Title: State v. Avery
Citation: 2013 WI 13
Docket Number: 2010AP001952
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 30, 2013

2013 WI 13 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP1952 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Brian K. Avery, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 337 Wis. 2d 560, 807 N.W.2d 638 
(Ct. App. 2011 - Published) 
PDC No: 2011 WI App 148  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 30, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 5, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis R. Cimpl 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
Prosser, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
Bradley, J., Abrahamson, C.J., dissent. 
(Opinion filed.)  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
For the defendant-appellant, the brief was filed by Keith 
A. Findley and Tricia J. Bushnell, and the Wisconsin Innocence 
Project, University of Wisconsin Law School, Madison, and oral 
argument by Keith A. Findley.  
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert R. Henak and 
Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James Friedman and 
Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison, Lori R. Mason and Cooley, LLP, 
 
 
2
Palo Alto, Kyle C. Wong and Maco Stewart, and Cooley, LLP, San 
Francisco, on behalf of the Innocence Network.    
An amici curiae brief was filed by Michael B. Van Sicklen 
and Foley & Lardner, LLP, Madison, on behalf of the following:  
Professor D. Michael Risinger, the John J. Gibbons Professor of 
Law at Seton Hall University School of Law; Thomas L. Bohan, 
Ph.D., J.D., a Former President of the American Academy of 
Forensic Sciences; Simon Cole, Member of the American Judicature 
Society’s Commission on Forensic Science and Public Policy; Dr. 
Itiel E. Dror, Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience at University 
College, London, and is also the principal consultant and 
researcher at Cognitive Consultants, International; Professor 
Gary Edmond, Director of the Program in Expertise, Evidence and 
Law and an Australian Research Council Research Fellow in the 
School of Law at The University of New South Wales, Sydney, 
Australia; Dr. Allan Jamieson, Director of The Forensic 
Institute in Glasgow, Visiting Professor of Forensic Sciences at 
Staffordshire University, and a Fellow of the British Society of 
Biology (formerly the British Institute of Biology); Dr. Roger 
Koppl, Director of the Institute for Forensic Science 
Administration of Fairleigh Dickinson University, where he is 
also a Professor of Economics and Finance; Irving L. Kornfield, 
Ph.D., Professor of Biology and Molecular Forensics, University 
of Maine; Dr. Dan Krane, Professor of Molecular Biology at 
Wright State University; Professor Jennifer L. Mnookin, 
Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law; Professor 
Christopher T. Robertson, Associate Professor of Law at the 
University of Arizona Rogers College of Law; Dr. Michael J. 
Saks, the Regents’ Professor of Law and Psychology and Faculty 
Fellow, Center for Law, Science & Innovation at Arizona State 
University; Dr. William C. Thompson, Professor at the University 
of California at Irvine (UCI), holding joint appointments in the 
School of Law and Department of Psychology and Social Behavior.  
 
 
 
3
 
 
 
2013 WI 13
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP1952 
(L.C. No. 
1994CF942514) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Brian K. Avery, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 30, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals,1 which reversed the 
decision of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Judge Dennis 
Cimpl presiding, denying Brian Avery's (Avery) motion for a new 
trial.   
¶2 
In 1995, a jury convicted Avery of two counts of 
robbery, party to a crime.  Twelve years later, in 2007, Avery 
brought a motion for postconviction relief.  Avery argued that 
he should be entitled to a new trial under the theories of newly 
                                                 
1 State v. Avery, 2011 WI App 148, 337 Wis. 2d 560, 807 
N.W.2d 638.   
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
2 
 
discovered evidence and in the interest of justice.  Both 
arguments were based on new expert analysis of a video of one of 
the 
robberies. 
 
By 
applying 
new 
technology, 
digital 
photogrammetry,2 one expert concluded that Avery was too tall to 
be the robber in the video.  After an evidentiary hearing, the 
circuit court denied Avery's motion for a new trial.  The court 
of appeals reversed.  We now reverse the court of appeals and 
conclude that Avery is not entitled to a new trial under either 
theory.   
¶3 
We conclude that there is not a reasonable probability 
that a jury, looking at both the evidence presented at trial and 
the new digital photogrammetry evidence, would have a reasonable 
doubt as to Avery's guilt.  We also conclude that the court of 
appeals erroneously exercised its discretion when it failed to 
properly analyze whether this was an exceptional case that 
entitled Avery to a new trial in the interest of justice.  Avery 
is not entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice 
because the controversy was fully tried even though the jury did 
not hear the photogrammetry evidence. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
In July 1994, Avery was charged with two counts of 
armed robbery, party to a crime, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 943.32(1)(b), (2)3 and 939.05 (1993-94).4  The first count 
                                                 
2 Photogrammetry 
is 
the 
"process 
of 
making 
precise 
measurements by means of photography."  The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 1364 (3d ed. 1992). 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 943.32, "Robbery," states in part:  
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
3 
 
related to a robbery that occurred at Malone's Fine Foods 
(Malone's) on the evening of July 7, 1994.  The second count 
related to a robbery that occurred at Attari Food Market 
(Attari) the afternoon of July 8, 1994.   
¶5 
During the four-day jury trial in April 1995, the 
State introduced two witnesses who had identified Avery as the 
perpetrator, Avery's confession, Avery's written apology, and a 
telephone conversation Avery had with his mother wherein he 
apologized for getting involved.  The first identification 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) Whoever, with intent to steal, takes property 
from the person or presence of the owner by [] the 
following means is guilty of a Class C felony: 
. . . . 
(b) By threatening the imminent use of force 
against the person of the owner or of another who is 
present with intent thereby to compel the owner to 
acquiesce in the taking or carrying away of the 
property.  
(2) Whoever violates sub. (1) by use or threat of 
use of a dangerous weapon or any article used or 
fashioned in a manner to lead the victim reasonably to 
believe that it is a dangerous weapon is guilty of a 
Class B felony.   
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.05, "Parties to crime" states in 
part:  
(1) Whoever is concerned in the commission of a 
crime is a principal and may be charged with and 
convicted of the commission of the crime although the 
person did not directly commit it and although the 
person 
who 
directly 
committed 
it 
has 
not 
been 
convicted or has been convicted of some other degree 
of the crime or of some other crime based on the same 
act. 
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
4 
 
witness was Alcherie Simmons (Simmons), a witness to the 
Malone's robbery.  During the trial, she recanted and told the 
jury that she had never identified Avery to the police.  
However, Detectives James Kraft and Ralph Spano testified that 
they each interviewed Simmons shortly after the robbery, and 
that during those interviews, Simmons had identified Avery as 
the robber from a set of photographs.  They also testified that 
she recognized Avery from a local Boys and Girls Club and 
Sherman 
Park. 
 
Detective 
William 
Blumenberg 
(Blumenberg) 
testified that Simmons told him she feared the robbers would 
retaliate against her if she spoke to the police.  Officer 
Eduardo Negron testified that Simmons told him if she was put on 
the stand, she would "look stupid" and would say she did not 
know anything.  The second identification witness was Mueen 
Hamdan (Hamdan), who witnessed the Attari robbery.  Hamdan 
identified Avery from a set of photographs about three weeks 
after the robbery.  He also identified Avery in the courtroom as 
one of the robbers.   
¶6 
Blumenberg also testified that Avery had confessed to 
participating in both robberies.  Avery was 19 years old at the 
time of his arrest and was a high school graduate.  Blumenberg 
testified that he had interrogated Avery on the afternoon of 
July 10, 1994, and that Avery told him the robbers met up at 
Sherman Park before both robberies, drove over to the stores, 
committed the robberies, and drove back to Sherman Park.  
Blumenberg relayed that Avery confessed to being the person with 
the sawed-off shotgun in the video of the Malone's robbery and 
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
5 
 
that Avery identified the rest of the robbers by their names or 
nicknames.5  Blumenberg testified that Avery had signed the 
interrogation form detailing the robberies and that Avery 
personally wrote an apology on the form.  Finally, Blumenberg 
testified that after the interrogation, he overheard Avery call 
his mother and apologize to her that he had "gotten involved."   
¶7 
The jury was shown the video of the Malone's robbery 
during the trial to provide context for witness testimony.  In 
closing arguments, however, the prosecutor asked the jury not to 
rely on the video for identification because it was of such poor 
quality.   
¶8 
Throughout the trial, Avery maintained his innocence.  
Three 
alibi 
witnesses 
testified 
that 
Avery 
was 
watching 
basketball at North Division High School shortly before the 
                                                 
5 In Avery's confession, he identified one of the robbers as 
"Dope Fiend."  Blumenberg showed Avery a picture of DeShawn 
Rodgers, and Avery identified Rodgers as "Dope Fiend" and stated 
that Rodgers was a participant in the robberies.  Rodgers, who 
was also arrested and prosecuted for his participation in the 
robberies, implicated Avery when he told the police that he 
committed the robberies with "Brian" who he knew from Sherman 
Park and the Boys and Girls Club. 
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
6 
 
Malone's robbery.6  Two witnesses testified to seeing Avery as 
they left the gym at approximately 8:15 p.m.; one witness 
testified to seeing Avery as the witness left the gym at 
approximately 8:05 p.m.  Two of Avery's family members testified 
that Avery was at home when the Attari robbery occurred.   
¶9 
Avery testified that on July 7, the date of the 
Malone's robbery, he and his friends watched basketball at North 
Division High School from about 7 p.m. until approximately 8:30 
p.m.  He testified that after the games, he went to two friends' 
houses and got home about 11 p.m.  He also testified that on 
July 8, the date of the Attari robbery, he was at home and 
talking on the telephone with a high school friend.  That 
testimony was corroborated by the friend and by phone company 
records.  Finally, Avery testified that his confession was 
coerced.  He testified that he maintained his innocence 
throughout the first interview in the early morning hours of 
July 10; that he did not sleep between the end of the first 
                                                 
6 A map in the State's brief shows that North Division High 
School, 
located 
at 
1011 
W. 
Center 
Street 
in 
Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin, is approximately 13 blocks away from the Malone's 
Fine Foods, located at 3610 N. Teutonia Avenue.  Detective Spano 
testified that in a car, it took him two minutes and 40 seconds 
to drive from North Division High School to Malone's.  The exact 
time of the Malone's robbery is not clear.  There is no time 
stamp on the video.  One officer testified that, based on his 
investigation, he believed the Malone's robbery occurred at 
approximately 8:30 p.m.  The complaint also states that the 
robbery occurred at approximately 8:30 p.m., which was based on 
the statement of a witness, Ahmed Hasan.  The State argues that 
Avery's testimony that he was at North Division High School 
shortly before the Malone's robbery is actually inculpatory, not 
exculpatory.   
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
7 
 
interview at approximately 5:30 a.m. and the beginning of the 
second interview, at approximately 12 p.m.; and that the 
detectives told him he could go home only if he cooperated.  He 
testified that when he confessed, he was simply agreeing to the 
information that the detectives relayed to him, and that he 
wrote the apology because the detectives told him the prosecutor 
would not come down as hard on him.7  He testified that he was 
not involved in the robberies. 
¶10 On April 7, 1995, the jury found Avery guilty of both 
robberies.   
¶11 On 
June 
17, 
1996, 
Avery 
filed 
a 
motion 
for 
postconviction relief under Wis. Stat. § 809.30 (1993-94).  The 
motion was partially granted and partially denied by the circuit 
court on October 1, 1996, granting an evidentiary hearing.  On 
December 4, 1996, the circuit court held a Machner8 hearing to 
determine if Avery's trial counsel was ineffective.  On January 
9, 1997, the circuit court issued a decision and order denying 
all of Avery's postconviction motions.  Avery appealed his 
conviction and trial court orders denying his motions for 
postconviction relief.  On December 1, 1998, the court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court judgment and orders.9  
                                                 
7 On appeal, Avery does not argue that his confession was 
involuntary.  There is no dispute that Avery waived his Miranda 
rights before both interrogations began.   
8 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979).  
9 State v. Avery, No. 97-0317-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Dec. 1, 1998).  
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
8 
 
Thereafter, Avery petitioned this court for review which was 
denied on April 27, 1999. 
¶12 Over 12 years after his conviction, on October 31, 
2007, Avery filed a motion under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (2005-06) 
for a new trial based on the theories of newly discovered 
evidence and in the interest of justice.  His motion was based 
on analysis of VISAR-enhanced10 frames from the video of the 
robbery at Malone's Fine Foods (the video).  Gene Grindstaff11 
(Grindstaff) analyzed the video using digital photogrammetry, 
and concluded that the person in the video believed to be Avery 
(the robber) was several inches shorter than Avery.   
¶13 On February 1, 2008, the circuit court denied Avery's 
motion for a new trial.  Avery appealed and on March 20, 2009, 
the court of appeals reversed the postconviction order and 
remanded the matter, concluding that Avery had made a prima 
facie claim of newly discovered evidence, and that he was 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing.  In March 2010, the circuit 
court held a four-day evidentiary hearing. 
                                                 
10 VISAR, or video image stability and registration, is used 
to improve the quality of images and videos by removing 
background noises, making the images clearer, and correcting 
horizontal and vertical camera motion.   
11 Grindstaff was qualified as an expert by the circuit 
court.  He has a bachelor's and master's degree in electrical 
engineering, he graduated from the United States Air Force 
Metrology School, he is a certified metrologist (the science of 
measurement), and he teaches courses at the FBI and CIA on how 
to make measurements using his company's software.  
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
9 
 
¶14 At the hearing, Grindstaff testified that he conducted 
an analysis of the video.  He explained how he applied the VISAR 
software to enhance the images and then used photogrammetry to 
estimate the robber's height.  He explained the inherent 
uncertainties in photogrammetry analysis and the steps he took 
to minimize inaccuracies in his measurements.  For instance, his 
analysis was based on images where the robber's foot appeared to 
be against the door frame and where the robber was standing, not 
walking.  Grindstaff estimated that the robber was five feet, 
ten and one-half inches, with a one-inch margin of error.  
Grindstaff did not believe the robber could have been six feet, 
three inches tall, Avery's height.  
¶15 The court also heard testimony from the State's 
witness, Richard Vorder Bruegge (Vorder Bruegge).12  Vorder 
Bruegge conducted his own analysis of the robber's height and 
reviewed 
Grindstaff's analysis.  Vorder Bruegge similarly 
explained his method of enhancing the video then applying 
photogrammetry to the images to determine the robber's height.  
He 
explained 
the 
inherent 
uncertainties 
in 
the 
process, 
including the low-quality video; obstructions; out of plane 
error; that the process works best when both feet are in view 
and planted on the ground; that the process works best when the 
robber has his shoulders back, locked knees, and is standing 
                                                 
12 Vorder Bruegge was qualified as an expert by the circuit 
court.  He works in the digital-evidence section of the FBI, has 
a Ph.D. in geological sciences, and has extensive training in 
photogrammetry.    
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
10 
 
close to an object that can be used as a scale; and that to 
produce the most accurate estimate of the robber's height, the 
expert must know the height of the camera.  Vorder Bruegge 
testified that these factors made the analysis of the Malone's 
video less certain.  Vorder Bruegge analyzed images other than 
those analyzed by Grindstaff because he did not believe 
Grindstaff's images would produce the most accurate estimate.  
Vorder Bruegge estimated that the robber in the video was six 
feet, one-half inch, with a one-inch margin of error, but he did 
not rule out that the robber could be Avery's height.13   
¶16 On March 11, 2010, the circuit court concluded that 
Avery was not entitled to new trial on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence.  It concluded that the photogrammetry 
evidence met the four prongs of the newly-discovered evidence 
test, but that there was not a reasonable probability that a 
                                                 
13 The circuit court also heard testimony from several other 
witnesses that Avery could not be the robber in the video for a 
variety of reasons.  We agree with the circuit court that since 
this testimony was available at the time of the trial, it did 
not qualify as newly discovered evidence.  See State v. Love, 
2005 WI 116, ¶43, 284 Wis. 2d 111, 700 N.W.2d 62 (requiring 
"newly 
discovered 
evidence" 
to 
be 
discovered 
after 
the 
conviction).   
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
11 
 
jury would have reasonable doubt as to Avery's guilt.14  The 
circuit court noted its belief that photogrammetry is an 
inherently subjective analysis: 
And Vorder Brugge [sic] . . . says Grindstaff didn't 
take into account things such as whether or not 
somebody is out of plane, how high was the camera, how 
far was the camera from the door, the posture of the 
subject.  A big assumption is made that his foot is 
against the wall.  You can't tell from even the 
enhanced video as to whether or not his knees are 
bent, even the knee you can see, because of the baggy 
pants that he's wearing. You can't tell if he's bent 
over from the knees, from the waist, from the 
neck. . . .    
. . . These are all variables which affect the 
reliability of the analysis of Mr. Grindstaff. 
¶17 The circuit court weighed the photogrammetry evidence 
against the evidence at trial: Hamdan's identification, police 
officers' 
testimony 
of 
Simmons's 
identification, 
Avery's 
confession, Avery's written apology, Avery's apology to his 
mother, Avery's alibi defense, and Avery's retraction of his 
confession.  The circuit court concluded that the new evidence 
is "simply not going to make a difference."  The new evidence 
                                                 
14 To prevail on a claim for newly discovered evidence, a 
defendant must first prove, by clear and convincing evidence, 
that "(1) the evidence was discovered after conviction; (2) the 
defendant was not negligent in seeking evidence; (3) the 
evidence is material to an issue in the case; and (4) the 
evidence is not merely cumulative."  Love, 284 Wis. 2d 111, ¶43. 
(citation omitted).  If the defendant makes this showing, "the 
circuit court must determine whether a reasonable probability 
exists that a different result would be reached in a trial."  
Id., ¶44 (citation omitted).  The State does not challenge that 
the photogrammetry evidence meets the four prongs of the test; 
it challenges only the final test.   
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
12 
 
was "not reliable enough."  The circuit court stated that 
photogrammetry is "an inexact science," unlike DNA.  
¶18 At a hearing on July 1, 2010, the circuit court also 
denied Avery's request for a new trial in the interest of 
justice.  The circuit court stated that granting a new trial in 
the interest of justice is done only in exceptional cases.  It 
stated that the photogrammetry evidence did not "destroy" the 
State's case, but merely "chip[ped] away" at the case and thus, 
was not an exceptional case so as to warrant a new trial.   
¶19 In October 2011, the court of appeals reversed and 
remanded for a new trial.  State v. Avery, 2011 WI App 148, 337 
Wis. 2d 560, 807 N.W.2d 638.  Concerning the newly-discovered 
evidence argument, the court of appeals determined that the 
circuit court improperly weighed the credibility of Grindstaff 
against the credibility of Vorder Bruegge.  Id., ¶34.  It 
concluded that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion 
because 
it is the jury's task to weigh the 
credibility of testimony.  Id.  The court of appeals concluded 
that 
Avery 
was 
entitled 
to 
a 
new 
trial 
based 
on 
the 
photogrammetry evidence because "if a jury believes the height 
of the video suspect as put forth by expert analysis of new 
video enhancement technology, it is reasonably probable that a 
reasonable doubt as to Avery's guilt would exist."  Id., ¶35.  
The court of appeals also concluded that Avery was entitled to a 
new trial in the interest of justice because the "jury was 
precluded from hearing photogrammetry evidence," and therefore, 
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
13 
 
the real controversy——Avery's involvement in the robberies——was 
not fully tried.  Id., ¶45.   
¶20 Judge Brennan dissented from the court of appeals' 
decision.  Id., ¶47.  As to the newly-discovered evidence claim, 
she concluded that the majority's analysis took the circuit 
court's comment out of context.  Id., ¶51.  Instead of weighing 
the credibility of one expert against the other, Judge Brennan 
determined that the circuit court was balancing the new 
evidence, which is unlike DNA because it is an inexact science, 
against the old evidence, which the circuit court found to be 
strong.  Id.  Judge Brennan agreed with the circuit court, and 
concluded that the new evidence would not create a reasonable 
doubt as to Avery's guilt.  Id., ¶55.  She also concluded that 
Avery was not entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice 
because the real controversy of Avery's identification had been 
fully tried.  Id., ¶¶57-58.  The State had presented strong 
evidence that included two eyewitnesses and Avery's confession; 
Avery presented an alibi defense and recanted his confession.  
Id., ¶58.  Judge Brennan concluded that the real controversy was 
fully tried because the jury had the opportunity to hear all of 
that evidence and made its own credibility determination when it 
found him guilty.  Id.   
¶21 The State petitioned this court for review and we 
granted the petition on February 23, 2012.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶22 Avery requests a new trial because the photogrammetry 
evidence constitutes newly discovered evidence that creates a 
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
14 
 
reasonable probability that the jury would have a reasonable 
doubt as to Avery's guilt.  The decision to grant or deny a 
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is 
committed to the circuit court's discretion.  State v. Plude, 
2008 WI 58, ¶31, 310 Wis. 2d 28, 750 N.W.2d 42.  We review the 
circuit court's determination for an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 473, 561 
N.W.2d 707 (1997). 
¶23 Avery also contends that he is entitled to a new trial 
in 
the 
interest 
of 
justice 
because 
the 
effect 
of 
the 
photogrammetry evidence is that the real controversy was not 
fully tried.  The court of appeals has the discretionary power 
to reverse a conviction in the interest of justice.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 752.35;15 
State 
v. 
Armstrong, 
2005 
WI 
119, 
¶113, 
283 
Wis. 2d 639, 
700 
N.W.2d 98. 
 
We 
review 
a 
discretionary 
determination for an erroneous exercise of discretion.  See 
Johnson v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 2012 WI 31, ¶22, 339 Wis. 2d 493, 
811 N.W.2d 756.  The court erroneously exercises its discretion 
when it applies the wrong legal standard or makes a decision not 
reasonably supported by the facts of record.  See id.; State v. 
McConnohie, 113 Wis. 2d 362, 371, 334 N.W.2d 903 (1983). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Newly Discovered Evidence  
                                                 
15 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
15 
 
¶24 We conclude that there is not a reasonable probability 
that a jury, looking at both the evidence presented at trial and 
the new digital photogrammetry evidence, would have a reasonable 
doubt as to Avery's guilt. 
¶25 To set aside a judgment of conviction based on newly 
discovered 
evidence, 
the 
evidence 
must 
be 
sufficient 
to 
establish 
that 
the 
defendant's 
conviction 
resulted 
in 
a 
"manifest injustice."  Plude, 310 Wis. 2d 28, ¶32 (citation 
omitted).  In a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence, the defendant must prove, by clear and convincing 
evidence, 
that 
"'(1) 
the 
evidence 
was 
discovered 
after 
conviction; (2) the defendant was not negligent in seeking the 
evidence; (3) the evidence is material to an issue in the case; 
and (4) the evidence is not merely cumulative.'"  Id. (quoting 
McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 473).  If the defendant is able to make 
this showing, then "the circuit court must determine whether a 
reasonable probability exists that a different result would be 
reached in a trial."  McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 473.  A 
reasonable probability of a different result exists if there is 
a reasonable probability that a jury, looking at both the old 
and the new evidence, would have a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt.  State v. Love, 2005 WI 116, ¶44, 284 
Wis. 2d 111, 700 N.W.2d 62.  A court reviewing the newly 
discovered evidence should consider whether a jury would find 
that the evidence "had a sufficient impact on other evidence 
presented at trial that a jury would have a reasonable doubt as 
to the defendant's guilt."  Plude, 310 Wis. 2d 28, ¶33.  While 
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
16 
 
the court must consider the new evidence as well as the evidence 
presented at trial, the court is not to base its decision solely 
on the credibility of the newly discovered evidence, unless it 
finds the new evidence to be incredible.  See McCallum, 208 
Wis. 2d at 474-75. 
¶26 For example, in McCallum, the defendant was convicted 
of second-degree sexual assault.  Id. at 468.  The State's 
primary evidence of guilt was the victim's statement.  Id.  
After the defendant entered an Alford plea, the victim recanted 
her accusation.  Id.  The circuit court denied the defendant's 
motion 
to 
withdraw 
his 
plea, 
finding 
that 
the 
victim's 
recantation was less credible than her accusation.  Id. at 474.  
This court concluded that the circuit court erred in basing its 
decision solely on the victim's recantation being less credible 
than her accusation.  Id. at 474-75.  This court remanded the 
matter to the circuit court for a determination of whether there 
was a reasonable probability that a jury would have a reasonable 
doubt as to McCallum's guilt.  Id. at 480.   
¶27 Similarly, in Edmunds, the court of appeals concluded 
that the circuit court improperly weighed the credibility of the 
witnesses.  State v. Edmunds, 2008 WI App 33, ¶18, 308 
Wis. 2d 374, 746 N.W.2d 590.  Edmunds was convicted of first-
degree reckless homicide based on expert testimony that a child 
had died of shaken baby syndrome while in Edmunds' care.  Id., 
¶¶2-4.  Ten years after her conviction, Edmunds brought a motion 
for a new trial based on medical testimony that now challenged 
whether the cause of death was shaken baby syndrome.  Id., ¶6.  
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
17 
 
Edmunds' newly discovered evidence consisted of six expert 
witnesses, who testified that "there is now significant debate 
in the medical community" concerning shaken baby syndrome.  Id.  
The circuit court weighed the credibility of Edmunds' new 
experts and the credibility of the State's new expert, and it 
denied Edmunds' motion after finding that the State's new expert 
was more convincing.  Id., ¶18.  The court of appeals reversed, 
concluding that it was improper to decide whether a new trial is 
warranted by weighing the State's new evidence against Edmunds' 
new evidence.  Id.  Instead, the court of appeals concluded 
"that the record establishes that there is a reasonable 
probability that a jury, looking at both the new medical 
testimony and the old medical testimony, would have a reasonable 
doubt as to Edmunds' guilt."  Id., ¶23.  
¶28 A reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt has been 
found to exist when the reliability of a witness critical to the 
State's case is completely called into question by newly 
discovered evidence, such as that witness's false credentials.  
For example, in Plude, the main issue at trial was whether Plude 
drowned his wife Genell by forcing her head in the toilet.  310 
Wis. 2d 28, 
¶4. 
 
The 
testimony 
of 
several 
doctors 
was 
inconclusive as to the cause of death, but the testimony of the 
State's expert, Saami Shaibani, was that Plude drowned his wife.  
Id., ¶25.  Shaibani testified that he was an expert in "injury 
mechanism analysis," a combination of physics, trauma, and 
engineering.  Id., ¶23.  He conducted a series of experiments 
and concluded that Genell could not have inhaled toilet bowl 
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
18 
 
water on her own.  Id., ¶37.  After Plude was convicted, newly 
discovered 
evidence 
revealed 
that 
Shaibani 
falsified 
his 
credentials.  Id., ¶36.  This court concluded that "in a trial 
rife 
with 
conflicting 
and 
inconclusive 
medical 
expert 
testimony . . . there exists a reasonable probability that, had 
the jury discovered that Shaibani lied about his credentials, it 
would have had a reasonable doubt as to Plude's guilt."  Id.   
¶29 The State argues that Avery is not entitled to a new 
trial based on newly discovered photogrammetry evidence because 
the newly discovered evidence is not enough to overcome the 
strong evidence at trial.   
¶30 Avery argues that he is entitled to a new trial based 
on the newly discovered evidence because if the jury believes 
that the robber is shorter than Avery, Avery would not be found 
guilty.    
¶31 In this case, it is undisputed that the four prongs of 
the newly-discovered evidence test are satisfied.  First, the 
photogrammetry 
evidence 
was 
"discovered 
after 
conviction" 
because in 1994, experts could not have enhanced the images and 
applied photogrammetry to estimate the robber's height.  Both 
Grindstaff and Vorder Bruegge testified that in 1994, the 
software used to enhance the images was not available, and the 
process would have been prohibitively expensive.  Second, Avery 
was not negligent in seeking the evidence because it was not 
available at the time of his trial.  Third, the evidence is 
material to the issue of Avery's participation in the robberies.  
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
19 
 
Fourth, the evidence is not merely cumulative.  There was no 
evidence in the trial regarding the robber's height.   
¶32 The parties dispute the ultimate question of whether 
there is a reasonable probability that a jury, looking at the 
evidence presented at trial and the new digital photogrammetry 
evidence, would have a reasonable doubt as to Avery's guilt.16  
The circuit court has discretion to grant a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence, and we cannot say that it erroneously 
exercised its discretion here.  Plude, 310 Wis. 2d 28, ¶31; 
McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 473.  Not all new evidence or new 
technology warrants a new trial.  The question is not whether 
                                                 
16 The State argues that "reasonable probability" means it 
is more likely than not a jury would have a reasonable doubt as 
to a defendant's guilt.  In support of its argument, the State 
cites 
State 
v. 
[Steven 
A.] 
Avery, 
213 
Wis. 2d 228, 
570 
N.W.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1997), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 693-94 (1984) ("[A] defendant need not show that 
counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the 
outcome in the case.  This outcome-determinative standard has 
several strengths. . . .   [I]t comports with the widely used 
standard for assessing motions for new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence."). 
Avery argues that the standard is whether the new evidence 
undermines the confidence in the outcome.  See Kyles v. Whitley, 
514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (defining "reasonable probability" as 
undermining confidence in the result); State v. Armstrong, 2005 
WI 119, ¶162, 283 Wis. 2d 639, 700 N.W.2d 98 (withdrawing 
language from [Steven A.] Avery that a defendant must prove a 
reasonable probability of a different outcome by clear and 
convincing evidence).  
We need not decide this issue because even under the 
definition of "reasonable probability" favorable to Avery——that 
the new evidence undermines the confidence in the outcome——we 
conclude that Avery is not entitled to a new trial based on the 
newly discovered evidence.   
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
20 
 
the evidence could create a reasonable doubt.  When weighing the 
new evidence against the evidence presented at trial, we cannot 
say that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
when it concluded that the photogrammetry evidence would not 
create a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury.   
¶33 We disagree with the court of appeals' determination 
that "[b]y concluding that Grindstaff's opinions were 'not 
reliable enough' to entitle Avery to a new trial, the trial 
court gave one opinion from a credible witness greater weight 
than a competing opinion from a different credible witness."  
Avery, 337 Wis. 2d 560, ¶31.  Instead, we conclude that the 
circuit court did not merely weigh the credibility of the 
experts.  See id., ¶51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  The circuit 
court did not conclude that the new evidence was less credible 
than the old evidence or that one expert was more credible than 
another.  See Edmunds, 308 Wis. 2d 374, ¶18; McCallum, 208 
Wis. 2d at 474-75.  In fact, a circuit court must consider the 
new evidence in order to properly determine whether the newly 
discovered evidence warrants a new trial.  In so doing, the 
circuit court here noted that the photogrammetry evidence was 
different than DNA or a third-party confession.  Indeed, unlike 
DNA or a third-party confession, the photogrammetry evidence 
here depends upon dozens of different variables.  A different or 
incorrect assumption on even one variable could lead to a 
different result.   
¶34 The 
circuit 
court 
correctly 
balanced 
the 
photogrammetry evidence against the evidence presented at trial.  
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
21 
 
The court considered the two witness identifications at trial of 
Avery as the robber.  Hamdan testified that before he was shot, 
he looked at Avery two times from two to three feet away.  
Hamdan identified Avery as the man who kicked his cousin and 
then stood by the door.  Hamdan's testimony was corroborated by 
events in the video.  While Simmons recanted her identification, 
the circuit court considered testimony of police officers that 
Simmons identified Avery in prior interviews, that Simmons knew 
Avery from the neighborhood, and that Simmons was fearful to 
testify against Avery.  In addition, Avery provided a detailed 
confession.  Avery confessed to details of the robbery that were 
not on the video.  He knew the names or nicknames of the other 
robbers, and he told police what the robbers did before and 
after the robberies.  Avery wrote an apology and also called his 
mother after his confession to apologize to her that he had 
"gotten involved."  While the video was used at trial, it was 
not used to identify Avery.  In fact, the State specifically 
asked the jury not to identify Avery from the video because it 
was of such poor quality.   
¶35 Avery's defense included alibi witnesses and his own 
testimony recanting his confession.  The circuit court noted 
that Avery's attorney "did an admirable job attacking the 
circumstances of the confession to the jury and they didn't buy 
it."  Three witnesses testified to seeing Avery at North 
Division High School watching basketball shortly before the 
Malone's robbery.  Two other witnesses testified that Avery was 
at home during the time frame of the Attari robbery.  Avery also 
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
22 
 
testified to his whereabouts during both robberies and to why he 
recanted his confession.  The jury heard all of this evidence, 
and they still found him guilty.   
¶36 The State's evidence in this case was far stronger 
than the State's evidence in McCallum, Edmunds, or Plude. In 
those cases, where the court afforded a new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence, the newly discovered evidence struck at the 
heart of the State's evidence at trial.  Quite unlike those 
cases, the photogrammetry evidence here does not create a 
reasonable probability that a jury, looking at the old evidence 
and the newly discovered evidence, would have a reasonable doubt 
as to Avery's guilt.   
B. Interest of Justice 
¶37 We also conclude that Avery is not entitled to a new 
trial in the interest of justice because the controversy was 
fully tried even though the jury did not hear the photogrammetry 
evidence. 
¶38 The supreme court and the court of appeals may set 
aside a conviction through the use of our discretionary reversal 
powers, 
though 
the 
circuit 
court 
does 
not 
have 
such 
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
23 
 
discretionary powers.17  See State v. Burns, 2011 WI 22, ¶24, 332 
Wis. 2d 730, 798 N.W.2d 166; State v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, ¶98, 
328 Wis. 2d 544, 787 N.W.2d 350.  However, such discretionary 
reversal power is exercised only in "exceptional cases."  Id., 
¶25; State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 161, 549 N.W.2d 435 
(1996).  The power to grant a new trial in the interest of 
justice is to be exercised "infrequently and judiciously."  
State v. Ray, 166 Wis. 2d 855, 874, 481 N.W.2d 288 (Ct. App. 
1992).  "This court approaches a request for a new trial with 
great caution.  We are reluctant to grant a new trial in the 
                                                 
17 The State argues that the court of appeals may not 
reverse a criminal conviction in the interest of justice on a 
motion made under Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  The State relies upon 
State v. Allen, 159 Wis. 2d 53, 464 N.W.2d 426 (Ct. App. 1990).  
However, State v. Armstrong is instructive on this issue: "we 
need not decide whether our statutory power is constrained 
according to Allen because this court has 'both inherent power 
and express statutory authority to reverse a judgment of 
conviction and remit a case for a new trial in the interest of 
justice.'"  2005 WI 119, ¶113, 283 Wis. 2d 639, 700 N.W.2d 98 
(quoting State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 159, 549 N.W.2d 435 
(1996)).  "This court has recently reaffirmed that our inherent 
power to reverse in the interest of justice is not limited to a 
direct appeal."  State v. Maloney, 2006 WI 15, ¶14, 288 
Wis. 2d 551, 709 N.W.2d 436.  The discretionary reversal power 
of this court and the court of appeals is coterminous.  
Armstrong, 
283 
Wis. 2d 639, 
¶113; 
Vollmer 
v. 
Luety, 
156 
Wis. 2d 1, 17-18, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990) ("[W]e conclude that, 
because secs. 751.06 and 752.35, Stats., are identical, the 
legislature did not intend for the court of appeals' power to 
reverse under sec. 752.35 to be less than that of the supreme 
court under sec. 751.06."). 
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
24 
 
interest of justice. . . ."18  Armstrong, 283 Wis. 2d 639, ¶114 
(citation omitted).   
¶39 The real controversy here was fully tried.  To prove 
Avery's guilt, the State presented evidence in the form of 
eyewitness 
identifications, 
officers' 
testimony, 
Avery's 
confession, Avery's written apology, and Avery's apology to his 
mother for getting involved.   
¶40 Avery presented an alibi defense at trial.  Three 
witnesses testified to seeing Avery at North Division High 
School watching basketball shortly before the Malone's robbery.  
Two other witnesses testified that Avery was at home during the 
time frame of the Attari robbery.  Avery also testified to his 
whereabouts during both robberies and to why he recanted his 
confession.  "The jurors had the opportunity to hear all of that 
evidence and made their own credibility determination when they 
found him guilty."  Avery, 337 Wis. 2d 560, ¶58 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).   
¶41 Avery's new photogrammetry evidence does not meet the 
standard set forth in Hicks or Armstrong.  Clearly, it does not 
                                                 
18 This court may grant a new trial in the interest of 
justice (1) whenever "the real controversy has not been fully 
tried," or (2) whenever "it is probable that justice has for any 
reason miscarried."  Wis. Stat. § 751.06.  Cases where the real 
controversy has not been fully tried have generally been limited 
to two situations: (1) when the jury was erroneously denied the 
opportunity to hear important evidence bearing on an important 
issue in the case or (2) when the jury had before it evidence 
not properly admitted that "so clouded" a crucial issue that it 
may be fairly said that the real controversy was not tried.  
Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 160. 
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
25 
 
"discredit[] one of the pivotal pieces of evidence forming the 
foundation of the State's case."  Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 171.  In 
Hicks and Armstrong, the State "assertively and repetitively" 
used physical evidence to prove a defendant's guilt.  That 
specific evidence later turned out to be seriously compromised.  
See also Maloney, 288 Wis. 2d 551, ¶40 ("[U]nlike Hicks and 
Armstrong, where the newly discovered evidence compromised 
evidence on which the prosecution relied, Maloney has alleged no 
facts that would substantiate allegations that evidence on which 
the prosecution relied was compromised."). 
¶42 The video was not used at trial for identification 
purposes.  Though the jury saw the video of the Malone's 
robbery, the State asked the jury not to make identifications 
from the video because it was of such poor quality.  We have no 
indication that the video played any part in the jury's verdict.  
The State did not "assertively and repetitively" use the video 
of the Malone's robbery to prove Avery's identification.  
Moreover, the photogrammetry evidence does not discredit two 
witness 
identifications 
of 
Avery 
as 
the 
robber, 
Avery's 
confession, his written apology, or his call apologizing to his 
mother for getting involved.  At most, the photogrammetry 
evidence "chip[s] away" at the State's case.  Hicks, 202 
Wis. 2d at 171.  
¶43 In Hicks, this court granted the defendant a new trial 
in the interest of justice when subsequent DNA tests refuted 
hair evidence the State presented repeatedly at trial as being 
"consistent" with the defendant's hair.  Id. at 153.  The hair 
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
26 
 
evidence at trial was critically important to the State's case.  
Hicks was convicted of burglary, robbery, and two counts of 
sexual assault.  Id. at 152.  At trial, the victim, D.F., 
testified that she heard a knock at her door, that she saw a 
black man standing outside, that the man said he was her 
upstairs neighbor, that he came in to use her phone, and that he 
assaulted her.  Id. at 152-54.  D.F., a white female, had 
limited visual contact with the assailant, but she picked Hicks 
out of a lineup two days after the assault.  Id. at 154. 
¶44 During the investigation, the police found several 
hairs in D.F.'s apartment.  Id.  One "Negro" head hair was found 
on D.F.'s comforter, and four "Negro" pubic hairs were found in 
the vacuum sweepings of D.F.'s apartment approximately 15 days 
after the assault.  Id.  During trial, an analyst testified that 
four of the hairs were "consistent" with Hicks' hair, and one 
hair was "similar" to Hicks' hair.  Id. at 154, 166.  
Additionally, a "Caucasian" head hair was found inside the pants 
Hicks was wearing when he was arrested, and the analyst 
testified that this hair was "consistent" with D.F.'s hair.  Id. 
at 154.  The hairs were not tested for DNA.  Id. at 155.   
¶45 The State's theory at trial was that all of the hairs 
came from the same person, Hicks.  Id. at 165-66.  At trial, the 
State relied heavily on the hair evidence and argued that the 
hair was "strong" and "powerful" evidence of Hicks' guilt.  Id. 
at 167.  In its opening statement, the State told the jury that 
hairs found in D.F.'s apartment were "consistent with the hair 
of Anthony Hicks."  Id. at 165.  An analyst testified that the 
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
27 
 
hairs found at the crime scene were consistent with Hicks' hair, 
and, over objection, an enlarged photograph of the hair evidence 
was shown to the jury.  Id. at 166.  The State argued that "I 
don't see, here, any prejudice, except for the fact that it's 
probative.  And it (the hair evidence) is probative evidence.  
That's for sure!"  Id. at 167.  During closing argument, the 
State again emphasized that Hicks should be convicted because 
the hairs "were compared and found consistent" to both Hicks' 
hair and the victim's hair.  Id. at 167-68.  
¶46 Hicks' defense at trial was that he had never been in 
D.F.'s apartment.  Id. at 163.  He presented alibi testimony but 
none for the exact time of the offense.  Id. at 155.  The jury 
convicted Hicks.  Id. at 152.   
¶47 Postconviction, an analyst conducted DNA tests on the 
five hairs.  Id. at 156.  The DNA evidence excluded Hicks as the 
source of two of the hairs.  Id.  The other hairs did not yield 
sufficient DNA for analysis.  Id.  Hicks then brought a motion 
for a new trial in the interest of justice, arguing that the 
real controversy——whether he was the man that entered D.F.'s 
apartment and assaulted her——had not been fully tried.  Id. at 
157-58.  The circuit court rejected his argument.  Id. at 152.  
The court of appeals reversed, granting Hicks a new trial, and 
the State appealed to this court.  Id. at 157.  
¶48 This court agreed with the court of appeals and 
concluded that it was an exceptional case.  Id. at 161.  "[T]he 
jury did not hear important DNA evidence that bore on an 
important issue of the case," and "the testimony the jury heard 
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
28 
 
with respect to the hair as affirmative proof of guilt was 
inconsistent with what the later DNA analysis revealed, thus 
clouding the crucial issue of identification."  Id.  The court 
noted: 
By itself, the fact that Hicks obtained post-
conviction DNA evidence might not persuade us to 
remand this matter for a new trial in the interest of 
justice.  The determinative factor in the present case 
is 
the 
fact 
that 
the 
State 
assertively 
and 
repetitively used hair evidence throughout the course 
of the trial as affirmative proof of Hicks' guilt.  
The State went to great lengths to establish that the 
hairs found at the scene came from the assailant.  In 
opening and closing arguments, the State relied 
heavily upon its expert's opinion that the hairs found 
at the scene were consistent with known standards 
provided by Hicks.  At various times, the State 
referred 
to 
a 
'match' 
between 
the 
hairs, 
thus 
elevating and highlighting the importance of the hair 
evidence to the jury. 
The combination of these two factors leads us to 
the conclusion that the real controversy was not fully 
tried. 
Id. at 164.  The DNA evidence did more than "chip away at the 
accumulation of evidence produced by the State to prove guilt.  
The DNA test result, in conjunction with D.F.'s testimony about 
the source of the Negro hairs in her apartment, discredits one 
of the pivotal pieces of evidence forming the foundation of the 
State's case."  Id. at 171.  Such is not the case with respect 
to Avery's photogrammetry evidence.   
¶49 Similar to Hicks, in Armstrong, the State used 
physical evidence forcefully during the trial to prove that 
Armstrong was guilty of the sexual assault and murder of Charise 
Kamps.  283 Wis. 2d 639, ¶¶87-89.  Later tests disproved 
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
29 
 
Armstrong as the source of two hairs and semen found near the 
body, and he brought a motion for a new trial in the interest of 
justice based on the DNA evidence.  Id., ¶¶94-95.   
¶50 The State's case against Armstrong consisted of five 
parts: 
(1) that Armstrong could not have been at Kamps' 
apartment before her murder; (2) two witnesses made 
observations that placed Armstrong at Kamps' apartment 
around the time she was murdered; (3) physical 
evidence 
conclusively 
and 
irrefutably 
established 
Armstrong's 
guilt, 
including 
(a) 
a 
fingerprint 
identified as Armstrong's found on a water bong in 
Kamps' apartment; (b) semen stains on the victim's 
bathrobe that came from a similar secretor type as 
Armstrong; (c) four head hairs found in the apartment 
characterized by the State's expert as "consistent" 
and "similar" to Armstrong's; (d) traces of blood 
underneath 
Armstrong's 
fingernails 
and 
toenails 
detected 
the 
evening 
following 
the 
murder; 
(4) 
Armstrong had a romantic interest in Kamps that she 
did not return; and (5) Armstrong paid Kamps $400 in 
repayment of a debt and following her murder, the $400 
could not be found in her apartment, while Armstrong 
made a $315 cash deposit the next day. 
Id., ¶8.   
¶51 Critical to the State's case and the conviction was 
certain physical evidence.  Armstrong's fingerprint was found on 
a bong in Kamps' apartment.  Id., ¶64.  A robe next to Kamps' 
body tested positive for semen, and the semen was consistent 
with a type-A secretor.  Id., ¶65.  An analyst testified that 
Armstrong, as well as 80 percent of the population, are type-A 
secretors.  Id.  The State also presented evidence that 
Armstrong had blood underneath his fingernails and toenails 
within a day after the murder.  Id., ¶¶68-69.  Finally, the 
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
30 
 
State presented hair evidence.  Police recovered a total of five 
hairs, all head hairs, that were "consistent" with Armstrong's 
hair.  Id., ¶¶80-83.  The hairs were recovered from the bathrobe 
belt draped over Kamps' body, the bathroom, the bodily fluid 
around Kamps' body, and the fan.  Id.   
¶52 Similar to Hicks, the State used the physical evidence 
"assertively 
and 
repetitively 
as 
affirmative 
proof 
of 
Armstrong's guilt."  Id., ¶139.  During closing arguments, the 
State emphasized the physical evidence and stated: "There was 
physical 
evidence 
at 
the 
scene. 
 
Physical 
evidence 
to 
demonstrate conclusively that Ralph Armstrong is the person who 
murdered Charise Kamps.  There is also physical evidence on 
Ralph Armstrong that ties him precisely with the scene of the 
crime."  Id., ¶140.  The State told the jury that "[t]wo of the 
defendant's hairs" were on the bathrobe belt across Kamps' body.  
Id., ¶142.  The State further argued that semen from a type-A 
secretor, like Armstrong, was found on the bathrobe next to 
Kamps' body.  Id., ¶144.  The State told the jury that "there 
was blood under every fingernail, every single one.  That was 
Charise Kamps' blood."  Id., ¶143.   
¶53 In Armstrong, the State "flaunted powerful conclusions 
before the jury that the physical evidence conclusively and 
irrevocably established Armstrong as the murderer."  Id., ¶154.  
The new evidence did more than "'chip away'" at the accumulation 
of the State's case, it "'discredit[ed] one of the pivotal 
pieces of proof forming the very foundation of the State's 
case.'"  Id., ¶155 (quoting Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 171).  Such is 
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
31 
 
not the case with respect to Avery's new photogrammetry 
evidence.   
¶54 In the case at issue, Avery argues that the real 
controversy of his involvement in the robberies was not fully 
tried 
because 
the 
jury 
was 
precluded 
from 
hearing 
the 
photogrammetry evidence during the trial.  Avery argues that we 
should affirm the court of appeals and grant him a new trial in 
the interest of justice.  
¶55 The State argues that this case, unlike Hicks and 
Armstrong, is not a truly exceptional one.  We agree.  The court 
of appeals erroneously exercised its discretion by granting a 
new trial in the interest of justice without undertaking any 
analysis to determine that this was such an exceptional case.19   
                                                 
19 While the court of appeals need not necessarily use the 
word "exceptional" in its analysis, it does have an obligation 
to analyze why a case is so exceptional to warrant a new trial 
in the interest of justice.  In other words, the court of 
appeals erroneously exercised its discretion by granting a new 
trial in the interest of justice without properly analyzing why 
this was such an exceptional case.  The court of appeals' 
analysis seems to simply restate the interest of justice test:  
"The jury was precluded from hearing photogrammetry evidence 
because, at the time of trial, the specific technique to 
sufficiently enhance the video surveillance evidence did not 
exist.  We conclude, as a result, that the real controversy of 
whether Avery was actually involved in the robberies was not 
fully tried."  Avery, 337 Wis. 2d 560, ¶45.  The court of 
appeals never analyzed whether the jury was erroneously denied 
the opportunity to hear important evidence bearing on an 
important issue in the case, or whether the jury had before it 
evidence not properly admitted that so clouded a crucial issue 
that it may be fairly said that the real controversy was not 
fully tried.  See Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 160. 
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
32 
 
¶56 In both Hicks and Armstrong, the real controversy was 
not fully tried.  In Hicks, the new DNA tests alone were not 
enough to grant a new trial, but it was the combination of the 
new evidence with the State's reliance on that specific evidence 
at trial that made the case so exceptional to warrant a new 
trial in the interest of justice.  202 Wis. 2d at 164.  The same 
cannot be said with respect to Avery's trial.  The jury saw the 
video, and it did not hear the photogrammetry evidence.  
However, 
we 
cannot 
say 
that 
the 
photogrammetry 
evidence 
discredits a pivotal piece of evidence presented to the jury 
such that the real controversy was not fully tried.  The State 
did not meaningfully rely on the video at trial and it certainly 
did not do so with respect to the issue of identification. 
¶57 A new trial is not warranted every time new technology 
affects evidence admitted at an earlier trial: 
It strains the meaning of 'fully tried' to suggest 
that [a] case was not fully tried because the 
scientific bases for physical evidence set forth in 
the trial were only state-of-the-art at the time of 
the trial, but not state-of-the-art at present.  Using 
the majority's standard, the real controversy can 
never be fully tried because scientific advances in 
evidence gathering and analysis will continue to 
improve. 
Armstrong, 283 Wis. 2d 639, ¶188 (Roggensack, J., dissenting).   
The judicial system has limited resources, and judicial policy 
favors finality of convictions.  See Love, 284 Wis. 2d 111, ¶58 
(Prosser, J., dissenting).  In a truly exceptional case, those 
interests do not trump the defendant's interest in having the 
No. 
2010AP1952   
 
33 
 
real controversy fully tried.  However, this is not such an 
exceptional case.   
¶58 Avery's photogrammetry evidence does not discredit a 
pivotal piece of evidence that the State used "assertively and 
repetitively" at trial to prove Avery's guilt.  Hicks, 202 
Wis. 2d at 165, 171-72.  The photogrammetry evidence, at most, 
merely "chip[s] away" at the State's case.  Id. at 171.  Thus, 
the real controversy was fully tried.  This is not an 
exceptional case that warrants granting Avery a new trial in the 
interest of justice.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶59 We conclude that there is not a reasonable probability 
that a jury, looking at both the evidence presented at trial and 
the new digital photogrammetry evidence, would have a reasonable 
doubt as to Avery's guilt.  We also conclude that the court of 
appeals erroneously exercised its discretion when it failed to 
properly analyze whether this was an exceptional case that 
entitled Avery to a new trial in the interest of justice.  Avery 
is not entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice 
because the controversy was fully tried even though the jury did 
not hear the photogrammetry evidence. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.    
No.  2010AP1952.dtp 
 
 
1 
 
¶60 DAVID 
T. 
PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  This case 
presents an important issue of statutory construction affecting 
postconviction review.  If the court approves the application of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 751.06 or 752.35 to postconviction motions under 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06, it will seriously jeopardize the high 
standards and finality in § 974.06.  I write separately to 
express this concern. 
I 
¶61 Two statutes, Wis. Stat. § 751.061 and Wis. Stat. 
§ 752.35,2 give the supreme court and the court of appeals, 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 751.06 reads as follows: 
Discretionary reversal. In an appeal in the 
supreme court, if it appears from the record that the 
real controversy has not been fully tried, or that it 
is 
probable 
that 
justice 
has 
for 
any 
reason 
miscarried, the court may reverse the judgment or 
order appealed from, regardless of whether the proper 
motion or objection appears in the record, and may 
direct the entry of the proper judgment or remit the 
case to the trial court for the entry of the proper 
judgment or for a new trial, and direct the making of 
such amendments in the pleadings and the adoption of 
such procedure in that court, not inconsistent with 
statutes or rules, as are necessary to accomplish the 
ends of justice. 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 752.35 reads as follows: 
Discretionary reversal. In an appeal to the court 
of appeals, if it appears from the record that the 
real controversy has not been fully tried, or that it 
is 
probable 
that 
justice 
has 
for 
any 
reason 
miscarried, the court may reverse the judgment or 
order appealed from, regardless of whether the proper 
motion or objection appears in the record and may 
direct the entry of the proper judgment or remit the 
case to the trial court for entry of the proper 
judgment or for a new trial, and direct the making of 
No.  2010AP1952.dtp 
 
 
2 
 
respectively, "discretionary reversal" authority on appeal.  
Both appellate courts may "reverse the judgment or order 
appealed from," "direct the entry of the proper judgment," or 
remit the case to the trial court for the entry of the proper 
judgment or for a new trial, "if it appears from the record that 
the real controversy has not been fully tried, or that it is 
probable that justice has for any reason miscarried."  Wis. 
Stat. §§ 751.06, 752.35. 
¶62 There is no dispute that the two statutes apply in a 
direct appeal from a judgment of conviction and/or a direct 
appeal from the denial of a postconviction motion under Wis. 
Stat. § 974.02.  The question in dispute is whether the two 
statutes apply in a collateral attack——that is, in an appeal 
from a postconviction motion under Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  A "yes" 
answer will undermine this court's decisions in State v. 
Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), and 
State v. Lo, 2003 WI 107, 264 Wis. 2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 756.   
II 
¶63 The language found in Wis. Stat. § 751.06 first 
appeared in the Wisconsin Statutes in 1913.  See ch. 214, Laws 
of 1913.3  In the 1925 statutes, the language is located in Wis. 
                                                                                                                                                             
such amendments in the pleadings and the adoption of 
such procedure in that court, not inconsistent with 
statutes or rules, as are necessary to accomplish the 
ends of justice. 
3  
Section 1.  There is added to the statutes a new 
section to read: Section 2405m.  In any action or 
proceeding brought to the supreme court by appeal or 
writ of error, if it shall appear to that court from 
No.  2010AP1952.dtp 
 
 
3 
 
Stat. § 251.09.  See ch. 4, Laws of 1925.  This statute was 
renumbered as Wis. Stat. § 751.06 in § 76, ch. 187, Laws of 
1977, and also was amended to read: 
 
751.06. Discretionary reversal.  In an appeal in 
the supreme court, if it appears from the record that 
the real controversy has not been fully tried, or that 
it is probable that justice has for any reason 
miscarried, the court may reverse the judgment or 
order appealed from, regardless of whether the proper 
motion or objection appears in the record, and may 
direct the entry of the proper judgment or remit the 
case to the trial court for the entry of the proper 
judgment or for a new trial, and direct the making of 
such amendments in the pleadings and the adoption of 
such procedure in that court, not inconsistent with 
statutes or rules, as are necessary to accomplish the 
ends of justice. 
§ 76, ch. 187, Laws of 1977. 
¶64 Wisconsin Stat. § 752.35 was created by § 112, ch. 
187, Laws of 1977, to accommodate the newly created court of 
appeals. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the record, that the real controversy has not been 
fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has 
for any reason miscarried, the supreme court may in 
its discretion reverse the judgment or order appealed 
from, 
regardless of the question whether proper 
motions, objections, or exceptions appear in the 
record or not, and may also, in case of reversal, 
direct the entry of the proper judgment or remit the 
case to the trial court for a new trial, and direct 
the making of such amendments in the pleadings and the 
adoption 
of 
such 
procedure 
in 
that 
court, 
not 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
statutes 
governing 
legal 
procedure, as shall be deemed necessary to accomplish 
the ends of justice.  
§ 1, ch. 214, Laws of 1913. 
No.  2010AP1952.dtp 
 
 
4 
 
¶65 Several observations should be made about these two 
statutes. 
¶66 First, both statutes are unquestionably intended to 
apply to civil cases as well as criminal cases.  See Hamilton v. 
State, 171 Wis. 203, 209, 176 N.W. 773 (1920) (citing § 2405m, 
supreme court found it "impossible" to say the real controversy 
was tried before a jury); Gillett v. Flanner-Steger Land & 
Lumber Co., 159 Wis. 578, 583-84, 150 N.W. 987 (1915) (citing 
§ 2405m, supreme court reversed negligence judgment); Graber v. 
Duluth S. Shore & Atl. Ry. Co., 159 Wis. 414, 422, 150 N.W. 489 
(1915) (citing § 2405m, supreme court stated that statute 
provides grounds to reverse a civil judgment); Root v. Saul, 
2006 WI App 106, ¶1, 293 Wis. 2d 364, 718 N.W.2d 197 (citing 
Wis. Stat. § 752.35, court of appeals reversed and remanded for 
a new trial when the jury was not properly instructed in 
personal injury case); State v. Peters, 2002 WI App 243, ¶¶1-2, 
258 Wis. 2d 148, 653 N.W.2d 300 (exercising its discretionary 
reversal power under § 752.35, court of appeals reversed and 
remanded for a new trial in a homicide case).  Consequently, the 
analysis of these statutes in one context is likely to have 
implications in the other context.   
¶67 For example, if the two statutes may be used for 
collateral attacks in criminal cases, they should be available 
for collateral attacks in civil cases as well. 
¶68 Graff v. Roop, 7 Wis. 2d 603, 97 N.W.2d 393 (1959), 
suggests otherwise.  In Graff, the court considered an appeal 
No.  2010AP1952.dtp 
 
 
5 
 
from an order in a mandamus action denying a motion for a new 
trial.  The court said: 
 
The appellant has misconceived the basis on which 
this court will exercise its discretionary reversal 
power under sec. 251.09, Stats.  This section was not 
intended to bring before the court issues which should 
have been raised by appeal from the judgment involving 
such issues.  The section presupposes a timely appeal 
from a judgment involving the issues and should not be 
the basis of abrogating or rendering inoperative the 
time within which an appeal must be taken under sec. 
274.01.  In the exercise of its discretionary power to 
reverse, the court can disregard the failure to make 
proper motions, objections, or exceptions before the 
trial court, but in such instances there is a judgment 
properly on review before the court. 
Id. at 606 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
¶69 In my view, both statutes presuppose a timely appeal, 
so that discretionary reversal is part of a direct appeal.  If 
this were not true, the court would have to manufacture time 
limitations for use of the two statutes unless it were to 
determine that the statutes have no time limitations. 
¶70 Second, if the statutes are not tied to a direct 
appeal, the court of appeals will likely be asked, sooner or 
later, to vacate or overrule a published decision it made on 
direct appeal when the new appeal is part of a collateral attack 
on the challenged judgment.  The court of appeals might even be 
asked to overrule a decision of the supreme court. 
¶71 In Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 560 N.W.2d 246 
(1997), however, this court held that "[t]he supreme court is 
the only state court with the power to overrule, modify or 
withdraw language from a previous supreme court case. . . .  
No.  2010AP1952.dtp 
 
 
6 
 
[O]nly the supreme court . . . has the power to overrule, modify 
or withdraw language from a published opinion of the court of 
appeals."  Id. at 189-90. 
¶72 Cook problems are avoided by confining application of 
the two statutes to direct appeals. 
¶73 Third, 
both 
statutes 
are 
entitled 
"Discretionary 
Reversal."  Both statutes give an appellate court authority to 
"reverse the judgment or order appealed from."  (Emphasis 
added.)  The words "reverse" and "reversal" imply a direct 
appeal because it is possible to reverse a "judgment" in a 
direct appeal but it is not possible to "reverse" a "judgment" 
in an appeal from an order denying a motion under Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06.4  The court of appeals in State v. Gilbert Allen, 159 
Wis. 2d 53, 55–56, 464 N.W.2d 426 (Ct. App. 1990), recognized 
this limitation in Wis. Stat. § 752.35: 
Our power of discretionary reversal under sec. 
752.35, Stats., may be exercised only in direct 
appeals from judgments or orders. . . .  When an 
appeal is taken from an unsuccessful collateral attack 
under sec. 974.06, Stats., against a judgment or 
order, that judgment or order is not before us.  All 
that is before us is an order which refuses to vacate 
and set the judgment of conviction aside or to grant a 
new trial or to correct a sentence.  Section 752.35 
does not permit us to go behind a sec. 974.06 order to 
reach the judgment of conviction.   
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 974.06(7) provides that, "An appeal may 
be taken from the order entered on the motion as from a final 
judgment."  (Emphasis added.)  This does not mean, however, that 
the "order" under § 974.06 is the same as a "judgment" under the 
two discretionary reversal statutes. 
 
No.  2010AP1952.dtp 
 
 
7 
 
¶74 Fourth, both statutes explain that the respective 
appellate 
courts 
have 
discretionary 
reversal 
authority 
"regardless of whether the proper motion or objection appears in 
the record."  Wis. Stat. §§ 751.06, 752.35.  This language 
specifically overrides statutory and common law rules on waiver 
or forfeiture of objections.  See State v. Schumacher, 144 
Wis. 2d 388, 401, 424 N.W.2d 672 (1988).  Again, discretionary 
reversal may be involved on direct appeal.  It is less likely 
that discretionary reversal may be used in a collateral 
proceeding because there is no statutory language inviting its 
use after appeal in a collateral proceeding. 
¶75 Fifth, there are two distinct avenues for relief in 
the discretionary reversal statutes: (1) the real controversy 
has not been fully tried, and (2) it is probable that justice 
has for any reason miscarried.  The second avenue——and only the 
second avenue——requires the appellate court to determine "that 
there would be a substantial probability that a different result 
would be likely on retrial."  Id. (citing State v. Wyss, 124 
Wis. 2d 681, 741, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985)); see also Morden v. 
Cont'l AG, 2000 WI 51, ¶95, 235 Wis. 2d 325, 611 N.W.2d 659 
(citing Garcia v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 651, 654, 245 N.W.2d 654 
(1976); and Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 16-17, 19, 456 
N.W.2d 797 (1990)).  Thus, if the discretionary reversal 
statutes were permitted to be used in collateral attacks to 
reverse judgments, they could be used in situations where there 
was no perceived probability of a different result on retrial.  
No.  2010AP1952.dtp 
 
 
8 
 
Is there any evidence to suggest that the legislature intended 
such a result? 
III 
¶76 Having examined why Wis. Stat. §§ 751.06 and 752.35 
are not consistent with collateral attack, I turn to Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06 
to 
show 
why 
it 
does 
not 
mesh 
with 
the 
two 
"discretionary reversal" statutes.   
¶77 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 974.06 
was 
created 
by 
the 
legislature in 1969.5  The history of the statute is discussed in 
Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 176–78, 181–82, and Lo, 264 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶16–22.  See also Angela B. Bartell, Comment, 
Wisconsin Post Conviction Remedies——Habeas Corpus: Past, Present 
and Future, 1970 Wis. L. Rev. 1145; Heather M. Hunt, Note, State 
v. Escalona-Naranjo: A Limitation on Criminal Appeals in 
Wisconsin?, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 207.  For a general discussion of 
the 
procedure 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 974.06, 
see 
Howard 
B. 
Eisenberg, Post-Conviction Remedies in the 1970's, 56 Marq. L. 
Rev. 69, 78–83 (1972). 
¶78 "With the exception of subsection (4), [Wis. Stat. 
§] 974.06 is a direct adaptation of 28 U.S.C. sec. 2255."  
Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 176 (footnotes omitted).  But 
"the language of § 974.06(4) was adapted from section 8 [Waiver 
of or Failure to Assert Claims] of the 1966 [Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act], even though the UPCPA was not adopted 
                                                 
5 The legislature created Wis. Stat. § 974.06 in § 63, ch. 
255, Laws of 1969, effective July 1, 1970.   
No.  2010AP1952.dtp 
 
 
9 
 
in its entirety by the Wisconsin legislature."  Lo, 264 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶18 (quoting Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 177–78) 
(internal citation omitted).   
¶79 The 
policy 
behind 
the 
subsection 
is 
thoroughly 
discussed in Escalona-Naranjo and Lo; namely, "a goal of 
finality in the criminal appeals process.  This finality is 
inherently related to the purpose of vindicating justice via a 
simplified and adequate postconviction remedy."  Lo, 264 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶46.  This remedy requires that a defendant "raise 
all grounds regarding postconviction relief in his or her 
original, supplemental or amended motion," absent a sufficient 
reason why a claim was not raised earlier.  Id. (citing 
Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 177); Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4). 
¶80 Several points must be made about Wis. Stat. § 974.06 
in the context of this case. 
¶81 First, the statute was adopted in 1969, more than half 
a century after the supreme court discretionary reversal statute 
became law in 1913.  If there is a conflict between the 
statutes, the latter statute has the effect of modifying the 
application of the former statute. 
¶82 Second, the scope of a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion is 
limited by § 974.06(1), as interpreted by Wisconsin court 
decisions.  "A sec. 974.06 motion is limited in scope to matters 
of 
jurisdiction 
or 
constitutional 
dimensions." 
 
Lo, 
264 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶23 (quoting Peterson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 370, 381, 
195 N.W.2d 837 (1972)).  See also State v. Langston, 53 
No.  2010AP1952.dtp 
 
 
10 
 
Wis. 2d 228, 
191 
N.W.2d 713 
(1971); 
State 
v. 
Klimas, 
94 
Wis. 2d 288, 308, 288 N.W.2d 157 (Ct. App. 1979).   
¶83 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 751.06 and 752.35 do not mesh with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 974.06 
because 
these 
discretionary 
reversal 
statutes are not limited "to matters of jurisdiction or 
constitutional dimensions."  After all, they apply in civil 
cases.  See ¶7, supra.   
¶84 Third, Wis. Stat. § 751.06 might have meshed with Wis. 
Stat. § 974.06 if the Wisconsin legislature had adopted section 
1 of the 1966 Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, which read 
in part: 
§ 1. [Remedy——To Whom Available——Conditions]. 
 
(a) Any person who has been convicted of, or 
sentenced for, a crime and who claims: 
. . . .  
 
 
(4) that there exists evidence of material 
facts, not previously presented and heard, that 
requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the 
interest of justice[.] 
Unif. Post-Conviction Procedure Act § 1, 11 U.L.A. 666 (Master 
ed. 2003) (emphasis added). 
 
¶85 But, as we noted in Lo, Wisconsin chose not to adopt 
section 1 of the UPCPA.  Instead, it adopted language taken 
directly from 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  Lo, 264 Wis. 2d 1, ¶21.  See 
Note, ch. 255, Laws of 1969.   
 
¶86 Finally, this court has ruled that a circuit court may 
apply the principles of Wis. Stat. § 751.06 when considering a 
motion under Wis. Stat. § 974.02.  State v. Henley, 2010 WI 97, 
No.  2010AP1952.dtp 
 
 
11 
 
¶63, 328 Wis. 2d 544, 787 N.W.2d 350.  But this court rejected 
the use of Wis. Stat. § 805.15(1) to introduce interest of 
justice principles into post-appeal proceedings. 
Allowing motions in the interest of justice under 
§ 805.15(1) at any time renders limitations under 
§ 974.02 and § 974.06 irrelevant.  These statutes 
would make no sense if motions under § 805.15(1) could 
be brought at any time.  No criminal defendant would 
limit 
themselves 
to 
bringing 
a 
motion 
under 
§ 974.06 . . . if the broader grounds in § 805.15 were 
always available. . . .  
Id., ¶55 (emphasis added).  "[T]here is no authority for the 
circuit court to grant a new trial in the interest of justice 
under § 974.06."  Id., ¶98 (Prosser, J., concurring).   
 
¶87 Thus, 
it 
is 
not 
logical 
to 
believe 
that 
the 
discretionary reversal statutes give appellate courts power to 
reverse circuit courts in appeals from Wis. Stat. § 974.06 
proceedings.   
IV 
 
¶88 In this case, the defendant was convicted of two 
counts of armed robbery at a jury trial in April 1995.  He was 
unsuccessful on appeal.  In October 2007 he moved for 
postconviction relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06, asking for a 
new trial based on (1) newly discovered evidence, and (2) the 
interest of justice. 
 
¶89 I have no objection to a motion for a new trial under 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06, based on newly discovered evidence, if the 
newly 
discovered 
evidence 
satisfies 
the 
requirements 
in 
§ 974.06(1) and (4).  The majority concludes, however, that 
"[t]he supreme court and the court of appeals may set aside a 
No.  2010AP1952.dtp 
 
 
12 
 
conviction through the use of our discretionary reversal powers, 
though the circuit court does not have such discretionary 
powers."  Majority op., ¶38 (footnote omitted).  The reference 
to the circuit court is to the circuit court's limited power 
under Wis. Stat. § 974.06.   
 
¶90 The majority explains the passage in a footnote, which 
reads: 
The State argues that the court of appeals may 
not reverse a criminal conviction in the interest of 
justice on a motion made under Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  
The State relies upon State v. Allen, 159 Wis. 2d 53, 
464 N.W.2d 426 (Ct. App. 1990).  However, State v. 
Armstrong is instructive on this issue: "we need not 
decide whether our statutory power is constrained 
according to Allen because this court has 'both 
inherent power and express statutory authority to 
reverse a judgment of conviction and remit a case for 
a new trial in the interest of justice.'"  2005 WI 
119, ¶113, 283 Wis. 2d 639, 700 N.W.2d 98 (quoting 
State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 159, 549 N.W.2d 435 
(1996)).  "This court has recently reaffirmed that our 
inherent power to reverse in the interest of justice 
is not limited to a direct appeal."  State v. Maloney, 
2006 WI 15, ¶14, 288 Wis. 2d 551, 709 N.W.2d 436.  The 
discretionary reversal power of this court and the 
court of appeals is coterminous.  Armstrong, 283 
Wis. 2d 639, ¶113; Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 
17-18, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990) ("[W]e conclude that, 
because 
secs. 
751.06 
and 
752.35, 
Stats., 
are 
identical, the legislature did not intend for the 
court of appeals' power to reverse under sec. 752.35 
to be less than that of the supreme court under sec. 
751.06."). 
Majority op., ¶38 n.17. 
¶91 In retrospect, Armstrong never held that the state's 
appellate courts have statutory authority for discretionary 
reversal under Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  Rather, Armstrong said that 
No.  2010AP1952.dtp 
 
 
13 
 
the supreme court has "both inherent power and express statutory 
authority to reverse a judgment of conviction and remit a case 
for a new trial in the interest of justice, even where the 
circuit court has exercised its power . . . to deny a new 
trial."  Armstrong, 283 Wis. 2d 639, ¶113 (quoting State v. 
Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 159, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996)).   
 
¶92 Of course, the supreme court has statutory authority 
to grant a new trial in the interest of justice where the 
circuit court has denied a new trial under Wis. Stat. § 974.02.  
But the only case cited by Armstrong that arguably supports 
discretionary reversal in a collateral attack under Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06 is State v. McConnohie, 113 Wis. 2d 362, 334 N.W.2d 903 
(1983), a case decided before Gilbert Allen and before Escalona-
Naranjo.   
 
¶93 The other cases cited by Armstrong are inapplicable.  
Hicks and State v. Penigar, 139 Wis. 2d 569, 408 N.W.2d 28 
(1987), involved direct appeals, not collateral attacks under 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  Stivarius v. DiVall, 121 Wis. 2d 145, 358 
N.W.2d 530 (1984), was a civil case. 
 
¶94 In truth, then, the Armstrong court relied exclusively 
on "inherent authority."  Armstrong, 283 Wis. 2d 639, ¶110 ("We 
conclude that even if Gilbert Allen is correct, we have the 
inherent 
authority 
to order a new trial, even where a 
defendant's appeal is not direct.").  The court added nothing to 
this analysis in Maloney. 
 
¶95 In sum, the only basis for the supreme court to 
exercise discretionary reversal in a case involving Wis. Stat. 
No.  2010AP1952.dtp 
 
 
14 
 
§ 974.06 is the court's inherent power.  The majority now 
bestows the same power on the court of appeals.   
 
¶96 If this court claims inherent power to reverse a 
conviction in the interest of justice in any collateral attack 
under Wis. Stat. § 974.06, it is asserting appellate power to 
wholly disregard the limitations in § 974.06.  That is a concern 
worth discussing. 
 
¶97 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.   
 
 
No.  2010AP1952.awb 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶98 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
reverses the court of appeals not because of any legal or 
factual error.  Rather, the majority in essence disregards the 
standard of review and reverses the court of appeals simply 
because it does not agree with the outcome.   
 ¶99 The standard of review in this case requires us to 
determine whether the court of appeals erroneously exercised its 
discretion because it committed a legal or factual error.  In 
order to appear as if it reviews this matter for an erroneous 
exercise of discretion, the majority takes the court of appeals 
to task for failing to analyze whether this case is "truly 
exceptional."  Majority op., ¶55. 
¶100 The problem with the majority's analysis is that what 
constitutes an "exceptional" case is in the eye of the beholder.  
What the majority is really doing is substituting its own 
evaluation of whether this is such an exceptional case in place 
of the court of appeals' reasoned determination that this case 
warrants a new trial in the interest of justice. 
¶101 By conducting what is really an independent review, 
the majority subverts the court of appeals' discretion to order 
a new trial in the interest of justice.  Vollmer v. Luety, 156 
Wis. 2d 1, 15, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990).  Because a straightforward 
review for an erroneous exercise of discretion would reveal that 
the court of appeals has committed no error of fact or law that 
requires reversal, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
No.  2010AP1952.awb 
 
2 
 
 
¶102 The majority correctly sets forth the two-part test 
for determining whether a new trial should be granted in the 
interest of justice when the controversy has not been fully 
tried.  Majority op., ¶38 n.18.  This court has concluded that 
the real controversy was not fully tried in two situations.  
State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 160, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996).  
First, when the jury was erroneously denied the opportunity to 
hear important evidence bearing on an important issue in the 
case.  Id.  Second, when the jury had before it evidence not 
properly admitted that "so clouded" a crucial issue that it may 
be fairly said that the real controversy was not fully tried.  
Id.   
¶103 The majority also correctly states the standard of 
review for an order of the court of appeals granting a new trial 
in the interest of justice: we review to determine whether the 
court of appeals erroneously exercised its discretion.  See 
Majority op., ¶38.  Nevertheless, in the very next paragraph, 
the majority concludes that "[t]he real controversy here was 
fully tried," in essence deciding the issue on its merits de 
novo.  Id., ¶39.   
¶104 Although the majority pays lip service to the correct 
standard of review, its approach to this case is evident from 
its declaration that Avery asks this court to "grant him a new 
trial in the interest of justice."  Id., ¶54.  Here, however, 
there is a fly in the majority's ointment——a new trial has 
already been granted.  The court of appeals analyzed this very 
issue and concluded that the real controversy was not fully 
No.  2010AP1952.awb 
 
3 
 
tried.  State v. Avery, 2011 WI App 148, 337 Wis. 2d 560, ¶37, 
807 N.W.2d 638.   
 
¶105 The majority mines through the facts of Hicks and 
Armstrong1 in an attempt to distinguish the facts in those cases 
from the facts here.  Majority op., ¶¶43-53.  Ultimately it 
concludes that unlike Hicks and Armstrong, this is not a "truly 
exceptional" case.  Majority op., ¶55.  
¶106 The majority then proceeds to independently evaluate 
the merits of the photogrammetry evidence and its effects on the 
trial.  Id., ¶56.  Although it acknowledges that the jury saw 
the video in this case but did not hear the photogrammetry 
evidence, it dismissively concludes that the photogrammetry 
evidence does not "discredit[] a pivotal piece of evidence" at 
trial.  Id.  Because the State "did not meaningfully rely on the 
video at trial," the majority dismisses the photogrammetry 
evidence's effect on the proceeding entirely.  Id.  Finally, 
although it cloaks its conclusion with the term "erroneous 
exercise of discretion," it determines that this is not an 
exceptional case and that Avery is not entitled to a new trial 
in the interest of justice.  Id., ¶59. 
II 
 
¶107 The problem with the majority's analysis is that one 
person's "exceptional" is another person's "routine."  The 
"exceptional" is to be found in the eyes of the beholder.  The 
exact outline of what constitutes an exceptional case is merely 
                                                 
1 State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119, 283 Wis. 2d 639, 700 
N.W.2d 98. 
No.  2010AP1952.awb 
 
4 
 
a matter of opinion based on one's view of the facts.  That is 
precisely the reason this court has traditionally accorded the 
court of appeals "substantial discretion" and has "liberally 
construed" its power of discretionary reversal under Wis. Stat. 
§ 752.35.2  Vollmer, 156 Wis. 2d at 15.   
¶108 In 
Vollmer, 
this 
court 
recognized 
that 
the 
discretionary power of reversal is "compatible with doing 
justice in an individual case, which is primarily the duty of 
the court of appeals."  Id.  That power is consistent with the 
court of appeals' error-correcting function, which this court 
has recognized means that the court of appeals is the court of 
last resort in many cases.  State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 
388, 408, 424 N.W.2d 672 (1988).  The court of appeals is thus 
accorded "substantial discretion" when it orders a new trial in 
the interest of justice under Wis. Stat. § 752.35.  Vollmer, 156 
Wis. 2d at 15. 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 752.35 states the following: 
Discretionary Reversal. In an appeal to the court of 
appeals, if it appears from the record that the real 
controversy has not been fully tried, or that it is 
probable that justice has for any reason miscarried, 
the court may reverse the judgment or order appealed 
from, regardless of whether the proper motion or 
objection appears in the record and may direct the 
entry of the proper judgment or remit the case to the 
trial court for entry of the proper judgment or for a 
new trial, and direct the making of such amendments in 
the pleadings and the adoption of such procedure in 
that court, not inconsistent with statutes or rules, 
as are necessary to accomplish the ends of justice. 
 
No.  2010AP1952.awb 
 
5 
 
¶109 Therefore, the proper role of this court on review is 
solely to determine whether the court of appeals committed an 
error of fact or law that requires reversal.  See Stivarius v. 
DiVall, 121 Wis. 2d 145, 153 n.5, 358 N.W.2d 530 (1984) 
(discretionary reversals by the court of appeals are reviewed 
for an error of law).  Because no one argues that an error of 
fact was committed by the court of appeals, the review in this 
case should be confined to whether an error of law was committed 
when the court of appeals granted a new trial because the real 
controversy was not fully tried.  The majority appears to 
abandon the proper standard of review simply because it 
disagrees with the result in this case. 
¶110 Ultimately, the majority today has sent a message to 
the court of appeals that regardless of the statutory authority 
given to the court of appeals to grant a new trial in the 
interest of justice pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.35, it should 
not be entrusted to exercise that discretion.  Instead, this 
court will not be bound by the standard of review and will 
No.  2010AP1952.awb 
 
6 
 
second-guess the court of appeals' discretionary determination 
even though there is no mistake of law or fact in its decision.3   
III 
¶111 A straightforward application of the correct standard 
of review reveals no error of fact or law that requires 
reversal.  As I note above, the court of appeals' grant of a new 
trial in the interest of justice is properly reviewed solely for 
an erroneous exercise of discretion.  No one argues that the 
court of appeals committed an error of fact, so the sole 
question on review should be whether the court of appeals' 
exercise of discretion was based on an error of law. 
                                                 
3 The court of appeals has granted only a handful of new 
trials in the interest of justice in recent years.  See, e.g., 
State v. Tanon, No. 2009AP491, unpublished slip op. (Ct. App. 
Mar. 18, 2010); State v. Vandenberg, No. 2009AP1242, unpublished 
slip op. (Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2010); State v. Louis, No. 
2009AP2502-CR, unpublished slip op. (Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2011); 
State v. Davis, 2011 WI App 147, 337 Wis. 2d 688, 808 N.W.2d 
130; State v. Jeffrey A.W., 2010 WI App 29, 323 Wis. 2d 541, 780 
N.W.2d 231; State v. Berard, No. 2010AP2439-CR, unpublished slip 
op. (Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2012); State v. Howland, No. 2011AP532-
CR, unpublished slip op. (Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2011).  There is no 
evidence that the court of appeals utilizes its power of 
discretionary 
reversal 
except 
in 
limited 
and 
extreme 
circumstances. 
Not 
one 
example 
cited 
above 
mentions 
the 
word 
"exceptional," much less analyzes what exceptional circumstances 
led the court of appeals to grant a new trial.  It appears that 
under the majority's analysis, nearly every instance where the 
court of appeals has ordered a new trial in the interest of 
justice in recent years was an erroneous exercise of discretion.  
See also State v. Plude, 2008 WI 58, ¶¶52-102, 310 Wis. 2d 28, 
750 N.W.2d 42 (Ziegler, J., concurring) (concluding that 
granting a new trial in the interest of justice was required 
without analyzing whether the case was exceptional). 
No.  2010AP1952.awb 
 
7 
 
¶112 This court has concluded that the real controversy was 
not fully tried in two situations.  Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 160.  
First, when the jury was erroneously denied the opportunity to 
hear important evidence bearing on an important issue in the 
case.  Id.  Second, when the jury had before it evidence not 
properly admitted that "so clouded" a crucial issue that it may 
be fairly said that the real controversy was not fully tried.  
Id.   
¶113 Here, the first situation is arguably satisfied.  The 
photogrammetry evidence was not heard by the jury but bears on a 
critical issue in the case.  Identification is nearly always an 
important issue in a criminal case, but in this case it was 
Avery's principal defense.  He testified that he was not a 
participant to the robberies and that his confession was 
coerced. 
 
Avery 
produced 
several 
alibi 
witnesses 
who 
corroborated his version of the events.   
¶114 In contrast, the State's case was heavily dependent on 
two eyewitnesses to the robberies.  This court has been critical 
of the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony, 
observing that studies confirm that eyewitness testimony is 
No.  2010AP1952.awb 
 
8 
 
often "hopelessly unreliable."4 State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 
¶30, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582.  In Dubose, we cited to a 
United States Department of Justice study reporting that 85% of 
wrongful convictions in the study were based primarily on 
misidentification.  Id.  This court stated: 
The research strongly supports the conclusion that 
eyewitness 
misidentification 
is 
now 
the 
single 
greatest source of wrongful convictions in the United 
States, and responsible for more wrongful convictions 
than all other causes combined. In a study conducted 
by the United States Department of Justice of 28 
wrongful 
convictions, it determined that 24 (85 
percent) of the erroneous convictions were based 
primarily on the misidentification of the defendant by 
a witness.   
Id.  (Citations omitted.) 
¶115 Studies also reveal an alarming number of false 
confessions.  Since 1992 the Innocence Project has used DNA 
evidence to help exonerate 301 people who were wrongly convicted 
                                                 
4 In light of the voluminous body of scientific knowledge 
that questions the reliability of eyewitness identifications, 
the Oregon Supreme Court recently established new procedures for 
the 
admissibility 
of 
eyewitness 
identifications. 
 
These 
procedures include shifting the burden of proof to the State to 
show that eyewitness identifications are sufficiently reliable 
to be admissible as evidence.  State v. Lawson, __ P.3d ___, 
2012 WL 5955056 (Or. 2012).  The Oregon Supreme Court decision 
followed on the heels of a decision by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court which also recognized the need to establish new procedures 
for the admissibility of eyewitness identifications.  State v. 
Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).  See also Honorable Stuart 
Rabner, Evaluating Eyewitness Identification Evidence in the 
21st Century, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1249 (2012); Office of the 
Wisconsin Attorney General, Model Policy and Procedure for 
Eyewitness 
Identification, 
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/eyewitnesspublic.pdf 
(last 
visited Dec. 19, 2012). 
No.  2010AP1952.awb 
 
9 
 
of a crime.5  About 25 percent were found to have given a false 
confession or plead guilty to the crime for which they were 
subsequently exonerated.6  Given the "hopelessly unreliable" 
nature of eyewitness identification testimony and the alarming 
incidence of false confessions, photogrammetry evidence that 
tends to show Avery was not a robber at Malone's Fine Foods 
certainly could reasonably be considered evidence not heard by 
the jury that bears on an important issue in the case.7  Hicks, 
202 Wis. 2d at 160. 
¶116 It is not an error of law to conclude if the jury 
believed the photogrammetry evidence, Avery could not have been 
present for the Malone's Fine Foods robbery.  His alibis for 
both robberies are likely to be viewed much more favorably by a 
jury if he could show, as the photogrammetry evidence arguably 
                                                 
5 Innocence 
Project, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/index.php (last visited Nov. 20, 
2012).   
6 Innocence 
Project, 
False 
Confessions, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/False-Confessions.php 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2012). 
Several academic studies find that false confessions are 
surprisingly easy to induce from innocent confessors.  See, 
e.g., 
Jennifer 
T. 
Perillo 
& 
Saul 
M. 
Kassin, 
Inside 
Interrogation: The Lie, The Bluff, and False Confessions, 35 Law 
& Hum. Behav. 327 (2011); False Confessions: Silence is Golden, 
The Economist, Aug. 12, 2011. 
7 The court had the benefit of a non-party brief filed by 
distinguished academics and forensic scientists.  The brief 
criticizes the methodology used by the prosecutor's expert for 
the "radically non-blind" nature of his evaluation.  It 
concludes that "[a]ny rational factfinder should give it little 
weight, and it certainly should not be treated as dispositive in 
this case." 
No.  2010AP1952.awb 
 
10 
 
does, that he was not involved in at least one of the two 
robberies.8   
¶117 Because it committed no legal or factual error, I 
conclude that the court of appeals' decision was not an 
erroneous exercise of discretion.  Rather, the error here lies 
in the majority's substitution of its own evaluation of this 
case in place of the court of appeals' reasoned determination 
that this case warrants a new trial in the interest of justice.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
¶118 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.   
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The majority opinion repeatedly refers to and applies the 
"reasonable probability test."  Its holding in footnote 16 
leaves 
for 
another 
day 
the 
standard 
for 
the 
reasonable 
probability test.  I am concerned about the effect of this 
holding on existing case law that has adopted a standard.    
No.  2010AP1952.awb 
 
1