Title: Rohr v. Henderson
Citation: 207 Kan. 123, 483 P.2d 1089
Docket Number: 45,939
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 10, 1971

207 Kan. 123 (1971)
483 P.2d 1089
MICHAEL G. ROHR, by and through Julius Rohr, his Father and Next Friend, Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM F. HENDERSON, Appellant.
No. 45,939

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 10, 1971.
Norbert R. Dreiling, of Dreiling and Bieker, of Hays, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
Robert F. Glassman, of Hays, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARMAN, C.:
This appeal involves interpretation of a jury's answers to special questions upon which the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff in a suit for personal injuries arising out of a bicycle-automobile collision.
Inasmuch as the parties have stipulated that the jury's answers to the special questions were supported by ample competent evidence, we have little in the record as to the circumstances of the collision. However, we glean that plaintiff, a thirteen year old boy, was riding his bicycle southeasterly on Main street, near its intersection with Twenty-third street, in Hays, Kansas, and while in the process of turning was struck by an automobile driven by the defendant, eighteen years of age, who was driving in a southerly direction on Main street.
The parties went to trial, and the jury was instructed, upon the issues of negligence, proximate cause, contributory negligence and the doctrine of last clear chance. The instructions included the following:
"No. 9
"No. 10
"No. 11
"There may be more than one proximate cause.
"No. 13
No general verdict was submitted to the jury; instead, special verdicts in the form of special questions were submitted under K.S.A. 60-249 (a).
The record on appeal reveals the following occurrence during the trial:
"(The jury then returned to the jury room.)"
The questions submitted to the jury and the answers returned were as follows:
"SPECIAL QUESTIONS AND SPECIAL VERDICTS
"ANSWER: Yes
"(Yes or no)
"ANSWER: YES
"(Yes or no)
"ANSWER: Yes
"(Yes or no)
"ANSWER: $6,500.00."
Upon these answers the trial court rendered judgment for plaintiff for $6,500.00. Defendant has appealed.
Appellant's contention is the doctrine of last clear chance is eliminated as a means of recovery upon a specific finding that a plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of his injury. He asserts the jury's finding of contributory negligence compels entry of judgment against appellee despite the other findings. Appellee counters with the contention the jury's answers to the special questions when read as a whole and construed in the light of all the evidence presented and the court's instructions are not inconsistent and conflicting but are harmonious with the judgment entered. Appellee relies on familiar cases arising under our former procedural code wherein that rationale was applied in harmonizing a jury's general verdict with its special findings of fact. He argues intent of the jury was clear that his negligence was not a proximate cause so as to defeat recovery. None of the cited cases, however, is applicable because the jury here rendered no general verdict. Indeed, the design of the special verdict procedure is to obtain answers to questions of fact with the knowledge of the jury limited as to whether its findings will favor one side or the other (see Skidmore v. Baltimore &amp; O. R. Co., 167 F.2d 54). We are not primarily concerned with the jury's intention on the issue of ultimate recovery and have no occasion to resort to evidence and none has been supplied. The judgment must stand or fall on the jury's answers considered in the light of the record.
The doctrine of last clear chance has been frequently approved and applied in this state. Its elements were concisely stated in Goodman v. Kansas City, M. &amp; S. Rld. Co., 137 Kan. 508, 21 P.2d 322, as follows:
The requirement that a plaintiff's negligence must have ceased *128 was explained in Letcher v. Derricott, 191 Kan. 596, 383 P.2d 533, where we said:
Recently we considered the doctrine in Sander v. Union Pacific Rld. Co., 205 Kan. 592, 470 P.2d 748, a fatal train-automobile collision case. This too was a situation in which the trial court had rendered a judgment for plaintiffs upon special verdicts in the form of answers to special questions finding the defendant liable under the last clear chance doctrine. The record on appeal contained the evidence, review of which convinced this court plaintiffs' decedents were, as a matter of law, contributorily negligent, such negligence continuing up until the very time of the collision. In reversing the judgment this court stated:
In Ross v. Chicago, R.I. &amp; P. Rly. Co., 165 Kan. 279, 194 P.2d 491, this court considered the negligence of one seeking to recover under the last clear chance theory and said:
In the instant case, under the instructions and the form of the special questions submitted, the jury necessarily found that appellee's negligence had not ceased. Instruction No. 11 defined proximate cause as that cause which in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by efficient intervening cause, produces that *129 injury and without which the result would not have occurred. It further stated there may be more than one proximate cause. Instruction No. 13 included proximate causation as an element of the term contributory negligence. Special question No. 3 also embodied the element of proximate cause so that the jury's affirmative answer thereto found plaintiff was negligent as alleged, "which [negligence] was a proximate cause of the collision". The jury's concern with the factor of proximate cause as well as the issue of ultimate recovery is reflected in its questions to the trial court during its deliberations.
