Title: State v. Jackson
Citation: 348 N.C. 644
Docket Number: 244PA97
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: July 30, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 244PA97
FILED: 30 JULY 1998
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
ELIZABETH WASHINGTON JACKSON
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a
decision of the Court of Appeals, 126 N.C. App. 129, 484 S.E.2d
405 (1997), setting aside a judgment entered by Martin (Jerry
Cash), J., on 16 November 1995 in Superior Court, Forsyth County,
and awarding defendant a new trial.  Heard in the Supreme Court
17 December 1997.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by William P. Hart,
Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.
The Law Offices of J. Darren Byers, P.A., by J. Darren
Byers; and Guy B. Oldaker III for defendant-appellee.
MITCHELL, Chief Justice.
On 24 April 1995, defendant was indicted by a Forsyth County
grand jury for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill
inflicting serious injury in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-32(a). 
She was tried at the 13 November 1995 Criminal Session of
Superior Court, Forsyth County.  The jury found defendant guilty
as charged.  On 16 November 1995, after making findings in
aggravation and mitigation, the trial court entered judgment
sentencing defendant to a term of from 108 to 139 months’
imprisonment.  Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.  The
Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had erred by
admitting hearsay evidence under the state of mind exception to
the hearsay rule in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the
North Carolina Constitution and ordered a new trial.  This Court
allowed the State’s petition for discretionary review.
The evidence at trial tended to show inter alia that on the
morning of 31 October 1994, defendant Elizabeth Jackson shot her
husband General Jackson five times with a .25-caliber pistol. 
The shooting occurred at the Evergreen Cemetery.  The victim, who
survived the shooting, was later found by a cemetery employee.  A
police officer who arrived at the scene identified the victim,
determined that he had been shot in the head and chest, and found
five spent cartridges on the ground nearby.
At no time after shooting her husband did defendant call an
ambulance or attempt to get help for him.  Following the
shooting, defendant, carrying her child, walked out of the
cemetery.  She left her wounded husband lying in some weeds in a
wooded area of the cemetery and their car stuck in the mud. 
Defendant got a ride home and called her mother.  Defendant said
that the victim had tried to kill her and that she had shot him. 
Defendant then called her friend Tanzia to pick her up to take
her to retrieve the car.  When Tanzia arrived, defendant had a
shovel and told Tanzia that her car was stuck at the cemetery. 
They looked for a wrecker to pull her out of the mud but were
unable to find one.
Failing to find a wrecker, Tanzia drove past the cemetery
while returning to defendant’s home.  Tanzia and defendant saw
numerous emergency vehicles at the cemetery as they drove by. 
Defendant then “started crying,” “saying she shot [her husband],
she killed him,” and had Tanzia take her to a magistrate. 
Defendant was hysterical and crying at the magistrate’s office,
where she surrendered a .25-caliber Raven pistol and stated that
she had killed a man.  It was later determined that the five
spent cartridges found at the cemetery were fired from the pistol
that defendant brought to the magistrate’s office.
The victim was taken to Baptist Hospital where he stayed for
about two months.  He had suffered bullet wounds to the head, the
right jaw, the left side of his neck, the left side of his chest,
and the left lower back.  The victim’s injuries left him with
impaired communication abilities.  At the time of the trial, he
was unable to speak in complete sentences.  He responded to
questions requiring “yes” or “no” answers inconsistently in that
he gave inappropriate responses half of the time.  However, on
voir dire, the trial court ruled that the victim was “competent
to testify in this matter as a witness.”  The victim was present
for the trial but was not called as a witness by either party.
The State called the victim’s mother, Lillian Jackson, to
testify about a conversation she had with her son on 30 October
1994, the day before the shooting.  The trial court conducted a
voir dire and concluded that her testimony was hearsay but
relevant and admissible under the state of mind exception to the
hearsay rule.  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803(3) (1992).  The trial
court further concluded under Rule 403 of the North Carolina
Rules of Evidence that the probative value of her testimony
outweighed any danger of unfair prejudicial effect.  N.C.G.S. §
8C-1, Rule 403 (1992).
Lillian Jackson testified at trial that her son, the victim
General Jackson, had told her that late on the night of
29 October 1994, he and defendant had an argument.  Later, in the
early morning hours of 30 October 1994, he saw defendant’s car in
a church parking lot and stopped to speak with her.  Defendant
put a gun to his head and asked if that was “what he wanted.” 
She then put the gun to her head and asked “or is this what you
want.”  The victim then left the church parking lot, went to his
mother’s house, and told her what had just happened.  The victim
told her that defendant was “serious about hurting him and
breaking up with him” and that “she had scared him so bad” that
he was going downtown to file for divorce the next day.
In support of its assignment of error, the State argues that
North Carolina’s Confrontation Clause does not afford a defendant
more protection than its federal counterpart.  Therefore, the
State contends that the Court of Appeals erred by awarding
defendant a new trial.
Defendant argues that the Court of Appeals was correct in
holding that admission of Lillian Jackson’s testimony under the
state of mind exception violated the Confrontation Clause of the
North Carolina Constitution and required that defendant have a
new trial.  N.C. Const. art. I, § 23.  In making this argument,
defendant contends that North Carolina’s Confrontation Clause
requires that the trial court make a finding of necessity before
hearsay can be admitted against a defendant in a criminal trial,
even if the hearsay falls within a firmly rooted exception to the
hearsay rule.  Therefore, defendant contends, the Confrontation
Clause of the North Carolina Constitution is more protective of
an individual’s rights in this regard than its federal
counterpart.  The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant on this
point and ordered a new trial.  For the reasons that follow, we
hold that the Confrontation Clause of the North Carolina
Constitution does not require a showing or finding of necessity
before hearsay testimony may properly be admitted under a firmly
rooted exception to the hearsay rule.
Questions concerning the proper construction and application
of the North Carolina Constitution can be answered with finality
only by this Court.  State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C.
438, 449, 385 S.E.2d 473, 479 (1989); State v. Arrington, 311
N.C. 633, 643, 319 S.E.2d 254, 260 (1984).  We have said that
even where provisions of the state and federal Constitutions are
identical, “we have the authority to construe our own
constitution differently from the construction by the United
States Supreme Court of the Federal Constitution, as long as our
citizens are thereby accorded no lesser rights than they are
guaranteed by the parallel federal provision.”  State v. Carter,
322 N.C. 709, 713, 370 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1988).  Strictly
speaking, however, a state may still construe a provision of its
constitution as providing less rights than are guaranteed by a
parallel federal provision.  Nevertheless, because the United
States Constitution is binding on the states, the rights it
guarantees must be applied to every citizen by the courts of
North Carolina, so no citizen will be “accorded lesser rights” no
matter how we construe the state Constitution.  For all practical
purposes, therefore, the only significant issue for this Court
when interpreting a provision of our state Constitution
paralleling a provision of the United States Constitution will
always be whether the state Constitution guarantees additional
rights to the citizen above and beyond those guaranteed by the
parallel federal provision.  In this respect, the United States
Constitution provides a constitutional floor of fundamental
rights guaranteed all citizens of the United States, while the
state constitutions frequently give citizens of individual states
basic rights in addition to those guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.
States remain free to interpret their own constitutions in
any way they see fit, including constructions which grant a
citizen rights where none exist under the federal Constitution. 
Lowe v. Tarble, 313 N.C. 460, 462, 329 S.E.2d 648, 650 (1985). 
In construing the North Carolina Constitution, this Court is not
bound by the decisions of federal courts, including the United
States Supreme Court.  Preston, 325 N.C. at 449-50, 385 S.E.2d at
479.  However, we give the most serious consideration to those
decisions, and “in our discretion we may conclude that the
reasoning of such decisions is persuasive.”  Id. at 450, 385
S.E.2d at 479.  In such cases, we will follow the reasoning of
the federal court and apply it in construing our state
constitutional provision.  Bearing these principles in mind, we
turn to a review of the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court construing the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.
United States Constitution
The relationship between exceptions to the hearsay rule and
the Confrontation Clause has been the subject of considerable 
discourse.  While the Confrontation Clause and rules of hearsay
may protect similar values, it would be an erroneous
simplification to conclude that the Confrontation Clause is
merely a codification of hearsay rules.  California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 155, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489, 495 (1970).  Evidence admitted
under an exception to the hearsay rule may still violate the
Confrontation Clause.  Id. at 155-56, 26 L. Ed. 2d at 495-96. 
The Confrontation Clause has its roots in the English common law
practice of trying prisoners using the affidavits and sworn
statements of witnesses or “accusers” rather than having the
witnesses brought before the court to testify in the presence of
the accused.  Id. at 156-57, 26 L. Ed. 2d at 496.  Sir Walter
Raleigh was tried for and convicted of treason in this fashion. 
Id. at 156-57 n.10, 26 L. Ed. 2d at 496 n.10.  The Confrontation
Clause seems to have been adopted in part to protect against this
practice.  Id. at 157-58, 26 L. Ed. 2d at 496-97.
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court decided Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980).  It was frequently
read as adopting a rule that the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment established two requirements for the admission of
any hearsay evidence.  First, “[i]n the usual case . . . , the
prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the
unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use
against the defendant.”  Id. at 65, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 607.  Second,
the hearsay sought to be introduced must be marked with such
trustworthiness that there is no material departure from the
reason for the general rule that the defendant have an
opportunity to confront the witnesses against him.  Id.  The
Court did expressly state, however, that such trustworthiness or
reliability “can be inferred without more in a case where the
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.”  Id. at
66, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 608.
Six years later, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify its
statement of the law in Roberts with regard to the Confrontation
Clause.  United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 89 L. Ed. 2d 390
(1986).  In response to an inferior federal court’s conclusion in
Inadi that Roberts had established a “clear constitutional rule”
requiring a showing of unavailability of a nontestifying
declarant before any out-of-court statement by the defendant
could be admitted, the Supreme Court said that Roberts “does not
stand for such a wholesale revision of the law of evidence, nor
does it support such a broad interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause.”  Id. at 392, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 396.  The Court pointed out
that in the Roberts opinion, it had “disclaimed any intention of
proposing a general answer to the many difficult questions
arising out of the relationship between the Confrontation Clause
and hearsay.”  Id.  The Court also cited several instances of
limiting language in the Roberts opinion which it said showed
that
Roberts should not be read as an abstract answer to
questions not presented in that case, but rather as a
resolution of the issue the Court said it was
examining:  “the constitutional propriety of the
introduction in evidence of the preliminary hearing
testimony of a witness not produced at the defendant’s
subsequent state criminal trial.”
Id. at 392-93, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 397 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at
58, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 602).  The Court went on to say that Roberts
had reaffirmed the long-standing unavailability requirement as
applied to former sworn testimony but did not support the
proposition that the requirement’s reach had been extended to all
hearsay.  Id. at 393-94, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 397-98.
The Court then proceeded to distinguish its application of
the unavailability requirement to former testimony in Roberts
from the application of that requirement to co-conspirators’ out-
of-court prior statements, the issue before it in Inadi.  Id. at
394, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 398.  The Court reasoned that former sworn
testimony
seldom has independent evidentiary significance of its
own, but is intended to replace live testimony.  If the
declarant is available and the same information can be
presented to the trier of fact in the form of live
testimony, with full cross-examination and the
opportunity to view the demeanor of the declarant,
there is little justification for relying on the weaker
version.  When two versions of the same evidence are
available, longstanding principles of the law of
hearsay, applicable as well to Confrontation Clause
analysis, favor the better evidence.
Id.  The Court reasoned in Inadi that the principle that in-court
testimony is the best evidence and should be favored does not
apply to co-conspirator statements, because the statements of
co-conspirators illuminate the nature and context of the
conspiracy and therefore cannot be reproduced by in-court
testimony.  Id. at 395, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 398.  Also, at trial, the
co-conspirators are no longer partners in crime with a common
goal.  As defendants, they may even have conflicting interests
which render their in-court testimony less reliable than their
out-of-court statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
Id. at 395, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 398-99.  Therefore, the
unavailability requirement is of little benefit in ensuring that
the better evidence is admitted in the context of co-conspirator
statements.  Id. at 396, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 399.  Ultimately, the
application of the unavailability requirement to co-conspirator
statements would yield few benefits and would impose significant
burdens.  Id. at 398-99, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 400-01.  In summary, the
Court held in Inadi that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment did not call for an unavailability requirement in cases
of co-conspirator statements and disavowed a reading of Roberts
that would apply the unavailability requirement to all hearsay. 
Id. at 400, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 401.
The United States Supreme Court again found it necessary to
clarify the relationship between hearsay and the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,
116 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1992).  There, the issue was whether hearsay
admitted under the excited utterance and the statement for
medical treatment exceptions violated the Confrontation Clause. 
Id. at 348-49, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 854-55.  The Court held that the
hearsay in question did not violate the Confrontation Clause. 
Id. at 357, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 860.  In reaching this conclusion,
the Court reaffirmed its analysis in Inadi and applied it to the
facts of White.  In its discussion, the Court pointed out that
under Inadi, the unavailability requirement was limited to prior
testimony.  Id. at 354, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 858.  The Court again
distinguished former in-court testimony from hearsay admitted
under a firmly rooted exception and, in the process, illuminated
the relative weakness of former in-court testimony.  Id. 
Finally, the Court reiterated that in cases of firmly rooted
exceptions to the rule against hearsay, the benefits of the
unavailability requirement would be few and the burdens would be
substantial.  Id. at 355, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 858-59.  The Court
summarized its reasoning and holding by stating:
The preference for live testimony in the case of
statements like those offered in Roberts is because of
the importance of cross-examination, “the greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.” 
Green, 399 U.S. at 158, 26 L. Ed. 2d [at 497].  Thus
courts have adopted the general rule prohibiting the
receipt of hearsay evidence.  But where proffered
hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to
come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay
rule, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied.
White, 502 U.S. at 356, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 859 (emphasis added)
(citation modified).  White, therefore, seems clearly to limit
the application of the unavailability requirement to cases
involving former testimony.  White resolves the conflict between
the Confrontation Clause and exceptions to the rule against
hearsay in favor of admitting hearsay that falls within a firmly
rooted exception, even in cases where there is no showing of any
particular necessity for or trustworthiness of the hearsay
evidence.
North Carolina Constitution
North Carolina’s rule prohibiting hearsay and the exceptions
thereto are now completely statutory creations.  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1,
Rules 801-806 (1992).  Defendant contends, and the Court of
Appeals held, that the trial court’s admission of the victim’s
mother’s testimony under the state of mind exception in the
present case violated defendant’s rights under the Confrontation
Clause of the North Carolina Constitution.  N.C. Const. art. I, §
23.
Defendant contends that prior decisions of this Court have
indicated that if the prosecution introduces hearsay evidence of
any type, it violates the Confrontation Clause of the North
Carolina Constitution unless it complies with a two-prong
constitutional test for the admission of hearsay by establishing
(1) necessity, and (2) trustworthiness.  E.g., State v. Swindler,
339 N.C. 469, 472-73, 450 S.E.2d 907, 910 (1994) (defendant
argued both federal and state Confrontation Clauses); State v.
Peterson, 337 N.C. 384, 390, 446 S.E.2d 43, 47-48 (1994) (same);
State v. Felton, 330 N.C. 619, 640, 412 S.E.2d 344, 357 (1992)
(same); State v. Deanes, 323 N.C. 508, 514-15, 374 S.E.2d 249,
254 (1988) (same), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101, 104 L. Ed. 2d
1009 (1989).  We do not agree.  First, we note that in each of
those cases, the hearsay evidence was admitted under the residual
or “catchall” exceptions established by Rule 803(24) and Rule
804(b)(5).  Each of those rules expressly provides for the
admission of residual hearsay only if both trustworthiness and
necessity are established.  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rules 803(24),
804(b)(5); see State v. Triplett, 316 N.C. 1, 340 S.E.2d 736
(1986); State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 337 S.E.2d 833 (1985). 
“Necessity” in this context is not limited to a showing of
unavailability, such as when the declarant is dead, out of the
jurisdiction, or insane.  It also includes situations in which
the court “cannot expect, again, or at this time, to get evidence
of the same value from the same or other sources.”  5 John Henry
Wigmore, Evidence § 1421(2) (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1974); see
also State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 95, 337 S.E.2d 833, 846 (1985)
(quoting Rule 803(24), which provides that hearsay is admissible
if it “is more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts”).  Further, in each of our cases relied upon
by defendant, this Court dealt with Sixth Amendment challenges to
the admission of hearsay, as well as challenges under the North
Carolina Constitution.  The United States Supreme Court has
indicated that “residual” hearsay exceptions are not “firmly
rooted” exceptions to the general rule against hearsay and
therefore do not relieve the prosecution of the duty under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to establish the
necessity for and reliability or trustworthiness of the hearsay
evidence.  Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638,
653-54 (1990); see Peterson, 337 N.C. at 392, 446 S.E.2d at 49. 
In none of our cases cited -- Swindler, Peterson, Felton, and
Deanes -- was it necessary for us to decide whether the
Confrontation Clause of the North Carolina Constitution requires
that no hearsay evidence whatsoever be admitted unless the
prosecution has complied with a two-prong test by establishing
(1) necessity, and (2) reliability or trustworthiness.  Any
possible inferences to that effect in those decisions, therefore,
were mere dicta and are disapproved.
Importantly, in addressing the state constitutional issue
presented here, we note that in our analyses of Confrontation
Clause issues in Swindler, Peterson, Felton, and Deanes, we cited
and relied on the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Roberts or North Carolina cases which relied on Roberts for their
analysis of Confrontation Clause issues.  Swindler, 339 N.C. at
472-73, 450 S.E.2d at 910; Peterson, 337 N.C. at 392, 446 S.E.2d
at 49; Felton, 330 N.C. at 641, 412 S.E.2d at 357; Deanes, 323
N.C. at 515, 374 S.E.2d at 255.  Thus, it is apparent that we
have relied heavily upon the United States Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
in cases in which defendants have also raised confrontation
issues under the Confrontation Clause of the North Carolina
Constitution.  As we have noted, we are free to interpret our
state Constitution differently than the United States Supreme
Court interprets even identical provisions of the federal
Constitution.  It suffices here, however, to state that we find
the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States when
construing the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment in
Inadi and White persuasive, and we adopt and shall apply that
reasoning for purposes of resolving issues arising under the
Confrontation Clause of the North Carolina Constitution. 
Specifically, we agree that the
preference for live testimony in the case of statements
like those offered in Roberts [prior testimony under
oath] is because of the importance of cross-
examination, “the greatest legal engine ever invented
for the discovery of truth.”  Green, 399 U.S. at 158,
26 L. Ed. 2d [at 497].  Thus courts have adopted the
general rule prohibiting the receipt of hearsay
evidence.  But where proffered hearsay has sufficient
guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly
rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Confrontation
Clause is satisfied.
White, 502 U.S. at 356, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 859 (emphasis added)
(citation modified).  This reasoning is equally sound when
construing the Confrontation Clause of the North Carolina
Constitution.  Accordingly, we hold that where hearsay proffered
by the prosecution comes within a firmly rooted exception to the
hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause of the North Carolina
Constitution is not violated, even though no particularized
showing is made as to the necessity for using such hearsay or as
to its reliability or trustworthiness.
In the present case, the testimony of the victim’s mother
was admitted into evidence under the state of mind exception to
the hearsay rule.  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803(3).  The state of
mind exception is a “firmly rooted” exception to the hearsay
rule.  State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278, 318, 406 S.E.2d 876, 899
(1991); State v. Faucette, 326 N.C. 676, 684, 392 S.E.2d 71, 75
(1990).  Therefore, the Confrontation Clause of the North
Carolina Constitution was not violated.
In this case, the Court of Appeals took the view that the
Confrontation Clause of the North Carolina Constitution entitled
defendant to greater protection than that accorded him by the
United States Constitution.  The Court of Appeals stated that
“the prosecution in a criminal trial must, as a prerequisite to
the introduction of hearsay evidence, show the necessity for
using the hearsay testimony and establish the inherent
trustworthiness of the original declaration.”  State v. Jackson,
126 N.C. App. 129, 138, 484 S.E.2d 405, 411 (1997).  As a result,
the Court of Appeals concluded that “although Mrs. [Lillian]
Jackson’s testimony falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception, because [General] Jackson (the out-of-court declarant)
was available as a witness, the trial court erred in admitting
Mrs. Jackson’s testimony of her conversation with [General]
Jackson.”  Id.  For the reasons previously discussed in this
opinion, the Court of Appeals erred in this conclusion and in
awarding defendant a new trial.  The decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to that court for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.