Title: Wisconsin Newspress, Inc. v. School District of Sheboygan Falls
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1995AP000184
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 9, 1996

No. 95-0184 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  95-0184 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
Wisconsin Newspress, Inc., Sandra Kimball, 
Press Publishing Company, and Robert 
Schumacher, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v. 
 
School District of Sheboygan Falls and Robert 
J. Englander, 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 APR 9, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Sheboygan 
County, John B. Murphy, Circuit Judge.  Affirmed in part, reversed 
in part, and remanded. 
 
ROLAND B. DAY, C.J.  This case is before the court on a 
petition to bypass the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.60 (1993-94).  The plaintiffs-appellants Wisconsin 
Newspress, 
Inc., 
and 
Press 
Publishing 
Co. 
(collectively, 
"Newspapers") seek review of a summary judgment denying the 
Newspapers' request under the open records law, Wis. Stat. 
§§ 19.31-.37 (1993-94), to release two records of the School 
 
No. 95-0184 
 
 
 
2 
District of Sheboygan Falls ("District") involving a disciplinary 
action against a school district administrator.  The issue in this 
case is whether all disciplinary or personnel records of public 
employees are exempted from the open records law.  We conclude 
that they are not, and reverse the circuit court's denial of the 
open records request on this issue.  We also conclude, however, 
that one of the records at issue in this case falls within the 
attorney-client privilege and we thus affirm the circuit court's 
judgment denying the release of that record.   
 
During February and March of 1994, the editors of the 
Newspapers submitted open records law requests to the District, 
asking for records relating to any disciplinary actions taken 
against the District's administrator, Norman Frakes.  The District 
released the minutes of several closed meetings of the Board of 
Education of the School District of Sheboygan Falls, but refused 
to release any other documents at that time.  The District listed 
nine reasons for its refusal to release the other documents, and 
claimed that release "would result in disclosure of privileged, 
confidential personnel information."   
 
The Newspapers then filed suit in the Circuit Court for 
Sheboygan County, seeking disclosure of the documents.  The 
circuit court denied their requests, ruling that this court's 
decision in Armada Broadcasting, Inc. v. Stirn, 183 Wis. 2d 463, 
516 N.W.2d 357 (1994), created an exception to the open records 
law for public employee disciplinary records.  Since the circuit 
 
No. 95-0184 
 
 
 
3 
court's judgment, Mr. Frakes has resigned from his position and 
taken a new job in another school district.   
 
The first issue we are to resolve is whether our decision in 
Armada exempted public employee disciplinary or personnel records 
from disclosure under the open records law.  This presents a 
question of law which we review without deference to the circuit 
court's determination.  Teigen v. Jelco of Wis., Inc., 124 Wis. 2d 
1, 5, 367 N.W.2d 806 (1985). 
 
This court has long recognized that the open records law 
"reflects the common law principles favoring access to public 
records."  Mayfair Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Baldarotta, 162 
Wis. 2d 142, 155, 469 N.W.2d 638 (1991).  The "Declaration of 
policy" for the open records law states: 
 
In recognition of the fact that a representative 
government is dependent upon an informed electorate, it 
is declared to be the public policy of this state that 
all persons are entitled to the greatest possible 
information regarding the affairs of government and the 
official acts of those officers and employes who 
represent them.  Further, providing persons with such 
information is declared to be an essential function of a 
representative government and an integral part of the 
routine 
duties 
of 
officers 
and 
employes 
whose 
responsibility it is to provide such information.  To 
that end, ss. 19.32 to 19.37 shall be construed in every 
instance with a presumption of complete public access, 
consistent with the conduct of governmental business.  
The denial of public access generally is contrary to the 
public interest, and only in an exceptional case may 
access be denied. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 19.31.  This court has noted: 
[T]he general presumption of our law is that public records 
shall be open to the public unless there is a clear 
statutory exception, unless there exists a limitation 
under the common law, or unless there is an overriding 
 
No. 95-0184 
 
 
 
4 
public 
interest 
in 
keeping 
the 
public 
record 
confidential.   
 
Hathaway v. Green Bay Sch. Dist., 116 Wis. 2d 388, 397, 342 N.W.2d 
682 (1984); see also State ex rel. Richards v. Foust, 165 Wis. 2d 
429, 433, 477 N.W.2d 608 (1991).   
 
The question posed in this case is whether public employee 
disciplinary or personnel records are exempted from the general 
presumption of disclosure.  The circuit court ruled that they 
were, relying on the following language from this court's decision 
in Armada: 
 
[S]everal sections of the Wisconsin statutes evince a 
specific legislative policy of protecting privacy and 
confidentiality in employee disciplinary actions.  For 
example, secs. 19.35(1) and 19.85(1)(b), (c), and (f) 
except from the open records and open meetings laws 
records or meetings dealing with disciplinary actions 
against employees.   
 
Armada, 183 Wis. 2d at 474.  Section 19.35(1) of the Wisconsin 
Statutes provides: 
(1) RIGHT TO INSPECTION.  (a) Except as otherwise provided by 
law, any requester has a right to inspect any record.  
Substantive common law principles construing the right 
to inspect, copy or receive copies of records shall 
remain in effect.  The exemptions to the requirement of 
a governmental body to meet in open session under s. 
19.85 are indicative of public policy, but may be used 
as grounds for denying public access to a record only if 
the authority or legal custodian under s. 19.33 makes a 
specific demonstration that there is a need to restrict 
public access at the time that the request to inspect or 
copy the record is made. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1) (1993-94).  The cross-referenced section, 
§ 19.85, provides that governmental bodies may meet in closed 
session when: 
 
No. 95-0184 
 
 
 
5 
 
(b) 
Considering 
dismissal, 
demotion, 
licensing 
or 
discipline of any public employe . . . or the 
investigation of charges against such person . . . . 
 
(c) Considering employment, promotion, compensation or 
performance evaluation data of any public employe over 
which 
the 
governmental 
body 
has 
jurisdiction 
or 
exercises responsibility. 
 
 
. . . .  
 
(f) Considering financial, medical, social or personal 
histories or disciplinary data of specific persons, 
preliminary consideration of specific personnel problems 
or the investigation of charges against specific persons 
except where par. (b) applies which, if discussed in 
public, would be likely to have a substantial adverse 
effect upon the reputation of any person referred to in 
such histories or data, or involved in such problems or 
investigations.   
 
Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1) (1993-94).   
 
Interpreting a version of the open records and open meetings 
laws enacted prior to the present §§ 19.35(1)(a) and 19.85(1), 
this court had described the "balancing test" which a record 
custodian must undertake in deciding whether to release a record: 
 
We determine that this legislative policy of not 
disclosing data which may unduly damage reputations 
carries over to the field of inspection of public 
records and documents.  The statutory word "unduly" is 
significant.  As applied to inspection it does not bar 
all inspection of public records and documents that 
might damage reputations, but requires a balancing of 
the interest of the public to be informed on public 
matters against the harm to reputations which would 
likely result from permitting inspection.   
 
State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 685, 137 N.W.2d 
470 (1965); see also Wisconsin State Journal v. University of 
Wisconsin-Platteville, 160 Wis. 2d 31, 40-41 n.3, 465 N.W.2d 266 
(Ct. App. 1990) (applying Youmans) [hereinafter UW-Platteville].  
Cases of both this court and the court of appeals have applied 
 
No. 95-0184 
 
 
 
6 
this 
balancing 
test, 
now 
incorporated 
in 
§ 19.35(1), 
in 
determining when records should be released under the open records 
law.  See, e.g., Newspapers, Inc., v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 427, 
279 N.W.2d 179 (1979) (balancing test involves determination 
"whether permitting inspection would result in harm to the public 
interest which outweighs the legislative policy recognizing the 
public interest in allowing inspection."); Mayfair Chrysler-
Plymouth, 162 Wis. 2d at 164-65; Journal/Sentinel, Inc., v. School 
Bd. of the School District of Shorewood, 186 Wis. 2d 443, 457, 521 
N.W.2d 165 (Ct. App. 1994) [hereinafter Shorewood].   
 
Courts have also applied the balancing test to personnel 
records.  In one such case, UW-Platteville, 160 Wis. 2d at 36-42, 
the court of appeals balanced the public policy expressed in 
§ 19.31, which presumes openness and disclosure, against the 
public policy expressed in § 19.85, which recognizes that the 
release of certain personnel records, such as disciplinary 
records, could cause harm to the public or to employees.  After 
concluding that certain meetings at issue in the case had been 
properly 
closed 
under 
§ 19.85(1)(f) 
because 
they discussed 
personnel and disciplinary matters, the court stated, "[t]his 
conclusion, however, does not end our inquiry.  It does not follow 
that, 
simply 
because 
meetings 
were 
properly 
closed 
under 
sec. 19.85(1)(f), Stats., documents compiled in conjunction with 
those meetings are exempt from disclosure under sec. 19.35(1)."  
Id. at 38. 
 
No. 95-0184 
 
 
 
7 
 
The 
method 
of 
analysis 
applied 
in 
UW-Platteville 
is 
consistent with a common-sense reading of the open records and 
open meetings laws.  The plain language of § 19.35(1)(a) directs 
the record custodian to consider the public policies expressed in 
§ 19.85, among which is the expression of a general public policy 
against opening disciplinary or personnel proceedings, when making 
a decision whether or not to release a record.  The sections, on 
their face, do not result in a "clear statutory exception," see 
Hathaway, 116 Wis. 2d at 397, forbidding the release of all public 
employee disciplinary records; rather, the statutes simply require 
the custodian to pay proper heed to the expressed policies in 
allowing or denying public access to a record.   
 
The District, however, points to three cases of the court of 
appeals, Village of Butler v. Cohen, 163 Wis. 2d 819, 472 N.W.2d 
579 (Ct. App. 1991); Law Offices of William A. Pangman & Assoc. v. 
Stigler, 161 Wis. 2d 828, 468 N.W.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1991); and Law 
Offices of William A. Pangman & Assoc., S.C., v. Zellmer, 163 
Wis. 2d 1070, 473 N.W.2d 538 (Ct. App. 1991).  The District argues 
these cases stand for the proposition that Wisconsin courts have 
"consistently held that public policy prohibits disclosure of 
personnel records related to disciplinary actions."  In these 
cases, the court of appeals did hold that some personnel records 
of 
police 
officers 
should 
not 
be 
released 
to 
attorneys 
representing criminal defendants; however, in each case the court 
of appeals clearly applied the balancing test in making its 
 
No. 95-0184 
 
 
 
8 
determination.  See Cohen, 163 Wis. 2d at 825; Stigler, 161 
Wis. 2d at 840; Zellmer, 163 Wis. 2d at 1080.  The cases do not 
stand for the proposition that there is a blanket exception for 
personnel records under the open records law.  Rather, the 
balancing test must be applied "on a case-by-case basis."  
Stigler, 161 Wis. 2d at 840.  The rule from these and the rest of 
this court's cases is that the balancing test must be applied in 
every case in order to determine whether a particular record 
should be released, and there are no blanket exceptions other than 
those provided by the common law or statute.  See Youmans, 28 
Wis. 2d at 682 ("We deem it unwise to attempt to catalog the 
situations in which harm to the public interest would justify 
refusal to permit inspection.  It is a subject which had best be 
left to case-by-case decision."); Hathaway, 116 Wis. 2d at 397. 
 
In fact, Armada, the case on which the circuit court relied 
in the present matter in ruling that personnel records are 
excepted from the open records law, ultimately endorsed the 
application of the balancing test to the records at issue in the 
case.  In Armada, a public employee sought to intervene in an open 
records law action filed against his employer.  Armada, 183 
Wis. 2d at 467.  The action sought the release of an investigative 
report in which the employee was a subject.  Id.  This court held 
that the employee did have a legally protected interest in the 
action, and a right to intervene.  Id. at 475.  The court noted, 
however, that its review was limited to the issue of intervention: 
 
No. 95-0184 
 
 
 
9 
"The issue before us does not involve a determination under the 
Open Records law.  We do not decide whether [the investigative 
report] should be disclosed to the public."  Id. at 473.  In fact, 
the Armada court remanded the case to the circuit court.  Id. at 
477.  If there were a blanket exception for public employee 
records, such a remand would not have been necessary. 
  
Thus, to be consistent with the case itself, the statutory 
language of the open records law, and the many cases discussed 
above which require a case-by-case application of the balancing 
test, the language from Armada on which the circuit court in the 
present matter relied should be clarified to the extent that it 
may be read as creating a blanket exception for disciplinary 
records.  The statement in Armada that "secs. 19.35(1)(a) and 
19.85(1)(b), (c), and (f), except from the open records and open 
meetings laws records or meetings dealing with disciplinary 
actions against employees" was noting the general public policy, 
as shown in the statutes, against releasing disciplinary or 
personnel records.  This policy is to be weighed in the balancing 
test, but it does not automatically require that such records 
cannot be disclosed.  Instead, the public policies favoring 
disclosure, including the presumption of openness as described in 
§ 19.31, are weighed against any policies favoring keeping the 
records from public view.  See, e.g., Newspapers, Inc., 89 Wis. 2d 
at 427; Mayfair Chrysler-Plymouth, 162 Wis. 2d at 164-71; 
Shorewood, 186 Wis. 2d at 457-59.  The Armada court, by its 
 
No. 95-0184 
 
 
 
10 
language noting the public policies disfavoring the disclosure of 
disciplinary records, did not create an exception to this 
established methodology of the balancing test. 
 
Having determined that there is no blanket exception under 
the open records law for public employee disciplinary or personnel 
records, the next question is did the District properly deny 
access to the records at issue in this case.  This presents a 
question of law which we review without deference to the courts 
below.  Mayfair Chrysler-Plymouth, 162 Wis. 2d at 154-55.   
 
These records consist of two documents.
1  The first document 
is a letter from the District's attorney to the District.  For 
convenience, we will refer to this document as the "attorney 
letter."  The second document is a letter from the District to Mr. 
Frakes, which describes the sanctions imposed as a result of the 
disciplinary actions taken against him.  We will refer to this 
document as the "District letter." 
 
The District argues that the attorney letter is protected by 
the attorney-client privilege.  See Wis. Stat. § 905.03 (1993-
94).
2  As we have already noted, exceptions to disclosure created 
                     
     
1  Pursuant to the circuit court's order, both documents were 
placed in the record for this case and the record was sealed.  We 
were thus able to review the documents in reaching our decision.   
     
2  Wis. Stat. § 905.03 provides in part: 
 
 
(2) GENERAL RULE OF PRIVILEGE.  A client has a privilege to 
refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from 
disclosing confidential communications made for the 
purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional 
 
No. 95-0184 
 
 
 
11 
under the common law or by statute still apply under the open 
records law.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a); Hathaway, 116 Wis. 2d 
at 397.  The District argues that release of the attorney letter 
would disclose confidential communications between the District 
and its attorney.  Our review of the attorney letter shows that 
the District is correct.  Although the Newspapers only seek the 
disclosure of a portion of the letter, the release of such portion 
of the attorney letter would reveal information protected by the 
attorney-client privilege.  The Newspapers argue that the 
attorney-client 
privilege 
generally 
does 
not 
apply 
to 
communications from the lawyer to the client, citing Shorewood, 
186 Wis. 2d at 460.  However, an exception is where disclosure of 
the communication would indirectly reveal the substance of the 
District's confidential communications to its lawyer.  Id.  We 
conclude that such an indirect revelation would occur in this 
case.   
 
The 
Newspapers 
also 
contend 
that 
the 
attorney-client 
privilege should not apply in this case because the privilege only 
extends to confidential communications which are not intended to 
be disclosed to third persons.  Section 905.03(1)(d) provides: "a 
communication is `confidential' if not intended to be disclosed to 
3rd persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance 
(..continued) 
legal services to the client . . . . 
 
No. 95-0184 
 
 
 
12 
of the rendition of professional legal services to the client . . 
. ."  
The record shows that the contested portions of the letter were 
discussed with Mr. Frakes.  However, the record also shows that 
the contents of the attorney letter were not disclosed to anyone 
other than the members of the school board and Mr. Frakes.  We 
conclude that the disclosure of the contested portion of the 
letter to Mr. Frakes was in furtherance of the rendition of 
professional legal services to the District.  We therefore affirm 
the portion of the circuit court's judgment withholding the 
attorney letter.
3 
 
For the remaining document, the District letter, we must 
still apply the open records law balancing test to determine 
whether the record should be released.  Because the application of 
the balancing test presents a question solely of law, we may 
perform the test on review even if the circuit court did not apply 
the test.  See Cohen, 163 Wis. 2d at 823 n.1.  We follow a two-
step procedure in reviewing open records cases: 
 
First, we must decide if the trial court correctly 
assessed whether the custodian's denial of access was 
made with the requisite specificity.  Second, we 
determine whether the stated reasons are sufficient to 
permit withholding, itself a two-step analysis.  Here, 
our inquiry is: (1) did the trial court make a factual 
determination supported by the record of whether the 
                     
     
3  Because we conclude that the document in question falls 
under the attorney-client privilege, we do not reach the 
District's argument that it is also privileged as attorney work 
product.  See State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 
559, 150 N.W.2d 387 (1967). 
 
No. 95-0184 
 
 
 
13 
documents implicate the public interests in secrecy 
asserted by the custodians and, if so, (2) do the 
countervailing interests outweigh the public interest in 
release. 
 
Milwaukee Journal v. Call, 153 Wis. 2d 313, 317, 450 N.W.2d 515 
(Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted) (quoted in Mayfair Chrysler-
Plymouth, 162 Wis. 2d at 157).  There is no dispute over 
specificity in the present case; the parties agree that the 
District stated its reasons for denial with sufficient specificity 
in its letters responding to the Newspaper's open records 
requests, each of which provided nine reasons for withholding the 
records.  As the District argues in its briefs before this court, 
its reasons for withholding the documents in question boil down to 
the fact that they contain "information regarding employee 
performance and other sensitive personnel information."  Our 
review of the records at issue in this case supports the circuit 
court's finding, implicit in its decision that Armada excepted 
personnel records from the open records law, that the records 
contain such personnel information.  We therefore turn to the 
final step of our analysis under Call: whether the interests 
asserted by the District would cause harm to the public interest 
which would outweigh the public interest in release.  Call, 153 
Wis. 2d at 317; see also Youmans, 28 Wis. 2d at 681-82. 
 
The District first points to Cohen, 163 Wis. 2d at 819; 
Stigler, 161 Wis. 2d at 828; and Zellmer, 163 Wis. 2d at 1070, as 
examples of cases favoring the withholding of personnel files.  
 
No. 95-0184 
 
 
 
14 
These cases note several public policies against disclosure of 
such records, including protecting the reputation of individuals, 
see Cohen at 829-30, encouraging open and honest evaluations by 
supervisors, see id. at 831, and avoiding loss of morale or 
causing public employees to choose other employment because of the 
possible disclosure of personnel records, see Zellmer, 163 Wis. 2d 
at 1083, 1089. 
 
These cases note, as we have already observed in this 
opinion, that personnel records may contain sensitive information 
which might have harmful effects on the public if released.  This 
is a factor properly weighed in the balancing test, and we take it 
into account in the present case.  We also note, however, that the 
application of the balancing test in the three cases cited by the 
District involved factors peculiar to law enforcement.  See, e.g., 
Zellmer, 163 Wis. 2d at 1087, 1089 (disclosure of personnel 
records would have "chilling effect" on law enforcement because 
officers might make fewer arrests if they knew their personnel 
files "might be made public as a result of arrest"); Cohen, 163 
Wis. 2d at 831 (possibility of cross-examination on matters in 
personnel records might impair police officer's ability or 
willingness to testify in court); Stigler, 161 Wis. 2d at 840 
(release of records would endanger officer engaged in undercover 
work).  The cases thus provide less support for withholding the 
records in the present matter, where such interests are not 
implicated. 
 
No. 95-0184 
 
 
 
15 
 
Against the interests asserted by the District, we consider 
the public policies favoring disclosure.  In this case, we find 
that these policies, as described below, weigh in favor of 
allowing the release of the District letter.   
 
First, as stated in the declaration of policy to the open 
records law, Wis. Stat. § 19.31, is the general public policy that 
"all persons are entitled to the greatest possible information 
regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those 
officers and employes who represent them. . . .  The denial of 
public access generally is contrary to the public interest, and 
only in an exceptional case may access be denied."  See also 
Breier, 89 Wis. 2d at 433-34 (open records law "reflects a basic 
tenet of the democratic system—that the electorate must be 
informed of the workings of government.")   
 
The public has a particularly strong interest in being 
informed about public officials who have been "derelict in [their] 
duty."  Youmans, 28 Wis. 2d at 685; see also Shorewood, 186 
Wis. 2d at 459 (citing 74 Op. Att'y Gen. 14, 16 (Wis. 1985)).  
When exposing such misconduct, "the fact that reputations may be 
damaged would not outweigh the benefit to the public interest in 
obtaining inspection."  Youmans, 28 Wis. 2d at 685.  In the 
present matter, therefore, although release of disciplinary 
records might cause some reputational harm to Mr. Frakes, the 
subject of the records, we may nonetheless consider the public's 
 
No. 95-0184 
 
 
 
16 
interest in information about misconduct by public officials to 
weigh more heavily in the balancing of interests. 
 
In addition, our courts have recognized that a prominent 
public official, or an official in a position of authority, should 
have a lower expectation of privacy regarding his or her 
employment records.  In State ex rel. Bilder v. Township of 
Delavan, 112 Wis. 2d 539, 557, 334 N.W.2d 252 (1983), this court 
allowed access to a police chief's files, noting that "[t]he 
documents 
in 
issue 
apparently 
contain 
information 
relating 
directly to [the police chief's] professional conduct . . . .  By 
accepting his public position [the police chief] has, to a large 
extent, relinquished his right to keep confidential activities 
directly relating to his employment as a public law enforcement 
official."  Similarly, in UW-Platteville, 160 Wis. 2d at 41, the 
court of appeals noted, in its application of the balancing test 
in an open records case, that the dean of a department at a state 
university, in taking his position "of public prominence," had 
"little 
reasonable 
expectation 
of 
privacy 
regarding 
his 
professional conduct."  In the matter presently before the court, 
we note that Mr. Frakes was the administrator of the school 
district, a position which elevated him to the view of the public; 
we thus, in our application of the balancing test, assign less 
weight to his personal expectation of privacy regarding activities 
related to his employment. 
 
No. 95-0184 
 
 
 
17 
 
The court of appeals in UW-Platteville also noted another 
factor relevant to our analysis in this matter.  Discussing the 
possible harm to the reputation of the subject of a disciplinary 
action, the court stated: 
 
In addition, the dangers of harm to reputation which 
might 
have 
justified 
nondisclosure 
during 
an 
investigation 
are 
no 
longer 
present 
once 
the 
investigation is complete.  While an investigation is 
continuing, the subject may suffer adverse reputational 
harm, whether warranted or not, simply because of the 
stigma that attaches as a result of being the "subject 
of an investigation." 
 
Once the investigation is complete, however, the danger 
of warrantless harm to reputation is reduced. 
 
UW-Platteville, 160 Wis. 2d at 42.  In the present matter, the 
disciplinary action against Mr. Frakes has been completed, and 
there would be no danger of creating false impressions by now 
releasing the results of the disciplinary action in the form of 
the sanctions imposed.  The District argues that the reasoning 
from UW-Platteville should only apply when the subject of the 
investigation is cleared of wrongdoing, as was the subject in that 
case.  See id.  Making such a distinction would be erroneous.  
Whether or not a person has been cleared of the charges against 
him or her, the completion of the investigation removes the danger 
warned against in UW-Platteville: that a subject of investigation 
might be stigmatized simply for being under investigation.  And, 
as we have already stated, we are to give greater weight to the 
public's interest in knowing the disciplinary results of conduct 
 
No. 95-0184 
 
 
 
18 
of its public officials than to the possible harm to a particular 
official's reputation.   
 
Having balanced the public policies favoring disclosure in 
this case, we conclude that they outweigh the general public 
policy against releasing this type of employee personnel record, 
and thus we allow the disclosure of the District letter.  Now that 
the investigation has concluded, the public has a right to know 
its results.  We therefore reverse that portion of the circuit 
court's judgment which denied access to the District letter and 
remand to the circuit court so that it may order the document's 
release. 
 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the circuit court is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause remanded for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
No. 95-0184 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
95-0184 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
Wisconsin Newspress, Inc., Sandra Kimball, 
 
 
 
Press Publishing Company and Robert Schumacher, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
School District of Sheboygan Falls and 
 
 
 
Robert J. Englander, 
 
 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
____________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
April 9, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 10, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan 
 
JUDGE: 
JOHN B. MURPHY 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the plaintiffs-appellants there were sealed 
briefs (in the court of appeals) by Robert J. Dreps, Linda M. 
Clifford, James A. Friedman, and LaFollette & Sinykin, Madison and 
oral argument by Robert J. Dreps. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a sealed brief (in 
the court of appeals) by Pamela A. Johnson, Philip C. Reid and 
Cook & Franke, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by Pamela A. 
Johnson.