Title: LEWIS v ANACONDA COMPANY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12852
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: December 18, 1975

No. 12852 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1975 REX F: TXWIS , P l a i n t i f f and Claimant, ANACONDA C O M P A N Y , Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l District, Honorable Robert J. Boyd, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For P l a i n t i f f : Scanlon and Connors, Anaconda, Montana Jack M. Scanlon argued, Anaconda, Montana For Respondent: Henningsen, P u r c e l l and Genzberger, Butte, Montana Rex F. Henningsen argued, Butte, Montana Submitted: November 6, 1975 Decided : DEC 1 8 1975 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This appeal originates from an i n d u s t r i a l accident which occurred on December 7, 1960. P l a i n t i f f Rex K. Lewis was a t t h a t time an employee of defendant Anaconda Company. While performing h i s duties a s a boilermaker, he was injured t o the extent of a fractured l e f t w r i s t and a f r a c t u r e of both nasal bones. H e was awarded $229.44 i n temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y benefits pursuant t o section 92-701, R.C.M. 1947. O n March 27, 1961, a p e t i t i o n f o r lump sum settlement i n the amount of $1,825 was approved by t h e I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board but Lewis received no p a r t of t h i s award. Over ten years l a t e r , an investigation revealed t h a t t h i s p e t i t i o n had been forged by a claims manager of the Anaconda Company. A n action on ~ e w i s ' behalf was t h e r e a f t e r commenced contending t h a t h i s i n j u r i e s e n t i t l e d him t o t h a t lump sum settlement, and t h a t the allegedly fraudulent actions of the Anaconda company's agent had e f f e c t i v e l y deprived him of t h a t award. The action was dismissed by the d i s t r i c t court i n Deer Lodge County f o r f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a claim upon which r e l i e f could be granted. That decision was appealed t o t h i s Court. W e affirmed t h e d i s t r i c t court and ruled t h a t the forged documents were not, by themselves, s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h a r i g h t t o r e l i e f and t h i s Court had no jurisdiction t o make such a determination u n t i l t h e proper administrative procedures were exhausted i n pro- ceedings before t h e I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board. Lewis v. The Anaconda Company, 160 Mont. 478, 503 P.2d 535. Lewis then petitioned the Workmen's Compensation Division f o r consideration of h i s case and hearing was held on April 17,1973. Its decision was adverse t o Lewis. H e was granted a rehearing, which a l s o resulted i n an unfavorable ruling. A n appeal was taken t o t h e d i s t r i c t court, Deer Lodge County. O n August 12, 1974, judgment was entered s p e c i f i c a l l y sustaining the findings and conclu- sions of the workmen's Compensation Division and denying t h e appeal i n i t s e n t i r e t y . In the more than ten year interim between the time t h a t ~ e w i s ' s i n d u s t r i a l accident occurred and the time t h a t h i s case was reopened before t h e workmen's Compensation Division, Lewis engaged i n a number of d i f f e r e n t occupations. Approximately two months a f t e r the accident he returned t o the Anaconda Company a s a boilermaker, where he was on r e s t r i c t i v e duty i n the welding shop. This employment was voluntarily terminated by Lewis nine months l a t e r , allegedly because of the residual e f f e c t s of h i s i n j u r i e s . Lewis then leased a service s t a t i o n and was s e l f - employed i n the year 1962. This lease was terminated i n the l a t t e r p a r t of 1962, and f o r the next seven years Lewis held a number of d i f f e r e n t jobs i n various s t a t e s . O n January 1, 1969, Lewis became a permanent member of the Anaconda police department. Two years l a t e r he suffered another i n d u s t r i a l accident i n the course of h i s employment a s a police off.i?w which resulted i n the f r a c t u r e of h i s r i g h t w r i s t . H e was awarded a lump sum settlement f o r permanent p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y i n the amount of $3500. Lewis' appeal t o t h i s Court i s based primarily on the premise t h a t the Workmen's Compensation Division acted i n t o t a l disregard of uncontm-d credible evidence i n denying h i s claim f o r r e l i e f and the d i s t r i c t court erred i n sustaining such action. Lewis points out t h a t under Montana's l e g i s l a t i v e scheme an injured workman may e l e c t t o proceed under e i t h e r of two s t a t u t o r y sections i n order t o e s t a b l i s h h i s r i g h t t o compensation. Under section 92-703, R.C.M. 1947, the claimant's r i g h t t o recover depends upon h i s a b i l i t y t o demonstrate an a c t u a l l o s s of earnings and t h e number of persons dependent upon him. But, recovery under section 92-709, R.C.M. 1947, i s based on a specific s t a t u t o r y schedule, and proof of an a c t u a l l o s s of earnings i s not required. Spieth v. S t u a r t , 130 Mont. 216, 299 P.2d 106. Thus, under one section the claimant i s compensated f o r h i s a c t u a l l o s s of wages, while the other provides the claimant with an indemnity f o r the l o s s of possible future earnings i n an amount determined by the l e g i s l a t u r e . Jones v. Glacier General Assurance Co., 145 Mont. 326, 400 P.2d 888. The conclusion of the workmen's Compensation Division was t h a t Lewis f a i l e d t o demonstrate any permanent p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y r e s u l t i n g from h i s 1960 injury, and he was therefore n o t e n t i t l e d t o recover under e i t h e r of t h e above provisions. With respect t o section 92-703, R.C.M. 1947, the Division placed p a r t i c u l a r em- phasis on several of i t s numerous findings of f a c t : 1) t h a t t h e claimant had voluntarily terminated h i s employment with the company i n order t o operate h i s service s t a t i o n ; 2) t h a t no evidence was offered regarding the amount of claimant's earnings i n the years between 1963 and 1968; and 3) t h a t claimant has been s t e a d i l y employed a s a police o f f i c e r since 1969. The Division s p e c i f i c a l l y recognized the existence of some evidence tending t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t Lewis had indeed suffered some loss of earning over the years. But, i n the ~ i v i s i o n ' s view, Lewis simply f a i l e d t o estab- l i s h by a preponderance of credible evidence t h a t t h i s l o s s of earnings o r earning capacity was a r e s u l t of the i n d u s t r i a l accident. In support of i t s denial of r e l i e f under section 92-709, R.C.M. 1947, the Division offered these findings of f a c t a s pro- mulgated by the hearings o f f i c e r i n the May 23, 1973, hearing: "21. That there i s no credible evidence i n t h e f i l e o r the record t h a t the claimant ever sought o r received medical treatment f o r the injury t o h i s l e f t w r i s t from e a r l y 1961 u n t i l a t the request of h i s attorney he saw D r . George E. Trobough on March 11, 1972, more than eleven years a f t e r h i s accident, and further, there is no credible evidence i n the record t h a t the claimant ever complained of any permanent physical disablement resulting from t h a t injury during t h e ten o r eleven years following the i n j ury . "22. That D r . George E. Trobough t e s t i f i e d t h a t when he saw t h e claimant more than eleven years a f t e r the injury, the claimant was suffering from a twenty- f i v e percent permanent residual d i s a b i l i t y t o t h e body a s a whole. "23. That t h e claimant was examined on March 26, 1973, by D r . Charles E. Buehler, Butte, Montana, who reported t h a t he could 'find no physical abnormalities with t h i s man's l e f t w r i s t t o warrant any permanent d i s a b i l i t y from t h i s accident. I 11 Under these f a c t s , the d i s t r i c t court s p e c i f i c a l l y found the workmen's Compensation Division t o have regularly pursued i t s authority, and i t s findings of f a c t were reasonable under the c i r - cumstances. It was therefore incumbent upon the d i s t r i c t court t o sustain those findings and t h e r e s u l t i n g conclusions of law. Section 92-834, R.C.M. 1947; DeLeary v. Anaconda Aluminum Co., - M o n t . , 541 P.2d 788, 32 St.Rep. 1041; Hurlbut v. Vollstedt Kerr Co. , M o n t . , 538 P.2d 344, 32 St. Rep. 752; Birnie v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 134 Mont. 39, 328 P.2d 133. Here we a r e presented with a basic c o n f l i c t i n the evidence. In actions under the workmen's Compensation Act, the appellate court must sustain Division action i f the evidence i s s u f f i c i e n t t o support the findings, even though some evidentiary c o n f l i c t may e x i s t . Dean v. Anaconda Co., 135 Mont. 13, 335 P.2d 854. Once promulgated, the findings of t h e Division become t h e equivalent of a jury verdict o r findings of a judge and its action w i l l not be reversed unless t h e preponderance of the evidence is c l e a r l y t o the contrary. Wieri v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 116 Mont. 524, 156 P.2d 838. The applicable r u l e has remained unchanged since i t s explication i n Cartwright v. I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board, 115 Mont. 596, 599, 147 P.2d 909: 11 Our function i n t h i s case i s t o determine whether or not there is substantial evidence t o support the judgment of the d i s t r i c t court. A s can be immediately ascertained from the foregoing summary of the evidence, there is a complete testimonial c o n f l i c t between the parties. In such a s i t u a t i o n t h e issue becomes one of c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e witnesses which i s and must be con- cluded by the I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board which had the opportunity t o observe the witnesses a s they t e s t i f i e d 9: 9 : 9:. " Lewis simply provides us with no legal basis for upsetting the factual conclusions of the workmen's Compensation Division or the district court. Accordingly, those decisions must be affirmed. Lewis also urges us to decide a collateral constitutional issue, a claim which extends to the due process and equal protec- tion provisions of the United States and Montana Constitutions. He argues that the actions of the hearing officers of the workmen's Compensation Division and the Anaconda Company in arbitrarily and capriciously applying a double standard in administering the workmen's Compensation Act discriminates against him by depriving him of a benefit he is entitled to, thus violating his constitutional rights of equal protection and due process. The question is presented for review for the first time to this Court. It is untimely, and therefore cannot be considered on appeal. Britt v . Cotter Butte Mines, 108 Mont. 174, 176, 89 P.2d 266; State ex rel. Anderson v. State Board of Equalization, 133 Mont. 8, 19, 319 P. 2d 221. Lewis cites In re lark's Estate, 105 Mont. 401, 74 P.2d 401, as authority for the proposition that constitutional issues may, under certain circumstances, be raised for the first time on appeal. In Clark the Court specifically invited the parties to raise the particular constitutional question involved, and in that context created the exception. That exception is clearly not applicable to the instant case, where no such invita- tion was extended. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Justice We Concur: Chief Justice Justices. $ 9 42-