Title: PEOPLE OF MI V ERWIN HARRIS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 119862
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 12, 2004

Michigan Supreme Court  
Lansing, Michigan 48909  
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 12, 2004 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHGIAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 120543 
CLARENCE D. MOORE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHGIAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 119862 
ERWIN HARRIS 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
WEAVER, J.  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
In these two cases, defendants were convicted of 
felony-firearm1 under an aiding and abetting theory.2 
Felony-firearm is the crime of carrying or possessing a 
firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a 
felony. 
The issue before the Court is whether the 
prosecutor must establish that a defendant assisted in 
obtaining or retaining possession of a firearm, the test 
that was set forth in People v Johnson, 411 Mich 50, 54; 
303 NW2d 442 (1981), in order to convict the defendant of 
felony-firearm under an aiding and abetting theory. 
We 
overrule Johnson because the test that it created is 
narrower than the test set forth in the language of the 
aiding and abetting statute. 
We conclude that under the 
statute, the proper standard for establishing felony­
firearm under an aiding and abetting theory is whether the 
defendant’s 
words 
or 
deeds 
“procure[d], 
counsel[ed], 
aid[ed], or abet[ted]” another to carry or have in his 
possession a firearm during the commission or attempted 
commission of a felony-firearm offense.3
 Applying that 
standard, we hold that there was sufficient evidence in 
each case to support the felony-firearm convictions, and we 
affirm both defendants’ convictions. 
1 MCL 750.227b.  
2 MCL 767.39.  
3 Id. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History  
A  
The charges against defendant Clarence D. Moore stem 
from a shooting in Flint on August 8, 1997.  That night, 
Moore and his friend, DeJuan Boylston, argued with Jacky 
Hamilton and his brother, Johnny Hamilton. 
Shortly 
thereafter, Moore and Boylston approached the Hamilton 
brothers while they were fishing at a lake. 
Boylston was 
carrying a gun, and Moore told the two brothers that they 
had better start swimming out into the lake. Boylston then 
recognized Johnny Hamilton from basketball games in the 
neighborhood. 
This recognition prompted Boylston to 
retreat, telling Moore that he did not want a problem with 
the Hamiltons. 
According to Johnny Hamilton, after 
Boylston declined to shoot the brothers, Moore attempted to 
grab the gun from Boylston. 
During this time, Moore made 
derogatory statements to Boylston to encourage him to shoot 
the victims. He questioned Boylston’s sense of masculinity 
and threatened that he would not associate with Boylston if 
Boylston did not shoot the Hamiltons. 
After walking about 
halfway up the hill, Boylston turned and fired, hitting 
Jacky, who later died from the gunshot wounds. 
3  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Following a jury trial, defendant Moore was convicted 
of murder in the first degree,4 assault with intent to 
murder,5 and felony-firearm6 on an aiding and abetting 
theory.7
 In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed Moore’s convictions on all counts. 
B 
The charges against defendant Erwin Harris stem from a 
robbery that took place in Washtenaw County on September 
28, 1998. 
Harris drove Eugene Mays to a gasoline station. 
Mays had a sawed-off shotgun in the vehicle. 
Harris first 
entered the store on the pretense of asking for directions. 
After leaving the store, he reentered moments later 
followed by Mays, who was wielding the shotgun. While Mays 
pointed the gun at the clerk, Harris approached a customer 
from behind and proceeded to remove the customer’s wallet 
and other items from his pockets. 
The clerk refused to 
give Mays any money and pushed a button that locked the 
cash register. Although Harris repeatedly directed Mays to 
“pop,” or shoot, the clerk after he locked the register, 
the two men left the store without physically harming 
either the clerk or the customer. 
4 MCL 750.316. 
5 MCL 750.83. 
6 MCL 750.227b. 
7 MCL 767.39. 
4  
 
 
                                                 
 
Defendant Harris was convicted by a jury on two counts 
of armed robbery,8 two counts of felony-firearm9 on an 
aiding and abetting theory,10 and one count of fleeing and 
eluding the police.11
 Harris appealed his convictions for 
the armed robbery of the customer and for the two counts of 
felony-firearm. 
In an unpublished, divided decision, the 
Court of Appeals upheld Harris’s convictions. 
C 
Both Moore and Harris sought leave to appeal in this 
Court. 
Each defendant argued that his conviction(s) for 
felony-firearm under an aiding and abetting theory should 
be reversed because he did not assist in either obtaining 
or retaining possession of the firearm, citing this Court’s 
decision in Johnson.  This Court granted leave to appeal in 
both cases and ordered that the cases be argued and 
submitted to the Court together. 
In each of these cases, 
the order granting leave to appeal limited the issues to 
“whether there is sufficient evidence to convict the 
defendant of violating MCL 750.227b and whether the 
decision in People v Johnson, 411 Mich 50 (1981), should be 
8 MCL 750.529. 
9 MCL 750.227b. 
10 MCL 767.39. 
11 MCL 750.479a(3). 
5 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
overruled or modified.” 
People v Harris, 467 Mich 896 
(2002); People v Moore, 467 Mich 897 (2002). 
II 
Resolution of these cases requires interpretation of 
the felony-firearm statute and the aiding and abetting 
statute. 
Statutory interpretation is a question of law 
that 
this 
Court 
reviews 
de 
novo. 
Robertson 
v 
DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich 732, 739; 641 NW2d 567 
(2002). 
If 
the 
statutory 
language 
is 
certain 
and 
unambiguous, that language is given its ordinary and 
generally accepted meaning. 
Piper v Pettibone Corp, 450 
Mich 565; 542 NW2d 269 (1995). 
A 
The felony-firearm statute, MCL 750.227b(1), states: 
A person who carries or has in his or her
possession a firearm when he or she commits or
attempts to commit a felony . . . is guilty of a
felony, and shall be imprisoned for 2 years. 
The felony-firearm statute applies whenever a person 
carries or has a firearm in his possession when committing 
or attempting to commit a felony. 
The evident purpose of 
the statute is to enhance the penalty for the carrying or 
possession of firearms during the commission of a felony 
and thus to deter the use of guns. 
Wayne Co Prosecutor v 
Recorder’s Court Judge, 406 Mich 374, 391; 280 NW2d 793 
(1979), overruled in part on other grounds by People v 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Robideau, 419 Mich 458; 355 NW2d 592 (1984). The important 
rationale behind the felony-firearm statute is demonstrated 
in its unique and severe punishment scheme. Conviction for 
felony-firearm results in automatic imprisonment, which may 
not be suspended. The guilty person is also ineligible for 
probation or parole during the mandatory prison sentence. 
The felony-firearm prison term must be served before and 
consecutively 
to 
any 
term 
of 
imprisonment 
for 
the 
underlying felony. 
A second conviction of felony-firearm 
requires a flat five year sentence, while a third or 
subsequent conviction requires a flat ten year sentence. 
MCL 750.227b(1)-(3). 
The aiding and abetting statute, MCL 767.39, states: 
Every person concerned in the commission of
an offense, whether he directly commits the act
constituting the offense or procures, counsels,
aids, or abets in its commission may hereafter be
prosecuted, indicted, tried and on conviction 
shall be punished as if he had directly committed
such offense. 
The purpose of the aiding and abetting statute is “to 
abolish the common law distinction between accessories 
before the fact and principals so that one who counsels, 
aids or abets in the commission of an offense may be tried 
and convicted as if he had directly committed the offense.” 
People v Palmer, 392 Mich 370, 378; 220 NW2d 393 (1974), 
citing People v Gould, 384 Mich 71, 77; 179 NW2d 617 
7  
 
 
   
 
 
   
  
                                                 
 
 
 
(1970). The phrase “aids or abets” is used to describe any 
type of assistance given to the perpetrator of a crime by 
words or deeds that are intended to encourage, support, or 
incite the commission of that crime. Palmer, p 378. 
Aiding and abetting means to assist the 
perpetrator of a crime. 
An aider and abettor is 
one who is present at the crime scene and by word
or 
deed 
gives 
active 
encouragement 
to 
the 
perpetrator of the crime, or by his conduct makes
clear that he is ready to assist the perpetrator
if such assistance is needed. 
[21 Am Jur 2d,
Criminal Law, § 206, p 273.] 
Each defendant argues that his conviction(s) for 
felony-firearm on an aiding and abetting theory should be 
reversed because he did not assist in either obtaining or 
retaining possession of the firearm, citing this Court’s 
decision in Johnson. 
In Johnson, this Court resolved a division in the 
Court of Appeals over whether a person who does not 
actually possess a firearm could be convicted under the 
felony-firearm statute as an aider and abettor.12 
Johnson 
12 Contrast People v Tavolacci, 88 Mich App 470, 475;
276 NW2d 919 (1979), rev’d People v Johnson, supra, (“[O]ne
may be convicted as an aider and abettor to the felony­
firearm offense.”), with People v Bridges, 98 Mich App 436,
439; 296 NW2d 275 (1980), rev’d 411 Mich 969 (1981), (A 
person who does not actually possess a firearm may not be
convicted under the statute as an aider and abettor.),
People v Powell, 90 Mich App 273, 275; 282 NW2d 803 (1979),
(“[T]he language of the felony-firearm statute clearly
contemplates ‘personal’ possession of a firearm by the
defendant. . . .”), and People v Johnson, 85 Mich App 654,
658; 272 NW2d 605 (1978), rev’d 411 Mich 50 (1981), (“We
8 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
   
consisted of two separate cases in which each defendant was 
convicted of felony-firearm on a theory of aiding and 
abetting. 
In the first case, defendant Johnson and an 
accomplice robbed a bar in Detroit. 
The accomplice held 
the gun while Johnson took money from the cash register. 
They then split the money after leaving the bar. 
In the 
second case, defendant Tavolacci brought the victim, an 
undercover narcotics officer, to a pool hall under the 
pretense of making a drug deal. 
The defendant’s two 
accomplices then took the officer to a remote field and 
attempted to shoot him. 
The defendant stayed at the pool 
hall while the attempted murder took place. 
Johnson 
resolved the division at the Court of Appeals by concluding 
that a defendant may be guilty of felony-firearm even if 
the defendant did not personally possess a firearm during 
the commission of a felony if the defendant is shown to 
have aided and abetted another who had such possession. 
The Court remanded both cases to the respective trial 
courts. 
In remanding, the Court added the restriction that to 
obtain a conviction for aiding and abetting the crime of 
interpret the felony-firearm statute to require that a
defendant personally carry or have in his possession a
firearm in order to be guilty thereunder. 
Being an aider
or abetter in an armed robbery is not enough to subject a
defendant to the enhanced sentence of the felony-firearm
statute.” [emphasis in original].).
9 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
carrying or possessing a firearm during the commission of a 
felony, it must be shown that the defendant assisted in 
obtaining or retaining the possession of the firearm: 
To convict one of aiding and abetting the 
commission 
of a separately charged crime of
carrying or having a firearm in one’s possession
during the commission of a felony, it must be
established 
that 
the 
defendant 
procured,
counselled, aided, or abetted and so assisted in 
obtaining 
the 
proscribed 
possession, 
or 
in 
retaining such possession otherwise obtained. 
See People v Doemer, 35 Mich App 149, 192 NW2d
330 (1971); People v Francis, 71 Cal 2d 66, 450
P2d 591, 75 Cal Rptr 199 (1969). 
In neither of the instant cases does the 
record show that the defendant assisted the 
accomplice to obtain or retain possession of the
firearm which the accomplice possessed during the
commission of the felony. 
[People v Johnson, 
supra, at 54 (emphasis added).] 
B 
Under 
the 
standard 
set 
forth 
in 
Johnson, 
each 
defendant’s conviction would be reversed because neither 
defendant specifically aided the principal in “obtaining” 
or “retaining” the firearm for immediate or eventual 
possession by the principal during the commission or 
attempted commission of a felony. 
Moore’s accomplice was carrying the gun during the 
offense. 
There was no evidence introduced showing that 
Moore assisted Boylston in either obtaining or retaining 
possession of the gun. 
Similarly, Harris’s accomplice was 
in possession of the weapon at all times, and there is no
10 
 
 
 
 
  
indication in the record that Harris assisted Mays in 
obtaining or retaining possession of the gun. 
The 
reasoning of the dissent in Harris clearly applies to both 
defendants: 
There is no proof that Harris carried or
loaded the firearm for Mays, that he purchased 
the firearm and gave it to Mays, or even that he
reminded Mays to bring the firearm into the store
with him. 
If Harris did help Mays obtain or
retain the firearm before he entered the store,
the record is simply silent on the matter. 
[Unpublished dissenting opinion, issued July 27,
2001, p 4 (Docket No. 222468).] 
Thus, under Johnson’s holding at 54 that “it must be 
established that the defendant procured, counselled, aided, 
or abetted and so assisted in obtaining the proscribed 
possession, or in retaining such possession otherwise 
obtained,” both defendants’ convictions of felony-firearm 
under an aiding and abetting theory would be reversed. 
C 
A close examination of the Court’s decision in Johnson 
reveals that this holding was overly narrow because it 
unnecessarily restricted the scope of the class of persons 
who can be convicted of felony-firearm on an aiding and 
abetting theory. 
The Court relied on two drug possession 
11  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
   
 
cases, People v Francis and People v Doemer,13 in reasoning 
that to convict one of felony-firearm under an aiding and 
abetting theory, “it must be established that the defendant 
procured, counselled, aided, or abetted and so assisted in 
obtaining the proscribed possession, or in retaining such 
possession otherwise obtained.” Johnson at 54. 
The Johnson Court’s holding takes the language of the 
Francis opinion out of context. 
The Francis court 
concluded that “[t]he record [did] not show that Francis 
aided or encouraged [his accomplice] in obtaining or 
retaining possession of marijuana.” 
Francis at 72. 
The 
actual test that the Francis court articulated for aiding 
and abetting is much broader than the test set forth in the 
language quoted in Johnson. 
The Francis court stated that 
“[i]n order to hold the accused as an aider and abettor the 
test is whether the accused in any way, directly or 
indirectly, aided the perpetrator by acts or encouraged him 
by words or gestures.” 
Francis at 72, quoting People v 
Villa, 156 Cal App 2d 128, 134; 318 P2d 828 (1957) 
(emphasis added). 
Thus, the language relied on by the 
Johnson Court is not the actual test set forth in Francis 
for aiding and abetting possessory crimes. 
13 In deciding Doemer, the Michigan Court of Appeals
simply relied on the same language as in Francis, a 
California Supreme Court case. 
12  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
 
 
  
Nothing in the language of Michigan’s felony-firearm 
statute supports Johnson’s narrow application of aiding and 
abetting principles to the commission of felony-firearm. 
In fact, the plain language of the statute suggests 
otherwise.14  In People v Mitchell, 456 Mich 693, 698; 575 
NW2d 283 (1998), this Court noted that the list of four 
exceptions15 to the statute was exclusive and that the 
Legislature intended “to provide for an additional felony 
charge and sentence whenever a person possessing a firearm 
committed a felony other than those four explicitly 
enumerated in the felony-firearm statute.” 
The felony­
firearm statute makes no mention of a narrower standard or 
an exception for those who aid and abet felony-firearm; 
therefore, aiding and abetting felony-firearm should be no 
different from aiding and abetting the commission of any 
other offense. 
14 The felony-firearm statute, MCL 750.227b(1), states
in part: 
A person who carries or has in his or her
possession a firearm when he or she commits or
attempts to commit a felony, except a violation
of section 223, section 227, 227a or 230, is
guilty of a felony, and shall be imprisoned for 2
years. 
15
 The four enumerated exceptions are for violations
of MCL 750.223 (unlawful sale of a firearm), MCL 750.227
(carrying a concealed weapon), MCL 750.227a (unlawful
possession of a firearm by a licensee), and MCL 750.230
(alteration of identifying marks on a firearm).
13 
 
 
Similarly, nothing in the aiding and abetting statute 
suggests that it should apply differently to a possessory 
offense than to any other crime. The general rule is that, 
to convict a defendant of aiding and abetting a crime, a 
prosecutor must establish that “(1) the crime charged was 
committed by the defendant or some other person; (2) the 
defendant 
performed 
acts 
or 
gave 
encouragement 
that 
assisted the commission of the crime; and (3) the defendant 
intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that 
the principal intended its commission at the time that [the 
defendant] gave aid and encouragement.” 
People v Carines, 
460 Mich 750, 768; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).  The aiding and 
abetting statute neither expressly nor impliedly limits the 
persons or crimes encompassed by its terms. 
The language 
of the statute applies to “every person” who commits “an 
offense.” 
Johnson’s holding, that to convict one of 
felony-firearm under an aiding and abetting theory it must 
be established that the defendant assisted in either 
obtaining or retaining possession of the firearm, is not 
based on the language of the aiding and abetting statute. 
We do not disagree with Johnson’s holding that a 
felony-firearm conviction is proper if a defendant aided 
the principal in “obtaining” or “retaining” the firearm 
while intending that the principal possess or carry the 
firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a 
14  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
felony, which possession or carrying by the principal 
occurs. 
But a defendant also can assist in the commission 
of a felony-firearm violation in other ways. 
All that is 
required to prove aiding and abetting felony-firearm is 
that the defendant aided and abetted another in carrying or 
having in his possession a firearm while that other commits 
or attempts to commit a felony. 
Adherence to the Johnson standard has resulted in 
numerous cases where the intent behind the statutes—to 
deter the use of firearms during the commission of felonies 
and to punish one who assists in the commission of an 
offense as if he had directly committed such offense—has 
not only been unrealized, but has been subverted.16
 The 
16 Various panels of the Court of Appeals have applied
the narrow Johnson test in felony-firearm aiding and 
abetting 
cases, 
often 
producing 
results 
that 
are 
incompatible with the statutes. In People v Buck, 197 Mich 
App 404, 418; 496 NW2d 321 (1992), reversed in part by
People v Holcomb, 444 Mich 853; 508 NW2d 502 (1993), the
Court of Appeals held that there was insufficient evidence
to sustain the felony-firearm conviction of one of the
defendants because the prosecutor failed to show that he
aided or abetted the acquisition or retention of the weapon
at issue. 
Following the Johnson standard, the Court 
reversed the conviction of a defendant who had dragged a
shooting victim back into reach after being shot so that
one of his codefendants could shoot the victim twice more,
finally killing him. 
In People v Eloby, 215 Mich App 472,
478; 547 NW2d 48 (1996), the defendant was convicted of
kidnapping, robbery, and sexual assault. Although he aided
and abetted the kidnapping, his conviction for felony­
firearm was reversed because he did not actually hold the
gun until after the victim was transported from the site of
the kidnapping to the house where she was later assaulted.
15 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
language of our statutes, the Johnson Court’s misreading of 
Francis, and appellate cases following Johnson that are 
incompatible with the statutes all command that this Court 
overrule the narrow Johnson standard. 
For these reasons, 
we overrule Johnson and hold that aiding and abetting the 
commission of felony-firearm is no different from aiding 
and abetting the commission of any other felony.17 
III 
Having overruled the narrow standard for aiding and 
abetting set forth in Johnson, we now apply general aiding 
and abetting principles to the facts of the cases before 
us. Under the aiding and abetting statute, MCL 767.39, the 
17  As we stated in People v Petit, 466 Mich 624, 633;
648 NW2d 193 (2002): 
It 
is 
well 
established 
that 
overruling
precedent must be undertaken with caution. 
The 
application of stare decisis is generally “’the
preferred 
course 
because 
it 
promotes 
the 
evenhanded, 
predictable, 
and 
consistent 
development of legal principles, fosters reliance
on judicial decisions, and contributes to the
actual and perceived integrity of the judicial
process.’” 
Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439,
463; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), quoting Hohn v United 
States, 524 US 236, 251; 118 S Ct 1969; 141 L Ed
2d 242 (1998). “However, stare decisis is not to
be applied mechanically to forever prevent the
Court from overruling earlier erroneous decisions
. . . .” [462 Mich] 463. 
Although under the doctrine of stare decisis we 
hesitate to overrule a prior decision by the Court, we
may do so when we are certain that the case was
wrongly decided and that “less injury will result from
overruling than from following it.” 
McEvoy v Sault
Ste Marie, 136 Mich 172, 178; 98 NW 1006 (1904).  
16 
 
 
   
                                                 
correct test for aiding and abetting felony-firearm in 
Michigan is whether the defendant “procures, counsels, 
aids, or abets in [another carrying or having possession of 
a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of 
a felony].” 
The prosecutors must do more than demonstrate that 
defendants aided the commission or attempted commission of 
the underlying crimes (here murder and robbery). 
Rather, 
the 
prosecutors 
must 
demonstrate 
that 
defendants 
specifically aided the commission of felony-firearm.18 
Establishing that a defendant has aided and abetted a 
felony-firearm offense requires proof that a violation of 
the felony-firearm statute was committed by the defendant 
or some other person, that the defendant performed acts or 
gave encouragement that assisted in the commission of the 
felony-firearm violation, and that the defendant intended 
18 Despite the concern expressed in Justice Taylor’s
dissent, our opinion does not make “an aider and abettor in
virtually any gun-related crime guilty of felony-firearm.”
Post at 1.  As explained above, we specifically require the
prosecutor to do more than demonstrate that the defendants
aided the commission or attempted commission of the 
underlying crimes. 
Nor are we suggesting that the fact
that 
the 
defendant 
incidentally 
benefited 
from 
the 
principal’s possession of the firearm is sufficient to
convict the defendant of aiding and abetting felony-firearm
possession. 
Rather, to convict a defendant of felony­
firearm under an aiding and abetting theory, the prosecutor
must 
present 
evidence 
proving 
that 
the 
defendant 
intentionally aided or abetted felony-firearm possession by
specific words or deeds. 
17 
 
 
 
the commission of the felony-firearm violation or had 
knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the 
time that the defendant gave aid and encouragement. 
Carines, supra, at 768. In determining whether a defendant 
assisted in the commission of the crime, the amount of 
advice, aid, or encouragement is not material if it had the 
effect of inducing the commission of the crime. 
People v 
Smock, 399 Mich 282, 285; 249 NW2d 59 (1976). 
It must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis whether the defendant 
“'performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted,'” 
Carines, supra at 768, quoting People v Turner, 213 Mich 
App 558, 568; 540 NW2d 728 (1995), in the carrying or 
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. 
In each of the cases now before us, the prosecutor 
established that a violation of the felony-firearm statute 
was committed and that the defendant intentionally aided or 
abetted that violation. 
The defendant in each case aided 
or abetted felony-firearm by actively urging, inciting, 
encouraging, or motivating the principal to use the weapon 
that was in the principal’s possession. 
Implicit in the 
use of a firearm is the possession of that firearm. 
Thus, 
when a defendant specifically encourages another possessing 
a gun during the commission of a felony to use that gun, he 
aids and abets the carrying or possessing of that gun just 
as surely as if he aided or abetted the principal in 
18  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
obtaining or retaining the gun. Moreover, the defendant in 
Harris encouraged and assisted the principal’s possession 
of the firearm by specifically relying on that possession 
to intimidate his own robbery victim and by specifically 
ensuring that the principal would be able to successfully 
enter and exit the scene of the crime while carrying the 
firearm. 
People v Moore 
In this case, defendant Moore procured, counseled, 
aided, or abetted the possession of a firearm during the 
commission of a felony—the murder of Jacky Hamilton. 
Although Moore did not “obtain or retain” the gun that 
killed the victim, nor did he pull the trigger, his words 
and actions incited Boylston to use the firearm that was in 
his possession to do exactly that. Moore provoked Boylston 
to shoot at the victims by attempting to grab the gun away 
from him and by telling him to “give me the gun; I’ll do 
it.”19  When Boylston first refused to shoot and turned to 
walk away from the victims, Moore attacked his sense of 
masculinity and threatened to dissociate himself from 
19 
Justice Cavanagh’s dissent argues that Moore’s 
actions in attempting to take away the gun that Boylston
possessed “did not encourage his accomplice’s possession;
Moore was actually encouraging just the opposite.” Post at 
5. 
But Moore’s words and actions, viewed in context, do
not evidence an intent to deprive Boylston of the gun, but
rather an intent to ensure that Boylston use the gun that
was in his possession. 
19 
 
 
 
 
Boylston if he did not shoot the two men. It is clear that 
Moore’s words and deeds were intended to encourage Boylston 
to use the gun against the two victims during the 
commission of a felony. 
In so provoking and inciting a 
hesitant Boylston to use the gun that he was carrying, 
Moore necessarily induced Boylston to possess that gun. 
Thus, applying the general aiding and abetting standard to 
the facts of this case, we hold that there was sufficient 
evidence 
in 
the 
record 
to 
establish 
that 
defendant 
performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted in the 
commission of the felony-firearm violation. 
Accordingly, 
we affirm Moore’s felony-firearm conviction. 
People v Harris 
Defendant Harris drove his accomplice, Mays, to the 
gasoline station. 
Harris first entered the store and 
“cased” its interior on the pretense of asking for 
directions. He left the store and then promptly reentered, 
followed by Mays, who was carrying a gun. 
Although Mays 
clearly had actual possession of the firearm at all times, 
Harris specifically used his confederate’s possession of 
that firearm to intimidate and rob a store customer. 
Harris also encouraged Mays to “pop,” or shoot, the store 
clerk when the clerk locked the register and refused to 
hand over any money. 
When the attempt to rob the store 
20  
 
 
 
 
proved 
unsuccessful, 
defendant 
drove 
away 
with 
his 
accomplice and the firearm. 
Harris’s words and deeds, viewed in their entirety, 
demonstrated his intent to procure, counsel, aid, or abet 
the possession of a firearm during the commission of the 
armed robberies. 
He first “cased” the store, thereby 
ensuring that Mays could succeed in entering it while 
carrying a gun. 
He then relied on May’s possession of the 
firearm to facilitate his own robbery of the customer. 
Finally, Harris expressly encouraged Mays to use the 
firearm in his possession to shoot the clerk after the 
clerk refused to give the men any money. 
Thus, Harris 
specifically aided and abetted the commission of felony­
firearm. 
Accordingly, we affirm Harris’s felony-firearm 
convictions. 
IV 
Because we have overruled Johnson’s narrow test for 
aiding and abetting a felony-firearm in Michigan, we must 
also note that the pertinent criminal jury instructions for 
that crime are now invalid. 
The instructions for felony­
firearm under an aiding and abetting theory directly, CJI2d 
11.35(6), and indirectly, CJI2d 11.36(6), currently state 
“that the defendant intentionally helped the person who 
possessed 
the 
firearm 
get 
or 
keep 
it.” 
The 
new 
instructions should not include any of the limiting 
21  
 
 
 
 
 
 
language of Johnson. 
Just as our new test is no longer 
limited to obtaining or retaining the firearm, our jury 
instructions should likewise not be limited to the language 
of getting or keeping that firearm. 
Conclusion 
There is no foundation in the language of either the 
aiding and abetting statute or the felony-firearm statute 
to support this Court’s narrow ruling in Johnson. 
To the 
extent that Johnson required a defendant to assist in 
either obtaining or retaining possession in order to be 
convicted of felony-firearm under an aiding and abetting 
theory, that decision is overruled. 
Following MCL 767.39, 
the appropriate test for aiding and abetting felony-firearm 
in Michigan is whether the defendant “procures, counsels, 
aids, or abets in [the commission of a felony-firearm 
offense].” 
Applying this standard, we hold that there was 
sufficient evidence in each case to support the felony­
firearm 
convictions, 
and 
we 
affirm 
both 
defendants’ 
convictions. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
v 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 120543 
CLARENCE D. MOORE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
________________________________ 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
v 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 119862 
ERWIN HARRIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
________________________________ 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
Today’s majority claims there are more ways to aid or 
abet possession of a firearm during the commission of a 
felony than those stated in People v Johnson, 411 Mich 50; 
303 NW2d 442 (1981). 
Therefore, the majority sees fit to 
overrule Johnson. 
This conclusory claim, however, is not 
supported by a reasoned analysis grounded in the statutory 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
      
 
 
 
  
language of MCL 750.227b(1) and 767.39.1  Therefore, I must 
respectfully dissent. 
I. ANALYSIS 
A fundamental flaw in the analysis offered by the 
majority is that it does not distinguish between a 
defendant’s actions in aiding or abetting the predicate 
felony and aiding or abetting felony-firearm possession. 
The majority correctly states that “the proper standard for 
establishing felony-firearm under an aiding and abetting 
theory 
is 
whether 
the 
defendant’s 
words 
or 
deeds 
‘procure[d], counsel[ed], aid[ed], or abet[ted]’ another to 
carry or have in his possession a firearm during the 
1 MCL 750.227b(1) relates to the carrying or possessing
of a firearm when committing or attempting to commit a
felony, and states the following: 
A person who carries or has in his or her
possession a firearm when he or she commits or
attempts to commit a felony, except a violation of
section 223, section 227, 227a or 230, is guilty of
a felony, and shall be imprisoned for 2 years
. . . . 
MCL 767.39 relates to the abolition of the distinction 
between an accessory and a principal, and states the 
following: 
Every person concerned in the commission of
an offense, whether he directly commits the act
constituting the offense or procures, counsels, 
aids, or abets in its commission may hereafter be
prosecuted, indicted, tried and on conviction shall
be punished as if he had directly committed such
offense. 
2  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
commission or attempted commission of a felony-firearm 
offense.” 
Ante at 2. 
However, the majority then errs 
because it does not use this standard in its analysis. The 
majority finds there was sufficient evidence to convict 
defendants of felony-firearm possession because they aided 
or abetted in the commission of a crime. 
But it does not 
matter that the defendant procured, counseled, aided, or 
abetted the commission of a crime. 
What matters is that 
the defendant, procured, counseled, aided, or abetted 
felony-firearm possession.  This analytical error permeates 
the opinion and results in convictions that violate the 
plain language, as well as the intent, of the statutes. 
There is a difference between aiding or abetting the 
use of a firearm and aiding or abetting the carrying or 
possession of a firearm, yet the majority’s analysis is 
devoid of this distinction. 
The majority admits that it 
was not established at trial that defendants Harris and 
Moore aided or abetted their respective accomplices in 
obtaining or retaining a firearm. 
The majority explicitly 
states, “Under the standard set forth in Johnson, each 
defendant’s conviction would be reversed because neither 
defendant specifically aided the principal in ‘obtaining’ 
or in ‘retaining’ the firearm for immediate or eventual 
possession by the principal during the commission or 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
attempted commission of a felony.” 
Ante at 10. 
However, 
the majority’s analysis does not describe what defendants 
Harris and Moore did, other than encourage their respective 
accomplice to use the firearm, to support convictions of 
felony-firearm possession under an aiding or abetting 
theory. 
The majority admits, “The defendant in each case 
aided 
or 
abetted 
felony-firearm 
by 
actively 
urging, 
inciting, encouraging, or motivating the principal to use 
the weapon that was in the principal’s possession.” 
Ante 
at 18 (emphasis added). 
Procuring, counseling, aiding, or 
abetting the use of a firearm in a predicate felony is not 
the same as procuring, counseling, aiding, or abetting the 
carrying or possession of a firearm. 
Regarding defendant Moore, the majority states that 
Moore incited his accomplice to possess and use the firearm 
by attempting to grab the gun away from him and attacking 
the accomplice’s masculinity. 
“It is clear that Moore’s 
words and deeds were intended to encourage Boylston [the 
accomplice] to use the gun against the two victims during 
the commission of a felony.” Ante at 20 (emphasis added). 
I 
agree 
that 
defendant 
Moore’s 
attacks 
on 
the 
accomplice’s masculinity encouraged the accomplice to use 
the firearm. 
But the majority’s argument that Moore 
encouraged possession by unsuccessfully trying to take the 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
firearm away is nonsensical. 
The accomplice already 
possessed the firearm, and Moore tried to take it away. 
Moore’s 
actions 
did 
not 
encourage 
his 
accomplice’s 
possession; 
Moore 
was 
actually 
encouraging 
just 
the 
opposite. 
Arguing that Moore’s actions, which sought to 
divest his accomplice of possession of the firearm, 
actually encouraged possession defies logic. 
Regarding 
defendant 
Harris, 
the 
majority 
states, 
“Harris expressly encouraged Mays [the accomplice] to use 
the firearm in his possession to shoot the clerk after the 
clerk refused to give the men any money.” 
Ante at 21 
(emphasis added). 
The majority also states that Harris 
“relied on May’s possession of the firearm to facilitate 
his own robbery of the customer.” 
Ante at 21. 
As with 
defendant Moore, the majority adequately explains how 
defendant Harris encouraged the use of the firearm, yet 
nowhere in the opinion is it explained how either defendant 
aided or abetted the carrying or possession of the 
firearms. 
In both of these cases what is really being 
encouraged is the use of the firearm. 
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, I am not 
suggesting we treat a possessory offense differently from 
any other crime. 
Nor am I suggesting that we treat aiding 
or abetting felony-firearm possession differently from any 
5  
 
 
 
other crime. I am merely applying basic rules of statutory 
construction and, once again, giving effect to the words 
used by the Legislature. 
See Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 
59, 65; 503 NW2d 435 (1993). 
The difference between 
possession and use is not a trivial one, and the fact that 
the Legislature chose to state that MCL 750.227b(1) applies 
only to a “person who carries or has in his or her 
possession a firearm when he or she commits or attempts to 
commit a felony” should not be ignored. 
While a defendant can aid or abet felony-firearm 
possession 
by 
physically 
assisting 
an 
accomplice 
in 
obtaining or retaining a firearm, there are also other ways 
to aid or abet an accomplice beyond physical assistance and 
Johnson does not preclude convictions for nonphysical 
assistance. 
A defendant can offer verbal encouragement to 
an accomplice before the accomplice has possession of the 
firearm or while the accomplice has possession of the 
firearm. 
But to meet the statutory standards, the verbal 
encouragement 
must 
relate 
to 
obtaining 
or 
retaining 
possession, not just the use. 
And while a person must 
indeed possess a firearm in order to use it, it does not 
mean that a defendant who encourages the use of a firearm 
that is already in the possession of an accomplice also 
encourages possession. Interpreting the statutory language 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
in this manner would essentially make the felony-firearm 
possession statute a strict liability statute for anyone 
who commits or participates in a crime with an accomplice 
who possesses a firearm. 
A fair reading of the statutory 
language does not support the majority’s position. 
II. THE REENACTMENT RULE 
The 
majority 
also 
ignores 
the 
fact 
that 
the 
Legislature reenacted the felony-firearm possession statute 
after the Johnson decision, yet the Legislature did not 
address the alleged “error” in Johnson. 
Under the 
reenactment rule, “[i]f a legislature reenacts a statute 
without modifying a high court’s practical construction of 
that statute, that construction is implicitly adopted.” 
People v Hawkins, 468 Mich 488, 519; 668 NW2d 602 (2003) 
(Cavanagh, J., dissenting), citing 28 Singer, Statutes and 
Statutory 
Construction 
(2000 
rev), 
Contemporaneous 
Construction, § 49.09, pp 103-112. 
The Legislature “is 
presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial 
interpretation 
of 
a 
statute 
and 
to 
adopt 
that 
interpretation when it [reenacts] a statute without change 
. . . .” Lorillard, a Div of Loew’s Theatres, Inc v Pons, 
434 US 575, 580; 98 S Ct 866; 55 L Ed 2d 40 (1978). “The 
reenactment rule differs from the legislative-acquiescence 
doctrine in that the former canon provides ‘prima facie 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
evidence of legislative intent’ by the adoption, without 
modification, of a statutory provision that had already 
received judicial interpretation.” 
Hawkins, supra at 488, 
quoting Singer at 107. In overruling Johnson, the majority 
reaches its desired result by ignoring the actions and 
intent of our Legislature, as well as the plain language of 
the statutes. 
III. IMPROPERLY OVERRULING JOHNSON 
Finally, 
I 
must 
address 
the 
majority’s 
stated 
hesitancy to overrule Johnson, which was a unanimous 
opinion of this Court. 
The majority’s zeal in overruling 
Johnson 
cannot, 
under 
any 
definition, 
be 
considered 
hesitancy. 
Its fervor results in an opinion that admits 
that the defendants cannot be convicted without overruling 
Johnson. 
The majority then offers a justification for 
overruling Johnson that does not comport with the statutory 
language used in MCL 750.227b(1) and 767.39. 
Further, the 
majority provides no sound example of how a person can aid 
or abet felony-firearm possession other than assisting in 
obtaining or retaining the possession of the firearm. 
While the majority has liberally peppered its opinion 
with the word “possession,” merely claiming that defendants 
aided or abetted the possession of a firearm does not make 
it so. 
Besides the copious use of the word “possession,” 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
the majority only supports its decision to overrule Johnson 
with conclusory statements that Johnson’s test was too 
“narrow.” 
However, the statutory language and the actions 
of our Legislature belie this erroneous conclusion. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would reverse 
the defendants’ convictions for felony-firearm possession 
because the convictions violate the statutory language of 
MCL 750.227b(1) and MCL 767.39. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 120543 
CLARENCE D. MOORE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
V 
No. 119862 
ERWIN HARRIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
TAYLOR, J. (dissenting). 
I agree with part I of Justice Cavanagh’s dissent. 
write 
separately 
to 
emphasize 
my 
concern 
that 
the 
majority’s opinion makes an aider and abettor in virtually 
any gun-related crime guilty of felony-firearm. 
Yet, the 
plain language of the statute only makes an aider and 
abettor guilty of felony-firearm if his aiding and abetting 
I 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
is directed toward the carrying or possession of the 
firearm.1  That is the reading we should give the statute. 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, it is required that no individual be forced 
to speculate, at peril of indictment, whether his conduct 
is prohibited. Dunn v United States, 442 US 100, 112; 99 S 
Ct 2190; 60 L Ed 2d 743 (1979). This is an exercise of the 
rule of lenity,2 which should control the resolution of this 
case and cause us to conclude that all the felony-firearm 
statute criminalizes is aiding and abetting the carrying or 
possessing of a firearm, nothing more.3 
Clifford W. Taylor 
1 MCL 750.227b(1), the statute we are interpreting,
relates to the carrying or possessing a firearm when 
committing or attempting to commit a felony, and states the
following: 
A person who carries or has in his or her
possession a firearm when he or she commits or
attempts to commit a felony, except a violation
of section 223, section 227, 227a or 230, is
guilty of a felony, and shall be imprisoned for 2
years. . . . 
2 The propriety of the rule of lenity was recently
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in United States v 
Granderson, 511 US 39, 54; 114 S Ct 1259; 127 L Ed 2d 611
(1994). 
3 I recognize that MCL 750.2 provides that “The rule
that a penal statute is to be strictly construed shall not
apply to this act or any of the provisions thereof. . . .”
It is, of course, a fundamental axiom of American law,
rooted in our history as a people and requiring no 
citations to authority, that the requirements of the 
Constitution prevail over a statute in the event of a
conflict. 
2