Title: State v. Wolleat
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S50919
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: May 5, 2005

FILED:  May 5, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
Respondent on Review,
v.
RICHARD JAMES WOLLEAT,

Petitioner on Review.

(CC 01C42188; CA A116196; SC S50919)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 14, 2004.
Monica L. Finch, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.  With
her on the briefs were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director of the
Office of Public Defense Services, and Peter Gartlan, Chief
Defender.
Stacey RJ Guise, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. 
With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
KISTLER, J.
The Court of Appeals decision and the judgment of the
circuit court are reversed in part.
* Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court,

John B. Wilson, Judge.

189 Or App 336, 75 P3d 921 (2003).

KISTLER, J.

The question in this case is whether evidence that
defendant dragged the victim from one room to another during the
course of an assault was sufficient to permit a reasonable juror
to find that defendant had kidnapped the victim.  The trial court
denied defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the
kidnapping charge, the jury found him guilty of kidnapping, and
the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion.  State v.
Wolleat, 189 Or App 336, 75 P3d 921 (2003).  We allowed
defendant's petition for review and now reverse.

In reviewing defendant's motion for a judgment of
acquittal, we state the facts in the light most favorable to the
state.  State v. King, 307 Or 332, 339, 768 P2d 391 (1989). 
Defendant and the victim lived together and were engaged to be
married.  After spending the evening out drinking with friends,
defendant returned home shortly after midnight.  He went into the
bedroom where the victim was sleeping, grabbed her by her hair,
and pulled her out of bed.  Still holding the victim by her hair,
defendant dragged her approximately 15 to 20 feet from the
bedroom into the living room, where he repeatedly struck her. 
The victim broke away from defendant and fled from the house.

The state charged defendant with fourth-degree assault
and first-degree kidnapping.  At the close of the state's case-in-chief, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the
kidnapping charge.  To establish that defendant had committed
first-degree kidnapping, as alleged in the indictment, the state
had to prove that defendant (1) took the victim from one place to
another; (2) with the intent to interfere substantially with her
personal liberty; (3) without consent or legal authority; and
(4) with the purpose of physically injuring her.  ORS 163.225;
ORS 163.235. (1)

In moving for a judgment of acquittal, defendant did
not dispute that a reasonable juror could find that he took the
victim from one place to another.  Rather, relying on 
State v.
Garcia, 288 Or 413, 605 P2d 671 (1980), defendant argued that no
reasonable juror could find that he had intended to interfere
substantially with the victim's personal liberty.

The trial court denied defendant's motion, and the jury
convicted him of assault and kidnapping.  The Court of Appeals
affirmed both convictions.  Defendant petitioned for review,
contending that there was insufficient evidence to submit the
kidnapping charge to the jury. (2)  We allowed defendant's
petition for review to consider a recurring question:  When will
the movement of a person from one place to another during the
commission of another crime, such as rape or assault, be
sufficient to establish the crime of kidnapping?

In answering that question, both parties focus on the
statutory phrase "with intent to interfere substantially with
another's personal liberty."  Relying on 
Garcia, defendant
contends that the phrase reflects a legislative judgment that a
brief movement or temporary detention that is incidental to the
commission of another crime is insufficient, as a matter of law,
to establish an intent to interfere substantially with the
victim's personal liberty.  Focusing on a footnote in 
Garcia, the
state responds that a reasonable juror can infer an intent to
interfere substantially from movement or detention whenever the
movement or detention is not "ordinarily inherent" in the
commission of another crime.

The parties' dispute turns initially on a question of
statutory interpretation, and we begin, as usual, with the text
and context of the statutes.  
See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (stating
statutory construction methodology).  The relevant portion of the
kidnapping statutes provides that "[a] person commits the crime
of kidnapping * * * if, with intent to interfere substantially
with [the victim's] personal liberty, * * * the person * * *
[t]akes the [victim] from one place to another."  ORS 163.225(1).

As defined, the offense has two elements--a physical
act and a mental state.  The phrase "[t]akes the [victim] from
one place to another" defines the act necessary to establish the
crime of second-degree kidnapping. (3)  By its terms, the
phrase does not require that a defendant take a victim a specific
distance, nor does it require that the distance be substantial. 
Rather, the text states that moving a victim "from one place to
another" will be sufficient to establish the element of
asportation.  Although the question of how far a defendant must
move a victim to satisfy that element can present a close
question, defendant has not contended that the movement in this
case was insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove asportation. 
Accordingly, we do not address that issue further and turn to the
mental element of the offense.

The phrase "intent to interfere substantially with [the
victim's] personal liberty" defines the mental state that must
accompany the act of moving the victim.  One proposition is clear
from the text of that phrase.  In moving a victim from "one place
to another," a defendant need not in fact interfere substantially
with the victim's personal liberty in order to complete the crime
of second-degree kidnapping:  The 
intent to interfere
substantially is sufficient.  Beyond that, the meaning of the
phrase is less certain.  How much interference, if accomplished,
would be "substantial," and what interests does the phrase
"personal liberty" protect from the intended interference? 
"[S]ubstantially" is not an exact term, and the text of the
kidnapping statutes provides no guidance on the extent of its
reach.  The phrase "personal liberty" also poses an
interpretative issue.  Viewed in the abstract, the words could
include a broad range of liberty interests.  Alternatively, the
words could refer more narrowly to a person's right to be free
from undesired restrictions on his or her movement.