Appellant objected to the giving of any instruction on last clear chance on the ground there was no evidence in support of that doctrine. Appellant also objected, unsuccessfully, to the form of the special questions on the ground inconsistent answers were possible under them, albeit his challenge was directed toward a situation other than that which actually ensued. The problem now seems to stem from the form both of the instructions and of the special questions but apparently appellee made no objection to either. Instruction No. 9 authorized recovery under the doctrine of last clear chance even though the appellee's negligence contributed to the collision. Under our decisions we are compelled to criticize and disapprove the use of the term contributory in the last phrase of the quoted instruction No. 9, "... despite any contributory negligence of the plaintiff", as being an incorrect statement of law under the cited authorities. Except for this defect, the instruction gave directions to the jury appropriate for its determination by way of general verdict of the issue of ultimate recovery for appellee, but the instruction was not as appropriate for the jury's use when confined to answering special questions. Special question No. 3 compounded the problem by embodying in the same question and answer both the appellee's negligence and the element of proximate cause. No effort was made to separate the two, as might have been done, and the jury was required to answer all questions in the form submitted.
Despite any intention on the part of the jury as to who should prevail, the judgment must be reversed because of the clear finding that appellee's negligence was a proximate cause of the collision, and we so hold.
A question remains as to further disposition of the case upon *130 reversal, that is, should judgment be rendered for appellant or should new trial be ordered? We have no precedent of our own. The general principles respecting federal rule No. 49 (a), the counterpart of our K.S.A. 60-249 (a), appear to be, a jury's findings on the essential issues submitted by way of special verdicts must be certain and definite, and must not be conflicting or inconsistent; in determining whether there is inconsistency in the findings, the findings are to be construed in the light of the surrounding circumstances and in connection with the pleadings, instructions and issues submitted; if the answers in respect to the controlling facts are inconsistent, a judgment should not be rendered but a new trial should be ordered; inconsistency in the findings does not preclude entry of a judgment if, as a matter of law, under no phase of the jury's findings and in no contingency could any other judgment be entered; if the jury finds the controlling facts, and there is no inconsistency or contradiction, the appropriate judgment should be entered (see 2B Barron &amp; Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, [Rules Ed.] § 1057). We approve and adopt these principles.
Further refinement of judicial duty may be found in the following language in A. &amp; G. Stevedores v. Ellerman Lines, 369 U.S. 355, 7 L. Ed. 2d 798, 82 S. Ct. 780, rehearing den. 369 U.S. 882, 8 L. Ed. 2d 284, 82 S.Ct. 1137:
The answers in controversy here are No's. 3 and 5. No. 3 stated appellee was guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of the collision. No. 5 related to the last clear chance doctrine, as that term was defined in instruction No. 9. As already discussed instruction No. 9, albeit improperly, authorized recovery even though appellee's negligence contributed to the collision. So considered, the answers to questions No. 3 and 5 are not inconsistent. The inescapable fact is that appellee remains convicted of negligence which was a proximate cause of the collision. Hence recovery is barred even though appellant was also negligent and judgment must be rendered for appellant.
The judgment is reversed with directions to enter judgment for appellant.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.
*131 FATZER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:
This case is an excellent example of the classical statement that "... the history of special verdicts is a `rocky road strewn with innumerable wrecks.'" (James, Civil Procedure, § 7.15, p. 294.) The wreck here resulted from the district court's own special questions, combined with erroneous Instruction No. 9. I concur in the court's reversal of this case, but must respectfully dissent from its order directing that judgment be entered in favor of the appellant.
Special findings are to be liberally construed on appeal and interpreted in the light of testimony with the view of ascertaining their intended meaning. (Bott v. Wendler, 203 Kan. 212, 218, 453 P.2d 100.) In view of all the facts and circumstances disclosed in the record, the district court's interpretation and approval of the special verdict and the entry of judgment thereon, and erroneous Instruction No. 9, the case should be remanded to the district court with directions to sustain the defendant's alternate motion to set aside the answers to the jury's special verdict, and grant a new trial.
FONTRON and FROMME, J J., join in the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.