Title: Willacy v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC20-1261
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 1, 2021

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
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No. SC20-1261 
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CHADWICK WILLACY, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
April 1, 2021 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Chadwick Willacy appeals an order denying his successive 
motion for postconviction relief, which was filed under Florida Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 3.851.1  We affirm the denial of relief. 
 
Willacy filed a successive postconviction motion claiming that 
he is entitled to relief under the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019), based on 
the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of juror Payne for allegedly racial 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
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reasons.  On August 12, 2020, the postconviction court entered an 
order denying Willacy’s successive postconviction motion.  
Specifically, the postconviction court found that Willacy’s motion 
was procedurally barred, untimely, and without merit. 
We agree with the postconviction court and affirm the denial of 
relief.  Prior challenges to the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of 
juror Payne for allegedly racial reasons were litigated during 
Willacy’s direct appeal and successive postconviction proceedings 
and resolved against Willacy.  See Hendrix v. State, 136 So. 3d 
1122, 1125 (Fla. 2014) (“Claims raised and rejected in prior 
postconviction proceedings are procedurally barred from being 
relitigated in a successive motion.”); Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 
1055, 1067 (Fla. 2000) (“This claim was raised on direct appeal; 
therefore, it is procedurally barred and was properly summarily 
denied.”). 
Further, Willacy’s successive motion is untimely.  See Fla. R. 
Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1) (“Any motion to vacate judgment of conviction 
and sentence of death shall be filed by the defendant within 1 year 
after the judgment and sentence become final.”); Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.851(d)(2) (providing an exception to the one-year time limit for 
 
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motions alleging “the fundamental constitutional right asserted was 
not established within the period provided for in subdivision (d)(1) 
and has been held to apply retroactively”).  Flowers did not 
establish a new constitutional right that has been held to apply 
retroactively.  Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2235, 2251 (“[W]e break no 
new legal ground.  We simply enforce and reinforce Batson [v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)] by applying it to the extraordinary 
facts of this case.”). 
Accordingly, Willacy is not entitled to relief based on Flowers, 
and we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of Willacy’s 
successive postconviction motion. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, 
COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County, 
Robin C. Lemonidis, Judge – 
Case No. 051990CF016062AXXXXX 
 
Eric C. Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Michael Hope, 
Ann Marie Mirialakis, and Adriana Corso, Assistant Capital 
Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, 
Florida, 
 
 
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for Appellant 
 
Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Lisa-
Marie Lerner, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee