Title: Figgs v. Boston Housing Auth.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11532
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 18, 2014

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11532 
 
TRENEA FIGGS  vs.  BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 8, 2014. - August 18, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, 
& Lenk, JJ.1 
 
 
Boston Housing Authority.  Housing Authority.  Municipal 
Corporations, Housing authority.  Practice, Civil, Action 
in nature of certiorari.  Administrative Law, Hearing, 
Substantial evidence.  Evidence, Hearsay. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Boston Division of the 
Housing Court Department on August 24, 2012. 
 
 
The case was heard by Jeffrey M. Winik, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Michael J. Louis & Angela Marcolina for the defendant. 
 
Jeremy T. Robin for the plaintff. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amicus curiae: 
 
Jeffrey C. Turk for Greater Boston Real Estate Board & 
another. 
 
James M. McCreight, Alex Munevar, & Quinten Steenhuis for 
Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless & others. 
 
Esme Caramello, Deena Greenberg, & Melanie Zuch for Charles 
Hamilton Houston Institute & another. 
 
                     
 
1 Chief Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  Trenea Figgs is a participant in the United 
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Housing 
Choice Voucher Program, commonly referred to as "Section 8," 
administered by the Boston Housing Authority (BHA) pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2012) and implementing HUD regulations.2  On 
November 22, 2011, the BHA notified Figgs of its intent to 
terminate her participation in the Section 8 program due to 
allegations of serious or repeated violations of her lease.  
Several weeks earlier, Boston police officers had executed a 
search warrant for Figgs's apartment in connection with a 
criminal investigation of her brother, Damon Nunes, and had 
discovered, among other things, two plastic bags of marijuana, a 
.380 caliber Ruger pistol, and five rounds of ammunition.  Figgs 
                     
 
2 In the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) Housing Choice Voucher Program (Section 8), 
HUD "pays rental subsidies so eligible families can afford 
decent, safe and sanitary housing."  24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(1) 
(1999).  See Costa v. Fall River Hous. Auth., 453 Mass. 614, 615 
n.2 (2009); Carter v. Lynn Hous. Auth., 450 Mass. 626, 626 n.1 
(2008); Wojcik v. Lynn Hous. Auth., 66 Mass. App. Ct. 103, 103 
n.2 (2006).  The Section 8 program is "generally administered by 
State or local governmental entities called public housing 
agencies (PHAs).  HUD provides housing assistance funds to the 
PHA.  HUD also provides funds for PHA administration of the 
programs."  24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(1).  Section 8 housing 
assistance may be "tenant-based" or "project-based."  24 C.F.R. 
§ 982.1(b)(1) (1999).  With tenant-based assistance, "[f]amilies 
select and rent units that meet program housing quality 
standards.  If the PHA approves a family's unit and tenancy, the 
PHA contracts with the owner to make rent subsidy payments on 
behalf of the family.  A PHA may not approve a tenancy unless 
the rent[] is reasonable."  24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(2) (1999).  See 
24 C.F.R. § 982.1(b)(1), (2) (1999). 
 
3 
 
appealed the proposed termination.  Following an informal 
hearing on February 22, 2012, a hearing officer, by decision 
dated August 6, 2012, upheld the termination of Figgs's Section 
8 housing subsidy. 
 
On August 24, 2012, Figgs filed a verified complaint in the 
Housing Court for injunctive and declaratory relief.  She sought 
to enjoin the BHA from terminating her Section 8 housing subsidy 
on the ground that the informal hearing failed to satisfy her 
procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, and she sought a declaration 
that the bases for her termination were insufficient.  In 
response, the BHA filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  
On March 19, 2013, a judge reversed the decision of the hearing 
officer, and he ordered the BHA to reinstate Figgs's Section 8 
housing subsidy back to November 22, 2011.3  The BHA appealed the 
                     
3 The judge treated Figgs's request for declaratory judgment as 
one seeking relief in the nature of certiorari pursuant to G. L. 
c. 249, § 4.  In light of his decision regarding the certiorari 
claim, the judge did not address the injunction or due process 
claims.  In her brief in this appeal, Figgs has not raised any 
due process claims.  It appears from the record that Figgs 
received proper notice of the BHA's intent to terminate her 
Section 8 housing subsidy, see 24 C.F.R. § 982.554(a) (1999); 
was afforded an informal hearing conducted by an impartial 
decision maker, see 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(a)(1)(v) and (e)(4)(i) 
(2000); was represented by counsel at the hearing, see 24 C.F.R. 
§ 982.555(e)(3) (2000); was given an opportunity to present 
evidence and question witnesses, see 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(5) 
(2000); and was issued a written decision stating the reasons 
for the decision, see 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(6) (2000), and 
explaining the hearing officer's assessment of mitigating facts, 
see 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2)(i) (2010).  See generally Costa v. 
4 
 
judge's decision, the case was entered in the Appeals Court, and 
we transferred it to this court on our own motion.  We conclude 
that, notwithstanding the enactment of G. L. c. 94C, § 32L, 
which decriminalized the possession of one ounce or less of 
marijuana, the BHA properly terminated Figgs's participation in 
the Section 8 program due to evidence of other criminal activity 
in her rental premises, which constituted a serious lease 
violation.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Housing 
Court.4 
 
