Title: Martin v. Delaware Home & Hospital
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 232, 2013
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 24, 2013

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
 
EDITH MARTIN, 
 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 232, 2013 
  
 
Claimant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware, in and for 
 
v. 
§ 
Kent County 
 
 
§ 
DELAWARE HOME AND  
§  C.A. No. K11A-07-001 
HOSPITAL, 
 
§  C.A. No. K12A-05-007 
 
 
§ 
 
Employer Below, 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 28, 2013 
 
 
Decided: 
 September 24, 2013 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 24th day of September 2013, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties, it appears to the Court that:  
1. 
Edith Martin, the appellant-below (“Martin”), appeals from two 
Superior Court orders.  The first Superior Court order, in 2012, reversed an 
Industrial Accident Board (the “Board”) decision that found Martin entitled to total 
disability benefits from her employer, Delaware Home & Hospital, which is 
operated by the State of Delaware (the “State”).  On remand from the Superior 
Court, the Board found that Martin had failed to sustain her burden of proof, and 
denied her petition for benefits.  In 2013, the Superior Court affirmed.  Martin 
 
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appeals from both Superior Court orders, claiming that she is entitled to total 
disability benefits.  We affirm both trial court orders.   
2. 
In 2007, Martin was employed as a dietary aide by the State when she 
suffered a work-related knee injury.  Because of that injury, she underwent her first 
surgery in 2008 and has not worked since May 2008.1  Martin underwent a second 
surgery on January 21, 2011, at which time her surgeon placed her on total 
disability status from January 21, 2011 through March 30, 2011.  On March 30, 
2011, Martin’s surgeon certified her as capable of returning to sedentary work. 
3. 
Martin filed a Petition before the Board for total disability benefits 
during her two-month post-surgical period, i.e., from January 21, 2011 through 
March 30, 2011.  The State argued that Martin was ineligible for those benefits.  
The State contended that total disability benefits are considered “wage replacement 
benefits,” and that because Martin had voluntarily left the workforce before her 
2011 surgery, she had no wages to be replaced.  Therefore, the State argued, 
Martin was not entitled to receive total disability benefits.   
4. 
In its first (June 2011) decision, the Board determined that Martin had 
not voluntarily withdrawn from the workforce, because she had taken active steps 
                                                 
1 In 2009, she received partial disability benefits as a result of suffering that injury and 
commuted those partial disability benefits, thereby receiving them in a lump sum.  The partial 
disability benefits are uncontroverted and not a subject of this appeal. 
 
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to find a job.2  The Board found that, before her 2011 surgery, Martin had earned a 
degree in medical billing and coding from the Harris School of Business “with the 
intent to find employment in that field,” although she had been unsuccessful in that 
quest.3  The Board further found that Martin had completed “vocational 
rehabilitation,” learned to be a cashier at Goodwill, applied for a job at Capitol 
Cleaners, and also searched the local newspapers for other jobs.4 
5. 
In February 2012, however, the Superior Court reversed.5  The court 
held that the Board had abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Martin’s job 
search that had been unavailable during discovery.6  The court found that although 
the State had twice requested Martin to produce information and documentation 
supporting her job search, Martin had not done so.7  As a result, the court held, the 
Board erred by admitting into evidence Martin’s testimony of her job search over 
the State’s objection.8  Martin contended that the State’s request for documentation 
supporting her job search was an impermissible discovery, and that therefore she 
                                                 
2 Martin v. State, Hearing No. 1307651, slip op. (IAB June 15, 2011).   
3 Id. at 4.   
4 Id. at 3.  
5 Delaware Home & Hospital v. Martin, C.A. No. K11A-07-001, slip op. (Del. Super. Feb. 21, 
2012). 
6 Id. at 2. 
7 Id. at 3.  
8 Id. at 3, 5-6.  
 
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had no obligation to provide any written documents to the State.  Rejecting that 
argument, the Superior Court held that: 
[Martin’s] characterization of the [State’s] request as an interrogatory 
may be fair.  [Martin’s] suggestion that [the State] is not entitled to an 
answer thereof, however, is not.  [Martin] argues that nothing in the 
Board rules indicates that interrogatories are permitted.  The fact that 
the rules do not suggest interrogatories does not mean, necessarily, 
that they are not allowed.  [Martin] does not present any authority to 
the contrary.  The request was proper.  [The State] was entitled to the 
information.9 
The trial court then reversed and remanded for a new Board hearing. 
 
6. 
In May 2012, on remand, the Board issued its second decision.  The 
Board found that although Martin had been “medically capable of working with 
restrictions” before her 2011 surgery, she had “failed to produce evidence of a 
reasonable job search.”10  As a result, the Board concluded, Martin had voluntarily 
left the workforce and was not entitled to any total disability benefits.11 
7. 
In its April 2013 decision, the Superior Court agreed.12  The court noted 
that during the Board’s hearing on remand, the State had again requested Martin to 
provide information pertaining to her job search.13  Martin, however, provided only 
                                                 
9 Id. at 6.  
10 Martin v. State, Hearing No. 1307651, slip op. at 4 (IAB May 14, 2012).   
11 Id. at 5.   
12 Martin v. Delaware Home & Hospital, C.A. No. K12A-05-007, slip op. (Del. Super. Apr. 8, 
2013).  
13 Id. at 5. 
 
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a “handwritten list of businesses, without dates, names or contact information of 
any kind” to the State less than 48 hours before the Board hearing.14  As a result, 
the Board sustained the State’s objection to admitting Martin’s testimony about her 
job retraining efforts and attempts to find a job.15  The Board did, however, admit 
Martin’s transcript from the Harris School of Business as an exhibit.16  The 
Superior Court concluded that due to Martin’s “wilful noncompliance” with the 
State’s repeated requests for information, the Board had properly determined that 
Martin had not satisfied her burden of proving her intent either to remain in or to 
return to the workforce.17  The court then upheld the Board’s determination that 
Martin was ineligible for total disability benefits.18 This appeal followed.   
8. 
We review a Superior Court ruling that, in turn, has reviewed a ruling 
of an administrative agency, by directly examining the decision of the agency.19  
We review the Board’s decision to determine if the decision is supported by 
                                                 
14 Id.  
15 Id. at 6. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 10, 12. 
18 Martin v. Delaware Home & Hospital, C.A. No. K12A-05-007, slip op. at 12 (Del. Super. Apr. 
8, 2013). 
19 Pub. Water Supply Co. v. DiPasquale, 735 A.2d 378, 380-81 (Del. 1999). 
 
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substantial evidence and free from legal error.20  Substantial evidence is such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.21  On appeal, this Court will not weigh the evidence, determine 
questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings.22  We review questions 
of law de novo.23  Absent an error of law, the standard of review for a Board’s 
decision is abuse of discretion.24  The Board has abused its discretion where its 
decision is found to have exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the 
circumstances.25 
9. 
On appeal, Martin advances two claims of error.  First, she argues that 
the State’s request for documentation of her job search is an interrogatory that is 
not permitted under the Board Rules, and therefore, she need not comply with the 
State’s request to furnish evidence of her job search.  Alternatively, she contends 
that her academic transcript (admitted as an exhibit at the second Board hearing) 
                                                 
20 Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 613 (Del. 1981); Unempl’t Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Duncan, 337 
A.2d 308, 308-09 (Del. 1975). 
21 Olney, 425 A.2d at 614. 
22 Person-Gaines v. Pepco Hldgs., Inc., 981 A.2d 1159, 1161 (Del. 2009). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. (quotation omitted). 
 
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sufficiently evidenced her intent to remain in the workforce, thereby entitling her 
to total disability benefits. 
10. Martin’s first impermissible interrogatories contention is misconceived.  
The Board Rules are silent about the role of interrogatories in an administrative 
hearing.  Board Rule 11, however, provides that “any party may serve on any other 
party a written request for the production . . . of any designated documents . . . 
which contain or constitute evidence relevant to the claim or petition . . . and which 
are in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is 
served.”26  The State therefore properly requested Martin to provide documents 
supporting her claim of an ongoing job search.   
 
11. Martin’s second argument is that, in any event, her academic transcript 
sufficiently evidenced an intent to remain in the workforce.  The Board admitted 
Martin’s transcript as an exhibit at the hearing.  The Board did not err, however, by 
implicitly finding that, absent other support information besides the transcript, 
Martin had not met her burden of proving that she was actively searching for a job 
before her 2011 surgery.  Accordingly, the Superior Court properly affirmed the 
Board’s decision and held that Martin was not entitled to total disability benefits. 
 
                                                 
26 Department of Labor, State of Delaware Industrial Accident Board Rules, available at 
http://dia.delawareworks.com/documents/Rules%20of%20the%20Industrial%20Accident%20Bo
ard.pdf (Rule 11(A)). 
 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the Superior 
Court are AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
       Justice