Title: Whitehead v. Toyota Motor Corp.
Citation: 897 S.W.2d 684
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: May 1, 1995

897 S.W.2d 684 (1995) Mark D. WHITEHEAD; H.D. Whitehead; and Jean D. Whitehead, Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, v. TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION; Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.; and Toyota Motor Distributors, Inc., Defendants-Petitioners-Respondents. Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville. May 1, 1995. *685 Fred C. Dance, Dance, Dance &amp; Lane, Nashville, for plaintiffs. Dennis J. Meaker and Winston S. Evans, Evans, Jones &amp; Reynolds, Nashville, for amicus curiae. John A. McReynolds, Jr., Baker, McReynolds, Byrne, Brackett, O'Kane &amp; Shea, Knoxville, for defendants. T. Harold Pinkley and Wynne C. Hall, Paine, Swiney &amp; Tarwater, Knoxville, for amicus curiae. DROWOTA, Justice. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, this Court has accepted two questions certified to us by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. The questions are as follows: 1. Whether the affirmative defense of comparative fault can be raised in a products liability action based on strict liability in tort? 2. If the affirmative defense of comparative fault may be raised in a products liability action based upon strict liability in tort, is this defense applicable to an enhanced injury case where it is undisputed that the alleged defect in the defendant's product did not cause or contribute to the underlying accident? For the following reasons, we answer each of these questions in the affirmative. This is a products liability action that arises from an accident that occurred on January 22, 1992. On that day Mark D. Whitehead, plaintiff, was injured when a 1988 Toyota pickup truck that he was driving crossed the center line of the road and collided head-on with a vehicle that was traveling in the opposite direction from Mr. Whitehead's pickup truck. The plaintiffs sued the defendants, the manufacturer and seller of the truck, based on the plaintiffs' contention that Mark D. Whitehead's injuries were enhanced beyond those he would have received had the truck he was driving been more crashworthy. The plaintiffs specifically contend that the seatbelt system of the Toyota pickup truck was defective. See T.C.A. § 29-28-105. The defendants answered the complaint, maintaining that there were no defects in the truck. The defendants also asserted, inter alia, the affirmative defense of comparative fault. The plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment in which they sought to have the U.S. District Court dismiss the defendants' affirmative defenses, including the defense of comparative fault. On June 24, 1994, the district court entered an order in which it granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed all of the defendants' affirmative defenses, including the defense of comparative fault. With respect to the defense of comparative fault, the district court stated that "... the Court will not charge comparative fault in this case. It will abide by its earlier decisions that the comparative fault defense is not applicable to an action based on strict liability in tort." The defendants then filed a motion in the district court in which they sought an interlocutory appeal on the comparative fault issue. The court granted the defendants' motion for an interlocutory appeal, stating as follows: *686 The district court then certified to this Court the first question listed above; and we accepted the question by an order dated August 19, 1994. Pursuant to a motion filed by the plaintiffs, the district court amended its first certification order to add the second question listed above. We entered an order on September 22, 1994, accepting certification of the second question. After briefing of the issues by the parties and by amicus curiae, we set this case for oral argument to be heard on February 6, 1995, in Nashville. On May 4, 1992, this Court decided McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992), in which we adopted a system of modified comparative fault. We described the system as follows: 833 S.W.2d at 57. After setting forth our holding, we acknowledged that the decision would drastically transform the law in Tennessee by stating that "[w]e recognize that today's decision affects numerous legal principles surrounding tort litigation. For the most part, harmonizing these principles with comparative fault must await another day." 833 S.W.2d at 57. However, we believed that such changes were justified in order to achieve a system that more closely links liability and fault. Since our decision in McIntyre, we have consistently applied the doctrine of comparative fault to other legal principles. In Perez v. McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. 1994), we held that the doctrine of secondary implied assumption of risk should not be retained as a separate defense but that, "[t]he reasonableness of a party's conduct in confronting a risk should be determined under the principles of comparative fault." 872 S.W.2d at 905. In Bervoets v. Harde Ralls Pontiac-Olds, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 905 (Tenn. 1994), we held that the remedy of contribution was not abolished by McIntyre and that actions for contribution should be tried in accordance with the principles of comparative fault. We continued to integrate our system of comparative fault into Tennessee law in Eaton v. McLain, 891 S.W.2d 587 (Tenn. 1994), where we set forth a general set of guidelines to assist trial courts and juries in their duties of apportioning fault. And in Volz v. Ledes, 895 S.W.2d 677 (Tenn. 1995), we confirmed that the doctrine of joint and several liability had been rendered obsolete by our decision in McIntyre, reasoning as follows: 895 S.W.2d at 680. With this background in mind, we now turn to the decisions of two federal courts which have considered the issue of whether the doctrine of comparative fault as enunciated in McIntyre applies in strict liability actions. These two decisions have yielded conflicting results. In McKinnie v. Ludell Manufacturing Co., Inc., 825 F. Supp. 834 (W.D.Tenn. 1993), the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee (Judge James D. Todd) held that comparative fault does apply to products liability actions based on strict liability. In reaching this conclusion, the district court focussed on this Court's emphasis on "fault" in McIntyre. The court stated as follows: 825 F. Supp. at 838-839. (Emphasis added.) The district court concluded its analysis by stating that: 825 F. Supp. at 840-841. In Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck &amp; Co., 834 F. Supp. 987 (E.D.Tenn. 1993), however, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee (Judge Thomas G. Hull, the certifying Judge in this case) reached the opposite result from that announced in McKinnie. The district court supported its conclusion by reasoning that: 834 F. Supp. at 989. Before we are able to determine which of these opposing positions is correct, and, therefore, to answer the first question certified to us by the federal district court, we must first examine two crucial areas: (1) the strict liability law in Tennessee before McIntyre was decided; and (2) how other jurisdictions have handled this question. In Ford Motor Company v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966), a case that was disposed of in favor of the plaintiff based on a manufacturer's misrepresentations regarding its product, this Court approved the theory of strict liability as expressed in Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.[1] The Court's decision in that case was closely followed by our decision in Olney v. Beaman Bottling Co., 220 Tenn. 459, 418 S.W.2d 430 (1967), in which we stated as follows: 418 S.W.2d at 431 (emphasis added). Our statement in Olney that strict liability could be imposed on the manufacturer of a product "without fault on his part," was, however, subsequently modified by Ford Motor Company v. Eads, 224 Tenn. 473, 457 S.W.2d 28 (1970), where we stated that such liability could be imposed "without proof of negligence on [the manufacturer's] part." 457 S.W.2d at 30 (emphasis added). Moreover, in Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1973), we again recognized that the concept of fault is inherent in the doctrine of strict products liability. In Ellithorpe, we began our analysis by setting forth the elements of the doctrine of strict liability in tort: 503 S.W.2d at 519 (citations omitted). The Ellithorpe court then noted that contributory negligence does not serve as a defense in a strict liability action. However, we did recognize that "assumption of risk" is a proper defense in such cases. We explained the reasons for this distinction as follows: 503 S.W.2d at 521-522 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Therefore, it is apparent that the Ellithorpe court found that "one who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous" is thereby engaging in "conduct which is culpable." The Court likened the distribution of a product that is in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" to "ultra hazardous or abnormally dangerous activities" or to the harboring of dangerous animals. Thus, while recognizing that strict products liability is not necessarily based upon a defendant's negligence, the Ellithorpe court acknowledged that the conduct that leads to liability based on a strict products liability theory does involve "fault," as that word is commonly understood. This acknowledgement represented a clear departure from the earlier statement in Olney that a manufacturer of a defective product could be held liable "without fault on his part." In 1978 the Tennessee General Assembly enacted the Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978. This legislation is currently codified at T.C.A. §§ 29-28-101, et seq. Under this act, a "product liability action" is defined to include: T.C.A. § 29-28-102(6). The key operative provision of the Act is T.C.A. § 29-28-105(a), which provides as follows: (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, "defective condition" is defined in T.C.A. § 29-28-102(2) to mean "a condition of a product that renders it unsafe for normal or anticipatable handling and consumption." And the term "unreasonably dangerous" is defined in T.C.A. § 29-28-102(8) as follows: Finally, T.C.A. § 29-28-106(b) provides as follows: (emphasis added.) Although the parties argue otherwise, we believe that the provisions of the Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978 do not control the issues before us. Courts in a majority of states that have considered the issue of whether comparative fault should apply in products liability actions based on strict liability in tort have decided that comparative fault should apply in such cases. A leading case is Butaud v. Suburban Marine &amp; Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976). In Butaud, the Supreme Court of Alaska explained the application of comparative fault to strict liability as follows: 555 P.2d at 45-46. Another leading case dealing with the application of comparative fault to strict liability is Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978). In that case the Supreme Court of California stated as follows: 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, at 385-387, 575 P.2d 1162, at 1167-1169. (emphasis in original.) In Suter v. San Angelo Foundry &amp; Machine Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979), the Supreme Court of New Jersey determined that New Jersey's comparative negligence statute should apply to strict liability actions.[2] In the course of making this determination, the Suter court stated as follows: 406 A.2d at 146. An overwhelming majority of states have adopted the view that comparative fault should apply to products liability actions based on strict liability. See Elliot v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 229 Conn. 500, 642 A.2d 709 (1994); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Kanecko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 65 Haw. 447, 654 P.2d 343 (1982); Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 111 Idaho 536, 726 P.2d 648 (1985); Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 73 Ill. Dec. 337, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983); Forsythe v. Coats Co., 230 Kan. 553, 639 P.2d 43 (1982); Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985); Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280 (Me. 1984); Brisboy v. Fibreboard Corp., 429 Mich. 540, 418 N.W.2d 650 (1988); Jack Frost, Inc. v. Engineered Bldg. Components Co., 304 N.W.2d 346 (Minn. 1981); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck Company, 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); Jaramillo *692 v. Fisher Controls Co., Inc., 102 N.M. 614, 698 P.2d 887 (App. 1985); Day v. General Motors Corp. 345 N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1984); Sandford v. Chevrolet Division, 292 Or. 590, 642 P.2d 624 (1982); Fiske v. MacGregor, 464 A.2d 719 (R.I. 1983); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984); Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981); Lundberg v. All-Pure Chemical Co., 55 Wash. App. 181, 777 P.2d 15 (1989); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 171 W. Va. 79, 297 S.E.2d 854 (1982); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967); Keltner v. Ford Motor Co., 748 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir.1984) (based on Arkansas law); Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D.Mont. 1981) (based on Montana law). See Applicability of Comparative Negligence Doctrine to Actions Based on Strict Liability in Tort, 9 ALR 4th 633. On the other hand, a minority of jurisdictions decline to apply comparative fault to strict liability actions. The minority view is expressed by the Supreme Court of South Dakota in Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W.2d 155 (S.D. 1979), in which that court stated: 278 N.W.2d at 160. Moreover, in Kinard v. Coats Company, Inc., 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1976), the Colorado Court of Appeals stated the following rationale in support of the minority view: 553 P.2d at 837. (citations omitted.)[3] Other decisions that express the minority view include Bowling v. Heil Co., 31 Ohio St.3d 277, 511 N.E.2d 373 (1987); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okl. 1974); Phillips v. Duro-Lasting Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834 (Wyo. 1991). It appears that many legal scholars agree with the majority position that comparative fault should apply to products liability actions based on strict liability in tort. See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, 3d Ed., Section 11.2 (1994); Carol A. Mutter, Moving to Comparative Negligence in an Era of Tort Reform: Decisions for Tennessee, 57 Tenn.L.Rev. 199, at 302 (1990); Grey Greenlee &amp; Ann Rochelle, Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability A Marriage of Necessity, 18 Land &amp; Water L.Rev. 643 (1983); Victor E. Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 Tenn. L.Rev. 171 (1974). Most of the states which have a modified form of comparative fault, such as the one adopted by this Court in McIntyre, have concluded that the same type of modified comparative fault that applies generally should apply to strict liability actions. Included in the decisions that express this view are Forsythe v. Coats Co., 230 Kan. 553, 639 P.2d 43 (1982); Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280 (Me. 1984); Sandford v. Chevrolet Division, 292 Or. 590, 642 P.2d 624 (1982); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 171 W. Va. 79, 297 S.E.2d 854 (1982). *693 A minority of jurisdictions that otherwise apply a form of modified comparative fault apply pure comparative fault to strict liability actions. See e.g., Hao v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 69 Haw. 231, 738 P.2d 416 (1987). In light of the foregoing discussion, our answer to the first question certified to us is that comparative fault principles do apply in products liability actions based on strict liability in tort. The conduct that leads to strict products liability involves fault, as the word "fault" is commonly understood. See generally William C. Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 Tex.L.Rev. 777 (1983). In keeping with the principle of linking liability with fault, a plaintiff's ability to recover in a strict products liability case should not be unaffected by the extent to which his injuries result from his own fault. Two principal reasons for the adoption of the doctrine of strict products liability in Tennessee and elsewhere were (1) to encourage greater care in the manufacture of products that are distributed to the public, and (2) to relieve injured consumers from the burden of proving negligence on a manufacturer's part. Our decision today does not weaken these principles. The incentive to exercise care in manufacturing is maintained because manufacturers remain liable for distributing defective products, even though the amount of such liability is determined, in part, by the extent to which a consumer's own fault causes his injuries. There is still no requirement that negligence on the part of a manufacturer be proved, only that the manufacturer distributed a defective or unreasonably dangerous product. The same form of modified comparative fault that we adopted in McIntyre, under which a plaintiff can recover as long as his fault is less than that of the defendant with recovery being reduced in proportion to the plaintiff's fault, will apply to strict products liability actions. The triers of fact will determine the percentage of a plaintiff's damages that is attributable to the defective or unreasonably dangerous product as well as the percentage that is attributable to the plaintiff's own fault. The second certified question from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District is: The majority view among jurisdictions that have considered this question is that comparative fault should be applied to such an enhanced injury case. Representative of the majority view is the decision of the Supreme Court of North Dakota in Day v. General Motors Corporation, 345 N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1984). In that case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota answered questions that had been certified to it by the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota. These questions included the following: 1. In a personal injury action against the manufacturer of a product wherein the plaintiff is seeking damages under a theory of strict liability based on an alleged design defect which plaintiff claims enhanced the injury, should plaintiff's percentage of fault be determined and applied so as to reduce or, as the case may be, defeat plaintiff's recovery? 2. If plaintiff's percentage of fault is relevant, should the determination include both plaintiff's accident producing fault and injury enhancing fault so as to reduce or, as the case may be, defeat plaintiff's recovery? 345 N.W.2d at 351. The Day court answered both of the foregoing questions in the affirmative, stating that "we agree that the ultimate objective of comparing negligence in a products liability case is to apportion, on a percentage basis, all causes of the mishap resulting in damages." 345 N.W.2d at 354. The majority view is based on the belief that the fault of the defendant and of the *694 plaintiff should be compared with each other with respect to all damages and injuries for which the conduct of each party is a cause in fact and a proximate cause. Other decisions expressing the majority view that comparative fault should be applied in enhanced injury products liability cases include Doupnik v. General Motors Corporation, 275 Cal.Rpt. 715, 225 Cal. App. 3d 849 (3rd Dist. 1990); Dahl v. BMW, 304 Or. 558, 748 P.2d 77 (Or. 1987); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984); Austin v. Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis.2d 628, 273 N.W.2d 233 (1979); Keltner v. Ford Motor Co., 748 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir.1984) (based on Arkansas law); Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 645 F. Supp. 909 (D.Colo. 1986) (based on Colorado law); Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D.Mont. 1981) (based on Montana law); Hinkamp v. American Motors Corp., 735 F. Supp. 176 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (based on North Carolina law). Most legal scholars prefer the view that comparative fault should be applied to a claim for enhanced injuries. See e.g., Victor E. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, 3d Ed. Section 11-5(a) (1994). The opposing minority view is exemplified by Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1992), in which the Supreme Court of Iowa, in reversing an earlier decision in Hillrichs v. Avco Corp., 478 N.W.2d 70 (Iowa 1991), held that a plaintiff's initial negligence in causing an accident should not be considered in apportioning damages based on injuries that are enhanced as a result of a defective product. In reaching this conclusion, the Reed court stated: 494 N.W.2d at 230 (emphasis in original). Thus, implicit in the Reed court's holding is the premise that a plaintiff's initial negligence in causing an accident is not a proximate cause of his enhanced injuries. Other decisions representing the minority view that comparative fault principles should not apply to enhanced injury cases include Andrews v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 106 Nev. 533, 796 P.2d 1092 (Nev. 1990); Cota v. Harley Davidson, 141 Ariz. 7, 684 P.2d 888 (Ariz. App. 1984). In light of the foregoing discussion, our response to the second question certified to us is that comparative fault principles will apply to enhanced injury cases in which the defective product does not cause or contribute to the underlying accident. The respective fault of the manufacturer and of the consumer should be compared with each other with respect to all damages and injuries for which the fault of each is a cause in fact and a proximate cause. The percentages of fault for such damages will be assigned in accordance with the principles discussed in Eaton, supra. Our response is partially based on the fact that having answered the first question in the affirmative, we believe that it would be illogical to answer this question in the negative. Any claim for "enhanced injuries" is nothing more than a claim for injuries that were actually and proximately caused by the defective product. For example, suppose that a plaintiff is driving a car and is involved in a two-car accident, for which plaintiff is entirely at fault; suppose further that plaintiff incurs $100,000 in damages as a result of this accident. Even though plaintiff's fault precludes him from recovering from the other driver, plaintiff brings an action against the manufacturer of the car, alleging that the seat belt system is defective. Plaintiff alleges that if the seat belt system had been properly designed and installed, he would have only suffered $50,000 in damages. This type of claim is often characterized as one for "enhanced injuries." The name given to the action has no real significance, however, because it merely represents the portion of the total damages for which the manufacturer is potentially liable; it is the "products *695 liability" component of the suit. (The manufacturer could not be liable for the first $50,000 in damages, which would have been incurred even if the seat belt had been properly manufactured and installed). Therefore, it is illogical to hold that comparative fault applies to products liability actions generally, but does not apply to "enhanced injury" claims. The questions are, in reality, the same. To conclude generally, comparative fault in strict products liability actions, as in other actions, constitutes an affirmative defense under Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. One of the parties who has filed an amicus brief in this matter has invited us to address issues other than the two questions that have been certified in this matter. We decline to do so because these issues are not properly before us. The Clerk will transmit this opinion in accordance with Rule 23, Section 8 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. The costs in this Court will be taxed equally between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants. ANDERSON, C.J., and REID, BIRCH and WHITE, JJ., concur. [1] Lonon was overruled on other grounds by First Nat. Bank of Louisville v. Brooks Farms, 821 S.W.2d 925, 929, 931 (Tenn. 1991). [2] Suter has since been superseded by statute. See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 577 A.2d 1239 (1990). [3] Kinard has since been superseded by statute. See Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470 (10th Cir.1990).