Title: People v. Garcia
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 84354
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: November 18, 1999

Docket No. 84354-Agenda 5-May 1999.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ROLANDO GARCIA, Appellee.
Opinion filed November 18, 1999.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Rolando Garcia, was charged with a single count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.
720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 1994). Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant was
convicted of the lesser-included offense of possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(a)(2)(A) (West 1994))
and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. The appellate court reversed. 292 Ill. App. 3d 685. We allowed the State's
petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) and now reverse the decision of the appellate court.
BACKGROUND
The appellate court provided a full accounting of the facts in the present case. We will repeat only those facts that are
relevant to the issues before us. The evidence in this case established that, on the morning of September 16, 1994, Chicago
police officers executed an arrest warrant for a person named "Hygie," as well as a search warrant for a residence located at
5520 South Francisco in Chicago. When the police arrived at the house, they were met by Alfredo Aguilar. While searching
the unfinished basement, the police found dirty adult clothing, a laundry area, a bed in a sleeping area, and a pool table.
One officer opened a utility closet along a wall of the basement and found a gas meter, and a small box of plastic sandwich
bags on a ledge several inches over the inner door of the closet. The box contained 24 small plastic bags of a white, rock-like substance, a small scale, some mail, traffic citations and court summonses issued to defendant. The traffic citations
indicated that, on July 23, 1994, defendant lived at that address. The court summonses were dated September 12, 1994, and
issued to defendant at that address.
Officer Ethel Scherr testified that, on September 29, 1994, she and her partner responded to a call regarding a suspicious
van containing two occupants in the 5400 block of South Rockwell. When Officer Scherr approached the van and asked
defendant for some identification, he could produce none, and was taken to the police station. At the police station,
defendant told the police his name and address, 5520 South Francisco. Officer Scherr testified that defendant did not seem
surprised when told of an outstanding narcotics warrant for his arrest. Defendant admitted the police had been to his home
recently. During this inquiry, defendant showed the officers a tattoo on his arm which read, "Hygie."
The defense called two of defendant's friends as witnesses. Michael Bagain testified that on the day of the police raid
defendant resided on Archer Avenue in Summit, Illinois. Also on the day of the raid, Bagain purchased cocaine from
Aguilar at 5520 South Francisco. Timothy Goheen testified that defendant moved into Goheen's apartment on Archer
Avenue in Summit sometime in September 1994.
After the parties rested, the attorneys met with the trial judge to discuss what instructions should be given to the jury. When
the court asked defense counsel whether he was offering an instruction on the lesser-included offense of possession of a
controlled substance, defense counsel answered in the negative.
The trial court then referred to the case of People v. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d 224 (1994), and admonished defendant of his
right to determine whether he wanted to request a jury instruction on the lesser-included but uncharged offense. The court
reviewed the charged offense and potential sentence and identified the lesser-included offense and potential sentence.
Defendant stated that he agreed with his lawyer's decision and did not want to request a lesser-included offense instruction.
The court then asked defendant his age and educational background, establishing that defendant was 21 years old and had
completed twelfth grade. The court told defendant and the parties that it had a responsibility to give the jury a
lesser-included offense instruction sua sponte if the evidence warranted it. The court summarized the evidence, noting the
small amount of narcotics recovered, and found that the evidence warranted a lesser-included offense instruction. The court
held that such an instruction was "fair under the circumstances of this case." The court stated it had the authority and
discretion to order such instruction and was going to do so, despite defendant's objection. The jury subsequently found
defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance.
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, in which he argued that the court erred in submitting a jury instruction sua sponte
on the lesser-included offense of possession of a controlled substance. After providing the justification for its earlier
reasoning, the trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial
court, and we granted the State leave to appeal.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, the State maintains that the trial court could give the jury an instruction, sua sponte, on the lesser-included
offense of possession of a controlled substance. Defendant argues that the trial court could not give an instruction on a
lesser-included offense where the State did not request the instruction and defendant strenuously objected. As we will
explain, however, this court's long-standing precedent supports the trial judge's conclusion that he possessed the discretion
to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on the lesser-included offense.
In People v. White, 311 Ill. 356 (1924), defendant was indicted for the murder of William Motley. Defendant was involved
in an altercation with Motley, during which Motley was shot in the forehead. Defendant denied that he had a gun, or shot
Motley during the altercation. On the other hand, witnesses for the State testified that defendant was armed with a gun. The
trial court instructed the jury on murder, and the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. The jury returned a verdict of
guilty of manslaughter.
On appeal, defendant maintained that it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the offense of manslaughter.
Defendant argued that if he was guilty of any crime it was murder. This court affirmed defendant's conviction, finding that
the trial court did not err in giving the instruction on manslaughter. The court explained:
In People v. Brown, 415 Ill. 23 (1953), defendant was indicted and tried for the murder of his wife. Defendant's sole
defense at trial was that he was insane at the time of the killing. The jury received an instruction on involuntary
manslaughter, and found defendant guilty of that crime. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, urging that the trial court
erred in giving the jury an instruction on involuntary manslaughter. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, this court
affirmed defendant's conviction. Noting that defendant consumed drugs far in excess of those prescribed for the condition
from which he suffered, the court observed there was evidence to support the jury's finding that defendant had lost the
power of reason and was incapable of any crime involving intent or malice. The court concluded that the trial court did not
err in giving the instruction on involuntary manslaughter, and defendant would not be heard to complain that the jury
convicted him of the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter. See also People v. Beil, 322 Ill. 434, 440 (1926); People v.
Treger, 320 Ill. 329, 331 (1926); People v. Tokoly, 313 Ill. 177, 185-86 (1924).
In People v. Taylor, 36 Ill. 2d 483 (1967), this court revisited the subject of jury instructions on lesser-included offenses.
Defendant was indicted for murder, voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. Witnesses for the State testified
that defendant initiated a fight with the victim; the victim tripped and fell as he tried to escape; defendant got over the
victim and struck him two or three times with a shiny object he had in his hand. Defendant testified that the victim was
trying to pull defendant's girlfriend out of defendant's car. A fight ensued during which the victim threatened "to blow"
defendant's "brains out" and reached for his pocket. Defendant then drew a knife out, and while they were wrestling,
inflicted the wounds that led to the victim's death.  At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial judge inquired whether the
defense wanted an instruction on manslaughter. Defense counsel responded that he was not requesting manslaughter
instructions. Nothing in the record suggested that defense counsel's decision was reached without consultation with
defendant. The jury found defendant guilty of murder.
On appeal, defendant maintained that the judgment must be reversed because the trial judge did not instruct the jury or
submit a form of verdict on manslaughter. In rejecting defendant's contention, this court observed:
The court explained, however, that a defendant does not have a "right" to compel a jury to consider only the greater offense
where there is proof to support a lesser-included offense:
The court concluded that "when the evidence in a murder case would support a verdict of manslaughter, and the defendant
does not request a manslaughter instruction, the giving of such an instruction is committed to the discretion of the trial
judge." Taylor, 36 Ill. 2d  at 489.
The court then set forth certain guidelines to be used by the trial court in determining whether or not to give an instruction
on the lesser-included offense:
The court thus recognized that a determination by the trial court to give an instruction on a lesser-included offense affects
the interest of society in achieving justice, and the interest of the defendant in averting a compromise verdict.
The court in Taylor also declined defendant's invitation to adopt a rule requiring a trial judge to instruct as to both the
greater and the lesser offenses whenever the evidence would sustain either verdict. Recognizing that other jurisdictions had
imposed such a requirement by statute or by court decision, the court observed:
The court chose to abide by the discretionary practice, noting that "[w]hen the evidence will support either charge and the
prosecution does not tender an instruction on the lesser offense, the defendant has a choice, subject to the judge's authority
to instruct [sua] sponte, of submitting one or both instructions." Taylor, 36 Ill. 2d  at 490.
On this issue of judicial discretion, we observe that our appellate court correctly followed Taylor in People v. Sinnott, 226
Ill. App. 3d 923, 925 (1992). The facts in Sinnott are strikingly similar to those in the present case. The defendant was
charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. At the instructions conference, defense counsel
informed the trial court that he had discussed the matter with defendant, and defendant did not wish to submit instructions
on the uncharged included offense of possession of a controlled substance. Sinnott, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 927. Nevertheless,
the trial court determined that it was necessary to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense. Over defendant's
objection, the trial court submitted an instruction to the jury on possession of a controlled substance. The jury found
defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense. Sinnott, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 927.
Citing Taylor, the court held that the trial court had the discretion to instruct, sua sponte, on uncharged lesser-included
offenses, despite defendant's objection. Sinnott, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 931-32. The court observed that defendant could not
"expect to escape punishment for admitted possession of controlled substances merely because (1) the State charged him
only with a greater offense, and (2) the jury was not convinced he was guilty of the charged offense, i.e., possession with
intent to deliver." Sinnott, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 931. See also People v. Pierce, 52 Ill. 2d 7, 11 (1972) (trial court did not err in
instructing the jury as to the crime of manslaughter over defense counsel's objection); People v. McCrory, 25 Ill. 2d 213,
216 (1962) (where the record did not contain a clear indication as to which party tendered an instruction on involuntary
manslaughter, and defendant filed an additional abstract purporting to show that the instruction was given by the trial court
over defendant's objection, this court said it did not have to determine from whence the instruction came since the
instruction was proper in light of the evidence); People v. Leppert, 105 Ill. App. 3d 514, 517-18 (1982) (in prosecution for
attempted murder, trial court was not required to give, sua sponte, an instruction on aggravated battery); People v. Lewis, 97
Ill. App. 3d 982, 988 (1981) ("[f]ailure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter could
have benefited defendant by removing the possibility that weak jurors would render a compromise verdict, or that malicious
jurors would take a middle ground even though self-defense was demonstrated"); People v. Mullen, 80 Ill. App. 3d 369,
376-77 (1980) (trial judge's failure to give sua sponte an instruction on the lesser-included offense of contributing to the
sexual delinquency of a child was not a denial of defendant's right to a fair trial); People v. Rosas, 52 Ill. App. 3d 555, 558
(1977) (trial court did not err in failing to give sua sponte over defendant's objections any instructions on voluntary
manslaughter); People v. Hall, 25 Ill. App. 3d 992, 1001 (1975); People v. Mitchell, 12 Ill. App. 3d 960, 964-65 (1973).
We find no reason to depart from the rule that the trial court has the discretion to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on a lesser-included offense. As this court observed in People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 105 (1994), "[a] lesser included offense is a
valuable tool for a defendant, a prosecutor, and society generally. For a defendant, an instruction on a lesser included
offense provides an important third option to the jury. *** For a prosecutor, a defendant may not automatically go free if
the evidence fails to prove an essential element of the greater offense. For society, the punishment that it imposes on a
criminal may conform more accurately to the crime actually committed." We agree with the appellate court's observation in
Sinnott that Taylor represents the proper "view of the judge's role in determining whether instructions on an uncharged
included offense should be given over a defendant's objection." Sinnott, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 930.
Further, allowing the trial court to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on a lesser-included offense comports with the notion that
the trial court may give an instruction, requested by the State, on a lesser-included offense despite defendant's objection.
See People v. Harris, 8 Ill. 2d 431, 434 (1956) (trial court did not err in giving manslaughter instructions tendered by
State); People v. Griswold, 405 Ill. 533, 542 (1950) (same); People v. Ivory, 217 Ill. App. 3d 619, 622-25 (1991) (in
prosecution for armed robbery, trial court did not err by instructing the jury, at the State's request, on the lesser-included
offense of robbery); People v. Falkner, 131 Ill. App. 3d 706, 710-13 (1985) (where defendant claimed self-defense, State
had a right to request and receive a voluntary manslaughter instruction); People v. Nicholson, 61 Ill. App. 3d 621, 624-25
(1978) (where victim's statement could be interpreted as saying that she was unsure defendant was armed, trial court did not
err in instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of robbery).
