Title: Cassel v. Super. Ct.
Citation: 51 Cal. 4th 113
Docket Number: S178914
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: January 13, 2011

1 
Filed 1/13/11 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
MICHAEL CASSEL, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioner, 
) 
 
 
) 
S178914 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/7 B215215 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS 
) 
ANGELES COUNTY, 
) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Respondent; 
)  
Super. Ct. No. LC070478 
 
 
) 
WASSERMAN, COMDEN,  
) 
CASSELMAN & PEARSON, L.L.P., 
) 
et al., 
 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Real Parties in Interest. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
In order to encourage the candor necessary to a successful mediation, the 
Legislature has broadly provided for the confidentiality of things spoken or written 
in connection with a mediation proceeding.  With specified statutory exceptions, 
neither “evidence of anything said,” nor any “writing,” is discoverable or 
admissible “in any arbitration, administrative adjudication, civil action, or other 
noncriminal proceeding in which . . . testimony can be compelled to be given,” if 
the statement was made, or the writing was prepared, “for the purpose of, in the 
course of, or pursuant to, a mediation . . . .”  (Evid. Code, § 1119, subds. (a), (b).)1  
                                              
1  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Evidence Code. 
2 
“All communications, negotiations, or settlement discussions by and between 
participants in the course of a mediation . . . shall remain confidential.”  (Id., 
subd. (c).)  We have repeatedly said that these confidentiality provisions are clear 
and absolute.  Except in rare circumstances, they must be strictly applied and do 
not permit judicially crafted exceptions or limitations, even where competing 
public policies may be affected.  (Simmons v. Ghaderi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 570, 580 
(Simmons); Fair v. Bakhtiari (2006) 40 Cal.4th 189, 194 (Fair); Rojas v. Superior 
Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 407, 415-416 (Rojas); Foxgate Homeowners’ Assn. v. 
Bramalea California, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1, 13-14, 17 (Foxgate).) 
The issue here is the effect of the mediation confidentiality statutes on 
private discussions between a mediating client and attorneys who represented him 
in the mediation.  Petitioner Michael Cassel agreed in mediation to the settlement 
of business litigation to which he was a party.  He then sued his attorneys for 
malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and breach of contract.  His complaint 
alleged that by bad advice, deception, and coercion, the attorneys, who had a 
conflict of interest, induced him to settle for a lower amount than he had told them 
he would accept, and for less than the case was worth. 
Prior to trial, the defendant attorneys moved, under the statutes governing 
mediation confidentiality, to exclude all evidence of private attorney-client 
discussions immediately preceding, and during, the mediation concerning 
mediation settlement strategies and defendants‟ efforts to persuade petitioner to 
reach a settlement in the mediation.  The trial court granted the motion, but the 
Court of Appeal vacated the trial court‟s order. 
The appellate court majority reasoned that the mediation confidentiality 
statutes are intended to prevent the damaging use against a mediation disputant of 
tactics employed, positions taken, or confidences exchanged in the mediation, not 
to protect attorneys from the malpractice claims of their own clients.  Thus, the 
3 
majority concluded, when a mediation disputant sues his own counsel for 
malpractice in connection with the mediation, the attorneys — already freed, by 
reason of the malpractice suit, from the attorney-client privilege — cannot use 
mediation confidentiality as a shield to exclude damaging evidence of their own 
entirely private conversations with the client.  The dissenting justice urged that the 
majority had crafted an unwarranted judicial exception to the clear and absolute 
provisions of the mediation confidentiality statutes. 
Though we understand the policy concerns advanced by the Court of 
Appeal majority, the plain language of the statutes compels us to agree with the 
dissent.  As we will explain, the result reached by the majority below contravenes 
the Legislature‟s explicit command that, unless the confidentiality of a particular 
communication is expressly waived, under statutory procedures, by all mediation 
“participants,” or at least by all those “participants” by or for whom it was 
prepared (§ 1122, subd. (a)(1), (2)), things said or written “for the purpose of” and 
“pursuant to” a mediation shall be inadmissible in “any . . . civil action.”  (§ 1119, 
subds. (a), (b).)  As the statutes make clear, confidentiality, unless so waived, 
extends beyond utterances or writings “in the course of” a mediation (ibid.), and 
thus is not confined to communications that occur between mediation disputants 
during the mediation proceeding itself. 
We must apply the plain terms of the mediation confidentiality statutes to 
the facts of this case unless such a result would violate due process, or would lead 
to absurd results that clearly undermine the statutory purpose.  No situation that 
extreme arises here.  Hence, the statutes‟ terms must govern, even though they 
may compromise petitioner‟s ability to prove his claim of legal malpractice.  (See 
Foxgate, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1, 17; Wimsatt v. Superior Court (2007) 
152 Cal.App.4th 137, 163 (Wimsatt).)  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment 
of the Court of Appeal. 
4 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On February 3, 2005, petitioner filed a complaint against defendants and 
real parties in interest Wasserman, Comden, Casselman & Pearson, L.L.P., a law 
firm (WCCP), and certain of its members, including attorneys Steve Wasserman 
and David Casselman (hereafter collectively real parties).  (Michael Cassel v. 
Wasserman, Comden, Casselman & Pearson, L.L.P., et al., Super. Ct. L.A. 
County, 2005, No. LC070478.)  The complaint alleged that real parties, 
petitioner‟s retained attorneys, had breached their professional, fiduciary, and 
contractual duties while representing petitioner in a third party dispute over rights 
to the Von Dutch clothing label. 
The complaint asserted the following:  In 1996, petitioner acquired a 
“global master license” (GML) to use the Von Dutch label, and he founded a 
company, Von Dutch Originals, L.L.C. (VDO), to sell clothing under that name.  
In 2002, WCCP began representing petitioner in a dispute over ownership of 
VDO.  Petitioner lost an arbitration resolving that dispute, but the rights to the 
GML were not determined.  Thereafter, petitioner did business in accordance with 
WCCP‟s advice that the GML still entitled him to market clothing under the Von 
Dutch label.  These activities caused VDO to sue petitioner for trademark 
infringement (the VDO suit).  WCCP did not inform petitioner that, in connection 
with the VDO suit, VDO sought a preliminary injunction against his use of the 
Von Dutch label.  When WCCP failed to oppose the injunction request, it was 
granted. 
The complaint continued:  Repeatedly assured by WCCP that the VDO 
injunction applied only within the United States, petitioner struck a deal to market 
Von Dutch clothing in Asia.  Around the same time, Steve Wasserman, a silent 
partner in his son‟s online sales business, persuaded petitioner to provide genuine 
Von Dutch hats for sale through the son‟s business.  Petitioner later learned this 
5 
business was also selling counterfeit Von Dutch goods.  Citing both the Asian 
agreement and the online sales as violations of the VDO injunction, VDO sought a 
finding of contempt against petitioner.  In discovery relating to the VDO suit and 
the contempt motion, VDO deposed Steve Wasserman about the online sales of 
counterfeit Von Dutch merchandise.  Wasserman thus assumed the conflicting 
roles of counsel and witness in the same case. 
Further, the complaint asserted:  A pretrial mediation of the VDO suit 
began at 10:00 a.m. on August 4, 2004.  Petitioner attended the mediation, 
accompanied by his assistant, Michael Paradise, and by WCCP lawyers Steve 
Wasserman, David Casselman, and Thomas Speiss.  Petitioner and his attorneys 
had previously agreed he would take no less than $2 million to resolve the VDO 
suit by assigning his GML rights to VDO.  However, after hours of mediation 
negotiations, petitioner was finally told VDO would pay no more than $1.25 
million.  Though he felt increasingly tired, hungry, and ill, his attorneys insisted he 
remain until the mediation was concluded, and they pressed him to accept the 
offer, telling him he was “greedy” to insist on more.  At one point, petitioner left 
to eat, rest, and consult with his family, but Speiss called and told petitioner he had 
to come back.  Upon his return, his lawyers continued to harass and coerce him to 
accept a $1.25 million settlement.  They threatened to abandon him at the 
imminently pending trial, misrepresented certain significant terms of the proposed 
settlement, and falsely assured him they could and would negotiate a side deal that 
would recoup deficits in the VDO settlement itself.  They also falsely said they 
would waive or discount a large portion of his $188,000 legal bill if he accepted 
VDO‟s offer.  They even insisted on accompanying him to the bathroom, where 
they continued to “hammer” him to settle.  Finally, at midnight, after 14 hours of 
mediation, when he was exhausted and unable to think clearly, the attorneys 
presented a written draft settlement agreement and evaded his questions about its 
6 
complicated terms.  Seeing no way to find new counsel before trial, and believing 
he had no other choice, he signed the agreement. 
In his May 2007 deposition, petitioner testified about meetings with his 
attorneys immediately preceding the mediation, at which mediation strategy was 
discussed, and about conversations with his lawyers, outside the presence of the 
other mediation participants, during the mediation session itself.  Petitioner‟s 
deposition testimony was consistent with the complaint‟s claims that his attorneys 
employed various tactics to keep him at the mediation and to pressure him to 
accept VDO‟s proffered settlement for an amount he and the attorneys had 
previously agreed was too low.  
Thereafter, real parties moved in limine under the mediation confidentiality 
statutes to exclude all evidence of communications between petitioner and his 
attorneys that were related to the mediation, including matters discussed at the 
premediation meetings and the private communications among petitioner, 
Paradise, and the WCCP lawyers while the mediation was under way.  A hearing 
on the motion took place on April 1 and 2, 2009.  The trial court examined 
petitioner‟s deposition in detail and heard further testimony from David 
Casselman. 
At length, the court ruled that, in addition to information about the conduct 
of the mediation session itself, the following evidence was protected by the 
mediation confidentiality statutes and would not be admissible:  (1) discussions 
between petitioner and WCCP attorneys on April 2, 2004, concerning plans and 
preparations for the mediation, mediation strategy, and amounts petitioner might 
be offered, and would accept, in settlement at the mediation; (2) similar 
discussions between petitioner and WCCP attorneys on April 3, 2004; (3) all 
private communications among petitioner, Paradise, and WCCP attorneys on 
April 4, 2004, during the mediation, concerning (a) the progress of the session, 
7 
(b) settlement offers made, (c) petitioner‟s departure from the mediation over the 
objection of WCCP attorneys and their efforts to secure his return, 
(d) recommendations by WCCP lawyers that petitioner accept VDO‟s $1.25 
million offer, (e) their accusations that he was “greedy” for considering $5 million 
as an appropriate amount, (f) who would try the case if petitioner did not settle the 
VDO suit, (g) a possible deal, if petitioner settled, to acquire an interest in VDO 
for him through the pending divorce of VDO‟s owner, and (h) WCCP‟s 
willingness to reduce its fees if petitioner settled the suit.  The court also ruled 
inadmissible, as communicative conduct, the act of a WCCP attorney in 
accompanying petitioner to the bathroom during the mediation. 
Petitioner sought mandate.  The Court of Appeal issued an order to show 
cause why the trial court‟s order should not be vacated.  After real parties filed a 
return to the petition, and petitioner filed a reply, the Court of Appeal granted 
mandamus relief. 
The majority reasoned as follows:  The mediation confidentiality statutes 
do not extend to communications between a mediation participant and his or her 
own attorneys outside the presence of other participants in the mediation.  The 
purpose of mediation confidentiality is to allow the disputing parties in a 
mediation to engage in candid discussions with each other about their respective 
positions, and the strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases, without fear 
that the matters thereby disclosed will later be used against them.  This protection 
was not intended to prevent a client from proving, through private 
communications outside the presence of all other mediation participants, a case of 
legal malpractice against the client‟s own lawyers.  Moreover, a mediation 
disputant and the disputant‟s attorneys are a single mediation “participant” for 
purposes of the mediation confidentiality statutes.  Thus, an attorney cannot block 
the client‟s disclosure of private attorney-client communications by refusing, as a 
8 
separate “participant,” to waive any mediation confidentiality that might otherwise 
apply.  (See § 1122, subd. (a)(2).)  Were this not so, the mediation confidentiality 
statutes would unfairly hamper a malpractice action by overriding the waiver of 
the attorney-client privilege that occurs by operation of law when a client sues 
lawyers for malpractice.  (See § 958.) 
In dissent, Presiding Justice Perluss argued that the majority had crafted a 
forbidden judicial exception to the clear requirements of mediation confidentiality.  
The dissent reasoned as follows:  By their plain terms, subdivisions (a) and (b) of 
section 1119 do not simply protect oral or written communications “in the course 
of” mediation — i.e., those made to the mediator, to other mediation disputants, or 
to persons participating in the mediation on behalf of such other disputants.  
Instead, the statutes also include within their protection communications made 
“for the purpose of” mediation.  Thus, even unilateral mediation-related 
discussions between a disputant and the disputant‟s own attorneys are confidential.  
Moreover, unless all mediation participants waive confidentiality, the protection 
applies even if the communications do not reveal anything about the content of the 
mediation proceedings themselves.  The latter conclusion flows from section 1122, 
subdivision (a)(2), which allows fewer than all participants in the mediation to 
waive, by an express writing or recorded oral statement, the confidentiality of an 
oral or written communication prepared solely for their benefit, but only if the 
communication “does not disclose anything said or done . . . in the course of the 
mediation.”  Applying the mediation confidentiality statutes in accordance with 
their plain meaning to protect private mediation-related discussions between a 
mediation disputant and the disputant‟s attorneys may indeed hinder the client‟s 
ability to prove a legal malpractice claim against the lawyers.  However, it is for 
the Legislature, not the courts, to balance the competing policy concerns. 
We granted review. 
9 
DISCUSSION2 
As below, real parties urge that under the plain language of the mediation 
confidentiality statutes, their mediation-related discussions with petitioner are 
inadmissible in his malpractice action against them, even if those discussions 
occurred in private, away from any other mediation participant.  Petitioner 
counters that the mediation confidentiality statutes do not protect such private 
attorney-client communications — even if they occurred in connection with a 
mediation — against the client‟s claims that the attorneys committed legal 
malpractice .  As we will explain, we agree with real parties.3 
Pursuant to recommendations of the California Law Revision Commission, 
the Legislature adopted the current version of the mediation confidentiality 
statutes in 1997.  (Simmons, supra, 44 Cal.4th 570, 578.)  The statutory purpose is 
to encourage the use of mediation by promoting “ „ “a candid and informal 
exchange regarding events in the past . . . .  This frank exchange is achieved only 
                                              
2  
John and Deborah Blair Porter have submitted an amicus curiae brief on 
behalf of petitioner.  The Association of Southern California Defense Counsel has 
submitted an amicus curiae brief on behalf of real parties. 
 
3  
As the Court of Appeal majority declared, “The question presented is 
whether, as a matter of law, mediation confidentiality requires exclusion of 
conversations and conduct solely between a client, [petitioner], and his attorneys, 
[WCCP], on August 2, 3, and 4, 2004[,] during meetings in which they were the 
sole participants and which were held outside the presence of any opposing party 
or [the] mediator.”  (Italics added.)  Thus, we need not, and do not, review the trial 
court‟s factual determinations that the communications it excluded from discovery 
and evidence were mediation related, and thus within the purview of the 
mediation confidentiality statutes.  As the Court of Appeal dissent pointed out, 
petitioner “does not argue . . . that the trial court abused its discretion in 
concluding, after carefully reviewing each of the statements at issue here, that they 
were materially related to the mediation . . . , and that issue is not properly before 
us.”  We frame our discussion accordingly. 
10 
if the participants know that what is said in the mediation will not be used to their 
detriment through later court proceedings and other adjudicatory processes.”  
[Citations.]‟  (Foxgate[, supra,] 26 Cal.4th 1, 14 . . . .)”  (Simmons, supra, at p. 
578.)  
Section 1119 governs the general admissibility of oral and written 
communications generated during the mediation process.  Subdivision (a) provides 
in pertinent part that “[n]o evidence of anything said or any admission made for 
the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation . . . is admissible or 
subject to discovery, and disclosure of the evidence shall not be compelled, in any 
. . . civil action . . . .”  (Italics added.)  Subdivision (b) similarly bars discovery or 
admission in evidence of any “writing . . . prepared for the purpose of, in the 
course of, or pursuant to, a mediation . . . .”  Subdivision (c) of section 1119 
further provides that “[a]ll communications, negotiations, or settlement 
discussions by and between participants in the course of a mediation . . . shall 
remain confidential.”  (Italics added.)  Exceptions are made for oral or written 
settlement agreements reached in mediation if the statutory requirements for 
disclosure are met.  (§§ 1118, 1123, 1124; see Simmons, supra, 44 Cal.4th 570, 
579.) 
Under section 1122, “participants” in the mediation may, by the means set 
forth in the statute, waive, at least in part, the confidentiality of otherwise 
protected mediation-related communications.  Subdivision (a)(1) of section 1122 
provides that all “who . . . participate” in a mediation may “expressly agree in 
writing,” or orally if statutory requirements are met, “to disclosure of [a] 
communication, document, or writing.”  Subdivision (a)(2) provides that if a 
“communication, document, or writing was prepared by or on behalf of fewer than 
all of the mediation participants, those participants [may] expressly agree in 
writing,” or orally if statutory requirements are met, to disclosure of the 
11 
communication, document, or writing, so long as “the communication, document, 
or writing does not disclose anything said or done . . . in the course of the 
mediation.”  (Italics added.) 
As noted above, the purpose of these provisions is to encourage the 
mediation of disputes by eliminating a concern that things said or written in 
connection with such a proceeding will later be used against a participant.  
“Toward that end, „the statutory scheme . . . unqualifiedly bars disclosure of 
communications made during mediation absent an express statutory exception.‟ ”  
(Fair, supra, 40 Cal.4th 189, 194, quoting Foxgate, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1, 15.)  
Judicial construction, and judicially crafted exceptions, are permitted only where 
due process is implicated, or where literal construction would produce absurd 
results, thus clearly violating the Legislature‟s presumed intent.  Otherwise, the 
mediation confidentiality statutes must be applied in strict accordance with their 
plain terms.  Where competing policy concerns are present, it is for the Legislature 
to resolve them.  (Simmons, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 582-583; Foxgate, supra, at 
pp. 14-17.) 
Thus, in Foxgate, we concluded that under the confidentiality provisions of 
section 1119, and under section 1121, which strictly limits the content of 
mediators‟ reports,4 a mediator may not submit to the court, and the court may not 
consider, a report of communications or conduct by a party which the mediator 
believes constituted a failure to comply with an order of the mediator and to 
                                              
4  
Section 1121 provides:  “Neither a mediator nor anyone else may submit to 
a court or other adjudicative body, and a court or other adjudicative body may not 
consider, any report, assessment, evaluation, recommendation, or finding of any 
kind by the mediator concerning a mediation conducted by the mediator, other 
than a report that is mandated by court rule or other law and that states only 
whether an agreement was reached, unless all parties to the mediation expressly 
agree otherwise in writing, or orally in accordance with [s]ection 1118.” 
12 
participate in good faith in the mediation process.  As we noted, the pertinent 
statutes are clear and unambiguous, thus precluding judicially crafted exceptions.  
Even if the failure to allow such a report means there is no sanction for a party‟s 
refusal to cooperate during a mediation, we observed, “the Legislature has 
weighed and balanced the policy that promotes effective mediation by requiring 
confidentiality against a policy that might better encourage good faith participation 
in the mediation process.”  (Foxgate, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1, 17.) 
Moreover, we pointed out, there was no justification to ignore the plain 
statutory language, because a literal interpretation neither undermined clear 
legislative policy nor produced absurd results.  As we explained, the Legislature 
had decided that the candor necessary to successful mediation is promoted by 
shielding mediation participants from the threat that their frank expression of 
views during a mediation might subject them to sanctions based on the claims of 
another party, or the mediator, that they were acting in bad faith.  (Foxgate, supra, 
26 Cal.4th 1, 17.) 
In Rojas, we confirmed that under the plain language of the mediation 
confidentiality statutes, all “writings” “ „prepared for the purpose of, in the course 
of, or pursuant to, a mediation,‟ ” are confidential and protected from discovery.  
(Rojas, supra, 33 Cal.4th 407, 416, quoting § 1119, subd. (b).)  We explained that 
the broad definition of “writings” set forth in section 250, and incorporated by 
express reference into section 1119, subdivision (b), encompasses such materials 
as charts, diagrams, information compilations, expert reports, photographs of 
physical conditions, recordings or transcriptions of witness statements, and written 
or recorded analyses of physical evidence.  (Rojas, at p. 416.)  We agreed that 
direct physical evidence itself is not protected, even if presented in a mediation, 
because such evidence is not a “writing.”  (§§ 250, 1119, subd. (b).)  We also 
acknowledged that a “writing” is not protected “solely by reason of its 
13 
introduction or use in a mediation.”  (§ 1120, subd. (a).)  However, we stressed 
that any “writing” is so shielded if that “writing” was prepared in connection with 
a mediation.  (Rojas, supra, at p. 417.) 
Rojas further made clear that the nondiscoverability of writings prepared 
for mediation, unlike the shield otherwise provided for certain attorney work 
product, is not subject to a “good cause” exception, based on “prejudice” or 
“injustice” to the party seeking discovery.  (Code Civ. Proc., former § 2018, 
subd. (b); see now id., § 2018.030, subd. (b) [attorney work product, other than 
writings reflecting “attorney‟s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal 
research or theories” (id., subd. (a)), is discoverable if court finds “that denial of 
discovery will unfairly prejudice the party seeking discovery . . . or will result in 
an injustice”].)  The mediation confidentiality statutes, we pointed out, include no 
similar “good cause” limitation, and courts are thus not free to balance the 
importance of mediation confidentiality against a party‟s need for the materials 
sought.  (Rojas, supra, 33 Cal.4th 407, 414, 423-424.) 
In Fair, we construed subdivision (b) of section 1123, which permits 
disclosure of a written settlement agreement reached in mediation if, among other 
things, “ „[t]he agreement provides that it is enforceable or binding or words to 
that effect.‟ ”  (Italics added.)  “In order to preserve the confidentiality required to 
protect the mediation process and provide clear drafting guidelines,” we held that, 
to satisfy section 1123, subdivision (b), the written agreement “must directly 
express the parties‟ agreement to be bound by the document they sign.”  (Fair, 
supra, 40 Cal.4th 189, 197, italics added.)  Thus, the writing must include, on its 
face, “a statement that it is „enforceable‟ or „binding,‟ or a declaration in other 
terms with the same meaning.”  (Id., at pp. 199-200, italics added.)  The mere 
inclusion of “terms unambiguously signifying the parties‟ intent to be bound” (id., 
at p. 197, italics added) will not suffice (id., at p. 200). 
14 
We further determined in Fair that a written settlement reached in 
mediation cannot be made admissible by virtue of extrinsic evidence of a party‟s 
intent to be bound, such as a representation in court by that party‟s attorney that a 
final, enforceable agreement was reached in mediation.  As we explained, section 
1123, subdivision (b) “is designed to produce documents that clearly reflect the 
parties‟ agreement that the settlement terms are „enforceable or binding.‟ ”  (Fair, 
supra, 40 Cal.4th 189, 198.) 
In reaching these conclusions, we noted that a tentative working document 
produced in mediation may include terms, such as an arbitration provision, 
“without reflecting an actual agreement to be bound.  If such a typical settlement 
provision were to trigger admissibility, parties might inadvertently give up the 
protection of mediation confidentiality during their negotiations over the terms of 
settlement.”  (Fair, supra, 40 Cal.4th 189, 198.)  Durable settlements, we 
explained, are more likely to result “if [section 1123, subdivision (b)] is applied to 
require language directly reflecting the parties‟ awareness that they are executing 
an „enforceable or binding‟ agreement.”  (Fair, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 198.) 
Most recently, in Simmons, we held that the judicial doctrines of equitable 
estoppel and implied waiver are not valid exceptions to the strict technical 
requirements set forth in the mediation confidentiality statutes for the disclosure 
and admissibility of oral settlement agreements reached in mediation.  (§§ 1118, 
1122, subd. (a), 1124.)  Thus, we determined, when the plaintiffs sued to enforce 
an oral mediation agreement the defendant had refused to sign,5 the plaintiffs 
                                              
5  
Except where confidentiality has been waived (§ 1124, subd. (b); see fn. 6, 
post), or where disclosure is necessary to show fraud, illegality or duress (§ 1124, 
subd. (c)), an oral agreement reached in mediation is inadmissible and protected 
from disclosure (§ 1119, subds. (a), (b)) unless all of the following requirements 
are satisfied:  (1) the oral agreement is transcribed by a court reporter, or recorded 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
15 
could not claim the defendant‟s pretrial disclosure of the agreement for litigation 
purposes estopped her from invoking the mediation confidentiality statutes, or 
constituted a waiver of their requirements.6 
We affirmed once again in Simmons that the Legislature intended the 
unambiguous provisions of the mediation confidentiality statutes to be applied 
broadly (Simmons, supra, 44 Cal.4th 570, 580), that exceptions are limited to 
narrowly proscribed statutory exemptions, and that “[e]xcept in cases of express 
waiver or where due process is implicated” (id., at p. 582; see Foxgate, supra, 
26 Cal.4th 1, 15-17; Rinaker v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 155, 167 
(Rinaker) [mediator required to testify where juvenile‟s due process right to 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
by a reliable means of sound recording (§ 1118, subd. (a)), (2) the agreement‟s 
terms are recited on the record, in the presence of all parties and the mediator, and 
the parties state on the record they agree to the terms recited (id., subd. (b)), (3) the 
parties to the agreement “expressly state on the record that the agreement is 
enforceable, or binding or words to that effect” (id., subd. (c)), and (4) the 
transcription or recording is reduced to writing and signed by the parties within 72 
hours after it is recorded (id., subd. (d)).  (See § 1124.) 
 
6  
As noted above, a communication or writing “made or prepared for the 
purpose of, or in the course of, or pursuant to” a mediation may be disclosed or 
admitted in evidence if (1) all participants in the mediation expressly so agree in 
writing, or orally as prescribed in section 1118 (§ 1122, subd. (a)(1)), or (2) the 
communication or writing was prepared “by or on behalf of fewer than all the 
mediation participants,” those participants expressly so agree in writing, or orally 
as prescribed in section 1118, and “the communication . . . or writing does not 
disclose anything said or done or any admission made in the course of the 
mediation” (§ 1122, subd. (a)(2)).  An oral agreement made “in the course of, or 
pursuant to, a mediation” is not inadmissible or protected from disclosure if the 
agreement satisfies the requirements of subdivisions (a), (b), and (d) of section 
1118 (see fn. 5, ante), “and all parties to the agreement expressly agree, in writing 
or orally in accordance with Section 1118, to disclosure of the agreement.”  
(§ 1124, subd. (b).) 
16 
confront witnesses outweighed mediation confidentiality]; Olam v. Congress 
Mortg. Co. (N.D.Cal. 1999) 68 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1118-1119, 1129 [parties 
expressly waived confidentiality]), mediation confidentiality must be strictly 
enforced, even where competing policy considerations are present. 
We determined that Simmons, “[l]ike Foxgate and Rojas, . . . [did] not 
implicate any due process right equivalent to the right bestowed by the 
confrontation clause of the United States Constitution, nor ha[d] the parties 
executed express waivers of confidentiality.”  (Simmons, supra, 44 Cal.4th at 
p. 583.)  Accordingly, we concluded that litigation conduct by the defendant, not 
meeting the technical requirements for the disclosure of an agreement reached in 
mediation, neither estopped her from invoking mediation confidentiality nor 
constituted an implied waiver of such confidentiality.  (Id. at pp. 582-588; accord: 
Eisendrath v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 351, 360-365 (Eisendrath) 
[no implied waiver by conduct].) 
Here, as in Foxgate, Rojas, Fair, and Simmons, the plain language of the 
mediation confidentiality statutes controls our result.  Section 1119, subdivision 
(a) clearly provides that “[n]o evidence of anything said or any admission made 
for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation . . . is admissible or 
subject to discovery . . . .”  As we noted in Simmons, section 1119, adopted in 
1997, “is more expansive than its predecessor, former section 1152.5.  Section 
1119, subdivision (a), extends to oral communications made for the purpose of or 
pursuant to a mediation, not just to oral communications made in the course of the 
mediation.  [Citation.]”  (Simmons, supra, 44 Cal.4th 570, 581, italics added, 
citing Cal. Law Revision Com. com., now reprinted at 29B pt. 3B West‟s Ann. 
Evid. Code (2009 ed.) foll. § 1119, p. 391.) 
The obvious purpose of the expanded language is to ensure that the 
statutory protection extends beyond discussions carried out directly between the 
17 
opposing parties to the dispute, or with the mediator, during the mediation 
proceedings themselves.  All oral or written communications are covered, if they 
are made “for the purpose of” or “pursuant to” a mediation.  (§ 1119, subds. (a), 
(b).)  It follows that, absent an express statutory exception, all discussions 
conducted in preparation for a mediation, as well as all mediation-related 
communications that take place during the mediation itself, are protected from 
disclosure.  Plainly, such communications include those between a mediation 
disputant and his or her own counsel, even if these do not occur in the presence of 
the mediator or other disputants.7 
                                              
7  
At oral argument, petitioner‟s counsel stressed that section 1119, 
subdivision (a) prohibits the discovery or admission in evidence “of anything said 
or any admission made for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a 
mediation . . . .”  (Italics added.)  Counsel seemed to suggest the italicized phrase 
“or any admission made” effectively narrows the plain meaning of “anything said” 
by limiting protection to mediation-related oral communications that are in the 
nature of damaging admissions.  We find no evidence to support this construction.  
Similar disjunctive language has existed in the statute since the 1985 adoption of 
section 1119, subdivision (a)‟s predecessor, former section 1152.5, subdivision (a) 
(Stats. 1985, ch. 731, p. 2379), and appeared in the original version of the 1985 
bill (see Assem. Bill No. 1030 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 27, 
1985, p.  1 (Assembly Bill No. 1030)).  Portions of the legislative history of 
Assembly Bill No. 1030 declare that the protective purpose extends, 
interchangeably, to “disclosures,” “information,” and “communications.”  
(Recommendation relating to Protection of Mediation Communications, 11 Cal. L. 
Revision Com. Rep. (1985) pp. 241, 247-248, Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis 
of Assem. Bill No. 1030 as amended Apr. 8, 1985, pp. 1, 2; Sen. Com. on 
Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1030 as amended July 1, 1985, pp. 1-3.)  
However, petitioner cites no document from this history, and we have found none, 
that indicates the phrase “or any admission made” was intended, in particular, to 
limit the plain meaning of “anything said.”  Nor does the history of the 1997 
legislation that was enacted as the current statutes suggest any such significance.  
On the contrary, as previously noted, the California Law Revision Commission 
comment to section 1119, subdivision (a) emphasizes that this provision was 
intended to broaden the protection for mediation-related discussions by extending 
it beyond utterances “in the course” of a mediation to include “oral 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
18 
This conclusion is reinforced by examination of section 1122, subdivision 
(a)(2), which sets forth the circumstances under which fewer than all of the 
participants in a mediation may stipulate to the disclosure of otherwise 
confidential mediation-related communications.  Under this statute, those 
mediation participants “by or on [whose] behalf” a mediation-related 
communication, document, or writing was prepared may agree, under specified 
statutory procedures, to its disclosure, but only insofar as the communication in 
question “does not [reveal] anything said or done . . . in the course of the 
mediation.”  (Italics added.)  Section 1122, subdivision (a)(2) thus presupposes 
there are mediation-related communications that (1) are prepared “by or on behalf 
of fewer than all the mediation participants,” and (2) do not “disclose anything 
said or done . . . in the course of the mediation,” but (3) are nonetheless protected 
by mediation confidentiality unless the affected participants otherwise agree.  
(Ibid.)  Logically, these must include communications that are made or prepared 
outside a mediation, but are “for the purpose of” or “pursuant to” the mediation.  
(§ 1119, subds. (a), (b).)  Such mediation-related communications plainly 
encompass those between a mediation disputant and the disputant‟s counsel, even 
though these occur away from other mediation participants and reveal nothing 
about the mediation proceedings themselves. 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
communications made for the purpose of or pursuant to a mediation.”  (Cal. Law 
Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 3B West‟s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 1119, 
p. 391, italics added.)  In this context, the phrase “anything said or any admission 
made” seems intended, at most, to indicate that the protection applies not only to 
damaging admissions conveyed by any means in the context of a mediation, but 
also, in an abundance of caution, to all other things “said . . . for the purpose of, in 
the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation . . . .”  (§ 1119, subd. (a), italics added.) 
19 
Agreeing with petitioner‟s contrary contention, the Court of Appeal 
majority noted that mediation is defined as “a process in which a neutral person or 
persons facilitate communication between the disputants to assist them in reaching 
a mutually acceptable agreement.”  (§ 1115, subd. (a), italics added.)  The majority 
thus reasoned that the “[l]egislative intent and policy behind mediation 
confidentiality are to facilitate communication by a party that otherwise the party 
would not provide, given the potential for another party to the mediation to use the 
information against the revealing party; they are not to facilitate communication 
between a party and his own attorney.”  (Italics added.)  Focusing on our statement 
in Foxgate that the frank exchange essential to a successful mediation “ „is 
achieved only if the participants know that what is said in the mediation will not 
be used to their detriment through later court proceedings and other adjudicatory 
processes‟ ” (Foxgate, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1, 14, italics added), the majority 
concluded that a party to mediation, and the party‟s attorney, are a single 
mediation “participant” whose communications inter se are not within the 
intended purview of the mediation confidentiality statutes. 
But there is no persuasive basis to equate mediation “parties” or 
“disputants” with mediation “participants,” and thus to restrict confidentiality to 
potentially damaging mediation-related exchanges between disputing parties.  In 
the first place, section 1119, subdivisions (a) and (b), do not restrict confidentiality 
to communications between mediation “participants.”  They provide more broadly 
that “[n]o evidence of anything said” (§ 1119, subd. (a), italics added), and “[n]o 
writing” (id., subd. (b)), is discoverable or admissible in a legal proceeding if the 
utterance or writing was “for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a 
mediation . . . .”   (Id., subds. (a), (b).)  The protection afforded by these statutes is 
not limited by the identity of the communicator, by his or her status as a “party,” 
20 
“disputant,” or “participant” in the mediation itself, by the communication‟s 
nature, or by its specific potential for damage to a disputing party. 
Second, the Court of Appeal majority‟s assumption that the mediation 
“disputants” are the only “participants” in the mediation, and that a disputant and 
his or her counsel are thus a single “participant,” does not bear scrutiny.  
“Participants” are not defined in the statutory text, but they are mentioned at 
several points in the statutory scheme, under circumstances making clear that the 
term “participants” includes more than the mediation parties or disputants. 
Thus, section 1119, subdivision (c) provides that “[a]ll communications, 
negotiations, or settlement discussions by and between participants in the course 
of a mediation . . . shall remain confidential.”  The California Law Revision 
Commission comment following section 1119 states, as to subdivision (c), that 
“[a] mediation is confidential notwithstanding the presence of an observer, such as 
a person evaluating or training the mediator or studying the mediation process.”  
(Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 3B West‟s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. 
§ 1119, p. 391.)  The implication is that such an observer is to be considered a 
“participant” in the mediation, who is obliged to maintain the confidentiality of 
communications in the course of a mediation. 
An even clearer indication of the correct concept of “participants” arises in 
connection with section 1122.  As noted above, section 1122, subdivision (a) 
states the conditions under which agreement can be reached for the disclosure and 
admission in evidence of otherwise confidential materials.  Subdivision (a)(1) 
states that mediation-related communications and writings are not made 
inadmissible, or protected from disclosure, if “[a]ll persons who conduct or 
otherwise participate in the mediation” expressly agree to such disclosure by the 
prescribed statutory means.  Subdivision (a)(2) provides that a communication or 
writing prepared “by or on behalf of fewer than all the mediation participants” is 
21 
not protected from disclosure, or made inadmissible, if “those participants” agree 
to permit disclosure, and the communication or writing “does not disclose 
anything said or done . . . in the course of the mediation.” 
The California Law Revision Commission comment following section 1122 
states, in its analysis of subdivision (a)(1), that “mediation documents and 
communications may be admitted or disclosed only upon agreement of all 
participants, including not only parties but also the mediator and other nonparties 
attending the mediation (e.g., a disputant not involved in litigation, a spouse, an 
accountant, an insurance representative, or an employee of a corporate affiliate).”  
(Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 3B West‟s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. 
§ 1122, p. 409, italics added.)  The list provided by the Commission is, by its 
terms, not all-inclusive (note the “e.g.” preceding the examples given), and no 
reason appears why other persons attending and assisting in the mediation on 
behalf of the disputants, such as their counsel, are not themselves distinct 
“participants” who must agree to the disclosure of confidential mediation-related 
communications they made or received.8  Though petitioner urges us to do so, we 
                                              
8  
As real parties observe, Judicial Council rules governing minimum 
standards of conduct for civil mediators define a “ „[p]articipant‟ ” in mediation as 
“any individual, entity, or group, other than the mediator taking part in a 
mediation, including but not limited to attorneys for the parties.”  (Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 3.852(3), italics added.)  The rules further provide that prior to the first 
mediation session, the mediator must provide the participants with a general 
explanation of mediation confidentiality.  (Id., rule 3.854(c).)  Under the rules, the 
mediator is further required to give all participants advance warning if he or she 
intends to speak with one or more participants outside the other participants‟ 
presence, and is prohibited from disclosing information revealed in confidence 
“unless authorized to do so by the participant or participants who revealed the 
information.”  (Ibid.)  We do not rely directly on the definition of “participant” in 
the Judicial Council rules, however, because the definitions therein provided “are 
applicable only to these rules of conduct and do not limit or expand mediation 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
22 
therefore decline to accept the Court of Appeal‟s “single participant” 
characterization, which contradicts the plain import of the statutes.9 
The Court of Appeal majority also implied that the mediation 
confidentiality statutes, in their role as protectors of frank exchanges between the 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
confidentiality under the Evidence Code or other law.”  (Advisory Com. com., 
23 pt. 1A West‟s Ann. Codes Court Rules (2006 ed.) foll. rule 3.852, p. 424.) 
 
9  
Petitioner urges that even if the attorneys who represent a mediation 
disputant are themselves “participants” in the mediation, they should not be 
deemed separate “participants” who may thus unilaterally block the discovery and 
admission in evidence of mediation-related attorney-client communications 
pertinent to the client‟s suit against them for legal malpractice.  But we see no 
basis to reach this construction of the statutory language.  Section 1122, 
subdivision (a)(2) clearly requires that when a communication was prepared “by 
or on behalf of fewer than all participants, those participants” must expressly 
agree to disclosure of the communication.  (Italics added.)  Any mediation-related 
communications from WCCP attorneys to petitioner were prepared “by” those 
“participant” lawyers, who, under the statutory language, must therefore consent 
by statutory procedures to the disclosure of such communications. 
 
 
Indeed, other provisions of the statute undermine petitioner‟s contention 
that a mediation disputant‟s participating lawyers are bound, as the disputant‟s 
agents, by the disputant‟s unilateral decision to waive confidentiality.  Section 
1115, subdivision (b) defines a “mediator” to include not only the neutral person 
who conducts a mediation, but also “any person designated by [the] mediator 
either to assist in the mediation or to communicate with the participants in 
preparation for [the] mediation.”  In turn, section 1122, subdivision (b) provides 
that whenever a mediator expressly agrees to disclosure of an otherwise 
confidential communication, that agreement also binds the persons described in 
section 1115, subdivision (b).  Insofar as the statutory scheme expressly defines 
one mediation participant (the mediator) to include his or her assisting agents, and 
explicitly binds those agents to the mediator‟s disclosure decision, we may assume 
the statute does not implicitly extend similar treatment to the relationship between 
another mediation participant (a disputant) and the disputant‟s participating 
counsel. 
23 
parties to a mediation, were not intended to trump section 958, which eliminates 
the confidentiality protections otherwise afforded by the attorney-client privilege 
(§ 950 et seq.) in suits between clients and their own lawyers.  But the mediation 
confidentiality statutes include no exception for legal malpractice actions by 
mediation disputants against their own counsel.  Moreover, though both statutory 
schemes involve the shielding of confidential communications, they serve separate 
and unrelated purposes. 
A legal client‟s personal statutory privilege of confidentiality (§§ 953, 954), 
applicable to all communications between client and counsel (§ 952), allows the 
client to consult frankly with counsel on any matter, without fear that others may 
later discover and introduce against the client confidences exchanged in the 
attorney-client relationship.  The exception to the privilege set forth in section 958 
simply acknowledges that, in litigation between lawyer and client, the client 
should not be able to use the privilege to bar otherwise relevant and admissible 
evidence which supports the lawyer‟s claim, or undermines the client‟s. 
By contrast, the mediation confidentiality statutes do not create a 
“privilege” in favor of any particular person.  (See, e.g., Wimsatt, supra, 
152 Cal.App.4th 137, 150, fn. 4; Eisendrath, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th 351, 362-
363; but see, e.g., Stewart v. Preston Pipeline Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1565, 
1572, fn. 5 [referring to a “mediation privilege”].)  Instead, they serve the public 
policy of encouraging the resolution of disputes by means short of litigation.  The 
mediation confidentiality statutes govern only the narrow category of mediation-
related communications, but they apply broadly within that category, and are 
designed to provide maximum protection for the privacy of communications in the 
mediation context.  A principal purpose is to assure prospective participants that 
their interests will not be damaged, first, by attempting this alternative means of 
resolution, and then, once mediation is chosen, by making and communicating the 
24 
candid disclosures and assessments that are most likely to produce a fair and 
reasonable mediation settlement.  To assure this maximum privacy protection, the 
Legislature has specified that all mediation participants involved in a mediation-
related communication must agree to its disclosure. 
Neither the language nor the purpose of the mediation confidentiality 
statutes supports a conclusion that they are subject to an exception, similar to that 
provided for the attorney-client privilege, for lawsuits between attorney and 
client.10  The instant Court of Appeal‟s contrary conclusion is nothing more or less 
than a judicially crafted exception to the unambiguous language of the mediation 
confidentiality statutes in order to accommodate a competing policy concern — 
here, protection of a client‟s right to sue his or her attorney. We and the Courts of 
Appeal have consistently disallowed such exceptions, even where the equities 
appeared to favor them. 
Of particular interest in this regard is the Court of Appeal‟s decision in 
Wimsatt.  There, the court held that mediations briefs and attorney e-mails written 
and sent in connection with the mediation were protected from disclosure by the 
mediation confidentiality statutes, even when one of the mediation disputants 
                                              
10  
Petitioner urges that if mediation confidentiality applies to private 
conversations between lawyer and client, insofar as they relate to a mediation, the 
attorneys get the best of both worlds when sued by a client for malpractice in 
connection with the mediation — i.e., the suit waives the attorney-client privilege, 
allowing the lawyers to present confidential communications favorable to them, 
but the mediation confidentiality statutes prevent the client from presenting 
evidence of such private discussions insofar as they are damaging to the attorneys.  
Petitioner overlooks that the mediation confidentiality statutes work both ways; 
they prevent either party to the malpractice suit from disclosing the content of 
their private mediation-related communications unless (1) the other agrees by the 
statutory means, and (2) the disclosure reveals nothing said or done in the 
mediation proceedings themselves. 
25 
sought these materials in support of his legal malpractice action against his own 
attorneys.  Confirming that there is no “attorney malpractice” exception to 
mediation confidentiality, the Wimsatt court explained: “Our Supreme Court has 
clearly and [unequivocally] stated that we may not craft exceptions to mediation 
confidentiality.  [Citation.]  The Court has also stated that if an exception is to be 
made for legal misconduct, it is for the Legislature to do, and not the courts.  
[Citation.]”  (Wimsatt, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th 137, 163.)  As the court in Wimsatt 
acknowledged, “[t]he stringent result we reach here means that when clients, such 
as [the malpractice plaintiff in that case], participate in mediation they are, in 
effect, relinquishing all claims for new and independent torts arising from 
mediation, including legal malpractice causes of action against their own counsel.”  
(Ibid.) 
The instant Court of Appeal majority reasoned that Wimsatt‟s facts were 
distinguishable, because there, communications between counsel for the disputants 
were at issue, whereas here, the communications sought occurred only between 
petitioner and his own counsel.  However, as we have explained, the language of 
the mediation confidentiality statutes extends beyond the narrow circumstances at 
issue in Wimsatt; it plainly includes every oral or written communication by any 
person that occurs “for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a 
mediation.”  (§ 1119, subds. (a), (b).)  As Wimsatt correctly determined, that broad 
rule does not become inapplicable in cases where a client seeks disclosure of the 
confidential communication as evidence in a legal malpractice action against his 
or her attorneys. 
A United States District Court case, Benesch v. Green (N.D.Cal. 2009) 
2009 WL 4885215 (Benesch), more recent than the Court of Appeal decision in 
this case, supports our analysis even more closely than does Wimsatt.  In Benesch, 
a mediation disputant sued her attorney, claiming counsel committed malpractice 
26 
by inducing her, in the mediation, to sign an enforceable “Term Sheet” that failed 
to meet her aim of ensuring her daughter‟s inheritance rights.  Defendant attorney 
sought summary judgment, asserting that the client had no case without 
introducing evidence protected by the mediation confidentiality statutes, including 
“the legal advice that [counsel] gave to [the client], and the circumstances in 
which the Term Sheet was executed.”  (Id., at p. *5.) 
The district court denied summary judgment, ruling that it was not 
absolutely clear the mediation confidentiality statutes left the client without 
evidence sufficient to prove her case.  Nonetheless, the court agreed that the 
multiple California cases construing the mediation confidentiality statutes, 
including Wimsatt, “generally support Defendant‟s position” that mediation-
related communications, including those only between client and counsel, are not 
subject to disclosure, even when this may inhibit a client‟s claim that her lawyer 
committed malpractice.  (Benesch, supra, 2009 WL 4885215, *5.) 
In particular, Benesch criticized the instant Court of Appeal majority‟s 
decision as at odds with section 1119, subdivision (a), contrary to the rule against 
implied exceptions to mediation confidentiality, and “in significant tension with 
the large majority of California appellate decisions” construing the mediation 
confidentiality statutes.  (Benesch, supra, 2009 WL 4885215, *7.)  As the district 
court observed, even if a private attorney-client conversation did not occur “in the 
course of” a mediation, this circumstance is not enough to exempt the 
communication from confidentiality, because the statutory “protections also 
encompass communications made „for the purpose of‟ or „pursuant to‟ mediation 
. . . .”  (Ibid.)  The latter phrases, the court explained, “must necessarily include 
statements that were not made in the course of the mediation itself, or those 
additional provisions would be superfluous.”  (Ibid.) 
27 
As pertinent here, the Benesch court declared, “Communications between 
counsel and client that are materially related to the mediation, even if they are not 
made to another party or the mediator, are „for the purpose of‟ or „pursuant to‟ 
mediation.”  (Benesch, supra, 2009 WL 4885215, *7.)  Indeed, the court noted, if 
protected communications did not include those outside the mediation 
proceedings, it would be unnecessary and useless for section 1122, subdivision 
(a)(2) to provide that communications by and between fewer than all participants 
in a mediation may be disclosed if all such participants agree and “ „the 
communication . . . does not disclose anything said or done . . . in the course of 
mediation.‟ ”  (Benesch, supra, at p. *7.) 
We agree with this analysis.  We further emphasize that application of the 
mediation confidentiality statutes to legal malpractice actions does not implicate 
due process concerns so fundamental that they might warrant an exception on 
constitutional grounds.  Implicit in our decisions in Foxgate, Rojas, Fair, and 
Simmons is the premise that the mere loss of evidence pertinent to the prosecution 
of a lawsuit for civil damages does not implicate such a fundamental interest. 
The Court of Appeal in Wimsatt expressly reached this very conclusion.  
There, the trial court had found that the mediation briefs and e-mails sought by the 
legal malpractice plaintiff were subject to disclosure notwithstanding the 
mediation confidentiality statutes.  The court had relied on Rinaker, supra, 
62 Cal.App.4th 155, which held that, under the circumstances of that case, the 
statutes governing mediation confidentiality were outweighed by juveniles‟ 
constitutional right to obtain evidence crucial to their defense against allegations 
of criminal conduct. 
However, in Wimsatt, the Court of Appeal rejected the analogy to Rinaker, 
explaining that “in Rinaker the information sought to be introduced was in 
delinquency proceedings where the minors were being charged with criminal 
28 
activity.  In Rinaker, the information to be elicited (admissions made by the 
victim) could have exonerated the minors.  To deny the minors access to the 
information would have denied them their constitutionally protected rights.  In 
contrast, the proceedings before us involve a civil legal malpractice action where 
money damages are sought.  The present case is no different from the thousands of 
civil cases routinely resolved through mediation.”  (Wimsatt, supra, 
152 Cal.App.4th 137, 162.)11 
Finally, while we pass no judgment on the wisdom of the mediation 
confidentiality statutes, we cannot say that applying the plain terms of those 
statutes to the circumstances of this case produces a result that is either absurd or 
clearly contrary to legislative intent.  The Legislature decided that the 
encouragement of mediation to resolve disputes requires broad protection for the 
confidentiality of communications exchanged in relation to that process, even 
where this protection may sometimes result in the unavailability of valuable civil 
evidence.  To this end, the Legislature could further reasonably conclude that 
confidentiality should extend to “anything” said or written “for the purpose of, in 
the course of, or pursuant to” a mediation (§ 1119, subds. (a), (b)), including 
mediation-related discussions between a mediation disputant and his own counsel, 
subject only to express waiver by all mediation “participants” involved in the 
communication (§ 1122), including such attorneys. 
                                              
11  
Indeed, by their plain terms, section 1119, subdivisions (a) and (b), protect 
mediation-related communications from disclosure and admissibility only in 
“arbitration[s], administrative adjudication[s], civil action[s] [and] other 
noncriminal proceeding[s] . . . .”  (Italics added.)  Thus, we note, these statutes 
would afford no protection to an attorney who is criminally prosecuted for fraud 
on the basis of mediation-related oral communications. 
29 
Inclusion of private attorney-client discussions in the mediation 
confidentiality scheme addresses several issues about which the Legislature could 
rationally be concerned.  At the outset, the Legislature might determine, such an 
inclusion gives maximum assurance that disclosure of an ancillary mediation-
related communication will not, perhaps inadvertently, breach the confidentiality 
of the mediation proceedings themselves, to the damage of one of the mediation 
disputants. 
Moreover, as real parties observe, the Legislature might reasonably believe 
that protecting attorney-client conversations in this context facilitates the use of 
mediation as a means of dispute resolution by allowing frank discussions between 
a mediation disputant and the disputant‟s counsel about the strengths and 
weaknesses of the case, the progress of negotiations, and the terms of a fair 
settlement, without concern that the things said by either the client or the lawyers 
will become the subjects of later litigation against either.  The Legislature also 
could rationally decide that it would not be fair to allow a client to support a 
malpractice claim with excerpts from private discussions with counsel concerning 
the mediation, while barring the attorneys from placing such discussions in context 
by citing communications within the mediation proceedings themselves. 
We express no view about whether the statutory language, thus applied, 
ideally balances the competing concerns or represents the soundest public policy.  
Such is not our responsibility or our province.  We simply conclude, as a matter of 
statutory construction, that application of the statutes‟ plain terms to the 
circumstances of this case does not produce absurd results that are clearly contrary 
to the Legislature‟s intent.  Of course, the Legislature is free to reconsider whether 
the mediation confidentiality statutes should preclude the use of mediation-related 
attorney-client discussions to support a client‟s civil claims of malpractice against 
his or her attorneys. 
30 
Finally, petitioner urges that application of the mediation confidentiality 
statutes to private attorney-client communications creates a difficult line-drawing 
problem because, when such discussions occur near the time of a mediation 
proceeding but in a broader litigation context, it may be “almost impossible” to 
determine whether the discussions were “exclusively” mediation related.  But 
petitioner‟s suggested alternative — that no private attorney-client 
communications, however closely related to a mediation, are covered by mediation 
confidentiality — ignores the plain language of the statutes.  By their terms, “[n]o 
evidence of anything said,” and “[n]o writing . . . prepared” is subject to discovery 
or admission in evidence in any “civil action” if the utterance or writing was “for 
the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation . . . .”  (§ 1119, 
subds. (a), (b), italics added.)  The exclusion of all private attorney-client 
communications from that proviso would simply engraft an exception that does 
not appear in the mediation confidentiality statutes themselves. 
Moreover, we need not decide in this case the precise parameters of the 
phrase “for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation.”  The 
communications the trial court excluded from discovery and evidence concerned 
the settlement strategy to be pursued at an immediately pending mediation.  They 
were closely related to the mediation in time, context, and subject matter, and a 
number of them occurred during, and in direct pursuit of, the mediation 
proceeding itself.  Petitioner raises no factual dispute about the relationship 
between the excluded communications, or any of them, and the mediation in 
which he was involved.  There appears no basis to dispute that they were “for the 
31 
purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation . . . .”  (§ 1119, 
subd. (a).)12 
We therefore conclude that the evidence the trial court ruled 
nondiscoverable and inadmissible by reason of the mediation confidentiality 
statutes was not, as a matter of law, excluded from coverage by those statutes on 
the mere ground that they were private attorney-client communications which 
occurred outside the presence or hearing of the mediator or any other mediation 
participant.  Instead, such attorney-client communications, like any other 
communications, were confidential, and therefore were neither discoverable nor 
admissible — even for purposes of proving a claim of legal malpractice — insofar 
as they were “for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation . . . .”  
                                              
12  
Petitioner suggests private attorney-client communications cannot be 
covered by the mediation confidentiality statutes, because they are not part of the 
“mediation process.”  In support of this contention, petitioner cites Saeta v. 
Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 261 for the proposition that the concept of 
“mediation” has limits.  Saeta held that the mediation confidentiality statutes did 
not apply to the proceedings of a “termination review board” before which a 
discharged employee had a contractual entitlement to review of the termination 
decision.  The board was composed of an employer representative, an employee 
representative, and a “neutral” third member, and was empowered to take 
evidence, then report to the employer‟s home office its view whether the 
termination should be upheld.  (Id. at p. 265.)  Applying the premise that 
“[statutory] privileges are narrowly construed  . . . because they operate to prevent 
the admission of relevant evidence” (id., at p. 272), the Saeta court observed that 
the board there at issue, which included party representatives, and whose function 
was to review and recommend, lacked two minimum elements of the “broad” 
definition of mediation — “a neutral mediator or group of mediators” and an “aim 
to facilitate a mutually acceptable result” by the parties‟ voluntary agreement (id., 
at p. 271).  Nothing in Saeta is inconsistent with what we conclude here.  No party 
disputes that the proceeding of August 4, 2004, was a mediation, within the 
meaning of section 1115, to attempt to settle the VDO suit.  The only question 
presented is whether certain attorney-client communications were “for the purpose 
of, in the course of, or pursuant to,” that mediation.  (§ 1119, subd. (a).) 
32 
(§ 1119, subd. (a).)  By holding otherwise, and thus overturning the trial court‟s 
exclusionary order, the Court of Appeal erred.  We must therefore reverse the 
Court of Appeal‟s judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeal‟s judgment is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
KENNARD, Acting C.J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
GEORGE, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________ 
* Retired Chief Justice of California, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
 
I concur in the result, but reluctantly. 
The court holds today that private communications between an attorney and 
a client related to mediation remain confidential even in a lawsuit between the 
two.  This holding will effectively shield an attorney‟s actions during mediation, 
including advising the client, from a malpractice action even if those actions are 
incompetent or even deceptive.1  Attorneys participating in mediation will not be 
held accountable for any incompetent or fraudulent actions during that mediation 
unless the actions are so extreme as to engender a criminal prosecution against the 
attorney.  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 28, fn. 11.)  This is a high price to pay to 
preserve total confidentiality in the mediation process. 
I greatly sympathize with the Court of Appeal majority‟s attempt to 
interpret the statutory language as not mandating confidentiality in this situation.  
But, for the reasons the present majority gives, I do not believe the attempt quite 
succeeds. 
Moreover, although we may sometimes depart from literal statutory 
language if a literal interpretation “would result in absurd consequences that the 
                                              
1  
I emphasize that I am not suggesting there was any malpractice or 
deception in this case.  The merits of the underlying lawsuit are not before us and, 
after today‟s ruling, might never come before any court.  I am speaking in general. 
2 
Legislature did not intend” (In re Michele D. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 606), I 
believe, just barely, that the result here does not so qualify.  Plausible policies 
support a literal interpretation.  Unlike the attorney-client privilege — which the 
client alone holds and may waive (Evid. Code, §§ 953, 954) — mediation 
confidentiality implicates interests beyond those of the client.  Other participants 
in the mediation also have an interest in confidentiality.  This interest may extend 
to private communications between the attorney and the client because those 
communications themselves will often disclose what others have said during the 
mediation.  Additionally, as the majority notes, it might “not be fair to allow a 
client to support a malpractice claim with excerpts from private discussions with 
counsel concerning the mediation, while barring the attorneys from placing such 
discussions in context by citing communications within the mediation proceedings 
themselves.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 29.) 
Accordingly, I agree with the majority that we have to give effect to the 
literal statutory language.  But I am not completely satisfied that the Legislature 
has fully considered whether attorneys should be shielded from accountability in 
this way.  There may be better ways to balance the competing interests than 
simply providing that an attorney‟s statements during mediation may never be 
disclosed.  For example, it may be appropriate to provide that communications 
during mediation may be used in a malpractice action between an attorney and a 
client to the extent they are relevant to that action, but they may not be used by 
anyone for any other purpose.  Such a provision might sufficiently protect other 
participants in the mediation and also make attorneys accountable for their actions.  
But this court cannot so hold in the guise of interpreting statutes that contain no 
such provision.  As the majority notes, the Legislature remains free to reconsider 
this question.  It may well wish to do so. 
3 
This case does not present the question of what happens if every participant 
in the mediation except the attorney waives confidentiality.  Could the attorney 
even then prevent disclosure so as to be immune from a malpractice action?  I can 
imagine no valid policy reason for the Legislature to shield attorneys even in that 
situation.  I doubt greatly that one of the Legislature‟s purposes in mandating 
confidentiality was to permit attorneys to commit malpractice without 
accountability.  Interpreting the statute to require confidentiality even when 
everyone but the attorney has waived it might well result in absurd consequences 
that the Legislature did not intend.  That question will have to await another case.  
But the Legislature might also want to consider this point. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Cassel v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 179 Cal.App.4th 152 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S178914 
Date Filed: January 13, 2011 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: William A. MacLaughlin 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys: 
 
Makarem & Associates, Ronald W. Makarem, Peter M. Kunstler, Jamie R. Greene; Mink Law Firm and 
Lyle R. Mink for Petitioner. 
 
Sauer & Wagner, Gerald L. Sauer and Laurie B. Hiller for John Porter and Deborah Blair as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Haight Brown & Bonesteel, Peter Q. Ezzel, Nancy E. Lucas and Stephen M. Caine for Real Parties in 
Interest. 
 
Robie & Matthai, Kyle Kveton and Steven Fleischman for Association of Southern California Defense 
Counsel as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Ronald W. Makarem 
Makarem & Associates 
11601 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2440 
Los Angeles, CA  90025-1760 
(310) 312-0299 
 
Gerald L. Sauer 
Sauer & Wagner 
1801 Century Park East, Suite 1150 
Los Angeles, CA  90067 
(310) 712-8100 
 
Peter Q. Ezzel 
Haight Brown & Bonesteel 
6080 Center Drive, Suite 800 
Los Angeles, CA  90045-1574 
(310) 215-7100