Title: Atlas Subsidiaries of Florida, Inc. v. Kornegay
Citation: 264 So. 2d 158
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 22, 1972

264 So. 2d 158 (1972)
ATLAS SUBSIDIARIES OF FLORIDA, INC., a Corporation
v.
J. J. KORNEGAY and Bertha Kornegay.
3 Div. 498.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 22, 1972.
*159 R. A. Norred, Birmingham, for appellant.
No brief from appellees.
*160 HEFLIN, Chief Justice.
In the proceedings below the plaintiff brought a statutory action in the nature of ejectment. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence the court granted defendants' motion to exclude the evidence. Judgment was entered in favor of the defendants. Immediately before and after the motion to exclude was granted, the trial court refused to allow the plaintiff to amend its complaint by adding an additional count. Appeal was perfected to this court. Defendants did not file a brief on appeal.
The plaintiff and defendants occupy the same positions on this appeal as they did in the proceedings below, and they will hereinafter be referred to as plaintiff and defendants.
Plaintiff contends that the evidence presented by it made out a prima facie case and the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion to exclude the evidence. Plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the plaintiff to amend its complaint.
The complaint alleged as follows:
The plaintiff rested after it introduced the following four written instruments:
The mortgage contained the following covenants:
A number of decisions have established that the trial court will not be put in error for granting a motion to exclude the evidence, though procedurally improper, where the plaintiff's evidence does not make out a prima facie case. Stewart v. Peabody, 280 Ala. 5, 189 So. 2d 554; Carter v. City of Gadsden, 264 Ala. 544, 88 So. 2d 689 and numerous cases cited therein.
*161 In this appeal this court must determine whether or not the plaintiff's evidence made out a prima facie case.
Section 938, Title 7 of the Code of Alabama, 1940, allows a plaintiff to proceed in a statutory action in the nature of ejectment under two alternatives. The first such alternative is where the complaint alleges that the plaintiff was possessed of the premises and the defendant entered thereupon and unlawfully withholds and detains the same. The other alternative is where the complaint alleges that the plaintiff has the legal title to the lands and the defendant entered thereupon and unlawfully withholds and detains the same.
In the case under review Count One follows the first alternative and Count. Two alleges the second alternative. It is only necessary that this court consider Count Two which contends that the plaintiff had legal title to the lands.
In a statutory action in the nature of ejectment a plaintiff may recover by showing legal title to the premises sued for at the time of the commencement of the suit and the right to immediate possession. Watson v. Spence, 258 Ala. 371, 62 So. 2d 919; Morris v. Yancey, 267 Ala. 657, 104 So. 2d 553; Carpenter v. Joiner, 151 Ala. 454, 44 So. 424.
The following was stated in Moorer v. Tensaw Land &amp; Timber Co., 246 Ala. 223, 20 So.2d 105:
The defendants' defense in this case was based on the plea of the general issue. The effect of this plea was an admission by the defendants that the defendants were in possession of the lands claimed by the plaintiff and were claiming legal title thereto, carrying the burden to the plaintiff to establish in himself the legal title. Millican v. Mintz, 251 Ala. 358, 37 So. 2d 425. See also § 941 of Title 7 of the Code of Alabama, 1940.
In a statutory action in the nature of ejectment a plaintiff may recover by showing title from a grantor in possession, or from a common source, or by an unbroken chain of title from the government. Stewart v. Peabody, supra, and numerous cases cited therein.
Where proof of title back to a common source of title is made in an ejectment action this is generally recognized as being sufficient. The following appears in 28 C.J.S. Ejectment § 23, page 874:
In support of this proposition the Alabama case of Payton v. Madison, 251 Ala. 353, 37 So. 2d 588 is cited by Corpus Juris Secundum. In that case the defendant received a tax deed after plaintiff's property was sold at a tax sale. Plaintiff contended the tax sale was invalid. Defendant maintained that plaintiff must prove a chain of title back to some grantor in possession or to the government. This court said:
This court can see no logical reason why the rationale of Payton v. Madison, supra, should not be applicable to the instant case. The plaintiff is in privity with the defendants-mortgagors by proper and legal assignments. The plaintiff's legal title is derived from the same title that the defendants had at the time of the execution of the mortgage. Not only is the plaintiff's title derived from a common source but it is also derived from the defendants themselves.
Moreover, the defendants recited in the covenants of the mortgage that they were seized of an indefeasible estate in fee simple to the lands and were in peaceable possession thereof. Such covenants and recitals are additional reasons why the defendants should be estopped to deny plaintiff's title. Such covenants are actionable by plaintiff against the defendants since they are specifically made to the mortgagee and its assigns.
In Byers v. Rodabaugh, 17 Iowa 53, 60, the following appears:
See also Seabury v. Doe, 22 Ala. 207; Spragins v. Fitcheard, 206 Ala. 694, 91 So. 793; and Annotation: Common Source of Title Doctrine, 5 A.L.R.3d 375, §§ 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9.
The mortgage in the instant case listed the requirements of foreclosure in connection with the power of sale. The foreclosure deed reveals that compliance was had with the terms of the mortgage pertaining to the foreclosure sale. This court has held that the recitals in a foreclosure deed given by a mortgagee to a purchaser at the sale showing compliance with the terms prescribed by the power of sale in the mortgage are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated as against the mortgagor, without proof aliunde *163 the recitals. Jackson v. Tribble, 156 Ala. 480, 47 So. 310. Elson v. Pridgen, 241 Ala. 233, 2 So. 2d 110.
From the evidence presented it is apparent that legal title to the premises, which the defendants are not in a position to deny, was in the plaintiff at the time of the commencement of the suit and by virtue of the mortgage and foreclosure deed, the plaintiff had a right to immediate possession. The plea of the general issue is an admission that the defendant is in possession of the premises. Therefore, this court concludes that the evidence presented stated a prima facie case under Count Two and the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion to exclude the evidence.
Since this case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial it is not necessary for this court to decide if the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to allow the plaintiff to amend its complaint.
Reversed and remanded.
MERRILL, HARWOOD, MADDOX and McCALL, JJ., concur.