The appellate court in the present case, nevertheless, relied upon this court's decisions in People v. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d 224 (1994), and People v. Barnard, 104 Ill. 2d 218 (1984), for the proposition that a trial court may not instruct a jury, sua
sponte, on a lesser-included offense. The appellate court's invocation of Brocksmith is centered around this court's holding
that the decision to tender a lesser-included offense instruction ultimately belongs to a defendant as opposed to defense
counsel. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d  at 229-30. The appellate court noted this court's statement that:
The appellate court then connected the statement with this court's conclusion in People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 54 (1992),
that the decision of what plea to enter belongs exclusively to the defendant. 292 Ill. App. 3d at 690. The appellate court
reasoned that: "if the two decisions are to be treated the same, we cannot allow a trial court to sua sponte submit an
included-offense instruction over defendant's objection. An equivalent ruling in a pretrial setting would have the trial court
deciding how a defendant is to plead." 292 Ill. App. 3d at 690. See also People v. Gramc, 271 Ill. App. 3d 282, 287 (1995).
Defendant's argument in this court mirrors the reasoning of the appellate court. He believes that he has control over what
plea to enter, and should have control, unfettered by the trial court's discretion, over instructions on lesser-included
offenses. He maintains that, if the right to submit jury instructions on a lesser-included offense belongs to him and not
defense counsel, it stands to reason that the trial judge should not have a greater right than defense counsel to submit such
an instruction to the jury against defendant's wishes.
We find defendant's contentions unpersuasive. First, defendant's reliance upon Brocksmith is misplaced. In Brocksmith,
this court considered whether the decision to tender a lesser-included offense instruction should be made by a defendant or
his counsel. The court held that it should be "defendant's decision to submit an instruction on a lesser charge at the
conclusion of the evidence." Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d  at 229.(1) Thus, as between defendant and his counsel, defendant is
to make a choice regarding the lesser-included offense instruction. The question of the trial court's authority to submit
instructions to the jury, sua sponte, on a lesser-included offense was not at issue. The court did not hold, or even intimate,
that the trial court no longer had discretionary authority to instruct a jury, sua sponte, on a lesser-included offense. Simply
stated, the holding in Brocksmith has no bearing on the trial court's discretionary authority to instruct sua sponte.
Second, as the State aptly points out, under defendant's rationale, where the evidence establishes both the greater and lesser
offenses, and the State requests an instruction on the lesser-included offense, defendant's objection to that instruction would
control and therefore prohibit the court from so instructing the jury. Such an expansion of Brocksmith is inconsistent with
established authority. See Harris, 8 Ill. 2d  at 434; Griswold, 405 Ill.  at 542; Ivory, 217 Ill. App. 3d at 622-25; Falkner, 131
Ill. App. 3d at 710-13; Nicholson, 61 Ill. App. 3d at 624-25.
Defendant's reliance upon Barnard is equally flawed. In Barnard, the defendant was charged with murder and armed
violence. Defendant's strategy at trial was to establish that he had killed the deceased in self-defense and defense of
dwelling. During the instruction conference, the court asked defense counsel if he had an issues instruction on murder
which contained the element of justification. Defense counsel replied that he did, but asked if the court gave his instruction
would the court automatically give an instruction on manslaughter. The court asked defense counsel if he was making a
motion to that effect. Defense counsel said that he was not, and he withdrew his instruction. Barnard, 104 Ill. 2d  at 231.
The jury convicted defendant of murder.
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court should have sua sponte given a self-defense and voluntary-manslaughter
instruction. In rejecting defendant's argument, this court stated:
Since defendant had not tendered a voluntary manslaughter instruction to the trial court, defendant could not claim error in
the trial court's failure to submit such an instruction to the jury.
The court then stated:
This statement, although dicta, has been cited for the proposition that a trial court may not instruct a jury sua sponte.
Gramc, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 290. See also People v. Sowinski, 148 Ill. App. 3d 231, 247 (1986); People v. Strohl, 118 Ill.
App. 3d 1084, 1091 (1983); People v. Gore, 72 Ill. App. 3d 171, 174 (1979) (all citing People v. Spataro, 67 Ill. App. 3d
69, 74-75 (1978), for the same proposition). We believe this interpretation is incorrect. Barnard recognized that a "court
should exercise restraint in giving instructions on its own motion when the instructions could interfere with defense
strategy." Sinnott, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 932. Stated in other words, "where the defense wholly refrained from tendering an
instruction on a lesser included offense, the possibility that such restraint may have been a viable strategy decision militates
against [the court] invoking any exceptions to the waiver doctrine," and finding error in the trial court's failure to instruct
the jury on the lesser-included offense. Lewis, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 988; see also Taylor, 36 Ill. 2d  at 491 (in reaching its
conclusion that the trial judge was not required to give a manslaughter instruction, this court observed that "the decision of
the defendant's attorney not to request manslaughter instructions was clearly stated in response to the trial judge's
inquiry"); Mullen, 80 Ill. App. 3d at 377 (trial judge's failure to give sua sponte an instruction on the lesser-included
offense was not error; a finding of guilt on the lesser-included offense would not have comported with trial counsel's view
of a desirable resolution of the case). However, Barnard did not overrule Taylor. The court in Barnard merely expressed
the view that it is not error for a trial court to refrain from giving an instruction to the jury which might interfere with
defense strategy.
As this court recognized in Taylor, in exercising his discretion to submit an instruction on a lesser-included offense, "it is
not impermissible for the judge to give weight to the views of the prosecution and defense as indicated by their requests for
instructions." Taylor, 36 Ill. 2d  at 491. However, it is also appropriate that the trial court take into consideration society's
interest in punishing the defendant for a crime, no more, no less, than the crime actually committed. The trial judge must
transcend the limitations of the adversarial system and give instructions which safeguard justice, society's interest in
avoiding the unjustified exoneration of wrongdoers and in punishing a defendant only to the extent of his crime.
The cogent policy considerations outlined in Taylor are controlling in this case. Moreover, these considerations have been
recognized by numerous courts around the nation, providing additional support for our resolution of this question. See
Glover v. State, 273 Ark. 376, 382, 619 S.W.2d 629, 632 (1981) (lesser-included offense instruction "should be given to the
jury in appropriate cases even over the defendant's objection"); State v. Pankratz, 238 Minn. 517, 539, 57 N.W.2d 635, 647
(1953) ("defendant may not demand as a matter of right that the court submit only the degree of the crime charged in the
indictment"); State v. White, 244 Neb. 577, 591, 508 N.W.2d 554, 566 (1993) ("[t]he trial court may instruct a jury, over a
defendant's objection, on any lesser-included offenses supported by the evidence and the pleadings"); State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 95 (Utah 1982), citing Taylor, 36 Ill. 2d 483 ("Clearly the State has no legitimate interest in obtaining a conviction
for a crime greater than that warranted by the evidence, but neither does the defendant have a right to an acquittal when the
evidence, although not sufficient to establish the greater crime, is sufficient to establish a lesser included offense"); State v.
Mora, 558 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah 1977) ("It is undoubtedly within the prerogative of the trial court to submit included
offenses if he thinks that the interest of justice so require").
Based on the foregoing, we reaffirm today that, under appropriate circumstances, a trial court possesses the discretion to
instruct a jury sua sponte on lesser-included offenses, even where the State does not request such instruction and the
defendant objects.
The dissent attempts to distinguish Taylor, stating:
The dissent acknowledges, however:
Nevertheless, the dissent believes that Barnard, a case decided in 1984, controls and reached a conclusion contrary to that
suggested in Taylor. According to the dissent,
With due respect, the dissent is mistaken. Barnard did not address the issue presented in this case. As noted above, the
defendant in Barnard did not submit an instruction to the trial court on manslaughter, and the court did not give such an
instruction. Hence, on appeal defendant argued that the trial court "should have sua sponte given a *** voluntary-manslaughter instruction." Barnard, 104 Ill. 2d  at 231. In the present case, the trial court gave an instruction, over
defendant's objection, on the lesser-included offense of possession of a controlled substance. In light of these disparate
facts, we must disagree with the dissent's conclusion. As noted above, Barnard did not overrule Taylor, and is not
dispositive.
Furthermore, Taylor is not the only decision supporting our opinion. Instead, our opinion today is based on a long-standing
line of cases holding that a trial court has discretion to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense. See, e.g., Brown, 415 Ill. 23; White, 311 Ill. 356. The trial court may exercise that discretion sua sponte or at the request of the State, even though
the defendant has objected to the instruction.
Next, we consider whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in submitting the lesser-included offense
instruction to the jury. We observe that the "abuse of discretion" standard of review must be applied in determining the
propriety of the trial court's action. People v. Jones, 175 Ill. 2d 126, 131-32 (1997); People v. Crane, 145 Ill. 2d 520
(1991); People v. Leach, 398 Ill. 515, 527-28 (1947).
As this court stated in Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 108, an instruction is appropriate if the evidence would permit a jury rationally
to find the defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense and acquit of the charged greater offense. See Keeble v. United
States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 36 L. Ed. 2d 844, 847, 93 S. Ct. 1993, 1995 (1973). An instruction on the lesser-included offense
is appropriate where the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual element that is not required for
conviction of the lesser-included offense. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 108. This evidentiary requirement "is usually satisfied by the
presentation of conflicting testimony on the element that distinguishes the greater offense from the lesser offense. However,
where the testimony is not conflicting, this requirement may be satisfied if the conclusion as to the lesser offense may fairly
be inferred from the evidence presented." Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 108, citing United States v. Medina, 755 F.2d 1269, 1273
(7th Cir. 1985). Importantly, the court in Novak stated that:
Our review of the record in the present case reveals that the evidence presented at trial supported the inference that
defendant was guilty of the lesser-included offense of possession of a controlled substance. Defendant admitted to the
police upon arrest that he was the Rolando Garcia sought by authorities; that he resided at the address for which the search
warrant was executed; and that he had prior knowledge that police had visited his residence. The evidence further
established that the police found the cocaine in defendant's apartment, hidden in a box containing some mail and traffic
citations issued to defendant. In our view, the foregoing was more than enough to support an instruction on the lesser-included offense of possession of a controlled substance. Moreover, in light of the policy considerations stressed in Taylor,
it would be unjust for defendant to escape punishment for possession of a controlled substance merely because the
prosecution charged him with the greater offense of possession with intent to deliver, and the jury was persuaded that
defendant was guilty of the lesser-included offense rather than the charged offense. We, therefore, hold that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by instructing the jury, sua sponte, on possession of a controlled substance.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion by providing instructions to the jury on the lesser-included
offense, despite defendant's objection. The judgment of the appellate court is therefore reversed, and the judgment of the
circuit court is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE BILANDIC, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Trial courts should not have the discretion to give a lesser-included offense instruction sua sponte
over the objection of the defendant. The decision to tender a lesser-included offense instruction is a matter of defense trial
strategy. Although such an instruction may often be beneficial to the defendant, it may also work to the defendant's
detriment by allowing the jury to reach a compromise verdict. If the defense chooses to forgo a lesser-included offense
instruction and gamble that the jury will acquit the defendant rather than convict on the greater charge, the trial court should
not have the authority to overrule that strategic decision.
JUSTICE RATHJE, also dissenting:
The responsibility for securing a criminal conviction no longer belongs to the prosecution; it now belongs to the judiciary.
No longer neutral arbiters, trial courts may now serve as independent grand juries, combing the record for chargeable
offenses that the State either overlooked or chose not to charge. Were this result compelled by the law, I would have no
choice but to concur. Fortunately, the law compels no such thing. To reach its result, the majority treats dicta as controlling
authority, lays waste to Barnard, and ignores the strategic realties associated with the prosecution of criminal cases. I
therefore dissent.
DICTA
The question in this case is whether a trial court may instruct the jury sua sponte on a lesser-included offense, where the
State does not request and the defendant objects to that instruction. The case upon which the majority primarily relies,
People v. Taylor, 36 Ill. 2d 483 (1967), in no way resolves this issue.
In Taylor, the defendant was convicted of murder. On appeal, he argued that, because the evidence would have supported a
manslaughter conviction, the trial court was required to give that instruction sua sponte even though he did not request it. In
rejecting the defendant's argument, this court explained that, "when the evidence in a murder case would support a verdict
of manslaughter, and the defendant does not request a manslaughter instruction, the giving of such an instruction is
committed to the discretion of the trial judge." (Emphasis added.) Taylor, 36 Ill. 2d  at 489. Because "the trial court was not
required to give a manslaughter instruction and since the defendant did not request one, there [was] no error of which he can
complain." Taylor, 36 Ill. 2d  at 491. Consequently, the defendant's murder conviction was affirmed. Taylor, 36 Ill. 2d  at
492. This decision represented "no more than an application of the familiar procedural rule that error cannot be assigned in
a reviewing court with respect to a matter upon which the trial court was not called upon to rule." Taylor, 36 Ill. 2d  at 489.
The majority does a great deal of block-quoting from Taylor (slip op. at 12-17), but the quoted portions of Taylor are,
without exception, pure dicta. In Taylor, no instruction was given because the defendant did not request one. Taylor's
holding is that, where a defendant does not request an instruction on an uncharged lesser-included offense, he cannot
challenge on appeal the trial court's failure to give that instruction. Consequently, Taylor's extended discussion of the trial
court's authority to give or withhold a lesser-included offense instruction, whether at a defendant's request or over a
defendant's objection, is dicta and therefore not binding in this case. See Greer v. Kadera, 173 Ill. 2d 398, 414 (1996).
BARNARD
Of course, that the portions of Taylor upon which the majority relies are dicta does not, by itself, subvert the majority's
analysis. It could be that those portions, albeit dicta, also happen to be right. The problem with that proposition, however, is
that, 17 years after Taylor, this court addressed the precise issue presented in this case and reached a conclusion contrary to
that suggested in Taylor.
In People v. Barnard, 104 Ill. 2d 218 (1984), the issue presented was whether defendant's counsel on direct appeal was
ineffective for failing to raise the trial court's failure to instruct the jury sua sponte on a lesser-included offense over the
defendant's objection. In holding that appellate counsel was not ineffective, this court explained that the proffered argument
was without merit:
Thus, unlike Taylor, Barnard addressed the precise question presented in the present appeal: whether, over a defendant's
objection, a trial court may instruct on an uncharged lesser-included offense. Barnard answered this question in the
negative, and Barnard therefore should dispose of this case.
The majority's efforts to explain away Barnard are unavailing. The majority's first strategy is to intimate that, if the
portions of Taylor upon which it relies are dicta, then the portion of Barnard upon which I rely must be dicta, too. Slip op.
at 12. The only problem is that, unlike the aforementioned portions of Taylor, which endeavor to adjudicate an issue not
presented, the portion of Barnard upon which I rely is the court's judgment. The issue in Barnard was whether defendant's
counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to raise the trial court's failure to instruct. In holding that appellate
counsel was not ineffective, this court gave two reasons for why the proffered argument would not have succeeded on direct
appeal: (1) because trial counsel's decision not to tender the instructions was a matter of sound trial strategy, it would have
been improper for the trial court to interfere with that strategy; and (2) because trial counsel did not tender the instruction,
the issue would likely have been found waived. Barnard, 104 Ill. 2d  at 232. Where the dicta comes in, I have no idea.
The majority next asserts that "Barnard recognized that a 'court should exercise restraint in giving instructions on its own
motion when the instructions could interfere with defense strategy.' Sinnott, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 932." Slip op. at 13.
Hyperbole aside, this is perhaps the strangest citation I have ever seen. The majority purports to quote from Barnard but
then cites an appellate court opinion decided eight years after Barnard that itself does not cite Barnard. I have been out of
law school a long time, but surely the Bluebook does not permit this.
As if the Sinnott citation were not suspicious enough, the majority then, using the simple phrase "in other words," recasts
Barnard beyond all recognition. Again, Barnard states:
To the majority, this is simply another way of saying:
How a categorical prohibition on the trial court's authority to instruct the jury on an uncharged lesser-included offense over
the defendant's objection is in any way related to, let alone synonymous with, a reviewing court's authority to suspend
waiver principles is beyond me. Nor does the majority provide any explanation, apparently content to leave it to the reader
to discern the relationship between the two doctrines. In "other words," indeed.
Finally, the majority attempts to circumvent Barnard by stating:
Let me say that I agree entirely with the majority that Barnard did not overrule Taylor. The reason for this is that the rule
set forth in Taylor-that a defendant who does not request a lesser-included offense instruction cannot argue on appeal that
that instruction should have been given-is irrelevant to Barnard. As I explained above, the issues in Taylor and Barnard are
unrelated. Consequently, the Barnard court would have no reason to mention Taylor, let alone overrule it.
That said, when did this court begin "expressing views"? I thought we issued controlling opinions. Barnard did not "merely
express[ ] the view that it is not error for a trial court to refrain from giving an instruction to the jury which might interfere
with defense strategy." Slip op. at 13. In fact, this language nowhere appears in Barnard. What Barnard did was hold that:
In sum, in Barnard, this court directly addressed the question presented in this appeal and concluded that it is improper for a
trial court to instruct the jury on an uncharged lesser-included offense over a defendant's objection. The majority offers no
compelling explanation for abandoning Barnard in favor of an unrelated decision rendered 17 years earlier.
TRIAL STRATEGY
I have no doubt that Barnard compels an affirmance in this case. But that begs the question: Was Barnard correctly
decided? It may be that the majority, without expressly saying so, is simply overruling Barnard in favor of a new and more
workable rule. I doubt this, however, as the public policy that informed Barnard remains sound.
Barnard explicitly recognized that the decision to tender a lesser-included offense instruction is a matter of trial strategy.
Barnard, 104 Ill. 2d  at 231-32. Perhaps the best statement of the strategic nature of this decision, however, is that
articulated by Chief Justice Freeman in his special concurrence in People v. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d 224 (1994), which
deserves to be quoted at length:
Notably, Chapman held that, in light of the strategic nature of the decision to tender a lesser-included offense instruction,
"it may be reversible error for the trial court to instruct the jury sua sponte on a lesser-included offense." Chapman, 94 Ill.
App. 3d at 608.
In the above passage, Chief Justice Freeman astutely dissects what the majority fails to recognize: how to instruct the jury is
a strategic decision that properly belongs to the parties. The facts of the present appeal demonstrate this principle perfectly.
The State charged defendant with possession with the intent to deliver, and the evidence was close. The State could have,
but chose not to, charge defendant with the lesser-included offense of simple possession. Similarly, defendant could have,
but chose not to, instruct the jury on simple possession. Both of these decisions were likely based on strategic calculations
designed to minimize the possibility of a compromise verdict. The State likely believed that it had presented a sufficient
case and did not want to jeopardize its potential conviction on the greater offense. Defendant, by contrast, likely believed
that the State had not proven the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt and did not want to jeopardize his potential
acquittal. As Chief Justice Freeman taught, "[i]t is these types of strategic calculations that a court will not second-guess."
Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d  at 233 (Freeman, J., concurring).
CONCLUSION
We are not the first court to consider this question. Faced with the same issue, the Supreme Court of Nebraska reached the
same conclusion as that reached by today's majority. See State v. Foster, 230 Neb. 607, 433 N.W.2d 167 (1988). Foster
was not unanimous, however, and Justice White wisely chronicled the dangers inherent in the majority's rule:
Upon this I cannot improve.
JUSTICE HARRISON joins in this dissent.
1.      1But see Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d  at 230 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring) ("the decision to tender a lesser
included offense instruction is a matter of trial strategy and, therefore, properly rests with defense counsel after full
consultation with defendant").

2.      2Admittedly, the majority in Brocksmith concluded that the decision to tender a lesser-included offense instruction
belongs to defendant, rather than defense counsel. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Freeman's analysis of the strategic
considerations that enter into that decision remains sound, irrespective of who actually makes the decision. 

3.      3Whether the bringing of criminal charges by the judiciary offends separation of powers principles is a question
best left for another day, as the parties in this appeal do not raise that question. See People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 113
(1994) ("It is settled 'that the State's Attorney, as a member of the executive branch of government, is vested with exclusive
jurisdiction in the initiation and management of a criminal prosecution. [Citations.] That discretion includes the decision
whether to prosecute at all, as well as to choose which of several charges shall be brought' " (emphasis added)); People ex
rel. Daley v. Moran, 94 Ill. 2d 41, 46 (1983) ("A trial judge cannot, consistent with the constitutional principle of separation
of powers, assume the role of prosecutor and determine which criminal offense shall be charged").