Title: STIFFARM v FUROIS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 85-020
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: August 15, 1985

No. 85-020 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1955 JOSEPH P. STIFFARM, Petitioner and Appellant, WILLIAM F. FUROIS, as Chief of the State of Montana, Department of Justice, l l l o t o r Vehicle Division, et al., Respondents. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District, In and for the County of Hill, The Honorable Chan Ettien, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Morrison, Barron & Young; Robert C . Melcher, Havre, Montana For Respondents: Barbara Claassen, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Submitted on Briefs: May 3, 1985 Decided: August 15, 1985 C l e r k Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. Joseph Stiffarm appeals from an order of the District Court affirming the one-year revocation of his driver ' s license by the Montana Motor Vehicle Division of the Department of Justice. On February 5, 1984, appellant was arrested for the offense of driving under the influence of a 1 cohol. The appellant refused to submit to a chemical test to determine the alcohol concentration of his breath. Appellant had previously refused the chemical test in March of 1982. The Motor Vehicle Division invoked section 61-8-402, MCA which requires the revocation of a driver's license for one year upon a second or subsequent refusal to submit to a chemical test within five years of a previous refusal. On September 13, 1984, the appellant filed a petition for writ of mandamus and claimed that the application of the mandatory revocation provision of section 61-8-402, MCA was improper because only one of the offenses upon which the revocation of his license was based, occurred after the effective date of the amendment. The District Court ordered the State to either return the appellant's driver's license or to appeal the determination. Following a hearing, the District Court affirmed the Motor Vehicle Division's application of section 61-8-402, MCA and the writ of mandamus was vacated. The dispositive issue before this Court is whether section 61-8-402, MCA, which requires revocation of a driver's license for one year upon a subsequent refusal to submit to a chemical test within five years of a previous refusal, was properly applied. Section 61-8-402, MCA provides: " (1) Any person who o p e r a t e s a motor v e h i c l e upon ways o f t h i s s t a t e open t o t h e p u b l i c s h a l l be deemed t o have given consent, s u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n o f 61-8-401, t o a chemical test o f h i s blood, b r e a t h , o r u r i n e f o r t h e purpose o f determining t h e a l c o h o l i c c o n t e n t of h i s blood i f a r r e s t e d by a peace o f f i c e r f o r d r i v i n g o r i n a c t u a l p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l o f a motor v e h i c l e w h i l e under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l . " ( 3 ) I f a r e s i d e n t d r i v e r under a r r e s t r e f u s e s upon t h e r e q u e s t o f a peace o f f i c e r t o submit t o a chemical t e s t designated by t h e a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r a s provided i n s u b s e c t i o n (1) o f t h i s s e c t i o n , none s h a l l be given, b u t t h e o f f i c e r s h a l l , on behalf o f t h e d i v i s i o n , immediately s e i z e h i s d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e . The peace o f f i c e r s h a l l forward t h e l i c e n s e t o t h e d i v i s i o n , along w i t h a sworn r e p o r t t h a t he had reasonable grounds t o b e l i e v e t h e a r r e s t e d person had been d r i v i n g o r was i n a c t u a l p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l o f a motor v e h i c l e upon ways o f t h i s s t a t e open t o t h e p u b l i c , while under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l and t h a t t h e person had refused t o submit t o t h e test upon t h e r e q u e s t of t h e peace o f f i c e r . Upon r e c e i p t o f t h e r e p o r t , t h e d i v i s i o n s h a l l suspend t h e l i c e n s e f o r t h e period provided i n s u b s e c t i o n ( 5 ) . The " (5) - following ~ - suspension - . . - and revocation p e r i o d s a r e a p p l i c a b l e upon r e f u s a l - t o submit t o a chemical test: - - " ( a ) upon - a f i r s t r e f u s a l , - a suspension of 90 days w i t h no p r o v i s i o n f o r a - - - - - r e s t r i c t e d probationary l i c e n s e ; " (b) upon a second o r subsequent r e f u s a l w i t h i c 5 y e a r s 0 7 a r e v i o u s r e f u s a l , a s determined -- from th; rzcord o f t h e d i v i s i o n , a revocation o f 1 y e a r w i t h - - - - no - p r o v i s i o n - f o r - a r e s t r i c t e d probationary l i c e n s e . " (Emphasis supplied.) P r i o r t o October 1, 1983, Montana law provided f o r a sixty-day suspension o f an i n d i v i d u a l ' s d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e f o r f a i l u r e t o t a k e a chemical t e s t . S e c t i o n 61-8-402, MCA (1981). I n 1983, s e c t i o n 61-8-402, MCA was amended, changing t h e sixty-day suspension period t o ninety-days. Section 61-8-402 (5) ( a ) , MCA. In a d d i t i o n , t h e amended version provided f o r mandatory revocation of t h e l i c e n s e of a d r i v e r who has refused t h e chemical t e s t a second time w i t h i n f i v e years of t h e previous r e f u s a l . Section 61-8-402 (5) (b) , MCA. The a p p e l l a n t argues t h a t s e c t i o n 61-8-402(5), MCA, should not be applied t o r e q u i r e a revocation of h i s license. The a p p e l l a n t argues t h a t he must be allowed a " f i n a l r e f u s a l " under t h e amended version of s e c t i o n 61-8-402 (5) , MCA before h i s l i c e n s e can be revoked based on a second o r subsequent refusa 1. Moreover, t h e a p p e l l a n t maintains t h a t section 1-2-109, MCA, which provides "no law contained i n any of t h e s t a t u t e s i n Montana i s r e t r o a c t i v e unless expressly so declared," precludes r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n . W e find t h a t s e c t i o n 61-8-402, MCA, i s void of any language which expresses an i n t e n t t o have it applied r e t r o a c t i v e l y . However, we a l s o find t h a t s e c t i o n 61-8-402, MCA does not f a l l within t h e d e f i n i t i o n of a r e t r o a c t i v e law. N o sanction was imposed on t h e f i r s t r e f u s a l occurring p r i o r t o t h e e f f e c t i v e date. Rather, it served a s a condition f o r imposing t h e one-year revocation f o r t h e subsequent r e f u s a l . The s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s revocation of a p p e l l a n t ' s l i c e n s e i n response t o h i s r e f u s a l i n February of 1984 because it was a r e p e t i t i v e r e f u s a l . I n Sanchez v. S t a t e Dept. of Rev. Motor Veh. (Colo.App. 1983), 667 P.2d 779, a most s i m i l a r sequence occurred. The Colorado Court of Appeals likewise upheld t h e mandatory revocation of a d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e upon a second conviction of d r i v i n g while a b i l i t y impaired a s applying t o a case i n which t h e second conviction occurred a f t e r t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e s t a t u t e , but the first offense occurred prior to the effective date of the statute. "This mode of statutory operation is not retroactive, nor does it constitute an ex post facto law in a criminal setting." Sanchez, supra, 667 P.2d at 780; see also Gryger v. Burke (1948), 334 U.S. 728, 68 S.Ct. 1256, 92 L.Ed. 1683. We are in accord with rulings from courts from other jurisdictions that an amended statute which is applied to a factual situation which occurred prior to the enactment of the amendment is not viewed as retroactive in application. See Nix v. Tice (Colo.App. 1980), 607 P.2d 399; McCartney v. West Adams County Fire Protection District (Colo. App. 1978) , 574 P.2d 516; Shoemaker v. Atchison (Ala.Civ.App. 1981), 406 So.2d 986. Accordingly, we hold that the one-year revocation of the appellant's driver's license as mandated by section 61-8-402, MCA was proper. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. We concur: / ; I