Title: Christie v. Hartley Constr., Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 359A13
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: December 19, 2014

NO. COA13-21 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 5 November 2013 
 
 
 
IN RE: TWIN COUNTY 
MOTORSPORTS, INC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nash County 
No. 11 CVS 1393 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by respondent from order entered 17 October 2012 by 
Judge Frank Brown in Nash County Superior Court.  Heard in the 
Court of Appeals 15 August 2013. 
 
Ralph E. Stevenson, III, for petitioner. 
 
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Christopher W. Brooks, 
Assistant Attorney General, for respondent. 
 
 
DAVIS, Judge. 
 
 
The Commissioner of the North Carolina Division of Motor 
Vehicles (the “DMV”) appeals from the trial court’s order (1) 
reversing the final agency decision assessing a civil penalty of 
$1,500 against Twin County Motorsports, Inc. (“Twin County”) and 
suspending its safety inspection license for a period of 1,080 
days; and (2) remanding for a new hearing before the DMV.  The 
primary issue raised on appeal is whether corporations are required 
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under North Carolina law to be represented by legal counsel in 
hearings before the DMV.  Because we hold that corporations cannot 
appear pro se in DMV hearings, we affirm the trial court’s order. 
Factual Background 
 
On 5 October 2010, Inspector L. Neil Ambrose (“Inspector 
Ambrose”) of the Bureau of License and Theft of the DMV went to 
the place of business of Twin County to investigate a report that 
the business was conducting state inspections without a licensed 
mechanic in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-183.7B(a)(3).1  
Inspector Ambrose spoke to Lance Cherry (“Cherry”), the owner of 
Twin County, and Brandon Crawley (“Crawley”), the service manager 
of the station, and learned that Twin County’s employees were 
improperly using the access code of a former employee — who was a 
licensed safety inspection mechanic — to conduct motor vehicle 
safety inspections. 
Inspector Ambrose charged Crawley with four counts of 
performing a safety inspection without a license (a Class 3 
misdemeanor) and cited Twin County with six violations of N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 20-183.7B(a)(3).  On 5 May 2011, Cherry was served 
                     
1 We note that our General Assembly recently amended N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 20-183.7B.  However, these amendments do not “become 
effective [until] October 1, 2013, and apply to violations 
occurring on or after that date.”  2013 N.C. Sess. Law ch. 302, § 
2-3, 13.  Therefore, the amendments do not apply to this case. 
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with Notices of Charges.  The violations alleged in the Notices of 
Charges were classified as “Type I” violations, which carry a civil 
penalty of $250 and a six month suspension of the business’ license 
for the first or second violation within three years and a penalty 
of $1,000 and a two-year license suspension for any subsequent 
violations. 
Cherry requested an administrative hearing before the DMV, 
and a hearing was held on 19 May 2011.  Twin County was not 
represented by counsel at this proceeding.  Instead, Cherry 
appeared on Twin County’s behalf, and DMV Hearing Officer Linda 
Brown allowed him to represent Twin County pro se.  On 24 May 2011, 
Hearing Officer Brown entered an Official Hearing Decision and 
Order (1) finding that Twin County committed the six Type I 
violations; (2) ordering the suspension of Twin County’s safety 
equipment inspection station license for a period of 1,080 days; 
and (3) imposing a civil penalty assessment of $1,500. 
Twin County requested a review by the Commissioner of the 
hearing officer’s decision.  The Commissioner subsequently upheld 
the hearing officer’s decision.  Twin County sought judicial review 
of the final agency decision in Nash County Superior Court pursuant 
to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-183.8G(g) and Article 4 of Chapter 150B. 
On 17 October 2012, the Honorable Frank Brown entered an order 
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reversing the final agency decision and remanding the matter to 
the hearing officer for “a new hearing on the Charge Order of 
October 5, 2010 with [Twin County] represented by proper counsel.”  
The Commissioner appealed to this Court. 
Analysis 
 
On appeal, the Commissioner argues that the trial court erred 
in reversing the final agency decision of the DMV on the grounds 
that (1) corporations are entitled to appear pro se in DMV 
hearings; and (2) there was substantial, competent evidence in the 
record supporting the final agency decision.  Because we hold that 
corporations must be represented by legal counsel in hearings 
before the DMV and cannot appear pro se, we affirm the trial 
court’s order. 
 
In North Carolina, the general rule is that “a corporation 
must be represented by a duly admitted and licensed attorney-at-
law and cannot proceed pro se . . . .” Lexis-Nexis, Div. of Reed 
Elsevier, Inc. v. Travishan Corp., 155 N.C. App. 205, 209, 573 
S.E.2d 547, 549 (2002). 
In Lexis-Nexis, Florence Smith, a non-attorney and the chief 
executive 
officer 
and 
sole 
shareholder 
of 
the 
defendant 
corporation, filed an answer and counterclaim on behalf of the 
corporation.  Id. at 206, 573 S.E.2d at 548.  The plaintiff moved 
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to strike Smith’s answer and counterclaim, arguing that Smith’s 
pro 
se 
representation 
of 
the 
defendant 
constituted 
the 
unauthorized practice of law.  Id.  The trial court allowed Smith 
to represent the defendant but dismissed her counterclaim against 
the plaintiff.  Id. 
Smith appealed the dismissal of her counterclaim, and the 
plaintiff cross-appealed the trial court’s order permitting 
Smith’s representation of the defendant.  Id.  We held that “a 
corporation must be represented by a duly admitted and licensed 
attorney-at-law and cannot proceed pro se unless doing so in 
accordance with the exceptions set forth in this opinion.”  Id. at 
209, 573 S.E.2d at 549.  In so holding, we reasoned that 
[r]egarding legal representation, North 
Carolina law provides that “it shall be 
unlawful for any person or association of 
persons, except active members of the Bar of 
the State of North Carolina admitted and 
licensed to practice as attorneys-at-law, to 
appear as attorney or counselor at law in any 
action or proceeding before any judicial body 
... except in his own behalf as a party 
thereto.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-4 (2001).  
Moreover, “[a] corporation cannot lawfully 
practice law.  It is a personal right of the 
individual.”  Seawell, Attorney General v. 
Motor Club, 209 N.C. 624, 631, 184 S.E. 540, 
544 (1936). 
 
Id. at 207, 573 S.E.2d at 548-49.  We then examined the law of 
other jurisdictions and set out the following three exceptions to 
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the rule requiring corporations to be represented by counsel:  (1) 
an employee of a corporation may prepare legal documents; (2) a 
corporation may appear pro se in small claims court; and (3) a 
corporation may enter an appearance through a corporate officer to 
avoid default.  Id. at 208, 573 S.E.2d at 549. 
 
In Allied Envtl. Servs., PLLC v. N.C. Dep’t of Envtl. & 
Natural Res., 187 N.C. App. 227, 229, 653 S.E.2d 11, 13 (2007), 
disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 354, 661 S.E.2d 238 (2008), a case 
upon which the DMV heavily relies in the present appeal, we held 
that our decision in Lexis-Nexis was not applicable to most 
contested case proceedings before the Office of Administrative 
Hearings (“OAH”).  Allied arose from a decision by the North 
Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources (“DENR”) 
to revoke the eligibility of Deans Oil Company, Inc. to receive 
reimbursement 
from 
the 
North 
Carolina 
Commercial 
Leaking 
Underground Storage Tank Clean Up Fund.2  Id. at 228, 653 S.E.2d 
at 12.  Upon receiving notification that it would no longer receive 
reimbursements for clean-up costs and that it was required to repay 
prior disbursements from the fund, Brian Gray, the president of 
Allied Environmental Services, attempted to appeal DENR’s decision 
                     
2 Deans Oil Company employed Allied Environmental Services, PLLC 
to clean up petroleum contamination and compensated Allied using 
the reimbursement funds. 
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by signing and submitting a petition for a contested case in the 
OAH.  Id. at 229, 653 S.E.2d at 12. 
 
DENR moved to dismiss the contested case petition, arguing 
that “Gray could not act as agent for Deans Oil Company in signing 
the petition because Deans Oil Company is a corporation and 
corporations can only be represented by an attorney.”  Id.  The 
administrative law judge granted the motion to dismiss, and the 
superior court affirmed its decision.  On appeal, this Court 
reversed, holding that a petition for a contested case in most 
proceedings before the OAH may be signed by a corporation’s non-
attorney representative.  Id. at 230, 653 S.E.2d at 13. 
 
Allied does not, however, stand for the broad proposition 
that a corporation is entitled to appear pro se in any 
administrative proceeding.  Instead, we made clear in Allied that 
our holding was addressing only “appeals arising before the OAH.”  
Id. at 229, 653 S.E.2d at 13.  Our General Assembly has expressly 
exempted the Department of Transportation — the agency within which 
the DMV exists — from the provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act authorizing contested cases to be brought in the OAH 
against certain state agencies.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-1(e)(8) 
(2011); Dep’t of Transp. v. Blue, 147 N.C. App. 596, 605, 556 
S.E.2d 609, 618 (2001), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 434, 572 
-8- 
 
 
S.E.2d 428 (2002). 
Therefore, because hearings before the DMV are not within the  
class of administrative hearings encompassed by our decision in 
Allied, we are not bound by our result in that case.  However, it 
is appropriate for us to examine the reasoning employed in Allied 
to determine whether it supports a similar result here.  We 
conclude that it does not. 
In Allied, we focused on the language used by our General 
Assembly in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-23 — the statute governing the 
commencement and hearing procedures regarding contested cases in 
the OAH.  We noted that the version of Section 150B-23 in effect 
at that time stated that a “petition [commencing a contested case 
before the OAH] shall be signed by a party or a representative of 
the party . . . .”  Allied, 187 N.C. App. at 229; 653 S.E.2d at 12 
(emphasis added).  We explained that 
it 
is 
clear 
to 
us 
that 
the 
term 
“representative” as used in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
150B-23 is not coterminous with the term 
“attorney.”  Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
“representative” as “[o]ne who stands for or 
acts on behalf of another . . . .”  Black’s 
Law Dictionary 1304 (7th ed. 1999).  The 
legislature, in drafting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
150B-23, 
could 
have 
chosen 
the 
word 
“attorney,” 
but 
instead 
chose 
“representative,” a word whose plain meaning 
is broader than “attorney.” 
 
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Id. at 230, 653 S.E.2d at 13. 
Conversely, hearings before the DMV are authorized pursuant 
to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-183.8G.  Unlike N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-
23, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-183.8G lacks any language suggesting a 
legislative intent to allow corporations to be represented by a 
representative other than an attorney. 
Allied also relied on provisions of the North Carolina 
Administrative Code making clear that parties could be represented 
by non-attorneys in proceedings before the OAH.  Indeed, we noted 
that 26 N.C.A.C. 3.0120(e) expressly stated that “[a] party need 
not be represented by an attorney.”  Id.  Likewise, we observed 
that 26 N.C.A.C. 3.0114(b) explicitly referenced an “attorney at 
law or other representative of a party . . . .”  Id. (emphasis in 
original).  None of these code provisions, however, apply to DMV 
hearings. 
Thus, because our decision in Allied was specifically 
premised on our interpretation of statutory and administrative 
code provisions that are inapplicable to DMV hearings, we believe 
that the reasoning underlying our ultimate conclusion in Allied is 
not relevant here.  We therefore hold that in hearings before the 
DMV, corporations must be represented by legal counsel pursuant to 
the general rule articulated in Lexis-Nexis. 
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Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court was correct in 
determining that corporations must be represented by licensed 
attorneys-at-law in DMV hearings.  As such, we affirm the trial 
court’s order remanding for a new hearing in which Twin County 
shall be represented by legal counsel.  Because we are affirming 
the trial court’s order remanding for a new hearing, we decline to 
address the DMV’s argument that there was substantial competent 
evidence supporting the final agency decision. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s 
order reversing the final agency decision and remanding for a new 
hearing. 
AFFIRMED. 
Judges CALABRIA and STROUD concur.