Title: State v. Gregory
Citation: 108 Ariz. 445, 501 P.2d 387
Docket Number: 2321
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: September 26, 1972

108 Ariz. 445 (1972) 501 P.2d 387 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Daniel Louis GREGORY, Appellant. No. 2321. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. September 26, 1972. *446 Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Mary Z. Chandler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender, by James H. Kemper, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal from jury verdicts and judgments of guilt to the crimes of robbery, §§ 13-641 and 13-643 A.R.S., and assault with a deadly weapon, § 13-249 A.R.S., with concurrent sentences of not less than 10 nor more than 12 years as to each offense. We are called upon to answer the following questions: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. Defendant entered a Circle K convenience market in Phoenix, Arizona, at approximately 4:00 p.m. on 4 January 1970. The manager of the market, Mrs. Florence Robida, was in the store with her husband, Mr. Ramon Robida. The defendant held a gun on the husband and ordered Mrs. Robida to put the money from the cash drawer in a sack which she did. After obtaining the sack with the money, the defendant directed the husband to the check-out stand and made both Mr. and Mrs. Robida lie face down on the floor. The defendant then left. At the trial before a jury, two thirteen year old patrons, as well as Mr. and Mrs. Robida, identified the defendant as the one who robbed the market. The defense was alibi and as part of the alibi testimony, the defendant's attorney called the mother of the defendant who testified that the defendant was home for *447 dinner on the day in question and that she remembered it because it was the day her daughter became engaged. On cross-examination, she admitted that she had made a notation on the calendar and this was admitted into evidence. The defendant did not testify. The jury did not accept the alibi defense and returned verdicts of guilty as to both charges. MUST THE GUN BE LOADED? It is the contention of the defendant that before a gun may be a deadly weapon it must be loaded, and that a person may not be convicted of assault with a deadly weapon unless the State shows that the gun was loaded at the time. This court held under the kidnapping statute wherein the statute reads, "* * * a crime as prescribed by the terms of subsections A and B, committed by a person armed with a gun or deadly weapon * * *" that: The statutory definition of assault, however, requires "present ability". § 13-241, subsec. A, A.R.S. reads as follows: In the instant case the evidence indicates that the defendant ran out of the store with the gun. The gun was never found and the defendant was not arrested until some months after the robbery. At the trial the defendant did not take the stand on his own behalf and no testimony was introduced which would indicate the gun was not in fact loaded. In Territory v. Gomez, 14 Ariz. 139, 125 P. 702, 42 L.R.A.,N.S., 975 (1912), the Arizona Supreme Court held the trial court erred in directing a verdict of acquittal because of the failure of the State to show that the gun used in an alleged assault with a deadly weapon was loaded. Justice Franklin stated: And we later stated: *448 Where the victim is close enough that the pistol or gun may be used as a bludgeon it is immaterial whether the gun was loaded or not for the gun can be used as a dangerous weapon with "present ability to commit a physical injury" without it being loaded. Where the victim is not that close, however, the law in Arizona remains unchanged. The defendant must affirmatively prove that the gun was not in fact loaded. Certainly the victim had every right to believe and to presume the gun was loaded and so does the State. We agree with the Texas court: And: We therefore hold that under the circumstances in this case, there being a presumption that the gun was loaded which the defendant failed to rebut by any evidence whatsoever, the verdict and judgment of guilt as to the crime of assault with a deadly weapon were proper. IMPROPER CONDUCT OF THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY In closing argument discussing the alibi testimony, the defense counsel stated: The attorney for the State stated in response: At this point the defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial and the attorney for the State went on: It is true that improper comments by the State's attorney can result in a mistrial and we agree that abuse of opposing counsel unwarranted by the evidence is not within the scope of proper argument and if carried too far may result in the granting of a new trial or reversal, but as we have stated: It has long been the rule in Arizona that counsel for both sides have considerable latitude in their arguments to the jury, State v. Narten, 99 Ariz. 116, 407 P.2d 81, cert. den., 384 U.S. 1008, 86 S. Ct. 1985, 16 L. Ed. 2d 1021 (1965), and that the granting or denial of the mistrial based upon such remarks is usually within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Woolery, 93 Ariz. 76, 378 P.2d 751 (1963). We do not believe that the remarks of the prosecuting attorney were as inflammatory or derogatory as the defendant contends and we find no error. DOUBLE PUNISHMENT Our statute provides: In this case we have a robbery and after the robbery was complete, the two victims were made to lie on the floor while the gun was pointed at them. This was after the robbery had been completed. We have stated: In the instant case there were two separate assaults only one of which was merged into the robbery offense. See also State v. Rhymes, 107 Ariz. 12, 480 P.2d 662 (1971). We believe that the defendant was properly convicted, adjudged guilty, and sentenced as to both robbery and assault with a deadly weapon. Judgments affirmed. HAYS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, LOCKWOOD and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.