Title: Hornibrook v. Richard
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13030
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 2, 2021

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13030 
 
KEVIN HORNIBROOK, personal representative,1  vs.  CHERILYN 
RICHARD & another.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 5, 2021. - August 2, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Conservator.  Judicial Immunity.  Fiduciary.  Conversion.  
Practice, Civil, Discovery, Motion to dismiss. 
 
 
 
Complaint in equity filed in the Norfolk Division of the 
Probate and Family Court Department on February 5, 2018. 
 
Following transfer to the Superior Court Department, a 
motion to dismiss was heard by Anthony M. Campo, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Kristyn M. Kelley for Cherilyn Richard. 
Ethan C. Stiles for the plaintiff. 
Adam Hornstine, Assistant Attorney General, for Attorney 
General, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
Patricia Keane Martin, for Massachusetts Chapter of the 
National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
1 Of the estate of Kathleen Hornibrook. 
 
 
2 NGM Insurance Company. 
2 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  This case concerns whether a conservator 
appointed by the Probate and Family Court (probate court) and 
acting pursuant to judicial approval is a quasi judicial 
officer, entitled to absolute immunity.3  We conclude that a 
conservator acting pursuant to judicial approval is a quasi 
judicial officer and is entitled to absolute immunity for 
conduct that is authorized or approved by the probate court. 
The plaintiff, Kevin Hornibrook, acting as guardian and 
next of friend for his mother, Kathleen Hornibrook, filed a 
complaint against the defendant conservator, Cherilyn Richard, 
alleging (1) breach of fiduciary duty, (2) malpractice, (3) 
conversion, and (4) fraud.  The defendant moved to dismiss the 
complaint.  A Superior Court judge allowed the motion as to the 
counts of malpractice and fraud but denied the motion as to the 
counts of breach of fiduciary duty and conversion.  We conclude 
that the plaintiff did not allege in his complaint that the 
defendant acted outside the authorized scope of her duties as 
conservator.  Accordingly, we reverse the judge's order denying 
 
3 As discussed in more detail infra, "'quasi judicial' 
officers . . . are involved in an integral part of the judicial 
process and thus must be able to act freely without the threat 
of a law suit.  When acting at a judge's direction, these 'quasi 
judicial' officers enjoy . . . absolute immunity for their 
conduct (citations omitted)."  LaLonde v. Eissner, 405 Mass. 
207, 211 (1989). 
3 
 
the defendant's motion to dismiss the remaining counts of breach 
of fiduciary duty and conversion.4 
Background.  We set forth the basic facts and the 
procedural background of the case.5 
1.  Care of Kathleen.  In 2013, Kathleen, then in her mid-
eighties and suffering from progressive dementia due to 
Alzheimer's disease, lived in her three-family home with her son 
Francis Hornibrook, who also was her purported caretaker.  In 
December 2013, Ethos Elder Services (Ethos) learned that Francis 
was neglecting and financially exploiting Kathleen.  In 2014, 
due to Francis's violent behavior toward home care aides, Ethos 
filed an emergency G. L. c. 19A protective services petition in 
the Suffolk Division of the Probate and Family Court Department 
and removed Kathleen to a nursing home.  In December 2014, a 
judge in the probate court appointed the defendant, a 
Massachusetts licensed attorney, as Kathleen's permanent 
conservator.  The judge appointed the plaintiff, Kathleen's 
other son, as her permanent guardian.6 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Attorney 
General and the Massachusetts Chapter of the National Academy of 
Elder Law Attorneys. 
 
5 Except where indicated, we rely on the amended complaint 
for the facts. 
 
6 The plaintiff had been serving as Kathleen's temporary 
conservator and guardian, but Francis objected to the 
plaintiff's appointment as permanent conservator.  The defendant 
4 
 
At an unspecified point in time, the plaintiff learned that 
Kathleen was eligible for twenty-four hour, in-home care from 
MassHealth and Medicaid.7  He and Ethos formed a plan to rent out 
the second- and third-floor units of Kathleen's home, move 
Kathleen into the first-floor unit, and use the rental income to 
cover her expenses.  Francis had to be removed from the home 
before Kathleen could return, given the threat that he posed to 
Kathleen and her property.  After her appointment as 
conservator, the defendant agreed to pursue the plaintiff's plan 
and took primary responsibility for evicting Francis.  In 
December 2014, the defendant made one failed attempt to change 
the locks and evict Francis.  Throughout 2015, the defendant 
repeatedly assured the plaintiff that she would take action in 
response to his numerous inquiries about the status of the 
eviction proceedings.  Nonetheless, there is only one record of 
the defendant contacting the probate court regarding an eviction 
process or protective order against Francis on behalf of 
 
was appointed from a list of attorneys qualified to accept fee-
generating appointments from the probate court. 
 
