Title: Bank of New York Mellon v. King
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12859
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 17, 2020

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SJC-12859 
 
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON1 vs. ALTON KING, JR. & another.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 2, 2020. - June 17, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Summary Process, Appeal.  Practice, Civil, Summary process, 
Appeal, Bond. 
 
 
 
 
Summary Process.  Complaint filed in the Western Division 
of the Housing Court Department on January 14, 2019. 
 
 
The case was heard by Robert G. Fields, J., on a motion for 
summary judgment, and a motion to waive an appeal bond was also 
heard by him. 
 
 
An appeal from the entry of summary judgment and an order 
setting an appeal bond was heard in the Appeals Court by Peter 
W. Sacks, J., and the case was reported by him to the Appeals 
Court.  The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Carl E. Fumarola (Christine Kingston also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
                                                 
 
1 Formerly known as the Bank of New York, as trustee on 
behalf of the registered holders of Alternative Loan Trust 2006-
J7, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-J7. 
 
2 Terri Mayes-King. 
2 
 
 
 
Lucas McArdle for the defendants. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Jeffrey B. Loeb & Nathaniel Donoghue for Jason Scaduto. 
 
Jane Alexandra Sugarman & Richard M.W. Bauer for South 
Coastal Counties Legal Services, Inc., & others. 
 
Deirdre Dundon, pro se. 
 
Gale Lutz-Henrickson, pro se. 
 
Ruth Adjartey, pro se. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  After foreclosing on the property of the 
defendant, Alton King, Jr., the Bank of New York Mellon (bank) 
successfully obtained judgment in a summary process action 
against the defendant.  The defendant appealed from the decision 
and moved to waive the appeal bond required under G. L. c. 239, 
§ 5.  The judge waived the bond but also ordered the defendant 
to prospectively pay monthly use and occupancy to the bank while 
the appeal was pending.  A single justice of the Appeals Court 
vacated the portion of the order requiring use and occupancy 
payments, concluding that such payments constituted a part of 
the bond, which had been waived, and that the provision in G. L. 
c. 239, § 5 (e), requiring a defendant to pay "all or any 
portion of any rent which shall become due" when his or her bond 
has been waived, did not apply to situations where there was no 
landlord-tenant relationship. 
 
The issue before us on appeal is whether the bond required 
for a defendant to appeal an adverse judgment under G. L. 
c. 239, § 5, may be waived for a defendant who appeals from a 
decision in a postforeclosure summary process action, and, if 
3 
 
 
so, whether a court may still order a defendant to make use and 
occupancy payments to the plaintiff even where the defendant's 
bond has been waived.  We conclude that, based on a consistent, 
harmonious reading of G. L. c. 239, §§ 5 and 6, that construes 
the language of the statutory scheme as a whole, the bond for a 
defendant appealing from an adverse judgment in a 
postforeclosure summary process action may be waived if he or 
she is indigent and pursuing nonfrivolous arguments on appeal.  
Further, we conclude that the postforeclosure defendant whose 
bond is waived may be ordered to pay use and occupancy to the 
plaintiff, based on "all or any portion" of the reasonable 
monthly rental value of the property.  We also conclude that the 
$4,000 per month the defendant was ordered to pay as use and 
occupancy reflects a fair balancing of interests given the facts 
of this case.3 
1.  Background.  In October 2015, Terri Mayes-King 
defaulted on a promissory note secured by property owned by her 
and the defendant in Longmeadow (property).4  The defendant was 
sent notice pursuant to G. L. c. 244, §§ 35A and 35B, and 
                                                 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by South 
Coastal Counties Legal Services, Inc., Greater Boston Legal 
Services, and Northeast Legal Aid; Jason Scaduto; Deirdre 
Dundon; Gale Lutz-Henrickson; and Ruth Adjartey. 
 
4 Mayes-King was dismissed from this case upon the agreement 
of the parties, and is a party in name only. 
4 
 
 
paragraph 22 of the defendant's mortgage.5  After the defendant 
failed to cure the default, the bank foreclosed on the mortgage 
on August 24, 2018.  The bank was the highest bidder at the 
foreclosure sale and took title to the property. 
After the bank took title, it filed a postforeclosure 
summary process action against the defendant in the Western 
District of the Housing Court Department for possession of the 
property.  The defendant filed an answer, in which he denied 
that he lived at the property unlawfully or owed any rent or use 
and occupancy to the bank.  In the answer, he also asserted that 
the bank did not comply with paragraph 22 of the defendant's 
mortgage when foreclosing on the property.  See Pinti v. 
Emigrant Mtge. Co., 472 Mass. 226, 236-237 (2015).  On May 31, 
2019, the bank filed a motion for summary judgment on its claim 
for possession, to which the defendant filed no written 
opposition.  Instead, at a hearing on the motion, the defendant 
requested time to obtain legal counsel, but the Housing Court 
judge denied the defendant's request.  The judge granted the 
bank's motion for summary judgment on July 5, 2019.  The 
                                                 
5 On June 29, 2017, the defendant was sent a letter 
notifying him of a ninety-day window in which he might cure his 
mortgage default, after failing to pay his mortgage for twenty-
one months.  The total past due amount as of June 2017 was 
$165,432.07. 
5 
 
 
defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment, which the 
judge denied. 
The defendant then appealed from the decision of the 
Housing Court judge and moved to waive the appeal bond pursuant 
to G. L. c. 239, § 5 (e).  The bank opposed the waiver of the 
bond and also filed a motion to set the bond.  The bank 
supported its motion to set bond with an affidavit of a licensed 
real estate broker who had inspected the interior and exterior 
of the property.  The broker averred that the property, 
consisting of a single-family, colonial style home with 7,540 
square feet of living area, five bedrooms, five and one-half 
bathrooms, an indoor basketball court, an in-law style 
apartment, and a three-car garage, had a fair rental value of 
$5,000 per month. 
After a hearing on the bond motions, the Housing Court 
judge issued an order setting appeal bond on October 31, 2019.  
In analyzing whether a waiver of the bond was appropriate 
pursuant to G. L. c. 239, §§ 5 and 6, the judge found that the 
defendant was indigent in accordance with G. L. c. 261, §§ 27A-
27G, and had nonfrivolous defenses on appeal such that he was 
entitled to a waiver of the bond.  Those defenses included the 
defendant's claims under Pinti, 472 Mass. at 236-237, that the 
bank did not strictly comply with the defendant's mortgage 
contract when giving notice of the foreclosure.  The judge also 
6 
 
 
ordered that the defendant prospectively make $4,000 monthly use 
and occupancy payments starting November 30, 2019.6 
The defendant then appealed from the bond order pursuant to 
G. L. c. 239, § 5 (f).  After a hearing on December 9, 2019, a 
single justice of the Appeals Court concluded that the defendant 
could not be required to make periodic payments pending appeal 
when his bond had been waived, relying on and attaching to his 
order an opinion by a different single justice of the Appeals 
Court in Bank of New York Mellon vs. Dundon, Mass. App. Ct., No. 
2019-J-257 (July 17, 2019).  The single justice in the Dundon 
case reasoned: 
"[General Laws, c. 239, § 5 (e),] does not require the 
payment of 'monthly payments pending appeal,' but only 
'rent which shall become due,' and [the statute] forbids 
the court from ordering any other payments.  Here, the 
parties have no tenancy relationship and the defendant does 
not owe rent.  [General Laws] c. 239, § 5 (e)[,] therefore 
forbade the Housing Court [judge] from ordering periodic 
payments pending appeal." 
 
The single justice in the Dundon case further reasoned that the 
periodic payments sometimes required by G. L. c. 239, § 6, when 
the defendant is a foreclosed-on entity are a "condition of the 
bond," and "[b]ecause there is no bond in this case, § 6 is 
inapplicable." 
                                                 
6 The Housing Court judge credited the testimony of the real 
estate broker that the property's fair monthly rental value was 
$5,000, but also found that conditions of the property warranted 
a reduction of that amount to $4,000 per month. 
7 
 
 
The single justice in the instant case reported the 
correctness of his decision to a panel of the Appeals Court 
pursuant to Rule 2:01 of the Rules of the Appeals Court (1975) 
and Mass. R. Civ. P. 64 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1403 (1996).  
We transferred that appeal to this court on our own motion. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  The issue raised 
in this case is one of statutory interpretation -- namely, 
whether the provisions of G. L. c. 239, § 5, allowing for a 
waiver of the appeal bond and requiring the payment of any rent 
when the bond is waived, apply to postforeclosure summary 
process actions.  "The interpretive question here is purely 
legal, and we review it de novo because [t]he duty of statutory 
interpretation rests ultimately with the courts," (quotations 
and citation omitted).  Tirado v. Board of Appeal on Motor 
Vehicle Liab. Policies & Bonds, 472 Mass. 333, 337 (2015).  With 
regard to the reasonableness of periodic payments ordered by the 
court, we also review de novo.  G. L. c. 239, § 5 (f) ("The 
court receiving the request shall review the findings, the 
amount of bond or deposit, if any, and the amount of periodic 
payment required, if any, as if it were initially deciding the 
matter, and the court may withdraw or amend any finding or 
reduce or rescind any amount of bond, deposit or periodic 
payment when in its judgment the facts so warrant"). 
8 
 
 
b.  The relevant statutory provisions.  At issue in the 
instant case is the interrelationship of various provisions of 
G. L. c. 239, §§ 5 and 6.  Neither the bank nor the defendant 
read them together as an integrated whole with common purposes.  
In order to correctly interpret the statute, we therefore set 
out the various relevant provisions and explain their 
relationship. 
Section 5 provides guidance on appeal bonds generally, 
explaining the requirements of appeal bonds, the conditions of 
those bonds, and the procedures governing them, including waiver 
of the bonds and the appeal of a decision denying waiver. 
Section 5 (c) covers the conditions of appeal bonds 
demanded in cases in which the plaintiff at the time of 
establishment of the appeals bond seeks to recover possession of 
land or tenements.  Section 5 (c) provides: 
"Except as provided in section 6, the defendant shall, 
before any appeal under this section is allowed from a 
judgment . . . rendered for the plaintiff for the 
possession of the land or tenements demanded in a case in 
which the plaintiff continues at the time of establishment 
of bond to seek to recover possession, give bond in a sum 
as the court orders, payable to the plaintiff, with 
sufficient surety or sureties approved by the court, or 
secured by cash or its equivalent deposited with the clerk, 
in a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court. . . .  The 
bond shall also be conditioned to pay to the plaintiff, if 
final judgment is in plaintiff's favor, all rent accrued at 
the date of the bond, all intervening rent, and all damage 
and loss which the plaintiff may sustain by the withholding 
of possession of the land or tenements demanded and by any 
injury done thereto during the withholding, with all costs, 
until delivery of possession thereof to the plaintiff." 
9 
 
 
 
G. L. c. 239, § 5. 
 
Section 6 provides more particular guidance for the 
conditions of appeal bonds in the subset of cases in § 5 that 
involve postforeclosure summary process actions.7  It provides: 
"If the action is for the possession of land after 
foreclosure of a mortgage thereon, the condition of the 
bond shall be for the entry of the action and payment to 
the plaintiff, if final judgment is in his [or her] favor, 
of all costs and of a reasonable amount as rent of the land 
from the day when the mortgage was foreclosed until 
possession of the land is obtained by the plaintiff.  If 
the action is for possession of land after purchase, the 
condition of the bond shall be for the entry of the action 
and payment to the plaintiff, if final judgment is in his 
[or her] favor, of all costs and of a reasonable amount as 
rent of the land from the day that the purchaser obtained 
title to the premises until the delivery of possession 
thereof to him [or her], together with all damage and loss 
which he [or she] may sustain by withholding of possession 
of the land or tenement demanded, and by any injury done 
thereto during such withholding with all costs.  Upon final 
judgment for the plaintiff, all money then due to him [or 
her] may be recovered in an action on the bond." 
 
G. L. c. 239, § 6. 
The purpose of all these bond provisions is two-fold:  to 
deter frivolous appeals and to provide compensation for 
plaintiffs for the loss of the property during the appeal.  The 
Legislature has, however, included a waiver provision for 
indigent defendants.  The waiver provision appears in § 5 (e): 
"A party may make a motion to waive the appeal bond 
provided for in this section if the party is indigent as 
provided in [G. L. c. 261, § 27A].  The motion shall, 
                                                 
7 General Laws c. 239, § 6, also provides guidance for 
appeal bonds in cases seeking possession of land after purchase. 
10 
 
 
together with a notice of appeal and any supporting 
affidavits, be filed within the time limits set forth in 
this section.  The court shall waive the requirement of the 
bond or security if it is satisfied that the person 
requesting the waiver has any defense which is not 
frivolous and is indigent as provided in [G. L. c. 261, 
§ 27A] .  The court shall require any person for whom the 
bond or security provided for in [G. L. c. 239, § 5 (c),] 
has been waived to pay in installments as the same becomes 
due, pending appeal, all or any portion of any rent which 
shall become due after the date of the waiver.  A court 
shall not require the person to make any other payments or 
deposits.  The court shall forthwith make a decision on the 
motion.  If the motion is made, no execution shall issue 
until the expiration of [six] days from the court's 
decision on the motion or until the expiration of the time 
specified in this section for the taking of appeals, 
whichever is later." 
 
G. L. c. 239, § 5 (e).  A defendant who is "aggrieved by the 
denial of a motion to waive the bond or who wishes to contest 
the amount of periodic payments required by the court may seek 
review" of that decision.  G. L. c. 239, § 5 (f). 
 
We read the statutory scheme set out in §§ 5 and 6 as a 
whole.  See Commonwealth v. Raposo, 453 Mass. 739, 745 (2009). 
Sections 5 (c), (e), and 6 are necessarily interconnected:  § 5 
in general outlines the requirements of appeal bonds, the 
conditions of those bonds, and the procedures governing them, 
including waiver of the bonds and their appeals.  Section 5 (c) 
provides specific conditions for a subset of appeal bonds in 
cases where a plaintiff, at the time the appeals bond is set, 
seeks to recover possession of land or tenements, and § 6 
further defines the conditions of bonds in postforeclosure 
11 
 
 
actions.  Each provision is part of a coherent whole.  The bonds 
referenced in §§ 5 and 6 also serve a common purpose -- to deter 
frivolous lawsuits and compensate plaintiffs for the loss of the 
possession of the property -- and the waiver of bonds under 
either section is thus properly understood to be subject to the 
same standards. 
 
Instead of reading the provisions together, each of the 
parties attempts to isolate the provisions that serve their 
purposes and ignore those that do not.  We begin with the bank's 
argument that § 6 appeal bonds may not be waived.  The argument 
is essentially as follows:  "Section 6 contains no waiver 
provision.  In contrast, [§] 5(e) does contain a waiver 
provision.  The very existence of this material difference 
between the two statutes is dispositive."  This, of course, is 
oversimplified.  Section 5 provides the necessary context and 
structure for the application of § 6.  Section 6 is not a stand-
alone provision.  It only sets out the conditions for a 
particular type of appeal bond that is a subset of the cases 
described in § 5, and is subject to the procedures delineated in 
§ 5.  See Home Sav. Bank of Am., FSB v. Camillo, 45 Mass. App. 
Ct. 910, 911 (1998) ("Section 6 of c. 239 spells out what 
damages a bond shall protect in the case of a summary process 
action arising out of mortgage foreclosure.  It does not cause 
the procedures of § 5 to be inapplicable in such cases").  See 
12 
 
 
also U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Johnson, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 291, 
296-297 (2019) (Johnson) (postforeclosure mortgagor was entitled 
to have her motion to waive appeal bond under § 5 heard). 
Concluding otherwise -- that § 5 does not apply to § 6 -- 
would render § 6 unenforceable.  As mentioned supra, § 5 
provides an essential backdrop to § 6.8  Section 6 does not 
create any other procedures for appeal bonds besides how to 
establish the conditions of those bonds.  For example, § 6 has 
no provision allowing for the appeal from the amount of the 
bond, as is the case in § 5 (f), yet no one would deny that such 
an appeal is possible.  Section 6 instead relies on the 
procedures established in § 5, which apply to all summary 
process appeals, even those following foreclosures.  See Home 
Sav. Bank of Am., 45 Mass. App. Ct. at 911.  See also Johnson, 
96 Mass. App. Ct. at 294 & n.6. 
Because the provisions of § 5 apply to § 6, we conclude 
that the procedures for waiving a bond, as established by 
§ 5 (e), are also applicable to postforeclosure cases governed 
by § 6.  In reaching this conclusion, we stress that § 5 applies 
                                                 
8 It is § 5 (c) that requires appeal bonds in cases for the 
possession of the land or tenements, which includes 
postforeclosure summary process actions.  Without the 
requirement of these bonds in § 5 (c), the conditions of a bond 
as outlined in § 6 have no meaning.  See G. L. c. 239, § 5 (c) 
("the defendant shall, before any appeal under this section is 
allowed . . . give bond in a sum as the court orders"). 
13 
 
 
to many different types of appeal bonds and nothing in § 5 
limits its terms to landlord-tenant relationships.  More 
specifically, § 5 governs a litany of possession cases without 
any landlord-tenant relationship.  See Adjartey v. Central Div. 
of the Hous. Court Dep't, 481 Mass. 830, 834 n.7 (2019) 
(enumerating eight categories of persons who may initiate 
summary process evictions while admitting that, for simplicity's 
sake, courts "often refer to Housing Court plaintiffs as 
'landlords' and Housing Court defendants as 'tenants,'" but 
"these terms do not fully capture all of the individuals who 
initiate and defend against summary process evictions").  
Finally, § 5 (e) does not on its face prohibit parties in a 
postforeclosure summary process action from seeking a waiver.  
We therefore readily conclude that the bond-waiver provision of 
§ 5 applies to postforeclosure summary process appeals whose 
bond conditions are governed by § 6. 
c.  Use and occupancy upon waiver of the bond.  Having 
concluded that an appellant in a postforeclosure summary process 
action may seek a waiver of the bond under § 5, we must now 
determine whether a postforeclosure appellant for whom the bond 
has been waived may be ordered to make use and occupancy 
payments "as rent" pending his or her appeal.  We conclude that, 
pursuant to the statute, judges may order such parties to pay 
use and occupancy payments "as rent" under § 5 (e). 
14 
 
 
As discussed supra, G. L. c. 239, § 5 (e), requires the party 
for whom the "bond or security provided for in [§ 5 (c)] has 
been waived to pay in installments as the same becomes due, 
pending appeal, all or any portion of any rent which shall 
become due after the date of the waiver."  Thus, parties for 
whom the bond has been waived must pay, at least in part, rent 
in lieu of a bond.  The court in Kargman v. Dustin, 5 Mass. App. 
Ct. 101 (1977), emphasized the historical importance of this 
approach: 
"The requirement that rent becoming due pending resolution 
of an appeal be paid in lieu of bond as a condition of 
appeal remained in effect with minor changes for more than 
a hundred years.  In 1969, G. L. c. 239, § 5[,] was amended 
to permit the waiver of the bond requirement in the case of 
a tenant with insufficient funds.  St. 1969, c. 366.  Two 
years later, however, the Legislature added the present 
final sentence to § 5 which permits a judge, who has waived 
security, to require a tenant to pay 'all or any portion of 
any rent which shall become due' . . . as a condition of 
remaining in possession of the premises pending appeal.  
That addition would indicate that the Legislature, after 
providing for the waiver of bond in hardship cases, decided 
to redress an imbalance in summary process appeals to 
permit a judge, in the exercise of his [or her] sound 
discretion, to order payment of an appropriate portion of 
the rent as security." 
 
Id. at 109-110.  We agree with the reasoning of the court in 
Kargman and conclude that, under the statute, rent balances the 
interests of plaintiffs and defendants in summary process cases 
when defendants remain in possession.  Such rent is paid in two 
different scenarios:  either in lieu of a waived bond, or as 
part of a bond that is not waived.  Compare G. L. c. 239, 
15 
 
 
§§ 5 (c) (requiring bond to be conditioned to pay to plaintiff 
"all rent accrued at the date of the bond [and] all intervening 
rent") and 6 (requiring appeal bonds in postforeclosure actions 
to include "a reasonable amount as rent of the land"), with G. 
L. c. 239, § 5 (e) (requiring payment of "all or any portion of 
any rent which shall become due" when bond is waived).  Thus, 
the rent a court may require a party to pay under § 5 (e) is 
distinct from the bond required by § 5 (c) or 6, in that it is 
paid in lieu of that bond.  Regardless, however, both provisions 
are designed to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of 
possession of the land or tenements. 
The question then is whether the Legislature intended 
"rent" in § 5 (e) to refer only to situations where there is a 
classic landlord-tenant relationship requiring the payment of 
rent, as the defendant contends, such that no payments are owed 
by the defendant here, who had no rental agreement with the 
bank, or whether the Legislature instead intended the term 
"rent" in this context more broadly to encompass use and 
occupancy payments, which would include payments owed by 
defendants in possession to purchasers of foreclosed properties 
like the bank in this case.  For the reasons that follow, our 
interpretation of the statute supports the latter conclusion. 
 
First, § 5 (e) refers to "any rent," which embraces a broad 
interpretation of the word.  See Ali v. Federal Bur. of Prisons, 
16 
 
 
552 U.S. 214, 219 (2008)("[r]ead naturally, the word 'any' has 
an expansive meaning, that is, 'one or some indiscriminately of 
whatever kind'" [citation omitted]); Hollum v. Contributory 
Retirement Appeal Bd., 53 Mass. App. Ct. 220, 223 (2001) ("The 
word 'any' is generally used in the sense of 'all' or 'every' 
and its meaning is most comprehensive" [citation omitted]).  
When the Legislature referred to the amounts required to be paid 
under § 6 "as rent," it clearly intended these amounts to fall 
within the meaning of "any rent" under § 5 (e).  We have 
interpreted the Legislature's use of the same terminology in 
closely related provisions to reflect their intention that the 
words are meant to be the same.  See Commonwealth v. Felt, 466 
Mass. 316, 321 n.7 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Wynton W., 
459 Mass. 745, 747 (2011) ("Where the Legislature uses the same 
words in several sections which concern the same subject matter, 
the words 'must be presumed to have been used with the same 
meaning in each section'").  See also Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 
836, citing G. L. c. 239, §§ 5-6 (interpreting to "rent" portion 
of both § 5 and § 6 appeal bonds as "a sum of money for the use 
and occupancy of the premises while the appeal is pending"). 
Further, as discussed supra, G. L. c. 239, § 5, governs 
appeals in divers cases not limited to traditional landlord-
tenant relationships.  Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 834 n.7.  Thus, 
the term "rent" in § 5 (e) must be read expansively to apply to 
17 
 
 
other situations besides appeals in landlord-tenant summary 
process cases where rental agreements remain in place.  
Otherwise, we conclude, the Legislature would have explicitly 
limited the application of § 5 (e) to such landlord-tenant 
relationships.  It did not do so.9 
This conclusion also avoids an absurd interpretation of 
§§ 5 and 6.  See Commonwealth v. Peterson, 476 Mass. 163, 167 
(2017).  As discussed supra, we conclude today that a § 6 
defendant may have his or her appeal bond waived, but "[o]nly by 
resort to § 5 (e) [is the defendant] relieved of that statutory 
requirement."  Novastar Mtge. Inc. v. Saffran, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 
1119 (2013).  We therefore cannot, in the same breath, hold 
that, "[h]aving had the benefit of the § 5 (e) procedure . . . 
the burdensome portion of that provision (requiring installment 
                                                 
9 We reject the defendant's argument that the Legislature, 
by explicitly referencing in § 5 (e) "bond[s] or securit[ies] 
provided for in" § 5 (c), "explicitly referenced the [§]5 (c) 
bond as the only bond that was subject to the continuing 
installment of rents that shall become due," and therefore 
excludes bonds whose conditions are set pursuant to § 6.  This 
misreads the statute:  as discussed supra, § 5 (c) establishes 
the various requirements for appeal bonds in cases in which 
defendants remain in possession of land or tenements.  Without 
those requirements, the conditions of the bond in the appeal of 
a postforeclosure summary process action established in § 6 
would be unenforceable, as § 6 is not a stand-alone provision.  
Therefore, all bonds in this context -- even those whose 
conditions are set pursuant to § 6 -- are "bond[s] or 
securit[ies] provided for" in § 5 (c) for purposes of the waiver 
provision in § 5 (e). 
18 
 
