Title: Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. v. City of Minneapolis
Citation: 239 N.W.2d 472
Docket Number: 45459
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: February 27, 1976

239 N.W.2d 472 (1976) MILWAUKEE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, Respondent, Jerome Nyenhuis, Respondent, William V. James, III, et al., Respondents. No. 45459. Supreme Court of Minnesota. February 27, 1976. Rider, Bennett, Egan, Johnson &amp; Arundel, Chester D. Johnson and Lee T. Peterson, Minneapolis, for appellant. Robert J. Alfton, Minneapolis, for City of Minneapolis. Feinberg, Meyers, Schumacher &amp; Schumacher and George G. Seltz, Minneapolis, for Nyenhuis. Stephen M. Goldfarb and George W. Roberts, Minneapolis, for James and others. Heard before KELLY, TODD and MacLAUGHLIN, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc. *473 TODD, Justice. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Company (Milwaukee Mutual) appeals from an order denying its alternative motion for amended findings or a new trial and from the judgment entered. Milwaukee Mutual sought a declaratory judgment that a homeowner's policy issued by it to Jerome Nyenhuis (Nyenhuis) did not cover injuries sustained by William V. James III (James). Nyenhuis and James were fellow police officers employed by the city of Minneapolis, and James was accidentally shot by Nyenhuis at the police station just prior to going on duty. The lower court found that the conduct which caused the injury was "ordinarily incident to nonbusiness pursuits," so the exclusionary provision in the policy under which Milwaukee Mutual sought to deny coverage was not applicable. We affirm. The matter was submitted for determination by the lower court on stipulated facts, the most significant of which are: *475 The lower court held that there was coverage under the homeowner's policy. In its memorandum accompanying its order, the court found that the accident arose out of the business pursuits of Nyenhuis, but that the activities giving rise to the injury were ordinarily incident to nonbusiness pursuits and not excluded by the insurance policy. In its memorandum accompanying its order denying Milwaukee Mutual's blended motion for amended findings or a new trial, the lower court further expanded its reasons for finding coverage. The lower court said: Milwaukee Mutual, while raising as the main issue the question of whether the lower court erred in determining that the conduct giving rise to the injury was incident to nonbusiness activities, also contends that the language of the policy is not ambiguous and that the court erred in so holding. However, a careful reading of the lower court's second memorandum does not indicate that it regarded the language as ambiguous. Our conclusion that the lower court did not find the language ambiguous is arrived at by analyzing both of the lower court's memoranda. By separating the issues, the court resolved any question of ambiguity. It found that Nyenhuis was engaged in a business pursuit, but that the conduct giving rise to the injury was ordinarily incident to nonbusiness pursuits. The trial judge's finding that the exclusion does not apply to the facts involved is eminently reasonable. The lower court's factual determination as to the nature of the activities giving rise to the injuries was not clearly erroneous and therefore will not be set aside by this court on appeal. Rule 52.01, Rules of Civil Procedure. As the Michigan Supreme Court recognized in a case holding the precise type of exclusion here at issue to be inapplicable to the facts there involved, an insurer who denies coverage on the basis of a policy exclusion bears the burden of proof: The trial judge properly determined that Milwaukee Mutual did not satisfy its burden of proof here. As he observed in the memorandum accompanying his first order, "hunting, weapon collecting and target shooting are but examples of non-business pursuits to which activities such as pistol handling and trigger spring checking [the activities giving rise to James' injury] are ordinarily incident." Therefore, the present case is clearly distinguishable from others holding exclusions similar to the present one to deny coverage where the injury-producing objects were things that would rarely, if ever, be used for other than business purposes. Contrast, e. g., Pitre v. Pennsylvania Millers Mutual Ins. Co., 236 So. 2d 920 (La.App.1970) (auger); Berry v. Aetna Cas. &amp; Surety Co., 221 So. 2d 272 (La.App.1969) (forklift truck). *476 Although the parties cite and discuss many cases from other jurisdictions regarding "business pursuits" exclusions similar to the instant one, we concur with an Illinois court which, in confronting this issue, stressed: "* * * [I]t is our task to construe the policy clause in question with reference to the facts in this particular case." State Farm Fire &amp; Cas. Co. v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co., 87 Ill.App.2d 15, 19, 230 N.E.2d 513, 515 (1967). Therefore, we can derive only general guidance from cases involving different fact situations. However, to the extent that general principles can be gleaned from the case law on this issue, we note that such principles are fully consistent with the trial judge's disposition herein. An article in 1970 Ins.L.J. 519, entitled The "Business Pursuits" Exclusion in Personal Liability Insurance Policies: What The Courts Have Done With It, summarizing cases dealing with this problem, concluded (1970 Ins.L.J. 533): Affirmed. AMDAHL, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.