Title: Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Company
Citation: 287 So. 2d 78
Docket Number: 43009
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 18, 1973

287 So. 2d 78 (1973)
Pat L. TORNILLO, Jr., Appellant,
v.
The MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING COMPANY, a Division of Knight Newspapers, Inc., Appellee.
No. 43009.

Supreme Court of Florida.
July 18, 1973.
Rehearing Denied October 10, 1973.
Jerome A. Barron, Syracuse, N.Y., Tobias Simon and Elizabeth J. du Fresne, Miami, for appellant.
Dan P.S. Paul and James W. Beasley, Jr., of Paul &amp; Thomson, Miami, for appellee.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., amicus curiae.
*79 Jonathan L. Alpert, Miami, Richard Yale Feder, Coral Gables, Irma Robbins Feder, Miami, and Warren S. Schwartz, Miami Beach, for amicus curiae, American Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc.
William C. Ballard of Baynard, McLeod, Lang, Eckert &amp; Ballard, St. Petersburg, for amicus curiae, Times Publishing Co.
Donald U. Sessions, Daytona Beach, amicus curiae.
S. Lindsey Holland, Jr., of Crofton, Holland &amp; Starling, Melbourne, for Gannett Florida Corp., News-Press Publishing Co. and Pensacola News-Journal, Inc., amicus curiae.
Harold B. Wahl, of Loftin &amp; Wahl, Jacksonville, for Florida Publishing Co., amicus curiae.
Thomas T. Cobb, of Cobb, Cole, Sigerson, McCoy, Bell &amp; Bond, Daytona Beach, for News-Journal Corp., amicus curiae.
Charles W. Pittman, of Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison &amp; Kelly, Tampa, for The Tribune Co., amicus curiae.
Terry McDavid, Lake City, for Lake City Reporter, amicus curiae.
James L. Livingston, of Livingston &amp; Livingston, Sebring, for Sebring News, Inc., amicus curiae.
Malcolm B. Johnson, for The Tallahassee Democrat, amicus curiae.
Selig I. Goldin, of Goldin &amp; Turner, Gainesville, for Gainesville Sun, amicus curiae.
Arthur I. Jacobs, Fernandina Beach, for Fernandina Beach News-Leader, amicus curiae.
A.W. Nichols, III, Palatka, for The Palatka Daily News, amicus curiae.
Willard Ayres, of Ayres, Swigert, Cluster, Tucker &amp; Curry, Ocala, for Ocala Star-Banner, amicus curiae.
John F. Wendel, of Wendel &amp; McArthur, P.A., Lakeland, for The Ledger, amicus curiae.
P.B. Howell, Jr., of Cherry, Howell &amp; Cummins, Leesburg, for The Daily Commercial, amicus curiae.
Cecil H. Albury of Heuer, Albury &amp; Okell, West Palm Beach, for Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., amicus curiae.
PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us upon direct appeal from Circuit Court of Dade County, holding Florida Statute 104.38, F.S.A.[1] unconstitutional thereby vesting jurisdiction in this Court under Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, as amended 1973, F.S.A.
Appellant Tornillo, plaintiff below, who was a candidate for the State Legislature demanded that appellee print verbatim his replies to two editorials printed therein attacking appellant's personal character. The appellee refused and Tornillo filed complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and punitive damages. Pursuant to Florida Statute 86.091, F.S.A., the Attorney General of this State was advised that appellee intended to contest the constitutionality vel non of Florida Statute 104.38, F.S.A. In view of the circumstances, the trial court granted the request for an emergency hearing.
*80 Preliminarily, the trial court determined that the statutory provision in question is a criminal statute and that absent special circumstances, equity will not ordinarily enjoin commission of a crime. Pompano Horse Club Co. v. State, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801 (1927). Notwithstanding this infirmity in appellant's complaint, the trial court further concluded that F.S. § 104.38, F.S.A. is violative of Article I, Sections 4 and 9 of the Constitution of Florida and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States as a resraint upon freedom of speech and press and because it is impermissibly vague and indefinite.
Believing that the promulgation of this statute is authorized by Article IV, Section 4,[2] and the First[3] and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and Article VI, Section 1,[4] and Article I, Section 4[5] of the Florida Constitution, and believing that this statute enhances rather than abridges freedom of speech and press protected by the First Amendment, we hold that it does not constitute a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States or Article I, Section 4, Florida Constitution.
The election of leaders of our government by a majority of the qualified electors is the fundamental precept upon which our system of government is based, and is an integral part of our nation's history. Recognizing that there is a right to publish without prior governmental restraint,[6] we also emphasize that there is a correlative responsibility that the public be fully informed.
The entire concept of freedom of expression as seen by our founding fathers rests upon the necessity for a fully informed electorate. James Madison wrote that, "A popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and a people who mean to be their own governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives (to W.T. Barry, August 4, 1822)."[7]
The public "need to know" is most critical during an election campaign. By enactment of the first comprehensive corrupt practices act relating to primary elections in 1909 our legislature responded to the need for insuring free and fair elections. Article III, Section 26, and Article VI, Section 9, Constitution of Florida 1885, *81 commanded the Legislature to pass laws "regulating elections and prohibiting under adequate penalties, all undue influence thereof from power, bribery, tumult or other improper practices" and to "enact such laws as will preserve the purity of the ballot given under this Constitution." This act of 1909 did not deal with the subject of the wrongful use of newspapers or other printed or written matter, with the exception of a provision which declared it to be a misdemeanor for any candidate or other person to have or distribute on day of primary at or near any polling place any writing against any candidate in the primary. Florida Statute 104.38, F.S.A., was originally enacted in 1913 as Chapter 6470, Section 12, Laws of Florida, 1913.[8] This second act adopted in 1913 known as the corrupt practices act was enacted to supplement the act of 1909. The statutory provision, the constitutionality vel non which is being questioned in the instant cause, was enacted not to punish, coerce or censor the press but rather as a part of a centuries old legislative task of maintaining conditions conducive to free and fair elections. The Legislature in 1913 decided that owners of the printing press had already achieved such political clout that when they engaged in character assailings, the victim's electoral chances were unduly and improperly diminished. To assure fairness in campaigns, the assailed candidate had to be provided an equivalent opportunity to respond; otherwise not only the candidate would be hurt but also the people would be deprived of both sides of the controversy.[9]
What some segments of the press seem to lose sight of is that the First Amendment guarantee is "not for the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of us all."[10] Speech concerning public affairs is more than self expression. It is the essence of self government.[11]
Mr. Justice Learned Hand expressed the role of the press well when he emphasized,
In Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 66 S. Ct. 1029, 90 L. Ed. 1295 (1946), the Supreme Court of the United States emphasized that the power of the press must be tempered with responsibility when it explained,
The concept which appears throughout the decisions underlying First Amendment guarantees that there is a broad societal interest in the free flow of information to the public by the Supreme Court of the United States was explicitly stated in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964), as well as other Supreme Court decisions, as follows:
The statute here under consideration is designed to add to the flow of information and ideas and does not constitute an incursion upon First Amendment rights or a prior restraint, since no specified newspaper content is excluded. There is nothing prohibited but rather it requires, in the interest of full and fair discussion, additional information.
The right of the public to know all sides of a controversy and from such information to be able to make an enlightened choice is being jeopardized by the growing concentration of the ownership of the mass *83 media into fewer and fewer hands, resulting ultimately in a form of private censorship. Through consolidation, syndication, acquisition of radio and television stations and the demise of vast numbers of newspapers, competition is rapidly vanishing and news corporations are acquiring monopolistic influence over huge areas of the country. We take note of a recent article in Florida Trend magazine, March 1973, explicating that the Miami Herald is the largest newspaper published in Florida, that it is larger in size than the next two largest newspapers; and that it is not only a large city daily newspaper but also is a regional and international newspaper.
Freedom of expression was retained by the people through the First Amendment for all the people and not merely for a select few. The First Amendment did not create a privileged class which through a monopoly of instruments of the newspaper industry would be able to deny to the people the freedom of expression which the First Amendment guarantees. The Supreme Court of the United States in Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20, 65 S. Ct. 1416, 1424, 89 L. Ed. 2013, clearly expounded,
More recently in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 127 U.S.App.D.C. 129, 381 F.2d 908, affirmed 395 U.S. 367, 89 S. Ct. 1794, 23 L. Ed. 2d 371 (1969), the Supreme Court opined,
By this tendency toward monopolization, the voice of the press tends to become exclusive in its observation and its wisdom which in turn deprives the public of their right to know both sides of controversial matters.
*84 Appellant urges that if a newspaper may attack a candidate with impunity and he is provided no right to reply, the public interest in free expression suffers, because they can only hear the publisher's side of the controversy and are denied the dissenting view.
Although we have carefully considered appellee's argument that Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., supra, is inapplicable to the present cause, we cannot discount certain excerpts therefrom which are applicable to First Amendment guarantees in general. Therein, the Supreme Court explained that,
That Court further stated in Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C., supra, 395 U.S., at 390, 89 S. Ct. 1794, in Associated Press v. U.S., supra, 326 U.S., at 20, 65 S. Ct. 1416, and New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S.  at 270, 84 S. Ct. 710, that it is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas wherein truth will prevail rather than to countenance a monopolization of that market whether by government or private enterprise.
Florida's right of reply statute is consistent with the First Amendment as applied to this State through the Fourteenth Amendment. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 47, 91 S. Ct. 1811, 1821, 29 L. Ed. 2d 296, we find that the Supreme Court of the United States is inclined to this position by the following quote from the majority opinion:
To this comment, the Court appended the following note:
Although appellee attempts to minimize the import of the aforestated quotation, we feel compelled to note that such remarks regarding right to reply legislation is entirely *85 consistent with past precedent establishing the fundamental purpose of the First Amendment to inform the people.
Neither appellant nor appellee takes issue with the holding of the trial court that it lacked jurisdiction to enjoin an alleged violation of Florida Statute 104.38, F.S.A. This provision is criminal in nature and absent special circumstances equity will usually not enjoin commission of a crime.[13]
Appellant urges that the Right of Reply Statute in question is neither impermissibly vague nor unnecessarily broad. We must agree and therefore uphold the constitutionality of this statutory provision. It is a fundamental principle that this Court has the duty, if reasonably possible, consistent with protection of constitutional rights, to resolve all doubts as to the validity of a statute in favor of its constitutionality and if reasonably possible a statute should be construed so as not to conflict with the constitution.[14] Courts are inclined to adopt that reasonable interpretation of a statute which removes it farthest from constitutional infirmity. In Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138, the Supreme Court of the United States stated every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of a statute, and the case is to be considered in the light of the principle that the State is primarily the judge of regulations in the interest of public safety and welfare.
We do not believe that Florida's statutory right of reply is lacking in any of the required standards of preciseness. The statute is sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it as to what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.
We recognize that certainty is all the more essential when vagueness might induce individuals to forego their rights of speech, press and association for fear of violating an unclear law. Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344, 79 S. Ct. 838, 3 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1959), Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 86 S. Ct. 1407, 16 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1965).
In Brock v. Hardie, 114 Fla. 670, 154 So. 690, 694 (1934), relative to the issue of vagueness, this Court said,
Inter alia, appellee attacks the constitutionality of the statute on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth because of the use of the term "any"  referring to the type of reply allowable. This statute provides in part,
Because of the longstanding policy of this Court to give a statute, if reasonably possible, a construction supporting its constitutionality, we hold that the mandate of the statute refers to "any reply" which is wholly responsive to the charge made in the editorial or other article in a newspaper being replied to and further that such reply will be neither libelous nor slanderous of the publication nor anyone else, nor vulgar nor profane.
We conclude that the statute in question is as certain and definite as others heretofore upheld as constitutionally permissible. The following statement made by Judge Tamm in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., supra, 381 F.2d  at 921, is clearly applicable to the instant cause: "Here there is no broad-reaching, all-embracive statutory provision penalizing knowing as well as unknowing conduct."
Although apparently not raised before the trial court, the brief of Amicus Times Publishing Co. has raised the issue that Florida Statute 104.38, F.S.A., is a deprivation of property right without due process. With this contention, we can not agree. Florida Statute 104.38, F.S.A. is a valid exercise of the state police power enacted to assure the integrity of the electoral process. In Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 48 S. Ct. 246, 72 L. Ed. 568 (1928), the Supreme Court stated,
We find this argument of deprivation of property rights by being required to furnish free space to be without merit. See Miller v. Schoene, supra; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, at 506, 66 S. Ct. 276, 90 L. Ed. 265; Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C., supra; Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, supra; Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Attorney General, 94 N.H. 148, 48 A.2d 478 (1946); Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 88 S. Ct. 1601, 20 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1968).
In conclusion, we do not find that the operation of the statute would interfere with freedom of the press as guaranteed by the Florida Constitution and the Constitution of the United States. Indeed it strengthens the concept in that it presents both views leaving the reader the freedom to reach his own conclusion. This decision will encourage rather than impede the wide open and robust dissemination of ideas and counterthought which the concept of free press both fosters and protects and which is essential to intelligent self government.
Newspapers are not wholly dependent on electronic media as were the broadcasters in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., supra. However, we have no difficulty in *87 taking judicial notice that the publishers of newspapers in this contemporary era would perish without this vital source of communications. The dissemination of news other than purely local is transmitted over telegraph wires or over air waves. This not only includes dissemination of news but also in chain newspaper operations so prevalent today, the Miami Herald being one; even editorials are prepared in one place and transmitted electronically to another. Therefore, the principles of law enunciated in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., supra, have been taken into consideration in reaching our opinion.
A half free press would be deceptive to the public. Florida Statute 104.38, F.S.A., in the interest of all the people, provides that candidates for public office under certain prescribed circumstances shall have a right of reply, a right of expression. It does not deny to the owner of the instruments of the newspaper industry any right of expression. The statute assures, and does not abridge, the right of expression which the First Amendment guarantees. The statute supports the freedom of the press in its true meaning  that is, the right of the reader to the whole story, rather than half of it  and without which the reader would be "blacked out" as to the other side of the controversy.
For the foregoing reasons, we find Florida Statute 104.38, F.S.A. to be constitutional and reverse the holding of the trial court that it is unconstitutional.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C.J., ADKINS, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., and RAWLS, District Court Judge, concur.
ROBERTS, J., concurs specially with Opinion in which CARLTON, C.J., ADKINS, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., and RAWLS, District Court Judge, concur.
BOYD, J., dissents with Opinion.
ROBERTS, Justice (specially concurring):
I concur in the opinion and judgment of the majority. We are fully cognizant of the recent decision rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 93 S. Ct. 2080, 36 L. Ed. 2d 772, decided May 29, 1973, which holds that neither the Federal Communications Act nor the First Amendment require broadcasters to accept paid editorial advertisements. But this opinion in no way derogated the earlier opinion of that court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 89 S. Ct. 1794, 23 L. Ed. 2d 371 (1969), validating the fairness doctrine of the Federal Communications Commission which imposes two affirmative responsibilities on the broadcaster  coverage of issues must be adequate and must fairly reflect differing viewpoints. As the Supreme Court stated in Columbia Broadcasting, supra, "In fulfilling its Fairness Doctrine obligations, the broadcaster must provide free time for the presentation of opposing views if a paid sponsor is unavailable, ... and must initiate programming on public issues if no one else seeks to do so. See John J. Dempsey, 6 P &amp; F Radio Reg. 615 (1950); Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S., at 378, 89 S.Ct., at 1800."
The complaints filed in Columbia Broadcasting, supra, by the Democratic National Committee and the Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, alleged that a broadcaster had violated the First Amendment by refusing to sell it time to broadcast spot announcements expressing political views of the different groups. The Supreme Court turned its decision primarily on the limited nature of the broadcasting airwaves and the existence of the Fairness Doctrine which requires broadcasters to provide free time for presentation of opposing political views when a paid sponsor is not available. The decision in Columbia Broadcasting is directed solely to the peculiar and limited nature of broadcasting *88 frequencies, and that decision is not applicable to the instant facts presently before this Court in the case sub judice. Chief Justice Burger commences the body of his opinion with the following remarks:
After recounting the history of broadcast regulations, the court in Columbia Broadcasting, supra, opined that broadcasters are charged with the duty of providing the listening and viewing public with access to a balanced presentation of information on issues of public importance. The Supreme Court was particularly concerned with forcing broadcasters to accept paid political advertisements when broadcasting frequencies are so limited because of a substantial risk that such a system would be monopolized by those who could and would pay the costs, and that a system so heavily weighted in favor of the financially affluent or those with access to wealth would in effect undermine the effective operation of the Fairness Doctrine. The views of the affluent would prevail since they would have it within their power to purchase time more frequently, and editorial advertising could then be monopolized by those of one political persuasion. Those were the concerns of the Supreme Court in Columbia Broadcasting, supra, when it rendered its decision that broadcasters are not required to accept paid editorial advertisements regardless of the content thereof.
Our opinion in the instant cause in no way conflicts with the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Columbia Broadcasting, supra.
CARLTON, C.J., ADKINS, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., and RAWLS, District Court Judge, concur.
BOYD, Justice (dissenting):
I respectfully dissent.
This statute carries a penalty provision for violations thereof, and it therefore *89 must be most strictly construed in favor of any person accused thereunder. The statute is so vague on its face as to raise doubts in the minds of those reading it as to the exact underlying legislative intent.
There are no standards as to when a publisher must carry a reply. For example, the following are just some of the important questions left unanswered by this statute. Does the law include both news stories and editorial comment? If a story mentions a "situation", but does not mention the candidate by name, may he reply? When the publisher knows his statements are true, must he publish a statement from the candidate which he knows to be false? If the reply of the candidate libels other persons, must the publisher print it, and, if so, is the publisher subject to liability for any resulting libel suit? If the candidate's reply were to contain obscene language, would the publisher still have to print it  and thereby invite prosecution under our obscenity laws?
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press... ." Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of the State of Florida similarly provides: "No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Since these constitutional provisions prohibit the government from limiting the right of the publishing press to publish news and comment editorially, it would be equally unconstitutional for the government to compel a publisher to print a statement of any other person, or persons, against that publisher's will.
The majority opinion correctly observes that freedom of speech and freedom of the press carry the duty to speak the truth. And, of course, the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press must be exercised with appropriate regard to the provisions of our libel and obscenity statutes. As in all other areas of public and private service, some errors will, from time to time, surely occur. Yet, recognizing that the survival of a free press is contingent upon the press fulfilling its duty to the general public, the overwhelming majority of those in the publishing press comply with the highest of ethical standards.
We are taught in the Bible that, "the truth will make you free".[1]
Free people can make proper decisions for their own self-government only when they are adequately informed by a free press. To the extent that government limits or adds to that which a publisher must distribute, freedom of speech and freedom of the press are thereby diminished.
Almost everyone whose name has been carried frequently in the news media has been offended, at one time or another, by stories or comments with which he disagrees. This is part of the price one pays for success and notoriety. If there exists a problem in this state of affairs, the muzzling of a free press is not the solution to such problem.
I therefore dissent.
PER CURIAM.
Appellee, Miami Herald, by petition for rehearing strenuously argues that this Court's opinion overlooks the fact that § 104.38, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., is a criminal statute and that this Court is without power to rewrite or perform plastic surgery on a criminal statute in an attempt to cure the statute's vagueness by writing a definition of "reply". Appellee then journeys upon numerous hypothetical inquiries  What is a newspaper? What is an assault? What is an equally "conspicuous place"?  and then reasons that these "obvious ambiguities" render the subject statute *90 so vague that same must be held unconstitutional.
As was emphatically stated in the opinion of this Court, the action underlying this cause before us is a civil action which was filed in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit seeking to require appellee to publish appellant's reply pursuant to Florida Statute 104.38, F.S.A. and for damages. No criminal penalty is sought in the case sub judice, and, therefore, the validity vel non of the criminal penalty is not here involved. We are not unmindful of the line of decisions from this Court and the Supreme Court of the United States requiring more specificity in statutory authorship to support a statute which imposes a criminal penalty. However, the language of our opinion clearly defines what would constitute a wrongdoing. We take this opportunity to restate the following excerpt from our opinion:
Even had this Court found the statute, the constitutionality vel non which is being questioned sub judice, not to be sufficiently definite and specific to support a criminal penalty, this criminal penalty provision would not be fatal to the statute because the statute is so constructed that the criminal penalty can be easily severed and deleted and still leave a complete legislative expression establishing a civil right to damages. This Court has long held that where certain clauses, provisions, or sections of a statutory enactment are in violation of constitutional mandates, it does not necessarily follow that the whole enactment should fail, and this Court has held that the Court may sever the unconstitutional provision and uphold the remainder if that which is left is complete in itself, sensible, and capable of being executed, whether or not the enactment contains a severability clause. State ex rel. Boyd v. Deal, 24 Fla. 293, 4 So. 899 (1888); Gwynn v. Hardee, 92 Fla. 543, 110 So. 343 (1926); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 109 Fla. 477, 147 So. 463, 149 So. 8 (1933); City of Daytona Beach v. Harvey, 48 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 1950); Youngblood v. Darby, 58 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1952); Harris v. Bryan, 89 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1956); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, 137 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1962); Davis v. State, 146 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1962); Musleh v. Marion County, 200 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1967); Small v. Sun Oil Company, 222 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1969). In State v. Newell, 85 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1956), this Court opined:
A comparable statute to Florida Statute 104.38, F.S.A. requiring a full and fair correction, apology, and retraction to be published in the same editions or corresponding issues of the periodical in which said article appeared, and in as conspicuous place and type as was said original article,[2] as an abatement of the publisher's liability for punitive damages, was held constitutional by this Court in Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1950). Courts have generally regarded this type of statute to be in aid of a free press. We take judicial notice that this statute has been frequently used to avoid punitive damages apparently with no adverse effect to newspaper publishers. But, indeed, this statute has been utilized to their financial advantage.
We also here note another retraction statute promulgated by the Florida Legislature which defines a procedure for abatement of criminal penalty. Florida Statute 836.08, F.S.A., provides:
Reverting to the hypothetical inquiries posed by appellee, it is observed that similar questions might well be posed as to the vagueness of certain provisions of Florida Statute 770.02, F.S.A., viz: "good faith"; "falsity"; "a full and fair correction"; "apology"; "conspicuous place"; and Florida Statute 836.08, F.S.A., viz: "correction"; "apology"; "reasonable grounds"; or "a full and fair correction". In short, the definition and meaning of specific words or phrases in a particular factual situation have been and will be an infinite subject of inquiry so long as Homo sapiens engage in the art of communication. At this stage of the instant controversy, we are confronted not with the wisdom of the Legislature in enacting the challenged statutory provision; our task is to preserve the prerogative of the legislative body unless it clearly contravenes the basic federal and state charters adopted by our citizenry.
In conclusion, it must be remembered that First Amendment Freedom of the Press is for the benefit of all the people and not just those who have invested money in the publishing business.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
CARLTON, C.J., ROBERTS, ADKINS, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., and RAWLS, District Court Judge, concur.
BOYD, J., dissents.
[1]  F.S. § 104.38  Newspaper assailing candidate in an election; space for reply.  If any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any candidate for nomination or for election in any election, or charges said candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his official record, or gives to another free space for such purpose, such newspaper shall upon request of such candidate immediately publish free of cost any reply he may make thereto in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for such reply, provided such reply does not take up more space than the matter replied to. Any person or firm failing to comply with the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082 or § 775.083.
[2]  Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and On Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.
[3]  Amendment I. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; ...
[4]  Section 1. Regulation of elections.  All elections by the people shall be by direct and secret vote. General elections shall be determined by a plurality of votes cast. Registration and elections shall, and political party functions may, be regulated by law.
[5]  Section 4. Freedom of speech and press.  Every person may speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions and civil actions for defamation the truth may be given in evidence. If the matter charged as defamatory is true and was published with good motives, the party shall be acquitted or exonerated.
[6]  Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357; New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S. Ct. 2140, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S. Ct. 862, 87 L. Ed. 1313; Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 85 S. Ct. 1493, 14 L. Ed. 2d 398.
[7]  6 Writings of James Madison 398 (Hunt Ed. 1906), The Complete Madison 337 (1953).
[8]  Chapter 6470, Section 12 (Laws of Florida, 1913), provided, "That if any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any candidate for nomination in a primary election, or charges such candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his official record, or gives to another free space for such purpose, such newspaper shall, upon request of such candidate, immediately publish free of cost any reply he may make thereto, in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for such reply; provided, such reply does not take up more space than the matter replied to. A person who fails to comply with the provisions of this Section, shall upon conviction be punished by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment." See subsequent history of statute, Section 5927, Revised General Statutes of Florida, 1920, entitled newspaper assailing candidate must give free space for reply. This provision was reenacted as Section 875.40, Florida Statutes, which varies only slightly from the present law. Section 875.40, Florida Statutes, was identical to Chapter 6470, Section 12 (Laws of Florida, 1913). In 1951, the Legislature renumbered and slightly revised this provision to cover any elections (not just primaries) and to provide that, "Any one failing to comply with the provisions of the section shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor." Chapter 26870, Laws of Florida, 1951. Section 104.38 was entitled, "Newspaper assailing candidate in election; space for reply." See also Chapter 28151, General Laws, 1953, which adds the words "or for election" so that the preliminary portion of the statute reads: "If any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any candidate for nomination or for election in any election... ." In 1972, HB 2801 attempting to repeal F.S. 104.38 died in committee.
[9]  Ex parte Hawthorne, 116 Fla. 608, 156 So. 619 (1934). 9 Florida L.J. 297 (1935), "Brief History of the Corrupt Practices Act of Florida," J.V. Keen.
[10]  Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389, 87 S. Ct. 534, 543, 17 L. Ed. 2d 456.
[11]  Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75, 85 S. Ct. 209, 13 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1964).
[12]  United States v. Associated Press, D.C., 52 F. Supp. 362, 372.
[13]  Pompano Horse Club Co. v. State, supra; 17 Fla.Jur. Injunctions, § 46.
[14]  Buck v. Gibbs, D.C., 34 F. Supp. 510, Mod. 313 U.S. 387, 61 S. Ct. 962, 85 L. Ed. 1416 (1940); Hunter v. Owens, 80 Fla. 812, 86 So. 839 (1920); Cragin v. Ocean &amp; Lake Realty Co., 101 Fla. 1324, 133 So. 569, 135 So. 795 (1931), appeal dism. 286 U.S. 523, 52 S. Ct. 494, 76 L. Ed. 1267; Haworth v. Chapman, 113 Fla. 591, 152 So. 663 (1933); Hanson v. State, 56 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1952); Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1969); Hancock v. Sapp, 225 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1969); Rich v. Ryals, 212 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1968).
[1]  John 8:32.
[1]  Buck v. Gibbs, D.C., 34 F. Supp. 510, mod. Watson v. Back, 313 U.S. 387, 61 S. Ct. 962, 85 L. Ed. 1416 (1940); Hunter v. Owens, 80 Fla. 812, 86 So. 839 (1920); Cragin v. Ocean &amp; Lake Realty Co., 101 Fla. 1324, 133 So. 569, 101 Fla. 1324, 135 So. 795 (1931), appeal dism., 286 U.S. 523, 72 S. Ct. 494, 76 L. Ed. 1267; Haworth v. Chapmen, 113 Fla. 591, 152 So. 663 (1933); Hanson v. State, 56 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1952); Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1969); Hancock v. Sapp, 225 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1969); Rich v. Ryals, 212 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1968).
[2]  Florida Statute 770.02, F.S.A. provides:

"If it appears upon the trial that said article was published in good faith, that its falsity was due to an honest mistake of the facts, and that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the statements in said article were true, and that within ten days after the service of said notice a full and fair correction, apology and retraction was published in the same editions or corresponding issues of the newspaper or periodical in which said article appeared, and in as conspicuous place and type as was said original article, then the plaintiff in such case shall recover only actual damages."