Title: Pucci v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 206, 2011
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 31, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
FRANCIS D. PUCCI, JR.,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 206, 2011 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, in and 
§  for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0811016532 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                       Submitted: July 29, 2011 
 
 
 
 
Decided:    August 31, 2011 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 31st day of August 2011, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) The defendant-appellant, Francis D. Pucci, Jr., filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s April 19, 2011 violation of probation (“VOP”) 
sentencing order.  The plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved 
to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on 
 
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the face of the opening brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and 
affirm. 
 
(2)  The record before us reflects that, in June 2009, Pucci pleaded 
guilty to Attempted Robbery in the Second Degree and Criminal Trespass in 
the Second Degree.  He was sentenced to a total of 6 years of Level V 
incarceration, with credit for 39 days previously served, to be suspended 
after 60 days for 1 year of Level III probation.  In September 2009, Pucci 
was found to have committed a VOP.  He was re-sentenced to a total of 4 
years and 6 months at Level V, to be suspended for 1 year of Level IV Work 
Release, in turn to be suspended after 6 months for probation.  In October 
2010, Pucci again was found to have committed a VOP.  He was re-
sentenced to 6 years at Level V, to be suspended after 2 years and 6 months 
for probation.     
 
(3) Pucci then appealed to this Court on the ground that his latest 
VOP sentence improperly exceeded his prior VOP sentence.  Agreeing with 
Pucci’s claim, the State moved to remand the matter to the Superior Court.  
On December 7, 2010, this Court remanded the matter to the Superior Court 
for fact-finding and correction of Pucci’s VOP sentence.  On remand, the 
Superior Court again imposed a VOP sentence that exceeded Pucci’s prior 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
 
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VOP sentence.  Pucci again appealed.  This Court ordered that the Superior 
Court provide the transcripts of Pucci’s VOP hearings and, at the request of 
the Superior Court, remanded the matter for correction of Pucci’s VOP 
sentence.  On April 19, 2011, the Superior Court re-sentenced Pucci to a 
total of 4 years and 6 months at Level V, to be suspended after 2 years and 6 
months for 1 year and 6 months of Level III probation.   
 
(4) In this appeal from his latest VOP sentence, Pucci claims that the 
sentence a) violates Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4333(c); and b) is unduly 
harsh, violating his constitutional rights as well as the Truth-in-Sentencing 
(“TIS”) guidelines.   
 
(5) Pucci’s first claim is legally incorrect.  Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 
§ 4333(c), which limits consecutive probationary sentences in multiple 
criminal cases, is inapplicable to the sentences at issue here, which stem 
from a single criminal case.  To the extent Pucci claims that his sentences 
violate Section 4333(b), that claim is without merit.  Pucci’s probationary 
sentence of 1 year at Level III for attempted robbery and his concurrent 
probationary sentence of 6 months at Level III for criminal trespass fully 
comply with the requirements of that statute.  To the extent Pucci claims that 
the Superior Court exceeded its authority in imposing a total of 4 years and 6 
months at Level V, Pucci offers no factual basis for that claim.  The Superior 
 
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Court is authorized to impose the full amount of Level V time remaining on 
a sentence once it determines that a VOP has been committed.2    
 
(6) As for Pucci’s second claim, this Court will not reverse a 
defendant’s sentence unless it is beyond the maximum permitted by statute 
or results from vindictive or arbitrary action on the part of the Superior 
Court.3  There is no evidence in the record before us that Pucci’s latest VOP 
sentence either exceeds the statutory maximum or is the result of vindictive 
or arbitrary action on the part of the Superior Court.  Once it was determined 
that Pucci had committed a VOP, the Superior Court had discretion to re-
impose the entire Level V sentence that originally was suspended, minus any 
Level V time previously served.4  Finally, it is well-settled that a defendant 
has no legal or constitutional right to appeal a statutorily-authorized sentence 
solely because it does not conform to the TIS sentencing guidelines.5  For all 
of the above reasons, we conclude that Pucci’s second claim is without 
merit. 
 
(7) It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
                                                 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §4334(c). 
3 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842-43 (Del. 1992). 
4 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §4334(c). 
5 Gaines v. State, 571 A.2d 765, 766-67 (Del. 1990). 
 
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settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
         Justice