Title: State of New Jersey v. Steven R. Fortin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-95-98
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: February 23, 2000

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). O'HERN, J., writing for a majority of the Court. This is an interlocutory appeal from pretrial rulings in a capital murder case. There are two issues raised. The first is whether the prosecution can introduce evidence of a similar crime in Maine on the issue of identity under N.J.R.E. 404(b). The second is whether the State's proposed witness can be qualified as an expert on the ritualistic and signature aspects of crime under N.J.R.E. 702, and testify through the use of linkage analysis that the same person who committed the Maine crime committed the murder in New Jersey. On August 11, 1994, Melissa Padilla was murdered in the Avenel section of Woodbridge Township. Her boyfriend found her body lying half inside a large-diameter concrete sewer or drainage pipe along the roadway. Padilla's body was naked from the waist down. She was wearing a shirt, but no bra. Her shorts, with her underwear still inside them, were found on a nearby shrub. The assailant had brutally beaten Padilla about her face and head, and her nose was broken. She had been killed by manual strangulation. The autopsy revealed rectal tearing and bite marks on Padilla's left breast, left nipple, and the left side of her chin. On April 3, 1995, Maine State Trooper Vicki Gardner came upon a vehicle stopped on the shoulder of the road. She question the driver, defendant Fortin, who told her he was having mechanical trouble. After noticing the smell of alcohol, Gardner summoned another trooper for assistance and administered a series of sobriety tests. While Gardner was administering the tests, Fortin grabbed her by the throat and strangled her until she almost lost consciousness. Gardner later realized that her pants and underpants had been removed and that Fortin was sexually assaulting her. When the back-up trooper arrived, Fortin sped away with Gardner in the car. Fortin cursed and punched Gardner in the face as he drove. Gardner was able to jump out of the moving car. Farther down the highway, Fortin lost control of the car and crashed. Fortin fled and was later apprehended at a rest area a mile away. Gardner's face had been severely beaten and her nose was broken. She had been manually strangled. In addition, she had been bitten on the left chin, left nipple, and left breast, and she suffered injuries from vaginal and anal penetration. Gardner's pants, underpants, and bra had been removed, and her underpants were still inside her pants. Fortin pled guilty to the assault of Gardner. Maine State Police contacted officers in New Jersey to inform them of Fortin's arrest. The police learned that Fortin had lived in Avenel at the time of the Padilla murder. They also learned that Fortin had argued, fought, and separated from his girlfriend earlier on the evening of the murder. When later seen by his girlfriend, Fortin had scratches on his head, neck, and chest. A dentist who examined the bite marks on Padilla and wax bites of Fortin concluded that the bite marks on Padilla's breast had been caused by Fortin, and that the remaining bite marks could have been caused by him. At a pre-trial hearing under N.J.R.E. 104, the State sought to introduce a trial report and testimony of Robert R. Hazelwood as an expert in the analysis of modus operandi (M.O.) and ritualistic crimes. Hazelwood had been an F.B.I. agent, working for the last sixteen years of his service in the Behavioral Science Unit, where he conducted research into the motivations and characteristics of the perpetrators of violent crimes. At the time of trial, Hazelwood was employed by the Academy Group, an association of retired FBI and secret service agents who formerly worked for the Behavioral Science Unit. Defense counsel objected to the introduction of any evidence related to the Maine crime or Hazelwood's proposed testimony. Hazelwood determined that the M.O. of the crimes demonstrated fifteen aspects that were consistent, and that he had never seen this cluster of M.O. characteristics in any other crime. He then described the ritualistic aspects of the crimes, i.e., the way in which the perpetrator sought sexual gratification. He identified five ritualistic behaviors common to these two crimes, including the bites and their location, injurious anal penetration, and frontal, manual strangulation. Hazelwood testified he had never before seen that precise combination of ritualistic behaviors. Using linkage analysis, Hazelwood determined that the likelihood of different offenders committing two such extremely unique crimes was highly improbable. Hazelwood explained that linkage analysis, which is based on a consideration of the concentration of M.O. and ritualistic characteristics, is used by criminal investigators to determine whether multiple crimes were committed by the same person. The Law Division held that the evidence of the Maine crime was admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b). The court found that evidence of the Maine crime was relevant on the issue of identity and that its probative value outweighed its probable prejudice. The Law Division also held that Hazelwood's testimony was admissible under N.J.R.E. 702, finding linkage analysis to be beyond the knowledge of the average juror and sufficiently relied on in the law enforcement community. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal and affirmed the 404(b) ruling but required that the evidence had to be sanitized, or limited to those facts necessary to prove identity. State v. Fortin, 318 N.J. Super. 577 (1999). The Appellate Division reversed on the admissibility of Hazelwood's testimony. It found that linkage analysis was not at a state of art such that the testimony would be sufficiently reliable. The Appellate Division observed that Hazelwood's testimony was essentially ultimate issue evidence _ an expert opinion that Fortin had committed the New Jersey crime. It also reasoned that linkage analysis involved an application of behavioral science, and as such, should be evaluated under the test for admission of scientific evidence. Fortin sought leave to appeal the Appellate Division's holding that evidence of his involvement in the Maine crime was admissible. The State sought review of the holding in respect of Hazelwood's expert testimony. The Supreme Court granted both motions. HELD: The proposed expert testimony concerning linkage analysis lacks sufficient scientific reliability and is therefore inadmissible; evidence of the Maine crime is admissible on the issue of identity with an appropriate limiting instruction. 1. The three requirements for the admission of expert testimony are: (1) the testimony must concern a subject beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the field must be at a state of the art such that an expert's testimony would be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the testimony. The Court finds that the second prong is not satisfied, since linkage analysis has not attained such a state of the art as to have sufficient scientific reliability. A witness like Hazelwood, however, would be qualified to testify as an expert on criminal investigative techniques without drawing conclusions about the guilt or innocence of the defendant. (Pp. 11-16) 2. New Jersey accepts the common-law rule that evidence of another crime may be relevant to prove identity. N.J.R.E. 404(b). The criminal activity must involve conduct that is unusual and distinctive so that it is like a signature, and there must be proof of sufficient facts in both crimes to establish an unusual pattern. It is initially for the court, and ultimately for the jury, however, to determine whether the inference concerning the ultimate issue of guilt may be drawn. In this regard, the trial court found persuasive Hazelwood's testimony that he had not seen a similar combination of characteristics in reviewing 4,000 cases. His premise can be fairly tested at trial. The Court emphasizes the importance of a carefully crafted limiting instruction that will explain to the jury the limited purpose for which the other-crimes evidence is being offered. (Pp. 16-26) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. JUSTICE LONG, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agrees with the holding that Hazelwood cannot testify as an expert in linkage analysis. She would reverse, however, on the admissibility of the Maine crime under N.J.R.E. 404(b), concluding that the jury would not be able to abide by a limiting instruction. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES GARIBALDI, STEIN, COLEMAN, and VERNIERO join in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion. JUSTICE LONG has filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-95/ 96 September Term 1998 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. STEVEN R. FORTIN, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. Argued September 28, 1999 -- Decided February 23, 2000 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 318 N.J. Super. 577 (1999). Matthew Astore, Deputy Public Defender II, argued the cause for appellant and cross respondent (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Astore, Anderson D. Harkov, Assistant Deputy Public Defender and Robert A. Obler, Designated Counsel, of counsel and on the briefs). Nicholas Ruggiero and Thomas J. Kapsak, Assistant Prosecutors, argued the cause for respondent and cross-appellant (Glenn Berman, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by O'HERN, J. This is a capital murder case. The State has charged the defendant with killing a woman in a savage sexual assault. There are two issues in this interlocutory appeal. The first issue is whether the Law Division erred in ruling that the prosecution could introduce evidence of a similar crime in Maine on the issue of identity under N.J.R.E. 404(b). The State offered the evidence to show similarities between an incident in which defendant sexually assaulted and strangled a state trooper in Maine and the sexual assault and murder for which he is charged in New Jersey. The second issue concerns whether the State's proposed expert witness, Robert R. Hazelwood, can be qualified as an expert on the ritualistic and signature aspects of crime under N.J.R.E. 702, and whether he can testify through the use of linkage analysis that the same person who committed the Maine crime committed the murder in New Jersey. In State v. Cofield, supra,, we formulated a rule of general application in order to avoid the over-use of extrinsic evidence of other crimes or wrongs. 127 N.J. at 338. For other-crimes evidence to be admissible, we stated that it must possess the following characteristics: 1. The evidence of the other crime must be admissible as relevant to a material issue; 2. It must be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; 3. The evidence of the other crime must be clear and convincing; and 4. The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. [Id. at 338 (citations omitted.)] Evidence of prior bad acts must be relevant not merely to a material issue, but to a material issue that is genuinely disputed. Ibid. (citing State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289 (1989)). In cases concerning signature crimes, we stated: Evidence Rule 55 [the predecessor to N.J.R.E. 404(b)] is most easily understood in situations of signature crimes, in which some distinct feature about the two crimes clearly allows the jury to make an inference other than propensity to commit crime. For example, the distinctive features of a silver pistol used in a prior crime would be admissible under Evidence Rule 55 in an unrelated murder trial to establish either the identity of the perpetrator or the weapon used. [Id. at 336 (citing State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, (1990)).] [Id. at 500-01.] The Appellate Division disagreed, holding that a greater degree of similarity between the charged crime and the uncharged crime is needed when the evidence of the other crime is introduced to prove identity than when it is introduced to prove state of mind. (citing E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 170, p. 452 (rev. ed. 1972)). The Appellate Division agreed that had the other crimes been accomplished by the use of a garrote or ligature, the other crimes might have borne a like signature. The court held: [Id. at 502-03. (citing State v. Sempsey, 141 N.J. Super. 317, 323 (1976))]. Thus, in order to be admissible on the issue of identity, the other crimes must bear peculiar, unique, or bizarre similarities. In Reldan, the panel concluded: The common factor relied on was an assumption by the court that rape or attempted rape in each case was accomplished by the 'use of force to the throat.' The commonality of this factor vanishes immediately upon analysis. Assuming that both cases being tried involved rape, we have no evidence that such purpose was accomplished by use of force to the throats of these unfortunate women. We only know that their deaths were commonly caused by a unique method. They were both garroted by use of a female stocking or pantyhose accompanied by use of the assailant's hand upon the neck fracturing the hyoid bone. Whether rape was attained by use of force at the throat or by threatened use of a revolver, knife, other weapon, or simple threats of physical assault to their person, is a matter of speculation. [Id. at 503.] Some sources suggest a stricter standard for introducing evidence of an unrelated prior act to show a method of operation that can be used to establish identity. See Frensley v. State, 291 Ark. 268, 274 (1987) (citing Edward J. Imwinkelreid, Uncharged Evidence, 3.10 to 3.12 (1984))See footnote 44. Other courts have held that when the acts are comparable in several important ways, discrepancies go to the weight of the challenged evidence and not to its admissibility. 29 Am Jur 2d Evidence 423 (1994). One source notes that in these courts [d]isparities are weighed evenhandedly against similarities, giving due measure to the number of each and to the distinctiveness of the attributes. Generally, when evidence of other acts is admitted, the comparison involves the conjunction of several identifying characteristics with the presence of some highly distinctive quality. The more distinctive the identifiers, the fewer of them need be present to demonstrate the requisite signature. [Ibid. (citing United States v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229 (1st Cir. 1987)) (holding that evidence of previous threatening letters written by defendant was admissible in prosecution for making threatening telephone call in interstate commerce).] We are satisfied that the standard for similarities in other-crimes evidence enunciated in Sempsey and later in Reldan continues to be appropriate. In order for evidence of a prior crime to be admissible on the issue of identity, the prior criminal activity with which defendant is identified must be so nearly identical in method as to earmark the crime as defendant's handiwork. The conduct in question must be unusual and distinctive so as to be like a signature, and there must be proof of sufficient facts in both crimes to establish an unusual pattern. [Reldan, 185 N.J. Super. at 502 (citing Sempsey,141 N.J. Super. at 323)]. VI. Finally, we repeat the importance of a carefully crafted limiting instruction that will explain to the jury the limited purpose for which the other-crimes evidence is being offered. In State v. Stevens, we explained that because "the inherently prejudicial nature of such evidence casts doubt on a jury's ability to follow even the most precise limiting instruction," 115 N.J. at 309, the court's instruction "should be formulated carefully to explain precisely the permitted and prohibited purposes of the evidence, with sufficient reference to the factual context of the case to enable the jury to comprehend and appreciate the fine distinction to which it is required to adhere." Id. at 304. We thus emphasized that a court should not state generally the content of N.J.R.E. 404(b) [then Evidence Rule 55], but should "state specifically the purposes for which the evidence may be considered and, to the extent necessary for the jury's understanding, the issues on which such evidence is not to be considered." Id. at 309. Hence, "more is required to sustain a ruling admitting such evidence than the incantation of the illustrative exceptions contained in the Rule." Id. at 305. The practice in Illinois is to instruct the jury when other crimes evidence is presented concerning the limited purpose for which it is offered. Steven A. Greenberg, Evidence of Prior Misconduct - When Is It Admissible in a Criminal Case?, 86 Ill. B.J. 694 (1998). In a case such as this, a court might initially state to the jurors when other-crime evidence is offered to prove identity: Members of the Jury: You are about to hear evidence presented by the State concerning a criminal act in Maine alleged by the State to have been committed by the defendant. I caution you that this evidence is not being offered to show that he is a bad person, but rather for a very limited purpose. The purpose for offering this evidence is to attempt to convince you that the crime committed in Maine and the crime committed here are so similar and so unique that you may infer that the same person committed the two crimes. In short, the evidence is being offered to prove the identity of the person who committed the crime in New Jersey on which you will deliberate. If you find the two crimes not to be so similar as to warrant an inference that the same person committed them, then you must disregard the evidence entirely. Above all, you are not to infer that because the defendant may have been shown to have committed another crime elsewhere, that he is a bad man with a propensity for crime. Neither logic nor law permit that inference to be made. Similar instructions should be included in the charge to the jury. (These are, of course, only suggested instructions. We request the Committee on Model Criminal Charges to recommend any needed changes in such a charge.) With these conditions, we believe that a crime-scene analyst such as Hazelwood, with broad experience in investigating similar crimes, can assist a court and a jury in understanding whether the crimes bear such a unique signature that an inference may be drawn that the perpetrator of the two crimes was the same person. The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the Law Division for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES GARIBALDI, STEIN, COLEMAN, and VERNIERO join in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion. JUSTICE LONG has filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. STEVEN R. FORTIN, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. LONG, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. IV I would reverse the determination of the Appellate Division that the details of the Maine crime are admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b). Because the majority has determined that that evidence can be admitted, I would hold that an expert is necessary to establish uniqueness. I would affirm the Appellate Division's conclusion that Hazelwood does not qualify as such an expert. NO. A-95/96 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. STEVEN R. FORTIN, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. DECIDED February 23, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz [Fortin, supra, 318 N.J. Super. at 577.]