Title: Clements v. Dr. John Alvan Stewart, PC
Citation: 595 So. 2d 858
Docket Number: 1900887
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 1992

595 So. 2d 858 (1992)
William CLEMENTS
v.
DR. JOHN ALVAN STEWART, P.C., and Dermatology Clinic.
1900887.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 28, 1992.
*859 Tom Dutton of Pittman, Hooks, Marsh, Dutton &amp; Hollis, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.
Michael A. Florie, Walter W. Bates and A. Sybil Vogtle of Starnes &amp; Atchison, Birmingham, for appellees.
HOUSTON, Justice.
William Clements brought this action in the Circuit Court of Lee County, Alabama, under the Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1987, against Dr. John Alvan Stewart, P.C., and Dermatology Clinic. (Our references hereinafter will be only to Dr. Stewart as the defendant.) The plaintiff contended that:
The defendant denied any negligence and contended that his treatment of the plaintiff met or exceeded the applicable standard of care (Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-542(2)). The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed, arguing three issues for our review.
Whether Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-542(5), violates Article IV, § 104(9), of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901.
Alabama Code 1975, § 12-21-12, provides, in pertinent part:
(Emphasis added.)
Subsequent to the enactment of § 12-21-12, the Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1987, Ala.Code 1975, §§ 6-5-540 through 6-5-552, was enacted. Section 6-5-542 provided, in pertinent part:
The plaintiff contends that because the definition of "substantial evidence" applicable in actions under the Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1987 is different from the definition of "substantial evidence" in all other civil actions, § 6-5-542(5) violates Article IV, § 104, of the Constitution. Article IV, § 104, provides, in pertinent part:
(Emphasis added.)
The word "exempt" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary 571 (6th ed.1990) as follows:
It is not clear how health care providers are exempted from a general law by the enactment of § 6-5-542(5). The wording of the statements of the quality and weight of the evidence necessary to submit an issue of fact to the trier of fact differs. However, with the judicial interpretation of § 12-21-12(d) in West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, *861 871 (Ala.1989) ("substantial evidence" was there defined as "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved"), we cannot find that plaintiffs in actions against health care providers have a higher burden of proof under § 6-5-542 (which defines "substantial evidence" as "admissible evidence which would convince an unprejudiced thinking mind of the truth of the fact to which the evidence is directed") than under § 12-21-12(d), which the plaintiff describes as the "general law." This is a difference without a distinction.
Likewise, a "health care provider," as defined by § 6-5-542(1) ("A medical practitioner, dental practitioner, medical institution, physician, dentist, hospital," and those other health care providers described in § 6-5-481 and Ala.Code 1975, § 22-21-20), is not an individual or corporation.
"Association" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary 121 (6th ed.1990) as "[a]n unincorporated society; a body of persons united and acting together without a charter, but upon the methods and forms used by incorporated bodies for the prosecution of some common enterprise." "Association" is defined in The American Dictionary of the English Language 80 (1969) as "[a]n organized body of people who have some interest, activity, or purpose in common; a society; league." Health care providers are not united or acting together; they are a diverse group who provide health care in a number of different ways to a number of different individuals with a number of different health care needs. Health care providers would not be an "association," as that word is used in § 104 of the Constitution.
Likewise, § 104 of the Constitution does not prohibit the legislature from "[e]xempting any individual, private corporation, or association from the operation of any general law," if the legislature does this by a general law. It could be argued that the last paragraph of § 104 expressly empowers the legislature to exempt an individual, private corporation, or association from the operation of any general law by enacting a general law; but certainly there is no prohibition against it.
"[G]eneral law," "local law," and "special or private law" are defined in Article IV, § 110, Constitution, as:
So a "special or private" law that cannot exempt any individual, private corporation, or association is a law that applies only to an individual, association, or corporation.
In Reese v. Rankin Fite Memorial Hospital, 403 So. 2d 158, 162 (Ala.1981), the Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1975 was challenged as violating § 104 of the Constitution. This Court held:
(Emphasis added.)
Reese v. Rankin Fite Memorial Hospital, supra, held that, despite the fact that the Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1975 dealt only with actions against health care providers, it applied uniformly to an entire class and was statewide in application and, *862 therefore, was a general law rather than a special or private law.
There is no difference in the scope of the Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1987 and the scope of the Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1975. Both deal only with actions against health care providers, both apply uniformly to an entire class, and both are statewide in application. Both apply to a shifting class of both medical malpractice plaintiffs and medical malpractice defendants. The Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1987 is statewide and comprehensive in its application to all causes of action against health care providers that accrue after June 11, 1987; therefore, "[i]t operates throughout the state alike on ... all the people of a class." Reese v. Rankin Fite Memorial Hospital, supra; Holt v. Mayor of Birmingham, 111 Ala. 369, 19 So. 735 (1896).
We have considered the authorities cited in the plaintiff's initial brief on this issue. Although the arguments are impressive, we are reluctant at this time to overturn a line of cases both predating the present Constitution (Holt v. Mayor of Birmingham, supra) and as recent as 1981 (Reese, supra), and holding that a "general law," as defined in § 104 of the Constitution and its predecessor in the Constitution of 1875, is a law that operates throughout the state alike on all the people or on all the people of a class.
Whether the plaintiff was prejudiced when he was not permitted to question the defendant as to statements contained in a medical text that was not admitted into evidence.
In the pretrial order in this case, the trial court required that "each of the parties to this litigation ... furnish or make available to each of the other parties for inspection and copying all documents, bills, reports, photographs, and other exhibits which each such party intends to utilize at trial." (Emphasis added.) In compliance with the pretrial order, each party provided the other party with medical literature that each party intended to utilize at trial.
During the trial, the plaintiff, in his case in chief, called the defendant as an adverse witness and attempted to question the defendant concerning his agreement or disagreement with statements contained in a medical text entitled Color Atlas and Synopsis of Clinical Dermatology, which had not been listed or furnished to the defendant as medical literature that the plaintiff intended to utilize at trial. The defendant objected, based on the fact that this particular text had not been named as an exhibit that the plaintiff would utilize at trial. The trial court sustained the objection. The plaintiff contends that this was a prejudicial abuse of discretion, under the authority of Harrison v. Wientjes, 466 So. 2d 125 (Ala.1985); and Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Nichols, 393 So. 2d 966 (Ala. 1981).
Neither Harrison nor Metropolitan Life involved the questioning of a witness by use of a treatise that had not been listed pursuant to a pre-trial order. Therefore, they are not persuasive as to whether the trial court erred to reversal. In this case, the trial court found that the plaintiff knew that he was going to use Color Atlas prior to trial, but failed to advise the defendant of this, and that this was a violation of the pretrial order. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the use of this treatise. Epperson v. Poe, 533 So. 2d 204 (Ala.1988); Hughes v. Arlando's Style Shop, 399 So. 2d 830 (Ala.1981); Stephens v. Central of Georgia R.R., 367 So. 2d 192 (Ala.1978).
PER CURIAM.
Whether the plaintiff was unfairly prejudiced by not being permitted to question the defendant's medical expert witness about that witness's "recent involvement as a defendant in a medical negligence action."
Before the defendant's medical expert witness testified, the defendant moved in limine to preclude the plaintiff from *863 cross-examining this witness "regarding the fact that he had been a defendant in a [medical negligence] lawsuit." The trial court granted the motion, stating as follows:
The plaintiff contends that the trial court's ruling effectively denied him an opportunity to establish bias on the part of the defendant's medical expert and, therefore, that he is entitled to a new trial. We agree.
In Louisville &amp; N.R.R. v. Martin, 240 Ala. 124, 198 So. 141 (1940), this Court reversed a judgment entered on a jury verdict for the plaintiff against a railroad in a negligence action alleging the wrongful death of the plaintiff's intestate, on the ground that counsel for the railroad had not been permitted to cross-examine the plaintiff's key expert witness concerning that witness's previous discharges from two other railroads. This Court stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
240 Ala. at 129, 198 So.  at 144-45. See, also, Jones v. Pizza Boy, Oxford, Inc., 387 *864 So. 2d 819 (Ala.1980), wherein this Court stated that the plaintiff was entitled to cross-examine the defendant's medical expert concerning defense counsel's representation of the witness in a pending malpractice suit.
In the present case, the testimony of the defendant's medical expert was critical to the defendant's case, in that it was contrary to the opinion that had been expressed by the plaintiff's expert witness, which was to the effect that the defendant had deviated from the appropriate standard of care. The plaintiff made an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury that showed that the defendant's medical expert had been a defendant in a medical malpractice action; that the witness had been represented in that action by the same law firm that now represents the defendant; and that that action had been settled. Although we are mindful of the trial court's considerable discretion in ruling on evidentiary matters of this kind, we believe that the trial court unduly and unnecessarily restricted the plaintiff's cross-examination of this witness with respect to any bias that he may have had against plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions and that, as a result, the plaintiff's case was substantially prejudiced. See Louisville &amp; N.R.R. v. Martin, supra, 240 Ala. at 132, 198 So.  at 147, wherein this Court pointed out that "[n]ot only is there allowable great latitude on cross-examination of a witness, but this latitude is enlarged as to [an] expert witness."
Based on this Court's holding as to issue III, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
MADDOX, SHORES, ADAMS, STEAGALL, KENNEDY and INGRAM, JJ., concur as to issues I and II.
ALMON, J., concurs in the result as to issue I and expresses no opinion as to issue II.
HORNSBY, C.J., expresses no opinion as to issues I and II.
HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON, SHORES, ADAMS, KENNEDY and INGRAM, JJ., concur as to issue III.
MADDOX, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., dissent as to issue III.
HOUSTON, Justice (dissenting as to issue III).
Immediately after the plaintiff rested his case, his counsel conducted the following examination of the defendant's medical expert outside the presence of the jury:
(Emphasis added.)
A party is entitled to a thorough and sifting cross-examination of witnesses against him; however, the trial court is vested with considerable control over the scope of cross-examination. Perry v. Brakefield, 534 So. 2d 602 (Ala.1988); Watson v. City of Florala, 420 So. 2d 55 (Ala. 1982); Lucky Mfg. Co. v. Activation, Inc., 406 So. 2d 900 (Ala.1981). The judgment of the trial court will be reversed only when there has been an abuse of discretion that causes substantial injury to the objecting party. Perry v. Brakefield, 534 So. 2d  at 608; Watson v. City of Florala, 420 So. 2d  at 56; Lucky Mfg. Co. v. Activation, Inc., supra.
In determining whether there was an abuse of discretion that caused substantial injury to the plaintiff, I would look first to the offer of proof made by the plaintiff. The witness testified in no uncertain terms that having been a defendant in a medical malpractice action did not make him biased or prejudiced for or against the defendant or the plaintiff in this case. To overcome this testimony, the majority holds, as a matter of law, that a former defendant in a totally unrelated medical malpractice action is automatically biased or prejudiced against a plaintiff who brings an action under the Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1987 and in favor of the defendant in such an action. This I refuse to do.
In determining whether there was an abuse of discretion that caused substantial injury to the plaintiff, I would also look to the record to determine whether the plaintiff was allowed to cross-examine the witness as to other areas of potential bias. In this case, the plaintiff questioned the witness about the fact that he was being paid by the defendant to testify, about the fact that he had given testimony on behalf of two other defendant physicians in Alabama, about the fact that he had never given deposition or trial testimony on behalf of a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action, and about the amount of money that he expected to be paid for his testimony in this case.
Because I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding testimony concerning the witness's having been a defendant in a prior medical malpractice action, I respectfully dissent.
MADDOX and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.