Title: Kaminskas v. New Jersey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: January 17, 2019

Kaminskas v. New Jersey Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Lieutenant John Kaminskas and Chief Daniel Vaniska, both members of the Union County Police Department, requested defense and indemnification by the Office of the Attorney General in a civil action brought against them for alleged investigatory and prosecutorial misconduct. The Attorney General denied their request on the basis that N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117 imposed such a duty on the county to defend and indemnify its police officers in such matters. The Appellate Division affirmed that decision, and the New Jersey supreme Court affirmed: under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117 and N.J.S.A. 59:10-4, the Legislature provided that each county -- not the Attorney General -- was responsible for defending and potentially indemnifying its police officers. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. Lieutenant John Kaminskas v. State (A-31-17) (080128)Argued September 26, 2018 -- Decided January 17, 2019FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for the Court. Lieutenant John Kaminskas and Chief Daniel Vaniska, who were both members of the Union County Police Department, requested defense and indemnification by the Office of the Attorney General (Attorney General) in a civil action brought against them for alleged investigatory and prosecutorial misconduct. The Attorney General denied their request on the basis that it is a county’s duty, under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117, to defend and indemnify its police officers in such matters. The Appellate Division affirmed that decision, and the Court now considers whether defense and indemnification were properly denied. This civil action arises out of a criminal matter. In 2006, Emmanuel Mervilus was arrested and charged with robbery, aggravated assault, and a weapons offense. Mervilus, who maintained his innocence, agreed to take a polygraph examination and stipulated to its admissibility at trial. Lieutenant Kaminskas administered Mervilus’s polygraph examination. At trial, Lieutenant Kaminskas testified that he frequently administered polygraph examinations on behalf of the Union County Prosecutor’s Office (UCPO) because it did not employ a polygraphist. At the time Lieutenant Kaminskas administered Mervilus’s polygraph examination, Daniel Vaniska was Chief of the Union County Police Department. Lieutenant Kaminskas testified at Mervilus’s trial as the State’s polygraph expert. He testified that polygraph tests differentiate reactions of persons who are “telling the truth” and those who are “lying” and thus innocent or guilty. He testified that polygraph examinations are “not just a lie detector [but] also a truth indicator.” He further testified that in his opinion Mervilus “wasn’t telling the truth.” A jury convicted Mervilus of first-degree robbery and aggravated assault. The Appellate Division reversed his convictions and remanded the matter for a new trial. State v. Mervilus, 418 N.J. Super. 138, 148 (App. Div. 2011). The Appellate Division found that Lieutenant Kaminskas’s testimony was improper because it may have led the jury to “perceive polygraph evidence as infallible” and to “give it disproportionate weight in deciding to convict or acquit.” Id. at 147. On remand, Mervilus was retried and acquitted of all charges. Mervilus filed a complaint against Lieutenant Kaminskas, Chief Vaniska, and two Union County prosecutors, among others, asserting claims for wrongful prosecution and conviction. The complaint alleged that the polygraph examination and Lieutenant Kaminskas’s testimony were contributing causes to his wrongful conviction and prosecution. 1 Lieutenant Kaminskas, Chief Vaniska, and the Union County prosecutors requested that the Attorney General defend and indemnify them pursuant to Wright v. State, 169 N.J. 422 (2001). The Attorney General agreed to defend and indemnify the county prosecutors but not Lieutenant Kaminskas or Chief Vaniska. The Attorney General noted that Wright requires it to defend and indemnify county prosecutors in appropriate circumstances but does not extend to county police officers. In addition, the Attorney General asserted that N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117 requires each county to defend its police officers. Lieutenant Kaminskas and Chief Vaniska appealed the Attorney General’s decision. The Appellate Division agreed with the Attorney General’s reasoning and affirmed. The Court granted the officers’ petition for certification. 231 N.J. 557 (2017).HELD: Under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117 and N.J.S.A. 59:10-4, the Legislature has provided that each county -- not the Attorney General -- is responsible for defending and potentially indemnifying its police officers.1. As part of the Tort Claims Act, the Legislature has set forth a detailed statutory scheme to govern the defense and indemnification of government employees sued for actions taken in the course of their employment. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1, “the Attorney General shall, upon a request of an employee or former employee of the State, provide for the defense of any action brought against such State employee or former State employee on account of an act or omission in the scope of his employment.” When the Attorney General is required to defend a State employee under that statute, then “the State shall provide indemnification for the State employee.” N.J.S.A. 59:10-1. In addition to those provisions pertinent to State employees, the Tort Claims Act addresses the indemnification of other public servants. Although the Act uses permissive language as to the indemnification of employees of local public entities in N.J.S.A. 59:10-4, it elsewhere creates an affirmative duty to defend county police officers under certain circumstances. As relevant here, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117 provides that “[w]henever a member or officer of a county police . . . department or force is a defendant in any action or legal proceeding arising out of or incidental to the performance of his duties, the governing body of the county . . . shall provide said member or officer with necessary means for the defense of such action or proceeding.” (pp. 10-12)2. Wright came before this Court as an interlocutory appeal filed during a civil suit brought “against several defendants including thirteen employees of the SCPO,” in which the plaintiff stated claims for false arrest and invasion of privacy based on withheld evidence. 169 N.J. at 429, 430-31. Somerset County requested representation and indemnification on behalf of the SCPO’s employees and, when the Attorney General denied the request, filed cross-claims against the State. Ibid. The Court first noted that N.J.S.A. 2A:158-7, which provides for the payment by the county treasurer, subject to certain limitations, of “[a]ll necessary expenses incurred by the prosecutor for each county in the detection, arrest, indictment and conviction of offenders against the laws,” did not resolve the issue of defense and indemnification. Id. at 443-44. Then, the Wright Court noted the “dual or hybrid status” of county prosecutors, id. at 454, and determined “that when county prosecutors and their subordinates are involved in the investigation and enforcement of the State’s criminal laws, 2 they perform a function that has traditionally been the responsibility of the State and for which the Attorney General is ultimately answerable,” id. at 455. Because county prosecutors and their subordinates essentially function as State employees under those circumstances, the Court concluded that “the State should be obligated to pay the county prosecutors and their subordinates’ defense costs and to indemnify them if their alleged misconduct involved the State function of investigation and enforcement of the criminal laws.” Ibid. Significantly, the Court underscored “that the Legislature intended a sharp distinction between State employees and employees of other public entities that may be indemnified by such entities” but determined that “that distinction did not contemplate public employees, such as county prosecutors, who have a hybrid status.” Id. at 455. (pp. 12-16)3. N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117’s language is clear and unambiguous -- and it applies here: Lieutenant Kaminskas and Chief Vaniska are “defendant[s]” in the underlying civil action, and that action “aris[es] out of . . . the performance of [their] duties.” Accordingly, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117 mandates that the “governing body of” Union County defend Lieutenant Kaminskas and Chief Vaniska in the underlying civil action, and Union County is therefore responsible for indemnifying them pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:10-4. In Wright, the Court considered the “unique role” of county prosecutors in the face of uncertainty in the relationship between the statute governing county reimbursement of expenses of the county prosecutor, N.J.S.A. 2A:158-7, and the TCA’s clear grant of indemnification and defense costs for state employees. Wright, 169 N.J. at 443-44. Here, however, faced with the clarity of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117, which did not exist for N.J.S.A. 2A:158-7, there is no reason to look beyond the Legislature’s clear mandate. To extend Wright’s function-based analysis to the officers here would frustrate the detailed liability structure the Legislature has enacted. As the Appellate Division noted, interpreting N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1 to cover Lieutenant Kaminskas and Chief Vaniska would result in an unnecessary conflict between N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1 and N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117. The Court declines to extend Wright in a manner that would create such conflict. The Attorney General is not required to defend and indemnify Lieutenant Kaminskas or Chief Vaniska. (pp. 16-18) AFFIRMED.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’S opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 31 September Term 2017 080128 Lieutenant John Kaminskas and Chief Daniel Vaniska of the Union County Police Department, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.State of New Jersey, Department of Law and Public Safety, Office of the Attorney General, Defendant-Respondent. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided September 26, 2018 January 17, 2019 Steven H. Merman, Assistant County Counsel, argued the cause for appellants (Robert E. Barry, Union County Counsel, attorney; Steven H. Merman, on the brief). Daniel M. Vannella, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Daniel M. Vannella and Benjamin H. Zieman, Deputy Attorneys General, on the brief). Victoria A. Flynn submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office 1 (GluckWalrath, attorneys; Michael D. Fitzgerald, Monmouth County Counsel, and Andrew Bayer, of counsel and on the brief; and Victoria A. Flynn, on the brief). Cindy Nan Vogelman submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae County of Hudson and the New Jersey Association of Counties (Chasan Lamparello Mallon & Cappuzzo, attorneys; Cindy Nan Vogelman, of counsel and on the brief; and Kirstin Bohn, on the brief). JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA delivered the opinion of the Court. Lieutenant John Kaminskas and Chief Daniel Vaniska, who were bothmembers of the Union County Police Department, requested defense andindemnification by the Office of the Attorney General (Attorney General) in acivil action brought against them for alleged investigatory and prosecutorialmisconduct. The Attorney General denied their request on the basis that it is acounty’s duty, under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117, to defend and indemnify its policeofficers in such matters. The Appellate Division affirmed that decision. We agree with the Appellate Division and thus affirm its judgment.Under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117 and N.J.S.A. 59:10-4, the Legislature has providedthat each county -- not the Attorney General -- is responsible for defending andpotentially indemnifying its police officers. Neither this Court’s decision inWright v. State, 169 N.J. 422 (2001), nor N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1 provides 2 otherwise. The Attorney General is accordingly not required to defend andindemnify Lieutenant Kaminskas or Chief Vaniska. I. A. This civil action arises out of a criminal matter. In 2006, EmmanuelMervilus was arrested and charged with first-degree robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; aggravated assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b); andthird-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d). Mervilus, who maintained his innocence, agreed to takea polygraph examination and stipulated to its admissibility at trial. Lieutenant Kaminskas administered Mervilus’s polygraph examination.At trial, Lieutenant Kaminskas testified that he frequently administeredpolygraph examinations on behalf of the Union County Prosecutor’s Office(UCPO) because it did not employ a polygraphist. At the time LieutenantKaminskas administered Mervilus’s polygraph examination, Daniel Vaniskawas Chief of the Union County Police Department. Lieutenant Kaminskas testified at Mervilus’s trial as the State’spolygraph expert. He testified that polygraph tests differentiate reactions ofpersons who are “telling the truth” and those who are “lying” and thusinnocent or guilty. He testified that polygraph examinations are “not just a lie 3 detector [but] also a truth indicator.” He further testified that in his opinionMervilus “wasn’t telling the truth.” A jury convicted Mervilus of first-degreerobbery and aggravated assault. The Appellate Division reversed his convictions and remanded thematter for a new trial. State v. Mervilus, 418 N.J. Super. 138, 148 (App. Div.2011). The Appellate Division found that Lieutenant Kaminskas’s testimonywas improper because it may have led the jury to “perceive polygraphevidence as infallible” and to “give it disproportionate weight in deciding toconvict or acquit.” Id. at 147. The error in admitting that improper testimonywas prejudicial, the panel found, because “the State’s evidence againstdefendant [could not be described] as overwhelming” and “[t]he improperpolygraph testimony could have made a difference to the outcome.” Ibid. Onremand, Mervilus was retried and acquitted of all charges. B. In November 2014, Mervilus filed a complaint against LieutenantKaminskas, Chief Vaniska, and two Union County prosecutors involved in hiscriminal proceedings, among others, in the United States District Court for theDistrict of New Jersey. As is relevant here, Mervilus’s complaint assertedclaims for wrongful prosecution and conviction under federal and state statutesand the common law. The complaint alleged that the State’s use of a 4 polygraph examination and Lieutenant Kaminskas’s testimony werecontributing causes to his wrongful conviction and prosecution. Lieutenant Kaminskas, Chief Vaniska, and the Union Countyprosecutors requested that the Attorney General defend and indemnify thempursuant to Wright. The Attorney General agreed to defend and indemnify thecounty prosecutors but not Lieutenant Kaminskas or Chief Vaniska. TheAttorney General noted that Wright requires it to defend and indemnify countyprosecutors in appropriate circumstances but does not extend to county policeofficers. In addition, the Attorney General asserted that N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117requires each county to defend its police officers. Lieutenant Kaminskas andChief Vaniska appealed the Attorney General’s decision. The Appellate Division agreed with the Attorney General’s reasoningand affirmed. The panel determined first that N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117 requirescounties to defend their police officers. The appellate panel then considered N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1 to -6 and concluded that the Attorney General’s duty todefend, as established in those statutes, applies only to “active and former'state employees.’” Finally, the panel reasoned that the “narrow exceptionestablished in Wright . . . applies only to county prosecutors and theiremployees.” The Appellate Division found it inappropriate to extend Wrightto cover county police officers because that extension would, in the Appellate 5 Division’s view, “create an unnecessary conflict between N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117and N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1 to -6.” We granted the officers’ petition for certification, 231 N.J. 557 (2017),and granted amicus curiae status to the County of Hudson, the New JerseyAssociation of Counties, and the Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office(MCPO). II. A. Lieutenant Kaminskas and Chief Vaniska contend they are entitled todefense and indemnification by the Attorney General based on “the sametheory of Wright” because they, like the members of the Somerset CountyProsecutor’s Office (SCPO) in Wright, were “non-state employees who wereacting as an 'arm of the State.’” The officers argue that LieutenantKaminskas’s actions in this case “did not arise of and were not incidental tohis employment” with the county police department, but were insteadundertaken for the UCPO. Stressing that they acted “for the sole benefit and atthe exclusive direction of the UCPO” in all matters connected to this case, theofficers assert that fairness and justice require that they “be given the sameprotection granted to the UCPO’s employees.” 6 The officers add that the Appellate Division’s approach is unduly rigidgiven that the Attorney General would be required to defend and indemnifyemployees of the prosecutor’s office if those employees had performed thesame functions that Lieutenant Kaminskas and Chief Vaniska performedduring Mervilus’s criminal trial. According to the officers, the mere fact thatthe UCPO called upon Lieutenant Kaminskas to “fill a void within the[UCPO]” by performing those duties rather than have someone on the UCPOpayroll administer and testify about the polygraph test should not make adifference as to defense and indemnification. The officers point to theinclusion of “servants” of the State in the Tort Claims Act’s definition of“employee” in support of their argument that the Act’s defense andindemnification provisions can extend to them under the circumstances of thiscase. And the officers contend that Wright requires a context-specific analysisthat extends beyond the employer-employee relationship to look at thefunction performed by the individuals involved. B. The Attorney General urges us to affirm the Appellate Division’sjudgment and stresses that Wright does not apply to county police officersbecause Wright specifically addressed the defense and indemnification ofcounty prosecutors and the employees of the county prosecutor’s office. 7 According to the Attorney General, the Wright Court reached its holding “thatcounty prosecutors and their employees should be defended and indemnifiedby the State to the extent they engage in investigation and enforcement of thecriminal laws” based on two considerations: first, the Attorney Generalmaintains supervisory control over the county prosecutors; and second, county“prosecutor’s office employees [are] not guaranteed defense andindemnification from the county.” Unlike employees of the countyprosecutor’s office, the Attorney General contends, county police officers, bystatute, remain under their employing county’s control at all times, and N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117 provides that the county that employs a particular officermust defend that officer from certain legal actions. Interpreting N.J.S.A.59:10A-1 and N.J.S.A. 59:1-3 to cover county police officers would, in theAttorney General’s view, conflict with N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117. C. Amici curiae the County of Hudson and the New Jersey Association ofCounties (together, the Counties) argue that the Attorney General is required todefend and indemnify Lieutenant Kaminskas and Chief Vaniska pursuant toWright because they worked for the State during Mervilus’s criminal trial.The Counties contend that when county police officers work under theprosecutor’s supervision, they are not supervised by the county and should 8 thus receive defense and indemnification from the Attorney General, not thecounty. According to the Counties, requiring the county to defend andindemnify a police officer who works under the control of the prosecutor’soffice is unjust and may discourage counties from allowing their officers towork under the control of the prosecutor’s office. The Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office (MCPO), as amicus curiae,agrees that, pursuant to Wright, the Attorney General should be required todefend and indemnify county police officers who work for the prosecutor’soffice. The MCPO expresses concern that the Appellate Division’s decisionwill prevent prosecutors from presenting the testimony of county policeofficers during criminal trials. III. We review de novo an agency’s interpretation of a statute and legalconclusions. Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 172 (2014). “The starting pointof all statutory interpretation [is] the language used in the enactment.” DCPPv. Y.N., 220 N.J. 165, 178 (2014) (citing Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salemv. N.J. Prop.-Liab. Ins. Guar. Assoc., 215 N.J. 522, 536 (2013)). “If theLegislature’s intent is clear from the statutory language and its context withrelated provisions, we apply the law as written.” Shelton v. Restaurant.com,Inc., 214 N.J. 419, 429 (2013) (citing Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Constr., 178 9 N.J. 513, 522 (2004)). “We turn to extrinsic tools to discern legislative intent. . . only when the statute is ambiguous, the plain language leads to a resultinconsistent with any legitimate public policy objective, or it is at odds with ageneral statutory scheme.” Ibid. (first citing Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. Cityof Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558, 572 (2012), and then citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 447, 492-93 (2005)). IV. A. As part of the Tort Claims Act, the Legislature has set forth a detailedstatutory scheme to govern the defense and indemnification of governmentemployees sued for actions taken in the course of their employment. Pursuantto N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1, “the Attorney General shall, upon a request of anemployee or former employee of the State, provide for the defense of anyaction brought against such State employee or former State employee onaccount of an act or omission in the scope of his employment.” The AttorneyGeneral may refuse to defend an action that falls within section 59:10A-1 onlyif the Attorney General “determines that” (a) “the act or omission was notwithin the scope of employment,” (b) “the act or the failure to act was becauseof actual fraud, willful misconduct or actual malice,” or (c) “the defense of theaction or proceedings by the Attorney General would create a conflict of 10 interest between the State and the employee or former employee.” N.J.S.A.59:10A-2. When the Attorney General is required to defend a State employeeunder that statute, then “the State shall provide indemnification for the Stateemployee.” N.J.S.A. 59:10-1. The Tort Claims Act defines an employee as“an officer, employee, or servant, whether or not compensated or part-time,who is authorized to perform any act or service,” but “the term [employee]does not include an independent contractor.” N.J.S.A. 59:1-3. In addition to those provisions pertinent to State employees, the TortClaims Act addresses the indemnification of other public servants. N.J.S.A.59:10-4 empowers “[l]ocal public entities . . . to indemnify local publicemployees consistent with the provisions of this act,” and specifies that [a] local public entity may indemnify an employee of the local public entity for exemplary or punitive damages resulting from the employee’s civil violation of State or federal law if, in the opinion of the governing body of the local public entity, the acts committed by the employee upon which the damages are based did not constitute actual fraud, actual malice, willful misconduct or an intentional wrong. Although the Tort Claims Act uses permissive language as to theindemnification of employees of local public entities, the Act elsewherecreates an affirmative duty to defend county police officers under certaincircumstances. As relevant here, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117 provides that 11 [w]henever a member or officer of a county police, or county park police, department or force is a defendant in any action or legal proceeding arising out of or incidental to the performance of his duties, the governing body of the county, or county park commission, as the case may be, shall provide said member or officer with necessary means for the defense of such action or proceeding. The parties and amici disagree about whether N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117’simposition of a duty of defense upon the county of employment should governhere, or whether the State should defend and indemnify the officers to theextent that they acted to further a State prosecution. The disagreement stemsfrom conflicting interpretations of Wright. B. Wright came before this Court as an interlocutory appeal filed during acivil suit brought “against several defendants including thirteen employees ofthe SCPO.” 169 N.J. at 429. Plaintiff Isaac Wright was arrested and convictedof several drug-related offenses. Id. at 430. One of his convictions wasreversed on direct appeal; two years later, his remaining convictions werereversed by way of post-conviction relief after “[t]he court found that high-ranking Somerset County law-enforcement officials concealed evidence of theillegal search for and seizure of cocaine used at Wright’s trial” and that theformer Somerset County Prosecutor “knew about, but concealed, the terms of afavorable plea agreement with one of the co-defendants who was a State’s 12 witness at Wright’s trial.” Id. at 431. While Wright challenged hisconvictions, he and his wife also filed a civil complaint alleging, in part, that“former Somerset County Prosecutor Nicholas L. Bissell, Jr., and severalemployees of the SCPO . . . , among others, acted to effect his false arrest andto invade his privacy.” Id. at 430-31. Wright later joined the State as adefendant. Id. at 432. Before the State was joined, “Somerset County sent the AttorneyGeneral a letter requesting representation and indemnification on behalf of theSCPO’s employees whom Somerset County was then representing.” Ibid.When the Attorney General denied the request, the SCPO employees and otherdefendants filed “cross-claims against the State for vicarious liability,indemnification and defense costs.” Ibid. The trial court granted the State’smotion for summary judgment on the vicarious liability claim and dismissedthe claims for defense and indemnification. Id. at 434. On a motion for leaveto appeal, we reversed as to all three of those claims. Id. at 452-53, 456. We determined the dispositive issue to be “whether the SCPO employeescan be considered 'State employees’” for purposes of the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-3. Id. at 444. The Court first noted that N.J.S.A. 2A:158-7,which provides for the payment by the county treasurer, subject to certainlimitations, of “[a]ll necessary expenses incurred by the prosecutor for each 13 county in the detection, arrest, indictment and conviction of offenders againstthe laws,” did not resolve the issue of defense and indemnification. Id. at 443-44. Then, the Wright Court noted the “dual or hybrid status” of countyprosecutors: It is well established that when county prosecutors execute their sworn duties to enforce the law by making use of all the tools lawfully available to them to combat crime, they act as agents of the State. On the other hand, when county prosecutors are called upon to perform administrative tasks unrelated to their strictly prosecutorial functions, such as a decision whether to promote an investigator, the county prosecutor in effect acts on behalf of the county that is the situs of his or her office. [Id. at 454 (quoting Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491 , 1499 (3d Cir. 1996)).]In light of that hybrid status and having determined that the TCA should bepredominant in its analysis, the Court reasoned that its inquiry should “focuson whether the function that the county prosecutors and their subordinateswere performing during the alleged wrongdoing is a function that traditionallyhas been understood to be a State function and subject to State supervision inits execution.” Ibid. We determined “that when county prosecutors and theirsubordinates are involved in the investigation and enforcement of the State’scriminal laws, they perform a function that has traditionally been the 14 responsibility of the State and for which the Attorney General is ultimatelyanswerable.” Id. at 455. Because county prosecutors and their subordinates essentially functionas State employees under those circumstances, we concluded that “the Stateshould be obligated to pay the county prosecutors and their subordinates’defense costs and to indemnify them if their alleged misconduct involved theState function of investigation and enforcement of the criminal laws. ” Ibid. Applying that test to the facts of the case, the Wright Court held “thatthe State of New Jersey may be required to indemnify and defend SCPO’sprosecutors and their subordinates for tortious conduct committed during theinvestigation, arrest, and prosecution of Isaac Wright, under the relevantprovisions of the [Tort Claims Act].” Id. at 456. The Court remanded to thetrial court to determine whether defense and indemnification was appropriateor whether one of the exceptions in N.J.S.A. 59:10A-2 applied. Ibid. Significantly, we underscored “that the Legislature intended a sharpdistinction between State employees and employees of other public entitiesthat may be indemnified by such entities,” but we determined that “thatdistinction did not contemplate public employees, such as county prosecutors,who have a hybrid status.” Id. at 455. Instead, we were “persuaded that thestatutory language used in N.J.S.A. 59:1-3 did not take into account the unique 15 role of county prosecutorial employees, paid by the county, but performing aState law enforcement function under State supervisory authority.” Id. at 455-56. Thus, “[t]o vindicate the legislative purpose of providing defense andindemnification to public employees performing an essential State function,we interpret[ed] the defense and indemnification provisions of the [TortClaims Act] to apply to county prosecutorial employees sued on the basis ofactions taken in the discharge of their law enforcement duties.” Id. at 456. V. The officers and their amici urge that the logic set forth in Wrightapplies with equal force to them, inasmuch as all the actions by LieutenantKaminskas that Mervilus has challenged pertain to Mervilus’s prosecution bythe State. But that argument ignores a statute that explicitly governs thedefense of county police officers in actions such as this one. N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117’s language is clear and unambiguous -- and it applies here: LieutenantKaminskas and Chief Vaniska are “defendant[s]” in the underlying civilaction, and that action “aris[es] out of . . . the performance of [their] duties.”Accordingly, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117 mandates that the “governing body of”Union County defend Lieutenant Kaminskas and Chief Vaniska in theunderlying civil action. Union County is therefore responsible forindemnifying Lieutenant Kaminskas and Chief Vaniska pursuant to N.J.S.A. 16 59:10-4. Because the Legislature has clearly identified the county ofemployment as the entity responsible for defending and indemnifying countypolice officers, our inquiry ends. See Shelton, 214 N.J. at 429. In Wright, this Court analyzed the “hybrid status” of county prosecutorsbecause the “statutory language used in N.J.S.A. 59:1-3 did not take intoaccount the unique role of” county prosecutors. 169 N.J. at 455-56. Statedsimply, in Wright this Court considered the “unique role” of countyprosecutors in the face of uncertainty in the relationship between the statutegoverning county reimbursement of expenses of the county prosecutor, N.J.S.A. 2A:158-7, and the TCA’s clear grant of indemnification and defensecosts for state employees, Wright, 169 N.J. at 443-44. Here, however, facedwith the clarity of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117, which did not exist for N.J.S.A.2A:158-7, we have no reason to look beyond the Legislature’s clear mandate. To extend Wright’s function-based analysis to the officers here,moreover, would frustrate the detailed liability structure the Legislature hasenacted, which delineates and allocates the responsibilities to defend andindemnify different categories of employees to specific governmental entities.The “Legislature intended a sharp distinction between State employees andemployees of other public entities that may be indemnified by such entities,”Wright, 169 N.J. at 455 -- and Lieutenant Kaminskas and Chief Vaniska 17 clearly fall within the latter category, regardless of the type of work they wereperforming in this case. As the Appellate Division noted, interpreting N.J.S.A.59:10A-1 to cover Lieutenant Kaminskas and Chief Vaniska would result in anunnecessary conflict between N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1 and N.J.S.A. 40A:14-117.See State ex rel. J.S., 202 N.J. 465, 480 (2010) (“[W]hen [statutory]construction involves the interplay of two or more statutes, we seek toharmonize the [statutes], under the assumption that the Legislature was awareof its actions and intended for cognate provisions to work together.”);DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 496-98 (declining to create a conflict between astatute’s preamble and text). We decline to extend Wright in a manner thatwould create such conflict. In short, the Legislature has provided that each county -- not theAttorney General -- is responsible for defending and potentially indemnifyingits police officers. Accordingly, the Attorney General is not required to defendand indemnify Lieutenant Kaminskas or Chief Vaniska. VI. For the reasons detailed above, we affirm the judgment of the AppellateDivision. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ- VINA’S opinion. 18