Title: State v. Coughlin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2019AP001876-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 21, 2022

2022 WI 43 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP1876-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Donald P. Coughlin, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 397 Wis. 2d 242, 959 N.W.2d 82 
(2021 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 21, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 1, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Juneau   
 
JUDGE: 
James Evenson and Stacy A. Smith   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. DALLET, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
KAROFSKY, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Winn S. Collins, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by Winn S. Collins.   
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Phillip J. Brehm and Phillip J. Brehm Attorney at Law, 
Janesville. There was an oral argument by Phillip J. Brehm.  
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 43 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP1876-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2010CF222) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Donald P. Coughlin, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 21, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. DALLET, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
 
KAROFSKY, J., did not participate.  
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The State of Wisconsin seeks 
review of the court of appeals' unpublished decision, which 
reversed Donald Coughlin's convictions on 15 counts of sexual 
assault.  Specifically, those counts consisted of 14 counts of 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
2 
 
first-degree and second-degree sexual assault of a child and one 
count of repeated sexual assault of a child.1   
¶2 
Arguing that the convictions should be reinstated, the 
State advances that there was sufficient evidence for the jury 
to find Coughlin guilty on all 15 counts at issue.  It also asks 
this court to hold that the jury instructions control in an 
evidence-sufficiency claim when there is a discrepancy between 
the jury instructions and the verdict form. 
¶3 
In response, Coughlin contends that because the State 
did not ask questions particular to the charged time periods, 
there was no evidence upon which the jury could have convicted 
him on these 15 counts.  For purposes of this case only, he also 
acknowledges that the jury instructions should guide this 
court's review. 
¶4 
Under the facts of this case, we conclude that the 
sufficiency of the evidence should be evaluated according to the 
jury instructions.  Further, we conclude that there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find Coughlin guilty on all 
15 counts at issue.  Coughlin failed to overcome his heavy 
burden to show that no reasonable jury could have concluded, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was guilty.  
¶5 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
                                                 
1 State v. Coughlin, No. 2019AP1876-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2021) (affirming in part and reversing in 
part judgment and order of the circuit court for Juneau County, 
James Evenson and Stacy A. Smith, Judges). 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
3 
 
I 
¶6 
In 2009, three individuals came forward as adults, 
alleging that Coughlin repeatedly sexually abused them over the 
course of their childhoods.  Throughout the opinion, we refer to 
these individuals as Coughlin's older stepson, younger stepson, 
and nephew.  
¶7 
Initially, the State charged Coughlin with one count 
of repeated sexual assault of a child2 and 21 counts of first-
degree3 and second-degree4 sexual assault of a child for alleged 
conduct that involved his nephew and two stepsons.  The six 
counts involving his older stepson were affirmed by the court of 
appeals, and Coughlin does not contest his convictions on those 
counts.  Thus, they are not at issue here.   
¶8 
The initial complaint also charged Coughlin with child 
enticement5 involving a fourth alleged victim.  This count 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. § 948.025(1) (2017-18).  
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(e).   
4 Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2). 
5 Wis. Stat. § 948.07. 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
4 
 
involving the fourth individual is likewise not before us.  The 
jury found Coughlin not guilty on that charge.6 
¶9 
Each count was tied to a separate, specified time 
period.7  The charged time periods involving the nephew 
encompassed primarily the autumn seasons of 1989, 1990, 1991, 
and 1992.8  Pertaining to the younger stepson, the charged time 
periods involved primarily each spring from 1990 through 1994 
and each autumn from 1989 through 1994.9  The periods were 
delineated in this fashion for the younger stepson because 
during the school year he lived with his mother, siblings, and 
                                                 
6 After getting divorced from the stepsons' mother, Coughlin 
remarried.  The individual associated with the child enticement 
count was the boyfriend of Coughlin's stepdaughter from that 
later marriage.  For this count, the time period was on or about 
and between February 1, 2008, and February 28, 2008, more than a 
decade in time after the other charged offenses.  The facts 
alleged pursuant to this count were unconnected to the facts 
pertaining to the nephew and stepsons discussed in this opinion. 
7 We refer to these charged time periods as the autumn and 
spring months because that is generally the seasons that the 
charged months cover.  However, we recognize that in certain 
instances, some of the charged time periods technically begin or 
end outside of that named season. 
8 Specifically, the charged time periods involving the 
nephew were September 1-November 19, 1989 (Count 7), September 
1-December 31, 1990 (Count 8), September 1-December 31, 1991 
(Count 9), and September 1-November 19, 1992 (Count 11). 
9 September 1-December 31, 1989 (Count 12), February 1-May 
14, 1990 (Count 13), September 1-December 31, 1990 (Count 14), 
February 1-May 14, 1991 (Count 15), September 1-November 9, 1991 
(Count 16), February 1-May 14, 1992 (Count 17), September 1-
December 31, 1992 (Count 18), February 1-May 14, 1993 (Count 
19), September 1-December 31, 1993 (Count 20), February 1-May 
14, 1994 (Count 21), and September 1-November 9, 1994 (Count 
22). 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
5 
 
Coughlin but spent summers with his uncle, at which time he 
would not have had as much interaction with Coughlin. 
¶10  At trial, the nephew and stepsons described an 
environment of near constant physical and sexual abuse at the 
hands of Coughlin.  They also described Coughlin making threats 
that discouraged them from reporting the abuse.  Such threats 
included Coughlin threatening to kill them or their mother, and 
Coughlin stating that no one would believe the boys if they came 
forward.   
¶11 According to the nephew's and stepsons' testimony, the 
abuse occurred either when one of them was alone with Coughlin 
or when all or some combination of the three boys were alone 
with Coughlin.  The locations of the abuse included Coughlin's 
truck when the boys went deer shining with him in autumn, at the 
village firehouse where Coughlin was fire chief, and at the 
family home where the stepsons lived with Coughlin.  The nephew 
lived nearby and often spent time at Coughlin's home with the 
stepsons. 
¶12 Specifically, the nephew testified that he started 
sixth grade in 1988 at 11 years old and that the sexual abuse 
started when he was in sixth grade.  The first incident involved 
Coughlin measuring his penis when they were at the firehouse.  
The nephew explained that the sexual abuse continued the same 
year as the first incident when he would go deer shining with 
Coughlin and his cousins (the stepsons).  He said that they went 
deer shining "quite a bit," further stating that it "[c]ould be 
four times a month, could be once a month, depending on the 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
6 
 
month."  He confirmed that deer shining happened "more than once 
a month during the late summer and fall."  The nephew's 
testimony also illustrated the pervasiveness of the abuse:  
"[T]here was so many incidents of stuff that -- to say one time 
for one thing is pretty hard to remember."  He testified that 
the abuse continued until he finished high school, and confirmed 
that it happened at least once in the autumn months of 1989, 
1990, 1991, and 1992.  
¶13 The younger stepson likewise testified that Coughlin 
started sexually abusing him in 1985 when he was seven years 
old.  He explained that Coughlin abused him when he took the 
boys deer shining, which occurred "twice a week" in the autumn 
of each year.  Additionally, he testified that the abuse would 
also occur at the home where he and the older stepson lived at 
the time with their mother, Coughlin, and two sisters.  When 
asked how often the abuse would occur in the home, the younger 
stepson responded, "Weekly."  The younger stepson testified that 
in 
the 
autumn 
of 
1989, 
some 
sort 
of 
sexual 
activity 
"[d]efinitely" occurred and that they would go deer shining with 
Coughlin one to two times a week at a minimum.  
¶14 With regard to the spring of 1990, the younger stepson 
testified that some type of sexual activity happened "[a]t least 
once a week."  In response to questioning, he also confirmed 
that some type of sexual activity occurred at least once in the 
autumn of 1990, spring of 1991, autumn of 1991, spring of 1992, 
autumn of 1992, spring of 1993, autumn of 1993, and spring of 
1994.  He further confirmed that Coughlin asked him to engage in 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
7 
 
sexual activity on at least three occasions in the autumn of 
1994.  
¶15 Even 
though 
Coughlin 
does 
not 
challenge 
his 
convictions as to the six counts involving the older stepson, 
the testimony regarding those convictions also displayed the 
pervasiveness of the abuse experienced by all three children.  
The older stepson explained that "going hunting, going shining 
deer, going to cut wood, going to play at the firehouse, those 
types of things where we'd be alone with him would lead up to it 
almost every time."  He testified that they would be "out 
shining deer nonstop" in autumn, which was an occasion when the 
abuse would occur "without fail."  The older stepson said that 
Coughlin would "pull his penis out of his pants and begin 
stroking it, and asking one of us to or ask us to join in, 
either masturbating ourselves or masturbate him."  The older 
stepson explained that at the firehouse, Coughlin would abuse 
them "[b]asically every time [they] were alone with him."  
¶16 Throughout trial, the nephew and stepsons often used 
the term "masturbate" to describe the following scenarios:  when 
they would "masturbate" themselves at Coughlin's direction, when 
Coughlin would "masturbate" himself in their presence, when 
Coughlin would "masturbate" the boys, and when the boys would 
"masturbate" Coughlin at Coughlin's direction.  The State would 
often refer to all four types of conduct as "sexual activity."  
It also referenced both Coughlin touching the boys' penises and 
Coughlin causing the boys to touch his penis in its closing 
argument. 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
8 
 
¶17 In his trial testimony, Coughlin denied that he ever 
abused his nephew or two stepsons or that he ever masturbated in 
their presence or instructed them to masturbate.  He said that 
he never molested them on their deer shining trips, in the home, 
or at other locations. 
¶18 At the close of evidence, the circuit court instructed 
the jury and also read each verdict form to the jury.  As 
relevant here, the definition of "sexual contact" in the jury 
instructions differed from the definition in the verdict form.  
The 
jury 
instructions 
defined 
"sexual 
contact" 
as 
"an 
intentional touching of the penis" of the nephew and stepsons by 
Coughlin 
or 
"an 
intentional 
touching 
by 
the 
victim" 
of 
Coughlin's penis "if the defendant intentionally caused or 
allowed the victim to do that touching."  For there to have been 
sexual contact, the defendant must have acted with the intent to 
become sexually aroused or gratified.  
¶19 By contrast, the verdict form defined "sexual contact" 
as only "the defendant touching the victim's penis" and did not 
include Coughlin intentionally causing them to touch his penis.  
"Sexual 
contact," 
in 
either 
definition, 
did 
not 
include 
instances when the nephew and stepsons masturbated themselves at 
Coughlin's direction or when Coughlin masturbated himself in the 
presence of the boys. 
¶20 The jury found Coughlin guilty of the counts involving 
the nephew and stepsons and acquitted him of the child 
enticement charge involving another individual.  Coughlin filed 
a postconviction motion, asking the circuit court to dismiss all 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
9 
 
counts on the grounds that there was an insufficient factual 
basis to support a conviction for each count.  In the 
alternative, Coughlin argued that he was entitled to a new trial 
due to ineffective assistance of counsel or because the real 
controversy had not been tried. 
¶21 Reasoning that there was "more than enough evidence as 
[to] each time period that there was a physical touching done by 
the defendant or the defendant had them touch him," the circuit 
court denied Coughlin's motion.  It further stated:   
[S]ince there was clearly testimony that supports the 
defendant on multiple occasions, either masturbating 
each victim or caused each victim to masturbate the 
defendant, it must be assumed that the jury used this 
testimony to support its verdict that the defendant 
was guilty of each of the counts they found him guilty 
of. 
The circuit court also concluded that Coughlin's counsel was not 
ineffective and that all of the real controversies had been 
tried to the jury. 
¶22 The court of appeals affirmed Coughlin's convictions 
for the six counts involving the older stepson and reversed his 
convictions as to the remaining counts involving the nephew and 
younger 
stepson. 
 
State 
v. 
Coughlin, 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶2 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2021).  It 
measured the sufficiency of the evidence against the verdict 
form and concluded that the evidence was insufficient to find 
Coughlin guilty on those counts.  Id., ¶¶19, 37.  In reaching 
its conclusion, the court of appeals reasoned that "there was no 
evidence from which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
10 
 
doubt" that Coughlin touched the nephew's and younger stepson's 
penises during any of the charged time periods.  Id., ¶24; see 
id., ¶28.  The court of appeals also observed that its 
conclusion on sufficiency of the evidence would have been the 
same even if it had evaluated the evidence according to the jury 
instructions instead of the verdict form.  Id., ¶37 n.13. 
¶23 Further, the court of appeals rejected Coughlin's 
argument that a new trial was warranted in the interests of 
justice on the six counts it affirmed.10  Id., ¶36.  The State 
petitioned for this court's review of the court of appeals' 
reversal of the 15 counts.  Coughlin did not cross-petition for 
review of the court of appeals' affirmance of his convictions on 
counts 1-6 involving the older stepson, and as noted, those 
counts are not before us. 
II 
¶24 We are called upon to determine whether the evidence 
at trial was sufficient to support Coughlin's convictions on the 
15 counts involving the nephew and younger stepson.  When a 
defendant challenges a verdict based on sufficiency of the 
evidence, we give deference to the jury's determination and view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.  State v. 
Long, 2009 WI 36, ¶19, 317 Wis. 2d 92, 765 N.W.2d 557.  If more 
than one inference can be drawn from the evidence, we must adopt 
                                                 
10 Coughlin abandoned his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim at the court of appeals and does not raise it here.  He 
likewise does not raise the argument that a new trial is 
warranted in the interests of justice. 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
11 
 
the inference that supports the conviction.  Id.  We will not 
substitute our own judgment for that of the jury unless the 
evidence is so lacking in probative value and force that no 
reasonable jury could have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the defendant was guilty.  Id.   
¶25 Thus, "a defendant challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence bears a heavy burden to show the evidence could not 
reasonably have supported a finding of guilt."  State v. Beamon, 
2013 WI 47, ¶21, 347 Wis. 2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 681.  Lastly, we 
consider the totality of the evidence when conducting a 
sufficiency of the evidence review.  State v. Smith, 2012 WI 91, 
¶36, 342 Wis. 2d 710, 817 N.W.2d 410. 
III 
¶26 We begin by addressing the threshold question of 
whether the jury instructions or the verdict form will guide our 
review of the sufficiency of the evidence in this case.  
Subsequently, we evaluate the evidence to determine whether a 
reasonable jury could find that Coughlin was guilty on the 15 
counts at issue. 
A 
¶27 In this case we are asked to determine first if we are 
testing the sufficiency of the evidence against the jury 
instructions or the verdict form.  The court of appeals assumed 
without deciding that it "should compare the trial evidence with 
the crime as described in the verdict form, rather than as 
defined in the jury instructions."  Coughlin, No. 2019AP1876-CR, 
at ¶19.  It further observed that its conclusions about the 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
12 
 
sufficiency of the evidence would be the same if it had instead 
measured the evidence against the jury instructions.  Id., ¶37 
n.13. 
¶28 Here the parties no longer contest this issue and 
essentially agree that the jury instructions should control at 
least for purposes of this case.  We agree, and for the reasons 
set forth below, determine that in this case the jury 
instructions should govern our review.  Our determination here 
to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence against the jury 
instructions is based not only on the agreement of the parties, 
but also on a review of our case law together with a review of 
this record. 
¶29 In State v. Beamon, this court addressed a situation 
where the jury instructions contained an erroneous statement of 
law.  347 Wis. 2d 559, ¶37.  We measured the sufficiency of the 
evidence against the statutory elements of the crime, not the 
jury instructions, because the jury instructions did not 
correctly set forth the law.  Id., ¶¶24, 40.  However, the court 
observed that "[g]enerally, when the jury instructions conform 
to the statutory requirements of that offense, we will review 
the sufficiency of the evidence by comparison to those jury 
instructions."  Id., ¶22. 
¶30 In this case, the jury instructions adhere to the 
statutory elements of the offenses.11  Unlike in Beamon, the jury 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.01(5) provides in part that sexual 
contact is defined as:   
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
13 
 
instructions here did not constitute an erroneous statement of 
the law.  Therefore, in reaching our conclusion, we take into 
account Beamon's statement regarding the trajectory of the law.  
¶31 Further, a review of this record indicates that the 
parties seemingly understood "sexual contact" to mean both 
Coughlin touching the victims' penises and Coughlin causing the 
victims to touch his penis.  "[J]ury instructions may be 
erroneous if they fail to instruct the jury on the theory of the 
crime that was presented to the jury during trial."  State v. 
Williams, 2015 WI 75, ¶57, 364 Wis. 2d 126, 867 N.W.2d 736.   
¶32 Here, 
the 
definition 
as 
reflected 
in 
the 
jury 
instructions was the theory of the crime presented throughout 
trial.  The victims testified to both types of sexual contact, 
and the State explicitly acknowledged both forms of sexual 
contact in its closing argument.  The record does not indicate 
that the jury was led to believe only Coughlin touching the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) 
Any 
of 
the 
following 
types 
of 
intentional 
touching, whether direct or through clothing, if that 
intentional touching is either for the purpose of 
sexually 
degrading 
or 
sexually 
humiliating 
the 
complainant or sexually arousing or gratifying the 
defendant: 
1. Intentional touching by the defendant or, upon 
the defendant's instruction, by another person, 
by the use of any body part or object, of the 
complainant's intimate parts. 
2. Intentional touching by the complainant, by 
the use of any body part or object, of the 
defendant's intimate parts or, if done upon the 
defendant's instructions, the intimate parts of 
another person. 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
14 
 
boys' penises constituted sexual contact.  Therefore, the jury 
instructions did not fail to instruct the jury on the theory of 
crime presented at trial.  Under the facts of this case, we thus 
evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence against the jury 
instructions. 
B 
¶33 We address next whether a reasonable jury could have 
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that during each of the 
charged time periods Coughlin engaged in "an intentional 
touching of the penis" of his nephew and younger stepson or 
there occurred "an intentional touching by the victim" of 
Coughlin's penis "if the defendant intentionally caused or 
allowed the victim to do that touching."  As observed above, 
when a defendant challenges a verdict based on sufficiency of 
the evidence, we give deference to the jury's determination and 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.  
Long, 317 Wis. 2d 92, ¶19.  Accordingly, the defendant faces a 
heavy burden.  Beamon, 347 Wis. 2d 559, ¶21.   
¶34 Our determination is influenced by both deference to a 
jury verdict and reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
the evidence presented.  We keep in mind that a juror is not 
required to "ignore the larger picture so as to focus on each 
piece in a vacuum and ask whether that piece standing alone 
supports a finding of guilt."  Smith, 342 Wis. 2d 710, ¶36.  
Thus, in giving deference to the jury verdict and viewing the 
evidence, together with reasonable inferences, in the light most 
favorable to the State, we conclude that there was sufficient 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
15 
 
evidence for the jury to find Coughlin guilty on all 15 counts 
at issue.  Coughlin failed to overcome his heavy burden to show 
that 
no 
reasonable 
jury 
could 
have 
concluded, 
beyond 
a 
reasonable doubt, that he was guilty. 
¶35 Given that Coughlin does not challenge his convictions 
on counts 1-6 involving the older stepson, we begin our 
examination with counts 7, 8, 9, and 11, the four counts 
involving the nephew.  These counts cover charges occurring 
primarily during the autumn months of 1989 through 1992.12  The 
State charged these time periods in autumn because that is when 
Coughlin would regularly take the children deer shining.  All 
three individuals testified to the frequency they went deer 
shining with Coughlin, and that abuse would nearly always occur 
at that time. 
¶36 The offense charged as count 7 was alleged to have 
taken place in the autumn of 1989.  For Coughlin to be found 
guilty of first degree sexual assault of a child, the nephew had 
to be under the age of 13.  See Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(e).  The 
jury heard testimony that the abuse started in the autumn of 
1989 before the nephew turned 13.  
¶37 For the remaining three counts, the nephew must have 
been under the age of 16 for Coughlin to be found guilty on 
those counts.  See Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).  Similarly, the jury 
                                                 
12 Again, those time periods were September 1-November 19, 
1989 (Count 7), September 1-December 31, 1990 (Count 8), 
September 1-December 31, 1991 (Count 9), and September 1-
November 19, 1992 (Count 11).  Count 10 was dismissed pursuant 
to a pretrial stipulation. 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
16 
 
heard testimony that Coughlin abused the nephew in the autumn of 
1990 when he was 13, in the autumn of 1991 when he was 14, and 
in the autumn of 1992 before he turned 16.  As such, the jury 
reasonably concluded that the nephew was the requisite age for 
that element of each charged offense. 
¶38 Direct and circumstantial evidence gleaned from the 
testimony further supports the jury's verdict on these four 
counts.13  The younger stepson testified that the nephew (his 
cousin) was frequently there with Coughlin and the two other 
boys when they went deer shining.  The nephew explained that the 
children would rotate sitting in the front seat, and that 
Coughlin would touch the penis of whoever was sitting in the 
front.  He further testified that "there was so many incidents 
of stuff that -- to say one time for one thing is pretty hard to 
remember."  The nephew explained that "it happened enough times 
                                                 
13 The nephew gave the following answers in response to 
questioning: 
Q:  But did you observe [Coughlin] masturbating 
someone in the front seat? 
A:  Yeah. 
Q:  Did he ever masturbate you while you were in the 
front seat? 
A:  Yes. 
Q: And [the older stepson]? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  And [the younger stepson]? 
A:  Yes. 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
17 
 
where . . . .  We would play with ourselves, he might play with 
somebody, might not play with somebody."  As to the requisite 
sexual contact, when asked if Coughlin ever masturbated him when 
he was in the front seat, the nephew responded:  "Yes."   
¶39 The younger stepson also testified that he observed 
both 
Coughlin 
masturbating 
the 
nephew 
and 
the 
nephew 
masturbating Coughlin during deer shining.  Knowing that deer 
shining occurs in autumn, that the nephew frequently went deer 
shining with Coughlin, and that the abuse nearly always occurred 
during deer shining, the jury could have reasonably inferred 
that Coughlin touched the nephew or caused the nephew to touch 
him at least once each autumn from 1989 through 1992.  Indeed, 
the nephew confirmed some sort of abuse occurred during each 
charged time period.14 
¶40 Next, we address counts 12-21 involving the younger 
stepson.  Each of these counts require at least one instance of 
                                                 
14 When asked about specific time periods, the nephew stated 
the following: 
Q:  [W]ould this have happened at least one time in 
the fall of 1989 before your 13th birthday? 
A:  Yeah.  If you're 13 when you're in sixth grade, 
yeah. 
Q:  Would it have happened at least one time in the 
fall of 1990 when you would have been 13 years old? 
A:  Yes. 
The prosecutor then proceeded to question the nephew in 
this manner for the fall of 1991 and 1992, to which the nephew 
also responded, "Yes." 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
18 
 
sexual contact, and they primarily encompass the autumn months 
from 1989 to 1994 and spring months from 1990 to 1994.15  The 
younger stepson testified that he was seven years old when the 
abuse began and that it continued "[t]hroughout the year" every 
year until he moved out when he was 18.16 
                                                 
15 September 1-December 31, 1989 (Count 12), February 1-May 
14, 1990 (Count 13), September 1-December 31, 1990 (Count 14), 
February 1-May 14, 1991 (Count 15), September 1-November 9, 1991 
(Count 16), February 1-May 14, 1992 (Count 17), September 1-
December 31, 1992 (Count 18), February 1-May 14, 1993 (Count 
19), September 1-December 31, 1993 (Count 20), and February 1-
May 14, 1994 (Count 21). 
16 Specifically, the younger stepson testified the following 
about the relevant time periods: 
Q:  So that we cover it and it's clear, [i]n the fall 
of 1989 prior to your 11th birthday, would there have 
been at least one occasion where the defendant had you 
engage in sexual activity? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  Likely more than one? 
A:  Definitely. 
Q:  How often in the fall would you guys go shining 
deer? 
A:  One to two times a week, minimum. 
Q:  In the spring of 1990 you would have been 11 years 
old? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  During that spring, would there have been at least 
one occasion where the defendant had you engage in 
some type of sexual activity? 
A:  Yes. 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
19 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Q:  Typically how often would something happen a week 
or a month? 
A:  At least once a week. 
Q:  Throughout the year? 
A:  Throughout the year. 
Q:  As long as you were there? 
A:  Yes. 
 . . .  
Q:  In the fall of 1990, before your 12th birthday, so 
while you were still 11, happen at least one time 
during that time frame as well? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  Spring of 1991, you would have been 12 years old? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  Can you tell us whether or not there was at least 
one occasion during that spring of 1991 when the 
defendant had you engage in some type of sexual 
activity? 
A:  Yes. 
Q: 
 
The 
fall 
of 
1991, 
prior 
to 
your 
13th 
birthday . . . .  Would there have been at least one 
occasion where it happened? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  In the spring of 1992, you would have been 13? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  And would there have been at least one occasion 
during that period of time when the defendant had you 
engage in some type of sexual activity? 
A:  Yes. 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
20 
 
¶41 He explained how in autumn of each year he would go 
deer shining with Coughlin once or twice a week at which time 
abuse would occur.  The younger stepson testified that not only 
was it always each person masturbating himself, but "there were 
times when [Coughlin] would want to masturbate us," which 
Coughlin would do.  As stated above, the nephew also testified 
to how the children would rotate who sat in the front seat with 
Coughlin, and how Coughlin would touch the penis of whoever was 
sitting up front, including the younger stepson's penis. 
¶42 In response to questioning, the younger stepson 
confirmed that there were times Coughlin masturbated him and 
times when he masturbated Coughlin.17  He explained how in 
                                                                                                                                                             
The prosecutor continued in this fashion, asking the 
younger stepson if the defendant had him engage in some type of 
sexual activity during the fall of 1992, the spring of 1993, the 
fall of 1993, and the spring of 1994, to which the younger 
stepson consistently replied, "Yes." 
17 The younger stepson testified the following in response 
to questioning: 
Q: 
 
Was 
it 
always 
everybody 
-- 
each 
person 
masturbating themselves, or did something else happen 
on occasion? 
A:  No, there were times when [Coughlin] would want to 
masturbate us. 
Q:  And would he do that? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  Were there times when he masturbated you? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  Was there anything else that would happen? 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
21 
 
addition to deer shining, that there were many occasions of 
sexual activity at the family home.  The following back-and-
forth ensued:  
Q:  And again, when the defendant would ask you to do 
this, was it always him asking you to masturbate, you 
would masturbate yourself, or did something else 
happen on occasion? 
A:  He would always ask.  He would always be there and 
want us to masturbate, he would want to masturbate us, 
and at times he did. 
Q: At times did he ask one of you to masturbate him?  
A: Yes.  
Q: Did this happen as well at the house?  
A: Yes. 
Q: How often would this happen in the home? 
A: Weekly.  
¶43 He identified the areas of the home where the abuse 
took place, including the bedrooms, basement, and living room.  
The younger stepson again confirmed later in his testimony that 
some kind of sexual activity occurred on a weekly basis.18  He 
                                                                                                                                                             
A:  He would want us to masturbate him. 
Q:  Did that happen as well? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  Were there times when you masturbated him? 
A:  Yes. 
18 Specifically, 
Q:  And I believe your testimony was this type of 
sexual 
activity 
happened 
weekly, 
obviously 
in 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
22 
 
explained the pervasiveness of the abuse and acknowledged that 
it was difficult to identify an exact time that the given 
conduct occurred:  "Because there was a lot of sexual abuse 
going on.  Kind of hard to keep track of all of it."19  
¶44 Additionally, the count of repeated sexual assault of 
a child, count 22, required the jury to find that there were at 
least three instances of sexual contact between Coughlin and the 
younger stepson from September 1, 1994, to November 9, 1994, not 
just one instance like every other count.20  See Wis. Stat. 
                                                                                                                                                             
different locations, not necessarily in the same spot, 
correct? 
A:  That's correct. 
Q:  And -- but it was still within the home on a 
weekly basis? 
A:  It was all over on a weekly basis. 
19 The State advanced that during each charged spring, 
Coughlin engaged in approximately 19 sexual acts against the 
younger stepson, from which the jury could have inferred that at 
least one instance of sexual contact occurred.  It further 
argued that for the autumn time periods, Coughlin committed 
approximately 30 sexual acts during the shortest charged period 
and over 50 acts during the longest.  From this, the State 
reasoned, the jury could likewise have inferred that the defined 
sexual contact occurred at least once during each charged time 
period. 
20 The younger stepson testified the following as to the 
count of repeated sexual assault of a child: 
Q:  Finally, in the fall of 1994, you turned 16 in 
November of that year? 
A:  Yes. 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
23 
 
§ 948.025(1).  Again, based on the trial testimony displaying 
the frequency of the abuse during this time of year, the jury 
could have reasonably inferred from all of the instances of 
sexual abuse that the charged conduct occurred at least three 
times.21 
¶45 Even though the counts involving the older stepson are 
not at issue, his testimony also supports the conclusion that a 
reasonable jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that Coughlin was guilty on the counts involving the nephew and 
younger stepson.  The older stepson testified that in the autumn 
when he was deer shining with Coughlin and the nephew or 
stepson, or both, that Coughlin "without fail" would ask one of 
the 
boys 
"to 
join 
in, 
either 
masturbating 
ourselves 
or 
masturbate him."   
¶46 Additionally, the older stepson testified as to the 
frequency of the sexual abuse in the firehouse, which he said he 
would go to once or twice a week with Coughlin, and often with 
                                                                                                                                                             
Q:  So while you were still 15, that fall, would there 
have been at least three occasions where the defendant 
would have asked you to engage in sexual activity? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  Again, you would go shining once, twice a week? 
A:  Yes. 
21 The State also advanced that for the count of repeated 
sexual assault of a child, charged from September 1, 1994, to 
November 9, 1994, approximately 30 sexual acts occurred, from 
which the jury could have reasonably inferred the charged 
conduct took place at least three times. 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
24 
 
his brother, the younger stepson:  "Basically every time we were 
there alone with him and there was time, on an evening where we 
were just down there playing pool it would happen.  And we were 
down there frequently, obviously intermingling with trips 
shining deer and cutting wood."  The jury could have reasonably 
relied on the older stepson's testimony, in addition to the 
other victims' testimony, to bolster its conclusion that the 
requisite sexual contact occurred at least once during each 
charged time period for the nephew and younger stepson, and at 
least three times for the charge of repeated sexual assault of a 
child involving the younger stepson. 
¶47 More than one inference could have been drawn from the 
testimony.  The jury could have inferred that, during each of 
the charged time periods, all or some combination of the 
following acts occurred:  Coughlin touched the victim's penis, 
caused the victim to touch his penis, instructed the victim to 
masturbate, or masturbated in front of the victim.  Taking into 
account the pervasiveness of the abuse and the victims' 
inability to recall specific acts at specific times, it was 
reasonable for the jury to infer that during each of the charged 
time periods, Coughlin either touched the victim's penis or 
caused the victim to touch his penis, meeting the definition of 
"sexual contact."   
¶48 The jury could have alternatively inferred that only 
masturbating of one's self occurred during each charged time 
period, which would not meet the definition of "sexual contact" 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
25 
 
here.22  However, when more than one inference can be drawn, we 
must adopt the inference that supports the conviction.  Long, 
317 Wis. 2d 92, ¶19.  We "may not substitute [our] judgment for 
that of the trier of fact unless the evidence, viewed most 
favorably to the state and the conviction, is so lacking in 
probative value and force that no trier of fact, acting 
reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."  
State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 752 
(1990).  Accordingly, as we must, we adopt the inference that 
supports the conviction and determine that the charged conduct 
occurred at least once during each charged time period for the 
first-degree and second-degree sexual assault charges, and at 
least three times for the repeated sexual assault of a child 
charge. 
¶49 We recognize that individuals who were victimized as 
children may not be able to pinpoint with precision the time 
                                                 
22 The dissent observes that not all of the sexual activity 
described by the victims is criminal pursuant to the statutes 
under which Coughlin was charged.  See dissent, ¶¶66, 68.  This 
is true, but it is beside the point.  We do not suggest that 
acts other than Coughlin touching the victims' penises or 
causing the victims to touch his penis meet the definition of 
sexual contact or that the jury could have relied on testimony 
about uncharged conduct to reasonably infer the charged conduct 
occurred. 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
26 
 
period of their abuse.23  Children may delay reporting for a 
myriad of reasons and "exactness as to the events fades in 
memory.  Young children cannot be held to an adult's ability to 
comprehend and recall dates and other specifics."  State v. 
Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d 244, 249, 426 N.W.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1988).  
From the last charged time period in 1994 to the time of trial 
in 2017, about 23 years elapsed since the last event in question 
took place.  The victims themselves indicated that it was hard 
to testify with specificity due to how frequently both charged 
and uncharged conduct occurred. 
¶50 It is true that the State could have asked more 
specific questions during trial to attempt to more explicitly 
connect the defined "sexual contact" to the exact months and 
years charged.  Admittedly, the State also often used the 
general term "sexual activity" when questioning the victims.  
But the State's failure to ask the victims specifically whether 
the defined sexual contact occurred during each of the charged 
                                                 
