Title: Douglas v. Ad Astra Info. Sys., LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 101445
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: February 8, 2013

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 101,445 
 
DANNY DOUGLAS, 
Claimant/Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
AD ASTRA INFORMATION SYSTEMS, L.L.C., 
Respondent/Appellant, 
 
and 
 
HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Insurance Carrier/Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1.  
 
Statutory interpretation is a question of law over which appellate review is 
unlimited. The interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency is not binding upon 
the appellate court; the doctrine of operative construction is no longer applicable in 
Kansas. 
 
2.  
 When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to 
any rules of statutory construction.  
 
3.  
A legal treatise may be utilized to explain and interpret Kansas law, but it cannot 
serve to supplant or alter the actual text of a statute. 
 
2 
 
 
 
4. 
 
K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 44-508(f) sets forth the circumstances under which injuries 
sustained by employees while engaged in recreational or social events will not be 
construed as arising out of and in the course of employment for purposes of workers 
compensation benefits. The circumstances that will exclude an employee's injuries from 
coverage under the Workers Compensation Act are where the employee was under no 
duty to attend the recreational or social event and where the injury did not result from the 
performance of tasks related to the employee's normal job duties or as specifically 
instructed to be performed by the employer. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 42 Kan. App. 2d 441, 213 P.3d 764 (2009). 
Appeal from Workers Compensation Board. Opinion filed February 8, 2013. Judgment of the Court of 
Appeals affirming the Workers Compensation Board is reversed. Judgment of the Workers Compensation 
Board is reversed and remanded to the Board with directions. 
 
Jennifer M. Hill, of McDonald, Tinker, Skaer, Quinn & Herrington, P.A., of Wichita, argued the 
cause, and Tracy M. Vetter, of Law Offices of Steve Piland, of Overland Park, was on the brief for 
appellants.  
 
Daniel M. Smith, of Ankerholz and Smith, of Overland Park, argued the cause and was on the 
brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
JOHNSON, J.:  Danny Douglas was awarded benefits under the Workers 
Compensation Act (Act) for an injury he sustained while operating a go-cart at an event 
sponsored by his employer, Ad Astra Information Systems, L.L.C. The employer and its 
insurance carrier, Hartford Insurance Company, (hereafter collectively referred to as Ad 
Astra) appealed the award, claiming that Douglas' injuries were not compensable under 
K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 44-508(f) because they were sustained during a recreational or social 
3 
 
 
 
event that Douglas was not required to attend. The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, 
affirmed the Workers Compensation Board (Board), and we granted Ad Astra's petition 
for review. Concluding that the Board applied the incorrect legal standard, we reverse 
and remand this case to the Board for further proceedings in conformance with the plain 
language of K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 44-508(f).  
 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW 
 
At the time of his injuries, Douglas worked as a computer support analyst for Ad 
Astra, a software company in Overland Park, Kansas. His normal duties required him to 
answer questions and solve customers' problems regarding Ad Astra's software between 
the hours of 8 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday.  
 
On November 3, 2006, Douglas received an e-mail inviting him to attend a 
company-sponsored event that afternoon at Sadler's, a facility that contains games and a 
go-cart track. Ad Astra employees were given the option of either attending the event or 
remaining at work. Douglas and at least one other employee testified that they felt 
pressured to attend the event; only two or three employees remained at their normal work 
stations. Ad Astra had arranged the special event primarily to show its appreciation to its 
employees for their recent work at a client conference, but some of the employees viewed 
the event as a "team builder." The company had reserved exclusive use of the go-cart 
track and covered all of the event expenses, including food. Ad Astra deducted the cost of 
the event as a necessary business expense. Employees were paid their full wage while 
attending the event. An employee who had scheduled vacation that day was permitted to 
take the time off, but was required to count the time as vacation. 
 
Upon arriving at Sadler's, the employees were directed to a room which had been 
reserved for them by Ad Astra and where food was provided for them. The company's 
owner, Tom Shaver, gave a short speech thanking the employees for their work on a 
4 
 
 
 
recent conference and, according to Douglas, gave a brief pep talk about one of the 
company's upcoming products. The employees were then divided into teams and asked to 
compete for prizes. The teams with the fastest lap times around the go-cart track would 
win. Douglas stated that he would normally not race a go-cart but that he agreed to race 
because he wanted to be a part of his team.  
 
Racing his go-cart in the team competition, Douglas encountered another go-cart 
stopped on the track, prompting him to sharply turn to avoid a collision while traveling at 
an estimated 20 to 30 miles an hour. Douglas crashed his go-cart into a tire wall and was 
thrown from the vehicle, landing on his right side. After the wreck, Douglas experienced 
pain and did not race again, although he remained at the event for the rest of the workday.  
 
Later that night, Douglas sought medical treatment for the injuries he sustained in 
the wreck. He was subsequently diagnosed with multiple injuries, including a rib fracture; 
pulmonary contusions; reduced pulmonary function; and a lung injury that required 
surgery. A court-appointed physician ultimately concluded that Douglas sustained a 15 
percent permanent impairment as the result of his injuries from the go-cart wreck.  
 
Workers compensation evidentiary hearing 
 
Before the administrative law judge (ALJ), Ad Astra denied that the accident was 
compensable because Douglas was engaged in a recreational or social event and was 
neither required to attend the event nor performing tasks related to his normal job duties. 
Douglas testified that he felt obligated to attend the event. He believed that it was 
designed for team building and that Ad Astra expected him to attend. Douglas also 
testified that he believed employees were not free to leave the event before 5 p.m. 
because the employees were told they would have to work at their normal duties if they 
did not attend the event. 
 
5 
 
 
 
Ad Astra's owners, Tom and Jackie Shaver, indicated that they intended the 
gathering at Sadler's to be a "thank you" to the employees and a fun event which was not 
mandatory. But Tom Shaver also stated that the event was intended to boost morale and 
increase enthusiasm towards the company and its products. Jackie Shaver testified that 
the e-mail invitations did not indicate that the Sadler's function was mandatory and that 
neither she nor her husband pressured employees to attend. Although she wanted the 
employees to attend the event, the two or three employees who did not attend were not 
reprimanded.  
 
Another employee, Joy Hoffman, stated that she felt some peer pressure to attend 
the Sadler's function and she perceived the event to be a team building exercise. Despite 
that perception, she admitted that no one ever told her the event was mandatory. 
Ultimately, however, Hoffman did not attend because she felt ill; she opted to remain at 
the Ad Astra offices.  
 
Another employee, Stacy White, testified that the purpose of the event was to do 
"something fun" and was meant as a thank you. She also did not feel that it was 
mandatory. According to White, team building may have been the idea behind the 
function, but it was not expressly stated. White indicated that she left early to pick up her 
children from daycare and that no one told her she was required to stay. She further stated 
that she was not forced to make up the missed time and was not reprimanded by her 
employers for leaving early.  
 
After hearing the evidence, the ALJ determined that Douglas' injuries were 
compensable. The ALJ awarded Douglas compensation for a 15 percent whole person 
permanent impairment, and Ad Astra appealed. 
 
6 
 
 
 
Appeal to the Board 
 
 On appeal, Ad Astra continued its argument that Douglas' claim was barred by 
K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 44-508(f). Ultimately, the Board affirmed the ALJ's award. 
 
The Board noted that the Act expressly states that it should be liberally construed 
to bring employers and employees within its provisions, but that once the Act's 
applicability has been determined, its provisions must be applied impartially. K.S.A. 
2006 Supp. 44-501(g). The Board then turned its attention to interpreting K.S.A. 2006 
Supp. 44-508(f), which provides:  
 
 
"The words, 'arising out of and in the course of employment' as used in the 
workers compensation act shall not be construed to include injuries to employees while 
engaged in recreational or social events under circumstances where the employee was 
under no duty to attend and where the injury did not result from the performance of tasks 
related to the employee's normal job duties or as specifically instructed to be performed 
by the employer." 
 
The Board opined that the Act does not define what a recreational or social event 
might be. Therefore, it utilized the three factors for determining whether recreational and 
social activities fall within the course of a worker's employment set forth in 2 Larson's 
Workers' Compensation Law § 22.01, p. 22-2 (2009). The Board described the Larson's 
factors as:  (1) whether the employer expressly or impliedly requires participation in the 
activity or brings the activity within the orbit of employment by making the activity part 
of the service of employment; (2) whether the employer derives a benefit from the 
employee's participation beyond the benefits of the employee's health and morale; and (3) 
whether the activities occur on the employer's premises during lunch or recreation period 
as a regular incident of the employment. 
 
7 
 
 
 
With respect to the first factor, the Board noted that the claimant and at least one 
other employee believed that participation in the event was required and that the 
employer had exerted some pressure on them to attend. The Board listed the 
circumstances that would support the implication that employees were required to attend 
the event and participate in go-cart racing. For instance, when Douglas arrived at 
Sadler's, he was directed to a room reserved for Ad Astra employees and assigned to a 
racing team by a coowner. The only alternative to event participation was to remain at 
work, effectively motivating employees to attend the social or recreational event. A 
coowner conceded that she wanted her employees to attend the event. 
 
With respect to the second Larson's factor—the employer's benefit from the 
employee's participation—the Board first noted that the activity was promoted by Ad 
Astra as a reward for its employees' work at a client conference. But it then considered 
that one coowner had given a brief speech regarding a new product and the other 
coowner had assigned the employees to teams for racing go-carts, implying a team-
building activity. The Board opined that if the sole purpose was to reward employees for 
past work, "it seems the more traditional cash bonuses or time off from work could have 
been utilized." 
 
For the third factor, the Board looked at Larson's declaration that recreational 
injuries incurred by an employee during the noon hour on the employer's premises have 
been held compensable in the majority of cases. Acknowledging that the injury did not 
occur on Ad Astra's normal work premises, the Board pointed out that the accident 
occurred on premises that Ad Astra had reserved exclusively for its employees to have 
lunch and race go-carts. The Board was also persuaded by the fact that Ad Astra was 
paying Douglas his normal wage at the time of the accident. Likewise, although the 
Sadler's event was not a regular incident of employment, Ad Astra routinely provided 
lunch for its employees (as it did here) 1 day a week. 
8 
 
 
 
 
After discussing Hizey v. MCI, 39 Kan. App. 2d 609, 181 P.3d 583, rev. denied 
286 Kan. 1177 (2008), where an injury during a voluntary dance contest was found to 
have arisen out of and in the course of employment, the Board held as follows: 
 
"There was, at a minimum, an implied requirement or some duty to attend the 
event, and claimant was assigned to a team which indicates that team building was a 
component of the event. Moreover he was encouraged to drive fast in the race. He was 
paid while attending the event at a location reserved for respondent's employees. 
Understanding that work often entails social interaction and that the Workers 
Compensation Act was intended to be liberally construed to bring employers and 
employees within its provisions, the Board finds claimant's accident did not occur during 
a recreational or social event as contemplated by K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 44-508(f)." 
 
Court of Appeals decision 
 
On appeal, a split panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Board. Douglas v. Ad 
Astra Information Systems, 42 Kan. App. 2d 441, 213 P.3d 764 (2009). One of Ad Astra's 
arguments on appeal was that the Board had erred in applying the Larson's factors, rather 
than following the statutory language of K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 44-508(f). The panel 
majority rejected that argument, agreeing with the Board that "the Act does not define 
what constitutes recreational or social events contemplated by K.S.A. [2006] Supp. 44-
508(f)." 42 Kan. App. 2d at 449. Citing to a number of cases in which Kansas appellate 
courts have referred to Larson's treatise on workers compensation, the majority 
concluded that the Board did not err in utilizing those treatise factors. 42 Kan. App. 2d at 
449. 
 
Notwithstanding the majority's finding that it was appropriate to use the Larson's 
factors, its opinion focused on the "no duty to attend" language in K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 44-
508(f). Acknowledging that the evidence was undisputed that Douglas' attendance at the 
9 
 
 
 
Sadler's event was not mandatory, the majority opined that fact did not establish that 
Douglas was under no duty to attend. Rather, it found that the question presented on 
appeal was whether the Board's determination that Douglas was under "some duty" to 
attend the Sadler's event was supported by substantial evidence. 42 Kan. App. 2d at 454. 
Reviewing the record as a whole, without reweighing the evidence, the majority found 
sufficient support for the Board's factual finding regarding Douglas' duty to attend the 
event and, therefore, determined that the Board had not erred in declining to exclude 
Douglas' injuries under K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 44-508(f). 42 Kan. App. 2d at 454. 
 
 
The dissent disagreed with the majority's holding that the Board properly 
consulted the Larson's factors because the dissent found the phrase "recreational or social 
events" to be unambiguous within the context of K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 44-508(f). Moreover, 
the dissent would have resolved any perceived ambiguity by looking at the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the words utilized by the legislature, rather than resorting to a 
treatise to develop a different standard to apply. 42 Kan. App. 2d at 454-55 (Green, J., 
dissenting). In the dissent's view, the statutory phrase "no duty to attend" means the same 
as "was not required to attend," i.e., if an employee is not required to attend a particular 
recreational event, then the employee is not under a duty to attend the recreational event. 
42 Kan. App. 2d at 457-58. The dissent discerned that the only support for the majority 
position was Douglas' perception that he had "some" duty to attend the event and that 
utilizing that subjective standard would effectively render K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 44-508(f) 
meaningless. The dissent would have reversed the Board and found Douglas statutorily 
barred from recovering workers compensation benefits for his injuries. 42 Kan. App. 2d 
at 459. 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
INTERPRETATION OF K.S.A. 2006 SUPP. 44-508(f) 
 
Standard of Review 
 
Generally, the issue of whether an employee's accident arose out of and in the 
course of employment for workers compensation purposes is a question of fact. 
Titterington v. Brooke Insurance, 277 Kan. 888, 896, 89 P.3d 643 (2004). But to the 
extent we are called upon to interpret K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 44-508(f), we are presented 
with a question of law over which our review is unlimited. See Unruh v. Purina Mills, 
289 Kan. 1185, 1193, 221 P.3d 1130 (2009).  
 
In dealing with a statute in a workers compensation appeal, no deference is due the 
interpretation or construction given the statute by an ALJ or the Board. Higgins v. 
Abilene Machine, Inc., 288 Kan. 359, 361, 204 P.3d 1156 (2009). To be crystal clear, we 
unequivocally declare here that the doctrine of operative construction, as described in 
Syllabus ¶ 3 and on page 448 of the Court of Appeals' opinion (Douglas, 42 Kan. App. 
2d 441), has been abandoned, abrogated, disallowed, disapproved, ousted, overruled, and 
permanently relegated to the history books where it will never again affect the outcome 
of an appeal. See, e.g., Fort Hays St. Univ. v. University Ch., Am. Ass'n of Univ. Profs., 
290 Kan. 446, 457, 228 P.3d 403 (2010). Accordingly, that portion of the Court of 
Appeals' opinion is reversed and held for naught.  
 
Analysis 
 
The general rule of employer liability for employee injuries is set forth in K.S.A. 
2006 Supp. 44-501(a), which states, in relevant part:   
 
 
"If in any employment to which the workers compensation act applies, personal 
injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment is caused to an 
11 
 
 
 
employee, the employer shall be liable to pay compensation to the employee in 
accordance with the provisions of the workers compensation act." (Emphasis added.) 
 
But, as indicated, the Act contains a limitation upon the definition of "arising out 
of and in the course of employment" that effectively excludes injuries sustained by 
employees while engaged in certain recreational or social events. K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 44-
508(f). The task presented here is to determine whether Ad Astra's go-cart racing event fit 
within the category of recreational or social events that are excluded from the Act. 
 
The first step in that analysis is simply to read the statutory language, giving 
common words their ordinary meanings. Padron v. Lopez, 289 Kan. 1089, 1097, 220 
P.3d 345 (2009). If that plain reading reveals what the legislature intended, we need not 
resort to legal treatises to create a meaning for the statute. Cf. Double M Constr. v. 
Kansas Corporation Comm'n, 288 Kan. 268, 271-72, 202 P.3d 7 (2009) (where statute 
plain and unambiguous, court need not resort to canons of construction or legislative 
history to construe legislature's intent). 
 
Both the Board and the Court of Appeals majority found the need to go beyond the 
statutory language because they discerned that the Act did not define what constitutes a 
recreational or social event under K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 44-508(f). See 42 Kan. App. 2d at 
449. But the inquiry is not what constitutes a recreational or social event, but rather 
which recreational or social events will be excluded from workers compensation 
coverage. One cannot credibly refute that the pizza eating and go-cart racing in this case 
were recreational or social activities. See State v. Sheldon, 290 Kan. 523, 526, 231 P.3d 
573 (2010) (citing Schmidtlien Electric, Inc. v. Greathouse, 278 Kan. 810, 822, 104 P.3d 
378 [2005]) ("Words in common usage are to be given their natural and ordinary 
meaning."). Yet, the statute only excludes injuries incurred by employees engaged in 
recreational or social events under certain circumstances, which are specifically described 
12 
 
 
 
in the statute to be "where the employee was under no duty to attend and where the injury 
did not result from the performance of tasks related to the employee's normal job duties 
or as specifically instructed to be performed by the employer." K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 44-
508(f). 
 
Ironically, the portion of the Larson's treatise to which the Board and the panel 
majority refer to fill the perceived definitional void in the Act actually addresses the 
identical subject matter as 44-508(f), albeit in the positive rather than the negative. The 
statute essentially says that recreational or social events are not within the course of 
employment where certain circumstances occur; Larson's says that "[r]ecreational or 
social activities are within the course of employment when" certain circumstances exist. 
(Emphasis added.) 2 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 22.01, p. 22-2. 
Accordingly, there was no need to resort to the Larson's factors when the statute 
contained all of the needed information to resolve the question presented.  
 
Moreover, the circumstances described in Larson's differ from those the legislature 
set forth in the statute. The statute focuses on whether the employee had no duty to attend 
the recreational or social event and whether the tasks being performed by the employee 
were normal job duties or were specially directed by the employer. Larson's second 
factor—the benefit derived by the employer—does not fit the statutory scheme at all. 
Granted, an analysis of Larson's first and third factors could provide some help with the 
consideration of the statutory attendance and task performance criteria, but they are not 
identical. For instance, Larson's implied duty to attend is not the same as the statute's no 
duty to attend; the latter criterion conveys the notion that there is a complete absence of 
any duty to attend, implied or otherwise. Accordingly, we hold that the Board erred in 
using the Larson's factors as the test, rather than applying the criteria laid out in the 
statute. A legal treatise may be utilized to explain and interpret Kansas law, but it cannot 
serve to supplant or alter the actual text of a statute. 
13 
 
 
 
 
Although Douglas does not ask us to find that any error in using the Larson's 
factors would be harmless error, we pause to briefly consider the possibility. We agree 
with the Court of Appeals majority that the record contains sufficient evidence to support 
the Board's finding that Douglas was under some duty to attend the Sadler's event. We 
disagree with the position of the Court of Appeals dissent that Douglas had no duty to 
attend the Sadler's event if his attendance at that facility was not mandatory. The 
evidence is undisputed that Douglas was mandated to be in one of two places at the time 
of the accident:  Sadler's facility or the Ad Astra facility. If he was not at his regular work 
station, Douglas had a duty to attend the recreational or social event at Sadler's. Such a 
conditional duty to attend cannot be said to fulfill the high hurdle of no duty to attend. 
 
Nevertheless, the Board applied the incorrect legal standard, and we are loathe to 
step in and make the requisite factual findings to apply the correct standard. Appellate 
courts do not make factual findings but instead review those made by district courts or 
administrative agencies. State v. Berriozabal, 291 Kan. 568, 591, 243 P.3d 352 (2010). 
Accordingly, we are unwilling to declare, sua sponte, that the Board's utilization of the 
incorrect legal standard in determining whether Douglas' injuries arose out of and in the 
course of his employment constituted harmless error. The matter is remanded to the 
Board to make the determination based on the statutory criteria of K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 44-
508(f). 
 
But before concluding, we make one last observation. Both the Board and the 
Court of Appeals majority summarily dismissed the task performance criteria of the 
statute by declaring that Douglas was not performing his normal job duties. That 
declaration overlooks the remainder of the statutory language:  "or as specifically 
instructed to be performed by the employer." K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 44-508(f). Consideration 
14 
 
 
 
should be given to any evidence which might support that a coowner specifically 
instructed Douglas to race the go-carts. 
 
Reversed and remanded to the Board with directions.  
 
MORITZ, J., not participating. 
PETER V. RUDDICK, District Judge, assigned.