Title: Salvation Army, Inc. v. Hart Etc.
Citation: 154 N.E.2d 487, 239 Ind. 1
Docket Number: 29,740
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: December 9, 1958

239 Ind. 1 (1958)
154 N.E.2d 487
SALVATION ARMY, INC., ET AL.
v.
HART, ETC., ET AL.
No. 29,740.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed December 9, 1958.
*4 Forrest M. Condit, Charles H. Sparrenberger and Fine, Hatfield, Sparrenberger &amp; Fine, all of Evansville, for appellants.
Clifton L. Markel and William L. Mitchell, both of Evansville, for appellees.
ARTERBURN, J.
In this appeal two actions have been consolidated for review. They come to us upon transfer from the Appellate Court.
The first question presented for our consideration deals with the construction of the will of Charles L. Hart and the operation of its provisions after his widow elected to take her share at law and thereby renounced the provisions made for her in the will. The will created a trust in event the widow survived. The income *5 therefrom was to be paid to Mrs. Hart during her life after paying $500.00 per month to a sister, Effie M. Baker, and $50.00 per month to Laura Dugan during their respective lives. Upon the death of the last survivor the assets in the trust under the will, vested in the appellants in the proportions specified.
The trial court held under the provisions of the Probate Code that the widow's election did not accelerate the remainder interest and that she received (in addition to the one-third at law) a life estate and income from the trust remaining as heir and next of kin for the reason it was intestate property.
The case was tried on a stipulation of facts as follows:
The appellants contended that "where the life tenant elects to take under the law, the remainders are accelerated and come into being immediately upon the election being taken."
It is recognized that prior to the time the new Probate Code became effective, Indiana did not follow the general rule of acceleration as contended, but it is urged it was the intention of the Legislature to adopt the well recognized rule of acceleration of remainders and it should be applicable in this case. It is agreed the new Probate Code applies to this case. The provisions of the Code relating to the problem here are as follows:
§ 6-301, Burns' 1953 Repl. (Acts 1953, ch. 112 Paragraphs (c) and (d)) provides:
Sec. 6-104, Burns' 1953 Repl. provides as follows:
The Commission's Comments read as follows:
Appellants say that so far as the operation of the will is concerned, the widow is "constructively" considered as predeceasing her husband by her election to take at law and therefore "Item V" of the will is effective. Item V provides that if the widow does not survive the testator the assets which would otherwise go into trust shall vest in the appellants subject to the lien or charge to pay the sister, Effie M. Baker $500 per month and Laura Dugan $50 per month.
*11 However, the provision in the code is not as broad in application as argued. It says where a spouse has renounced her rights, "the will shall be construed with respect to the property so devised to him (or her) as if such surviving spouse had predeceased the testator." (Our italics).
It does not say that any property, other than that devised to her, shall be treated as if she predeceased her husband. The terms of the will should be preserved so far as possible. The contention that she predeceased her husband is a construction to be given to no other terms of the will and no other property is to be changed in its disposition.
It may be stated as a general proposition that it is the law that when a spouse renounces the benefits of a will, that the interest of no other person taking under the will or any interest in a trust shall be disturbed, or changed in any respect if such can be avoided. The intentions of the testator are carried out in so far as possible. Jones v. Jones (1925), 84 Ind. App. 176, 149 N.E. 108; 57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 1549, p. 1054; 4 Page on Wills, sec. 1390 n (16), p. 94.
One could subscribe to the argument for an acceleration were the widow the only interested person or beneficiary under the trust upon her renunciation of the provisions made for her but Effie M. Baker and Laura Dugan have an interest in keeping the trust in operation rather than have a mere charge on assets, which may be taken out of this jurisdiction upon acceleration of the remainder interest. A remainder interest will not be accelerated if the interest of a beneficiary in the intervening life estate is altered thereby. In re Skinner (1941), 230 Iowa 1016, 300 N.W. 1, 136 A.L.R. 907; In re Estate of Maris (1930), 301 Pa. 20, *12 151 Atl. 577, 70 A.L.R. 1330; 54 Am. Jur., Trust, sec. 100, p. 92; 164 A.L.R. 1442.
The consequences of an acceleration are made clearer if we assume the beneficiaries were to receive a percentage of the income instead of a fixed sum, yet their legal interest in the preservation of the trust is the same whether the income is a stated amount or a share of the income.
It is argued, however, that the testator provided in his will for the contingency that his wife might predecease him. That is true. However, in actuality, she did not, and we have no right to thwart his will in that respect by the construction of a fiction which under the statute is applicable only to the property devised to the wife and no one else.
All constructive or fictitious assumptions in law are forced by necessities to reach an equitable or just result and are never indulged in or raised when doing so perverts the ends of justice. A "constructive death" should be limited strictly to the evil intended to be remedied. It is apparent that the purpose of the Probate Code in creating such a fiction as to the death of a spouse who rejects the benefits of a will and takes at law, is to prevent such spouse from taking any more than the statutory share. The Code could not be plainer.
Henry's Probate Law and Practice arrives at the same intepretation in regard to the effect of an election:
The cases cited by the appellees to the contrary, were decided prior to the effective date of the Probate Code, which specifically states that the widow shall be deemed to renounce "all rights and interest of every kind and character in the personal and real property of the deceased" (our italics) in event of an election to take her share at law. Wilson v. Moore, et al. (1882), 86 Ind. 244; Rocker v. Metzger (1908), 171 Ind. 364, 86 N.E. 403.
Under the prior law the will of the testator could be in some cases practically thwarted in its entirety by an election to take at law. The widow was encouraged in that direction to take her third share and also salvage from the ensuing wreckage all the resulting intestate property in certain situations. It was the rule of "have your cake and eat it." Acts 1907, chap. 48, sec. 1, p. 73.
No doubt, careful draftsmen should avoid such results in event of an election to reject the terms of a will, but few wills are so carefully drawn.
We hold that the trust created under the will did not fail by reason of a fictitious death of Mrs. Hart, prior to her husband upon her renunciation of the will. She will take only a statutory share of the estate, and no more, since she "is deemed to renounce all rights and interest of every kind and character *14 in the personal and real estate of the deceased spouse and to accept such elected award in lieu thereof." The trust with such assets as remain therein, continues with its accumulations for the benefit of all interested parties except the widow.
The will provides (Item VI) that "all the rest and residue" shall go into the trust. Thus there is no intestate property. It further provides that upon the termination of the trust "all remaining corpus and any accumulated income of said trust estate" shall go to the appellants at such time.
Under the provisions of the Probate Code it also follows that the benefits of Item II of the will, relative to the payment of all inheritance and estate taxes out of the general assets of the estate, will not apply to the statutory share taken by the widow since she renounced all benefits under the will. Merchants Nat. Bk. &amp; Tr. Co. v. U.S. (1957), (C.C.A. 7th) 246 F.2d 410; In re Est. of Donovan (1951), 409 Ill. 195, 98 N.E.2d 757; 29 A.L.R.2d 215; Murphy v. Murphy (1936), 125 Fla. 855, 170 So. 856; In re Uihlein's Will (1953), 264 Wis. 362, 59 N.W.2d 641, 38 A.L.R.2d 961.
Upon the issues raised on appeal from objections made to the final report, we adopt and approve the language of the Appellate Court, which begins with the recital of the stipulations as follows:
The stipulation then lists thirteen items which included bank deposits, building and Loan Association accounts, government bonds and household furniture, disclosing a total valuation of $52,409.34 under the first column and $26,204.67 under the second column.
"`It is further stipulated by and between the interested parties, as hereinabove set forth, that for the purpose of the United States Estate Tax Return, the instruments itemized in the accounting, hereinabove referred to, were listed as follows:
*18 "In this action the Court found:
"`"Personal property" includes interests in goods, money, choses in action, evidences of debt and chattels real.'
Since the facts are stipulated, a new trial would serve no purpose. The judgment is reversed with directions to enter a judgment in conformity with the law as expressed herein.
Landis, C.J., Achor, Emmert and Bobbitt, JJ., concur.
NOTE.  Reported in 154 N.E.2d 487.