Title: Moses v. Southwestern Va. Transit Mgmt. Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 060369
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 2007

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and Agee, 
JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
ESTATE OF BOBBY GENE MOSES,   
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
DECEASED, BY THE PERSONAL  
 
 
  JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
REPRESENTATIVE, CARLTON L. MOSES 
 
 
    April 20, 2007 
 
v. Record No. 060369 
 
SOUTHWESTERN VIRGINIA TRANSIT  
MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 
Clifford R. Weckstein, Judge 
 
 
 
Carlton L. Moses (“Moses”), personal representative of the 
Estate of Bobby Gene Moses (the “decedent”) appeals from the 
judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of Roanoke in favor of 
Southwestern Virginia Transit Management Company, Inc. and Karen 
R. Poindexter (collectively, “the defendants”).  Moses contends 
the circuit court erred when it set aside a jury verdict in his 
favor and entered judgment for the defendants on the basis that 
the decedent was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law.  For the reasons set forth below, we will reverse the 
judgment of the circuit court. 
I. BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The decedent, seventy-two years of age, was crossing 
Campbell Avenue, a one-way, four-lane street in downtown Roanoke 
on the afternoon of July 16, 2002.  He testified that he looked 
both ways before stepping onto Campbell Avenue at a point 
approximately 125 feet from a crosswalk at the nearest 
intersection.  At some point as the decedent crossed Campbell 
Avenue, a Southwestern bus, driven by Poindexter, exited the 
adjacent Southwestern bus terminal and struck him.  The decedent 
suffered a fractured hip and other related injuries from the 
accident.  The decedent died of unrelated causes before filing 
an action at law for his injuries.  His personal representative, 
Moses, filed a motion for judgment against the defendants for 
those injuries pursuant to Code § 8.01-25. 
At trial, the videotaped deposition of the decedent was 
introduced to describe the accident, in which he stated: “I had 
been over to the Union Bank and I was crossing the street, and 
the bus pulls out of the garage and hits me.”  The decedent knew 
that there was no crosswalk at the point where he crossed, but 
he attempted to cross because “[e]verybody else crosses there.”  
On direct examination, the decedent explained the precautions he 
took in crossing the street: 
Q. 
And did you look both ways before you crossed? 
A. 
Yes, sir.  I looked both ways, yes, sir. 
Q. 
And was there any traffic coming? 
A. 
No, sir, wasn’t a thing coming. 
The decedent testified on cross-examination that the 
accident occurred when he was preparing to step up onto the curb 
adjacent to the bus station: 
Q. 
So you had completely crossed Campbell Avenue? 
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A. 
Just about, yeah. 
Q. 
And you were stepping up on the sidewalk? 
A. 
Yes, ma’am. 
Q. 
On the same side where the bus terminal is? 
A. 
Yeah. 
. . . . 
Q. 
And you were in the process of stepping up on the 
curb? 
A. 
Yeah. 
Q. 
When what happened? 
A. 
That’s when the bus pulls out and hits me. 
. . . . 
Q. 
Were you almost at the curb, or were you stepping 
up onto the curb? 
A. 
I think I stepped up on it.  I can’t swear to it.  
I was getting ready to. 
When the decedent was asked to explain why he did not see 
the bus approaching as he crossed the street, he testified in 
the following colloquy: 
Q. 
All right.  Can you explain to us how it was that 
you didn’t see the bus in order to get out of the 
way? 
A. 
I didn’t see the bus get out of the way?  The bus 
hadn’t pulled out until I started to cross the 
road . . . 
Q. 
All right. 
A. 
The bus was sitting over there. 
Q. 
Did you try to avoid the bus? 
3 
A. 
I didn’t know the bus was going to pull out until 
after it hit me. . . .  The bus wasn’t moving 
when I crossed the road.  (emphasis added).  
An eyewitness to the accident explained that Poindexter was 
looking to her right in the direction of oncoming traffic on the 
one-way street, while simultaneously closing the doors to the 
bus and attempting to make a left turn onto Campbell Avenue, 
when the bus she was driving struck the decedent, who was 
positioned to her left: 
Q. 
The driver of the bus.  When the impact occurred 
– 
A. 
Yeah, she was looking to her right – 
Q. 
– she was looking to her right. 
A. 
She was looking to her right for traffic.  I do 
remember that, yes. 
Q. 
Okay.  The elderly man that was involved in the 
accident, was he right there to her right? 
A. 
No. 
Q. 
So when the impact occurred she wasn’t looking in 
his direction? 
A. 
No. 
The defendants presented conflicting eyewitness testimony 
as to the cause of the accident, including one witness who 
testified that the decedent “didn’t react at all until the bus 
hit him.  He just kept walking straight across the street.”  
Testimony was also presented that the impact occurred out in 
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Campbell Avenue and farther from the curb than the decedent 
described. 
Following a two-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for 
Moses and awarded damages of $50,000.  When the court polled the 
jury, there was confusion on the part of some jurors as to the 
verdict.  The court then gave the jury additional instruction 
and sent the jury to deliberate further.  After the jury again 
expressed confusion, the court provided additional instructions, 
and the jury again deliberated.  When the jury returned, it 
delivered a unanimous verdict for Moses in the amount of 
$50,000, as it did originally.  Moses then moved for entry of 
judgment on the verdict, but the court denied “the motion for 
entry of judgment today.”  The defendants moved to set aside the 
jury verdict.  In its final order dated January 25, 2006, the 
circuit court granted the defendants’ motion, set the jury 
verdict aside “on the ground that the plaintiff’s decedent was 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law,” and 
entered judgment in favor of the defendants.  We granted Moses 
this appeal. 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
The circuit court's authority to set aside a jury verdict 
is limited and should be exercised “only if a jury verdict is 
plainly wrong or without credible evidence to support it.”  
McGuire v. Hodges, 273 Va. 199, 205, 639 S.E.2d 284, 287 (2007) 
5 
(quoting Jenkins v. Pyles, 269 Va. 383, 388, 611 S.E.2d 404, 407 
(2005)); see also Cohn v. Knowledge Connections, Inc., 266 Va. 
362, 366, 585 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2003); Shalimar Dev., Inc. v. 
FDIC, 257 Va. 565, 569-70, 515 S.E.2d 120, 123 (1999); Code 
§ 8.01-430.  If the evidence adduced at trial is conflicting on 
a material point, or if reasonable persons may draw different 
conclusions from the evidence, or if a conclusion is dependent 
on the weight the fact finder gives to the evidence, a judge may 
not substitute his or her conclusion for that of the jury merely 
because he or she would have reached a different result. 
McGuire, 273 Va. at 205, 639 S.E.2d at 287; see also Jenkins, 
269 Va. at 388, 611 S.E.2d at 407; Cohn, 266 Va. at 366, 585 
S.E.2d at 581; Shalimar Dev., 257 Va. at 570, 515 S.E.2d at 123. 
 
For purposes of this appeal, the defendants’ primary 
negligence in the accident is not at issue.  Rather, what is in 
controversy is whether there was sufficient evidence upon which 
the jury should resolve the issue of contributory negligence or 
whether, as a matter of law, the decedent was guilty of 
contributory negligence.  See e.g., Jenkins, 269 Va. at 389, 611 
S.E.2d at 407. 
 
We have stated the principles of law that define 
contributory negligence and its determination on many occasions.  
“Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense that must be 
proved according to an objective standard whether the plaintiff 
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failed to act as a reasonable person would have acted for his 
own safety under the circumstances.”  Jenkins, 269 Va. at 388, 
611 S.E.2d at 407; see also Sawyer v. Comerci, 264 Va. 68, 74, 
563 S.E.2d 748, 752 (2002); Ponirakis v. Choi, 262 Va. 119, 124, 
546 S.E.2d 707, 710 (2001); Artrip v. E.E. Berry Equip. Co., 240 
Va. 354, 358, 397 S.E.2d 821, 823-24 (1990).  “The essential 
concept of contributory negligence is carelessness.”  Jenkins, 
269 Va. at 388, 611 S.E.2d at 407; Sawyer, 264 Va. at 74, 563 
S.E.2d at 752; Ponirakis, 262 Va. at 124, 546 S.E.2d at 711; 
Artrip, 240 Va. at 358, 397 S.E.2d at 823-24. 
 
“The issue whether a plaintiff is guilty of contributory 
negligence is ordinarily a question of fact to be decided by the 
fact finder.”  Jenkins, 269 Va. at 389, 611 S.E.2d at 407; see 
also Sawyer, 264 Va. at 74, 563 S.E.2d at 752; Hot Shot Express, 
Inc. v. Brooks, 264 Va. 126, 135, 563 S.E.2d 764, 769 (2002); 
Ponirakis, 262 Va. at 125, 546 S.E.2d at 711.  “The issue 
becomes one of law for the circuit court to decide only when 
reasonable minds could not differ about what conclusion could be 
drawn from the evidence.”  Jenkins, 269 Va. at 389, 611 S.E.2d 
at 407; see also Hot Shot Express, 264 Va. at 135, 563 S.E.2d at 
769; Love v. Schmidt, 239 Va. 357, 360, 389 S.E.2d 707, 709 
(1990). 
 
Contributory negligence consists of the independent 
elements of negligence and proximate causation.  See Karim v. 
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Grover, 235 Va. 550, 552, 369 S.E.2d 185, 186 (1988).  Proof of 
a plaintiff’s negligence alone is insufficient to establish 
contributory negligence, even if the plaintiff is negligent per 
se, as we explained in Karim:  
 
When a defendant relies upon contributory 
negligence as a defense, he has the burden of proving 
by the greater weight of the evidence not only that 
the plaintiff was negligent, Burks v. Webb, 
Administratrix, 199 Va. 296, 307, 99 S.E.2d 629, 638 
(1957), but also “that his negligence was a proximate 
cause, a direct, efficient contributing cause of the 
accident,” Whitfield v. Dunn, 202 Va. 472, 477, 117 
S.E.2d 710, 714 (1961); accord Powell v. Virginian 
Railway Co., 187 Va. 384, 390-91, 46 S.E.2d 429, 432 
(1948). Thus, while the violation of a statute 
regulating traffic constitutes negligence,  
it does not necessarily follow that such 
negligence will as a matter of law prevent a 
recovery by the plaintiff. There must be a 
causal connection between the violation of 
the statute and the injury, otherwise the 
violation is immaterial; and unless it is 
shown that the plaintiff's violation was a 
proximate or concurring cause which 
contributed directly to his injury, he is 
not thereby barred from a recovery. 
Powell, 187 Va. at 390, 46 S.E.2d at 432; accord Bray 
v. Boston, etc., Corp., 161 Va. 686, 692, 172 S.E. 
296, 298 (1934); Lavenstein v. Maile, 146 Va. 789, 
801, 132 S.E. 844, 848 (1926).  
 
Ordinarily, the issue of proximate cause is a 
question of fact for resolution by a jury. It becomes 
a question of law for decision by a court only when 
reasonable minds cannot differ about the result. 
Litchford v. Hancock, 232 Va. 496, 499, 352 S.E.2d 
335, 337 (1987).  
235 Va. at 552-53, 369 S.E.2d at 186. 
8 
 
Citing our decision in Thomas v. Settle, 247 Va. 15, 439 
S.E.2d 360 (1994), Moses contends on appeal that the decedent 
was not negligent and alternatively, even if he was negligent in 
crossing the street outside the crosswalk, his negligence was 
not a proximate cause of the accident.  In either circumstance, 
Moses asserts that the issue of whether the decedent was 
contributorily negligent was properly left to the jury, and the 
circuit court thus erred when it set aside the jury’s verdict. 
 
The defendants respond that the circuit court correctly set 
aside the jury verdict because the decedent was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law.  The defendants contend that by 
crossing in the middle of the street and not at a crosswalk – in 
violation of Code § 46.2-923 – the decedent placed himself in 
obvious peril, barring him from recovery for his injuries.  
Relying on Hooker v. Hancock, 188 Va. 345, 348, 49 S.E.2d 711, 
712 (1948), the defendants argue that the decedent knowingly 
walked into the path of a moving vehicle, thereby establishing 
contributory negligence as a matter of law.   
 
As the circuit court failed to articulate a basis for 
holding the decedent “was guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law,” we must examine the record to determine if the 
evidence on the elements of contributory negligence were 
sufficient for the jury to decide the issue or whether the 
circuit court correctly determined “reasonable minds could not 
9 
differ about what conclusion could be drawn from the evidence.”  
Jenkins, 269 Va. at 389, 611 S.E.2d at 407.  Upon that review, 
we agree with Moses that the circuit court erred because the 
issue of contributory negligence was proper for a decision by 
the jury. 
 
The case at bar is similar to Settle in which this Court 
reversed the circuit court’s judgment setting aside the jury 
verdict.  247 Va. at 20, 24, 439 S.E.2d at 363, 365.  In Settle, 
a sixteen-year old driver’s car stalled after it ran out of gas, 
and he was attempting to maneuver the car out of traffic when a 
truck rear-ended the vehicle.  Id. at 17-18, 439 S.E.2d at 361-
62.  After the jury decided in favor of the plaintiff, the 
circuit court sustained defendant’s motion to set aside the 
verdict and entered judgment for the defendant, concluding the 
plaintiff had been contributorily negligent as a matter of law.  
Id.  This Court, while assuming the possibility of plaintiff’s 
negligence, held “the trial court erred in concluding that the 
decedent's negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of the 
accident as a matter of law; that question presented a classic 
jury issue under the facts of this case.”  Id. at 20, 439 S.E.2d 
at 363. 
 
As in Settle, we hold that the circuit court erred in 
determining contributory negligence as a matter of law because 
the evidence “presented a classic jury issue under the facts of 
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this case.”  Id.  Even if we assume, without deciding, that the 
decedent was negligent either by crossing the street outside a 
crosswalk or otherwise, the decedent’s negligence alone does not 
establish contributory negligence.  See Karim, 235 Va. at 552-
53, 369 S.E.2d at 186.  Just as in Settle, the additional 
element must be proven that the plaintiff’s negligence “was a 
proximate or concurring cause that contributed directly to the 
accident.”  247 Va. at 20, 439 S.E.2d at 363. 
 
The evidence in the record was such that reasonable minds 
could differ about the conclusions to be drawn from that 
evidence.  For example, if the jury believed the decedent’s 
testimony that before crossing Campbell avenue he “looked both 
ways . . . wasn’t a thing coming,” that “[t]he bus wasn’t moving 
when [he] crossed the road,” and that he “was ready to get up on 
the curb” when the bus pulled out while Poindexter “wasn’t 
looking in [decedent’s] direction,” then reasonable minds could 
differ on the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence.  It 
would thus not be unreasonable, as a matter of law, for a jury 
to conclude, based on the foregoing, that the decedent’s actions 
were not “a proximate cause, a direct, efficient contributing 
cause of the accident.”  Karim, 235 Va. at 552, 369 S.E.2d at 
186 (quoting Whitfield, 202 Va. at 477, 117 S.E.2d at 714.  
Accordingly, the issue of the element of proximate cause for 
contributory negligence was properly submitted to the jury for 
11 
resolution.  Consequently, it was reversible error for the 
circuit court to set aside the jury verdict so determined and to 
fail to enter judgment for Moses.  See, e.g., Burroughs v. 
Keffer, 272 Va. 162, 169, 630 S.E.2d 297, 301 (2006); Jenkins, 
269 Va. at 389-90, 611 S.E.2d at 408; Artrip v. E.E. Berry 
Equip.Co., 240 Va. 354, 358-59 397 S.E.2d 821, 823-24 (1990).  
The defendants’ reliance upon our decision in Hooker v. Hancock 
is unavailing because the factual issues were markedly distinct 
in that case and not applicable to the case at bar.∗ 
 
Given the conflicting evidence, the jury properly reviewed 
the credibility of the witnesses and weighed the evidence in 
reaching the verdict.  We must therefore reinstate the jury 
verdict because credible evidence supports it. See Loving v. 
Hayden, 245 Va. 441, 442, 429 S.E.2d 8, 9 (1993). 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will therefore reverse the 
judgment of the circuit court, reinstate the jury's verdict, and 
enter final judgment for Moses. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
                                                 
∗ In Hooker, the injured party, attempting to cross a two-way 
street on a dark night, ran “real fast” to avoid being hit by a 
car headed in one direction, and then dashed into the path of 
defendant’s car, which was approaching from the other direction 
and had been visible for some distance because there was no 
visual obstruction at the time the injured party started across 
the busy thoroughfare.  188 Va. at 349-54, 49 S.E.2d at 713-15. 
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