Title: State v. Robert C. Deilke
Citation: 2004 WI 104
Docket Number: 2002AP002897-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 8, 2004

2004 WI 104 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NOS.: 
02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert C. Deilke,  
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 151 
Reported at: 266 Wis. 2d 274, 667 N.W.2d 867 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 11, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire   
 
JUDGE: 
Eric J. Wahl   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: SYKES, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Kathleen M. Ptacek, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney 
general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Kelly J. 
McKnight and Wachowski & Johnson, S.C., Eau Claire, and oral 
argument by Kelly J. McKnight. 
 
 
2004 WI 104 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.  02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR 
(L.C. Nos. 93 CT 174 & 00 CT 250) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert C. Deilke,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J.   The State of Wisconsin 
requests review of a decision of the court of appeals that 
reversed an order of the circuit court for Eau Claire County 
vacating plea agreements between Robert C. Deilke and the State, 
and permitting the State to reinstate charges against Deilke, 
which resulted in convictions that the court of appeals also 
reversed. 
¶2 
We conclude that the circuit court, Judge J. Eric 
Wahl, 
presiding, 
correctly 
held 
that 
Deilke's 
successful 
collateral challenge to his convictions constituted a material 
and substantial breach of the plea agreements on which the 
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
2 
 
convictions were based.  Further, because we agree with the 
circuit court that the appropriate remedy for the breach was to 
vacate the plea agreements and reinstate those original charges 
for which the State requested reinstatement and to accept 
Deilke's subsequent guilty pleas, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
On May 12, 1993, the State charged Deilke with one 
count of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OMVWI),1 
second offense (OMVWI-2nd), and one count of operating with a 
prohibited alcohol content (PAC),2 second offense (PAC-2nd).  
Deilke entered a guilty plea and was convicted of the OMVWI-2nd.  
The court dismissed the PAC-2nd.   
¶4 
On March 3, 1994, Deilke was arrested and charged with 
one count of OMVWI-3rd, one count of PAC-3rd, and one count of 
operating after revocation (OAR).3  On March 19, 1994, Deilke was 
arrested again and charged with OMVWI and PAC, as third offenses 
because he had not yet been convicted of the charges that arose 
out of his March 3 conduct.  He also was charged with OAR-2nd.  
Subsequently, Deilke pled guilty to the March 3 OMVWI-3rd, and 
                                                 
1 Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) (2001-02).  Because there is no 
difference among the statutes that were in effect on the various 
dates of Deilke's violations that is material to the issues 
presented, 
we 
use 
the 
2001-02 
version 
of 
the 
statutes.  
Additionally, unless otherwise noted, all further references are 
to the 2001-02 version. 
2 Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b). 
3 Wis. Stat. § 343.30(1q). 
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
3 
 
the State dismissed five other charges:  the March 3 PAC-3rd, 
the March 3 OAR, the March 19 OMVWI, the March 19 PAC and the 
March 19 OAR.   
¶5 
On March 29, 2000, Deilke was arrested again and 
charged with one count of OMVWI-4th and one count of PAC-4th.  
Deilke pled guilty and was convicted of the OMVWI-4th.  The PAC-
4th was dismissed as part of the plea agreement.   
¶6 
On March 8, 2001, Deilke was arrested, yet again, and 
charged with one count of OMVWI-5th and one count of PAC-5th.  
His convictions in 1993, 1994 and 2000, as well as one earlier 
conviction, served as the basis for charging the violations as 
fifth offenses.  See Wis. Stat. § 343.307 (explaining which 
convictions count as prior convictions for charging purposes).  
In this case, however, Deilke filed a motion to collaterally 
attack his earlier OMVWI convictions, arguing that his plea 
colloquies in those cases did not show that he had validly 
waived his right to counsel.  The State agreed no valid waiver 
of the right to counsel occurred, and the circuit court granted 
Deilke's motion.   
¶7 
Deilke's 
successful 
collateral 
challenge 
to 
the 
validity of his 1993, 1994 and 2000 convictions caused none to 
be available for use as penalty enhancers for the 2001 charges 
and for any OMVWI charges that may be brought subsequently.  The 
State moved to vacate the plea agreements and to reinstate three 
of the dismissed PAC charges.  It argued that Deilke breached 
the plea agreements by his successful collateral attack.   
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
4 
 
¶8 
The circuit court granted the State's motion in the 
1993 and 2000 cases.4  The State reinstated the dismissed PAC 
charges in those cases, and Deilke, with the advice of counsel, 
pled no contest to them.  The State requested no additional 
punishment for the convictions.5  Deilke appealed the order 
allowing the State to vacate the plea agreements and reinstate 
the PAC charges, as well as the judgments of conviction. 
¶9 
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Deilke 
had served his sentences, and that his collateral attack on the 
three 
judgments 
of 
conviction 
did 
not 
materially 
and 
substantially breach the plea agreements.  According to the 
court of appeals, the State did not tell Deilke that a 
successful collateral attack of the convictions would breach the 
plea agreements; and therefore, it was only an unarticulated 
expectation that was not agreed to by Deilke.  State v. Deilke, 
2003 WI App 151, ¶23, 266 Wis. 2d 274, 667 N.W.2d 867.  We 
granted review, and we reverse. 
                                                 
4 The State's motion regarding Deilke's 1993 and 2000 cases 
was granted by the circuit court for Eau Claire County, Judge 
Eric J. Wahl, presiding.  The State's motion regarding Deilke's 
1994 conviction was denied by a different judge in a different 
circuit court branch and is not part of this appeal. 
5 In arguing the equities of its position, the dissent asks, 
"How can you undo the forfeiture of his car and the period of 
time that he was without its use?"  Dissent, ¶51.  The answer to 
this query is that there is no need to undo it because no 
further sentence was given Deilke.  He received and served the 
sentence for which he entered the plea bargains, and his later 
PAC convictions did not change that.   
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
5 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶10 This case requires us to determine whether Deilke's 
successful collateral attack on his convictions constitutes a 
material and substantial breach of the plea agreements.  While 
the historical facts will not be set aside unless they are 
clearly erroneous, whether the particular conduct constitutes a 
material and substantial breach of a plea agreement is a 
question of law that we review de novo.  State v. Williams, 2002 
WI 1, ¶5, 249 Wis. 2d 492, 637 N.W.2d 733; State v. Wills, 193 
Wis. 2d 273, 277, 533 N.W.2d 165 (1995).  In this case, the 
historical facts leading up to Deilke's convictions are not at 
issue; rather, we review, de novo, whether his successful 
collateral attack constitutes a material and substantial breach 
of the plea agreements warranting a remedy.  And finally, we 
will not reverse the remedy selected by the circuit court for a 
material and substantial breach unless the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion.  State v. Howard, 2001 WI 
App 137, ¶36, 246 Wis. 2d 475, 630 N.W.2d 244. 
B. 
Plea Agreements, Generally 
¶11 Plea agreements are "an essential component of the 
administration of justice."  Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 
257, 260 (1971); see also State ex rel. White v. Gray, 57 
Wis. 2d 17, 21-22, 203 N.W.2d 638 (1973).  They can result in 
the prompt disposition of criminal cases and eliminate the need 
for full-scale trials, saving the State time, money and other 
resources.  Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260-61.  They also reduce 
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
6 
 
the amount of time a defendant spends awaiting disposition of 
charges against him or her, id. at 261; can reduce the risk of 
additional convictions when charges are dismissed; and reduce a 
defendant's exposure to higher penalties at sentencing after a 
trial.  We require certain procedural protections to safeguard 
defendants from unfair treatment.  Id. at 262.6  Once a plea 
agreement has been reached and a plea made, a defendant's due 
process rights require the bargain be fulfilled.  Williams, 249 
Wis. 2d 492, ¶37; State v. Matson, 2003 WI App 253, ¶16, 268 
Wis. 2d 725, 674 N.W.2d 51.   
¶12 A plea agreement is analogous to a contract, though 
the analogy is not precise.7  However, we do draw upon contract 
principles in determining the rights of the parties to a plea 
agreement and whether there has been a breach that is material 
                                                 
6 For example, a defendant's plea must be made knowingly and 
voluntarily, see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-62 
(1971), and the circuit court must follow specific statutory 
guidelines before accepting the plea.  Wis. Stat. § 971.08 
(2001-02); State v. Lange, 2003 WI App 2, ¶18, 259 Wis. 2d 774, 
656 N.W.2d 480. 
7 The plea agreement-contract analogy is not precise because 
plea agreements may implicate fundamental due process rights.  
State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 413, 316 Wis. 2d 395 (1982); 
State v. Scott, 230 Wis. 2d 643, 655, 602 N.W.2d 296 (Ct. App. 
1999).   
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
7 
 
and substantial.8  State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 413-14, 316 
N.W.2d 395 (1982); State v. Scott, 230 Wis. 2d 643, 654-55, 602 
N.W.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Toliver, 187 Wis. 2d 346, 
355, 523 N.W.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Jorgensen, 137 
Wis. 2d 163, 167, 404 N.W.2d 66 (Ct. App. 1987).   
C. 
Breach of Plea Agreement 
¶13 Not all conduct that deviates from the precise terms 
of a plea agreement constitutes a breach that warrants a remedy.  
State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 290, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986) 
(concluding that a technical breach will not warrant a remedy).  
In order for a court to vacate a plea agreement, the breach must 
be material and substantial.9  Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 492, ¶38; 
                                                 
8 "Material and substantial," though it appears to have two 
parts, is actually a single concept.  In relation to a breach of 
a plea agreement, the concept makes its first appearance in 
Rivest.  106 Wis. 2d at 414.  Rivest, however, uses three 
different variations to describe a breach of a plea agreement 
that warrants a remedy:  "material and substantial," id., 
"sufficiently material," id., and "substantial default of a 
material issue," id.  "Material and substantial" is the phrase 
that has survived, and that has been used in subsequent cases as 
the standard, though it is a single concept, and that concept 
deals with materiality.  See note 9, supra. 
9 The concept of a material breach comes from contract law.  
See Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d at 413.  In contract law, a material 
breach of a contract releases the non-breaching party from 
performance of the contract.  Management Computer Servs., Inc. 
v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 206 Wis. 2d 158, 183, 557 N.W.2d 
67 (1996).  A material breach can be one that deprives the non-
breaching party of a benefit that party reasonably expected.  
Id., 206 Wis. 2d at 184.  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 241 (1981).  However, in contract law, there is no parallel 
concept of "substantial" breach.  Nonetheless, "substantial" has 
been used in tandem with "material" regarding breaches of plea 
agreements, and we use it here as well, noting that "material 
and substantial" is a single concept.        
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
8 
 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 290; Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d at 414.  The 
burden is on the party arguing a breach to show, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that a breach occurred and that the breach 
is material and substantial.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 289; State 
v. Rock, 92 Wis. 2d 554, 559, 285 N.W.2d 739 (1979).   
¶14 A material and substantial breach of a plea agreement 
is one that violates the terms of the agreement and defeats a 
benefit for the non-breaching party.  Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 492, 
¶¶38, 46-47 (concluding that the prosecutor's failure to relate 
the sentence agreed upon in a neutral fashion was a material and 
substantial breach of the agreement); Matson, 268 Wis. 2d 725, 
¶25 (concluding that the investigating officer's letter to the 
court in which he recommended a sentence greater than that which 
the prosecutor requested in the plea agreement was a material 
and substantial breach of the agreement); State v. Robinson, 
2002 WI 9, ¶47, 249 Wis. 2d 553, 638 N.W.2d 564 (concluding that 
Robinson's successful withdrawal of a no-contest plea to one of 
the counts of which he was convicted was a material and 
substantial 
breach); 
Howard, 
246 
Wis. 2d 
475, 
¶¶16-17 
(concluding that a prosecutor's recommendation of a consecutive, 
rather than a concurrent, sentence was not merely a technical 
violation); State v. Howland, 2003 WI App 104, ¶37, 264 Wis. 2d 
279, 663 N.W.2d 340 (concluding that the prosecutor's comments 
to the presentence investigative report's drafter that resulted 
in an amended report recommending a greater sentence was a 
material and substantial breach of the plea agreement).   
D. 
Deilke's Plea Agreements 
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
9 
 
1. 
Material and substantial breach 
¶15 We must decide whether Deilke's successful collateral 
attack on his previous convictions for OMVWI constitutes a 
material and substantial breach of the plea agreements.10  In the 
plea agreements between Deilke and the State, there is no 
dispute that both parties relinquished rights and received 
benefits by plea-bargaining.  Deilke gave up his constitutional 
rights to a jury trial, to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt by a unanimous jury, to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses, and to remain silent.  In return, Deilke was 
convicted of only three charges:  an OMVWI in 1993, 1994 and 
2000.  His pleas eliminated the risk of going to trial on six 
additional charges:  1993, PAC-2nd; 1994 PAC-3rd, OAR, OMVWI-4th 
and PAC-4th; 2000, PAC-4th.11  He also received less-than-maximum 
fines and penalties.  For its part, the State gave up the right 
to prosecute other viable charges against Deilke and it 
                                                 
10 The State agrees with Deilke that he had the right to 
collaterally 
challenge 
his 
previous 
convictions 
during 
a 
proceeding where the prior convictions were being used for 
sentence enhancement, based on an alleged invalid waiver of the 
right to counsel.  See State v. Hahn, 2000 WI 118, 238 Wis. 2d 
889, 618 N.W.2d 528; Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 
(1994).  Both parties also agree that Deilke's 1993, 1994 and 
2000 OMVWI convictions were obtained without a valid waiver of 
counsel. 
11 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(c), the State may 
proceed on both OMVWI and PAC charges when they arise out of the 
same incident.  However, a person found guilty of both OMVWI and 
PAC receives a single conviction for purposes of sentencing and 
for purposes of counting convictions.  
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
10 
 
recommended less-than-maximum fines and penalties.12  However, 
the State did not have to prepare for and participate in 
trials;13 it obtained fines, jail time, license revocations and 
the effect of those convictions on penalties for subsequent 
OMVWI convictions.  In assessing the plea bargains, the circuit 
court concluded: 
Deilke in each incident received the benefit of some 
bargain with the District Attorney.  In most instances 
the District Attorney, in exchange for a plea to the 
OWI charges, dismisses any other traffic citations 
which are part of the file.  In other instances, lower 
guideline penalties are applied as an inducement for 
the defendant to plead to the charge. 
¶16 The State asserts that due to Deilke's breach, it did 
not receive the full benefit of the plea bargains because his 
successful attack eliminated a portion of the punishment for 
each conviction——the effect of the convictions on the statutory 
penalties available for subsequent OMVWI convictions.  Deilke 
makes three arguments to counter the State's argument and to 
support the court of appeals decision:  (1) he did not move to 
withdraw his pleas, he moved to invalidate only their effect; 
                                                 
12 The dissent contends that the State did not give up the 
opportunity to prosecute Deilke on additional charges because 
the additional "charges are dismissed, not as a benefit of a 
plea bargain, but by operation of law."  Dissent, ¶39.  The 
dissent's assertion is incorrect because, absent a plea bargain, 
Deilke would have been required to defend against both PAC and 
OMVWI charges at trial.  Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(c).  
13 The court of appeals focused on the lesser amount of work 
the State was required to perform in avoiding a trial by a plea 
bargain.  See State v. Deilke, 2003 WI App 151, ¶16, 266 Wis. 2d 
274, 667 N.W.2d 867.  However, we note that Deilke, through the 
plea bargains, also avoided the expense and strain of a trial. 
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
11 
 
(2) during the negotiation for the plea bargains, no one told 
him that he could not attack the convictions at a later date 
because the State was relying on the penalty enhancers that are 
connected with the convictions; and (3) he has served his jail 
time and paid his fines so no breach of the plea bargains 
occurred.   
¶17 In regard to his first argument, Deilke argues to us, 
as he did in the circuit court, that since he did not move to 
withdraw his pleas, but merely attacked the convictions due to 
the lack of a valid waiver of counsel, the convictions were not 
invalidated; they simply cannot be used for purposes of sentence 
enhancement.  Deilke cites no authority for the novel idea that 
a conviction obtained through an unrepresented defendant's plea, 
made without a valid waiver of counsel, can stand, yet its 
effect cannot.14  Indeed, in Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114-
15 (1967), the United States Supreme Court concluded that a 
conviction obtained without the assistance or the waiver of 
counsel is "void."  We employed similar reasoning, citing 
Burgett, and came to a similar conclusion in State v. Hahn, 2000 
WI 118, ¶29, 238 Wis. 2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528, where we stated 
                                                 
14 The dissent bases its position on this theory as well, 
and following Deilke's lead, it, too, cites no authority for its 
legal conclusion.  Dissent, ¶40.  Instead, the dissent cites 
Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967), which we have cited in 
some detail in ¶17.  However, Burgett provides no support for 
the dissent's theory.  In Burgett, the United States Supreme 
Court held that a conviction obtained without assistance or a 
valid waiver of counsel is "void."  Id. at 114-15.  It said 
nothing about keeping the conviction in place while removing the 
effect of the conviction.   
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
12 
 
that, "the offender may seek to reopen a sentence imposed as a 
persistent repeater . . . if that sentence was based on the 
vacated conviction."  Id. (emphasis added).  Therefore, in each 
case where a defendant's constitutional right to counsel was 
abridged, the conviction was set aside in its entirety.  
Additionally, once a conviction for OMVWI is entered and not set 
aside, the legislature determines its effect on punishments for 
future OMVWI violations, through Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2).15  
Therefore, we conclude that Deilke cannot have it both ways:  
either the conviction is invalid because of the violation of 
Deilke's right to counsel or it is valid because he chooses to 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin Stat. 346.65(2) states in relevant part: 
Any person violating s. 346.63(1): 
(b) . . . shall be fined not less than $350 nor 
more than $1,100 and imprisoned for not less than 5 
days nor more than 6 months if the number of 
convictions . . . counted under s. 343.307(1) within a 
10-year period, equals 2 . . . . 
(c) . . . shall be fined not less than $600 nor 
more than $2,000 and imprisoned for not less than 30 
days nor more than one year in the county jail if the 
number 
of 
convictions 
. . . 
counted 
under 
s. 
343.307(1), equals 3 . . . . 
(d) . . . shall be fined not less than $600 nor 
more than $2,000 and imprisoned for not less than 60 
days nor more than one year in the county jail if the 
number 
of 
convictions 
. . . 
counted 
under 
s. 
343.307(1), equals 4 . . . . 
(e) . . . is guilty of a Class H felony and shall 
be fined not less than $600 and imprisoned for not 
less than 6 months if the number of convictions . . . 
counted under s. 343.307(1), equals 5 or more . . . . 
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
13 
 
withdraw his challenge.  We conclude that the result of Deilke's 
successful 
collateral 
attack 
on 
the 
convictions 
was 
to 
invalidate the convictions.  Accordingly, we address the 
remainder of our discussion to Deilke's two other arguments. 
¶18 Deilke asserts that none of his plea agreements 
contained the express condition that the convictions would be 
used for penalty enhancing purposes or that he could not 
collaterally challenge those convictions.  In the absence of 
such express provisions, Deilke contends he cannot have breached 
the plea agreements.  He asserts that the court of appeals was 
correct in concluding that, "[The State's] contended harm arises 
from an unspoken expectation not evident or explained to Deilke 
during the plea process.  Deilke could not breach a plea 
agreement 
by 
failing 
to 
comply 
with 
an 
unarticulated 
requirement."  Deilke, 266 Wis. 2d 274, ¶23.  The State argues 
that the punishment to which Deilke was subject as part of the 
plea agreements included the statutory effect of repetitive 
OMVWI convictions set out in Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2), and by 
removing that effect, he materially and substantially breached 
the agreement.  Without the penalty-enhancing feature, the State 
claims the convictions are virtually useless in trying to keep 
impaired drivers off the road.16   
                                                 
16 The prosecutor noted, "[I]t doesn't do me much good to 
get a conviction in this [b]ranch if I can't then use it for 
penalty enhancement purposes in the future.  I mean[,] what good 
is a conviction on his record if it doesn't mean anything?" 
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
14 
 
¶19 Additionally, in decisions that have reviewed the 
contention that a plea agreement has been breached, the conduct 
that was held to be a breach never was explicitly mentioned as 
an act a party to the agreement was constrained from taking.  
See, 
e.g., 
Matson, 
268 
Wis. 2d 
725 
(concluding 
that 
an 
investigating officer's letter to the court recommending that 
the sentence be longer than was agreed to in the plea bargain 
was a material and substantial breach of the plea bargain); 
Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 492 (concluding that a prosecutor's "less 
than neutral" presentation of the plea bargain breached the 
agreement).  Accordingly, we conclude that the lack of a 
specific instruction to Deilke in regard to a subsequent attack 
of the convictions, is not dispositive of any issue before us.17 
                                                 
17 The dissent characterizes the statutory consequences of 
repetitive OMVWI convictions as an "implicit" term of the plea 
agreements, and accuses the majority of "attempting to stretch 
the law" because the dissent maintains that no case cited by the 
majority relies on a breach of an "implicit term of a plea 
agreement."  Dissent, ¶44.  In arguing that there can be no 
breach of the plea agreement if the breached provision is 
"implicit," dissent ¶¶44, 47, 53, the dissent sets up a straw-
man so that it can then knock it down.  The word "implicit" is 
not used in the majority opinion.  Indeed, if one were forced to 
choose a label for the statutory penalties that increase with 
each OMVWI conviction, it surely would be "explicit," as the 
mandatory 
consequences 
of 
repetitive 
OMVWI 
violations are 
clearly stated in the statutes.  Furthermore, Deilke had to know 
that these statutory provisions were part of his pleas because 
the charge at issue here was his 6th OMVWI in ten years, during 
which time he was subjected to those increasing penalties.  
Additionally, breaches of provisions that were not explicitly 
stated in plea agreements have been held to be material and 
substantial breaches, as we discussed in ¶14. 
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
15 
 
¶20 Furthermore, we are not persuaded by Deilke's argument 
that because he served jail time and paid fines, no breach of 
the plea agreement occurred.  We agree with the State that a 
part of Deilke's punishment was the effect of the statutory 
scheme regarding drunken driving penalties under Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65, which envisions progressive punishment as a central 
component of convictions.  See State v. Banks, 105 Wis. 2d 32, 
49, 313 N.W.2d 67 (1981) (noting that removing drunk drivers 
from the highways is the "underlying premise of the criminal 
penalties" in § 346.65, and that "the purpose of general 
repeater statutes is to increase the punishment of persons who 
fail to learn to respect the law after suffering the initial 
penalties and embarrassment of conviction").   
¶21 In addition, the prosecutor is without the authority 
or power to bargain away the penalty-enhancing character of an 
OMVWI or PAC conviction.  See Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1) (stating, 
in relevant part, "The court shall count the following . . . to 
determine the penalty under s. 346.65(2):  (a) Convictions for 
violations under s. 346.63(1) [i.e., OMVWI or PAC convictions]") 
(emphasis added).  See also Banks, 105 Wis. 2d at 39 (stating 
that the use of the word "shall" in the penalty provisions of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2) evidences a legislative intent that "all 
the penalties for repeated offenses . . . be mandatory rather 
than discretionary . . . .").   Without a conviction for a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) that allows the State to use 
the penalty-enhancing value of that conviction in the sentencing 
under § 346.65(2), the grounds on which the State negotiated the 
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
16 
 
plea agreement substantially changed.  See Robinson, 249 Wis. 2d 
553, ¶47. 
¶22  We note that analyzing the parties' contentions under 
contract principles also causes us to conclude that Deilke 
materially and substantially breached the plea agreement.18  For 
example, in reviewing the effect of a successful attack on a 
conviction that resulted from a plea bargain, we concluded a 
breach occurred.  Robinson, 249 Wis. 2d 553, ¶47.  Robinson and 
the State entered into a plea agreement whereby the State 
dropped a repeater allegation and reduced an aggravated battery 
charge to a reckless endangerment charge, while retaining a 
second reckless endangerment charge.  The State's amendment 
reduced Robinson's possible prison time from twenty-seven years 
to ten years.  Robinson pled to both counts of reckless 
endangerment.  He was sentenced to five years on each count, to 
be served consecutively.  Id., ¶¶6-8.  Robinson then filed a 
postconviction motion arguing that the two counts of recklessly 
endangering safety were multiplicitous and violated the double 
jeopardy clauses of the state and federal constitutions.  Id., 
¶9.  On appeal, the State did not challenge this contention, 
id., ¶12, but it argued the effect of Robinson's motion, which 
would reduce Robinson's overall sentence from ten years to five 
                                                 
18 The dissent takes issue with the application of contract 
principles to Deilke's breach of the plea agreement.  Dissent, 
¶57.  However, when a defendant is alleged to have breached a 
plea agreement, contract principles guide the analysis and the 
remedy.  See State v. Robinson, 2002 WI 9, ¶50, 249 Wis. 2d 553, 
638 N.W.2d 564. 
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
17 
 
years (half of what the State believed it had bargained to 
receive), amounted to a repudiation of the plea agreement.  See 
id., ¶¶9, 18.  We agreed that the successful withdrawing of 
Robinson's plea to one of the counts of reckless endangerment 
constituted a repudiation of the plea agreement.  Id., ¶47.  
Accordingly, we conclude that Deilke's collateral attack here 
also prevented the State from receiving all it bargained for 
when it dismissed multiple charges in exchange for one OMVWI 
conviction which has, at its core, repeater consequences 
designed to remove drunk drivers from Wisconsin highways.  
¶23 We also note that decisions that have reviewed alleged 
breaches of plea agreements have concluded that good faith is 
implied in plea agreements.  Scott, 230 Wis. 2d at 656 
(concluding that the State was "obliged to act in good faith and 
adhere to the bargain it had struck with Scott"); see also State 
v. Wills, 187 Wis. 2d 529, 537, 523 N.W.2d 569 (Ct. App. 1994).19  
We have also concluded that a party to a plea agreement cannot 
do an "end run" around the plea agreement and in so doing 
accomplish by indirect means what could not be done by direct 
means.  Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 492, ¶42.   
¶24 Here, Deilke's successful collateral challenge of the 
convictions 
entered 
on 
the 
basis 
of 
his 
guilty 
pleas 
                                                 
19 This court was equally divided on whether the State 
breached the plea agreement at issue in State v. Wills, 
therefore, the decision of the court of appeals on that issue——
and the proposition that the parties to a plea agreement are 
required to act in "good faith"——was affirmed.  State v. Wills, 
193 Wis. 2d 273, 275, 533 N.W.2d 165 (1995).     
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
18 
 
accomplished by indirect means what he could not have done 
directly.  He retains all of the benefits of the plea agreement 
(e.g., being subject to fewer charges, less-than-maximum fines 
and jail time) and attempts to place himself in a better 
position than he would have been if he had entered the same 
agreements with advice of counsel.  That is, the previous 
convictions he successfully challenged cannot be used as penalty 
enhancers in subsequent OMVWI/PAC proceedings.  The State, on 
the other hand, retains only some of the benefits of the 
original agreement (e.g., not having to take the case to trial), 
but it is left in a far worse position.  As the circuit court 
said at the hearing to reinstate the charges, "So the practical 
effect is what, despite this rather horrendous record that Mr. 
Deilke has achieved that now he gets credit to be an OWI first?"  
This is inconsistent with concepts of fairness that run to both 
the State and Deilke.  As we explained in Rivest, "To allow a 
defendant to claim the benefit of an agreement where he, 
himself, is in default, offends fundamental concepts of honesty, 
fair 
play 
and 
justice." 
 
Rivest, 
106 
Wis. 2d 
at 
414.  
Accordingly, we conclude that Deilke's conduct materially and 
substantially breached the plea agreements. 
2. 
Remedy for breach 
¶25 Having concluded that Deilke's successful collateral 
challenge to his previous convictions was a material and 
substantial breach of the plea agreements, we turn now to 
whether the remedy of rescission that was applied here is 
warranted.  Not every breach of a plea agreement necessarily 
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
19 
 
gives rise to a per se right to a remedy; however, a material 
and substantial breach is a manifest injustice that requires 
vacating the plea.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 289.  The 
appropriate remedy for a material and substantial breach of a 
plea agreement depends on the totality of the circumstances.  
Robinson, 249 Wis. 2d 553, ¶48.  "A court must examine all of 
the circumstances of a case to determine an appropriate remedy 
for that case, considering both the defendant's and State's 
interests."  Id.  One remedy is to vacate the negotiated plea 
agreement and reinstate the original charges against the 
defendant.  Id.  In Robinson, we concluded that given the 
circumstances in that case, the parties should be restored to 
the same positions they held before the defective plea agreement 
was entered.  Id. at ¶49.  See also State v. Briggs, 218 Wis. 2d 
61, 73-74, 579 N.W.2d 783 (Ct. App. 1998) (reinstating the 
parties to the positions they had before they negotiated a plea 
agreement based on an inaccurate view of the law).  
¶26 In this case, the State requested reinstatement of the 
PAC charges against Deilke.20  The circuit court granted the 
motion and Deilke, with advice of counsel, pled to the PAC 
counts.  The State did not request any additional jail time, 
fines or term of license revocation for these convictions, other 
than that which had been imposed at the time of the OMVWI 
convictions.  However, the PAC convictions then served as the 
                                                 
20 It did not request reinstatement of the fourth PAC count, 
the OAR counts or the OMVWI that also were dismissed. 
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
20 
 
basis for the OMVWI-5th and PAC-5th charges that occurred in 
2001.  We conclude that the circuit court appropriately 
exercised its discretion when it rescinded the plea agreements 
and returned the parties to the positions they occupied at the 
time they believed they had entered into valid plea agreements.   
3. 
Statute of limitations   
¶27 Deilke argues that the statute of limitations bars the 
reinstatement of the 1993 PAC charge because the three-year time 
limitation for prosecution of misdemeanors has run.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 939.74(1).21  The circuit court22 rejected Deilke's 
statute of limitations defense and added that even if it were a 
defense, the State would be able to block its use through the 
discovery rule announced in Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co., 113 
Wis. 2d 550, 560, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983) (holding that a personal 
injury action accrues, for statute of limitations purposes, when 
the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover, the 
injury).  We agree with the circuit court that Deilke does not 
have a statute of limitations defense.  However, we reach our 
conclusion on a different basis.  See State v. Chrysler Outboard 
Corp., 219 Wis. 2d 130, 148-49, 580 N.W.2d 203 (1998) (refusing 
                                                 
21 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.74(1) provides in relevant part:  
"Except as provided in subs. (2) and (2d) and s. 946.88(1), 
prosecution . . . must be commenced . . . for a misdemeanor 
. . . within 3 years after commission thereof.  Within the 
meaning of this section, a prosecution has commenced when a 
warrant or summons is issued, an indictment is found, or an 
information is filed." 
22 The court of appeals did not reach this issue. 
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
21 
 
to extend the discovery rule to quasi-criminal environmental 
enforcement cases and limiting the discovery rule to tort 
cases).   
¶28 The primary purpose of the statute of limitations is 
to protect the accused from criminal consequences for remote 
past actions.  State v. Jennings, 2003 WI 10, ¶15, 259 Wis. 2d 
523, 657 N.W.2d 393 (citations omitted).  However, we have held 
that prosecution for the act in question tolls the statute of 
limitations that otherwise would apply.  State v. Pohlhammer, 78 
Wis. 2d 516, 522, 254 N.W.2d 478 (1977).   
¶29 In Pohlhammer, we addressed the consequence to the 
parties of charges that were withdrawn when a plea bargain 
resulted in the filing of an amended information to which 
Pohlhammer pled.  On postconviction motion, Pohlhammer argued 
that the act described in the amended information (making a 
false representation) was different from the act described in 
the original information (intentionally damaging a building by 
means of fire).  We agreed, concluding that not all charges that 
arise out of the same course of conduct comprise the same acts.  
Id. at 522-23.  Therefore, because the amended information was 
filed more than six years after the complained of act, 
Pohlhammer argued he had an absolute defense to the charge and 
his conviction should be vacated.  Id. at 522-23.  We agreed 
that the conviction was properly vacated.  Id. at 524.  However, 
because the amended information, which was filed based on 
Pohlhammer's agreement to plead guilty to the one charge it 
contained, formed the basis for the plea bargain that Pohlhammer 
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
22 
 
breached 
through his successful postconviction 
motion, we 
returned the parties to "the same posture" they occupied prior 
to his plea.  Id.  Accordingly, we reinstated the original 
information that contained three counts of arson with intent to 
defraud an insurer, as party to the crime, and permitted further 
proceedings on those charges.  Id. at 524-25.  
¶30 We conclude that Pohlhammer provides ample support for 
the circuit court's conclusion that Deilke has no statute of 
limitations defense to the PAC charges he pled to after his 
original convictions were set aside.  As in Pohlhammer, PAC was 
charged and initial appearances were made before the statute of 
limitations was implicated.  As in Pohlhammer, the PAC charges 
were not proceeded upon because of plea bargains in which Deilke 
pled to OMVWI charges, the convictions for which he later 
successfully overturned.  As in Pohlhammer, Deilke's pleas 
induced the State to refrain from prosecuting the PAC charges 
when they were originally filed.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
the circuit court was correct in rescinding the plea agreements 
so that the parties were in the same posture as they had prior 
Nos. 02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR   
 
23 
 
to Deilke's pleas, when the statute of limitations was not 
implicated.23  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶31 We conclude that the circuit court correctly held that 
Deilke's successful collateral challenge to his convictions 
constituted a material and substantial breach of the plea 
agreements on which the convictions were based.  Further, 
because we agree with the circuit court that the appropriate 
remedy for the breach was to vacate the plea agreements and 
reinstate those original charges for which the State requested 
reinstatement and to accept Deilke's subsequent guilty pleas, we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
¶32 DIANE S. SYKES, J., did not participate. 
 
                                                 
23 Other 
states 
that 
have 
considered 
a 
statute 
of 
limitations defense after a plea agreement has been abrogated 
and the charges dismissed earlier have been reinstated have come 
to the same conclusion.  See, e.g., Geiger v. State, 532 So.2d 
1298, 1301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (finding statute of 
limitations tolled during postconviction motion because the 
charges were merely reinstated and the defendant had implied 
notice that abrogation of plea agreement would result in 
reinstatement of the charges); State v. White, 838 S.W.2d 140, 
142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that in the interest of 
fairness, the statute of limitations tolls during a defendant's 
postconviction motion); State v. Neely, 1 S.W.3d 679, 683 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 1999) (holding that the statute of limitations tolls 
during a postconviction motion because, otherwise, a defendant 
could attack the reinstated conviction while the state could not 
rescind from its side of the bargain). 
No.  02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶33 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I, too, am 
concerned about the problem of drunk drivers on our highways and 
realize that the safety of all citizens is jeopardized by their 
presence.  Nevertheless, I cannot join the majority opinion 
because in reaching its conclusion the majority (1) inflates the 
facts; (2) stretches the law; and (3) fails to consider the 
broad consequences of its decision. 
¶34 The majority cannot cite a single case from any 
jurisdiction that has ruled that a defendant who has served his 
sentence breaches his plea agreement by collaterally attacking 
the use of a prior conviction for penalty enhancement.  Because 
I agree with the unanimous court of appeals' decision here, 
which concluded that Robert Deilke did not breach the plea 
agreements in the 1993 and 2000 cases by collaterally attacking 
the results of those convictions, I respectfully dissent.   
¶35 In 1993, 1994, and 2000, Deilke was convicted on the 
basis of pleas obtained without benefit of counsel.  He 
successfully collaterally attacked those convictions, and the 
State concedes that the convictions were obtained in violation 
of Deilke's constitutional right to counsel.  Now, the majority 
concludes that by asserting his constitutional rights, Deilke is 
attempting to evade the consequences of his bargain with the 
State and in so doing has materially and substantially breached 
that bargain. 
No.  02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
A.  Inflation of Facts 
¶36 The essence of the majority's analysis lies in the 
application of contract principles to plea bargains.  Majority 
op., ¶12.  After doing a benefit of the bargain analysis, it 
concludes that it would be unfair to allow Deilke to retain "all 
of the benefits of the plea agreement" and not be subjected to 
penalty enhancement of the prior convictions.  Id., ¶24. 
¶37 Herein lies the majority's problem.  In weighing "all 
of the benefits," it fails to note that most of the dismissed 
charges that it is weighing have nothing to do with this case.  
As the parties made abundantly clear in their briefs and at oral 
argument, we are dealing with only two prior convictions, not 
three.  The convictions that are the focus of our inquiry are 
the 1993 and 2000 convictions——not the 1994 conviction.  The 
majority acknowledges that in a footnote,24 but nevertheless uses 
the charges in the 1994 case to inflate the benefits received by 
Deilke. 
¶38 The majority weighs an asserted benefit to Deilke of 
not facing six additional charges because they were dismissed as 
                                                 
24 The majority opinion states:   
 
The State's motion regarding Deilke's 1993 and 2000 
cases was granted by the circuit court for Eau Claire 
County, Judge Eric J. Wahl, presiding.  The State's 
motion regarding Deilke's 1994 conviction was denied 
by a different judge in a different circuit court 
branch and is not part of this appeal.   
Majority op., ¶8, n. 4. 
No.  02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
part of the plea agreements.  Id., ¶15.  Yet, four of the six 
dismissed charges are in the 1994 case and are not involved 
here.  
¶39 Of the two remaining charges that were dismissed, the 
1993 PAC charge and the 2000 PAC charge, there is no benefit 
whatsoever that inures to Deilke.  Those two charges are 
dismissed, not as a benefit of a plea bargain, but by operation 
of law.  Although Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(c) provides that the 
State may prosecute both OMVWI and PAC, one of the charges must 
be dismissed because only a single conviction can be entered.25    
¶40 Thus, there is no benefit that inures to Deilke for 
dismissed charges.  Rather, under the facts of this case, quite 
the opposite is true.  Because Deilke never attacked his 1993 
and 2000 OMVWI convictions, but only contested the consequences 
of those convictions for purposes of penalty enhancement, those 
OMVWI convictions still remain of record.  Rather than receiving 
                                                 
25 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.63(1)(c) provides:  
 
A person may be charged with and a prosecutor may 
proceed upon a complaint based upon a violation of any 
combination of par. (a) or (b) or both for acts 
arising out of the same incident or occurrence.  If 
the person is charged with violating both par. (a) and 
(b), the offenses shall be joined.  If the person is 
found guilty of both pars. (a) and (b) for acts 
arising out of the same incident or occurrence, there 
shall 
be 
a 
single 
conviction 
for 
purposes 
of 
sentencing and for purposes of counting convictions 
under ss. 343.30(1q) and 343.305.  Paragraphs (a) and  
(b) each require proof of a fact for conviction which 
the other does not require. 
No.  02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
the benefit of any dismissed charges, Deilke now has the burden 
of both OMVWI and PAC convictions of record for the 1993 and 
2000 
offenses.  By anyone's math, 
because 
of 
the 
dual 
convictions of record, the numbers reflect a net loss to Deilke, 
not an unfair benefit. 
B. 
Stretching the Law 
¶41 The majority cannot cite a single case from any 
jurisdiction that holds as the majority does here:  that a 
defendant who has served his sentence breaches his plea 
agreement 
by 
collaterally 
attacking 
the 
use 
of 
a 
prior 
conviction for penalty enhancement.  On the contrary, many cases 
suggest 
that 
the 
majority's 
approach 
is 
constitutionally 
suspect. 
¶42 In Burgett v. Texas, the Supreme Court announced that 
if a defendant demonstrates that an earlier conviction was 
obtained in violation of his right to counsel, it may not be 
used as a penalty enhancer in a subsequent proceeding.  389 U.S. 
109, 115 (1967).  There, the court recognized that use of the 
uncounseled prior conviction compounds the harm done to the 
defendant by deprivation of the right to counsel.  Id.  See also 
Custis v. U.S., 511 U.S. 485 (1994).  This court analyzed Custis 
in State v. Hahn and reaffirmed that a defendant has a federal 
constitutional right to challenge the use of a prior conviction 
in an enhanced sentencing proceeding when the defendant alleges 
that his constitutional right to counsel was violated in the 
No.  02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
earlier proceeding.  2000 WI 118, ¶17, 238 Wis. 2d 889, 618 
N.W.2d 528. 
¶43 By holding that a collateral attack of a conviction as 
a 
penalty 
enhancer 
in 
an 
entirely 
separate 
proceeding 
constitutes a breach of the earlier plea agreement, the majority 
is imposing a rather stiff tax on the exercise of the 
constitutional right to challenge a conviction obtained in 
violation of the right to counsel.  It is not clear how, if at 
all, the majority can reconcile its holding with Burgett, 
Custis, and Hahn.  
¶44 The majority concludes that the collateral attack 
violated an implicit term of the plea agreement.  It offers a 
pair of cases as authority for the premise that a plea agreement 
contains implicit terms the violation of which constitute 
breach.26  Once again, the majority is attempting to stretch the 
law to accommodate its novel contention.  Neither of the cases 
                                                 
26 Actually, the majority asserts that "in decisions that 
have reviewed the contention that a plea agreement has been 
breached, the conduct that was held to be a breach never was 
explicitly mentioned as an act a party to the agreement was 
constrained from taking."  Majority op., ¶19. 
The majority nowhere explains what term of the plea 
agreement Deilke violated.  The reader is left to guess that the 
majority concluded that Deilke violated an implicit term not to 
collaterally attack the convictions in future proceedings.  
Whatever the term might be, it must be an implicit term supplied 
by the majority, as the express terms of the plea agreement are 
silent with respect to the issue in this case. 
No.  02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
cited by the majority involved an implicit term of a plea 
agreement. 
¶45 In State v. Matson, a detective wrote to the judge 
requesting that the judge impose the maximum allowable sentence.  
2003 WI App 253, 268 Wis. 2d 725, 674 N.W.2d 51.  The court of 
appeals concluded that the letter controverted the sentencing 
recommendation and therefore constituted a breach of the plea 
agreement, noting that "once an accused agrees to plead guilty 
in reliance upon a prosecutor's promise to perform a future act, 
the accused's due process rights demand fulfillment of the 
bargain."  Id., ¶16.  
¶46 In State v. Williams, we found that the prosecutor 
presented the agreed-upon sentencing recommendation in a less-
than-neutral way.  2002 WI 1, 249 Wis. 2d 492, 637 N.W.2d 733.  
Citing constitutional concerns identical to those mentioned in 
Matson, we concluded that this effectively breached the plea 
agreement.  Id., ¶59.   
¶47 Contrary to the majority's contention, in both Matson 
and Williams the court found that the State violated an explicit 
term of the plea agreement, i.e. to recommend the agreed upon 
sentence.  Furthermore, the reasoning underlying these cases was 
specific to the defendant's due process rights and not grounded 
in contract principles.  Consequently, they do not address 
whether a defendant who has performed as specified in the 
explicit terms of his plea agreement may be found to have 
No.  02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
breached an implied term, nor do they speak to whether such a 
breach, if it could take 
place, 
might be 
material and 
substantial.   
¶48 The majority also invokes a pair of cases in which the 
defendants were found to have materially and substantially 
breached their plea agreements:  State v. Robinson, 2002 WI 9, 
249 Wis. 2d 553, 638 N.W.2d 564, and State v. Rivest, 106 
Wis. 2d 406, 316 N.W.2d 395 (1982).  In Robinson, the defendant 
had not yet started to serve his sentence.  Pursuant to an 
agreement, the State filed an amended information and the 
defendant plead guilty to two counts of reckless endangerment, 
with 
a 
resulting 
exposure 
of 
10 
years' 
imprisonment.  
Subsequently he sought to have one count vacated, claiming that 
it was multiplicitious.  Thus, he attempted to cut his exposure 
to only five years' imprisonment——half of what was contemplated 
in the plea agreement. 
¶49 The Robinson court determined that when a defendant 
successfully challenges his conviction on one count of a two-
count information and thus reduces his exposure to half of what 
was contemplated in the plea agreement, the defendant has 
breached a term of the agreement.  249 Wis. 2d 553, ¶57.  
Employing the contract principle of detrimental reliance, the 
court concluded that the remedy is to reverse the convictions 
and sentences, vacate the plea agreement, and reinstate the 
No.  02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
original information so that the parties are restored to their 
positions prior to the negotiated plea agreement.  Id., ¶55. 
¶50 In this case the future use of Deilke's convictions 
for penalty enhancement purposes was never made a part of the 
agreement.  Unlike in Robinson, where the defendant was 
challenging one of two convictions in the same information 
before the court, here the convictions which the State seeks to 
vacate are closed cases, dating back to eight years prior to the 
case currently pending before the court. 
¶51 Moreover, Deilke served all of his time, paid all of 
his fines, attended all required classes, endured his license 
revocations, and even forfeited his vehicle.  Unlike in 
Robinson, where the defendant had not yet started to serve his 
sentence, the defendant cannot be restored to his position prior 
to the negotiated plea agreement.  How can you undo the 
forfeiture of his car and the period of time that he was without 
its use? 
¶52 In State v. Rivest, another case relied upon by the 
majority, the defendant agreed to testify against an accomplice 
as part of his plea agreement.  It was later determined that he 
had testified falsely.  The Rivest court gave deference to the 
factual findings of the circuit court which expressly held that 
one of the conditions of the plea agreement was that Rivest 
would give truthful testimony.  In reviewing the circuit court's 
findings, this court determined that the testimony of both 
No.  02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
Rivest's attorney and the prosecutor "demonstrates that it was 
implicit in the plea agreement that Rivest's testimony was to be 
truthful . . . ."  106 Wis. 2d at 416.   
¶53 The majority cites Rivest for the premise that a 
defendant who defaults on an implied term of a plea agreement 
cannot reap its benefit.  I do not dispute that premise.  I 
disagree, however, with the application of the Rivest premise to 
this case.  Rivest can be distinguished in significant ways. 
¶54 First and foremost, it is important to note that both 
Rivest's defense attorney and the prosecutor agreed that such an 
implicit condition existed.  Here, the parties do not agree.  
Second, the court determined that by violating a fundamental 
tenet 
of 
the 
American 
system 
of 
jurisprudence——truthful 
testimony——the defendant had defaulted on the plea agreement.  
Exercising a collateral challenge to sentence enhancement is not 
akin to violating a fundamental tenet of our American system of 
jurisprudence.  Here, Deilke did not default by exercising his 
constitutional rights.  Rather, he had already served his 
sentences and otherwise performed the specified terms of his 
plea agreement. 
¶55 The majority is also stretching the precedent in its 
analysis of the duty of good faith implied in plea agreements.  
In State v. Wills, 187 Wis. 2d 529, 523 N.W.2d 569 (Ct. App. 
1994), and State v. Scott, 230 Wis. 2d 643, 602 N.W.2d 296 (Ct. 
App. 1999), the court of appeals ruled not on the basis of the 
No.  02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
implied duty of good faith but rather on the same due process 
grounds that controlled our decisions in Williams and Matson. 
¶56 In sum, the majority is stretching the law and has 
absolutely no authority to support its novel contention that a 
defendant who has served his sentence breaches a plea agreement 
by collaterally attacking the use of a prior conviction for 
penalty enhancement. 
C.  The Consequences 
¶57 Although the majority pays lip service in a footnote 
to the limitations of applying contract principles to plea 
agreements, it fails to acknowledge the extent of those 
limitations.  Majority op., ¶12, n. 7, ¶22, n. 18.27  Likewise, 
the majority fails to acknowledge the consequences of having 
courts, months or years later, reading implied terms into plea 
                                                 
27 As stated in Rivest, "[w]hile analogies to contract law 
are important to the determination of questions regarding the 
effects of a plea bargain, such analogies are not solely 
determinative of the question as fundamental due process rights 
are implicated by the plea agreement."  State v. Rivest, 106 
Wis. 2d 406, 413, 316 N.W.2d 395 (1982).  We further explained 
in 
Robinson: 
"The 
constitutional 
concerns 
undergirding 
a 
defendant's 'contract rights' in a plea agreement demand broader 
and more vigorous protection than those accorded private 
contractual commitments."  State v. Robinson, 2002 WI 9, ¶50, n. 
24, 249 Wis. 2d 553, 638 N.W.2d 264 (quoting State v. Scott, 230 
Wis. 
2d 
643, 
654-55, 602 
N.W.2d 
296 
(Ct. 
App. 1999)).  
"[C]riminal defendant's rights are grounded in more than 
contract; thus, contract principles, while useful, do not 
completely define the obligations of the parties.  A myriad of 
collateral 
considerations . . . are 
implicated 
in 
plea 
agreements.  In light of such implications, application of the 
rules of commercial contract law may require 'tempering' the 
rules."  Scott, 230 Wis. 2d at 655, n. 8 (citations omitted). 
No.  02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
agreements.  To give such unbridled license undermines the 
finality of convictions. 
¶58 The State claims that the benefit it bargained for in 
the original plea negotiations was the ability to establish the 
earlier convictions for use in penalty enhancement if there were 
any subsequent convictions.  Yet, the State concedes that it 
never 
discussed 
this 
term 
with 
Deilke 
during 
the 
plea 
negotiations.  It never informed him that it was seeking the 
specific benefit of using his convictions for later penalty 
enhancement.  How can there be a meeting of the minds between 
the parties as to this unarticulated condition? 
¶59 Additionally, I am concerned about the breadth of the 
majority's holding.  Its application of contract principles is 
not limited to OWI penalty enhancement cases.  This may become 
the motion du jour, brought by both the State and by defendants, 
trying to open up prior convictions because there was not a 
meeting of the minds on an unstated term of a plea agreement.  
Where is the stopping point? 
¶60 Here, the majority advances that this court should 
read into the plea bargain what it views as an implicit term, 
regardless if there was ever any meeting of the minds as to the 
term.  Yet, to read such a term into plea agreements would 
effectively create an implicit waiver of the right to counsel in 
all plea agreements, and to do so would chill the exercise of a 
defendant's constitutional rights. 
No.  02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
¶61 It is unnecessary to introduce this new layer of 
complexity and uncertainty to the law.  A simpler remedy would 
place the onus for obtaining the defendant's waiver of counsel 
on the State, at the peril of their ability to use convictions 
for later penalty enhancement.  Like the court of appeals, I 
conclude that Deilke could not have materially and substantially 
breached 
the 
plea 
agreement 
based 
on 
this 
unarticulated 
condition.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶62 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this opinion. 
 
No.  02-2897-CR & 02-2898-CR.awb 
 
 
 
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