Title: Warren County Bd. of Educ. v. Wilkinson
Citation: 500 So. 2d 455
Docket Number: 56035
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: December 10, 1986

500 So. 2d 455 (1986) WARREN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION v. Alexandra Renee WILKINSON, a Minor, By and Through Her Next Friend and Father, John C. WILKINSON. No. 56035. Supreme Court of Mississippi. December 10, 1986. *456 M. James Chaney, Jr., Teller, Chaney &amp; Rector, Vicksburg, for appellant. Mark W. Prewitt, Prewitt &amp; Johnson, Vicksburg, for appellee. Before ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and ANDERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ. GRIFFIN, Justice, for the Court: "But we know that the law is good, if a man use it lawfully."[1] This case has as its genesis the loss of all credit for a semester as a result of a minor indiscretion by a 16-year-old sophomore attending Warren Central Senior High School. The conduct of the school officials epitomizes the misuse of good law. What we have to say in this case shall not be interpreted as condemnation of any individual, but is supplied as a guide in future disciplinary actions taken by school boards. On June 1, 1984, the appellee, Alexandra Renee Wilkinson, and a friend and schoolmate, after her parents had gone to work, drank two or three sips of her daddy's beer at her residence and then went to school. This was the last day of school. Renee was exempt from examinations because of her perfect attendance, deportment and good grades. Nevertheless, she attended school and after lunch, some time after 1:00 but before 1:30, the school principal removed her from a class and extracted from her an admission that she and her friend had drunk beer at her home before coming to school. Other teachers had confronted the classmate and received a statement concerning the consumption of the beer. There was no odor of beer on Renee's breath or any evidence of misconduct, and the principal, when asked if during his interrogation of her, her shirt was not fluttering from her heartbeat, stated that she was nervous. Mr. and Mrs. Wilkinson received the following letter from the principal: The Wilkinsons did not appear before the school board on June 14 because of prior commitments of the father, but appeared on July 12, 1984. The minutes of that meeting concerning this matter show the following: After a call to the school board, the Wilkinsons were advised of the results of the hearing by a letter from the president of the school board dated July 18, 1984, which reads as follows: The Wilkinsons had a right to appeal; however, they elected to seek an injunction for violation of constitutional rights in chancery court, and the matter was heard before the Chancellor a very short time before the opening of the next semester. On July 29, 1984, the Chancellor entered the following opinion: *459 We have no disagreement with the Chancellor's opinion and could well adopt the same as the opinion of this Court. However, though busy, we do have more time to delineate the proper procedure in such matters and to give reasons therefor. The Chancellor's opinion could have gone much further. It goes undisputed in this record that the superintendent of the schools, prior to the hearing, advised the appellee's father that his "daughter broke the rules and she was going to be punished". It is apparent that no witnesses were questioned at the school board hearing and, according to the president of the school board, none were offered to Mr. Wilkinson, who proposed to represent his daughter, for cross-examination. According to Mr. Wilkinson, "after about 30 minutes and after a member of the board advised me that the school board could interpret the law any way they wanted to, I felt it was fruitless to produce any witnesses whether they be for my daughter or not." This goes undisputed. First, we are compelled to advise this school board and others that might entertain such an erroneous notion as to the source of their powers. That source is the state of Mississippi, acting through its legislature, and the school boards exercise only such powers as are conferred upon them by law. Harrell v. City of Jackson, 229 Miss. 815, 92 So. 2d 240 (1957), and the authorities there cited. This rule was recognized in Clinton Mun. Separate School Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So. 2d 237, 240 (Miss. 1985), and it is well that we recite Judge Robertson's language as follows: Mississippi Code Annotated § 37-9-71 (1972) provides as follows: Section 37-7-301 provides in part as follows: The school board adopted a rule defining misconduct on the use of alcohol *460 and drugs, as noted by the Chancellor in his opinion. The plain reading of the rule clearly reveals that the appellee did not violate it. The beer was consumed in her home. She did not have possession of it on the way to school or use it while traveling to school or on the school grounds or in the buildings. The school board has called our attention to no rule expressly or impliedly prohibiting a student from drinking beer at home indeed, we doubt a school board would have authority to make any such rule, although the point is not before us today. It is elementary that it is a violation of due process to punish one for conduct that has not been lawfully condemned. This requires no citation of authority. In Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir.1969), the late Professor Lon L. Fuller is quoted as follows: "The first desideratum of a system for subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules is an obvious one: there must be rules." The opinion there continues as follows: See also Harris v. Mississippi State Real Estate Com'n., 500 So. 2d 958, 966-967 (1986). It is almost trite to state that one has to be advised of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and that such cause must be previously determined. Nevertheless, from time to time courts find it necessary to advise the citizenry of the existence of such constitutionally protected rights. As much as we revere our forefathers Madison and others who gave us our Constitution we recognize that the law on these matters far outdated their time. The ancient Romans enjoyed this privilege. Paul asserted his right as a Roman citizen to stand at Caesar's judgment seat, and Governor Festus, on informing King Agrippa of Paul's assertion, told him of his answer to the Jews who had demanded immediate judgment. His statement was: (Acts 25:16). And Festus said, (Acts 25:27). The cases in this jurisdiction announcing the same principle are legion, and apply to school boards as well as the courts. Questions of law and constitutional rights are for judicial determination. County Board of Education of Alcorn County v. Parents and Custodians of Students at Rienzi School Attendance Center, 251 Miss. 195, 168 So. 2d 814 (1964). Here, in order to protect the constitutional rights of the students, the school board properly adopted a procedure for a de novo hearing before the school board, and further provided that a student would be informed in writing of the charges against him, "the possible penalties therefor, that he will have the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, his right to call witnesses in his own behalf, his right to be represented by counsel, and advise him that he may request in *461 writing the names of the witnesses that may testify against him." In this case, the notice only told the date of the hearing and, for all practical purposes, nothing else. It did state that she came to school after drinking beer at home; however, there is no recitation as to what rule was violated. The hearing being de novo, the burden was on her accusors to go forward, but to the contrary the president of the school board merely inquired of the appellee if she had drunk beer, and the board received a report from the school principal, presumably in writing, inasmuch as the board president said no witness was offered for cross-examination. The school's rule affording due process was ignored and the hearing became no more than an inquiry and discussion. This should be sufficient for the purpose of this opinion. However, we bring to the attention of the school board Sec. 28 of the Mississippi Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment. The punishment inflicted here appears to us to be unreasonable when considered along with other offenses set forth in the handbook. There are four types of offenses: Type I, the lesser of the offenses, provides for corporal punishment, in or out of school suspension, and grants options to the principal. Type II offenses provide for a five-day suspension for a first offense. Type III offenses, which includes stealing and possession of weapons, provides for suspension of ten days or more. Our present offense, Type IV, has the harshest of all punishments suspension for the remainder of the semester, loss of all credits, and no readmission without appearing before the school board. The school board states, according to the president, that they are "evenhanded" because they exercise no discretion in Type IV offenses though permitted by the rule. It is suggested that the rules themselves are not evenhanded. It taxes the credulity of the Court to believe that two or three sips of beer at home is as heinous an offense as stealing or carrying a weapon. Type I offenses include "improper boy-girl conduct". Admittedly this is a rather broad rule, but, if carried to its ultimate, fornication would not be as offensive as two or three sips of beer. According to the record, the school board does not exercise its discretion. We thought that Judge Robertson, in Clinton v. Byrd, supra, amply pointed out that flexibility and leniency were desirable. He stated: 477 So. 2d at 241. Wise men through the centuries have exercised discretion. Solomon stated, "The discretion of a man deferreth his anger; and it is his glory to pass over a transgression." (Proverbs 19:11). The legislatures of the various states and the national congress have, from time to time, vested trial judges with discretion in the matter of punishment and, if judges did not exercise their discretion, particularly leniency, it would be impossible for the citizens to afford the burden of a penitentiary system. In Ross v. State, 480 So. 2d 1157 (Miss. 1985), this Court quoted with approval the United States Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2079, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 668 (1969), wherein it was stated: "Prevalent modern philosophy of penology is that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime." We, therefore, hold that the Chancellor was correct in stating that procedural due process was not afforded the appellee. This is true because she was not provided the witnesses against her, though requested in writing as provided by the rule. No witnesses at all were presented nor afforded for cross-examination. She was tried *462 and convicted for an offense that did not exist. The Constitution of the State of Mississippi and the Constitution of the United States mandate due process. We realize that it is difficult at times for laymen to understand exactly what is required of them. However, the taxpayers afford these boards attorneys and their services should be utilized. AFFIRMED. WALKER, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE and HAWKINS, P.JJ., and DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur. [1] I Timothy 1:8, Paul's letter to Timothy after release from the Roman prison.