Title: Schellinger v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 296, 2004
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2005

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
PETER M. SCHELLINGER,
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No. 296, 2004
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below--Superior Court 
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of the State of Delaware, in and
v.
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for New Castle County in Cr. 
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A. Nos. IN98-10-0839, 0840;
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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IN98-11-1162.
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Plaintiff Below,
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Appellee.
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Def. ID No. 9810003616
Submitted: April 12, 2005
Decided:
July 12, 2005
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices.
O R D E R
This 12  day of July 2005, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties,
th
the Superior Court record, and the parties’ post-briefing submissions, it appears
to the Court that:
(1)
The appellant, Peter M. Schellinger, has appealed from the
Superior Court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61").  We find no merit to the appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm.    
(2)
In September 1999, a Superior Court jury convicted Schellinger
of Murder in the First Degree, Attempted Murder in the First Degree and
Schellinger was convicted of killing Janice Markovic at her home and then stabbing
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and attempting to kill Janice Markovic’s fourteen-year old son, Joshua Markovic.
Schellinger v. State, 2000 WL 1587950 (Del. Supr.).
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In September 2003, Schellinger submitted a postconviction motion that was returned
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as non-compliant.
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Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony.   The
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Superior Court sentenced Schellinger to two life sentences for the murder and
attempted murder convictions, and to twenty years at Level V for the weapons
offense.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Schellinger’s conviction and
sentence.2
(3)
In December 2003, Schellinger filed a motion for postconviction
relief.   Schellinger raised a number of claims, including ineffective assistance
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of counsel, judicial misconduct, and prosecutorial misconduct.  Moreover,
Schellinger alleged that the evidence used to convict him was either insufficient
or inadmissible.  At the Superior Court’s request,  Schellinger’s defense
counsel and the prosecutor submitted responses to the postconviction motion.
By opinion and order dated June 10, 2004, the Superior Court denied
Schellinger’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on its merits and denied
the remaining claims as procedurally barred.   This appeal followed. 
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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3
(4)
When reviewing the Superior Court’s denial of a postconviction
motion pursuant to Rule 61, this Court first must consider the procedural
requirements of the rule before addressing any substantive issues.   Rule
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61(i)(4), for instance, provides that any ground for relief that was formerly
adjudicated is thereafter procedurally barred, unless reconsideration of the
claim is warranted in the interest of justice.  Conversely, Rule 61(i)(3) provides
that any ground for relief that was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the
judgment of conviction is procedurally barred, unless the movant demonstrates
“cause  for relief from the procedural default” and “prejudice” stemming from
the alleged grievance.  Furthermore, Rule 61(i)(5) states in pertinent part that
the procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(3) shall not apply to a colorable claim that
there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation.
(5)
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Schellinger must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that, but for defense counsel’s errors, there is
a reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have been
different.   Although not insurmountable, the standard is highly demanding and
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Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753-54 (Del. 1990).
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leads to a strong presumption that counsel’s representation fell within a wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.   
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(6)
In his postconviction motion and now on appeal, Schellinger
alleges that his defense counsel refused to locate defense witnesses and to
investigate the reliability of the prosecution’s witnesses.  Moreover, according
to Schellinger, defense counsel “threatened” him, refused to bring him civilian
clothing to wear at trial, “ambushed” him at trial when arguing for a lesser
included offense, and refused his request to amend the direct appeal.  After
carefully reviewing the briefs and the record, however, we conclude that
Schellinger’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is without merit.  We agree
with the Superior Court that Schellinger has not demonstrated that his defense
counsel was unreasonable and unprofessional, or that he was prejudiced as a
result of his counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness.
(7)
Next, Schellinger alleges that the prosecutor committed
misconduct when he requested that Schellinger wear a restraint during trial.
Moreover, according to Schellinger, the prosecutor made inflammatory and
inaccurate descriptions of Schellinger’s alleged attacks on the victims and
otherwise misled the jury as to the results of drug and alcohol tests that were
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
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Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
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administered to Schellinger. The Superior Court determined, however, and we
agree, that the  prosecutorial misconduct claim is procedurally barred pursuant
to Rule 61(i)(3).  Schellinger has demonstrated neither cause for his failure to
raise the claim nor prejudice from the alleged violation of his rights.7
Moreover, without any support in the record  for his claim that the prosecutor
inflamed or misled the jury or otherwise adversely impacted his right to a fair
trial, Schellinger has shown no basis under Rule 61(i)(5) to apply the exception
to the procedural bar.  
(8)
Third, Schellinger alleges that the trial judge committed “judicial
misconduct” when he threatened to remove Schellinger from the courtroom and
when he failed to address other threats directed to Schellinger by the prosecutor
and a corrections officer.  Also, Schellinger alleges that the trial judge failed to
safeguard Schellinger’s right to wear civilian clothing to trial and failed to
provide Schellinger with transcripts.  Nonetheless, the judicial misconduct
claim is barred as Schellinger could have, but did not, assert the claim on direct
appeal from his conviction, and he has shown no cause for relief from the
procedural default or prejudice from a violation of his rights.   Moreover, with
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Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
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Schellinger’s claim arises from the Clerk’s letter of March 29, 2005 that requested
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that counsel for the State provide the Court with a copy of defense counsel’s response to the
postconviction motion when that response was not found in the Superior Court record.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).  See Schellinger v. State, 2000 WL 1587950 (Del.
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Supr.) (concluding on direct appeal that Superior Court did not err when admitting
Schellinger’s statements to police).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
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no support in the record for Schellinger’s claim, clearly there is no basis upon
which to apply the exception to the procedural bar.  
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(9)
As further evidence of both judicial and prosecutorial misconduct,
Schellinger contends on appeal that the trial judge and counsel for the State
misrepresented that they received defense counsel’s response to the
postconviction motion.   Schellinger’s claim is conclusory, however, and
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otherwise provides no basis for relief.
(10)
Finally, Schellinger argues without success that the evidence used
to convict him was either insufficient or inadmissible.  To the extent
Schellinger challenges the admission of his statements to the police at the scene
of a car accident in which Schellinger was involved, the claim is barred as
formerly adjudicated.   The balance of Schellinger’s evidentiary claim is
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procedurally barred as Schellinger has demonstrated neither cause for failing
to assert the claim nor prejudice as a result of the alleged error.   Furthermore,
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Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
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Schellinger has not made a colorable claim of a miscarriage of justice to
warrant application of the exception to the procedural default.   
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice