Title: People v. Renteria
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S266854
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 25, 2022

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
CRISTIAN RENTERIA, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S266854 
 
Fifth Appellate District 
F076973 
 
Tulare County Superior Court 
VCF304654 
 
 
August 25, 2022 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Groban, Jenkins, and Guerrero concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
S266854 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
Late one August night, Cristian Renteria walked through 
a neighborhood in Tulare and fired a gun at a house.  Then, after 
a dog barked next door, Renteria fired the gun at that house, 
too.  For this episode — which fortunately did not result in any 
injuries — a jury convicted Renteria of two counts of shooting at 
an inhabited dwelling.  (Pen. Code, § 246.)  That offense is 
ordinarily punishable by no more than seven years of 
imprisonment.  (Ibid.)  But the prosecution alleged that 
Renteria was subject to indeterminate life terms for the 
shootings because he committed the crimes “for the benefit of 
. . . any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, 
further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members.”  
(Id., former § 186.22, subdivision (b)(4).)  While Renteria was a 
gang member, there was no evidence he was accompanied by 
any other gang members at the time of the shooting.  The jury 
nonetheless found the gang allegation true, and Renteria was 
sentenced to two indeterminate terms of life imprisonment.   
Renteria challenged the gang penalties as unsupported by 
the evidence, but the Court of Appeal affirmed, relying on an 
expert’s testimony that a gang member’s acts of violence both 
benefit the gang and promote its members’ criminal activities by 
enhancing the gang’s reputation for violence in the community. 
We granted review to address the showing the prosecution 
must make to establish that Penal Code section 186.22 gang 
enhancements or penalties apply to a crime committed by a gang 
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
2 
member who acts alone.  Not every crime committed by an 
individual gang member is for the gang’s benefit or to promote 
criminal conduct by gang members, as the gang enhancement 
statute requires in such cases; gang members can, of course, 
commit crimes for their own purposes.  Without more, expert 
testimony about the reputational benefits of crime does not 
support an inference that a lone gang member committed a 
crime for gang-related reasons — as opposed to acting from 
other, more personal motives.  Because there was no adequate 
basis for drawing the necessary inference about Renteria’s 
intent in this case, we reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal and remand for resentencing. 
I. 
Because this case concerns the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting the gang penalties, we review the trial evidence in 
some detail.  Evidence concerning the circumstances of the 
shootings came largely from the testimony of a neighbor, 
Anthony A.1  Earlier on the evening of the shooting, Anthony 
became aware of a group of young men walking through an 
empty field near his house; he heard some of them yelling “Sur 
trece,” a gang reference.  Anthony went outside to tell the young 
men he did not want any problems and recognized Renteria 
among them.  Renteria told Anthony that a couple of his 
companions were drunk and he was trying to help them home.  
A “little while” later, Anthony heard a “pop” in the field, went 
back outside, and saw Renteria and a person he did not 
recognize walk past.  Anthony lost sight of the two for “at least 
 
1  
We identify the witnesses as they were identified in the 
opinion of the Court of Appeal.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
8.90(b).) 
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
3 
one or two minutes,” and then saw Renteria return and shoot at 
the house of Anthony’s neighbor Jack D.  After the first shots, 
dogs from the house next to Jack’s began barking.  Renteria then 
shot at that house before shooting again at Jack’s and running 
away.   
A few days after the shooting, Officer Jacob Adney 
arrested Renteria.  Earlier police contacts with Renteria 
indicated that he admitted being a Sureño2 gang member in 
2008, when he was in middle school, and had been detained in 
2011 on suspicion of spray painting gang-related graffiti in an 
abandoned house.  After his 2014 arrest for the current offense, 
Renteria again admitted belonging to a Sureño gang.  Renteria 
also acknowledged that earlier the day of the shooting he had 
been “hit up” — someone asked where he was from, a question 
understood to be a gang challenge.  When Renteria heard what 
sounded like a shotgun being racked, he ran.  Renteria assumed 
Northern gang members were responsible.   
Jack D. testified that he lived with his wife and four 
grandsons and that neither his children nor grandchildren were 
involved in any gangs.  An officer investigating the shooting 
noticed bullet holes in Jack’s garage door and opened it to see if 
anyone was injured.  No one was inside, but the officer saw a 
sawed-off shotgun in the garage.   
Officer Adney testified as a gang expert.  He explained 
that in gang culture, respect is everything and that gang 
members are expected to retaliate if they are the victim of a 
 
