Title: NICOLE M BEAUDRIE V PAULINE HENDERSON
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 114261
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 27, 2001

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 27, 2001  
NICOLE M. BEAUDRIE,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 114261  
PAULINE HENDERSON,  
Defendant-Appellee,  
and  
CITY OF DEARBORN, and DEARBORN 
POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
Defendants.  
YOUNG, J.  
Plaintiff was abducted, assaulted, and raped by her  
ex-boyfriend.  This case pertains to the actions of defendant  
Pauline Henderson, a police dispatcher and friend of the  
assailant’s mother. 
Defendant Henderson allegedly was  
contacted at her place of employment by the assailant’s mother  
 
while plaintiff was being held captive.  Plaintiff alleged  
that defendant was grossly negligent and engaged in active  
misconduct when she failed to notify the police of the  
whereabouts 
of 
plaintiff’s assailant and acted in concert with  
the assailant’s mother in withholding information from  
authorities. Defendant argued that the public duty doctrine  
shielded 
her 
from 
liability, and moved for summary disposition  
under MCR 2.116(C)(8).  The trial court denied defendant’s  
motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed.  
We granted leave to consider whether the public duty  
doctrine, first recognized by this Court in White v Beasley,  
453 Mich 308; 552 NW2d 1 (1996), should be extended to protect  
governmental employees other than police officers who are  
alleged to have failed to provide protection from the criminal  
acts of third parties. 
We conclude that, given the  
comprehensive governmental immunity statute, MCL 691.1407,1  
1MCL 691.1407 provides, in relevant part:  
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, 
a governmental agency is immune from tort liability 
if the governmental agency is engaged in the 
exercise or discharge of a governmental function. 
Except as otherwise provided in this act, this act 
does not modify or restrict the immunity of the 
state from tort liability as it existed before July 
1, 1965, which immunity is affirmed.  
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this 
section, and without regard to the discretionary or 
ministerial nature of the conduct in question, each 
officer and employee of a governmental agency, each 
(continued...)  
2  
 
this judicially created doctrine should not be so extended.  
Thus, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and  
remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.  
I. Factual and Procedural Background  
Because 
this 
appeal arises under MCR 2.116(C)(8), we take  
all material facts from plaintiff’s first amended complaint.  
According to her complaint, plaintiff was abducted by her  
ex-boyfriend, David Wilke, on April 6, 1994.  Earlier that  
day, plaintiff had given preliminary examination testimony  
against Wilke in a case that arose out of a series of prior  
1(...continued) 
volunteer acting on behalf of a governmental 
agency, and each member of a board, council, 
commission, or statutorily created task force of a 
governmental agency is immune from tort liability 
for an injury to a person or damage to property 
caused by the officer, employee, or member while in 
the course of employment or service or caused by 
the volunteer while acting on behalf of a  
governmental agency if all of the following are 
met:  
(a) 
The 
officer, 
employee, 
member, 
or  
volunteer is acting or reasonably believes he or 
she is acting within the scope of his or her 
authority.  
(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the 
exercise or discharge of a governmental function.  
(c) The officer's, employee's, member's, or 
volunteer's conduct does not amount to gross 
negligence that is the proximate cause of the 
injury or damage.  As used in this subdivision, 
"gross negligence" means conduct so reckless as to 
demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for  
whether an injury results.  
3  
assaults committed by Wilke against her, including criminal  
sexual conduct. Wilke was released on bond.  
At approximately 1:21 a.m. on April 7, 1994, the Dearborn  
Police Department issued an all points bulletin (APB)  
regarding the suspected abduction, including a description of  
Wilke and the vehicle that was believed to be involved. The  
police knew that plaintiff had parked her own vehicle in her  
driveway, but never made it inside her home.  The police also  
knew that Wilke had criminal charges pending against him  
involving plaintiff, that he had been released on bond, that  
he had threatened to kill plaintiff in the past, and that he  
had access to handguns.2  
Around 9:30 a.m., defendant, who was working as a  
dispatcher at the Dearborn Police Department, received a call  
from Wilke’s mother, who was defendant’s personal friend.  
Wilke’s 
mother 
informed defendant that Wilke was missing, that  
she believed him to be armed and dangerous, and that it  
appeared that he had taken plaintiff with him.  
Plaintiff’s first amended complaint further alleged that  
2Plaintiff’s amended complaint specifically quotes the 
following portion of the APB:  
The victim parked her vehicle in the driveway 
and never made it inside at her home in the south  
end of our city.  The victim has pending csc 
charges out against the suspect, and he was freed 
on bond today.  He has threatened to kill her in  
the past and he does have access to handguns.  
4  
defendant suspected that Wilke had taken plaintiff to a  
family-owned 
trailer 
at Camp Dearborn.  Plaintiff alleged that  
defendant contacted Camp Dearborn, represented herself as a  
Dearborn police dispatcher, and requested that Camp Dearborn  
employees verify whether the suspect vehicle was there. She  
gave the employees a description of the vehicle, its license  
plate number, and warned them not to approach the vehicle.  
Approximately fifteen minutes later, defendant received  
notification that Wilke and the vehicle were indeed at Camp  
Dearborn.  At that point, defendant contacted Wilke’s mother.  
Plaintiff alleged that the two women agreed to withhold  
information 
from 
the 
police until Wilke’s mother could contact  
Wilke’s attorney.  Wilke’s mother, having spoken with Wilke’s  
attorney, 
allegedly 
contacted 
defendant 
again 
at 
approximately  
11:45 a.m., at which time they agreed to withhold information  
about Wilke’s whereabouts. At approximately noon, defendant  
left Dearborn Police Dispatch, picked up Wilke’s mother and  
sister, and drove to Camp Dearborn.  
According to plaintiff’s first amended complaint, “[a]s  
a direct and proximate result of these acts and/or omissions  
by Defendant Pauline Henderson, the brutal rape, beating and  
abduction of Plaintiff Nicole Beaudrie was allowed to  
continue, and the suspect, David James Wilke, was allowed the  
opportunity to escape the fenced perimeter of Camp Dearborn  
with his victim.” Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against  
5  
defendant,3 alleging that defendant’s conduct amounted to  
“intentional misconduct . . . active malfeasance, and gross  
negligence,” and that plaintiff’s continued victimization was  
“a direct and proximate result” of defendant’s actions.  
Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR  
2.116(C)(8) on the ground that, under the public duty  
doctrine, she did not owe any duty to plaintiff.  The trial  
court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals then reversed  
in a split decision.4  
We granted plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal.  
463 Mich 888 (2000).  
II. Standard of Review  
The 
trial 
court 
granted 
summary 
disposition 
to 
defendants  
under MCR 2.116(C)(8).  We review that decision de novo.  
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). A  
motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(8)  
tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint on the basis of  
the pleadings alone.  The purpose of such a motion is to  
determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which  
relief can be granted.  The motion should be granted if no  
factual development could possibly justify recovery.  Spiek v  
3Plaintiff also brought suit against the city of Dearborn 
and the Dearborn Police Department.  However, those parties 
are not involved in this appeal.  
4Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued December 4, 1998 
(Docket No. 202304).  
6  
 
 
Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201  
(1998).  
Summary disposition of a plaintiff’s gross negligence  
claim is proper under MCR 2.116(C)(8) if the plaintiff fails  
to establish a duty in tort.  See Maiden, supra at 135.  
Whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty of care is a  
question of law for the court. Id. at 131.  
III. History of the Public Duty Doctrine  
It appears that the origins of the common-law public duty  
doctrine can be traced to South v Maryland, 59 US (18 How)  
396; 15 L Ed 433 (1855). There, the plaintiff was kidnapped  
and held for ransom.  Upon his release, the plaintiff sued the  
county 
sheriff, 
alleging 
that, 
despite 
the 
plaintiff’s 
request  
for protection, the sheriff neglected and refused to protect  
him or to otherwise keep the peace.  In rejecting the  
plaintiff’s claim, the United States Supreme Court held that  
the sheriff’s duty to preserve the public peace was “a public  
duty, for neglect of which he is amenable to the public, and  
punishable by indictment only.”  Id. at 403. 
The Supreme  
Court of Tennessee has noted that a clear majority of state  
courts considering the issue adhere to the public duty  
doctrine in one form or another.  See Ezell v Cockrell, 902  
SW2d 394, 399, n 5 (Tenn, 1995).  
Before our 1996 decision in White, supra, this Court had  
not recognized the public duty doctrine.  However, the lead  
7  
  
opinion in White noted that our Court of Appeals had  
consistently relied on the doctrine as early as 1970.  See id.  
at 322, n 7.  A majority of the Court agreed that the public  
duty doctrine serves a useful purpose and should apply in  
Michigan. 
Id. at 316 (Brickley, C.J., joined by Riley and  
Weaver, JJ.), 330 (Cavanagh, J., joined by Mallett, J.).  
IV. The Scope of the Public-Duty Doctrine under White  
Before we can determine the future of the public-duty  
doctrine in Michigan, it is necessary to examine its current  
state.  At issue in White was whether the defendant police  
officer who failed to assist and protect the plaintiff from a  
criminal assault by a third party was liable in tort.  This  
Court invoked the public duty doctrine and found no liability.  
Chief Justice Brickley’s lead opinion in White adopted  
the following articulation of the public duty doctrine from  
Justice Cooley’s leading 19th century treatise on torts:  
[I]f the duty which the official authority 
imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a 
failure to perform it, or an inadequate or  
erroneous performance, must be a public, not an 
individual injury, and must be redressed, if at 
all, in some form of public prosecution.  On the  
other hand, if the duty is a duty to the  
individual, then a neglect to perform it, or to 
perform it properly, is an individual wrong, and 
may support an individual action for damages. 
[White, supra at 316, quoting 2 Cooley, Torts (4th 
ed), § 300, pp 385-386.]  
However, it is not entirely clear from our fractured  
decision in White whether application of the public duty  
8  
 
  
 
doctrine was intended to apply to all government employees or  
only to police officers who are alleged to have failed to  
provide police protection.  The lead opinion suggested an  
expansive application of the doctrine:  
In conclusion, we find that the public-duty 
doctrine still serves useful purposes. . . . 
Government 
employees 
should 
enjoy 
personal 
protection from tort liability based on their 
action in conformity with, or failure to conform 
to, statutes or ordinances not intended to create 
tort liability. 
The job titles of government  
employees alone should not create a duty to  
specific members of the public. [Id. at 319.]  
Fairly read, nothing in the lead opinion indicated an intent  
to limit application of the public duty doctrine to any  
particular class of governmental employees.  
Justice Boyle agreed with the statement in the lead  
opinion that “[a]pplied to police officers, the public-duty  
doctrine insulates officers from tort liability for the  
negligent failure to provide police protection . . . .” Id.  
at 325.  She noted that “a contrary result could lead to  
officers arresting (and detaining) all persons who might  
conceivably jeopardize a foreseeable plaintiff.” Id. at 329­
330.  However, Justice Boyle argued that, even when limited to  
police officers, the doctrine should only apply to cases  
involving 
nonfeasance, 
i.e., 
“‘passive 
inaction 
or 
the 
failure  
to actively protect others from harm.’” Id. at 328, quoting  
Williams v Cunningham, 429 Mich 495, 498-499; 418 NW2d 381  
(1988).  
9  
Justice 
Cavanagh would have limited the decision “to only  
those cases in which liability is alleged on the basis of the  
police officer’s failure to protect an individual from the  
actions of a third party.” 
Id. at 330 (Cavanagh, J.,  
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  He opined that  
the case “should have no bearing in a case involving an injury  
caused by the police officer’s own actions.”  Id. 
Justice  
Cavanagh noted that “the public-duty doctrine recognizes that  
police officers and their departments must make discretionary  
or policy decisions in order to carry out the duties imposed  
on them.” 
Id. at 331. 
However, Justice Cavanagh also  
suggested that the public duty doctrine should apply to “fire  
fighters, life guards, and similar governmental safety  
professionals.” Id. at 331, n 1.  
Justice Levin dissented, arguing that the public-duty  
doctrine is inconsistent with the governmental immunity  
statute, which “hold[s] governmental officers and employees,  
except those at the highest levels, subject to liability on  
the basis of gross negligence, defined as reckless conduct.”  
Id. at 342-343.  
Clearly then, the various opinions in White offered  
relatively 
little 
guidance to lower courts regarding the scope  
of the doctrine recognized in that case. 
Since White, the  
Court of Appeals has not hesitated broadly to apply the public  
10  
 
  
duty doctrine outside the police protection context.5  
V. The Future of the Public Duty Doctrine in Michigan  
We now address the issue left open in White: should the  
public duty doctrine apply in cases other than those alleging  
a failure to provide police protection from the criminal acts  
of a third party?  As illustrated by our differing opinions in  
White, as well as the split decision in the Court of Appeals  
in this case, the doctrine has proven to be difficult to  
define and apply.  Even more important, further expansion of  
the doctrine is unwarranted because the governmental immunity  
statute 
already 
provides 
government 
employees 
with 
significant  
protections from liability.  
Thus, we reject further expansion of the public duty  
doctrine. The liability of government employees, other than  
those who have allegedly failed to provide police protection,  
should 
be 
determined 
using 
traditional 
tort 
principles 
without  
regard to the defendant’s status as a government employee.  
5See, e.g., Elmadari v Filiak, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d 
___ (2001) (a city maintenance worker owed no duty to a child 
injured 
by 
an 
allegedly dangerous slide); McGoldrick v Holiday  
Amusements, Inc, 242 Mich App 286; 618 NW2d 98 (2000) (a state 
ski lift inspector owed no duty to an injured skier); Koenig  
v South Haven, 221 Mich App 711; 562 NW2d 509 (1997), rev’d in 
part on other grounds 460 Mich 667; 597 NW2d 99 (1999) (city 
officials owed no duty to decedent who was swept off a pier 
into a lake during inclement weather); Reno v Chung, 220 Mich 
App 102; 559 NW2d 308 (1996), aff’d on other grounds 461 Mich 
109; 597 NW2d 817 (1999) (a medical examiner owed no duty to 
the plaintiff who was mistakenly convicted of murder in part 
because of the examiner’s report).  
11  
 
  
 
A. Shortcomings of the Public Duty Doctrine  
As stated, the public duty doctrine is widely applied.  
The lead opinion in White set forth two commonly cited  
justifications for retaining the doctrine: 
“First, the  
doctrine protects governments from unreasonable interference  
with policy decisions, and, second, it protects government  
employees from unreasonable liability.” Id. at 317. However,  
as the Supreme Court of Colorado recognized in Leake v Cain,  
720 P2d 152, 158 (Colo, 1986):  
[A] growing number of courts have concluded 
that the underlying purposes of the public duty 
rule are better served by the application of 
conventional tort principles and the protection 
afforded by statutes governing sovereign immunity 
than by a rule that precludes a finding of an 
actionable duty on the basis of the defendant’s 
status as a public entity.  
Indeed, a number of courts that have examined the doctrine in  
detail have rejected it.6  
As 
formulated 
by Justice Cooley, the public duty doctrine  
provides only that a plaintiff cannot rely on the fact that a  
public employee owes general duties to the public at large to  
support a claim of negligence. Justice Cooley explained:  
6See, e.g., Adams v State, 555 P2d 235 (Alas, 1976); Ryan  
v State, 134 Ariz 308; 656 P2d 597 (1982); Leake, supra; 
Commercial Carrier Corp v Indian River Co, 371 So 2d 1010 
(Fla, 1979); Jean W v Commonwealth, 414 Mass 496; 610 NE2d 305  
(1993); Maple v Omaha, 222 Neb 293; 384 NW2d 254 (1986); 
Brennen v City of Eugene, 285 Or 401; 591 P2d 719 (1979); 
Hudson v East Montpelier, 161 Vt 168; 638 A2d 561 (1993); 
Coffey v Milwaukee, 74 Wis 2d 526; 247 NW2d 132 (1976).  
12  
“The failure of a public officer to perform a 
public duty can constitute an individual wrong only 
when some person can show that in the public duty 
was involved also a duty to himself as an  
individual, and that he has suffered a special and 
peculiar injury by reason of its nonperformance.” 
[2 Cooley, Torts (4th ed), § 300, p 386 (citation 
omitted).]  
Such an analysis merely states the obvious:  a plaintiff must  
show some common-law duty owed to him by the public employee.  
However, application of the public duty doctrine has not  
been so limited.  In our view, application of the doctrine has  
been reduced to a conclusory statement that where there is a  
duty to all, there is a duty to none.  Such a “reformulation”  
of the doctrine is tantamount to a grant of common-law  
governmental immunity, an area already dealt with by statute  
in many jurisdictions, including Michigan.  The Supreme Court  
of Alaska was one of the first courts to reject the doctrine  
on precisely this basis.  In Adams v State, 555 P2d 235 (Alas,  
1976), the plaintiffs were injured in a hotel fire.  The hotel  
had been inspected eight months earlier by the state fire  
marshall’s office. It was alleged that the state inspectors  
had failed to abate several hazards that they had discovered.  
Rejecting the argument that the state owed a duty only to the  
public generally, the Supreme Court of Alaska noted that an  
application of the public duty doctrine in that case would  
have resulted in a finding of no duty even though “a private  
defendant would have owed such a duty . . . .”  Id. at 242.  
13  
In the absence of statutory immunity, the court declined to  
make it more difficult to establish a duty when the state is  
the defendant. Id.7  
Other 
courts 
have 
also 
recognized 
that 
routine  
application of the public duty doctrine has resulted in an  
artificial 
distinction 
between 
so-called 
“public” 
and  
“private” duties. In Commercial Carrier Corp v Indian River  
Co, 371 So 2d 1010, 1015 (Fla, 1979), the Florida Supreme  
Court explained that it is  
circuitous reasoning to conclude that no cause of 
action exists for a negligent act or omission by an 
agent of the state or its political subdivision 
where the duty breached is said to be owed to the 
public at large but not to any particular person.  
In rejecting the public duty doctrine in Ryan v State, 134  
Ariz 308, 310; 656 P2d 597 (1982), the Arizona Supreme Court  
found 
the 
attempt 
to 
distinguish between public and individual  
duties to be a “speculative exercise.”8  
We agree with these sentiments. The fact that a public  
employee owes general duties to the public at large does not  
logically preclude the imposition of a private, individual  
7As noted in Wilson v Anchorage, 669 P2d 569, 571 (Alas,  
1983), the Alaska Legislature has since conferred upon 
municipalities immunity from liability arising from negligent 
inspections.  
8Following the decision in Ryan, the Arizona Legislature 
enacted various immunity provisions.  See Clouse v Dep’t of  
Public Safety, 194 Ariz 473, 476-477; 984 P2d 559 (Ariz App, 
1998).  
14  
duty.  These duties are not mutually exclusive.  Consequently,  
any attempt to draw a distinction between a government  
employee’s “public duty” and “private duty” has proven to be  
confusing 
and 
prone 
to 
arbitrary 
and 
inconsistent 
application.  
Consider, for example, the case of building inspectors.  
As did the Adams court, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in  
Coffey v Milwaukee, 74 Wis 2d 526; 247 NW2d 132 (1976),  
imposed on a building inspector an actionable duty of care to  
perform fire safety inspections in a reasonable manner. The  
court held that there was no distinction in that case between  
“a ‘public duty’ and a ‘[private] duty.’”  Id. at 540.  
Reaching the opposite result, in Lynn v Overlook Development,  
98 NC App 75, 78; 389 SE2d 609 (1990), aff’d in part and rev’d  
in part 328 NC 689; 403 SE2d 469 (1991), the Court of Appeals  
of North Carolina held that the duty to carry out building  
inspections 
was 
owed 
“not to the plaintiffs, individually, but  
to the general public.”9  However, the conclusory analysis in  
Lynn merely begs the question why a duty to carry out building  
inspections, which undeniably benefits the general public,  
cannot also give rise to an individual duty in an appropriate  
9We note that, although it did not expressly overrule  
Lynn, the Supreme Court of North Carolina recently decided 
that the public duty doctrine should no longer apply outside 
the police protection context.  Thompson v Waters, 351 NC 462, 
464-465; 526 SE2d 650 (2000).  
15  
 
case.10  
From these examples it is clear that the courts “have not  
managed to draw an intellectually defensible line between  
immune ‘public’ duties and actionable negligence.” Jean W v  
Commonwealth, 414 Mass 496, 510; 610 NE2d 305 (1993) (citation  
omitted).  We will not attempt to do so because a traditional  
common-law duty analysis provides a far more familiar and  
workable framework for determining whether a public employee  
owes a tort-enforceable duty in a given case.  Moreover, as  
explained below, the need for an expanded application of the  
public duty doctrine has been undermined by the protections  
afforded 
governmental 
employees 
by 
our 
state’s 
broad  
governmental immunity statute.  
B.  Relationship Between the Public Duty Doctrine and the 
Governmental Immunity Act  
A 
government 
employee is immune from tort liability under  
the governmental immunity statute if all the following  
conditions are met:  
(a) The officer . . . is acting or reasonably 
believes he or she is acting within the scope of 
his or her authority.  
(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the 
exercise or discharge of a governmental function.  
(c) The officer’s . . . conduct does not  
10Indeed, Justice Cooley himself recognized that, in the 
inspection context, “duties are imposed in respect to the 
public and also in respect to individuals.” 2 Cooley, Torts 
(4th ed), § 304, p 403.  
16  
 
 
 
amount to gross negligence that is the proximate 
cause of the injury or damage.  As used in this  
subdivision, “gross negligence” means conduct so 
reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of  
concern for whether an injury results. 
[MCL 
691.1407(2).]  
In our view, the Legislature has expressed through these  
provisions its intent to subject lower-level government  
employees to potential liability for performing their jobs in  
a grossly negligent manner.11  This is so even though the  
governmental agency itself would be exempt from liability.  
See MCL 691.1407(1).  Thus, expanding the common-law public  
duty doctrine to shield all government employees from tort  
liability is at least arguably inconsistent with this  
statutory scheme.12  
Even if that were not the case, the fact that the  
governmental immunity statute makes public employees immune  
from liability for conduct that does not amount to “gross  
negligence” and is not “the proximate cause” of the injury  
certainly undermines the need for the common-law “immunity”  
11Judges, legislators, and the elective or highest 
appointive executive officials of all levels of government 
are, of course, absolutely immune from liability for their 
policy-making decisions. See MCL 691.1407(5).  
12However, we reject Justice Levin’s suggestion in  
White, supra at 355, that MCL 691.1407 “defines the duty 
pursuant to which a governmental employee is subject to 
liability.”  The statute does not create a cause of action.  
Plaintiffs are still required to establish a common-law duty.  
17  
 
granted by the public duty doctrine.13  
The Supreme Court of Vermont employed similar reasoning  
in Hudson v East Montpelier, 161 Vt 168, 179; 638 A2d 561  
(1993), where it “[d]ecline[d] to adopt the confusing and  
inconsistent public duty doctrine as a means of limiting  
liability 
of 
government employees who are already protected to  
some extent by [statutory immunity.]”  
We recognize that public employees often are required to  
perform various tasks by virtue of their position. However,  
“[p]rivate 
persons 
[also] 
have 
affirmative 
duties 
arising 
from  
their employment responsibilities that others do not have.”  
Jean W, supra at 508. Again, the governmental immunity act  
contemplates that government employees may be held liable for  
performing their jobs in a grossly negligent manner.  Indeed,  
the Legislature has expressly authorized government agencies  
to defend and indemnify employees facing potential tort  
liability for injuries caused by the employee “while in the  
course of employment and while acting within the scope of his  
or her authority . . . .” MCL 691.1408(1).  
In sum, the Legislature, through the governmental  
immunity statute, has signified that a defendant’s status as  
13Although we recognized in White, supra, that the public 
duty doctrine is part of tort law, id. at 323, the effect of 
the rule arguably is identical to that of governmental 
immunity. “Under both doctrines, the existence of liability 
depends entirely upon the public status of the defendant.” 
Leake, supra at 160.  
18  
  
 
a government employee alone does not preclude liability. We  
choose not to undermine that public policy choice by expanding  
the application of the judicially created public duty  
doctrine.  
Consistent with our decision in White, we will, however,  
continue to apply the public duty doctrine, and its  
concomitant “special relationship” exception,14 in cases  
involving an alleged failure to provide police protection.15  
We agree with Chief Justice Brickley’s statement in White that  
14Under the “special relationship” test adopted and 
applied by a majority of the Court in White, a police officer 
may be exposed to liability for failure to protect a plaintiff 
from the criminal acts of a third party only if the following 
elements are met:  
“(1) an 
assumption 
by 
the 
municipality, 
through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty 
to act on behalf of the party who was injured;  
(2) knowledge 
on 
the 
part 
of 
the  
municipality’s agent that inaction could lead to 
harm;  
(3) some form of direct contact between the  
municipality’s agents and the injured party; and  
(4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the 
municipality’s affirmative undertaking . . . .” 
[White, supra at 320 (citation omitted).]  
15The Supreme Court of North Carolina has adopted such a 
distinction. Thompson v Waters, 351 NC 462, 464-465; 526 SE2d 
650 (2000).  As has the Supreme Court of Georgia. 
See  
Hamilton v Cannon, 267 Ga 655; 482 SE2d 370 (1997); Dep’t of  
Transportation v Brown, 267 Ga 6; 471 SE2d 849 (1996). 
Interestingly, in its decision limiting application of the 
public duty doctrine to the police protection context, the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina cited the same concerns that 
we express today. Thompson, supra.  
19  
 
 
 
 
 
“[p]olice officers must work in unusual circumstances. They  
deserve unusual protection.”  Id. at 321. 
Moreover, the  
public duty doctrine as applied in White is consistent with  
the general common-law rule that no individual has a duty to  
protect another who is endangered by a third person’s conduct  
absent “a ‘special relationship’ either between the defendant  
and the victim, or the defendant and the third party who  
caused the injury.” Murdock v Higgins, 454 Mich 46, 54; 559  
NW2d 639 (1997).  
However, for purposes of determining the liability of  
public 
employees 
other than police officers, we will determine  
a government employee’s duty using the same traditional  
common-law duty analysis applicable to private individuals.  
VI. Application  
The Court of Appeals relied solely on the public duty  
doctrine in ordering that summary disposition be entered in  
defendant’s favor under MCR 2.116(C)(8). 
As stated,  
application of the public duty doctrine is limited to cases  
like White involving an alleged failure of a police officer to  
protect a plaintiff from the criminal acts of a third party.  
We agree with plaintiff that this case clearly does not fall  
within 
the 
circumstances presented in White. Accordingly, the  
Court of Appeals erred in relying on the public duty doctrine  
to dismiss plaintiff’s case.  
VII. Conclusion  
20  
 
Distinguishing between a government employee’s “public”  
and “private” duties has proven to be an unwieldy exercise.  
Moreover, the need for expanding the public duty doctrine  
outside the police protection context is undermined by the  
comprehensive 
protections 
from 
liability 
provided 
to  
government employees by the governmental immunity statute.  
Therefore, we decline to do so.  The decision of the Court of  
Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial  
court for further proceedings.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred with YOUNG, J.  
21  
____________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
NICOLE M. BEAUDRIE,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 114261  
PAULINE HENDERSON,  
Defendant-Appellee,  
and  
CITY OF DEARBORN, and DEARBORN 
POLICE DEPARTMENT,  
Defendants.  
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring).  
I join parts I and II of the majority opinion, which  
accurately discuss the pleadings.  I also join the majority’s  
decision to reverse. I write separately, however, because I  
believe the majority goes beyond what is necessary to resolve  
the limited question before us.  I would hold only that (1)  
the plaintiff successfully pleaded a claim upon which relief  
may be granted, and (2) that the defendant failed to overcome  
 
the plaintiff’s amended pleadings because the defendant’s  
claim of nonstatutory immunity was predicated on inapplicable  
precedent.  
I believe the majority’s discussion of the history and  
wisdom of the public duty doctrine is misplaced, given that we  
are examining a motion for summary disposition that tests only  
the 
sufficiency 
of 
the pleadings. MCR 2.116(C)(8).  Therefore,  
I would not delve into the statutory issues discussed by the  
majority.  Instead, I would resolve this case on the basis of  
the narrow grounds discussed in this opinion.  
I  
MCR 
2.116(C)(8) 
“tests the legal sufficiency of the claim  
on the pleadings alone to determine whether the plaintiff has  
stated a claim on which relief may be granted.  The motion  
must be granted if no factual development could justify the  
plaintiffs' 
claim 
for 
relief.” 
Spiek 
v 
Dep’t 
of  
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).  The  
plaintiff’s 
first 
amended 
complaint 
alleged 
that 
the 
defendant  
had engaged in gross negligence and active misconduct.1
 The  
most direct discussion of gross negligence and active  
misconduct can be found at the first paragraph 27 of the  
plaintiff’s amended complaint, which states as follows:  
1 The plaintiff labels her claims under the title, “Count 
I-Gross Negligence/Active Misconduct.”  
2  
 
At all relevant times, Defendant Pauline  
Henderson committed acts of intentional misconduct, 
and active malfeasance, and gross negligence, which 
are not protected by the Public Duty Doctrine 
and/or governmental immunity including, but not 
limited to, the following:  
a. Representing herself to be conducting 
official police business for improper purposes;  
b. Using her authority as a Dearborn Police 
Dispatcher to verify the location of the suspect 
for improper purposes;  
c. 
Actively 
withholding 
and 
concealing 
information from the authorities regarding the 
verified location of a felony suspect which she 
otherwise would have provided without hesitation;  
d.
 Purposefully accepting instruction from 
the suspect’s mother and criminal attorney in 
contravention of her duties;  
e. Intentionally conspiring to keep the  
verified whereabouts of the suspect concealed  
despite actual knowledge of a police emergency;  
f.  Affirmatively abrogating her obligations 
in 
order 
to 
prevent 
the 
authorities 
from  
apprehending a known suspect in the commission of a 
brutal felony;  
g. Intentionally abandoning her post as a 
police dispatcher in order to engage in misconduct;  
h. Driving to Camp Dearborn to meet with the 
suspect;  
i.  Engaging in other active misconduct, gross 
negligence and/or intentional malfeasance which may 
become known prior to trial.  
Further in support of her claim, the plaintiff repeatedly  
alleged that the defendant conspired and agreed to abrogate  
her duties as a police dispatcher and to conceal information  
3  
from 
the 
authorities.  The complaint also specifically alleged  
that the defendant’s active misconduct was “intended to  
prevent police authorities from saving a rape and kidnapping  
victim,” that the defendant’s intentional acts and omissions  
proximately resulted in the continued abuse of the plaintiff  
for an additional ten hours, and that damages resulted from  
the defendant’s acts and omissions.  
II  
In response to the allegations raised by the plaintiff,  
the defendant brought a motion for summary disposition  
pursuant to MCR 2.116 (C)(8).  In support of its position that  
no 
amount 
of 
factual 
development could justify the plaintiff’s  
claim, the defendant argued that defendant Henderson is  
protected by the public duty doctrine.  
The basis of defendant’s public duty doctrine claim  
The defendant’s brief in support of summary disposition  
claimed that “Under the public duty doctrine, a public  
employee owes a duty to the general public and not to any one  
individual unless a special relationship exists between the  
employee and the individual.”  In the defendant’s view, the  
plaintiff in the present case failed to establish that a  
special 
relationship 
existed, citing White v Humbert, 206 Mich  
App 459; 522 NW2d 681 (1994), and Reno v Chung, 220 Mich App  
102, 105; 559 NW2d 308 (1996), aff'd sub nom Maiden v Rozwood,  
4  
 
461 Mich 109; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). As such, the public duty  
doctrine would bar recovery. In response to the defendant’s  
motion for summary disposition, the plaintiff argued that the  
defendant was not protected by the public duty doctrine  
because the doctrine applies only to cases involving  
nonfeasance.  The present complaint alleged active misconduct  
amounting 
to 
malfeasance.  Further, the plaintiff alleged that  
the defendant’s actions arose out her relationship with David  
Wilke and his mother.  Thus, plaintiff argued, the public duty  
doctrine would be inapplicable. The defendant filed a reply  
brief, arguing that the malfeasance versus nonfeasance  
argument advocated by the defendant was unsupportable because  
“[t]here is no allegation or implication that Henderson took  
any dynamic step toward aiding David Wilke in his criminal  
activity.”  
I cannot agree with the defendant that the public duty  
doctrine shields her from liability.  I believe that the  
defendant applies the public duty doctrine too broadly, and  
ignores the plaintiff’s allegations that she called Camp  
Dearborn, confirmed Wilke’s presence there, left work, drove  
to Camp Dearborn, and collaborated with Kondzer and Wilke’s  
attorney in addition to deciding to withhold information from  
the authorities.  
5  
 
As noted in the majority opinion, the public duty  
doctrine on which the defendant builds her argument was the  
subject of much discussion in White v Beasley, 453 Mich 308,  
552 NW2d 1 (1996).  There, in separate opinions, a majority of  
this Court adopted a formulation of the doctrine that provides  
that an officer may be shielded from an individual action for  
damages when the officer is being charged with failing to  
perform or inadequately performing a duty to the public.  Yet,  
the opinion did not preclude the possibility that the officer  
nonetheless might owe an individual enforceable duty in tort.2  
Though in Beasley, this Court acknowledged a “special  
relationship 
exception” to the public duty doctrine, the Court  
did not hold that the doctrine is so broad that a public  
officer would automatically be protected from liability under  
the public duty doctrine when the officer’s abrogation of  
2  
“[I]f the duty which the official authority 
imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a 
failure to perform it, or an inadequate or  
erroneous performance, must be a public, not an 
individual injury, and must be redressed, if at 
all, in some form of public prosecution.  On the  
other hand, if the duty is a duty to the  
individual, then a neglect to perform it, or to 
perform it properly is an individual wrong, and may 
support 
an 
individual 
action 
for 
damages.” 
[Beasley at 316, quoting 2 Cooley, Torts (4th ed), 
§ 300, pp 385-386.]  
6  
duties 
and 
personal 
involvement 
in 
the 
circumstances  
surrounding the plaintiff allegedly caused the plaintiff’s  
injuries to result.  
Though the defendant tries to squeeze her case into the  
parameters of Beasley, her efforts must fail because this case  
is distinguishable from Beasley. 
The plaintiff is not  
asserting that the defendant should be liable simply because  
the defendant was a police dispatcher who owed a general  
governmental duty to the plaintiff as a member of the public.  
Instead, the pleadings assert that the defendant became  
personally involved by acting upon special knowledge that she  
obtained 
because 
of 
a personal relationship with the assailant  
and his mother, and that the defendant chose to abrogate  
rather than perform her duties as a police dispatcher, despite  
the fact that she received information while on duty.  
According to the complaint, the relationship between the  
defendant, Kondzer, and Wilke made the defendant privy to  
special 
information 
about the alleged attack on the plaintiff.  
Thus, it was not the defendant’s position as a police  
dispatcher that gave rise to the alleged misconduct, it was  
her relationship with the assailant’s mother. Additionally,  
the complaint alleged various ways in which the defendant  
actively 
engaged 
in 
conduct that delayed apprehension of Wilke  
so that injury to the plaintiff resulted.  
7  
 
The allegations throughout the plaintiff’s amended  
complaint, and specifically listed in the first paragraph 27,  
state 
that 
the 
defendant 
knowingly 
and 
intentionally 
abrogated  
her duties as a police dispatcher and became involved in the  
case for personal reasons.  I believe that the plaintiff’s  
repeated 
references 
to 
the 
relationship 
between 
the 
defendant,  
Kondzer, and Wilke, if accepted as true, would support a claim  
for a common-law cause of action.  As such, I am not persuaded  
that this is the type of case in which the public duty  
doctrine of Beasley should be applied. Thus, the basis for  
the defendant’s MCR 2.116(C)(8) motion collapses, as does the  
decision of the Court of Appeals.  Therefore, I join the  
majority’s decision to reverse.  
III 
 I agree with the trial court that the defendant failed  
to establish that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon  
which relief may be granted.  As such, summary disposition was  
correctly denied.  Therefore, I would reverse the decision of  
the Court of Appeals and remand this case for further  
proceedings.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
8  
1