Title: Lloyd v. State
Citation: 170 N.E.2d 904, 241 Ind. 192
Docket Number: 29,960
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: December 19, 1960

241 Ind. 192 (1960)
170 N.E.2d 904
LLOYD
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 29,960.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed December 19, 1960.
*193 Robert S. Baker, Public Defender, and Thomas A. Hoadley, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.
Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General and Patrick D. Sullivan, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
ACHOR, J.
Appellant and three others, named Caine, Parnell and Hansborough, were indicted for murder in the commission of a robbery, under Acts 1941, ch. 148, § 1, p. 447 (being § 10-3401, Burns' 1956 Repl.). Caine, who fired the gun which caused the death, pleaded guilty *194 and was separately sentenced. Parnell, Hansborough and Lloyd were tried jointly by a jury and were found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment on November 14, 1949.
On May 5, 1959, Hon. Robert S. Baker, the Public Defender of the State of Indiana, filed on behalf of the appellant a petition for writ of error coram nobis attacking the judgment. After considering the appellant's verified petition and the affidavits in support thereof, and after hearing evidence in the cause, the court denied the petition.
Because of the decision we have reached, we will consider only one of the grounds asserted in the 23 paragraphs of the petition. This pertains to the inadequacy of appellant's representation by counsel. The undisputed evidence regarding the factual background of the case upon this issue is as follows:
The indictment was filed in the Circuit Court of Johnson County. Each of the defendants engaged separate counsel who appeared of record on their behalf. Frank Sisson, of Indianapolis, now deceased, appeared as counsel for the appellant. Thereafter the venue of the case was changed to Bartholomew County where the case was tried. Prior to the date of trial, James Acker, an attorney of Franklin, Indiana, who represented the defendant Parnell, contacted Edward Morrison, an attorney of Columbus, Indiana, "to act as Mr. Acker's co-counsel for the sole purpose of assisting in the impaneling of the jury."
On the morning of the day of trial, attorney Sisson withdrew from the case because of non-payment of his fee. However, prior to the interrogation of the jury, attorney Morrison asked a fee of $50 from each of the defendants for his services in selecting the jury. He was told by appellant that he did not have $50 and that *195 he did not want a $50 attorney to represent him in the case. However, upon promise of appellant's sister to pay the requested fee, Morrison entered an appearance for appellant and the other defendants at about 11:00 A.M. on the day of the trial. Thereupon, on inquiry by the court regarding a continuance, attorneys Acker and Morrison stated that they would be ready for trial at 1:30 P.M. Under these circumstances Morrison remained as attorney of record for appellant throughout the trial and, for reasons not disclosed in the evidence, Morrison thereafter not only aided in the selection of the jury but assisted attorney Acker throughout the trial of the case.
However, the evidence is uncontradicted that Morrison never consulted with appellant at any time, other than on the subject of attorney's fees; that he did not consult with appellant regarding appellant's defense either before the trial started or at any time during the trial, and that after appellant's conviction, he did not consult with appellant about the filing of a motion for new trial. For this and other reasons, appellant asserts that he was denied his constitutional right to competent counsel.
As further evidence of the fact that appellant was not adequately represented by counsel, the record discloses that, as asserted by appellant, the defenses of the appellant and the defendant Parnell were, by reason of conflicting statements made by them, antagonistic in nature, so that Morrison could not effectively represent both Parnell and the appellant.
The issue presented here was considered at length in the case of Abraham v. State (1949), 228 Ind. 179, 185, 91 N.E.2d 358. In that case the following pertinent propositions of law were enunciated:
This court, in deciding the Abraham case, supra, cited among others the case of Batchelor v. State (1920), 189 Ind. 69, 76-77, 125 N.E. 773, as follows:
It is particularly significant to note, that the above quoted Batchelor case was one of the cases relied upon by the Supreme Court of the United States in deciding the celebrated Scottsboro case of Powell v. Alabama (1932), 287 U.S. 45, 57, 53 S. Ct. 55, 60, 77 L. Ed. 158, 165, 84 A.L.R. 527, wherein the Supreme Court said:
This court, in Hoy v. State (1947), 225 Ind. 428, 437-438, 75 N.E.2d 915, expressly approved the following language of the Supreme Court of the United States in *198 Powell v. Alabama, supra. In the Hoy case this court stated:
The principle announced by both the Supreme Court of Indiana and the Supreme Court of the United States is, that the constitutional right to counsel includes not only the right to representation by counsel during trial, but also prior thereto, in order that such counsel may be prepared for a "zealous and active" defense. In the case at bar, appellant was not afforded this right.
On several occasions this court has been called upon to consider what period of time is adequate or sufficient *199 for counsel to consult with the accused and investigate the facts and prepare for his defense. Sweet v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 160, 117 N.E.2d 745; Bradley v. State; Taylor v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 131, 84 N.E.2d 580; Hoy v. State, supra; Wilson v. State (1943), 222 Ind. 63, 51 N.E.2d 848. We do not here pretend to fix a minimum period of time which must be allowed by the court in every case between the time of the appointment or employment of counsel and the commencement of trial. This is particularly true since, in this case, there was no consultation between attorney and client relative to the defense of appellant's case. We do, however, hold that where the charge was murder, which carried the penalty of life imprisonment or life itself, a period of two and one-half hours (including the lunch period) was utterly insufficient for consultation, investigation and preparation for trial, resulting in a virtual denial of the appellant's constitutional right to assistance of counsel.
Judgment is therefore reversed, with instructions to grant the petition in error coram nobis.
Bobbitt, C.J., Arterburn, Jackson and Landis, JJ., concur.
NOTE.  Reported in 170 N.E.2d 904.