Title: State v. Huerter
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 101438
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: March 18, 2011

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 101,438 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
ERIC F. HUERTA, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1)'s prohibition of direct appeal jurisdiction over presumptive 
sentences does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.  
 
2. 
Defendant's due process challenge to K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1)'s prohibition of direct 
appeal jurisdiction over presumptive sentences is abandoned. 
 
3.  
A criminal defendant's allegation of constitutional infirmity in an individual 
presumptive sentence does not make the sentence amenable to direct appeal under K.S.A. 
21-4721(c)(1).  
 
Review of the involuntary dismissal of the appeal by the Court of Appeals on May 21, 2009. 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; DAVID J. KAUFMAN, judge. Opinion filed March 18, 2011. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  
 
Richard Ney, of Ney, Adams & Sylvester, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant.  
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David Lowden, assistant district attorney, argued the cause for appellee.   
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BEIER, J.: This case arises on petition for review from the Court of Appeals' 
dismissal of defendant Eric Huerta's sentencing appeal for lack of jurisdiction under the 
authority of K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1). Huerta challenges the constitutionality of this statute, 
arguing for reversal and remand to the Court of Appeals for consideration of each of his 
issues on the merits. 
  
Huerta was sentenced to consecutive presumptive sentences totaling 372 months' 
imprisonment after his guilty pleas in two multiple-felony cases. He argued in his brief to 
the Court of Appeals that the State violated due process by presenting false information 
during his sentencing hearing, that his sentence was disproportionate to his co-
defendant's sentence, and that the State impermissibly urged the sentencing judge to rely 
on his post-arrest silence. Given the dismissal of Huerta's appeal, the Court of Appeals 
did not reach the merits of any of Huerta's arguments. The Court of Appeals also denied 
Huerta's motion to reinstate his appeal.  
 
 
In his petition for review to this court, Huerta argued that the dismissal under 
K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1) violated due process and equal protection. He also asserted that, 
when a sentencing appeal relies on a constitutional argument, as at least two of his issues 
do, even a sentence that falls within a presumptive grid box is not truly "presumptive."  
Huerta cited our decision in State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, 190 P.3d 209 (2008), to 
support this last position; he also cited State v. Dillon, 44 Kan. App. 2d 1138, 244 P.3d 
680 (2010), during oral argument before this court. 
 
Constitutional questions such as those posed by Huerta here raise issues of law, 
and this court's review is unlimited. Johnson, 286 Kan. at 842 (construction of Kansas 
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Sentencing Guidelines Act [KSGA], determination of constitutionality of provisions 
questions of law). Moreover, this case requires us to interpret K.S.A. 21-4721(c). 
 
"When courts are called upon to interpret statutes, the fundamental rule 
governing our interpretation is that 'the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can 
be ascertained. The legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the 
language of the statutory scheme it enacted.' State ex rel. Stovall v. Meneley, 271 Kan. 
355, 378, 22 P.3d 124 (2001). For this reason, when the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, courts 'need not resort to statutory construction.' In re K.M.H., 285 Kan. 
53, 79, 169 P.3d 1025 (2007). Instead, '[w]hen the language is plain and unambiguous, an 
appellate court is bound to implement the expressed intent.' State v. Manbeck, 277 Kan. 
224, Syl. ¶ 3, 83 P.3d 190 (2004)." Board of Sumner County Comm'rs v. Bremby, 286 
Kan. 745, 754-55, 189 P.3d 494 (2008).   
 
This court has further stated: 
 
"Where a statute's language is subject to multiple interpretations, however, a 
reviewing court 'may look to the historical background of the enactment, the 
circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplished, and the effect the 
statute may have under the various constructions suggested. [Citation omitted.]' Robinett 
v. The Haskell Co., 270 Kan. 95, 100-01, 12 P.3d 411 (2000). Generally, courts should 
construe statutes to avoid unreasonable results and should presume that the legislature 
does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation. Hawley v. Kansas Dept. of 
Agriculture, 281 Kan. 603, 631, 132 P.3d 870 (2006). We ascertain the legislature's intent 
behind a particular statutory provision 'from a general consideration of the entire act. 
Effect must be given, if possible, to the entire act and every part thereof. To this end, it is 
the duty of the court, as far as practicable, to reconcile the different provisions so as to 
make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible. [Citation omitted.]' In re Marriage of 
Ross, 245 Kan. 591, 594, 783 P.2d 331 (1989); see also State ex rel. Morrison v. Oshman 
Sporting Goods Co. Kansas, 275 Kan. 763, Syl. ¶ 2, 69 P.3d 1087 (2003). Thus, in cases 
that require statutory construction, 'courts are not permitted to consider only a certain 
isolated part or parts of an act but are required to consider and construe together all parts 
4 
 
thereof in pari materia.' Kansas Commission on Civil Rights v. Howard, 218 Kan. 248, 
Syl. ¶ 2, 544 P.2d 791 (1975)." Bremby, 286 Kan. at 754-55.  
 
