Title: ROSE v EIGHTH JUD DIST COURT
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 81-090
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: May 28, 1981

No. 81-90 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 RONALD E. ROSE, Petitioner and Appellant, VS. THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, Cascade County, H. William Coder, Judge, Respondents. ORIGIPJAL PROCEEDING : Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Lawrence A. Anderson argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondents: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Mark Murphy, argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana Barbara Bell argued, Deputy County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana Mike Garrity argued, Dept. of Revenue, Helena, Montana Robert F. James, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: April 24,1981 Decided: -MAY 2 8 1 ? a Filed: Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s is an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i seeking a review of t h e p r o c e e d i n g s by which Ronald Rose was adjudged g u i l t y of contempt of c o u r t . The record d i s c l o s e s t h a t on o r about J a n u a r y 1 5 , 1980, t h e S t a t e of Montana, t h e Department of Revenue, t h e Department of S o c i a l and R e h a b i l i t a t i o n S e r v i c e s , Diana L. Ruff and L i s a M. Ruff f i l e d a p e t i t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e E i g h t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , C a s c a d e C o u n t y , t o e s t a b l i s h p a t e r n i t y and p r o v i d e s u p p o r t f o r a minor c h i l d born on September 21, 1979. The p e t i t i o n a l l e g e d t h a t t h e S t a t e , t h e mother and t h e daughter ". . . a r e informed and b e l i e v e t h a t Respondent [Rose] is t h e f a t h e r of t h e c h i l d based upon t h e following: Diana L. Ruff has named t h e Respondent, Ronald E. Rose, a s t h e f a t h e r of t h e minor c h i l d , L i s a M . Ruff." A t t e n d a n t t o t h e p e t i t i o n was a motion t o r e q u i r e Rose t o submit t o blood t e s t s p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 40-6-112, MCA. An ex p a r t e o r d e r was i s s u e d by t h e D i s t r i c t Court r e q u i r i n g Rose t o show cause why he should n o t submit t o a blood t e s t . On February 28, 1980, Rose f i l e d an answer. On March 11, 1980, Rose f i l e d a motion t o quash t h e o r d e r t o show cause. The b a s i s f o r R o s e ' s motion was t h a t s u b m i s s i o n t o a b l o o d t e s t would v i o l a t e v a r i o u s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s i n c l u d i n g h i s r i g h t of p r i v a c y and f r e e d o m from u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s . I n o p p o s i t i o n t h e p e t i t i o n e r s argued t h a t t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of t h e i n t r u s i o n , coupled w i t h t h e compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t t o determine p a r e n t a g e , a u t h o r i z e s t h e minimal i n v a s i o n of p r i v a c y involved i n o b t a i n i n g a blood sample. On August 21, 1980, t h e D i s t r i c t Court e n t e r e d its o r d e r v a c a t i n g t h e p r e t r i a l h e a r i n g o r i g i n a l l y set f o r August 20, 1980, and r e s e t it f o r December 15, 1980. The D i s t r i c t Court a d d i t i o n a l l y o r d e r e d t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s motion c o m p e l l i n g d i s c o v e r y be h e a r d on S e p t e m b e r 1 9 , 1 9 8 0 . Subsequently, on October 9 , 1980, t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s s u e d an ex p a r t e order f o r blood t e s t s , whereby Rose was ordered t o appear a t Columbus H o s p i t a l , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana, on October 21, 1980, t o submit t o a blood t e s t . A f t e r f o r m a l l y a s s e r t i n g h i s r i g h t t o r e f u s e t h e t e s t , Rose f a i l e d t o appear f o r t h e court-ordered blood test. On November 5, 1980, t h e D i s t r i c t Court o r d e r e d Rose t o show cause why he should n o t be h e l d i n contempt of c o u r t f o r f a i l i n g t o t a k e t h e blood test. On November 28, 1980, t h e D i s t r i c t Court found Rose i n contempt of c o u r t and i s s u e d t h e following decree: "1. That Respondent, Rose, be confined i n t h e Cascade County J a i l f o r a p e r i o d of f i v e days ; "2. That t h e e x e c u t i o n of s a i d judgment of contempt and o r d e r of confinement i n t h e C a s c a d e County J a i l b e , and h e r e b y is, s t a y e d ; " 3 . That Respondent, Rose, may purge himself of s a i d c o n t e m p t by c o m p l y i n g w i t h t h e C o u r t ' s O r d e r o f O c t o b e r 9 , 1 9 8 0 , by s u b m i t t i n g t o t h e r e q u i r e d blood t e s t w i t h i n f o u r t e e n days from t h e d a t e h e r e o f ; "4. That t h e Clerk of t h i s Court is d i r e c t e d t o provide n o t i c e of t h i s Order by m a i l i n g a t r u e copy t h e r e o f t o t h e Respondent, Rose." On December 11, 1 9 8 0 , Rose f i l e d a complaint i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t a l l e g i n g c i v i l r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s under 42 U.S.C. 1983, i n t h a t s e c t i o n 40-6-112, MCA, v i o l a t e d h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . Rose prayed t h a t t h e c o u r t g r a n t i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f b a r r i n g t h e S t a t e D i s t r i c t Court from o r d e r i n g blood t e s t s under s e c t i o n 40-6-112, MCA. On J a n u a r y 6 , 1981, t h e S t a t e f i l e d a motion t o d i s m i s s w i t h s u p p o r t i n g b r i e f s . The F e d e r a l D i s t r i c t Court h a s n o t i s s u e d a temporary r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r o r g r a n t e d any i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f a t t h i s t i m e , and t h e motion t o d i s m i s s is p r e s e n t l y under advisement. On o r about March 3 , 1981, Rose f i l e d w i t h t h i s Court an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i o r o t h e r a p p r o p r i a t e r e l i e f t o determine t h e m a t t e r s s e t f o r t h above. On June 27, 1980, p r i o r t o being h e l d i n contempt by t h e D i s t r i c t Court, p e t i t i o n e r f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l w i t h t h i s Court. The p e t i t i o n was denied on t h e ground t h a t he had an adequate remedy by a p p e a l . T h i s r u l i n g contemplated t h a t p e t i t i o n e r would s u b m i t t o t h e b l o o d t e s t a n d , i n t h e a s s e r t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , e i t h e r move t o s u p p r e s s t h e r e s u l t s p r i o r t o an a d j u d i c a t i o n of p a t e r n i t y or appeal t h e f i n a l judgment on t h e m e r i t s . T h i s p r o c e d u r e would answer p e t i t i o n e r ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t submission t o a blood t e s t is a n i r r e t r i e v a b l e f o r f e i t u r e o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s ; however, it does n o t p r e v e n t a p o s s i b l e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e . Herzog v. Reinhardt ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 2 Ariz.App. 103, 406 P.2d 7 3 8 , h o l d s t h a t c i t i z e n s a r e p r o t e c t e d from a r b i t r a r y a c t i o n s of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . I f fundamental c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s a r e v i o l a t e d i n t h e contempt p r o c e s s , t h e contempt o r d e r can be a t t a c k e d c o l l a t e r a l l y a s v o i d , upon c e r t i o r a r i . Also, i n p r e c l u d i n g an appeal from an a d j u d i c a t i o n of contempt, s e c t i o n 3-1-523, MCA, p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e o n l y method of review is a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i . A w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i w i l l i s s u e o n l y when a t r i a l c o u r t h a s exceeded its j u r i s d i c t i o n . S t a t e v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f S e c o n d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ( 1 9 0 0 ) , 24 Mont. 494, 62 P. 820; Matter of Gr a v e l e y Mont . The s t a t u t e i n q u e s t i o n is s e c t i o n 40-6-112, MCA, which is a t t a c k e d i n i s o l a t i o n from t h e b a l a n c e of t h e Uniform Act and p r o v i d e s a s f o l l o w s : "(1) The c o u r t may, and upon r e q u e s t of a a r t y s h a l l , r e q u i r e t h e c h i l d , mother o r i l l e q e d f a t h e r t o submit t o blood t e s t s . The tests s h a l l be p e r f o r m e d by a n e x p e r t q u a l i f i e d a s an examiner of blood t y p e s , appointed by t h e c o u r t . " ( 2 ) The c o u r t , upon r e a s o n a b l e r e q u e s t by a p a r t y , s h a l l o r d e r t h a t independent tests be p e r f o r m e d by o t h e r e x p e r t s q u a l i f i e d a s examiners of blood t y p e s . " ( 3 ) I n a l l c a s e s t h e c o u r t s h a l l d e t e r m i n e t h e number and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s o f t h e e x p e r t s . " (Emphasis added.) I n Marshall v. Barlows, I n c . , OSHA ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 436 U.S. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court h e l d t h e s e a r c h and s e i z u r e p r o v i s i o n of t h e F o u r t h Amendment a p p l i c a b l e t o c i v i l a s w e l l a s c r i m i n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . The C o u r t a l s o h e l d i n S c h m e r b e r v . C a l i f o r n i a ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1 6 L.Ed.2d "Cour t - o r d e r e d blood t e s t s a r e undoubtedly ' s e a r c h e s ' w i t h i n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n . The F o u r t h Amendment p r o s c r i p t i o n , however, is d i r e c t e d o n l y t o t h o s e s e a r c h e s which a r e u n r e a s o n a b l e . An unreasonable s e a r c h is one u n j u s t i f i e d by t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o r c a r r i e d o u t i n an improper manner. " - . - . 384 U.S. a t 757. ( E m p h a s i s s u p p l i e d . ) I n S t a t e v. Meacham ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 93 Wash.2d 738, 612 P.2d 795, p r e c i s e l y t h e same p o i n t s came b e f o r e t h e Washington court as are presented in the case before us today. In that case, which involved two separate cases consolidated for appeal, the putative fathers were ordered to submit to the withdrawal of a small amount of their blood for testing. Each objected on constitutional grounds: (1) invasion of the right of privacy; (2) the unlawful search and seizure; and (3 ) interference with their freedom of religion. With respect to privacy the Washington court said: "The right to privacy, to be let alone, while fundamental and personal in nature, is not absolute. The State may reasonably regulate this right to safeguard society or where it otherwise has a compelling interest. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977). "Here, the State has a compelling interest in fixing the parentage of a minor child. The test specified to be used is highly reliable. No other evidence that is at all comparable in effectiveness is available to the State. The pain inflicted when blood is withdrawn by an experienced technician is inconsequential. And, any hazard to health is virtually nonexistent." 612 P.2d 797. With respect to the argument that the blood test was an unreasonable search and seizure, the Washington court said: "In addition to the issue of privacy, appellants challenge the order to submit to blood withdrawal on grounds that it constitutes an illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. We reject that contention out of hand. "'Court-ordered blood tests are undoubtedly "searches" within the meaning of the constitution. The Fourth Amendment proscription, however, is direct* only to those searches which are unreasonable. An unreasonable search is one unjustified by t G circumstances or carried out i n a n improper manner. ' Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. "For example, in Schmerber, a blood sample was taken over the objections of a criminal defendant. An informed, deliberate decision was made t o o r d e r t h e t e s t . Because of t h e S t a t e ' s i n t e r e s t i n d e t e r r i n g d r i v i n g while u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e of a l c o h o l and t h e r e l a t i v e l y i n o f f e n s i v e n a t u r e of a p r o p e r l y c o n d u c t e d b l o o d t e s t , t h e t a k i n g o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s blood i n t h e h o s p i t a l s e t t i n g was n o t deemed t o be an unreasonable s e a r c h . " Meacham, 612 P.2d a t 798. However, t h e blood t e s t s i n Meacham were o r d e r e d a f t e r a f u l l a d v e r s a r y h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t where it was determined t h a t a prima f a c i e showing had been made t o j u s t i f y t h e o r d e r f o r blood tests. Here, a t t e m p t s a t d i s c o v e r y from p e t i t i o n e r have been met w i t h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o b j e c t i o n s a s t o h i s testimony. A d e p o s i t i o n of t h e mother was taken b e f o r e t h e second o r d e r which i n d i c a t e d s e x u a l a c t i v i t y w i t h p e t i t i o n e r . The Montana s t a t u t e on blood tests i n p a t e r n i t y proceedings is found i n a s e c t i o n of t h e Uniform P a r e n t a g e A c t , T i t l e 40, Montana Code Annotated. The Act h a s been adopted now i n most of t h e s t a t e s . The Act a r i s e s because of t h e e f f o r t s of t h e f e d e r a l government t o recover monies p a i d f o r t h e s u p p o r t o f d e p e n d e n t c h i l d r e n where t h e c h i l d r e n a r e born o u t of wedlock o r , a s h e r e , an a b s e n t p a r e n t is n o t s u p p o r t i n g h i s c h i l d . There is a s t r o n g s o c i e t a l reason f o r upholding such a c t s which r i s e from d e c i s i o n s of t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n t h e 1970s t h a t i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n were e n t i t l e d t o t h e same c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b e n e f i t s and p r o t e c t i o n s a s l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n . Out of t h i s c o n c e p t , o n l y l a t e l y developed, h a s come t h e d o c t r i n e t h a t a mother, even though n o t wed, o r l i v i n g a p a r t from t h e f a t h e r , n e v e r t h e l e s s h a s a r i g h t t o have t h e burden of s u p p o r t s h a r e d by t h e f a t h e r of t h e c h i l d . The C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t i n S a l a s v. C o r t e z , ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 154 Cal.Rptr. 529, 593 P.2d 226, d e f i n e s t h e S t a t e i n t e r e s t i n t h e s e c a s e s a s f o l l o w s : "The s t a t e ' s i n t e r e s t i n d e t e r m i n i n g p a r e n t a g e has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been l i m i t e d t o p r e v e n t i n g c h i l d r e n born o u t of wedlock from becoming p u b l i c c h a r g e s ( s e e a n A c t f o r S e t t i n g t h e Poor on Work ( 1 5 7 6 ) , 18 E l i z . 1, Ch. 3, S 2, quoted i n Krause, s u p r a , a t pp. 105-106). The amendments t o f e d e r a l law which gave r i s e t o t h e p r e s e n t c a s e s were brought about by concerns s i m i l a r t o t h o s e t h a t i n s p i r e d t h e E l i z a b e t h a n Poor Laws--the i n c r e a s i n g appearance on t h e w e l f a r e r o l l s of c h i l d r e n born o u t of wedlock. (See, Note ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 52 Wash.L.Rev. 169, 1 7 0 . ) I n r e c e n t y e a r s n e a r l y h a l f of t h e f a m i l i e s r e c e i v i n g AFDC have had a t l e a s t one c h i l d born o u t of wedlock. ( I d . a t 177. ) Were t h e s t a t e a b l e t o recover from a b s e n t p a r e n t s even a p o r t i o n o f t h e f u n d s expended t h r o u g h t h e AFDC program, t h e s a v i n g s would be s u b s t a n t i a l . ( S e e , I d . a t 1 7 2 . ) " I t is c l e a r l y w i t h i n t h e power of t h e s t a t e t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e e n f o r c e m e n t o f t h e p a r e n t a l d u t y t o s u p p o r t o n e ' s c h i l d r e n . The s t a t e may f u r t h e r l e g i t i m a t e l y p r o v i d e f o r t h e e x p e n d i t u r e of p u b l i c funds t o a s s i s t c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t s i n e n f o r c i n g t h e s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n s of a b s e n t p a r e n t s , whether or n o t t h e c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t i s r e c e i v i n g p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e . Such e f f o r t s a r e a l a u d a b l e a t t e m p t t o p r e v e n t c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t s , t h e overwhelming m a j o r i t y of which a r e women, from having t o bear a l o n e t h e burden of a mutual d e c i s i o n t o engage i n s e x u a l r e l a t i o n s . . ." 593 P.2d a t 233. I n S a l a s , t h e c o u r t h e l d t h a t an i n d i g e n t p u t a t i v e f a t h e r was e n t i t l e d t o c o u n s e l , s u p p l i e d a t t h e expense of t h e s t a t e . Although a number of c a s e s a r e now a r i s i n g on t h e problem of blood tests under t h e Uniform Parentage A c t , no c o u r t has set a s i d e t h e s t a t u t e r e q u i r i n g blood t e s t s a s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l per s e . The l e g a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of blood t e s t s is n o t t h a t t h e r e s u l t s may p o s s i b l y i n c l u d e t h e accused a s t h e f a t h e r , b u t t h a t such r e s u l t s may p o s i t i v e l y exclude him a s t h e f a t h e r . Thus, it h a s been h e l d i n any number of c a s e s t h a t a f a t h e r h a s an a b s o l u t e r i g h t t o demand a blood t e s t of t h e mother and c h i l d , even t o g e t a continuance i f t h e c h i l d h a s n o t y e t been born f o r t h e reason t h a t such t e s t may p o s i t i v e l y e x c l u d e him a s t h e f a t h e r . See People v. S t o e c k l (Mich. 1 9 5 6 ) , 78 N.W.2d 640. Thus, t h e r i g h t s of t h e p a r t i e s a r e r e c i p r o c a l , and a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e l i m i n a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e would s e v e r e l y l i m i t t h e r i g h t s of t h e p u t a t i v e f a t h e r . To understand t h e procedure i n t h e Uniform P a r e n t a g e Act, p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h r e l a t i o n t o blood t e s t s , it is n e c e s s a r y t o r e a l i z e t h e advances t h a t have been made i n c o n n e c t i o n with blood t e s t s . For t h i s purpose, a r e a d i n g of C u r r e n t S t a t u s of P a t e r n i t y T e s t i n q , by Dr. Chang Ling Lee, 9 Family Law Q u a r t e r l y 615 ( 1 9 7 5 ) , is i n s t r u c t i v e . The a r t i c l e e x p l a i n s t h e v a r i o u s means of t e s t i n g f o r g e n e t i c markers. Under s e c t i o n 40-6-114(4), MCA, it is provided t h a t i f t h e s c i e n t i f i c evidence r e s u l t i n g from a blood t e s t c o n c l u s i v e l y shows t h e d e f e n d a n t could n o t have been t h e f a t h e r , t h e a c t i o n s h a l l be dismissed. I f , however, t h e r e is a s t a t i s t i c a l chance t h a t he is t h e f a t h e r , t h e blood t e s t s , weighed i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e e v i d e n c e , a r e a d m i s s i b l e r e l a t i v e t o t h e p a t e r n i t y . S e c t i o n 40-6-113(3), MCA . I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e it is a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y procedure has n o t been followed. What should occur under t h e Uniform P a r e n t a g e Act is t h a t a f t e r t h e a c t i o n h a s been brought t o d e c l a r e t h e p a t e r n i t y of t h e c h i l d , an informal h e a r i n g by way o f p r e t r i a l p r o c e e d i n g s s h o u l d o c c u r . S e c t i o n 40-6-111, MCA. A t t h e p r e t r i a l h e a r i n g , i f any p a r t y t o t h e a c t i o n r e f u s e s t o t e s t i f y under o a t h , t h e c o u r t may order him to testify. If he refuses to testify, the court has the power to grant him immunity from all criminal liability on account of the testimony he is required to produce (except for perjury). Section 40-6-111(2), MCA. It is at the pretrial proceeding that the court may order the blood tests. Section 40-6-112, MCA. At that point, therefore, it is assured from the statutory scheme that a prima facie case (the equivalent of probable cause in a criminal proceeding) is established for the ordering of the blood test. It is at the pretrial proceedings that the evidence relating to paternity, including the blood tests, are considered. Section 40-6-114, MCA. Thereafter, there are pretrial recommendations to be made as set forth in section 40-6-114(1), MCA. At that point, the court considers whether or not the case should go on. The statute says : "On the basis of the information produced at the pretrial hearing, the judge or referee conducting the hearing shall evaluate the probability of determining the existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship in a trial and whether a judicial declaration of the relationship would be in the best interest of the child. On the basis of the evaluation, an appropriate recommendation for settlement shall be made to the parties, which may include any of the following: [options omitted]." Section 40-6-114, MCA. As our discussion has revealed, the mere conclusory allegations by the movant in the petition are insufficient to satisfy the "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. 11, Section 11, 1972 Montana Constitution. Reasonableness can only be established by an affirmative showing by the movant that there exists a prima facie case against the putative f a t h e r . A f t e r t h i s , a blood t e s t may be t a k e n . T h e r e f o r e , t h e Uniform P a r e n t a g e A c t , a s it r e l a t e s t o t h i s s u b j e c t , must be construed a s a whole, and we w i l l n o t c o n s i d e r an a t t a c k upon an i s o l a t e d s e c t i o n , i . e . , s e c t i o n 40-6-112, MCA, t o determine its c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . However, w e do conclude t h a t t h e f a i l u r e t o f o l l o w t h e s t a t u t o r y procedures t o e s t a b l i s h r e a s o n a b l e n e s s p r i o r t o t h e o r d e r i n g of t h e " s e a r c h " r e n d e r s t h e ordered s e a r c h a v i o l a t i o n of t h e a c c u s e d ' s Fourth Amendment r i g h t s t o be s e c u r e from "unreasonable" s e a r c h and a l s o v i o l a t e s A r t . 11, S e c t i o n 11, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . The w r i t , a s prayed f o r , s h a l l i s s u e : 1. The contempt o r d e r of November 28, 1980, by t h e D i s t r i c t Court is hereby vacated and s e t a s i d e . 2. The c a s e is r e t u r n e d t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o f o l l o w t h e procedure set f o r t h i n t h e Uniform P a r e n t a g e Act a s d i s c u s s e d h e r e i n . A s provided i n s e c t i o n 40-6-111, MCA, t h i s w i l l r e q u i r e an i n f o r m a l p r e t r i a l proceeding b e f o r e t h e c o u r t . I n t h e e v e n t a prima f a c i e c a s e is made showing t h e d e f e n d a n t t o be a p o s s i b l e f a t h e r , t h e n an o r d e r p r o p e r l y may be made r e q u i r i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t t o submit t o t h e blood t e s t . I n t h e e v e n t d e f e n d a n t r e f u s e s t o t e s t i f y , t h e c o u r t may g r a n t him immunity from a l l c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y and t h e r e a f t e r r e q u i r e t h a t he t a k e t h e blood t e s t . 3 . A copy of t h i s o p i n i o n , when served by t h e C l e r k of t h i s Court, s h a l l perform t h e o f f i c e of a formal w r i t . d & . d # / J u s t i c e W e concur: 2 A & J, p , g 4 Chief J u s t i c e ILrrniblsL ~ o n d r a b l e James B. Wheelis. i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n of Mr. J u s t i c e John C.