Title: In re W.R.
Citation: 363 N.C. 244
Docket Number: 560PA06
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: May 1, 2009

IN THE MATTER OF W.R.
No. 560PA06
FILED: 1 MAY 2009
Confessions and Incriminating Statements; Juveniles–-juvenile delinquency--custody--
participation of resource officer during questioning
The trial court did not commit plain error in a juvenile delinquency case based on
the unlawful and willful possession of a weapon on school property in violation of N.C.G.S. §
14-269.2(d) by admitting, without objection, evidence of respondent juvenile’s statements to
school officials that he possessed a knife on school property even though the juvenile contends
he was in custody and subject to custodial interrogation because: (1) Miranda is limited to
custodial interrogations, and statements made to private individuals unconnected with law
enforcement are admissible so long as they were made freely and voluntarily; (2) even if the
person occupies some official capacity or position of authority, Miranda does not apply to
questioning by such persons unless the person is acting as an agent of law enforcement; (3)
inasmuch as no motion to suppress was made, no evidence was presented and no findings were
made as to either the school resource officer’s actual participation in the questioning of the
juvenile or the custodial or noncustodial nature of the interrogation, nor were any findings made
as to whether the statements were freely and voluntarily made; (4) based on the limited record,
our Supreme Court could not conclude that the presence and participation of the school resource
officer at the request of school administrators conducting the investigation rendered the
questioning of respondent juvenile a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings and the
protections of N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101; and (5) no conflicting evidence having been presented, the
trial court, sitting as judge and jury, was not required to make findings of fact and conclusions of
law as to the voluntariness of the statement.
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of
a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 179 N.C. App. 642,
634 S.E.2d 923 (2006), vacating both an adjudication order
entered on 21 January 2005 by Judge Lillian B. Jordan and a
juvenile dispositional order entered on 4 March 2005 by Judge
Wendy M. Enochs, both in District Court, Guilford County.  Heard
in the Supreme Court 12 February 2008.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by William P. Hart,
Senior Deputy Attorney General, for the State-
appellant.
Michelle FormyDuval Lynch for juvenile-appellee.
PARKER, Chief Justice.
The issue before this Court is whether the Court of
Appeals erred in finding plain error in the trial court’s
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admission of evidence of defendant’s statements to school
officials.  For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
The record shows that on 19 August 2004, Jesse Pratt,
the principal of Allen Middle School in Guilford County, received
a call from a concerned parent.  Based on the information
gathered in that call, Mr. Pratt and Dr. Judy Flake, the
assistant principal, went to W.R.’s classroom and escorted W.R.,
a fourteen-year-old seventh grader, to Dr. Flake’s office.  While
in the office, Mr. Pratt and Dr. Flake asked W.R. several times
whether he had anything in his possession at school then or on
the previous day that he should not have had.  W.R. repeatedly
answered that he had not.
At some point the school resource officer, Officer E.W.
Warren, joined Mr. Pratt and Dr. Flake in their questioning of
W.R.  After about fifteen minutes of questioning, W.R. was asked
to empty his pockets, and Officer Warren did a basic search for
weapons.  W.R.’s locker was also searched.  The searches revealed
nothing.
Mr. Pratt, Dr. Flake, and Officer Warren left the
office at various times during the questioning.  During these
times W.R. was never left unsupervised, and Officer Warren
remained in the room during most of the questioning.  After
talking with other students, Dr. Flake informed W.R. that other
students had said that W.R. possessed a knife at school the day
before.  Dr. Flake also told W.R. that “this is very serious.  If
you did you need to tell us the truth.”  At this point, which was
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approximately thirty minutes after the questioning began, upon
being told of the other students’ allegations, W.R. admitted
possessing a knife the day before at school and on the bus.
While this investigation was taking place, a search of
W.R.’s records revealed that W.R. did not live in that school
district, so the decision was made not to return W.R. to his
class but to have his parents pick him up and take him to his
assigned school.  W.R. was kept in Dr. Flake’s office until his
mother arrived about an hour and a half after W.R. had been
removed from class.
On 7 October 2004, Officer Warren filed a petition in
District Court, Guilford County alleging W.R. was a delinquent
juvenile as defined by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1501(7) in that he
unlawfully and willfully possessed a weapon on school property in
violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(d).  On 21 January 2005, the
trial court adjudicated W.R. delinquent and subsequently entered
a dispositional order placing W.R. on Level One probation for six
months.  W.R. appealed, and on 3 October 2006, the Court of
Appeals issued a unanimous opinion vacating the adjudication of
delinquency and subsequent dispositional order.  In re W.R., 179
N.C. App. 642, 634 S.E.2d 923 (2006).  The State filed an
application for temporary stay, a petition for writ of
supersedeas, and a petition for discretionary review, all of
which were allowed by this Court.
Before the Court of Appeals, respondent, contending
that he was in custody during the interrogation, argued that the
trial court committed plain error by admitting evidence of
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statements respondent made as a result of the interrogation
without making a finding that he waived his rights, in violation
of N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101 and the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.  The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that
respondent was in custody and that the trial court committed
plain error in admitting respondent’s incriminatory statements.
Id. at 646, 634 S.E.2d at 926-27.  Before this Court, the State
contends that the Court of Appeals erred in its determination
that respondent was in custody and subjected to custodial
interrogation when he admitted to possessing the knife on school
property.
At the outset we note that respondent did not make a
motion to suppress or object when his admissions came into
evidence and did not raise these statutory and constitutional
issues at trial; consequently, the trial court did not have the
opportunity to consider or rule on these issues.  See, N.C. R.
App. P. 10(b)(1).  Thus, respondent failed to preserve these
issues for appellate review.  See, e.g., State v. Lawrence, 352
N.C. 1, 13, 530 S.E.2d 807, 815 (2000) (holding that defendant
failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and therefore,
waived appellate review of that issue), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1083, 148 L. Ed. 2d 684 (2001).  Under the plain error doctrine,
errors or defects affecting a fundamental right may be addressed
even though they were not previously brought to the attention of
the court.  N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4); State v. Odom, 307 N.C.
655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983). “However, plain error
review is limited to errors in a trial court’s jury instructions
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or a trial court’s rulings on admissibility of evidence.”  State
v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 460, 533 S.E.2d 168, 230-31 (2000)
(citing State v. Cummings, 346 N.C. 291, 313-14, 488 S.E.2d 550,
563 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1092, 139 L. Ed. 2d 873
(1998)), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 931, 149 L. Ed. 2d 305 (2001).
As the Court of Appeals noted, Miranda warnings and the
protections of N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101 apply only to custodial
interrogations.  In re W.R., 179 N.C. App. at 645, 634 S.E.2d at
926.  “Custodial interrogation” is defined as “‘questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way.’”  State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 337,
543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706 (1966) (emphasis added)).  The
test for determining if a person is in custody is whether,
considering all the circumstances, a reasonable person would not
have thought that he was free to leave because he had been
formally arrested or had had his freedom of movement restrained
to the degree associated with a formal arrest.  Id. at 338-40,
543 S.E.2d at 827-28.  Absent indicia of formal arrest, that
police have identified the person interviewed as a suspect and
that the interview was designed to produce incriminating
responses from the person are not relevant in assessing whether
that person was in custody for Miranda purposes.  Stansbury v.
California, 511 U.S. 318, 324, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293, 300 (1994).
Because Miranda is limited to custodial interrogations,
“statements made to private individuals unconnected with law
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enforcement are admissible so long as they were made freely and
voluntarily.”  State v. Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 43, 352 S.E.2d
673, 679 (1987) (citations omitted).  Even if the person occupies
some official capacity or position of authority, Miranda does not
apply to questioning by such persons unless the person is acting
as an agent of law enforcement.  Id. at 43-44, 352 S.E.2d at 679
(citations omitted).
In the present case, the Court of Appeals placed
substantial emphasis on the role of the school resource officer. 
In re W.R., 179 N.C. App. at 643, 646, 634 S.E.2d at 925, 926-27.
However, no motion to suppress respondent’s statement was made
and no objection was raised at the time the inculpatory statement
came into evidence.  In fact defense counsel first elicited the
statement on cross-examination of the State’s first witness,
Jesse Pratt, the school principal.  Inasmuch as no motion to
suppress was made, no evidence was presented and no findings were
made as to either the school resource officer’s actual
participation in the questioning of W.R. or the custodial or
noncustodial nature of the interrogation.  Nor were any findings
made as to whether the statements were freely and voluntarily
made.
After careful review, we are not prepared based on the
limited record before this Court to conclude that the presence
and participation of the school resource officer at the request
of school administrators conducting the investigation rendered
the questioning of respondent juvenile a “custodial
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interrogation,” requiring Miranda warnings and the protections of
N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101.
No conflicting evidence having been presented, the
trial court, sitting as judge and jury, was not required to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the voluntariness
of the statement.  See State v. Keith, 266 N.C. 263, 266-67, 145
S.E.2d 841, 843-44 (1966) (holding that when on voir dire the
evidence is not in conflict as to the voluntariness of a
confession, the trial judge is not required to make findings of
fact before ruling on defendant’s objection to introduction of
the confession).  Under these circumstances, the trial court did
not err in admitting, without objection, respondent’s statement
admitting that he possessed the knife on school property.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed.
REVERSED.