Title: MATTER OF C M S
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14763
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: November 15, 1979

No. 14763 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 IN THE MATTER OF C.M.S., A DEPENDENT AND NEGLECTED CHILD. Appeal from: District Court of the Second Judicial District, Honorable Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Leonard J. Haxby, Butte, Montana For Respondent : John G. Winston, County Attorney, Butte, Montana Michael E. Wheat, Deputy County Attorney, Butte, Montana Henningsen, Purcell and Genzberger, Butte, Montana Corette, Smith, Dean, Pohlman and Allen, Butte, Montana John R. Carr, Miles City, Montana Submitted on briefs: September 20, 1979 Decided: N d v i : 1 9 7 9 N O Y * . - 2 Filed: M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment finding C.M.S. a dependent and neglected c h i l d and giving permanent custody with the r i g h t t o consent t o adoption t o t h e Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services of t h e S t a t e of Montana. C.M.S., a minor c h i l d , was born i n Butte, S i l v e r Bow County, Montana, on J u l y 9, 1975. H e r mother, a t both t h e t i m e of conception and delivery, was confined t o t h e S t a t e Hospital a t Warm Springs, Montana, having been acquitted of t h e charge of homicide by reason of a mental d e f e c t exclud- i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The name of t h e f a t h e r i s unknown, and t h i s i s r e f l e c t e d upon t h e c h i l d ' s b i r t h c e r t i f i c a t e . Following t h e b i r t h of the c h i l d , t h e mother was re- turned t o t h e S t a t e Hospital a t Warm Springs where she has been and i s still confined. The c h i l d w a s placed under t h e p r o t e c t i v e guidance of t h e Butte-Silver Bow Office of t h e Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services. Immedi- a t e l y following her b i r t h , on J u l y 11, 1975, t h e Department placed t h e c h i l d i n a f o s t e r home, licensed by the S t a t e of Montana, t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e c h i l d should receive proper care. The c h i l d has remained i n t h i s same home f o r over 3- 1/2 years a t t h e t i m e of hearing, and a t t h i s point, over 4 years. The home provided f o r the c h i l d has four o t h e r children and i s t h e only family u n i t t h e c h i l d has ever had. During the 3-1/2 years p r i o r t o t h e hearing, the Depart- ment of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) sought on t h r e e occasions t o acquire permanent custody with t h e r i g h t t o consent t o adoption. On each occasion, SRS's p e t i t i o n w a s objected t o by t h e guardian of t h e b i o l o g i c a l mother upon t h e grounds t h a t she was mentally incompetent, was confined a t t h e Warm Springs S t a t e Hospital, a d i s a b i l i t y which prevented her from caring f o r t h e c h i l d . The Honorable A. B. Martin of M i l e s C i t y , Montana, made an o r d e r following a c q u i t t a l of t h e mother on homicide charges by reason of mental d e f e c t excluding r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , t h a t James B. Hathaway be appointed a s guardian of t h e person and t h e estate of t h e mother, and counsel w a s ap- proved by t h a t c o u r t f o r t h e guardianship. O n November 23, 1976, SRS f i l e d t h i s p e t i t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of S i l v e r Bow County f o r permanent custody of t h e c h i l d with t h e r i g h t t o consent t o her adoption. A f t e r n o t i c e was given t o a l l concerned p a r t i e s , a series of hearings were held t o determine whether SRS should be awarded t h e permanent custody with t h e r i g h t t o consent t o adoption. A t t h e s e hearings, Leonard J. Haxby appeared on behalf of t h e mother. John R. Carr w a s r e t a i n e d by t h e mother's guardian, James Hathaway of M i l e s City, t o r e p r e s e n t t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e guardian i n t h e proceedings. James E. P u r c e l l w a s appointed by t h e c o u r t a s a t t o r n e y f o r t h e minor c h i l d . Michael E. Wheat, a s s i s t a n t deputy county a t t o r n e y , appeared f o r SRS, and Dolphy 0. Pohlman represented t h e f o s t e r parents. A t a hearing on December 21, 1978, a f t e r a l l p a r t i e s had been properly served and were p r e s e n t i n c o u r t and represented by counsel, a motion w a s made by a p p e l l a n t ' s counsel t h a t t h e c o u r t lacked proper j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e matter. The hearing w a s continued s o t h a t a d d i t i o n a l t i m e could be taken t o determine t h e r e s t o r a t i o n capacity of a p p e l l a n t , who a t t h a t t i m e w a s making an e f f o r t t o be r e l e a s e d from t h e S t a t e Hospital and r e s t o r e d t o capacity. The c o u r t ordered t h a t t h e hearing resume on February 15, 1979. O n t h a t d a t e t h e hearing was resumed, and a p p e l l a n t again objected t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e court. The c o u r t overruled t h e objection and proceeded t o a f i n a l hearing. From t h e evidence adduced a t the hearing, t h e c o u r t found t h a t C.M.S. was abused, dependent and neglected and granted t h e p e t i t i o n of SRS f o r permanent custody of the c h i l d with t h e r i g h t of adoption i n t h e State. Two i s s u e s are r a i s e d by appellant: (1) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court lacked j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear t h e matter because appellant d i d n o t consent t o the proceedings? (2) Whether t h e findings of t h e c o u r t t h a t C.M.S. was abused, dependent and neglected w e r e supported by s u f f i c i e n t c r e d i b l e evidence? Regarding t h e f i r s t i s s u e , a p p e l l a n t maintains t h a t consent was a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l p r e r e q u i s i t e t o t h e proceedings i n t h e i n s t a n t case. Appellant argues t h a t SRS's p e t i t i o n was, i n e f f e c t , a p e t i t i o n f o r adoption and under s e c t i o n 40-8-111, MCA, consent i s required f o r adoptions. Before t h e c o u r t could g r a n t SRS custody of t h e c h i l d with t h e r i g h t t o consent t o her adoption, a p p e l l a n t contends t h a t SRS had t o obtain e i t h e r her consent o r t h a t of her l e g a l guardian. Without such consent, t h e c o u r t lacked t h e neces- s a r y j u r i s d i c t i o n t o proceed. I n answering t h i s argument, w e note f i r s t t h a t appel- l a n t i s c o r r e c t i n a s s e r t i n g t h a t , a s a general r u l e , p a r e n t a l consent i s required f o r adoptions. Section 40-8- 111, MCA. I n t h i s case, however, t h e consent of a p p e l l a n t o r her l e g a l guardian w a s n o t necessary f o r t h e c o u r t t o o b t a i n j u r i s d i c t i o n . The p e t i t i o n f i l e d by SRS was n o t f o r an adoption b u t was f o r a d e c l a r a t i o n of dependency and neglect. Chapter 3 , T i t l e 4 1 of t h e Montana Code Annotated provides t h a t children may be declared dependent and ne- glected under c e r t a i n circumstances and t h a t a p e t i t i o n e r may ask f o r permanent l e g a l custody with t h e r i g h t t o con- s e n t t o adoption as r e l i e f . Parental consent is n e i t h e r necessary t o declare a c h i l d abused, dependent o r neglected nor t o g r a n t permanent custody of t h e c h i l d t o persons o t h e r than t h e n a t u r a l parents. A l l t h a t i s required, r a t h e r , is t h a t t h e c o u r t f i n d , upon t h e b a s i s of s u f f i c i e n t c r e d i b l e evidence, t h a t t h e c h i l d is, within t h e t e r m s of t h e s t a t u - t o r y d e f i n i t i o n s , "abused, dependent, o r neglected." Appellant's apparent confusion lies with the number of s t a t u t o r y schemes a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e termination of p a r e n t a l r i g h t s and t h e f a c t t h a t , t o some e x t e n t , these s t a t u t o r y schemes may be s a i d t o overlap. While consent i s required under some schemes, it i s n o t required under others. Pre- viously, w e have attempted t o c l a r i f y t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e s t a t u t o r y schemes where o t h e r s have been con- fused. W e s t a t e d i n Matter of Guardianship of Aschenbrenner (1979) Mont. , 597 P.2d 1156, 1164, 36 St.Rep. "The confusion of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s under- standable. W e a r e a b l e t o i d e n t i f y a t l e a s t f i v e s t a t u t o r y schemes governing t h e termina- t i o n of parental r i g h t s o r t h e custody of c h i l d r e n o r both. [Citations omitted. 1 "Nevertheless, while t h e r e i s some overlap i n these various procedures a s t o general s u b j e c t matter, each i s used f o r a d i s t i n c t purpose and sets f o r t h s p e c i f i c procedures which must be followed before a v a l i d judgment o r order may be issued." H e r e , SRS proceeded under t h e provisions f o r declaring a c h i l d dependent o r neglected. Parental consent i s n o t required under t h i s chapter f o r a t l e a s t two reasons. F i r s t , r e q u i r i n g consent could conceivably d e f e a t t h e policy and t h e purposes of p r o t e c t i n g abused, dependent, and neglected children: " ( 1 ) It is hereby declared t o be t h e p o l i c y of t h e s t a t e of Montana t o : " ( a ) i n s u r e t h a t a l l youth a r e afforded an adequate physical and emotional environment t o promote normal development; " ( 2 ) I t is t h e p o l i c y of t h i s s t a t e t o provide f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of c h i l d r e n whose h e a l t h and welfare are adversely a f f e c t e d and f u r t h e r threatened by t h e conduct of those responsible f o r t h e i r c a r e and p r o t e c t i o n . . ." Section 41-3-101, MCA. Second, it is, s t r i c t l y speaking, i l l o g i c a l t o r e q u i r e p a r e n t a l consent i n dependency and n e g l e c t proceedings. Such proceedings by t h e i r very nature a r e h o s t i l e t o t h e p a r e n t s and a g a i n s t t h e i r wishes. Even t h e adoption s t a t u t e s of t h i s s t a t e except t h e general requirement of p a r e n t a l consent where c h i l d r e n are abused, dependent and neglected. Section 40-8-111, MCA, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : " ( 1 ) A n adoption of a c h i l d may be decreed when t h e r e have been f i l e d w r i t t e n consents t o adop- t i o n executed by: " ( a ) both p a r e n t s , i f l i v i n g , o r t h e surviving p a r e n t of a c h i l d , provided t h a t consent s h a l l n o t be required from a f a t h e r o r mother: -- -- - " (iii) who has been j u d i c i a l l y deprived of t h e custody of t h e c h i l d on account of c r u e l t y o r n e g l e c t toward t h e c h i l d ; " ( i v ) who has . . . w i l l f u l l y abandoned such c h i l d ; " (v) who has caused t h e c h i l d t o be maintained by . . . t h e department of s o c i a l and r e h a b i l i - t a t i o n s e r v i c e s of t h e s t a t e of Montana f o r a period of 1 year without c o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h e support of s a i d c h i l d during s a i d period, i f a b l e ; o r " ( v i ) i f it i s proven t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e c o u r t t h a t s a i d f a t h e r o r mother, i f a b l e , has n o t contributed t o t h e support of s a i d c h i l d during a period of 1 year before t h e f i l i n g of a p e t i t i o n f o r adoption." (Emphasis added.) H e r e , t h e r i g h t s of t h e n a t u r a l p a r e n t s t o due process of law w e r e properly recognized. The s p e c i f i c procedures i n s e c t i o n 41-3-401, MCA, w e r e complied with. Proper n o t i c e was given t o a p p e l l a n t and her guardian. The f a t h e r of t h e c h i l d w a s n o t known, i s n o t now known, and has been never named on t h e c h i l d ' s b i r t h c e r t i f i c a t e . Appellant, who was p r e s e n t a t t h e hearing of t h e District Court, a l s o had a chance t o r e f u t e t h e a l l e g a t i o n s , b u t she chose n o t t o t a k e advantage of t h e opportunity. The only testimony presented on her behalf w a s by her home economics teacher a t t h e S t a t e Hospital regarding her a b i l i t y i n t h e classroom. W e f i n d t h a t t h e consent of a p p e l l a n t or t h a t of her l e g a l guardian was n o t necessary f o r t h e c o u r t t o o b t a i n j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h e i n s t a n t case. Turning t o t h e second i s s u e , a p p e l l a n t argues t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n f i n d i n g t h a t C.M.S. w a s abused, dependent and neglected because t h e f i n d i n g s w e r e n o t supported by s u f f i c i e n t c r e d i b l e evidence. I n addressing t h e duty of a D i s t r i c t Court t o make f i n d i n g s i n an abuse o r n e g l e c t a c t i o n , t h i s Court has recognized t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court's f i n d i n g s w i l l enjoy a presumption of c o r r e c t n e s s and w i l l n o t be overturned u n l e s s unsupported by c r e d i b l e evidence that would amount t o a c l e a r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . I n t h e d e c i s i o n of I n re G . , Youths i n Need of Care (1977), Mont. , 570 P.2d 1110, 1112, 34 St.Rep. 1179, 1181-82, w e s t a t e d : "This Court i s mindful t h a t t h e primary duty of deciding t h e proper custody of t h e c h i l d i s t h e t a s k of t h e D i s t r i c t Court. A s a r e s u l t , a l l reasonable presumptions a s t o t h e correctness of t h e determination by the D i s t r i c t Court w i l l be made. [ C i t a t i o n s omitted. I Due t o t h i s presumption of correctness, t h e D i s t r i c t Court findings w i l l n o t be disturbed on appeal unless t h e r e is a mistake of law o r finding of f a c t n o t supported by c r e d i b l e evidence t h a t would amount t o a clear abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . " A t i s s u e here i s whether t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t c r e d i b l e evidence t o support t h e finding t h a t C.M.S. was "abused, de- pendent and neglected." Those t e r m s a r e defined under sec- t i o n 41-3-102, MCA: " ( 2 ) 'Abuse' o r 'neglect' means: " (b) t h e commission o r omission of any a c t o r a c t s by any person i n t h e s t a t u s of parent, guardian, o r custodian who thereby and by rea- son of physical o r mental incapacity o r other cause refuses, o r , with s t a t e and p r i v a t e a i d and assistance, i s unable t o discharge t h e d u t i e s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r proper and necessary subsistence, education, medical, o r any o t h e r care necessary f o r t h e youth's phy- s i c a l , moral and emotional well being. " ( 3 ) 'Dependent youth' means a youth who i s abandoned, dependent upon t h e public f o r sup- p o r t , d e s t i t u t e , without parents o r guardian o r under t h e c a r e and supervision of a s u i t a b l e a d u l t , o r who has no proper guidance t o provide f o r h i s necessary physical, moral, and emotional w e l l being . . ." W e f i n d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n finding t h a t C.M.S. w a s "abused, dependent and neglected" and t h a t t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t c r e d i b l e evidence t o support t h e findings of t h e court. With r e s p e c t t o t h e finding of "abuse o r neglect," w e take j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of t h e order f i l e d i n t h i s case t h a t a p p e l l a n t w a s confined t o t h e S t a t e Hospital i n 1973; t h a t she has suffered from an organic b r a i n dysfunction since b i r t h ; t h a t she experiences delusions; and, t h a t her condition i s diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenia with no hope of s i g n i f i c a n t improvement in t h e foreseeable f u t u r e . The record a l s o d i s c l o s e s t h a t a p p e l l a n t w a s p r e s e n t a t t h e hearings held by t h e D i s t r i c t Court regarding SRS's p e t i t i o n , b u t made no attempt t o personally t e s t i f y a s t o her p a r e n t a l f i t n e s s . The only testimony presented on behalf of a p p e l l a n t regarding her p a r e n t a l f i t n e s s w a s t h a t of a home economics teacher from t h e S t a t e Hospital who t e s t i f i e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t had successfully completed a home economics course, one a s p e c t of which w a s c h i l d development. W e b e l i e v e t h a t , under t h e s t a t u t e , a p p e l l a n t ' s confinement is a s u f f i c i e n t a c t of omission which, by reason of physical and mental incapacity, renders a p p e l l a n t unable t o discharge t h e d u t i e s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s necessary f o r t h e c h i l d ' s well-being. With r e s p e c t t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t C.M.S. w a s a dependent youth, t h e record d i s c l o s e s t h a t a p p e l l a n t i s possessed of a $40,000 e s t a t e and t h a t she has contributed i n no s u b s t a n t i a l way t o t h e support of C.M.S. Rather, t h e support which has been given has been provided by SRS and t h e f o s t e r parents. F i n a l l y , t h e record i n d i - c a t e s t h a t a p p e l l a n t , because of her mental condition, could n o t provide proper guidance f o r C.M.S.'s necessary physical, moral and emotional well-being. Appellant i s demanding every f a c e t of s t a t u t o r y scheme be severely and s t r i c t l y s c r u t i n i z e d t o p r o t e c t t h e r i g h t s of t h e n a t u r a l parent. However, proceedings conducted under t h e "abuse s t a t u t e " demand and provide a c e r t a i n amount of e l a s t i c i t y t o t h e court. Every c a s e i s unique and must be d e a l t with on i t s own m e r i t s . Absent a c l e a r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t Court is t o be upheld. There i s no such abuse of d i s c r e t i o n here. The D i s t r i c t Court i n a l l such hearings has an obliga- t i o n t o balance t h e r i g h t s of t h e mother and t h e c h i l d . And while t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s r i g h t s are of g r e a t import, it i s n o t an a b s o l u t e r i g h t . I n a r e c e n t m a t t e r from t h e D i s t r i c t of Columbia, Matter of t h e Adoption of J.S.R. (D.C. 1977), 374 A.2d 860, 863, t h e c o u r t held: "The r i g h t of a n a t u r a l p a r e n t t o r a i s e o n e ' s c h i l d i s a fundamental and e s s e n t i a l one which i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y protected. [ C i t a t i o n s omitted.] However, it i s n o t an a b s o l u t e one. The s t a t e has both t h e r i g h t and t h e duty t o p r o t e c t minor c h i l d r e n through j u d i c i a l d e t e r - minations of t h e i r i n t e r e s t . To t h i s end t h e s t a t e has a s u b s t a n t i a l range of a u t h o r i t y t o p r o t e c t t h e welfare of t h e c h i l d . [ C i t a t i o n s omitted. 1 " See a l s o Matter of Guardianship of Doney (1977), M o n t . , 570 P.2d 575, 577, 34 St.Rep. 1107, 1 1 1 0 ; Matter of Guardianship of Aschenbrenner (1979), Mon t . , 597 P.2d 1156, 1160, 36 St.Rep. 1282, 1284; Boyer v. Boyer (Ohio This Court r e c e n t l y faced a s i m i l a r contention. I n t h e Matter of Inquiry i n t o J.J.S., Youth i n Need of Care (1978), Mont. , 577 P.2d 378, 381, 35 St.Rep. 394, 397, t h e Court held: " W e f i n d no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n awarding permanent custody t o SRS. I n determining t h e custody i s s u e , t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d i s t h e paramount concern. I n t h e Matter of Henderson (1975), 168 Mont. 329, 342 P.2d 1204, t h i s Court said: "'What is, o r what i s n o t i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d depends upon t h e f a c t s and circum- s t a n c e s of each case. The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of de- c i d i n g custody i s a d e l i c a t e one which i s lodged with t h e d i s t r i c t court. The judge hearing o r a l testimony i n such a controversy has a superior advantage i n determining t h e s a m e , and h i s deci- s i o n ought n o t t o be disturbed except upon a c l e a r showing of abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . ' [ C i t a t i o n s omitted . I " While it is t h e function of t h i s Court whenever pos- s i b l e t o p r o t e c t t h e u n i t y of t h e family under s e c t i o n 41-3- 101, MCA, t h i s is n o t a f a c t o r i n t h i s cause. Here t h e c h i l d has never had a v i a b l e parent-child r e l a t i o n s h i p with t h e mother. I n f a c t , t h e c h i l d has never seen o r been a s s o c i a t e d with her n a t u r a l mother. She knows b u t one family--her f o s t e r home. I t i s t h e only family r e l a t i o n s h i p t h e c h i l d has. Indeed, her f o s t e r p a r e n t s have w i l l i n g l y undertaken t h e o b l i g a t i o n s of r a i s i n g t h i s c h i l d , and what a p p e l l a n t n e g l e c t s t o r e a l i z e is t h a t t h e o b l i g a t i o n s t h a t a r e a t t e n d a n t with parenthood have never i n any way been assumed by a p p e l l a n t , t h e n a t u r a l mother. This Court i n a r e c e n t decision, I n re G . , supra, 570 P.2d a t 1 1 1 4 , 34 St.Rep. a t 1179, set f o r t h t h e c r i t e r i a which w i l l be considered i n dependent and n e g l e c t cases. There we noted: "Children have a r i g h t under t h e ' b e s t i n t e r e s t test' t o r e c e i v e normal physical and emotional development. By looking a t t h e t o t a l i t y of t h e circumstances, t h e c o u r t may determine what i s t h e c h i l d ' s ' b e s t i n t e r e s t . ' " Viewing a l l t h e testimony presented, one r e l e v a n t f a c t emerges: The c h i l d i s an e s s e n t i a l p a r t of a family. She has developed an emotional and physical t r u s t f o r her f o s t e r parents. The r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t she has with her " b r o t h e r s and s i s t e r s " can only be developed i n a loving environment. This c h i l d i s undergoing a normal and physical development within a proper family home s i t u a t i o n , and it i s i n her b e s t i n t e r e s t t h a t she remains i n same. The c o u r t recognized t h a t t h e r e w e r e competing r i g h t s between t h e c h i l d and t h e mother here. The c o u r t appointed counsel t o r e p r e s e n t t h e c h i l d ' s i n t e r e s t s . After reviewing a l l of t h e f a c t s and evidence, t h e r e can be b u t one con- clusion--the b e s t i n t e r e s t s of C.M.S. can only be served by affirming t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court. The judgment of the District Court is in accord with its findings of fact and conclusions of law and is affirmed. We concur: