Title: Washburn v. Columbia Forest Products, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S52254
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: May 4, 2006

FILED: May 4, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
ROBERT WASHBURN,
Respondent on Review,
v.
COLUMBIA FOREST PRODUCTS, INC.,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 0012-12516; CA A116664; SC S52254)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 7, 2005.
Scott G. Seidman, of Tonkon Torp LLP, Portland, argued the
cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the briefs was Lynda
J. Hartzell.
Philip M. Lebenbaum, Portland, argued the cause and filed
the briefs for respondent on review.
Bruce L. Campbell, Louis B. Livingston, Alyssa E. Tormala,
and J. Michael Porter, of Miller Nash LLP, Portland, filed briefs
on behalf of amici curiae WinCo Foods, Inc.; Freightliner LLC;
and CertainTeed Corporation.
Gregory W. Byrne, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amici
curiae Associated Oregon Industries, Inc.; Oregon-Columbia
Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America;
Associated Oregon Loggers, Inc.; and the National Federation of
Independent Business.
Craig A. Crispin, Scott N. Hunt, and Theodore E. Wenk, 
Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amici curiae Oregon Trial
Lawyers Association and Oregon Advocacy Center.
William N. Later, Portland, and Leland R. Berger, Portland,
filed a brief on behalf of amici curiae American Civil Liberties
Union Foundation of Oregon; National Organization for the Reform
of Marijuana Laws; and Americans for Safe Access.
Before Carson,** Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz,*** Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Kistler, J., concurred and filed an opinion.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Nely Johnson, Judge. 197 Or App 104, 104 P3d 609 (2005).
**Chief Justice when case was argued.
***Chief Justice when decision was rendered.
DE MUNIZ, C. J. 
This case involves the Oregon statutes that prohibit
unlawful workplace discrimination against disabled persons, ORS
659 A. 112 to 659 A. 139.  The issue before us is whether those
provisions require an employer to make a disability-related
accommodation for an employee who uses marijuana for medical
purposes.  Plaintiff, Robert Washburn, was an employee of
Columbia Forest Products, Inc. (employer).  He was also a medical
marijuana recipient who regularly used the drug before going to
bed to counteract leg spasms that otherwise would keep him awake. 
After plaintiff tested positive for marijuana use, employer
terminated his employment.  Plaintiff brought the present action
against employer alleging a violation of state prohibitions
against disability-related discrimination in the workplace.  The
trial court granted summary judgment for employer, holding, in
part, that plaintiff was not "disabled" under the pertinent 
Oregon statutes.  The Court of Appeals disagreed with that
conclusion and held that employer's summary judgment motion
should not have been granted.  Washburn v. Columbia Forest
Products, Inc., 197 Or App 104, 104 P3d 609 (2005).  We allowed
employer's petition for review and now conclude that plaintiff is
not "disabled" for the purposes of ORS 659 A. 112 to 659 A. 139.  We
therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are undisputed.  Plaintiff worked
for employer as a millwright.  Plaintiff suffers from muscle
spasms in his legs that, left untreated, limit his ability to
sleep.  At one time, plaintiff took prescription medication that
alleviated those spasms and helped him to rest, but plaintiff's
doctor subsequently approved plaintiff's participation in
Oregon's medical marijuana program.  Plaintiff began smoking
marijuana in the evening before going to bed, and, according to
plaintiff, the marijuana was more effective in helping him sleep
than the prescription drugs that he previously had taken.
Employer has a workplace drug policy that prohibits
employees from reporting for work with a controlled substance in
their system.  The policy defines controlled substances as "all
forms of narcotics, depressants, stimulants, hallucinogens, and
cannabis, whose sale, purchase, transfer, use or possession is
prohibited by law."  Violation of the drug policy subjects an
employee to discipline up to, and including, termination.  On
several occasions, plaintiff provided employer with urine samples
for drug tests.  The particular type of drug tests that employer
used could indicate only whether a person had used marijuana
within the two-to-three week span preceding the test; the tests
were incapable, however, of ascertaining whether a person was
drug-impaired at the time of testing.  The tests of plaintiff's
urine subsequently detected the presence of marijuana metabolites
in his system, indicating that plaintiff had used marijuana
within the two-to-three week period prior to the test.  Employer
placed plaintiff on a leave of absence as a result.  Shortly
thereafter, plaintiff requested that employer accommodate his
condition by allowing him to take a different drug test, one
aimed only at determining drug impairment.  Employer and
plaintiff began negotiations regarding that request, but, after
negotiations broke down, employer terminated plaintiff's
employment.
Plaintiff initiated this civil action against employer,
alleging that employer had failed to accommodate his disability
under ORS 659A.112(2)(e). (1)  Employer moved for summary
judgment, asserting, in part, that plaintiff did not qualify as a
disabled individual under Oregon law; the trial court granted
that motion.  In doing so, the trial court reasoned:
"[I]n this case[,] it's undisputed that there is
medication * * * which is a mitigating measure, other
than the marijuana, and which deals with the
Plaintiff's problem; and, therefore, he is not
disabled, in my view, under the act.
"* * * * *
"[U]nless, you know, the person can choose what
mitigating method the person wants to use to define him
or herself as disabled, unless that's the law, which I
don't believe it is, if there are mitigating factors
and with mitigating factors the problem is alleviated,
the person is not disabled under the act." 
Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that employer was not entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law.  Washburn, 197 Or App 104, Among other things, the
Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court's reliance on
mitigating measures to define bona fide disabilities under ORS
659 A. 112 to 659 A. 139.  Although acknowledging that some parts of
the law were statutorily required to be interpreted in step with
federal disability decisions, the Court of Appeals nevertheless
refused to do so with regard to ORS 659 A. 100 and its definition
of "disabled person": 
"As noted, ORS 659 A. 139 requires us, to the extent
possible, to construe some portions of Oregon
disability law consistently with the ADA.  We have
noted that ORS 659 A. 139 appears to be a 'lockstep'
statute, designed to make state law a mirror image of
federal law in many respects.  The language used in
both state and federal law to define 'disability' is
quite similar.  ORS 659A.100(1)(a) defines a disabled
person as 'an individual who has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major
life activities, has a record of such an impairment or
is regarded as having such an impairment.'  The federal
definition of 'disability' is 'a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of [the] individual[.]'  Despite
that similarity, however, ORS 659 A. 100 is not subject
to the 'lockstep' statute because it is not within the
range of statutes that the legislature identified in
ORS 659 A. 139 that are to be construed, to the extent
possible, in a manner consistent with federal
constructions of parallel provisions."
Washburn, 197 Or App at 109-10 (internal citations omitted).  As
a result, although the United States Supreme Court had held that
a person is not disabled under federal disability law if a
mitigating measure will alleviate an otherwise substantial
limitation to a major life activity, see, e.g., Sutton v. United
Airlines, Inc., 527 US 471, 119 S Ct 2139, 144 L Ed 2d 450 (1999)
(so holding), the Court of Appeals concluded that the legislature
did not intend to include the "mitigating measures" concept as
part of the definition of a "disabled person" contained in ORS
659 A. 100.  To do so, the court reasoned, would require it to
contravene ORS 174.010 (2) and to "add to the statute a
requirement that the legislature did not place there."  Washburn,
197 Or App at 111.  As a result, the Court of Appeals held that
ORS 659A.100(1)(a) defined the phrase "disabled person" without
reference to mitigating measures.  
On review, employer advances several different
arguments, among them the proposition that there is no duty to
accommodate an employee who is not substantially limited in a
major life activity after a mitigating measure is taken into
account.  Plaintiff responds by asserting that the Court of
Appeals correctly construed the relevant statutes regarding that
issue and correctly concluded that plaintiff had a viable
employment discrimination claim based on employer's refusal to
accommodate plaintiff's alleged disability.  Because we conclude
that the question of plaintiff's status as a disabled person is
dispositive in this case, we limit the scope of our inquiry to
that issue. 
With regard to Oregon employment law, the general rule
is that an employer may discharge an employee at any time and for
any reason, absent a contractual, statutory, or constitutional
requirement to the contrary.  Patton v. J. C. Penney Co., 301 Or
117, 120, 719 P2d 854 (1986).  Among the statutes that make
employment termination unlawful in certain instances are the
discrimination provisions involving disabled workers. (3)  ORS
659 A. 112 establishes that discrimination against disabled persons
in the workplace is an unlawful employment practice:    
"(1) It is an unlawful employment practice for any
employer to refuse to hire, employ or promote, to bar
or discharge from employment or to discriminate in
compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of
employment because an otherwise qualified person is a
disabled person.
"(2) An employer violates subsection (1) of this
section if the employer does any of the following:
"* * * * *
"(e) The employer does not make reasonable
accommodation to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified disabled person
who is a job applicant or employee, unless the employer
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of the business of the
employer."
As used within those provisions, the phrase "disabled person" has
a specific meaning.  ORS 659A.100(1)(a) provides:   
 "As used in ORS 659 A. 100 to 659 A. 145, unless the context requires otherwise:
"(a) 'Disabled person' means an individual who has
a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities, has a record
of such an impairment or is regarded as having such an
impairment."
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the
federal definition of "disability" is similar to the Oregon
definition:
"The term 'disability' means, with respect to an
individual --
"(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual;
"(B) a record of such an impairment; or
"(C) being regarded as having such an impairment."
42 USC § 12102(2) (2000).  The similarity between those two
definitions is noteworthy because ORS 659 A. 139 also requires
Oregon courts to construe the law's disability-related employment
provisions in a specific manner.  That so-called "construction
statute," ORS 659 A. 139, provides:  
"ORS 659 A. 112 to 659 A. 139 shall be construed to
the extent possible in a manner that is consistent with
any similar provisions of the federal Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended."
We turn now to the primary question before us:  Is
plaintiff a disabled person under ORS 659 A. 112 to 659A.139?  As
previously noted, the Court of Appeals answered that question
affirmatively.  It reasoned that the statutory construction
requirement set out in ORS 659 A. 139 -- and with that requirement,
the notion of mitigating measures that the United States Supreme
Court addressed in Sutton, 527 US 471, -- cannot be applied to
the statutory definition of "disabled person" in ORS
659A.100(1)(a) because that definition is not within the range of
statutes to which ORS 659 A. 139 expressly applies. (4) 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that, for the purposes of
ORS 659 A. 112 to 659 A. 139, the legislature intended the phrase
"disabled person" to be interpreted without regard for the
Supreme Court's holding in Sutton, and without regard for the
impact of mitigating measures on a disability.  
Although the Court of Appeals invoked PGE v. Bureau of
Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), in
its discussion of the term "disabled person" in ORS
659A.100(1)(a), the court's analysis did not go far enough.  The
Court of Appeals stopped short of examining the actual terms that
make up the text of the statutory definition.  Engaging in that
analysis now, we conclude that, even without determining the
applicability of federal precedents like Sutton, the plain text
of ORS 659A.100(1)(a) evinces a clear legislative intent to
define "disabled person" in a manner that is contrary to the
Court of Appeals' reading of that term.
ORS 659A.100(1)(a) identifies a "disabled person" as
someone having an impairment that "substantially limits" a major
life activity.  ORS 659A.100(2)(d) goes on to define the term
"substantially limits" to mean:
"(A) The impairment renders the individual unable
to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform; or
"(B) The impairment significantly restricts the
condition, manner or duration under which an individual
can perform a particular major life activity as
compared to the condition, manner or duration under
which the average person in the general population can
perform the same major life activity." 
(Emphasis added.)
The statutory definition of "substantially limits"
makes clear that determining the applicability of Oregon's
disability law requires an individualized assessment.  In other
words, the statutory scheme requires a determination whether the
identified impairment "renders" an individual unable to perform a
major life activity or significantly restricts the condition,
manner, or duration under which that major life activity can be
performed.  In our view, that means that the legislature did not
intend to categorize an impairment as substantially limiting if,
for example, medication could ameliorate the effects of
impairment such that the individual would be capable of
performing the otherwise affected major life activity.  To read
the phrase "substantially limits" differently would ignore the
fact that an impairment may be disabling for some individuals but
not others, depending on factors such as the particular stage or
seriousness of a disease or disorder, the side-effects of any
medication taken to treat it, or the effects of collateral
conditions that, in combination, could render one particular
impairment disabling.  To illustrate, if courts fail to consider
the effects of mitigating measures, they might conclude that an
individual afflicted by hypertension is a "disabled person"
simply because for most people, the failure to treat that
condition eventually results in substantial limitations to at
least one major life activity due to heart disease, kidney
disease, hardening of the arteries, or stroke.  Under that
analysis, an individual who controls his or her hypertension
through medication –- as many today do –- nevertheless would be
considered a "disabled person" simply because the individual had
the condition.  That approach would require the court to evaluate 
persons with similar impairments according to general group
characteristics, rather than as individuals. 
In addition, the statutory definition of the term
"substantially limits" uses key terms such as "renders" and
"restricts," in the present, indicative verb tense.  ORS
659A.100(2)(d)(B).  The legislature's use of present tense
indicates that, to be considered disabled under the statutory
definition, a person must possess a substantial limitation that
operates presently, as opposed to potentially or hypothetically. 
The Court of Appeals disregarded that requirement by reading the
statute to include conditions that, due to mitigating measures,
may not actually rise to the level of a present substantial
limitation.  Had the legislature intended that outcome, it would
have incorporated into the definition of "substantially limits"
other terms, such as "may," "might," or "could," thereby
connoting a tentative or potential effect.  The legislature, of
course, did not do so. 
Based on the foregoing statutory analysis, we conclude
that, with regard to the substantive provisions set out in ORS
659 A. 112 to 659 A. 139, the legislature intended the definition of
"disabled person" to be construed in light of mitigating measures
that counteract or ameliorate an individual's impairment.  The
Court of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise.  
In this case, plaintiff argues that he is disabled by
virtue of his leg spasms, a condition that he claims
substantially limits one of his major life activities, i.e.,
sleeping.  However, as the trial court noted below, it is
undisputed that plaintiff is able to counteract those leg spasms
and the resulting sleep problems by using prescription
medication.  As a result, we conclude that, because plaintiff can
counteract his physical impairment through mitigating measures,
his impairment does not, at this time, rise to the level of a
substantial limitation on a major life activity.  Consequently,
we conclude that plaintiff is not a "disabled person" for
purposes of ORS 659 A. 112 to 659 A. 139.  Because plaintiff is not a
"disabled person" under those statutes, employer had no statutory
duty to accommodate plaintiff's physical limitation in the manner
sought by plaintiff.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
KISTLER, J., concurring.
I join the majority's opinion holding that plaintiff is
not a "disabled person" within the meaning of ORS 659A.100(1)(a). 
I write separately because, in my view, plaintiff's employment
discrimination claim suffers from an additional defect:  Federal
law preempts state employment discrimination law to the extent
that it requires employers to accommodate medical marijuana use.
As the majority notes, plaintiff's doctor approved
plaintiff's participation in Oregon's medical marijuana program,
and plaintiff smokes marijuana at night to help him sleep.
Defendant employs plaintiff and has adopted a zero-tolerance
policy; defendant prohibits its employees from reporting to work
with the "presence of [a] controlled substance, intoxicant, or
illegal drug in their system."  Because plaintiff violated that
policy, defendant terminated him.  Plaintiff brought this action
claiming that, because he was an otherwise qualified disabled
employee, ORS 659A.112(2)(e) required defendant to accommodate
his medical use of marijuana and that the failure to do so
constituted employment discrimination.
I agree with the majority that plaintiff is not a
"disabled person" who can invoke the employment discrimination
laws.  Even if he were, however, federal law still would preempt
plaintiff's claim that his employer must accommodate his medical
use of marijuana.  Plaintiff notes that ORS 659A.112(2)(e)
requires employers to "make reasonable accommodation to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified disabled
[employee]" unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the
employer.  Plaintiff recognizes that, as a matter of state law,
employers do not have to accommodate the "illegal use of drugs." 
ORS 659 A. 124.  He observes, however, that the "illegal use of
drugs" does not include "the use of a drug taken under the
supervision of a licensed health care professional[.]"  See ORS
659A.100(1)(c) (defining "illegal use of drugs"). (5) 
Plaintiff argues that, because he uses marijuana under his
physician's supervision, the employment discrimination statutes
require defendant to accommodate his medical use of marijuana.
The difficulty with plaintiff's argument, in my view,
is that federal law preempts the state employment discrimination
statute to the extent that it requires defendant to accommodate
plaintiff's medical marijuana use.  The federal Controlled
Substances Act prohibits possessing, manufacturing, dispensing,
and distributing marijuana.  21 USC §§ 841(a), 844.  That
prohibition applies even when a person possesses, manufactures,
dispenses, or distributes marijuana for a medical use.  United
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 US 483, 494
and n 7, 121 S Ct 1711, 149 L Ed 2d 722 (2001) (no medical
necessity defense to prohibition against distributing marijuana;
holding applies equally to other prohibited acts).  Plaintiff
cannot use marijuana without possessing it, and the federal
prohibition on possession is inconsistent with the state
requirement that defendant accommodate its use.
State law cannot require what federal law prohibits;
when the two laws conflict, federal law controls.  See California
v. ARC America Corp., 490 US 93, 100-01, 109 S Ct 1661, 104 L Ed
2d 86 (1989) (state law preempted when "it actually conflicts
with federal law, that is, when compliance with both state and
federal law is impossible").  It follows that the Controlled
Substances Act preempts state employment discrimination law to
the extent that the state law requires accommodation of
plaintiff's medical use of marijuana. 
Plaintiff has advanced only one argument in response. 
He relies on an informal opinion that the Oregon Attorney General
issued in response to the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 US ___, 125 S Ct 2195, 162 L Ed 2d 1
(2005).  In that opinion, the Attorney General reasoned that
Raich, which upheld Congress's authority to prohibit the medical
use of marijuana, would not affect the operation of Oregon's
medical marijuana program.  The Attorney General's reasoning does
not advance plaintiff's claim that state law requires defendant
to accommodate his medical marijuana use.  Among other things,
the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act exempts, from the operation of
state criminal laws, persons who possess a "registry
identification card" and who are "engaged in * * * the medical
use of marijuana."  ORS 475.309(1).  In reasoning that the
decision in Raich did not affect Oregon's medical marijuana
program, the Attorney General focused on that exemption.  Noting
that "[t]he [Oregon Medical Marijuana] Act protects medical users
from state criminal prosecution for production, possession, or
delivery of a controlled substance," the Attorney General
concluded that the fact that the federal government criminalizes
the medical use of marijuana does not require the state to do so.
The fact that the state may choose to exempt medical
marijuana users from the reach of the state criminal law does not
mean that the state can affirmatively require employers to
accommodate what federal law specifically prohibits.  Federal law
preempts the latter decision but not the former.  In my view,
given the Controlled Substances Act, defendant had no binding
state obligation to accommodate plaintiff's medical marijuana
use.
1. ORS 659A.112(2)(e) provides:
"An employer violates subsection (1) of this section if the employer does
any of the following:
"* * * * *
"(e) The employer does not make reasonable accommodation to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified disabled person who is a
job applicant or employee, unless the employer can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business
of the employer."
2. ORS 174.010 requires judges, in the course of construing statutes, simply to
"ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has
been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted[.]"
3. Although ORS 659 A. 112 to 659 A. 139 are aimed primarily at proscribing
unlawful discrimination against disabled workers on the job, some provisions of those statutes
(together with other statutes, also delineate employer actions that are unaffected by those statutes. 
ORS 659A.127(6), for example, allows employers to require employees to conform to both state
and federal laws surrounding illegal drug use:
"ORS 659 A. 112 to 659 A. 139 do not affect the ability of an
employer to do any of the following:
"* * * * *
"(6) An employer may require that employees comply with
all federal and state statutes and regulations regarding alcohol and
the illegal use of drugs."
4. We note that, in the text of ORS 659 A. 100 that
immediately proceeds the definition of "disabled person" in the
statute, the legislature indicated that the definition was
subject to ORS 659 A. 139 by providing initially that the statutory
definition was to be "used in ORS 659 A. 100 to 659 A. 145, unless
the context requires otherwise."
5. ORS 659A.100(1)(c) provides:
"'Illegal use of drugs' means any use of drugs, the possession or
distribution of which is unlawful under state law or under the Controlled
Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A. 812, as amended, but does not include the use of a
drug taken under supervision of a licensed health care professional, or other uses
authorized under the Controlled Substances Act or under other provisions of state
or federal law."