Title: Burley v. U.S. Foods, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 123A14
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: September 25, 2015

NO. COA13-1081 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed:  3 June 2014 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Wake County 
Nos. 12 CRS 215921, 215922 
ANTONIO NEAL GRAY 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 5 April 2013 by 
Judge G. Wayne Abernathy in Wake County Superior Court.  Heard 
in the Court of Appeals 19 February 2014. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 
Richard G. Sowerby, for the State. 
 
McCotter Ashton, P.A., by Rudolph A. Ashton, III, for 
defendant-appellant. 
 
 
McCULLOUGH, Judge. 
 
 
Antonio Neal Gray (“defendant”) appeals from judgments 
entered upon his convictions for attempted robbery with a 
dangerous weapon, conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous 
weapon, and first degree burglary.  For the following reasons, 
we find no error. 
I. Background 
On 16 July 2012, defendant was arrested pursuant to 
warrants finding probable cause to believe defendant committed 
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the following offenses on 11 July 2012:  two counts of attempted 
robbery with a dangerous weapon, one count of conspiracy to 
commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, and one count of first 
degree burglary.  On 11 September 2012 a Wake County Grand Jury 
indicted defendant on the charges in case numbers 12 CRS 215921 
and 215922.  Defendant pled not guilty and his cases came on for 
trial in Wake County Superior Court before the Honorable G. 
Wayne Abernathy on 3 April 2013. 
At trial the State’s evidence tended to show the following:  
Isai Ntirenganya was a car dealer and a club promoter in 
Raleigh.  Through his role as a promoter, Mr. Ntirenganya met 
Alneisa McKoy, who expressed interest in doing some promotion 
work.  On the evening of 11 July 2012, Mr. Ntirenganya met up 
with Ms. McKoy and her friend, Allison Smith, at a sweepstakes 
parlor and took them to his friend’s home in a trailer park off 
New Bern Avenue to talk about promotion work.  Mr. Ntirenganya’s 
friend, Kory Clark, was the only one home at the time. 
 
Mr. Ntirenganya and Mr. Clark both testified that they and 
the two women were just hanging out, talking about promotion 
opportunities, drinking, and smoking marijuana.  Mr. Ntirenganya 
and Mr. Clark recalled that during this time, Ms. McKoy and Ms. 
Smith were on their phones texting, were giggling and whispering 
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to each other, and were back and forth to the bathroom numerous 
times.  Mr. Clark found their behavior suspicious. 
 
