Title: Alma Bicknese, M.D. v. Thomas B. Sutula
Citation: 2003 WI 31
Docket Number: 2000AP001825
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 2, 2003

2003 WI 31 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-1825 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Alma Bicknese, M.D.,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Thomas B. Sutula and the Board of Regents of the 
University of Wisconsin System,  
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  248 Wis. 2d 526, 635 N.W.2d 905 
(Ct. App. 2001-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 2, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 7, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert DeChambeau   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
SYKES, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, C.J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Mary E. Kennelly, BethAnne Yeager, and Fox & Fox, S.C., 
Madison and oral argument by Michael R. Fox. 
 
For the defendants-respondents the cause was argued by John 
R. Sweeney, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2003 WI 31 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-1825  
(L.C. No. 
98 CV 217) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Alma Bicknese, M.D.,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Thomas B. Sutula and the Board of Regents  
of the University of Wisconsin System,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 2, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Alma Bicknese (Bicknese) 
alleges that Thomas Sutula (Sutula), who was chair of the 
Neurology Department at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, 
offered her a position as an assistant professor and that she 
relied upon this offer in turning down a comparable job offer 
from the University of New York-Buffalo.  Bicknese seeks review 
of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, which 
dismissed Bicknese's claims on the grounds that Sutula was 
immune from personal liability based on public officer immunity.   
¶2 
The issue here is not whether Bicknese is entitled to 
damages from Sutula.  The issue is whether Bicknese can even sue 
No. 
00-1825   
 
2 
 
Sutula.  Sutula claims that as a public officer, he is shielded 
by public officer immunity.  Bicknese argues that Sutula is not 
immune from suit because his conduct falls under an exception to 
public 
officer 
immunity; 
namely, 
the 
performance 
of 
a 
ministerial duty or actions that are malicious, willful, and 
intentional.  Bicknese argues, in part, that Sutula had a 
ministerial duty to make the job offer consistent with the 
University 
of 
Wisconsin 
Faculty 
Policies 
and 
Procedures.  
Bicknese alleges that Sutula breached his ministerial duty when 
he failed to set the terms of the offer pursuant to these 
policies and procedures; therefore, he loses his public officer 
immunity.  We agree with Bicknese.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
¶3 
In order to have a full understanding of the facts and 
appreciate 
their 
significance, 
we 
first 
briefly 
review 
Bicknese's theory for recovering damages.  Sutula, who was the 
chair 
of 
the 
Neurology 
Department 
at 
the 
University 
of 
Wisconsin-Madison (UW), offered Bicknese a position as an 
assistant professor in the department.  One of the terms of the 
offer was a five-year tenure clock; that is, five years to 
qualify for tenure.  Based on that offer, Bicknese turned down a 
comparable job offer from the University of New York-Buffalo 
(Buffalo), which also included a five-year tenure clock.  
Bicknese relied on the terms represented by Sutula in rejecting 
Buffalo's offer.  As concluded by the circuit court: 
Under one reasonable view of the facts in this 
case, it could be inferred that Sutula offered 
No. 
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3 
 
Bicknese a position at Wisconsin and intentionally 
held 
back 
critical 
information 
concerning 
the 
likelihood that the tenure clock for Bicknese would 
not in fact be extended from the three years required 
by the rules to five, despite the fact that he 
affirmatively promised her a five year tenure clock.   
[A] 
reasonable 
fact 
finder 
could 
determine 
that . . . Sutula. . . [withheld] critical information 
regarding the hiring decision . . . with the purpose 
of 
inducing 
[Bicknese] 
to 
reject 
an 
offer 
of 
employment from the State University of New York at 
Buffalo.    
¶4 
As chair of the Neurology Department, Sutula had a 
ministerial duty to accurately state the terms under which the 
offer was extended to Bicknese in accordance with the UW Faculty 
Policies and Procedures.  Sutula breached this ministerial duty 
when he failed to adhere to the specific directives of the UW 
Faculty Policies and Procedures in calculating Bicknese's tenure 
clock.  Therefore, Sutula has no public officer immunity.   
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶5 
Alma Bicknese was an assistant professor at the State 
University of New York-Stony Brook (Stony Brook), where she had 
been employed since 1992.  In October 1996, Bicknese decided to 
leave Stony Brook and seek a position at another university.  
She applied for assistant professor positions at Buffalo and the 
UW.  In January 1997, Bicknese received a job offer from Buffalo 
with a starting salary of $100,000, start-up funds for a 
laboratory, and a five-year tenure clock.  Bicknese informed 
Buffalo that she could not accept the offer until she could 
compare it with an offer from the UW.  When Bicknese informed 
Sutula that she had an offer from Buffalo, she claimed that 
No. 
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4 
 
Sutula assured her that he was very interested in hiring her, 
and that he already considered her to be a member of the 
Neurology Department at the UW.     
¶6 
In February 1997, Bicknese visited the UW and met with 
Sutula and other members of the Neurology Department.  Bicknese 
testified that Sutula told her that she would have a five-year 
tenure clock and that the UW "always went along with what the 
chairman recommended . . . so it was no big deal."  Sutula 
admitted that he told Bicknese that she would have a five-year 
tenure clock; although, he confessed that he misstated the 
process when he represented to Bicknese that he had control over 
setting her tenure clock.  On April 25, 1997, the Executive 
Committee of the Pediatric Neurology Department unanimously 
voted to hire Bicknese; however, a formal offer was not extended 
due to an initial incorrect posting of the position as a 
clinical appointment instead of a tenure-track position.  The 
position had to be re-posted; consequently, a formal offer could 
not be made until the new posting time expired.      
¶7 
In May 1997, Bicknese told Sutula that she needed to 
make a decision regarding the offer from Buffalo.  She testified 
that Sutula reassured her that "the job was [hers] for the 
taking" and that they were only waiting for the posting period 
to expire before sending a formal offer.  Bicknese further 
claimed that Sutula told her to turn down the job offer from 
Buffalo.  Bicknese testified that she was uncomfortable in 
turning down the offer from Buffalo without a formal offer from 
the UW, so Sutula sent her a "white copy" offer letter.  The 
No. 
00-1825   
 
5 
 
"white copy" offer letter detailed the terms of Bicknese's 
appointment and tenure, including a five-year tenure clock, but 
it was not signed or printed on letterhead.  Bicknese claimed 
Sutula told her that the "white copy" offer letter was the same 
document that she would receive once the posting period was 
complete.  Based on these representations, Bicknese contacted 
Buffalo and informed them that she had accepted an offer from 
the UW.   
¶8 
Sutula disputed that he ever made a job offer to 
Bicknese, and claimed that the UW Medical School has no 
procedure for verbal job offers.  He also testified that he did 
not tell Bicknese to turn down the offer from Buffalo, but 
conceded that he did tell her that she should let Stony Brook 
know that she would be accepting a position elsewhere.  Sutula 
admitted that he told Bicknese throughout the process that he 
was committed to working out the details to eventually offer her 
a job.  The trial evidence also contained a letter from Sutula 
to Bicknese, in which he stated: "[W]e remain firmly committed 
to the offer of a position, and we are all determined to do 
whatever is necessary to bring you to Madison . . . ."  
¶9 
Around the beginning of July 1997, Bicknese contacted 
Sutula because she had not yet received the formal offer from 
the UW.  Bicknese testified that Sutula told her that the letter 
had not been sent because they needed to set a start date.  A 
start date was set for October 1997, and Bicknese gave Stony 
Brook notice of her departure; however, Sutula contacted 
Bicknese about a week and a half later to inform her that there 
No. 
00-1825   
 
6 
 
was a problem with the tenure clock calculation.  For the first 
time, Sutula told Bicknese that in order to extend her tenure 
clock to five years, he would have to petition the University 
Committee.  Bicknese testified that had she known about the 
tenure clock problem earlier, she would not have rejected the 
offer from Buffalo.   
¶10 Sutula petitioned the University Committee for an 
extension of Bicknese's tenure clock from three years to five 
years, but the Committee denied Sutula's request based on the 
clear provisions of § 7.04(H) of the UW Faculty Policies and 
Procedures, which allows extensions in only certain enumerated 
circumstances.1  In light of the Committee's decision, the 
Department of Neurology determined that a three-year tenure 
                                                 
1Section 7.04(H) of the UW Faculty Policies and Procedures 
states:  
7.04 THE MAXIMUM PROBATIONARY PERIOD 
H. 
The maximum probationary period may be extended for an 
appropriate period in accordance with the provisions of UWS 
3.04(3) and these policies.  Extensions shall be granted in 
periods 
of 
one 
or 
two 
semesters 
(for 
academic 
year 
appointments), 
or 
six 
months 
or 
one 
year 
(for 
annual 
appointments). 
 
1. 
Requests for extension of the probationary period 
with respect to childbirth or adoption shall be submitted by the 
faculty member in writing to the Vice Chancellor for Academic 
Affairs and Provost . . . . 
 
2. 
Requests for extension of the probationary period 
on the grounds of significant responsibilities with respect to 
elder care or dependent care obligations, disability or chronic 
illness or circumstances beyond the control of the faculty 
member . . . shall 
be 
submitted 
in 
writing 
to 
the 
Vice 
Chancellor for Academic Affairs and Provost . . . . 
No. 
00-1825   
 
7 
 
clock would be insufficient for Bicknese to meet her tenure 
requirements.  Sutula contacted Bicknese to inform her that the 
Neurology Department decided it would be  "unreasonable to 
proceed with a formal job offer . . . ."  Bicknese eventually 
accepted a position at St. Louis University in July 1998, which 
is a Tier II institution.  In contrast, both the UW and Buffalo 
are Tier I institutions.  Tier I institutions are considered 
preferable to Tier II schools because of their emphasis on 
research and their ability to attract grant money.    
¶11 Bicknese sued Sutula, the UW Board of Regents, the 
State of Wisconsin, the UW Executive Committee, and the UW 
Medical School, including its Department of Neurology, alleging 
promissory estoppel, intentional misrepresentation, and strict 
liability misrepresentation.  The circuit court for Dane County, 
Judge Robert DeChambeau presiding, dismissed all the defendants 
except for Sutula and the Board of Regents (Board), but with 
respect to the Board, the court concluded that its only 
liability would be to pay the judgment if Sutula was found 
liable.  As an affirmative defense, Sutula asserted that he was 
immune from liability as a public officer.   
¶12 At trial, the jury was instructed on the promissory 
estoppel and intentional misrepresentation claims.  A claim of 
promissory estoppel involves three elements: (1) whether the 
promise is one which the promisor should reasonably expect to 
induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial 
character on the part of the promisee; (2) whether the promise 
induced such action or forbearance; and (3) whether injustice 
No. 
00-1825   
 
8 
 
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.  Hoffman v. 
Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 697-98, 133 N.W.2d 267 
(1965). 
 
With 
respect 
to 
a 
claim 
of 
intentional 
misrepresentation, 
a plaintiff must 
sufficiently 
show the 
following: (1) the defendant made a representation of fact; (2) 
the representation of fact was untrue; and (3) the plaintiff 
must have believed such representations to be true and relied 
thereon to his or her detriment.  Gauerke v. Rozga, 112 
Wis. 2d 271, 277-78, 332 N.W.2d 804 (1983).  Furthermore, a 
plaintiff must show that the untrue representation made by the 
defendant was made with the intent to deceive and induce the 
plaintiff to act upon it to the plaintiff's pecuniary damage.  
Id.        
¶13 The jury found in favor of Bicknese on the promissory 
estoppel claim.2  Specifically, the jury found that Sutula 
                                                 
2 Although this court has held that public officer immunity 
does not bar a lawsuit for a breach of contract, Energy 
Complexes, Inc. v. Eau Claire County, 152 Wis. 2d 453, 464, 449 
N.W.2d 35 (1989); we have not specifically determined whether 
public officer immunity applies in the context of contract-like 
actions, such as promissory estoppel.  While a claim of 
promissory estoppel is somewhat similar to a contract cause of 
action, "[w]e deem it would be a mistake to regard an action 
grounded on promissory estoppel as the equivalent of a breach of 
contract action."  Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 
Wis. 2d 683, 698, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).  Thus, promissory 
estoppel might be more accurately characterized as quasi-
contractual. 
 
"Promissory 
estoppel, 
therefore, 
is 
not 
a 
contractual theory but a quasi-contractual or equitable doctrine 
designed to prevent the harm resulting from . . . reasonable and 
detrimental reliance. . . ."  Karnes v. Doctors Hosp., 555 
N.E.2d 280, 283 (Ohio 1990).  Since neither party petitioned 
this court for a determination of whether promissory estoppel 
should be treated the same as a contract with respect to public 
officer immunity, we do not address this issue. 
No. 
00-1825   
 
9 
 
promised Bicknese a job at the UW and that Sutula made 
representations of fact that Bicknese had a job at the UW 
Medical School.  The jury awarded Bicknese $375,000 in damages: 
$225,000 for the wages Bicknese would have earned at Buffalo and 
$150,000 
for 
the 
loss 
of 
reputation, 
embarrassment, 
and 
emotional distress.  However, Bicknese did not prevail on the 
intentional misrepresentation claim.  In particular, the jury 
answered "no" to the following question: "Did defendant [Sutula] 
make representations with the intent to deceive and induce 
plaintiff to act upon such representations?"  
¶14 Sutula moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
renewing his argument that, as public officer, he was entitled 
to immunity from liability.  The circuit court granted Sutula's 
motion and entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
dismissing Bicknese's claims.  Bicknese appealed, and the court 
of appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding that 
Sutula is entitled to public officer immunity because neither 
the exception for a breach of a ministerial duty nor the 
exception for malicious, willful, and intentional conduct apply 
to Sutula.  Bicknese petitioned this court for review.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶15 The proper scope of the common law doctrine of public 
officer immunity presents a question of law that this court 
reviews de novo.  Kimps v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 546 
N.W.2d 151 (1996); Kierstyn v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 228 
Wis. 2d 81, 88, 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999).  In addition, the review 
of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is a question of law 
No. 
00-1825   
 
10 
 
that is reviewed de novo.  Mgmt. Computer Serv. v. Hawkins, Ash, 
Baptie, 206 Wis. 2d 158, 177, 557 N.W.2d 67 (1996).      
III. PUBLIC OFFICER IMMUNITY 
¶16 Public officer immunity is a substantive limitation on 
the personal liability of public officers that developed out of 
the common law.  Lister v. Bd. of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 298-
99, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976).  Public officer immunity does not 
originate 
from 
the 
state's 
sovereign 
immunity 
under 
the 
Wisconsin Constitution, but instead is based on considerations 
of public policy.  Id. at 299.  These considerations include:  
(1) The danger of influencing public officers in the 
performance of their functions by the threat of 
lawsuit; (2) the deterrent effect which the threat of 
personal liability might have on those who are 
considering entering public service; (3) the drain on 
valuable 
time 
caused 
by 
such 
actions; 
(4) 
the 
unfairness 
of 
subjecting 
officials 
to 
personal 
liability for the acts of their subordinates; and (5) 
the feeling that the ballot and removal procedures are 
more appropriate methods of dealing with misconduct in 
public office. 
Id.   
¶17 There are four recognized exceptions to public officer 
immunity that have developed in order to balance "the need of 
public officers to perform their functions freely against the 
right of an aggrieved party to seek redress."  Lister, 72 
Wis. 2d at 300.  Public officer immunity does not apply to: (1) 
the performance of ministerial duties; (2) the performance of 
duties with respect to a "known danger;" (3) actions involving 
medical discretion; and (4) actions that are "malicious, 
willful, and intentional."  Willow Creek Ranch v. Town of 
No. 
00-1825   
 
11 
 
Shelby, 2000 WI 56, ¶ 26, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693.  Of 
these four, only the performance of a ministerial duty and 
actions that are malicious, willful, and intentional are at 
issue in this case.   
A.  Malicious, Willful, Intentional  
¶18 The parties disagree whether the exception regarding 
malicious, willful, and intentional conduct should be read in 
the conjunctive (malicious, willful, and intentional) or the 
disjunctive (malicious, willful, or intentional).  The source of 
the confusion stems from the use of both "and" and "or" by 
courts in stating the exception.  The exception was first 
announced in Lister as "malicious, willful and intentional 
misconduct," but the court concluded in that case that "[t]he 
complaint contains no allegation of malicious or intentional 
misconduct on the part of [the defendant] which could subject 
him to personal liability."  Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 302 (emphasis 
added).  Since Lister, Wisconsin courts have stated the 
exception in both the conjunctive and disjunctive; however, in 
No. 
00-1825   
 
12 
 
the majority of cases, the exception has been recited in the 
conjunctive.3     
¶19 Bicknese argues that mere "intentional" conduct, as 
opposed to negligent conduct, is sufficient to abrogate public 
officer immunity.  We disagree.  As will be discussed, this 
proffered interpretation is unquestionably over-inclusive.  We 
recognize that people often act "intentionally;" thus, common 
sense dictates that the exception should not cover every 
"intentional" act, but rather intentional acts of a harmful or 
                                                 
3 The 
following 
cases 
state 
the 
exception 
in 
the 
conjunctive: Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶24, 
253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314; Willow Creek Ranch v. Town of 
Shelby, 2000 WI 56, ¶26, 235 Wis. 2d  409, 611 N.W.2d 693; 
Kierstyn v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 81, 90-91 
n.8, 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999); Kimps v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 10 n. 
7, 
546 
N.W.2d 151 
(1996); 
Barillari 
v. 
Milwaukee, 
194 
Wis. 2d 247, 257, 533 N.W.2d 759 (1995); C.L. v. Olson, 143 
Wis. 2d 701, 711, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988); Ibrahim v. Samore, 118 
Wis. 2d 720, 728, 348 N.W.2d 554 (1984); Kegonsa Joint Sanitary 
Dist. v. City of Stoughton, 87 Wis. 2d 131, 147, 274 N.W.2d 598 
(1979); Lister v. Bd. of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 302, 240 
N.W.2d 610 (1976); Caraher v. City of Menomonie, 2002 WI App 
184, ¶13 n.4, 256 Wis. 2d 605, 649 N.W.2d 344; Rolland v. County 
of Milwaukee, 2001 WI App 53, ¶8 n. 1, 241 Wis. 2d 215, 625 
N.W.2d 590; Sheridan v. City of Janesville, 164 Wis. 2d 420, 
425, 474 N.W.2d 799 (Ct. App. 1991); Harmann v. Schulke, 146 
Wis. 2d 848, 852, 432 N.W.2d 671 (Ct. App. 1988); Yotvat v. 
Roth, 95 Wis. 2d 357, 366, 290 N.W.2d 524 (Ct. App. 1980).   
The 
following 
cases 
recite 
the 
exception 
in 
the 
disjunctive: Ottinger v. Pinel, 215 Wis. 2d 266, 273, 572 
N.W.2d 519 (Ct. App. 1997); Walker v. Univ. of Wisconsin Hosp., 
198 Wis. 2d 237, 249, 542 N.W.2d 207 (Ct. App. 1995); Protic v. 
Castle Co., 132 Wis. 2d 364, 369, 392 N.W.2d 119 (Ct. App. 
1986); Graney v. Bd. of Regents, 92 Wis. 2d 745, 766, 286 
N.W.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1979).  Notably, Ottinger and Walker cite 
Barillari for the exception, but Barillari states the standard 
in the conjunctive.     
No. 
00-1825   
 
13 
 
pernicious character.  Moreover, the exception also refers to 
malicious and willful conduct.  These additional terms indicate 
that the exception should only apply to ill-intended acts, as 
opposed to all "intentional" actions.  One court has articulated 
the exception as "'where the alleged acts involve malice, 
wantonness or intent to injure, rather than negligence.'"  Colon 
v. City of New Haven, 758 A.2d 900, 902 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Evon v. Andrews, 559 A.2d 1131, 1134 
(Conn. 1989)).  In addition, "malice" is defined as "the intent, 
without justification or excuse, to commit a wrongful act."  
Black's Law Dictionary 968 (7th ed. 1999).4  Furthermore, this 
court has characterized the exception pertaining to "'malicious, 
willful and intentional conduct'" as a potential "remedy [for] 
gross municipal wrongdoing."  Willow Creek, 235 Wis. 2d, ¶36 
n.12 (quoting Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 90 n.8).  Accordingly, 
the exception does not apply to mere intentional conduct of a 
public officer or employee without more.  Therefore, the three 
terms should be read in conjunction as  "malicious, willful, and 
intentional."     
                                                 
4 "[M]alice in the legal sense imports (1) the absence 
of all elements of justification, excuse or recognized 
mitigation, and (2) the presence of either (a) an 
actual intent to cause the particular harm which is 
produced or harm of the same general nature, or (b) 
the wanton and wilful doing of an act with awareness 
of a plain and strong likelihood that such harm may 
result."   
Black's Law Dictionary 968 (7th ed. 1999) (quoting 
Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 860 
(3d ed. 1982)). 
No. 
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14 
 
¶20 In this case, the jury found that Sutula made 
representations to Bicknese that she had a job at the UW Medical 
School even though this was not true.  On the other hand, the 
jury found that Sutula did not make these representations with 
the intent to deceive Bicknese or to induce her to act upon such 
representations.  It appears from Sutula's efforts that he 
genuinely wanted Bicknese to the join the faculty at the UW and 
was not trying to intentionally harm her.  Thus, while Sutula 
presumably acted intentionally, he did not act maliciously with 
an intent to injure Bicknese.  Admittedly, Sutula's tactics to 
persuade Bicknese to choose the UW and turn down the competing 
offer from Buffalo were arguably highly inappropriate; however, 
it does not appear that Sutula's actions were principally aimed 
at causing harm to Bicknese.  Consequently, we hold that 
Sutula's actions must have risen to the level of malicious, 
willful, and intentional conduct in order to abrogate his public 
officer immunity.  There is sufficient evidence from the record 
to support a finding that Sutula's actions were not malicious, 
willful, and intentional.  Accordingly, we uphold the jury 
verdict that answered this question in the negative.   
B.  Ministerial Duties  
¶21 This court has described the exception regarding a 
ministerial duty as follows:  
A public officer's duty is ministerial only when it is 
absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the 
performance of a specific task when the law imposes, 
prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for 
its performance with such certainty that nothing 
remains for judgment or discretion. 
No. 
00-1825   
 
15 
 
Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301 (footnote omitted).  In analyzing a 
public officer's actions, "the nature of the specific act upon 
which liability is based, as opposed to the categorization of 
the general duties of a public officer . . . is determinative of 
whether an officer is immune from liability."  C.L. v. Olson, 
143 Wis. 2d 701, 716, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988).   
¶22 Bicknese argues that Sutula breached a ministerial 
duty when he failed to adhere to the directives set forth in 
chapter seven of the UW Faculty Policies and Procedures with 
respect to setting Bicknese's tenure clock.  In response, Sutula 
asserts 
that 
he 
was 
under 
no 
ministerial 
duty 
because 
application of the UW Faculty Policies and Procedures involves 
discretionary judgment.  Furthermore, Sutula claims that a 
promise of a job to Bicknese did not create a ministerial duty.   
¶23 We agree with Sutula that a mere promise does not 
necessarily create a ministerial duty; however, we disagree that 
Sutula, in making the offer, had discretion under the UW Faculty 
Policies and Procedures in determining Bicknese's tenure clock 
and representing a calculation to Bicknese that contravened 
these policies and procedures.   
¶24 The court of appeals agreed with Sutula's arguments, 
concluding that "a promise does not by itself transform a 
discretionary act into a ministerial duty."  Bicknese v. Sutula, 
No. 00-1825, unpublished slip op., ¶17 (Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2001).  
The court of appeals examined a case where police officers 
promised a sexual assault victim that they would arrest her ex-
boyfriend at a specific date and time; however, the ex-boyfriend 
No. 
00-1825   
 
16 
 
subsequently killed the victim after the police failed to follow 
through 
on 
their 
promise. 
 
Barillari 
v. 
Milwaukee, 
194 
Wis. 2d 247, 251-52, 533 N.W.2d 759 (1995).  This court held 
that the police officers' "promise" to apprehend and arrest the 
ex-boyfriend did not transform their discretionary acts into 
ministerial duties.  Id. at 251.  While the court of appeals is 
correct that a mere promise does not ordinarily transform a 
discretionary act into a ministerial duty, there was more than 
just a promise made in this case.  
¶25 At trial, the jury found that Sutula both: (1) 
promised Bicknese a job and (2) made representations that 
Bicknese indeed had a job at the UW Medical School.  In other 
words, the jury found that Sutula made an offer of employment to 
Bicknese, and, because there is ample evidence to support this 
determination, this court will not upset that jury finding.5  
Sutula was not required to make an offer of employment to 
Bicknese; however, when he did make the offer, he was obligated 
to abide by the specific directives under chapter seven of the 
                                                 
5 Contrary to the assertions in Justice Bradley's dissent, 
the majority is not engaging in a contract analysis; rather, we 
are merely upholding the jury's finding that Sutula offered 
Bicknese a job, in analyzing whether Sutula is entitled to 
public officer immunity.  It is the departmental executive 
committee, of which Sutula was a member, that selects the 
individuals to whom offers may be made, even if employment 
contracts are technically between faculty members and the UW.  
See UW Faculty Policies & Procedures § 7.03(B).  In this case, 
the "white copy" offer letter, which is usually considered "the 
offer" by a potential faculty candidate, had signature lines for 
Sutula, the President/CEO of the Medical School, and the Dean of 
the Medical School.  
No. 
00-1825   
 
17 
 
UW Faculty Policies and Procedures, which were adopted pursuant 
to Chapter UWS 3 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code.6   
                                                 
6 The relevant portions of Chapter UWS 3 of the Wisconsin 
Administrative Code state:  
UWS 3.03 Appointments——general.  The faculty of each 
institution  . . . shall develop rules relating to 
faculty 
appointments. 
 
Each 
person 
to 
whom 
an 
appointment is offered must receive an appointment 
letter 
in 
which 
an 
authorized 
official 
of 
the 
institution details the terms and conditions of the 
appointment, including but not limited to, duration of 
the appointment, salary, starting date, ending date, 
general position responsibilities, probation, tenure 
status, and crediting of prior service.  
UWS 
3.04 
Probationary 
appointments. 
 
(1) 
Each 
institution's rules for faculty appointments shall 
provide for a maximum 7-year probationary period in a 
full-time position.   . . . Provision shall be made 
for the appropriate counting of prior service at other 
institutions and at the institution.   
The relevant portions of chapter seven of the UW Faculty 
Policies and Procedures state:  
7.04 THE MAXIMUM PROBATIONARY PERIOD.  
A.  The maximum probationary period is defined as the 
maximum amount of time a faculty member can be 
appointed in probationary ranks in the University.  
This period shall be specified for each individual at 
the time of his/her initial appointment. 
B.  In calculating a person's maximum probationary 
period, all periods of service, but not to exceed 
three years, at one-half time or greater in other 
institutions at ranks equivalent to instructor or 
above in this University, shall be subtracted from the 
normal seven years (emphasis added). 
No. 
00-1825   
 
18 
 
¶26 This court has acknowledged that in certain cases, 
"once public officers choose in their discretion to act, they 
are bound by a ministerial duty to act in a certain manner."  
Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 93.  For example, in a case where 
public officers made a discretionary decision to erect a highway 
warning sign, the officers were deemed to have a ministerial 
duty 
to 
place 
the 
sign 
in 
accordance 
with 
applicable 
administrative rules.  Chart v. Dvorak, 57 Wis. 2d 92, 100-101, 
203 N.W.2d 673 (1973).  Similarly, in a case dealing with the 
construction of sewer systems, this court stated that while the 
design of sewer systems is discretionary, compliance with the 
plan design is a ministerial duty.  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Metro. 
Sewerage Comm., 80 Wis. 2d 10, 16-17, 258 N.W.2d 148 (1977).  In 
sum, these cases reflect that a ministerial duty may be found 
where "public officers did not have to act at all——but if they 
did choose to act, they faced a specific legal obligation to do 
so in a prescribed manner."  Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 93 
(emphasis added).   
¶27 As chairman of 
the 
Neurology Department, 
Sutula 
admitted that "one of my duties was to take care of [the] tenure 
clock and be familiar with how the procedure works."  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
Although it would appear that Bicknese would have four 
years instead of three years on her tenure clock under § 7.04(B) 
(seven years minus three years), the last year in a probationary 
period is considered a "notice year."  That is, the tenure 
determination is made at the beginning of that year; therefore, 
the tenure clock is referred to as "three years" since Bicknese 
would only have had three years in which to prepare for the 
tenure determination.    
No. 
00-1825   
 
19 
 
process for calculating a tenure clock is prescribed under 
§ 7.04(B) of the UW Faculty Policies and Procedures, which 
states: "In calculating a person's maximum probationary period, 
all previous service, but not to exceed three years  . . . shall 
be subtracted from the normal seven years." UW Faculty Policies 
and Procedures § 7.04(B) (emphasis added).  The only exceptions 
to this calculation are enumerated under § 7.04(H) and include: 
childbirth, 
adoption, 
dependent 
care, 
and 
extenuating 
circumstances such as chronic illness or disability.  None of 
these 
exceptions 
applied 
to 
Bicknese. 
 
Furthermore, 
the 
exceptions under § 7.04(H) provide for leave that is ordinarily 
no more than one year.  In this case, Sutula told Bicknese that 
her tenure clock would be five years instead of three —— an 
extension of two years.    
¶28 Under the clear mandate of § 7.04 of the UW Faculty 
Policies and Procedures, Sutula had no discretion in setting 
Bicknese's tenure clock.  The fact that Sutula, once he made the 
offer, was required to act in a certain manner, distinguishes 
this case from this court's recent decision in Kierstyn.  In 
Kierstyn, a benefits specialist, who was employed by the Racine 
Unified School District (District), was authorized to give 
District employees information about their union benefits; 
however, he was not an agent of the Wisconsin Retirement System 
(WRS) nor could he authoritatively represent to District 
employees what WRS benefits they were entitled to receive.  
Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 85.  In contrast, Sutula admitted that 
No. 
00-1825   
 
20 
 
as head of the department, his duties included recruiting and 
hiring new faculty, which entailed calculating tenure clocks.   
¶29 It is apparent that Sutula was aware of his duties in 
this regard based on the "white copy" offer letter he sent to 
Bicknese.  Upon being offered a faculty position, Bicknese was 
entitled to be accurately apprised of the terms of her 
appointment, including her tenure clock calculation, pursuant to 
§ UWS 3.03 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code.  Section UWS 
3.03 requires that "[e]ach person to whom an appointment is 
offered 
must 
receive 
an 
appointment 
letter 
in 
which 
an 
authorized official of the institution details the terms and 
conditions of the appointment, including . . . [the] crediting 
of prior service."  Consistent with § UWS 3.03, the "white copy" 
offer letter sent to Bicknese detailed the terms of her 
appointment, including a five-year tenure clock.  Thus, unlike 
the benefits specialist in Kierstyn, who had no authority or 
duty to provide retirement benefits information to District 
employees, Sutula, once he chose to make an offer, had a duty to 
inform Bicknese of the terms of her appointment in accordance 
with § UWS 3.03, as evidenced by the detailed information 
provided in the "white copy" offer letter.    
¶30 In essence, Sutula's acknowledged duties of hiring new 
faculty and setting their tenure clocks, differentiate this case 
from Kierstyn, where the benefits specialist had neither the 
authority nor a duty to provide retirement benefits information.  
The specialist in Kierstyn could provide retirement benefits 
information, but he was not required to do so.  Consequently, 
No. 
00-1825   
 
21 
 
this court held that the specialist did not breach a ministerial 
duty when he provided incorrect retirement benefits information 
to an employee.  Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 94.  The court in 
Kierstyn emphasized that the benefits specialist was "under no 
duty . . . under Wisconsin law [or] . . . under his contractual 
arrangement" to advise employees regarding their retirement 
benefits.  Id. at 91.  Contrary to the situation in Kierstyn, 
Sutula, once he chose to make an offer, was required to 
accurately calculate Bicknese's tenure clock and inform her of 
the calculation.  Sutula was bound by a specific legal 
obligation to set the tenure clock in accordance with § 7.04 of 
the UW Faculty Policies and Procedures, which provided for only 
a three-year tenure clock in Bicknese's case.  Sutula's duty in 
this regard was "absolute, certain and imperative . . . with 
such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion."  
Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301 (footnote omitted).   
¶31 Sutula argues that his attempt to lengthen Bicknese's 
tenure clock from three to five years indicates that there was 
room for discretion in setting her tenure clock.  We are not 
persuaded.  Sutula's appeal to the University Committee to 
adjust Bicknese's tenure clock does not change the fact that 
Sutula had a duty to set Bicknese's tenure clock in a particular 
manner under § 7.04 of the UW Faculty Policies and Procedures.  
Sutula's apparent misimpressions about setting Bicknese's tenure 
clock 
do 
not 
convert 
a 
clear 
ministerial 
duty 
into 
a 
discretionary 
act. 
 
In 
rejecting 
Sutula's 
request, 
the 
University Committee explicitly referred to the procedure that 
No. 
00-1825   
 
22 
 
must be followed under § 7.04(B) and the lack of any applicable 
exception under § 7.04(H) in this case.  Moreover, despite his 
assertion of discretion, Sutula himself admitted at trial that 
he misstated the process when he indicated to Bicknese that he 
had control over setting her tenure clock.       
¶32 Accordingly, we hold that Sutula is not entitled to 
public officer immunity because in making the job offer to 
Bicknese, he was under a ministerial duty to correctly set the 
terms of the offer, including calculating Bicknese's tenure 
clock, in accordance with the specific directives under chapter 
seven of the UW Faculty Policies and Procedures.  Therefore, the 
jury's finding and damages award in favor of Bicknese on her 
promissory estoppel claim must be reinstated.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
¶33 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  00-1825.awb 
 
1 
 
¶34 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Two very subtle 
passages in the majority's opinion deserve attention.  One has a 
substantial effect on the outcome of this case and the other 
affects the development of our law.  Both could easily go 
unnoticed. 
¶35 The first is a subtle shift in the analysis set forth 
in ¶25 of the opinion which erroneously transposes a promise of 
an offer of employment into an offer of employment.  This 
seemingly slight shift is outcome determinative in this case.  
¶36 The second is set forth in footnote 2, which at first 
blush is a rather innocuous statement indicating that "public 
officer immunity does not bar a lawsuit for breach of contract."  
However, in making this statement, the majority reaches out and 
arguably answers in a footnote an issue it need not address.  
Apparently, the majority fails to recognize that the extent to 
which public officer immunity applies in contract actions is an 
unsettled area of law. 
¶37 Because I believe the subtle shift in analysis from a 
promise of an offer to an actual offer distorts the outcome of 
this case, and that the majority unnecessarily addresses, 
without adequate analysis or briefing, an otherwise unsettled 
area of law, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶38 At the outset of the discussion of public officer 
immunity, the majority correctly and artfully analyzes the 
"malicious, willful, and intentional" exception to immunity.  It 
next discusses the breach of ministerial duty exception to 
No.  00-1825.awb 
 
2 
 
immunity and appropriately sets forth the oft-quoted definition 
of ministerial duty which requires that the public officer's 
task be specifically prescribed and defined as to time, mode and 
occasion for its performance, leaving nothing for judgment or 
discretion. 
¶39 Citing to the case of C.L. v. Olson, the majority 
correctly emphasizes that in analyzing public officer immunity 
we look to "the nature of the specific act upon which liability 
is based . . . ."  C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 422 N.W.2d 
614 (1988).  But without explanation, the majority then 
transposes the "act upon which liability is based" from a 
promise of an offer to an actual offer. 
¶40 The cause of action before this court is one of 
promissory estoppel.  It is not a cause of action for breach of 
contract.  The "act upon which liability is based" is a promise 
of an offer and not an actual offer.  This case was pled on the 
basis of a promise of an offer, it was tried on the basis of a 
promise of an offer, and indeed the jury found liability on the 
basis of a promise of an offer.  The jury answered "yes" to the 
first question of the special verdict which asked:  "Did 
defendant 
promise 
plaintiff 
a 
job 
at 
the 
University 
of 
Wisconsin?" (emphasis supplied).  
¶41 The subtle shift in analysis appears in ¶25 of the 
opinion when the majority focuses on another question set forth 
in 
the 
special 
verdict 
which 
addressed 
the 
tort 
of 
misrepresentation: "Did defendant (Sutula) make representations 
of fact that plaintiff had a job at University of Wisconsin 
No.  00-1825.awb 
 
3 
 
Medical School?"  Curiously, the majority takes the "yes" answer 
of the jury to this question and applies it to a different legal 
analysis.  The majority transforms the jury findings regarding 
the existence of a tort of misrepresentation into findings 
related to elements necessary to create a binding contract. 
¶42 The majority, in misconstruing the jury finding in the 
tort cause of action, states: "In other words, the jury found 
that Sutula made an offer of employment to Bicknese . . . "  
Majority op., ¶25.  Even the plaintiff acknowledged that Sutula 
could not make a contractual offer of employment.  Only the 
University could make such an offer.  That is why the plaintiff 
brought this case based on promissory estoppel and not based in 
contract. 
¶43 Yet, the majority in ¶25 transposes the act of a 
promise of an offer, together with a jury finding addressing the 
tort of misrepresentation, into an actual contractual offer.  
Why?  Because without this subtle change the majority's analysis 
collapses.  The remaining analysis of the opinion relies on this 
misconstruction.  Without an actual offer here, there is no 
ministerial duty. 
¶44 The 
facts 
in 
this 
case 
present 
a 
series 
of 
negotiations in which a promise of an offer of employment was 
made.  Such a promise, made in the course of negotiations, does 
not meet the definition of a ministerial duty.  The basis for 
which liability is imposed here, i.e., the promise of an offer 
by Sutula, is not a specific task which the law imposes and 
which so certainly defines "the time, mode and occasion for 
No.  00-1825.awb 
 
4 
 
[making the promise of an offer] . . . that nothing remains for 
judgment or discretion."  Lister v. Bd. of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 
282, 301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976). 
¶45 Even the majority acknowledges that such a promise of 
an offer made in the course of negotiations is not so "absolute, 
certain and imperative" and so defined in "time, mode and 
occasion of its performance" to meet the stringent definition of 
a ministerial duty.  But what the majority giveth, it taketh 
away, when it subtly transposes the basis of liability from the 
promise of an offer to making an offer, and thus adulterates its 
remaining analysis.  The majority states: "We agree with Sutula 
that a mere promise does not necessarily create a ministerial 
duty; however, we disagree that Sutula, in making the offer 
. . . ." (emphasis supplied).  Majority op., ¶23. 
¶46 A ministerial duty did not exist because Sutula's 
promise of an appointment did not constitute an offer of an 
appointment. 
 
The 
majority 
advances 
that 
"Sutula 
had 
a 
ministerial duty to make the job offer consistent with the 
University 
of 
Wisconsin 
Faculty Policies and 
Procedures."  
Majority op., ¶2.  The specific Faculty Procedure that created 
the ministerial duty states that each person "to whom an 
appointment is offered" must receive an appointment letter 
outlining various terms including the tenure clock.  UW Faculty 
Policies and Procedures § 7.04(B). 
¶47 Section 7.04(B) is not triggered when an appointment 
is promised.  Rather, it is triggered when an appointment is 
actually 
offered. 
 
In 
order 
to 
circumvent 
this 
fatal 
No.  00-1825.awb 
 
5 
 
distinction, the majority attempts to blur the distinction by 
re-characterizing the finding of the jury. 
¶48 As noted above, in ¶25 the majority states:  "In other 
words, the jury found that Sutula made an offer of employment to 
Bicknese, and, because there is ample evidence to support this 
determination, this court will not upset that jury finding." 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Even though the majority says it is simply 
upholding the jury's finding that there was an "offer," the 
reality is that the majority is independently making its own 
conclusion that an "offer" existed. 
¶49 The majority must make this re-characterization so 
that it can use § 7.04(B) as the basis for imposing the 
ministerial duty.  However, the question asked of the jury was 
not whether Sutula made an offer, but rather "Did defendant 
promise plaintiff a job at the University of Wisconsin?"  Thus 
the subtle shift in analysis and re-characterization of the jury 
finding fundamentally distorts the outcome of this case. 
II 
¶50 Additionally, I take issue with footnote 2 of the 
majority's opinion.  Footnote 2 begins with an introductory 
statement which concludes that "public officer immunity does not 
bar a lawsuit for a breach of contract." 
¶51 The majority should not make this conclusion for three 
reasons.  First and foremost, the conclusion arguably settles an 
otherwise unsettled area of law even though the making of the 
conclusion has no impact on the majority's analysis of this 
case.  Second, the majority does not discuss its reasoning for 
No.  00-1825.awb 
 
6 
 
making the conclusion.  Third, the parties have not adequately 
briefed this issue.  Nevertheless, the majority makes the 
conclusion, and in a footnote no less. 
¶52 I pause to voice my concern about this court's growing 
tendency to reach out and address, in footnotes, issues that it 
need not address.  See Town of Beloit v. County of Rock, 2003 WI 
8, ¶¶72-79, ____ Wis. 2d ____, 657 N.W.2d 344 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
dissenting).  The problem is exacerbated here because the 
majority makes its bald assertion in an unsettled area of law 
without adequate analysis or briefing.  This problematic 
approach hampers the development of our law because when the 
issue is squarely presented in the future, fully briefed and 
argued, it will be unclear what effect should be given to the 
majority's cursory footnote resolution. 
¶53 Contrary to the majority's statement in footnote 2, 
the extent to which public officer immunity applies in contract 
actions is unsettled.  In Energy Complexes, we addressed whether 
a contract claim against Eau Claire County was barred either by 
common law immunity for counties or by statutory immunity for 
counties under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  We concluded that these 
types of immunity do not apply to breach of contract actions.  
Energy Complexes, Inc. v. Eau Claire County, 152 Wis. 2d 453, 
464-65, 449 N.W. 2d 35 (1989).  In Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. 
Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, ¶35, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 
693, we described Energy Complexes as holding that "Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) does not grant immunity to actions based in 
contract."  Although Energy Complexes did not deal specifically 
No.  00-1825.awb 
 
7 
 
with public officer immunity, its holding indicates that public 
officer immunity analysis may not be applicable in contract 
actions. 
¶54 However, other cases apply the breach of ministerial 
duty analysis in connection with contract actions, thereby 
implying that common law immunity and statutory immunity 
analysis are applicable in contract actions.  In Major v. County 
of Milwaukee, 196 Wis. 2d 939, 944-945, 539 N.W.2d 472 (Ct. App. 
1995), the court of appeals concluded that Milwaukee County and 
its officers had discretion to determine the terms of the sale 
of the property, but once those terms were set in the contract, 
the County was under a ministerial duty to comply with the terms 
of the contract.  We discussed the Major case in Kierstyn v. 
Racine Unified School District, 228 Wis. 2d 81, 94, 596 N.W.2d 
417 (1999), in which we stated: "while the public officers in 
Major were not obligated to sell county property or were free to 
sell it on their own terms, once they signed a sales contract 
they were under a ministerial duty to follow the terms of that 
contract."  As these cases indicate, the extent to which public 
officer immunity applies in contract actions is unsettled.   
¶55 Further, because public officer immunity may not be 
applicable to contract claims, we need to address as a threshold 
question whether a promissory estoppel claim is to be treated 
the same as a contract.  Footnote 2 recognizes that public 
officer immunity may not be applicable to promissory estoppel 
claims such as the one in this case.  The court nevertheless 
decides that since the parties did not adequately raise the 
No.  00-1825.awb 
 
8 
 
issue, it would apply the public officer immunity analysis even 
though it might not be applicable. 
¶56 I suppose that, if public officer immunity does not 
apply to promissory estoppel claims, the fact that the majority 
nevertheless proceeds to examine an exception to public officer 
immunity does not affect the outcome of this case.  However, I 
agree with Justice Sykes that we "should not expound upon an 
exception to an immunity defense if the immunity defense is 
unavailable in the first place."  Justice Sykes' dissent, ¶66. 
¶57 In sum, I conclude that the shift in analysis from a 
promise of an offer to an actual offer distorts the outcome of 
this case and that there is no breach of a ministerial duty.  
Additionally, I disagree with the majority's reaching out in a 
footnote and arguably settling, without adequate analysis or 
briefing, an issue it need not address.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  00-1825.dss 
 
1 
 
¶58 DIANE S. SYKES, J.   (dissenting).  This case suffers 
from significant analytical confusion.  The majority has 
evaluated the applicability of various exceptions to public 
officer immunity without first addressing the question of 
whether public officer immunity even applies to the claim on 
which the plaintiff prevailed in this case.  This confusion is 
not entirely the court's fault.  The lower courts made the same 
mistake (except for the concurrence in the court of appeals), 
and the plaintiff's positions have been inconsistent in the 
circuit court and on appeal.  The briefs in this court were at 
best incomplete on this subject.  But this threshold question 
must be addressed.   
¶59 
The 
jury 
in 
this 
case 
rejected 
Bicknese's 
misrepresentation claim.  Bicknese prevailed only on her 
promissory estoppel cause of action.  Promissory estoppel is not 
a tort.  Promissory estoppel is a species of contract claim.  
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 693-94, 133 
N.W.2d 267 (1965); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981 
& Supp. 2002). 
¶60  This court first recognized the promissory estoppel 
cause of action in Hoffman, adopting § 90 of the Restatement 
(First) of Contracts.  Hoffman, 26 Wis. 2d at 696.  The language 
of § 90 of the Restatement (Second) is substantially the same as 
the first: 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably 
expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of 
the promisee or a third person and which does induce 
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can 
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.  The 
No.  00-1825.dss 
 
2 
 
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice 
requires.  
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90. 
¶61  This is the language of contract law ("a promise . . . 
is binding"; "enforcement of the promise"; "remedy . . . for 
breach may be limited").  Indeed, the commentary to the second 
Restatement says "[a] promise binding under this section is a 
contract."  Id., § 90, cmt. d (emphasis added). 
¶62  It is true that in Wisconsin, a promissory estoppel 
cause of action is not considered the equivalent of a breach of 
contract action in that the recovery allowed in a promissory 
estoppel case may not necessarily include full breach of 
contract damages.  Hoffman, 26 Wis. 2d at 698; Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 90, cmt. d.  Nevertheless, there is 
nothing in Hoffman to indicate that the court was creating a new 
tort as opposed to recognizing a new contract remedy.7  After 
all, the court adopted a section from the Restatement of 
Contracts, and repeatedly cited to contract treatises and 
articles.  Hoffman, 26 Wis. 2d at 694-99.  Clearly, the court in 
                                                 
 
7  This court has said that "the basis of promissory 
estoppel is akin to the contractual basis for reformation."  
Ahnapee & W. Ry. Co. v. Challoner, 34 Wis. 2d 134, 145, 148 
N.W.2d 646 (1967).  In Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Co., 2001 WI 
23, ¶25, 241 Wis. 2d 700, 722-23, 623 N.W.2d 739, this court 
commented on a cause of action that the plaintiff there might 
have asserted had the facts been more favorable: "Similarly, 
there might be a cause of action sounding in contract under 
promissory estoppel. . . . A cause of action for promissory 
estoppel in the employment context, like a contract cause of 
action based on an employee handbook, is in accordance with 
Wisconsin contract law." 
  
No.  00-1825.dss 
 
3 
 
Hoffman was filling a gap in the law of contracts, not the law 
of torts. 
 
¶63  Justice Bradley's dissent asserts that "the extent to 
which public officer immunity applies in contract actions is an 
unsettled area of law."  Justice Bradley's dissent, ¶36.  I do 
not agree.  In Energy Complexes, Inc. v. Eau Claire County, 152 
Wis. 2d 453, 464-65, 449 N.W. 2d 35 (1989), this court held that 
neither common law nor statutory public officer immunity applies 
to contract claims.  Energy Complexes, 152 Wis. 2d at 456, ("We 
conclude that neither common-law immunity nor statutory immunity 
under sec. 893.80(4) bars the lawsuit of Energy Complexes, 
Inc."). 
¶64 
 
Energy 
Complexes 
involved 
breach 
of 
contract, 
promissory estoppel, and quantum meruit claims against a county 
stemming from the conduct of county officials in connection with 
a construction contract.  Energy Complexes, 152 Wis. 2d at 459.  
This court declared unequivocally that common law and statutory 
public officer immunity defenses are unavailable in contract 
claims.  Id. at 464. 
¶65  Justice Bradley's dissent cites Kierstyn v. Racine 
Unified School District, 228 Wis. 2d 81, 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999), 
and Major v. County of Milwaukee, 196 Wis. 2d 939, 539 N.W.2d 
472 (Ct. App. 1995), as support for the notion that common law 
or statutory public officer immunity might apply to contract 
actions.  I do not see how this could be so.  Kierstyn was a 
negligence and negligent misrepresentation case; Major involved 
a misrepresentation claim.  Neither involved a contract cause of 
No.  00-1825.dss 
 
4 
 
action, whether breach of contract, promissory estoppel, or 
otherwise. 
¶66  Energy Complexes applies here, as the concurrence in 
the court of appeals noted.  Bicknese v. Sutula, No. 00-1825, 
unpublished slip op., ¶27 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2001) 
(Roggensack, J., concurring).  Accordingly, we need not evaluate 
the various exceptions to public officer immunity because public 
officer immunity does not apply to promissory estoppel claims, 
which sound in contract.8   We should not expound upon an 
exception to an immunity defense if the immunity defense is 
unavailable in the first place. 
                                                 
8 It is technically true, as the majority states, that 
"[n]either party petitioned this court for a determination of 
whether promissory estoppel should be treated the same as a 
contract with respect to public officer immunity."  Majority 
op., ¶13 n.2.  However, both the plaintiff’s petition for review 
and the defendants’ response to the petition for review raised 
and discussed the issue of whether, assuming that promissory 
estoppel is a contract claim, public officer immunity applies.  
See, e.g., Petition for Review at 18 ("Since immunity does not 
apply to contract actions, there is no need for the ministerial 
duty exception to abrogate governmental immunity."); Response to 
Petition 
for 
Review 
at 
19 
("[P]etitioner 
argues 
that 
a 
promissory estoppel claim is really a contract theory, and 
points out that immunity does not shield government officials 
from breach of contract actions.").  The parties also debated 
the tort/contract alternatives in their briefs.  The issue is 
properly before the court and should not be sidestepped.  "Once 
a case is properly before us, it is this court's obligation to 
resolve the issues presented regardless of the court's original 
reason for accepting the case."  State v. Schumacher, 144 
Wis. 2d 388, 410 n.15, 424 N.W.2d 672 (1988) (quoting State v. 
Strege, 116 Wis. 2d 477, 492, 343 N.W.2d 100 (1984)).  However, 
because the majority has specifically declined to address this 
threshold question, majority op., ¶13 n.2, this case should not 
be read to mean that public officer immunity now applies to 
contract actions or that Energy Complexes, Inc. v. Eau Claire 
County, 152 Wis. 2d 453, 449 N.W.2d 35 (1989), has been 
overruled sub silentio.   
No.  00-1825.dss 
 
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¶67  Sutula and the Board of Regents have argued in the 
alternative that constitutional sovereign immunity applies, that 
this requires compliance with the claim procedures of Wis. Stat. 
§ 775.01, and that Bicknese failed to plead or prove compliance 
with the statute.  See Wis. Const. art. IV, § 27; Wis. Stat. § 
775.01.  Constitutional sovereign immunity is distinct from 
public officer immunity.9  Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 
WI 71, ¶22 n.2, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 336, 646 N.W.2d 314. 
¶68  Constitutional sovereign immunity is a defense to 
personal jurisdiction: 
 
The concept of sovereign immunity in this state 
derives from art. IV, sec. 27 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, which provides: 'The legislature shall 
direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits 
may be brought against the state.'  From this 
provision the rule developed that the state cannot be 
sued without its consent.  This immunity is procedural 
in nature and, if properly raised, deprives the court 
of personal jurisdiction over the state. 
Lister v. Bd. of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 291, 240 N.W.2d 610 
(1976).  "There is no question that the board of regents is an 
arm or agency of the state for sovereign immunity purposes."  
                                                 
 
9  Public officer immunity, whether state or municipal, 
derives from the common law.  Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 
2002 WI 71, ¶¶22-24, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 336, 646 N.W.2d 314.  
Public officer immunity was partially abrogated by this court in 
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 37, 115 N.W.2d 618 
(1962).  However, Holytz specifically retained immunity for the 
discretionary 
acts 
of 
public 
officers; 
discretionary 
act 
immunity for municipal public officers was subsequently codified 
in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d at 336, ¶22.  
"Immunity for public officers and employees, both state and 
municipal, is based largely upon public policy considerations 
that spring from the interest in protecting the public purse and 
a preference for political rather than judicial redress for the 
actions of public officers."  Id. at ¶23.  
  
No.  00-1825.dss 
 
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Walker v. Univ. of Wis. Hosps., 198 Wis. 2d 237, 243, 542 N.W.2d 
207 (Ct. App. 1995). 
¶69 
 
Pursuant 
to 
Article 
IV, 
Section 
27 
of 
the 
constitution, the state has consented to be sued only in the 
manner provided in Wis. Stat. § 775.01, and compliance with the 
statute is a condition precedent to suit.  See State v. P.G. 
Miron Const. Co., 181 Wis. 2d 1045, 1053, 512 N.W.2d 499 (1994); 
Boldt v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 566, 572, 305 N.W.2d 133 (1981).  
 
¶70  As noted above, the tort claim against Sutula was 
rejected by the jury.  The promissory estoppel claim sought to 
establish and enforce a quasi-contract not between Bicknese and 
Sutula but between Bicknese and the Board of Regents, based on 
Sutula's promise.10  This sort of claim is subject to a sovereign 
immunity defense, which the defendants pleaded in their answer 
and raised in their summary judgment motion prior to trial.  The 
circuit court inexplicably failed to address it. 
¶71  Sutula and the Board of Regents preserved and argued 
this defense on appeal.  Having concluded that Sutula is not 
entitled to public officer immunity because of the presence of a 
ministerial duty, the majority is obliged to address the 
sovereign immunity defense.  The majority does not explain why 
                                                 
 
10  As Judge Roggensack noted in her concurrence in the 
court of appeals, Bicknese was not seeking to be employed by 
Sutula but, rather, by the university, so "if the court were to 
create an equitable contract of employment under a promissory 
estoppel theory, it could not create it between Bicknese and 
Sutula."  Bicknese v. Sutula, No. 00-1825, unpublished slip op., 
¶27  (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2001) (Roggensack, J., concurring). 
  
No.  00-1825.dss 
 
7 
 
it takes no notice of Article IV, Section 27 of the constitution 
and Wis. Stat. § 775.01.   
 
¶72  Interestingly, just after the circuit court announced, 
post-verdict, that it would grant the defendants' motion to 
dismiss on public officer immunity grounds, counsel for Bicknese 
argued that the promissory estoppel claim was a contract action, 
and as such, public officer immunity did not apply.  She told 
the court: "the promissory estoppel claim should be treated more 
as a contract as opposed to a tort.  As a contract action, 
public official immunity does not apply at all . . . it is a 
contract action, and the action should lie directly then against 
the 
board 
of 
regents." 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner's 
Appendix at 22.  Bicknese's counsel had earlier argued in 
opposition to summary judgment that promissory estoppel "is not 
a tort as that term has been defined by the courts."  
Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 23.  She maintained this argument in the 
court of appeals.  Plaintiff-Appellant's Court of Appeals Brief 
at 4-5. 
¶73  Bicknese's argument in this court, however, was quite 
different: 
Dr. Sutula does suggest that if Dr. Bicknese's 
promissory estoppel claim sounded in contract, she 
could not enforce a contract between herself and the 
UW because of sovereign immunity.  Sovereign immunity 
is not an issue here.  Dr. Bicknese's promissory 
estoppel claim did not seek to enforce a contract, but 
to recover damages resulting from the detrimental 
reliance induced by Dr. Sutula.  This claim sounds in 
tort, as did her entire complaint. 
Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner at 9 n.11. 
No.  00-1825.dss 
 
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¶74  Thus, Bicknese has argued that promissory estoppel is 
both a contract claim (when she wants to avoid a defense based 
on public officer immunity) and a tort claim (when she wants to 
avoid a defense based on sovereign immunity).  She cannot have 
it both ways.11  Her first argument is correct, and she has cited 
no authority in support of her second, contradictory argument.  
Nor has Bicknese responded to the sovereign immunity defense on 
the merits. 
                                                 
 
11  "The equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel, as 
traditionally applied in this state, is intended to protect 
against a litigant playing fast and loose with the courts by 
asserting inconsistent positions.  The doctrine precludes a 
party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding and then 
subsequently asserting an inconsistent position."  State v. 
Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 347, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted).  Historically, this 
doctrine, when applied to inconsistent positions taken within 
the same case, is known as the "mend the hold" doctrine, see, 
Harbor Ins. v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 362-65 (7th Cir. 
1990), although this terminology has not previously been used in 
Wisconsin.  That the majority declines to address the threshold 
issue of whether promissory estoppel sounds in contract, and 
neglects to address the sovereign immunity defense, only serves 
to reward this sort of game-playing. 
  
No.  00-1825.dss 
 
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¶75  The record reflects that Bicknese has neither pleaded 
nor proved compliance with Wis. Stat. § 775.01.  The promissory 
estoppel claim is barred by sovereign immunity.  I would affirm 
the court of appeals, although on different grounds. 
 
 
 
No.  00-1825.dss 
 
 
 
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