Title: Parris v. Ballantine et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1180908
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 25, 2020

Rel: September 25, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
advance sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741
((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2020
____________________
1180908
____________________
James L. Parris, G.D. Varn III, James V. Searse, Jr., and
Samuel S. Parris
v.
Phyllis H. Ballantine, Scott Preston Harrison, and Renee
DuPont Harrison
Appeal from Jefferson Probate Court
(No. 196712)
STEWART, Justice.
This appeal involves the question whether, under the
terms of a particular trust instrument, a person adopted as an
adult is considered a lineal descendant of a beneficiary of
the trust and, thus, a beneficiary. James L. Parris, G.D. Varn
III, James V. Searse, Jr., and Samuel S. Parris appeal from a
1180908
partial summary judgment in favor of Phyllis H. Ballantine,
Scott Preston Harrison, and Renee DuPont Harrison. We affirm
the judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
In 1971, C. Porter Schutt and Phyllis DuPont Schutt ("the
trustors") created a trust ("the 1971 trust") for the benefit
of their three children and their children's "lineal
descendants." The 1971 trust provides, in pertinent part: 
"Upon the date of the execution of this Trust,
trustee shall divide the Trust into three equal
shares so that one share shall be set aside for the
issue, per stirpes, of [Charles Porter Schutt, Jr.,
Sarah Schutt Harrison, and Caroline Schutt Brown],
respectively. Each child of Trustor for whose issue
a share is set aside shall be referred to as the
'primary descendant' of the Trust in which such
share is held. Trustee shall hold each such share as
a separate trust, and each such separate trust shall
be subject to [specific delineated provisions] ...."
Pursuant to the terms of the 1971 trust, the trustee is
to make distributions of income and principal "to or among the
issue of the primary descendant[s] and such issue's lineal
descendants." The 1971 trust defines "lineal descendants" as
"those hereafter born, either before or after 
trustor's death,
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as well as those now in existence. A child en ventre sa mere
shall be deemed to be living."1 
In 2002, in response to a dispute between the trustees of
the 1971 trust and the income beneficiaries, the Mobile
Circuit Court entered a judgment incorporating a settlement
agreement between the parties that divided the 1971 trust into
three separate trusts -- one trust for each of the trustors'
three children (Charles Porter Schutt, Jr., Sarah Schutt
Harrison, and Caroline Schutt Brown) and the children's
descendants. One of the three trusts was for Sarah Schutt
Harrison and her four children: Phyllis Harrison Ballantine,
Renee DuPont Harrison, Scott Preston Harrison, and Aimee
Harrison Parris ("the Harrison trust"). 
In 2010, a dispute arose between the beneficiaries of the
Harrison trust. The Jefferson Probate Court ("the probate
court") entered an order approving a settlement agreement
between the parties ("the 2010 order") that created four
separate trusts for each of Sarah Schutt Harrison's children
and her children's lineal descendants ("the sibling trusts"):
1Black's Law Dictionary defines "en ventre sa mere" as a
fetus "in the mother's womb." Black's Law Dictionary 675 (11th
ed. 2019).
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one for Phyllis and her lineal descendants; one for Renee and
her lineal descendants; one for Scott and his lineal
descendants; and one for Aimee and her lineal descendants
("Aimee's trust"). The 2010 order provided that the sibling
trusts would "be the same in form and terms as" the 1971
trust. In addition, it provided that, if a sibling trust had
no remaining issue or lineal-descendant beneficiaries, the
assets and liabilities of that trust would be divided equally
among the remaining sibling trusts.  
Aimee appointed James L. Parris (her husband), G.D. Varn
III, and James V. Searse, Jr., as individual trustees of her
trust ("the individual trustees"), and they in turn appointed
BancorpSouth Bank to serve as the corporate trustee. In
November 2016, after learning that she had a terminal illness,
Aimee adopted Samuel S. Parris, her adult stepchild and her
husband's biological son. The adoption decree was entered in
the Family Court of Charleston County, South Carolina. In
February 2017, Aimee died.
In March 2017, BancorpSouth filed in the probate court a
petition for final settlement of Aimee's trust.2 In response,
2The petition and its amendment are not in the record.
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Phyllis, Renee, and Scott ("the siblings") filed an answer and
counterclaim 
against 
BancorpSouth 
and 
cross-claims 
against 
the
individual trustees and Samuel. The siblings argued, among
other things, that, because Samuel was adopted as an adult, he
is not a "lineal descendant" of Aimee's and, thus, was not a
beneficiary of Aimee's trust. Therefore, they argued, there
being no remaining issue or lineal descendants of Aimee's, the
assets from Aimee's trust should be divided among the three
other sibling trusts.  
 In January 2018, the siblings filed a motion for a
partial summary judgment. In their motion, the 
siblings argued
that language in the 1971 trust included only biological
descendants of the trustors' children as beneficiaries. The
siblings asserted that the 1971 trust language was 
unambiguous
but that, if the probate court did not find so, it could
consider affidavit testimony from Thomas P. Sweeney, a co-
drafter of the 1971 trust.
Samuel filed a response in opposition to the siblings'
partial-summary-judgment motion. In his response, Samuel
argued that the language of the 2010 order confirmed that
adopted children were meant to be included as beneficiaries
under the 1971 trust because, by the time that order was
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entered, this Court had made clear that terms such as "issue"
and "lineal descendant" included an adopted child. Samuel also
argued that, before entering the 2010 order, the probate court
had appointed a guardian ad litem to represent "all unborn,
unconceived, 
and 
unascertainable 
income 
and 
remainder
beneficiaries." Samuel argued that the use of the word
"unascertainable" 
demonstrated 
that 
it 
was 
in 
the
contemplation of the parties and the probate court that there
were other potential beneficiaries who did not fall into the
categories 
of 
unborn 
or 
unconceived and 
that 
"unascertainable"
could only be a reference to children adopted in the future. 
Samuel attached to his response an affidavit of Aimee that had
been filed in the adoption proceeding, an affidavit of James
Parris that included letters from Thomas Sweeney discussing
the terms of the 1971 trust, a transcript from the 2002
proceedings in the Mobile Circuit Court, and a mineral trust
between C. Porter Schutt and First Alabama Bank created in
1993. BancorpSouth also filed a response in which it stated
that it neither joined nor opposed the partial-summary-
judgment motion. 
Samuel filed a motion to strike the affidavit of Thomas
Sweeney in which Samuel asserted that previous letters from
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Sweeney, the contents of which Sweeney had testified about in
the Mobile Circuit Court proceedings, conflicted with his
testimony in the affidavit. Samuel also objected because, he
said, the affidavit was based on Sweeney's subjective belief,
rather than personal knowledge. The siblings filed a reply to
Samuel's response to their motion for a partial summary
judgment and a motion to strike the affidavit of James Parris
that Samuel had submitted. The probate court did not rule on
the motions to strike. 
On July 1, 2019, the probate court entered a partial
summary judgment. The probate court found, among other things,
that the language of the 1971 trust was not ambiguous, that
Samuel was not a "lineal descendant" as defined by the 1971
trust, and that, therefore, Samuel was not a beneficiary of
Aimee's trust. The probate court certified the order as final
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. On August 7, 2019,
Samuel and the individual trustees filed a notice of appeal.
(The individual trustees assert that taking a position on the
issues in this appeal with regard to Samuel is inconsistent
with their duties of loyalty and impartiality. Accordingly,
the arguments on appeal are referred to as only Samuel's even
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though the individual trustees joined in the notice of
appeal.) 
Discussion
I. Procedural Issues
On December 19, 2019, after Samuel filed his reply brief,
the siblings filed a "corrected" brief along with a
"declaration of technology difficulties and a motion to 
accept
corrected brief as timely filed" in which they asserted that
they fixed typographical errors, pagination errors, and
citation errors present in their original brief. The Supreme
Court Clerk's office, after determining that there were also
changes to the language in the "corrected" brief, issued a
show-cause order to the siblings to explain why this Court
should accept the corrected brief, noting that there is no
provision in the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure to
accept an appellee's brief after the briefing period has
closed. The siblings responded that there had been no
substantive changes and that the revisions were to correct
typographical oversights, and they submitted a version
evidencing their corrections. After reviewing the two
versions, we note that there are multiple changes in the
"corrected" 
brief, 
including the 
addition 
of 
legal 
authorities
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not cited in the original brief. Based on the large number of
changes, and because the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure
do not contemplate accepting an appellee's brief after the
appellant has submitted a reply brief, we have considered only
the siblings' originally filed brief. 
We must next address a motion to dismiss filed in this
Court by the siblings. In their motion, the siblings asserted
that Act No. 1144, Ala. Acts 1971 ("Act No. 1144"), a local
act that requires notices of appeal from certain probate-court
judgments to be filed within 30 days of the entry of the
judgment, controls and that, because Samuel and 
the 
individual
trustees did not file their notice of appeal within 30 days,
this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider their appeal. Samuel
argues that Act No. 1144 governs only appeals from matters
concerning the administration of estates and that, because
this matter involves a dispute over an inter vivos trust, Act
No. 1144 is inapplicable. 
Act No. 1144 was enacted to provide probate courts in
counties with a population of 500,000 or more general and
concurrent jurisdiction with circuit courts in equity and in
matters relating to the administration of estates. See Title
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to Act No. 1144. The relevant portion of Act No. 1144
provides:
"Section 4. Appeals may be taken from the
orders, judgments, and decrees of such a Probate
Court, relating to the administration of such
aforesaid estates, including decrees on partial
settlements and rulings on demurrer, or otherwise
relating to action taken pursuant to jurisdiction
conferred by this act, to the Supreme Court within
thirty days from the rendition thereof, or within
thirty days from the decision of such a Probate
Court on a motion for new trial, in the manner and
form as is provided for appeals from the Probate
Courts to the Supreme Court."
 
(Emphasis added.)
 
The underlying matter does not involve the administration
of an estate. Instead, it involves the interpretation of the
terms of a trust and was brought pursuant to the Alabama
Uniform Trust Code, § 19-3B-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the
AUTC").3
Act No. 1144 does not concern proceedings involving
the administration of 
trusts. Therefore, the AUTC, rather than
3Under § 19-3B-203(b) of the AUTC, "[a] probate court
granted statutory equitable jurisdiction has concurrent
jurisdiction with the circuit court in any proceeding
involving a testamentary or inter vivos trust." The Jefferson
Probate 
Court 
has 
been 
granted 
statutory 
equitable
jurisdiction and has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Jefferson Circuit Court "to hear any proceeding brought by a
trustee or beneficiary concerning the administration of a
trust." Regions Bank v. Reed, 60 So. 3d 868, 880 (Ala. 2010).
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Act No. 1144, controls, and there is no specific provision in
the AUTC regarding appeals. 
Section 12-22-2, Ala. Code 1975, provides: "From any
final judgment of the circuit court or probate court, an
appeal lies to the appropriate appellate court as a matter of
right by either party, or their personal representatives,
within the time and in the manner prescribed by the Alabama
Rules of Appellate Procedure." Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P.,
provides that a notice of appeal must be filed within 42 days
of the entry of the judgment from which the appellant appeals. 
Therefore, Samuel's notice of appeal, filed 37 days after the
entry of the order appealed from, was timely and this Court
has jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Accordingly, the
siblings' motion to dismiss is denied.
II. Analysis
On appellate review of a summary judgment, the reviewing
court will apply the same standard applied by the trial court.
Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So. 2d 72, 74
(Ala. 2003). "Where, as here, the facts of a case are
essentially undisputed, this Court must determine whether the
trial court misapplied the law to the undisputed facts,
applying a de novo standard of review." Continental Nat'l
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Indem. Co. v. Fields, 926 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Ala. 2005). The
issues raised on appeal in this case present a question of
law; they do not concern a disputed issue of fact.
Accordingly, we review the probate court's summary judgment de
novo without any presumption of correctness. Ex parte Byrom,
47 So. 3d 791, 794 (Ala. 2010).
The resolution of the issues in this appeal requires the
construction and interpretation of the terms of the 1971
trust. In construing a legal document, this Court has
explained that, "[w]hen a document is unambiguous, its
construction and legal effect are questions of law for the
court to decide." Baldwin v. Branch, 888 So. 2d 482, 484 (Ala.
2004) (citing Wheeler v. First Alabama Bank of Birmingham, 364
So. 2d 1190 (Ala. 1978)).4
"'An "instrument is unambiguous if only one
reasonable 
meaning 
clearly 
emerges."' 
Reeves
Cedarhurst Dev. Corp. v. First Amfed Corp., 607 So.
2d 184, 186 (Ala. 1992)(quoting Vainrib v. Downey,
565 So. 2d 647, 648 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990)). 'When
the language of a [trust] is clear and unambiguous,
the rules of construction cannot be employed to
4Section 19-3B-112 of the AUTC provides: "Except as
otherwise provided in this chapter, the rules of construction
... that apply in this state to the interpretation of and
disposition of property by will also apply as appropriate to
the interpretation of the terms of a trust and the disposition
of the trust property." 
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rewrite that [trust] and put it at variance with the
meaning of the language used by the testator.'
Windham v. Henderson, 658 So. 2d 431, 434 (Ala.
1995). '[W]ords employed in a [trust] are to be
taken in their primary or ordinary sense and use,
unless a different  meaning is indicated by the
context and circumstances of the case ....' Wiley v.
Murphree, 228 Ala. 64, 68, 151 So. 869, 872 (1933)."
Harrison v. Morrow, 977 So. 2d 457, 459–60 (Ala. 2007).
Both sides contend, and the probate court found, that the
language of the 1971 trust is unambiguous. Samuel argues that
the term "lineal descendants" as defined in the 1971 trust
presumptively includes adopted children. In support, Samuel
argues that the law in Alabama since 1931 has been clear that
adopted children are included in terms such as "issue,"
"lineal descendants," "child," and other similar terms and
that adopted children are treated the same as biological
children unless an intent to exclude them is clearly indicated
in the instrument. The siblings argue that the use of the
phrase "hereafter born" in defining "lineal descendants" in
the 1971 trust implies that "adopted" descendants are excluded
and demonstrates the trustors' intent that the 1971 trust
benefit their biological descendants only. The siblings also
assert that the trustors defined "lineal descendants" in a
manner different than the 
generic legal definition, while they
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defined "heirs" as all persons entitled to take by intestacy
-– the primary, generic legal meaning. Therefore, the 
siblings
argue, the trustors intended "lineal descendants," with its
"radically different language," i.e., "hereafter born," to be
limited to biological descendants.5 Relying, in part, on this
Court's decision in Whitfield v. Matthews, 334 So. 2d 875
(Ala. 1976), the probate court concluded that "[u]sing 'born'
to define 'lineal descendants' without including 'or adopted'
is a clear indication of Trustors' intent to exclude persons
adopted as beneficiaries."6
5The 
siblings 
also 
devote 
much 
argument 
to 
challenging the 
adoption 
decree, 
alleging 
that 
the 
proper 
statutory
formalities were not followed before the entry of the decree.
To the extent the siblings challenge the validity of the
adoption under South Carolina laws, however, Alabama courts
are not the proper forum through which to lodge a collateral
attack, and the siblings did not raise that argument in the
probate court. It will not be considered for the first time on
appeal. See Landers v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 564 So. 2d 925, 926
(Ala. 1990)("This Court will not review an issue raised for
the first time on appeal.").
6The provision of the trust instrument at issue in
Whitfield provided that the trust was "'for the benefit of the
children now or later born to my son, L.B. Whitfield, III.'"
Whitfield, 334 So. 2d at 877. This Court concluded that the
adopted daughter of the testator's son was excluded from being
considered a beneficiary of the trust, stating: "Had the
trustor intended to favor those his sons legally adopted as
well as his blood descendants, it would seem he could easily
have accomplished this by saying so." 334 So. 2d at 878.
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In challenging the probate court's judgment, Samuel
relies primarily on Gotlieb v. Klotzman, 369 So. 2d 798 (Ala.
1979), McCaleb v. Brown, 344 So. 2d 485, 488 (Ala. 1977), and
a 1931 adoption statute. Samuel argues that the trustors had
"constructive knowledge of the effect of the enactment of the
1931 Act pertaining to the inheritance rights of adoptees."
Samuel's brief, at 23. In Gotlieb, this Court considered
whether the term "descendant" in a testamentary trust included
adopted children. This Court explained:
"In 1931, a statute was passed which allowed
adopted children to inherit property by and through
their adoptive parents. Act No. 405, Acts of
Alabama, 1931, p. 504. In McCaleb v. Brown, [344 So.
2d 485 (Ala. 1977),] this Court stated that adopted
children are 'presumptively within the designation
of the adopter's descendants unless the context or
circumstances 
clearly 
establish 
a 
contrary
intention.' 344 So. 2d at 489. In view of the fact
that scriveners were put on notice after 1931 that
adopted children would be treated the same as
natural children, and in view of the public policy
extant at the time the wills were drawn and in the
present case, by looking only at the wording of the
wills, we determine that the testators, by using the
term 'descendants,' intended to include the two
adopted children."
369 So. 2d at 800. This Court also rejected the argument that,
"in 1964, the term 'descendants' did not include adopted
children," and it held that "the public policy of this state
[is] that adopted children are treated the same as natural
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children, unless a desire to exclude them is clearly indicated
by the testator." 369 So. 2d at 801. Likewise, in McCaleb,
this Court, in concluding that the language used in a deed
included adopted children, considered that the law at the time
the deeds were executed would have allowed an adopted child to
be an heir. 344 So. 2d at 488. This Court also considered that
holding otherwise would "frustrate the overall policy of the
adoption statute to treat adopted children in all respects as
natural children unless a contrary meaning is clearly
expressed." Id. at 489.
Gotlieb and McCaleb, however, are distinguishable from
the present case. For one, the instruments at issue in Gotlieb
and McCaleb did not include the specific term "born" as did
the 1971 trust.7 Moreover, Gotlieb, McCaleb, and the 1931
statute specifically addressed adopted children. See Doby v.
7Samuel also cites Tierce v. Gilliam, 652 So. 2d 254 (Ala.
1994), Sellers v. Blackwell, 378 So. 2d 1106 (Ala. 1979),
Southside Baptist Church v. Drennen, 362 So. 2d 854 (Ala.
1978), and Zimmerman v. First National Bank of Birmingham, 348
So. 2d 1359 (Ala. 1977), in support of his argument that
"issue" and "descendants" include adopted children. Tierce
involved a child born after divorce who was presumed to be a
beneficiary's legal child. Sellers, Southside Baptist Church,
and Zimmerman all involved an adopted child, and the
instruments in those cases did not include the specific use of
the word "born" or a similar variation.
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Carroll, 
274 
Ala. 
273, 
275, 
147 
So. 
2d 
803, 
805
(1962)(explaining that the 1931 statute applied only to minor
children and that there was no provision for an adoption of an
adult in Alabama). Samuel was adopted as an adult. At the time
the 1971 trust was executed, there was no provision in the law
authorizing the adoption of adults. Although the Alabama
Legislature enacted the Adult Adoption Act, codified at §§
43–4–1 through –4, Ala. Code 1975, in 1973 authorizing the
adoption of an adult for inheritance purposes, that act came
into being two years after the 1971 trust was executed. 
Moreover, those Code sections were repealed effective January
1, 1991, and replaced by the Alabama Adoption Code, § 26-10A-1
et seq., Ala. Code 1975. See Act No. 554, Ala. Acts 1990. 
Accordingly, the probate court's judgment is due to be
affirmed on the basis that the law at the time the 1971 trust
was executed did not allow adult adoption, that Samuel's
adoption as an adult in 2016 did not make him a "lineal
descendant" as that term is defined in the 1971 trust, and
that, therefore, Samuel was not a beneficiary of Aimee's
trust. 
Because we are affirming the probate court's judgment on
the above grounds, we need not address the parties' arguments
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concerning the probate court's reliance on Whitfield v.
Matthews, 334 So. 2d 875 (Ala. 1976). In addition, we
pretermit discussion of the siblings' argument regarding
whether Alabama public policy favors the inclusion of adopted
adults within the term "lineal descendants." Furthermore, the
analysis in this opinion is limited to the unique facts of
this case, which involves the adoption of an adult, and should
not be read to have any application to adoptions involving
children.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the
probate court.
MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED; AFFIRMED.
Parker, C.J., and Bryan, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ.,
concur.  
Bolin and Shaw, JJ., concur in the result.  
Wise and Sellers, JJ., dissent.
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SELLERS, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. This case is controlled by well
settled 
full-faith-and-credit 
principles 
rendering 
the
majority's extended analysis unnecessary.  Our Constitution
provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
every other State."  U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1.  Adoption
decrees are among those judgments to which full faith and
credit is due. See V.L. v. E.L., ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1017,
194 L.Ed.2d 92 (2016) (holding that Georgia superior court had
subject-matter jurisdiction to grant adoption, triggering
Alabama's full-faith-and-credit obligation). And, despite the
various public-policy arguments regarding adult adoptions in
Alabama, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that,
although "[a] court may be guided by the forum State's 'public
policy' in determining the law applicable to a controversy,"
there is "no roving 'public policy exception' to the full
faith and credit due judgments."  Baker v. General Motors
Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998). In other words, regarding
judgments, "the full faith and credit obligation is 
exacting."
Id. 
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In this case, the Charleston County Family Court received
into evidence the affidavit of Aimee Harrison Parris in which
Aimee testified that her purposes in seeking to adopt her
stepson, Samuel S. Parris, were to affirm the loving familial
relationship between them and to ensure that Samuel inherit
from her as her descendant, thus effectuating her estate plan.
Based on that evidence, the South Carolina court entered an
adoption decree, adjudicating a parent-child relationship
between Aimee and Samuel. See § 43-8-230, Ala. Code 1975
(stating that "adopted persons ... are included in class gift
terminology ... for determining relationships for purposes of
intestate succession"). Therefore, unless the 1971 trust
specifically evidences a clear intent to exclude adopted
children -- and I submit that it does not -- Samuel is
presumed to be a lineal descendant under the 1971 trust. The
1971 trust defines "lineal descendants" as "those hereafter
born, either before or after trustor's death, as well as those
now in existence."  The phrase "hereafter born" references the
time frame in which lineal descendants are born in relation to
the trustors' deaths and makes that time frame as expansively
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inclusive as possible.8 To this extent, Samuel was born in
1993 and became a lineal descendant in 2016, when Aimee
adopted him.  
Because the South Carolina adoption decree appears on its
face to have been rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction, the Alabama probate court was required to 
afford
full faith and credit to that decree. Accordingly, I would
reverse the judgment of the probate court and render a
judgment holding that Samuel is a lineal descendant of Aimee
and thus a beneficiary under the terms of the 1971 trust.
Wise, J., concurs.
8Relying, in part, on Whitfield v. Matthews, 334 So. 2d
876 (Ala. 1976), the probate court found that the phrase
"hereafter 
born" 
in 
defining 
"lineal 
descendants" 
demonstrated
the trustors' intent for the 1971 trust to benefit only their
biological descendants. In 
Whitfield, this Court held that the
phrase "'for the benefit of the children now or later born to
my son, L.B. Whitfield, III,'" did not include an adopted
child of the son. Whitfield is clearly distinguishable. In
Whitfield, the trustor concisely expressed his intent that the
trust assets benefit only those children born to his son; this
excluded adopted children. Here, the 1971 trust does not
define "lineal descendants" as those "hereafter born" to any
specific person or class of persons, nor does the trust
include any express language excluding adopted children.
Rather, the phrase "hereafter born" taken in its proper
context merely references the time frame in which lineal
descendants are born in relation to the trustors' deaths to
make clear that all children, regardless of the time or
circumstances of their birth, are included in the definition
of "lineal descendants" and can thus benefit under the terms
of the 1971 trust. 
21