Title: State v. Folstrom
Citation: 331 N.W.2d 231
Docket Number: C7-82-663
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: March 11, 1983

331 N.W.2d 231 (1983) STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Robert FOLSTROM, Appellant. No. C7-82-663. Supreme Court of Minnesota. March 11, 1983. Tupper, Smith, Mattson &amp; Finn and Harold R. Finn, Walker, for appellant. Hubert H. Humphrey III, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, James R. Wilson, County Atty., Bagley, for respondent. Hubert H. Humphrey III, Atty. Gen., Richard B. Allyn, Deputy Atty. Gen., James M. Schoessler and Stephen B. Masten, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., St. Paul, for amicus Minnesota Atty. Gen. Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc. TODD, Justice. Robert Folstrom, a Chippewa Indian, was convicted of possession of a pistol without a permit in violation of Minn.Stat. § 624.714 (1982), a Minnesota criminal statute. At the time of the arrest, Folstrom was on Indian trust property adjacent to reservation property. Folstrom claims he was using the pistol for deer hunting. He further claims that the State of Minnesota has no subject matter jurisdiction under the facts of this case. We affirm. *232 The facts are stipulated and provide as follows: Based on these facts, the trial court found Folstrom guilty of illegal possession of a pistol. The trial court held that Minnesota had jurisdiction to enforce its criminal code. The trial court further made a factual determination that Folstrom was not engaged in deer hunting at the time of his arrest. We affirm. The issues presented are: 1. Does Minnesota's criminal statute apply under the facts of this case? 2. Was the defendant Folstrom engaged in the act of deer hunting at the time of his arrest? 1. Folstrom was arrested for possessing a pistol without a permit under the provisions of Minn.Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1 (1982), which provides in part: Folstrom argues that his conviction is invalid because the statute under which he was convicted is not a criminal statute. He claims that it is a civil or regulatory statute, similar to a statute requiring a permit to hunt or fish. State civil regulatory statutes, appellant contends, cannot be enforced in Indian country, following Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota, 426 U.S. 373, 96 S. Ct. 2102, 48 L. Ed. 2d 710 (1976). He argues that the district court, therefore, had no jurisdiction to decide this case. We decline to accept the argument of the defendant. The statute in question is part of the Criminal Code of 1963, Part V, entitled "Crimes, Criminals"; the title of Chapter 624 is "Crimes, other provisions." The act for which the defendant was arrested is defined as a gross misdemeanor, which is punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both. Minn.Stat. § 609.03(2) (1982). The permit requirement does not convert the statute into a civil licensing statute. This court recognized that the purpose of Minn.Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1 (1982), is to prohibit criminal behavior when it stated in State v. Paige, 256 N.W.2d 298, 303 (Minn.1977): In Blore v. Mossey, 311 Minn. 288, 290, 249 N.W.2d 447, 448 (1976), this court noted that the permit requirement operates "to restrict the class of persons" who are allowed to carry pistols. The state can reasonably restrict the class. This court so held in In re Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Minn.1980), where the restriction is "in the interest of public safety." The defendant invites us to adopt the criteria established by the federal court in the case of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, (5th Cir.1981). In that case the court classified statutes by determining whether they were "civil/regulatory" or "criminal/prohibitory". We decline to adopt this approach.[1] Rather, we prefer a direct approach. Minn.Stat. § 624.714 (1982), is part of our criminal code. It defines possession of a pistol without a permit as a crime and provides criminal punishment. It is a criminal statute. This classification is of importance since Congress has granted Minnesota the power to enforce its criminal statutes in Indian country. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976), provides that "Indian country" means * * * "(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same." The road on which appellant was arrested was part of trust land, Indian title to which had not been extinguished. By federal statute, the road is part of Indian country. Ordinarily, state law does not apply to offenses committed by Indians in Indian country. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1976). But Congress has provided[2] that states can extend *234 their criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in certain areas. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976), provides: Thus, we conclude that Minnesota had jurisdiction to arrest, prosecute and convict the defendant Folstrom. 2. Folstrom further contends that a treaty conferred hunting rights upon him at the place of his arrest. The trial court made a factual determination that he was not hunting. This finding of fact is not clearly erroneous. Minn.R.Civ.P. 52.01. Having concluded that Folstrom was not in fact hunting deer at the time of his arrest, we need not discuss what hunting rights he possessed at the time of his arrest.[3] The arrest, prosecution and conviction of the defendant Folstrom violated none of his rights as a member of White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe. Affirmed. [1] We do note that under the Butterworth test this particular statute should be classified as criminal/prohibitory. [2] Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub.L. No. 280, § 2, 67 Stat. 588, 588-89 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976)). See Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota, 426 U.S. 373, 383, 96 S. Ct. 2102, 48 L. Ed. 2d 710 (1976) (legislative history of Pub.L. No. 280 indicates legislative intent to supplement inadequate law enforcement resources in Indian country by extending state jurisdiction). [3] The defendant has cited a recent Wisconsin decision, State v. Lemieux, 110 Wis.2d 158, 327 N.W.2d 669 (1983). In that case, the Wisconsin court held that the particular statute involved was primarily a hunting regulation and its enforcement would infringe upon the hunting rights of the defendant. Thus, the Wisconsin case is distinguishable and inapplicable to the facts of this case.