Title: State of Florida v. Alfred J. Wagner
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC02-2167
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 8, 2004

1.  We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida
Constitution.  
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC02-2167
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
vs.
ALFRED J. WAGNER,
Respondent.
[January 8, 2004]
BELL, J.
We review State v. Wagner, 825 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), which
expressly and directly conflicts with State v. Tremblay, 642 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1994).1  For the reasons that follow, we quash the Fifth District's decision in
Wagner and approve the decision of the Fourth District in Tremblay, which held
that a signed court status form does not constitute a final, appealable order under
the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.  Our approval of Tremblay, however, is
limited to its holding.  We disapprove the dicta expressed in that opinion.
2.  The transcript of the hearing reveals the following colloquy:
THE COURT:  . . . So what I'm going to do at this point, Mr.
Kutsche [Wagner's attorney], is I'm going – you're going to have to
draw the order, but what I'm going to do, at this moment, subject to a
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I.
The State sought to have Alfred Wagner involuntarily committed as a
sexually violent predator pursuant to the Jimmy Ryce Act.  §§ 394.910-.931, Fla. 
Stat. (2002).  On January 23, 2002, the circuit court held a hearing on Wagner's
motion to dismiss the State's involuntary commitment petition.  The court denied
the motion to dismiss but concluded that Wagner should be released from custody
pending resolution of the commitment proceedings.  The judge then signed the
"open court minutes" form, which contained the following notation: "Defendant to
be released immediately from custody."
At the hearing, the judge instructed Wagner's attorney to prepare the formal
order.  This instruction was also noted on the court minutes form: "[Wagner's
attorney] to prepare an Order."  The judge explained to the attorneys that Wagner's
attorney was to send a copy of the drafted order to the State's attorney and that a
follow-up hearing would be held if the State's attorney objected to the content of
the drafted order.2  As it turned out, the State did object to portions of Wagner's 
formal order, I'm going to deny your motion to dismiss the petition in
the case without prejudice for you to raise the additional arguments
that you have wanted, that you've filed here today at a later time, and
I'm going to order Mr. Wagner to be released immediately from the
custody of the Department of Children and Families.
. . . .
THE COURT: And I'd ask you to draw the order, and I'll find
the fifteen days [sic] for the State to appeal to begin upon the rendition
of the order.
[WAGNER'S ATTORNEY]: Yes sir.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: I would ask Mr. Kutsche to
somehow notify me so that I can, when the order is drafted and when
it's signed by you so I know what my appeal time is.
THE COURT: Well, what will happen is . . . [b]efore he sends
me an order to sign, he'll send you a copy of the order so you can
approve it as to form.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Right.
THE COURT: And then you'll know when it's been signed.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  I just wanted that on the record so I
know that I'm going to receive that copy.
THE COURT:  In other words, once you draft the order, send
it over, let her look at it, if she thinks you've got something in there that
I didn't say, then you can, – we even have hearings sometimes when
they disagree as to the form of the order.  Basically, I want to give you
something to appeal more than what I just said, more than some form
order that the clerk prepared.  By then, the Supreme Court may decide
that Atkinson was wrongly decided and we can all take it back.
. . . .
[WAGNER'S ATTORNEY]: Your honor, is he – I take it that
he actually is not going to be released until the formal order is signed
and transmitted.
THE COURT: I just signed an order saying that he's to be
released from custody immediately.  We'll give this to these gentleman
that brought him here, and they can head on back without him unless
he wants to go back with them to get his stuff and be released from
Martin County, that's up to him.  I guess they'll give him a ride, I don't
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know.  I don't know if their insurance will cover it or not.
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drafted order, arguing that it did not accurately reflect the judge's prior oral
pronouncements.  A hearing on the matter was held on March 20, 2002.  On March
26, 2002, the court issued its formal written order releasing Wagner from custody
pending resolution of the involuntary commitment proceedings.
On April 25, 2002, the State petitioned the Fifth District for a writ of
certiorari.  The district court dismissed the petition as untimely filed.  Wagner, 825
So. 2d at 453-54.  It concluded that the signed court minutes form, which "gave a
clear written direction to release Wagner immediately," constituted an appealable
order.  Id. at 455.  This conclusion was premised upon the determination that the
order was rendered that same day when it was filed with the court clerk.  Id. 
Consequently, the State's certiorari petition was deemed untimely because it was
filed more than thirty days thereafter.  Id. at 455-56.
The State invoked this Court's discretionary jurisdiction, claiming that the
district court's opinion expressly and directly conflicted with Tremblay.  In
Tremblay, the Fourth District held that a signed court status form, which indicated
that a particular charge against the defendant had been dismissed, did not constitute
a final, appealable order under the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.  We
exercised our discretionary jurisdiction to resolve the conflict.
3.  "An order is rendered when a signed, written order is filed with the clerk
of the lower tribunal."  Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h). 
4.  A petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed "within 30 days of rendition
of the order to be reviewed."  Fla. R. App. P. 9.100(c)(1).
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II.
Wagner argues that the trial court rendered its order3 on January 23, which
was the date on which it orally pronounced that Wagner was to be immediately
released and on which it then signed and filed with the clerk the court minutes form,
which indicated that Wagner was to be immediately released.  The State, on the
other hand, contends that the trial court's order was not rendered until March 26,
the date on which the trial court issued its formal written order.  If Wagner is
correct, then the State's certiorari petition was properly dismissed by the district
court as untimely filed.4  If the State is correct, then its petition was timely filed and
improperly dismissed by the district court.
The Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure define an "order" as "[a] decision,
order, judgment, decree, or rule of a lower tribunal, excluding minutes and minute
book entries."  Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(f).  The rules explicitly exclude "minutes and
5.  Instead of looking to rule 9.020(f), the Fifth District looked to a legal
dictionary to define an "order" as "a command, direction, or instruction."  Wagner,
825 So. 2d at 455 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1123 (7th ed. 1999)).
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minute book entries" from the definition of "order."5  The Committee Notes to rule
9.020 state that "[m]inute book entries are excluded from the definition in
recognition of the decision in Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 326
So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1976).  It was intended that this rule encourage the entry of written
orders in every case."
In Employers' Fire, we noted that "[t]he inevitable variations in the way
judges complete court minutes suggest that these entries would generally be an
unreliable guide by which to measure either appellate or limitations time."  326 So.
2d at 180.  We also noted the "wide disparity in the practices of our trial courts as
to the time, manner and completeness of minute book entries," id., and foresaw "a
whole range of legal problems arising from signings on a day subsequent to the day
of the actual activity recorded, and from the completeness of the information
contained in minute book recitations."  Id. at 180 n.8.  On the other hand, we also
recognized "that there is an arbitrary aspect to a measuring event which depends
upon the willingness of trial counsel to supply a form called 'final judgment' to the
trial judge."  Id. at 180.
Ultimately, we concluded in Employers' Fire that "a distinction should be
6.  Although the issue before us in Employers' Fire dealt expressly with
"judgments," we noted that "[b]oth parties argue from decisions fixing the time for
commencement of an appeal."  Id. at 179-80.
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drawn between the time for commencing an appeal and the time for commencing a
statute of limitations on a money judgment."  Id. 6 
With respect to an appeal, the arbitrary delay between a
determination of liability and the signing of a judgment document is not
a significant cause for concern.  The rendition of an adverse money
judgment in a lawsuit, and the desire to suspend the effect of the loss
as promptly as possible, provide sufficient incentives for counsel to
prepare and submit the necessary paper work to end the trial court's
labor and lay the predicate for appellate review.  Equally important is
the fact that a trial court's decision is more clearly articulated, and
therefore more reviewable, in a final judgment document than in a
minute book notation.  For these reasons, the time for taking an appeal
should be governed by the rendition of a formal document of
judgment by the trial judge . . . rather than by the signed entry in a
minute book.
Id. at 180-81 (emphasis added).
We believe that the rationale of Employers' Fire, which was explicitly
included in the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, controls our resolution of this
case.  For purposes of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(c)(1), which
requires a petition for a writ of certiorari to be filed "within 30 days of rendition of
the order to be reviewed," a court minutes form, even if signed by the judge, does
not constitute a reviewable order.  The text of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.020(f), the Committee Notes, and the rationale of Employers' Fire clearly dictate
7.  For example, in State v. Brown, 629 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), the
Fifth District held that a "court minutes/order" form, signed by the judge and filed
with the court clerk, constituted a rendered order.  As opposed to the court
minutes form at issue here, and the court status form at issue in Tremblay, the form
signed by the judge and filed with the clerk in Brown was explicitly designated by
the court as an "order."  Brown, 629 So. 2d at 980 ("The trial court X'd the blanks
preceding both the words 'Court Minutes' and the words 'Order (Motion Hearing),'
indicating that the subject form was both the court minutes and an order of the
court.").
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this result.  A formal written order will articulate the trial court's decision and its
supporting reasoning much more clearly than a clerk's notation in a court minutes
form.  The result reached by the Fifth District in Wagner would not serve the policy
of efficient and thorough appellate review.  It would also create situations of
inadvertent rendition where the judge had signed a court minutes form and filed it
with the clerk unbeknownst to the parties.7  A regime engendering so much
uncertainty is anything but workable.  
III.
Because the signed court minutes form was not an order within the definition
of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, the act of filing it with the court clerk
did not amount to the rendition of an order.  The appellate jurisdictional clock of
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(c)(1) did not begin ticking in this case
until March 26, the date on which the formal written order was signed by the judge
and filed with the court clerk.  It follows, therefore, that the State's petition for a
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writ of certiorari was timely filed.  Accordingly, we quash the decision of the Fifth
District in the case below.
With respect to Tremblay, we approve the holding of the Fourth District that
a signed court status form does not constitute a final, appealable order under the
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.  However, we disapprove the court's
statement that under certain peculiar circumstances a court status form could be
found to be a final, appealable order.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and CANTERO,
JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct
Conflict
Fifth District - Case No. 5D02-1211
(Seminole County)
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Thomas H. Duffy, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Judy Taylor Rush, Assistant Attorney General,
Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
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James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Nancy Ryan, Assistant Public Defender,
Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent