Title: State v. Fermanich
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2021AP000462-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 14, 2023

2023 WI 48 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP462-CR  
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Michael K. Fermanich, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 402 Wis. 2d 309, 974 N.W.2d 895  
(2022 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 14, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 12, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Langlade   
 
JUDGE: 
John B. Rhode    
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ROGGENSACK, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., 
joined. DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion. ZIEGLER, C.J., 
filed a dissenting opinion in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., 
joined. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Colleen Marion, assistant state public defender. There 
was an oral argument by Colleen Marion, assistant state public 
defender.  
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Jacob J. Wittwer, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
 
 
2 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Jacob J. Wittwer, assistant attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 48 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2021AP462-CR 
 
(L.C. No. 
2017CF313) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael K. Fermanich, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JUN 14, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ROGGENSACK, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., 
joined. DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion. ZIEGLER, C.J., 
filed a dissenting opinion in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., 
joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   In the span of approximately two 
hours, Michael Fermanich stole and drove three trucks in 
Langlade County, eventually driving the third over the border 
into Oneida County.  The State brought charges first in Oneida 
County.  The Oneida County Circuit Court imposed cash bail that 
Fermanich could not post, so he stayed in jail.  Several months 
later, while Fermanich remained in the Oneida County Jail, the 
No. 
2021AP462-CR 
 
 
2 
 
State brought charges in Langlade County.  The Langlade County 
Circuit Court imposed a signature bond.  Ultimately, the two 
cases were consolidated in Langlade County.  Fermanich pled no 
contest to three charges——one from Langlade County and two from 
Oneida County.  The other charges from both counties were 
dismissed and read in.  Fermanich was eventually sentenced to 
concurrent terms on each of the three counts.   
¶2 
The question before us is whether Fermanich is 
entitled to sentence credit on his Langlade County charge for 
time served in the Oneida County Jail.  We conclude he is.  A 
defendant 
is 
entitled 
to 
sentence 
credit 
for 
pre-trial 
confinement "for all days spent in custody in connection with 
the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed," which 
includes "confinement related to an offense for which the 
offender is ultimately sentenced."  Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) 
(2021-22).1  Under State v. Floyd, pre-trial confinement on a 
dismissed and read-in charge relates to an offense for which the 
offender is ultimately sentenced.  2000 WI 14, ¶32, 232 
Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155, abrogated on other grounds by State 
v. Straszkowski, 2008 WI 65, ¶¶89, 95, 310 Wis. 2d 259, 750 
N.W.2d 835.  Three of Fermanich's Oneida County charges——for 
which he was confined pre-trial——were dismissed and read in at 
sentencing on the Langlade County charge.  Therefore, under 
Floyd, confinement on the dismissed and read-in Oneida County 
charges relates to the Langlade County charge for which 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2021-22 version. 
No. 
2021AP462-CR 
 
 
3 
 
Fermanich was ultimately sentenced.  Accordingly, he is entitled 
to credit on that charge. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
On September 30, 2017, Michael Fermanich stole three 
trucks in Langlade County, one after the other.  After stealing 
the third truck, he drove it from Langlade County into Oneida 
County, where officers eventually arrested him.  The whole 
affair lasted around two hours. 
¶4 
In October 2017, the State filed a five-count criminal 
complaint against Fermanich in Oneida County:  one count of 
operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent; two 
counts of attempting to flee or elude an officer; one count of 
obstructing an officer; and one count of failure to obey a 
traffic officer/signal.  The Oneida County Circuit Court imposed 
a $10,000 cash bond the same day.  Fermanich did not post the 
bond, so he was incarcerated in the Oneida County Jail where he 
remained for 433 days.   
¶5 
In December 2017, the State filed a criminal complaint 
in Langlade County with three counts:  one count of operating a 
motor vehicle without the owner's consent——repeater; and two 
counts of operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent—
—joyriding, repeater.  In February 2018, while Fermanich 
remained in custody in Oneida County, the Langlade County 
Circuit Court2 imposed a $10,000 signature bond.  By signing the 
                                                 
2 The Honorable John B. Rhode presided. 
No. 
2021AP462-CR 
 
 
4 
 
signature bond, Fermanich was free to go for purposes of the 
Langlade County charges, but promised to pay the cash amount if 
the bail conditions were not satisfied.  Again, through all of 
this, he was incarcerated in the Oneida County Jail based on his 
charges there.   
¶6 
In October 2018, Fermanich applied to consolidate the 
two cases in Langlade County under Wis. Stat. § 971.09(1).  Once 
the Langlade County Circuit Court approved, the State filed an 
amended information that combined all eight charges from both 
counties.  This fused the two "independent and separate actions" 
"into a single action."  State v. Rachwal, 159 Wis. 2d 494, 515, 
465 N.W.2d 490 (1991). 
¶7 
Fermanich ultimately pled no contest to three charges:  
Count 1, operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent——
repeater (originally brought in Langlade County); Count 4, 
operating 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
without 
the 
owner's 
consent 
(originally brought in Oneida County); and Count 5, attempting 
to flee or elude an officer (originally brought in Oneida 
County).  The State dismissed the other five charges and read 
them in at the sentencing hearing.3  Three of those dismissed and 
read-in charges were originally brought in Oneida County.  In 
the end, the circuit court withheld Fermanich's sentence and 
placed him on probation for five years.   
                                                 
3 Read-in charges are charges that are not prosecuted but 
can be considered by the circuit court during sentencing.  State 
v. Hinkle, 2019 WI 96, ¶10 n.10, 389 Wis. 2d 1, 935 N.W.2d 271. 
No. 
2021AP462-CR 
 
 
5 
 
¶8 
In 2019 and 2020, however, Fermanich committed several 
probation violations and spent time in custody on probation 
holds and alternative-to-revocation arrangements.  As a result 
of violating the conditions of his probation, the circuit court 
imposed a sentence of 18 months of initial confinement and 24 
months of extended supervision on all three charges, each to run 
concurrently, meaning that they are served simultaneously.  
¶9 
In November 2020, Fermanich filed a motion to modify 
the judgment of conviction, asking the circuit court to credit 
him with 433 days for time spent in the Oneida County Jail for 
all three charges.  At that hearing, the parties agreed 
Fermanich was entitled to 433 days of credit on the two Oneida 
County charges.  But the parties disagreed on the credit owed 
for the Langlade County charge because Fermanich was "free" on a 
signature bond for that offense.  The circuit court awarded 
Fermanich 433 days of credit on all three charges for time spent 
in the Oneida County Jail.  The State appealed, and the court of 
appeals reversed.  See State v. Fermanich, No. 2021AP462-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2022) (per curiam).  
We granted Fermanich's petition for review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶10 Wisconsin's sentence credit statute requires circuit 
courts to give defendants credit for time spent in custody.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).  It provides: 
A convicted offender shall be given credit toward the 
service of his or her sentence for all days spent in 
No. 
2021AP462-CR 
 
 
6 
 
custody in connection with the course of conduct for 
which 
sentence 
was 
imposed. 
 
As 
used 
in 
this 
subsection, "actual days spent in custody" includes, 
without limitation by enumeration, confinement related 
to an offense for which the offender is ultimately 
sentenced, or for any other sentence arising out of 
the same course of conduct . . . . 
Id.  Application of § 973.155(1)(a) "to a particular set of 
facts presents a question of law we review independently."  
State v. Kontny, 2020 WI App 30, ¶6, 392 Wis. 2d 311, 943 
N.W.2d 923. 
¶11 Fermanich argues his crime spree constituted a "course 
of conduct" under Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a), entitling him to 
credit on the Langlade County charge.  He also argues that our 
decision in State v. Floyd applies because the confinement on 
his dismissed and read-in charges relates to "an offense for 
which the offender is ultimately sentenced," here, the Langlade 
County charge.  232 Wis. 2d 767, ¶32.  We agree with the latter, 
and therefore need not reach Fermanich's first argument.  
¶12 In Floyd, the defendant was charged with recklessly 
endangering safety while armed with a dangerous weapon (among 
other charges).  Id., ¶2.  While free on bond, the police 
arrested the defendant for armed robbery.  Id., ¶3.  He remained 
in custody for several months.  Id.  Eventually, the defendant 
pled guilty to the reckless endangerment charge——the charge on 
which he posted bond.  Id., ¶4.  As part of the plea, the State 
agreed to dismiss and read in the armed robbery charge for which 
he spent time in custody.  Id.  The court then sentenced the 
defendant to five years on the reckless endangerment charge.  
Id., ¶6.  However, the court declined to grant the defendant 
No. 
2021AP462-CR 
 
 
7 
 
credit for the time he spent in custody on the armed robbery 
charge.  Id., ¶7.   
¶13 Before us, the defendant made two arguments, the 
second of which is relevant to this case.  Id., ¶¶14, 18.  His 
argument 
concerned 
the 
second 
sentence 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a), which says that "'actual days spent in custody' 
includes . . . confinement related to an offense for which the 
offender is ultimately sentenced."  Id., ¶¶13, 18.  The 
defendant maintained that because the sentencing court took his 
dismissed and read-in armed robbery charge into account when 
sentencing him for reckless endangerment, his confinement on the 
armed robbery charge "was related to an offense for which he was 
ultimately sentenced."  Id., ¶18.  We agreed.  Id., ¶32. 
¶14 We initially found the statute ambiguous because it 
could be read to include either dismissed and read-in charges 
broadly or only the charge on which a defendant is convicted.  
Id., ¶¶18-19.  To resolve that ambiguity, we turned to the 
statute's history and purpose.  Id., ¶¶20-23.  We observed that 
the statute provided "sentence credit in a wide range of 
situations" and "was 'designed to afford fairness' and ensure 
'that a person not serve more time than he is sentenced.'"  Id., 
¶23 (quoting another source).  We also consulted the nature of 
read-in charges.  Id., ¶¶24-27.  At the time, read-ins 
constituted "admissions by the defendant to those charges."  
Id., ¶25.  That made them different from other types of charges 
considered 
by 
the 
sentencing 
court——such 
as 
unproven 
or 
No. 
2021AP462-CR 
 
 
8 
 
acquitted offenses——because more weight would be placed on them.  
Id., ¶27.  The "unique nature of read-in charges" coupled with 
the 
legislative 
history 
and 
purpose 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a) led us to conclude that the legislature intended 
the statute to provide credit for read-ins.  Id., ¶31.  
Therefore, we unanimously held that "pre-trial confinement on a 
dismissed charge that is read in at sentencing relates to 'an 
offense for which the offender is ultimately sentenced.'"  Id., 
¶32.  This meant the defendant was entitled to credit.4  Id.   
¶15 Applying our decision in Floyd, Fermanich is entitled 
to credit on the Langlade County charge.5  Fermanich signed a 
                                                 
4 A few years after State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, 232 
Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155, we held that read-in charges do not 
necessarily require a defendant to admit guilt.  State v. 
Straszkowski, 2008 WI 65, ¶97, 310 Wis. 2d 259, 750 N.W.2d 835.  
We acknowledged that some of our prior cases——such as Floyd——
stated that read-ins constitute admissions.  Id., ¶89.  But 
after consulting the statutory definition of read-in crimes 
(which made no mention of admissions), as well as a wide array 
of cases on the subject, we concluded that circuit courts should 
not "deem the defendant to admit as a matter of law to the read-
in crime for purposes of sentencing."  Id., ¶¶59-92.  We 
withdrew language from prior cases, including Floyd, suggesting 
otherwise.  Id., ¶95.   
In his brief, Fermanich contends he admitted to the charges 
when the cases were consolidated.  The State does not contest 
this point.  Thus, neither party argues that Straszkowski 
changes the calculus regarding Floyd's application to the facts 
of this case, so we do not address it. 
5 Instead of applying Floyd, the dissent contends it should 
be overruled, which no party asked us to do.  See Serv. Emps. 
Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶24, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 
N.W.2d 35 ("We do not step out of our neutral role to develop or 
construct arguments for parties; it is up to them to make their 
case."). 
No. 
2021AP462-CR 
 
 
9 
 
signature bond on the Langlade County charge, similar to the 
personal recognizance bond signed by the defendant in Floyd.  
Id., ¶2.  But Fermanich spent time in custody on the Oneida 
County charges that were dismissed and read in at sentencing, 
the same way the defendant in Floyd spent time in custody on the 
armed robbery charge that was dismissed and read in at 
sentencing.  Id., ¶¶3, 6.  Thus, per Floyd, Fermanich's 
confinement on the Oneida County charges, which were read in at 
sentencing, related under Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) to the 
Langlade County charge——the charge for which Fermanich was 
ultimately sentenced.  Id., ¶32.  Fermanich is therefore 
entitled to credit on that sentence just as the defendant in 
Floyd was entitled to credit on his reckless endangerment charge 
for his confinement on the armed robbery charge.  Id.   
¶16 The State does not ask us to overrule Floyd.  Instead, 
it argues that Floyd does not control because Fermanich already 
received credit for the dismissed and read-in charges when the 
circuit court awarded him credit on the two Oneida County 
charges for which he was sentenced.  The State misreads Floyd.  
The defendant in Floyd received credit because the confinement 
on the armed robbery charge became related to the reckless 
endangerment charge when the circuit court considered them 
together at the sentencing hearing.  Id.  The same applies here.  
The dismissed and read-in Oneida County charges were considered 
alongside the Langlade County charge for which the circuit court 
ultimately sentenced Fermanich.  Therefore, Floyd does control 
No. 
2021AP462-CR 
 
 
10 
 
the outcome here and Fermanich is entitled to credit for the 433 
days he spent in the Oneida County Jail on the Langlade County 
charge.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶17 Fermanich was in custody in the Oneida County Jail for 
offenses in that county.  At sentencing, three of those offenses 
were dismissed and read in alongside three counts he pled no 
contest to, one of which originated in Langlade County.  Under 
Floyd, pre-trial confinement on a dismissed and read-in charge 
relates to an offense for which the offender is ultimately 
sentenced.  Id.  Applied here, that means that the confinement 
on the dismissed and read-in Oneida County charges related to 
the Langlade County charge.  Fermanich is therefore entitled to 
credit on that charge for time spent in custody in the Oneida 
County Jail. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
No.  2021AP462-CR.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶18 REBECCA 
FRANK 
DALLET, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
One 
September night, Michael Fermanich stole three trucks in 
Langlade County, one after the other, before crashing the third 
into a creek in neighboring Oneida County.  For this less than 
two hour episode, Fermanich racked up numerous charges which 
were filed in separate cases in the two counties.  Unable to 
post bail on the Oneida County charges, Fermanich spent 433 days 
in pre-trial custody in the Oneida County Jail.  Eventually, all 
of the pending charges were consolidated into a single case in 
Langlade County, and Fermanich pleaded no contest to three 
offenses1:  (1) operating a motor vehicle without the owner's 
consent in Langlade County, (2) operating a motor vehicle 
without the owner's consent in Oneida County, and (3) fleeing 
and eluding in Oneida County.  The circuit court sentenced 
Fermanich to 18 months of initial confinement and 24 months of 
extended supervision for each of these counts,2 with the 
sentences to be served concurrently.   
¶19 The central question in this case is how much sentence 
credit Fermanich is due on count one——operating a motor vehicle 
without the owner's consent in Langlade County.  The answer to 
that 
question 
is 
important 
because 
everyone 
agrees 
that 
Fermanich is entitled to 433 days of credit against his 
                                                 
1 The remaining five counts were dismissed and read in at 
sentencing.   
2 As explained in the majority opinion, the circuit court 
initially withheld sentence and placed Fermanich on probation.  
See majority op., ¶7.  After several probation violations, the 
circuit court revoked probation and imposed this sentence.  Id., 
¶8.   
No.  2021AP462-CR.rfd 
 
2 
 
sentences on both of his Oneida County convictions for the time 
he spent in pre-trial custody in Oneida County.  Given that the 
circuit court imposed concurrent sentences, that credit would be 
meaningless if Fermanich is not entitled to the same credit 
against the sentence on his Langlade County conviction.  He 
would have to serve 433 additional days in prison.    
¶20 To decide Fermanich's entitlement to sentence credit 
we should begin with the text of the relevant statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).  That statute says that "[a] convicted 
offender shall be given credit toward the service of his or her 
sentence for all days spent in custody in connection with the 
course of conduct for which sentence was imposed."  Id. 
(emphasis added).  Section 973.155(1)(a) doesn't define "course 
of conduct," but it is a common phrase with a familiar meaning.  
It simply refers to two or more acts, connected to each other by 
a common purpose or intention.3  Many statutes define the phrase 
similarly.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 940.32(1)(a) ("'Course of 
conduct' means 2 or more acts carried out over time, however 
short 
or 
long, 
that 
show 
a 
continuity 
of 
purpose."); 
§ 947.013(1)(a) ("'Course of conduct' means a pattern of conduct 
composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however 
short, 
evidencing 
a 
continuity 
of 
purpose."); 
see 
also 
                                                 
3 See, 
e.g., 
Course, 
Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/course 
(defining 
"course" as "accustomed procedure or normal action," "an ordered 
process or succession," and "the act or action of moving in path 
from point to point"); Conduct, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/conduct 
(describing 
conduct as an "act, manner, or process of carrying on") 
No.  2021AP462-CR.rfd 
 
3 
 
§ 943.204(1)(b) (incorporating the definition in § 947.013(1)(a) 
by reference).   
¶21 Although § 973.155(1)(a) doesn't expressly incorporate 
these definitions, they all mirror the way an ordinary person 
might use the phrase "course of conduct" when applied to a 
series of criminal acts.  For example, if someone robs a bank 
and flees the scene, leading the police on a high speed chase, 
one might refer to those acts together as a "course of conduct."  
While the theft and the fleeing are different acts that might 
support different criminal charges, they are nevertheless part 
of a single course of conduct because they are united by a 
common purpose——stealing from the bank.   
 ¶22 So too for Fermanich's actions.  He stole three 
different trucks from three different locations in Langlade 
County.  The police finally caught up with him in Oneida County.  
While fleeing from the police, he crashed the third stolen 
truck.  Fermanich's purpose was stealing trucks, and his one-
after-the-other-after-the-other crime spree is a classic example 
of a course of conduct.  As the circuit court correctly put it, 
"[t]his was all the same course of conduct.  It happened on the 
same day within a short period of time.  The only reason we're 
dealing with this issue is because it happened to spill over a 
county line."   
¶23 Given that Fermanich's actions were all part of the 
same course of conduct, he is entitled to the same credit 
against his sentences on all three counts under § 973.155(1)(a).  
As explained previously, defendants are entitled to credit for 
No.  2021AP462-CR.rfd 
 
4 
 
pre-trial custody "in connection with the course of conduct for 
which sentence [is] imposed."  Id.  In other words, if a 
defendant is held in pre-trial custody for an offense that is 
part of a broader course of conduct, he is entitled to credit 
for that time so long as he is ultimately convicted of an 
offense that is also part of that same course of conduct.   That 
is what happened here.  The 433 days Fermanich "spent in 
custody" were for driving a stolen vehicle from Langlade County 
into Oneida County and using it to flee and obstruct officers.  
Id.  This conduct was part of the same "course of conduct for 
which sentence was imposed"——stealing trucks in Langlade County, 
driving one into Oneida County, and, when caught, fleeing from 
the police.  Id.  Therefore, Fermanich is entitled to credit.   
¶24 This 
interpretation 
of 
§ 973.155(1)(a) 
straightforwardly applies its text and furthers the statute's 
purpose——"to afford fairness by ensuring 'that a person [does] 
not serve more time than that for which he is sentenced.'"  See 
State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 107, ¶70, 304 Wis. 2d 318, 735 
N.W.2d 505 (quoting State v. Beets, 124 Wis. 2d 372, 379, 369 
N.W.2d 382 
(1985)). 
 
Nevertheless, 
cases 
interpreting 
§ 973.155(1)(a) have strayed a long way from its text.  Since at 
least the court of appeals' decision in State v. Tuescher, 226 
Wis. 2d 465, 595 N.W.2d 443 (Ct. App. 1999) and our decision in 
State ex rel. Thorson v. Schwarz, 2004 WI 96, 274 Wis. 2d 1, 681 
N.W.2d 914, courts have rejected a reading of § 973.155(1)(a)'s 
"course of conduct" language that would cover all parts of "the 
same criminal episode."  Tuescher, 226 Wis. 2d at 471.  Instead, 
No.  2021AP462-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
they read § 973.155(1)(a) to apply only to time a defendant 
spends in custody in connection with "the specific 'offense or 
acts' embodied in the charge for which the defendant is being 
sentenced."  Tuescher, 226 Wis. 2d at 471 (quoting another 
source); see also Schwarz, 274 Wis. 2d 1, at ¶31 (discussing 
Tuescher's 
interpretation 
of 
the 
phrase). 
 
Under 
this 
interpretation, if my hypothetical bank robber were held in pre-
trial custody only on a charge of fleeing the police, he would 
not receive any sentence credit for that time if he were 
ultimately convicted and sentenced only for the bank robbery.    
¶25 There are many reasons to reject this overly narrow 
interpretation.  For starters, it reads the words "course of" 
out of § 973.155(1)(a).  If the legislature intended for credit 
to be available only for "the specific 'offense or acts'" for 
which the defendant is being sentenced, see Tuescher, 226 
Wis. 2d at 471 (quoting another source), then it could easily 
have written a statute entitling defendants to credit only "for 
all days spent in custody in connection with the conduct for 
which sentence was imposed."  See § 973.155(1)(a).  But the 
legislature did not do so.  Moreover, by using the phrase 
"course of conduct," the legislature focused the sentence-credit 
inquiry directly on the factual relationship between the conduct 
for which a defendant was in custody and the conduct for which 
sentence was imposed.  See id.; see also State v. Carter, 2010 
WI 77, ¶56, 327 Wis. 2d 1, 785 N.W.2d 516 (explaining that "it 
is the factual connection between custody and the conduct for 
which sentence is imposed that is controlling").  The analysis 
No.  2021AP462-CR.rfd 
 
6 
 
required by § 973.155(1)(a)'s text is thus at odds with Tuescher 
and Schwarz's narrow focus on just "the specific 'offense or 
acts' embodied in the charge for which the defendant is being 
sentenced."  Tuescher, 226 Wis. 2d at 471 (quoting another 
source); see also Schwarz, 274 Wis. 2d 1, at ¶31.   
¶26 We 
should 
therefore 
consider 
realigning 
our 
interpretation 
of 
§ 973.155(1)(a) 
with 
its 
text 
in 
an 
appropriate case.  But we need not do so here because, as the 
majority opinion correctly explains, our decision in Floyd 
governs.4  Floyd makes clear that Fermanich is entitled to the 
sentence 
credit 
he 
seeks 
under 
a 
different 
part 
of 
§ 973.155(1)(a).  See State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, ¶32, 232 
Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155, abrogated on other grounds by State 
v. Straszkowski, 2008 WI 65, ¶¶89, 95, 310 Wis. 2d 259, 750 
N.W.2d 835.  I therefore join the majority opinion in full and 
respectfully concur.    
                                                 
4 Moreover, the parties did not ask us directly to revisit 
our precedent.   
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶27 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (dissenting).  We 
accepted this case for review in order to determine the meaning 
of the phrase "all days spent in custody in connection with the 
course of conduct for which sentence was imposed" under Wis. 
Stat. § 973.155(1)(a), Wisconsin's sentence credit statute.  But 
the majority neglects to answer this question.  The majority 
instead rests its decision on a precedent that is entirely 
disconnected from the statutory text.  The result is that 
Fermanich receives credit for time spent in custody toward a 
sentence that has no connection to his previous custody, based 
on offenses for which he was neither convicted nor sentenced.  
¶28 This case involves Fermanich's series of motor vehicle 
thefts, which occurred in both Langlade and Oneida counties on a 
single night.  He was subsequently held in custody for the 
Oneida County charges but posted bond on the Langlade County 
charges, meaning his custody was unrelated to those charges.  
Fermanich later pled no contest to one of the Langlade County 
counts and two of the Oneida County counts.  The remaining 
charges were read in at sentencing.  
¶29 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) entitles a convicted 
defendant to sentence credit "for all days spent in custody in 
connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was 
imposed."  Although Fermanich is entitled to credit for the 
Oneida County counts, he is not entitled to credit for the 
Langlade County counts because his custody in Oneida County was 
not connected to the conduct underlying the Langlade County 
counts.  Fermanich's separate offenses also do not constitute 
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
the same "course of conduct."  The conduct underlying each 
offense occurred at a different time, in a different place, 
using different acts than were required to prove the other 
offenses.  His Langlade County conduct was not connected to his 
custody, so he is not entitled to sentence credit toward any 
Langlade County count. 
¶30 The 
majority, 
however, 
reaches 
the 
opposite 
conclusion.  It does so based not on the language of the 
statute, but instead on the erroneous conclusion in State v. 
Floyd that a defendant is entitled to sentence credit based on 
read-in charges.  This directive is absurd and must be 
overruled.  It is impossible to grant sentence credit for read-
in charges because defendants are not sentenced for read-in 
charges.  Floyd deals with this hurdle by granting credit toward 
a sentence even if the sentence is not imposed for conduct 
connected to the defendant's custody.  Floyd's result is flatly 
at odds with the language of Wis. Stat. § 973.155, and we should 
bring clarity to this area of law by overruling it.  Because the 
majority fails to do so, I respectfully dissent.   
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶31 On September 30, 2017, Michael Fermanich committed a 
series of crimes.  He stole three trucks, one after the other, 
in Langlade County.  He stole the first truck in the Town of 
Antigo.  After driving that truck to the Town of Peck, Fermanich 
abandoned it and proceeded to steal a second truck.  He drove 
that second truck to the Town of Parish, where he abandoned that 
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
truck and stole a third.  The trucks were each owned by separate 
individuals.  
¶32 After stealing the third truck, Fermanich drove into 
Oneida County.  He led officers on a pursuit throughout Oneida 
County before losing control of the stolen truck and running it 
off the road into a ditch.  He was arrested and charged in 
Oneida County with five offenses, each involving conduct that 
took place in Oneida County:  operating a motor vehicle without 
the owner's consent contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.32(2), two 
counts of attempting to flee or elude an officer contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3), obstructing an officer contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 946.41(1), and failure to obey a traffic officer or 
signal contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.04(2t).  He was held in the 
Oneida County jail on cash bail. 
¶33 Two months later, on January 29, 2018, Fermanich was 
charged in Langlade County with one count of taking and driving 
a motor vehicle without the owner's consent contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 943.23(2), and two counts of operating a vehicle without 
the owner's consent contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.23(3).  Each 
offense involved conduct that took place in Langlade County.  
Fermanich made his initial appearance in Langlade County and 
signed a $10,000 signature bond on February 6, 2018.  As the 
majority correctly observes, "[b]y signing the signature bond, 
Fermanich was free to go for purposes of the Langlade County 
charges."  Majority op., ¶5.    
¶34 The cases were consolidated, and the State amended the 
Langlade County information to include the Oneida County 
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
charges.  At a plea and sentencing hearing in Langlade County 
circuit court on December 6, 2018, Fermanich pled no contest to 
one of the Langlade County charges (count 1) and two of the 
Oneida County charges (counts 4 and 5).  All other counts were 
dismissed and read in at sentencing.  The circuit court withheld 
sentencing, 
imposed 
five 
years' 
probation, 
and 
concluded 
Fermanich was entitled to 433 days of sentence credit on counts 
4 and 5 for the time he spent in the Oneida County jail if 
probation was later revoked.  
¶35 In 2020, Fermanich's probation was revoked, and the 
circuit court imposed a sentence consisting of 18 months' 
initial confinement and 24 months' extended supervision.  The 
circuit court imposed this same sentence for each of the three 
counts to be served concurrently.  The issue is whether 
Fermanich's 433 days of sentence credit for the time spent in 
the Oneida County jail applies against his sentences for all 
three counts or just the counts arising out of Fermanich's 
conduct in Oneida County, counts 4 and 5.1     
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶36 The question in this case "presents a straightforward 
issue of statutory interpretation that we review de novo."  
Backus v. Waukesha Cnty., 2022 WI 55, ¶8, 402 Wis. 2d 764, 976 
N.W.2d 
492. 
 
"[W]e 
have 
repeatedly 
held 
that 
statutory 
interpretation 'begins with the language of the statute.  If the 
meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the 
                                                 
1 The parties agree that Fermanich is entitled to 433 days 
of credit on counts 4 and 5.  
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 
WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. 
O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  
"Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or 
phrases are given their technical or special definitional 
meaning."  Id.  "Therefore, statutory language is interpreted in 
the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of 
a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related 
statutes; 
and 
reasonably, 
to 
avoid 
absurd 
or 
unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46.  Legislative history may be 
"consulted to confirm or verify a plain-meaning interpretation."  
Id., ¶51. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶37 Unlike the majority, I begin with the essential task 
of attempting to find meaning in the statutory text.  See id., 
¶44 ("It is, of course, a solemn obligation of the judiciary to 
faithfully give effect to the laws enacted by the legislature, 
and to do so requires a determination of statutory meaning.").  
I then explain that Wis. Stat. § 973.155's plain meaning does 
not entitle Fermanich to credit on count 1.  Finally, I discuss 
Floyd and conclude it should be overruled because its ruling is 
directly contrary to the language of the statute Floyd purported 
to interpret.  
A.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155(1)(a)'s Proper Interpretation 
¶38 Fermanich argues he is entitled to 433 days of 
sentence credit on count 1 because his confinement in Oneida 
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
County was "in connection with the course of conduct for which 
sentence 
was 
imposed" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a), 
Wisconsin's sentence credit statute.  According to Fermanich, 
this is so because "all three counts arose from a single course 
of conduct."  The State argues the counts did not arise from the 
same "course of conduct."  Instead, the phrase "course of 
conduct" means "the 'specific acts' or offense for which 
sentence was imposed."  Because Fermanich was never in custody 
for the same specific acts for which sentence was imposed on 
count 1, the State argues Fermanich is not entitled to 433 days 
of credit on count 1.   
¶39 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155(1), Wisconsin's sentence 
credit statute, provides in relevant part: 
(a)  A convicted offender shall be given credit 
toward the service of his or her sentence for all days 
spent in custody in connection with the course of 
conduct for which sentence was imposed. As used in 
this subsection, "actual days spent in custody" 
includes, 
without 
limitation 
by 
enumeration, 
confinement related to an offense for which the 
offender is ultimately sentenced, or for any other 
sentence arising out of the same course of conduct, 
which occurs: 
1.  While the offender is awaiting trial; 
2.  While the offender is being tried; and 
3.  While the offender is awaiting imposition of 
sentence after trial. 
(b)  The categories in par. (a) and sub. (1m) 
include custody of the convicted offender which is in 
whole or in part the result of a probation, extended 
supervision or parole hold under s. 302.113(8m), 
302.114(8m), 304.06(3), or 973.10(2) placed upon the 
person for the same course of conduct as that 
resulting in the new conviction.   
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
The statute is remarkably uncomplicated.  A convicted defendant 
receives sentence credit for "all days spent in custody."  Those 
days spent in custody must be "in connection with the course of 
conduct for which sentence was imposed."  If a defendant was in 
custody for a course of conduct, and later sentenced for that 
same course of conduct, the defendant receives credit. 
¶40 The question this case presents is what constitutes a 
"course of conduct."  One need look no further than the 
statutory text to find the answer:  "course of conduct" refers 
to the conduct underlying the offense for which the defendant is 
convicted and sentenced.  We know this based on the statute's 
definition of "actual days spent in custody."  After stating the 
"actual days spent in custody" must be "in connection with the 
course of conduct for which sentence was imposed," the statute 
restates and clarifies this requirement.  "[A]ctual days spent 
in custody" includes "confinement related to an offense for 
which the defendant is ultimately sentenced, or for any other 
sentence arising out of the same course of conduct."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a). 
¶41 "[A]ctual days spent in custody" therefore includes 
confinement related to either the "offense" or the "course of 
conduct" for which the defendant was ultimately sentenced.  This 
language draws a distinction between a "course of conduct" and 
an "offense," which makes sense because the same conduct can 
give rise to multiple statutory offenses.  This reality is well 
recognized in the law generally.  As we have stated in the area 
of double jeopardy:  
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
[T]his court was one of many state courts signifying 
the distinction between acts and offenses by stating: 
"'The test is not whether the defendant has already 
been tried for the same act, but whether he has been 
put in jeopardy for the same offense.'"  State v. 
Brooks, 215 Wis. 134, 140, 254 N.W. 374 (1934) 
(quoting Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 
(1871)).  The same distinction between acts and 
offenses has long been noted by scholars and treatise 
writers addressing the double jeopardy questions posed 
by multiple prosecutions.  E.g., I Wharton's Criminal 
Law 509 (11th ed. 1912) ("Same act may constitute two 
or 
more 
offenses 
which 
are 
distinct 
from 
each 
other."). 
State v. Hansen, 2001 WI 53, ¶29, 243 Wis. 2d 328, 627 
N.W.2d 195 (footnote omitted).  Recognizing this distinction, 
the statute provides credit for confinement that is related to 
either the "offense" for which the defendant is sentenced or the 
"course of conduct" for which the defendant is sentenced.  
Because a single "course of conduct" can give rise to multiple 
"offense[s]," the statute ensures the defendant receives credit 
regardless of the specific statutory offense for which the 
defendant is ultimately sentenced.  It does so by providing 
credit based on the "course of conduct" underlying the offense, 
as opposed to providing credit based on the offense alone.  This 
makes clear that when the statute says "course of conduct," it 
is referring to the conduct underlying the offense for which the 
defendant is sentenced. 
¶42 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155's legislative history and 
our precedent support this plain meaning.  We previously 
examined 
the 
statute's 
legislative 
history 
in 
State 
v. 
Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d 86, 423 N.W.2d 533 (1988).  We began by 
discussing Klimas v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 244, 249 N.W.2d 285 
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
(1977), which we decided before the legislature first enacted 
the 
sentence 
credit 
statute. 
 
In 
Klimas, 
"[t]his 
court 
specifically invited the legislature's attention to the existing 
federal law, 18 U.S.C.A. sec. 3568.  We stated that the federal 
law being 'simple and . . . just' had much to recommend . . . ."  
Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d at 91 (alterations in original) (quoting 
Klimas, 75 Wis. 2d at 251).  A month after we made this 
recommendation, the legislature followed suit.  Id.  It enacted 
§ 973.155 using the very same wording that exists today.  § 9, 
ch. 353, Laws of 1977.   
¶43 Our review of legislative history revealed that Wis. 
Stat. § 973.155 is rooted "in the federal sentence-credit 
statute, 18 U.S.C. sec. 3568,[2] and in the Model Penal Code sec. 
                                                 
2 The sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted 
of an offense shall commence to run from the date on 
which such person is received at the penitentiary, 
reformatory, or jail for service of such sentence.  
The Attorney General shall give any such person credit 
toward service of his sentence for any days spent in 
custody in connection with the offense or acts for 
which sentence was imposed.  As used in this section, 
the term 'offense' means any criminal offense, other 
than an offense triable by court-martial, military 
commission, provost court, or other military tribunal, 
which is in violation of an Act of Congress and is 
triable in any court established by Act of Congress. 
If any such person shall be committed to a jail or 
other place of detention to await transportation to 
the place at which his sentence is to be served, his 
sentence shall commence to run from the date on which 
he is received at such jail or other place of 
detention. 
No sentence shall prescribe any other method of 
computing the term. 
18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1977). 
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
7.09" and that "our legislature intended a statute with the same 
meaning."  Id. at 92–93.  A report in the legislative drafting 
file explained:  
If enacted, the Bill would clarify a currently unclear 
and chaotic area of the law . . . and would bring 
Wisconsin law into conformity with the recommended 
minimum criminal justice sentencing standards of the 
American Bar Association, Section 7.09 of the American 
Law Institute's Model Penal Code, federal criminal 
sentencing procedures as set forth in 18 U.S.C. 
s. 3568 and the laws of many other states. 
Id. at 92 (quoting Wisconsin Legislative Council Report No. 6 to 
the 1977 Legislature:  Legislation Relating to Credit for Time 
in Jail, 2).  We also observed that the federal statute uses 
similar language to § 973.155.  "[E]ach uses the language, 'in 
connection with,'——in the state statute, 'in connection with the 
course of conduct for which sentence was imposed,' and in the 
federal statute, 'in connection with the offense or acts for 
which sentence was imposed.'"  Id. at 93.  "We perceive[d] no 
meaningful difference between" the two statutes.  Id.   The 
Model Penal Code similarly used the phrase, "the crime for which 
such sentence is imposed," and "[t]he comments note that 
'obviously,' if the detention were for the 'same series of acts 
as the sentence,' presentence credit would not depend on their 
being the same crime in a narrow sense."  Id. at 97-98.  Based 
on this review of the text and the legislative history, we 
arrived at an interpretation that confirms the plain meaning 
explained above and illustrates the distinction between an 
"offense" and a "course of conduct":   
[I]t would appear that the drafters of the Wisconsin 
statute, who acknowledged their use of the MPC as a 
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
model, simply avoided the problem inherent in the 
MPC's use of the phrase, "for the crime for which such 
sentence is imposed."  Thus, in order to make clear 
that the defendant is entitled to credit for time 
served pretrial, even if he is ultimately convicted of 
a different crime than that charged, the drafters of 
the Wisconsin statute hit upon the idea of referring 
to the defendant's objectionable behavior as a "course 
of conduct."  In this way, there could be no argument 
that a defendant who was charged with rape, but 
convicted 
of 
assault, 
should 
not 
get 
his 
full 
presentence credit.  Instead, because both the rape 
charge and the assault conviction arose out of the 
"same course of conduct," he clearly was entitled to 
credit. 
Id. at 98.  This confirms that "course of conduct" refers to the 
conduct underlying the offense for which sentence was imposed.  
¶44 The court of appeals later relied on our decision in 
Boettcher in a case that presented the same question as the 
present 
case. 
 
State 
v. 
Tuescher, 
226 
Wis. 2d 465, 
595 
N.W.2d 443 
(Ct. 
App. 
1999), 
involved 
a 
defendant 
who 
"burglarized a restaurant while armed with a shotgun" and, 
"[w]hen police confronted [the defendant] as he left the 
restaurant, he exchanged gunfire with them and wounded an 
officer."  Id. at 467.  He was charged and sentenced for 
attempted second-degree intentional homicide, attempted burglary 
while armed, and possession of a firearm by a felon.  Id. at 
467-68. He "received 224 days credit on each of the three 
concurrent sentences for time he spent in custody prior to 
sentencing."  Id. at 468.  The attempted homicide conviction was 
eventually overturned, and the defendant later pled guilty to 
the lesser charge of first-degree reckless injury.  Id.  The 
issue was whether the defendant was entitled to credit for the 
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
12 
 
time spent "serving the other two sentences" but not "serving a 
sentence for the shooting of the police officer."  Id.    
¶45 Resolving that issue, like in the present case, 
"turn[ed] on our interpretation of the phrase 'course of 
conduct' in [Wis. Stat.] § 973.155."  Id. at 470.  The defendant 
argued he was entitled to credit because "his burglary and 
firearm possession sentences 'arise out of the same course of 
conduct' for which the reckless injury sentence was imposed." 
Id.  Relying in part on our decision in Boettcher, the court of 
appeals disagreed.  It concluded, even though the defendant's 
offenses 
"were 
committed 
virtually 
simultaneously," 
the 
sentences did not arise from the same course of conduct because 
the sentences were not "based on the same specific acts."3  Id. 
at 475.  The acts underlying the offenses——burglarizing the 
restaurant and shooting an officer——were different, so they did 
not constitute the same "course of conduct."   
¶46 We embraced Tuescher's interpretation of "course of 
conduct" five years later in State ex rel. Thorson v. Schwarz, 
2004 WI 96, 274 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 914.  Thorson involved a 
defendant who was convicted of attempted second-degree sexual 
assault and false imprisonment, and sentenced to 13 years in 
                                                 
3 The court of appeals also relied on its earlier decision 
in State v. Gavigan, 122 Wis. 2d 389, 362 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 
1984), where it concluded a robbery and later act of fleeing the 
police, though "closely related," were not the same "course of 
conduct."  Id. at 393.  See also State v. Beets, 124 
Wis. 2d 372, 381-83, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985) (approving of Gavigan 
and stating "it is clear that, unless the acts for which the 
first and second sentences are imposed are truly related or 
identical, the sentencing on one charge severs the connection 
between the custody and the pending charges").    
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
13 
 
prison.  Id., ¶2.  "Shortly before his scheduled release, the 
State commenced an action to commit [the defendant] as a 
sexually violent person pursuant to Chapter 980.  Thus, instead 
of being released from custody, [the defendant] was transferred 
to the Wisconsin Resource Center (WRC) for further evaluation."  
Id., ¶3.  A jury declined to commit the defendant, and he was 
released on parole.  Id., ¶4.  He later violated parole and was 
incarcerated for ten months.  Id., ¶6.  The defendant sought 
sentence credit for the time at the WRC awaiting the Chapter 980 
trial.  Id., ¶7.   
¶47 We concluded the defendant was not entitled to 
sentence credit for the time spent at the WRC because it was not 
"in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was 
imposed."4  Id., ¶30.  We began by recognizing that "[t]he phrase 
'course of conduct' was explicitly construed by the court of 
appeals in Tuescher" as meaning "the specific 'offense or acts' 
embodied in the charged for which the defendant is being 
sentenced," not a mere "criminal episode."  Id., ¶31 (quoting 
Tuescher, 226 Wis. 2d at 471).  We then applied Tuescher's 
definition, concluding the defendant "was not detained for the 
specific offense that caused his original conviction.  Rather, 
the filing of a Chapter 980 petition was the reason for his 
detention."  Id., ¶34. 
                                                 
4 We also concluded the defendant was not entitled to credit 
because he was not "in custody" for purposes of the sentence 
credit statute.  State ex rel. Thorson v. Schwarz, 2004 WI 96, 
¶29, 274 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 914. 
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
14 
 
¶48 The case now before the court presents one of those 
rare circumstances where nearly every data point leads to the 
same answer.  The statutory text, the legislative history, and 
the case law all converge on one interpretation of "course of 
conduct" under Wis. Stat. § 973.155.  It means the conduct 
underlying the offense for which the defendant was sentenced——or 
as Tuescher put it, "the specific 'offense or acts' embodied in 
the charge for which the defendant is being sentenced."5  
Tuescher, 226 Wis. 2d at 471. 
B.  Application to This Case 
¶49 Applying this straightforward definition of "course of 
conduct," it is clear that Fermanich is not entitled to credit 
on count 1, which relates to an offense Fermanich committed in 
Langlade County.  "[T]wo conditions must be met in order for a 
defendant to receive sentence credit:  (1) the defendant must 
have been 'in custody' for the period in question; and (2) the 
period 'in custody' must have been 'in connection with the 
course of conduct for which the sentence was imposed.'"  
Thorson, 
274 
Wis. 2d 1, 
¶15 
(quoting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a)).   
                                                 
5 One should not confuse "specific acts" with "specific 
act."  Often there are multiple acts, as opposed to just one 
act, which are required to establish a statutory offense, such 
as conspiracy.  See Wis. Stat. § 939.31.  This is why Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155(1) uses "course of conduct" rather than "conduct."  
This rule is sensible and easy to apply.  It merely 
requires comparing the conduct underlying the offense for which 
the defendant was sentenced and the conduct connected to the 
defendant's custody.  There is no need to engage in a vague, 
subjective inquiry into the defendant's purpose. 
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
15 
 
¶50 It is undisputed that Fermanich was "in custody" for 
433 days.  The only issue is whether that custody was "in 
connection with the course of conduct for which the sentence was 
imposed."  It was not.  Fermanich's custody was in connection 
with only the Oneida County charges, not count 1——the Langlade 
County charge.  He failed to post cash bail on the Oneida County 
charges, meaning he was "in custody" for purposes of those 
charges.  But his custody was unrelated to any of the Langlade 
County charges.  Fermanich "was incarcerated in the Oneida 
County Jail based on his charges there," not based on count 1.  
Majority op., ¶5.  He signed a signature bond and was therefore 
"free to go for purposes of the Langlade County charges."  Id.   
¶51 Fermanich's argument that the conduct underlying all 
of the charges is the same "course of conduct" clearly fails 
under Wis. Stat. § 973.155's clear meaning.  A "course of 
conduct" is the conduct underlying the offense for which 
sentence was imposed.  Fermanich was sentenced for three 
offenses:  count 1, operating a vehicle without the owner's 
consent in Langlade County; count 4, operating a vehicle without 
the owner's consent in Oneida County; and count 5, fleeing and 
eluding an officer in Oneida County.  The conduct underlying 
count 1 is not the same as the conduct underlying the Oneida 
County counts.  Fermanich took a truck in Langlade County 
without the owner's permission and operated it in Langlade 
County.  The other counts involve different acts, namely 
operating the truck at a different point in time and eluding law 
enforcement.  The conduct underlying count 1 occurred at a 
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
16 
 
different time, in a different place, using different acts than 
were required to prove the other offenses.  It is a different 
"course of conduct." 
¶52 As a result, because the conduct underlying count 1 is 
not the same "course of conduct" as the conduct underlying the 
other counts, and because Fermanich's custody was not in 
connection with count 1 due to the signature bond, he is not 
entitled to sentence credit on count 1.  
C.  State v. Floyd 
¶53 This case presents the opportunity to bring clarity to 
the law.  The majority declines this opportunity, instead 
applying State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 606 
N.W.2d 155, which erroneously held "that Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1) 
requires sentence credit for confinement on charges that are 
dismissed and read in at sentencing."  Id., ¶1.  This approach 
endorses an "unclear and chaotic" sentencing regime much like 
what the legislature sought to avoid when it enacted Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155.   
¶54 Floyd involved a defendant who "was charged with 
recklessly endangering safety while armed with a dangerous 
weapon, carrying a concealed weapon, fourth-degree sexual 
assault, disorderly conduct, and criminal trespass."  Id., ¶2.  
"He was released on a $3,500 personal recognizance bond," but 
was subsequently re-arrested for a later armed robbery.  Id., 
¶¶2-3.  Unable to post bond, he remained in custody.  Id., ¶3.  
As part of a plea agreement, the State dismissed the armed 
robbery charge and instead filed a felony bail jumping charge.  
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
17 
 
Id., ¶4.  The defendant "pled guilty to both the original 
reckless endangerment charge and the felony bail jumping charge 
with the understanding that all remaining charges, including the 
armed robbery charge, would be dismissed and read in at 
sentencing."  Id.  At sentencing, defense counsel asked that the 
court grant 217 days of credit against all sentences for the 
time the defendant spent in custody after his second arrest.  
Id., ¶7. 
¶55 From there, the resolution should have been simple.  
The defendant's custody was never in connection with the 
reckless endangerment charge because he posted bond on that 
charge.  His later custody was in connection with only the 
felony bail jumping charge.  Therefore, the defendant in Floyd 
should have received credit toward his sentence for bail jumping 
but not reckless endangerment.  
¶56 But Floyd searched for ambiguity rather than meaning 
in Wis. Stat. § 973.155.  Floyd concluded the phrase "offense 
for which the offender is ultimately sentenced" was ambiguous.  
Id., ¶18.  According to Floyd, it was possible to read the 
statute either as "allow[ing] credit only on the charge for 
which the offender is convicted" or as "includ[ing] credit for a 
read-in offense upon which the sentence ultimately might be 
based."  Id., ¶19 (emphasis added).  Based on § 973.155's 
perceived purpose, and with a brief nod to the rule of lenity, 
the court concluded it does permit credit for dismissed and 
read-in offenses.  Id., ¶¶31-32.   
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
18 
 
¶57 Floyd made several important errors, and the majority 
compounds those errors by applying it today.  Most importantly, 
Floyd skipped the essential work of attempting to find meaning 
in the statute and summarily declaring it ambiguous.  "[A]n 
offense for which the offender is ultimately sentenced" is clear 
as day:  a sentence which is imposed for that offense.  Wis. 
Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).  It is elementary that a court has no 
ability to impose a sentence unattached to any offense for which 
the court found the defendant guilty.  Absent any independent 
conviction, a defendant cannot be sentenced for a read-in 
charge.  As Floyd recognized, but apparently disregarded, "[a]n 
offender does not run the risk of consecutive or concurrent 
sentences based on read-in charges and, in that respect, is not 
formally sentenced on these charges."  Id., ¶26.  It is simply 
not the case that considering the defendant's conduct at the 
sentencing stage means the sentence was imposed for that 
conduct.  That has never been the law.  Austin v. State, 49 
Wis. 2d 727, 732, 183 N.W.2d 56 (1971) ("Under our read-in 
procedure, the defendant does not plead to any charges and 
therefore is not sentenced on any of the read-in charges but 
such admitted uncharged offenses are considered in sentencing 
him on the charged offense.") (also referencing "[t]he English 
practice of 'taking into account' [which] allowed consideration 
of uncharged offenses at the request of the accused and, like 
the Wisconsin practice, there was no conviction in respect to 
such offenses"); cf. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 399 
(1995) ("[U]se of evidence of related criminal conduct to 
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
19 
 
enhance a defendant's sentence for a separate crime within the 
authorized statutory limits does not constitute punishment for 
that 
conduct 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
the 
Double 
Jeopardy 
Clause.").   
58 
Second, Floyd applied credit to offenses that were 
neither connected to any custody nor part of the same course of 
conduct 
as 
offenses 
that 
were 
connected 
to 
custody.  
Understandably, the defendant in Floyd did not ask for credit 
toward his sentence for the read-in charge; he was not sentenced 
for a read-in charge, so no such sentence existed.  He instead 
asked for credit toward his sentence for reckless endangerment.  
Because Floyd concluded the defendant should receive credit 
based on the read-in charges, but there was no sentence 
accompanying those read-in charges, the court applied the credit 
anywhere it could.  The only option was the sentence for 
reckless endangerment because the defendant already received 
credit toward his sentence for bail jumping.  But the defendant 
was never in custody in connection with the conduct underlying 
the reckless endangerment charge.  He posted bail after his 
initial arrest, meaning he was not in custody.  Nor was the 
conduct underlying the reckless endangerment charge part of the 
course of conduct forming the basis for his later custody——
felony bail jumping.6   
                                                 
6 Floyd correctly concluded the same, characterizing the 
connection between the reckless endangerment and bail jumping 
offenses as procedural rather than factual.  State v. Floyd, 
2000 WI 14, ¶¶14-17, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155.  
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
20 
 
¶59 In short, Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a) entitles a 
convicted offender to credit "for all days spent in custody in 
connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was 
imposed."  "[T]wo conditions must be met in order for a 
defendant to receive sentence credit:  (1) the defendant must 
have been 'in custody' for the period in question; and (2) the 
period 'in custody' must have been 'in connection with the 
course of conduct for which the sentence was imposed.'"  
Thorson, 
274 
Wis. 2d 1, 
¶15 
(quoting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a)).  Contrary to the statute, Floyd required that 
sentence credit be granted toward the defendant's sentence for 
reckless endangerment even though the defendant's custody was 
not "in connection with the course of conduct for which the 
sentence was imposed."  In this case, blindly and unquestionably 
applying Floyd, as the majority does, results in Fermanich 
receiving credit toward his sentence based on a period spent in 
custody that has no connection to that sentence.  Floyd mandates 
that sentence credit be awarded in a manner directly at odds 
with the statutory text, and it must be overruled to restore 
clarity, 
consistency, 
and 
sensibility 
to 
sentence 
credit 
determinations.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶60 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155(1) sets forth a simple and 
understandable method for granting defendants sentence credit 
for time served.  If an offender was in custody in connection 
with the conduct underlying the offense for which he was 
ultimately sentenced, then the offender receives credit for that 
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
21 
 
time spent in custody.  Floyd upended this system by granting 
credit based on offenses for which a defendant was neither 
convicted nor sentenced, and applying that credit toward a 
sentence disconnected from any time spent in custody.  Because 
the majority's decision to adhere to this erroneous precedent 
completely strays from clear statutory language, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶61 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2021AP462-CR.akz 
 
 
 
1