Title: State v. Abbott
Citation: 476 So. 2d 1224
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 13, 1985

476 So. 2d 1224 (1985)
STATE of Alabama
v.
L.R. ABBOTT and C.R. Abbott.
No. 83-1435.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 13, 1985.
Jack F. Norton, Chief Counsel, Alabama Highway Dept., and G. William Noble of Barnett, Tingle, Noble &amp; Sexton, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Birmingham, and Patrick Tate, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Fort Payne, for appellant.
W.N. Watson of Watson &amp; Watson, Fort Payne, for appellees.
James O. Spencer, Jr. and James A. Bradford of Balch &amp; Bingham, Birmingham, for amicus curiae Alabama Power Co.
MADDOX, Justice.
The original opinion filed in this cause June 21, 1985, is hereby withdrawn, and the following opinion is substituted in lieu thereof:
This case presents the question of whether the State, by failing to record a condemnation order dated December 21, 1939, can be divested of its title to a highway rightof-way under § 6887, Code of 1923 (now, Code 1975, § 35-4-90). We think that it can. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Briefly stated, the facts of this case are as follows:
In 1932, the State of Alabama acquired a 66-foot right-of-way along what is now Alabama Highway No. 35 in Fort Payne, Alabama. In 1939, the State acquired an additional 17-foot right-of-way along each side of the then-existing highway. It is the State's failure to record this second acquisition that is in dispute.
Appellees, L.R. Abbott and C.R. Abbott, constructed a store on part of the State's 17-foot right-of-way, and they contend that because they purchased their property for value and without notice of the condemnation order that their land is free of any encumbrances resulting from that unrecorded order.
The trial court, in its final decree, held as follows:
"Evidence presented at a hearing before the court establishes that the State acquired a 66-foot right-of-way in 1932 for the construction of Highway 35. The State claims that it acquired an additional 34 feet of right-of-way by a 1939 condemnation proceeding which increased the width of the right-of-way to 100 feet. Through an apparent oversight in 1939, the documents of this condemnation proceeding were not filed of record in the DeKalb County Probate Office and remained unrecorded until June, 1983.
"The defendant purchased the property in question in 1965 unaware that the State was claiming a right-of-way of 100 feet as opposed to 66 feet as shown by the records then on file in the Probate Office. The defendant contends that because the State's 1939 acquisition was not recorded in the Probate Office in 1965 and because he had no actual knowledge of such acquisition when he purchased the property in 1965, the State's claim is inoperative and void as to him.
"The law which governs is found in Section 35-4-90, Code of Alabama (1975):
"It is clear that the application of this statute voids the State's claim to a 100-foot right-of-way across the defendant's property, and that the state's right-of-way across defendant's property is limited to 66 feet.
"This is a classic example of the legal consequences that can result by a failure to record in the Probate Office deeds and other documents relating to [a] real estate transaction. The law exempts no one  not even the State  from such consequences."
The Abbotts contend that they fall squarely within the protection of § 35-4-90. We agree.
The crucial question is whether an order of condemnation is a "conveyance of real property" within the meaning of § 6887, which was applicable at the time.[1]
We have found sparse authority on the issue, and it was only on application for rehearing that we were furnished, for the first time, with any authority which discussed the specific question. On application for rehearing, our attention has been called to two cases from other jurisdictions which have addressed the issue specifically and have held that the transfer of title by an order of condemnation is not a "conveyance" for the purpose of recordation statutes. See State Highway Commission v. Meeker, 75 Wyo. 210, 294 P.2d 603 (1956); City of San Antonio v. Grandjean, 91 Tex. 430, 41 S.W. 477 (1897).
Black's Law Dictionary 402 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) defines a "conveyance" as follows:
In reaching the decision we reach, we necessarily have considered how the Alabama legislature has addressed the question of providing notice of eminent domain proceedings.
An order of condemnation is a transfer of title to land, and, as we stated earlier, the only question is: Did the legislature intend for § 6887, Code of 1923 (now Code 1975, § 35-4-90), to include orders entered in condemnation proceedings? We think so, even though the State of Alabama and the Alabama Power Company, as amicus curiae, both strongly insist that orders of condemnation have never been considered by them to be transfers of title which have to be recorded. Condemnors may, or may not, have recorded orders of condemnation, but that fact cannot change the meaning of our recordation statutes. We cannot accept the State's argument that the mere entry of an order of condemnation is sufficient notice that title to land has been transferred. In fact, the legislature has, as late as 1971, provided for more notice, rather than less notice, to be given of condemnation proceedings.
In 1971, the legislature enacted Act No. 181, Acts of Alabama, Second Special Session, 1971, pp. 4441-42:
"* * *
"Section 4. Section 70, of Title 47, Alabama Code of 1940, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Where the suit, proceeding, or levy, notice of which has been entered in the lis pendens record, shall be terminated, whether on the merits or not, the court wherein the same was pending may direct the judge of probate who has custody of the record to make such entry thereof as he shall prescribe, to give notice of the result of the suit, proceeding or levy, and of the devolution of the land, and the judge of probate shall at once, on presentation thereof, file and record an entry and note the date of filing and recording on the record; provided, that where an application has been made for an order of condemnation of land, or any interest therein, the probate judge shall make such entry on his own motion. The office or party filing such notice must, within thirty days after demand, enter on the margin of the record of the same satisfaction *1227 of such claim under the lis pendens notice whenever the same shall have been fully satisfied or terminated, and such satisfaction shall have the same effect as if made by the judge of probate as hereinabove provided. Nothing in this section, nor in Section 74, of Title 47, Alabama Code of 1940, shall be construed to alter the form used in maintaining the lis pendens records in those counties where the public land records are, by authority of the statute law of the State of Alabama, maintained on microfilm." (Now Code 1975, § 35-4-136, emphasis added.)
The title to Act No. 181 sets forth its purpose in its title, as follows:
The fact that the legislature specifically amended the 1940 Code sections dealing with lis pendens, and took no action with regard to present Code section 35-4-90, does not constrain us to reach the same result reached in the cases from Wyoming and Texas, cited to us on application for rehearing.
As we stated earlier, we do not know whether the State habitually fails to record orders of condemnation, but we do know that the order of condemnation in the subject case was ordered to be "recorded" by the probate judge. His order reads, in part:
Furthermore, a state right-of-way engineer testified concerning the subject condemnation, as follows:
*1228 If our construction of § 35-4-90 is considered by the legislature to be contrary to its intent, the legislature is free to amend § 35-4-90 to specifically provide that orders of condemnation need not be recorded.
Based on the foregoing, the original opinion of this Court is withdrawn, the application for rehearing is denied, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
ORIGINAL OPINION WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; APPLICATION FOR REHEARING DENIED; AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and JONES, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
[1]  Code 1975, § 35-4-90, cited by the trial court in the final decree, is identical in language to § 6887, Code of Alabama 1923, which would have been the applicable section on December 21, 1939, the date of the order of condemnation.