Title: State ex rel Lincoln Loan Co. v. Court of Appeals
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S50310
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: September 5, 2003

Filed: September 5, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
ex rel LINCOLN LOAN COMPANY,
	Petitioner,
	v.
COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON,
and MARY J. DEITS, Chief Judge,
WALTER I. EDMONDS; JACK L. LANDAU;
RICK T. HASELTON; REX ARMSTRONG,
VIRGINIA LINDER, ROBERT WOLLHEIM;
RIVES KISTLER; DAVID V. BREWER;
and DAVID SCHUMAN, Judges,
	Respondents.
(SC S50310)

	On petition for writ in the nature of quo warranto dated
March 25, 2003.
	Steven E. Benson, Portland, filed the petition for
petitioner.
	No appearance contra.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, and
Riggs, Justices.*
	GILLETTE, J.
	The petition for writ in the nature of quo warranto is
denied.
	*De Muniz, Balmer, and Kistler, JJ., did not participate in
the consideration or decision of this case.
		GILLETTE, J.
		This is an original proceeding purporting to invoke
this court's discretionary jurisdiction in quo warranto. 
Petitioner Lincoln Loan seeks an order of this court directing
the Court of Appeals to dismiss a certain appeal now pending
before it on the ground that the Legislative Assembly did not
have the authority to create that court.  For the reasons that
follow, we decline to issue a writ of quo warranto.	
		The underlying facts are straightforward.  On February
28, 2002, the Multnomah County Circuit Court awarded Lincoln Loan
a judgment in the case of Carey v. Lincoln Loan Co., Case No.
9706-04753.  On March 22, 2002 -- within the time provided by law
-- the plaintiffs in that case filed a notice of appeal
(designated CA A117696) in the Court of Appeals.  It is the
authority of the Court of Appeals to hear and decide that case
that is at the heart of this proceeding.
		On November 5, 2002, Lincoln Loan moved the Court of
Appeals to dismiss the appeal in the Carey case on the ground
that the Court of Appeals "has no appellate jurisdiction or
judicial power" to grant to the plaintiffs any relief from the
circuit court judgment.  The Court of Appeals denied the motion
on February 27, 2003.
Lincoln Loan then brought the present proceeding "in
the nature of Quo Warranto" on March 25, 2003, asking this court
to intervene.  Lincoln Loan's underlying theory is as follows:
(1) The Court of Appeals was created in 1969 by an act (now
embodied in ORS 2.510 and 2.516) of the Legislative Assembly and
presently has statutory jurisdiction over most appeals, including
the appeal in the Carey case; (2) the Legislative Assembly
enacted the statutes in question pursuant to authority
specifically granted to it by Article VII (Amended), section 1,
of the Oregon Constitution; (1) (3) Article VII (Amended) was not
adopted in compliance with three different requirements of the
Oregon Constitution in place at the time of its adoption, viz.,
the "canvas-and-proclaim" requirement, the "separate-vote"
requirement, and the "full-text" requirement; (4) as a result of
the failure of the people to adopt Article VII (Amended) in
accordance with constitutional requirements, Article VII
(Original), which the people adopted at statehood, remains in
effect; (5) under Article VII (Original), the Legislative
Assembly never was granted the power to create any state court
other than the Supreme Court, the circuit courts, and county
courts; and (6) the Court of Appeals therefore is usurping the
judicial power by purporting to exercise a part of that power --
the power to review decisions of the circuit court -- that is
reserved to the Supreme Court under Article VII (Original).
		This court did not take any immediate action respecting
Lincoln Loan's petition, because we believed that our disposition
of the case of State ex rel McIntire v. Balmer, which this court
has had before it on certification from the Court of Appeals and
which involves, inter alia, the same assertions concerning the
alleged invalidity of Article VII (Amended), would assist in the
disposition of the present matter.  However, we now have
concluded that, for reasons not touching on the merits of Lincoln
Loan's theory, the claims of the plaintiffs in McIntire are moot. 
See State ex rel McIntire v. Balmer, ___ Or ___, ___ P3d ___
(September 5, 2003) (so holding).  It follows that Lincoln Loan's
petition for a writ in the nature of quo warranto should be
addressed independently, and we do so now.
		There are two notable peculiarities attendant to this
case.  The first is that Lincoln Loan does not dispute the idea
that the judgment in its favor in the Carey case is (or, at
least, would have been) appealable somewhere; indeed, Lincoln
Loan's own theory necessarily would mean that the appeal belongs
in this court, rather than in the Court of Appeals.  Lincoln Loan
does not spell out the consequences for the appeal if its
underlying theory is sustained, but we surmise that it then would
move to dismiss the appeal altogether on the ground that it had
not been taken directly and specifically to this court in a
timely manner.
The second peculiarity lies in paragraph 1 of Lincoln
Loan's petition.  That paragraph states: "The Supreme Court may
take original jurisdiction in quo warranto proceedings pursuant
to Article VII (Amended), section 2, of the Oregon
Constitution." (2)

  The anomaly created by that assertion should be
plain to all:  If, as Lincoln Loan asserts, Article VII (Amended)
never was adopted properly and is void, then it would appear to
be impossible for this court to exercise any authority
purportedly granted to this court under that amended provision. 
And that point is important because, unlike the amended article,
the original Article VII did not grant to this court original
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, or quo
warranto.  O'Brien v. O'Brien, 36 Or 92, 94-95, 57 P 374 (1899).
		That last point demonstrates why, at this juncture, we
decline to exercise our discretion to assert our extraordinary
quo warranto authority in this case.  To do so would involve this
court in a circular discussion:  Lincoln Loan has invoked this
court's original, discretionary authority in quo warranto.  This
court has that authority only by virtue of the explicit grant of
such authority in Article VII (Amended), section 2, of the Oregon
Constitution.  But Lincoln Loan's underlying legal theory -- the
basis on which it seeks relief from the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals -- is that Article VII (Amended) is not valid.  And,
if that amended article is not valid, by what authority could
this court grant Lincoln Loan the relief that it seeks?  We do
not suggest that a court may not assess its own jurisdiction at
any time; of course it may.  But we perceive no pressing reason
to exercise our discretion to do so, especially where it is
difficult to see how our assessment would directly benefit the
petitioner.
		Another consideration also militates against our
utilizing our discretionary authority here.  If we decline to
issue the writ, then the underlying appeal in the Carey case can
proceed.  And, when it does, Lincoln Loan may prevail.  In that
event, Lincoln Loan will have no need to pursue its present legal
theory further.
The petition for writ in the nature of quo warranto is
denied. (3)



1. 	That provision of the Oregon Constitution provides, in
part:
		"The judicial power of the state shall be vested
in one supreme court and in such other courts as may
from time to time be created by law.* * *"

2. 	Article VII (Amended), section 2, of the Oregon
Constitution provides:
		"The courts, jurisdiction, and judicial system of
Oregon, except so far as expressly changed by this
amendment, shall remain as at present constituted until
otherwise provided by law.  But the supreme court may,
in its own discretion, take original jurisdiction in
mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus proceedings."
3. 	Our denial of the petition on discretionary grounds
makes it unnecessary for this court to address other potential
barriers to Lincoln Loan's theory, including the statutory
requirement in the quo warranto statute, ORS 30.510 to 30.640, of
district attorney participation in quo warranto proceedings, as
well as the possibility that this proceeding would be time
barred.