Title: Smith v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC18-822
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 22, 2021

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC18-822 
____________ 
 
DONALD JAMES SMITH, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
April 22, 2021 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Donald James Smith appeals his judgment of conviction and 
sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. 
Const.  We affirm. 
I 
On June 21, 2013, Smith met eight-year-old Cherish 
Perrywinkle, her sisters, and her mother, Rayne, at a Dollar General 
store in Jacksonville.  Smith overheard Rayne explain to an 
employee that she could not afford to purchase a dress for Cherish, 
and offered to drive the Perrywinkles to Walmart and buy clothes 
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for the family.  Smith explained to Rayne that his wife had a gift 
card and would meet the group there.  At Walmart, they shopped 
together for hours.  It got late and the Perrywinkles had not eaten, 
so Smith said he would buy them all cheeseburgers at a McDonalds 
inside the store.  Instead, at 10:44 p.m., he vanished with Cherish. 
Surveillance cameras caught Smith leading her to his van, as well 
as the two of them driving away.   
Cherish was not seen alive again.  The next morning, with the 
help of witnesses reporting the location of Smith’s van, police 
located Cherish’s body in a creek behind a church, under a pile of 
debris.  Cherish had been brutally raped, then strangled to death.  
An officer identified Smith, who was soaking wet, behind the wheel 
of the same van that had left Walmart.  It contained the things 
Rayne had bought at Dollar General.  Smith was arrested and 
charged with kidnapping, sexual battery of a person under twelve, 
and first-degree murder. 
News outlets in Florida and the United States covered the 
murder extensively.  In Jacksonville, live broadcasts highlighted 
Smith’s prior sex crime convictions in 1977, 1992, and 2009.  
Outlets in Panama City, Tallahassee, Orlando, Tampa, and Miami 
- 3 - 
 
reported on the murder.  Even CNN and Fox News picked up the 
story.  City news stations dedicated webpages to the case and many 
blogs and social media posts discussed the murder. 
Media outlets also covered the effect of the murder on the local 
community, and the community’s outreach to Rayne.  Hundreds of 
people attended Cherish’s funeral, which was locally televised.  
Eighteen to nineteen hundred people reportedly signed the guest 
book at Cherish’s viewing.  Families that had never met the 
Perrywinkles stopped by their home with groceries. 
Smith’s case progressed to trial, and in 2015, Smith’s defense 
team filed a motion to change venue.  They argued that widespread 
media coverage had painted Smith as a monster who should be 
executed, a sexual predator who was guilty beyond doubt.  Smith 
maintained that the media had adopted the State’s theory of the 
case, and that the State’s themes persisted on social media two 
years after Cherish’s death.  The trial court held a hearing on the 
motion for change of venue, but reserved ruling until after jury 
selection.  In light of the extensive pretrial publicity, the trial court 
used a written juror questionnaire and individual voir dire 
regarding exposure to press coverage as part of the jury selection 
- 4 - 
 
process.  The questionnaire asked about jurors’ knowledge of the 
case and witnesses, and about any opinions they had formed about 
the case and the death penalty.  Three hundred potential jurors 
completed these questionnaires.  The court ultimately empaneled 
the jury without an objection from defense counsel or a request for 
a final ruling on its motion to change venue. 
Before trial began, Smith also filed a motion in limine to 
prevent the State from offering autopsy photos of the victim.  
Counsel argued that because Dr. Valerie Rao, the chief medical 
examiner for Duval County and a trained pathologist, was to testify 
to Cherish’s injuries, there was no need to introduce photographs of 
those injuries.  Smith’s team argued that the pictures’ unduly 
prejudicial emotional effect would outweigh their probative value.  
The trial court denied Smith’s motion. 
In the State’s opening statement at trial, the prosecutor 
described what took place at Walmart and stated, “Every mother’s 
darkest nightmare became Rayne Perrywinkle’s reality.”  Smith 
objected to the comment on the grounds that it was argumentative, 
and the court overruled the objection.  
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Later in the proceedings, the State called Dr. Rao to testify to 
the extent of Cherish’s injuries.  Dr. Rao explained that she had 
testified in hundreds of cases as an expert witness, providing her 
opinion on various potential causes of death.  Dr. Rao had 
performed Cherish’s autopsy and had been present at the creek 
when her body was recovered.  As Dr. Rao testified, the State 
introduced twenty-six pictures of Cherish’s autopsy into evidence.  
Dr. Rao described injuries on Cherish’s scalp, chest, legs, arm, 
neck, chin, lip, nose, eyes, genitals, and throat.  When the 
prosecutor asked Dr. Rao about Cherish’s throat, Dr. Rao 
stammered slightly, and the following exchange occurred:  
Prosecutor:  I’m going to show you two more photographs 
of the dissection taken of Cherish Perrywinkle’s throat.  
Will you first tell the jury what you saw when you dissected 
her throat? 
 
Dr. Rao:  Yes.  So what we do is – I’m sorry.  I just need a 
break.  Have [sic] about five minutes. 
 
Court:  You want a five-minute break?  I think we’ll all take 
a break for ten minutes.  Thank you. 
 
 
The judge dismissed the jury and defense counsel moved for a 
mistrial, arguing that Dr. Rao’s response was so prejudicial that it 
could not be cured by any jury instruction.  The court denied the 
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motion.  After the ten-minute recess, Dr. Rao resumed her 
testimony without further interruption.  The State later called a 
crime laboratory analyst, who testified that Smith’s DNA was found 
on and inside Cherish’s body.  He put the odds at one in 35 
quintillion that the DNA belonged to someone else.  The State also 
produced surveillance footage of Smith leading Cherish from 
Walmart to his van.  
During closing argument, the State at one point stated, “And 
from the grave she’s crying out to you, [‘]Donald Smith raped me. 
Donald Smith sodomized me.  Donald Smith strangled me until 
every last breath left my body.[’]”  Counsel for Smith did not object 
to this statement, and indeed presented no closing argument.   
The jury deliberated for nineteen minutes before unanimously 
finding Smith guilty of kidnapping, sexual battery of a person under 
twelve years old, and first-degree murder.  By special verdict, the 
jury convicted Smith of both premeditated and felony murder with 
kidnapping and sexual battery as the underlying felonies. 
At the penalty phase of trial, Smith presented nine witnesses, 
including a psychologist, a neurologist, and his son.  The State 
presented one witness, the victim of a 1992 attempted kidnapping 
- 7 - 
 
by Smith.  Following these presentations, the jury unanimously 
recommended that Smith be sentenced to death.1  After conducting 
a Spencer hearing,2 the trial court entered a sentencing order 
accepting the jury’s recommendation and imposing the death 
penalty.  
II 
On appeal, Smith raises the following five claims: (a) the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying Smith’s motion for change of 
venue; (b) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Smith’s 
motion for mistrial during the medical examiner’s testimony; (c) the 
trial court abused its discretion by denying Smith’s motion to 
exclude autopsy photos; (d) the trial court abused its discretion by 
 
1.  The jury unanimously found six aggravating factors: (1) the 
defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or 
threat of violence to the person; (2) the defendant was engaged in a 
kidnapping and sexual battery during the capital felony; (3) the 
capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or 
preventing a lawful arrest; (4) the capital felony was especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (5) the capital felony was a homicide 
and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner 
without any pretense of moral or legal justification; and (6) the 
victim of the capital felony was a person less than twelve years of 
age. See § 921.141(b), (d)-(e), (h)-(i), and (l), Fla. Stat. (2017). 
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
- 8 - 
 
overruling an objection to the prosecutor’s opening statement and 
committed fundamental error by not granting a mistrial during the 
prosecutor’s closing statement; and (e) the cumulative effect of the 
errors in the case deprived Smith of a fair trial.  We address each 
claim in turn. 
A 
 
Smith argues that the trial court erroneously denied his 
motion for change of venue.  “[A] defendant may move for a change 
of venue on the ground that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had 
in the county where the case is pending for any reason other than 
the interest and prejudice of the trial judge.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.240(a).  A trial court should grant a change of venue if “the . . . 
state of mind of the inhabitants of a community is so infected by 
knowledge of the incident and accompanying prejudice, bias, and 
preconceived opinions that jurors could not possibly put these 
matters out of their minds and try the case solely on the evidence 
presented in the courtroom.”  Manning v. State, 378 So. 2d 274, 276 
(Fla. 1979).   
Generally, we review a trial court’s ruling on such a motion for 
abuse of discretion.  However, as is the case with most trial 
- 9 - 
 
objections, an objection to the trial court’s denial of a motion for a 
change of venue must be preserved for appellate review.  That is, 
“the issue or legal argument must be raised and ruled on by the 
trial court.”  Rhodes v. State, 986 So. 2d 501, 513 (Fla. 2008).  If an 
issue is not preserved, it is reviewed only for fundamental error.    
Such an error “reach[es] down into the validity of the trial itself to 
the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained 
without the assistance of the alleged error.”  Knight v. State, 286 So. 
3d 147, 151 (Fla. 2019) (quoting Brown v. State, 124 So. 2d 481, 
484 (Fla. 1960)).  Defendants have no constitutional due process 
right to correct an unpreserved error, and appellate courts should 
“exercise . . . discretion under the doctrine of fundamental error 
very guardedly.”  Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970). 
 
The trial court never ruled upon Smith’s motion for change of 
venue and Smith did not renew his objection, thus the issue was 
not preserved for appellate review.  Smith made the motion in 2015, 
three years before trial commenced, and the court reserved ruling 
on the motion until after the parties attempted to seat a jury in 
Duval County.  In 2018, at the beginning of jury selection, counsel 
renewed Smith’s motion for change of venue, but the court again 
- 10 - 
 
deferred a ruling.  At the end of jury selection, counsel stated that 
they had no further objections.  When the jury was sworn at the 
beginning of trial, Smith’s team did not renew the objection or 
request a final ruling on the motion for change of venue.  Because 
there was no ruling on the motion, the issue was not preserved and 
the trial court’s failure to grant Smith’s motion is reviewed for 
fundamental error.  Rhodes, 986 So. 2d at 513; see also Jones v. 
State, 998 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2008) (finding appellant’s Brady [v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)] claim was not preserved because it 
was not ruled on by the trial court). 
The trial court committed no fundamental error in failing to 
grant Smith’s motion for change of venue.  See e.g., Armstrong v. 
State, 862 So. 2d 705, 719 (Fla. 2003) (finding a trial court 
committed no fundamental error when it denied a motion for 
change of venue where jurors explained they could set aside pretrial 
knowledge and feelings about victims).  Courts correct errors as 
fundamental despite a party’s failure to conform to procedural rules 
regarding preservation “to protect the interests of justice itself.” 
Maddox v. State, 760 So. 2d 89, 98 (Fla. 2000).  For example, this 
Court has found fundamental error when appellants were denied 
- 11 - 
 
the right to counsel.  Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562, 566 (Fla. 
2008) (“While a denial of counsel for an entire sentencing 
proceeding would constitute fundamental error, the temporary 
absence of counsel [during a victim impact statement] does not.”); 
see also Gonzalez v. State, 838 So. 2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2003) (vacating an indigent appellant’s sentence and remanding for 
further resentencing after appellant was denied counsel).  We have 
also found fundamental error when a court provided an inaccurate 
definition of a disputed element of a crime in a jury instruction.  
Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366, 369 (Fla. 2002) (quashing a district 
court’s decision after the court provided a definition of “maliciously” 
in conflict with a previous Florida Supreme Court decision).  
Similarly, we found fundamental error when evaluating “a 
conviction imposed upon a crime totally unsupported by evidence.”  
Troedel v. State, 462 So. 2d 392, 399 (Fla. 1984); see also F.B. v. 
State, 852 So. 2d 226, 230 (Fla. 2003) (“[A]n argument that the 
evidence is totally insufficient as a matter of law to establish the 
commission of a crime need not be preserved.  Such complete 
failure of the evidence meets the requirements of fundamental error 
. . . .”).  
- 12 - 
 
Unlike the cases above, here, the interests of justice were not 
jeopardized by counsel’s failure to obtain a ruling on Smith’s motion 
for change of venue.  Smith has advanced no specific allegations of 
prejudice, and there is no evidence that the media exposure 
actually tainted Smith’s trial.  In capital cases, a fundamental error 
is one that is “so significant that the sentence of death ‘could not 
have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.’”  
Poole v. State, 151 So. 3d 402, 415 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Snelgrove v. 
State, 107 So. 3d 242, 257 (Fla. 2012)).  Here, we find no basis 
upon which to make that conclusion.  For one thing, the evidence of 
guilt is overwhelming.  The jury in this case saw Cherish’s autopsy 
photos, learned that Smith’s DNA was on and in Cherish’s body, 
watched surveillance footage of Smith leading Cherish to his car, 
heard witness testimony about his van’s location, and listened to 
Rayne Perrywinkle’s 911 call.  A jury anywhere in the state would 
have given great weight to this evidence. 
What is more, the court would not have abused its discretion 
had it denied the motion.  In exercising discretion regarding a 
change of venue, “a trial court must make a two-pronged analysis, 
evaluating: (1) the extent and nature of any pretrial publicity; and 
- 13 - 
 
(2) the difficulty encountered in actually selecting a jury.”  Griffin v. 
State, 866 So. 2d 1, 12 (Fla. 2003).  This Court has previously 
explained that “pretrial publicity is normal and expected in certain 
kinds of cases, and that fact standing alone will not require a 
change of venue.”  Id.  There are five factors to be considered when 
evaluating pretrial publicity: (1) when the publicity occurred in 
relation to the crime and the trial, (2) whether the publicity was 
made up of factual or inflammatory stories, (3) whether the 
publicity favored the State’s side of the story, (4) the size of the 
community exposed to the publicity, and (5) whether the defendant 
exhausted all of his peremptory challenges in seating the jury. 
Rolling v. State, 695 So. 2d 278, 285 (Fla. 1997). 
 
Here, on balance, the Rolling factors weigh in the State’s favor. 
Much of the pretrial publicity in this matter occurred five years 
before jury selection—in 2013, right after Cherish Periwinkle was 
murdered.  The court administered a jury questionnaire to screen 
potential jurors for concerns arising from exposure to media 
reports.  Four of the jurors ultimately chosen for Smith’s trial had 
not heard of the case at all.  Seven jurors had seen some coverage 
in years past but had minimal knowledge of the case.  One juror 
- 14 - 
 
testified that she knew about Smith and the victims, but knew 
nothing of their pasts, and could serve on the jury impartially 
because she saw Smith as a human being.  Thus, notwithstanding 
substantial and negative media coverage about Smith and the facts 
of the case, the size and diversity of the community from which the 
venire was drawn, the long delay between the initial publicity and 
trial, and the fact that Smith sought no additional peremptory 
challenges all weigh in favor of concluding that the trial court would 
not have abused its discretion had it denied the motion to change 
venue.  See Rolling, 695 So. 2d at 287 (denying motion for change of 
venue in Gainesville after a defendant murdered five students 
despite overwhelming media attention and the fact that “every 
member of the venire had some extrinsic knowledge of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding this case.”). 
B 
 
Next, Smith argues that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion for a mistrial on account of the interruption to Dr. Rao’s 
testimony.  While testifying to the injuries that Cherish sustained, 
Dr. Rao paused, took a breath, and asked to take a break.  The trial 
court promptly recessed.  Smith contends that this pause was 
- 15 - 
 
tantamount to a breakdown and asserted the only way to cure the 
disruption was to declare a mistrial.  We disagree.   
We review the denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of 
discretion, and “[a] mistrial is appropriate only where the error is so 
prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial.”  Hamilton v. State, 703 So. 
2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. 1997).  When reviewing a motion for a mistrial 
dealing with emotional outbursts from witnesses, “appellate courts 
should defer to trial judges’ judgments and rulings when they 
cannot glean from the record how intense a witness’s outburst 
was.”  Thomas v. State, 748 So. 2d 970, 980 (Fla. 1999) (finding no 
abuse of discretion in failing to grant a mistrial after a friend of the 
victim suffered an emotional breakdown when asked to identify an 
accused while testifying in front of a jury). 
 
The fact that Dr. Rao took a break during her testimony did 
not affect the fairness of Smith’s trial.  The jury saw no outburst of 
emotion.  From its vantage point, which was closer to Dr. Rao’s 
reaction than ours, the trial court determined that a recess was 
appropriate, and a mistrial was not.  See Thomas, 748 So. 2d at 
980.  We cannot say this was an abuse of discretion.   
- 16 - 
 
This case is not like the one cited by Smith, where a witness’s 
outburst injected into the proceedings a concern for the emotional 
distress of another sufficient to distract the jury from its work as 
finders of fact.  See Colon v. State, 191 So. 3d 985, 986 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2016) (reversing a trial court’s denial of motion for mistrial 
after a witness-mother cried and threw up when photographs of her 
dead child’s genitals were introduced through her testimony).  Here, 
Dr. Rao paused, caught her breath, and asked for a break.  She did 
not state why she was requesting a break, and when testimony 
resumed, Dr. Rao spoke clearly and did not appear to the jury to be 
in any emotional distress. 
Smith objects that the trial court should have given a curative 
instruction after Dr. Rao asked to pause.  The response to a witness 
outburst is also “better left to the discretion of trial judges who are 
in the best position to assess the intensity of the outburst and its 
potential effect on jurors.”  Talley v. State, 260 So. 3d 562, 569 n.4 
(Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (declining a defendant’s suggestion to adopt a 
new standard requiring trial courts to poll a jury whenever there is 
an outburst during trial proceedings); see also Arbelaez v. State, 
626 So. 2d 169, 176 (Fla. 1993) (affirming a trial court’s use of a 
- 17 - 
 
curative instruction after a witness-mother, crying as she took the 
witness stand, cursed the defendant).  Here, we cannot say the trial 
court abused its discretion in declining to give such an instruction.   
C 
 
Smith argues next that the trial court improperly denied his 
motion to exclude autopsy photographs used during Dr. Rao’s 
testimony.  Smith’s motion argued that admitting these 
photographs would violate section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2017) 
(“Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.”).  The State ultimately introduced twenty-six 
photos of Cherish’s various injuries, including pictures of her 
exposed skull and trachea.   
We evaluate rulings about the admissibility of evidence for 
abuse of discretion, and “[t]his Court has long followed the rule that 
photographs are admissible if they are relevant and not so shocking 
in nature as to defeat the value of their relevance.”  Czubak v. State, 
570 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 1990).  A court “must determine whether 
the gruesomeness of the portrayal is so inflammatory as to create 
- 18 - 
 
an undue prejudice in the minds of the jury and [distract] them 
from a fair and unimpassioned consideration of the evidence.”  Id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting Leach v. State, 132 So. 2d 329, 332 
(Fla. 1961)). 
 
This Court has “consistently upheld the admission of allegedly 
gruesome photographs where they were independently relevant or 
corroborative of other evidence.”  Id. at 928; see also Seibert v. 
State, 64 So. 3d 67 (Fla. 2010) (upholding admission of 
photographs of victim’s dismembered body to show premeditation 
and consciousness of guilt); Jackson v. State, 545 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 
1989) (upholding admission of photographs of victims’ charred 
remains to prove identity, show circumstances surrounding 
murder, and corroborate medical examiner’s testimony); Bush v. 
State, 461 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1984) (ruling photographs of blowup of 
bloody gunshot wound to victim’s face admissible to corroborate 
medical examiner’s testimony); Straight v. State, 397 So. 2d 903 
(Fla. 1981) (holding photograph of victim’s decomposed body 
admissible to corroborate testimony as to how death was inflicted).  
 
Smith has argued that there was no need to publish the 
autopsy photographs given the overwhelming evidence already 
- 19 - 
 
present in the case linking him to the victim, but “[t]he test for 
admissibility of photographic evidence is relevancy rather than 
necessity.”  Pope v. State, 679 So. 2d 710, 713 (Fla. 1996); see also 
Campbell v. State, 271 So. 3d 914, 934 (Fla. 2018) (“There is no 
question that [the exhibit] is graphic, depicting a significant 
chopping wound to the brain.  However, the photograph was 
relevant to illustrate the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries, 
as well as the medical examiner’s testimony.”); see also Patrick v. 
State, 104 So. 3d 1046, 1062 (Fla. 2012) (“[P]hotographs . . . 
depict[ing] the skin of the victim’s head pulled back to reveal his 
skull and the entire torso opened to reveal his upper chest . . . were 
provided to demonstrate the internal injuries sustained since they 
were not otherwise visible.”). 
 
Cherish’s autopsy photos were relevant to the brutality of her 
rape and the premeditation of her murder, as well as the heinous, 
atrocious, and cruel nature of the crime.  For example, as the State 
argued, a picture showing the manner in which the skin had been 
stripped from Cherish’s throat was relevant evidence that the cause 
of her death had been strangulation. While not on its own sufficient 
to establish premeditation, “evidence of strangulation, in 
- 20 - 
 
conjunction with one or more additional facts indicating that the 
killer had time to reflect upon his actions and to form a conscious 
purpose to kill, justifies submitting the question of premeditation to 
the jury for its determination.”  Berube v. State, 5 So. 3d 734, 744 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2009); see also Wainwright v. State, 2 So. 3d 948, 952 
(Fla. 2008) (“The trial court did not err in concluding that evidence 
of strangulation alone may be sufficient to support the HAC 
aggravator.  ‘[T]his court has consistently upheld the HAC 
aggravator in cases where a conscious[3] victim was strangled.’”) 
(quoting Bowles v. State, 804 So. 2d 1173, 1178 (Fla. 2001)); 
Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836, 850 (Fla. 2002) (“Because 
strangulation of a conscious victim involves foreknowledge and the 
extreme anxiety of impending death, death by strangulation 
constitutes prima facie evidence of HAC.”). 
 
Context matters in evaluating a trial court’s exercise of 
discretion in evidentiary rulings.  While, absent such context, the 
photographs at issue in this case seem numerous, the reality is that 
most of the photos identified separate injuries on Cherish’s body.  
 
3. Dr. Rao testified that evidence of a struggle showed Cherish 
was conscious when Smith strangled her. 
- 21 - 
 
There were multiple photographs of Cherish’s genitals and throat, 
but these pictures were necessary to demonstrate the extent of the 
damage done to her body during the sexual battery and to support 
the medical examiner’s explanation of the time period and force 
required to strangle her to death.  Each photograph was relevant to 
the brutality of Cherish’s death, and the brutality of the crime, in 
turn, was relevant to support the State’s legal charge: a murder that 
was both premediated and heinous, atrocious, and cruel. 
D 
 
Next, Smith argues that the State made inappropriate 
comments in its opening statement and in closing argument.  Smith 
objected to the prosecutor’s opening statement (“[e]very mother’s 
darkest nightmare became Rayne Perrywinkle’s reality”), so we 
review the trial court’s overruling the objection for abuse of 
discretion.  Merck v. State, 975 So. 2d 1054, 1061 (Fla. 2007).  
Smith did not object to the prosecutor’s closing statement (“from 
the grave she’s crying out to you, Donald Smith raped me”), so we 
review this statement for fundamental error.  State v. Smith, 241 So. 
3d 53, 55 (Fla. 2018). 
- 22 - 
 
 
First, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling 
Smith’s objection to the statement at issue in the State’s opening.  
The purpose of an opening statement is for parties to convey to the 
jury what they expect the evidence produced at trial to establish.  
Perez v. State, 919 So. 2d 347, 363 (Fla. 2005).  In Florida, the trial 
court gives parties “wide latitude” in presenting opening and closing 
statements, and “comments by the prosecutor will merit a mistrial 
only when they deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial trial, 
materially contribute to the conviction, are so harmful or 
fundamentally tainted as to require a new trial, or are so 
inflammatory they might have influenced the jury to reach a more 
severe verdict than it would have otherwise rendered.”  Miller v. 
State, 161 So. 3d 354, 382 (Fla. 2015) (citing Spencer v. State, 645 
So. 2d 377, 383 (Fla. 1994).  Here, Smith claims that the 
prosecutors’ comments amounted to improper “golden rule” 
arguments, which impermissibly persuade jurors to “place 
themselves in the victim’s position during the crime and imagine 
the victim’s suffering.”  Mosley v. State, 46 So. 3d 510, 520 (Fla. 
2009). 
- 23 - 
 
 
The State’s opening comment was dramatic, but not untrue; 
nor was it a mischaracterization of the evidence that would soon be 
presented to the jury.  At trial, the State may make comments that 
“are based on evidence introduced at trial and are relevant to the 
circumstances of [the crime].”  Braddy v. State, 111 So. 3d 810, 843 
(Fla. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Mosley, 46 So. 3d at 
521).  When the prosecutor made the statement at issue, she knew 
that Rayne Perrywinkle was slated to testify and that Rayne’s 
testimony and 911 call recording would attest to the terror she felt 
when she realized Cherish was missing.  Here, the State was not 
making an impermissibly inflammatory statement; rather, the 
prosecutor was previewing what Rayne herself would soon explain.4 
 
In Reese v. State, 694 So. 2d 678, 685 (Fla. 1997), this Court 
found no error where a prosecutor made similar comments during 
closing argument describing a victim’s rape and murder as “every 
woman’s worst nightmare.” Reese v. Sec’y Fla., Dept of Corr., 675 F. 
3d 1277, 1292 (11th Cir. 2012).  Nor did the Eleventh Circuit find 
 
4. In her testimony, Rayne explained that she “started to 
panic,” and her 911 call documented her asking, “Why on earth 
would he take my little girl?” 
- 24 - 
 
any part of that closing argument to be a due process violation.  Id. 
at 1278-88.  The court explained that no golden rule violation had 
occurred because “the prosecutor did not impermissibly invite ‘the 
jury to place themselves in the victim’s shoes.’”  Id. at 1292 (quoting 
Reese, 694 So. 2d at 685 (Fla. 1997).  Like the comment in Reese, 
here, the State’s opening comment was a reasonable projection of 
what the evidence would show to be Rayne Perrywinkle’s state of 
mind when she found out her daughter was missing. 
 
Second, the trial court did not commit fundamental error 
when it allowed the State’s comment during summation to which 
Smith objects.  Summation is intended to review evidence and draw 
inferences, but, like opening statement, “must not be used to 
inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict 
reflects an emotional response to the crime or the defendant rather 
than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable 
law.”  Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 134 (Fla. 1985).  
Comments that “invit[e] the jury to imagine the victim’s final pain, 
terror and defenselessness” are prohibited.  Id. at 133.  Yet a 
prosecutor’s words may, indeed sometimes must, elicit an 
emotional response from the jury.  That fact of life, particularly in 
- 25 - 
 
matters of life and death, is not a basis for reversal.  Here, by the 
time of closing argument, the State had put forth evidence that 
Smith raped and sodomized Cherish, and that he strangled her to 
death.  The prosecutor’s comments did more purposefully to elicit 
an emotional reaction than is advisable, but they were moving in 
substantial measure because of how they characterized the 
disturbing facts in evidence.  See Rogers v. State, 957 So. 2d 538, 
549 (Fla. 2007) (holding that State’s comments describing victim’s 
murder and last moments alive were not improper because they 
were based upon facts in evidence); see also Mosley, 46 So. 3d at 
520 (holding that State’s comments describing victim trying to 
breathe as she was being suffocated and noting victim’s opportunity 
to contemplate death were not improper because comments were 
based on facts in evidence).5  Smith had an opportunity to rebut the 
 
5. In Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986), the 
Supreme Court relied on six factors in evaluating a due process 
claim arising from a prosecutor’s inappropriate comments: (1) 
whether the prosecutor manipulated or misstated the evidence, (2) 
whether the comments implicated other specific rights of the 
accused, (3) whether the comments were invited by or responsive to 
defense counsel’s arguments, (4) whether the trial court’s 
instructions ameliorated the harm, (5) whether the evidence 
weighed heavily against the defendant, and (6) whether the 
defendant had an opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s comments. 
- 26 - 
 
prosecutor’s comments in closing argument, but waived closing 
statement instead.  See Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. 
E 
In the final point on appeal, Smith argues that the cumulative 
effect of the errors in this case deprived him of a fair trial.  Where 
multiple errors are discovered, it is appropriate to review the 
cumulative effect of those errors because even with competent, 
substantial evidence to support a verdict, “and even though each of 
the alleged errors, standing alone, could be considered harmless, 
the cumulative effect of such errors [may be] such as to deny to 
defendant the fair and impartial trial that is the inalienable right of 
all litigants in this state and this nation.”  McDuffie v. State, 970 So. 
2d 312, 328 (Fla. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Brooks v. 
State, 918 So. 2d 181, 202 (Fla. 2005)).  But relief is not warranted 
if there is “no reasonable probability that the cumulative effect of 
these errors affected [a defendant’s] right to a fair trial.”  Floyd v. 
 
The comments at issue here did not manipulate or misstate the 
evidence, implicated no specific rights of the accused, and while 
they were neither invited by the accused nor the subject of an 
instruction from the court, were insignificant when compared to the 
weight of the evidence, and drew no response from the defendant. 
- 27 - 
 
State, 850 So. 2d 383, 408 (Fla. 2002).  And where we find “no 
individual error, no cumulative error can exist.”  Smith v. State, 998 
So. 2d 516, 530 (Fla. 2008); see also Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d 179, 
214 (Fla. 2020) (finding an appellant entitled to no relief on his 
cumulative error claim when each of his individual claims of error 
was meritless). 
That is the case here.  Smith’s DNA was found in and on 
Cherish’s body, he was caught on several different surveillance 
cameras leading Cherish to his car, multiple witnesses spotted his 
van by the water in which Cherish’s body was found, and his pants 
were soaking wet as he was arrested.  It is the evidence in this case, 
not error, that is cumulative. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm Smith’s judgment of conviction and sentence of 
death. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, COURIEL, and 
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
MUÑIZ, J., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
- 28 - 
 
LABARGA, J., concurring in result. 
 
In light of this Court’s decision in Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 
3d 544 (Fla. 2020) (receding from proportionality review 
requirement in death penalty direct appeal cases), and for the 
reasons expressed in my dissent in Lawrence, id. at 552-58, I can 
only concur in the result. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, 
Mallory Durden Cooper, Judge – 162013CF005781AXXXMA 
 
H. Kate Bedell and Richard Randall Kuritz of Law Offices of Bedell 
& Kuritz, Jacksonville, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee