Title: McNeely v. Industrial Commission
Citation: 108 Ariz. 453, 501 P.2d 555
Docket Number: 10934-PR
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: October 6, 1972

108 Ariz. 453 (1972) 501 P.2d 555 Opal McNEELY, In re Billy W. McNeely, Deceased, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, Respondent, Reynolds Metals Company, Respondent Employer, State Compensation Fund, Respondent Carrier. No. 10934-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. October 6, 1972. Rehearing Denied October 31, 1972. Chris T. Johnson, Phoenix, for petitioner. Porter, Stahnke &amp; Phillips by Bernald C. Porter, Tempe, for respondent employer. William C. Wahl, Jr., Chief Counsel, The Industrial Comm. of Ariz., Phoenix, for respondent. Robert K. Park, Chief Counsel, State Compensation Fund, Phoenix, for respondent carrier. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is a petition for review of a decision and opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One, Department B, which affirmed a finding and award of the Industrial Commission of Arizona denying benefits to the surviving wife and children of Billy W. McNeely. We are called upon to determine whether the Industrial Commission of Arizona may deny compensation where it is found that even though the work contributed to *454 the injury that the contribution was "not material." The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. The deceased, Billy McNeely, first started working for the respondent, Reynolds Metals Company, in 1948 and worked continuously for them until his death on 19 January 1969. He was employed as a maintenance mechanic and his duties were described by his co-employees as heavy in nature. At the time of his death, his work required him to change tires ranging in weight from 50 to 350 pounds several times a week and also required that he climb 60 to 100 feet to repair cranes used in the Reynolds Metals plant. He had no previous history of heart disease. He saw the company doctor on 31 December 1968 complaining of chest pains on heavy lifting or exertion. The doctor felt that the pains were a symptom of heart disease and prescribed nitroglycerin tablets and allowed the deceased to return to work. On 6 January 1969, he was seen at the plant by a nurse complaining of indigestion and he also sought at this time to see his own family doctor. On Wednesday, 15 January 1969, it is believed deceased suffered a myocardial infarction. This was not reported to the plant nurse or doctor. Deceased worked on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday. The next day while returning from a drug store where he had gone to get some medication for indigestion, he suffered a heart attack which resulted in his death. Hearings were held at which the medical testimony was elicited from medical experts in cardiology and pathology as well as respondent's company doctor and decedent's personal doctor. The referee made the following findings of fact: The Industrial Commission, by a vote of 3 to 2, affirmed the decision of the referee. Heart attacks may be accidents within the meaning of the Arizona Workmen's Compensation Act. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Commission, 38 Ariz. 307, 299 P. 1026 (1931); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cabarga, 79 Ariz. 148, 285 P.2d 605 (1955). Where causation is peculiarly within the knowledge of medical experts as in heart attack cases we must rely upon the opinion of medical experts to determine when an accident has occurred and its cause. Waller v. Industrial Commission, 99 Ariz. 15, 406 P.2d 197 (1965); Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 15 Ariz. App. 565, 489 P.2d 1267 (1971). And an industrially related accident does not have to be the cause of the injury or death, but merely a cause. If a worker's job precipitated or accelerated a heart attack, there is a causal connection between the employment and the worker's death. Russell v. Industrial Commission, 98 Ariz. 138, 402 P.2d 561 (1965); Tatman v. Provincial Homes, 94 Ariz. 165, 382 P.2d 573 (1963). *456 In the instant case, the deceased had worked for over 20 years of his life for respondent in what was admittedly hard and strenuous work activity. The testimony of Dr. Grenfell, a pathologist, on cross-examination was as follows: While other medical experts felt that the conditions of employment did not contribute to the infarction, there was no disagreement that by continuing to work after the attack on 15 January 1969 his death was accelerated. Dr. Grenfell stated: Dr. Sherman Minkoff, a cardiologist, stated: "I think one could reasonably assume that heavy work following infarction might accelerate his death, yes." Dr. Thurl Andrews, a specialist in cardiology and internal medicine and defendant's family physician, testified: "I would say that his continuing to work after the onset of the pre-infarction phase, we must presume contributed some to his demise." We have here a man with no previous history of heart disease though the company doctor, a month before the heart attack, suspected something, prescribed medication, and had the deceased return to work. Decedent was not trained in medicine and could only follow these directions and it is apparent from the testimony that by returning to work that his death was accelerated. As our Court of Appeals has stated: The opinion of the Court of Appeals, 17 Ariz. App. 185, 496 P.2d 611 (1972), is vacated and the award of the Industrial Commission is set aside. HAYS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, LOCKWOOD and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.