Title: Kindschy v. Aish
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2020AP001775
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 2024

2024 WI 27 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP1775 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Nancy Kindschy, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Brian Aish, 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 401 Wis. 2d 406, 973 N.W.2d 828 
(2022 – published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 27, 2024   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 1, 2022 and March 19, 2024   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Trempealeau   
 
JUDGE: 
Rian W. Radtke   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, KAROFSKY, and PROTASIEWICZ, 
JJ., joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed an opinion 
concurring in the judgment, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Dudley A. Williams, and Buting, Williams & Stilling 
S.C., Milwaukee; Joan M. Mannix (pro hac vice), and Thomas More 
Society, Chicago, IL. There were oral arguments by Joan M. 
Mannix.  
 
For the respondent-respondent, there were briefs filed by 
Diane M. Welsh, Leslie A. Freehil and Pines Bach LLP, Madison. 
There were oral arguments by Leslie A. Freehil and Diane M. 
Welsh. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Thomas C. Bellavia, 
assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was Joshua L. 
Kaul, attorney general, on behalf of Wisconsin Department of 
Justice.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Andrew t. Dufresne, 
Jacob A. Neeley, and Perkins Coie LLP, Madison; Arthur S. 
Greenspan (pro hac vice), Evelyn Pang (pro hac vice), and 
Perkins Coie LLP, New York, NY; Kathleen Wills (pro hac vice), 
and Perkins Coie LLP, Washington, D.C, on behalf of End Domestic 
Abuse Wisconsin.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2024 WI 27
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP1775 
(L.C. No. 2020CV40) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Nancy Kindschy, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Brian Aish, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JUN 27, 2024 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, KAROFSKY, and PROTASIEWICZ, 
JJ., joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed an opinion 
concurring in the judgment, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined.  
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.  This case involves a 
harassment injunction issued against Brian Aish, an anti-
abortion protestor, based on statements he made to Nancy 
Kindschy, a nurse practitioner, as she left her job at a family 
planning clinic.  We must decide whether the injunction violates 
Aish's First Amendment right to free speech.   
No. 
2020AP1775   
 
2 
 
¶2 
We conclude that the injunction is a content-based 
restriction on Aish's speech, and therefore complies with the 
First Amendment only if: (1) Aish's statements were "true 
threats" and he "consciously disregarded a substantial risk that 
his [statements] would be viewed as threatening violence;" or 
(2) the injunction satisfies strict scrutiny; that is, it is 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.  See 
Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 69 (2023); R.A.V. v. City 
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992).  On the record before us, 
we hold that the injunction fails to satisfy either of these two 
standards.  We therefore reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand to the circuit court with instructions to 
vacate the injunction.1 
I 
¶3 
Brian Aish protests outside of family planning clinics 
to "warn women [seeking abortions] they will be accountable to 
God on the day of judgment if they proceed," and to persuade 
clinic staff to work elsewhere.  Between 2014 and 2019, Aish 
regularly protested at two clinics where Nancy Kindschy worked 
as a nurse practitioner.  Aish's conduct during that time 
consisted mainly of holding up signs quoting Bible verses and 
                                                 
1 Our remedy, directing the circuit court to vacate the 
injunction, is limited to the injunction at issue in this case, 
and does not affect any injunction issued in any other case.  On 
remand, the circuit court need not dismiss the petition and is 
free to conduct additional fact-finding to consider whether an 
injunction premised on new facts complies with the First 
Amendment. 
No. 
2020AP1775   
 
3 
 
preaching his Christian and anti-abortion beliefs broadly to all 
staff and visitors.  Beginning in 2019, however, Aish began 
directing his comments toward Kindschy, singling her out with 
what she believed to be threatening messages. 
¶4 
Kindschy petitioned for a harassment injunction under 
Wis. Stat. § 813.125 (2019-20).2  That statute allows the court 
to issue an injunction if there are "reasonable grounds to 
believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment with 
intent 
to 
harass 
or 
intimidate 
the 
petitioner."  
§ 813.125(4)(a)3.  Harassment is defined in pertinent part as 
"[e]ngaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts 
which harass or intimidate another person and which serve no 
legitimate purpose."  § 813.125(1)(am)4.b.   
¶5 
The circuit court3 heard two days of testimony, and 
made the following findings of fact: 
 On October 8, 2019, as Kindschy and a co-worker were 
leaving the clinic, Aish stated that Kindschy had time 
to repent, that "it won't be long before bad things 
will happen to you and your family," and that "you 
could get killed by a drunk driver tonight." 
 On February 18, 2020, Aish said to Kindschy, "I pray 
you guys make it home safely for another day or two 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version. 
3 The Honorable Rian W. Radtke of the Trempeleau County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2020AP1775   
 
4 
 
until you turn to Christ and repent.  You still have 
time." 
 On February 25, 2020, Aish again indicated that 
Kindschy would be lucky if she made it home safely.  
 The statements made by Aish on these dates were 
specifically directed toward Kindschy.  
¶6 
The circuit court further found that the testimony of 
both Kindschy and Aish was credible.  Kindschy, the circuit 
court explained, was credible and genuine, although "her 
recollection wasn't exactly clear on certain details."  And Aish 
was "very credible as to what happened [during] the incidents, 
as well as his position on his religious beliefs."  As the 
circuit court explained, Aish was "trying to share the gospel, 
and also has a stance of being against the things that Planned 
Parenthood does, which includes abortions . . . ."  According to 
the circuit court, Aish's purpose in speaking to Kindschy was 
"to get [her] to leave her employment or stop what she was 
doing," but also, "a dual purpose here was to get Ms. Kindschy 
to adopt . . . Mr. Aish's religious beliefs . . . ."  The 
circuit court said that persuading another person to adopt 
different religious beliefs was "a legitimate purpose from 
[Aish's] perspective, from his standpoint," and noted that 
Aish's statements were made in the context of "convey[ing] a 
message of repentance" and were "even coming from a place of 
love or nonaggression."  Nonetheless, the circuit court found 
that Aish's statements were intimidating because they were the 
"types of things [that] certainly would intimidate somebody 
No. 
2020AP1775   
 
5 
 
because . . . they are statements that address somebody's loss 
of life or their family members being hurt or harmed . . . ."  
The circuit court further concluded that Aish's statements did 
not serve a legitimate purpose because "to use intimidation or 
scare tactics" to persuade someone to leave their employment or 
adopt different religious beliefs is "not a legitimate purpose."   
¶7 
Following the hearing, the circuit court issued a 
four-year injunction which prohibited Aish from speaking to 
Kindschy, or going to her residence "or any other premises 
temporarily occupied by [Kindschy]."  Aish appealed and the 
court of appeals affirmed the issuance of the injunction.  See 
Kindschy v. Aish, 2022 WI App 17, 401 Wis. 2d 406, 973 N.W.2d 
828. 
¶8 
We granted review.  After we heard oral argument but 
before we issued an opinion, the United States Supreme Court 
decided Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023), holding that 
in a criminal prosecution for harassment premised on true 
threats, the First Amendment requires the government to prove at 
a 
minimum 
that 
the 
defendant 
"consciously 
disregarded 
a 
substantial risk that his communications would be viewed as 
threatening violence."  Id. at 69.  Subsequently, we ordered the 
parties to submit supplemental briefing and heard a second round 
of oral argument regarding the impact of Counterman on this 
case. 
II 
¶9 
When reviewing a harassment injunction, we uphold the 
No. 
2020AP1775   
 
6 
 
circuit court's factual findings unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  See Bd. of Regents-UW Sys. v. Decker, 2014 WI 68, 
¶20, 355 Wis. 2d 800, 850 N.W.2d 112.  We review whether a 
harassment injunction complies with the First Amendment de novo.  
See id. 
 
III 
¶10 The First Amendment protects the fundamental right to 
free speech.  See U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech").  "[A]s a general 
matter, the First Amendment means that government has no power 
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter, or its content."  Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 
564, 573 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
¶11 
But this principle is not absolute.  Regulation of speech based on the message it 
conveys, known as a content-based restriction, may pass constitutional muster in two ways.  
First, if the regulation restricts speech that falls into one of several historically unprotected 
categories, such as "fighting words,"4 incitement to imminent lawless action,5 obscenity,6 
defamation,7 or——as is relevant here——"true threats."  Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 
(1969) (per curiam).  Second, if the regulation restricts otherwise protected speech but satisfies 
strict scrutiny; that is, if it is "'necessary to serve a compelling state interest and . . . [are] 
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.'"  State v. Baron, 2009 WI 58, ¶45, 318 Wis. 2d 60, 769 
N.W.2d 34 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)). 
                                                 
4 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
5 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
6 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
7 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
No. 
2020AP1775   
 
7 
 
¶12 
The harassment injunction in this case is a content-based restriction.  That is 
because it was issued based on the content of Aish's speech, namely his statements that "bad 
things are going to start happening to [Kindschy] and [her] family," she "could get killed by a 
drunk driver tonight," and that she "would be lucky if [she] got home safely."8  See City of 
Austin v. Reagan Nat'l Advert. of Austin, LLC, 596 U.S. 61, 69 (2022) ("A regulation of speech 
is facially content based under the First Amendment if it 'target[s] speech based on its 
communicative content'——that is, if it 'applies to particular speech because of the topic 
discussed or the idea or message expressed.'" (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 
163 (2015))).  Kindschy primarily argues that the injunction is nonetheless constitutional because 
Aish's statements were true threats and were thus unprotected by the First Amendment.  
Kindschy's secondary argument is that even if Aish's statements were not true threats, the 
injunction is constitutional because it survives strict scrutiny. 
¶13 
We begin by evaluating Kindschy's true-threats argument.  We conclude that even 
if Aish's statements were true threats——an issue we do not decide——the harassment 
injunction still violates the First Amendment because the circuit court did not make the necessary 
finding that Aish "consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his communications would be 
viewed as threatening violence."  Counterman, 600 U.S. at 69.  We then explain why the 
injunction cannot be upheld on alternate grounds because it does not satisfy strict scrutiny.  
A 
                                                 
8 Kindschy contends that the injunction entered against Aish 
is content neutral because it does not prevent him from 
expressing certain ideas or opinions as long as they aren't 
directed 
towards 
Kindschy. 
 
Kindschy 
misunderstands 
the 
analysis.  Restrictions on speech are content neutral if they 
"are justified without reference to the content of the regulated 
speech."  See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 
(1989).  Here, the injunction is not content neutral because it 
was justified based on the content of Aish's speech.   
No. 
2020AP1775   
 
8 
 
¶14 "True threats are 'serious expression[s]' conveying 
that a speaker means to 'commit an act of unlawful violence.'"  
Id. at 74 (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003)).  
In Counterman v. Colorado, the United States Supreme Court 
explained that "a statement can count as [a true] threat based 
solely on its objective content."  Id. at 72.  Thus, "[t]he 
existence of a [true] threat depends not on 'the mental state of 
the author,' but on 'what the statement conveys' to the person 
on the other end."  Id. at 74 (quoting Elonis v. United States, 
575 U.S. 723, 733 (2015)).9  In other words, determining whether 
a statement is a true threat does not require an inquiry into 
the speaker's subjective mindset.  
 
¶15 Although the test for whether a statement is a true 
threat is objective, Counterman held that before a person may be 
criminally convicted for making a true threat, the First 
Amendment requires proof of the speaker's subjective intent.  
See id. at 69.  Specifically, the Court determined that in order 
to avoid chilling protected, non-threatening expression, proof 
that the speaker acted at least recklessly is required.  See id. 
                                                 
9 Prior to Counterman, we followed a different standard for 
determining whether a statement was a true threat.  In State v. 
Perkins, 2001 WI 46, ¶29, 243 Wis. 2d 141, 626 N.W.2d 762, we 
held that "[a] true threat is a statement that a speaker would 
reasonably foresee that a listener would reasonably interpret as 
a serious expression of a purpose to inflict harm[.]"  This 
analysis, which considers the perspectives of both the listener 
and the speaker, is inconsistent with the objective test for 
true threats stated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Counterman.  Accordingly, Counterman abrogated Perkins on this 
ground, and Counterman's test for true threats is binding. 
No. 
2020AP1775   
 
9 
 
at 78-79.  Recklessness in this context means that the speaker 
"consciously 
disregarded 
a 
substantial 
risk 
that 
his 
communications would be viewed as threatening violence."  Id. at 
79.  
1 
¶16 Kindschy claims that because she sought a civil 
harassment injunction against Aish, Counterman's requirement 
that the government prove a defendant's subjective mental state 
does not apply.  In support, Kindschy makes two arguments.  
First, she contends that Counterman did not explicitly extend 
its holding beyond the criminal prosecution at issue in that 
case.  Second, Kindschy asserts that unlike the Colorado statute 
at issue in Counterman, the intent-to-harass requirement in Wis. 
Stat. § 813.125 always satisfies Counterman's recklessness 
standard.   
¶17 We find neither of Kindschy's arguments persuasive.10  
To begin with, nothing on the face of the Court's decision 
limits its holding to the criminal context.11  On the contrary, 
                                                 
10 Some courts have, with little or no analysis, declined to 
apply Counterman in the civil context.  See Sealed Plaintiff 1 
v. Patriot Front, No. 22-cv-670, 2024 WL 1395477, at *29 (E.D. 
Va. Mar. 31, 2024); Boquist v. Courtney, 682 F. Supp. 3d 957, 
969 n.10 (D. Or. July 17, 2023).  These courts summarily 
dismissed Counterman's relevance because no criminal statute was 
at issue in the case.  But as we explain, although Counterman 
involved a criminal prosecution, nothing in the Court's analysis 
suggests its holding is limited to the criminal context.   
11 The language the Supreme Court used to describe liability 
strengthens this point.  The Court repeatedly used the word 
"liability" by itself, not "criminal liability" or "criminal 
punishment."  See, e.g., Counterman, 600 U.S. at 75, 79 n.5. 
No. 
2020AP1775   
 
10 
 
two aspects of the decision indicate that it also applies to a 
civil harassment injunction premised on true threats.  First, 
the Court relied upon the law of defamation and incitement, 
which includes both civil and criminal liability.  The Court 
emphasized that the recklessness rule it was adopting "fits with 
the analysis in [the Court's] defamation decisions," which also 
"adopted a recklessness rule, applicable in both civil and 
criminal contexts[.]"  Counterman, 600 U.S. at 80 (emphasis 
added).  And the Court explained that the more stringent intent 
standard required in civil and criminal incitement cases 
"compel[led] the use of a [recklessness] standard" in true 
threats cases.  Id. at 82.  By relying on these civil claims, 
the Supreme Court implied that the same standard for criminal 
prosecutions also applies to civil harassment injunctions based 
on true threats. 
¶18 Second, the Court's broader reasoning is as applicable 
to civil harassment injunctions based on true threats as it is 
to criminal prosecutions.  The Court's animating concern in 
Counterman was that applying an objective standard to true-
threat claims might chill otherwise protected speech.  See id. 
at 75.  As the Court said, "A speaker may be unsure about the 
side of a line on which his speech falls.  Or he may worry that 
the legal system will err, and count speech that is permissible 
as instead not.  Or he may simply be concerned about the expense 
of becoming entangled in the legal system."  Id.  Those concerns 
are just as salient in the context of a civil harassment 
injunction as they are in the criminal context.  Although the 
No. 
2020AP1775   
 
11 
 
stakes may be higher in a criminal prosecution, the threat of a 
civil harassment injunction may be no less chilling of protected 
speech.   
¶19 As to her second argument, Kindschy points to the 
requirement in § 813.125 that the circuit court find the 
respondent "engaged in harassment with intent to harass or 
intimidate the petitioner."  § 813.125(4)(a)3. (emphasis added).  
A finding of intent to harass or intimidate, she argues, will 
always satisfy Counterman's recklessness standard because intent 
is a higher bar than recklessness.  
¶20 This argument conflates two distinct findings:  the 
finding that the speaker intended to harass or intimidate under 
§ 813.125 and the finding that the speaker intentionally or 
recklessly uttered a true threat under the First Amendment.  We 
have previously interpreted what it means to "harass" or 
"intimidate" under § 813.125, and neither is synonymous with a 
true threat.  To harass under the statute is to "worry and 
impede by repeated attacks, to vex, trouble or annoy continually 
or chronically, to plague, bedevil or badger."  Bachowski v. 
Salamone, 139 Wis. 2d 397, 407, 407 N.W.2d 533 (1987) (citation 
omitted).  To intimidate under the statute is to "'make timid or 
fearful.'"  Id. (quoted source omitted).  In contrast, a true 
threat under the First Amendment is an expression "conveying 
that a speaker means to 'commit an act of unlawful violence.'"  
Counterman, 600 U.S. at 74 (quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 359).  
Because the terms have distinct meanings, meeting the standard 
for one does not implicate the standard for the other.  In other 
No. 
2020AP1775   
 
12 
 
words, a court can find one intended to harass or intimidate 
another without necessarily finding someone uttered a true 
threat 
at 
all, 
let 
alone 
uttered 
one 
intentionally 
or 
recklessly.  For that reason, the intent standard in § 813.125 
cannot serve as a substitute for Counterman's recklessness 
standard.   
¶21 In sum, we hold that Counterman applies to civil 
harassment injunctions premised on true threats.  Thus, before 
issuing such an injunction, a circuit court must find that the 
respondent "consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his 
communications would be viewed as threatening violence."  Id. at 
69.  
2 
 
¶22 In 
this 
case, 
the 
circuit 
court's 
harassment 
injunction was issued before Counterman was decided.  The 
circuit 
court 
therefore 
did 
not 
evaluate 
whether 
Aish's 
statements were true threats, or whether he "consciously 
disregarded a substantial risk that his communications would be 
viewed as threatening violence."  Id.  Because the circuit court 
failed to make clear findings regarding Aish's subjective mental 
state as it relates to his statements to Kindschy, we need not 
decide whether Aish's statements were true threats.  Whether 
they were true threats or not, the injunction cannot be 
justified on true-threats grounds.  See id. 
B 
¶23 Kindschy alternatively argues that the injunction 
against Aish is nonetheless constitutional because it survives 
No. 
2020AP1775   
 
13 
 
strict 
scrutiny. 
 
As 
mentioned 
previously, 
content-based 
restrictions 
on 
protected 
speech 
are 
constitutionally 
permissible if they are "necessary to serve a compelling state 
interest and . . . narrowly drawn to achieve that end."  Baron, 
318 Wis. 2d 60, ¶45.  Kindschy claims several state interests 
are served by the injunction, including protecting her right to 
privacy, her right to free passage in going to and from work, 
and her right to be free from the fear of death or bodily harm.  
See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716-717 (2000); Black, 538 
U.S. at 360.  She further maintains that the injunction is 
narrowly tailored and burdens no more speech than is necessary 
because Aish is free to protest anywhere except locations she 
temporarily occupies. 
¶24 Strict scrutiny is a high bar, and the injunction at 
issue here cannot clear it.  Even if the interests Kindschy 
identified are compelling, an injunction still must be narrowly 
tailored to protect those interests.  Baron, 318 Wis. 2d 60, 
¶45.  Here, the injunction orders Aish to avoid any location 
Kindschy might be, effectively prohibiting Aish from speaking 
not just to Kindschy, but to others at the clinic or anywhere 
else that she might be.  In doing so, the injunction burdens 
significantly 
more 
speech 
than 
is 
necessary 
to 
protect 
individual privacy, freedom of movement to and from work, and 
freedom from fear of death.  Therefore, it cannot survive strict 
scrutiny. 
III 
No. 
2020AP1775   
 
14 
 
¶25 We 
conclude 
that 
Counterman 
applies 
to 
civil 
harassment injunctions premised on true threats.  Even if Aish's 
speech fell into this unprotected category of speech, the 
circuit court did not find that he "consciously disregarded a 
substantial risk that his communications would be viewed as 
threatening violence."  Counterman, 600 U.S. at 69.  Therefore, 
we conclude that the injunction is not permissible on this 
basis.  Additionally, we determine the injunction is a content-
based restriction on Aish's speech and that it fails to satisfy 
strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to protect a 
compelling state interest.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
injunction violates the First Amendment, and remand to the 
circuit court with instructions to vacate the injunction.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
No.  2020AP1775.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶26 REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (concurring 
in 
the 
judgment).   
 
[I]f Men are to be precluded from offering their 
sentiments on a matter, which may involve the most 
serious and alarming consequences, that can invite the 
consideration of Mankind; reason is of no use to us——
the freedom of Speech may be taken away——and, dumb & 
silent we may be led, like sheep, to the Slaughter.   
From George Washington to Officers of the Army, 15 March 1783.1 
¶27 Brian Aish protested regularly at a Planned Parenthood 
clinic in Blair, Wisconsin.  On multiple occasions, Aish made 
statements directed at a Planned Parenthood employee, Nancy 
Kindschy, as she left the Planned Parenthood facility.  Based on 
those statements, the circuit court ordered Aish to avoid places 
temporarily occupied by Kindschy, effectively enjoining Aish 
from protesting at the Blair Planned Parenthood facility for 
four years.  Aish contends the injunction violates the First 
Amendment.  It does.   
¶28 For the injunction to clear the First Amendment, the 
majority holds it must either proscribe a true threat or the 
injunction must survive strict scrutiny.  The majority does not 
decide whether Aish's comments were true threats; instead, it 
holds the injunction violates the First Amendment because the 
circuit court did not make the required mens rea finding under 
Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023), and the injunction 
fails strict scrutiny.  I agree.  But the injunction against 
Aish violates the First Amendment——and therefore must be 
                                                 
1 https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-
02-10840.  
No.  2020AP1775.rgb 
 
2 
 
vacated——for a more fundamental reason:  The circuit court never 
deemed Aish's statements true threats, and no reasonable 
factfinder could have made such a finding based on the record 
before the circuit court.  
I 
¶29 Kindschy worked as a nurse practitioner at the Planned 
Parenthood facility in Blair, Wisconsin.2  The facility was open 
only on Tuesdays from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.  Aish protested at 
the facility nearly every Tuesday, between 12:00 p.m. and 
closing time.  Aish would share his religious views and his 
views on Planned Parenthood and abortion with those entering and 
leaving the facility.   
¶30 On 
March 
10, 
2020, 
Kindschy 
petitioned 
for 
a 
harassment injunction against Aish under Wis. Stat. § 813.125.  
To grant an injunction under § 813.125, a circuit court must 
conclude "reasonable grounds [exist] to believe that the 
respondent has engaged in harassment with intent to harass or 
intimidate the petitioner."  § 813.125(4)(a)3.  The statute 
defines "harassment," as relevant in this case, as "[e]ngaging 
in a course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts which 
harass 
or 
intimidate 
another 
person 
and 
which 
serve 
no 
legitimate purpose."3  § 813.125(1)(am)4.b.  The circuit court 
held hearings on July 13 and September 9, 2020.   
                                                 
2  Kindschy has since retired, according to her counsel.   
3 "Harassment" is statutorily defined to also include 
"[s]triking, shoving, kicking or otherwise subjecting another 
person to physical contact; engaging in an act that would 
constitute abuse under s. 48.02 (1), sexual assault under s. 
940.225, 
or 
stalking 
under 
s. 
940.32; 
or 
attempting 
or 
No.  2020AP1775.rgb 
 
3 
 
¶31 Kindschy testified that on October 8, 2019, as she 
left the Blair Planned Parenthood facility,  Aish stood on the 
sidewalk three to four feet away from her vehicle holding a 
sign.  Aish looked at Kindschy and said, "You have time to 
repent.  You will be lucky if you don't get killed by a drunk 
driver on your way home.  Bad things are going to start 
happening to you and your family."  According to Kindschy, Aish 
was "very aggressive," "loud," and "very stern" during this 
interaction.  She testified his statements made her fearful.  
According to Kindschy, Aish had never before made comments about 
her possibly being killed or bad things happening to her family.   
¶32 Kindschy testified that on October 15, 2019, as she 
left the clinic, Aish received a ticket from a police officer.4  
Aish told her she has blood on her hands.  According to 
Kindschy, Aish was "cold, angry, and loud."  Kindschy also 
testified that on October 29, 2019, as she drove out of the 
facility's parking area, Aish walked from the sidewalk onto the 
road and waived an anti-abortion sign close to her vehicle.     
¶33 The next relevant interaction between Kindschy and 
Aish occurred on February 18, 2020.  Kindschy testified Aish 
stood on the sidewalk a few feet from her vehicle and said, 
"Ma'am, you have time to repent.  If I recall, you are 
Lutheran."  He told her she has blood on her hands, called her a 
liar, and asked, "Do you know who plays the game of lies, ma'am?  
                                                                                                                                                             
threatening to do the same."  Wis. Stat. § 813.125(1)(am)4.a.     
4 Kindschy's testimony does not explain why Aish received a 
ticket. 
No.  2020AP1775.rgb 
 
4 
 
It's [S]atan.  Satan will come to judge you."  He also said she 
would be "lucky if [she] got home safely and that [she] could 
possibly be killed and that bad things are going to start 
happening to [her] family."  According to Kindschy, she felt 
threatened by these words.  Aish made the comments to her 
directly, and according to Kindschy, he was "very loud, very 
stern, and he was very agitated."   
¶34 Kindschy recorded this interaction, and the recording 
was submitted into evidence during the hearing.  The recording 
shows Aish was not loud, stern, or agitated.  He stood on the 
sidewalk, several feet away from Kindschy.  He held a sign that 
said, "Those who love me, obey me!  Jesus."  Aish said to 
Kindschy, "You play the game of the lies ma'am.  You know who 
the father of all lies is?"  He also remarked, "You're a 
professing Christian.  If I remember right, you are Lutheran 
aren't you?"  He then stated, "You understand the father of all 
lies is Satan, not God.  You mock but he'll be mocking on the 
day of your judgment."  As Kindschy entered the front driver's 
side of her vehicle, Aish can be heard saying, "I'll pray you 
guys make it home safely for another day or two so you turn to 
Christ and repent.  You still have time."  Kindschy testified 
the recording reflected how Aish behaved during all relevant 
interactions.   
¶35 The final encounter occurred a few days after the 
recorded interaction, on February 25, 2020.  Kindschy testified 
Aish said she lied about him to the authorities, she still has 
time to repent, and she would "be lucky if [she is] able to make 
No.  2020AP1775.rgb 
 
5 
 
it home safely."  She testified she felt threatened by being 
called a liar.  Aish was "very loud," "very stern," and "very 
agitated."  Kindschy acknowledged Aish never touched her or her 
vehicle and remained on the sidewalk during the relevant 
encounters.   
¶36 Although Aish directed specific comments at Kindschy, 
she testified Aish made what Kindschy characterized as harassing 
comments to other staff and patients.  For example, Aish told 
the building's security guard, "they're training you to be a 
death court, they're training you to have a hardened heart."  To 
a new medical assistant, he said, "They're training you to have 
a hardened heart; that's Planned Parenthood's way."  Aish told 
patients the clinic condones abortion and Planned Parenthood is 
a "murder mill."5   
                                                 
5 Two center managers for Planned Parenthood also testified. 
Shonda Racine confirmed that on October 8, 2019, Aish told 
Kindschy she has "blood on [her] hands" and "[b]ad things are 
going to start happening to you and your family; you need to 
repent; I cannot help you."  Racine said she thought these 
statements were threats.  She testified that on October 15, 
2019, Aish told Kindschy she has "blood on [her] hands."  On 
October 29, 2019, Aish again said to Kindschy, "You need to 
repent, you have blood on your hands."  Racine testified that on 
each one of these dates, Aish was "aggressive," "[l]oud," and 
"angry."  He was "yelling and screaming."  According to Racine, 
Aish never touched her or Kindschy.  Racine also testified Aish 
would protest throughout the day when he was at the Blair 
Planned Parenthood facility, sharing his position with those 
around him.  Racine also watched the video of the February 18, 
2020, incident.  According to her, Aish was louder during the 
October, 2019 incidents she witnessed.   
No.  2020AP1775.rgb 
 
6 
 
¶37 Aish also testified.  He described his Christian 
beliefs and explained the purpose of his protests was to "share 
the gospel with young women murdering their children."  He 
explained he would go to the Blair Planned Parenthood facility, 
among other places, to "share the gospel" and "warn those going 
in there that if they're going to even consider torturing and 
murdering their child for convenience or choice, they're being 
misled and they're going to be accountable because they're 
shedding 
innocent 
blood 
of 
a 
child . . . ." 
 
By 
"held 
accountable," Aish meant by God.  He testified he would stay 
until the Blair Planned Parenthood facility closed to try to 
convince the last patients not to be "misled" and to share his 
religious views with them.  "I want them to turn away from their 
sin and because 7,000 people are dying every day in this 
country, we don't know if we're going to have another 
day . . . so we try to warn them because they may not make it to 
next week, with DUI accidents, murder or criminal behavior and 
all of that."   
¶38 Aish denied targeting Kindschy in particular, but said 
he has known her longer than any of the other employees.  He 
shared his message with nearly everyone.  Aish expressed that 
his protests came from a place of "love."  "We're there because 
we're trying to warn them and trying to get them to repent and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Jess Beranek testified Aish directed his comments to 
Kindschy on February 18, 2020.  Beranek also testified Kindschy 
appeared bothered and scared after the incident.  According to 
Beranek, Aish became more aggressive after the location became a 
Planned Parenthood facility.  It is unclear from the record on 
what date Planned Parenthood began operating the facility.   
No.  2020AP1775.rgb 
 
7 
 
turn 
away 
from 
their 
sinful 
lifestyle, 
especially 
doing 
something so heinous as being involved with Planned Parenthood."  
Aish stated he had no intention of harming Kindschy.  Telling 
Kindschy she could be killed by a drunk driver was, according to 
Aish, part of his religious message:  "I'm warning them because 
7,000 people die in this country every day and most of them do 
not know the gospel and we don't know if we'll have a tomorrow.  
So God warns us, don't assume you're going to have a tomorrow, 
worry about today."   
¶39 While the circuit court found all of the witnesses 
credible, it noted Kindschy sometimes blurred days together and 
sometimes "wasn't exactly clear on certain details."  Aish, 
according to the circuit court, was "very credible as to what 
happened on the incidents, as well as his positions on his 
religious beliefs."   
¶40 Ultimately, the circuit court issued an injunction 
against Aish.  The court based the injunction on statements made 
by Aish on three occasions, which the court found were directed 
at Kindschy specifically:  (1) October 8, 2019 ("You have time 
to repent.  You will be lucky if you don't get killed by a drunk 
driver on your way home.  Bad things are going to start 
happening to you and your family."); (2) February 18, 2020 
("I'll pray you guys make it home safely for another day or two 
so you turn to Christ and repent.  You still have time."); and 
(3) February 25, 2020 (Kindschy would "be lucky if [she is] able 
to make it home safely.").  The circuit court found that Aish 
was not angry or aggressive while making these statements; 
No.  2020AP1775.rgb 
 
8 
 
rather, based on the video footage of the February 18, 2020, 
incident, the court found Aish was merely "passionate about his 
beliefs."  Nevertheless, the circuit court said such comments 
would be intimidating "even in the context that is presented 
here of trying to convey a message of repentance."  Although 
Aish was "trying to share the gospel" and change the behavior of 
those working at Planned Parenthood, coming from a "place of 
love 
or 
nonaggression," 
the 
circuit 
court 
found 
Aish's 
statements "would intimidate somebody" because the statements 
"address somebody's loss of life."   
¶41 The circuit court also determined Aish's conduct 
served no legitimate purpose.  The court found Aish wanted to 
"scare" Kindschy into leaving Planned Parenthood's employ and 
adopting his religious beliefs.  According to the court, Aish's 
"scare tactics" were not a legitimate method to achieve his 
goals.  Although the court noted the importance of Aish's First 
Amendment right to protest, the circuit court ultimately 
determined Kindschy should not "have to even think about that 
she might get killed on her way home or bad things are going to 
happen to her and her family."  The circuit court ordered Aish 
to cease harassing Kindschy; to avoid her residence or any 
premises 
temporarily 
occupied 
by 
her; 
and 
to 
avoid 
all 
communication with her.   
II 
¶42 Freedom of speech is a principal pillar of a free 
government; when this support is taken away, the 
constitution of a free society is dissolved, and 
tyranny is erected on its ruins. 
No.  2020AP1775.rgb 
 
9 
 
Benjamin Franklin, On Freedom of Speech and the Press, Pa. 
Gazette, Nov. 1737, reprinted in 2 The Works of Benjamin 
Franklin 285, 285 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1840). 
¶43  The First Amendment reads, in relevant part, "Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."6  U.S. 
Const. amend. I.  With few exceptions, the state may not 
prohibit or restrict speech based on its content.  "The hallmark 
of the protection of free speech is to allow 'free trade in 
ideas'——even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people 
might find distasteful or discomforting."  Virginia v. Black, 
538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 
U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).  "Content-based 
regulations [of speech] are presumptively invalid" under the 
First Amendment.  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 
(1992).  Only "well-defined" and "narrowly limited" categories 
of speech fall beyond the historical protections of the First 
Amendment.  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 
(1942); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382-83.  "These 'historic and 
traditional categories long familiar to the bar,'" United States 
v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (quoting Simon & Schuster, 
Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 
127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)), include 
"true threats."  Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60; Watts v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (per curiam).   
                                                 
6 The United States Supreme Court has held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the First Amendment against 
the states.  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
No.  2020AP1775.rgb 
 
10 
 
¶44 Not all statements that stoke fear in listeners are 
true threats.  "True threats are 'serious expression[s]' 
conveying that a speaker means to 'commit an act of unlawful 
violence.'"  Counterman, 600 U.S. at 74 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 359).  Threats must be "real" for 
the government to proscribe them.  Elonis v. United States, 575 
U.S. 723, 747 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); State v. Perkins, 2001 WI 46, ¶17, 243 
Wis. 2d 141, 626 N.W.2d 762 ("[S]ome threatening words are 
protected speech under the First Amendment.").  True threats——as 
distinguished 
from 
protected 
expressions——"convey 
a 
real 
possibility that violence will follow."  Counterman, 600 U.S. at 
74 (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708).   
¶45 To constitute a true threat, the communication must 
express, explicitly or implicitly, that the speaker or a co-
conspirator intends to inflict imminent or future injury on the 
victim.  Id.; New York ex rel. Spitzer v. Operation Rescue 
Nat'l, 273 F.3d 184, 196 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. White, 
670 F.3d 498, 513-14 (4th Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood of 
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 
F.3d 1058, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); United States v. 
Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 636-37 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2011); United States 
v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392, 396 (10th Cir. 1999); United States 
v. Wheeler, 776 F.3d 736, 746 (10th Cir. 2015); United States v. 
Dillard, 795 F.3d 1191, 1201 (10th Cir. 2015).  This element is 
essential.  Speech cannot be punished or restricted on the 
No.  2020AP1775.rgb 
 
11 
 
ground that a listener "fears a generalized harm because of what 
the speaker has suggested."  Matthew G. T. Martin, True Threats, 
Militant Activists, and the First Amendment, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 
280, 315 (2003).  If the communication does not convey the 
speaker or a co-conspirator will enact violence on the victim, 
"then 
understanding 
the 
communication 
as 
a 
threat 
is 
'objectively less reasonable' and the perceptions and fears of 
the listener are devoid of a sufficiently rational basis."  Id. 
at 316 (footnotes omitted).   
¶46 Violence must be threatened, not "merely predicted," 
hoped 
for, 
or 
endorsed. 
 
Cassel, 
408 
F.3d 
at 
636-37; 
Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1119; United States v. Lincoln, 403 
F.3d 703, 707 (9th Cir. 2005); State v. Carroll, 196 A.3d 106, 
119 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018).  The standard for 
assessing a communication is an objective one; a statement is a 
true threat only if a reasonable listener,7 who is familiar with 
the full context, would understand the statement as conveying 
the speaker or a co-conspirator intends to inflict unlawful 
violence on a person or group of people.  See, e.g., Counterman, 
600 U.S. at 74 (quoting Elonis, 575 U.S. at 733) ("The existence 
of a threat depends . . . on 'what the statement conveys' to the 
                                                 
7 "The listener might be the victim of a threat or another 
recipient of the communication."  State v. Perkins, 2001 WI 46, 
¶25 n.15, 243 Wis. 2d 141, 626 N.W.2d 762.  Reasonable listeners 
are not "omniscient persons, aware of every fact potentially 
existing at the time of the speech.  The . . . 'reasonable 
listener' [is] limited in knowledge to the facts readily 
available to the . . . actual listener at the time of the speech 
at issue."  State v. Douglas D., 2001 WI 47, ¶34 n.12, 243 
Wis. 2d 204, 626 N.W.2d 725.   
No.  2020AP1775.rgb 
 
12 
 
person on the other end.").  "The speaker need not actually 
intend to carry out the threat," Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60; nor 
is it "necessary that the speaker have the ability to carry out 
the threat."8  Perkins, 243 Wis. 2d 141, ¶29.   
¶47 True threats are not protected by the First Amendment 
for a host of reasons:  The fear such threats inflict on 
individuals and society,9 the "disruption that fear engenders," 
and the possibility of preventing violence that may follow a 
threat.  R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388; see also Rogers v. United 
States, 422 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Like 
a threat to blow up a building, a serious threat on the 
President's 
life 
is 
enormously 
disruptive 
and 
involves 
substantial costs to the Government.").  Threats of violence can 
paralyze the victims of crime from taking action.  As Justice 
Samuel Alito has noted, "[t]hreats of violence and intimidation 
are among the most favored weapons of domestic abusers . . . ."  
Elonis, 575 U.S. at 748 (Alito, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); see Wittig v. Hoffart, 2005 WI App 198, 287 
Wis. 2d 353, 704 N.W.2d 415.   
                                                 
8 A speaker's known inability to carry out the alleged 
threat may make it less reasonable to believe the statement is a 
serious expression of intent to enact violence.  See State v. 
Krijger, 97 A.3d 946, 960 n.11 (Conn. 2014).   
9 Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 
25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 283, 291 (2001) ("The psychological 
fear created by a threat to oneself or one's family or the 
threat of serious property damage . . . is unquestionably a 
disturbing experience.  People who are forced to live under the 
shadow of such threats suffer a myriad of psychological and 
health problems including nightmares, heart problems, inability 
to work, loss of appetite, and insomnia.").   
No.  2020AP1775.rgb 
 
13 
 
¶48 Threats of violence undermine one of the central 
values animating the First Amendment:  deliberative democratic 
decision making.  Self-government requires a robust, uninhibited 
exchange of viewpoints.  See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 
U.S. 1, 4 (1949).  Threats of violence "silence the speech of 
others who become afraid to speak out," Counterman, 600 U.S. at 
89 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment), rendering the "market place of ideas,"10 upon which 
our democracy relies, less populous.  State v. Taylor, 866 
S.E.2d 740, ¶67 (N.C. 2021) (Earls, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (quoted source omitted) (alteration in 
original) ("If the cost of participating in public life is to be 
bombarded with serious threats of violence towards one's self 
and family, many people will choose to forego contributing their 
voices to the 'free exchange [that] facilitates an informed 
public opinion, which, when transmitted to lawmakers, helps 
produce laws that reflect the People's will.'"); Planned 
Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1086 (noting true threats "turn[] the 
First Amendment on its head" by shutting the victims of threats 
out of public debate through fear).  "[A] society which is 
forced to settle political disputes in the looming shadow of 
violence . . . cannot function as a self-governing democracy."  
Taylor, 866 S.E.2d 740, ¶69 (Earls, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).   
                                                 
10 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 56 (1953) (Douglas, 
J., concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("free trade in ideas").   
No.  2020AP1775.rgb 
 
14 
 
¶49 At the same time, "First Amendment vigilance is 
especially important when speech is disturbing, frightening, or 
painful, because the undesirability of such speech will place a 
heavy thumb in favor of silencing it" whether the First 
Amendment protects such speech or not.  Counterman, 600 U.S. at 
87 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).  Political speech is often caustic, heated, and 
outrageous, tempting would-be censors to recast political speech 
as threats of violence.  See Operation Rescue, 273 F.3d at 195-
96 ("As much as we might idealize the antiseptic, rational 
exchange of views, expressions of anger, outrage or indignation 
nonetheless play an indispensable role in the dynamic public 
exchange safeguarded by the First Amendment."); Martin, supra, 
at 296 (noting "much effective political rhetoric, as well as 
philosophical, religious, and motivational rhetoric, is meant to 
engender fear as a means to promote a paradigm shift").    
¶50 The 
First 
Amendment 
is 
a 
bulwark 
against 
the 
weaponization 
of 
the 
justice 
system 
to 
squelch 
or 
even 
criminalize disfavored political voices.  Courts are duty bound 
to protect the free exchange of thought on which our republic 
depends.  At the same time, courts ought not "lend a cloak of 
legitimacy to methods of achieving political change that are 
antithetical to everything the First Amendment stands for."  
Taylor, 866 S.E.2d 740, ¶70 (Earls, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  
III 
No.  2020AP1775.rgb 
 
15 
 
¶51 Whether a statement constitutes a true threat beyond 
the protection of the First Amendment is a question of fact 
usually left for the factfinder to decide, unless a statement is 
"unquestionably" protected by the First Amendment, such that no 
reasonable factfinder could find the statement is a true threat.  
See State v. Douglas D., 2001 WI 47, ¶33, 243 Wis. 2d 204, 626 
N.W.2d 725; accord Perkins, 243 Wis. 2d 141, ¶48; Watts, 394 
U.S. at 708; United States v. Clemens, 738 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 
2013); United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(citing United States v. Carrier, 672 F.2d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 
1982)); United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287, 298 (3d Cir. 
2013); United States v. Landham, 251 F.3d 1072, 1083 (6th Cir. 
2001); United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 497 (7th Cir. 2008); 
Brandy v. City of St. Louis, 75 F.4th 908, 915 (8th Cir. 2023); 
United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458, 462-63 (9th Cir. 1984); 
Wheeler, 776 F.3d at 742.11  The factfinder must consider the 
totality of the circumstances and "all relevant factors that 
might affect how the statement could reasonably be interpreted."  
Perkins, 243 Wis. 2d 141, ¶¶29, 31.  In this case, as the 
majority notes, majority op., ¶22, the circuit court did not 
consider whether Aish's statements were true threats and made no 
findings on that issue.12  Given the findings already made by the 
                                                 
11 But see United States v. Bly, 510 F.3d 453, 457-58 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 
466 U.S. 485, 506–11 (1984)) ("Whether a written communication 
contains either constitutionally protected 'political hyperbole' 
or an unprotected 'true threat' is a question of law and fact 
that we review de novo.").   
12 The lack of circuit court findings regarding true threats 
suffices to vacate the circuit court's injunction, and this 
No.  2020AP1775.rgb 
 
16 
 
circuit court after an evidentiary hearing, no reasonable 
factfinder could find Aish's statements were true threats.13   
IV 
¶52 A true threats analysis begins with an examination of 
the statements themselves.  See State v. Krijger, 97 A.3d 946, 
958 (Conn. 2014).  Aish made three statements to Kindschy on 
which the circuit court based the injunction: 
 October 8, 2019:  "You have time to repent.  You will 
be lucky if you don't get killed by a drunk driver on 
your way home.  Bad things are going to start 
happening to you and your family."   
 February 18, 2020:  "I'll pray you guys make it home 
safely for another day or two so you turn to Christ 
and repent.  You still have time." 
                                                                                                                                                             
court could have done so at least a year ago.  Successive rounds 
of supplemental briefing and oral argument ordered by the 
majority were unnecessary to decide this case, and the delay 
only prolonged the impermissible restraint on Aish's liberty.  
See Kindschy v. Aish, No. 2020AP1775, unpublished order (Wis. 
July 28, 2023) (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting); 
Kindschy v. Aish, No. 2020AP1775, unpublished order (Wis. Feb. 
5, 2024) (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting). 
13 "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."  
Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2).  "A circuit court's findings of fact are 
clearly erroneous when the finding is against the great weight 
and clear preponderance of the evidence.  Under the clearly 
erroneous standard, 'even though the evidence would permit a 
contrary finding, findings of fact will be affirmed on appeal as 
long as the evidence would permit a reasonable person to make 
the same finding.'"  Royster-Clark, Inc. v. Olsen's Mill, Inc., 
2006 WI 46, ¶12, 290 Wis. 2d 264, 714 N.W.2d 530 (internal 
citations and quoted source omitted); Phelps v. Physicians Ins. 
Co. of Wis., 2009 WI 74, ¶39, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 615.   
No.  2020AP1775.rgb 
 
17 
 
 February 25, 2020:  Aish said that Kindschy lied about 
him to the authorities, she still has time to repent, 
and she would "be lucky if [she is] able to make it 
home safely."   
On their face, Aish's statements cannot be interpreted as true 
threats.  
 
¶53 Aish uttered words of caution or warnings, not threats 
of violence.  The statement, "Bad things are going to start 
happening to you and your family," does not overtly refer to 
violence.  "Bad things" could include violence, but they could 
just as easily include other undesirable outcomes, such as the 
loss of a job.   
¶54 More 
importantly, 
none 
of 
the 
three 
statements 
suggested Aish or a co-conspirator would be the one to cause any 
harm 
to 
Kindschy. 
 
At 
most, 
the 
statements 
suggested 
unaffiliated third parties could cause Kindschy harm, like a 
"drunk driver."  When Aish specified what kind of harm might 
befall Kindschy, it was a harm he would be extremely unlikely to 
cause and not something he would intend.  If a statement does 
not 
expressly 
or 
implicitly 
suggest 
the 
speaker 
or 
co-
conspirator intends to commit the violence, the statement cannot 
be viewed as a true threat.  "[T]he statement, 'If you smoke 
cigarettes you will die of lung cancer,' is protected, even 
though its purpose is to scare you into quitting smoking.  So 
is, 'If you mess around with Tom's girlfriend, he'll break your 
legs,' unless the speaker is sent by Tom."  Planned Parenthood 
of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 244 
No.  2020AP1775.rgb 
 
18 
 
F.3d 1007, 1015 n.8 (9th Cir. 2001), aff'd in part, vacated and 
remanded in part, 290 F.3d 1058.  People who believe employees 
of abortion providers "are sinners who are going to be struck 
down by the hand of God should be able to voice their beliefs.  
The line is crossed, however, when the speaker suggests that he 
or his associates will help God by taking action down on Earth."  
Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 283, 346 (2001).  On their face, Aish's 
statements did not cross that line.   
¶55 Aish's statements could not be true threats of 
violence because he disclaimed any desire for violence to befall 
Kindschy.  Lincoln, 403 F.3d at 707 (holding a letter could not 
be a true threat because the author "disassociated himself from 
any violent action"); In re R.D., 464 P.3d 717, ¶53 (Colo. 2020) 
(A true threats inquiry "should [] examine whether the speaker 
said or did anything to undermine the credibility of the 
[alleged] threat."); cf. Krijger, 97 A.3d at 961 (speaker 
apologizing immediately after saying the listener would get into 
a car accident, just as his son did years earlier, undercut the 
threatening undertone of the statement).  For example, Aish said 
he would "pray" Kindschy made it home safely so that she could 
"turn to Christ and repent."  Aish thereby expressed he did not 
want Kindschy to get hurt.  Instead, he hoped she would adopt 
his religious views and leave her job at Planned Parenthood.  In 
other statements, Aish again implored Kindschy to "repent" and 
only then suggested a car accident could occur.  If the harm 
Aish predicted happened to Kindschy, she could not repent; 
No.  2020AP1775.rgb 
 
19 
 
Kindschy's repentance, not harm to her, was Aish's stated 
objective.  None of Aish's statements conveyed an intent to 
enact violence on Kindschy.   
¶56 A true threat analysis does not end with what a 
statement means on its face, however.  As with all other forms 
of communication, context is everything.  See Perkins, 243 
Wis. 2d 141, ¶¶29, 31; Douglas D., 243 Wis. 2d 204, ¶¶38-39.  
The Sixth Circuit explained:  
A reasonable listener understands that a gangster 
growling "I'd like to sew your mouth shut" to a 
recalcitrant debtor carries a different connotation 
from the impression left when a candidate uses those 
same 
words 
during 
a 
political 
debate. 
 
And 
a 
reasonable listener knows that the words "I'll tear 
your head off" mean something different when uttered 
by a professional football player from when uttered by 
a serial killer.  
United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 480 (6th Cir. 2012).  A 
true threat may "blossom[]" or wither away when context is 
considered.  Lincoln, 403 F.3d at 704; In re S.W., 45 A.3d 151, 
156 (D.C. 2012) ("A threat is more than language in a vacuum.  
It is not always reasonable——and sometimes it is patently 
irrational——to take every pronouncement at face value."); Fogel 
v. Collins, 531 F.3d 824, 832 (9th Cir. 2008) (speech may not be 
a true threat in context even if "taken literally").  A burning 
cross placed on one's lawn does not literally say, "I am going 
to kill you."  But given the grotesque history of cross burning 
in the United States, the message is unmistakable to the 
recipient.  See generally, Black, 538 U.S. 343.   
¶57 An expression that in one context may be a warning 
could be a veiled threat of violence in another——"you better 
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watch your back," for example.  State v. Taveras, 271 A.3d 123, 
131 (Conn. 2022).  Context is how we distinguish warnings from 
veiled threats.  "You've got to give him the money or he'll kill 
you" is likely a warning if coming from one's wife, and a threat 
if coming from a henchman.  Given the relevant context, Aish's 
statements can only be understood as warnings to Kindschy that 
she needed to repent before harm befell her.  From Aish's point 
of view, Kindschy engaged in sinful conduct, and should repent 
and cease such conduct or risk God's condemnation.  Some might 
be disturbed by Aish's comments, but they were not true threats.   
¶58 The environment in which speech is uttered and the 
events 
leading 
up 
to 
a 
statement 
are 
valid 
contextual 
considerations in any true threats inquiry.  Jeffries, 692 F.3d 
at 482; State v. Carroll, 196 A.3d. at 117.  In this case, 
Aish's comments were made in the context of his ongoing and 
religiously inspired protests at the Blair Planned Parenthood 
facility.  The testimony shows Aish visited the grounds outside 
the facility regularly to protest Planned Parenthood and 
abortion, and he shared his religious message with nearly 
everyone.  Although true threats can, of course, be made at 
protests, when statements are made as a part of an ongoing 
protest, a reasonable listener is more likely to see the 
statement as charged political or religious rhetoric, not a 
sincere threat of violence.  See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.  In 
this case, Aish's protests took place on the sidewalk outside of 
the Planned Parenthood facility——the traditional forum for 
sharing ideas.  See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988) 
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(quoted source omitted) (alteration in original) ("'[T]ime out 
of mind' public streets and sidewalks have been used for public 
assembly and debate . . . .").   
¶59 The meaning of a statement can change depending on the 
tone and demeanor of the speaker.  State v. A.S., 2001 WI 48, 
¶24, 243 Wis. 2d 173, 626 N.W.2d 712; United States v. Alaboud, 
347 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Ivers, 
967 F.3d 709, 719 (8th Cir. 2020).  "I'm going to kill you" said 
with a smile and laugh is unlikely a true threat; in contrast, 
"I'm going to kill you" said in angry, aggressive, or rage-
filled tones, is more likely to be a true threat.  Kindschy 
contends Aish was loud, angry, and aggressive when he made his 
statements.  The recording that captured the events of February 
18, 2020, belies her account.  The recording reveals Aish was 
not loud, angry, or aggressive; he spoke with a normal tone and 
demeanor.  Indeed, the circuit court found that Aish was not 
angry or aggressive during their interactions, but "passionate 
about his beliefs."  Based on this record, it is far more 
reasonable to understand Aish's statements as warnings grounded 
in his religious beliefs rather than veiled threats.   
¶60 The nature and specificity of the alleged threats are 
also relevant factors.  Alaboud, 347 F.3d at 1297.  Aish's 
statements were somewhat vague.  He indicated "[b]ad things" 
would begin to happen to Kindschy and her family if she didn't 
repent.  He also suggested she could get into a car accident, 
perhaps caused by a drunk driver.  These statements lacked 
"accurate details tending to heighten" the reasonable belief the 
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speaker will act on his statements.  R.D., 464 P.3d 717, ¶53; 
Bailey v. Iles, 87 F.4th 275, 285 (5th Cir. 2023) (social media 
post held not to be a true threat, in part, because it failed to 
"threaten[] [a] specific harm at [a] specific location[]"); 
United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411, 421 n.5 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(distinguishing "obviously flippant statement[s]" from "lengthy 
and detailed discussion[s]" of harm).  The statements did not 
suggest Aish planned to harm Kindschy or "considered acting on 
these supposed threats."  Taylor, 866 S.E.2d 740, ¶82 (Earls, 
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see Ivers, 967 F.3d 
at 717 ("'You don't know the 50 different ways I planned to kill 
her.'").       
¶61 In assessing whether a statement is a sincere warning 
or a veiled threat, courts consider whether the listener had 
reason to believe the speaker had a propensity to engage in 
violence.  Perkins, 243 Wis. 2d 141, ¶31 (quoting United States 
v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000)); S.W., 45 A.3d at 
158-60.  For example, in Wittig v. Hoffart, the court of appeals 
held a speaker's threats to kill his wife could reasonably be 
viewed as true threats, as opposed to "empty posturing, devoid 
of any venal intent," because of his prior pattern of abusing 
the victim.  287 Wis. 2d 353, ¶¶18-20.  The past abuse included 
yelling at her, shaking her head, pushing her down and dragging 
her, suffocating her with a pillow, touching her sexually in an 
inappropriate manner, and putting his hands around her neck and 
squeezing.  Id., ¶¶2-4.  In short, because he "'made good on his 
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threats in the past,'" it made sense to take his threats to kill 
her seriously.  Id., ¶3.   
¶62 Nothing in the record suggests a listener would 
believe Aish had a propensity for violence.  Nothing in the 
record suggests Aish threatened to harm Kindschy or anyone else 
in the past.  See Douglas D., 243 Wis. 2d 204, ¶37; United 
States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 917-18 (8th Cir. 1996).  Nor 
does the record indicate Aish committed any violent acts against 
anyone——ever.  See Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 917-18, 925.  Kindschy 
testified Aish never touched her or her vehicle at any point; he 
remained on the sidewalk, several feet away from her, during 
each of the three encounters.  The record is bereft of any 
evidence Aish took steps to carry out a plan to harm others.  
Parr, 545 F.3d at 501 ("[W]hen a person says he plans to blow up 
a building, he will naturally be taken more seriously if he has 
a history of building bombs and supporting terrorism.")  The 
record lacks any evidence Aish endorsed or advocated for 
violence against employees of abortion providers or associated 
with anyone who did.  Id.; Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 918 (speaker 
was "a well-known advocate of the viewpoint that it is 
appropriate to use lethal force to prevent a doctor from 
performing abortions"); Dillard, 795 F.3d at 1201-02 (speaker 
had a publicized friendship with someone who recently killed the 
location's only abortion provider).  In short, none of Aish's 
past actions or background suggests he is or was apt to enact 
violence on Kindschy.   
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¶63  Kindschy 
argues 
Aish's 
comments 
are 
reasonably 
understood as veiled threats in light of historical and ongoing 
violence perpetrated against abortion providers.  But Kindschy 
has never explained why Aish's statements should be viewed as 
threats in light this violence.  While it is true a veiled 
threat may exist when "a speaker makes a statement against a 
known background of targeted violence," Thunder Studios, Inc. v. 
Kazal, 13 F.4th 736, 746 (9th Cir. 2021), unlike other cases 
involving abortion providers, none of Aish's comments alluded 
to, or were concomitant with, any real-world acts of violence.  
Cf. A.S., 243 Wis. 2d 173, ¶23 (student's statements that he 
would kill everyone at his school could be true threats because 
the student made allusions to a similar, real-world event, 
familiar to himself and others at the school:  the Columbine 
High School shooting).   
¶64 In United States v. Hart, the defendant parked two 
Ryder trucks close to the doors of an abortion clinic, blocking 
the entrances.  212 F.3d at 1072.  He left each truck unattended 
and without indicating their purpose.  Id. at 1069.  On its own, 
this was not a true threat.  Only two years earlier, however, a 
federal office building had been bombed, and the crime involved 
a Ryder truck.  Id. at 1070.  Given the Ryder trucks' history 
and placement at the entrances of the facility, the employees of 
the facility, unsurprisingly, worried their building would be 
bombed too.  Unlike the trucks in Hart, Aish's statements did 
not allude to any recent, or well-known, real-world acts of 
intentional violence.   
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¶65 In United States v. Dillard, a family practitioner, 
Dr. Mila Means, publicly confirmed she would offer abortion 
services to the public in Wichita.  795 F.3d at 1196.  At the 
time, no doctors were performing abortions in Wichita; the last 
doctor to do so (Dr. George Tiller) was murdered two years 
prior.  Id.  In a letter to Dr. Means, Angela Dillard wrote, "If 
Tiller could speak from hell, he would tell you what a soulless 
existence 
you 
are 
purposefully 
considering . . . ." 
 
Id.  
Dillard added, "You will be checking under your car everyday——
because maybe today is the day someone places an explosive under 
it."  Id.  "I urge you to think very carefully about the choices 
you are making.  . . . We will not let this abomination continue 
without doing everything we can to stop it."  Id. at 1197.  
Dillard also had a publicized friendship with Dr. Tiller's 
killer.  Id. at 1202.  As the Tenth Circuit explained:   
The context in this case includes Wichita's past 
history of violence against abortion providers, the 
culmination of this violence in Dr. Tiller's murder 
less than two years before Defendant mailed her 
letter, Defendant's publicized friendship with Dr. 
Tiller's killer, and her reported admiration of his 
convictions.  When viewed in this context, the 
letter's reference to someone placing an explosive 
under Dr. Means' car may reasonably be taken as a 
serious and likely threat of injury, and Defendant's 
discussion of what Dr. Tiller might say if he "could 
speak from hell"——which inherently carries an implicit 
allusion to his death——can reasonably be read to 
provide an additional threatening undertone to the 
letter.   
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Id. at 1201.14  No similar contextual factors exist in this case.  
Nothing in the record documents any history of violence at the 
Blair Planned Parenthood facility.  Aish's statements did not 
allude to past acts of intentional violence against abortion 
providers.  There is no evidence Aish endorsed or associated 
with anyone who has engaged in violent activism.   
¶66 Courts must be careful not to use the context of 
background violence by third parties to misconstrue obviously 
non-threatening speech as true threats.  Doing so would 
impermissibly chill the speech of those who express a position 
shared by a violent fringe.  The "fear of liability due to third 
party action would deprive the marketplace of particular ideas 
and particular speakers of the liberty to express such ideas."  
Martin, supra, at 306.   
¶67 The conditional nature of Aish's statements is not 
very probative.  Conditional statements are sometimes less 
threatening than non-conditional statements.  See Watts, 394 
U.S. at 706-08 ("'If they ever make me carry a rifle the first 
man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.'").  Aish suggested bad 
things, including death, could happen if Kindschy did not 
repent.  While warnings are generally conditional ("If you don't 
buckle your seatbelt, you may die in a car crash"), so are most 
threats.  United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Velasquez, 772 F.2d 1348, 
                                                 
14 See also United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 917 
(8th Cir. 1996); Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. 
v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1085 (9th Cir. 
2002) (en banc).    
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1357 (7th Cir. 1985)) ("Most threats are conditional; they are 
designed to accomplish something; the threatener hopes that they 
will accomplish it, so that he won't have to carry out the 
threats.").  Because the conditional nature of Aish's statements 
could cut either way, that factor cannot be dispositive in this 
case.   
¶68 The listener's reaction is not very probative either.  
Although Kindschy testified she felt threatened by Aish's 
statements, such testimony is not dispositive.15  See Douglas D., 
243 Wis. 2d 204, ¶37 (holding a creative writing assignment 
describing the teacher having her head cut off by a student, 
which the teacher believed was a threat, was not a true threat 
under the First Amendment); Wheeler, 776 F.3d at 746 (listener's 
reaction is "not dispositive").  The test for whether a 
statement 
constitutes 
a 
true 
threat 
is 
objective, 
not 
subjective.  We consider whether a reasonable listener, given 
relevant context, would understand Aish's statements as threats 
                                                 
15 Kindschy did not pursue her claim of harassment under 
Wis. Stat. § 813.125(1)(am)4.a., which defines "harassment" as 
"[s]triking, shoving, kicking or otherwise subjecting another 
person to physical contact . . . or attempting or threatening to 
do the same."  As counsel for Kindschy conceded before the 
circuit court, that definition is "not relevant" in this case.   
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of violence.16  Elonis, 575 U.S. at 751 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(explaining the reasonable listener test ensures speech will not 
"be suppressed at the will of an eggshell observer"); Operation 
Rescue, 273 F.3d at 196 ("[E]xcessive reliance on the reaction 
of recipients would endanger First Amendment values, in large 
part by potentially misconstruing the ultimate source of the 
fear.").  On its own, a listener's reaction cannot convert non-
threatening statements into true threats.  See R.D., 464 P.3d 
717, ¶61.   
¶69  In some cases, directing a statement to a particular 
person might suggest the statement is a threat.  See Hart, 212 
F.3d at 1071.  Although Aish's statements were made directly to 
Kindschy, a reasonable listener would not believe Aish intended 
to inflict violence on Kindschy.  A clearly non-threatening 
statement, such as a word of caution or warning, does not become 
threating merely because it is directed to a particular person.  
An indirect warning is often ineffective.    
V 
¶70 A law that can be directed against speech found 
offensive to some portion of the public can be turned 
against minority and dissenting views to the detriment 
                                                 
16 Importantly, the record does not indicate Kindschy ever 
reported Aish's statements to the police as threats of violence.  
See United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 
2011); New York ex rel. Spitzer v. Operation Rescue Nat'l, 273 
F.3d 184, 196 n.5. (2d Cir. 2001).  Nothing in the record shows 
how police officers reacted to his statements.  It is also 
unclear what Kindschy meant when she testified she felt 
threatened by Aish.  During her testimony, she said she felt 
threatened by Aish on February 25, 2020, because he called her a 
liar.  Calling someone a liar does not convey an intent to enact 
violence.     
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of all.  The First Amendment does not entrust that 
power to the government's benevolence.  Instead, our 
reliance must be on the substantial safeguards of free 
and open discussion in a democratic society. 
Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218, 253–54 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
¶71 The government may not silence speech simply because 
it offends or frightens others.  The circuit court entered an 
injunction against Aish because it believed Kindschy should not 
"have to even think about that she might get killed on her way 
home or bad things are going to happen to her and her family."  
The First Amendment, however, protects speech that makes people 
think about the possibility of their deaths.  Unless a 
reasonable listener, who is familiar with the full context, 
would understand the statement as conveying the speaker or a co-
conspirator intends to inflict unlawful violence on a person or 
group of people, the speech cannot be restricted or punished.   
¶72 Some might regard Aish's speech as frightening, 
offensive, and hurtful.  But silencing speech because it offends 
"strikes at the heart of the First amendment."  Id. at 246 
(plurality opinion).  "'If there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may 
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society 
finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.'"  Snyder v. 
Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).  "[T]he proudest boast of our free speech 
jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express 'the 
thought that we hate.'"  Matal, 528 U.S. at 246 (quoting United 
States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., 
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dissenting)).  Before the People ratified the Constitution, our 
Founders understood that infringing the essential liberty to 
speak freely would imperil our freedom.  
¶73 Free speech rights bear a cost.  They force us to 
endure distressing and loathsome speech.  See, e.g., Snyder, 562 
U.S. at 454 (holding the First Amendment protected the picketing 
of a funeral with signs that included messages such as "Thank 
God for IEDs," "God Hates Fags," and "Thank God for Dead 
Soldiers"); Bible Believers v. Wayne Cnty., 805 F.3d 228, 238 
(6th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (protesters carrying signs saying, 
inter alia, "Islam Is A Religion of Blood and Murder" along with 
"a severed pig's head on a spike").  That is the price we pay 
for living in a free society that tolerates and encourages, 
rather than suppresses, alternative points of view.  Free speech 
stands as a bulwark against tyranny. 
 
¶74 Because a reasonable factfinder could not construe 
Aish's statements as true threats, the First Amendment protects 
them.  An unconstitutional injunction impermissibly infringed 
Aish's fundamental First Amendment right to speak freely on "a 
profound moral issue on which Americans hold sharply conflicting 
views."  Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 223 
(2022).  The government violated Aish's free speech rights for 
nearly four years, in part because of this court's avoidable 
delay in deciding the matter.  Any future attempt to enjoin Aish 
based on those statements would violate the Constitution.  
 
¶75 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this concurrence.  
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