Title: Rankin v. United Commercial Travelers of America
Citation: 193 Kan. 248, 392 P.2d 894
Docket Number: 43,702
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 1964

193 Kan. 248 (1964)
392 P.2d 894
RUBY LaVERNE RANKIN, Appellant,
v.
UNITED COMMERCIAL TRAVELERS OF AMERICA, Appellee.
No. 43,702

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 6, 1964.
W. Luke Chapin, of Medicine Lodge, argued the cause, and appeared on the briefs for the appellant.
W.A. Kahrs, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Riley W. MacGregor and John W. MacGregor, both of Medicine Lodge, Robert H. Nelson, H.W. Fanning, Richard C. Hite, and Darrell D. Kellogg, all of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This is an appeal from a judgment holding that death from a heart attack while fighting a pasture fire was not an accidental death within the meaning of an accidental death certificate issued by a fraternal benefit society.
At a pretrial conference the above issue was presented to the trial court on the statement of counsel for the defendant that he would, for the purpose of having the issue determined, admit all facts alleged in the petition and also all facts contended for by the plaintiff at the pretrial conference. It is necessary, therefore, that the facts which were alleged in the petition, in detail, be presented. We quote in part, omitting introductory allegations:
The defendant in its answer demurred to the petition for the reason that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, admitted the general allegations of the petition for all practical purposes and further alleged:
The reply was a general denial.
After the issues were joined the case was set for a pretrial conference. It was there agreed by counsel for defendant that all of the facts stated by counsel for plaintiff would be admitted in addition to the facts alleged in the petition for the purpose of determining the question of law in advance of the trial. We have, therefore, searched the record for the purpose of determining what statements of fact were made at the pretrial conference which were not covered by the allegations of the petition.
Counsel for plaintiff stated in connection with the general nature of the terrain:
Counsel for plaintiff stated his contention as to the cause of the heart attack:
Counsel for defendant introduced the constitution and by-laws of the defendant as exhibits with the consent of plaintiff. Counsel for defendant stated in connection therewith:
The admissions as to medical testimony are disclosed by the following colloquy between counsel:
"Mr. Chapin: All right."
The case was submitted to the trial court as a question of law to be determined on the facts as admitted.
After careful consideration and following a well written and helpful memorandum opinion, the trial judge concluded that the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, stipulations and admissions should be sustained. Judgment was entered accordingly and plaintiff has appealed.
It would perhaps be helpful to all interested if we, before proceeding with the discussion, attempt to consolidate into one brief statement the issues of fact and issues of law which present the question for determination.
Where an able-bodied man, 54 years of age, without apparent physical or health impairment, dies of a heart attack caused exclusively from emotional strain, heat and physical exertion while engaged in fighting a large pasture fire, is the death the result of *252 bodily injury effected solely through external, violent and accidental means, independent of all other causes?
It is agreed by the parties that the defendant which issued the accident indemnity insurance certificate was a fraternal benefit society with its home office in the state of Ohio, and that the answer to the controversy should be determined by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Unfortunately the determination of the question based on the decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court presents a complicated problem. The court's decisions after its latest pronouncement do not appear to be in complete harmony. It would appear that the court is divided four to three on just what its decisions on the particular question do mean.
The first case from Ohio which touched directly on the question was Casualty Co. v. Johnson, 91 Ohio St. 155, 156, 110 N.E. 475. The appellee relies chiefly on this case and it was given considerable consideration by the lower court in making its determination. In its opinion the court stated the undisputed facts as follows:
It was held in the syllabus:
We must agree, as argued by appellee, that the Johnson case was decided on the distinction made between "accidental means" and "accidental results" and if followed would require the affirmance of the case now before us for consideration.
The Johnson case was decided in 1914. In 1940, the Ohio Supreme Court decided the case of Mitchell v. N.Y.L. Ins. Co., 136 Ohio St. 551, 27 N.E.2d 243. It was held:
We quote from the opinion at some length because what is there said is diametrically opposite to the conclusion reached in the next decision to be considered. On page 554 of the opinion the court, quoting from Rock v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 172 Cal. 462, 156 Pac. 1029, stated:
The opinion continued:
It will be noted that in Landress v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 78 L. Ed. 934, 54 S. Ct. 461, 90 A.L.R. 1382, cited in the above quotation, that recovery was denied for death from a sun stroke under an insurance policy covering death by accidental means because there was no "accidental means" although there was an "accidental result." The court stated that there must be some unforeseen or unintended condition or combination of circumstances, external to the victim's body, which contributed to the accidental result. It further stated:
Justice Cardozo warned in a dissenting opinion that an attempt to distinguish between "accidental means" and "accidental results" would plunge "this branch of the law into a Serbonian Bog."
At this point we would call special attention to the Landress case which is reported in 90 A.L.R. 1382 and an annotation follows at page 1387. The case and the annotation cite the numerous cases touching on the present controversy and they will not be repeated here.
Getting back to the Mitchell case, supra, the dissenting opinion approved by three of the justices is worthy of consideration because what was said was a forerunner of what was to come. It is stated at page 556:
The above statement was, in fact, followed in the next Ohio case which was decided in 1952. In Hammer v. Accident Assn., 158 Ohio St. 394, 395, 109 N.E.2d 649, the court had under consideration a sunstroke case. The facts are stated as follows:
*255 It was held:
The court stated in the opinion:
The court appears to have followed the general rule without stating the reason for it. The great weight of authority allows recovery for death from a sunstroke under an accidental death policy because it recognizes the accidental result although the instrumentality which caused the result was not necessarily accidental.
In the opinion the court attempts to distinguish its previous decisions. It said of Casualty Co. v. Johnson, supra:
We fail to distinguish between the above situation and one where the insured deliberately enters on a project which takes him out into the rays of the sun which are no hotter than he knows them to be and dies of a heart attack from heat exhaustion.
We agree with the statement in the dissenting opinion approved by three of the justices:
*256 Thus the Ohio court in the Hammer case has adopted what is now the general law in most jurisdictions, as stated in 166 A.L.R. 473:
Regardless of any distinction which the Ohio Supreme Court may make in the future between "accidental means" and "accidental result," we are unable to make any distinction between a case in which a man dies from a heart attack caused by heat exhaustion and overexertion from the rays of the sun in which he is working, and a case in which a man dies from a heart attack caused by heat exhaustion and overexertion from the flames of a pasture fire which he is fighting. If there is any distinction the latter would come nearer being an unusual occurrence and the result of accidental means, if it is desired to distinguish between "accidental means" and "accidental result."
The court had to consider that the sunstroke in the Hammer case was, in and of itself, an accidental means, or drop its distinction between "accidental means" and "accidental cause." The decisions which hold that death from a heart attack as the result of a sunstroke, consider "accidental means" as a means or a cause that is unexpected, unforeseen, and fortuitous; it is an accidental event, unexpected and unforeseeable, an occurrence that is unexpected and unforeseen.
The Ohio Supreme Court appears to have adopted the rule that where death or injury is not the natural and probable result of a voluntary and intentional act by the insured, or something unforeseen or unexpected or unusual occurs in the act which precedes the injury, then the injury is the result of accidental means.
In cases arising under accident insurance policies, where possible negligence on the part of the assured does not affect the question of liability, the efficient cause of a sunstroke, the vis major which inflicts the injury, is considered to be the excessive heat, and it must, therefore, be deemed "the means" of the injury.
The general rule permitting recovery for heart attacks under circumstances such as are before us for consideration is stated in 56 A.L.R.2d 816, with supporting citations as follows:
We are forced to conclude that under the authority of Hammer v. Accident Assn., supra, where an able bodied man, without apparent physical or health impairment, dies of a heart attack caused exclusively from emotional strain, heat and physical exertion while engaged in fighting a pasture fire, the death is the result of bodily injury effected solely through external, violent and accidental means.
The plaintiff may not be able to prove the facts alleged in the petition which brings the case within the above rule but she should have the opportunity.
It follows from what has been said that the trial court erroneously rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, as a matter of law, on the pleadings, stipulations and admissions following the pretrial conference.
The conclusion reached renders unnecessary a discussion of other alleged trial errors.
The judgment is reversed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.