Title: Russell Construction of Alabama, Inc. v. Peat
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1180979
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 22, 2020

Rel: May 22, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
_________________________
1180979
_________________________
Russell Construction of Alabama, Inc.
v.
Christopher Peat
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-18-902291)
SHAW, Justice.
Russell Construction of Alabama, Inc. ("Russell"),
appeals from an order of the Montgomery Circuit Court vacating
a judgment entered on an arbitration award in favor of Russell
1180979
and against Christopher Peat.  We affirm in part, reverse in
part, and remand. 
Facts and Procedural History
In 2015, Russell and Peat entered into a contract
pursuant to which Russell agreed to construct a residence for
Peat on "a cost plus a fee basis."  The documents executed in
connection with the contract provided, in the event of a
controversy or dispute, first for mediation and then for
arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American
Arbitration Association.   The arbitration agreement further
provided that "[t]he award rendered by the arbitrator or
arbitrators shall be final, and judgment may be entered upon
it in accordance with applicable law in any court having
jurisdiction thereof." 
Upon completion of the residence, a dispute arose between
Russell and Peat regarding Russell's performance and the
balance due Russell under the contract.  In January 2018,
Russell filed a formal demand for arbitration, seeking
$295,408 allegedly due from Peat for the construction of the
residence.  Peat counterclaimed, alleging breach of fiduciary
duty and breach of contract and disputing his consent to costs
2
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incurred by Russell; Peat sought specific performance and an
award of $255,000 on his counterclaims.  Thereafter, in May
2018, the parties reached, as a result of mediation, a
settlement agreement.  In essence, the settlement agreement
required Russell to make certain repairs to the residence;
required Peat to pay Russell $245,408 on or before June 15,
2018, at which time Russell agreed to release its recorded
lien; and required Peat to deposit into escrow an additional
$50,000 to ensure completion, by the end of August 2018, of a
"punch-list" 
to 
the 
satisfaction 
of 
a 
third-party
"Construction Consultant." 
In July 2018, Russell, on the ground that Peat had failed
to comply with the settlement agreement, moved that the
arbitrator enter an award based on the terms of the settlement
agreement.  Peat moved either to reform or to rescind the
settlement agreement based on disagreement with some of
Russell's charged costs, on mistake and/or fraud, and on his
own purported "economic duress."  On July 25, 2018, the
parties proceeded to an arbitration hearing to consider
whether Peat was entitled to rescind or reform the settlement
3
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agreement, whether Peat had breached that agreement, and
damages, if any. 
On August 22, 2018, subsequent to the parties' submission
of post-hearing filings, the arbitrator issued a "Partial
Final Award" in which he concluded:
"The [settlement agreement] is enforceable.  Peat
breached the agreement by failing to pay Russell
$245,408.00 on June 15, 2018.  Russell is entitled
to an award in that amount plus interest at the
agreed rate of 8%.  While Peat also failed to pay
$50,000 into escrow, Russell is not damaged because
it has not performed the completion/punch list work
against which the $50,000 was to be escrowed."
Noting that Peat's arguments for either rescission or
reformation 
of 
the 
settlement 
agreement 
were 
legally
unsupportable, the arbitrator's award further provided that
"both parties, with advice of counsel, stipulated that they
wanted the remaining provisions of the settlement agreement to
remain in effect and binding on the parties" with the
extension of certain deadlines provided in the agreement. 
That included Russell's completion of the remaining remedial
work identified on the punch list and the related distribution
of the funds to be placed in escrow.  On September 5, 2018,
the arbitrator entered a "Modified Partial Final Award" in
which he identified a miscalculation in the Partial Final
4
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Award and revised the amount awarded to Russell to
$258,959.89, which amount included interest. 
On December 19, 2018 –- well over 30 days after the
issuance of the arbitrator's Modified Partial Final Award --
Russell filed in the Montgomery Circuit Court, pursuant to
Rule 71C, Ala. R. Civ. P.,1 a motion seeking entry of a
1Rule 71C provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) Who May Enforce.  Any party to an
arbitration may seek enforcement of the award
entered as a result of the arbitration.
"(b) When Filed. If no appeal has been filed
pursuant to Rule 71B[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,]  within
thirty (30) days of service of the notice of the
award, thereby resulting in a waiver of the right to
review, the party seeking enforcement of the award
may at any time thereafter seek enforcement of the
award in the appropriate circuit court as set forth
in paragraph (c) of this rule.
"(c) Where Filed. The motion for entry of
judgment shall be filed with the clerk of the
circuit court where the action underlying the
arbitration is pending or if no action is pending in
the circuit court, then in the office of the clerk
of the circuit court of the county where the award
is made.
