Title: State v. Ortiz-Mondragon
Citation: 2015 WI 73
Docket Number: 2013AP002435-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2015

2015 WI 73 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP2435-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Fernando Ortiz-Mondragon, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 358 Wis. 2d 423, 856 N.W.2d 339) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No: 2014 WI App 114 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 9, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 21, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Brown 
 
JUDGE: 
Donald R. Zuidmulder 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, ABRAHAMSON, J.J., dissent. (Opinion 
Filed.) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Michelle L. Velasquez, assistant state public defender, and 
oral argument by Michelle L. Velasquez. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Nancy 
A. Noet, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Barbara Graham on 
behalf of the Catholic Charities Legal Services for Immigrants, 
Milwaukee. 
 
 
 
2015 WI 73
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2013AP2435-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2012CF1101) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent,   
 
 
v. 
 
Fernando Ortiz-Mondragon,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals,1 which affirmed the 
Brown County Circuit Court's2 judgment of conviction and order 
denying Fernando Ortiz-Mondragon's ("Ortiz-Mondragon") post-
conviction motion to withdraw his no-contest plea to substantial 
battery as an act of domestic abuse.3  
                                                 
1 State 
v. 
Ortiz-Mondragon, 
2014 
WI 
App 
114, 
358 
Wis. 2d 423, 856 N.W.2d 339. 
2 The Honorable Donald R. Zuidmulder presided. 
3 Some documents in the record spell the defendant's name as 
Fernando Ortiz-Mondragen.  
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Ortiz-Mondragon argues that the circuit court erred by 
denying his motion to withdraw his plea.  He argues that he 
should be allowed to withdraw his plea on the basis of 
ineffective assistance of counsel under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 
U.S. 356 (2010).  In Padilla the Supreme Court held that "[w]hen 
the law is not succinct and straightforward . . . , a criminal 
defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client 
that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse 
immigration consequences."  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 
369 (2010).  "But when the deportation consequence is truly 
clear, . . . the duty to give correct advice is equally clear." 
Id.  
¶3 
Specifically, Ortiz-Mondragon argues that his trial 
counsel performed deficiently by failing to inform him that his 
no-contest plea to substantial battery, with a domestic abuse 
enhancer, was certain to result in his deportation and permanent 
exclusion from the United States.  He argues that these 
immigration consequences were clear and certain because his 
substantial battery was a "crime involving moral turpitude" 
under 
federal 
immigration 
law, 
thereby 
rendering 
him 
automatically deportable and permanently inadmissible.4  Ortiz-
                                                 
4 We recognize that an alien could be "deportable" if 
"convicted of a crime of domestic violence."  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).  However, whether an alien will actually be 
deported because of such a conviction is far from certain.  We 
do not address this issue because it was not raised, briefed, or 
argued by any of the parties in the case at issue.  See Aurora 
Consol. Health Care v. LIRC, 2012 WI 49, ¶43 n.7, 340 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
3 
 
Mondragon further argues that his trial counsel performed 
deficiently by failing to research or consider the possible 
immigration consequences of the plea agreement.  He argues that 
this deficient performance prejudiced him because he would have 
insisted on going to trial had he known that his plea to 
substantial battery would subject him to mandatory deportation 
and permanent exclusion from the United States.  He reasons 
that, because he has lived, worked, and raised a family in the 
United States since 1997, he would have sought a plea agreement 
that avoided these immigration consequences.  If he were unable 
to secure such a plea agreement, he argues that he would have 
gone to trial to leave open the possibility of remaining in the 
United States.  
¶4 
The State argues that the circuit court correctly 
denied Ortiz-Mondragon's motion to withdraw his plea.  The State 
argues that trial counsel's performance was not deficient.  The 
State contends that, because federal law is not succinct and 
straightforward 
with 
respect 
to 
the 
possible 
immigration 
consequences of Ortiz-Mondragon's plea, trial counsel gave 
correct advice under Padilla when he advised Ortiz-Mondragon 
that the "plea could result in deportation, the exclusion of 
admission to this country, or the denial of naturalization under 
federal law."  Specifically, the State contends that federal 
immigration law does not clearly and succinctly provide that 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wis. 2d 367, 814 N.W.2d 824 (declining to address arguments not 
raised before this court). 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
4 
 
Ortiz-Mondragon's 
conviction 
for 
substantial 
battery 
would 
constitute a crime involving moral turpitude.  The State further 
argues that, if we determine that trial counsel's performance 
was deficient, we should remand the matter to the circuit court 
for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the 
deficiency prejudiced Ortiz-Mondragon.  
¶5 
We conclude that Ortiz-Mondragon is not entitled to 
withdraw his no-contest plea to substantial battery because he 
did 
not 
receive 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel.  
Specifically, his trial counsel did not perform deficiently.  
Because federal immigration law is not "succinct, clear, and 
explicit" 
in 
providing 
that 
Ortiz-Mondragon's 
substantial 
battery constituted a crime involving moral turpitude, his 
attorney "need[ed] [to] do no more than advise [him] that 
pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration 
consequences."  See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.  Ortiz-Mondragon's 
trial attorney satisfied that requirement by conveying the 
information contained in the plea questionnaire and waiver of 
rights form——namely, that Ortiz-Mondragon's "plea could result 
in deportation, the exclusion of admission to this country, or 
the denial of naturalization under federal law."  Counsel's 
advice was correct, not deficient, and was consistent with Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) (2011-12).5  In addition, Ortiz-Mondragon's 
                                                 
5 This statute provides:  
Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or no 
contest, 
it 
shall . . . [a]ddress 
the 
defendant 
personally and advise the defendant as follows: "If 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
5 
 
trial attorney did not perform deficiently by failing to further 
research the immigration consequences of the plea agreement. 
Because Ortiz-Mondragon failed to prove deficient performance, 
we do not consider the issue of prejudice.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶6 
In 1997 Ortiz-Mondragon came to the United States from 
Mexico. In 2002 he moved to Wisconsin to work in the 
agricultural industry.  He has four children, all of whom are 
United States citizens and reside in Wisconsin.  
¶7 
On September 14, 2012, the State filed a criminal 
complaint 
charging 
Ortiz-Mondragon 
with: 
(1) 
substantial 
battery, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.19(2); 
(2) 
false 
imprisonment, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.30; (3) felony 
intimidation of a victim, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.45(1); 
(4) criminal damage to property, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.01(1); and (5) disorderly conduct, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 947.01(1).  Each count included a domestic abuse enhancer 
under Wis. Stat. § 968.075.  All of the counts stemmed from one 
incident that occurred on September 12, 2012.  
                                                                                                                                                             
you are not a citizen of the United States of America, 
you are advised that a plea of guilty or no contest 
for the offense with which you are charged may result 
in deportation, the exclusion from admission to this 
country or the denial of naturalization, under federal 
law." 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) (2011-12).  All subsequent references 
to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011-12 version unless 
otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
6 
 
¶8 
According to the complaint, Ortiz-Mondragon violently 
attacked J.S., who was his cohabiting girlfriend at the time and 
who is the mother of two of his children.  Ortiz-Mondragon 
became enraged because J.S. was talking to a male neighbor on 
the phone.  Ortiz-Mondragon jumped on top of J.S. while she was 
talking on the phone in bed.  Their two young children were in 
the room with them.  Ortiz-Mondragon put his hands around J.S.'s 
neck and began squeezing.  J.S. had trouble breathing and 
thought that Ortiz-Mondragon was going to kill her.  When J.S. 
managed to get off of the bed and tried to leave the bedroom, 
Ortiz-Mondragon punched her in the face and mouth and hit her in 
the back of the head.  J.S.'s head bled profusely.  Ortiz-
Mondragon also broke J.S.'s phone in half.  When J.S. later 
sought treatment for her injuries, a wound on her face required 
five staples. 
¶9 
On September 24, 2012, Ortiz-Mondragon waived his 
right to a preliminary examination and was bound over for trial.  
That same day, the State filed an information that contained the 
same five charges as the complaint.  
¶10 On November 15, 2012, the State made a plea offer to 
Ortiz-Mondragon.  If Ortiz-Mondragon pled guilty or no contest 
to substantial battery, criminal damage to property, and 
disorderly conduct, all with a domestic abuse enhancer, the 
State would dismiss and read-in the intimidation and false 
imprisonment charges.  The State would recommend three years of 
probation and four months in jail as a condition of probation. 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
7 
 
¶11 On November 27, 2012, the circuit court held a plea 
and sentencing hearing.  Ortiz-Mondragon's attorney, Raj Kumar 
Singh ("Attorney Singh"), informed the court that the State 
recently made a plea offer to the defendant.  Attorney Singh 
stated that he had "presented" the State's plea offer to Ortiz-
Mondragon, "given him paperwork to use to study it, given him 
information to use in counseling, and [Ortiz-Mondragon] has just 
now confirmed that now he's made his final decision.  He would 
like to take the offer."  
¶12 Attorney Singh then handed a plea questionnaire and 
waiver of rights form, along with "some other papers," to the 
circuit 
court. 
 
Ortiz-Mondragon 
had 
signed 
the 
plea 
questionnaire and waiver of rights form, which stated, inter 
alia: "I understand that if I am not a citizen of the United 
States, my plea could result in deportation, the exclusion of 
admission to this country, or the denial of naturalization under 
federal law."  Attorney Singh had signed the plea questionnaire 
and waiver of rights form immediately below the following 
affirmation: "I am the attorney for the defendant.  I have 
discussed this document and any attachments with the defendant.  
I believe the defendant understands it and the plea agreement.  
The defendant is making this plea freely, voluntarily, and 
intelligently. . . . " 
¶13 Ortiz-Mondragon then stated that he wished to plead no 
contest to three counts pursuant to the plea agreement.  The 
circuit court then informed him of the possible immigration 
consequences of his pleas. 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
8 
 
THE COURT:  All right.  The law requires I 
address you now and advise you of the following: If 
you're not a citizen of the United States, the plea 
you offer me could result in your deportation, the 
exclusion 
of 
admission, 
or 
the 
denial 
of 
naturalization under federal law. . . .    
These are collateral consequences to [sic] on top of 
whatever I sentence you to.  Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  All right.  Do you still wish to 
offer me these pleas then? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
¶14 The circuit court then confirmed that Ortiz-Mondragon 
and his attorney had discussed the plea questionnaire and waiver 
of rights form, which contained a warning about possible 
immigration consequences of a conviction.  
THE COURT:  All right.  In my right hand I have a 
plea-questionnaire-and-waiver-of-rights form.  I have 
the standard jury instruction for the charge of 
substantial battery with intent to cause bodily harm 
as well as the elements of criminal damage and 
disorderly conduct.  Do you see all these documents? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  Did you sign the plea questionnaire? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.  
THE COURT:  Before you signed it, did you read it 
over carefully? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.  
THE COURT:  And while you were going over all 
these documents, did you have an opportunity to fully 
discuss it with your attorney, Mr. Singh? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.  
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
9 
 
THE 
COURT:  And 
are 
you 
satisfied 
with 
his 
representation thus far? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
¶15 The 
court 
concluded: 
"I'm 
going 
to 
find 
the 
defendant's 
pleas 
today 
to 
be 
freely, 
voluntarily, 
and 
intelligently entered on the record I have made.  I'll 
incorporate in support of that the plea-questionnaire-and-
waiver-of-rights form."  The court then determined that "[t]he 
facts do support his pleas" and "adjudge[d] him guilty today of 
substantial 
battery 
and 
criminal 
damage 
to 
property 
and 
disorderly conduct."  
¶16 The State then explained that, pursuant to a joint 
recommendation, 
it 
was 
going 
to 
recommend 
"three 
years' 
probation with four months' jail and other standard conditions 
of probation."  The State explained that it had "consulted with 
the 
victim," 
Ortiz-Mondragon 
committed 
a 
"fairly 
violent 
offense," and he had no prior criminal record.  The State also 
noted that although Ortiz-Mondragon "was on an immigration hold 
at the . . . initial appearance," he was not "on any other type 
of hold at all."  
¶17 The victim of Ortiz-Mondragon's domestic abuse, J.S., 
then spoke to the court.  She stated that she would like for the 
felony battery charge to be reduced to a misdemeanor.  J.S. 
stated that Ortiz-Mondragon has two children with her and also 
has two other children, and they "were trying to keep them here 
in the states, but if he ends up with a felony charge, that's 
not going to happen."  The court informed J.S. that Ortiz-
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
10 
 
Mondragon had just been found guilty of a felony.  J.S. then 
stated that probation and four months in jail were "fine" with 
her. 
¶18 Attorney Singh then asked the court to grant Ortiz-
Mondragon sentence credit, which the court granted.  The court 
then asked Attorney Singh whether Ortiz-Mondragon has an 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement hold.6  Attorney Singh 
stated, "I think there is, but the information I get is 
secondhand."  
¶19 Ortiz-Mondragon then apologized for his behavior and 
stated that he "never had a problem like this before."  
¶20 The court then proceeded to sentence Ortiz-Mondragon.  
It stated that its sentence would be based on "the protection of 
the public, punishment of the defendant, the defendant's 
rehabilitative needs, and other factors."  The court noted that 
it received a joint recommendation and that it "defer[s] a 
little bit to [the State's] judgment" in "these kinds of cases 
because [the State] handle[s] so many of them . . . ."  The 
court then discussed the "great impact parents' behaviors have 
on their children" and encouraged Ortiz-Mondragon to "do a 
better job of being a parent and an adult."  The court then 
adopted the joint recommendation, withheld sentence on all three 
counts, placed Ortiz-Mondragon on probation for three years, and 
                                                 
6 The United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement is a 
component of the United States Department of Homeland Security. 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
11 
 
sentenced him to four months in the county jail as a condition 
of probation.  
¶21 J.S. then asked the court if Ortiz-Mondragon will "be 
let go" after his jail sentence.  The court stated that he would 
be let go "if the immigration doesn't put a hold on him.  If the 
immigration people put a hold on him, that's a federal issue.  
Our officers have nothing to do with that." 
¶22 After Ortiz-Mondragon completed his jail sentence,7 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement took him into custody and 
commenced removal proceedings against him.  He agreed to a 
voluntary departure to avoid a deportation on his record.8  
¶23 On 
September 
17, 
2013, 
Ortiz-Mondragon 
filed 
a 
postconviction motion to withdraw his no-contest plea to 
substantial battery on grounds of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  In the motion, Ortiz-Mondragon argued that his 
                                                 
7 The record does not indicate exactly when Ortiz-Mondragon 
was released from jail.  At the plea and sentencing hearing on 
November 27, 2012, the circuit court sentenced Ortiz-Mondragon 
to four months in jail and granted him 76 days of sentence 
credit.  Accordingly, he seems to have been released from jail 
in early or mid-January 2013.  
8 Ortiz-Mondragon's motion to withdraw his plea discusses 
these events but does not indicate when they took place.  The 
record 
contains 
a 
letter 
from 
Immigration 
and 
Customs 
Enforcement ("ICE"), which was filed with the Brown County 
Circuit Court on December 12, 2012.  This letter requested that 
the circuit court forward to ICE certified copies of the 
complaint, information, judgment and commitment order for this 
case.  The letter stated that these documents would help ICE "in 
its efforts to expeditiously remove alien criminals from the 
United States."  Under "charge(s)," the letter stated "940.19(2) 
Substantial Battery——Intend Bodily Harm." 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
12 
 
substantial battery as an act of domestic abuse was a "crime 
involving 
moral 
turpitude" 
under 
federal 
immigration 
law, 
thereby rendering him subject to mandatory deportation and 
permanent exclusion from the United States.  He argued that 
these consequences of his substantial battery conviction were 
clear and that under Padilla his attorney performed deficiently 
in failing to inform him of these consequences.  Ortiz-Mondragon 
further argued that this deficiency prejudiced him.  He 
contended that, had he known the immigration consequences of 
this conviction, he would have sought a different plea agreement 
or would have insisted on going to trial in order to preserve 
the possibility of remaining in or returning to the United 
States to be with his family.  
¶24 On October 29, 2013, the circuit court issued a 
written order denying Ortiz-Mondragon's motion without a Machner 
hearing.9  The court first held that Ortiz-Mondragon's "trial 
counsel was not required to provide [Ortiz-Mondragon] with 
unequivocal 
advice 
regarding 
the 
immigration-related 
consequences of his plea because the law elucidating the 
                                                 
9 See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. 
App. 1979).  "[T]he circuit court has the discretion to deny the 
postconviction motion without a Machner hearing 'if the motion 
fails to allege sufficient facts to raise a question of fact, 
presents 
only 
conclusory 
allegations, 
or 
if 
the 
record 
conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to 
relief.'"  State v. Roberson, 2006 WI 80, ¶43, 292 Wis. 2d 280, 
717 N.W.2d 111 (emphasis added in Roberson) (quoting State v. 
Curtis, 218 Wis. 2d 550, 555 n. 3, 582 N.W.2d 409 (Ct. App. 
1998)). 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
13 
 
consequences is not succinct and straightforward."  The court 
reasoned that "a 'crime involving moral turpitude' is a broad, 
rather than specific, classification of crimes," and Ortiz-
Mondragon failed to prove that his substantial battery was a 
crime involving moral turpitude.  Quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 
369, the circuit court stated that, "[b]ecause the law is not 
succinct and straightforward, [Ortiz-Mondragon's] counsel 'need 
do no more than advise [Ortiz-Mondragon] that pending criminal 
charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.'"  
Ortiz-Mondragon "does not assert that trial counsel did not so 
advise him, and the record affirmatively establishes that trial 
counsel did so advise him."  
¶25 The circuit court discussed the immigration warnings 
and advice that Ortiz-Mondragon received.  In particular, the 
court noted that Ortiz-Mondragon "acknowledges that he was given 
equivocal immigration warnings by both the Court, as required by 
[Wis. Stat. §] 971.08, and the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of 
Rights form."  The court also noted that, at the plea and 
sentencing hearing, "[Ortiz-Mondragon] confirmed with the Court 
that he read [the plea questionnaire] over carefully before 
signing it and had the opportunity to fully discuss it with his 
attorney."  The court further noted that Attorney Singh signed 
the plea questionnaire form under a statement affirming that he 
discussed that form with Ortiz-Mondragon and that Ortiz-
Mondragon understood the form and the plea agreement.  The court 
concluded that Attorney Singh did not perform deficiently.  
Specifically, 
the 
court 
concluded 
that 
"[u]nder 
the 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
14 
 
circumstances, [Ortiz-Mondragon] has not stated sufficient facts 
which entitle him to a hearing on his postconviction motion.  
The facts, as alleged, demonstrate that [Ortiz-Mondragon's] 
counsel did not perform deficiently by providing [Ortiz-
Mondragon] with equivocal, rather than unequivocal, advice 
regarding the immigration-related consequences of his plea."  
The court did not address the issue of prejudice. 
¶26 On October 7, 2014, the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit 
court's 
order 
denying 
Ortiz-Mondragon's 
motion 
to 
withdraw his plea.  The court of appeals explained that Ortiz-
Mondragon "has not identified clear authority indicating any of 
the crimes to which he pled were crimes of moral turpitude."  
State v. Ortiz-Mondragon, 2014 WI App 114, ¶13, 358 Wis. 2d 423, 
856 N.W.2d 339.  The court of appeals reasoned that "[i]f an 
attorney must search federal court and unfamiliar administrative 
board decisions from around the country to identify a category 
of elements that together constitute crimes of moral turpitude, 
and then determine whether a charged crime fits that category, 
then the law is not 'succinct, clear, and explicit.'"  Id., ¶12 
(quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368).  It concluded that "Ortiz–
Mondragon's attorney did not perform deficiently by failing to 
unequivocally 
inform 
him 
that 
his 
plea 
would 
result 
in 
deportation and permanent inadmissibility."  Id., ¶13.  The 
court of appeals did not address the issue of prejudice.   
¶27 On November 6, 2014, Ortiz-Mondragon filed a petition 
for review, which we granted on December 18, 2014.  
II. STANDARD FOR PLEA WITHDRAWAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
15 
 
¶28 "In general 'a circuit court should freely allow a 
defendant to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing for any fair 
and just reason, unless the prosecution [would] be substantially 
prejudiced.'"  State v. Lopez, 2014 WI 11, ¶2, 353 Wis. 2d 1, 
843 N.W.2d 390 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Jenkins, 2007 
WI 96, ¶2, 303 Wis. 2d 157, 736 N.W.2d 24) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  In contrast, "the general rule [is] that a 
defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea after 
sentencing must prove manifest injustice by clear and convincing 
evidence."  State v. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, ¶29, 343 Wis. 2d 1, 
819 
N.W.2d 749 
(emphasis 
added) 
(citations 
omitted).  
Ineffective assistance of counsel is one type of manifest 
injustice.  State v. Taylor, 2013 WI 34, ¶49, 347 Wis. 2d 30, 
829 N.W.2d 482.  
¶29 "The clear and convincing standard for plea withdrawal 
after sentencing, which is higher than the 'fair and just' 
standard before sentencing, 'reflects the State's interest in 
the finality of convictions, and reflects the fact that the 
presumption of innocence no longer exists.'"  Id., ¶48 (quoting 
State 
v. 
Cross, 
2010 
WI 
70, 
¶42, 
326 
Wis. 2d 492, 
786 
N.W.2d 64).  "The higher burden 'is a deterrent to defendants 
testing the waters for possible punishments.'"  Id. (quoting 
State v. Nawrocke, 193 Wis. 2d 373, 379–80, 534 N.W.2d 624 (Ct. 
App. 1995)).  "Disappointment in the eventual punishment does 
not rise to the level of a manifest injustice."  Id., ¶49 
(citing Nawrocke, 193 Wis. 2d at 379).  
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
16 
 
¶30 "A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a 
mixed question of fact and law."  State v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, 
¶19, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695 (citations omitted).  "We 
will uphold the circuit court's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous."  Id. (citation omitted).  "Findings of fact 
include 'the circumstances of the case and the counsel's conduct 
and strategy.'"  Id. (quoting State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶21, 
264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305) (quotation marks omitted).  
"Moreover, this court will not exclude the circuit court's 
articulated assessments of credibility and demeanor, unless they 
are clearly erroneous."  Id. (citing Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 57, 
¶23).  "However, the ultimate determination of whether counsel's 
assistance was ineffective is a question of law, which we review 
de novo."  Id.  
III. ANALYSIS 
¶31 "Both the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
guarantee 
criminal 
defendants 
the 
right 
to 
counsel."  Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶20 (citing U.S. Const. 
amend. VI; Wis. Const. art. I, § 7).  "The United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that 'the right to counsel is the right to 
the effective assistance of counsel.'"  Id. (quoting Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)) (quotation marks 
omitted).  
¶32 "Whether a convicted defendant received ineffective 
assistance of counsel is a two-part inquiry."  Id., ¶21 (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  "First, the defendant must prove 
that 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
deficient." 
 
Id. 
(citing 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
17 
 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  "Second, if counsel's performance 
was deficient, the defendant must prove that the deficiency 
prejudiced the defense."  Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687).  To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant must prove both deficient performance and 
prejudice.  Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  If a 
defendant fails to prove deficient performance, a reviewing 
court need not consider whether the defendant was prejudiced. 
See id., ¶36; State v. Franklin, 2001 WI 104, ¶13, 245 
Wis. 2d 582, 629 N.W.2d 289 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
697). 
¶33 The Supreme Court in Padilla held "that advice 
regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the 
ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel."  Id. at 366.  
The Court explained that the scope of counsel's duty to provide 
advice regarding deportation depends on whether the immigration 
consequences 
of 
a 
conviction 
are 
clear, 
succinct, 
and 
straightforward.  It explained that counsel's duty to provide 
advice regarding deportation "is more limited" in "situations in 
which the deportation consequences of a particular plea are 
unclear or uncertain."  Id. at 369.  Specifically, "[w]hen the 
law is not succinct and straightforward . . . , a criminal 
defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client 
that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse 
immigration consequences."  Id. (emphases added).  "But when the 
deportation consequence is truly clear, . . . the duty to give 
correct advice is equally clear."  Id.  
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
18 
 
¶34 The Court in Padilla held that defense counsel 
performed deficiently by incorrectly advising the defendant that 
he would not be deported upon conviction.  Id. at 368-69.  The 
Court reasoned that "the terms of the relevant immigration 
statute are succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the 
removal consequence for Padilla's conviction."  Id. at 368 
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)).  "The consequences of 
Padilla's plea could easily be determined from reading the 
removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, 
and his counsel's advice was incorrect."  Id. at 369. 
¶35 In order to determine whether Ortiz-Mondragon's trial 
counsel performed deficiently, we must first determine what 
advice Padilla required Ortiz-Mondragon's trial attorney to 
provide.  To that end, we will determine whether immigration law 
is succinct, clear, and explicit such that Ortiz-Mondragon's 
trial attorney should have discovered that Ortiz-Mondragon would 
be deported and excluded because his substantial battery was a 
crime involving moral turpitude.  Second, we will determine 
whether Ortiz-Mondragon's trial attorney performed deficiently 
under Padilla by giving inadequate advice and failing to further 
research the immigration consequences of the plea agreement. 
Because we conclude that Ortiz-Mondragon's trial attorney did 
not perform deficiently, we do not address prejudice. 
 
A. Is Immigration Law Succinct, Clear, and Explicit  
that Ortiz-Mondragon's Substantial Battery  
Was a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude? 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
19 
 
¶36 The 
relevant 
immigration 
statutes 
authorize 
deportation and exclusion of an alien who is convicted of a 
"crime 
involving 
moral 
turpitude."10 
 
Under 
certain 
circumstances, "[a]ny alien who . . . is convicted of a crime 
involving 
moral 
turpitude . . . is 
deportable." 
 
8 
U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).  Any such alien "shall, upon the order of 
the Attorney General, be removed . . . ."  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) 
(intro.).  The Attorney General may not "cancel removal" of an 
alien who is "inadmissible or deportable" due to a conviction 
for 
a 
crime 
involving 
moral 
turpitude. 
 
See 
8 
U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(b)(1)(C).  Further, an alien is "ineligible to receive 
visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States" if 
"convicted of . . . a crime involving moral turpitude . . . ."  
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).  
¶37 However, the Immigration and Nationality Act, which 
includes those statutory provisions, does not define "crime 
involving moral turpitude."  See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 361; id. 
at 377-78 (Alito, J., concurring).  The Code of Federal 
Regulations also does not define that term.  Garcia v. State, 
425 S.W.3d 248, 260 (Tenn. 2013) ("[A] crime involving moral 
turpitude 
is 
nowhere 
defined 
in 
the 
[Immigration 
and 
Nationality] Act or in the Code of Federal Regulations.").  The 
Immigration and Nationality Act does not even list examples of 
crimes involving moral turpitude.  Lopez-Penaloza v. State, 804 
                                                 
10 "The term 'alien' means any person not a citizen or 
national of the United States."  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
20 
 
N.W.2d 537, 544 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) ("The [Immigration and 
Nationality Act] does not define the term 'moral turpitude' or 
list [crimes involving moral turpitude]."). 
¶38 Thus, 
because 
the 
term 
"crime 
involving 
moral 
turpitude" is undefined in the immigration statutes, we will 
consider case law that defines this term.  We need to determine 
whether immigration law is succinct, clear, and explicit such 
that Ortiz-Mondragon's counsel was deficient for failing to 
discover that the substantial battery offense was a crime 
involving moral turpitude and advise Ortiz-Mondragon to that 
effect.  Because we conclude that immigration law is not 
succinct, clear, and explicit in this case, counsel was not 
deficient for not giving further immigration advice to Ortiz-
Mondragon.  In order to explain how immigration law is not 
succinct, clear, and explicit in this case, we will discuss 
cases wherein the subject of the dispute was whether a 
particular crime qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude.  
One important difference between the cases we will discuss and 
the case at issue is that the analysis in those cases concerned 
appeals from actual deportation proceedings.  The dispute in 
those cases was not whether counsel was ineffective for failing 
to discover and then advise that a specific crime involved moral 
turpitude.  
¶39 Even the case law that analyzes whether a crime 
qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of 
deportation often uses terms of generality, not specifics.  
"[T]he phrase 'crime involving moral turpitude' is notoriously 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
21 
 
baffling . . . ."  Garcia-Meza v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 535, 536 
(7th Cir. 2008)."  "As a general rule, a crime involves 'moral 
turpitude' if it is inherently base, vile, or depraved, and 
contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed 
between persons or to society in general."  In re Sanudo, 23 
I. & N. Dec. 968, 970 (BIA 2006) (emphasis added); see also 
Garcia-Meza, 516 F.3d at 536.  The term "crime involving moral 
turpitude" "generally refers to acts that are per se morally 
reprehensible and intrinsically wrong."  In re Solon, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. 239, 240 (BIA 2007) (emphasis added) (citing Rodriguez v. 
Gonzales, 451 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 2006)).  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has "put [its] own 
gloss on the term," "stating that crimes of moral turpitude are 
usually serious crimes (in terms of the magnitude of the loss 
they cause or the indignation in the public they arouse) that 
are committed deliberately."  Garcia-Meza, 516 F.3d at 536 
(emphasis added).  Thus, even in deportation proceedings 
themselves, the issue of what constitutes a crime involving 
moral turpitude is frequently litigated as it is often less than 
clear. 
¶40 Even in deportation proceeding cases where the subject 
of the litigation is whether a crime qualifies as a crime 
involving moral turpitude, "[n]either the seriousness of the 
underlying offense nor the severity of the punishment imposed is 
determinative of whether a crime involves moral turpitude."  
Solon, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 240 (citing In re Serna, 20 I. & N. 
Dec. 579, 581 (BIA 1992)).  "[A]t least in the context of 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
22 
 
assault crimes, a finding of moral turpitude involves an 
assessment of both the state of mind and the level of harm 
required to complete the offense."  Id. at 243.  "Thus, 
intentional conduct resulting in a meaningful level of harm, 
which must be more than mere offensive touching, may be 
considered morally turpitudinous."  Id. (emphasis added).  
¶41 In addition to the fact that the amorphous term "crime 
involving moral turpitude" is not defined, it is even more 
problematic to ascertain whether a particular crime would 
qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude.  Padilla, 559 U.S. 
at 
378 
(Alito, 
J., 
concurring) 
("As 
has 
been 
widely 
acknowledged, determining whether a particular crime is . . . a 
'crime involving moral turpitude [(CIMT)]' is not an easy 
task.").  Even courts confronted with analyzing crimes involving 
moral turpitude in deportation proceedings are not uniform in 
their analysis of whether a crime qualified as a crime involving 
moral turpitude.  Five federal circuit courts of appeals apply a 
two-step test consisting of a "categorical approach" and 
"modified categorical approach."11  Two other circuits follow a 
three-step test for determining whether a crime qualifies as a 
                                                 
11 See Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 200 & n.1 (5th 
Cir. 2014); Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 746 F.3d 907, 911-16 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (amended opinion); Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 
480-84 (4th Cir. 2012); Fajardo v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 659 F.3d 
1303, 1307-11 (11th Cir. 2011); Jean-Louis v. Att'y Gen. of 
United States, 582 F.3d 462, 472-82 (3d Cir. 2009). 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
23 
 
crime involving moral turpitude.12  In the wake of Descamps v. 
United States, how federal courts will determine whether a crime 
qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude is unclear.  See 
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 282 
(2013) (holding "that sentencing courts may not apply the 
modified categorical approach when the crime of which the 
defendant was convicted has a single, indivisible set of 
elements"); id. at 2288-89 (holding that under the modified 
categorical 
approach, 
a 
court 
may 
rely 
on 
"only 
facts . . . constituting elements of the offense," rather than 
"rely[ing] on its own finding about a non-elemental fact").  
Thus, relevant immigration law is far from succinct, clear, and 
explicit as to what constitutes a crime involving moral 
turpitude.  See State v. Telford, 22 A.3d 43, 49-50 (N.J. App. 
Div. 2011) (holding that immigration law was not succinct, 
clear, and explicit because of a circuit split "surrounding the 
type of analysis that would be undertaken by the tribunals 
charged with determining whether a noncitizen has committed an 
aggravated felony").  
                                                 
12 See Bobadilla v. Holder, 679 F.3d 1052, 1057 (8th Cir. 
2012); Mata-Guerrero v. Holder, 627 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 
2010).  For a discussion of the categorical approach and 
modified categorical approach, see Descamps v. United States, 
570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281-82 (2013).  For a discussion 
of the two- and three-step tests, see In re Silva-Trevino, 26 
I. & N. Dec. 550, 550-51 (A.G. 2015); Maria Theresa Baldini-
Potermin, Defending Non-Citizens in Illinois, Indiana, and 
Wisconsin 
3-5 
to 
3-9 
(2009), 
available 
at 
https://www.immigrantjustice.org/defendersmanual.  
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
24 
 
¶42 In addition to that circuit split, the United States 
Attorney General has added to the complexity of determining 
whether a crime will qualify as a crime involving moral 
turpitude.  In 2008 the United States Attorney General adopted 
the three-step test for the Board of Immigration Appeals.13  In 
re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008).  However, on 
April 10, 2015, the Attorney General issued an opinion vacating 
his In re Silva-Trevino opinion in its entirety.  In re Silva-
Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550, 550, 554 (A.G. 2015).  That 2015 
opinion seemingly leaves unresolved how the Board of Immigration 
Appeals should determine whether a crime will qualify as a crime 
involving moral turpitude.  That opinion stated that  
the Board may address, in this case and other cases as 
appropriate, the following issues: 
1.  How adjudicators are to determine whether a 
particular criminal offense is a crime involving moral 
turpitude under the Act; 
2.  When, and to what extent, adjudicators may 
use a modified categorical approach and consider a 
record of conviction in determining whether an alien 
has been "convicted of . . . a crime involving moral 
turpitude" . . . . 
Id., 26 I. & N. Dec. at 553. 
¶43 In 
her 
comprehensive 
guide 
on 
the 
immigration 
consequences of convictions, Maria Theresa Baldini-Potermin 
wrote in 2009 that "[t]he current state of the case law for 
                                                 
13 The Board of Immigration Appeals is an administrative 
appellate body within the United States Department of Justice. 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
25 
 
crimes involving moral turpitude is presently in a state of 
flux . . . ."  Maria Theresa Baldini-Potermin, Defending Non-
Citizens in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin 3-5 (2009), 
available at https://www.immigrantjustice.org/defendersmanual.  
¶44 Recognizing this lack of clarity, the State argues 
that, "[w]hile Ortiz-Mondragon's conviction may well qualify as 
a crime of moral turpitude, that conclusion is not 'clear and 
certain' or 'succinct and straightforward.'"  The State notes 
that case law has held that domestic battery is not necessarily 
a crime involving moral turpitude.  The State argues that the 
relevant case law and the circuit split regarding the two- or 
three-step 
test 
"illustrate 
the 
complexity 
of 
deciphering 
whether a given offense is a crime involving moral turpitude."  
Thus, because Ortiz-Mondragon's conviction does not clearly 
constitute a crime involving moral turpitude, the State contends 
"that Ortiz-Mondragon's trial attorney was required to do no 
more than advise him that his plea 'may carry a risk of adverse 
immigration consequences.'"  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.  
¶45 Despite the lack of any clear guidance by statute or 
jurisprudence regarding whether a particular crime qualifies as 
a crime involving moral turpitude, Ortiz-Mondragon argues that 
federal law is "succinct" and "straightforward" in providing 
that his substantial battery was a crime involving moral 
turpitude such that his counsel should have given him different 
advice.  He contends that "[s]ome crimes, such as substantial 
battery, domestic abuse, are universally treated as [crimes 
involving moral turpitude] . . . ."  In both of his briefs to 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
26 
 
this court, he provides string cites to several cases that, 
according to him, support that conclusion.14  He argues that this 
court can determine that his substantial battery was a crime 
involving moral turpitude simply by looking at Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.19(2) and the case law addressing "similar offenses."  
¶46 For example, Ortiz-Mondragon relies on two spousal 
abuse deportation cases arising from California: Grageda v. U.S. 
I.N.S., 12 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1993), superseded by statute on 
other grounds, and In re Tran, 21 I. & N. Dec. 291 (BIA 1996). 
In Grageda the Ninth Circuit held "that spousal abuse under 
[California Penal Code] section 273.5(a) is a crime of moral 
turpitude."  Grageda, 12 F.3d at 922.  In In re Tran the Board 
of Immigration Appeals expanded the holding in Grageda and 
concluded "that any violation of section 273.5(a) of the 
California Penal Code constitutes a crime involving moral 
turpitude."  In re Tran, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 294.  However, the 
                                                 
14 Ortiz-Mondragon also relies on publications that do not 
have the force of law.  For example, he cites to the Immigrant 
Defense 
Project's 
Immigration 
Consequences 
of 
Convictions 
Summary Checklist, which states that crimes involving moral 
turpitude "includ[e]" "[c]rimes in which bodily harm is caused 
or threatened by an intentional act, or serious bodily harm is 
caused or threatened by a reckless act . . . ."  However, that 
checklist does not cite to legal authority for that proposition 
and does not state that such crimes necessarily are crimes 
involving moral turpitude.  To the contrary, such crimes may be 
considered crimes involving moral turpitude.  See In re Solon, 
24 I. & N. Dec. 239, 243 (BIA 2007) ("[I]ntentional conduct 
resulting in a meaningful level of harm, which must be more than 
mere 
offensive 
touching, 
may 
be 
considered 
morally 
turpitudinous."). 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
27 
 
Ninth Circuit in Grageda explained that its holding was limited 
to spousal abuse and did not include abuse of a cohabitant.15  
Grageda, 12 F.3d at 921-22 n.1.  
¶47 In a subsequent decision, the Ninth Circuit recognized 
the narrow holding of Grageda and concluded that a "conviction 
under Cal. Penal Code § 273.5(a) for abuse of a cohabitant is 
not 
categorically 
a 
[crime 
involving 
moral 
turpitude]."  
Morales-Garcia v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1058, 1064-67 (9th Cir. 
2009).16  In Morales-Garcia the Ninth Circuit expressly declined 
to follow In re Tran.  Id. at 1066 & n.4.  Accordingly, it is 
unclear whether abuse of a cohabitant, in violation of Cal. 
                                                 
15 The Ninth Circuit's holding in Grageda may be limited to 
spousal abuse that willfully causes a "traumatic condition."  
See Morales-Garcia v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 
2009) (quoting Grageda v. U.S. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 919, 922 (9th 
Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("In Grageda, for 
example, we held that 'when a person willfully beats his or her 
spouse severely enough to cause a traumatic condition, he or she 
has committed an act of baseness or depravity contrary to 
accepted moral standards.'").  Ortiz-Mondragon does not discuss 
whether 
substantial 
battery 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.19(2) 
involves the willful infliction of a traumatic condition.  
16 In Morales-Garcia the Ninth Circuit held that abuse of a 
cohabitant is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude 
because not all cohabitants "are committed to, trust, or depend 
upon each other."  Morales-Garcia, 567 F.3d at 1066.  If 
cohabitants are not committed to such a relationship, then their 
status as cohabitants does not transform a battery offense into 
a crime involving moral turpitude.  See id.  But if cohabitants 
are committed to such a relationship, then their status as 
cohabitants "may transform" a battery offense into a crime 
involving moral turpitude.  See id. at 1065 ("Otherwise non-
morally turpitudinous conduct targeted at a victim with whom the 
defendant has a special relationship may transform a crime into 
one involving moral turpitude.").  
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
28 
 
Penal Code § 273.5(a), is a crime involving moral turpitude.  In 
the present case, Ortiz-Mondragon was convicted for battering 
his cohabiting girlfriend, not a spouse.   
¶48 Furthermore, 
Ortiz-Mondragon's 
substantial 
battery 
conviction was under a Wisconsin statute, not a California 
statute.  Because the cases cited by Ortiz-Mondragon do not 
discuss whether substantial battery under Wis. Stat. § 940.19(2) 
is a crime involving moral turpitude, those cases do not 
succinctly, clearly, and explicitly demonstrate that Ortiz-
Mondragon's substantial battery under § 940.19(2) was a crime 
involving moral turpitude.  See Garcia, 425 S.W.3d at 260-61 
(holding that immigration law was not "clear, succinct, and 
straightforward" partly because the defendant "provided no 
federal judicial or administrative decision considering whether 
the Tennessee offenses to which he pleaded guilty amount to 
crimes involving moral turpitude, although the [defendant] has 
cited court decisions classifying abuse offenses in other 
jurisdictions as crimes involving moral turpitude").  Thus, 
Grageda and In re Tran do not succinctly, clearly, and 
explicitly 
demonstrate 
that 
Ortiz-Mondragon's 
substantial 
battery was a crime involving moral turpitude.  
¶49 Ortiz-Mondragon also relies on cases in which courts 
held that aggravated assault of a peace officer and aggravated 
child abuse were crimes that qualified as crimes involving moral 
turpitude.  See In re Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 669, 673 (BIA 
1988) (aggravated assault of peace officer); Garcia v. Attorney 
Gen. of United States, 329 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2003) 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
29 
 
(aggravated 
child 
abuse). 
 
However, 
as 
Morales-Garcia 
demonstrates, it is not safe to assume that Ortiz-Mondragon's 
substantial battery of his cohabiting girlfriend is necessarily 
a crime involving moral turpitude simply because aggravated 
assault of a peace officer and aggravated child abuse qualify as 
crimes involving moral turpitude.  See Morales-Garcia, 567 F.3d 
at 
1064-67 
(holding 
that 
abuse 
of 
a 
cohabitant 
is 
not 
necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude, although spousal 
abuse contrary to California law necessarily is). 
¶50 As the Board of Immigration Appeals has explained, "it 
has often been found that moral turpitude necessarily inheres in 
assault and battery offenses that are defined by reference to 
the infliction of bodily harm upon a person whom society views 
as deserving of special protection, such as . . . a domestic 
partner . . . ."  Sanudo, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 971-72 (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted).  However, such crimes do not 
categorically qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude.  See 
id.  Rather, "a case-by-case approach has been employed to 
decide whether battery (or assault and battery) offenses involve 
moral turpitude."  Id. at 971.  Thus, the State's argument that, 
"[w]hile Ortiz-Mondragon's conviction may well qualify as a 
crime of moral turpitude, that conclusion is not 'clear and 
certain' or 'succinct and straightforward,'" is correct.17 
                                                 
17 Ortiz-Mondragon argues that if the case law on which he 
relies does not succinctly, clearly, and explicitly indicate 
that his substantial battery was a crime involving moral 
turpitude, then this court should look to his record of 
conviction, including the criminal complaint and plea hearing 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
30 
 
¶51 Based on the foregoing discussion, we conclude that 
federal immigration law does not succinctly, clearly, and 
explicitly provide that Ortiz-Mondragon's substantial battery 
was a crime involving moral turpitude such that his counsel's 
advice should have been different.  The methodology for 
determining whether a crime qualifies as a crime involving moral 
turpitude varies by jurisdiction and is in a "state of flux."  
                                                                                                                                                             
transcript.  In other words, he argues that this court should 
proceed to the second step of the two- or three-step test for 
determining whether a crime qualified as a crime involving moral 
turpitude.  However, when determining whether a crime qualifies 
as a crime involving moral turpitude, a court looks to a record 
of conviction only if the statute of conviction is "divisible"——
that is, only if the statute "includes some offenses which 
involve moral turpitude and some which do not."  In re Short, 20 
I. & N. Dec. 136, 137-38 (BIA 1989) (citations omitted) ("Only 
where the statute under which the respondent was convicted 
includes some offenses which involve moral turpitude and some 
which do not do we look to the record of conviction . . . .").  
Because 
Ortiz-Mondragon 
does 
not 
argue 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.19(2) is divisible, his record of conviction will not help 
to determine whether his substantial battery qualified as a 
crime involving moral turpitude.  
Further, Ortiz-Mondragon does not explain how the relevant 
immigration law would be succinct, clear, and explicit if one 
must consult a record of conviction under the two- or three-step 
test in order to determine whether a crime qualified as a crime 
involving moral turpitude.  See State v. Telford, 22 A.3d 43, 50 
(N.J. App. Div. 2011) (stating that an attorney "would be hard-
pressed to provide any clear advice regarding the deportation 
consequences of a guilty plea" if the immigration advice could 
"turn on the precise wording of the indictment").  See also 
Garcia v. State, 425 S.W.3d 248, 260-61 (Tenn. 2013) (holding 
that immigration law did not succinctly, clearly, and explicitly 
provide that the defendant's conviction qualified as a crime 
involving moral turpitude); Lopez-Penaloza v. State, 804 N.W.2d 
537, 545-46 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (same). 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
31 
 
Baldini-Potermin, supra, 3-5; Telford, 22 A.3d at 49-50 (holding 
that a federal circuit split made the relevant immigration law 
not succinct, clear, and explicit).  The cases that Ortiz-
Mondragon cites fail to provide a succinct, clear, and explicit 
answer as to whether Ortiz-Mondragon's substantial battery 
qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude.  Accordingly, 
his trial counsel "need[ed] [to] do no more than advise [him] 
that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse 
immigration consequences."  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.  We now 
consider 
whether 
his 
counsel 
performed 
deficiently 
under 
Padilla.  
 
B. Whether Ortiz-Mondragon's Trial Counsel  
Performed Deficiently 
¶52 "To demonstrate deficient performance, the defendant 
must show that his counsel's representation 'fell below an 
objective 
standard 
of 
reasonableness' 
considering 
all 
the 
circumstances." 
 
Carter, 
324 
Wis. 2d 640, 
¶22 
(quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).  "In evaluating the reasonableness 
of 
counsel's 
performance, 
this 
court 
must 
be 
'highly 
deferential.'"  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).  
"Counsel enjoys a 'strong presumption' that his conduct 'falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'"  
Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).  "Indeed, counsel's 
performance need not be perfect, nor even very good, to be 
constitutionally 
adequate." 
 
Id. 
(citing 
 
Thiel, 
264 
Wis. 2d 571, ¶19). 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
32 
 
¶53 Ortiz-Mondragon 
argues 
that 
his 
trial 
counsel, 
Attorney Singh, performed deficiently by failing to advise him 
that his conviction for substantial battery would necessarily 
result in his deportation and permanent exclusion from the 
United States.  Ortiz-Mondragon concedes that "the circuit 
[court] found that the record affirmatively demonstrated that 
Mr. 
Ortiz-Mondragon 
received 
advice 
about 
the 
immigration 
consequences of his plea in the form of the general warnings 
contained in the plea questionnaire form as well as the circuit 
court's statutory warnings."  However, he argues that the 
circuit court's statutory warning and the plea questionnaire are 
"insufficient" "substitute[s] for the advice of counsel."  
¶54 Ortiz-Mondragon further argues that his trial counsel 
performed deficiently by failing to research the relevant 
immigration law and Ortiz-Mondragon's immigration status.  He 
argues that "the record contains no evidence that defense 
counsel investigated Mr. Ortiz-Mondragon's immigration status or 
relevant law."  He contends that "[e]ven when a more general 
warning is warranted, counsel must reasonably investigate the 
potential immigration consequences in light of the particular 
facts of the case because counsel cannot determine the clarity 
of a consequence without some investigation and research."  He 
further argues that "[c]ounsel's failure to inform a defendant 
of the adverse immigration consequences when legal research 
would show that the crimes at issue involved moral turpitude for 
immigration purposes falls below an objective standard of 
reasonableness."  
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
33 
 
¶55 The 
State 
argues 
that, 
because 
the 
immigration 
consequences of the plea agreement were not succinct, clear, and 
explict, "Ortiz-Mondragon's trial attorney was required to do no 
more than advise him that his plea 'may carry a risk of adverse 
immigration consequences.'"  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.  The 
State contends that "[t]he court should also uphold the circuit 
court's finding that Ortiz-Mondragon did, in fact, receive such 
a warning."  The State does not separately address Ortiz-
Mondragon's argument that his attorney failed to adequately 
research his immigration status or the immigration consequences 
of the plea agreement.  
¶56 We will first determine whether Ortiz-Mondragon's 
trial counsel, Attorney Singh, performed deficiently by giving 
incorrect advice.  We will next determine whether Attorney Singh 
performed deficiently by failing to adequately research the 
immigration consequences of the plea agreement.   
¶57 The record in the circuit court demonstrates that 
Ortiz-Mondragon knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made 
no-contest pleas to the subject charges.  The record further 
demonstrates that he knew he faced a risk of deportation and 
exclusion if he entered a no-contest plea to substantial 
battery.  Not only does the record reveal that there were 
serious known concerns regarding an ongoing Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement hold, but despite that, Ortiz-Mondragon 
discussed this case with counsel, accepted the State's plea 
bargain, 
signed 
a 
plea 
questionnaire, 
and 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily pled in the circuit court.  
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
34 
 
Specifically, his counsel, Attorney Singh, had "presented" the 
State's plea offer to him, "given him paperwork to use to study 
it, [and] given him information to use in counseling . . . ."  
Attorney Singh and the plea questionnaire both informed Ortiz-
Mondragon that the "plea could result in deportation, the 
exclusion of admission to this country, or the denial of 
naturalization under federal law."  The circuit court advised 
Ortiz-Mondragon: "If you're not a citizen of the United States, 
the plea you offer me could result in your deportation, the 
exclusion of admission, or the denial of naturalization under 
federal law."  Ortiz-Mondragon's girlfriend stated that he and 
she were trying to keep their family together "in the states, 
but if he ends up with a felony charge, that's not going to 
happen."  Ortiz-Mondragon himself stated that he carefully read 
the plea questionnaire and discussed it with his attorney before 
he signed it.  Ortiz-Mondragon also stated that he understood 
the circuit court's immigration warning and wished to enter his 
no-contest pleas.  All of these factors militate against the 
arguments that Ortiz-Mondragon makes today.  
¶58 Moreover, when Ortiz-Mondragon filed a motion to 
withdraw his plea and request a Machner hearing, the circuit 
court correctly concluded that his motion did not warrant a 
hearing.  While it is a defendant's burden to demonstrate that 
he is entitled to a Machner hearing by alleging sufficient facts 
to raise a question of fact, the circuit court correctly 
concluded that Ortiz-Mondragon's proffer was insufficient to 
warrant a Machner hearing.  In fact, the circuit court concluded 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
35 
 
that, "[u]nder the circumstances, [Ortiz-Mondragon] has not 
stated sufficient facts which entitle him to a hearing on his 
postconviction motion.  The facts, as alleged, demonstrate that 
[Ortiz-Mondragon's] counsel did not perform deficiently by 
providing 
[Ortiz-Mondragon] 
with 
equivocal, 
rather 
than 
unequivocal, 
advice 
regarding 
the 
immigration-related 
consequences of his plea."  It is well-established that a 
"circuit court has the discretion to deny the postconviction 
motion without a Machner hearing 'if the motion fails to allege 
sufficient facts to raise a question of fact, presents only 
conclusory 
allegations, 
or 
if 
the 
record 
conclusively 
demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief.'"  
State v. Roberson, 2006 WI 80, ¶43, 292 Wis. 2d 280, 717 
N.W.2d 111 (emphasis added in Roberson) (quoting State v. 
Curtis, 218 Wis. 2d 550, 555 n. 3, 582 N.W.2d 409 (Ct. App. 
1998)). 
¶59 In its order denying Ortiz-Mondragon's request for a 
Machner hearing and his motion to withdraw his plea, the circuit 
court found that "the record affirmatively establishes that 
trial counsel did so advise him" that "'pending criminal charges 
may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.'"  This 
finding is not clearly erroneous.18  The court noted that Ortiz-
                                                 
18 "Facts which are stated in a trial court's memorandum 
decision will be accorded the same weight as if they had been 
contained in formal findings."  Lambert v. Wrensch, 135 
Wis. 2d 105, 114-15, 399 N.W.2d 369 (1987) (citing Hochguertel 
v. San Felippo, 78 Wis. 2d 70, 86, 253 N.W.2d 526 (1977)). 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
36 
 
Mondragon conceded "that he was given equivocal immigration 
warnings by both the Court, as required by [Wis. Stat. 
§] 971.08, and the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form." 
The circuit court also noted that, at the plea and sentencing 
hearing, "[Ortiz-Mondragon] confirmed with the [c]ourt that he 
read [the plea questionnaire] over carefully before signing it 
and had the opportunity to fully discuss it with his attorney."  
The circuit court further noted that Attorney Singh signed the 
plea questionnaire, thereby affirming that he discussed it with 
Ortiz-Mondragon and that he believed Ortiz-Mondragon understood 
it and the plea agreement.  
¶60 The immigration advice that Ortiz-Mondragon received 
stands in stark contrast to the incorrect immigration advice 
that was given in Padilla.  In contrast to the present case, the 
immigration law in Padilla was "succinct, clear, and explicit" 
in providing that Padilla's conviction made him "eligible for 
deportation."  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368.  Thus, Padilla's 
attorney was required to do more than advise him that his 
conviction may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.  
Id. at 369.  But "Padilla's counsel provided him false assurance 
that his conviction would not result in his removal from this 
country."  Id. at 368.  That "advice was incorrect."  Id. at 
369.  By contrast, the advice that Ortiz-Mondragon received was 
correct.  
¶61 In fact, had Attorney Singh given the immigration 
advice that Ortiz-Mondragon argues he should have given, he may 
well have given incorrect advice.  Because federal immigration 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
37 
 
law does not succinctly, clearly, and explicitly provide that 
Ortiz-Mondragon's substantial battery was a crime involving 
moral turpitude, it may well have been inaccurate for Attorney 
Singh to unequivocally tell Ortiz-Mondragon that the immigration 
authorities would determine that his substantial battery was a 
crime involving moral turpitude.  Accordingly, it also may well 
have been inaccurate for Attorney Singh to unequivocally tell 
Ortiz-Mondragon that he would be deportable and inadmissible to 
the United States on grounds of moral turpitude if convicted of 
substantial battery.  
¶62 We note that incorrect advice that a plea will result 
in deportation or exclusion, like incorrect advice that a plea 
will not result in deportation or exclusion, could impact an 
alien 
defendant's 
decisionmaking. 
 
The 
former 
kind 
of 
misinformation 
might 
encourage 
a 
defendant 
to 
reject 
a 
beneficial plea offer and thereby subject him or herself to 
significantly more exposure.  The latter kind of misinformation 
could cause a defendant to be surprised with the actual 
immigration consequences.  Counsel should give accurate advice.  
Counsel should avoid overstating or understating the possible 
immigration consequences of a conviction.  Ortiz-Mondragon's 
position, if adopted, would require more of an attorney than is 
required under Padilla because it is not succinct, clear, and 
explicit that Ortiz-Mondragon's substantial battery is a crime 
involving moral turpitude.19  
                                                 
19 Case 
law 
demonstrates 
that 
even 
if 
immigration 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
38 
 
¶63 In sum, we conclude that Ortiz-Mondragon's trial 
counsel did not perform deficiently by advising him that the 
plea agreement "could result in deportation, the exclusion of 
admission to this country, or the denial of naturalization under 
federal law."  That warning was correct and adequate under 
Padilla because it informed Ortiz-Mondragon that a conviction 
may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.  
¶64 We turn briefly to Ortiz-Mondragon's argument that his 
attorney performed deficiently by failing to perform an adequate 
amount of research.  Contrary to Ortiz-Mondragon's assertion, 
the record contains evidence that Attorney Singh researched 
Ortiz-Mondragon's immigration status and relevant immigration 
law.  For example, at the plea and sentencing hearing, the 
circuit court asked Ortiz-Mondragon's attorney, Attorney Singh, 
whether 
Ortiz-Mondragon 
had 
an 
Immigration 
and 
Customs 
Enforcement hold.  Attorney Singh stated that "I think there is, 
but the information I get is secondhand," indicating that 
Attorney Singh had conducted some research into the matter.  
Further, at the plea and sentencing hearing, Attorney Singh 
informed the court that he had "presented" the State's plea 
                                                                                                                                                             
proceedings were commenced against Ortiz-Mondragon for the 
substantial battery being a crime involving moral turpitude, 
whether his substantial battery would qualify as a deportable 
offense could be, and likely would be, contested in those 
proceedings.  See Abdelqadar v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 668, 673-74 
(7th Cir. 2005) (holding that an alien was not deportable under 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) because his crime involving moral 
turpitude occurred more than five years after he initially 
entered the United States). 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
39 
 
offer to Ortiz-Mondragon, "given him paperwork to use to study 
it, [and] given him information to use in counseling . . . ."  
Immediately thereafter, Attorney Singh handed a signed plea 
questionnaire and waiver of rights form, along with "some other 
papers," to the court.  
¶65 Because the record provides evidence that Ortiz-
Mondragon's attorney did some level of research regarding the 
immigration consequences of the plea agreement, we turn now to 
Ortiz-Mondragon's argument that his attorney was deficient for 
failing to perform additional research.  Ortiz-Mondragon argues 
that 
additional 
research 
would 
have 
revealed 
that 
his 
substantial battery is a crime involving moral turpitude. Ortiz-
Mondragon relies on Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 16 N.E.3d 1143 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2014), and Montes-Flores v. United States, No. 
2:11-CR-032-JMS-CMM, 2013 WL 428024 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 2013).  
¶66 In Balthazar the defendant moved to withdraw his 
guilty pleas to larceny and malicious destruction of property 
after 
the 
Immigration 
and 
Naturalization 
Service 
began 
deportation 
proceedings 
against 
him 
as 
a 
result 
of 
the 
convictions.  Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 16 N.E.3d 1143, 1145 & 
n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014).  He alleged that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney told him 
that he would not be deported because the charges had been 
reduced to misdemeanors.  Id. at 1145, 1147.  The Massachusetts 
Appeals Court held that, "[a]s legal research would have 
indicated that the crimes were ones involving moral turpitude, 
we must conclude . . . that counsel's failure to inform the 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
40 
 
defendant that pleading guilty to the charges would subject him 
to presumptively mandatory deportation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness."  Id. at 1147-48.  
¶67 In Montes-Flores the defendant pled guilty to making a 
material false statement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).  
Montes-Flores v. United States, No. 2:11-CR-032-JMS-CMM, 2013 WL 
428024, at *1-2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 2013).  Prior to the plea, 
her attorney "'told her that it was possible that she could face 
deportation but that it will be up to the immigration judge to 
decide.'"  Id. at *3.  The federal district court granted the 
defendant's post-sentencing motion to withdraw her plea on 
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. at *2, *4-5.  
The court held that the attorney's immigration advice was 
deficient because, "[w]hile crimes of 'moral turpitude' are not 
specifically defined in the statute, the Seventh Circuit has 
repeatedly held that '[t]here can be no question that a 
violation of [18 U.S.C. §] 1001 is a crime involving moral 
turpitude.'"  Id. at *4 (emphases added) (internal citation 
omitted) (quoting Ghani v. Holder, 557 F.3d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 
2009)) (citing Benaouicha v. Holder, 600 F.3d 795, 797 (7th Cir. 
2010)).  Thus, "counsel's failure to inform Montes–Flores that a 
conviction under § 1001 would result in presumptively mandatory 
deportation was objectively unreasonable."  Id. at *5.  The 
court further held that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defendant.  Id. at *6. 
¶68 Balthazar 
and 
Montes-Flores 
are 
distinguishable.  
Unlike in those cases, additional research in the present case 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
41 
 
would not have revealed that the crime at issue clearly 
qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude.  Thus, even had 
Attorney Singh performed additional research, his immigration 
advice would not have changed.  As we explained earlier, federal 
immigration law does not succinctly, clearly, and explicitly 
provide 
that 
Ortiz-Mondragon's 
substantial 
battery 
is 
necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude.  This lack of 
clarity presents a far different situation than that in 
Balthazar and Montes-Flores.  Unlike the defendant in Montes-
Flores, Ortiz-Mondragon has not shown that the Seventh Circuit 
has "repeatedly held" that there can be "no question" that his 
conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude.20  See 
                                                 
20 Although not cited by Ortiz-Mondragon, we recognize that 
in some Seventh Circuit deportation cases the defendant conceded 
that his domestic battery qualified as a crime involving moral 
turpitude.  See Coyomani-Cielo v. Holder, 758 F.3d 908, 910-11 
(7th Cir. 2014) (noting that, after an immigration judge 
determined that the defendant was removable because his domestic 
battery "qualifies as a [crime involving moral turpitude]" and 
"'an aggravated felony,'" the defendant argued that "he is 
subject [to removal] only" for committing a crime involving 
moral turpitude but that "he might be eligible for cancellation 
of removal"); Castellanos v. Holder, 652 F.3d 762, 764 (7th Cir. 
2011) (noting that the defendant "denied that he committed an 
aggravated felony or a crime of domestic violence, but conceded 
that he was removable as an alien convicted of two crimes 
involving moral turpitude"); Benaouicha v. Holder, 600 F.3d 795, 
798 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that the defendant "conceded that he 
is deportable under [8 U.S.C. §] 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) for having 
been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude"). The Seventh 
Circuit in those cases did not hold that the domestic battery 
crimes at issue qualified as crimes involving moral turpitude. 
Further, the defendants in those cases were convicted for 
domestic battery under Illinois and Indiana statutes, not Wis. 
Stat. § 940.19(2). Thus, those cases do not succinctly, clearly, 
and explicitly demonstrate that Ortiz-Mondragon's substantial 
(continued) 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
42 
 
Montes-Flores, 2013 WL 428024, at *4.  Although the circuit 
court did not make specific findings with respect to what 
research Attorney Singh performed and which paperwork he 
provided to the court and Ortiz-Mondragon, we can infer that the 
circuit court implicitly found that Attorney Singh performed an 
adequate amount of research.  See State v. Hubanks, 173 
Wis. 2d 1, 27, 496 N.W.2d 96 (Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted) 
("The [circuit] court found that Hubanks had not been denied 
effective assistance of counsel.  Although the [circuit] court 
did not make specific findings of fact, we may assume on appeal 
that such findings of fact were made implicitly in favor of its 
decision.").  Accordingly, unlike defense counsel in Balthazar 
and Montes-Flores, Attorney Singh was not deficient for failing 
to perform additional legal research, which would not have 
changed his immigration advice.  
¶69 We conclude that the immigration advice that Attorney 
Singh provided to Ortiz-Mondragon was sufficient under Padilla.  
Because the law is not "succinct, clear, and explicit" with 
respect to whether Ortiz-Mondragon's substantial battery was a 
crime involving moral turpitude, his trial counsel "need[ed] 
[to] do no more than advise [him] that pending criminal charges 
may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences."  See 
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369 (emphases added).  Counsel met that 
requirement by advising Ortiz-Mondragon that the "plea could 
                                                                                                                                                             
battery under § 940.19(2) was a crime involving moral turpitude. 
See supra ¶48. 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
43 
 
result in deportation, the exclusion of admission to this 
country, or the denial of naturalization under federal law."  
See Garcia, 425 S.W.3d at 260-61 (holding that, because the 
defendant's crimes did not clearly qualify as crimes involving 
moral turpitude, counsel gave adequate advice by stating that 
the guilty pleas "might or might not have an adverse affect on 
his ability to return legally to the United States"); Lopez-
Penaloza, 
804 
N.W.2d 
at 
546 
(holding 
that, 
because 
the 
defendant's crime did not clearly qualify as a crime involving 
moral turpitude, counsel gave adequate advice by stating "'that 
a criminal conviction, deferred judgment, or deferred sentence 
may affect [her] status under federal immigration laws'"). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶70 We conclude that Ortiz-Mondragon is not entitled to 
withdraw his no-contest plea to substantial battery because he 
did 
not 
receive 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel.  
Specifically, his trial counsel did not perform deficiently.  
Because federal immigration law is not "succinct, clear, and 
explicit" 
in 
providing 
that 
Ortiz-Mondragon's 
substantial 
battery constituted a crime involving moral turpitude, his 
attorney "need[ed] [to] do no more than advise [him] that 
pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration 
consequences."  See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.  Ortiz-Mondragon's 
trial attorney satisfied that requirement by conveying the 
information contained in the plea questionnaire and waiver of 
rights form——namely, that Ortiz-Mondragon's "plea could result 
in deportation, the exclusion of admission to this country, or 
No. 
2013AP2435-CR   
 
44 
 
the denial of naturalization under federal law."  Counsel's 
advice was correct, not deficient, and was consistent with Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08(1)(c).  In addition, Ortiz-Mondragon's trial 
attorney did not perform deficiently by failing to further 
research the immigration consequences of the plea agreement.  
Because Ortiz-Mondragon failed to prove deficient performance, 
we do not consider the issue of prejudice. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2013AP2435-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶71 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  This case 
represents yet another example of the intersection of state 
criminal law with the federal immigration law.  It likewise 
offers another example of why the mantra of the bar and bench 
alike should be: read the relevant statute. 
¶72 Had the attorney merely read the governing statute, he 
would have discovered that the crime to which Ortiz-Mondragon 
pled made him deportable.  Aside from the subsection on crimes 
involving moral turpitude (CIMTs), the statute has another 
subsection 
clearly 
rendering 
noncitizens 
deportable 
for 
a 
conviction of domestic violence.  8 U.S.C § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). 
¶73 Because the consequence of a conviction is clear, the 
duty to give accurate immigration advice is likewise clear.  
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368 (2010) ("when the 
deportation consequence is truly clear, . . . the duty to give 
correct advice is equally clear.").   
¶74 Nevertheless, the majority essentially ignores the 
relevant domestic abuse subsection of the statute and the 
attorney's apparent failure to read it, and engages in a lengthy 
discussion of CIMTs.  Rather than focusing on whether the 
specific 
crime 
at 
issue 
qualifies 
as 
a 
CIMT 
under 
the 
controlling federal precedent, it focuses instead on whether 
there is a clear definition of "crime of moral turpitude" and a 
consistent application of the concept across the federal 
judicial circuits.  
No.  2013AP2435-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
¶75 Because the circuit court denied Ortiz-Mondragon's 
motion for postconviction relief without a hearing, it is hard 
to know the extent of the information the attorney provided and 
his basis for it.  The record is wholly insufficient to 
determine the merits of the claim.  The majority, however, 
purports to perform this task, concluding that Ortiz-Mondragon's 
claim must fail. 
¶76 Padilla's requirement that attorneys inform their 
clients of the immigration consequences of entering a plea was 
not a mere suggestion.  It set the standard for attorney 
performance under the Sixth Amendment.  Unlike the majority, I 
conclude that Ortiz-Mondragon's claim of a Padilla violation 
cannot be so quickly brushed aside.   
¶77 Because the consequence of deportation is clear under 
the subsection on domestic abuse (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)), 
the duty under the Sixth Amendment to give correct advice is 
likewise clear.  Given that no hearing was held, it is 
impossible to know the nature and extent of the advice given to 
the defendant.  Without a developed record, it is also 
impossible to determine whether there was a violation of the 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel.  Accordingly, I would remand to the circuit court for a 
Machner hearing.1  
                                                 
1 In State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 804, 285 N.W.2d 905 
(Ct. App. 1979), the court of appeals determined that when a 
defendant raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim a 
hearing is necessary to obtain trial counsel's testimony.  These 
hearings have become known as "Machner hearings."  
No.  2013AP2435-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
I 
¶78 The majority ignores that had defense counsel done the 
bare minimum amount of research and merely read the governing 
statute, he would have discovered that the crime to which Ortiz-
Mondragon pled made him deportable.  Aside from the subsection 
on CIMTs, the statute has another subsection clearly rendering 
noncitizens deportable for a conviction of domestic violence: 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).   
¶79 In 
language 
that 
is 
clear 
and 
succinct, 
that 
subsection provides that any noncitizen who at any time after 
admission is convicted of a crime of domestic violence is 
deportable:  
Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted 
of a crime of domestic violence, a crime of stalking, 
or a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child 
abandonment is deportable. 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (emphasis added).   
¶80 The subsection further details what qualifies as a 
crime of domestic violence: 
For purposes of this clause, the term "crime of 
domestic violence" means any crime of violence (as 
defined in section 16 of Title 18) against a person 
committed by a current or former spouse of the person, 
by an individual with whom the person shares a child 
in common, by an individual who is cohabiting with or 
has cohabited with the person as a spouse, by an 
individual similarly situated to a spouse of the 
person under the domestic or family violence laws of 
the jurisdiction where the offense occurs, or by any 
other individual against a person who is protected 
from that individual's acts under the domestic or 
family violence laws of the United States or any 
No.  2013AP2435-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
State, Indian tribal government, or unit of local 
government. 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).2   
¶81 If there is any doubt about the plain meaning of the 
subsection of the statute, it is put to rest by a recent 
decision by the United States Supreme Court.  In Mellouli v. 
Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1990 n.11 (June 1, 2015), the Court 
described the subsection as "specif[ying] the conduct that 
subjects an alien to removal."  See also id. at 1992 (Thomas, J. 
dissenting) (describing § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) as "making removable 
'[a]ny alien who . . . is convicted of a crime of domestic 
violence,' where 'the term "crime of domestic violence" means 
any crime of violence . . . committed by' a person with a 
specified family relationship with the victim"). 
¶82 This is in accord with prior circuit court decisions.  
See, e.g., Carrillo v. Holder, 781 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(noncitizen rendered removable due to his domestic violence 
conviction); Florez v. Holder, 779 F.3d 207, 209 (2d Cir. 2015) 
("8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), [] makes any alien removable if, 
                                                 
2 Section 16 of title 18 defines "crime of violence" as:  
 
(a) 
an offense that has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person or property of another, 
or 
 
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by 
its nature, involves a substantial risk that 
physical force against the person or property of 
another may be used in the course of committing 
the offense. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 16. 
 
No.  2013AP2435-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
'at any time after admission,' the alien 'is convicted of a 
crime of domestic violence, a crime of stalking, or a crime of 
child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment.'"); Gonzalez-
Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 649, 650 (9th Cir. 2004) ("§ 1227 
is titled 'Deportable aliens' and 'Domestic Violence' is listed 
as an offense under § 1227(a)(2), which lists criminal grounds 
of deportation."); Csekinek v. INS, 391 F.3d 819, 826-827 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (observing that 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) "renders 
deportable any alien convicted of a domestic violence offense 
after entry into the United States.").3   
¶83 Like a conviction for a CIMT, a domestic violence 
conviction renders noncitizens ineligible for relief under 8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(b).  In relevant part, it provides that "The 
Attorney General may cancel removal of, and adjust to the status 
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien 
who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the 
alien—— . . . has not been convicted of an offense under section 
1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3) of this title."  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(b)(1).  Both CIMTs and crimes of domestic violence are 
listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2).  
                                                 
3 Notably, although deportation for CIMTs is limited to 
CIMTs "committed within five years (or 10 years in the case of 
an alien provided lawful permanent resident status under section 
1255(j)) 
after 
the 
date 
of 
admission," 
8 
U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), a conviction for a crime of domestic 
violence is not so limited.  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) states 
that a crime of domestic violence occurring at "any time after 
admission" will render a noncitizen deportable. 
No.  2013AP2435-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
¶84 Fundamental to the practice of law is being familiar 
with the relevant statutes.  Failure to do so constitutes a 
quintessential example of deficient performance.  See Hinton v. 
Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089 (2014) ("[a]n attorney's 
ignorance of a point of law that is fundamental to his case 
combined with his failure to perform basic research on that 
point is a quintessential example of unreasonable performance 
under Strickland.").   
¶85 Reading the governing statutes is required by the 
prevailing professional norms which, under Strickland, set the 
standards for deficient performance.  Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) ("[t]he proper measure of attorney 
performance 
remains 
simply 
reasonableness 
under 
prevailing 
professional norms."). For example, Standard 4-6.3(d) of the ABA 
Standards 
for 
Criminal 
Justice, 
Prosecution 
and 
Defense 
Functions (4th ed. 2015), states that "[d]efense counsel should 
investigate and be knowledgeable about sentencing procedures, 
law, 
and 
alternatives, 
collateral 
consequences 
and 
likely 
outcomes,  . . .  and advise the client on these topics before 
permitting the client to enter a negotiated disposition." 
¶86 Likewise, Standard 14-3.2 of the ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty (3d ed. 1999), requires 
attorneys to investigate the law before advising defendants 
about 
pleas. 
 
The 
commentary 
advises 
that 
because 
the 
immigration consequence of a guilty plea may well be a client's 
greatest priority, "counsel should be familiar with the basic 
immigration consequences that flow from different types of 
No.  2013AP2435-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
guilty pleas, and should keep this in mind in investigating law 
and fact and advising the client."  Id. at 127.   
¶87 Here, had defense counsel read the governing statute 
he would have been able to provide Ortiz-Mondragon with more 
than a general warning.4  Nevertheless, the majority attempts to 
circumvent this problem by simply dismissing the domestic abuse 
subsection in a footnote.  It ignores not only the clear 
language of the subsection but also Padilla's clear directive: 
attorneys 
must 
"provide 
[their] 
client[s] 
with 
available 
advice . . . ."  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 371.   
II 
¶88 Rather than discussing the plain language of the 
domestic abuse subsection or focusing on whether the crime at 
issue renders Ortiz-Mondragon deportable, the majority takes a 
different approach.  It discusses the lack of definition of 
CIMTs in the immigration statute, that other courts have deemed 
the term "crime involving moral turpitude" ambiguous, and that 
                                                 
4 The majority's determination that defense counsel did 
adequate research is highly speculative.  It refers to defense 
counsel's statement that "the information I get is secondhand," 
his statement that he had given Ortiz-Mondragon "paperwork," and 
that he handed the signed plea questionnaire and waiver of 
rights form, along with "some other papers," to the court.  The 
majority contends that these facts are evidence that he did 
"some level of research."  Majority op., ¶64.  It then "infer[s] 
that the circuit court implicitly found that [defense counsel] 
performed an adequate amount of research."  Id., ¶68.  The 
flimsy details that the majority points to say nothing about 
what that research was or what the attorney knew.  Without a 
Machner hearing, this information is unknowable. 
 
No.  2013AP2435-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
different circuits have different tests for determining whether 
a crime is a CIMT.  Majority op., ¶¶37, 39, 41.  Accordingly, 
the majority concludes that the immigration consequences were 
unclear and that defense counsel's performance was not deficient 
because he needed to do no more than tell Ortiz-Mondragon that a 
conviction may have negative immigration consequences. 
¶89 The majority ignores, however, that this case did not 
require defense counsel to determine the definition of a CIMT.  
Rather he needed to determine only if the crime Ortiz-Mondragon 
faced, substantial battery with a domestic abuse enhancer, 
qualified as a CIMT.  Further, defense counsel was not required 
to determine what other federal circuits would have done.  
Rather, he should have looked at the law in the Seventh Circuit, 
which governs Ortiz-Mondragon's case. 
¶90 Review 
of 
removal 
proceedings 
conducted 
in 
this 
federal judicial circuit is performed by the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals and therefore its precedent governs those 
cases.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) ("The petition for review 
shall be filed with the court of appeals for the judicial 
circuit 
in 
which 
the 
immigration 
judge 
completed 
the 
proceedings.").   
¶91 Immigration 
removal 
proceedings 
for 
Wisconsin 
residents, such as Ortiz-Mondragon, are conducted in Chicago.  
See Executive Office for Immigration Review, Department of 
Justice, "EOIR Immigration Court Listing" (2015), available at 
www.justice.gov/eoir/immigration-court-administrative-control-
No.  2013AP2435-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
list#Chicago.5  Thus, upon completion of his sentence Ortiz-
Mondragon's removal proceeding would have occurred in Chicago 
and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals precedent would govern. 
¶92 A basic search of Seventh Circuit cases provides a 
clear answer to whether domestic battery qualifies as a CIMT.  
The answer is "yes."  In Coyomani-Cielo v. Holder, the Seventh 
Circuit plainly stated that "[defendant] was convicted of 
domestic battery, which qualifies as a CIMT . . . ."  758 F.3d 
908, 910 (7th Cir. 2014).   
¶93 The majority attempts to explain away this clear 
statement by inaccurately asserting that it was presented as a 
concession by the defendant.  Majority op., ¶68 n.20.  It was 
neither a concession nor even a debatable point. Rather, the 
court made this statement as a clear statement of fact in its 
description of the background of the case.   
¶94 Admittedly, Coyomani-Cielo considered a conviction 
under Illinois law.  Accordingly, to determine whether Ortiz-
Mondragon's conviction would be a CIMT, one must take the 
additional step of comparing the Illinois statute at issue in 
that case, 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2, with the Wisconsin statutes at 
issue, Wis. Stat. §§ 940.19(2), 968.075.   
¶95 Under 
the 
Illinois 
statute, 
domestic 
battery 
is 
committed by: "knowingly without legal justification by any 
means: (1) Caus[ing] bodily harm to any family or household 
                                                 
5 The DOJ list of immigration courts and their assigned 
geographic responsibilities is published pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.11. 
No.  2013AP2435-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
member; (2) Mak[ing] physical contact of an insulting or 
provoking nature with any family or household member."6  Under 
the 
Wisconsin 
statute, 
Ortiz-Mondragon 
was 
convicted 
of 
"caus[ing] substantial bodily harm to another by an act done 
with intent to cause bodily harm to that person or another."  
Wis. Stat. § 940.19(2).  The domestic abuse enhancer means that 
the individual Ortiz-Mondragon inflicted harm on was "his or her 
spouse or former spouse, . . .  an adult with whom [he] resides 
or formerly resided or  . . .  an adult with whom the person has 
a child in common."  Wis. Stat. § 968.075.   
¶96 The statutes reveal that a Wisconsin conviction for 
substantial battery with a domestic abuse enhancer necessarily 
would qualify as domestic battery under Illinois law.  Thus, the 
crime for which Ortiz-Mondragon was convicted should likewise be 
deemed a CIMT. 
¶97 Other Seventh Circuit precedent is in accord.  In 
Garcia-Meza v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2008), the court 
                                                 
6 Illinois 
defines 
"family 
or 
household 
member" 
as 
including: 
spouses, 
former 
spouses, 
parents, 
children, 
stepchildren, and other persons related by blood or by 
present or prior marriage, persons who share or 
formerly shared a common dwelling, persons who have or 
allegedly have a child in common, persons who share or 
allegedly share a blood relationship through a child, 
persons who have or have had a dating or engagement 
relationship, persons with disabilities and their 
personal assistants, and caregivers as defined in 
Section 12-4.4a of this Code.  
720 ILCS 5/12-0.1 
No.  2013AP2435-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
considered whether aggravated battery of a police officer 
qualified as a CIMT.  The court observed that "crimes involving 
moral turpitude are usually serious crimes (in terms of the 
magnitude of the loss they cause or the indignation in the 
public they arouse) that are committed deliberately."  Id. at 
536.  It commented that precedent has "emphasized the bodily 
harm requirement in concluding that the assault crime was 
serious enough to be turpitudinous."  Id. at 537.  It then 
referred 
to 
precedent 
determining 
that 
"moral 
turpitude 
necessarily inheres in assault and battery offenses that are 
defined by reference to the infliction of bodily harm upon a 
person whom society views as deserving of special protection, 
such as a child, a domestic partner, or a peace officer."  In re 
Sanudo, 23 I.& N. Dec. 968, 971-72 (B.I.A. 2006).   
¶98 Ultimately, 
the 
Seventh 
Circuit 
determined 
that 
battery of a police officer did not necessarily constitute a 
CIMT because the Illinois statute at issue did not include 
bodily harm as an element.  Garcia-Meza, 516 F.3d at 538.  
Garcia-Meza is instructive.  Its analysis reveals that a crime 
qualifies as a CIMT when it includes as an element bodily harm 
to a person who society recognizes as deserving of special 
protection, such as a domestic partner.  See also Castellanos v. 
Holder, 652 F.3d 762, 764 (7th Cir. 2011) (defendant conceded 
his domestic battery conviction constituted a CIMT); Benaouicha 
v. Holder, 600 F.3d 795, 797 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting defendant's 
concession that his conviction for the battery of his wife 
No.  2013AP2435-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
constituted a conviction for a CIMT).7  Ortiz-Mondragon's 
conviction for substantial battery with a domestic abuse 
enhancer meets these criteria. 
¶99 Even if defense counsel had been unable to find and 
analyze the governing precedent, he could have determined that 
substantial battery with a domestic abuse enhancer qualified as 
a CIMT by consulting legal practice guides.  Padilla instructs 
attorneys to consult guidebooks to educate themselves about the 
relevant immigration law: "we expected that counsel who were 
unaware of the discretionary relief measures would 'follo[w] the 
advice of numerous practice guides.'"  559 U.S. at 368.   
¶100 Practice guides indicate that substantial battery with 
a domestic abuse enhancer qualifies as a CIMT.  For example, 
                                                 
7 Although they are not binding, it is notable that other 
jurisdictions 
have 
determined 
that 
crimes 
comparable 
to 
substantial battery with a domestic abuse enhancer constitute 
CIMTs.  See, e.g., Medina v. United States, 259 F.3d 220, 228 
(4th Cir. 2001) ("we find it significant that Medina's crime was 
carried out against his former fiancée, Maria Bracho. The INS——
which is statutorily authorized to administer the immigration 
laws and determine what constitutes a CIMT——has, in the past 
several years, taken steps to assert that crimes of assault upon 
victims that have a 'special relationship' with the assaulter 
may be a CIMT."); Toutounjian v. INS, 959 F. Supp. 598, 603 
(W.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Sexual or physical abuse of women or children 
has been almost uniformly found to involve a crime of moral 
turpitude."); In re Tran, 21 I. & N. Dec. 291, 292-93 (BIA 1996) 
(concluding that acts of violence against someone in a special 
relationship with the assaulter is "different from [assault] 
between strangers or acquaintances," and is a CIMT).  The one 
case the majority cites as stating to the contrary, Morales-
Garcia v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2009), has not been 
followed outside of the Ninth Circuit. 
No.  2013AP2435-CR.awb 
 
13 
 
Maria Baldini-Porterman's comprehensive guide on immigration 
consequences conveys the same information as Garcia-Meza: 
Where the elements of a domestic battery offense do 
not require either actual infliction of serious harm 
or specific intent and physical injury to the victim, 
the offense is not categorically a crime involving 
moral turpitude.  The willful infliction of corporal 
injury on a spouse, cohabitant, or parent of the 
offender's child in violation of California Penal Code 
§ 273.5(a) has been found to be a crime involving 
moral turpitude. 
Maria Baldini-Porterman, Defending Non-Citizens in Illinois, 
Indiana and Wisconsin (Heartland Alliance's National Immigrant 
Justice Center 2009).   
¶101 Likewise, 
another 
practice 
guide 
states: 
"moral 
turpitude has been found where the assault and battery offenses 
are defined by reference to the infliction of bodily harm on 
someone whom society views as deserving of special protection 
(such as a child or spouse)."  Austin T. Fragomen, Jr. and 
Steven C. Bell, Immigration Fundamentals: A Guide to Law and 
Practice, § 7:2.2 at 7-32 (4th ed. 2014).  
¶102 The 
"Immigration 
Consequences 
Crimes 
Summary 
Checklist," published by the Immigrant Defense Project (2010), 
provides even clearer guidance.  Its list of CIMTs includes 
"[c]rimes in which bodily harm is caused or threatened by an 
intentional 
act . . . ." 
 
Ortiz-Mondragon's 
conviction 
for 
substantial 
battery 
with 
a 
domestic 
abuse 
enhancer 
unquestionably 
meets 
these 
requirements. 
As 
noted 
above, 
substantial battery is defined as "caus[ing] substantial bodily 
harm to another by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm 
to that person or another."  Wis. Stat. § 940.19(2). 
No.  2013AP2435-CR.awb 
 
14 
 
¶103 By focusing on the difficulty of defining "crimes of 
moral turpitude" and the different approaches the circuit courts 
take in determining whether a crime is a CIMT, the majority 
hides the fact that a conviction for substantial battery with a 
domestic abuse enhancer qualifies as a CIMT in the Seventh 
Circuit.  Whether by reading the plain language of the domestic 
abuse subsection of the statute or by following clear Seventh 
Circuit precedent, defense counsel should have discovered the 
immigration consequences of Ortiz-Mondragon's plea.  It was 
clear the plea would render him deportable.  Thus, "the duty to 
give correct advice is equally clear."  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 
368.  Defense counsel was obligated to provide the advice that 
was available.  Id., 371. 
¶104 As explained above, the United States Supreme Court 
has instructed, "[t]he proper measure of attorney performance 
remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional 
norms." 
 
Strickland, 
466 
U.S. 
at 
688. 
 
In 
criminal 
representation, this "entails certain basic duties," including 
the "duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable 
decision 
that 
makes 
particular 
investigations 
unnecessary."  Id. at 688, 691. "[A]n attorney's ignorance of a 
point of law that is fundamental to his case combined with his 
failure 
to 
perform 
basic 
research 
on 
that 
point 
is 
a 
quintessential 
example 
of 
unreasonable 
performance 
under 
Strickland."  Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089 (2014).   
¶105 The majority conducts no inquiry into whether defense 
counsel's research was reasonable under professional norms, or 
No.  2013AP2435-CR.awb 
 
15 
 
whether defense counsel was ignorant on a fundamental point of 
law (i.e. the immigration consequences of a plea), nor could it. 
Without a Machner hearing the record is silent in this respect.  
Just as the record fails to show what warnings defense counsel 
provided, it also fails to show that he did adequate research 
into the immigration issue.   
III 
¶106 In contrast to the majority, I would remand this case 
for a Machner hearing.  Such hearings are required unless the 
motion 
claiming 
ineffectiveness 
"presents 
only 
conclusory 
allegations," "fails to allege sufficient facts to raise a 
question of fact," or "if the record conclusively demonstrates 
that the defendant is not entitled to relief."  Roberson, 292 
Wis. 2d 280, ¶43.  
¶107 Ortiz-Mondragon's motion is quite detailed and alleges 
sufficient facts which, if true, show that he is entitled to 
relief.  It details that his plea rendered him ineligible for 
cancellation of his removal:  
 
Mr. Ortiz-Mondragon pleaded no contest to substantial 
battery, 
domestic 
abuse, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.19(2). 
 
This 
is 
a 
crime 
involving 
moral 
turpitude.  The maximum sentence for this offense is 
3.5 years of imprisonment.  Because the maximum period 
of confinement exceeds one year, Mr. Ortiz-Mondragon's 
conviction rendered him ineligible for cancellation of 
removal. 
It also explains that the plea prevents Ortiz-Mondragon from 
returning to the United States: 
 
[B]ecause of his convictions, Mr. Ortiz-Mondragon is 
permanently excluded from legally re-entering the 
United States.  An individual applying for admission 
No.  2013AP2435-CR.awb 
 
16 
 
to the United States cannot have been convicted for a 
crime 
involving 
moral 
turpitude. 
INA 
§212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).  The only exception is when the 
conviction involves a crime for which the maximum 
punishment is less than one year, and the actual 
sentence of the court does not exceed six months. 
¶108  Further, the motion alleges that defense counsel was 
deficient for failing to advise him of these consequences: 
"[Ortiz-Mondragon] was not properly advised of the adverse 
immigration consequences of his plea."  It explains what his 
attorney should have told him: "counsel's advice to Mr. Ortiz-
Mondragon should have been that accepting a plea agreement in 
which he would plead guilty or no contest to substantial 
battery-domestic abuse would result in automatic removal and 
permanent exclusion from the United States."  It then claims 
that his attorney failed to provide this advice: "trial counsel 
failed to advise him of adverse immigration consequences of his 
plea, specifically that the convictions mandated removal and 
resulted in permanent exclusion from the country once removed." 
¶109 Finally, 
the 
motion 
alleges 
that 
this 
deficient 
performance prejudiced Ortiz-Mondragon: "Mr. Ortiz-Mondragon 
would have gone to trial instead of pleading no contest had he 
known his convictions made him automatically deportable and 
permanently excluded."  It explains that "[Ortiz-Mondragon] has 
already left the country and is now in Mexico.  Due to his 
conviction, he was unable to apply for cancellation of his 
removal and he is now permanently excluded from re-entering the 
country."  "[H]ad Mr. Ortiz-Mondragon known and understood the 
consequences of a conviction for substantial battery, he would 
No.  2013AP2435-CR.awb 
 
17 
 
have attempted to negotiate a plea agreement that avoided the 
automatic and permanent consequences he now faces." 
¶110 These facts, if true, show that Ortiz-Mondragon's 
attorney was deficient because he did not meet the Padilla 
requirements.  They also sufficiently allege that the deficiency 
prejudiced Ortiz-Mondragon.  Thus, if true, the allegations 
establish a violation of Ortiz-Mondragon's Sixth Amendment 
rights, entitling him to relief. 
¶111  Nothing in the record conclusively rebuts Ortiz-
Mondragon's claim.  It does not indicate what, if anything, 
defense counsel told Ortiz-Mondragon about the immigration 
consequences of his plea.  It also fails to indicate the basis 
for that advice, whether it was grounded in research, and 
whether it was reasonable under prevailing professional norms.   
¶112 None of the scenarios that would preclude a Machner 
hearing are present.  Roberson, 292 Wis. 2d 280, ¶43 (Machner 
hearing not required if the motion "presents only conclusory 
allegations," "fails to allege sufficient facts to raise a 
question of fact," or "if the record conclusively demonstrates 
that the defendant is not entitled to relief.").  Accordingly, a 
Machner hearing is required to determine the merits of Ortiz-
Mondragon's claim.  
IV 
¶113  Under Padilla, attorneys representing noncitizens 
must research the relevant immigration consequences of a 
conviction and provide that information to their clients.  These 
requirements are important protections to noncitizens.   
No.  2013AP2435-CR.awb 
 
18 
 
¶114 Each of the majority's errors removes some of that 
protection.  By ignoring statutory grounds rendering Ortiz-
Mondragon 
deportable, 
the 
majority 
implicitly 
approves 
of 
attorneys 
not 
reading 
the 
governing 
immigration 
statutes, 
leaving the door open for uninformed, inaccurate advice. By 
determining 
that 
the 
immigration 
consequences 
of 
Ortiz-
Mondragon's plea are unclear because the definition of CIMT is 
unclear, the majority reduces the number of situations in which 
attorneys must provide available immigration advice.   
¶115 In contrast to the majority, I believe that Padilla's 
requirements have teeth.  Had defense counsel researched the 
immigration consequences of Ortiz-Mondragon's plea, he would 
have discovered that it rendered Ortiz-Mondragon deportable.  
Under Padilla, that means that defense counsel was required to 
convey that information to his client.  Ortiz-Mondragon should 
have the opportunity to prove that such advice was not given and 
that he was prejudiced as a result.  Therefore a remand is 
required and a Machner hearing is necessary.   
¶116 For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully 
dissent.       
¶117 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.   
 
No.  2013AP2435-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1