Title: Williams v. Evans
Citation: 220 Kan. 394, 552 P.2d 876
Docket Number: 48,034
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 23, 1976

220 Kan. 394 (1976)
552 P.2d 876
GEORGIA WILLIAMS, d/b/a LIBERAL TAXI COMPANY, Appellee, (DELTA LUCILLE HERMAN, Individually and as guardian and Conservator of RHONDA SUE HERMAN, SHAWN RAYMON HERMAN and CHRISTOPHER TODD HERMAN, Minors, Plaintiff.)
v.
EDWARD EVANS a/k/a EDDIE EVANS, Appellant.
No. 48,034

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 23, 1976.
Robin L. Wick, of Turner and Hensley, Chartered, of Great Bend, argued the cause, and Lee Turner and Raymond L. Dahlberg, of the same firm, were on the brief for the appellant.
*395 Michael P. Dreiling, of Liberal, argued the cause, and Gene H. Sharp, also of Liberal, was with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FOTH, C.:
This case is one of several stemming from a two car crash on August 27, 1970, in the city of Liberal. The issue is whether a personal injury judgment in favor of a passenger in one car against both his driver and the driver of the other car has any binding effect in a subsequent action between the two drivers. We hold that it does not.
One car was a taxi driven by Anthony Herman and owned by the appellee Georgia Williams, doing business as the Liberal Taxi Company. The second vehicle was driven by the appellant Edward Evans; Marilyn Evans and Gary Vaughn were his passengers. Herman, the taxi driver, was killed and all occupants of the Evans vehicle were injured.
Gary Vaughn, a passenger in the Evans car, sued his driver and the taxi company. As to his driver he alleged gross and wanton negligence, as required by the guest statute (K.S.A. 8-122b, now repealed). As to the taxi company he alleged simple negligence on the part of its agent, the taxi driver Herman. Marilyn Evans, the other passenger in the Evans car, filed an action only against the taxi company. The two actions were consolidated for trial, resulting in verdicts for both plaintiffs.
The appellee taxi company filed a third party petition against Evans and Vaughn alleging gross and wanton negligence causing the destruction of its taxi. The claim against Vaughn was later dismissed on motion of the taxi company, leaving standing its claim against Evans, the driver of the private vehicle. He answered the company's petition by denying gross and wanton negligence on his part and alleging simple contributory negligence on the part of the taxi driver Herman. He also counterclaimed against the company for damage to the vehicle he was driving. These third party claims were severed from the actions of the two passengers, and all issues in the third party actions were reserved for trial at a later time. They were later consolidated with a wrongful death action brought by Herman's widow.
After the verdict for the passenger Vaughn against both Evans and the taxi company, Herman's widow and the company both moved for partial summary judgment on their claims against Evans, as to the issue of liability. Their argument was that the *396 jury's verdict necessarily found Evans guilty of gross and wanton negligence, and it did not matter that it also convicted the taxi driver of simple negligence. The motion of Herman's widow was denied and is not at issue here, but the taxi company's motion was granted upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Evans has appealed.
The main thrust of appellant's argument is that collateral estoppel is inappropriate because the jury verdict did not adjudicate the question of possible contributory negligence by the taxi driver Herman. The appellee, on the other hand, treats the case as a summary judgment problem, arguing that since the first case established gross and wanton negligence by Evans, only gross and wanton contributory negligence can defeat recovery, citing Bogle v. Conway, 198 Kan. 166, 422 P.2d 971. Under that theory Herman's simple contributory negligence, as pleaded by Evans, is insufficient, and the case was ripe for summary judgment.
The trouble with this theory, apparently adopted by the trial court, is that it presupposes that the prior finding in favor of Vaughn against Evans works a collateral estoppel in favor of the taxi company against Evans. We do not believe it does.
Collateral estoppel is defined as "a bar in an action upon a different claim as to certain matters in issue which were determined in a former judgment." (Penachio v. Walker, 207 Kan. 54, 57, 483 P.2d 1119.) It is closely related to res judicata, the distinction being pointed out in Goetz v. Board of Trustees, 203 Kan. 340, 454 P.2d 481, Syl. para 6:
We are thus looking for "issues" which have been litigated "between the same parties." Put another way:
See also, Neville v. Hennigh, 214 Kan. 681, 522 P.2d 443.
Here the issue of the relative negligence of the two drivers was *397 not raised by any pleadings which were being tried between Williams and Evans. While it is true both co-defendants by answer alleged that the accident was the fault of the other, such statements were mere denials of plaintiff's claim and did not amount to assertions of claims against each other. The issue of liability between them was thus not before the jury at the trial. "The trial court has jurisdiction to decide only such issues as are raised by the pleadings ..." (Bowen, Administrator v. Lewis, 198 Kan. 605, 612, 426 P.2d 238.) The issue, therefore, cannot be deemed adjudicated for purposes of collateral estoppel. As this court has stated:
By that standard the question of negligence as between the co-defendants was not "necessary" to the first judgment, which went only to their respective liability to the plaintiff passenger.
This case is virtually controlled by Mickadeit v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 174 Kan. 484, 257 P.2d 156, not cited by the parties. In that case KP&amp;L asserted the defense of res judicata, based on an earlier case in which one Dorssom had sued both Mickadeit and the power company alleging joint liability for an auto accident. KP&amp;L had asserted its innocence and alleged negligence on the part of both Dorssom and Mickadeit. Mickadeit had filed a counterclaim against Dorssom, but no cross-claim against KP&amp;L.
In the second suit, in which Mickadeit sued KP&amp;L, the power company argued that when Mickadeit filed his counterclaim against Dorssom he was required to litigate all matters arising out of the accident, including any claims against KP&amp;L. This court agreed that the prior judgment was conclusive as to issues between the plaintiff (Dorssom) and defendant (Mickadeit) in the first suit, but rejected the argument as to issues between the co-defendants in the first suit, who were true adversaries for the first time in the second suit. The court quoted with approval from an annotation in 101 A.L.R. 104, 105:
The court also cited annotations in 142 A.L.R. 727 and 23 A.L.R.2d 710, and quoted with approval the encyclopedias (174 Kan. at 491):
The court goes on to discuss and quote from several cases from other jurisdictions before concluding that the action by Dorssom against Mickadeit and KP&amp;L had no binding effect.
The annotation quoted in Mickadeit is supplemented in 24 A.L.R.3d 318. Among the cases noted therein is Pearlman v. Truppo, 10 N.J. Misc. 477, 159 A. 623, which applies precisely the principle applicable here. There, in a prior action, a passenger in Pearlman's car had sued both Pearlman and Truppo. The plaintiff had received a judgment against Pearlman, but a nonsuit was entered in favor of the defendant Truppo. In the second case Truppo asserted res judicata, claiming that his lack of negligence was established by the prior judgment in his favor. The court, however, found the doctrine inapplicable.
The author of the later annotation also states a rationale for the general rule:
We therefore hold that the prior judgment against the co-defendants Evans and the taxi company does not activate the doctrine of collateral estoppel as to liability between the two defendants. This is so because the question of liability between them was not expressly put in issue in the prior case, but in fact that issue was expressly reserved by the severance of the cross-claims from the main action.
Since neither the alleged gross and wanton negligence nor the simple negligence of Evans is established as to Williams (the taxi company), and each is denied by Evans, the partial summary judgment on liability was premature. The judgment is therefore reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.