Title: Hawthorn v. City of Richmond
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 960261
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 18, 1997

Present:  All the Justices 
 
BRIAN K. HAWTHORN 
                                           OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 960261 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 
                                          April 18, 1997       
CITY OF RICHMOND 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
 
Randall G. Johnson, Judge 
 
 
This is an appeal in a personal injury action brought by 
Brian K. Hawthorn (Hawthorn) against the City of Richmond (the 
City).  Because the case was decided below on demurrer, we accept 
as true the well-pleaded facts set forth in Hawthorn's motion for 
judgment.  Russo v. White, 241 Va. 23, 24, 400 S.E.2d 160, 161 
(1991). 
 
The City owns and operates a park on Belle Island in the 
James River containing paths designed for bicycling, running, and 
walking.  One of the paths slopes downward and, as it emerges 
from a wooded area, curves abruptly and sharply to the left along 
the edge of a steep cliff.  On August 8, 1993, Hawthorn rode his 
bicycle along this path, fell over the cliff, and injured 
himself.  At the time of the accident, no barrier or guardrail 
existed to prevent Hawthorn from plummeting over the cliff, and 
no signs were posted warning of danger.    
 
Hawthorn's motion for judgment contained two counts.  In 
Count I, entitled "Negligence and Nuisance," Hawthorn alleged 
that the City was negligent in failing "to use reasonable care to 
maintain the path in a reasonably safe condition for public use 
or, in the alternative, to warn of any dangers which might exist 
upon the path."  Hawthorn also alleged in Count I that the path 
was "dangerous, faulty, defective and hazardous in itself."  In 
Count II, entitled "Gross Negligence," Hawthorn alleged that the 
City's acts were "so willful and wanton as to evince a conscious 
disregard of the rights of others, as well as malicious conduct." 
 
The City demurred on the ground that, at most, the motion 
for judgment stated a cause of action for simple or ordinary 
negligence and that Code § 15.1-291 grants a municipality 
immunity from all liability for damages resulting from injury 
caused by any act or omission constituting simple or ordinary 
negligence in the maintenance or operation of a park or other 
recreational facility.  The trial court sustained the demurrer 
with respect to Count I and dismissed that count but overruled 
the demurrer with respect to Count II.  Later, the court 
dismissed Count II on Hawthorn's own motion.  We awarded Hawthorn 
an appeal from the final order dismissing Count I. 
 
In pertinent part, Code § 15.1-291 provides as follows: 
 
No city or town which shall operate any . . . park 
. . . or other recreational facility shall be liable in 
any civil action or proceeding for damages resulting 
from any injury to the person or property of any person 
caused by any act or omission constituting simple or 
ordinary negligence on the part of any officer or agent 
of such city or town in the maintenance or operation of 
any such recreational facility.  Every such city or 
town shall, however, be liable in damages for the gross 
or wanton negligence of any of its officers or agents 
in the maintenance or operation of any such 
recreational facility. 
 
 
 
The immunity created by this section is hereby 
conferred upon counties in addition to, and not 
limiting on, other immunity existing at common law or 
by statute. 
 
 
Hawthorn contends that this Court "has long recognized a 
municipal corporation has no immunity for creating or maintaining 
a nuisance," yet the trial court "reversed over one hundred years 
of common law holding cities have no immunity for negligent 
creation of nuisances in any context."  Hawthorn complains the 
trial court incorrectly interpreted Code § 15.1-291 "to grant 
nuisance immunity in the operation of recreational facilities, 
even though the statute fails to mention causes of action for 
nuisance and refers only to acts or omissions caused by simple or 
ordinary negligence."   
 
