Title: Anderson v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 711, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 24, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
VALERIE I. ANDERSON, 
§ 
 
  
§ 
No. 711, 2010 
 
     Respondent Below, 
§ 
 
 
     Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of 
 
  
§ 
the State of Delaware, in and for 
       v. 
 
§  
New Castle County 
 
  
§ 
C.A. No. N10A-04-004 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
§ 
 
 
 
§ 
 
     Petitioner Below, 
§ 
 
 
     Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  April 20, 2011 
 
 
Decided:     May 24, 2011 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Santino Ceccotti, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, 
Delaware; for Appellant. 
 
 
 
Paul R. Wallace (argued) and Elizabeth A. Powers, Esquires, Department of 
Justice, Wilmington, Delaware; for Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JACOBS, Justice: 
 
The State of Delaware, as petitioner-below appellee, filed an habitual 
driving offender petition in the Court of Common Pleas against the respondent-
below appellant, Valerie I. Anderson (“Anderson”), under Chapter 28 of Title 21 
of the Delaware Motor Vehicle Code.1  Hours after declaring Anderson an habitual 
driving offender, the Court of Common Pleas, sua sponte, vacated its earlier 
judgment, holding that the State’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion in 
Anderson’s case was inconsistent with the State’s prosecution of other habitual 
driving offender petitions heard that same day.  On appeal, the Superior Court 
reversed the Court of Common Pleas’ decision as an abuse of discretion, and 
reinstated the judgment declaring Anderson an habitual driving offender.  We 
agree with the Superior Court that the Court of Common Pleas erred in vacating its 
earlier order declaring Anderson an habitual driving offender, and therefore affirm. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On December 7, 2006, the State petitioned the Court of Common Pleas for 
an order declaring Anderson an habitual driving offender under 21 Del. C. § 2802.2  
Although the Delaware Division of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) had recommended 
Anderson to the Attorney General for prosecution on three previous occasions,3 the 
                                                 
1 21 Del. C. § 2801 et seq. 
 
2 21 Del. C. §2802 (defining “habitual offender”). 
 
3 The DMV also submitted Anderson’s name to the Attorney General’s office on March 5, 2003, 
June 14, 2004, and October 29, 2004. 
2 
December 7, 2006 petition was the first time the State had filed an habitual driving 
offender petition against her. 
 
At a hearing on the petition held on October 26, 2007, the Court of Common 
Pleas granted the State’s request for a four-month continuance to allow Anderson 
to secure counsel.4  The court rescheduled the hearing for February 29, 2008.  At 
the rescheduled hearing, the Deputy Attorney General  (“DAG”) prosecuting 
Anderson’s case withdrew the petition “after review of [the] petition and record.”  
Withdrawal of the petition made Anderson eligible to reinstate her driver’s license, 
which she did in April 2009. 
 
Thereafter, the State received a fourth recommendation from the DMV, and 
filed a second habitual driving offender petition against Anderson on August 10, 
2009.  On September 25, 2009, the Court of Common Pleas conducted a hearing 
on the State’s second petition.  At that hearing, Anderson did not dispute the three 
convictions that formed the basis for that petition, nor did she dispute that her 
driving record qualified her as an habitual driving offender.  Rather, she argued 
that revoking her driving privileges would create a hardship, because she was 
responsible for picking up her grandchildren from school and, moreover, she 
                                                 
4 As the State explained, it frequently offers respondents four-month or six-month continuances 
in habitual driving offender petition proceedings.  A four-month continuance is used to allow an 
unrepresented respondent to secure counsel.  The State offers a six-month continuance, 
commonly referred to as a “standard continuance,” to give a first-time respondent an opportunity 
to demonstrate good behavior in exchange for the State withdrawing its petition at the 
rescheduled hearing date. 
3 
worked three days a week.  The court noted that it understood the hardship that 
might be created, but stated that it “really [did not] have a choice” since the 
General Assembly “provided [no] discretion . . . as to whether it is or is not fair.”  
Accordingly, the trial court granted the State’s petition and declared Anderson an 
habitual driving offender under 21 Del. C. § 2807.5 
 
That same morning, the trial court heard several other habitual driving 
offender petitions the State had prosecuted against other drivers.  In one of those 
proceedings, the State requested a six-month continuance, which the trial court 
granted.  Immediately thereafter, the trial judge called the DAG to a sidebar 
conference, and the following conversation ensued: 
 
THE COURT:  So the lady with the three kids and a job, and the 
grandkids; you couldn’t do that for her? 
 
 
DAG:  No. 
 
 
THE COURT:  What’s the difference? 
 
 
DAG:  Because we did it once for her. 
 
 
THE COURT:  Oh, you already did it once. 
 
 
DAG:  That’s correct.  The thing was submitted. 
 
 
THE COURT:  Got it. 
 
                                                 
5 21 Del. C. § 2807 (“If the Court finds that the person is the same person named in the abstract 
and that the person is an habitual offender, the Court shall by appropriate judgment direct that 
such person not drive or operate a motor vehicle on the highways of this State and to surrender to 
the Court all licenses or permits to operate a motor vehicle upon the highways of this State.”). 
4 
After the conclusion of the habitual driving offender calendar, the trial court 
conducted, sua sponte, its own review of Anderson’s driving record and compared 
it to the records of the other drivers offered a six-month continuance by the State 
that same day.  The Court of Common Pleas found that it could not distinguish 
Anderson’s driving record “from other persons who were offered the opportunity 
to continue the hearing for six (6) months to avoid new traffic charges. . . .”6  
Accordingly, that court vacated its earlier judgment declaring Anderson an habitual 
driving offender, on the ground that “justice demands fairness, including a 
consistent application of prosecutorial discretion . . . [but] the exercise of [that] 
prosecutorial judgment as to [Anderson] was not consistent. . . .”7 
Thereafter, the State next moved the Court of Common Pleas to vacate its 
September 25, 2009 order and reinstate the judgment declaring Anderson as an 
habitual driving offender.  The court denied that motion, for two reasons.  That 
court first determined that the DAG had made “inaccurate representations” at the 
September 25, 2009 hearing, because the State had not offered Anderson a 
“standard” six-month continuance when it prosecuted its 2006 habitual driving 
offender petition against her.8  Therefore, the DAG’s explanation—that the State 
                                                 
6 Order Vacating Declaration of Habitual Offender (Del. Ct. Com. Pl. Sept. 25, 2009). 
 
7 Id. 
 
8 State v. Anderson, 2010 WL 1006558, at *4 (Del. Ct. Com. Pl. Feb. 26, 2010) (“Anderson I”). 
 
5 
did not offer Anderson a continuance in the 2009 petition because “we did it once 
for her”—constituted a misrepresentation.9 
The Court of Common Pleas then concluded that it had the “express and 
inherent” judicial authority to vacate its own order declaring Anderson an habitual 
driving offender.10  The court held that the DAG’s statement constituted a 
“misrepresentation” within the meaning of Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 
60(b)(3), and provided the necessary legal basis for vacating its earlier judgment 
under Rule 60(b).11  The court also determined that the interests of justice required 
the exercise of its inherent power to vacate its earlier order sua sponte, because it 
was “patently unfair for the [State] to offer ‘standard’ [six-month] continuances to 
other respondents whose drivers’ records were worse than Anderson’s record,”12 
such “that [the State’s] exercise of prosecutorial judgment as to Anderson violated 
principles of justice.”13 
 
On appeal, the Superior Court held that the Court of Common Pleas had 
abused its discretion by vacating its order declaring Anderson an habitual driving 
                                                 
9 See id. at *4-5. 
 
10 Id. at *4. 
 
11 See id. at *4-5.  
 
12 Id. at *4 
 
13 Id. 
 
6 
offender.14  Finding that the trial court had “misinterpreted the interaction between 
prosecutorial and judicial discretion,”15 the Superior Court explained that 
“Delaware courts’ deference in reviewing prosecutorial enforcement decisions 
extends to decisions regarding whom to prosecute as an habitual driving offender 
and how such prosecutions proceed,” and that those prosecutorial decisions are 
“not subject to judicial oversight unless they violate equal protection or due 
process principles.”16  The Superior Court determined that the Court of Common 
Pleas also had “exceeded the scope of its inherent and express authority,”17 
because neither the “interests of justice” nor the “misrepresentation” exceptions of 
Rule 60(b) were implicated by the facts of this case.18  Anderson appeals from that 
Superior Court ruling. 
ANALYSIS 
On appeal, Anderson claims that the Superior Court erred by reversing the 
Court of Common Pleas’ order vacating its judgment.  She first argues that the 
Court of Common Pleas properly exercised its authority to vacate her habitual 
driving offender status, because that was done to correct “an unfair application and 
                                                 
14 State v. Anderson, 2010 WL 4513029 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2010) (“Anderson II”). 
 
15 Id. at *4. 
 
16 Id. at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
17 Id. at *4. 
 
18 Id. at *7-11. 
7 
enforcement” of the habitual driving offender statute.  Anderson also contends that 
the Court of Common Pleas, having relied on the State’s “calculated 
misrepresentations,” had the authority to vacate its previous order under Court of 
Common Pleas Civil Rules 11 and 60(b)(3). 
This Court’s review of the Court of Common Pleas’ decision mirrors that of 
the Superior Court.19  We independently review the Court of Common Pleas’ 
determination for “whether there is legal error, whether the trial court’s factual 
findings are sufficiently supported by the record, and whether those findings are 
the product of an orderly and logical reasoning process.”20  We review de novo the 
Court of Common Pleas’ formulation and application of legal principles,21 but will 
not overturn the trial court’s factual findings unless those findings are “clearly 
wrong.”22 
                                                 
19 Hicklin v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 970 A.2d 244, 248 (Del. 2009). 
  
20 Id.; see also State v. Cagle, 332 A.2d 140, 142-43 (Del. 1974). 
 
21 Reddy v. MBKS Co., Ltd., 945 A.2d 1080, 1085 (Del. 2008) (establishing standard of review 
for a trial court’s formulation and application of legal principles). 
 
22 Cagle, 332 A.2d at 143. 
 
8 
I.  There Was No “Wrong” Requiring A Remedy 
A.  Anderson’s Argument 
Anderson first claims that the Superior Court erred in finding that the State 
has discretion under Section 2804 of the habitual driving offender statute to decide 
whether or not to bring an habitual driving offender petition against a respondent.23  
She argues that the statutory language “[t]he Attorney General, upon receiving the 
abstract from the [DMV], shall forthwith file a petition . . .” requires the State to 
institute a petition every time the DMV makes a recommendation.24  Because the 
State did not obey that mandate, but instead exercised its prosecutorial discretion in 
determining which petitions to bring, the Court of Common Pleas had the inherent 
power to vacate her adjudicated habitual driving offender status to remedy “an 
unfair application and enforcement” of Section 2804. 
Anderson’s claim rests on an incorrect premise, namely, that the State’s 
exercise of its prosecutorial discretion constituted a “wrong” that required a 
judicial remedy.  Article III, Section 17 of the Delaware Constitution provides that 
it is the role of the executive to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”25  
Thus, “[t]he decision as to which crimes and criminals to prosecute is entrusted . . . 
                                                 
23 21 Del. C. § 2804. 
 
24 Id. (emphasis added). 
 
25 DEL. CONST. art. III, § 17. 
 
9 
not to the judiciary, but to the executive who is charged with seeing that laws are 
enforced.”26  The Attorney General’s Office is given broad discretion when 
deciding against whom to focus its limited prosecutorial resources,27 and a strong 
“presumption of regularity supports . . . [its] prosecutorial decisions.”28  
Consequently, the judiciary must give deference to a prosecutor’s exercise of 
charging discretion, unless that exercise violates equal protection or due process 
principles.29  Anderson has not claimed that the State’s exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion violated equal protection or due process principles.  Therefore, our 
inquiry ends here.30 
Notwithstanding Anderson’s contrary claim, there is no requirement that the 
State prosecute each and every violation of the law.  Such a requirement would 
                                                 
26 United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 807 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, 
which provides that “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”).  See also Albury 
v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 61-62 (Del. 1988) (recognizing that the Delaware Attorney General’s 
Office is responsible for prosecuting criminal actions). 
 
27 Albury, 551 A.2d at 61 (“In our criminal justice system, the State has broad discretion as to 
whom to prosecute.”). 
 
28 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (citations and quotation marks omitted); 
see also DAVID L. FINGER & LOUIS J. FINGER, DEL. TRIAL HANDBOOK § 10:3 at n.36 (discussing 
the presumption of propriety of prosecutorial charging decisions and citing Delaware cases). 
 
29 Albury, 551 A.2d at 61 n.13; see also Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463-64.  Once a valid habitual 
driving offender petition is brought, however, the State cannot withdraw that petition without 
leave of court, except in the limited circumstances provided in Court of Common Pleas Civil 
Rule 41.  See DEL. CT. COM. PL. CIV. R. 41. 
 
30 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463 (noting that a defendant has a “demanding” burden when seeking 
to establish that he is being selectively prosecuted in an unconstitutional manner); see also 
Albury, 551 A.2d at 61 n.13. 
 
10 
ignore the “reality resulting from limited law enforcement and judicial 
resources.”31  That the Attorney General has chosen not to file an habitual driving 
offender petition in every instance does not give the Court of Common Pleas the 
power to deny the State’s habitual driving offender petition against any specific 
person, such as Anderson.32  The habitual driving offender statute recognizes only 
two circumstances authorizing the denial of a petition: (1) if the trial court finds 
that the respondent is not the person identified in the certified DMV driving record, 
or (2) if the trial court finds that the respondent was not actually convicted of a 
predicate offense listed in the certified DMV driving record.33  Neither 
circumstance was argued to the Court of Common Pleas.  Thus, the Court of 
Common Pleas had no legal basis to conclude that Anderson was not an habitual 
driving offender, where, as here, the statutory requirements for habitual driving 
offender status had all been established. 
 
 
                                                 
31 Smith, 231 F.3d at 807 (“The reality resulting from limited law enforcement and judicial 
resources is that not every criminal violation of the United States Code can be prosecuted.”). 
 
32 Sandra Anderson v. State, 2010 WL 3103400, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. June 3, 2010) (“While [it] 
may be troubling [that the Attorney General does not bring a petition every time it receives a 
DMV driving record], [that] does not form a basis for denying the petition in another case.  That 
is because the Attorney General’s charging decisions are only subject to judicial review for due 
process and equal protection violations.”). 
 
33 21 Del. C. § 2807; see also State v. Kamalski, 429 A.2d 1315 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981). 
 
11 
B.  The Court of Common Pleas’ Decision 
 
In vacating Anderson’s status as an habitual driving offender, the Court of 
Common Pleas concluded that it had properly exercised its authority to remedy 
what it had found to be a “patently unfair” exercise of prosecutorial discretion.34  
The “wrong,” the trial court found, was that the State did not offer Anderson a 
“standard” six-month continuance to improve her driving record as was done for 
other drivers similarly situated.35  To remedy that wrong, the trial court vacated its 
previous order declaring Anderson an habitual driving offender. 
In finding that the State’s refusal to offer a continuance to Anderson 
constituted a legal “wrong,” the Court of Common Pleas erred.  The State is not 
required to request a continuance in each and every habitual driving offender 
prosecution.36  Nor did the State, in fact, request a continuance in each and every 
habitual driving offender case presented the same day Anderson’s petition was 
                                                 
34 Anderson I, 2010 WL 1006558, at *4 (Del. Ct. Com. Pl. Feb. 26, 2010). 
 
35 Id. 
 
36 See Ward v. State, 414 A.2d 499, 500 (Del. 1980) (noting that the State has “broad discretion 
in law enforcement” and “is not obliged to treat two similarly situated defendants alike.”). 
 
12 
heard.  It is well-recognized that the State’s decision to offer, agree to, or reject a 
continuance involves the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.37 
To be sure, where the State does request a continuance, it is within the trial 
judge’s discretion to grant or deny that request.38  A trial court may also offer a 
continuance sua sponte, although neither party is required to accept the court’s 
offer.39  Thus, if the Court of Common Pleas believed that Anderson was wronged 
because the State did not offer her the continuance it had offered to other 
respondents, the court could have remedied any perceived “wrong” by making its 
own offer to continue the case. 
The Court of Common Pleas did not do that, however.  Instead, it vacated its 
earlier judgment declaring Anderson an habitual driving offender, thereby 
effectively dismissing the State’s petition against Anderson.  That dismissal 
remedy bore no logical relationship to the supposed procedural wrong (i.e., no 
                                                 
37 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Leatherbury, 453 A.2d 957, 959 (Pa. 1982) (O’Brien, C.J., 
dissenting) (“The [prosecution’s] decision to request a third continuance rather than proceed with 
the preliminary hearing was, by the [prosecution’s] own admission, an exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.”). 
 
38 Secrest v. State, 679 A.2d 58, 64 (Del. 1996) (commenting that whether to deny or grant a 
request for a continuance is at the “discretion of a trial judge whose ruling will not be disturbed 
on appeal unless that ruling is clearly unreasonable or capricious.” (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)). 
 
39 See, e.g., Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 502 (2003) (noting that “defense counsel 
more than once declined the trial court’s offer of a continuance” to further examine evidence); In 
re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 32 (Del. 1995) (finding that respondent had refused to accept a court-
offered continuance); Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Md., Inc., 418 A.2d 968, 983 (Del. 1980) 
(observing that plaintiff had refused to accept the trial court’s offer to order a continuance). 
 
13 
continuance being offered).40  A court cannot impose a remedy that bears no 
relation to the wrong it seeks to redress.41  As the United States Supreme Court has 
explained, “remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the . . . 
violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests.”42  Here, no 
logical relationship existed between the remedy (effectively denying the State’s 
petition) and the supposed wrong (the State’s decision not to offer Anderson a 
continuance). 
II.  There Was No Misrepresentation. 
 
A.  Application of Rule 60(b) 
We also uphold the Superior Court’s conclusion that the Court of Common 
Pleas erroneously relied on Court of Common Pleas Civil Rules 60(b)(3) and 
                                                 
40 See, e.g., Folks v. Scott, 1998 WL 781846, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 1998) (noting that for the 
court to grant injunctive relief, a plaintiff “must show a logical relationship (a “nexus”)” between 
the alleged wrong and the requested remedy); id. at *4 n.11 (citing cases).  See also United States 
v. Van Engel, 15 F.3d 623, 631 (7th Cir. 1993) (“A federal judge is not authorized to punish the 
misconduct of a prosecutor by letting the defendant walk, unless the misconduct not only 
violated the defendant’s rights but also prejudiced his defense. . . .” (citing United States v. 
Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981) and United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 742 n.9 (1980)). 
 
41 See, e.g., Van Engel, 15 F.3d at 632 (concluding that “a remedy which consists of striking 
counts from [defendant’s] indictment bears very little relation to the wrong” of governmental 
misconduct, where that misconduct did not infringe upon the defendant’s rights). 
 
42 Morrison, 449 U.S. at 364 (addressing remedies to Sixth Amendment violations); see also 
Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 429 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that in prison and desegregation 
cases, “the nature of the remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional 
violation and thus must be related to ‘the condition’ alleged to offend the Constitution.” (internal 
quotation marks, citations, and emphasis omitted)). 
 
14 
60(b)(6) as a basis to remedy the State’s “misrepresentation.”43  Rule 60(b) 
pertinently provides that: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the Court may relieve a 
party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons:  (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party . . . or (6) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment.44 
 
1.  Rule 60(b)(3). 
AA Rule 60(b)(3) motion is reserved for situations where a party has 
engaged in fraud or misrepresentation that prevents the moving party from fairly 
and adequately presenting his or her case.”45  To obtain relief under that Rule, the 
moving party “bears a heavy burden” of showing “the most egregious conduct 
involving a corruption of the judicial process itself.”46 
The transcript of the September 25, 2009 hearing does not support the Court 
of Common Pleas’ finding that the State engaged in “egregious conduct” 
constituting a “misrepresentation” under Rule 60(b)(3).  At most, the colloquy 
between the trial judge and the DAG involved an unfortunate misunderstanding.  
The trial judge likely thought that her questions to the DAG were clear, but the 
                                                 
43 See Anderson II, 2010 WL 4513029, at *7-11 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2010). 
 
44 DEL. CT. COM. PL. CIV. R. 60(b)(3), (b)(6). 
 
45 MCA, Inc. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 785 A.2d 625, 639 (Del. 2001). 
 
46 Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
15 
record shows that the subject she had in mind—“a six-month continuance”—was 
never explicitly verbalized in their conversation.  Rather, the trial judge asked the 
DAG (non-specifically), “So the lady with the three kids and a job, and the 
grandkids; you couldn’t do that for her?”  To which the DAG responded (with 
equal non-specificity), “No. . . .  Because we did it once for her. . . .  The thing was 
submitted.” 
Taking in context the pronouns “that” and “it” and the generic noun “thing,” 
it becomes apparent that the DAG believed the trial judge was asking him why the 
State could not show Anderson leniency (because of the hardship it would cause), 
and offer her a chance to avoid revocation of her driver’s license upon a showing 
of good behavior.  That belief is evidenced by the DAG’s response “[b]ecause we 
did it once for her” and “[t]he thing was submitted.”  What the DAG meant was 
that Anderson had previously been offered a four-month continuance when the 
State brought its first petition against her, after which the first petition was 
withdrawn. 
To the extent the DAG and the trial judge were “on different wavelengths,” 
the DAG’s response could not have constituted a misrepresentation within the 
meaning of Rule 60(b)(3).  Nothing in the record supports the conclusion that the 
DAG intended to mislead the Court of Common Pleas or acted in bad faith.  
Because there was no misrepresentation, no basis existed for the trial court to 
16 
vacate its earlier order declaring Anderson as an habitual driving offender under 
Rule 60(b)(3). 
2.  Rule 60(b)(6). 
Nor does Rule 60(b)(6) support the Court of Common Pleas’ order vacating 
its earlier determination that Anderson was an habitual driving offender.  For a 
court to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(6), there must be a showing of “extraordinary 
circumstances.”47  If such extraordinary circumstances are shown, the court may 
vacate a judgment “[where] such action is appropriate to accomplish justice.”48 
The facts of this case did not constitute “extraordinary circumstances.”  
Anderson does not contest the substantive validity of the State’s petition, nor does 
she dispute the three predicate motor vehicle convictions on which that petition 
was based.  The State’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion here was proper, 
legally and factually.  Legally, Anderson has not challenged that exercise of 
discretion on equal protection or due process grounds.  Factually, although the trial 
court independently found that Anderson’s driving record was “indistinguishable” 
from that of other habitual driving offenders on the calendar that day, the record 
                                                 
47 Jewell v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 401 A.2d 88, 90 (Del. 1979). 
 
48 Id. (quoting Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 615 (1949)). 
17 
does not support that finding.49  Nothing in the record supports the trial court’s 
application of Rule 60(b)(6) in the circumstances presented here. 
B.  Application of Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 11 
Finally, Anderson claims that the trial court had authority under Court of 
Common Pleas Civil Rule 11 to vacate its earlier order as a sanction for the State’s 
misrepresentation.  This claim also lacks merit.   
Rule 11 pertinently provides that:   
the sanction may consist of or include, directives of a nonmonetary 
nature, an order to pay a penalty into Court, or, if imposed on motion 
and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to 
the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other 
expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.50 
 
Nothing in Rule 11 suggests that the trial court may vacate an earlier order, thereby 
resulting in a dismissal of the proceeding, as a sanction for a party’s alleged 
violation of that Rule.51 
                                                 
49 See Anderson II, 2010 WL 4513029, at *11 n. 66 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2010) (identifying 
factual inaccuracies in the trial court’s analysis). 
 
50 DEL. CT. COM. PL. CIV. R. 11(c). 
 
51 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11, sanctions that are imposed by the court’s 
initiative (as opposed to a motion by a party) are limited to monetary penalties payable to the 
court.  See 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PRO. CIV. § 1336.3 (3d ed.) (describing types of 
Rule 11 sanctions).  See also Drejka v. Hitchens Tire Serv., Inc., 15 A.3d 1221, 1224 (Del. 2010) 
(concluding that the trial court’s exclusion of plaintiff’s expert witness, which effectively 
operated as a dismissal, was not an appropriate sanction for violation of a discovery scheduling 
order). 
 
18 
Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate to deter and punish the bringing of 
frivolous or meritless claims.52  Those circumstances were not implicated here.  
Anderson does not dispute that all the statutory requirements of the habitual 
driving offender statute were satisfied.  Nor does she claim that by filing its 
petition against her, the State engaged in abusive litigation or misuse of the court’s 
process.53  Thus, no basis existed to impose a Rule 11 sanction. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. 
                                                 
52 In re Appeal of Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215, 221 (Del. 1990); see also Shahin v. Del-
One Del. Fed. Credit Union, 950 A.2d 659 (Table), 2008 WL 2332951, at *1 n. 4 (Del. 2008) 
(citing Barker v. Huang, 610 A.2d 1341, 1345 (Del. 1992)). 
 
53 See Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d 58, 62 (3d. Cir. 1994) (“We have emphasized that Rule 11 
targets abuse, making sanctions appropriate only if the filing of the complaint constituted abusive 
litigation or misuse of the court’s process.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).