Title: Commonwealth v. Dirico
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12400
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 13, 2018

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12400 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSEPH DIRICO. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     April 2, 2018. - September 13, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Speedy trial.  Practice, Criminal, Speedy 
trial, Discovery. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 15, 2005. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by John T. Lu, J.; the cases 
were tried before Elizabeth M. Fahey, J.; a motion for 
reconsideration of the motion to dismiss was heard by Fahey, J.; 
and a supplemental motion to reconsider the motion to dismiss, 
filed on October 28, 2015, was considered by Lu, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Rebecca Rose for the defendant. 
 
Jamie M. Charles, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The defendant, Joseph Dirico, claims a 
violation of his rights to a speedy trial under Mass. R. Crim. 
2 
 
 
36 (b), as amended, 422 Mass. 1503 (1996) (rule 36 [b]); the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as 
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment; and art. 11 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  The defendant contends 
that the Commonwealth was responsible for the delay in providing 
him with the results of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence 
testing, and that none of the time after he filed a motion for 
mandatory discovery should be considered excludable delay.  We 
hold that the defendant's right to a speedy trial under rule 
36 (b) was not violated. 
 
We conclude that the discovery the defendant characterized 
as "mandatory" was not mandatory discovery that the Commonwealth 
must automatically provide to a defendant under Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 14 (a) (1), as amended, 444 Mass. 1501 (2005) (rule 
14 [a] [1]).  We also conclude that, even if it did constitute 
mandatory discovery, a defendant who does not want the speedy 
trial clock to be tolled where a scheduled event is continued 
because of the Commonwealth's delay in providing mandatory 
discovery must, under rule 14 (a) (1) (C), move to compel the 
production of that discovery or move for sanctions, which the 
defendant failed to do here.  Here, the defendant acquiesced in, 
benefited from, and was partially responsible for the vast 
majority of the delay between the filing of his motion for 
mandatory discovery and the filing of his motion to dismiss for 
3 
 
 
lack of a speedy trial:  the defendant retained an expert to 
evaluate the results of the Commonwealth's DNA testing, the 
defendant did not object to the Commonwealth's delay in 
providing the additional information regarding that testing 
ordered by the judge to be produced, and a trial date could not 
reasonably be assigned until the expert had obtained and 
evaluated that additional information. 
 
Finally, we conclude that a criminal defendant who moves 
for dismissal for lack of a speedy trial, claiming violation of 
his or her rights to a speedy trial under rule 36 and the United 
States and Massachusetts Constitutions, is entitled to review of 
such constitutional claims even where his or her rule 36 claim 
is denied.  A constitutional analysis of a speedy trial claim is 
separate and distinct from a rule 36 analysis, and is triggered 
when a defendant alleges "that the interval between accusation 
and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from 
'presumptively prejudicial' delay."  Commonwealth v. Butler, 464 
Mass. 706, 709-710 (2013), citing Doggett v. United States, 505 
U.S. 647, 651-652 (1992).  Having conducted that constitutional 
analysis, we hold that the defendant's constitutional rights to 
a speedy trial were not violated. 
 
Background.  On September 15, 2005, a Middlesex County 
grand jury returned indictments charging the defendant with 
three counts of statutory rape of his fifteen year old daughter 
4 
 
 
(victim), in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 23.  The defendant was 
arraigned on October 20, 2005, in the Superior Court, and 
pleaded not guilty to all three counts. 
 
During the course of its investigation, the police learned 
from the defendant's wife that the victim disclosed to her that 
the defendant had had sexual intercourse with the victim on the 
couch in the basement of the family home.  A police officer 
accompanied the defendant's wife into the home and seized the 
cushion cover of the couch as evidence.  Later, using a 
fluorescent light, the police located approximately seven spots 
on the cushion cover and observed signs of semen.  On May 16, 
2005, the cushion cover was brought to the State police crime 
laboratory (crime lab) for examination of possible DNA evidence. 
 
On July 11, 2006, the defendant's wife notified the police 
that the victim had found a framed photograph of the victim on 
which, according to the victim, the defendant had ejaculated 
numerous times during masturbation and then handed to the 
victim.  A police inspector examined the framed photograph with 
a fluorescent light and an orange filter, and observed signs of 
bodily fluids on the frame.  This item was submitted to the 
crime lab on July 21, 2006, for DNA testing. 
 
On September 7, 2006, a judge ordered the defendant to 
provide his saliva on a buccal swab.  On December 13, 2006, the 
record indicates that the prosecutor provided the defendant with 
5 
 
 
a "DNA Affidavit" from a crime lab case manager of forensic 
biology, which was dated January 9, 2006.  The record does not 
reflect the content of this affidavit, but one can infer that it 
did not include a DNA examination of the framed photograph and 
that it did not compare the defendant's DNA to any DNA that 
might have been located on the cushion cover. 
 
On May 23, 2007, the Commonwealth provided additional DNA 
discovery to the defendant,1 and defense counsel informed the 
prosecutor that the defendant would be retaining an expert to 
review the DNA findings.  On June 22, 2007, the defendant filed 
a motion for funds for a DNA expert and a motion for "mandatory 
discovery."  The latter motion sought an order that the 
Commonwealth provide copies of "all [electronic data] regarding 
the DNA testing," "all electronic files related to the case, 
reported or not," and the "Standard Operating Manual" used by 
the laboratory analysts who conducted the DNA testing.  The 
judge allowed both motions on that same day.  But he did not 
issue an order to Orchid Cellmark, the private laboratory that 
the Commonwealth had used to conduct the DNA testing, directing 
the production of the records, until September 4, 2007.2  On 
                                                          
 
 
1 The record does not reflect the content of that 
deoxyribonucleic acid discovery. 
 
 
2 The precise date on which the Commonwealth submitted 
evidence samples to Orchid Cellmark for analysis is unclear from 
the record. 
6 
 
 
September 10, 2007, the Commonwealth provided the defendant with 
the supplemental discovery that the defendant had requested. 
 
On August 6, 2007, a status review was held, and the case 
was continued until September 4, 2007, to give defense counsel 
more time to provide the Commonwealth with the name and 
curriculum vitae of its defense expert.  A status review was 
held on September 4, 2007, but the case was continued at the 
suggestion of the court (without any objection by the defendant) 
until October 11, 2007.  At that October 11 status conference, 
the defendant had yet to provide the Commonwealth with the 
required reciprocal discovery regarding his defense expert; this 
was provided to the Commonwealth on October 23, 2007. 
 
Late in December, 2007, the defendant sent a report to the 
Commonwealth that "included a notation about missing discovery 
material."  The Commonwealth represents that it promptly 
telephoned defense counsel and initiated written communications 
in an effort to clarify what discovery was missing.  
Nevertheless, it took until January 30, 2008, for the 
Commonwealth to receive clarification that the defendant did not 
have the results of the Y-chromosome short tandem repeat method 
(Y-STR) testing, which is male-specific DNA testing.  On March 
6, 2008, shortly after receiving the Y-STR results from Orchid 
Cellmark, the Commonwealth provided the defendant with them.  
7 
 
 
With this production, the defendant had the results of all of 
the DNA testing in the case. 
 
The DNA analysis of the couch cushion and framed photograph 
found DNA only in epithelial cells commonly found on the surface 
of human skin.  The results of the Y-STR testing demonstrated 
that the defendant "could not be excluded as the donor of any of 
the DNA profiles obtained from any of the epithelial [cell] 
fractions of the cushion cuttings."  The results of the Y-STR 
testing demonstrated that the defendant's DNA "matched" the DNA 
profile from an epithelial fraction of the framed photograph.  
One of the cushion cover samples yielded "a possible [DNA] 
mixture, indicating the possible presence of an unidentified 
individual."  No DNA from semen was reported to be found on 
either item that was tested. 
 
On May 20, 2008, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss 
for lack of a speedy trial, claiming that the delay in bringing 
his case to trial violated rule 36 (b), the Sixth Amendment, and 
art. 11.  The judge calculated what he found to be the 
excludable delay, reached a "preliminary" finding of fact that 
no more than 258 days attributable to the Commonwealth had 
elapsed between the date of arraignment and the date of the 
filing of the motion to dismiss, and accordingly denied the 
defendant's motion without prejudice. 
8 
 
 
 
The defendant's first trial began on September 30, 2008, 
and, as a result of a hung jury, ended in a mistrial on October 
8, 2008.  On February 17, 2009, the defendant's second trial 
commenced before a different judge, and the jury found the 
defendant guilty on all three counts of statutory rape.  The 
Appeals Court affirmed his convictions in an unpublished 
memorandum and order pursuant to its rule 1:28.  See 
Commonwealth v. Dirico, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 1130 (2011). 
 
On November 26, 2012, the defendant, representing himself, 
moved for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to dismiss 
for lack of a speedy trial, and the judge who had presided over 
his second trial denied the motion, concluding that the 
defendant had waived this claim by not seeking reconsideration 
before appeal and by not raising it on appeal.  The defendant 
appealed, and the appeal was stayed by the Appeals Court to 
allow him, after the appointment of counsel, to renew his motion 
to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. 
 
On October 28, 2015, the defendant, now represented by 
counsel, filed a supplemental motion to reconsider the denial of 
the motion to dismiss, arguing that his rights to a speedy trial 
under rule 36 (b), the United States Constitution, and the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights had been violated by the 
denial of his motion to dismiss before his first trial.  The 
judge who had originally denied that motion issued new findings 
9 
 
 
of fact and denied the motion to reconsider, this time finding 
that, after considering the excludable delay, only ninety-seven 
days that were attributable to the Commonwealth had elapsed 
between the date of arraignment and the date of the filing of 
the motion to dismiss.  The judge noted that, on June 22, 2007, 
another judge had allowed the defendant's "Motion for Mandatory 
Discovery," where the defendant moved for discovery of various 
data, files, and documents relating to DNA testing, but that 
these items of discovery were not produced in full to the 
defendant until March 6, 2008.  The judge declined to count any 
portion of this DNA discovery delay as elapsed time attributable 
to the Commonwealth because the defendant had not filed a motion 
to compel this discovery or a motion for sanctions pursuant to 
rule 14. 
 
The defendant appealed, and the Appeals Court affirmed the 
denial of the defendant's motion for reconsideration in an 
unpublished memorandum and order pursuant to its rule 1:28.  See 
Commonwealth v. Dirico, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 1116 (2017).  We 
granted the defendant's application for further appellate 
review. 
 
Discussion.  In reviewing a defendant's speedy trial claim 
on appeal, we accept the judge's findings of fact absent clear 
error where the judge's findings rest on his or her evaluation 
of the credibility of a witness testifying at an evidentiary 
10 
 
 
hearing, or where the judge's findings rest on his or her memory 
of events from presiding over the proceedings.  See Barry v. 
Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 285, 289 (1983).  We then "make an 
independent determination of the correctness of the judge's 
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found."  
Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Mercado, 422 Mass. 367, 369 (1996).  But "[w]e 
are in as good a position as the judge below to decide whether 
the time limits imposed by the rule have run" where the judge's 
findings, as here, rest solely on the docket, the clerk's 
minutes, and additional evidence in the record.  See 
Commonwealth v. Denehy, 466 Mass. 723, 730 (2014), quoting 
Barry, supra.  See Commonwealth v. Roman, 470 Mass. 85, 93 
(2014) ("For purposes of a rule 36 calculation . . . , the 
docket and the clerk's log are prima facie evidence of the facts 
recorded therein").3 
 
1.  Rule 36.  Rule 36 is a "[case] management tool, 
designed to assist the trial courts in administering their 
dockets."  Barry, 390 Mass. at 295-296, quoting Reporters' Notes 
to Mass. R. Crim. P. 36, Mass. Ann. Laws, Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, at 525 (1979).  It also "creates a means through 
                                                          
 
 
3 In Commonwealth v. Taylor, 469 Mass. 516, 524 (2014), we 
declared, "On appeal, we consider whether the judge abused his 
discretion in assessing the defendant's speedy trial claims."  
We no longer believe this to be the correct standard of review. 
11 
 
 
which [criminal] defendants who desire a speedy trial can secure 
one."  Id. at 296.  Under rule 36, "a criminal defendant who is 
not brought to trial within one year of the date of arraignment 
is presumptively entitled to dismissal of the charges unless the 
Commonwealth justifies the delay."  Commonwealth v. Spaulding, 
411 Mass. 503, 504 (1992).4  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 
36 (b) (1) (C), (D).  Dismissal under rule 36 is with prejudice.  
Commonwealth v. Lauria, 411 Mass. 63, 71 (1991). 
 
Here, the defendant has established a prima facie violation 
of rule 36, because 943 days elapsed between his arraignment on 
October 20, 2005, and the filing of his motion to dismiss for 
lack of a speedy trial on May 20, 2008.  The burden therefore 
shifts to the Commonwealth to justify the delay.  See Spaulding, 
411 Mass. at 504.  Subtracting twelve months (i.e., 365 days) 
from this period leaves 578 days that the Commonwealth has the 
burden to show were excludable.5 
                                                          
 
 
4 Rule 36 provides that "a defendant shall be tried within 
twelve months after the return day in the court in which the 
case is awaiting trial."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (1) (C), as 
amended 422 Mass. 1503 (1996).  The return day is "the day upon 
which a defendant is ordered by summons to first appear or, if 
under arrest, does first appear before a court to answer to the 
charges against him, whichever is earlier."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 
2 (b) (15), as amended, 397 Mass. 1226 (1986).  Here, where the 
defendant was under arrest, the return day is the date of 
arraignment, October 20, 2005.  See id. 
 
 
5 In making our calculations, we adhere to rule 36 (b) (3), 
which provides:  "In computing any time limit other than an 
excluded period, the day of the act or event which causes a 
12 
 
 
 
The defendant contends that the Commonwealth cannot meet 
this burden because the 333 days that elapsed between the filing 
of his motion for mandatory discovery on June 22, 2007, and the 
filing of his motion to dismiss on May 20, 2008, should not be 
deemed excludable delay in that this delay resulted from the 
Commonwealth's failure to timely provide the defendant with 
mandatory DNA discovery.6 
 
There are two separate ways in which the Commonwealth can 
meet its burden of justifying a delay, thereby excluding it from 
the speedy trial calculation under rule 36.  The first way is to 
show that the delay falls within one of the "excluded periods" 
specifically enumerated under rule 36 (b) (2).  Such periods 
include, for example, "delay[s] resulting from hearings on 
pretrial motions" and "delay[s] . . . during which any 
proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
designated period of time to begin to run shall not be included.  
Computation of an excluded period shall include both the first 
and the last day of the excludable act or event."  However, 
"[i]f there are excludable periods of delay which overlap, a day 
is excluded only once."  Barry v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 285, 
292 (1983). 
 
 
6 The Appeals Court noted that, "[a]t oral argument, defense 
counsel agreed that our resolution of the [333 days between the 
filing of the defendant's motion for mandatory discovery and the 
filing of his motion to dismiss] is outcome-determinative.  The 
defendant's rule 36 speedy trial claim rises or falls on the 
attribution of the [333-day delay] to the Commonwealth."  See 
Commonwealth v. Dirico, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 1116 (2017).  Although 
the defendant no longer makes this concession on appeal, we may 
take note of his earlier statements before the Appeals Court. 
13 
 
 
advisement."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2) (A) (v), (vii).  Also 
excludable is "[a]ny period of delay resulting from a 
continuance granted by a judge . . . , if the judge granted the 
continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of 
justice served by taking such action outweighed the best 
interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial."  
Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2) (F).7 
 
The second way that the Commonwealth can justify a delay is 
provided not by any provision in rule 36, but by the common law.  
Under the common law, a defendant is not entitled to dismissal 
if he or she acquiesced in, was responsible for, or benefited 
from the delay.  See Barry, 390 Mass. at 295.  A defendant is 
held to have acquiesced in a delay if he or she "agreed to a 
                                                          
 
 
7 The judge may exclude a period of delay under rule 
36 (b) (2) (F) only if "the judge sets forth in the record of 
the case, either orally or in writing, his reasons for finding 
that the ends of justice served by the granting of the 
continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the 
defendant in a speedy trial."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2) (F).  
See Commonwealth v. Davis, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 631, 637 n.11 
(2017) (rule 36 [b] [2] [F] finding "need not be explicit, but 
may be implied from the record").  As a reviewing court, we are 
not in a position to characterize a continuance as an "ends of 
justice" exception under rule 36 (b) (2) (F) where the motion 
judge did not explicitly or implicitly make the requisite 
finding.  See Reporter's Notes to Mass. R. Crim. P. 
36 (b) (2) (F), Massachusetts Rules of Court, Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, at 212 (Thomson Reuters 2018) ("It is implicit that 
[b][2][F] does not countenance an after-the-fact appraisal of 
the causes of delay by a reviewing court; in order to be 
excluded, the delay must have been the subject of a formal 
continuance.  This does not, of course, preclude the appellate 
court from considering whether the grant or denial of a 
continuance constituted an abuse of discretion"). 
14 
 
 
continuance . . . or has not entered an objection to delay."  
Id. at 298.  Thus, in several cases, we have excluded time under 
rule 36 based on the defendant's failure to object to a delay.  
See, e.g., Roman, 470 Mass. at 93 (time excluded where defendant 
failed to object to continuance); Denehy, 466 Mass. at 731-732 
(same); Lauria, 411 Mass. at 68-69 (same); Commonwealth v. 
Farris, 390 Mass. 300, 305 (1983) (same).  In doing so, we have 
emphasized that rule 36 imposes obligations on all parties, and 
that it is the obligation of criminal defendants to "press their 
case through the criminal justice system."  Lauria, supra at 68, 
quoting Barry, supra at 297.  We have required defendants to 
object to delays in order to preserve their rights under rule 36 
because we recognize that otherwise, "the public interest . . . 
[may] be thwarted by those defense counsel who decide that delay 
is the best defense tactic."  Barry, supra.8 
 
Delay arising from forensic testing at a laboratory, such 
as the analysis of DNA found at a crime scene, is not an 
enumerated category of delay under rule 36 (b) (2).  
Accordingly, there is no automatic excludable delay for the time 
                                                          
 
 
8 The determination whether a defendant acquiesced in, was 
responsible for, or benefited from a delay is often 
retrospective, and accordingly requires "a thorough examination 
of the record."  Reporter's Notes to Mass. R. Crim. P. 
36 (b) (2), supra at 210.  We note that in order to avoid these 
difficult retrospective determinations on an often slim record, 
judges should, where possible, make contemporaneous findings 
whether time should be excluded under rule 36 (b) (2) (F). 
15 
 
 
period between when a sample is sent to a laboratory for 
analysis and when a laboratory report is completed.  Cf. Barry, 
390 Mass. at 292 ("once [the Commonwealth] establishes that an 
act or event triggers an excludable period of time [under rule 
36 (b) (2)], the exclusion of the period is automatic").  But 
excludable delay may arise from forensic testing where a 
scheduled court event is continued because the forensic testing 
has yet to be completed and the scheduled event cannot 
reasonably be held until the parties obtain the testing results.  
For instance, where a final pretrial conference needs to be 
continued because the parties have yet to receive a forensic 
report from the laboratory, the period of delay arising from the 
continuance can be excluded pursuant to rule 36 (b) (2) (F) if 
the judge finds that "the ends of justice served by the granting 
of the continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and 
the defendant in a speedy trial."  Where a judge grants a 
continuance to allow more time for forensic testing without 
making a rule 36 (b) (2) (F) finding, the delay arising from the 
continuance may also be excludable if the defendant acquiesced 
in the delay by agreeing to, or failing to object to, a 
continuance, if the defendant was responsible for the delay (by 
asking for the forensic testing, or otherwise being the reason 
for the continuance), or if the delay has benefited the 
defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 448 Mass. 538, 542-543 
16 
 
 
(2007) (delay of 239 days resulting from continuances caused by 
delay in completion of Commonwealth's forensic DNA testing was 
excluded under speedy trial rule, where Commonwealth presented 
evidence that, "at each of the Commonwealth's requested 
postponements of status conferences on the subject, the 
defendant agreed to postponements to specific future dates," and 
there was "no evidence to suggest that the Commonwealth misled 
the defense as to the progress [or lack thereof] in testing, and 
the defendant was always free to insist that a scheduled status 
conference go forward so that the delay in testing could be 
explained to the judge" [footnote omitted]). 
 
The results of the DNA samples submitted for forensic 
testing in this case had the potential to be significant to both 
the prosecution and the defense.  If DNA from the defendant's 
semen were identified on the cushion cover or on the framed 
photograph, it would have provided powerful corroboration of the 
victim's account of the sexual assaults.  If DNA from the 
defendant's semen were not identified on either item, its 
absence might have undercut the victim's credibility. 
 
The parties were scheduled to be assigned a trial date on 
May 23, 2007, but a trial date could not be set because, on that 
date, the prosecutor provided defense counsel with additional 
DNA discovery and defense counsel informed the prosecutor that 
the defendant intended to retain an expert to review the DNA 
17 
 
 
findings.  The discovery motion the defendant filed on June 22, 
2007 -- seeking the production of electronic data and files 
regarding the DNA testing, and the laboratory's standard 
operating manual -- appears to have been intended to assist the 
defendant's DNA expert in his review, because the defendant 
moved that same day for funds to retain such an expert.  The 
defendant did not provide the prosecutor with the name and 
curriculum vitae of the defense expert until October 23, 2007, 
and the defense expert apparently was still engaged in the 
forensic review in late December, 2007, when defense counsel 
notified the prosecutor that discovery was missing, without 
specifying precisely what discovery was missing.  A final 
pretrial conference scheduled for January 14, 2008, was not 
held, and the jury trial scheduled for January 28, 2008, was 
postponed; the docket does not reflect whether a new trial date 
was scheduled at that time.  Clarification that the results of 
Y-STR testing were missing from the discovery furnished to 
defense counsel did not occur until January 30, 2008, and these 
additional results were provided to the defendant on March 6, 
2008, which was the date of a scheduled pretrial conference.  A 
final pretrial conference was held on May 8, 2008, and trial was 
scheduled for June 9, 2008, but this trial date was continued 
after the defendant moved on May 20, 2008, to dismiss for lack 
of a speedy trial. 
18 
 
 
 
The time period between May 23, 2007, when the hearing was 
held for assignment of a trial date, and May 8, 2008, when a 
trial date appears to have been finally assigned at the final 
pretrial conference, is an excludable delay of 352 days because 
the defendant simultaneously acquiesced in, benefited from, and 
was partially responsible for the delay.  A trial date could not 
reasonably be assigned until the defendant's expert had 
completed his review of the results of the forensic testing.  
With these 352 days of excludable delay added to the 349 days 
preceding May 23, 2007, which are also excludable, and one day 
of overlap subtracted, see the table set forth in the Appendix, 
the Commonwealth has met its burden by demonstrating a total of 
700 days of excludable delay (well beyond the 578 days of 
excludable delay it needed to avoid running afoul of rule 36). 
 
The defendant challenges the conclusion that the 
Commonwealth has met its burden here by contending that he 
sought mandatory discovery on June 22, 2007, and that, as 
articulated in Taylor, 469 Mass. at 527, "[a] defendant should 
not be required to choose between the right to mandatory 
discovery and the right to a speedy trial."  The defendant is 
correct that, in Taylor, we recognized that where the 
Commonwealth had failed to furnish a defendant with mandatory 
discovery, it would be unfair to require the defendant to decide 
between forgoing that discovery or moving to compel that 
19 
 
 
discovery if the filing of the motion to compel would produce 
automatic excludable delay under rule 36 (b) (2) (A).  See id. 
at 526-527.  To protect a defendant from this dilemma, we 
declared that where a defendant, pursuant to rule 
14 (a) (1) (C), moves to compel the production of mandatory 
discovery or seeks sanctions for its nondisclosure, the time it 
takes to resolve the motion "shall not be excluded automatically 
from the ultimate speedy trial calculation."  Id. at 527-528.  
Instead, the judge is to assess whether "the ends of justice 
served" by excluding the time outweigh "the best interests of 
the public and the defendant in a speedy trial."  Id. at 528, 
quoting Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2) (F).  We also declared that 
the same principle applies where a defendant agrees to a 
continuance only because the defendant has yet to be given 
mandatory discovery.  See id. at 525. 
 
But the defendant here cannot benefit from our holding in 
Taylor for three reasons.  First, the discovery he sought on 
June 22, 2007, was not mandatory discovery.  Mass. R. Crim. P.  
14 (a) (1) identifies categories of "mandatory discovery" that 
the prosecutor must provide to a defendant as "automatic 
discovery," including "[a]ny facts of an exculpatory nature," 
and "[m]aterial and relevant . . . reports of . . . scientific 
tests or experiments."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A) (iii), 
(vii).  "Because rule 14 was intended to facilitate the 
20 
 
 
automatic production of mandatory discovery 'without the need 
for motions or argument,' . . . and because the Commonwealth's 
obligation to produce is ongoing, . . . the defendant need not 
request any mandatory discovery items."  Taylor, 469 Mass. at 
521, quoting Reporter's Notes (Revised, 2004) to Rule 14, 
Massachusetts Rules of Court, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 
179 (Thomson Reuters 2014).  But the defendant here did not seek 
"reports of . . . scientific tests"; instead, he sought all of 
the electronic data used to prepare the reports, all of the 
electronic files related to the case (whether reported or not), 
and the laboratory's standard operating manual.  The disclosure 
of these items of discovery might prove beneficial to an expert 
who is retained to analyze a DNA report and may properly be 
ordered to be disclosed, but the Commonwealth is not 
automatically required under rule 14 (a) (1) to disclose these 
items in the course of mandatory discovery unless they are 
exculpatory (which the defendant does not contend they are). 
 
Second, even if the discovery that the defendant had 
requested constituted mandatory discovery, the defendant failed 
to move pursuant to rule 14 (a) (1) (C) to compel its production 
or to seek sanctions for its nondisclosure.  "[A] defendant 
seeking both to preserve his speedy trial rights and to obtain 
items of missing mandatory discovery must file a motion for 
sanctions or to compel pursuant to rule 14 (a) (1) (C)."  
21 
 
 
Taylor, supra at 527-528.  "[A] defendant may not 'sit by 
passively,' then later invoke rule 36."  Id. at 527, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Bourdon, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 420, 426 (2008).  
Rather, a defendant must "take proactive steps to alert the 
court and the prosecution" that the Commonwealth has violated 
its mandatory discovery obligations.  See Taylor, supra.9 
 
Third, even if this were mandatory discovery, and even if 
we construed the defendant's motion dated June 22, 2007, as a 
rule 14 motion to compel, the judge allowed the motion on the 
same day it was filed.  Therefore, were we to decline to 
automatically exclude the "time it takes to resolve the rule 
14 (a) (1) (C) motion" under rule 36 (b) (2), see Taylor, supra 
at 528, the defendant would only gain one day under rule 36. 
 
The report of the scientific test regarding the results of 
the Y-STR testing would fall within the rubric of mandatory 
discovery, but the defendant never moved to compel its 
production or to seek sanctions for its nondisclosure.  
Therefore, even if the defendant had agreed to continue the 
                                                          
 
 
9 Because the defendant did not file a motion pursuant to 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 14, as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004), we 
need not reach the issue whether the rule announced in Taylor 
should apply retroactively to the defendant.  See Commonwealth 
v. Taylor, 469 Mass. 516, 528 n.17 (2014) ("We note, as did the 
judge hearing the rule 36 motion, that the defendant in this 
case never pressed any remedies pursuant to rule 14 in an effort 
to address the missing mandatory discovery.  Even under the rule 
we announce today, therefore, the defendant's motion to dismiss 
on speedy trial grounds would not have been successful"). 
22 
 
 
final pretrial conference solely because he had yet to receive 
this mandatory discovery, he failed to do what was necessary to 
"sound the rule 36 'crisis call' and fulfil his . . . 
obligations under the rule."  Taylor, supra at 526. 
 
Where a defendant contends that he or she is being denied 
the right to a speedy trial because of excessive delays in the 
completion of forensic testing and the production of a 
scientific report, a defendant must move to compel the 
production of that scientific report or move for sanctions 
pursuant to rule 14 (a) (1) (C).  A defendant is also encouraged 
to bring a rule 14 (a) (1) (C) motion when he or she anticipates 
that undue delay in the completion of forensic testing will 
necessitate the continuance of a scheduled event, or when undue 
delay has caused a continuance and the defendant seeks to 
prevent the need for a further continuance.  Bringing this type 
of motion alerts the judge that the defendant is actively 
contesting the delay, rather than sitting by passively.  See 
Taylor, supra at 527-528.  Where the delay necessitates the 
continuance of a scheduled event, a judge faced with a rule 
14 (a) (1) (C) motion must evaluate whether "the Commonwealth 
[can] demonstrate[] that its delayed production was not due to 
wilful noncompliance or a lack of due diligence," which may 
render it "appropriate for the speedy trial clock to be tolled," 
and for appropriate findings to be made by the judge that the 
23 
 
 
continuance serves the "ends of justice" as required under rule 
36 (b) (2) (F).  See Taylor, supra at 528.  A judge might 
otherwise resolve a rule 14 (a) (1) (C) motion by ordering that 
the forensic testing, including the production of the scientific 
report, be expedited to avoid the need for a continuance or a 
further continuance.  See id. 
 
Here, because the 352 days between May 23, 2007, and May 8, 
2008, gave the defendant time to prepare his DNA expert for 
trial, and because the defendant never filed a motion to compel 
discovery or for sanctions under rule 14 (a) (1) (C), the 
defendant simultaneously acquiesced in, benefited from, and was 
partially responsible for the delay.  Consequently, we hold that 
the defendant's right to a speedy trial under rule 36 (b) was 
not violated. 
 
2.  Constitutional right to a speedy trial.  The defendant 
also argues that his constitutional rights to a speedy trial 
under the Sixth Amendment and art. 11 have been violated by the 
pretrial delay.  We note at the outset that rule 36 is "a rule 
of case management" and, accordingly, "is wholly separate from 
[a defendant's] constitutional right to a speedy trial."  
Lauria, 411 Mass. at 67.  See Barry, 390 Mass. at 295-296 (rule 
36 "creates a means through which [criminal] defendants who 
desire a speedy trial can secure one," but "the opportunity 
conferred by the rule is not a fundamental constitutional right, 
24 
 
 
or even a right created by statute").  Consequently, even where, 
as here, we conclude that there has been no violation of rule 
36, a defendant who claims that his or her constitutional rights 
to a speedy trial have been violated is entitled to review of 
that claim.  See Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 17-24 
(1994) (concluding that defendant's constitutional rights to 
speedy trial were not violated after rejecting defendant's rule 
36 claim); Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 523, 529-
530 (2002) (same).  See also Commonwealth v. Levin, 390 Mass. 
857, 858 n.2 (1984) (declining to analyze constitutional right 
separately "[b]ecause the parties agree that rule 36 provides 
protection at least as great as the constitutional rights to 
speedy trial").10 
 
Both the Sixth Amendment, incorporated through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and art. 11 guarantee criminal defendants 
                                                          
 
 
10 We note that Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (c) provides that even 
where a defendant is not entitled to dismissal under rule 36 (b) 
because fewer than twelve months of nonexcludable delay have 
elapsed since arraignment, a defendant is still entitled to 
dismissal, upon motion, "where the judge after an examination 
and consideration of all attendant circumstances determines 
that:  (1) the conduct of the prosecuting attorney in bringing 
the defendant to trial has been unreasonably lacking in 
diligence and (2) this conduct on the part of the prosecuting 
attorney has resulted in prejudice to the defendant."  Rule 
36 (c) "is a statement of the fundamental constitutional 
guarantee" and "puts the constitutional standard into manageable 
operational terms."  See Reporter's Notes to Mass. R. Crim. P. 
36 (c), supra at 213.  Although rule 36 (c) derives from the 
constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial, a defendant may seek 
dismissal under rule 36 (c) without making a separate 
constitutional speedy trial claim. 
25 
 
 
the right to a speedy trial.  We interpret art. 11 through the 
lens of Sixth Amendment analysis.  See Commonwealth v. Butler, 
464 Mass. 706, 709 n.5 (2013) ("Although we ultimately decide 
this case pursuant to art. 11 . . . , we cite Federal cases that 
interpret the Sixth Amendment . . . because the analysis is 
analogous").  The burden is on the defendant to demonstrate 
prejudicial delay sufficient to warrant dismissal of the 
indictments against him.  See Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 366 Mass. 
18, 22 (1974). 
 
Although a defendant who fails to prove a rule 36 (b) 
violation faces an uphill battle in proving a violation of his 
or her constitutional rights to a speedy trial, the analysis is 
somewhat different.  One difference is that the speedy trial 
clock for a constitutional analysis does not begin at the time 
of arraignment.  Under art. 11, it begins to run upon the 
issuance of a criminal complaint, see Butler, 464 Mass. at 712 
("a defendant's right to a speedy trial, at least under art. 11, 
attaches when a criminal complaint issues"), and under the Sixth 
Amendment, it begins to run at the time of indictment.  See 
Butler v. Mitchell, 815 F.3d 87, 89 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. 
denied sub nom. Butler v. Murphy, 137 S. Ct. 1064 (2017) ("Under 
the Sixth Amendment . . . , the speedy-trial right attached, and 
the count began, not when the complaint was issued, but when the 
. . . indictment was announced").  "[T]o trigger a speedy trial 
26 
 
 
analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between 
accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary 
from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay."  Butler, supra at 709-
710, citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-652 
(1992).  The burden of establishing "presumptively prejudicial 
delay" is relatively modest -- "[d]epending on the nature of the 
charges, the lower courts have generally found postaccusation 
delay 'presumptively prejudicial' at least as it approaches one 
year."  Doggett, supra at 652 n.1.  See Commonwealth v. Boyd, 
367 Mass. 169, 179-180 (1975) (delay of fourteen months enough 
to "trigger some concern").  Here, the defendant's criminal 
complaint was issued on May 10, 2005, the indictment was 
announced on September 15, 2005, and he filed his motion to 
dismiss for lack of a speedy trial on May 20, 2008; this delay 
between 2005 and 2008 is more than sufficient to establish 
"presumptively prejudicial delay."11 
                                                          
 
 
11 Because the defendant here is appealing from the denial 
of his motion to reconsider his earlier motion to dismiss for 
lack of a speedy trial, the speedy trial clock tolls at the time 
the defendant filed his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy 
trial (just as it did for the rule 36 analysis).  Had the 
defendant moved for a new trial following his convictions and 
claimed a constitutional violation of his right to a speedy 
trial, the speedy trial clock would have tolled on the date when 
his first trial commenced.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Butler, 
464 Mass. 706, 707, 714 (2013) (defendant appealed from order 
denying motion for new trial, and speedy trial clock tolled on 
first day of defendant's trial for purposes of constitutional 
speedy trial analysis). 
27 
 
 
 
Where a defendant has "established presumptive prejudice," 
we apply the four-factor test articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 
407 U.S. 514, 530-531 (1972), to evaluate whether the 
defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been 
violated.  See Butler, 464 Mass. at 710, citing Doggett, 505 
U.S. at 651-652.  Under the Barker test, a reviewing court 
weighs the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the 
defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and 
prejudice to the defendant.  See Barker, supra at 530. 
 
Here, the length of the delay was substantial, but there is 
no evidence (and no claim by the defendant) that the 
Commonwealth was deliberately attempting to delay the trial for 
the purpose of hindering the defense.  See Commonwealth v. 
Wallace, 472 Mass. 56, 61 (2015) ("Weighing most heavily against 
the government are deliberate attempts at delay").  Where, as 
earlier noted, the trial was delayed in part by the delay in 
obtaining all of the forensic testing results, the worst that 
can be said is that the Commonwealth was negligent in failing to 
more promptly obtain those results.  "Although 'our toleration 
of . . . negligence varies inversely with its protractedness,' 
. . . negligence is obviously to be weighed more lightly than a 
deliberate intent to harm the accused's defense."  Butler, 464 
Mass. at 716, quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657.  Because there 
is no evidence here of "intentional delay or bad faith on the 
28 
 
 
part of the Commonwealth," the second prong of the Barker test 
weighs only lightly against the Commonwealth.  See Butler, 
supra. 
 
The defendant's assertion of his speedy trial rights were 
notably absent from the record, and a defendant's "failure to 
assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove 
that he was denied a speedy trial."  Wallace, 472 Mass. at 66, 
quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.  "If the defendant were truly 
concerned that the passage of time would undermine his ability 
to defend himself, common sense dictates that he would have 
pressed for a speedy trial."  Gilbert, 366 Mass. at 23.  Because 
the record reflects that the defendant was responsible for, 
benefited from, and acquiesced in the vast majority of the delay 
in bringing him to trial, the third prong of the Barker test 
weighs heavily against the defendant.  See Butler, 464 Mass. at 
717.12 
 
Prejudice to the defendant "should be assessed in the light 
of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was 
                                                          
 
 
12 We note that the constitutional analysis of this third 
prong of the test in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-531 
(1972), differs slightly from the rule 36 analysis.  A 
defendant's acquiescence in delay will render the delay 
excludable under rule 36 (b) and, therefore, might prove fatal 
to a rule 36 speedy trial claim.  But under a constitutional 
analysis, "the failure by the defendants to assert their speedy 
trial right is not a waiver of the right itself but simply a 
factor to be weighed," albeit an important factor.  See 
Commonwealth v. Wallace, 472 Mass. 56, 68 (2015). 
29 
 
 
designed to protect," which include the interests "(i) to 
prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize 
anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the 
possibility that the defense will be impaired."  Barker, 407 
U.S. at 532.  "[A]lthough the defendant is not entirely absolved 
of responsibility to present some particularized prejudice at 
this stage of the analysis, he is entitled to some degree of 
presumptive prejudice that the Commonwealth can rebut with 
evidence that any delay left the defendant's 'ability to defend 
himself unimpaired.'"  Butler, 464 Mass. at 717, quoting 
Doggett, 505 U.S. at 658 n.4. 
 
Here, the defendant was released on pretrial probation at 
his arraignment on October 20, 2005, his bail was revoked on 
July 11, 2006, and he was placed in custody when he did not make 
bail.  But he eventually made bail on July 19, 2006, and was 
released from custody.  There is nothing in the docket to 
suggest that he was returned to custody before his first trial 
commenced on September 30, 2008.  Where he spent only eight days 
in custody, the defendant did not suffer prejudice from 
oppressive pretrial incarceration.  We recognize that, "even if 
an accused is not incarcerated prior to trial, he is still 
disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a 
cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility."  Barker, 407 
U.S. at 533.  Although we do not minimize the hardships the 
30 
 
 
defendant suffered pending trial,13 they do not rise to the level 
of prejudice that would justify a dismissal on constitutional 
speedy trial grounds.  See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 
781 F.3d 599, 615 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 196 
(2015) (although defendant "argues convincingly that he has 
suffered great stress throughout the proceedings, he does not 
demonstrate why his anxiety was greater than that suffered by 
many other defendants, other than that it continued longer"). 
 
The potential impairment of a defense from delay is the 
"most serious" concern when evaluating whether the defendant was 
prejudiced, "because the inability of a defendant adequately to 
prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system."  
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.  But nothing in the record before us 
suggests that the delay in bringing the defendant to trial 
precluded him from advancing his best defense or otherwise 
prejudiced his defense.  See Commonwealth v. Beckett, 373 Mass. 
329, 334 (1977) ("There was no claim that any witness was 
unavailable, nor any proof that any witness, potentially helpful 
to the defendant, had forgotten significant facts"). 
                                                          
 
 
13 The defendant claimed that the allegations against him 
and the delay in bringing him to trial "forced" him to move out 
of his home and to move to Arizona, led to his resignation from 
his job, contributed to his severe panic attacks and heart 
catheterization, and resulted in his receipt of "angry and 
taunting" messages from family and friends. 
31 
 
 
 
In conclusion, although the delay between the issuance of 
the defendant's criminal complaint (or, under the Sixth 
Amendment, the announcement of the indictment) and the filing of 
his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial was certainly 
troubling in its length, the four Barker factors, "applied in 
their totality," do not establish that the defendant's 
constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated under either 
the Sixth Amendment or art. 11.  See Butler, 464 Mass. at 719.  
We therefore hold that the defendant's rights to a speedy trial 
under the United States and Massachusetts Constitutions were not 
violated.  See Beckett, 373 Mass. at 335 ("Considering the lack 
of prejudice to the defendant and her failure to assert her 
right to a speedy trial for over four years after her 
indictment, we conclude that, in spite of the inordinate delay, 
the defendant was not denied her constitutional rights in the 
circumstances"). 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated, we affirm the denial 
of the defendant's motion to reconsider the denial of his motion 
to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
Appendix. 
 
Under rule 36, the Commonwealth bears the burden of showing 
that, of the 943 days between the defendant's arraignment and 
the filing of his motion to dismiss, 578 days should be 
excluded.  As explained above, the 352 days between May 23, 
2007, and May 8, 2008, are excluded because the defendant 
simultaneously acquiesced in, benefited from, and was partially 
responsible for the delay.  The following table looks to the 
time period prior to May 23, 2007, to determine whether the 
Commonwealth can justify the remaining 226 days.  We conclude 
that the Commonwealth has satisfied its burden by demonstrating 
that 349 days of excludable delay preceded May 23, 2007, for a 
total of 700 days of excludable delay.1 
Events 
No. days 
excluded 
Explanation 
October 20, 2005 
(arraignment) -- 
January 9, 2006 
(pretrial 
conference) 
0 
 
 
Included.  Commonwealth does 
not contest this. 
January 9, 2006 
(pretrial 
conference) -- March 
15, 2006 (scheduled 
0 
 
 
Included.  Pretrial conference 
held as scheduled.  Defendant 
did not acquiesce to delay by 
failing to object to motion 
                                                          
 
 
1 Adding up the days of excludable delay in the table 
results in a total of 362 days.  But because a day is excluded 
only once where excludable periods of delay overlap, see Barry 
v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 285, 292 (1983), thirteen days of 
overlap must be subtracted from the 362, resulting in 349 days 
of excludable delay.  One day of overlap must also be subtracted 
when adding the 349 days of excludable delay preceding May 23, 
2007, to the 352 days of excludable delay following May 23, 
2007.  The result is a total of 700 days of excludable delay. 
2 
 
 
Events 
No. days 
excluded 
Explanation 
motion hearing) 
hearing that was scheduled at 
arraignment.  Commonwealth did 
not demonstrate that this 
period ought to be excluded. 
 
March 15, 2006 
(scheduled motion 
hearing) -- April 
19, 2006 (scheduled 
status conference) 
0 
Included.  Motion hearing was 
"not reached by Court," and 
does not appear to have been 
rescheduled.  Defendant did not 
acquiesce to this delay by 
failing to object to next 
scheduled event, a status 
conference, which was scheduled 
at arraignment. Commonwealth 
did not demonstrate that this 
period ought to be excluded. 
 
April 19, 2006 
(scheduled status 
conference) –- May 
9, 2006 (scheduled 
status conference) 
21 
Excluded.  Status conference 
continued at joint request of 
parties and rescheduled to May 
9, 2006. 
 
May 9, 2006 
(scheduled status 
conference) -- June 
6, 2006 (status 
conference) 
29 
Excluded.  Status conference 
continued at joint request of 
parties and rescheduled to June 
6, 2006. 
 
June 6, 2006 (status 
conference) -- June 
13, 2006 (scheduled 
suppression hearing) 
0 
Included.  Status conference 
held as scheduled.  Defendant 
did not acquiesce to delay by 
failing to object to next 
scheduled event, a suppression 
hearing. 
 
June 13, 2006 
(scheduled 
suppression hearing) 
-- June 26, 2006 
(scheduled status 
conference) 
0 
Included.  Suppression hearing 
not held because defendant 
filed no motions to suppress.  
Defendant did not acquiesce to 
delay by failing to object to 
next scheduled event, a status 
conference. 
 
3 
 
 
Events 
No. days 
excluded 
Explanation 
June 26, 2006 
(scheduled status 
conference) -- July 
10, 2006 (scheduled 
status conference) 
0 
 
 
Included.  Status conference 
not held for unknown reasons.  
Commonwealth does not claim 
this time to be excludable. 
 
July 10, 2006 
(scheduled status 
conference) -- 
August 8, 2006 
(scheduled final 
pretrial conference) 
30 
Excluded.  Status conference 
not held at the request of 
defendant. 
 
August 8, 2006 
(scheduled final 
pretrial conference) 
-- September 7, 2006 
(hearing on "misc. 
matters") 
31 
Excluded.  Final pretrial 
conference not held at request 
of defendant. 
 
September 7, 2006 
(hearing on "misc. 
matters") -- 
September 26, 2006 
(scheduled trial 
date) 
0 
 
 
Included.  Hearing held as 
scheduled.  Defendant did not 
acquiesce to delay by failing 
to object to next scheduled 
event, the trial date, which 
was scheduled at arraignment.  
Commonwealth did not 
demonstrate that this period 
ought to be excluded. 
 
September 26, 2006 
(scheduled trial 
date) -- October 20, 
2006 (scheduled 
discovery hearing) 
25 
Excluded.  Trial date was 
postponed at request of both 
parties. 
 
October 20, 2006 
(scheduled discovery 
hearing) -- October 
23, 2006 (discovery 
hearing) 
4 
Excluded.  Discovery hearing 
continued at request of 
defendant and rescheduled to 
October 23, 2006. 
4 
 
 
Events 
No. days 
excluded 
Explanation 
October 23, 2006 
(discovery hearing) 
-- November 1, 2006 
(pretrial 
conference) 
10 
Excluded.  On October 23, 2006, 
parties executed new tracking 
order because defendant was 
appointed new counsel.  This 
set forth November 1, 2006, as 
a scheduled pretrial conference 
date; December 7, 2006, as a 
date for hearing on 
nonevidentiary motions to 
dismiss; and May 8, 2007, as a 
proposed trial date.  Defendant 
was partially responsible for, 
and benefited from, this delay. 
 
November 1, 2006 
(pretrial 
conference) -- 
November 22, 2006 
(scheduled hearing 
on "misc. matters") 
22 
Excluded.  On November 1, 2006, 
parties executed a second 
pretrial conference report, 
requiring that defendant's new 
counsel be provided with same 
discovery that had been 
provided to defendant's prior 
counsel by November 22, 2006. 
Defendant was partially 
responsible for, and benefited 
from, this delay. 
 
November 22, 2006  
(scheduled hearing 
on "misc. matters") 
-- December 7, 2006 
(scheduled discovery 
hearing) 
16 
Excluded.  Hearing not held at 
request of defendant.  
Defendant was partially 
responsible for, and benefited 
from, this delay because of 
appointment of new counsel. 
December 7, 2006 
(scheduled discovery 
hearing) -- January 
25, 2007 (discovery 
hearing) 
50 
 
 
 
 
Excluded.  Discovery hearing 
was not held, without objection 
from defendant, and discovery 
hearing was rescheduled for 
January 25, 2007.  Defendant 
was partially responsible for, 
and benefited from, this delay. 
 
5 
 
 
Events 
No. days 
excluded 
Explanation 
January 25, 2007 
(discovery hearing) 
-- March 5, 2007 
(status conference) 
40 
Excluded.  Defendant was 
partially responsible for, and 
benefited from, this delay 
because of appointment of new 
counsel. 
 
March 5, 2007 
(status conference) 
-- March 6, 2007 
(hearing on "misc. 
matters") 
2 
Excluded.  Defendant was 
partially responsible for, and 
benefited from, this delay 
because of appointment of new 
counsel. 
 
March 6, 2007 
(hearing on "misc. 
matters") -- March 
19, 2007 (scheduled 
suppression hearing) 
14 
Excluded.  Defendant was 
partially responsible for, and 
benefited from, this delay 
because of appointment of new 
counsel. 
 
March 19, 2007 
(scheduled 
suppression hearing) 
-- April 17, 2007 
(final pretrial 
conference) 
30 
Excluded.  Defendant requested 
that a scheduled suppression 
hearing be continued until 
April 17, 2007; the record does 
not indicate whether this 
hearing was held thereafter. 
Defendant was partially 
responsible for, and benefited 
from, this delay. 
 
April 17, 2007 
(final pretrial 
conference) -- May 
8, 2007 (scheduled 
trial date) 
22 
Excluded.  Parties filed a 
joint motion to continue and 
convert then-scheduled trial 
date of May 8, 2007, into a 
status date because defendant 
wanted to afford his expert 
more time to review the DNA 
testing data.  Defendant was 
partially responsible for, and 
benefited from, this delay. 
 
May 8, 2007 
(scheduled trial 
date) -- May 23, 
2007 (hearing for 
trial assignment 
date) 
16 
Excluded.  Parties jointly 
requested a continuance until 
May 23, 2007. 
 
6 
 
 
 
TOTAL:  349 days of excludable delay (thirteen days of overlap 
subtracted from 362)