Title: Stevens v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 482, 2008
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 24, 2009

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
REGINALD STEVENS,  
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 482, 2008     
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 0802003292 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  February 11, 2009 
 
 
Decided:     March 24, 2009 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 24th day of March 2009, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties 
and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1. Reginald Stevens, the defendant below, appeals from a Superior Court 
final judgment of conviction.  A jury convicted Stevens of Maintaining a Vehicle 
for Keeping a Controlled Substance and Possession of a Controlled Substance.  On 
appeal, Stevens claims that the Superior Court abused its discretion by denying his 
motion to suppress drug evidence seized after an allegedly unlawful vehicle stop.  
Stevens argues that that stop was unlawful, because: (i) he was stopped for 
violating a noise ordinance based solely on a police officer’s subjective 
interpretation of the ordinance, and (ii) the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague.  
 
2 
Because the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Stevens’ 
motion to suppress, we affirm. 
 
2. 
On February 3, 2008, at approximately 6:15 p.m., Wilmington Police 
Officer Mark Martinez pulled Stevens over for playing extremely loud music in 
Stevens’ car, which Officer Martinez heard from a block and a half (approximately 
300 feet) away.  Martinez was able to feel the vibrations from the bass in Stevens’ 
music when he drove past Stevens’ car.  Officer Martinez determined that Stevens 
was violating the City of Wilmington’s Ordinance on “Noise Control and 
Abatement”1 (the “Ordinance”), because Martinez believed that the Ordinance 
prohibited playing music from a vehicle that could be clearly heard more than 50 
feet away.   
 
3. 
After Officer Martinez pulled Stevens over and asked him for his 
license and registration, Stevens produced his registration and proof of insurance, 
but no driver’s license.  Officer Martinez performed a DMV check on Stevens,  
found that Stevens’ license was suspended, and arrested Stevens for driving with a 
                                                 
1 The Ordinance prohibits operating a noise amplifying device in such a manner: 
 
[A]t any time during any 24-hour-day, and so as to be . . . plainly audible at a 
distance of 50 feet from such a device when operated within a motor vehicle on a 
public right-of-way or on a public space. 
 
WILMINGTON, DEL., CODE § 11-60(c)(2)(a)(4).   
 
 
3 
suspended license.  Upon searching Stevens at the police station, Officer Martinez 
discovered 25 bags of crack cocaine in Stevens’ jacket pocket. 
 
4. 
Before trial, Stevens moved to suppress that drug evidence.  The 
Superior Court denied the motion, ruling that Officer Martinez had a reasonable 
and articulable suspicion that Stevens was violating the Ordinance.  A jury 
convicted Stevens of Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping a Controlled Substance 
and Possession of a Controlled Substance.  This appeal followed. 
 
5. 
In denying Stevens’ motion to suppress, the Superior Court reasoned: 
… that the officer acted reasonably under the circumstances.  He 
described in detail the level of the noise.  He described his actions.  
He clearly was familiar with the statute, although he certainly did not 
have it memorized, and the fact that he, for example, couldn’t 
remember whether the enforcement provision was at the beginning or 
the end of Section 11-60, does not mean that the officer was not 
familiar with the salient and executory provisions of the statute. 
Therefore, I find based upon the noise, and a noise disturbance and 
violation of the ordinance, there was a reasonable articulable 
suspicion a crime was being committed in the context of the totality of 
the circumstances. 
 
The Superior Court also stated: 
I don’t think [the Ordinance] does the police any favors either because 
it makes it difficult to know when enforcement should take place.  I 
think there is a valid argument, that the [Ordinance], as written, is 
overly broad, unduly vague, which leaves a dangerous potential for 
disparate and arbitrary enforcement.  This is particularly with regard 
to the definition of noise disturbance.... 
 
6. On appeal, Stevens claims the Superior Court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion to suppress.  Stevens claims that suppression was required, 
 
4 
because: (i) Officer Martinez could not explain objectively how Stevens caused a 
noise disturbance, or what standard Officer Martinez used to determine that there 
was a noise disturbance, and (ii) the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad, requiring that any evidence resulting from the enforcement of the 
statute be suppressed.  Stevens’ argument that Officer Martinez arbitrarily enforced 
the Ordinance against him, appears to rest on the fact that during cross-
examination at the suppression hearing, Officer Martinez could not explain 
precisely what was covered by the Ordinance.2   
7. The State argues that the Superior Court correctly held that Officer 
Martinez, based on his detailed observations, had an articulable suspicion that 
Stevens was violating the Ordinance.  The State claims that the Ordinance 
prohibits playing music that would be “plainly audible at a distance of 50 feet” 
when played “on a public right of way.”3  The State does not contradict Stevens’ 
assertion that the Ordinance is ambiguous, however. 
8. The issue presented is what was required, in this context, to establish a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion for a police officer to conduct a vehicle stop.  
                                                 
2 During cross-examination, Stevens’ attorney pressed Officer Martinez to define what a noise 
disturbance was, but Officer Martinez could not articulate clearly what a noise disturbance was, 
other than stating that it was the type of noise that would disturb a person of “normal 
sensibilities.”  Officer Martinez did, however, correctly identify the 50 foot standard for noise 
coming from a motor vehicle.   
 
3 WILMINGTON, DEL., CODE § 11-60(c)(2)(a)(4).  
 
 
5 
We do not address Stevens’ second argument―that the alleged unconstitutionality 
of the Ordinance required the suppression of the drug evidence.  That argument is 
waived, because Stevens conceded at his suppression hearing that the alleged 
unconstitutionality of the Ordinance had no bearing on his motion to suppress.  
9. We review the denial of a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion.4  
We review issues of law de novo.5  “To be valid under the Fourth Amendment, an 
automobile stop must be based on an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the 
vehicle is subject to seizure for violation of the law.”6  To meet this standard, that 
suspicion must have some objective basis.7  A determination of reasonable 
suspicion must be based on the “totality of the circumstances as viewed through 
the eyes of a reasonable, trained police officer in the same or similar 
circumstances, combining objective facts with such an officer’s subjective 
interpretation of the facts.”8  
10. Stevens argues that because Officer Martinez made a mistake of law, 
namely, that he did not understand precisely what the Ordinance requires, he was 
                                                 
4 Lopez–Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Del. 2008).  
 
5 Id. at 1285.  
 
6 State v. Coursey, 906 A.2d 845, 848 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006) (citing Bease v. State, 884 A.2d 
495, 498 (Del. 2005)).  
 
7 Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). 
 
8 Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 861 (Del. 1999) (citations omitted).  
 
 
6 
stopped without an articulable suspicion of criminal activity.  Stevens relies on 
State v. Coursey,9 a Superior Court decision, for the proposition that where the 
seizing officer misunderstands the law upon which a traffic stop is based, and 
cannot articulate precisely how the defendant violated that law, any resulting 
evidence must be suppressed.    
 
11. In Coursey, the seizing officer testified that he stopped a vehicle 
because the windows were tinted in violation of a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standard.10  The officer incorrectly stated that the Safety Standard was whether the 
tinting was so dark the occupants in the vehicle could not be seen.11  In fact, the 
Standard was whether the windows were tinted over 70%.12  The court found that 
“failure to understand the law by a person charged with enforcing it is not 
objectively reasonable” and that, therefore, the officer had no reasonable 
articulable suspicion to legally stop the vehicle.13   
12. Coursey is factually distinguishable.  Here, Officer Martinez could 
objectively apply the Ordinance.  Although, he could not recite the Ordinance 
                                                 
9 906 A.2d 845. 
 
10 Coursey, 906 A.2d at 846-47.  Delaware law incorporated that Federal Standard. 
 
11 Id. at 848. 
  
12 Id. at 847. 
  
13 Id. 
 
 
7 
verbatim, Martinez knew that the Ordinance contained a 50 foot objective standard 
in determining a noise disturbance.  Because Officer Martinez could hear Stevens’ 
music from 300 feet away, he had proper grounds to stop Stevens.   
13.  Moreover, another Superior Court judge has questioned Coursey in a 
more recent decision, State v. Trower.14  There the Superior Court found that 
although the Safety Standard is violated only by a tint greater than 70%, an 
officer’s inability to clearly see a car’s occupants would provide a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion sufficient to stop the car to investigate a possible violation of 
that law.15     
14. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Martinez had a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Stevens.  He could hear Stevens’ 
music from 300 feet away, a distance far exceeding the Ordinance’s 50 feet 
standard.  Even if the Ordinance were vague, Stevens was clearly violating it, and 
Officer Martinez had grounds to pull him over.  Once Martinez discovered that 
Stevens was driving on a suspended license, the resulting arrest and search were 
proper. 
                                                 
14 State v. Trower, 931 A.2d 456, 459 (Del. Super. Ct. 2007) (holding that “window tint which is 
so dark that one cannot see the occupants inside the vehicle creates a reasonable suspicion that it 
violates the standard.”).  The Trower court attempted to distinguish Coursey, by claiming that 
there was no mistake of law in Trower.  The Trower court goes on to state, however, that if 
Coursey was not distinguishable, then it “respectfully declined to follow it.”  Id. 
 
15 Id. 
 
8 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
       Justice