7 MassHealth, the State-administered Medicaid program in 
Massachusetts, is a joint State and Federal program designed to 
pay the cost of medical care for those who are otherwise unable 
to afford it.  See G. L. c. 118E, § 9, inserted by St. 1933, 
c. 161, § 17. 
5 
 
Kathleen.  Francis continued to reside in the newly renovated 
home and caused substantial damage therein.8 
2.  Sale of Kathleen's house.  Kathleen had a reverse 
mortgage on her house, and in late 2015, the lender issued a 
notice of foreclosure on the house, as Kathleen's twelve-month 
absence from the home violated the terms of her mortgage and the 
underlying Federal reverse mortgage rules.  In January 2016, the 
plaintiff learned about the foreclosure action and subsequently 
informed the defendant.  The defendant retained counsel to bring 
an equity action to enjoin the foreclosure proceedings 
temporarily.  The action was successful.  The defendant first 
notified the plaintiff in January 2016 that she was preparing 
the house for sale. 
On March 2, 2016, the defendant filed a motion in the 
probate court seeking permission to enter the property to remove 
trash and debris from the house, take photographs of the 
property, show the property for sale on a specified date, and 
periodically enter the property on specified dates until it was 
sold.  The motion was granted.  On March 25, 2016, the defendant 
and other counsel successfully evicted Francis and obtained an 
execution for possession of the property from the probate court. 
 
8 During one exchange in January 2016, the defendant 
informed the plaintiff that her role as conservator was a 
strictly financial one, and that the plaintiff, as his mother's 
guardian, had the power to move his mother back home. 
6 
 
In May 2016, the defendant hired a real estate company and 
listed the property for sale.  She also hired a cleaning company 
to clean and remove personal items from the home.  In August 
2016, the defendant applied to the probate court for a license 
to sell the property for $1.12 million.  In November 2016, the 
court issued a license to sell, and the plaintiff did not 
object.  The property sold for $1.285 million.9  The defendant 
paid the real estate agent $32,500 in commission, $775 for 
unspecified reasons, and $2,185 for changing the locks on the 
property.  Kathleen never returned home and resided in a nursing 
facility until her death in January 2019.  Following her death, 
Kathleen's estate was required to reimburse Medicaid for her 
stay in the nursing facility. 
3.  Prior proceedings.  In January 2018, the plaintiff, 
acting as guardian and next friend of his mother, Kathleen, 
filed a complaint against the defendant and her bond issuer in 
the Norfolk Division of the Probate and Family Court Department.  
The complaint alleged (1) breach of fiduciary duty, (2) 
 
9 The original buyer was willing to pay $1.12 million for 
the property.  The plaintiff, however, found another buyer who 
offered $1.22 million.  When the defendant refused to consider 
the higher offer, the plaintiff filed an objection to the 
defendant's previously allowed motion for a license to sell the 
property.  The original buyer then raised its offer to $1.285 
million. 
7 
 
malpractice, (3) conversion, and (4) fraud.10,11  The defendant 
filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction and immunity from suit.  A judge agreed that the 
probate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter 
and ordered it transferred to the Superior Court. 
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss in the Superior 
Court, arguing that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), and that she 
was entitled to quasi judicial immunity.  A judge allowed the 
motion.  The plaintiff moved for relief from judgment pursuant 
to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60, 365 Mass. 828 (1974), and the judge 
denied the motion without prejudice. 
The plaintiff was thereafter appointed the personal 
representative of Kathleen's estate and filed a renewed motion 
for relief from judgment.  The renewed motion also opposed the 
motion to dismiss and sought to amend the original complaint by 
substituting parties.  After a hearing, the judge granted the 
 
10 The plaintiff's complaint also included one count of 
surety liability against NGM Insurance Company (NGM).  The 
Superior Court judge severed and stayed proceedings against NGM 
pending resolution of the claims against the defendant.  Because 
we conclude that the defendant is not liable to the plaintiff, 
we also conclude that NGM Insurance is not liable to the 
plaintiff. 
 
11 On October 20, 2016, the plaintiff also attempted to have 
the defendant removed as conservator on grounds similar to those 
that he advances in this case.  A judge in the Suffolk Division 
of the Probate and Family Court Department denied his motion. 
8 
 
plaintiff's renewed motion for relief from judgment and 
substitution of the parties but did not rule on the motion to 
dismiss. 
After another hearing, the judge dismissed the legal 
malpractice and fraud counts for failure to state a claim on 
which relief could be granted; denied the motion to dismiss on 
the breach of fiduciary duty and conversion counts, noting that 
the claims alleged were "paper-thin"; and ruled that a 
conservator enjoys quasi judicial immunity when acting within 
the scope of his or her duties.  The parties were ordered to 
conduct and complete discovery to show whether the defendant was 
acting outside the scope of her duties in relation to the 
plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion.  
The defendant appealed from the Superior Court judge's denial of 
the motion to dismiss on the breach of fiduciary duty and 
conversion counts.  We transferred the case to this court on our 
own motion. 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  We review the denial 
of a motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6) de 
novo.  Drake v. Leicester, 484 Mass. 198, 199 (2020).  "We 
accept as true the allegations in the complaint and draw every 
reasonable inference in favor of the plaintiff."  Dartmouth v. 
Greater New Bedford Regional Vocational Tech. High Sch. Dist., 
461 Mass. 366, 374 (2012).  To survive a motion to dismiss for 
9 
 
failure to state a claim, the claimant must plausibly allege an 
entitlement to relief above the speculative level.  See 
Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008). 
2.  Quasi judicial immunity.  Judicial immunity is a well-
settled principle under common law.  Allard v. Estes, 292 Mass. 
187, 189–190 (1935).  A judge is entitled to judicial immunity 
and therefore is "exempt from liability to an action for any 
judgment or decision rendered in the exercise of jurisdiction 
vested in him [or her] by law."  LaLonde v. Eissner, 405 Mass. 
207, 210 (1989), quoting Allard, supra.  See Stump v. Sparkman, 
435 U.S. 349, 356-357 (1978) (judge will be deprived of immunity 
only when he or she has acted in "clear absence of all 
jurisdiction" [citation omitted]).  We do not limit such 
immunity to judges.  Comins v. Sharkansky, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 37, 
39 (1995).  Rather, we have extended the protections afforded by 
judicial immunity to persons who perform quasi judicial 
functions.  See LaLonde, supra at 210-211, 212 (court-appointed 
psychiatrist); Temple v. Marlborough Div. of the Dist. Court 
Dep't, 395 Mass. 117, 133 (1985) (court clerks); Sarkisian v. 
Benjamin, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 741, 745 (2005) (guardian ad litem); 
Farber vs. Sherman, Mass. App. Div., No. 17-ADCV-44SO (Dist. Ct. 
Mar. 15, 2018) (personal representative of estate). 
Massachusetts uses a functional analysis when determining 
whether an individual performs a quasi judicial function and is 
10 
 
therefore entitled to absolute immunity.  LaLonde, 405 Mass. at 
212.  Using this functional approach, courts look at the "nature 
of the duties performed, and whether they are 'closely 
associated with the judicial process.'"  Cok v. Cosentino, 876 
F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989), quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 
U.S. 193, 200 (1985).  See LaLonde, supra (defendant entitled to 
quasi judicial immunity because he rendered expert opinion to 
judge, which was essential judicial function).  We recognize as 
a matter of public policy that when officers are deemed to be 
integral to the judicial process, they "must be able to act 
freely without the threat of a law suit."  LaLonde, supra at 
211.  As such, we have found that individuals appointed to 
perform essential judicial functions are entitled to absolute 
immunity in the performance of those quasi judicial services.  
Id. at 213.  Conversely, absolute immunity does not attach when 
such persons perform acts that are outside the scope of their 
authority.  Cok, supra. 
The plaintiff contends that court-appointed conservators 
ordinarily are not entitled to quasi judicial immunity because 
they do not perform essential judicial functions.  We have not 
yet addressed whether the immunity afforded to individuals 
appointed by the court extends to court-appointed conservators.12  
 
12 A conservator's role is to manage the property of a 
protected person.  A conservator takes title to the protected 
11 
 
However, the ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit in Cok, 876 F.2d at 3, provides guidance on 
this issue.  In Cok, the First Circuit determined that a 
conservator of assets was a nonjudicial person fulfilling quasi 
judicial functions, because a conservator performs functions 
that aid and inform the family court.  Id.  As such, the 
conservator was involved in the adjudicative process and shared 
in the family court judge's absolute immunity.  Id.  The First 
Circuit held that the conservator had "absolute quasi-judicial 
immunity for those activities intimately related to the judicial 
process."  Id. 
Whether an individual is entitled to immunity as a quasi 
judicial officer depends on the functions he or she performs.  
See LaLonde, 405 Mass. at 212.  When acting as directed or 
authorized by a judge, a court-appointed attorney functions "as 
an arm of the court."  Sarkisian, 62 Mass. App. Ct. at 745.  We 
conclude that a court-appointed conservator similarly functions 
as an arm of the court and has absolute immunity for activities 
that are integrally related to the judicial process.  See Cok, 
876 F.2d at 3. 
A conservator is a nonjudicial person fulfilling quasi 
judicial functions.  See id.  Under G. L. c. 190B, § 1-201, a 
 
person's property as fiduciary for the protected person.  See 
G. L. c. 190B, § 5-419. 
12 
 
conservator is defined as "a person who is appointed by a court 
to manage the estate of a protected person."  Typically, a 
conservator manages properties and pays bills for any work done.  
See G. L. c. 190B, § 5-423.  See also Cok, 876 F.2d at 3.  When 
these duties performed are closely associated with the judicial 
process, the conservator shares in the judge's absolute 
immunity.  See Gross v. Rell, 304 Conn. 234, 251-252 (2012) 
(conservators entitled to quasi judicial immunity for acts 
authorized or approved by probate court).  See also Myers v. 
Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1466-1467 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 
U.S. 828 (1987) (once court finds that nonjudicial persons 
fulfill quasi judicial functions intimately related to judicial 
process, they have absolute immunity for damages claims arising 
from their performance of delegated functions).  "[W]hen the 
conservator has obtained the authorization or approval of the 
Probate Court for his or her actions on behalf of the 
conservatee's estate, the conservator cannot be held personally 
liable."  Gross, supra.  In this capacity, the conservator is 
not acting on behalf of the conservatee, but rather as an agent 
of the probate court.  See id. at 251. 
Indeed, "imposing liability on a conservator for acts 
authorized or approved by the Probate Court would chill that 
court's ability to make and carry out fearless and principled 
decisions regarding the conservatee's care and the management of 
13 
 
his or her estate."  Gross, 304 Conn. at 252.  See Sarkisian, 62 
Mass. App. Ct. at 745 (immunity is defense against personal 
liability).  Cf. Chicopee Lions Club v. District Attorney for 
the Hampden Dist., 396 Mass. 244, 252 (1985) ("to protect 
prosecutors from the debilitating task of defending themselves 
in civil lawsuits for their official acts, absolute immunity 
must at the same time shelter both the scrupulous and the errant 
public official"); Temple, 395 Mass. at 133 ("Court clerks enjoy 
qualified immunity from suit and are absolutely immune for their 
conduct when acting at a judge's direction").  However, when a 
conservator's acts are not authorized by the probate court, the 
conservator is treated as a fiduciary of the conservatee and may 
be held personally liable.  See Gross, supra at 254. 
3.  Claims at issue.  Having determined that conservators 
possess quasi judicial immunity for judicially approved acts, we 
consider whether the plaintiff's remaining claims arise from the 
defendant's judicially authorized functions.  The plaintiff 
argues that the claims for breach of fiduciary duty and 
conversion are analogous to accounting and indemnification 
claims, which are to be permitted against a conservator under 
G. L. c. 190B, § 5-428.  The defendant argues that her actions, 
which include selling Kathleen's house, evicting Francis, and 
cleaning and preparing the home for sale, are not outside the 
scope of the probate court judge's approval.  Rather, she 
14 
 
argues, the allegations both relate to actions expressly 
authorized by the probate court and within the defendant's 
statutorily delegated capacity as a conservator.  For the 
reasons discussed infra, we conclude that the plaintiff's 
pleadings failed to suggest plausibly that the defendant acted 
outside the scope of her function as conservator and the express 
authority granted by the probate court, and therefore the judge 
erred in denying the motion to dismiss the breach of fiduciary 
duty and conversion claims.  See Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 636. 
a.  Breach of fiduciary duty.  The plaintiff alleges that 
the defendant failed to preserve Kathleen's property and estate 
in breach of her fiduciary duty.  Specifically, the plaintiff 
alleges that the defendant depleted the estate's assets through 
multiple failed attempts to evict Francis from the house in 
breach of her fiduciary duty.  "To establish a breach of 
fiduciary duty, there must be a duty owed to the plaintiff by 
the defendant and injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by 
the breach."  Estate of Moulton v. Puopolo, 467 Mass. 478, 492 
(2014). 
The plaintiff contends that his arguments find support in 
the probate code, G. L. c. 190B, § 5-428 (b) and (d).  The 
statute allows for a conservator to be found personally liable 
in certain circumstances, including from "obligations arising 
from ownership or control of property of the estate," or "torts 
15 
 
committed in the course of administration of the estate."  G. L. 
c. 190B, § 5-428 (b).  Under G. L. c. 190B, § 5-428 (d), "[a]ny 
question of liability between the estate and the conservator 
personally may be determined in a proceeding for accounting, 
surcharge, or indemnification, or other appropriate proceeding 
or action." 
While the plaintiff recognizes that immunities are a 
defense from the personal liability set out in the statute, he 
argues that the defendant's duties were not performed as "an arm 
of the court," and therefore, she is not entitled to quasi 
judicial immunity.  Sarkisian, 62 Mass. App. Ct. at 745.  The 
plaintiff specifically contends that the probate court 
implicitly recognized a distinction between the necessity to 
sell the house and the actions leadings up to the sale in its 
authorization to sell the home.  Therefore, the plaintiff 
argues, the defendant's role in necessitating the sale was not 
judicially sanctioned and is actionable.  We disagree. 
The defendant moved for authorization to sell the home.  
After the plaintiff objected on the ground that the sale price 
was inadequate, the defendant amended the motion to reflect the 
increased price of the sale.  The defendant included in her 
motion facts surrounding Francis's continued and unauthorized 
16 
 
residence in the home.13  The plaintiff filed no further 
objection.  The probate court issued to the defendant the 
license to sell.  When viewed in the context of the defendant's 
request outlining the need to evict Francis before the sale 
could become effectuated, the judge's authorization inherently 
encompassed evicting Francis from the home to prepare it for 
sale.  Because the judge's authorization extended to evicting 
Francis, the defendant is protected under quasi judicial 
immunity from any claim relating to her efforts to evict 
Francis. 
 
The plaintiff further alleges that the defendant committed 
a breach of her fiduciary duty through her failure to follow the 
care plan established by the plaintiff, leading to Kathleen's 
unnecessarily expensive, prolonged stay in the skilled nursing 
facility.  The defendant, as conservator of Kathleen's estate, 
had responsibility over the estate's assets.  The plaintiff, as 
Kathleen's guardian, ultimately had control over determining 
 
13 In her March 2, 2016, motion to the probate court, the 
defendant noted, "Mr. Francis Hornibrook has remained in the 
first floor unit without permission of Ms. Hornibrook's 
conservator.  Shawn O'Rourke, Esq was hired to evict Mr. 
Hornibrook.  He has been served with notice to quit on 
January 22, 2016. . . .  All attempts to reason with Mr. 
Hornibrook were met with threats and a refusal to cooperate.  He 
then threatened to call the police. . . .  The property is 
riddled with trash and debris. . . .  I sent a letter to Mr. 
Hornibrook requesting access to the property and have not heard 
back from him regarding the request." 
17 
 
Kathleen's residence and care plan.14  Moreover, there is no 
indication in the plaintiff's complaint that he ever asked the 
probate court to approve or implement this plan.  When the court 
issued the defendant a license to sell the property in November 
2016, the plaintiff did not object.  As the defendant points 
out, the plaintiff's purported care plan would not have been 
possible if the house were sold, suggesting, at the very least, 
that this care plan was not fully developed.  In any event, the 
defendant was acting under the authority of the court in 
effectuating the sale of the house.  The plaintiff does not 
plausibly suggest otherwise in his complaint.  That the sale of 
the house prevented the plaintiff from implementing his alleged 
care plan does not render the defendant's action unprotected by 
quasi judicial immunity. 
b.  Conversion.  The plaintiff alleges that the defendant 
converted Kathleen's house, the personal property in the house, 
and the monetary proceeds from the sale of the house.  To state 
a plausible claim of conversion, a plaintiff must allege that 
the defendant wrongfully exercised dominion or control over the 
personal property of the plaintiff.  Weiler v. PortfolioScope, 
 
14 "[A] guardian of an incapacitated person shall make 
decisions regarding the incapacitated person's support, care, 
education, health and welfare, but a guardian is not personally 
liable for the incapacitated person's expenses."  G. L. c. 190B, 
§ 5-309 (a). 
18 
 
Inc., 469 Mass. 75, 87 (2014).  The plaintiff does not dispute 
that the probate court judge gave the defendant authority to 
clean out the house.  Rather, the plaintiff's allegations all 
relate to actions that the defendant undertook in clear exercise 
of the authority granted to her by the probate court judge.  
Nowhere in his complaint does the plaintiff allege theft or 
misappropriation.  The sale of the home was done pursuant to an 
order of the probate court, and therefore the conservator is 
immune from the claims as alleged.  The plaintiff's amended 
complaint fails to plausibly allege that the defendant exceeded 
the probate court judge's orders.  See Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 
636.  See also Cok, 876 F.2d at 3 (selling of real estate quasi 
judicial function in context of court-appointed conservator of 
assets).  Accordingly, the allegations in the complaint are not 
sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. 
c.  Discovery.  We briefly address the Superior Court 
judge's ruling ordering "narrowly tailored discovery" to aid the 
court in determining whether the complaint alleged conduct that 
falls outside the quasi judicial immunity afforded to the 
defendant.  We agree with the plaintiff that the question 
whether a defendant is entitled to absolute immunity is not one 
that should be determined through "narrowly tailored discovery" 
based on what the judge described as "paper-thin" allegations in 
the complaint.  Rather, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to set 
19 
 
forth factual allegations plausibly suggesting that the 
defendant acted outside her jurisdiction.  See Cok, 876 F.2d at 
4 (claims against conservator dismissed where there were "no 
allegations of theft or personal profiteering, or that any of 
the[] acts were taken without the sanction of the family 
court"); Kermit Constr. Corp. v. Banco Credito Y Ahorro Ponceno, 
547 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1976) ("burden of pleading and of 
showing the absence of privilege falls on the plaintiff").  The 
plaintiff has failed to do so here. 
4.  Personal liability of conservators.  The applicability 
of the common-law rule of quasi judicial immunity to 
conservators for claims arising out of specifically delegated 
judicial functions does not mean that conservators are entitled 
to absolute immunity in all circumstances.  See G. L. c. 190B, 
§ 5-428.15  The defendant's quasi judicial status entitles her to 
absolute immunity when acting within the scope of express 
judicial approval.  However, when a conservator's acts are not 
authorized or approved by the probate court, the conservator is 
no longer acting as an agent of the court, and as such may be 
held personally liable.  See Gross, 304 Conn. at 253-254.  
 
15 As previously stated, an estate may seek personal 
recovery from a conservator through "accounting, surcharge, or 
indemnification, or other appropriate proceeding or action" 
pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 5-428 (d).  Moreover, conservators 
may be liable for some "torts committed in the course of 
administration of the estate."  G. L. c. 190B, § 5-428 (b). 
20 
 
Because the plaintiff here does not allege that the defendant 
was acting outside the express authorization of the probate 
court, we do not address the extent to which a conservator may 
be held liable personally when acting within his or her 
statutory authority but without express authorization or 
approval of the probate court. 
Conclusion.  The order of the Superior Court denying the 
defendant's motion to dismiss is reversed.  The case is remanded 
to the Superior Court for entry of an order allowing the motion 
to dismiss. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.