Title: Com. v. Starr
Citation: 406 A.2d 1017, 486 Pa. 530
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: October 1, 1979

486 Pa. 530 (1979) 406 A.2d 1017 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Donald L. STARR, Jr., Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued May 21, 1979. Decided October 1, 1979. *531 John H. Chronister, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant. John C. Uhler, Dist. Atty. of York County, Sheral Ann Dorney, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee. Before EAGEN, C.J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ. O'BRIEN, Justice. Appellant, Donald L. Starr, Jr., was tried by a judge sitting without a jury and convicted of murder of the second degree for the stabbing death of Wilbur Grim during a robbery. Post-verdict motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment. This appeal followed. Appellant raises only one issue in this appeal. He alleges the trial court erred in refusing his pretrial motion to suppress his confession. The facts are as follows. Once appellant became suspect in the instant homicide, he was asked to go to the state police barracks for purposes of taking a polygraph examination. Once at the barracks, appellant met with Trooper John B. Kelly, the polygraph examiner. Trooper Kelly explained how the test would be administered, and then fully informed appellant of his applicable constitutional rights. As Trooper Kelly testified: *532 Appellant was then asked if he would be willing to take the examination. He originally was somewhat reluctant to take the test. When Trooper Kelly questioned him as to why he was reluctant, appellant agreed to take the examination. Following the examination, Kelly indicated to appellant that the results indicated deception on appellant's part when he denied participation in the Grim stabbing. Shortly thereafter, appellant was again informed of his constitutional rights, which he waived. He then admitted killing the victim in the course of a robbery. However, appellant testified: He then admitted killing the victim. We note preliminarily the applicable test. "When the admissibility of a confession is challenged, the prosecution at *533 the suppression hearing has the burden of proving that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights when being questioned by the police; that waiver must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence." [Citations omitted]. "In deciding whether the burden has been met, we consider the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, and that portion of the evidence offered by the defense that remains uncontradicted." [Citations omitted]. Commonwealth v. Jones, 459 Pa. 286, 289, 328 A.2d 828, 829 (1974). Appellant claimed the waiver of his Miranda rights was ineffective because Trooper Kelly's representations led appellant to believe the results of the polygraph examination could be used as evidence against him. The burden, thus, fell to the prosecution to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that no such misleading representations were made. The suppression court, approaching the heart of the matter, inquired of Trooper Kelly: This equivocating answer by the Commonwealth's principal witness to the critical question of precisely what representations were made to appellant falls short of satisfying the burden which adhered to the prosecution. This is especially so where it is uncontradicted that some representations, at least, were made to appellant concerning the use to which the polygraph results might be put and the effect *534 which they might have. The record of the suppression hearing does not indicate the Commonwealth met its burden of proving the representations made did not impinge with such force upon appellant's understanding of his right to remain silent so as to render his decision to waive that right a knowing and voluntary one. Reversed and remanded for a new trial. NIX and LARSEN, JJ., file dissenting opinions. NIX, Justice, dissenting. I am forced to vigorously register my dissent to today's Opinion of the Court. The majority Opinion entirely misreads, and accordingly fails to cite, our prior cases on the issue of the nature of the representations made to a defendant and that allegedly result in a confession. In Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 423, 435, 322 A.2d 119, 126-27 (1974), this Court stated: Today's Opinion stands the law on this issue upside down. The representations appellant alleges were made are not of the type or nature that would preclude the finding of a knowing or voluntary waiver. I therefore dissent. LARSEN, Justice, dissenting. I dissent; a new trial is an unnecessary prolongation of this case. Assuming appellant's version of the facts surrounding his confession (namely, that immediately prior to his confession, Trooper Kelly told him that "he'd be showing . . . [appellant's polygraph examination] to the district attorney and the judge"), Trooper Kelly's statement was not such that it was "likely to cause an untrustworthy confession" nor was it "so reprehensible as to invalidate the confession as offensive to the basic notions of fairness." Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 423, 435, 322 A.2d 119, 126 (1974). In holding that appellant's confession was admissible, the suppression court found: The record supports the suppression court's findings and, therefore, I would affirm appellant's judgment of sentence.