Title: Edwards v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12175
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 2017

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SJC-12175 
 
SAUNDRA R. EDWARDS  vs.  COMMONWEALTH & another.1 
 
 
 
Essex.     February 6, 2017. - June 8, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, & Lowy, JJ. 
 
 
Governor.  Privileged Communication.  Evidence, Privileged 
communication.  Libel and Slander. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 31, 2014. 
 
 
Motions to dismiss were heard by Richard E. Welch, III, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Michael J. Pineault for Deval Patrick. 
 
William H. Sheehan, III (Thomas J. Flannagan also present) 
for the plaintiff. 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  On September 16, 2014, then Governor Deval 
Patrick removed Saundra R. Edwards from her position as chair of 
the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB).  A few days later, in 
response to media inquiries about Edwards's abrupt departure, 
                     
 
1 Deval Patrick. 
2 
 
 
Patrick explained that, among other reasons, he had decided to 
replace Edwards because she inappropriately had attempted to 
pressure a SORB hearing officer to change the outcome of one of 
his decisions on an offender's classification level.  In 
subsequent comments to the media, after Edwards had filed an 
action for defamation and wrongful termination in the Superior 
Court, Patrick repeated his explanation that he had decided to 
remove Edwards from office because she had interfered with the 
independence of a SORB hearing officer.  Edwards filed an 
amended complaint, asserting a wrongful termination claim 
against the Commonwealth, and two defamation claims against 
Patrick, individually, one for each of the two statements. 
Patrick moved pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 
Mass. 754 (1974), to dismiss Edwards’s amended complaint on two 
grounds.  He argued that the court should conclude, consistent 
with Federal law and with a number of other jurisdictions, that 
he, as governor, had an absolute privilege for statements made 
in the course of his official duties.  In the alternative, 
Patrick argued that he had a qualified privilege, because the 
statements were made while acting within the scope of his 
official duties concerning Edwards's status as a public 
official, and that the allegations in the amended complaint were 
not sufficient to overcome that privilege.  Because, Patrick 
maintained, the amended complaint contained only bare conclusory 
3 
 
 
assertions of actual malice without allegations of facts 
sufficient to support those assertions beyond the level of mere 
speculation, the complaint did not meet the pleading 
requirements for a defamation claim under Iannacchino v. Ford 
Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008).  A Superior Court judge 
denied Patrick's motion to dismiss the defamation claims, and 
denied the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss the wrongful 
termination claim.  Patrick appealed from the denial of his 
motion, and both defendants sought a stay in the Superior Court 
pending the resolution of that appeal.  We allowed Patrick's 
motion for direct appellate review. 
Considering first whether the amended complaint alleges 
facts sufficient to overcome a qualified or conditional 
privilege, we conclude that it does not assert facts sufficient 
to demonstrate that Patrick's statements to the media were made 
with actual malice, and thus the complaint against him properly 
should have been dismissed.  Given this conclusion, we need not 
reach Patrick's argument as to the existence of an absolute 
privilege against defamation claims for a governor, or other 
high-ranking State official, for statements made in the course 
of his or her official duties. 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts asserted in the 
amended complaint, taking them as true for purposes of 
evaluating the motion to dismiss.  SORB is an administrative 
4 
 
 
agency within the Executive Office of Public Safety and Security 
(EOPSS).  SORB is responsible for enforcing the provisions of 
the sex offender registry law, G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q, and 
also promulgates rules, regulations, and guidelines to implement 
those provisions.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1).  The chair of 
SORB is "appointed by and serve[s] at the pleasure of the 
governor."  Id. 
Edwards had been a member of the Massachusetts bar for 
almost twenty-five years when Patrick appointed her as chair of 
SORB on November 5, 2007.  Edwards served in that role until 
September 16, 2014.  Prior to her appointment, Edwards had 
served as an assistant district attorney in Plymouth County for 
thirteen years.  She specialized in prosecuting sex offenses, 
child abuse, and domestic violence. 
a.  Sigh-Paglia matter.  According to the amended 
complaint, in September, 1993, Patrick's brother-in-law, Bernard 
Sigh, pleaded guilty to a charge of spousal rape in California; 
in his plea he admitted that he "accomplished an act of sexual 
intercourse with [his] wife against her will by means of force."  
He was sentenced to a term of incarceration followed by five 
years of probation.  Sigh moved to Massachusetts in 1995, but 
5 
 
 
did not register as a sex offender2 when the Legislature enacted 
the sex offender registry law in 1996.3 
In December, 2006, almost a year before Edward's 
appointment as chair, SORB notified Sigh of his duty to register 
as a level 1 (lowest risk) sex offender.  Sigh sought a hearing 
to challenge the determination that he had been convicted of a 
"like offense" to the offense of rape as defined in 
Massachusetts law.  SORB scheduled a hearing on his petition and 
assigned the matter to one of its board members.  While that 
hearing was pending, SORB referred to the office of the Attorney 
General the question whether a conviction of spousal rape under 
California law was a "like offense" to rape under Massachusetts 
law, thus requiring a Massachusetts resident to register with 
SORB. 
SORB hearing officer Attilio Paglia replaced the previously 
assigned board member, and scheduled a hearing on Sigh's 
                     
2 A sex offender is defined as a person who has been 
convicted of any violation of enumerated Massachusetts sex 
offenses, as well as like violations in other jurisdictions.  
See G. L. c. 6, § 178C.  See generally Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 
612, 615 (2010). 
 
3 The sex offender registry law, G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q, 
requires that anyone who has been convicted as a sex offender 
must register with SORB and with the local police department 
where the individual lives, unless, in limited circumstances, an 
individual has been deemed exempt.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178E. 
 
6 
 
 
petition.4  SORB officials authorized Paglia to decide 
preliminary motions in the case, but instructed him to continue 
the hearing pending the Attorney General's review of the legal 
question concerning the status in Massachusetts of Sigh's 
offense. 
Notwithstanding these instructions, Paglia began the 
hearing on August 1, 2007.  After being informed of the hearing, 
Paglia's supervisor ordered him not to issue a decision in the 
matter pending a determination by the Attorney General.  Paglia 
continued to hear evidence on August 10 and 31 and issued an 
oral decision finding that the California crime of spousal rape 
is not a like offense to the Massachusetts crime of rape.  
Accordingly, he relieved Sigh of the obligation to register as a 
sex offender.  Paglia did not issue a written decision, as is 
required by SORB regulations. 
b.  Edwards's involvement in the Sigh-Paglia matter.  
Edwards took office on November 5, 2007, several months after 
the Sigh hearing and the oral decision.  She was advised by 
SORB's counsel and other SORB officials of the disagreement 
between SORB administrators and Paglia.  She also learned that, 
                     
4 Edwards's amended complaint alleges that Paglia, for an 
unknown reason, "took the extraordinary step" of removing the 
case from the previously assigned board member and assigning the 
case to himself. 
7 
 
 
as a result of his actions with respect to the Sigh matter, 
Paglia had been disciplined for insubordination. 
On May 9, 2008, Edwards met with Paglia to discuss the Sigh 
matter.  She informed Paglia (who is not an attorney) of the 
legal elements of rape as defined under Massachusetts law, and 
also told him that the California crime of spousal rape is a 
like offense to the Massachusetts crime of rape because "rape is 
rape."  After consulting with EOPSS and SORB's general counsel, 
Edwards directed that a written decision issue in the Sigh case.  
SORB also enacted an emergency regulation to permit it to 
correct errors of law by hearing officers.  To prevent further 
classification errors, Edwards also instituted a training 
program on the elements of Massachusetts sex offenses and on 
conducting classification hearings. 
Paglia resigned from his position at SORB and commenced a 
"whistleblower" action, G. L. 149, § 185, in the Superior Court 
against SORB, Edwards in her official capacity, and other SORB 
officials, claiming retaliation for his decision in the Sigh 
matter.5  Paglia claimed that the SORB defendants, including 
Edwards, engaged in repeated and unsuccessful efforts to change 
                     
5 Because Edwards referenced Paglia's complaint in her 
amended complaint, and Patrick attached the Paglia complaint to 
his motion to dismiss, the Paglia complaint is included in the 
record and may be considered by this court.  See Coghlin Elec. 
Contrs., Inc. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 472 Mass. 549, 552 n.5 
(2015); Marram v. Kobrick Offshore Fund, Ltd., 442 Mass. 43, 45 
n.4 (2004). 
8 
 
 
the result of the Sigh hearing, and created a hostile work 
environment, characterized by harassing electronic mail messages 
and telephone calls, and poor performance reviews.  Paglia also 
claimed that he had complained to Edwards about "unlawful 
conduct that occurred prior to and during her tenure as Chair," 
and that Edwards retaliated by accusing him (through the deputy 
counsel of EOPSS) of insubordination and performance 
deficiencies.  Paglia further asserted that Edwards had 
attempted to influence the independence of hearing officer 
decisions by instituting a regulation permitting SORB to revise 
or overturn decisions, known internally as the "Paglia 
Regulation," and hiring a hearing decision editor to "subject 
the finality of hearing examiner decisions to doubt and 
ambiguity." 
Edwards's termination.  According to the amended complaint, 
on September 15, 2014, Edwards was ordered to attend a meeting 
the next day at the governor's office, with the general counsel 
and chief of staff of EOPSS, and Patrick's director of boards 
and commissions, Kendra Foley.  Edwards was not given an 
explanation for the meeting. 
Edwards met with Foley on September 16, 2014.  She was 
joined by Patrick's legal counsel and a representative of human 
resources from EOPSS.  Patrick was not present at this meeting.  
Foley told Edwards, "As you know, you serve at the Governor's 
9 
 
 
pleasure.  He has decided to replace you as the Chairperson of 
the Sex Offender Registry Board."  Edwards asked Foley if there 
was "a problem," or if she had done something wrong.  Foley 
replied that Edwards had not done anything wrong, but repeated 
that her employment was being terminated.  To avoid the stigma 
of being terminated, Edwards asked if she could tender a letter 
of resignation.  Edwards was allowed to resign effective that 
day. 
d.  Patrick's statements to the media.  The amended 
complaint further states that Patrick made two statements to the 
media concerning Edwards's removal as SORB chair.  On 
September 22, 2014, he said during a press conference: 
"The final straw was the settlement of a lawsuit, 
which happened about not quite a year ago now, that 
involved some inappropriate, at least, maybe, unlawful, 
pressuring by the Chair and the Executive Director of a 
hearing officer to change the outcome of a case.  The 
hearing officer did not ultimately do that.  It turns out 
that the case is the case that arose out of my brother-in-
law's experience way back at the beginning of the first 
campaign when the Republican Party, sorry to say, aided by 
the [Boston} Herald, nearly destroyed their lives."6 
 
On January 2, 2015, Patrick made additional comments to the 
media concerning his reasons for removing Edwards: 
"You know, people do things like this when they've 
been, sometimes when they've been called out, and, you 
                     
 
6 Patrick also stated that he had lost confidence in 
Edwards' ability to lead the SORB for other reasons:  " several 
cases where the [Supreme Judicial Court] has reversed them"; " 
critici[sm] for not updating their regulations"; and " a number 
of reports about the work environment not being positive." 
10 
 
 
know, it's part of the business.  The fact is that she 
influenced inappropriately, or attempted to influence 
inappropriately, a hearing officer, and that's a matter of 
record.  That hearing did involve my brother-in-law, that 
is true.  We've never made a secret of that, but it's still 
inappropriate, and that's the reason why I asked for her 
resignation. 
 
"We can't have officials inappropriately interfering 
with the independence of hearing officers.  It undermines 
the whole process whether it involves someone I know or 
not."  
 
d.  Edwards's complaint.  On December 31, 2014, Edwards 
filed a complaint in the Superior Court against the 
Commonwealth, claiming wrongful termination for her removal as 
SORB chair, and against Patrick individually, alleging that his 
September 22, 2014 statements to the media "accusing her of 
wrongdoing" were defamatory.  Thereafter, on March 2, 2015, 
Edwards filed an amended complaint, adding a second claim of 
defamation based on Patrick's January 2, 2015, response to media 
inquiries following the filing of Edwards's initial complaint. 
Patrick moved to dismiss the defamation claims on grounds 
of absolute and qualified or conditional privilege.  A Superior 
Court judge denied the motion,7 noting that the matter of an 
absolute privilege had not been recognized by this court, and 
determining that Edwards had overcome the qualified privilege by 
                     
7 The judge also denied the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss 
the wrongful termination claim.  The Commonwealth has not 
appealed from that decision, and the matter has been stayed as 
to both defendants pending resolution of this interlocutory 
appeal. 
 
11 
 
 
pleading sufficient facts to establish actual malice.  We 
allowed Patrick's application for direct appellate review.8 
Discussion.  We review the denial of a motion to dismiss de 
novo, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true and 
drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.  
Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011).  
In assuming the facts as alleged, however, "[w]e do not regard 
as 'true' legal conclusions cast in the form of factual 
allegations."  Leavitt v. Brockton Hosp., Inc., 454 Mass. 37, 39 
n.6 (2009).  To survive a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged 
must "'plausibly suggest[] (not merely be consistent with)' an 
entitlement to relief."  Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 636, quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (Twombly).  
See Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 56 
(1st Cir. 2012) (court applies Twombly pleading standard in 
defamation action by isolating and ignoring "actual malice 
buzzwords"). 
a.  Absolute privilege.  Patrick argues first that he is 
immune from Edwards's defamation claims because his statements 
to the media were made in the discharge of his official duties 
as governor and thus are, or should be, protected by an absolute 
                     
 
8 The denial of Patrick's motion to dismiss, which raised 
claims of absolute and qualified privilege, was immediately 
appealable under the doctrine of present execution.  Visnick v. 
Caulfield, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 809, 811 n.4 (2009). 
12 
 
 
privilege.  "An absolute privilege provides a defendant with a 
complete defense to a defamation suit even if the defamatory 
statement is uttered maliciously or in bad faith."  Mulgrew v. 
Taunton, 410 Mass. 631, 634 (1991).  In Massachusetts, the 
existence of an absolute privilege has been recognized in 
"comparatively few cases," Vigoda v Barton, 348 Mass. 478, 484 
(1965), and has been "limited to cases in which public policy or 
the administration of justice requires complete immunity."  
Ezekiel v. Jones Motor Co., 374 Mass. 382, 385 (1978).  See 
Sriberg v. Raymond, 370 Mass. 105, 108-109 (1976) (statements by 
party, counsel or witness made in relation to judicial 
proceeding); Sheppard v. Bryant, 191 Mass. 591, 592-593 (1906) 
(statements by witness testifying before legislative committee 
which were pertinent to questions and subject of examination). 
 
Patrick argues that, as the majority of States to have 
considered the question have done, we should adopt the Federal 
standard, which affords certain high-ranking Federal officials 
absolute immunity from defamation claims based on statements 
made within the scope of their official duties.  See Spalding v. 
Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896); 1 Sack on Defamation, Libel, 
Slander, and Related Problems § 8.2.5 (4th. ed. 2010) (Sack). 
 
The United States Supreme Court has expressed two 
significant policy reasons for the adoption of an absolute 
privilege.  See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-576 (1959).  
13 
 
 
First, Federal officials should be able to discharge their 
duties uninhibited by the fear and distraction of lawsuits.  Id. 
at 571-573.  Second, an absolute privilege furthers free speech 
by allowing Federal officials to speak with complete candor 
concerning matters of public importance.  Id. at 577 (Black, J., 
concurring).  The Court has recognized that application of an 
absolute privilege may result in an injustice to defamed 
citizens left without a remedy, but has deemed this a necessary 
sacrifice for the "greater good" given the specific positions at 
issue.  Id. at 576. 
As Patrick points out, consistent with the holding in Barr, 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 591 (2002) provides for an 
absolute privilege for defamation claims brought against high-
ranking Federal and State executive officers, including 
governors or State "superior executive officers."  According to 
the Restatement, "[a]n absolute privilege to publish defamatory 
matter concerning another in communications made in the 
performance of his official duties exists for (a) any executive 
or administrative officer of the United States; or (b) a 
governor or other superior executive officers of the state."  
Id. 
A majority of States have been persuaded by this reasoning, 
and have adopted an absolute privilege which shields the 
governor, or cabinet-level State officials, from defamation 
14 
 
 
claims for statements made in the course of their official 
duties.  See Sack, supra at § 8.2.5.  See, e.g., Blair v. 
Walker, 64 Ill. 2d 1, 6-11 (1976) (adopting absolute immunity to 
shield Illinois governor from defamation claim); Jones v. State, 
426 S.W.3d 50, 55-56 (Tenn. 2013) (cabinet-level State officials 
such as commissioner of Department of Correction immune from 
defamation claims arising from their official duties); Salazar 
v. Morales, 900 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex. App. 1995) (Texas Attorney 
General had absolute privilege to publish defamatory statements 
in communications associated with official duties). 
Nonetheless, other jurisdictions have recognized strong, 
countervailing considerations against extending an absolute 
privilege to a State governor and cabinet-level State officials.  
See e.g., Clark v. McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 613, 618 (1980) ("Public 
office does not carry with it a license to defame at will, for 
even the highest officers still exist to serve the public, not 
to denigrate its members").  Chief Justice Earl Warren, 
dissenting in Barr, observed that the public should have a right 
to criticize government officials without being "subjected to 
unfair -- and absolutely privileged -- retorts."  Barr, 360 U.S. 
at 584.  Consistent with this view, a substantial minority of 
State courts that have considered the issue have concluded that 
a qualified or conditional privilege is sufficient to protect 
high-ranking public officials from liability where their 
15 
 
 
statements are made in good faith and without malice.  See, 
e.g., Aspen Exploration Corp. v. Sheffield, 739 P.2d 150, 161 
(Alaska 1987) (application of absolute privilege to defamation 
suit against governor "would do little more than protect 
unprivileged defamatory statements leaving injured plaintiff 
without a remedy"); Goddard v. Fields, 214 Ariz. 175, 178-180 
(2007) (court declined to grant Attorney General absolute 
immunity to defend comments made in press release). 
As the motion judge noted in his decision, this court has 
not decided whether an absolute privilege shields the governor, 
or other high-ranking State officials, from liability for all 
defamation claims arising out of statements made in the 
performance of their official duties.  See Barrows v. Wareham 
Fire Dist., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 623, 630 n.10 (2012).  We 
considered the issue in considerable depth in two cases, 
Mulgrew, 410 Mass. at 634-635, and Vigoda, 348 Mass. at 483-484.  
In Mulgrew, supra at 634, a police chief argued that he had an 
absolute privilege to defend public comments he made regarding a 
police officer's fitness for duty.  In Vigoda, supra at 481, 
483, a social worker brought a defamation claim against the 
superintendent of Boston State Hospital, in connection with 
written evaluations, and the superintendent claimed that his 
official statements should be protected by an absolute 
privilege.  In both cases, we declined to apply an absolute 
16 
 
 
privilege because a qualified privilege in those circumstances 
was sufficient to shield the public official from liability.  
See Mulgrew, supra at 635; Vigoda, supra at 484. 
Given the conflicting policy considerations discussed 
above, it is more prudent to examine whether Edwards pleaded 
sufficient facts to state a cognizable claim for defamation.  We 
conclude that she did not. 
b.  Adequacy of the complaint.  Edwards was required to 
allege sufficient facts to establish that:  (1) Patrick made a 
statement concerning her to a third party; (2) the statement was 
defamatory such that it could damage her reputation in the 
community; (3) Patrick was at fault for making the statement; 
and (4) the statement caused her to suffer economic loss or was 
actionable without economic loss.  Ravnikar v. Bogojavlensky, 
438 Mass. 627, 629-630 (2003).  In addition, as a public figure, 
Edwards is required to allege that Patrick made a false and 
defamatory statement with knowledge that it was false or 
reckless disregard of its falsity.9  See New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280 (1964); id. at 270 (First 
                     
9  Patrick's status as governor also provides an independent 
basis for the imposition of the actual malice standard.  Edwards 
brought her defamation claim against Patrick for statements made 
while Patrick was acting within the scope his official duties.  
He was protected, at a minimum, by a qualified privilege when 
speaking to the media about Edwards's removal.  See Mulgrew v. 
Taunton, 410 Mass. 631, 635 (1991); Vigoda v. Barton, 348 Mass. 
478, 484 (1965). 
17 
 
 
Amendment to United States Constitution protects debate on 
public issues even where debate includes "vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials").  See also Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 449 Mass. 
42, 48 & n.8 (2007) (discussing application of actual malice 
requirement to defamation action brought by judge); Rotkiewicz 
v. Sadowsky, 431 Mass. 748, 755 (2000) ("As New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan[, supra,] and subsequent cases have made clear, a 
plaintiff who is a public official may not recover damages for 
defamation related to his or her public office unless the 
plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant made the false statement with actual malice"). 
The actual malice standard requires the public figure to 
prove that the statement was made either with knowledge that it 
was false, or with reckless disregard as to whether it was 
false.  See Rotkiewicz, 431 Mass. at 755.  Thus, to survive a 
motion to dismiss, Edwards must allege sufficient facts to 
establish that Patrick knew the statements were false, or acted 
with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity.  See Vigoda, 
348 Mass. at 485 ("Where the official believes the matter to be 
true . . . and has not acted with actual malice . . . or with 
reckless indifference to the rights of the individual citizen, 
his conditional privilege is not abused" [citations omitted]).  
Reckless disregard requires more than negligence; a plaintiff 
18 
 
 
must prove that the individual making the alleged defamatory 
statement "entertained serious doubts as to the truth" of the 
statement.  Murphy, 449 Mass. at 48, quoting St. Amant v. 
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).  The actual malice test is 
subjective.  "That information was available which would cause a 
reasonably prudent man to entertain serious doubts is not 
sufficient.  In order to negate the privilege, the jury must 
find such doubts were in fact entertained by the defendant."  
Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 867-868 
(1975).  See Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334 n.6 
(1974). 
Because it is rare to garner direct evidence of an 
individual's state of mind, a plaintiff may rely on 
circumstantial evidence to prove that a defendant had actual 
knowledge that the statements were false, or had serious doubts 
about their accuracy.  Levesque v. Doocey, 560 F.3d 82, 90 (1st 
Cir. 2009).  See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 
692 F.2d 189, 196 (1st Cir. 1982), aff'd, 466 U.S. 485 (1984) 
(subjective determination whether defendant in fact entertained 
serious doubts about truth of statement may be established by 
inference "as it would be very rare for a defendant to admit 
such doubts").  See also Murphy, 449 Mass.  at 57-58 
(determination of defendant's subjective state of mind may be 
made based on circumstantial evidence). 
19 
 
 
 
Edwards advances three distinct theories to support her 
claim that the amended complaint alleged sufficient facts to 
establish actual malice.  First, she points to a Patrick 
administration official's assurance that she had done nothing 
wrong as indicating the falsity of Patrick's subsequent 
statements accusing her of wrongdoing.  Second, she notes that 
the Paglia lawsuit, which Patrick referenced in his comments, 
did not accuse Edwards of pressuring Paglia to change his 
decision.  Third, Edwards contends that Patrick's spite and ill 
will toward her establish actual malice.  We address each 
argument in turn.10 
The amended complaint asserts that Edwards and Foley, 
Patrick's director of boards and commissions, met on 
September 16, 2014.  During that meeting, Foley informed 
Edwards:  "As you know, you serve at the Governor's pleasure.  
He has decided to replace you as Chairperson of the Sex Offender 
Registry Board."  Responding to Edwards's inquiry about the 
reasons for her removal, the complaint alleges that Foley 
                     
10 Edwards also claims that inconsistencies between 
Patrick's September 22, 2014, statement and his January 2, 2015, 
statement demonstrate that he lied about her removal.  This 
argument is without merit.  Patrick's January 2, 2015, remarks 
focused on the primary allegation that Edwards improperly sought 
to influence the independence of a hearing officer.  His failure 
to mention the purported systemic difficulties at SORB, as he 
had in his statement in September, as a further reason to remove 
Edwards from her position as chair did not constitute evidence 
that he believed that Edwards's job performance had been 
satisfactory. 
20 
 
 
assured Edwards that she had not done anything wrong.  Yet, 
after Edwards's meeting with Foley, Patrick twice informed the 
media that Edwards was removed from her position for interfering 
with the independence of a hearing officer. 
Edwards concedes that Foley's statements are not directly 
attributable to Patrick.  She contends, however, that Foley's 
assurance that Edwards had done nothing wrong is evidence of 
what Patrick actually believed.  Edwards urges us to draw the 
following inferences:  (1) Patrick spoke with Foley before the 
September 16 meeting; (2) Patrick informed Foley that he had the 
authority to replace Edwards in the exercise of his discretion; 
(3) Patrick told Foley that Edwards had done nothing wrong; and 
(4) Patrick accused Edwards of interfering with the independence 
of a SORB hearing officer although he knew she had done nothing 
wrong.  All of these inferences strung together, Edwards argues, 
are sufficient to prove that Patrick's subsequent statements 
that he removed Edwards for interfering with a hearing officer 
were knowingly false or were made in reckless disregard of their 
falsity. 
 
This attempt to ground the allegation of actual malice on a 
statement purportedly made by Foley at the termination meeting 
does not satisfy the pleading standard set forth in Iannacchino, 
451 Mass. at 636.  The theory that Foley's statement somehow 
reflected Patrick's personal view of Edwards's job performance 
21 
 
 
would require a fact finder to jump from one inference to 
another absent any of the necessary factual support.  Edwards's 
assertions regarding Patrick's likely state of mind, based on 
Foley's alleged statement to Edwards, are too speculative to 
support a claim of actual malice.  See Shay v. Walters, 702 F.3d 
76, 83 (1st Cir. 2012) ("inquiring court need not give weight to 
bare conclusions, unembellished by pertinent facts"); Biro v. 
Condé Nast, 963 F. Supp. 2d 255, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff'd, 807 
F.3d 541 (2d Cir. 2015) ("Not only is '[p]roving actual malice a 
heavy burden,  . . . but in the era of [Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662 (2009),] and Twombly, pleading actual malice is a more 
onerous task as well" [quotations and citation omitted]).  See 
also Sanford, Libel and Privacy § 13.3 at 13-62 (2d ed. Supp. 
2017) (noting difficulty in pleading actual malice in light of 
heightened pleading standards); 2 Sack on Defamation, Libel, 
Slander, and Related Problems, § 16:2.2 (noting courts' 
"insistence that litigation in which 'actual malice' must be 
established by the plaintiff provides no exception to the Iqbal 
and Twombly pleading requirements"). 
In her second argument, Edwards contends that the 
allegations in the amended complaint are sufficient to establish 
actual malice because it is reasonable to infer that Patrick 
read the complaint in the Paglia action, and knew that the 
asserted pressure brought to bear on Paglia occurred before 
22 
 
 
Edwards was appointed to be SORB chair.  This inference, 
however, is not supported by Edwards's own allegations in the 
amended complaint concerning the Paglia lawsuit, nor by the 
plain language in the Paglia complaint that was submitted as an 
exhibit to the Superior Court.  In her amended complaint, 
Edwards acknowledges that Paglia did bring a complaint against 
her for retaliation, and that he filed that claim after Edwards 
discussed the Sigh classification decision with him, and stated 
that she disagreed with his decision because "rape is rape."  
Moreover, the Paglia lawsuit described in some detail Edwards's 
alleged role in the Sigh matter.  Paglia's complaint clearly 
alleged that Edwards pressured him to withdraw his 
classification decision and to classify Sigh as a sex offender 
under Massachusetts law, and retaliated against him for his 
failure to do so.  The complaint also alleged that Edwards 
"verbally berated" Paglia, "at one point making him so nervous 
and panicked that [he] had to go to the hospital."  Accordingly, 
no view of the allegations in the Paglia lawsuit would support a 
claim that Patrick was on notice, after reading the complaint, 
that Edwards did nothing wrong. 
Edward's third theory concerning the sufficiency of her 
complaint is that Patrick's ill will and spite over her role in 
his brother-in-law's case support a claim of actual malice.  In 
this view, Patrick's statements were motivated by hostility 
23 
 
 
toward Edwards for having "nearly destroyed the lives of his 
sister and brother-in-law."  Thus, Patrick's statements to the 
media accusing Edwards of wrongdoing were strictly personal, 
meant to harm Edwards's reputation, and served no public 
purpose. 
Evidence of ill will or spite is insufficient, standing 
alone, to establish actual malice.  In Rotkiewicz, 431 Mass. at 
755, quoting Stone, 367 Mass. at 867, we held: 
"In the context of defamation, the term 'actual 
malice' does not mean the defendant's dislike of, hatred 
of, or ill will toward, the plaintiff.  Rather, actual 
malice means that the 'defamatory falsehood was published 
with knowledge that it was false or reckless disregard of 
whether it was false.'" 
 
Regardless of Patrick's alleged spiteful, negative feelings 
toward Edwards, which we take, as we must, as true for purposes 
of considering the sufficiency of the complaint, Edwards was 
required to allege specific facts to prove that Patrick made his 
statements to the media with knowledge of their falsity or with 
reckless disregard of their truth or falsity.  That Patrick 
might have harbored ill will toward Edwards for "nearly 
destroy[ing]" the lives of some members of his family does not 
substitute for proof of actual malice.  See Beckley Newspapers 
Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 82 (1967) ("personal spite, ill 
will or a desire to injure plaintiff" is not equivalent of 
actual malice). 
24 
 
 
Order denying motion to 
  dismiss reversed.