At some point, Mr. Clark left the trailer to buy beer and 
cigarettes from a nearby convenience store.  The women wanted to 
go with Mr. Clark and leave Mr. Ntirenganya by himself, but Mr. 
Clark left without them.  When Mr. Clark returned several 
minutes later, he locked the door behind him. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Ntirenganya and Ms. McKoy went to a 
back room in the trailer to talk.  At that time, two men burst 
through the door that Mr. Clark had locked upon his return from 
the convenience store.  Mr. Ntirenganya testified that someone 
jumped on his back and they tumbled to the floor.  Mr. 
Ntirenganya recalled someone instructing him to “[g]et on the 
ground[]” and a female screaming “[s]omebody got a gun.”  The 
man that jumped on Mr. Ntirenganya’s back was smaller than Mr. 
Ntirenganya and Mr. Ntirenganya was able to wrestle away from 
him and flee the trailer. 
Mr. Clark testified that he heard the commotion and fled 
the trailer through another door.  Mr. Clark did not see the 
intruders. 
Both Mr. Ntirenganya and Mr. Clark indicated that nothing 
appeared to be missing from the trailer following the attempted 
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robbery.  Mr. Ntirenganya’s wallet and keys, which were on top 
of cabinets near the door, appeared undisturbed. 
In addition to Mr. Ntirenganya and Mr. Clark, Ms. Smith and 
Ms. McKoy testified at trial.  Their testimony revealed that 
they planned to rob Mr. Ntirenganya with James Diaz and 
defendant, who they identified as the intruders.  At the time, 
Ms. Smith was in a relationship with Mr. Diaz and Ms. McKoy was 
in a relationship with defendant.  Although defendant did not 
initially want to take part in the robbery, he went along with 
the plan.  Ms. Smith and Ms. McKoy each described the plan in 
detail and testified that they were communicating with Mr. Diaz 
and defendant through text messages to give directions to the 
trailer, to inform them how many people were in the trailer, and 
to let them know that the door to the trailer was unlocked.  
These text message conversations were admitted into evidence at 
trial. 
At the close of the State’s evidence, defendant moved to 
dismiss the charges.  The trial court allowed defendant’s motion 
as to count two in case number 12 CRS 215921, attempted robbery 
with a dangerous weapon from the person of Mr. Clark, and denied 
the motion as to the remaining charges.  Defendant did not put 
on any evidence and the case was given to the jury. 
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On 5 April 2013, the jury returned verdicts finding 
defendant guilty of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, 
conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, and first 
degree burglary.  The trial court then entered judgments 
sentencing defendant to a term of 23 to 40 months for conspiracy 
to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon and a consecutive term 
of 59 to 83 months imprisonment for attempted robbery with a 
dangerous 
weapon 
and 
first 
degree 
burglary, 
which 
were 
consolidated for judgment.  Defendant gave notice of appeal in 
open court. 
II. Discussion 
Defendant raises the following three issues on appeal:  
whether the trial court (1) erred in denying his motion to 
continue; (2) plainly erred in allowing testimony of a detective 
concerning 
his 
opinions, 
decisions, 
observations, 
and 
interpretation of text messages; and (3) erred in allowing the 
State to introduce text messages from Mr. Diaz’s cell phone.  We 
address each issue in order. 
Motion to Continue 
 
The trial court granted defense counsel a twenty-four hour 
continuance on 2 April 2013.  Then, as the State prepared to 
call defendant’s case for trial on 3 April 2013, defense counsel 
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renewed his motion to continue asserting he needed additional 
time to prepare for trial following the late receipt of a 
statement by Ms. McKoy implicating Mr. Diaz as the possessor of 
the gun during the attempted robbery.  Specifically, defense 
counsel argued he prepared for trial as if defendant possessed 
the gun during the attempted robbery and he needed extra time to 
prepare the defense following receipt of Ms. McKoy’s statement, 
which defense counsel claimed changed the theory of the State’s 
case against defendant to acting in concert. 
The trial court rejected defendant’s argument and denied 
the motion to continue.  The trial court reasoned that Ms. 
McKoy’s statement was duplicative, did not introduce any new 
actors or witnesses, and did not significantly change the 
State’s case against defendant.  The trial court explained that, 
under the law, it did not matter who possessed the gun; if one 
of the perpetrators possessed a gun, all perpetrators were 
guilty to the same extent.  Additionally, the trial court noted 
it had already granted defendant a twenty-four hour continuance. 
Now on appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to continue.  We disagree. 
As this Court has recognized, 
“Ordinarily, 
a 
motion 
to 
continue 
is 
addressed to the discretion of the trial 
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court, and absent a gross abuse of that 
discretion, the trial court's ruling is not 
subject to review.”  State v. Taylor, 354 
N.C. 28, 33, 550 S.E.2d 141, 146 (2001) 
(citing State v. Searles, 304 N.C. 149, 153, 
282 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1981)).  “‘Continuances 
are not favored and the party seeking a 
continuance 
has 
the 
burden 
of 
showing 
sufficient grounds for it. 
 The chief 
consideration is whether granting or denying 
a 
continuance 
will 
further 
substantial 
justice.’”  In re Humphrey, 156 N.C. App. 
533, 
538, 
577 
S.E.2d 
421, 
425 
(2003) 
(quoting Doby v. Lowder, 72 N.C. App. 22, 
24, 324 S.E.2d 26, 28 (1984)).  “However, if 
‘a 
motion 
to 
continue 
is 
based 
on 
a 
constitutional 
right, 
then 
the 
motion 
presents a question of law which is fully 
reviewable on appeal.’”  State v. Jones, 342 
N.C. 523, 530–31, 467 S.E.2d 12, 17 (1996) 
(quoting State v. Covington, 317 N.C. 127, 
129, 343 S.E.2d 524, 526 (1986)). 
In re D.Q.W., 167 N.C. App. 38, 40-41, 604 S.E.2d 675, 676-77 
(2004). 
“To establish that the trial court's failure 
to 
give 
additional 
time 
to 
prepare 
constituted 
a 
constitutional 
violation, 
defendant must show ‘how his case would have 
been better prepared had the continuance 
been granted or that he was materially 
prejudiced by the denial of his motion.’  
‘[A] motion for a continuance should be 
supported by an affidavit showing sufficient 
grounds 
for 
the 
continuance.’ 
 
‘“[A] 
postponement is proper if there is a belief 
that material evidence will come to light 
and such belief is reasonably grounded on 
known facts.”’” 
Id. at 41, 604 S.E.2d at 677 (quoting State v. McCullers, 341 
N.C. 19, 31–32, 460 S.E.2d 163, 170 (1995) (quoting State v. 
-8- 
 
 
Covington, 317 N.C. 127, 130, 343 S.E.2d 524, 526 (1986); State 
v. Kuplen, 316 N.C. 387, 403, 343 S.E.2d 793, 802 (1986); and 
State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 357, 226 S.E.2d 353, 362 (1976) 
(other citation omitted))). 
In support of his argument that the trial court erred, 
defendant cites two cases, State v. Smith, 178 N.C. App. 134, 
631 S.E.2d 34 (2006) and State v. Pickard, 107 N.C. App. 94, 418 
S.E.2d 690 (1992), in which trial courts denied the respective 
defendants’ motions for continuances.  This Court subsequently 
affirmed the trial courts’ decisions in both of those cases.  
Smith, 178 N.C. App. at 142-44, 631 S.E.2d at 39-41; Pickard, 
107 N.C. App. at 100-01, 418 S.E.2d at 693-94.  Defendant then 
argues a different result is warranted in this case because it 
is distinguishable from Smith and Pickard.  Specifically, 
defendant repeats the argument made before the trial court that, 
while Ms. McKoy’s statement is less inculpatory of defendant, 
the statement was prejudicial to defendant because it changed 
the theory of the case against him at the eleventh hour. 
Although the present case may be distinguished from Smith 
and Pickard, we are not convinced that the trial court erred in 
denying defendant’s motion to continue.  We agree with the trial 
court that Ms. McKoy’s statement did not significantly change 
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the case to defendant’s prejudice so as to require additional 
time 
to 
prepare 
for 
trial 
beyond 
the 
twenty-four 
hour 
continuance already granted by the trial court.  Thus, we hold 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant’s motion to continue. 
To the extent defendant argues the denial violated his 
constitutional rights, defendant was not prejudiced.  As argued 
by the State, there is nothing in the record tending to show 
that the State implied it was proceeding to trial solely on the 
theory that defendant possessed the gun.  In fact, defense 
counsel should not have been surprised by Ms. McKoy’s statement.  
During defendant’s bond hearing on 11 February 2013, months 
before 
trial, 
the 
State 
summarized 
the 
evidence 
against 
defendant.  In that summary, the State indicated that Mr. Diaz 
possessed the gun during the attempted robbery.  Defense counsel 
was present at the hearing. 
Moreover, there was contradictory testimony elicited by the 
State at trial from which the jury could have determined 
defendant possessed the gun during the attempted robbery.  Ms. 
Smith testified that defendant possessed the gun while Ms. McKoy 
testified that Mr. Diaz entered the trailer with the gun. 
Opinion Testimony 
 
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At trial, the State called Detective Snowden of the Raleigh 
Police Department to testify.  The State then questioned 
Detective Snowden about text messages between the perpetrators 
on the night of the attempted robbery.  Detective Snowden 
testified about three separate text message conversations:  a 
conversation between Ms. McKoy and defendant, a conversation 
between Mr. Diaz and Ms. Smith, and a conversation between Mr. 
Diaz and Ms. McKoy. 
When questioned about the text messages between Ms. McKoy 
and defendant, Detective Snowden stated “it was clear . . . that 
[Ms. McKoy] had assisted [defendant] with the plan and execution 
of the attempted robbery.  And it looked like directions were 
given to [defendant’s] cell phone and allowing access to the 
residence.”  Detective Snowden also testified that the address 
provided to defendant by Ms. McKoy in the text messages 
corresponded to the trailer where the attempted robbery took 
place and it appeared defendant was asking Ms. McKoy if the door 
to the trailer was open.  When questioned about his observations 
of the text messages between Mr. Diaz and Ms. Smith, Detective 
Snowden responded that they appeared to illustrate “the actual 
time line [sic] of the attempted robbery, along with, [he] 
guess[ed], the escape of Ms. Smith.”  Detective Snowden stated 
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“[i]t was clear that [Ms. Smith] had helped her boyfriend, Mr. 
Diaz, plan and execute the attempted robbery.”  Detective 
Snowden further indicated that defendant’s and Ms. McKoy’s 
nicknames appeared in the text message conversation.  When 
questioned about his observations of the third text message 
conversation between Ms. McKoy and Mr. Diaz, Detective Snowden 
stated, “it appeared that directions were being given, the doors 
were being asked to be unlocked, and then it seemed like they 
were trying to find Ms. Smith.” 
Detective Snowden then described his overall impression 
from the text messages as follows: 
Just looking at the text messages, again, 
like I said, it kind of gave a good timeline 
of what had occurred, that a robbery was 
being planned with Mr. Diaz and [defendant] 
involved, and that the girls were part of 
that robbery, and they were supposed to open 
a door.  They were telling them how much 
money was there, how many people -- or how 
many victims might be there. 
 
Just -- all together, it just -- it kind of 
put everything in place as far as a robbery 
was going to be done, but, as described by 
the victims, it was botched, and nothing was 
gotten.  And it seemed like, once Ms. Smith 
got lost, it also showed you they were 
trying to find her, you know, and direct her 
how to get to a certain spot to be picked 
up. 
Defendant did not object to Detective Snowden’s testimony 
at trial.  Yet, now on appeal, defendant contends the trial 
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court plainly erred in allowing Detective Snowden to testify 
regarding his opinions and observations of the text messages.  
We disagree. 
“In criminal cases, an issue that was not preserved by 
objection noted at trial and that is not deemed preserved by 
rule or law without any such action nevertheless may be made the 
basis of an issue presented on appeal when the judicial action 
questioned is specifically and distinctly contended to amount to 
plain error.”  N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4) (2014). 
For error to constitute plain error, a 
defendant 
must 
demonstrate 
that 
a 
fundamental error occurred at trial.  To 
show that an error was fundamental, a 
defendant must establish prejudice that, 
after examination of the entire record, the 
error had a probable impact on the jury's 
finding 
that 
the 
defendant 
was 
guilty.  
Moreover, because plain error is to be 
applied 
cautiously 
and 
only 
in 
the 
exceptional case, the error will often be 
one that seriously affect[s] the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings[.] 
State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012) 
(citations and quotation marks omitted). 
Regardless of whether or not the admission of Detective 
Snowden’s testimony concerning his opinion and observations from 
the text messages was error, given the overwhelming and 
uncontroverted evidence of defendant’s guilt in the record, the 
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alleged error does not amount to plain error requiring a new 
trial. 
Text Messages 
As referenced, at trial, the State introduced photographs 
of text messages between Mr. Diaz and Ms. Smith and between Mr. 
Diaz and Ms. McKoy that were found on Mr. Diaz’s cell phone 
following his arrest.  Defendant did not initially object to the 
admission of the photographs of the text messages and they were 
admitted into evidence as the State’s exhibits ten and twelve.  
At the request of the State, Detective Snowden read the text 
messages photographed in exhibit ten aloud in open court.  
Defendant did not object.  However, immediately after exhibit 
twelve was admitted and the State requested that Detective 
Snowden read the photographed text messages between Mr. Diaz and 
Ms. McKoy in open court, defense counsel asked to be heard and 
objected to the admission of exhibit twelve based on lack of 
authentication.  After hearing arguments, the trial court 
overruled defendant’s objection. 
Defendant now contends the trial court erred in allowing 
the photographs of the text messages between Mr. Diaz and the 
two women to be admitted into evidence. 
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At the outset, we note defendant’s objection was untimely 
as to the admission of exhibit ten.  Therefore, defendant has 
not preserved the issue for appeal.  See N.C. R. App. P. 
10(a)(1) (2014) (“In order to preserve an issue for appellate 
review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely 
request, objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds for 
the ruling the party desired the court to make if the specific 
grounds were not apparent from the context.”).  Nevertheless, 
the following analysis for exhibit twelve applies equally to 
exhibit ten. 
In support of his argument that there was inadequate 
authentication, defendant cites State v. Taylor, 178 N.C. App. 
395, 632 S.E.2d 218 (2006).  In Taylor, the State sought to 
admit printouts or transcripts of text messages sent to and from 
the victim’s cell phone.  Id. at 412, 632 S.E.2d at 230.  In 
order to authenticate the text messages, the State called 
employees of the cell phone company to testify concerning how 
the company kept records of its customers’ text messages and how 
they are retrieved.  Id. at 413, 632 S.E.2d at 230.  This court 
held the combination of the employee’s testimony and the 
circumstantial evidence within the text messages was sufficient 
to authenticate the evidence.  Id. 
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Defendant now argues the same type of testimony was needed 
in this case to authenticate the photographs of the text 
messages admitted as exhibit twelve.  We disagree. 
The North Carolina Rules of Evidence provide that “[t]he 
requirement of authentication or identification as a condition 
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient 
to support a finding that the matter in question is what its 
proponent claims.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 901(a) (2013).  
The rule further provides a nonexclusive list of ways to 
authenticate evidence, including “testimony of a witness with 
knowledge ‘that a matter is what it is claimed to be.’”  Taylor, 
178 N.C. App. at 413, 632 S.E.2d at 230 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 8C-1, Rule 901(b)(1)). 
In this case, Detective Snowden testified that he took 
pictures of text messages on Mr. Diaz’s cell phone while 
searching the phone incident to Mr. Diaz’s arrest.  Detective 
Snowden then identified the photographs in exhibit twelve as 
screen shots of Mr. Diaz’s cell phone and testified that they 
were in substantially the same condition as when he obtained 
them.  Ms. McKoy, with whom Mr. Diaz was communicating in the 
text messages, also testified to the authenticity of exhibit 
twelve.  Specifically, Ms. McKoy testified that she, Mr. Diaz, 
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Ms. Smith, and defendant had planned to rob Mr. Ntirenganya.  
The plan was that she and Ms. Smith would meet up with Mr. 
Ntirenganya and communicate with Mr. Diaz and defendant through 
text messages to let them know what was going on.  Ms. McKoy 
testified that she sent text messages to Mr. Diaz and defendant 
telling them where the trailer was located, how many people were 
in the trailer, and that the door was open.  Ms. McKoy then 
identified exhibit twelve as the text message conversation 
between her and Mr. Diaz.  Ms. McKoy further stated exhibit 
twelve was an accurate representation of her text message 
conversation with Mr. Diaz. 
We hold the testimony in this case by Detective Snowden, 
who recovered the text messages from Mr. Diaz’s cell phone, and 
Ms. McKoy, with whom Mr. Diaz was communicating in the text 
messages illustrated in exhibit twelve, was sufficient to 
authenticate exhibit twelve.  Thus, the trial court did not err 
in admitting the photographs into evidence. 
III. Conclusion 
For the reasons discussed above, the trial court did not 
error in denying defendant’s motion to continue or in allowing 
the photographs of the text messages into evidence at trial.  
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Additionally, the trial court did not plainly error in allowing 
the testimony of Detective Snowden. 
No Error. 
Judges HUNTER, Robert C., and GEER concur.