Title: Daniel Lugo v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC06-1532
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 8, 2008

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Supreme Court of Florida  
No. SC06-1532 
DANIEL LUGO, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
[October 8, 2008] 
PER CURIAM. 
Appellant Daniel Lugo seeks review of an order which denied 
postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  Lugo 
challenged capital convictions for which sentences of death were imposed.  This 
Court possesses jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida 
Constitution. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A jury convicted Daniel Lugo of first-degree murder (two counts), 
conspiracy to commit racketeering, racketeering, kidnapping (two counts), armed 
kidnapping, attempted extortion, grand theft (three counts), attempted first-degree 
 
 
 
 
                                          
 
  
murder, armed robbery, burglary of a dwelling, first-degree arson, armed extortion, 
money laundering (nine counts), forgery (six counts), uttering a forged instrument 
(six counts), possession of a removed identification plate, and conspiracy to 
commit a first-degree felony.  See Lugo v. State, 845 So. 2d 74, 91 n.30 (Fla. 
2003). Most of these convictions arose from the abduction, extortion, and 
attempted murder of Marc Schiller, and the abduction, attempted extortion, and 
murder of Frank Griga and Krisztina Furton.  See id. at 84. For each murder, the 
jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of eleven to one.  See id. at 91. 
Following that recommendation, the trial court sentenced Lugo to death for both 
murders and adjudicated him guilty of all thirty-nine counts for which he was 
convicted. See id.1  Lugo’s trial included co-defendants Noel Doorbal and John 
Mese; however, while the charges against Doorbal and Mese were considered and 
determined by the same jury, the charges against Lugo were evaluated by a 
separate jury. See id. at 97 n.41. Although the circumstances underlying the 
crimes charged are somewhat complicated (and are fully detailed in the opinion on 
direct appeal), a summary of the facts for the Schiller and Griga/Furton counts 
follows. 
The Schiller Counts 
1. The trial court ordered that all sentences run consecutively.  See id. 
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Marc Schiller was a wealthy Miami businessman whose firm, in addition to 
other pursuits, provided services that were reimbursed by Medicare.  See id. at 84. 
Schiller hired Jorge Delgado to assist with the Medicare operations, and Schiller 
eventually sold the Medicare-related portion of his business to Delgado.  See id.  In 
September or October 1994, Daniel Lugo, a friend of Delgado who at times 
performed billing work for the Medicare operation, informed Delgado of his belief 
that Schiller had engaged in improper conduct that had caused them a financial 
loss. See id. at 84 n.4, 85. Delgado requested that Lugo take action to recover the 
money that was owed to them.  See id.  Lugo enlisted Doorbal and two other 
individuals in a plot to kidnap and extort money from Schiller.  See id.  On direct 
appeal, we analyzed: 
After several failed attempts at locating and capturing Schiller, 
on November 15, 1994, the group finally succeeded in abducting him . 
. . . Doorbal and Weekes grabbed Schiller, and Weekes subdued 
Schiller, shocking him with a stun gun.  Another cohort, Sanchez, 
assisted Doorbal and Weekes in forcing Schiller into a waiting van. 
Inside the van, Schiller was handcuffed and duct tape was placed over 
his eyes. A gun was placed at Schiller’s head, and his wallet and 
jewelry [were] removed as the van proceeded to a warehouse that 
Delgado had rented. He also received additional shocks with the stun 
gun and he was kicked. Lugo arrived at the warehouse shortly after 
Doorbal and the others arrived with Schiller. 
Schiller’s captors demanded a list of his assets[,] which Schiller 
initially refused to provide.  The refusal resulted in [him] being 
slapped, shocked with the stun gun, and beaten with a firearm.  
Weekes questioned Schiller about his assets, based on information 
provided by Lugo and Delgado. Schiller testified that after he again 
refused to provide the requested information, he was told that he was 
going to engage in a game of Russian Roulette . . . .  Schiller’s captors 
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proceeded to read a highly accurate list of his assets to him, 
demanding that he corroborate what they already knew and that he 
add to the list assets of which they were not aware.  The captors also 
apprised Schiller that they knew the alarm code for entry into his 
home . . . . 
The captors further threatened that if Schiller did not cooperate, 
his wife and children would also be abducted and his wife raped in his 
presence. Schiller was eventually compelled to agree to cooperate but 
only if his wife and children were allowed to leave the country 
unharmed.  In the ensuing days, Schiller began signing over his assets, 
including a quitclaim deed for his home, various documents granting 
access to his checking, savings, and IRA accounts, and authorization 
for changing the beneficiary of his million-dollar insurance policies. 
During Schiller’s captivity, Lugo and Doorbal entered 
Schiller’s home and removed many furnishings and other items.  
Lugo, Delgado, and Weekes also began charging thousands of dollars 
to Schiller’s credit cards. Money in Schiller’s safe in his home was 
divided among Doorbal, Weekes, and Pierre.  Three weeks into 
Schiller’s captivity, Doorbal and Delgado convinced Lugo that 
Schiller must be killed, because he had likely surmised the identities 
of some, if not all, of his captors.  A plan was then developed to kill 
Schiller but to give the appearance that Schiller’s death resulted from 
the operation of his automobile under the influence of alcohol.   
In the fourth week, Schiller was forced to consume large 
amounts of alcohol to make him intoxicated.  Lugo drove Schiller’s 
Toyota 4-Runner into a utility pole on a Miami-area street to create 
the impression that Schiller had been involved in an accident resulting 
from driving while intoxicated.  Doorbal and Weekes accompanied 
Lugo, and Schiller was placed in the front seat of the 4-Runner after it 
had been driven into the pole.  Lugo and Doorbal then poured 
gasoline on the vehicle and set it ablaze.  Lugo, Doorbal, and Weekes 
had planned to exit the scene in another vehicle that Weekes had 
driven to the scene, but they noticed that Schiller had somehow 
managed to exit his burning vehicle and was staggering in the 
roadway. . . . At the urging of Lugo and Doorbal, Weekes used his 
vehicle to . . . run over Schiller. The three left the scene of these 
events believing they had killed Schiller.  . . . 
Miraculously, Schiller survived this attempt to take his life.  He 
remembered awakening in a Miami hospital having a broken pelvis, 
ruptured bladder, bruises and burns, and temporary paralysis.  Lugo 
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and the others eventually learned that Schiller had survived, so they 
visited the hospital where they thought Schiller was recuperating, with 
a plan to suffocate him while he lay in his hospital bed.  Unknown to 
Lugo and the others, based upon a well-founded fear for his safety, 
Schiller had already arranged to be airlifted to a New York hospital to 
complete his recuperation.  Lugo, Doorbal, and some of the other 
captors proceeded to empty Schiller’s home of the remaining 
furnishings and valuables.  
Id. at 85-87 (footnotes omitted). 
The Griga/Furton Counts 
Griga was also a wealthy Miami businessman, and Furton was his girlfriend.  
See id. at 88. After learning of Griga’s significant wealth and seeing his 
Lamborghini, Doorbal determined that “Griga would be a prime target for 
kidnapping and extortion,” and he enlisted Lugo to participate with him in the 
crime.  Id. at 88. After an initial business meeting with Griga2 and a first failed 
abduction, Lugo and Doorbal succeeded in kidnapping Griga and Furton: 
When Lugo and Doorbal returned to Griga’s home on May 24, 
1995, they had concocted the scheme of inviting Griga and Furton to 
dinner, with the further goal of luring them to Doorbal’s apartment, 
where the abduction and extortion would begin.  Between 10 and 
10:30 p.m., Judi Bartusz, a friend of Griga’s, saw Lugo and Doorbal 
leave Griga’s home in a gold Mercedes, while Griga and Furton left in 
the Lamborghini. 
On May 25, Delgado met Lugo and Doorbal at Doorbal’s 
apartment.  Lugo informed him that Griga was already dead:  Doorbal 
had killed Griga after the two became involved in a scuffle in and 
2. Lugo and Doorbal met with Griga “to discuss Griga’s interest in 
investing in phone lines in India.”  Id.  The investment scheme was bogus, but was 
“designed as a scheme for Lugo and Doorbal to ingratiate themselves with Griga 
and to gain his confidence.”  Id. at 88. 
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around the downstairs computer room in Doorbal’s apartment.  [n.22] 
Griga’s body had been placed in a bathtub in Doorbal’s apartment.  
Lugo related that when Furton had heard the scuffling between 
Doorbal and Griga, she rose from her seat in the living room and 
began to scream when she realized that Griga had been seriously 
injured. Lugo restrained her and subdued her with an injection of 
Rompun.  Lugo expressed his anger toward Doorbal for having killed 
Griga before the extortion plan had been completed. 
[N.22.] The record reflects that, at some point 
before he was killed, Griga was injected with Rompun [a 
horse tranquilizer]. Dr. Allan Herron, a veterinarian, 
provided expert testimony that the presence of horse 
tranquilizer in Griga’s brain and liver indicated that he 
was alive when he was injected.  Rompun slows 
respiration and heart rate, and causes salivation, 
vomiting, and a burning sensation.  Dr. Herron stated that 
there are no clinical uses for Rompun in humans. 
Medical examiner Dr. Roger Mittleman testified 
that Griga was a homicide victim.  While he could not 
pinpoint the exact cause of death, he opined that Griga 
died from one or more of the following causes: an 
overdose of horse tranquilizer; asphyxia from 
strangulation, with the overdose of horse tranquilizer 
contributing to the asphyxiating effect; or blunt force 
trauma to his skull and the consequent bleeding 
(exsanguination) from this blunt force. 
Lugo and Doorbal subsequently turned their focus toward 
Furton. They suspected that she must know the code to enter Griga’s 
home.  Knowledge of the code would allow Lugo and Doorbal to 
enter Griga’s home with the hope of gaining access to valuables and, 
most importantly, bank account information for access to much of his 
wealth. Doorbal carried Furton down the stairs from the second floor 
of the apartment.  Furton was barely clad, wearing only the red leather 
jacket that she had worn when she left Griga’s home the night before, 
and a hood covered her head.  Not long after Doorbal placed Furton 
near the bottom of the stairs, although handcuffed, she began 
screaming for Griga.  At Lugo’s direction, Doorbal injected Furton 
with more horse tranquilizer, causing her to scream again.  Lugo and 
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Doorbal then questioned Furton about the security code for Griga’s 
home.  Eventually, Furton refused to answer more questions.  Doorbal 
injected her yet again with additional horse tranquilizer.  . . . 
Armed with what he believed to be the access code for Griga’s 
home security, Lugo took Petrescu [Lugo’s girlfriend] to attempt entry 
while Doorbal and Delgado stayed behind.  After failing to gain 
access to Griga’s home, Lugo called Doorbal on his cellular phone. 
As the two talked, Petrescu heard Doorbal say, “The bitch is cold,” 
which she believed was Doorbal’s indication that Furton was dead.  
[n.24] 
[N.24.] Dr. Mittleman, the medical examiner, 
opined that the effects from horse tranquilizer were 
consistent with the cause of [Furton’s] death.  He also 
stated that her death was consistent with asphyxia. 
Id. at 88-89 (some footnotes omitted).  Lugo and Doorbal subsequently 
dismembered the bodies of Griga and Furton and disposed of the body parts in two 
different South Florida locations.  See id. at 90. 
During the penalty phase, the State offered the victim-impact testimony of 
two witnesses—the father of Krisztina Furton and the sister of Frank Griga.  Lugo 
offered the testimony of his 71-year-old mother, Carmen Lugo.  Mrs. Lugo 
testified that, as a child, Lugo attended Catholic school and served as an altar boy.  
She related that Lugo’s father was an alcoholic, on one occasion Lugo’s father 
struck him on the chest with a hanger, and on another occasion threw food at Lugo 
because he refused to eat.  Mrs. Lugo was of the opinion that Lugo received less 
favorable treatment than his sister.  The family never received complaints about 
Lugo from school, and he performed well academically.  He enjoyed football and 
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was not involved with alcohol or tobacco.  Lugo was not violent during his youth, 
and he received a scholarship to attend college.  Lugo was the only one of her 
children who provided care when the father suffered from cancer, and Lugo had 
also provided care for the four children of his former sister-in-law after she died.  
When asked if she loved her son, Mrs. Lugo replied, “I love him with all my 
heart.” 
Santiago Gervacio, a restaurant owner from Miami, met Lugo in 1990.  
Gervacio considered Lugo to be a “very good friend,” and he was unaware of Lugo 
being involved in any violence. Lugo had two children with his third wife, and he 
served as the primary caretaker of the couple’s daughter.  Gervacio described Lugo 
as thinking of others before himself.  Lugo had loaned money to Gervacio 
whenever Gervacio asked, and he neither charged Gervacio interest nor pressured 
him for repayment.  According to Gervacio, the only time Lugo asked to be repaid 
was when he was in need of money.  Lugo chose not to testify during the penalty 
phase. 
In imposing the death sentence for the Griga and Furton murders, the trial 
court found five aggravating factors and accorded each great weight: (1) Lugo had 
been convicted of prior violent felonies; (2) the murders were committed to avoid 
arrest; (3) they were committed for pecuniary gain; (4) they were committed in the 
course of a kidnapping; and (5) they were cold, calculated, and premeditated 
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(CCP). See Lugo, 845 So. 2d at 91-92. In addition, the trial court found that the 
murder of Furton was heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) and accorded that factor 
great weight. See id. at 92. With regard to mitigation, the trial judge did not find 
any statutory mitigators but did find five nonstatutory mitigators:  
(1) Lugo was not a totally immoral person and had exhibited great 
acts of kindness in the past (little weight); (2) Lugo’s execution would 
have a negative impact on his elderly mother (little weight); (3) Lugo 
exhibited appropriate courtroom behavior (little weight); (4) Lugo 
assisted the police . . . in finding the torsos of Griga and Furton (very 
little weight); and (5) life terms for Lugo for each of the murders 
would permanently remove him as a menace to society (little weight). 
Id. at 92 n.31. 
Direct Appeal 
On direct appeal, Lugo raised the following issues:  (1) the trial court erred 
when it denied the motion to sever the Schiller counts, the Griga/Furton counts, 
and the RICO counts and to have separate trials for each set of counts; (2) 
insufficient evidence existed to support the convictions for RICO activity and 
conspiracy to commit RICO activity; (3) the State committed fundamental error 
during opening statements; (4) his right to a fair trial was denied when Doorbal 
adversely cross-examined witnesses in an attempt to shift culpability to Lugo; (5) 
the State improperly introduced evidence of Lugo’s prior fraud conviction and his 
federal probation to establish his propensity to commit crimes or bad acts; (6) the 
trial court erred when it prohibited counsel for Lugo from interrogating a witness 
as to whether a lawyer accompanied her when she was subpoenaed for questioning 
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at the state attorney’s office; (7) Brady3 violations occurred, which warranted that 
Lugo receive a new trial or the right to conduct further discovery; (8) the State 
committed fundamental error during closing statements; (9) the trial court 
erroneously found certain aggravating factors; (10) the trial court improperly 
weighed or erroneously failed to find nonstatutory mitigating factors which Lugo 
proffered; (11) the sentences imposed for the noncapital offenses were excessive; 
(12) the death sentences were disproportionate; and (13) Florida’s capital-
sentencing scheme is unconstitutional.  See 845 So. 2d at 92-119. This Court 
denied relief on all claims and affirmed Lugo’s convictions and sentences.  See id. 
at 119. 
Postconviction Proceedings 
On October 18, 2004, Lugo filed an initial motion for postconviction relief 
which raised a number of claims and requested a competency evaluation.  Two 
experts evaluated Lugo, and both concluded that he was competent to assist in his 
postconviction proceedings. 
On April 21, 2005, Lugo served an amended motion for postconviction 
relief, in which he raised the following claims:  (1) Lugo was denied his right to a 
fair trial because, during voir dire, juror Schlehuber failed to disclose that he had 
been the victim of a violent crime; alternatively, if this claim is procedurally 
3. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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barred, trial counsel was ineffective for the failure to investigate juror 
backgrounds; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for the failure to object to improper 
“Golden Rule” arguments that were made by the State; (3)  trial counsel was 
ineffective for the failure to adequately investigate and present evidence of 
nonstatutory mitigation; (4) Lugo was denied his right to consular relations under 
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention; (5) trial counsel was ineffective for the 
failure to obtain the appointment of a qualified mental-health expert in sufficient 
time to properly evaluate Lugo for the penalty phase; (6) the State improperly 
withheld potentially useful information which impeached victim/witness Marc 
Schiller; and (7) Florida’s sentencing scheme is unconstitutional.   
A Huff4 hearing was held on September 7, 2005, and the postconviction 
court granted an evidentiary hearing on claim 3 (the failure to investigate and 
present mitigation evidence) but limited Lugo to presentation of the testimony of 
former football coaches, friends from New York City (where Lugo was raised), a 
former girlfriend, and his sister.  The evidentiary hearing was initially scheduled 
for December 1, 2005, but was subsequently continued to January 23, 2006.  On 
December 27, 2005, Lugo sought to amend the postconviction motion to add four 
additional claims.  The postconviction court denied the motion.  After an 
4. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
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evidentiary hearing, the court entered an order denying the amended rule 3.851 
motion for postconviction relief.  Lugo now appeals the denial of the motion.   
ANALYSIS 
Failure to Investigate or Present Mitigation 
In his first claim, Lugo contends that his trial counsel was ineffective during 
the penalty phase for failing to investigate and offer mitigation testimony with 
regard to his positive attributes and healthy lifestyle during the time he was a 
student at Fordham University in the early 1980s.   
Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court has held that two requirements must 
be satisfied for an ineffective-assistance claim to be successful:  
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of 
the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards. 
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  A court 
considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a 
specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is 
clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied. 
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted).  With 
regard to penalty-phase claims of ineffective assistance, a capital defendant must 
show that but for counsel’s deficiency, the defendant probably would have 
received a life sentence. See Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 570 (Fla. 1996); see 
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also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”).  Both prongs of the 
Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact.  Therefore, we defer to the 
trial court’s factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, 
but review its legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 
771-72 (Fla. 2004).  
Mitigation—Evidentiary Hearing 
During the evidentiary hearing, Lugo presented the testimony of seven 
witnesses, including his own and that of original trial counsel.  A former state 
prosecutor and current supreme court judge in the State of New York5 testified that 
he met Lugo in the early 1980s when they played football together at Fordham 
University. Lugo was a good teammate, a hard worker, and a friend who was 
considered to be honest, trustworthy, ethical, and nonviolent.  Lugo was not known 
to use drugs or alcohol. On cross-examination, it was revealed that the witness had 
never been to Lugo’s home and did not know his family.  After 1982, the witness 
had very little contact with Lugo, and after the spring of 1983, he saw Lugo no 
more than one dozen times.  The witness did not know if Lugo graduated from 
Fordham University and had never spoken to Lugo since he relocated to Florida.  
After recounting what he knew about Lugo’s convictions, the witness agreed that 
5. In New York, the Supreme Court is a trial court. 
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the conduct involved was violent, dishonest, selfish, and immoral.  The witness 
conceded that the person who committed these crimes was not the Lugo he had 
known in 1983. 
  Oneal Tutein was employed as a football coach at Fordham University 
from 1981 until 1985.  He recruited Lugo from Xavier High School due to the 
recommendation of the high school football coach.  Lugo was a quiet individual 
who was committed to the football program and was generally popular with the 
other players. Lugo did not develop deep relationships with his teammates because 
he commuted to campus but he was “every bit a part of the team.”  The coach 
viewed Lugo as honest, trustworthy, and a fair competitor, and Tutein never knew 
Lugo to commit a violent act, use drugs or alcohol, or engage in immoral behavior.  
However, Tutein admitted that he had no contact with Lugo after he left Fordham. 
After viewing photos of the bodies of Griga and Furton, Tutein testified that he had 
had no idea of the man Lugo had become and that it was hard to believe that the 
person he knew in 1982 was capable of these crimes.   
An attorney who now owns insurance agencies testified that he and Lugo 
were on the same football team at Fordham.  This teammate viewed Lugo as 
hardworking, dedicated, honest, trustworthy, generous, and a fair competitor.  This 
teammate also was unaware of any drug or alcohol use by Lugo, and never knew 
Lugo to have committed any violent acts.  This teammate further acknowledged 
- 14 -
 
 
 
that he only had contact with Lugo through football and, after that, there was no 
social interaction. 
Cindy Velez met Lugo when she was 16 years old—while Lugo was a 
student at Fordham—and they had a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship.  She thought 
Lugo was a wonderful person with a kind heart who was outgoing, healthy, and 
nonviolent.  She remembered that he attended church, did not use steroids (even 
though he was a bodybuilder), drugs or alcohol, and did not engage in greedy or 
immoral behavior.  Velez explained that her mother terminated the relationship and 
sent Velez to Puerto Rico because Velez was too young to have a boyfriend.  After 
moving to Puerto Rico many years ago, her first interaction with Lugo was in 2003 
when she contacted him on death row.  Although Velez expressed her belief that 
Lugo could be a contributing member of society if not executed, she revealed that 
she was unsure of the nature of his crimes and did not know how many murder 
convictions Lugo had received. Velez believed that Lugo “was not the kind of 
person who would do that.” 
Trial counsel was a thirty-eight-year trial veteran and had represented many 
death-penalty defendants. He had a good relationship with Lugo, and they 
discussed evidence and trial strategies. Lugo informed him that he did not wish to 
call mitigation witnesses during the penalty phase—family or otherwise—because 
he did not want to bring further grief upon his family.  Trial counsel requested that 
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Lugo provide him with a list of all persons who might be able to testify in a 
positive manner on his behalf.  Counsel spoke with several of the persons listed as 
possible witnesses, and he ultimately presented two witnesses during the penalty 
phase. Although Lugo did not want his mother to testify, counsel presented her at 
trial because he felt she was a very sympathetic witness and that her penalty-phase 
presentation was powerful. Additionally, counsel presented Santiago Gervacio as 
a witness because he knew Lugo during the time that the crimes were committed 
and could offer favorable testimony.   
The only information trial counsel obtained from Lugo with regard to his 
college years was that he was a “decent student and he played football for 
Fordham.” College academic records were not obtained and coaches or faculty 
were not contacted. Counsel admitted that he did not “investigate the entire State 
of New York for possible people that knew [Lugo].”  With regard to the now-state 
court judge, counsel believed that he would have been a good mitigation witness.  
Counsel would have also spoken with coaches if Lugo had identified his former 
coaches as helpful witnesses.  Lugo simply did not list or mention either of these 
witnesses to his trial counsel. When asked whether he allows his clients to 
determine the scope of the mitigation investigation, trial counsel replied, “I have to 
know who to speak to . . . I have to know what this person knows that relates to 
him. . . .  The law may require me to do a lot of things, but if I don’t have 
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information to do it, obviously, I can’t.” With regard to Velez, Lugo never 
provided his counsel with her name and, further, it was unknown what helpful 
evidence she could offer because only she knew Lugo during the early 1980s— 
when she was sixteen and he was eighteen.  Trial counsel opined that it would have 
been “silly” to call a witness to testify under such circumstances “considering that 
you are before the jury who heard the vivid facts of this case.”  For the same 
reason, trial counsel believed that Lugo’s status as a former college football player 
would not have assisted him during the penalty phase.   
During cross-examination by the State, trial counsel acknowledged that it 
would not have been beneficial to continually reinforce to the jury that Lugo was 
an individual who had every opportunity in life, but eventually became a torturer, 
kidnapper, and double murderer.  Presenting the testimony of college friends who 
had become successful lawyers and businessmen could have invited unfavorable 
comparisons to Lugo, who this jury heard had turned to a life of crime.  
Additionally, witnesses who, after reviewing the facts or photos of these crimes, 
might change their opinion of Lugo (as actually occurred during this collateral 
proceeding) “would look horrible in front of the jury.”   
Finally, Lugo testified during the evidentiary hearing and denied that he had 
advised trial counsel not to contact non-family members. He acknowledged, 
however, that he did not provide his counsel with the names of potential mitigation 
- 17 -
 
 
  
 
witnesses from his past.  Lugo testified that he had thought of many individuals he 
would have liked to have presented as witnesses, but he did not have the ability to 
locate them. He believed that his counsel should have possessed such a capability.  
Finally, Lugo admitted that, during the evidentiary hearing below, he did not offer 
the testimony of any witnesses who knew him in 1994; i.e., the time during which 
he committed the relevant crimes.   
Analysis 
We conclude that it is not necessary to address whether counsel was 
deficient because, even if the testimony of these mitigation witnesses had been 
presented during the penalty phase, Lugo cannot demonstrate a reasonable 
probability that he would have received a life sentence—that is, a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  See Cherry v. State, 781 So. 
2d 1040, 1048 (Fla. 2000) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95). Lugo’s mother 
was presented during the penalty proceeding, and she established his positive 
performance in school, his service as an altar boy, and his participation in football.  
Moreover, Mrs. Lugo provided compelling testimony of good deeds by Lugo, such 
as caring for his ailing and elderly parents, and taking responsibility for the four 
children of his former sister-in-law.  Further, counsel did present the testimony of 
Santiago Gervacio—a friend during the time that Lugo committed the crimes— 
who testified that Lugo was a generous and nonviolent person.  We conclude that 
- 18 -
 
Lugo was not prejudiced by the failure to present the testimony of the witnesses 
who testified during the evidentiary hearing because the testimony actually 
presented by the penalty-phase witnesses was much more compelling than that of 
the evidentiary-hearing witnesses who had not seen Lugo since 1982 and 1983— 
more than a decade before Lugo committed the crimes at issue in this case. 
Furthermore, some of the evidentiary-hearing witnesses even testified that the 
Lugo who committed these crimes was not the Lugo they knew during college.   
Although Lugo may have once been an honest, nonviolent, trustworthy 
individual who was a fair competitor on the football field, the facts of this case— 
i.e., that Lugo kidnapped, tortured, extorted, and murdered for profit—do not 
reflect such a person. Any mitigation that could have been derived from these 
postconviction witnesses would have been insignificant when compared to the 
brutality, dishonesty, and avarice involved in these crimes, and there is no 
reasonable probability sufficient to undermine our confidence in the outcome that 
Lugo would have received a life sentence had this testimony been presented during 
the penalty phase. See Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 225-26 (Fla. 1998) 
(“Even if the additional mitigation evidence Rutherford presented at the 3.850 
hearing had been heard and considered by the jury and original judge, it is not 
reasonably probable, given the nature of the mitigation offered, that this altered 
picture would have led to the imposition of a life sentence, outweighing the 
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multiple substantial aggravators at issue in this case.”); see also Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694.6 
Further, the witnesses now suggested could have been detrimental to Lugo 
because two of his former teammates have achieved professional success—one as 
a prosecutor and judge, and the other as an attorney and business owner.  If these 
witnesses had been presented, the jury could have drawn an unfavorable 
comparison between these witnesses—who became law-abiding, successful 
members of society—and Lugo, who engaged in a pattern of violent criminal 
behavior for the purpose of accruing material wealth.  See generally Williamson v. 
State, 681 So. 2d 688, 698 (Fla. 1996) (upholding assignment of only “some” 
weight to mitigation that concerned defendant’s allegedly dysfunctional upbringing 
where evidence demonstrated that “appellant’s siblings became productive 
members of society despite a similar upbringing”).   
6. In the instant case, the prior-violent-felony aggravator was established by 
the attempted murder of Schiller and the contemporaneous murder of the other 
victim. See Lugo, 845 So. 2d at 91-92. Further, the trial court found that the CCP 
aggravator applied to the murders of both Furton and Griga and that the HAC 
aggravator applied to the murder of Furton.  See id. at 92; see also Guardado v. 
State, 965 So. 2d 108, 119 (Fla. 2007) (“[B]oth the HAC and CCP aggravators are 
‘two of the most serious aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme.’ ” 
(quoting Buzia v. State, 926 So. 2d 1203, 1216 (Fla. 2006))). 
- 20 -
 
 
 
We affirm the denial of the claim that counsel was ineffective for the failure 
to investigate and present evidence with regard to Lugo’s lifestyle and participation 
in football during the years that he attended college. 
Juror Claim 
Lugo next contends that he is entitled to a new trial because juror Schlehuber 
failed to disclose during voir dire that he had been the victim of a violent crime—a 
battery. According to Lugo, a police report reflects that a person who made a 
delivery to a worksite had pushed Schlehuber to the ground.  The suspect also 
allegedly struck him in the face with a closed fist, and punched him several times 
in the chest.   
Lugo and the State disagree with regard to the applicable standard by which 
we should evaluate whether Lugo is entitled to a new trial.  Lugo contends that the 
three-part test articulated by this Court in De La Rosa v. Zequeira, 659 So. 2d 239 
(Fla. 1995), applies. Conversely, the State contends that the claim of juror 
nondisclosure is procedurally barred, and that to the extent Lugo alleges 
ineffectiveness of trial counsel, he has failed to demonstrate that a biased juror 
actually served. See Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312, 324 (Fla. 2007) (“[W]here 
a postconviction motion alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
or preserve a cause challenge, the defendant must demonstrate that a juror was 
- 21 -
 
actually biased.”). We conclude that Lugo is not entitled to relief under either 
standard. 
With regard to claims of nondisclosure, this Court has held that  
[i]n determining whether a juror’s nondisclosure of information 
during voir dire warrants a new trial, courts have generally utilized a 
three-part test. First, the complaining party must establish that the 
information is relevant and material to jury service in the case. 
Second, that the juror concealed the information during questioning. 
Lastly, that the failure to disclose the information was not attributable 
to the complaining party’s lack of diligence. 
De La Rosa, 659 So. 2d at 241. Lugo has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled 
to a new trial. 
The record reflects that Lugo was indicted for dozens of crimes, including 
burglary of a dwelling, armed robbery, money laundering, grand theft, uttering 
forged instruments, and extortion.  A number of jurors who were selected to serve 
on Lugo’s jury disclosed that they had been victims of crimes similar to those with 
which Lugo was charged. Trial counsel did not interrogate those jurors about their 
experiences related to those events.  For example, the parties agree that juror Fort 
reported on her questionnaire that she had been the victim of a robbery.  However, 
during individual voir dire, trial counsel did not ask Fort if her status as a victim of 
this crime would affect her ability to serve as a juror.  The same applies to jurors 
Dacal and LePow as victims of burglaries.  Finally, even though juror Schlehuber 
disclosed his status as a victim of a theft, trial counsel did not question him during 
- 22 -
 
 
individual voir dire with regard to this crime or whether it would impact his ability 
to serve as a juror. This patterns reflects that even if juror Schlehuber had 
disclosed the events at his place of employment, trial counsel would not have 
inquired further about this crime.    
Moreover, Schlehuber’s status with regard to that prior event is an extremely 
tenuous basis upon which to question his service on the jury that evaluated the 
charges against Lugo. As described by Lugo, the event involving Schlehuber was 
a one-time isolated incident which occurred at his workplace during a 
disagreement. Thus, unlike victim Marc Schiller, Schlehuber was not kidnapped, 
held hostage for approximately one month in a warehouse, tortured by his captors 
in an effort to extort his assets, placed in a vehicle which was subsequently ignited, 
and then struck by a motor vehicle after he managed to escape from the burning 
vehicle. The sheer disparity between the workplace incident and the extended 
torture and captivity of Schiller causes us to conclude that the workplace incident 
was not sufficiently material or relevant to service on Lugo’s jury such that a 
failure to disclose this information requires a new trial.  See generally Conde v. 
State, 860 So. 2d 930, 939 n.6 (Fla. 2003) (juror failed to include in questionnaire 
information regarding two arrests and to fully reveal information about the arrests 
during voir dire; Court concluded that nondisclosure “was not material to the 
degree that the denial of a cause challenge was an abuse of discretion”).   
- 23 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, during group voir dire, the trial judge expressly inquired of the 
entire group venire whether individuals who had been victims of crime would 
allow their personal feelings or experiences to influence their decision-making 
process in Lugo’s case: 
COURT: Now, I am sure in a group this size we are going to 
have plenty of people who have been victims of crime, okay, one 
crime or another.  Or friends or relatives of yours have been victims of 
crime.  . . . Can we all agree on one thing?  Whatever . . . you have 
been a victim of in the past has absolutely nothing to do with whether 
or not this man committed the crimes he’s accused of[.]  Can we agree 
on that? 
VENIRE:  Yes. 
COURT: Okay. And your role as a juror is to decide, did he 
commit those crimes.  Did the State convince you beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he committed those crimes. 
So you can see that your personal involvement as either a 
victim or accused really has nothing to do with whether he is guilty or 
not guilty. Now, that’s logic.  Okay.  I’m just explaining to you what 
logically follows from these statements.  But you have to tell me what 
emotionally follows.  Every once in awhile I have someone on the 
jury that says, well, I know that but, you know . . . I’m going to take it 
out on him.  I was victimized. Somebody broke in my house. I 
haven’t gotten over it. I know he may not be guilty in this case. I 
can’t separate the two and I’m going to take it out on him.  If you feel 
that way, you can understand why we should know that, because you 
wouldn’t be a fair impartial juror if you’re going to take it out on this 
defendant who has nothing to do with your case. 
. . . . 
We recognize that is something that emotionally may happen.  
And we would just appreciate your honesty.  If you feel you can’t be a 
fair, impartial juror . . . that you are going to hold it against this 
defendant or the State, even though it’s not logically related, it may be 
emotionally related; is there anybody who feels that way? 
- 24 -
 
 
None of the jurors indicated that any of their past experiences as crime victims 
would impact against Lugo.   
The record reflects that the trial judge provided a detailed explanation with 
regard to how improper emotions could impact the thinking process and provided 
the jurors the opportunity to disclose if they entertained lingering feelings or 
resentments that might influence their jury service.  After the trial court’s specific 
discussion, juror Schlehuber did not indicate that his prior altercation at work 
would affect his ability to be impartial during Lugo’s trial. Therefore, we conclude 
that the events referenced with regard to juror Schlehuber were neither relevant nor 
material to jury service in Lugo’s case.  See generally Owen v. State, 986 So. 2d 
534, 550 (Fla. 2008) (trial court did not err in failing to remove juror who had 
recently been the victim of a home invasion during which her daughter was raped; 
although juror was a victim of a crime similar to the crime committed by Owen, 
her responses during voir dire indicated “that she would be able to ‘lay aside any 
bias or prejudice and render [her] verdict solely upon the evidence presented and 
the instructions on the law given to [her] by the court.’ ” (quoting Lusk v. State, 
446 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. 1984))). 
Further, Lugo is not entitled to a new trial because the failure of juror 
Schlehuber to disclose this workplace event may have been attributable to trial 
counsel’s limited inquiry.  As previously noted, trial counsel did not explore prior 
- 25 -
 
experiences as crime victims.  During group voir dire by the State, one juror 
admitted she had failed to state in her questionnaire that she had been the victim of 
a theft, which she had not reported to the police. We have held that 
[t]he “due diligence” test requires that counsel provide a sufficient 
explanation of the type of information which potential jurors are being 
asked to disclose, particularly if it pertains to an area about which an 
average lay juror might not otherwise have a working understanding. 
Thus, resolution of this “diligence” issue requires a factual 
determination regarding whether the explanations provided by the 
judge and counsel regarding the kinds of responses which were sought 
would reasonably have been understood by the subject jurors to 
encompass the undisclosed information. 
Roberts v. Tejada, 814 So. 2d 334, 343 (Fla. 2002). When trial counsel for Lugo 
conducted group voir dire, he did not inquire if any of the other jurors had also 
inadvertently failed to include on their questionnaire altercations, whether reported 
to the police or whether charges were actually filed.  Here, it appears that charges 
were never pursued against the deliveryman involved with juror Schlehuber, and 
therefore, at best, an ambiguity may exist which was not explored.    
Lugo is not entitled to a new trial under a De La Rosa analysis based upon 
the failure of juror Schlehuber to disclose the altercation at work.  This asserted 
nondisclosure was simply immaterial and irrelevant to jury service in Lugo’s case, 
and the failure to disclose was attributable, in part, to the lack of diligence of trial 
counsel. 
- 26 -
 
 
 
 
Under the “actual bias” standard articulated by this Court in Carratelli, Lugo 
has similarly failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief.  In Carratelli, we 
explained: 
A juror is competent if he or she “can lay aside any bias or 
prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the evidence presented 
and the instructions on the law given to him by the court.”  Lusk, 446 
So. 2d at 1041. Therefore, actual bias means bias-in-fact that would 
prevent service as an impartial juror.  See United States v. Wood, 299 
U.S. 123, 133-34 (1936) (stating, in a case involving a statute 
permitting government employees to serve as jurors in the District of 
Columbia, that the defendant in a criminal case still has the ability 
during voir dire to “ascertain whether a prospective juror . . . has any 
bias in fact which would prevent his serving as an impartial juror”).  
Under the actual bias standard, the defendant must demonstrate that 
the juror in question was not impartial—i.e., that the juror was biased 
against the defendant, and the evidence of bias must be plain on the 
face of the record. 
961 So. 2d at 324 (emphasis supplied).  Our analysis with regard to the De la Rosa 
standard defeats any assertion by Lugo that a biased juror actually served on the 
jury. As we have noted, the trial court engaged in an extended venire discussion to 
assure that the status of a juror as a crime victim would not impact his or her ability 
to fairly and impartially adjudicate the guilt or innocence of Lugo with regard to 
the charged crimes.  Juror Schlehuber did not indicate that he would be unable to 
set aside any of his past experiences if he were selected to serve on Lugo’s jury.  In 
Carratelli, we held that the defendant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice where 
the challenged juror explained during voir dire that he could be fair, listen to the 
evidence, and follow the law.  See id. at 327. Lugo similarly has failed to 
- 27 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
demonstrate that juror Schlehuber was actually biased against him.  See id. at 324. 
Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief under Carratelli. 
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Lugo is not entitled to a new trial 
and we deny relief on this claim. 
“Golden Rule” Commentary 
Lugo next contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
improper “Golden Rule” commentary by the State during closing statements.  As 
noted by the State, during his direct appeal Lugo challenged statements made by 
the prosecutor on this basis: 
The prosecutor’s statements which cause us concern are those 
related to an asserted “Golden Rule” argument.  During her closing 
argument, the prosecutor addressed the jury as follows: 
Imagine with tape over your mouth and a hood over 
your head, imagine it on Krisztina.  Not on yourselves, 
on Krisztina and what Krisztina is going through. 
An error is fundamental in nature when it “reaches down into the 
validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not 
have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.”  An 
improper “Golden Rule” argument typically occurs when counsel asks 
jurors to place themselves in the circumstances of the victim.  It 
extends beyond the evidence and “unduly create[s], arouse[s] and 
inflame[s] the sympathy, prejudice and passions of [the] jury to the 
detriment of the accused.” Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 421 (Fla. 
1998) (quoting Barnes v. State, 58 So. 2d 157, 159 (Fla. 1951)). The 
prosecutor unmistakably asked the jurors to place themselves in 
Furton’s position, which clearly is error.  We reject the State’s 
assertion that the prosecutor’s remarks were merely permissible 
comments on the evidence. A seasoned prosecutor involved in a 
capital case knows better than to make an improper “Golden Rule” 
- 28 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
argument. However, because this incident was isolated, and an 
overwhelming amount of unrebutted evidence exists against Lugo, we 
determine that the error is, on this record, harmless in nature and 
therefore deny relief. 
Lugo, 845 So. 2d at 106-07 (emphasis supplied).  Under our precedent, where 
improper comments by a prosecutor do not constitute reversible error, the 
defendant cannot “demonstrate the prejudice requisite for a successful ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, rendering summary denial of the issue appropriate.”  
Hodges v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 356 (Fla. 2004). Since we previously held that 
the “Golden Rule” comments by the State constituted harmless error, the summary 
denial of Lugo’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was proper.  Lugo is not 
entitled to relief on this claim. 
Vienna Convention 
Lugo contends that his arrest in the Bahamas by Bahamian police violated 
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention because the Bahamian police failed to contact 
the United States Consulate in the Bahamas or advise Lugo of his right to contact 
that consulate.  Lugo asserts that we should order suppression of the evidence that 
resulted from the Vienna Convention violation and either dismiss the indictment or 
vacate his convictions.  
The instant claim is procedurally barred because Lugo could have raised it 
during his direct appeal. See Maharaj v. State, 778 So. 2d 944, 959 (Fla. 2000) 
(allegation that State failed to comply with its international obligation to inform the 
- 29 -
 
consulate that a British citizen had been charged with a capital crime was 
procedurally barred because it could have and should have been raised on direct 
appeal); see also Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1361 n.8 (2008) (citing 
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006), for the proposition that the 
Vienna Convention does not preclude the application of state procedural bars).  
Absent the procedural bar, we nonetheless conclude that Lugo is not entitled to 
relief on this claim.  In Maharaj, we concluded that the defendant was not entitled 
to relief because he has “failed to establish that he has standing, as treaties are 
between countries, not citizens.” 778 So. 2d at 959 (citing Matta-Ballesteros v. 
Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990)).    
Moreover, even if Lugo possessed standing to assert a Vienna Convention 
violation, he cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any alleged violation.  
The circumstances presented here are far different from those in which a Vienna 
Convention violation may arise—i.e., a foreign national commits a crime in the 
United States, and a violation is claimed based upon the fact that the American 
officials failed to notify the consulate of the national’s home country. See, e.g., 
Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 2002) (capital defendant was a foreign 
national and citizen of the Bahamas who was charged with first-degree murder in 
the United States); Rodriguez v. State, 837 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) 
- 30 -
 
 
   
                                          
 
 
(criminal defendant was a Mexican national charged with DUI-related crimes in 
the United States). 
On the other hand, here, Lugo was an American citizen in the Bahamas who 
was sought by American officials for crimes committed in the United States. The 
Bahamian authorities arrested Lugo at the request of American officials. Thus, 
even if Lugo had been advised of his right to contact the American consulate, the 
consulate would play no part in providing him with legal advice to challenge his 
arrest by Bahamian authorities at the request of American officials, let alone 
challenge his extradition to the United States for crimes committed in the United 
States.7 
Finally, even if this issue was not procedurally barred and Lugo could 
establish that he was prejudiced by a Vienna Convention violation, he would not 
be entitled to the relief he seeks—i.e., the suppression of statements to the police.  
This Court has held that suppression of a post-arrest statement “is not an 
appropriate remedy for an alleged violation of article 36 of the Vienna 
Convention.” Conde, 860 So. 2d at 953 (citing United States v. Chaparro­
7. The trial record further reflects that, rather than contest extradition, Lugo 
voluntarily returned to the United States. Moreover, even if Lugo had decided to 
challenge extradition, it is unlikely that he would have been successful since death 
is an available punishment in the Bahamas. See ch. 84, §115, Statute Law of the 
Bahamas, available at 
http://laws.bahamas.gov.bs/statutes/statute_CHAPTER_84.html#Ch84s115.  
- 31 -
 
 
 
 
                                          
 
 
Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Cordoba-Mosquera, 
212 F.3d 1194, 1196 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 
2000); and United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 541 (6th Cir. 2000)); see also 
Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 350 (“[N]either the Vienna Convention itself nor our 
precedents applying the exclusionary rule support suppression of Sanchez-Llamas' 
statements to police.”). 
In light of the foregoing, we deny this claim.   
Brady/Giglio8 Violations 
Lugo next contends that the State committed a Brady violation because it 
failed to disclose that Schiller was under federal investigation for Medicare fraud, 
and that this evidence could have been used to impeach the testimony presented by 
Schiller during trial. Lugo further asserts that the State committed a Giglio 
violation when it allowed Schiller to falsely testify that he had not engaged in 
Medicare fraud. We reject both assertions. 
During the appeal from the denial of the motion for postconviction relief 
filed by codefendant Noel Doorbal, Doorbal asserted that the trial court erred when 
it denied a motion to depose the assistant state attorneys (ASAs) involved in his 
case based upon the discovery of an e-mail from ASA Levine to her supervisor.  
According to Doorbal, this e-mail proved that the State withheld exculpatory 
8. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
- 32 -
 
  
                                          
 
 
Brady evidence (i.e., that Schiller was guilty of Medicare fraud) and also 
committed a Giglio violation (i.e., it allowed Schiller to falsely testify during trial 
that he was not guilty of Medicare fraud).  See Doorbal v. State, 983 So. 2d 464, 
478 (Fla. 2008).9  In our analysis of Doorbal’s claim, we first provided a history of 
Schiller’s alleged involvement in Medicare fraud.  See id. at 478-80. We then 
concluded that codefendant Doorbal had failed to establish either a Giglio or a 
Brady violation and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to depose the 
ASAs. See id. at 480-82. Our analysis in Doorbal applies equally to this 
postconviction proceeding and, therefore, we hold that Lugo is not entitled to relief 
on this claim. 
9. This e-mail stated, in pertinent part: 
Alicia Valle AUSA called and told me the[y] got the flip in N.J.  They 
do NOT need Delgado to make the case.  BUT, Jack Denaro came to 
her office and asked her for a plea and she is thinking about making it 
CONCURRENT. Just what I don’t want.  Last week when I spoke 
with Ms. Rundle about the Natale matter, she told me to make sure 
that the Feds did not mess me up. That they can just wait because our 
case is so much more important. . . .  I thought that if we gave the 
Feds more info so they didn’t need Delgado that they would give him 
consecutive time.  I really think that we need to stand firm on this 
even if you or Ms. Rundle have to call the powers that be over there.  
They just seem like they will plead anyone out—But Schiller.  That’s 
the only person they care about even though Delgado is in this for 
over a million.  By the way the deal will also save his entire family.  
He is looking worse and worse for me. . . . I rather he be pending 
charges when I try the case than this cush deal. 
Id. at 478 n.6. 
- 33 -
 
 
 
Motion to Amend 
In this claim, Lugo asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
denied his request to amend and supplement his postconviction motion with four 
additional claims.  We disagree. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(f)(4) 
provides in pertinent part: 
A motion filed under this rule may be amended up to 30 days prior to 
the evidentiary hearing upon motion and good cause shown. The trial 
court may in its discretion grant a motion to amend provided that the 
motion sets forth the reason the claim was not raised earlier and 
attaches a copy of the claim sought to be added. 
(Emphasis supplied.)  The refusal of a trial court to grant a party leave to amend a 
3.851 motion is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.  See generally 
Bryant v. State, 901 So. 2d 810, 817 (Fla. 2005) (stating that we “review 
discretionary acts by trial judges under an abuse of discretion standard” and 
holding that “the trial court abused its discretion in striking the initial motion 
without granting leave to amend”). Discretion is abused only when “the judicial 
action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that 
discretion is abused only where no reasonable person would take the view adopted 
by the trial court.” Parker v. State, 904 So. 2d 370, 379 (Fla. 2005) (quoting State 
v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 137 (Fla. 2003)). 
Lugo contends that the challenges to the arrest warrant and the violation of 
the extradition treaty between the Bahamas and the United States that he sought to 
- 34 -
 
 
   
add were not previously raised because postconviction counsel “failed to timely 
identify those claims as factually supported and legally viable.”  Postconviction 
counsel expressly acknowledged that “Lugo had himself mentioned to the 
undersigned counsel his belief in the factual and legal basis for those claims.”   
Invalidity of Arrest Warrant 
Lugo initially sought to add a claim that his arrest warrant was invalid based 
upon the presentation of false information.  Lugo asserts that although the affidavit 
in support of the warrant provided that Schiller recognized Lugo’s voice because 
of a distinctive lisp, this statement was false because he has never had a lisp.  Lugo 
also contends that the affidavit omitted the fact that police did not believe Schiller 
when he initially reported the crimes against him. 
These facts were readily available to postconviction counsel at the time that 
Lugo filed his initial rule 3.851 motion and, therefore, these claims should have 
been raised in that motion. On direct appeal, we stated that “Schiller testified that 
Lugo’s speech often had a very recognizable lisp-like trait.”  Lugo, 845 So. 2d at 
86. Thus, postconviction counsel should have been aware that Schiller identified 
Lugo on the basis of an alleged lisp in his speech.    
With regard to the claim that Lugo’s arrest warrant was based upon an 
omission, the direct-appeal record reflects that the deposition of F.B.I. agent Arthur 
Wells was attached to a brief that was stricken by this Court.  In the deposition, 
- 35 -
 
 
 
 
 
Wells testified that when he was first informed of Schiller’s ordeal by Ed Dubois 
(a private investigator hired by Schiller), he thought that the story was unbelievable 
and told DuBois that he (Wells) would need to speak with Schiller in person before 
he would pursue an investigation.  Thus, appellate counsel was aware of this 
alleged omission.   
Further, in Mese v. State, 824 So. 2d 908, 919 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), a 
dissenting opinion noted that the police initially did not believe Schiller’s 
explanation of what had occurred: 
Schiller decided in April 1995 to report the crime to the police, but 
after meeting with an investigative officer, Schiller concluded that the 
police did not believe him and again left the country.  It was not until 
late May 1995 that Schiller was contacted by his investigator and told 
that there had been a crime similar to the crimes against him and that 
the police wanted him to return to Miami and give a statement.  
The evidence thus shows that the facts of the Schiller 
kidnaping, extortion and attempted murder are so incredible that it 
was only after the police learned of the Griga/Furton murders that 
they began investigating the Schiller incident.  
(Ramirez, J., dissenting.)  Finally, this was public information due to its 
publication in a local periodical, The Miami New Times News, on December 30, 
1999. Since this information was widely available before postconviction counsel 
filed Lugo’s initial rule 3.851 motion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when it denied Lugo’s request to amend the motion to add this claim.  
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
- 36 -
 
  
                                          
 
  
Lugo next sought to add a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for the 
failure to seek suppression of evidence on the basis that the arrest affidavit 
contained false information that Schiller was able to identify Lugo through his 
alleged lisp. This allegedly false information was available to postconviction 
counsel at the time he filed the initial rule 3.851 motion.  Since the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow Lugo to supplement his 
postconviction motion with a claim that challenged the validity of his arrest 
warrant, we similarly conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when 
it refused to allow Lugo to amend his motion to add this ineffectiveness claim.10 
Lugo also sought to add an ineffectiveness claim based upon trial counsel’s 
failure to allege a Vienna Convention violation.  Lugo sought to add this claim 
because the United States Supreme Court had recently granted certiorari in 
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 1001 (2005), to address whether the Vienna 
Convention affords individual rights that may be enforced by suppression.  
Although a potential change in the law was possible in light of the Supreme 
Court’s acceptance of jurisdiction in a case that addressed individual rights under 
the Vienna Convention, at the time Lugo sought to amend his motion, the 
10. Further, had the evidentiary hearing been held on its originally 
scheduled date, December 1, 2005, Lugo’s December 27, 2005, motion to amend 
clearly would have been untimely. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(4). Lugo’s 
motion to amend was “timely” solely because the evidentiary hearing was 
continued from December 1 to January 23, 2006—more than seven weeks later.     
- 37 -
 
 
  
 
 
                                          
 
established law in Florida was that suppression of a post-arrest statement “is not an 
appropriate remedy for an alleged violation of article 36 of the Vienna 
Convention.” Conde, 860 So. 2d at 953. Since trial counsel is not ineffective for 
the failure to raise a nonmeritorious issue, see Parker v. State, 611 So. 2d 1224, 
1227 (Fla. 1992), and Lugo would not have obtained relief on his ineffectiveness 
claim, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Lugo’s motion to 
amend.11 
Extradition Treaty 
During trial, it was revealed that Lugo did not contest extradition.  See 
supra, note 7, at 31.  Although the treaty between the United States and the 
Bahamas provides that extradition proceedings may be waived “[i]f the person 
sought agrees in writing to be surrendered to the Requesting State,” Extradition 
Treaty, Mar. 9, 1990, U.S.-Bah., Art. 15, Treaty Doc. No. 102-17, Lugo clearly 
would have known that he did not waive extradition in writing.  Thus, Lugo should 
have challenged the validity of his extradition during the trial proceedings and on 
direct appeal. Since this claim was procedurally barred, the postconviction court 
11. Had the United States Supreme Court ultimately held that suppression is 
a remedy for violations of the Vienna Convention, Lugo could have sought relief 
based upon that ruling.  However, in Sanchez-Llamas the Supreme Court 
ultimately held that “neither the Vienna Convention itself nor our precedents 
applying the exclusionary rule support suppression of Sanchez-Llamas’ statements 
to police.” 548 U.S. at 350. Thus, even if Lugo had been allowed to amend his 
motion to add this claim, he ultimately would not have obtained relief.   
- 38 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
did not abuse its discretion when it denied Lugo’s motion to amend his rule 3.851 
motion to add this claim.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(1) (“This rule does not 
authorize relief based upon claims that could have or should have been raised at 
trial and, if properly preserved, on direct appeal of the judgment and sentence.”). 
Accordingly, Lugo is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of the rule 3.851 motion by 
the postconviction court. 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.  
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., did not participate.  
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND  
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Dade County,  
David H. Young, Judge – Case No. F95-17381C 
Roy D. Wasson of Wasson and Associates, Miami, Florida, 
 
for Appellant 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Sandra S. Jaggard, 
Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, 
 
for Appellee 
- 39 -