Title: Broughton v. Merchants Nat. Bank of Mobile
Citation: 476 So. 2d 97
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 6, 1985

476 So. 2d 97 (1985)
Elliott P. BROUGHTON
v.
The MERCHANTS NATIONAL BANK OF MOBILE, a corporation.
84-341.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 6, 1985.
*98 James F. Hampton of McLain &amp; Hampton, Montgomery, for appellant.
*99 William H. Hardie, Jr. of Johnstone, Adams, Howard, Bailey &amp; Gordon, Mobile, for appellee.
BEATTY, Justice.
This is an appeal from summary judgment for the defendant in an action for negligent mismanagement of a living trust, conspiracy and fraud against the deceased beneficiary of the trust, and breach of the fiduciary duty owed by the trustee/executor to the decedent. The action was brought by the decedent's testamentary heir. We affirm.
Appellant Elliott P. Broughton is one of three heirs of the estate of Dorothy Carter Broughton, who died in 1979 in Mobile, Alabama. In 1971, Mrs. Broughton entered into a trust agreement with Merchants National Bank of Mobile (Merchants). The agreement provided that Merchants would manage the trust for Mrs. Broughton's benefit during her lifetime and that, upon her death, it would pay over any remaining trust property to her estate. Mrs. Broughton's will also named Merchants as executor of her estate.
After Mrs. Broughton's death, Merchants filed a petition for the probate of her will in the Probate Court of Mobile County. The petition for final settlement was heard by the probate court in March 1983. In that hearing, Elliott Broughton submitted a memorandum brief outlining his objections to the settlement of the estate. He contended that Merchants "did not execute fully or properly its duties as an Executor of this Estate"; that the executor "failed in its fiduciary capacity because of an inherent conflict of interest"; and that Merchants mismanaged and misadministered the living trust. Broughton requested that the probate court order "an independent audit so that the true facts of the management of this trust (and therefore estate) can be made known to the court." Merchants submitted a brief in reply.
The probate court issued its decree on final settlement, finding that Merchants had properly administered the estate and releasing Merchants from any further duty or liability to Mrs. Broughton's estate. Rather than appealing this order of the probate court, Broughton filed a new complaint in the Mobile Circuit Court. The five counts of that complaint are quoted in pertinent part below:
In an affidavit filed in response to Merchants' motion for summary judgment, Broughton stated:
Notwithstanding the assertions contained in his affidavit, the trial court granted summary judgment against Broughton.
On appeal, Broughton argues that the statements made in his affidavit furnish at least a scintilla of evidence that genuine issues of material fact exist in this case and that the administration of Dorothy Carter Broughton's estate in the probate court did not bar this action for tortious misconduct against the trustee and executor. Merchants, on the other hand, contends that a testamentary heir has no standing to bring ex delicto claims against his decedent's trustee or executor. Merchants further contends that, under the doctrine of res judicata, this action is barred by the final settlement order entered in the probate court, where the same issues were litigated.
The dispositive issue in this case is whether the probate court's decree, which absolved the executor of wrongdoing, bars Broughton from brining this separate action in tort. We agree with Merchants' argument that these claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.[1] The four essential elements of res judicata are:
As the following analysis demonstrates, each of these four elements is present in the case at bar.
The judgment of a probate court is entitled to the same finality as the judgment of any other court of general jurisdiction. A probate court is a court of record and is "vested with original and general jurisdiction in practically all matters having to do with probate and administration of decedents' estates or with orphans' business.... Its judgments and decrees are entitled to the `same validity and presumption which are accorded to judgments and decrees of other courts of general jurisdiction.'" Opinion of the Justices, 280 Ala. 653, 657, 197 So. 2d 456, 460 (1967). Furthermore, "[w]here jurisdiction has attached, a decree of the Probate Court, within its sphere of jurisdiction, is as conclusive as that of any other court of general jurisdiction, and is aided by the same intendments of law." White v. Hilbish, 282 Ala. 498, 502, 213 So. 2d 230, 234 (1968).
Section 12-13-1 establishes the general jurisdiction of probate courts:
In addition to having original and general jurisdiction over executorship, the probate court of Mobile County was also granted general equity power concurrent with that of the circuit court by Act No. 974, 1961 Ala. Acts, p. 1551:
Thus, the probate court clearly had jurisdiction to render a decree on final settlement of Mrs. Broughton's estate, even though issues of negligence and mismanagement were raised. Indeed, at the hearing upon final settlement in the probate court, Broughton, through his attorney's brief and cross-examination of witnesses, raised the issues of mismanagement of the living trust and conflict of interest, charging that the trustee/executor failed in its fiduciary capacity. Thus, the probate court considered these issues before rendering its decree on the merits in favor of Merchants.
*102 Although Broughton contends that he was not a party to the proceedings in the probate court, Merchants maintains that he was a party. In Smith v. Rice, 265 Ala. 236, 240, 90 So. 2d 262, 266 (1956), the Court used the following criteria to determine who was a party to proceedings in the Probate Court of Jefferson County:
Broughton appeared at the hearing and was represented by counsel; his attorney submitted a brief to the probate court and cross-examined witnesses during the hearing. Thus, Broughton clearly was a party to those proceedings.
Furthermore, the fact that Broughton added five fictitious defendants in his complaint in the circuit court does not violate the requirement that the parties to both suits be identical. As this Court has stated:
The first three elements of res judicata being present in this case, it is necessary to determine whether the cause of action is the same in both the original proceeding and the present action. The determination of this issue "depends on whether the issues in the two suits are the same and whether the same evidence would support a recovery in both suits. Geer Brothers, Inc. v. Crump, 349 So. 2d 577 (Ala.1977), quoting Sessions v. Jack Cole Co., 276 Ala. 10, 158 So. 2d 652 (1963)." Dominex, Inc. v. Key, 456 So. 2d 1047, 1054 (Ala.1984).
In Dominex and in the more recent case of Chandler v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 467 So. 2d 244 (Ala.1985), this Court engaged in an extensive analysis of the cause-of-action element of res judicata. In Chandler, we observed:
In the present case, both the allegations asserted by Broughton in the probate court and the claims he now asserts in this case arose from the same nucleus of circumstances, those being Merchants' handling of the trust and the estate, as well as the alleged conflict of interest or fraud resulting therefrom. Broughton has not presented in this action any new or different evidence from that which he presented in the probate court; the facts alleged in support of his claims before the circuit court are the same as those before the probate court.
Furthermore, Broughton could have raised the issues of fraud, conspiracy to defraud, and mismanagement of the living trust in the probate court proceedings.
*103 While that court could not have awarded him the damages he now seeks, he did have a recourse. Broughton could have asserted his claims sounding in tort by having the case removed to the circuit court before the probate court had rendered its decree of final settlement. Section 12-11-41, Code of 1975, provides:
Removal was not Broughton's only possible course of action. Having lost the right to removal when the probate court entered upon final settlement (Culp v. Godwin, 295 Ala. 316, 329 So. 2d 88 (1976); White v. Hilbish, 282 Ala. 498, 213 So. 2d 230 (1968)), Broughton could have appealed to the circuit court for a trial de novo. Such appeals are provided by §§ 12-22-2 and -20, Code of 1975.
Summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Merchants. Because we find that prior proceedings bar relitigation of the claims, we need not address Merchants' contention that the ex delicto claims did not survive or are barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, the judgment below is due to be, and it is hereby, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES and SHORES, JJ., concur.
[1]  Because we hold that the claims asserted by Broughton are barred by res judicata, we decline to reach the issue of whether these claims survive in favor of Broughton and against Merchants.