Title: Heumphreus v. State
Citation: 334 N.W.2d 757
Docket Number: 68738
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: June 15, 1983

334 N.W.2d 757 (1983) Jerry HEUMPHREUS, Administrator of the Estate of Billy Gene Heumphreus, Deceased; Teresa Heumphreus, Parent, Guardian, and next friend of Amy Heumphreus, a minor; and Teresa Heumphreus, Individually, Appellants, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee. No. 68738. Supreme Court of Iowa. June 15, 1983. *758 Bruce L. Walker, Iowa City, for appellants. Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Iris J. Post, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Considered by UHLENHOPP, P.J., and HARRIS, McCORMICK, LARSON, and CARTER, JJ. UHLENHOPP, Justice. This wrongful death action by the survivors of a deceased penitentiary inmate raises a question of subject-matter jurisdiction of the district court. In the present action the survivors filed a petition in district court against the State containing the following allegations with respect to liability: Plaintiffs also filed a separate claim against the State before the industrial commissioner under the worker's compensation act, chapter 85, Iowa Code (1979) (references are to that Code). In the present case the State challenged the jurisdiction of the district court by a special appearance grounded on sections 25A.14(6) and 85.59 of the Code. Special appearance is a proper way to challenge the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that the industrial commissioner has exclusive jurisdiction. Jansen v. Harmon, 164 N.W.2d 323, 326 (Iowa 1969). Chapter 25A provides a system for making tort claims against the State notwithstanding sovereign immunity, but section 25A.14(6) of that chapter provides: *759 Section 85.59 is apparently the outgrowth of Frederick v. Men's Reformatory, 203 N.W.2d 797, 799 (Iowa 1973). The section provides in its first, second, and fifth paragraphs: The district court held a hearing on the special appearance, and sustained it. The survivors appealed. I. At common law a jailer has a duty to exercise reasonable diligence with reference to the care of injured, ill, or diseased inmates. Lang v. City of Des Moines, 294 N.W.2d 557, 560-61 (Iowa 1980); Miller v. Dickinson County, 68 Iowa 102, 105, 26 N.W. 31, 32 (1885); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965). But for section 25A.14(6) of the Code, clearly the district court would have subject-matter jurisdiction under chapter 25A of the present tort claim. Do sections 25A.14(6) and 85.59 substitute a worker's compensation claim for the present tort claim? This question poses a problem of statutory construction. II. Section 25A.14(6) does not allow State tort liability for an inmate's claim which falls under section 85.59. What is such a claim? Section 85.59 provides that an inmate includes a person confined to a correctional institution (which Heumphreus was), while working in connection with the maintenance of the institution (which Heumphreus was). Does this end the inquiry? Is an injured inmate who is confined to a correctional institution and working in the maintenance of the institution ipso facto entitled to worker's compensation and disentitled to seek relief for a tort, whatever the other facts of the case may be? The second and fifth paragraphs of section 85.59 bear on this question. The second paragraph begins, "If an inmate is permanently incapacitated by injury in the performance of his or her work in connection with the maintenance of the institution" the inmate is entitled to worker's compensation. (Emphasis added.) The fifth paragraph, dealing with resulting death, parallels the second paragraph. We construe the italicized words to require a nexus between the permanent injury or the death and the performance of the work the injury or death must be "in" the performance of the work. This analysis of the sections leads us to the following conclusion in situations such as the present one. An "inmate" under section 85.59 and hence under section 25A.14(6) is a person who is (a) confined in a correctional institution, (b) at work on maintenance of the institution, and (c) permanently *760 incapacitated or killed in the performanceas a resultof that work. Such a person is entitled to worker's compensation but not to relief for tort. Otherwise the person is entitled to seek relief for tort but cannot have worker's compensation. III. What are the survivors' allegations here? They allege that Heumphreus was (a) confined to a correctional institution and (b) at work on maintenance of the institution. They also allege he had a heart attack and died as a result of negligent post-attack care. If the heart attack resulted from the performance of the work under either of the theories in Sondag v. Ferris Hardware, 220 N.W.2d 903 (Iowa 1974), the survivors would be entitled to worker's compensation for injury or death growing out of improper care after the heart attack. Brinkman v. Buffalo Bills Football Club, 433 F. Supp. 699, 702 (W.D.N.Y.1977); Dixon v. Ford Motor Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 499, 505, 125 Cal. Rptr. 872, 875 (1976); Komel v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 56 Ill.App.3d 967, 970, 14 Ill.Dec. 563, 565, 372 N.E.2d 842, 844 (1978); Szydlowski v. General Motors Corp., 397 Mich. 356, 358, 245 N.W.2d 26, 28 (1976); 1 Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law § 13.20, 2 Id. § 61.12(d) (1982). This is in line with the rule in tort cases generally. Casey v. Koos, 323 N.W.2d 193, 197 (Iowa 1982); Hunt v. Ernzen, 252 N.W.2d 445, 447 (Iowa 1977); Becker v. D. &amp; E. Distributing Co., 247 N.W.2d 727, 731 (Iowa 1976). The survivors therefore would not be entitled to relief for tort. If however the heart attack did not result from the work under either Sondag theory but would have occurred anyway, the survivors would not be entitled to worker's compensation but they would be entitled to try to establish tort liability for damages for death resulting from negligent post-attack care, under the principle of section 314A of the Restatement. IV. The survivors do not allege in this case that the heart attack resulted from performance of the work. Since their allegations relating to the merits and to jurisdiction of the district court are intertwined, a ruling on jurisdiction should not be made at this time. Martin v. Ju-Li Corp., 332 N.W.2d 871 (Iowa 1983). If the worker's compensation claim is heard and decided first, and the decision is that the death is not compensable because the heart attack did not result from Heumphreus' performance of work, then the special appearance in the present case should be overruled; but if the decision is that the heart attack did result from the work and the death is compensable, then the special appearance in this case should be sustained. On the other hand, if this tort case is tried and decided first and a decision is made that the death resulted from Heumphreus' performance of work, then the special appearance should be sustained; but if a decision is made that the heart attack did not result from the work, then the present special appearance should be overruled and the survivors will not be entitled to worker's compensation. We find no necessity to decide the constitutional question the survivors present by supplemental brief. REVERSED. All Justices concur except CARTER and McCORMICK, JJ., who concur specially. CARTER, Justice (concurring specially). I concur in the result because I agree that under the allegations of the petition it would be possible for the evidence to sustain a claim which does not fall under section 85.29; such circumstance would permit a negligence claim to be maintained under chapter 25A. I believe, however, that the majority opinion unduly limits the circumstances under which this would be possible. Under the holding of the majority, a determination by the fact finder that the heart attack resulted from decedent's performance of work would conclusively establish that compensation for his death may only be based on the worker's compensation law. I believe that it would be possible for the evidence to show that decedent's heart attack was caused by the performance of work but that his death was not. If this were found to be the case and if it is also shown that the death resulted from the *761 negligence of agents of the state, this circumstance should permit a claim under chapter 25A regardless of whether the heart attack resulted from the performance of work. McCORMICK, J., joins in this special concurrence.