Title: Firebaugh v. Whitehead
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 010934
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 1, 2002

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
WILLIAM CALVIN FIREBAUGH, 
CO-EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF 
MARTHA F. SOWERS, DECEASED, ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
        OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 010934 
          JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
      March 1, 2002 
 
CHARLES F. WHITEHEAD, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BOTETOURT COUNTY 
Duncan M. Byrd, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether Charles F. and Martha 
A. Whitehead (collectively, “the Whiteheads”) possess a valid 
and enforceable right of first refusal to purchase property 
owned by the estate of Martha F. Sowers (“Sowers”).  We further 
consider whether the right, if valid and enforceable, is binding 
upon the co-executors of Sowers’ estate, William C. Firebaugh 
(“Firebaugh”) and Evelyn O. Carlson (“Carlson”) (collectively, 
“co-executors”). 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
On July 22, 1987, Sowers conveyed approximately 13.77 acres 
of land by deed to the Whiteheads.  On August 7, 1987, Sowers 
executed an agreement granting to the Whiteheads a right of 
first refusal to purchase additional acres, which was 
subsequently recorded in the Botetourt County Clerk’s Office in 
Deed Book 336, Page 539.  The agreement, in pertinent part, 
granted the Whiteheads: 
[A] first right of refusal to purchase certain 
parcels currently owned by [Sowers] lying on the 
northerly side of State Route 665 and designated 
as Tax Parcel #72-83 and Tax Parcel #72-53 and 
shown on that certain plat prepared by Charles R. 
McMurry, C.L.S. dated March 29, 1987, a copy of 
which is recorded in the Clerk’s Office of the 
Circuit Court of Botetourt County, Virginia in 
Deed Book 336, Page 533.1
 
Sometime in the latter part of 1987 the Whiteheads moved from 
Virginia to Mississippi and did not notify Sowers that they were 
leaving the area. 
 
Sowers died in 1993 and Firebaugh and Carlson qualified as 
co-executors of her estate.  On April 22, 1993, the estate 
received an offer from the Botetourt Country Club, Inc. (“BCC”) 
to purchase approximately 16.9 acres of property, including the 
property subject to the Whiteheads’ right of first refusal, for 
$94,950.00.  Firebaugh and Carlson conveyed the property by deed 
to BCC on May 21, 1993.  The Whiteheads first learned of the 
sale to BCC in March 1994, when Claude Carter, BCC’s attorney, 
called Mrs. Whitehead and notified her. 
 
On November 20, 1995, the Whiteheads filed an amended bill 
of complaint against Firebaugh and Carlson, as co-executors of 
                     
1 The recorded grant memorialized a prior unrecorded 
contract between the parties.  The contract, dated May 21, 1987, 
granted the right of first refusal to two parcels “designated as 
Tax Parcel #72-93 and Tax Parcel #72-53 . . . .”  The trial 
court dismissed with prejudice the part of the Whiteheads’ suit 
referring to the property designated as Tax Parcel 72-83 in the 
deed. 
 
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the estate of Sowers, and against BCC.2  The Whiteheads alleged 
that by failing to offer them the property subject to their 
right of first refusal, the estate breached the agreement.  The 
Whiteheads requested specific performance, asking the trial 
court to order BCC to convey the property to the Whiteheads.  
Alternatively, the Whiteheads requested monetary damages from 
the co-executors.  In their answer, the co-executors claimed 
that the agreement including the right of first refusal was 
executed by Sowers individually, and could not be enforced 
against the co-executors of Sowers’ estate. 
 
The trial court heard evidence and argument on July 1 and 
2, 1997.  A large portion of the evidence and argument related 
to whether the description of the land in the right of first 
refusal was sufficient to render the right enforceable.  At 
trial, Kirk Lumsden (“Lumsden”) was qualified as an expert in 
land surveying.  Lumsden testified that he was able to identify 
the property subject to the right of first refusal by examining 
the agreement containing the right, along with other documents 
referenced in the agreement, including the plat prepared by 
Charles McMurray.  Lumsden explained that he “did some 
additional deed research for the properties that adjoin the tax 
                     
2 The Whiteheads filed a bill of complaint against Firebaugh 
and Carlson as co-executors, and BCC, on August 3, 1994.  The 
procedural history leading up to the filing of the amended bill 
of complaint is not relevant to this appeal. 
 
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parcels referenced [in the agreement], and used that to help 
identify the property.”  Lumsden testified in detail about the 
steps he took in order to identify the property subject to the 
right of first refusal.  Lumsden was asked on cross-examination 
whether he could identify the property by looking at the 
agreement purporting to grant the right.  Lumsden answered:  
“Not from the agreement, per se, but by pulling out the plat and 
taking information from the plat,” he could identify the 
property. 
 
In an opinion letter dated July 30, 1997, incorporated in 
an order entered November 5, 1997, the trial court ruled that 
the Whiteheads’ right of first refusal was valid and 
enforceable.  In the order of November 5, 1997, the trial court 
denied the Whiteheads’ request for specific performance from BCC 
but permitted the Whiteheads to maintain their claim against the 
co-executors for damages. 
 
On February 7, 2001, the trial court entered final judgment 
against the co-executors, jointly and severally in their 
capacity as co-executors, in the amount of $64,000, plus 
prejudgment interest from November 5, 1997, and postjudgment 
interest until the award was fully paid.  Both the Whiteheads 
and the co-executors appealed the final order and we denied an 
appeal to the Whiteheads, but awarded an appeal to the co-
executors. 
 
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The co-executors claim that the trial court erred in 
holding that the right of first refusal held by the Whiteheads 
was valid and enforceable, and that the trial court erred in 
holding that the agreement between Sowers and the Whiteheads was 
binding upon the co-executors. 
II.  Standard of Review 
 
The issues in this appeal present questions of law; 
therefore, we review them under a de novo standard.  
Transcontinental Ins. Co. v. RBMW, Inc., 262 Va. 502, 514, 551 
S.E.2d 313, 319 (2001). 
III.  Analysis 
 
The co-executors assert that “the description of the land 
contained in the agreement [is] so vague and ambiguous as to 
make it nearly impossible to identify the land subject to the 
right of first refusal.”  They further claim that the agreement 
lacks essential terms which render it invalid, specifically, 
provisions concerning notification of potential offers to the 
Whiteheads and details concerning the proper method of response 
of the holder of a first right of refusal.  Additionally, the 
co-executors argue that the agreement lacks a specified time 
period during which the right would remain valid, which they 
claim renders the agreement void as violating the rule against 
perpetuities and as an unlawful restraint against alienation.  
Finally, they maintain that even if the right of first refusal 
 
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is valid and enforceable, it is not binding upon them because 
the agreement was personal to Sowers. 
 
The Whiteheads assert that the description of the property 
subject to the right of first refusal is sufficient because the 
property can be located with the aid of extrinsic evidence.  
They further argue that a right of first refusal need not 
include information about notification, provisions about how and 
when the holder must exercise the right, or a duration 
limitation of the right.  Finally, the Whiteheads claim that 
Sowers’ death did not terminate her contractual obligations; 
therefore, the co-executors are bound by the Whiteheads’ right 
of first refusal.  We agree with the Whiteheads. 
 
In a deed conveying land or an interest in land, the main 
object of the description “is not in and of itself to identify 
the land sold . . . but to furnish the means of identification, 
and when this is done it is sufficient.”  Harper v. Wallerstein, 
122 Va. 274, 278, 94 S.E. 781, 782 (1918) (citing Thorn v. 
Phares, 35 W. Va. 771, 782, 14 S.E. 399, 405 (1891)).  The 
description of the subject property must be sufficient “to 
afford the means, with the aid of extrinsic evidence, of 
ascertaining with accuracy what is conveyed and where it is.”  
Smith v. Bailey, 141 Va. 757, 768, 127 S.E. 89, 93 (1925) 
(citing Merritt v. Bunting, 107 Va. 174, 179, 57 S.E. 567, 568 
(1907)).  “The description need not be given with such 
 
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particularity as to make a resort to extrinsic evidence 
[unnecessary].”  Pavlock v. Gallop, 207 Va. 989, 993, 154 S.E.2d 
153, 156 (1967) (citing Grayson Lumber Co. v. Young, 118 Va. 
122, 126, 86 S.E. 826, 827 (1915)). 
 
In the present case, an expert in land surveying testified 
that the description in the agreement was sufficient to allow 
him to identify the subject property.  He explained that he 
identified the property by looking at the agreement along with 
extrinsic evidence including land records and the plat 
referenced in the agreement.  Accordingly, the description in 
the agreement satisfies the legal requirements for conveying or 
transferring an interest in land. 
 
The co-executors also argue that the Whiteheads’ right of 
first refusal lacks essential terms, including provisions about 
notification to the Whiteheads and details about how the 
Whiteheads were to respond.  This Court addressed issues similar 
to these in Landa v. Century 21 Simmons & Co., 237 Va. 374, 377 
S.E.2d 416 (1989). 
 
In Landa, the contract at issue stated:  “Purchaser to have 
first option on remaining tract.  Notice must be in writing to 
3018 Boulevard, Col. Hgts.”  Id. at 378, 377 S.E.2d at 418.  
Although called a “first option,” we held that the right 
expressed was a right of first refusal.  The trial court found 
the contractual provisions “incomplete and uncertain” because 
 
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they failed to define “the remaining tract,” failed to specify 
the right’s duration and whether the right survived settlement, 
and failed to set a price.  Id. at 380, 377 S.E.2d at 419.  In 
reversing the judgment of the trial court, we observed that a 
right of first refusal is included in a contract for the benefit 
of the person who is given the right and, therefore, must “be 
interpreted with that purpose in mind.”  Id.  A right of first 
refusal limits a property owner’s right “to dispose freely of 
his property by compelling him to offer it first to the party 
who has the first right to buy.”  Id. at 381, 377 S.E.2d at 420 
(quoting 11 Samuel Williston, Williston on Contracts § 1441A (3d 
ed. 1968)); see also Cities Service Oil Co. v. Estes, 208 Va. 
44, 47, 155 S.E.2d 59, 62 (1967).  The nature of the right makes 
it unnecessary for the terms of a future offer to be known in 
advance.  Landa, 237 Va. at 381, 377 S.E.2d at 420.  Therefore, 
we held that the trial court erred in ruling that the right of 
first refusal was uncertain and indefinite because “the terms of 
the contract to be specifically enforced are determined from the 
offer whose terms the holder of the right of refusal agrees to 
meet.”  Id. at 383, 377 S.E.2d at 421.  In this case, the 
deficiencies alleged by the co-executors are not fatal to the 
validity of the right of first refusal. 
 
Additionally, the co-executors argue that the failure to 
specify duration “raises the possibility that the right of first 
 
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refusal is void as an unlawful restraint against alienation and 
violative of the Rule Against Perpetuities.”  In Landa we 
rejected the argument that failure to specify a duration for a 
right of first refusal invalidated the right.  237 Va. at 380, 
377 S.E.2d at 419. 
We have recognized that rights of first refusal are subject 
to the rule against perpetuities; therefore, a right is void ab 
initio if, at its creation, there is a possibility the right 
might not be exercised until after the expiration of the time 
period fixed by the rule, which is measured by a life or lives 
in being plus 21 years and 10 months.  Lake of the Woods Ass’n, 
Inc. v. McHugh, 238 Va. 1, 4-5, 13, 380 S.E.2d 872, 873, 874-75 
(1989); United Virginia Bank v. Union Oil, 214 Va. 48, 51, 197 
S.E.2d 174, 177 (1973).  The right of first refusal in the case 
before us was specifically granted to “Charles Whitehead and 
Martha A. Whitehead, or the survivor.”  The relevant lives in 
being at the time of the grant were Sowers and the Whiteheads, 
and the right vested at the time of the execution of the 
agreement. 
 
Finally, the co-executors argue that the right of first 
refusal is invalid because there are no specific provisions for 
notice to the holders of the right and no specific requirements 
for a time to respond to the notice.  The co-executors cite no 
cases in support of their argument and we can find none.  
 
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Additionally, when a contract does not provide a time within 
which a party must act, the law will imply a reasonable time 
within which to do so.  Merriman v. Cover, Drayton & Leonard, 
104 Va. 428, 442, 51 S.E. 817, 821 (1905). 
 
We hold that the Whiteheads’ right of first refusal 
includes a sufficient description of the property and does not 
lack any essential terms.  Furthermore, the lack of a duration 
limitation does not violate the rule against perpetuities or 
create an unlawful restraint against alienation.  Accordingly, 
the Whiteheads’ right of first refusal is valid and enforceable. 
 
We must now decide whether the right is binding upon the 
co-executors of Sowers’ estate.  In Looney v. Belcher, 169 Va. 
160, 170-71, 192 S.E. 891, 895 (1937) we recognized: 
It is a presumption of law that the parties to a 
contract bind not only themselves but their 
personal representatives.  Executors, therefore, 
are held to be liable on all contracts of the 
testator which are broken in his lifetime, and, 
with the exception of contracts in which personal 
skill or taste is required, on all contracts 
broken after his death. 
 
(Quoting United States v. Chain, 300 U.S. 31, 35 (1937)). 
 
 
We examine the facts and circumstances of each particular 
case to determine whether a contract is purely personal in 
nature.  Moore v. Crutchfield, 136 Va. 20, 25, 116 S.E. 482, 483 
(1923).  Contracts requiring artistic or mechanical skill, 
ability, or training are generally considered personal 
 
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contracts, where the death of the promisor results in discharge 
of the obligation.  14 Corbin on Contracts § 75.2 at 127 (James 
P. Nehf, ed. 2001). 
 
In the present case, Sowers granted the Whiteheads an 
interest in land.  A contract granting an interest in land does 
not involve any special skills or training; thus, it does not 
have the characteristics of a personal contract and the death of 
the promisor does not discharge the obligation.  Therefore, 
Sowers’ estate is bound by the contract which granted the 
Whiteheads their valid and enforceable right of first refusal. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 
court. 
Affirmed.
 
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