Title: Branning v. State
Citation: 224 So. 2d 579
Docket Number: 45411
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: June 9, 1969

224 So. 2d 579 (1969) Jack Rush BRANNING v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 45411. Supreme Court of Mississippi. June 9, 1969. Rehearing Denied July 3, 1969. *580 A.S. Scott, Jr., Henry S. Davis, Jr., Laurel, for appellant. Joe T. Patterson, Atty. Gen., by G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. ROBERTSON, Justice: The appellant, Jack Rush Branning, was convicted in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial District of Jones County, Mississippi, of the possession of narcotics contrary to the provisions of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act of 1962, which is Sections 6844-6866 Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (Supp. 1968). This being a third offense, as defined in Section 6866, the court sentenced him to pay a fine of $2,000 and to serve twenty years in the state penitentiary. The appellant assigned as error: (1) The lower court erred in overruling the demurrer to the indictment because two of the offenses were committed and the appellant convicted of them before the enactment of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act of 1962, and, therefore, the 1962 law was an ex post facto law. (2) The lower court erred in overruling the demurrer to the indictment because the indictment "revealed appellant's prior convictions to the jury before the current charge was adjudicated." (3) The lower court erred in granting the following instruction to the State: Section 5, Chapter 397, General Laws of 1962 [Section 6866 Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (Supp. 1968)] does not constitute an ex post facto law. The portion of this law questioned by the appellant provides: The argument of the appellant was answered by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 68 S. Ct. 1256, 92 L. Ed. 1683 (1948), wherein Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the Court, said: In this case the third offense was committed on April 15, 1968, six years after the passage of the act increasing the penalty that could be imposed for a third offense. In a 1961 case before the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court said: In New Jersey v. Taylor, 72 N.J. Super. 388, 178 A.2d 266 (1962), in ruling on a similar case to the case at bar, the court said: The lower court was correct in overruling the demurrer to the indictment; the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act of 1962 was not an ex post facto law. The lower court was also correct in overruling the demurrer to the indictment wherein it was contended that the indictment was fatally defective in that it revealed the appellant's prior convictions to the jury before the third offense had been tried. It was necessary not only to charge the previous convictions but also to make proof thereof in order to fit the case within the statute on habitual offenders. This practice was specifically upheld in Breen v. Beto, 341 F.2d 96 (5th Cir.1965). There is no merit in appellant's criticism of the instruction granted the State that identity of name of the defendant and the person previously convicted is prima facie evidence of identity of person. The appellant did not deny his identity with the two previous convictions charged and proved; therefore, the presumption is that the appellant is one and the same person as the one previously convicted. The jury was entitled to this instruction as to the law from the court. We said in Goldsby v. State, 240 Miss. 647, 123 So. 2d 429 (1960), cert. den., 365 U.S. 861, 81 S. Ct. 829, 5 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1961): The judgment of the circuit court should be and is affirmed. Affirmed. ETHRIDGE, C.J., and PATTERSON, INZER, and SMITH, JJ., concur.