Title: 97 CV 438J Richard Ahrens v. Town of Fulton
Citation: 2002 WI 29
Docket Number: 1999AP002466
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 26, 2002

2002 WI 29 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
99-2466 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Richard Ahrens, Shirley Ahrens, Robert Albright, 
Shirley Albright, Barbara Allen, Nicholas Allen, 
Dolores Allen, June Ann Amell, Arnold Anderson, 
Loraine Anderson, John Augustyniak, Margaret 
Augustyniak, Milton Bates, Helen Bates, Robert 
Bauer, Gail Bauer, David Bear, Karen Bear, 
Michael Bellettiere, Pat Bellettiere, Otto Benz, 
Glen Black, Melaine Black, Edward Blanchard, 
Jane Blanchard, Kathy Blazyk, Nordine Bolstad, 
Nancy Bolstad, Jim Booker, Diana Booker, 
Virginia Boswell, Robert Boszko, Kathy Boszko, 
Donald Brake, Mary Brake, Albert Brueggeman, 
Mary Ann Brueggeman, Fred Burrow, Rosemary 
Burrow, Wallace Campbell, Donald Childers, 
Robert Clark, Ilona Clark, Gary Curry, Sandra 
Curry, Donald Dahlke, Lyla Dahlke, Emery 
DeRosier, Luvern DeRosier, M.A. DiMarcantonio, 
Thomas Draws, Vernon Duessing, Dean Eveland, 
Donna Eveland, Lewis Farmer, Kathleen Farmer, 
Louis Finger, Loretta Finger, Robert Fisher, 
Jean Fisher, Mike Foley, Mary Lou Foley, Charles 
Foudray, Milly Foudray, Diane Franke, Bill Neff, 
Wayne Frantz, Janet Frantz, John Fritz, Paul 
Gauer, Sandy Gauer, Gene Gehrt, Jane Gehrt, 
Antonino Giardina, Rose Giardina, Frank 
Giardina, Donald Ginchoff, Patricia Ginchoff, 
Sandra Goff, Kenneth Gray, Jane Gray, Richard 
Gross, Jane Gross, Wilbur Groth, Lois Groth, 
Caroline Gruner, Joe Gruspier, Alice Gruspier, 
Donna Gurholt, Robert Hanlon, Shirley Hanlon, 
William Hefka, Gail Hefka, Donald Heidner, Helen  
Heidner, Jack Hill, Mary K. Hill, Edward 
Hinchley, Marge Hinchley, Darwin Hoefs, Judy 
Hoefs, Bill Hoke, Rita Hoke, Philip Howard, 
Helen Howard, Albert Huber, Arlene Huber, Dean 
Huffstutler, Jinny Huffstutler, Craig Hughes, 
Sandra Hughes, Edward Hughes, Marlene Hughes, 
Terry Hurm, Susan Hurm, Lenard W. Jendal, Edith 
Jendall, Herman L. Johnson, Mary Kane, Edward 
Kaszubowski, Steven Kostakos, Francis Kozina, 
Maryellen Kozina, Walter Kruszynski, Loretta 
Kruszynski, Joseph Kucher, Ruth Kucher, Elaine 
LaPlant, William Linde, Timothy Liv, Christine 
Liv, Mike Lockard, Tina Lockard,  Richard Lowe, 
 
 
 
Dawn Lowe, Ralph Lussier, Theresa Lussier, James 
Lytle, Rita Lytle, Donald Mason, Barbara Mason, 
Marshall Matijevich, C. James Mayer, Betty 
Mayer, James McCarthy, Elizabeth McCarthy, 
Albert McGraw, Evelyn McGraw, Thomas McGuire, 
Howard McIntosh, Rosetta McIntosh, William A. 
Meinzer, Marion Melzer, Joseph Michalowski, Rose  
Michalowski, Raymond Murphy, Lillian Murphy, 
Walter Mysliwiec, Marcia Mysliwiec, Clarence 
Negus, Imelda Negus, Edwin Nelson, Carl Nickel, 
Jack Niemann, Linda Niemann, Marion Obukowicz, 
Grace Obukowicz, Patricia Olson, Michael 
Parsons, Linda Parsons, Thomas Peterson, Diane 
Peterson, Craig Pearson, JoAnn Pearson, Melvin 
Peterson, Ruth Peterson, William Pflanz, Jackie 
Pflanz, Leonard Pflughaupt, Caryl Pflughaupt, 
Wallace Phillips, Carolyn Phillips, Donald 
Pierce, Jeanne Pierce, Phillip Piotrowski, 
Deborah Piotrowski, Leonard Piejda, Mary Piejda, 
Brian Pluta, Kathryn Pluta, Homer Proctor, Joyce 
Proctor, Michael Rausch, Richard Renaud, 
Vincenette Renaud, Wayne Rice, Dolores Rice, 
John Riley, Annette Riley, Norman Rippberger, 
Barbara Rippberger, Dale Rogers, Eugene 
Romanski, Ilene Romanski, James Rother, Hugh 
Ryan, Carl Schimka, Roman Schmidt, Nancy 
Schmidt, Clarence Schultz, Joyce Schultz, Warren 
Schultz, Harriet Schultz, T. George Schumert, 
Lemke Schurmann, Glenn Shelley, Robert Short, 
Rosa Short, Gary Shulz, Carol Shulz, Louis D. 
Simmons, Lillian Simmons, George C. Sims, Jr., 
Marvin E. Smith, Ronald Solner, Ray Staley, 
Beverly Staley, Frank Stefaniak, Londine 
Stefaniak, Milan Sulaver, Corinne Sulaver, 
Joseph Szamlewski, Barbara Szamlewski, Wesley 
Tanner, Carmelia Tanner, Ronald Theis, Jean 
Theis, Martin Tivador, Doris Tivador, Stephen 
Tobolic, Charles Ulam, Josephine Ulam, David 
Wallestad, Joyce Wallestad, Lloyd Weber, Thomas 
Weinmann, Madeline Weinmann, Harry Whitney, 
Donna Whitney, Robert Wirt, Jr., Robert Wirt, 
Sr., Marilyn Wirt, Jyles Womack, Lynn Womack, 
Hubert J. Wright, Mary Wright, Jerome Young, Fay 
Young and Anthony Zappia,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Town of Fulton,  
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
__________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Richard Ahrens, Shirley Ahrens, Robert Albright, 
Shirley Albright, Barbara Allen, Nicholas Allen, 
Dolores Allen, June Ann Amell, Arnold Anderson, 
Lorraine Anderson, John Augustyniak, Margaret 
Augustyniak, Milton Bates, Helen Bates, Robert 
Bauer, Gail Bauer, David Bear, Karen Bear, Otto 
Benz, Glen Black, Melaine Black, Kathy Blazyk, 
Nordine Bolstad, Nancy Bolstad, Jim Booker, 
Diana Booker, Virginia Boswell, Robert Boszko, 
Kathy Boszko, Donald Brake, Mary Brake, Albert 
Brueggeman, Mary Ann Brueggeman, Fred Burrow, 
Rosemary Burrow, Wallace Campbell, Donald 
Childers, Robert Clark, Ilona Clark, Gary Curry, 
Sandra Curry, Donald Dahlke, Lyla Dahlke, Emery 
DeRosier, Luvern DeRosier, M.A. DiMarcantonio, 
Thomas Draws, Vernon Duesing, Lewis Farmer, 
Kathleen Farmer, Louis Finger, Loretta Finger, 
Robert Fisher, Jean Fisher, Charles Foudray, 
Milly Foudray, Bill Neff, Diane Franke, Wayne 
Frantz, Janet Frantz, John Fritz, Paul Gauer, 
Sandy Gauer, Gene Gehrt, Jane Gehrt, Antonino 
Giardina, Rose Giardina, Frank Giardina, Donald 
Ginchoff, Patricia Ginchoff, Sandra Goff, 
Kenneth Gray, Jane Gray, Richard Gross, Jane 
Gross, Wilbur Groth, Lois Groth, Joe Gruspier, 
Alice Gruspier, Donna Gurholt, Robert Hanlon, 
Shirley Hanlon, William Hefka, Gail Hefka, 
Donald Heidner, Helen Heidner, Jack Hill, Mary 
K. Hill, Edward Hinchley, Marge Hinchley, Darwin 
Hoefs, Judy Hoefs, Bill Hoke, Rita Hoke, Philip 
Howard, Helen Howard, Albert Huber, Arlene 
Huber, Dean Huffstutler, Jinny Huffstutler, 
Edward Hughes, Sandra Hughes, Edward Hughes, 
Marlene Hughes, Terry Hurm, Susan Hurm, Lenard 
Jendal, Edith Jendal, Herman L. Johnson, Mary 
Kane, Edward Kaszubowski, Steven Kostakos, 
Francis Kozina, Maryellen Kozina, Walter 
Kruszynski, Loretta Kruszynski, Joseph Kucher, 
Ruth Kucher, Elaine LaPlant, William Linde, 
Timothy Liv, Christine Liv, Ralph Lussier, 
Theresa Lussier, James Lytle, Rita Lytle, Donald 
Mason, Barbara Mason, Marshall Matjevich, C. 
James Mayer, Betty Mayer, James McCarthy, 
Elizabeth McCarthy, Albert McGraw, Evelyn 
McGraw, Thomas McGuire, William A. Meinzer, 
Burness Melton, Juanita Melton, Marion Melzer, 
Joseph Michalowski, Rose Michalowski, Raymond 
Murphy, Lillian Murphy, Walter Mysliwiec, Marcia  
Mysliwiec, Clarence Negus, Imelda Negus, Edwin 
Nelson, Carl Nickel, Jack Niemann, Linda 
 
 
 
Niemann, Marion Obukowicz, Grace Obukowicz, 
Willard Parejko, Michael Parsons, Linda Parsons, 
Thomas Peterson, Diane Peterson, William Pflanz, 
Jackie Pflanz, Leonard Pflughaupt, Caryl 
Pflughaupt, Wallace Phillips, Carolyn Phillips, 
Donald Pierce, Jeanne Pierce, Brian Pluta, 
Kathryn Pluta, Michael Rausch, Richard Renaud, 
Vincenette Renaud, Wayne Rice, Dolores Rice, 
John Riley, Annette Riley, Norman Rippberger, 
Barbara Rippberger, Dale Rodgers, Eugene 
Romanski, Ilene Romanski, James Rother, Hugh 
Ryan, Carl Schimka, Roman Schmidt, Nancy 
Schmidt, Clarence Schultz, Joyce Schultz, Warren 
Schultz, Harriet Schultz, George T. Shumert, 
Glen Shelley, Robert Short, Rosa Short, Gary 
Shulz, Carol Shulz, Louis D. Simmons, Lillian 
Simmons, George C. Sims, Jr., Marvin Smith, 
Ronald Solner, Ray Staley, Beverly Staley, Frank  
Stefaniak, Londine Stefaniak,  Milan Sulaver, 
Corinne Sulaver, Joseph Szamlewski, Barbara 
Szamlewski, Wesley Tanner, Carmelia Tanner, 
Ronald Theis, Jean Theis, Martin Tivador, Doris 
Tivador, Stephen Tobolic, Charles Ulam, 
Josephine Ulam, David Wallestad, Joyce 
Wallestad, Lloyd Weber, Harry Whitney, Donna 
Whitney, Robert Wirt, Jr., Robert Wirt, Marilyn 
Wirt, Jyles Womack, Lynn Womack, Hubert J. 
Wright, Mary Wright, Jerome Young, Fay Young and 
Anthony Zappia,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Town of Fulton,  
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
__________________________________ 
 
Richard Ahrens, Shirley Ahrens, Robert Albright, 
Shirley Albright, Barbara Allen, Nicholas Allen, 
Dolores Allen, June Ann Amell, Arnold Anderson, 
Lorraine Anderson, John Augustyniak, Margaret 
Augustyniak, Milton Bates, Helen Bates, Robert 
Bauer, Gail Bauer, David Bear, Karen Bear, 
Michael Bellettiere, Pat Bellettiere, Otto Benz, 
Glen Black, Melanie Black, Edward Blanchard, 
Jane Blanchard, Kathy Blazyk, Nordine Bolstad, 
Nancy Bolstad, Jim Booker, Diana Booker, 
Virginia Boswell, Robert Boszko, Kathy Boszko, 
Donald Brake, Mary Brake, ALbert Brueggeman, 
Mary Ann Brueggeman, Fred Burrow, Rosemary 
Burrow, Wallace Campbell, Donald Childers, 
Robert Clark, Ilona Clark, Gary Curry, Sandra 
 
 
 
Curry, Donald Dahlke, Lyla Dahlke, Emery 
DeRosier, Luvern DeRosier, M.A. DiMarcantonio, 
Thomas Draws, Vernon Duesing, Dean Eveland, 
Donna Eveland, Lewis Farmer, Kathleen Farmer, 
Louis Finger, Loretta Finger, Robert Fisher, 
Jean Fisher, Mike Foley, Mary Lou Foley, Charles 
Foudray, Milly Foudray, Bill Neff, Diane Franke, 
Wayne Frantz, Janet Frantz, John Fritz, Paul 
Gauer, Sandy Gauer, Gene Gehrt, Jane Gehrt, 
Antonio Giardina, Rose Giardina, Frank Giardina,  
Donald Ginchoff, Patricia Ginchoff, Sandra Goff, 
Kenneth Gray, Jane Gray, Richard Gross, Jane 
Gross, Wilbur Groth, Lois Groth, Caroline 
Gruner, Joe Gruspier, Alice  Gruspier, Donna 
Gurholt, Robert Hanlon, Shirley Hanlon, William 
Hefka, Gail Hefka, Donald Heidner, Helen 
Heidner, Jack Hill, Mary K. Hill, Edward 
Hinchley, Marge Hinchley, Darwin Hoefs, Judy 
Hoefs, Bill Hoke, Rita Hoke, Phillip Howard, 
Helen Howard, Albert Huber, Arlene Huber, Dean 
Huffstutler, Jinny Huffstutler, Craig Hughes, 
Sandra Hughes, Edward Hughes, Marlene Hughes, 
Terry Hurm, Susan Hurm, Lenard W. Jendal, Edith 
Jendal, Herman L. Johnson, Mary Kane, Edward 
Kaszubowski, Steven Kostakos, Dr. Francis 
Kozina, Maryellen Kozina, Walter Kruszynski, 
Loretta Kruszynski, Joseph Kucher, Ruth Kucher, 
Elaine LaPlant, William Linde, Timothy Liv, 
Christine Liv, Mike Lockard, Tina Lockard, 
Richard Lowe, Dawn Lowe, Ralph Lussier, Theresa 
Lussier, James Lytle, Rita Lytle, Donald Mason, 
Barbara Mason, Marshall Matijevich, C. James 
Mayer, Betty Mayer, James McCarthy, Elizabeth 
McCarthy, Albert McGraw, Evelyn McGraw, Thomas 
McGuire, Howard McIntosh, Rosetta McIntosh, 
William A. Meinzer, Burness Melton, Juanita 
Melton, Marion Melzer, Joseph Michalowski, Rose 
Michalowski, Raymond Murphy, Lillian Murphy, 
Walter Musliwiec, Marcia Mysliwiec, Clarence 
Negus, Imelda Negus, Edwin Nelson, Carl Nickel, 
Jack Niemann, Linda Niemann, Marion Obukowicz, 
Grace Obukowicz, Patricia Olson, Willard 
Parejko, Michael Parsons, Linda Parsons, Thomas 
Peterson, Diane Peterson, Craig Pearson, JoAnn 
Pearson, Melvin Peterson, Ruth Peterson, William 
Pflanz, Jackie Pflanz, Leonard Pflughaupt, Caryl 
Pflughaupt, Wallace Phillips, Carolyn Phillips, 
Donald Pierce, Jeanne Pierce, Phillip 
Piotrowski, Deborah Piotrowski, Leonard Piejda, 
Mary Piejda, Brian Pluta, Kathryn Pluta, Homer 
 
 
 
Proctor, Joyce Proctor, Michael Rausch, Richard 
Renaud, Vincenette Renaud, Wayne Rice, Dolores 
Rice, John Riley, Annette Riley, Norman 
Rippberger, Barbara Rippberger, James Rother, 
Roman Schmidt, Nancy Schmidt, Clarence Schultz, 
Joyce Schultz, Warren Schultz, Harriet Schultz, 
Lemke Schurmann, Glenn Shelley, Marvin E. Smith, 
Wesley Tanner, Carmelia Tanner, Martin Tivador, 
Doris Tivador, Stephen Tobolic, Lloyd Weber, 
Harry Whitney, Donna Whitney, Robert Wirt, Jr., 
Robert Wirt, Marilyn Wirt, Jyles Womack, Lynn 
Womack, Hubert J. Wright, Mary Wright, Jerome 
Young, Fay Young and Anthony Zappia,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Town of Fulton,  
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 268 
Reported at:  240 Wis. 2d 131, 621 N.W.2d 643 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 26, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 2, 2001 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Rock-Janesville 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. Byron   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
SYKES, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Dianne M. Soffa, Russell W. Devitt and Soffa & Devitt, LLC, 
Whitewater, and oral argument by Russell W. Devitt. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Robert 
Horowitz, Meg Vergeront and Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Madison, and 
oral argument by Robert Horowitz. 
 
 
 
 
 
2002 WI 29 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  99-2466  
(L.C. No. 
96 CV 303J, 97 CV 438J, 98 CV 422) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
 
Richard Ahrens, Shirley Ahrens, Robert  
Albright, Shirley Albright, Barbara  
Allen, Nicholas Allen, Dolores Allen,  
June Ann Amell, Arnold Anderson, Loraine  
Anderson, John Augustyniak, Margaret  
Augustyniak, Milton Bates, Helen Bates,  
Robert Bauer, Gail Bauer, David Bear,  
Karen Bear, Michael Bellettiere, Pat  
Bellettiere, Otto Benz, Glen Black,  
Melaine Black, Edward Blanchard, Jane  
Blanchard, Kathy Blazyk, Nordine Bolstad,  
Nancy Bolstad, Jim Booker, Diana Booker,  
Virginia Boswell, Robert Boszko, Kathy  
Boszko, Donald Brake, Mary Brake, Albert  
Brueggeman, Mary Ann Brueggeman, Fred  
Burrow, Rosemary Burrow, Wallace  
Campbell, Donald Childers, Robert Clark,  
Ilona Clark, Gary Curry, Sandra Curry,  
Donald Dahlke, Lyla Dahlke, Emery  
DeRosier, Luvern DeRosier, M.A.  
DiMarcantonio, Thomas Draws, Vernon  
Duessing, Dean Eveland, Donna Eveland,  
Lewis Farmer, Kathleen Farmer, Louis  
Finger, Loretta Finger, Robert Fisher,  
Jean Fisher, Mike Foley, Mary Lou Foley,  
Charles Foudray, Milly Foudray, Diane  
Franke, Bill Neff, Wayne Frantz, Janet  
Frantz, John Fritz, Paul Gauer, Sandy  
Gauer, Gene Gehrt, Jane Gehrt, Antonino  
Giardina, Rose Giardina, Frank Giardina,  
Donald Ginchoff, Patricia Ginchoff,  
Sandra Goff, Kenneth Gray, Jane Gray,  
Richard Gross, Jane Gross, Wilbur Groth,  
Lois Groth, Caroline Gruner, Joe  
Gruspier, Alice Gruspier, Donna Gurholt,  
FILED 
 
MAR 26, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
Robert Hanlon, Shirley Hanlon, William  
Hefka, Gail Hefka, Donald Heidner, Helen  
Heidner, Jack Hill, Mary K. Hill, Edward  
Hinchley, Marge Hinchley, Darwin Hoefs,  
Judy Hoefs, Bill Hoke, Rita Hoke, Philip  
Howard, Helen Howard, Albert Huber,  
Arlene Huber, Dean Huffstutler, Jinny  
Huffstutler, Craig Hughes, Sandra Hughes,  
Edward Hughes, Marlene Hughes, Terry  
Hurm, Susan Hurm, Lenard W. Jendal, Edith  
Jendall, Herman L. Johnson, Mary Kane,  
Edward Kaszubowski, Steven Kostakos,  
Francis Kozina, Maryellen Kozina, Walter  
Kruszynski, Loretta Kruszynski, Joseph  
Kucher, Ruth Kucher, Elaine LaPlant,  
William Linde, Timothy Liv, Christine  
Liv, Mike Lockard, Tina Lockard,  Richard  
Lowe, Dawn Lowe, Ralph Lussier, Theresa  
Lussier, James Lytle, Rita Lytle, Donald  
Mason, Barbara Mason, Marshall  
Matijevich, C. James Mayer, Betty Mayer,  
James McCarthy, Elizabeth McCarthy,  
Albert McGraw, Evelyn McGraw, Thomas  
McGuire, Howard McIntosh, Rosetta  
McIntosh, William A. Meinzer, Marion  
Melzer, Joseph Michalowski, Rose  
Michalowski, Raymond Murphy, Lillian  
Murphy, Walter Mysliwiec, Marcia  
Mysliwiec, Clarence Negus, Imelda Negus,  
Edwin Nelson, Carl Nickel, Jack Niemann,  
Linda Niemann, Marion Obukowicz, Grace  
Obukowicz, Patricia Olson, Michael  
Parsons, Linda Parsons, Thomas Peterson,  
Diane Peterson, Craig Pearson, JoAnn  
Pearson, Melvin Peterson, Ruth Peterson,  
William Pflanz, Jackie Pflanz, Leonard  
Pflughaupt, Caryl Pflughaupt, Wallace  
Phillips, Carolyn Phillips, Donald  
Pierce, Jeanne Pierce, Phillip  
Piotrowski, Deborah Piotrowski, Leonard  
Piejda, Mary Piejda, Brian Pluta, Kathryn  
Pluta, Homer Proctor, Joyce Proctor,  
Michael Rausch, Richard Renaud,  
Vincenette Renaud, Wayne Rice, Dolores  
Rice, John Riley, Annette Riley, Norman  
Rippberger, Barbara Rippberger, Dale  
Rogers, Eugene Romanski, Ilene Romanski,  
 
 
 
James Rother, Hugh Ryan, Carl Schimka,  
Roman Schmidt, Nancy Schmidt, Clarence  
Schultz, Joyce Schultz, Warren Schultz,  
Harriet Schultz, T. George Schumert,  
Lemke Schurmann, Glenn Shelley, Robert  
Short, Rosa Short, Gary Shulz, Carol  
Shulz, Louis D. Simmons, Lillian Simmons,  
George C. Sims, Jr., Marvin E. Smith,  
Ronald Solner, Ray Staley, Beverly  
Staley, Frank Stefaniak, Londine  
Stefaniak, Milan Sulaver, Corinne  
Sulaver, Joseph Szamlewski, Barbara  
Szamlewski, Wesley Tanner, Carmelia  
Tanner, Ronald Theis, Jean Theis, Martin  
Tivador, Doris Tivador, Stephen Tobolic,  
Charles Ulam, Josephine Ulam, David  
Wallestad, Joyce Wallestad, Lloyd Weber,  
Thomas Weinmann, Madeline Weinmann, Harry  
Whitney, Donna Whitney, Robert Wirt, Jr.,  
Robert Wirt, Sr., Marilyn Wirt, Jyles  
Womack, Lynn Womack, Hubert J. Wright,  
Mary Wright, Jerome Young, Fay Young and  
Anthony Zappia,  
 
          Owners-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Town of Fulton,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
__________________________________ 
 
Richard Ahrens, Shirley Ahrens, Robert  
Albright, Shirley Albright, Barbara  
Allen, Nicholas Allen, Dolores Allen,  
June Ann Amell, Arnold Anderson, Lorraine  
Anderson, John Augustyniak, Margaret  
Augustyniak, Milton Bates, Helen Bates,  
Robert Bauer, Gail Bauer, David Bear,  
Karen Bear, Otto Benz, Glen Black,  
Melaine Black, Kathy Blazyk, Nordine  
Bolstad, Nancy Bolstad, Jim Booker, Diana  
Booker, Virginia Boswell, Robert Boszko,  
Kathy Boszko, Donald Brake, Mary Brake,  
 
 
 
Albert Brueggeman, Mary Ann Brueggeman,  
Fred Burrow, Rosemary Burrow, Wallace  
Campbell, Donald Childers, Robert Clark,  
Ilona Clark, Gary Curry, Sandra Curry,  
Donald Dahlke, Lyla Dahlke, Emery  
DeRosier, Luvern DeRosier, M.A.  
DiMarcantonio, Thomas Draws, Vernon  
Duesing, Lewis Farmer, Kathleen Farmer,  
Louis Finger, Loretta Finger, Robert  
Fisher, Jean Fisher, Charles Foudray,  
Milly Foudray, Bill Neff, Diane Franke,  
Wayne Frantz, Janet Frantz, John Fritz,  
Paul Gauer, Sandy Gauer, Gene Gehrt, Jane  
Gehrt, Antonino Giardina, Rose Giardina,  
Frank Giardina, Donald Ginchoff, Patricia  
Ginchoff, Sandra Goff, Kenneth Gray, Jane  
Gray, Richard Gross, Jane Gross, Wilbur  
Groth, Lois Groth, Joe Gruspier, Alice  
Gruspier, Donna Gurholt, Robert Hanlon,  
Shirley Hanlon, William Hefka, Gail  
Hefka, Donald Heidner, Helen Heidner,  
Jack Hill, Mary K. Hill, Edward Hinchley,  
Marge Hinchley, Darwin Hoefs, Judy Hoefs,  
Bill Hoke, Rita Hoke, Philip Howard,  
Helen Howard, Albert Huber, Arlene Huber,  
Dean Huffstutler, Jinny Huffstutler,  
Edward Hughes, Sandra Hughes, Edward  
Hughes, Marlene Hughes, Terry Hurm, Susan  
Hurm, Lenard Jendal, Edith Jendal, Herman  
L. Johnson, Mary Kane, Edward  
Kaszubowski, Steven Kostakos, Francis  
Kozina, Maryellen Kozina, Walter  
Kruszynski, Loretta Kruszynski, Joseph  
Kucher, Ruth Kucher, Elaine LaPlant,  
William Linde, Timothy Liv, Christine  
Liv, Ralph Lussier, Theresa Lussier,  
James Lytle, Rita Lytle, Donald Mason,  
Barbara Mason, Marshall Matjevich, C.  
James Mayer, Betty Mayer, James McCarthy,  
Elizabeth McCarthy, Albert McGraw, Evelyn  
McGraw, Thomas McGuire, William A.  
Meinzer, Burness Melton, Juanita Melton,  
Marion Melzer, Joseph Michalowski, Rose  
Michalowski, Raymond Murphy, Lillian  
Murphy, Walter Mysliwiec, Marcia  
Mysliwiec, Clarence Negus, Imelda Negus,  
Edwin Nelson, Carl Nickel, Jack Niemann,  
 
 
 
Linda Niemann, Marion Obukowicz, Grace  
Obukowicz, Willard Parejko, Michael  
Parsons, Linda Parsons, Thomas Peterson,  
Diane Peterson, William Pflanz, Jackie  
Pflanz, Leonard Pflughaupt, Caryl  
Pflughaupt, Wallace Phillips, Carolyn  
Phillips, Donald Pierce, Jeanne Pierce,  
Brian Pluta, Kathryn Pluta, Michael  
Rausch, Richard Renaud, Vincenette  
Renaud, Wayne Rice, Dolores Rice, John  
Riley, Annette Riley, Norman Rippberger,  
Barbara Rippberger, Dale Rodgers, Eugene  
Romanski, Ilene Romanski, James Rother,  
Hugh Ryan, Carl Schimka, Roman Schmidt,  
Nancy Schmidt, Clarence Schultz, Joyce  
Schultz, Warren Schultz, Harriet Schultz,  
George T. Shumert, Glen Shelley, Robert  
Short, Rosa Short, Gary Shulz, Carol  
Shulz, Louis D. Simmons, Lillian Simmons,  
George C. Sims, Jr., Marvin Smith, Ronald  
Solner, Ray Staley, Beverly Staley, Frank  
Stefaniak, Londine Stefaniak,  Milan  
Sulaver, Corinne Sulaver, Joseph  
Szamlewski, Barbara Szamlewski, Wesley  
Tanner, Carmelia Tanner, Ronald Theis,  
Jean Theis, Martin Tivador, Doris  
Tivador, Stephen Tobolic, Charles Ulam,  
Josephine Ulam, David Wallestad, Joyce  
Wallestad, Lloyd Weber, Harry Whitney,  
Donna Whitney, Robert Wirt, Jr., Robert  
Wirt, Marilyn Wirt, Jyles Womack, Lynn  
Womack, Hubert J. Wright, Mary Wright,  
Jerome Young, Fay Young and Anthony  
Zappia,  
 
          Owners-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Town of Fulton,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
__________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard Ahrens, Shirley Ahrens, Robert  
Albright, Shirley Albright, Barbara  
Allen, Nicholas Allen, Dolores Allen,  
June Ann Amell, Arnold Anderson, Lorraine  
Anderson, John Augustyniak, Margaret  
Augustyniak, Milton Bates, Helen Bates,  
Robert Bauer, Gail Bauer, David Bear,  
Karen Bear, Michael Bellettiere, Pat  
Bellettiere, Otto Benz, Glen Black,  
Melanie Black, Edward Blanchard, Jane  
Blanchard, Kathy Blazyk, Nordine Bolstad,  
Nancy Bolstad, Jim Booker, Diana Booker,  
Virginia Boswell, Robert Boszko, Kathy  
Boszko, Donald Brake, Mary Brake, ALbert  
Brueggeman, Mary Ann Brueggeman, Fred  
Burrow, Rosemary Burrow, Wallace  
Campbell, Donald Childers, Robert Clark,  
Ilona Clark, Gary Curry, Sandra Curry,  
Donald Dahlke, Lyla Dahlke, Emery  
DeRosier, Luvern DeRosier, M.A.  
DiMarcantonio, Thomas Draws, Vernon  
Duesing, Dean Eveland, Donna Eveland,  
Lewis Farmer, Kathleen Farmer, Louis  
Finger, Loretta Finger, Robert Fisher,  
Jean Fisher, Mike Foley, Mary Lou Foley,  
Charles Foudray, Milly Foudray, Bill  
Neff, Diane Franke, Wayne Frantz, Janet  
Frantz, John Fritz, Paul Gauer, Sandy  
Gauer, Gene Gehrt, Jane Gehrt, Antonio  
Giardina, Rose Giardina, Frank Giardina,  
Donald Ginchoff, Patricia Ginchoff,  
Sandra Goff, Kenneth Gray, Jane Gray,  
Richard Gross, Jane Gross, Wilbur Groth,  
Lois Groth, Caroline Gruner, Joe  
Gruspier, Alice  Gruspier, Donna Gurholt,  
Robert Hanlon, Shirley Hanlon, William  
Hefka, Gail Hefka, Donald Heidner, Helen  
Heidner, Jack Hill, Mary K. Hill, Edward  
Hinchley, Marge Hinchley, Darwin Hoefs,  
Judy Hoefs, Bill Hoke, Rita Hoke, Phillip  
Howard, Helen Howard, Albert Huber,  
Arlene Huber, Dean Huffstutler, Jinny  
Huffstutler, Craig Hughes, Sandra Hughes,  
Edward Hughes, Marlene Hughes, Terry  
Hurm, Susan Hurm, Lenard W. Jendal, Edith  
Jendal, Herman L. Johnson, Mary Kane,  
Edward Kaszubowski, Steven Kostakos, Dr.  
 
 
 
Francis Kozina, Maryellen Kozina, Walter  
Kruszynski, Loretta Kruszynski, Joseph  
Kucher, Ruth Kucher, Elaine LaPlant,  
William Linde, Timothy Liv, Christine  
Liv, Mike Lockard, Tina Lockard, Richard  
Lowe, Dawn Lowe, Ralph Lussier, Theresa  
Lussier, James Lytle, Rita Lytle, Donald  
Mason, Barbara Mason, Marshall  
Matijevich, C. James Mayer, Betty Mayer,  
James McCarthy, Elizabeth McCarthy,  
Albert McGraw, Evelyn McGraw, Thomas  
McGuire, Howard McIntosh, Rosetta  
McIntosh, William A. Meinzer, Burness  
Melton, Juanita Melton, Marion Melzer,  
Joseph Michalowski, Rose Michalowski,  
Raymond Murphy, Lillian Murphy, Walter  
Musliwiec, Marcia Mysliwiec, Clarence  
Negus, Imelda Negus, Edwin Nelson, Carl  
Nickel, Jack Niemann, Linda Niemann,  
Marion Obukowicz, Grace Obukowicz,  
Patricia Olson, Willard Parejko, Michael  
Parsons, Linda Parsons, Thomas Peterson,  
Diane Peterson, Craig Pearson, JoAnn  
Pearson, Melvin Peterson, Ruth Peterson,  
William Pflanz, Jackie Pflanz, Leonard  
Pflughaupt, Caryl Pflughaupt, Wallace  
Phillips, Carolyn Phillips, Donald  
Pierce, Jeanne Pierce, Phillip  
Piotrowski, Deborah Piotrowski, Leonard  
Piejda, Mary Piejda, Brian Pluta, Kathryn  
Pluta, Homer Proctor, Joyce Proctor,  
Michael Rausch, Richard Renaud,  
Vincenette Renaud, Wayne Rice, Dolores  
Rice, John Riley, Annette Riley, Norman  
Rippberger, Barbara Rippberger, James  
Rother, Roman Schmidt, Nancy Schmidt,  
Clarence Schultz, Joyce Schultz, Warren  
Schultz, Harriet Schultz, Lemke  
Schurmann, Glenn Shelley, Marvin E.  
Smith, Wesley Tanner, Carmelia Tanner,  
Martin Tivador, Doris Tivador, Stephen  
Tobolic, Lloyd Weber, Harry Whitney,  
Donna Whitney, Robert Wirt, Jr., Robert  
Wirt, Marilyn Wirt, Jyles Womack, Lynn  
Womack, Hubert J. Wright, Mary Wright,  
Jerome Young, Fay Young and Anthony  
Zappia,  
 
 
 
 
          Owners-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Town of Fulton,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
WILLIAM 
A. 
BABLITCH, 
J.   Richard 
Ahrens 
and 
approximately 136 to 138 other mobile home owners (owners)1 
appeal from a court of appeals' decision that held that, with 
respect to all but one of the twenty representative owners 
chosen to represent the entire class, their mobile homes were 
appropriately taxed as real property, as opposed to personal 
property as the owners contend.  The statutes require that a 
mobile home must be "set upon a foundation" before it can be 
taxed as real property.  We conclude that all of the 
representative owners' mobile homes were "set upon a foundation" 
within the meaning of the statute.   
I 
¶2 
This case involves the classification of mobile homes 
for property tax purposes.  The law pertaining to such 
                                                 
1 The parties use both 136 and 138 as the total number of 
mobile home owners in this action.  The precise number is not 
relevant to this appeal.  
No. 
99-2466   
 
2 
 
classification is important to note at the outset.  "Mobile 
homes" are defined under Wis. Stat. § 66.058(1)(d)(1997-98)2 as 
follows: 
 
"Mobile home" is that which is, or was as 
originally constructed, designed to be transported by 
any motor vehicle upon a public highway and designed, 
equipped and used primarily for sleeping, eating and 
living quarters, or is intended to be so used; and 
includes 
any 
additions, 
attachments, 
annexes, 
foundations and appurtenances. 
For property tax purposes, such mobile homes are classified into 
two categories:  improvements to real property and personal 
property.  Wisconsin Stat. § 70.043 sets forth the criteria for 
each classification, stating: 
 
70.043  Mobile homes.  (1) A mobile home as defined in 
s. 66.058, is an improvement to real property if it is 
connected to utilities and is set upon a foundation 
upon land which is owned by the mobile home owner.  In 
this section, a mobile home is "set upon a foundation" 
if it is off its wheels and is set upon some other 
support. 
 
(2) A mobile home, as defined in s. 66.058, is 
personal property if the land upon which it is located 
is not owned by the mobile home owner or if the mobile 
home is not set upon a foundation or connected to 
utilities.   
Wis. Stat. § 70.043(1)-(2).  For purposes of this case, it is 
important to note that Wis. Stat. § 70.111(19)(b) provides an 
exemption 
from 
taxation 
for 
some 
mobile 
homes 
that 
are 
classified as personal property.  This statute specifically 
provides:   
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
99-2466   
 
3 
 
 
70.111 Personal property exempted from taxation.  The 
property described in this section is exempted from 
general property taxes: 
 
. . . . 
 
 
(19) Camping Trailers and Recreational Mobile 
Homes.  (a) Camping trailers as defined in s. 
340.01(6m). 
 
 
(b) Mobile homes, as defined in s. 66.058, that 
are no larger than 400 square feet and that are used 
primarily 
as 
temporary 
living 
quarters 
for 
recreational, camping, travel or seasonal purposes. 
Wis. Stat. § 70.111(19)(b).  In this case, all of the owners' 
mobile homes were classified as improvements to real property.   
 
¶3 
The 
owners 
brought 
actions 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 74.35, which permits taxpayers to recover any 
unlawful taxes.  This statute provides the following definition 
for an "unlawful tax": 
 
74.35  Recovery of unlawful taxes.  (1) Definitions.  
In this section "unlawful tax" means a general 
property tax with respect to which one or more errors 
specified 
in 
s. 
74.33(1)(a) 
to 
(f) 
were 
made.  
"Unlawful tax" does not include a tax in respect to 
which the alleged defect is solely that the assessor 
placed a valuation on the property that is excessive. 
Wis. Stat. § 74.35(1).  The owners claimed that errors occurred 
under Wis. Stat. § 74.33(1)(a), (b), or (c).  This statute 
provides: 
 
74.33  Sharing and charging back of taxes due to 
palpable errors.  (1) Grounds.  After the tax roll has 
been delivered to the treasurer of the taxation 
district under s. 74.03, the governing body of the 
taxation district may refund or rescind in whole or in 
part any general property tax shown in the tax roll, 
including agreed-upon interest, if: 
No. 
99-2466   
 
4 
 
 
(a) A clerical error has been made in the 
description of the property or in the computation of 
the tax. 
 
(b) 
The 
assessment 
included 
real 
property 
improvements which did not exist on the date under s. 
70.10 for making the assessment. 
 
(c) The property is exempt by law from taxation, 
except as provided under sub. (2). 
Wis. Stat. § 74.33(1)(a)-(c).  With this legal background, we 
next discuss the facts and procedural history of this case.   
II 
¶4 
The 
owners 
each 
own 
a 
mobile 
home 
located 
on 
individually-owned lots in a real estate development known as 
Wisconsin's Rock River Leisure Estates in the Town of Fulton 
(Town) in Rock County.  For the 1995, 1996, and 1997 tax years, 
the Town taxed the mobile homes as improvements to real 
property, as defined under Wis. Stat. § 70.043(1).  For each tax 
year, the owners paid the taxes and then filed claims with the 
Town pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 74.35(2), which permits property 
taxpayers to seek recovery of unlawful taxes from the taxation 
district that collected the tax.  The Town disallowed these 
claims. 
¶5 
For each tax year, the owners also filed separate 
actions in Rock County Circuit Court to recover the amount of 
the 
claim 
not 
allowed, 
as 
permitted 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 74.35(3)(d).  In each action, the owners claimed 
that their homes should have been exempt personal property under 
Wis. Stat. § 70.111(19)(b) and that taxation of their homes as 
No. 
99-2466   
 
5 
 
improvements to real property constituted an error under 
Wis. Stat. § 74.33(1), requiring a finding that an unlawful tax 
had been levied.  The circuit court consolidated the actions by 
agreement of the parties.  The parties then agreed that 20 of 
the approximately 138 owners would serve as representative 
owners and would stipulate to certain facts.3   
¶6 
The parties stipulated to the following relevant facts 
regarding the 20 representative owners.  Each owner has on his 
or her lot a "basic unit," which consisted of "a structure that 
is, or was as originally constructed, designed to be transported 
by any motor vehicle upon a public highway and designed, 
equipped and used primarily for sleeping, eating, and living 
quarters."  This definition is basically identical to the 
definition of "mobile home" under Wis. Stat. § 66.058(1)(d).  
The floor areas of each of these "basic units" ranges from 372 
to 420 square feet.  Each basic unit still has its wheels 
attached and is connected to utilities.  All but four of the 
units have their weight at least partially on their wheels and 
partially on some form of stabilizer, such as cement blocks, 
cinder blocks, or screw jacks.  Three units have their weight 
                                                 
3 The representative owners included Richard and Shirley 
Ahrens, Robert and Gail Bauer, David and Karen Bear, Albert and 
Mary Ann Brueggeman, Nordine and Nancy Bolstad, Robert and Kathy 
Boszko, Donald and Lila Dahlke, Emery and Luvern Derosier, Dean 
and Donna Eveland, Mary Lou and Michael Foley, Wilbur and Lois 
Groth, Terry and Susan Hurm, Donald and Helen Heidner, Dean and 
Virginia Huffstutler, Timothy and Christin Liv, Marion and Grace 
Obukowicz, James and Violet Rother, Joseph Rupperech, Hugh and 
Elizabeth Ryan, and Charles and Josephine Ulam.   
No. 
99-2466   
 
6 
 
completely 
supported 
by 
stabilizers. 
 
One 
unit 
has 
no 
stabilizers and is supported only by its wheels.  Each owner 
also has additional structures——including decks, screen rooms, 
porches, and sheds——on their lot that are either attached to or 
freestanding from the basic unit.  Finally, two of the owners 
reside in their homes for 12 months of the year; three of them 
for seven months; three of them for six months; one for five and 
one-half months; one for three months; and the rest for two 
months of the year or less.   
¶7 
The Town moved for summary judgment, and the circuit 
court, the Honorable Michael J. Byron, granted the Town partial 
summary judgment.  In its decision, the court examined two 
issues.  First, it examined whether the representative owners' 
mobile homes were properly taxed as improvements to real 
property.  In its analysis, the court noted that, because the 
parties had stipulated that the homes were connected to 
utilities and situated on land owned by the mobile home owner, 
the only question was whether the homes were "set upon a 
foundation."  Under this requirement, "a mobile home is 'set 
upon a foundation' if it is off its wheels and is set upon some 
other support."  Wis. Stat. § 70.043(1).  The court found the 
terms "off its wheels" and "set upon some other support" 
ambiguous and construed the statute to mean that a mobile home 
is an improvement to real property when the majority of the 
weight of the home is borne by some support other than its 
wheels.  From this interpretation, the court concluded that 
there were some of the representative owners' homes that were 
No. 
99-2466   
 
7 
 
improperly assessed and taxed as improvements to real property.  
The court, however, regarded any error in classification as 
immaterial, concluding that, even if the property had been 
appraised as personal property, the value of the tax would have 
been the same.   
¶8 
The second issue that the court examined was whether 
any of the representative owners' mobile homes qualified for the 
personal 
property 
tax 
exemption 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 70.111(19)(b). 
 
In 
its 
analysis, 
the 
court 
concluded that all additional structures——even freestanding 
structures that were unattached to the basic unit——must be 
considered in determining whether the owners met the 400 square 
foot limitation under the statute.  When considering the 
additional structures on the lots, the court concluded that the 
representative owners' homes were all over 400 square feet and 
that therefore they would not qualify for the personal property 
tax exemption.   
¶9 
Following this decision, the circuit court directed 
the parties to submit additional briefs regarding the effect of 
the court's previous decision on the remaining owners.  After 
briefs were submitted, the court issued a supplemental decision 
and order.  In the decision, the court analyzed whether the 
owners had established a cause of action for unlawful taxes, 
particularly whether any errors under Wis. Stat. § 74.33(1)(a), 
(b) and (c) had occurred, including whether the taxed property 
was exempt by law from taxation.  The court concluded that the 
owners had established no cause of action for the refund of 
No. 
99-2466   
 
8 
 
unlawful taxes, and as a result, the court dismissed all of the 
owners' actions.   
¶10 In a split decision, the court of appeals affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and remanded the cause with directions.  
Ahrens v. Town of Fulton, 2000 WI App 268, ¶1, 240 Wis. 2d 124, 
621 N.W.2d 643.  Like the circuit court, the court of appeals 
began its analysis with the question of whether the mobile homes 
were "set upon a foundation."  Id. at ¶9. Like the circuit 
court, the court also found that the statutory definition of 
"set upon a foundation," requiring a mobile home to be "off its 
wheels" and "set upon some other support" was ambiguous.  Id. at 
¶11.  The court of appeals, however, departed from the circuit 
court by rejecting the circuit court's interpretation of these 
terms to require a "majority of the weight" of the mobile home 
to be off its wheels before it would be classified as real 
property.  Id. at ¶12.  Instead, the court of appeals held that 
the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 70.043(1) required a 
finding that a mobile home is "set upon a foundation" when any 
part of its weight is off its wheels and set upon some other 
support.  Id. at ¶¶15-16.   
¶11 Applying this test, the court concluded that all but 
one of the representative mobile homes were properly assessed 
and taxed as improvements to real property "because they 
rest[ed], in whole or in part, on supports other than their 
wheels."  Id. at ¶17.  Thus, the court affirmed the circuit 
court's dismissal of these actions.  Id. at ¶33.  With respect 
to the remaining mobile home, the court concluded that any tax 
No. 
99-2466   
 
9 
 
against it would be unlawful, pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 74.33 
and 74.35, only if the home was exempt from taxation under 
Wis. Stat. § 70.111(19)(b).  Id. at ¶21.  In its exemption 
analysis, 
the 
court 
departed 
from 
the 
circuit 
court 
by 
concluding that freestanding additional structures must not be 
considered in figuring whether the 400 square feet limitation 
was exceeded.  Id. at ¶23.  Despite this conclusion, the court 
still affirmed the circuit court's decision that the remaining 
mobile home was not exempt because it exceeded 400 square feet 
in size, and therefore, it dismissed the action.  Id. at ¶¶25, 
33.  With respect to the nonrepresentative owners, the court 
reversed and remanded to allow the owners to show that their 
mobile homes were personal property and exempt in light of the 
conclusions reached by the court.  Id. at ¶31.  The court 
rejected the owners' claims that it and the circuit court 
violated the owners' rights to due process and equal protection 
and usurped a legislative function by allegedly holding the 
owners liable for personal property taxes that were never levied 
on the homes by the Town.  Id. at ¶¶26-29.   
¶12 The owners now argue that both the circuit court and 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
erred 
in 
its 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 70.043(1).  They instead rely on the interpretation 
provided by Judge Dykman in his dissent.  See id. at ¶¶34-45 
(Dykman, J., dissenting).  Dykman concluded that the term "off 
its wheels" is not ambiguous; "off its wheels" means that there 
is space between the tires and the ground.  Id. at ¶¶41-42 
(Dykman, J., dissenting).  The owners urge us to adopt this 
No. 
99-2466   
 
10 
 
interpretation and to conclude that, for those representative 
owners whose mobile homes are not "off their wheels" under this 
definition——and are therefore not real property——the levy of 
real property taxes should be held void.  The owners then assert 
that the taxes against these homes should be refunded and the 
actions of the nonrepresentative owners should be remanded for 
further proceedings on whether their mobile homes were properly 
taxed as improvements to real property.   
¶13 We conclude, however, that the interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 70.043(1) put forth by the owners and Judge Dykman 
should not be followed.  Instead, with some modification, we 
adopt the interpretation of the court of appeals.  We hold that 
a mobile home is "set upon a foundation" when the home is 
resting for more than a temporary time, in whole or in part, on 
some other means of support than its wheels.  This definition 
rests 
on 
a 
distinction 
between 
temporary 
and 
permanent, 
recognizing that the legislature intended that the permanency of 
the mobile home was important in making a distinction between 
real and personal property.  We conclude that the legislature 
intended that anything more than a transient location would be 
permanent and, accordingly, an improvement to real property.  
III 
¶14 The primary question in this case is whether the Town 
properly classified and taxed the owners' mobile homes as 
improvements to real property.  To answer this question, we must 
interpret Wis. Stat. § 70.043(1) and determine when a mobile 
home is properly regarded as an improvement to real property.  
No. 
99-2466   
 
11 
 
If we determine that the Town improperly classified and taxed 
the homes, the next question is whether this misclassification 
error provides a basis for recovery under Wis. Stat. § 74.35. 
¶15 We review the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment.  We review motions for summary judgment using the same 
methodology as the circuit court.  Meyer v. Sch. Dist. of Colby, 
226 Wis. 2d 704, 708, 595 N.W.2d 339 (1999).  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 802.08(2) sets forth this methodology, stating that summary 
judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law."  Resolution of this case also 
requires an interpretation of several statutes.  "Interpretation 
of a statute and application of a statute to undisputed facts 
are ordinarily questions of law that this court considers 
independent of the decisions of the circuit court and court of 
appeals, but benefiting from their analyses."  Meyer, 226 
Wis. 2d at 708.   
¶16 "Our sole purpose when interpreting a statute is to 
discern the intent of the legislature."  United Methodist 
Church, Inc. v. Culver, 2001 WI 55, ¶26, 243 Wis. 2d 394, 627 
N.W.2d 469.  To this end, we begin with the language of the 
statute.  Id.  "Courts should resolve statutory ambiguities so 
as to advance the legislature's purpose in enacting the 
legislation."  Id.   
No. 
99-2466   
 
12 
 
¶17 Mobile homes in Wisconsin may be subject to property 
tax as real or personal property, may be subject to monthly 
mobile home parking fees, or may be exempt from property 
taxation and parking fees.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 66.058(3)(c), 
70.043, 70.111(19)(b), 70.112(7).  In determining how or if a 
unit will be taxed, we first examine whether the unit meets the 
definition of "mobile home" under § 66.058(1)(d).  The parties 
have so stipulated.   
¶18 We 
next 
examine 
Wis. Stat. § 70.043 
to 
determine 
whether 
each 
"mobile 
home" 
is 
personal 
property 
or 
an 
improvement to real property.  The parties stipulated that the 
mobile homes at issue are located on property owned by the 
mobile home owner and are connected to utilities.  Thus, the 
only question remaining on whether the homes are improvements to 
real 
property 
is 
whether 
these 
homes 
are 
"set 
upon 
a 
foundation."  
¶19 Again, "a mobile home is 'set upon a foundation' when 
it is off its wheels and is set upon some other support."  
Wis. Stat. § 70.043(1).  We noted above that the circuit court 
and the court of appeals construed this phrase in different 
ways.  We find the discussion by the circuit court and the court 
of appeals, both the majority opinion and the dissent, very 
helpful to our analysis.    
¶20 The court of appeals discussed the different possible 
interpretations of this phrase as follows: 
 
This language could mean, as the owners maintain, that 
in order to be deemed an improvement to real property, 
No. 
99-2466   
 
13 
 
a mobile home must have its wheels physically removed, 
or, at a minimum, that the entire weight of the mobile 
home must rest on something other than its wheels.  
Or, it could mean, as the Town argues, that a mobile 
home is "off its wheels and  . . . set upon some other 
support" whenever any part of its weight is borne by 
[something] other than its wheels.  Finally, it could 
also mean, as the trial court concluded, that what is 
required is that a majority of the weight of the 
mobile home is borne by some support other than its 
wheels. 
Ahrens, 2000 WI App 268, ¶11.  Indeed, these different 
reasonable interpretations dictate that we look to extrinsic 
aids 
to 
interpret 
the statute and 
seek 
to 
advance the 
legislature's purpose in our interpretation of the statute.   
¶21 We look specifically to the legislative history of 
1983 Wis. Act 342, which enacted Wis. Stat. § 70.043.  Part of 
this legislative history includes a Legislative Council report, 
which discussed various legislative proposals on mobile home 
taxation that were considered by the Legislative Council Special 
Committee on Mobile Home Taxation and Zoning.  This report, 
which was discussed by both the circuit court and the court of 
appeals, provides significant evidence that the legislature 
adopted the current test under § 70.043(1) to address core 
problems that were present with the previous statutory test.  20 
Wisconsin Legislative Council, Legislation Relating to Mobile 
Home Taxation and Zoning 3 (1983).   
¶22 The previous test stated that a mobile home would be 
subject 
to 
taxation 
as 
real 
property 
if 
the 
value 
of 
improvements (additions, attachments, annexes, foundations, and 
appurtenances) to the mobile home equaled 50 percent or more of 
No. 
99-2466   
 
14 
 
the assessed value of the mobile home.  Id. (discussing 
Wis. Stat. § 66.058(1)(e)(1981-82)).  The problems with this 
test were (1) that it was difficult and time-consuming for the 
assessors to apply and (2) that it was "not an accurate 
indicator of whether a given mobile home ha[d] taken on the 
character of a real estate improvement and, therefore, should be 
subject to property taxation as is conventional housing."  Id.  
The test that has been adopted under Wis. Stat. § 70.043(1) was 
therefore proposed.   
¶23 Before discussing 
the test, 
however, 
the 
report 
revisited the reasons for distinguishing real and personal 
property for property tax purposes, stating:   
 
The primary rationale under the property tax 
system for distinguishing between real and personal 
property is that personal property is more mobile than 
real property.  It is easier to enforce and collect 
property taxes which are levied upon real property 
than taxes which are levied upon personal property.  
Therefore, assessment procedures, payment due dates 
and the remedies which are available to collect 
property 
taxes 
differ 
according 
to 
whether 
the 
property is classified as real property or as personal 
property.   
20 Wisconsin Legislative Council, Legislation Relating to Mobile 
Home Taxation and Zoning at 3-4 (emphasis added).  The report 
then discussed the Committee's proposal for a new test, stating:   
 
 
The Committee concluded that a better indicator 
than the "50%" test of when a given mobile home has 
taken on the character of real property is if the 
mobile home is hooked up to utilities and is set upon 
a foundation on land which is owned by the mobile home 
owner.  This is the same test as is used by the 
Department of Revenue (DOR) to classify mobile homes 
as real property, for purposes of exempting the sale 
No. 
99-2466   
 
15 
 
of these mobile homes from the sales tax [s. Tax 
11.88, Wis. Adm. Code].  The Committee believed that, 
under 
these 
circumstances, 
the 
mobile 
home 
is 
sufficiently permanent that it should be taxed as is 
conventional housing.   
Id. at 4 (second emphasis added).4 
¶24 Thus, 
from 
this 
report, 
it 
is 
clear 
that 
the 
legislature adopted specific criteria——hooked up to utilities 
and set upon a foundation on land owned by the mobile home 
owner——to identify mobile homes that were sufficiently permanent 
in nature so as to be regarded as improvements to real property.  
Thus, in interpreting the requirement that a mobile home must be 
"off its wheels and set upon some other support," our objective 
must be to incorporate those mobile homes that are "sufficiently 
permanent in nature."  Mobile homes that do not show any signs 
of permanency and are mobile should fall outside the definition 
and be regarded as personal property.   
¶25 Before arriving at a test, however, it is important to 
note the owners' objections to the court of appeals' test, which 
                                                 
4 The Department of Revenue regulation provided:   
Tax 11.88 Mobile homes. (1) Mobile home as 
personal property vs. realty improvement.  A mobile 
home is personal property if it is located in a mobile 
home park or other place where the land on which the 
mobile home is located is not owned by the mobile home 
owner.  A mobile home is a realty improvement if it is 
permanently affixed to land owned by the owner of the 
mobile home.  It is permanently affixed to the land 
for sales tax purposes if the mobile home sits on a 
foundation and is connected to utilities.  "On a 
foundation" means it is off its wheels and sitting on 
some other support.   
Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.88(1) (Jan., 1981).   
No. 
99-2466   
 
16 
 
only required some of the weight of the mobile home to be off 
its wheels before it would be classified as an improvement to 
real property.  Echoing Judge Dykman's dissent, their primary 
objection, with which we agree, is that the test effectively 
eliminated the possibility that a mobile home——one that is 
connected to utilities and is situated on the mobile home 
owner's real property——will ever qualify as personal property or 
be 
exempt 
from 
taxation 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 70.111(19)(b) 
because, they assert, a mobile home never rests entirely on its 
wheels.  They contend that, if a mobile home is never entirely 
on its wheels, it will always be classified as an improvement to 
real property under the court of appeals' test when it is 
connected to utilities and on the owner's property.  The 
exemption then is nullified for certain mobile homes that may 
otherwise qualify for the exemption.  Judge Dykman made this 
observation in his dissent, stating: 
 
 
What the majority has concluded is that no mobile 
home located on its owner's real estate can be 
exempted from taxation unless the owner disconnects 
the mobile home from its utilities.  The majority 
reaches this 
conclusion 
because 
it requires one 
hundred percent of the mobile home's weight to be 
carried on its wheels before the exemption [under 
Wis. Stat. § 70.111(19)(b)] applies.  But no such 
mobile home exists.  Under Wis. Stat. § 348.10(5)(c), 
all mobile homes must have at least thirty-five pounds 
of their weight rest on something other than their 
wheels, and it is that thirty-five pounds that the 
majority uses to disqualify all 400-square-foot or 
less, 
landowner-occupied, 
utility-connected 
mobile 
homes from personal property tax-exempt status.   
 
 
The legislature must have intended to exempt some 
mobile homes from personal property taxes when it 
No. 
99-2466   
 
17 
 
enacted Wis. Stat. § 70.111(19)(b).  The legislature 
was 
aware 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 70.043(1) 
and 
the 
significance of the distinction between mobile homes 
that are personal property and mobile homes that are 
real estate.  Had the legislature wanted to tax small 
utility-connected 
mobile 
homes 
located 
on 
their 
owners' real estate, it could have easily done so in 
§ 70.111(19).  But it did not.  The only rational 
explanation of the exemption is that it applies to all 
small qualifying mobile homes located on their owners' 
real estate. 
Ahrens, 2000 WI App 268, ¶¶38-39 (Dykman, J., dissenting).   
¶26 We agree with Judge Dykman's discussion.  The owners 
argue that we should adopt the test put forth by Judge Dykman, 
that is, that a mobile home is "set upon a foundation" only when 
all of its weight is taken off its wheels and placed upon some 
type of support.  This interpretation, the owners assert, 
preserves 
the 
statutory 
exemption 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 70.111(19)(b) because, unlike the court of appeals' 
test, it allows for some mobile homes, which are connected to 
utilities and situated on the owner's property, to still qualify 
as personal property.  They argue that Judge Dykman's test 
ensures that only those mobile homes that are similar to 
customary homes are taxed and provides a test that is easy for 
assessors to apply.  We disagree with this formulation because 
it fails to take into account the legislative intent to reach 
only those mobile homes that have taken on a permanency vis-a-
vis the real estate.   
¶27 We 
recognize 
that 
any 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 70.043(1) should give effect to the legislature's 
intent to create an exemption for some mobile homes under 
No. 
99-2466   
 
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Wis. Stat. § 70.111(19)(b).  We note, however, that harmonizing 
these statutes is difficult because of the different criteria 
examined under both statutes.  Specifically, under § 70.043, the 
location of the mobile home (on the owner's property), its 
utility hook-up, and its foundation are examined to determine 
whether it is real or personal property.  Under § 70.111(19)(b), 
the mobile home's size (no larger than 400 square feet) and the 
intended use of the mobile home are examined.  The different 
criteria create problems because some mobile homes may qualify 
as both real property and exempt personal property.  A 
reevaluation of the criteria under these statutes by the 
legislature may be appropriate to ensure that the statutes are 
given their intended effect. 
¶28 Nevertheless, "[w]hen confronted with a statutory 
inconsistency of this nature, it is the duty of this court, when 
possible, to construe statutes on the same subject matter in a 
manner as to harmonize these provisions in order to give each 
full force and effect."  Glinski v. Sheldon, 88 Wis. 2d 509, 
519, 276 N.W.2d 815 (1979).   
¶29 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 70.043(1) requires the 
following:  a mobile home is an improvement to real property 
when the home is resting for more than a temporary time, in 
whole or in part, on some other means of support than its 
wheels.  As mentioned above, this definition rests on a 
distinction between temporary and permanent, recognizing that 
the legislature intended that permanency of the structure was 
important in distinguishing between real property and personal 
No. 
99-2466   
 
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property.  We therefore reject the test put forth by Judge 
Dykman, which requires the mobile home to be completely off its 
wheels before it is considered an improvement to real property.  
In this respect, we agree with the court of appeals, which 
stated:   
 
To conclude that a mobile home may not be taxed as 
realty until its last ounce of weight has been removed 
from its wheels would thwart the legislature's goal of 
treating mobile homes which have "taken on the 
character of a real estate improvement" the same as 
"conventional housing" for property taxation purposes.   
Ahrens, 2000 WI App 268 at ¶14.   
¶30 We decline to define "temporary" in terms of a 
specific number of days, concluding that it is a responsibility 
better left to the legislature or the state department of 
revenue.  Suffice to say, a mobile home is not taxable as real 
property if its location is temporary and for a limited time.  
Mobile homes that are truly "mobile," that is, transitory and 
moving from place to place with no intent by the owner to 
permanently place them in one location, would certainly fall 
under that category.  Conversely, mobile homes placed at a given 
location for more than a very limited time would properly be 
taxed as realty.   
¶31 The statute specifically requires "other means of 
support."  However, it does not specifically require that the 
support be permanently affixed to the property or the mobile 
home.  Instead, it only requires that the home be set upon some 
other "support" before it will be taxed as real property.  The 
support mechanisms utilized by the owners in this case included 
No. 
99-2466   
 
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chocks, basic stabilizing jacks and levelers, and blocks.  The 
owner's use of these items for more than a temporary basis 
support the conclusion that the support system is sufficiently 
permanent.5  When the mobile home has remained off its wheels and 
on the property with the same support system for more than a 
temporary period of time, it reflects the owner's intent to 
treat the mobile home as something other than personal property.   
¶32 Thus, under this interpretation, mobile homes——even if 
they are connected to utilities and located on the mobile home 
owner's property——may constitute personal property and still 
qualify for the exemption under Wis. Stat. § 70.111(19)(b) even 
though they may have some weight off their wheels.  Thus, any 
                                                 
5 The owners argue that a mobile home's foundation must be 
something that is underground to be sufficiently permanent.  
However, the history of Tax 11.88——the regulation upon which 
Wis. Stat. § 70.043 is based——suggests that the regulation was 
written without such a requirement in mind.  In particular, a 
memorandum discussing a hearing on the proposed regulation 
state:  
Members 
of 
the 
[Assembly 
Revenue] 
Committee 
expressed concern that local assessors in some areas 
assess some mobile homes as personal property even 
though they are on some sort of foundation, such as 
cement blocks.  The Committee asked that we define 
"foundation" as used in rule 11.88(1) and that this 
definition be identical to the one used by the 
Department for property taxation.   
Memorandum from K. Kaspar, Jr., State of Wisconsin Department of 
Revenue to J.E. DeYoung (June 20, 1980).  The definition of "set 
upon a foundation" was drafted shortly thereafter.  The idea 
that cement blocks could constitute a foundation for real 
property suggests that the definition was intended to include 
various means of support, not just those that are underground. 
No. 
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concerns 
that 
this 
personal 
property 
exemption 
has 
been 
completely nullified by our interpretation are without merit.   
¶33 We acknowledge that the statutes in their present form 
are nearly irreconcilable.  Both the majority and the dissent 
did yeoman work with that which the legislature gave them.  
However, both fail to take into account co-existing statutes.  
The court of appeals' majority opinion leads to a nullification 
of 
the 
exemption 
for 
personal 
property 
created 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 70.111(19).  Judge Dykman's test, for the most 
part, would tax all mobile homes as personal property, contrary 
to the legislative intent of Wis. Stat. § 70.043(1).  For this 
reason, 
we 
conclude 
that 
our 
test, 
which 
follows 
the 
legislature's clear intent, must be adopted.  As we have noted, 
"when a legislative mandate is 'clearly expressed and there is 
no warrant for alternative construction, a court may not impose 
its view on what the law should be.'"  Ervin v. City of Kenosha, 
159 Wis. 2d 464, 478, 464 N.W.2d 654 (1991) (citation omitted).  
We have proceeded in this manner.  Nevertheless, given the 
problems in terms of assessment, the legislature should pay 
immediate attention to the statutes at issue in this case.  See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 13.83(1)(c)1 and 13.93(2)(d) (1999-2000).   
¶34 Having enumerated the test, we now apply it to the 
facts of this case.  "Where the facts are undisputed, a question 
of whether a structure is statutorily real or personal property 
is a question of law."  Pulsfus Poultry Farms v. Town of Leeds, 
149 Wis. 2d 797, 811, 440 N.W.2d 329 (1989).  In this case, the 
stipulated facts reveal that 19 of the 20 representative owners 
No. 
99-2466   
 
22 
 
have "some form of stabilizer under the unit, whether it be 
concrete blocks, cinder blocks or screw jacks . . . ."  The use 
of these support mechanisms effectively took some of the weight 
of the home off its wheels.  The remaining mobile home, which 
was owned by Robert and Gail Bauer, did not have any stabilizers 
under it.  This mobile home did, however, have additional 
structures that were caulked to the unit.  The additional 
structures included a 385 square foot screened-in room and a 104 
square foot porch.  Both structures rested on footings.  The 
Town asserts that the unambiguous text of the statute requires 
that the Bauers' physically attached addition to their basic 
unit must be considered for purposes of determining whether the 
Bauers' mobile home is set upon a foundation.  The Town argues 
that, when this addition is considered, the Bauers' mobile home 
would not be completely supported by its wheels.  We agree with 
this interpretation.   
¶35 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
incorrectly 
rejected 
this 
interpretation, stating: 
 
[W]hen defining what it means for a mobile home to be 
"set upon a foundation," § 70.043(1) requires the 
mobile home to be "off its wheels" (emphasis added).  
It makes no sense to talk about an attached deck or 
porch being "off its wheels."  The plain implication 
of this language is that the legislature was referring 
to the "basic unit," which is the only structure that 
would once have been on wheels. 
Ahrens, 2000 WI App 268, ¶18.  Under the definition of mobile 
home, however, such additions or attachments are considered as 
part of the mobile home itself.  As a result, if this part of 
No. 
99-2466   
 
23 
 
the mobile home is resting on some other means of support than 
the wheels of the basic unit, the mobile home itself is being 
supported by means other than the wheels.  Thus, on the whole, 
all twenty of the representative owners had their mobile homes 
off their wheels and on some other support.  The question then 
remains for what period of time these homes were off their 
wheels. 
¶36 On this issue, the representative owners stipulated 
that they have their mobile homes located on their lots.  
Similarly, in each of the complaints, the owners admitted that 
they have their mobile homes located on their lots.  These 
admissions suggest that the mobile homes were situated on the 
lots and were not moved.  There is nothing in the record to 
suggest otherwise.  The only variable with respect to time spent 
on the lot is the time each owner spends residing in his or her 
mobile home.6  Even this information shows that the mobile homes 
were located on the property for more than a temporary basis.  
These facts lead to the conclusion that these homes were 
properly classified and taxed as improvements to real property 
because the homes were supported by means other than the wheels 
for more than a temporary basis.  For this reason, we need not 
                                                 
6 With respect to the representative owners, the record 
reveals that the Bears, Lot 143, were on their lot for 52 days; 
the Brueggemans, Lot 82, for 24 days; the Boszkos, Lot 556, for 
30 days; the Dahlkes, Lot 59, for 40 days; the Groths, Lot 377, 
for 4 months; the Heidners, Lot 419, for 40 days; the 
Obukowiczs, Lot 69, for 72 days; and the Ryans, Lot 97, for 56 
days.  
No. 
99-2466   
 
24 
 
address whether the taxes levied against these representative 
owners' mobile homes were unlawful under Wis. Stat. § 74.35.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' decision, which 
upheld the circuit court's judgment of dismissal on the 
representative owners' actions.   
IV 
¶37 With respect to the disposition of the claims of the 
nonrepresentative owners, we conclude that remand to the circuit 
court 
is 
appropriate 
to 
provide 
a 
proper 
evidentiary 
determination on whether each of these owners fall within the 
definition of improvements to real property, as it has been 
defined in this opinion.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of 
appeals' decision in this respect and remand the actions of the 
remaining owners for further evidentiary proceedings. 
V 
¶38 In sum, we affirm the court of appeals' decision.  For 
the representative owners, dismissal is appropriate because the 
Town 
properly 
assessed 
and 
taxed 
these 
mobile 
homes 
as 
improvements to real property.  For the nonrepresentative 
owners, we remand to the circuit court for further proceedings 
to determine whether the mobile homes of these owners were 
properly classified as improvements to real property in light of 
this opinion.   
By the Court.—The decision of the courts of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
No.  99-2466.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶39 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring).  
I agree with the majority opinion that Wis. Stat. § 70.043 needs 
legislative attention.  No judicial definition of "set upon a 
foundation" or "off its wheels" or "set upon some other support" 
is free from difficulties.  Nevertheless, in choosing among 
several unsatisfactory alternatives set forth by the courts, I 
would adopt the test set forth in the majority opinion in the 
court of appeals because I think it presents the fewest problems 
in application.  I would not further complicate the issue, as 
the majority opinion does, by adding the concepts of "temporary" 
(majority op. at ¶30), "temporary and for a limited time" 
(majority op. at ¶30), "very limited time" (majority op. at 
¶30), or "temporary basis" (majority op. at ¶31) in interpreting 
the statute.   
¶40 Moreover, I do not understand how the majority opinion 
can apply its new test to defeat the claims of 136 plaintiffs 
without giving these plaintiffs an opportunity to present 
evidence under the new test. 
¶41 I am authorized to state that Justice DIANE S. SYKES 
joins this opinion. 
 
No.  99-2466.ssa 
 
1