THE STATUTE AT ISSUE 
 
 
K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1) states: "On appeal from a judgment or conviction entered for 
a felony committed on or after July 1, 1993, the appellate court shall not review: (1) Any 
sentence that is within the presumptive sentence for the crime." K.S.A. 21-4703(q) 
defines "presumptive sentence" as "the sentence provided in a grid block for an offender 
classified in that grid block by the combined effect of the crime severity ranking of the 
current crime of conviction and the offender's criminal history." 
 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
 
Huerta contends that K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1) violates the Equal Protection Clause of 
the United States Constitution, and he provides two examples to demonstrate. 
 
First, Huerta argues, under K.S.A. 21-4721(e)(1), a defendant could appeal a 
departure sentence resulting from partiality, prejudice, oppression, or corrupt motive—
e.g., a sentencing court imposes an upward departure on an African-American defendant 
because of racial prejudice. But K.S.A. 21-4721 would not permit an appellate court to 
review the imposition of a presumptive sentence, even if the sentence is based on that 
same racial bias. Huerta contends that there is no rational basis to permit an appellate 
court to review a departure sentence based on partiality, prejudice, oppression, or corrupt 
motive while denying it the opportunity to review a presumptive sentence resulting from 
the same partiality, prejudice, oppression, or corrupt motive.   
 
Second, Huerta argues that this court has reviewed a claim that consecutive 
presumptive misdemeanor sentences were disproportionate and violated the Eighth 
5 
 
Amendment. He cites State v. Snow, 282 Kan. 323, 346-47, 144 P.3d 729 (2006), in 
which we applied an abuse of discretion standard when the appellant complained not that 
a statute was unconstitutional, but that his particular sentence was unconstitutional. 
Huerta asserts that there is no rational basis to prohibit review of a constitutional 
challenge to consecutive presumptive felony sentences. 
 
Our first step in equal protection analysis is determination of whether the 
legislative classification at issue results in arguably indistinguishable classes of 
individuals being treated differently. Only if there is a differential treatment of similarly 
situated individuals is the Equal Protection Clause implicated. State v. Salas, 289 Kan. 
245, 248, 210 P.3d 635 (2009) (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 
432, 439, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 [1985] [guiding principle of equal protection 
analysis is that similarly situated individuals should be treated alike]; Hodges v. Johnson, 
288 Kan. 56, 72, 199 P.3d 1251 [2009]; State v. Denney, 278 Kan. 643, 652, 101 P.3d 
1257 [2004]). This court has recognized that it is the burden of the party raising an equal 
protection complaint to demonstrate that he or she is similarly situated to others treated 
differently. Salas, 289 Kan. at 249.     
 
Unless a party meets his or her "similarly situated" burden, we do not move to our 
second step in equal protection analysis, i.e., determination of the nature of the rights 
affected by the classification and thus the level of scrutiny applied: strict scrutiny, 
intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis. Salas, 289 Kan. at 248-49. We note, however, 
that this court has applied the rational basis test to an Equal Protection Clause challenge 
to a criminal statute. State v. Denney, 278 Kan. 643, 651-52, 101 P.3d 1257 (2004).  If a 
litigant has not demonstrated himself or herself to be similarly situated to those in a 
favored group, we also do not move to the last step of equal protection analysis, i.e., 
application of the appropriate level of scrutiny to determine whether a classification 
passes muster. Salas, 289 Kan. at 249. 
 
6 
 
A preliminary note is necessary before we turn to whether Huerta is similarly 
situated to defendants permitted under K.S.A. 21-4721(e)(1) to challenge departure 
sentences as the products of partiality, prejudice, oppression, or corrupt motive.  
 
Defendants such as Huerta used to be permitted to appeal on the same grounds as 
those subject to departure sentences. A 1995 statutory amendment altered the language of 
K.S.A. 21-4721(e)(1). See K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 21-4721(e)(1); State v. Flores, 268 Kan. 
657, 658, 999 P.2d 919 (2000). Before the amendment, Kansas appellate courts also 
reviewed presumptive sentences for partiality, prejudice, oppression, or corrupt motive. 
See, e.g., State v. Windom, 23 Kan. App. 2d 429, 430-31, 932 P.2d 1019, rev. denied 262 
Kan. 969 (1997); State v. Clark, 21 Kan. App. 2d 697, 699-700, 907 P.2d 898 (1995), 
rev. denied 259 Kan. 928 (1996); State v. Bost, 21 Kan. App. 2d 560, 571-72, 903 P.2d 
160 (1995); State v. Peal, 20 Kan. App. 2d 816, 821-22, 893 P.2d 258, rev. denied 257 
Kan. 1095 (1995); State v. Myers, 20 Kan. App. 2d 401, 403, 888 P.2d 866 (1995); State 
v. Starks, 20 Kan. App. 2d 179, 183, 885 P.2d 387 (1994). After the amendment, this 
court determined that appellate courts no longer had jurisdiction to review appeals of 
presumptive sentences, even if those appeals were based on claims of partiality, 
prejudice, oppression, or corrupt motive. Flores, 268 Kan. at 659.   
 
There is no pertinent legislative history explaining the reasoning behind the 1995 
amendment of K.S.A. 21-4721(e). In the absence of such evidence of legislative intent, 
we presume an alteration to statutory language to effect a substantive change in the law. 
See State v. Preston, 287 Kan. 181, 184, 195 P.3d 240 (2008). Here, that means that the 
legislature intended to remove presumptive sentences from the ambit of appellate review. 
  
At oral argument, Huerta contended that, had he merely moved unsuccessfully for 
downward departure, then an appellate court could have reviewed his sentence under 
K.S.A. 21-4721. But the factual premise of this comparison is inaccurate. K.S.A. 21-
4721(a) provides: "A departure sentence is subject to appeal by the defendant or the 
7 
 
state." (Emphasis added.) Merely moving for a departure sentence does not grant the right 
of appeal to a defendant, if the result of the motion is a presumptive sentence. See K.S.A. 
21-4721(c)(1). The only defendants permitted to appeal are those sentenced to an upward 
departure on the State's motion or the court's notice, see K.S.A. 21-4721(d) and (e), 
K.S.A. 21-4718(a)(3) and (b)(1), or those who seek a downward departure to a specific 
term and who receive the departure but to a term longer than the one sought, see K.S.A. 
21-4721(d). It is these defendants to whom Huerta must demonstrate he is similarly 
situated. 
  
We hold that he has not done so. 
 
The process for arriving at a departure is completely different from that for 
arriving at a presumptive sentence. In imposing a departure sentence, the sentencing court 
must state on the record at the time of sentencing the substantial and compelling reasons 
for the departure. K.S.A. 21-4716(a). In addition, when an upward durational departure is 
under consideration, "any fact that would increase the penalty for a crime beyond the 
statutory maximum, other than a prior conviction, shall be submitted to a jury and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt." K.S.A. 21-4716(b). An appellate court's review of a 
departure sentence is limited to whether the sentencing court's findings of fact are 
supported by substantial competent evidence and whether the factors they underlie are 
substantial and compelling reasons for departure. K.S.A. 21-4721(d); State v. Blackmon, 
285 Kan. 719, 724, 176 P.3d 160 (2008). There is significant latitude for a sentencing 
judge's exercise of discretion. See State v. Favela, 259 Kan. 215, 243-44, 911 P.2d 792 
(1996).   
 
On the other hand, when handing down a presumptive sentence, the discretion of 
the sentencing judge is narrowly circumscribed. K.S.A. 21-4704 requires the court to 
impose one of three sentences within the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act's drug or 
nondrug grid box, which contains a lower, middle, and upper number for the term of 
8 
 
months. Selection of one of those numbers does not require the court to state any 
particular findings on the record. See Johnson, 286 Kan. at 851-52. Indeed, the principal 
point of enacting the KSGA was "'to standardize sentences so that similarly situated 
offenders would be treated the same, thus limiting the effects of racial and geographic 
bias.'" State v. Paul, 285 Kan. 658, 667, 175 P.3d 840 (2008) (quoting State v. Bandy, 25 
Kan. App. 2d 696, 699, 971 P.2d 749 [1998]). 
 
We acknowledge the emotional appeal of Huerta's hypothetical concerning an 
overtly racist judge imposing the top number in a grid box for no reason other than his or 
her prejudice against a minority defendant. But emotional appeal cannot appellate 
jurisdiction make. And, as we have held before, the legislature generally can delineate the 
boundaries of appellate jurisdiction. Gleason v. Samaritan Home, 260 Kan. 970, Syl. ¶ 5, 
926 P.2d 1349 (1996). Here, it appears to have made a deliberate choice in 1995 to 
eliminate appeals of presumptive sentences, even if they result from partiality, prejudice, 
oppression, or corrupt motive. Given the protections from sentencing judge discretion run 
amok inherent in the KSGA's grid ranges, that choice does not cross a constitutional line.   
 
Because we do not find that Huerta is similarly situated to those defendants who 
receive departure sentences, we do not reach the remaining two steps of equal protection 
analysis on his first argument. 
 
Huerta's second equal protection argument depends upon his being similarly 
situated to the defendant in Snow, who was given, inter alia, consecutive presumptive 
sentences for multiple misdemeanors and whose disparate sentencing appeal was 
considered on its merits.   
 
This second equal protection argument also fails. 
 
9 
 
In Snow, the defendant was convicted of several felonies and misdemeanor 
offenses, and the sentencing court ordered his sentences for each offense to run 
consecutively to one another. Because of K.S.A. 21-4720(b), his total sentence for the 
felonies was limited to twice the base felony sentence. But K.S.A. 21-4720(b) does not 
apply to misdemeanor sentences, and his consecutive misdemeanor sentences were not 
truncated. The defendant therefore advanced a sentencing disparity argument on appeal, 
asserting that, had he committed all felony-level offenses rather than some misdemeanor-
level offenses, his total sentence would be shorter. Snow, 282 Kan. at 346-47. 
 
This court recognized that the Snow defendant was not arguing that the sentencing 
statutory scheme was unconstitutional; rather, he was arguing that his particular sentence 
was unconstitutional. We relied on an abuse of discretion standard, 282 Kan. at 347, and 
held that the misdemeanor sentences were not grossly disproportionate under the Eighth 
Amendment. We declined to analyze his challenge to his misdemeanor sentences any 
further. Snow, 282 Kan. at 348 (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73, 123 S. Ct. 
1166, 155 L. Ed. 2d 144 [2003]; Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23-24, 123 S. Ct. 
1179, 155 L. Ed. 2d 108 [2003]).   
 
Snow cannot help Huerta. The defendant in Snow had been sentenced for multiple 
felonies and multiple misdemeanors, and it was the combination of felony sentences and 
misdemeanor sentences that triggered appellate review. In addition, application of K.S.A. 
21-4721(c)(1) to prevent consideration of the consecutive presumptive misdemeanor 
sentences was not raised or argued in Snow; consequently, it was not the focus of this 
court's decision. We hold that Huerta and the defendant in Snow are not similarly 
situated; without that threshold determination, we do not proceed with equal protection 
analysis based on Snow. 
 
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DUE PROCESS 
 
In his petition for review to this court, Huerta devoted only a couple of sentences 
to his due process argument, claiming that the Court of Appeals' dismissal of his appeal 
under K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1) without consideration of the merits was unfair and arbitrary. 
He did not engage in either a full substantive or a full procedural due process analysis. 
Indeed, he did not elaborate on his due process claim at all. Further, his counsel made no 
mention of a due process claim at oral argument before this court. Mere characterizations 
of a statute's application as "unfair" and "arbitrary" do not constitute a sufficient due 
process argument, and we hold that Huerta has abandoned this issue on appeal. See State 
v. Holmes, 278 Kan. 603, 622, 102 P.2d 406 (2004) (issue not adequately briefed deemed 
abandoned). 
 
JOHNSON AND DILLON 
 
Huerta has also argued that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to decide the 
merits of this appeal because he raised constitutional claims. He contends that, under the 
recent Court of Appeals decision in State v. Dillon, 44 Kan. App. 2d 1138, 244 P.3d 680, 
(2010), and our decision in State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, 190 P.3d 209 (2008), a 
sentence that violated the constitution does not qualify as "presumptive" and therefore an 
appellate court has jurisdiction to hear the merits of a defendant's appeal. 
 