"(d) What Filed. A party seeking enforcement of
an award shall file a motion for entry of judgment,
and shall attach to the motion a copy of the award,
signed by the arbitrator, if there is only one, or
by a majority of the arbitrators.
"....
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judgment in the amount of $258,959.89 in accordance with the
arbitrator's 
Modified 
Partial 
Final 
Award 
(case 
no.
CV-18-902291).  Russell submitted copies of the settlement
agreement, the Partial Final Award, and the Modified Partial
Final Award and further indicated that Peat had failed to pay
the 
awarded 
amount. 
 
Russell 
specifically 
requested
enforcement of the Modified Partial Final Award.  
In February 2019, the parties attended a second
arbitration hearing 
at 
which 
the 
arbitrator considered whether
the parties' failure to perform remaining obligations under
the settlement agreement amounted to another breach of the
agreement and, if so, whether another award of damages was
warranted.    On March 7, 2019, the arbitrator entered what it
called a "Final Award."    In it, the arbitrator found that
neither Russell nor Peat had performed their remaining
obligations under the settlement agreement and, accordingly,
"[made] an equitable allocation of the contract balance of
$50,000.00," which, based upon his findings as to the
"(f) Procedure After Filing. The clerk promptly
shall enter the award as the final judgment of the
court. After service pursuant to paragraph (e) of
this rule, the prevailing party may seek execution
on the judgment as in any other case."
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1180979
respective fault of each, he awarded as follows:  $33,500 to
Russell, which had been reduced by $7,000 based on Russell's
failure to make repairs to the concrete at Peat's residence,
and $16,500 to Peat.  The Final Award "reaffirmed" the earlier
Modified Partial Final Award, resulting in a total monetary
judgment to Russell in the amount of $295,305.80, which amount
included interest.
On March 13, 2019, Peat filed an "answer" in the circuit
court to Russell's prior Rule 71C motion seeking a judgment on
the Modified Partial Final Award.  In it, Peat both denied the
allegations in the motion and asserted various affirmative
defenses, including fraud.   Peat's answer included no
attachments.  
The circuit court set the matter for a "bench trial." 
Russell then filed an "Amended Rule 71C Motion for Entry of
Judgment by Clerk on Arbitration Award," notifying the circuit
court of the arbitrator's Final Award, of Peat's failure to
pay the amount required by either the Modified Partial Final
Award or the Final Award, and of Peat's purported failure to
appeal from the Final Award within the 30-day time frame
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1180979
provided in Rule 71B, Ala. R. Civ. P.2  Russell sought entry
of a judgment against Peat in the amount of $295,305.80.  The
Final Award was included as an exhibit to the motion.  
Thereafter, Russell filed a "Motion for Instructions to
the Clerk of Court to Enter Judgment on Arbitration Award" in
which it again cited Peat's alleged failure to pay or to
appeal the Final Award within 30 days and requested that the
circuit court "instruct the Clerk of the Court to immediately
enter judgment on the Final Award pursuant to [Rule] 71C in
the amount of $295,305.80."  On April 30, 2019, the circuit
court granted that motion and instructed its clerk to enter
judgment accordingly.  On that same date, the clerk entered a
"Final Judgment Pursuant to Rule 71C" in favor of Russell and
against Peat in the amount of $295,305.80.
On May 1, 2019, Peat filed, presumably pursuant to Rule
59, Ala. R. Civ. P., a "Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate
Order Done on April 30, 2019."  Although conceding, as Russell
2Rule 71B(b) provides that a notice of appeal from an
arbitration award "shall be filed within thirty (30) days
after service of notice of the arbitration award.  Failure to
file within thirty (30) days shall constitute a waiver of the
right to review."
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1180979
alleged in its amended Rule 71C motion, that the arbitrator
had, in fact, entered the Final Award on March 7, 2019,3 Peat
argued that his March 13 answer to Russell's Rule 71C motion
on the Modified Partial Final Award had asserted various
grounds as to why an award should not be enforced.  More
specifically, Peat alleged:
"[I]t is a long-standing principle of this court
that substance shall prevail over form and that it
is the true intent of the Answer and the defenses
asserted to challenge the sufficiency of the
arbitration award.
"... That the Answer was filed on March 13, 2019
and it was within 30 days of the Arbitration award,
but it was not filed consistent with other sections
of Rule 71B of the Ala.R.Civ.P.
"... [That he] was served with [Russell's] Rule
71C petition the same day of the final arbitration
hearing, and thus ... was not given 30 days to
properly file his Rule 71B motion before [Russell]
filed its 71C petition to enforce the arbitration
award."
Based on the foregoing, Peat sought a hearing in the circuit
court "to determine if the arbitration award should be
upheld."  As discussed below, Peat contends that the March 13,
3Peat did not claim below and does not argue on appeal
that he was not timely served with either the arbitrator's
Partial Final Award or the Modified Partial Final Award.
9
1180979
2019, answer was, in effect, a notice of appeal of the
arbitration award. 
After a hearing, the circuit court entered an order, on
July 25, 2019, granting Peat's motion to set aside the April
30, 2019, judgment.  In its order, the circuit court explained
that, pursuant to Peat's motion, it had been called on "to
determine if the arbitration award should be upheld, and/or
[whether to] allow [Peat] to cure defects in his answer and
properly submit a Rule 71B Notice of Appeal from the
arbitration award."  On August 6, 2019, Peat filed a purported
notice of appeal in which he alleged that the Final Award was
"legally unjust" and requested that it be overturned.  That
notice was assigned a separate case number in the trial court
(CV-19-901484); however, on Russell's motion, the two actions
were consolidated under case number CV-18-902291.  Russell
filed its notice of appeal to this Court on August 27, 2019. 
See Rule 71B(g) ("An appeal may be taken from the grant or
denial of any Rule 59[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] motion challenging
[an arbitration] award by filing a notice of appeal to the
appropriate appellate court pursuant to Rule 4, Alabama Rules
of Appellate Procedure.").
10
1180979
Standard of Review
"'In R.P. Industries, Inc. v. S & M
Equipment Co., 896 So. 2d 460 (2004), this
Court reviewed the trial court's order
granting a motion to confirm an arbitration
award and denying the opposing party's
motion to vacate that award. We stated:
"'"'Where parties, as in
this 
case, have 
agreed 
that
disputes 
should 
go 
to
arbitration, the role of the
courts 
in 
reviewing 
the
arbitration award is limited.
Transit Casualty Co. v. Trenwick
Reinsurance Co., 659 F. Supp.
1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affirmed,
841 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1988);
Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs
International Traders, Inc., 375
F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1967). On
motions to confirm or to vacate
an award, it is not the function
of courts to agree or disagree
with 
the 
reasoning 
of 
the
arbitrators. 
Application 
of
States Marine Corp. of Delaware,
127 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
Courts are only to ascertain
whether there exists one of the
specific grounds for vacation of
an award.  Saxis Steamship Co.  A
court 
cannot 
set 
aside 
the
arbitration award just because it
disagrees 
with 
it; 
a 
policy
allowing it to do so would
undermine the federal policy of
encouraging the settlement of
disputes by arbitration.  United
Steelworkers 
of 
America 
v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
11
1180979
U.S. 593, 80 S. Ct. 1358, 4 L.
Ed. 
2d 
1424 
(1960); 
Virgin
Islands 
Nursing 
Association's
Bargaining Unit v. Schneider, 668
F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1981).  An
award should be vacated only
where the party attacking the
award clearly establishes one of
the 
grounds 
specified 
[in 9
U.S.C. § 10].  Catz American Co.
v. Pearl Grange Fruit Exchange,
Inc., 292 F. Supp. 549 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).'"
"'896 So. 2d at 464 (quoting Maxus, Inc. v.
Sciacca, 598 So. 2d 1376, 1380–81 (Ala.
1992)).  The standard by which an appellate
court reviews 
a trial court's 
order
confirming an arbitration award under the
Federal Arbitration Act is that questions
of law are reviewed de novo and findings of
fact are reviewed only for clear error. 
See Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307
F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th Cir. 2002).'
"Hereford v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 13 So. 3d 375, 378
(Ala. 2009)."
Terminix Int'l Co., L.P. v. Scott, 142 So. 3d 512, 519–20
(Ala. 2013).
Discussion
On appeal, Russell maintains, as it argued below, that
the circuit court's order setting aside the clerk's entry of
judgment on the arbitrator's award contravenes Rule 71B and
is, 
therefore, erroneous. 
 
Specifically, 
Russell 
contends 
that
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1180979
Peat neither filed a notice of appeal nor, if his answer is
construed as one, filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of
service of the award as required by Rule 71B(b).  Because,
Russell argues, Peat indisputably failed to timely file a
notice of appeal, it maintains that Peat has waived review of
any challenges to the arbitrator's awards.  Peat, however,
contends that his answer was sufficient under Rule 71B to
constitute notice that he disputed the validity of the
arbitration awards. 
Rule 71B, which became effective on February 1, 2009,4 
establishes the procedure for appealing an arbitration award
to the circuit court.  This Court has previously summarized
the procedure as follows: 
"(1) A party must file a notice of appeal with the
appropriate circuit court within 30 days after
service of the notice of the arbitration award; (2)
the clerk of the circuit court shall promptly enter
the award as the final judgment of the circuit
court; (3) the aggrieved party may file a Rule 59,
Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to set aside or vacate the
4See Honea v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 240 So. 3d
550, 557 (Ala. 2017) ("[The] rule ... provides the procedure
for appealing an arbitration award and supersedes the
procedures in § 6–6–15[, Ala. Code 1975].  See Committee
Comments to Rule 71B.").
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1180979
judgment, and such filing is a condition precedent
to further review by any appellate court; (4) the
circuit court grants or denies the Rule 59 motion;
and (5) the aggrieved party may then appeal from the
circuit 
court's 
judgment 
to 
the 
appropriate
appellate court." 
Guardian Builders, LLC v. Uselton, 130 So. 3d 179, 181 (Ala.
2013). 
To the extent that Peat argues that his March 13, 2019,
answer to Russell's Rule 71C motion was, in substance, a
notice of appeal, there is authority suggesting that the Court
may construe other pleadings "as a notice of appeal for
purposes of Rule 71B when the motion was in substance a notice
of appeal."   Alabama Psychiatric Servs., P.C. v. Lazenby,
[Ms. 1170856, June 21, 2019] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2019)
(citing Honea v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 240 So. 3d
550, 559 (Ala. 2017), Uselton, 130 So. 3d at 182, and J.L.
Loper Constr. Co. v. Findout P'ship, LLP, 55 So. 3d 1152 (Ala.
2010)).  As to this issue, we have explained:
"This Court 'treat[s] a pleading and any other
filing according to its substance, rather than its
form or its style.'  Ex parte Bender Shipbuilding &
Repair Co., 879 So. 2d 577, 584 (Ala. 2003).  A
notice of appeal, in the context of the Alabama
Rules of Appellate Procedure, 'shall specify the
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate
the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from;
and shall name the court to which the appeal is
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1180979
taken.'  Rule 3(c), Ala. R. App. P.  Honea's January
14, 
2008, 
motion 
to 
vacate 
specifies 
that
information.  Further, we note that this Court has
construed a motion to vacate an arbitration award as
a notice of appeal for purposes of Rule 71B, which
superseded § 6–6–15.  Guardian Builders, LLC v.
Uselton, 130 So. 3d 179, 182 (Ala. 2013). See also
J.L. Loper Constr. Co. v. Findout Partnership, LLP,
55 So. 3d 1152 (Ala. 2010).  Thus, we conclude that,
in substance, Honea's January 14, 2008, motion to
vacate was a notice of appeal of the arbitration
award."
Honea, 240 So. 3d at 559 (footnote omitted).  The Court has
nonetheless cautioned that "a party desiring appellate review
of an arbitration award should follow the explicit procedure
for appealing established by Rule 71B."  Uselton, 130 So. 3d
at 182. 
First, as to the Modified Partial Final Award, it is
unnecessary for us to determine whether Peat's answer "was in
substance a notice of appeal," see Lazenby, supra, because it
was, in any event, untimely.  The Modified Partial Final Award
resolving the parties contract-balance dispute was issued on
September 5, 2018.  As mentioned elsewhere, nothing before the
Court suggests –- and, in fact, Peat does not claim –- that 
Peat was not promptly served with the award at that time.
Under Rule 71B, assuming Peat was dissatisfied with the
terms of the Modified Partial Final Award, he was required to
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1180979
raise any challenge by timely filing his notice of appeal
within 30 days of the entry of the award.  It is undisputed
that Peat did not do so; his answer was filed over six months
too late.  Accordingly, he failed to follow the explicit
procedure for appealing the Modified Partial Final Award
outlined in Rule 71B.  See J.L. Loper Constr. Co. and Uselton,
supra.  We find no authority allowing a trial court to extend
the time for filing the notice of appeal from an arbitrator's
award beyond the deadline provided in Rule 71B or establishing
exceptions thereto.5  In consideration of the foregoing, we
conclude that the circuit court erred in setting aside the
judgment entered by the clerk in favor of Russell to the
5Peat contends that the circuit court could vacate the
award pursuant to Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  However, Peat
raises no grounds that could not have been raised in a timely
appeal, and a Rule 60(b) motion cannot be used as a substitute
for an appeal.  See, e.g., Washington Mut. Bank, F.A. v.
Campbell, 24 So. 3d 435, 442 (Ala. 2009) ("'[D]espite the
general discretion vested in trial courts to grant or deny
relief from a judgment, a Rule 60(b) motion is not a
substitute for appeal and "is not available to relieve a party
from his failure to exercise the right of appeal."'" (quoting
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Pitts, 900 So. 2d 1240, 1245 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2004), quoting in turn Morgan v. Estate of Morgan,
688 So. 2d 862, 864 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997))). 
16
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extent 
that 
that 
judgment 
reaffirmed the 
arbitrator's 
Modified
Partial Final Award. 
As to the arbitrator's second, "Final Award" entered on
March 7, 2019, which addressed subsequent breaches of the
settlement agreement, we reach a different conclusion.  
Within
one week of the entry of that award, Peat filed the answer to
Russell's Rule 71C motion, which pleading Peat maintains was
sufficient to have been deemed by the circuit court as
satisfying the requirements of Rule 71B.  Further, Peat's
answer denied the enforceability of the award, sought a
hearing, and included as 
stated defenses grounds for attacking
the finality of the award, including fraud, as contemplated by
§ 6-6-14, Ala. Code 1975.6  Thus, the circuit court could
properly have treated Peat's answer as a timely notice of
6Section 6-6-14 provides:
"An award made substantially in compliance with
the provisions of this division is conclusive
between the parties thereto and their privies as to
the matter submitted and cannot be inquired into or
impeached for want of form or for irregularity if
the award determines the matter or controversy
submitted, and such award is final, unless the
arbitrators are guilty of fraud, partiality, or
corruption in making it."
(Emphasis added).
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1180979
appeal to the extent that it provided notice that Peat was
challenging the Final Award.  See Honea, 240 So. 3d at 559.
Russell, on appeal, contends that Peat filed no notice of
appeal sufficient to satisfy Rule 71B; however, other than
quoting Rule 71B, Russell's brief includes no analysis or
authority explaining why Peat's answer was substantively
insufficient as a notice of appeal challenging the Final
Award.
"'Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. 
App. P., 
requires that
arguments in an appellant's brief contain "citations
to the cases, statutes, other authorities, and parts
of the record relied on." Further, "it is well
settled 
that 
a 
failure 
to 
comply 
with 
the
requirements of Rule 28(a)(10) requiring citation of
authority in support of the arguments presented
provides this Court with a basis for disregarding
those arguments." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Motley, 909 So. 2d 806, 822 (Ala. 2005) (citing Ex
parte Showers, 812 So. 2d 277, 281 (Ala. 2001)).
This is so, because "'it is not the function of this
Court to do a party's legal research or to make and
address legal arguments for a party based on
undelineated general propositions not supported by
sufficient authority or argument.'" Butler v. Town
of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 20 (Ala. 2003)(quoting Dykes
v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 251 (Ala.
1994)).'"
Prattville Mem'l Chapel v. Parker, 10 So. 3d 546, 560 (Ala.
2008) (quoting Jimmy Day Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Smith,
964 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007)).  
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1180979
Here, Peat's timely filed answer, in essence, challenges
the arbitrator's Final Award.  Russell does not include
argument and authority establishing that, based on its
contents, Peat's answer was insufficient to be deemed a notice
of appeal.  "It is the appellant's burden to refer this Court
to legal authority that supports [his] argument."  Madaloni v.
City of Mobile, 37 So. 3d 739, 749 (Ala. 2009).  Accordingly,
Russell has waived this claim for purposes of appellate
review.  See City of Birmingham v. Business Realty Inv. Co.,
722 So. 2d 747, 752 (Ala. 1998) ("When an appellant fails to
cite any authority for an argument on a particular issue, this
Court may affirm the judgment as to that issue, for it is
neither this Court's duty nor its function to perform an
appellant's legal research."). 
With no explanation as to how Peat's answer failed to
constitute sufficient notice of Peat's challenge below, we
hold that the circuit court did not err to the extent that it
set aside the judgment entered pursuant to the arbitrator's
Final Award.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's July
25, 2019, order to the extent that it vacated any judgment on
the arbitrator's Final Award related to Russell's and Peat's
19
1180979
breach of the provisions of the settlement agreement that
remained in effect after the Modified Partial Final Award and
the distribution of the outstanding $50,000 at issue.  We
reverse that same order to the extent it purported to vacate
any judgment on the Modified Partial Final Award of
$258,959.89 and remand this cause for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Parker, C.J., and Bryan, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ.,
concur.
20