Title: Monica M. Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee
Citation: 2000 WI 15
Docket Number: 1998AP001821-FT
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 16, 2000

2000 WI 41 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-1821-FT 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Monica M. Blazekovic,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
City of Milwaukee,  
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
City of Milwaukee, City of Milwaukee Fire  
Department, Donald V. Dillard, Linda O.  
Dillard,  
 
Defendants, 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company  
and American Standard Insurance Company  
of Wisconsin,  
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners.  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  225 Wis. 2d 837, 593 N.W.2d 809 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999 – Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 16, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
January 6, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Guolee 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners, there 
were briefs and oral argument by Beth A. Boyer-Ryan, Milwaukee. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief 
2000 WI 41 
 
and oral argument by Robert L. Elliot, Milwaukee. 
 
2000 WI 41 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-1821-FT 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Monica M. Blazekovic,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
City of Milwaukee,  
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Milwaukee, City of Milwaukee Fire  
Department, Donald V. Dillard, Linda O.  
Dillard,  
 
          Defendants, 
 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company  
and American Standard Insurance Company  
of Wisconsin,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants- 
          Petitioners. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Petitioners American Standard 
Insurance Company (American Standard) and American Family Mutual 
Insurance Company (American Family) seek review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals that affirmed the circuit court 
FILED 
 
MAY 16, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-1821-FT 
 
 
2 
order denying their motion for summary judgment.1  The insurers 
contend that the exclusion contained in their insurance policies 
precludes uninsured motorist coverage for injuries sustained by 
Monica M. Blazekovic while employed as a firefighter and riding 
in a City of Milwaukee fire truck.    Because we determine that 
the exclusion 
does 
not 
fit 
the 
narrow definition 
of a 
permissible "drive other car" exclusion under Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(5)(j) (1997-98),2 we affirm the court of appeals.  
 
¶2 
The relevant facts are brief and undisputed.  Monica 
M. Blazekovic, a City of Milwaukee firefighter, suffered 
injuries when the fire truck she was occupying was struck by an 
uninsured motor vehicle on August 25, 1995.  At that time, 
Blazekovic had automobile insurance policies in effect on two 
vehicles.   American Family provided coverage for her pick-up 
truck and American Standard provided coverage for her car.   
¶3 
Both policies included uninsured motorist coverage as 
required by statute, with limits of $50,000 per person and 
$100,000 per accident.  Both policies also contained the 
following exclusion, identified as "Endorsement 44":  
 
EXCLUSION 
OF 
NON-OWNED 
EMERGENCY 
TYPE 
AUTOMOBILE ENDORSEMENT 
 
                     
1 Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee, 225 Wis. 2d 837, 593 
N.W.2d 809 (Ct. App. 1999) (affirming order and judgment of 
Circuit Court, Milwaukee County, Michael D. Guolee, J.)  
2 All future references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
1997-98 volumes unless indicated otherwise. 
 
No. 
98-1821-FT 
 
 
3 
The insurance provided by this policy under 
Part 
I, 
Part 
II, 
Part 
III 
[Uninsured 
Motorists Coverage], Part IV, Part V or 
Underinsured Motorists Coverage shall not 
apply to Blazekovic, Monica when using non-
owned emergency type vehicles in connection 
with his or her employment, occupation, or 
profession.       
Endorsement 44 is a particular breed of "drive other car" 
exclusion, which seeks to limit uninsured motorist coverage 
based on the car being driven. 
 
¶4 
Blazekovic initially filed suit against the uninsured 
motorist and the City of Milwaukee Fire Department, subsequently 
amending her complaint to include American Standard and American 
Family as named defendants.  She sought uninsured motorist 
coverage for the injuries she sustained as a result of the 
accident.  In response, the insurers filed for summary judgment 
and claimed that Endorsement 44 precludes coverage because 
Blazekovic was using a non-owned emergency vehicle in connection 
with her employment.   
 
¶5 
The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
summary 
judgment 
and 
determined that Endorsement 44 was an invalid exclusion. 
Accordingly, the court declared that the insurers’ policies 
provided uninsured motorist coverage for Blazekovic’s injuries. 
¶6 
Prior to the circuit court’s order, Blazekovic settled 
her uninsured motorist claim with the City of Milwaukee for 
$25,000 as payment towards the expenses for her injuries. 
Thereafter, American Family and American Standard stipulated 
that the additional value of Blazekovic’s claim was $9,000 and 
No. 
98-1821-FT 
 
 
4 
permitted the entry of judgment against them for that amount.  
The insurers then filed a notice of appeal from that judgment. 
 
¶7 
The court of appeals affirmed, agreeing with the 
circuit court that Endorsement 44 is an invalid exclusion of 
uninsured motorist coverage.  Observing that legislative changes 
in 1995 validated certain exclusions of uninsured motorist 
coverage that had been held invalid by prior case law, the court 
of appeals nevertheless concluded that Endorsement 44 remains a 
prohibited 
exclusion. 
 
Because 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(5)(j) 
explicitly permits "drive other car" exclusions only when three 
conditions are met, and Endorsement 44 fails to meet one of 
those conditions, the court determined that Endorsement 44 may 
not be used by the insurers to deny Blazekovic relief for her 
injuries.  Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee, 225 Wis. 2d 837, 
844, 593 N.W.2d 809 (Ct. App. 1999). 
 
¶8 
This case comes before the court on a review of a 
summary judgment motion.  In reviewing motions for summary 
judgment, we follow the same methodology as does the circuit 
court.  Swatek v. County of Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 47, 61, 531 N.W.2d 
45 (1995); See also Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  Summary judgment is 
properly granted when there is no genuine issue of material 
fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 
N.W.2d 816 (1987).   
¶9 
Because the facts in this case are not in dispute, the 
determination of whether Endorsement 44 is a valid uninsured 
motorist exclusion turns on an examination of the statutory 
No. 
98-1821-FT 
 
 
5 
bases of uninsured motorist coverage under Wis. Stat § 632.32.  
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we 
decide independently of the determinations rendered by the 
circuit court and court of appeals.  Theis v. Midwest Ins. Co., 
2000 WI 15, ¶9, 232 Wis. 2d 749, 606 N.W.2d 162.  The primary 
goal in the interpretation of a statute is to discern the intent 
of the legislature.  Reyes v. Greatway Ins. Co., 227 Wis. 2d 
357, 365, 597 N.W.2d 687 (1999). 
¶10 Before delving into statutory analysis, however, we 
briefly discuss the background of uninsured motorist insurance 
to provide context for our analysis.  Uninsured motorist 
coverage in Wisconsin dates back to 1966 and was developed in 
response to the problems attendant to compensating victims of 
traffic accidents.  Arnold P. Anderson, Wisconsin Insurance Law 
§ 3.1 (4th ed. 1998).  See also Alan I. Widiss, Uninsured and 
Underinsured Motorist Insurance, §§ 1.1-1.14., pp.3-19 (2d rev. 
ed. 1999).  Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(4)(a) mandates that every 
policy of automobile insurance issued in the state include 
uninsured motorist coverage.   
¶11 The statute sets forth that such coverage is "[f]or 
the protection of persons injured who are legally entitled to 
recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor 
vehicles 
because 
of 
bodily 
injury, 
sickness 
or 
disease, 
including death resulting therefrom, in limits of at least 
$25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a).  Underlying the uninsured motorist statute is an 
intent to compensate the injured victim of an uninsured 
No. 
98-1821-FT 
 
 
6 
motorist’s negligence to the same extent as if the uninsured 
motorist were insured.  Theis, 2000 WI 15 at ¶28.  As a 
legislative creation, uninsured motorist coverage is governed by 
the legislature’s pronouncements on its scope and viability. 
¶12 The issue before us is whether Endorsement 44 is a 
valid uninsured motorist exclusion.  We begin our statutory 
interpretation with an examination of the language of Wisconsin 
Stat. § 632.32(5)(e), which states that "[a] policy may provide 
for exclusions not prohibited by sub. (6) or other applicable 
law."  Based on the statutory language, this court has fashioned 
a two-part test to determine the validity of a particular 
exclusion.  Clark v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 218 Wis. 2d 
169, 174, 577 N.W.2d 790 (1998).  
¶13 First, we must direct our focus to Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(6) 
and 
decide 
whether 
the 
exclusion 
fits 
the 
description of any of the enumerated prohibitions.3  Id.  If it 
does, the matter is resolved, and the exclusion is invalid. 
Otherwise, we proceed to the second part of the test, which 
requires that we examine any "other applicable law" that may 
                     
3  The following are the enumerated prohibitions: 1) 
coverage exclusions for the agents and employees of motor 
vehicle handlers when the agents or employees are using motor 
vehicles used by customers doing business with the motor vehicle 
handler; 2) exclusions for persons related by blood or marriage 
to the insured; 3) exclusions for any named insured or passenger 
in an insured vehicle, with the exception of a motorcycle or 
moped designed to carry only one person; 4) exclusions based 
solely on age; and 5) exclusions for the use of the motor 
vehicle for illegal purposes or while the driver is under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol.  See Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6).  
No. 
98-1821-FT 
 
 
7 
prohibit the exclusion.  Id.  Absent any other applicable law 
prohibiting the exclusion, it remains valid.   
¶14 In this case, the parties agree that Endorsement 44 
does not fall under the enumerated exclusions prohibited under 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6).  However, whether the exclusion is 
prohibited by other applicable law under the second part of the 
test forms the crux of our analysis and lies at the center of 
the parties’ disagreement. 
¶15 Blazekovic 
directs 
our 
attention 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(5)(j) and contends that this provision represents the 
other applicable law prohibiting Endorsement 44.  Section 
632.32(5)(j) states: 
 
A policy may provide that any coverage under the 
policy does not apply to a loss resulting from 
the use of a motor vehicle that meets all of the 
following conditions: 
 
1.  Is owned by the named insured, or is owned by 
the named insured’s spouse or a relative of the 
named insured if the spouse or relative resides 
in the same household as the named insured. 
 
2.  Is not described in the policy under which 
the claim is made. 
 
3.  Is not covered under the terms of the policy 
as a newly acquired or replacement motor vehicle. 
(emphasis supplied). 
¶16 Blazekovic posits that the statute is unambiguous and 
permits "drive other car" exclusions only when all three 
requirements are satisfied.   Here, Blazekovic was using a 
vehicle owned by the City of Milwaukee.  Thus, Endorsement 44 is 
No. 
98-1821-FT 
 
 
8 
prohibited because it fails to satisfy the plain language of the 
first requirement: that the vehicle be owned by the insured or a 
family member residing with the insured. 
¶17 American Family and American Standard agree that Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) is unambiguous, yet maintain that it does 
not represent other applicable law prohibiting the exclusion.  
Rather, it represents a permissive statute and nothing therein 
reflects a prohibitory intent.   
¶18 The 
insurers 
further 
argue 
that 
all 
case 
law 
invalidating 
such 
exclusions 
as 
Endorsement 
44 
has 
been 
overturned 
by 
sweeping 
legislative 
changes 
in 
1995 
that 
reinstated those exclusions.  They rest their argument on 
language contained in Clark that notes the effect of these 
legislative changes in overruling prior case law.  218 Wis. 2d 
at 177 nn. 3,4.  Because there is no other applicable law 
explicitly prohibiting Endorsement 44, and it is not prohibited 
under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6), the insurers claim that the 
exclusion is valid to preclude uninsured motorist coverage for 
Blazekovic’s injuries.  
¶19 Prior to 1995, a long line of cases held invalid 
uninsured motorist exclusions that served to prohibit the 
stacking of claims.  See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. 
Zastrow, 166 Wis. 2d 423, 480 N.W.2d 8 (1992); Welch v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 122 Wis. 2d 172, 361 N.W.2d 680 
(1985); Hulsey v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 142 Wis. 2d 
639, 419 N.W.2d 288 (Ct. App. 1987). Courts also invalidated 
exclusions that generally sought to limit uninsured motorist 
No. 
98-1821-FT 
 
 
9 
coverage.  See, e.g., Nicholson v. Home Ins. Cos., 137 Wis. 2d 
581, 405 N.W.2d 327 (1987); Niemann v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 143 
Wis. 2d 73, 420 N.W.2d 378 (Ct. App. 1988).  Cases invalidating 
the various "drive other car" exclusions relied on the broad 
purpose underlying uninsured motorist coverage and reasoned that 
such 
coverage 
is 
personal 
and 
portable 
"under 
all 
circumstances."  Welch, 122 Wis. 2d at 181.   
¶20 In 
1995, 
the 
legislature 
enacted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 632.32(5)(f)-(5)(j).4  1995 Wis. Act 21.  The first four 
                     
4 Wis. Stat. §§ 632.32(5)(f)-(5)(i) state as follows: 
(f) A policy may provide that regardless of the 
number 
of 
policies 
involved, 
vehicles 
involved, 
persons covered, claims made, vehicles or premiums 
shown on the policy or premiums paid the limits for 
any coverage under the policy may not be added to the 
limits for similar coverage applying to other motor 
vehicles to determine the limit of  insurance coverage 
available for bodily injury or death suffered by a 
person in any one accident. 
(g) A policy may provide that the maximum amount 
of 
uninsured 
or 
underinsured 
motorist 
coverage 
available for bodily injury or death suffered by a 
person who was not using a motor vehicle at the time 
of an accident is the highest single limit of 
uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, whichever 
is applicable, for any motor vehicle with respect to 
which the person is insured. 
(h) A policy may provide that the maximum amount 
of medical payments coverage available for bodily 
injury or death suffered by a person who was not using 
a motor vehicle at the time of an accident is the 
highest single limit of medical payments coverage for 
any motor vehicle with respect to which the person is 
insured. 
No. 
98-1821-FT 
 
 
10
provisions, 
§§ 
632.32(5)(f)-(5)(i), primarily 
address 
anti-
stacking and reducing clauses, validating such clauses to avoid 
the duplication of benefits permitted under prior case law.  
Additionally, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) authorizes the exclusion 
of uninsured motorist coverage when three statutory requirements 
are satisfied.  However, we do not discern from the legislative 
changes an intent, as the insurers assert, to authorize all 
"drive other car" uninsured motorist exclusions. 
¶21 While Wis. Stat. §§ 632.32(5)(f)-(5)(i) govern the 
monetary limits of recovery, subsection (5)(j) stands apart from 
these other provisions and addresses the particular set of 
circumstances in which a "drive other car" exclusion of 
uninsured motorist coverage may be permitted.  First, the 
exclusion must pertain to a car owned by the insured or a 
relative residing within the insured’s household.  Wis. Stat. § 
632.32(5)(j).  Second, the car to which the exclusion applies 
must not be described in the policy under which the uninsured 
motorist claim is made.  Id.   Third, the car must not be 
                                                                  
(i) A policy may provide that the limits under 
the policy for uninsured or underinsured coverage for 
bodily injury or death resulting from any one accident 
shall be reduced by any of the following that apply: 
1. Amounts paid by or on behalf of any person or 
organization that may be legally responsible for the 
bodily injury or death for which the payment is made. 
2.  Amounts paid or payable under any worker’s 
compensation law. 
3.  Amounts paid or payable under any disability 
benefits laws.  
No. 
98-1821-FT 
 
 
11
covered under the policy as a newly acquired or replacement 
vehicle.  Id.  A "drive other car" exclusion that does not 
comport with this set of circumstances is not permitted. 
¶22 Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) has replaced the broad 
proposition of Welch and its progeny that uninsured motorist 
coverage is available in all circumstances.  However, it has not 
eviscerated the general prohibition against "drive other car" 
exclusions. There is a particular type of "drive other car" 
exclusion that now is allowed under the statute. 
¶23 American Standard and American Family assert that 
because the legislature lifted the prior ban on anti-stacking 
and reducing clauses through Wis. Stat. §§ 632.32(5)(f)-(5)(i), 
it intended to lift the ban on all exclusions of uninsured 
motorist coverage.  They urge this court to read the statutory 
provisions in conjunction and recognize the permissive intent of 
the legislature.   
¶24 We do not dispute the permissive nature of the 1995 
legislation.  However, we hesitate to translate an intent to 
permit anti-stacking and reducing clauses into a sweeping 
validation of "drive other car" exclusions in all circumstances, 
particularly 
when 
only 
a 
specific 
set 
of 
permissive 
circumstances has been clearly set forth. Although the statute 
now allows insurers to prevent stacking, the specific type of 
"drive other car" exclusion that may be used to achieve this 
goal is circumscribed by the requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(5)(j). 
No. 
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12
¶25 In 
Clark, 
we 
noted 
that 
the 
1995 
legislation 
overturned all prior case law relating to exclusions of 
uninsured motorist coverage.  218 Wis. 2d at 177 nn. 3, 4.  We 
now take this opportunity to clarify the import of our language 
in Clark.  Indeed a majority of those cases mentioned in Clark 
permitted stacking, and thus have been replaced by the statutes 
that now resuscitate anti-stacking clauses.  Furthermore, Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) has replaced the broad proposition, relied 
upon in several of the cases, that uninsured motorist coverage 
exists in all circumstances.  However, not all of the types of 
exclusions at issue in those cases have been validated as a 
result of the legislative changes in 1995.  
¶26 As the court of appeals astutely recognized, the 
"drive 
other 
car" 
exclusion 
in 
Niemann 
remains 
invalid.  
Blazekovic, 225 Wis. 2d at 845-46.  Niemann involved a 
particular type of "drive other car" exclusion that sought to 
deny recovery for accidents arising from the use of a car 
furnished for the insured’s "regular use."  143 Wis. 2d at 76.  
When the insured police officer sustained injuries in an 
accident while driving a squad car, the insurer denied uninsured 
motorist recovery.  Id. at 75-76.  However, the court relied 
upon the Welch rationale that uninsured motorist coverage is 
available in all circumstances, and invalidated the "drive other 
car" exclusion.  Id. at 79-80.  
¶27 Niemann has not been overruled by the 1995 statutory 
amendments, but merely limited for its reliance on the broad 
Welch rationale.  The "drive other car" exclusion at issue in 
No. 
98-1821-FT 
 
 
13
Niemann remains an invalid exclusion because, like Endorsement 
44, it does not satisfy the first requirement listed under Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(5)(j).  The legislature was aware of the "drive 
other car" exclusion at issue in Niemann prior to its 1995 
amendments.  Had it intended to approve all "drive other car" 
exclusions, the legislature may have easily done so by stating 
such 
an 
intent. 
 
Instead, 
the 
legislature 
engrafted 
a 
permissible "drive other car" exclusion that must comply with 
three specific requirements.  This reflects the legislative 
intent to prohibit restrictions of uninsured motorist coverage 
except in a singular set of circumstances. 
¶28 American Family and American Standard disagree with 
the interpretation that Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) applies to 
"drive other car" exclusions in the uninsured motorist context. 
Yet, at oral argument the insurers conceded that § 632.32(5)(j) 
was enacted to address uninsured motorist exclusions.  Moreover, 
since Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) governs exclusions that limit 
coverage depending on the particular car being driven, it 
describes a "drive other car" exclusion.  See Anderson, 
Wisconsin Insurance Law at § 3.4, 3-22, 3-30 (recognizing that 
Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) addresses a specific type of 
"drive other car" exclusion). 
¶29 Legislative history confirms our interpretation.  The 
Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis to 1995 Senate Bill 6, 
which 
was 
eventually 
enacted 
as 
the 
current 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 632.32(5)(f)-(5)(j), notes: 
  
 
No. 
98-1821-FT 
 
 
14
The bill also validates certain drive-other-car 
exclusions, which courts have invalidated when 
used to prevent stacking.  Under the bill, a 
policy may exclude coverage for losses resulting 
from the use of a vehicle that is not described 
in the policy and that is owned by the insured or 
a family member residing with the insured. 
(emphasis added). 
¶30 If we were to construe Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) in 
the manner suggested by the insurers, as a permissive statute 
reflecting no prohibitory intent, then the statute would be 
rendered superfluous.  There would be no need to separately 
provide for a permitted exclusion because by virtue of not being 
enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6) an exclusion would be 
rendered valid.  A fundamental rule of statutory construction 
requires that effect be given, if possible, to every word, 
clause, and sentence in a statute, and that a construction 
resulting in any portion of a statute being superfluous should 
be avoided whenever possible.  Lake City Corp. v. City of 
Mequon, 207 Wis. 2d 155, 162, 558 N.W.2d 100 (1997).  We 
therefore decline to adopt the interpretation proferred by the 
insurers 
because 
it 
renders 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(5)(j) 
superfluous. 
¶31 American Family and American Standard also claim that 
our 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
632.32(5)(j) 
would 
effectively nullify Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(e), which allows 
exclusions not prohibited by § 632.32(6) or other applicable 
law.  We note that § 632.32(5)(e) was not included in the 1995 
legislative changes 
but 
rather pre-existed 
those changes. 
Subsection (5)(e) has essentially the same effect on "drive 
No. 
98-1821-FT 
 
 
15
other 
car" 
uninsured 
motorist 
exclusions 
now 
as 
it 
had 
previously.  It currently has added substance due to the 
validation of a specific type of "drive other car" exclusion.  
We thus 
do not 
share the 
insurers’ 
concerns 
about the 
purportedly toothless effect of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(e).  
¶32 American Standard and American Family next contend 
that an invalidation of Endorsement 44 under Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(5)(j) would lead to absurd results because a myriad of 
other exclusions would also be invalidated, including those 
denying coverage for intentional acts and punitive damages. 
According to the insurers, exclusions of tortious activity and 
punitive damages have been held valid previously by the courts 
of this state, and our interpretation would overturn those 
judicial decisions.  See, e.g., Schwersenska v. American Family 
Mut. Ins. Co., 206 Wis. 2d 549, 557 N.W.2d 469 (Ct. App. 1996); 
Macherey v. Home Ins. Co., 184 Wis. 2d 1, 516 N.W.2d 434 (Ct. 
App. 1994).   
¶33 However, the cases offered by the insurers essentially 
address liability exclusions.  They do not address uninsured 
motorist exclusions.  Because Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) is 
limited to "drive other car" exclusions in the uninsured 
motorist context and does not address liability coverage, we are 
not persuaded by the insurers’ predictions.   
¶34 The insurers likewise fail to convince us that the 
uninsured motorist territorial exclusion in Clark would be 
invalidated as a result of our construction of § 632.32(5)(j).  
As we note once again, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) was intended to 
No. 
98-1821-FT 
 
 
16
address "drive other car" exclusions in the uninsured motorist 
context, 
not 
territorial 
exclusions 
of 
uninsured motorist 
coverage.  Our interpretation would do no violence to the 
holding in Clark.   
¶35 In Clark, upon completing the two-part test for 
determining the validity of the territorial exclusion at issue, 
we observed that neither Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6) nor any other 
applicable law prohibited the exclusion.  218 Wis. 2d at 179.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) was not implicated in Clark 
because it addresses "drive other car" exclusions.  In this 
case, however, § 632.32(5)(j) is the other applicable law that 
prohibits 
the 
"drive 
other 
car" 
exclusion 
identified 
as 
Endorsement 44.  Thus, under our interpretation of the statute, 
the exclusion in Clark remains valid. 
¶36 Apart 
from 
their 
statutory 
arguments, 
American 
Standard and American Family offer policy reasons for validating 
Endorsement 44.  First, they assert that when an insurance 
contract is plain on its face, it must not be construed so as to 
bind the insurer to an unintended risk that it was unwilling to 
cover and for which payment was not made.  See Garriguenc v. 
Love, 67 Wis. 2d 130, 135, 226 N.W.2d 414 (1975); Limpert v. 
Smith, 56 Wis. 2d 632, 640, 203 N.W.2d 29 (1973).  According to 
the insurers, under our reading of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) 
Blazekovic receives more protection than for which she bargained 
and paid.  In essence, she receives more uninsured motorist 
coverage than liability coverage.  
No. 
98-1821-FT 
 
 
17
¶37 We hasten to point out that in this case we are 
presented with an issue of statutory interpretation, not the 
construction of an insurance contract.  The short response to 
the insurers’ argument is that an insured may not receive less 
coverage than that mandated by the statute.  An insurance 
contract 
that 
contravenes 
statutory 
requirements 
must 
be 
invalidated.  Uninsured motorist coverage may not be whittled 
away in the absence of a clear legislative directive intending 
to restrict coverage, and we conclude that there is no such 
legislative directive. 
¶38 In addition, liability coverage differs from uninsured 
motorist coverage, and the two are not to be equated.  A 
liability policy requires the insurer to shield the insured from 
making payment on a claim for which the insured is liable.  
Landvatter v. Globe Sec. Ins. Co., 100 Wis. 2d 21, 26, 300 
N.W.2d 875 (Ct. App. 1980).  In contrast, uninsured motorist 
coverage seeks to compensate the insured after the insured has 
sustained an actual loss.  Id.  
¶39 Since the purposes underlying the two types of 
coverage differ, it is of little consequence that Blazekovic 
would receive more uninsured motorist coverage than liability 
coverage.  There is no indicia that the legislature intended a 
convergence of liability and uninsured motorist coverage in 
light of the different goals underlying the two types of 
insurance.   
¶40 American Standard and American Family also argue that 
our construction of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) would permit 
No. 
98-1821-FT 
 
 
18
double recovery.  This contention has little substance in light 
of the stipulation that Blazekovic’s claim against the insurers 
in the amount of $9,000 represents the difference between the 
total of her expenses, $34,000, and the amount paid to her by 
the City of Milwaukee pursuant to its uninsured motorist 
coverage, $25,000.  We do not detect any issue of double 
recovery here. 
¶41 The uninsured motorist statute commands that uninsured 
motorist coverage be part and parcel of every automobile policy 
to guarantee that the victim of an uninsured driver’s negligence 
is compensated to the same extent as if the driver were insured. 
 The significant policy rationale underlying uninsured motorist 
coverage would be defeated by allowing for every exclusion 
except 
those 
specifically 
delineated 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(6).  By explicitly permitting only one type of "drive 
other 
car" 
exclusion, 
rather 
than 
sanctioning 
all 
such 
exclusions, the legislature has chosen not to depart from the 
remedial purpose underlying uninsured motorist coverage. 
¶42 In sum, we conclude that because Endorsement 44 fails 
to satisfy the statutory requirements of a permissible "drive 
other car" exclusion under Wis. Stat. 632.32(5)(j), it is 
prohibited under Wisconsin law.  Therefore, American Standard 
and American Family may not deny Blazekovic uninsured motorist 
coverage for the injuries she sustained while operating a non-
owned emergency vehicle during the course of her employment. 
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
No. 
98-1821-FT 
 
 
19
By the Court.-The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
No. 
98-1821-FT 
 
 
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