Title: McLeod v. McLeod
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 246, 2014
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 5, 2014

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
STEVEN A. MCLEOD, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
HUGHEY F. MCLEOD, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 246, 2014 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  C.A. No. N11C-03-111 
§   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: May 29, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: June 5, 2014 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
This 5th day of June 2014, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
On May 15, 2014, the appellant, Steven McLeod, filed a notice of 
interlocutory appeal from an April 25, 2014 opinion of the Superior Court denying 
his motion to dismiss the counterclaims of the appellee, Hughey McLeod.  The 
Clerk issued a Supreme Court Rule 29(b) notice directing the appellant to show 
cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for his failure to comply with 
Supreme Court Rule 42 (“Rule 42”) in taking an appeal from an apparent 
interlocutory order. 
(2) 
On May 29, 2014, the appellant responded to the notice to show 
cause.  In his response, the appellant appears to assert that: (i) a ruling on a motion 
2 
 
to dismiss based upon the absolute litigation privilege is appealable as a collateral 
order; (ii) he complied with Rule 42 by applying for certification of an 
interlocutory appeal in the Superior Court after receiving the notice to show cause; 
and (iii) his failure to comply with Rule 42 should be excused by his pro se, 
incarcerated status.  We find no merit to any of these arguments.   
(3) 
The collateral order doctrine “only applies to ‘that small class [of 
decisions] which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, 
rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent 
of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole 
case is adjudicated.’”  Evans v. Justice of the Peace Court No. 19, 652 A.2d 574, 
576 (Del. 1995) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan, 337 U.S. 541, 546 
(1949)).    In denying the appellant’s motion to dismiss based on the absolute 
litigation privilege, the Superior Court did not finally determine a claim of right of 
the appellant.  The Superior Court found that the absolute litigation privilege might 
not apply because the record reflected that the appellant had allegedly made 
defamatory statements outside of the context of a judicial proceeding.  The 
Superior Court noted that if discovery did not support the claim of defamatory 
statements outside of the judicial context, then the appellant could invoke the 
absolute litigation privilege in a summary judgment motion.  The federal decisions 
that the appellant relies upon—Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) and Mitchell v. 
3 
 
Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)—involved the assertion of qualified immunity by 
government officials for official conduct and are not relevant here.  Accordingly, 
the Superior Court’s denial of the appellant’s motion to dismiss does not fall within 
the collateral order doctrine. 
(4) 
Absent compliance with Rule 42, the jurisdiction of this Court is 
limited to the review of final judgments of trial courts.1  The appellant’s untimely 
application for certification of an interlocutory appeal in the Superior Court2 did 
not cure his failure to file an application in the Superior Court before filing this 
appeal as required by Rule 42.3  Rule 42(d)(iii) does not, contrary to the appellant’s 
contentions, authorize his actions.  That provision, which requires an appellant to 
file a supplementary notice of appeal if the appellant files a notice of appeal before 
the Superior Court has ruled on an application for certification, still presumes that 
the appellant filed an application for certification in the Superior Court before 
filing an appeal in the Supreme Court.4  Finally, the appellant’s pro se, incarcerated 
                                                 
1 Werb v. D’Alessandro, 606 A.2d 117, 119 (Del. 1992). 
2 Supr. Ct. R. 42(c)(i) (requiring that application for certification of interlocutory appeal “be 
served and filed within 10 days of the entry of the order from which the appeal is sought or such 
longer time as the trial court, in its discretion, may order for good cause shown.”).  Under this 
rule, an application for certification of an interlocutory appeal from the Superior Court’s April 
25, 2014 was due, absent good cause shown, in the Superior Court by May 5, 2014.  
3 Supr. Ct. R. 42(c) (stating “[a]n application for certification of an interlocutory appeal shall be 
made in the first instance to the trial court”) (emphasis added). 
4 Supr. Ct. R. 42(d)(iii). 
4 
 
status does not excuse his failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 42.5  
Thus, the Court concludes that this appeal must be dismissed. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, under Supreme Court 
Rules 29(b) and 42, that the within appeal is DISMISSED. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
Justice 
 
                                                 
5 Hall v. Danberg, 2010 WL 2624382 (Del. July 1, 2010).