In Dillon, the defendant argued that the district judge failed to consider the 
proportionality of his individual sentence. The Court of Appeals stated that, in 
determining jurisdiction, it was faced with three questions: (1) Did the district judge 
consider the argument defendant made in his departure motion? (2) If not, did the district 
judge's failure to consider that argument deny defendant due process? and (3) If the 
answer to the first two questions was yes, did the district judge's violation of defendant's 
due process rights at sentencing provide an exception to the general rule that this court 
11 
 
has no jurisdiction to consider the appeal of a presumptive sentence? 44 Kan. App. 2d at 
1140. The Court of Appeals concluded that the district judge failed to consider 
defendant's argument regarding individual proportionality, that the failure denied 
defendant due process, and that this violation of due process provided an exception to 
K.S.A. 21-4721(c). The Court of Appeals relied on Johnson to conclude that, "[w]hen the 
district court's sentencing procedures violate the constitution, the sentence is not 
considered a presumptive sentence." 44 Kan. App. 2d at 1144 (citing Johnson, 286 Kan. 
at 841-42).   
 
Dillon substantially overread our decision in Johnson. Johnson was a challenge to 
the statutory scheme for sentencing, arguing that the discretion granted a sentencing 
judge to assign the upper grid box term without requiring additional fact-finding by a jury 
violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 
(2000). Johnson, 286 Kan. at 840. In other words, the defendant in Johnson mounted a 
facial challenge to the design of the KSGA; his argument was not limited to his case 
alone. Johnson, 286 Kan. at 842. We concluded that the sentencing scheme did not 
violate Apprendi; and, because Johnson's individual sentence was presumptive, we did 
nothing further, concluding that we had no jurisdiction under K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1). 
Johnson, 286 Kan. 851-52. 
 
We have conducted the same type of analysis of the overall statutory scheme for 
sentencing and come to similar conclusions in cases other than Johnson. See State v. 
Bramlett, 273 Kan. 67, 67-68, 41 P.3d 796 (2002) (imposition of consecutive sentences 
does not violate Apprendi; court without jurisdiction to review presumptive sentences); 
State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, 41 P.3d 781 (2002) (use of criminal history score to impose 
presumptive sentence does not violate Apprendi; court without jurisdiction to review 
presumptive sentences). In contrast, we do not review cases such as Huerta's on direct 
appeal, when a defendant merely argues that his or her individual presumptive sentence 
has a constitutionally based infirmity. See State v. Clemons, 273 Kan. 328, 343-44, 45 
12 
 
P.3d 384 (2002) (court without jurisdiction to review presumptive sentence, when 
defendant argued sentence constituted cruel, unusual punishment). 
 
Dillon also relied on a prior Court of Appeals decision, State v. Cisneros, 42 Kan. 
App. 2d 376, 212 P.3d 246 (2009), which it read to grant appellate jurisdiction to review 
a presumptive sentence when the district judge had misunderstood the limits of his or her 
discretion in sentencing after a revocation of probation. Dillon, 44 Kan. App. 2d at 1145. 
In Cisneros, the defendant appealed because the district judge believed he had no power 
to reduce Cisneros' sentence upon a probation revocation, despite language to the 
contrary in K.S.A. 22-3716(b). The Court of Appeals determined that this was a question 
of law over which it had jurisdiction. 42 Kan. App. 2d at 379. The court went on to state 
that, if it dismissed Cisneros' appeal for lack of jurisdiction under K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1), 
"then Cisneros would have no remedy to determine whether the district court properly 
applied K.S.A. 22-3716(b) in his case." 42 Kan. App. 2d at 379. Cisneros is plainly, 
factually, and procedurally distinct from the situation before the Court of Appeals in 
Dillon, and Dillon's reliance on Cisneros was misplaced. 
 
We also observe that the Dillon panel looked to the merits of Dillon's appeal to 
determine whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction rather than determining the 
existence of jurisdiction before considering the merits. If subject matter jurisdiction is in 
question, that issue needs to be resolved first. The merits come second. See, e.g., In re 
Adoption of Baby Girl P., 291 Kan. 424, 428-29, 242 P.3d 1168 (2010) (jurisdiction a 
preliminary matter for court to consider); Kansas Medical Mut. Ins. Co. v. Svaty, 291 
Kan. ___, 244 P.3d 642, 653 (2010) (jurisdiction a preliminary question for court to 
consider before addressing issues argued by parties).  
 
Finally, do our holdings in this case leave a defendant who believes there has been 
constitutional error in arriving at his or her individual presumptive sentence but who does 
not challenge the facial constitutionality of the sentencing scheme with no remedy? No, 
13 
 
not necessarily. It may be that constitutional error so infects the sentence that it qualifies 
as illegal under K.S.A. 22-3504; State v. Pennington, 288 Kan. 599, 601, 205 P.3d 741 
(2009). And a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 remains an option, albeit one with additional 
hurdles for the movant to overcome.   
 
Affirmed.