Title: Oscar Ray Bolin, Jr. V. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC02-37
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 5, 2004

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC02-37
____________
OSCAR RAY BOLIN, JR.,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[February 5, 2004]
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a
sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For
the reasons that follow, we affirm the conviction and sentence of death.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant Oscar Ray Bolin, Jr. is again before this Court on direct appeal of
his conviction and sentence of death for the December 1986 murder of Teri Lynn
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Mathews.  In 1991, a Pasco County grand jury returned an indictment charging
Bolin with first-degree murder.  In 1992, Bolin was tried and convicted for the
murder.  The trial judge followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Bolin
to death.  On appeal, this Court reversed Bolin’s conviction because improper
evidence was admitted at trial.  See Bolin v. State, 650 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1995)
(concluding that trial court erred in finding waiver of spousal privilege based on
defendant’s deposition of his ex-wife).  On remand, Bolin was again tried,
convicted, and sentenced to death.  On appeal, this Court reversed a second time,
based upon an abuse of discretion by the trial court for denying Bolin’s motion for
individual voir dire of prospective jurors on the issue of pretrial publicity.  See
Bolin v. State, 736 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1999).  The second retrial commenced on
October 15, 2001.  Bolin was again convicted and sentenced to death.
Evidence presented at Bolin’s 2001 trial included the following.  Mathews’
body was discovered on December 5, 1986, near the side of a road in rural Pasco
County.  The body was found wrapped in a sheet imprinted with a St. Joseph’s
Hospital logo.  The body had multiple head injuries, was shoeless, and was wet,
although it had not rained recently.  The victim’s car keys were found close to the
body.  Evidence collected from the scene included nylon pantyhose and a pair of
white pants.  There was a single set of truck tire tracks leading to the body.  The
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victim’s car was found the next day by Mathews’ boyfriend, Gary McClelland,
who was worried about her disappearance and attempted to trace her steps after
she left work the previous day.  The victim’s red Honda was found parked at the
Land O’ Lakes Post Office, with its headlights still on.  The victim’s mail was
found scattered on the ground, and her purse was found undisturbed on the seat
inside her car.
Bolin’s half-brother, Phillip, testified that he was awakened by Bolin on the
night of December 4, 1986.  Bolin appeared to be nervous and told Phillip that he
needed Phillip’s help.  The two walked outside, and then Phillip heard a moaning
sound, which he thought could have been a wounded dog.  Instead, he saw a sheet-
wrapped body, and Bolin told him that the girl was shot near the Land O’ Lakes
Post Office.  Bolin then walked over and straddled the body with his feet, raised a
wooden stick with a metal end, and hit the body several times.  Phillip said that he
turned away because he was scared to watch, but compared the sound to hitting a
pillow with a stick.  Bolin next turned on a water hose and sprayed the body.  Bolin
demanded that Phillip help him load the body onto the back of a black Ford tow
truck, and Phillip helped by picking up the body by the ankles.  Phillip testified that
he noticed there were no shoes on the body and that the girl was wearing
pantyhose.  Phillip refused Bolin’s offer of money to go with him to dispose of the
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body, so Bolin went alone and returned twenty to thirty minutes later.  He continued
talking to Phillip about the girl, stating that she had been shot in a drug deal.
At school the next day, Phillip talked with his friend, Danny Ferns, about
what happened the night before and took Danny to where the body had been. 
Danny testified at trial, to corroborate Phillip’s account of the murder, that there
were blood stains on the ground at the site and that the grass in the area was
disturbed.  The State presented other corroborating evidence, which included the
testimony of Rosie Kahles Neal.  At the time of the murder, Neal co-owned with
her now-deceased husband Kahles and Kahles, Inc., the business that employed
Bolin as a tow truck driver.  She testified that the truck Bolin was driving on the
night of the murder was not returned that night, and she thought the truck had been
stolen by Bolin because he could not be located and it was the first call he had
handled by himself.  Neal testified that Bolin was late coming to work the next
morning, was wearing the same clothes as he had the day before, and had a foul
smell.  She further testified that Bolin played with and carried a knife and got
excited when the story of the missing girl, Mathews, was reported on the news. 
