Title: State v. Delap
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2016AP002196-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 2018

2018 WI 64 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP2196-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Steven T. Delap, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 375 Wis. 2d 799, 899 N.W.2d 738 
(2017 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 6, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 12, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dodge 
 
JUDGE: 
Steven G. Bauer 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
GABLEMAN, J., concurs, joined by KELLY, J. 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
and an oral argument by Michael J. Herbert, Madison. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief and an oral 
argument by Jennifer R. McNamee, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.
 
 
2018 WI 64
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP2196-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CM408) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Steven T. Delap, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 6, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming a 
judgment of conviction of the Circuit Court for Dodge County, 
Steven G. Bauer, Judge.1  Steven Delap, the defendant, was 
convicted of obstructing an officer in violation of Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
1 State v. Delap, No. 2016AP2196-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2017).  The case was decided by one 
judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(f) (2015-16).  All 
subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2015-
16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP2196-CR   
 
2 
 
§ 946.41(1) and possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 961.573(1), both as a repeater.   
¶2 
In the circuit court, the defendant claimed that his 
arrest was unlawful and that the evidence seized should be 
suppressed.  The defendant argued that law enforcement officers, 
who had two valid warrants for his arrest, unlawfully attempted 
to stop him in the driveway of his home, unlawfully pursued him 
into his home to effectuate his arrest, and unlawfully seized 
evidence obtained from a search incident to his arrest.    
¶3 
The defendant claims that the arrest and subsequent 
search violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶4 
The circuit court denied the defendant's motion to 
suppress the evidence.  The circuit court concluded that the hot 
pursuit doctrine permitted the law enforcement officers in the 
instant case to follow the defendant into his home to effectuate 
his arrest.  Relying on the hot pursuit doctrine, the court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court's denial of the defendant's 
motion to suppress evidence.   
¶5 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals, but on 
grounds different than those relied upon by the circuit court 
and court of appeals.  We conclude that the instant case is 
No. 
2016AP2196-CR   
 
3 
 
governed by Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), and we need 
not address the applicability of the hot pursuit doctrine.2   
¶6 
In Payton, the United States Supreme Court declared 
that "for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded 
on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited 
authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when 
there is reason to believe the suspect is within."  Payton, 445 
U.S. at 603.  
¶7 
In the instant case, law enforcement officers had two 
valid arrest warrants based on probable cause for the arrest of 
the defendant.  The facts and circumstances known to the 
officers at the time they located the defendant were sufficient 
to form probable cause to believe that the individual they saw 
entering the residence was the defendant and that the defendant 
lived in the residence into which he fled.   
¶8 
Thus, applying the teachings of Payton, we conclude 
that the law enforcement officers in the instant case lawfully 
entered the defendant's residence to execute the two valid 
warrants for the defendant's arrest and lawfully seized evidence 
discovered in the search incident to the defendant's arrest.3 
                                                 
2 We note that although the circuit court and court of 
appeals did not rely on Payton, the parties briefed and argued 
the application of Payton to the facts of the instant case while 
in this court.   
3 Because we affirm the decision of the court of appeals 
under the Supreme Court's decision in Payton, we need not (and 
do not) address the issue of whether the hot pursuit doctrine 
permitted the law enforcement officers in the instant case to 
follow the defendant into his home to effectuate his arrest. 
No. 
2016AP2196-CR   
 
4 
 
¶9 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
¶10 The following facts are taken from the testimony 
elicited at the hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress 
evidence and from the circuit court's findings based on that 
testimony. 
¶11 On September 6, 2015, Sergeant Michael Willmann and 
Deputy Dustin Waas of the Dodge County Sheriff's Department 
arrested the defendant in his home.  
¶12 Approximately one month prior to the defendant's 
arrest, Sergeant Willmann overheard that his colleague, Deputy 
John Gallenbeck, "conduct[ed] a traffic stop on a vehicle where 
the driver subsequently fled from the vehicle and went into a 
wooded area and deputies were unable to locate him."  Deputy 
Gallenbeck had learned from a passenger in the vehicle that the 
fleeing driver "was Steven Delap [the defendant] and that he was 
living at 110 Milwaukee Street in Neosho." 
¶13 Approximately one week prior to the defendant's 
arrest, Sergeant Willmann "received a teletype correspondence 
from the Walworth County Sheriff's Office stating that [the 
defendant] was involved in a very similar incident . . . where 
he had fled from a traffic stop in the same type of manner."  
The teletype indicated that the defendant lived at 110 Milwaukee 
Street. 
¶14 Sergeant Willmann ran the defendant's name through 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation and National Crime 
No. 
2016AP2196-CR   
 
