Title: Nama Holdings, LLC v. World Market Center Venture, LLC et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 407, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 2, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
NAMA HOLDINGS, LLC, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 407, 2010 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Court of   
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Chancery of the State of  
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Delaware 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
WORLD MARKET CENTER  
§ 
VENTURE, LLC, and RELATED 
§ 
WORLD MARKET CENTER, LLC, § 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiffs Below,  
 
§ 
C.A. No. 5131  
 
Appellees.  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: July 23, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
August 2, 2010 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 2nd day of August 2010, upon consideration of the Clerk’s notice 
to show cause, the appellant’s response to the Clerk’s notice, the appellees’ 
reply to the appellant’s response, and the appellees’ letter advising the Court 
of “recent developments in the Court of Chancery,” it appears to the Court 
that: 
 
(1) 
On July 6, 2010, the appellant filed a notice of appeal from the 
Court of Chancery’s memorandum opinion dated April 30, 2010 and order 
dated June 2, 2010.  Upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the Clerk issued a 
 
2
notice directing the appellant to show cause1 why the appeal should not be 
dismissed as untimely filed.2   
 
(2) 
In response to the notice to show cause, the appellant contends 
that its notice of appeal was timely filed because it was filed within thirty 
days of July 2, 2010, the date upon which the Court of Chancery’s June 2, 
2010 order “became final.”  The appellees contend that the June 2, 2010 
order “remains interlocutory,” and that the appeal “is premature.” 
 
(3) 
Upon consideration of the parties’ positions, we conclude that 
finality has not attached to the June 2, 2010 order.  The test for whether an 
order is final and, therefore, ripe for appeal is whether the trial court has 
clearly declared its intention that the order be the court’s “final act.”3    In 
this case, the Court of Chancery’s contemplation of additional proceedings 
on the issue of attorneys’ fees renders the June 2 order interlocutory.4 
 
(4) 
The Court’s authority to receive appeals from interlocutory 
orders must be exercised within the limits of Supreme Court Rule 42.  In this 
case, the appellant did not intend to file an interlocutory appeal and thus 
                                          
 
1 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 29(b). 
2 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 6(a)(i). 
3 J.I. Kislak Mortgage Corp. of Delaware v. William Matthews, Builder, Inc., 303 A.2d 
648, 650 (Del. 1973). 
4Lipson v. Lipson, 799 A.2d 345 (Del. 2001).  This Court takes no position on the 
timeliness of the appellees’ fee application. 
 
3
made no effort to comply with Rule 42.  Absent compliance with Rule 42, 
the Court must decline to exercise its appellate jurisdiction.5   
 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rules 29(b) and 42, that the appeal is DISMISSED.  Jurisdiction is not 
retained.6  The notice to show cause is moot.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice  
                                          
 
5 Stroud v. Milliken Enterprises, 552 A.2d 476, 481-82 (Del. 1989).   
6 The appellant’s filing fee shall be applied to any future appeal filed by the appellant 
following the issuance of a final order by the Court of Chancery in this matter.