Title: People v. Lewis
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S260598
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 26, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
VINCE E. LEWIS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S260598 
 
Second Appellate District, Division One 
B295998 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
TA117431 
 
 
July 26, 2021 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, Kruger, and Jenkins concurred. 
 
 
1 
 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
S260598 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015; Senate Bill 
1437) eliminated natural and probable consequences liability for 
murder and limited the scope of the felony murder rule.  (Pen. 
Code, §§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e), as amended by Senate 
Bill 1437.)  Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1170.95 to the 
Penal Code,1 which creates a procedure for convicted murderers 
who could not be convicted under the law as amended to 
retroactively seek relief.   
In this case, we are asked to decide two questions specific 
to section 1170.95, subdivision (c):  (1) may superior courts 
consider the record of conviction in determining whether a 
defendant has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for 
relief?; and (2) when does the right to appointed counsel arise? 
Here, the trial court considered the record of conviction 
without appointing counsel and summarily denied defendant 
Vince E. Lewis’s section 1170.95 petition.  The Court of Appeal 
concluded this procedure was proper.  Contrary to the Court of 
Appeal’s decision, we conclude that the statutory language and 
legislative intent of section 1170.95 make clear that petitioners 
are entitled to the appointment of counsel upon the filing of a 
facially sufficient petition (see § 1170.95, subds. (b), (c)) and that 
 
1  
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal 
Code. 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
only after the appointment of counsel and the opportunity for 
briefing may the superior court consider the record of conviction 
to determine whether “the petitioner makes a prima facie 
showing that he or she is entitled to relief.”  (§ 1170.95, subd. 
(c).)   
Nevertheless, we conclude that the deprivation of Lewis’s 
right to counsel under subdivision (c) of section 1170.95 was 
state law error only, tested for prejudice under People v. Watson 
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson).  The parties dispute whether the 
trial court’s failure to appoint counsel can be deemed harmless 
on this record.  We decline to reach that issue.  We instead 
reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment and remand the cause 
to the Court of Appeal for an evaluation of prejudice under 
Watson in the first instance.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Factual and Procedural History 
In 2012, defendant Lewis, along with codefendants Ariana 
Coronel and Mirian Herrera, were convicted of killing fellow 
Easy Riders gang member Darsy Noriega for her apparent 
disloyalty to their gang.2  At their trial, former codefendant Amy 
Aleman testified that Noriega was ordered to attend a gang 
meeting, which had been called by Lewis, on the night of her 
death.  During the meeting, Lewis told Aleman, Coronel, 
Herrera, and Noriega to accompany him to buy beer, which they 
 
2  
The brief summary of facts is drawn from the Court of 
Appeal’s prior opinion in Lewis’s direct appeal.  (People v. Lewis 
(July 14, 2014, B241236) [nonpub. opn.] (Lewis I).)  In this 
matter, the Court of Appeal took judicial notice of Lewis I.  (See 
People v. Lewis (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1133, fn. 1 (Lewis 
II).) 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
did.  After leaving the liquor store, Lewis drove around, 
eventually parking on a street near an alley.  After Lewis 
parked, Aleman, Herrera, and Noriega got out of the car and 
walked down the alley; Lewis and Coronel remained in the car.  
In the alley, Herrera shot Noriega to death; Noriega was hit by 
approximately ten bullets.  The prosecution’s gang expert 
offered testimony that “in general a gang meeting is required to 
decide whether a member needs to be disciplined and only one 
person in the gang, the ‘shot caller,’ can call such a meeting.”  
(Lewis I, supra, B241236.)   
The jury convicted Lewis, Coronel, and Herrera of 
Noriega’s first degree murder.  (§ 187, subd. (a).)  The jury 
further found that the murder was committed for the benefit of 
a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(c)) and that 
Herrera personally and intentionally discharged a firearm 
causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).  Lewis was sentenced to 
25 years to life.  
Lewis, Coronel, and Herrera appealed.  (Lewis I, supra, 
B241236.)  While their appeal was pending, we decided People 
v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu).  Chiu “held that natural 
and probable consequences liability cannot extend to first 
degree premeditated murder because punishing someone for 
first degree premeditated murder when that person did not 
actually perpetrate or intend the killing is inconsistent with 
‘reasonable concepts of culpability.’ ”  (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th 
at p. 838, quoting Chiu, at p. 165; see generally Chiu, at pp. 165–
166.)3  Chiu further explained, “When a trial court instructs a 
 
3  
As we stated in Gentile, Senate Bill 1437 superseded Chiu, 
supra, 59 Cal.4th 155 insofar as Chiu upheld aider and abettor 
 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
4 
jury on two theories of guilt, one of which was legally correct and 
one legally incorrect, reversal is required unless there is a basis 
in the record to find that the verdict was based on a valid 
ground.”  (Chiu, at p. 167.)  Stated differently, “[d]efendant’s 
first degree murder conviction must be reversed unless we 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury based its 
verdict on the legally valid theory that defendant directly aided 
and abetted the premeditated murder.”  (Ibid.)  
In relevant part, the Lewis I court agreed with Lewis that, 
under Chiu, the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it 
could convict him of Noriega’s murder if he aided Herrera in an 
assault on Noriega with force likely to produce great bodily 
injury and that murder was the natural and probable 
consequence of the assault.  (Lewis I, supra, B241236.)  
However, quoting Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at page 167, the Lewis 
I court concluded the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt because the record showed that Lewis directly aided and 
abetted Herrera in the deliberate, premeditated murder of 
Noriega.  (Ibid.) 
We denied Lewis’s petition for review of Lewis I.   
B.  Senate Bill 1437 
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate 
Bill 1437 “to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and 
probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to 
ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is 
not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was 
 
liability for second degree murder under the natural and 
probable consequences theory.  (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 
848–849.)  
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with 
reckless indifference to human life.”  (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, 
subd. (f).)  In addition to substantively amending sections 188 
and 189 of the Penal Code, Senate Bill 1437 added section 
1170.95, which provides a procedure for convicted murderers 
who could not be convicted under the law as amended to 
retroactively seek relief.  (See Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at 
p. 843.)   
Pursuant to section 1170.95, an offender must file a 
petition in the sentencing court averring that:  “(1) A complaint, 
information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that 
allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony 
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences 
doctrine[;] [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or 
second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer 
in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for 
first degree or second degree murder[;] [¶] [and] (3) The 
petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder 
because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective 
January 1, 2019.”  (§ 1170.95, subds. (a)(1)–(3); see also 
§ 1170.95 subd. (b)(1)(A).)  Additionally, the petition shall state 
“[w]hether the petitioner requests the appointment of counsel.”  
(§ 1170.95, subd. (b)(1)(C).)  If a petition fails to comply with 
subdivision (b)(1), “the court may deny the petition without 
prejudice to the filing of another petition . . . .”  (§ 1170.95, subd. 
(b)(2).)   
Where the petition complies with subdivision (b)’s three 
requirements, then the court proceeds to subdivision (c) to 
assess whether the petitioner has made “a prima facie showing” 
for relief.  (§ 1170.95, subd. (c).)   
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
6 
If the trial court determines that a prima facie showing for 
relief has been made, the trial court issues an order to show 
cause, and then must hold a hearing “to determine whether to 
vacate the murder conviction and to recall the sentence and 
resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts in the same 
manner as if the petitioner had not . . . previously been 
sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater 
than the initial sentence.”  (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(1).)  “The 
prosecutor and the petitioner may rely on the record of 
conviction or offer new or additional evidence to meet their 
respective burdens.”  (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).)  At the hearing 
stage, “the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for 
resentencing.”  (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).)   
C.  Section 1170.95 Petition 
On January 7, 2019, Lewis filed a petition complying with 
section 1170.95 in the sentencing court, wherein he requested 
counsel. On February 4, 2019, the superior court, without 
appointing counsel, summarily denied the petition by minute 
order.  The court concluded, in pertinent part, that Lewis did not 
make a prima facie case for resentencing under Senate Bill 1437 
because, based on the Lewis I court’s decision on direct appeal, 
he “would still be found guilty with a valid theory [direct aiding 
and abetting] of first degree murder.”   
Lewis appealed.  The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial 
court’s summary denial.  (Lewis II, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th 1128.)  
The court rejected Lewis’s claims that the trial court erred by 
not appointing counsel and relying on the record of conviction to 
summarily deny his petition.  We granted Lewis’s petition for 
review. 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
II.  APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
A.  Principles of Statutory Interpretation 
The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
we review de novo.  (United Educators of San Francisco etc. v. 
California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 805, 
812; People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71.)  “ ‘ “ ‘As in any 
case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task 
here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate 
the law’s purpose.  [Citation.]  We begin by examining the 
statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense 
meaning.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.)  
“ ‘[W]e look to “the entire substance of the statute . . . in order to 
determine the scope and purpose of the provision . . . .  
[Citation.]”  [Citation.]  That is, we construe the words in 
question “ ‘in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious 
purpose of the statute . . . .’  [Citation.]”  [Citation.]  We must 
harmonize “the various parts of a statutory enactment . . . by 
considering the particular clause or section in the context of the 
statutory framework as a whole.” ’ ”  (People v. Arroyo (2016) 62 
Cal.4th 589, 595 (Arroyo).)  
B.  Language and Structure of Section 1170.95, 
Subdivision (c) 
The two issues before us turn on the interpretation of 
subdivision (c) of section 1170.95.  Subdivision (c) provides in 
full:  “The court shall review the petition and determine if the 
petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the petitioner 
falls within the provisions of this section.  If the petitioner has 
requested counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to represent 
the petitioner.  The prosecutor shall file and serve a response 
within 60 days of service of the petition and the petitioner may 
file and serve a reply within 30 days after the prosecutor 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
response is served.  These deadlines shall be extended for good 
cause.  If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that he or 
she is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show 
cause.”  (§ 1170.95, subd. (c), italics added.) 
The Court of Appeal and the People read subdivision (c)’s 
two references to “a prima facie showing” to require two distinct, 
sequential inquiries: one “that petitioner ‘falls within the 
provisions’ of the statute,” and a second “ ‘that he or she is 
entitled to relief.’  (§ 1170.95, subd. (c).)”  (Lewis II, supra, 43 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1140; see also People v. Verdugo (2020) 44 
Cal.App.5th 320, 327 (Verdugo) [agreeing with Lewis II and 
describing in greater detail subdivision (c)’s “two-step process 
for the court to determine if an order to show cause should 
issue”], review granted Mar. 18, 2020, S260493.)  By 
chronologically parsing out each sentence of subdivision (c), the 
Court of Appeal concluded that a petitioner is only entitled to 
counsel, if requested, after successfully making the first prima 
facie showing.  (Lewis II, at p. 1140.) 
We reject this interpretation of section 1170.95, 
subdivision (c).  Rather, we read subdivision (c) to describe only 
a single prima facie showing.  (Accord People v. Cooper (2020) 54 
Cal.App.5th 106, 118, review granted Nov. 10, 2020, S264684 
(Cooper); People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 673–674, 
review granted Feb. 24, 2021, S266336 (Daniel) [same panel 
“adher[ing] to our holding in Cooper”].)  Considering subdivision 
(c)’s language in the context of section 1170.95 as a whole (see 
Arroyo, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 595), subdivision (c) clearly 
describes a single process.  More specifically, the first sentence 
of subdivision (c) does not require a distinct prima facie showing 
before the appointment of counsel.  Under its natural reading, 
“ ‘[t]he first sentence [of subdivision (c)] states the rule’ ” and 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
9 
“ ‘[t]he rest of the subdivision establishes the process for 
complying with that rule.’ ”  (Cooper, at p. 115, quoting People v. 
Tarkington (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 892, 917 (dis. opn. of Lavin, 
J.), review granted Aug. 12, 2020, S263219 (Tarkington); accord 
Daniel, at pp. 673–674, review granted.)   
Such a reading does not “disregard” the first sentence of 
subdivision (c), as the People contend.  Rather, the first sentence 
provides the rule:  the court reviews the petition to determine “if 
the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the 
petitioner falls within the provisions of this section.”  (§ 1170.95, 
subd. (c).)  The last sentence describes what the court shall do if 
a petitioner makes a prima facie showing, namely, issue an 
order to show cause.  This reading is in harmony with the 
remainder of section 1170.95.  The People’s interpretation of the 
first sentence of subdivision (c), by contrast, endeavors to create 
a separate initial review process, but the initial review process 
is clearly laid out immediately prior in subdivision (b)(2), which 
permits a court to deny a noncomplying petition “without 
prejudice.”  (§ 1170.95, subd. (b)(2).)  Thus, to read the first 
sentence of subdivision (c) to thereafter provide for another pre-
briefing review by the court, without the assistance of counsel, 
conflicts with the overall structure of section 1170.95.  (See 
People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 357–358 [“But ‘[t]he 
words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in 
mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections 
relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both 
internally and with each other, to the extent possible’ ”].) 
Notably, whether a petitioner “requests the appointment 
of counsel” is part of the information that must be included in a 
petition for it to satisfy the court’s subdivision (b)(2) review.  
(§ 1170.95, subd. (b)(1)(C); see also subd. (b)(2).)  Subdivision 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
(c)’s language regarding the appointment of counsel is 
mandatory:  “If the petitioner has requested counsel, the court 
shall appoint counsel to represent the petitioner.”  (§ 1170.95, 
subd. (c), italics added.)  The combined meaning is clear:  
petitioners who file a complying petition requesting counsel are 
to receive counsel upon the filing of a compliant petition.   
Nonetheless, the People and the Court of Appeal adopt a 
position that interprets subdivision (c) to mean that the court 
shall appoint counsel only after a first-step prima facie showing 
is made, and then counsel may assist the petitioner in making a 
second-step prima facie showing.  But that is not what the 
subdivision says.  The sentence addressing counsel simply 
states that if petitioner asks for counsel, counsel “shall” be 
appointed.  (§ 1170.95, subd. (c).)  It noticeably does not say that 
counsel will be appointed only after some “first-step” prima facie 
showing is made.  Thus, the People’s proposed reading focuses 
instead upon the placement of the second sentence, i.e., because 
the second sentence appears after a reference to a “prima facie 
showing” in the first sentence, this means that the Legislature 
intended to create a separate, first-step prima facie analysis 
conducted without the aid of counsel.  If the first and second 
sentences of subdivision (c) were reversed, presumably the 
People’s chronological argument fails.  We are unwilling to place 
more import on the placement of the second sentence than on 
the actual words used in the statute, especially since, as one 
analyzes the implications of the People’s argument, it cannot 
withstand scrutiny.   
The People rely on Verdugo, which, elaborating on the 
reasoning in Lewis II, attempts to support a two-step process by 
underscoring that the first reference to a prima facie showing in 
section 1170.95, subdivision (c) uses the phrase “falls within the 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
11 
provisions of this section,” which Verdugo takes to mean “that 
the petitioner may be eligible for relief” (Verdugo, supra, 44 
Cal.App.5th at p. 328, review granted, italics added), whereas 
the second reference uses the distinct phrase “a prima facie 
showing that he or she is entitled to relief” (§ 1170.95, subd. (c), 
italics added).  (See Verdugo, at p. 328; see also Tarkington, 
supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 897, review granted [adopting 
Verdugo’s two-step interpretation]; People v. Edwards (2020) 48 
Cal.App.5th 666, 673–674, review granted July 8, 2020, 
S262481 [same]; People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965, 
975–976 (Drayton) [same]; People v. Torres (2020) 46 
Cal.App.5th 1168, 1177–1178, review granted June 24, 2020, 
S262011 [same].)  This is a distinction without a difference.  This 
argument overlooks the fact that the terms “eligibility” and 
“entitlement” are used interchangeably elsewhere in section 
1170.95.  (Cooper, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 120, review 
granted.)   
Subdivision (d)(2) provides in part that “[t]he parties may 
waive a resentencing hearing and stipulate that the petitioner 
is eligible to have his or her murder conviction vacated and for 
resentencing.”  (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(2), italics added.)  If 
entitlement is something more than eligibility, “why would a 
stipulation that the petitioner is merely eligible for relief obviate 
the need for a hearing on entitlement?”   (Cooper, at p. 120.)  As 
Cooper 
concluded, 
“[S]ection 
1170.95’s 
interchangeable 
references to eligibility and entitlement repudiate the notion 
that the concepts have different meanings.”  (Cooper, at p. 120.)  
It thus follows that there is no syntactic basis for interpreting 
subdivision (c)’s first sentence to delay petitioner’s right to 
counsel. 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
The briefing schedule established by subdivision (c) also 
belies this “two-step” theory.  The Court of Appeal and the 
People presume that the trial court’s “first stage” prima facie 
review will take place before the appointment of counsel and the 
submission of written briefs.  (See Lewis II, supra, 43 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1140.)  The People assert that “[t]he court can 
easily conduct the step one analysis without the prosecutor 
running afoul of the 60-day deadline, or the court may grant the 
prosecutor an extension of time.”  In Tarkington, the majority 
inferred from subdivision (c)’s briefing deadlines “that the 
Legislature simply intended to ensure that the petition is 
evaluated, from start to finish, in an expeditious fashion.  It is 
to be expected that the superior court will promptly rule on 
eligibility; running the briefing period from the date of the 
petition’s filing ensures that this is so, absent good cause for a 
longer period.”  (Tarkington, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 904, fn. 
9, review granted.)  But that is not what the statute says.  (See 
Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 
1094, 1103 [“it is well settled that we must look first to the words 
of the statute, ‘because they generally provide the most reliable 
indicator of legislative intent’ ”].)  
Section 1170.95, subdivision (c) expressly requires that a 
prosecutor “shall file and serve a response within 60 days of 
service of the petition and the petitioner may file and serve a 
reply within 30 days after the prosecutor response is served.”  
(§ 1170.95, subd. (c), italics added.)  “ ‘[I]f the Legislature had 
anticipated that the court would undertake its own review of the 
merits of the petition as an intermediate step before appointing 
counsel, it would have calculated the deadlines not from the date 
of service of the petition but instead from the date the court 
completed its initial review.  And though the Legislature 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
13 
required the prosecution to respond within 60 days of being 
served with the petition, it did not create a deadline for the court 
to conduct an intermediate review.’ ”  (Cooper, supra, 54 
Cal.App.5th at p. 121, review granted, quoting Tarkington, 
supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 920 (dis. opn. of Lavin, J.), review 
granted, fn. omitted.)  The briefing deadlines may only be 
extended “for good cause.”  (§ 1170.95, subd. (c).)   
Though the structure envisioned by the People and the 
Court of Appeal assumes that the trial courts will “promptly rule 
on eligibility” (Tarkington, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 904, fn. 
9, review granted), there is nothing in the statute that compels 
them to do so and, predictably, our busy trial courts may be 
unable to turn to these petitions in less than 60 days.  There is 
no time limit by which the trial court must make a ruling.  This 
means that courts can rule, and have ruled, on the so-called 
first-step prima facie review after 60 days have passed.  The 
effect of the People’s interpretation is that the prosecution may 
be compelled to file its response before the court makes its “first-
step” prima facie determination.  Creating this artificial first 
step (which is unencumbered by any time limits) means that the 
trial court can, and sometimes does, wait for the prosecution’s 
response and then deny the petition before the petitioner even 
files a reply.  Furthermore, since the briefing deadlines are 
triggered by the filing of the petition, the parties will likely begin 
preparing their briefs at the same time the court is conducting 
its first-step review, the result of which is that the court and the 
parties may be duplicating their efforts by conducting 
essentially the same type of review of the same documents at 
the same time.  Moreover, if the trial court awaits full briefing 
on its first-step prima facie review and then decides that the 
petitioner has met his or her burden, the subdivision, by its 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
14 
terms, does not contemplate any additional briefing for the 
second-step prima facie review.  While the People propose that 
the trial courts can extend time for the filing of the response, 
and perhaps courts may order supplemental briefing for the 
second-step 
prima 
facie 
review, these 
options deviate 
considerably from the briefing schedule set out by the statute 
itself.   
In addition, the People assume (as they must in order to 
avoid the illogical conclusion that the petitioner must file a 
written reply to the prosecution’s response without the aid of 
counsel) that the petitioner’s counsel will assist in preparing a 
reply.  But, again, there is no time limit for the trial court to 
conduct its so-called first step review, which means that, absent 
a ruling from the trial court, petitioners may be forced to file 
their reply briefs without the assistance of counsel.  (See Cooper, 
supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 121, fn. 8, review granted [“If the 
Legislature intended an initial prima facie review before the 
parties submitted briefing, surely a better way to ensure that a 
trial court conducted it promptly would be to impose a deadline 
on the court, not the prosecution”].)  Thus, the People’s 
interpretation risks creating a highly disorganized and 
uncertain briefing schedule, whereby the parties have no idea 
whether the court will rule before their statutory deadlines come 
due.  This means that the parties may prepare their briefs even 
if the court rules before they are filed.  Under our reading, the 
parties can be confident that the court will not act on a petition 
until after briefing is complete.4    
 
4  
We recognize that, because the time for briefing runs from 
the “service of the petition,” any delays in appointing counsel 
 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
15 
All of this, of course, lays bare the fallacy of the so-called 
first-step prima facie framework:  because the briefing schedule 
is tied to the filing of the petition itself and because there is no 
time limit by which courts must make this purported “first step” 
analysis, section 1170.95, subdivision (c) does not envision a 
structure by which courts can make an initial determination 
without briefing and without the appointment of counsel.  
Instead, there is a much more logical interpretation of this 
provision, and it is the one we adopt here:  a complying petition 
is filed; the court appoints counsel, if requested; the issue is 
briefed; and then the court makes one (not two) prima facie 
determination.5 
The People’s interpretation also raises serious questions 
about how to distinguish between the so-called first-step and 
second-step prima facie analyses.  The Court of Appeal 
 
could pose an obstacle to a represented petitioner submitting a 
reply within the required timeframe.  (§ 1170.95, subd. (c).)  As 
a general matter, a trial court should afford both parties the 
opportunity to brief the question of a petitioner’s eligibility for 
relief and may extend the briefing deadlines “for good cause” as 
necessary to ensure that such an opportunity is meaningful.  
(§ 1170.95, subd. (c).)  
 
5 
In concluding that the trial court could review the record 
of conviction before appointing counsel, the Court of Appeal 
analogized to section 1170.18 (enacted by Proposition 47 in 
2014) and section 1170.126 (enacted by Proposition 36 in 2012).  
(See Lewis II, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at pp.  1137–1138.)  We find 
the reliance on these sections unhelpful because there are 
significant differences in the way the statutes are drafted.  
Specifically, unlike section 1170.95, neither section 1170.18 nor 
section 1170.126 expressly provides for the appointment of 
counsel or setting of a briefing schedule respecting the prima 
facie determination. 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
16 
acknowledged that “[i]t is not clear from the text of subdivision 
(c) what, if any, substantive differences exist between” the two 
prima facie showings the court identified.  (Lewis II, supra, 43 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1140, fn. 10.)  The Court of Appeal ultimately 
concluded that:  “We need not decide this issue because the court 
properly concluded that defendant was neither within the 
provisions of the statute, nor entitled to relief, as a matter of law 
based on the record of conviction.”  (Ibid.)  We share the Court 
of Appeal’s reluctance to distinguish the “first step” prima facie 
review from the “second step,” but we come to a different 
conclusion: 
 
the 
reason 
the 
steps 
sound 
virtually 
indistinguishable is because there are not two steps at all.   
The People admit that “[t]he substantive question in step 
two is the same as in step one — whether the record of 
conviction shows the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter 
of law.”  However, they argue that the so-called steps “may be 
distinct in time and manner of presentation even if the legal 
question they pose is the same.”  While the People accept that 
there “is no textual basis” to distinguish between the steps, they 
posit that appointing counsel “at step two may be helpful for 
practical reasons.”  More specifically, the People argue, “at step 
two, ‘the prosecutor may be able to identify additional material 
from the record of conviction not accessible to, or reviewed by, 
the court during its first prima facie determination (for example, 
jury instructions) that establish the petitioner is not eligible for 
relief.  In a reply the petitioner, represented by counsel, may 
rebut the prosecutor’s claim of ineligibility.’  (Verdugo, supra, 44 
Cal.App.5th at p. 330, fn. 9, review granted.)”  
According to the People’s argument, the substantive 
question in step two is the same as step one and the court may 
rely on precisely the same information it relied on in step one.  
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
17 
At core, the People’s position is that the only difference between 
the two steps is that under the first step the trial court can act 
without giving petitioner an opportunity to be heard and 
without giving petitioner a lawyer.  We disagree. 
In sum, subdivision (c) does not establish an internal, 
threshold barrier to the appointment of counsel and the 
opportunity for briefing.  
C.  Other Interpretive Aids 
Even if we considered the language and structure of 
section 1170.95, subdivision (c) to be susceptible to the Court of 
Appeal’s piecemeal reading, “ ‘other aids, such as the statute’s 
purpose, legislative history, and public policy,’ ” support our 
interpretation.  (Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership 
(2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1163, quoting Coalition of Concerned 
Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 
737.)  
As previously noted, Senate Bill 1437 was enacted “to 
ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is 
not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was 
not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with 
reckless indifference to human life.”  (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, 
subd. (f).)  Lewis points out, “section 1170.95 requires legal and 
factual inquiry into complex legal theories (felony murder, and 
natural and probable consequences) not easily understood by an 
unrepresented litigant.”  Appointing counsel to assist a 
petitioner in navigating these complex theories, upon the filing 
of a facially sufficient petition, promotes the reliability of section 
1170.95’s petitioning process and thereby advances Senate Bill 
1437’s stated purpose. 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
 
The Court of Appeal concluded it was “sound policy” to 
delay the appointment of counsel in the manner it described 
because it “ ‘would be a gross misuse of judicial resources to 
require the issuance of an order to show cause or even 
appointment of counsel based solely on the allegations of the 
petition, which frequently are erroneous, when even a cursory 
review of the court file would show as a matter of law that the 
petitioner is not eligible for relief.’ ”  (Lewis II, supra, 43 
Cal.App.5th at p. 1138, quoting Couzens et al., Sentencing Cal. 
Crimes (The Rutter Group 2019) ¶ 23:51(H)(1), pp. 23–150 to 
23–151; accord, Tarkington, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 901, 
review granted.)   
 
However, noncomplying petitions may be quickly screened 
out under subdivision (b)(2) of section 1170.95.  Further, the 
requirement that a petition include “[a] declaration by the 
petitioner that he or she is eligible for relief under this section, 
based on all the requirements of subdivision (a)” (§ 1170.95, 
subd. (b)(1)(A)) should discourage frivolous petitions.  Lastly, as 
Lewis himself concedes, after the appointment of counsel the 
parties’ briefing, as contemplated by subdivision (c), does not 
need to be extensive.  (See Tarkington, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 925 (dis. opn. of Lavin, J.), review granted [“a brief need be no 
longer than the [summary] order the court prepared in this 
case”].)  Additionally, appointed counsel may ultimately 
conclude that a petition is clearly meritless and recommend that 
the petition be withdrawn.  Conversely, the parties may 
stipulate that the petitioner is entitled to relief.   
 
Of course, these devices will not screen out all meritless 
petitions.  Subdivision (b)(2), for example, only screens out 
noncomplying petitions, not petitions that lack substantive 
merit.  Similarly, despite the declaration requirement under 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
19 
subdivision (b)(1)(A), some petitioners may nonetheless file 
petitions even when they are not eligible for relief.  Section 
1170.95 is clearly not without expense.  But it is for the 
Legislature to balance costs with rewards and, here, the 
Legislature appears to have concluded that the benefits to be 
gained from providing broad access to counsel, in order to ensure 
that all those entitled to resentencing are able to obtain relief, 
outweigh the costs of appointing counsel in many cases where 
no relief will prove available.   
 
Indeed, the legislative history of Senate Bill 1437 
demonstrates the Legislature’s full awareness of its potential 
impact on judicial resources.  The Senate and Assembly 
Appropriations Committees examined the potential fiscal 
impact of Senate Bill 1437.  They acknowledged that Senate Bill 
1437 could lead to “potentially-major costs in the millions of 
dollars” for courts to process petitions and hold resentencing 
hearings, as well as “potentially-major costs in the hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to the millions of dollars” to allow the 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to transport 
inmates 
to 
resentencing 
hearings. 
 
(Sen. 
Com. 
on 
Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. 
Sess.) as introduced Feb. 16, 2018, p. 1; see also Assem. Com. on 
Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended May 25, 2018, p. 1; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of 
Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill 1437 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 29, 2018, p. 6.)  Senate Bill 
1437 would also entail “[u]nknown costs to county District 
Attorneys’ Offices and Public Defenders’ Offices to litigate 
petitions for resentencing.  These costs likely would be 
reimbursable by the state, the extent to which would be 
determined by the Commission on State Mandates.”  (Sen. Com. 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
20 
on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. 
Sess.) as introduced Feb. 16, 2018, p. 1.)   
On the other hand, there could also be significant cost 
savings for the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.  
The 
Senate 
Appropriations 
Committee 
observed 
that, 
depending on the number of individuals who could successfully 
petition for reduced sentences under Senate Bill 1437, the 
proposed legislation could result in “[u]nknown, potentially-
major out-year or current-year savings in reduced incarceration 
expenses,” 
and 
“[w]hen 
these 
averted 
admissions 
are 
compounded, the savings could reach into the millions of dollars 
annually.”  (Sen. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill 
1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 16, 2018, p. 1.)   
In apparent recognition of the expenses accompanying its 
implementation, Senate Bill 1437 provides:  “If the Commission 
on State Mandates determines that this act contains costs 
mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and 
school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 
(commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the 
Government Code.”  (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 5.) 
This legislative background shows the Legislature did, in 
fact, engage in the exact type of cost-benefit assessment and 
policy determination it was entitled to make.  (See Superior 
Court v. County of Mendocino (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45, 53 [“The 
judiciary, in reviewing statutes enacted by the Legislature, may 
not undertake to evaluate the wisdom of the policies embodied 
in such legislation; absent a constitutional prohibition, the 
choice among competing policy considerations in enacting laws 
is a legislative function”].)  
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
21 
Permitting trial courts to summarily deny relief before the 
appointment of counsel would not significantly conserve judicial 
resources.  “[E]ven assuming the practice leads to short-term 
efficiencies, those savings are a false economy that shifts work 
from trial counsel to appellate counsel and from the trial courts 
to the appellate courts.”  (Tarkington, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 925 (dis. opn. of Lavin, J.), review granted.)  Leaving it to an 
appellate court to review a summary denial, on an 
underdeveloped record, arguably places a greater strain on 
judicial resources than appointing counsel from the outset.  (See 
Tarkington, at p. 926 [“Cases in which the prosecution 
assembles the record below and writes a short explanatory brief 
before defense counsel submits on the record are much less time 
consuming on appeal than cases like this one, in which we 
cannot even determine the basis for the trial court’s decision”].) 
Indeed, the two-part process contemplated by the Court of 
Appeal can create unnecessary inefficiencies.  It can be 
inefficient to ask the trial court to make these threshold legal 
determinations without the aid of briefing.  It is inefficient to 
expect prosecutors to start briefing the question of whether a 
petitioner may be eligible for relief under section 1170.95 
without knowing if the trial court may simply issue a “first-step” 
prima facie denial before their brief is filed.  And it is inefficient 
to ask our Courts of Appeal to review these “first-step” prima 
facie determinations, all without the aid of a fully developed 
record below.   
Consider a situation where the trial court, without 
briefing, summarily denies a petition, but does so on an 
improper basis.  Petitioner then obtains counsel on appeal who 
must argue that the trial court made a legal error.  The Court of 
Appeal is able to decipher the legal error (despite the absence of 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
22 
a fully developed record below) and then must remand to the 
trial court to reassess the question of whether the record entitles 
the petitioner to an order to show cause.  This is exactly what 
happened in Cooper.  (See Cooper, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 
123–126, review granted; id. at p. 110 [observing that, while 
some documents were in the appellate record, “it is unclear what 
other documents the court may have considered”].)  That 
sequence of events is far from efficient.   
In sum, “other aids” resolve any conceivable ambiguity in 
the statutory language of section 1170.95, subdivision (c) in 
favor of an interpretation requiring that counsel be appointed 
upon the filing of a facially sufficient petition.  (Jones v. Lodge 
at Torrey Pines Partnership, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1163.) 
III.  RECORD OF CONVICTION 
Having concluded that a petitioner is statutorily entitled 
to counsel, if requested, upon the filing of a facially sufficient 
petition, and that subdivision (c) describes only one prima facie 
showing, we now turn to the question of whether a trial court 
can rely on the record of conviction in determining whether that 
single prima facie showing is made.  The answer is yes.  In fact, 
Lewis agrees that “the court may — with the benefit of advocacy 
for both sides — consider the record of conviction at [the prima 
facie] stage.”  In Lewis’s view, appointed counsel and the 
prosecutor “can and should make use of the record of conviction.”  
Notably, there is no disagreement amongst the Courts of Appeal 
regarding the propriety of the parties and the trial court looking 
at the record of conviction after the appointment of counsel.  (See 
Cooper, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 122, review granted, italics 
added, footnote omitted [explaining that the legislative history 
of Senate Bill 1437 indicates “the Legislature intended for the 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
23 
prosecutor, not the court, to take the lead in identifying which 
petitioners are not entitled to relief as a matter of law based on 
the record of conviction”]; Daniel, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at 
p.  677, review granted [“While we agree with Daniel that a trial 
court may not rely on the record of conviction to deny a facially 
sufficient petition, he offers no reason why a court would be 
prohibited from relying on the record of conviction to deny a 
petition after deeming it facially sufficient, appointing counsel, 
and receiving briefing from the parties”]; see also Tarkington, 
supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 925 (dis. opn. of Lavin, J.), review 
granted, italics added [“If, based on the record of conviction or 
the facts of the case, a petition is clearly meritless, the 
prosecutor can submit a simple brief summarizing why the 
petitioner is not entitled to a resentencing hearing”].)   
The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial 
court’s prima facie inquiry under section 1170.95, allowing the 
court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those 
that are clearly meritless.  This is consistent with the statute’s 
overall purpose:  to ensure that murder culpability is 
commensurate with a person’s actions, while also ensuring that 
clearly meritless petitions can be efficiently addressed as part of 
a single-step prima facie review process.  (See Stats. 2018, ch. 
1015, § 1, subd. (f).) 
While the trial court may look at the record of conviction 
after the appointment of counsel to determine whether a 
petitioner has made a prima facie case for section 1170.95 relief, 
the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited.  Like the 
analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, 
“ ‘the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and 
makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the 
petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
24 
allegations were proved.  If so, the court must issue an order to 
show cause.’ ”  (Drayton, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 978, 
quoting Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.551(c)(1)).)  “[A] court should 
not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility 
grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.”  
(Ibid., fn. omitted, citing In re Serrano (1995) 10 Cal.4th 447, 
456 (Serrano).)  “However, if the record, including the court’s 
own documents, ‘contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made 
in the petition,’ then ‘the court is justified in making a credibility 
determination adverse to the petitioner.’ ” (Drayton, at p. 979, 
quoting Serrano, at p. 456.)   
Appellate opinions, like Lewis I, are generally considered 
to be part of the record of conviction.  (See People v. Woodell 
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 454–455.)  However, as we cautioned in 
Woodell, the probative value of an appellate opinion is case-
specific, and “it is certainly correct that an appellate opinion 
might not supply all answers.”  (Id. at p. 457.)  In reviewing any 
part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a 
trial court should not engage in “factfinding involving the 
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.”  (Drayton, 
supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 980.)  As the People emphasize, the 
“prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very low.” 
In sum, the parties can, and should, use the record of 
conviction to aid the trial court in reliably assessing whether a 
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief under 
subdivision (c).6 
 
6  
A petitioner is entitled to relief under section 1170.95 only 
when he or she “could not be convicted of first or second degree 
murder because of changes to section 188 or 189 made effective 
 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
25 
IV.  PREJUDICE 
A. Standard of Review 
Lewis contends that a trial court’s “consideration of the 
record of conviction in connection with a section 1170.95 petition 
is a ‘critical stage’ of the criminal process” such that the 
deprivation of counsel during such consideration, whether 
viewed as a state statutory violation or as a federal or state 
constitutional violation, is structural error requiring automatic 
reversal.  We disagree.   
1.  The failure to appoint counsel was error under 
state statutory law only. 
There is no unconditional state or federal constitutional 
right to counsel to pursue collateral relief from a judgment of 
conviction.  (See In re Barnett (2003) 31 Cal.4th 466, 475 [no 
federal or state “constitutional right to counsel for seeking 
collateral relief from a judgment of conviction via state habeas 
corpus proceedings”]; People v. Shipman (1965) 62 Cal.2d 226, 
232 [observing the same in the context of coram nobis relief]; 
Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987) 481 U.S. 551, 556, 557 [observing 
that “[p]ostconviction relief is even further removed from the 
criminal trial” and concluding that respondent had “no 
underlying constitutional right to appointed counsel in state 
postconviction proceedings”].)  However, we have held that “if a 
 
January 1, 2019.”  (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).)  We are not asked to 
resolve what is substantively required under subdivision (a)(3); 
here we only address if, in assessing whether the petitioner has 
made a prima facie case for relief under subdivision (c), the court 
may consider documents in the record of conviction if they are 
relevant to the underlying substantive question.  Our holding in 
this case means there is no categorical bar to consulting the 
record of conviction at the prima facie stage.  
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
26 
[habeas] petition attacking the validity of a judgment states a 
prima facie case leading to issuance of an order to show cause, 
the appointment of counsel is demanded by due process 
concerns.”  (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 780.)  When “an 
indigent petitioner has stated facts sufficient to satisfy the court 
that a hearing is required, his claim can no longer be treated as 
frivolous and he is entitled to have counsel appointed to 
represent him.”  (Shipman, at p. 232; see also People v. Fryhaat 
(2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 969, 980–981 [due process requires 
appointment of counsel when defendant establishes prima facie 
case for postconviction relief under section 1473.7]; People v. 
Rouse (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 292, 299 [due process right to 
counsel at a Proposition 47 resentencing hearing arose after the 
“[d]efendant passed the eligibility stage”].)   
For the same reasons, a petitioner is not constitutionally 
entitled to counsel at the outset of the subdivision (c) stage of 
the section 1170.95 petitioning process.  (Accord Daniel, supra, 
57 Cal.App.5th at p. 676, review granted.)  At that point, the 
petitioner has not yet “stated facts sufficient to satisfy the court 
that a hearing is required,” but merely endeavors to do so.  
(Shipman, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 232.)  Instead, the Legislature, 
weighing the costs in favor of broader access to counsel (see 
discussion ante), created a purely statutory right to counsel that 
attaches before the issuance of an order to show cause.  Thus, 
the trial court’s failure to appoint counsel to represent Lewis 
was state law error only. 
2. The error is reviewed for prejudice under 
Watson. 
Typically, when an “error is purely one of state law, the 
Watson harmless error test applies.”  (People v. Epps (2001) 25 
Cal.4th 19, 29; see Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)  
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
27 
However, state statutory error may amount to structural error 
if it is “ ‘analogous to’ . . . ‘the total deprivation of the right to 
counsel at trial.’ ”  (People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 699 
(Lightsey), quoting Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279.) 
Lewis likens the deprivation of counsel in his case to that 
in Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 699–700, wherein we held 
the trial court’s failure to appoint counsel to represent a 
defendant during a mental competency proceeding, in violation 
of section 1368, was structural error.  In considering the 
question of prejudice in Lightsey, we observed that, “[a]s with a 
pervasive Sixth Amendment violation, the statutory violation 
here cannot be likened to ‘trial error’ . . . .  Attempting to assess 
the effect of the absence of counsel on the trial court’s finding of 
competence is, in truth, no different than attempting to assess 
the effect on a jury’s final verdict of the absence of counsel 
during a trial on substantive charges: there is no reasoned 
manner in which to do so because the lack of true adversarial 
testing denied defendant the basic procedure by which his 
competence should have been determined.”  (Id. at p. 701.)  We 
further observed that permitting an individual whose mental 
competence is contested to self-represent and maintain his or 
her competence causes “a breakdown . . . in the process of 
meaningful adversarial testing central to our system of justice.”  
(Id. at pp. 696–697.) 
Lewis’s reliance on Lightsey proves unpersuasive; no 
similar analogy to the “total deprivation of the right to counsel 
at trial” (Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 699) can be made when 
a section 1170.95 petitioner is deprived of his right to counsel 
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
28 
under subdivision (c).7  Unlike the deprivation of counsel at a 
competency hearing, where a defendant’s very ability to 
understand the nature and purpose of the criminal proceedings 
against him is in dispute (see Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at 
p. 690), the prima facie stage under subdivision (c) is not 
similarly adversarial.  Instead, the trial court asks only whether 
the petitioner can make a prima facie showing for relief; as we 
explained ante, at the prima facie stage, a petitioner’s 
allegations should be accepted as true, and the court should not 
make credibility determinations or engage in “factfinding 
involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.”  
(Drayton, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 980.)  Lewis must 
therefore “demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that in 
the absence of the error he . . . would have obtained a more 
favorable result.”  (Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 699, citing 
People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 968; Watson¸ supra, 46 
Cal.2d at p. 836.)  More specifically, a petitioner “whose petition 
is denied before an order to show cause issues has the burden of 
showing ‘it is reasonably probable that if [he or she] had been 
afforded assistance of counsel his [or her] petition would not 
have been summarily denied without an evidentiary hearing.’ ”  
(Daniel, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 676, review granted.)   
 
7  
Lewis makes no argument that he should be entitled to 
present new or additional evidence at the prima facie stage 
pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 1170.95.  We assume, for 
purposes of our analysis, that petitioners may not present new 
evidence at the prima facie stage.  We express no view on the 
merits of this assumption.  
PEOPLE v. LEWIS 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
29 
B. The Court of Appeal Shall Determine on 
Remand Whether the Error Was Prejudicial 
Lewis contends that “[e]ven if this Court, like the Court of 
Appeal in Daniel, [supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 676, review 
granted] leaves open the possibility of harmless error, the error 
was not harmless in this case.  Counsel could have assisted Mr. 
Lewis in making a prima facie factual case that his conviction 
for murder rests on now-forbidden natural and probable 
consequences reasoning.”  The People disagree.  We decline to 
resolve this dispute and remand the cause to the Court of Appeal 
for an evaluation of prejudice under Watson in the first instance. 
V.  DISPOSITION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.  The 
cause is remanded to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings 
consistent with the views expressed herein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Lewis 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 43 Cal.App.5th 1128 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S260598 
Date Filed: July 26, 2021 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Ricardo R. Ocampo  
 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Robert D. Bacon, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Sara Ross, Stephen Dunkle and John T. Philipsborn for California 
Attorneys for Criminal Justice as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kate Chatfield for Senator Nancy Skinner and The Justice 
Collaborative Institute as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Sean Riordan, Summer Lacey and David Loy for American Civil 
Liberties Union of Northern California, American Civil Liberties Union 
of Southern California and American Civil Liberties Union of San 
Diego and Imperial Counties as Amici Curie on behalf of Defendant 
and Appellant. 
 
 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 
Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen, Idan Ivri and Amanda V. 
Lopez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Mark Zahner and Nicole C. Rooney, Deputy District Attorney (San 
Diego), for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae 
for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Robert D. Bacon 
484 Lake Park Avenue, PMB 110 
Oakland, CA 94610 
(510) 834-6219 
 
Idan Ivri 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6168