5 
 
Information 
Center 
files 
which 
turned 
up 
two 
valid 
and 
outstanding warrants for the defendant's arrest: one through 
Jefferson County and another through the Wisconsin Department of 
Corrections.  Because of the defendant's prior history of 
fleeing police, Sergeant Willmann requested that Deputy Waas 
accompany him to arrest the defendant pursuant to the two arrest 
warrants. 
¶15 At about 10:00 p.m. on September 6, 2015, Sergeant 
Willmann and Deputy Waas went to 110 Milwaukee Street in Neosho 
to arrest the defendant pursuant to the two outstanding arrest 
warrants.  Sergeant Willmann was in full uniform:  green pants, 
tan shirt, patches, a badge, and a duty belt.  The officers 
parked about a block away from 110 Milwaukee Street out of 
concern that the defendant "would either run or not answer the 
door" if they parked closer.  They left their vehicles and 
walked down Milwaukee Street, counting down the numbers on the 
houses as they went.  Sergeant Willman recalled that the last 
building number he counted was 120 before seeing the final 
building on the 100 block of Milwaukee Street.  That building 
was a duplex, and based on his counting, Sergeant Willmann 
believed that one of the two doors at the duplex had to be 110 
Milwaukee Street. 
¶16 When Sergeant Willmann walked "towards what [he] 
believed [was] the residence," he saw a man standing next to a 
car parked on Milwaukee Street and another man walking down the 
driveway in front of the duplex towards that car.  As Sergeant 
Willmann and Deputy Waas approached, the man who was walking 
No. 
2016AP2196-CR   
 
6 
 
down the driveway turned and looked at the officers before 
turning around and running towards the back of the duplex.  
Sergeant Willmann shined his flashlight on the individual and 
shouted, "Stop, police!" but the man did not stop and instead 
continued running towards the back of the duplex.   
¶17 Sergeant Willmann gave chase.  Based upon the man's 
proximity to 110 Milwaukee Street and his reaction upon seeing 
the two police officers, Sergeant Willmann believed that the 
fleeing man was the defendant, Steven Delap. 
¶18 When the man got to the rear door of the residence, he 
went inside and began shutting the door.  Sergeant Willmann used 
his shoulder to "keep the door from latching completely shut."  
Sergeant Willmann and the man pushed back and forth on the door 
until Deputy Waas joined Sergeant Willmann.  The two police 
officers together pushed the door open.   
¶19 At some point, one of the officers pulled out his 
Taser, "got [the defendant] to the ground, [and] got [the 
defendant] in cuffs."  After the arrest, the fleeing individual 
was identified as Steven Delap, the defendant.   
¶20 A subsequent search incident to the defendant's arrest 
revealed three syringes and a silver tube used for smoking crack 
cocaine in the defendant's right cargo pocket.  
¶21 The 
defendant 
was 
charged 
with 
one 
count 
of 
obstructing an officer in violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1) 
and possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.573(1), both as a repeater. 
No. 
2016AP2196-CR   
 
7 
 
¶22 The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained 
as a result of the search incident to his arrest.  The defendant 
argued that the officers' attempt to stop him while he was still 
in his driveway was unlawful, and further, that it was unlawful 
for the officers to pursue him into his home in order to arrest 
him. 
¶23 At the suppression hearing, the circuit court seemed 
inclined to rule that the officers lawfully entered the 
defendant's home under the rationale announced in Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).  The circuit court stated that "[t]he 
bottom line is there's a legitimate arrest warrant for you and 
the police officer[s], through their investigation, had reason 
to believe and probable cause that you lived there, okay.  
That's all I needed, probable cause that you lived there and 
they had the arrest warrant.  That's enough." 
¶24 Nevertheless, the circuit court's written order denied 
the defendant's motion on the basis that the officers' entry 
into the home was permitted under the hot pursuit doctrine.  The 
defendant pleaded no contest to the charges against him and 
appealed.  The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, relying 
on the hot pursuit doctrine.   
II 
¶25 We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of 
review. 
¶26 "Our review of an order granting or denying a motion 
to suppress evidence presents a question of constitutional 
fact."  State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶22, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 
No. 
2016AP2196-CR   
 
8 
 
N.W.2d 463; see also State v. Iverson, 2015 WI 101, ¶17, 365 
Wis. 2d 302, 871 N.W.2d 661 (quoting Robinson).   
¶27 "When presented with a question of constitutional 
fact, this court engages in a two-step inquiry.  First, we 
review the circuit court's findings of historical fact under a 
deferential standard, upholding them unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Second, we independently apply constitutional 
principles to those facts."  Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶22 
(citations omitted); see also Iverson, 365 Wis. 2d 302, ¶18; 
State v. Hogan, 2015 WI 76, 
¶32, 364 Wis. 2d 167, 868 
N.W.2d 124. 
III 
¶28 For purposes of this review, no dispute exists about 
the historical facts.  No party argues (and we do not conclude) 
that any of the circuit court's findings of fact based on the 
testimony are clearly erroneous.  Therefore, we apply the 
relevant constitutional principles to the historical facts.   
¶29 The relevant constitutional principles are set forth 
in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
¶30 The United States Supreme Court declared in Payton 
that "for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded 
on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited 
authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when 
there is reason to believe the suspect is within."  Payton, 445 
U.S. at 603.   
¶31 The Supreme Court has further explained 
Payton, 
stating that the Payton Court "recognized that an arrest warrant 
No. 
2016AP2196-CR   
 
9 
 
alone was sufficient to authorize the entry into a person's home 
to effect his arrest. . . . Because an arrest warrant authorizes 
the police to deprive a person of his liberty, it necessarily 
also authorizes a limited invasion of that person's privacy 
interest when it is necessary to arrest him in his home."  
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 214 n.7 (1981). 
¶32 Under Payton, police may enter a residence pursuant to 
an arrest warrant if two factors are present:  "(1) the facts 
and circumstances present the police with a reasonable belief 
that the subject of the arrest warrant resides in the home; and 
(2) the facts and circumstances present the police with a 
reasonable belief that the subject of the arrest warrant is 
present in the home at the time entry is effected."  State v. 
Blanco, 2000 WI App 119, ¶16, 237 Wis. 2d 395, 614 N.W.2d 512.   
¶33 The federal circuit courts are divided regarding what 
Payton meant by a "reasonable belief."  See United States v. 
Hill, 649 F.3d 258, 262-63 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that some 
circuits have equated "reasonable belief" with "probable cause" 
while others have concluded that "reasonable belief" means 
something less stringent than "probable cause").   
¶34 We need not (and do not) decide today whether 
"reasonable belief" means "probable cause" or something less 
stringent because, in the instant case, the officers had 
No. 
2016AP2196-CR   
 
10 
 
probable cause to believe that the defendant resided in the 
duplex into which he fled.4 
¶35 We 
have 
explained 
that 
"probable 
cause 
eschews 
technicality and legalisms in favor of a flexible, common-sense 
measure of the plausibility of particular conclusions about 
human behavior."  State v. Kiper, 193 Wis. 2d 69, 83, 532 
N.W.2d 698 (1995) (internal quotation marks and quoted source 
omitted).  For probable cause to exist, "[t]he quantum of 
evidence must constitute 'more than a possibility or suspicion 
that defendant committed an offense, but the evidence need not 
reach the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even that 
guilt is more likely than not.  The information which 
constitutes probable cause is measured by the facts of the 
particular case.'"  Id. at 82 (quoting State v. Mitchell, 167 
Wis. 2d 672, 681-82, 482 N.W.2d 364 (1992)). 
¶36 The first factor, whether the police had probable 
cause to believe that the defendant resided in the home, is at 
issue in the instant case.5  The defendant argues that the police 
officers in the instant case did not have probable cause to 
                                                 
