Title: Evans v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 399, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 4, 2009

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
AUGUSTUS H. EVANS, JR.,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 399, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0609011528A 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: October 7, 2009 
 
 
 
 
Decided:    November 4, 2009 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 4th day of November 2009, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Augustus H. Evans, Jr., filed an 
appeal from the Superior Court’s July 6, 2009 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior 
Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening 
brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
In July 2007, Evans was found guilty by a Superior Court jury 
of Assault in the Second Degree, Aggravated Menacing, Resisting Arrest, 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
 
2 
and two counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission 
of a Felony.  Evans’ convictions stemmed from his shooting of a rival drug 
dealer on the night of September 16, 2006 in Seaford, Delaware, and his 
threatening a police officer with a gun the next morning in Laurel, Delaware.  
Evans waived his right to counsel and represented himself at trial, with 
standby counsel present.  He was sentenced as a habitual offender to a total 
of 79 years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after 72 years for 
decreasing levels of supervision.  This Court affirmed Evans’ convictions on 
direct appeal.2   
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his 
postconviction motion, Evans claims that a) the Superior Court abused its 
discretion when it denied his motion for postconviction relief; b) his 
detention and questioning by the Seaford police was improper in the absence 
of an arrest warrant; c) the affidavit of probable cause supporting his arrest 
by the Laurel police contained false statements; d) his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise the above issues in his direct appeal; and e) his 
standby counsel was not present at all critical stages of the criminal process.  
To the extent that Evans fails to present arguments that were previously 
                                                 
2 Evans v. State, Del. Supr., No. 471, 2007, Ridgely, J. (Feb. 13, 2009).  Evans also 
represented himself on direct appeal. 
 
3 
raised, those arguments are deemed to be waived and will not be considered 
by this Court.3 
 
(4) 
Before considering the merits of a motion under Rule 61, the 
Superior Court must first determine whether to apply any of the procedural 
bars set forth in the rule.4  Because Evans unsuccessfully raised his second 
and third claims in his direct appeal, he is barred from raising those claims in 
these proceedings5 unless he can demonstrate that reconsideration of those 
claims is warranted in the interest of justice.6 In the absence of any such 
evidence, we conclude that the claims are procedurally barred. 
 
(5) 
Evans also claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise the above issues in his direct appeal and for failing to be present at all 
critical stages of the criminal process.  Because this Court previously 
determined that the issues Evans claims should have been raised by counsel 
on appeal are without merit,7 there is no factual basis for an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.  Moreover, because Evans waived his 
constitutional right to counsel and exercised his constitutional right to 
                                                 
3 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993).  In his motion for postconviction 
relief filed in the Superior Court, Evans also argued that a photographic lineup was 
unduly suggestive. 
4 Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991). 
5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 
6 Id. 
7 Evans v. State, Del. Supr., No. 471, 2007, Ridgely, J. (Feb. 13, 2009). 
 
4 
represent himself, he cannot now claim that his standby counsel provided 
constitutionally ineffective assistance.8    
 
(6) 
It is manifest on the face of Evans’ opening brief that this 
appeal is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled 
by settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is 
implicated, there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Justice  
                                                 
8 Hartman v. State, 918 A.2d 1138, 1143 (Del. 2007).