Title: Schoenvogel v. Venator Group Retail, Inc.
Citation: 895 So. 2d 225
Docket Number: 1021932
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2004

895 So. 2d 225 (2004)
Andrea K. SCHOENVOGEL, a minor, who sues by and through her mother and next friend, Ava SCHOENVOGEL; and Ava Schoenvogel, individually
v.
VENATOR GROUP RETAIL, INC., d/b/a Lady Footlocker; and the estate of Anthony DaSilva, deceased.
1021932.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 9, 2004.
*227 John W. Haley and Bruce J. McKee of Hare, Wynn, Newell &amp; Newton, LLP, Birmingham; and Richard S. Jaffe and Stephen A. Strickland of Jaffe, Strickland &amp; Drennan, P.C., Birmingham, for plaintiffs.
John J. Coleman, C. Paul Cavender, and Ashley H. Hattaway of Burr &amp; Forman, LLP, Birmingham, for Venator Group Retail, Inc., d/b/a Lady Footlocker.
Peyton Lacy, Jr., Brian R. Bostick, and Christopher A. Mixon of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &amp; Stewart, P.C., Birmingham, for the estate of Anthony DaSilva.
HARWOOD, Justice.
Pursuant to Rule 18, Ala. R.App. P., we accepted the following certified question from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama:
The plaintiffs, Andrea K. Schoenvogel, a minor, who sues by and through her mother and next friend, Ava Schoenvogel; and Ava Schoenvogel, individually, and one of the defendants, the estate of Anthony DaSilva ("DaSilva's estate"), agree that this Court intended that Rule 601, Ala. R. Evid., supersede the Dead Man's Statute, § 12-21-163, Ala.Code 1975. (Schoenvogels' brief, pp. 24-28; Brief of DaSilva's estate, p. 24.) The other defendant, Venator Group Retail, Inc., d/b/a Lady Footlocker ("Venator"), does not necessarily agree, but essentially deflects the question by arguing that "[w]hether or not Rule 601 ever affected the Dead Man's Statute is really only an extraneous issue," because of Venator's perception that the Legislature has "repeatedly re-enacted the Statute subsequent to the adoption of Rule 601." (Venator's brief, p. 28.)
In 1988 this Court appointed a committee to consider the formal adoption of a body of evidence law. Professor Charles W. Gamble was appointed the reporter of the committee. In his article, "Drafting, Adopting and Interpreting the New Alabama Rules of Evidence: A Reporter's Perspective," 47 Ala. L.Rev. 1 (1995), he recounted the following history:
47 Ala. L.Rev. at 3-4 (footnotes omitted). Professor Gamble further noted:
47 Ala. L.Rev. at 7 (footnotes omitted).
Only one objection to the proposed abrogation of the Dead Man's Statute was received by the committee or the Court. That objection and all other objections received were summarized for the Court by Professor Gamble in the report he submitted to it, as set out in the appendix to his article. Important to the present discussion is the fact that, after stating clearly in his report that the adoption of Rule 601 would abrogate the Dead Man's Statute, referencing the Advisory Committee's Notes, Professor Gamble offered this suggestion:
Gamble, 47 Ala. L.Rev., appendix at 44.
Although this Court elected to make certain changes to the proposed rules in response to the various comments and objections received, it chose to adopt Rule 601 unchanged and without any repudiation of the Advisory Committee's Notes.
Against this backdrop of lengthy and painstaking vetting of the rules by this Court, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court intended for the adoption of Rule 601 to abrogate the Dead Man's Statute.
Morgan County Comm'n v. Powell, 292 Ala. 300, 325-26, 293 So. 2d 830, 853-54 (1974) (Heflin, C.J., dissenting).
Section 6.11 of Amendment No. 328 to the Alabama Constitution of 1901 reads:
Section 6.21(h) of Amendment No. 328 provides:
The "old judicial article" comprised Art. VI, §§ 139-172, Constitution of Alabama 1901. The "new judicial article" repealed the old judicial article and replaced it with an entirely new Article VI. There was no counterpart to § 6.11 in the old judicial article, but rather Art. VI, § 140, was deemed to imply an inherent power in the Supreme Court of Alabama to make rules governing practice and procedure in the courts. Section 140 provided that "the supreme court shall have the power to issue writs of injunction, habeas corpus, quo warranto, and such other remedial and original writs as may be necessary to give it a general superintendence and control of inferior jurisdictions." Article VI, § 139, of the old judicial article, like Art. VI, § 6.01, of the new judicial article, vested the judicial power of the State in the Supreme *232 Court and other specified courts (except, under § 139, the judicial power of the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment, and under § 6.01, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this Constitution").
Analyzing the rulemaking powers established by those constitutional provisions, this Court declared as follows in Ex parte Foshee, 246 Ala. 604, 606-07, 21 So. 2d 827, 828-29 (1945):
This Court affirmed on a number of subsequent occasions its inherent authority to promulgate rules of practice and procedure for the lower courts over which the Alabama Constitution gave it "superintendence and control." Pankey v. City of Mobile, 250 Ala. 566, 35 So. 2d 497 (1948); Louisville &amp; Nashville R.R. v. Johns, 267 Ala. 261, 101 So. 2d 265 (1958); Ex parte Huguley Water Sys., 282 Ala. 633, 213 So. 2d 799 (1968); and Morgan County Comm'n v. Powell, supra.
Because § 6.11 explicitly confers on this Court rulemaking authority, and, in fact, mandates that this Court exercise that authority, some of the rationale of Ex parte Foshee, supra, is undercut. The Court in Foshee placed great emphasis on the fact that its rulemaking power was derived only "by implication" from the Constitution as it then stood, "flowing from [it] by inference," 246 Ala. at 606, 21 So. 2d  at 829, as contrasted with the "plenary power" conferred on the Legislature. Thus, in assessing the relative rulemaking powers of the Legislature and this Court under the language of § 6.11, it must be remembered that "[p]re-1973 cases dealing with the Legislature's authority merely provide historical background." Ex parte Stewart, 730 So. 2d 1246, 1250 n. 1 (Ala.1999).
Nonetheless, it has long been recognized that the Legislature, operating within its separate sphere of constitutional authority, also has the power to establish rules governing practice and procedure in the courts in this State.
Porter v. State, 234 Ala. 11, 13, 174 So. 311, 312 (1937).
Ex parte Dozier, 262 Ala. 197, 199, 77 So. 2d 903, 905 (1953).
Louisville &amp; Nashville R.R. v. Johns, 267 Ala. at 276-77, 101 So. 2d  at 279-80 (quoting from an opinion on original deliverance in Birmingham Transit Co. v. Persons, 266 Ala. 406, 96 So. 2d 673 (1957), that was withdrawn on application for rehearing).
The Legislature exceeds its power in the area of rulemaking if its action "prohibits the due and orderly processes by which [a] court functions, or prevents it from properly functioning," Ex parte Foshee, 246 Ala. at 607, 21 So. 2d  at 829, or disturbs the functions and orderly processes of the court, Broadway v. State, 257 Ala. 414, 418, 60 So. 2d 701, 704 (1952). "[T]he functions and orderly processes of courts which derive their existence from the state constitution may not be disturbed by any legislative enactment." Ex parte Huguley Water Sys., 282 Ala. at 639, 213 So. 2d  at 805. A legislative enactment may not encroach on the core judicial power. Ex parte Jenkins, 723 So. 2d 649, 653-56 (Ala.1998). The mandate to this Court in § 6.11 to make and promulgate rules governing the administration of all courts and rules governing practice and procedure in all courts is an empowerment by and from the people; it does not depend on legislative enactment for its existence or implementation.
Nonetheless, because that was not true for all features of the new judicial article, and because coordinated confirmatory legislation was helpful for the purpose of furthering the declaration of § 6.01 of the new judicial article that "the judicial power of the state shall be vested exclusively in a unified judicial system," the Legislature enacted Act No. 1205 in 1975, the title of which states that it is an act "[t]o implement the new Judicial Article of the Alabama Constitution (Amendment No. 328, approved December 18, 1973); by establishing a unified judicial system for the state ..." ("the Judicial Article Implementation Act"). Among the sections of that act pertinent to the present discussion were the following provisions, as subsequently codified:
Ala.Code 1975, § 12-2-19(a) and (c).
In 1977, as a part of its adoption of the "Code of Alabama 1975," the Legislature included § 12-1-1, which reads as follows:
That Code section, along with the rest of the Code of Alabama 1975, became effective on October 31, 1977. Ex parte Stewart, 730 So. 2d  at 1249. As explained in Ex parte Stewart, however:
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, pursuant to the express legislative declaration in § 12-1-1, when this Court adopted the Alabama Rules of Evidence effective January 1, 1996, those rules supplanted and superseded any provisions of Title 12 of the Code of Alabama 1975 inconsistent with those rules, subject, however, to the limitation declared in Ex parte Stewart that the prospective application of § 12-1-1 would not preclude the Legislature from subsequently overriding one of those rules under the authority conferred on it in § 6.11 to do so by a general act of statewide application.
Therefore, the only questions remaining are whether this Court, in undertaking to abrogate the Dead Man's Statute by adopting Rule 601 of the Alabama Rules of Evidence, exceeded its authority under the Alabama Constitution and whether, assuming this Court did not exceed its authority in adopting Rule 601, the Legislature subsequently changed that rule and revived the Dead Man's Statute by a general act of statewide application.
Venator argues that Art. I, § 21, Ala. Const. 1901, providing "[t]hat no power of suspending laws shall be exercised except by the legislature," prevents Rule 601 from "suspending" the Dead Man's Statute. Technically speaking, there is a material difference between the repeal or abrogation *236 of a statute and its suspension. "A repeal puts an end to the law; a suspension holds it in abeyance." 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 276 (1999)(footnote omitted).
This Court recognized in Ex parte Ward, 540 So. 2d 1350 (Ala.1988), that it had violated § 21 when it "attempted to suspend the operation," 540 So. 2d  at 1352, of Article 5 of the Judicial Article Implementation Act, which established "a new body of substantive law" pertaining to juvenile proceedings until the Court was about to promulgate complementary rules. At issue in Ward was the effect of that attempted suspension as it related to the subject-matter jurisdiction of juvenile courts based on the age of the accused. The opinion in Ward explains that "the substantive provisions" of the legislation "became effective on October 10, 1975, the date it was approved," 540 So. 2d  at 1352, but this Court attempted, by resolution, to suspend and defer that effective date until January 16, 1977, to allow time for the promulgation of necessary procedural rules. In Ward, we belatedly recognized that the resolution, given its attempted suspension of substantive law, particular subject-matter jurisdiction, contravened both § 21 and § 6.11 of Amendment No. 328.
We did not hold in Ward, contrary to the extension of its rationale urged by Venator, that § 21 would bar the abrogation by a court rule adopted pursuant to the authority granted in § 6.11 of a prior statutorily effected rule of practice and procedure. To the contrary, it is clear that § 6.11 envisions that this Court's power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure for all courts could supersede legislatively enacted rules of practice and procedure, so long as the rules promulgated by this Court did not abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights of any party, and subject to the right of the Legislature to change the court-adopted rules by a general act of statewide application.
This Court held in Opinion of the Justices No. 229, 342 So. 2d 361 (Ala.1977), that existing Code sections governing the method of selecting juries in criminal cases would survive the ratification of Amendment No. 328 because of the provision in § 6.21(h) that "all provisions of law and rules of court in force on the effective date of this article [i.e., the new judicial article, as established by Amendment No. 328] shall continue in effect until superseded in the manner authorized by the Constitution." Pertinent to the present analysis was the Court's explanation that "[t]he provisions of law relative to the selection of juries has not been superseded `in the manner authorized by the Constitution'  that is, by a rule promulgated by the Supreme Court." 342 So. 2d  at 362. Therefore, we reject the argument of DaSilva's estate that "[t]his Court has long held that once the Legislature acts in the field of procedure, its enactments trump any inconsistent actions by the Court, whether the Legislative action is before or after the Court promulgates a Rule." (Brief of DaSilva's estate, p. 34.) (Emphasis added.)
The Legislature, as the author of § 6.11, which it subsequently put before the people for approval, confirmed its understanding of that power vested in this Court when, a little more than three years after Amendment No. 328 was approved and ratified, it enacted § 12-1-1 as a part of the Code of Alabama 1975, expressly providing that "[a]ny provisions of [Title 12 of the Code] regulating procedure shall apply only if the procedure is not governed by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, or any other rule of practice and procedure as may be adopted by the Supreme Court *237 of Alabama." Thus, the Legislature acknowledged that any provision of any statute "regulating procedure" was, or could be, trumped by any rule of practice and procedure adopted by this Court, a process directly contrary to Venator's expansive reading of § 21 of the Constitution. Of course, as already discussed, the "prospective field of operation" of § 12-1-1 would run afoul of the concluding sentence of § 6.11 if taken to its furthest reach to block forever any legislative changes of court-adopted rules of practice and procedure. Nonetheless, the holding in Ex parte Stewart, supra, reined in § 12-1-1 only "to the extent [prospective application of the statute] would never allow a statute enacted after [§ 6.11's] effective date to override a rule of court ...." 730 So. 2d  at 1249. The prospective application of § 12-1-1, which Stewart recognizes, is otherwise unaffected.
As noted, § 6.11 not only constitutionally confirms the power and authority of this Court to make rules governing the administration of, and practice and procedure in, all courts, but it also mandates that this Court make such rules. The only limitation on that power and authority, as pertinent to the matters now under consideration, is that "such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive right of any party." Thus, by virtue of the terminology employed in § 6.11, we must determine in the first instance, whether the Court's abrogation of the Dead Man's Statute abridges, enlarges, or modifies the substantive rights of any party.
Venator and DaSilva's estate both argue that the Dead Man's Statute should be viewed as a substantive rather than a procedural statute and, therefore, not susceptible to change by court rule. They argue that the Dead Man's Statute has the substantive effect and purpose of protecting the estates of decedents. "Testimony is prohibited only when the deceased's estate is affected in a negative way. Stephens v. Stephens, 680 So. 2d 329, 332 (Ala.Civ.App.1996)." (Venator's brief, p. 39.) "The Alabama Dead Man's Statute vests substantive rights in an estate, and those rights can only be taken away by the Alabama Legislature. ... The statute was enacted to protect the estates of decedents. Williams v. Williams, 497 So. 2d 481, 484 (Ala.1986)." (Brief of DaSilva's estate, p. 38.) DaSilva's estate argues that the Dead Man's Statute "is not designed to further the fact-finding or truth-finding function of the trial process," but rather "was designed by the Legislature to safeguard the assets of estates from unmeritorious claims." (Brief of DaSilva's estate, pp. 41-42.)
A review of the origins and purposes of dead man's statutes in general, and the Alabama statute in particular, reveals those assertions to be overstatements.
"16 2 [John H.] Wigmore, [Evidence] § 576, at 810 [(Chadbourn rev.1979)]."
Joseph A. Colquitt &amp; Charles W. Gamble, From Incompetency to Weight and Credibility: The Next Step in an Historic Trend, 47 Ala. L.Rev. 145, 147-48 (1995) (some footnotes omitted).
Herbert E. Tucker, Colorado Dead Man's Statute: Time for Repeal or Reform?, 29 Colo. Law. 45, 45 (January 2000) (footnotes omitted).
The Dead Man's Statute is "to be construed in light of the common-law rule that all persons who were parties to the record, or had a pecuniary interest in the result of the suit, were incompetent to testify." Mobile Sav. Bank v. McDonnell, 87 Ala. 736, 740, 6 So. 703, 704 (1889). "We have often said, that the purpose and policy of the statute are to exclude the living from testifying against the dead, because the latter can not be heard in contradiction. A contrary rule would open broad the door to the entry of innumerable frauds." Id. From its earliest enactment, as § 2704, Code of 1867, the Dead Man's Statute has declared broadly that "there must be no exclusion of any witness because he is a party or interested in the issued tried," subject to an exception relating to any transaction with, or statement by, a deceased person whose estate is interested in the result of the suit. § 12-21-163, Ala.Code 1975. The formulation of the rule in the Code of 1867 read:
*239 Section 3058 of the Code of 1876 carried this reformulation of the rule:
As can be seen, the revised version applied in any civil action or proceeding, rather than in just an action "by or against executors, or administrators." In the revised version, neither party could be allowed to testify against the other as to any transaction with or statement by "any deceased person whose estate is interested in the result of such suit," rather than just a transaction with or statement "by the testator, or intestate," and statements or transactions of a deceased person were implicated "when such deceased person, at the time of such statement or transaction, acted in any representative or fiduciary relation whatsoever to the party against whom such testimony is sought to be introduced."
The only subsequent changes of significance were effected by the Code of 1896, § 1794, where the type of prohibited witness was expanded from just a party to any "person having a pecuniary interest in the result of the suit or proceeding...." The preclusion would not apply if the testimony of the deceased person relating to the subject transaction or statement was introduced in evidence by the party whose interest was opposed to that of the witness, or the testimony had been taken and was on file in the cause; and no incompetent witness could make himself competent by transferring his interest to another. That version of the Dead Man's Statute has been carried forward in successive Codes without change (§ 4007, Code of 1907; § 7721, Code of 1923; Title 7, § 433, Code of 1940; and § 12-21-163, Code of 1975). Thus, "[t]he statute enlarges to some extent the former [common-law] rule of competency, or, what is the same thing, narrows the old rule of exclusion; but it `preserves the common-law rule as to the class of excepted cases.'" Mobile Sav. Bank, 87 Ala. at 740, 6 So.  at 704.
Id.
Thus, in enacting the Dead Man's Statute, the Alabama Legislature was seeking to liberalize court-created rules of witness competency, while at the same time attempting to control a perceived fertile field for perjury. The policy and purpose of the statute were remedial. Kumpe v. Coons, 63 Ala. 448, 456 (1879); Kemp v. Kroutter, 531 So. 2d 854, 857 (Ala.1988).
In furtherance of that policy and purpose, it was declared early on that the statute must be applied to afford reciprocal or "mutual" protections to the living and dead alike:
Harwood v. Harper, 54 Ala. 659, 667-68 (1875).
This principle and purpose of "mutuality" is emphasized time and again in the caselaw of this Court.
Kumpe, 63 Ala. at 454-55. See also Davis v. Tarver, 65 Ala. 98 (1880); Boykin v. Smith, 65 Ala. 294 (1880); and Hodges v. Denny, 86 Ala. 226, 5 So. 492 (1889).
In McDonald v. Harris, 131 Ala. 359, 31 So. 548 (1901), a physician sought to recover from the executor of the estate of his deceased patient the value of medical services rendered to the deceased during his lifetime. The defendant executor, the son of the deceased patient, set up the defense that the services had not been rendered in a skillful and competent manner, and sought to prove through his own testimony and that of his mother certain transactions between the plaintiff and his patient, and statements made by each in connection with the same. The son and widow were heirs of the decedent and distributees of his estate, and thereby had a pecuniary interest in the result of the suit, which interest was opposed to that of the plaintiff, against whom they were called to testify by the estate. Their testimony was thus offered in an attempt to protect the estate. The trial court excluded their testimony as incompetent under the Dead Man's Statute, however, and, following a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the executor appealed. A unanimous Court explained the full import of the principle of "mutuality":
McDonald v. Harris, 131 Ala. at 364-65, 31 So.  at 549.
Thus, the Court made clear that the exclusionary effect of the Dead Man's Statute "cut[ ] both ways," and its purpose and effect were not invariably to protect the estate or those interested in it. Rather, the offered witness (originally either "a party or [a person] interested in the issue tried," and, commencing in 1896, any "person having a pecuniary interest in the result of the suit or the proceeding") could not testify against the party to whom his interest was opposed. Therefore, in any instance where an estate needed to establish a claim asserted by it, or to defend a claim asserted against it, it was not allowed to do so by calling a person having a pecuniary interest in the result of the action or proceeding to testify against the party to whom his interest was opposed as to any transaction with, or statement by, the deceased person whose estate was interested in the result of the action or proceeding (or where the deceased, at the time of the transaction or statement, was acting in any representative or fiduciary relation to the other party).
Accordingly, the Court held in Qualls v. Monroe County Bank, 229 Ala. 315, 156 So. 846 (1934), that, in an action by the payee of a promissory note against the administrator of the estate of the deceased alleged maker of the note, a son of the decedent who was also an heir, was not competent to testify that his father had stated that he would not sign the note. "The well-defined purpose of the law is to seal the lips of living parties where death has sealed the lips of others." 229 Ala. at 316, 156 So.  at 847.
Likewise, it was error in another case for the trial court to allow the widow of a deceased whose estate was interested in the action and who herself had an interest in the result of the suit to testify as to statements made by her husband. "It is a mistaken construction of the statute to assume that it does not prohibit the testimony if it is favorable to the interest of the estate, and the witnesses is called in behalf *242 of such interest." Pfingstl v. Solomon, 240 Ala. 58, 63, 197 So. 12, 16 (1940).
The proposition of mutuality was revisited, and emphatically so, in Niehuss v. Ford, 251 Ala. 529, 532, 38 So. 2d 484, 487 (1949):
(Emphasis supplied.)
Likewise, in Livingston v. Powell, 257 Ala. 38, 44-45, 57 So. 2d 521, 526 (1952), the Court again explained that it was a misconception of the effect of the Dead Man's Statute to consider it solely for the benefit of the estate, "although there are some cases which loosely make that statement when it was not necessary to do so," citing Niehuss, supra, and Pfingstl, supra.
More recently, in Taylor v. First National Bank of Tuskaloosa, 279 Ala. 624, 189 So. 2d 141 (1966), the trial court was held to have erred in allowing, in an action brought by the executor of a deceased testator against one of the testator's daughters, the testimony of his widow and two other daughters concerning statements made by the testator relating to the transaction in controversy. In effect, persons having a pecuniary interest in the result of the action or proceeding were allowed to testify against the party to *243 whom their interest was opposed as to a transaction with, or statement by, the deceased person whose estate was interested in the result of the action. The Court reiterated, "it is a mistaken construction of the statute to assume that it does not prohibit the testimony if it is favorable to the interest of the estate, and the witness is called in behalf of such interest." 279 Ala. at 630, 189 So. 2d  at 146.
Citing Taylor, supra, the Court stated in DeShazo v. Miller, 346 So. 2d 423, 426 (Ala.1977):
The Court compressed that analysis somewhat in Bank of the Southeast v. Koslin, 380 So. 2d 826, 829 (Ala.1980), stating:
Unfortunately, the Court got somewhat "off track" a couple of years later when, in Lavett v. Lavett, 414 So. 2d 907, 911 (Ala.1982), overruled on other grounds, McBride v. McBride, 548 So. 2d 155 (Ala.1989), it stated:
(Emphasis supplied.)
This phrasing of the fourth criterion was appropriate to the case at hand, but only because the party against whom the witness was called to testify was in fact "the deceased person or his or her estate." As noted, the proper and "neutral" expression of this criterion, true to the wording of the statute itself, is, as expressed in DeShazo, 346 So.2d at 426: "Is the interest of the witness opposed to the interest of the party against whom he is called to testify?" It was not even necessary to attempt a statement of this fourth criterion in Lavett, because the Court first held, for reasons totally independent of any of the criteria, that the statute was inapplicable under the procedural circumstances of the case, and, further, in regard to the third criterion, that the witness in question did not have a pecuniary interest in the action. Although the case-specific phrasing of the fourth criterion was of no consequence in Lavett because that particular factor was never "in play" in it, that phrasing of the fourth criterion was carelessly picked up and perpetuated *244 as a part of the listing of the criteria in some subsequent cases in which only one or more of the other criteria were pertinent to a disposition, or in which indeed it was the estate which was the party against whom the witness was called to testify.
Thus, by way of rote repetition, the Lavett phrasing was included in the listing of the criteria in Staik v. Jefferson Federal Savings &amp; Loan Association of Birmingham, 434 So. 2d 763, 766 (Ala.1983), with a citation to only Lavett. It was then included in Lett v. Watts, 463 So. 2d 138, 142 (Ala.1984), with a citation to only Staik. Edwards v. Vanzant, 492 So. 2d 990, 993 (Ala.1986), repeated the listing, citing Lett, but also, and inappropriately insofar as the phrasing of the fourth factor, to Koslin, supra, and Taylor, supra. Next Williams v. Williams, 497 So. 2d 481, 483 (Ala.1986) (now cited by DaSilva's estate, as noted above), repeated the listing, citing Lett and Lavett. Likewise, in McDaniel v. Laminack, 603 So. 2d 1010, 1012 (Ala.1992), the listing was given, citing only Edwards. Recently, the listing was repeated by the Court of Civil Appeals in Stephens v. Stephens, 680 So. 2d 329, 332 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (now cited by Venator, as noted above). In Stephens, the trial court's exclusion of certain testimony based on the Dead Man's Statute was deemed error because the witness actually had no pecuniary interest in the outcome of the suit and, alternatively, any type of interest he arguably did have was not adverse to the estate's at the time of the transaction and statements at issue. The "interest" of the witness, such as it was, therefore, was not adverse to the party against whom he was called to testify, i.e., the trustee of a trust established by the deceased during his lifetime.
Obviously, because the focus of each of those cases was on another of the criteria or the estate was indeed the party against whom the witness was called to testify, the unilateral, as opposed to mutual, statement of the fourth criterion was innocuous in those cases. We take this opportunity, however, true to the teaching of McDonald, Qualls, Pfingstl, Niehuss, Livingston, Taylor, and DeShazo, supra, to emphasize that the Dead Man's Statute was designed to prohibit, neutrally, and with "mutuality," a person having a pecuniary interest in the result of the action or proceeding from testifying "against the party to whom his interest is opposed" as to any transaction with, or statement by, the deceased person whose estate was interested in the result of the proceeding, or who acted as a representative or fiduciary for the party against whom the testimony is sought to be introduced. Sometimes the protected party would be "the decedent or his estate," but other times it would be the party adverse to the estate, and at those times the interest of the deceased or the estate would not be favored by application of the statute, but rather would be prejudiced.
The principal purpose of the Dead Man's Statute was to further the fact-finding or truth-finding function of the trial process by eliminating a particularly tempting opportunity for perjury. Further evidencing that fact is that portion of the statute providing that
*245 This provision is apparently unique to Alabama; certainly no contemporary dead man's statute in another jurisdiction incorporates a similar feature.
In Beddingfield v. Central Bank of Alabama, N.A., 440 So. 2d 1051 (Ala.1983), a bank customer sued the bank asserting various claims arising out of an alleged kickback scheme perpetrated by a former officer of the bank before his death, pursuant to which he allegedly extorted some $9,000 from the customer. Because the deceased officer had clearly acted in a representative relation to the bank at the time of his alleged transactions with the customer, and because only the two of them had been present during the transaction, this particular portion of the Dead Man's Statute served to exclude the customer's testimony, leaving him without any means of proving his allegations, resulting in the entry of a summary judgment in favor of the bank. On appeal, the customer contended that the Dead Man's Statute, as thus applied, was unconstitutional because, he argued, it deprived him of equal protection and due process under both the United States Constitution and the Alabama Constitution and it contravened his right of redress guaranteed by the Alabama Constitution. There being no suspect classification or fundamental right involved, however, this Court was called upon to determine only whether the classification furthered a proper governmental purpose and whether it was rationally related to that purpose. 440 So. 2d  at 1053. The Court noted that the Court in McCrary's Adm'r v. Rash's Adm'r, 60 Ala. 374 (1877), had discussed the purpose of the subject portion of the statute, stating that it
440 So. 2d  at 1053 (quoting McCrary's Adm'r, 60 Ala. at 377).
Applying a "rational basis" analysis to the statute, this Court found that it "furthers a proper governmental purpose and the provisions of the statute are rationally related to that purpose." 440 So. 2d  at 1053. Consequently, the statute was upheld against the constitutional challenge and applied to affirm the summary judgment in favor of the bank, even though the estate of the deceased bank officer was not a party to the action.
Similarly, in Moseley v. Lewis &amp; Brackin, 583 So. 2d 1297 (Ala.1991), Moseley, a defendant sued by a law firm for legal fees, defended on the basis that one of the partners in the firm, Roy Lewis, who died before trial, had orally agreed that the firm would look to others for payment of its fees. The trial court excluded Moseley's testimony concerning that alleged oral agreement and, following an adverse jury verdict, Moseley appealed.
583 So. 2d  at 1299.
See, to like effect, Power Equip. Co. v. First Alabama Bank, 585 So. 2d 1291 (Ala.1991); Campbell v. Colonial Bank, 583 So. 2d 236 (Ala.1991), and Richter v. Central Bank of Alabama, N.A., 451 So. 2d 239 (Ala.1984).
Accordingly, it is clear that the primary policy and purpose behind Alabama's Dead Man's Statute was the avoidance of the incentive and opportunity for perjury that would exist if the sole surviving witness to statements of, or a transaction with, a deceased person were to be allowed to testify to the statements or transaction without limitation. "The purpose of Alabama's Dead Man's Statute was an attempt to aid the factfinder's truth-seeking function." Colquitt &amp; Gamble, 47 Ala. L.Rev. at 153. Protection of the estate of the deceased, while often the result of application of the statute, was not its primary purpose; application of the statute could equally serve to prejudice the estate, and it applied to protect a business or other employer in litigation involving a transaction of a deceased employee even though the employee's estate was not interested in the result of the litigation.
The phrasing of § 6.11 closely parallels, in pertinent part, that of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, pursuant to which Congress delegated rulemaking power to the United States Supreme Court. As it read at the time of Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S. Ct. 1136, 14 L. Ed. 2d 8 (1965), the Rules Enabling Act empowered the Supreme Court" `to prescribe, by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts,'" with the caveat that "`[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall preserve the right of trial by jury ....'" 380 U.S.  at 464, 85 S. Ct. 1136. The Supreme Court observed in Hanna that "[t]he line between `substance' and `procedure' shifts as the legal context changes. `Each implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is used.' Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. [99] at 108[, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 89 L. Ed. 2079] [(1945)]; Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, pp. 154-183 (1942)." 380 U.S.  at 471, 85 S. Ct. 1136.
Terry A. Moore, Does the Alabama Supreme Court Have the Power to Make Rules of Evidence?, 25 Cumb. L.Rev. 331, 346 n. 96 (1994-1995).
Robert G. Lawson, Modifying the Kentucky Rules of Evidence  A Separation of Powers Issue, 88 Ky. L.J. 525, 552-53 (1999-2000)(footnotes omitted). A quarter of a century before Hanna, the Supreme Court, in determining whether two federal rules of civil procedure should be invalidated as abridging, enlarging, or modifying substantive rights, stated:
Sibbach v. Wilson &amp; Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14, 61 S. Ct. 422, 85 L. Ed. 479 (1941).
In Burlington Northern R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5, 107 S. Ct. 967, 94 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1987), the Court observed that
Concurring in Hanna, Justice Harlan wrote specially to state that
380 U.S.  at 475, 85 S. Ct. 1136 (Harlan, J., concurring).
This approach has its advocates. Professor Ely states that "in attempting to give content to the notion of substance, the *248 literature has focused on `those rules of law which characteristically and reasonably affect people's conduct at the stage of primary private activity.' [H. Hart &amp; H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 686, 678 (1953)]." John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L.Rev. 693, 725 (1974). Professor Dudley suggests the line of demarcation between substance and procedure as being between rules "designed to affect behavior outside the courtroom" and rules designed "to enhance the accuracy of the fact-finding process." Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and Federal Rule of Evidence 501: Privilege and Vertical Choice of Law, 82 Geo. L.J. 1781, at 1781, 1797 (1994). A rule is substantive "even if its purposes are entirely procedural, if it is calculated to affect behavior at the planning as distinguished from the disputative stage of activity." Olin Guy Welborn III, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Application of State Law in the Federal Courts, 55 Tex. L.Rev. 371, 404 (1977). "For purposes of the Rules Enabling Act, when a rule of law is one which would affect a person's conduct prior to the onset of litigation and has no design to manage ongoing litigation, it is rule of substance rather than procedure." 32 Am.Jur.2d Federal Practice &amp; Procedure § 399 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
Another approach is to analyze the purpose of the evidentiary statute or rule. "The foremost problem with the [`purpose' test] involves its central assumption that every rule of evidence is based on a single purpose, either substantive or procedural. However, this assumption ignores the fact that many evidentiary rules promote two or more purposes." Moore, 25 Cumb. L.Rev. at 347 (footnotes omitted).
Dudley, 82 Geo. L.J. at 1797 (footnotes omitted).
Still another approach is the "primary effects" test, which examines a rule to determine if it primarily affects substance or procedure.
Moore, 25 Cumb. L.Rev. at 347-48 (footnotes omitted).
Another way of analyzing the substance versus procedure dilemma was proposed by Charles Anthony Riedl in his seminal article To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-making Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A.J. 601, 604 (1940):
Moore, having discussed in his article the perceived shortcomings in these various *249 approaches, proposes an "historical test," which he explains as follows:
25 Cumb. L.Rev. at 350-51 (footnotes omitted).
Moore undertakes to analyze whether application of the historical test would yield a determination that the abrogation of the Dead Man's Statute by Rule 601 violates § 6.11:
25 Cumb. L.Rev. at 353 (footnotes omitted).
The appellate courts of this state have had little occasion to address the issue of what constitutes substance, as opposed to procedure, in the rulemaking context, and no occasion to apply the distinction to the abrogation in Rule 601 of the Dead Man's Statute. In Holsemback v. State, 443 So. 2d 1371 (Ala.Crim.App.1983), the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that court rules controlling joinder and consolidation for trial of separately indicted defendants, adopted under the authority of § 6.11, dealt with "a matter of procedure and [do] not abridge the substantial right of an accused to a jury trial." 443 So. 2d  at 1376. As discussed, in Ex parte Ward, 540 So. 2d 1350 (Ala.1988), this Court determined that the jurisdictional age limit of juveniles was a substantive issue. Also, we viewed the "method of selecting juries" to be within our rulemaking jurisdiction in Opinion of the Justices No. 229, 342 So. 2d 361 (Ala.1977).
Other state appellate courts have considered the question more directly. "Most procedural rules may have some collateral substantive effect but do not become substantive in nature because of such indirect effect." Fehrenbach v. Fehrenbach, 42 Wis.2d 410, 413, 167 N.W.2d 218, 219-20 (1969).
Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 364-65, 307 A.2d 571, 578 (1973).
In Davis v. Hare, 262 Ark. 818, 820, 561 S.W.2d 321, 322 (1978), the Supreme Court of Arkansas declared that the Arkansas dead man's statute was "merely a rule of evidence and was therefore procedural in nature." Likewise, in Johnson v. Porter, 14 Ohio St.3d 58, 60, 471 N.E.2d 484, 487 (1984), the Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that its adoption of the counterpart to our Rule 601, providing that "[e]very person is competent to be a witness," with certain limited exceptions, served effectively to abrogate that state's dead man's statute. The court noted that it had previously stated that "rules of witness competency, are procedural and do not create, modify, or abridge substantive rights."
In Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. McKay, 306 Or. 493, 760 P.2d 871 (1988), the Supreme Court of Oregon concluded that, for conflicts-of-laws purposes, under Oregon law Washington's dead man's statute should be regarded as "procedural," insofar as having to choose as between its being either "substantive" *251 or "procedural." The court quoted from Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 6, 395 P.2d 543 (1964), its approval of following test from G. Stumberg's Principles of Conflict of Laws 133 (3d ed. 1963):
306 Or. at 496, 760 P.2d  at 873.
Venator and DaSilva's estate cite Electronic Planroom, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 135 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D.Mich.2001), as holding that a dead man's statute represented an enactment of substantive law, immune from abrogation under a court-adopted version of Rule 601. In that case the federal district court speculated that the intended abrogation of the Michigan dead man's statute by Michigan Rule of Evidence 601 would probably be deemed unavailing in that state because of the opinion by its Supreme Court in McDougall v. Schanz, 461 Mich. 15, 597 N.W.2d 148 (1999).
The district court's analysis of the implications of McDougall, even if sound, which we need not decide here, is of little practical application to the present case, because of the following distinguishing considerations: The Michigan Supreme Court has long held that the rulemaking authority is placed exclusively in its hands but that it must distinguish between practice and procedure, on the one hand, and substantive law on the other. The question in McDougall was whether a statute passed by the Michigan Legislature regarding expert testimony, enacted as a part of medical-malpractice reform, trespassed upon the Supreme Court's exclusive constitutional authority to promulgate rules regarding practice and procedure in Michigan courts. The McDougall court, overruling prior authority, established a new test whereby a statute addressing an evidentiary matter would be deemed to violate the court's constitutional rulemaking authority "only when' "no clear legislative policy reflecting considerations other than judicial dispatch of litigation can be identified."'" 461 Mich. at 30, 597 N.W.2d  at 156. The court concluded that "the statute does not involve the mere dispatch of judicial business," and, therefore, was not an unconstitutional infringement upon the supreme court's exclusive rulemaking authority over practice and procedure. 461 Mich. at 35, 597 N.W.2d  at 159.