Hawthorn argues that in sustaining the City's demurrer with 
respect to Count I, the trial court improperly emphasized the 
portion of the statutory language relating to "injury . . . 
caused by . . . negligence" and "essentially treated [his] cause 
of action for nuisance as a cause of action for negligence."  He 
seeks to recover, Hawthorn says, not for an injury caused by 
negligence but for one caused by "a condition hazardous in itself 
 -- i.e., a nuisance," and Code § 15.1-291 "limits immunity to 
injuries caused by acts constituting simple or ordinary 
negligence and does not apply to injuries caused by a nuisance."  
 
Hawthorn acknowledges that when a municipality is authorized 
by law to perform a particular act, it cannot be held liable for 
maintaining or operating a nuisance unless the act is negligently 
performed.  City of Newport News v. Hertzler, 216 Va. 587, 595, 
221 S.E.2d 146, 151 (1976);
1  City of Virginia Beach v. Virginia 
                     
    
1 On brief, Hawthorn says that this Court failed to 
apply Code § 15.1-291 in Hertzler and that this failure 
suggests "the statute does not grant immunity from 
liability for creating a nuisance."  However, Code 
§ 15.1-291 was not in issue in Hertzler; it was not 
cited in the briefs filed by the parties in that case 
and was not mentioned in the opinion. 
Beach Steel Fishing Pier, Inc., 212 Va. 425, 427, 184 S.E.2d 749, 
750-51 (1971).  Hawthorn does not question the authority of the 
City to maintain and operate the park, but he argues that 
negligence and nuisance are distinct causes of action and that 
reliance on negligent acts does not transform a nuisance cause of 
action into a negligence cause of action.  "Likewise," Hawthorn 
opines, "the fact negligent acts created the alleged nuisance 
here does not mean § 15.1-291 applies to an injury caused by a 
nuisance."
2
 
We agree with Hawthorn that, ordinarily, a municipal 
corporation has no immunity from liability for injury caused by a 
nuisance.  City of Portsmouth v. Weiss, 145 Va. 94, 109, 133 S.E. 
781, 786 (1926); see Chalkley v. City of Richmond, 88 Va. 402, 
409, 14 S.E. 339, 341-42 (1891).  We are of opinion, however, 
that in the enactment of Code § 15.1-291, the General Assembly 
has created a clear exception to the no-immunity rule in nuisance 
actions against municipalities so far as recreational facilities 
are concerned and thus has abrogated the common law to that 
extent.  See Boyd v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 346, 349, 374 S.E.2d 
301, 302 (1988). 
 
We also agree with Hawthorn that nuisance and negligence are 
distinct legal concepts.  Chapman v. City of Virginia Beach, 252 
                     
    
2 In support of his argument in the text, Hawthorn 
cites Taylor v. City of Charlottesville, 240 Va. 367, 
397 S.E.2d 832 (1990).  But Taylor involved a nuisance 
in the form of a dangerous condition adjacent to a 
public highway, not in a recreational facility, and the 
case was decided on common law principles, not under a 
legislative 
provision 
similar 
to 
Code 
§ 15.1-291.  
Hence, Taylor is inapposite. 
Va. 186, 192, 475 S.E.2d 798, 802 (1996).
3  But it does not 
obliterate the distinction between the two concepts to say, as it 
must be said, that negligence is an essential element or 
component of nuisance when one seeks to hold a municipality 
liable for maintaining or operating a nuisance.  
 
We further agree with Hawthorn that Code § 15.1-291 does not 
mention a cause of action for nuisance by name.  However, the 
statute states that the immunity granted therein applies in "any 
civil action or proceeding," and this language is broad enough to 
encompass actions for both negligence and nuisance. 
 
In this case, the negligence representing the essential 
element or component of Hawthorn's nuisance cause of action is 
the City's failure to provide a barrier or guardrail to prevent 
him from plummeting over the cliff and the failure to post signs 
warning of the presence of danger.  It was these very acts or 
omissions that caused Hawthorn's injury, and since they were 
pleaded in Count I as constituting only simple or ordinary 
negligence, the City is entitled to the grant of immunity 
provided by Code § 15.1-291.  
 
Hawthorn argues, however, that it is improper to interpret 
Code § 15.1-291 as applicable to any civil action "'in which 
negligence is a component or element.'"  Hawthorn says that "the 
                     
    
3 Hawthorn states on brief that this Court's 
guidance in Chapman "on the distinction between a cause 
of action for negligence and a cause of action for 
nuisance casts light on the issue at bar."  However, in 
Chapman, we did not address the "issue at bar" because 
it was "not [then] ripe for resolution."  252 Va. at 
193, 475 S.E.2d at 802. 
mere fact negligence is an element of a cause of action for 
nuisance against a city should not affect the application of 
§15.1-291 because, on its face, it applies to damages caused by 
negligence alone and does not refer to a cause of action for 
nuisance."  Hawthorn submits that if the General Assembly "had 
intended to include actions in which negligence was merely a 
component or element . . . it could have included those actions 
under the statute."  The General Assembly did not make that 
inclusion, Hawthorn submits, "because the purpose of the statute 
was merely to create a higher standard of proof in negligence 
cases, not in nuisance cases." 
 
In Frazier v. City of Norfolk, 234 Va. 388, 362 S.E.2d 688 
(1987), we discussed the General Assembly's intent in enacting 
what is now Code § 15.1-291.  Although Frazier did not involve a 
cause of action for nuisance, what we said there concerning the 
Code section applies with equal force here: 
 
The statute was enacted shortly after this Court 
decided Hoggard v. City of Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 200 
S.E. 610 (1939).  There, in a 4-3 decision imposing 
tort liability upon a city, the Court held that a 
municipality acted in a ministerial and not 
governmental capacity when operating a bathing and 
swimming pool, although it did not derive any pecuniary 
advantage from the activity. . . . 
 
 
[W]e conclude that the General Assembly intended to 
limit the civil liability of municipalities in the 
maintenance and operation of [any] recreational 
facilities to cases of gross or wanton negligence.  
That is what the legislature said in plain terms [and] 
there is no necessity to resort to maxims of statutory 
construction or to employ other devices to ascertain 
legislative intent. 
 
234 Va. at 391, 362 S.E.2d at 690. 
 
Finally, Hawthorn contends that in his motion for judgment, 
he alleged a cause of action for the "negligent creation of a 
nuisance, in addition to the [negligent] maintenance and 
operation thereof," and that Code § 15.1-291 "grants immunity 
only for maintenance and operation of recreation facilities, not 
for the negligent creation of those facilities."  Hence, Hawthorn 
concludes, his claim for negligent creation "falls outside the 
statute's parameters of immunity." 
 
It is not at all certain that Hawthorn's motion for judgment 
alleges a cause of action for the negligent creation of a 
nuisance, separate and apart from a cause of action for the 
negligent maintenance and operation of a nuisance.  Only a terse 
statement in the concluding paragraph of Count I that he was 
injured "[a]s a proximate result of the negligence of the City in 
creating, maintaining, and opening the path to bicyclists," 
indicates that negligent creation is included as a basis for 
recovery. 
 
Be that as it may, we will assume for the purposes of this 
discussion that the motion for judgment does state a cause of 
action for negligent creation.  The fact remains that the only 
acts or omissions on the part of the City that Hawthorn alleges 
in his motion for judgment are the failure to provide a barrier 
or guardrail to prevent him from plummeting over the cliff and 
the failure to post signs warning of danger.  Therefore, it is 
upon these acts or omissions that Hawthorn must rely to support a 
cause of action for the negligent creation of a nuisance.  But 
they are the identical acts or omissions he must rely upon to 
support a cause of action for negligent maintenance or operation 
of a nuisance, for which, as demonstrated earlier in this 
opinion, the City is immune from liability. 
 
We will not presume that when the General Assembly enacted 
Code § 15.1-291, it intended in circumstances like those present 
here that immunity would be granted with one hand and taken away 
with the other.  Indeed, such a presumption would be improper in 
light of our conclusion in Frazier that the General Assembly 
intended in its enactment of Code § 15.1-291 "to limit the civil 
liability of municipalities in the maintenance and operation of 
[any] recreational facilities to cases of gross or wanton 
negligence."  234 Va. at 391, 362 S.E.2d at 690.  It would thwart 
this legislative intent to say now that municipalities, when 
creating recreational facilities, have no immunity from liability 
for the identical acts or omissions from which they would be 
immune when maintaining or operating the same facilities.  
Accordingly, we reject Hawthorn's argument that his claim for 
negligent creation "falls outside the statute's parameters of 
immunity."  
 
For the reasons assigned, we will affirm the judgment of the 
trial court. 
 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE STEPHENSON, with whom JUSTICE HASSELL joins, dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
It is well established, as the majority acknowledges, that 
actions based upon negligence and actions based upon negligently 
creating and maintaining a public nuisance are separate and 
distinct causes of action.  Chapman v. City of Virginia Beach, 
252 Va. 186, 192, 475 S.E.2d 798, 802 (1996); Taylor v. City of 
Charlottesville, 240 Va. 367, 372-74, 397 S.E.2d 832, 835-37 
(1990).  Indeed, as Chief Justice Carrico said in Finley, Inc. v. 
Waddell, 207 Va. 602, 610, 151 S.E.2d 347, 353 (1966), "[t]he 
torts of nuisance and negligence are distinct and differ in their 
nature and consequences."   
 
It is equally well established that a municipal corporation 
is immune from liability for claims caused by ordinary negligence 
if it is engaged in a governmental function; however, a municipal 
corporation is not immune from liability for negligence when it 
performs a proprietary function.  Taylor, 240 Va. at 370, 397 
S.E.2d at 834.  Also, a municipal corporation ordinarily is not 
immune from liability for negligently creating and maintaining a 
public nuisance whether it is performing either a governmental or 
a proprietary function.  Id. at 373, 397 S.E.2d at 836. 
 
Statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly 
construed, and the common law will not be considered changed by 
statute unless the legislative intent is clearly evident.  
Moreover, there is a presumption that no change in the common law 
is intended by the legislature; therefore, any change in the 
common-law rule is limited to what is expressly stated in the 
statute or what is necessarily implied therefrom.  Indeed, 
"[w]hen an enactment does not encompass the entire subject 
covered by the common law, it abrogates the common-law rule only 
to the extent that its terms are directly and irreconcilably 
opposed to the rule."  Boyd v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 346, 349, 
374 S.E.2d 301, 302 (1988).  Additionally, a court must presume 
that the General Assembly acted with full knowledge of the strict 
construction that must be given to a statute that is in 
derogation of the common law.  Hannabass v. Ryan, 164 Va. 519, 
525, 180 S.E. 416, 418 (1935). 
 
Code § 15.1-291 is in derogation of the common law, and the 
issue in the present case is whether the statute, when strictly 
construed, directly and irreconcilably changes the common law.  
Code § 15.1-291, in clear, plain language, limits immunity to 
injuries "caused by any act or omission constituting simple or 
ordinary negligence."  (Emphasis added.)  The statute makes no 
mention, however, of immunity from liability for nuisance, 
although the General Assembly is presumed to have known that 
negligence and nuisance are separate and distinct causes of 
action. 
 
The majority, focusing on only a portion of Code § 15.1-291, 
states that the statute grants immunity in "`any civil action or 
proceeding'" and concludes that "this language is broad enough to 
encompass actions for both negligence and nuisance."  I would 
agree with that conclusion if that were all the section states.  
As previously noted, however, the statute further states that the 
immunity granted is limited to injuries caused by simple or 
ordinary negligence.  In enacting Code § 15.1-291, the General 
Assembly could have granted immunity from liability for injuries 
caused by the creation and maintenance of a nuisance.  It did not 
do so, and I submit that this Court also should not do so.