Title: Johnson v. Reddoch
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1121481
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 18, 2015

REL: 12/18/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
____________________
1121481
____________________
Jeffrey Johnson, by and through his aunt and next friend,
Sue Thompson
v.
Jim Reddoch, as Commissioner of the Alabama Department 
of Mental Health, and Beatrice J. McLean, individually 
and as Director of Searcy Hospital
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-12-901693)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Jeffrey Johnson, by a through his aunt and next friend,
Sue Thompson, appeals from the Mobile Circuit Court's
1121481
dismissal of his action against Jim Reddoch, in his official
capacity as commissioner of the Alabama Department of Mental
Health ("ADMH"),  Beatrice J. McLean, in her official capacity
1
as director of Searcy Hospital ("Searcy"), and McLean and
fictitiously named defendants 1 through 8 in their individual
capacities. Johnson also appeals the circuit court's quashing
of a subpoena served on ADMH seeking records pertaining to
Johnson.  We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History
At the time of the incident that is the subject of this
action, Searcy was a state-owned and state-operated facility
for the care of the mentally ill located in Mt. Vernon,
Alabama, and Johnson was a 40-year-old patient at Searcy who
suffered from paranoid schizophrenia.  According to the
complaint, Johnson's condition is so severe that Johnson was
"required to be under constant 2-on-1 supervision by [ADMH]
Reddoch 
resigned 
as 
commissioner 
effective 
June 
30, 
2015. 
1
James V. Perdue was appointed as commissioner effective
July 1, 2015.  Pursuant to Rule 43(b), Ala. R. App. P., Perdue
was automatically substituted as 
an 
appellee.  Although Perdue
is now the appellee, because this case proceeded in the
circuit court and on appeal while Reddoch was commissioner, we
have chosen not to restyle the appeal.
2
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employees at Searcy Hospital."  This supervision was supposed
to be in place 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.  
On June 22, 2012, Johnson was severely beaten in his ward
at Searcy.  He collapsed and he was taken to University of
South Alabama Hospital. Medical testing showed that, as a
result of the beating, he suffered severe 
and 
life-threatening
injuries, including internal bleeding, severe bruising to his
face and body, a fractured nose, and several broken ribs. 
ADMH 
policies 
and 
procedures 
prohibit 
employees,
including mental-health workers, from abusing, mistreating,
exploiting, or neglecting mental-health patients in their
care.  Employees are also required to immediately report any
injuries sustained by a patient and to report if they have
knowledge of or suspect any mental-health worker of abusing,
mistreating, exploiting, or neglecting a patient.  In
Johnson's case, he alleged, Searcy's mental-health workers
failed to keep him under the required constant supervision and
failed to immediately report his injuries.  
ADMH closed Searcy on October 31, 2012.  Johnson was
transferred to another ADMH facility, Bryce Hospital in
Tuscaloosa, Alabama.  It is undisputed that, although McLean
3
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was the director of Searcy on June 22, 2012, she is not the
director of Bryce Hospital and she is no longer an employee of
the State of Alabama.  It is also undisputed that Zelia Baugh
was the commissioner of ADMH on June 22, 2012; Reddoch became
the commissioner of ADMH on July 1, 2012.  
On August 7, 2012, Johnson commenced in the Mobile
Circuit Court the present action by a through his aunt and
next friend, Sue Thompson.  Johnson sought prospective
injunctive relief against Reddoch and McLean 
in 
their official
capacities. 
 
Johnson 
also 
asserted 
claims 
against 
fictitiously
named defendants 1 through 8, the mental-health workers
responsible for Johnson's care ("the fictitiously named
defendants"), in their individual capacities, for damages
based 
on 
noncompliance 
with 
ministerial 
duties 
and 
checklists,
violations of nondiscretionary rules, and negligent, wanton,
and deliberate conduct.  In his complaint, Johnson averred
that his counsel
"attempted in good faith to determine the identities
of the Fictitiously Named Defendants mentioned in
the Complaint.  A review of the medical records
reveal[s] that the names of the individual mental
health works are illegible.  It is known that
several mental health workers employed at Searcy
have been suspended. Despite direct requests made to
4
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the [ADMH], they will not identify the individual
mental health workers in any way to counsel."
On September 12, 2012, McLean filed a motion to dismiss
the claims against her on the ground that she possessed State
immunity under Article I, § 14, Ala. Const. 1901.  On
September 26, 2012, 
Reddoch 
filed a virtually identical motion
to dismiss the claims against him on the same ground. 
On October 9, 2012, Johnson filed his "First Amended
Complaint" in which he added a claim for damages against
McLean in her individual capacity, alleging that McLean
negligently failed to supervise ADMH employees by failing to
inform them of the policies and regulations they were required
to follow, negligently failed to have supervisors properly
train employees to monitor patients, and negligently allowed
employees to abuse, neglect, mistreat, and/or exploit
residents.  More specifically, Johnson alleged that during
McLean's tenure as director of Searcy, the facility developed
a "very lax policy related to employees carrying out
ministerial 
duties 
and 
following 
set 
policies 
and 
procedures."
Johnson also alleged that McLean knew that "the staffing at
Searcy 
Hospital 
was 
insufficient 
to 
enable 
adequate
habitation, monitoring, and care for residents, and to ensure
5
1121481
safety of residents, including Jeffrey Johnson."  Johnson's
amended complaint also reiterated his claims against Reddoch
and against the fictitiously named defendants.  
On October 18, 2012, Reddoch and McLean filed separate
motions to dismiss the claims against them in the first
amended complaint.  As to the claims asserted against them in
their 
official 
capacities, 
Reddoch 
and 
McLean 
reiterated 
their
defense of State immunity.  As to Johnson's claims against
McLean 
in her individual capacity, McLean contended that those
claims were due to be dismissed based on State-agent immunity
as enunciated in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000). 
On June 28, 2013, the circuit court entered an order in
which it granted Reddoch's and McLean's motions to dismiss
Johnson's first amended complaint as to all claims asserted
against them.  The order did not provide the reasons for the
dismissal of Johnson's claims against Reddoch and McLean.  The
case-action summary stated that the case was "DISPOSED BY
(DISM W/O PREJ) ON 06/28/2013."
On July 22, 2013, Johnson filed a motion to alter, amend,
or vacate the judgment entered on June 28, 2013, under
Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P.  In that motion, Johnson for the
6
1121481
first time noted that "[w]ith the closing of Searcy Hospital,
[Johnson] has been transferred to Bryce Hospital, also
operated by [ADMH], in Tuscaloosa County."  In a footnote in
the motion, Johnson asserted that "[n]either the motions to
dismiss nor this Court's order addressed [Johnson's] claims
asserted against [fictitiously named] Defendants 1 through 8.
Discovery is proceeding in an effort to identify appropriate
individuals to substitute for the current identifications." 
On July 25, 2013, in an attempt to continue discovery as
to the fictitiously named defendants, Johnson served on ADMH
a subpoena for records titled "Notice of Intent to Serve
Subpoena on Non-Party, Alabama Department of Mental Health,
for Jeffrey Johnson Records."  On August 2, 2013, ADMH filed
an "Objection to Subpoena and Motion to Quash," in which it
noted that Johnson's action had been dismissed "against all
named Defendants" on June 28, 2013.  ADMH attached as an
exhibit to its motion a copy of the case-action summary
indicating that the case had been "disposed."  ADMH contended
that the entire case had been dismissed and that Johnson's
postjudgment motion reflected the posture of the action. ADMH
argued that because there was no active case, it was under no
7
1121481
obligation to respond to Johnson's subpoena.  ADMH also
contended that the subpoena was "overly burdensome to this
State agency and requires production of privileged matters,
and confidential and private information in 
violation of state
and federal laws regarding personal privacy of employees."
On August 21, 2013, the circuit court entered an order
denying Johnson's postjudgment motion.  On September 5, 2013,
the circuit court entered an order granting the motion to
quash 
Johnson's subpoena to ADMH without specifying its 
reason
for doing so.  
Johnson challenges on appeal both the circuit court's
dismissal of his claims against Reddoch and McLean and the
circuit court's refusal to allow nonparty discovery to
ascertain the identities of and other information regarding 
the fictitiously named defendants.
II.  Standard of Review
"'Inasmuch as the issue before us is whether the
trial court correctly denied a Rule 12(b)(6), Ala.
R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss, "[t]his Court must
accept the allegations of the complaint as true."
Creola Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke Housing,
L.L.C., 828 So. 2d 285, 288 (Ala. 2002).  Moreover,
as the defendants sought only a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal without resort to facts supplied by
affidavit or other evidentiary material outside the
allegations of the complaint, and as the trial court
8
1121481
accordingly treated the motion only as what it was,
a motion to dismiss and not a motion for summary
judgment with evidentiary materials outside the
allegations of the complaint, those allegations
themselves are the only potential source of factual
support for the defendants' claims of immunity. Rule
12(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Mooneyham v. State Bd. of
Chiropractic Examiners, 802 So. 2d 200 (Ala. 2001);
Garris v. Federal Land Bank of Jackson, 584 So. 2d
791 (Ala. 1991); Hales v. First Nat'l Bank of
Mobile, 380 So. 2d 797 (Ala. 1980)."
Ex parte Walker, 97 So. 3d 747, 749-50 (Ala. 2012).
"On appeal, a dismissal is not entitled to a
presumption of correctness.  Jones v. Lee County
Commission, 394 So. 2d 928, 930 (Ala. 1981); Allen
v. Johnny Baker Hauling, Inc., 545 So. 2d 771, 772
(Ala. Civ. App. 1989).  The appropriate standard of
review under Rule 12(b)(6) is whether, when the
allegations of the complaint are viewed most
strongly in the pleader's favor, it appears that the
pleader could prove any set of circumstances that
would entitle her to relief.  Raley v. Citibanc of
Alabama/Andalusia, 474 So. 2d 640, 641 (Ala. 1985);
Hill v. Falletta, 589 So. 2d 746 (Ala. Civ. App.
1991).  In making this determination, this Court
does not consider whether the plaintiff will
ultimately prevail, but only whether she may
possibly prevail.  Fontenot v. Bramlett, 470 So. 2d
669, 671 (Ala. 1985); Rice v. United Ins. Co. of
America, 465 So. 2d 1100, 1101 (Ala. 1984). We note
that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only when
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of the claim that would
entitle the plaintiff to relief.  Garrett v. Hadden,
495 So. 2d 616, 617 (Ala. 1986); Hill v. Kraft,
Inc., 496 So. 2d 768, 769 (Ala. 1986)."
Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993).
9
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III.  Analysis
A.  Does the Circuit Court's June 28, 2013, Order Constitute
a Final, Appealable Judgment?
At the outset, we note that there is a question as to
whether the judgment from which Johnson has appealed is a
final judgment.
"With some exceptions not applicable here, an
appeal lies only from a final judgment.  Ex parte
Green, 58 So. 3d 135, 144 (Ala. 2010); see also Bean
v. Craig, 557 So. 2d 1249, 1253 (Ala. 1990); § 12-
22-2, Ala. Code 1975.  'The general rule is that a
trial court's order is not final [for purposes of
appeal] unless it disposes of all claims as to all
parties.'  Dickerson v. Alabama State Univ., 852 So.
2d 704, 705 (Ala. 2002)."
First Commercial Bank of Huntsville v. Nowlin, 122 So. 3d 829,
831 (Ala. 2013) (footnote omitted).  
Johnson asserts in his appellate brief, as he did in his
postjudgment motion, that the circuit court's June 28, 2013,
order did not dispose of all of his claims.  Specifically, he
contends that the circuit court did not dispose of his claims
against the fictitiously named defendants.  Despite this
2
Johnson argues in his appellate brief that "the trial
2
court was wrong" in viewing its order as a final judgment
because "the trial court's order did not effectively end
litigation as to the Fictitious[ly named] Defendants, and
[Johnson] is entitled to conduct discovery against the
Fictitious[ly named] Defendants (see Ala. R. Civ. P. 26)." 
10
1121481
assertion, Johnson urges this Court, "in the interest of
judicial economy," to "assume appellate jurisdiction over the
substance of the appeal and determine if the dismissals [of
claims against Reddoch and McLean] were proper."
As the above quotation from First Commercial Bank of
Huntsville indicates, we could not consider this appeal if
Johnson was correct that his claims against the fictitiously
named defendants remain pending before the circuit court,
because the June 28, 2013, order would not have disposed of
all claims as to all parties.  Johnson is incorrect, however,
that his claims against the fictitiously named defendants
remain pending.
First, it should be noted that the case-action summary
states that the case was "DISPOSED BY (DISM W/O PREJ) ON
06/28/2013."  The circuit court's dismissal of the claims
against Reddoch and McLean based on State immunity and State-
agent immunity -- the only arguments presented by those
parties in their motions to dismiss -- would have been with
prejudice.  There would be no reason for the notation of a
Nonetheless, Johnson "timely filed this appeal to ensure that
no claim is forfeited."  Id.
11
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dismissal without prejudice unless that notation was intended
to refer to the dismissal of the claims against the
fictitiously named defendants, who obviously did not file any
motions in the circuit court because they had not been served.
Further, as Johnson admits, the circuit court's refusal
to allow the issuance of a postjudgment, nonparty subpoena to
ADMH seeking information about the fictitiously named
defendants is a further indication that the circuit court
understood its order of June 28, 2013, to have effectively
ended Johnson's action.
  
Moreover, as Reddoch and McLean note, this Court has
rejected the idea that an action can be commenced or survive
against only fictitiously named parties.  Thus, the dismissal
of, or a summary judgment as to, the only named defendants in
a civil action also disposes of any remaining allegations
against fictitiously named parties. 
"In Ex parte Matthews, 447 So. 2d 154 (Ala.
1984), a complaint was filed naming Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company and several fictitious parties as
defendants.  Liberty Mutual filed a motion to
dismiss the case, which the trial court granted with
the notation '[M]otion to dism. is granted. This
case is dismissed.  All costs taxed against
plaintiff.'  Both of the parties proceeded with
discovery for over a year, apparently unaware that
the motion had been granted.  By consent of both
12
1121481
parties, the trial court granted a 'motion to
reinstate' the case.  Soon thereafter, the plaintiff
substituted Matthews for a fictitious party and the
trial court granted Liberty Mutual's motion for
summary judgment.  This court held that a final
judgment could not be set aside based on the consent
of the named defendant, and then, in effect, the
suit resurrected against a fictitious defendant. 
The Court said that a Rule 60(b), A[la]. R. Civ. P.,
motion is the appropriate procedure for a delayed
attack upon a judgment.  That case explained that a
'motion to reinstate' in regard to named parties
could not be construed as a Rule 60(b)(6) motion for
relief from judgment.  Because the judgment of the
trial court was final and there was no attack upon
that judgment during the proper time, the Court held
that there was no action pending as to those parties
substituted 
for 
fictitious 
parties 
after 
the
purported motion to reinstate."
Toomey v. Foxboro Co., 528 So. 2d 302, 303 (Ala. 1988).  Thus,
in Ex parte Matthews, 447 So. 2d 154 (Ala. 1984), the Court
considered the effect of the dismissal of the only named
defendant and the notation that "[t]his case is dismissed" to
be that the claims against the fictitiously named  parties had
been dismissed as well.
In Toomey, the plaintiff filed a wrongful-death action
against Courtaulds North America, Inc. ("Courtaulds"), and
fictitiously named parties.  Courtaulds filed a motion for a
summary judgment.  The Toomey Court noted that, "[a]ccording
to the case action summary sheet, Judge Hocklander granted the
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motion on May 5, 1981, with the notation 'Motion for Summary
Judgment 
granted. 
 
Cause 
dismissed, 
costs 
taxed 
to
Plaintiff.'"  528 So. 2d at 302.  Three months later, the
plaintiff filed an amended complaint in which she substituted
the Foxboro Company for a fictitiously named party; the
plaintiff made the 
amendment expressly pursuant to Rule 15(a),
Ala. R. Civ. P..  The Foxboro Company filed a motion to
dismiss, which the circuit court eventually granted.  The
plaintiff appealed.  The Toomey Court ruled:
"The decision 
in 
Matthews 
is 
dispositive 
of 
this
appeal. On May 5, 1981, Judge Hocklander dismissed
the action with the notation 'Cause dismissed, costs
taxed to Plaintiff.' This was, in both form and
substance, a final judgment as to all the parties.
This case is, therefore, affirmed on the authority
of Matthews."
528 So. 2d at 303. 
In Toomey, as in Matthews, the Court considered the entry
of a summary judgment in favor of the named defendant and the
notation that the case was being "dismissed" to mean that the
May 5, 1981, order was a final judgment as to all parties,
including the fictitiously named parties.   And more recently,
in Weaver v. Firestone, 155 So. 3d 952, 963 (Ala. 2013), this
Court expressly rejected the arguments that Rule 9, Ala. R.
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Civ. P., permits a plaintiff to "file[] a complaint naming as
defendants only fictitious parties" and that a complaint
naming only fictitious partes "would have served to commence
an action against the alleged tortfeasors." 
As was the case in Matthews and Toomey, and consistent
with our holding in Weaver, no action remained pending
following the circuit court's entry of its June 28, 2013,
order.  That order therefore constituted a final judgment
subject to appeal.
B.  Did the Circuit Court Properly Dismiss All Claims?
Reddoch and McLean contended, and the circuit court
apparently agreed, that they were entitled to State immunity
from Johnson's claims seeking injunctive relief against them
in their official capacities.
"Section 14 prohibits actions against state
officers in their official capacities when those
actions are, in effect, actions against the State.
Lyons v. River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So. 2d 257,
261 (Ala. 2003); Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801,
806 (Ala. 1992).  'In determining whether an action
against a state officer or employee is, in fact, one
against the State, [a] [c]ourt will consider such
factors as the nature of the action and the relief
sought.  Phillips v. Thomas, 555 So. 2d 81, 83 (Ala.
1989).  Such factors include whether 'a result
favorable to the plaintiff would directly affect a
contract or property right of the State,' Mitchell,
598 So. 2d at 806, whether the defendant is simply
15
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a 'conduit' through which the plaintiff seeks
recovery of damages from the State, Barnes v. Dale,
530 So. 2d 770, 784 (Ala. 1988), and whether 'a
judgment against the officer would directly affect
the financial status of the State treasury,' Lyons,
858 So. 2d at 261."
Haley v. Barbour Cnty., 885 So. 2d 783, 788 (Ala. 2004).
Johnson contends that he is not seeking monetary relief
from Reddoch and McLean in their official capacities but,
rather, is simply seeking injunctive relief and that,
therefore, his claims against them in their official
capacities are not precluded by § 14.  
"[C]ertain actions against State officials are not
regarded as actions against the State for purposes
of § 14.  Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d
137, 142 (Ala. 2002).  For example, '[i]njunctive
action may be maintained against a state official
[in his official capacity], if the official is
acting beyond the scope of his authority or acting
illegally.'  St. Clair County v. Town of Riverside,
272 Ala. 294, 296, 128 So. 2d 333, 334 (1961)."
Ex parte Dangerfield, 49 So. 3d 675, 681 (Ala. 2010).  In his
first amended complaint, Johnson sought "to enjoin [Reddoch
and McLean] ... to provide a safe environment for Jeffrey
Johnson that protects from abuse, neglect, exploitation and
mistreatment at the hands of other mental health workers or
patients at Searcy."  
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The primary problem with Johnson's claims against Reddoch
and McLean in their official capacities, which seek only
injunctive relief, is that nothing in Johnson's complaint
alleges that Reddoch and McLean are currently "acting beyond
the scope of [their] authority or acting illegally."  As noted
in the rendition of the facts, Searcy ceased operations on
October 31, 2012, and Johnson is now being treated at Bryce
Hospital. 
 
Because 
Johnson's 
claims 
for 
prospective 
injunctive
relief do not allege any type of ongoing or imminent
wrongdoing by Reddoch and McLean, those claims cannot be
maintained against the named defendants in their official
capacities.
Johnson also asserted claims for damages against McLean
and the fictitiously named defendants in their individual
capacities, alleging negligent and wanton conduct by the
defendants in connection with the alleged assault that
occurred on June 22, 2012.  McLean contended, and the circuit
court apparently agreed, that she was entitled to State-agent
immunity under Ex Parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000),
as to those claims.
17
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This Court, in Cranman, stated the test for State-agent
immunity as follows:3
"A State agent shall be immune from civil
liability in his or her personal capacity when the
conduct made the basis of the claim against the
agent is based upon the agent's
"(1) 
formulating 
plans, 
policies, 
or 
designs; 
or
"(2) exercising his or her judgment in the
administration of a department or agency of
government, including, but not limited to, examples
such as:
"(a) 
making 
administrative
adjudications;
"(b) allocating resources;
"(c) negotiating contracts;
"(d) hiring, firing, transferring,
assigning, or supervising personnel; or
"(3) discharging duties imposed on a department
or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar
as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the
manner for performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner; or
"(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of
the criminal laws of the State, including, but not
limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons; or
Cranman was a plurality opinion.  The test set forth in
3
Cranman was subsequently adopted by a majority of the Court in
Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000).
18
1121481
"(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of
duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in
releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons
of unsound mind, or educating students.
"Notwithstanding 
anything 
to 
the 
contrary 
in 
the
foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall
not be immune from civil liability in his or her
personal capacity
"(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws,
rules, or regulations of this State enacted or
promulgated for the purpose of regulating the
activities 
of 
a 
governmental 
agency 
require
otherwise; or
"(2) when the State agent acts willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his
or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation
of the law."
Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405.  Johnson argues that the second
category of exceptions is applicable in this case.
McLean argues that she "was, at the time of the incident,
serving as the Director of Searcy Hospital" and that, in that
capacity, she "exercised 
her 
judgment in the administration of
Searcy Hospital."  McLean cites three cases in which this
Court 
previously 
has 
granted 
State-agent 
immunity 
to 
directors
at other ADMH facilities:  Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Mental
Health & Mental Retardation, 937 So. 2d 1018 (Ala. 2006)
(directing trial court to enter summary judgment for two J.S.
19
1121481
Tarwater 
Developmental 
Center 
directors 
for 
claims 
arising 
out
of alleged assault of ADMH patient); Vick v. Sawyer, 936 So.
2d 517 (Ala. 2006) (affirming a summary judgment for two
Albert P. Brewer Developmental Center directors on basis of
State-agent 
immunity for claims arising out of alleged 
assault
of ADMH patient); and Smith V. King, 615 So. 2d 69, 70 (Ala.
1993) 
(granting 
pre-Cranman 
immunity 
to 
director 
of
Thomasville Adult Adjustment Center).
Although the circumstances in the present case ultimately
may prove comparable to the circumstances in the cited cases,
the difficulty with McLean's argument is highlighted by the
fact that the defendants in each of the cited cases were
granted State-agent immunity at the summary-judgment stage. 
We have said that a "'"motion to dismiss is typically not the
appropriate vehicle by which to assert ... qualified immunity
or State-agent immunity and ... normally the determination as
to the existence of such a defense should be reserved until
the 
summary-judgment 
stage, 
following 
appropriate
discovery."'"  Ex parte Walker, 97 So. 3d 747, 750 (Ala. 2012)
(quoting Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Youth Servs., 880 So. 2d
393, 397-98 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn Ex parte Alabama
20
1121481
Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 837 So. 2d 808,
813-14 (Ala. 2002)).  This Court has repeatedly observed that
"'"[i]t is a rare case involving the defense of [State-agent]
immunity that would be properly disposed of by a dismissal
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), [Ala. R. Civ. P.]."'" Ex parte
Alabama Dep't of Mental Health & Retardation, 837 So. 2d at
814 (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d at 177, quoting in
turn Patton v. Black, 646 So. 2d 8, 10 (Ala. 1994) (quoting
earlier cases)).
McLean alleges that she exercised her judgment in the
performance of her duties at Searcy and that the second
exception to State-agent immunity –- i.e., that she acted
willfully, 
maliciously, 
fraudulently, 
in 
bad 
faith, 
beyond 
her
authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law –-
does not apply.  We noted in the Standard of Review, however,
that, "'as the trial court ... treated the motion only as what
it was, a motion to dismiss and not a motion for summary
judgment 
with 
evidentiary 
materials 
outside 
the 
allegations 
of
the complaint, [the allegations in the complaint] are the only
potential source of factual support 
for 
the defendants' claims
of immunity.'"  ___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting Ex parte Walker, 97
21
1121481
So. 3d at 749-50).  In this case, the complaint does not
provide sufficient factual support for extending State-agent
immunity to McLean on Johnson's claims against her in her
individual capacity.  
The Court in Ex parte Alabama Department of Mental Health
& Mental 
Retardation, 
supra, concluded that claims against the
then commissioner of ADMH in her individual capacity were
"fact intensive."  As a result, the Court reasoned, the
commissioner's 
"Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss is premature with
regard to these claims. No discovery has been
conducted in this case. After the parties have had
the opportunity to conduct discovery, Sawyer will
have the opportunity to seek a summary judgment on
the ground that she is entitled to State-agent
immunity."
837 So. 2d at 814.  Similarly, it is entirely possible that
McLean will be able to produce sufficient facts to qualify for
State-agent immunity on a summary-judgment motion, 
but 
she has
not done so at this stage of the litigation.
Given that McLean has not established facts that entitle
her to State-agent immunity from Johnson's claims, it follows
that the fictitiously named defendants -- who have not filed
any motion with the circuit court -- likewise have not done
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so. If anything, the fictitiously named defendants, as the
mental-health 
workers 
actually 
responsible 
for 
Johnson's 
care,
may have more difficulty demonstrating that they fall within
one of the Cranman categories to which State-agent immunity
generally applies.  Therefore, the circuit court erred in
dismissing Johnson's claims against the fictitiously named
defendants.
C.  Did the Circuit Court Properly Quash the Nonparty
Subpoena?
Johnson also has challenged the circuit court's order
granting ADMH's motion to quash a nonparty subpoena seeking
information concerning the fictitiously named defendants.  As
explained above, the circuit court erred in dismissing
Johnson's claims against McLean in 
her 
individual capacity and
hence against the fictitiously named defendants, and,
therefore, Johnson's case against the fictitiously named
defendants should have remained active at the time the circuit
court ruled on ADMH's motion to quash the subpoena.  It is not
clear, however, whether the circuit court granted ADMH's
motion on the basis of ADMH's argument that there was no
active case or based on its argument that the requested
discovery was overly burdensome and that it sought privileged
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information.  We therefore instruct the circuit court on
remand to reconsider the issue of discovery pertaining to the
fictitiously named defendants in light of the conclusions
reached in this opinion.
IV.  Conclusion
The circuit court correctly dismissed Johnson's claims
against Reddoch and McLean in their official capacities.  The
circuit court erred in dismissing Johnson's claims against
McLean and the fictitiously named defendants in their
individual capacities.  We remand the case for further
proceedings 
consistent 
with 
this 
opinion, 
including
consideration of Johnson's subpoena for discovery served on
ADMH.  
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Bolin, Main, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Moore, C.J., concurs in the result.
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