Title: Nelson v. Miller
Citation: 233 Kan. 122, 660 P.2d 1361
Docket Number: 54,630
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: March 26, 1983

233 Kan. 122 (1983)
660 P.2d 1361
R.A. NELSON, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
VERN MILLER, et al., Defendants-Appellees, and FRED W. PHELPS, Counterclaimant and Third Party Plaintiff,
v.
R.A. NELSON, M.D. and JERRY K. LEVY, Counterdefendant and Third Party Defendant.
No. 54,630

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 26, 1983.
Jerry K. Levy, of Jerry K. Levy, P.A., of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
J.H. Eschmann, of Ascough, Bausch, Eschmann, P.A., of Topeka, argued the cause and John A. Bausch, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for the appellee Vern Miller.
Charles L. Davis, Jr., of Davis, Unrein, Hummer &amp; McCallister, of Topeka, argued the cause and James K. Keller, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for appellees, Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin &amp; Creskoff, a partnership.
Thomas L. Theis, of Sloan, Listrom, Eisenbarth, Sloan and Glassman, of Topeka, and Alan v. Johnson, of the same firm, were on the brief for appellee/cross-appellant Jerry K. Levy.
Fred W. Phelps, of Topeka, appeared pro se.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HERD, J.:
This is a lawsuit alleging malicious prosecution of a civil action. Plaintiff appeals from the trial court's order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment.
On April 1, 1976, a medical malpractice lawsuit entitled Van Nover, et al. v. Wesley Medical Center, et al., was filed in Sedgwick County District Court. Attorneys for the plaintiffs in that action were Vern Miller; Fred Phelps, Chartered; and Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin &amp; Creskoff, a law firm of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The petition in that case alleged the Van Novers had been damaged by negligent treatment afforded Ms. Van *123 Nover and her child by the defendants, which included R.A. Nelson, M.D.
Dr. Nelson's attorney in the case was William Tinker, Sr., of Wichita. Mr. Tinker had been employed by the Medical Protective Company, Nelson's insurance carrier, with Nelson's knowledge and consent. Tinker felt strongly Dr. Nelson was not guilty of malpractice and thus attempted to get the case dismissed. At a hearing held September 29, 1977, Tinker requested the Van Novers' attorneys agree to a dismissal as to Dr. Nelson. Phelps and Adler, although wary of the prospect of a future lawsuit alleging malicious prosecution of a civil action brought by Nelson, consented. They also requested Tinker to waive the six-month limitation period for commencing a new action against Dr. Nelson contained in K.S.A. 60-518. The resulting order of dismissal read as follows:
This order was filed October 10, 1977.
In the meantime, Dr. Nelson began looking into a possible lawsuit against the Van Novers' attorneys. Toward that end Nelson hired Jerry Levy on approximately July 6, 1977. "To look at the case and see if there was merit...."
After extensive discovery, counsel for the remaining defendants in Van Nover filed motions for summary judgment. These motions were granted April 18, 1978, with respect to all remaining defendants. That summary judgment was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion and a petition for review was denied. Opinion No. 50,109 filed June 29, 1979; rev. denied 226 Kan. 793.
Following the entry of summary judgment in the medical malpractice action Dr. Nelson filed an action in Shawnee County District Court against the present defendants who were the attorneys of record for the plaintiffs in Van Nover, et al. v. Wesley *124 Medical Center, et al., Nelson alleged malicious prosecution of a civil action and negligence. The defendants filed motions to dismiss which were sustained. Dr. Nelson appealed to this court, which overturned the dismissal of his claim for malicious prosecution of a civil action. In Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980), (Nelson I), this court pointed to the "scanty record" before the trial court at the time the motions to dismiss had been granted and remanded the case "to permit the parties to proceed with discovery so that the facts may be developed and the rights of the parties determined as to the plaintiff's claim for malicious prosecution of a civil action." 227 Kan. at 289.
After the opinion in Nelson I, Fred Phelps filed a counterclaim against Dr. Nelson and a third party petition joining Jerry Levy as an additional party defendant to the counterclaim against Dr. Nelson.
On remand the trial court held a hearing to determine the precise nature of the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of the Van Novers' original malpractice action. Afterward, the appellees herein again moved for summary judgment. The trial court sustained the motion, stating:
Dr. Nelson has appealed.
This appeal is solely concerned with the propriety of the trial court's holding the dismissal of Nelson in Van Nover v. Wesley Medical Center was not a termination of the case favorable to Dr. Nelson. The larger issue divides into two parts: (1) Did the trial *125 court err in reexamining the favorable termination issue; and (2) are there genuine issues of material fact remaining unresolved?
Nelson first contends the trial court erred in reexamining the favorable termination question. Discussion of this issue requires a brief review of this court's opinion in Nelson I. As mentioned that case was an appeal from the trial court's order dismissing Dr. Nelson's petition against appellee. The record before the trial court consisted of four documents: (1) Dr. Nelson's amended petition; (2) the plaintiff's petition in Van Nover v. Wesley Medical Center; (3) the order dismissing the Van Novers' petition; and (4) the decision granting summary judgment to the remaining Van Nover defendants.
In its opinion in Nelson I this court first noted the elements a plaintiff must prove to be successful when alleging malicious prosecution of a civil action:
In discussing item (d), the court noted:
After citing Marbourg v. Smith, 11 Kan. *554, *562-63 (1873), we held: "It is thus the law that a voluntary dismissal of the prior action without prejudice may be a termination in favor of the person against whom the action was brought." 227 Kan. at 281.
Later we reached the following conclusion:
Thus, the case was remanded to the trial court "to permit the parties to proceed with discovery so that the facts may be developed and the rights of the parties determined as to plaintiff's claim for malicious prosecution of a civil action." 227 Kan. at 289.
When seen against the background of Nelson I it becomes clear appellant's first issue is without merit. In Nelson I the court stated a dismissal without prejudice may be a termination in favor of the defendant in that action. Whether that dismissal is in fact a termination favorable to the defendant depends upon "the circumstances under which the proceedings are withdrawn." 227 Kan. at 280. Thus, the trial court on remand held a hearing to determine the facts surrounding Dr. Nelson's dismissal as ordered in Nelson I.
The favorable termination issue was not finally decided in Nelson I. The trial court acted properly in hearing evidence concerning the question.
Appellant next contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because several facts material to the favorable termination issue were controverted.
It is axiomatic summary judgment is not warranted where the record reflects genuine issues of fact remain. "Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Panhandle Agri-Service, Inc. v. Becker, 231 Kan. 291, 295, 644 P.2d 413 (1982). Further, in considering a motion for summary judgment, the party against whom the motion is directed is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences and *127 doubts that may be drawn from the facts under consideration. Farmers State Bank &amp; Trust Co. of Hays v. City of Yates Center, 229 Kan. 330, 341-42, 624 P.2d 971 (1981).
The decision to dismiss the action against Dr. Nelson was made by the Van Novers' attorneys on September 29, 1977. A discovery conference was held in the office of Judge Howard C. Kline at which time the issue was discussed. The discussion was not recorded. Those present were William Tinker, Sr., attorney for Dr. Nelson and his insurance carrier; Fred Phelps, Sr., Avram Adler and David Rapp, attorneys for the plaintiffs; and Darrell D. Kellogg and Gerald L. Michaud, attorneys for the other defendants. What occurred at that meeting provides the evidence with regard to the circumstances under which the proceedings against Dr. Nelson were withdrawn. Out of this evidence must come the answer to the ultimate question of whether the proceedings were terminated in favor of Dr. Nelson. For the moment, however, an examination of the evidence also settles the issue as to whether summary judgment was proper.
Since Dr. Nelson is the party against whom the motion for summary judgment was made he is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the evidence. It is thus unnecessary to discuss in detail the evidence supporting the trial court's holding the dismissal was a result of compromise. Nevertheless, we will present a brief summary of that evidence.
Mr. Adler of the Philadelphia law firm testified by affidavit Tinker told him the dismissal of Dr. Nelson would not be the basis for a subsequent lawsuit brought by Dr. Nelson. Adler said he agreed to the dismissal conditioned upon the right to reinstate the lawsuit within six months.
Mr. Rapp, in spite of having only a sketchy recollection of the meeting, testified he wrote a memo after the meeting which indicated Tinker had expressed his opinion the Van Novers had probable cause to file the original suit against Dr. Nelson.
Finally, Mr. Phelps testified he never felt the need to specifically ask Tinker if he was going to file suit on behalf of Dr. Nelson because of Tinker's "assurances." Phelps said that in response to a question regarding the possibility of Nelson filing suit he remembered Tinker answered, "He better not because he wouldn't have any case if he did." Phelps also testified he *128 would not have agreed to dismiss the suit had Tinker refused to waive the six month statute of limitation.
The evidence supporting Dr. Nelson's argument the dismissal was solely a result of the lack of evidence against him must be examined in more detail.
Mr. Tinker testified by affidavit:
....
Darrell Kellogg also recalled the meeting by affidavit:
*129 Finally, there is the following testimony by Mr. Phelps:
After a statement about Dr. Nelson prescribing Tussionex, Phelps stated:
Later Levy tried to pin Phelps down regarding the reason for Dr. Nelson's dismissal:
Phelps further attempted to explain how the appellant's attorneys *130 were disappointed in the testimony of Dr. Romebach, an expert witness:
....
....
From the foregoing it is clear there are two different versions of what happened at the September 29, 1977, meeting. Appellees argue the dismissal of the case against Dr. Nelson was the result *131 of a compromise reached that day. Indeed, there is evidence from which a jury could have found such was the case. If the dismissal was the result of compromise it was not a sufficient termination to meet the requirements of a cause of action for malicious prosecution of a civil proceeding. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 660(a); § 674, comment j (1976).
On the other hand, Dr. Nelson and his attorney argue the dismissal resulted from the appellee's realization they had no case against him. Again, there is evidence from which a jury could have found this to be the case. If so the dismissal would certainly have been a termination in favor of Dr. Nelson.
Clearly, the material facts regarding the question of whether the dismissal of the Van Novers' lawsuit against Dr. Nelson was terminated in his favor were in substantial dispute, particularly when viewed in the light most favorable to Dr. Nelson as required in considering a motion for summary judgment. As such, a question for the jury is presented. We hold the trial court erred in granting the appellee's motion for summary judgment.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for trial.
HOLMES and LOCKETT, JJ., not participating.
SCHROEDER, C.J.,
concurring. I agree with the foregoing opinion written for the court. The record reflects that while Dr. Nelson wanted to have the action against him dismissed, he did not at any time authorize William Tinker, Sr., who was employed by the Medical Protective Company, Dr. Nelson's insurance carrier, to settle the case on his behalf. This court has held a settlement by the insurer of a claim by a third person against the insured made without the insured's consent or against his protest of nonliability, and not thereafter ratified by him, will not ordinarily bar an action by the insured against the person receiving the settlement, on a claim arising out of the same state of facts. Graves Truck Line, Inc. v. Home Oil Co., Inc., 181 Kan. 507, 312 P.2d 1079 (1957); Lohman v. Woodruff, 224 Kan. 51, 578 P.2d 251 (1978); Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 937 and Later Case Service.