Title: Briggs v. Burk
Citation: 172 Kan. 375, 239 P.2d 981
Docket Number: 38,533, 38,546, 38,556
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: January 26, 1952

172 Kan. 375 (1952)
239 P.2d 981
STELLA BRIGGS, Appellee,
v.
CLYDE BURK and THE HARTFORD ACCIDENT &amp; INDEMNITY CO., a Corporation, Appellant. SHIRLEY BURNS, Appellee,
v.
CLYDE BURK and THE HARTFORD ACCIDENT &amp; INDEMNITY CO., a Corporation, Appellant. MRS. MAX ELDON WADE, Appellee,
v.
CLYDE BURK and THE HARTFORD ACCIDENT &amp; INDEMNITY CO., a Corporation, Appellant.
Nos. 38,533, 38,546, 38,556

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 26, 1952.
David H. Fisher, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Irwin Snattinger, of Topeka, was with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Ward D. Martin, of Topeka, argued the cause, and A. Harry Crane and Arthur L. Claussen, both of Topeka, and Leonard W. McAnarney, of Lyndon, were with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARVEY, C.J.:
In each of these cases the plaintiff sued for damages for the wrongful death of her husband alleged to have resulted from the negligence of the defendant, Clyde Burk. They were filed separately in the district court of Shawnee county and one was assigned to each of the three divisions of that court. Burk's insurance carrier was made a party-defendant and filed a demurrer to the petition as amended upon the ground that the petition does not state a cause of action against it. In each of the cases the demurrer was overruled and the insurer alone has appealed. The *376 cases are consolidated here because the same legal question is presented in each of them.
The facts pertinent to this appeal may be stated briefly as follows: On February 9, 1950, Robert C. Burns, husband of plaintiff in case No. 38,546, was operating a described automobile owned by him. Riding with him was Joseph E. Briggs, husband of plaintiff in case No. 38,533, and Max Eldon Wade, husband of plaintiff in case No. 38,546. Burns was driving his automobile south from Topeka on U.S. Highway No. 75, which is paved. At a place about three-tenths of a mile south of the Carbondale intersection Clyde Burk, doing business as the Burk Nursery Company of Dodge City, was driving his Ford pick-up truck north on the same highway and negligently drove or allowed the truck to turn into the west side of the highway in front of the automobile driven by Burns, causing a collision, as a result of which each of the three men who were riding in the automobile received fatal injuries.
In this appeal we are not concerned with the negligence of Burk. He has filed an answer in each case and the cases have not been tried. Appellant here does not contend that the respective petitions do not state causes of action against Burk. With respect to appellant it is alleged in the petition, as amended in case No. 38,533 (and substantially the same in each of the other cases) the following:
Exhibit "B," attached to and made a part of the petition, reads:
We first take note that the above order of May 25, 1942, is not the permit which at some time prior thereto had been issued to Burk. Since that was referred to in the order as a "private carrier permit" we assume that at sometime prior to the date of this order there had been issued to Burk a permit to operate as a private motor carrier of property, as that term is defined in G.S. 1949, 66-1,108 (i), as follows:
And G.S. 1949, 66-1,111, provides:
Counsel for appellant argue there can be no question of the state corporation commission's authority to restrict the permit, citing G.S. 1949, 66-1,112b. This deals with an application for a permit and provides for a notice and hearing and for terms of permits, and contains the following:
It is observed that the order of May 25, 1942, was not made upon the application for a permit, neither was it made after notice and a hearing. The order was ex parte. Apparently Burk filed an application to have the permit previously issued to him limited as to area, and that the commission examined the files and made an order granting the request. What the files showed is not disclosed. The granting of these permits was regarded by our legislature as a matter important to the public as well as to the applicant. We are cited to no statute of this state which authorizes the commission to modify them by an ex parte order as to area covered. We shall not rest our decision upon this point, however, since it has not been argued by counsel. Apparently counsel on both sides have presented the case in the trial court and here as though the commission's order of May 25, 1942, was valid, and for the sole purpose of this case, we shall so regard it.
Counsel for appellant argue that Burk was not operating his vehicle at the time of the accident pursuant to his permit and point out that the order of the corporation commission of May 25, 1942, restricts the permit previously issued to Burk to the territory within a radius of 150 miles of Burk's base point, which was three miles southwest of Dodge City, and that the accident happened 240 miles from Dodge City. On this point they cite Smith v. Republic Underwriters, 152 Kan. 305, 101 P.2d 858, which was considering *379 a provision in an insurance policy which limited coverage to vehicles "being operated `pursuant to the permit,'" and where the court held:
In their brief counsel quote from the opinion the following:
The opinion continues:
Appellants also cite Schoonover v. Clark, 155 Kan. 835, 130 P.2d 619. There a truck owner who had a permit to operate his truck as a private carrier, after completing a trip using his truck in the business authorized by the permit, went on a pleasure trip to Dodge City, sixty-eight miles from the place he ceased to use his truck on the trip and there had an accident, for which he was sued. It was held the insurer could not be joined in that action for the reason that the truck was not being used under the permit at the time of the accident.
In Waugh v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 157 Kan. 690, 143 P.2d 788, the question of whether the insurer of a truck owner, who had a permit as a contract and as a private motor carrier of property could be joined as a defendant, it was said (p. 696):
So, in each of the cases cited it was the use of the truck for the purpose authorized by the permit that was the controlling question. In the petition in this case such use was alleged at the time of the accident in question.
In Putts v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 173 F.2d 153 (Tenth Circuit), the owner of the truck was the holder of a permit issued by the State Corporation Commission of New Mexico, which expressly limited the coverage of the policy to the motor vehicle described therein while being operated within fifty miles of Deming, New Mexico, as a motor carrier of goods for hire; also the holder of a permit from the Interstate Commerce Commission to operate in interstate commerce as a contract carrier of goods for hire. At the time of the accident which gave rise to the suit he was enroute to Dallas, Texas, for the purpose of transporting merchandise belonging to him for use in his cotton gin. The court held he was not at that time acting under either one of the permits and hence that the insurer was not liable, but the court took occasion to say:
In Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cunningham, 107 F.2d 857 (Eighth Circuit), construing the Missouri bus and truck law, the court had occasion to say:
*381 In Miller v. State Automobile Asso., 74 N.D. 306, 308, 21 N.W.2d 621, it was said:
One of the principal purposes of our statutes pertaining to the regulation of motor carriers of persons and property is to have the motor vehicles operated in such a way as to promote the safety and welfare of the public. The commission is authorized to issue permits to private motor carriers of property, require annual and other reports, and prescribe reasonably necessary rules and regulations. It is unlawful for a private motor carrier of property to operate within this state without obtaining a license therefor, which can be issued only upon written application to the corporation commission stating the ownership, financial condition, equipment to be used, and such other information as the commission may require. In addition to the regular license fees or taxes imposed there is levied a gross ton mileage tax for which the commission shall issue appropriate plates bearing the letters "K.C.C.," which shall be attached to the vehicle for which the plates are issued. The commission is given authority to administer and enforce all provisions of the act and to inspect the books or other documents for that purpose. A number of the safety rules are embodied in the statute. This summarization is not intended to be complete. Any violation of the act by the carrier is declared to be a misdemeanor for which upon a conviction the carrier may be fined in a sum not exceeding $500, and the permit issued to the carrier may be suspended or revoked. (See, G.S. 1949, Chap. 66, Art. 1, sections 1,112d; 1,112g; 1,115, 1,120; 1,120a; 1,123; 1,129; 1,130; 1,112b.)
If we were to carry the argument of counsel for appellant to the extreme, any material violation of the statutory requirements imposed upon the holder of the permit would constitute a violation of the permit and thereby relieve the insurer of liability under the policy. We think the position is untenable. Under the allegations of the petition we conclude that the insurer is not released from liability upon the ground that the accident occurred about 240 miles from Dodge City.
*382 With reference to insurance the statute provides:
Counsel for appellant next contend that Burk was committing a violation of the insurance policy not covered by the Kansas liability and property endorsement. With respect to that they point out that one of the endorsements uses the following phrase:
The interpretation of that phrase has already been determined. Appellant further contends that Burk was violating the terms of the insurance policy filed with the state corporation commission.
The policy filed gave the name of the insured as Clyde Burk; his address as "Route No. 1, Dodge City, Ford county, Kansas;" his occupation or business as "Nursery"; named the insured as an individual; the policy period from April 1, 1949, to April 1, 1950; the policy stated coverage to be: "A  Bodily Injury Liability, B  Property Damage Liability, C  Medical Payments," with limits of liability for each, and it contained this provision:
It contained the following under "Insuring Agreements":
*383 "VI. POLICY PERIOD, TERRITORY, PURPOSES OF USE
The policy was filed with the commission and at that time contained two endorsements, each dated April 1, 1949. The first reads:
The second reads:
*384 Without going into an extended discussion of it we think it cannot be said that the insurance policy was being violated at the time and place of the accident. Counsel have cited a number of cases, all of which and others have been examined, but we think it not worth while to go into an extended discussion of them.
The judgments of the respective trial courts which were appealed from are affirmed.