Title: Apel Steel Corporation v. JS Nationwide Erectors, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1110612
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 1, 2012

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({334) 
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2 
012 
1110612 
Ex parte Northstar Battery Company, LLC 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
(In re; Apel Steel Corporation 
V. 
JS Nationwide Erectors, Inc., 
et 
al.) 
(Cullman C i r c u i t Court, CV-10-163) 
WOODALL, J u s t i c e . 
N o r t h s t a r B a t t e r y Company, LLC ("Northstar"), p e t i t i o n s 
t h i s Court f o r a w r i t of mandamus d i r e c t i n g the Cullman 
1110612 
C i r c u i t Court to vacate i t s order denying N o r t h s t a r ' s motion 
to 
dismiss 
the 
a c t i o n 
f i l e d 
against 
i t by 
Apel 
S t e e l 
Corporation 
("Apel") and to enter an order d i s m i s s i n g the 
a c t i o n f o r l a c k of i n personam j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
We grant 
the 
p e t i t i o n and i s s u e the w r i t . 
I. F a c t u a l and Procedural Background 
Apel's claims against N o r t h s t a r are a s s e r t e d i n Apel's 
f i r s t amended complaint, which named as defendants not only 
N o r t h s t a r , a l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y company whose p r i n c i p a l place 
of business i s l o c a t e d i n S p r i n g f i e l d , M i s s o u r i , but a l s o (1) 
JS Nationwide E r e c t o r s , Inc. ("JS Nationwide"), a l l e g e d to be 
a " c o r p o r a t i o n l o c a t e d i n Cullman County, Alabama," and 
(2) 
Walton C o n s t r u c t i o n Company, LLC, a l l e g e d t o be "a c o r p o r a t i o n 
headquartered 
i n Kansas C i t y , M i s s o u r i . " 
The 
f i r s t amended 
complaint c o n t a i n s i n t o t o the f o l l o w i n g f a c t u a l averments: 
"In 
e a r l y 2009, Apel S t e e l was 
working 
as 
a 
subcontractor f o r s t e e l f a b r i c a t i o n and e r e c t i o n on 
a p r o j e c t at a b a t t e r y manufacturing 
p l a n t under 
c o n s t r u c t i o n i n S p r i n g f i e l d , M i s s o u r i . 
Defendant 
N o r t h s t a r B a t t e r y , the owner of the p l a n t 
being 
b u i l t , 
had 
c o n t r a c t e d 
w i t h 
Defendant 
Walton 
C o n s t r u c t i o n t o serve as general c o n t r a c t o r f o r t h i s 
p r o j e c t , 
and 
Apel 
S t e e l was 
a 
s u b c o n t r a c t o r 
t o 
Walton 
C o n s t r u c t i o n . 
Apel 
S t e e l 
had 
f u r t h e r 
subcontracted a p o r t i o n of i t s 
work t o Defendant JS 
Nationwide, 
whose 
r o l e 
i n the 
p r o j e c t 
was 
the 
e r e c t i o n of s t r u c t u r a l s t e e l at the p l a n t , i n c l u d i n g 
2 
1110612 
a mezzanine. 
On 
February 
4, 
2009, 
d u r i n g 
the 
welding of s t e e l on the mezzanine by a JS Nationwide 
employee, sparks from the welding 
s t a r t e d a 
f i r e 
r e s u l t i n g i n the d e s t r u c t i o n of property/equipment 
and 
a l s o 
causing 
heat 
and 
smoke damage i n 
the 
a f f e c t e d area of the p l a n t . 
"Walton C o n s t r u c t i o n learned of the f i r e on the 
day 
that 
i t 
occurred, 
February 
4, 
2 
009, 
and 
immediately began a f u l l - s c a l e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 
Apel 
S t e e l 
f i r s t 
learned 
of 
the 
f i r e 
from 
Walton 
C o n s t r u c t i o n . 
Pursuant to the c o n t r a c t between Apel 
S t e e l and Walton C o n s t r u c t i o n , any 
l o s s e s and/or 
damages caused by any f i r e were t o be covered by the 
p r o p e r t y insurance provided under the Prime Contract 
between Walton C o n s t r u c t i o n and 
the owner of 
the 
p r o j e c t , N o r t h s t a r B a t t e r y . 
Instead of s u b m i t t i n g 
a c l a i m on the owner's property insurance 
p o l i c y , 
Walton C o n s t r u c t i o n i n s t e a d i n s i s t e d t h a t Apel S t e e l 
pay 
a l l 
damages 
a l l e g e d l y 
caused 
by 
i t s 
subcontractor, 
JS 
Nationwide. 
I n 
f a c t , 
a 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of Walton C o n s t r u c t i o n t o l d Hank Apel 
of Apel 
S t e e l t h a t , 
'Northstar B a t t e r y i s a b i g 
customer, and we don't want to upset them by 
f i l i n g 
a c l a i m . ' 
Walton C o n s t r u c t i o n informed Apel S t e e l 
that i t would subtract any and a l l c o s t s r e l a t e d t o 
the f i r e and any and a l l 
costs r e l a t e d t o any delays 
to the p r o j e c t caused by the f i r e from money due to 
Apel 
S t e e l 
under 
i t s 
c o n t r a c t 
w i t h 
Walton 
C o n s t r u c t i o n . 
Because of the pressure from Walton 
C o n s t r u c t i o n 
and 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of s u b s t a n t i a l 
backcharges, Apel S t e e l ( f o r the time being) agreed 
to absorb the costs a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the f i r e . 
Apel 
S t e e l then asked JS Nationwide to submit a c l a i m to 
i t s 
insurance 
c a r r i e r 
f o r payment. 
However, 
JS 
Nationwide's i n s u r e r r e f u s e d to pay the c l a i m , and 
Apel S t e e l was f o r c e d to f i l e t h i s l a w s u i t a g a i n s t 
JS Nationwide seeking to recover from JS Nationwide 
the money t h a t was w i t h h e l d by Walton C o n s t r u c t i o n 
from Apel S t e e l . 
JS Nationwide has 
f i l e d a motion 
f o r summary judgment ( c u r r e n t l y 
pending before 
t h i s 
Court) c l a i m i n g that Apel S t e e l waived any 
c l a i m 
3 
1110612 
against any subcontractor f o r 
damages caused by a 
f i r e on the N o r t h s t a r B a t t e r y p l a n t p r o j e c t . 
The 
waiver was a l l e g e d l y made when, Apel S t e e l entered 
i n t o i t s c o n t r a c t w i t h Walton C o n s t r u c t i o n f o r the 
N o r t h s t a r B a t t e r y p r o j e c t pursuant t o 
a p r o v i s i o n 
i n 
the c o n t r a c t between Walton C o n s t r u c t i o n and Apel 
S t e e l . 
The subcontract between Apel S t e e l and JS 
Nationwide 
i n c o r p o r a t e d 
the p r o v i s i o n s of 
Apel 
S t e e l ' s c o n t r a c t w i t h Walton. 
"The 
c o n t r a c t between Apel 
S t e e l and Walton 
contained a p r o v i s i o n by which Apel S t e e l a l l e g e d l y 
waived a l l r i g h t s 
against JS Nationwide, 
as 
i t s 
subcontractor, ' f o r damages caused by f i r e or other 
causes of l o s s t o the extent covered by p r o p e r t y 
insurance provided under the 
Prime Contract or other 
property insurance 
a p p l i c a b l e t o the Work.' 
The 
Prime Contract was the c o n t r a c t between N o r t h s t a r 
B a t t e r y and Walton C o n s t r u c t i o n . 
N o r t h s t a r B a t t e r y 
and Walton C o n s t r u c t i o n never submitted a c l a i m 
f o r 
the February 4, 2 
009 
f i r e t o the i n s u r e r t h a t was 
supposed t o cover any claims f o r any p r o p e r t y damage 
at the N o r t h s t a r 
B a t t e r y p r o j e c t . 
As 
d i s c u s s e d 
above, Walton i n s t e a d f o r c e d Apel S t e e l to pay 
a l l 
costs a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the f i r e . 
" I t i s 
c l e a r from the f a c t s of t h i s case that JS 
Nationwide E r e c t o r s , N o r t h s t a r B a t t e r y and/or Walton 
C o n s t r u c t i o n are r e s p o n s i b l e t o 
pay a l l 
damages and 
costs 
r e l a t e d t o the f i r e 
t h a t 
took 
p l a c e 
on 
February 4, 2 
00 
9 at the N o r t h s t a r B a t t e r y p r o j e c t . 
I t i s a l s o c l e a r that the one p a r t y who should not 
bear the costs and damages from that f i r e i s Apel 
S t e e l , the 
very p a r t y who, t o date, has absorbed a l l 
of those c o s t s . " 
(Emphasis omitted.) 
The 
counts i n the 
f i r s t amended 
complaint 
a g a i n s t 
N o r t h s t a r a l l e g e d (1) negligence, (2) u n j u s t enrichment, (3) 
4 
1110612 
breach of 
c o n t r a c t , (4) 
suppression and 
m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , and 
(5) conspiracy. 
The f i r s t amended complaint 
a s s e r t e d that 
venue f o r the 
a c t i o n was proper i n Cullman County, because, i t 
s t a t e d , "a s u b s t a n t i a l 
part of 
the 
events and 
omissions g i v i n g 
r i s e t o [Apel's] claims occurred i n 
Cullman County." 
N o r t h s t a r moved to 
dismiss the 
claims against i t f o r l a c k 
of i n 
personam j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
I t s p e c i f i c a l l y challenged the 
c o n t e n t i o n that events or omissions g i v i n g r i s e t o 
the claims 
against i t occurred i n Cullman County. Attached t o i t s motion 
was the a f f i d a v i t of 
Tim C a l d w e l l , an employee of N o r t h s t a r . 
The 
a f f i d a v i t s t a t e d that N o r t h s t a r (1) 
was "not 
a p a r t y t o 
any c o n t r a c t w i t h 
[Apel]"; (2) had never " q u a l i f i e d t o do 
business i n Alabama"; (3) has no o f f i c e s or employees i n 
Alabama; and (4) 
has no property i n t e r e s t s i n 
Alabama. The 
t r i a l 
court denied N o r t h s t a r ' s motion, and N o r t h s t a r 
f i l e d 
t h i s p e t i t i o n . 
I I . 
D i s c u s s i o n 
" ' 
[A] p e t i t i o n f o r 
a w r i t of mandamus i s the 
proper device by which t o challenge the 
d e n i a l of 
a 
motion 
t o 
dismiss 
f o r l a c k 
of i n personam 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . ' 
Ex 
p a r t e 
D i l l , 
D i l l , 
Carr, 
Stonbraker & Hutchinas. P.C.. 866 So. 2d 519, 
525 
(Ala. 
2003) 
. 'A p e t i t i o n e r may be e n t i t l e d t o 
a w r i t 
of mandamus i n 
such a case upon a showing of 
a c l e a r 
l e g a l 
r i g h t t o an order 
d i s m i s s i n g the a c t i o n 
5 
1110612 
against i t . ' Ex parte F i r s t Western Bank, 898 So. 
2d 701, 704 (Ala. 2004). ... 
"'This 
Court 
has 
e x p l a i n e d 
the 
a p p r o p r i a t e 
a n a l y s i s and the 
p a r t i e s ' 
r e s p e c t i v e 
burdens 
on 
a 
p e r s o n a l -
j u r i s d i c t i o n 
i s s u e 
as 
f o l l o w s . 
"The 
p l a i n t i f f has the burden of p r o v i n g 
that 
the t r i a l court has personal 
j u r i s d i c t i o n 
over the defendant. 
Ex p a r t e 
Covington  
P i k e Dodge. Inc. . 904 So. 2d 226 ( A l a . 
2 
0 
04)." 
J.C. 
Duke 
& 
Assocs. 
Gen. 
C o n t r a c t o r s . Inc. 
v. West, 991 So. 2d 194, 
196 (Ala. 2008). 
"'"'"In c o n s i d e r i n g a Rule 
12(b)(2), A l a . R. C i v . 
P., motion 
to dismiss f o r 
want of p e r s o n a l 
j u r i s d i c t i o n , 
a 
court 
must 
consider as true the a l l e g a t i o n s 
of the p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint not 
c o n t r o v e r t e d by the defendant's 
a f f i d a v i t s , Robinson v. Giarmarco  
& B i l l , P.C.. 74 F.3d 253 (11th 
C i r . 
1996), 
and 
Cable/Home 
 
Communication Corp. v. Network  
Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829 
(11th C i r . 1990) 
...."' 
II I II 
II I 
"However, when the complaint f a i l s t o a l l e g e any 
 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l 
b a s i s . 
'there 
i s nothing 
i n the  
complaint ... that the court must c o n s i d e r as t r u e  
and 
that 
t h e r e f o r e places 
[any1 burden on [the  
defendant! t o c o n t r o v e r t by a f f i d a v i t . ' 
[Ex p a r t e  
E x c e l s i o r F i n . , Inc., 42 So. 3d 96, 103-04 (Ala. 
2010)] 
(defendant need not present 
evidence of 
6 
1110612 
absence of j u r i s d i c t i o n when the complaint 
c o n t a i n s 
no j u r i s d i c t i o n a l averments)." 
Ex parte McNeese T i t l e , LLC. 82 So. 3d 670, 673-74 ( A l a . 2011) 
(quoting Ex p a r t e E x c e l s i o r F i n . . Inc.. 42 So. 
3d 96, 
103 
(Ala. 
2010) 
(emphasis d e l e t e d ; emphasis added). 
In 
other 
words, the f a i l u r e of the complaint 
s p e c i f i c a l l y t o i d e n t i f y 
any f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r the a s s e r t i o n of personal 
j u r i s d i c t i o n 
r e l i e v e s the o b j e c t i n g defendant of the burden of 
producing 
evidence negating j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
Ex p a r t e McNeese. 82 So. 3d 
at 
674. 
According 
t o N o r t h s t a r , Apel's 
f i r s t amended 
complaint 
contains no j u r i s d i c t i o n a l averments. 
P e t i t i o n , at 7. 
To 
counter that c o n t e n t i o n , Apel o f f e r s o n l y i t s statement that 
venue 
i s 
proper 
i n 
Cullman 
County 
as 
a 
s u f f i c i e n t 
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l averment. 
We disagree w i t h A p e l . 
The f a c t u a l averments i n the f i r s t amended complaint 
are 
u t t e r l y devoid of any acts a l l e g e d l y 
performed i n , or d i r e c t e d 
at, 
Alabama 
that 
c o u l d 
be 
construed 
as 
a t t r i b u t a b l e to 
N o r t h s t a r f o r j u r i s d i c t i o n a l purposes. The venue statement i n 
the complaint 
i s not such a f a c t u a l averment. but r a t h e r a 
generic c o n c l u s i o n . The statement that "a s u b s t a n t i a l 
part of 
the events and 
omissions 
g i v i n g r i s e 
to 
[Apel's] 
claims 
7 
1110612 
occurred i n Cullman County" i s not s p e c i f i c a l l y a t t r i b u t a b l e 
to N o r t h s t a r . 
This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y noteworthy i n l i g h t of the 
f a c t that the f i r s t amended complaint names three defendants 
-- one of which (JS Nationwide) i s a l l e g e d t o be " l o c a t e d i n  
Cullman County." 
Because the 
f i r s t amended complaint 
thus 
contains no 
f a c t u a l averments upon which j u r i s d i c t i o n 
over 
Northstar 
could 
be 
based, 
the 
burden never 
s h i f t e d 
t o 
N o r t h s t a r to present evidence of the absence of j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
Ex parte McNeese, 82 So. 3d at 674.^ 
Consequently, we need 
not 
analyze 
the 
evidence 
N o r t h s t a r 
d i d 
present 
i n i t s 
challenge t o the t r i a l court's e x e r c i s e of j u r i s d i c t i o n over 
i t . 
Ex p a r t e McNeese, 82 So. 3d at 
677. 
I I I . 
Conclusion 
Apel 
f a i l e d to c a r r y i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n a l burden. 
The 
t r i a l court c l e a r l y erred, t h e r e f o r e , i n denying N o r t h s t a r ' s 
motion t o d i s m i s s . 
We grant the p e t i t i o n and d i r e c t the 
t r i a l 
court to d i s m i s s the claims against N o r t h s t a r . 
^This same p l e a d i n g d e f a u l t precludes an order -- which 
Apel seeks from t h i s Court i n the a l t e r n a t i v e -- a l l o w i n g i t 
to engage i n j u r i s d i c t i o n a l d i s c o v e r y . 
See Ex p a r t e T r o n c a l l i  
C h r y s l e r Plymouth Dodge, Inc. , 876 So. 2d 459, 468 ( A l a . 2003) 
(a p l a i n t i f f i s not e n t i t l e d to j u r i s d i c t i o n a l d i s c o v e r y where 
the complaint does not " 
' a l l e g e f a c t s that would support 
a 
c o l o r a b l e c l a i m of j u r i s d i c t i o n ' " 
(quoting Schenck v. Walt  
Disney Co., 
742 F, Supp. 838, 840 n . l (S.D.N.Y. 1990))). 
8 
1110612 
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED. 
Malone, C.J., 
and S t u a r t , B o l i n , Parker, Shaw, Main, 
and 
Wise, J J . , concur. 
Murdock, J . , 
concurs i n 
the r e s u l t . 
9 
1110612 
MURDOCK, J u s t i c e (concurring i n 
the r e s u l t ) . 
I wrote s p e c i a l l y i n Ex p a r t e McNeese T i t l e , LLC, 82 
So. 3d 670 ( A l a . 2011) , t o e x p l a i n my understanding 
that 
n e i t h e r Rule 12(b)(2), A l a . 
R. C i v . 
P., nor any other 
r u l e 
contemplates 
a 
p l e a d i n g 
requirement 
as 
t o 
personal 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
That i s , there i s 
no r u l e of procedure that 
r e q u i r e s 
a 
p l a i n t i f f 
t o 
a f f i r m a t i v e l y 
a l l e g e 
personal 
j u r i s d i c t i o n i n 
a complaint 
f i l e d i n 
an Alabama s t a t e 
t r i a l 
court of g e n e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n , i . e . , 
a c i r c u i t c o u r t . I d . at 
677-82 (Murdock, J . , 
c o n c u r r i n g i n 
the r e s u l t ) . 
Instead, i t has always been and continues to be my 
understanding 
t h a t , i n order t o j o i n the i s s u e of p e r s o n a l 
j u r i s d i c t i o n , the defendant has the i n i t i a l burden of coming 
forward w i t h a prima f a c i e e v i d e n t i a r y showing t h a t there are 
not s u f f i c i e n t contacts between the 
defendant and the 
State of 
Alabama t o confer j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
Once that has occurred, the 
burden then s h i f t s t o the p l a i n t i f f , who bears the u l t i m a t e 
burden of demonstrating personal j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
The p l a i n t i f f 
can meet t h i s burden w i t h e i t h e r one or a combination of 
the 
f o l l o w i n g : 
(a) evidence deemed persuasive by the t r i a l court 
w i t h respect t o the f a c t u a l i s s u e s as t o which the defendant 
10 
1110612 
has presented evidence, or (b) a l l e g a t i o n s of f a c t actually-
made i n 
the complaint but l e f t unaddressed by the defendant's 
e v i d e n t i a r y 
submission. 
Id. at 678-79 
(Murdock, J . , 
concurring i n 
the r e s u l t ) ( d i s c u s s i n g Ex p a r t e Covington Pike  
Dodge. Inc. , 904 So. 2d 226 (Ala. 2004)). 
As I e x p l a i n my 
w r i t i n g 
c o n c u r r i n g 
i n the r e s u l t i n Ex p a r t e McNeese, I 
b e l i e v e 
the d i f f e r e n t scheme 
adopted 
i n that 
case and 
r e i t e r a t e d i n the present case has the e f f e c t of c o n v e r t i n g 
Rule 12(b)(2) from a r u l e r e q u i r i n g d i s m i s s a l i n 
the event of 
an 
a c t u a l 
l a c k of personal 
j u r i s d i c t i o n , 
determined as a 
f a c t u a l matter by the t r i a l court, i n t o a r u l e more l i k e Rule 
12(b)(6) that measures the s u f f i c i e n c y of a l l e g a t i o n s i n 
the 
complaint, i . e . , 
a r u l e a l l o w i n g f o r d i s m i s s a l where the 
complaint 
" f a i l s 
t o 
s t a t e 
a 
c l a i m " 
of 
i n personam 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
82 So. 3d at 677-78. 
Nonetheless, i n Ex parte McNeese I concurred i n the 
r e s u l t 
( i s s u i n g the w r i t and o r d e r i n g the t r i a l 
court to 
dismiss the claims) because the defendants-movants i n that 
case d i d 
i n f a c t submit e v i d e n t i a r y a f f i d a v i t s s u f f i c i e n t "to 
provide 
a prima 
f a c i e e v i d e n t i a r y 
showing of a 
l a c k of 
personal 
j u r i s d i c t i o n by Alabama courts over [them]." 82 So. 
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3d at 681 
(Murdock, J . , c o n c u r r i n g 
i n the 
r e s u l t ) 
. 
The 
question i n that case t h e r e f o r e became whether the 
p l a i n t i f f 
had put on contrary evidence that rebutted the e v i d e n t i a r y 
submission of the defendants or, f a i l i n g t h a t , whether there 
were a l l e g a t i o n s i n the p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint 
"(1) that have 
not s p e c i f i c a l l y been rebutted by the e v i d e n t i a r y submission 
of the defendants and, t h e r e f o r e , [were] ' l e f t standing' 
and 
(2) that [were] of a nature s u f f i c i e n t to provide a b a s i s f o r 
the e x e r c i s e of personal 
j u r i s d i c t i o n over the defendants." 
Id. 
at 681-82 (Murdock, J . , c o n c u r r i n g i n the r e s u l t ) . 
The 
answer to both of the l a t t e r i n q u i r i e s was 
i n the 
negative, 
and I t h e r e f o r e agreed w i t h the r e s u l t reached by the main 
o p i n i o n , i . e . , that the complaint was due t o be d i s m i s s e d f o r 
the f a i l u r e of the 
p l a i n t i f f t o c a r r y h i s burden of proof as 
to the i s s u e of personal 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
The same i s true i n the present case. 
The defendant d i d 
i n f a c t make a prima f a c i e e v i d e n t i a r y showing of a l a c k of 
personal j u r i s d i c t i o n by Alabama courts over i t . 
An a f f i d a v i t 
submitted on i t s behalf averred that N o r t h s t a r was a l i m i t e d 
l i a b i l i t y company e x i s t i n g under the laws of the State 
of 
M i s s o u r i w i t h i t s p r i n c i p a l p l a c e of business i n S p r i n g f i e l d , 
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M i s s o u r i ; that N o r t h s t a r entered i n t o a c o n t r a c t w i t h Walton 
C o n s t r u c t i o n Company, LLC, "to perform c e r t a i n work on a 
p r o j e c t l o c a t e d i n S p r i n g f i e l d , M i s s o u r i " ; t h a t N o r t h s t a r was 
not a p a r t y t o any contract w i t h the p l a i n t i f f , Apel S t e e l 
Corporation; that Northstar had never q u a l i f i e d to do business 
i n Alabama and was not a r e s i d e n t of 
t h i s 
S t a t e ; 
that 
N o r t h s t a r does not have any o f f i c e s i n Alabama nor employ 
anyone i n t h i s S t a t e ; and that N o r t h s t a r does not own, manage, 
or lease any property i n Alabama. 
Although t h i s 
a f f i d a v i t 
cannot be s a i d t o have as much "substance and breadth" as the 
somewhat more thorough a f f i d a v i t s i n Ex parte McNeese, i t i s 
enough "to 
provide a prima f a c i e e v i d e n t i a r y showing of a l a c k 
of personal 
j u r i s d i c t i o n by Alabama c o u r t s " over N o r t h s t a r . 
Ex parte McNeese, 82 So. 3d at 681 (Murdock, J . , 
c o n c u r r i n g i n 
the r e s u l t ) 
. 
A l s o s i m i l a r t o Ex parte McNeese, the p l a i n t i f f 
here d i d not overcome t h i s prima f a c i e showing w i t h e i t h e r 
contrary evidence or a l l e g a t i o n s i n i t s 
complaint, uncountered 
by 
e v i d e n t i a r y 
submissions 
of the defendant, 
of 
f a c t s 
s u f f i c i e n t t o provide a b a s i s f o r 
the t r i a l court's e x e r c i s e 
of personal 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . ^ 
J u s t as i n Ex p a r t e 
McNeese, 
^ C i t i n g t h i s Court's d e c i s i o n i n Ex p a r t e DBI. 23 So. 3d 
635 (Ala. 2009), the p l a i n t i f f argues that the a f f i d a v i t 
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t h e r e f o r e , I agree that the complaint i n the present case i s 
due t o be dismissed f o r 
the f a i l u r e of the p l a i n t i f f to carry-
i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n a l burden. 
submitted 
by N o r t h s t a r does not i n c l u d e an averment that 
N o r t h s t a r does not do business by agent i n t h i s S t a t e . 
The 
p l a i n t i f f 
f u r t h e r argues that N o r t h s t a r 
does i n f a c t do 
business by agent i n Alabama, s t a t i n g i n i t s b r i e f that the 
b a t t e r i e s i t 
manufactures 
are d i s t r i b u t e d t o and s o l d i n a l l 
50 s t a t e s . There are two problems w i t h t h i s argument: (1) the 
p l a i n t i f f does not a l l e g e i n i t s complaint t h a t N o r t h s t a r does 
business 
by agent i n Alabama and t h e r e f o r e 
there 
i s no 
a l l e g a t i o n to t h i s 
e f f e c t that can be 
s a i d t o be 
" l e f t 
standing" by N o r t h s t a r ' s 
a f f i d a v i t , and (2) Ex p a r t e DBI i s 
concerned 
w i t h 
" s p e c i f i c " 
i n personam 
j u r i s d i c t i o n 
not 
"general" i n personam j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
See Ex p a r t e DBI, 23 
So. 3d at 652-55 
(a s o - c a l l e d "stream-of-commerce" case 
r e l y i n g upon Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 
(1985), a " s p e c i f i c " 
j u r i s d i c t i o n case as d i s c u s s e d at 471 
U.S. at 472-73 n. 15 and accompanying t e x t ) . 
Even i f the 
complaint i n 
the present case had a l l e g e d t h a t N o r t h s t a r s o l d 
b a t t e r i e s by agent i n 
Alabama, i t s claims i n t h i s case do not 
a r i s e out of such s a l e s as would be necessary t o e s t a b l i s h 
" s p e c i f i c " i n 
personam j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
See a l s o H e l i c o p t e r o s  
Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. H a l l , 467 U.S. 408, 414 nn. 8¬
9 and accompanying t e x t 
(1984) 
( f u r t h e r e x p l a i n i n g the 
d i f f e r e n c e between " s p e c i f i c " i n personam j u r i s d i c t i o n and 
"general" i n personam j u r i s d i c t i o n ) . 
14