Title: DeMendoza v. Huffman
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S48430
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: August 8, 2002

Filed: August 8, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
FRANK LEON DeMENDOZA and			
JAVIER MENDOZA,
Plaintiffs,
	v.
BRUCE HUFFMAN, WILLIAM
HUFFMAN, and EVELENE HUFFMAN,
Defendants,
	and
STATE OF OREGON,
Intervenor-Defendant.
(DV 95-3071-PA; SC S48430)
	En Banc
	On certified questions from the United States District Court
Order dated April 18, 2001; certification accepted July 18, 2001.
	Honorable Michael R. Hogan, District Judge.
	Argued and submitted January 16, 2002.
	Kathryn H. Clarke, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
brief for plaintiffs.  With her on the brief was David V.
Gilstrap, of Davis, Gilstrap, Hearn, Shaw, &amp; Saladoff, Ashland.
	No appearance for defendants. 
	Mary H. Williams, Assistant Solicitor General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for intervenor-defendant.  With her
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General, and Julie A. Smith, Assistant
Attorney General.
	Charles J. Merten, Beaverton, filed the brief for amicus
curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
	Elizabeth A. Earls, of Associated Oregon Industries, Salem,
filed the brief for amicus curiae Associated Oregon Industries.
	BALMER, J.
	Certified questions and additional question answered.
		This case is before the court on certified questions of
Oregon law from the United States District Court for the District
of Oregon under ORS 28.200 et seq. and ORAP 12.20.  See generally
Western Helicopter Services v. Rogerson Aircraft, 311 Or 361, 811
P2d 627 (1991) (discussing factors court considers in exercising
discretion to accept certified questions).  The certified
questions ask whether ORS 18.540, (1) which allocates 60 percent of
each punitive damages award in Oregon to the state's Criminal
Injuries Compensation Account, violates specified provisions of
the state constitution.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude
that it does not.
		We take the facts from the District Court certification
order.  A jury assessed punitive damages against defendants in
the amount of $550,000 for the wrongful use of civil proceedings
and fraudulent transfer of real property.  The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the jury's decision.  DeMendoza v. Huffman, 2001 WL
30084 (9th Cir Jan 8, 2001) (unpublished opinion).  Defendants
have abandoned further appeal, and the only issue remaining is
the proper distribution of the punitive damages award.
		On April 9, 2001, the District Court granted the
state's motion to intervene as a judgment creditor to assert the
state's claim under ORS 18.540 to a portion of the punitive
damages award.  Plaintiffs then challenged the constitutionality
of ORS 18.540 on multiple grounds, arguing that they were
entitled to the entire award.  Because Oregon appellate courts
have not previously decided whether, by allocating to the state a
60-percent share in punitive damage awards, ORS 18.540 violates
provisions of the state constitution, the District Court
certified to this court the following five questions:
		"1.  Does ORS 18.540 violate Article I, section
18, of the Oregon Constitution?
		"2.  Does ORS 18.540 violate Article IV, section
18, and Article IX, sections 1 and 3, of the Oregon
Constitution?
		"3.  Does ORS 18.540 violate the right to jury
trial protected by Article I, section 17, and Article
VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution?
		"4.  Does ORS 18.540 violate the 'remedy' or
'justice' clauses of Article I, section 10, of the
Oregon Constitution?
		"5.  Does ORS 18.540 violate the separation of
powers doctrine protected by Article III, section 1,
and Article VII (Amended), section 1, of the Oregon
Constitution?"
		We accepted certification of those questions and,
because the case involved state law claims that were tried in
federal court under that court's diversity jurisdiction, we added
an initial question of law:
		"Did the Oregon legislature contemplate the
application of ORS 18.540 in federal cases arising
under state law?"
See Western Helicopter Services, 311 Or at 370-71 (court has
discretion to reframe questions presented).  We begin with that
threshold question.
I.
		Since 1987, Oregon statutes have directed that a
portion of any punitive damages award be paid into a state fund
for victims of crime.  See Or Laws 1987, ch 774, § 3 (creating
state fund).  Codified at ORS 18.540, the legislature has amended
that so-called "split-recovery" statute several times, most
recently in 1997.  See Or Laws 1997, ch 73, § 1.  Plaintiffs
filed their complaint on September 25, 1995.  At that time, ORS
18.540 provided:
		"(1) Upon the entry of a verdict including an
award of punitive damages, the Department of Justice
shall become a judgment creditor as to the punitive
damages portion of the award to which the Criminal
Injuries Compensation Account is entitled pursuant to
paragraph (b) of this subsection, and the punitive
damage portion of an award shall be allocated as
follows:
		"(a) Forty percent shall be paid to the prevailing
party.  The attorney for the prevailing party shall be
paid out of the amount allocated under this paragraph,
in the amount agreed upon between the attorney and the
prevailing party.  However, in no event may more than
20 percent of the amount awarded as punitive damages be
paid to the attorney for the prevailing party.
		"(b) Sixty percent shall be paid to the Criminal
Injuries Compensation Account to be used for the
purposes set forth in ORS chapter 147.  However, if the
prevailing party is a public entity, the amount
otherwise payable to the Criminal Injuries Compensation
Account shall be paid to the general fund of the public
entity.
		"(2) The party preparing the proposed judgment
shall assure that the judgment identifies the judgment
creditors specified in subsection (1) of this section.
		"(3) Upon the entry of a verdict including an
award of punitive damages, the prevailing party shall
provide notice of the judgment to the Department of
Justice.  The notice shall be in writing and shall be
delivered to the Department of Justice within five days
after the entry of the verdict.
		"(4) Whenever a judgment includes both
compensatory and punitive damages, any payment on the
judgment by or on behalf of any defendant, whether
voluntary or by execution or otherwise, shall be
applied first to compensatory damages, costs and
court-awarded attorney fees awarded against that
defendant and then to punitive damages awarded against
that defendant unless all affected parties, including
the Department of Justice, expressly agree otherwise,
or unless that application is contrary to the express
terms of the judgment.
		"(5) Whenever any judgment creditor of a judgment
which includes punitive damages governed by this
section receives any payment on the judgment by or on
behalf of any defendant, the judgment creditor
receiving the payment shall notify the attorney for the
other judgment creditors and all sums collected shall
be applied as required by subsections (1) and (4) of
this section, unless all affected parties, including
the Department of Justice, expressly agree otherwise,
or unless that application is contrary to the express
terms of the judgment."
		As noted, we first must determine whether the Oregon
legislature contemplated that ORS 18.540 would apply in federal
cases arising under state law.  In that regard, plaintiffs
emphasize that the statute specifies, in part, a procedure by
which the state is "identified" as a judgment creditor.  See ORS
18.540(2).  Federal courts follow their own procedures, which do
not similarly provide for the identification of judgment
creditors.  See In re Stein, 236 BR 34, 37 (D Or 1999) (so
stating).  Therefore, plaintiffs argue, the legislature did not
intend ORS 18.540 to apply in federal courts, because the
application of that statute would impose a state rule of
procedure upon federal courts in violation of the Supremacy
Clause of the federal constitution.  See US Const, Art VI, cl 2; 
Finley v. Empiregas Inc. of Potosi, 28 F3d 782, 785 n 7 (8th Cir
1994) (refusing to enforce, as violation of Supremacy Clause,
state procedure requiring court clerks to notify state of final
judgment awarding punitive damages, when no "parallel provision"
existed in federal rules of procedure).
		As further support for their position, plaintiffs note
that the text of ORS 18.540 indicates that the split-recovery
provision would not apply to all punitive damage awards; rather,
it would apply only to "punitive damages governed by this
section."  ORS 18.540(5) (emphasis added).  According to
plaintiffs, that statement is evidence that the legislature
contemplated that some punitive damages awards -- including,
plaintiffs argue, those determined in federal courts -- are to be
excluded from the requirements of ORS 18.540.
		The state, in response, concedes that subsection (2) of
ORS 18.540 specifies a procedure and that federal courts
generally have been unwilling to adopt it.  See, e.g., Stein, 236
BR at 37 (noting that ORS 18.540(2) does not require federal
courts to identify state as judgment creditor, because that
provision "is procedural and does not apply to federal court
judgments").  However, the state contends that the legislature
nonetheless intended that other provisions of ORS 18.540 would
apply in federal cases arising under state law, including the
provisions that establish the state's substantive right to 60
percent of all punitive damages awards.
		We agree with the state.  Contrary to plaintiffs'
assertions, the legislature's intent with respect to ORS 18.540
as substantive law cannot be determined from the possibility that
procedural aspects of the statute may be inapplicable in federal
court.  ORS 18.540 unambiguously creates in the state a
substantive right as a judgment creditor to 60 percent of any
punitive damages award.  That right exists whether or not a
federal court lists the state as a judgment creditor under ORS
18.540(2), and, indeed, the state may enforce its right by other
means. (2)  For example, in this case, as in others, the Oregon
federal district court has recognized the state's ability to
intervene under FRCP 24 (3) to enforce its substantive rights under
ORS 18.540.  See Stein, 236 BR at 37 (noting that state may
become judgment creditor under ORS 18.540, even if not identified
as such in federal judgment).
		Legislative intent is derived, instead, from the
statute's text and context, PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), and the text
and context of ORS 18.540 provide no exception to the substantive
aspects of the statute in federal cases arising under state law. 
The absence of an exception is significant, because we may not,
as a general rule, "insert what has been omitted" in a statute. 
ORS 174.010.  Neither can we agree with plaintiffs that a
legislative intent to limit the application of ORS 18.540 in
federal cases can be inferred from the qualifying statement
contained in subsection (5), which, as noted, restricts
application to "punitive damages governed by this section."  ORS
18.540(5) (emphasis added).  Given a natural reading, that phrase
refers to punitive damages awards as to which the state becomes a
judgment creditor under ORS 18.540, in contrast to those punitive
damages awards that the statute itself excludes from its
coverage, such as those awarded to public entities.  See ORS
18.540(1)(b).  In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the
legislature contemplated that ORS 18.540 would apply in federal
cases arising under Oregon state law.
II.
		We turn to the issue whether ORS 18.540 violates the
five provisions of the Oregon Constitution that are presented in
the certified questions.  For organizational purposes, we begin
with the fourth certified question, which deals with the remedy
clause of Article I, section 10, as our analysis of that
provision provides background and support for our conclusions
with respect to the other certified questions.
A.  Remedy Clause
		Article I, section 10, provides that
	"[n]o court shall be secret, but justice shall be
administered, openly and without purchase, completely
and without delay, and every man shall have a remedy by
due course of law for injury done him in his person,
property, or reputation."
(Emphasis added.)  In Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or
83, 124, 23 P3d 333 (2001), this court examined in detail the
origin and meaning of the remedy clause, and held that, because
Article I, section 10, guarantees a remedy for any injury to
absolute common-law rights respecting person, property, or
reputation, the legislature does not have the authority to deny a
remedy for such injuries.  The conclusions about the remedy
clause outlined in Smothers define the inquiry necessary to
determine whether legislative action violates that constitutional
guarantee.  See Jensen v. Whitlow, ___ Or ___, ___, ___ P3d ___
(Aug 8, 2002) (slip op at 5-6) (so stating).  In accordance with
the analytical approach of Smothers, our first step, ordinarily,
is to determine whether the injury that plaintiffs have alleged
is one for which the remedy clause guarantees a remedy. 
Smothers, 332 Or at 124.  If so, then the next question is
whether the legislation at issue -- in this case, ORS 18.540 --
abolished that remedy without providing a constitutionally
adequate substitute.  Id.  
		In this case, the parties appear to agree that the
injury plaintiffs allege -- their underlying claims for wrongful
use of civil proceedings and fraudulent transfer of real property
-- are ones for which Article I, section 10, guarantees a remedy. 
The parties' dispute concerns whether the jury's punitive damages
award is part of that constitutionally protected remedy. 
Plaintiffs argue that the punitive damages award itself is a
remedy to which they are entitled under Article I, section 10,
and that, therefore, the legislature may not interfere with
plaintiffs' receipt of that award without providing a
constitutionally adequate substitute remedy. (4)  As we explain
below, a punitive damages award is not a "remedy" that Article I,
section 10, guarantees to a particular party for injury to
person, property, or reputation.
		This court previously examined whether Article I,
section 10, protects the availability of punitive damages awards
as a "remedy" in Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or 99, 118-19, 593 P2d 777
(1979).  There, the court's concern was whether the availability
of punitive damages awards in actions for defamation amounted to
a restraint of free speech in violation of Article I, section 8,
of the Oregon Constitution. (5)  Because, among other reasons, "the
threat of large damage recoveries can easily inhibit the exercise
of freedom of constitutionally protected expression, as well as
its abuse," the court was "convinced * * * that a proper
application of Article I[, section] 8, prohibit[ed] the award of
punitive damages in defamation cases, unless some other
constitutional provision require[d] that they be allowed."  Id.
at 119 (emphasis added).
		Turning to examine Article I, section 10, the court
concluded that that constitutional provision did not require the
availability of punitive damages because "'* * * such damages are
awarded by way of punishment to the offender and as a warning to
others, or according to some authorities, by way of example.'" 
Wheeler, 286 Or at 118 (quoting Martin v. Cambas, 134 Or 257,
261, 293 P 601 (1930)).  In other words, punitive damages were
"[not] necessary to compensate the plaintiff for injury to
reputation."  Wheeler, 286 Or at 118.  The court therefore
concluded that it is the right to recover compensation for
injuries suffered, not the punishment or deterrence that punitive
damages might provide, that is the "remedy" protected by Article
I, section 10.  Id. at 119 (citing Davidson v. Rogers, 281 Or
219, 222, 574 P2d 624 (1978) (Linde, J., concurring) (statute
that bars general damages for defamation, absent timely
retraction request, does not violate Article I, section 10).  See
also Hall v. May Dep't Stores Co., 292 Or 131, 145, 637 P2d 126
(1981) (remedy under Article I, section 10, "does not extend
beyond compensation for the injury to punishment or deterrence").
		Plaintiffs argue that the conclusions reached in
Wheeler were the result of a unique situation that required the
balancing of two competing constitutional interests.  They assert
that "Article I, [section] 10[,] did not require punitive damages
in defamation cases, because Article I[, section] 8[,] protected
free expression."  (Emphasis in plaintiffs' brief.)  However,
that interpretation of Wheeler is the opposite of what this court
stated in that case.  As explained above, the court in Wheeler
held that Article I, section 8, could be interpreted to bar
plaintiffs' recovery of punitive damages because Article I,
section 10, does not protect those damages as a remedy for
plaintiffs who suffer an injury to reputation.  Wheeler, 286 Or
at 118-19.  In other words, Wheeler suggests that Article I,
section 10, does not protect punitive damages awards generally,
and, with respect to this case, Wheeler thus supports the
conclusion that the state can, as it does under ORS 18.540,
appropriate portions of punitive damages awards in any case
without depriving plaintiffs of a constitutionally protected
remedy.
		Nevertheless, although we view the conclusions in
Wheeler to be relevant here with respect to Article I, section
10, in that case the court did not engage in as detailed an
analysis of the origins and meaning of the constitutional
provision as this court more recently has concluded is
appropriate.  See Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 415-16, 840 P2d
65 (1992) (setting out methodology for analyzing constitutional
provision).  For that reason, we choose to follow the inquiry set
out in this court's more recent case law.  However, in doing so,
we do not reject the conclusion that this court reached in
Wheeler.  Indeed, this court's holding in Wheeler is consistent
with the conclusion we reach here regarding Article I, section
10. 
		Under the analytical framework set out in Priest and
followed in Smothers, we address an original constitutional
provision on three levels:  "Its specific wording, the case law
surrounding it, and the historical circumstances that led to its
creation."  Priest, 314 Or at 415-16.  According to the state,
such an analysis reveals that the framers of Article I, section
10, viewed the purpose of punitive damages in Oregon as a means
of punishing a defendant for particularly egregious conduct and
deterring such conduct in the future.  In light of that dual
purpose, both aspects of which focus solely on vindicating
society's interests, the state contends that the framers did not
intend punitive damages to be a "remedy" protected by Article I,
section 10, because such damages were not necessary to compensate
a particular plaintiff for injury caused by the defendant's
conduct.  The state's position is consistent with the conclusions
that this court reached in Wheeler, and, for the reasons that
follow, it is correct.
	1.  Text
		We begin with an analysis of the text of Article I,
section 10.  Priest, 314 Or at 415-16.  As we noted above, the
remedy clause of that provision guarantees that persons whose
protected rights have been injured will have a means to seek
redress for such injuries.  Smothers, 332 Or at 119-20, 124. 
Significantly, the text of Article I, section 10, protects the
availability of a remedy "to every man" only for an "injury done
him in his person, property, or reputation."  (Emphasis added.) (6) 
Those words indicate that Article I, section 10, protects
punitive damages as a "remedy" only if those damages are a means
of restoring the rights of an injured party.  To determine
whether that is the case, we turn to an examination of the
historical circumstances surrounding the adoption of Article I,
section 10.  Priest, 314 Or at 415-16.
	2.  Historical Circumstances
		During the two decades before the drafting of Article
I, section 10, in 1857, two treatises appear to have had
particularly strong influence on the thinking surrounding the
subject of punitive damages:  Simon Greenleaf's Treatise on the
Law of Evidence, published in 1842, and Theodore Sedgwick's On
the Measure of Damages, published five years later, in 1847. 
References to those two legal works were pervasive in American
courts in the 1850s.  Based upon those references, we assume that
the framers of the Oregon Constitution were familiar with at
least some of the many cases dealing with punitive damages that
were decided under principles discussed in those treatises, even
if they were not directly familiar with the treatises
themselves. (7)  On that assumption, we turn to a review of the two
texts.
		When Greenleaf published his treatise on evidence in
1842, American courts had been awarding punitive damages to
plaintiffs for about 50 years, following a practice that had its
modern origins in late eighteenth-century England. (8)  In England,
a plaintiff typically could recover compensatory damages only for
tangible injuries to which an exact monetary value could be
attached.  Linda L. Schleuter &amp; Kenneth R. Redden, 1 Punitive
Damages § 1.3(C), 7 (4th ed 2000).  As a consequence, the
doctrine of punitive damages emerged from the English courts'
desire, in part, to compensate plaintiffs for intangible
injuries, such as mental anguish and insult caused by especially
egregious conduct, for which there was no available remedy.  Id.
§ 1.3(D) at 8. (9)  Unlike English courts, however, by the time
Greenleaf wrote his treatise, courts in America steadily had
expanded the notion of compensatory damages to cover intangible
injuries to such an extent that the idea of punitive damages
serving as additional compensation had begun to fade.  Id.
§ 1.4(A) at 15.  American courts instead justified punitive
damages solely as a means by which juries could punish and deter
defendants for egregious conduct.  Id. § 1.4(A) at 16.
		Greenleaf objected in his treatise that punitive
damages, stripped of any compensatory justification, were an
improper intrusion of a public interest into private disputes. 
See Simon Greenleaf, 2 A Treatise on the Law of Evidence § 253,
244 (3d ed 1850), reprinted in Morton J. Horowitz, ed., American
Law: The Formative Years (1972).  See also Michael Rustad &amp;
Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages
Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 Amer U L Rev 1269, 1298-1300 (1993) (reviewing Greenleaf's criticisms).  Greenleaf
asserted that
	"[d]amages are given as a compensation, recompense, or
satisfaction to the plaintiff, for an injury actually
received by him from the defendant.  They should be
precisely commensurate with the injury; neither more,
nor less; and this, whether it be to his person or
estate."
Greenleaf, 2 Law of Evidence § 253 at 244 (footnotes omitted). 
One of Greenleaf's practical concerns was that, by permitting
society to vindicate an interest in punishment and deterrence in
a private action, punitive damages threatened to expose a
defendant, who might still be subject to criminal prosecution or
fines, to double punishment.  Id. § 253 at 244 n 2, 250.
		In 1847, Sedgwick published the first edition of his
treatise on damages.  Rather than join Greenleaf in criticizing
the propriety of punitive damages, Sedgwick declared that, 
	"'wherever the elements of fraud, malice, gross
negligence, or oppression mingle in the controversy,
the law, instead of adhering to the system, or even the
language of compensation, adopts a wholly different
rule.  It permits the Jury to give what it terms
punitory, vindictive, or exemplary damages; in other
words, blends together the interest of society and of
the aggrieved individual, and gives damages not only to
recompense the sufferer, but to punish the offender.'"
Greenleaf, 2 Law of Evidence § 253 at 244 n 2 (quoting Theodore
Sedgwick, Sedgwick on Damages 39) (emphasis in Greenleaf). 
Sedgwick justified his views primarily on the ground of stare
decisis (indeed, Sedgwick conceded that, "were it a new
proposition, [punitive damages] would strike the Anglo-Saxon
lawyer as an absurdity" (10)), and he cited the many American and
English cases where courts had approved of punitive damages
awards in the past.  See Theodore Sedgwick, Sedgwick on the
Measure of Damages 525-32 (4th ed 1868) (hereinafter Sedgwick on
Damages (4th ed)).
		In subsequent editions of his treatise, Greenleaf
included a rejoinder to Sedgwick's statement of the law, pointing
out that, in each of the cases that Sedgwick had cited as
approving of punitive damages, the courts actually had used such
terms as "exemplary" or "vindictive" damages to refer to damages
for mental anguish, personal indignity, insult, or other injury. 
In other words, in Greenleaf's view, the courts improperly had
described as "exemplary" or "vindictive" damages what should have
been understood as compensatory damages for nontangible injuries. 
Greenleaf, Law of Evidence § 253 at 244 n 2, 249-50.  See also
Donald Paul Hodel, The Doctrine of Exemplary Damages in Oregon,
44 Or L Rev 175, 177 (1965) (reviewing Greenleaf's criticism). 
Greenleaf thus continued to insist that "true" punitive damages -- i.e., damages inflicted solely to punish and deter -- had no
doctrinal support.  See Rustad, 42 Amer U L Rev at 1299. 
Sedgwick subsequently modified his view of punitive damages to
omit any reference to a compensatory justification, but he
nonetheless continued to maintain that such damages were
warranted to "impose a punishment on the defendant and [to] hold
up an example to the community."  Sedgwick on Damages (4th ed) at
522.
		Courts in the 1850s frequently cited the conflict
between Greenleaf and Sedgwick in decisions involving punitive
damage awards. (11)  Although many acknowledged Greenleaf's
criticisms, only four states (Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska,
and Washington) ultimately rejected as improper the awarding of
punitive damages to punish a defendant in any case.  See Charles
T. McCormick, McCormick on Damages § 78, 278-79 (1935) (reviewing
extent of acceptance of punitive damages).  Most state courts
accepted Sedgwick's view that punitive damages, whether or not
conceptually satisfying, had become part of the law, based on
long-standing precedent. (12)  However, what is significant here is
not that Sedgwick's view ultimately prevailed in the majority of
states but, rather, the way in which Greenleaf and Sedgwick had
framed the debate -- namely, whether punitive damages were an
appropriate means of vindicating an interest of society.  Neither
writer asserted that punitive damages were necessary to vindicate
an interest of an injured plaintiff.
		In 1851, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged
that, although "the propriety of [the] doctrine [of punitive
damages had] been questioned by some writers," (undoubtedly
referring to Greenleaf, among others) the matter had been settled
as follows:
		"It is a well-established principle of the common
law, that in * * * all actions on the case for torts, a
jury may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive,
or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view
the enormity of his offense rather than the measure of
compensation to the plaintiff."
Day v. Woodworth, 54 US 363, 371, 13 How 363, 14 L Ed 181 (1851)
(emphasis added).  Day reflects the outcome of the Greenleaf-Sedgwick debate and illustrates the predominant view of punitive
damages in the years preceding the drafting of the Oregon
Constitution in 1857:  Punitive damages were imposed on
defendants as punishment and deterrence, not as a means of
compensating an injured party.
		Because it generally was understood that punitive
damages were not compensatory in nature, it is not surprising
that a plaintiff's receipt of those damages was not considered to
be an entitlement or a right.  Greenleaf, of course, because he
advocated the abolition of punitive damages, certainly did not
think so:
	"'* * * The criminal, by suffering in his goods, may be
discouraged or prevented from offending again[;] but a
design to discourage or prevent him from offending
again can be no ground for that person, whom he has
injured by offending once, to claim property in the
goods, which he is deprived of.  The ends of punishment
may be answered by taking the criminal's goods from
him[;] but these ends do not require, that the
property, which he loses, should be vested in the
person, whom he has injured.'"
Greenleaf, 2 Law of Evidence § 253 at 244 n 2, 254 (quoting T.
Rutherforth, 1 Rutherforth's Institutes of Natural Law 434
(1799)).  Sedgwick, on the other hand, believed that awarding
plaintiffs punitive damages was a benign and even helpful
practice:
	"[T]here is little practical harm in the injured party
getting more than actual compensation, if it be proper
that the offender should pay it.  There is a large
class of offences which society is slow in punishing. 
The community (or those who represent it in the
prosecution of such offenses), often fails to pursue
the offender, and he would too often escape unless
brought to justice by the determined effort which
springs from the personal sense of wrong.  A change in
the rule would therefore be, to a certain extent, an
irreparable loss to society."
Sedgwick on Damages (4th ed) at 532 n , 535 (emphasis added). 
Sedgwick never suggested, however, that a plaintiff was entitled
to receive punitive damages as a matter of right.
		To the contrary, several common-law principles,
endorsed by Sedgwick, among others, reinforced the idea that
punitive damages were not a right or entitlement.  First, it was
recognized as a general rule that a jury had the discretion to
refuse to award punitive damages, even if the plaintiff had
proved all facts in support of such an award.  See, e.g.,
Theodore Sedgwick, 1 Sedgwick on Damages § 387, 546 (8th ed 1891)
(hereinafter 1 Sedgwick on Damages (8th ed)) ("it is error to
instruct the jury to give exemplary damages, for the plaintiff
can never claim them as a matter of law").  See also Smith v.
Wade, 461 US 30, 52, 103 S Ct 1625, 75 L Ed 2d 632 (1983)
(because punitive damages are within jury's discretion, they "are
never awarded as of right, no matter how egregious the
defendant's conduct").  Second, courts refused to allow
plaintiffs to assert a claim for punitive damages, alone, as the
basis for an action.  See 1 Sedgwick on Damages (8th ed) § 361 at
525 (citing cases).  Finally, courts circumscribed plaintiffs'
ability to recover punitive damages in various circumstances
deemed inappropriate.  See, e.g., Francis Hilliard, The Law of
Remedies for Torts, or Private Wrongs § 17, 446 (1867) (citing
cases barring recovery when tortfeasor is deceased and, thus,
cannot be punished); 1 Sedgwick on Damages (8th ed) § 370 at 531
(citing cases barring recovery of punitive damages in breach of
contract cases).
		The foregoing historical circumstances indicate that,
around the time the Oregon Constitution was drafted in 1857, most
courts and commentators viewed punitive damages as a means by
which society could punish and deter egregious behavior and not
as a "remedy" for an injured party.  Furthermore, although
plaintiffs were acknowledged as the traditional beneficiaries of
those damages, plaintiffs could not claim those damages as a
matter of right or entitlement.  Having examined the text of the
remedy clause and historical evidence, our final step is to
examine Oregon case law to determine whether this court's rulings
are consistent with the notion that punitive damages are not a
"remedy" within the meaning of Article I, section 10.  See
Priest, 314 Or at 415-16.
	3.  Oregon Case Law
		Like the majority of courts in other states, the
earliest Oregon Supreme Court cases endorsed the view that juries
could award punitive damages in those cases in which the
defendant had injured the plaintiff "wilfully" or with "express
malice."  See Moore v. Floyd, 4 Or 101, 104 (1871) (in cases of
willful neglect, "exemplary damages might be recovered against
[defendant]").  See also Heneky v. Smith, 10 Or 349, 353 (1882);
Smith v. Harris, 7 Or 76, 77 (1879) (both holding same). 	However, the Oregon Supreme Court did not address the doctrine of
punitive damages meaningfully until 1885, when it decided
Sullivan v. Oregon Ry. &amp; Nav. Co., 12 Or 392, 7 P 508 (1885). 
There, this court stated:
	"It has in many instances been seriously questioned
whether exemplary or punitive damages could properly be
allowed in any private action.  It would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to give any good reason
for such allowance, since the rule giving actual
damages has been so liberally construed; but, however
that may be, it seems to have attached itself to our
jurisprudence, and we are made recipients of its
benefits and compelled to endure the hardships it
imposes. * * * When the conduct of a person has been
wilful, malicious, and wanton or reckless, and an
injury has resulted to another in consequence of it, a
jury might, with a semblance of reason, in an action to
recover damages for such injury, assess something more
than a mere compensatory sum therefor.  That course,
doubtless, would have a salutary effect in two
respects: would visit the wrong-doer with wholesome
punishment, and afford an example calculated to deter
others from the commission of malevolent acts[.]"
Id. at 404.  
		Thus, in Sullivan, based upon the principle of stare
decisis, this court accepted the doctrine of punitive damages as
a means of punishment and deterrence.  This court never has
articulated any other rationale for the doctrine.  See, e.g.,
Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co., 310 Or 206, 210, 797 P2d
1019 (1990) ("Punitive damages are not a substitute for
compensatory awards nor an offset against litigation expense."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)); Lane County v. Wood, 298 Or
191, 203, 691 P2d 473 (1984) ("Punitive damages are not to
compensate an injured party, but to give bad actors a legal
spanking."); Noe v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 248 Or 420, 425, 435
P2d 306 (1967) ("Punitive damages can only be justified on the
theory of determent.").  See also Hodel, 44 Or L Rev at 182 ("No
Oregon case has been found which approves of the idea that
exemplary damages are allowed to give the plaintiff revenge, and
no cases assert the compensatory function of exemplary damages as
a justification for their award.").  Furthermore, Oregon courts
viewed the punitive and deterrent effect of punitive damages as
vindicating interests of society in general, and not of any
plaintiff in particular.  See, e.g., Stroud v. Denny's
Restaurant, 271 Or 430, 437, 532 P2d 790 (1975); Noe, 248 Or at
425 (both so stating).  
		Consistent with those views, this court never has
recognized punitive damages as an entitlement or right protected
by the Oregon Constitution.  For example, in Osmun v. Winters, 25
Or 260, 268, 35 P 250 (1894), this court held that "'the question
whether [exemplary damages] shall be given or not is one for the
jury, and it is erroneous to instruct the jury to give exemplary
damages, for the plaintiff can never recover them as a matter of
law.'"  (Quoting Jacobs v. Sire, 23 NYS 1063, 1064 (NY Super
1893)) (emphasis added).  See also Hall, 292 Or at 146 ("Where
such damages beyond any actual injury are allowable, the
plaintiff collects them as a form of public punishment, not by
virtue of a personal entitlement to compensation."); State ex
rel. Young v. Crookham, 290 Or 61, 71-72, 618 P2d 1268 (1980)
("The issue in determining punitive damages is not who will share
what with whom, but the sufficiency of the deterrent effect of
punitive damages on the defendant."); Van Lom v. Schneiderman,
187 Or 89, 108, 210 P2d 461 (1949) ("[T]he jury has entire
discretion to refrain from giving any punitive damages at all
even though all the elements of malicious and damaging misconduct
may have been established."); Lane v. Schilling et al., 130 Or
119, 127, 279 P 267 (1929) (plaintiff receives "exemplary damages
to which he is not entitled as a matter of right and
compensation").
		Courts and commentators nonetheless have advanced a
number of reasons why plaintiffs should receive punitive damages
awards.  One of the more common arguments, articulated by
Sedgwick among others, is that the prospect of receiving punitive
damages provides an incentive for plaintiffs to "prosecute"
claims that the state otherwise would not pursue, i.e., to act as
so-called "private attorneys general."  See Sedgwick on Damages
(4th ed) at 532 fn , 535 (discussing punitive damages as
inducement to pursue claims); Hodel, 44 Or L Rev at 182 (same).  
Indeed, for that reason this court has noted the "utility" of
punitive damages.  See Crookham, 290 Or at 68-69 (discussing
rationales for multiple awards of punitive damages against single
wrongdoer for a single wrongful act).  That rationale for
awarding punitive damages also is consistent with the underlying
purpose of punitive damages as serving a societal interest.
		As the cases previously discussed demonstrate, this
court for more than a century has affirmed the usefulness of
punitive damages as a means to punish and deter wrongful conduct. 
We also have recognized the "desirability" of awarding punitive
damages to plaintiffs to provide an incentive to bring claims
against wrongdoers.  Crookham, 290 Or at 68.  However, the extent
of that incentive is a matter of common-law adjudication or
policy, and this court never has viewed it as a constitutional
entitlement under Article I, section 10.  As such, like other
nonconstitutional issues of law, the allocation of punitive
damages may be changed by the legislature.  "[O]rdinarily, the
creation of law for reasons of public policy * * * is a task
assigned to the legislature, not to the courts."  Bennett v.
Farmers Ins. Co. of Or., 332 Or 138, 149, 26 P3d 785 (2001).
		To summarize, although this court's first discussions
of punitive damages awards are not precisely contemporaneous with
the drafting of the Oregon Constitution in 1857, they contain
some of the earliest expressions of the purpose and nature of
punitive damages in the state.  When taken together with the
historical circumstances surrounding the drafting of Article I,
section 10, they lead us to conclude that punitive damages were
understood as a means of vindicating society's interest in
punishing and deterring especially egregious conduct, rather than
as "a means for seeking redress for injury" to person, property
or reputation.  Accordingly, we hold that ORS 18.540 does not
deprive plaintiffs of a remedy protected under Article I, section
10, by allocating part of punitive damages awards to the state. 
B.  The Right to Jury Trial
		We next address the certified question whether ORS
18.540 violates plaintiffs' right to a jury trial as guaranteed
by Article I, section 17, and Article VII (Amended), section 3,
of the Oregon Constitution.  We begin with Article I, section 17,
which provides that "[i]n all civil cases the right of trial by
jury shall remain inviolate."  
		In Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 329 Or 62, 78, 987
P2d 463 (1999), this court concluded that a statutory cap on
noneconomic compensatory damages was unconstitutional because, in
a civil action to which the right to a jury trial attached in
1857, Article I, section 17, "prohibits the legislature from
interfering with the full effect of a jury's assessment of
noneconomic damages[.]"  Plaintiffs rely on Lakin to argue that
the distributive scheme of ORS 18.540 similarly is
unconstitutional under Article I, section 17, because that scheme
acts like a "cap" in preventing a plaintiff from receiving the
full amount of a jury's punitive damages award.
		We disagree with plaintiffs.  As we explained in Jensen
v. Whitlow, ___ Or ___, ___, ___ P3d ___ (Aug 8, 2002) (slip op
at 12):
	"Article I, section 17, is not a source of law that
creates or retains a substantive claim or a theory of
recovery in favor of any party.  Instead, * * * Article
I, section 17, simply 'guarantees a jury trial in civil
actions for which the common law provided a jury trial
when the Oregon Constitution was adopted in 1857[.]' 
Lakin, 329 Or at 82 (citing Molodyh v. Truck Insurance
Exchange, 304 Or 290, 744 P2d 992 (1987)).  The right
to pursue a 'civil action,' if it exists, must arise
from some source other than Article I, section 17[.]"
(Citations omitted; emphasis added.)  Likewise, if a "right" to
receive an award that reflects the jury's determination of the
amount of punitive damages exists, then it must arise from some
source other than Article I, section 17.  For example, in Lakin,
the plaintiffs' rights under Article I, section 17, were
violated, because the cap on noneconomic compensatory damages
interfered with the plaintiffs' "right to receive an award that
reflect[ed] the jury's factual determination of the amount of the
damages" that would "'* * * fully compensate [plaintiffs] for all
loss and injury to [them].'"  329 Or at 81 (quoting Oliver v.
North Pacific Transportation Co., 3 Or 84, 87-88 (1869)).  Here,
in contrast, plaintiffs have no underlying "right to receive an
award" that reflects the jury's determination of the amount of
punitive damages, nor are those damages necessary to "compensate"
plaintiffs for a "loss or injury [to them]."  ___ Or at ___ (slip
op at 28) (no right to punitive damages as remedy under Article
I, section 10).  Because plaintiffs lack that right, the
legislature's allocation of a portion of the punitive damages
award to the state does not implicate Article I, section 17. 
		We next turn to address Article VII (Amended), section
3, which provides that "no fact tried by a jury shall be
otherwise re-examined in any court of this state * * *." 
Although plaintiffs have no constitutionally protected right to
punitive damages, those damages often are available, and the jury
is allowed to determine the appropriate amount.  This court has
held that, under Article VII (Amended), section 3, the assessment
of punitive damages is a determination of fact for the jury. 
See, e.g., Van Lom v. Schneiderman, 187 Or 89, 110-11, 210 P2d
461 (1949), overruled in part on other grounds by Oberg v. Honda
Motor, Ltd., 320 Or 544, 888 P2d 8 (1995).  The effect of ORS
18.540, however, is not to modify a jury's assessment of punitive
damages, but, instead, to modify the way in which those damages
are distributed.
		The distribution of punitive damages is not a factual
determination that a jury makes.  This court suggested that
conclusion in Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co., 310 Or 206,
797 P2d 1019 (1990).  There, this court addressed the question
whether it was error to inform a jury "that a portion of any
punitive damages award would be used to pay the plaintiff's
attorney or to contribute to a worthy cause, such as help for
victims of crime," under ORS 18.540.  Id. at 211.  The court
concluded that "a jury should be told nothing concerning the
distribution of an award of punitive damages," id. at 208
(emphasis added), and that, in fact, it is reversible error if a
trial court provides any information to a jury "as to how the law
require[s] any award of punitive damages to be distributed," id.
at 211.  As this court stated in State ex rel Young v. Crookham,
290 Or 61, 71-72, 618 P2d 1268 (1980), "[t]he issue in
determining punitive damages is not who will share what with
whom, but the sufficiency of the deterrent effort of punitive
damages on the defendant."  Thus, because ORS 18.540 concerns the
distribution of a punitive damages award only, it does not
require a court to reexamine any factual determination that a
jury might have made.  Accordingly, we conclude that ORS 18.540
does not violate Article VII (Amended), section 3.
C.  Takings and Tax Claims
		We address together the certified questions whether ORS
18.540 constitutes a taking of property without compensation in
violation of Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution,
or whether that statute constitutes a revenue bill or tax in
violation of Article IV, section 18, and Article IX, sections 1
and 3, of the Oregon Constitution. (13)  With respect to both
issues, plaintiffs assert that they have a vested property right
in the punitive damages awarded in this case.  Therefore, they
argue that ORS 18.540 either constitutes a taking of, or a tax
on, their property.  The state argues that plaintiffs' claims
have no merit because plaintiffs never acquired a vested property
interest in that portion of the punitive damages award that ORS
18.540 reserved for the Criminal Injuries Compensation Account. 
Again, we agree with the state and, as a consequence, also
conclude, with respect to the certified questions, that ORS
18.540 does not violate Article I, section 18, Article IV,
section 18, or Article IX, sections 1 or 3.
		Article I, section 18, provides that "[p]rivate
property shall not be taken for public use * * * without just
compensation[.]"  Although this court has held that "a judgment
is personal property, giving rise to vested rights which the
legislature cannot, by retroactive law, either destroy or
diminish in value," State ex rel. Weingart v. Kiessenbeck, 167 Or
25, 30, 114 P2d 147 (1941), this case does not involve the
retroactive diminishment in value of a vested judgment.  The
statute at issue, ORS 18.540, took effect before plaintiffs filed
their complaint and, from the outset, subjected any potential
judgment for punitive damages to partial defeasance "upon the
entry of a verdict."  The question is whether a vested property
right in a punitive damages award can accrue before entry of a
final judgment for the purposes of Article I, section 18.  The
answer is that it cannot.
		As we explained previously in this opinion, a plaintiff
has no right or entitlement to punitive damages as a remedy under
Article I, section 10, and, as a result, the jury has complete
discretion not to award punitive damages, even if a plaintiff
successfully proves all elements of a claim.  See ___ Or at ___
(slip op at 25-26).  Consequently, before entry of a final
judgment, a plaintiff in Oregon always has had, at most, an
expectation of such an award.  Moreover, in this case, in which
the tort that gave rise to plaintiffs' claim occurred after ORS
18.540 was enacted, plaintiffs cannot credibly argue that they
had any expectation interest in the portion of the punitive
damages award that the statute directs to the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Account.  "'A vested right must be something more
than a mere expectation based upon the anticipated continuance of
existing laws; it must have become a title legal or equitable to
the present or future enjoyment of property.'"  Coshun v.
Hurlburt et al., 102 Or 240, 243, 201 P 870 (1921) (quoting
Black, Constitutional Law 430).  We therefore hold that
plaintiffs do not have a vested prejudgment property right in
punitive damages. (14)
		Plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary are not
persuasive.  They cite no Oregon case law in support of their
claim that punitive damages are the property of plaintiffs before
judgment.  Instead, they first rely upon two United States
Supreme Court decisions that, in their view, provide some
authority for the proposition that a property right protected by
the "takings" clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution may vest in a party to an action at a time before
the property comes into existence or is subject to state control. 
In Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 US 156, 118 S Ct
1925, 141 L Ed 2d 174 (1998), and Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,
Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 US 155, 101 S Ct 446, 66 L Ed 2d 358
(1980), the Supreme Court concluded that the owners of funds
deposited with state entities had a property right in the future
interest earned on those funds, if and when it accrued.  See
Phillips, 524 US at 172 (with respect to funds deposited with
state-adopted lawyer trust account program); Webb's, 449 US at
161-62 (with respect to interpleader funds deposited with
courts).  Plaintiffs urge this court to apply similar reasoning
to find a property right in a future punitive damages award under
Article I, section 18, if and when a jury decides to include such
an award in a verdict.
		We do not consider Webb's and Phillips to be relevant
here.  As those cases emphasize, "the existence of a property
interest is determined by reference to 'existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law.'"  Phillips, 524 US at 164 (quoting Board of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth, 408 US 564, 577, 92 S Ct 2701, 2709, 33 L
Ed 2d 548 (1972)).  See also Webb's, 449 US at 161 (stating
same).  In both Webb's and Phillips, the Supreme Court grounded
its recognition of a property right in the "interest follows
principal" rule, which "ha[d] been established under English
common law since at least the mid-1700's," and was "firmly
embedded in the common law of the various States."  Phillips, 524
US at 165.  Put another way, the Supreme Court held that interest
earned on principal was "private property" subject to a takings
claim only because it was a "traditional property interest[] long
recognized under state law."  Id. at 167.  In contrast, as we
have explained, there is no "long-recognized" private property
interest in an Oregon punitive damages award before judgment; it
always has been, at most, an expectation. (15)
		Plaintiffs next rely upon Kirk v. Denver Publishing
Co., 818 P2d 262, 270-72 (Colo 1991), in which the Supreme Court
of Colorado concluded that a plaintiff possessed a vested
property right to a punitive damages award in its entirety and
that Colorado's split-recovery statute, which would have
allocated one third of that award to a state general fund,
amounted to an unconstitutional taking under the state and
federal constitutions. (16)  The Kirk decision, however, is
distinguishable from this case.  There, the court emphasized that
Colorado's split-recovery statute "affirmatively disavowed" any
state interest in the judgment before payment becoming due. 
Kirk, 818 P2d at 272.  The court then concluded that such a
repudiation "affirmatively belie[d] any notion that the judgment
creditor's property interest in the judgement [was] less than
total."  Id. at 272.  In other words, "[Colorado's] asserted
interest [was] not in the judgment itself but in the monies
collected on the judgment, and that interest [arose] only at a
point in time after the judgment creditor's property interest in
the judgment ha[d] vested by operation of law."  Id. (emphasis
added).
		Regardless of our view of the soundness of the
conclusions in Kirk, (17) unlike the split-recovery statute at issue
in that case, ORS 18.540 does not disavow an interest in a
judgment for punitive damages until monies are collected. 
Rather, it asserts that the state has an interest immediately
"upon entry of a verdict."  Contrary to plaintiffs' contentions,
that is a significant distinction that the Kirk majority itself
acknowledged.  See Kirk, 818 P2d at 272 (without statutory
repudiation of state interest in judgment, split-recovery statute
"might be read to defeat any reasonable economic expectation on
the part of the judgment creditor to the total judgment"). 
Oregon's split-recovery statute never allows a plaintiff to
obtain a "reasonable economic expectation" of a punitive damages
award in its entirety.  Thus, there is no ground similar to that
in Kirk upon which to conclude that a plaintiff obtains a vested
property right in a punitive damages award. (18)
		Plaintiffs' other arguments in support of their
position are not well taken.  We conclude that a party never
obtains a prejudgment property interest in a punitive damages
award and, therefore, that ORS 18.540, by allocating 60 percent
of such an award to the state, is not "taking" private property
without compensation in violation of Article I, section 18, of
the Oregon Constitution.  It also follows from that conclusion
that ORS 18.540 is neither a tax in violation of Article IX,
sections 1 and 3, see Perry v. State Tax Commission, 245 Or 483,
486, 422 P2d 578 (1967) (property not subject to taxes if not
"held" by person with possession or right to possession of
property), nor a revenue bill enacted in violation of Article IV,
section 18, see Northern Counties Trust v. Sears, 30 Or 388, 401-02, 41 P 931 (1895) (characterizing revenue bill as one that
imposes tax on property). (19)
D.  Separation of Powers
		The final certified question asks whether ORS 18.540
interferes with the judiciary in violation of the separation of
powers provisions of Article III, section 1, and Article VII
(Amended), section 1, of the Oregon Constitution.  
		Article III, section 1, provides, in part:
	"The powers of the Government shall be divided
into three seperate (sic) departments, the Legislative,
the Executive, including the administrative, and
Judicial; and no person charged with official duties
under one of these departments, shall exercise any of
the functions of another, except as in this
Constitution expressly provided."
Article VII (Amended), section 1, provides, in part:
	"The judicial power of the state shall be vested
in one supreme court and in such other courts as may
from time to time be created by law."
		Article III (Amended), section 1, is violated if "a
'person' or member of one department is exercising a function of
another department of government."  Circuit Court v. AFSCME, 295
Or 542, 547, 669 P2d 314 (1983).  Article VII, section 1, is
implicated when "some other department of government, by
legislation or otherwise, prevents or obstructs the courts'
exercise of its judicial power."  Id.
		Plaintiffs assert that, by requiring courts to list the
state as a judgment creditor under ORS 18.540, the legislature
has violated both the foregoing provisions by interfering with a
judicial function, specifically, the obligation to enter a
judgment "consistent with a jury's verdict."  We disagree.  As
this court explained in AFSCME, 
	"[t]here can be no question that the legislature may
enact laws prescribing the exercise of judicial powers. 
'The rule has evolved that legislation can affect [the
courts] so long as it does not unduly burden or
substantially interfere with the judiciary.'"
295 Or at 549 (quoting Sadler v. Oregon State Bar, 275 Or 279,
285, 550 P2d 1218 (1976)).  "Only an outright hindrance of a
court's ability to adjudicate a case * * * or the substantial
destruction of the exercise of a power essential to the
adjudicatory function" will render legislation constitutionally
defective under Article VII (Amended), section 1.  Id. at 551. 
		By setting out a distributive scheme for punitive
damages awards in ORS 18.540, the legislature has not interfered
impermissibly with the adjudication of plaintiffs' claims.  As we
explained in the previous section, the distribution of punitive
damages is not a matter within a jury's discretion or, even, a
matter that it considers.  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 31-32).  As
it has done in other areas of the law, by enacting ORS 18.540 the
legislature has established reasonable guidelines for courts to
follow in the exercise of their duties.  See, e.g., State ex rel
Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597, 614, 932 P2d 1145, cert den 522
US 994 (1997) (mandatory minimum sentences do not violate
separation of powers); State ex rel Ray Wells, Inc. v.
Hargreaves, 306 Or 610, 615 n 2, 761 P2d 1306 (1988) (legislature
did not perform judicial function when it enacted judge
disqualification statutes); Nendel v. Meyers, 162 Or 661, 664, 94
P2d 680 (1939) (statute requiring court to decide motion for new
trial within 55 days does not violate separation of powers).
III.  CONCLUSION
		For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the
legislature contemplated that ORS 18.540 would apply in federal
cases arising under state law and that the statute does not
violate Article I, sections 10, 17 or 18; Article III, section 1;
Article IV, section 18; Article VII (Amended), sections 1 or 3;
or Article IX, sections 1 or 3, of the Oregon Constitution.
		Certified questions and additional question answered.



1. 	The text of ORS 18.540 (1995) is set out post, ___ Or
at ___ (slip op at 3-4).  The parties agree that the 1995 version
of the statute, which was in force when plaintiffs filed their
complaint, is the version at issue here.  The statute was amended
in 1997, see Or Laws 1997, ch 73, § 1, but those amendments are
not relevant to our discussion of the certified questions in this
case.  All future references to ORS 18.540 in this opinion are to
the 1995 version of that statute.

2. 	Finley v. Empiregas Inc. of Potosi, 28 F3d 782 (8th Cir
1994), cited by plaintiffs, is not to the contrary.  In that
case, the court concluded that the text of Missouri's split-recovery statute explicitly prohibited the state from intervening
to assert an interest in a punitive damages award.  Id. at 785. 
See Mo Ann Stat § 537.675(3) (Vernon 2000) ("The state of
Missouri shall have no interest in or right to intervene at any
stage of any judicial proceeding under this section.").  ORS
18.540 contains no such prohibition. 

3. 	FRCP 24(a) provides:
		"Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted
to intervene in an action * * * when the applicant
claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and the
applicant is so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the
applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless
the applicant's interest is adequately represented by
existing parties."

4. 	Plaintiffs present additional arguments that the
availability of punitive damages is required under Article I,
section 10, to ensure that justice is administered "without
purchase."  That phrase "means simply that justice shall not be
bought with bribes, nor shall the attendant or incidental
expenses of litigation, in the nature of costs and disbursements,
be so exorbitant and onerous as to virtually close the doors of
courts of justice to those who may have occasion to enter there." 
Bailey v. Frush, 5 Or 136, 138 (1873).  We reject without further
discussion the notion that, by allocating punitive damages to the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Account, ORS 18.540 violates that
aspect of Article I, section 10.

5. 	Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides:
	"No law shall be passed restraining the free expression
of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write,
or print freely on any subject whatever; but every
person shall be responsible for the abuse of this
right."

6. 	As this court stated in Smothers, 332 Or at 90, we
interpret "every man" in Article I, section 10, to mean every
person.

7. 	We note that citations to both Greenleaf's and
Sedgwick's treatises appear in the earliest volumes of the Oregon
reports, including decisions that predate the drafting of the
Oregon Constitution in 1857.  See, e.g., Bequette v. The People's
Trans. Co., 2 Or 200, 201 (1867) (citing Sedgwick); Pratt v.
King, 1 Or 49, 50 (Or Terr 1853) (citing Greenleaf).

8. 	For more extensive discussions of the origins of the
modern doctrine of punitive damages in England and its subsequent
development in America, see generally Linda L. Schleuter &amp;
Kenneth R. Redden, 1 Punitive Damages 1-16 (4th ed 2000); Donald
Paul Hodel, The Doctrine of Exemplary Damages in Oregon, 44 Or L
Rev 175, 176-178 (1965).

9. 	See, e.g., Tullidge v. Wade, 95 Eng Rep 909, 910 (KB
1769) (justifying punitive damages on ground that "the
circumstances of time and place, when and where the insult is
given requires different damages, as it is a greater insult to be
beaten upon the Royal Exchange than in a private room").

10. 	Theodore Sedgwick, Sedgwick on the Measure of Damages
532 n , 535 (4th ed 1868).  Sedgwick went so far as to concede
in later editions of his treatise that Greenleaf and other
opponents of the doctrine of punitive damages "have maintained,
what is perfectly true, that it is an exceptional or anomalous
doctrine, at variance with the general rule of compensation;
hence that, logically, it is wrong."  Theodore Sedgwick, 1
Sedgwick on Damages § 353, 515 (8th ed 1891).

11. 	See, e.g., St. Peter's v. Harvey Beach, 26 Conn 355,
1857 WL 960 (1857); Fowler v. Sergeant, 1 Grant 355, 1856 WL 6922
(Pa 1856); Black v. The Carollton Railroad Co., 10 La Ann 33,
1855 WL 113 (1855); Fry v. Bennett, 1 Abb Pr 289, 1855 WL 6398
(NY Sup 1855); McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis 424, 1854 WL 3450
(1854); Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind 322, 1854 WL 3361 (1854); True &amp;
ux. v. Plumley, 36 Me 466, 1853 WL 2042 (1853).

12. 	Not every state acceded quietly.  See, e.g., Fay v.
Parker, 53 NH 342, 350-62, 1872 WL 4394 (1872), comparing the
doctrine of punitive damages to a physical deformity:
	"It was once said, 'If thy right eye offend thee, pluck
it out; * * and if thy right hand offend thee, cut it
off.'  Wherefore, not reluctantly should we apply the
knife to this deformity, concerning which every true
member of the sound and healthy body of the law may
well exclaim, -- 'I have no need of thee.'"

13. 	  We note that plaintiffs conceded at oral argument
that, if this court determined that punitive damages awards were
not a "remedy" protected under Article I, section 10, then those
damages did not qualify as "property" subject to a takings claim. 
Nonetheless, we address the arguments presented in plaintiffs'
brief to answer fully the questions that the district court
certified.

14. 	We note that cases in other jurisdictions agree that a
party has no vested property right in a claim for punitive
damages until judgment is entered.  See, e.g., Fust v. Missouri,
947 SW2d 424, 431 (Mo 1997) (rejecting takings challenge to
split-recovery statute on ground that plaintiff has no vested
property interest in punitive damages claim); Mack Trucks, Inc.
v. Conkle et al., 263 Ga 539, 544, 436 SE2d 635, 639 (1993) ("A
plaintiff has no vested property right in the amount of punitive
damages which can be awarded in any case[.]"); Gordon v. State,
608 So 2d 800, 801-02 (Fl 1992) ("'The right to have punitive
damages assessed is not property; and it is the general rule
that, until a judgment is rendered, there is no vested right in a
claim for punitive damages. * * *'"); Shepherd Components, Inc.
v. Brice Petrides-Donohue &amp; Assoc., 473 NW2d 612, 619 (Iowa 1991)
("[P]laintiff did not have a vested right to punitive damages
prior to the entry of a judgment."); Smith v. Hill, 12 Ill 2d
588, 595, 147 NE2d 321, 325 (1958) (no right to punitive damages
"until a vested property right attaches to them through a
judgment"); Louisville &amp; Nashville R.R. v. Street, 164 Ala 155,
51 So 306, 307 (1909) (no property right in punitive damages
award); Osborn v. Leach, 135 NC 628, 47 SE 811, 813 (NC 1904)
(punitive damages awarded "on grounds of public policy" and are
"therefore not property").

15. 	Plaintiffs' suggested interpretation of the holdings in
Webb's and Phillips in a manner that restricts the ability of
states to regulate punitive damages also is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's traditional deference to state legislatures in
that regard.  See, e.g., Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc., 532 US 424, 433, 121 S Ct 1678, 149 L Ed 2d 674 (2001)
("legislatures enjoy broad discretion in authorizing and limiting
permissible punitive damages awards"); BMW of North America, Inc.
v. Gore, 517 US 559, 568, 116 S Ct 1589, 134 L Ed 2d 809 (1996)
("States necessarily have considerable flexibility in determining
the level of punitive damages that they will allow in different
classes of cases and in any particular case."); Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 US 1, 39, 111 S Ct 1032, 113 L
Ed 2d 1 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("State legislatures and
courts have the power to restrict or abolish the common-law
practice of punitive damages[.]").

16. 	At issue in Kirk was former Colo Rev Stat § 13-21-102(4) (1987) (repealed 1995), which stated:
		"One-third of all reasonable damages collected
pursuant to this section shall be paid into the state
general fund.  The remaining two-thirds of such damages
collected shall be paid to the injured party.  Nothing
in this subsection (4) shall be construed to give the
general fund any interest in the claim for exemplary
damages or in the litigation itself at any time prior
to payment becoming due."

17. 	Like the Supreme Court of Missouri, we do not agree
with "the implicit conclusion in Kirk that a plaintiff has a
greater property interest in a judgment upon a tort claim than
the interest recognized by law when the claim accrued."  Fust v.
Missouri, 947 SW2d 424, 431 (Mo 1997).  See also Gordon v. State,
585 So 2d 1033, 1036 (Fla App 1991) ("where an existing statute
provides that funds recovered under it are subject to a prior
claim, a party cannot thereafter obtain a vested right to that
claim"). 

18. 	We also note that, given the unique provisions of the
split-recovery statute at issue, Kirk stands alone among state
supreme court decisions in striking down a split-recovery statute
as an unconstitutional taking.  See Fust v. Missouri, 947 SW2d
424, 431 (Mo 1997); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle et al., 263 Ga
539, 544, 436 SE2d 635, 639 (1993); Gordon v. State, 608 So 2d
800, 801-02 (Fl 1992); Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice
Petrides-Donohue &amp; Assoc., 473 NW2d 612, 619 (Iowa 1991) (all
upholding split-recovery statutes against takings challenges).

19. 	Article IX, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides:
		"The Legislative Assembly shall, and the people
through the initiative may, provide by law uniform
rules of assessment and taxation.  All taxes shall be
levied and collected under general laws operating
uniformly throughout the State."
Article IX, section 3, of the Oregon Constitution, further
provides that "[n]o tax shall be levied except in accordance with
law."
		Article IV, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides:
		"Bills may originate in either house, but may be
amended, or rejected in the other; except that bills
for raising revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives."