Title: Commonwealth v. Duncan
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 031036
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 5, 2004

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 031036   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
                          March 5, 2004 
CARLTON WENDELL DUNCAN 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
                    
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in reversing a circuit court's holding that a defendant's 
acts and omissions in the care of his six-month-old son were "so 
gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for 
human life" under former Code § 18.2-371.1.* 
 
Carlton W. Duncan was indicted for the criminal abuse and 
neglect of his son, Carlton W. Duncan, II (Carlton), in 
violation of what is now Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1), which states: 
 
Any parent, guardian, or other person responsible 
for the care of a child under the age of 18 whose 
willful act or omission in the care of such child was 
so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless 
disregard for human life shall be guilty of a Class 6 
felony. 
 
Duncan was convicted of the offense after a bench trial in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Williamsburg and James City County.  
The circuit court sentenced Duncan to a term of five years' 
imprisonment, with four years suspended. 
 
 
* Code § 18.2-371.1 was amended in 2003.  Paragraph B of the 
former statute, under which Duncan was indicted, is now set 
 
Duncan appealed from his conviction to the Court of 
Appeals.  A panel of that Court reversed the circuit court's 
judgment and dismissed the indictment in an opinion that was 
withdrawn when the Court granted the Commonwealth's petition for 
a rehearing en banc. 
 
On rehearing en banc, the Court reversed Duncan's 
conviction and dismissed the indictment in an unpublished 
memorandum opinion, Duncan v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1060-01-1 
(April 8, 2003).  The Court held that the "evidence was 
insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Duncan's willful acts and omissions in caring for his 
child were so gross, wanton, and culpable as to show a reckless 
disregard for human life."  The Commonwealth appeals from the 
Court of Appeals' judgment. 
 
We will state the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the circuit court, and 
will accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences fairly deducible from that evidence.  Zimmerman v. 
Commonwealth, 266 Va. 384, 386, 585 S.E.2d 538, 539 (2003); 
Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 568, 570, 570 S.E.2d 836, 837 
(2002); Commonwealth v. Hill, 264 Va. 541, 543, 570 S.E.2d 805, 
806 (2002).  The evidence showed that Jennifer Dansby, Eliza L. 
                                                                  
forth in identical language as paragraph (B)(1) in the amended 
statute.  We will use the current numbering in this opinion. 
 
2
Nemo, and Michelle Cribbs shared a residence in James City 
County.  On June 11, 2000, the three housemates were introduced 
to Duncan and his six-month-old son, Carlton, through a mutual 
acquaintance. 
 
The next day, about 3:30 p.m., Dansby returned home from 
work to find Cribbs and some other friends at the house.  
Although Carlton also was there, Duncan was not present.  Dansby 
and the other adults took turns holding Carlton, but they did 
not feed him because there was no baby food or formula in the 
house. 
 
Nemo arrived at the house later that night and joined the 
other adults in caring for Carlton.  An "impromptu party" soon 
started as several more friends arrived and began drinking beer 
and using illegal drugs. 
 
About 10:30 p.m., Duncan arrived at the house with a small 
bag of marijuana.  Duncan's eyes appeared to be "glazed over," 
and the whites of his eyes were "yellowed" in appearance.  After 
his arrival, Duncan did not feed Carlton or "care for the baby 
in any way," but began drinking beer. 
 
Around midnight, Carlton became "fussy" and began to cry 
loudly.  Duncan announced that he would "take care of the 
problem," and he took Carlton into a bedroom. 
 
Nemo was concerned about Carlton's welfare because she 
perceived a negative tone in Duncan's voice when he said that he 
 
3
would "take care of the problem."  After she entered the bedroom 
where Duncan and Carlton were located, Duncan went to the 
kitchen. 
 
Dansby, who was seated in the living room, saw Duncan enter 
the kitchen.  Dansby heard the refrigerator door being opened 
and closed, which she thought was "odd" because the refrigerator 
only contained beer and "wine coolers."  About five minutes 
later, Dansby saw Duncan leaving the kitchen carrying a baby 
bottle. 
 