Her testimony also corroborated the murder weapon, as she testified that she gave
Bolin a “tire buddy” on the night of the murder.  The tire buddy was a two-foot-
long wooden club, which was drilled out and filled with lead.
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Michelle Steen also offered corroborating testimony.  Michelle Steen was
married to Bolin’s cousin, David Steen.  In 1987, while Bolin visited their home, he
volunteered that he had killed and beaten a girl in Florida and put a hose down her
throat, and that Phillip had watched him do it.
The State then offered the perpetuated videotaped testimony of Cheryl
Coby, Bolin’s ex-wife, who had died after the first trial.  She had been a severe
diabetic, was hospitalized numerous times in 1986, often brought home hospital
towels and sheets from St. Joseph’s Hospital, and identified the sheet that had been
wrapped around Mathews’ body as a hospital sheet resembling the ones she
brought home.  Cheryl Coby had a post office box at the Land O’ Lakes Post
Office, and Bolin picked up her social security checks there when she was in the
hospital.
The State also offered DNA testimony indicating that Bolin could have been
the source of the semen found in a stain on Mathews’ pants.  Federal Bureau of
Investigation forensic serology expert John R. Brown testified that he could not
eliminate Bolin as the contributor of the semen stain but could eliminate Gary
McClelland, Mathews’ boyfriend, as the source of the stain.  David Walsh, a
molecular biologist, extracted DNA from the stain on the pants and found that he
could exclude both the victim and McClelland as the donors of the stain on the
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
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pants.  Walsh found that five of the six bands of DNA detected in the stain
matched five of the six bands from Bolin’s DNA.  Walsh was not able to visualize
one band because of the small amount of DNA remaining on the pants.  Dr.
Christopher Basten, an expert in population genetic frequency, testified that Bolin
was 2100 times more likely to be the source of the semen than a random, unrelated
person.
Bolin was convicted of first-degree murder as charged in the indictment. 
Following the conviction, but prior to the beginning of the penalty phase, Bolin
informed the court that he did not want to have a jury advisory proceeding, put on
mitigation evidence, or question witnesses.  The trial judge held an on-the-record
colloquy with Bolin; the trial judge made a finding that Bolin’s waiver was knowing,
voluntary and intelligent; and the penalty phase proceeded without a jury.  The State
presented aggravating evidence through three witnesses with regard to aggravating
circumstances.  The Court stated that the defense could present whatever evidence
in mitigation that the defense wanted to present at a Spencer1 hearing, which was
thereafter scheduled.
The Spencer hearing was held on December 14, 2001, and again defense
counsel told the court that Bolin instructed it not to call any witnesses or present
2.  The aggravating factors found by the trial court were:  (1) Bolin was
previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or
threat of violence to the person (great weight); (2) the capital felony was committed
while Bolin was engaged in the kidnapping of the victim from the post office or
defendant intended to commit a sexual battery (great weight); and (3) the capital
felony was heinous, atrocious, or cruel (great weight).
3.  The court found the statutory mitigator that the capacity of Bolin to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct was substantially impaired because of
brain damage, but the court gave this mitigator little weight.
4.  The court found twelve nonstatutory mitigators:  (1) Bolin had a
somewhat difficult childhood (some weight); (2) he had a sporadic and minimal
educational experience (little weight); (3) he received improper care during
childhood (little weight); (4) he was under stress at the time of the murder because
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any evidence.  The prosecutor suggested that pursuant to Muhammad v. State, 782
So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2001), the court should obtain a presentence investigation to look
for mitigation and review prior testimony in prior trials regarding mitigation.  The
court questioned Bolin about his decision, and Bolin declared his desire to waive
presentation of penalty-phase evidence, stating, “I’ve read Muhammad three times. 
I understand the philosophy behind Muhammad, and I understand what counsel
has told me.  I’ve discussed it with them.  I made a free and voluntary decision.” 
At the sentencing hearing on December 28, 2001, Bolin was once again sentenced
to death for the murder of Mathews.  The court followed the Muhammad guidelines
and found three aggravating factors,2 one statutory mitigating factor,3 and twelve
nonstatutory mitigating factors.4  The court found that the three aggravators
of his wife being pregnant and frequently ill (slight weight); (5) Bolin was twenty-
four years of age at the time he committed the murder; (6) he was respectful to
other parties in this case (little weight); (7) he saved another life by rescuing a
drowning person (some weight); (8) he was employed at the time of the offense
(slight weight); (9) he received no adverse disciplinary reports from prison (some
weight); (10) he had used alcohol and drugs as a minor, but did not have a
dependancy problem (slight weight); (11) he had some evidence of minor brain
damage or mental illness (little weight); and (12) he had a medical history that
included multiple suicide attempts (slight weight).
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outweighed all of the mitigators combined.
FOR-CAUSE CHALLENGES
In his first claim, Bolin asserts that the trial court wrongfully denied his voir
dire cause challenges as to prospective jurors Almas, Glass, and Gale, thus forcing
him to use peremptory challenges.  Bolin was allowed ten peremptory challenges,
and he used all ten of those challenges.  Pursuant to Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d
691 (Fla. 1990), Bolin then requested two additional peremptories, identifying jurors
Cox and Bradley as the jurors upon whom he would have exercised challenges if
the additional challenges were granted.  The trial court refused to grant the extra
peremptory challenges.  Two alternate jurors were seated, both of whom were
accepted by Bolin.
We find no basis for relief.  The record of the voir dire examinations of
jurors Cox and Bradley demonstrate that the examinations consisted of such
confusing and leading questions that the answers to the questions which formed the
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basis of the cause challenges appear to have been merely answers prompted by the
questions rather than the fixed beliefs of the jurors.  Based upon the questions and
answers of jurors Cox and Bradley, we do not find that the trial court’s decision to
deny the cause challenges was an abuse of discretion.  Hertz v. State, 803 So. 2d
629, 638 (Fla. 2001).  Moreover, even if the trial court erred in denying the cause
challenges during the voir dire examinations, any such error as to juror Cox was
subsequently rendered harmless and, as to juror Bradley, was later waived.
In respect to juror Cox, he was excused during the trial because of illness
and thus was not a member of the jury that returned the verdict in the case.  Cox
was replaced by an alternate juror, to whom Bolin had no objection.
With regard to juror Bradley, during the trial she advised the court that she
recognized a witness, the victim’s mother, as a shopper at the Home Depot where
Bradley worked as a cashier.  The court questioned Bradley, who stated that her
knowledge of the witness would not affect her decision-making process.  Defense
counsel then moved to strike Bradley on the basis that she could not be fair.  The
court did not strike Bradley but stated to defense counsel, “Towards the end of the
trial you can renew that and we’ll take it up again.”  At the conclusion of the trial
but before deliberations, the court gave defense counsel the option to replace
Bradley with the second alternate juror.  The record contains the following
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discussion:
MR. HALKITIS [prosecutor]:  Judge you have to make a
determination on Ms. Bradley.
THE COURT:  We’re going to do that now.  Do you want a
few minutes to chat?
MR. WILLIAMS [defense counsel]:  We’re going to withdraw
our motion.
THE COURT:  Okay.  So you’re going to keep Ms. Bradley?
MR. WILLIAMS:  Yes.
THE COURT:  For the record, did you discuss that with Mr.
Bolin, he’s in agreement with that?
MR. WILLIAMS:  I don’t know if we did or not.
MR. SWISHER [defense counsel]:  I’m not sure.  Let me go
ask.
After consulting with Mr. Bolin, we’re going to keep Ms.
Bradley.
COURT:  Okay.  Just to make it clear, when I said we’d
entertain your objection at the end of the trial had you elected to
excuse Ms. Bradley, I’m inclined to grant that.
With that knowledge in mind, Mr. Bolin wants to keep Ms.
Bradley.
MR. HALKITIS:  Could the record reflect that they’ve had
some time to consult with Mr. Bolin and they have consulted with Mr.
Bolin.
It is plain that Bolin elected to keep juror Bradley and waived his objection to juror
Bradley when he was given the opportunity to remove her at the conclusion of the
trial before deliberations.
REPLACEMENT OF JUROR COX
Bolin next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by replacing juror
Cox with an alternate juror.  Midway through the trial, juror Cox called the trial
5.  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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court’s office and told a judicial assistant and the jury manager that he had been
unable to sleep, was having breathing problems, and was going to the doctor or
hospital.  The trial court held a hearing at which both sides inquired of the judicial
assistant and the jury manager about juror Cox’s condition.  The court then found
that it was impractical to delay the trial on the chance that juror Cox might be able
to return, given that he was elderly, on oxygen, had emphysema, and had an attack
the night before.  We find no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in excusing juror
Cox and having the previously accepted alternate juror replace him.
USE OF TERM “MATCH” IN DNA EVIDENCE
Bolin next claims that the testimony about the DNA comparison of the semen
sample from the victim’s pants and Bolin’s blood was improper because David
Walsh, who analyzed the DNA in question, used the word “match.”  We find no
merit in this claim.  First, the record reveals that no Frye5 hearing was requested
with respect to this DNA evidence.  Thus, there was no challenge similar to that in
Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1997).  This claim is only a challenge as to the
use of the term “match.”  The testimony of expert Walsh as well as the testimony
of the two other DNA experts were subject to full cross-examination.  In this
record we do not find that the use of the term “match” was error, but even if it was
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error, such error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
LACK OF RECORD OF VENIRE’S OATH
Bolin next claims that he is entitled to a new trial or proof of the venire’s oath
because the record does not reflect whether the prospective jurors were sworn
prior to voir dire.  Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.300 states, “The
prospective jurors shall be sworn collectively or individually, as the court may
decide.”  Bolin accurately contends that the record does not indicate whether the
venire was sworn prior to voir dire.  Rather, the record begins with the judge's
opening remarks and proceeds directly to voir dire.  Although the record does not
indicate whether the venire was sworn, defense counsel did not object at any point
during the trial to a failure to give the oath to the venire and thus waived any
objection.  Id.  We recently addressed this issue in Smith v. State, No. SC01-2103
(Fla. Jan. 29, 2004).  In Smith, there was no record evidence that the venire was
sworn, and we concluded that no fundamental error occurred.  Consistent with
Smith, we deny relief on this claim.
WAIVER OF PENALTY-PHASE JURY
Bolin’s final claim is that the trial court erred by accepting Bolin’s waiver of
a penalty-phase jury recommendation.  We have carefully reviewed the record on
this issue and find that the trial judge correctly considered and ruled upon Bolin’s
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waiver.
After the jury returned its verdict of guilty, Bolin advised the trial court that
he did not want to have a jury for the penalty phase.  There followed an extensive
hearing before the trial court in which the prosecutor, Bolin’s counsel, and Bolin
himself discussed the proper procedure to be used in view of Bolin’s stated
decision to waive the jury.
This Court’s recent decision in Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343 (Fla.
2001), was discussed at length with the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the trial
court, each working to comply with what is required when a capital defendant
states an intent to effect a waiver.  That discussion follows.
MR. SWISHER [defense counsel]:  He does not want us to call
mitigation witnesses, that’s correct.
THE COURT:  So you’re saying two things then.  He doesn’t
want a jury recommendation and he doesn’t want to utilize mitigating
witnesses, whether there’s a recommendation from a jury or not?
MR. SWISHER:  Correct.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Do you want to have him put anything
on the record?  He has that opportunity now.
MR. SWISHER:  He’s sitting right here next to me and I’ve
been talking out loud, so I assume if he disagrees with me, he’ll say
something.
THE COURT:  Well, let’s not assume anything.
MR. SWISHER:  Well, ask him.
THE COURT:  Do you want to add anything, Mr. Bolin, to
what Mr. Swisher has said in your behalf?
[BOLIN]:  I instructed counsel to not pursue a jury mitigation
advisory sentence.
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THE COURT:  And he said more than that.  Was there more to
what you want to acknowledge in terms of the recommendation in
terms of mitigation?
MR. SWISHER:  Do you want us to put on mitigation evidence
or not, to the jury?  Do you want us to put on mitigation evidence in
front of the jury?
[BOLIN]:  No.
Then a brief recess was taken by the court, after which this discussion continued.
THE COURT:  All right.  Let’s see if we can finalize this current
scenario.
Defense want to put anything on the record before I do
additional inquiry of Mr. Bolin on this issue?
MR. SWISHER:  No, sir.
THE COURT:  All right.  Mr. Bolin, to reiterate.  I think we’ve
covered this.  I want to make sure there’s no doubt in your mind or
mine as to what you’re telling me.
You want to waive your right to a jury recommendation; is that 
correct?
[BOLIN]:  Yeah.
THE COURT:  You want to waive the penalty phase by a jury,
correct?
[BOLIN]:  Yes.
THE COURT:  In other words, you understand a penalty phase
would be conducted, but it would be conducted by the Court and the
Court alone.  Do you understand that?
[BOLIN]:  Exactly.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Now, I know you’re not, but in an
abundance of caution, are you under the influence of any alcohol,
drugs, or medication?
[BOLIN]:  No.
THE COURT:  Are you making this waiver of your own free
will, understanding your rights?
[BOLIN]:  Yes.
THE COURT:  Okay. You consider yourself making an
intelligent waiver?
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[BOLIN]:  I’m not under any influence or anything.
THE COURT:  Well, no, because I’ve seen you participating
right along.  You seem to be very articulate, very intelligent.  You seem
to understand all these proceedings, from my observations.
Is there anything you don’t understand, you need your attorneys
to clarify at this juncture?
[BOLIN]:  No.
THE COURT:  You understand everything; is that correct?
[BOLIN]:  (Indicating.)
THE COURT:  Okay.  Counsel, can you assure the Court your
client is fully aware of his rights and making a knowing and intelligent
waiver?
MR. SWISHER:  Yes, sir.
THE COURT:  All right.  Now you understand if you waive—if
I dismiss this jury, send them home, and you waive your right to have
a jury recommendation, that’s irreversible?  You can’t turn around
tomorrow or next week or five weeks or a month from now and say,
oh, now I want a recommendation.  It’s a final, irrevocable waiver. 
Do you understand that?
[BOLIN]:  It’s a waiver of a jury recommendation as far as
mitigation to them, nothing to do with the Court.
THE COURT:  Right.
[BOLIN]:  Yeah.
THE COURT:  There’s no jury recommendation going to be
sought today or any other time.  You’re waiving that is irreversible, for
all time.  Do you understand that?
[BOLIN]:  Yes, sir.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Either counsel have anything else?
MR. HALKITIS [the prosecutor]:  Judge, I’d just like you to
ask the defendant whether he’s had enough time to confer with his
lawyers.  Does he feel that he’s had an opportunity to discuss this
situation and that he doesn’t need any more time?
THE COURT:  Well, that’s a fair request, even though it’s
pretty fairly obvious we’ve had several breaks in this to ferret out the
final position.
Have you had a chance to speak to your lawyers, sir, to your 
satisfaction?
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[BOLIN]:  I’ve talked to both Mr. Swisher and Mr. Williams.
THE COURT:  All right.  So you’ve had all your questions
answered, right?
[BOLIN]:  Yes, sir.
THE COURT:  So you still feel you’re making it of your own
free will knowing your legal rights, and after speaking to your lawyers,
this is your final decision; is that correct?
[BOLIN]:  Yes, sir.
Based upon this record, we find no error in the trial court accepting Bolin’s waiver
of the penalty-phase jury.  This case is distinguishable from Thibault v. State, 850
So. 2d 485 (Fla. 2003), in which there was not a sufficient waiver.  Additionally,
even if there was merit to Bolin’s claim on appeal, Bolin would not be entitled to
relief since he did not attack the voluntariness of his waiver in the trial court.  Griffin
v. State, 820 So. 2d 906, 912 (Fla. 2002).
PROPORTIONALITY
This Court must review the proportionality of a death sentence, even if the
issue has not been raised by the defendant.  See Jennings v. State, 718 So. 2d 144,
154 (Fla. 1998).  To determine whether a sentence of death is a proportionate
penalty, this Court must consider the totality of the circumstances of the case and
compare this case with other capital cases.  Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416-17
(Fla. 1998).  The trial court found three aggravating factors, one statutory mitigator,
and twelve nonstatutory mitigators.  However, each aggravator was given great
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weight by the court, while the mitigators were found insignificant.  The trial court
found that “each and every one of the aggravating factors in this case, standing
alone, is more than sufficient to outweigh the entirety of mitigation.”  The instant
case is similar to other cases where death was imposed.  See Singleton v. State,
783 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 2001) (upholding sentence where two weighty aggravators
justified death sentence over three statutory and nine nonstatutory mitigators);
Johnston v. State, 841 So. 2d 349, 360 (Fla. 2002) (upholding sentence where
victim was sexually assaulted and later killed, and trial court found two weighty
aggravators justified death sentence over one statutory and twenty-six nonstatutory
mitigators).  Therefore, we find that Bolin’s death sentence is proportionate.  See
Spencer v. State, 691 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1996).
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
This Court must review the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether
sufficient evidence exists to support a first-degree murder conviction, even if this
issue has not been raised by the defendant.  See Mansfield v. State, 758 So. 2d
636, 649 (Fla. 2000).  Upon a thorough review of the record, substantial evidence
exists to support Bolin’s conviction.  There is substantial testimony in the record of
Bolin’s half-brother, Phillip, concerning Bolin’s activities on the night of the
murder.  Both Bolin and the victim had post office boxes at the Land O’ Lakes
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Post Office.  Mathews’ car was found the next morning at the post office, with its
headlights still on and her mail on the ground.  Bolin picked up his wife’s social
security check on the night of the murder from that post office.  The victim’s body
was found wrapped in a sheet from a hospital in which Bolin’s then wife, Cheryl
Coby, had been hospitalized and from which Coby testified she had brought home
sheets like the one wrapped around the victim’s body.  Bolin failed to return his
employer’s tow truck to the business on the night of the murder.  The victim’s
body revealed trauma wounds to the victim’s head that were consistent with the tire
buddy given to Bolin, as corroborated by Phillip Bolin’s eyewitness portrayal of
the beating of what Phillip testified Bolin told him was a girl’s body wrapped in a
sheet.  Phillip also corroborated that the body was shoeless but that the girl was
wearing pantyhose.  Bolin’s semen was found on the victim’s pants, as determined
by DNA testing which revealed that Bolin was 2100 times more likely to be the
source of the semen than a random, unrelated person.  Based upon this evidence
and the other evidence in the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to
support Bolin’s first-degree murder conviction.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm Bolin’s conviction of first-degree
murder and sentence of death.
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It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ.,
concur.
QUINCE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pasco County, 
Craig C. Villanti, Judge - Case No. 91-00521CFAWS
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Douglas S. Connor, Assistant
Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida,
for Appellant
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Robert J. Landry, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee