Title: DeWeese-Boyd v. Gordon College
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12988
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 5, 2021

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12988 
 
MARGARET DeWEESE-BOYD  vs.  GORDON COLLEGE & others.1 
 
 
 
Essex.     January 4, 2021. - March 5, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Religion.  Constitutional Law, Freedom of religion.  Anti-
Discrimination Law, Religious beliefs, Employment.  
Employment, Discrimination. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 13, 2017. 
 
 
The case was heard by Jeffrey T. Karp, J., on motions for 
summary judgment, and a question of law was reported by him to 
the Appeals Court. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Eric S. Baxter, of the District of Columbia, for the 
defendants. 
 
Hillary Schwab for the plaintiff. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Julia E. Schlozman for Jewish Alliance for Law and Social 
Action & others. 
 
Risa Lieberwitz, of Florida, Aaron Nisenson & Nancy Long, 
of the District of Columbia, Donald J. Siegel, James A.W. Shaw, 
 
 
1 D. Michael Lindsay and Janel Curry. 
2 
 
 
& Jasper Groner for American Association of University 
Professors. 
 
Gene C. Schaerr, of the District of Columbia, & Dwight G. 
Duncan for Council for Christian Colleges and Universities & 
others. 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, David C. Kravitz, Deputy 
State Solicitor, & Abigail B. Taylor, Assistant Attorney 
General, for the Attorney General. 
 
Anne L. Josephson for the Charles Hamilton Houston 
Institute for Race and Justice & others. 
 
Blaine H. Evanson & Paige Muhlestein, of California, Vince 
Eisinger, of New York, & Joshua S. Lipshutz for Jewish Coalition 
for Religious Liberty & another. 
 
Michael Francisco, of Colorado, for Robert F. Cochran, Jr., 
& others. 
 
Ruth A. Bourquin for American Civil Liberties Union of 
Massachusetts, Inc. 
 
Ryan P. McManus & Michael J. Puzo for Roman Catholic 
Archdiocese of Boston. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  This case requires us to assess, in light of 
the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Our Lady of 
Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020) (Our 
Lady of Guadalupe), whether the ministerial exception applies to 
an associate professor of social work at a private Christian 
liberal arts college.  When the ministerial exception applies, 
the employee may not claim important protections of civil law 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of any protected factor, 
such as race, religion, national origin, sex, or sexual 
orientation.  Such exceptional treatment is deemed necessary to 
protect our religious institutions against interference by civil 
authorities in the selection of those who minister to their 
faithful.  We are thus presented with a potential conflict 
3 
 
 
between two fundamental American legal principles.  The 
application of the ministerial exception could eclipse, and 
thereby eliminate, civil law protection against discrimination 
within a religious institution; in contrast, the decision not to 
apply the exception could allow civil authorities to interfere 
with who is chosen to propagate religious doctrine, a violation 
of our country's historic understanding of the separation of 
church and State set out in the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  Unfortunately, the parameters of the 
exception -- that is to say, who is covered by the ministerial 
exception -- remain somewhat unclear. 
We conclude that Gordon College (Gordon) is a religious 
institution, but that the plaintiff, Margaret DeWeese-Boyd, is 
not a ministerial employee.  Her duties as an associate 
professor of social work differ significantly from cases where 
the ministerial exception has been applied, as she did not teach 
religion or religious texts, lead her students in prayer, take 
students to chapel services or other religious services, deliver 
sermons at chapel services, or select liturgy, all of which have 
been important, albeit not dispositive, factors in the Supreme 
Court's functional analysis.  The most difficult issue for us is 
how to evaluate her responsibility to integrate her Christian 
faith into her teaching and scholarship as a professor of social 
work. 
4 
 
 
 
The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the 
significance of the responsibility to integrate religious faith 
into instruction and scholarship that would otherwise not be 
considered ministerial.  If this integration responsibility is 
sufficient to render a teacher a minister within the meaning of 
the exception, the ministerial exception would be significantly 
expanded beyond those employees currently identified as 
ministerial by the Supreme Court.  The number of employees 
playing key ministerial roles in religious institutions would be 
greatly increased.  In fact, Gordon has recently attempted to 
describe all of its faculty, and even all of its employees, as 
ministers, over the objection of the faculty itself.  It is our 
understanding that the ministerial exception defined by the 
Supreme Court is more circumscribed.2 
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Roman 
Catholic Archdiocese of Boston; by Jewish Coalition for 
Religious Liberty and Agudath Israel of America; by the Attorney 
General; by Jewish Alliance for Law and Social Action, Clergy 
and Laity United for Economic Justice, Keshet, National Council 
of Jewish Women, New England Jewish Labor Committee, T'ruah:  
the Rabbinic Call for Human Rights, and Unitarian Universalist 
Massachusetts Action Network; by the Charles Hamilton Houston 
Institute for Race and Justice, GLBTQ Legal Advocates & 
Defenders, Lawyers for Civil Rights, Massachusetts Employment 
Lawyers Association, National Association of Social Workers, and 
Union of Minority Neighborhoods; by American Association of 
University Professors; by the Council for Christian Colleges and 
Universities and forty-six individual religious colleges and 
universities; by American Civil Liberties Union of 
Massachusetts, Inc.; and by four religious liberty scholars. 
5 
 
 
 
1.  Procedural history.  In September 2017, DeWeese-Boyd, a 
tenured associate professor of social work at Gordon, commenced 
a civil action against Gordon and its president (D. Michael 
Lindsay) and provost (Janel Curry).  She alleged in her 
complaint that the defendants unlawfully retaliated against her 
for her vocal opposition to Gordon's policies and practices 
regarding individuals who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender, or queer (or questioning), and others (LGBTQ+ 
persons), by denying her application for promotion to full 
professor, despite the fact that the faculty senate unanimously 
recommended her for the promotion.  Specifically, she alleged 
unlawful retaliation in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 9; 
unlawful discrimination on the basis of her association with 
LGBTQ+ persons or on the basis of her gender in violation of 
G. L. c. 151B, § 9; as to the individual defendants, aiding and 
abetting discriminatory and retaliatory acts and interference 
with her rights in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4; violation of 
the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA), G. L. c. 12, §§ 11H, 
11I; breach of contract; breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing; and tortious interference with 
contractual or advantageous relations. 
 
The parties cross-moved for summary judgment on the 
question whether the ministerial exception, which prohibits 
government interference with employment relationships between 
6 
 
 
religious institutions and their ministerial employees, barred 
the plaintiff's claims.  See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & Sch. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 565 U.S. 
171, 188-189 (2012) (Hosanna-Tabor).  On April 3, 2020, a 
Superior Court judge allowed the plaintiff's motion and denied 
the defendants' motion, concluding that Gordon is a religious 
institution but DeWeese-Boyd was not a ministerial employee.  On 
April 24, 2020, the same judge granted the defendants' motion to 
report to the Appeals Court the question whether the dismissal 
of the defendants' summary judgment motion was error.3  We 
subsequently allowed Gordon's application for direct appellate 
review. 
 
2.  Factual background.  a.  Gordon.  i.  History and 
guiding principles.  Gordon is a private, nondenominational 
Christian liberal arts college in Wenham.4  It was chartered by 
the Commonwealth in 1889 "for the purpose of carrying on the 
educational work begun . . . by the Reverend Adoniram Judson 
 
 
3 The reported question asks:  "Did the [c]ourt err in 
dismissing on summary judgement the affirmative defense of the 
ministerial exception which was recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court for the first time in [Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 
188-190]?" 
 
 
4 Gordon is distinct from Gordon-Conwell Theological 
Seminary, which was formed after Gordon's divinity school 
separated from Gordon in 1970. 
 
7 
 
 
Gordon."5  Its mission is "to graduate men and women 
distinguished by intellectual maturity and Christian character, 
committed to lives of service and prepared for leadership 
worldwide."  Gordon's bylaws state that Gordon is dedicated to 
both "[t]he historic, evangelical, biblical faith" and 
"[e]ducation, not indoctrination." 
 
Gordon's Administrative/Faculty Handbook (handbook) 
indicates that it is "a Christian community, distinguished from 
other Christian communities by its primary commitment to provide 
a liberal arts education."  Community members, including 
faculty, must affirm Gordon's Statement of Faith and agree to 
abide by the behavioral standards in Gordon's Statement on Life 
and Conduct.  Each undergraduate must be able to describe their 
faith and must complete Gordon's core curriculum, which 
"explores the liberal arts and sciences from a Christian 
perspective."6  Lindsay testified, "[A]t Gordon there are no 
nonsacred disciplines. . . .  Every subject matter that we 
pursue is informed by, shaped by, the Christian tradition." 
 
 
5 Except where otherwise noted, quotations are taken from 
Gordon's Administrative/Faculty Handbook (handbook) and other 
official Gordon materials. 
 
6 The core curriculum includes courses in biblical studies, 
science, history, languages, philosophy, and physical education. 
 
8 
 
 
 
ii.  Social work department.7  The Gordon social work 
program's mission was "the education of men and women for entry 
level, generalist practice in social work within the context of 
a Christian liberal arts institution."  The program's four 
stated goals were the "integration and application of social 
work and Christian values," the "understanding and application 
of a generalist model of social work practice," the "promotion 
of social and economic justice," and the "preparation of 
students who achieve professional competence." 
 
iii.  Faculty.  A.  Faculty responsibilities and tenure 
evaluation.  In the section, "Responsibilities of Faculty," 
Gordon's handbook states: 
"Faculty members at Gordon College are teacher-scholars.  
As an undergraduate liberal arts institution, Gordon values 
faculty who are distinguished by excellence in teaching, 
commitment to mentoring and advising students, and service 
to the College.  Teaching and service also need to be 
continually enriched and informed by an active scholarly 
life. . . .  To prepare students in an academic discipline, 
Gordon faculty need to be sound practitioners of that 
discipline, adding to and applying the knowledge within 
their respective fields of study.  Furthermore, Gordon 
faculty members need to be interpreters of their 
disciplines.  Not only should faculty be able to explain 
current methodologies and theories of their disciplines to 
their students and colleagues, but they should continually 
explore how a Christian worldview enhances, redefines, or 
confronts their discipline's preeminent practices and 
philosophical assumptions." 
 
 
 
7 Gordon eliminated the social work major in 2019, while 
this case was pending. 
9 
 
 
 
Gordon faculty are described in the handbook as "members of 
a community of Christian scholars," and as "committed to imaging 
Christ in all aspects of their educational endeavors."  The 
handbook is clear that Gordon's Christian perspective does not 
limit academic freedom, "but rather provide[s] an integrative 
approach to [the community's] scholarly endeavors." 
 
The handbook divides professors' basic responsibilities -- 
and the bases on which tenure and promotions are evaluated -- 
into three categories:  teaching, scholarly and professional 
activity, and institutional service. 
 
In their role as teachers, faculty effectiveness is 
evaluated in five areas:  (1) self-understanding; (2) course 
design and content; (3) presentation; (4) sensitivity to student 
needs, and (5) integration, in which the faculty member 
a.  "cultivates a sense that 'knowing' is a matter not just 
of the intellect, but also of faith, praxis,[8] and 
intuitive insight"; 
 
b.  "encourages students to uncover, question, and reflect 
on their tacit assumptions about their world"; 
 
c.  "helps students to make inter-curricular connections"; 
 
d.  "helps students make connections between course 
content, Christian thought and principles, and personal 
faith and practice"; and 
 
 
 
8 In a religious or philosophical context, "praxis" often 
means "action which arises from true belief, the manifestation 
of religion in practice."  J. Bowker, The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary of World Religions (2016). 
10 
 
 
e.  "encourages students to develop morally responsible 
ways of living in the world informed by biblical principles 
and Christian reflection." 
 
 
In their role as scholars, faculty are expected to "promote 
understanding of their disciplines from the perspectives of the 
Christian faith and to engage in scholarship, professional 
participation, and dissemination of research and creative work 
appropriate to their disciplines."  The handbook notes that 
scholarship at Gordon can be "integrative scholarship that 
develops Christian perspectives," but can also take other forms 
(specifically, disciplinary, interdisciplinary, or practical 
scholarship). 
 
To satisfy their institutional service responsibilities, 
faculty are expected to serve in a variety of capacities, such 
as attending faculty meetings and serving on departmental 
committees, "guided by a concern to further the mission of 
Gordon." 
 
As faculty members progress through the promotion and 
tenure processes, they are required to detail how they integrate 
faith and learning, including submitting an "integration paper" 
at the end of their third year of appointment.  The faculty 
senate is responsible for making recommendations on applications 
for promotion and tenure. 
 
Curry, Gordon's provost, testified that faculty are not 
required to participate in leading prayers or to attend regular 
11 
 
 
chapel services on campus.  The handbook does not contain any 
specific reference to faculty responsibility for leading 
prayers.9 
 
Lindsay, who became president of Gordon after DeWeese-Boyd 
was hired, testified that when he interviews a faculty member, 
he "will liken joining Gordon College to joining a religious 
order."10  Formal religious training is not, however, required 
for employment at Gordon, although some professors have seminary 
degrees.  Professors with seminary training do not have 
different titles from other professors. 
 
B.  Addition of "minister" to the handbook.  In October 
2016, Gordon added the following language to the handbook: 
"One of the distinctives of Gordon College is that each 
member of faculty is expected to participate actively in 
the spiritual formation of our students into godly, 
biblically-faithful ambassadors for Christ.  Faculty 
members should seek to engage our students in meaningful 
ways to strengthen them in their faith walks with Christ.  
In the Gordon College context, faculty members are both 
educators and ministers to our students." 
 
 
 
9 Lindsay testified that leading students in prayer "would 
be an expectation of the job" of faculty "that I think would be 
communicated in the various opportunities we provide throughout 
the year and in the norms and expectations we have on the 
campus," but he provided no specific reference to what those 
norms and expectations are or how they are communicated other 
than the handbook. 
 
 
10 There is no evidence in the record indicating whether 
such a statement was made to DeWeese-Boyd. 
12 
 
 
 
This language was drafted by Meirwyn Walters, Gordon's 
counsel.  The handbook did not previously use the term 
"minister" to describe faculty.  Faculty were not informed of 
this change to the handbook.  After they discovered the 
language, it was discussed at a faculty meeting in the fall of 
2017, the minutes of which state: 
"The language was composed by Meirwyn, and not the 
administration for legal reasons.  This was due to cultural 
shifts relating to religious liberty to 'shore up' our 
governing documents.  This allows us to trigger judicial 
deference to protect our First Amendment rights. . .  In 
his opinion, this statement does not add anything new to 
faculty responsibilities."11 
 
 
Multiple professors stated in affidavits that there was 
"serious opposition" to the addition of this language, in large 
part due to concerns that it was inaccurate, misleading, and "a 
significant departure from [both] the faculty's own sense of 
their responsibilities and calling at Gordon" and "Gordon's 
long-standing ethos."  The Gordon chapter of the American 
Association of University Professors issued the following formal 
statement in response to the addition: 
"We respectfully disagree with the designation of faculty 
as 'Ministers' in the most recent version of the Faculty 
Handbook. . . .  Adopting the language of 'Minister' in a 
presumed attempt to bring faculty within the scope of the 
Ministerial Exception at best effects a mere change of 
 
 
11 Walters testified that the language "wasn't a change, it 
was an addition of language that captured what the school had 
been doing historically and its expectations of faculty."  
Lindsay testified that this language was an attempt to 
"memorialize what the expectations were of our faculty." 
13 
 
 
label while wrongly describing the faculty role within the 
College.  Attempting to shoehorn faculty into this 
employment category is at odds with our desire to live in a 
distinctive Christian community as 'Teacher-Scholars.'" 
 
 
b.  DeWeese-Boyd.  i.  Employment and promotion history.  
Gordon hired DeWeese-Boyd as an assistant professor in 1998.  
Prior to her employment at Gordon, DeWeese-Boyd worked in the 
mission field; received a master of arts degree in general 
theological studies from Covenant Theological Seminary and a 
master of social work degree from Washington University, both in 
St. Louis, Missouri; and was pursuing a doctoral degree in 
political science from the University of Missouri at St. Louis 
and a doctoral degree in social work from Washington 
University.12  She highlighted all of these experiences in her 
cover letter for a tenure-track position at Gordon. 
 
She also submitted a curriculum vitae, a statement 
regarding her educational philosophy, and an application 
detailing her personal faith, its impact on her scholarship, and 
her view of faculty responsibilities in a Christian higher 
education institution.  In these documents, she listed her 
teaching areas as "social policy; research methods; values and 
ethics; the policy process; political thought; [and] community 
 
 
12 DeWeese-Boyd completed her doctoral degree in political 
science shortly after she was officially hired.  She later 
completed all but her dissertation in pursuit of the doctoral 
degree in social work. 
14 
 
 
development practice and theory."  She also made statements 
regarding faith and her profession, specifically:  "Christians 
have an undeniable call to minister to others"; "[m]y Christian 
commitment affects my scholarship by allowing me to see my work 
as participation in the reform of human society"; and "it is 
. . . the role of the Christian academic to guide and mentor 
each student in such a way as to help her to discern how 
Christianity impacts upon her particular discipline." 
 
In 2002, DeWeese-Boyd submitted a book review as her third-
year integration paper.  The paper reviewed two books, titled, 
"The Paradox of Natural Mothering" and "The Price of Motherhood:  
Why the Most Important Job in the World Is Still the Least 
Valued."  Describing the paper, DeWeese-Boyd wrote:  "[W]hat I 
have submitted is a piece of my work that reflects my 
understanding of integration.  In other words, I have simply 
submitted a piece of my work as a Christian scholar.  It is work 
that I believe to be inherently integrated."  She described the 
paper as integrative scholarship that brings "disciplinary 
insights to a wider Christian audience," as opposed to 
"integrative scholarship [that brings] a decidedly Christian 
perspective to bear on a disciplinary manner," which her paper 
was not. 
15 
 
 
 
DeWeese-Boyd was promoted to associate professor in 2004 
and approved for tenure in 2009.13  In 2016, she applied for a 
promotion to full professor.  Her curriculum vitae accompanying 
her application detailed her work in development of the social 
work program,14 professional memberships, and scholarly 
publications on primarily secular topics.  She also submitted a 
self-evaluation, in which she reflected on her teaching, 
scholarly work, and institutional service. 
 
The faculty senate unanimously recommended her for the 
promotion, noting her teaching effectiveness, contributions to 
scholarship, and leadership as director of the social work 
practicum.  In 2017, Curry and Lindsay decided not to forward 
that recommendation to the board of trustees, citing a lack of 
scholarly productivity, professionalism, responsiveness, and 
engagement.  The letter from Curry detailing the decision did 
 
 
13 For her tenure application, she initially submitted a 
paper on land use and development.  The provost and faculty 
senate asked her to be more explicit in her understanding of 
integration, and she then submitted a different paper, 
"Reflections on Christian Scholarship," for consideration for 
tenure. 
 
 
14 DeWeese-Boyd's curricular contributions included 
increasing the statistics requirements to provide students "with 
a fuller background in social scientific methods and research," 
introducing a course on community and sustainability, creating 
and coordinating a sustainable development minor, and serving as 
the social work practicum director. 
 
16 
 
 
not include any reference to religious or ministerial matters or 
theological disagreement.15 
 
ii.  General role at Gordon.  The terms of DeWeese-Boyd's 
contracts16 state that Gordon employed her as teaching faculty 
and that her responsibilities were governed by the handbook "as 
that may be amended from time to time . . . including 
subscribing to the Statement of Faith and the Life and Conduct 
Statement."  Apart from the reference to the handbook, the 
contracts do not explicitly provide for any spiritual 
responsibilities. 
 
DeWeese-Boyd is not ordained by any church body or 
denomination, nor was she ever formally commissioned or ordained 
as a minister for Gordon.17  She was never required to complete 
education or professional development regarding ministerial 
responsibilities.18  She never viewed herself or held herself out 
 
 
15 DeWeese-Boyd's position was terminated when the social 
work major was cut in 2019, while this case was pending. 
 
 
16 DeWeese-Boyd submitted her contracts for the academic 
years 1998-1999 and 2017-2018 to the court. 
 
17 Although Gordon now holds a "Vision Day" for new faculty, 
which includes prayer and commissioning, Vision Day did not 
exist when DeWeese-Boyd was hired and she did not participate in 
any such commissioning. 
 
 
18 Gordon now conducts seminars concerning the integration 
of faith and learning to assist second-year faculty in writing 
their third-year integration paper, but Gordon did not conduct 
those seminars when DeWeese-Boyd was a second-year faculty, and 
she never attended such a seminar. 
17 
 
 
as a minister for Gordon, nor did she understand her job to 
include responsibility for encouraging students to participate 
in religious life or leading them in spiritual exercises.  She 
did not teach religion or biblical studies to students, take 
students to religious services at Gordon, lead or select content 
for chapel services at Gordon, conduct Bible studies at Gordon, 
or preach at Gordon.  She attended Gordon chapel services 
approximately twice per year. 
 
3.  Discussion.  a.  Ministerial exception.  In Hosanna-
Tabor, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, provided a 
historical explanation of the ministerial exception and how it 
arose out of the English experience of the Crown imposing its 
will on the selection of ecclesiastic offices and the colonists' 
decision to cross the ocean and free themselves "to elect their 
own ministers and establish their own modes of worship."  
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182.  As the Chief Justice further 
explained, 
"The members of a religious group put their faith in the 
hands of their ministers.  Requiring a church to accept or 
retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for 
failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment 
decision.  Such action interferes with the internal 
governance of the church, depriving the church of control 
over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs.  
By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the 
Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group's 
right to shape its own faith and mission through its 
appointments.  According the state the power to determine 
which individuals will minister to the faithful also 
18 
 
 
violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits 
government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions." 
 
Id. at 188-189. 
 
The Supreme Court also recognized the significant 
consequences of the ministerial exception.  Building on a line 
of lower court cases, the Court held that this principle 
provides an affirmative defense available to religious 
institutions, barring employment discrimination claims against 
such an institution by one of its ministers.  Hosanna-Tabor, 565 
U.S. at 188, 195 n.4.  The facts of the various cases before the 
Supreme Court emphasize the serious consequences of the 
exception.  One of the plaintiffs in Our Lady of Guadalupe 
alleged that she was terminated because of her age.  Our Lady of 
Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2057-2058.  Another plaintiff claimed 
that she was terminated because she sought treatment for breast 
cancer.  Id. at 2059.  In the instant case, the plaintiff 
contends that she was terminated on the basis of her association 
with LGBTQ+ persons or on the basis of her gender in violation 
of G. L. c. 151B.  If the ministerial exception applies, even if 
such allegations are true, the religious institution will be 
free to discriminate on those bases.  The same would be true for 
racial discrimination or discrimination on the basis of national 
origin. 
19 
 
 
 
The potential for conflict between these fundamental legal 
principles is therefore obvious and of great concern, not only 
to the individual plaintiffs, but also for our civil society and 
religious institutions.  While "the interest of religious groups 
in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, 
and carry out their mission" is an undoubtedly important First 
Amendment right, so, too, is "[t]he interest of society in the 
enforcement of employment discrimination statutes."  Hosanna-
Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196.  See Bostock v. Clayton County, Ga., 140 
S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020) ("In our time, few pieces of federal 
legislation rank in significance" with legislation outlawing 
"discrimination in the workplace on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin"); Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984) (eliminating discrimination 
"plainly serves compelling state interests of the highest 
order"); Flagg v. AliMed, Inc., 466 Mass. 23, 29 (2013) ("the 
Legislature determined that workplace discrimination harmed not 
only the targeted individuals but the entire social fabric"). 
 
Despite the high stakes, the difficult issue is not at this 
point whether the ministerial exception should be created -- it 
is well established, Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 436 
Mass. 574, 579 (2002) -- or whether it should eclipse and 
thereby eliminate civil law protection against discrimination -- 
it clearly does.  Rather, the difficult issue is who is a 
20 
 
 
minister.  We will return to this issue and address it in detail 
after considering the threshold question, which is whether 
Gordon is a religious institution.  If Gordon is not a religious 
institution, as DeWeese-Boyd contends, a professor of social 
work at the institution is certainly not covered by the 
ministerial exception. 
 
b.  Application to the present case.  i.  Standard of 
review.  We review summary judgment decisions de novo.  
Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Krusell, 485 Mass. 431, 435 (2020). 
"The standard of review of a grant of summary judgment is 
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  
Id., quoting Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 
117, 120 (1991).  We consider the record as a whole and need not 
rely on the same reasoning as the Superior Court judge.  Lynch 
v. Crawford, 483 Mass. 631, 641 (2019). 
 
The employer who asserts the ministerial exception as an 
affirmative defense has the burden of proving it.  Hosanna-
Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195 n.4 (ministerial exception is affirmative 
defense).  See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 2 
(2006) (noting long-established common-law rule that "the one 
relying on an affirmative defense must set it up and establish 
it"). 
21 
 
 
 
ii.  Religious institution.19  The Supreme Court has not 
directly addressed what constitutes a religious institution for 
purposes of the ministerial exception other than a traditional 
church or organized sect.  See Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. 
at 2056 n.3 (plaintiff teachers at Roman Catholic primary school 
employed directly by archdiocese); Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 
177 (defendant "member congregation" of Missouri synod was both 
church and school).  Federal circuit courts have concluded that 
to invoke the exception, an employer need not be a traditional 
religious organization, so long as its "mission is marked by 
clear or obvious religious characteristics."  Conlon v. 
InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA, 777 F.3d 829, 831, 834 
(6th Cir. 2015), quoting Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater 
Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 310 (4th Cir. 2004) (concluding that 
campus ministry whose purpose "is to establish and advance at 
colleges and universities witnessing communities of students and 
faculty who follow Jesus as Savior and Lord:  growing in love 
for God, God's Word, God's people of every ethnicity and culture 
and God's purposes in the world" is religious institution).  See 
 
 
19 The defendants argue that the question whether Gordon is 
a religious institution is not properly before this court given 
that neither party appealed from the judge's ruling that Gordon 
is a religious institution.  However, the reported question -- 
whether the judge erred in applying the ministerial exception 
affirmative defense -- requires a conclusion as to whether 
Gordon is a religious institution. 
22 
 
 
Shaliehsabou, supra at 310-311 (concluding that home whose 
mission "is to provide elder care to 'aged of the Jewish faith 
in accordance with the precepts of Jewish law and customs'" is 
religious institution).  We agree that this is the appropriate 
test and further conclude that Gordon satisfies these 
requirements. 
 
Although the inquiry is particularly straightforward when 
addressing churches, temples, mosques, or religious schools 
affiliated with particular denominations, religious institutions 
are not so limited.  Gordon's nondenominational nature does not 
preclude a finding that it is a religious institution.  As the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained 
in Conlon: 
"[T]he ministerial exception's applicability does not turn 
on its being tied to a specific denominational faith; it 
applies to multidenominational and nondenominational 
religious organizations as well. . . .  [I]n order to 
invoke the exception, an employer need not be a traditional 
religious organization such as a church, diocese, or 
synagogue, or an entity operated by a traditional religious 
organization" (quotation and citation omitted). 
 
Conlon, 777 F.3d at 834.  The Sixth Circuit concluded that 
InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA (InterVarsity), "with not 
only its Christian name, but its mission of Christian ministry 
and teaching," clearly fit the definition of a religious 
institution despite its lack of denominational affiliation or 
hierarchy.  Id.  Like InterVarsity, Gordon has a clear 
23 
 
 
commitment to Christian principles, as well as historical 
religious roots. 
 
DeWeese-Boyd also argues that because Gordon's "primary 
commitment" is to provide a liberal arts education, it is not a 
religious institution.  There is, however, no primary purpose 
requirement.  Gordon identifies as both a Christian college and 
a liberal arts college, as the portion of the handbook the 
plaintiff quotes makes clear:  Gordon is "a Christian community, 
distinguished from other Christian communities by its primary 
commitment to provide a liberal arts education."  The existence 
of one purpose does not negate the other where Gordon's mission 
remains undoubtedly "marked by clear or obvious religious 
characteristics."  Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 310.  All of 
Gordon's governing documents reference religious purposes, and 
all members of the Gordon community, including its faculty, are 
expected to articulate and affirm their faith and abide by 
faith-based behavioral standards.  Upon review of the abundant 
record concerning Gordon's obvious religious character, we 
conclude that it is a religious institution. 
iii.  Ministerial employee.  We now turn to the primary 
issue in this case:  who is covered by the ministerial 
exception.  We look to the two recent ministerial exception 
decisions issued by the Supreme Court, Hosanna-Tabor and Our 
24 
 
 
Lady of Guadalupe, focusing first on the facts and the specific 
holdings.  In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court stated: 
"Every Court of Appeals to have considered the question has 
concluded that the ministerial exception is not limited to 
the head of a religious congregation, and we agree.  We are 
reluctant, however, to adopt a rigid formula for deciding 
when an employee qualifies as a minister.  It is enough for 
us to conclude, in this our first case involving the 
ministerial exception, that the exception covers [the 
plaintiff], given all the circumstances of her employment." 
 
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190. 
 
More specifically, Hosanna-Tabor involved an Evangelical 
Lutheran church and school.  Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 177.  
Cheryl Perich was a "called" teacher, who had undergone formal 
religious training and accepted a formal call to religious 
service.  Id. at 178, 191-192.  Both Perich and her employer 
viewed her as a minister, and her employer commissioned, 
reviewed, and referred to her as such.  Id. at 191-192.  Her 
formal title was "Minister of Religion, Commissioned."  Id. at 
191.  Her job duties included "lead[ing] others toward Christian 
maturity" and "teach[ing] faithfully the Word of God," and to 
this end she taught her students religion, led them in prayer 
three times a day, took them to chapel, and occasionally led the 
chapel service.  Id. at 192.  She also claimed a special housing 
allowance on her taxes that was available only to employees 
earning their compensation "in the exercise of the ministry."  
Id. at 191-192.  In concluding that Perich was a ministerial 
25 
 
 
employee, the Court focused on "the formal title given Perich by 
the Church, the substance reflected in that title, her own use 
of that title, and the important religious functions she 
performed for the Church."  Id. at 192. 
 
Our Lady of Guadalupe involved two teachers at Roman 
Catholic primary schools, Agnes Morrisey-Berru and Kristen Biel, 
who brought actions against their employers after demotion and 
discharge.  Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2056-2059.  The 
Court recognized the vital importance of education in the faith 
to many religions and applied that understanding to their 
analysis, concluding that the teachers were ministers: 
"As elementary school teachers responsible for providing 
instruction in all subjects, including religion, they were 
the members of the school staff who were entrusted most 
directly with the responsibility of educating their 
students in the faith.  And not only were they obligated to 
provide instruction about the Catholic faith, but they were 
also expected to guide their students, by word and deed, 
toward the goal of living their lives in accordance with 
the faith.  They prayed with their students, attended Mass 
with the students, and prepared the children for their 
participation in other religious activities.  Their 
positions did not have all the attributes of Perich's.  
Their titles did not include the term 'minister,' and they 
had less formal religious training, but their core 
responsibilities as teachers of religion were essentially 
the same.  And both their schools expressly saw them as 
playing a vital part in carrying out the mission of the 
church, and the schools' definition and explanation of 
their roles is important." 
 
Id. at 2066. 
In determining who is a minister, the Court in Our Lady of 
Guadalupe emphasized a functional analysis: 
26 
 
 
"What matters, at bottom, is what an employee does.  And 
implicit in our decision in Hosanna-Tabor was a recognition 
that educating young people in their faith, inculcating its 
teachings, and training them to live their faith are 
responsibilities that lie at the very core of the mission 
of a private religious school.  As we put it, Perich had 
been entrusted with the responsibility of 'transmitting the 
Lutheran faith to the next generation.'  One of the 
concurrences made the same point, concluding that the 
exception should include 'any "employee" who leads a 
religious organization, conducts worship services or 
important religious ceremonies or rituals, or serves as a 
messenger or teacher of its faith.'"  (Citations omitted.) 
 
Id. at 2064.  The Court stressed that in making the 
determination whether someone is a ministerial employee, it must 
"take all relevant circumstances into account and . . . 
determine whether each particular position implicated the 
fundamental purpose of the exception."  Id. at 2067. 
We begin, as Our Lady of Guadalupe instructs, with what 
DeWeese-Boyd did, and what she did not do.  She was, first and 
foremost, a professor of social work.  She taught classes on 
sustainability and general social work practice and oversaw 
practicums.  DeWeese-Boyd was not required to, and did not, 
teach classes on religion, pray with her students, or attend 
chapel with her students, like the plaintiffs in Our Lady of 
Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2066, nor did she lead students in 
devotional exercises or lead chapel services, like the plaintiff 
in Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192.  We consider this a 
significant difference. 
27 
 
 
 
DeWeese-Boyd was, however, required to, and did, both 
engage in teaching and scholarship from a Christian perspective 
and integrate her faith into her work.20  The handbook defines 
this faculty duty, variously, as "continually explor[ing] how a 
Christian worldview enhances, redefines, or confronts their 
discipline's preeminent practices and philosophical 
assumptions"; "promot[ing] understanding of their disciplines 
from the perspectives of the Christian faith"; "help[ing] 
students make connections between course content, Christian 
thought and principles, and personal faith and practice"; and 
"encourag[ing] students to develop morally responsible ways of 
living in the world informed by biblical principles and 
Christian reflection."  The social work curriculum "is informed 
by a Christian understanding of individuals, communities, and 
societies," and seeks the "integration and application of social 
work and Christian values" and to "[e]mphasize the Christian 
liberal arts foundation and perspective."  DeWeese-Boyd 
 
 
20 The concept of integrating faith and learning in higher 
education is, of course, not unique to Gordon.  See, e.g., 
Hasker, Faith-Learning Integration:  An Overview, Christian 
Scholar's Rev., vol. 21, No. 3, Mar. 1992, at 234; Smith, 
Liberty University, Faculty Publications and Presentations, The 
Integration of Faith and Learning:  Perspectives on the 
Librarian's Role (June 2004), https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu 
/lib_fac_pubs/2 [https://perma.cc/VPE8-4TMQ].  Because we are 
sensitive to the judiciary's necessarily limited understanding 
of any religious underpinnings of the concept of integration, we 
rely on the handbook to illuminate DeWeese-Boyd's duties in this 
respect. 
28 
 
 
recognized this duty by submitting scholarship on secular 
topics, teaching students about connections between course 
material and the Christian faith, and reflecting on the role of 
Christian scholarship in the "decidedly nonsectarian" field of 
social work in the "struggle against flawed social, political 
and economic structures."21  It is undisputed that this 
integrative responsibility was part of her duty and function as 
a social work professor at a nondenominational religious 
institution. 
We also recognize that the integrative responsibility was 
an important aspect of being a professor at Gordon.  Curry and 
Lindsay referenced Gordon's history, mission, and tradition of 
integrating faith into education when asked about religious 
requirements for faculty, even likening joining Gordon to 
responding to a formal call to religious service.  Both 
individual defendants testified to the effect that Gordon's 
nature makes every faculty member, and likely every employee, 
ministerial.  Janitorial and kitchen staff, according to the 
defendants, are ministerial because they "befriend[] students," 
"model[] Christ-like behavior," and "nurtur[e] the students' 
faith commitments and maturity." 
 
 
21 This language is drawn from DeWeese-Boyd's tenure paper. 
29 
 
 
 
Less clear is whether DeWeese-Boyd was required to take on 
the role of a spiritual mentor for her students beyond her 
duties of integrating a Christian perspective into her teaching 
and scholarship.  The recently revised handbook describes a 
faculty duty to "participate actively in the spiritual formation 
of our students into godly, biblically-faithful ambassadors for 
Christ" and to "seek to engage our students in meaningful ways 
to strengthen them in their faith walks with Christ."  Even 
applying this language -- added eighteen years into her 
employment -- to DeWeese-Boyd, there are nonetheless no formal 
requirements to meet with students for spiritual guidance, pray 
with students, directly teach them doctrine, or participate in 
religious rituals or services with them, but rather a general 
exhortation for faculty "to be fully prepared in all facets of 
their tasks as Christian teachers and advisors, both inside and 
outside the classroom." 
 
The individual defendants have testified to the effect that 
taking on the role of a spiritual mentor or advisor is "part and 
parcel" of what it means to be faculty at a Christian college.  
While it may be true that Gordon employs Christians, and 
"Christians have an undeniable call to minister to others," this 
line of argument appears to oversimplify the Supreme Court test, 
suggesting that all Christians teaching at all Christian schools 
and colleges are necessarily ministers.  If this were the case, 
30 
 
 
the Court could have simply said so and not developed the two-
prong test and functional analysis laid out in Our Lady of 
Guadalupe.  For this reason, we focus on the handbook's detailed 
expectations of faculty to understand the nature and extent of 
DeWeese-Boyd's duties. 
In particular, we focus on DeWeese-Boyd's responsibility to 
integrate the Christian faith into her teaching, scholarship, 
and advising at a nondenominational Christian college, and 
whether this rendered her a minister when she did not teach 
religion, the Bible, or religious doctrine; did not lead her 
students in devotional exercises or chapel services; and was not 
required to pray or attend chapel with her students.  In 
Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady of Guadalupe, the religious 
instruction was specific and sectarian, and the teachers led 
prayers and religious rituals.  These traditional ministerial 
acts informed, or at least provided context for, the Court's 
more general statements about "educating young people in their 
faith, inculcating its teachings, and training them to live 
their faith."  Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2064. 
Here, the integrative function is not tied to a sectarian 
curriculum:  it does not involve teaching any prescribed 
religious doctrine, or leading students in prayer or religious 
ritual.  Yet it does involve integrating the Christian faith 
generally into teaching and writing about social work.  Whether 
31 
 
 
this more general religious reflection was meant to be included 
in the Supreme Court's statement about "educating young people 
in their faith," and is enough to render her a minister, is not 
directly answered by precedent.  Id. 
We do not find DeWeese-Boyd's title or training to provide 
decisive insight into resolving the difficult question whether 
she was a minister.  More specifically, DeWeese-Boyd's formal 
title, "associate professor of social work," does not indicate 
any religious position.  The revised handbook does describe all 
faculty not only as educators, but also as ministers; that 
paragraph was, however, added to the handbook in October 2016 -- 
eighteen years after DeWeese-Boyd was hired, and just two months 
before she was unanimously recommended for promotion to full 
professor.  All that being said, "[s]imply giving an employee 
the title of 'minister' is not enough to justify the exception."  
Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2063.  "A religious 
institution's explanation of the role of such employees in the 
life of the religion in question is important," id. at 2066, but 
the Court has not adopted the position of two of its concurring 
justices that we must accept Gordon's view as binding where 
there is disagreement, see id. at 2069-2070 (Thomas, J., 
concurring, with whom Gorsuch, J., joined) (expressing view that 
courts should "defer to religious organizations' good-faith 
claims that a certain employee's position is 'ministerial'"); 
32 
 
 
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (Thomas, J., concurring) (same).  
See also Sterlinski v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 934 F.3d 568, 
571 (7th Cir. 2019) (courts are competent in "separating 
pretextual justifications from honest ones," and church's claim 
that organist was minister "reflects a longstanding tradition; 
it is not an explanation hoked up for the occasion"); Grussgott 
v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655, 660 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 456 (2018) (deferring to 
organization on question of distinction between secular and 
religious organization "where there is no sign of subterfuge"). 
In this instance, the label is uninstructive, not only 
because it was added so late in DeWeese-Boyd's tenure, but also 
because there is abundant evidence in the record of what was 
required and expected of Gordon faculty during her employment 
there and our focus, as the Supreme Court has directed, is on 
function.  Rather than rely on this late labeling of DeWeese-
Boyd's position, we return again to the functional analysis 
recommended in Our Lady of Guadalupe.  She was a teacher of 
social work, expected and required to integrate the Christian 
faith into her teaching, scholarship, and advising. 
Like her title, DeWeese-Boyd's training provides some 
guidance, but is not dispositive as to any ministerial status.  
On the one hand, she is not ordained, has not otherwise accepted 
formal religious service, and was never formally commissioned by 
33 
 
 
Gordon.  Cf. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191-192.  Also, unlike 
the plaintiff in Hosanna-Tabor, DeWeese-Boyd's position did not 
require the formal religious training that she obtained, and she 
was not given a different title because of it.  On the other 
hand, the seminary training appears to have been relevant to her 
initial hiring, and it provided her with knowledge upon which 
she could have drawn to perform her integrative 
responsibilities.  In Our Lady of Guadalupe, the Court cautioned 
against placing too much weight on formal training, at least at 
the elementary school level: 
"the Ninth Circuit assigned too much weight to the fact 
that Morrissey-Berru and Biel had less formal religious 
schooling than Perich.  The significance of formal training 
must be evaluated in light of the age of the students 
taught and the judgment of a religious institution 
regarding the need for formal training.  The schools in 
question here thought that Morrissey-Berru and Biel had a 
sufficient understanding of Catholicism to teach their 
students, and judges have no warrant to second-guess that 
judgment or to impose their own credentialing 
requirements."  (Citations and footnote omitted.) 
 
Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2067-2068. 
In addition to her title and training, which go to the 
question whether Gordon held DeWeese-Boyd out as a minister, we 
consider whether DeWeese-Boyd ever held herself out as a 
minister for Gordon.22  See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191-192.  
 
 
22 The defendants would have us rely, in part, on DeWeese-
Boyd's professed faith in determining that she was a minister.  
DeWeese-Boyd has made several statements concerning the 
importance of her faith to her life and how it motivates her 
34 
 
 
This factor, although again not dispositive, weighs against 
finding that the ministerial exception applies.  It is clear 
that she did not view herself as a minister, either formally or 
informally, in her role as a professor at Gordon.  On the 
contrary, she was part of the group of professors opposed to the 
addition of "minister" to the handbook because they viewed it as 
"wrongly describing the faculty role within the College."  
Unlike Perich, she never held herself out as a minister or 
referred to herself as such, and never claimed a ministerial 
housing allowance.  See id. 
 
personal choices, including her choice of profession and the 
manner in which she practices it.  We are, however, cautioned 
against inquiring into what it means for her to practice her 
faith.  See Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2069 (argument 
that plaintiff was not within ministerial exception because she 
was not "practicing Catholic" rejected because it "would require 
courts to delve into the sensitive question" of meaning of 
"practicing").  We may, and do, consider that she was required 
to share and affirm Gordon's Statement of Faith as a duty of her 
job; but we cannot, as the defendants suggest, rely on her 
professions as evidence that DeWeese-Boyd was a minister.  Her 
personal statements of faith are not equivalent to expressly 
holding herself out as a minister, as Perich did in Hosanna-
Tabor; as the defendants themselves testified, being a Christian 
and being a ministerial employee are not the same.  See Hosanna-
Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191-192; Richardson v. Northwest Christian 
Univ., 242 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1145 (D. Ore. 2017) ("although 
there is ample evidence plaintiff held herself out as a 
Christian, there is no evidence she held herself out as a 
minister").  The notion that, in DeWeese-Boyd's words, all 
Christians have "an undeniable call to minister to others" 
cannot be the basis of the ministerial exception, or else the 
exception would swallow the rule in every Christian context.  
Cf. Our Lady of Guadalupe, supra at 2055 (ministerial exception 
applies to "employment relationship between a religious 
institution and certain key employees"). 
35 
 
 
 
Having evaluated "all relevant [material] circumstances," 
Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2067, we conclude that a 
faculty member with DeWeese-Boyd's responsibilities at Gordon is 
significantly different from the ordained ministers or teachers 
of religion at primary or secondary schools in the cases that 
have come before the Supreme Court.23  DeWeese-Boyd was not 
 
 
23 The parties have identified several decisions from courts 
other than the United States Supreme Court that involve a 
ministerial exception analysis in an educational setting, but 
all except one were decided prior to Our Lady of Guadalupe, and 
none is directly analogous to the determination we must make.  
See Temple Emanuel of Newton v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against 
Discrimination, 463 Mass. 472, 486 (2012) (teacher of "religious 
subjects at a school that functioned solely as a religious 
school, whose mission was to teach Jewish children about Jewish 
learning, language, history, traditions, and prayer" was 
ministerial employee); Menard v. Archdiocese of Boston, 98 Mass. 
App. Ct. 144, 150 (2020) (parish "director of music ministries" 
who "prayerfully" selected music and was expected to transmit 
"significant knowledge of her faith's musical canon" and 
"convey[] the Church's message" was ministerial employee); 
Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 659–660 (Hebrew teacher whose resume 
"tout[ed] significant religious teaching experience" and who 
followed religious curriculum, "integrate[d] religious 
teachings" into lessons, "taught her students about Jewish 
holidays, prayer, and the weekly Torah readings," prayed, and 
performed certain religious rituals with students was 
ministerial employee); Fratello v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 
190, 195, 208-209 (2d Cir. 2017) (Catholic school principal who 
expressly applied for "important leadership role" with 
archdiocese, "understood that she would be perceived as a 
religious leader," supervised leadership of Masses, led daily 
prayers, and updated parents on students' spiritual development 
was ministerial employee); Lishu Yin v. Columbia Int'l Univ., 
335 F. Supp. 3d 803, 817 (D.S.C. 2018) (teacher of English 
language at private Christian university who directly engaged in 
students' spiritual formation by requiring them to pray 
together, directly preparing them for ministry roles, and 
36 
 
 
ordained or commissioned; she was not held out as a minister and 
did not view herself as a minister; and she was not required to 
 
planning and leading chapels was ministerial employee); 
Richardson, 242 F. Supp. 3d at 1145-1146 (assistant professor of 
exercise science with no specialized religious training at 
Christian university who "was expected to integrate her 
Christianity into her teaching and demonstrate a maturing 
Christian faith," did not perform religious instruction, and 
"was charged with no religious duties such as taking students to 
chapel or leading them in prayer" was not ministerial employee); 
Braun v. St. Pius X Parish, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1319 (N.D. 
Okla. 2011), aff'd, 509 Fed. Appx. 750 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(Catholic school teacher required to "teach and act in 
accordance with the precepts of the Catholic Church" and to "aid 
in the Christian formation of students" who did not teach 
religion or lead students in prayer and was not Catholic was not 
ministerial employee); Adams vs. Indiana Wesleyan Univ., U.S. 
Dist. Ct., No. 3:09-CV-468 (N.D. Ind. July 15, 2010) (social 
work professor at university governed by Wesleyan church who 
incorporated church doctrine into classroom activities, used 
scriptural principles to illustrate ideas, and led "in-class 
'devotions'" was ministerial employee); Stately v. Indian 
Community Sch. of Milwaukee, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 858, 869 
(E.D. Wis. 2004) (teacher who "integrate[d] Native American 
culture and religion" into classes, participated in and led 
religious ceremonies, and served as mentor to students regarding 
their spiritual health was ministerial employee); Kirby v. 
Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 611-614 (Ky. 
2014) (seminary professor of Christian social ethics who gave 
sermons on multiple occasions, served communion, taught classes 
on religious doctrine, opened class with prayer each day, 
affirmatively promoted students' development in ministry, and 
served as representative of seminary at events on multiple 
occasions was ministerial employee); Kant v. Lexington 
Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 587, 593–595 (Ky. 2014) (Jewish 
professor of religious studies and history of religion at 
Christian seminary "was a source of religious instruction but 
did not play an important role in transmitting the Seminary's 
faith to the next generation" and thus was not ministerial 
employee [quotations and alteration omitted]). 
37 
 
 
undergo formal religious training, pray with her students, 
participate in or lead religious services, take her students to 
chapel services, or teach a religious curriculum.  Her 
responsibility to integrate the Christian faith into her 
teaching, scholarship, and advising was different in kind, and 
not degree, from the religious instruction and guidance at issue 
in Our Lady of Guadalupe and Hosanna-Tabor.  See Hosanna-Tabor, 
565 U.S. at 199 (Alito, J., concurring) ("The First Amendment 
protects the freedom of religious groups to engage in certain 
key religious activities, including the conducting of worship 
services and other religious ceremonies and rituals, as well as 
the critical process of communicating the faith"). 
 
We recognize that some of the language employed in Our Lady 
of Guadalupe may be read more broadly, in a way that would 
include every educator at a religious institution.  As Gordon 
has stated, the integrative function applies to all teachers at 
the college, whether they teach computer science, calculus, or 
comparative religion.24  See Richardson v. Northwest Christian 
 
 
24 At some points, the defendants have suggested DeWeese-
Boyd was a ministerial employee because she was a professor of 
social work and there is a strong connection between the field 
of social work and Christian values.  It is clear that Gordon 
does not view any one subject as more sacred or less so than 
others.  To rely on evidence implying that social work is 
particularly Christian would require us to go too far in 
examining the defendants' testimony as to the Protestant beliefs 
underpinning Gordon's educational philosophy. 
38 
 
 
Univ., 242 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1138-1139, 1145–1146 (D. Ore. 2017) 
("If plaintiff was a minister, it is hard to see how any teacher 
at a religious school would fall outside the exception.  Courts 
have properly rejected such a broad reading . . . , which would 
permit the ministerial exception to swallow the rule that 
religious employers must follow federal and state employment 
laws"). 
It would also apply, Gordon implies, to all its employees, 
as integrating the Christian faith into daily life and work is 
part of the college's mission for everyone in the community,25 
whether they be coaches, food service workers, or transportation 
providers.  This would provide a significant expansion of the 
ministerial exception well beyond "individuals who play certain 
key roles" in a religious institution.  Our Lady of Guadalupe, 
140 S. Ct. at 2060.  It would also change the existing 
understanding of those "personnel who are essential to the 
performance" of the religious instructions, services, and 
rituals.  Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 199 (Alito, J., 
concurring).  The integration of religious faith and belief with 
daily life and work is a common requirement in many, if not all, 
religious institutions.  As a result, the breadth of this 
 
 
25 Gordon's Statement of Life and Conduct includes 
"recognizing the Lordship of Christ in every activity" and a 
"responsibility for service to others" among its foundational 
biblical principles. 
39 
 
 
expansion of the ministerial exception and its eclipsing and 
elimination of civil law protection against discrimination would 
be enormous. 
 
We recognize that a case need not mirror Hosanna-Tabor and 
Our Lady of Guadalupe in order for the ministerial exception to 
apply.  Here, however, the facts are materially different.  
Thus, the significant expansion of the ministerial exception 
doctrine requested by Gordon is not dictated nor, do we believe, 
directed by existing Supreme Court precedent.  It is our 
understanding that the ministerial exception has been carefully 
circumscribed to avoid any unnecessary conflict with civil law. 
 
In sum, we conclude that DeWeese-Boyd was expected and 
required to be a Christian teacher and scholar, but not a 
minister.26  Therefore, the ministerial exception cannot apply as 
a defense to her claims against Gordon.27 
 
 
26 The distinction between being a Christian teacher and 
scholar and a Christian minister is one DeWeese-Boyd has drawn 
herself and is one drawn by many of Gordon's faculty in response 
to the change in the handbook that occurred eighteen years into 
her tenure, and that attempted to collapse the distinction.  The 
defendants have also testified that being a Christian scholar 
and a Christian minister, or a Christian and a Christian 
minister, are not equivalent, although they maintain that Gordon 
faculty are both. 
 
 
27 Because we conclude that DeWeese-Boyd was not a 
ministerial employee, we need not reach the question whether the 
ministerial exception bars her contract claims.  See Hosanna-
Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 ("We express no view on whether the 
exception bars other types of suits, including actions by 
40 
 
 
 
4.  Conclusion.  We answer the reported question in the 
negative.  The Superior Court judge did not err in dismissing on 
summary judgment the affirmative defense of the ministerial 
exception, which was recognized by the United States Supreme 
Court for the first time in Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188-190.  
The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by 
their religious employers").