Title: The Florida Bar v. John Newman Bryant
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC94-965
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 21, 2002

1.  The Bar argues that:  (1) the referee erred in finding Bryant not guilty of
violating Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.4(a) and 4-1.4(b) in the Albano
disciplinary proceeding; (2) the referee erred in finding Bryant not guilty of violating
rule 4-8.4(i) in the Rodehaver disciplinary proceeding; and (3) the referee’s
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
_______________________
Nos. SC94965 and SC00-801
_______________________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
JOHN NEWMAN BRYANT,
Respondent.
[February 21, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a referee’s report regarding alleged ethical breaches by
John Newman Bryant in two separate matters, which were consolidated by the
referee.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  The Bar raises three
issues for our review.1  Bryant only challenges the assessment of costs.
proposed punishment is not sufficient in light of Bryant’s ethical violations.
-2-
ALBANO DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
Frank Albano retained Bryant by telephone in April or May of 1996 to
defend Albano in a contempt hearing concerning a failure to pay child support.  At
the time, Albano lived in Richmond, Virginia, and requested that Bryant seek a
continuance at a previously scheduled May 6, 1996, hearing.  Bryant obtained the
continuance.  Bryant testified before the referee that he was “sure” that he had
talked with Albano after the May 6 hearing but produced no documentation
supporting that contention.  Albano testified that he moved in July 1996, to Virginia
Beach, Virginia, and telephoned Bryant with his new address and phone number. 
He further testified that he never heard from Bryant either by phone or
correspondence until the matter had been decided against him in December 1996.
The trial judge dismissed the suit on September 16, 1996, for a lack of
prosecution.  The suit was reinstated in October 1996, and a hearing was set for
December 6, 1996.  Bryant produced a letter dated October 24, 1996, addressed to
Albano at Albano’s former Virginia address, advising Albano of the December 6
hearing and requesting that Albano send Bryant records of all subsequent payments
Albano made to his ex-wife, Debra.  Albano testified that he never received that
letter.  Bryant produced a handwritten letter from Albano dated November 12,
-3-
1996, which purported to include evidence of his child support payments.  The
letter stated, “Here are the copies of payments to Debra that you requested.”
Bryant attended the December 6 hearing, and Albano did not appear.  The
trial judge denied Bryant’s oral request for a continuance and entered an order
against Albano requiring Albano to pay $2,900 in child support.  Bryant sent
Albano a letter to Albano’s former address explaining the outcome of the hearing
and detailing Bryant’s efforts to contact Albano.  Albano testified that he did not
know about the hearing until his ex-wife notified him about the result.  Albano
testified that after being notified by his ex-wife about the order, he attempted to talk
with Bryant several times to no avail.
The Bar charged respondent with violating rules 4-1.3 (diligence), 4-1.4(a)
(informing client of status of representation), 4-1.4(b) (duty to explain matters to
the client), and 4-8.4(g) (lawyer to respond to disciplinary agency during
investigation) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.  The referee found the
evidence stale in that both Bryant and Albano had trouble recollecting the events. 
The referee concluded based on the documentary evidence that Albano was
informed of the December 6, 1996, hearing.  The referee found that the contact
between Bryant and Albano was inadequate to prepare for such a serious hearing. 
The referee noted that some of the blame rested with Albano.  Accordingly, the
-4-
referee found Bryant not guilty of violating rules 4-1.4(a) and 4-1.4(b).  The referee,
however, found Bryant guilty of violating rule 4-1.3 (diligence), as Bryant did not
sufficiently attempt to protect Albano’s interest after it was clear that there had been
a loss of communication.
With regard to rule 4-8.4(g) (lawyer to respond to disciplinary agency during
investigation), the referee found that the Bar mailed correspondence to Bryant on
August 7, 1997, and August 28, 1997, regarding the Albano matter.  Bryant did not
respond to these letters, which resulted in a referral to the grievance committee on
September 7, 1997.  Bryant first responded to the grievance committee on April 10,
1998.  Accordingly, the referee additionally found Bryant guilty of violating rule 4-
8.4(g).
The Bar challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to the
referee’s determination that Bryant did not violate rules 4-1.4(a) (informing client of
status of representation) and 4-1.4(b) (duty to explain matters to the client).  The
Bar’s argument is premised upon its assertion that there was testimony in the
record to support a guilt finding.  According to the Bar, the referee failed to
consider the totality of the circumstances.
We do not disturb the referee’s not guilty determinations regarding rules 4-
1.4(a) and 4-1.4(b), as the record contains competent, substantial evidence to
-5-
support the referee’s findings.  See Florida Bar v. Vining, 761 So. 2d 1044, 1047
(Fla. 2000).  The record contains a letter dated October 24, 1996, in which Bryant
notifies Albano of the December 6 hearing and requests copies of the latest child
support payments, a handwritten letter dated November 12 in which Albano
responds with copies of his latest child support payments, and a letter dated
December 6 in which Bryant explains to Albano the results of the hearing.  These
documents provide an evidentiary basis for the referee’s finding that Bryant did
inform and explain matters to Albano.  The Bar’s argument that other evidence
exists in the record tending to establish the rule violations is without merit.  See id.
at 1048 (“[A] party does not satisfy [its] burden of showing that a referee's findings
are clearly erroneous by simply pointing to the contradictory evidence where there
is also competent, substantial evidence in the record that supports the referee's
findings.”).
We approve the referee’s determinations not contested by Bryant that Bryant
violated rules 4-1.3 and 4-8.4(g).
RODEHAVER DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
While the Albano proceeding was pending, the Bar alleged that in connection
with his representation of Pamela Rodehaver, Bryant violated rules 4-8.4(b) (lawyer
shall not commit criminal act reflecting adversely on lawyer’s honesty,
2.  There are no allegations of ethical violations with Bryant’s representation
of Herndon.  Testimony before the referee established that Bryant and Herndon had
been engaging in occasional sexual relations long before Bryant represented
Herndon on the municipal ordinance violation.
-6-
trustworthiness, or fitness), 4-8.4(d) (lawyer shall not engage in conduct prejudicial
to administration of justice), and 4-8.4(i) (lawyer shall not engage in sexual conduct
with client which exploits lawyer-client relationship).  The referee consolidated this
proceeding with the Albano proceeding.
Rodehaver and Barbara Herndon were arrested in October 1998 for a
misdemeanor violation of a municipal ordinance regulating exotic dancers. 
Herndon was a long-term acquaintance of Bryant, with whom she occasionally
engaged in sexual relations.2  Bryant’s normal fee for representing a defendant in
such a case was between $500 and $1500.  Rodehaver had little or no money, and
she suggested that Bryant represent her in exchange for sexual relations.  Bryant
agreed.  Bryant acknowledges that Rodehaver performed oral sex several times
during the pendency of the municipal ordinance charge.  The municipal ordinance
case was concluded to Rodehaver’s satisfaction.
Shortly after the conclusion of the municipal ordinance charge, Rodehaver
was again arrested.  This time, she was arrested on several first-degree felony
racketeering charges.  Authorities suspected that Rodehaver was operating a large
3.  Bryant wanted to take the depositions of several adult entertainers with
knowledge of the events because he feared that it would be difficult to remain in
contact with these individuals.
-7-
prostitution ring, which eventually turned out to only be a few women.  While
Rodehaver was being held in jail on a $100,000 bond, Bryant was contacted to
represent her.  Bryant visited Rodehaver in jail and agreed to represent her for
$2500.  Bryant accepted $750 as part of the payment.  Rodehaver did not make any
further payment despite Bryant’s attempts to collect.  There was no sex-for-service
discussion with regard to the felony case, and both Bryant and Rodehaver stated
that no sexual relations occurred during the felony case.
Rodehaver’s truck and computer were confiscated by the State.  Bryant was
able to obtain the return of the truck but not the computer.  Rodehaver and her
husband increasingly pressured Bryant to obtain the return of the computer.  Bryant
requested the remainder of his fee be paid so that he could conduct more
discovery.3  As no further payments were made, Bryant arranged a proffer with
Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) Agent Terrence Mullen.  Bryant’s
strategy was to demonstrate Rodehaver’s cooperation, which he hoped would lead
the State to reduce the charges or discuss a plea deal.  Agent Mullen was not
interested in the information Rodehaver had provided him as a proffer.
At about this time, Rodehaver contacted FDLE and related her version of her
4.  The transcript includes statements by Bryant that Rodehaver’s obligations
for the municipal case had been fulfilled, but there was no sex-for-service
discussion regarding the felony case.  The transcript does, however, reveal that
Bryant requested oral sex from Rodehaver on account that it was his birthday.
-8-
history with Bryant.  Rodehaver would later give to FDLE a sworn statement,
wherein she indicated that Bryant attempted to pressure her into having sex with
him or he would withhold legal services.  As Agent Mullen thought that Bryant
possibly was extorting Rodehaver, Mullen requested that Rodehaver wear a body
microphone so that Mullen could tape a conversation between Bryant and
Rodehaver.4  After that taped conversation, Mullen visited Bryant.  Bryant told
Mullen that he had engaged in oral sex with Rodehaver and Herndon in exchange
for legal services but denied threatening to quit working on the case.  Bryant
admitted to Mullen that Bryant told Rodehaver:  “The happier you keep me, the
harder I will work.”  Thereafter, Bryant withdrew from his representation of
Rodehaver because of the conflict of interest.  The public defender was appointed
to represent Rodehaver.
The referee concluded that trading sexual favors for legal service was not a
per se violation of rule 4-8.4(i) and found Bryant not guilty of violating rule 4.8.4(i). 
The referee found Bryant violated section 796.07, Florida Statutes (1997), which
outlaws prostitution.  Accordingly, the referee found Bryant guilty of violating rule
5.  Rule 4-8.4(i) provides:  “A lawyer shall not . . . engage in sexual conduct
with a client that exploits the lawyer-client relationship.”
-9-
4-8.4(b) (lawyer shall not commit criminal act reflecting adversely on lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness).  The referee also found Bryant guilty of
violating rule 4-8.4(d) (lawyer shall not engage in conduct prejudicial to
administration of justice).
The Bar challenges the referee’s conclusion that Bryant did not violate rule 4-
8.4(i) during his representation of Rodehaver.5  In concluding there that was no
violation, the referee focused on the fact that Rodehaver, being a prostitute,
bartered her services for Bryant’s legal services.  The referee noted that this
arrangement was in violation of the criminal law proscribing prostitution but
concluded that there needed to be a showing of exploitation to find a rule 4-8.4(i)
violation.
The referee found as fact that Bryant told Rodehaver, “The happier you keep
me, the harder I will work.”  Florida Bar v. Bryant, SC94965 & SC00-801, report
of referee at 12 (report filed Nov. 18, 2000).  The referee also found that, prior to
the commencement of the legal representation, there was no previous relationship
between Bryant and Rodehaver.  Also relevant is the referee’s finding that Bryant
and Rodehaver engaged in sexual relations which commenced during the period of
-10-
legal representation.
Bryant testified that he made the “happier you keep me, the harder I will
work” statement to Rodehaver.  FDLE Agent Mullen testified that Bryant admitted
to Mullen that Bryant made this statement.  Further, Bryant testified that he met
Rodehaver after she was arrested on the municipal ordinance violation and that he
engaged in sexual relations with Rodehaver.  The transcript of the Rodehaver-
Bryant conversation includes Bryant’s request for oral sex from his client.  Thus,
the referee’s findings of fact are supported by competent, substantial evidence. 
See Vining, 761 So. 2d at 1047.
The referee discredited Rodehaver’s testimony and determined three specific
allegations of exploitation were not proven, including claims that Bryant demanded
that Rodehaver:  (1) perform fellatio upon him in his office instead of fulfilling a
voyeuristic role; (2) perform fellatio upon him immediately prior to the final hearing
on the misdemeanor charge; and (3) make interest payments in the form of
intercourse and oral sex during the felony case.
While accepting the referee’s findings of fact, we reject the referee’s
conclusion that Bryant was not in violation of rule 4-8.4(i).  We conclude that the
referee erred by focusing on Rodehaver being a prostitute and framing the issue as
whether, in view of her prostitution, Rodehaver could be exploited by sex; whereas,
-11-
the correct focus pursuant to the plain language of the rule is whether a lawyer
obtained the sexual activity through an exploitation of the lawyer-client relationship.
When viewed with this proper focus, it is plain that there was a violation of
rule 4-8.4(i).  Rodehaver performed these sex acts because she required Bryant’s
services as a lawyer.  Thus, the lawyer-client relationship was exploited, and we
find that the record does not contain competent, substantial evidence to support the
referee’s rejection of a rule 4-8.4(i) violation.  Accordingly, we find that Bryant
violated rule 4-8.4(i).
We approve the referee’s determinations not contested by Bryant that Bryant
violated ruled 4-8.4(b) and 4-8.4(d).
DISCIPLINE
The Bar challenges the discipline recommended by the referee.  We have
repeatedly indicated that our review of a referee’s discipline is broader than our
review afforded to a referee’s factual findings because this Court has the ultimate
authority to determine the appropriate sanctions.  See, e.g., Vining, 761 So. 2d at
1048.  We do not agree with the referee’s proposed discipline.
The referee recommended the cumulative sanctions of a public reprimand,
six months probation during which Bryant must complete a Professionalism
Enhancement Program, and payment of costs to the Bar in the amount of
6.  Bryant challenges $5,168.07 as the correct assessment of costs and
contends that $3,633.17 is the correct assessment for both cases.  The Bar in its
reply brief concurs that the correct total costs in both cases is $3,633.17.
7.  We note that Florida Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 9.22(a)
provides that a minor misconduct finding that is seven or more years old without an
intervening disciplinary sanction may not be considered as aggravation.  Thus, we
find it appropriate to disregard the earlier admonishment as suggested by standard
9.22(a).
-12-
$5,168.07.6  The referee found that Bryant was in good standing at the time of these
matters and has been a licensed attorney in Florida since 1978.  The referee noted
three instances of prior minor misconduct:
1.  A private reprimand in Case Number 88-00,169(04A) as [a]
result of a Report of Minor Misconduct dated July 7, 1988;
2.  A private reprimand in Case Number 88-00,192(04A) as [a]
result of a Report of Minor Misconduct dated July 5, 1988.  Bryant
was found guilty of making suggestive comments and conducting
inappropriate touching of a female client; and
3.  An admonishment in Case Number 97-00,356(04A) as a
result of a Report of Minor Misconduct dated September 29, 1997.
Report of Referee at 17.
The Bar contends that the referee’s recommended discipline of a public
reprimand is insufficient in view of the violations of the rules in respect to Pamela
Rodehaver and in view of Bryant’s disciplinary history.7  The Bar seeks instead a
one-year suspension.  We agree.
In our recent case of Florida Bar v. Scott, Nos. SC96087 & SC97020 (Fla.
-13-
February 7, 2002), we disbarred Scott for ethical misconduct, which included a
violation of 4-8.4(i).  We recognize that Scott involved conduct even more
aggravated than the violations by Bryant, and for that reason we accept the Bar’s
contention that a one-year suspension is appropriate in this case.  We also
recognize that case law from other jurisdictions supports a one-year suspension
under the circumstances of this case.  See People v. Crossman, 850 P.2d 708
(Colo. 1993) (attorney suspended for one year and a day for requesting sexual
favors from clients in exchange for reduction of legal fees); see also In re Redd,
660 So. 2d 839 (La. 1995) (attorney suspended for one year and a day for
photographing and touching female applicant’s breasts).  Members of The Florida
Bar and the public should read our decisions in Scott and Bryant as reflecting our
serious concern about lawyers violating rule 4-8.4(i).  This Court will strictly
enforce the rule against lawyers engaging in sexual conduct with a client that
exploits the lawyer-client relationship.
CONCLUSION
John Newman Bryant is hereby suspended from the practice of law for one
year and must successfully complete a Professionalism Enhancement Program
prior to reinstatement.  Thereafter, Bryant shall be on probation for two years.  The
suspension will be effective thirty days from the filing of this opinion so that Bryant
8.  I note, as pointed out in the referee's report, that Bryant received a private
reprimand in 1988 as a result of being found guilty of making suggestive comments
and inappropriately touching a female client.  Although neither the referee nor this
Court considered this private reprimand, it concerns me that this lawyer was
engaged in this type of inappropriate conduct well over a decade before the current
incident.    
-14-
can close out his practice and protect the interests of existing clients.  If Bryant
notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer practicing and does not need the
thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court will enter an order making the
suspension effective immediately.  Bryant shall accept no new business from the
date this opinion is filed until the suspension is completed.  Judgment is entered for
The Florida Bar, 650 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399, for recovery
of costs from John Newman Bryant in the amount of $3,633.17, for which sum let
execution issue.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ.,
concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION.
PARIENTE, J., concurring.
I concur fully in the majority opinion.8  I write separately to urge The Florida
Bar to revisit rule 4-8.4(i) and to consider a rule that prohibits all sexual
9.  The comment to rule 4-8.4(i) explains, in pertinent part, that the rule
proscribes exploitation of the client and the lawyer-client relationship
by means of commencement of sexual conduct.  The lawyer-client
relationship is grounded on mutual trust.  A sexual relationship that
exploits that trust compromises the lawyer-client relationship.  A
sexual relationship between a lawyer and a client that exists before
commencement of the lawyer-client relationship does not violate this
subdivision if the lawyer and client continue to engage in sexual
conduct during the legal representation.  
10.  As a law journal article has noted, under Florida's rule 4-8.4(i), "a sexual
relationship with a client is not exploitative per se.  Thus, a lawyer can engage in sex
-15-
relationships between lawyers and their clients during the attorney-client
relationship. 
The intent of rule 4-8.4(i) is to broadly prohibit most sexual relationships
between lawyers and clients.  However, the presence of the qualifier that the sexual
conduct must "exploit[ ]" that relationship may not give clear notice in all
circumstances as to the intended broad prohibition envisioned by this rule.9 
Further, the question of what in fact constitutes sexual conduct that "exploits the
lawyer-client relationship" in a given case may depend on many variables,  including
the sophistication of the client, the subject matter of the representation, and the
subjective state of mind of the lawyer and the client.  Thus, my concern is that the
continued use of the qualifier "exploits," creates uncertainty in the application of the
rule and the scope of permissible conduct.10  
with his client as long as he does not exploit the lawyer-client relationship. The
circumstances in which an attorney is exploiting the attorney-client relationship are
not clear."  Abed Awad, Attorney-Client Sexual Relations, 22 J. Legal Prof. 131,
139 (1998).
-16-
Sound reasons exist for an absolute ban on sexual relations between
attorneys and clients who are engaged in an ongoing attorney-client relationship.
The rules of professional conduct demand that an attorney exercise independent
professional judgment in representing the client and thus, objectivity is a necessary
prerequisite.  Furthermore, there are simply far too many circumstances where a
sexual relationship between the lawyer and client creates the potential for adversely
affecting the attorney-client relationship, including increased vulnerability on the part
of the client and compromised decision-making on the part of the lawyer.  This is
true even if the sexual relationship began before the commencement of the attorney-
client relationship--conduct that is presently permitted under the existing rule. 
Regarding conflict of interest concerns, as the author of a law journal notes:
On its face an attorney-client sexual relationship is likely to raise
several conflict of interest issues.  For instance, the termination of the
sexual relationship can result in the termination of the legal
representation to the detriment of the client.  A sexual relationship may
raise disagreement on lawyer's fees. It is recognized that a sexual
relationship may alter the lawyer's objectivity and detachment resulting
in incompetent representation. A sexual relationship will undoubtedly
result in a change in attorney-client self-interest. An attorney in a sexual
-17-
relationship with a client may not pursue his client's interest zealously
out of fear that conclusion of the legal matter would end the sexual
affair. In a divorce matter, for example, an attorney may be reluctant to
pursue serious reconciliation between the client and his/her spouse. An
attorney living with the client or considering a serious relationship with
the client may urge the client not to seek child custody. In short, a
lawyer may pursue an unwise course of action on behalf of his/her
client due to the sexual involvement. Most importantly, sexual
involvement with a client may lead a lawyer to commit other ethical
violations such as disclosing confidential information or becoming a
potential adverse witness. Generally, any information obtained by the
attorney in the professional relationship is privileged. When the lawyer
is sexually involved with the client, it becomes difficult to determine
whether information was obtained in the professional or sexual
relationship. For example, a party in a marital dispute could subpoena
the opposing attorney to testify regarding any matter arising out of the
personal relationship that may be relevant to the divorce and other
related issues, as opposed to the professional relationship which is
privileged.  Most significantly, the sexual relationship can prejudice or
injure the client's case. . . . The emotional involvement characteristic of
a sexual relationship, has the potential to compromise the "objective
detachment" that is required for adequate representation. 
Abed Awad, Attorney-Client Sexual Relations, 22 J. Legal Prof. 131, 173-75 (1998)
(footnotes omitted).
The existence of an ongoing sexual relationship has the potential for
adversely affecting the attorney-client relationship, regardless of whether in any
given instance the quality of the representation actually suffers.  As stated in
Attorney-Client Sexual Relations, the law journal article cited above, which
advocates a per se ban on sexual relationships between attorneys and clients: 
11.  Since the Board of Governors adopted rule 4-8.4(i), a myriad of law
review articles and commentary on this subject has appeared exploring the
regulation of attorney-client relations.  See generally Awad, Attorney-Client Sexual
Relations, 22 J. Legal Prof. at 134 n.11.  Although Awad and other commentators
have advocated a complete ban, for a contrary view, see Mischler, Reconciling
Rapture, Representation, and Responsibility:  An Argument Against Per Se Bans
on Attorney-Client Sex, 10 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 209 (1997).
-18-
Even an arguably "consensual" relationship could end up with a client
alleging she was coerced or manipulated into the relationship. An
express rule would protect the client from the attorney and the attorney
from the client, thereby preserving the integrity of the legal profession.
More importantly, an express rule would afford attorneys clear notice
that a sexual relationship is a per se ethical violation.
Id. at 136. 
Accordingly, for all these reasons, I strongly urge The Florida Bar to
consider amending the rule to prohibit all sexual relationships between a lawyer and
his or her client during the attorney-client relationship.11
Two Cases:
Original Proceedings - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, John Anthony Boggs, Staff Counsel,
and James N. Watson, Jr., Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Complainant
John Newman Bryant, pro se, Jacksonville, Florida,
for Respondent