Title: Kimbroughtillery v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11699
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 26, 2015

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SJC-11699 
 
KEIAL KIMBROUGHTILLERY  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 3, 2015. - May 26, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Probation, Revocation of probation, 
Collateral estoppel.  Collateral Estoppel. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on April 24, 2014. 
 
 
The case was reported by Cordy, J. 
 
 
 
Rebecca Kiley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the petitioner. 
 
Shoshana E. Stern, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  In this case, here on a reservation and report 
from a single justice of the county court, we consider whether 
principles of collateral estoppel bar a second probation 
revocation proceeding on the same charged misconduct that was 
litigated in an earlier probation revocation proceeding in a 
different county and was resolved in favor of the petitioner, 
2 
 
Keial Kimbroughtillery.  We conclude that principles of 
collateral estoppel bar the second proceeding. 
 
1.  Background.  On February 28, 2013, the petitioner was 
charged by criminal complaint in the New Bedford Division of the 
District Court Department (New Bedford District Court) with 
unarmed robbery, G. L. c. 265, § 19 (b), and assault and 
battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13A (a) (new offenses).  The complaint 
was based on allegations that on February 26, 2013, while the 
victim was sitting in the driver's seat of her vehicle, the 
petitioner leaned over her, grabbed an envelope containing $630 
from her right coat pocket, and fled the scene.  At the time the 
complaint issued, the petitioner was serving probationary 
sentences imposed by the Dorchester Division of the Boston 
Municipal Court Department (Boston Municipal Court), the New 
Bedford District Court, and the Fall River Division of the 
District Court Department (Fall River District Court).1  A notice 
                     
 
1 On April 25, 2012, the petitioner pleaded guilty in the 
Dorchester Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department 
(Boston Municipal Court) to a complaint charging him with 
assault and battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13A (a).  On July 31, 2012, 
the petitioner pleaded guilty in the New Bedford Division of the 
District Court Department (New Bedford District Court) to a 
complaint charging him with uttering a false check, G. L. 
c. 267, § 5, and forgery of a check, G. L. c. 267, § 1.  That 
same day, he pleaded guilty in the New Bedford District Court to 
a separate complaint charging him with larceny of property over 
$250 by false pretenses, G. L. c. 266, §§ 30 (1), 34, and 
uttering a false check.  On October 2, 2012, the petitioner 
pleaded guilty in the Fall River Division of the District Court 
Department (Fall River District Court) to a complaint charging 
3 
 
of probation violation and hearing was issued to the petitioner 
from the Boston Municipal Court on March 4, 2013.  Similar 
notices were issued to him from the New Bedford District Court 
on March 5, 2013, and from the Fall River District Court on 
May 15, 2013.  Each notice alleged that the petitioner had 
violated the terms of his probation by committing the new 
offenses.2 
 
The first probation revocation hearing was held in the 
Boston Municipal Court on June 12 and August 20, 2013.  During 
the hearing, the petitioner's probation officer testified, as 
did the alleged victim of the new offenses and three witnesses 
called by the defense.3  Following closing arguments, a judge 
found "no violation of probation" with respect to the new 
offenses.4  However, he did find that the petitioner had violated 
                                                                  
him with two counts each of forgery of a check, uttering a false 
check, and larceny over $250. 
 
 
2 The notice from the Boston Municipal Court also alleged 
that the petitioner had failed to pay an attorney's fee of $150 
and a victim witness fee of $50.  In addition, the notice from 
the Fall River District Court alleged that he had failed to 
report to his probation officer on one occasion and had failed 
to pay restitution in the amount of $6,582.40. 
 
 
3 One of the defense witnesses was Miriam Lopes, a caregiver 
for the petitioner who was employed by Beacon Adult Foster Care.  
She testified, among other things, that in early February, 2013, 
the petitioner had surgery, that he required constant care 
because he was "really sick," and that he did not leave the 
house on February 26. 
 
 
4 As this court pointed out in Commonwealth v. Holmgren, 421 
Mass. 224, 225 (1995), a criminal prosecution and a subsequent 
4 
 
his probation by failing to pay certain fees.  See note 2, 
supra.  Based on the agreement of the parties, the judge 
extended the petitioner's probation for nine months. 
 
On September 25, 2013, the petitioner filed a motion in the 
New Bedford District Court and the Fall River District Court to 
hold the Commonwealth bound by the order of the Boston Municipal 
Court.  The petitioner asserted that because the judge found no 
violation of probation with respect to the new offenses, the 
parties were bound by the judge's order under the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel.  The Commonwealth opposed the motion.  The 
parties then filed a joint motion to consolidate the probation 
violation hearings, which was allowed by a judge in the New 
Bedford District Court.  On February 18, 2014, the petitioner's 
motion to hold the Commonwealth bound by the order of the Boston 
Municipal Court was denied.  He thereafter filed a petition for 
relief in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
contending that, because the issue whether he had violated the 
terms of his probation by committing the new offenses already 
had been decided by a valid and binding final judgment of the 
Boston Municipal Court, collateral estoppel barred relitigation 
                                                                  
probation revocation proceeding have different standards of 
proof.  "In a criminal case, of course, the Commonwealth must 
prove the elements of each crime charged beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  In a probation revocation hearing, the Commonwealth 
bears a lesser burden. . . .  [I]t is proof by a preponderance 
of the evidence."  Id. at 225-226. 
5 
 
of the issue.5  The Commonwealth opposed the petition.  On June 
18, 2014, a single justice reserved and reported the case to the 
full court. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The petitioner contends that once the 
judge in the Boston Municipal Court found no probation violation 
with respect to the new offenses, principles of collateral 
estoppel barred a subsequent probation revocation proceeding in 
a different county on the new offenses.  In its brief before 
this court, the Commonwealth states that, "having considered at 
length both the legal and policy issues inherent in the question 
before the [c]ourt, [it] now substantially agrees with the 
defendant." 
 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as issue 
preclusion, provides that "when an issue of ultimate fact has 
once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue 
cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future 
lawsuit."  Commonwealth v. Lopez, 383 Mass. 497, 499 (1981), 
quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).  See 
Commonwealth v. Scala, 380 Mass. 500, 503 (1980).  "In a 
criminal case, the applicability of the doctrine may derive 
either from the common law, with roots in civil proceedings, 
                     
 
5 Because the petitioner's claim is so closely identified 
with double jeopardy, a petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, is the appropriate avenue for review.  Cf. Cepulonis v. 
Commonwealth, 426 Mass. 1010, 1010 (1998); Costarelli v. 
Commonwealth, 374 Mass. 677, 679-680 (1978). 
6 
 
. . . or from the protection against double jeopardy of the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution" (citations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Stephens, 451 Mass. 370, 375 (2008).  
See Commonwealth v. Williams, 431 Mass. 71, 74 (2000); 
Commonwealth v. Ellis, 160 Mass. 165, 165 (1893). 
 
The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment consists 
of three independent constitutional protections.  "It protects 
against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
acquittal.  It protects against a second prosecution for the 
same offense after conviction.  And it protects against multiple 
punishments for the same offense" (footnotes omitted).  
Aldoupolis v. Commonwealth, 386 Mass. 260, 271-272, cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 864 (1982), S.C., 390 Mass. 438 (1983), quoting 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).  See Krochta 
v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 711, 713 (1999).  Unlike the United 
States Constitution, the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
does not include a double jeopardy clause, but our statutory and 
common law have long embraced the same principles and 
protections.  See Commonwealth v. Selavka, 469 Mass. 502, 509 
n.8 (2014); Commonwealth v. Woods, 414 Mass. 343, 346, cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 815 (1993).  See also G. L. c. 263, § 7.  
Jeopardy does not attach at a probation revocation proceeding.6  
                     
 
6 A probation revocation proceeding is not considered to be 
a new criminal prosecution because the Commonwealth already has 
"met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the 
7 
 
See Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 446 Mass. 61, 66 (2006); Krochta, 
supra at 713-714.  Therefore, as the petitioner acknowledges, 
collateral estoppel based on principles of double jeopardy is 
not applicable in this case.  See Krochta, supra at 714. 
 
In the past, we have considered, without deciding, "whether 
collateral estoppel protection between proceedings litigated 
against the government is encompassed within the constitutional 
right to due process, independent of the double jeopardy 
clause."  Id. at 715.  See Williams, 431 Mass. at 73-74; 
Commonwealth v. Dias, 385 Mass. 455, 460 (1982); Scala, 380 
Mass. at 503.  Here, we again need not decide this issue because 
the present case can be resolved by application of common-law 
collateral estoppel principles.  See Williams, supra at 74. 
 
"The common-law doctrine of collateral estoppel is designed 
to 'relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple 
lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing 
inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.'"  
Stephens, 451 Mass. at 375, quoting Massachusetts Prop. Ins. 
Underwriting Ass'n v. Norrington, 395 Mass. 751, 756 (1985).  
See Scala, 380 Mass. at 505 (describing collateral estoppel 
policy considerations).  Our decision in Krochta, which 
                                                                  
person's guilt on the underlying crime."  Commonwealth v. 
Wilcox, 446 Mass. 61, 65 (2006).  See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 
U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (probation revocation, like parole 
revocation, not stage of criminal prosecution); Commonwealth v. 
Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 112 (1990). 
8 
 
concerned the preclusive effect of a determination made at a 
probation revocation proceeding on a subsequent criminal 
prosecution, set forth the prerequisites for a valid collateral 
estoppel claim.  "Collateral estoppel is available to a 
defendant as a shield against a subsequent attempt by the 
government to litigate an issue necessarily decided in previous 
litigation between the defendant and the government only where 
there is (1) a common factual issue; (2) a prior determination 
of that issue in litigation between the same parties; and (3) a 
showing that the determination was in favor of the party seeking 
to raise the estoppel bar" (footnotes omitted).7  Krochta, 429 
Mass. at 715-716.  For collateral estoppel to apply, the two 
proceedings sharing a "common factual issue" must be resolved 
using the same standard of proof.8  See id. at 716-717.  The 
                     
 
7 For a discussion of the five requirements that must be met 
for collateral estoppel to apply in the context of a motion to 
suppress, see Commonwealth v. Cabrera, 449 Mass. 825, 829-831 
(2007). 
 
 
8 In Krochta v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 711, 711-712 (1999), 
this court held that principles of collateral estoppel did not 
bar criminal prosecution of a defendant on various larceny 
charges, even though the same offenses had triggered an earlier 
probation revocation proceeding that was resolved in the 
defendant's favor.  We explained that the essential components 
of collateral estoppel had not been satisfied because common 
factual issues were decided under different standards of proof 
and under different procedural rules in the two proceedings.  
Id. at 716, 718.  See Holmgren, 421 Mass. at 225 (concluding 
that, because of different burdens of proof in criminal case and 
probation revocation proceeding, "[p]rinciples of collateral 
estoppel do not bar the Commonwealth from revoking probation 
based on evidence of a violation of law of which a probationer 
9 
 
burden of showing the concurrence of these three collateral 
estoppel requirements "is always on the person raising the bar."  
Lopez, 383 Mass. at 499. 
 
In this case, the petitioner has satisfied the requirements 
of collateral estoppel.  Following a hearing in the Boston 
Municipal Court, a judge determined, based on a preponderance of 
the evidence, that the petitioner did not violate the terms of 
his probation with respect to the new offenses.  The 
Commonwealth seeks to relitigate this same factual issue based 
on the same standard of proof and the same procedural rules at 
subsequent probation revocation proceedings on the new offenses 
that have been consolidated in the New Bedford District Court.9  
We conclude that principles of collateral estoppel bar the 
Commonwealth from doing so. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  We remand this matter to the single 
justice for entry of a judgment allowing the petition for relief 
under G. L. c. 211, § 3, and reversing the February 18, 2014, 
                                                                  
has been found not guilty").  Further, we stated in Krochta, 
supra at 719, that "[i]f collateral estoppel bars a criminal 
prosecution as a result of a probation revocation proceeding, a 
conflict between the separate goals of the probation department 
and the district attorney may result, frustrating the ability of 
both to accomplish the ends assigned to them by the 
Legislature." 
 
 
9 With regard to two additional alleged probation violations 
set forth in the notice from the Fall River District Court prior 
to consolidation of the hearings, see note 2, supra, the 
petitioner does not contend that the Commonwealth cannot proceed 
on those alleged violations. 
10 
 
order of the New Bedford District Court that denied the 
petitioner's motion to hold the Commonwealth bound by the order 
of the Boston Municipal Court that found no probation violation 
with respect to the new offenses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.