2  
At trial, counsel and the witnesses used “Southerner” and 
the Spanish “Sureño” interchangeably to signify a member of 
the gang.  Similarly, they used “Northerner” and “Norteño” to 
signify the rival gang. 
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
crime, otherwise they lose their respect.  Officer Adney believed 
that a crime committed by a gang member would benefit or 
promote the gang, even if the victim were not a rival gang 
member, because people would see a gang crime in the news and 
would be reluctant to cooperate with the police or testify against 
the gang.  Officer Adney said that unless gang members identify 
their gang during a crime, “[t]here’s really no way — it’s kind of 
hard to know which gang — if it is a gang, which gang is 
responsible.”  
Officer Adney explained that Northerners are rivals of 
Southerners and the two groups typically fight over territory.  
But unlike in other regions where gangs control specific 
territory with defined boundaries, in Tulare County a gang 
member’s turf “is simply where that person lives at that time.”  
Southerners identify with the number 13 and the words 
Anthony heard — “sur” and “trece” — mean “south” and “13” in 
Spanish.  The prosecutor tried to elicit Officer Adney’s opinion 
that some of Jack’s grandsons were Northerners, but that 
opinion was not forthcoming.  Officer Adney instead testified to 
a different connection:  that a man named Robert P. did not live 
with Jack but was “associated” with the residence and that 
Adney had personally seen Robert in the company of 
Northerners.  Officer Adney opined that a person who had been 
threatened by Northerners and who shot at the houses while 
yelling “Sur trece” would be showing that he was retaliating, 
thus elevating his own status in the gang and enhancing the 
gang’s status and ability to intimidate residents of the 
neighborhood.  
The jury found the gang allegation true for both counts of 
shooting an inhabited dwelling — that is, both for shooting at 
Jack’s house and for shooting at the house next door with the 
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
5 
barking dogs.3  On each count Renteria received a sentence of 
three years under Penal Code section 246 and was subject to a 
15-year-to-life gang penalty under Penal Code section 186.22, 
subdivision (b)(4)(B).4  The gang penalty in turn rendered 
Renteria eligible for a 20-year sentence enhancement for 
personally and intentionally discharging a firearm in the 
commission of a felony punishable by life imprisonment.  (See 
Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subds. (a)(17), (c).)  The court sentenced 
Renteria to two consecutive terms of 23 years to life.   
On appeal, Renteria argued, among other things, that 
there was insufficient evidence to support the gang allegations.  
A divided Court of Appeal rejected this challenge and affirmed 
the gang penalties.  (People v. Renteria (Jan. 5, 2021, F076973) 
[nonpub. opn.].)  Although the majority opinion noted that an 
unidentified companion may have been with Renteria at the 
time of the shootings, the court assumed that Renteria was not 
acting in association with or at the direction of another gang 
member.  The court nonetheless determined there was sufficient 
evidence to satisfy both prongs of the gang enhancement 
 
3  
The prosecution also charged Renteria with grossly 
negligent discharge of a firearm for an incident that occurred 
the previous evening, but the jury acquitted Renteria on this 
count. 
4  
“As 
we 
have 
previously 
explained, 
a 
sentence 
enhancement adds ‘ “an additional term of imprisonment to the 
base term,” ’ while an alternate penalty like section 186.22(b)(4) 
‘ “provides for an alternate sentence when it is proven that the 
underlying offense has been committed for the benefit of, or in 
association with, a criminal street gang.” ’  [Citation.]  Both 
types of provisions differ from substantive offenses in that they 
do not ‘ “define or set forth elements of a new crime.” ’ ”  (People 
v. Lopez (2022) 12 Cal.5th 957, 962, fn. 4.) 
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
6 
statute, Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b) (section 
186.22(b)).5 
As evidence the shootings were committed “for the benefit” 
of the Sureño gang (§ 186.22(b)), the court cited Officer Adney’s 
testimony that the shootings would benefit the gang, even if the 
shootings had not been committed against rival gang members.  
It further cited evidence that Jack’s house had “at least some 
link to Norteños, even if it was not a hotbed of rival gang 
activity”; Renteria’s statement to Officer Adney that he thought 
he had been “ ‘hit up’ ” by Northerners; and Anthony’s testimony 
that he was tired of “ ‘issues’ ” in the neighborhood. 
As for Renteria’s “intent to promote, further, or assist” the 
“criminal conduct by gang members” (§ 186.22(b)), the court 
cited People v. Hill (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 770, 774 for the 
proposition that Renteria’s intent to promote his own criminal 
conduct, in the form of the current offenses, sufficed.  But 
acknowledging another court’s admonition that the charged 
 
5 
The alternate penalty provision that applied to Renteria, 
section 186.22(b)(4), provides for an indeterminate life term for 
particular enumerated felonies, including shooting at an 
inhabited dwelling.  Section 186.22(b)(1) applies to other 
felonies and imposes a sentence enhancement of lesser, 
determinate terms.  Both subdivisions, however, contain the 
identically worded requirement that the felony be committed for 
the benefit of the gang and to promote the criminal conduct of 
its members.  We therefore use the shorthand “section 
186.22(b)” or “gang enhancement statute” in discussing the 
felony requirements at issue here and refer to those 
requirements generally as “enhancement provisions.”   
Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) has since 
amended some of these requirements.  (See fn. 6, post.)  Unless 
otherwise noted, we refer to the law as it existed at the time of 
Renteria’s conviction.  
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
7 
offense and gang membership alone are insufficient to satisfy 
this aspect of the gang enhancement statute, the court went on 
to explain why the evidence showed more than that.  The court 
cited Officer Adney’s testimony that a Sureño who is a victim of 
a crime is required to respond; that “[s]howing one is willing to 
put in work for the gang and be violent elevates that person’s 
status within the gang and the status of the gang as a whole”; 
and “[i]ntimidation of witnesses and the community increases 
the gang’s control of territory.”  Here, the court reasoned, a 
reasonable jury could infer that Renteria intended for the 
shootings to intimidate rival gang members and neighborhood 
residents, “thus facilitating future crimes committed by himself 
and his fellow gang members.”  A jury could also infer that 
shooting Jack’s house was retaliation for getting “ ‘hit up,’ ” and 
was meant “as a means of recouping respect” for Renteria and 
for the gang.  Finally, the jury could conclude that Renteria shot 
at the house next door to intimidate possible witnesses, quiet 
the dogs, and facilitate escape, “thereby furthering his gang’s 
reputation and control of contested territory, and his own gang-
motivated criminal conduct.”   
Justice Smith wrote a partial dissent.  (People v. Renteria, 
supra, F076973 (conc. & dis. opn. of Smith, J.).)  Justice Smith 
noted, among other things, that the record did not support the 
conclusion that the shooter had shouted “Sur trece” at the time 
of the shooting.  It was, however, based on that incorrect 
assumption that Officer Adney opined that the shootings 
benefited the Sureño gang.  Without that unsupported 
assumption, Justice Smith concluded, Adney’s opinion was 
“ultimately irrelevant and of no help to the jury,” leaving 
insufficient evidence to support the gang penalties.   
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
After we granted review in this case, the Legislature 
enacted Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), which 
narrowed the scope of section 186.22(b) enhancement provisions 
in several respects.  (Assem. Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) 
(Assembly Bill 333); see Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3.)6  Although the 
 
6 
Assembly Bill 333 has made several noteworthy changes 
to the law governing gang enhancements and penalties.  First, 
Assembly Bill 333 “narrows the definition of ‘ “criminal street 
gang” ’ to ‘an ongoing, organized association or group of three or 
more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its 
primary activities the commission of one or more [enumerated 
criminal acts], having a common name or common identifying 
sign or symbol, and whose members collectively engage in, or 
have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity.’  (Assem. 
Bill 333, § 3; [Pen. Code,] § 186.22, subd. (f), [as amended by 
Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3,] eff. Jan. 1, 2022, italics added.)”  
(People v. Lopez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327, 344.)  Assembly Bill 
333 also increases the prosecution’s burden of proof by 
“alter[ing] the requirements for proving the ‘pattern of criminal 
gang activity’ necessary to establish the existence of a criminal 
street gang.”  (Lopez, at p. 345; see Pen. Code, § 186.22, 
subd. (e), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 
2022.)  Among other things, Assembly Bill 333 requires that the 
predicate offenses used to demonstrate a pattern of criminal 
gang activity must have “ ‘commonly benefited a criminal street 
gang’ ” where the “ ‘common benefit . . . is more than 
reputational.’ ”  (Lopez, at p. 345; see Pen. Code, § 186.22, 
subd. (e)(1), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 
2022.)   
 
As particularly relevant to the issues addressed in this 
opinion, Assembly Bill 333 also includes a provision stating that, 
as used in the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act 
(Pen. Code, § 186.20 et seq.), “to benefit, promote, further, or 
assist means to provide a common benefit to members of a gang 
where the common benefit is more than reputational.  Examples 
of a common benefit that are more than reputational may 
 
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
9 
parties agree Assembly Bill 333 applies retroactively to nonfinal 
cases, they disagree about the effect of Assembly Bill 333 on the 
gang penalties imposed on Renteria in this matter.  We do not 
resolve this dispute because we conclude the evidence was not 
sufficient to sustain the gang penalties even under the law in 
effect at the time of Renteria’s trial.   
II. 
 
The gang enhancement statute was enacted in 1988 as 
part of the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act 
(STEP Act, or Act).  (Pen. Code, § 186.20 et seq.; see People v. 
Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 609.)  Finding that crimes 
committed by members of violent street gangs “present a clear 
and present danger to public order and safety,” the Legislature 
aimed to eradicate criminal gang activity “by focusing upon 
patterns of criminal gang activity and upon the organized 
nature of street gangs, which together, are the chief source of 
terror created by street gangs.”  (Pen. Code, § 186.21.) 
 
The gang enhancement provisions provide one of two 
primary means by which the STEP Act punishes criminal gang 
activity.  The first, codified in Penal Code section 186.22, 
subdivision (a) (section 186.22(a)), consists of “a substantive 
 
include, but are not limited to, financial gain or motivation, 
retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or 
intimidation or silencing of a potential current or previous 
witness or informant.”  (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (g), as 
amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3,  eff. Jan. 1, 2022.) 
 
Because of our resolution of the case, we do not here 
address any question about the effect of these amendments on 
Renteria’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge; we instead focus 
on the law as it existed before the enactment of Assembly Bill 
333.  
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
10 
offense” punishing “ ‘[a]ny person who actively participates in 
any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members 
engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, 
and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious 
criminal conduct by members of that gang . . . .’ ”  (People v. 
Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125, 1130 (plur. opn.) (Rodriguez), 
quoting § 186.22(a).)  The gang enhancement provisions, by 
contrast, codified in section 186.22(b), prescribe sentence 
enhancements or alternate penalties of varying length for “any 
person who is convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of, 
at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street 
gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in 
any criminal conduct by gang members.”  (§ 186.22(b)(1); see id., 
subd. (b)(4).) 
 
The substantive offense and enhancement provisions 
“strike at different things.”  (Rodriguez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at 
p. 1138 (plur. opn.).)  “[W]ith section 186.22(a), the Legislature 
sought to punish gang members who acted in concert with other 
gang members in committing a felony regardless of whether 
such felony was gang related.”  (Rodriguez, at p. 1138, citing 
People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 55 (Albillar).)  Thus, as 
we held in Rodriguez, section 186.22(a) does not reach the 
conduct of a gang member acting alone.  (Rodriguez, at p. 1132.)  
The enhancements provisions prescribed by section 186.22(b) 
are, by contrast, designed to punish “gang-related conduct.”  
(Rodriguez, at p. 1138.)  The Courts of Appeal have uniformly 
held, and the parties here agree, this includes the gang-related 
conduct of an individual who acts alone.  (See id. at pp. 1138–
1139 (plur. opn.); id. at pp. 1140–1141 (conc. opn. of Baxter, J.); 
People v. Rios (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 542, 546; People v. Soriano 
(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 278, 285.) 
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
 
Our prior cases addressing the gang enhancement statute 
for the most part have concerned the conduct of individuals 
acting in concert with other gang members, however.  (E.g., 
Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 61; People v. Gardeley, supra, 14 
Cal.4th at p. 619.)  The distinction is important, because, as we 
recognized in Albillar, the joint nature of the alleged conduct 
frequently affects the type of evidentiary showing that is 
sufficient to demonstrate the conduct was gang-related and 
committed to promote the criminal activity of gang members, as 
section 186.22 requires. 
 
The question in Albillar concerned the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting gang enhancements for a forcible rape and 
other sex offenses perpetrated by gang members acting in 
concert.  Upholding the enhanced sentences, we explained that 
the Legislature required the underlying felony be committed for 
the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a 
criminal street gang “to make it ‘clear that a criminal offense is 
subject to increased punishment under the STEP Act only if the 
crime is “gang related.” ’  [Citation.]  Not every crime committed 
by gang members is related to a gang.  These crimes, though, 
were gang related in two ways:  they were committed in 
association with the gang, and they were committed for the 
benefit of the gang.”  (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 60.)  
Where three members of the same gang “actively assisted each 
other” and, because of their common gang membership, “could 
rely on each other’s cooperation in committing these crimes,” 
there was sufficient evidence of both association and benefit — 
in particular, that the gang members “would benefit from 
committing [the crimes] together.”  (Id. at p. 62.)  On the latter 
point concerning benefit, we also cited expert testimony that the 
crimes bolstered the gang’s reputation as a violent, aggressive 
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
gang.  (Id. at pp. 62–63.)  We explained that “[e]xpert opinion 
that particular criminal conduct benefited a gang by enhancing 
its reputation for viciousness can be sufficient to raise the 
inference that the conduct was ‘committed for the benefit of . . . 
a[] criminal street gang’ within the meaning of section 
186.22(b)(1).”  (Albillar, at p. 63.) 
 
As for the second requirement of the enhancement, we 
said that when the evidence “establishes that the defendant 
intended to and did commit the charged felony with known 
members of a gang, the jury may fairly infer that the defendant 
had the specific intent to promote, further, or assist criminal 
conduct by those gang members.”  (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 
p. 68.) 
 
Albillar thus established that in cases where multiple 
gang members were involved in the charged offense, the fact of 
their joint involvement in a crime often provides sufficient 
evidence of association and benefit, as well as circumstantial 
evidence of an intent to promote the criminal activity of other 
gang members, in connection with the very same criminal 
offense.  (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 60, 68.)  But for 
reasons Albillar makes clear, cases involving lone actors pose 
different problems.  Where there is no proof the defendant acted 
in association with or at the direction of the gang, the 
prosecution cannot rely on the joint nature of the offense to 
establish either the requisite benefit to the gang or the specific 
intent to promote the criminal activity of gang members.  In a 
lone-actor case, a different showing is necessary to satisfy these 
requirements.   
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
13 
III. 
A. 
 
In considering the nature of that showing, we start with 
the text.  Section 186.22(b) sets out what is, in effect, a two-
pronged requirement:  the felony must be committed (1) for the 
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal 
street gang, and (2) with the specific intent to promote, further, 
or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members.  
(§ 186.22(b)(1), (4); Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 51, 68.)7 
 
We interpret this two-pronged requirement in light of the 
constitutional backdrop against which it was enacted.  Decades 
before the STEP Act, the United States Supreme Court 
explained in Scales v. United States (1961) 367 U.S. 203 (Scales) 
that the Constitution limits the state’s power to criminalize 
membership in particular groups, including groups that engage 
in illegal activities.  As Scales put it:  “In our jurisprudence guilt 
is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a status 
or on conduct can only be justified by reference to the 
 
7 
The prosecution must also prove that the gang in question 
is a “criminal street gang” within the meaning of the STEP Act.  
At the time of the offenses at issue, the statute defined the term 
“criminal street gang” to mean “ ‘an[y] ongoing organization, 
association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal 
or informal, having as one of its primary activities the 
commission of one or more [enumerated criminal acts], having a 
common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose 
members individually or collectively engage in, or have engaged 
in, a pattern of criminal gang activity.’ ”  (People v. Lopez, supra, 
73 Cal.App.5th at p. 344, italics omitted.)  As noted previously, 
Assembly Bill 333 has since narrowed the scope of this 
requirement.  (See fn. 6, ante.) 
 
 
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
14 
relationship of that status or conduct to other concededly 
criminal activity . . . , that relationship must be sufficiently 
substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to 
withstand attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.”  (Scales, at pp. 224–225.) 
 
The Legislature was aware of Scales when it was drafting 
the STEP Act.  (See People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 
749.)  And with Scales in mind, the Legislature wrote section 
186.22(b) in a manner designed to avoid imposing additional 
punishment for a given felony based on “mere gang 
membership.”  (People v. Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 623.)  
Rather, the Legislature imposed requirements intended to 
“provide a nexus to gang activity sufficient to alleviate due 
process concerns.”  (Rodriguez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1139 
(plur. opn.).) 
 
In cases involving joint activity, the required nexus is 
generally shown by proof of criminal conduct undertaken in 
concert with other gang members.  (E.g., People v. Castaneda, 
supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 750–751.)  But in a case involving a lone 
actor, operation of the statute turns, at bottom, on the nature of 
the individual’s actions and reasons for committing the 
underlying felony.  Specifically, the statute requires proof that 
the defendant committed the underlying felony (1) for the 
benefit of the gang, and (2) with specific intent to promote, 
further, or assist the criminal conduct of gang members.  Insofar 
as the statute “applies when a defendant has personally 
committed a gang-related felony with the specific intent to aid 
members of that gang,” it satisfies the “constitutional 
requirement of personal guilt.”  (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 
pp. 68, 67.) 
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
15 
 
Two features of the intent requirement are particularly 
relevant in lone-actor prosecutions.  First, the specific intent to 
aid the criminal activities of a gang’s members implies 
knowledge of the nature of at least some of those activities.  
(People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1131 [“One cannot 
intend to help someone do something without knowing what 
that person meant to do”]; see also People v. Beeman (1984) 35 
Cal.3d 547, 558 [to establish “ ‘ “guilty knowledge and intent” ’ ” 
with regard to another’s criminal conduct, the defendant must 
know “the perpetrator’s criminal purpose” and “at least realize 
he or she is aiding” in the conduct].)  As Scales holds, due process 
requires there be a significant connection between the 
defendant’s “guilty knowledge and intent” and the criminal 
conduct of the defendant’s associates — that is, “concrete” and 
“practical” encouragement of “specifically illegal activities.”  
(Scales, supra, 367 U.S. at p. 227.)  Reading the statute against 
this backdrop, we infer that to satisfy the second prong of the 
statute, a defendant facing sentence enhancement allegations 
for a gang-related felony under section 186.22(b) must at least 
be aware of the type of criminal activity the gang members 
pursue; without such awareness, the defendant cannot intend to 
aid in such activity. 
 
Second, the statute refers to the intent to promote 
“criminal conduct by gang members” (§ 186.22(b)(1), (4), italics 
added), the most natural reading of which means the promotion 
of criminal conduct by more than one member of the gang (cf. 
Rodriguez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1133 (plur. opn.) [giving 
meaning to the plural use of “members” in section 186.22(a)]) — 
which, in a lone-actor case, necessarily means the promotion of 
conduct other than the commission of the underlying felony.  
This is not to suggest that a defendant’s current offense is 
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
16 
always out of bounds; in Albillar we stated that the gang 
enhancement statute does not require that “ ‘ “criminal conduct 
by gang members” be distinct from the charged offense.’ ”  
(Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 66.)  There, however, we 
addressed a context in which three gang members acted 
together; the charged offenses thus already involved each 
defendant assisting the criminal conduct of the other two gang 
members.  But where, as here, the defendant acts alone, the 
criminal conduct of multiple gang members is not at issue.  
Because the showing of intent must include the intent to 
promote criminal activity by others, in a lone-actor case this 
necessarily means an intent to promote criminal activity other 
than the charged offense.8  
B. 
 
To establish the requisite intent in a lone-actor case, the 
prosecution has often relied on expert opinion about the 
potential for a gang member’s crime to benefit the gang by, 
among other things, enhancing a gang’s reputation for violence 
among rival gangs or in the community more generally.  The 
prosecution has typically asked the jury to infer that the 
defendant committed the underlying felony in order to reap that 
reputational benefit, and, by enhancing the gang’s reputation, 
to facilitate members’ future crimes. 
 
This approach is not without basis in case law:  We cited 
similar expert opinion in Albillar to support our conclusion that 
the concerted actions of gang members in that case conferred a 
benefit to the gang.  (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 63.)  
 
8  
We disapprove People v. Hill, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th 770, 
to the extent it is inconsistent with this understanding.  (See id. 
at p. 774.)    
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
17 
Assembly Bill 333 has since placed clear limits on this approach 
by requiring a cognizable “benefit” to be more than purely 
reputational.  (See fn. 6, ante.)  But even setting these statutory 
changes to one side, there have always been limits to what 
expert testimony could show about a defendant’s reasons for 
committing a crime.  Without more, generalized expert opinion 
that commission of a particular crime enhances the gang’s 
power in the community by increasing its reputation for violence 
falls short for at least two reasons.   
 
First, this sort of expert opinion proves too much.  If 
generalized testimony about the reputational benefits of a 
defendant’s violent crime were, standing alone, sufficient to 
support an inference that the defendant committed the crime for 
the benefit of the gang, with specific intent to promote, further, 
or assist its members’ crimes, it would mean that essentially 
every violent crime committed by a gang member could be 
punished more severely under section 186.22(b) purely because 
of the defendant’s gang membership.  But “our STEP Act does 
not criminalize mere gang membership,” nor does it impose 
additional punishment on individuals merely because they 
happened to belong to a gang when they committed a crime.  
(People v. Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 623.)  As we have 
explained above, any other understanding of the reach of the 
STEP Act would raise significant constitutional concerns the 
Legislature consciously sought to avoid.  Thus, to “provide a 
nexus to gang activity sufficient to alleviate due process 
concerns” (Rodriguez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1139 (plur. opn.)), 
the statute requires a closer connection between the defendant’s 
crime and the conduct of the gang and its members than 
generalized community reputation testimony can provide. 
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
18 
 
Second, describing a benefit to the gang is only part of the 
equation; the prosecution must also establish that the defendant 
committed the underlying felony with the specific intent to 
promote, further, or assist criminal conduct by other gang 
members — a requirement we have described as knowledge of 
at least some of the criminal activities of the gang and its 
members and intent to further those activities.  Without more, 
evidence that committing a violent crime can enhance the gang’s 
reputation for viciousness in the community does not support an 
inference that the defendant committed a particular violent 
crime for the benefit of the gang and with the intent to facilitate 
known criminal activity by other gang members. 
 
None of this is to suggest that prosecutors may not rely on 
expert opinion to connect the defendant’s crime with the conduct 
of the gang and its members; to the contrary, we have previously 
held that “ ‘[e]xpert opinion that particular criminal conduct 
benefited a gang’ is not only permissible but can be sufficient to 
support the Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), gang 
enhancement.”  (People v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1048.)  
But important limitations apply to the use of such testimony.  
Expert opinion, typically guided by hypothetical questions, 
“ ‘must be rooted in facts shown by the evidence.’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 1045.)  They “ ‘may not be based “on assumptions of fact 
without evidentiary support [citation], or on speculative or 
conjectural factors.” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 1046.)    
 
The appellate case law offers guidance about how to 
ensure that expert reputation testimony is linked by specific 
evidence, rather than speculation or conjecture, to a defendant’s 
gang-related goals in committing a particular crime.  People v. 
Ochoa (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 650 is instructive.  There, in a 
case involving a carjacking, the expert testified that carjacking 
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
19 
was a “ ‘signature’ ” crime of gangs generally, and its 
commission in that case would elevate the reputation of the 
defendant’s gang.  (Id. at p. 655; id. at p. 656.)  The Court of 
Appeal concluded the expert opinion was based on speculation, 
however, finding no evidence the defendant engaged in a 
distinctive carjacking style that could be attributed to his gang; 
no evidence the defendant made his gang affiliation known or 
later took credit for the crime; no evidence the victim was a gang 
member or rival; and no evidence the defendant’s purpose 
involved retaliation for past gang activity.  (Id. at pp. 662–663.)  
Across cases, appellate courts have relied on similar factors — 
whether the defendant’s gang membership was apparent to 
observers, whether the victim was a gang member or rival of the 
defendant’s gang, and whether retaliation for prior gang activity 
or disputes prompted the defendant’s crime — to describe the 
limits of reputation evidence and ensure that it is grounded in 
specific facts that show the defendant acted on behalf of a gang 
rather than for personal reasons.  (E.g., People v. Soriano, supra, 
65 Cal.App.5th at p. 289; People v. Perez (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 
598, 609; People v. Ramirez (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 800, 819; 
People v. Rios, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 573.)9   
 
9  
Some courts have noted that a defendant’s presence in 
gang territory may be relevant to determining whether a crime 
was gang-related.  (E.g., In re Frank S. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 
1192, 1199; People v. Ochoa, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 662; 
People v. Rios, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 574; People v. Perez, 
supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 609.)  Such evidence should be 
approached with caution, however; it may not be “particularly 
probative” when, for example, the territory in question is also 
where the defendant lives.  (People v. Soriano, supra, 65 
Cal.App.5th at p. 289.)   
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
20 
 
Some appellate courts have discerned in Albillar a broader 
authorization to rely on generalized reputation testimony.  This 
overreads our opinion in that case; Albillar is best understood 
in light of its particular factual context. 
 
We did state in Albillar that “[e]xpert opinion that 
particular criminal conduct benefited a gang by enhancing its 
reputation for viciousness can be sufficient to raise the inference 
that the conduct was ‘committed for the benefit of . . . a[] 
criminal street gang.’ ”  (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 63.)  
But the showing in that case included evidence that three gang 
members together raped a young woman in an apartment 
“ ‘saturated’ ” with their gang paraphernalia (id. at p. 62) and 
then attempted to leverage their violence and gang membership 
when threatening the victim to stop her from reporting their 
crimes (id. at p. 53).  Unlike expert testimony about the 
reputational benefits of crime in general, the evidence in 
Albillar demonstrated a connection between the gang’s 
reputation for viciousness and the specific ways the gang 
benefited from that reputation, namely, the intimidation of 
specific, identifiable witnesses and the possibility that gang 
members might avoid prosecution or conviction for their crimes.  
And Albillar also highlighted the benefit the gang members 
derived from acting together (id. at p. 62), indicating that 
evidence supporting the associational element of the statute 
provided further circumstantial evidence of a benefit to the 
gang.  Albillar therefore did not present a situation in which 
reputation evidence alone satisfied the gang enhancement 
statute in a case involving a felony committed by a lone actor, or 
where the jury was left to speculate about the target of the 
intimidation by the gang members or what criminal activity the 
gang members intended to facilitate.   
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
21 
 
Nor do our other cases offer such authorization.  In 
Gardeley, we found evidence supporting the section 186.22(b) 
enhancement sufficient when expert testimony provided a link 
between the crime committed and intimidation that was 
relevant to specific gang activities.  There, gang members 
assaulted a stranger who entered an area where they were 
selling cocaine; expert testimony established that the gang’s 
primary purpose was to sell narcotics and that such violent 
assaults intimidated residents in the gang’s territory, allowing 
its members to maintain their drug-dealing stronghold.  (People 
v. Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 612–613, 619.) 
 
And in People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, we found 
evidence sufficient to establish “that Rivera specifically 
intended the murder [of a police officer] to benefit and promote 
the gang” when it showed that Rivera was an active gang 
member, that he participated in and pleaded guilty to offenses 
related to the gang’s drug trade, that the officer killed had been 
leading an investigation of the gang’s drug trade, and that the 
officer had questioned Rivera and searched his home regarding 
the investigation.  (Id. at p. 332; see id. at pp. 331–332.)  These 
facts not only connected Rivera’s actions to the criminal 
activities of his gang and its members but also suggested 
“substantial participation” in those activities that would 
support an inference of knowledge and intent to facilitate them 
through the killing of the investigating officer.  (People v. 
Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 630.)  
 
In the end, any inference that might otherwise be drawn 
from testimony that “particular criminal conduct benefited a 
gang by enhancing its reputation for viciousness” (Albillar, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 63) must be cabined so that section 
186.22(b) prosecutions avoid punishing mere gang membership, 
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
22 
as opposed to gang-related conduct.  In a case involving a gang 
member who has acted alone in the commission of a felony, there 
must be evidence connecting testimony about any general 
reputational advantage that might accrue to the gang because 
of its members’ crimes to the defendant’s commission of a crime 
on a particular occasion for the benefit of the gang, and with the 
specific intent to promote criminal activities by the gang’s 
members.   
IV. 
 
With all this in mind, we turn to the specifics of Renteria’s 
challenge to the imposition of gang penalties for shooting at two 
inhabited dwellings.  “In considering a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support an enhancement, we 
review the entire record in the light most favorable to the 
judgment to determine whether it contains substantial 
evidence — that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of 
solid value — from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  [Citation.]  We 
presume every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact 
could have reasonably deduced from the evidence.  [Citation.]  If 
the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, 
reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the 
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a 
contrary finding.  [Citation.]  ‘A reviewing court neither 
reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness’s credibility.’ ”  
(Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 59–60.)   
 
As this guidance indicates, and as we reiterated recently, 
sufficiency determinations necessarily take account of the 
“standard of proof that applied before the trial court” 
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1008); that is why 
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
23 
in criminal cases we must ensure the record demonstrates 
substantial evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt (ibid.; see also People v. Soriano, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 281 [reiterating the standard of proof in reviewing sufficiency 
of gang enhancement evidence]).  
 
This was a lone-actor case.  True, as the Court of Appeal 
stated, “[i]t is not altogether certain defendant acted alone.”  
(People v. Renteria, supra, F076973.)  The evidence did indicate 
that someone was with Renteria when he shot at Jack D.’s 
house.  But it did not establish who that person was or whether 
he or she was a gang member.  The record therefore lacks 
substantial evidence that Renteria acted with another gang 
member in committing these offenses.  So we proceed, for 
purposes of analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence, on the 
premise that Renteria acted alone.10 
 
In finding sufficient evidence to support the gang 
penalties, the Court of Appeal concluded that Renteria’s actions 
intimidated the community in a way that both benefited his 
gang and demonstrated his intent to promote his own future 
criminal activity and that of other gang members.  The court 
stated that Renteria’s shootings intimidated rival gang 
members and neighborhood residents, increased his gang’s 
control of contested territory, and therefore facilitated future 
crimes that he and his fellow gang members would commit.  
(People v. Renteria, supra, F076973.)  The Attorney General 
 
10  
At oral argument, the Attorney General suggested for the 
first time that this case might not be a lone-actor case if Renteria 
were acting according to an official gang “policy.”  In those 
circumstances, the argument goes, the actions would be “at the 
direction of” the gang.  We do not consider this belatedly raised 
possibility and so express no views on the merit of the argument.  
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
24 
similarly argues that intimidating witnesses and rivals 
established Renteria’s intent to facilitate future criminal 
conduct by other gang members.  And at trial, the gang expert 
testified that the Sureño gang benefited from violence by its 
members because the violence intimidated witnesses and 
allowed gang members to continue their “day-to-day gang 
activity.” 
 
The 
first 
and 
most 
fundamental 
difficulty 
with 
prosecution’s case is that no substantial evidence shows that 
Renteria intended his actions to be attributed to his gang.  The 
Attorney General points to evidence that, at some point on the 
night of the shootings, Renteria associated with a group that 
shouted out “Sur trece,” a gang slogan.  But the description of 
events did not provide substantial evidence that this happened 
especially close in time to the shootings, and the record does not 
support the inference that, by walking along with the group 
earlier in the night, Renteria intended the later shootings to be 
attributed to the gang.  Although the parties dispute the timing 
of events, the evidence shows that the group dispersed and, 
according to Anthony A., it was “a little while” later when 
Renteria returned and shot at the houses.  When questioned by 
Anthony, Renteria minimized and distanced himself from the 
shouting, suggesting those involved were drunk and he was just 
helping them home.  There was no evidence that Renteria 
identified himself or his gang during the shooting or took credit 
for it on behalf of his gang afterwards.   
 
Nor does the record support a conclusion that Renteria 
could have reasonably anticipated the community would 
perceive a gang connection.  No witnesses testified that they 
believed the shootings were related to a Sureño gang or gang 
rivalry, or that they feared Sureño gang activity.  When the 
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
25 
prosecutor asked one neighbor if he worried about testifying or 
feared for his family because of his role in the case, the witness 
denied such concerns; another neighbor testified that she was 
frightened by the shooting but did not connect it to gang activity, 
much less to Renteria’s gang.  Jack D. did not attribute the 
shooting of his house to gang activity either; he testified that he 
had not even been aware of it.  And Anthony testified that he 
understood Renteria’s companions to be shouting “slang gang 
words” earlier in the evening, but gave no indication he thought 
Renteria himself was a Sureño gang member or that he believed 
the shootings were related to a Sureño cause. 
 
Equally important, no substantial evidence in the record 
supports the Attorney General’s claim that Renteria intended 
the shooting to contribute to his gang’s rivalry with 
Northerners.  The Attorney General argues the evidence 
reasonably allowed the jury to infer that Renteria shot at 
Jack D.’s house for the benefit of his gang because he was 
retaliating for being “ ‘hit up’ ” earlier the same evening.  The 
record demonstrates that Renteria had been challenged by 
people he assumed were Northerners; he believed they had a 
shotgun and ran from them.  Police later found a shotgun in 
Jack’s closed garage that would not have been visible to 
Renteria.  Officer Adney also testified that in the past, he had 
seen Robert P., who was “associated” with Jack’s home (but did 
not live with Jack), in the presence of Norteño gang members.  
The Court of Appeal noted that “there was evidence Jack D.’s 
house had at least some link to Norteños, even if it was not a 
hotbed of rival gang activity.”  (People v. Renteria, supra, 
F076973.)  But the shotgun and a vague reference to Robert does 
not amount to substantial evidence from which the jury could 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that shooting at Jack’s 
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
26 
house was a retaliation carried out to benefit Renteria’s gang, or 
that it would have been so understood by anyone in a position to 
know about the shooting.  To the extent Officer Adney testified 
that Renteria may have engaged in the shooting to maintain his 
own respect within the gang, such evidence fails to explain how 
enhancing his personal reputation within the gang would 
facilitate the criminal activities of the gang and its members, as 
section 186.22(b) requires.11    
 
Finally, we see no other evidence from which the jury 
could infer that Renteria knew of and thus might have intended 
to promote the criminal activities of his gang’s members.  
Renteria admitted being a Sureño when he was in middle school 
and a few years later police detained him at an abandoned house 
that had been spray painted with gang-related graffiti.  Renteria 
again admitted being a Sureño when he was arrested for the 
current charges, but the prosecutor offered no evidence to show 
the degree of Renteria’s involvement with the gang, to otherwise 
suggest his familiarity with the criminal activities of the gang’s 
members, or to identify the criminal conduct Renteria’s actions 
might have facilitated.  (Cf. Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 62 
[evidence that defendants had large gang tattoos on their torso, 
neck, and face and lived in an apartment “ ‘saturated’ with gang 
paraphernalia” showed their relationship with the gang was 
 
11  
The Attorney General concedes that Renteria’s motivation 
for shooting at the second house was unrelated to retaliation but 
argues that it contributed to the violent reputation of his gang.  
As we have discussed, however, there was no evidence the 
victims or other community or gang members perceived a 
connection between Renteria’s actions and his gang, such that 
Renteria’s gang might have stood to benefit in this way.  Nor 
was there evidence that Renteria intended to facilitate known 
criminal activity by other gang members. 
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
27 
more than “ ‘superficial’ ”]; People v. Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p. 331 [charged crimes involved defense of drug dealing territory 
and the defendant had previously pleaded guilty to offenses 
related to his gang’s drug trade]; People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 
Cal.4th 665, 699 [evidence of the defendant’s prior law 
enforcement contacts “bolstered the prosecution’s theory that he 
acted with intent to benefit his gang”].)   
 
 
In sum, considering the record as a whole, we conclude 
there was not sufficient evidence to support either prong of the 
gang enhancement statute, with respect to either shooting.  The 
evidence at trial demonstrated that Renteria was a gang 
member at the time of the shootings.  But the evidence did not 
support the inference that Renteria committed the shootings for 
the gang’s benefit, with the specific intent to promote the 
criminal activities of gang members, as opposed to acting for his 
own, personal reasons.  Thus, while Renteria is undisputedly 
subject to punishment for the unlawful shootings, he is not 
subject to the additional punishment prescribed for felonies that 
have been shown to be gang-related under section 186.22(b). 
DISPOSITION 
 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal insofar as 
it upheld the imposition of the section 186.22(b)(4) penalties, 
with directions to remand the case to the trial court for 
resentencing in accordance with this opinion. 
 
 
PEOPLE v. RENTERIA 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
28 
 
 
              KRUGER, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Renteria 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 1/5/21 – 5th Dist. 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S266854 
Date Filed:  August 25, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Tulare 
Judge:  Kathryn T. Montejano 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
James Bisnow, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Mary K. McComb, State Public Defender, Hassan Gorguinpour and 
Alyssa Mellott, Deputy State Public Defenders, for the Office of the 
State Public Defender as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters 
and Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. 
Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Darren K. 
Indermill, Rachelle A. Newcomb, Cavan M. Cox II and Lewis A. 
Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
James Bisnow 
117 East Colorado Boulevard, Suite 600 
Pasadena, CA 91105 
(626) 229-9665 
 
Lewis A. Martinez  
Deputy Attorney General 
2550 Mariposa Mall, Room 5090 
Fresno, CA 93721 
(559) 705-2308 
 
Alyssa Mellott  
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, Suite 1000 
Oakland, CA 94602 
(510) 267-3300