Title: New Jersey v. Chavies
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2021

New Jersey v. Chavies Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In connection with a 2014 shooting, defendant David Chavies was charged with murder, aggravated assault, and weapons offenses. In June 2016, defendant pled guilty to second-degree aggravated assault based on accomplice liability. His prison intake form indicated that his health was poor and that he suffered from asthma, sickle cell anemia, and a heart murmur. Defendant was sentenced to a ten-year term of imprisonment with an 85% period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act (NERA). In May 2020, defendant filed a Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion for release from custody and, in the alternative, sought a judicial furlough until the COVID-19 pandemic subsided. Defendant provided voluminous medical documents in support of his motion showing he had been undergoing treatment for his ailments. The court determined that defendant was barred from relief under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) because he had not yet served 85% of his sentence, the period of parole ineligibility, as mandated by NERA. Finding no reversible error, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. David Chavies (A-25-20) (084999)Argued February 2, 2021 -- Decided July 12, 2021FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for the Court. In this case, the Court considers whether an inmate may be released from prison under Rule 3:21-10(b) while still in the process of serving a period of parole ineligibility imposed in accordance with the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. In connection with a 2014 shooting, defendant David Chavies was charged with murder, aggravated assault, and weapons offenses. In June 2016, defendant pled guilty to second-degree aggravated assault based on accomplice liability. His prison intake form indicated that his health was poor and that he suffered from asthma, sickle cell anemia, and a heart murmur. Defendant was sentenced to a ten-year term of imprisonment with an 85% period of parole ineligibility under NERA. In May 2020, defendant filed a Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion for release from custody and, in the alternative, sought a judicial furlough until the COVID-19 pandemic subsided. Defendant provided voluminous medical documents in support of his motion showing he had been undergoing treatment for sickle cell anemia, asthma, latent tuberculosis, hypothyroidism, and a heart murmur. The court determined that defendant was barred from relief under Rule 3:21- 10(b)(2) because he had not yet served 85% of his sentence, the period of parole ineligibility, as mandated by NERA. The court also assessed the various factors for considering Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motions set forth in State v. Priester, 99 N.J. 123 (1985), and found that defendant was not entitled to relief. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the Court granted certification. 244 N.J. 403 (2020).HELD: NERA mandates that a defendant serve 85% of the sentence “actually imposed” for certain crimes before becoming eligible for parole. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(b). Allowing defendants to proceed with a Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion prior to serving that 85% would circumvent the Legislature’s objectives and its approach to violent crimes. Moreover, the timing of defendant’s motion aside, he failed to meet his burden under Priester since he cannot prove the necessary devastating effect that incarceration had on his health, in addition to various other Priester factors. 1 1. Under NERA, “[a] court imposing a sentence of incarceration for a crime of the first or second degree enumerated in subsection (d) . . . shall fix a minimum term of 85% of the sentence imposed, during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole.” N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a). Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault is covered under subsection (d). Subsection (b) mandates further that the period of parole ineligibility “shall be calculated based upon the sentence of incarceration actually imposed.” N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(b). In State v. Mendel, the Appellate Division found that “a sentence cannot be changed or reduced under [Rule] 3:21-10(b) below the parole ineligibility term required by statute.” 212 N.J. Super. 110, 112-13 (App. Div. 1986). In the court’s view, the Rule “was never intended to permit the change or reduction of a custodial sentence which is required by law.” Ibid. And in State v. Brown, the Appellate Division held that a discretionary minimum period of incarceration could be modified but that courts are without jurisdiction to consider Rule 3:21-10(b) motions until any mandatory parole ineligibility period has been served. 384 N.J. Super. 191, 194, 196 (App. Div. 2006). (pp. 15-18)2. When sentencing a defendant pursuant to NERA, the court has discretion in setting the term that is used to calculate the period of parole ineligibility but has no discretion in determining the period of parole ineligibility. NERA represents a clear mandate by the Legislature that those who commit the most violent of crimes must serve 85% of the sentence imposed -- their period of parole ineligibility -- before they are eligible for release under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2). To permit defendant’s release under Rule 3:21- 10(b)(2) would effectively reduce his NERA sentence, which the Legislature and the plain language of NERA expressly forbid. Further, allowing the sentencing court to resentence an individual to reduce the original sentence for the purpose of reducing the NERA period of parole ineligibility would thwart the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, as well as the expressed intent of the Legislature. The recently enacted Compassionate Release Statute, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e, provides that notice must be given to victims or the victims’ families as to a petition for compassionate release so that they may present a statement at a hearing or testify in court. Given the clear legislative intent that an inmate not be afforded compassionate release without such safeguards, the Court declines to permit defendant to seek release under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) prior to the completion of his parole ineligibility period, as required by NERA. (pp. 18-21)3. The Court finds that defendant’s application cannot be considered before he has satisfied his mandatory minimum period of incarceration but provides guidance as to the Priester factors. “The predicate for relief under [Rule 3:21-10(b)(2)] is proof of the serious nature of the defendant’s illness and the deleterious effect of incarceration on the prisoner’s health.” Priester, 99 N.J. at 135. As to whether prison is harmful to a defendant’s health, courts should consider “the availability of medical services in prison.” Ibid. Moreover, a defendant must demonstrate “changed circumstances in his [or her] health . . . since the time of the original sentence.” Id. at 136. In considering a Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion, courts should also consider “the nature and severity of the crime, 2 the severity of the sentence, the criminal record of the defendant, the risk to the public if the defendant is released, and the defendant’s role in bringing about his current state of health.” Id. at 137. (pp. 21-22)4. Here, the motion court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s release under Priester. As evidenced by defendant’s over 1,000 pages of supporting medical documentation, there is no indication that defendant’s prison would be unable to treat him should he contract COVID-19. Additionally, nothing in the record establishes that defendant’s health has drastically changed as a result of his incarceration. And the motion court did not abuse its discretion in its analysis of the final Priester prong -- the weighing of various other factors such as the severity of the crime and sentence, defendant’s criminal record, the risk to the public should he be released, and his role in bringing about his current state of health. See id. at 137. While defendant’s medical conditions are beyond his control, the offense to which he pled guilty was serious and his escalating criminal record is also cause for concern. In sum, the motion court properly balanced all of the Priester factors before denying defendant’s Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion. (pp. 22-24) AFFIRMED. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, dissenting, would reverse and remand the disposition of defendant’s application and issue an interim order immediately revising the language of Rule 3:21-10(b)(2). The dissent views the majority’s approach as ceding part of a court’s authority to adjust a base term of a defendant’s sentence whenever a NERA sentence is implicated. The dissent observes that the Court has the constitutional authority, through its rulemaking powers, to amend Rule 3:21-10 -- a product of the Court’s own creation -- and stresses that such an amendment would be consistent with the innate power of a court to resentence at any time. So long as a resentenced defendant is not released during the NERA parole ineligibility period of 85% of a resentenced base term, the dissent states, a defendant should be able to utilize an application under subsection (b)(2) to seek release for medical reasons controlled through the Priester analysis. In the dissent’s view, NERA does not preclude a resentencing; it only precludes a release before 85% of the refixed base term is served in prison. The dissent would immediately amend Rule 3:21-10 so it can be of meaningful use during a pandemic that is still sickening and killing people in this state and nation, as well as for use by future inmates who are seriously ill or infirm.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA filed a dissent, in which JUSTICES ALBIN and PIERRE-LOUIS join. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 25 September Term 2020 084999 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. David Chavies, a/k/a David Q. Chavies, and, Dave Chavies, Defendant-Appellant. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division . Argued Decided February 2, 2021 July12, 2021John P. Flynn, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; John P. Flynn, of counsel and on the briefs).Joseph Paravecchia, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney; Randolph E. Mershon, III, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs, and Laura Sunyak, Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs).Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, 1 attorneys; Alexander Shalom and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief). Matthew F. Bruno argued the cause for amici curiae Medical and Public Health Experts (Greenberg Traurig, attorneys; Matthew F. Bruno, of counsel and on the brief). Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney General/ Acting Essex County Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for amicus curiae County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey (Esther Suarez, President, County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey, attorney; Frank J. Ducoat, of counsel and on the brief). Carol M. Henderson, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Carol M. Henderson, of counsel and on the brief). JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, the Court determines whether an inmate may be releasedfrom prison under Rule 3:21-10(b) when that inmate is still in the process ofserving a period of parole ineligibility imposed in accordance with the NoEarly Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. According to Rule 3:21-10(b)(2), “[a] motion may be filed and an ordermay be entered at any time . . . amending a custodial sentence to permit therelease of a defendant because of illness or infirmity of the defendant.” Here,defendant David Chavies argues that because he has been diagnosed with 2 asthma, latent tuberculosis, and sickle cell anemia, and is at a higher risk forserious illness or death should he contract COVID-19 in prison, he should bereleased. The issue is whether defendant’s application for release under theRule should have been granted, despite the fact that he had not yet served 85%of his sentence imposed at the time of his application, as required by NERA. The Appellate Division held that relief under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) isavailable only to inmates who had first served their mandatory paroleineligibility term and that the trial judge “correctly determined defendant didnot meet his burden under [State v. Priester, 99 N.J. 123 (1985)] or [State v.Boone, 262 N.J. Super. 220 (Law Div. 1992)] to warrant the relief herequested.” We agree. NERA mandates that a defendant serve 85% of the sentence“actually imposed” for certain crimes before becoming eligible for parole. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(b). Allowing defendants to proceed with a Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion prior to serving that 85% would circumvent the Legislature ’sobjectives and its approach to violent crimes. Moreover, the timing ofdefendant’s motion aside, he failed to meet his burden under Priester since hecannot prove the necessary devastating effect that incarceration had on hishealth, in addition to various other Priester factors. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division. 3 I. A. We begin by summarizing the pertinent facts and procedural history. OnOctober 20, 2014, Trenton police responded to a report of gun shots at a deli.Upon their arrival, the officers discovered two gunshot victims, both claimingto be innocent bystanders. Both individuals were transported to a nearbyhospital where they were treated for non-life-threatening injuries. One victim told detectives that he noticed three or four men, allwearing ski masks, walk toward the deli prior to the shooting. The men thenopened fire on him as he ran toward the back of the store. At the time of theshooting, there were three other customers inside the deli as well as threeemployees. Surveillance footage captured the suspected vehicle -- a goldChevrolet Trailblazer -- and revealed three individuals wearing black clothingwalking toward the vehicle following the shooting. Defendant was identifiedas one of the individuals walking back to the car and arrested the same day asthe shooting. Defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree murder, contraryto N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3; six counts of second-degree aggravated assault, contraryto N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); second-degree possession of a weapon for anunlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); and second-degree 4 unlawful possession of a weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). On June 2,2016, defendant pled guilty to a final amended charge of second -degreeaggravated assault based on accomplice liability, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12- -1(b)(1) and 2C:2-6(a). Defendant’s prison intake form, dated August 2, 2016, indicated that hishealth was poor and that he suffered from asthma, sickle cell anemia, and aheart murmur. Three days later, on August 5, 2016, defendant was sentenced to a ten-year term of imprisonment with an 85% period of parole ineligibility underNERA. Additionally, the court imposed a three-year period of parolesupervision following defendant’s release. In sentencing defendant, the courtfound applicable aggravating factors three, the risk that defendant willreoffend; six, the extent of defendant’s criminal record and the seriousness ofhis current offense; and nine, the need to deter future offenses. See N.J.S.A.2C:44-1(a)(3), (6), (9). The court found no mitigating factors. The court alsofound that defendant had accumulated 655 days in time credits since beingtaken into custody on October 20, 2014. B. In May 2020, defendant filed a Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion for releasefrom custody and, in the alternative, sought a judicial furlough under Boone, 5 262 N.J. Super. 220, until the COVID-19 pandemic subsided. Defendantprovided voluminous medical documents in support of his motion showing hehad been undergoing treatment at Garden State Youth Correctional Facility forsickle cell anemia, asthma, latent tuberculosis, hypothyroidism, and a heartmurmur. In denying the motion and furlough request, the court first denieddefendant’s request for a hearing, given the quality of the written submissionsand the over 1,000 pages of medical records submitted. Citing State v.Mendel, 212 N.J. Super. 110, 113 (App. Div. 1986), the court next determinedthat defendant was barred from relief under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) because he hadnot yet served 85% of his sentence, the period of parole ineligibility, asmandated by NERA. Although the court determined that by virtue of NERA, defendant couldnot be released from prison without serving 85% of his custodial term, it stillassessed the various factors for considering Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motions as setforth in Priester, 99 N.J. 123. First, the court found that defendant’sconditions were serious and could potentially place him at a higher risk forserious illness or death should he contract COVID-19 in prison. The Courtalso acknowledged, citing In re Request to Modify Prison Sentences, 242 N.J. 6 357, 379 (2020), that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a change incircumstances under Priester. Ultimately, however, the court determined that while defendant’s “healthmay have deteriorated, he [did] not show[] that incarceration [was] the cause.”The court understood defendant’s motion as being based on the future fear ofcontracting COVID-19 while incarcerated. Additionally, the court noted therewas no lifesaving drug that was available to the public yet unavailable todefendant and that defendant’s argument that the public had greater access topreventative care and treatment for COVID-19 could not support his release.The court also noted the violent nature of defendant’s offenses, the stance theLegislature took against such offenses in enacting NERA, and the “disturbingescalation” of defendant’s criminal history -- from drug possession topossession of a machine gun to the current offense -- all of which the courtfound to weigh against defendant’s release. The court concluded thatdefendant was a danger to the public under the Priester analysis and was thusnot entitled to relief under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2). As for defendant’s alternative request for a judicial furlough, which isnot the subject of defendant’s current appeal, the court emphasized thatdefendant did not presently face near-certain death or even require additionalmedical treatment, contrary to the facts in Boone. 7 The Appellate Division affirmed for substantially the same reasons citedby the motion court. The panel noted that relief under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) wasnot available “until a mandatory period of parole ineligibility has beenserved.” According to the Appellate Division, although Mendel involved aRule 3:21-10(b)(1) motion and a defendant who had sought to change hissentence to facilitate drug treatment, it also provided support for the motioncourt’s conclusion that Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) could not be used to reducedefendant’s term below the mandatory parole ineligibility period. Moreover, the panel found that defendant failed to meet his burden forrelief under both Priester and Boone and that the motion court appropriatelyexercised its discretion in denying defendant’s motion and furlough request.Last, the Appellate Division rejected defendant’s request for a remand toconduct a hearing on his Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion, finding that the motioncourt’s decision to rely on the parties’ submissions was “overwhelminglysupported by the record.” We granted defendant’s petition for certification. 244 N.J. 403 (2020).We also granted leave to participate as amici curiae to the American CivilLiberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU), a collectively represented group ofmedical and public health experts, the Attorney General, and the CountyProsecutors Association of New Jersey. 8 II. A. Defendant first argues that he satisfies the medical predicates requiredfor relief under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2): a serious illness and prison’s deleteriouseffects on his health, along with a change in circumstances since the time ofsentencing. According to defendant, it is “the existence of [a] serious threat todefendant’s physical condition, rather than the prison system’s ability toprovide beneficial and desirable medical services, . . . that is determinative of aRule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion.” Further, defendant contends that the motion courtmisconstrued this Court’s reference, in Request to Modify, to generalized fearsof contracting the virus being insufficient to warrant relie f as, instead,requiring that a defendant actually contract the virus. Defendant maintainsthat “[w]hile an otherwise healthy inmate might only have a 'generalized fear’of contracting COVID-19, a medically vulnerable individual with underlyingconditions can establish increased health risks posed by incarceration duringthis pandemic.” In response to amici the Attorney General and the County ProsecutorsAssociation, defendant urges this Court to find that a defendant may satisfy themedical predicates for relief under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) by showing (1) that his 9 underlying medical conditions exacerbate the risks of COVID-19 and (2) thatcontinued incarceration increases the risk of contracting the virus. Finally, defendant argues that the “Appellate Division has consistently,and erroneously, relied on [Mendel] to hold that defendants are procedurallybarred from medical release under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) when serving amandatory period of parole ineligibility.” He distinguishes Rule 3:21-10(b)(1), which was the subject of Mendel, from Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) on theground that the former permits changing a sentence to facilitate entrance into adrug treatment program while the latter permits release. Defendant maintainsthat Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) was “intended to codify a court’s inherent authority,similar to the Governor’s clemency power, to release an ill or infirm inmate atany time.” Accordingly, in defendant’s view, a defendant cannot becategorically barred from release by a mandatory period of parole ineligibility,but rather a court may consider a NERA sentence when weighing the factorsfor and against their release. Defendant asserts that Rule 3:21-10(b)(2)“embodies the judiciary’s inherent power to release an infirm individual fromprison and does not involve a resentencing.” He claims that it would be“grossly unfair” to conclude that the Legislature intended to bar defendantsfrom relief solely for failure to complete their mandatory minimum sentences 10 and notes that Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) is, for defendants like him, the lone avenuefor relief during the pandemic. B. Amicus curiae the ACLU aligns itself with defendant and argues that themotion court and Appellate Division have “forced movants to surmount animpossible threshold: wait until you actually have contracted COVID -19 . . .before you can satisfy the medical predicates for relief.” The ACLU contendsthere is no binding, on-point authority requiring completion of a term ofstatutorily mandated parole ineligibility before seeking relief under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2). Instead, the ACLU compares Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) to a gubernatorialpardon, and argues that the rule empowers courts to release defendants at anytime due to illness or infirmity. Last, the ACLU argues that the motion courterred in evaluating defendant’s medical conditions by focusing on the prisonsystem’s ability to treat his existing and potential future health issues andconsidering his claim of serious comorbidities as a mere allegation that he maycontract the virus in the future. The ACLU contends that reliance ondefendant’s ability to be treated for his sickle cell anemia in prison ignoresboth that, under State v. Tumminello, 70 N.J. 187, 193 (1976), a defendant’saccess to prison medical care is not determinative and that defendant’sconditions place him at greater risk of death should he contract COVID-19. 11 C. An amicus group of medical and public health experts also aligns itselfwith defendant. The group argues that any one of defendant’s medicalconditions, taken alone, would significantly impact his ability to fight COVID -19, and stresses that social distancing is “essentially impossible in prisons.”According to these experts, requiring that a defendant be infected with thevirus is inconsistent with the purpose of Rule 3:21-10(b)(2), which predicatesrelief on the outcome individuals seek to avoid. D. The State first emphasizes that “defendants who are required to serve astatutorily mandated period of parole ineligibility cannot be released fromprison under [Rule 3:21-10(b)(2)] until they have completed the required termof incarceration delineated by the statute.” The State maintains that inMendel, the Appellate Division concluded that Rule 3:21-10(b) may not beused to amend sentences so that they fall below the mandatory term of paroleineligibility. The State further stresses that even if the mandatory period of paroleineligibility did not serve as a barrier to defendant’s motion, he fails to satisfythe Priester factors. Although the State does not contest defendant’s medicalconditions and the health risks posed by COVID-19, it argues that defendant 12 has offered no evidence that he cannot receive proper treatment in prisonshould he contract the virus or, as noted by the motion court, thatimprisonment is causing his health to deteriorate. Rather, the State submitsthat defendant’s voluminous medical records demonstrate the appropriatemedical care he has received in prison. E. The Attorney General aligns with the State and argues that limitingMendel’s applicability to Rule 3:21-10(b)(1) alone would, incongruously,make it more difficult for defendants to seek admission into a drug treatmentprogram than to seek a full release. The Attorney General emphasizes thatmandatory periods of parole ineligibility apply to some of the State’s mostviolent offenders and represent legislative consideration of the seriousness ofthose offenses. F. Amicus curiae the County Prosecutor’s Association also supports theState’s position and contends the sentencing discretion of courts is limited bythe Legislature’s imposition of mandatory periods of parole ineligibility. TheAssociation cites a report from the Supreme Court’s Committee on CriminalPractice in support of its argument that a Rule 3:21-10(b) order “cannot beentered reducing a mandatory jail term.” Relying on Mendel, which it 13 contends prohibits changes or reductions in sentences prior to the completionof the mandated parole ineligibility, the County Prosecutor’s Associationargues that Rule 3:21-10(b) “was never intended to permit the change orreduction of a custodial sentence which is required by law.” III. “As with sentencing, the scope of appellate review of a trial court ’sdecision to grant or deny a Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion is whether the trial courtabused its discretion.” Priester, 99 N.J. at 137. Since Rule 3:21-10(b)(2)“offers extraordinary relief to” prisoners, it “must be applied prudently,sparingly, and cautiously.” Id. at 135. A court abuses its discretion when its“decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed fromestablished policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.’” State v. R.Y., 242 N.J. 48, 65 (2020) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571(2002)). A. We begin by addressing whether a defendant may obtain relief underRule 3:21-10(b)(2) when that defendant has not yet completed a statutorilymandated period of parole ineligibility under NERA. 14 1. Under NERA, “[a] court imposing a sentence of incarceration for acrime of the first or second degree enumerated in subsection (d) of this sectionshall fix a minimum term of 85% of the sentence imposed, during which thedefendant shall not be eligible for parole.” N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a).Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault is covered under subsection (d) N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(d)(4). Subsection (b) mandates further that the period ofparole ineligibility “shall be calculated based upon the sentence ofincarceration actually imposed.” N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(b). Given that Rule3:21-10 “must be read in light of those provisions of the Code of CriminalJustice which require parole ineligibility terms,” when “a parole ineligibilityterm is required or mandated by statute, an application may not be grantedunder Rule 3:21-10(b) so as to change or reduce that sentence.” Mendel, 212 N.J. Super. at 113. In Mendel, the defendant was serving concurrent eight-year sentencesfor robbery convictions -- each with a four-year parole ineligibility periodpursuant to the Graves Act. Id. at 112. Less than three years into his term, thedefendant filed a motion under Rule 3:21-10(b)(1). 1 Ibid. The court noted 1 Rule 3:21-10(b)(1) provides for “changing a custodial sentence to permit entry of the defendant into a custodial or non-custodial treatment or rehabilitation program for drug or alcohol abuse.” 15 there was a difference between a parole ineligibility period mandated bystatute and one imposed as a matter of the court’s discretion. Id. at 112-13.Although the appellate court acknowledged that Rule 3:21-10(b)(1) motionscould be considered when the defendant was serving a discretionary period ofparole ineligibility, it found that “a sentence cannot be changed or reducedunder [Rule] 3:21-10(b) below the parole ineligibility term required bystatute.” Ibid. In the court’s view, the Rule “was never intended to permit thechange or reduction of a custodial sentence which is required by law.” Ibid.Accordingly, the Appellate Division held that since “the defendant was stillserving the three-year minimum ineligibility term required by the Graves Actin this case, the court could not change or reduce the sentence under [Rule]3:21-10(b)(1) at the time the application was filed.” Id. at 114 (citationomitted). In State v. Brown, the Appellate Division considered whether, under theGraves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), a minimum term of imprisonment greaterthan one-third of a sentence for the predicate crime was mandatory, andtherefore not subject to modification, or discretionary, therefore permittingconsideration of a Rule 3:21-10(b)(1) motion. 384 N.J. Super. 191, 192 (App.Div. 2006). Significantly, at the time of the defendant’s sentencing in Brown,the Graves Act provided in relevant part that a defendant’s “term of 16 imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term. The minimumterm shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentenceimposed by the court or three years.” N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) (1997). The Browncourt thus confronted whether a Rule 3:21-10(b)(1) motion could beentertained with respect to the fraction of the defendant’s sentence that fellbetween the one-third and one-half range established by the Graves Act. 2 In Brown, the defendant held up a restaurant with a shotgun while hisaccomplice stole cash from the register. Ibid. The defendant fired the gunbefore leaving, wounding two employees. Id. at 192-93. He pled guilty toattempted murder and robbery and was sentenced to a twenty -year term with aten-year mandatory minimum pursuant to the Graves Act. Id. at 193. Thedefendant thereafter moved under Rule 3:21-10(b)(1) to have his sentencechanged so that he could enter a drug-treatment program. Ibid. The Stateopposed the motion on the ground that the defendant had not yet completed histen-year parole ineligibility period, and the court denied the motion. Ibid. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that, [i]n this case the Graves Act sentence mandated a minimum period of parole ineligibility “at, or between,” six and two-thirds years and ten years, and the determination to impose the maximum ten-year2 The current iteration of the statute directs that the mandatory term “be fixed at one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or 42 months, whichever is greater.” N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) (2021). 17 period was an exercise of sentencing discretion clearly based on the conduct of the defendant and the serious injury to one of the victims. Accordingly, we hold that since the defendant has served in excess of the mandatory minimum parole ineligibility term of one - third of his base term and is now serving the narrow discretionary period of his sentence, the trial court has jurisdiction to consider his [Rule] 3:21-10(b)(1) application for modification of his custodial sentence to permit his entry into a substance abuse treatment program in accordance with the standards for consideration of such an application. [Id. at 196.] Significantly, the Appellate Division based its decision in Brown on thestatutory scheme, which required a one-third minimum but left the option ofincreasing the minimum period of incarceration, up to one-half of thedefendant’s sentence, to the discretion of the court. The court did not find inBrown that the one-third sentence could be modified. On the contrary, citingMendel and its progeny, the Appellate Division held that courts are withoutjurisdiction to consider Rule 3:21-10(b) motions until any mandatory paroleineligibility period has been served. Id. at 194. 2. Applying the principles stated in the case law, we conclude that the 85%parole ineligibility period represents a period of parole ineligibility that ismandated by NERA and that a defendant may therefore not file a motion underRule 3:21-10(b)(2) until after serving that time. 18 The 85% parole ineligibility period is calculated using the sentencingterm “actually imposed” by the sentencing court. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(b)(emphasis added). Although the sentencing court has discretion in setting theterm that is thus used to calculate the period of parole ineligibility, thesentencing court has no discretion in determining the period of paroleineligibility. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a) (stating that in sentencing a defendantto one of the enumerated crimes, the sentencing court “shall fix a minimumterm of 85% of the sentence imposed”). The sentencing court is thus requiredto sentence a defendant to an 85% period of parole ineligibility. Allowingdefendants to file a motion under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) to amend such NERAsentences would encroach upon the Legislature, which intended “to increaseprison time for offenders committing the most serious crimes in societ y.” S.855 (1996). In our view, NERA represents a clear mandate by the Legislature thatthose who commit the most violent of crimes must serve 85% of the sentenceimposed -- their period of parole ineligibility -- before they are eligible forrelease under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2). To permit defendant’s release in thisinstance under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) would effectively reduce his NERAsentence, which the Legislature and the plain language of NERA expresslyforbid. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a) (the court “shall fix a minimum term of 19 85% of the sentence imposed” for the period of parole ineligibility); see also Inre H.D., 241 N.J. 412, 418 (2020) (“Where 'a statute’s plain language is clear,we apply that plain meaning and end our inquiry.’” (quoting Garden StateCheck Cashing Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Banking & Ins., 237 N.J. 482, 489(2019))). Further, allowing the sentencing court to resentence an individual toreduce the original sentence for the purpose of reducing the NERA peri od ofparole ineligibility would thwart the clear and unambiguous language of thestatute, as well as the expressed intent of the Legislature. Our conclusion is further supported by the Legislature’s recentenactment of the Compassionate Release Statute, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e. Thestatute addresses the issue of an inmate’s diagnosis, id. at (b), the process forpetitioning for compassionate release after a qualifying diagnosis, id. at (d),and the process by which an inmate may be returned to confinement, id. at (j),among other provisions, see generally id. at (a) to (l). Of particular note, instark contrast to Rule 3:21-10, the Compassionate Release Statute providesthat, upon the filing of a petition for compassionate release, notice must begiven to victims or the victims’ families so that they may present a statementat a hearing or testify in court as to the petition for compassionate release. Seeid. at (e)(2). Given the clear legislative intent that an inmate not be afforded 20 compassionate release without such safeguards, we further decline to permitdefendant to seek release under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) prior to the completion ofhis parole ineligibility period, as required by NERA. The dissent acknowledges that trial judges cannot release a defendantserving a mandatory period of parole ineligibility under NERA. Post at ___(slip op. at 8-9) The dissent proposes a workaround that would have the sameeffect. In doing so it does not thoroughly consider the Court’s lack ofauthority to resentence such defendants through the rulemaking process.Neither a committee report from 1975 nor generic language about a court’sinherent power offers support for reducing mandatory NERA terms. Id. at ___(slip op. at 6). Further review by a committee will not change that. B. Although we find that defendant’s application cannot be consideredbefore he has satisfied his mandatory minimum period of incarceration, wenevertheless consider, by way of guidance, whether defendant satisfies thePriester factors. 1. “The predicate for relief under [Rule 3:21-10(b)(2)] is proof of theserious nature of the defendant’s illness and the deleterious effect ofincarceration on the prisoner’s health.” Priester, 99 N.J. at 135. As to whether 21 prison is harmful to a defendant’s health, courts should consider “theavailability of medical services in prison.” Ibid. That factor is significant“only insofar as it tends to establish that without such medical services thedefendant’s condition will seriously worsen or deteriorate in prison.” Ibid. Asuccessful Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion requires the prisoner to prove “that themedical services unavailable at the prison would be not only beneficial . . . butare essential to prevent further deterioration in his health.” Ibid. Moreover, adefendant must demonstrate “changed circumstances in his [or her] health . . .since the time of the original sentence.” Id. at 136. In considering a Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion, courts should also consider“the nature and severity of the crime, the severity of the sentence, the crimi nalrecord of the defendant, the risk to the public if the defendant is released, andthe defendant’s role in bringing about his current state of health.” Id. at 137. 2. Applying those guiding principles, we conclude that the motion court didnot abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s release under Priester. We acknowledge that defendant’s medical conditions, taken together, aresufficiently serious and place him at a greater risk for complications than thatfaced by others, should he contract COVID-19. And, as indicated in Request 22 to Modify, the COVID-19 pandemic is a change in circumstances for Priesterpurposes. 242 N.J. at 379. However, as the motion court found, and as evidenced by defendant ’sover 1,000 pages of supporting medical documentation, there is no indicationthat defendant’s prison would be unable to treat him should he contractCOVID-19. Additionally, nothing in the record establishes that defendant’shealth has drastically changed as a result of his incarceration. See Priester, 99 N.J. at 141 (“[I]t is only the devastating impact of incarceration on a prisoner’shealth that permits the application of [Rule 3:21-10(b)(2)].”); see also State v.Trippiedi, 204 N.J. Super. 422, 428 (App. Div. 1985) (“Where the prisonsystem can provide beneficial and desirable medical care, incarceration doesnot threaten further deterioration in defendant’s health.”). Last, we conclude that the motion court did not abuse its discretion in itsanalysis of the final Priester prong -- the weighing of various other factorssuch as the severity of the crime and sentence, defendant’s criminal record, therisk to the public should he be released, and his role in bringing about hiscurrent state of health. See Priester, 99 N.J. at 137. While defendant’smedical conditions are beyond his control, defendant pled guilty to second-degree aggravated assault based on accomplice liability for the shooting of twoinnocent bystanders. Given that aggravated assault is one of the enumerated 23 NERA crimes under subsection (d), defendant’s NERA sentence reflects theseverity of his crime. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(d)(4). Moreover, as the motioncourt concluded, we find that defendant’s ten-year sentence is substantial andreflects the serious nature of his crime. Defendant’s criminal record is also cause for concern. In 2015, he wasconvicted of third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance and,just prior to the current second-degree aggravated assault, was found to be inpossession of a machine gun. As the motion court found, such a patternsignals a “disturbing escalation of [d]efendant’s aberrant conduct.” Given thisescalation, we conclude that the motion court did not abuse its discretion infinding that releasing defendant would place the public at risk. In sum, the motion court properly balanced all of the Priester factorsbefore denying defendant’s Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion and it did not abuse itsdiscretion in doing so. IV. The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA filed a dissent, in which JUSTICES ALBIN and PIERRE-LOUIS join. 24 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. David Chavies, a/k/a David Q. Chavies, and, Dave Chavies, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, dissenting. A court’s power to resentence a defendant is as inherent a feature ofjudicial authority as the power to sentence at all. Rule 3:21-10 is anexpression of that authority. State v. Priester, 99 N.J. 123, 135 (1985). Forexample, Rule 3:21-10(b) permits resentencing at any time when on jointapplication of a defendant and prosecuting attorney for good cause shown, tochange a custodial sentence to permit entry into the Intensive SupervisionProgram, and to permit entry into a drug or rehabilitation program. It is themajority, not the dissent, that is mistaken about the scope of this Court’sauthority to promulgate rules about resentencing. The majority’s approach here cedes part of a court’s authority to adjust abase term of a defendant’s sentence whenever a No Early Release Act 1 (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, sentence is implicated. I do not believe theCourt should surrender its authority to act in these circumstances and adjustour Court Rule. Our Court Rule is subject to further amendment to add to thecircumstances under which a defendant’s base term may be re -examined, aseven the Attorney General’s representative readily agreed at oral argument inthis matter. And, when the base term of a defendant’s sentence comes down,so does the NERA period of parole ineligibility. This Court has the constitutional authority, through its rulemakingpowers, to amend the Rule to permit the resentencing of a seriously ill orinfirm inmate and provide medical release. Any resentencing of the basecustodial term of a defendant’s sentence concededly, would adjust the required85% parole ineligibility period of any reduced resentence for a defendant. Incompliance with NERA’s language, medical release could not occur during anunserved portion of the adjusted 85% parole ineligibility period of a reducedcustodial term. But if 85% of the reduced base custodial term has been served,there is no impediment to the medical release. Viewed in that light, theconflict with the Legislature feared by the majority does not exist. We are dealing with a rule of our own construction. This Court shouldutilize its rulemaking authority to clarify that ---- 3:21-10 with all its Rulesubsection (b) exceptions -- a product of the Court’s own creation -- is, at 2 bottom a resentencing vehicle. As such, and consistent with the innate powerof a court to resentence at any time, we should recognize the need toimmediately amend the Rule so it can be of meaningful use during a pandemicthat is still sickening and killing people in this state and nation, as well as foruse by future inmates who are seriously ill or infirm. I would amend the Rulewith an interim order to accompany this opinion and implement a permanentrule amendment with the assistance of the Criminal Practice Committee. Respectfully, I dissent. I. The modern iteration of Rule 3:21-10 was created by this Court in 1975.We have the benefit of a thoughtful Criminal Practice Committee Reportmemorializing the reasons for the recommended rule amendments that wereadopted by the Court. See generally Report of the New Jersey SupremeCourt’s Committee on Criminal Practice (1975) (1975 Report). As has beennoted, section (a) creates judicial time limits for the bringing of a motion forthe resentencing of a defendant. Id. at 38-39. Section (b) sets forth thecircumstances in which the Court’s own Rule authorizes a court to resentencean individual post-conviction, notwithstanding section (a)’s time limit on suchapplications. Id. at 39, 41. There are several exceptions. Notably, subsection(b)(3) permits a defendant to seek resentencing at any time with the consent of 3 the prosecutor. Plainly, the Court viewed itself as having the authority tocreate exceptions that are not limited to correction of illegal sentences, whichwere problematic from the outset. Our attention here is on subsection (b)(2), which utilizes differentlanguage than the other subsections. Whereas the other exceptions speak to acourt’s ability to change, correct, or reduce a sentence, see (b)(1)(“changing”), (3) (“changing”), (4) (“changing”), (5) (“correcting”), (6)(“changing”), (7) (“changing or reducing”), subsection (b)(2) aut horizes acourt on motion to enter an order “amending a custodial sentence to permit therelease of a defendant because of illness or infirmity of the defendant.”Despite the various verbs, subsection (a) of the Rule nonetheless refers to theexceptions, collectively, as motions “to reduce or change a sentence.” Thatwould seemingly include (b)(2) among the provisions that implicitly carry theability to resentence and thereby reduce or change an original sentence. Butthe differently structured language has resulted in an understanding ofsubsection (b)(2)’s application as limited to authorizing release of an inmatewhen medically justified. This Court, in Priester, structured a two-part test to be utilized when acourt considers an application for the release of an inmate under subsection(b)(2). 99 N.J. at 135-37. The Priester decision established the standard by 4 which a court reviews, under (b)(2), the post-conviction effects on animprisoned defendant’s physical or mental health when determining whether toamend a sentence to permit the release of a defendant because of illness orinfirmity. Id. at 135-36. That said, courts have held that, as presently worded,(b)(2) speaks only to release and not to the reduction of a sentence. Id. at 140-41 (holding that once medical conditions did not justify inmate’s immediaterelease, a court did not have authority under (b)(2) to excise a paroleineligibility term to facilitate earlier Parole Board review for release); see alsoState v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 411 (1989) (citing Priester for the propositionthat the Rule does not provide a basis for “challeng[ing] the original sentencebut is reserved only for post-sentence circumstances”); State v. Sanducci, 167 N.J. Super. 503, 510-12 (App. Div. 1979) (stating that Rule 3:21-10(b)(2)speaks only to release, so when medical conditions do not merit release, areduction in sentence is not permitted absent prosecutor consent). II. No doubt, those past decisions took a limited view of a court’s power toconsider the post-conviction release of an inmate under (b)(2) utilizing thePriester factors as the necessary prerequisites for release. This Court shouldrecognize that the remedy sought by defendant and other applicants like him isin our hands to deliver. 5 Priester, the case that both the majority and I recognize as the seminalcase construing the Rule, recognized that the Rule “is an extension of thesentencing power of the court, involving the same complexity as thesentencing decision and the same delicate balancing of various factors. ” 99 N.J. at 135; see also State v. Tumminello, 70 N.J. 187, 193-94 (1976). Suchan understanding of the Rule is consistent with the 1975 Report. Although Committee Reports do not bind the Court, we have relied onsuch reports in the past. Robertelli v. N.J. Off. of Attorney Ethics, 224 N.J. 470, 484 (2016) (“If the text of the rules is ambiguous, we can turn to extrinsicevidence, including committee reports, for guidance.”). The 1975 Reportmakes clear that the traditional understanding of Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) was thatthe Rule is a manifestation or articulation of the courts’ power to amendcriminal sentences at any point in time. 1 975 Report at 41-44 (quoting, amongother cases, United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 , 311 (1931); United States v.Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir. 1968)). Specifically, the Committeeasserted “that the power of the judicial branch to make its own rules ofprocedure may be used to continue jurisdiction of a case, at least insofar as itsright to reconsider a sentence imposed.” 1 975 Report at 42-43; see id. at 41(“[T]he courts have the inherent power, subject to any limits set down by theSupreme Court, to reduce or change a sentence at any time.”); see also State v. 6 Howard, 110 N.J. 113, 123 (1988) (“Sentencing remains a judicial function. . . .”); State v. McCrary, 97 N.J. 132, 139 (1984) (describing the “'judicialpower . . . vested in this Court . . . as the repository of the judicial power tofashion remedies. In no context is this judicial power to fashion remediesmore appropriately exercised than in a criminal case.” (citation omitted)). Tothat end, Rule 3:21-10(b)(2)’s Committee Report discusses how theamendments were intended to facilitate a court’s inherent ability to secureindividualized relief from imprisonment for inmates suffering from seriousillness or injury, here made worse for defendant by the pandemic, or for otherreasons affecting future defendants. It was with this understanding of the judicial power that the Committeerecommended that “Rule 3:21-10(b)(2), as proposed, would permit a custodialsentence to be amended to allow the release of a defendant because of illnessor infirmity of the defendant.” 1 975 Report at 44. The Committee recognizedthat the judicial power of the courts is distinguishable from that of the ParoleBoard, which does not exercise the judicial power as such, and “can only actafter the statutorily prescribed term prerequisite to parole has been served.”Ibid. Accordingly, as the Committee understood it, the Rule, as an articulationof the courts’ authority to enter and reopen sentences, would permit a court to 7 amend a sentence “to allow the release of a defendant because of illness orinfirmity of the defendant.” Ibid. The Court adopted the Rule that the Committee recommended. Asnoted, however, this Court applied (b)(2) in a limited fashion in Priester,authorizing release, but, when release was not warranted, not authorizing areduction in the defendant’s sentence. Since the Rule was adopted, the Appellate Division delivered twoopinions interpreting when release is permissible without undermining amandatory period of parole supervision. State v. Mendel established that amandatory period of parole supervision bars release under subsection (b)(2) ofthe Rule. 212 N.J. Super. 110, 112-14 (App. Div. 1986). State v. Brownexplored the meaning of mandatory parole supervision, distinguishing it fromportions of a period of parole ineligibility that is within a sentencing court’sability to decide. 384 N.J. Super. 191, 194-96 (App. Div. 2006). Accepting, as the majority does, that Mendel 1 and Brown are good law,ante at ___ (slip op. at 15-18), I would agree that a court may not “release” a1 Mendel was cited as good law by this Court only once before in State v. Cannon, but the citation was for the central holding of Mendel. See Cannon, 128 N.J. 546, 552 (1992) (citing Mendel in support of the proposition that “[a] defendant is not eligible if sentenced to a statutorily mandated period of parole ineligibility”), superseded by statute on other grounds by L. 1993, c. 123, § 2a(3). 8 defendant during a period of parole supervision prescribed entirely by theLegislature and therefore is truly mandatory. In the instant matter, whichinvolves the application of NERA’s period of parole ineligibility, I would alsoagree that release is not permitted under (b)(2) before a defendant has served85% of the sentence imposed, as called for by NERA. But that simplisticstatement does not fully address the problem that defendant presents to thisCourt. NERA’s 85% parole disqualifier moves with the sentence “actuallyimposed.” In NERA, the Legislature understood that the mandatory fixedperiod of parole ineligibility applies to the base sentence imposed by the court.Whereas the majority goes to pains to explain what the Legislature did dothrough the enactment of NERA, it also bears noting what the Legislature didnot do. The Legislature did not make NERA’s parole ineligibility period amandatory 85% of the minimum of the sentencing range applicable to adefendant, or to the maximum of the sentencing range applicable to adefendant, or any fixed amount of time (as was done for the required five-yearperiod of post-incarceration parole supervision). 2 Rather, the Legislature2 The Graves Act’s parole disqualifier, an earlier version of which was the provision at issue in Mendel, is a particularly resonant example of such a fixed parole disqualifier. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) (“A person who has been convicted under [certain subsections] shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The term of imprisonment shall include the 9 specifically called for a period of parole ineligibility -- “85% of the sentenceimposed” -- that has meaning only as it relates to a discretionary sentencingdecision made by a court when setting the base term of a defendant’s sentence.That base is changeable, and subject to being reevaluated, as Rule 3:21-10clearly permits. By allowing an application made under subsection (b)(2) to include aresentencing of defendant’s base term, we would not be authorizing thevacating of defendant’s NERA sentence. Rather, we would permit the motioncourt to perform the traditional sentencing function of reconsidering andresentencing a defendant. The defendant would be evaluated again, as in otherresentencing settings, according to the aggravating and mitigatingcircumstances as applicable to defendant on the date of resentencing. SeeState v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 354 (2012). One such mitigating factor is, ofcourse, excessive hardship to defendant, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11), whichimposition of a minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at one -half of the sentence imposed by the court or 42 months, whichever is greater, or 18 months in the case of a fourth degree crime, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.”); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c) (“[T]he term of imprisonment imposed under this paragraph shall be either a term of 25 years during which the actor shall not be eligible for parole, or a specific term between 25 years and life imprisonment, of which the actor shall serve 25 years before being eligible for parole . . . .”); N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(b) (“A person convicted of carjacking shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and that term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term of at least five years during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.”). 10 would dovetail with the consideration of the Priester factors that warranted thereconsideration under subsection (b)(2). I cannot agree to a construction of NERA that has transformed a movingperiod of parole ineligibility into an automatic set period, as if the statute hadinstead declared the parole ineligibility period to be five years or some otherpre-ordained amount that is not subject to the exercise of judicial discretion insetting the base term from which the parole ineligibility percentage is derived. The overall purpose of the restructuring of Rule 3:21-10 was to bringadministrative control and efficiency to when the cutoff for applications toresentencing could be made. That reasoning permeates the 1 975 Report. 3 TheRule was structured so as to limit the time for making such applications, but toallow certain reasons for permitting resentencing of a defendant beyond thatpoint in time. Accordingly, this Court need not be constrained from amendingsubsection (b)(2) to permit reconsideration of the base term of an ill or infirmdefendant in light of changed circumstances recognizable under Priester; andif, once that basis is reevaluated and a defendant has served the equivalent ormore of 85% of that new base, he or she could be released under (b)(2).3 E.g., 1 975 Report at 38-39 (“It is therefore suggested that R. 3:21-10(a) be revised to require the defendant to file at least a timely appeal if he is to have time following the appellate court’s judgment to request a change of sentence.”). 11 Contrary to the majority’s assertion, that results in no violation of NERA’sparole ineligibility period. This Court, through its own Rule, would be simplypermitting another basis for a change in sentence -- which is within the innateauthority of the court. III. It bears recalling that we held out the promise of individualized reliefunder this Rule in a unanimous opinion only a short while ago. Yet today, theCourt dashes such hopes for anyone serving a NERA sentence, taking theposition that the Court’s hands are tied. In Matter of Request to Modify Prison Sentences, 242 N.J. 357 (2020),this Court unanimously recognized that Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) provided an avenuefor seriously ill individual inmates to seek relief from the courts for releasefrom their sentence of imprisonment. Id. at 380. And yet, no advocate couldtell us during oral argument that even a single inmate has been able to securethat relief under our Rule. That result is all the more disappointing after wespelled out in that opinion our recognition that a Priester analysis shouldgovern that indisputably extraordinary relief. Id. at 378-79. And we furtherrecognized that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a change incircumstances for purposes of bringing such an application. Id. at 379. What 12 the Rule did not do, we said, was provide a basis for a broad furlough programto be overseen by the Judiciary. Id. at 378. I would adhere to the view of our Rule as providing a source of relief fora defendant such as Chavies, who has never even had a hearing on the meritsof his application, which was supported by a thousand pages of medicalrecords and was further supplemented post-argument with even more medicalinformation related to changing, and new, severe, medical needs. The newlegislation directing what the Department of Corrections must do for illinmates who are near death or in similar dire straits, - - - - - at ___ (slip op. at see ante20) (discussing the Compassionate Release Statute, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e),referred to in the majority opinion, in no way limits the scope of this Court’srulemaking and sentencing authority. I am singularly unpersuaded that theenactment in any way should affect the relief available through the courts.What the Department of Corrections must do in responding to the needs ofsuch inmates, as directed by the Legislature, does not preclude the courts fromexercising a traditional sentencing function -- so long as this Court permitssuch applications to be heard, and does not bar them on the basis of a timelimit we have chosen to put into place for administrative convenience. For me, the proper frame for this appeal is the Rule and our authority toset procedures for the courts to exercise their continuing power to revisit and 13 resentence a defendant. I see no conflict with NERA were we to recognize,under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2), a court’s ability to resentence a defendant at anytime post-conviction in connection with a showing under Priester’s two-partstandard for assessing a medical illness or injury and changed circumstances. Subsection (b)(3) already pronounced a court’s authority to resentence adefendant at any time post-conviction “for good cause shown” and theadditional requirement of prosecutorial consent. Having prosecutorial consentdoes not confer the ability to resentence. Resentencing authority is reposed inthe courts. Consent is simply a limitation we imposed on an otherwiseunlimited number of unchanneled applications by defendants outside of thetime limit of subsection (a) of the Rule. Indeed, an unintended consequence ofthe majority’s view of the power to recognize when a resentencing of a baseterm may be accomplished is, although it does not say so, to wipe out theability of the State to consent to a court’s resentencing of a cooperatingdefendant that results in reducing any NERA sentence. The majority’s view ofNERA’s parole ineligibility period fails to acknowledge that it is onlymandatory to the extent the court is satisfied with the base term it imposes,even on resentencing. In sum, to the extent the reason advanced by a defendant under (b)(2)relates to a health concern, it is in our hands to deliver relief through an 14 amendment to the Rule. I would immediately amend our Rule with an interimorder adjusting its language, with a permanent amendment to follow throughthe Criminal Practice Committee in the normal rule amendment process. 4 Solong as a resentenced defendant is not released during the NERA paroleineligibility period of 85% of a resentenced base term, a defendant should beable to utilize an application under subsection (b)(2) to seek release formedical reasons controlled through the Priester analysis. NERA does notpreclude a resentencing; it only precludes a release before 85% of the refixedbase term is served in prison. Thus, I would reverse and remand defendant’s application and issue aninterim order immediately revising the language of Rule 3:21-10(b)(2).4 This Court has used that procedure, or has taken it upon itself to amend rules itself. E.g., State v. Mercedes, 233 N.J. 152, 171-72 (2018); State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 71-74 (2017). 15