1.  Background.  Figgs and her three minor children are the 
authorized occupants of a subsidized apartment on Woolson Street 
in the Mattapan section of Boston.  Nunes would visit her there 
and, on occasion, would babysit her children.  Pursuant to 
paragraph 10(a) of her lease, Figgs agreed "to refrain from 
engaging in and to cause Household member(s), guest(s), or any 
person under any Household member's control to refrain from 
engaging in any criminal or illegal activity in the rental 
                                                                  
Fall River Hous. Auth., 453 Mass. at 621-632.  Accordingly, we 
are not of the view that Figgs's due process rights were 
violated. 
 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted in support of 
Figgs by the Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless, the 
Boston Tenants Coalition, and City Life/Vida Urbana; and by the 
Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice, the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services, and the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts.  We also acknowledge the 
amicus brief submitted in support of the Boston Housing 
Authority (BHA) by the Greater Boston Real Estate Board and the 
Institute of Real Estate Managers. 
5 
 
Premises."  BHA model lease § 10(a).  As a participant in the 
Section 8 program, Figgs also signed a document entitled "Family 
Obligations of the Housing Choice Voucher Program," which 
stated, among its provisions, that "[t]he family may not commit 
any serious or repeated violation of the lease."5  By signing 
this document, she certified that she understood her obligations 
under the Section 8 program, and that her failure to comply with 
these obligations "may result in the termination of [her] 
participation in the program."  According to Figgs, prior to the 
commencement of the underlying proceedings, she had been a 
participant in the Section 8 program for approximately ten years 
without incident. 
 
On October 18, 2011, members of the Boston police 
department initiated an investigation into Nunes after a 
confidential informant (CI) told officers that the CI had 
observed a black .380 caliber firearm in Nunes's bedroom at the 
apartment where Figgs lived with her children.  The CI believed 
that Nunes also lived there.  The CI told officers that Nunes 
had been in possession of this firearm "for some time," and that 
Nunes had been known on occasion to hide the firearm on the back 
porch of the apartment outside his bedroom window.  As part of 
                     
 
5 Under HUD's regulations, "[f]amily" is defined as "[a] 
person or group of persons, as determined by the PHA, approved 
to reside in a unit with assistance under the [Section 8] 
program."  24 C.F.R. § 982.4 (2002).  Pursuant to this 
definition, Nunes was not a member of Figgs's "family." 
6 
 
the investigation, officers independently observed Nunes 
entering and leaving the house in which the apartment was 
located several times over the course of approximately one week.  
Detective Rodney Best then applied for and obtained from a judge 
in the Superior Court a search warrant for Figgs's apartment. 
 
On the evening of October 24, members of the Boston police 
department assigned to the youth violence strike force detained 
Nunes outside Figgs's apartment and executed the search warrant.  
The apartment was unoccupied at the time of the search.  From 
the room that they understood to be Nunes's bedroom, officers 
recovered two bags of a leafy green substance believed to be 
marijuana,6 $653 in cash, a box of sandwich bags, a Massachusetts 
photographic identification card of Nunes, a Rhode Island 
medical card for Nunes, a red cellular telephone, and an "iPod," 
a portable media player.7  The police incident report did not 
indicate the amount or weight of the marijuana.  In a separate 
bedroom, officers found a Massachusetts electronic bank transfer 
(EBT) card.  They also recovered a sneaker from the back porch 
of the apartment, inside of which was a .380 caliber Ruger 
                     
 
6 Although the search warrant made no mention of controlled 
substances, the marijuana was discovered in plain view. 
 
 
7 The police incident report stated that officers also 
recovered a digital scale, but that item did not appear on the 
inventory list of property taken from Figgs's apartment pursuant 
to the search warrant.  The hearing officer did not include the 
digital scale in his itemization of what was recovered during 
the search of the apartment. 
7 
 
pistol that contained five rounds of ammunition.  Nunes was 
arrested and charged with possession of a class D substance with 
intent to distribute, commission of this offense within a school 
zone, unlawful possession of a firearm and of ammunition, and 
improper storage of a firearm. 
 
