Title: Commonwealth v. Ware
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11387
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 26, 2019

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SJC-11387 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DARRYENE WARE. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     April 5, 2019. - July 26, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Conduct of prosecutor, New trial, 
Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 6, 2011. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Thomas F. McGuire, Jr., J., and 
a motion for a new trial, filed on December 21, 2015, was heard 
by him. 
 
 
 
Robert F. Shaw, Jr., for the defendant. 
 
Nathaniel Kennedy, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  Shots were fired into a crowd attending an 
outdoor baby shower in Brockton around 11 P.M. on April 25, 
2009.  Multiple people were injured, and one person was killed.  
A jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on 
2 
 
 
a theory of deliberate premeditation.1  We have consolidated the 
defendant's appeal from his convictions with his appeal from the 
denial of his motion for a new trial. 
 
State police Trooper Robert F. Clements, Jr., who was 
assigned to the district attorney's office, testified at trial 
that the defendant told police during two separate interviews 
that he was picked up on the night of the shooting in the area 
of a Dunkin' Donuts restaurant that was near the crime scene, 
and next to which three people were observed jumping into a back 
yard after the shooting.  This testimony was false.  As 
demonstrated by the trooper's police reports and transcripts of 
the defendant's interviews with police, the defendant never told 
police that he was picked up at or near Dunkin' Donuts.2  Because 
the Commonwealth's erroneous elicitation of and failure to 
correct this false testimony created a substantial likelihood of 
                     
 
1 The defendant also was convicted of two counts of armed 
assault with intent to murder, two counts of assault and battery 
by means of a dangerous weapon, and unlawful possession of a 
firearm. 
 
 
2 Two police interviews with the defendant are relevant to 
this opinion.  The first interview took place at the defendant's 
house on July 13, 2009, about three months after the shooting, 
and is described in a police report of State police Trooper 
Robert F. Clements, Jr..  The second interview took place at a 
police station on October 9, 2010, about one and one-half years 
after the shooting.  A transcript and video recording of the 
second interview are in the record. 
3 
 
 
a miscarriage of justice, we reverse.3 
 
Background.  We recite pertinent facts the jury could have 
found, with an emphasis on testimony about where the defendant 
was "picked up" on the night of the shooting.  The 
Commonwealth's theory at trial was that the defendant tried to 
kill the victim's boyfriend at a baby shower, and that the 
defendant inadvertently killed the victim instead.  The 
defendant and the victim's boyfriend were members of rival 
gangs, and the defendant made known that he did not like the 
                     
 
3 The trooper testified also, although not in so many words, 
that nobody except the defendant confessed to killing the 
victim.  The defendant contends, and the motion judge found, 
that the trooper's statement was false because the trooper's 
police reports discuss other confessions.  It is not always 
error for a prosecutor to elicit from a police officer testimony 
inconsistent with the officer's police report.  See Commonwealth 
v. McLeod, 394 Mass. 727, 743, cert. denied sub nom. Aiello v. 
Massachusetts, 474 U.S. 919 (1985) ("Simply because a witness 
alters some portion of his testimony at the time of trial is not 
a sufficient reason to conclude that the new testimony is false, 
or that the Commonwealth knew or had reason to know that it was 
false").  Here, however, the judge found based on the police 
reports that informants told the trooper about confessions by 
individuals other than the defendant, and the Commonwealth 
concedes that the reports show the police knew about other 
confessions.  Because the prosecutor was responsible for the 
contents of the trooper's police reports, cf. Commonwealth v. 
Murray, 461 Mass. 10, 19 (2011) (prosecutor must disclose 
exculpatory evidence possessed by police officer who "acts as an 
agent of the government in the investigation and prosecution of 
the case"), the prosecutor erroneously elicited and failed to 
correct what she knew or should have known was false testimony 
about a lack of other confessions.  We need not decide whether 
this error warrants reversal where the trooper's false testimony 
about the defendant's statements to police created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
4 
 
 
victim's boyfriend and "was going to get him."  The defendant 
was part of a group that decided to target the victim's 
boyfriend.  A member of that group learned that the boyfriend 
was going to be at a party on April 25, 2009, but after learning 
that the party was a baby shower he said at a meeting in the 
week before the shooting that they "shouldn't hit it."  The 
defendant responded that he still "wanted to do it" and that he 
did not care "if it was a baby shower or not." 
 
A friend of the defendant electronically sent "instant 
messages" to the defendant around 2 or 3 P.M. from the April 25 
baby shower, telling the defendant that the victim's boyfriend 
was there.  Shots were later fired from the street into a crowd 
attending the baby shower around 11 P.M., killing the victim.  
Some witnesses to the shooting thought there was one shooter, 
and others thought there were more.  Nobody at trial identified 
the defendant as a shooter. 
 
A resident of the area testified that she saw three people 
jump into her back yard after she heard gunshots just before 11 
P.M. on April 25, and that her back yard abuts a Dunkin' Donuts.  
The Dunkin' Donuts is roughly a five-minute walk from the crime 
scene. 
 
The defendant's marijuana dealer, David Barros, testified 
that the defendant telephoned and asked for a ride on the night 
of the shooting.  Barros picked up the defendant around 11:30 
5 
 
 
P.M.  When Barros asked the defendant whether the defendant knew 
how many people had been shot at the baby shower, the defendant 
said, "I don't know yet." 
 
Barros did not remember at trial where he picked up the 
defendant.  The trooper testified that Barros had told police 
that he picked up the defendant near Dunkin' Donuts.  Although 
Barros testified that he did not remember telling police that he 
picked up the defendant near Dunkin' Donuts, he admitted that 
while he and the defendant were driving, they stopped at a 
traffic light next to the Dunkin' Donuts and saw "an unmarked 
police car pass[] by with the lights flashing." 
 
The trooper also testified that the defendant told police 
on two occasions that Barros picked him up in the area of 
Dunkin' Donuts.  According to the trooper, the defendant also 
told police that "when [the defendant] was in [Barros]'s car in 
the area of Dunkin' Donuts, he had seen police cars going by 
with their lights on." 
 
Roughly four hours after the shooting, at around 3 A.M., 
the defendant went to the house of the friend who had sent him 
instant messages from the baby shower.  The friend testified 
that it was uncommon for the defendant to go to her house around 
that time of the morning, and that although the defendant was 
usually "hyper and jumpy," he was more nervous than usual and 
"was a weird type of jumpy and nervous."  It seemed to the 
6 
 
 
friend that the defendant already knew about the shooting. 
 
The Commonwealth did not present a murder weapon, and 
bullets found at the crime scene were not compared against any 
particular firearm.  However, the defendant was seen with a .25 
caliber firearm in the month before the shooting, and a 
ballistics expert testified that the fatal bullet found in the 
victim's body was consistent with .25 caliber ammunition and 
that multiple .25 caliber cartridge casings were recovered from 
the crime scene.  Additionally, the defendant was seen looking 
for the victim's boyfriend with a .22 caliber handgun in the 
months after the shooting, and there was testimony that the 
shots at the baby shower sounded like they came from a .22 
caliber handgun.  Two days after the shooting, the defendant was 
seen with bullets and a revolver that was not fully loaded. 
 
There was evidence that the defendant confessed multiple 
times to killing the victim.  At a gathering after the shooting, 
the defendant "jumped up and said he killed that bitch."  On 
cross-examination, however, a witness to the defendant's 
outburst testified that after the defendant said he "killed the 
bitch," "[e]veryone start[ed] laughing" and one of the people 
present said, "[H]e's joking."  Additionally, the witness 
admitted that the defendant had earlier told him that the 
7 
 
 
defendant had nothing to do with the shooting.4 
 
A childhood friend of the defendant testified that the 
defendant confessed multiple times to killing "[the boyfriend]'s 
bitch."  The friend testified on cross-examination that he was 
"laughing at" the defendant and "thought [the defendant] was 
joking" at the time of the confessions.  He also acknowledged 
that he had told the grand jury it was in the defendant's nature 
to "lie[] about things."  However, on redirect examination, the 
friend testified that he no longer thought the defendant was 
joking when he reported the defendant's actions to the police. 
 
Another witness testified that she overheard the defendant 
say to someone else that he shot "the bitch," referring to the 
victim.  According to the witness, the defendant told her not to 
say anything about what she heard and she delayed going to the 
police because she "didn't want to die."  Another witness who 
was present during the conversation between the defendant and 
the other individual testified, "I'm pretty sure if I heard 
someone confess that they murdered someone I would have 
remembered it. . . .  And I really don't remember hearing that."  
She also acknowledged that she intentionally did not pay 
attention to the defendant's conversation. 
                     
 
4 Likewise, the victim's boyfriend testified that sometime 
after the night of the shooting, the defendant told him that "he 
didn't do it." 
8 
 
 
 
The defendant moved for a new trial on various grounds.  
Most relevant to our decision is the defendant's claim that the 
trooper testified falsely that the defendant told police that 
Barros picked him up on the night of the shooting at the Dunkin' 
Donuts near the crime scene.  After a hearing, the judge denied 
the motion in a written decision.  With respect to the trooper's 
testimony about where the defendant said he was picked up, the 
judge concluded that although "there is a discrepancy between 
[the trooper's] testimony on direct examination and his police 
report," "[t]he mere fact that a prosecution witness gives 
inconsistent testimony does not amount to a violation of [the 
cases] dealing with false testimony."  The judge also observed 
that defense counsel "corrected" the inconsistency on cross-
examination and that the trooper "adopted" the information in 
his police report.  However, in his analysis, the judge 
discussed only the trooper's testimony about the first interview 
with the defendant, even though the trooper testified that the 
defendant had said he was picked up in the area of Dunkin' 
Donuts during two separate interviews. 
 
Discussion.  In reviewing the denial of a motion for a new 
trial, "[w]e review the motion judge's decision for abuse of 
discretion."  Commonwealth v. Burgos, 462 Mass. 53, 60, cert. 
denied, 568 U.S. 1072 (2012).  Where, as here, the motion judge 
was also the trial judge, "we afford particular deference" to 
9 
 
 
the judge's factual findings.  Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 481 
Mass. 641, 649 (2019). 
 
"The Commonwealth may not present testimony at trial 'which 
[it] knows or should know is false.'"  Commonwealth v. Forte, 
469 Mass. 469, 490 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 410 
Mass. 521, 532 (1991), S.C., 469 Mass. 340 (2014).  Nor may the 
Commonwealth, "although not soliciting false evidence, allow[] 
it to go uncorrected when it appears."  Commonwealth v. Hurst, 
364 Mass. 604, 608 (1974), quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 
264, 269 (1959).  Because the defendant did not raise at trial 
the issue of false testimony,5 we review any error for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.6  See 
                     
 
5 At trial, defense counsel did express concern that the 
trooper's testimony about the defendant's interviews was false, 
stating at sidebar, "I already found out about the picking him 
up at Dunkin' Donuts.  My client didn't say that.  So I'm going 
to impeach him . . . with that."  The judge deferred addressing 
the issue until after the trooper's direct examination.  After 
the direct examination was completed, the judge asked to "see 
counsel again on that issue," and the defense attorney replied, 
"No, I'm all right.  Thank you."  Thus, the judge did not have 
an opportunity to address any claim that the Commonwealth had 
elicited or failed to correct false testimony.  See Commonwealth 
v. McDonagh, 480 Mass. 131, 137 n.7 (2018) ("At least as 
important as protecting the record, a timely and precise 
objection provides the judge with an opportunity to consider the 
argument presented in order to make a reasoned decision"). 
 
 
6 The judge applied a different standard in his decision 
denying the defendant's motion for a new trial, namely, whether 
there is "any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony 
could have affected the judgment of the jury."  Commonwealth v. 
Gilday, 382 Mass. 166, 177 (1980), quoting United States v. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 & n.9 (1976).  Because the "any 
10 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Woollam, 478 Mass. 493, 504 (2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 1579 (2018), citing Burgos, 462 Mass. at 60 
(reviewing for substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice 
claim of "prosecutorial misconduct in failing to correct" false 
testimony). 
 
The trooper testified at trial that during the trooper's 
first interview with the defendant, the defendant initially told 
the trooper that on the night of the shooting "he was at a 
friend Derrick Wells'[s] house," and then later "recalled that 
he was with a friend . . . Barros."  According to the trooper, 
the defendant "stated that [Barros] had picked him up over in 
the area of Dunkin' Donuts."  However, as the judge concluded, 
"there is a discrepancy between [the trooper's] testimony on 
direct examination and his police report." 
 
According to the police report, the defendant told the 
trooper, in relevant part: 
"when the shooting of [the victim] happened, [the 
defendant] was with a friend named 'David' . . . .  [The 
defendant] was at [Wells]'s residence on Winthrop Street 
when David called him. . . .  [The defendant] asked David 
to come pick him up. . . .  [W]hen he was talking to him, 
David said he was over by Addison Avenue. . . .  David told 
[the defendant] there were a lot of police by the Dunkin 
                     
reasonable likelihood" standard is a matter of due process, see 
Gilday, supra, the "substantial likelihood" standard may not 
provide less protection to defendants in this context.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Urena, 417 Mass. 692, 696 (1994) ("satisfaction 
of the standard for effective assistance of counsel under the 
[Massachusetts] Declaration of Rights . . . satisfies the 
Federal standard"). 
11 
 
 
Donuts . . . ." 
 
Although the report does not state where the defendant met up 
with Barros, the implication is that the defendant was still at 
Wells's house on Winthrop Street when he asked Barros for a 
ride.7  It is possible from the report's language that the 
defendant told Barros to pick him up elsewhere.  But Barros 
seems to have been near the Dunkin' Donuts when he was talking 
with the defendant on the telephone.  Therefore, he would have 
had to go somewhere other than the Dunkin' Donuts to "come pick 
[the defendant] up." 
 
Defense counsel addressed on cross-examination the 
discrepancy between the trooper's testimony and the police 
report by going line-by-line through the relevant portion of the 
report.  In his decision on the defendant's motion for a new 
trial, the judge found that the trooper "adopted" his police 
report and "affirmed that the defendant said that he was at his 
friend [Wells]'s house, rather than Dunkin' Donuts, when he 
asked Barros to pick him up."  In response to defense counsel's 
question whether the defendant said "he was picked up at . . . 
Wells'[s] on Winthrop Street by . . . Barros," the trooper 
                     
 
7 A map in evidence shows that Winthrop Street is no closer 
to the crime scene than the defendant's house, which according 
to the trooper's testimony is approximately two miles from the 
crime scene. 
12 
 
 
replied, "That was his . . . initial story."8  Thus, we agree 
with the motion judge that any error by the Commonwealth in 
eliciting or failing to correct the trooper's testimony about 
his first interview with the defendant did not in and of itself 
require a new trial.  See United States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593, 
601 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 278 (2018) ("It is 
difficult to imagine how a conviction could have been 'obtained 
by the knowing use of perjured testimony' when that testimony 
was almost immediately corrected by the witness himself"). 
 
The analysis is different for the trooper's testimony about 
his second interview with the defendant, the falsity of which 
neither party corrected at trial.  The trooper testified that 
during this second interview, the defendant stated that on the 
night of the shooting Barros "picked him up in the area of 
Dunkin' Donuts."  The prosecutor then asked the trooper, "At 
some point during this interview with the defendant . . . , did 
he then change his story and indicate that he had not, in fact, 
been picked up at Dunkin' Donuts by . . . Barros?"  The trooper 
replied, "Yes. . . .  [I]t changed to . . . his house."  This 
questioning and testimony created the impression that the 
defendant initially told police during the second interview that 
                     
 
8 The trooper testified that the second story the defendant 
told during the first interview was that he went to the house of 
the friend who had sent him "instant messages" from the baby 
shower. 
13 
 
 
he was picked up at or near Dunkin' Donuts, next to the very 
location where three people were observed jumping into a back 
yard after the shooting, and then changed his story by saying he 
was picked up at his house. 
 
However, the second interview transcript reveals that the 
trooper characterized falsely the defendant's statements 
regarding where the defendant was picked up on the night of the 
shooting.  The defendant never stated that he was picked up at 
or near the Dunkin' Donuts.  He pointedly denied on at least 
four occasions being picked up there despite the police 
officers' questions and comments suggesting that he was, and he 
consistently asserted that he was picked up at his house.  The 
judge did not address, in the context of the defendant's false 
testimony claim, the trooper's testimony about the defendant's 
second interview with police.9  It is apparent from the 
transcript of the second interview, however, that the trooper 
testified falsely as to both where the defendant said he was 
picked up and the lack of consistency in the defendant's story 
about where he was picked up.10 
                     
 
9 The judge discussed the second interview only in the 
context of the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, concluding that defense counsel was not ineffective for 
failing to cross-examine the trooper about the second interview. 
 
 
10 The defendant stated during the second interview that he 
lives "right up the street from . . . Dunkin' Donuts."  However, 
this statement does not make correct the trooper's false 
14 
 
 
 
Nothing in the record definitively resolves whether the 
prosecutor purposely elicited false testimony.  However, she 
said at sidebar -- in the midst of her questioning about the 
second interview -- that she was "essentially going through" the 
interview transcripts.  The prosecutor should have known, based 
on these transcripts, that the defendant had not said at the 
second interview that he was picked up at or near the Dunkin' 
Donuts, and she should have corrected the trooper's testimony to 
the contrary.  Cf. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 
(1972) ("whether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or 
design, it is the responsibility of the prosecutor"). 
 
Some of our cases suggest that a prosecutor need not 
correct false testimony where, as here, the defendant has access 
at trial to materials showing the testimony is false.11  See 
Burgos, 462 Mass. at 60, 62; Commonwealth v. Jewett, 442 Mass. 
                     
testimony that the defendant had said he was picked up "in the 
area of Dunkin' Donuts."  First, according to the trooper's 
testimony the defendant's house is approximately two miles from 
the Dunkin' Donuts.  Second, the trooper testified that the 
defendant had two explanations for where he was picked up:  in 
the area of Dunkin' Donuts and at his house.  The trooper 
clearly was not referring to the defendant's house when he said 
that the defendant had stated he was picked up in the area of 
Dunkin' Donuts. 
 
 
11 The interviews with the defendant were the subject of a 
motion to suppress, and at the hearing on that motion the judge 
was provided with a transcript of the second interview.  At 
trial, the prosecutor said at sidebar that she "provided these 
transcripts to [defense counsel] several weeks ago, prior to the 
motion to suppress." 
15 
 
 
356, 363 (2004); Commonwealth v. Mercado, 383 Mass. 520, 525 
(1981); Commonwealth v. Heffernan, 350 Mass. 48, 55, cert. 
denied, 384 U.S. 960 (1966) ("defendant's full knowledge of the 
facts is for us the definitive answer to the defendant's claim 
of suppression of evidence and related use of perjured 
testimony").  In his decision denying the defendant's motion for 
a new trial, the judge cited a Federal case to that effect.  See 
United States v. Mangual-Garcia, 505 F.3d 1, 10-11 (1st Cir. 
2007), cert. denied sub. nom. Villanueva-Rivera v. United 
States, 553 U.S. 1019 (2008) ("When the defendant knows about 
the false testimony and fails to bring it to the jury or the 
court's attention, the assumption is that he did so for 
strategic reasons, and the defendant will not be allowed to 
question his own strategic choices on appeal"). 
 
However, where the testimony is blatantly false and 
pertains to an issue central to the Commonwealth's case, a 
defendant's ability to discern the statement's falsity does not 
absolve prosecutors of their duty to correct.  Cf. United States 
v. Stein, 846 F.3d 1135, 1147 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 
S. Ct. 556 (2017) ("where the government not only fails to 
correct materially false testimony but also affirmatively 
capitalizes on it, the defendant's due process rights are 
violated despite the government's timely disclosure of evidence 
showing the falsity"); Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 909 (9th 
16 
 
 
Cir. 2011), quoting Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 
1109, 1122 (9th Cir. 2001) ("It is 'irrelevant' whether the 
defense knew about the false testimony and failed to object or 
cross-examine the witness, because defendants 'c[an]not waive 
the freestanding ethical and constitutional obligation of the 
prosecutor as a representative of the government to protect the 
integrity of the court and the criminal justice system'").   
 
