Title: Godbolt v. Brawley
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 950105
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 1995

Present:  All the Justices 
 
BENJIE GODBOLT 
 
v.  Record No. 950105 
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
                                      November 3, 1995 
ROBERT W. BRAWLEY, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
 
James B. Wilkinson, Judge 
 
 
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the trial court, 
in a civil action for assault, erred in admitting evidence that 
the plaintiff and one of his witnesses had been convicted of 
simple assault arising out of the same incident. 
 
On September 12, 1993, the plaintiff, Benjie Godbolt, and 
some members of his family went to Scarlett Shockoe Kitchen and 
Bar (Scarlett), a restaurant and nightclub located in the City of 
Richmond.  Robert W. Brawley, an off-duty deputy sheriff, was 
working as a security guard outside the entrance to Scarlett.   
 
During the evening, Godbolt and his family were involved in 
an altercation with a member of the band performing at Scarlett. 
 As the Godbolt family was being ejected from the club, Brawley 
attempted to detain them on the steps until the police arrived.  
A fight ensued. 
 
Godbolt's brother, Terry, started the fight by punching 
Brawley.  As Brawley fought back using his blackjack, Benjie 
Godbolt became involved in the fight and also began punching 
Brawley.  Brawley fell to his knees and shot both Godbolt 
brothers with a gun that he had kept tucked in the waistband of 
his pants.  
 
Both Benjie and Terry Godbolt were convicted of simple 
 
 
 
 
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assault arising out of this incident.  No charges were instituted 
against Brawley. 
 
Benjie Godbolt filed a motion for judgment against Brawley 
and Scarlett, seeking recovery for damages resulting from the 
shooting.  At trial, the court allowed the jury to hear evidence 
that both Benjie and Terry Godbolt had been convicted of simple 
assault based on this incident.  After Godbolt rested his case, 
the trial court struck his evidence and granted the defendants' 
motions for summary judgment, ruling that Godbolt could not 
recover damages resulting from his own wrongdoing. 
 
Godbolt contends that, although evidence of the actual 
conduct is admissible, the trial court erred in admitting 
evidence of the assault convictions.  He argues that the trial 
court improperly admitted this evidence as proof that he had 
committed a wrong against Brawley.  Godbolt asserts that this 
ruling was erroneous because, under the holding of Selected Risks 
Ins. Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 260, 355 S.E.2d 579 (1987), mutuality 
must exist in order for evidence of the conviction to be 
admissible.  He argues that there is no mutuality between this 
case and his criminal prosecution because the parties, 
procedures, and purposes of the two proceedings differ. 
 
In response, the defendants argue that, while a litigant 
generally is prohibited from presenting evidence of a prior 
criminal conviction in a civil case arising out of the same 
incident, this rule is subject to the exception that a civil 
 
 
 
 
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plaintiff cannot profit from his or her own criminal act.  The 
defendants assert that, under such circumstances, a defendant may 
introduce evidence of the plaintiff's prior conviction. 
 
The defendants rely on Eagle, Star and British Dominions 
Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927), in which 
this Court held that a convicted arsonist could not recover under 
an insurance policy for damages to a building that he had burned. 
 Id. at 105-06, 140 S.E. at 321.  Based on this authority, the 
defendants argue that evidence of the Godbolts' convictions was 
properly admitted into evidence, in order to prevent Benjie 
Godbolt from recovering damages from the victim of the crime. 
 
In examining this issue, we first consider Smith v. New 
Dixie Lines, Inc., 201 Va. 466, 111 S.E.2d 434 (1959), in which 
this Court stated that the general rule in Virginia is that 
 
a judgment of conviction or acquittal in a criminal 
prosecution does not establish in a subsequent civil 
action the truth of the facts on which it was rendered, 
or constitute a bar to a subsequent civil action based 
on the offense of which the party stands convicted or 
acquitted, and such judgment of conviction or acquittal 
is not admissible in evidence. 
 
Id. at 472, 111 S.E.2d at 438. 
 
This Court explained that "[t]he reason for the rule is that 
the parties in a criminal proceeding are not the same as those in 
a civil proceeding and there is a consequent lack of mutuality." 
 Id., 111 S.E.2d at 438; see also Selected Risks Ins. Co., 235 
Va. at 261, 355 S.E.2d at 579.  Two additional reasons supporting 
the rule are:  (1) the objects of the two proceedings are 
 
 
 
 
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different; and (2) the results and procedures of the two trials 
are different.  Aetna v. Czoka, 200 Va. 385, 389, 105 S.E.2d 869, 
872 (1958). 
 
In Aetna, we explained that, under the principle of 
mutuality, "[n]o party is, as a general rule, bound in a 
subsequent proceeding by a judgment, unless the adverse party now 
seeking to secure the benefit of the former adjudication would 
have been prejudiced by it if it had been determined the other 
way."  Id. at 389, 105 S.E.2d at 873 (citation omitted).  
However, an exception to the requirement of mutuality arises when 
a plaintiff attempts to recover for a harm that is the direct 
result of his or her own criminal conduct, and the dispositive 
issue in the civil action is the precise issue that the criminal 
conviction addressed.   
 
In Eagle, Star, this Court held that evidence of an 
arsonist's criminal conviction was admissible in his subsequent 
civil action to recover damages under the insurance policy he had 
obtained on the premises.  This Court noted that the plaintiff 
"committed the felony, and [then sought] to recover the fruit of 
his own crime."  149 Va. at 105, 140 S.E.2d at 321.  In addition, 
the policy the plaintiff had obtained excluded recovery if the 
policyholder willfully burned his own property.  Id.
 
This Court observed that the central issue in the civil 
action was the same as the issue adjudicated in the criminal 
proceeding, namely, that the plaintiff feloniously burned his 
 
 
 
 
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goods with the intent to defraud his insurance company.  The 
Court stated that this issue was "quite different from those 
generally raised by a plaintiff suing the alleged wrongdoer in 
tort."  Id. at 105-06, 140 S.E. at 321.  The Court held that to 
apply the rule of mutuality in that situation would enable the 
plaintiff to commit "the same fraud which has been established, 
condemned and punished in the criminal case."  Id. at 106, 140 
S.E. at 321. 
 
Similarly, in Miller v. Bennett, 190 Va. 162, 56 S.E.2d 217 
(1949), this Court held that the estate of a woman, who died 
after participating in an illegal abortion, could not recover 
damages for wrongful death from the person who performed the 
abortion procedure.  This holding was based on the fact that the 
direct cause of the decedent's death was the illegal conduct in 
which she consensually participated. 
 
Employing the same reasoning in Zysk v. Zysk, 239 Va. 32, 
404 S.E.2d 721 (1990), this Court held that a woman who had 
contracted a sexually transmitted disease during premarital sex 
could not recover damages from her partner.  The act of sexual 
intercourse was both consensual and illegal.  We explained that 
"courts will not assist the participant in an illegal act who 
seeks to profit from the act's commission."  Id. at 34, 404 
S.E.2d at 722. 
 
The plaintiffs in Eagle, Star, Miller, and Zysk were all 
willing participants in the intentional criminal acts that caused 
 
 
 
 
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their injuries.  The plaintiff in Eagle, Star burned his own 
property.  The decedent in Miller consented to, and thereby 
intentionally participated in, the abortion procedure which 
caused her death.  Likewise, the plaintiff in Zysk participated 
in the illegal act of premarital sex that caused the transmission 
of the disease. 
 
In contrast, the facts underlying Benjie Godbolt's assault 
on Brawley differ from the factual situations outlined above.  
Unlike the plaintiffs in Eagle, Star, Miller, and Zysk, Godbolt's 
intentional criminal act was not the direct cause of his injury. 
 Although Godbolt may have intentionally engaged in assaultive 
behavior, he did not engage in the use of deadly force and did 
not consent to its use.  The direct cause of the injury for which 
Godbolt seeks damages is Brawley's use of deadly force.  Thus, 
the exception to the general rule does not apply under these 
facts, and we conclude that evidence of Godbolt's assault 
conviction is inadmissible, and that the trial court erred in 
ruling that the conviction barred Godbolt's action against the 
defendants. 
 
We also conclude that evidence of Terry Godbolt's assault 
conviction is inadmissible.  A misdemeanor conviction of a 
witness is generally admissible only for impeachment purposes, 
and, then, only if the misdemeanor is one involving moral 
turpitude.  Parr v Commonwealth, 198 Va. 721, 723, 96 S.E.2d 160, 
163 (1957). 
 
 
 
 
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Finally, we disagree with Scarlett's assertion that the 
trial court's award of summary judgment to Scarlett is harmless 
error.  Scarlett contends that, as a matter of law, it is not 
vicariously liable for Godbolt's injuries, because Brawley was 
acting in his public function as a deputy sheriff when he 
attempted to restrain Godbolt. 
 
Under certain circumstances, an employer may incur liability 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the acts of 
employees who are off-duty public officers.  In Glenmar 
Cinestate, Inc. v. Farrell, 223 Va. 728, 292 S.E.2d 366 (1982), 
we held that 
 
[t]he test is:  in what capacity was the officer acting 
at the time he committed the acts for which the 
complaint is made?  If he is engaged in the performance 
of a public duty such as the enforcement of the general 
laws, his employer incurs no vicarious liability for 
his acts, even though the employer directed him to 
perform the duty.  On the other hand, if he was engaged 
in the protection of the employer's property, ejecting 
trespassers or enforcing rules and regulations 
promulgated by the employer, it becomes a jury question 
as to whether he was acting as a public officer or as 
an agent, servant, or employee. 
 
Id. at 735, 292 S.E.2d at 369-70 (citation omitted). 
 
The record before us contains evidence that Brawley was 
acting in conjunction with other Scarlett personnel who were 
ejecting the Godbolts from the club.  There is also evidence that 
the Godbolts had engaged in destructive behavior, such as 
breaking beer bottles, while they were on Scarlett's premises.  
We hold that this evidence raises a jury question whether Brawley 
was acting as an employee, attempting to impose order on 
 
 
 
 
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Scarlett's premises, when the incident occurred.  
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and remand this case for a new trial consistent with the 
principles expressed in this opinion. 
 
Reversed and remanded.