Title: Larkin v. Tsavaris
Citation: 85 So. 2d 731
Docket Number: N/A
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 2, 1956

85 So. 2d 731 (1956)
T.K. LARKIN and Ida M. Larkin, his wife, Appellants,
v.
John E. TSAVARIS, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida, Division A.
March 2, 1956.
Finch &amp; Mosley, Clearwater, for appellants.
James M. Stevens, Tarpon Springs, for appellee.
*732 HOBSON, Justice.
Defendants here appeal from so much of a final decree in an equity suit as was favorable to the plaintiff-appellee.
This is a case wherein the chancellor heard all of the testimony and observed the witnesses. His findings are therefore entitled to the highest degree of respect, and we regard all factual disputes with great circumspection. Moreover, the chancellor has favored us with an opinion containing detailed findings, and, in addition thereto, the final decree is prefaced with basic findings in summarized form.
The final decree, omitting formal parts, reads as follows:
"It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed:
*733 Appellants seek to interpret finding number 1 and certain portions of the opinion of the chancellor as an adjudication that the neighborhood had so materially changed that the city zoning laws were no longer effective, and to reason from this premise that appellants were making a "lawful use of their property" throughout, which it was error to enjoin. But a careful reading of finding number 1, and paragraph number 1 of the final decree entered consequent thereupon, demonstrates that the chancellor refused to enjoin the use of the dwelling house as a multiple dwelling unit not because such use was unlawful under the ordinance, but because "no material deterioration in the value of plaintiff's property has been caused thereby."
We note parenthetically that insofar as this suit partakes of the nature of a suit to enjoin a private nuisance, the validity of the chancellor's consideration, in finding number 1, of the fact that "said dwelling house was used for multiple dwelling units prior to the time defendants purchased said property" might be questionable under Lawrence v. Eastern Air Lines, Fla., 81 So. 2d 632, 634, wherein we held it no defense that the plaintiff "`came to the nuisance.'" But this point is not raised, and can have no effect upon the outcome of this appeal.
Appellants contend that injunction is a drastic remedy and should not have been granted to restrain a "lawful use" of property. But the uses restrained were determined by the chancellor to be unlawful in each instance, in that they violated the zoning ordinance as well as depreciated the value of appellee's property. The one exception was the "spite fence" alluded to in finding number 4 which could, of course, be enjoined as a private nuisance. No abuse of discretion has been shown.
Although we have considered all points raised, the only one remaining to which we find it necessary to refer is the contention of appellants that this suit should have been held barred by laches. It appears from the record that plaintiff-appellee acted with all due diligence as soon as he discovered the facts upon which he ultimately sued. Plaintiff's first efforts, however consisted of attempts to persuade the city officials to enforce the city zoning ordinance. The chancellor's refusal to apply the laches doctrine is adequately supported by the record.
Affirmed.
DREW, C.J., and TERRELL and THORNAL, JJ., concur.