Title: GOLDSMITH v. CITY OF ARDMORE
Citation: 136 Okla. 201, 1929 OK 124, 277 P. 23 0
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: March 19, 1929

GOLDSMITH v. CITY OF ARDMORE Annotate this Case GOLDSMITH v. CITY OF ARDMORE 1929 OK 124 277 P. 230 136 Okla. 201 Case Number: 20126 Decided: 03/19/1929 Supreme Court of Oklahoma GOLDSMITH et al. v. CITY OF ARDMORE et al. Syllabus ¶0 1. Injunction--Function of Restraining Order--When Order of Dissolution Unnecessary. The purpose of a restraining order is to maintain the subject of controversy in status quo until such time as may be designated therein or until a hearing may be had and the right of an injunction determined, and when such condition shall have obtained, the force and effect of a restraining order is spent and no order dissolving the same is necessary. 2. Injunction--Writ not Issued to Restrain What Is Already Done. A court will not entertain an action to enjoin a party from doing that which he has already done. 3. Appeal and Error -- Dismissal -- Moot Questions. When a question presented by an appeal has become moot, the appeal will be dismissed. Error from District Court, Carter County; John B. Ogden, Judge. Action by J. Goldsmith et al. against the City of Ardmore et al. From judgment denying injunction, plaintiffs appeal. Dismissed. Sigler & Jackson, for plaintiffs in error. Russell B. Brown and Champion, Champion & Fischl, for defendants in error. PER CURIAM. ¶1 This is an appeal from an order and judgment of the district court of Carter county rendered in an action wherein the plaintiffs in error were plaintiffs, and the defendants in error were defendants. ¶2 The plaintiffs sought an injunction against the defendants and each of them from issuing bonds for the laying of concrete slabs on certain streets in the city of Ardmore. The issues were joined in the action and a hearing had upon the application for temporary restraining order, at the conclusion of which the court, on the 3rd day of January, 1929, ordered and directed that a temporary restraining order be issued in said cause restraining the defendant city of Ardmore from issuing pavement bonds against the property of the plaintiffs described in the petition. On the same day the defendants filed their motion to dissolve said restraining order, and upon agreement of the parties the cause was submitted to the court on the motion to dissolve the restraining order and final trial upon the same testimony was taken upon the application of the plaintiffs for temporary restraining order, and upon such submission the court dissolved the restraining order and denied the injunction. The plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial, which was by the court, on the same day, overruled, notice of appeal given in open court, and time given in which to make and serve case-made. The court further ordered that the plaintiffs have 5 days to make the supersedeas bond in the sum of $ 500. From the action of the trial court dissolving said restraining order and denying said injunction, plaintiffs in error appeal. ¶3 The defendants have filed herein their motion to dismiss the appeal upon the grounds that the question raised in this appeal has become moot for the reason that the plaintiffs failed to file supersedeas bond as ordered by the court and the paving bonds have been issued. ¶4 Under the provisions of section 405, C. O. S. 1921, a temporary injunction may be granted at the time of the filing of the petition or during the litigation to restrain the act complained of, under the conditions therein set forth. In the case of Ex parte Grimes et al., 20 Okla. 446 , 94 P. 668, this court held that section 405, supra, should be construed in conjunction with section 415, which provides that no injunction, unless otherwise provided by special statute, shall operate until party obtaining the same shall give an undertaking as conditioned therein. The record in this cause discloses that no undertaking was ever filed in said cause, and the restraining order issued on the 3rd day of January, 1929, was not a temporary injunction, but it appears to have been issued under and by virtue of the provisions of section 408, C. O. S. 1921, as the parties in this cause had answered. Said section provides that an injunction shall not be granted against a party who has answered, unless upon notice, but such party may be restrained until the decision of the application for an injunction. In Cyc., vol. 22, page 745, a restraining order is defined as an order granted to maintain the subject of controversy in status quo until a hearing on an application for temporary injunction. Its purpose is merely to suspend proceedings until there may be an opportunity to inquire whether any injunction should be granted, and it is not intended as an injunction pendente lite. ¶5 When the cause was by agreement submitted to the court upon the evidence already produced by the parties, and the court rendered its decision, the restraining order theretofore issued had spent its force and effect and the cause rested upon the order denying an injunction, and the appeal lodged in this court is therefore from the order denying the injunction, and does not come within the provisions of section 809, C. O. S. 1921, which provides that when an order discharging or modifying a temporary injunction shall be made in any case and the parties who obtain such an injunction shall except to the order for the purpose of having the same reviewed in the Supreme Court upon petition in error, the judge shall fix the time, not exceeding 30 days therefrom, within which to file a petition in error in this court, and during such time the execution of said order shall be suspended and until the decision of the case upon the petition in error, if the same shall be filed. The record in this cause does not disclose that any supersedeas bond was filed as required by the order of the court, and this court in the case of Patterson et al. v. Riley et al., 46 Okla. 205 , 148 P. 169, held that: