Title: People v. Caballero
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 88784
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 18, 2002

Docket No. 88784-Agenda 3-January 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
								JUAN CABALLERO, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 18, 2002.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Late on a February night in 1979, three teenaged boys left an
all-night diner in Chicago. On their way out of the restaurant, one
of them approached a group of four others in an attempt to
purchase marijuana. Not knowing that the four were members of
the Latin Kings, he falsely claimed membership in a rival gang, the
Latin Eagles. Before the night was over, the three were lured into
an alley and murdered.
	Three of the four killers, defendant, Luis Ruiz, and Placido
LaBoy, were apprehended within days, but LaBoy was released
after a preliminary hearing for lack of probable cause. Defendant
and Ruiz were both tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. The
fourth, Nelson Aviles, fled to California, where he was eventually
arrested in 1988. He agreed to plead guilty and to testify against
LaBoy, in return for a sentence of 40 years' imprisonment. The
State unsuccessfully sought the death penalty for LaBoy, who
received three consecutive natural life sentences.
	This is the fifth occasion we have had to consider whether
defendant was properly sentenced to death for his involvement in
the brutal slayings of Michael Salcido, Arthur Salcido, and Frank
Mussa. On direct appeal, this court affirmed his convictions of
murder, armed violence, and unlawful restraint and the imposition
of the death sentence. People v. Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d 23 (1984)
(Caballero I). Following the circuit court's dismissal of
defendant's first post-conviction petition, this court affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on
defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
properly prepare and present evidence in mitigation. People v.
Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248 (1989) (Caballero II). On remand, the
circuit court held the required hearing and again dismissed
defendant's claim. We affirmed. People v. Caballero, 152 Ill. 2d 347 (1992) (Caballero III). Defendant's second post-conviction
petition claimed that his death sentence is unconstitutionally
disproportionate to the sentences imposed on Aviles and LaBoy.
The circuit court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary
hearing. We rejected his claim as to Aviles, on the basis that
Aviles' guilty plea justifies the substantial disparity in their
sentences. As to LaBoy, however, we reversed in part and
remanded to the circuit court for a hearing. People v. Caballero,
179 Ill. 2d 205 (1997) (Caballero IV). The circuit court held the
required hearing and rejected defendant's claim.
	Defendant raises two claims in the present appeal: (1) his
constitutional right to due process was violated because he did not
receive a full and fair hearing before the circuit court on remand,
and (2) his death sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate to
LaBoy's life sentences. In addition, we granted leave to the United
Mexican States to submit a brief amicus curiae. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.
We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Caballero Trial and Sentencing
	At defendant's trial, the State was permitted to introduce
evidence of a statement made by defendant on the night of his
arrest. Defendant denied making the statement, claiming that he
was beaten by two police officers and threatened with more
beatings if he did not sign a written statement that they placed in
front of him. The State's witnesses testified that when defendant
was told by the investigating officer that Ruiz had already made a
statement implicating him, he gave his own version of the killings.
He was advised of his rights and a court reporter took his
statement, which he voluntarily signed.
	Defendant's written statement said that he, Ruiz, LaBoy, and
Aviles were entering a restaurant called King Castle as three other
young men were leaving. One of them, Michael, approached Ruiz
and asked if he knew where they could buy some marijuana. After
Ruiz said no, Michael asked if he knew Juan Cortez. The four
were members of the Latin Kings and they knew that Cortez was
a Latin Eagle, but they played along with Michael, letting him
think that they were members of the same gang as Cortez. Michael
bragged about his connections to the Latin Eagles and claimed to
have driven the car during several "hits."
 	The three got into the front seat of their car, the four others
got in the back seat, and they drove into a nearby alley on the
pretense of making a drug deal. Arthur and Frank were told to stay
in the car while the four walked down the alley with Michael.
Once they were out of sight, they began to beat and kick Michael.
When he was on the ground, they revealed that they were Latin
Kings.
	Defendant and Aviles stayed with Michael while Ruiz and
LaBoy returned to the car. They came back a few minutes later,
with the car. LaBoy was driving, with Arthur and Frank still in the
front seat. Ruiz was in the back seat. Defendant, Aviles, and
Michael got in the back seat and LaBoy drove to another alley.
During this brief drive, the four conversed in Spanish and decided
that they had to kill the three young men so that they could not
identify them.
	After they stopped, Ruiz handed defendant a gun. Defendant
and LaBoy walked Michael and Frank down the alley and ordered
them to lie face down in a snowbank. Defendant gave the gun to
LaBoy and told him to stay there while he went back to the car to
see what was happening. When he got there, he saw Aviles
repeatedly stabbing Arthur, who was in the right front seat of the
car.
	Dr. Robert Kirschner, the medical examiner, had testified
earlier in the trial that Arthur was found in the front passenger seat
of the car, with 18 neck wounds and eight chest wounds. The neck
wounds severed both carotid arteries and both jugular veins as
well as the trachea. He had no defensive wounds.
	Ruiz told defendant to "go get the other guy." Frank was led
back to the car and told to close his eyes and get in the left front
seat. LaBoy told defendant to stab him, but defendant stated that
he had never stabbed anyone and would rather shoot him. LaBoy
grabbed the knife from Aviles and began stabbing Frank.
Defendant stated, "I told him to slice his throat." Defendant then
went back to where Michael was lying in the snow to watch him.
	Kirschner testified that Frank was found in the driver's seat
and died as a result of 21 stab wounds to the neck, jaw, chest, and
back. He also had an incised wound of the face. He had no
defensive wounds.
	Finally, defendant led Michael back to the car and told him to
keep his eyes closed and get in the back seat. Michael opened his
eyes and, when he saw the others, began to resist. Defendant took
the knife from LaBoy, grabbed Michael by his hair, and slashed
his throat. He continued to stab Michael until he got tired. Michael
yelled, "I'm dead. I'm dead. Don't stab me." Defendant stabbed
him a few more times. LaBoy took the knife and stabbed him
several more times, to make sure he was dead.
	Kirschner's testimony was that Michael had multiple stab
wounds, including 24 to the face and neck, 5 to the chest and
abdomen, and 3 to the back. Michael had defensive wounds to the
right hand and forearm. He was found in the back seat of the car.
	Defendant said that Ruiz, LaBoy, and Aviles then took several
pairs of socks from a suitcase they had found in the car, put the
socks on their hands, and attempted to wipe off any fingerprints
they might have left. The police recovered two bloody socks near
the scene, which were admitted into evidence. In addition, one
fingerprint matching Ruiz was found on an outside rear window
of the car. As they walked away, LaBoy discarded the knife in a
snowbank. The four went to LaBoy's house to clean up. Ruiz
stated that he had to return the gun he had been carrying to the
person from whom he borrowed it. The others got in a cab to go
home.
	The assistant State's Attorney who questioned defendant
testified that he read the transcribed statement, made some
corrections, and signed it. The assistant State's Attorney asked
defendant whether, if he had it to do over, he would do the same
thing again. Defendant replied, "[I]f it was a sure thing." The
assistant State's Attorney answered, "[T]here's no such thing as a
sure thing. You got caught." Defendant's response was,"[A] lot of
Kings kill people without getting caught. *** I'd kill Michael for
sure, but I don't know about the other two."
	Defendant agreed to return to the scene with the detectives
and to point out where the knife had been discarded. They did not
recover the knife at that time. A knife was discovered in a
snowbank several days later by a passer-by, who turned it over to
the police. It had minute bloodstains that were insufficient to type
or identify.
	The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all charges and the
sentencing stage began several days later. As to defendant's
history of prior criminal activity, the State introduced evidence of
defendant's prior conviction for unlawful use of a weapon in 1978,
for which he received a sentence of probation. The jury also heard
testimony that while in custody awaiting trial, defendant solicited
another prisoner who was about to be released to put out a "hit" on
the individual defendant suspected of informing the police of his
involvement in the three murders.

B. LaBoy Trial and Sentencing
	Over a decade later, Aviles testified that he had been a 17-year-old gang member in 1979 when he and three older members
of the Latin Kings-Caballero, Ruiz, and LaBoy-met three young
men as they were leaving the King Castle restaurant, which was on
Latin Eagle "turf." One of the young men said that he was looking
for Juan Cortez because he wanted to buy some marijuana. Aviles
and his companions knew that Cortez was the leader of the Latin
Eagles. Ruiz told the boys that he knew where they could buy
some "weed," but they needed a ride to get there. All seven got
into the car, the three eventual victims in the front seat and the
four Latin Kings in back. As they drove, Michael Salcido bragged
about having done "a couple of hits on Latin Kings." Speaking in
Spanish, Ruiz told Aviles and the others that they were going to
"rob these guys." The three boys in the front seat did not react.
None of them spoke Spanish.
	Ruiz directed the driver to an alley. He stayed with Arthur and
Frank at the car while Aviles, Caballero, and LaBoy took Michael
around a corner, ostensibly to make the marijuana purchase. As
soon as they were out of sight of the others, LaBoy "jumped on
him" and started to beat him up. Michael fell to the ground and
Aviles picked him up. Michael was "hysterical." He screamed that
he was not an Eagle, that he had just wanted to be their friend.
LaBoy yelled at him to shut up and continued to beat him.
Eventually, they walked Michael back to the car. When the others
saw Michael crying and beaten and asked what was going on, Ruiz
pulled a gun. Aviles and the others began to rob the victims, taking
their watches and the contents of their pockets. Michael told them
to take whatever they wanted and promised that they would not go
to the police. LaBoy struck him in the face and told him to shut up.
	At that point, Ruiz said, in Spanish, that they had to kill the
three boys. Aviles responded, still in Spanish, that he thought they
were only going to rob them. LaBoy said that the three had seen
their faces, so they could not let them go, but he had a better way
of dealing with it than Ruiz's gun. He pulled a knife, which he
handed to Ruiz. Then he grabbed the boy who had been driving
(Arthur) and shoved him into the front seat of the car on the
passenger side. Caballero and LaBoy walked Michael and Frank
down the alley. Ruiz called Aviles around to the other side of the
car, handed him the knife, and told him to get in the car and "do
the guy." Aviles hesitated, but Ruiz kept telling him to go ahead.
Ruiz was pointing the gun at Arthur as Aviles stabbed him in the
chest three or four times. When Arthur put his hands up as if to
resist, Aviles panicked and dropped the knife. Then the passenger
side door burst open and LaBoy grabbed the knife. He began
stabbing Arthur, while screaming at Aviles for not "taking care of
business." LaBoy grabbed Arthur by the head and slit his throat,
telling Aviles, "This is how you do it." He sliced repeatedly at
Arthur's throat and stabbed him in the chest several times. When
he was done, he licked the blood from his hand as he told Aviles
that he had "no heart" and that this was how a "true King takes
care of business." Aviles told LaBoy that he "didn't want any part
of this," so LaBoy sent him down the alley to act as a lookout.
	As he walked down the alley, he saw Caballero, who had the
other two boys on the ground in the snow. Aviles threw up in
some bushes. Later, he saw LaBoy take "the guy that was doing all
the talking" (Michael) back to the car and force him into the back
seat. Michael begged him not to kill him, screaming that he was
not an Eagle. LaBoy told him to shut up and started stabbing him.
	Ruiz, LaBoy, and Caballero eventually motioned for Aviles
to come back to the car. When he did, he saw that all three of the
boys were dead, two in the front seat of the car and one in the
back. LaBoy and Ruiz said that they had to wipe the car down.
LaBoy took the keys from the ignition and opened the trunk. He
opened a suitcase he found inside and started passing out the socks
they used to wipe the car of fingerprints. They threw the bloody
socks into backyards along the alley as they walked away. LaBoy
shoved the knife into a pile of snow. Ruiz left, and the others went
to LaBoy's home.
	The jury found LaBoy guilty. At the sentencing phase, the
State argued that LaBoy was the most culpable of the four killers,
and that he was responsible for all 24 stab wounds inflicted on
Michael. Reflecting Aviles' testimony, the State's only mention of
defendant was to describe him as aiding, abetting, or attempting to
aid LaBoy.

C. The Evidentiary Hearing
	In Caballero IV, this court found that defendant had made "a
substantial showing that his constitutional rights were violated so
as to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on the disparity between
his death sentence and LaBoy's life sentence." Caballero IV, 179 Ill. 2d  at 217, citing People v. Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d 145, 166 (1980)
(acknowledging "this court's duty to ensure that the cases in which
death is imposed are rationally distinguished from those in which
it is not imposed").
	The evidence before the circuit court at the evidentiary
hearing consisted of the transcripts of the trials and sentencing
hearings of defendant and LaBoy. No additional testimony was
presented. Defense counsel preceded her argument with a
summary of the factors relevant in the analysis of sentencing
disparity: the relative culpability of the offenders (Gleckler, 82 Ill.
2d at 166), their rehabilitative prospects (Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d at
171), and their criminal histories (Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d at 170-71).
Defense counsel argued that defendant's only criminal record,
prior to being found guilty of these three murders, was for
unlawful possession of a weapon. He received a sentence of
probation. In contrast, after the murders at issue here, but before
his trial, LaBoy was convicted of three major felonies, all
involving armed violence, and one of which was the attempted
aggravated sexual assault of a 16-year-old girl. Counsel also noted
that defendant has been a model prisoner for 20 years, thus
demonstrating his potential for rehabilitation, while LaBoy's
subsequent actions show that he is unlikely to ever be
rehabilitated. In addition, LaBoy took pleasure in the three
murders, smiling and licking the blood from his fingers in a
"particularly ghoulish" display that further demonstrated his lack
of rehabilitative potential. As to the relative culpability of the two,
counsel argued that it was LaBoy who initiated the beating of
Michael and then rejected Ruiz's plan to use a gun and produced
the knife. Defendant had "no role" in the killings of Arthur and
Frank. He did stab Michael, but so did LaBoy. LaBoy also took the
lead in the attempt to wipe down the car and dispose of the murder
weapon. Counsel also pointed to the State's closing argument at
LaBoy's trial that he was the principal in at least two of the
killings while defendant was merely aiding and abetting. Defense
counsel concluded that LaBoy was the "worst actor" under all
three factors of the analysis.
 	The State responded that defendant was an "active and willing
participant" in all three killings. He participated in the beating of
Michael, took part in setting up the murder, encouraged LaBoy to
use a knife instead of a gun, escorted two of the victims back to
the car to their deaths, and actually killed one of them. Thus, he
was not simply a follower or bystander.
	The State also explained that the evidence presented in the
two cases was slightly different. At defendant's trial, his own
statement about his role in the events of that night was introduced
into evidence. The statement was not admitted in the LaBoy trial.
Aviles' testimony was the linchpin of the State's case against
LaBoy, but Aviles' perspective was slightly different from
defendant's and, as a result, different facts were emphasized. For
example, because Aviles walked away from the scene for a while,
he did not observe some of the events that defendant described.
Aviles portrayed LaBoy as the ringleader, while defendant's
version suggested that he, Ruiz, and LaBoy were equals in this
regard.
	The State argued that defendant is the "most culpable" of the
four killers because he took a "more active role" in setting up the
murders. He forced two of the victims to lie face down in the snow
while they waited to be taken back to the car where they were
murdered. He urged LaBoy to slice Frank's throat and "savagely
murdered" Michael. Ruiz may have come up with the initial plan
or, perhaps, "was the first to speak it aloud," but defendant "kept
it going." As to rehabilitative potential, the State acknowledged
that LaBoy had been convicted of several violent felonies during
the years it took to bring him to trial for these killings and that
these convictions demonstrated his lack of potential. However,
defendant's own words and actions demonstrated his lack of
rehabilitative potential. He showed no remorse and stated that he
would kill again if it were a sure thing. He tried to arrange for
another murder from his jail cell. In conclusion, the State argued
that both defendant and LaBoy should have received the death
penalty; however, just because one or more of the LaBoy jurors
were not convinced of this, defendant's death sentence is not
rendered unconstitutional.
	Defense counsel pointed out that, at each trial, the prosecutor
argued that the person on trial was the most culpable. Such
conduct by the prosecutors, counsel argued, is "scandalous." The
State responded that such argument is merely advocacy.
	At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court
found that: (1) defendant was "as involved" as LaBoy and was an
active and willing participant in the killings; (2) LaBoy had a more
significant criminal history "at the time of their respective
sentencings" than did defendant; and (3) and at the time he was
sentenced, defendant was "a ruthless killer who exhibited
absolutely no remorse for his crime and, in fact, indicated that he
would do it again if he could get away with it," revealing that his
potential for rehabilitation was "absolutely none." Therefore, the
circuit court ruled, defendant's death sentence was not
unconstitutionally disparate from LaBoy's life sentences.



II. DUE PROCESS
	Defendant asserts that he was denied a full and fair
evidentiary hearing before the circuit court, in violation of his
constitutional right to due process. Specifically, he claims that the
State argued before the LaBoy jury that LaBoy was the most
culpable of the four killers while defendant was "aiding and
abetting, [and] attempting to aid," and then, at the evidentiary
hearing, argued that defendant was the more active participant in
the killings and that LaBoy's conduct was peripheral. According
to defendant, the State's characterization of his role in the killings
"contradicted the theory" the State advanced at LaBoy's trial and
was "incompatible with the evidence presented there." He further
claims that he was prejudiced because the circuit court accepted
the State's characterization of his actions as more blameworthy
than LaBoy's. Defendant's brief describes the State's conduct as
"cho[osing] to misrepresent the facts."
	In its brief, the State concedes that the comments made about
defendant's culpability during closing argument at the LaBoy trial,
which minimized defendant's involvement in the killings, were
inaccurate, but were "nothing more than a passing reference" and
"not a declaration of defendant's role in the murders." Further,
because defendant's role in the killings was established by his
1979 confession and LaBoy's role was established by Aviles' 1992
testimony, minor discrepancies between the two accounts are to be
expected.
	The State further acknowledges that it made a "mistake" at the
evidentiary hearing by arguing that defendant is the most culpable
of the four killers. Because this was argument to the bench, rather
than an assertion of fact, and because the court had access to the
transcripts of both trials, the State now argues that the mistake did
not prejudice defendant.
	The State's current position is that defendant and LaBoy are
equally culpable in the three killings and that the death penalty
would be appropriate for both. Although one or more members of
the LaBoy jury chose to reject the death penalty, defendant's role
as an active participant in the killings justifies the imposition of
the death penalty. With regard to rehabilitative potential, the
State's brief postulates that defendant's prospects for rehabilitation
were "dismal" at the time he was sentenced and that LaBoy's were
"no better." During oral argument, however, the State argued that
defendant's potential for rehabilitation is less than LaBoy's
because LaBoy expressed remorse for the killings while defendant
was "cold-hearted" and stated that he would do the same thing
again if he thought he could get by with it. The State also suggests
that their criminal records are not subject to comparison because,
while LaBoy was at large committing several felonies, defendant
was on death row where he had "no further opportunity to offend."
	Defendant's due process argument rests on the State's
changing positions on the issues of culpability and rehabilitative
prospects. Defendant claims that if the State "had stayed true" to
the position argued to the LaBoy jury-that LaBoy is the most
culpable-defendant would have prevailed before the circuit court
on his sentencing-disparity claim. In addition, defendant argues
that the State has admitted LaBoy's prospects for rehabilitation are
"no better" than his and asks this court to "hold them to that." At
oral argument, defense counsel characterized the State's conduct
as "playing fast and loose" with the court. The effect of the State's
arguing "a theory of culpability that [the prosecutor] knew was
invalidated by evidence his office had stood by in the past" was to
make the evidentiary hearing "fundamentally unfair."
	Defendant does not suggest what remedy would be
appropriate if this court were to agree with his due process claim.
His use of the expression "playing 'fast and loose' " sounds in the
doctrine of judicial estoppel, which "provides that a party who
assumes a particular position in a legal proceeding is estopped
from assuming a contrary position in a subsequent legal
proceeding." Bidani v. Lewis, 285 Ill. App. 3d 545, 549 (1996)
(commenting that the doctrine " 'estops a party from playing "fast
and loose" with the court' "). The doctrine of judicial estoppel
rests not upon due process concerns, but "upon public policy
which upholds the sanctity of the oath and its purpose is to bar as
evidence statements and declarations which would be contrary to
sworn testimony the party has given in the same or previous
judicial proceedings." Bidani, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 549. Five
elements are generally required for the doctrine of judicial
estoppel to apply: the party to be estopped must have (1) taken two
positions, (2) that are factually inconsistent, (3) in separate judicial
or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, (4) intending for the
trier of fact to accept the truth of the facts alleged, and (5) have
succeeded in the first proceeding and received some benefit from
it. People v. Coffin, 305 Ill. App. 3d 595, 598 (1999). Application
of the doctrine is within the discretion of the court. Bidani, 285 Ill.
App. 3d at 550.
	This court has rarely, if ever, had occasion to consider the
doctrine, but our appellate court has done so in the context of
criminal proceedings. See Coffin, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 598 (holding
that the State is not estopped from using results of a blood-alcohol
test performed on blood sample obtained in a hospital emergency
room to prosecute the defendant for DUI, even though the State
previously used defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol
test to obtain summary suspension of driver's license; the
positions taken by the State were not factually inconsistent);
People v. Gayfield, 261 Ill. App. 3d 379, 386 (1994) (holding that
the State did not take contradictory positions in two proceedings
where, in the first proceeding, Jones pleaded guilty to murder and
identified Cooks as the shooter and, in the second proceeding, the
State charged Gayfield with the murder and identified him as the
shooter); People v. Wisbrock, 223 Ill. App. 3d 173, 175 (1991)
(holding the State estopped from using results of breathalyzer test
in DUI prosecution when it had previously taken the position that
defendant refused to take the test in proceeding to obtain summary
suspension of his driver's license).
	The doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply in the present
case because the disputed statements by the State regarding
relative culpability and rehabilitative prospects were matters of
opinion, not of fact. Thus, despite invoking the familiar "fast and
loose" mantra of judicial estoppel, defendant argues that his right
to due process is violated when the State is allowed to offer
argument that contradicts its earlier argument on the same issue.
Defendant cites two cases in support of his claim that the State's
shifting positions on the questions of relative culpability and
potential for rehabilitation violate the due process clause. The
State attempts to distinguish both cases on the basis that they
involve the guilt phase of trial, not disparity of sentencing.
	In Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1049 (8th Cir. 2000), the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered "whether the Due
Process Clause forbids a state from using inconsistent,
irreconcilable theories to secure convictions against two or more
defendants in prosecutions for the same offenses arising out of the
same event." Four juveniles were involved in the robbery and
murders at issue in Smith. One of them, Lytle, gave two conflicting
versions of the killings. The State used one version to convict
Smith and the other version to convict Bowman. The court held
that the State's "use of inherently factually contradictory theories
violates the principles of due process." Smith, 205 F.3d  at 1052.
	In Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir.
1997), rev'd on other grounds, 523 U.S. 538, 140 L. Ed. 2d 720,
118 S. Ct. 1489 (1998), the circuit court of appeals found "glaring
inconsistenc[ies] between the prosecutor's theories, arguments,
and factual representations" at the separate trials of the two
defendants. "The prosecutor manipulated evidence and witnesses,
argued inconsistent motives, and at [the trial of the second
defendant] essentially ridiculed the theory he had used to obtain a
conviction and death sentence [at the trial of the first defendant]."
Thompson, 120 F.3d  at 1057. The State's conduct in this case
violated the "bedrock principle[ ]" that "when no new significant
evidence comes to light a prosecutor cannot, in order to convict
two defendants at separate trials, offer inconsistent theories and
facts regarding the same crime." Thompson, 120 F.3d  at 1058.
	We agree with the State that no due process violation
occurred. First, the State has not offered "inconsistent theories and
facts regarding the same crime" (Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1058).
Rather, at defendant's trial, the State used his own statement as the
basis for its argument to the jury that he deserved the death
penalty. At LaBoy's trial, the State used Aviles' testimony, which
contained more detail about LaBoy's conduct than defendant's
earlier statement, to argue that LaBoy deserved the death penalty.
As the Smith court noted, "the passage of time between trials, ***
may be a legitimate excuse for minor variations in testimony or
defects in memory ***." Smith, 205 F.3d  at 1052. At the
evidentiary hearing and before this court, the State has not argued
inconsistent facts. Instead, it has merely made different arguments
from those facts.
	Our own research has identified the case of United States v.
Paul, 217 F.3d 989 (8th Cir. 2000), in which the defendant was
sentenced to death while his co-offender was given a life sentence.
Both men shot at the victim during an armed robbery, but it was
impossible to determine which gun caused the fatal wound. The
prosecutor argued at both trials that the defendant on trial was the
killer. Citing Smith, the court determined that there was no due
process violation where the prosecutor made inconsistent
arguments at the two trials, but did not use evidence that was
"factually inconsistent and irreconcilable." Paul, 217 F.3d  at 998.
	Similarly, in Drake v. Francis, 727 F.2d 990 (11th Cir. 1984),
the State's arguments at the trials of two defendants varied only
with regard to the extent of their involvement in the murder. In the
first case, the prosecutor argued that the defendant was the sole
murderer. In the second case, the prosecutor argued that the first
defendant had been too weak to commit the crime alone and that,
therefore, the second defendant must have participated in the fatal
attack. Drake, 727 F.2d  at 994. Both were convicted and sentenced
to death. The court of appeals found that the two theories were
"fairly consistent" and that there was no due process violation.
Drake, 727 F.2d  at 994.
	These cases stand for the proposition that a party is not as
bound by his prior arguments as he is by prior assertions of fact.
We conclude that no due process violation has occurred in the
present case when the State's shifting positions involved matters
of opinion, not of underlying fact. We, therefore, decline to hold
the State to the argument it made to the LaBoy jury that he is the
most culpable of the four killers. That argument was permissible
in the context of the LaBoy trial and supported by the evidence
presented to that jury. In this proceeding, however, the purpose is
the direct comparison of the relative culpability of defendant and
LaBoy. We do not find it necessary to constrain the State's
argument on this issue.
	We do, however, hold the State to its position that, at the time
of sentencing, defendant and LaBoy had equally "dismal"
prospects for rehabilitation, because the State has asserted this
argument in its brief before this court. We will not consider
counsel's remark at oral argument that defendant's prospects were
"worse" because, unlike LaBoy, he did not express remorse for the
murders.
	Defendant also argues his right to due process will be violated
by allowing the State to base its relative-culpability argument on
the record of his own trial, because the factual discrepancies
between defendant's "purported" confession and Aviles' testimony
cannot be reconciled. As an initial matter, we reject the
implication that defendant's statement should be considered less
reliable than Aviles' because it allegedly was not voluntary. At
defendant's trial, the court rejected defendant's claim of coercion
and this court affirmed that ruling on appeal. Caballero I, 102 Ill. 2d  at 33-37. Because the relative culpability of defendant and
LaBoy must be determined by a comparison of their roles in the
murders, we have examined both transcripts in depth to ascertain
the extent and significance of the discrepancies.
	Defendant's statement described their stopping the car twice,
in two different alleys. The beating of Michael took place at the
first location and the killings at the second. Aviles did not mention
getting back in the car and moving to another alley after the
beating. In their descriptions of the beating, defendant had all four
Kings participating, while Aviles made LaBoy primarily
responsible.
	Both defendant and Aviles testified that defendant and LaBoy
took Frank and Michael down the alley to guard them while
Arthur was killed. Aviles noted that, at that point, Ruiz had
already pulled a gun and LaBoy had produced a knife. Aviles said
that Ruiz gave the knife to him and he began to stab Arthur while
Ruiz held the gun on them both. According to defendant's version,
Ruiz could not have been holding the gun on Aviles, because
defendant took the gun with him when he and LaBoy went down
the alley. Defendant also said that he gave the gun to LaBoy and
left him to guard Frank and Michael. Defendant walked back to
the car in time to see Aviles stabbing Arthur.
	The two versions differ at this point because Aviles stated that
LaBoy returned to the car, took the knife from him, and began
stabbing Arthur. According to Aviles, LaBoy licked blood from
his fingers and bragged about how a King takes care of business,
details that were clearly intended to portray to the LaBoy jury that
he was the ringleader and the most culpable of the four. Aviles did
not mention defendant's returning to the car. If, however, both
defendant and LaBoy were at the car to see Aviles stabbing
Arthur, no one was guarding Frank and Michael.
 	Defendant said that Ruiz told him to go get Frank. He brought
Frank back to the car and LaBoy told defendant to stab him. When
defendant hesitated, LaBoy took the knife from Aviles and began
to stab Frank. Thus, in both accounts, LaBoy took the knife from
Aviles, but they differ as to whether he used it to stab Arthur or
Frank. Defendant admitting telling LaBoy to slice Frank's throat
before he went back to watch Michael.
	Aviles, however, testified that after Arthur's killing, he was
sent down the alley to act as a lookout; he did not see Frank being
stabbed. Aviles claimed to have seen defendant still guarding
Frank and Michael in the alley, which conflicts with defendant's
description of his coming back to the car while Aviles was still
stabbing Arthur and leaving LaBoy to stand guard.
	Aviles also testified that he saw LaBoy take Michael back to
the car, force him into the back seat, and stab him. Defendant said
that he was the one who led Michael to the car, took the knife
from LaBoy, slashed Michael's throat, and began stabbing him.
Only when he tired did LaBoy take the knife back and stab him
some more.
	The State attributes any factual discrepancies in the two
accounts to the passage of time and the fact that Aviles did not see
everything that happened, because he went down the alley during
the second killing.
	We recognize that the two accounts differ somewhat. It is not
certain whether LaBoy stabbed all three of the victims, or only
two. LaBoy did apparently take the knife away from one of the
others and continue to stab an already wounded victim, either
taking the knife from Aviles to stab Arthur or taking the knife
from defendant to stab Michael. Defendant and Aviles also gave
differing accounts of who was at the car at various times and who
held the gun. We reject, however, the suggestion that Aviles'
testimony exculpates defendant. More than a decade passed
between the events in the alley and LaBoy's trial. Memories fade.
Aviles certainly told a version that implicated himself as little as
possible. In addition, the State's purpose at the LaBoy trial was to
elicit testimony from Aviles that fully described LaBoy's role in
the killings, not the roles of Ruiz and defendant. Aviles' focus on
LaBoy's conduct does not provide a basis for concluding anything
about defendant's conduct that night.
	In another case that involved a substantial delay between the
trials of the two codefendants, the defendant in People v.
Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148, 184 (1994), was convicted and
sentenced to death in 1982. His codefendant, Moore, was not tried
until 1986. In his post-conviction proceeding, Thompkins argued
that the testimony presented at Moore's trial established that
Moore played a more significant role in the two murders of which
they were both convicted. We rejected Thompkin's claim, finding
that "[a]lthough the testimony presented at Moore's trial provides
a more complete picture of Moore's participation in these
offenses, that evidence does not detract from the earlier depiction
at the defendant's trial of defendant's own involvement in the
crimes." Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d  at 184. The same can be said of
the present case.
	In sum, we find no irreconcilable contradictions between the
factual accounts offered by the State at the two trials that could be
said to affect defendant's due process rights. Therefore, there is no
need to limit the State's argument to the evidence presented at
LaBoy's trial.

III. DISPARITY OF SENTENCES
	The defendant argues, and the State does not dispute, that de
novo review is appropriate in a post-conviction case in which no
new evidence was presented at the evidentiary hearing that would
require the circuit court to assess the credibility of witnesses.
Therefore, because the circuit court only examined the records of
the two trials and heard argument on behalf of each party,
defendant urges this court to review the matter de novo.
	No decision of this court has discussed the applicable standard
of review in such a situation. The de novo standard of review is
applicable when the issue presented is purely a question of law.
People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 217 (2000) (stating that de
novo review is appropriate when there are no factual or credibility
disputes and the appeal, therefore, "involves a pure question of
law"); see also People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 21 (2000) (stating that
de novo review is applicable to questions of statutory
interpretation or other questions of law). In Hall, the defendant
urged de novo review because the rulings at issue "involved no
fact-finding based on the demeanor or credibility of the witnesses
because the evidence was written." Hall, 195 Ill. 2d  at 21. We
rejected this argument because the issue presented, whether certain
evidence should have been admitted at trial, was not a pure
question of law. Some deference was due to the trial court's
rulings because "the trial court exercised discretion ***, i.e., the
court based these rulings on the specific circumstances of this case
and not on a broadly applicable rule." Hall, 195 Ill. 2d  at 21.
	Although the circuit court in the present case heard no new
evidence and credibility of witnesses was not a concern, the circuit
court did have to weigh the facts and make inferences therefrom
in order to rule on "the specific circumstances of this case."
Nevertheless, we will apply a de novo standard of review because
the circuit court had no special expertise or familiarity with the
1979 trial of defendant or the 1992 trial of LaBoy that would make
it more capable than this court of weighing the facts presented by
the written record and drawing necessary inferences.
	Comparative proportionality review in capital cases is not
required by either the United States Constitution or the Illinois
death penalty statute. Thus, we will not compare the sentence
received by one individual to sentences received by other persons
convicted of similar crimes. This court does, however, have a
constitutional duty to determine whether the death penalty has
been imposed arbitrarily or capriciously, or is unduly severe,
considering the circumstances of the offense and the character and
rehabilitative prospects of the defendant. To guarantee the
individualized sentencing required by the eighth amendment, this
court will consider whether a defendant's death sentence is
disproportionately harsh in comparison to a lesser sentence
imposed on a codefendant or accomplice convicted of the same
crime. People v. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d 548, 576 (2000).
		"In reviewing a death sentence, we examine the facts of
the particular case and the evidence introduced at the guilt
and sentencing phases of trial. The relevant factors in
comparative proportionality review include the offenders'
extent of involvement in the offense, the nature of the
offense, the character and background of the offenders,
including any criminal record, and their potential for
rehabilitation. Similarly situated individuals must not
receive arbitrary or unreasonably disparate sentences."
Williams, 192 Ill. 2d  at 576.
	Applying these factors, defendant claims that LaBoy is more
culpable than he, has a worse criminal record, and has similarly
poor rehabilitative prospects. Thus, he argues, his death sentence
must be vacated. The State responds that defendant is "no less"
culpable than LaBoy, his rehabilitative prospects are "no better"
than LaBoy's, and their criminal histories are not comparable
because defendant was already on death row, with no opportunity
to commit further crimes, while LaBoy was at large, committing
three subsequent violent felonies. The State argues that the
leniency of the LaBoy jury does not render defendant's death
sentence unconstitutionally disproportionate to LaBoy's life
sentence. We shall discuss each of the three factors in turn.
A. Rehabilitative Potential
	Defendant formulates the question of rehabilitative potential
as whether the potential for rehabilitation of the person who
received the more severe sentence is "demonstrably poorer" than
that of his co-offender, citing Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d  at 171, in which
the defendant's death sentence was vacated because he had "no
criminal history, the personality of a doormat, and a problem with
alcohol, was not the ringleader ***; nor [were] his rehabilitative
prospects demonstrably poorer" (emphasis added) than those of
his codefendants who received prison terms.
	In a subsequent case, after finding the death penalty excessive,
we discussed, in dicta, the factors relevant to the analysis of
disparate sentences for codefendants. We found the defendant's
rehabilitative prospects "not demonstrably poorer than those of
her codefendants who received terms of imprisonment."
(Emphasis added.) People v. Smith, 177 Ill. 2d 53, 103 (1997),
citing Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d  at 171.
	Based on our use of the phrase "demonstrably poorer" in such
cases, the defendant argues that his death sentence cannot stand
because his prospects for rehabilitation are not demonstrably
poorer than LaBoy's. We reject defendant's argument. In the past,
we have not used the phrase "demonstrably poorer" in Gleckler
and its progeny to mean that the death penalty is precluded unless
the defendant's rehabilitative prospects are found to be
demonstrably poorer than those of his codefendant. Rather, we
have stated that the comparison of rehabilitative potentials "is only
one factor we consider in determining whether a defendant's
capital sentence is disproportionate to his codefendant's sentence."
People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 498 (2000). In Emerson,
although the defendant's behavior in prison suggested that his
potential for rehabilitation was greater than that of his brother, the
codefendant, we did not conclude that his death sentence was
unconstitutionally disparate to his brother's prison sentence.
Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d  at 498. Thus, while a defendant's
demonstrably poorer rehabilitative potential may explain his being
sentenced to death while a codefendant receives a prison sentence,
codefendants with similar prospects for rehabilitation need not
necessarily receive the same sentence.
	The parties agree that LaBoy's potential for rehabilitation is
nil. The State's claim that defendant's prospects are "no better"
than LaBoy's relies on his lack of remorse for the killings,
evidence that he solicited another prisoner to put out "a hit" on a
person he suspected of informing on him, and his statement that he
would have killed Michael again if he could have gotten away
with it.
	Defendant counters that he has been a model prisoner for the
past 20 years and that it is "wrong" to use the "mere words of an
eighteen-year-old boy as justification for his execution twenty
years later." Defendant's arguments point to one of the conditions
making the disparity analysis so difficult in this case-the lapse of
over a decade between his trial and LaBoy's. In 1979, the death
sentence was given to an 18-year-old confessed, remorseless killer,
who revealed not only a willingness, but an eagerness, to kill
again. In 1992, a killer in his thirties, whose life history
demonstrated absolutely no likelihood that he could ever be
rehabilitated, received three consecutive life sentences for the
same crimes. We conclude that neither defendant nor LaBoy, at
the time of their respective trials and sentencing, revealed any
likelihood of rehabilitation.

B. Criminal History
	Defendant argues that LaBoy's criminal history at the time of
sentencing was "more substantial and violent" than his own. In
addition, defendant points to the lack of evidence of any
misconduct on his part during 20 years in prison. The State
responds that defendant had no further opportunity to commit
crime after he was placed on death row.
	We accept defendant's suggestion that the mere fact of
incarceration does not necessarily prevent one from committing
further offenses. See People v. Moss, No. 87134, slip op. at 25
(October 18, 2001) (finding defendant's poor adjustment to
incarceration "as evidenced by his possession of weapons and his
receipt of 44 disciplinary tickets while in prison" relevant to the
comparison of criminal records of the codefendants); Emerson,
189 Ill. 2d  at 498 (noting that codefendant's prison record over
four years shows "repeated disciplinary violations involving
violence, including possession of a weapon, attacking prison staff
members, and fighting").
	Nevertheless, it is difficult to compare the criminal histories
of defendant and LaBoy when they were tried over a decade apart.
Although LaBoy's three felonies are certainly more significant
than defendant's single misdemeanor conviction, defendant is, in
effect, suggesting that one offender may not be sentenced to death
as long as one or more of his co-offenders are at large and may be
committing further crimes.
	In addition, even if there had not been a lengthy interval
during which defendant was in prison while LaBoy was engaging
in further crimes, the criminal history factor is not determinative.
See People v. Caffey, No. 86975, slip op. at 61 (October 18, 2001)
(affirming death penalty where codefendant's criminal record was
"quantitatively more severe than defendant's" but defendant's
participation in the multiple homicides was "not significantly less"
than that of the codefendant).
	We conclude that this factor may weigh slightly in
defendant's favor, but because of the unusual circumstances of the
timing of the two trials, it is the least meaningful of the three
factors that we must consider.

C. Relative Culpability
	Defendant claims that, first, he may not be sentenced to death
unless he is shown to be more culpable than his codefendant who
did not receive the death penalty, and, second, because LaBoy was
clearly the leader of the four, it would be impossible for defendant
to have played a greater role in the murders than he. We find no
support in the case law for the proposition that a defendant may be
sentenced to death only if he is more culpable than his codefendant
who receives a prison sentence. As we have noted above, the
codefendants' relative culpability is but one factor of three to be
considered.
	In support of his assertion that LaBoy is more culpable,
defendant argues that LaBoy was the "primary actor in two of the
three killings"; he produced the knife and suggested that it be used
instead of Ruiz's gun; he was, at age 23, the oldest of the four; and
he directed the others in wiping down the fingerprints and
disposing of the weapon and other evidence. In addition, defendant
points to LaBoy's words and actions that evinced his enthusiasm
for the act of killing.
 	The State does not argue that defendant is more culpable than
LaBoy. Instead, the State argues that defendant is no less culpable
than LaBoy because he was an active participant, not a mere
follower. He guarded Frank and Michael while Arthur was killed.
He did not refuse to kill Frank, he merely demurred because he
wanted to use a gun instead of a knife. When LaBoy did attack
Frank with the knife, defendant urged him to slice the boy's throat.
Finally, when Michael was the only one left alive, defendant sliced
his throat and then stabbed him until he was too tired to stab any
more. Defendant's own account of the killings reveals that he was
not merely following LaBoy's lead.
	When we consider relative culpability, our purpose is to
ensure that a passive participant, who may have had a less
blameworthy mental state or whose conduct caused less harm,
does not receive the ultimate penalty while an active participant,
with a more culpable mental state or who caused the greater harm,
serves a prison sentence. Thus, evidence that a defendant was a
follower, rather than a leader, in the commission of the crime has
been held to be a significant factor in the analysis of disparate
sentences. People v. Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d 43, 125 (1991), citing
Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d  at 171. In Gleckler, for example, the
defendant's death sentence was vacated, in part, because he was
less culpable than his companion who forced the victims off the
road, ordered them from their car, and shot them, after which he
ordered Gleckler, who had "the personality of a doormat," to shoot
the victims again. Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d  at 152-53, 171.
 	In contrast, there is no evidence in the present case that
defendant's mental state was any less blameworthy than LaBoy's.
Defendant did not act under any sort of compulsion nor was he a
less than willing participant in the three murders. As for the harm
done, the attacks on Arthur, Michael, and Frank were so savage
and brutal that it is impossible to say that LaBoy is more
responsible for their deaths simply because he may have inflicted
more wounds than defendant.
	This case bears many similarities to People v. Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d 1 (1994). Kitchen and Reeves were both convicted of the
murders of two women and their three children. Kitchen, who was
22 years old, received the death penalty, while Reeves, age 29,
received a sentence of natural life in prison. Kitchen argued that
his death penalty should be vacated because Reeves was more
culpable: Reeves was also convicted of five counts of aggravated
arson; he was older and the ringleader; the State argued at
Reeves's trial that he was the more culpable of the two; and he had
been found eligible for the death penalty on two separate bases.
Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d  at 43. In rejecting Kitchen's claim that he was
less culpable, we noted that he had admitted to at least two other
persons that he actually participated in the killings and said that,
if necessary, he would do so again. Although he claimed in his
statement to the police that he was a mere bystander while Reeves
committed the murders, we did not credit his attempt to shift the
blame to Reeves, and distinguished this case from Gleckler and
others in which there were circumstances that mitigated the
culpability of the defendant. Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d  at 45-46. In
effect, we found that Kitchen's mental state and his participation
in the killings were no less blameworthy than Reeves'.
	Defendant has also attempted to shift blame to his
codefendant, but his own statement reveals his mental state and his
actions to be as blameworthy as LaBoy's. We find that defendant
is no less culpable than LaBoy for these killings.

D. Analysis of Three Factors
	In sum, we have found that defendant and LaBoy are equally
culpable for these crimes, neither showed any prospects for
rehabilitation at the time of his conviction and sentencing, and
although LaBoy has a more significant criminal record, this factor
carries little weight because of the long delay between the two
trials. Considering the cumulative effect of all three factors, we are
left with the impression that they weigh more or less equally.
	Defendant argues that, all things being equal, his death
sentence cannot stand because executing him while imprisoning
LaBoy for life would violate the eighth amendment prohibition
against arbitrary and capricious sentencing, citing Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 883, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932 (1976), and Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d  at 119 (holding that an
unreasonable disparity between the sentences of similarly situated
codefendants violates the United States and Illinois Constitutions).
Defendant reminds us of the words of Justice Stewart who, writing
for the plurality in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305,
49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991 (1976), said that
"[d]eath, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than
a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two."
Defendant asserts that he is "no more deserving" of the death
penalty than LaBoy and, thus, this court should vacate his
sentence.
	The State argues that, all things being equal, it is not a
violation of the constitution for one defendant to receive the death
penalty while his codefendant receives a life sentence. Merely
because one or more members of the LaBoy jury chose not to
impose the death penalty does not render defendant's sentence
unconstitutionally disproportionate.
	"Arbitrary and unreasonable disparity between the sentences
of similarly situated codefendants is impermissible." Caballero IV,
179 Ill. 2d  at 216. However, a disparity in the sentences of
similarly situated codefendants does not, by itself, show a
violation of fundamental fairness. Caballero IV, 179 Ill. 2d  at 216.
Although the State cites no authority for its statement about the
effect of two separate juries reaching different conclusions about
the death penalty, we have made similar statements in the past. See
People v. Jimerson, 127 Ill. 2d 12, 54-55 (1989); Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d  at 46. These statements reflect our understanding that sentences
may be disparate without being unreasonably so. We are reading
a cold record, many years after the trial. We did not hear the
witnesses or observe the defendants in court. We do not know
what considerations influenced one jury to recommend a sentence
of death and one not. We cannot say, however, given the very
slight differences between the two, that the different sentences
were imposed arbitrarily or unreasonably.
	We, therefore, affirm the circuit court's judgment dismissing
defendant's post-conviction petition. We do not find his sentence
unconstitutionally disparate as compared to LaBoy's three
consecutive life sentences.
	Defendant has also suggested that his sentence is
fundamentally unfair because he is the only one of the four to face
the death penalty. Aviles pleaded guilty in return for a sentence of
40 years. LaBoy will serve natural life. Ruiz, who was originally
sentenced to death, has been granted a new sentencing hearing,
based on ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368 (1997). Defendant also points to the circuit court's
subsequent granting of Ruiz's motion to bar the State from seeking
the death penalty in light of LaBoy's life sentence for the same
crimes. This court, however, reversed and remanded for a capital
sentencing hearing because it "would be premature to compare a
sentence of death in his case with the sentences received by
LaBoy." People v. Ruiz, 194 Ill. 2d 454, 464 (2000). Similarly, it
is premature to compare defendant's death sentence with a
sentence not yet determined for Ruiz.



IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW
	Although the transcript of defendant's trial reveals that his
mother testified he was born in Mexico, the question of his
citizenship was not raised. The brief amicus curiae of the United
Mexican States (Mexico) now informs this court that defendant is
a citizen of Mexico and that he is the only one of the four
perpetrators who is not a United States citizen. The amicus brief
also states, inaccurately, that defendant is the youngest of the four
killers. In fact, Aviles was 17 at the time of the killings; defendant
was 18. They were not the youngest persons present. Frank and
Michael were 16 and 17.
	Mexico asserts that defendant has been denied certain
protections under international law and that he is entitled to a
remedy for these alleged violations. Specifically, Mexico claims
that defendant's death sentence violates the Convention for the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Convention)
(International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, opened for signature March 7, 1966, 660
U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force January 4, 1969; for the United
States, November 20, 1994)), and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, December 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
entered into force March 23, 1976; for the United States, June 8,
1992).
A. Role of Amicus Curiae
	In Caballero IV, this court remanded to the circuit court for an
evidentiary hearing on a single issue-whether the sentences of
defendant and LaBoy are unconstitutionally disparate. In its
amicus brief, Mexico has made claims under international law that
were not presented in defendant's post-conviction petition and are,
therefore, not properly part of this appeal.
	Because the sole function of an amicus curiae is to advise or
make suggestions to the court, this court has "repeatedly rejected
attempts by amic[i] to raise issues not raised by the parties to the
appeal." Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 62
(2001). "An amicus takes the case as he finds it, with the issues
framed by the parties." People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 234 (1991).
In Burger, when the amicus curiae sought " 'to bring to the
attention of this court additional argument which may be of
interest to the court, but which is unlikely to be raised by either
party' " (Burger, 198 Ill. 2d at 62), we declined to address the
additional argument.
	In the present case, Mexico is " 'not a party to the action but
is, instead, a "friend" of the court.' " Burger, 198 Ill. 2d  at 62,
quoting P.H., 145 Ill. 2d  at 234. As such, Mexico is not entitled to
present these claims in the present proceeding. Nevertheless,
because Mexico has framed its arguments under the Convention
and the ICCPR in terms of the disparity of sentencing between
defendant and his three co-offenders, we choose to address
Mexico's arguments.

B. The International Convention for the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination
	The Convention was signed by the United States on
September 28, 1966, but was not ratified by the Senate until
October 21, 1994. By that date, defendant had been convicted and
sentenced to death; his conviction and sentence had been affirmed
on direct appeal (Caballero I, 102 Ill. 2d 23); his first-post
conviction petition had been dismissed and that dismissal affirmed
in part, reversed in part, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing
(Caballero II, 126 Ill. 2d 248); the circuit court had held the
required hearing and again dismissed defendant's claim; and this
court had affirmed that ruling (Caballero III, 152 Ill. 2d 347).
	Mexico has not suggested that the Convention applies
retroactively to actions taken by the State of Illinois prior to
ratification. Nor does Mexico suggest that any specific actions
taken by the State prior to the ratification of the Convention
violated the Convention. Rather, Mexico argues that this court's
refusal, at this time, to vacate defendant's death sentence would
have an "unmistakable discriminatory effect" because he is "the
only Mexican citizen among the four offenders" and the only one
of the four currently facing the death penalty.
	As noted above, Aviles was sentenced to a term of 40 years'
imprisonment and LaBoy received three consecutive life
sentences. Ruiz was tried at the same time as defendant and was
also sentenced to death. However, Ruiz's petition for post-conviction relief was granted and a new sentencing hearing
ordered, based on ineffective assistance of counsel at the original
capital sentencing hearing. See People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368
(1997). The matter is currently pending in the circuit court of
Cook County.
	The Convention requires signatory states to "prohibit and
eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the
right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national
or ethnic origin, to equality before the law," including the "right
to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other organs
administering justice." International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S.
195, art. 5(a). Discrimination is broadly defined: "any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent,
or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on
an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public
life." (Emphasis added.) International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S.
195, art. 1.
	We accept Mexico's assertion that this definition
encompasses any discrimination that might occur in the context of
a criminal proceeding. However, we take exception to the
emphasis placed on the words "or effect," and the lack of attention
paid to the words "based on." Depending on the outcome of Ruiz's
resentencing, defendant may, in the end, be the only one of the
four killers to be executed for this crime. However, Mexico has
not attempted to argue that this "effect" is in any way "based on"
defendant's nationality.
	The equal protection clauses of the United States and Illinois
Constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,
§2) also prohibit the type of discrimination claimed by Mexico on
defendant's behalf. A defendant who alleges an equal protection
violation has the burden of demonstrating either discriminatory
intent (McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-93, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262, 278, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1767 (1987)), or discriminatory effect
(United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465, 134 L. Ed. 2d 687, 699, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1487 (1996)). To show discriminatory
effect, the defendant must demonstrate that similarly situated
individuals were treated differently. Armstrong, 517 U.S.  at 465,
134 L. Ed. 2d  at 699, 116 S. Ct.  at 1487.
	During defendant's trial, he and his co-offenders were all
believed to be United States citizens. After the defense suggested
that defendant's written statement was coerced, or that he might
not have understood what he was signing, the prosecutor tried to
determine whether defendant was fluent in English. He asked
defendant's mother, who was testifying for the defense, "He was
born in this country, was he not?" She answered, "No." "Where
was he born?" the prosecutor asked. "In Mexico," she replied. The
State, thus, did not learn until after resting its case that defendant
was born in Mexico and, even then, no follow-up questions were
asked to determine his citizenship. Clearly, discriminatory intent
was not present.
	As for discriminatory effect, the State sought the death penalty
for all three of the killers who went to trial. Only Aviles, who
pleaded guilty and testified against LaBoy, received a fixed term
sentence. For reasons only the 12 members of the jury know,
LaBoy was spared the death penalty and received three
consecutive sentences of natural life in prison. Defendant and Ruiz
were tried simultaneously before separate juries, both of which
recommended a sentence of death. That Ruiz subsequently won a
new sentencing hearing does not offer any support for the
suggestion that this defendant was somehow disadvantaged
because of his nationality.
	Defendant has received the benefit of every procedural
safeguard provided by our state and national constitutions and
state statutes, including two post-conviction proceedings and
appeals, each of which resulted in remand for an evidentiary
hearing. He has failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination
and, therefore, his claim under the Convention is rejected.
	The remainder of the discussion in this section of Mexico's
amicus brief is, in effect, an argument that defendant's sentence is
disproportionate to LaBoy's. We have already rejected the
argument that the two sentences are constitutionally
disproportionate. We now reject the argument that the disparity
between the two sentences violates the Convention. The
Convention calls for individuals to be placed "on an equal footing"
regardless of their nationality. In this case, the State treated
defendant no differently than Ruiz and LaBoy, despite the
different outcomes of their cases.


C. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
	The ICCPR was ratified by the United States Senate on June
8, 1992. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
December 19, 1966, 99 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March
23, 1976). As noted above, this event occurred long after the crime
for which defendant was convicted and sentenced, and long after
his direct appeal and the filing of his first post-conviction petition.
It cannot be said that his initial prosecution, direct appeal, or first
post-conviction proceeding violated the ICCPR because the United
States was not a party to the Covenant at the time. The claim now
advanced by Mexico must be read as a claim that actions by the
State subsequent to June 8, 1992, have violated the ICCPR.
	Mexico points to the disparity in sentences between defendant
and LaBoy, implicitly acknowledging that until LaBoy was
sentenced, defendant received every protection provided by the
United States and Illinois Constitutions, including a jury trial, the
assistance of counsel, and the protection against self-incrimination. He obtained prompt and thorough review of his
conviction and sentence by this court, and twice availed himself of
the protections of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The only
"violation" of the ICCPR that Mexico asserts is that it is simply
unfair for defendant to face execution while LaBoy does not. We
disposed of that argument above.
	In addition, when ratifying the ICCPR, the United States
attached a reservation, which stated that "the United States
reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to
impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant
woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting
the imposition of capital punishment." U.S. Reservations,
Understandings, and Declarations, International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 138 Cong. Rec. 8070, par. I(2) (1992).
Because defendant's sentence has been found not to violate any
constitutional constraints, it cannot violate the obligations
undertaken by the United States when it ratified the ICCPR.
	Defendant has not demonstrated that his civil or political
rights were in any way limited as a result of his nationality.

V. CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
circuit court. We direct the clerk of this court to enter an order
setting Tuesday, January 14, 2003, as the date on which the
sentence of death entered by the circuit court of Cook County shall
be carried out. Petitioner shall be executed in the manner provided
by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 2000). The clerk of this court
shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the
Director of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms Correctional
Center, and to the warden of the institution where petitioner is now
confined.

Affirmed.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting:
	For the reasons set forth in my dissents in People v. Hickey,
No. 87286, slip op. at 39-43 (September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J.,
dissenting), and People v. Simpson, No. 85084, slip op. at 35-39
(September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), I believe that
defendant's convictions and sentence should be set aside because
the trial proceedings were not conducted in accordance with the
new supreme court rules governing capital cases. As I stated in my
dissents, the procedures in capital cases prior to this court's
adoption of the new rules were inherently unreliable and did not
sufficiently protect a defendant's constitutional rights. For this
reason, the new rules should be applied retroactively. See People
v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 220-21 (1997). Therefore, I
respectfully dissent.