Title: William Taylor v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC04-2243
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 2006

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-2243 
____________ 
 
WILLIAM TAYLOR,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[June 29, 2006] 
CORRECTED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
We have on appeal a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a 
corresponding sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. 
Const.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the conviction and sentence of death.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On August 25, 2001, a grand jury returned an indictment for appellant 
William Taylor on one count of first-degree premeditated murder for the murder of 
Sandra Kushmer, one count of attempted first-degree murder for the attempted 
murder of William Maddox, one count of robbery with a deadly weapon, one count 
of robbery with a firearm, and one count of armed burglary of a dwelling.   
 
 
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At trial, Renata Sikes established that on Friday, May 25, 2001, she, along 
with her daughter Sandra Kushmer and her son William Maddox, went to visit her 
husband in the hospital.  Kushmer and Maddox left the hospital in a rental car.  At 
approximately 10:30 p.m. that night, Sikes called her home and spoke to Kushmer, 
who advised that “Ken” was there with Kushmer and Maddox,1 and, according to 
Sikes, it sounded as though she was having fun.  Thirty minutes later, Sikes again 
called home to inform her children that she would remain at the hospital, but there 
was no answer.  Sikes called her home repeatedly thereafter, but the calls were 
never answered.  At approximately 3:30 p.m. on Saturday, May 26, 2001, Sikes 
returned home.  Upon arriving, Sikes noticed that the rental car was gone, and she 
observed blood on the outside of her house.  In addition, Sikes discovered her 
daughter’s medication, purse, and shoes lying outside on the ground.  Upon 
entering the house, Sikes found Kushmer lying in a puddle of blood.  As Sikes 
walked further into the house, she discovered Maddox lying on the bed in a back 
bedroom.  Sikes observed that Maddox’s face was black and blue, his pillow black 
with blood, but he was still alive.  Sikes later determined that cameras belonging to 
her husband which had been stored in the closet of Maddox’s room were missing.   
Cynthia Byrnes was working at Harry’s Country Bar on the night of Friday, 
May 25, 2001, the night of these events.  She saw Kushmer and Maddox enter the 
                                          
 
 
1.  Taylor’s middle name is Kenneth. 
 
 
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bar that night, while Taylor was also present.  According to Byrnes, Maddox was 
drinking the most expensive liquor sold at the bar, paying for his drinks with 
twenty-dollar bills, and leaving good tips.  Byrnes testified that Maddox, Kushmer, 
and Taylor left the bar together.   
On Saturday, May 26, 2001, Tommy Riley awoke to see Taylor on his 
doorstep.  Later that morning, Taylor asked Riley to cash a $580 check, but Riley 
refused.  The name on the two-party check was William Maddox, and it was from 
a bank in California, where Maddox lived.  Later that evening, Taylor was in a bar 
where Riley worked as a bartender, paying for drinks with twenty-dollar bills.  The 
following morning, Sunday, May 27, 2001, Riley was advised by an employee at 
Harry’s Bar, where Taylor, Kushmer, and Maddox had been the night of the 
murder, that detectives were looking for Taylor.  Riley conveyed this information 
to Taylor, and he immediately left Riley’s house in his pickup truck.   
The detective in charge of investigating these crimes obtained information 
that Maddox’s credit cards had been used in Tampa, Florida; Valdosta, Georgia; 
and Memphis, Tennessee.  Based on this information, she contacted the United 
States Marshal’s Office in Tampa, which then relayed the information to the 
Marshal’s Office in Tennessee.  Deputy Marshal Scott Sanders of the Memphis 
office received the information on May 29, 2001, from the Tampa office that two 
warrants for Taylor’s arrest for federal probation violations were outstanding and 
 
 
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that Taylor might be in the Memphis area because he was believed to be in 
possession of credit cards that were being used in that location.   
The Tennessee marshals located Taylor’s pickup truck at a motel, and he 
was taken into custody.  Sanders wanted to search Taylor’s motel room at that time 
but he was unable to do so because he could not locate a Marshal’s Office consent 
form.  He then obtained a consent form from the Shelby County Sheriff’s Office, 
added the words “and the U.S. Marshals Office” to the top of the form, and filled it 
out, writing in the motel name and the room number to be searched.  Sanders 
explained the form to Taylor and told him the consent form was for his motel 
room.  According to Sanders, Taylor did not express any hesitation in signing the 
form.   
The search of Taylor’s room revealed a checkbook wallet containing checks 
in the name of Bill Maddox, three credit cards issued to Maddox, credit card 
receipts, a ticket from a pawn shop in Memphis, a Discover credit card issued to 
Sandra Kushmer, and a Texaco card issued to Barry Sikes, which Renate Sikes 
testified she had given to Kushmer.  Receipts dated May 29, 2001, indicated that 
the Maddox credit card had been used to purchase a gold chain and a wedding 
band.  The pawn shop ticket with the same date indicated that Taylor had pawned 
the two items.   
 
 
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When the lead Florida detective met with Taylor in Tennessee on May 30, 
2001, she asked him for consent to search his truck.  She read the applicable 
consent to search form to Taylor and he signed it.  Taylor was then presented a 
consent to interview form which he also signed.  The interview revealed that on 
Friday, May 25, 2001, Taylor called Kushmer and arranged a meeting at Harry’s 
Bar.  Taylor disclosed that early that evening, he encountered an unnamed 
individual who lived near the bar, and he told this individual that he (Taylor) 
wanted to rob the Sikes home.  This other person also had an interest in 
participating in the crime.  Later that evening, Maddox and Kushmer left the bar 
with Taylor and they went to the Sikes home.  Taylor confirmed that after the trio 
had beer and sandwiches, Taylor and Kushmer left the house and traveled to 
another bar, where they remained until approximately 12:30 a.m.  They then 
returned to the Sikes home.  When they arrived, the individual with whom Taylor 
had previously discussed the crime was in the driveway.  This individual struck 
Kushmer on the back of the head with a long black bar.  Kushmer fell to the 
ground, and Taylor removed two credit cards from her purse.  Taylor admitted that 
he then went into the Sikes home and discovered Maddox lying in a puddle of 
blood.  Taylor described the scene as the other unnamed individual in the bedroom 
going through the dresser drawers and a jewelry box.  According to Taylor, his 
partner in this crime heard a noise, checked outside, and advised Taylor that 
 
 
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Kushmer was now sitting up against the house.  Taylor stated that this other 
individual then took a shotgun that was leaning against the wall, telling Taylor, 
“I’m just going to hit her with it.”  While Taylor was removing the bag containing 
cameras from Maddox’s room, he heard a gunshot and went to the back of the 
house, where this other individual stated that he had shot Kushmer.  Taylor then 
carried Kushmer into the house and placed her on the floor.  Taylor then fled from 
the scene in his truck.  The next morning, Taylor and Jose Arano went to Ybor 
City.  Taylor said it was in a bar there that he used Maddox’s credit cards to pay 
for drinks, and a card was also used to purchase food.   
The day after the interview, the lead Florida detective searched Taylor’s 
truck and found a black bag on the floorboard which contained cameras and 
camera accessories.  The detective presented these items to Sikes, who identified 
them as belonging to her husband.  The detective then went to a bar in Memphis at 
which Taylor had used the Maddox credit cards and spoke with Pamela Williams, 
who disclosed that Taylor had purchased drinks for her at the bar on the night of 
May 28, 2001, and introduced himself to her as William Maddox.  She also 
showed the detective a note given to her by Taylor which he signed as “Bill 
Maddox” and identified himself as the owner of his own financial corporation.   
After speaking with Williams, the detective returned to interview Taylor 
again.  When Taylor was advised by the detective that she did not believe 
 
 
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everything he had related the day before, Taylor told her the interview was over.  
However, Taylor continued to speak, and at one point, he said, “I shot her.”  The 
detective inquired if Taylor understood that he had terminated the interview and 
whether he wished to continue.  Taylor replied that he did wish to continue.  Taylor 
then changed his prior version of the events and stated that after Kushmer had been 
hit by the unnamed individual with him, Taylor armed himself with a shotgun from 
his truck.  Taylor then stated that after he had burglarized the house and as he was 
leaving, he saw a movement and fired the shotgun in that direction.  Taylor 
described that when he discovered that he had shot Kushmer, he carried her inside 
the house, placed her on the floor, threw the gun in the back of his truck, and 
immediately left.  Taylor then stated that he pawned the shotgun and threw the 
clothes he was wearing in a dumpster.   
Almost a month later, the lead Florida detective was informed that Taylor 
wished to again speak with her at the jail.  When she arrived, Taylor gave the 
detective a letter that he had written which stated that during the earlier interviews, 
the detective had been “absolutely correct in [her] constant believing in the 
[unidentified] person being [Jose Arano].”  According to his letter, after Arano 
picked up Taylor’s ex-wife, Lorena, Taylor instructed him to go to the Sikes home 
and hide in front of the house with Lorena.  Taylor’s letter disclosed that as Taylor 
and Kushmer approached the front of the house at approximately 1:20 a.m., Lorena 
 
 
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came from her concealment and hit Kushmer with a crowbar.  Taylor then 
removed Kushmer’s keys from her purse, the three of them entered the Sikes 
home, and Taylor retrieved the shotgun from his truck.  Taylor’s letter stated that it 
was Arano who had beaten Maddox with the crowbar.  According to the letter, 
Lorena then heard a noise outside.  As Taylor went outside, someone turned the 
corner, and Taylor fired the gun in that direction.  When he realized that it was 
Kushmer, he brought her inside the house.  Taylor took the cameras, a couple of 
watches, and the keys to the rental car.  Taylor and Arano drove away from the 
Sikes home in separate vehicles (with Lorena riding in Taylor’s truck), and Taylor 
threw the car keys for the rental car in a ditch.  The three stopped at a 7-11, where 
Arano cleaned the crowbar and placed it in Lorena’s car.  Taylor gave Lorena the 
money and the watches and advised her to go to Miami.   
The medical examiner, Dr. Lee Miller, testified that the cause of Kushmer’s 
death was a shotgun wound to the head that penetrated her arteries and veins, 
which caused her to bleed to death.  Based on the available evidence, at the time of 
the shooting the shotgun had been pressed against Kushmer’s mouth.  The wound 
path was consistent with Kushmer having been in a sitting position.  The medical 
examiner was of the opinion that Kushmer’s wound was inconsistent with being 
shot by a person standing in the doorway of the house as she appeared around the 
 
 
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corner.  Additionally, the laceration on the back of Kushmer’s head was consistent 
with being struck by the butt of a shotgun.   
A blood spatter expert opined that the blood smears on the outside wall of 
the Sikes home were likely caused by Kushmer’s bloody hair.  Further, high- 
velocity blood spatter located to the left of the smears indicated that the spatter was 
caused by a gunshot wound.  The impact site was consistent with a victim who had 
been shot in the mouth while sitting or kneeling at the time.  The blood patterns 
inside the Sikes home were consistent with Kushmer’s body having been carried 
into the home and swung in an arc-like manner before being dropped on the floor.   
Latent fingerprints were lifted from beer bottles found in the garbage at the 
scene.  A fingerprint expert matched one latent fingerprint with the known print of 
Taylor’s right index finger.  The Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office collected 
the shotgun and the pawn ticket from the shop where Taylor had pawned the item.  
A different fingerprint examiner was of the opinion that a thumbprint on the pawn 
ticket from the shotgun transaction also matched the known fingerprints of Taylor.  
The Florida Department of Law Enforcement tested the shotgun, and two areas 
tested positive for blood.  DNA testing on the blood from these two areas 
generated partial DNA profiles that matched the profile of Maddox at three and 
four genetic points.   
 
 
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After hearing the evidence, the jury rendered a verdict finding Taylor guilty 
of first-degree murder as to the death of Kushmer, attempted first-degree murder as 
to William Maddox, robbery with a deadly weapon as to Maddox, robbery with a 
firearm as to Kushmer, and armed burglary of a dwelling.  During the penalty 
phase, the State presented the testimony of the victims of crimes from Taylor’s 
prior convictions for burglary, first-degree assault, and possession of a deadly 
weapon during the commission of a felony, who described the circumstances 
surrounding the crimes.  The parties also stipulated that at the time of the murder, 
Taylor was on federal felony probation.  Victim impact statements prepared by 
Renate Sikes, William Maddox, and William Maddox, Sr. (Kushmer’s father) were 
read to the jury.   
During the penalty phase, the defense presented videotaped depositions of 
three witnesses and live testimony from three additional witnesses.  Taylor’s 
maternal aunt disclosed that his stepfather physically and mentally abused him and 
beat his mother.  Josephine Quattrociocchi, who met Taylor in prison while 
visiting another inmate, was of the view that Taylor was a sincere and nice person.  
Taylor worked as a painter at one time, and his employer summarized that Taylor 
was an excellent worker, had initiative and a good work ethic, his work product 
was good, he could follow special instructions, and he did not require excessive 
supervision.  A former counselor at Glades Correctional Institution informed the 
 
 
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jury that Taylor had completed a drug program that he operated, and afterwards 
Taylor became a facilitator who assisted inmates in the drug program.   
The defense also presented mental health experts.  One diagnosed Taylor as 
suffering from a cognitive disorder, with deficits related primarily to the frontal 
lobe.  He also opined that Taylor met the criteria for Antisocial Personality 
Disorder and most of the criteria for Borderline Personality Disorder.  This expert 
also noted that Taylor himself and medical reports indicated that Taylor suffered a 
traumatic brain injury by falling from a scaffold in or around 1981, and after that, 
Taylor began to have headaches and seizures.  This expert ultimately concluded 
that Taylor has a chronic emotional disorder; i.e., frontal lobe syndrome, which 
was aggravated or exacerbated on the night of the murder by Taylor’s extensive 
consumption of alcohol.  Due to the circumstances of that evening and Taylor’s 
frontal lobe syndrome, his judgment was compromised to the extent that his ability 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired.   
A second expert diagnosed that Taylor had presented brain dysfunction in 
the form of frontal lobe impairment and evidenced impairment with regard to the 
formulation of intent and impulse control.  He concluded that Taylor suffered from 
epilepsy, which is consistent with a traumatic brain injury, based on the history that 
Taylor relayed and the medical records which detailed Taylor’s response to the 
antiseizure medication Dilantin.   
 
 
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A State expert responded to this mental health evidence and concluded that 
Taylor met the criteria for both Borderline and Antisocial Personality Disorders.  
In his view, while Taylor may have suffered seizures after the head injury that 
Taylor claimed to have suffered, there was no indication of a permanent seizure 
disorder.  The State expert found no evidence of frontal lobe or temporal lobe 
impairment in Taylor, and he concluded that Taylor’s reported head injury in the 
1980s did not result in any permanent brain damage.  This expert concluded that on 
the night of the murder, Taylor did not suffer from any mental disease or defect 
that substantially impaired his capacity to appreciate the criminal nature of his 
conduct or his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.   
After consideration of the evidence, the jury returned a recommendation of 
death by a vote of twelve to zero.  During the Spencer2 hearing, a defense mental 
health expert estimated that Taylor consumed ten beers and eight ounces of tequila 
and had smoked two or three marijuana joints on the day of the murder.  He 
testified that Taylor’s poor performance on tests that measure frontal lobe function 
was strongly indicative of frontal lobe damage and his neuropsychological deficits 
were more likely developmental in nature and likely preceded the head injury that 
Taylor suffered in the 1980s.    
                                          
 
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
 
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The trial judge sentenced Taylor to death for the murder of Kushmer.  In 
pronouncing Taylor’s sentence, the trial court determined that the State had proven 
the existence of three statutory aggravators:  (1) the murder was committed while 
Taylor was on felony probation, see § 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001); (2) Taylor 
had previously been convicted of a felony involving a threat of violence to the 
person, see § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001); and (3) the murder was committed 
for pecuniary gain, see § 921.141(5)(f), Fla. Stat. (2001).  The trial court assigned 
each of these factors great weight.  The court did not find that any statutory 
mitigators existed, but found a total of thirteen nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances, two of which were assigned modest weight, six were assigned some 
weight, two assigned little weight, and three were assigned minimum weight.3  In 
                                          
 
 
3.  The trial court found the following nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances:  (1) Taylor was under some mental or emotional disturbance at the 
time of the crime (some weight); (2) psychological trauma due to abuse and 
neglect in formative years (some weight); (3) psychological trauma due to 
deprivation in parental nurturing (some weight); (4) stepfather provided no 
emotional or parental support (modest weight); (5) neurological impairments 
affecting ability to control impulses (some weight); (6) learning disabilities, 
attention deficit problems, and problems with social interactions (some weight); (7) 
obtained GED in prison (minimum weight); (8) attempts to address and recover 
from drug dependence (modest weight); (9) good worker and dependable 
employee (minimum weight); (10) agreed to be interviewed and cooperated with 
the police (minimum weight); (11) history of substance abuse dating back to pre-
teen years (some weight); (12) under the influence of alcohol at time of crime 
(little weight); and (13) appropriate conduct during trial (little weight).   
 
 
 
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imposing a sentence of death, the trial court concluded that “[t]he aggravating 
circumstances in this case far outweigh the mitigating circumstances.”   
This direct appeal followed. 
ANALYSIS 
Guilt Phase4 
 
In his only challenge to the guilt phase proceedings, Taylor asserts that the 
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence that was obtained 
as a result of the search of his motel room in Memphis.  In this motion, Taylor 
alleged that the evidence was seized without a warrant and as the result of an 
illegal search because he believed that the consent form he signed was only 
permission to search his truck.   
We have stated that “[a] trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress comes to 
us clothed with a presumption of correctness and, as the reviewing court, we must 
interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom 
in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.”  Connor v. State, 
803 So. 2d 598, 605 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Murray v. State, 692 So. 2d 157, 159 
(Fla. 1997)).  Nevertheless, “mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately 
                                          
 
 
4.  Although not challenged by Taylor, this Court independently reviews the 
evidence to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to support his first-degree 
murder conviction.  See Sexton v. State, 775 So. 2d 923, 933 (Fla. 2000) (“[I]t is 
this Court’s independent obligation to review the record for sufficiency of 
evidence.”).  We conclude that there was competent, substantial evidence to find 
Taylor guilty of the first-degree murder of Sandra Kushmer.  
 
 
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determine constitutional rights should be reviewed by appellate courts using a two-
step approach, deferring to the trial court on questions of historical fact but 
conducting a de novo review of the constitutional issue.”  Id.  
At the suppression hearing, there was a dispute in the evidence with regard 
to the consent to search form that Taylor signed.  Taylor testified that when the 
deputy marshal provided the consent form, it had no handwriting, and he believed 
that the consent was only for a search of his truck.  According to Taylor, when the 
deputy marshal presented him with the form: 
They read it to me and asked me would I sign it so they could take my 
pickup away because they needed to get inside and take stuff out, they 
needed to get evidence out of the pickup truck, and I said, yes, I’ll 
sign the warrant to take the evidence out of the pickup truck.   
Taylor thought the form was only for a search of his truck because when he was 
initially taken into custody, officers went into his room at that time to search for 
other individuals.  On cross-examination, Taylor testified that he never questioned 
why the consent to search form that he was asked to sign was blank.  However, he 
also admitted that he was familiar with such forms because he had been arrested 
approximately four times in the past.  Taylor conceded that he did not question 
why the Florida investigator requested that he sign a consent form to search his 
truck the next day (even though he believed he had already consented to a search 
of the truck), nor did he question the propriety of the search of his room when the 
Florida officer advised him that evidence had been found there.   
 
 
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The Tennessee deputy marshal, who at the time of trial had been employed 
with the Marshal’s Office for eighteen years, offered a different account of the 
events.  He testified that after he obtained a consent form from the Shelby County 
Sheriff’s Office, he “filled [it] out and then talked with Mr. Taylor and explained 
the form to him and asked for permission to search the room.”  The deputy marshal 
stated that he read the form to Taylor line-by-line, including the handwritten 
additions, and testified at the suppression hearing that this has been his standard 
practice for years.  He stated that he was not interested in searching the vehicle at 
that time because “[Florida officials] would be processing it for . . .  evidence . . . .  
[W]e knew it was going to be secured and it would be searched at a later time.”  
The deputy marshal did not believe there had been any discussion concerning a 
search of the vehicle at that time; at most, he may have asked Taylor if there were 
any narcotics or weapons in the truck.  A second deputy marshal observed the 
reading of the consent form to Taylor, watched Taylor sign the form, and also 
signed the form.   
 
The trial court ultimately found “the consent to search was signed freely and 
voluntarily” and denied the motion to suppress based on the following facts:  (1) 
the deputy was a veteran supervisor of the Marshal’s Office; (2) Taylor’s claim 
that the form was blank at the time it was read to him “ma[de] no sense”; (3) 
Taylor’s familiarity with consent to search forms; (4) Taylor’s failure to question 
 
 
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the signing of a second consent to search form for his truck; and (5) Taylor’s 
failure to object when the Florida officer stated that evidence had been recovered 
from his room.  The trial court specifically found the deputy marshal’s testimony 
to be credible.  
 
This Court “recognize[s] and honor[s] the trial court’s superior vantage point 
in assessing the credibility of witnesses and in making findings of fact.  The 
deference that appellate courts afford findings of fact based on competent, 
substantial evidence is an important principle of appellate review.  In many 
instances, the trial court is in a superior position ‘to evaluate and weigh the 
testimony and evidence based upon its observation of the bearing, demeanor, and 
credibility of the witnesses.’ ”  Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1034 (Fla. 
1999) (quoting Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. 1976)).  During the 
suppression hearing, the trial court considered the conflicting testimony of Taylor 
and the deputy marshal, observed their demeanor, and concluded that the testimony 
of the deputy marshal was more credible.  We conclude that these findings of 
historical fact are supported by competent, substantial evidence, and we defer to 
the conclusion that Taylor gave free and voluntary consent to search his motel 
room.  Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to 
suppress.  See Jorgenson v. State, 714 So. 2d 423, 426 (Fla. 1998) (concluding that 
 
 
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“a search will be considered lawful if conducted pursuant to consent which was 
given freely and voluntarily”).    
Penalty Phase 
I.  Jury Instructions 
 
Taylor asserts that Florida’s standard jury instructions are unconstitutional 
for two reasons.  He first claims that the instructions unconstitutionally shift the 
burden of proof to the defendant by instructing that the jury has the duty to 
recommend a sentence based on whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist 
to outweigh any existing aggravating circumstances.  Taylor further claims that 
Florida’s standard jury instructions unconstitutionally minimize and denigrate the 
role of the jury in violation of  Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), by 
repeatedly advising the jury that its verdict is only advisory and informing the jury 
that the decision as to sentence rests solely with the court.  We reject both of these 
assertions. 
 
As to the first challenge, this Court has repeatedly rejected the argument that 
the standard penalty phase jury instructions impermissibly shift the burden to the 
defense to prove that death is not the appropriate sentence.  See, e.g., Elledge v. 
State, 911 So. 2d 57, 79 (Fla. 2005); Sweet v. Moore, 822 So. 2d 1269, 1274 (Fla. 
2002).  Further, despite this challenge to the standard jury instruction, the trial 
judge in this case did not use the standard instruction.  The trial court in 
 
 
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preliminary proceedings informed the parties that she was going to use a modified 
instruction which informed the jury that only if the jury finds that the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances could a sentence of death be 
recommended: 
Court:  I would intend to read an instruction that indicates only if the 
aggravators outweigh.  In other words, it does away with the 
possibility of shifting the burden.  You understand what I am saying? 
State:  I understand.  But that’s the standard instruction that I go off 
of. 
Court:  The standard isn’t going to get it, okay.  This is a death 
penalty case.  As far as I’m concerned, the standard is . . . it’s extreme 
due process.  So if there is a doubt as to which way––what harm is it?  
That’s really what you are asking them to do.  The burden really is on 
the State. 
Since the judge at trial did not read the standard jury instruction that Taylor asserts 
to be erroneous, but read an instruction that required the jurors to determine if the 
aggravators found outweighed the mitigators in rendering an advisory sentence, we 
conclude that Taylor’s claim is without merit on this issue. 
 
With regard to Taylor’s Caldwell challenge, this Court has previously held 
that the standard jury instruction fully advises the jury of the importance of its role 
and does not unconstitutionally denigrate that role.  See Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 
274, 283 (Fla. 1998) (citing Burns v. State, 699 So. 2d 646, 654 (Fla. 1997), and 
Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 637, 647 (Fla. 1995)).  This Court has also held that 
the decision in Caldwell is inapplicable to death penalty cases in Florida.  See 
Combs v. State, 525 So. 2d 853, 856 (Fla. 1988).   
 
 
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Further, as with Taylor’s first jury instruction challenge, the judge in this 
case did not give the standard jury instruction.  Rather, at the beginning of the trial 
and in the actual jury instruction, the judge repeatedly informed the jury that great 
weight would be given to its recommended sentence.  Even before voir dire, the 
court told the prospective jurors: 
Now, it is the judge’s responsibility to impose a sentence in any case, 
including a case involving murder in the first degree.  However, 
however––and this is important, I want you to hear me very carefully–
–in a case where a jury makes a recommendation of a sentence of 
either life or death, it is only under very, very rare circumstances 
where a Court would impose a sentence other than the one 
recommended by the jury. 
I’m going to repeat that.  Although it’s the judge’s job, in any 
case, to sentence a defendant, in any case, in a case involving the 
charge of murder in the first degree where a jury is called upon to 
make a recommendation as far as sentencing is concerned, it is only 
under the very rarest of circumstances when a judge would not follow 
the jury’s recommendation. 
During the penalty phase, the judge instructed the jurors as follows: 
As you have been told, the final decision as to what punishment shall 
be imposed is the responsibility of the judge. 
 
However, your advisory sentence must be given great weight 
by the Court in determining what sentence to impose upon the 
defendant.  And it is only under very rare circumstances that the Court 
could impose a different sentence. 
The argument Taylor presents has been rejected by this Court, see Brown, 721 So. 
2d at 283, and the trial judge did not use the standard jury instruction; therefore, we 
conclude that this claim is similarly without merit. 
II. Ring Claims 
 
 
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Taylor claims that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), invalidated Florida’s capital sentencing procedures.  
Taylor also argues that Ring requires that: (1) the recommendation of death be 
unanimous; (2) the aggravators be alleged in the indictment; and (3) the 
aggravators be individually found by a unanimous jury verdict.  
This Court has rejected each of Taylor’s arguments in prior decisions.  In 
Jones v. State, 845 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2003), we rejected the claim that Florida’s 
capital sentencing scheme violates the United States Constitution under Ring.  See 
id. at 74 (citing Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 
1070 (2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 
1067 (2002)).  Furthermore, one of the aggravating factors found by the trial court 
in this case was a prior conviction of a violent felony, a factor “which under 
Apprendi and Ring need not be found by the jury.”  Jones v. State, 855 So. 2d 611, 
619 (Fla. 2003).5  Finally, this Court has rejected Ring claims in direct death 
appeals where the recommendations for the imposition of death were unanimous, 
as occurred in the instant case.  See Crain v. State, 894 So. 2d 59, 78 (Fla. 2004), 
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 47 (2005).   
Taylor’s remaining challenges have already been rejected by this Court in 
prior decisions.  See Parker v. State, 904 So. 2d 370, 383 (Fla. 2005) (“This Court 
                                          
 
 
5.  We reject Taylor’s claim that the existence of a prior violent felony 
aggravator should not bar the application of Ring to death sentences. 
 
 
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has repeatedly held that it is not unconstitutional for a jury to recommend death on 
a simple majority vote . . . [and] has rejected claims that Ring v. Arizona . . . 
requires aggravating circumstances to be individually found by a unanimous jury 
verdict.”); Brown v. Moore, 800 So. 2d 223, 224-25 (Fla. 2001) (rejecting 
constitutional challenge predicated on the failure to list aggravating factors in the 
indictment).  Accordingly, we conclude that Taylor’s claims are without merit.  
III.  Proportionality Review 
 
Finally, Taylor asserts that the imposition of the death sentence for the 
murder of Sandra Kushmer is disproportionate because it constitutes one of the 
least aggravated and most mitigated of crimes.  To ensure uniformity in death 
penalty proceedings, this Court conducts a comprehensive analysis to determine 
whether the crime falls within the category of both the most aggravated and the 
least mitigated of murders, as we attempt to afford uniformity in the application of 
the sentence.  See Floyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 564, 578 (Fla. 2005).  Death is a 
unique punishment, and it is necessary that we engage in a thoughtful, deliberate 
proportionality review to consider the totality of circumstances and to compare 
each case with other capital cases.  This process is not a comparison between the 
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  See Crook v. State, 908 So. 
2d 350, 356 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 
1990)).  Further, despite Taylor’s assertion to the contrary, the mere absence of the 
 
 
- 23 -
heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravators 
is not absolutely controlling as we conduct a proportionality analysis.  See Larkins 
v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999).   
The jury here recommended the death penalty by a vote of twelve to zero.  
The trial court found such punishment to be appropriate after considering all 
evidence and properly weighing the aggravation with the mitigation.  In sentencing 
Taylor to death, the trial court found the following three statutory aggravators and 
gave each great weight:  (1) Taylor had previously been convicted of a felony 
involving a threat of violence to the person; (2) the murder was committed for 
pecuniary gain; and (3) the murder was committed while Taylor was on felony 
probation.   
With regard to the prior violent felony, the trial court found that Taylor had 
committed two prior felonies that involved the use or threat of violence.  At the age 
of seventeen, Taylor shot a woman in the neck and back through a window in her 
home while she was sitting at a table.  Taylor’s victim attempted to call her 
daughter for help, but she could not speak because her throat was filled with blood. 
She was forced to ultimately walk across the street to a neighbor’s house to obtain 
assistance.  In a second prior criminal incident, Taylor struck a female 
acquaintance in the face when she discovered Taylor burglarizing her room.  In 
 
 
- 24 -
concluding that the latter crime qualified as an aggravating violent felony, the trial 
judge stated: 
[T]his is not a run-of-the-mill, push-and-shove, get out of the way.  
He took his fist and shoved it in her face full force, evidently.  . . .  
You know, her jaw could have been broken.  Her neck could have 
snapped.  . . .  So as far as I’m concerned she was lucky.  She was 
very, very lucky . . . . 
In affording this aggravator great weight, the trial court noted that “each [of these] 
crime[s] definitely shows that at an early age and without provocation, [Taylor] 
acted violently toward others.  Either crime standing alone, would have caused the 
Court to give this circumstance great weight.”  The trial court found the defense 
assertion that the crimes occurred twenty-seven years ago to be without major 
impact because “for approximately twenty-three of the last twenty-seven years 
[Taylor] has been confined.”    
In mitigation, the trial judge found the following thirteen nonstatutory 
mitigating factors:  (1) Taylor was under some mental or emotional disturbance at 
the time of the crime (some weight); (2) Taylor suffered psychological trauma 
from abuse and neglect during his formative years (some weight); (3) Taylor 
suffered psychological trauma due to deprivation in parental nurturing (some 
weight); (4) Taylor’s stepfather provided Taylor with no emotional or parental 
support (modest weight); (5) Taylor suffered from neurological impairments 
affecting his ability to control impulses (some weight); (6) Taylor suffered from 
 
 
- 25 -
learning disabilities, attention deficit problems, and problems with social 
interactions (some weight); (7) Taylor had obtained his GED in prison (minimum 
weight); (8) Taylor had made attempts to address and recover from his drug 
dependence (modest weight); (9) Taylor was a good worker and dependable 
employee (minimum weight); (10) Taylor agreed to be interviewed and cooperated 
with the police (minimum weight); (11) Taylor has a history of substance abuse 
dating back to his preteen years (some weight); (12) Taylor was under the 
influence of alcohol at time of crime (little weight); and (13) Taylor behaved 
appropriately during trial (little weight).   
Having independently reviewed the totality of circumstances, we conclude 
that this case falls among the most aggravated of murders.  The record 
conclusively demonstrates that Taylor was with Kushmer for a significant part of 
the evening of May 25, 2001, while he planned the crime.  He drove Kushmer and 
Maddox home from Harry’s Bar, and then proceeded to have drinks and food with 
them before going to another bar with Kushmer.  From these actions, it is apparent 
that Taylor had secured Kushmer’s trust and she considered him to be a friend.  
However, when they returned to the Sikes home, Taylor, who is six feet, three 
inches tall, incapacitated Kushmer, who was five feet, two inches tall, and weighed 
ninety-five pounds, by striking her on the back of the head with the butt of a 
shotgun.  Kushmer was left unconscious outside the house as he proceeded to enter 
 
 
- 26 -
the home, savagely beat Maddox with the shotgun as he slept,6 and steal items 
from the residence.  When Kushmer began to regain consciousness, Taylor could 
have easily fled the premises with Kushmer on the ground, injured, possibly 
intoxicated, and she posed no immediate threat.  Instead, Taylor chose to place a 
gun against Kushmer’s mouth and fire a shotgun into her head.  After the murder, 
Taylor used the stolen credit cards to buy drinks for his friends and women at bars 
and to buy items that were pawned for quick cash.  Taylor even identified himself 
at a bar as business owner Bill Maddox.  Taylor had a history of violent felonies 
and, with the other aggravation, we conclude that this senseless and brutal murder 
falls under the category of the most aggravated of crimes, and it is not outweighed 
by the mitigation found to exist. 
The cases advanced by Taylor to assert that the death penalty is 
disproportionate are clearly distinguishable.  In Voorhees v. State, 699 So. 2d 602 
(Fla. 1997), and Sager v. State, 699 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1997), which involved 
codefendants to the same murder, we reversed the death penalty for each of the 
defendants in part because we concluded that the murder resulted from a 
spontaneous fight.  See Voorhees, 699 So. 2d at 605.  We noted that both the 
victim and the defendants had been drinking and were intoxicated at the time of the 
                                          
 
 
6.  At trial, Dr. Scott Gallagher, who was chief resident of surgery at Tampa 
General Hospital and treated Maddox for his head injuries, testified that Maddox’s 
injuries were “the most significant or severe assault to the head in a patient that I 
have seen survive.”   
 
 
- 27 -
incident.  See id. at 615.  In reversing the sentences, we reasoned that defendant 
Voorhees suffered from alcoholism and had an abnormal reaction to alcohol, see 
id., while defendant Sager suffered from mental illness, and “there was evidence 
that Voorhees was the leader of the two.”  Sager, 699 So. 2d at 623.  On the other 
hand, Taylor’s actions prior to the murder of Kushmer were not part of a 
spontaneous confrontation, but rather were the result of a formulated plan by 
Taylor.  Further, even though both Kushmer and Taylor had been drinking that 
night, the murder of Kushmer was not preceded by a spontaneous drunken fight.   
The other cases upon which the defense relies are similarly distinguishable.  
Cf. Kramer v. State, 619 So. 2d 274, 278 (Fla. 1993) (reversing death penalty 
where “[t]he evidence in its worst light suggests nothing more than a spontaneous 
fight, occurring for no discernible reason, between a disturbed alcoholic and a man 
who was legally drunk”); Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 954, 965-66 (Fla. 1996) 
(reversing death penalty where murder resulted from a “robbery gone bad”; 
concluding that “the aggravation [was] not extensive given the totality of the 
underlying circumstances”).  Instead, the instant case is significantly more 
analogous to Shellito v. State, 701 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1997), wherein we affirmed the 
imposition of the death penalty.  In Shellito, an eighteen-year-old defendant “saw a 
man walking down the street, stopped and shook him down, and, after determining 
that the man had no money, shot him.”  701 So. 2d at 839.   In that case, the trial 
 
 
- 28 -
court found the aggravators of prior violent felony and pecuniary gain/murder 
committed during a robbery (which were merged).  See id. at 840.  In the instant 
case, the prior violent felony and pecuniary gain aggravators were also found to 
exist.  Further, like the present case, the defendant in Shellito was on probation at 
the time he committed the murder.  See id. at 845.  Additionally, in concluding that 
the trial court in Shellito did not err in giving the defendant’s claims of mental 
illness slight weight, we noted that evidence of the defendant’s mental condition 
was conflicting.  See id. at 844.  Likewise, in the instant case, the expert testimony 
conflicted as to whether Taylor suffered from frontal lobe impairment or a 
permanent seizure disorder. 
In light of the foregoing, we hold that Taylor’s death sentence is not 
disproportionate to other capital cases where death has been imposed.   
CONCLUSION 
Having received oral argument and thoughtfully considered each of the 
issues presented in this direct appeal, we affirm Taylor’s convictions and the 
sentence of death. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
PARIENTE, C.J., concurs with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J., concurs. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs as to the convictions and concurs in result only as to the 
sentence. 
 
 
 
- 29 -
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
PARIENTE, C.J., concurring. 
 
I concur in the majority opinion and write separately to commend the trial 
judge for using special instructions that gave jurors a better and more complete 
picture of their roles in the capital sentencing process than the standard 
instructions.  However, I believe that under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), 
jurors should also be told that they are the finders of fact as to aggravating 
circumstances that qualify a defendant for the death penalty. 
 
The trial court’s instruction on the weight that the court would give the 
sentence recommendation was an improved elaboration on the standard instruction, 
which informs the jury that its recommendation would be an “advisory sentence” 
and that the final sentencing decision would rest solely with the judge.  See Fla. 
Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.11.  Echoing instructions given before voir dire, the judge 
acknowledged that the final sentencing decision rested with her, but added: 
However, your advisory sentence must be given great weight by the 
Court in determining what sentence to impose upon the defendant.  
And it is only under very rare circumstances that the Court could 
impose a different sentence. 
(Emphasis supplied.)  This instruction correctly reflected the law concerning the 
jury’s role and conveys to jurors the gravity of a death recommendation.  See 
Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975) (stating that jury recommendation 
 
 
- 30 -
should be given great weight and life recommendation should not be overridden 
unless “the facts suggesting a sentence of death [are] so clear and convincing that 
virtually no reasonable person could differ”). 
 
As noted by the majority, this Court has repeatedly rejected challenges to the 
standard instructions based on Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), in 
which the United States Supreme Court ruled that a prosecutor’s argument to a 
capital sentencing jury that its decision is reviewable and not final diminished the 
jurors’ sense of responsibility in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  However, 
the cases cited by the majority predate Ring.  As Justice Lewis stated shortly after 
Ring, the standard penalty phase instructions in Florida may inaccurately reflect 
the Sixth Amendment role played by the jury in deciding whether the defendant 
lives or dies.  See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 731-33 (Fla. 2002) (Lewis, 
J., concurring in result only).  In my view, and as I have stated before, trial judges 
should also inform jurors that they are the finders of fact on aggravating 
circumstances.  See Globe v. State, 877 So. 2d 663, 680 (Fla. 2004) (Pariente, J., 
specially concurring) (concluding that in light of Ring, “[a]t the very least, jurors 
should be told that they are the finders of fact on aggravating circumstances”). 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County,  
Barbara Fleischer, Judge - Case No. 01-CF-00-8692A 
 
J. Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Andrea M. Norgard, Special Assistant 
Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Carol M. Dittmar, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee