Title: Chernick v. City of Grand Forks
Citation: 210 N.W.2d 73
Docket Number: 8892
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: August 13, 1973

210 N.W.2d 73 (1973) Michael CHERNICK et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF GRAND FORKS, a municipal corporation, et al., Defendants and Appellees. Civ. No. 8892. Supreme Court of North Dakota. August 13, 1973. *75 Daniel S. Letnes, Grand Forks, for plaintiffs and appellants. Allen I. Olson, Atty. Gen., Bismarck, and Caldis &amp; Arneson, Grand Forks, for defendants and appellees. PAULSON, Judge. This is an appeal from a summary judgment rendered by the Grand Forks County District Court. The summary judgment, dated November 24, 1972, dismissed the plaintiffs-appellants' complaint, which sought to void a special assessment district created in Grand Forks for the purpose of building an overpass over railroad tracks passing through that city. This is the second time we consider the subject matter involved in this case. Our first opinion on the subject can be found in Parker Hotel Company v. City of Grand Forks, 177 N.W.2d 764, 767-768 (N.D. 1970), wherein the essential facts of the instant case were stated by this court as follows: In Parker Hotel, supra, the plaintiffs, who are substantially the same plaintiffs involved in the instant case, claimed that the City of Grand Forks [hereinafter City] exceeded its jurisdiction when it created Street Improvement District No. 5, Project No. 1999, to build an overpass over railroad tracks running through Grand Forks. In Parker Hotel, a certiorari proceeding, it was held that the City did not exceed its jurisdiction in creating the special improvement district. In Parker Hotel, supra, 177 N.W.2d at 774, we found that: In this action the plaintiffs are attempting to void the special assessments determined by the special assessment commission in Grand Forks by claiming: The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, City of Grand Forks, as it appeared to that court that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact not previously adjudicated in Parker Hotel Company v. City of Grand Forks, supra, that case being res judicata of the issues raised in this action. The plaintiffs-appellants present seven issues for review by this court. Four of the issues are rephrasings of their previously stated claims to void the special assessments; the remaining issues are whether or not the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the City, whether the Parker Hotel case is res judicata of the issues in this case, and whether equity requires this court to order a review of the method and formula used in determining the special assessments which were confirmed by the Grand Forks City Council. We will first address ourselves to the constitutionality of the challenged statutes, *77 namely, §§ 40-22-06, 40-22-08, and 40-22-09, N.D.C.C., which read as follows: The plaintiffs-appellants' arguments with reference to the unconstitutionality of the challenged statutes resolve themselves into a claim that due process and equal protection of the law were denied to those property owners assessed in the instant case. This claimed denial of due process and equal protection of the law is premised upon the fact that property in the urban renewal area was not included in the special assessment district even though such property was adjacent to the proposed overpass, and that the overpass would be of general benefit to the city, since everyone could use it and, therefore, the assessment should be spread over all the property in the city. There is thus presented a divergence of opinion as to what property is benefited and should be assessed. In such a situation we agree with the Minnesota Supreme Court where it said, in Village of Edina v. Joseph, 264 Minn. 84, 119 N.W.2d 809 (1962), in paragraph 6 of the syllabus, that: We said, in Fisher v. City of Minot, 188 N.W.2d 745 (N.D.1971), in paragraph 4 of the syllabus, that The plaintiffs-appellants in the case at bar have not made it clearly appear to us that the challenged statutes violate either the State or the Federal Constitution. In addition, all three of the challenged statutes, namely, §§ 40-22-06, 40-22-08, and 40-22-09, N.D.C.C., have been upheld by prior decisions of this court. In Parker Hotel, supra, in paragraph 5 of the syllabus, we held that: In addition, in Parker Hotel, supra, 177 N.W.2d at 773, we said: Section 40-22-06, N.D.C.C., was one of the statutes considered in the Parker Hotel case and we believe that our decision in Parker Hotel leaves no doubt as to § 40-22-06, N.D.C.C., being constitutionally valid. In Fisher v. City of Minot, supra, §§ 40-22-08 and 40-22-09, N.D.C.C., among others, were challenged as unconstitutional as denying due process under the State and Federal Constitutions. In Fisher we found the notice by publication provision (§ 40-22-15, N.D.C.C.) and the protest provision (§ 40-22-18, N.D.C.C.) to be valid, and we held, in paragraph 5 of the syllabus: In the area of equal protection of the laws, the reasonableness of the classifications for taxing purposes becomes important. In Souris River Telephone Mutual Aid Corporation v. State, 162 N.W.2d 685, 689 (N.D.1968), we stated the rule on taxing classifications to be: In State v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., supra, we held, in paragraph 5 of the syllabus: The taxing classifications established by the special assessment commission in the instant casethat is, the property within the special assessment district as distinguished from the property outside the said districtare not unreasonable nor invidiously discriminatory. The requirement in Souris River Telephone, supra, that there be differences in the subjects to justify differences in taxation is met in the instant case by the fact that the property in the special assessment district was determined to be specially benefited by the construction *80 of the overpass. Therefore the specially assessed property is differentiated from the property not assessed and the special assessment tax is not a denial of equal protection of the laws to those property owners assessed. The plaintiffs-appellants also claimed that the assessment in this case violated § 176 of the North Dakota Constitution, which provides in pertinent part: In Rolph v. City of Fargo, 7 N.D. 640, 76 N.W. 242 (1898), this court held, in paragraph 3 of the syllabus, that: This rule has more recently been upheld in Becker County Sand &amp; Gravel Co. v. Wosick, 62 N.D. 740, 245 N.W. 454 (1932), at page 461; and in Gallaher v. City of Fargo, 64 N.W.2d 444 (N.D.1954), at page 449. Finally, in Fisher, supra, we said at 188 N.W.2d at pages 752-753 of that decision: From our decision in Fisher and from the holdings in the cases previously cited, we are convinced that the challenged sections, namely, §§ 40-22-08 and 40-22-09, as well as § 40-22-06, N.D.C.C., are constitutionally valid. The next issue deals with the legality of not including the Grand Forks Urban Renewal Area in the special assessment district. The plaintiffs-appellants claim that it was illegal not to include the urban renewal area within the special assessment district since it is adjacent to the overpass. In Murphy v. City of Bismarck, supra, 109 N.W.2d at 643-644, this court stated: While we are cognizant that § 40-22-09, N.D.C.C., was amended in 1971 by the Legislature, such amendment does not affect the issues involved in the case at bar. We therefore adopt the reasoning set forth in Murphy v. City of Bismarck, supra. In City of Southwest Fargo Urban Renewal Agency v. Lenthe, 149 N.W.2d 373 (N.D.1967), this court held, in paragraph 3 of the syllabus: In the Southwest Fargo case, the urban renewal property was in the special assessment district at the time it was condemned by the urban renewal agency. The court in that case held only that urban renewal property could not claim an exemption from payment of special assessments, not that urban renewal property must be included in a special assessment district due to its location. After perusing Murphy v. City of Bismarck, supra, and City of Southwest Fargo Urban Renewal Agency v. Lenthe, supra, it is quite evident there was nothing illegal about not including the urban renewal area in the special assessment district in question in this case. Relying on the *81 Murphy case, supra, this court will not concern itself with the wisdom of a municipal ordinance or resolution. The next issue asserted by the plaintiffs-appellants is whether the special assessment commission of the City of Grand Forks, which commission's action was confirmed by the city council of Grand Forks, acted arbitrarily in determining the size and form of the special assessment district and in determining the assessments. Section 40-22-09, N.D.C.C., provides in pertinent part: In Soo Line Railroad Co. v. City of Wilton, 172 N.W.2d 74 (N.D.1969), this court held, in paragraph 5 of the syllabus: Although the Soo Line case involved street, curb, and gutter improvements, we believe our ruling in Soo Line on the scope of this court's review has application in this case. We therefore hold that the Grand Forks City Council had jurisdiction to create the special improvement district in question, that it applied the appropriate law, and that it did not act arbitrarily. The plaintiffs-appellants urge that, because anyone could use the overpass involved in the instant case, it would be a general rather than a special benefit and that it should be paid for by an assessment of all of the taxpayers in Grand Forks. After reviewing the record, we believe that the judgment of the district court in favor of the City should be upheld because the fact that anyone could use the overpass does not detract from the fact that such overpass would specially benefit the property owners assessed by the special assessment commission in this case. The next issue is whether the benefits determined by the city council were based on speculation or conjecture. Our review of this issue is governed by the holding previously quoted from paragraph 5 of the syllabus in the Soo Line case, supra. In Village of Edina v. Joseph, 264 Minn. 84, 119 N.W.2d 809 (1962), the Minnesota Supreme Court held, in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the syllabus: We adopt this reasoning. In the case at bar, the Grand Forks City Council determined the property that would be benefited by the construction of the overpass. The fact that property adjacent to the overpass was not included in the assessment district does not *82 void the assessment, nor does the fact that anyone could use the overpass. The determinations made by the Grand Forks City Council were matters of judgment and discretion, and this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the city council. In Reed v. City of Langdon, 78 N.D. 991, 54 N.W.2d 148 (1952), this court held, in paragraph 4 of the syllabus: The plaintiffs-appellants have not sustained their burden of proof in this case and we therefore hold the assessments by the special assessment commission to be valid. Finally, the plaintiffs-appellants have urged this court that there be a review of the method and formula used by the special assessment commission of the City of Grand Forks. The plaintiffs-appellants did not specially request a review under Chapter 40-26, N.D.C.C., but elected to request such review in one of their prayers for relief in this action. Chapter 40-26, N.D.C.C., provides that in the event that such review is requested such review must be made within six months from the date of the confirmation of the assessment by a city council. The record reveals that no such request was demanded by the plaintiffs-appellants within the prescribed time. See Ellison v. City of LaMoure, 30 N.D. 43, 151 N.W. 988 (1915). Because of our decision in this case, we do not believe that a review of the method and formula used by the special assessment commission of the City of Grand Forks is merited. In light of our holding in this case and the holding in Parker Hotel, supra, we agree with the district court that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. The summary judgment in favor of the defendant, City of Grand Forks, is, accordingly, affirmed. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and TEIGEN, VOGEL and KNUDSON, JJ., concur.