Title: Parrish v. Worldwide Travel Service
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 980825
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 26, 1999

PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice  
 
JACK M. PARRISH, III 
 
 
                   OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 980825          SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
 
 
 
 
       February 26, 1999 
WORLDWIDE TRAVEL SERVICE, INC. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Melvin R. Hughes, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we decide whether the evidence of an 
employee's refusal to follow his employer's directions 
constitutes good cause for the employee's discharge as a 
matter of law. 
 
In October 1995, Jack M. Parrish, III, sold a travel 
agency  he operated as Dynasty Travel, Inc. (Dynasty) to 
another travel agency, Worldwide Travel Service, Inc. 
(Worldwide).  At that time, Parrish entered into a three-year 
employment contract with Worldwide which specified that 
Parrish could be discharged only for cause.  Approximately 13 
months later, Worldwide sent Parrish a letter terminating his 
employment "for unsatisfactory performance." 
Parrish filed this action against Worldwide for breach of 
his employment contract.  After hearing the evidence in a 
bench trial, the circuit court held that Worldwide had not 
breached the contract because it had terminated his employment 
"for cause," and entered a final judgment for Worldwide.  
Parrish appeals. 
Among other things, Parrish contends that the evidence is 
insufficient to establish a cause for his termination.  
Worldwide responds that, as a matter of law, the evidence 
shows it had sufficient cause to terminate Parrish.1
As material here, the contract defined "cause" for 
termination of Parrish's employment as: 
any material breach by Employee of a material term 
of this Agreement, including, without limitation, 
material failure to perform a substantial portion of 
his 
duties 
and 
responsibilities 
hereunder 
in 
satisfactory and customary fashion as reasonably 
directed by Employer. 
 
The contract also specified that Parrish was to have the 
"duties designated by the [Worldwide] Board of Directors."  
Before the sale, Parrish asked Sharon Nichols, Worldwide's 
president, what his duties were to be as an employee of 
Worldwide.  Shortly thereafter, he received a copy of a 
written memorandum from Nichols containing the following:  
[Parrish's] role/goals-Initially to assist with the 
transition and as consultant to [Nichols]; also to 
maintain existing accounts; build sales with new 
                     
1 Parrish also claims the trial judge failed to place the 
burden on Worldwide of establishing that it had good cause to 
terminate Parrish and that the trial judge implicitly required 
Parrish to establish Worldwide's lack of good cause for his 
termination.  Because we conclude, as a matter of law, that 
the evidence establishes Worldwide's good cause to discharge 
Parrish, we do not consider these contentions. 
 
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accounts focusing on groups; formulating an "outside 
sales" team and managing the team; maintaining a 
presence in the community; assisting with future 
acquisitions as needed. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
Time frame of performance expectation?  Anticipate 
the first 30 days devoted to transition (i.e.: 
meetings 
with 
major 
clients, 
vendors, 
etc.); 
thereafter move toward goals of building business. 
 
 
Although Parrish testified that "[t]hese were my roles as 
I understood them," he knew before the sale that he and 
Nichols disagreed as to the length of the transition period 
required.  Nichols thought it would require 30 days and 
Parrish thought it would require from 12 to 18 months. 
Four months after Parrish began his employment, Nichols 
asked him to turn his attention to business development and to 
prepare a marketing plan.  In a memorandum later that month, 
Nichols asked Parrish about his marketing plan and also 
directed him to prepare a weekly plan of action relating to 
"business development and client retention."  Parrish did not 
submit what he called a marketing plan until the day he was 
discharged, although Nichols kept asking for one.  Parrish did 
not submit weekly plans of action until the latter part of 
October 1996, a short time before he was discharged. 
On a date not shown in the record, Parrish submitted an 
undated document captioned "Preliminary Marketing Discussion - 
January - June, 1996" in which he listed commercial accounts 
 
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he wanted "to call on, as we went forward into 1996."  Even 
though Nichols and Susan Tobias Youngs, one of the principals 
in Worldwide, were urging that Parrish develop this new 
commercial business and Parrish knew that they thought 
Worldwide could handle this new business, he did not contact 
his listed prospects.  He did not do so because, he said, "I 
realized that this transition was going very poorly, and it 
makes no sense to call on new business when you cannot handle 
it."  He also testified that, "there [was] no question in my 
mind" that because of his time in the travel industry, he knew 
better than they did whether Worldwide could handle the new 
business. 
 
Despite Parrish's expressed opinion, Nichols and Youngs 
still felt that Worldwide could handle any new commercial 
business which Parrish might secure if he called upon his 
suggested commercial contacts and others that Nichols had 
suggested.  Yet Parrish did not try to solicit new commercial 
clients to see whether Worldwide could handle any such new 
business.  Indeed, during the trial, Parrish did not claim 
that he tried to carry out these instructions of Nichols and 
Youngs.  Instead, he introduced evidence tending to support 
his opinion that Worldwide could not handle the business.  The 
issue thus presented is whether Parrish had the right to 
 
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refuse to follow his employer's instructions to solicit this 
new business until he thought Worldwide was able to handle it. 
 
An employee's duty of loyalty to his employer includes 
the duty to follow the employer's reasonable instructions.  
Spotswood Arms Corp. v. Este, 147 Va. 1047, 1061, 133 S.E. 
570, 574 (1926).  And we think that this duty applies even 
though there may be differences of opinion as to the 
probability of success in carrying out those instructions. 
 
Here, there were differing opinions of the ability of 
Worldwide to handle this new business.  As the trial court 
pointed out,  
the other concerns [were] not [Parrish's] any more, 
but those of his employers. And I think while he had 
the best of intentions, ultimately, the call was 
with the employer with respect to what he was to do, 
and thereby he didn't live up to those expectations. 
 
 
Parrish's role in soliciting this new business was a 
substantial portion of his duties and responsibilities.  His 
refusal to exercise that function was a material breach of his 
employment contract.  Hence, the evidence establishes as a 
matter of law that Worldwide had sufficient cause as defined 
in the contract to terminate Parrish's employment.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Affirmed.
 
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