Title: Taylor v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 64, 2000
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 2, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
TYRONE TAYLOR,
)
)  No. 64, 2000
Defendant Below,
)
Appellant,
)  Court Below – Superior Court
)  of the State of Delaware,
v.
)  in and for Kent County
)  Cr. A. Nos. IK 99-09-0281, 0283
STATE OF DELAWARE,
)  through 0291
)
Plaintiff Below,
)
Appellee.
)
Submitted:  June 26, 2001
Decided:  August 2, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER and
STEELE, Justices.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED.
Sandra W. Dean, Camden, Delaware, for Appellant.
John Williams, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for Appellee.
STEELE, Justice for the Majority:
2
On September 23, 1999, a Superior Court jury found Tyrone L. Taylor,
Appellant, Defendant-Below, guilty of eleven drug-related charges including
intent to deliver cocaine.  Taylor filed a timely notice of appeal.  Taylor argues
that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted:  two prior drug-related
convictions during the State’s case-in-chief; the testimony of a police officer
regarding his observations of the area outside Taylor’s home; and, the cocaine
Taylor allegedly sold.  We find that admitting Taylor’s prior convictions during
the State’s case-in-chief unfairly prejudiced his right to present an entrapment
defense and thus significantly undermines our confidence in the outcome of the
trial.  Further, the trial court’s failure to hold consideration of the relevance of
the remoteness of certain prior convictions until the evidence on predisposition
could be reviewed under all of the circumstances surrounding the alleged offense
compels us to reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and remand this case
for a new trial.
I
On March 9, 1999, a confidential police informant arranged a drug
transaction between Taylor and an undercover police officer.  After the informant
contacted Taylor, the informant and the officer went to Taylor’s home where the
officer expressed an interest in purchasing cocaine.  Taylor sold the officer crack
3
cocaine for twenty dollars.  On March 19, 1999, the officer returned to Taylor’s
home to purchase more cocaine, but Taylor refused to sell the officer cocaine
because the informant was not present.  On March 25, 1999, police arrested
Taylor.  During a search of Taylor’s home the police discovered several items of
paraphernalia such as scales, baking soda and glass vials.  Police also discovered
marijuana and $314 cash.  A jury convicted Taylor of eleven counts of
possession, manufacture, delivery and distribution of controlled substances under
11 Del. C. §§ 4751, 4755, 4767.  The State filed a motion to sentence Taylor as
an habitual offender under 11 Del. C. 4214(b) because of two earlier drug
convictions.  The trial court granted the State’s motion and sentenced Taylor to
life imprisonment.
II
This Court first heard oral argument in this case on December 12, 2000.
The Court issued an order on February 28, 2001 requesting supplemental
briefing on three issues:  (1) whether Taylor objected to the State’s introduction
of evidence of his prior convictions during its case-in-chief; (2) whether evidence
of the defendant’s prior bad acts should be admissible under D.R.E. during the
4
State’s case-in-chief to rebut reasonably anticipated defense arguments;1 and (3)
whether the convictions in this case were too remote in time to be relevant to
Taylor’s predisposition at the time of the transaction.2
This case raises two issues concerning evidence of a defendant’s prior bad
acts.  First, we determine whether evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts may
be admissible during the State’s case-in-chief to rebut anticipated evidence
supporting elements of an affirmative defense.  This issue requires us to consider
relevant language in Getz v. State,3 regarding the introduction of prior bad act
evidence during the State’s case-in-chief in light of the Court’s recent decisions in
Milligan v. State4 and Cobb v. State.5  Second, we determine whether Taylor’s
two drug convictions in 1990 and 1993 were too remote in time to be relevant to
his alleged predisposition to sell drugs at the time of the 1999 drug transaction.
At trial, Taylor objected to the admission of his two prior drug convictions
because they were too remote in time from the March 1999 transaction to be
relevant and because their admission unfairly prejudiced him by preventing the
                                   
1 This issue requires us to reconsider language in Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 734 (1988) based
on two recent decisions in State v. Milligan, Del. Supr., 761 A.2d 6 (2000) and Cobb v. State,
Del. Supr., __ A.2d __, No. 168, 1999, Veasey, C.J. (Jan. 3, 2001) regarding the introduction of
prior bad act evidence during the State’s case-in-chief where the State can “demonstrate the
existence, or reasonable anticipation, of such a material issue.”
2 See Taylor v. State, Del. Supr., No. 64, 2000, Veasey, C.J. (Feb. 28, 2001) (ORDER).
3 538 A.2d 726, 734 (1988).
4 Del. Supr., 761 A.2d 6 (2000).
5 Del. Supr., 765 A.2d 1252 (2001).
5
jury from fairly considering his credibility on the relevant issue of predisposition.
The record does not reflect, however, that Taylor objected specifically to the
State’s request to introduce the convictions as part of its case-in-chief.
A review of the transcript of counsels’ argument concerning the admission
of Taylor’s prior convictions suggests that the parties and the court operated on
the implicit assumption that, under Getz, the State could offer evidence in its
case-in-chief to rebut an anticipated entrapment defense.6  Getz does not
explicitly distinguish between evidence offered in the State’s case-in-chief to
rebut a reasonably anticipated affirmative defense and that offered to support an
issue which must be established in the State’s own case.  Milligan and Cobb were
not decided until after Taylor’s trial.  Therefore, the defense had no clear,
discrete legal basis to object to the admission of Taylor’s earlier convictions
during the State’s case-in-chief.  We conclude that Taylor’s general objection to
the admission of his earlier convictions sufficiently preserved the question for
appeal.7
                                   
