Title: Stuber v. Sowder
Citation: 168 Kan. 467, 213 P.2d 989
Docket Number: 37,726
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: January 28, 1950

168 Kan. 467 (1950)
213 P.2d 989
GRANVILLE STUBER, Appellee,
v.
ALFRED SOWDER, Appellant.
No. 37,726

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 28, 1950.
Harry W. Colmery and Byron M. Gray, both of Topeka, and Edward E. Pedroja, of Eureka, were on the briefs for the appellant.
Harold G. Forbes and Thos. C. Forbes, both of Eureka, were on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARVEY, C.J.:
The appeal in this case is from an order of the trial court overruling defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's petition, the allegations of which may be summarized as follows: In 1946 plaintiff was engaged in farming in the eastern part of Greenwood county, and in June orally contracted with W.A. Nelson to lease a described twenty-three acres of land owned by him, and on the following terms. Plaintiff was to prepare the seed-bed, furnish the alfalfa seed and phosphate at his own expense and to plant the land to alfalfa and Nelson was to furnish the necessary lime; that plaintiff was to cut and bale the alfalfa for a term of three years, retain one-half of the alfalfa for himself and to deliver to Nelson, free of cost, one-half of the baled alfalfa in a described barn, in which plaintiff could also store his half of the alfalfa; that pursuant to this contract Nelson furnished the lime and limed the field and plaintiff prepared the ground, furnished the seed and phosphate and seeded the land to alfalfa in the fall of 1946; that in the spring of 1947 plaintiff cut, baled and stored the alfalfa in accordance with the contract; that sometime in the summer (the exact date unknown to plaintiff) Nelson sold the farm to the defendant Sowder and orally informed defendant of the rights of the plaintiff to the alfalfa and of his right to harvest the same for the crop years of 1947, 1948 and 1949; that defendant took possession *468 of the farm in the fall of 1947 with the full knowledge of plaintiff's rights; that thereafter plaintiff cut and baled the last cutting of alfalfa for 1947 and stored all of the alfalfa in the barn previously mentioned, placing the one-half of the alfalfa belonging to defendant on one side of the barn and the other half belonging to plaintiff on the other side of the barn; that in May, 1948, plaintiff went to the described real estate for the purpose of cutting and baling the alfalfa in accordance with the terms of his contract and found the gate to the field locked; that he contacted defendant and was informed by him not to come upon the premises, as defendant did not intend to recognize the rights of the plaintiff, although he knew plaintiff's rights at the time of purchasing the property and had recognized them during the latter part of 1947; that plaintiff repeatedly requested permission to enter upon the land for the sole purpose of carrying out the terms of the aforesaid lease, but was refused by defendant, who had proceeded to cut, bale and dispose of the alfalfa, to plaintiff's detriment. There were allegations as to the value of the crop cut by defendant, for which plaintiff prayed judgment, and also allegations that unless restrained and enjoined from doing so defendant would continue to cut the alfalfa and appropriate it to his own use, to plaintiff's great damage, for which he had no adequate remedy at law, and plaintiff prayed defendant be restrained and enjoined from doing so.
A restraining order was issued at the time the action was brought and later a temporary injunction was granted upon plaintiff's giving bond.
The petition was not attacked by motion. Defendant demurred to plaintiff's petition "on the ground that said petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against defendant and in favor of plaintiff in that said petition of plaintiff shows on its face that the oral agreement alleged in said petition comes within the statute of frauds and is unenforceable and void." This demurrer was considered by the court upon the briefs and arguments of parties and overruled, from which ruling the defendant has appealed.
Counsel for appellant contend that the oral contract pleaded was void under our statute of frauds, and that part performance does not render it valid. The statute relied upon reads:
In 37 C.J.S. 771, the rule with respect to part performance of leases is stated thus:
In Bard v. Elston, 31 Kan. 274, 1 Pac. 565, the resident agent of a nonresident owner of unimproved land leased it orally for a term of six years and authorized the tenant to go upon the land and improve it, which he did. The tenant continued to farm the land and pay the rent thereon in harmony with the oral agreement for five years, when the owner brought a forcible detainer action against him and relied, in part, upon the statute of frauds (sections 5 and 6). The court said:
In Deisher v. Stein, 34 Kan. 39, 7 Pac. 608, the syllabus reads:
Counsel for appellant quote an excerpt from the opinion in Skinner v. Davis, 104 Kan. 467, 468, 179 Pac. 359:
This is in harmony with the statement previously quoted from Bard v. Elston, 31 Kan. 274, 1 Pac. 565. Here the parties were not dealing with an ordinary crop. One of the principal purposes of growing alfalfa is to fertilize the land. The preparation of a seed-bed for the growing of alfalfa requires much more labor than for the sowing of wheat, and the seed and phosphates are expensive. Under the facts of this case the trial court might very well have concluded that the improvement of land was to the extent that it would take the case out of the statute of frauds.
Counsel contend that the defendant is the proper party to raise the defense of the statute of frauds. As the grantee of Nelson he may properly be held to be in privity with him. In 37 C.J.S. 719, it is said:
So the real question is: Could Nelson, in May, 1948, have availed himself of the statute of frauds to stop plaintiff from harvesting the alfalfa and dividing it in 1948 and 1949 without any liability? It seems clear to us he could not have done so. Such conduct would have been taking advantage of the statute of frauds to do the plaintiff an injustice. The plaintiff could have sued for damages based upon quantum meruit. We think defendant here is in no better position. See Nelson v. Street, 148 Kan. 587, 83 P.2d 793, and the authorities cited therein and the many cases cited in the annotation following a report of the case in 119 A.L.R. 1225.
In the petition plaintiff alleges that defendant knew of this contract at the time he purchased the property, and took the property subject to the contract, and that thereafter he accepted the benefits *471 of it. For the purpose of the demurrer these allegations may be taken as true.
We think the trial court properly overruled the demurrer to the petition and its ruling is affirmed.