Title: City of Gadsden v. Boman
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1120579
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 8, 2013

Rel: 11/8/13
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
1120579
____________________
City of Gadsden
v.
John Boman
____________________
1120633
____________________
Joe N. Dickson et al.
v.
John Boman
Appeals from Etowah Circuit Court
(CV-09-0669)
1120579, 1120633
BRYAN, Justice.
The City of Gadsden ("Gadsden") and certain members of
the State Employees' Insurance Board ("the Board") appeal two
orders of the Etowah Circuit Court, in which the court granted
injunctive relief to John Boman.  We reverse the orders and
remand the cause for further proceedings.
In City of Gadsden v. Boman, 104 So. 3d 882 (2012)
(hereinafter referred to as "Boman I"), this Court set forth
many of the relevant facts related to the action underlying
these consolidated appeals:
"John Boman worked as a [Gadsden] police officer
from 1965 until he retired in 1991.  At the time of
his retirement, police officers were operating under
provisions of the 'City of Gadsden Employee
Handbook: Police Department (ed. 1989–1992)' ('the
handbook').  In § 26, entitled 'employee benefit
plan,' the handbook listed 'Major Medical benefits
–- 80% UCR [usual, customary, and reasonable
charges] for the first $10,000 with 100% of covered
expenses ... each year after $2,000 annual out-of-
pocket per person.'  The employee-benefit plan was
issued and administered by Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Alabama ('Blue Cross').
"In 2000, Gadsden elected to join the 'Local
Government Health Insurance Plan' ('the [State]
plan'), a 'self-insurance health benefit plan
administered by the State Employees' Insurance
Board' ('the Board').  The claims administrator for
the [State] plan was Blue Cross. The [State] plan
stated, in pertinent part:
2
1120579, 1120633
"'Retired Employees
"'Health benefits will be modified when you
or your dependent becomes entitled to
Medicare.  Coverage under this plan will be
reduced by those benefits payable under
Medicare, Parts A and B....
"'The [State plan] remains primary for
retirees until the retiree is entitled to
Medicare.  Upon Medicare entitlement, the
member's coverage under the [State plan]
will complement his/her Medicare Parts A
and B coverages.  Medicare will be the
primary payer and the [State plan] will be
the secondary payer.  A Medicare retiree
and/or Medicare dependent should have both
Medicare Parts A and B to have adequate
coverage with the [State plan].'
"(Some emphasis added; some emphasis omitted.)
"When Boman turned 65 in 2011, he was receiving
medical care for 'congestive heart failure' and
'severe osteoarthritis of the spine.'  After his
65th birthday, Blue Cross began denying his claims
for medical treatment based on the failure to
provide Blue Cross with a 'record of the Medicare
payment.'  However, Boman had no Medicare credits.
...
"'....'
"... [A]lthough Gadsden did begin participation in
the Medicare program in 2006, Boman's employee group
had not opted to obtain Medicare coverage before
Boman retired.  Consequently, Boman never paid
Medicare taxes and does not claim to have Medicare
coverage.
"When the dispute over coverage arose, Boman
sought review by the Board.  In response, he
3
1120579, 1120633
received a letter dated March 30, 2011, from James
J. Bradford, general counsel for the Board, which
stated, in pertinent part:
"'The [State plan] becomes secondary when
a retiree becomes entitled to Medicare.  In
order to have no gaps in coverage a retiree
must have both Parts A and B.  This
requirement is published in the benefits
handbook that every employee and retiree
receives each year.  All employees and
retirees are, therefore, on notice of this
requirement.
"'Although I can appreciate Mr. Boman's
situation, 
the 
[Board] 
must 
strictly
enforce the [State] plan provisions.  If
the [Board] granted an exception to the
[State 
plan's] 
Medicare 
secondary
provisions for retirees of units, who for
their own financial purposes decided not to
participate in Medicare, it would result in
all units who do participate in Medicare
subsidizing the cost of the retirees of
those units who do not participate.  As
fiduciaries of the [State plan] 
the [Board]
cannot allow such a practice.  Accordingly,
your request for the [State plan] to remain
Mr. Boman's primary coverage cannot be
granted.
"'Appeals are limited to exclusions or
exceptions 
to 
coverage 
based 
on 
extenuating
or extraordinary circumstances or policy
issues 
not 
recently 
addressed 
or 
previously
contemplated by the [Board].  The Medicare
secondary provisions of the [State plan]
have been in place since the inception of
the [State] plan in 1993 and have been
enforced 
without 
exception 
since 
that 
time,
regardless of whether the employer unit
participates in Medicare.  The fact that
4
1120579, 1120633
the City of Gadsden did not begin its
participation in Medicare until 2006 does
not meet the criteria necessary to allow an
appeal of the application of the [State
plan's] Medicare secondary provisions. Mr.
Boman's 
request 
for 
an 
appeal 
is,
therefore, denied.'
"Meanwhile, as early as November 3, 2009, Boman
and 18 other active and retired Gadsden police
officers sued Gadsden, alleging, among other things,
that they had 'been deprived of Social Security and
Medicare protection which other police officers have
been provided' and that, after 20 years of service,
they were being required to pay a higher pension
charge or percentage of base pay than their
counterparts who were hired after April 1, 1986.  On
May 2, 2011, Boman filed a 'motion for immediate
relief for medical care.'  He alleged that, when he
was hired, Gadsden 'provided police and firemen a 20
year retirement program whereby police and firemen
would receive 50% retirement benefits after 20 years
of service and lifetime medical care.'  He averred
that Gadsden had 'breached its contract with [him]
to provide continuing medical insurance,' and he
requested 'immediate relief by ordering [Gadsden] to
pay for [his] medical care or in the alternative
ordering [Gadsden] to pay for Medicare coverage for
... Boman so he will have continuing medical
insurance as agreed by [Gadsden].   On July 8, 2011,
2
Gadsden filed a 'motion for joinder of indispensable
parties,' pursuant to Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ. P. The
motion alleged, in pertinent part[, that the Board
and the State plan should be joined to the action].
"....
"... [O]n August 1, 2011, Boman and the other
officers filed a 12th amended complaint.  It named
as additional defendants the Board and the [State]
plan.  It also added distinct claims by Boman 'for
benefits' and alleged the torts of bad faith and
5
1120579, 1120633
outrage against Gadsden. Central to this appeal is
the allegation in the complaint that
"'the Defendants have interpreted the
State's medical plan as secondary to
Medicare even though the City of Gadsden
never gave Plaintiff Boman the opportunity
to participate in Medicare.  Therefore,
Plaintiff Boman is not Medicare eligible. 
Plaintiff Boman is not eligible for medical
care because the State medical plan is
secondary to Medicare and Boman does not
have Medicare.'
"(Emphasis added.)  Boman alleged that his 'rights
to medical care [had] vested and [could not] be
modified or reduced.'  He sought 'injunctive
emergency relief requiring [Gadsden] and Defendants
to provide continuing medical care and a judgment
for any unpaid medical bills which [were] due and
owing.'
"On September 1, 2011, the Board filed a motion
to dismiss the action as to it and the [State] plan. 
As to it, the Board alleged that it was an agency of
the State and, therefore, was entitled to absolute
immunity from suit.  Also, according to the Board,
the [State] plan is not a legal entity subject to
suit, but 'merely a program administered by the
Board to provide insurance.'   It also averred that,
3
'[e]ven if [the State plan] were an entity subject
to suit, it would be immune for the same reasons
[the] Board is immune.'  Boman's response to the
Board's motion failed to acknowledge or mention the
immunity question.
"On December 15, 2011, the trial court, without
conducting an evidentiary hearing, entered an 'order
granting 
motion 
for 
emergency 
relief,' 
which
provided, in pertinent part:
6
1120579, 1120633
"'The court grants Plaintiff Boman's
motion for immediate relief of medical
care.  The City of Gadsden shall be
responsible for major medical expenses
under the [State] Plan provided by Gadsden
without the newly added provision that
benefits are secondary to Medicare.  The
court finds that John Boman was not
provided Medicare coverage with [Gadsden].
"'The City of Gadsden, at its option,
may pay John Boman's Medicare premium which
is estimated to be $500/month so that
Medicare will become the primary medical
provider with the benefits provided by
[Gadsden] through the State system as the
secondary medical provider.
"'....
"'The court holds that John Boman has
an 
enforceable 
agreement 
with 
[Gadsden] 
for
continued medical benefits which cannot be
unilaterally modified by [Gadsden] because
John Boman's benefits vested after 20 years
and/or when he retired.'
"On December 28, 2011, the trial court dismissed the
claims against the Board and the [State] plan. That
same day, Gadsden appealed.[ ]
1
"____________________
" Although the basis of Boman's breach-of-
2
contract claim is not entirely clear, it appears to
On July 30, 2012, while the appeal was pending in Boman
1
I the circuit court entered an order, holding Gadsden in
contempt for failing to comply with the December 15 order,
which the circuit court found had not been stayed, and
instructing Gadsden to provide Boman with medical coverage as
set forth in the December 15 order.
7
1120579, 1120633
rest on the theory that the handbook created an
enforceable contract or promise on the part of
Gadsden.
For purposes of this appeal, we regard the
3
Board's characterization of the [State] plan as
correct."
Boman I, 104 So. 3d at 883-86.
This Court went on in Boman I to reverse the circuit
court's judgment, granting Boman injunctive relief against
Gadsden and ordering the payment of Boman's outstanding
medical bills.  The Court stated:
"Because the [State Employees' Insurance]
Board's construction of the [State] plan is at the
heart of this dispute, that construction must be
adjudicated in this action, and its officials must
be bound by any such adjudication."
104 So. 3d at 888.  The Court went on to hold that, although
the Board itself could not be added to the complaint, "the
inclusion of [officials of the Board] is, at a minimum,
necessary for the rendition of 'complete relief ... among
those already parties,' Rule 19(a), [Ala. R. Civ. P.,] and is
needed for the just and efficient adjudication of this
dispute."  Id.  We then reversed the circuit court's judgment
and remanded the cause with instructions to the circuit court
"to entertain an amendment to the complaint adding claims
8
1120579, 1120633
against those officials of the Board who are charged with
administering the plan in their official capacities."  Id., at
888-89.
On remand, Boman again amended the complaint, adding as
defendants members of the Board Joe N. Dickson, Paige Hebson,
David Bronner, Marquita Davis, Jon Barganier, John Carroll,
William Meellown, Faye Nelson, Robert Pickett, Joanne W.
Randolph, and Robert Wagstaff ("the Board members"), and
seeking
"injunctive relief  requiring ... the State Board
members to provide continuing medical care and a
judgment for any unpaid medical bills which are due
and owing. Plaintiff Boman request[ed] attorney
fees.
"Boman also request[ed] a determination of the
Court as to whether he is Medicare eligible as
defined by the State Plan.  Plaintiff Boman
request[ed] an Order compelling the Board Members to
find that Boman is not Medicare eligible and an
Order compelling the State Board Members to provide
primary health insurance to John Boman since he is
not Medicare eligible."
Gadsden moved the circuit court to vacate its December 15 and
July 30 orders.  See supra note 1.  The circuit court did not
rule on that motion.
On October 23, 2012, the Board members moved the circuit
court for a summary judgment, arguing, among other things,
9
1120579, 1120633
that because Boman is over 65 years old and a United States
citizen, he is entitled to Medicare benefits.  Therefore, the
Board argued, "as a matter of law, any coverage for Boman
under the [State plan] is secondary to Medicare."  The Board
members did not take a position with regard to Gadsden's
obligation to provide Boman with medical benefits.
In November 2012, Boman moved for a "Summary Judgment on
the issue of the State medical insurance being primary
coverage for Boman since he is not Medicare eligible."  Boman
argued that under the retirement plan in place when he
retired, he was entitled to 50% retirement benefits and
lifetime medical care funded by Gadsden.  He also argued that
he was not "Medicare eligible" and that, therefore, he was
entitled to primary coverage under the self-insurance health-
benefit plan administered by the Board ("the State plan").  In
January 2013, Boman moved the circuit court to instruct the
Board members or, in the alternative, Gadsden to pay his
medical bills and to reinstate his prescription card. 
On February 5, 2013, after a hearing on the summary-
judgment motions, the circuit court entered a 
summary 
judgment
in favor of Boman "on the issue of the State medical insurance
10
1120579, 1120633
being primary coverage for Boman since he is not Medicare
eligible."  The circuit court found, among other things, that
"[t]he insurance provided to John Boman by the [Board]
provides that medical insurance provided by the State is
secondary to Medicare" and that "Boman does not have
Medicare."  The circuit court went on to conclude, among other
things, that "John Boman is not Medicare eligible because he
was never allowed to participate in the Medicare program while
a Gadsden Police Officer," that "[t]he medical insurance
provided by the [Board] does not define 'Medicare eligible,'"
and that "[t]he [Board] is obligated to provide medical
benefits to John Boman as primary insurance because John Boman
is not 'Medicare eligible.'"
The circuit court determined that "John Boman [was]
entitled to summary judgment on the issue of the State medical
insurance being primary coverage for Boman since he is not
Medicare eligible" and awarded him relief based on that
conclusion.  Specifically, the circuit court stated: 
"The Board Members ... are ordered to provide
major medical insurance benefits to John Boman and
his wife as primary insurance through the insurance
coverage provided the [Board].
11
1120579, 1120633
"The insurance provided to John Boman will
include all medical expenses incurred after John
Boman became 65 years old. 
"The Board Members shall approve all costs of
medical treatment reasonably incurred by John Boman
and his wife. 
"The Board Members shall report back to the
Court on the payment of John Boman's medical bills
within 14 days of this Order. 
"In the event that a higher Court overturns the
Court's decision that the [Board] is responsible for
medical benefits for John Boman and his wife, the
City shall be responsible for providing medical
benefit coverage for John Boman and his wife."
On February 7, 2013, the circuit court entered an "order
granting emergency relief," in which the circuit 
court 
ordered
the Board members to "process all of John Boman's outstanding
bills for medical services forthwith in accordance with the
State plan," based on its finding that Boman was not eligible
for Medicare.  The circuit court also ordered the Board
members to continue Boman's insurance coverage during any
appeal that might be filed and to provide "prompt and full
insurance coverage" for Boman under the State plan.
The February 7 order also granted Boman injunctive relief
against Gadsden.  The circuit court ordered Gadsden to pay
Boman's medical expenses and to provide coverage, including
12
1120579, 1120633
prescription coverage, to Boman in accordance with the
retirement program Gadsden was using at the time Boman retired
as a Gadsden police officer.  The circuit court also found
that Gadsden was responsible for making up the difference, if
any, between Boman's coverage under the State plan and
coverage under the plan in place at the time Boman retired.2
Gadsden and the Board members separately appealed the
circuit court's orders.  Those appeals have been consolidated
for the purpose of issuing one opinion. 
Although the February 5 summary judgment adjudicated the
claims raised by Boman against the Board members, it did not
address all the claims against Gadsden, and it was not
certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. 
"'A nonfinal judgment will not support an appeal.'"  Schlarb
v. Lee, 955 So. 2d 418, 420 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Dzwonkowski
v. Sonitrol of Mobile, Inc., 892 So. 2d 354, 363 (Ala. 2004)). 
However, the February 5 and February 7 orders award injunctive
Gadsden's responsibility to provide Boman with medical
2
coverage, pursuant to the plan in place when Boman retired,
has not been adjudicated on the merits.  No hearing was held
on Boman's motion for emergency relief, and the summary
judgment does not address the existence of an alleged contract
between Boman and Gadsden or Gadsden's alleged responsibility
to provide ongoing medical coverage to Boman.
13
1120579, 1120633
relief against the Board members and Gadsden, and the Board
and Gadsden appeal those orders pursuant to Rule 4(a), Ala. R.
App. P., which provides, in pertinent part, for an appeal from
"any interlocutory order granting, continuing, modifying,
refusing, or dissolving an injunction."  In Dawkins v. Walker,
794 So. 2d 333, 335 (Ala. 2001), this Court addressed a
similar situation, involving a summary judgment that included
an award of injunctive relief.  It stated:
"At the outset, we note that this Court must
consider this appeal as an appeal from an order
granting injunctive relief.  Such an order is
appealable.  See Rule 4(a)(1)(A), Ala.R.App.P.,
relating to the appeal of 'any interlocutory order
granting, 
continuing, 
modifying, 
refusing, 
or
dissolving an injunction, or refusing to dissolve or
to modify an injunction.'  Any noninjunctive aspect
of this interlocutory 'summary judgment' would not
be appealable.  See Ala. Code 1975, § 12–22–2.
"An injunction is defined as '[a] court order
commanding or preventing an action.'  Black's Law
Dictionary 788 (7th ed. 1999).  Because the order at
issue in this case directs the [board of directors]
to take action, by ordering that 'Walker be restored
to the [board of directors] ... forthwith,' we
conclude that the order, though styled as a 'partial
summary judgment,' was injunctive in nature."
The February 5 order in this case was entered in response
to a motion for a summary judgment as to "the issue of the
State medical insurance being primary coverage for Boman." 
14
1120579, 1120633
That order, like the order in Dawkins, directs the Board
members to take action, by ordering them "to provide major
medical insurance benefits to John Boman and his wife," to
include in that coverage "all medical expenses incurred after
John Boman became 65 years old," to "approve the costs of
medical treatment reasonably incurred by John Boman and his
wife," and to report back to the circuit court when the
payment was complete.  The February 5 order also instructed
Gadsden to provide Boman's medical-benefits coverage, in the
event that the order regarding the Board members was
overturned on appeal.  Like the summary judgment in Dawkins,
the February 5 order in this case was injunctive in nature and
that order, although not a final judgment, and the February 7
order are appealable pursuant to Rule 4(a). 
The orders provide both permanent and preliminary
injunctive relief.  
A permanent injunction is 
"[a]n 
injunction
granted after a final hearing on the merits."  Black's Law
Dictionary 855 (9th ed. 2009), whereas a preliminary
injunction is "[a] temporary injunction issued before or
during trial to prevent an irreparable injury from occurring
before the court has a chance to decide the case."  Id.  The
15
1120579, 1120633
relief awarded in the February 5 order followed a hearing on
Boman's summary-judgment motion addressing the issue whether
Boman was entitled to Medicare and, therefore, entitled to
primary coverage under the State plan.  Thus, the relief
related to the Board members' obligations under the State
plan, i.e., directing the Board members to provide Boman and
his wife major-medical insurance benefits, was in the nature
of permanent injunctive relief.
"'"To be entitled to a permanent
injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate
success on the merits, a substantial threat
of irreparable injury if the injunction is
not granted, that the threatened injury to
the plaintiff outweighs the harm the
injunction may cause the defendant, and
that granting the injunction will not
disserve the public interest."
"'TFT, Inc. v. Warning Sys., Inc., 751 So. 2d 1238,
1242 (Ala. 1999), overruled on another point of law,
Holiday Isle, LLC v. Adkins, 12 So. 3d 1173 (Ala.
2008). The entry of a permanent injunction is
reviewed de novo ....'"
Walden v. ES Capital, LLC, 89 So. 3d 90, 105 (Ala. 2011)
(quoting Sycamore Mgmt. Grp., LLC v. Coosa Cable Co., 42 So.
3d 90, 93 (Ala. 2010)).
The Board members argue that "Boman cannot be successful
on the merits in this case because he is not entitled to
16
1120579, 1120633
primary coverage under the terms of the [State] Plan."  Board
members' brief, at 27.  The State plan provides, in pertinent
part:
"Retired Employees
"Health benefits will be modified when you or your
dependent becomes entitled to Medicare.  Coverage
under this plan will be reduced by those benefits
payable under Medicare, Parts A and B. ...
"The [State plan] remains primary for retirees until
the retiree is entitled to Medicare.  Upon Medicare
entitlement, the member's coverage under the [State
plan] will complement his/her Medicare Parts A and
B coverages.  Medicare will be the primary payer and
the [State plan] will be the secondary payer.  A
Medicare retiree and/or Medicare dependent should
have both Medicare Parts A and B to have adequate
coverage with the [State plan]."
(Emphasis added.)
The Board members argue that "[t]he language of the
applicable [State] Plan is unambiguous.  Coverage under the
Plan becomes secondary once an insured is 'entitled to
Medicare.'"  Board members' brief, at 17.  Boman appears to
agree that the State plan is unambiguous, arguing, however,
that "[t]he [State] Plan clearly provides that benefits will
be provided when the beneficiary becomes entitled to the
benefit."  Boman's brief, at 17.  Boman goes on to argue that
"[i]f the [State] Plan is ambiguous, the [State] Plan should
17
1120579, 1120633
be construed in favor of the insured against the insurer." 
Id.  The parties disagree, however, on the meaning of the
phrase "entitled to Medicare" as that phrase is used in the
State plan.3
"'Under general Alabama rules of contract
interpretation, the intent of the contracting
parties is discerned from the whole of the contract. 
Where there is no indication that the terms of the
contract are used in a special or technical sense,
they will be given their ordinary, plain, and
natural meaning.  If the court determines that the
terms are unambiguous (susceptible of only one
reasonable meaning), then the court will presume
that the parties intended what they stated and will
enforce the contract as written.'"
Shoney's LLC v. MAC E., LLC, 27 So. 3d 1216, 1222 (Ala. 2009)
(quoting Homes of Legend, Inc. v. McCollough, 776 So. 2d 741,
746 (Ala. 2000) (citations omitted)).
The State plan does not define the term "entitled" as
that word is used in the State plan.  However, there is no
Boman and the circuit court frame the issue as whether
3
Boman is "Medicare eligible" rather than "entitled to
Medicare."  The relevant provisions of the State plan do not
use the term "eligible" in reference to Medicare, and the
Board members argue that the terms "entitled" and "eligible"
are not synonymous.  Addressing the alleged distinction
between those two terms is not necessary to our resolution of
the question of Boman's coverage under the State plan. 
However, for purposes of clarity, we will track the language
of the State plan and address the issue in terms of whether
Boman is "entitled to Medicare."
18
1120579, 1120633
indication that the term is "used in a special or technical
sense." Shoney's, 27 So. 3d at 1222.  Thus, "[it] will be
given [its] ordinary, plain, and natural meaning."  Id.  To
"entitle" is "to furnish with proper grounds for seeking or
claiming something."  Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary
417 (11th ed. 2003).  That definition is consistent with the
definition 
in 
the 
federal 
Medicare 
regulations, 
which 
provides
that "[e]ntitled means that an individual meets all the
requirements for Medicare benefits."  42 C.F.R. § 400.202.
The Board members argue:
"For purposes relevant to this case, there are
two primary Medicare coverages –- Part A (hospital
insurance) 
and 
Part 
B 
(medical 
insurance). 
Individuals who have paid a sufficient amount of
Medicare taxes while working are automatically
enrolled in Part A and do not have to pay a monthly
premium for Part A coverage.  (C. 1081; 42 C.F.R. §
406.5, 406.6, 406.10.)  This concept is generally
referred to as premium-free Part A hospital
insurance.  Unlike Part A, there is no premium-free
Part B.  All participants in Part B must enroll and
pay a premium. ...
"If an individual such as Boman, who has not
participated in Social Security, is not entitled to
premium-free Part A hospital insurance, he or she is
still entitled to participate in Part A by simply
enrolling and paying the applicable premium. (C.
1081-1084.)  The only requirements for enrollment
are that the individual be a U.S. citizen and
resident who is 65 or older. 42 C.F.R. §§406.20 and
407.10.  ...
19
1120579, 1120633
"....
"The requirements for Medicare Part A benefits
are listed within 42 C.F.R. § 406.1, et seq.  As
specifically relevant to Boman, 42 C.F.R. § 406.20
lists the requirements for enrolling in Medicare
Part A, premium hospital insurance. ... [T]he
regulation states that any individual may enroll for
Medicare Part A if he or she: '(1) Has attained age
65; (2) Is a resident of the United States and is
either -- (i) a citizen of the United States; or
(ii) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence ...; (3) Is not eligible for Part A
benefits under [the premium-free provision]; and (4)
Is entitled to supplementary medical insurance
[under Part B of Medicare].'  42 C.F.R. § 406.20. 
The requirements for receipt of Part B benefits
likewise only require that an individual be 65 or
older, be a resident of the U.S. and be a citizen or
lawfully admitted alien. 42 C.F.R. § 407.10.
"There is no dispute in this case that Boman is
a United States resident and citizen, who is age 65
or older.  Therefore, pursuant to 42 C.F.R. §§
406.20 and 407.10, he meets the requirements to
enroll in Part A and Part B of Medicare and is thus
'entitled' to Medicare benefits as defined by 42
C.F.R. § 400.202. Because Boman is entitled to
Medicare benefits, his health insurance coverage
under the Plan is secondary to the coverage
available to him under Medicare."
Board members' brief, at 22-25.
The Board members' representation of the cited Medicare
provisions and the requirements that must be met to access
coverage under Parts A and B appears to be correct, and Boman
provides no argument to the contrary.  Instead, he argues that
20
1120579, 1120633
he is not eligible for Medicare because "he was never allowed
to participate in Medicare by [Gadsden]."  Boman's brief, at
17.  However, a failure to "participate in Medicare" or to pay
Medicare taxes during employment does not cut off all access
to Medicare.  The Medicare regulations state that "[h]ospital
benefits are available to most individuals age 65 or over and
to certain individuals under age 65 who do not qualify for
those benefits under subpart B of this part[, which addresses
premium-free hospital coverage for, among others, those that
paid Medicare taxes through their employer,] and are willing
to pay a monthly premium."  42 C.F.R. § 406.20.  Boman has not
argued that he falls outside the scope of "most individuals"
who can get access to Medicare coverage, pursuant to the
requirements of 42 C.F.R. §§ 406.20 and 407.10.  As the Board
members note in their brief, "the concept of eligibility for
premium-free Medicare coverage differs significantly from the
concept of entitlement to participate in the Medicare
program."  Board members' brief, at 22.
The plain language of the State plan provides that
coverage under that plan becomes secondary when a retiree
becomes "entitled to Medicare," not when a retiree becomes
21
1120579, 1120633
"entitled 
to 
premium-free 
Medicare." 
 
To 
adopt 
the
construction advocated by Boman and applied by the circuit
court, this Court would have to read an additional condition
into the State plan.  To do so is contrary to settled
principles of Alabama law regarding the construction of
contracts (i.e., when terms in a contract are unambiguous,
"'the court will presume that the parties intended what they
stated and will enforce the contract as written,'" Shoney's,
27 So. 3d at 1222 (quoting Homes of Legend, Inc. v.
McCollough, 776 So. 2d at 746), and "'[i]f there is no
ambiguity, courts ... cannot defeat express provisions in a
policy ... by making a new contract for the parties.'" 
Shrader v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 907 So. 2d 1026, 1034
(Ala. 2005) (quoting St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Chilton-
Shelby Mental Health Ctr., 595 So. 2d 1375, 1377 (Ala.
1992))). 
Thus, we conclude that the circuit court erred in
determining that Boman is not "entitled" to Medicare as that
term is used in the State plan.  Therefore, Boman has not
demonstrated success on the merits as to that issue, and he
was not entitled to the injunctive relief awarded against the
22
1120579, 1120633
Board members on that basis.  The February 5 order also
awarded injunctive relief to "[Boman's] wife."  However, his
wife is not a party to the underlying action, and no claims
have been made or relief requested on her behalf in any of the
pleadings filed in this case.  No argument was made in the
summary-judgment motion or at the hearing as to her
entitlement to coverage under the State plan or as a result of
any agreement with Gadsden.  Thus, the circuit court erred in
awarding her injunctive relief in the February 5 order.
The circuit court also awarded injunctive relief against
Gadsden in its February 5 order.  The circuit court ordered:
"In the event that a higher Court overturns the
[circuit] 
[c]ourt's 
decision 
that 
the 
[Board
members] [are] responsible for medical benefits for
John Boman and his wife, the City shall be
responsible for providing medical benefit coverage
for John Boman and his wife."
This relief was awarded following the hearing on Boman's
motion for a summary judgment as to the issue of primary
coverage under the State plan.  However, there has been no
final hearing on the merits as to Gadsden's alleged
obligations to Boman for medical benefits.  Thus, a permanent
injunction against Gadsden with regard to this issue would not
be appropriate at this time, and, as will be demonstrated
23
1120579, 1120633
hereinafter, Boman has not met the requirements for
preliminary injunctive relief against Gadsden, pursuant to
Rule 65(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Therefore, the circuit court
erred in awarding alternative injunctive relief against
Gadsden in the February 5 order.
The February 7 order also awarded preliminary injunctive
relief against Gadsden.   It provided, among other things,
4
that Gadsden was responsible for providing Boman 
with benefits
"in accordance with the medical benefits plan provided by
[Gadsden] in effect ... [on] the date of John Boman's
retirement."  The circuit court also ordered Gadsden to make
up the difference, if any, in the medical coverage provided
under the State plan and the medical coverage allegedly
provided by the plan that was in place at the time Boman
retired and to provide Boman with prescription coverage.  
Rule 65(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
"'No restraining order or preliminary injunction
shall issue except upon the giving of security by
The February 7 order also included injunctive relief
4
against the Board members based on the circuit court's finding
that Boman was entitled to primary coverage under the State
plan.  Because we have determined that Boman is not entitled
to such coverage, that part of the February 7 order awarding
injunctive relief against the Board members is due to be
reversed as well.
24
1120579, 1120633
the applicant, in such sum as the court deems
proper, for the payment of such costs, damages, and
reasonable attorney fees as may be incurred or
suffered by any party who is found to have been
wrongfully 
enjoined 
or 
restrained; 
provided,
however, no such security shall be required of the
State of Alabama or of an officer or agency thereof,
and provided further, in the discretion of the
court, no such security may be required in domestic
relations cases."
This Court noted in Spinks v. Automation Personnel
Services, Inc., 49 So. 3d 186, 190 (Ala. 2010), that "'"there
are ... necessary exceptions to such an absolute holding ...
under Rule 65(c) [that security must be given before a
preliminary injunction can issue], such as requiring only a
nominal security, or where the litigant is impecunious or the
issue is one of overriding public concern."'" (Quoting Anders
v. Fowler, 423 So. 2d 838, 840 (Ala. 1982), quoting in turn
Lightsey v. Kensington Mortg. & Fin. Corp., 294 Ala. 281, 285,
315 So. 2d 431, 434 (1975).)  However, this Court went on to
state:
"Alabama law ... clearly provides that '[i]t is
mandatory that security be given under Rule 65(c),
"unless the trial court makes a specific finding
based upon competent evidence that one or more of
the exceptions ... do exist."'  Anders, 423 So. 2d
at 840 (quoting Lightsey, 294 Ala. at 285, 315 So.
2d at 434) (emphasis added) ....
25
1120579, 1120633
"Here, the trial court issued a preliminary
injunction without requiring [Automation Personnel
Services, Inc.,] to give security as mandated by
Rule 65(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Furthermore, the trial
court failed to make 'a specific finding based upon
competent evidence that one or more of the
exceptions, stating them, do exist.'  Anders, 423
So. 2d at 840.  As noted, 'there can be no
injunction ... until the bond has been given.' 
Anders, 423 So. 2d at 840 (quoting Ex parte Miller,
129 Ala. [130] at 133, 30 So. [611] at 612 [(1901)],
quoted with approval in Lightsey, 294 Ala. at 285,
315 So. 2d at 434).  Accordingly, '[u]nder the clear
mandate of Rule 65(c), and the previous decisions of
this court, we have no alternative but to reverse
and remand.'"
Spinks, 49 So. 3d at 191 (quoting Anders, 423 So. 2d at 840).
Like the trial court in Spinks, the circuit court here
issued preliminary injunctive relief against Gadsden without
requiring Boman to give security and without making any
specific finding that an exception to Rule 65(c) applied. 
Boman has made no argument to the contrary.  Thus, as we did
in Spinks, this Court has "no alternative but to reverse" the
preliminary injunction issued against Gadsden and remand the
cause.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the circuit court
erred in awarding injunctive relief against the Board members
and Gadsden.  The circuit court's orders are reversed in that
26
1120579, 1120633
regard, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
1120579 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., dissents.
Moore, C.J., recuses himself.
1120633 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Shaw, Main, and Wise,
JJ., concur.
Moore, C.J., recuses himself.
27
1120579, 1120633
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring as to case no. 1120633 and
dissenting as to case no. 1120579).
I concur in the reversal of the judgment of the trial
court awarding injunctive relief against the Board members in
case no. 1120633.  As to case no. 1120579, in which this Court
reverses 
the 
trial 
court's 
judgment 
awarding 
injunctive 
relief
in favor of Boman and against the City of Gadsden, I
respectfully dissent.  Unlike the majority, I believe that the
trial court intended by its February 5, 2013, and February 7,
2013, orders to enter a final judgment providing permanent
injunctive relief against the City of Gadsden.  Furthermore,
I see no basis in Gadsden's brief to this Court for reversing
the judgment against it; therefore, I would affirm that
judgment.
28