6 For example, defense counsel stated:  “Now, we understand that in a [sic] entrapment defense,
that that’s why we are having this argument, because we are using an entrapment defense . . . .”
Appx. to Appellant’s Op. Br. at A-31.  Similarly, in its ruling, the court noted that:  “Under Rule
404(a)(1), . . . when the defendant offers evidence of a pertinent trait of his character, which I
think they are doing here by electing the entrapment defense, then the prosecution does have the
right to rebut that.”  Id. at A-34.
7 The State’s citation to State v. Porter, Del. Super., 587 A.2d 188, (1990) is mistaken because
the Superior Court’s opinion does not refer to a specific defense objection to the admission of the
contested evidence in the State’s case-in-chief.  Instead, the court indicated that its decision was
6
Getz established six guidelines for the admission of other crimes evidence
against a criminal defendant.  The first of these guidelines requires that:
The evidence of other crimes must be material to an
issue or ultimate fact in dispute in the case. If the State
elects to present such evidence in its case-in-chief it
must 
demonstrate 
the 
existence, 
or 
reasonable
anticipation, of such a material issue.8
Under Getz, the State may introduce evidence of a defendant’s other crimes
during its case-in-chief if: the bad acts have independent logical relevance to an
ultimate issue in the case; and, the State reasonably anticipates that the issue will
arise.9
In Milligan v. State10 we clarified this analysis.  In Milligan, the defense
indicated before trial that it intended to impeach the complainant’s testimony
concerning an alleged sexual offense by highlighting the delay between the
alleged incident and her decision to report the incident.  In response to this
                                                                                                                  
in response to a defense objection to “to any statements the State intends to offer concerning
hearsay statements . . . containing alleged death threats directed to her by the defendant.”  Based
on case law from other jurisdictions, the court concluded that such evidence is admissible only
“admitted in rebuttal after evidence of accident, self-defense, suicide or extreme emotional
distress has been presented by the defense.”  Id. at 193.  See Supr. Ct. R. 8.
8 See Getz, 538 A.2d at 734; see also Cobb v. State, Del. Supr., 765 A.2d 1252, 1254 (2001) (“As
we have held, the State may introduce bad acts evidence that ‘is material to an issue or ultimate
fact in dispute in the case’ as part of its case-in-chief if it demonstrates ‘the existence, or
reasonable anticipation, of such a material issue.’”) (quoting Getz, 538 A.2d at 734).
9 See Deshields v. State, Del. Supr., 706 A.2d 502, 507 (1998) (“[I]f other crime evidence is
admitted during the State’s case-in-chief to prove the charged offense, it must have independent
logical relevance and the jury should be carefully instructed regarding the limited purpose for
which it can be considered.”) (citing Getz, 538 A.2d at 730-31, 734).
10 761 A.2d at 8.
7
anticipated argument, the State offered evidence in its case-in-chief of a later
incident involving the defendant and the complainant to explain what triggered
the delayed decision to report.  The trial court admitted evidence of the later
incident, in part because “it provided an explanation for the ‘victim’s’ late
reporting without which the jury could be misled or confused.”11
On appeal, we held that it was “premature” to admit evidence of the
defendant’s uncharged bad act during the State’s case-in-chief to rebut the
defendant’s anticipated “late reporting” argument:  “While the defense did
acknowledge that ‘late reporting’ would be made an issue in its case and would
be mentioned in its opening, ‘late reporting’ bore no reasonable relationship to an
issue or ultimate fact to be proved in the State's case-in-chief.”12  We concluded
that “the State had no basis to seek admission of the later bad acts to explain ‘late
reporting’ until rebuttal,” and “only after Milligan had in fact introduced
evidence of ‘late reporting’” to impeach the complainant’s testimony.13
                                   
11 Id.
12 Id.  Among the cases cited by the State to support its argument that the State is entitled to offer
evidence in its case-in-chief to rebut anticipated defense arguments is United States v. Miller,
D.C. Cir., 895 F.2d 1431, 1435 n.9 (1990).  In Miller, the D.C. Circuit permitted the government
to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts during its case-in-chief in order to
impeach witness testimony implicating the defendant in a check-forging scheme.  Although the
court did not specify the rationale for its decision, the holding in Miller runs counter to this
Court’s decision in Milligan.
13 Milligan, 761 A.2d at 8.
8
In order to introduce evidence of other crimes in the State’s case-in-chief,
those crimes must be logically relevant not just to “an issue or ultimate fact in
dispute in the case,”14 but to “to an issue or ultimate fact to be proved in the
State's case-in-chief.”  This language identifies a distinction between bad act
evidence that is offered to prove an element of the State’s prima facie case and
bad act evidence that is offered to rebut an issue, dispute of fact or element of a
defense, that might reasonably be raised in the defendant’s case.  Under this
formulation of the Getz rule, the State may offer evidence of the defendant’s bad
acts only if: (1) the evidence is independently relevant to an element of the
State’s prima facie case (for example, knowledge or intent) and (2) the State
reasonably anticipates that the defendant will dispute that element of its case.15
                                   
14 Getz, 538 A.2d at 734.
15 All but two of the cases cited by the State (which are discussed supra note 12 and infra note
24), are consistent with a rule permitting the prosecution to introduce evidence of the defendant’s
prior bad acts during the State’s case-in-chief only where the evidence is related to the
prosecution’s prima facie case.  See, e.g., United States v. Burchinal, 8th Cir., 657 F.2d 985,
993 (1981) (“Where intent or guilty knowledge are elements of the crime charged, evidence of
other crimes or acts tending to establish those elements is generally admissible. Furthermore,
‘(t)he government need not await the defendant's denial of intent before offering evidence of
similar acts relevant to that issue.’”) (citations omitted); United States  v. Mills, 2nd Cir., 895
F.2d 897, 907 (1990) (finding that the trial court properly admitted evidence of prior crimes
during the State’s case-in-chief to prove the defendant’s intent to counterfeit because the
defendant “raised the issue of intent in his opening to the jury”);  United States v. Hooton, 9th
Cir., 662 F.2d 628, 635 (1981) (“[E]ven in general intent crimes, the government can offer
evidence of other acts as part of its case-in-chief when it is obvious that the defense will raise
lack of intent as a defense.”); United States v. Cohen, 2nd Cir., 489 F.2d 945, 950 (1973)
(“[S]ince appellant had in his opening statement put into issue his motive and intent to commit
the crimes charged, evidence of prior similar acts and involvement on appellant's part in
allegedly illegal JDL activities was admissible on this issue [during the government’s case-in-
9
Our holding in Milligan does no more than clarify what was implicit in the
Getz Court’s analysis.  Indeed, the Getz Court noted that “the State presented the
other sexual misconduct evidence in its case-in-chief and must justify its use at
that time and not on the basis of whether the defendant might later offer evidence
of his own character.”16  In Getz, the Court justified the admission of evidence of
the defendant’s prior bad acts during the State’s case-in-chief in part because,
“[w]hile certainly the better practice is for the State to present such evidence on
cross-examination or in rebuttal, the prosecutor is not clairvoyant and has no
assurance that the defendant will necessarily supply the predicate issue.”17
This rationale supports the admission of bad act evidence in the State’s
case-in-chief only if there is some concern that the State will not have an
                                                                                                                  
chief].”); United States v. Escobar, 8th Cir., 50 F.3d 1414, 1422 (1995) (finding that evidence of
defendant’s bad acts was admissible during the government’s case-in-chief because the evidence
was relevant to the defendant’s intent); United States v. Aranda, 8th Cir., 963 F.2d 211, 215
(1992) (“[T]he [prior bad act] evidence was relevant to show the plan of the conspiracy, and thus
its existence, and to show that Aranda knowingly and purposefully participated in this conspiracy
. . . . to establish a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.”); United States v. Evans, 8th Cir., 697 F.2d
240, 248 n.8 (1983) (“Contrary to Evans' assertion the government is entitled to put this evidence
on in anticipation of a defense of lack of intent.”); Foy v. State, Tex. Crim. App., 593 S.W.2d
707, 709 (1980) (“[W]e hold that evidence of prior extraneous offenses committed against the
victim of the offense charged, and indicating the existence of ill will or hostility toward the
victim, is admissible as part of the State's case in chief as circumstantial evidence of the
existence of a motive for committing the offense charged.”); Thompson v. United States, D.C.
Ct. App., 546 A.2d 414, 423-24 & n.16 (1988) (holding that “the government may not be
permitted to introduce other crimes evidence in its case in chief to prove intent” unless the
defense disputes intent during opening statements).
16 See Getz, 538 A.2d at 732.
17 Id. at 731.
10
appropriate opportunity to present the evidence as part of its rebuttal case.18  To
require the State to present relevant bad act evidence only in rebuttal when a
defendant indicates that he plans to challenge an element of the charged crime
creates an unfair burden upon the State because the State’s evidence on this
element of its prima facie case may appear disjointed and out-of-context.
Similarly, where the defense elects not to present evidence, the State will not
have an opportunity to present the evidence in rebuttal at all despite the fact that
the evidence is relevant to its prima facie case.
In contrast, when a defendant decides to present an affirmative defense that
must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence,19 there is no concern that
waiting to present the bad act evidence until rebuttal will leave the State’s case-
in-chief incomplete because, until the defense presents its case, there is no
argument for the State to rebut.20  One would not be concerned that the defendant
                                   
18 In Getz, the Court held that evidence of the defendant’s alleged uncharged sexual contact with
the victim was not relevant to the defendant’s motive, intent, or common scheme to commit the
crime charged.  See Getz, 538 A.2d at 732-34.  In rejecting a proposed “sexual gratification”
exception to Rule 404(b) in incest cases, the Court noted that other courts have criticized this
exception because “such evidence bears upon an issue which is not an element of the offense and
concerning which the State has no burden.”  Id. at 733.
19 See 11 Del. C. § 304.
20 In Deshields, 706 A.2d at 507, for example, the State offered evidence of the defendant’s use
of a deadly weapon in a prior crime to prove that the defendant “display[ed] what appear[ed] to
be a deadly weapon” as part of the State’s prima facie case against the defendant for first degree
robbery.  The Court held that the prior crime evidence was inadmissible in the State’s case-in-
chief because it was not independently relevant to this element of first degree robbery—
particularly since the victim’s testimony presented sufficient direct testimony to satisfy the
State’s burden with respect to that element.  See id. at 507-08.  The Second Circuit has likewise
11
will not “supply the predicate issue” because the defendant is required to present
some evidence to carry its burden of proof.21  Moreover, the premature
admission of bad act evidence to rebut an anticipated affirmative defense may
effectively lock the defense into making an undesirable argument that defense
counsel had tentatively raised during opening statements.  If the defendant no
longer wishes to pursue the argument at trial, the premature admission of bad act
evidence to rebut that argument presents the defendant with a Hobson’s choice.
The defendant must either present an argument that the defendant no longer finds
tenable in order to deflect the impact of the bad act evidence or decline to present
the argument and find another way to limit the damage done by the bad act
evidence.  In fairness, this choice cannot be forced upon the defendant by the
State’s prejudicial structuring  of its case-in-chief.
We hold that the State may introduce evidence of a defendant’s other
crimes in its case-in-chief only where that evidence is independently relevant to
                                                                                                                  
noted that “it is usually preferable for the trial court to await the conclusion of the defendant’s
case before admitting similar act evidence” because “the court will best be able to judge the
prosecutor's need for the evidence after the defense; at that time the court may best weigh the
probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect.” United States v. Danzey, 2nd Cir.,
594 F.2d 905, 912 (1979).  The Second Circuit in Danzey went on to note that prior bad act
evidence was nevertheless admissible in that case because “it was abundantly clear to the trial
judge before the case began that the only major issue was the identity of the robbers.”  Id.
21 Similarly, if the defense indicates that it will present evidence during its case to impeach the
testimony of a State witness (as in Milligan and Cobb), there is no concern that the State will not
have the “predicate issue” to justify offering further evidence to refute the defense evidence
during the State’s rebuttal case.
12
an issue or fact that the State must prove as part of its prima facie case.
Applying this rule to the present case, Taylor had not yet presented evidence
supporting the affirmative defense of entrapment22 when Taylor’s two prior
convictions were admitted during the State’s case-in-chief.23  As a consequence,
the trial court erred when it admitted Taylor’s earlier convictions during the
State’s case-in-chief.  The State was permitted prematurely to rebut an anticipated
defense argument during its case-in-chief with evidence that was not
independently relevant to an issue that the State was required to establish as part
of its prima facie case against Taylor.
Having concluded that the trial court erred by admitting Taylor’s prior
convictions during the State’s case-in-chief, we next address whether this error
mandates a new trial.24  The admission of Taylor’s convictions during the State’s
                                   
22 The legislature has established entrapment as an affirmative defense with the concomitant
burden of proof on the defendant rather than as an element of an offense to be negated in the
State’s prima facie case. See 11 Del. C. § 432(a).
23 Arguments by counsel during opening statements and summation are not evidence and thus
cannot be said to raise an affirmative defense.  Cf. Milligan  761 A.2d at 8 (holding that evidence
of a later sexual encounter that triggered the delayed report was admissible “only after Milligan
had in fact introduced evidence of ‘late reporting’” to impeach the victim’s testimony).
24 Cf. United States v. Bailey, D.C. Cir., 505 F.2d 417, 420-21 (1974) (finding that trial court
should have required a proffer of the prosecution evidence of the defendant’s prior crimes in part
because the trial court should determine “whether it might be more desirable to defer admitting
the evidence until the government's rebuttal” but finding that the court’s error was harmless).
The Seventh Circuit has rejected a rule requiring the prosecution to present bad act evidence in
rebuttal, holding that “[w]hen the entrapment defense is clearly raised in the defense's opening
statement and the entrapment defense obviously materializes through a defendant's presentation
of its own witnesses or through cross-examination of the government's witnesses, it is not error
for the government to present evidence of predisposition in its case-in-chief.”  United States v.
13
case-in-chief prejudiced Taylor in three respects.  First, premature admission of
the convictions permitted the State to negate Taylor’s entrapment defense by
steeling the jury’s mind about predisposition before Taylor had an opportunity to
present his evidence supporting a lack of predisposition to commit the offense.
By doing so, the State effectively placed on Taylor the additional burden—
beyond merely proving his entrapment case—of overcoming the damage to his
credibility in the minds of the jurors.  Second, the trial court effectively
precluded itself from a fair consideration of the relevance of the remoteness of
the prior offenses and their significance to Taylor’s ultimate claims of efforts at
rehabilitation which were arguably inconsistent with a predisposition to sell drugs
when it allowed the State to introduce the other crimes in its case in-chief.
Third, presenting evidence out of logical order makes it difficult for the jurors to
draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and to apply them to the law.
When jurors hear the State’s rebuttal evidence of other crimes before they hear
and can understand the defense evidence in support of entrapment it is far more
likely that they will use that evidence to conclude that a defendant is “a bad
                                                                                                                  
Goodapple, 7th Cir., 958 F.2d 1402, 1407 (1992).  The Seventh Circuit thus permits the
prosecution to present evidence to rebut an entrapment defense so long as the defendant
eventually presents the entrapment defense.  See id. (distinguishing a case in which the
prosecution offered bad act evidence to rebut an anticipated entrapment defense “that never
actually materialized”).
14
person” rather than comprehend its relevance to the charges or the affirmative
defense.
In addition, the approach in this case is particularly damaging to the
defense where, as here, the affirmative defense requires that Taylor admit to the
conduct that constitutes the offense.  Since Taylor admitted that he sold the
cocaine to the undercover officer, his entire case rested on a fair opportunity to
be heard on his affirmative defense of entrapment.  Admitting damaging evidence
directed at his credibility during the State’s case-in-chief, but totally unnecessary
to the State’s need to establish the issues and elements of its own case, unfairly
weakened Taylor’s only opportunity to be heard by a jury with an open mind and
raises serious concerns about the fairness of his trial.  By undercutting Taylor’s
entrapment defense before he presented it, the State unfairly enhanced Taylor’s
burden of proving that he would not be disposed to sell drugs before the police
enticed him to do so.  In view of these concerns, the trial court’s erroneous
admission of his convictions during the State’s case-in-chief unfairly prejudiced
Taylor, and a new trial is required.
To provide guidance to the Superior Court on remand, we next address
whether Taylor’s 1990 and 1993 drug convictions are admissible in the State’s
15
rebuttal case to refute Taylor’s argument that he was not “otherwise disposed” to
sell cocaine to the undercover police officer in March 1999.
In this context, the Getz requirements bear repeating.  The evidence of the
other crimes must be (1) “material to an issue or ultimate fact in dispute,” (2)
admissible under D.R.E. 404(b), (3) proved by clear and convincing evidence,
(4) not too remote from the crime charged, (5) not unfairly prejudicial under
D.R.E. 403, and (6) accompanied by a limiting instruction.25 In the present case,
the State sought to counter Taylor’s entrapment defense by introducing Taylor’s
1990 and 1993 drug convictions for the purpose of negating Taylor’s anticipated
claim that he would not be disposed to sell cocaine in March 1999.
Applying the Getz framework to this case, the State offered Taylor’s prior
convictions to rebut Taylor’s anticipated entrapment defense under 11 Del. C. §
432(a)26 because drug-related convictions may tend to show that Taylor was
already “disposed to” sell crack cocaine when the police informant arranged the
transaction.  As a result, the convictions are arguably related to a central issue in
dispute.  Under the second factor, the convictions were admitted for a proper
purpose under 404(b) because the State offered them not to prove that Taylor is a
                                   
25 Getz, 538 A.2d at 734.
26 11 Del. C. § 432(a) provides: “it is an affirmative defense that the accused engaged in the
proscribed conduct because the accused was induced by a law-enforcement official or the law-
16
bad person but to prove that he was predisposed to complete the drug
transaction.27 Third, the State proved the convictions with clear and convincing
evidence from uncontested certified copies of the convictions.  In addition, the
court properly instructed the jury on the limited purpose for which they could
consider the evidence when the court presented the convictions to the jury.28
The remaining issue concerns whether Taylor’s convictions were too
remote in time to be relevant to his predisposition to sell cocaine at the time of
the transaction.  Under the Getz analysis, the “remoteness concern” bears on
whether the other crimes are sufficiently relevant to a material issue.29  As a
general matter, “[e]vidence is too remote in time ‘only where there is no visible,
plain, or necessary connection between it and the proposition eventually to be
                                                                                                                  
enforcement official’s agent . . . to engage in the proscribed conduct . . . when such person is not
otherwise disposed to do so.”
27 Although D.R.E. 404(b) does not explicitly permit evidence of prior bad acts to prove
predisposition, the list of permissible uses in Rule 404(b) is not exclusive.  See Smith v. State,
Del. Supr., 669 A.2d 1, 5 (1995) (“This list offers examples of purposes for which evidence of
prior wrongs could be admitted; it is not exclusive.”) (citations omitted). Other states have
determined that Rule 404(b) covers evidence that is relevant to the defendant’s predisposition at
the time of the crime.  See, e.g., State v. DeWolfe, R.I. Supr., 402 A.2d 740, 744 (1979)
(affirming admission of prior drug sales to prove predisposition to engage in drug offense); State
v. Dolce, N.J. Supr., 197 A.2d 185, 191 (1964) (“Predisposition is evidenced by previous
conviction of crime, reputation for criminal activities . . . .”); State v. Shuck, Tenn. Supr., 953
S.W.2d 662, 670 (1997) (“Factors relevant to determining a defendant’s predisposition include
the character or reputation of the defendant, including any prior criminal record. . . .”).
28 Specifically, the court instructed the jury that the convictions “are introduced solely as they
may relate in your deliberations to the defense of entrapment . . . .”
29 Allen v. State, Del. Supr., 644 A.2d 982, 988 (1994).
17
proved.’”30 To assist in this determination, “courts tend to analogize [the
remoteness prong in Getz] to the 10 year time limit contained in Rule 609(b)
governing impeachment by evidence of conviction of a crime.”31  As a
consequence, this Court has generally endorsed the admission of prior
convictions under Getz where the convictions preceded the charged crime by less
than ten years.32  The State therefore argues that the Court should follow the
standard ten-year guideline in this case and should reject Taylor’s remoteness
argument.
As appealing as bright line rules generally are for their ease of application,
evidence of “predisposition” in entrapment cases, however, presents an issue that
the generic Getz remoteness analysis does not contemplate.  This Court held in
Harrison v. State that “the point of reference for ascertaining the predisposition
of a defendant to commit a particular crime is the time period extending from just
before the State’s solicitation to just before the defendant’s commission of the
                                   
30 Kendall v. State, Del. Supr., 726 A.2d 1191, 1195 (1999) (quoting Lloyd v. State, Del. Supr.,
No. 239, 1990, Walsh, J. (Nov. 6, 1991), Order at ¶ 6)).
31 Trowbridge v. State, Del. Supr., 647 A.2d 1076, 1078 (1994) (citations omitted).
32 See, e.g., Santini v. State, Del. Supr., No. 88, 1994, Berger, J. (July 7, 1995) (ORDER), Order
at ¶ 11 (affirming decision to admit 1985 conviction for possession with intent to deliver heroin
during trial for 1992 cocaine trafficking charges); Moorhead v. State, Del. Supr., 638 A.2d 52,
54-55 (1994) (affirming decision to admit DUI convictions between three and six years before
charges of second-degree murder by automobile).
18
crime.”33  This assertion suggests that evidence of predisposition in an
entrapment case should be relatively close in time to the crime charged.
The holding in Harrison does not contemplate a “bright line test for the
remoteness factor.”34  Rather, a trial court should consider the nature of the
proposition that the evidence is intended to prove or disprove in determining
whether a particular piece of evidence is too temporally remote from the charged
crime.35  Where the defendant presents an entrapment defense, the trial court
necessarily has discretion to determine whether the defendant’s earlier
convictions are too remote to be relevant to the defendant’s predisposition at the
time of the alleged offense, but the court must keep in mind that the relevant time
period for determining the defendant’s “predisposition” is relatively limited.36
                                   
33 Del. Supr., 442 A.2d 1377, 1386 (1982); see also Atkins v. State, Del. Supr., 523 A.2d 539,
547 (1987) (citing Harrison with approval); cf. United States v. Catanzaro, 3rd Cir., 407 F.2d
998, 1001 (1969) (“The basic question in an alleged entrapment case is whether the accused was
ready and willing to commit the crime if an opportunity should be presented, or whether a person
not otherwise disposed to wrongdoing was corrupted by some overreaching or special
inducement, often amounting to reprehensible conduct, by public officers or those acting in
concert with them.”).
34 Allen v. State, Del. Supr., 644 A.2d 982, 988 (1994); see also Kendall v. State, Del. Supr., 726
A.2d 1191, 1195-96 (1999) (“We recognize that this Court in the past has analogized the ‘too-
remote’ factor in Getz to the ten-year time limit contained in D.R.E. 609(b) governing
impeachment by evidence of conviction of a crime. But we have noted that this is not a bright
line rule.”) (footnotes omitted).
35 Cf. Allen, 644 A.2d at 988 (endorsing a “sliding scale” approach balancing remoteness with
relevance).
36 Cf. United States v. White, 6th Cir., 390 F.2d 405, 406 (1968) (“[E]ven if the arrest without
prosecution and conviction were probative of prior illegal narcotic activity, the episode occurred
eight years before the acts charged in the indictment . . . [and] was not only probative of nothing
relevant but was also too remote [to prove the defendant’s predisposition].”) (citing Sherman v.
19
Moreover, there is greater concern about remoteness where, as in this case, the
defendant alleges attempts at rehabilitation between the time of the convictions
and the time of the charged offense.
Given that the focus is on whether Taylor was predisposed to engage in a
drug transaction with the police informant, the drug-related convictions in 1990
and 1993 may be too remote to be relevant to the 1999 transaction at issue in this
case.  In addition, Taylor testified that he had participated in a drug-counseling
program in 1995 and that he did not return to drug use until April 1998.37  These
intervening events, together with the length of time between Taylor’s previous
convictions and the present charges are factors to be considered in determining
whether Taylor’s 1990 and 1993 convictions may be too remote and, therefore,
irrelevant to his predisposition in March 1999.  On remand, the trial court should
consider whether Taylor’s convictions are too remote to be relevant to Taylor’s
                                                                                                                  
United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958)).  This rule is consistent with the holding in Kendall, 726
A.2d at 1195, because the rule acknowledges that the remoteness inquiry depends on the nature
of the issue to be proved.  In Kendall, the Court found a twelve-year-old conviction relevant
because it established a pattern of activity that was relevant “to prove Kendall’s criminal intent
to steal from the homebuyers and others” because the evidence “demonstrate[d] a continuous
flow of related illicit activity spanning nearly 12 years.”  Id. at 1195-96.  Whereas the “pattern of
racketeering” that the State sought to prove in Kendall required evidence of misconduct that is
more than ten years old, similarly remote convictions are not necessarily relevant to a
defendant’s predisposition at the time of a specific transaction.
37 Cf. United States v. Sherman, U.S. 375-76 (1958) (“[A] nine-year-old sales conviction and a
five-year-old possession conviction are insufficient to prove petitioner had a readiness to sell
narcotics at the time Kalchinian approached him, particularly when we must assume from the
record he was trying to overcome the narcotics habit at the time.”).  The State’s attempt to
20
predisposition in March 1999 and wait to do so until both the defendant and the
State have an opportunity to present all of the circumstances bearing on the issue.
III
Taylor next argues that the trial court erroneously admitted testimony of a
police officer who testified that he “observed a lot of foot and vehicular traffic”
in front of Taylor’s residence and that he could “see people running or walking
quite fast towards the back of [Taylor’s] residence into the wooded area” as his
marked police car approached.38  In addition, the officer stated that Taylor’s
street is a “high crime or drug area.”39  We review the Superior Court’s
decisions to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion.40
Taylor contends that the only inference that this testimony supports is that
people congregated near Taylor’s house in order to purchase drugs from him.
Taylor argues that this inference is improper because the officer did not see
anyone enter the house and did not witness any drug transactions.  The State
counters and the trial court found that this testimony is relevant circumstantial
                                                                                                                  
distinguish Sherman from the present case relies primarily on facts in each case that do not relate
to the remoteness of the convictions to the alleged transactions.
38 Appx. to Appellant’s Op. Br. at A-20 to A-22.
39 Id. at A-21.  The officer presented this testimony after the trial court held voir dire to rule on
Taylor’s relevance objection.  The trial court held that the officer could testify about facts within
his personal knowledge but that the officer could not testify about a tip he received concerning
foot traffic around Taylor’s residence.  (A38, B36).
40 See Williamson v. State, Del. Supr., 707 A.2d 350, 354 (1998).
21
evidence tending to show that Taylor regularly sold drugs from his residence and
thus was predisposed to sell drugs to the undercover officer.
The primary question here is whether the jury may reasonably infer that
Taylor regularly conducted drug transactions based on (1) the number of people
loitering near his house, (2) the reaction of these people to an approaching police
officer, and (3) the characteristics of the neighborhood.  If the jury may properly
infer that Taylor regularly sold drugs, the officer’s testimony is relevant in
determining whether Taylor was predisposed to sell drugs at the time of the
March 1999 transaction.41  The State’s relevance argument, however, requires
the jury to make several substantial logical leaps to reach the conclusion that
Taylor regularly sold illegal drugs.  The jury had to infer: (1) that people avoid
approaching officers only if they are engaged in illegal conduct,42 (2) that these
persons generally congregate in high crime neighborhoods to buy or sell drugs,
and (3) that these facts would generate heavy foot traffic near a drug dealer’s
home.
                                   
41 D.R.E. 401 provides:  “’Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
42 But see Quarles v. State, 696 A.2d 1334, 1341 (1997) (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]o assume
that innocent persons have no reason to fear sudden approach by police ignores the experiences
of many members of minority groups.”) (citations omitted).
22
Relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or
misleading the jury . . . or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”43
Immediately after the officer testified, however, the trial court instructed the jury
that it could consider the officer’s testimony only in connection with Taylor’s
entrapment defense.  The court’s instruction effectively minimized the likelihood
that the jury would improperly infer that Taylor is a bad person and thus
minimized the potential for unfair prejudice to Taylor.  The trial court’s carefully
crafted timely limiting instruction44 was based on its broad discretion to admit or
exclude evidence under D.R.E. 403.45  Although the function of the jury is to
make common sense judgments and inferences about behavior,46 it is questionable
whether this series of logical steps is too tenuous to form the basis for a
reasonable inference by the jury.47  Nevertheless, the trial court’s decision to
                                   
43 D.R.E. 403.
44 See Sawyer v. State, Del. Supr., 634 A.2d 377, 380 (1993) (observing that testimony is less
likely to undermine the fairness of the trial where the court issues an effective instruction).
45 See Smith v. State, Del. Supr., 560 A.2d 1004, 1007 (1989).
46 See generally Gannett Co., Inc. v. State, Del. Supr., 571 A.2d 735, 762 (1989) (“The jury
represents the public, bringing the public’s values and common sense to bear upon the problems
of justice.”).
47 See Bishop v. State, Del. Supr., No. 257, 1990, Holland, J. (April 30, 1991) (ORDER) Order at
¶ 7 (“[The defendant’s state of mind] may be shown not only by direct proof, but also by such
inferences as may be reasonably drawn from the evidence adduced.”); cf. Gannett Co., Inc. v.
Kanaga, Del. Supr., 750 A.2d 1174, 1188 (2000)(“While the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of
reasonable inferences from established facts, the jury cannot supply any omission by speculation
or conjecture.”).
23
admit the officer’s testimony does not defy logic nor ignore settled principles of
law.  Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
the officer’s testimony.
IV
Taylor argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion by admitting the
cocaine into evidence because there were inconsistencies and irregularities in its
identification.  At trial, the State offered as evidence a small amount of crack
cocaine that the State asserted was the subject of the transaction between Taylor
and the undercover police officer.  Taylor challenged the authenticity of this
evidence on three grounds:  (1) the conflicting testimony by State witness
concerning whether the cocaine was wrapped in plastic, (2) the apparent
difference between the single piece of cocaine sold by Taylor and the multiple
pieces presented at trial and (3) a crossed-out address and case number on the
evidence tag.  When viewed together, Taylor argues, these irregularities indicate
that the cocaine introduced at trial was not the cocaine that Taylor sold to the
undercover officer.  The trial court found (1) that the discrepancy concerning the
packaging of the cocaine was the result of “faulty memory,” (2) that the single
piece sold by Taylor probably crumbled into multiple pieces and (3) that the
irregularities on the evidence tag were simply clerical mistakes.  The trial court
24
admitted the evidence and permitted the jury to consider these irregularities in
determining the proper weight of the evidence.  This Court reviews the Superior
Court’s determination under D.R.E. 901(a) that an offering party has properly
authenticated evidence for an abuse of discretion.48
Under D.R.E. 901(a), a party seeking to offer evidence must first produce
“evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims.”  The State must therefore provide a “rational basis from
which the jury may conclude” that the evidence offered at trial is authentic.49
This requirement does not eliminate the “necessity of showing the chain of
custody of exhibits in criminal proceedings,”50 which “indirectly establishes the
identity and integrity of the evidence by tracing its continuous whereabouts.”51
Stated differently, these rules require the State to establish “as a matter of
reasonable probability” that the police did not misidentify, exchange, or tamper
with the evidence offered at trial.52
                                   
48 See Demby v. State, Del. Supr., 695 A.2d 1127, 1133 (1997).
49 Whitfield v. State, Del. Supr., 524 A.2d 13, 16 (1987) (quoting United States v. Natale,
2nd Cir., 526 F.2d 1160, 1173 (1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 950 (1976)).
50 D.R.E. 901 cmt.
51 Whitfield v. State, Del. Supr., 524 A.2d 13, 16 (1987).
52 Id.
25
Given this standard,53 we find that the Superior Court did not abuse its
discretion.  The State presented sufficient testimony from which the jury could
rationally conclude that the cocaine offered at trial was the cocaine that Taylor
sold to the undercover police officer.  In particular, Officer Rust testified that the
undercover officer returned from Taylor’s house after about twelve minutes and
immediately gave Officer Rust the cocaine.  Officer Rust then wrapped the
cocaine in plastic and put the package in his date book.  Officer Rust field tested
the cocaine, placed the cocaine in a sealed envelope indicating its origin, and
placed the envelope in the police safe for delivery to the medical examiner.  The
State also presented evidence that crack cocaine often breaks into smaller pieces
when it is handled.  Based on this chain-of-custody testimony, the jury could find
that the cocaine evidence was authentic despite confusion about the packaging of
the cocaine and the fact that the State offered multiple pieces of cocaine rather
than one piece.54
                                   
53 See Whitfield, 524 A.2d at 16.
54 The State presented (and this Court accepted) essentially the same chain-of custody evidence
in Demby v. State, Del. Supr., 695 A.2d 1127, 1131-32 (1997); see also id. at 1131 (“[T]he State
must simply demonstrate an orderly process from which the trier of fact can conclude that it is
improbable that the original item has been tampered with or exchanged.”).
26
Taylor also challenges the authenticity because the evidence tag indicated
that the cocaine initially had a different case number.55  The State counters that
the irregularities on the evidence tag were simply “clerical errors.”  The trial
court found sufficient testimony to support this.  Officer Rust testified that he
initially recorded the wrong address on the evidence tag and later corrected the
error.  Although the irregularities that Taylor has identified are cause for
concern, the chain-of-custody testimony indicates a low likelihood of
misidentification or tampering.56  As a result, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the pieces of cocaine offered by the State.
Conclusion
In conclusion, because we find that the trial court should not have admitted
Taylor’s two prior convictions in the State’s case-in-chief and that the trial court
prematurely considered whether these convictions may be too remote to be
relevant to Taylor’s predisposition by failing to wait until all of the actual
                                   
55 See Whitfield, 524 A.2d at 16 (“‘Courts need [to] exercise greater care when the issue
concerns the very identity of the evidence, rather than just possible changes in its condition.”)
(quoting United States v. Lampson, 7th Cir., 627 F.2d 62, 65 (1980)).
56 Cf. Tricoche v. State, Del. Supr., 525 A.2d 1511 (1987).  The present case is thus
distinguishable from United States v. Ladd, 1st Cir., 885 F.2d 954 (1989).  In Ladd, the First
Circuit excluded mislabeled blood samples because “the chain of custody binding the samples
was so seriously flawed as to leave no reliable foundation for admission of the test results.”
Ladd, 885 F.2d at 956.  This case is also unlike Whitfield, in which this Court reversed the
Superior Court’s decision to admit a weapon because the “whereabouts of the admitted weapon
were unaccounted-for for three and one-half months following the robbery” and because a third
person had possession of the weapon during that period.  Whitfield, 524 A.2d at 17.
27
circumstances touching on predisposition had been introduced in both the State
and the defendant’s cases, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and
remand this case for a new trial.
28
BERGER, Justice: Dissenting
For more than a decade, Getz controlled the admissibility of prior Abad
acts.@  Until the Milligan decision last year, counsel and trial judges relied on
Getz as authority for the State to introduce such evidence during its case-in-chief
as long as the State could demonstrate a Areasonable anticipation@ that the
evidence of other crimes would be Amaterial to an issue or ultimate fact in dispute
in the case.@57  In Milligan, and more emphatically in this case, we have modified
Getz by holding that the State may introduce prior bad acts evidence in its case-
in-chief only if the evidence is relevant to an element of the State=s prima facie
case.
                                   
57Getz v. State, Del. Supr., 538 A.2d 726, 734 (1988).
I agree with the majority that this modification to our law is reasonable and
appropriate.  But I cannot join in its conclusion that failure to follow this newly
announced timing rule constituted prejudicial error mandating a new trial in this
case.  Assuming that the evidence of Taylor=s prior crimes would have been
admissible if presented to the jury during cross-examination of Taylor, instead of
during the State=s case-in-chief, the prejudice to Taylor is minimal. The majority
says that, especially in a case like this, where the defendant is admitting the
29
crime and raising an entrapment defense, there should be nothing to impair the
defendant=s credibility before he gets to present his defense to the jury.  The
majority then divines that the jury was Asteeled@ against Taylor, confused, and
closed minded  B   all because it heard about Taylor=s prior drug convictions
before it heard about his efforts at rehabilitation.
The majority=s conclusions are not supported by any record evidence.
When the trial court told the jury about Taylor=s prior convictions, it also
instructed the jury that the convictions were being made part of the record solely
as they might relate to the defense of entrapment.  Right after that, Taylor began
his defense by taking the stand and trying to explain how he was induced to sell
the cocaine to his friend.  On cross examination, the prosecutor focused on
Taylor=s drug addiction, his prior involvement as a Arunner@ for drug dealers, and
the high cost of maintaining his habit.  All of this information, which was not at
all complicated or hard to follow, was presented to the jury within a matter of
hours.  What is it about this sequence of events that would confuse the jury?
If the real problem is that the jury was steeled against Taylor because it
heard about his criminal past before it got a chance to assess his credibility as a
witness, then our whole criminal justice system is in trouble.  Juries always hear
the State=s case first and they are instructed to withhold judgment until all the
evidence is in.  By the time a criminal defendant takes the witness stand, if he
chooses to, most juries have heard a lot of negative information that would
undermine their view of the defendant=s credibility.  Yet we expect juries to
remain open minded.  In this case, where Taylor voluntarily explained his long
history of criminal activity (cocaine addiction/use), how prejudicial could it be
for the jury to learn about his prior convictions before Taylor began testifying
instead of learning that fact on cross-examination?  To be sure, there could be a
case where, because a defendant changes his defense strategy at the last minute,
the premature introduction of prior convictions would be highly prejudicial.  But
this is not such a case.  Taylor has never argued that he wanted to rely on a
defense other than entrapment.
In short, the evidence against Taylor was strong B  so strong that his only
defense was entrapment.  In arguing entrapment, Taylor had to convince the jury
that, although he was a drug user, he was not a drug seller.  Since Taylor
acknowledged that he worked on Aodd jobs@(when he worked at all), received
31
food stamps, and had a drug habit that could cost as much as $500 per day, it is
not surprising that the jury rejected his entrapment defense.  There simply is no
reason to believe that the timing of the disclosure of Taylor=s prior convictions
influenced the verdict and I would affirm the convictions.