Title: Lichau v. Baldwin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S47776
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: February 14, 2002

FILED: FEBRUARY 14, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
DANIEL DAVID LICHAU,
Petitioner on Review,
	v.
G.H. BALDWIN,
Superintendent,
Eastern Oregon Correctional Institution,
Respondent on Review.
(CV96-0127; CA A97504; SC S47776)
	En Banc
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted October 4, 2001.
	Steven H. Gorham, Salem, argued the cause and filed the
brief for petitioner on review.
	Kaye Ellen McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. 
With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	BALMER, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and
affirmed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
	*Appeal from Umatilla County Circuit Court, Garry L. Reynolds, Judge (Memorandum Opinion), Jeffrey M. Wallace, Judge (Amended Judgment). 166 Or App 411, 999 P2d 1207 (2000).
BALMER, J.
		The issue in this post-conviction relief proceeding is
whether petitioner received inadequate assistance of counsel at
his criminal trial.  The post-conviction court rejected all but
one of petitioner's claims.  Respecting that claim, which
involved trial counsel's withdrawal of petitioner's alibi
defense, the trial court concluded that counsel had performed
inadequately and granted petitioner a new trial.  The Court of
Appeals reversed, concluding that counsel's assistance had been
adequate under the circumstances.  Lichau v. Baldwin, 166 Or App
411, 999 P2d 1207 (2000).  For the reasons that follow, we now
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the
judgment of the post-conviction court.
I.  BACKGROUND		
In February 1993, a grand jury indicted petitioner for
the June 1989 rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse of his 11-year-old
niece.  The indictment alleged that, on two occasions, petitioner
abused his niece while she and her seven-year-old sister were
staying at the home of petitioner's parents in Lane County.
		The niece first reported the abuse to authorities when
she was 14, three years after it allegedly had occurred.  She
claimed that, on two consecutive nights, petitioner had abused
her in a bedroom while her sister lay sleeping on the same bed. 
Because so much time had passed, however, she could not remember
the precise dates of the abuse.  She was able to recall, though,
that on the first night of abuse, petitioner's parents had been
awake watching television in the next room.  She also believed
that the abuse had occurred "two or three days" before she was
admitted to the hospital, on June 19, 1989, for an unrelated leg
infection.  The niece recalled that petitioner had visited her at
the hospital.  The indictment accused petitioner of committing
the abuse "on or between" June 1 and June 19, 1989.
		Petitioner pleaded not guilty and was represented by
lawyer McCrea.  During June 1989, petitioner had been enlisted in
the United States Marine Corps and stationed at Camp Lejeune in
North Carolina.  He told McCrea that, although he could not be
sure, he did not believe that he had visited his parents that
summer, but that his military records would confirm whether he
had taken leave.  Petitioner's parents similarly were unable to
recall whether he had been home at the time the niece said that
the abuse had occurred.  Accordingly, McCrea prepared an alibi
defense and, in addition, a defense of implausibility.  In other
words, McCrea planned to contend that petitioner was not in
Oregon in June 1989 and, even if he had been, that he could not
have abused his niece as described without either waking up the
younger sister or alerting petitioner's parents.
		On the first day of trial, however, McCrea withdrew
petitioner's alibi defense and proceeded with only the
implausibility defense.  McCrea later testified that he made that
decision after meeting with the prosecutor earlier that morning. 
According to McCrea, the prosecutor had threatened to present
testimony and introduce documents that she claimed would prove
that, in June 1989, petitioner had been in Oregon on a special
kind of leave called "basket leave" that does not appear on
official military leave records.  McCrea decided to withdraw
petitioner's alibi defense until he had the chance to view the
evidence the prosecutor claimed to possess.  Despite McCrea's
repeated requests, however, the prosecutor never gave him any
evidence relating to "basket leave."
		At trial, petitioner and his parents testified that
they could not recall whether petitioner had been in Oregon in
June 1989.  With no alibi defense, however, the jury was not
instructed that petitioner's presence in Oregon was a contested
fact.  To counter petitioner's remaining implausibility defense,
the prosecution introduced the testimony of two of petitioner's
sisters, who stated that he often had assaulted them sexually
under similar circumstances when they were children. 
Petitioner's sisters further testified that their parents had
been aware of the abuse but had refused to intervene.  The jury
convicted petitioner of all charges, the Court of Appeals
affirmed, and this court denied review.  State v. Lichau, 133 Or
App 602, 891 P2d 25, rev den 321 Or 340, 898 P2d 192 (1995).
II.  POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDING
		Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging,
inter alia, that McCrea had provided constitutionally inadequate
assistance of counsel by withdrawing petitioner's alibi defense. 
Petitioner claimed that McCrea did not exercise reasonable skill
and judgment because McCrea's decision to withdraw the alibi
defense was not supported by a reasonable pretrial investigation
of potential alibi witnesses or petitioner's military records. 
Petitioner contended that a reasonable investigation would have
uncovered evidence demonstrating that, contrary to the
prosecutor's assertions on the morning of trial, he had not
visited Oregon in 1989 while on "basket leave."  Alternatively,
petitioner argued that, once the prosecution failed to divulge
any evidence of his alleged "basket leave," McCrea's failure to
reinstate the alibi defense had been unreasonable, resulting in
constitutionally inadequate assistance of counsel.  Finally, to
show prejudice, petitioner asserted that, if McCrea had presented
his alibi defense, that defense would have tended to affect the
outcome of his trial because the jury would have heard additional
evidence that he was not in Oregon when, according to his niece,
the abuse allegedly had occurred.
		At the post-conviction hearing, McCrea testified that
he had not been familiar with military records or leave
procedures and that, to investigate petitioner's alibi defense,
he had sought assistance from petitioner's previous counsel, a
military officer in New Mexico who had been assigned to represent
petitioner when the allegations of abuse first arose.  According
to McCrea, that officer was "sympathetic to [petitioner's]
situation and indicated that he was willing to try to help." 
During all the months that McCrea represented petitioner before
trial, however, that officer produced no information.  As a
consequence, McCrea admitted that "all of the military records
that I had received, I received as part of discovery from the
prosecution."  And, although the record is not entirely clear, it
appears that those documents consisted solely of petitioner's
1989 Marine battalion movement record, which revealed only that
his unit was not deployed overseas in June 1989; it did not
disclose when or if petitioner had been on leave.  Ultimately,
McCrea subpoenaed petitioner's military records, but not until
over a year after his trial.  Thus, McCrea testified that, if he
had not withdrawn the alibi defense, "[i]t would have been both
the parents testifying and the defendant testifying, and I don't
recall what was done, if anything, regarding records."
		As noted, McCrea withdrew petitioner's alibi defense on
the morning of trial when the prosecutor threatened to present
evidence of unrecorded "basket leave."  At the post-conviction
hearing, McCrea explained that, in his opinion, if the prosecutor
could have cast doubt on petitioner's alibi, it would have been
the "kiss of death" for his client:
	"In my experience with juries, it's not only [that]
credibility is shot but that the jury resolves the case
into just a 'was-he-or-wasn't-he-there' issue. * * *
They forget all about the 'did-he-do-it.'  They assume
he did it if he was there."
McCrea offered no explanation why he had not reinstated the alibi
defense once the prosecutor failed to turn over any evidence of
"basket leave":
		"Q.  Did you ever seek with the Court leave to
reinstate the alibi?
		"A.  No, I did not.
		"Q.  And do you remember why not?
		"A.  Well, I've tried to -- I've tried to
determine that myself, why not.
		"Q.  Did it make any difference to the defense
case not to have the alibi[?]
		"A.  Well, it definitely did. * * *"
		For his part, petitioner testified at the post-conviction hearing that, during preparations for trial, he had
urged McCrea repeatedly to obtain his 1989 leave records, but
that McCrea never did so.  Those records, petitioner argued,
demonstrated conclusively that he had not taken regular leave
from Camp Lejeune in June 1989.  Petitioner further testified
that he had provided McCrea with names of supervisors who might
have confirmed his presence at Camp Lejeune, but that McCrea
never had contacted them.  For example, petitioner introduced the
affidavit of his platoon commander, Captain Tull, who confirmed
that "basket leave" had not been available to members of his unit
in 1989 as a general rule and that, at most, 96 hours of
unrecorded special liberty could have been authorized.  Tull
further stated that, to the best of his knowledge, "[t]he vast
majority of the unit, including [petitioner], remained in Camp
Lejeune until July, 1989, at which time they joined the advance
party in Okinawa."  Even if petitioner had secured a 96-hour
liberty pass, Tull asserted that petitioner would not have been
allowed to travel more than 350 to 500 miles away because
traveling farther would have required special arrangements and a
signed authorization from the commanding officer.  Petitioner
submitted affidavits of other persons from Camp Lejeune
corroborating Tull's testimony.
		Petitioner presented further evidence that, with
minimal effort, McCrea could have subpoenaed other military
records, including petitioner's Marine unit diary, that would
have supported his alibi defense.  According to petitioner,
McCrea had declined an offer from a Marine, Sergeant Glenz, to
assist in obtaining those military records.  The unit diary was
in evidence at the post-conviction hearing and contained an entry
demonstrating that petitioner had qualified on the rifle range at
Camp Lejeune on June 28, 1989.  According to testimony,
petitioner would have started qualifying on the range on June 26
and, before that date, would have participated in preparatory
training, called a "snap-in," that could have commenced as early
as June 19.  Petitioner therefore argued that McCrea could have
used the unit diary to demonstrate that the state had failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner had been in
Oregon in early or mid-June 1989.
		Petitioner also argued that a reasonable investigation
by McCrea would have revealed other witnesses and evidence
supporting his alibi defense.  First, petitioner's brother
testified that he had visited his parents' home regularly on the
weekends during June 1989 and that petitioner was not present.  A
neighbor, Thompson, provided similar testimony.  Both claimed
that they had been available to testify at petitioner's trial,
but that McCrea had not called them.  Second, petitioner
presented evidence of bank statements which demonstrated that he
had not withdrawn more than $300 in June 1989, suggesting that he
could not have purchased a plane ticket to fly from Camp Lejeune
to Oregon during that time.  Finally, petitioner presented
testimony that various items that had since been destroyed,
including telephone records, checking account information, and
postmarked letters to his fiancée, would have been available at
trial to prove that he had not been in Oregon in June 1989, but
that McCrea had not sought those items.
		In light of the foregoing, the post-conviction court
agreed with petitioner that 
	"[McCrea's] failure to investigate and use the evidence
and witnesses available to him regarding Petitioner's
alibi, as well as his withdrawal of and subsequent
failure to move to reinstate his alibi defense when the
state's promised evidence was not forthcoming, was a
failure to exercise reasonable professional skill and
judgment."
		The post-conviction court found that, if McCrea had
performed an adequate investigation and had not withdrawn the
alibi defense, the jury could have heard the following testimony:
		"1) Petitioner was not at his parents' home in
June of 1989.
		"2) Petitioner had no recorded leave from the
Marine Corps at the time of the alleged crimes.
		"3) There was no basket (unrecorded) leave
available to him.
		"4) The longest unrecorded period away from base
during the time of the alleged crimes was for a 96-hour
liberty.
		"5) Petitioner could not have traveled f[a]rther
than 300-500 miles during said liberty without the
express written permission of his commanding officer. 
Such an extension required special arrangements and
would have been difficult to arrange with the short
advance warning given for 96 hour liberties.
		"6) According to the unit records, Petitioner
would have been involved in a 'snap in' to qualify for
rifle training in North Carolina on June 19, 1989, the
day the victim testified he visited her in the hospital
in Oregon following the alleged crimes."
The court concluded that the absence of the above evidence
"clearly ha[d] a tendency to affect the result of the prosecution
of the case" and granted petitioner post-conviction relief. 
		The state appealed, assigning error to the post-conviction court's conclusions.  As noted, the Court of Appeals
reversed, concluding that petitioner had failed to prove that
McCrea's pretrial investigation of petitioner's alibi defense had
been unreasonable under the circumstances.  The court's decision
focused on the fact that neither petitioner nor his parents could
testify with certainty whether petitioner was in Oregon in June
1989.  In the court's view, "[t]hat uncertainty made the
viability of an alibi defense questionable from the inception." 
Lichau, 166 Or App at 418.  Because the military lawyer that
McCrea had contacted did not produce any further evidence, and
because nothing in the record supported a finding that McCrea
"should have suspected that the military [lawyer's] search for
records had been inadequate," id. at 419, the court concluded
that McCrea had acted reasonably in presuming that "a further
search would be fruitless," id. at 420.  The court also noted
that Sergeant Glenz did not offer to help McCrea obtain
petitioner's records until after the trial had started. 
Accordingly, the court concluded that, "under the totality of the
circumstances, [McCrea] had conducted a reasonable pretrial
investigation."  Id. at 419.
		In light of its conclusion that McCrea had conducted a
reasonable investigation, the Court of Appeals also concluded
that McCrea's decision to withdraw the alibi, and thereafter not
to reinstate it, was reasonable under the circumstances. 
Specifically, the court noted that McCrea's investigation had
revealed no conclusive proof that petitioner had not been in
Oregon in June 1989.  Therefore, because the prosecutor had
threatened to introduce evidence of "basket leave," the court
concluded that McCrea was reasonable in opting to avoid "the risk
that the [alibi] defense would not be strong enough to convince
the jury."  Id. at 420.  This court allowed petitioner's petition
for review. 
III.  DISCUSSION
		Post-conviction relief is warranted when there has been
a "substantial denial" of "rights under the Constitution of the
United States, or under the Constitution of the State of Oregon,
or both, and which denial rendered the conviction void."  ORS
138.530(1)(a).  We begin by considering whether petitioner was
denied his right to adequate counsel under Article I, section 11,
of the Oregon Constitution. (1)  See State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260,
262, 666 P2d 1316 (1983) (setting out methodology).  To prevail,
petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that McCrea failed to exercise reasonable professional skill and
judgment, and that petitioner suffered prejudice as a result. 
See ORS 138.620(2) (establishing burden of proof); Stevens v.
State, 322 Or 101, 108, 902 P2d 1137 (1995) (identifying standard
for inadequate assistance).  However, "[n]ot all lapses of
professional skill and judgment entitle a defendant to post-conviction relief.  Instead, only those acts or omissions by
counsel which have a tendency to affect the result of the
prosecution can be regarded as of constitutional magnitude." 
Stevens, 322 Or at 110 (citing Trujillo v. Maass, 312 Or 431,
435, 822 P2d 703 (1991)) (internal quotations omitted; emphasis
in original).
		In this case, therefore, we engage in a two-pronged
inquiry.  See Gorham v. Thompson, 332 Or 560, 564, 34 P3d 161
(2001) (explaining methodology).  First, we must determine
whether petitioner demonstrated by a preponderance of the
evidence that McCrea failed to exercise reasonable professional
skill and judgment.  Id.  Second, if we conclude that petitioner
met that burden, we further must determine whether he proved that
counsel's failure had a tendency to affect the result of his
trial.  Id.  In reviewing the decision of the post-conviction
court, we are bound by its findings of historic facts that are
supported by evidence in the record.  See Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or
485, 487, 443 P2d 621 (1968) (so stating).  Additionally, "[i]f
findings are not made on all such facts, and there is evidence
from which such facts could be decided more than one way, we will
presume that the facts were decided in a manner consistent with
the [post-conviction court's] ultimate conclusion * * *."  Id.
A.  Reasonable Professional Skill and Judgment
		On review, petitioner first contends that McCrea's
decision to withdraw the alibi defense was not an exercise of
reasonable professional skill and judgment because it was not
supported by an investigation of potential alibi witnesses and
military records that was reasonable under the circumstances.  We
note at the outset, as did the Court of Appeals, that a lawyer's
decision to withdraw a certain defense is, in the abstract, a
tactical one, deserving of considerable deference.  See
Krummacher v. Gierloff, 290 Or 867, 875, 627 P2d 458 (1981)
("[I]f counsel exercises reasonable professional skill and
judgment, a reviewing court will not second-guess the lawyer in
the name of the constitution * * *.").  Indeed, a court reviewing
a claim of inadequate assistance of counsel must make every
effort to evaluate a lawyer's conduct from the lawyer's
perspective at the time, without the distorting effects of
hindsight.  See id. ("The constitution gives no defendant the
right to a perfect defense -- seldom does a lawyer walk away from
a trial without thinking of something that might have been done
differently or that he would have preferred to have avoided.").
		However, this court repeatedly has cautioned that, to
be considered an exercise of professional skill and judgment, a
lawyer's tactical decision "must be grounded on a reasonable
investigation."  Gorham, 332 Or at 567; see also Krummacher, 290
Or at 875 ("[C]ounsel must investigate the facts and prepare
himself on the law to the extent appropriate to the nature and
complexity of the case * * *.").  More specifically, this court
has stated that tactical decisions made in the course of
preparing for trial must involve
	"a conscious choice by a lawyer either to take or to
omit some action on the basis of an evaluation of the
nature and complexity of the case, the likely costs and
potential benefits of the contemplated action, and
other factors."
Stevens, 322 Or at 109.  Accordingly, each decision to limit
investigation of a particular defense itself must be a reasonable
exercise of professional skill and judgment under the
circumstances.
		In this case, the record discloses that McCrea limited
his investigation of documentary alibi evidence to seeking
assistance from petitioner's former military lawyer, who
ultimately gave none, and to reviewing material provided by the
prosecution, which consisted solely of a battalion movement
record that did not disclose when or if petitioner had been on
leave.  McCrea did not seek any additional military documents,
such as petitioner's personal leave record.  Neither did he
attempt to contact possible alibi witnesses, aside from
petitioner's parents.  As noted, the Court of Appeals concluded
that the foregoing limited investigation was reasonable, given
petitioner's own uncertainty of his whereabouts and because, in
the court's view, it was not unreasonable for McCrea to presume
that petitioner's prior military lawyer had conducted an
unsuccessful investigation for records and that "a further search
would be fruitless."  Lichau, 166 Or App at 420.  We disagree on
both counts.
		Despite petitioner's uncertainty of his whereabouts in
1989, McCrea knew that, in June of that year, petitioner had been
enlisted in the United States Marine Corps, a highly regulated
environment, and had been stationed at Camp Lejeune, thousands of
miles from the scene of the alleged abuse.  Petitioner repeatedly
had told McCrea both that military records demonstrating that he
had not taken leave in June 1989 were available and that
supervisors might be able to confirm that he was at Camp Lejeune
during that time.  In our view, such information should have
prompted McCrea to investigate further.
		In that regard, this case is comparable to Stevens,
where the defense counsel chose not to interview any potential
witnesses at the school where the complaining witness had spent
the morning after the defendant allegedly had raped her.  Under
those circumstances, this court held that the trial counsel's
decision "was not a choice that was based on a reasonable
evaluation of the likely costs and potential benefits of pursuing
the investigation."  Stevens, 322 Or at 109.  Here, McCrea
himself knew enough to suspect that "the military would keep
records that would demonstrate where a person was, especially
things like roll call or duty rosters and those kinds of things
* * *."  Yet he chose not to investigate potential witnesses at
Camp Lejeune or to subpoena records from the military until over
a year after the criminal trial.  We conclude that choosing to
limit his investigation in that way was not "based on a
reasonable evaluation of the likely costs and potential benefits"
to petitioner.  Id.
		Next, we disagree that McCrea nevertheless was entitled
to rely on the lack of information that he had received from
petitioner's prior military lawyer as evidence that further
investigation was unnecessary.  The evidence in the record, far
from establishing that McCrea had found a sympathetic colleague
who "was unable to locate any additional records that would
corroborate petitioner's alibi,"  Lichau, 166 Or App at 419, discloses nothing
about the extent of that officer's efforts.  Indeed, the post-conviction court found only that
	"[McCrea] couldn't remember the officer's name or any
information that he actually received from this
individual." 


In other words, the record does not indicate that that officer
had represented to McCrea that he had conducted any investigation
of petitioner's military records.  However, the record does
indicate that petitioner was able to present the post-conviction
court with what the state concedes is "a substantial amount" of
documentary and testimonial evidence in support of his alibi
defense that McCrea did not uncover.  Given those circumstances,
we agree with the post-conviction court's finding that McCrea's
reliance on petitioner's former military lawyer did not excuse
McCrea from further investigating petitioner's alibi defense.
		We return, then, to McCrea's decision to withdraw
petitioner's alibi defense on the morning of trial.  As noted,
that decision was based on McCrea's belief that the alibi defense
might have been compromised by the prosecutor's claimed evidence
of "basket leave."  Because of his unreasonably limited pretrial
investigation, however, McCrea lacked the information necessary
to evaluate properly the prosecutor's threat.  In other words,
McCrea was not "equipped to advise his client, exercise
professional judgment and represent [petitioner] in an informed
manner."  Krummacher, 290 Or at 875.  We therefore conclude that
the record supports the post-conviction court's finding that
McCrea's decision to withdraw petitioner's alibi defense was not
a reasonable exercise of professional skill and judgment. (2)
B.  Prejudice
		Having concluded that McCrea failed to exercise
reasonable professional skill and judgment in the course of
representing petitioner, we now must decide whether that failure
prejudiced petitioner.  Gorham, 332 Or at 564.  As noted, "only
those acts or omissions by counsel which have a tendency to
affect the result of the prosecution can be regarded as of
constitutional magnitude[.]"  Krummacher, 290 Or at 883. 
		The Court of Appeals concluded that petitioner had
received adequate assistance of counsel and, therefore, that it
did not have to address the question of prejudice.  Nevertheless,
the court determined that the evidence that petitioner presented
at the post-conviction hearing "yield[ed] the portrait of a
somewhat more viable, but still not 'airtight,' alibi defense." 
Lichau, 166 Or App at 422.  Thus, the Court of Appeals suggested
that, even if McCrea's investigation had been inadequate,
petitioner would not have been prejudiced because "there is no
reason to conclude that a more thorough investigation would have
dictated that [McCrea] pursue the alibi defense * * *."  Id.  We
disagree.
		Whether McCrea would have proceeded with the alibi
defense had he been aware of the evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing is a question of fact.  As such, we are bound
by the post-conviction court's finding that McCrea would have
done so, if that finding is supported by evidence in the record. 
Ball, 250 Or at 487.  Here, the record discloses that, when shown
petitioner's unit diary at his post-conviction deposition, McCrea
admitted that, "if I had had it, and I don't recall ever having
seen this before, I would not have withdrawn the alibi defense. 
And secondly, would I have presented it to the jury? 
Absolutely."  (Emphasis added.)  Accordingly, contrary to the
Court of Appeals's suggestion, the prejudice inquiry in this case
must proceed from the premise that the jury would have heard the
alibi evidence that petitioner presented at the post-conviction
hearing.  The question, then, is whether that evidence would have
had a tendency to affect the result.
		In that regard, the state argues that none of the alibi
evidence that petitioner produced at the post-conviction
proceeding "conclusively" establishes that petitioner was at Camp
Lejeune at the time the alleged abuse occurred and that, even if
petitioner's evidence had been introduced at trial, it would not
have had a tendency to affect the result because the state could
have presented other evidence to counter it.  The state appears
to concede that petitioner was not on regular leave in June 1989
and that United States Marine Corps regulations would not have
permitted him to take more than 96 hours of undocumented leave. 
The state argues, however, that 96-hour leave almost certainly
was available to petitioner and that 96 hours was enough time for
him to have traveled to Oregon where he could have committed the
alleged abuse.  The state further suggests that, hypothetically,
petitioner could have taken in excess of 96 hours of leave "had
he been disposed to break [the] rules."  The state similarly
attacks all petitioner's other evidence, including his Marine
unit diary, as failing to establish conclusively that petitioner
did not take an undocumented 96-hour leave in June 1989.  That
petitioner's evidence fails to prove anything with certainty,
according to the state, is fatal to his claim that the absence of
that evidence prejudiced his case.  We are not persuaded by the
state's position.
		This court never has held that evidence presented at a
post-conviction hearing -- evidence that could have been
presented at petitioner's criminal trial -- must be "conclusive"
to be deemed to have a tendency to affect the result of a trial. 
This case primarily turned on the credibility of the niece and
petitioner.  The niece had suggested that petitioner was home
long enough to visit her in the hospital on June 19, 1989, "two
or three days" after he had abused her over the course of two
consecutive nights.  At his trial, petitioner testified only that
he did not believe that he had been home then, but that he could
not be absolutely sure.  With the alibi defense, however,
petitioner could have presented credible evidence that, if
accepted, would have demonstrated that, the week before June 19,
1989, he was not on official leave from military duty; unofficial
"basket leave" probably was not available to him; at most, he
might have had 96 hours within which to make an unauthorized trip
from North Carolina to Oregon and back; and he was not seen at
home in Oregon.  In our view, the presentation of that evidence
could have tended to affect the jury's consideration of the
niece's and petitioner's version of events.
		Moreover, if McCrea had not withdrawn the alibi
defense, petitioner could have requested that the court instruct
the jury that the state had the burden of proving, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that petitioner was present in Oregon during
the narrow period of "on or between" June 1 and June 19, 1989. 
Instead, McCrea testified that the court specifically had
instructed the jury "that there was not an issue as to whether or
not [petitioner] was there."  In light of the foregoing, we
cannot say that petitioner's alibi defense would not have had "a
tendency to affect the result of the prosecution * * *." 
Krummacher, 290 Or at 883.  We agree with the post-conviction
court that petitioner was prejudiced by trial counsel's
unreasonable failure to investigate petitioner's alibi defense.
		Petitioner was denied adequate assistance of counsel in
violation of Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. (3) 
He therefore is entitled to post-conviction relief as provided in
ORS 138.520.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in
part and affirmed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed.
1. 	Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right * * * to be heard by himself and counsel[.]"

2. 	  Because we conclude that McCrea's initial withdrawal
of petitioner's alibi defense was unreasonable under the
circumstances, we need not address petitioner's alternative claim
that McCrea had acted unreasonably in failing to reinstate the
alibi defense once he realized that the state's evidence of
"basket leave" was not forthcoming.

3. 	Because we decide this case under Article I, section
11, of the Oregon Constitution, we need not consider petitioner's
arguments under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
		In addition, because we conclude that petitioner is
entitled to a new trial as a result of his lawyer's
constitutionally inadequate assistance, we need not address
petitioner's cross-assignment of error with regard to the post-conviction court's dismissal of his remaining claims of trial
court error, prosecutorial misconduct, and other issues.  In any
event, petitioner did not properly develop or present those
claims in his briefs in this court or in the Court of Appeals.