Title: Wydell Jody Evans v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC00-468
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 14, 2002

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC00-468
____________
WYDELL JODY EVANS,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[November 14, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder,
kidnaping, and aggravated assault.  Appellant was sentenced to death for the first-
degree murder conviction and received concurrent sentences of life imprisonment
and 108.15 months for the kidnaping and aggravated assault convictions,
respectively. We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
I.  FACTS
On October 21, 1998, two days after being released from prison, Wydell
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Evans shot and killed his brother’s seventeen-year-old girlfriend, Angel Johnson,
during an argument over her alleged unfaithfulness to Evans' brother.  At the time of
the shooting, Evans was in an automobile with Johnson, Erica Foster, Sammy
Hogan, and Lino Odenat.  At some point during the argument, Johnson laughed, to
which Evans responded, "You think it’s funny?  You think it's funny?"  Evans then
pulled out a gun and shot Johnson in the chest.
After the shooting, Evans directed Hogan to drive to the home of a man
called "Big Dick."  As they drove, Evans passed the gun to Odenat and told him to
dispose of it.  When they arrived at Big Dick’s house, Evans left the car and talked
to Big Dick.  While Evans was talking, Odenat decided to get out of the car and let
the others take Johnson to the hospital.  As Odenat opened the door and stepped
out, Evans told him to get back into the car and Odenat obeyed.  Within a few
minutes, Evans returned and directed Hogan to drive into a nearby parking lot. 
There, Evans threatened Foster and Hogan not to tell who shot Johnson or he
would kill them and their families.  After threatening Foster and Hogan, Evans tried
to wipe his fingerprints from inside the car and left with Odenat.  Once Evans was
out of the car, Foster and Hogan rushed Johnson to the hospital where she later
died of her wounds.
At the hospital, Foster and Hogan were questioned by the police, at which
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time they first told police that a white man driving a cream-colored car shot
Johnson over a drug deal.  They later changed their story and reluctantly identified
Evans as the shooter.  The police found Evans at a motel the next morning.  He
was taken into custody, charged, and after a jury trial, convicted of one count of
first-degree premeditated murder, one count of kidnaping, and one count of
aggravated assault.
The trial judge followed the jury's recommendation of a sentence of death,
finding two aggravating circumstances and several nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances.  The court imposed concurrent sentences of life imprisonment on
the kidnaping count and 108.15 months with a three-year mandatory minimum term
on the aggravated assault count.  Evans raises six issues on appeal.
I.  GUILT PHASE
A.  Hearsay
Evans first argues that the trial court erroneously permitted the introduction
of hearsay testimony.  During its case in chief, the state called two police officers
who each testified that Hogan and Foster identified Evans as the person who shot
Johnson.  Over defense counsel's objection, the trial court allowed the testimony on
1.  Contrary to the State's contention, we find that although defense
counsel's objection on one occasion came after the witness had already begun to
answer the question, it was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.
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the grounds that Hogan and Foster's statements constituted excited utterances.1 
We agree with Evans that the statements were not admissible as excited utterances.
An excited utterance is defined as a statement "relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by
the event or condition."  § 90.803(2), Fla. Stat. (1999).  To qualify for this
exception, (1) the declarant must have experienced or witnessed an event startling
enough to cause nervous excitement; (2) the statement must have been made while
under the stress of excitement caused by the startling event; and (3) the statement
must have been made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent.  See Stoll
v. State, 762 So. 2d 870, 873 (Fla. 2000).
The statements at issue do not qualify under the excited utterance exception
to the hearsay rule.  While Hogan and Foster had experienced several events
startling enough to cause nervous excitement and their statements identifying Evans
may have been made while they were still under the stress of excitement caused by
those events, their statements clearly were not made before they had time to
contrive or misrepresent.  A significant amount of time elapsed between the startling
events and the statements.  More importantly, both Hogan and Foster lied to the
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police officers who initially questioned them, telling the officers that Johnson was
shot by a white man driving a cream-colored car.  Only after new officers arrived
and questioned Hogan and Foster separately did they identify Evans as the person
who shot Johnson.  Because Hogan and Foster's statements identifying Evans were
made some time after the startling events and after they had contrived a false story,
they cannot qualify as excited utterances and should not have been admitted under
that hearsay exception.
Although the statements do not qualify under the excited utterance exception
to the hearsay rule, their admission was not error because under section 90.801,
Florida Statutes (1999), a statement is not hearsay "if the declarant testifies at the
trial . . . and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the
statement is . . . [o]ne of identification of a person made after perceiving the
person."  § 90.801(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1999).  Here, both Hogan and Foster testified
at trial and were subject to cross-examination concerning their identification of
Evans as the shooter.
B.  Prosecutorial Comments
Evans next argues that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a
mistrial based on comments made by the prosecutor in her closing argument. 
Evans' defense and his testimony at trial centered around his assertion that the
2.  The State urges that because defense counsel objected to this line of
argument only after the prosecutor brought it up a second time, Evans' objections
to the earlier portion of the prosecutor’s comments were not preserved for appeal. 
We disagree.  On the record, defense counsel's objection covered both portions of
the prosecutor's arguments, sufficiently placed the trial judge on notice that an error
may have occurred, and provided an opportunity to correct the error; thus, the
objection was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.
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murder weapon discharged accidentally.  Evans also testified that although the
shooting was an accident, he did not immediately go to the police because he was
scared and paranoid, but that he planned to call the police the next morning to
explain what had happened.  These themes were repeated in defense counsel's
closing argument.
In her rebuttal argument, the prosecutor made several comments directed to
Evans’ defense, making the point that if the shooting was really an accident as
Evans claimed, he would not have disposed of the gun and would have immediately
gone to the police and explained the circumstances.  The prosecutor further
suggested that had Evans not disposed of the gun, it could have been tested to
determine whether, in fact, it had a slight trigger pull or was prone to misfire or fire
accidentally.  She suggested that because Evans knew that the gun did not
malfunction or fire accidentally, he disposed of it, and as a result, the State was
unable to confirm these facts.  Defense counsel objected to these comments2 and
moved for a mistrial.  The motion was denied.  On appeal, Evans argues that the
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trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion.  He contends that the
prosecutor's insinuation that he disposed of the gun was not supported by the
evidence and that the comments at issue improperly shifted the burden of proof to
the defendant to prove his innocence.  We disagree.
Normally, "the state cannot comment on a defendant's failure to produce
evidence to refute an element of the crime, because doing so could erroneously
lead the jury to believe that the defendant carried the burden of introducing
evidence."  Jackson v. State, 575 So. 2d 181, 188 (Fla. 1991).  However, a
prosecuting attorney may comment on the jury's duty to analyze and evaluate the
evidence and state his or her contention relative to what conclusions may be drawn
from the evidence.  See Ruiz v. State, 743 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999).  In this instance,
Erica Foster, who was in the car when the shooting occurred, testified that after
Evans shot Johnson, he gave the gun to Lino Odenat and told him to dispose of it.
She further testified that once Evans and Odenat exited, the gun was no longer
present in the car.  From this evidence, the prosecutor was entitled to argue that the
jury could and should conclude that Evans was responsible for disposing of the
gun.
We further reject Evans' argument that the prosecutor's comments
improperly shifted the burden of proof.  Evans took the stand in his own defense,
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and by doing so, he placed his credibility at issue.  Accordingly, the prosecution
was entitled to highlight inconsistencies between Evans' testimony and other
evidence in the case and to expose contradictions and improbabilities in Evans'
version of events.  The clear import of the challenged comment was to discredit
Evans' testimony by pointing out that his actions in disposing of the gun were
inconsistent with his claim that the shooting was an accident.  This was fair
comment on the evidence, and we find no error.
C.  Denial of Motion for Acquittal
Evans raises as his third issue his assertion that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal.  As to the murder charge, Evans
argues that the State did not sufficiently establish premeditation.  This Court has
defined premeditation as  a "fully formed conscious purpose to kill" which may be
"formed a moment before the act but must exist for a sufficient length of time to
permit reflection as to the nature of the act to be committed and the probable result
of that act."  Woods v. State, 733 So. 2d 980, 985 (Fla. 1999).  Premeditation can
be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, including "the nature of the
weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate provocation, previous
difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the homicide was committed,
and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted."  Holton v. State, 573 So. 2d
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284, 289 (Fla. 1990).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there is
competent, substantial evidence to support a finding of premeditation.  Edward
Rogers, Evans' former prison-mate, testified that while he and Evans were
incarcerated, he overheard part of a telephone conversation in which Evans was
arguing with Angel Johnson.  When Evans hung up the phone, he told Rogers that
if he could get his hands on Johnson, he was going to kill her.  Within hours after
his release from prison, Evans discussed with several people his belief that Johnson
was cheating on his brother and stated that he was going to "take care of his
brother’s work" for him.  There was also evidence that on the evening of the
shooting, Evans was looking for Johnson.  Once Johnson was in the car, Evans
confronted her regarding the allegations that she was cheating on his brother. 
When she denied the allegations and smiled and laughed, he pulled out the gun,
aimed it at her chest, and fired.  These facts are sufficient to support premeditated
murder.  Accordingly, the trial judge was correct in submitting this issue to the jury.
Evans next asserts that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the
murder charge because the State did not prove that Johnson's death occurred
because of a criminal act; instead, he asserts that it was an accident caused when
Johnson tried to push the gun away.  Although Evans testified to this version of
3.  The indictment charged in a single count that "WYDELL JODY EVANS,
did forcibly, secretly or by threat, confine, abduct or imprison another person,
ANGEL JOHNSON, ERICA FOSTER, SAMMY HOGAN."  Evans does not
allege any error in the charging document.
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events, Foster and Hogan disputed his testimony, stating that Johnson never
touched the gun and had her hands up in the air when the gun was fired. 
Additionally, the testimony of the medical examiner regarding the physical evidence
cast serious doubts upon Evans' version of events.  Accordingly, while the
evidence was conflicting, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury finding;
therefore, the trial judge was correct in denying Evans' motion for judgment of
acquittal.
Evans also asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support his 
conviction for kidnaping.  Again, we disagree.  Evans was charged and convicted
of only one count of kidnaping either Angel Johnson, Erica Foster, or Sammy
Hogan.3  Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we hold that
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Evans kidnaped any one of the
three victims.  Although initially all three were voluntarily in the car with Evans, there
was sufficient evidence that once the shooting took place, the victims no longer
willingly accompanied Evans to the various locations to which he directed he be
taken and that he confined them against their will either by force or threat with the
4.  The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
Before you can find the Defendant guilty of kidnapping, the
State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable
doubt:  
Number one: Wydell Jody Evans forcibly, secretly, or by threat
confined, abducted, or imprisoned Angel Johnson, Erica Foster, or
Sammy Hogan against their will.
Number two:  Wydell Jody Evans had no lawful authority.
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intent to terrorize them.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Evans'
motion for judgment of acquittal on the kidnaping charge.
D.  Jury Instructions
Evans argues that the trial court erred in its kidnaping instruction.  Although
Evans was charged with kidnaping under two theories, (1) kidnaping with the intent
to terrorize and (2) kidnaping with the intent to facilitate the commission of another
felony, the jury was instructed only as to kidnaping with the intent to terrorize. 
Evans argues that the instructions given by the court improperly combined the two
theories of kidnaping and, in doing so, eliminated an essential element of the crime. 
Because Evans failed to object to the jury instructions, this Court will review this
claim only if the instructions amount to a fundamental error.  See State v. Wilson,
686 So. 2d 569, 570 (Fla. 1996).
Although the instruction as given commingles the elements of kidnaping with
the intent to terrorize and kidnaping with the intent to facilitate a felony,4 it does not
Number three:  Wydell Jody Evans acted with the intent to inflict
bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person.
In order to be kidnaping the confinement, abduction or
imprisonment:  
A:  Must not be slight, inconsequential or merely incidental to
the felony;
B:  Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the felony;
and 
C:  Must have some significance independent of the felony in
that it makes the felony substantially easier of commission or
substantially lessens the risk of detection.
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amount to fundamental error in that it contains all of the essential elements of
kidnaping with the intent to terrorize, which was the sole theory of kidnaping
submitted to the jury.  The fact that the instruction contained additional elements of
proof benefitted the defendant by making it more difficult to prove the kidnaping
charge. 
II.  PENALTY PHASE
A.  Presentence Investigation Reports
During the penalty phase, the trial court permitted the State to introduce, over
defense counsel's objections, portions of several presentence investigation reports
from Evans’ prior convictions.  The reports were introduced for the purpose of
proving the details of the prior violent felonies of which Evans had been convicted. 
Pursuant to section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1999), hearsay testimony is
admissible to establish these details, provided the defendant has a fair opportunity
5.  The State contends that this claim is procedurally barred because Evans
asserted below only that the reports should not be admitted because they constitute
hearsay.  We disagree.  Although Evans' counsel did not specifically assert a Sixth
Amendment challenge, the hearsay objection raised is closely related to the right of
confrontation.  Hence, we will review this issue on the merits.
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to rebut the hearsay.  See § 921.141(1), Fla. Stat. (1999) (during the penalty phase
of a capital case,"[a]ny such evidence which the court deems to have probative
value may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of
evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any
hearsay statements").
Here, Evans argues that he was not afforded a fair opportunity to rebut the
hearsay statements contained in the presentence investigation reports and that their
admission denied his Sixth Amendment confrontation right because he was unable
to cross-examine the person who prepared them.5  We disagree.  The transcripts of
the prior trials were available to rebut any inaccuracies in the reports.  The reports
themselves contained Evans' statements regarding the crimes and also included
victim impact information which was favorable to the defense.  The trial court
agreed to allow Evans to place that information before the jury, but he elected not
to do so.  Further, while as described above there were other ways Evans could
have rebutted the statements contained in the reports, Evans voluntarily took the
stand during the penalty phase and gave his version of the facts underlying the
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previous violent felony convictions.  Under the circumstances of this case, the
admission of the presentence investigation reports was not an abuse of discretion. 
Accordingly, we deny relief on this ground.
B.  Proportionality
Evans finally raises the issue of whether the sentence of death is
proportional.  The trial judge in this case found that two statutory aggravators were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt:  (1) the existence of prior violent felonies; and
(2) that the current crime was committed while Evans was on probation.  The judge
rejected the statutory mitigator that the victim was a participant in the defendant's
conduct, finding that although there was some testimony that the victim had
slapped the gun away causing it to misfire, this testimony was rendered implausible
by the testimony of the medical examiner and the location of the bullet in the car.
The judge also found that several nonstatutory mitigators were proven:  (1)
Evans had an abused or deprived childhood as a result of his mother's crack
addiction (little weight); (2) he contributed to society as evidenced by his exemplary
work habits (little weight); (3) he performed charitable or humanitarian deeds (some
weight); (4) he counseled youth to avoid crime and stay in school (little weight);
and (5) he had good behavior in prison (little weight).  The trial court rejected the
mitigator of remorse, finding it was not proven.  After concluding that the
6.  To the extent that the proportionality analysis in Blakely v. State, 561 So.
2d 560 (Fla. 1990), and Wilson v. State, 493 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 1986), rests on a
"domestic dispute exception to imposition of the death penalty" that this Court has
disavowed in Spencer and subsequent cases, we recede from Blakely and Wilson.
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aggravators far outweighed the mitigators, the judge agreed with the jury's
recommendation and sentenced the defendant to death.
In reviewing the proportionality of death sentences, this Court does not
simply compare the number of aggravators to the number of mitigators. See 
Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 612 (Fla. 2001).  Instead, we must ensure
uniformity in the death penalty by reviewing all the circumstances in the present
case relative to other capital cases.  See Bryant v. State, 785 So. 2d 422, 436 (Fla.
2001).
Upon review, we find that the imposition of the death penalty in this case is
proportionately warranted.  While the evidence reveals a close, almost familial type
of relationship between Evans and Johnson, this factor alone does not render
Evans' death sentence disproportionate.  As we explained in Spencer v. State, 691
So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1996), "this Court has never approved a ‘domestic dispute’
exception to imposition of the death penalty."  Id. at 1065; see also Blackwood v.
State, 777 So. 2d 399, 412 (Fla. 2000); Zakrzewski v. State, 717 So. 2d 488, 493
(Fla. 1998).6  In some murders that result from domestic disputes, we have
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determined that the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating circumstance
(CCP) was erroneously found because the heated passions involved were
antithetical to "cold" deliberation.  See Santos v. State, 591 So. 2d 160, 162-63
(Fla. 1991) (concluding that the CCP aggravator was not applicable where the
defendant was involved in an ongoing, highly emotional domestic dispute with
victim and her family, even though he had acquired a gun in advance and made
previous death threats against victim; concluding that murder was not "cold" even
though it may have appeared to be calculated); Douglas v. State, 575 So. 2d 165,
167 (Fla. 1991) (same as to killing that arose from a domestic dispute associated
with a lover's triangle).  "However, we have only reversed the death penalty if the
striking of the CCP aggravator results in the death sentence being
disproportionate."  Spencer, 691 So. 2d at 1065.  Instead, our proportionality
analysis properly "focuses on whether death is a proportionate penalty after
considering the totality of the circumstances in a particular case."  Blackwood, 777
So. 2d at 412.
In the instant case, Johnson was Evans' brother’s long-time girlfriend, and
Evans was very concerned about rumors that Johnson was being unfaithful while
his brother was incarcerated.  When Evans confronted Johnson about the rumors
while they were riding in the same car, an argument ensued between them.  When
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Johnson made a comment and laughed, Evans responded by pulling out a gun and
shooting Johnson in the chest.  While the shooting occurred during an argument,
Evans made prior statements that he intended to kill Johnson for cheating on his
brother.  Two days after he was released from jail, Evans made good on this threat
by shooting the victim point blank in the chest.  He refused to let other individuals
who were present during the shooting take Johnson to the hospital.  These
individuals testified that the victim was gasping for breath and pleading for help. 
The victim died shortly after reaching the hospital, having bled to death from the
gunshot wound that severed her aorta.  Further, Evans was previously convicted of
three violent felonies:  aggravated battery for leading a brutal attack on a motorist,
and battery on law enforcement officers on two separate occasions.  He committed
the murder of Johnson while serving felony probation on two separate cases.  In
addition, the applicable mitigating factors did not involve the circumstances of the
murder itself.  See, e.g.,  Ross v. State, 474 So. 2d 1170, 1174 (Fla. 1985)
(concluding that trial court erred in not considering the circumstances of the murder
to be a "significant mitigating factor," including that the defendant had been
drinking when he attacked the victim, that he had a drinking problem, and that the
killing was the result of an angry domestic dispute in which victim realized that
defendant was having difficulty controlling his emotions).
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When the circumstances of the instant case are compared to similar cases,
we conclude that the death penalty is proportionate here.  See, e.g., Blackwood v.
State, 777 So. 2d 399, 412 (Fla. 2000) (finding death sentence proportional where
defendant had been involved in relationship with the victim several months before
the murder and sole aggravating circumstance of heinous, atrocious, or cruel
outweighed statutory mitigator of no significant history of prior criminal conduct
and eight nonstatutory mitigators).
For the reasons stated above, we affirm Evans' convictions and death
sentence.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., and HARDING, Senior Justice, concur.
SHAW, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which
ANSTEAD, C.J., and PARIENTE, J., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
SHAW, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I concur in the majority's decision to affirm Evans' convictions, I find
that imposition of the death penalty in this case is disproportionate and not in
accord with previous decisions of this Court.  The homicide committed by Evans
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occurred during an argument between Evans and the victim over her alleged
unfaithfulness to his brother.  The victim made the fatal mistake of laughing which
incensed Evans to the point that he pulled out a gun and shot her in the chest. 
There is nothing in the record to show that this was a planned or premeditated
killing.  In fact, the record reflects that the shooting was a spontaneous response to
what Evans obviously felt was inappropriate laughter.
Although this Court has never approved a “domestic dispute” exception to
the application of the death penalty, in other cases involving circumstances similar
to those presented here, we have held that the death penalty was disproportionate. 
See Farinas v. State, 569 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1990) (vacating death sentence where
defendant shot his former girlfriend three times, first paralyzing her as she ran from
him and then shooting her twice in the head, where murder was HAC and murder
was committed during a kidnapping but there was mitigating evidence that
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance due
to intense jealousy); Wilson v. State, 493 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 1986) (vacating death
sentence of defendant convicted of killing father in heated confrontation, where
there were two valid aggravating circumstances (the murder was HAC and
defendant had been convicted of a prior violent felony) and no mitigating
circumstances); Ross v. State, 474 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1985) (vacating death
7.  See Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999) (holding that CCP and
HAC “are two of the most serious aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing
scheme, and, while their absence is not controlling, it is also not without some
relevance to a proportionality analysis”). 
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sentence of defendant convicted of killing wife where killing was HAC but was
mitigated by fact that defendant had been drinking and fact that killing occurred
during angry domestic dispute); Blair v. State, 406 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1981)
(vacating death sentence of defendant convicted of killing wife in response to her
threat to go to police about relationship between defendant and her daughter, where
there was one valid aggravating circumstance (murder committed to avoid or
prevent lawful arrest) and one mitigating circumstance (no significant history of
prior criminal activity)).  I believe that this result is further supported by the fact that
there was no finding of either the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator or
the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator7 and that the trial court found five
nonstatutory mitigators.  
The majority opinion ignores the above precedent based on the statement in 
Spencer v. State, 691 So. 2d 1062, 1065 (Fla. 1996), that "this Court has never
approved a 'domestic dispute' exception to imposition of the death penalty."  Id.
(emphasis added).  As Spencer explicitly recognized, it did not change the law. 
Instead, domestic situations are and always have been "evaluated in the same
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manner as other cases for determination as to whether a death sentence may be
disproportional given the overall circumstances."  Butler v. State, 27 Fla. L. Weekly
S461, S466 (Fla. May 9, 2002).  The mere fact that these cases involved family
members or friends is of no moment.  They stand for the proposition that when a
heated argument leads to a killing that was most likely upon reflection of a short
duration, this Court will treat this as an important mitigating circumstance which
must be weighed against the aggravating factors.  Since I do not believe that the
facts of this case demonstrate that it is one of the most aggravated and the least
mitigated of first-degree murders, accordingly, I dissent.  I would affirm the
conviction but would vacate the death sentence and remand for imposition of a life
sentence.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and PARIENTE, J., concur.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County,
Jere E. Lober, Judge - Case No. 98-25245-CFA
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Michael S. Becker, Assistant Public
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Judy Taylor Rush, Assistant
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Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellee