Title: People v. Aledamat
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S248105
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: August 26, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
YAZAN ALEDAMAT, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S248105 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Two 
B282911 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BA451225 
 
 
August 26, 2019 
 
Justice Chin authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan and Kruger 
concurred.    
 
Justice Liu filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. 
 
Justice Cuéllar filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, in 
which Justice Groban concurred. 
 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
S248105 
 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
Defendant Yazan Aledamat was charged with assault 
with a deadly weapon, specifically a box cutter.  A few objects 
are inherently deadly weapons.  Others, including a box cutter, 
are deadly weapons only if used in a way that makes them 
deadly weapons.  Here, the trial court erroneously permitted the 
jury to consider the box cutter an inherently deadly weapon.  It 
presented the jury with two possible theories of guilt:  (1) that 
the box cutter was inherently deadly, and (2) that defendant 
used the box cutter in a deadly way.  The first of these theories 
was erroneous under the facts.  A box cutter is, as a matter of 
law, not inherently deadly.  The second theory was correct.  We 
must decide what standard of review applies to this error. 
We conclude the usual “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard of review established in Chapman v. California (1967) 
386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman) for federal constitutional error 
applies.  The reviewing court must reverse the conviction unless, 
after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and 
considering all relevant circumstances, it determines the error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  On this record, 
applying this standard, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error was harmless.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal, which found the error 
prejudicial. 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
2 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Court of Appeal opinion summarized the facts.  “In 
October 2016, defendant approached a woman working at a 
lunch truck parked in downtown Los Angeles.  He told her that 
he found her attractive and asked her for her phone number; she 
declined, explaining that she was married with children.  On 
October 22, 2016, defendant approached the woman’s husband, 
who owned the food truck.  Defendant asked, ‘Where’s your 
wife?’  Defendant then told the man that he wanted to ‘fuck’ his 
wife because she was ‘very hot’ and ‘had a big ass and all of that.’  
When the man turned away to remove his apron, defendant 
pulled a box cutter out of his pocket and extended the blade; 
from three or four feet away, defendant thrust the blade at the 
man at waist level, saying, ‘I’ll kill you.’  Two nearby police 
officers on horses intervened and arrested defendant.”  (People 
v. 
Aledamat 
(2018) 
20 
Cal.App.5th 
1149, 
1151-1152 
(Aledamat).) 
As relevant to the issue on review, the People charged 
defendant with assault with a deadly weapon under Penal Code 
section 245, subdivision (a)(1), and making a criminal threat 
under Penal Code section 422.1  As to the threat charge, the 
People also alleged that defendant personally used a deadly and 
dangerous weapon.  (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).)  The case went to a 
jury trial. 
The court instructed the jury that, for the assault charge, 
the People had to prove the following:  “The defendant did an act 
with a deadly weapon other than a firearm that by its nature 
would directly and probably result in the application of force to 
                                        
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
3 
say [sic] person; the defendant did that act willfully; when the 
defendant acted, he was aware of facts that would lead a 
reasonable person to realize that his act by its nature would 
directly and probably result in the application of force to 
someone; and when the defendant acted, he had the present 
ability to apply force with a deadly weapon other than a firearm 
to a person.”  (See CALCRIM No. 875.) 
The court defined “a deadly weapon” as “any object, 
instrument, or weapon that is inherently deadly or one that is 
used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to 
cause death or . . . great bodily injury.”  (See CALCRIM No. 
875.)  Regarding the weapon enhancement, the court instructed 
that “a deadly or dangerous weapon is any object, instrument, 
or weapon that is inherently dangerous, . . . or one that is used 
in such a way that it is capable of causing or likely to cause death 
or great bodily injury.  In deciding whether an object is a deadly 
weapon, consider all of the surrounding circumstances including 
when and where the object was possessed and any other 
evidence that indicates whether the object would be used for a 
dangerous rather than a harmless purpose.”  (See CALCRIM 
No. 3145.)  The court did not define what “inherently” deadly or 
dangerous meant. 
In his opening argument to the jury, the prosecutor argued 
that the box cutter was a “deadly weapon” because “[i]f used in 
a way to cause harm, it would cause harm.”  Emphasizing the 
word “probably,” defense counsel argued that defendant’s act 
would not probably result in the application of force to the 
victim.  Defense counsel did not specifically discuss whether the 
box cutter was a deadly weapon.  In his closing argument, the 
prosecutor argued that the box cutter was an “inherently deadly 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
4 
weapon,” noting that “you wouldn’t want your children playing 
with” it. 
The jury convicted defendant of both counts and found the 
weapon allegation true.  The court sentenced defendant to 
prison, and he appealed. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction for making a 
criminal threat.  But it reversed the conviction of assault with a 
deadly weapon and the true finding on the weapon allegation.  
It found that the trial court erroneously permitted the jury to 
find the box cutter to be an inherently deadly weapon.  It 
believed the error required it to reverse the conviction “ ‘absent 
a basis in the record to find that the verdict was actually based 
on a valid ground,’ ” which “exists only when the jury has 
‘actually’ relied upon the valid theory.”  (Aledamat, supra, 20 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1153.)  It found “no basis in the record for 
concluding that the jury relied on the alternative definition of 
‘deadly weapon’ (that is, the definition looking to how a 
noninherently dangerous weapon was actually used).”  (Id. at p. 
1154.) 
The Court of Appeal added that “the rules regarding 
prejudice that we apply in this case are arguably in tension with 
more recent cases, such as People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819 
[216 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 392 P.3d 421], providing that the failure 
to instruct on the elements of a crime does not require reversal 
if those omitted elements are ‘uncontested’ and supported by 
‘ “overwhelming evidence.” ’  (Id. at pp. 821-822, 830-832; see 
Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 17-18 [144 L.Ed.2d 35, 
119 S.Ct. 1827].)  That test would certainly be satisfied here, 
where defendant never disputed that the box cutter was being 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
5 
used as a deadly weapon and where the evidence of such use is 
overwhelming.”  (Aledamat, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 1154.) 
We granted the Attorney General’s petition for review to 
determine the standard of review of error of this kind, and to 
determine whether the error was prejudicial under this 
standard. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  The Error 
The jury found defendant guilty of assault with a deadly 
weapon under section 245, subdivision (a)(1), and, as to the 
criminal threat charge, it found true that defendant personally 
used a deadly or dangerous weapon under section 12022, 
subdivision (b)(1).  The court instructed the jury that a weapon 
could be either inherently deadly or deadly in the way defendant 
used it.  The instruction accurately stated the law.  However, as 
the parties agree, the evidence did not support the instruction. 
“As used in section 245, subdivision (a)(1), a ‘deadly 
weapon’ is ‘any object, instrument, or weapon which is used in 
such a manner as to be capable of producing and likely to 
produce, death or great bodily injury.’  [Citation.]  Some few 
objects, such as dirks and blackjacks, have been held to be 
deadly weapons as a matter of law; the ordinary use for which 
they are designed establishes their character as such.  (People v. 
Graham (1969) 71 Cal.2d 303, 327 [78 Cal.Rptr. 217, 455 P.2d 
153] . . . .)  Other objects, while not deadly per se, may be used, 
under certain circumstances, in a manner likely to produce 
death or great bodily injury.  In determining whether an object 
not inherently deadly or dangerous is used as such, the trier of 
fact may consider the nature of the object, the manner in which 
it is used, and all other facts relevant to the issue.”  (People v. 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
6 
Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028-1029; accord, People v. 
Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1065.) 
Because a knife can be, and usually is, used for innocent 
purposes, it is not among the few objects that are inherently 
deadly weapons.  “While a knife is not an inherently dangerous 
or deadly instrument as a matter of law, it may assume such 
characteristics, depending upon the manner in which it was 
used . . . .”  (People v. McCoy (1944) 25 Cal.2d 177, 188.)  “A box 
cutter is a type of knife” that, “because it is designed to cut 
things and not people,” is not an inherently deadly weapon as a 
matter of law under McCoy.  (Aledamat, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 1153; see People v. Stutelberg (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 
317 (Stutelberg) [also involving assault with a box cutter].)2 
Accordingly, as the Court of Appeal held in this case, and 
as the court in Stutelberg, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at page 317, 
held, the trial court erred in presenting the jury with two 
theories by which it could find the box cutter a deadly weapon:  
                                        
2  
The weapon enhancement is for use of a “deadly or 
dangerous” weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), rather than 
specifically a deadly weapon, as under section 245, subdivision 
(a)(1).  But the same rule appears to apply, as indicated by 
McCoy’s statement that “a knife is not an inherently dangerous 
or deadly instrument as a matter of law.”  (People v. McCoy, 
supra, 25 Cal.2d at p. 188; see People v. Graham, supra, 71 
Cal.2d at p. 327 [stating the same rule regarding whether an 
object is a “ ‘dangerous or deadly weapon,’ ” cited in People v. 
Aguilar, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1029]; People v. Brown (2012) 
210 Cal.App.4th 1, 9-10.)  Accordingly, a box cutter is neither an 
inherently deadly nor an inherently deadly or dangerous 
weapon.  For simplicity, we will generally refer to this case as 
involving a deadly weapon. 
 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
7 
(1) inherently or (2) as used.  The first theory (inherently) is 
incorrect, but the second theory (as used) is correct. 
In People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116 (Guiton), we 
considered the consequences when a court instructs on two 
theories of guilt, one correct and the other incorrect.3  We 
distinguished between two categories of incorrect theories.  
Under what we called a “ ‘factually inadequate theory,’ ” the 
theory is incorrect only because the evidence does not support it.  
(Id. at p. 1128.)  We said that “[i]f the inadequacy of proof is 
purely factual, of a kind the jury is fully equipped to detect, 
reversal is not required whenever a valid ground for the verdict 
remains, absent an affirmative indication in the record that the 
verdict actually did rest on the inadequate ground.”  (Id. at p. 
1129; see People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 329.) 
Under what we called a “ ‘legally inadequate theory,’ ” the 
theory is incorrect because it is contrary to law.  (Guiton, supra, 
4 Cal.4th at p. 1128.)  An example of this second category “is a 
case where the inadequate theory ‘fails to come within the 
statutory definition of the crime.’ ”  (Ibid.)  As an example, we 
cited People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, where the jury was 
erroneously permitted to consider 90 feet to be sufficient to 
satisfy the asportation element for kidnapping.  “At issue [in 
Green] was whether 90 feet was sufficient asportation to satisfy 
the elements, or the ‘statutory definition,’ of kidnapping.  There 
was no insufficiency of proof in the sense that there clearly was 
evidence from which a jury could find that the victim had been 
asported the 90 feet.  Instead, we held that the distance was 
                                        
3  
 We will call this kind of error “alternative-theory error,” 
as has the United States Supreme Court.  (Hedgpeth v. Pulido 
(2008) 555 U.S. 57, 61 (Hedgpeth).) 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
8 
‘legally insufficient.’  (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 67, italics 
added.)”  (Guiton, at p. 1128.) 
When the theory is legally erroneous—i.e., of a kind the 
jury is not equipped to detect—a higher standard must be met 
for the error to be found harmless.  “These different tests reflect 
the view that jurors are ‘well equipped’ to sort factually valid 
from invalid theories, but ill equipped to sort legally valid from 
invalid theories.”  (Aledamat, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1153-
1154, quoting Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1126.)  Or, as the 
Stutelberg court summarized, “A legal error is an incorrect 
statement of law, whereas a factual error is an otherwise valid 
legal theory that is not supported by the facts or evidence in a 
case.  [Citation.]  Between the two, legal error requires a more 
stringent standard for prejudice, for jurors are presumed to be 
less able to identify and ignore an incorrect statement of law due 
to their lack of formal legal training.  [Citation.]  Factual errors, 
on the other hand, are less likely to be prejudicial because jurors 
are generally able to evaluate the facts of a case and ignore 
factually inapplicable theories.”  (Stutelberg, supra, 29 
Cal.App.5th at p. 318.) 
As both the Court of Appeal and Stutelberg held, the error 
here is of the second category:  legal error.  Courts have held 
that a knife is not inherently deadly as a matter of law.  Only a 
few items that are designed to be used as deadly weapons are 
inherently deadly.  (People v. Perez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1065; 
People v. Aguilar, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1029.)  If the court had 
instructed the jury on this point, the error would have been 
purely factual.  “But the jurors were never provided with this 
definition, and they could reasonably classify a box cutter, which 
is sharp and used for cutting, as inherently dangerous based on 
the common understanding of the term.  This amounts to legal, 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
9 
rather than factual, error.”  (Stutelberg, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 319.)  “There was no failure of proof—that is, a failure to 
show through evidence that the box cutter is an ‘inherently 
dangerous’ weapon.  Instead, a box cutter cannot be an 
inherently deadly weapon ‘as a matter of law.’ ”  (Aledamat, 
supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 1154.)  Because the trial court here 
did not define what “inherently deadly” meant, the jury would 
not be equipped to know that, contrary to what the instruction 
suggested, a box cutter is not an inherently deadly weapon. 
Based on the state of the law at the time, in Guiton, we 
said that legal error is “subject to the rule generally requiring 
reversal.”  (Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1128.)  But we also 
said that this does not mean that reversal is always required 
when the error is legal.  (Id. at p. 1129.)  Because the error in 
Guiton was purely factual, and thus subject to the lenient 
standard of review applicable to factually inadequate theories, 
we did not need to decide the exact standard of review of cases 
involving legal error.  (Id. at p. 1130.)  We said that “[o]ne way 
of finding this kind of error harmless has long been recognized.  
Sometimes it is possible to determine from other portions of the 
verdict that the jury necessarily found the defendant guilty on a 
proper theory.  [Citations.]  [¶]  There may be additional ways 
by which a court can determine that [legal] error . . . is harmless.  
We leave the question to future cases.”  (Id. at pp. 1130-1131.) 
We now consider this question. 
B.  Standard of Review of the Error 
“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held 
harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Chapman, supra, 386 
U.S. at p. 24.)  This harmless error rule applies in a variety of 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
10 
contexts, such as to error in omitting entirely one or more 
elements of a charged offense.  (People v. Merritt, supra, 2 
Cal.5th at p. 822 (Merritt).) 
In Merritt, the trial court neglected to instruct the jury on 
most of the elements of the charged offenses of robbery.  We 
found the error, “serious though it was,” subject to harmless 
error review.  (Merritt, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 822.)  Relying 
heavily on United States Supreme Court decisions such as 
Neder v. United States, supra, 527 U.S. 1 (Neder) (omission of 
an element of the offense) and Hedgpeth, supra, 555 U.S. 57 
(alternative-theory error like that of this case), we held the error 
“is reversible unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
(Merritt, at p. 822.) 
Defendant argues that the application of Chapman is 
different 
for 
alternative-theory 
error 
than 
for 
other 
misdescriptions of the elements of the charged offense.  The 
Court of Appeal agreed.  Citing Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1116, it 
believed the error requires reversal unless there is a basis in the 
record to find that “the jury has ‘actually’ relied upon the valid 
theory . . . .”  (Aledamat, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 1153.)  The 
court further believed that, on this record, it could not find that 
the jury actually relied on the valid theory.  Guiton did not 
resolve the question; it reserved it for a future case.  (See People 
v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1203 (Chun); People v. Cross 
(2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 70 (conc. opn. of Baxter, J.).)  We conclude 
that no higher standard of review applies to alternative-theory 
error than applies to other misdescriptions of the elements.  The 
same beyond a reasonable doubt standard applies to all such 
misdescriptions, including alternative-theory error.  We agree 
with the recent Court of Appeal decisions of Stutelberg, supra, 
29 Cal.App.5th at pages 319-321, and People v. Brown, supra, 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
11 
210 Cal.App.4th at pages 12-13, which reached similar 
conclusions regarding similar error.4 
Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th 1172, involved alternative-theory 
error concerning the element of implied malice in a murder case.  
Citing authority that included Neder, supra, 527 U.S. 1, and 
Hedgpeth, supra, 555 U.S. 57, we reiterated that “[i]nstructional 
error regarding the elements of the offense requires reversal of 
the judgment unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the 
verdict.”  (Chun, at p. 1201.)  In seeking a more precise test, we 
quoted Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in another case 
involving misdescription of an element:  “ ‘The error in the 
present case can be harmless only if the jury verdict on other 
points effectively embraces this one or if it is impossible, upon 
the evidence, to have found what the verdict did find without 
finding this point as well.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1204, quoting California 
v. Roy (1996) 519 U.S. 2, 7 (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.).)  We then 
said, “Without holding that this is the only way to find error 
                                        
4  
Although 
Stutelberg, 
supra, 
29 
Cal.App.5th 
314, 
purported to apply the Chapman test, it concluded its harmless 
error analysis as to one count as follows:  “Had the jury been 
provided only with the ‘deadly or dangerous as used’ theory and 
not the inapplicable ‘inherently deadly weapon’ theory, there is 
no reasonable probability it would have rejected the deadly 
weapon enhancement on count 1.  Therefore, the instructional 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Id. at p. 322, 
italics added.)  But the reasonable probability test is different 
and more lenient than the reasonable doubt test that applies 
here.  (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 
[reasonable probability test applies to errors of state law].)  
Reviewing courts must apply the Chapman test to error of this 
kind, not the inapplicable Watson test. 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
12 
harmless, we think this test works well here, and we will use it.  
If other aspects of the verdict or the evidence leave no 
reasonable doubt that the jury made the findings necessary for 
conscious-disregard-for-life malice, the erroneous felony-murder 
instruction was harmless.”  (Chun, at pp. 1204-1205.) 
In People v. Cross, supra, 45 Cal.4th 58, the defendant 
argued that alternative-theory error can be found harmless only 
if the verdict itself shows that the jury relied on a valid theory.  
Justice Baxter authored a concurring opinion arguing against 
this position, which we find persuasive.  He “agree[d] with the 
weight of existing authority, which applies the Chapman 
harmless-error 
standard 
in 
determining 
whether 
the 
submission to the jury of two legal theories, one valid and one 
invalid, requires reversal.”  (Cross, at p. 70 (conc. opn. of Baxter, 
J.).)  Noting that a related question was then before the high 
court (ibid., citing the case that later became Hedgpeth, supra, 
555 U.S. 57), he argued that “an instructional error with respect 
to an element does not become more problematic simply because 
the jury may potentially have relied on an alternative theory 
that was entirely error free.  Defendant’s argument [that a more 
stringent test applies to alternative-theory error] ‘reduces to the 
strange claim that, because the jury here received both a “good” 
charge and a “bad” charge on the issue, the error was somehow 
more pernicious than in [a high court decision]—where the only 
charge on the critical issue was a mistaken one.  That assertion 
cannot possibly be right, so it is plainly wrong.’  (Quigley v. Vose 
(1st Cir. 1987) 834 F.2d 14, 16; accord, Becht v. U.S. (8th Cir. 
2005) 403 F.3d 541, 548 [“it would be ‘anomalous’ to preclude 
harmless-error review under Chapman ‘because the jury also 
was given the option to convict based on a constitutionally valid 
theory . . .’] . . . .)”  (Cross, at p. 71 (conc. opn. of Baxter, J.).) 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
13 
A few months after Justice Baxter wrote this in Cross, the 
high court expressed similar views in the case that he 
mentioned.  (Hedgpeth, supra, 555 U.S. 57.)  After citing 
decisions such as Neder, supra, 527 U.S. 1, that applied the 
reasonable doubt standard to review of instructional error 
regarding the elements of the charged offense, the high court 
said this:  “Although these cases did not arise in the context of a 
jury instructed on multiple theories of guilt, one of which is 
improper, nothing in them suggests that a different harmless-
error analysis should govern in that particular context. . . .  [¶]  
In fact, drawing a distinction between alternative-theory error 
and the instructional errors in [several cases including Neder] 
would be ‘patently illogical,’ given that such a distinction 
‘ “reduces to the strange claim that, because the jury . . . 
received both a ‘good’ charge and a ‘bad’ charge on the issue, the 
error was somehow more pernicious than . . . where the only 
charge on the critical issue was a mistaken one.” ’ ”  (Hedgpeth, 
at p. 61, quoting Pulido v. Chrones (9th Cir. 2007) 487 F.3d 669, 
677-678 (conc. opn. of O’Scannlain, J.), which quoted Quigley v. 
Vose, supra, 834 F.2d at p. 16, and citing Becht v. U.S., supra, 
403 F.3d 541, 548.) 
Hedgpeth, supra, 555 U.S. 57, involved collateral review 
on federal habeas corpus.  But, in another case of alternative-
theory error, the high court “clarif[ied]” that harmless-error 
analysis “applies equally to cases on direct appeal.”  (Skilling v. 
United States (2010) 561 U.S. 358, 414, fn. 46 [remanding the 
case to the circuit court to determine whether the error was 
prejudicial].)  As the court that reviewed the Skilling case on 
remand recognized, in Hedgpeth and Skilling, the court “did not 
specifically identify the harmless-error standard that is 
applicable to alternative-theory errors, but it cited to a string of 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
14 
cases that apply a common harmless-error standard to other 
types of instructional errors.”  (U.S. v. Skilling (5th Cir. 2011) 
638 F.3d 480, 481; see id. at p. 482 [applying the beyond a 
reasonable 
doubt 
standard].) 
 
Additionally, 
Hedgpeth’s 
statement that nothing “suggests that a different harmless-
error 
analysis 
should 
govern” 
alternative-theory 
error 
(Hedgpeth, at p. 61), leaves no doubt that the same Chapman 
analysis of harmless error applies to alternative-theory error as 
applies to other kinds of misdescription of the elements.  Federal 
circuit decisions have consistently applied the Chapman test to 
alternative-theory error.  (U.S. v. Garrido (9th Cir. 2013) 713 
F.3d 985, 994; Bereano v. U.S. (4th Cir. 2013) 706 F.3d 568, 577-
578; U.S. v. Jefferson (4th Cir. 2012) 674 F.3d 332, 360-361; U.S. 
v. Ferguson (2d Cir. 2011) 676 F.3d 260, 276-277; U.S. v. Black 
(7th Cir. 2010) 625 F.3d 386, 388.) 
Applying a different standard of error in this case would 
be particularly anomalous.  If the trial court had simply 
instructed the jury that a box cutter was a deadly weapon as a 
matter of law, and given no correct instruction whatsoever, the 
error would clearly be subject to Chapman harmless error 
review.  (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 69 [misdescription 
of an element of a charged offense].)  But here, the court also 
provided the jury with a valid theory.  Providing the jury with 
both a valid and an invalid theory should not be subject to a 
higher standard of review than applies when the court provides 
the jury only with an invalid theory. 
Our decisions in In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216 
(Martinez) and People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu) are 
not to the contrary.  In both cases, we reviewed alternative-
theory error regarding the elements of first degree murder.  In 
Chiu, we said that “[w]hen a trial court instructs a jury on two 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
15 
theories of guilt, one of which was legally correct and one legally 
incorrect, reversal is required unless there is a basis in the 
record to find that the verdict was based on a valid ground. 
[Citations.]  Defendant’s first degree murder conviction must be 
reversed unless we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
jury based its verdict on the legally valid theory that defendant 
directly aided and abetted the premeditated murder.”  (Chiu, at 
p. 167.)  But we also noted that questions from the jury during 
deliberations “shows that the jury may have based its verdict of 
first degree premeditated murder on the [erroneous] theory.”  
(Ibid.)  Accordingly, we could not “conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the jury ultimately based its first degree murder 
verdict on a different theory, i.e., the legally valid theory that 
defendant directly aided and abetted the murder.”  (Id. at p. 
168.) 
In Martinez, we applied the same standard to collateral 
review of cases containing the same error:  “Chiu error requires 
reversal unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the jury actually relied on a legally valid 
theory in convicting the defendant of first degree murder.”  
(Martinez, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1218.)  But we also noted that 
the prosecutor had relied heavily on the invalid theory in 
argument to the jury, and that “an inquiry by the jury during its 
deliberations suggested that it was considering the” invalid 
theory.  (Id. at p. 1227.)  For these reasons, “we conclude[d] that 
the Attorney General has not shown beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the jury relied on a legally valid theory in convicting 
Martinez of first degree murder.”  (Ibid.) 
Defendant argues that, by focusing on what the jury 
actually did, Chiu and Martinez stated a standard different, and 
higher, than Chapman’s reasonable doubt standard.  But Chiu 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
16 
and Martinez were only a specific application of the more 
general reasonable doubt test stated in cases like Neder, supra, 
527 U.S. 1, and Merritt, supra, 2 Cal.5th 819.  The test stated in 
Chiu and Martinez was taken from Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at 
pages 1203 to 1205.  (See Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 167.)  
Chun also stated that the error “requires reversal of the 
judgment unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the 
verdict.”  (Chun, at p. 1201.)  Finding beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error did not contribute to the verdict is essentially the 
same as finding the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
In Chun, we said that one way, but not necessarily the only way, 
the Chapman test could be satisfied was to apply Justice Scalia’s 
test of whether “ ‘it is impossible, upon the evidence, to have 
found what the verdict did find without finding’ ” the missing 
point as well.  (Id. at p. 1204.)  We equated this impossibility 
with a conclusion that the jury actually made the necessary 
finding.  (Id. at pp. 1204-1205.) 
In determining this impossibility or, more generally, 
whether the error was harmless, the reviewing court is not 
limited to a review of the verdict itself.  An examination of the 
actual verdict may be sufficient to demonstrate harmlessness, 
but it is not necessary.  In both Chiu and Martinez, we examined 
the record and found that it affirmatively showed the jury might 
have based its verdict on the invalid theory.  Because no other 
basis to find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt was 
at issue, we did not explore whether other ways of finding the 
error harmless existed.  Those cases merely provide one way in 
which a court might evaluate harmlessness.  They do not 
preclude other ways. 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
17 
For these reasons, we conclude that alternative-theory 
error is subject to the more general Chapman harmless error 
test.  The reviewing court must reverse the conviction unless, 
after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and 
considering all relevant circumstances, it determines the error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  We disapprove of any 
interpretation of People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, that limits 
the reviewing court to an examination of the jury’s findings as 
reflected in the verdict itself or that is otherwise inconsistent 
with this opinion. 
We now apply this standard to this case. 
C.  Application of the Standard to This Case 
A number of circumstances convince us beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.  It is clear the 
error did not contribute to the verdict. 
The argument that the error was prejudicial supposes 
that, under the instructions, the jury would believe there were 
two separate ways it could find the box cutter to have been a 
deadly weapon.  The first method would be simply to find it was 
inherently deadly without considering any of the surrounding 
circumstances.  The second method would be to consider how 
defendant used it.  Technically, this is correct.  The court used 
the disjunctive “or,” which, out of context, would seem to permit 
such separation.  In context, however, it is unlikely the jury 
would so view the instructions. 
The instruction referred to an object that is “inherently 
deadly or one that is used in such a way that it is capable of 
causing and likely to cause death or . . . great bodily injury.”  
This juxtaposition at least indicates what the “inherently 
deadly” language was driving at.  Additionally, the jury was also 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
18 
instructed:  “In deciding whether an object is a deadly weapon, 
consider all of the surrounding circumstances including when 
and where the object was possessed and any other evidence that 
indicates whether the object would be used for a dangerous 
rather than a harmless purpose.”  This part of the instruction 
suggested the question was unitary, that is, that the jury had to 
consider all of the circumstances in deciding whether the object 
was a deadly weapon, either inherently or as used.  The jury 
would likely view the “inherently deadly” language in light of 
this additional instruction that it had to consider all of the 
circumstances.  Given this additional instruction, it seems 
unlikely the jury would simply view the box cutter as inherently 
deadly without considering the circumstances, including how 
defendant used it. 
The arguments of counsel support this conclusion.  At one 
point, the prosecutor stated that the box cutter was inherently 
deadly because “you wouldn’t want your children playing with” 
it, without further explaining the term.  But no one ever 
suggested to the jury that there were two separate ways it could 
decide whether the box cutter was a deadly weapon.  Defense 
counsel argued that defendant did not use the box cutter in a 
way that would probably result in the application of force, that 
is, that defendant did not assault the victim at all—an argument 
the jury necessarily rejected when it found defendant guilty of 
that crime.  But counsel never argued that, if he did assault the 
victim with the box cutter, the box cutter was not a deadly 
weapon.  Although defense counsel did not expressly concede 
that the box cutter was a deadly weapon, he did not contest the 
point. 
Contesting the point would have been futile based on the 
record here.  A box cutter is not inherently deadly because it is 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
19 
not designed for that purpose.  But if used to assault someone, 
i.e., used as a weapon, a box cutter is potentially deadly even if 
not designed for that purpose.  (See People v. Graham, supra, 71 
Cal.2d at pp. 327-328 [explaining that when a sharp or heavy 
object “is capable of being used in a ‘dangerous or deadly’ 
manner, and it may be fairly inferred from the evidence that its 
possessor intended on a particular occasion to use it as a weapon 
should the circumstances require, we believe that its character 
as a ‘dangerous or deadly weapon’ may be thus established”].)  
Counsel could readily believe it would be pointless for him to 
argue that even if (contrary to the argument counsel did make) 
the jury found defendant assaulted the victim with the box 
cutter, it was not a deadly weapon.  This is particularly so in 
light of defendant’s statement, “I’ll kill you.” 
A nonexclusive way the error can be found harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, one that “work[ed] well” in Chun, 
supra, 45 Cal.4th at page 1205, and that also works well here, 
is the test derived from Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in 
California v. Roy, supra, 519 U.S. at page 7.  The reviewing court 
examines what the jury necessarily did find and asks whether it 
would be impossible, on the evidence, for the jury to find that 
without also finding the missing fact as well.  (Chun, at pp. 
1204-1205.)  Here, under the instructions, the jury necessarily 
found the following:  (1) defendant did an act with a deadly 
weapon (either inherently or as used) that by its nature would 
directly and probably result in the application of force; (2) 
defendant was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable 
person to realize that his act by its nature would directly and 
probably result in the application of force to someone; and (3) 
defendant had the present ability to apply force with a deadly 
weapon to a person. 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
20 
Additionally, the jury must have considered the term 
“inherently deadly” to mean something.  As the Stutelberg court 
explained, the theoretical risk is that, because the court did not 
define the term, the jury might have applied its common 
understanding to find the box cutter deadly because it is sharp 
and used for cutting.  (Stutelberg, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 
319; cf. People v. Pruett (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 77, 86 [the trial 
court did not err in failing to define what is a deadly weapon 
because “[j]urors can certainly employ common sense and 
experience to determine whether or not such a knife is a ‘deadly’ 
instrument”].)  But if the jury did so, it would necessarily find 
the box cutter deadly in the colloquial sense of the term—i.e., 
readily capable of inflicting deadly harm—and that defendant 
used it as a weapon. 
“No reasonable jury that made all of these findings could 
have failed to find” that defendant used the box cutter in a way 
that is capable of causing or likely to cause death or great bodily 
injury.  (Merritt, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 832.)  For all of these 
reasons, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
D.  The Instructions 
As this case demonstrates, the standard instructions on 
assault with a deadly weapon and use of a deadly and dangerous 
weapon are problematic.  (See CALCRIM Nos. 875, 3145.)  They 
do not define what is an inherently deadly weapon.  Worse, 
without modification, they provide the jury with the “inherently 
deadly” theory even in those cases (i.e., most of them) in which 
the weapon is not inherently deadly as a matter of law.  We 
suggest the instructions be modified to avoid these problems in 
the future. 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
21 
In most cases, the inherently deadly language is 
inapplicable, for most objects are not inherently deadly even if 
they may be used in a way that makes them deadly.  The 
inherently deadly language is also generally unnecessary.  For 
the most part, those objects that are designed for use as a deadly 
weapon will be also used in a way that makes them deadly 
weapons.5  Accordingly, the standard instruction might be 
improved by simply deleting any reference in the usual case to 
inherently deadly weapons. 
But because, under current law, some objects, such as 
dirks and blackjacks, are inherently deadly, instructing on that 
theory might be appropriate in some cases.  (But see fn. 5.)  If 
the prosecution believes the weapon used in a given case is 
inherently deadly, and it believes modifying the instruction 
would be useful, it may request the court to add that theory of 
the case to the instructions.  On such a request, the court should 
consider whether the evidence would support a finding that the 
weapon is inherently deadly.  If so, the court would have 
discretion to instruct on that theory.  If it does so, however, it 
should also define what is meant by inherently deadly, i.e., an 
object that is designed for use as a deadly weapon.  (See People 
v. Perez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1065.) 
                                        
5  
In light of this, it may be asked whether a policy exists for 
treating inherently deadly weapons differently from other 
objects capable of being used as a deadly weapon, particularly 
since the distinction is not reflected in the text of section 245.  
Because the facts and arguments of this case do not present the 
question, we leave it for another day. 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
22 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand the matter to that court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
CHIN, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
S248105 
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
 
I agree with today’s opinion that alternative-theory error 
is subject to the Chapman beyond-a-reasonable-doubt harmless 
error standard (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24) 
and that our decisions in People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 
People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, and In re Martinez (2017) 
3 Cal.5th 1216 are “not to the contrary.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 14; see id. at pp. 14–16.)  
I part ways with today’s opinion, however, with respect to 
its conclusion that in light of what “the jury necessarily did find 
. . . it would be impossible, on the evidence, for the jury to find 
that without also finding the missing fact as well.”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 19.)  Justice Cuéllar’s concurring and dissenting 
opinion carefully explains why we cannot be confident beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the jury in this case found the box cutter 
to be a deadly weapon on a valid legal theory.  In particular, the 
trial court’s own equivocation and the prosecutor’s repeated 
conflation of the deadly-weapon and force requirements in 
closing argument could well have misled the jury.  (Conc. & dis. 
opn. of Cuéllar, J., post, at pp. 7–8.)  Because of these confusing 
statements, and because the trial court erred in providing the 
“inherently deadly” instruction to the jury, the jury may have 
convicted defendant for conduct that does not constitute the 
crime of assault with a deadly weapon.  Although the jury “must 
have considered the term ‘inherently deadly’ to mean 
something” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 20), it is quite possible that the 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
2 
jury understood “inherently deadly” to mean that the box cutter 
itself was readily capable of causing deadly harm, without 
finding that defendant in fact used the box cutter in a manner 
likely to cause death or great bodily injury.  Accordingly, I would 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
S248105 
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Cuéllar 
 
In our constitutional system the right to trial by jury 
means “the jury, rather than the judge, reach[es] the requisite 
finding of ‘guilty.’ ”  (Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 
277; see Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.)  That’s a principle that can be 
simple to state but difficult to honor, especially when harmless 
error review is at stake.  Because virtually all forms of harmless 
error review risk infringing on “the jury’s factfinding role and 
affect[ing] the jury’s deliberative process in ways that are, 
strictly speaking, not readily calculable,” courts performing 
harmless error review are walking a tightrope — where they 
must weigh how an error affected the proceedings without 
displacing the jury as finder of fact.  (Neder v. United States 
(1999) 527 U.S. 1, 18 (Neder).)   
That’s why caution’s been the watchword when we’ve 
stepped onto that tightrope.  Like the United States Supreme 
Court, to date we’ve found instructional error harmless only 
when we can conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt” either that 
the jury necessarily relied on a valid legal theory (see People v. 
Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1205 (Chun); see maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 20) or that the element omitted or misdescribed “was 
uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that 
the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error” 
(Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 17, italics added; see, e.g., maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 19; People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 824 
(Merritt) [finding error harmless where the defense expressly 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Cuéllar, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
2 
conceded a robbery occurred and there was overwhelming video 
evidence of the only contested issue]; cf. People v. Canizales 
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 616 (Canizales) [examining both the 
“strong” and the “conflicting evidence” on a contested issue and 
noting “both the prosecutor’s closing argument and the 
attempted murder instruction” had “the potential to cause 
confusion”]; People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 417 (Mil) 
[reversing burglary and robbery special circumstances because 
the defendant “contested whether he acted with reckless 
indifference to human life” and “the record support[ed] a 
reasonable doubt as to that element”]).  These tests — 
permutations of harmless-error review tailored for instructional 
error — demand searching inquiry, and rightly so:  They help us 
maintain the critical equilibrium between constitutional 
guarantees and “ ‘society’s interest in punishing the guilty.’ ”  
(Id. at p. 18.) 
The majority loses that balance today.  Tumbling headlong 
into the jury’s factfinding role, the majority fails to live up to the 
“more general Chapman [v. California] harmless error test” it 
purports to apply.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 16; see Chapman v. 
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman).)  The result, 
unfortunately, is an error of our own –– one hardly harmless to 
the defendant in this case.  With respect, I dissent. 
I. 
To find Yazan Aledamat guilty of assault with a deadly 
weapon, the jury had to decide not only that he had the box 
cutter in his hand, but that he used it as a deadly weapon.  The 
trial judge issued form instructions from CALCRIM No. 875, 
which provides that the prosecution must prove: 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Cuéllar, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
3 
(1) that the defendant did an act with a deadly weapon 
other than a firearm that by its nature would directly and 
probably result in the application of force to a person;  
(2) that the defendant did that act willfully; 
(3) that when the defendant acted, he was aware of facts 
that would lead a reasonable person to realize that his act by its 
nature would directly and probably result in the application of 
force to someone; and  
(4) that when the defendant acted, he had the present 
ability to apply force with a deadly weapon other than a firearm.  
(CALCRIM No. 875.) 
Here’s what’s also covered by those jury instructions:  to 
“apply force” means “to touch in a harmful or offensive manner,” 
which can include “the slightest touching” if done in a rude or 
angry way.  As long as the prosecution can prove the defendant’s 
act would probably result in the application of force, it is not 
required to prove “that the defendant actually touched 
someone.”  (CALCRIM No. 875.)  A deadly weapon other than a 
firearm, moreover, “is any object, instrument, or weapon that is 
inherently deadly or one that is used in such a way that it is 
capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily 
injury.”  (Ibid.)  Great bodily injury, in turn, “means significant 
or substantial physical injury.  It is injury that is greater than 
minor or moderate harm.”  (Ibid.)  
Presented to the jury during trial, these instructions 
permit the jury to conclude a box cutter can be a deadly weapon.  
But to reach that conclusion, a jury must find the box cutter is 
either “inherently deadly” or was “used in such a way that it is 
capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily 
injury.”  (CALCRIM No. 875.)  Yet as the majority explains, this 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Cuéllar, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
4 
instruction is incorrect, at least in this case:  as a matter of law, 
a box cutter is not inherently deadly.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5.)  
It is, however, capable of causing death or great bodily injury 
and, depending on how it is used, may even be likely to cause 
death or great bodily injury.  (Ibid.)  So for a proper conviction 
of assault with a deadly weapon on these facts, the jury would 
have needed to rely on the second prong of the deadly weapon 
definition — the legally valid theory in this case.   
The majority plays up that there’s more than “one way” 
(maj. opn., ante, pp. 16, 19) a reviewing court can conclude 
“ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to 
the verdict’ ” (id. at p. 16, quoting Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at 
p. 1201).  I agree.  But when, we cannot “conclude, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the jury based its verdict on a legally 
valid theory” (Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1203), we may find 
the instructional error harmless only if we can determine 
beyond a reasonable doubt that “the jury verdict would have 
been the same absent the error.”  (Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at 
p. 17.)  That’s the situation here. 
In other words, we ask whether it is clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt the jury would have found Aledamat guilty of 
assault with a deadly weapon had it been given only the correct 
instruction, which required it to find that he used a box cutter 
in a manner “capable of causing and likely to cause death or 
great bodily injury.”  (CALCRIM No. 875.)  Or, “ ‘in typical 
appellate-court fashion,’ ” we ask the inverse:  “ ‘whether the 
record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary 
finding with respect to the [deadly weapon] element.’ ”  (Merritt, 
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 832, quoting Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 
19.)  And Neder itself provided a useful rubric to evaluate 
instructional error, explaining that Chapman’s mandate can be 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Cuéllar, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
5 
satisfied where the element omitted or misdescribed “was 
uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence.”  (Neder, 
at p. 17.) 
The majority seems not to have made this inquiry.  Indeed, 
its primary quarrel is with the very notion that the instruction 
was error, let alone prejudicial error.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17.)  
It argues, in essence, that the jury “likely” understood the term 
“inherently deadly” to mean something approximating the 
correct instruction — “capable of and likely to cause great bodily 
injury.”  (Id. at pp. 17, 18.)  That is, a jury is “unlikely” to find 
the disjunctive “or” — “inherently deadly or . . . capable of 
causing and likely to cause” great bodily injury (CALCRIM No. 
875, italics added) — to present two alternatives.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 17–18.)  Instead, the majority says, the jury will 
understand “inherently deadly” to be defined by the words 
surrounding it, notwithstanding the disjunctive.  (Id. at p. 17 
[explaining the “juxtaposition” of the words “at least indicates 
what the ‘inherently deadly’ language was driving at”]; id. at 
p. 20 [“[T]he jury must have considered the term ‘inherently 
deadly’ to mean something”].)  In other words, if the jury doesn’t 
understand that “inherently deadly” is a shortcut, it will hold 
the prosecution to roughly the same standard that the correct 
instruction does.   
Three problems mar this argument.  First, it is pure 
conjecture.  Nothing in the record suggests, let alone compels us 
to conclude, that the jury read the instructions in the way the 
majority speculates.  It is just as likely — and more consistent 
with principles of English usage — that the “juxtaposition” of 
two disjunctive clauses suggests just that (maj. opn., ante, at p. 
17):  They are juxtaposed because they are distinct.  One does 
not define the other, in whole or in part.  
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Cuéllar, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
6 
Second, the argument is at odds with the majority’s 
characterization of the instructions as “problematic” and its 
suggestion that they be “modified to avoid these problems in the 
future.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21.)  Why alter anything if, as the 
majority implies, jurors can more or less figure it out on their 
own?  (Id. at p. 20 [citing People v. Pruett (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 
77, 86 for the proposition that jurors can determine whether a 
knife is a deadly instrument based on “common sense”].)  
(Indeed, jurors can guess approximate meanings for most legal 
principles and elements, from robbery to “deadly weapon”; I 
imagine the majority would not suggest we dispense with those 
instructions out of an abiding belief that common sense will 
suffice.) 
Third — and perhaps most importantly — in this case 
there is evidence not only that the jury may have misunderstood 
the task before it, but that it was affirmatively (though 
inadvertently) misled.   
The confusion began when the judge instructed the jury 
on the elements.  On beginning to read the definition of great 
bodily injury — and before reaching the definition of a deadly 
weapon — the judge stopped, said the jury “[didn’t] need that 
definition” and asked the jury to cross it out.  The jurors affirmed 
that they had crossed out the definition.  Moving on to the 
deadly weapon instruction, the judge realized the definition of 
“great bodily injury” was relevant.  He stopped, had a short 
exchange on the record with counsel, told the jury to ignore their 
earlier strike-through of the definition — “And despite the fact 
I told you to cross it out, I [now] want you to consider it.  Okay?  
If you want to write it in, you can.” — and allowed the jury a 
brief break.  He then recited the criminal threat instructions 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Cuéllar, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
7 
without revisiting the remainder of the deadly weapon 
instruction. 
The majority highlights a feature of the jury instructions.  
The jury was instructed to consider “all of the surrounding 
circumstances” in deciding whether an object is a deadly weapon 
— “ ‘including when and where the object was possessed and any 
other evidence that indicates whether the object would be used 
for a dangerous rather than a harmless purpose.’ ”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 17.)  “Given this additional instruction,” the majority 
writes, “it seems unlikely the jury would simply view the box 
cutter 
as 
inherently 
deadly 
without 
considering 
the 
circumstances, including how the defendant used it.”  (Id. at p. 
18.)  
But the additional instruction didn’t apply to the assault 
charge.  The judge read it in instructing the jury on the deadly 
weapon enhancement, and expressly said it became relevant 
only if the jury “[found] the defendant guilty of the crimes 
charged in counts 1 and 2.”  What’s more, during deliberations 
the jury asked the court “how to deal with the issue of the 
allegation, the deadly or dangerous weapon allegation.”  It is far 
from obvious that the jury understood its obligation to make a 
finding on the deadliness of the box cutter.  (See Canizales, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 617 [noting that the jury requested a 
readback of testimony that “suggests the jurors at one point 
were focused on testimony that would have supported the 
[defense] theory”].) 
There’s more.  In closing arguments the prosecutor 
exacerbated this confusion, suggesting that the mere existence 
of the box cutter was sufficient to satisfy the deadly weapon 
allegation:  “You don’t have to actually inflict injury on the 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Cuéllar, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
8 
person.  What [Aledamat] did was sufficient; he committed a 
crime, a crime of assault with a deadly weapon.  And the added 
allegation is that he used a box cutter.”  (Italics added.)  She then 
conflated the deadly weapon and force requirements, saying, 
“Ladies and gentlemen, you wouldn’t want your children using 
a box cutter, would you?  This is a deadly weapon.  If used in a 
way to cause harm, it would cause harm.  It’s not whether he did 
cause harm; it’s could he; could he have caused harm with that 
box cutter?  The answer:  Absolutely.” 
That statement is wrong.  Mangling the recitation of the 
applicable 
deadly 
weapon 
instruction, 
the 
prosecutor’s 
statement confuses the minimal force requirement with the 
requirement that Aledamat have used the box cutter in a way 
“likely to cause death or great bodily injury.”  (CALCRIM No. 
875.)  Nevertheless, the majority charges that defense counsel 
failed to “contest the point” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 
18) — seemingly recognizing that Neder compels an inquiry of 
whether the mistaken instruction was contested.   
True:  We and the United States Supreme Court have said 
that “removing an element of the crime from the jury’s 
consideration” can be harmless “where the defendant concedes 
or admits that element.”  (People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 
504; see Hurst v. Florida (2016) 136 S. Ct. 616, 623 [describing 
Neder as “holding that the failure to submit an uncontested 
element of an offense to a jury may be harmless,” italics added]; 
Connecticut v. Johnson (1983) 460 U.S. 73, 87 (plur. opn. of 
Blackmun, J.) [stating that an instructional error “may be 
harmless” if “defendant himself has taken the issue . . . away 
from the jury”].)  But the burden of proof in a criminal trial lies 
solely with the People.  (See Flood, at p. 481.)  That burden “is 
not relieved by a defendant’s tactical decision not to contest an 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Cuéllar, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
9 
essential element of the offense.”  (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 
U.S. 62, 69.)  Moreover still, where the defense contested 
Aledamat’s slightest application of force, it defies logic that the 
defense would not also contest an element predicated — at least 
in this case — on an even greater application of force.  It is at 
the very least inconsistent with what we have previously 
required.  (See, e.g., Merritt, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 824 [finding 
the defense conceded that a robbery occurred when counsel said 
there was “no question these people were robbed, okay.  Our only 
contention is with element number one that it was not the 
defendant.”].) 
And counsel did contest the point — explicitly, at the 
outset of his closing argument, when he told the jury that one of 
the “two main questions” that they “need[ed] to answer” was 
“with respect to the great bodily injury.” 
On rebuttal, the prosecutor continued to conflate the 
minimal touching requirement with the dangerousness of the 
box cutter itself.  “As I said before,” she said, “you wouldn’t want 
your children playing with this (indicating).  It’s inherently a 
deadly weapon.  It’s by definition the reason this law was 
created.”  (Italics added.)  By that time, there was no opportunity 
for defense counsel to “contest” the point.   
It’s quite plausible that the jury took the prosecutor at her 
parting words:  the box cutter is “inherently a deadly weapon” 
and “by definition the reason this law” — assault with a deadly 
weapon — “was created.”  The majority all but acknowledges the 
only possible understanding of these words, noting that “no one 
ever suggested to the jury that there were two separate ways it 
could decide whether the box cutter was a deadly weapon.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)  That’s true.  The prosecutor suggested 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Cuéllar, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
10 
only one method of finding the box cutter was a deadly weapon, 
and that method was incorrect as a matter of law.  That the 
defense spent so little time discussing the element — which, 
again, was not its burden to disprove — further risked letting 
the case pivot on the prosecutor’s easy reassurance that 
“inherently deadly” was, in essence, just a matter of common 
sense — what objects you wouldn’t let your children play with.  
(See In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216, 1226–1227 
[concluding the jury could have convicted on the invalid theory 
where the prosecutor argued that theory to the jury “at length 
during closing argument and rebuttal”].)  This is not the kind of 
record to give one confidence in the majority’s argument that the 
jury understood “inherently deadly” to mean something 
approximating deadly as-used.  Far more likely on this record is 
that the jury would “quickly and easily have found the element 
satisfied” by “relying on the instructional misdefinition” 
available to it.  (People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 445 (conc. 
opn. of Mosk, J.); see Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 614 
[concluding there was “a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
understood the kill zone instruction in a legally impermissible 
manner” because the prosecution’s definition “was significantly 
broader than a proper understanding of the theory permits” and 
thus “had the potential to mislead the jury”].)  So based on the 
jury instructions and counsel’s arguments we can’t conclude 
“that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the 
error.”  (Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 17.)     
II. 
 
The majority’s harmless-error analysis makes scant 
reference to the evidence in the record.  Relying on that record, 
however, is how we evaluate whether the evidence to support 
the correct theory — that Aledamat used the box cutter in a 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Cuéllar, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
11 
way “capable of causing and likely to cause death or great 
bodily injury” (CALCRIM No. 875) — was so strong that we 
can safely conclude the instructional error did not contribute to 
the verdict.  (See Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 17.) 
Consider, for instance, what we decided in the recent case 
of In re B.M. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 528 (B.M.).  We analyzed the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction for assault 
with a deadly weapon — in that case, a butter knife.  We 
explained that “for an object to qualify as a deadly weapon based 
on how it was used, the defendant must have used the object in 
a manner not only capable of producing but also likely to 
produce death or great bodily injury.”  (Id. at p. 530, italics 
omitted.)  Though we avoided defining “likely,” we explained 
that we have previously treated the term to mean at least 
“probable” (id. at p. 533) — based on “how the defendant 
actually ‘used’ the object,” rather than on conjecture as to how 
the object could have been used or what injury might have been 
inflicted had the object been used differently (id. at p. 534).   
As an example, we discussed People v. Duke (1985) 174 
Cal.App.3d 296, 302, in which the defendant used a headlock to 
hold his victim.  The victim said the headlock made her feel 
choked but did not cut off her breathing; the defendant’s grip 
was “ ‘firm,’ ” but the victim did not testify that he tightened his 
grip.  (B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 534.)  We favorably cited the 
Duke court’s explanation for reversing the conviction:  “[T]he 
fact that appellant could have easily broken [the victim’s] neck 
or could have choked her to the point of cutting off her breathing 
by exerting greater pressure on her neck or windpipe will not 
support the conviction of felony assault.”  (B.M., at p. 534, 
quoting Duke, at p. 303, internal quotation marks omitted.)  It 
would involve “gross speculation on the part of the jury as to 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Cuéllar, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
12 
what the appellant would have done if he had not stopped.”  
(B.M., at p. 534, quoting Duke, at p. 303, internal quotation 
marks omitted.)  We emphasized in B.M., however, that it is 
appropriate to consider “what harm could have resulted from 
the way the object was actually used.”  (B.M., at p. 535.)  We 
further held that “the extent of actual injury or lack of injury” is 
relevant, in that it may “suggest that the nature of the object or 
the way it was used was not capable of producing or likely to 
produce death or serious harm.”  (Ibid.) 
Against that backdrop, here is what the jury heard in 
Aledamat’s trial:  Aledamat approached a food truck in 
downtown Los Angeles and made crude remarks about the truck 
owner’s wife.  The owner, standing on the sidewalk, reacted in 
shock, and removed his apron.  From approximately three or 
four feet away, Aledamat took a step back, pulled from his right 
pocket a box cutter, blade extended — how far it extended, how 
large it was, or whether it was locked in its casing, no one 
explained — and “thrust” or “pointed” it from his waist towards 
the owner, saying, “I’ll kill you.”  It was clear that Aledamat had 
moved his arm toward the truck owner.  But there was no 
indication that Aledamat jabbed the box cutter at the owner, or 
that he flailed his arms around or advanced as though to cut 
him.  Naturally, the owner jerked back.  The jury heard nothing 
about what the owner was wearing or how close the box cutter 
actually got to his clothing or body.  The box cutter did not touch 
him.   
A police officer approached on horse and noticed Aledamat 
was holding the box cutter in his right hand “in a forward 
direction, about waistline.”  The officer said Aledamat was not 
lunging; he was “just holding” the box cutter.  When Aledamat 
saw the officer, he retracted the box cutter and placed it back in 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Cuéllar, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
13 
his pocket.  The truck owner reported to the police that 
Aledamat had “pulled a knife” on him. 
On these facts, it may well have been reasonable for the 
jury to convict Aledamat of using the box cutter in a way 
“capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily 
injury,” where “great bodily injury,” in turn, is “significant or 
substantial.”  (CALCRIM No. 875.)  Aledamat did, after all, say, 
“I’ll kill you” while wielding a sharp blade.  But “our task in 
analyzing the prejudice from the instructional error is [to 
determine] whether any rational fact finder could have come to 
the opposite conclusion.”  (Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 418, first 
italics added.)   
Even a brief survey of the evidence presented at trial 
reveals that the answer is yes.  The People admitted in rebuttal 
that Aledamat had not “lunged” at the victim; he had “thrust” 
the box cutter out from his waist from a distance of several feet.  
(Cf. B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 536 [defendant used the knife 
only on the victim’s legs, which were covered in a blanket, and 
did not attempt to use the knife on any exposed or vulnerable 
part of the victim’s body].)  The jury received no information 
about how far the blade was extended, whether the blade was 
locked — such that it would have stayed protruded had it made 
contact with the victim — or whether, at the time, it was spring-
operated to snap back into its casing.  (Cf. People v. Stutelberg 
(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 322 [finding instructional error 
prejudicial in part because “[t]he exact manner in which 
Stutelberg used the box cutter against [a victim]” was 
“unclear”].)  Nor did the jury hear testimony about what the 
victim was wearing, which has some bearing on whether a single 
thrust likely would cause serious bodily injury.  (Cf. B.M., at p. 
536 [“[T]he moderate pressure that B.M. applied with the knife 
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Cuéllar, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
14 
was insufficient to pierce the blanket, much less cause serious 
bodily injury to [the victim].”].)  And there was no evidence to 
suggest Aledamat reared for another thrust, that he advanced 
on the victim after his initial threat, or that he wielded the box 
cutter uncontrollably.  (Cf. id. at p. 538 [noting that the butter 
knife “was not applied to any vulnerable part of [the victim’s] 
body” and there was “no evidence that B.M. wielded the knife 
wildly or uncontrollably”]; Stutelberg, at p. 322 [“The jury could 
reasonably conclude that his ‘flicking’ motion was more of a 
threat, as opposed to an act likely to cause death or great bodily 
injury.”].)  Indeed, the truck owner refused to confirm his 
previous statement to the police, claiming instead not to know 
what he had said and repeating only that Aledamat “pulled out 
[the box cutter] when we were close to each other.”  
Only by casting aside this record evidence and 
supplanting it with its own reasoning can the majority justify 
its conclusion.  It assumes the jury understood “inherently 
deadly” — the inapt instruction — to mean “something,” and 
assumes that something is a “common understanding” that a 
box cutter is deadly.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20.)  But it overlooks 
the reasonable possibility that the “something” the jury 
understood was not “capable of causing and likely to cause death 
or great bodily injury” (CALCRIM No. 875), but instead likely to 
cut your child during ill-advised play.  It assumes that finding 
the box cutter deadly “in the colloquial sense of the term” is 
sufficient because a box cutter is “readily capable of inflicting 
deadly harm.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20.)  But it both misstates 
the standard — which requires the likelihood of deadly harm — 
and misses the holdings of B.M., which require a jury to look at 
how the weapon was actually used in context.  (B.M., supra, 6 
Cal.5th at p. 535.)   
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Cuéllar, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
15 
These assumptions aside, the evidence is sufficient for a 
reasonable jury to have found Aledamat guilty under the correct 
definition of a deadly weapon.  To its credit, the majority 
concedes that’s not the standard here.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 
16–17; Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1201 [stating that we 
reverse unless it is clear “beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error did not contribute to the verdict”].)  Yet, for whatever 
reason, that’s the standard it ends up applying.  (See, e.g., maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 17 [speculating that it is “unlikely” the jury 
would have viewed the instructions as presenting two 
alternative methods of finding the box cutter “deadly”]; id. at 
pp. 18–19 [arguing it would have been futile for defense counsel 
to contest deadliness because a box cutter is “potentially” 
deadly].)  
III. 
We do not undermine a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to a fair trial by jury if we hold an instructional error 
harmless where the record demonstrates that the jury actually 
relied on a different legal theory, untouched by error.  (Martinez, 
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1226; Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1205.)  
Nor do we undermine that guarantee under the “unusual 
circumstances” in which “each element was undisputed, the 
defense was not prevented from contesting any of the omitted 
elements, and overwhelming evidence supports the omitted 
element.”  (Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 414.)  In those limited 
cases, harmless-error review serves the useful purpose of 
preventing us from “setting aside convictions for small errors or 
defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the 
result of the trial.”  (Ibid., quoting Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at 
p. 19, internal quotation marks omitted.)   
PEOPLE v. ALEDAMAT 
Cuéllar, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
16 
This is not such a case, and today the majority dispenses 
with the guardrails that help us discern as much.  Aledamat 
contested the element of force in the assault, which necessarily 
extends to the greater degree of force required to convict him of 
using a deadly weapon.  The People presented little or no 
evidence that Aledamat used the box cutter in a way likely to 
cause death or great bodily injury, and further confused the jury 
by referring to the box cutter as “inherently deadly” and 
suggesting heuristics for assessing its dangerousness.  (Cf. 
People v. Marsh (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 474, 490 [finding no 
prejudice where “the prosecutor only presented the [deadly-as-
used] theory”].)  On this record, I cannot conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same 
absent the error.  (See Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 19; Chun, 
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1215.)   
No doubt we’ll continue doing our utmost to tread carefully 
when deciding whether an error was harmless under the 
Chapman standard.  But today the majority loses its footing.  I 
dissent with respect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
I Concur: 
GROBAN, J. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Aledamat 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 20 Cal.App.5th 1149 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S248105 
Date Filed: August 26, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Stephen A. Marcus 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Andrea S. Bitar, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Edward C. DuMont, State Solicitor General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Mercer, Timothy L. 
O’Hair and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, and Michael R. Johnsen, Deputy State Solicitor 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Mary K. McComb, State Public Defender, Barry P. Helft, Chief Deputy State Public Defender, and Samuel 
Weiscovitz, Deputy State Public Defender, as Amici Curiae. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Andrea S. Bitar 
Bird Rock Law Group 
5580 La Jolla Boulevard, #456 
La Jolla, CA  92037 
(619) 356-1624 
 
Michael R. Johnsen 
Deputy State Solicitor General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 269-6090 
 
Samuel Weiscovitz 
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, Suite 1000 
Oakland, CA  94607 
(510) 267-3300