Title: State v. Pennye
Citation: 104 Ariz. 146, 449 P.2d 611
Docket Number: 1848
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: January 22, 1969

104 Ariz. 146 (1969) 449 P.2d 611 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Edward Charles PENNYE, Appellant. No. 1848. Supreme Court of Arizona. In Banc. January 22, 1969. *147 Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., Darrell F. Smith, former Atty. Gen., Carl Waag, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Arthur W. Vance, Jr., Yuma, for appellant. McFARLAND, Justice. Edward Charles Pennye, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was charged and convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, with a prior conviction, and sentenced to a term of not less than ten nor more than thirty years. From this conviction and sentence he appeals. The prior conviction of murder without malice was proven by a copy of a legally-authenticated conviction record, upon which appeared the name of "Edward Charles Pennye." On appeal, this Court held that identicalness of the name on the record, and the name of defendant, is insufficient to establish the prior conviction. 102 Ariz. 207, 427 P.2d 525. The case was remanded, and the issue of the prior conviction was retried. At the second trial there were admitted in evidence, over defendant's objection, (1) a copy of the record of conviction in Midland County, Texas, (2) a picture allegedly of defendant, and (3) a copy of the record of defendant's fingerprints. Attached to this was the certification and attestation of the "record clerk of the Texas Department of Corrections," the penitentiary where defendant had been committed. The clerk certified that all documents were true copies of the official records of "E.C. Pennye." The number below the photo matched the number printed on the fingerprint record. J.F. McGill qualified as an expert witness on fingerprints, and testified after making a comparison of defendant's fingerprints taken personally by McGill at the time of defendant's arrest on the charge in the instant case, that the prints matched those contained in the Texas record. This evidence was to the effect that defendant, E.C. Pennye, was the same "E.C. Pennye" previously convicted in Texas. Rule 272 of Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., authorize the use of the civil rules of evidence in criminal cases, unless otherwise provided; thus Rule 44(g), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., is applicable. This Rule states: This rule was complied with in every respect; however, defendant contends that this rule is not applicable, because it contemplates that an "official record" is only one required to be kept by the statutory law of Texas. Defendant asserts that because the prosecution failed to reveal any such Texas law, the admission of the evidence was reversible error. It is defendant's contention that in order for a record to be admissible under Rule 44(g) it must be an official record authorized by statute, and that the record of the defendant in the Texas penitentiary was not admissible for the reason that there was no Texas law requiring that such a record be kept. Wigmore, 3d Ed., Vol. 5, p. 517, states that the necessity of "trustworthiness" of the hearsay exception doesn't demand statutory specificity. Justice Cardozo, in People v. Reese, 258 N.Y. 89, 179 N.E. 305, 79 A.L.R. 1329, states: We therefore conclude the record must be made under official duty. The question is Was the clerk of the Texas penitentiary under such a duty? Texas has general statutory provisions providing for the maintenance and supervision of its prison system by its Texas Prison Board. Vernon's Texas Statutes Annotated, Art. 6166a and 6166j. The recording of photographs and fingerprints at a state prison is an official and inherent duty of the penitentiary's record clerk. State v. Courser, 199 Wash. 559, 92 P.2d 264, 266: We therefore hold that the record was properly admitted. Defendant next contends that the State's witness, J.F. McGill, was not a qualified expert, and therefore admission of his testimony over objection was reversible error. *149 Whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert falls within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Reyes, 99 Ariz. 257, 408 P.2d 400, 14 A.L.R.3d 1262; State v. Espinosa, 101 Ariz. 474, 421 P.2d 322. The record shows that McGill had both formal training and on-the-job training in classification of fingerprints. The extent of his training went to the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence. Formhals v. United States, 278 F.2d 43 (9th Cir.); United States v. Alker, 260 F.2d 135 (3d Cir.); Territory of Hawaii, by Sharpless v. Adelmeyer, 45 Haw. 144, 363 P.2d 979. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting McGill to testify as an expert. Judgment affirmed. UDALL, C.J., LOCKWOOD, V.C.J., and STRUCKMEYER and HAYS, JJ., concur.