Two sources bear on the meaning of "substantially" and
"personal liberty."  First, the kidnapping statutes are directed
at restrictions on a person's freedom of movement.  ORS 163.225
prohibits one person from taking another person from one place to
another or secretly confining that person.  That wording suggests
that, when the legislature prohibited performing either of those
acts with the intent to interfere substantially with another's
"personal liberty," it did not use the term "liberty" in its
broad sense.  Rather, the legislature intended to refer more
narrowly to interfering with a person's liberty to move freely.

This court's decision in 
Garcia also provides guidance. 

See State v. Snyder, 337 Or 410, 417, 97 P3d 1181 (2004)
(considering prior statutory interpretation at first level of
analysis).  In 
Garcia, the defendant held a knife to the victim's
throat and forced her to cross a street, walk two blocks, cross
another street, and then go behind a house where the defendant
raped and sodomized her.  288 Or at 415.  In determining whether
the jury could find the defendant guilty of kidnapping in
addition to rape and sodomy, the court looked to the legislative
history of the kidnapping statutes and drew three conclusions
from that history.  
Id. at 416-20.

The court concluded initially that the legislature
"intended that there be no conviction of the defendant for the
separate crime of kidnapping where the detention or asportation
of the victim is merely incidental to the accomplishment of
another crime."  Id. at 420.  The court concluded additionally,
and conversely, that the "legislature perceived no reason not to
prosecute and punish a malefactor for the separate crime of
kidnapping where the detention 
or asportation is 
not merely
incidental to the commission of the underlying crime."  
Id. (emphases in original).  Finally, the court explained:

Id. at 420-21 (emphasis in original; citation and footnote
omitted).

The decision in 
Garcia removes some of the ambiguity
from the phrase "intent to interfere substantially with another's
personal liberty."  It confirms that the liberty interest that
the statute protects from interference is the interest in freedom
of movement and concludes that, in order for the interference to
be substantial, a defendant must intend either to move the victim
a "substantial distance" or to confine the victim for a
"substantial period of time."  The decision, however, does not
provide any guidance on the minimum distance that a defendant
must intend to move a victim or the minimum amount of time that a
defendant must intend to confine a victim before the intended
movement or confinement will constitute substantial interference. 
The defendant in 
Garcia had failed to move for a judgment of
acquittal on the kidnapping charge, and the court held only that,
in light of the defendant's unpreserved objection, it could not
say that the trial court had erred in sending the kidnapping
charge to the jury.  Id. at 421-22.

Because the text and context of ORS 163.225(1) do not
clarify the legislature's understanding of the minimum distance
that will be "substantial," we turn, as the court did in 
Garcia,
to the legislative history.  
See 
PGE, 317 Or at 611-12
(explaining when courts may look to legislative history).  In
doing so, we limit our examination of the legislative history to
the issue that 
Garcia left open and on which this case turns--whether there is some minimum distance that a defendant must
intend to move the victim before a reasonable juror can say that
the defendant intended to interfere substantially with the
victim's personal liberty.

Three portions of the legislative history provide
guidance on that issue.  First, in explaining the phrase
"substantial distance" in the first preliminary draft of the
kidnapping statutes, the research counsel told a subcommittee of
the Criminal Law Revision Commission (4) that the phrase

Minutes, Criminal Law Revision Commission, Subcommittee No 2, Oct
25, 1968, 3. (5)

Second, the commentary to the first preliminary draft
of the kidnapping statutes notes that some courts had held that
"almost any movement of the victim" will satisfy the requirement
that the defendant take or carry the victim away.  Commentary to
Criminal Law Revision Commission Proposed Oregon Criminal Code,
Preliminary Draft No 1, Art 12, §§ 2, 3 (Oct 1968). 
Specifically, the commentary notes that the California Supreme
Court had held that "a defendant who dragged a rape victim from
one room to another" had committed the separate crime of
kidnapping.  
Id.; That holding was problematic, the commentary
explains, because "the same harsh penalties [for kidnapping] may
now be imposed for conduct of little seriousness as for the most
heinous forms of behavior."  
Id. (6)

Finally, when the Criminal Law Revision Commission
considered the fourth preliminary draft of the kidnapping
statutes, then-Attorney General Lee Johnson questioned using the
phrase "intent to interfere substantially with another's personal
liberty" as part of the definition of second-degree
kidnapping. (7)  Minutes, Criminal Law Revision Commission,
June 17, 1969, 20.  Johnson stated that "he had not resolved in
his own mind the necessity of having the two elements--the
'intent to interfere substantially with another's personal
liberty' and 'without consent' " and asked whether the first
element, the intent to interfere substantially, could be omitted. 

Id.

The director of the Commission responded that he did
not think that that element could be omitted and explained that
the fourth draft had included that element


"to distinguish kidnapping from incidental conduct that
might accompany some other crime.  He cited as an
example the taking of a holdup victim from the front
office to a back room against his will so that he might
open a safe.  If the reference to personal liberty were
deleted from [the section defining second-degree
kidnapping], he felt there would be a potential of a
kidnapping charge where kidnapping is not really the
crime."

Id.  Johnson found the director's explanation persuasive, and the
Commission adopted the fourth draft of the kidnapping statutes,
which it submitted to the legislature as part of the proposed
criminal code.  The legislature adopted the proposed kidnapping
statutes without further comment.

One proposition emerges clearly from the legislative
history.  Moving a victim from one room to another while
committing another crime does not constitute moving the victim a
substantial distance.  Put differently, that movement is not
sufficient, by itself, to give rise to an intent to interfere
substantially with the victim's liberty to move freely.  
See Garcia, 288 Or at 421 (explaining that concept of "substantial
distance" informs meaning of "intent to interfere
substantially").  With that background in mind, we turn to the
facts of this case.

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
state, shows that defendant moved the victim from the bedroom to
the living room, approximately 15 to 20 feet, while he assaulted
her.  A reasonable juror could infer from that evidence that
defendant intended to move the victim the distance that he did. 
However, an intent to do only that would be insufficient to
establish the mental element necessary to prove kidnapping--a
point that the legislative history makes clear.  In order to find
defendant guilty of kidnapping, a reasonable juror would have to
be able to infer that defendant intended either to move the
victim a greater distance than he did or to transport her to a
place of confinement.  As our recitation of the facts makes
clear, no reasonable juror could draw that inference from this
record.

We recognize, as the court did in Garcia, that in most
cases the question whether the defendant intended to interfere
substantially with the victim's liberty will present a question
of fact for the jury.  Id.  In some cases, however, the intended
movement will be so minimal that a court can say, as a matter of
law, that no reasonable juror could find that the defendant had
the statutorily required intent.  This is one of those cases, as
the examples in the legislative history make clear.

The state advances primarily one argument in response. 
Relying on a footnote in 
Garcia, the state contends that, because
the act of moving the victim from one room to another is not
"ordinarily inherent" in the crime of assault, the jury could
find that defendant intended to interfere substantially with the
victim's personal liberty. (8)  The state reads too much into
that footnote.  The court in 
Garcia appended that footnote to its
conclusion, in the text, that the question whether a defendant
substantially interferes with a victim's personal liberty turns
on whether the defendant moves the victim a substantial distance
or confines the victim for a substantial period of time.  
Id. at
421, 421 n 8.  The footnote observes that the text of the phrase
"interfere substantially with another's personal liberty" could
be read, in the abstract, more broadly but explains that it is
"readily apparent" that the drafters of the kidnapping statutes
were not attempting to protect people from conduct that is
ordinarily inherent in the crimes of rape and sodomy.  Rather,
they were attempting to protect them from interference with their
right to move freely--a proposition that the text of the
opinion makes clear.

On this record, defendant was entitled to a judgment of
acquittal on the kidnapping charge.  We accordingly reverse the
Court of Appeals decision to the extent that it affirmed
defendant's conviction for kidnapping.

The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are reversed in part.
1. 
ORS 163.235 defines the offense of first-degree
kidnapping.  It provides, in part:
2. Defendant has not challenged his conviction for assault
either in this court or the Court of Appeals, and that conviction
is not before us.
3. Alternatively, a defendant may commit second-degree
kidnapping by "[s]ecretly confin[ing] the person in a place where
the person is not likely to be found."  ORS 163.225(1)(b).  In
this case, the state charged defendant under ORS 163.225(1)(a)
with taking the victim from one place to another, and we limit
our discussion accordingly.
4. 
The 1967 legislature created the Oregon Criminal Law
Revision Commission to revise the state's criminal laws.  
Garcia,
288 Or at 416.  The Commission divided responsibility for
drafting the revised criminal code among three subcommittees. 
Those subcommittees produced drafts of the code and submitted
those drafts, together with commentaries on them, to the
Commission, which produced a final draft of the proposed code and
presented the final draft and commentary to the legislature.     
5. 
Although the research counsel for the Commission was
commenting on the phrase "substantial distance" in the first
preliminary draft, the court found that her comments on that
phrase informed the meaning of the phrase "interfere
substantially" in ORS 163.225(1).  
Garcia, 288 Or at 421.
6. Although the commentary to later versions of the draft
omitted this example, the commentary continued to state that the
serious penalties associated with kidnapping should not apply to
brief detentions that are incidental to the commission of another
crime.  Commentary to the Criminal Law Revision Commission
Proposed Oregon Criminal Code, Final Draft and Report §§ 98, 99
(July 1970).
7. 
The first three preliminary drafts had not used the
phrase "intent to interfere substantially with another's personal
liberty" as part of the definition of second-degree kidnapping. 

See, e.g., Criminal Law Revision Commission Proposed Oregon
Criminal Code, Preliminary Draft No 3, Art 12, §§ 1, 2 (Feb 1969)
(defining second-degree kidnapping differently).
8. 
The footnote on which the state relies observes: