Title: Wood v. Bass Pro Shops
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 942033
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: September 15, 1995

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Whiting,
1 Lacy, 
Hassell, and Keenan, JJ. 
 
DARRELL WOOD 
 
v.  Record No. 942033 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL 
                                   September 15, 1995 
BASS PRO SHOPS, INC. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRY COUNTY 
 
David V. Williams, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal of a judgment for the defendant in a product 
liability action, we consider whether assumption of the risk is a 
defense to a claim of breach of an implied warranty, and we 
decide issues relating to the admission of certain evidence. 
 
I. 
 
PROCEEDINGS 
 
Darrell A. Wood filed a motion for judgment against Bass Pro 
Shops, Inc. alleging, among other things, negligence and breach 
of express and implied warranties.  Wood alleged that he suffered 
severe personal injuries, including partial paralysis, when he 
fell from a hunter's tree stand purchased from the defendant. 
 
Wood nonsuited his negligence and express warranty claims, 
and the case proceeded to trial on his breach of implied warranty 
claim.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant.  
We awarded Wood an appeal and agreed to consider the defendant's 
assignments of cross-error.   
 
II. 
 
FACTS 
 
In accordance with well-settled principles, we will review 
the facts and all reasonable inferences they raise in the light 
                     
    
1Justice Whiting participated in the hearing and decision 
of this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 
August 12, 1995. 
most favorable to the defendant, who comes to this Court with a 
favorable jury verdict, confirmed by the trial judge.   
 
  Wood purchased a tree stand after he had seen an 
advertisement in the defendant's mail-order catalog.  The tree 
stand was designed by Amacker International, Inc., and 
manufactured by Tree Stand Manufacturing Company.  The tree stand 
was packaged, placed in a box, and shipped to Wood.  Wood 
testified that when he opened the box, neither instructions nor a 
safety belt accompanied the tree stand.  The box manufacturer's 
representative testified that the following instructions were 
printed on the side of the box:  "Always use a safety belt when 
using a tree stand."  The representative also stated that a 
safety belt and additional instructions were routinely placed in 
the same box along with each tree stand and shipped to a 
customer.   
 
The safety belt is designed to prevent the hunter from 
falling.  One portion of the belt is attached to the hunter's 
body, and the other portion of the belt is secured to the tree.  
Wood did not contact the defendant to obtain a safety belt or 
instructions. 
 
The tree stand, which Wood used when hunting, may be affixed 
to a tree by wrapping a strap around the tree.  The tree stand 
permits a hunter to position himself at elevations above a deer's 
line of sight or range of scent.  The hunter may either stand on 
a mesh platform on the tree stand's lower framework or sit on a 
small seat on the higher portion of the stand.   
 
On November 20, 1991, Wood and his friend, Hardin Daniel 
Morrison, went on a deer hunt.  Wood had previously suffered an 
ankle fracture and was wearing a short-leg cast on his left 
ankle.  Wood climbed about 26 feet up a tree without using a 
safety belt and affixed the tree stand to the tree.  He took his 
safety belt, which he had acquired from another manufacturer 
about a year before he purchased the tree stand, out of his 
pocket and put it on.   
 
After a couple of hours, Wood decided to end his hunt.  He 
removed his safety belt and placed it in his pocket.  He moved 
the seat of the tree stand and prepared to descend.  Then, 
"something broke [and] Wood fell over twenty feet to the ground." 
 Wood suffered a spinal injury that paralyzed him below the 
waist.   
 
Wood presented evidence at trial that the tree stand 
collapsed because the stand was defectively designed and 
manufactured.  The defendant presented evidence that the tree 
stand was not defective and that Wood's injuries were caused 
because, inter alia, he had failed to wear a safety belt when 
preparing to descend from the tree stand.   
 
III. 
 
ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK 
 
The trial court, over Wood's objection, instructed the jury 
that Wood could not recover on his breach of implied warranty 
claim if the jury found that he had assumed the risk of injury.  
Wood contends that assumption of the risk is not a defense to a 
breach of implied warranty claim.  The defendant argues the trial 
court properly instructed the jury that assumption of the risk is 
a defense that may be asserted in a breach of implied warranty 
action.   
 
We have not heretofore considered whether the doctrine of 
assumption of the risk is a defense to an action for breach of 
implied warranty.  See White Consolidated Industry v. Swiney, 237 
Va. 23, 29-30, 376 S.E.2d 283, 286 (1989).  However, in Brockett 
v. Harrell Brothers, Inc., 206 Va. 457, 462-63, 143 S.E.2d 897, 
902 (1965), we considered whether contributory negligence is a 
defense in an action of implied warranty of fitness.  There, we 
stated: 
 
 
There is a conflict of authority as to whether 
contributory negligence is a proper defense in an 
action for breach of implied warranty of fitness.  The 
majority view is that since the action is ex contractu, 
contributory negligence as a defense has no place 
therein.  Other courts take the view that since such an 
action has its origin in tort, contributory negligence 
is a proper defense. . . .   
 
 
 
We adopt the majority view since that is more in 
accord with our concept of the nature of the action.  
In actions for damages for the sale of unwholesome 
foodstuffs we have recognized the distinction between 
those based on negligence and those based on breach of 
implied warranty of fitness.  The latter we have 
consistently regarded as action ex contractu.  Kroger 
Grocery & Baking Co. v. Dunn, 181 Va. 390, 392, 25 
S.E.2d 254, 255; Blythe v. Camp Manufacturing Co., 183 
Va. 432, 434, 32 S.E.2d 659, 660; Swift & Company v. 
Wells, supra, 201 Va. at 217, 110 S.E.2d at 206.  
Consequently, we hold that the contributory negligence 
of the plaintiff will not be material on the issue of 
the defendants' breach of implied warranty of fitness. 
  
 
We are of opinion that the rationale we invoked in Brockett 
is applicable here.  Wood's action for breach of implied 
warranty, just as the plaintiff's action in Brockett, is ex 
contractu.  Even though the tort defenses of contributory 
negligence and assumption of the risk are different and 
distinguishable defenses, we have described these defenses as 
"associated defenses," Amusement Slides v. Lehmann, 217 Va. 815, 
818, 232 S.E.2d 803, 805 (1977), and we have said that "these 
defenses often overlap," Budzinski v. Harris, 213 Va. 107, 109, 
189 S.E.2d 372, 375 (1972).  We perceive no persuasive reason to 
treat these tort defenses differently.  Thus, we hold that the 
tort or ex delicto defense of assumption of the risk is not 
applicable in an action for breach of an implied warranty.   
 
Nevertheless, a defendant in a product liability case has 
other available defenses.  As we have repeatedly stated, "there 
can be no recovery against the manufacturer for breach of . . . 
implied warranties when there has been an unforeseen misuse of 
the article supplied."  Featherall v. Firestone, 219 Va. 949, 
964, 252 S.E.2d 358, 367 (1979); White Consolidated Industry, 237 
Va. at 29, 376 S.E.2d at 286.  We also emphasize, as we noted in 
Brockett, that a plaintiff may not recover damages for breach of 
an implied warranty if the purported defect of which the 
plaintiff complains was "known, visible or obvious" to him.  
Brockett, 206 Va. at 463, 143 S.E.2d at 902.  The trial court 
erred, however, in submitting the issue of assumption of the risk 
to the jury.   
 
IV. 
 
ADMISSIBILITY OF MANUFACTURERS' INSTRUCTIONS AND WARNINGS 
 
The trial court, over Wood's objections, permitted the 
defendant to introduce in evidence a box imprinted with certain 
instructions, and copies of other instructions and warnings that 
were manufactured by a tree stand manufacturer, A.P.I. Outdoors, 
Inc.  The trial court also permitted the defendant to introduce 
in evidence pages from catalogs of retailers of tree stands, even 
though those retailers are not parties to this action.  Wood 
alleges that the trial court erred by admitting this evidence 
because the defendant failed to prove that he had read the 
warnings and instructions.  Further, Wood says, "[t]here would be 
no basis for admitting these Exhibits in evidence because the 
A.P.I. instructions and warnings said nothing about the dangerous 
hidden . . . defect in the structure of the 'Tree Stand,' and 
thus did not warn him of it."
2
 
The defendant argues, and we agree, that the exhibits are 
admissible because they are relevant to the issue whether Wood 
misused the tree stand by failing to wear his safety belt when 
descending from the tree.  Wood admitted that he received 
information and warnings concerning the use of a safety belt 
manufactured by A.P.I. Outdoors, Inc.  Wood also testified that 
in 1988, before his accident, he ordered tree stands from two 
companies, Cabela's, Inc. and Gander Mountain, Inc.   
 
Cabela's catalog contained the following warning displayed 
beside a picture of a tree stand that Wood had purchased: 
 
Cabela's strongly recommends that you always use a 
safety belt when using any tree stand. 
 
Gander Mountain's catalog also contained a prominent warning 
stating: 
 
The Manufacturer and Gander Mountain strongly recommend 
using a safety belt with all tree stands. 
 
Gander Mountain's catalog also contained a photograph of a hunter 
standing on a tree stand using a safety belt. 
 
We hold that the trial court properly admitted these 
                     
    
2We find no merit in Wood's argument that these exhibits 
constitute "unverified hearsay."  These exhibits were offered 
to show notice to or knowledge held by Wood, and not for the 
truth of the matter asserted therein.  See State Farm Fire 
and Casualty Co. v. Scott, 236 Va. 116, 122, 372 S.E.2d 383, 
386 (1988). 
exhibits because they support the defendant's contention that 
even though Wood knew it was dangerous to use a tree stand 
without wearing a safety belt, he purportedly misused the tree 
stand by failing to wear a safety belt when descending from the 
tree.  Additionally, the jury might have inferred that Wood had 
read some of the warnings because the warnings in the catalogs 
were prominently displayed on pages containing pictures of items 
that Wood had purchased. 
 
V. 
 
ADMISSIBILITY OF MEDICAL TESTIMONY 
 
Wood asserts that the trial court erred by admitting in 
evidence certain portions of the de bene esse deposition of Dr. 
Carey Charles Mayer, a psychiatrist.  Mayer testified that he had 
treated Wood for depression and sleeplessness before Wood was 
injured on November 20, 1991.  Mayer also testified that Wood had 
suicidal thoughts before November 20, 1991.   
 
The defendant argues that Mayer's testimony is admissible 
because Wood "claims that he has incurred physical and mental 
suffering as a result of Bass Pro's alleged breaches [and thus 
he] place[d] his entire medical condition into issue."  We agree 
with the defendant.   
 
We have held that "[e]very fact, however remote or 
insignificant, that tends to establish the probability or 
improbability of a fact in issue, is relevant, and if otherwise 
admissible, should be admitted."  Ravenwood Towers, Inc. v. 
Woodyard, 244 Va. 51, 56, 419 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1992) (quoting 
Harrell v. Woodson, 233 Va. 117, 122, 353 S.E.2d 770, 773 
(1987)).  Additionally, the determination of relevancy involves 
the exercise of the trial court's discretion.  Owens-Corning 
Fiberglas Corp. v. Watson, 243 Va. 128, 138, 413 S.E.2d 630, 636 
(1992).  Here, Wood placed his medical condition at issue and, 
among other things, he sought, as an element of damages, 
compensation for mental anguish that he claimed was caused as a 
result of the defendant's alleged breach of implied warranty.  
The defendant was entitled to present relevant evidence that 
Wood's mental anguish was caused by a factor for which the 
defendant was not responsible.  Therefore, we hold the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. 
 
VI. 
 
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
 
A. 
 
The defendant assigns cross-error to the admission of 
certain expert testimony.  In the first instance, the trial court 
permitted Lynwood Eugene Merricks to testify as an expert witness 
on the subjects of metal fabrication, tree stand designs, the use 
of tree stands, and common practices utilized in hunting white 
tail deer.  The defendant argues that the trial court erred by 
permitting Merricks to qualify as an expert witness on these 
subjects.  We disagree.   
 
In Grubb v. Hocker, 229 Va. 172, 326 S.E.2d 698 (1985), we 
stated: 
 
 
Whether a witness is qualified to express an 
opinion as an expert is a question largely within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. . . .  A decision 
to exclude a proffered expert opinion will be reversed 
on appeal only when it appears clearly that the witness 
was qualified. . . .  And the expressed belief of a 
witness that he is an expert does not ipso facto 
require his qualification. . . .  The facts must show 
that he possesses sufficient knowledge, skill or 
experience to make him competent to testify as an 
expert on the subject matter of the inquiry.   
 
Id. at 176, 326 S.E.2d at 700 (quoting Noll v. Rahal, 219 Va. 
795, 800, 250 S.E.2d 741, 744 (1979)); Griffett v. Ryan, 247 Va. 
465, 469, 443 S.E.2d 149, 152 (1994).  We have also held that 
"the knowledge necessary to qualify a witness to testify as an 
expert might be derived from study alone, or experience, or 
both."  Grubb, 229 Va. at 176, 326 S.E.2d at 700-01; Griffett, 
247 Va. at 469, 443 S.E.2d at 152.   
 
The evidence shows that Merricks had 3,500 hours of 
vocational education and training in mechanics, machine design, 
and fabrication.  He made hunting and trapping equipment for 
Southern Outdoor Supplies, a sporting goods retailer.  He had 
made approximately 30 to 40 different types of deer hunting 
stands, and he has designed tree stands.  Merricks has experience 
with the use of safety belts and safety harnesses.  He also has 
extensive experience hunting deer.  Thus, we hold that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by permitting Merricks to 
testify as an expert witness. 
 
B. 
 
In a second assignment of cross-error, the defendant argues 
that the trial court erred by refusing to permit it to conduct a 
demonstration in the presence of the jury.  The trial court 
refused to permit this demonstration because Wood objected on the 
basis that the demonstration was a test and, as such, the 
demonstration would not be permissible because it did not 
duplicate the accident conditions.  We do not consider the 
defendant's argument because the record does not contain a 
proffer of the proposed demonstration.  City of Manassas v. Board 
of County Supervisors of Prince William County, 250 Va. 126, 137, 
458 S.E.2d 568, 573 (1995); Brown v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 460, 
465, 437 S.E.2d 563, 565 (1993); Blue Cross v. Commonwealth, 221 
Va. 349, 357, 269 S.E.2d 827, 832 (1980). 
 
VII. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court 
and remand this case for a new trial consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
Reversed and remanded.