Title: State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. M. A. D.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S057403
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2010

FILED: June 10, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of M. A. D.,
a Youth.
STATE ex rel JUVENILE DEPARTMENT OF CLACKAMAS COUNTY,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
M. A. D.,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 031120J02; CA A132290; SC
S057403)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted February 22, 2010.
Paul L. Smith, Assistant Attorney
General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review. 
With him on the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and Jerome Lidz,
Solicitor General.
Angela Sherbo, Juvenile Rights Project,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.
Morgan Smith, Salem, filed a brief for amicus
curiae Oregon School Boards Association.
Nancy J. Hungerford, The Hungerford Law
Firm, Oregon City, filed a brief for amici curiae Centennial School
District, Eagle Point School District, Hermiston School District, and Neah-Kah-Nie
School District.
Professor Carrie Leonetti, pro hac
vice, University of Oregon School of Law, Eugene, and Rankin Johnson IV, Portland,
filed a brief for amicus curiae Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers
Association.
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
*Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit
Court, Douglas V. Van Dyk, Judge. 226 Or App 21, 202 P3d 249 (2009).
BALMER, J.
This juvenile delinquency case
requires us to decide when a public school official's search of a high school
student for illegal drugs is permissible under Article I, section 9, of the
Oregon Constitution.  We conclude that, when school officials at a public high
school have a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that
an individual student possesses illegal drugs on school grounds, they may respond
to the immediate risk of harm created by the student's possession of the drugs
by searching the student without first obtaining a warrant.  
After school officials received a tip
from a named student that the youth who is the subject of this proceeding (youth)
had been attempting to sell drugs earlier that morning near school property, one
of the school officials reached into youth's pocket and discovered marijuana
and other contraband.  The state filed a delinquency petition, alleging that
youth had committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute
delivery of a controlled substance.  In the delinquency proceeding, youth moved
to suppress the marijuana that school officials had found on his person,
arguing that the school officials had violated his rights under Article I,
section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.  The juvenile court denied youth's
motion.  Youth appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
search of youth was invalid because the school officials lacked probable cause
to believe that youth possessed illegal drugs.  State ex rel Juv. Dept. v.
M. A. D., 226 Or App 21, 202 P3d 249 (2009).  The state petitioned for
review, arguing that the Court of Appeals had erred in concluding that the
school officials' search of youth violated Article I, section 9, and we allowed
review.  
Before this court, the state concedes
that the school officials did not have probable cause to search youth.  The
state asserts, however, that the appropriate standard for determining the
validity of a search by a school official under Article I, section 9, is the
"reasonable suspicion" standard, rather than the probable cause
standard that the Court of Appeals applied.  Under that standard, the state
argues, the search was permissible.(1) 
Youth maintains that the Court of Appeals was correct in applying the probable
cause standard and in concluding that the evidence should be suppressed because
the facts here did not establish probable cause.  For the reasons that follow, we
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
We take the facts from the juvenile
court record.  On January 7, 2005, Brooks, the assistant principal at Rex
Putnam High School, called a student into his office to discuss concerns about
the student's attendance and performance in school.  When Brooks confronted the
student about skipping school to smoke, the student responded by telling Brooks
that he had seen youth attempting to sell marijuana that morning in an area
near the school commonly referred to as "the pit."  Brooks took the
student's report seriously, based on the student's prior history with drugs, on
"who [the student] hung around with," and on Brooks's knowledge that
students often used drugs in the area known as the pit.  Although the student informant
had previously promised to go to class or finish his homework and not followed
through, he had never falsely accused another student of wrongdoing.  According
to Brooks, the student "was quick to give up other people if he thought it
would take the heat away from him"; however, Brooks believed that in
making the allegations regarding youth, the student was not only attempting to
take attention away from himself, but also was providing Brooks with accurate
information about youth possessing marijuana on school grounds.  Brooks had not
had any interactions with youth, and, until that day, Brooks had not had any
particular concerns about youth and drug use.  However, Brooks knew that
youth's records from schools that he had previously attended noted "target
behaviors * * * about attendance and possible indication of drug and alcohol
issues."  
Based on the foregoing information,
Brooks was concerned that youth might have sold or attempted to sell drugs to
other students and might have drugs in his possession.  As a result, he called
youth to his office, where Brooks and youth's counselor were waiting for him. 
Youth arrived at the office with a staff learning specialist, Pogel.  Brooks
informed youth that a witness had indicated that youth might be in possession
of drugs and asked youth if there was "anything he needed to tell me or
that he wanted to show me."  At that point, youth did not admit to
possessing or attempting to sell drugs; he simply responded by saying,
"This is stupid" or "This is a dumb thing."  Brooks told
youth that he had "reasonable cause to search [him]" and then called
youth's mother "as a courtesy" to inform her that they were planning
to search youth.  During Brooks's conversation with youth's mother, she
"expressed * * * that she thought [youth] probably was holding
something."    
Brooks allowed youth to speak to his
mother, and, afterward, youth indicated that he was willing to turn his pockets
inside out.  Youth then emptied his pants pockets and the outside pockets of
his jacket.  Brooks noticed a bulge in the inner breast pocket of youth's
jacket and asked youth to empty that pocket.  Youth refused, stating that he
did not trust Brooks.  Pogel asked if youth trusted him; youth responded that
he did.  Pogel then asked if he could look inside youth's pocket, and youth
responded by unzipping his jacket.  Pogel reached into the inner pocket of
youth's jacket, pulled out a cloth bag, and dumped the contents of the bag on
the counter, revealing a plastic bag with marijuana in it, about half a dozen
empty plastic bags, and a small pipe used for smoking marijuana.  Youth
admitted that the marijuana was his and that he had attempted to sell it. 
Brooks then called the police to report what they had discovered.
The state filed a delinquency
petition with the juvenile court, alleging, among other things, that youth had
committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute delivery of a
controlled substance.  Youth moved to suppress both the evidence found in his
jacket and his confession, arguing that the school officials had violated his
rights under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.(2) 
The juvenile court concluded that reaching into youth's pocket constituted a
search and that the school officials did not have probable cause to believe
that youth had drugs in his possession.  The court nevertheless upheld the validity
of the search, concluding that it was "reasonable to apply a more flexible
standard than probable cause" in the context of a school search.  In the
absence of Oregon appellate cases addressing the application of Article I,
section 9, to a search of a public school student by school officials, the
juvenile court used the standard applied by the United States Supreme Court in
Fourth Amendment cases.  Specifically, the juvenile court relied upon the
Court's holding in New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 US 325, 105 S Ct 733, 83
L Ed 2d 720 (1985), that such a search does not require "probable
cause," but is valid if the official has "reasonable grounds for
suspecting" that the search will reveal evidence of a violation of law or
school rules.  The court concluded that, here, the school officials had
reasonable grounds for suspecting that youth had drugs in his possession and
that the search was reasonable in scope; it therefore denied youth's motion and
subsequently found youth to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.  
Youth appealed, and the Court of
Appeals reversed in a divided opinion.  The majority first observed that juveniles
are entitled to the protections of Article I, section 9.  M. A. D., 226
Or App at 25.  Because the school officials had conducted a warrantless search
of youth, the majority proceeded to determine whether the search came within
any exception to the warrant requirement.  It found that the state had not
proved that youth had consented to the search or that the school officials had probable
cause to believe that youth possessed illegal drugs.  Id. at 25-29.(3) 
The majority then turned to the state's alternative argument that the court
should adopt an exception to the warrant requirement, similar to that discussed
in T. L. O., that would permit school authorities to conduct searches if
they reasonably suspected that a student possessed illegal drugs, even if they
could not establish probable cause.  The majority rejected that argument as
inconsistent with the protection of privacy interests afforded by Article I,
section 9.  Id. at 31-32.  It therefore concluded that the juvenile
court had erred in denying youth's motion to suppress.  
The dissent agreed that the state had
not proved that the school officials acted with probable cause; however, in the
dissent's view, the search was nonetheless "reasonable" under Article
I, section 9, because the school officials had "reasonable suspicion that
a violation of laws or school rules on possession or distribution of drugs had occurred." 
Id. at 35 (Sercombe, J., dissenting).  As noted, the state sought review,
which we allowed to address the appropriate standard for determining whether
the search for drugs in this case was constitutional.
II.  ARTICLE I, SECTION 9, ANALYSIS
The threshold inquiry in any Article
I, section 9, analysis is whether the government action at issue constitutes a "search"
for constitutional purposes.  State v. Wacker, 317 Or 419, 426, 856 P2d
1029 (1993).  This court has repeatedly emphasized that Article I, section 9,
protects individuals' "privacy" interests and that, as a result, when
government conduct invades those privacy interests, a search has occurred for
purposes of the state constitution.  See, e.g., State v. Howard/Dawson,
342 Or 635, 640, 157 P3d 1189 (2007) (stating principle).  Although a Fourth
Amendment search occurs when government conduct infringes an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy, "'the privacy protected by Article I,
section 9, is not the privacy that one reasonably expects but the
privacy to which one has a right.'"  Id. at 643 (quoting State
v. Campbell, 306 Or 157, 164, 759 P2d 1040 (1988)) (emphases in Campbell). 

The privacy rights protected by Article
I, section 9, include the right of "the people" to be free from unreasonable
searches or seizures of their "persons, houses, papers, and
effects."  Here, at Brooks's request, youth emptied several of his
pockets.  However, when Brooks asked him to empty a specific pocket in his
jacket in which Brooks had observed a bulge, youth refused.  After youth
unzipped the jacket, Pogel opened the jacket so that he could see inside the
inner pocket, reached into that pocket, and removed what he suspected was --
and what proved to be -- contraband.  Those facts present a classic example of
a warrantless "search" for purposes of Article I, section 9.  See
State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 11, 20, 115 P3d 908 (2005) (applying Article I,
section 9, to evidence officer obtained by reaching into defendant's pocket).

Having determined that the school
officials conducted a search of youth, the next question is whether that search
was valid under Article I, section 9.  Ordinarily, a warrantless search is per
se unreasonable, and therefore invalid, unless it comes within one of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement that this court has recognized.  State v. Meharry, 342 Or 173, 177, 149 P3d 1155 (2006).  Although the state
concedes that the school officials had no warrant to search youth, it does not
rely on any of the exceptions that this court has identified in past cases.  In
particular, it does not contend that the search was conducted pursuant to an
appropriate statutorily authorized administrative program, which, as we have
held, may justify a search without a warrant and without any individualized
suspicion at all.  See State v. Atkinson, 298 Or 1, 8-10, 688 P2d 832
(1984) (so holding).  Nor does the state argue that youth voluntarily consented
to the search or that the telephone call that the school officials made to
youth's mother constituted a request that she consent to a search of youth.  See
State v. Paulson, 313 Or 346, 351-52, 833 P2d 1278 (1992) (describing
consent exception to warrant requirement).  As noted, the state also concedes
that probable cause was lacking here, thus making unavailable to the state
another well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement -- a search based
on a combination of probable cause and exigent circumstances.  See State v.
Machuca, 347 Or 644, 652-57, 227 P3d 729 (2010) (warrantless search
permissible if officer has probable cause to believe that crime was committed
and exigent circumstances exist). 
Instead of relying on a previously established
exception to the warrant requirement, the state urges us to hold that searches of
public school students that are conducted by school officials, on school
grounds, and during school hours, are constitutionally permissible if school
officials have "reasonable suspicion" that the search will reveal
evidence of a crime or a violation of school rules.  In other words, the state
argues that the ordinary level of certainty necessary for a search -- probable
cause -- should not apply in the school setting and that this court should
adopt the approach that the United States Supreme Court took in interpreting the
Fourth Amendment in T. L. O.  
The state bases its argument for a
"reasonable suspicion" test for school searches on the "unique
mission and circumstances of public schools."  Specifically, the state
points to the schools' mission to educate children and argues that "school
officials must take reasonable steps to foster that learning environment." 
According to the state, the school context -- including the responsibility of
protecting students from harm, maintaining order, and fulfilling the schools'
educational mission -- makes it inappropriate to hold school officials to the
"probable cause" standard applicable to searches by law enforcement
officials.  Instead, the state argues, this court should adopt the less
exacting "reasonable suspicion" test that the Court used in T. L. O. 
We agree -- in part -- with the state's argument.
The state is correct that the unique
context of the school setting distinguishes school searches from searches
conducted by law enforcement officers in other settings.(4) 
Oregon statutes require children to attend school, unless they come within a
specific exemption.  ORS 339.010.  For that reason, large numbers of children
are required to gather each day in an institutional setting where government
employees are responsible for their safety and education and where the
necessity for "swift and informal disciplinary procedures," T. L. O.,
469 US at 340, is apparent.  Further, various statutes emphasize the
responsibility of school districts to provide a safe school environment for
students, teaching faculty, and classified workers, see, e.g., ORS
339.315 (requiring reporting to officials of any persons believed to possess
unlawful firearms in a school); ORS 339.250(3) (authorizing suspension or
expulsion of student who assaults or menaces a school employee or other
student), and our cases recognize the "special duty arising from the
relationship between educators and children entrusted to their care."  Fazzolari
v. Portland School Dist. No. IJ, 303 Or 1, 19-20, 734 P2d 1326 (1987).  From
the classroom to the cafeteria to the sports field, we require students to
follow the directions of teachers and other school officials in order to
preserve the safety of all students and further the schools' educational
objectives.  
We conclude that the school context
is sufficiently different from the setting in which ordinary police-citizen
interactions occur to justify an exception to the warrant requirement in
certain circumstances, and we turn to the scope and application of the state's
proposed exception.  First, we describe what we view as the closest analogy to
that exception, the long-standing and well-defined "officer-safety
exception" to the warrant requirement of Article I, section 9.  Under the
officer-safety exception, a police officer may take "reasonable steps"
-- including a limited search -- to protect the officer or others if, "during
the course of a lawful encounter with a citizen, the officer develops a
reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that the
citizen might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the
officer or to others then present."  State v. Foster, 347 Or 1, 8,
217 P3d 168 (2009) (quoting State v. Bates, 304 Or 519, 524, 747 P2d 991
(1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The officer-safety exception is
necessary because of the unique circumstances to which it applies:
"'A police officer in the field frequently must make
life-or-death decisions in a matter of seconds.  There may be little or no time
in which to weigh the magnitude of a potential safety risk against the
intrusiveness of protective measures.  An officer must be allowed considerable
latitude to take safety precautions in such situations.  Our inquiry therefore
is limited to whether the precautions taken were reasonable under the
circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time that the decision was
made.'"
Id. (quoting Bates, 304 Or at 524-25).  As
noted, the officer-safety exception requires reasonable suspicion of an
immediate threat of serious physical injury to the officer or others, based on specific,
articulable facts.  In assessing whether an officer's actions are permitted
based on those facts, the court "asks only whether safety precautions
chosen by the officer were reasonable under the perceived circumstances." 
Id. at 11.  Because such "reasonable steps," which may include
at least a limited search, do not violate Article I, section 9, evidence of
wrongdoing obtained as a result of the search will not be suppressed.(5)
In our view, the concerns underlying
the officer-safety exception also apply to some searches conducted by school
officials.  As described above, the school context -- characterized by
compulsory attendance and large numbers of students and educators present each
day in a relatively confined area -- raises heightened safety concerns.  As
persons responsible for maintaining a safe learning environment, when school
officials perceive there to be an immediate threat to student or staff safety
at a school, they must be able to take prompt, reasonable steps to remove that
threat.  As with an officer-safety search, when a school official develops a
"reasonable suspicion," based on "specific and articulable
facts," that a particular individual on school property either personally
poses or is in the possession of some item that poses an "immediate
threat" to the safety of the student, the official, or others at the
school, the school official "must be allowed considerable latitude to take
safety precautions."  See Foster, 347 Or at 8 (quoting Bates,
304 Or at 524) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Moreover, as this court has
noted with respect to an officer's judgment in that context, it is not our
function to "uncharitably second-guess" the considered protective
actions taken by school officials.  See id. (quoting Bates, 304
Or at 524) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
For the same reasons that we have
applied the less exacting "reasonable suspicion" standard, rather
than the probable cause standard, to determine whether a limited officer-safety
search is permissible under Article I, section 9, we conclude that the
reasonable suspicion standard should apply to a search, like the one here, for
illegal drugs that is conducted on school property by school officials acting
in their official capacity.  We do not mean to suggest that the officer-safety
doctrine and a school official's search of a student for drugs are identical in
all respects.  However, we agree with the state that the public school setting
and the obligation of school officials to provide a safe learning environment
requires that they be able to respond quickly to credible information, based on
specific and articulable facts, about immediate threats of serious harm to
students and staff, such as the presence of illegal drugs on school grounds.
There are important limits on the
kinds of searches that may be permitted under this approach.  Consistently with
the standards that we have developed in the officer-safety cases, a school
official may not rely on generalizations about suspected drug use or on information
that is not specific or current.  Moreover, we specifically reject the state's
request that we adopt, in this case, a general rule that all school
searches should be subject to a "reasonable suspicion" standard.  The
state's argument that we should follow T. L. O. and sanction warrantless
searches whenever a school official has reasonable suspicion that a student
possesses evidence of a violation of a school rule or policy goes further than necessary
to decide this case.  This case involves a present threat to student safety and
a search by a school official acting in his official capacity and in
furtherance of his responsibility to protect students and staff; our holding is
based on those circumstances.  The permissibility of other kinds of searches by
school officials is not before us.
As we have stated above, high school
students, like other citizens, have privacy rights that are protected by
Article I, section 9, against unreasonable intrusions by state officials. 
Those rights, however, like the rights of a person searched pursuant to a valid
officer-safety search, must yield if the state officials can point to specific
and articulable facts that reasonably create a risk of immediate and serious harm
to the officials or others.  See Foster, 347 Or at 8 (stating test).  If
the protective actions taken by the school officials are based on those facts, and
are reasonable, their conduct does not violate Article I, section 9.  See id.
at 9-11 (applying test).
Applying that test here, we conclude
that the school officials reasonably suspected that youth possessed illegal
drugs at the time of the search and had sought to distribute those drugs to
other students earlier that morning.  Another student told Brooks that he had
seen youth that morning at the pit attempting to sell marijuana.  Brooks knew
of the informant's background with drugs and that students often used drugs at
the pit.  He also knew from youth's records from schools that he had previously
attended that youth had possible drug issues.  When Brooks called youth's mother,
she expressed her opinion that youth "probably was holding
something."  The record in this case demonstrates that Brooks was aware of
specific, articulable facts that would lead a reasonable person to suspect that
youth was then in possession of illegal drugs.  Moreover, Brooks reasonably
could have concluded that youth's possession and alleged attempt to sell those
drugs earlier that morning created an immediate risk of harm to youth and to
other students at the school.  Those facts justified the actions of Brooks and
Pogel, including Pogel's conduct in reaching into youth's jacket pocket and
removing the bag that contained drugs and drug paraphernalia.  Pogel's search
was reasonable in scope in light of the information that he had, the immediate
safety risk presented, and the bulge that Brooks had observed in youth's pocket. 
The steps that Brooks and Pogel took were reasonable precautions in the
circumstances and were not unreasonably intrusive.  Their actions thus did not
violate Article I, section 9.
Because the actions of the school
officials did not violate youth's Article I, section 9, rights, the evidence
that they recovered should not have been suppressed.  The juvenile court
correctly denied youth's motion to suppress.
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
1. Because
the state now relies only on its argument that the "reasonable
suspicion" rather than the "probable cause" standard applies to
school searches, we do not address or decide whether the state is correct in
conceding that the school officials did not have probable cause to search
youth, as the trial court and the Court of Appeals determined.  
2. Article
I, section 9, provides:
"No law shall violate the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized."     
3. Consent
to a search is one exception to the warrant requirement.  State v. Paulson,
313 Or 346, 351, 833 P2d 1278 (1992).  Similarly, a warrantless search can be
justified by a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances.  State
v. Meharry, 342 Or 173, 177, 149 P3d 1155 (2006).  Because the Court
of Appeals concluded that the state had not demonstrated probable cause, it did
not consider whether exigent circumstances existed.  M. A. D., 226 Or
App at 29 n 3.
4. The state also argues that we should adopt the "reasonable suspicion"
standard because school officials are not trained in the "fine legal
distinctions between probable cause and reasonable suspicion" and
therefore should be required to understand only the lesser "reasonable
suspicion" standard.  We reject that argument as a basis for our
decision.  First, we do not decide constitutional requirements based on what is
"easier" to understand.  Second, the probable cause standard is not
any more complicated than the reasonable suspicion standard.  Like many
constitutional standards, it may present close questions in some cases, but the
concept itself is straightforward:  Would the facts on which the government
actor relied lead a reasonable person to believe that the objects seized will
probably be found in the location to be searched?  State v. Henderson,
341 Or 219, 225, 142 P3d 58 (2006).  We reject the probable cause standard for
school searches for the reasons discussed in the text, not because the standard
is too difficult in application or because school officials have not mastered
it in their training.
5. Our
officer-safety cases make it clear that the permissible scope of a search
depends on the nature of the safety threat.  See State v. Morgan, 348 Or
283, 290, ___ P3d ___ (2010) (officer may take "reasonable steps" to
protect officer's safety).  If the safety threat is based, for example, on
reasonable suspicion that the person searched is carrying a rifle, that
suspicion would not ordinarily be sufficient to justify a strip search of the
person or a search of the person's wallet.