On November 22, the BHA notified Figgs of its intent to 
terminate her participation in the Section 8 housing program.  
Among the stated reasons for the proposed termination were 
"[s]erious or repeated violations of the lease," specifically 
paragraph 10(a), committed on October 24 when police discovered 
marijuana and a loaded firearm in her apartment.8  As authority 
for its decision, the BHA relied on 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(e) 
(2010) (obligation not to commit serious violation of lease), 
and 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(i) (2010) (authority to terminate 
assistance for violation of any family obligation).  Figgs 
appealed the proposed termination and requested an informal 
hearing. 
                     
 
8 The BHA also sought to terminate Figgs's Section 8 housing 
subsidy on the grounds that she failed to request approval from 
the BHA to add a family member (Nunes) as an occupant of the 
apartment, and failed to provide complete and accurate 
information regarding family composition and income.  The 
hearing officer found that, because the evidence was 
insufficient to prove that Nunes was living in Figgs's 
apartment, these two grounds for termination lacked merit.  The 
Housing Court judge affirmed the hearing officer's 
determinations with regard to these two bases for termination, 
and the BHA has not challenged this portion of the judge's 
decision on appeal. 
8 
 
 
Following a hearing on February 22, 2012, at which Figgs 
was represented by counsel and presented evidence on her own 
behalf, a hearing officer upheld the BHA's decision.9  He stated 
that the police reports contained "substantial indicia of 
reliability to warrant a finding that Mr. Nunes was involved in 
crimes of drugs and unlawful possession of [a] firearm in 
[Figgs's] apartment."  Notwithstanding the fact that the firearm 
was found on the back porch, he continued, that area was still 
part of the apartment.  Given Figgs's acknowledgement that Nunes 
was permitted to go to her apartment, the hearing officer found 
that Nunes was Figgs's invitee and, as such, was under her 
control when he engaged in criminal activities in her 
apartment.10  Based on these findings, the hearing officer 
concluded that Figgs had violated paragraph 10(a) of her lease. 
                     
 
9 In support of its allegations, the BHA submitted police 
incident reports dated October 24 and 25, 2011; a so-called 
"return" of the officer who executed the search warrant, listing 
an inventory of the property taken from the premises; an 
affidavit in support of the search warrant application; and a 
"Recertification Questionnaire," signed by Figgs on January 25, 
2011, setting forth the "Family Composition" of her apartment. 
 
 
10 Under HUD's regulations, the phrase "[o]ther person under 
the tenant's control" means, in relevant part, that "the person, 
although not staying as a guest (as defined in this section) in 
the unit, is, or was at the time of the activity in question, on 
the premises (as premises is defined in this section) because of 
an invitation from the tenant or other member of the household 
who has express or implied authority to so consent on behalf of 
the tenant."  24 C.F.R. § 5.100 (2001).  In this appeal, Figgs 
has not challenged the hearing officer's characterization of 
Nunes as a person "under [her] control."  Id. 
9 
 
 
The hearing officer next considered whether the lease 
violation was "serious," such that it warranted Figgs's 
termination from the Section 8 program.  The hearing officer 
said that Nunes was involved in an activity that threatened the 
safety of others because a firearm containing five rounds of 
ammunition was recovered in the apartment.  Moreover, he 
continued, the quantity of marijuana, the drug paraphernalia, 
the large amount of cash, and the firearm permitted an inference 
not only that Nunes was in possession of drugs, but also that he 
intended to distribute or sell drugs in the apartment and to use 
the apartment as a storage place for his firearm.  The hearing 
officer determined that the BHA had sufficient grounds to 
propose termination of Figgs's Section 8 housing subsidy for a 
serious lease violation. 
 
Finally, in accordance with 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2) 
(2010), the hearing officer considered whether there were 
mitigating circumstances that would warrant an outcome other 
than Figgs's termination from the Section 8 program.  He stated 
that Figgs's claimed lack of knowledge about Nunes's behavior 
and her positive history as a Section 8 tenant did not offset 
the seriousness of the criminal activities in her apartment.  
The hearing officer found that Figgs had failed to exercise 
proper control in her apartment, which would have forestalled 
such criminal activities in the first place.  He also found that 
10 
 
because Figgs was not disabled, had graduated from a computer 
technology program, and was actively looking for employment, her 
termination from the Section 8 program would not cause a severe 
hardship to her family.  Accordingly, the hearing officer 
concluded that termination of Figgs's Section 8 housing subsidy 
was proper in light of her serious lease violation.11 
 
In reversing the hearing officer's decision and entering 
judgment in favor of Figgs, the Housing Court judge concluded 
that the hearing officer committed legal errors that adversely 
affected Figgs's material rights.  The judge determined that 
there was insufficient reliable evidence in the administrative 
record to support an inference that Nunes either engaged in 
drug-related criminal activity in Figgs's apartment or kept an 
illegal firearm and ammunition there.  With regard to the 
marijuana, he pointed out that the police officers did not 
include in their written reports any observations or findings 
about its weight or amount.  In the judge's view, this was a 
critical omission because under G. L. c. 94C, § 32L, "possession 
of one ounce or less of marihuana shall only be a civil 
offense," not a crime.  The judge stated that without evidence 
that the marijuana collectively weighed more than one ounce, 
                     
 
11 At the hearing, the BHA stated that it was not willing to 
offer a lesser sanction of prohibiting Nunes from visiting Figgs 
at her apartment given that both drugs and a firearm were found 
in the apartment, posing a danger to other residents and 
neighbors. 
11 
 
there was no basis for the hearing officer to conclude that 
Nunes had engaged in the crime of possession of a class D 
substance.  Moreover, he continued, there was no evidence that 
Nunes intended to distribute marijuana to others.  The judge 
concluded that the hearing officer made a legal error in 
determining that Figgs had committed a serious violation of 
paragraph 10(a) of her lease "based upon illegal drug activity." 
 
With regard to the firearm and ammunition, the judge stated 
that the hearing officer relied primarily on the hearsay 
statements of the CI, as set forth in the search warrant 
affidavit, to support his finding that Nunes kept a pistol in 
Figgs's apartment.  The judge pointed out that, apart from such 
statements, there was no testimony from anyone who saw a firearm 
in Figgs's apartment, who saw Nunes with a firearm, or who saw 
Nunes place a firearm on the porch of the apartment.  Further, 
the judge continued, there was no evidence that the second-floor 
porch was part of the apartment leased to Figgs, or that she had 
exclusive access to it.  The judge concluded that the hearing 
officer's reliance on the CI's hearsay statements constituted 
legal error because the statements were not supported by 
substantial indicia of reliability and, therefore, were not 
sufficient to support the termination of Figgs's Section 8 
housing subsidy. 
12 
 
 
2.  Standard of review.  The function of a civil action in 
the nature of certiorari under G. L. c. 249, § 4, is "to relieve 
aggrieved parties from the injustice arising from errors of law 
committed in proceedings affecting their justiciable rights when 
no other means of relief are open."12  Swan v. Justices of the 
Superior Court, 222 Mass. 542, 544 (1916).  Certiorari also has 
been described as "a limited procedure reserved for correction 
of substantial errors of law apparent on the record created 
before a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal."  School Comm. of 
Hudson v. Board of Educ., 448 Mass. 565, 575-576 (2007).  "To 
obtain certiorari review of an administrative decision, the 
following three elements must be present:  (1) a judicial or 
quasi judicial proceeding, (2) from which there is no other 
reasonably adequate remedy, and (3) a substantial injury or 
injustice arising from the proceeding under review."13  Indeck v. 
                     
 
12 General Laws c. 249, § 4, provides that "[a] civil action 
in the nature of certiorari . . . may be brought in the supreme 
judicial or superior court or, if the matter involves any right, 
title or interest in land . . . in the land court."  Pursuant to 
G. L. c. 185C, § 3, the Boston division of the Housing Court 
Department has concurrent jurisdiction with the Superior Court 
Department regarding housing matters.  We conclude that the 
Housing Court has jurisdiction under G. L. c. 249, § 4, 
concurrent with the Superior Court, to review decisions of a 
public housing authority regarding housing matters. 
 
 
13 The parties have not challenged whether an action in the 
nature of certiorari was the proper avenue for review of the 
BHA's decision.  Although we have acknowledged that there is 
some debate whether review of a local housing authority's action 
should proceed under G. L. c. 249, § 4, or under G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 14, we also have recognized jurisprudence standing for the 
13 
 
Clients' Sec. Bd., 450 Mass. 379, 385 & n.12 (2008).  See Hoffer 
v. Board of Registration in Med., 461 Mass. 451, 456-457 (2012). 
 
It is well established that "the standard of review [under 
G. L. c. 249, § 4,] may vary according to the nature of the 
action for which review is sought."  Garrity v. Conservation 
Comm'n of Hingham, 462 Mass. 779, 792 (2012), quoting Forsyth 
Sch. for Dental Hygienists v. Board of Registration in 
Dentistry, 404 Mass. 211, 217 (1989).  See Boston Edison Co. v. 
Boston Redev. Auth., 374 Mass. 37, 49 (1977).  Ordinarily, where 
the action being reviewed is a decision made in an adjudicatory 
proceeding where evidence is presented and due process 
protections are afforded, a court applies the "substantial 
evidence" standard.14  See Black Rose, Inc. v. Boston, 433 Mass. 
                                                                  
proposition that a local housing authority is not an "agency" 
within the meaning of G. L. c. 30A, § 1.  See Rivas v. Chelsea 
Hous. Auth., 464 Mass. 329, 333-334 (2013), and cases cited.  
Because the BHA's decision satisfies the necessary elements for 
certiorari review, and because the Housing Court judge treated 
Figgs's complaint as one seeking relief under G. L. c. 249, § 4, 
we do the same.  See id. at 334 (for purposes of appeal, 
decision of local housing authority treated "as it ha[d] been 
treated throughout the appeal process"). 
 
 
14 In contrast, "[w]here the action being reviewed is not a 
decision made in an adjudicatory proceeding and where the action 
entails matters committed to or implicating a board's exercise 
of administrative discretion, the court applies the 'arbitrary 
and capricious' standard" (emphasis added).  Garrity v. 
Conservation Comm'n of Hingham, 462 Mass. 779, 792 (2012).  See 
Forsyth Sch. for Dental Hygienists v. Board of Registration in 
Dentistry, 404 Mass. 211, 217-218 & n.2 (1989) (judge correctly 
applied "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review where 
proceeding before board was not adjudicatory and did not 
implicate right to engage in lawful occupation). 
14 
 
501, 504-505 (2001); Saxon Coffee Shop, Inc. v. Boston Licensing 
Bd., 380 Mass. 919, 924-925 (1980); Durbin v. Selectmen of 
Kingston, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5-6 & n.7 (2004).  See also A.J. 
Cella, Administrative Law and Practice § 1917, at 501 n.55 (1986 
& Supp. 2013).  Therefore, we consider whether the Housing Court 
judge correctly ruled that the hearing officer committed legal 
errors that adversely affected Figgs's material rights.  As part 
of this inquiry, we examine the record to determine whether the 
hearing officer's factual findings were supported by substantial 
evidence.15 
 
3.  Discussion.  Congress has declared that it is a policy 
of the United States to "promote the goal of providing decent 
and affordable housing for all citizens through the efforts and 
encouragement of Federal, State, and local governments, and by 
the independent and collective actions of private citizens, 
organizations, and the private sector."  42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(4) 
(2012).  To facilitate the achievement of this goal, Congress 
has further declared that the United States will "assist States 
and political subdivisions of States to address the shortage of 
                     
 
15 Pursuant to HUD's regulations, the hearing officer's 
factual findings "relating to the individual circumstances of 
the family shall be based on a preponderance of the evidence 
presented at the hearing."  24 C.F.R. §§ 982.555(e)(6) (2000).  
See Carter v. Lynn Hous. Auth., 450 Mass. at 634, 636.  A 
preponderance of the evidence persuades a trier of fact that 
what is sought to be proved is more probably true than not true.  
See Goffredo v. Mercedes-Benz Truck Co., 402 Mass. 97, 102-103 
(1988); Sargent v. Massachusetts Acc. Co., 307 Mass. 246, 250 
(1940). 
15 
 
housing affordable to low-income families."  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437(a)(1)(B) (2012).  Through the Section 8 program, 
"assistance payments may be made with respect to existing 
housing" for the purposes of "aiding low-income families in 
obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically 
mixed housing."  42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a).  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437f(o)(1)(A) (Secretary of HUD may provide financial support 
to public housing agencies for tenant-based assistance using 
established payment standard). 
 
Congress has authorized the Secretary of HUD to "make such 
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out his 
functions, powers, and duties."  42 U.S.C. § 3535(d) (2012).  
Accordingly, the Secretary promulgated 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.1-
982.643 (1995) as "a unified statement of program requirements 
for the tenant-based housing assistance programs under Section 8 
of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. [§] 1437f)."  
24 C.F.R. § 982.2(a) (1999).  The BHA, which administers the 
Section 8 program on behalf of HUD, see note 2, supra, was 
required to adopt "a written administrative plan that 
establishes local policies for administration of the program in 
accordance with HUD [regulations and] requirements."  24 C.F.R. 
§ 982.54(a) (2001).  See 24 C.F.R. § 982.54(b) (2001).  The BHA 
Administrative Plan for Section 8 Programs (rev. 2011) (BHA 
administrative plan) provides that it may, in its discretion, 
16 
 
terminate a housing subsidy where the participant "has violated 
any Family obligation under the [Section 8] program by action or 
failure to act as listed in section 13.5.2 or as set forth in 24 
C.F.R. § 982.551."  BHA administrative plan § 13.3.9.  See 24 
C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(i) (BHA "may at any time . . . terminate 
program assistance for a participant . . . [i]f the family 
violates any family obligations under the program"). 
 
More specifically, as pertinent here, § 13.5.2(d) of the 
BHA administrative plan states that "[t]he Family may not commit 
any serious or repeated violation of the Lease."  Similarly, 24 
C.F.R. § 982.551(e) provides that "[t]he family may not commit 
any serious or repeated violation of the lease."  Paragraph 
10(a) of the lease signed by Figgs on January 25, 2011, states 
that she agrees "to refrain from engaging in and to cause 
Household member(s), guest(s), or any person under any Household 
member's control to refrain from engaging in any criminal or 
illegal activity in the rental Premises" (emphasis added). 
 
In this appeal, the BHA first contends that the judge 
improperly relied on G. L. c. 94C, § 32L, rather than on Federal 
law, to decide that Nunes had not engaged in any criminal 
activity vis-à-vis the marijuana.  As such, the BHA continues, 
the judge wrongly concluded that the hearing officer erred in 
finding that Figgs had committed a serious lease violation, 
predicated on Nunes's drug activity, that warranted her 
17 
 
termination from the Section 8 program.  Figgs counters by 
arguing that G. L. c. 94C, § 32L, serves a vital function in 
assessing the severity of a lease violation.  We begin our 
analysis by considering whether Nunes was engaged in any 
"criminal or illegal activity" in Figgs's apartment, focusing 
first on the marijuana and subsequently on the firearm.  To the 
extent that we conclude that Nunes did engage in such activity, 
we then consider whether the hearing officer erred in 
determining that it constituted a serious lease violation 
warranting the termination of Figgs's housing subsidy. 
 
On November 4, 2008, Massachusetts voters approved St. 
2008, c. 387, pursuant to the provisions of art. 48, The 
Initiative, Part V, § 1, as amended by art. 81, § 2, of the 
Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution.  See Commonwealth 
v. Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 509 (2012); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 
Mass. 459, 464 (2011).  This initiative, entitled "An Act 
establishing a sensible State marihuana policy," was codified at 
G. L. c. 94C, §§ 32L-32N.  See St. 2008, c. 387.  It changed the 
status of possession of one ounce or less of marijuana from a 
criminal offense to a civil infraction.16  See G. L. c. 94C, 
                     
 
16 General Laws c. 94C, § 32L, states, in relevant part:  
"Notwithstanding any general or special law to the contrary, 
possession of one ounce or less of marihuana shall only be a 
civil offense, subjecting an offender who is eighteen years of 
age or older to a civil penalty of one hundred dollars and 
forfeiture of the marihuana, but not to any other form of 
criminal or civil punishment or disqualification." 
18 
 
§ 32L.  Notwithstanding the passage of this initiative, 
"[p]ossession of one ounce or less of marijuana with intent to 
distribute continues to be a crime, and the Commonwealth may 
prosecute it as such, but only where an intent to distribute is 
supported by probable cause."  Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 
Mass. 562, 570 (2013).  See G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (a); 
Commonwealth v. Keefner, supra at 514. 
 
The hearing officer found that Figgs violated paragraph 
10(a) of her lease, in part, because Boston police officers, 
when executing the search warrant for her apartment, found two 
plastic bags of marijuana and "drug paraphernalia" in a bedroom 
used by Nunes.  The hearing officer determined that Nunes was a 
person under Figgs's control when he engaged in drug activity in 
her apartment.  See note 10, supra.  Significantly, no evidence 
was presented to the hearing officer regarding the weight of the 
marijuana.  Nonetheless, Nunes was charged with possession of a 
class D substance with intent to distribute, which is a crime, 
irrespective of the actual weight of the marijuana.  The hearing 
officer stated that two bags of marijuana, a box of sandwich 
bags (which was found not in the kitchen but in the bedroom), 
$653 in cash, and a firearm permitted an inference not only that 
Nunes possessed the drugs, but also that he intended to 
distribute or sell them from Figgs's apartment.  We conclude 
that the hearing officer properly could find, by a preponderance 
19 
 
of the evidence, that Figgs violated paragraph 10(a) of her 
lease because Nunes was engaged in criminal drug activity in her 
apartment.  BHA model lease § 10(a). 
 
We recognize that a significant rationale for the Housing 
Court judge's reversal of the hearing officer's decision was the 
fact that there was no evidence regarding the weight of the 
marijuana.  When this fact was considered in the context of 
G. L. c. 94C, § 32L, decriminalizing the possession of one ounce 
or less of marijuana, the judge determined that there was no 
basis for the hearing officer to conclude that Nunes had engaged 
in the "crime" of possession of a class D substance.  Given the 
judge's additional determination that there was no evidence that 
Nunes intended to distribute marijuana to others, the judge 
concluded that the hearing officer erred in finding a lease 
violation predicated on drug activity.  In light of our 
conclusion in the present appeal that there was substantial 
evidence of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, 
we do not decide whether possession of one ounce or less of 
marijuana alone would be sufficient to constitute an "illegal 
activity in the rental Premises" in violation of paragraph 10(a) 
of Figgs's lease.  BHA model lease § 10(a). 
 
Next, we consider whether Nunes unlawfully possessed a 
firearm and ammunition in Figgs's apartment.  The BHA contends 
that, contrary to the judge's conclusion, the hearing officer 
20 
 
did not err in relying on the hearsay statements of a CI because 
they contained sufficient indicia of reliability.  Further, the 
BHA continues, when such statements were evaluated in 
conjunction with other evidence presented at the informal 
hearing, the hearing officer properly could conclude that Nunes 
kept a loaded firearm in the rental premises.  We agree. 
 
As the BHA acknowledges, the hearing officer relied, in 
substantial part, on the hearsay statements of a CI that were 
contained in the search warrant affidavit of Detective Best.  
Pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(5) (2000), evidence "may be 
considered [by a hearing officer] without regard to 
admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable to judicial 
proceedings."  See BHA administrative plan § 13.7.5(f).  In 
Costa v. Fall River Hous. Auth., 453 Mass. 614, 624-625 (2009), 
we read this regulation's "specific reference to the 
inapplicability of formal rules of evidence as support for the 
conclusion that there is no categorical prohibition of hearsay" 
at a hearing on the termination of a tenant's Section 8 housing 
subsidy.  After analyzing the due process implications of 
relying on such evidence, we held that "hearsay evidence may 
form the basis of a [public housing authority's] decision to 
terminate Section 8 assistance so long as that evidence contains 
substantial indicia of reliability."  Id. at 627.  See Gammons 
v. Massachusetts Dep't of Hous. & Community Dev., 502 F. Supp. 
21 
 
2d 161, 165-166 (D. Mass. 2007) (hearsay evidence is admissible 
in administrative proceedings, such as Section 8 hearing, where 
relevant).  See also Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. 
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 638 (2011) ("In the 
context of administrative proceedings, hearsay evidence bearing 
indicia of reliability constitutes admissible and substantial 
evidence"). 
 
In the present case, the CI told officers that he had 
observed a black .380 caliber firearm in Nunes's bedroom at 
Figgs's apartment.17  The CI further told officers that Nunes had 
been in possession of this weapon for some time, and that Nunes 
had been known on occasion to hide the firearm on the back porch 
of the apartment outside his bedroom window.18  As part of their 
investigation, officers independently observed Nunes entering 
and leaving the house in which Figgs's apartment was located 
several times over the course of approximately one week.  Based 
                     
 
17 In his affidavit in support of the search warrant, Boston 
police Detective Rodney Best stated that, as part of the police 
investigation into Nunes, he had conducted a firearms license 
inquiry with respect to both Nunes and Figgs, and that no 
records were found. 
 
 
18 Paragraph 2 of Figgs's lease defines the rental premises 
as "the Unit and common areas appurtenant to the Unit" located 
at the specified address on Woolson Street.  See Black's Law 
Dictionary 123 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "appurtenant" as 
"[a]nnexed to a more important thing").  During the informal 
hearing, Figgs's counsel introduced a map of Figgs's apartment, 
which she had drawn, showing that the porch was appurtenant to 
her unit, right outside the window of the bedroom purportedly 
used by Nunes, as the CI had described. 
22 
 
on all the information set forth in Detective Best's affidavit,19 
a Superior Court judge issued a search warrant, finding that 
there was probable cause to believe that an illegal firearm 
would be found in Figgs's apartment, either on the person or in 
the possession of Nunes.  Once officers executed the search 
warrant, they found the loaded firearm on the back porch of the 
apartment, just as the CI had told them.  The hearsay statements 
of the CI bore sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant 
their consideration by the hearing officer. 
 
Apart from these hearsay statements, the hearing officer 
also relied on police incident reports stating that, once 
officers searched Figgs's apartment and recovered the loaded 
pistol, Nunes was arrested and charged with, among other things, 
unlawful possession of a firearm and of ammunition.  See Costa 
v. Fall River Hous. Auth., 453 Mass. at 627 (police report 
offering detailed factual account based on personal observations 
of detective was sufficiently reliable to serve as basis for 
termination decision).  In totality, the hearing officer 
properly could find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
Nunes unlawfully possessed a firearm and ammunition in Figgs's 
apartment.  Unlawful possession of a firearm and of ammunition 
are criminal offenses.  See G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h). 
                     
 
19 We note that the affidavit in support of the search 
warrant stated that the CI, in the past, had provided 
information that had led to the arrest of wanted persons, as 
well as to the recovery of drugs. 
23 
 
 
On the basis of the police officers' discovery of both 
evidence of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute 
and a loaded firearm in Figgs's apartment, the hearing officer 
properly concluded that Figgs violated paragraph 10(a) of her 
lease because Nunes, a person under her control, had engaged in 
criminal activity in the rental premises.  The judge below erred 
in reaching a contrary conclusion. 
 
We now turn our attention to the question whether the 
hearing officer abused his discretion in determining that such 
activity by Nunes constituted a serious lease violation 
warranting Figgs's termination from the Section 8 program.  
Absent an eviction, which did not occur in this case, Federal 
law does not mandate a tenant's termination from the Section 8 
program for a serious lease violation.20  Rather, a public 
                     
 
20 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(7) (2012) governs leases and 
tenancy under the Section 8 program.  It states that the housing 
assistance payment contract between a public housing agency and 
the owner of a dwelling unit shall provide that "during the term 
of the lease, any criminal activity that threatens the health, 
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other 
tenants, any criminal activity that threatens the health, 
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of their residences by 
persons residing in the immediate vicinity of the premises, or 
any violent or drug-related criminal activity on or near such 
premises, engaged in by a tenant of any unit, any member of the 
tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the 
tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy."  
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(7)(D).  This statutory provision pertains 
to termination of a tenancy by a landlord, not to termination 
from the Section 8 program.  However, if a family is evicted 
from Section 8 housing for a serious lease violation, then the 
PHA must terminate the family's housing subsidy.  See 24 C.F.R. 
§ 982.552(b)(2) (2010). 
24 
 
housing authority may terminate a Section 8 housing subsidy if 
the family violates any of the family obligations set forth 
under 24 C.F.R. § 982.551, which include the obligation to "not 
commit any serious or repeated violation of the lease."  See 24 
C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(i).  See also BHA administrative plan 
§ 13.3.9.  The termination decision rests within the discretion 
of the BHA.  See Costa v. Fall River Hous. Auth., 453 Mass. at 
630-631; Wojcik v. Lynn Hous. Auth., 66 Mass. App. Ct. 103, 111-
112 (2006).  See also Carter v. Lynn Hous. Auth., 450 Mass. at 
638 n.20, quoting Baldwin v. Housing Auth. of Camden, 278 F. 
Supp. 2d 365, 371 (D.N.J. 2003) (housing authorities not 
required under law, nor encouraged by HUD, to terminate 
assistance in every circumstance where basis for termination 
exists).  When deciding whether to terminate a family's 
participation in the Section 8 program because of action or 
failure to act by a family member, "[t]he PHA may consider all 
relevant circumstances such as the seriousness of the case, the 
extent of participation or culpability of individual family 
members, mitigating circumstances related to the disability of a 
family member, and the effects of denial or termination of 
assistance on other family members who were not involved in the 
action or failure."  24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2)(i) (2010).  
Another circumstance that may be relevant in a termination 
decision, depending on the nature of the particular case, is the 
25 
 
fact that Massachusetts has decriminalized the possession of one 
ounce or less of marijuana.21  See G. L. c. 94C, § 32L. 
 
Review under an abuse of discretion standard requires that 
we "look for decisions based on 'whimsy, caprice, or arbitrary 
or idiosyncratic notions.'"  Cruz v. Commonwealth, 461 Mass. 
664, 670 (2012), quoting Bucchiere v. New England Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 396 Mass. 639, 642 (1986).  We do not disturb a decision 
"simply because [we] might have reached a different result; the 
standard of review is not substituted judgment.'"  Cruz v. 
Commonwealth, supra, quoting Bucchiere v. New England Tel. & 
Tel. Co., supra at 641.  As we already have described, the 
hearing officer evaluated the nature of the criminal activity by 
Nunes in Figgs's apartment, as well as mitigating circumstances 
that could point away from the termination of Figgs's Section 8 
housing subsidy.  Contrast Carter v. Lynn Hous. Auth., 450 Mass. 
at 636-637.  We conclude that there was substantial evidence to 
support the hearing officer's findings as to possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute and unlawful possession of a 
firearm and ammunition.  Accordingly, the hearing officer did 
not abuse his discretion in determining that Figgs had committed 
                     
 
21 Given the factual circumstances presented in this case, 
we do not decide whether evidence of only the simple possession 
of one ounce or less of marijuana would constitute a serious 
lease violation permitting a tenant's termination from the 
Section 8 program.  Although we question whether such a 
termination could withstand an abuse of discretion analysis, we 
address neither this matter, nor whether in such circumstances 
G. L. c. 94C, § 32L, would have any applicability. 
26 
 
a serious lease violation warranting her termination from the 
Section 8 program. 
 
4.  Conclusion.  For the reasons stated in this opinion, 
the judgment of the Housing Court is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.