Title: Smallwood v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 082228
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 5, 2009

Present:  Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and Millette, JJ., 
and Carrico and Russell, S.JJ. 
 
WILLIAM S. SMALLWOOD 
 
v.  Record No. 082228      OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
November 5, 2009 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
Following a bench trial upon an indictment charging 
possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a 
felony in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2, William S. Smallwood 
(“Smallwood”) was convicted and sentenced to five years’ 
imprisonment with three years suspended.  In this appeal, we 
consider whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient 
evidence to support Smallwood’s conviction. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
On or about July 27, 2007, Smallwood was driving a 
vehicle in Cumberland County, accompanied in the front 
passenger seat by Crystal B. Barnett (“Barnett”).  At 
approximately one o’clock in the morning, the vehicle was 
stopped pursuant to a “road check.”  Deputy Sheriff James F. 
Lampkin (“Deputy Lampkin”) testified that he approached the 
vehicle and “smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming from the 
vehicle.”  Deputy Lampkin had Smallwood pull over to the side 
of the road for further investigation.  Deputy Lampkin 
determined that Barnett was the one that had been drinking 
alcohol, and not Smallwood. 
 
Deputy Sheriff Michael Boggs (“Deputy Boggs”) approached 
the rear of the vehicle “for safety reasons.”  Deputy Boggs 
testified that he “shined [his] flashlight, and inside [he] 
saw a weapon that was in the console.”  It “[s]eemed to be a 
.38 revolver.”  Deputy Boggs described the vehicle as “small” 
and he testified that the “weapon was . . . right there in 
plain view.”  After Deputy Boggs alerted Deputy Lampkin to the 
weapon’s presence, Deputy Lampkin “got the weapon out, [and] 
put it on top of the car.”  Deputy Lampkin described the 
weapon as a “small .38 silver revolver.” 
 
Deputy Lampkin testified that the weapon was “in the 
console, between the console right beside [Smallwood’s] right 
leg.”  He further described the vehicle as “small” and the 
gun’s location as “an open console between the seats where you 
could just lay something, like a little section.  It was small 
in between two bucket seats.”  The firearm was not concealed. 
 
At the scene, Deputy Lampkin asked Smallwood about the 
firearm.  Deputy Lampkin testified that: 
[Smallwood] told me that he thought it was 
fine.  The gun was [Barnett’s] gun . . . and he 
thought it was fine as long as she was in the 
car, with the car; that it was her 
responsibility to have the gun with her; that 
it wouldn’t fall on him.   
 
 
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Following the deputies’ testimony, the Commonwealth 
introduced evidence of Smallwood’s two previous felony 
convictions.  The Commonwealth then rested its case and 
Smallwood moved to strike the evidence, arguing that the 
Commonwealth, in its proof of constructive possession, failed 
to show that Smallwood “actually had dominion and control over 
the weapon.”  The trial court denied the motion to strike, 
stating that “[w]hat the law requires is for a prima facie case 
he was aware of the presence and the character of the firearm 
and that it was subject to his dominion and control.  It 
doesn’t have to be exclusive possession.” 
 
Barnett then testified that she owned both the car and the 
firearm.  Barnett and Smallwood had been in the car “[p]robably 
around six, seven hours” and “[i]n that period of time the gun 
was in the console in plain view on the console that entire 
time.”  Barnett testified that she had placed the firearm in 
the console.  During their time in the vehicle, Barnett and 
Smallwood made stops and had gotten in and out of the vehicle. 
 
She testified that she had been drinking that evening and 
that was the reason why Smallwood was driving.  She testified 
that she did not tell Smallwood about the firearm and he did 
not “ever use it or touch it . . . in any way.”  The firearm 
was “in the console and it stayed there the whole time.” 
 
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Barnett testified that she normally kept the firearm in 
plain view on the console because she had applied for a 
concealed weapon permit but had not received one.  She 
testified that she has “always carried [the firearm] after 
[she] got assaulted.”  At the conclusion of Barnett’s 
testimony, the defense rested and renewed its motion to strike.  
The trial court again denied the motion. 
 
The trial court found Smallwood guilty of felony 
possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony 
in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2 and sentenced him to five 
years’ imprisonment with three years suspended.  Smallwood 
timely filed his notice of appeal.  The Court of Appeals, per 
curiam, denied his petition for appeal.  Smallwood timely filed 
his notice of appeal to this Court and we awarded an appeal on 
the following assignment of error: 
It was error for the Court of Appeals to fail 
to overturn the trial court ruling and the 
trial court erred in ruling that there was 
sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of 
one count of felony possession of a firearm 
after having been previously convicted of a 
felony. 
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Standard of Review 
 
“Under well-settled principles of appellate review, we 
consider the evidence presented at trial in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.”  
 
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Bolden v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144, 148, 654 S.E.2d 584, 586 
(2008).  “We also accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all 
inferences fairly deducible from the evidence.”  Riner v. 
Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296, 303, 601 S.E.2d 555, 558 (2004).  
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 
conviction, the Court will affirm the judgment unless the 
judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”  
Bolden, 275 Va. at 148, 654 S.E.2d at 586. 
B.  Constructive possession 
 
In this appeal we consider whether the evidence was 
sufficient to convict Smallwood under Code § 18.2-308.2.  
Smallwood argues that the “Commonwealth has only proven that 
Mr. Smallwood knew of the weapon’s presence and not that he 
exercised dominion and control over the firearm.”  However, 
Smallwood misapprehends established principles of constructive 
possession. 
 
Code § 18.2-308.2 provides in relevant part that “[i]t 
shall be unlawful for . . . any person who has been convicted 
of a felony . . . to knowingly and intentionally possess . . . 
any firearm.”  We first held that constructive — rather than 
actual — possession of contraband was sufficient to obtain a 
criminal conviction in Ritter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 732, 
741, 173 S.E.2d 799, 806 (1970).  Ritter involved the delivery 
to a mailbox “used by defendant and other members of his 
 
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family” of a package containing marijuana, the contents of 
which Ritter identified after the package was presented to 
him.  Id.  “When asked if the marijuana were his, Ritter 
responded:  ‘It must be mine, it’s got my name on it.’ ”  Id. 
at 742, 173 S.E.2d at 806. 
 
In Ritter, the Court outlined the guiding principles of 
the doctrine of constructive possession.  First, the Court 
noted that “it generally is necessary to show that [the] 
defendant was aware of the presence and character of the 
particular substance.”  Id. at 741, 173 S.E.2d at 805.  Next, 
the Court noted that possession may be joint:  “the possession 
need not always be exclusive.  The defendant may share it with 
one or more.”  Id., 173 S.E.2d at 806.  Finally, the Court 
held that “[t]he defendant may be shown to have had 
constructive possession by establishing that the drugs 
involved were subject to his dominion and control.”  Id. 
 
We cautioned that “the issue [of what constitutes 
constructive possession] is largely a factual one and must be 
established by evidence of the acts, declarations and conduct 
of the accused.”  Id. at 743, 173 S.E.2d at 807.  We held that 
“[w]hen [the package containing marijuana was] delivered by 
the postal authorities and deposited in the mailbox under the 
joint use and control of defendant and his family, it had 
 
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reached its destination, and defendant was then in 
constructive possession.”  Id. at 742, 173 S.E.2d at 807. 
 
Much more recently, in Bolden we affirmed the principles 
of constructive possession announced in Ritter. 
A conviction for the unlawful possession of a 
firearm can be supported exclusively by evidence 
of constructive possession; evidence of actual 
possession is not necessary.  To establish 
constructive possession of the firearm by a 
defendant, the Commonwealth must present evidence 
of acts, statements, or conduct by the defendant 
or other facts and circumstances proving that the 
defendant was aware of the presence and character 
of the firearm and that the firearm was subject 
to his dominion and control.  While the 
Commonwealth does not meet its burden of proof 
simply by showing the defendant’s proximity to 
the firearm, it is a circumstance probative of 
possession and may be considered as a factor in 
determining whether the defendant possessed the 
firearm. 
 
Bolden, 275 Va. at 148, 654 S.E.2d at 586 (citations and 
quotations omitted). 
 
When these principles are applied to the present case, it 
is clear there was sufficient evidence to support Smallwood’s 
conviction.  Smallwood’s own statements establish that he was 
aware of the presence and character of the firearm.  And even 
without his admission, it strains credulity that someone 
entering and exiting a small vehicle over a period of six or 
seven hours would fail to notice a “small .38 silver revolver” 
that was “in plain view.” 
 
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Smallwood argues that he “could not have exercised 
dominion and control over the gun when the gun was under the 
dominion and control of Ms. Barnett at all times.”  Further, 
Smallwood argues that “Barnett’s testimony excludes the 
possibility of joint possession” because “Smallwood never 
touched or manipulated the weapon in any way.” 
 
As we noted in Ritter, the issue of constructive 
possession “is largely a factual one and must be established 
by evidence of the acts, declarations and conduct of the 
accused.”  210 Va. at 743, 173 S.E.2d at 807.  According the 
Commonwealth the benefit of all inferences fairly deducible 
from the evidence, Bolden, 275 Va. at 148, 654 S.E.2d at 586, 
the record clearly supports the finding that the firearm in 
Barnett’s car was “subject to” Smallwood’s dominion and 
control. 
 
Both deputies described the vehicle as small.  Barnett 
acknowledged that the firearm was “in plain view” during the 
entire six or seven hours in which she and Smallwood occupied 
the vehicle.  The firearm rested on an open console “right 
beside [Smallwood’s] right leg.”  In an instant, Smallwood 
could have had actual, exclusive possession of the firearm and 
Smallwood’s access to the firearm was not restricted in any 
way. 
 
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While Barnett’s ownership of the firearm is relevant to 
the inquiry, it is not dispositive.  “Possession and not 
ownership is the vital issue.  Possession may be joint or 
several.  Two or more persons may be in possession where each 
has the power of control and intends to exercise control 
jointly.”  Burnette v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 785, 792, 75 
S.E.2d 482, 487 (1953). 
 
For the same reasons, Smallwood’s argument that the 
Commonwealth failed to exclude “all reasonable hypotheses of 
innocence” must fail.  “The statement that circumstantial 
evidence must exclude every reasonable theory of innocence is 
simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth has the 
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Commonwealth v. 
Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513, 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003). 
 
In a joint constructive possession case, the focus is on 
the “acts, statements, or conduct by the defendant or other 
facts and circumstances proving that the defendant was aware 
of the presence and character of the firearm and that the 
firearm was subject to his dominion and control.”  Bolden, 275 
Va. at 148, 654 S.E.2d 586 (emphasis added).  As in Bolden, 
here the contraband was “open and obvious to someone looking 
in the vehicle, and it was located in immediate proximity to 
where [the defendant] had been sitting.”  Id. at 149, 654 
S.E.2d at 586. 
 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to 
support Smallwood’s conviction under Code § 18.2-308.2 and we 
will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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