Title: WIEDMAN v TRINITY EVANGELICAL LUTH
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14649
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: March 31, 1980

No. 14649 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 MAUDE J. WIEDMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, VS. TRINITY EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH and THE CITY OF KALISPELL, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Honorable James M. Salansky, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: James A. Cumming argued, Columbia Falls, Montana For Respondents: Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn and Phillips, Kalispell, Montana I. James Heckathorn argued, Kalispell, Montana Submitted: February 21, 1980 Decided: $pk 1 - MQ . . - . , I '. - , - p :L,; 4 . . -, 5.: .- 2 Filed: & ' . -- M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Maude Wiedman brought t h i s a c t i o n i n t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l District, Flathead County, t o e s t a b l i s h an easement by p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r t h e use of c e r t a i n land which adjoined h e r property. By her s u i t she a l s o attempted t o e n j o i n t h e C i t y of K a l i s p e l l and t h e T r i n i t y Evangelical Lutheran Church from implementing a s p e c i a l improvement d i s t r i c t plan f o r i n s t a l l a t i o n of curbs and g u t t e r s along Washington S t r e e t i n K a l i s p e l l without c u t t i n g a curb a t t h e entrance t o p r o p e r t i e s she had used f o r access f o r years. The Honorable James M. Salansky held a t r i a l without a jury on t h e i s s u e of whether M s . Wiedman had e s t a b l i s h e d an easement by p r e s c r i p t i o n over t h e property i n question. Judge Salansky found M s . Wiedman's use of t h e property had been permissive and concluded t h a t she had n o t e s t a b l i s h e d an easement by p r e s c r i p t i o n . Judgment was entered accord- ingly. This appeal followed. M s . Wiedman and her former husband purchased a p a r c e l of property from t h e K a l i s p e l l Townsite Company i n 1934. The property w a s located j u s t o u t s i d e t h e c i t y l i m i t s of K a l i s p e l l on t h e northwest corner of Washington S t r e e t and Fourth Avenue. The property i s marked a s t h e "Weidman Property" on t h e map below. SDIWT. AUD A O ' I I Y I S ~ T I O P BUIWIYOS  bout a year a f t e r they purchased t h e property, M s . ~ i e d m a n and her husband w e r e divorced and t h e property w a s conveyed t o M s . Wiecknun's s o l e ownership. She has remained t h e s o l e owner of t h e property ever since. When M s . Weidman and her former husband purchased t h e property they expected t h e Townsite Company t o extend Fourth Avenue northward along t h e e a s t e r n boundary of t h e property. They b u i l t a house on t h e property o r i e n t e d t o the expected f u t u r e street. M s . Wiedman used t h e w e s t p o r t i o n of t h e expected extension of Fourth Avenue i n a manner which a n t i - c i p a t e d i t s l a t e r dedication. She s i t u a t e d her garage so t h a t i t s entrance faced t h e f u t u r e s t r e e t . M s . Wiedman parked cars on t h e expected avenue, and when f r i e n d s and family v i s i t e d they parked t h e i r v e h i c l e s on t h e same loca- t i o n . This use continued d a i l y from 1934 u n t i l t h e present. I t i s over t h i s access r o u t e t h a t M s . Wiedman now claims a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement. The property includes t h e w e s t 35 f e e t of what would have been Fourth Avenue f o r 75 f e e t north of Washington S t r e e t a d j a c e n t t o M s . Wiedmanfs property. It i s marked "claimed easement" on t h e map. I t should be pointed o u t t h a t M s . Wiedman does have a door t o her house t h a t f a c e s south toward Washington S t r e e t . She a l s o can g a i n access t o her garage v i a an a l l e y running p a r a l l e l t o her property on t h e w e s t , although t h i s would r e q u i r e her t o remove some t r e e s and change t h e door on her garage. About f i v e y e a r s a f t e r M s . Wiedman purchased her prop- e r t y , t h e Townsite Company decided n o t t o dedicate t h e extension of Fourth Avenue f o r street purposes. t he Company approached M s . Wiedman with an o f f e r t o sell the property t o her. She d i d n o t buy t h e property, apparently f e e l i n g no need t o buy property t h a t was a p u b l i c street. The Company subsequently sold t h e property t o a M r . Scovel, who l i v e d i n a home located immediately t o t h e n o r t h of M s . Wiedman's property . Not long a f t e r M r . Scovel purchased t h e property, he and M s . Wiedman had a conversation about t h e sale of h a l f t h e property t o M s . Wiedman. M r . Scovel i s now deceased. M s . Wiedman r e c a l l e d t h e conversation i n a deposition taken before t r i a l a s follows: "Q. [Mr. Heckathorn] W h o i s t h a t [who owned t h e property before T r i n i t y Lutheran Church]? "A. [Ms. Wiedman] Clyde S c o v i l l [ s i c ] . And he s a i d he would never t r y t o s t o p m e from coming i n t h e r e - "Q. H e had it a l l t h e t i m e u n t i l t h e T r i n i t y Lutheran Church had g o t i t ? "A. Y e s . "Q. And he s a i d t h a t you could use it anytime you wanted t o ? "A. Y e s . "Q. And d i d t h e church ever say you couldn't? "A. No. "Q. They have j u s t l e t you use it, too, haven't they? "A. Yes." A t t r i a l M s . Wiedman t e s t i f i e d concerning t h e conversa- t i o n as follows: "Q. [Mr. Heckathorn] And s o he [Mr. Scovel] then bought it [ t h e property i n question] and he then t o l d you t h a t as f a r as he was con- cerned you could use t h a t a r e a and he wouldn't attempt t o s t o p you, i s n ' t t h a t c o r r e c t ? "A. [Ms. Wiedman] And he went on t o say-- I d o n ' t remember t h e e x a c t conversation. I sup- pose it was t o t h a t e f f e c t . But he s a i d he d i d n ' t think he could s t o p m e i f he wanted t o . "Q. But anyhow he conveyed t o you t h a t he d i d n ' t want t o t r y t o s t o p you and t h a t you could go ahead and use it. "A. I think he wanted t o , a l l r i g h t , b u t he d i d n ' t want t o pursue it. "Q. Did he i n d i c a t e t h a t you could continue t o use it a s long a s he had i t ? "A. W e l l , I used it a s long a s he had it and I have used it ever since. "Q. A f t e r t h a t discussion d i d you and he ever have any f u r t h e r discussion about t h a t ? "A. I d o n ' t believe w e did. There w a s nothing t o discuss. H e wouldn't s e l l m e half of it f o r a driveway s o it w a s dropped. "Q. And then t h e T r i n i t y Church people came i n and bought it and, a s I understand it, they j u s t bought o u t S c o v i l l ' s [ s i c ] i n t e r e s t and you had no c o n t a c t with them and they had no c o n t a c t with you. "A. None whatsoever." Respondent T r i n i t y Evangelical Lutheran Church pur- chased t h e property over which M s . Wiedman now claims t h e easement from M r . Scovel i n 1957. The church constructed an elementary school on property adjacent t o t h e disputed property. T r i n i t y made l i t t l e use of t h e disputed property a f t e r it w a s acquired. The church now plans t o expand t h e school f a c i l i t i t e s , The plans include extension of t h e school playground t o u t i l i z e the property over which M s . Wiedman c l a i m s t h e easement. I n expanding t h e playground, T r i n i t y plans t o fence t h e property and have curbing i n - s t a l l e d along Washington S t r e e t . The C i t y of K a l i s p e l l agreed t o i n s t a l l t h e curbing. M s . Wiedman brought t h i s s u i t when t h e C i t y began i n s t a l l i n g curbing without c u t t i n g o u t a p o r t i o n of t h e curb t o allow her access t o t h e prop- e r t y over which she claims t h e easement. The s o l e i s s u e presented by t h i s case i s whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n finding t h a t M s . Wiedman's use of t h e property i n question was permissive. To e s t a b l i s h a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement, t h e p a r t y claim- i n g t h e easement must show open, notorious, exclusive, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted use of the easement f o r t h e s t a t u t o r y period. Medhus v. Dutter (1979), Mont. - , 603 P.2d 669, 672, 36 St.Rep. 2044, 2047; G a r r e t t v. Jackson (1979), - Mont. - , 600 P.2d 1177, 1179, 36 St.Rep. 1769, 1771; Hayden v. Snowden (1978), Mon t . - I 576 P.2d 1115, 1117, 35 St.Rep. 367, 369; Taylor v. Petranek (1977), 173 Mont. 433, 437, 568 P.2d 120, 122; Harland v. Anderson (1976), 169 Mont. 447, 451, 548 P.2d 613, 615. The controversy here c e n t e r s around t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t M s . Wiedman's use of t h e property i n question w a s permissive r a t h e r than adverse. I n Taylor, supra, t h e Court s t a t e d : "The l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s governing defendants' a t t a c k on t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e evidence t o support t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s a r e c l e a r . Rule 5 2 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P., provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : I' I . . . Findings of f a c t s h a l l n o t be set a s i d e unless c l e a r l y erroneous, and due re- gard s h a l l be given t o t h e opportunity of t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o judge t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e witnesses . . .' "This Court's function on appeal i s simply t o determine whether t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s and w i l l n o t r e v e r s e them u n l e s s t h e r e i s a clear preponderance of evidence a g a i n s t them. M e r r i t t v. M e r r i t t , 165 Mont. 172, 526 P.2d 1375; Finley v. Rutherford, 151 Mont. 488, 444 P.2d 306." 173 Mont. a t 437, 568 P.2d a t 1 2 2 . The evidence before t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t t h e use was permissive c o n s i s t s m a i n l y o f t h e testimony of M s . Wiedman concerning her conversation with M r . Scovel about her use of t h e property. I n her deposition T r i n i t y Lutheran's a t t o r n e y asked M s . Wiedrnan, "And he [Mr. Scovel] s a i d t h a t you could use it [ t h e property i n question] anytime you wanted to?" M s . ~ i e d m a n answered "Yes." A t t r i a l t h e church's a t t o r n e y asked M s . ~ i e d m a n , "And s o he [ M r . Scovel] then bought it [ t h e property i n question] and he then t o l d you t h a t a s f a r a s he w a s concerned you could use t h a t a r e a and he wouldn't attempt t o s t o p you, i s n ' t t h a t c o r r e c t ? " M s . Wiedman responded, "And he went on t o say-- I d o n ' t remember t h e e x a c t conversation. - I suppose it was t o t h a t e f f e c t . But ---- he t o l d m e he d i d n ' t think he could s t o p m e i f he wanted t o . " (Emphasis added. ) Presented with t h i s type of evidence, it cannot be s a i d t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e D i s t r i c t Court were c l e a r l y erroneous. There c e r t a i n l y i s no clear preponderance of t h e evidence a g a i n s t t h e finding t h a t t h e use of t h e disputed property w a s permissive. I n f a c t , t h e testimony i n d i c a t e s M r . Scovel d i d indeed give M s . Wiedrnan permission t o use t h e property. W e t h e r e f o r e uphold t h e finding of t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t M s . Wiedman's use of t h e disputed property was permissive. When a p a r t y ' s use of property i s permissive a t i t s inception, t h e use cannot r i p e n i n t o a p r e s c r i p t i v e r i g h t u n l e s s t h e r e is a l a t e r d i s t i n c t a s s e r t i o n of a r i g h t h o s t i l e t o t h e owner, which i s brought t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e owner, and t h e use i s continued f o r t h e f u l l prescrip- t i v e period. Medhus, supra, 603 P.2d a t 672, 36 St-Rep. a t 2047-2048; Taylor, supra, 173 Mont. a t 438, 568 P.2d a t 123; Wilson v. Chestnut (1974), 164 Mont. 484, 491, 525 P12d 2 4 , 27. The above discussion shows t h a t M s . Wiedman's use of t h e disputed property w a s i n i t i a l l y permissive. ~ e f o r e her use of t h e property could become h o s t i l e and eventually r i p e n i n t o a p r e s c r i p t i v e r i g h t , M s . Wiedman would have had t o make some p o s i t i v e a s s e r t i o n of t h e h o s t i l e n a t u r e of her use of t h e property and bring t h e f a c t of her h o s t i l e use t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e owner of the property. The record i s t o t a l l y devoid of any such a c t i o n by M s . Wiedman. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t she and M r . Scovel d i d n o t d i s c u s s her use of t h e property a f t e r t h e i r conversation i n which he granted her permission t o use t h e property. The evidence a l s o shows t h a t M s . Wiedman never discussed her use of t h e property with t h e owners of T r i n i t y Evangelical Lutheran Church. M s . Wiedman's use of t h e property was thus permissive a t i t s inception and continued t o be so up t o t h e t i m e she i n i t i a t e d t h i s action. The t r i a l c o u r t t h e r e f o r e c o r r e c t l y concluded M s . Wiedman d i d n o t gain t h e r i g h t t o use t h e disputed property by p r e s c r i p t i o n . W e a f f i r m t h a t conclu- s i o n on t h i s appeal. W e concur: / # Hono a b l e P e t e r G. M e P trict Judge, s i t t l m place of M r . Chief J u s t c e aswell. Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy dissenting: I cannot agree that a person who has used as a drive- way a strip of land belonging to three other successive owners over a period of forty five years has not established open, notorious, exclusive, adverse, continuous, and un- interrupted use of the easement to establish her prescriptive right to the continuance of that use. Medhus v. Dutter (1979) , - Mon t . , 603 P.2d 669, 36 St.Rep. 2044, 2047. The ground upon which the majority find a permissive use here is that Mr. Scovel, prior to 1957, had a conversation with Mrs. Wiedman, which at best is equivocal, and out of which the court finds a permissive use. What is ignored here is that the ownership changed in 1957, and that since that time, Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, although the ostensible owner of the property, has done nothing in the face of the continued adverse, notorious and open use of the driveway by Mrs. Wiedman over what was then the church's property. Even if we assume that her use under Scovel was permissive, there is no presumption of law that continues such permissive use when the ownership changes hands and there is no indicia of any kind that the subsequent owner continues the permission. In this case, the prior owner had established a gate or barrier at the north end of the area over which Mrs. Weidman claimed an easement. This is strongly indicative that the prior owner acquiesced in Mrs. Wiedman's right under an adverse user. An owne2s acquiescence in an adverse user of a driveway across his land without more, does not show that the use, claimed to be adverse, was in fact permissive. Dozier v. Krmpotich (1949), 227 Minn. 503, 35 N.W.2d 696. -9- There was no showing in this case that the user was permissive "in the inception", which is the foundation requirement for proof of a permissive use. The majority has confused "permissive" use in this case with the "acquiescence" that always accompanies an adverse use. ". . . The very foundation of a right to an easement by prescription is the acquiescence by the owner of the servient tenement in the acts relied upon to establish such prescriptive right. 17 Am.Jur., Easements, section 66. It is also the rule that, where the user is permissive on the part of the owner, there can be no prescriptive right, and that, if the user was permissive -- in its inception, it must become adverse to the knowledge of the owner of the servient estate before any prescriptive rights can arise (citing a case.) It must be apparent therefore, that 'acquiescence', regardless of what it might mean otherwise, means, when used in this connection, passive conduct on the part of the owner of the servient estate consisting of failure on his part to assert his paramount rights against the invasion thereof by the adverse user.. . ." Dozier v. Krmpotich, supra, 35 N.W.2d at 699. (Emphasis added.) The conversation with Scovel, beg* long after the inception of the use of the driveway, and after which Scovel acted in acquiescence in placing the barrier as he did, shows that Scovel agreed with plaintiff's claim of right, and acquiesced in a manner that made his land servient to the prescriptive right of Mrs. Weidman to her driveway. I would reverse.