Duncan returned to the bedroom and handed the baby bottle 
to Nemo.  Duncan then left the room and joined some people on 
the porch. 
 
Nemo began feeding the contents of the baby bottle to 
Carlton and returned with him to the living room.  As Nemo, who 
was still holding Carlton, sat down on a couch, she noticed an 
unusual odor coming from the bottle.  Both Nemo and Dansby, who 
were sitting together on the couch, thought that the odor 
"smelled like alcohol."  They also observed that the liquid in 
the bottle was a "milky pinkish color."  A friend tasted the 
liquid inside the bottle and concluded that the liquid contained 
alcohol. 
 
Dansby went into the kitchen and opened the refrigerator 
door.  She saw that a bottle of "wine cooler" was missing from 
the refrigerator, and that an open bottle of "wine cooler" had 
 
4
been placed behind some "bags of trash" on the kitchen counter 
next to the refrigerator.  The liquid inside the "wine cooler" 
bottle was pink in color and "about three inches" of liquid had 
been removed from the bottle.  Dansby became more concerned, 
telephoned the police, and placed the baby bottle in a safe 
location until the police arrived. 
 
Lieutenant Stout and Officer P.A. Nacastro of the James 
City County Police Department arrived at the house in response 
to Dansby's telephone call.  Lieutenant Stout opened the baby 
bottle and observed that the liquid inside the bottle was a 
"milky color" and "smelled like an alcoholic beverage of some 
type."  Officer Nacastro observed that the baby bottle contained 
a "liquid substance" that was of a "whitish, . . . pinkish 
color," and that the "wine cooler" bottle contained a liquid 
that was "pinkish" in color. 
 
According to Officer Nacastro, Duncan's eyes were "very 
bloodshot," his speech was "slightly mumbled," and "[t]here was 
an odor of intoxicant about his person."  The police officers 
placed Duncan under arrest and seized both the baby bottle and 
the bottle of "wine cooler." 
 
A certificate of analysis admitted into evidence indicated 
that the baby bottle contained a "[c]loudy, pink-ish colored 
liquid" that had an alcohol content of 2.8% ethyl alcohol by 
volume.  The certificate also reflected test results from an 
 
5
examination of the contents of a 12-ounce bottle labeled 
"Seagram's Wild Berries Flavored Cooler."  These test results 
showed that the bottle of "wine cooler" contained a "[c]lear, 
pink liquid" that had an alcohol content of 3.2% ethyl alcohol 
by volume. 
 
Duncan also testified at the trial.  He maintained that 
Carlton was with him during the entire day of June 12th, 2000, 
and that earlier in the day, he had fed Carlton some cereal.  
Duncan testified that about 7:30 p.m., he took Carlton to a 
friend's house, which was located next to Dansby's residence.  
Duncan stated that Carlton ate part of a banana and drank some 
baby formula there.  Duncan further testified that he and 
Carlton left the friend's house about 9:30 p.m., and went next 
door to Dansby's residence. 
 
Duncan admitted giving Nemo the baby bottle, but denied 
placing any "wine cooler" into the bottle, and said that he did 
not know that there was any substance other than milk in the 
bottle.  Duncan conceded that he had drunk "three or four beers" 
on the night in question. 
 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the circuit court found 
Duncan guilty of criminal abuse and neglect of his child, as 
charged in the indictment.  In explaining its decision, the 
circuit court stated: 
 
6
 
I find that Mr. Duncan is not a believable 
witness.  I reject his testimony as to the 
explanation.  I find the Commonwealth's witnesses 
. . . to clearly show and prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant took the baby back to the 
back bedroom . . . , he then is the one who goes to 
the kitchen area, he comes back with a bottle that has 
this clear pinkish substance in it, he gives the 
bottle to Ms. Nemo, then he walks out. 
 
 
Feeding alcohol to a six-month[-old] baby is 
clear neglect.  Coupled with all the other acts, 
omissions and commissions that he did, I find the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
felony charge. 
 
 
Duncan appealed to the Court of Appeals, which held that 
the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  The 
Court stated that although "Duncan was negligent in caring for 
his child" and that "[h]is conduct was inexcusable and cannot be 
condoned," a finding of negligence was not sufficient to convict 
Duncan of the felony of child abuse and neglect for which he was 
indicted.  The Court noted that although Duncan had just met the 
women at Dansby's residence the day before leaving his baby with 
them, there was no evidence to show that the women were 
irresponsible, incapable, or unwilling to care for Carlton.  The 
Court further stated that there was no evidence that Carlton was 
hungry or otherwise in distress during the time that the women 
cared for him in Duncan's absence. 
 
The Court also observed that "when the baby [later] became 
fussy and started to cry loudly," Duncan, in spite of his 
"apparent" intoxicated state, "responded to him" and "took steps 
 
7
to feed him, albeit with a bottle containing a liquid mixture, 
part of which was wine cooler."  In further explaining its 
holding, the Court stated: 
Plainly, at some quantitative level, based on the 
alcoholic content and volume of the liquid ingested, 
feeding a six-month-old child liquid that contains 
alcohol would . . . constitute a danger to the child's 
life.  In this case, however, there was no evidence 
presented to show that feeding a six-month-old child 
up to eight ounces of a liquid that is 2.8% ethyl 
alcohol by volume endangers the child's life.  Such a 
conclusion would, therefore, have to be based on pure 
conjecture and speculation, rather than on the 
evidence or inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.  
Hence, we conclude the evidence did not support such a 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt by the trial court. 
 
 
On appeal to this Court, the Commonwealth argues that the 
totality of Duncan's acts and omissions were so gross, wanton, 
and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for his son's life.  
The Commonwealth contends that while Duncan's most culpable act 
was placing an alcoholic beverage into Carlton's bottle, he also 
committed other "reckless" acts, such as failing to feed his son 
for several hours, which demonstrated Duncan's "disregard for 
his infant son's life." 
 
In response, Duncan argues that the Commonwealth failed to 
establish that his acts or omissions were "so gross, wanton and 
culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life," within 
the meaning of Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1).  He asserts that 
although his actions were "irresponsible and less than what one 
expects of a parent," he did not endanger Carlton.  Duncan also 
 
8
contends that the evidence was insufficient because there was no 
expert testimony concerning the amount of "wine cooler" 
necessary to endanger a child's life or health.  Duncan asserts 
that without such evidence, any claim that Carlton's life was 
endangered rests on mere conjecture and suspicion. 
 
We consider these arguments under an established standard 
of review.  When a defendant contests the sufficiency of the 
evidence on appeal, the reviewing court must give the judgment 
of the circuit court sitting without a jury the same weight as a 
jury verdict.  McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 492, 545 
S.E.2d 541, 547 (2001); Tarpley v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 251, 
256, 542 S.E.2d 761, 763 (2001); Hickson v. Commonwealth, 258 
Va. 383, 387, 520 S.E.2d 643, 645 (1999).  The appellate court 
has the duty to review the evidence that tends to support the 
conviction and to uphold the circuit court's judgment unless it 
is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.  Code 
§ 8.01-680; Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178, 204, 590 
S.E.2d 520, 535 (2004); McCain, 261 Va. at 492-93, 545 S.E.2d at 
547; Tarpley, 261 Va. at 256, 542 S.E.2d at 763. 
 
We have not previously had occasion to address the elements 
of the crime of child abuse and neglect set forth in the 
language of what is now Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1).  Initially, we 
agree with the Court of Appeals' observation that the statutory 
language does not apply to acts of simple negligence.  We base 
 
9
our conclusion on the express language of the statute 
prohibiting "willful act[s] or omission[s] . . . so gross, 
wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human 
life."  Id.; see also Cable v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 236, 240, 
415 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1992); Davis v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 201, 
206, 335 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1985); Bell v. Commonwealth, 170 Va. 
597, 611-12, 195 S.E. 675, 681 (1938); Ellis v. Commonwealth, 29 
Va. App. 548, 555, 513 S.E.2d 453, 457 (1999). 
 
The statutory requirement that such conduct be "willful" 
means that the conduct must be knowing or intentional, rather 
than accidental, and be done without justifiable excuse, without 
ground for believing the conduct is lawful, or with a bad 
purpose.  See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191-92 
(1998); United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394-95 (1933); 
Ellis, 29 Va. App. at 554, 513 S.E.2d at 456.  Thus, the term 
"willful," as used in Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1), contemplates an 
intentional, purposeful act or omission in the care of a child 
by one responsible for such child's care. 
 
Unlike Code § 18.2-371.1(A), the plain language of Code 
§ 18.2-371.1(B)(1) does not require that a child actually suffer 
serious injury as a result of a defendant's acts or omissions.  
The absence of an injury requirement in subsection (B)(1) 
reflects the lesser nature of the offense, a Class 6 felony, and 
 
10
demonstrates a legislative intent to prohibit conduct that also 
has the potential of endangering a child's life. 
 
Notably, subsection (B)(1) does not limit the prohibited 
conduct to acts and omissions that subject a child to an actual 
risk of death, but proscribes conduct that is so "gross, wanton 
and culpable" as to demonstrate a "reckless disregard" for the 
child's life.  Id.  Therefore, we hold that such "reckless 
disregard" can be shown by conduct that subjects a child to a 
substantial risk of serious injury, as well as to a risk of 
death, because exposure to either type of risk can endanger the 
child's life. 
 
Applying these principles, we disagree with the Court of 
Appeals' conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to 
support Duncan's conviction.  We examine the totality of the 
evidence, and do not limit our review of the record to Duncan's 
act of placing "wine cooler" in the baby bottle for Carlton's 
consumption.  Viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, this evidence showed that Duncan left his infant 
son for several hours with people he barely knew, and that he 
did not give them any food or formula to ensure that the baby 
would be fed.  As a result, Carlton did not receive any food or 
liquids for more than seven hours. 
 
After returning to the house, Duncan did not attend to 
Carlton but joined a group of people who were drinking alcohol 
 
11
and using illegal drugs.  Duncan appeared impaired and his eyes 
were "glazed over."  When Carlton started crying, Duncan poured 
an alcoholic beverage into Carlton's bottle and handed the 
bottle to an acquaintance for her to feed to Carlton. 
 
In addition, the circuit court found that Duncan was not a 
"believable witness," and directly rejected his explanation of 
the events in question.  As finder of fact, the circuit court 
was entitled to infer that Duncan was lying to conceal his 
guilt.  See Shackleford v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 196, 209, 547 
S.E.2d 899, 907 (2001); Dowden v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 459, 
469, 536 S.E.2d 437, 442 (2000); Phan v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 
506, 511, 521 S.E.2d 282, 284 (1999). 
 
The above record demonstrates a pattern of neglect over an 
extended period that ended in Duncan's knowing and reckless 
decision to feed an alcoholic beverage to his baby who had been 
deprived of food and hydration for several hours.  Thus, we 
conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence to support 
the circuit court's determination that Duncan's acts and 
omissions were willful and, considered as a whole, were so 
gross, wanton, and culpable as to demonstrate a reckless 
disregard for Carlton's life. 
 
Contrary to Duncan's contention, the Commonwealth was not 
required to produce expert testimony showing that consumption of 
alcohol by a six-month-old baby who had not had any food or 
 
12
 
13
liquids for at least seven hours presented a substantial risk of 
serious injury or risk of death to the baby.  Based on the 
evidence presented, the dangers inherent in such a situation 
could be inferred by the fact finder as a matter of common 
knowledge.  Therefore, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred 
in concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support 
Duncan's conviction. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals and reinstate Duncan's conviction in accordance 
with the circuit court's judgment order. 
Reversed and final judgment.