Title: Jordan v. Clay's Rest Home
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 961320
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 1997

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and  
Koontz, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
 
BRIDGETTE JORDAN, ET AL. 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 961320                   February 28, 1997 
 
CLAY'S REST HOME, INC. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NOTTOWAY COUNTY 
 
Thomas V. Warren, Judge 
 
 
In this action by an employee against her former employer, 
we consider whether to adopt an indirect, burden shifting method 
of proof in wrongful discharge cases.  We also consider whether 
the trial court erred by imposing sanctions against the employee 
and her attorney for filing a frivolous lawsuit. 
 
Appellant Bridgette Jordan filed this action against Clay's 
Rest Home, Inc., an adult residential facility in Blackstone, 
seeking recovery of both compensatory and punitive damages.  The 
plaintiff alleged that she is a black female hired in May 1993 by 
the defendant "as a full time office employee," that she 
sustained "an on-the-job injury" in June 1993, and that defendant 
terminated her employment in July 1993.  
 
In a count labelled "Wrongful Discharge - Retaliation," 
plaintiff alleged defendant "willfully and wantonly discharged" 
her "because of her on-the-job injury and her filing of a claim 
for compensation under the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act." 
In another count labelled "Wrongful Discharge - Race 
Discrimination," plaintiff alleged defendant "willfully and 
wantonly discharged" her "because of her race in violation of the 
public policy of Virginia . . . prohibiting race discrimination 
 
 
 
 
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in employment."  
 
In a grounds of defense, the defendant denied the 
allegations of wrongful discharge and denied indebtedness to the 
plaintiff in any amount.  With the grounds of defense, the 
defendant filed a motion for sanctions against the plaintiff and 
her attorney.  The defendant asserted that the plaintiff evinced 
in the past an intent to "get" the defendant and that the filing 
of the action was "irresponsible."  The defendant asked the court 
to assess a monetary penalty against the plaintiff and her 
counsel.  
 
Subsequently, and following some discovery proceedings, the 
action was tried to a jury.  At the conclusion of the plaintiff's 
case-in-chief, the trial court granted defendant's motion to 
strike the evidence upon both counts, and entered summary 
judgment for defendant.  
 
Later, the court held a hearing on the sanctions motion and 
granted it.  The court ordered the plaintiff and her attorney 
each to pay $5,000 to defendant "as sanctions for filing and 
pursuing a claim that was not well grounded in law & fact."  
 
The plaintiff appeals from the summary judgment order.  The 
plaintiff and her attorney, pro se, appeal from the sanctions 
order. 
 
Initially, we shall address the plaintiff's action for 
damages.  Because the trial court struck the plaintiff's 
evidence, the sufficiency of that evidence to sustain a recovery 
 
 
 
 
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is challenged.  Therefore, we shall consider the evidence, and 
all reasonable inferences drawn from it, in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff.  Page v. Arnold, 227 Va. 74, 76, 314 
S.E.2d 57, 58 (1984). 
 
The plaintiff's case was presented through the testimony of 
two witnesses, the assistant administrator of defendant's 
facility and the plaintiff herself, as well as through a number 
of documents.  This evidence showed that plaintiff had been 
"hired" by Barbara T. Daniel, the local assistant administrator  
with the approval of the "owner" of the facility, who resided in 
Newport News.  The plaintiff first reported to work on May 5, 
1993 at a wage of $5 per hour as "a new employee" on a 90-day 
"probationary period."  She "was hired on a part-time basis," 
although she worked eight-hour shifts and typically 40 hours per 
week.  The defendant's policy was to evaluate probationary 
employees' performance during and at the end of the 90-day period 
to determine whether the employee qualified for further 
employment.   
 
The plaintiff was hired as an "office person."  Her duties 
included washing and ironing the residents' clothes and 
delivering these items to residents' rooms.  In addition, she 
would "check" on the residents every hour during her shift, count 
medicine, count money, and "[d]o a little book work."  
 
In the course of evaluating plaintiff's performance, Daniel, 
without advising plaintiff, noted in plaintiff's personnel file 
 
 
 
 
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"a couple of instances" relating to her conduct.  A file entry 
dated June 11, 1993 states plaintiff "made several inappropriate 
remarks about a male resident's back side" and plaintiff was 
"extremely loud and used profanity on several occasions."  Daniel 
testified that the "bad language" had been used in the presence 
of residents.   
 
On June 28, 1993, plaintiff was running up stairs in the 
facility and fell because of "a nail hanging out of a step," 
injuring her knee.  Daniel knew on the day the injury occurred 
that plaintiff was "reporting" it as a "work claim."  
 
On July 1, 1993, Daniel notified the plaintiff by telephone 
"that she should not come back to work."  No reason for the 
discharge was given by Daniel; she advised the plaintiff that 
"she would get a reason from [defendant's attorney] explaining 
why she was being terminated."  Plaintiff testified that, prior 
to this time, no one on behalf of defendant had warned her she 
was "in danger of being fired."   
 
On August 2, 1993, defendant's attorney wrote plaintiff the 
following letter: 
 
   "At the request of John H. Graham, President of 
Clay's Rest Home, I am advising you that your dismissal 
from employment was due to the following facts: 
 
 
   1.  You were employed on a 90 day trial basis. 
 
   2.  It became apparent that you did not or could not 
perform up to the standards they expect at Clay's Rest 
Home. 
 
   3.  You were an employee at will and as such your 
employer may terminate at anytime without cause, which 
was done."  
 
 
 
 
 
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The evidence showed that during the time plaintiff worked 
for defendant, it employed approximately 22 persons at the 
facility.  Over half of those persons were black, several of them 
acting in a supervisory capacity.  The record also shows that 
during the period January 1 - December 31, 1993, 20 of 
defendant's 32 employees were black.  Plaintiff was the only 
employee terminated by defendant during 1993, 1994, and 1995. 
 
Following her discharge, the plaintiff was "replaced" by a 
white female.  The replacement was "hired after me," according to 
the plaintiff.  The record does not show the replacement's 
qualifications. 
 
At the time of trial in January 1996, there were 
approximately 55 residents at the facility, of which one was 
black.  In 1993, none of the residents was black.  This situation 
resulted from "chance" because defendant has a nondiscriminatory 
admissions policy, according to the evidence.   
 
Following plaintiff's accident, she filed a workers' 
compensation claim; as a result, she was awarded benefits for 
lost wages, medical expenses, and attorney's fees.  Plaintiff 
testified she could not remember the date of filing the claim, 
and the record does not establish it.   
 
When asked how she had been subjected to racial 
discrimination, the plaintiff testified "because there's no black 
residents there."  Elaborating, the plaintiff explained:  "I 
recall a long time ago when my mother called there and tried to 
 
 
 
 
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get her mother in Clay's Rest Home, but they would not accept 
her."  The plaintiff also testified that because Daniel, who is 
white, "just didn't have very much to say to" her, plaintiff felt 
she was a victim of discrimination.   
 
During argument of the defendant's motion to strike, the 
plaintiff urged the trial court to adopt an indirect, burden 
shifting method of determining whether plaintiff had established 
a prima facie case of wrongful discharge.  Under this theory, the 
plaintiff argued, once an employee proves a "bare-minimum type 
case," the employer "would have to come forward on their case to 
articulate a legitimate explanation of the reason for the 
discharge."  Refusing to adopt the plaintiff's theory, the trial 
court ruled "the plaintiff has not proven a prima facie case," 
and struck the plaintiff's evidence on both counts.   
 
On appeal, the plaintiff says the "fundamental issue 
presented in this case is whether the law of Virginia permits a 
plaintiff such as Jordan, who lacks direct evidence in support of 
her claims of wrongful discharge, to prove her claims 
circumstantially, pursuant to the indirect, burden shifting 
method of proof recognized in McDonnell Douglas [Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792 (1973)] and subsequent case law."   Continuing, the 
plaintiff submits that this model should apply "to statutory 
wrongful discharge actions, such as Jordan's action under [Code] 
§ 65.2-308" (employer shall not discharge employee solely because 
employee "intends to file or has filed" a workers' compensation 
 
 
 
 
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claim).  The plaintiff says the model should also apply to 
"common law wrongful discharge actions [for race and gender-based 
discrimination] under the principles set forth in Lockhart v. 
Commonwealth Education Systems Corp., 247 Va. 98, 439 S.E.2d 328 
(1994)."  The plaintiff, injecting facts on brief that have no 
support in the testimonial or documentary evidence presented 
during the jury trial, then proceeds to argue that the trial 
court erred in ruling she failed to prove a prima facie case.   
 
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court considered 
"significant questions as to the proper order and nature of proof 
in actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq."  411 U.S. 793-94.  The Court said:  
"The critical issue before us concerns the order and allocation 
of proof in a private, non-class action challenging employment 
discrimination."  Id. at 800.  In that case, an employer was 
charged with a violation of the Civil Rights Act for refusing to 
rehire a former employee who was black. 
 
There, the Court held that a Title VII complainant "must 
carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a 
prima facie case of racial discrimination."  This may be done, 
the Court said, if the employee shows "(i) that he belongs to a 
racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job 
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, 
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after 
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer 
 
 
 
 
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continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's 
qualifications."  Id. at 802. 
 
Continuing, the Court said the "burden then must shift to 
the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the employee's rejection."  Id.  The Court did not 
attempt to detail "every matter which fairly could be recognized 
as a reasonable basis for a refusal to hire."  Id. at 802-03.  
The Court did, however, rule that the employer's showing that the 
employee participated in wrongful conduct against it sufficed to 
discharge the employer's "burden of proof at this stage" and to 
meet the employee's prima facie case of discrimination.  Id. at 
803. 
 
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 
U.S. 248 (1981), the Supreme Court again addressed "the nature of 
the evidentiary burden placed upon the defendant in an employment 
discrimination suit" brought under the Civil Rights Act.  Id. at 
249-50.  That case involved a refusal to promote and a subsequent 
decision by the employer to terminate an employee allegedly based 
on gender discrimination in violation of Title VII.  Id. at 251. 
 There, the Court summarized the McDonnell Douglas "basic 
allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a 
Title VII case alleging discriminatory treatment."  Id. at 252. 
 
Again, in United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. 
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983), the Court applied the McDonnell 
Douglas framework in a Title VII action brought by a black postal 
 
 
 
 
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service worker who claimed his employer had discriminatorily 
refused to promote him to a higher position.  And, more recently, 
in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993), a Title 
VII action by a black employee who charged his employer with 
demoting him and then discharging him because of his race, the 
Court summarized McDonnell Douglas, Burdine, and Aikens. 
 
From these decisions, and citing state-court decisions 
adopting the McDonnell Douglas rationale, the plaintiff in the 
present case fashions four elements that she says Virginia should 
embrace when a plaintiff alleges wrongful discharge based on 
race.  According to the argument, a "plaintiff may establish a 
prima facie case sufficient to shift the burden of production to 
the defendant" if the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of 
the evidence:  (1) that "the plaintiff was black"; (2) that "the 
defendant discharged the plaintiff from employment"; (3) that 
"the plaintiff was satisfactorily performing the job," that is, 
she "was qualified for the job"; and (4) that "the plaintiff was 
replaced with a white employee."   
 
Given the Commonwealth's strong commitment to the 
employment-at-will doctrine, and because we conclude that 
Virginia's procedural and evidentiary framework for establishing 
a prima facie case is entirely appropriate for trial of wrongful 
discharge cases, we reject plaintiff's invitation to adopt the 
McDonnell Douglas indirect, burden shifting idea.  The McDonnell 
Douglas outline, refined in later cases, was adopted by the 
 
 
 
 
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Supreme Court in the context of Title VII actions under the 
federal Civil Rights Act.  There was no focus, as here, on the 
employment-at-will doctrine.  Indeed, in none of the Supreme 
Court cases is there even a passing reference to the doctrine, 
except in Burdine where there is a mention of "traditional 
management prerogatives."  450 U.S. at 259. 
 
Furthermore, Virginia law is settled that in trial of civil 
actions generally, and in the trial of wrongful discharge cases 
specifically, a plaintiff may prove a prima facie case by 
circumstantial as well as direct evidence.  See Charlton v. 
Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp., 235 Va. 485, 490, 369 S.E.2d 175, 177-
78 (1988).  Thus, there is no necessity for the Commonwealth to 
provide a special framework for trial of wrongful discharge 
cases. 
 
And, contrary to plaintiff's contention, the fact that 
Virginia uses a burden shifting procedure relating to jury 
selection when there is a constitutional claim of racial 
discrimination does not prompt us to embrace such a method here. 
 See Buck v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 449, 450-51, 443 S.E.2d 414, 
415 (1994); Barksdale v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 456, 459, 460 
n.3, 438 S.E.2d 761, 763, 764 n.3 (1993). 
 
Therefore, applying conventional procedural principles, we 
must determine whether the plaintiff presented evidence 
sufficient to survive a motion to strike.  We agree with the 
plaintiff's statement on brief that, given the rejection of the 
 
 
 
 
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indirect, burden shifting method of proof, she cannot "prevail in 
this action, as she lacked direct evidence of wrongful 
discharge."  We accept that concession, but add that the 
plaintiff also lacked circumstantial evidence of wrongful 
discharge. 
 
First, we address the question whether there is 
circumstantial evidence to establish, prima facie, the 
retaliatory discharge count.  As we have noted, Code § 65.2-
308(A) provides, as pertinent, that no employer "shall discharge 
an employee solely because the employee intends to file or has 
filed" a workers' compensation claim.  The record is devoid of 
evidence that plaintiff was fired because she had "filed" a 
claim.  We do not know from the evidence when the plaintiff's 
claim was filed; if, as the record seems to indicate, the claim 
was filed weeks or months after she was discharged, then, under 
this evidence, the discharge could not have been proximately 
related to the filing. 
 
Moreover, the circumstantial evidence is insufficient to 
establish, prima facie, that plaintiff was fired "solely" because 
she intended to file a claim.  The evidence merely shows the date 
of injury, that plaintiff thought she had been performing her 
duties satisfactorily, that supervisor Daniel then knew plaintiff 
was "reporting" the injury as work-related, and that plaintiff 
was discharged three days later.  Every employee injured in an 
accident arising out of and in the course of her employment 
 
 
 
 
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presumably will make a claim for compensation benefits.  So the 
timing of these events and the employer's knowledge that the 
employee was "reporting" the injury, without more, does not raise 
an inference that the plaintiff was fired solely because she 
intended to file a workers' compensation claim.  Otherwise, a 
question of fact on this issue would arise in every case merely 
upon proof that an employee had been fired after a work-related 
injury.  We refuse to establish such a precedent. 
 
Second, we address the question whether there is 
circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish, prima facie, the 
race discrimination count.  We hold there is not. 
 
The evidence shows that the plaintiff is black; that her 
white supervisor "just didn't have very much to say to" her; that 
"a long time ago" plaintiff's grandmother was refused admission 
to defendant's facility for some unknown reason; that plaintiff 
was discharged; and, that a white female with unknown 
qualifications, who was hired after the plaintiff had been 
employed, "replaced" her.  And, the race of the facility's 
various residents is irrelevant, particularly in view of the fact 
that a majority of defendant's employees were of the same race as 
plaintiff.  This evidence is utterly insufficient to prove, prima 
facie, that defendant intentionally discriminated against 
plaintiff on the basis of race. 
 
Finally, we address the correctness of the sanctions order. 
 As pertinent, Code § 8.01-271.1 provides that the signature of 
 
 
 
 
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an attorney on a pleading constitutes the attorney's certificate 
that "to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, 
formed after reasonable inquiry," the pleading "is well grounded 
in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."  
The court, upon violation of the statute, "shall impose" upon the 
attorney or his client, or both, "an appropriate sanction," as 
specified in the statute. 
 
On appeal, the plaintiff and her attorney contend the trial 
court erred in finding that they lacked a reasonable basis for 
the filing of the motion for judgment.  Elaborating, they "submit 
that their mistake in believing that Jordan could try her 
wrongful discharge claims on the basis of the McDonnell Douglas 
model was reasonable and a good faith argument."  They contend 
that in a case like this "of first impression under Virginia 
law," they should be permitted to argue "in support of the 
adoption of a method of proof set forth in more than 20 years of 
case law in the United States Supreme Court . . . without running 
an unacceptable risk of being found in violation of § 8.01-
271.1."  They contend that no violation of the statute was shown. 
 We agree. 
 
In considering whether an attorney's conduct violates the 
foregoing provisions of § 8.01-271.1, "we apply an objective 
standard of reasonableness" in order to determine whether the 
trial court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions.  Nedrich 
 
 
 
 
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v. Jones, 245 Va. 465, 471-72, 429 S.E.2d 201, 204 (1993).  Thus, 
we must determine whether, after reasonable inquiry, the attorney 
could have formed a belief that the motion for judgment was 
warranted by a good faith argument for modification of existing 
law. 
 
Our research has disclosed that appellate courts in at least 
20 states have adopted the McDonnell Douglas framework.  It has 
been discussed in employment-law treatises.  One author labels it 
a "popular paradigm."  2 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Employee 
Dismissal Law and Practice § 7.22, at 98 (3d ed. 1992).  Thus, we 
believe the plaintiff and her attorney could have formed a 
belief, after reasonable inquiry, that the motion for judgment 
was warranted by a good faith argument for modification of 
existing law.  Accordingly, we hold the trial court abused its 
discretion in imposing sanctions. 
 
Consequently, the order entering summary judgment on the 
merits of the plaintiff's action will be affirmed, the order 
assessing sanctions against the plaintiff and her attorney will 
be reversed, and final judgment will be entered here. 
                                              Affirmed in part,
                                              reversed in part,
 
and final judgment. 
 
 
JUSTICE HASSELL, with whom JUSTICE LACY and JUSTICE KEENAN join, 
concurring. 
 
 
I do not join the majority's opinion for three significant 
reasons.  First and foremost, the majority seems to suggest that 
 
 
 
 
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Virginia's strong adherence to the employment-at-will doctrine is 
more important than Virginia's strong public policy which 
prohibits gender and/or racial discrimination in the work place. 
 Such a suggestion is inconsistent with precedent of this Court. 
 We have already determined that termination of employment based 
on racial discrimination violates clear state policy against such 
discrimination and gives rise to a cause of action for wrongful 
discharge, notwithstanding the employment-at-will doctrine.  
Lockhart v. Commonwealth Education Systems, 247 Va. 98, 439 
S.E.2d 328 (1994).   
 
Second, I disagree with the majority's opinion because I do 
not believe that this is an appropriate case to decide whether 
Virginia should accept or reject the indirect burden shifting 
method of proof recognized in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792 (1973).  Here, the plaintiff's evidence of racial 
discrimination was so deficient that she would not have been able 
to establish a viable cause of action under any recognized burden 
of proof.  Additionally, even though the majority says that when 
the McDonnell Douglas principles were enunciated, "[t]here was no 
focus . . . on the employment-at-will doctrine," the majority 
neglects to acknowledge that the McDonnell Douglas burden of 
proof principles are applied by federal trial and appellate 
courts in Virginia.  See Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1141-42 
(4th Cir. 1995).  I believe that there may be instances where the 
application of the McDonnell Douglas principles may be proper, 
 
 
 
 
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and I would reserve that determination for another day. 
 
Finally, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that a 
retaliatory discharge claim under Code § 65.2-308 is 
insufficient, as a matter of law, if a plaintiff alleges only 
that she incurred a job-related injury and was discharged after 
notifying her employer that she intended to file a workers' 
compensation claim.  Although the plaintiff here failed to 
establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, the 
factual allegations and evidence in any other case are not before 
this Court.  The sufficiency of the evidence of each case must be 
reviewed on its own merit, and I believe that the majority's 
placement of a blanket restriction on future cases is 
inappropriate.