23 One of the detectives involved in the investigation, 
Special Agent Holmes, also testified.  He explained the 
methodology regarding how he generally develops a timeline of 
events during an investigation.  For example, he described that 
in interviews, "a person may not recall specific date or time" 
so he uses birthdays, holidays, anniversaries, and other events 
to identify when during the year certain events took place.  
Special Agent Holmes determines their grade in school and their 
ages during that grade.  This testimony could have helped the 
jury better understand the time periods at issue and the answers 
the victims gave regarding their ages and grades in school at 
the time of the abuse.  It also could have helped the jury 
understand that victims cannot always be expected to recall the 
exact dates that certain conduct took place. 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
27 
 
time periods does not negate Coughlin's heavy burden to overcome 
the deference we give to a jury verdict.   
¶51 The jury was apprised of the ages of the victims and 
the years during which the abuse took place.  It could, for 
example, reasonably connect deer shining to the autumn months, 
and it knew that both charged and uncharged conduct took place 
during deer shining.  The jury could then draw the inference 
that the charged conduct took place at least once during each 
autumn.  It could likewise draw the inference that Coughlin 
engaged in the charged conduct against the younger stepson in 
the spring, since the jury heard testimony about abuse occurring 
"weekly" and "[t]hroughout the year" for as long as the younger 
stepson lived with Coughlin.  Considering the totality of the 
evidence, including the pervasiveness of the abuse throughout 
the boys' childhoods, the jury was not required to view each 
piece of evidence in a vacuum and conclude that only uncharged 
conduct took place during the charged time periods.  See Smith, 
342 Wis. 2d, 710, ¶36. 
¶52 Additionally, we observe that the jury acquitted 
Coughlin on the count involving a fourth alleged victim.  This 
is indicative of a jury that carefully evaluated the evidence 
for each count.  See State v. Leach, 124 Wis. 2d 648, 673, 370 
N.W.2d 240 (1985) ("The jury was expressly instructed to 
consider each count separately.  The jury was also instructed 
not to let the defendant's guilt or innocence on one count 
affect its verdict on any other count.  Only cynicism would 
suggest this instruction was disregarded by the jury . . . .").  
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
28 
 
When denying Coughlin's postconviction motion, the circuit court 
also highlighted this acquittal as an indicator of the jury 
acting 
reasonably. 
 
Although 
this 
observation 
is 
not 
dispositive, it supports the notion that the jury considered 
each count in turn and with it each charged time period. 
¶53 We cannot conclude that the jury acted unreasonably 
when it convicted Coughlin of all 15 counts at issue.  Based on 
the testimony that indicates the victims essentially lived with 
this abuse in their day-to-day lives over a longer time period 
that spanned the charged time periods, we cannot agree with 
Coughlin that there is no evidence that the charged conduct 
occurred during those specific time periods.  We acknowledge 
that the charged conduct was mixed in with uncharged conduct and 
the State's questioning occasionally lacked specificity, but the 
evidence that the charged conduct occurred at all relevant times 
is not so lacking in probative value and force such that we 
should substitute our judgment for that of the jury. 
¶54 In sum, under the facts of this case, we conclude that 
the sufficiency of the evidence should be evaluated according to 
the jury instructions.  Further, we conclude that there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find Coughlin guilty on all 
15 counts at issue.  Coughlin failed to overcome his heavy 
burden to show that no reasonable jury could have concluded, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was guilty. 
¶55 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
No. 
2019AP1876-CR   
 
29 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
¶56 JILL J. KAROFSKY, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  2019AP1876-CR.rfd 
1 
 
 
¶57 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  The problems 
in this case are of the State's own making.  The State did not 
have to charge Coughlin the way it did:  only with violating 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) and (2) by having "sexual contact" with 
the victims, as defined in Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5), and only 
during narrow and particular date ranges.1  Having made that 
decision, however, it was the State's burden to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt both that Coughlin committed the specific 
crimes he was charged with and that he did so during the date 
range associated with each count.  It failed to do so.  
Alternatively, the State could have amended the charges at trial 
to reflect the evidence presented to the jury, including 
broadening the time period for each charge.  It didn't do that 
either.  And so, given the specific charges listed in counts 7–9 
and 11–22, the record contains insufficient evidence to support 
the jury's guilty verdict.   
¶58 The majority opinion also mistakenly evaluates the 
sufficiency of the evidence against the jury instructions 
instead of the verdict form.  The verdict form, however, is the 
only indication of what facts the jury actually found.  So, at 
least in this case, where the verdict form lists only one of two 
                                                 
1 The State also charged Coughlin with one count of repeated 
sexual assault of a child under Wis. Stat. § 948.025(1)(d).  
That count is premised on at least three violations of Wis. 
Stat. § 948.02(1) between September 1 and November 9, 1994.  
Because the State failed to meet its burden to show that any 
violation of § 948.02(1) occurred during any of the charged time 
periods, it necessarily also failed to meet its burden of 
showing at least three such violations occurred during the 
period related to the alleged violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.025.   
No.  2019AP1876-CR.rfd 
2 
 
possible theories of guilt, the verdict form should guide our 
review.  I therefore respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶59 Coughlin's 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
challenge 
presents a novel problem.  Relevant to every sufficiency-of-the-
evidence challenge are the information, the jury instructions, 
and the verdict form.  The information lists the statute under 
which the defendant was charged and includes brief factual 
allegations supporting the charge.  Before the jury deliberates, 
the judge instructs the jury on all of the elements of the 
crime, as well as on any possible defenses.  The jury then 
deliberates and returns a verdict form, indicating whether it 
found the defendant guilty or not guilty of the crime "as 
charged in the information."  In a typical case, there is no 
discrepancy between the information, the jury instructions, and 
the verdict form; they all list the same statutory elements and 
factual theory of guilt.  Thus, in a typical sufficiency-of-the-
evidence challenge, it makes no difference whether the court 
evaluates the evidence against the jury instructions or the 
verdict form. 
¶60 Here, however, there is a discrepancy between the two.  
The jury was instructed that it could find Coughlin guilty if 
either he touched the victims' penises or they touched his.  
Those instructions mirror the factual theory the State presented 
at trial, as well as the two theories of guilt listed in the 
definition of "sexual contact" in Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5)(a): 
No.  2019AP1876-CR.rfd 
3 
 
1. Intentional touching by the defendant or, upon the 
defendant's instruction, by another person, . . . of 
the complainant's intimate parts. 
2. Intentional touching by the complainant . . . of 
the defendant's intimate parts or, if done upon the 
defendant's 
instructions, 
the 
intimate 
parts 
of 
another person. 
See also Wis. Stat. § 948.02 (requiring "sexual contact" as an 
element of second-degree sexual assault).  The verdict form (and 
the 
information), 
however, 
reflected 
just 
one 
of 
those 
theories:  that Coughlin had touched the victims' penises.  Both 
the jury instructions and verdict form are accurate, but the 
verdict form is under-inclusive; that is, it states just one of 
the two possible theories of guilt on which the jury was 
instructed.  Since neither misstates the law, the question here 
is which one should control our review of the sufficiency of the 
evidence. 
¶61 Our prior cases have dealt with related situations, 
but no prior case is directly on point.  In State v. Beamon, 
2013 WI 47, 347 Wis. 2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 681, we held that when 
the jury instructions required proof of an element of the crime 
not included in the statute, then the court should test the 
sufficiency of the evidence against the statutory elements.  
Id., ¶¶28, 40.  Two years later, we explained that the jury 
instructions must include a theory of guilt consistent with both 
the statutory elements of the crime and the factual theory of 
guilt the State presented at trial.  State v. Williams, 2015 
WI 75, ¶63, 364 Wis. 2d 126, 867 N.W.2d 736.  When they don't, 
the court should determine whether the jury would have convicted 
the defendant had it been given such proper instructions.  Id.   
No.  2019AP1876-CR.rfd 
4 
 
¶62 Although neither Beamon nor Williams are directly on 
point, our rationale in Williams supports the conclusion that 
the verdict form should control in this case because it reflects 
what the jury actually found.2  In Williams we explained that 
when we review a jury's verdict in a sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
challenge and the jury received erroneous jury instructions, our 
conclusion turns on what the jury would have done absent the 
erroneous instructions.  364 Wis. 2d 126, ¶63.  We also 
explained that not every such challenge is created equal.  For 
instance, when the jury instructions include an extra element 
not required by statute, we can safely assume that the jury 
would have convicted the defendant under the proper jury 
instructions because if it found that the State proved an extra, 
non-statutory element, it necessarily found that the State also 
proved all of the statutory elements.  Id., ¶¶61–62; see also 
State v. Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d 143, 151, 557 N.W.2d 813 (1997).  
The inverse, however, is not true.  "[I]f an erroneous jury 
instruction omits an element or instructs on a different theory, 
it will often be difficult to surmise what the jury would have 
done if confronted with a proper instruction," because the 
jury's verdict says nothing about statutory elements or factual 
theories of guilt the jury was never asked to consider.  
Williams, 364 Wis. 2d 126, ¶62. 
                                                 
2 In reaching the opposite conclusion, the majority relies 
mostly on Beamon.  But Beamon dealt only with a conflict between 
the statutory elements and the jury instructions.  See 347 
Wis. 2d 559, ¶¶24, 28.  Here, neither the jury instructions nor 
the verdict form conflict with the elements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02, so Beamon doesn't help resolve the issue. 
No.  2019AP1876-CR.rfd 
5 
 
¶63 Applying that rationale to this case, the court should 
test the sufficiency of the evidence against the verdict form 
because that is the only evidence of what the jury actually 
found.3  See id.  A verdict form reflects the jury's actual 
findings based on the evidence, while the jury instructions only 
inform the jury about the law it must apply when making those 
findings.  Here, the jury was correctly instructed that, as 
defined in Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5), "sexual contact" could 
include either Coughlin touching one of the victim's penises or 
one of the victims touching Coughlin's.  The State's factual 
theory at trial included both statutory theories of guilt.  But 
the verdict form shows that, for each count, the jury concluded 
only that Coughlin had touched a victim's penis during the 
relevant time periods.  See Williams, 364 Wis. 2d 126, ¶62.  
Accordingly, in evaluating whether there is sufficient evidence 
to support the jury's verdict, we should evaluate whether, 
viewing the evidence most favorably to upholding the verdict, a 
reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Coughlin touched the relevant victim's penis during each 
relevant time period.  See id., ¶63.   
II 
¶64 All of that said, even if the court evaluates the 
evidence against the jury instructions, it is still insufficient 
to support the jury's guilty verdict.  When we review a 
                                                 
3 The opposite is likely true if the verdict form includes a 
theory of guilt that was not part of the jury instructions; that 
is, the verdict form is over-inclusive.  See Williams, 364 
Wis. 2d 126, ¶¶60–61; Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d at 151. 
No.  2019AP1876-CR.rfd 
6 
 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, we "give deference to the 
jury's determination and view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State."  See, e.g., State v. Long, 2009 WI 36, 
¶19, 317 Wis. 2d 92, 765 N.W.2d 557.  Coughlin was charged under 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) and (2), for which the key element is 
"sexual contact . . . with a person who has not attained the age 
of 16."  And consistent with the definition of "sexual contact" 
in § 948.01(5), the State alleged that Coughlin intentionally 
touched the victims' penises or had them touch his.  It also 
alleged that, for each count, such conduct occurred during 
specific time periods, each comprising no more than four months.  
Thus, to sustain Coughlin's convictions, the record must contain 
evidence that, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, 
would allow a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that during the specific months alleged for each count, 
Coughlin either intentionally touched that victim's penis or 
that victim intentionally touched Coughlin's penis at his 
direction.  See, e.g., Long, 317 Wis. 2d 92, ¶19. 
¶65 The majority wrongly concludes that just because there 
is evidence that Coughlin had criminal sexual contact with the 
victims at some point, the jury could infer that such contact 
occurred during each specific time period.  In doing so, the 
majority papers over the ambiguous testimony regarding exactly 
what kind of sexual activity happened when.  Specificity matters 
because some of the sexual activity the victims testified to 
fits the charges of second-degree sexual assault, but some does 
not.  Likewise, it's unclear that the conduct that fits the 
sexual-assault charge occurred during the charged time periods.  
No.  2019AP1876-CR.rfd 
7 
 
These ambiguities are not "beside the point," see majority op., 
¶48 n.22; they are the point.  The jury's guilty verdict cannot 
be sustained based on the victims' testimony that "some sort of 
abuse occurred during each charged time period."  See id., ¶39 
(emphasis added).  There must be evidence on which the jury 
could rely to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
specific kind of abuse with which Coughlin was charged——"sexual 
contact" as defined in Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5)(a)——occurred with 
respect to each victim during each charged time period.  See 
State v. Hall, 53 Wis. 2d 719, 723, 193 N.W.2d 653 (1972) 
(reversing defendant's conviction because, although there was 
evidence committed some crime, the evidence was insufficient 
that he committed the specific crime with which he was charged).  
Because there is not, the jury could not find Coughlin guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d at 151–54. 
¶66 The evidence shows that different kinds of sexual 
abuse occurred for many years, but it is unclear about exactly 
what form that abuse took and when it happened.  There is 
certainly evidence that Coughlin engaged in sexual contact with 
the victims at some point.  As the majority correctly points 
out, there is testimony that Coughlin touched the victims' 
penises or they touched his.  See majority op., ¶38 n.13.  Both 
victims also testified, however, that other sexual activity 
occurred during each time period that does not fit the charge of 
No.  2019AP1876-CR.rfd 
8 
 
second-degree sexual assault of a child.4  For instance, A.F. 
testified that on some occasions he, J.C., and Coughlin 
masturbated together, but he and J.C. did not touch Coughlin's 
penis nor did he touch theirs.  J.C. testified that sometimes 
when he went deer shining with Coughlin, Coughlin would 
"masturbate whoever was in the front seat, or he would try to, 
and himself."  The statutes under which Coughlin was charged, 
Wis. Stats. § 948.02(1) and (2), criminalize neither attempted 
sexual contact with children nor their self-masturbation, even 
if done at the defendant's instruction.5  Other statutes do, such 
as § 948.07 (sexual enticement) or § 948.10 (exposing genitals), 
but the State neither charged Coughlin with those offenses nor 
amended the charges at the close of the evidence.  What the 
court is left with then is evidence showing that sometimes 
Coughlin committed second-degree sexual assault as charged and 
sometimes he didn't.  It fell to the State to clear up that 
ambiguity and prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, during each 
                                                 
4 A third victim testified about Coughlin's conduct with 
J.C. and A.F.  His testimony, like J.C.'s and A.F.'s, identified 
conduct both criminal and not criminal but was ambiguous as to 
which conduct occurred when.  Therefore, the jury could not 
infer from this victim's testimony that Coughlin committed 
second-degree sexual assault against either J.C. or A.F. during 
the specific months the State alleged. 
5 Self-masturbation 
is 
covered 
by 
the 
definition 
of 
"sexually explicit conduct" in Wis. Stat. § 948.01(7), but such 
conduct does not constitute second-degree sexual assault unless 
it 
also 
meets 
the 
definition 
of 
"sexual 
contact" 
in 
§ 948.01(5)(a) or "sexual intercourse" in § 948.01(6).  See Wis. 
Stat. § 948.02(2).  Self-masturbation is also likely covered by 
§ 948.10, which makes it a felony for a person to either expose 
his genitals to a child or cause a child to expose the child's 
genitals.  The State, however, charged Coughlin only under 
§ 948.02(1) and (2). 
No.  2019AP1876-CR.rfd 
9 
 
specified time period, Coughlin engaged in sexual contact as 
defined by § 948.01(5)(a).   
¶67 The State failed to meet that burden on all counts.  
For the counts related to J.C., see majority op., ¶9 n.8, the 
prosecutor's questioning regarding the particular time periods 
directly followed a series of questions about whether Coughlin 
had performed oral sex on J.C. or any of the other victims.  
J.C. testified that Coughlin had tried but had not done so.  The 
prosecutor then asked whether "this" happened during the fall of 
1989 (count 7), to which J.C. answered, "yes."  Regarding 
counts 8, 9, and 11, the prosecutor asked J.C. whether "it" 
happened during each of the relevant time periods, to which J.C. 
again answered, "yes."  The only reasonable inference from this 
series of questions is that, during each time period, Coughlin 
asked to perform oral sex on the victims and they refused.  That 
is attempted sexual contact, evidence of which is insufficient 
to support an inference that Coughlin actually engaged in sexual 
contact as defined by § 948.01(5)(a) during the time frames 
relevant to counts 7–9 and 11. 
¶68 To be sure, J.C. testified that Coughlin engaged him 
in some "sexual activity" on a regular basis during the relevant 
time periods.  But "sexual activity" is a broad term undefined 
by statute, and it is not necessarily "sexual contact" as 
defined by § 948.02(2)——a crucial distinction the majority 
ignores.  J.C. testified that he went deer shining with Coughlin 
"a lot of times over the years," and that when he did, he and 
Coughlin would "definitely usually" masturbate: 
No.  2019AP1876-CR.rfd 
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State: And was it each person masturbating themselves 
or would something else happen? 
J.C.: 
[Coughlin] would either masturbate whoever was 
in the front seat, or he would try to, and 
himself. 
State: [W]ould he ask somebody to masturbate him on 
occasions? 
J.C.: 
Yeah.  He would ask, but I never saw anyone 
actually do it. 
State: Okay.  So that never happened when you were 
along? 
J.C.: 
No. 
State: But did you observe him masturbating someone in 
the front seat? 
J.C.: 
Yeah. 
State: Did he ever masturbate you while you were in 
the front seat? 
J.C.: 
Yes. 
State: And [the third victim]? 
J.C.: 
Yes. 
State: And [A.F.]? 
J.C.: 
Yes. 
. . .    
State: Okay.  And how often did you go shining with 
[Coughlin] 
and 
[the 
third 
victim] 
and/or 
[A.F.]? 
J.C.: 
A lot of times over the years.  But I couldn't 
say for sure how many times per given year. 
State: Okay.  Was it something that happened once a 
month, more than once a month, less than on[c]e 
a month? 
J.C.: 
I would say more than once a month during the 
late summer and fall. 
No.  2019AP1876-CR.rfd 
11 
 
State: Okay.  And would it always end up with you guys 
parking 
somewhere 
and 
having 
everybody 
masturbate? 
J.C.: 
Definitely usually. 
This 
testimony, 
which 
is 
representative 
of 
the 
State's 
questioning of the other victims, establishes that some of the 
times that J.C. went deer shining with Coughlin, Coughlin would 
masturbate J.C., which is sexual contact under § 948.01(5)(a) 
and therefore second-degree sexual assault under § 948.02(2).  
Other times, J.C. and Coughlin would each masturbate themselves, 
which is not sexual contact and therefore is not second-degree 
sexual assault.  But there is no evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could infer that the former occurred during the 
narrow time periods associated with counts 7–9 and 11.  It could 
only speculate on that point, which is insufficient to sustain 
the jury's verdict.  See State ex rel. Kanieski v. Gagnon, 54 
Wis. 2d 108, 117, 194 N.W.2d 808 (1972) ("[T]he defendant cannot 
be convicted on mere suspicion or conjecture."). 
¶69 The State's case on the counts regarding A.F., see 
majority op., ¶9 n.9, fares no better.  A.F. testified that 
Coughlin assaulted him in Coughlin's car after shining deer, at 
A.F.'s house, at an industrial business, and at the Lyndon 
Station firehouse.  He testified that the assaults during deer-
shining trips began in 1985——three years before the earliest 
charged time period——and that sometimes Coughlin and A.F. would 
masturbate 
themselves, 
while 
other 
times 
Coughlin 
would 
masturbate A.F.  As for the assaults in the house, A.F. 
testified that they would happen "weekly" and that they would 
"typically" 
involve 
Coughlin 
"watching 
[A.F.] 
masturbate," 
No.  2019AP1876-CR.rfd 
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although "at times" Coughlin would ask A.F. to masturbate him.  
At the industrial business, A.F. testified that, there, Coughlin 
only "asked [A.F.] to masturbate."  And at the firehouse, 
Coughlin "would want to masturbate" after playing pool with A.F. 
¶70 Of those instances, only the times that Coughlin 
masturbated A.F. after shining deer constitute sexual conduct 
for the charge of second-degree sexual assault.  But, per A.F.'s 
testimony, that could have happened as early as 1985, and the 
State never clarified whether that specific conduct occurred 
during the short, specific time periods related to each count 
from 1989 through 1994.  The State's questioning on that point 
was again ambiguous, asking A.F. whether, during the time period 
associated with each count, Coughlin "had [A.F.] engage in some 
type of sexual activity" (emphasis added).  But again, not all 
sexual activity A.F. described is criminal under § 948.02(2).  
Thus, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the State, a reasonable jury could not have found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Coughlin committed second-degree sexual 
assault against A.F. during the specified time periods. 
III 
¶71 Criminal defendants have a high bar to clear when 
challenging their convictions on sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
grounds.  But that standard does not relieve the State of its 
duty to clear the equally high bar of proving a defendant is 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Here, the State failed to do 
so 
regarding 
the 
specific 
time 
periods 
associated 
with 
No.  2019AP1876-CR.rfd 
13 
 
counts 7-9 and 11–22.  Coughlin's convictions must therefore be 
reversed. 
No.  2019AP1876-CR.rfd 
 
 
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