 
said:  Because of your movements we're going to search 
your car? 
A:  As——that is our procedure, correct. 
Q:  Okay.  And so really, if Mr. Johnson had 
indicated he didn't want you to, you still would have 
gone ahead with that search; is that correct? 
A:  That's correct. 
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
12 
 
Q: 
And basically Mr. Johnson indicated that he 
wasn't going to do anything to stop you; is that 
correct? 
A:   That's correct.  
¶19 As the record indicates, neither Stillman nor Dummer 
asked for Johnson's permission to search the car.  Stillman did 
not recall asking for consent, but indicated he would have noted 
that fact in his report if he had.  Dummer clarified that 
Stillman advised Johnson that "we were going to search the 
vehicle."  Johnson's response to that command must consequently 
be construed as acquiescence.  On the basis of the undisputed 
testimony of Stillman and Dummer, we therefore conclude that the 
circuit court's statement that Stillman obtained Johnson's 
consent to search the vehicle was against the great weight and 
clear preponderance of the evidence, and was, therefore, clearly 
erroneous.  See Richards v. First Union Securities, Inc., 2006 
WI 55, ¶12 n. 5, 290 Wis. 2d 620, 714 N.W.2d 913 (noting that 
the former "great weight and clear preponderance" standard for 
reviewing a circuit court's findings of fact is essentially the 
same as the current "clearly erroneous" standard of review).  As 
a matter of constitutional fact, we independently conclude that 
Johnson did not freely and voluntarily give his consent to 
search his vehicle.  
IV 
¶20 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article 1, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution protect 
persons from unreasonable governmental searches and seizures.  
In general, our cases have ordinarily construed the search and 
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
13 
 
seizure protections of the state and federal constitutions 
coextensively.7  See, e.g. State v. Williams, 2001 WI 21, ¶18 
n.6, 241 Wis. 2d 631, 623 N.W.2d 106 (citation omitted); but see 
State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶63, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625 
(holding that with respect to the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule, Article 1, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution affords additional protection than that which is 
afforded by the Fourth Amendment).   
¶21 During an investigative stop, an officer is authorized 
to conduct a search of the outer clothing of a person to 
determine whether the person is armed if the officer is "able to 
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together 
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant 
that intrusion."  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).  The 
test is an objective one:  "[W]hether a reasonably prudent 
[officer] in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief 
that his [or her] safety or that of others was in danger" 
because the person may be armed with a weapon and dangerous.  
                                                 
7 However, we have consistently recognized that Article 1, 
Section 11 of the state constitution is not the poor stepchild 
of its federal counterpart. As Justice Bablitch explained in 
State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶59, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517: 
[I]t would be a sad irony for this court to exhort 
magistrates to act as something more than "rubber 
stamps" when issuing warrants, and to then act as mere 
rubber 
stamps 
ourselves 
when 
interpreting 
our 
Wisconsin Constitution. It is our responsibility to 
examine the State Constitution independently. This 
duty exists even though our conclusions in a given 
case may not differ from those reached by the Supreme 
Court when it interprets the Fourth Amendment. 
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
14 
 
Id. at 27.  "[I]n determining whether the officer acted 
reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not 
to [the officer's] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he [or 
she] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his [or her] 
experience."  Id. at 27.   
¶22 Circuit courts must "decide on a case-by-case basis, 
evaluating the totality of the circumstances, whether an officer 
had reasonable suspicion to effectuate a protective search for 
weapons in a particular case."  State v. Kyles, 2004 WI 15, ¶49, 
269 Wis. 2d 1, 675 N.W.2d 449.8  The requirement that an officer 
conducting a protective search have a reasonable suspicion to 
believe that the person is dangerous and may have immediate 
access to a weapon strikes a proper balance between two 
                                                 
8 The Wisconsin Legislature codified the standard of Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), for protective searches in 
Wis. Stat. § 968.25, which provides, in relevant part: 
When a law enforcement officer has stopped a person 
for temporary questioning pursuant to s. 968.24 and 
reasonably suspects that he or she or another is in 
danger of physical injury, the law enforcement officer 
may search such person for weapons or any instrument 
or article or substance readily capable of causing 
physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried 
in public places by law abiding persons.  
When construing § 968.25, we apply not only Terry, but also the 
cases following it.  See State v. Williamson, 113 Wis. 2d 389, 
399-400, 335 N.W.2d 814 (1983).  Thus, we have held that 
§ 968.25 incorporates Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), 
see infra ¶¶23-26, thereby authorizing protective searches of 
vehicles, despite the fact that the text of the section refers 
only to protective searches of a suspect's person.  State v. 
Moretto, 144 Wis. 2d 171, 177-78, 423 N.W.2d 841 (1988).   
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
15 
 
important interests:  the safety of law enforcement officers and 
the right of persons to be free from unreasonable government 
intrusions.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-27. 
 
¶23 In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), and 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the United States 
Supreme Court applied the principles of Terry to the validity of 
protective searches executed during a roadside stop.  In Mimms, 
434 U.S. at 111, the Court established a per se rule that an 
officer may order a person out of his or her vehicle incident to 
an otherwise valid stop for a traffic violation.  However, to 
conduct a protective search of that person, the Mimms Court 
concluded an officer must be able to point to specific, 
articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the 
person is dangerous and may have immediate access to a weapon.  
Id. at 111-12.  
¶24 Similarly, in Long, the Supreme Court held that 
officers may under the proper circumstances conduct a protective 
search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle during a 
traffic stop.  Citing Terry, Long concluded that such a search 
is justified when an officer reasonably suspects that the person 
"is dangerous and . . . may gain immediate control of weapons" 
placed or hidden in the passenger compartment.  Long, 463 U.S. 
at 1049.  
¶25 This court is sensitive to the serious risks law 
enforcement officers must undertake whenever they initiate 
contact 
with 
a 
suspect 
who 
is 
seated 
in 
a 
vehicle.  
"Investigative detentions involving suspects in vehicles are 
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
16 
 
especially fraught with danger to police officers."  Long, 463 
U.S. at 1047.  In State v. Moretto, 144 Wis. 2d 171, 179, 423 
N.W.2d 841 (1988), we noted that the  
central policy of [Wis. Stat. § 968.25] is to "provide 
for the safety of the officer by permitting a search 
for weapons."  Comments to chapter 255, laws of 1969.  
This policy is advanced by permitting vehicle searches 
where the officer has reasonable grounds to believe 
that the individual is dangerous and may be harboring 
a weapon in his or her vehicle.  The Supreme Court in 
Long noted that roadside encounters between police and 
suspects are especially hazardous, and that danger may 
arise from the possible presence of weapons in the 
area 
surrounding 
a 
suspect 
who 
is 
stopped 
for 
questioning by police.   
Moreover, this court has recognized that since Terry, the number 
of assaults on officers by armed suspects has increased, making 
"[t]he need for officers to frisk for weapons . . . even more 
compelling."  State v. McGill, 2000 WI 38, ¶20, 234 Wis. 2d 560, 
609 N.W.2d 795. 
¶26 The Supreme Court in Long "stress[ed]" that its 
decision "d[id] not mean that the police may conduct automobile 
searches whenever they conduct an investigative stop."  Id. at 
1049 n.14 (emphasis in original).  The sole justification for 
the search is the protection of the police officers and others 
nearby.  Id.  The Court noted that "[a] Terry search . . . is 
not justified by any need to prevent the disappearance or 
destruction of evidence of crime."  Id.  
¶27 Our prior decisions in this area, while based upon the 
unique 
circumstances 
of 
each 
case, 
provide 
guidance. 
In 
Williams, 241 Wis. 2d 631, ¶¶48-55, this court considered 
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
17 
 
whether officers had reasonable suspicion to frisk a person whom 
officers suspected of drug trafficking based upon the tip of an 
anonymous informant.  The informant called 911 and told the 
dispatcher that persons were selling drugs out of a blue and 
burgundy-colored van in a back alley-like driveway behind her 
home.  Id., ¶4.  Officers were dispatched to investigate the tip 
and, shortly thereafter, arrived at the tipster's home. The 
officers pulled their squad car into the driveway and drove it 
up to the front of the van, where they observed a man later 
identified as Williams sitting in the front seat with his arm 
hidden behind the back of the passenger's seat.  Id., ¶¶7-8.   
Officers verified several details described by the informant.  
Id., ¶6.  Additionally, they noted that the van had no license 
plates.  Id., ¶7. 
¶28 A majority of the Williams court concluded that the 
officers' protective search was supported by articulable facts 
justifying a reasonable suspicion that Williams may have been 
armed and dangerous.9  The lead opinion's analysis of the 
                                                 
9 This court issued State v. Williams, 2001 WI 21, 241 Wis. 
2d 631, 623 N.W.2d 106, after the U.S. Supreme Court vacated 
this court's decision in State v. Williams, 225 Wis. 2d 159, 591 
N.W.2d 
823 
(1999), 
and 
remanded 
the 
case 
for 
further 
consideration in light of Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), 
a case involving a stop and frisk based on an anonymous tip 
about an individual carrying a concealed weapon.  The J.L. Court 
concluded the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct 
the stop and frisk because the tip lacked sufficient indicia of 
reliability to justify the officer's action where the police 
knew nothing of the informant or how he knew about the gun, and 
had no other reason to believe that the informant had some 
inside information about J.L.  Id. at 271-72.   
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
18 
 
reasonableness of the protective search focused on three 
conditions that were particularly relevant to the overall 
circumstances facing the officers. 
¶29 First, officers in Williams were responding to a 
complaint involving suspected drug activity, a crime known by 
law enforcement to be associated with weapons possession.  Id., 
¶51 ("[A]s [an officer involved in the stop and search of 
Williams] testified, 'drug dealers have been known to carry 
guns.'").  Other cases of this court have noted the link between 
dangerous weapons and the drug trade.10  See also State v. Guy, 
                                                                                                                                                             
On 
remand, 
a 
three-member 
plurality 
of 
this 
Court 
distinguished J.L. on grounds that the tip in Williams contained 
sufficient indicia of reliability for the officers to consider 
the information contained in the tip when determining the 
reasonableness of the stop and frisk.  The plurality noted that 
the tipster in Williams:  (1) was an eyewitness to the criminal 
activity and described what she saw as it was happening to the 
operator; (2) described her location to the operator; (3) risked 
that her identity would be discovered by providing self-
identifying information to the operator; and (4) was recorded, 
permitting some review of her veracity based on her tone and 
delivery.  Williams, 241 Wis. 2d 631, ¶¶33-37.  Justice Prosser 
concurred in the judgment, but concluded that he would not have 
analyzed Williams as an anonymous informant case because 
officers knew or could have easily discovered the caller's 
identity because the county's 911 system was equipped with 
caller identification.  Id., ¶¶58, 64 (Prosser, J. concurring). 
10 However, as this court observed in Williams, the scope of 
a Terry search must be "'strictly tied to and justified by’ the 
circumstances 
which 
rendered 
its 
initiation 
permissible." 
Williams, 241 Wis. 2d 631, ¶53 (quoting U.S. v. Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 19)(citation omitted).  For this reason, the Williams' court 
rejected adoption of a per se rule that suspicion of drug 
dealing of itself would constitute circumstances justifying a 
protective search.  We reaffirm today our rejection of such a 
per se rule.   
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
19 
 
172 Wis. 2d 86, 96-97, 492 N.W.2d 311 (1992); State v. Williams, 
168 Wis. 2d 970, 984, 485 N.W.2d 42 (1992); State v. Richardson, 
156 Wis. 2d 128, 144, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990).  Second, officers 
observed Williams make a reaching movement behind the passenger 
seat when they pulled the squad car up to the van.  Williams, 
241 Wis. 2d 631, ¶53.  Finally, the officers found themselves in 
a particularly vulnerable position vis-à-vis the suspects in 
Williams; their squad car was parked in an alley-like driveway 
facing the suspect's van, requiring that they back their vehicle 
out to exit.11  Id., ¶52.  Based on these factors, this court 
concluded that officers had reasonable suspicion under the 
totality of the circumstances to justify the investigatory stop 
and their protective search of Williams' person and vehicle.        
 
¶30 Likewise, in McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, this court 
concluded that several conditions incident to a traffic stop 
justified a protective search.  There, the officer on squad 
patrol at 10:10 p.m. turned on his emergency lights to pull over 
a vehicle after it drove onto a barricaded street that was 
posted "road closed."  Id., ¶¶2-3.  The vehicle did not stop and 
pull over, and drove several more blocks.  Id., ¶4.  When the 
vehicle eventually stopped in a private driveway, McGill exited 
the car and began to walk away "as if he were 'trying to avoid 
                                                 
11  Additionally, officers observed that Williams' van had 
no license plates.  This court considered this circumstance in 
its analysis of whether the investigative stop was justified, 
but did not factor it into the discussion of the reasonableness 
of the protective search.  See Williams, 241 Wis. 2d 631, ¶¶45, 
48-55.   
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
20 
 
being with that vehicle or being stopped by the police.'"  Id., 
¶5.  The officer ordered McGill to stop and return to his 
vehicle, and McGill complied.  Id., ¶6.  The officer observed 
that McGill appeared more nervous than other individuals he had 
routinely 
stopped 
while 
on 
patrol, 
that 
his 
hands 
were 
twitching, and that he had the odor of intoxicants and the 
slight odor of marijuana on his person.  Id., ¶7.  
¶31 On these facts——McGill's erratic behavior (failing to 
pull over in a timely manner, exiting the vehicle immediately 
after the stop and walking away, unusual nervousness), the fact 
that he smelled of both drugs and alcohol, and the poorly-lit 
conditions in the private driveway——this court concluded that 
the protective frisk was justified because, under the totality 
of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion to 
believe that McGill may have been dangerous and had access to a 
weapon.  Id., ¶¶8, 24, 27-33.     
¶32 However, in Kyles, 269 Wis. 2d 1, this court reached a 
different conclusion.  There, Kyles was questioned outside of a 
vehicle he was a passenger in that was pulled over at 8:45 p.m. 
in a "high-crime" neighborhood for operating without headlights 
after dark.  Id., ¶11.  No one in the vehicle was suspected of a 
crime.  Id.  During a consensual search of the vehicle, Kyles 
appeared nervous and twice stuffed his hands in the pockets of 
his oversized, fluffy coat after the officer asked him to remove 
his hands from his pockets.  Id., ¶¶13-14.  Kyles did not try to 
flee.  Id., ¶13.  The officer testified that he "didn't feel any 
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
21 
 
particular 
threat 
before 
searching" 
Kyles.12 
 
Id., 
¶17.  
Nevertheless, Kyles was frisked approximately four to eight 
seconds after he exited the vehicle.  Id., ¶15.   
¶33 Taken together, this court concluded that without 
more, Kyles' putting his hands in his pockets, his nervousness, 
the size and bulkiness of his coat, the time (8:45 p.m.) and 
place ("high-crime" area) of the stop, as well as the officer's 
belief that he was not in danger, provided the officer with no 
more than "an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
'hunch'," instead of a reasonable suspicion that the defendant 
was armed and dangerous to the officer or others.  Id., ¶¶69-72.  
V 
¶34 Turning to the present case, the State contends that 
Johnson's movement in the interior of the car was a sufficiently 
compelling factor to justify Stillman's protective search of 
Johnson's car.  The State asserts that the court of appeals 
improperly concluded this single factor, by itself, was not 
enough to establish reasonable suspicion.   
                                                 
12 Although the test of reasonableness is generally an 
objective one, we held in Kyles that "a court may . . . consider 
a police officer's fear or belief that his or her safety or that 
of others [is] in danger as part of the totality of the 
circumstances" when determining the reasonableness of a frisk. 
State v. Kyles, 2004 WI 15, ¶34, 269 Wis. 2d 1, 675 N.W.2d 449.  
We emphasized in Kyles that the officer's subjective belief "is 
but one factor in the totality of the circumstances that a court 
may consider," id., ¶39, that "may be of some assistance to a 
court in weighing the totality of the factors" in determining 
the reasonableness of a protective search.  Id., ¶37.  
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
22 
 
¶35 We agree with the State that the presence of a single 
factor, if sufficiently compelling, may give rise to reasonable 
suspicion justifying a protective search.  The cumulative effect 
of several factors in one case may not add up to reasonable 
suspicion while a single, highly persuasive factor in another 
may provide a sufficient basis for a search.  See State v. 
Sutherland, 637 N.E.2d 366, (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (search of 
vehicle incident to routine traffic stop justified by "furtive" 
movements of the driver and passenger); see also United States 
v. Beatty, 170 F.3d 811 (8th Cir. 1999) (search of vehicle 
justified where officer saw leather strap from a gun holster 
protruding from a briefcase in vehicle).  "There is no set 
standard for what constitutes a reasonable police reaction in 
all situations.  Rather, the reasonableness of the reaction 
depends upon the circumstances facing the officer."  State v. 
Mohr, 2000 WI App 111, ¶13, 235 Wis. 2d 220, 613 N.W.2d 186.  
"The essential question is whether the action of the law 
enforcement officer was reasonable under all the facts and 
circumstances present."  State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 
139-40, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990) (quoting State v. Jackson, 147 
Wis. 2d 824, 831, 434 N.W.2d 386 (1989)).   
¶36 Under the totality of the circumstances present in 
this case, we conclude that Johnson's "head and shoulders" 
movement did not give Stillman reasonable suspicion to conduct a 
search of Johnson's person and car.   
 
¶37 Stillman and Dummer testified that, in light of their 
experience, they believed that Johnson's movement was consistent 
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
23 
 
with an attempt to conceal contraband or weapons.13  Depending 
upon the totality of the circumstances in a given case, a 
surreptitious movement by a suspect in a vehicle immediately 
after 
a 
traffic stop could be a substantial factor in 
establishing that officers had reason to believe that the 
suspect was dangerous and had access to weapons.   
¶38 Such was the case in Williams.  There, however, 
additional 
circumstances 
were 
critical 
to 
this 
court's 
conclusion that officers possessed specific, articulable facts 
justifying a protective search.  Williams, 241 Wis. 2d 631, 
¶¶51-55.  Williams, unlike Johnson, was suspected of selling 
drugs, id., ¶51, a crime officers have known to be associated 
with the possession of deadly weapons.  See, e.g. Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002-03 (1991) (citing Goldstein, Drugs 
and Violent Crime, in Pathways to Criminal Violence 16, 24-36 
(N. Weiner & M. Wolfgang eds. 1989)) (plurality opinion) 
(Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor and Souter, JJ.).  Moreover, 
the position of the officer's squad car in Williams——nose-to-
nose with the suspect's van in a narrow, alley-like driveway——
left officers in a more vulnerable position than the officers 
here. 
¶39 Similarly, McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, is readily 
distinguishable.  McGill, unlike Johnson, smelled of both drugs 
                                                 
13 As we noted earlier, the sole justification of a 
protective search under Terry is the protection of the police 
officers and others nearby.  A protective search is not 
justified by any need to preserve or discover evidence.  See 
supra, ¶26. 
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
24 
 
and alcohol when stopped.  Id., ¶7.  Once again, the police 
officers already had a basis for believing that ongoing criminal 
activity may have been afoot.14  Moreover, McGill's odd behavior, 
including continuing to drive for several blocks when signaled 
by officers to pull over, exiting his car and walking away after 
the stop and extreme nervousness, id., ¶¶4-7, provided a 
compelling 
basis 
to 
justify 
the 
officers' 
frisk. 
 
Such 
compelling circumstances were not present here.   
¶40 In this case, Johnson was only suspected of driving a 
vehicle with a suspended registration for an emissions violation 
and failing to signal for a turn, violations in no way linked to 
criminal activity or weapons possession.  Johnson was further 
able to satisfy the officer that the suspended registration had 
                                                 
14 We do not mean to suggest that officers must always have 
evidence that the subject of the investigative stop is engaged 
in criminal activity to be authorized to conduct a protective 
search incident to a traffic stop.  See, e.g. United States v. 
Arnold, 388 F.3d 237, 238 (7th Cir. 2004) (defendant stopped for 
burned-out headlight; protective search of the vehicle upheld 
where the defendant turned around to look at the officer in the 
squad car then "wormed his way between the passenger and the 
driver's seats into the back seat"); United States v. Fryer, 974 
F.2d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1992) (defendant stopped for failure to 
come to a complete stop before making right turn on red light; 
protective search of the vehicle upheld when officer "observed 
furtive movements between the driver and the passenger, as if 
they were passing something between them," driver did not stop 
immediately when signaled to pull over, and stop occurred in "a 
marginally safe neighborhood, in the wee hours of the morning").    
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
25 
 
been taken care of.  What was left was a traffic violation for 
failure to signal a turn, and the head and shoulders movement.15   
¶41 As in Kyles, where we concluded officers lacked 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective search, Johnson was 
not suspected of a crime associated with weapons possession, and 
officers had had no prior contact with Johnson suggesting that 
he was a dangerous individual.  The stop occurred in early 
evening in an area that was well lit.  Johnson cooperated with 
officers, producing documentation showing that his vehicle had 
recently passed an emissions test.  Despite complaining of a bad 
leg, Johnson complied with Stillman's lawful request for him to 
exit the vehicle.     
¶42 Moreover, in Kyles, the circumstances facing officers 
were 
arguably 
more 
dangerous 
(and 
thus 
a 
search 
more 
justifiable) than those of the present case.  There, officers 
were engaged in a face-to-face confrontation with an unusually 
nervous suspect who refused to remove his hands from his 
pockets.  Kyles, 269 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶12-14.  In addition, the stop 
occurred at 8:45 p.m. in a "high-crime" area.  Id., ¶¶11, 17.  
In contrast, the only purported basis for the protective search 
in this case was a single, partially obscured movement the 
officers observed from their squad car. 
                                                 
15 Moreover, we note that Officer Stillman did not ask 
Johnson to explain the surreptitious movement that he had 
observed before conducting the protective search of the vehicle. 
A suspect's answer to such a question and demeanor while 
answering could provide information that is relevant to whether 
a protective search is reasonable.   
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
26 
 
¶43 Were we to conclude that the behavior observed by the 
officers here was sufficient to justify a protective search of 
Johnson's 
person 
and 
his 
car, 
law 
enforcement 
would 
be 
authorized to frisk any driver and search his or her car upon a 
valid traffic stop whenever the driver reaches to get his or her 
registration out of the glove compartment; leans over to get his 
wallet out of his back pocket to retrieve his driver's license; 
reaches for her purse to find her driver's license; picks up a 
fast food wrapper from the floor; puts down a soda; turns off 
the radio; or makes any of a number of other innocuous movements 
persons make in their vehicles every day.  In each of these 
examples, the officer positioned behind the vehicle might see 
the driver's head and shoulders move, or even momentarily 
disappear from view.  Without more to demonstrate that, under 
the totality of circumstances, an officer possesses specific, 
articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that a 
person is dangerous and may have immediate access to a weapon, 
such an observation does not justify a significant intrusion 
upon a person's liberty.   
¶44 The test of reasonableness is an objective one:  "'In 
determining whether the officer acted reasonably . . . due 
weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion or "hunch," but to the specific reasonable inferences 
which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 
experience.'"  Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 466, 251 N.W.2d 
461 (1977) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).  The dissent ignores 
this well-established principle and relies on the officers' 
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
27 
 
subjective 
experience, 
stating 
that 
their 
training 
and 
experience 
as 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
justified 
their 
perceptions.  Dissent, ¶¶82-84.  For example, the dissent argues 
that the officers were faced with "two choices.  They could 
ignore what they believed to be Johnson's reaching under the 
front seat and also ignore their experiences as law enforcement 
officers as to what such a reaching could mean" or they could 
conduct a protective search of the vehicle.  Dissent, ¶84.  We 
note, however, that the officer's subjective experience is not 
the proper focus of the analysis; the relevant inquiry is 
whether the officer is "able to point to specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."  Terry, 
392 U.S. at 21.  This is a question of law, subject to our 
independent review.16  State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, ¶16, 241 
Wis. 2d 52, 621 N.W.2d 891.     
                                                 
16 The dissent repeatedly questions this court's competence 
to decide the legal question presented in this case.  See 
dissent, ¶¶85, 88.  For example, the dissent states:  "[T]he 
majority of this court, none of whom have any experience 
conducting traffic stops, is merely substituting its judgment 
for that of two experienced officers."  Dissent, ¶85.  The 
dissent continues:  "In addition, [the majority] errs when it 
substitutes its judgment for that of law enforcement about the 
reasonable import of Johnson's furtive movement as the officers 
approached his vehicle."  Dissent, ¶88.  This is just another 
way of saying that only law enforcement officers (or perhaps 
judges who happen to have been former law enforcement officers) 
are qualified to determine the reasonableness of a protective 
search.  The dissent would apparently have this court abdicate 
its constitutional function of ascertaining whether specific and 
articulable facts which, taken along with rational inferences 
from those facts, meet the legal standard of reasonably 
warranting an intrusion by law enforcement officers.  See 
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
28 
 
¶45 Another 
factor 
weighs 
strongly 
against 
the 
reasonableness of the protective search in this case.  Before 
Johnson was asked to exit the vehicle and submit to a pat down, 
he gave Stillman paperwork showing that his vehicle had passed 
an emissions test recently, and that, as a result, the 
registration suspension had been lifted.  Officers may detain a 
person on a stop for a routine traffic violation only for as 
long 
as 
necessary 
to 
complete 
the 
investigation 
of 
the 
violation.  See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998).  The 
paperwork 
Johnson 
provided 
to 
Stillman 
established 
that 
Johnson's vehicle was no longer subject to an emissions 
suspension.17   
 
¶46 Finally, the State contends that Johnson's falling 
down during the protective frisk of his person "sheds light" on 
the reasonableness of the search of the passenger's compartment 
of the vehicle.  The State argues that Johnson's behavior during 
the pat down was part of the totality of the circumstances under 
which Johnson's furtive movement in the car should be assessed.  
However, in the same breath, the State concedes that "post-
                                                                                                                                                             
dissent, ¶¶85, 88.  Compare State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, ¶17, 
241 Wis. 2d 52, 621 N.W.2d 891.  
17 We recognize that the officers noted that Johnson had 
failed to signal a turn prior to the stop.  The record does not 
establish whether the officers had finished their investigation 
with respect to his failure to signal a turn.  What is clear in 
light of Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998), is that once an 
investigation for a minor traffic violation is completed, the 
officers' generalized concern for safety does not provide a 
basis for a full protective search.  
No. 
2005AP573-CR   
 
29 
 
protective 
search 
occurrences 
cannot 
establish 
reasonable 
suspicion for a protective search."     
 
¶47 We 
reject 
the 
State's 
assertion 
that 
Johnson's 
collapse to the ground during the frisk because of leg pain 
(whether feigned or actual) is in any way relevant to the 
reasonableness of the protective search.  As we have explained, 
officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the pat down of 
Johnson's person.  Thus, any events resulting from that pat down 
may not be considered when calculating the reasonableness of the 
search of the vehicle.  
VI 
 
¶48 Because the protective search was not justified by 
specific, articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion 
that Johnson posed a threat to the officers' safety or that of 
others, we conclude the circuit court erred in denying Johnson's 
motion to suppress contraband obtained incident to the search of 
his car and his person.  We therefore affirm the court of 
appeals' decision reversing the circuit court's judgment of 
conviction and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP573-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶49 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (dissenting).   Gary A. 
Johnson was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to 
deliver due to the discovery of 11 individually wrapped rocks of 
crack cocaine on his person.  The majority affirms the court of 
appeals reversal of Johnson's conviction.  It does so because it 
concludes that the search of Johnson's vehicle, which led to the 
search 
of 
his 
person, 
"was 
not 
justified 
by 
specific, 
articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that Johnson 
posed a threat to the officers' safety or [to] that of others."  
Majority op., ¶1.  The majority opinion makes two basic errors.  
First, it errs when it permits an assistant attorney general's 
"concession" that Johnson did not consent to the search of his 
vehicle to affect the court's obligation to fully analyze the 
totality of the circumstances that led to the vehicle's search.  
Id., ¶14.  Second, it errs when it substitutes its own view, for 
that of experienced police officers' contrary view, in regard to 
whether it was reasonable for the officers to believe that 
Johnson's appearing to reach under the front seat as the 
officers approached his vehicle could be due to his placing a 
weapon or contraband under the seat.  Id., ¶36.  
¶50 Because the circuit court's finding of fact that 
Johnson's consent-in-fact to the search of his vehicle cannot be 
overturned, as it is not clearly erroneous, and because Johnson 
did not agree to the proposed search as a result of law 
enforcement's coercion, duress or misrepresentation, his consent 
was voluntarily given.  In addition, it was reasonable for law 
enforcement to believe Johnson's furtive movement as the 
No.  2005AP573-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
officers approached his vehicle could have been due to placing a 
weapon under the front seat.  As I explain in detail below, 
rectifying either of these errors in the majority opinion will 
result in affirming Johnson's conviction.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶51 Officers Dummer and Stillman, who where in a marked 
squad car with the emergency lights and siren activated, stopped 
Johnson's vehicle for a suspected registration violation and for 
failing to signal a turn.  As the officers approached Johnson's 
vehicle, Johnson leaned forward so that most of his head and 
shoulders disappeared from view.  Officer Dummer testified that 
Johnson appeared to be reaching under the front seat.  He said 
that based on his law enforcement experience, a movement of that 
type can occur when an occupant of a vehicle is trying to 
conceal weapons or contraband under the seat before an officer 
reaches the vehicle.  Officer Stillman confirmed the description 
of Johnson's movement as he and Dummer walked to Johnson's 
vehicle.  He also interpreted this movement as Johnson's placing 
something under the front seat.  At no time has Johnson or his 
counsel ever disputed the accuracy of the officers' description 
of his movement as they approached.  
¶52 Dummer explained that when he and Stillman reached the 
vehicle, Stillman asked Johnson to step out, and Johnson did so.  
Stillman then tried to do a pat-down search for weapons, but he 
was unable to complete it because whenever he got to the pocket 
on the left leg of Johnson's pants, Johnson fell to the ground.  
No.  2005AP573-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
Therefore, Stillman asked Johnson to sit on the curb, and Dummer 
stood right behind him, "always watching over him so that he 
didn't make any more movements."  Stillman asked Johnson if 
there was anything illegal in the vehicle, and Johnson said 
there was not.  Stillman then told Johnson that he was going to 
search the vehicle.  Dummer said that Johnson affirmatively 
replied to Stillman, "I don't have a problem with that."1   
¶53 When Stillman searched the vehicle, he recovered a bag 
of marijuana from under the driver's seat.  Dummer confirmed 
that the bag of marijuana was found where he had seen Johnson 
reaching.  Johnson denied that the marijuana was his, but 
Stillman placed Johnson under arrest for its possession.  He 
then searched Johnson incident to that arrest.  When he did so, 
he discovered 11 individually wrapped rocks of crack cocaine in 
the pocket on the left leg of Johnson's pants——the same pocket 
on which the officer had been unable to do a pat-down because 
Johnson had repeatedly fallen to the ground.  After the cocaine 
was recovered, Dummer testified that Johnson said that he had 
begun selling crack cocaine only recently.   
¶54 Johnson moved to suppress the drugs found in the car 
and on him, as well as his statement that he was selling crack 
cocaine.  After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found 
that Johnson consented to the search of his vehicle, and it 
denied the motion.  As part of a plea agreement, Johnson pled 
guilty and was convicted of possession with intent to deliver a 
                                                 
1 The majority opinion agrees that Johnson made this 
statement.  Majority op., ¶18.  
No.  2005AP573-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
lesser amount of crack cocaine than had been found on his 
person.   
¶55 Johnson appealed his conviction based on a claimed 
error of the circuit court in denying his motion to suppress the 
admission of the drugs found and his statement to the officers.  
On appeal, the State "conceded" that Johnson did not consent to 
the search of his vehicle.  The court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court decision on suppression, based in part on the 
State's "concession," which the court of appeals accepted 
without discussion.  We granted the State's petition for review.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶56 Whether a defendant has consented to a search is 
initially a question of historic fact.  State v. Garcia, 195 
Wis. 2d 68, 75, 535 N.W.2d 124 (Ct. App. 1995).  We will uphold 
a circuit court's finding of historic fact unless it is clearly 
erroneous.  State v. Sykes, 2005 WI 48, ¶12, 279 Wis. 2d 742, 
695 N.W.2d 277 (citing State v. Vorburger, 2002 WI 105, ¶32, 255 
Wis. 2d 537, 648 N.W.2d 829).  Whether the consent-in-fact was 
voluntarily given is a question of constitutional fact that we 
review independently.  State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 195, 
577 N.W.2d 794 (1998).   
¶57 Whether a law enforcement officer has articulated 
sufficient facts that, when taken together with the rational 
inferences from those facts, would cause a reasonable officer to 
believe that his safety or that of others was in danger, is a 
No.  2005AP573-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
question of law for our independent review.  State v. Matejka, 
2001 WI 5, ¶16, 241 Wis. 2d 52, 621 N.W.2d 891.   
B. 
Constitutional Principles 
¶58 The test for searches and seizures that are alleged to 
have violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution is one of reasonableness, because only unreasonable 
searches and seizures violate constitutional guaranties.  State 
v. Stout, 2002 WI App 41, ¶10, 250 Wis. 2d 768, 641 N.W.2d 474 
(citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)).  Searches 
and seizures conducted without a warrant are unreasonable, 
subject to certain exceptions.  Id.  Consent to search is one 
such exception.  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 196.  Another 
exception occurs when "a police officer observes behavior that 
he or she reasonably believes is suspicious," such that either 
the safety of the officer or the safety of others could be in 
jeopardy.  Stout, 250 Wis. 2d 768, ¶10 (citing Minnesota v. 
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372-73 (1993)).  
 
1. 
Johnson's consent 
¶59 Whether an individual has given consent to search is, 
in the first instance, a question of fact.  Garcia, 195 Wis. 2d 
at 75.  In the first step of this analysis, we determine what 
the defendant said or did.  Id.  The validity of the consent 
given is not affected by whether an officer informs the person 
that he or she has the right to withhold consent.  Ohio v. 
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 34 (1996); Vorburger, 255 Wis. 2d 537, 
¶100; Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 203.  Consent may be given 
No.  2005AP573-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
verbally or it may be given in a non-verbal form, by gestures or 
actions.  State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, ¶37, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 
648 N.W.2d 367.  If consent-in-fact is found, the second step is 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
consent 
was 
constitutionally 
sufficient.  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 190-94.   
¶60 Only 
voluntarily 
given 
consent 
will 
pass 
constitutional muster.2  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
222 (1973); Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 194-95.  Consent that is 
the product of duress, coercion or misrepresentation by law 
enforcement is not voluntarily given consent.  Schneckloth, 412 
U.S. at 227; Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968); 
State v. Giebel, 2006 WI App 239, ¶19, __ Wis. 2d __, 724 N.W.2d 
402.  There is no single fact, the absence or presence of which, 
determines whether consent was voluntarily given.  Schneckloth, 
412 U.S. at 226.  "The problem of reconciling the recognized 
legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be 
free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by 
any infallible touchstone."  Id. at 229.  Rather, in order to 
determine whether consent was voluntarily given, the totality of 
the circumstances of each individual case must be examined.  Id. 
                                                 
2 Johnson does not assert to this court that his consent to 
search the vehicle was not voluntarily given.  This may be due 
to the assistant attorney general's concession that Johnson did 
not consent to the search.  Because of that concession, the 
court must raise and decide the issue of consent to search 
Johnson's vehicle with no assistance to this court from either 
party.  This writer objects to the assistant attorney general's 
less than complete representation of all arguable issues.  The 
issue of consent to search Johnson's vehicle is not frivolous, 
as the circuit court's finding, the majority opinion and the 
dissent show. 
No.  2005AP573-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
at 233.  In examining the totality of the circumstances, we 
consider "both the circumstances surrounding the consent and the 
characteristics of the defendant."  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 198 
(additional citations omitted).  The State has the burden of 
proving that the consent was freely and voluntarily given.  
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222 (further citations omitted). 
¶61 In addressing the issue of consent, the majority 
conflates consent-in-fact with the voluntariness of the consent.  
Majority op., ¶¶16-19.  When a verbal response is given, as 
occurred here, consent to search and the voluntariness of the 
consent are two separate issues, with different tests and 
different standards of review.  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 196-97.  
¶62 Because the circuit court found that Johnson consented 
to the search of his vehicle, I begin with a review of the 
circuit court record to determine whether a finding that 
Johnson's consent-in-fact is clearly erroneous.  State v. 
Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d 531, 541, 577 N.W.2d 352 (1998).  The 
transcript of the hearing of Johnson's motion to suppress shows 
that Officer Dummer, one of the arresting officers, testified 
that Johnson's response to Officer Stillman's statement that he 
was going to search Johnson's vehicle was, "I don't have a 
problem with that."  There is nothing equivocal about Johnson's 
statement.  Johnson was present and represented by counsel at 
the suppression hearing.  He heard Dummer's testimony.  However, 
No.  2005AP573-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
Johnson did not testify that Dummer's statement was incorrect.3  
He also has not argued that the officer reported his statement 
incorrectly.   
¶63 The testimony of Dummer is sufficient to support the 
finding that Johnson consented, and even if more than one 
inference could have been drawn from the testimony at the 
suppression hearing, it is for the circuit court to decide which 
inference to choose.  State v. Friday, 147 Wis. 2d 359, 370-71, 
434 N.W.2d 85 (1989).  "[T]he inferential finding of the 
suppression judge[] was not a legal determination to be 
addressed de novo by the court of appeals . . . ."  Id. at 371.  
There is nothing in the record that would show that the circuit 
court's 
finding 
of 
historic 
consent-in-fact 
was 
clearly 
erroneous.   
¶64 However, instead of analyzing whether the circuit 
court's finding of historic fact, i.e., what did Johnson say, 
was clearly erroneous, the majority opinion focuses on the 
officer's statement that he would have searched the vehicle even 
if Johnson had said that he could not.  Majority op., ¶18.  
However, the officer did not tell Johnson that he was going to 
search his vehicle 
even if Johnson said he could not.  
Furthermore, it has long been the law in Wisconsin, as we have 
recently explained, that we are "unwilling to entertain Fourth 
                                                 
3 I am fully aware that Johnson has no obligation to 
testify, and that it is the State's burden to prove that consent 
was given.  See State v. Stout, 2002 WI App 41, ¶10, 250 Wis. 2d 
768, 641 N.W.2d 474 (citing United States v. Basinski, 226 F.3d 
829, 833 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
No.  2005AP573-CR.pdr 
 
9 
 
Amendment 
challenges 
based 
on 
the 
actual 
motivations 
of 
individual officers."  State v. Sykes, 2005 WI 48, ¶29, 279 
Wis. 2d 742, 695 N.W.2d 277 (quoting Accord Arkansas v. 
Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771 (2001) (further citations omitted).  
The officers' subjective beliefs are not dispositive of any 
aspect of the Fourth Amendment questions presented here.  
Accordingly, because the circuit court's finding of historic 
fact was not clearly erroneous, I move to the second step of the 
consent analysis, whether Johnson's verbal response was consent 
voluntarily given.  
¶65 The totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
consent show there was no coercion, duress or misrepresentation 
by law enforcement.  When Johnson fell to the ground a second 
time as the officer attempted to pat-down the pocket in the left 
leg of his pants, the officers permitted him to sit on the curb.  
In so doing, they were solicitous of Johnson's claimed leg 
injury.  They did not threaten him or misrepresent any fact to 
him.  Johnson appeared to understand what the officers were 
saying, as he sat on the curb and waited while the officer 
searched his vehicle.  His statement, "I don't have a problem 
with that" was a direct response to the officer's statement.  
Furthermore, Johnson has not claimed he was coerced, or that he 
was under duress when he responded or that law enforcement 
misrepresented to him.  Accordingly, I conclude that Johnson's 
consent to search his vehicle passes constitutional muster, as 
the totality of the circumstances show it was voluntarily given.   
No.  2005AP573-CR.pdr 
 
10 
 
¶66 The 
majority opinion concludes that because the 
officer advised Johnson that he was going to search the vehicle, 
Johnson's response, "I don't have a problem with that" is 
insufficient to show consent and shows only "acquiescence."  
Majority op., ¶19.  The majority then goes on to conclude that 
because there was "acquiescence," as the majority uses that 
term, the circuit court's finding that Johnson consented is 
clearly erroneous.  Id.   
¶67 However, the concept of acquiescence, when there is a 
verbal response to law enforcement in regard to a proposed 
search, 
is 
related 
to 
voluntariness, 
a 
question 
of 
constitutional fact.  State v. Wilson, 229 Wis. 2d 256, 269, 600 
N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1999).  Acquiescence is a term that has been 
used in a number of opinions.  But contrary to the majority 
opinion's assertion, it is not the silver bullet to set aside 
voluntarily given consent.   
¶68  For example, in Schneckloth, while relating the 
reasoning underlying Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 
(1946), the Supreme Court explained that even though there was 
an initial refusal, "that [] initial refusal to turn the coupons 
over was soon followed by acquiescence in the demand——these 
circumstances all support the conclusion of the District Court 
[that petitioner consented to the search]."  Schneckloth, 412 
U.S. at 233.  Therefore, in Schneckloth, the Supreme Court's own 
use of the term, acquiescence, shows it is not fatal to a 
constitutionally sufficient consent. 
No.  2005AP573-CR.pdr 
 
11 
 
¶69 However, acquiescence causes Fourth Amendment problems 
when the acquiescence is made to claimed lawful authority to 
search, when no such lawful authority exists.  Bumper, 391 U.S. 
at 548-49.  For example in Bumper, law enforcement personnel 
obtained permission of the homeowner to search by asserting that 
they had a warrant to search.  Id.  However, they had no 
warrant.  Id.  As the supreme court explained, the consent 
obtained 
subsequent 
to 
this 
misrepresentation 
was 
not 
a 
voluntary consent: 
When a law enforcement officer claims authority 
to search a home under a warrant, he announces in 
effect that the occupant has no right to resist the 
search.   
Id. at 550. 
¶70 The court of appeals applied a similar analysis in 
Giebel, where law enforcement showed Giebel part of a subpoena, 
implying it was for his computer.  Giebel said that when the 
officer showed him part of the subpoena, he believed he had no 
choice to refuse to give consent.  Giebel, 2006 WI App 239, ¶7, 
__ Wis. 2d __.  The court of appeals considered the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding Giebel's consent and concluded 
that his consent was not voluntary.  As the court explained, "we 
will not presume acquiescence in the loss of a fundamental 
right."  Id., ¶16 (citing Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util.'s 
Comm'n of Ohio, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937).   
¶71 The majority opinion uses acquiescence incorrectly 
because it does not acknowledge that when a person gives a 
verbal, but positive, response to a request to search or a 
statement that a search will be conducted, he is always 
No.  2005AP573-CR.pdr 
 
12 
 
"acquiescing" to law enforcement.4  However, such "acquiescence" 
is not the equivalent of an involuntary consent, and only that 
acquiescence 
that 
evidences 
involuntary 
consent 
violates 
constitutional guarantees.  See State v. Williamson, 58 Wis. 2d 
514, 521, 206 N.W.2d 613 (1973) (concluding that Williamson's 
response of "I don't care" to an officer's request to search his 
car did not even raise the issue of voluntariness of the consent 
to search). 
¶72 Only verbal acquiescence that is evidence of a consent 
that is involuntarily given runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  See State v. Bermudez, 221 Wis. 2d 
338, 585 N.W.2d 628 (Ct. App. 1998) (explaining that when the 
totality of the circumstances shows that consent was obtained 
due to duress, coercion or misrepresentation by law enforcement, 
it is constitutionally insufficient because it was obtained by 
"acquiescence to an unlawful assertion of authority").  Id. at 
348 (citing Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-49). 
¶73 The majority opinion also quotes a statement from 
Wilson that "Acquiescence to an unlawful assertion of police 
authority is not equivalent to consent," but its analysis slides 
over the requirement that the assertion of authority must be 
"unlawful."  Majority op., ¶16.  In Wilson, the court of appeals 
opinion relies on the unlawfulness of police action and the 
duress applied to Wilson to obtain consent to search.  Wilson, 
                                                 
4 Webster defines acquiesce as "to accept or comply tacitly 
or passively."  Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 11 (1977).  
An antonym for "to acquiesce" is "to object."  Id.  
No.  2005AP573-CR.pdr 
 
13 
 
229 Wis. 2d at 269.  Wilson relies on Bumper where law 
enforcement obtained consent by misrepresenting that they had a 
warrant to search.  In Wilson, law enforcement unlawfully 
penetrated the curtilage of Wilson's home and applied duress by 
refusing to permit Wilson to use the bathroom until he was 
searched, such that the totality of the circumstances showed 
that the search was unlawful.  Id.   
¶74 However, there is nothing "unlawful" about an officer 
saying, "I am going to search the car," any more than there 
would have been in a question, "Can I search the car?"  As 
Bermudez, and the cases on which it relies, explain, an 
"unlawful" assertion of authority arises when law enforcement is 
coercive, applies duress or misrepresents to the person whose 
property law enforcement seeks to search.  Bermudez, 221 Wis. 2d 
at 348.  There was nothing unlawful about the officer's 
statement to Johnson.   
¶75 The record created in the circuit court shows that the 
State's concession that Johnson did not consent to the search of 
his vehicle should have been rejected by the majority of this 
court. As Professor Blinka relates, "A consent search is 
constitutionally reasonable to the extent that the search 
remains within the bounds of the actual consent given to the 
officers."  9 Christine M. Wiseman, Nicholas L. Chiarkas & 
Daniel D. Blinka, Wis. Prac., Criminal Practice & Procedure 
§ 19.82 (2006) (citing State v. Douglas, 123 Wis. 2d 13, 22, 365 
N.W.2d 580 (1985)).  Here, there can be no question that 
Johnson's consent to search his vehicle was not exceeded.  
No.  2005AP573-CR.pdr 
 
14 
 
Marijuana was found under the front seat of Johnson's vehicle 
and Johnson consented to the scope of that search.   
¶76 Johnson was arrested for possession of marijuana 
(tetrahydrocannabinols also referred to as THC), contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(e); therefore, the subsequent search of 
his person, where the 11 rocks of crack cocaine were found, was 
incident to a lawful arrest.  There is no basis for suppressing 
the discovery of crack cocaine on Johnson's person, nor is there 
any basis to suppress his statement that he had just begun 
selling crack cocaine.  The majority opinion errs in doing so.   
2. 
Reasonable inference 
¶77 Setting aside the issue of Johnson's consent to search 
his vehicle, the majority also errs when it concludes that 
Johnson's furtive movement as the officers approached his 
vehicle could not reasonably be interpreted by the officers as 
Johnson placing a weapon under the vehicle's front seat.  See 
majority op., ¶¶29-30.   
¶78 The United States Supreme Court has held that there is 
"no ready test for determining reasonableness [of a search] 
other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion 
which the search entails."  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) 
(quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 
(1967)).  The need to search is affected by the location in 
which an officer encounters a suspect because that factor may 
affect officer safety.  For example, "investigative detentions 
involving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with 
No.  2005AP573-CR.pdr 
 
15 
 
danger to police officers."  Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 
1047 (1983). 
¶79 One study showed that "approximately 30% of police 
shootings occurred when a police officer approached a suspect 
seated in an automobile."  Id. at 1048 n.13.  As the Supreme 
Court has noted, "suspects may injure police officers and others 
by virtue of their access to weapons, even though they may not 
themselves be armed."  Id. at 1048.  And finally, the passenger 
compartment of an automobile, to which a suspect who has been 
briefly detained may return, provides access to any weapons that 
are inside that compartment.  Id. at 1052.  "If a suspect is 
'dangerous,' he is no less dangerous simply because he is not 
arrested."  Id. at 1050. 
¶80 When a suspect who has been detained but has not been 
arrested is about to return to his vehicle, an officer must make 
a "quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from 
possible danger."  Id. at 1052 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 28).  
In order to engage in a weapons search of the passenger 
compartment of an automobile subsequent to a traffic stop where 
the vehicle's occupant has not been arrested, an officer must 
have an "articulable suspicion" that re-entry of the vehicle by 
the suspect has the capacity to create a "potentially dangerous" 
situation for the officer or others.  Id. at 1052 n.16.   
¶81 The search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle 
is not so intrusive as the search of one's person.  See Matejka, 
241 Wis. 2d 52, ¶28.  Therefore, when the need for a search is 
balanced with the intrusiveness of a search, need for officer 
No.  2005AP573-CR.pdr 
 
16 
 
safety may weigh more heavily in the balance if a passenger 
compartment were being searched than it would if a suspect's 
person were being searched.   
¶82 Here, two officers testified that as they approached 
Johnson's vehicle he leaned forward to the extent that much of 
his head and shoulders disappeared from view, and that his 
movement was considered "furtive" because it appeared he was 
concealing something underneath the front seat.  Both officers 
also testified that in their experiences such a movement can 
occur when the occupant of the vehicle is placing a weapon under 
the seat.   
¶83 The 
officer's 
conclusion 
that 
Johnson's 
furtive 
movement could have resulted from placing a weapon under the 
seat was reasonable because they accurately described what 
Johnson did, and they had past experience with similar movements 
of occupants who had secreted a weapon under the front seat.  
Accordingly, the officers reasonably believed that Johnson's 
actions had the potential to create a dangerous situation upon 
his re-entry into the vehicle because he would have access to 
any weapon he placed under the front seat.   
¶84 The officers had to make a quick decision about their 
own safety after they decided not to arrest Johnson.  They had 
two choices.  They could ignore what they believed to be 
Johnson's reaching under the front seat and also ignore their 
experiences as law enforcement officers as to what such a 
reaching could mean or they could conduct a limited search of 
No.  2005AP573-CR.pdr 
 
17 
 
the area of Johnson's vehicle into which he would re-enter.  
They chose the latter course of action. 
¶85 The majority concludes that the limited search of the 
passenger compartment of Johnson's vehicle was not reasonable 
because Johnson could have been trying to retrieve his driver's 
license, or picking up a fast food wrapper from the floor or 
several other innocuous acts.  Majority op., ¶43.  While I have 
no quarrel with the majority's discussion of what Johnson 
"could" have been doing, the discussion demonstrates only that 
the majority of this court, none of whom have any experience 
conducting traffic stops, is merely substituting its judgment 
for that of two experienced officers.  But more importantly, the 
majority opinion does not explain why the officers' belief was 
not reasonable as is required.  Stout, 250 Wis. 2d 768, ¶31. 
¶86 That Johnson's furtive movement could have an innocent 
explanation is not persuasive because, as this court has 
explained, 
a 
suspicious 
circumstance, 
such 
as 
a 
furtive 
movement, "by its very nature" is an ambiguous circumstance.  
See State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 84, 454 N.W.2d 763 
(1990).  Simply because Johnson's furtive movement could have 
resulted from something other than concealing a weapon, it does 
not follow that the officers' belief that Johnson's movement had 
the potential of weapon concealment, was unreasonable.  Stout, 
250 Wis. 2d 768, ¶31 (concluding that while there may have been 
No.  2005AP573-CR.pdr 
 
18 
 
an innocent reason for Stout's furtive movement, it was also 
reasonable to conclude that he was reaching for a weapon).5   
¶87 As the United States Supreme Court has explained, 
traffic stops are very dangerous for law enforcement personnel.  
Long, 463 U.S. at 1048.  Therefore, when an officer releases a 
suspect who has made a furtive movement that could have been due 
to securing a weapon under the front seat, the officer must make 
a quick decision about whether to ignore what he has seen and 
his training and experience about the import of that observation 
or he can secure his own safety and that of others by conducting 
a limited search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle to 
which the suspect may return.  In situations such as this case 
presents, when the officer opts for safety, no constitutional 
right is violated because the search is reasonable under the 
circumstances.  Because the majority opinion does not balance 
the officer's need for the search with the level of intrusion on 
Johnson's privacy, it errs in concluding the vehicle search was 
not lawful.  In so doing, it unnecessarily increases the risk of 
                                                 
5 The majority opinion suggests that my criticism of its 
reasoning and conclusion that Johnson's furtive movement as the 
officers walked to his vehicle did not reasonably suggest that 
he could have been placing a weapon or drugs under the front 
seat is a request that the majority "abdicate its constitutional 
function."  Majority op., ¶44 n.16.  That is mere hyperbole.  
All I am requesting is that the majority opinion analyze the 
facts and determine what a reasonable police officer would have 
believed under the circumstances.  An officer's experience bears 
on what is reasonable for him to believe, and, given the fluid 
nature of a traffic stop and its inherent dangers to police 
officers, their belief, given the facts herein presented, was 
reasonable.  See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1983).  
No.  2005AP573-CR.pdr 
 
19 
 
harm for officers who, in the future, choose the lack of action 
that the majority opinion requires.  
III. CONCLUSION 
¶88 In conclusion, because the circuit court's finding of 
historic fact that Johnson consented to the search of his 
vehicle cannot be overturned, as it is not clearly erroneous, 
and because Johnson's agreeing to the proposed search was not 
acquiescence of the type that affected the voluntariness of his 
consent, the majority errs in concluding that Johnson did not 
consent to the search of his vehicle.  In addition, it errs when 
it substitutes its judgment for that of law enforcement about 
the reasonable import of Johnson's furtive movement as the 
officers 
approached 
his 
vehicle. 
 
Accordingly, 
because 
rectifying either of these errors will result in affirming 
Johnson's conviction, I respectfully dissent.   
¶89 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2005AP573-CR.pdr 
 
1