Title: SNYDER v McKINLEY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12630
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: May 6, 1974

No. 12630 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1974 T H O M A S SNYDER, Petitioner and Appellant, J A M E S McKINLEY, HOWARD H A M M E R and ED SPANKUTH, a s Commissioners of Ravalli County, Montana, Respondents and Respondents. Apneal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Edward Dussault, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Tipp and Hoven, Missoula, Montana Vernon Hoven argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondents : Murray and Holt, Missoula, Montana Douglas G. Harkin argued, Hamilton, Montana Submitted: February 27, 1974 Decided :MAY 6 1914 M r . Justice Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal by petitioner from an order of the d i s t r i c t court of the fourth judicial d i s t r i c t of the State of Montana, i n and for the County of Ravalli, dismissing a peremptory writ of mandate which ordered the Board of County Commissioners to hold an election. The described area was owned by a non-resident Utah corporation. There w e r e no indi- vidual freeholders i n the e n t i r e area, even though as appears hereinafter there were residents and electors. The matter w a s originally presented to the d i s t r i c t court on an agreed statement of facts which noted, among other things, that 51 qualified electors and residents of Pinedale community signed a petition, directed to the county commissioners, respond- ents, and hereinafter referred to as the Board, requesting them to hold an election for the purpose of incorporating a c i t y o r town. The petition was submitted to the Board on May 23, 1972. Three months l a t e r on September 1, 1972, the Board denied the petition. O n September 8, 1972, petitioner and appellant, Tom Snyder, f i l e d an application for a writ of mandate to compel the Board to c a l l an election pursuant to section 11-203, R.C.M. 1947, and thereafter the Court issued an alternative w r i t for the Board to show cause why a permanent w r i t should not issue; by stipulation of counsel the matter w a s continued u n t i l the above mentioned agreed statement of facts was f i l e d at which t i m e the trial judge Emmet Glore took the matter under advisement and gave counsel t i m e to submit briefs. O n December 29, 1972, Judge Glore issued an order granting the w r i t of mandate but said order was not f i l e d i n the office of the clerk of court of Ravalli County u n t i l January 4, 1973, some four days after Judge Glore l o s t jurisdiction due to h i s retirement on December 31, 1972. After studying several decisions of this Court, counsel for both sides agreed that Judge Glore' s order was void, and Judge Dussault, w h o succeeded Judge Glore, assumed jurisdiction. On February 13, 1973, Judge Dussault, having had the cause submitted to him, ordered an election, but t h i s order was stayed on April 6 , when special counsel requested time to submit briefs. O n April 13, 1974, Judge Dussault set aside his order of February 13 and directed that certain things be done prior to h i s hearing the matter again, one of which would have allowed petitioner to submit a new petition to respondent Board. The petitioner refused to submit a new petition so the respondent Board, following Judge Dussault' s order, provided a new census which required more information than the previous census, and the inhabitants of the area refused to answer a l l but four of said questions alleging that t h i s was an interf erence with their personal liberties. In the meantime, and unknown to any of counsel, the dis- t r i c t judge, o r the parties, the Legislature had passed certain amendments to section 11-203, R.C.M. 1947. These amendments, interestingly, were contained i n two separate acts, Chapter 86, Laws of 1973 and Chapter 515, Laws of 1973. Neither amendatory enactment mentioned or incorporated the changes made by the other . The amendatory enactments did not con£ l i c t . Chapter 515 w a s made effective on passage and approval. It w a s signed by the Governor on April 4, 1973. Thus, as Judge Dussault assumed jurisdiction he w a s totally unaware of the new pro- visions. He did not become aware of them u n t i l August 20, 1973. More w i l l be said about these enactments hereinafter. On June 21, 1973, a f t e r hearing arguments on certain motions the court directed respondent Board to hold an election pursuant to section 11-204, R.C.M. 1947. A w r i t of mandate w a s served on the Board on July 13, 1973, with the return being dated July 17, 1973. Some eleven days l a t e r on July 26, 1973, the Board f i l e d motions for (1) extension of time to f i l e notice of appeal, (2) request to reopen hearings for additional testimony, (3) and for permission to present addi- tional testimony. The court granted the ~ o a r d ' s request to extend t i m e for notice of appeal on August 10, 1973, which was followed by petitioner's motion to quash the order extend- ing time, dated August 17, 1973, On August 24, 1973, the court denied petitioner's motion to quash and the ~ o a r d ' s motion to hear additional evidence. Then on September 12, 1973, the Board f i l e d a motion to dismiss the w r i t of mandate and the court on September 18, 1973, ruled t h a t the order of July 13, 1973, directing that an election be held, w a s dismissed and t h i s appeal results. Counsel for the petitioner, reviewing the history of the litigation, refers to it as either a comedy of errors o r viewed in the eyes of the appellant, a tragedy of errors for on three separate occasions the question involved was determined by the court only to be s e t aside. The respondent Board argues that i t took timely action after the w r i t issued on June 21, 1973, when i t learned, unbe- known to a l l parties i n the action and the judge, that the Legis- lature had amended section 11-203, R.C.M. 1947, by two acts-- Chapter 86, Laws of 1973, which provided that no area could be incorporated within three miles of a presently incorporated area; and Chapter 515, Laws of 1973, stating the petition for incorporation now requires the signatures of 213 of the quali- fied electors against 50 electors under the old Act, a canvas from house to house must be conducted as compared to no speci- fied type of canvas under the old Act; that there must be 150 electors i n each of the several wards where no number was required under the old law. A l l of these changes were made with an effective date of April 4, 1973, on one Act and July 1, 1973, on the other. From the foregoing, it i s seen that Judge Dussault had clearly been unaware of the changes i n the law and just as clearly had been incorrect i n ordering an election on a moot petition, This, aside from any previous determinations. The Commissioners moved to dismiss the peremptory w r i t of mandate under Rule 60 (b) ( 6 ) , M.R.Civ,P. which provides i n part that: "On motion * * * the court may relieve a party * * * from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: * * * (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. * * *" Several issues are s e t forth for our consideration: (1) Did the court e r r i n granting an extension of time to the defendants i n which to appeal i t s order of August 10, 1973, and denying respondent ~ o a r d ' s motion to quash the order granting such extension by i t s order of August 24, 1973? (2) Did the lower court e r r i n making i t s order of September 18, 1973, suspending the order directing defendants to c a l l a special election as provided for i n its order of June 21, 1973? (3) Did the court e r r i n dismissing the w r i t of mandate heretofore issued as set forth i n i t s order of September 28, 1973? The foregoing issues a l l involve technical time l i m i t s and do not embrace a consideration of the correctness of the final decision of the d i s t r i c t court. In view of the new law i n effect a t the time, to hold an election a t that time under a petition clearly not valid would be an idle act -- not to say expensive. The law does not require idle acts. Rule 60(b) (6) M.R.Civ.P., as partially quoted above provides for setting aside a judgment or order within a reason- able time. Certainly under the facts here, within time allowed for an appeal, the time was reasonable. The Comissioners moved to dismiss the peremptory w r i t of mandate promptly after being advised of the amendments to the controlling statutes. The appellant here r e l i e s on Federal Land Bk. v. Gallatin C o ., 84 Mont. 98, 274 P. 288, for the proposition that the Court w i l l not grant r e l i e f for mistakes of law. That case was i n 1929, long before the adoption of Rule 60 (b) (6) and i s distin- guishable i n other ways. It does not apply here. W e have reviewed the issues presented and find no m e r i t . Any election held f o r purposes of incorporation must comply with the l a w and to order an election now under the old petition would be meaningless. Accordingly, the order appealed from is affirmed and each party w i l l bear their own costs. Justice WE CONCUR: - . . Chief Justice