Title: DAVID P TAGGART V TERRY L TISKA
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 118206
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: April 2, 2002

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 2, 2002  
DAVID P. TAGGART and  
BONNIE J. TAGGART,  
Plaintiffs/Counter- 
Defendants-Appellants,  
v  
No. 118206  
TERRY L. TISKA,JAK 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., and 
KEITH SMITH, jointly and 
severally,  
Defendants/Counter­
Plaintiffs/Appellees.  
PER CURIAM  
This is a real estate case.  Owners of adjoining parcels  
each claim ownership of a strip of land near the border of the  
two parcels.  The circuit court granted summary disposition  
for the defendants on the ground the plaintiffs’ suit was  
tardily filed because MCL 600.5868 provides a one-year  
limitation period.  The Court of Appeals affirmed. We reverse  
 
the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals  
because those courts misinterpreted MCL 600.5868. We remand  
this case to the circuit court for further proceedings.  
I  
This is a dispute between adjacent owners of rural  
property in St. Clair County.1  The plaintiffs own the lot at  
9055 Stone Road.  To the east is a parcel at 9057 Stone Road.  
The defendants include the current and former owners of the  
9057 property. The dispute concerns a triangle of property,  
with the point of the triangle on Stone Road and the base to  
the north, along the back property line.  A surveyor confirmed  
that the disputed property lies within the legal description  
of 9057.  
At all pertinent times, the 9055 property has contained  
a residence.  From the late 1950s until 1979, it was owned by  
Edward F. Compton and his wife, whose name does not appear in  
the record.  She was awarded the property when the Comptons  
divorced in 1979.  In 1980, she sold it to plaintiffs David P.  
Taggart and Bonnie J. Taggart.2  
The 9057 property was undeveloped until 1996.  It had  
been owned by Lawrence W. David and Nellie I. David.  As it  
happens, Ms. David was Mr. Compton’s kindergarten teacher.  
1 
 The circuit court granted the defendants’ motion for 
summary disposition.  For purposes of this opinion, we accept  
as true the facts alleged by the plaintiffs. 
Where  
appropriate to supplement this narrative, we have drawn other 
uncontested facts from the record.  
2 
 We are told that the Taggarts’ purchase of the 9055 
property occurred in November 1980.  
2  
Ms. David passed title to the couple’s children, Lawrence N.  
David and Diane D. Shafer.  They, in turn, conveyed the  
property to Keith Smith,3 who is the owner and president of  
defendant JAK Construction, Inc.4  Mr. Smith built a house on  
the lot in 1996 (the house is not on the disputed strip), and  
then sold the 9057 lot to defendant Terry L. Tiska.  
Ms. Shafer and Mr. Compton have filed affidavits in which  
they state that Mr. Compton long ago cut and cleared the  
disputed area in order to push back mosquitos that lived on  
9057.  When he began, his former kindergarten teacher told him  
to stop, lest he someday claim the property as his own. She  
and he then agreed that he could clear the strip if, at his  
own expense, he obtained and signed a lawyer-drawn document  
stating that the use was permissive and could never be the  
basis for a claim that he owned that portion of 9057.  Neither  
Ms. Shafer nor Mr. Compton can locate a copy of that document.  
In their complaint, the Taggarts say that, since 1980,  
they “have been in actual, visible, open, notorious,  
exclusive, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of [the  
disputed strip of property].”  The Taggarts further state5  
that they have cleared brush, cut trees, gardened, maintained  
3 The David family’s sale of the 9057 property apparently 
occurred in December 1995.  
4 The papers at hand sometimes speak of a conveyance to  
JAK.  In this opinion, references to Mr. Smith include his 
company.  
5 
 These assertions are found in a paper designated 
“affidavit” and signed by Mr. Taggart, but not notarized.  
3  
  
a picnic area and horseshoe pit, constructed a burning pit  
with concrete blocks, and generally treated the disputed  
property as their own.  
The current dispute arose in 1996, when Mr. Smith began  
preparing the 9057 property for construction of the house and  
its later sale to Ms. Tiska.  While it appears that the  
Taggarts did not contest every step taken, they did make their  
displeasure known and they did protest Detroit Edison’s  
installation of an electrical line through a trench in the  
disputed area.6  
In December 1997, the Taggarts filed suit.  The complaint  
was filed more than a year after the defendants had entered  
the disputed strip and had begun using it as their own, and  
more than a year after the plaintiffs had complained to  
Detroit Edison.  
As indicated, the plaintiffs sought ejectment and the  
defendants counterclaimed to quiet title.7 
Among other  
claims, the defendants asserted that the plaintiffs’ suit was  
6 The parties disagree about many of the facts.  Among 
the points of controversy are the extent to which the  
Taggarts’ usage was permissive, the dates of the key events of 
1996, the timing and significance of negotiations to resolve 
this matter by quitclaim deed, the significance of everyone’s 
failure to survey the land for many years, and the extent to 
which trees and other features of the land would reasonably 
suggest a natural boundary.  
7 The parties submitted a variety of claims by complaint, 
countercomplaint, and third-party complaint.  However, the 
claims mentioned above (ejectment and quiet title) are all 
that we consider in this opinion.  
4  
untimely 
under 
MCL 
600.5868, 
which 
the 
defendants  
characterized as a one-year statute of limitation.  
The circuit court granted a defense motion for summary  
disposition, agreeing that the plaintiffs’ suit was untimely.  
The circuit court thus ruled that Ms. Tiska, as holder of the  
recorded title, was the owner of the property.  The court did  
not address the merits of the question whether the Taggarts  
had gained ownership by adverse possession.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed.  242 Mich App 688; 619  
NW2d 731 (2000).8  
The Taggarts have applied for leave to appeal in this  
Court.  
II  
This case concerns the proper interpretation of MCL  
600.5868.  Specifically, the issue is whether the following  
provision states a one-year period of limitation barring the  
Taggarts’ ejectment suit:  
No person shall be deemed to have been in 
possession of any lands, within the meaning of this 
chapter merely by reason of having made an entry 
thereon, unless he continues in open and peaceable 
possession of the premises for at least 1 year next 
after such entry, or unless an action is commenced 
upon such entry and seisin, within 1 year after he 
is ousted or dispossessed of the premises.  
We stated our standard of review earlier this year in  
Hanson v Mecosta Co Rd Comm’rs, 465 Mich 492, 497; 638 NW2d  
396 (2002):  
8 Reh den by unpublished order, entered November 21, 2000 
(Docket No. 219498).  
5  
 
 
This case involves a review of a decision on a  
motion for summary disposition, and presents an 
issue of statutory construction, both of which we 
review de novo.  Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 
456, 461; 628 NW2d 515 (2001); Brown v Michigan  
Health Care Corp, 463 Mich 368, 374; 617 NW2d 301 
(2000).  
III  
In its opinion of affirmance, the Court of Appeals  
explained 
its 
conclusion that MCL 600.5868 provides a one-year  
limitation period. The Court stated:  
We note that in this case the statute’s  
wording causes its meaning and intended application 
to be less than perfectly clear, and we urge the 
Legislature to revisit and clarify this provision. 
However, this section is contained in the portion 
of the Revised Judicature Act[9] governing the 
limitation of actions and it is well established  
that a plaintiff who is aware of his right to bring 
a cause of action may not sit idly by and later 
bring an untimely suit.  Therefore, in light of the  
intent of the Legislature to generally limit  
untimely actions, and the language of the statute 
at issue in this case, we conclude that the statute 
requires an action for recovery of property to be 
commenced within one year after a person has 
reentered the property after being ousted. [242 
Mich App 690-691.]  
Because the Taggarts filed their complaint more than a year  
after Mr. Smith began work on the 9057 property and more than  
a year after a trench was dug across the disputed strip, the  
Court of Appeals concluded that the suit was untimely filed  
more than one year after the Taggarts had been ousted.  
The Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion that MCL  
600.5868 is a one-year statute of limitation for persons who,  
after becoming owners by adverse possession, need to enforce  
9 MCL 600.101 et seq.  
6  
 
 
 
 
their rights of ownership.  Although the language of the  
statute is less than perfectly clear, a proper understanding  
of MCL 600.5868 can be gained by examining this Court's  
application of this statutory language.  
In Donovan v Bissell, 53 Mich 462; 19 NW 146 (1884), the  
unanimous opinion of Chief Justice COOLEY explains the nature  
of this provision.  Daniel Donovan and Augustus A. Bissell  
were adjacent landowners.  By error, Mr. Donovan erected a  
fence that encroached fifty feet onto the land owned by Mr.  
Bissell.  More than twenty years later (i.e., after the  
statutory period for gaining ownership by adverse possession  
had run10), Mr. Bissell's successor in interest tore down the  
fence, prompting Mr. Donovan to sue for trespass.  It was  
evident that Mr. Donovan had acquired title by adverse  
possession unless his twenty-year period of continuous  
possession had been interrupted when Mr. Bissell tore the  
fence down on one earlier occasion. The Court explained:  
At that time Mr. Bissell, according to the 
testimony, after having asserted his right to the 
land in dispute, in an interview with the  
plaintiff, went upon the land with assistance, and 
tore down a fence built by the plaintiff where the 
fence more recently torn down was afterwards  
constructed.  How long the fence remained down is 
not shown; but it seems to have been some days, and 
may have been for a considerable period.  But it  
does not appear that Mr. Bissell took possession 
for a single day or hour except for the purposes of 
this act of destruction.  
The circuit judge instructed the jury that if 
Bissell made to the plaintiff a claim of right to  
10 The limitation period is now fifteen years. 
MCL  
600.5801(4).  
7  
the premises, and went out to them and pulled down 
the fence in pursuance of this claim, such acts 
would break the continuity of the possession; that 
the possession must be continuous, and if thus 
broken, the plaintiff could claim nothing by  
adverse possession. 
 The judge was in error. 
The act proven by 
the defendants was a mere trespass upon the  
plaintiff's possession and worked no disseizin.  It  
might, perhaps, have constituted a sufficient entry 
at the common law; but a mere entry is not  
sufficient in this State to stop the running of the 
statute of limitations, unless the party making it 
"shall have continued in open and peaceable 
possession of the premises for at least one year 
next after such entry, or unless an action shall be 
commenced upon such entry and seizin within one 
year after he shall be ousted or dispossessed of 
the premises."  How. Stat. § 8705. Mr. Bissell did  
not bring himself within the terms of this statute.  
The judgment [for the defendants, who claimed 
title under Mr. Bissell] must be reversed and a new 
trial ordered. [53 Mich 463-464.]  
This Court similarly applied the predecessor of MCL  
600.5868 in Place v Place, 139 Mich 509, 510; 102 NW 996  
(1905). In Place, the question was whether a title holder's  
occasional exercise of rights of ownership effectively  
interrupted an otherwise continuous period of adverse  
possession by his former spouse.  Place held that "these  
disturbances 
of 
her 
possession would not interrupt the running  
of [her period of adverse possession]." Id.  
To restate the holding of Place in the words of the  
statute, the ex-husband was not deemed to have been in  
possession of the disputed land merely by reason of having  
made an entry thereon, unless he either continued in open and  
peaceable possession for at least a year following the entry,  
or, if ousted by the adverse possessor, filed suit within a  
8  
year after she ousted him.  He did neither, and so the running  
of her adverse possession was not interrupted.11  
IV  
In the present case, the Taggarts allege that they became  
owners of the disputed strip before 1996 as the result of many  
years of uninterrupted adverse possession. Defendants Smith  
and Tiska pose various defenses, including that the Taggarts'  
use was permissive and never adverse. These issues were not  
tried because the circuit court applied MCL 600.5868 as a one­
year statute of limitation on the Taggarts' claim. However,  
if the Taggarts did indeed gain ownership through adverse  
possession, their claim is governed by the same fifteen-year  
period12 as any other owner.  
MCL 600.5868 is not a one-year statute of limitation on  
the Taggarts' ejectment suit.  Instead, it is relevant in  
determining whether an adverse possessor's hostile possession  
11 The predecessor of MCL 600.5868 is also noted in 
Riopelle v Gilman, 23 Mich 33, 35 (1871). 
Dealing with an 
issue that concerned “a remnant of the old real estate law,” 
Chief Justice CAMPBELL did not elaborate on the meaning of the 
language now found in MCL 600.5868.  However, his treatment is 
consistent with our holding today.  
12 In pertinent part, MCL 600.5801(4) provides:  
No person may bring or maintain any action for 
the recovery or possession of any lands or make any 
entry upon any lands unless, after the claim or 
right to make the entry first accrued to himself or 
to someone through whom he claims, he commences the 
action or makes the entry within the periods of 
time prescribed by this section.  
And:  
. . . the period of limitation is 15 years.  
9  
 
 
 
 
of land was interrupted before the expiration of the fifteen­
year period necessary to establish ownership by adverse  
possession.  If pertinent to this case at all, MCL 600.5868  
will assist in the application of this limitation period by  
clarifying the circumstances that constitute a continuous  
possession of land.13  
For these reasons, we reverse the judgments of the  
circuit court and the Court of Appeals. We remand this case  
to the circuit court for further proceedings on the unresolved  
claims of the parties. MCR 7.302(F)(1).  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, 
KELLY, TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, 
and  
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.  
13 In this respect, the function of MCL 600.5868 is 
somewhat similar to that of the preceding section, MCL 
600.5867, 
which 
states 
certain 
presumptions 
regarding 
possession of land.  
10