Title: Sanders v. State of Wis. Claims Bd.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2021AP000373
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 2023

2023 WI 60 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP373 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Derrick A. Sanders, 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin Claims Board, 
          Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 404 Wis. 2d 327, 978 N.W.2d 398 
(2022 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 30, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 19, 2023   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Stephen E. Ehlke   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., announced the mandate of the Court, 
and 
delivered 
an 
opinion, 
in 
which 
ZIEGLER, 
C.J., 
and 
ROGGENSACK, J., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring 
opinion.  KAROFSKY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Hannah S. Jurss, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by Colin T. Roth, assistant attorney general.  
 
For the petitioner-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Matthew Splitek and Quarles & Brady LLP, Madison. There was an 
oral argument by Matthew Splitek. 
 
 
2023 WI 60 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2021AP373 
(L.C. No. 
2020CV1016) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Derrick A. Sanders, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Claims Board, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 2023 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., announced the mandate of the Court, 
and 
delivered 
an 
opinion, 
in 
which 
ZIEGLER, 
C.J., 
and 
ROGGENSACK, J., joined.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring 
opinion.  KAROFSKY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   In 1992, Derrick A. 
Sanders and two others "severely beat[]" James.1  After the 
assault, Sanders's co-actors took James to another location.  
Sanders did not accompany them.  One of the co-actors shot James 
in the head, killing him.   
                                                 
1 James is a pseudonym.  We use it to preserve victim 
privacy.  See Wis. Stat. § 950.04(1v)(ag) (2021–22). 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Sanders 
twice 
pled 
no 
contest 
to 
first-degree 
intentional homicide as party to a crime; consequently, he spent 
about 26 years in prison.  He incorrectly believed the State 
could prove that charge even though he participated only in the 
assault.  The first plea was vacated in 1995.  The State brought 
the charge again, and Sanders entered the second plea.  In 2018, 
the second plea was vacated.   
¶3 
Months later, Sanders petitioned the State Claims 
Board for compensation, seeking over $5.7 million.  The Board 
awarded $25,000, the maximum under Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4) (2019–
20).2  Section 775.05(4) provides, in relevant part, "[i]f 
the . . . [B]oard 
finds 
that" 
$25,000 
"is 
not 
adequate 
compensation it shall submit a report specifying an amount which 
it considers adequate to the chief clerk of each house of the 
legislature[.]"  The Board did not find $25,000 inadequate; 
therefore, it did not submit a report.   
¶4 
Sanders sought judicial review, arguing the Board 
should have made a finding regarding the adequacy of $25,000.  
The circuit court rejected his argument, affirming the Board.3  
In a split decision, the court of appeals reversed.  Sanders v. 
State of Wis. Claims Bd., No. 2021AP373, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. June 9, 2022).  We granted review. 
                                                 
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent references to 
the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019–20 version. 
3 The Honorable Stephen E. Ehlke, Dane County Circuit Court, 
presided. 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
3 
 
¶5 
We reject Sanders's argument.  It is incompatible with 
the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4).  Section 775.05(4) 
requires the Board to submit a report in the event that the 
Board finds $25,000 inadequate.  The Board did not so find.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.4 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
¶6 
The governing statute requires the Board to use a 
multiple-step process when it receives a claim.  First, the 
Board must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine "either that 
the evidence is clear and convincing that the petitioner was 
innocent of the crime for which he . . . suffered imprisonment, 
or that the evidence is not clear and convincing that 
he . . . was 
innocent." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 775.05(3). 
 
"If 
the . . . [B]oard finds that the petitioner was innocent and 
that he . . . did not by his . . . act or failure to act 
contribute to bring about the conviction and imprisonment for 
which he . . . seeks compensation," the Board proceeds to 
address compensation.  § 775.05(4).   
                                                 
4 The court of appeals also suggested the Board engaged in 
improper ex parte communications with the Milwaukee County 
District Attorney's Office.  Sanders v. State of Wis. Claims 
Bd., No. 2021AP373, unpublished slip op., ¶48 (Wis. Ct. App. 
June 9, 2022).  It concluded the issue needed to be explored on 
remand.  Id.  The State asks us to resolve this issue.  Sanders 
does not develop an argument in response.  "An argument to which 
no response is made may be deemed conceded for purposes of 
appeal."  Waukesha County v. S.L.L., 2019 WI 66, ¶42, 387 
Wis. 2d 333, 929 N.W.2d 140 (Hoffman v. Econ. Preferred Ins., 
2000 WI App 22, ¶9, 232 Wis. 2d 53, 606 N.W.2d 590).  We do not 
address the ex parte communications issue because it has been 
abandoned. 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
4 
 
 
¶7 
As to compensation, the Board must first "find the 
amount which will equitably compensate the petitioner, not to 
exceed $25,000 and at a rate of compensation not greater than 
$5,000 per year for the imprisonment."  Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4).  
Second, "[i]f the . . . [B]oard finds that the amount it is able 
to award is not an adequate compensation it shall submit a 
report specifying an amount which it considers adequate to the 
chief clerk of each house of the legislature[.]"  Id. 
 
¶8 
In this case, the Board found Sanders was innocent of 
the crime for which he was imprisoned.  He did not participate 
in the murder——only the assault.  It also found he did not 
contribute to his conviction even though he twice pled no 
contest.  No party challenges these findings.  Sanders takes 
issue with the Board only for not making a finding regarding 
adequacy. 
 
¶9 
After the Board awarded Sanders $25,000, Sanders filed 
a petition for rehearing.  The Board, via its Chairman, denied 
the petition.  The denial letter explains: 
The . . . Board's decision clearly states that the 
[B]oard . . . voted 
to 
award 
compensation 
in 
the 
amount of $25,000.  Because the Board did not conclude 
that the amount which it was able to award was "not 
adequate compensation," it is not required to submit a 
report to the legislature "specifying an amount which 
it considers adequate."  Therefore, the absence of an 
explicit 
statement 
regarding 
the 
request 
for 
additional 
damages 
does 
not 
render 
the 
Board's 
decision incomplete. 
 
¶10 The circuit court affirmed the Board, noting Sanders 
did not cite any "administrative rule, policy, or prior practice 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
5 
 
that requires the Board to expressly address his additional 
damages claims in its final decision."  As the court continued:  
He relies solely on the final sentence of Wis. Stat. 
§ 775.05(4) . . . .  I find Sanders'[s] reliance on 
this portion of the statute unpersuasive. . . .  [T]he 
Board did not make a finding that $25,000 was 
inadequate compensation and it was therefore not 
required to take further action. 
Over one judge's dissent, the court of appeals reversed and 
remanded to the circuit court with directions to remand to the 
Board.  Sanders, No. 2021AP373, ¶1. 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW  
 
¶11 Sanders argues Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4) compels the 
Board to make a finding regarding adequacy.  The interpretation 
of a statute is a question of law subject to our independent 
review.  State v. Neill, 2020 WI 15, ¶14, 390 Wis. 2d 248, 938 
N.W.2d 521 (quoting State v. Hinkle, 2019 WI 96, ¶14, 389 
Wis. 2d 1, 935 N.W.2d 271). 
 
¶12 Our rejection of Sanders's interpretation triggers 
another issue:  Was the Board required to explain why it did not 
make a finding?  Our consideration of this issue turns on a 
question of statutory interpretation and accordingly is also 
subject to our independent review.  See id.  Specifically, Wis. 
Stat. § 775.05(5) authorizes judicial review only of the Board's 
"findings and the award," so we must determine the meaning of 
that phrase.  We assume, without deciding, that the first issue—
—whether the Board was required to make a finding——falls within 
the purview of § 775.05(5).  We conclude the Board is not so 
required; it has discretion.  Our assumption, however, does not 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
6 
 
extend to the Board's exercise, or non-exercise, of this 
discretion. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
 
¶13 In this court's seminal 2004 decision, State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, we confirmed textualism 
is the correct methodology for statutory interpretation.  2004 
WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Kalal is binding on 
"all 
Wisconsin 
courts"——indeed, 
it 
is 
"the 
most 
cited 
[Wisconsin] case of modern time[.]"  See Daniel R. Suhr, 
Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes, 100 Marq. L. Rev. 969, 969–70 
(2017); see also State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, ¶104 n.1, 273 
Wis. 2d 1, 681 
N.W.2d 203 (Sykes, J., concurring) ("[T]he 
principles of statutory interpretation articulated by this court 
in . . . Kalal . . . [cannot] be dismissed as mere 'spirited 
discussions' 
or 
'vigorous 
discussions' 
by 
'part 
of 
the 
court.' . . .  Needless to say, Kalal is binding precedent.").  
(emphasis added).  Under this well-established textualist 
methodology, we begin and end with a plain-meaning analysis of 
Wis. Stat. § 775.05 because its text is unambiguous.  See 
Enbridge Energy Co. v. Dane County, 2019 WI 78, ¶19, 387 
Wis. 2d 687, 929 N.W.2d 572 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶45).   
 
¶14 We interpret the relevant words of the statute in 
accordance with their "common and approved usage"; however, 
"technical words and phrases and others that have a peculiar 
meaning in the law" are "construed according to such meaning."  
See Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1).  To determine common and approved 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
7 
 
usage, we consult dictionaries.  See State v. McKellips, 2016 
WI 51, ¶32, 369 Wis. 2d 437, 881 N.W.2d 258 (citing State v. 
Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 499–500, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998)).  To 
determine the meaning of legal terms of art, we consult legal 
dictionaries.  State v. Schaefer, 2008 WI 25, ¶¶29–31, 308 
Wis. 2d 279, 746 N.W.2d 547 (consulting Black's Law Dictionary 
to determine the meaning of "discovery").   
¶15 We read the relevant words of the statute "in the 
context in which . . . [they] are used; not in isolation but as 
part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or 
closely-related statutes."  James v. Heinrich, 2021 WI 58, ¶20, 
397 Wis. 2d 517, 960 N.W.2d 350 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶46).  We also consider traditional canons of construction, 
which serve as "helpful, neutral guides" for our analysis.  Id., 
¶23 n.12 (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 61 (2012)). 
¶16 Lastly, we consider statutory history, which can be 
relevant to plain meaning.  Brey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 
2022 WI 7, ¶20, 400 Wis. 2d 417, 970 N.W.2d 1 (quoting James, 
397 Wis. 2d 517, ¶26); Wis. Stat. § 990.001(7) ("A revised 
statute is to be understood in the same sense as the original 
unless the change in language indicates a different meaning so 
clearly as to preclude judicial construction.  If the revision 
bill contains a note which says that the meaning of the statute 
to which the note relates is not changed by the revision, the 
note is indicative of the legislative intent.").   
 
¶17 Wisconsin Stat. § 775.05(4) states, in relevant part: 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
8 
 
[T]he claims board shall find the amount which will 
equitably compensate the petitioner, not to exceed 
$25,000 . . . .  If the claims board finds that the 
amount it is able to award is not an adequate 
compensation it shall submit a report specifying an 
amount which it considers adequate to the chief clerk 
of each house of the legislature[.] 
The key word in Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4) is "if."  As the State 
argues, "[t]his case presents a straight-forward statutory 
interpretation 
question 
that, 
at 
base, 
asks 
whether 
the 
[l]egislature actually means 'if' when it uses the word 'if.'"  
"If" means "[i]n the event that" or "[o]n the condition that[.]"  
if, The American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2011); see also 
if, Random House Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 1993) (defining 
"if" as "in case that" or "on condition that"); if, Funk & 
Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language (1923) 
(defining "if" as "provided or on condition that").  For 
example, consider the hit song, "If You Leave," which includes 
the following lyrics:  "if you leave, don't look back."  
Orchestral Manoeuvres in the Dark, If You Leave (A&M 1986).  
These lyrics are not an unconditional command to never look 
back; rather, they state a directive applicable upon the 
fulfillment of the "if" condition, which may never be satisfied.  
See Wisconsin Bill Drafting Manual § 2.08(2) (2023–24) ("If you 
are expressing a condition that may never occur, use 'if' to 
introduce the condition, not 'when' or 'where.'").  The 
directive, "don't look back," is simply irrelevant unless "you" 
left.  The lyrics are also not a command to decide whether to 
leave. 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
9 
 
 
¶18 Applying these definitions, Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4) 
requires the Board to submit a report "in the event that" or "on 
the condition that" the Board finds $25,000 inadequate.  The 
Board did not so find.  As noted in the letter denying the 
petition for rehearing, "the Board did not conclude that the 
amount 
which 
it 
was 
able 
to 
award 
was 
'not 
adequate 
compensation[.]'" 
 
¶19 In 
contrast 
to 
the 
structure 
of 
the 
preceding 
subsection, Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4) does not command the Board to 
make a finding regarding the adequacy of $25,000.  The "whole-
text canon" instructs "interpreter[s] to consider the entire 
text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical 
relation of its many parts."   Brey, 400 Wis. 2d 417, ¶13 
(quoting Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 167).  The language of 
§ 775.05(4) is notably distinct from § 775.05(3), which states:  
"the . . . [B]oard shall find either that the evidence is clear 
and convincing that the petitioner was innocent of the crime for 
which he . . . suffered imprisonment, or that the evidence is 
not clear and convincing that he . . . was innocent."  The 
legislature could have used similar language in § 775.05(4) but 
did not.  The differences between the two subsections inform our 
analysis. 
¶20 Wisconsin Stat. § 775.11(3) similarly informs our 
analysis.  The statute is closely related because it appears in 
the same chapter of the Wisconsin Statutes.  State v. Reyes 
Fuerte, 2017 WI 104, ¶27, 378 Wis. 2d 504, 904 N.W.2d 773 
(citing City of Janesville v. CC Midwest, Inc., 2007 WI 93, ¶24, 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
10 
 
302 Wis. 2d 599, 734 N.W.2d 428).  For context, § 775.11(1) 
provides:  "Any state employee against whom charges are filed 
under . . . [Wis. Stat. §] 940.29, and who is subsequently found 
not guilty, shall be reimbursed by the state for reasonable 
attorney fees and costs in defending such action."  Subsection 
(3) declares:  "On receipt of such a claim the . . . [B]oard 
shall determine whether the claim is authorized by this section 
and if so shall determine the amount of attorney fees and costs 
incurred and shall allow such attorney fees and costs as in its 
judgment are reasonable."  Effectively, Sanders would have us 
rewrite Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4) with language parallel to 
§ 775.11(3).  Specifically, Sanders presses an interpretation of 
§ 775.05(4) that would require the Board to determine whether 
the amount it is able to award is not an adequate compensation, 
and if so, to submit a report to the legislature.  The statute, 
however, does not say this, and "[i]t is not up to the courts to 
rewrite the plain words of statutes[.]"  Neill, 390 Wis. 2d 248, 
¶23 
(quoting 
State 
v. 
Wiedmeyer, 
2016 
WI App 46, 
370 
Wis. 2d 187, 
881 
N.W.2d 805) 
(second 
modification 
in 
the 
original).  "Rather, we interpret the words the legislature 
actually enacted into law."  Id. (quoting State v. Fitzgerald, 
2019 WI 69, ¶30, 387 Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165). 
¶21 Sanders does not reconcile his interpretation with 
Wis. Stats. §§ 775.05(3) or 775.11(3) and even acknowledges, "it 
is 
true" 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 775.05(4) 
"does 
not . . . specifically direct the Board to determine whether its 
award is 'adequate.'"  He claims, however, a fair reading of 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
11 
 
§ 775.05(4) necessarily implies this direction.  He first claims 
two words are materially the same:  "equitably" and "adequate."  
Recall that the Board, before the report issue is even reached, 
must "find the amount which will equitably compensate the 
petitioner, not to exceed $25,000[.]"  § 775.05(4) (emphasis 
added).  Then, "[i]f the . . . [B]oard finds that the amount it 
is able to award is not an adequate compensation it shall submit 
a report[.]"  Id. (emphasis added).  Conflating the two words, 
Sanders argues:  "the Board cannot 'find the amount which will 
equitably compensate' an exoneree without determining whether 
such an amount is adequate equitable compensation.  The two 
questions [1] whether an amount is 'the amount which will 
equitably compensate the petitioner' and [2] whether the same is 
'an adequate compensation' are indistinct." 
 
¶22 The problem with this reasoning is twofold.  First, we 
normally 
"presume . . . different 
words 
have 
different 
meanings."  Parsons v. Assoc. Banc-Corp., 2017 WI 37, ¶26, 374 
Wis. 2d 513, 893 N.W.2d 212 (quoting Pawlowski v. Am. Fam. Mut. 
Ins., 2009 WI 105, ¶22, 322 Wis. 2d 21, 777 N.W.2d 67).  The 
"presumption of consistent usage" canon holds, "[a] word or 
phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text; a 
material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning."  
Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 170.  Sanders's argument 
relies, by his own admission, on "equitably" and "adequate" 
being "indistinct."  Second, under the "surplusage" canon 
"[s]tatutory language is read where possible to give reasonable 
effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  James, 397 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
12 
 
Wis. 2d 517, ¶21 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46; citing 
Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 174).  As the State argues: 
[I]f "equitably compensate" were the same as "adequate 
compensation," then how could the . . . Board ever 
simultaneously determine that an amount within the 
statutory 
maximum 
is 
indeed 
"equitabl[e] 
compensat[ion] (as it is required to do . . . ) while 
also choosing to affirmatively find that the amount it 
awarded as "equitabl[e] compensate[ion]" was "not an 
adequate compensation" and submit a report?  Put 
differently, if the inquiries were one-and-the-same, 
then the . . . Board's submitting a report to the 
[l]egislature would necessarily mean that its award 
was not "equitabl[e] compensat[ion]."   
Under 
Sanders's 
interpretation, 
the 
Board's 
initial 
determination 
that 
the 
statutory 
maximum 
is 
"equitable 
compensation"——and, inherently, adequate——effectively prevents 
it from ever concluding that amount is inadequate.  For this 
reason, Sanders cannot overcome the presumption that different 
words have different meanings. 
 
¶23 Sanders also misunderstands the "predicate act" canon, 
which holds, "[a]uthorization of an act also authorizes a 
necessary predicate act."  Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 192.  
For example, "permission to harvest the wheat on one's land 
implies permission to enter the land for that purpose."  Id.  
According to Sanders: 
The final sentence of . . . [Wis. Stat. §] 775.05(4) 
tells the Board what it must do "if" it finds that 
"the amount it is able to award is not an adequate 
compensation." . . .  [A] necessary predicate of the 
Board's 
making——or 
even 
declining 
to 
make——that 
finding is a prior determination whether the Board's 
award is adequate. 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
13 
 
Problematically for Sanders, no one suggests the Board is not 
authorized to make a finding regarding adequacy.  Sanders would 
turn authorization into a command.  For this reason, the canon 
does not aid his proffered interpretation.  As Sanders candidly 
concedes, the canon is "not on all fours."  
 
¶24 Lastly, Sanders advances an unpersuasive statutory-
history argument.  In 1913, the legislature enacted the 
following: 
If the board shall find that the petitioner was 
innocent of the crime or offense for which he has 
suffered imprisonment, and that he did not by his act 
or failure to act contribute to bring about the 
conviction 
and 
imprisonment 
for 
which 
he 
seeks 
compensation, the board shall proceed to find the 
amount which will compensate the petitioner for his 
wrongful imprisonment.  Such board may award a 
compensation to the petitioner so found innocent of 
not to exceed five thousand dollars in any case, and 
at a rate of compensation not greater than fifteen 
hundred dollars per year for the imprisonment so 
unjustly suffered.  If the board shall find that the 
amount they may be able to award will not be an 
adequate compensation to the petitioner they shall 
report an amount to the legislature which they shall 
deem 
to 
be 
adequate 
and 
shall 
recommend 
the 
appropriation by the legislature to the petitioner of 
the amount in excess of the amount they may have 
awarded. 
§ 4, ch. 189, Laws of 1913 (emphasis added).      
 
¶25 Sanders 
construes 
relevant 
amendments 
as 
merely 
stylistic, suggesting we should infer the plain meaning of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 775.05(4) 
by 
considering 
the 
language 
of 
its 
predecessor.  In his view, the predecessor board (a different 
entity than the Board) was first required to find the total 
amount of money the petitioner would need to be compensated——
No. 
2021AP373   
 
14 
 
without regard to a statutory maximum.  If the amount needed 
were more than the statutory maximum, that amount, he claims, 
would be necessarily inadequate, thereby requiring a finding and 
report. 
 
¶26 The 1913 statute did not require the board to make a 
finding 
regarding 
the 
adequacy 
of 
the 
statutory 
maximum 
compensation.  It used conditional language, like the current 
statute.  In this case, statutory history does not affect our 
plain-meaning analysis. 
 
¶27 Next, we consider whether the Board was required to 
explain why it did not make a finding regarding adequacy.  
Sanders is entitled to judicial review under Wis. Stat. ch. 227, 
which governs administrative procedures and review; however, 
Wis. Stat. § 227.03(5) provides, "[t]his chapter does not apply 
to proceedings of the . . . [B]oard, except as provided in [Wis. 
Stats. §§] 775.05(5), 775.06(7) and 775.11(2)."  We therefore 
examine § 775.05(5), the only applicable statute among the 
enumerated exceptions. 
 
¶28 Wisconsin Stat. § 775.05(5) does not subject all 
aspects of the Board's decision-making process to judicial 
review; rather, it states:  "The . . . [B]oard shall keep a 
complete record of its proceedings in each case and of all the 
evidence.  The findings and the award of the . . . [B]oard shall 
be subject to review as provided in ch. 227."  Section 775.05(5) 
states 
an 
exception 
to 
the 
general 
exclusion 
of 
Board 
proceedings articulated in Wis. Stat. § 227.03(5).  Under that 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
15 
 
exception, we may review only the Board's "findings" and "the 
award."   
¶29 As used in Wis. Stat. § 775.05(5), "findings" is a 
legal term of art——it is a "word[]" with "a peculiar meaning in 
the law[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1).  "Findings" is synonymous 
with "finding[s] of fact."  finding, Black's Law Dictionary 
(11th ed. 2019).  A "finding of fact" is "[a] determination by a 
judge, jury, or administrative agency of a fact supported by the 
evidence in the record[.]"  Id. at finding of fact; see also 
finding of fact, Mellinkoff's Dictionary of American Legal Usage 
(1992) ("[A] determination by the jury, or by a judge in a case 
tried without a jury, that the evidence proves that something is 
a fact.").  For example, the phrase "finding of fact" is used 
appropriately in the following sentence:  "[H]e agreed with the 
jury's finding of fact that the driver did not stop before 
proceeding into the intersection[.]"  finding of fact, Black's 
Law Dictionary.  A "finding of fact" is capable of being 
reviewed on appeal to determine whether "substantial evidence in 
the record" supports its validity.  See Wis. Stat. § 227.57(6).   
¶30 Although the word "finding" is sometimes used in an 
informal manner to refer to non-factual determinations, the word 
was not so used in Wis. Stat. § 775.05(5).  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 775.06 is a closely-related statute; it appears in the "same 
chapter" (indeed, it immediately follows § 775.05), and it uses 
"similar terms."  See Reyes Fuerte, 378 Wis. 2d 504, ¶27 (citing 
CC Midwest, Inc., 302 Wis. 2d 599, ¶24).  Additionally, Wis. 
Stat. § 227.03(5) cross-references both statutes as exceptions 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
16 
 
to the general exclusion of Board proceedings from judicial 
review.  Cf. id. (explaining statutes are closely related if one 
references the other (citing CC Midwest, Inc., 302 Wis. 2d 599, 
¶24)).  For context, § 775.06(1) provides:   
The . . . [B]oard 
shall 
hear 
petitions 
from 
law 
enforcement officers employed by the state who have 
judgments against them for damages caused while in 
their line of duty where they acted in good faith and 
who have incurred charges for counsel fees and costs 
in defending said action.   
Subsection (7) says:  "The . . . [B]oard shall keep a complete 
record of its proceedings in each case and of all the evidence.  
The findings, conclusions, determination and award shall be 
subject to review as provided in ch. 227."  Under the surplusage 
canon, discussed above, "findings" is not synonymous with 
"conclusions" 
or 
the 
"determination." 
 
See 
James, 
397 
Wis. 2d 517, ¶21 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46; citing 
Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 174).  While § 775.06(7) 
authorizes 
judicial 
review 
of 
"conclusions" 
and 
the 
"determination," § 775.05(5) does not.  Section 775.05(5) is 
narrower in scope, indicating "findings" is used in its formal, 
legal sense. 
 
¶31 Under the text of Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4), "the award" 
is the "[c]ompensation awarded" by the Board.  The report is not 
a part of "the award," because the statute provides for the 
filing of a report if "the amount" the Board is "able to award 
is not an adequate compensation."  § 775.05(4); see also Wis. 
Stat. § 20.505(4)(d) ("A sum sufficient for payments of award 
made by the . . . [B]oard . . . under . . . [§] 775.05(4)[.]"). 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
17 
 
 
¶32 We conclude the Board's decision not to make a non-
required finding regarding adequacy is not a "finding" in the 
legal sense of the word as used in the statute.   See Wis. Stat. 
§ 775.05(5).  It is not possible to apply a substantial evidence 
standard to the Board's exercise or non-exercise of its 
discretion because the Board did not determine the truth or 
falsity of a fact in declining to make a finding regarding 
adequacy.  Additionally, this exercise or non-exercise of 
discretion does not impact "the award"——only whether to submit a 
report, which is not a part of "the award[.]"  See id.  
Accordingly, the Board's exercise or non-exercise of its 
discretion in this regard is not subject to judicial review.   
IV.  THE CONCURRENCE 
 
¶33 The concurrence author does not join any part of our 
opinion——not even those portions with which he agrees.  "[I]t is 
this court's function to develop and clarify the law."  State ex 
rel. Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 436, 424 
N.W.2d 385 (Wis. 1988) (citations omitted).  Without cause, the 
concurrence author deprives the people of precedent on a novel 
issue, preferring instead to act as a court of one.   
 
¶34 The concurrence discusses only two portions of our 
opinion in explaining the author's decision to deny this opinion 
precedential value.  First, the concurrence discusses the 
meaning of the word "findings."  According to the concurrence, 
our opinion "reaches beyond the issues raised by the parties and 
addresses the reviewability of findings in this statutory 
scheme."  Concurrence, ¶50.  The concurrence is wrong. 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
18 
 
 
¶35 Sanders argued, "[r]eversal and remand are necessary 
so the Board can exercise its discretion."  He claims, like the 
dissent, that the Board erroneously exercised its discretion by 
not documenting its decision-making process.  In response, the 
Board argues certain aspects of its decision making are not 
subject to judicial review.  Specifically, it argues a court may 
review only:  "(1) its decision about whether a claimant has 
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that he was 
innocent . . . ; and (2) its decision about the amount of 
equitable compensation, not to exceed $25,000." 
 
¶36 Although we adopt a slightly different rationale than 
the Board's argument, any suggestion that we have deviated 
significantly from the parties' presentation of this case is 
false.  The concurrence misunderstands either the parties' 
arguments or the party presentation principle.  Regardless, 
"[w]e sit here to decide the law as we find it, and not as the 
parties or others may have supposed it to be."  Wis. Jud. Comm'n 
v. Woldt, 2021 WI 73, ¶66, 398 Wis. 2d 482, 961 N.W.2d 854 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring/dissenting) (quoting 
Ross v. Bd. of Outagamie Cnty. Supervisors, 12 Wis. 26, 44 
(1860) (Dixon, C.J., dissenting)).  "In a legal system in which 
appellate opinions not only establish the meaning of law, but do 
so through precedent that binds future litigants, courts cannot 
cede to the parties control over legal analysis."  St. Augustine 
Sch. v. Taylor, 2021 WI 70, ¶103, 398 Wis. 2d 92, 961 N.W.2d 635 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (quoting Amanda Frost, 
The Limits of Advocacy, 59 Duke L.J. 447, 453 (2009)).  This 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
19 
 
court has a duty to independently research, analyze, and 
interpret the law on behalf of the nearly 6 million people of 
Wisconsin.  See State v. Alexander, 2015 WI 6, ¶83, 360 
Wis. 2d 292, 858 N.W.2d 662 (Gableman, J., concurring) ("[I]t is 
axiomatic that this court is not bound by the issues presented 
or the arguments made by the parties.").   
¶37 Strict application of the party presentation principle 
is especially unsuited for the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  This 
court is not a lower court; it serves a law-developing function.  
State v. Grawien, 123 Wis. 2d 428, 432, 367 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 
1985) ("The Wisconsin Supreme Court, unlike the court of 
appeals, has been designated by the constitution and the 
legislature as a law-declaring court.  While the court of 
appeals 
also 
serves 
a 
law-declaring 
function, 
such 
pronouncements should not occur in cases of great moment."  
(internal citation omitted)); see also State v. Herrmann, 2015 
WI 84, ¶154, 364 Wis. 2d 336, 867 N.W.2d 772 (Ziegler, J., 
concurring) ("Unlike a circuit court or the court of appeals, 
the supreme court serves a law development purpose[.]").  The 
concurrence's application of this non-binding principle would 
turn this court into a circuit court, "consign[ing] the state's 
highest court to selecting winners and losers in litigation 
rather than declaring law."  St. Augustine Sch., 398 Wis. 2d 92, 
¶105. 
 
¶38 Ironically, the concurrence deviates from the party 
presentation principle in this very case.  As the dissent points 
out, the Board "concede[d]"——in very explicit terms——that it 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
20 
 
should lose under the 1913 statute.  See dissent, ¶71.  Under a 
strict application of the party presentation principle, Sanders 
should prevail unless we are willing to declare that subsequent 
amendments were substantive.  Recognizing the Board's error, the 
concurrence 
properly 
deviates 
from 
the 
principle. 
 
The 
concurrence author has deviated from the principle in other 
cases as well.  See, e.g., 5 Walworth, LLC v. Engerman 
Contracting, Inc., 2023 WI 51, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ 
(overruling a decision of this court even though no party asked 
this court to do so); Friends of Frame Park, U.A. v. City of 
Waukesha, 
2022 
WI 57, 
402 
Wis. 2d 1, 
976 
N.W.2d 263 
(majority/lead op.) (adopting an argument neither party advanced 
in order to overrule a long line of court of appeals decisions).   
 
¶39 The 
concurrence's 
claim 
that 
the 
definition 
of 
"findings" is unnecessary to resolve this case is also difficult 
to follow.  Concurrence, ¶50.  The concurrence appears to agree 
the Board has discretion to make or not make a finding.  
Discretionary decisions typically are subject to judicial 
review.  Accordingly, some discussion as to why this particular 
exercise of discretion is not subject to review is warranted, 
particularly because Sanders argues the Board erroneously 
exercised its discretion.   
 
¶40 The concurrence also declines to join this opinion's 
critique of the dissent.  The concurrence declares the dissent's 
analysis is a "well-reasoned, good-faith reading of the statute" 
ostensibly not rooted in "public policy."  Id., ¶52.  The 
concurrence does not, however, explain why the dissent is wrong 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
21 
 
or address the irrelevancy of the dissent drawing comparisons 
between the amount of compensation available under Wisconsin's 
law versus other states' statutes.  The dissenters believe 
policy is a legitimate consideration in conducting a statutory 
analysis.  In other cases, the dissenters have quite clearly 
advocated for a so-called "holistic approach" to statutory 
interpretation.  See, e.g., Clean Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 2021 WI 71, 
¶41, 398 Wis. 2d 386, 961 N.W.2d 346 (Dallet, J., concurring).  
The dissent's focus on, for example, the amount of compensation 
available in New Hampshire to the wrongfully convicted makes 
much more sense in the context of the dissenters' other separate 
writings. 
 
See 
dissent, 
¶56 
n.1. 
 
The 
concurrence's 
unwillingness to critique an anti-textual analysis does not.  
 
¶41 On a final note, the concurrence characterizes our 
response as "overly emphatic[.]"  Concurrence, ¶51.  If the 
concurrence means to suggest our analysis of important legal 
issues is thorough, we take it as a compliment.  If the 
concurrence disagrees on the legal principles presented, we 
would welcome a discourse but the concurrence does not cite any 
law or even secondary sources to support its position.   
V.  THE DISSENT 
 
¶42 The 
dissent 
would 
hold 
the 
Board 
is 
"require[d] . . . to make an adequacy determination when the 
Board awards the $25,000 maximum despite a wrongly imprisoned 
petitioner's request for more."  Dissent, ¶55.  Alternatively, 
for the sake of argument, the dissent would hold, "[t]he choice 
to refrain from determining adequacy is . . . a discretionary 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
22 
 
choice."  Id., ¶75.  Either way, the dissent faults the Board 
for not "document[ing] and explain[ing]" its decision.  Id., 
¶76. 
 
¶43 The dissent's conclusions are grounded in public 
policy, 
not 
law. 
 
The 
dissent 
begins 
with 
what 
it 
mischaracterizes 
as 
"context" 
for 
"determin[ing] 
whether . . . [the Board] fulfilled its statutory duty in 
Sanders' case."  Id., ¶58.  The dissent derives "context" not 
from the statutory text but from its own policy preferences.  
The dissent's "context" consists of the following complaint:  
"Wisconsin is lagging far behind" the other 38 states that have 
created compensation schemes for the wrongfully convicted.  Id., 
¶56 (citation omitted).  Wisconsin "currently has the lowest per 
year compensation cap at $5,000 and the second lowest total 
compensation cap at $25,000."  Id. (citation omitted).  "Only 
New Hampshire's total compensation cap is lower, at $20,000."  
Id., ¶56 n.1 (citation omitted).  "The difference between 
Wisconsin's cap and those in other states is significant."  Id., 
¶57.  The dissent then imbues its interpretation of the 
statutory text with its subjective view of "common sense," but 
unambiguous statutes are not empty vessels to be filled with 
judicial sensibilities.  See id., ¶¶69, 81.  In claiming the 
court's analysis will "shield[] the Board from [judicial] 
review," "incentivize[]" the Board to act unscrupulously, and 
"allow[] the Board to add insult to injury," the dissent makes a 
policy argument about what the statute should say, not a 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
23 
 
textualist argument about what the statute actually says.  See 
id., ¶¶81 n.8, 85.   
 
¶44 Although the dissent's public policy discussion is 
interesting, it has no relevance to the legal questions 
presented in this case, regardless of the number of years 
Sanders spent in prison.  Courts decide what the law is, not 
what it should be.  In the course of executing this judicial 
function, we neither endorse nor condemn the legislature's 
policy choices.   
¶45 Following the dissent's policy discussion, it commits 
multiple analytical errors in interpreting the statutory text.  
First, it conflates the Board's mandatory duty to submit a 
report upon a finding of inadequacy with a non-existent duty to 
make a finding regarding adequacy.  Repeatedly, the dissent 
emphasizes the statute uses "mandatory language"——"it shall 
submit a report"——but the dissent overlooks the conditional 
nature of the words preceding the mandatory language.  See, 
e.g., id., ¶¶54, 67.  The mandatory language becomes operative 
only if the condition——a finding of inadequacy——is fulfilled.   
¶46 Second, the dissent interprets the word "findings" 
beyond its generally accepted legal meaning: 
"[F]inding" is often used . . . to mean a decision or 
a 
determination. 
 
See 
Find, 
American 
Heritage 
Dictionary (5th ed. 2022) ("To come to a legal 
decision or verdict.").  Wisconsin Stat. § 775.05 uses 
"find" in this general sense . . . .  As such, there 
is no indication in the statute that the word 
"finding" in . . . § 775.05(5) was meant in a limited 
sense to exclude some types of decisions, rather than 
No. 
2021AP373   
 
24 
 
as 
a 
general 
synonym 
for 
"decision" 
or 
"determination." 
Id., ¶27.  As a preliminary matter, the dissent incorrectly 
cites a non-legal dictionary for a legal definition.  Legal 
precision favors using legal dictionaries for defining legal 
concepts embedded in laws.  Additionally, the legislature 
generally does not use "synonyms."  See Wisconsin Bill Drafting 
Manual, § 2.04(5) ("Avoid using synonyms.  Use different words 
for different meanings and the same word when the same meaning 
is intended.").  By interpreting "finding" to be synonymous with 
various other phrases, the dissent would subject all aspects of 
the Board's decision making to judicial review.  In so doing, 
the dissent's interpretation effectively amends Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.03(5) as follows:  "This chapter does not apply to 
proceedings of the . . . [B]oard, except as for claims filed 
under provided in" § 775.05.  We do not have the power the 
dissent would usurp from the legislature. 
¶47 Lastly, the dissent suggests Wis. Stat. § 775.06 is 
not a closely-related statute because it references "findings, 
conclusions, determination, and award," whereas Wis. Stat. 
§ § 775.05(5) uses only the phrase "findings and the award[.]"  
See dissent, ¶80 n.7.  If the dissent's view were correct, few 
if any statutes would be closely related, and we would interpret 
a statute "in isolation[.]"  James, 397 Wis. 2d 517, ¶20 
(quoting 
Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
¶46). 
 
This 
court 
has 
repeatedly rejected such a cramped construction of statutes.  
Id. (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46).  
No. 
2021AP373   
 
25 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
¶48 The people have not given this court the power to 
"second-guess" the legislature's policy choices.  Johnson v. 
WEC, 2021 WI 87, ¶3, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469.  "Judicial 
deference to the policy choices enacted into law by the 
legislature 
requires 
that 
statutory 
interpretation 
focus 
primarily on the language of the statute."  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
¶44. 
 
"While textualism cannot 
prevent 
the 
incursion 
of 
policy 
preferences 
into 
legal 
analysis . . . without textualism, 
such 
encroachment 
is 
certain."   Friends of Frame Park, U.A. v. City of Waukesha, 
2022 WI 57, ¶96, 403 Wis. 2d 1, 976 N.W.2d 263 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J., concurring) (quoting Woldt, 398 Wis. 2d 482, ¶92).  
The court of appeals majority "grafted onto . . . [Wis. Stat. 
§ 775.05(4)] a process the legislature has not sanctioned"; 
accordingly, its conclusions——and the dissent's——"are contrary 
to 
policy 
choices 
made 
by 
the 
legislature." 
 
Sanders, 
No. 2021AP373, ¶56 (Fitzpatrick, J., dissenting) (citing Mayo v. 
Wis. Injured Patients & Fams. Comp. Fund., 2018 WI 78, ¶¶26, 40, 
383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678). 
 
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.
No.  2021AP373.bh 
 
1 
 
¶49 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  After the Claims 
Board awarded Derrick Sanders the statutory maximum of $25,000, 
Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4) required the Board to submit a report to 
the legislature if the Board found the award inadequate.  No 
report was submitted.  Sanders maintains the Board erred because 
it did not explain why the award to Sanders was adequate.  The 
statute is only triggered, however, if the Board finds the 
amount of the award inadequate.  If the Board does not find the 
amount inadequate, there is no statutory mandate to explain why 
it decided against making a finding that § 775.05 does not 
require the Board to make.  I agree with the lead opinion's 
statutory analysis explaining why this is so, reasoning that 
largely mirrors Judge Fitzpatrick's dissent at the court of 
appeals. 
¶50 The lead opinion goes further, however.  It reaches 
beyond the issues raised by the parties and addresses the 
reviewability of findings in this statutory scheme.  Because 
this discussion is not necessary to resolve the dispute, was not 
briefed, and could have wider implications, I believe it would 
be unwise to address that issue authoritatively in this case.   
¶51 The lead opinion answers with an extended discussion 
of the party presentation principle for reasons I do not 
understand.  Every member of the court agrees that sometimes our 
case-deciding, law-clarifying function requires us to go beyond 
the precise contours of the parties' legal arguments.  A 
majority of this court——and as far as I am aware, almost every 
court in the country——also agrees we usually should not do so, 
No.  2021AP373.bh 
 
2 
 
particularly when resolving a case does not require it.  That is 
the case here.  Therefore, the lead opinion's overly emphatic 
response to a rather standard judicial decision-making principle 
makes little sense.   
¶52 Additionally, the lead opinion engages in a lengthy 
critique of the dissent for allegedly rooting its conclusions in 
public policy rather than law.  While I reject an approach to 
statutory 
interpretation 
that 
incorporates 
one's 
preferred 
policy outcome, I simply do not see that in the dissent's 
analysis.  The briefing on both sides of this case was 
excellent, and in my view, the dissent presents a well-reasoned, 
good-faith reading of the statute.  Sometimes judges endeavoring 
to faithfully interpret statutes disagree; no nefarious motive 
need be invoked.  Although I disagree with the dissent's 
analysis, the critique by the lead opinion misses the mark.    
¶53 For these reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
No.  2021AP373.jjk 
 
1 
 
¶54 JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   (dissenting).  Derrick Sanders 
wrongfully spent 26 years imprisoned for a homicide that he did 
not commit.  Because he was wrongly imprisoned by the State, the 
Wisconsin Claims Board awarded him $25,000, the statutory 
maximum that the Board itself is authorized to award from its 
appropriation fund.  Wisconsin Stat. § 775.05(4) says that "[i]f 
the claims board finds that the amount it is able to award is 
not an adequate compensation it shall submit a report specifying 
an amount which it considers adequate to the chief clerk of each 
house of the legislature . . . ."  Despite this directive, the 
Board said nothing about whether or not the $25,000 award was 
adequate to compensate Sanders for his 26 years of imprisonment, 
nor did the Board submit a report to the legislature.  Yet a 
majority of this court holds that the Board did everything it 
was required to do under the statute.  This holding transforms 
the mandatory language of the statute into a mere suggestion and 
erroneously shields the Board from judicial review.  As such, I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶55 I begin with a brief history of Wisconsin's practice 
of compensating innocent people who were wrongly imprisoned by 
the State.  I then provide some necessary factual background.  
Next, I look to Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4) and explain how the 
statute requires the Board to make an adequacy determination 
when the Board awards the $25,000 maximum despite a wrongly 
imprisoned petitioner's request for more.  Finally, I explain 
how the Board's failure to explain and document its decision 
No.  2021AP373.jjk 
 
2 
 
allows it to evade review, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 775.05(5) 
and Wis. Stat. ch. 227. 
I.  HISTORY 
¶56 In 1913, Wisconsin was first off the starting blocks 
in compensating innocent people wrongfully imprisoned by the 
state.  Shelley Fite, Compensation for the Unjustly Imprisoned: 
A Model for Reform in Wisconsin, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 1181, 1182 
(2005).  Since then, thirty-eight states and the federal 
government have followed in our tracks.  See The National 
Registry of Exonerations, Compensation by the Numbers: State 
Statutory Compensation (Apr. 6, 2023), https://perma.cc/N9RC-
9EZM.  Now, despite once leading the pack in compensating 
individuals for the "sacrifices which the state imposes on 
[them] for the public purpose of punishing crime," Wisconsin is 
lagging far behind.  See John H. Wigmore, The Bill to Make 
Compensation to Persons Erroneously Convicted of Crime, 3 J. Am. 
Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 665, 665 (1913).  This state 
currently has the lowest per year compensation cap at $5,000 and 
the second lowest total compensation cap at $25,000.1  The 
National Registry of Exonerations, Compensation Statutes: A 
National Overview (June 2, 2022), https://perma.cc/6XRD-PT6D.   
¶57 The difference between Wisconsin's caps and those in 
other 
states 
is 
significant. 
 
The 
majority 
of 
states 
compensating for wrongful conviction provide at least $50,000 
per year of wrongful imprisonment, ten times Wisconsin's per-
                                                 
1 Only New Hampshire's total compensation cap is lower, at 
$20,000.  N.H. Rev. Stat. § 541-B:14.   
No.  2021AP373.jjk 
 
3 
 
year cap.  Innocence Project, Key Provisions in Wrongful 
Conviction 
Compensation 
Laws 
(May 
27, 
2022), 
https://perma.cc/39LX-7EJJ.  Even setting aside comparisons to 
other states, the total compensation cap set by Wisconsin 
legislators in 1913 ($5,000), adjusted for inflation, translates 
to more than $150,000 in today's dollars, six times the current 
cap of $25,000.  See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Inflation 
Calculator, 
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm 
(accessed Apr. 21, 2023). 
¶58 However, these low caps do not serve as an absolute 
ceiling.  Section 775.05(4) includes an escape hatch which 
instructs the Board to submit a report to the legislature if the 
maximum allowable award is inadequate compensation for a 
wrongfully convicted petitioner.  See Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4).  
Within this context, we examine the Board's decision to 
determine whether it fulfilled its statutory duty in Sanders' 
case. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
¶59 The lead opinion minimizes the fact that Sanders 
wrongfully spent 26 years in prison, while emphasizing that 
Sanders participated in an earlier battery of the victim——a 
crime that Sanders was not convicted of and a fact that is 
irrelevant to our review of the Board's decision.  In order to 
clarify which facts are relevant to our review, I provide a 
brief summary of the Board's decision here. 
 
¶60 In 2018, the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County 
vacated 
Sanders' 
conviction 
for 
first-degree 
intentional 
No.  2021AP373.jjk 
 
4 
 
homicide.  After 26 years in prison, Sanders walked free.  
Subsequently, Sanders petitioned the Board for compensation, 
seeking around $530,000 for lost wages and assets, and around 
$5.2 million in lost earning potential.2  The Milwaukee County 
District Attorney's Office did not oppose the petition.   
¶61 The 
Board 
made 
two 
determinations. 
 
First, 
it 
determined that Sanders had shown by clear and convincing 
evidence that he was innocent and did not contribute to his 
conviction.  Second, it decided to award Sanders $25,000, less 
than $1,000 per year of wrongful imprisonment. 
 
¶62 The Board offered a detailed rationale for its 
determination that Sanders was innocent.  It explained that a 
court had found that there was no factual basis for Sanders' no 
contest plea to first-degree intentional homicide.  It noted 
that Sanders consistently maintained he had not been involved in 
the homicide, and that one of the men actually involved in the 
homicide had signed a statement that Sanders was neither present 
nor involved.  The Board additionally explained that the "unique 
facts" of the case showed that Sanders had not contributed to 
his own conviction, despite his no contest plea.  Specifically, 
Sanders had always maintained his innocence, sought a plea 
withdrawal, and met the high legal standard to merit withdrawal. 
                                                 
2 In his hearing before the Board, Sanders explained that 
"I'm not trying to say I would have earned $5 million, what I'm 
saying is compensation due to . . . the precedent that I've been 
seeing . . . ."  Sanders then referenced two prior cases before 
the Board, one in which a petitioner received $7.5 million after 
being wrongfully imprisoned for 24 years, and another in which a 
petitioner 
received 
$13 
million 
after 
being 
wrongfully 
imprisoned for 13 years. 
No.  2021AP373.jjk 
 
5 
 
 
¶63 By contrast, the Board provided zero rationale for its 
decision 
to 
award 
Sanders 
the 
statutory 
maximum 
without 
requesting more from the legislature.  The Board merely restated 
that Sanders was innocent of the crime for which he was 
convicted, and that "[a]ccordingly, the Board further concludes 
that compensation in the amount of $25,000 shall be awarded" 
from its appropriation fund.  We do not know whether the Board 
considered Sanders' role in the beating of the victim prior to 
the crime.  We do not know whether the Board considered Sanders' 
factually unsupported no contest plea.  We do not know whether 
the Board considered how Sanders' case compared with those 
wrongfully convicted petitioners who were awarded millions of 
dollars.  We do not even know whether the Board considered 
adequacy at all or whether it ceased consideration of the case 
upon awarding the statutory maximum from the appropriation fund.  
The reality is that we do not know anything about the Board's 
rationale for not sending a report to the legislature. 
 
¶64 Having established the relevant background, I turn to 
Wis. Stat. § 775.05 and explain why the Board was required to 
document and explain its decision regarding the adequacy of the 
award. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶65 Wisconsin Stat. § 775.05 requires the Board to (1) 
determine whether or not its award to Sanders was adequate; and 
(2) provide at least some rationale for its determination so 
that a court may review its determination under Wis. Stat. ch. 
227.  See Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4)-(5). The Board failed to meet 
No.  2021AP373.jjk 
 
6 
 
both of these requirements.  Therefore, the Board's action 
should be reversed and remanded with instructions to correct 
that failure.  I discuss each of these points in turn below. 
A.  The Board Must Determine Adequacy. 
¶66 The text and history of Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4) make it 
clear that the Board was required to determine whether or not 
its award to Sanders was adequate.  The relevant portion of Wis. 
Stat. § 775.05(4) reads as follows: 
If the claims board finds that the petitioner was 
innocent . . . the claims board shall find the amount 
which will equitably compensate the petitioner, not to 
exceed $25,000 and at a rate of compensation not 
greater 
than 
$5,000 
per 
year 
for 
the 
imprisonment . . . .  If the claims board finds that 
the amount it is able to award is not an adequate 
compensation it shall submit a report specifying an 
amount which it considers adequate to the chief clerk 
of each house of the legislature . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4) (emphasis added). 
¶67 The statute uses the mandatory language "shall," 
requiring the Board to report to the legislature if it "finds 
the amount it is able to award is not an adequate compensation."  
Wis. Stat. 
§ 775.05(4).  In order to comply with this 
requirement, the Board must first determine whether or not the 
amount it is able to award is adequate.  Because an award is 
either adequate or it is not, the word "if," coupled with the 
report requirement, sets up a binary decision tree with two 
options.  Option 1: the Board decides that the award is 
adequate, so it is not required to submit a report to the 
legislature.  Option 2: the Board decides that the award is 
No.  2021AP373.jjk 
 
7 
 
inadequate, so it is required to submit a report to the 
legislature.   
¶68 The lead opinion relies almost entirely on the 
proposition that the word "if" creates a third option for the 
Board, and allows the Board to entirely refrain from determining 
whether or not the award is adequate.  This reading of the 
statute strains credulity.  By the lead opinion's logic, Wis. 
Stat. § 775.05 includes a mandatory requirement that the Board 
submit a report to the legislature if it finds that the maximum 
award is inadequate.  But it simultaneously allows the Board to 
avoid that requirement at whim regardless of the adequacy or 
inadequacy of the award.  
¶69 The 
lead 
opinion's 
foray 
into 
80s 
pop 
music 
illustrates the absurdity of its position.  The "if" condition 
presented by the lyrics "if you leave" creates two options: 
leave or stay.  It is unlikely that any listener of sound mind 
would determine that the singer was also presenting a third 
choice: refuse to decide whether to stay or leave and instead 
exist in some bizarre metaphysical state outside of staying or 
leaving.  The same is true of the statute.  There are two 
options——the award is adequate or it is inadequate——and the lead 
opinion treads outside the bounds of common sense in determining 
there is a third option. 
¶70 Returning from the lead opinion's musical interlude, I 
now turn to the statutory history of Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4), 
which confirms that the Board is required to determine whether 
No.  2021AP373.jjk 
 
8 
 
its award is adequate.  The 1913 version of the statute read, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
If the board shall find that the petitioner was 
innocent . . . the board shall proceed to find the 
amount which will compensate the petitioner for his 
wrongful imprisonment.  Such board may award a 
compensation to the petitioner so found innocent of 
not to exceed five thousand dollars in any case, and 
at a rate of compensation not greater than fifteen 
hundred dollars per year for the imprisonment so 
unjustly suffered.  If the board shall find that the 
amount they may be able to award will not be an 
adequate compensation to the petitioner they shall 
report an amount to the legislature which they shall 
deem to be adequate . . . . 
Section 3203a(4), ch. 189, Laws of 1913. 
¶71 It is clear that the 1913 statute first required the 
Board to find the amount that would compensate the petitioner 
for the time spent wrongfully imprisoned, and then separately 
enabled the Board to award up to the statutory maximum.  The 
Board concedes as much.  The fact that a subsequent 1935 
revisor's bill condensed this language and combined the first 
two sentences together did not change the Board's duty to 
determine the correct amount of compensation.   
¶72 "A revisor's bill ordinarily does not result in a 
change in the meaning of the statutes revised," and it did not 
result in a change in meaning here.  S. Milwaukee Sav. Bank v. 
Barrett, 2000 WI 48, ¶37, 234 Wis. 2d 733, 611 N.W.2d 448; see 
also Wis. Stat. § 990.001(7) ("If the revision bill contains a 
note which says that the meaning of the statute to which the 
note relates is not changed by the revision, the note is 
indicative of the legislative intent.").  The revisor's bill in 
No.  2021AP373.jjk 
 
9 
 
question noted that its purpose was to "make the statutes more 
clear, concise, and compact," rather than make substantive 
changes, and that "[t]he absence of a note to any section of the 
bill means that only verbal changes [were] intended."  1935 S.B. 
75 (directing the reader to see the first note in 1935 S.B. 50); 
1935 S.B. 50.  There was no note appended to the section at 
issue here, and therefore no substantive change was intended.    
The 1913 and 1935 statutes required the Board to determine the 
amount that will compensate the petitioner, regardless of the 
statutory maximum, and the statute continues to do so in its 
current form. 
¶73 In analyzing the statutory history, the lead opinion 
misses the point.  It focuses on the 1913 statute's conditional 
statement, while ignoring the requirement that "the board shall 
proceed to find the amount which will compensate the petitioner 
for his wrongful imprisonment."  The act of "find[ing] the 
amount which will compensate" a person necessarily implies some 
determination 
of 
how 
much 
is 
required 
to 
appropriately 
recompense the person for the loss suffered.  See "Compensate," 
Merriam-Webster 
Online 
Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/compensate (last visited June 23, 2023) 
("to make an appropriate and usually counterbalancing payment 
to" (emphasis added)).  Necessarily, in deciding the proper 
amount of compensation, the Board has already determined the 
adequacy of the amount it is statutorily able to award.3 
                                                 
3 This determination is a matter of simple math: is the 
amount which will compensate the petitioner greater than the 
amount the statute allows the Board to award?  
No.  2021AP373.jjk 
 
10 
 
¶74 It is not surprising, therefore, that the Board 
conceded that the 1913 version of the statute required it to 
determine how much would compensate the petitioner, regardless 
of the statutory maximum.  Where the Board goes wrong, of 
course, is in arguing that a revisor's bill made substantive 
changes to that requirement, when the revisor's bill made 
explicit that there were no substantive changes. 
¶75  As explained, the text and history of the statute 
make clear the Board was required to determine whether or not 
its award would adequately compensate Sanders.  But even if we 
were to assume the lead opinion's reading of the statute is 
correct——and the Board is allowed to refrain from determining 
whether the award is adequate——the Board is still required to 
make a determination that it must document and explain.  The 
choice 
to 
refrain 
from 
determining 
adequacy 
is 
still 
a 
discretionary choice.4  Under either reading, the statute 
requires the Board to exercise its discretion in making a 
decision, and (as the next section explains) document the 
rationale behind the decision. 
                                                 
4 An example of when the Board arguably made such a 
determination is when it decided not to submit a report to the 
legislature on behalf of a petitioner because "a legislative 
committee 
[was] 
presently 
considering 
a 
range 
of 
issues 
concerning 
innocent 
convicts. 
 
The 
committee 
may 
make 
recommendations on the issue of compensation for innocent 
convicts."  State of Wisconsin Claims Board, Decisions re: 
December 
2, 
2004 
hearings 
(Dec. 
14, 
2004), 
https://claimsboard.wi.gov/Documents/Decision_Conv_2004-12-
02%20Avery,%20Steven.pdf. 
No.  2021AP373.jjk 
 
11 
 
B.  The Board Must Document Its Decision-Making Process. 
¶76 Having established that Wis. Stat. § 775.05 requires 
the Board to determine whether or not its award is adequate, 
regardless of the statutory maximum, I now turn to the 
requirement that the Board must document and explain that 
decision.  
¶77 The 
Board's 
decisions 
regarding 
compensation 
for 
wrongfully convicted petitioners are subject to judicial review 
"as provided in ch. 227."5  Wisconsin Stat. § 775.05(5) provides 
that the Board "shall keep a complete record of its proceedings 
in each case and of all the evidence.  The findings and the 
award of the claims board shall be subject to review as provided 
in ch. 227."  Section 227.57(8) instructs a court to reverse or 
remand the cause when an "exercise of discretion is outside the 
range of discretion delegated to the agency by law; is 
inconsistent with a . . . prior agency practice . . . or is 
otherwise 
in 
violation 
of 
a 
constitutional 
or 
statutory 
provision."  In order for a court to determine whether the 
Board's exercise of discretion is within these bounds, the Board 
must document its decision and the rationale behind it.  See 
Reidinger v. Optometry Examining Bd., 81 Wis. 2d 292, 297-298, 
260 N.W.2d 270 (1977) ("Discretion is not synonymous with 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.03(5) states that chapter 227 "does 
not apply to proceedings of the claims board, except as provided 
in ss. 775.05(5), 775.06(7), and 775.11(2)."  Section 775.05(5) 
relates to proceedings regarding compensation for innocent 
convicts——the relevant proceeding in this case.  As such, 
chapter 227 review standards apply to the "findings" and "award" 
of the subject proceedings in this case.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 775.05(5).  
No.  2021AP373.jjk 
 
12 
 
decision-making. Rather, the term contemplates a process of 
reasoning . . . there should be evidence in the record that 
discretion was in fact exercised and the basis of that exercise 
of discretion should be set forth."). 
¶78 This is not a new concept.  We have long said that 
discretionary decision-making requires some documented evidence 
of the decision-maker's rationale.  See, e.g., Arrowhead United 
Tchrs. Org. v. Wis. Emp. Rels. Comm'n, 116 Wis. 2d 580, 603, 342 
N.W.2d 709 (1984); Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 
of Wisconsin, 109 Wis. 2d 127, 136-137, 325 N.W.2d 339 (1982); 
Hacker v. State Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 197 Wis. 2d 441, 
476-480 541 N.W.2d 766 (1995) (all evaluating discretionary 
determinations in the context of ch. 227 review).  Documentation 
is the necessary implication of ch. 227 review.  In order to 
determine whether a reasoning process is outside a decision-
maker's range of discretion, inconsistent with prior practice, 
or in violation of the law, there must be some indication of the 
decision-maker's reasoning process.  To decide otherwise allows 
discretionary decision-makers subject to review to avoid review 
of their decisions, thereby contravening § 227.57.  Worse, it 
allows decision-makers to make determinations based on reasons 
that are well outside the bounds of rational decision-making, 
without any means for those negatively affected by arbitrary 
decisions to challenge them. 
¶79 The lead opinion asserts that the Board was not 
required to document anything about the adequacy of the award 
because "the Board's decision not to make a non-required finding 
No.  2021AP373.jjk 
 
13 
 
regarding adequacy is not a 'finding' in the legal sense of the 
word as used in the statute."  See lead op., ¶32.  This is 
incorrect.  As I have explained above, the Board is required to 
decide whether or not the award is adequate.  And the Board's 
adequacy decision is clearly a "finding" that is subject to 
review under the plain language of the statute.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 775.05(4) ("If the claims board finds that the amount . . . is 
not an adequate compensation . . . ."); Wis. Stat. § 775.05(5) 
(The findings and the award of the claims board shall be subject 
to review . . . .).  Consequently, the Board must document 
whether or not it found the statutory maximum adequate and its 
rationale for that decision. 
¶80 However, even if we assume for the sake of argument 
that the statute does not require the Board to make an adequacy 
determination, the lead opinion's limited reading of the word 
"finding"——a reading that excludes the Board's decision to avoid 
deciding adequacy——simply does not comport with the way the word 
"find" is used in the statute.  The lead opinion insists that 
"find" is a legal term of art and is synonymous to "findings of 
fact," but "finding" is often used in a broader sense to mean a 
decision or a determination.  See Find, American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2022) ("To come to a 
legal decision or verdict.").  Wisconsin Stat. § 775.05 uses 
"find" in this general sense each time it describes a decision 
the Board makes, without regard to whether the Board is finding 
a fact or making a more discretionary determination, such as 
"find[ing] the amount which will equitably compensate the 
No.  2021AP373.jjk 
 
14 
 
petitioner, not to exceed $25,000."6  As such, there is no 
indication in the statute that the word "finding" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 775.05(5) was meant in a limited sense to exclude some types 
of decisions, rather than as a general synonym for "decision" or 
"determination."7 
 
¶81 Under 
a 
commonsensical 
reading 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 775.05(4), the Board is required to find whether or not the 
statutory maximum is adequate——a finding that clearly is subject 
to review under ch. 227.  Wis. Stat. § 775.05(5).  But even 
under a reading that allows the Board to refrain from deciding 
                                                 
6 See Wis. Stat. § 775.05(3) ("the claims board shall find 
either that the evidence is clear and convincing that the 
petitioner was innocent of the crime . . ."); Wis. Stat. 
§ 775.05(4) ("If the claims board finds that the petitioner was 
innocent and that he or she did not . . . contribute to bring 
about the conviction . . . , the claims board shall find the 
amount which will equitably compensate the petitioner, not to 
exceed $25,000 . . . .  Compensation awarded by the claims board 
shall include any amount to which the board finds the petitioner 
is entitled for attorney fees, costs and disbursements. If the 
claims board finds that the amount it is able to award is not an 
adequate 
compensation 
it 
shall 
submit 
a 
report . . . ." 
(emphasis added)). 
7 The language the lead opinion points to in Wis. Stat. 
§ 775.06(7), "findings, conclusions, determination, and award" 
mirrors language used earlier in that particular section.  See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 775.06(4) 
("the 
findings, 
conclusions, 
determination, and award of, or denial thereof, shall be based 
on all the evidence . . . ").  Wisconsin Stat. § 775.05, by 
contrast, includes no such language, but instead uses the word 
"finding" throughout to describe each of the decisions the Board 
makes. 
No.  2021AP373.jjk 
 
15 
 
adequacy, the decision to refrain is still subject to review.8  
Because the Board is subject to ch. 227 review, it is required 
to document the rationale behind its discretionary decisions——
including its decision regarding the adequacy of an award. 
C.  The Board Failed to Document Its Decision-Making Process. 
¶82 Turning to the Board's decision here, the record is 
devoid of any evidence indicating the Board exercised discretion 
regarding the adequacy of the award.  In its decision, the Board 
did not address whether $25,000 was adequate, but wrote only 
that it found Sanders innocent, and "[a]ccordingly, the Board 
further concludes that compensation in the amount of $25,000 
shall 
be 
awarded 
from 
the 
Claims 
Board 
appropriation."  
Additionally, in its decision to deny Sanders' petition for 
rehearing, the Board wrote only that "the Board did not conclude 
that the amount which it was able to award was 'not adequate 
compensation.'" 
¶83 Neither of those brief statements provide evidence 
that 
"discretion 
was 
in 
fact 
exercised" 
when 
the 
Board 
determined the adequacy of the award, nor do they set forth "the 
                                                 
8 In addition to shielding the Board from review of its 
decision to refrain from considering adequacy, the lead opinion 
effectively shields the Board from review of any decision not to 
send a report to the legislature.  The Board is incentivized to 
say nothing, even if it actively finds that the award is 
adequate.  As already established (and not refuted by the lead 
opinion), the Board's finding of adequacy is reviewable under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 227.03(5) & 775.05(5).  However, the Board may 
refrain from documenting its finding of adequacy and thus evade 
review because the reviewing court must assume from the empty 
record——as the lead opinion appears to do in this case——that 
adequacy was not considered.      
No.  2021AP373.jjk 
 
16 
 
basis of that exercise of discretion."  See Hacker, 197 Wis.2d 
at 478 (quoting Reidinger, 81 Wis.2d at 298).  The Board's 
decision does not mention whether it determined the award was 
adequate, much less the basis for that determination.  Likewise, 
the order denying rehearing, which stated that "the Board did 
not conclude that the amount which it was able to award was 'not 
adequate compensation'" failed to establish that an adequacy 
determination was made.  Although a double negative often 
colloquially translates into the corresponding positive, the 
Board's use of the double negative here establishes only the 
negative——the Board refrained from making a decision regarding 
adequacy.  Even accepting that the Board did determine $25,000 
was adequate, the Board failed to set forth any basis for that 
determination in its order.  Accordingly, the court of appeals 
was correct in remanding the matter to the Board to properly 
exercise its discretion as to whether $25,000 was adequate. 
¶84 It bears repeating that requiring some documentation 
of the Board's decision-making is not simply an exercise in 
ensuring that the Board dot its I's and cross its T's, but 
instead is a matter of real substantive importance.  Perhaps the 
Board did have a legitimate reason for not recommending a higher 
amount to the legislature.  The problem is that we do not know 
the reason, or whether there was any reasoning at all.  The lead 
opinion's 
decision 
allows 
the 
Board 
to 
evade 
review 
of 
determinations made on potentially illegitimate or arbitrary 
grounds by simply not documenting the grounds for its decision.  
No.  2021AP373.jjk 
 
17 
 
This directly contravenes the legislature's directive that the 
Board be subject to review.  See Wis. Stat. § 775.05(5). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶85 Sanders spent twenty-six years in prison for a crime 
he did not commit.  To be awarded even a cent for those lost 
decades, he was required to clear a high bar that only 179 
petitioners have cleared since 2000——prove to the Board by clear 
and convincing evidence that he was innocent.  Here the lead 
opinion allows the Board to add insult to injury by absolving 
the Board of its duty to follow the legislature's directive to: 
(1) determine whether or not the statutory maximum is adequate; 
and (2) explain its reasoning such that a court can review——and 
Sanders can understand——the rationale behind its determination.  
Because the Board did not do so here, I respectfully dissent. 
¶86 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join this dissent. 
 
 
                                                 
9  State of Wisconsin Claims Board, Innocent Convict 
Compensation 
Decisions 
(accessed 
Jun. 
2, 
2023), 
https://claimsboard.wi.gov/Pages/InnocentConvictDecisions.aspx. 
No.  2021AP373.jjk 
 
 
 
1