Our cases cited supra are not inconsistent with this 
conclusion, as they do not address blatantly false testimony 
central to the prosecution's case.  See Burgos, 462 Mass. at 60, 
62 (prosecutor did not "knowingly and improperly fail[] to 
correct allegedly false testimony" where defendant knew at trial 
about information that purportedly showed testimony was false, 
and where judge found "that it would have been reasonably clear 
to the jury that the witnesses were not suggesting" false 
information); Jewett, 442 Mass. at 363 (Commonwealth not 
required to impeach own witness with documents in defendant's 
possession that were supposedly inconsistent with witness 
testimony where documents were "cryptic and inconclusive"); 
Mercado, 383 Mass. at 525 (no misconduct where defendant knew at 
trial about information that allegedly showed testimony was 
false, and where information did not in fact show testimony was 
false); Heffernan, 350 Mass. at 54-55 (no error where defendant 
had "full knowledge" of pertinent facts and "prosecutor had no 
17 
 
 
knowledge of there being anything amounting to perjury"). 
 
Here, the trooper's testimony about the second interview 
was blatantly false and pertained to a critical component of the 
Commonwealth's case.  Thus, it was error for the prosecutor not 
to correct the testimony.12  And because of its importance to the 
Commonwealth's case, the testimony "was likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion" and, thus, created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
Commonwealth v. DiPadova, 460 Mass. 424, 437 (2011), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Berry, 457 Mass. 602, 618 (2010), S.C., 466 
Mass. 763 (2014). 
 
Proving the defendant's presence at or near the Dunkin' 
Donuts was a cornerstone of the Commonwealth's strategy at 
trial.  The Commonwealth elicited testimony showing that the 
Dunkin' Donuts was a five-minute walk from the crime scene.  The 
jurors later visited two locations during a view:  the Dunkin' 
Donuts and the crime scene.  During the view, the prosecutor 
twice asked the jurors to observe the properties next to the 
Dunkin' Donuts and the distance between the crime scene and the 
                     
 
12 The Commonwealth argues that any false testimony was 
corrected when the prosecutor asked the trooper why the 
defendant "was thinking of the Dunkin' Donuts," and the trooper 
replied that the defendant had stated that "when he was in 
[Barros]'s car in the area of Dunkin' Donuts, he had seen police 
cars going by with their lights on."  However, this testimony 
served to explain an inconsistency that never existed.  It did 
not correct the trooper's false testimony. 
18 
 
 
Dunkin' Donuts.  Importantly, following the view there was 
testimony that three people jumped into a back yard abutting the 
Dunkin' Donuts after gunshots were heard on the night of the 
shooting.  Considering this evidence, the trooper's testimony 
that the defendant had said he was picked up at or near the 
Dunkin' Donuts placed the defendant near the scene of the crime 
and in the precise area where the shooter or shooters were seen 
fleeing. 
 
The prosecutor solidified the impact of the trooper's 
testimony when she said in closing argument that "[y]ou . . . 
need presence at or near a crime scene in a murder case."  She 
reminded jurors about the witness "who said they jumped the 
fence in her yard that backs right up to the Dunkin' Donuts 
parking lot, . . . the one where . . . Barros may or may not 
have picked up the defendant."  Although the prosecutor 
acknowledged that the defendant was picked up "either at the 
Dunkin' Donuts, the area around the Dunkin'[] Donuts, . . . or 
at the defendant's [home] address," the trooper's false 
testimony encouraged a finding that the defendant was picked up 
at or near the Dunkin' Donuts. 
 
Any other evidence that the defendant was picked up there 
was tenuous at best.  As discussed supra, the trooper testified, 
inconsistently with his police report, that during the 
defendant's first interview with police the defendant said he 
19 
 
 
had been picked up in the area of Dunkin' Donuts.  But the 
trooper contradicted his own testimony on cross-examination and 
adopted the information in his report, according to which the 
defendant said he was picked up at a friend's house. 
 
The trooper also testified that Barros told the trooper he 
picked up the defendant "in the area of Dunkin' Donuts."  
However, immediately before this testimony the judge instructed 
the jury that testimony about out-of-court statements could be 
used only for impeachment.  Earlier in the trial, Barros had 
testified that he did not remember telling the police he had 
picked up the defendant near Dunkin' Donuts.  When asked where 
he did tell the police he had picked up the defendant, he 
responded, "I told them I picked him up somewhere around our 
house[s]."  No substantive evidence supported the trooper's 
impeachment testimony that Barros had said he picked up the 
defendant near the Dunkin' Donuts.13 
 
The jury did hear substantive evidence that the defendant 
                     
 
13 The defendant claims it is false that Barros told the 
police he picked up the defendant near the Dunkin' Donuts.  The 
judge rejected this argument, observing that "[t]he defendant 
offers no evidence that th[e] testimony was false."  As 
indicated in the text, Barros testified that he had told the 
police that he picked up the defendant "somewhere around our 
house[s]," and the trooper testified that Barros had told the 
police that he picked up the defendant "in the area of Dunkin' 
Donuts."  However, inconsistent testimony is insufficient to put 
a prosecutor on notice that a particular witness's story is 
false.  See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 410 Mass. 521, 531-532 
(1991), S.C., 469 Mass. 340 (2014). 
20 
 
 
was near the Dunkin' Donuts on the night of the shooting after 
Barros picked him up at a different location.  Barros testified 
that he and the defendant, while in Barros's vehicle, were 
stopped at a traffic light near the Dunkin' Donuts and saw a 
police car pass with flashing lights.  And the trooper 
testified, consistently with a transcript of the second 
interview, that the defendant had told police that "when he was 
in [Barros]'s car in the area of Dunkin' Donuts, he had seen 
police cars going by with their lights on."  Although 
inculpatory to some extent, evidence that the defendant was near 
the crime scene in a car after the shooting and after having 
been picked up elsewhere pales against evidence that the 
defendant was picked up near the crime scene.  This is 
especially true considering the testimony that individuals 
jumped into a back yard next to the Dunkin' Donuts after the 
shooting. 
 
Finally, although there was no instruction on consciousness 
of guilt, the jury may have perceived the false testimony that 
the defendant changed his story about where he was picked up as 
evidence of the defendant's guilty mind.  See Commonwealth v. 
Vick, 454 Mass. 418, 424 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 453 (2008) ("false statements to the 
police" may warrant consciousness of guilt instruction).  
Without the false testimony, the jury would have been less 
21 
 
 
likely to believe that the defendant changed his story from 
being picked up at or near the Dunkin' Donuts to being picked up 
at his house.  The only other substantive evidence that the 
defendant said he had been picked up at or near the Dunkin' 
Donuts would have come from the trooper's testimony about his 
first interview with the defendant, which the trooper 
contradicted when he adopted on cross-examination the statements 
in his police report about where the defendant had said he was 
picked up.  Thus, absent the uncorrected false testimony, the 
only inconsistency about where the defendant said he had been 
picked up would have been the defendant saying during the first 
interview that he had been picked up at his friend's house and 
saying during the second interview that he had been picked up at 
his own house.14  This discrepancy is less inculpatory than one 
involving the Dunkin' Donuts, which the Commonwealth linked with 
the crime throughout trial. 
 
The trooper's false testimony about the defendant's second 
interview with the police created a substantial likelihood of a 
                     
 
14 The trooper testified about an inconsistency in the 
defendant's statements unrelated to where Barros picked up the 
defendant.  According to the trooper, during the first interview 
the defendant "stated that he . . . took a cab from [Wells]'s 
house . . . to his father's house . . . .  He then changed that 
when I confronted him with the cab records, which indicated that 
he had actually taken a cab from Hillberg to his dad's."  This 
testimony is consistent with the police report describing the 
interview, as well as testimony at trial about taxicab records 
from the morning after the shooting. 
22 
 
 
miscarriage of justice.  The false testimony went to "a central 
point in the trial as a whole," DiPadova, 460 Mass. at 437, and 
the case against the defendant, although considerable, was not 
quite strong enough to overcome the prejudice from the 
Commonwealth's erroneous elicitation of and failure to correct 
the false testimony.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607, 
623 (2015) ("over-all strength or weakness of the evidence 
presented against a defendant is significant . . . because it 
provides the context within which to assess whether the newly 
discovered evidence would have been a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations").15 
                     
 
15 Because we are ordering a new trial, we do not address 
fully certain other claims the defendant raises on appeal, 
including his request that we exercise our power under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  However, with respect to the contention that 
various statements in the Commonwealth's closing argument were 
improper, the Commonwealth should use caution when paraphrasing 
the defendant's statements, be certain that any reference to a 
"murder weapon" is grounded in the evidence about what type of 
bullet killed the victim, avoid asking jurors to put themselves 
into the case, and, as always, characterize the law accurately. 
 
 
With respect to the defendant's various arguments about 
cell site location information (CSLI), we observe that if 
defense counsel was provided with CSLI during discovery, then he 
was constitutionally ineffective for failing to recognize the 
existence of that information, assuming none existed, and then 
raising the issue on cross-examination of the trooper by asking, 
"You didn't map out anything regarding . . . where [the 
defendant] was on April 25, 2009, did you?" to which the trooper 
replied, "Yes, we did."  We observe also that, according to the 
defendant, the Commonwealth did not comply with a discovery 
order to turn over CSLI mapping.  In his decision denying the 
defendant's motion for a new trial, the judge rejected this 
argument because "a large number of records from cell phone 
23 
 
 
 
Conclusion.  The error warranting reversal here goes to the 
heart of the Commonwealth's obligation to do justice.  A 
prosecutor "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; 
                     
companies were obtained during grand jury proceedings and 
provided to the defense."  If requested CSLI mapping exists, 
then the Commonwealth is obligated to provide it to the 
defendant at a new trial. 
 
 
Finally, with respect to the defendant's various arguments 
about third-party culprit evidence in the form of instant 
messages, we need not unravel the thicket of this evidentiary 
and discovery dispute, as "[t]he defense now has the relevant 
information and counsel can adequately assert the defendant's 
rights at any retrial."  Commonwealth v. Connor, 392 Mass. 838, 
852 (1984).  Nevertheless, we provide some general guidance.  As 
the judge recognized implicitly, the defendant is required as a 
foundational matter to authenticate the instant messages.  
Authentication is an issue of conditional relevance.  See Mass. 
G. Evid. § 104(b) (2019).  See generally Mass. G. Evid. §§ 901, 
902 (authentication).  A judge, when addressing an issue of 
conditional relevance, does not decide whether he or she 
believes that the item being offered in evidence is what it is 
purported to be.  Rather, the judge decides whether a trier of 
fact "could reasonably find the conditional fact . . . by a 
preponderance of the evidence."  Commonwealth v. Meola, 95 Mass. 
App. Ct. 303, 308 n.13 (2019), quoting Huddleston v. United 
States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988).  The judge is not making a 
credibility decision when addressing conditional relevance.  For 
that, we put our faith in the jury.  This circumstance is in 
contrast to that of the judge addressing preliminary questions 
of fact upon which admissibility depends.  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 104(a).  With respect to those questions, the judge decides 
whether a foundational issue of evidentiary law has been 
satisfied in determining the admissibility of evidence.  See, 
e.g., Mass. G. Evid. § 804(a) (unavailability of out-of-court 
declarant for purposes of certain hearsay exceptions); Mass. 
G. Evid. § 803(2) (spontaneous utterance exception to rule 
against hearsay); Mass. G. Evid. § 702 (reliability of expert 
witness testimony); Mass. G. Evid. art. V (privileges). 
24 
 
 
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not 
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. . . .  
It is as much his [or her] duty to refrain from improper methods 
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use 
every legitimate means to bring about a just one."  Berger v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 
The defendant's convictions are vacated and set aside.  The 
case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.