Title: Anthony Mungin v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC03-780
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 31, 2006

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-780 
____________ 
 
ANTHONY MUNGIN,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-1774 
____________ 
 
 
ANTHONY MUNGIN,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JAMES R. MCDONOUGH, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[April 6, 2006] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Anthony Mungin appeals an order of the circuit court denying a motion for 
postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and petitions 
 
 
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the Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), 
(9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons explained in this opinion, we affirm the trial 
court’s order and deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Anthony Mungin was convicted of the 1990 murder of convenience store 
clerk Betty Jean Woods.  The pertinent facts of this case are set forth in this 
Court’s opinion on direct appeal as follows:  
Betty Jean Woods, a convenience store clerk in Jacksonville, 
was shot once in the head on September 16, 1990, and died four days 
later.   There were no eyewitnesses to the shooting, but shortly after 
Woods was shot a customer [Ronald Kirkland] entering the store 
passed a man leaving the store hurriedly with a paper bag.  The 
customer, who found the injured clerk, later identified the man as 
Mungin.  After the shooting, a store supervisor found a $59.05 
discrepancy in cash at the store. 
Mungin was arrested on September 18, 1990, in Kingsland, 
Georgia.  Police found a .25-caliber semiautomatic pistol, bullets, and 
Mungin’s Georgia identification when they searched his house.  An 
analysis showed that the bullet recovered from Woods had been fired 
from the pistol found at Mungin’s house. 
Jurors also heard Williams[1] rule evidence of two other crimes.  
They were instructed to consider this evidence only for the limited 
purpose of proving Mungin’s identity. 
First, William Rudd testified that Mungin came to the 
convenience store where he worked [in Monticello] on the morning of 
September 14, 1990, and asked for cigarettes.  When Rudd turned to 
get the cigarettes, Mungin shot him in the back.  He also took money 
from a cash box and a cash register.  Authorities determined that an 
expended shell recovered from the store came from the gun seized in 
Kingsland. 
Second, Thomas Barlow testified that he saw Meihua Wang 
                                          
 
 
1.  Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959). 
 
 
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Tsai screaming in a Tallahassee shopping center on the afternoon of 
September 14, 1990.  Tsai had been shot while working at a store in 
the shopping center.  A bullet that went through Tsai’s hand and hit 
her in the head had been fired from the gun recovered in Kingsland. 
 
Mungin v. State, 689 So. 2d 1026, 1028 (Fla. 1995) (footnote omitted).  The jury, 
which was instructed on both premeditated murder and felony murder with robbery 
or attempted robbery as the underlying felony, returned a general verdict of first-
degree murder.  See id.   
 
During the penalty phase, the State presented the testimony of Detective 
Cecil Towle, who was the lead investigator in the Tallahassee case.  Detective 
Towle testified regarding his interview with the victim, Ms. Tsai, who had returned 
to China. 
In mitigation, Mungin presented the testimony of friends and family who 
had close contact with Mungin as a child and teenager.  They collectively testified 
that he was very respectful of his grandparents, with whom he lived, that he 
attended church, and that he was not a violent or aggressive person.  However, 
most of these witnesses also testified that they had not had any contact with 
Mungin in at least several years.   
Mungin also presented the testimony of Glenn Young, a corrections and 
probation officer who supervised Mungin for about six months when Mungin 
resided at the Cross City Correctional Institution beginning in January 1992.  
Young testified that Mungin had no disciplinary violations during that time.  
 
 
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During questioning by defense counsel, Young also indicated that although 
Mungin was currently serving a life sentence for the other shootings, it did not 
necessarily mean that he would be incarcerated for life.        
 Last, Mungin presented the testimony of Dr. Harry Krop, a clinical 
psychologist and expert in forensic psychology.  Dr. Krop testified that he did not 
find any evidence that Mungin suffered from any major mental illness or 
personality disorder.  Dr. Krop indicated that Mungin functioned in the average 
range of intellectual ability and that there was no evidence of any type of 
neurological impairment.  Dr. Krop did state that Mungin suffers from a history of 
drug and alcohol abuse and that Mungin did fairly well in school until drugs 
changed his lifestyle.  Dr. Krop also made it clear that although shooting someone 
is an antisocial act, in his opinion, Mungin does not suffer from a personality 
disorder, shows a number of positive strengths, and would be able to function in 
open prison society.   
At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury recommended the death 
penalty by a vote of seven to five.  See id. at 1028.  After weighing the aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances, the trial court followed the jury’s recommendation 
and sentenced Mungin to death.2  
                                          
 
 
2.  The trial court found two aggravating circumstances:  (1) Mungin had 
previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to 
another person; and (2) Mungin committed the capital felony during a robbery or 
 
 
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Mungin raised nine issues on direct appeal.3  This Court concluded that the 
trial court erred in denying Mungin’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the 
theory of premeditated murder.  See id. at 1029.  However, the Court did not 
reverse Mungin’s first-degree murder conviction because the Court concluded that 
the trial court correctly denied Mungin’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the 
alternative theory of felony murder.  See id.  The Court also ruled that although the 
trial court erred in instructing the jury on premeditated murder, this error was 
harmless.  See id.  The Court rejected all of Mungin’s other arguments as either 
                                                                                                                                        
robbery attempt and committed the capital felony for pecuniary gain.  See id.  The 
trial court found no statutory mitigation and gave minimal weight to the 
nonstatutory mitigation that Mungin was not antisocial and could be rehabilitated.   
See id.   
 
 
3.  These issues were: (1) whether the trial court erred in overruling a 
defense objection to the State’s peremptory strike of an African-American 
prospective juror; (2) whether the evidence was insufficient to support a first-
degree murder conviction; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to 
introduce irrelevant evidence that Mungin shot a collateral crime victim in the 
spine; (4) whether fundamental error occurred when a defense witness testified in 
the penalty phase that inmates serving life sentences are eligible for conditional 
release and could be released in as little as five years; (5) whether the trial court 
erred in instructing the jury on and in finding the aggravating circumstances of 
robbery and pecuniary gain; (6) whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct 
the jury that Mungin’s age could be considered in mitigation; (7) whether the trial 
court erred in failing to find and give some weight to unrebutted nonstatutory 
mitigation; (8) whether the death sentence is inappropriate if the Court eliminates 
the aggravating circumstances of robbery and pecuniary gain and considers 
mitigation that the trial court failed to find; and (9) whether Mungin’s conviction 
and death sentence are unconstitutional.  See id. at 1029 n.4. 
 
 
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unpreserved or meritless, and affirmed the first-degree murder conviction and 
sentence of death.  See id. at 1030-32.  
After several changes of counsel, Mungin filed a consolidated amended  
motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, 
in which he raised multiple claims.  Following a Huff4 hearing, the circuit court 
ordered an evidentiary hearing on three of Mungin’s claims: (1) that trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance during the guilt phase; (2) that there is newly 
discovered evidence; and (3) that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
during the penalty phase by failing to present evidence of Mungin’s troubled 
childhood.  Prior to the evidentiary hearing, Mungin filed two supplemental 
claims.  The first claim alleged that if the State knew of eyewitness Kirkland’s 
criminal history and did not disclose it to defense counsel, the State violated Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  In his second supplemental claim, Mungin 
argued that his death sentence should be reversed under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584 (2002).  The circuit court declined to consider Mungin’s supplemental Brady 
claim based on its previous ruling that it would not allow any more filings.  The 
trial court also decided not to address the Ring claim until there was further 
development on the issue from either this Court or the United States Supreme 
Court.     
 
                                          
 
4.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
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At the evidentiary hearing, Mungin presented the testimony of several 
witnesses to support his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  Charles 
G. Cofer, Mungin’s lead trial counsel, testified regarding his recollection of his 
actions during trial preparation and trial.5  Edward Kimbrough, Jesse Sanders, 
Brian Washington, Victoria Jacobs, Philip Levy, and Vernon Longworth testified 
regarding Mungin’s whereabouts on the day of the murder and to other facts 
supporting Mungin’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to fully 
investigate Mungin’s alibi defense.  Eyewitness Ronald Kirkland testified 
regarding his statement to police in 1990, his identification of Mungin, and his 
prior criminal history.  In rebuttal, the State presented the testimony of Cofer and 
Detective Dale Gilbreath, the lead detective in the case.   
The trial court issued an order denying relief and Mungin appeals, raising 
seven issues, which include numerous subissues, for this Court’s review.6  Mungin 
also petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, raising three claims for relief.7 
                                          
 
 
5.  Lewis Buzzel, who assisted Cofer with Mungin’s case, did not testify at 
the hearing. 
 
 
6.  These issues are: (1) whether the failure of the trial judge and the Fourth 
Judicial Circuit to recuse themselves from Mungin’s postconviction proceedings 
was fundamental error; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to conduct an in- 
camera inspection of exempted public records from the Duval County State 
Attorney’s Office and the Duval County Sheriff’s Office; (3) whether the trial 
court erred in denying Mungin’s request to review Detective Gilbreath’s notes of 
the interview with Mungin; (4) whether the trial court erred in summarily denying 
several of Mungin’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; (5) whether the 
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
A. 
MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 
1. 
Recusal of Judge Southwood 
In his first issue on appeal, Mungin argues that Senior Judge John D. 
Southwood, as well as all of the judges on the Fourth Judicial Circuit, should have 
been recused from presiding over Mungin’s postconviction proceedings because at 
the time of these proceedings Mungin’s trial counsel, Charles G. Cofer, was a 
sitting county judge in Duval County.  Mungin admits that he did not timely file a 
motion to disqualify in the trial court but argues that Judge Southwood should have 
sua sponte recused himself and that his failure to do so was fundamental error.  
Mungin asks this Court to reverse the denial of his postconviction motion and grant 
him a new evidentiary hearing in another judicial circuit.  Essentially, he urges a 
per se rule that any time a judge in a circuit represented the defendant in a criminal 
trial and testifies as a witness in a postconviction proceeding, all the judges of that 
                                                                                                                                        
trial court erred in denying Mungin’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel during the guilt phase after an evidentiary hearing; (6) whether the trial 
court erred in denying Mungin’s claim that the Public Defender’s Office had an 
actual conflict of interest; and (7) whether the trial court erred in denying Mungin’s 
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the penalty phase after an 
evidentiary hearing. 
 
 
7.  These claims are: (1) Mungin received ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel; (2) the Court should reconsider its ruling on direct appeal that the trial 
court’s error in failing to grant Mungin’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the 
charge of premeditated murder did not require reversal; and (3) Mungin’s death 
sentence is unconstitutional under Ring.       
 
 
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circuit must sua sponte recuse themselves.  We disagree that any rule, statute or 
court precedent dictates such a result and consider a rule of circuitwide 
disqualification unnecessary to preserve judicial impartiality.  
In addition, Mungin’s argument is procedurally barred because it was raised 
for the first time on appeal in disregard of the time parameters in which motions to 
disqualify should be filed.  As we stated in a recent case, a claim of judicial bias is 
procedurally barred on direct appeal if the defendant fails to seek disqualification 
of the judge after having specific knowledge of the grounds for disqualification.  
See Schwab v. State, 814 So. 2d 402, 407 (Fla. 2002).   
In Schwab, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the judge 
should have recused himself under Canon 3E of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  We 
distinguished Maharaj v. State, 684 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1996), in which the defendant 
discovered after he commenced his appeal of the denial of his 3.850 motion that 
the trial judge had previously supervised the attorneys who prosecuted the  
defendant.  See Schwab, 814 So. 2d at 408.  Canon 3E(1)(b) expressly requires that 
a judge be disqualified if “the judge served as a lawyer or was the lower court 
judge in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom the judge previously 
practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or 
the judge has been a material witness concerning it.”  (Emphasis supplied.)  
 
 
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Accordingly, under Canon 3E, the trial judge in Maharaj should have recused 
himself regardless of whether a motion to disqualify was filed.   
In contrast to Maharaj and as in Schwab, Mungin had specific knowledge of 
the alleged grounds for disqualification but failed to file a motion to disqualify.  
Further, unlike Maharaj, there is no specific requirement that a trial judge recuse 
himself or herself simply because a fellow judge in the circuit is to serve as a 
witness.  Mungin has made no claim of actual, rather than merely presumptive, 
bias.  Thus, his claim is both procedurally barred and without merit.  
2. 
Public Records Request 
In his second issue on appeal, Mungin argues that the trial court’s failure to 
conduct an in-camera inspection of documents from the Duval County State 
Attorney’s Office and Duval County Sheriff’s Office, claimed to be exempt from 
his public records request, was error that warrants reversal of the denial of his 
motion for postconviction relief.  In Vining v. State, 827 So. 2d 201, 218 (Fla. 
2002), this Court addressed the defendant’s claim that he was denied access to 
public records.  In granting the defendant’s request for additional public records, 
the trial court ordered the defendant to submit a demand to each agency with a list 
of the specific documents requested and ordered the agencies to comply within 
fifteen days.  See id. at 219.  The defendant took no further action between the date 
of the order and the evidentiary hearing on his postconviction claims.  See id.  This 
 
 
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Court rejected the defendant’s public records claim, stating: 
Although Vining now contends that there are many public 
records outstanding, he made no further complaint on the public 
records issue during the five-month span between the postconviction 
court’s public records order and the evidentiary hearing.  Based on 
this record, we conclude that the court afforded Vining ample time 
and opportunity to pursue any public records claim.  Through his own 
actions, Vining either waived or abandoned any claim that he was 
denied public records. 
Id.   
 
This Court rejected a similar claim in Pace v. State, 854 So. 2d 167, 180 
(Fla. 2003).  In that case, the trial court denied an evidentiary hearing on the 
defendant’s claim that certain state agencies failed to provide public records.  The 
defendant then filed a similar public records request but “made no complaint and 
filed no motion to compel with the postconviction court regarding these requests.”  
Id.  The Court cited to Vining and concluded that “[d]ue to Pace’s inaction during 
the year and a half between his public records request and the evidentiary 
hearing, . . . Pace has waived or abandoned any claim that he was denied public 
records.”  Id.      
As in Vining and Pace, Mungin made a request for public records but 
subsequently failed to follow up on the request by informing the trial court that the 
issue had not been resolved.  Postconviction counsel, Dale Westling, was well 
aware of the sealed boxes at the records repository, filing a second request to have 
those records sent to the court.  The trial court subsequently entered an order 
 
 
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directing that those records be delivered.  Kenneth Malnik, Mungin’s privately 
retained counsel who first appeared in the case on March 1, 2001, was aware that 
there were records that had not been provided by Westling to Malnik.  In fact, due 
to this discovery, Malnik sought and was granted an extension of time in which to 
file the consolidated amended motion for postconviction relief.  However, Malnik 
did not pursue an in-camera inspection of any documents that were claimed to be 
exempt from disclosure.  Thus, Mungin had ample opportunity to pursue this issue 
from the date of the trial court’s order to the time of the evidentiary hearing in June 
2002.  Accordingly, Mungin has waived or abandoned his claim that the trial court 
failed to conduct an in-camera review of these records and we deny this claim for 
relief.   
3. 
Detective Gilbreath’s Notes 
 
Mungin next asserts that he was denied a full and fair postconviction 
evidentiary hearing because the trial court refused to review Detective Gilbreath’s 
rough notes of the interview Detective Gilbreath conducted with Mungin during 
the investigation.  The trial court declined to review the notes, finding that they 
were not relevant to Mungin’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim and that the 
issue was beyond the scope of direct examination.  Mungin does not contend that 
these notes might contain Brady material, nor does it appear that these notes were 
part of the Duval County Sheriff’s Office records that were the subject of 
 
 
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Mungin’s public records request.  Under the circumstances of this case, there was 
no error in the trial court’s ruling on this evidentiary matter.  
4. 
Summary Denial of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 
In his next issue on appeal, Mungin argues that the trial court erred in 
summarily denying several of his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(d) provides that a claim may be denied 
without a hearing where “the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively 
show that the movant is entitled to no relief.”8  Thus, to support summary denial 
without a hearing, a trial court must either state its rationale or attach to its order 
those specific parts of the record that refute each claim presented in the motion. 
See Anderson v. State, 627 So. 2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. 1993).  Further, when the trial 
court denies postconviction relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing, “this 
Court must accept [the defendant’s] factual allegations as true to the extent they are 
not refuted by the record.”  Rose v. State, 774 So. 2d 629, 632 (Fla. 2000), receded 
from on other grounds by Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 2003).  However, 
                                          
 
 
8.  For all death case postconviction motions filed after October 1, 2001, 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 requires an evidentiary hearing “on 
claims listed by the defendant as requiring a factual determination.”  Fla. R. Crim. 
P. 3.851(f)(5)(A)(i); see also Amendments to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure 
3.851, 3.852, & 3.993, 802 So. 2d 298, 301 (Fla. 2001).  However, prior to the 
2001 amendments to rule 3.851, rule 3.850(d) applied to the summary denials of 
postconviction motions in both death and nondeath cases.  See McLin v. State, 827 
So. 2d 948, 954 n.3 (Fla. 2002).  Because Mungin’s motion for postconviction 
relief was filed in 1998, the summary denial standard set forth in rule 3.850(d) 
applies in this case. 
 
 
- 14 -
the defendant has the burden of establishing a legally sufficient claim.  See 
Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000).  If the claim is legally 
sufficient, this Court must then determine whether the claim is refuted by the 
record.  See id. 
To obtain relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel Mungin must 
establish  
deficient performance and prejudice, as set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  See Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 
2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1998).  As to the first prong, deficient performance, 
a defendant must establish conduct on the part of counsel that is 
outside the broad range of competent performance under prevailing 
professional standards.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.  Second, as to 
the prejudice prong, the deficient performance must be shown to have 
so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceedings that 
confidence in the outcome is undermined.  See id. at 694; Rutherford, 
727 So. 2d at 220. 
Gore v. State, 846 So. 2d 461, 467 (Fla. 2003) (parallel citations omitted).  
“[W]hen a defendant fails to make a showing as to one prong, it is not necessary to 
delve into whether he has made a showing as to the other prong.”  Waterhouse v. 
State, 792 So. 2d 1176, 1182 (Fla. 2001).  Further, as the United States Supreme 
Court explained in Strickland, 
[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly 
deferential. . . .  A fair assessment of attorney performance requires 
that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged 
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the 
time.  Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a 
 
 
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court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance . . . .  
466 U.S. at 689.  We address each of Mungin’s claims separately below. 
(a)  Voir Dire  
 
Mungin first contends that the trial court erred in denying without an 
evidentiary hearing his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for accepting the 
jury without objection, which thereby failed to preserve for appeal the issue of 
whether the trial court erred in overruling a defense objection to the State’s use of a 
peremptory challenge to strike juror Galloway, an African-American female.  At 
the Huff hearing, the State argued that Mungin was not prejudiced by trial 
counsel’s failure to object because the underlying claim was meritless.  After 
reviewing the record of the voir dire, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in granting the State’s peremptory challenge of juror Galloway. 
Therefore, the prejudice prong of Strickland is conclusively refuted.  See Valle v. 
State, 705 So. 2d 1331, 1335 (Fla. 1997).   
(b) Failure to Object During State’s Closing Argument  
Mungin next asserts that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim 
that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to three comments made 
by the prosecutor during guilt and penalty phase closing arguments.  After 
reviewing the comments, we conclude that the record conclusively establishes that 
none of these isolated arguments was objectionable, and accordingly no ineffective 
 
 
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assistance of counsel in failing to object can be demonstrated.  Thus, summary 
denial was appropriate because this claim is without merit.   
(c)  Failure to Properly Prepare Witness 
Mungin next asserts that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim 
that trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase for failing to properly 
prepare witness Glenn Young.  During direct examination, trial counsel asked 
Young about the amount of time Mungin was already required to serve in prison 
because of his prior convictions.  Young responded that Mungin was serving a life 
sentence, but that life does not always mean life.   Mungin asserts that as a result of 
trial counsel’s failure to prepare Young, Young was permitted to give highly 
damaging testimony about the possibility of early release if Mungin was sentenced 
to life in this case.  The trial court denied this claim as procedurally barred.  
In his motion for postconviction relief, Mungin appears to argue both the 
merits of the underlying claim—that Young’s testimony was fundamental error—
and that trial counsel was ineffective for allowing this testimony.  As to the merits 
of the underlying claim, the trial court correctly found this issue to be procedurally 
barred because Mungin raised this issue on direct appeal and it was rejected by the 
Court.  See Mungin, 689 So. 2d at 1030.  However, Mungin’s claim that counsel 
was ineffective for opening the door to this testimony is cognizable in a motion for 
postconviction relief.  See Brown v. State, 846 So. 2d 1114, 1123-24 (Fla. 2003) 
 
 
- 17 -
(addressing the defendant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for opening the door 
to damaging testimony); Johnson v. State, 769 So. 2d 990, 1000-01 (Fla. 2000) 
(same).  Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to address the merits of this 
claim.  
The trial court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing unless Mungin’s 
allegations failed to state a legally sufficient claim or the claim was refuted by the 
record.  See Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1061.  To establish prejudice, Mungin’s 
allegations must show that Young’s testimony that life does not always mean life 
“so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceedings that confidence in the 
outcome is undermined.”  Gore, 846 So. 2d at 467.  Specifically, as it pertains to 
the penalty phase, we must determine whether allowing Young’s testimony 
undermines our confidence in the imposition of the death sentence.  We conclude 
that Mungin has failed to meet this burden. 
First, Young’s testimony on this subject, although not all favorable to 
Mungin, allowed defense counsel to argue to the jury that Mungin had already 
been sentenced to prison for the rest of his natural life.  Second, as noted by the 
Court on direct appeal, the trial court properly instructed the jury that the law at the 
time for capital sentences was death or life with a minimum mandatory term of 
twenty-five years.  See Mungin, 689 So. 2d at 1031.  Thus, regardless of the 
specter of early release on Mungin’s prior convictions, the jury knew that a life 
 
 
- 18 -
sentence in this case meant Mungin would serve at least twenty-five years in 
prison.  Accordingly, we conclude that Mungin cannot demonstrate prejudice 
under the Strickland standard as to this aspect of trial counsel’s performance alone 
or in combination with other alleged deficiencies.9   
5. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel during the Guilt Phase 
In Mungin’s fifth issue on appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred in 
denying three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of 
his trial following an evidentiary hearing.  In reviewing a trial court’s ruling after 
an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court 
defers to the factual findings of the trial court to the extent that they are supported 
by competent, substantial evidence, but reviews de novo the application of the law 
to those facts.  See Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1031-32 (Fla. 1999).   
                                          
 
9.  Mungin admits that he raised the following claims in his postconviction 
motion solely to preserve them for federal review:  Claim VI (failure to object to 
various comments and arguments by the State which diminished the jurors’ sense 
of responsibility in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985)); 
Claim VIII (Mungin is innocent of first-degree murder and was denied an 
adversarial testing); Claim IX (Mungin is innocent of the death penalty); Claim X 
(penalty phase instructions improperly shifted the burden to the defense to prove 
that death was an inappropriate sentence and trial counsel failed to object); Claim 
XI (jurors received inadequate guidance as to aggravating factors and Florida’s 
statute is unconstitutionally vague); Claim XII (denial of constitutional rights and 
right to collateral counsel due to rules prohibiting juror interviews); Claim XIII 
(death sentence predicated on an automatic aggravating circumstance of 
commission of murder during the course of a felony); Claim XV (Mungin is insane 
to be executed); and Claim XVII (electrocution and lethal injection are 
unconstitutional and violative of principles of international law).  We agree that the 
trial court did not err in summarily denying relief on these claims. 
 
 
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Mungin’s first subclaim is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
sufficiently impeach the testimony of Ronald Kirkland.  Specifically, Mungin 
argues that Cofer should have made the jury aware that Kirkland was on probation 
at the time of the trial and that warrants had been issued for Kirkland’s arrest on 
violation of probation and subsequently recalled.10   
Even if Cofer’s performance was deficient because he failed to discover and 
use Kirkland’s probationary status as impeachment evidence, Mungin has failed to 
establish prejudice.  Cofer attacked Kirkland’s identification of Mungin on cross- 
examination of Kirkland, and by his cross-examination of the victim of the 
Monticello shooting and the eyewitness to the Tallahassee shooting, whose 
descriptions of the perpetrator were different from Kirkland’s.  In closing 
argument, Cofer argued extensively that due to these inconsistencies, Kirkland’s 
identification could not be believed beyond a reasonable doubt.  Moreover, 
                                          
 
10.  In the alternative, Mungin asserts that the State violated Brady by failing 
to disclose Kirkland’s probation status as well as the recalled warrants.  The trial 
court refused to address this claim because it was raised not in Mungin’s 
consolidated amended motion for postconviction relief, but as a supplemental 
claim filed on the day of the evidentiary hearing.  Despite the trial court’s ruling,  
both Cofer and Kirkland were asked about these events at the evidentiary hearing 
and there was no evidence presented to support a finding that the State knew about 
Kirkland’s probationary status or warrants.  Kirkland testified that he did not 
disclose his probation to anyone at the State Attorney’s Office and was unaware 
that a warrant for violation of probation had even been issued.  Cofer testified that 
neither the State Attorney’s Office nor the Public Defender’s Office is involved in 
obtaining a warrant for violation of probation.  Moreover, the warrants were 
recalled in February 1993, after Mungin’s trial.  The State could not suppress 
information that was not available.    
 
 
- 20 -
Kirkland testified that he did not tell anyone from the State Attorney’s Office that 
he was on probation and that he did not have any deals with the State in exchange 
for his testimony at Mungin’s trial.  Mungin does not allege that any deals were 
made.  As for trial counsel’s failure to inform the jury of the recalled warrants for 
Kirkland’s arrest, because the warrants were not recalled until after the trial it 
cannot be said that counsel’s performance was deficient.   
Mungin also asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call 
Detective Christie Conn to testify regarding Kirkland’s identification of Mungin in 
a photo spread.  Specifically, Mungin asserts that according to Detective Conn’s 
deposition testimony, Kirkland stated at the time of the identification that he could 
not swear in court that the man in the photograph was the same man he saw exiting 
the store on the day of the murder.  After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court 
denied this claim, finding that Cofer “made a tactical decision, after discussing the 
possibility with Defendant, not to call Detective Conn as a witness.”  
Cofer testified at the evidentiary hearing that after discussing the issue with 
Mungin, he made a tactical decision not to call Detective Conn.  Cofer stated that it 
was their decision that unless they had something “pretty important” to present, 
they wanted to try to reserve initial and final closing argument, and that on balance 
Kirkland admitted to most of the things that they would have used Detective Conn 
to impeach.  Mungin argues that Cofer’s asserted reason for failing to call 
 
 
- 21 -
Detective Conn is belied by the record, which shows that the defense team waived 
initial closing argument.   
Although trial counsel ultimately waived initial closing argument, that does 
not demonstrate that at the time the decision was made not to call Detective Conn, 
trial counsel did not intend to use both the initial and final closing.  Further, Cofer 
stated at the evidentiary hearing that the decision was part of his trial strategy, 
which he discussed with Mungin and to which Mungin agreed.  Mungin did not 
testify at the hearing and therefore failed to present any evidence to rebut Cofer’s 
testimony that Mungin was consulted about this decision.   
Even assuming that counsel’s performance was deficient in this regard, we 
conclude that Mungin has failed to establish prejudice.  As noted above, trial 
counsel attacked Kirkland’s identification of Mungin on cross-examination by 
bringing out the limited time he had to actually view the perpetrator and the fact 
that it took him fifteen to twenty minutes to pick Mungin out of the photo lineup.  
Cofer also brought Kirkland’s identification into question by his cross-examination 
of the victim of the Monticello shooting and the eyewitness to the Tallahassee 
shooting, who gave different descriptions of the perpetrator than did Kirkland.  
Accordingly, our confidence in the outcome of Mungin’s trial is not undermined 
by Cofer’s failure to call Detective Conn to testify.  
 
 
- 22 -
In his final guilt phase ineffective assistance subclaim, Mungin asserts that 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue an alibi defense.  The trial court 
denied this claim, finding that Cofer’s testimony that the alibi defense was 
inconsistent with the facts of the case and that such testimony would not have 
benefited Mungin was credible.  The trial court concluded that Cofer’s strategic 
decision not to pursue this defense did not result in deficient performance or 
prejudice.  We agree.  Mungin’s claim that a man named “Ice” would have helped 
to establish his innocence is not supported by any credible evidence.      
The Court has rejected ineffective assistance of counsel claims alleging a 
failure to present an alibi defense when counsel has investigated and made a 
strategic decision, supported by the record, not to present the defense.  See, e.g., 
Reed v. State, 875 So. 2d 415, 429-30 (Fla. 2004) (affirming the trial court’s 
finding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to present an alibi defense 
when, after an investigation, trial counsel concluded that the available testimony 
provided, at best, an incomplete alibi). 
In this case, it appears that counsel was confused about the details of 
Mungin’s alibi defense.  However, Mungin has failed to establish prejudice.  
Mungin was linked to the crime by the ballistics evidence that identified the gun 
used in the Tallahassee and Monticello shootings, and found in Mungin’s room the 
night he was arrested, as the same gun that was used to shoot the victim in this 
 
 
- 23 -
case.  The State also presented the eyewitness testimony of Ronald Kirkland, who 
identified Mungin as the man he saw leaving the store.  In addition, Mungin 
presented no evidence at the evidentiary hearing that trial counsel would have been 
able to locate “Ice” or any evidence connecting “Ice” to the gun.  Although Edward 
Kimbrough and Jesse Sanders testified that they knew an individual who went by 
the name “Ice,” Kimbrough had not seen “Ice” since the early or mid-1990s and 
Saunders had not seen him since 1987.  Neither witness testified that he could have 
helped Cofer find “Ice” in 1992, and neither witness directly supported Mungin’s 
claim that he gave “Ice” the gun.   
Equally important, Mungin’s other alibi witnesses do not establish that 
Mungin could not have committed the murder on the afternoon of September 16, 
1990.  The testimony of Brian Washington, who was sure that the date he drove 
Mungin to Jacksonville was September 16, 1990, placed Mungin in Jacksonville 
on the day of the shooting.  Philip Levy and Vernon Longworth remembered 
seeing Mungin in Jacksonville on a Sunday in September but neither could 
remember the exact date or time.  Therefore, even assuming that the day they saw 
Mungin was September 16, 1990, their testimony does not provide persuasive 
evidence that Mungin would have been unable to commit the murder between 1:30 
and 2:00 that afternoon.   
 
 
- 24 -
In light of the strong evidence linking Mungin to the crime and the 
weaknesses in the testimony of Mungin’s alibi witnesses, we conclude that Mungin 
has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by Cofer’s failure to follow up on his 
alibi defense.  Cf. Torres-Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So. 2d 1321, 1325 (Fla. 1994) 
(concluding that although counsel’s failure to thoroughly investigate an alibi 
defense may have been deficient performance under the facts of the case, 
defendant failed to establish prejudice where four witnesses testified contrary to 
the alibi testimony offered at the evidentiary hearing and three other witnesses 
placed the defendant at the scene of the crime).   
6. 
Public Defender’s Conflict of Interest 
In his sixth issue on appeal, Mungin asserts that his conviction and sentence 
should be vacated because the Public Defender’s Office for the Fourth Judicial 
Circuit had an actual conflict of interest that it failed to disclose due to its 
representation of a State’s witness, Ronald Kirkland, both before and during 
Mungin’s trial.  In the alternative, Mungin contends that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to investigate whether a conflict existed.  After the 
evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied this claim, finding that no actual conflict 
of interest existed.   
 This Court has recognized that “[a]s a general rule, a public defender’s 
office is the functional equivalent of a law firm” and that “[d]ifferent attorneys in 
 
 
- 25 -
the same public defender’s office cannot represent defendants with conflicting 
interests.”  Bouie v. State, 559 So. 2d 1113, 1115 (Fla. 1990).  Moreover, “the right 
to effective assistance of counsel encompasses the right to representation free from 
actual conflict.”  Hunter v. State, 817 So. 2d 786, 791 (Fla. 2002).  However, in 
order to show a violation of the right to conflict-free counsel or to establish a claim 
of ineffective assistance premised on an alleged conflict, the defendant must 
“establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s 
performance.”  Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980)); see also 
Bouie, 559 So. 2d at 1115 (same).   In Hunter, the Court explained that  
[a] lawyer suffers from an actual conflict of interest when he or she 
“actively represent[s] conflicting interests.”  Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350.  
To demonstrate an actual conflict, the defendant must identify specific 
evidence in the record that suggests that his or her interests were 
compromised.  See Herring v. State, 730 So. 2d 1264, 1267 (Fla. 
1998).  A possible, speculative or merely hypothetical conflict is 
“insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction.”  Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 
350.  “[U]ntil a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented 
conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate 
for his claim of ineffective assistance.”  Id.  If a defendant 
successfully demonstrates the existence of an actual conflict, the 
defendant must also show that this conflict had an adverse effect upon 
his lawyer’s representation.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; Cuyler, 
446 U.S. at 350. 
817 So. 2d at 792 (parallel citations omitted) (alterations in original). 
Hunter involved an allegation that an actual conflict existed because a State 
witness was formerly represented by the same public defender’s office that 
represented the defendant.  See id. at 791.  The Court rejected the defendant’s 
 
 
- 26 -
argument because trial counsel was unaware of the public defender’s previous 
representation of the witness and did not even know about the witness’s criminal 
background.  See id. at 793.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court found its prior 
decision in McCrae v. State, 510 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1987), which involved similar 
facts, on point.  In that case, in addition to noting that trial counsel was unaware of 
the public defender’s representation of the witness, the Court also concluded that 
counsel was not required “to make inquiry into the matter in order to be considered 
reasonably effective and within the range of normal, professional competence.”  Id. 
at 877.  
In this case, Cofer was aware of some of Kirkland’s prior criminal history. 
However, there is nothing in the record to support a conclusion that Cofer knew 
that Kirkland had been represented by the Public Defender’s Office for the Fourth 
Judicial Circuit before or during Mungin’s case.  Cofer testified that he could not 
recall whether he checked the public defender’s database or whether he knew that 
Kirkland had been represented by the public defender’s office.  He also stated that 
if he had known about the public defender’s simultaneous representation of 
Kirkland in 1992, he would have disclosed this information to Mungin.  Cofer’s 
testimony supports the trial court’s finding that no actual conflict existed.       
However, even if an actual conflict did exist, Mungin has failed to 
demonstrate that the conflict adversely affected Cofer’s representation.  See 
 
 
- 27 -
Hunter, 817 So. 2d at 792 (noting that the defendant must satisfy both prongs of 
Cuyler to be entitled to relief).  Cofer cross-examined Kirkland extensively about 
his identification of Mungin, and in light of the fact that Mungin has presented no 
evidence that Cofer knew of the public defender’s representation of Kirkland, 
Mungin cannot establish that the alleged conflict prevented adequate cross-
examination of Kirkland.  See Hunter 817 So. 2d at 793; Bouie, 559 So. 2d at 
1115.   
Finally, regarding Mungin’s claim that Cofer was ineffective for failing to 
determine that the public defender’s office had represented Kirkland, this Court 
rejected that argument in McCrae.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial 
of relief on this claim.  
7. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the Penalty Phase 
In his final ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, Mungin asserts that 
his trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase for failing to present 
mitigation evidence that Mungin attempted suicide at the age of twelve.  As with 
Mungin’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase, he 
must establish both deficient performance and prejudice to be entitled to relief.  
With respect to mitigation this Court has recognized that “the obligation to 
investigate and prepare for the penalty portion of a capital case cannot be 
overstated.”  State v. Lewis, 838 So. 2d 1102, 1113 (Fla. 2002).  “[A]n attorney 
 
 
- 28 -
has a strict duty to conduct a reasonable investigation of a defendant’s background 
for possible mitigating evidence.”  Ragsdale v. State, 798 So. 2d 713, 716 (Fla. 
2001) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Reichmann, 777 So. 2d 342, 350 
(Fla. 2000)).  Moreover, the United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the 
importance of a thorough investigation by defense counsel into mitigating factors.  
See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).  When evaluating claims that counsel 
was ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence, the defendant has the 
burden of showing that counsel’s ineffectiveness “deprived the defendant of a 
reliable penalty phase proceeding.”  Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d 974, 985 (Fla. 2000) 
(quoting Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 223 (Fla. 1998)).  
With regard to deficient performance, Cofer testified that he was aware of 
Mungin’s attempted suicide at age twelve and generally presented this type of 
information to the mental health expert to incorporate into his or her testimony.  
Dr. Krop testified at trial that in conducting his evaluation he reviewed psychiatric 
records from when Mungin was twelve years old.  Thus, this is not a case where 
counsel did not investigate potential mental health mitigation.  Instead, Cofer chose 
to submit all relevant information to the mental health expert to allow the expert to 
make a diagnosis.  This method of presenting Mungin’s mental health mitigation 
cannot be automatically considered deficient performance, especially given Dr. 
Krop’s conclusion that Mungin did not suffer from any major mental illness or 
 
 
- 29 -
personality disorder.  It was an informed strategic decision well within professional 
norms.    
Even if Cofer’s decision not to present evidence of Mungin’s suicide attempt 
directly to the jury could be considered deficient performance, Mungin has failed 
to establish prejudice.  The suicide attempt took place when Mungin was twelve 
years old, which was twelve years before he committed the murder at issue in this 
case.  Mungin presented no evidence at the hearing that he had any suicidal 
tendencies at the time of the murder.  Nor did he present any evidence to contradict 
Dr. Krop’s testimony at trial that Mungin did not suffer from any major mental 
illness or personality disorder at the time of the murder.  Finally, there are 
contradictory statements in the hospital report regarding whether Mungin took two 
Valium tablets to help him sleep or to attempt suicide.  Thus, although the jury 
recommended death by a close seven-to-five vote, we conclude that Cofer’s failure 
to present evidence of Mungin’s suicide attempt to the jury did not “so affect[] the 
fairness and reliability of the proceedings that confidence in the outcome is 
undermined.”  Gore, 846 So. 2d at 467.       
B.  PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
1. 
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
Mungin raises two claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  
“The criteria for proving ineffective assistance of appellate counsel parallel the 
 
 
- 30 -
Strickland standard for ineffective trial counsel.”  Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 So. 
2d 1162, 1163 (Fla. 1985).  Thus, the Court must consider 
first, whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, 
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result. 
 
Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So. 2d 1009, 1027 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Suarez v. 
Dugger, 527 So. 2d 190, 192-93 (Fla. 1988)).  “If a legal issue ‘would in all 
probability have been found to be without merit’ had counsel raised the issue on 
direct appeal, the failure of appellate counsel to raise the meritless issue will not 
render appellate counsel’s performance ineffective.”  Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 
2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 86 (Fla. 
1994)).  
Mungin first argues that he received ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel because appellate counsel failed to raise on appeal the State’s introduction 
of hearsay testimony during the penalty phase.  The State presented the testimony 
of Tallahassee Police Department Officer Cecil Towle regarding the facts of a 
prior crime that had been used in the guilt phase as Williams rule evidence.   
Mungin asserts that this hearsay testimony violated his constitutional right of 
confrontation.  To the extent Mungin relies on Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36 (2004), we have recently concluded that Crawford is not retroactive.  See 
 
 
- 31 -
Chandler v. Crosby, 916 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2005).  Moreover, Mungin did not raise a 
confrontation clause argument in the trial court and therefore that specific 
argument was not preserved for appeal.  “[A]ppellate counsel cannot be ineffective 
for failing to raise claims which were not preserved due to trial counsel’s failure to 
object.”  Johnson v. Singletary, 695 So. 2d 263, 266 (Fla.1996).  In addition, the 
use of hearsay testimony of a police officer to discuss details of a prior crime in the 
penalty phase does not constitute error, much less fundamental error.  See 
generally Dufour v. State, 905 So. 2d 42, 62-63 (Fla. 2005) (rejecting the 
defendant’s argument that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
hearsay testimony of the attorney who prosecuted the defendant for an out-of-state 
murder and who summarized the testimony of the pathologist who testified in the 
out-of-state trial).  Accordingly, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to 
raise this issue on appeal.  
 
Mungin also asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
on appeal the State’s introduction during the penalty phase of two photographs of 
the victim of the Tallahassee crime.  The same standard for introducing testimony 
of a prior violent felony conviction during the penalty phase applies to 
photographs.  See generally Lockhart v. State, 655 So. 2d 69, 72-73 (Fla. 1995) 
(applying the same standard to testimony and photographs regarding prior violent 
felony conviction).  Thus, photographs depicting the victim of a prior violent 
 
 
- 32 -
felony committed by the defendant are admissible so long as they are relevant and 
the prejudicial effect of the photographs does not outweigh their probative value.  
See id. at 73; Duncan v. State, 619 So. 2d 279, 282 (Fla. 1993).    
 
 We conclude that the two photographs of the Tallahassee victim admitted in 
this case were relevant to show the victim and circumstances of the Tallahassee 
shooting, and that even if not relevant, the admission of the photographs was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Dufour, 905 So. 2d at 73-74.  
Accordingly, we deny this claim for relief.         
2. 
Court’s Prior Ruling  
 
In the second claim raised in his habeas petition Mungin asks this Court to 
reconsider its ruling on direct appeal that the trial court’s error in instructing the 
jury on both premeditated and felony murder was harmless.  Since Mungin’s direct 
appeal, this Court has reaffirmed that “[a] general verdict need not be reversed 
‘where the general verdict could have rested upon a theory of liability without 
adequate evidentiary support when there was an alternative theory of guilt for 
which the evidence was sufficient.’” Teffeteller, 734 So. 2d at 1018 (quoting 
Mungin, 689 So. 2d at 1030).  We decline to revisit this issue and deny this claim 
for relief.       
3. 
Ring v. Arizona 
 
 
- 33 -
 
Mungin acknowledges that this Court has repeatedly rejected claims for 
relief under Ring, and states that he raises the claim only to preserve it for federal 
review.  Moreover, as the State notes, this Court has now expressly held that Ring 
does not apply retroactively.  See Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 412 (Fla. 
2005).  Accordingly, we deny this claim for relief. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 
Mungin’s motion for postconviction relief and deny Mungin’s petition for a  
writ of habeas corpus. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
ANSTEAD and QUINCE, JJ., concur in result only. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
John Southwood, Judge - Case No. 92-3178-CF 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Todd G. Scher, Miami Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Curtis M. French, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent