Title: Wells v. Oklahoma Roofing & Sheet Metal
Citation: 2019 OK 45
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 2019

Wells v. Oklahoma Roofing & Sheet Metal Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The daughter of a deceased employee brought a wrongful death action against the her father’s employer for intentional tort, asserting that the employer was willful, wanton, and intentional in directing the decedent-employee to perform certain tasks that the decedent's employer knew was certain or substantially certain to result in the decedent-employee's death. She sought declaratory relief that the exclusive liability provision of the Workers' Compensation Act was unconstitutional. The district court declared the Act's exclusivity provision constitutional, ultimately determined the decedent-employer's liability was exclusively governed by the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act, and dismissed the daughter's petition. The Court of Civil Appeals declared the statute unconstitutional as a special law in violation of Okla. Const. art. 5, sections 46, 59. The COCA reversed the district court's order of dismissal and remanded the matter for further proceedings. Based on its review of the undisputed facts, the Oklahoma Constitution, and applicable laws, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found the portion of section 12 that included intentional torts was “not within the walls of the workers' compensation scheme or jurisdiction.” This analysis applied equally to subsequent iterations found in Okla. Stat. tit. 85A, section 5(B)(2)(2013),4 209(B),5 and Okla. Stat. tit. 85, section 302(B)(2011) (now repealed). Accordingly, the district court's order was reversed and the matter remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Oklahoma Supreme Court? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Oklahoma Supreme Court. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . WELLS v. OKLAHOMA ROOFING & SHEET METAL 2019 OK 45 Case Number: 112844 Decided: 06/18/2019 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. CRYSTAL WELLS, individually and as Administrator of the ESTATE OF ROBERT YOUNG, Deceased, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. OKLAHOMA ROOFING & SHEET METAL, L.L.C., and OKLAHOMA ROOFING & SHEET METAL, INC., Defendants/Appellees. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION IV ¶0 Daughter of the deceased employee brought a wrongful death action in district court against the decedent's employer for intentional tort, asserting that the decedent's employer was willful, wanton, and intentional in directing the decedent-employee to perform certain tasks that the decedent's employer knew was certain or substantially certain to result in the decedent-employee's death and sought declaratory relief that the exclusive liability provision of the Workers' Compensation Act was unconstitutional. The district court declared the Act's exclusivity provision constitutional, ultimately determined the decedent-employer's liability was exclusively governed by the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act, and dismissed the daughter's petition. The Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV, declared the statute constitutionally infirm as a special law in violation of Okla. Const. art. 5, §§ 46, 59. The COCA reversed the district court's order of dismissal and remanded the matter for further proceedings. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT ORDER REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. James K. Secrest, II, Edward J. Main, SECREST, HILL, BUTLER & SECREST, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Appellees. Larry A. Tawwater, Darren M. Tawwater, THE TAWWATER LAW FIRM, P.L.L.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellant. Mike Hunter1, ATTORNEY GENERAL, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Colbert, J. ¶1 The issue presented on certiorari review is whether intentional torts are within the purview of the workers' compensation scheme at Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 12 (2001 and Supp. 2010)2 and whether this part of § 12 is an unconstitutional special law in violation of Okla. Const. art. 5, §§ 46, 59.3 Based on this Court's review of the undisputed facts, the Oklahoma Constitution, and applicable laws, we find that the portion of § 12 that includes intentional torts is not within the walls of the workers' compensation scheme or jurisdiction. This analysis applies equally to subsequent iterations found in Okla. Stat. tit. 85A, § 5(B)(2)(2013),4 209(B),5 and Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 302(B)(2011) (now repealed). Accordingly, the district court's order is reversed and the matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with today's pronouncement. I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE ¶2 On June 27, 2011, Robert Young, an employee of Oklahoma Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., and Oklahoma Roofing & Sheet Metal, L.L.C. (collectively, Employer), was working on a roof applying a membrane roof on a three-story building when he was required by Employer to unhook his single line lanyard requiring him to cross over two coworkers. He walked ten feet beyond the point where he had unhooked his lanyard when he fell, landing on an awning thirty feet below, and then he rolled off the awning and fell onto bricks on the ground twelve feet below to his death. Prior to the date of Wells injury and death, Oklahoma Roofing and Sheet Metal, Inc., was cited for a violation related to the duty to have a sufficient fall protection system. ¶3 Crystal Wells, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Robert Young, Deceased (Wells), commenced an action in district court seeking damages for Decedent's death and declaratory relief. Wells's first amended petition alleged Decedent's death was the result of Employer's intentional tort. Specifically, Wells alleged that Employer provided and intended Decedent to use a single-line lanyard fall-protection system that required Decedent to temporarily unhook his safety anchor in order to pass over the other co-workers working on the roof. Wells alleged that when the anchor was unhooked, the fall protection system was inoperable; and therefore, unable to prevent an employee's fall like the instant fall which led to Decedent's death. Wells alleged Employer knew the single-line system would lead to Decedent's death; that Employer's actions were willful, wanton, and intentional; that Employer was found to be a repeat violator of the Occupational and Safety Health Administration's (OSHA) safety rules; that Employer was fined by OSHA for acts related to Decedent's death;6 and that Employer was previously cited on two7 separate occasions "by the United States Government for violating various Federal requirements regarding the fall-protection equipment." Wells alleged Employer's actions were willful, wanton, and intentional, with specific knowledge of the dangerous and potentially lethal conditions and thus, her remedy was not limited to those benefits provided by the Workers' Compensation Act. In addition, Wells sought declaratory relief to declare the exclusivity provision of Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 12 (2001 and Supp. 2010) unconstitutional as a special law and therefore, inapplicable to her action. Employer filed a motion to dismiss, essentially alleging that Wells's claims were barred by § 12. In relevant part, that section states: The liability [of the Act] shall be exclusive . . . except in the case of an intentional tort, . . . . An intentional tort shall exist only when the employee is injured as a result of willful, deliberate, specific intent of the employer to cause such injury. Allegations or proof that the employer had knowledge that such injury was substantially certain to result from its conduct shall not constitute an intentional tort. The issue of whether an act is an intentional tort shall be a question of law for the court . . . . (emphasis added). ¶4 The district court declared § 12 constitutional and granted Employer's motion to dismiss. The court held that, while Wells's allegations met the "substantial certainty" element set forth in Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 2005 OK 54, 127 P.3d 572 , it did not satisfy the specific intent definition prescribed in § 12. Plaintiff Wells appealed. ¶5 Upon review, the COCA found that, in the context of the workers' compensation law, § 12 defined an "intentional tort" much narrower than the definition utilized in a garden-variety intentional tort action, although both types of actions are litigated in courts of general jurisdiction. As applied, § 12 created a subset of litigants and treated those litigants differently than other similarly-situated litigants. The COCA reversed the district court's determination and held § 12 unconstitutional as a special law. Employer sought certiorari review. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶6 Decedent's work-related death occurred on June 27, 2011. The law in effect at the time of Decedent's death, including claims for injuries, is governed by Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 12 (2001 and Supp. 2010). Vasquez v. Dillard's, Inc., 2016 OK 89, ¶ 25 n.60, 381 P.3d 768, 786; Holliman v. Twister Drilling Co., 2016 OK 82, ¶ 5, 377 P.3d 133, 134. ¶7 At issue is the constitutionality and application of Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 12 (2001 and Supp. 2010). A constitutional challenge to a statute's "validity, construction and application are legal questions this Court reviews de novo." John v. St. Francis Hosp., 2017 OK 81, ¶ 8, 405 P.3d 681, 685. De novo review is the proper standard also for reviewing the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss. Wilson v. State ex rel. State Election Bd., 2012 OK 2, ¶ 4, 270 P.3d 155 , 157 (citation omitted). Generally, motions to dismiss are "disfavored and granted only when there are no facts consistent with the allegations under any cognizable legal theory or there are insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory." Id. Last, we assume "plenary independent and non-deferential authority to reexamine a trial court's legal rulings." John v. St. Francis Hosp., 2017 OK 81, ¶ 8, 405 P.3d 681, 685 (internal citation omitted). III. DISCUSSION A. Specific Intent and Substantial Certainty are Nomenclatures of an Intentional Tort ¶8 At the outset, it is critical to this Court's analysis to bring into focus what constitutes an intentional tort while fortifying the walls of the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation's exclusivity provision. In general, an employer's liability for an employee's injuries is limited to the exclusive purview of the Workers' Compensation Court, except in cases of an intentional injury and, although not applicable here, "where the employer has failed to secure the payment of compensation for the injured employee." Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 12 (2001 and Supp. 2010). It is well-settled that the common law divides actionable tortious conduct into two categories: (1) accidental and (2) willful acts that result in intended or unintended harm. Graham v. Keuchel, 1993 OK 6, ¶ 49, 847 P.2d 342 , 362. Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., reflects that dichotomy. 2005 OK 54, ¶ 12, 127 P.3d 572 , 575. ¶9 In Parret, a worker died when he was electrocuted while replacing emergency lights at a job site as ordered to do by his employer even though the employee knew that the lights were "hot or energized." Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 127 P.3d at 574. This Court settled the question that only an employer's intentional acts fall outside of the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation exclusivity provision. Id. ¶ 24, 127 P.3d at 579. Our review in Parret, however, was limited in scope to the two questions certified by the Federal court. Id. ¶ 1, 127 P.3d at 573-74. Relevant here, is question one, seeking guidance on the application of Oklahoma's intentional tort standard--namely, the "true intentional tort" and "substantial certainty." Id. ¶ 9, 127 P.3d at 575. ¶10 Parret reiterated that an employer's intentional acts against its employee come within the exclusivity exception to the workers' compensation laws, as intentional acts are neither accidental in nature nor arise out of the normal course and scope of an employee/employer relationship. Id. ¶¶ 8-9, 127 P.3d at 575. There, we stressed that the legal justification for an intentional tort action at common law, is the non-accidental, deliberate character of the injury judged from the employer's subjective standpoint. Id. ¶ 24, 127 P.3d at 579. Our focus was not limited to a particular employee and the injury sustained; but rather, the employer's intentional acts or willful failure to act as contemplated by the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation scheme. Our lengthy discussion detailed the historical development of Oklahoma's workplace injuries; the Legislature's expressed act of excluding injuries not covered by the terms in the workers' compensation laws; and the balance of interests driving the legislatively created scheme to provide employees compensation for accidental injures, regardless of fault. Id. ¶ 19, 127 P.3d at 579. Cloaking an employer with immunity from liability for their intentional behavior unquestionably would not promote a safe and injury-free work environment. An employer's impunity to commit an intentional act with the knowledge that, at the very most, his workers' compensation premiums may rise slightly is not in accord with Oklahoma's public policy. Id. ¶ 22, 127 P.3d at 578. Because Oklahoma's workers' compensation laws clearly underscore and contemplate the accidental character of a workplace injury, an employer's immunity, then, cannot be stretched to include the employer's intentional acts. ¶11 Parret denotes that when an employer "(1) desire[s] to bring about the worker's injury or (2) act[s] with the knowledge that such injury was substantially certain to result from the employer's conduct," an intentional tort action will lie. Id. ¶ 24, 127 P.3d at 579. We acknowledged that "all consequences which the actor desires to bring about are intended." Id. ¶ 17, 127 P.3d at 577. That intent, whether an intentional act or intentional inaction, is, by definition, deliberate. So, because "[i]ntent denotes a desire to cause the consequences of his act that the actor knows is certain, or substantially certain to result, then under the law, the actor has in fact desired to produce the result." Id. ¶ 17, 127 P.3d at 579 (quoting 1 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965)). Shifting our focus to the substantial certainty element, we stated that the employer not only had to intend the act that caused the injury, but also required that the employer knew that the injury was substantially certain to follow. Id. ¶ 24, 127 P.3d at 579. The employee, then, "must allege facts which 'plausibly demonstrate that' the employer's conduct was intentional . . . ." Id. The employer's knowledge "may be inferred from the employer's conduct and all the surrounding circumstances." Id. Although our limited review focused on the substantial certainty aspect of an intentional tort, we by no means "expand[ed] the narrow intentional tort exception to [the] workers' compensation exclusivity" provision. Id. ¶ 27, 127 P.3d at 579. Rather, we stated that both elements constitute an intentional tort and spoke directly to the tortfeasor's requisite mental state--that is, the employer's subjective appreciation of the resulting injury. Id. ¶ 24, 127 P.3d at 579. In short, Parret did not recognize two types or levels of intentional torts. Compsource Okla. v. L&L Construction, Inc., 2009 OK CIV APP 28, ¶ 18, 207 P.3d 415 , 420. Rather, Parret clarified what kinds of conduct constitute an intentional tort. Id. ¶12 Employer contends that § 12, like its successors,8 was a legislative response to address a perceived unwarranted expansion of the intentional tort exception to the workers' compensation laws resulting, presumably, from our decision in Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 2005 OK 54, 127 P.3d 572 . According to Employer, § 12 attempts to redefine the existence of intentional torts to only those that result from the "willful, deliberate, specific intent of the employer" to cause injury and excepts those injuries an employer knows are substantially certain to occur. Yet, that fallacy is premised on the specific intent and substantial certainty nomenclatures, commonly misunderstood as one being different than the other. They are not. "[W]hat appears at first glance as two distinct bases for liability is revealed on closer examination to be one and the same." Hoyle v. DTJ Enters., Inc., 36 N.E.3d 122, 127 (quoting Rudisill v. Ford Motor Co., 709 F.3d 595, 602--03 (6th Cir.2013) (describing Ohio R.C. 2745.01 as "a statute at war with itself")). ¶13 In relevant part, § 12 states: "An intentional tort shall exist only when the employee is injured as a result of willful, deliberate, specific intent of the employer to cause such injury." That is, an employer's intent to injure an employee must be willful, deliberate, and specific. But what do those words mean? In examining a legislative enactment, this Court will "construe and apply it in a manner that avoids conflict with our Constitution and give[s] the enactment the force of law." Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC, 2016 OK 20, ¶ 17, 373 P.3d 1057, 1066--67, as corrected (Mar. 4, 2016). ¶14 Our analysis begins with the text and context of § 12. The operative word in § 12 is "intentional." The category of intentional torts have remained unchanged since before the inception of Oklahoma's workers' compensation laws in 1915--a period in excess of a century. Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co., 1917 OK 47, 162 P. 938; see also Roberts v. Barclay, 1962 OK 38, 369 P.2d 808 . The first constitutional challenge to Oklahoma's workers' compensation scheme was addressed in Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co., 1917 OK 47, 162 P. 938. In Adams, the court upheld the workers' compensation scheme as the exclusive remedy for work-related accidental injuries. Id. ¶ 17, 162 P. at 945. In determining the Act's constitutionality, we stated: "The act does not undertake to regulate willful injuries . . . but leaves the injured employee to his remedy as it existed when the act was passed. Considering the various provisions of the act together . . . [the Act] embraces all kinds of accidental injuries . . . whether occurring from the negligence of the employer or not arising out of and in the course of employment, but does not include willful or intentional injuries inflicted by the employer." Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 162 P. at 945. ¶15 In a subsequent decision, U.S. Zinc Co. v. Ross, the court clarified the Adams decision, holding that only injuries occasioned by an employer's willful and intentional injuries could not be considered accidental. 1922 OK 247, ¶ 3, 208 P. 805, 806. There, the court defined "willful" as "more than a mere act of will, and carries with it the idea of premeditation, obstinacy,9 and intentional wrongdoing." Id. ¶ 6, 208 P. at 807 (citation omitted). By its definition, "willful" embodies intentional. Id. In context, this reading is consistent with the preceding provision that conditions an employer's liability on accidental injuries and expressly excludes injuries resulting from the "willful intention" and "willful failure" of the employee and co-employee. Id. The definition of "intentional," then, remains fixed and excluded from our compensation laws since before adoption of the compensation scheme and therefore, controls its meaning. ¶16 In the context of deliberate intent, that is an employer's deliberate intentions, the Supreme Court of Oregon stated that, [D]eliberate intent follows as a deduction from the allegation of knowledge of the danger and the carelessness, negligence, and recklessness of defendant in not obviating it . . . . A deliberate act is one the consequences of which are weighed in the mind beforehand. It is prolonged premeditation, and the word when used in connection with an injury to another denotes design and malignity of heart. It has been defined so many times that it is difficult to select any one definition which covers every phase in which the word is used, but some of the most apt are: "The word 'deliberate' is derived from two Latin words, which mean, literally, 'concerning,' and 'to weigh.' * * * As an adjective * * * it means that the manner of the performance was determined upon after examination and reflection--that the consequences, chances and means weighed, carefully considered and estimated." "Deliberation is that act of the mind which examines and considers whether a contemplated act should or should not be done." Jenkins v. Carman Mfg. Co., 79 Or. 448, 453, 155 P. 703, 705 (1916) (citations omitted). "Deliberation" is "premeditation." Id. And, the premeditated thought is described as a mental thought beforehand, for any length of time preceding an act or willful failure to act, however short. See Easley v. State, 78 Okl. Cr. 1, 8, 143 P.2d 166, 170 (1943). In order to come within § 12's exception, "it is incumbent upon an injured [employee] to establish that his employer had a deliberate intention to injure him or someone else and that he was in fact injured as a result of that deliberate intention." Kilminster v. Day Mgmt. Corp., 323 Or. 618, 631, 919 P.2d 474 , 481 (1996) (citations omitted). The more difficult question is how does an injured employee demonstrate an employer's requisite statutory intent when that intent is subjective. ¶17 An employer's "specific intent" to injure, or knowledge that an injury is "substantially certainty to result," equate to an intentional tort. Both require a knowledge of foreseeable consequences and are interpreted to mean intentionally knowing culpable acts. The belief that one has a different level or degree of a tortious act, and thereby concluding that specific intent and substantial certainty are different animals, is a fallacy. "A culinary example may be more illustrative. If you make a peanut butter cookie, it is apparent that it is a smooth, one flavor cookie. It is still a peanut butter cookie even if you use crunchy peanut butter, because its major flavor is still peanuts. . . ." Douglas v. Cox Ret. Properties, Inc., 2013 OK 37, ¶ 19, 302 P.3d 789 , 801 (Kauger, J., concurring specially). Yet, despite its consistency, it remains a cookie. Similarly, the major flavor of intentional tort is the actor's subjective intent to cause harm. That requisite mens rea no more ceases to be intentional merely because the actor specifically targeted a particular employee or another employee, generally. Parret recognized that point, finding that the two definitions were essentially the same and demonstrated the Legislature's intent to permit recovery for an employer's intentional acts only when an employer acts with the specific intent to cause an injury. In both instances, you must prove that the willful, deliberate, culpable act was intentional. ¶18 Specific intent, like its counterpart substantial certainty, is purely a subjective fact never susceptible to direct proof. Stated differently, showing an employer's subjective intent to engage or refusal to engage in an activity that the employer knows that injury is certain to occur requires consideration of objective facts, and from those objective facts, an ultimate conclusion is drawn. See Tiger v. Verdigris Valley Elec. Coop., 2016 OK 74, ¶¶ 14-15, 410 P.3d 1007, 1011--12. "[A]n employer's knowledge may be inferred from the employer's conduct and all the surrounding circumstances." Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, an employer's conduct and the surrounding circumstances can be established through circumstantial evidence. Estrada v. Port City Prop., Inc., 2011 OK 30, ¶ 22, 258 P.3d 495, 504. To illustrate, assume a "defendant pushes [a] plaintiff into a room, locks the door and throws away the key." § 29 The Meaning of Intent, Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden and Ellen M. Bublick. Because "the trier of fact has no mind reading machine to determine" the defendant's subjective intent," the trier of fact is entitled to infer [from external or objective evidence] that the defendant intends to confine the plaintiff, at least for a time." Id. "[E]vidence that the defendant intended any given act may be good evidence that he also intended the results that tend to follow such an act." Id. Such a determination is clearly a question of fact that is ordinarily inferred from the employer's conduct or acts under the circumstance of a particular case. Lucenti v. Laviero, 176 A.3d 1, 11 (Conn. 2018). ¶19 We think by the words "willful, deliberate, specific intent of the employer to cause such injury" that the Legislature unequivocally intended to convey that the employer must have determined to injure an employee and used some means appropriate to that end; and that there must be a deliberate intent. It is now settled that an employer's willful, deliberate, specific intent to injure with the purpose to cause injury or which injury is substantially certain that makes an employer's act or failure to act intentional. Mere carelessness or negligence, however gross, will not suffice. However, we do not believe, as Employer contends, that the Legislature intended to bifurcate the sphere of intentional torts constitutionally reserved as common law rights of actions which predate the inception of Oklahoma's workers' compensation scheme. ¶20 At this juncture we note that there has always been disparity between the rights and remedies of persons injured while in the course and scope of their employment and those who are injured elsewhere. See Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co., 1917 OK 47, 162 P. 938. However, that disparity is properly confined within the Workers' Compensation system. Id. The original Industrial Bargain/Grand Bargain struck between employees and employers is premised on compensating employees for accidental work-related injuries regardless of fault. Id. "[T]he workers' compensation statutes were designed to provide the exclusive remedy for accidental injuries sustained during the course and scope of a worker's employment [and] were not designed to shield employers or co-employees from willful, intentional or even violent conduct." Parret, 2005 OK 54, ¶ 8, 127 P.3d 572 , 575 (quoting Thompson v. Madison Machinery Co., 1984 OK CIV APP 24, ¶ 17, 684 P.2d 565 , 568). ¶21 The relevant part of the 2010 version of 85 O.S. § 12 and the current version of 85A O.S. § 5 state: "Allegations of proof that the employer had knowledge that the injury was substantially certain to result from the employer's conduct shall not constitute an intentional tort." The Defendants are making the argument herein that the Legislature may rework or change the Grand Bargain where employees lost the right to bring a District Court action against their employers in exchange for the no-fault workers' compensation remedies. Invoking the legislature's power to change the Grand Bargain is going beyond merely stating an evidentiary standard to prove an intentional tort in District Court has been statutorily changed. The Employer is therefore arguing for a form of absolute immunity from legal liability for an employer when that employer intentionally injures an employee pursuant to the substantial certainty standard. In other words, it is argued the Legislature may state both an employer's intentional tort is not actionable in a District Court regardless of the nature or extent of the employee intentionally injured and the employee's injury caused by the employer has no remedy in the workers' compensation scheme; leaving the employee in a virtual no man's land when it comes to seeking a remedy. ¶22 The effect of the Employer's argument before this Court is that an employee's injury is compensable in a workers' compensation no-fault scheme even if the injury was a result of merely a slight degree of negligence, but an employer's substantially certain intentional tort received no remedy in workers' compensation or in the District Court.10 No public interest is articulated by Employer to support any public policy for denying a course of action in District Court based upon an employer's intentional tort injuring an employee while also denying a workers' compensation remedy other than the party's reference to the power of the Legislature. This interpretation of the statutes presents an underinclusive-overinclusive constitutional invalidity issue similar to the one addressed in Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC.11 ¶23 When the Legislature superseded Parret, as argued by Employer herein, it did not also change the definition of an "accident" or otherwise expressly make clear a substantially certain employer's intentional tort is compensable using a workers' compensation remedy. It is patently clear that the Legislature has expressed an intent to confine adjudication of accidental work-related injuries to the workers' compensation system.12 By its expressed terms, § 3 of 85A mandates that every employer and employee shall be subject and bound to the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act, but that the "act shall only apply to claims for injuries and death based on accidents . . . ." § 3(B) (emphasis added). The key here is that the Act only covers injuries or deaths caused by accidents based on negligence where a duty of care has been breached. The Act was never intended as a remedy for intentional torts. Therefore, we find that the Legislature's definition of intentional tort codifies and galvanizes the common law right of an intentional tort action. We further find that intentional injuries have never been inside the walls of the workers' compensation scheme of Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 12. IV. CONCLUSION ¶24 We hold that the willful, deliberate, specific intent of the employer to cause injury, and those injuries that an employer knows are substantially certain to occur, are both intentional torts that are not within the scheme of the workers' compensation system or its jurisdiction. Plaintiff's additional constitutional arguments are thus not necessary to adjudicate this appeal. For the reasons expressed herein, the district court's order is reversed and the matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with today's pronouncement. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT ORDER REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. VOTE: Gurich, C.J., Colbert J., Reif, S.J. and Rapp, S.J., concur; Edmondson, J., concurs specially (by separate writing) Darby, V.C.J., Kauger (by separate writing), Winchester (by separate writing) and Combs, JJ., dissent. FOOT