Title: State v. Blow
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 446A14
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: September 25, 2015

NO. COA12-940 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 21 May 2013 
 
 
WILLIAM T. USSERY and wife, 
CAROLYN B. USSERY, 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Richmond County 
No. 08 CVS 887 
BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by Plaintiffs from Order entered 16 April 2012 by 
Judge W. David Lee in Richmond County Superior Court. Heard in 
the Court of Appeals 14 February 2013. 
 
Anderson, Johnson, Lawrence & Butler, L.L.P., by Steven C. 
Lawrence and Stacey E. Tally, for Plaintiffs.  
 
Bell, Davis & Pitt, P.A., by Kevin G. Williams and Michael 
D. Phillips, for Defendant.  
 
 
STEPHENS, Judge. 
 
 
Factual Background and Procedural History 
 
This appeal arises from communications involving Branch 
Banking and Trust Company (“Defendant” or “BB&T”), Mr. William 
T. Ussery (“Plaintiff”), and Mr. D. Wayne Barker (“Barker”) 
surrounding events occurring between November of 1999 and 
January of 2008. Before that time, the owners of a chair 
manufacturing business located in Rockingham, North Carolina, 
-2- 
 
 
had approached Barker and Plaintiff to discuss the possibility 
of selling their struggling company, CAFCO. Barker had spent a 
number of years managing CAFCO, which manufactured chairs, but 
lacked Plaintiff’s individual financial ability to start a 
business. 
By November of 1999, Plaintiff and Barker had purchased 
CAFCO 
and 
its 
manufacturing 
building 
(“the 
original 
manufacturing building”). Their new company was known as “Chair 
Specialties” 
and 
was 
intended 
to 
manufacture 
specialty 
furniture. Plaintiff maintained a 60% ownership interest in the 
company and Barker held a 40% interest. Barker was responsible 
for the company’s day-to-day operations, and the parties entered 
into their relationship with the understanding that Barker would 
eventually seek to purchase Plaintiff’s interest in Chair 
Specialties with money obtained through a $450,000 government-
backed small business loan (“the government-backed loan”). 
In order to purchase equipment to operate their business, 
Plaintiff and Barker also took out a $100,000 loan from BB&T. 
Around that same time, Plaintiff purchased a second building 
(“the Cheraw Road building”) for $150,000. The Cheraw Road 
building was meant to house the Chair Specialties manufacturing 
operations process. Plaintiff intended to develop the original 
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manufacturing building into a residential condominium complex. 
He and Barker would then use the Cheraw Road building as 
collateral for the government-backed loan. However, because the 
Cheraw Road building suffered from environmental limitations, it 
could not be used for manufacturing purposes until the parties 
had completed lead removal and abatement. 
During the process of purchasing CAFCO and starting Chair 
Specialties, Plaintiff and Barker communicated with an employee 
of BB&T, Mr. Wiley Mabe (“Mabe”), concerning their plan to 
secure the government-backed loan. Once lead removal and 
abatement had been accomplished, they approached Mabe about 
obtaining that loan. Plaintiff alleges that Mabe “assured” them 
that Chair Specialties would qualify for the loan. In order to 
cover their expenses in the meantime, however, Plaintiff and 
Chair Specialties took out two more loans from BB&T over the 
next two years. In addition to the $100,000 note mentioned 
above, Chair Specialties took out a $50,000 loan in February of 
2000, and Plaintiff took out a $125,000 loan in February of 
2001. Plaintiff asserts that these funds were acquired in 
reliance on Mabe’s “repeated assurances” that they would be 
approved for the government-backed loan. 
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In January of 2002, Mabe informed Plaintiff and Barker 
that, to his surprise, they had not 
qualified for 
the 
government-backed loan. After further research, Plaintiff and 
Barker learned that, in fact, Mabe had not submitted the loan 
package on time because “he did not believe that [they] would 
qualify.” As Plaintiff and Barker had accumulated additional 
debt in the past two years, Plaintiff alleges they were unable 
to obtain any money from another source. He further alleges 
that, as a result, they were forced to close Chair Specialties. 
Three months later, in an attempt to mitigate their losses, 
Barker and Plaintiff applied for and received a $425,000 loan 
from BB&T. The proceeds from that loan were used to pay off 
their three other loans, with an additional $99,187.75 going to 
Plaintiff. 
Due in part to the terms of the final, $425,000 loan from 
BB&T, Barker was unable to sustain his payments. Accordingly, he 
brought a civil action against BB&T in May of 2003 for breach of 
fiduciary duty, negligence, and breach of contract. Plaintiff 
did not join that action and now alleges that he was dissuaded 
from doing so by representatives of BB&T, who allegedly assured 
him that “everything would be worked out in the Barker 
litigation” and requested that he “hold off on instituting any 
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action[] to allow resolution of the Barker matter [and his own 
claims against BB&T].” In Plaintiff’s answers to Defendant’s 
first set of interrogatories, he stated that BB&T  
gave 
assurances 
. . . 
that 
[it] 
would 
resolve the matter and the Note would be 
canceled upon resolution of the Barker/BB&T 
suit. [Plaintiff] delayed filing any action 
against BB&T upon the assurances that the 
loan would be forgiven and he would be 
reimbursed any expenses incurred related to 
BB&T’s failure to obtain the [government-
backed loan]. 
 
Importantly, the action between Barker and BB&T was settled on 
20 April 2006 — after the statutes of limitation had already 
expired as to Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff consulted counsel 
regarding those claims that summer.1 
On 17 October 2006, Plaintiff sent a letter to BB&T 
demanding 
both 
cancellation 
of 
the 
$425,000 
loan 
and 
compensatory damages resulting from BB&T’s failure to obtain the 
government-backed loan. After talking with counsel for BB&T, 
however, Plaintiff agreed to delay litigation further so that 
Defendant could perform an environmental inspection of the 
Cheraw Road building. As consideration for delaying his action, 
BB&T held the $425,000 note in abeyance pending completion of 
                     
1 It is not clear from the record whether that was the first time 
Plaintiff had consulted counsel regarding his claims against 
BB&T. Defendant’s brief indicates, however, that it was. 
-6- 
 
 
its inspection. Plaintiff alleges that, pursuant to that 
agreement, BB&T then informed him that he could “ignore the 
computer generated delinquency notices,” which had begun to 
accumulate in response to his failure to make payments. On 14 
August 2007, after BB&T had completed its environmental testing, 
Plaintiff wrote to BB&T to express his concern that “the only 
way for [him] to correct this situation and to be compensated 
for his financial losses [was] through litigation.” On 14 
January 2008, Plaintiff received a letter from BB&T officially 
rejecting his 17 October 2006 demand for cancellation and 
proposing an alternate resolution. 
On 25 June 2008, approximately six years and five months 
after he first learned that the government-backed loan had been 
denied, 
Plaintiff 
brought 
this 
action.2 
Based 
on 
his 
communications with BB&T, 
Plaintiff alleged the following 
independent 
claims: 
(1) 
negligence, 
(2) 
negligent 
misrepresentation, (3) breach of contract, (4) unfair and 
deceptive trade practices, (5) breach of fiduciary relationship, 
(6) breach of duty of good faith dealing, and (7) fraud. As a 
                     
2 Though both Mr. Ussery and his wife are listed as “Plaintiffs,” 
the record reflects that Mr. Ussery — who is frequently referred 
to in an exclusive manner as “Plaintiff” in the documents 
presented to this Court — was the primary, if not sole, actor. 
-7- 
 
 
consequence, BB&T filed a compulsory counterclaim to collect the 
outstanding money, including interest, owed by Plaintiff via the 
$425,000 loan. BB&T noted therein its intention to collect 
attorneys’ fees. 
On 15 December 2011, BB&T moved for summary judgment on 
grounds that Plaintiff’s action was barred by the relevant 
statutes of limitation. The next year, on 16 April 2012, the 
trial 
court 
granted 
BB&T’s 
motion 
for 
summary 
judgment, 
dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice, and entered 
judgment in favor of BB&T. Plaintiff appeals that judgment. 
Standard of Review 
 
“Our standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment 
is de novo; such judgment is appropriate only when the record 
shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” In 
re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted). On a motion for summary 
judgment, the evidence presented must be viewed in a light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. Duke Energy Corp. v. Malcolm, 
178 N.C. App. 62, 64–65, 630 S.E.2d 693, 695 (2006). “Summary 
judgment is a drastic remedy which should be approached with 
caution. It should be awarded only where the truth is quite 
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clear.” Bradshaw v. McElroy, 62 N.C. App. 515, 518, 302 S.E.2d 
908, 911 (1983) (citations and quotation marks omitted).  
Discussion 
I. Statutes of Limitation 
 
Plaintiff’s claims against BB&T accrued, at the latest, in 
January 
of 
2002 
when 
he 
learned 
about 
Mabe’s 
alleged 
misrepresentation concerning the government-backed loan. See, 
e.g., Bruce v. N.C.N.B., 62 N.C. App. 724, 727, 303 S.E.2d 561, 
563 (1983) (“[T]he cause of action [in a case of breach of 
fiduciary duty] accrued at the date of the alleged breach or, at 
the latest, on the date it was discovered.”). Plaintiff filed 
his complaint on 25 June 2008. As it had been at least six years 
and five months since Plaintiff’s asserted claims accrued, those 
causes of action were barred by their respective statutes of 
limitation. As noted in Defendant’s brief, the following of 
Plaintiff’s claims are subject to a three-year statute of 
limitations: (1) negligence under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(5), (2) 
negligent misrepresentation under section 1-52(5), (3) breach of 
contract 
under 
section 
1-52(1), 
(4) 
breach 
of 
fiduciary 
relationship under section 1-52(1), (5) breach of duty of good 
faith and fair dealing under section 1-52(1), and (6) fraud 
under section 1-52(9). In addition, Plaintiff’s claim of unfair 
-9- 
 
 
and deceptive trade practices is subject to a four-year statute 
of limitations under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16.2. Because 
Plaintiff did not institute proceedings based on his alleged 
causes of action within the time allotted, they are time-barred.  
II. Equitable Estoppel 
Despite this, Plaintiff contends that Defendant should be 
equitably estopped from asserting the statutes of limitation as 
a defense because he relied on the alleged assurances of BB&T. 
We agree.  
North Carolina courts have recognized 
and applied the principle that a defendant 
may 
properly 
rely 
upon 
a 
statute 
of 
limitations as a defensive shield against 
“stale” 
claims, 
but 
may 
be 
equitably 
estopped from using a statute of limitations 
as a sword, so as to unjustly benefit from 
his own conduct which induced a plaintiff to 
delay filing suit. 
 
Friedland v. Gales, 131 N.C. App. 802, 806, 509 S.E.2d 793, 796 
(1998). “Equitable estoppel arises when a party has been induced 
by another’s acts to believe that certain facts exist, and that 
party rightfully relies and acts upon that belief to his [or 
her] detriment.” Jordan v. Crew, 125 N.C. App. 712, 720, 482 
S.E.2d 735, 739 (1997) (citation and quotation marks omitted); 
see also Bryant v. Adams, 116 N.C. App. 448, 459–60, 448 S.E.2d 
832, 838 (1994) (“A party may be estopped to plead and rely on a 
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statute of limitations defense when delay has been induced by 
acts, representations, or conduct which would amount to a breach 
of good faith.”) (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 339 
N.C. 736, 454 S.E.2d 647 (1995). “In order for equitable 
estoppel to bar application of the statute of limitations, a 
plaintiff must have been induced to delay filing of the action 
by the misrepresentations of the defendant.” Jordan, 125 N.C. 
App. at 720, 482 S.E.2d at 739; see also McNeely v. Walters, 211 
N.C. 112, 113, 189 S.E. 114, 115 (1937) (comparing the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel to “the golden rule” — i.e., that “one 
should do unto others as, in equity and good conscience, he 
would have them do unto him, if their positions were reversed” — 
and citing to the maxim of “fair play”).  
On appeal, Plaintiff asserts that “when a party’s actions 
or statements convince another not to institute legal action — 
particularly where promises to remedy the dispute are made — 
. . . , [equitable estoppel] will not permit the statute of 
limitations [to bar a claim] when such assurances are broken.” 
In support of that point, Plaintiff cites three cases: Duke 
Univ. v. Stainback, 320 N.C. 337, 357 S.E.2d 690 (1987); 
Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. Ellis-Don Constr., Inc., 210 N.C. 
App. 522, 709 S.E.2d 512 (2011); and Miller v. Talton, 112 N.C. 
-11- 
 
 
App. 484, 435 S.E.2d 793 (1993). Though we disagree with 
Plaintiff’s articulation of the rule, we find these cases 
instructive and agree that the doctrine is applicable here. 
Our Supreme Court has listed the elements of equitable 
estoppel as follows: 
[A]s related to the party estopped . . . : 
(1) 
Conduct 
which 
amounts 
to 
a 
false 
representation or concealment of material 
facts, or, at least, which is reasonably 
calculated to convey the impression that the 
facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent 
with, 
those 
which 
the 
party 
afterwards 
attempts 
to 
assert; 
(2) 
intention 
or 
expectation that such conduct shall be acted 
upon by the other party, or conduct which at 
least is calculated to induce a reasonably 
prudent person to believe such conduct was 
intended or expected to be relied and acted 
upon; (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, 
of the real facts.  
 
In re Will of Covington, 252 N.C. 546, 549, 114 S.E.2d 257, 260 
(1960).  
As related to the party claiming estoppel, 
[the elements] are: (1) lack of knowledge 
and [lack of] the means of knowledge of the 
truth as to the facts in question; (2) 
reliance upon the conduct of the party 
sought to be estopped; and (3) action based 
thereon of such a character as to change his 
position prejudicially.  
Id. (citations omitted); see also Parker v. Thompson-Arthur 
Paving Co., 100 N.C. App. 367, 370, 396 S.E.2d 626, 628–29 
(1990) 
(listing 
the 
elements 
of 
equitable 
estoppel). 
-12- 
 
 
Importantly, the first element — conduct amounting to a false 
representation 
or 
concealment 
of 
material 
facts 
— 
has 
alternatively been articulated as “[c]onduct . . . at least, 
which is reasonably calculated to convey the impression that the 
facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the 
party afterwards attempts to assert[.]” Hawkins v. M & J Finance 
Corp., 238 N.C. 174, 177, 77 S.E.2d 669, 672 (1953). Further, 
“[a] party may be estopped to deny representations made when he 
had no knowledge of their falsity, or which he made without any 
intent to deceive the party now setting up the estoppel. The 
fraud consists in the inconsistent position subsequently taken, 
rather than in the original conduct.” Hamilton v. Hamilton, 296 
N.C. 574, 576, 251 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1979) (citation, quotation 
marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted). Under this alternative 
expression of equitable estoppel, “[i]t is the subsequent 
inconsistent position, and not the original conduct that 
operates to the injury of the other party.” Id. at 576–77, 251 
S.E.2d at 443 (citation omitted). Primarily, the doctrine turns 
on a consideration of “the balances of equity,” which is 
dependent on the facts of each case. Miller, 112 N.C. App. at 
488, 435 S.E.2d at 797 (citation omitted). “If the evidence in a 
particular case raises a permissible inference that the elements 
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of equitable estoppel are present, but other inferences may be 
drawn from contrary evidence, estoppel is a question of fact for 
the jury.” Id. (citations omitted; emphasis added).  
In Stainback, our Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
payment of certain hospital bills owed by the defendant-father 
to Duke Hospital. Stainback, 320 N.C. at 338, 357 S.E.2d at 691. 
Before the statute had run and after receiving a bill from Duke, 
the father’s attorney informed the hospital that he was in the 
process of suing the father’s insurer for payment of the medical 
bill and “would keep Duke informed of the situation.” Id. at 
339, 357 S.E.2d at 691. The father maintained contact with Duke 
throughout 
the 
litigation 
and, 
based 
on 
the 
father’s 
representations, Duke did not join the suit against the insurer. 
Id. at 339, 357 S.E.2d at 692. When Duke brought suit for 
payment of the bill, the father refused to pay and asserted the 
statute of limitations as a defense. Id. at 340, 357 S.E.2d at 
692. Under those circumstances, our Supreme Court held that the 
father was equitably estopped from asserting the statute of 
limitations as a defense because his “actions and statements 
. . . lulled Duke into a false sense of security. [He] breached 
the golden rule and fair play, [which justifies] the entry of 
equity to prevent injustice.” Id. at 341, 357 S.E.2d at 693.  
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In Cleveland Construction, the defendant general contractor 
notified its subcontractor, the plaintiff, that it intended to 
submit a generalized claim for compensation to the State. 
Cleveland Constr., Inc., 210 N.C. App. at 525, 709 S.E.2d at 
517. In order to present all of the claims available, the 
general contractor solicited all of the plaintiff’s claims to be 
used in its own, aggregated complaint. Id. A few months later, 
the general contractor submitted the aggregated claims and 
notified the subcontractor of its submission. Id. at 533, 709 
S.E.2d at 521. The general contractor also sent a letter to the 
subcontractor discouraging it from filing suit against the 
general contractor so that both parties could present a “unified 
front” against the State. Id. The subcontractor relied on that 
letter and delayed suit against the general contractor until 
after the statute of limitations had run. Id. Accordingly, we 
held that the general contractor was barred from asserting the 
statute of limitations as a defense, citing the general 
contractor’s “affirmative representations that [(1)] it was 
pursuing [the subcontractor’s] claims against the State and 
[(2)] initiating a lawsuit would jeopardize ‘the success’ of 
recovery[.]” Id. Given those representations, we determined that 
the general contractor had lulled the subcontractor into a false 
-15- 
 
 
sense of security and induced the delayed filing. Id. (noting 
that the balance of the equities disfavored the general 
contractor, which had already been paid on the subcontractor’s 
claims against the State). 
In Miller, the plaintiff property owners brought suit 
against the defendant neighbors for water that the defendants 
had allegedly redirected onto the plaintiffs’ property. Miller, 
112 N.C. App. at 485, 435 S.E.2d at 795. The defendants asserted 
the statute of limitations as a defense, and we denied that 
protection. Id. at 486, 435 S.E.2d at 796. Relying on the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel, we noted that the defendants had 
“repeatedly promised to remedy the surface water drainage 
problems, [the] plaintiffs believed that [the] defendants would 
keep their word and fix the problems, and[,] in reliance on 
[the] defendants’ promises, [the] plaintiffs delayed instituting 
legal action.” Id. at 489, 435 S.E.2d at 797.  
For four reasons, Defendant argues that these cases are not 
applicable and Plaintiff should not be allowed to proceed to 
trial under a theory of equitable estoppel. First, BB&T asserts 
that it did not make a false representation of a material fact 
when it informed Plaintiff that “everything would be worked out 
in the Barker litigation.” In support of that argument, 
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Defendant assets that, when applying the elements of equitable 
estoppel, “a promise of future fulfillment does not constitute a 
misrepresentation of material fact unless such promise is made 
with no intent to comply.” We disagree.  
Fraud is generally found when, inter alia, there is (1) a 
false representation or concealment of a material fact, (2) 
which is reasonably calculated to deceive, and (3) made with the 
intent to deceive. Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, 
Inc., 323 N.C. 559, 569, 374 S.E.2d 385, 391 (1988) (citation 
omitted). Unlike fraud, equitable estoppel exists when there is 
simply conduct that amounts to a false representation of a 
material fact. It does not require that the defendant-party 
intend to misrepresent such a fact. Hamilton, 296 N.C. at 576, 
251 S.E.2d at 443 (“[N]either bad faith, fraud nor intent to 
deceive is necessary before the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
can be applied.”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, to the extent 
that Defendant’s representations during the Barker litigation 
were neither “promises” nor direct attempts at deception, they 
do not negate the applicability of the equitable estoppel 
doctrine. Rather, as this Court has frequently noted, and as 
Defendant points out in its brief, the gravamen of equitable 
estoppel is the subsequent inconsistent position taken by the 
-17- 
 
 
defendant party. See Cleveland Constr., Inc., 210 N.C. App. at 
__, 709 S.E.2d at 521 (where defendant general contractor sent a 
letter to plaintiff subcontractor discouraging it from filing 
suit so the parties could present a “unified front,” but 
subsequently took the inconsistent position that the plaintiff’s 
suit was barred by the statute of limitations). 
Here, Plaintiff alleges that during the pendency of the 
Barker lawsuit — that crucial period of time just before the 
statutes of limitation ran on his claims — BB&T (1) informed him 
that “everything would be worked out in the Barker litigation”; 
(2) told him to “hold off on instituting any action[] to allow 
resolution of the Barker matter [and his own claims against 
BB&T]”; and (3) informed him that “the Note would be canceled 
upon resolution of the Barker [suit] . . . . [,] the loan would 
be forgiven[,] and [Plaintiff] would be reimbursed any expenses 
incurred related to BB&T’s failure to obtain the [government-
backed loan].” Plaintiff also alleges and provides evidence 
that, by the end of the Barker litigation and after the statute 
of limitations had run, BB&T failed to follow through on these 
assurances. Though BB&T later stated that it was “willing to 
work with [Plaintiff]” despite the fact that Plaintiff’s claims 
were “clearly time-barred” and offered to apply the net proceeds 
-18- 
 
 
from the sale of the Cheraw Road building to the debt already 
owed by Plaintiff, this offer does not comport with the 
“assurances” Plaintiff alleges he received. 
In addition, we note that the alleged assurances and 
subsequent inconsistent position taken in this case are, 
together, 
significantly 
more 
substantial 
than 
those 
in 
Stainback. As noted above, our Supreme Court made clear that 
equitable estoppel operated to bar application of the statute of 
limitations in that case when the defendant merely stated that 
he would “keep Duke informed of the situation” in his pending 
lawsuit and was aware of Duke’s continuing interest in receiving 
payment for its medical services. Stainback, 320 N.C. at 339–40, 
357 S.E.2d at 691-92. Despite the fact that the defendant made 
no direct promise regarding what would occur after his lawsuit 
with the insurance carrier ended, the Supreme Court sustained 
the trial court’s finding that “[the] representations and 
conduct of [the defendant]” justifiably induced Duke to refrain 
from bringing suit and, thus, held that there was sufficient 
evidence to estop him from pleading the statute of limitations 
as a defense. See id. at 340–41, 357 S.E.2d at 692–93. Based on 
Stainback, we conclude that the forecast of evidence in this 
case, considering the evidence in a light most favorable to 
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Plaintiff, as we must, Best v. Duke Univ., 337 N.C. 742, 749, 
448 S.E.2d 506, 510 (1994) (“The trial court must examine the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that 
may be drawn therefrom.”), is sufficient to raise an inference 
that BB&T’s actions, when taken together, lulled Plaintiff into 
a false sense of security, induced him to refrain from filing 
suit within the required limitations periods, and, as such, 
constituted 
conduct 
reasonably 
calculated 
to 
convey 
the 
impression that the facts were otherwise than, and inconsistent 
with, what BB&T later attempted to assert.  
Second, BB&T argues that it did not take a subsequent 
inconsistent position because it “never disavowed [its alleged 
assurance that ‘everything would be worked out’] or commenced 
action against Plaintiffs to collect on the $425,000 note until 
it had no choice but to do so as a compulsory counterclaim.” We 
are unpersuaded.  
Defendant’s 
failure 
to 
either 
disavow 
its 
alleged 
assurances or seek payment of the note owed by Plaintiff, while 
perhaps admirable, does not speak to the question of whether it 
took a subsequent inconsistent position. A party takes a 
subsequent inconsistent position when it fails to act in 
-20- 
 
 
conformity with its prior assurances — not when it merely fails 
to deny that those assurances were made. See, e.g., Stainback, 
320 N.C. at 338–42, 357 S.E.2d at 691–93 (holding that equitable 
estoppel barred operation of the statute of limitations when the 
defendant’s actions lulled the plaintiff into a false sense of 
security — despite the defendant’s failure to later disavow 
those assurances); Meacham v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 59 
N.C. App. 381, 386, 297 S.E.2d 192, 196 (1982) (“It is 
undisputed that both [the] plaintiff and [the] defendant acted 
in good faith, yet this fact alone does not bar [the] 
plaintiff’s claim that [the] defendant be estopped. It is 
sufficient 
that 
[the] 
defendant’s 
subsequent 
inconsistent 
position operated to injure the plaintiff.”).  
Third, BB&T argues that Plaintiff failed to exercise 
reasonable diligence and care to protect his legal rights and, 
thus, is barred from circumventing the statute of limitations on 
a theory of equitable estoppel, citing the maxim that “he who 
claims the benefit of an equitable estoppel on the ground that 
he has been misled by the representations of another must not 
have been misled through his own want of reasonable care and 
circumspection.” Hawkins, 238 N.C. at 179, 77 S.E.2d at 673. In 
support of this argument, Defendant notes that Plaintiff 
-21- 
 
 
commenced this action (1) more than six years after learning 
that he did not qualify for the government-backed loan, (2) more 
than five years after he learned that Barker had brought suit 
against BB&T, (3) more than two years after the Barker action 
was settled, (4) two years after he first consulted legal 
counsel, and (5) more than a year after he demanded cancellation 
of the note. Accordingly, Defendant alleges, Plaintiff refrained 
from bringing suit despite having the advantage of trial counsel 
and despite his status as “an intelligent businessman and real 
estate developer who served on the board of a bank.” We are, 
again, unpersuaded.  
It appears from the record that Plaintiff first consulted 
legal counsel after the statute of limitations had already run 
on his claims. Thus, the fact that he later had access to a 
lawyer does not address his awareness of the legal implications 
of his failure to bring suit during that crucial time before the 
various statutes had run. Further, while it is true that 
Plaintiff is a competent and capable businessman, this does not 
preclude the operation of equitable estoppel.  
As noted in Plaintiff’s brief, equitable estoppel was 
employed by our Supreme Court in Stainback to allow plaintiff’s 
suit to proceed to trial despite the fact that the statute of 
-22- 
 
 
limitations had run. Stainback, 320 N.C. at 341, 357 S.E.2d at 
693. The plaintiff in that case was Duke Hospital, one of the 
most highly rated hospitals at one of the most highly regarded 
universities in the nation, which has a plethora of attorneys on 
hand to respond to its legal disputes. See id. Here, while 
assuredly a competent businessman, Plaintiff had significantly 
fewer resources at his command than Duke Hospital. See also 
Cleveland Constr., Inc., 210 N.C. App. at 524, 709 S.E.2d at 516 
(where the plaintiff was a subcontractor).  
While equitable estoppel does not protect an individual who 
simply sleeps on her or his rights, the doctrine can be and has 
been employed to protect parties of all levels of sophistication 
when those parties have relied on a false representation of 
material fact to their detriment and lack knowledge or the means 
of attaining knowledge of the real facts in question. Parker, 
100 N.C. App. at 370, 396 S.E.2d at 628–29. Importantly, when 
the real fact in question depends on the other party’s 
willingness to cooperate at a later point, as it does here and 
as it did in Stainback, the party asserting equitable estoppel 
cannot have the means to know that fact at the time of the 
assurance. In such a circumstance, we look to whether the other 
party took a subsequent inconsistent position. When that has 
-23- 
 
 
occurred, as Plaintiff properly alleges that it did here, then 
equitable estoppel is applicable.  
Lastly, Defendant asserts that Miller is not applicable in 
this case because, unlike the plaintiffs in Miller, who were 
individual landowners not represented by legal counsel, the 
plaintiff in this case is “an admittedly sophisticated real 
estate developer” and “the ‘balances of equity’ do not similarly 
favor [him].” For the reasons discussed above, we disagree. See, 
e.g., 
Stainback, 
320 
N.C. 
at 
341, 
357 
S.E.2d 
at 
693. 
Accordingly, we hold that the events alleged by Plaintiff raise 
a permissible inference that the elements of equitable estoppel 
are present, and we reverse the trial court’s grant of 
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment so that the jury may 
address this question at trial. 
III. Attorneys’ Fees 
Next, Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in 
granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on BB&T’s 
counterclaim for payment on the $425,000 loan, arguing that 
there is an issue of fact concerning the enforceability of the 
promissory note, the interest accrued on that note, and the 
right to recover attorneys’ fees. 
-24- 
 
 
Because we have determined that Plaintiff’s claims are 
sufficient to allow the jury to determine whether equitable 
estoppel barred operation of the statute of limitations, we hold 
that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to the 
enforceability of the promissory note, the amount of interest 
accrued on the promissory note, and Defendant’s right to recover 
attorneys’ fees was in error. Therefore, we reverse the trial 
court’s grant of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on that 
issue and remand for further proceedings at trial.  
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
Judge STROUD concurs. 
Judge DILLON concurs in part and dissents in part by 
separate opinion. 
NO. COA12-940 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 21 MAY 2013 
 
 
WILLIAM T. USSERY and wife, 
CAROLYN B. USSERY 
 
Plaintiff 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Richmond County 
No. 08 CVS 887 
BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY, 
Defendant 
 
 
 
 
 
DILLON, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
I concur with the majority in its result that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact on Defendant’s counterclaim as to 
the amount of accrued interest due under the promissory note.  
However, because I believe that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact as to Plaintiff’s claims3 or to the remainder of 
Defendant’s counterclaims, I respectfully dissent.   
I:  Statutes of Limitation 
 
I agree with the majority’s holding that “[b]ecause 
Plaintiff did not institute proceedings based on his alleged 
causes of action within the time allotted, they are time-
barred.”   
                     
3 As pointed out by the majority, though there are two 
plaintiffs, the record consistently refers to Mr. Ussery as 
“Plaintiff,” as he was the primary, if not sole, actor. 
-2- 
 
 
II: Equitable Estoppel 
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that Defendant made 
certain “assurances” inducing Plaintiff not to file this action 
before the statute of limitations had run.  The majority holds 
these alleged “assurances” are sufficient to create a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Defendant is equitably 
estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as an 
affirmative 
defense. 
 
The 
majority 
has 
grouped 
these 
“assurances” allegedly made by Defendant into three categories: 
1. Defendant 
assured 
Plaintiff 
that 
“everything would be worked out in the 
Barker litigation”;  
 
2. Defendant requested Plaintiff “hold off on 
instituting 
an 
action 
[] 
to 
allow 
resolution of the Barker matter”; and  
 
3. Defendant assured Plaintiff that “the Note 
would be canceled upon resolution of the 
Barker [suit][,] . . . the loan would be 
forgiven[,] 
and 
[Plaintiff] 
would 
be 
reimbursed any expenses incurred related 
to [Defendant’s] failure to obtain the 
[government loan].”   
 
I have thoroughly examined the record on appeal, and I do not 
believe the evidence before the trial shows that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact as to Plaintiff’s claim. 
Regarding the first two “assurances” cited above, there is 
nothing in them from which a jury could infer that Defendant 
-3- 
 
 
promised to settle the claim in any particular way.  The 
statements are nothing more than mere “promises” that Defendant 
would work to resolve Plaintiff’s claims in the future.  We have 
consistently held that a mere promise to negotiate a resolution 
in the future, as opposed to an assurance that a claim would be 
resolved in a definitive way, is not the type of promise which 
would equitably estop a defendant from asserting a statute of 
limitations defense.  See Duke v. St. Paul, 95 N.C. App. 663, 
384 S.E.2d 36 (1989); Teague v. Randolph, 129 N.C. App. 766, 501 
S.E.2d 382 (1998); Blizzard v. Smith, 77 N.C. App. 594, 335 
S.E.2d 762 (1985), cert. denied, 315 N.C. 389, 339 S.E.2d 410 
(1986).   
In Duke v. St. Paul, we stated that “[m]ere negotiation 
with a possible settlement unsuccessfully accomplished is not 
that type of conduct designed to lull the claimant into a false 
sense of security so as to constitute an estoppel by conduct 
thus precluding an assertion of . . . [limitations] by the 
insured.”  Id. at 673, 384 S.E.2d at 42. 
In Blizzard, we held that the plaintiff “fail[ed] to show 
the essential elements of equitable estoppel” based on the 
following communication from defendant’s counsel to plaintiff’s 
counsel:  “Please do not institute any lawsuit until we have had 
-4- 
 
 
a chance to perhaps work this matter out.”  Id. at 595-596, 335 
S.E.2d at 763. 
In Teague, we held that the elements of equitable estoppel 
were not present based on the following facts:  A representative 
for the defendant’s liability insurer “indicated to plaintiffs’ 
counsel his willingness to discuss settlement or, failing that, 
arbitration as a possible means of resolving the matter[.]”  Id. 
at 772, 501 S.E.2d at 376.  Additionally, the representative 
“proposed a time and date to meet with [the plaintiffs’] counsel 
[to] 
discuss 
settlement” 
but 
later 
“cancelled 
further 
negotiations . . . citing his belief that [the plaintiffs’] 
claim was time barred.”  Id. at 772, 501 S.E.2d at 386-387. 
The majority relies on Duke Univ. v. Stainback, 320 N.C. 
337, 357 S.E.2d 690 (1987), Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. Ellis-Don 
Constr., 210 N.C. App. 522, 709 S.E.2d 512 (2011), and Miller v. 
Talton, 112 N.C. App. 484, 435 S.E.2d 793 (1993), to support its 
holding that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
plaintiff’s equitable estoppel claim in this case.  I believe 
each of the foregoing cases are readily distinguishable from 
this case because each involves statements or conduct which led 
a plaintiff to believe that the defendant would resolve a claim 
in 
a 
definitive 
way. 
 
In 
Stainback 
and 
in 
Cleveland 
-5- 
 
 
Construction, the defendant’s conduct led the plaintiff to 
believe that the defendant would pay the plaintiff’s claim if 
and when the defendant received a recovery from a certain third 
party.  However, in both cases, the defendant subsequently 
received money from the third party, but refused to pay the 
plaintiff.  In Miller, the defendant promised his neighbor to 
fix a water-flow problem which had damaged his neighbor’s land, 
again an “assurance” to resolve a dispute in a particular way.  
Relying on this promise, the neighbor held off on filing an 
action.  However, after the statute of limitations had run, the 
defendant refused to fix the problem. 
The third “assurance” cited by the majority is an oral 
statement allegedly made by an officer of the Defendant that 
Defendant would cancel the promissory note and reimburse 
Plaintiff his expenses he had incurred.  However, I believe this 
alleged oral assurance by Defendant’s officer is inadmissible 
and incompetent under the parole evidence rule, and therefore 
cannot be relied upon to create a material factual issue to 
withstand a summary judgment motion.  Here, after Defendant’s 
alleged assured Plaintiff that the note would be forgiven, the 
record shows that on six occasions over a 44-month period, from 
April 2003 to November 2006, Plaintiff executed separate “Note 
-6- 
 
 
Modification Agreement[s].”  In each of these six written 
agreements, Plaintiff acknowledged owing the debt and promised 
to repay the debt.   
The applicability of the parole evidence rule in the 
context of a promissory note has been dealt with extensively by 
our Supreme Court, most notably in the case Borden v. Brower, 
284 N.C. 54, 199 S.E.2d 414 (1973).  After stating the basic 
principles of the parole evidence rule generally, the Court in 
Borden stated the following: 
Promissory notes are not generally subject 
to the parole evidence rule to the same 
extent as other contracts . . . .  [I]t is 
rather common for a promissory note to be 
intended as only a partial integration of 
the agreement in pursuance of which it was 
given, and parole evidence as between the 
original parties may well be admissible so 
far as it is not inconsistent with the 
express terms of the note. 
  
Id. at 61, 199 S.E.2d at 419-20 (1973) (emphasis added); see 
also Bank v. Gillespie, 291 N.C. 303, 308, 230 S.E.2d 375, 378-
79 (1976).  
 
The Borden Court provided situations where parole evidence 
may be admissible to show an agreement at variance to the terms 
of the written promissory note: 
“[T]his Court has permitted variance of 
[the] expressed terms [of a promissory note] 
by showing that it was to be enforced only 
-7- 
 
 
on the happening of certain conditions, or 
only to the extent necessary to accomplish a 
certain purpose, or that it was payable only 
out of a certain fund, or that it was given 
as evidence of an advancement, or that it 
might be discharged by a method of payment 
or performance different from that stated in 
the writing.” 
 
Id. at 63, 199 S.E.2d at 421.  The Court cited eleven “[o]ther 
promissory note cases involving the North Carolina method of 
payment and discharge exception to the parole evidence rule” as 
follows: 
“Carroll v. Brown, 228 N.C. 636, 46 S.E.2d 
715 (1948) (note to be paid out of profits 
of a partnership in which maker and payee 
were engaged); Ripple v. Stevenson, 223 N.C. 
284, 25 S.E.2d 836 (1943) (note to be paid 
out of rents and profits from an office 
building); Insurance Co. v. Guin, 215 N.C. 
92, 1 S.E.2d 123 (1939) (note to be paid out 
of commissions); Bank v. Rosenstein, 207 
N.C. 529, 177 S.E. 643 (1935) (co-maker’s 
liability on a note limited to the value of 
land covered by a deed of trust); Galloway 
v. Thrash, 207 N.C. 165, 176 S.E. 303 (1934) 
(note to be paid by crediting it against 
payee’s 
anticipated 
share 
of 
maker’s 
estate); Trust Co. v. Wilder, 206 N.C. 124, 
172 S.E. 884 (1934) (note to be paid out of 
proceeds of land when land was sold); . . .; 
Kerchner v. McRae, 80 N.C. 219 (1877) (bond 
to be credited with the proceeds from sale 
of cotton).” 
 
Id. at 62-63, 199 S.E.2d at 420.  In Borden and in the eleven 
cases cited in that decision, a debtor was allowed to introduce 
parole evidence to show an oral agreement regarding the means by 
-8- 
 
 
which the obligation recited in the written note would be 
satisfied, because the parole evidence did not  contradict the 
terms of the note.  However, there is no exception to the parole 
evidence rule regarding evidence that a borrower simply and 
inexplicably does not owe the money he was loaned. 
 
To the contrary, the Supreme Court’s explained Borden in 
its prior ruling in Vending Co. v. Turner, 267 N.C. 576, 148 
S.E.2d 531 (1966).  In Vending Co., our Supreme Court stated 
that “[t]he promise set forth in [a promissory] note could not 
be contradicted or destroyed by parole testimony that the makers 
thereof would not be called upon to pay in accordance with the 
terms of the note.”  Id. at 582, 148 S.E.2d at 536.  In 
explaining Vending Co., the Borden Court stated: 
“Although 
that 
opinion 
does 
contain 
a 
general statement to the effect that a 
promise set forth in the note could not be 
contradicted 
or 
destroyed 
by 
parol 
testimony, the opinion actually affirmed a 
judgment that embodies the mode of payment 
or method of discharge exception to the 
parol evidence rule.” 
 
Borden, 284 N.C. at 65, 148 S.E.2d at 422 (emphasis added).  
   
I believe Borden and the eleven cases cited therein are 
distinguishable from the case sub judice.  In this case, the 
alleged oral “assurance” made prior to the written modification 
agreements was that Defendant was simply forgiving the $425,000 
-9- 
 
 
note 
and 
all 
interest 
expense 
payable 
thereunder. 
 
The 
“assurance” was not an oral agreement describing the means by 
which the payment of the note would be paid or the method by 
which Plaintiff’s obligation would be discharged or otherwise 
which would fall under any of the other exceptions recited in 
Borden where parole evidence would be allowed.  Rather, the 
alleged oral “assurance” that the promissory note would not have 
to 
be 
paid 
back 
under 
any 
circumstance 
is 
in 
direct 
contradiction to the terms of the six written agreements 
executed by Plaintiff.  Therefore, I believe the alleged 
statement by Plaintiff that Defendant would simply forgive the 
$425,000 note and all of Plaintiff’s expenses is incompetent, as 
it violates the parole evidence rule, and therefore, must not be 
considered in the determination of whether there is a genuine 
issue of material fact with regard to Plaintiff’s claims.4 
                     
4 In Bank v. Gillespie, in which the Supreme Court quotes the 
Borden decision extensively, the Court considered “the course of 
dealings” between the parties to determine whether parole 
evidence would be admissible.  Id. at 310, 230 S.E.2d at 379-
380.  In the case sub judice, Plaintiff’s course of dealing with 
regard to the note is in direct contradiction to the alleged 
“assurance” that he would not be held liable for the principle 
or interest expense under the note.  Specifically, in addition 
to executing six note modifications where he acknowledged the 
debt and agreed to pay it back, an attachment to Plaintiff’s own 
affidavit shows that Plaintiff continued to pay interest 
expenses on the promissory note on a number of occasions, with 
 
-10- 
 
 
Even if this alleged “assurance” is not barred by the 
parole evidence rule, I do not believe the assurance is 
otherwise sufficient to create a jury question regarding 
equitable estoppel.  Plaintiff admits in his brief and in his 
affidavit that was offered at the summary judgment hearing that 
the 
alleged 
assurance 
was 
merely 
part 
of 
an 
unresolved 
settlement negotiation.  Specifically, on page 8 of his brief, 
Plaintiff recites the following as his version of the facts:  
“[Defendant] continued to assure [Plaintiff] 
after the Barker settlement was entered that 
their $425,000.00 Note, and their expenses 
related to [Defendant’s] failure to procure 
financing for Barker and Chair Specialties, 
would be worked out . . . .  Although 
[Defendant] failed to propose a specific 
plan 
and 
improperly 
refused 
to 
provide 
Plaintiff information regarding [Defendant’s 
settlement with Mr. Barker, Defendant’s] 
issuance 
of 
several 
Note 
Modification 
Agreements 
from 
2003 
through 
2006, 
as 
additional consideration for refraining from 
filing suit, and its agreement on 5 July 
2006 to discuss resolution as previously 
pledged, 
reassured 
Plaintiffs 
that 
[Defendant] would honor its promise. 
 
(emphasis 
added.) 
Also, 
Plaintiff, 
in 
his 
affidavit, 
characterizes the assurance in the following way: 
I have previously set forth in Plaintiff’s 
responses to Defendant’s written discovery, 
                     
the last interest payment in the amount of $11,064.76 being made 
in April 2006.    
-11- 
 
 
my 
conversations 
with 
Charles 
Smith, 
authorized representative of BB&T, at the 
time of the litigation was filed by Wayne 
Baker against BB&T . . . and the fact that 
Charles Smith had advised me that the issues 
involving the expenses and debt involving 
Chair Specialties, including the $425,000.00 
Note, would be resolved. 
 
(emphasis added.)  Since Plaintiff admitted at the summary 
judgment hearing and in his brief that he interpreted the 
alleged assurance as part of a settlement that had not yet been 
resolved, this assurance is essentially the same as the first 
two 
assurances, 
namely 
a 
promise 
to 
reach 
a 
definitive 
resolution in the future; and, likewise, cannot be relied upon 
by Plaintiff to establish a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding equitable estoppel.5 
  See St. Paul, 95 N.C. App. 663, 
384 S.E.2d 36; Randolph, 129 N.C. App. 766, 501 S.E.2d 382; 
Smith, 77 N.C. App. 594, 335 S.E.2d 762.   
                     
5 Additionally, Plaintiff failed to show why it would have been  
“reasonable” for him to rely on any statement by Defendant that 
(1) his claims against Defendant regarding the promissory note 
would somehow be resolved or worked out in an unspecified way 
without his input or participation and in the course of the 
legal proceeding with Mr. Barker, who was not a party to the 
note; or (2) that Defendant would unilaterally forgive the 
entire $425,000.00 debt and repay Plaintiff’s incurred expenses 
where Defendant otherwise required Plaintiff to continue paying 
interest, which Defendant, in fact, continued to pay.  Adkins v. 
Adkins, 82 N.C. App. 289, 291, 346 S.E.2d 220, 221 (1986) 
(stating that “[a]n essential element of [equitable estoppel] is 
reasonable reliance”).  
-12- 
 
 
III: Defendant’s Counterclaims 
I believe that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law on its counterclaims to recover the outstanding 
principal due on the note of $425,000.00; pre-judgment interest 
from December 13, 2011 in the amount of $97.40 per day; and 
attorneys’ fees in the amount of $63,750.00.  However, I believe 
the evidence in the record creates a genuine issue of material 
fact as to the amount of interest owed on the promissory note.  
There is evidence in the record that Plaintiff would not be 
responsible for interest payments for at least some period 
following his last interest payment made in April 2006.  This 
evidence includes a printout generated by Defendant that 
$38,164.14 in interest was waived in 2007.  Therefore, I would 
reverse the portion of the summary judgment order which awards 
the interest due on the promissory note and remand this cause 
for a jury trial on this issue only. 
IV: Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, I would vote to affirm the 
trial court’s summary judgment order to the extent that it 
grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s 
claims and to the extent that it grants summary judgment to 
Defendant on its counterclaims for the principal due on the 
-13- 
 
 
promissory note, prejudgment interest, and attorneys’ fees.  I 
would vote to reverse and remand for a trial on the issue of 
damages with respect to the amount of interest due on the 
promissory note.