Title: Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming (Opinion - Leave Granted)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 145816
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: February 6, 2014

TER BEEKv CITY OF WYOMING 
 
Docket No. 145816.  Argued October 10, 2013 (Calendar No. 8).  Decided February 6, 2014. 
 
 
John Ter Beek, a resident of the city of Wyoming, filed an action in the Kent Circuit 
Court against the city, seeking to have a city zoning ordinance declared void and an injunction 
entered prohibiting its enforcement.  The ordinance generally prohibited uses that were contrary 
to federal law, state law, or local ordinance, and permitted punishment of violations by civil 
sanctions.  Ter Beek was a qualifying patient and held a registry identification card under the 
Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA), MCL 333.26421 et seq.  He wished to grow and 
use marijuana for medical purposes in his home and argued that § 4(a) of the MMMA, MCL 
333.26424(a), which provides that registered qualifying patients shall not be subject to arrest, 
prosecution, or penalty in any manner for certain medical use of marijuana in accordance with 
the act, preempted the ordinance.  Both parties moved for summary disposition.  Ter Beek 
argued that because the federal controlled substances act (CSA), 21 USC 801 et seq., prohibited 
the use, manufacture, or cultivation of marijuana, the ordinance likewise  prohibited the use, 
manufacture, or cultivation of marijuana for medical use and therefore conflicted with and was 
preempted by the MMMA.  The city argued instead that the CSA preempted the MMMA.  The 
court, Dennis B. Leiber, J., granted summary disposition in favor of the city, agreeing that the 
CSA preempted the MMMA.  Ter Beek appealed.  The Court of Appeals, SHAPIRO, P.J., and 
HOEKSTRA and WHITBECK, JJ., reversed, concluding that the ordinance conflicted with § 4(a) of 
the MMMA and that the CSA did not preempt § 4(a) because it was possible to comply with 
both statutes simultaneously and the state-law immunity for certain medical marijuana patients 
under § 4(a) did not stand as an obstacle to the federal regulation of marijuana use.  297 Mich 
App 446 (2012).  The Supreme Court granted the city leave to appeal.  493 Mich 957 (2013). 
 
 
In a unanimous opinion by Justice MCCORMACK, the Supreme Court held: 
 
 
The federal controlled substances act does not preempt § 4(a) of the MMMA, but § 4(a) 
preempts the ordinance because the ordinance directly conflicts with the MMMA. 
 
 
1.  The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, US Const, art VI, cl 2, 
invalidates state laws that interfere with or are contrary to federal law.  Under 21 USC 903, 
which specifically addresses the CSA’s preemption of state statutes, the relevant inquiry is 
whether there is a positive conflict between the federal and state statutes so that the two cannot 
consistently stand together.  Such a conflict can arise when it is impossible to comply with both 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Stephen J. Markman 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Corbin R. Davis 
the federal and the state requirements or when state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 
 
 
2.  The CSA does not preempt § 4(a) on the ground of impossibility preemption.  
Impossibility preemption requires more than the existence of a hypothetical or potential conflict.  
It results when state law requires what federal law forbids or vice versa.  It is not impossible to 
comply with both the CSA and § 4(a) of the MMMA.  The CSA makes manufacture, 
distribution, or possession of marijuana a criminal offense under federal law.  Section 4(a) of the 
MMMA does not require commission of that offense, however, nor does it prohibit punishment 
under federal law.  Instead, if certain individuals choose to engage in MMMA-compliant medical 
use of marijuana, § 4(a) provides them a limited state-law immunity from arrest, prosecution, or 
penalty, an immunity that could not and does not purport to prohibit the federal criminalization 
of, or punishment for, that conduct. 
 
 
3.  Section 4(a) does not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of the CSA, and the CSA accordingly does not preempt § 4(a) on 
that ground.  A state law presents an obstacle to a federal law if the purpose of the federal law 
cannot otherwise be accomplished.  Under the CSA, Congress categorized marijuana as a 
Schedule I controlled substance, thereby designating it as contraband for any purpose and 
indicating that it has no acceptable medical uses.  Michigan also has designated marijuana as a 
Schedule 1 controlled substance, and its possession, manufacture, and delivery remain 
punishable offenses under Michigan law.  In enacting the MMMA, however, the people of the 
state chose to part ways with Congress only regarding the scope of acceptable medical use of 
marijuana, allowing a limited class of individuals to engage in certain uses in an effort to provide 
for the health and welfare of Michigan citizens.  While the MMMA and the CSA differ with 
respect to the medical use of marijuana, the limited state-law immunity for that use under § 4(a) 
does not frustrate the CSA’s operation or prevent its purpose from being accomplished.  The 
immunity does not purport to alter the CSA’s federal criminalization of marijuana or interfere 
with or undermine federal enforcement of that prohibition.  Moreover, by expressly declining in 
21 USC 903 to occupy the field of regulating marijuana, the CSA explicitly contemplates a role 
for the states in that regard, and there is no indication that the purpose or objective of the CSA 
was to require states to enforce its prohibitions. 
 
 
4.  The ordinance is preempted by § 4(a).  Under Const 1963, art 7, § 22, a municipality’s 
power to adopt resolutions and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns is subject to the 
Constitution and the law.  A municipality is therefore precluded from enacting an ordinance if 
the ordinance directly conflicts with the state’s statutory scheme or if the statutory scheme 
preempts the ordinance by occupying the field of regulation that the municipality seeks to enter, 
to the exclusion of the ordinance, even if there is no direct conflict between the two schemes of 
regulation.  A direct conflict exists when the ordinance permits what the statute prohibits or the 
ordinance prohibits what the statute permits.  The city’s ordinance directly conflicts with the 
MMMA by permitting what the MMMA expressly prohibits: the imposition of any penalty, 
including a civil one, on a registered qualifying patient whose medical use of marijuana falls 
within the scope of the immunity granted under § 4(a). 
 
 
Court of Appeals’ judgment affirmed, grant of summary disposition in favor of the city 
reversed, and case remanded to the circuit court for entry of summary disposition in favor of 
Ter Beek. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2014 State of Michigan 
 
 
FILED FEBRUARY 6, 2014 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
JOHN TER BEEK, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 145816 
 
CITY OF WYOMING, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
 
MCCORMACK, J.  
The Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA), MCL 333.26421 et seq., 
enacted pursuant to a voter initiative in November 2008, affords certain protections under 
state law for the medical use of marijuana in the state of Michigan.  Among them is 
§ 4(a) of the MMMA, which immunizes registered qualifying patients from “penalty in 
any 
manner” 
for 
specified 
MMMA-compliant 
medical 
marijuana 
use.  
MCL 333.26424(a).  At issue here is the relationship between this immunity, the federal 
prohibition of marijuana under the controlled substances act (CSA), 21 USC 801 et seq., 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Stephen J. Markman 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
 
 
 
 
 
2
and a local zoning ordinance adopted by the city of Wyoming which prohibits and 
subjects to civil sanction any land “[u]ses that are contrary to federal law.”  City of 
Wyoming Code of Ordinances, § 90-66.  As set forth below, we agree with the Court of 
Appeals that the ordinance directly conflicts with, and is preempted by, § 4(a) of the 
MMMA, and that § 4(a) is not preempted by the federal CSA.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the Court of Appeals’ judgment. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 2010, approximately two years after the MMMA went into effect, defendant, 
the city of Wyoming (the City), adopted an ordinance (the Ordinance) amending the 
zoning chapter of the Wyoming city code to add the following provision: 
Uses not expressly permitted under this article are prohibited in all 
districts.  Uses that are contrary to federal law, state law or local ordinance 
are prohibited.  
City of Wyoming Code of Ordinances, § 90-66.  Under the city code, violations of the 
Ordinance constitute municipal civil infractions punishable by “civil sanctions, including, 
without limitation, fines, damages, expenses and costs,” City of Wyoming Code of 
Ordinances, § 1-27(a) to (b), and are also subject to injunctive relief, City of Wyoming 
Code of Ordinances, § 1-27(g).   
Plaintiff, John Ter Beek, lives in the City and is a qualifying patient under the 
MMMA who possesses a state-issued registry identification card.1  Upon the City’s 
                                              
1 The MMMA specifies the circumstances under which a person can register with the 
state as a qualifying medical marijuana patient.  Upon satisfaction of these criteria, the 
state issues a registry identification card to the qualifying patient.  See MCL 333.26426.   
 
 
 
3
adoption of the Ordinance, Ter Beek filed the instant lawsuit in circuit court.  Ter Beek 
alleges that he wishes to grow, possess, and use medical marijuana in his home in 
accordance with the MMMA.  The Ordinance, however, by its incorporation of the 
CSA’s federal prohibition of marijuana, prohibits and penalizes such conduct.  This, 
Ter Beek contends, impermissibly contravenes § 4(a) of the MMMA, which provides that 
registered qualifying patients “shall not be subject to arrest, prosecution, or penalty in any 
manner . . . for the medical use of marihuana in accordance with” the MMMA.  
Accordingly, Ter Beek seeks a declaratory judgment that the Ordinance is preempted by 
the MMMA and a corresponding injunction prohibiting the City from enforcing the 
Ordinance against him for the medical use of marijuana in compliance with the MMMA.2  
The parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 
2.116(C)(10), disputing whether the Ordinance is preempted by the MMMA and whether 
the MMMA is preempted by the CSA.  The circuit court granted summary disposition in 
favor of the City, concluding that the MMMA is preempted by the CSA.  Ter Beek 
appealed by right in the Court of Appeals, which reversed the circuit court’s grant of 
summary disposition in favor of the City and remanded the case for entry of summary 
disposition in favor of Ter Beek.  Ter Beek v Wyoming, 297 Mich App 446; 823 NW2d 
864 (2012).  The Court of Appeals first concluded that the Ordinance directly conflicts 
with, and is thus preempted by, § 4(a) of the MMMA, because it purports to penalize the 
medical use of marijuana in contravention of § 4(a)’s grant of immunity from such 
                                              
2 Ter Beek has not been charged with violating the Ordinance or subjected to any 
enforcement action in connection with it.  The City unsuccessfully challenged his 
standing before the circuit court, and has abandoned that challenge on appeal. 
 
 
 
4
penalties.  The Court of Appeals then concluded that § 4(a) is not preempted by the 
federal CSA, reasoning that it is possible to comply with both statutes simultaneously and 
that § 4(a)’s state-law immunity for certain medical marijuana patients does not stand as 
an obstacle to the CSA’s federal regulation of marijuana use or to the federal enforcement 
of same.  The City sought leave to appeal, which we granted, to address the questions of 
state and federal preemption.  Ter Beek v Wyoming, 493 Mich 957 (2013).3   
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether § 4(a) of the MMMA preempts the Ordinance, and whether the CSA 
preempts § 4(a), are questions of law which we review de novo.  Detroit v Ambassador 
Bridge Co, 481 Mich 29, 35; 748 NW2d 221 (2008); Mich Coalition For Responsible 
Gun Owners v City of Ferndale, 256 Mich App 401, 405; 662 NW2d 864 (2003).  We 
also review de novo the decision to grant or deny summary disposition, Spiek v Dep’t of 
Transp, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998), and review for clear error factual 
findings in support of that decision, Ambassador Bridge, 481 Mich at 35. 
As we have recently explained, the intent of the electors governs the interpretation 
of voter-initiated statutes such as the MMMA, just as the intent of the Legislature 
governs the interpretation of legislatively enacted statutes.  People v Bylsma, 493 Mich 
                                              
3 We also granted permission for interested persons or groups to move to submit briefs 
amicus curiae.  The City of Livonia, the Michigan Municipal League, the Prosecuting 
Attorneys Association of Michigan, and the State Bar of Michigan Public Corporation 
Law Section submitted briefs in support of the City; the Cannabis Attorneys of Mid-
Michigan, and the Cato Institute, the Drug Policy Alliance, and Law Enforcement 
Against Prohibition submitted briefs in support of Ter Beek.   
 
 
 
5
17, 26; 825 NW2d 543 (2012).  The first step when interpreting a statute is to examine its 
plain language, which provides the most reliable evidence of intent.  If the statutory 
language is unambiguous, no further judicial construction is required or permitted 
because we must conclude that the electors intended the meaning clearly expressed.  Id. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  KEY PROVISIONS OF THE MMMA, THE CSA, AND THE ORDINANCE 
The questions of state and federal preemption in this case arise from the differing 
treatment of medical marijuana use under the MMMA and the CSA.  As noted, § 4(a) of 
the MMMA provides, in relevant part:  
A qualifying patient who has been issued and possesses a registry 
identification card shall not be subject to arrest, prosecution, or penalty in 
any manner, or denied any right or privilege, including but not limited to 
civil penalty or disciplinary action by a business or occupational or 
professional licensing board or bureau, for the medical use of marihuana in 
accordance with this act . . . .  [MCL 333.26424(a).]   
The MMMA defines “medical use” as “the acquisition, possession, cultivation, 
manufacture, use, internal possession, delivery, transfer, or transportation of marihuana 
or paraphernalia relating to the administration of marihuana to treat or alleviate a 
registered qualifying patient’s debilitating medical condition or symptoms associated 
with the debilitating medical condition.”  MCL 333.26423(f). 
The CSA, meanwhile, contains no such immunity.  Rather, it makes it “unlawful 
for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or 
possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.”  21 
 
 
 
6
USC 841(a)(1).  The CSA classifies marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance, 21 
USC 810(c)(12), and thus largely prohibits its manufacture, distribution, or possession.4   
The parties do not dispute that the Ordinance, by prohibiting all “[u]ses that are 
contrary to federal law,” incorporates the CSA’s prohibition of marijuana and makes 
certain violations of that prohibition both punishable by civil sanctions and subject to 
injunctive relief.  Thus, an individual whose medical use of marijuana falls within the 
scope of § 4(a)’s immunity from “penalty in any manner” may nonetheless be subject to 
punishment under the Ordinance for that use. 
B.  THE CSA DOES NOT PREEMPT § 4(a) OF THE MMMA  
As noted, the circuit court rejected Ter Beek’s challenge to the Ordinance because 
it held that § 4(a) of the MMMA is preempted by the CSA.  The Court of Appeals 
disagreed.  Although raised under the particular circumstances of this case as a defense, 
we address this question first, and hold that the CSA does not preempt § 4(a). 
Federal preemption of state law is grounded in the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution, US Const, art VI, cl 2, which “invalidates state laws that 
‘interfere with, or are contrary to,’ federal law.”  Hillsborough Co v Automated Med 
Labs, Inc, 471 US 707, 712; 105 S Ct 2371; 85 L Ed 2d 714 (1985), quoting Gibbons v 
Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat) 1, 211; 6 L Ed 23 (1824).  When a state law is preempted by 
                                              
4 The only exception to this prohibition is for research projects approved by the federal 
government.  See 21 USC 823(f); United States v Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop, 532 
US 483, 490; 121 S Ct 1711; 149 L Ed 2d 722 (2001). 
 
 
 
 
7
federal law, the state law is “without effect.”  Maryland v Louisiana, 451 US 725, 746; 
101 S Ct 2114; 68 L Ed 576 (1981).   
“ ‘[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption 
case.’ ”  Wyeth v Levine, 555 US 555, 565; 129 S Ct 1187; 173 L Ed 51 (2009), quoting 
Medtronic, Inc v Lohr, 518 US 470, 485; 116 S Ct 2240; 135 L Ed 2d 700 (1996).  
Furthermore, “[i]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has 
legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied, we start with the 
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the 
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”  Wyeth, 555 US 
at 565 (citations and quotation marks omitted).  See also Maryland, 451 US at 746 
(“Consideration under the Supremacy Clause starts with the basic presumption that 
Congress did not intend to displace state law.”).  The areas of public health and safety are 
among those traditionally left to the states.  Gonzales v Oregon, 546 US 243, 270; 126 S 
Ct 904; 163 L Ed 2d 748 (2006).  If the federal statute contains a clause expressly 
addressing preemption, “we ‘focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily 
contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.’ ”  Chamber of Commerce v 
Whiting, 563 US ___, ___; 131 S Ct 1968, 1977; 179 L Ed 2d 1031 (2011), quoting CSX 
Transp, Inc v Easterwood, 507 US 658, 664; 113 S Ct 1732; 123 L Ed 2d 387 (1993).  
Where such a clause is ambiguous, and the federal statute at issue pertains to an area of 
traditional state regulation, we “have a duty to accept the reading [of the clause] that 
disfavors pre-emption.”  Bates v Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 US 431, 449; 125 S Ct 
1788; 161 L Ed 2d 687 (2005).  Tie, in that case, goes to the state. 
With those principles in mind, we look to the CSA, which expressly provides: 
 
 
 
8
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an 
intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that 
provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any 
State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be within the 
authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between that 
provision of this subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot 
consistently stand together.  [21 USC 903.]   
Accordingly, in assessing whether § 4(a) of the MMMA is preempted by the CSA, the 
relevant inquiry is whether there is a “positive conflict” between the two statutes such 
that they “cannot consistently stand together.” 
Such a conflict can arise when it is impossible to comply with both federal and 
state requirements, Mut Pharm Co, Inc v Bartlett, 570 US ___, ___; 133 S Ct 2466, 2473; 
186 L Ed 2d 607 (2013), or when state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress, Hillsborough, 471 US at 
713.  See also Wyeth, 555 US at 567-581 (applying this preemption standard to a federal 
statute providing that it did not preempt state law unless there was a “direct and positive 
conflict” between it and state law).  We find neither such conflict here. 
First, we do not find it impossible to comply with both the CSA and § 4(a) of the 
MMMA.  “Impossibility pre-emption is a demanding defense,” Wyeth, 555 US at 573, 
and requires more than “[t]he existence of a hypothetical or potential conflict,” Rice v 
Norman Williams Co, 458 US 654, 659; 102 S Ct 3294; 73 L Ed 1042 (1982).  Such 
impossibility results when state law requires what federal law forbids, or vice versa.  See, 
e.g., Mut Pharm, 570 US at ___; 133 S Ct at 2476-2477; PLIVA, Inc v Mensing, 564 US 
___, ___; 131 S Ct 2567, 2577-2578; 180 L Ed 2d 580 (2011); Geier v American Honda 
Motor Co, Inc, 529 US 861, 873; 120 S Ct 1913; 146 L Ed 2d 914 (2000); Barnett Bank 
of Marion Co, NA v Nelson, 517 US 25, 31; 116 S Ct 1103; 134 L Ed 2d 237 (1996). 
 
 
 
9
The CSA criminalizes marijuana, making its manufacture, distribution, or 
possession a punishable offense under federal law.  Section 4(a) of the MMMA does not 
require anyone to commit that offense, however, nor does it prohibit punishment of that 
offense under federal law.  Rather, the MMMA is clear that, if certain individuals choose 
to engage in MMMA-compliant medical marijuana use, § 4(a) provides them with a 
limited state-law immunity from “arrest, prosecution, or penalty in any manner”—an 
immunity that does not purport to prohibit federal criminalization of, or punishment for, 
that conduct.  See MCL 333.26427(a) (“The medical use of marihuana is allowed under 
state law to the extent that it is carried out in accordance with the provisions of this act.”); 
see also MCL 333.26422 (noting that “approximately 99 out of every 100 marihuana 
arrests in the United States are made under state law, rather than under federal law,” that 
“changing state law will have the practical effect of protecting from arrest the vast 
majority of seriously ill people who have a medical need to use marihuana,” and that 
“[a]lthough federal law currently prohibits any use of marihuana except under very 
limited circumstances, states are not required to enforce federal law or prosecute people 
for engaging in activities prohibited by federal law”).  Nor, of course, could the MMMA 
prohibit such federal regulation and enforcement.  See United States v Hicks, 722 F Supp 
2d 829, 833 (ED Mich, 2010) (“It is indisputable that state medical-marijuana laws do 
not, and cannot, supercede federal laws that criminalize the possession of marijuana.”), 
citing, inter alia, Gonzales v Raich, 545 US 1, 29; 125 S Ct 2195; 162 L Ed 2d 1 (2005).5 
                                              
5 The City contends that these cases, as well as Oakland Cannabis, 532 US 483, support a 
finding of federal preemption in this case.  These cases, however, indicate that state 
medical marijuana laws cannot be used to inhibit federal enforcement of the CSA; none 
 
 
 
 
10
The City objects that § 4(a) forces it, as well as the state of Michigan and every 
other municipality therein, to “ignore” the CSA.  But that is not the precise question. 
While, as discussed at greater length below, § 4(a) does prevent the City from fully 
incorporating the CSA’s prohibition of marijuana into its own local enforcement scheme, 
it does not require that the City violate that federal prohibition.  Neither does the CSA 
require that the City, or the state of Michigan, enforce that prohibition.  In fact, it is well 
established that, “ ‘[e]ven where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to 
pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the 
states to require or prohibit those acts.’ ”  Printz v United States, 521 US 898, 924; 117 S 
Ct 2365; 138 L Ed 2d 914 (1997), quoting New York v United States, 505 US 144, 166; 
112 S Ct 2408; 120 L Ed 2d 120 (1992).  We do not find it impossible to comply with 
both the CSA and § 4(a) of the MMMA. 
 
We likewise hold that § 4(a) does not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of the CSA.  Hillsborough, 471 US at 
713.  A state law presents such an obstacle to a federal law “ ‘[i]f the purpose of the 
                                              
of them suggests that such laws cannot exempt from penalty under state law certain 
conduct that remains illegal under federal law.  See Raich, 545 US at 15-33 (holding that 
the federal government had constitutional authority to prohibit and prosecute under 
federal law the cultivation of marijuana, regardless of whether such activity violated state 
law); Oakland Cannabis, 532 US at 486-495 (holding that, in a federal prosecution under 
the CSA, there was no medical necessity defense available under federal law, regardless 
of whether that defense would be available under state law); Hicks, 722 F Supp 2d at 
832-834 (holding that the federal defendant’s compliance with the MMMA did not 
excuse his violation of the conditions of his federal supervised release).  This line of 
authority thus fully comports with our holding here. 
 
 
 
 
11
[federal law] cannot otherwise be accomplished—if its operation within its chosen field 
else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural effect.’ ”  Crosby v 
Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363, 373; 120 S Ct 2288; 147 L Ed 2d 352 (2000), 
quoting Savage v Jones, 225 US 501, 533; 32 S Ct 715; 56 L Ed 1182 (1912).  As the 
United States Supreme Court has stated, “[w]hat is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of 
judgment,” to be assessed under the circumstances of the given case and “to be informed 
by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended 
effects.”  Crosby, 530 US at 373.   
According to the Supreme Court in Raich, “[t]he main objectives of the CSA were 
to conquer drug abuse and to control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled 
substances.”  545 US at 12.  “To effectuate these goals, Congress devised a closed 
regulatory system making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any 
controlled substance except in a manner authorized by the CSA.”  Id. at 13.  As noted, in 
devising that scheme, Congress categorized marijuana as a Schedule I controlled 
substance, thereby designating it “as contraband for any purpose” and indicating that it 
“has no acceptable medical uses.”  Id. at 27. 
 
Michigan also designates marijuana as a Schedule 1 drug, and its possession, 
manufacture, and delivery remain punishable offenses under Michigan law.  People v 
Kolanek, 491 Mich 382, 394; 817 NW2d 528 (2012).  See also MCL 333.7212(1)(c), 
MCL 333.7401(2)(d), and MCL 333.7403(2)(d).  In enacting the MMMA, however, the 
people of the State of Michigan chose to part ways with Congress only regarding the 
scope of acceptable medical use of marijuana, allowing “a limited class of individuals” to 
 
 
 
12
engage in certain such use in “an ‘effort for the health and welfare of [Michigan] 
citizens.’ ”  Kolanek, 491 Mich at 393-394, quoting MCL 333.26422(c).   
 
While the MMMA and CSA differ with respect to medical use of marijuana, 
§ 4(a)’s limited state-law immunity for such use does not frustrate the CSA’s operation 
nor refuse its provisions their natural effect, such that its purpose cannot otherwise be 
accomplished.  Crosby, 530 US at 373.  As the Court of Appeals duly recognized and the 
MMMA itself makes clear, see MCL 333.26422 and MCL 333.26427(a), this immunity 
does not purport to alter the CSA’s federal criminalization of marijuana, or to interfere 
with or undermine federal enforcement of that prohibition.  The CSA, meanwhile, by 
expressly declining to occupy the field of regulating marijuana, 21 USC 903, “explicitly 
contemplates a role for the States” in that regard, Oregon, 546 US at 251, and there is no 
indication that the CSA’s purpose or objective was to require states to enforce its  
prohibitions.  Indeed, as noted, Congress lacks the constitutional authority to impose such 
an obligation.  As a result, we fail to see how § 4(a) creates, as the City claims, 
“significant and unsolvable obstacles to the enforcement of the” CSA, such that the 
former is preempted by the latter.   
 
In reaching the opposite conclusion, both the City and the circuit court rely heavily 
on Mich Canners & Freezers Ass’n v Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Bd, 467 US 
461; 104 S Ct 2518; 81 L Ed 2d 399 (1984), and Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc v Bureau 
of Labor & Indus, 348 Or 159; 230 P3d 518 (2010).  Such reliance, however, is 
misplaced.  At issue in Michigan Canners was whether Michigan’s Agricultural 
Marketing and Bargaining Act (the Michigan Act) was preempted by the federal 
Agricultural Fair Practices Act (AFPA).  In order to protect individual producers of 
 
 
 
13
agricultural commodities from coercion by associations of producers, the AFPA 
prohibited those associations from “engag[ing] in practices that interfere with a 
producer’s freedom to choose whether to bring his products to market himself or to sell 
them through” an association.  Mich Canners, 467 US at 464.  The Michigan Act, 
however, provided that, under certain circumstances, a producers’ association could 
receive state accreditation to become the exclusive bargaining agent for all producers of a 
given commodity; when an association was so accredited, “all producers of that 
commodity, regardless of whether they have chosen to become members of the 
association, must pay a service fee to the association and must abide by the terms of the 
contracts the association negotiates with processors.”  Id. at 467-468.  The United States 
Supreme Court concluded that the Michigan Act was preempted by the AFPA because 
the Michigan Act, by compelling individual producers to effectively join and be bound by 
the actions of accredited associations, “empowers producers’ associations to do precisely 
what the federal Act forbids them to do” and “imposes on the producer the same 
incidents of association membership with which Congress was concerned in enacting” 
the AFPA.  Id. at 478.  In other words, the AFPA guaranteed individual producers the 
freedom to choose whether to join associations; the Michigan Act, however, denied them 
that right. 
 
Such circumstances are not present here.  Section 4(a) simply provides that, under 
state law, certain individuals may engage in certain medical marijuana use without risk of 
penalty.  As previously discussed, while such use is prohibited under federal law, § 4(a) 
does not deny the federal government the ability to enforce that prohibition, nor does it 
purport to require, authorize, or excuse its violation.  Granting Ter Beek his requested 
 
 
 
14
relief does not limit his potential exposure to federal enforcement of the CSA against 
him, but only recognizes that he is immune under state law for MMMA-compliant 
conduct, as provided in § 4(a).  Unlike in Michigan Canners, the state law here does not 
frustrate or impede the federal mandate. 
Emerald Steel is also distinguishable, never mind nonbinding.  At issue in that 
case was whether the plaintiff’s medical use of marijuana constituted an “illegal use of 
drugs” under a state statutory provision governing his claim for employment 
discrimination.  The statute, in turn, provided that “illegal use of drugs” did not include 
“uses authorized under the [CSA] or under other provisions of state or federal law.”  
Emerald Steel, 348 Or at 170, quoting Or Rev Stat 659A.122(2).  The plaintiff argued 
that his medical marijuana use was not an “illegal use of drugs” under the statute because 
it was authorized under the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act, which provided that certain 
individuals, under certain circumstances, “may engage in . . . the medical use of 
marijuana.”  Or Rev Stat 475.306(1).  The Oregon Supreme Court rejected this position, 
concluding that, to the extent the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act authorized the use of 
marijuana, it was preempted by the CSA.  Emerald Steel, 348 Or at 190.  The decision 
made clear, however, that it did “not hold that the [CSA] preempts provisions of the 
Oregon Medical Marijuana Act that exempt the possession, manufacture, or distribution 
of medical marijuana from state criminal liability.”  Id.  See also, e.g., id. at 171-172 
nn 11 and 12.  Thus, Emerald Steel addresses a substantively different question than the 
one presently before us—whether the CSA preempts § 4(a)’s limited state-law immunity 
 
 
 
15
from penalty for certain medical marijuana use—and we see nothing in its answer that 
would alter our own.6 
In sum, there is no “positive conflict” between the CSA and § 4(a) of the MMMA 
such that the two “cannot consistently stand together,” 21 USC 903: it is not impossible 
to comply with both the CSA’s federal prohibition of marijuana and § 4(a)’s limited 
state-law immunity for certain medical marijuana use, and § 4(a) does not stand as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of the 
CSA.  Mut Pharm, 570 US at ___, ___; 133 S Ct at 2473, 2476-2477; Hillsborough, 471 
US at 713.  As such, the CSA does not preempt § 4(a) of the MMMA. 
C.  THE ORDINANCE IS PREEMPTED BY § 4(a) OF THE MMMA  
Having found that the CSA does not preempt § 4(a) of the MMMA, we turn next 
to whether the Ordinance, as applied to Ter Beek, is preempted by § 4(a).  We agree with 
the Court of Appeals that it is.  The required analysis on this point is not complex.  
                                              
6 Furthermore, we have misgivings, mildly put, about Emerald Steel’s reasoning.  In 
particular, in finding preemption, the Oregon Supreme Court characterized Michigan 
Canners as a case of “state law permit[ting] what federal law prohibits,” and reasoned by 
analogy that “[a]ffirmatively authorizing a use that federal law prohibits stands as an 
obstacle to the implementation and execution of the full purposes and objectives of the” 
CSA.  Emerald Steel, 348 Or at 177-178.  Michigan Canners, however, does not stand for 
the broad proposition that, if a state law permits something a federal law prohibits, it is 
preempted.  Instead, Michigan Canners involved a state law that not only permitted what 
federal law prohibited, but also required that certain federal guarantees be denied.  
Indeed, the Oregon Supreme Court has since moderated this aspect of its analysis, 
clarifying that “Emerald Steel should not be construed as announcing a stand-alone rule 
that any state law that can be viewed as ‘affirmatively authorizing’ what federal law 
prohibits is preempted.”  Willis v Winters, 350 Or 299, 310 n 6; 253 P3d 1058 (2011). 
 
 
 
16
Under the Michigan Constitution, the City’s “power to adopt resolutions and 
ordinances relating to its municipal concerns” is “subject to the constitution and the law.”  
Const 1963, art 7, § 22.  As this Court has previously noted, “[w]hile prescribing broad 
powers, this provision specifically provides that ordinances are subject to the laws of this 
state, i.e., statutes.”  AFSCME v Detroit, 468 Mich 388, 410; 662 NW2d 695 (2003).  The 
City, therefore, “is precluded from enacting an ordinance if . . . the ordinance is in direct 
conflict with the state statutory scheme, or . . . if the state statutory scheme preempts the 
ordinance by occupying the field of regulation which the municipality seeks to enter, to 
the exclusion of the ordinance, even where there is no direct conflict between the two 
schemes of regulation.”  People v Llewellyn, 401 Mich 314, 322; 257 NW2d 902 (1977) 
(footnotes omitted).  A direct conflict exists when “the ordinance permits what the statute 
prohibits or the ordinance prohibits what the statute permits.”  Id. at 322 n 4.  Here, the 
Ordinance directly conflicts with the MMMA by permitting what the MMMA expressly 
prohibits—the imposition of a “penalty in any manner” on a registered qualifying patient 
whose medical use of marijuana falls within the scope of § 4(a)’s immunity. 
The City disputes this characterization of the Ordinance, noting that while it 
permits the imposition of civil sanctions, it does not require them; instead, a violation of 
the Ordinance can be enforced through equitable relief such as a civil injunction.  We 
agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that enjoining a registered qualifying patient 
from engaging in MMMA-compliant conduct unambiguously falls within the scope of 
penalties prohibited by § 4(a).  For § 4(a) makes clear that individuals who satisfy the 
statutorily specified criteria “shall not be subject to . . . penalty in any manner,” a 
prohibition which expressly includes “civil penalt[ies].”  As the Court of Appeals noted, 
 
 
 
17
the MMMA does not define “penalty,” but that term is commonly understood to mean a 
“punishment imposed or incurred for a violation of law or rule . . . something forfeited.”  
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2000).  See, e.g., People v Morey, 461 
Mich 325, 330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999) (“Where, as here, the Legislature has not 
expressly defined terms used within a statute, we may turn to dictionary definitions to aid 
our goal of construing those terms in accordance with their ordinary and generally 
accepted meanings.”).  Under the Ordinance, individuals are subject to civil punishment 
for engaging in the medical use of marijuana in accordance with the MMMA; by the 
plain terms of § 4(a), the manner of that punishment—be it requiring the payment of a 
monetary sanction, or denying the ability to engage in MMMA-compliant conduct—is 
not material to the MMMA’s immunity from it. 
Nor do we agree with the City that our decision in Michigan v McQueen, 493 
Mich 135; 828 NW2d 644 (2013), mandates a different outcome.  In McQueen, this 
Court held that, because the defendants’ business, a medical marijuana dispensary, was 
not being operated in accordance with the MMMA, it was properly enjoined as a public 
nuisance under MCL 600.3801.7  McQueen, 493 Mich at 140.  The City contends that, 
because the growth and cultivation of marijuana is a violation of the Ordinance, and 
violations of zoning ordinances constitute nuisances per se under the Michigan Zoning 
Enabling Act (MZEA), MCL 125.3407, McQueen permits the City’s regulation through 
injunction.  McQueen, however, affirmed the injunction of the defendants’ business not 
                                              
7 MCL 600.3801(1)(c) provides that “[a] building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place is a 
nuisance if . . . [i]t is used for the unlawful manufacture, transporting, sale, keeping for 
sale, bartering, or furnishing of a controlled substance.” 
 
 
 
18
simply because it was a nuisance, but because it was a nuisance that fell outside the scope 
of conduct permitted under the MMMA.  McQueen does not, as the City contends, 
authorize a municipality to enjoin a registered qualifying patient from engaging in 
medical use of marijuana in compliance with the MMMA, simply by characterizing that 
conduct as a zoning violation.    
Furthermore, contrary to the City’s suggestion, the fact that the Ordinance is a 
local zoning regulation enacted pursuant to the MZEA does not save it from preemption.  
The City stresses that the MZEA affords local municipalities a broad grant of authority to 
use their zoning powers to advance local interests, such as “public health, safety, and 
welfare.”  MCL 125.3201.  The MMMA, however, provides in no uncertain terms that 
“[t]he medical use of marihuana is allowed under state law to the extent that it is carried 
out in accordance with” the MMMA, MCL 333.26427(a), and that “[a]ll other acts and 
parts of acts inconsistent with [the MMMA] do not apply to the medical use of 
marihuana,” MCL 333.26427(e).  The City contends that the MMMA does not express a 
sufficiently clear intent to supersede the MZEA, but we see no ambiguity in the 
MMMA’s plain language to this effect.  See Bylsma, 493 Mich at 26 (explaining that the 
MMMA’s plain language provides the most reliable evidence of intent and that if this 
language is unambiguous, no further judicial construction is required or permitted 
because we must conclude that the electors intended the meaning clearly expressed).  It is 
well accepted that when two legislative enactments seemingly conflict, the specific 
provision prevails over the more general provision.  See, e.g., Crane v Reeder, 22 Mich 
322, 334 (1871).  Accordingly, the City cannot look to the MZEA to authorize or excuse 
 
 
 
19
the Ordinance’s contravention of the specific immunity for medical marijuana use 
provided under § 4(a) of the MMMA.8   
The City also points to Riverside v Inland Empire Patients Health & Wellness Ctr, 
Inc, 56 Cal 4th 729; 156 Cal Rptr 3d 409; 300 P3d 494 (2013), in support of its position.  
In that case, the California Supreme Court found certain state medical marijuana laws did 
not preempt a local zoning ordinance.  Riverside, however, is beside the point.  At issue 
there was whether a local zoning ordinance prohibiting medical marijuana dispensaries 
within city limits was preempted by California’s Compassionate Use Act (CUA) and 
Medical Marijuana Program Act (MMP).  The California Supreme Court concluded that 
there was no preemption, as the CUA and MMP offered only a limited immunity from 
sanction under certain specified state criminal and nuisance statutes, thereby “signal[ing] 
that the state declines to regard the described acts as nuisances or criminal violations, and 
                                              
8 No more availing is the City’s attempt to import certain zoning-related standards into 
our preemption analysis.  The City, for instance, points to Kyser v Kasson Twp, 486 Mich 
514, 521; 786 NW2d 543 (2010), which states that, when a citizen challenges a zoning 
ordinance on due process grounds, the “ordinance is presumed to be reasonable.”  The 
City also cites the MZEA’s exclusionary zoning provision, MCL 125.3207, which 
requires a showing of “demonstrated need” for a certain land use in order to overcome a 
zoning ordinance’s “effect of totally prohibiting the establishment of a land use within a 
local unit of government”—a need, the City contends, that Ter Beek cannot show, since 
he can likely procure marijuana for medical use in other municipalities.  We do not see 
how these standards impact our assessment of whether the Ordinance is preempted by the 
state-law immunity from penalty provided by § 4(a) of the MMMA.  The City seems to 
suggest that, for this immunity to attach, a registered qualifying patient must show a 
“demonstrated need” under MCL 125.3207 for his or her MMMA-compliant medical 
marijuana use.  Neither § 4(a) nor any other provision of the MMMA, however, imposes 
or betrays a tolerance for such a condition with respect to the availability of its 
protections.  Thus, to the extent the MZEA may be read to require such a showing for an 
individual to claim the immunity provided under § 4(a), it is inconsistent with and 
superseded by the MMMA.  MCL 333.26427(e). 
 
 
 
20
that the state’s enforcement mechanisms will thus not be available against these acts.”  
Id. at 762.  As such, these “limited provisions” were found to “neither expressly or 
impliedly restrict or preempt the authority of individual local jurisdictions to choose 
otherwise for local reasons, and to prohibit collective or cooperative medical marijuana 
activities within their own borders.”  Id.  The scope of § 4(a)’s immunity, however, is not 
similarly circumscribed; in prohibiting certain individuals from being “subject to . . . 
penalty in any manner,” § 4(a) draws no distinction between state and local laws or 
penalties.  We thus do not find Riverside’s reasoning instructive. 
Lastly, the City stresses that the MMMA does not create an absolute right to grow 
and distribute marijuana.  Correct.  See People v Kolanek, 491 Mich 382, 394; 817 
NW2d 528 (2012) (“The MMMA does not create a general right for individuals to use 
and possess marijuana in Michigan.  Possession, manufacture, and delivery of marijuana 
remain punishable offenses under Michigan law.”); Bylsma, 493 Mich at 32 (discussing 
Kolanek); People v Koon, 494 Mich 1, 5; 832 NW2d 724 (2013) (“The MMMA, rather 
than legalizing marijuana, functions by providing registered patients with immunity from 
prosecution for the medical use of marijuana.”).  Ter Beek, however, does not seek to 
assert any such general or absolute right.  Nor does our conclusion recognize one.  The 
Ordinance directly conflicts with the MMMA not because it generally pertains to 
marijuana, but because it permits registered qualifying patients, such as Ter Beek, to be 
penalized by the City for engaging in MMMA-compliant medical marijuana use.  Section 
 
 
 
21
4(a) of the MMMA expressly prohibits this.  As such, the MMMA preempts the 
Ordinance to the extent of this conflict.9 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Ordinance is preempted by § 4(a) of 
the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act, which in turn is not preempted by the federal 
controlled substances act.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, 
reverse the circuit court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of the City, and remand 
for entry of summary disposition in favor of Ter Beek. 
 
 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Mary Beth Kelly 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
David F. Viviano 
                                              
9 Contrary to the City’s concern, this outcome does not “create a situation in the State of 
Michigan where a person, caregiver or a group of caregivers would be able to operate 
with no local regulation of their cultivation and distribution of marijuana.”  Ter Beek 
does not argue, and we do not hold, that the MMMA forecloses all local regulation of 
marijuana; nor does this case require us to reach whether and to what extent the MMMA 
might occupy the field of medical marijuana regulation.