 
payments for use and occupancy after the date of bond waiver, 
pending appeal) [is] inapplicable."  Id. 
The balancing of interests that the Legislature required in 
the landlord-tenant context also is clearly applicable to 
postforeclosure cases covered by § 6.  As this court stated 
recently:  "The Legislature has recognized that 'time lost in 
regaining [real property] from a party in illegal possession can 
represent an irreplaceable loss to the owner.'"  Davis v. 
Comerford, 483 Mass. 164, 180 (2019) (Comerford), quoting 
Commentary to Rule 1 of the Uniform Rules of Summary Process 
(1980).  See Kargman, 5 Mass. App. Ct. at 110 (legislative 
requirement to pay rent upon waiver of bond "redress[ed] an 
imbalance in summary process appeals").  Indeed, these ongoing 
payments may be even more vital given the greater complexity and 
higher stakes and thus lengthier litigation involved in 
postforeclosure summary process actions.  See, e.g., Federal 
Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Rego, 474 Mass. 329, 331-332 (2016); U.S. 
Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Schumacher, 467 Mass. 421, 423-425 (2014).  
As the amici point out, for subsequent purchasers of such 
property who are not banks, the burdens may be even greater.  
Finally, just as there are due process implications when a 
tenant remains in possession without paying rent, see Lindsey v. 
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 67 n.13 (1972), so too are there due 
process implications when a tenant at sufferance in the 
19 
 
 
postforeclosure context remains in possession without paying use 
and occupancy.  See Comerford, supra at 170 & n.14. 
The defendant attempts to counter all of these reasons with 
the difference between "as rent" and "any rent," contending that 
"'[a]s rent' is not rent" and § 5 (e) only applies to a 
conventional leasehold arrangement requiring the payment of 
rent.  We disagree.  If this distinction has any significance 
whatsoever, it reflects careful drafting by the Legislature to 
respect the technical difference between a tenancy at sufferance 
and a tenancy at will.  Although § 5 clearly applies to both 
types of arrangements, the Legislature may have referred to the 
amounts required to be paid pursuant to § 6 "as rent" to be 
respectful of the distinction between tenants at sufferance and 
tenants at will, while still requiring such payments to be made 
pursuant to § 5 (e).  As a tenant at sufferance is a more 
disfavored status than a tenant at will, and the payment of 
"rent" itself suggests a tenancy at will, the Legislature may 
have added the word "as" before rent to make clear that use and 
occupancy payments under § 6 are more precisely defined as the 
equivalent of rent rather than rent itself.  By describing the 
use and occupancy payments required by § 6 "as rent," the 
Legislature thus respects the technical distinctions between 
tenants at will and tenants at sufferance, and between rent and 
20 
 
 
use and occupancy payments, but still provides for the payment 
of use and occupancy under § 5 (e), which covers "any rent."10 
                                                 
10 A tenancy at sufferance exists when a mortgagor remains 
in possession of a premises on which the mortgagee has 
foreclosed, a legal principle long established by our case law, 
and is meant to refer to the requirement that the tenant at 
sufferance pay use and occupancy, as discussed infra.  See 
Cunningham v. Davis, 175 Mass. 213, 222 (1900) ("After the entry 
to foreclose, the mortgagor and those claiming under him became 
tenants at sufferance of the mortgagee . . ."); Kinsley v. Ames, 
2 Met. 29 (1840).  See also Georgia Driz, LLC vs. Spenlinhauer, 
2017 Mass. App. Div. 120 ("After a foreclosure, the mortgagor 
becomes a tenant at sufferance of the mortgagee").  In such 
cases, we have held, "[i]t is obvious that the defendant [is] a 
tenant at sufferance.  His original entry was lawful, but after 
a sale and the entry of the purchaser, he had a mere naked 
possession, without any right or interest whatever."  Kinsley, 
supra at 31. 
 
By contrast, "[a] tenant at will is one who, under the 
terms of a written lease agreement, continues in a tenancy as 
long as the parties mutually agree."  49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord 
and Tenant § 119 (2d. ed. Supp. 2020).  A tenancy at will is 
also created, however, if a landlord accepts rental payments 
without providing a written lease.  Staples v. Collins, 321 
Mass. 449, 451 (1947) ("tenancy at sufferance is readily changed 
into a tenancy at will," and "payment and acceptance of rent, 
standing alone, are prima facie proof of the creation of a 
tenancy at will").  Further, "[a] tenancy at will may be 
terminated at any time by the will of the parties" (quotations 
and citation omitted).  Davis v. Comerford, 483 Mass. 164, 166 
n.4 (2019) (Comerford).  "Because tenants at will remain in 
possession with their landlords' consent, their possession is 
lawful, but it is for no fixed term, and landlords can put them 
out of possession at any time."  49 Am. Jur. 2d, supra.  A 
tenant at sufferance, on the other hand, stays beyond the 
termination of the tenancy at will without the landlord's 
consent.  See Comerford, supra at 169 n.12. 
 
Although the Legislature has referred to the payments 
required by tenants at sufferance as rent, such payments are 
more properly described as use and occupancy payments.  
Comerford, 483 Mass. at 169 n.13 ("Although G. L. c. 186, § 3, 
refers to 'rent,' the term 'use and occupation' or 'use and 
21 
 
 
In evaluating what weight should to be given to these 
semantic differences, we also must recognize that the terms "use 
and occupancy" and "rent" have been closely linked in this 
context, and used nearly interchangeably.  See G. L. c. 186, § 3 
("Tenants at sufferance in possession of land or tenements shall 
be liable to pay rent therefor for such time as they may occupy 
or detain the same"); Ghoti Estates, Inc. v. Freda's Capri 
Restaurant, Inc., 332 Mass. 17, 26 (1954), citing G. L. c. 186, 
§ 3 (Ter. Ed.) ("tenant at sufferance was liable to pay for use 
and occupation for such time as it occupied the premises").  See 
also Comerford, 483 Mass. at 169 & n.13 (discussing 
interchangeable use of "rent" and "use and occupancy").  
Therefore, contrary to the defendant's argument, we conclude 
that the Legislature intended "any rent" in § 5 (e) to encompass 
the payment of use and occupancy "as rent" in § 6.  See Anderson 
v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh PA, 476 Mass. 377, 
381–382 (2017) ("All the words of a statute are to be given 
                                                 
occupancy' is typically used because a landlord's acceptance of 
'rent' from a tenant at sufferance otherwise might indicate that 
the parties wished to create a tenancy at will").  See Staples, 
321 Mass. at 451 (distinguishing "mere use and occupation for 
which a tenant at sufferance is made liable by G. L. [Ter. Ed.] 
c. 186, § 3, for such time only as he 'may occupy or detain' the 
land" from "payment and acceptance of rent" that may provide 
"prima facie proof of the creation of a tenancy at will").  Cf. 
Rubin v. Prescott, 362 Mass. 281, 285 (1972) (landlord's 
acceptance of "rent" payments that tenants at sufferance were 
"obligated to make" pursuant to G. L. c. 186, § 3, did not 
create tenancy at will). 
22 
 
 
their ordinary and usual meaning, and each clause or phrase is 
to be construed with reference to every other clause or phrase 
without giving undue emphasis to any one group of words, so 
that, if reasonably possible, all parts shall be construed as 
consistent with each other so as to form a harmonious enactment 
effectual to accomplish its manifest purpose" [quotation and 
citation omitted]). 
 
Because the provisions of § 5 (e) apply to defendants whose 
bond conditions are governed by § 6, and because payment of rent 
under § 5 (e) is paid in lieu of a bond, we conclude that courts 
may order postforeclosure mortgagors like the defendant to pay 
use and occupancy "as rent" to the purchaser of the premises 
during the pendency of their appeal when the mortgagor's bond 
has been waived.  Such an obligation is consistent with our case 
law and reflects a proper balancing of interests.11 
                                                 
11 Because the payment of rent under § 5 (e) is a 
requirement separate from the bond when the bond has been 
waived, as discussed supra, and because we conclude the use of 
the word "rent" in §§ 5 and 6 encompasses use and occupancy 
payments, the language in § 5 (e) prohibiting the court from 
requiring "any other payments" when a bond has been waived does 
not forbid the court from ordering use and occupancy payments 
for defendants under § 6, as the single justice in Bank of New 
York Mellon vs. Dundon, Mass. App. Ct., No. 2019-J-257 (July 17, 
2019), reasoned.  Given our analysis supra, the requirement to 
pay rent when there is a waiver under § 5 (e) does not present 
an all-or-nothing approach turning solely on whether there is a 
contract defining rent.  We therefore reject the defendant's 
argument and the single justice's interpretation of the statute. 
 
23 
 
 
d.  Reasonableness of payment ordered.  The defendant 
requests that, if we conclude that a postforeclosure defendant 
is liable to pay use and occupancy during his pending appeal, as 
we have done, this court establish parameters for such payments.  
We begin as we must with the statutory language itself:  G. L. 
c. 239, § 5 (e), provides that "[t]he court shall require any 
person for whom the bond or security provided for in [§ 5] (c) 
has been waived to pay . . . all or any portion of any rent 
which shall become due."  This language is relatively open-
ended, in that it provides for the payment of "all or any 
portion of any rent which shall become due," thereby providing 
for the exercise of discretion by the judge.  See Comerford, 483 
Mass. at 179; Kargman, 5 Mass. App. Ct. at 110 (judge may, "in 
the exercise of his [or her] sound discretion, . . . order 
payment of an appropriate portion of the rent as security").  In 
exercising that discretion, the court should attempt to achieve 
                                                 
Nor does the language of § 6 providing that, "[u]pon final 
judgment for the plaintiff, all money then due to him may be 
recovered in an action on the bond" change our analysis of the 
issue before us.  In this vein, we disagree with the conclusion 
in Bank of New York vs. Apollos, Mass. App. Div. 208 (Sept. 19, 
2008), where the court reasoned that, "[i]f the Legislature 
intended that periodic payments be made directly to a victorious 
plaintiff, there would be no need to mandate a separate action."  
This reasoning fails to acknowledge that use and occupancy 
payments are ordered in lieu of the bond.  If a bond has been 
waived, whereupon use and occupancy payments are ordered in its 
stead, there is no need to initiate an action to recover on the 
bond under § 6. 
24 
 
 
a fair balancing of both parties' interests.  Among the factors 
that the court may consider are the fair rental value of the 
property, the merits of the defense, the amount owed per month 
on the mortgage, the number of months that no money has been 
paid on the mortgage, the real estate taxes on the property, the 
expected duration of the litigation, and the respective 
financial conditions of the parties.12  See generally Comerford, 
supra at 179-182 (discussing factors for court to consider when 
exercising discretion in ordering use and occupancy payments in 
landlord-tenant summary process appeals). 
The statute also appears to provide for a de novo standard 
of review of the judge's G. L. c. 239, § 5 (e), order:  "The 
court receiving the request shall review the findings, the 
amount of bond or deposit, if any, and the amount of periodic 
payment required, if any, as if it were initially deciding the 
matter, and the court may withdraw or amend any finding or 
                                                 
12 We recognize that, after oral argument in this case, on 
April 20, 2020, the Legislature passed, and the Governor signed, 
emergency legislation governing foreclosures during the COVID-19 
pandemic.  That legislation establishes a time-defined 
"moratorium on evictions and foreclosures during the 
[G]overnor's COVID-19 emergency declaration."  St. 2020, c. 65 
(preamble).  Under that legislation, "[a] creditor or mortgagee 
shall grant a forbearance to a mortgagor of a mortgage loan for 
a residential property . . . if the mortgagor submits a request 
to the mortgagor's servicer affirming that the mortgagor has 
experienced a financial impact from COVID-19."  St. 2020, c. 65, 
§ 5 (b).  The instant case precedes this emergency legislation 
and is not covered by it. 
25 
 
 
reduce or rescind any amount of bond, deposit or periodic 
payment when in its judgment the facts so warrant."  G. L. 
c. 239, § 5 (f).  In reviewing the order, we will therefore 
likewise review for a fair balancing of interests, considering 
those same factors. 
While we seek to "avoid creating a 'monetary barrier' to an 
impecunious [defendant] with a potentially meritorious defense," 
Comerford, 483 Mass. at 182, a defendant who remains in 
possession after foreclosure is not entitled to remain on the 
property for nothing, even if he or she is indigent and even if 
he or she has a nonfrivolous defense.  See G. L. c. 239, 
§ 5 (c).  See also Jones v. Aciz, 109 R.I. 612, 632 (1972) 
("While we are mindful of the plight of the indigent we are also 
cognizant of the fact that the duty to care for the poor and the 
needy is on the state and not on the landlord").  Such a 
defendant is neither paying his or her mortgage and property 
taxes, nor the fair rental value of the property, but he or she 
is continuing to receive the benefit of possession of the 
property.  Instead, the cost of the mortgage, real estate taxes, 
and the loss of fair rental value are being imposed on the 
plaintiff still seeking to recover possession.  This is not the 
fair balancing of interests contemplated by the Legislature. 
We discern no error in the amount selected by the Housing 
Court judge in the present case.  The use and occupancy payment 
26 
 
 
that the judge required "as rent" was based on the fair market 
rental value of the property, which had a value of $1 million; 
took into account conditions-related defects, see Comerford, 483 
Mass. at 170; and was less than the principal and interest of 
the defendant's mortgage.13  The defendant had not paid any of 
his mortgage for twenty-one months before he was sent a letter 
in June 2017 notifying him of his ninety-day window to cure the 
default.  His failure to cure resulted in the foreclosure on the 
property in August 2018.  The real estate taxes on the property 
were also approximately $29,040 per year.  The defendant was 
clearly hopelessly over his head, and had been so for years.  
Although the judge required the payment of all and not a portion 
of the fair market rental value of the property, we discern no 
error in that choice.  The reality of the situation is such 
that, even assuming the defendant has a meritorious claim under 
Pinti, 472 Mass. at 236-237, if he cannot afford use and 
occupancy that amounts to less than his monthly mortgage payment 
-- an amount he has not been able to afford for years before 
this litigation commenced -- the bank will likely have no choice 
but to reinstate foreclosure proceedings.  See Federal Nat'l 
Mtge. Ass'n v. Marroquin, 477 Mass 82, 90 n.8 (2017) (despite 
defendant's successful claim under Pinti, supra, and void 
                                                 
13 In addition to the mortgage, the estimated tax on the 
property in this case amounts to $2,400 per month. 
27 
 
 
foreclosure sale, "[n]othing bars [the mortgagee] from 
reinitiating the foreclosure process with a notice of defaults 
that strictly complies with paragraph 22 of the mortgage").  In 
these circumstances, we conclude that there has been a fair 
balancing of interests. 
Conclusion.  A postforeclosure mortgagor may seek a waiver 
of an appeals bond under G. L. c. 239, § 5 (e), if he or she is 
indigent and has nonfrivolous claims on appeal.  The court 
shall, however, order, pursuant to § 5 (e), a postforeclosure 
mortgagor remaining in possession of the property to pay use and 
occupancy to the purchaser of the property "as rent" pending the 
appeal if his or her bond has been waived.  The amount of rent 
shall reflect a fair balancing of interests.  Such a fair 
balancing occurred here, where the amount of use and occupancy 
was based on the fair market rental value of the property and 
was less than the mortgage payments the defendant would have 
otherwise been required to make, and where those mortgage 
payments had not been paid for years, indicating foreclosure was 
inevitable even if the defendant had a meritorious defense.  For 
the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the Housing 
Court ordering the defendant to pay $4,000 per month in use and 
occupancy to the bank during the course of his appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.