The district judge in Electronic Planroom concluded that the legislative policy reflected in the dead man's statute, that witnesses should not be permitted to "lie about the dead when the dead are no longer present to answer," related to a concern that "seemingly extends beyond the `mere dispatch of judicial business,' McDougall, 461 Mich. at 35, 597 N.W.2d  at 158, and thereby renders [the statute] an enactment of substantive law which is not obligated by the conflicting Michigan Rule of Evidence 601." 135 F. Supp. 2d  at 816. In Alabama, this Court's rulemaking authority, shared with the Legislature, does not extend only to matters involving the "mere dispatch of judicial business."
More recently, in Maltas v. Maltas, 197 F. Supp. 2d 409 (D.Md.2002), reversed on other grounds, 65 Fed. Appx. 917 (4th Cir.2003) (unpublished), a federal district court undertook this analysis:
197 F. Supp. 2d  at 423-25.
Under any of the various tests and approaches to discriminating between substance and procedure, we would conclude that abrogation of the Dead Man's Statute by Rule 601 represents a permissible exercise of this Court's constitutional rulemaking authority; the statute governs practice and procedure and does not abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive right of any party. Certainly it does not affect the prelitigation conduct of a party. Also, as previously discussed, its predominant and paramount purpose is to aid the fact-finder's truth-seeking function by avoiding a particularly tempting potential for perjury. Its unique "representative or fiduciary relation" provision reflects that aim. Thus, truth seeking, not the protection of estates, is the primary purpose of the Dead Man's Statute; it only incidentally affects bogus claims against estates. Historically, witness competency was governed initially only by court-fashioned rules, and has only evolved into a shared area of rulemaking between this Court and the Legislature.
The certified question, and Venator in its brief, point to two cases decided after the adoption of Rule 601 that fail to note the abrogation in Rule 601 of the Dead Man's Statute. In Smart v. Sandy Spring National Bank of Maryland (No. Civ.99-0336-AH-C, Feb. 23, 2000) (S.D.Ala.2000)(not published in F.Supp.2d), an unpublished opinion, the plaintiff in an action to quiet title to real property sought to establish his title through adverse possession by prescription. Attempting to avoid a summary judgment, he filed an affidavit asserting that he had had a conversation with a person now deceased, the predecessor in title of the defendant, during which the plaintiff had renounced his previous permissive use and asserted a right to the property. The district judge rejected this affidavit on the basis that it failed to indicate a date of the alleged conversation or to otherwise provide sufficient facts. "Plaintiff may not defeat Defendants' properly supported motion for summary judgment simply with an affidavit simply containing vague and conclusory allegations." Although that ruling was dispositive, the district judge opined that "[a]dditionally, Plaintiff's affidavit is suspect under the Alabama dead man's statute," and found "alternatively" that the affidavit was inadmissible under the Dead Man's Statute. No postjudgment motion was filed by either side and no appeal was taken. Obviously, the defendants had no reason to contest the "alternative" rationale, and the plaintiff presumably recognized that to do so would be an academic exercise, inasmuch as his affidavit *254 would remain rejected regardless. The reason the federal district judge took no note of Rule 601 of the Alabama Rules of Evidence is a matter about which we can only speculate; his failure to do so, without any analysis, or even acknowledgment of his awareness of the rule, does not provide persuasive authority to any degree in favor of Venator's position.
Venator also cites Evans v. Waddell, 689 So. 2d 23 (Ala.1997), a case in which the Court applied the Dead Man's Statute to disallow the testimony of two witnesses. Rule 601 simply was not applicable to that case, however, because as the opinion explains, the action was filed in 1992 and the appeal was from a summary judgment entered on December 16, 1995. Rule 1103 of the Alabama Rules of Evidence expressly provides that the rules apply only to proceedings begun on or after January 1, 1996. Accordingly, there was no occasion for the Court to address Rule 601 in Evans.
Section 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072 ("the Rules Enabling Act") presently reads, following amendments in 1988 and 1990:
Venator and DaSilva's estate argue that the treatment given by Congress to the Rules of Evidence proposed by the United States Supreme Court, and to Rule 601 in particular, compels the conclusion that all dead man's statutes reflect substantive law and therefore are not amenable to abrogation by court rule. Our independent review persuades us that the considerations influencing the congressional reaction to proposed federal Rule 601 are not germane to the "procedural versus substantive" choice § 6.11 requires this Court to make. As originally proposed to Congress by the Supreme Court, Federal Rule of Evidence 601 consisted only of the first sentence of the rule eventually enacted: that sentence constitutes the Alabama version of Rule 601.
During the pertinent time frame, 1973-1975, dead man's statutes nationwide, unlike the Alabama version, generally excluded evidence only when offered against an estate and contained no provision for the exclusion of evidence where the estate of the deceased person was not interested in the outcome of the action. The broad sweep of the first sentence of Rule 601 was criticized in some quarters for failing to provide recognition in "diversity of citizenship" cases for state rules of evidence that might be perceived as substantive under the Erie Doctrine,[1] designed to prevent inappropriate displacement of a state's substantive law by federal rules.
Rather than accept the proposed rules of evidence promulgated by the Supreme Court, Congress intervened and amended various of the rules before enacting them in December 1974. In so doing, Congress insisted upon an adherence to state law in diversity cases by adding a second sentence *255 to Rule 601. That sentence reads: "However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance with State law." Fed. Rule Evid. 601. Thus, state law was to be respected with respect to such evidentiary issues as presumption, privileges, and competency of witnesses.
One of the objections lodged against eliminating the effect of state dead man's statutes in diversity actions in federal court was that such a move would encourage forum shopping by allowing a plaintiff hemmed in by a state dead man's statute to avoid its effect by placing his case in federal court. "Now all the disappointed mistress has to do is to move her domicile to a neighboring state and perjure herself into a fortune." 27 Charles Allen Wright &amp; Victor James Gold, Federal Practice &amp; Procedure § 6001 (West 1990), quoting from a letter written to Congress by an attorney.
A second concern, principally advanced by the special constituency of those interests who managed decedent's estates, was that the protection afforded decedent's estates nationally by many dead man's statutes would be lost. Although the Federal Rules Advisory Committee argued that competency rules were procedural under Erie because they were merely rules bearing on witness credibility, the political clout of the opponents carried the day, even though some of them admitted that dead man's statutes were probably procedural under the Erie Doctrine. See Wright &amp; Gold, supra, § 6002. "Congress did not have to care about whether Dead Man's Acts were more substantive than procedural; the Erie Doctrine gave Congress the power to treat such borderline issues as either procedural matters for federal control or substantive matters to be decided under state law. What Congress did care about was politics.... Solicitude for `state's rights,' the importance in our federal system of sometimes deferring to state substantive law, is the policy foundation for the second sentence of Rule 601." Id. (footnotes omitted). As Judge Weinstein has explained in his treatise:
3 Jack B. Weinstein &amp; Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 601App.102[5][b](Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. March 1997).
As already explained, "the basic concern" animating this state's version of the Dead Man's Statute was the deterrence of perjury, as opposed to the protection of widows.
The defendants argue that even if Rule 601, Ala. R. Evid., constitutionally and validly abrogated the Dead Man's Statute, that statute was readopted when, on March 26, 1996, the Legislature approved Act No. 96-261. Section 1 of that Act specifies only that "[t]hose general and permanent laws of the State enacted during the 1995 Regular Session of the Legislature as contained in [certain specified 1995 cumulative supplements and replacement volumes of the Code of Alabama 1975] are adopted and incorporated into the Code of Alabama 1975." Section 1 had no effect on the Dead Man's Statute. Section 2 of the Act, however, states that "[t]he adoption and incorporation of the supplement and replacement volumes specified in this act shall constitute a continuous systematic codification of the entire Code of Alabama 1975 for purposes of Section 85 of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901. This act is a law that adopts a code for the purposes of Section 45 of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901."
Section 85 of the Constitution of Alabama 1901 provides that "[i]t shall be the duty of the legislature, at its first session after the ratification of this Constitution, and within every subsequent period of twelve years, to make provision by law for revising, digesting, and promulgating the public statutes of this State, of a general nature, both civil and criminal." Section 45 of the Constitution specifies certain requirements for laws enacted by the Legislature, but excepts from those provisions "bills adopting a Code." Section 3 of Act No. 96-261 declares that the Code publisher has certified the discharge of its duties to edit and publish the specified replacement volumes by "combining the material in the previous bound volumes with the material contained in cumulative supplements without making substantive changes...."
The 1995 Replacement Volume 11 was one of the specified replacement volumes, and it, comprising 961 pages, contains the entire of Title 12 of the Code, relating to "Courts." The defendants make the point that the 1995 Replacement Volume 11 contains the full text of § 12-21-163. It indeed does so, followed by the Code Commissioners note: "Cross references  For this section being commented on by new Rule 501, Ala. R. of Evid., effective January 1, 1996, see the Advisory Committee's notes to new Rule 501 in Volume 23." (The reference to Rule "501" is clearly a typographical error, because the Advisory Committee's notes to that Rule contain no comment on § 12-21-163, but rather the Rule obviously intended to be referenced is 601, the Advisory Committee's Notes to which do comment on § 12-21-163.)
Venator makes the companion argument that § 12-21-163 was again "readopted" by "2002 Ala. Act 403 (adopting the 2001 Cumulative Supplement)." That supplement did not "contain" the text of § 12-21-163, however, but simply a few case annotations. Thus, it did not represent any type of readoption or reenactment.
The parties devote much of their briefs to discussing our cases of Densmore v. Jefferson County, 813 So. 2d 844 (Ala.2001); Swift v. Gregory, 786 So. 2d 1097 (Ala.2000); and Ex parte State Department of Revenue, 683 So. 2d 980 (Ala.1996), all of which discuss the effect on preexisting statutes and their codifications of the adoption by the Legislature of an official Code of laws. In Ex parte State Department of Revenue, 683 So. 2d  at 982, we explained:
In Densmore, 813 So. 2d  at 851, we observed, after quoting the above passage, that "[a]lthough this Court found it unnecessary to discuss the annual codification process in Ex parte State Department of Revenue, the Court did note that the annual codification process was begun after this Court had decided Coker." In Densmore, the Court held that an infirmity in the manner in which legislation had been enacted was "cured by its codification as the part of the Code of Alabama 1975." 813 So. 2d  at 852.
The plaintiffs make the following responsive argument in their reply brief:
Although the parties present provocative arguments, we need not resolve their opposing contentions, for a reason not addressed in their briefs. As noted, § 12-1-1 of the Code of Alabama of 1975 declares that any provisions of Title 12 "regulating procedure," which would include the Dead Man's Statute codified as § 12-21-163, "shall apply only if the procedure is not governed by ... any other rule of practice and procedure as may be adopted by the Supreme Court of Alabama." As previously discussed, we recognized in Ward, supra, the constitutional necessity for some limitation on the prospective field of operation of § 12-1-1. We held in Ex parte Stewart that § 12-1-1 could not prospectively apply "to the extent it would never allow a statute enacted after that section's effective date to override a rule of court," 730 So. 2d  at 1249, given the express stipulation in § 6.11 that rules adopted by this Court "may be changed by a general act of statewide application." Nonetheless, the full retroactive application of § 12-1-1 has never been challenged in this Court, and is not now questioned by the parties to the present proceeding.
That being the case, even if we were to take the defendant's "readoption" argument at full face value, it would be self-defeating. That is because 1995 Replacement Volume 11 not only contains § 12-21-163, the Dead Man's Statute, but also the full text of § 12-1-1. If we are to accept the defendant's position that the Dead Man's Statute was reenacted by its inclusion it in 1995 Replacement Volume 11, we must consider that § 12-1-1 was likewise reenacted so that it also has a "new" operative date, as of the March 26, 1996, approval of Act No. 96-261. That being the situation, § 12-1-1 had the effect of rendering § 12-21-163 inapplicable, because the procedure established by § 12-21-163 was by then, i.e., as of the March 26, 1996, the new effective dates of both § 12-1-1 and § 12-21-163, governed by the Alabama Rules of Evidence, effective January 1, 1996. In other words, if, as is necessary to the defendants' argument, § 12-21-163 is due to have a new, re-invigorated effective date of March 26, 1996, by virtue of its inclusion in 1995 Replacement Volume 11, then likewise so must § 12-1-1, because of its inclusion in that same replacement volume. Because Rule 601 of the Alabama Rules of Evidence was an "other rule of practice and procedure [which had been] adopted by the Supreme Court of Alabama" as of March 26, 1996, and governed the same procedure as governed by § 12-21-163, the latter could not "apply" because of the preemptive effect given the former by § 12-1-1.
The Alabama Dead Man's Statute, § 12-21-163, Ala.Code 1975, has been superseded by Rule 601, Ala. R. Evid.
QUESTION ANSWERED.
HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.
[1]  Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938).