Title: Hawke v. Hawke
Citation: 395 A.2d 449
Docket Number: 
State: Maine
Issuer: Maine Supreme Court
Date: December 22, 1978

Hawke v. Hawke Annotate this Case 395 A.2d 449 (1978) David HAWKE v. Beatrice A. HAWKE. Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. December 22, 1978. *450 Lipman, Parks, Livingston & Lipman, by David M. Lipman, John M. Parks, Augusta (orally), for plaintiff. Thomas A. Berry, Boothbay Harbor (orally), for defendant. Before McKUSICK, C. J., and POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, DELAHANTY and GODFREY, JJ. ARCHIBALD, Justice. The judgment of the District Court granting a divorce to Mr. Hawke on the grounds of irreconcilable marital differences was appealed by Mrs. Hawke to the Superior Court, where the judgment was affirmed. Asserting that the District Court (1) erred in giving retrospective application to amendments to Maine's divorce law regarding irreconcilable marital differences and (2) abused its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance, Mrs. Hawke filed a timely appeal of the Superior Court affirmance. We deny the appeal. EFFECT OF AMENDMENT TO THE DIVORCE STATUTE Appellee commenced this divorce action on January 17, 1977, and later amended his complaint on July 26, 1977, to add irreconcilable marital differences as grounds for divorce. At a hearing held on November 29, 1977, the District Court Judge ordered the parties to seek marriage counseling. Mrs. Hawke, however, had not attended any marriage counseling sessions prior to December 29, 1977, the date set for final hearing, when the District Court Judge granted the divorce on grounds of irreconcilable marital differences. Maine's divorce law prior to October 24, 1977,[1] precluded a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences unless both parties had received marriage counseling. Effective October 24, 1977, 19 M.R.S.A. § 691[2] provides that the refusal of a party who denies the existence of irreconcilable marital differences to attend marriage counseling creates prima facie evidence of irreconcilable marital differences. The refusal of one party to attend marriage counseling *451 also no longer precludes the court from granting a divorce on the basis of irreconcilable differences. Appellant contends on appeal[3] that the trial judge improperly gave retrospective application to the 1977 amendments to the divorce statute. We disagree. We stated in Mattson v. Mattson, Me., 376 A.2d 473 (1977), that marriage counseling was not an element of irreconcilable marital differences as grounds for divorce. Marriage counseling represented merely a legislatively mandated procedural device that manifested the State's interest in preserving the marriage. Mattson v. Mattson, supra at 477. A party cannot acquire a vested interest in a particular procedure. See Fournier v. Fournier, Me., 376 A.2d 100 (1977); Thut v. Grant, Me., 281 A.2d 1 (1971). Section 691 as amended in 1973, therefore, conferred no vested rights to a particular procedure to be utilized whenever irreconcilable differences were alleged. Absent a saving clause the pre-1977 Section 691, unconditionally repealed effective October 24, 1977, no longer had applicability. Thut v. Grant, supra at 6. The trial judge properly applied the procedure mandated by the effective statute. Fournier v. Fournier, supra; Thut v. Grant, supra. DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE At the hearing held on November 29, 1977, the trial judge set December 29, 1977, as the date for final hearing. Aware of the December 29th hearing date, Mrs. Hawke, nevertheless, intended to make a Christmas trip with her son to Disney World. Shortly after November 29, 1977, counsel for the appellant became apprised of the difficulty that attendance at the hearing on that date would create for his client. Not until December 16, 1977, however, did counsel attempt to inform the court by letter of this problem and move for a continuance. The letter from counsel did not, in fact, come to the judge's attention until December 21 or 22, a week before the scheduled hearing. Having failed to comply with M.R.D.C.Civ.P. 40(b), which requires a motion as soon as practicable after the cause therefor becomes known, appellant asserts that the trial judge abused his discretion in not granting a continuance on the grounds that the appellant was on a pre-arranged trip to Disney World and unable therefore to testify. We believe that the trial judge was amply justified in denying the motion on either of two grounds. First, counsel for the appellant[4] inexcusably failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 40(b). Finally, allowing the appellant the choice of attending her divorce hearing or taking a holiday simply does not aid the interests of justice in this instance. The entry is: Appeal denied. WERNICK and NICHOLS, JJ., did not sit.