Title: Stewart v. Bay Minette Infirmary
Citation: 501 So. 2d 441
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 3, 1986

501 So. 2d 441 (1986)
Patsy STEWART, as Administratrix of the Estate of Ronald Glen Stewart, Deceased
v.
BAY MINETTE INFIRMARY and Dr. David Davis.
84-833.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 3, 1986.
Rehearing Denied January 9, 1987.
*442 R. Gordon Pate of Hare, Wynn, Newell &amp; Newton, Birmingham, for appellant.
Charles C. Simpson III of Owens, Latour &amp; Simpson, Bay Minette, for appellee Bay Minette Infirmary.
W. Boyd Reeves and Edward A. Dean of Armbrecht, Jackson, DeMouy, Crowe, Holmes &amp; Reeves, Mobile, for appellee Dr. David Davis.
ALMON, Justice.
This is an appeal from an order granting motions for summary judgment in favor of Dr. David Davis and the Bay Minette Infirmary in a medical malpractice wrongful death case.
At 11:05 p.m. on September 10, 1982, Ronald Stewart was admitted to the emergency room of the Bay Minette Infirmary. Stewart complained that he had hurt his back while picking up a sofa that morning. He was treated by Dr. Davis, whom he told that he had taken 6 Valium 5 mg. capsules and had drunk three mixed alcoholic drinks. The emergency room record shows that Stewart's vital signs were: blood pressure, 158/110; temperature, 98°; pulse, 108; and respiration, 20. Dr. Davis stated in his affidavit:
Dr. Davis concluded that he was not negligent in his treatment of Stewart and that he did not deviate from the standard of care of other physicians similarly situated.
The record shows that Stewart was administered 30 milligrams of Talwin and 25 milligrams of Phenergan at 11:25 p.m., and an unspecified amount of caffeine benzoate sodium at 11:30 p.m. The prescriptions were for Tylox and Flexaril.
An autopsy was performed and a report was prepared by Drs. Gary D. Cumberland and LeRoy Riddick, pathologists with the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences. Dr. Cumberland wrote a letter to the district attorney which included the following:
We note that the autopsy report itself contains the following:
We make no judgment at this stage regarding this discrepancy between "cause of death" and "manner of death."
Stewart's administratrix opposed Dr. Davis's motion for summary judgment with two affidavits from Dr. David Abramson of Washington, D.C. The first reads in pertinent part:
Upon objection to the sufficiency of this affidavit, Dr. Abramson submitted a second affidavit which included his curriculum vitae, stated that he had reviewed Dr. Davis's answers to interrogatories, and added to the end of the above-quoted statements, "My opinion is based on my massive experience in primary care medicine and I am convinced that Dr. Davis did not meet the minimum acceptable standards."
In a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff is ordinarily required to produce expert testimony to withstand a summary judgment motion supported by the defendant doctor's affidavit stating that he was not negligent and that his actions did not fall below the standard of care. See Rule 56(e), A.R.Civ.P. If there is a scintilla of evidence of negligence which proximately caused the injury, however, a jury question is presented. Williams v. Bhoopathi, 474 So. 2d 690 (Ala.1985); Orange v. Shannon, 284 Ala. 202, 224 So. 2d 236 (1969). Dr. Abramson's affidavits present sufficient evidence of negligence and of proximate cause to make summary judgment improper. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Dr. Davis.
Bay Minette Infirmary argues that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in its favor because the only allegations of negligence related to the conduct of Dr. Davis and there was no indication that Dr. Davis was the Infirmary's agent, servant, or employee. The complaint, however, alleged that the Infirmary, by admitting Stewart to its emergency room, "assumed the duty of providing competent and timely medical care," and that Dr. Davis, "as agent and employee of defendant Bay Minette Infirmary, and while acting within the line and scope of his employment with Bay Minette Infirmary," undertook to treat Stewart.
The Infirmary presented the affidavit of its administrator, Gary Farrow. He stated, in part:
(Emphasis added.)
When asked in interrogatories whether he had ever held a position or office in any hospital, Dr. Davis answered that he had served as chief of staff, assistant chief of staff, and secretary of the Bay Minette Infirmary, but that he could not remember the dates he held any of the offices. He also stated that he had been a staff physician at the Bay Minette Infirmary, with full staff privileges, from 1971 to the present.
A registered nurse who was the emergency room supervisor administered the medications under Dr. Davis's orders. The Infirmary charged Stewart an emergency room fee and charged him for the medications. It also included Dr. Davis's fee on *444 its emergency room record, although this was not included in the "balance due hospital."
Given the record before us, we cannot say as a matter of law that the evidence adduced in support of and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment does not present a genuine issue of material fact as to the plaintiff's claims against both defendants. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Bay Minette Infirmary and Dr. Davis.
The motion to dismiss is without merit.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL DENIED; REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES, SHORES, ADAMS, BEATTY and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.