Title: Ex parte Marvin Earl Pines.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1130871
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 3, 2015

REL:04/03/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
____________________
1130871
____________________
Ex parte Marvin Earl Pines
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Marvin Earl Pines
v.
State of Alabama)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CC-12-429;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-12-0856)
PER CURIAM.
WRIT QUASHED. NO OPINION.
1130871
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur.  
Moore, C.J., and Murdock and Main, JJ., dissent.
2
1130871
MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
Marvin Earl Pines was convicted of trafficking in
cannabis, a violation of § 13A-12-231(1)(a), Ala. Code 1975,
and was sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Pines's conviction and
sentence, without an opinion. Pines v. State (No. CR-12-0856,
March 21, 2014), ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2014)
(table). This Court initially granted certiorari review; it
now quashes the writ. Because I believe Pines was entitled to
a judgment of acquittal on the ground of entrapment, I
respectfully dissent.
On the morning of September 16, 2011, Larry Wells, a
confidential informant working with the Montgomery Police
Department, contacted Cpl. M.K. Webster, an officer with the
Montgomery Police Department, informing Cpl. Webster that
Pines had agreed to sell Wells three pounds of marijuana.
Pines and Wells ultimately arranged for the exchange to take
place in the parking lot of a Winn-Dixie grocery store on the
Atlanta Highway in Montgomery. Once Pines arrived, 
the 
police,
who were watching from a distance, moved in and arrested
3
1130871
Pines. The police found approximately three pounds of
marijuana in Pines's vehicle. 
Pines was indicted for trafficking in cannabis, a
violation of § 13A-12-231(1)(a), Ala. Code 1975. At trial,
Cpl. Webster testified that he had had sufficient evidence to
charge Wells with distribution of marijuana in an earlier case
but that Wells had agreed to serve as a confidential informant
in lieu of prosecution. Neither the State nor Pines called
Wells as a witness. At the close of the State's case-in-chief,
Pines moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground of
entrapment, which motion was denied. 
Pines testified in his own defense. According to Pines,
Wells had telephoned him four or five times on the evening of
September 15, 2011, asking Pines to sell him three pounds of
marijuana. Pines testified that he had refused each time,
explaining that he could not find three pounds of marijuana.
According 
to 
Pines, 
Wells 
telephoned 
him 
again 
at
approximately 9:30 a.m. on September 16, 2011, asking Pines to
sell him three pounds of marijuana, and Pines again refused.
Pines testified that Wells telephoned him yet again at around
11:00 a.m. on September 16, 2011, and that, at that point,
4
1130871
Pines finally agreed to sell him the marijuana he was seeking.
Pines testified that his job paid only between $250 and $300
per week and that the thought of the extra money ultimately
led him to agree to sell Wells the marijuana. Pines further
testified that, after agreeing to sell Wells the marijuana, he
acquired three pounds of marijuana from a friend of his, who
was a drug dealer, and then went to meet Wells. Pines admitted
that he had prior drug-related convictions, but he testified
that the maximum amount of marijuana he had sold previously
was one-half of a pound. 
At the close of his case-in-chief, Pines moved again for
a judgment of acquittal on the ground of entrapment. The trial
court again denied Pines's motion, but it instructed the jury
on the defense of entrapment. The jury returned a guilty
verdict. Pines was sentenced, as a habitual offender, to life
imprisonment.  Pines was also ordered to pay a $25,000 fine,
1
court costs, a $100 fine to the Department of Forensic
Sciences, and a $50 crime-victims-compensation assessment. 
Pines had been convicted three times of unlawful
1
possession of marijuana in the first degree, a violation of §
13A-12-213, Ala. Code 1975, a Class C felony.
5
1130871
On appeal, Pines's court-appointed trial counsel filed a
no-merit brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967).  As part of the Anders procedure, the Court of
2
Criminal Appeals issued an order, offering Pines the
opportunity to present pro se any issues he wanted that court
to review, but he did not reply. After examining the record
and holding that there was "no basis for reversing the
judgment of the trial court," the Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed Pines's conviction and sentence in an unpublished
memorandum. Pines v. State (No. CR-12-0856, March 21, 2014),
___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2014) (table). On April 2,
2014, the Court of Criminal Appeals appointed new counsel to
represent Pines on rehearing. Pines filed his application for
rehearing on April 21, 2014, which the Court of Criminal
Appeals overruled on April 24, 2014. Pines then petitioned
this Court for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted
on June 16, 2014.
This Court reviews a trial court's order denying a motion
for a judgment of acquittal as follows:
Anders 
provides 
that 
if 
court-appointed 
appellate 
counsel
2
"finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious
examination of it, he should so advise the court and request
permission to withdraw." Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
6
1130871
"'Appellate courts are limited in reviewing a
trial court's denial of a motion for judgment of
acquittal grounded on insufficiency.' McFarland v.
State, 581 So. 2d 1249, 1253 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).
'The standard of review in determining sufficiency
of evidence is whether evidence existed at the time
of [the defendant's] motion for acquittal was made,
from which the jury could by fair inference find the
[defendant] guilty.' Linzy v. State, 455 So. 2d 260,
261 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (citing Stewart v. State,
350 So. 2d 764 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977), and Hayes v.
State, 395 So. 2d 127 (Ala. Crim. App.), writ
denied, 395 So. 2d 150 (Ala. 1981)). In determining
the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State.
Linzy, supra."
Ex parte Burton, 783 So. 2d 887, 890-91 (Ala. 2000)
(alterations in the original).
Pines argues that the decision of the Court of Criminal
Appeals conflicts with Davis v. State, 570 So. 2d 791 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1990). In Davis, a government agent induced an
informant to persuade a third party to set up a drug
transaction with Ricky Davis. Davis kept refusing to
participate in the transaction, but he finally agreed after he
was telephoned on a daily basis for about a week. 570 So. 2d
at 792. Davis was arrested when the transaction occurred; he
was ultimately convicted of unlawful distribution. Id. 
Before the Court of Criminal Appeals, Davis argued that
the evidence at trial was insufficient to negate his defense
7
1130871
of entrapment. The court defined "entrapment" as "'the
conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his
procurement of its commission by one who would not have
perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud
of the officer.'" 570 So. 2d at 793 (quoting Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454 (1932)). Alabama follows the
"subjective approach" in determining whether an entrapment
defense exists. Id.
"'A two-step test is used under the subjective
approach: the first inquiry is whether or not the
offense was induced by a government agent; and the
second is whether or not the defendant was
predisposed to commit the type of offense charged.
A defendant is considered predisposed if he is
'ready and willing to commit the crimes such as are
charged in the indictment, whenever opportunity was
afforded.'" 
570 So. 2d at 793 (quoting 1 Wayne LaFave, Substantive
Criminal Law § 5.2(b) (1986)). 
Regarding the proper allocation of the burden of proof
when the entrapment defense is raised, the Davis court stated:
"'The defendant must first come forward with
evidence sufficient to raise a jury issue "that the
Government's conduct created a substantial risk that
the offense would be committed by a person other
than one ready to commit it." United States v.
Mosley, 496 F.2d 1012, 1014 (5th Cir. 1974)[,]
citing Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 163, 168
(5th Cir. 1969). Once such issue is raised, the
8
1130871
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was predisposed to commit the charged
offense. Id. See also United States v. Gomez–Rojas,
507 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1975).'"
Davis, 570 So. 2d at 795 (quoting United States v. Dickens,
524 F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 1976)). 
The Court of Criminal Appeals first considered whether
Davis had been induced by the government agent to arrange the
drug transaction. Citing Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
435, 442 (1932), the court provided the following test for
determining whether a defendant has been induced:
"In Sorrells, supra, the United States Supreme
Court articulated the 'origin of intent test.' This
test permits invocation of the entrapment defense
'when the criminal design originates with the
officials of the Government, and they implant in the
mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit
the alleged offense and induce its commission in
order that they may prosecute.' Sorrells, supra, 287
U.S. at 442, 53 S.Ct. at 212–13."
570 So. 2d at 793. After holding that the origin-of-intent
test was broad enough to encompass inducement by an
unsuspecting middleman, the court reasoned that the crime was
"the creature of 
[Agent 
Cosey's] purpose" and that, therefore,
Davis had been induced by the government agent. Davis, 570 So.
2d at 794 (alteration in the original). 
9
1130871
Turning to the second step of the test, the Davis court
analyzed whether Davis was predisposed to commit the offense: 
"In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the
transaction complained of was not initiated by the
appellant. Indeed, the appellant rebuffed the
agent's advances on numerous occasions before
finally giving in so that they would cease 'bugging'
him. 'It is the response of the target when the
enterprise is initially proposed that can tell most
about the individual's predisposition. In many
entrapment cases, the accused exhibits reluctance,
and the inducing agent or private individual applies
pressure or persuasion, at the outset.' [Note,
Entrapment Through Unsuspecting Middlemen, 95 Harv.
L. Rev. 1139 (1982). (Footnotes omitted.)"
570 So. 2d at 795-96. The court also noted that there was no
evidence indicating that Davis had been a drug dealer, that
Davis did not know where to procure drugs to sell, and that
Davis did not make any profit off the sale. 570 So. 2d at 796.
Accordingly, the court reversed Davis's conviction and
rendered a judgment in his favor. 
Applying Davis to the present case, the first issue is
whether Wells induced Pines to commit the offense. The
evidence tended to show that Wells, the government agent,
initiated the transaction with Pines. According to Pines,
Wells telephoned him four or five times on the evening of
September 15, 2011, and each time Pines refused to sell Wells
10
1130871
three pounds of marijuana. Pines testified that on the morning
of September 16, 2011, Wells telephoned Pines twice more, and
on the second telephone call Pines finally agreed to sell
Wells the marijuana. Thus, the crime was "the creature of
[Wells's] purpose." Davis, 570 So. 2d at 794. 
The State argues that Pines was not induced because, it
argues, he actively participated in arranging the exchange
once he agreed to do it and that, therefore, at the very
least, the evidence was conflicting and the issue properly
went to the jury. I believe the State misapprehends the
inducement prong of the entrapment defense. Under the origin-
of-intent test, the relevant inquiry is whether the crime was
"the creature of the [government agent's] purpose." Davis, 
570
So. 2d at 794. In this case, the evidence showed that the
transaction was Wells's idea. Because Pines "committed the
offense as a result of [Wells's] actions," Davis, 570 So. 2d
at 794, I believe Pines was induced to commit the offense of
trafficking in cannabis. 
The next issue is whether Pines was predisposed to commit
the offense. Like the defendant in Davis, Pines initially
refused to commit the offense when the government agent sought
11
1130871
to induce him. Further, like the defendant in Davis, Pines
kept refusing to commit the offense when the government agent
kept telephoning him. Pines refused four or five times on
September 15, 2011, and once more on September 16, 2011,
before finally giving in on the sixth or seventh telephone
call, thus making Pines's response similar to Davis's.
Although Pines (unlike Davis) had a familiarity with drugs,
Pines testified that he had never sold three pounds of
marijuana and that he had never sold more than a half pound of
marijuana at one time. 
Moreover, Pines repeatedly testified that he told Wells
he could not locate three pounds of marijuana. In my opinion,
it is impossible to prove that a defendant is "ready and
willing" to commit the offense of trafficking in cannabis,
which involves selling at least 2.2 pounds of marijuana, §
13A-12-231(1)(a), Ala. Code 1975, if the defendant cannot
locate the amount of marijuana necessary to complete the
offense and makes that known to the government agent. See
Davis, 570 So. 2d at 795 (holding that the accused must be
"ready and willing" to commit the crime). If Pines was unable
to perform as requested, then he certainly could not be ready
12
1130871
to commit the crime. Just as intoxication can negate the
ability to form the requisite intent to commit a crime, see
Lee v. State, 439 So. 2d 818, 821 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983), so
the inability to perform can negate the requisite readiness to
commit a crime. Given the evidence above, I am persuaded that
a jury could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Pines was
predisposed to commit the crime of trafficking in cannabis.
Aside from the merits, the State argues that the writ is
due to be quashed for two reasons: (1) Pines did not raise the
entrapment issue in his initial brief on appeal, and (2) Pines
allegedly does not comply with the procedural requirements of
Rule 39, Ala. R. App. P., in making his conflict argument. 
As to the State's first argument, Pines's counsel filed
a no-merit brief in the Court of Criminal Appeals pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Anders provides the
following procedure when appellate counsel finds his or her
client's appeal to be without merit:
"[I]f counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous,
after a conscientious examination of it, he should
so advise the court and request permission to
withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied
by a brief referring to anything in the record that
might arguably support the appeal. A copy of
counsel's brief should be furnished the indigent and
time allowed him to raise any points that he
13
1130871
chooses; the court--not counsel--then proceeds,
after a full examination of all the proceedings, to
decide whether the case is wholly frivolous. If it
so finds it may grant counsel's request to withdraw
and 
dismiss 
the 
appeal 
insofar 
as 
federal
requirements are concerned, or proceed to a decision
on the merits, if state law so requires. On the
other hand, if it finds any of the legal points
arguable on their merits (and therefore not
frivolous) it must, prior to decision, afford the
indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the
appeal."
386 U.S. at 744 (emphasis added).
It is usually true that "[m]atters not argued in
appellant's brief on original submission cannot be raised for
the first time on application for rehearing." SouthTrust Bank
v. Copeland One, L.L.C., 886 So. 2d 38, 43 (Ala. 2003)
(opinion on application 
for 
rehearing). However, in this case,
newly appointed counsel raised the issue of entrapment in the
brief filed on application for rehearing in the Court of
Criminal Appeals. Under Anders, the Court of Criminal Appeals
had the responsibility to appoint new counsel for Pines before
rehearing to argue the issue, which I believe has merit; it
failed to do so. I do not agree that this Court should quash
the writ on that basis. 
Secondly, the State argues that Pines did not adequately
state a conflict between the decision below and Davis. The
14
1130871
essence of the State's argument is that the Court of Criminal
Appeals held in its unpublished memorandum merely that it had
"reviewed the record and [could] find no basis for reversing
the judgment of the trial court." Thus, according to the
State, this Court would have to speculate as to why the Court
of Criminal Appeals could find no reason to reverse Pines's
conviction. I disagree. Whatever the Court of Criminal
Appeals' reasons were for finding Pines's entrapment defense
meritless, that court nonetheless affirmed Pines's conviction
and sentence. That affirmance conflicted with Davis because
Pines's motion for a judgment of acquittal should have been
granted. 
Under the evidence discussed above, I do not believe that
the State had sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Pines was predisposed to commit the crime of
trafficking in cannabis for which he was convicted. If this is
true, then "the law requires that [Pines's] conviction be
reversed and judgment rendered in his favor." Davis, 570 So.
2d at 796. I believe that Pines's motion for a judgment of
acquittal was due to be granted. I respectfully dissent. 
Murdock, J., concurs.
15