4 Moreover, this issue was not briefed or argued by the 
parties in the instant case.  Because the resolution of this 
issue is unnecessary to the resolution of the instant case, we 
leave for another day the meaning of Payton's "reasonable 
belief" language.  See Jamerson v. Dep't of Children & Families, 
2013 WI 7, ¶57, 345 Wis. 2d 205, 824 N.W.2d 822; Pool v. City of 
Sheboygan, 2007 WI 38, ¶19, 300 Wis. 2d 74, 729 N.W.2d 415. 
5 The second factor is not at issue.  No one disputes that 
the police had probable cause to believe that the defendant was 
present in the dwelling at the time of the officers' entry. 
No. 
2016AP2196-CR   
 
11 
 
believe that he was the subject of the arrest warrants (i.e., 
that the fleeing man was Steven Delap) or that he resided in the 
dwelling into which he fled.  We are not persuaded by the 
defendant's arguments.   
¶37 The following facts known to the police officers 
support a finding of probable cause to believe that the fleeing 
individual was Steven Delap and that the individual resided in 
the dwelling into which he fled: 
• Steven Delap had two outstanding warrants for his 
arrest:  one from Jefferson County and one from the 
Wisconsin Department of Corrections. 
• Steven Delap had a prior history of fleeing from 
police officers. 
• Approximately one month prior to the defendant's 
arrest, Sergeant Willmann overheard that Steven Delap 
had fled a traffic stop conducted by one of his 
colleagues, and that a passenger in the vehicle said 
that Steven Delap lived at 110 Milwaukee Street in 
Neosho. 
• Approximately one week prior to the defendant's 
arrest, 
Sergeant 
Willmann 
received 
a 
teletype 
correspondence from the Walworth County Sheriff's 
Office stating that Steven Delap was again involved in 
fleeing a traffic stop.  The teletype indicated that 
Steven Delap lived at 110 Milwaukee Street. 
• As he and Deputy Waas walked down Milwaukee Street, 
Sergeant Willmann counted down the numbers on the 
No. 
2016AP2196-CR   
 
12 
 
houses.  When he reached number 120, there was only 
one other building on the 100 block of Milwaukee 
Street:  a duplex that Sergeant Willmann deduced must 
include 110 Milwaukee Street. 
• As Sergeant Willmann and Deputy Waas approached the 
duplex, a man who was walking down the driveway 
noticed the officers, turned around, and began running 
towards the back of the duplex.  Sergeant Willmann was 
in full uniform when the man noticed the officers and 
fled.  Sergeant Willmann shined his flashlight on the 
man and shouted, "Stop, police!" but the man continued 
running towards the back of the duplex. 
¶38 Taken together, the facts and circumstances presented 
to Sergeant Willmann and Deputy Waas establish probable cause to 
believe that the man in the driveway of 110 Milwaukee Street who 
turned and ran after noticing the police officers was Steven 
Delap, the subject of the arrest warrants who had a prior 
history of fleeing police and who was believed to reside at 110 
Milwaukee Street. 
¶39 The defendant offers two other arguments, both of 
which are undeveloped and perplexing.  
¶40 The defendant contends, without explanation, that the 
officers did not know that the outstanding arrest warrants were 
supported 
by 
probable 
cause 
as 
determined 
by 
a 
neutral 
magistrate.  Arrest warrants must be supported by probable 
No. 
2016AP2196-CR   
 
13 
 
cause.6  The language of Payton requires only a valid arrest 
warrant, a reasonable belief that the subject of the warrant 
resides in a particular dwelling, and a reasonable belief that 
the subject of the warrant will be present in the dwelling at 
the time of entry.  Payton, 445 U.S. at 603.  Payton does not 
require the specific arresting officers to also have personal 
knowledge regarding the issuance of the arrest warrant.  The 
defendant does not argue or contend that the two warrants issued 
for his arrest in the instant case lacked probable cause, only 
that Sergeant Willmann and Deputy Waas did not have personal 
knowledge 
regarding 
the 
issuance 
of 
the 
two 
warrants.  
Accordingly, we reject the defendant's argument. 
¶41 The defendant also asserts that even if the officers' 
entry into his home was permissible under Payton, his arrest was 
nonetheless unreasonable because of the officers' use of force 
and display of weapons.  The defendant fails to explain how the 
police officers' use of force in the instant case overrides the 
officers' authority to enter the home to execute the two valid 
                                                 
6 State v. Ritchie, 2000 WI App 136, ¶12, 237 Wis. 2d 664, 
614 N.W.2d 837 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 5.1(g), at 50 (3d ed. 1996)):  
The requirement of the Fourth Amendment that no 
warrant 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation and particularly 
describing the person or things to be seized, applies 
to arrest warrants as well as search warrants, and 
thus much of what [is] said . . . with respect to the 
issuance of search warrants applies by analogy to 
arrest warrants. 
No. 
2016AP2196-CR   
 
14 
 
outstanding arrest warrants or how the use of force in the 
instant case was unreasonable. 
¶42 Applying Payton to the undisputed facts, we conclude 
that the police officers' entry into the defendant's home to 
execute two valid warrants for the defendant's arrest was 
permissible.  We therefore affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals affirming the defendant's judgment of conviction. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
No.  2016AP2196-CR.mjg 
 
1 
 
¶43 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   (Concurring).  I agree with 
the majority that the entry into Delap's residence was lawful 
pursuant to Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), and, 
consequently, his conviction should be affirmed.1  However, I 
would go further and also answer the question of whether the 
officers' entry into Delap's residence was lawful pursuant to 
the hot pursuit doctrine.  See, e.g., State v. Washington, 2018 
WI 3, ¶¶61-68, 379 Wis. 2d 58, 905 N.W.2d 380 (Gableman, J., 
joined by R.G. Bradley and Kelly, JJ, concurring) ("I would go 
further and hold that Washington forfeited his right to be 
present at trial."); Leavitt v. Beverly Enters., 2010 WI 71, 
¶¶59-62, 
326 
Wis. 2d 421, 
784 
N.W.2d 683 
(Ziegler, 
J., 
concurring) ("I write separately because I would go further and 
decide that an order compelling arbitration is not appealable as 
a matter of right."). 
¶44 Though appellate courts should generally decide cases 
on the narrowest possible grounds, State v. Toliver, 2014 WI 85, 
¶12, 356 Wis. 2d 642, 851 N.W.2d 251, I would make an exception 
in this case for three reasons:  (1) the circuit court and court 
of appeals based their respective decisions on hot pursuit;2 (2) 
                                                 
1 I join the majority opinion except the last sentence of ¶5 
and footnote three. 
2 The circuit court relied on both Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573 (1980) and hot pursuit in its oral decision denying 
Delap's motion to suppress.  However, in its written order, the 
circuit court relied only on hot pursuit.  In addition, the 
court of appeals relied only on hot pursuit in affirming Delap's 
conviction.  State v. Delap, 2016AP2196-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. April 20, 2017). 
 
No.  2016AP2196-CR.mjg 
 
2 
 
Delap presented only the hot pursuit question in his petition 
for review;3 and (3) answering the hot pursuit question in this 
case may serve to alleviate any confusion stemming from our 
splintered decision in State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96, 372 Wis. 2d 
202, 887 N.W.2d 554. 
   
I.  THE OFFICERS WERE IN HOT PURSUIT OF DELAP WHEN THEY ENTERED 
HIS HOME. 
¶45 "The 
Fourth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution protect the right of people to be secure in their 
persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures."  
State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶29, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 
120.  This protection also bars police entry into a private 
residence without consent or a warrant.  Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 
U.S. 740, 748 (1984).  Wisconsin "adhere[s] to the basic 
principle that warrantless searches[, or entries,] are per se 
unreasonable unless they fall within a well-recognized exception 
to the warrant requirement."  State v. Foster, 2014 WI 131, ¶32, 
360 Wis. 2d 12, 856 N.W.2d 847.  One well-recognized exception 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement 
is 
the 
exigent 
circumstances 
doctrine.  State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶24, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 
786 N.W.2d 463.  The exigent circumstances doctrine provides 
that a warrantless search is reasonable under the Fourth 
                                                 
3 The State raised Payton in its response brief to this 
court.  Though petitioners may address only issues raised in the 
petition for review, respondents (such as the State in this 
case) may advance any argument in support of the judgment below.  
Cynthia E. v. La Crosse Cty. Human Servs., 172 Wis. 2d 218, 233, 
493 N.W.2d 56 (1992). 
 
No.  2016AP2196-CR.mjg 
 
3 
 
Amendment if the need for the search is urgent and there is 
insufficient time to obtain a warrant.  Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 
421, ¶30. 
¶46 We 
have 
identified 
four 
categories 
of 
exigent 
circumstances:  "1) hot pursuit of a suspect, 2) a threat to the 
safety of a suspect or others, 3) a risk that evidence will be 
destroyed, and 4) a likelihood that the suspect will flee."  
State v. Howes, 2017 WI 18, ¶24, 373 Wis. 2d 468, 893 N.W.2d 812 
(quoting State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶29, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 
N.W.2d 29).  The burden is on the State to "prov[e] that a 
warrantless home entry is justified by exigent circumstances."  
State v. Ferguson, 2009 WI 50, ¶20, 317 Wis. 2d 586, 767 N.W.2d 
187.  In the present matter, we are concerned with only the 
first category of exigent circumstances:  hot pursuit. 
¶47 The hot pursuit exception applies when officers are in 
"immediate or continuous pursuit of [a suspect] from the scene 
of a crime."  State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96, ¶28, 372 Wis. 2d 202, 
887 N.W.2d 554 (quoting Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶29).  Thus, 
the State must show that:  (1) the officers were in immediate 
pursuit of the suspect; and (2) the officers had probable cause 
to arrest the fleeing suspect for a "jailable criminal offense."  
State v. Sanders, 2008 WI 85, ¶117, 311 Wis. 2d 257, 752 N.W.2d 
713 (Prosser, J., concurring) (citing Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753). 
A.  The Officers were in Immediate Pursuit of Delap 
¶48 The first element of the hot pursuit test requires 
that the officers actually be engaged in pursuing or chasing the 
defendant. 
 
While 
"'hot 
pursuit' 
means 
some 
sort 
of 
 
No.  2016AP2196-CR.mjg 
 
4 
 
chase, . . . it need not be an extended hue and cry in and about 
public streets." United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 
(1976).  A pursuit or chase that ends "almost as soon as it 
began [does] not render it any less a 'hot pursuit' sufficient 
to justify the warrantless entry."  Sanders, 311 Wis. 2d 257, 
¶109 (Prosser, J., concurring) (citing Santana, 427 U.S. at 43).  
"[A] suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in 
motion in a public place, and is therefore proper under [United 
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976)], by the expedient of 
escaping into a private place."  Santana, 427 U.S. at 40. 
Law enforcement is not a child’s game of prisoner[’]s 
base, or a contest, with apprehension and conviction 
depending upon whether the officer or defendant is the 
fleetest of foot. A police officer in continuous 
pursuit of a perpetrator of a crime committed in the 
officer’s presence . . . must be allowed to follow the 
suspect into a private place, or the suspect’s home if 
he chooses to flee there, and effect the arrest 
without a warrant. 
Weber, 372 Wis. 2d 202, ¶30 (quoting Sanders, 311 Wis. 2d 257, 
¶133 (Prosser, J., concurring)). 
¶49 Stated otherwise, "[a]n officer in 'hot pursuit' does 
not need to make a split-second determination about the 
availability of 'hot pursuit' as an exigency . . . . [He must] 
determin[e] whether there is probable cause to make an arrest 
for a jailable crime.  Presuming probable cause, pursuit . . . 
is justified."  Sanders, 311 Wis. 2d 257, ¶117 (Prosser, J., 
concurring). 
¶50 This element of the hot pursuit test is satisfied by 
the circumstances of the chase from Delap's driveway to his 
doorway.  Although the chase was short, it nonetheless qualifies 
 
No.  2016AP2196-CR.mjg 
 
5 
 
as a chase because Sgt. Willmann pursued Delap from his driveway 
into his home after identifying himself as a police officer and 
ordering Delap to stop.  See Santana, 427 U.S. at 43; Sanders, 
311 Wis. 2d 257, ¶109 (Prosser, J., concurring). 
 
B.  The Officers had Probable Cause to Arrest Delap for a 
Jailable Offense. 
¶51 The second element of hot pursuit requires that the 
officers had probable cause to believe that the defendant 
committed a jailable offense at the time of the chase.  See 
Ferguson, 317 Wis. 2d 586, ¶29.  "[I]n evaluating whether a 
warrantless 
entry 
is 
justified 
by 
exigent 
circumstances, 
[courts] should consider whether the underlying offense is a 
jailable or nonjailable offense, rather than whether the 
legislature has labeled that offense a felony or misdemeanor."  
Id. (citing Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753 (holding that a noncriminal 
traffic offense was not serious enough for exigent circumstances 
to exist); Sanders, 311 Wis. 2d 257, ¶93 (Prosser, J., 
concurring)). 
¶52 Here, the officers had probable cause that Delap 
committed the jailable offense of obstructing an officer 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1).  Obstructing an officer is a 
class A misdemeanor punishable by up to 9 months in jail and/or 
a fine not to exceed $10,000.  Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1); see also 
Wis. Stat. § 939.51(3)(a). 
¶53 In order to convict a person of obstructing an 
officer, the State must prove that the person knowingly:  (1) 
obstructed an officer; (2) while the officer was doing any act 
in an official capacity; and (3) the officer was acting with 
 
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lawful authority.4  Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1); see also State v. 
Lossman, 118 Wis. 2d 526, 536, 348 N.W.2d 159 (1984). 
¶54 Delap's conduct provided the officers with probable 
cause to believe he violated all three elements.  First, Delap 
knowingly obstructed the officers when he fled from them.  State 
v. Grobstick, 200 Wis. 2d 242, 249-50, 546 N.W.2d 187 (Ct. App. 
1996).   
¶55 Second, Delap knew the officers were acting in their 
official capacity because:  (1) the officers were the only 
people walking up the street at the time; (2) the officers were 
shining their flashlights in the direction of Delap; (3) the 
officers were in full uniform; and (4) the officers yelled 
"stop——police" when they saw Delap.  Sanders, 311 Wis. 2d 257, 
¶121 (Prosser, J., concurring) (citing City of Middletown v. 
Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 331 (Ohio 2002)).   
¶56 Third, we are to look at the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether Delap knew the officers were 
acting with lawful authority.  See Lossman, 118 Wis. 2d at 543-
44 ("[I]n order for the [S]tate to prove that the defendant knew 
or believed that the officer was acting with lawful authority, 
the defendant's subjective intent must be ascertained, based on 
the totality of the circumstances.").  Many of the same facts 
                                                 
4 The pattern jury instructions list four elements for the 
crime of obstructing an officer.  Wis. JI——Criminal 1766 (2010).  
This is so because the pattern jury instructions construe the 
necessary mens rea (knowing) as a separate, fourth element of 
the offense.  Id.; see also State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶57, 294 
Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729.  
 
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that demonstrate Delap knew the officers were acting in their 
official capacities also demonstrate that he knew they were 
acting with lawful authority:  (1) the officers were in uniform; 
(2) the officers were wearing their standard service belt; and 
(3) the officers yelled that they were police when Delap started 
running.  See id. (holding that jury could infer defendant knew 
officer was acting with lawful authority because defendant:  (1) 
saw the officer in uniform; (2) saw the officer's holstered 
weapon; and (3) was told why the officer was on his property).  
Based on these facts, the officers had probable cause to believe 
Delap committed the jailable offense of obstructing an officer.   
II.  CONCLUSION 
¶57 In his petition for review, Delap raised the issue of 
whether his arrest fell within the hot pursuit exception to the 
warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment——the basis on 
which the court of appeals affirmed his conviction.  State v. 
Delap, 2016AP2196-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. April 
20, 2017).  While I both fully understand that "it is axiomatic 
that this court is not bound by the issues presented or the 
arguments made by the parties,"5 and agree with the majority's 
application of Payton, 445 U.S. 573, I believe it would have 
been prudent for the court to address the hot pursuit exception 
to help resolve any confusion stemming from our splintered 
decision in Weber, 372 Wis. 2d 202 last term.   
                                                 
5 State v. Alexander, 2015 WI 6, ¶83, 360 Wis. 2d 292, 858 
N.W.2d 662 (Gableman, J., concurring); see also Springer v. Nohl 
Elec. Prods. Corp., 2018 WI 48, ¶41, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___. 
 
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¶58 Accordingly, I respectfully concur.   
¶59 I am authorized to state that Justice DANIEL KELLY 
joins this concurrence. 
 
 
 
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