Title: Smith v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 35S02-1106-CR-369
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: March 23, 2012

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Matthew G. Grantham 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Bowers, Brewer, Garrett & Wiley, LLP 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Huntington, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Angela N. Sanchez 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 35S02-1106-CR-369 
 
TROY R. SMITH, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Huntington Superior Court, No. 35D01-0610-FD-240 
The Honorable Jeffrey R. Heffelfinger, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 35A02-1008-CR-996 
_________________________________ 
 
 
March 23, 2012 
 
 
Rucker, Justice. 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Mar 23 2012, 9:17 am
 
2 
 
The trial court revoked the probation of Troy R. Smith for failure to pay weekly child 
support as a condition of his probation.  On appeal Smith argued the State failed to carry its 
burden of proof that his failure to pay was reckless, knowing, or intentional.  We disagree and 
affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 
On May 22, 2007, under terms of a written agreement, Smith pleaded guilty to non-
support of a dependent child, a Class D felony.  At that time Smith was in arrears on his support 
obligations in the amount of $4,671.13.  Appellant’s App. at 29.  Among other things the 
agreement provided (i) for a sentence of three years suspended to probation; (ii) that Smith “shall 
pay current support every week in the amount of $78.79 as modified from time to time”;1 and 
(iii) that Smith “shall pay an additional $16.00 weekly on the arrearage.”  Appellant’s App. at 
27.2  On June 26, 2007, the trial court sentenced Smith according to the terms of the plea 
agreement.  
 
 
From June 26, 2007 until November 23, 2008, Smith remained current on his weekly 
payments and also made payments toward his arrearage.  However, starting in March 2009 Smith 
began making only partial payments on his support and arrearage, with no payments being made 
between May 22, 2009 and July 16, 2009.  In like fashion between September 14, 2009 and 
December 16, 2009, Smith sometimes made partial weekly and arrearage payments and other 
times no payments at all. 
 
 
On March 8, 2010, Smith’s probation officer filed a petition to revoke probation.  By this 
time Smith owed a total of $8,645.49 in unpaid support.  Tr. at 48.  An evidentiary hearing was 
held on August 10, 2010.  The State introduced evidence of Smith’s payment history from June 
26, 2007, through the date of the hearing.  Smith testified on his own behalf.  And although he 
                                                 
1 On November 24, 2008, the trial court modified Smith’s weekly support obligation to $124.00.  Tr. at 
49.  The record does not reveal why there was an increase, but Smith testified that he was aware of the 
modification.  Tr. at 71. 
 
2 The record shows that Smith signed the agreement.  Appellant’s App. at 30; Tr. at 63.  And Smith 
acknowledged in open court that he understood the terms of the agreement.  Tr. at 64-65. 
 
3 
made no express admission that he violated the terms of his probation, when asked what he had 
done to raise money to pay his child support Smith replied, “I really haven’t had any way.  I 
mean, I’ve been barely skimming by and really it’s hard just putting food on the table.”  Tr. at 
71.  He also testified at length about his health problems; including diabetes, back pain, asthma, 
high blood pressure, and depression.   
 
 
 
Concluding that Smith had violated the terms of his probation by failing to pay current 
support every week, the trial court revoked Smith’s probation and ordered Smith to serve the 
remainder of his three-year sentence.  Smith appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed finding 
first that the “State did not meet its burden to prove Smith’s ability to pay notwithstanding his 
failure to pay weekly child support as a condition of his probation,” and second that even if 
Smith did “violate his probation the trial court abused its discretion in revoking Smith’s 
probation to the full.”  Smith v. State, 945 N.E.2d 740, 747-48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).  Having 
previously granted the State’s petition to transfer thereby vacating the Court of Appeals’ opinion, 
see Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A), we now affirm the judgment of the trial court.  Additional facts 
are set forth below where necessary. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
“Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal 
defendant is entitled.”  Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007).  A trial court’s 
probation decision is subject to review for abuse of discretion.  An abuse of discretion occurs 
“where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.”  Id.  A 
probation hearing is civil in nature and the State need only prove the alleged violations by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 551 (Ind. 1999).  We will 
consider all the evidence most favorable to supporting the judgment of the trial court without 
reweighing that evidence or judging the credibility of witnesses.  Id.  If there is substantial 
evidence of probative value to support the trial court’s conclusion that a defendant has violated 
any terms of probation, we will affirm its decision to revoke probation.  Id. 
 
 
 
4 
Discussion 
 
A person’s probation may be revoked if “the person has violated a condition of probation 
during the probationary period.”  Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a)(1).  In order to obtain a revocation of 
probation, “[t]he state must prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.”  I.C. § 35-
38-2-3(e).  Further, “[p]robation may not be revoked for failure to comply with conditions of a 
sentence that imposes financial obligations on the person unless the person recklessly, 
knowingly, or intentionally fails to pay.”  I.C. § 35-38-2-3(f).  In this case Smith concedes that 
“the State’s evidence did establish he was behind in support.”  Appellant’s Br. at 4.  He argues 
however, “the State offered nothing to establish why he was behind in support.”  Appellant’s Br. 
at 4.  Smith also contends the statutes are “not clear [on] who holds the burden of proof in this 
matter.”  Appellant’s Br. at 6. 
 
In a recent opinion this Court noted that under the foregoing statutory scheme, probation 
may be revoked for violation of a probation condition.  Runyon v. State, 939 N.E.2d 613, 616 
(Ind. 2010).3  However, if the condition violated involves a financial obligation, then the 
probationer must be shown to have recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally failed to pay.  Id.  
This Court determined “[a]s to the fact of violation, the statute expressly imposes the burden of 
proof upon the State.  But with respect to the ability to pay, the burden of proof is not explicitly 
designated.”  Id.  Noting that revoking probation for violating a financial obligation requires 
proof of both the underlying violation and the defendant probationer’s state of mind, we held, “it 
is the State’s burden to prove both the violation and the requisite state of mind in order to obtain 
a probation revocation.”  Id.  With respect to the ability to pay, we held that it is the defendant 
probationer’s burden “to show facts related to an inability to pay and indicating sufficient bona 
fide efforts to pay so as to persuade the trial court that further imprisonment should not be 
ordered.”  Id. at 617 (citing Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 641 (Ind. 2008)).  
 
                                                 
3 We observe that Runyon was decided after the parties had filed their briefs before the Court of Appeals.  
Many of the questions Smith posed in his Appellant’s Brief are answered by Runyon.  By the time the 
Court of Appeals decided this case, Runyon had been decided.  The court cited and discussed Runyon, but 
distinguished it in part on grounds that unlike the probationer in Runyon, here the probationer did not 
admit his violation.  We disagree with our colleagues that Runyon may be distinguished on this ground.  
 
5 
A. 
The fact of violation and requisite mental state 
 
 
 
The record makes clear that Smith failed to pay weekly support obligations as a required 
condition of his probation.  Indeed on appeal Smith concedes as much.  Rather Smith complains 
the State failed to show that “he had missed weekly child support payments knowingly, 
intentionally, or recklessly.”  Appellant’s Br. at 4.  
 
 
 
First, as we observed in Runyon “because the phrase ‘recklessly, knowingly, or 
intentionally’ appears in the disjunctive and thus prescribes alternative considerations, the state 
of mind requirement may be satisfied by adequate evidence that a defendant’s failure to pay a 
probation imposed financial obligation was either reckless, knowing, or intentional.”  939 N.E.2d 
at 616.  Indiana Code section 35-41-2-2(b) provides that a person engages in conduct 
“knowingly” if, when he or she engages in the conduct, the person is aware of a “high 
probability” that he or she is doing so.  Because knowledge is a mental state of the actor, it may 
be proved by circumstantial evidence and inferred from the circumstances and facts of each case.  
See Young v. State, 761 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Ind. 2002).  Thus, aside from the inability to pay – 
which we discuss below – in order to sustain the probation revocation in this case, the evidence 
must show that Smith was aware of a high probability that he was not “pay[ing] current support 
every week in the amount of $78.79 as modified from time to time.”  Appellant’s App. at 27. 
 
 
As indicated earlier Smith gave extensive testimony concerning his various medical 
problems, including back surgery in August 2009.  When asked on cross-examination whether he 
had ever filed for a modification of the support ordered in this case he answered, “no ma’am” 
and elaborated, “I feel like I want to take care of my children and everything. . . .  I’m not trying 
to get out of paying it I just . . . . I’m trying the best I can.”  Tr. at 69-70.  When asked on redirect 
examination, “In addition to looking for new employment then, after you lost your job last fall, 
have you done anything else to raise money to pay your support?” Smith responded, “[I] really 
haven’t had any way.  I mean, I’ve been barely skimming by and really it’s hard just putting food 
on the table.”  Tr. at 71.  From this testimony we are of the view that the trial judge as fact finder 
could reasonably conclude that Smith knowingly failed to pay current child support every week 
as required by the terms of his probation.   
 
6 
B. Inability to pay 
 
 
The record shows that at the revocation hearing Smith made no explicit argument 
concerning his inability to pay support.  The record reveals that Smith was employed during part 
of the time between November 2008 and December 2009.  But it does not clearly indicate his 
income was such that he was unable to pay support as ordered.  In fact Smith’s own testimony 
revealed that even when he was employed full time he did not make his regular support 
payments.  See Tr. at 73.  At the hearing Smith focused on his various medical problems, 
hospital stays, required treatments, and lack of health insurance.  Apparently Smith was 
attempting to show – at least by inference – that he was unable to work and thus unable to pay 
support.  But as the trial court observed, “I simply cannot tell from the records whether he’s able 
to work or incapable of working.  All I know is that he was in the hospital.  There is nothing 
from a physician or a doctor indicating that he’s not capable of working.”  Tr. at 75. 
 
It is the probationer’s burden “to show facts related to the inability to pay and indicating 
sufficient bona fide efforts to pay so as to persuade the trial court that further imprisonment 
should not be ordered.”  Runyon, 939 N.E.2d at 617.  Here Smith failed to carry his burden.  The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Smith’s probation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.  
 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan and David, JJ., concur.