Title: Simmons v. Mercado
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: June 17, 2021

Simmons v. Mercado Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Plaintiffs Baffi Simmons and the African American Data and Research Institute (collectively, AADARI) submitted a request under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA) to defendants Millville City Clerk Wendy Mercado, the City of Millville, and the City of Millville Police Department (collectively, MPD) for complaint-summonses, known as CDR-1s, for certain classes of drug-related offenses. In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether a records request for complaint-summonses from a municipal police department was proper under OPRA. The key question was whether the complaint-summonses -- electronic records populated with information by local police officers but stored on Judiciary servers -- were the police department’s government records under OPRA and, if so, whether the records request at issue here was sufficiently narrow. The Supreme Court found that because MPD officers created the information contained in the CDR-1s, the CDR-1s fell well within OPRA’s definition of a government record. Further, AADARI’s records request was narrowly tailored and would not constitute research beyond OPRA’s scope. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. Baffi Simmons v. Wendy Mercado (A-18-20) (084695)Argued March 31, 2021 -- Decided June 17, 2021PIERRE-LOUIS, J., writing for a unanimous Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether a records request for complaint- summonses from a municipal police department is proper under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13. The key question is whether the complaint- summonses -- electronic records populated with information by local police officers but stored on Judiciary servers -- are the police department’s government records under OPRA and, if so, whether the records request at issue here was sufficiently narrow. Plaintiffs Baffi Simmons and the African American Data and Research Institute (collectively, AADARI) submitted a request under OPRA to defendants Millville City Clerk Wendy Mercado, the City of Millville, and the City of Millville Police Department (collectively, MPD) for complaint-summonses, known as CDR-1s, for certain classes of drug-related offenses. Specifically, AADARI requested copies of the following four categories of documents prepared by MPD from January 2017 onward: (1) driving while intoxicated/driving under the influence (DWI/DUI) complaints and summonses; (2) drug possession complaints and summonses; (3) MPD’s “Arrest Listings”; and (4) drug paraphernalia complaints and summonses. AADARI requested those records as part of a comparative data analysis on the subject of disparate treatment in the administration and enforcement of marijuana and other drug-related offenses in New Jersey. In response to AADARI’s OPRA request, MPD provided documents responsive to category 3 and advised AADARI to request the other three categories of items from the Millville Municipal Court. AADARI filed a complaint and an order to show cause, after which MPD provided AADARI documents responsive to category 1. So when the parties appeared before the trial court on the order to show cause, the only outstanding requests were the documents in categories 2 and 4 -- the drug-related complaints and summonses. The trial court ruled in favor of AADARI, rejecting MPD’s claims that it did not need to produce the pertinent records because MPD did not maintain them. The court also found that the records request did not require MPD to conduct research and therefore did not go beyond OPRA’s scope. 1 The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the requested records are in the custody of the Judiciary and that AADARI must therefore direct its records request to the Judiciary, not MPD. 464 N.J. Super. 77, 79, 84 (App. Div. 2020). The appellate court did not address whether AADARI’s request would require research. Id. at 84. The Court granted AADARI’s petition for certification. 244 N.J. 342 (2020).HELD: Because MPD officers create the information contained in the CDR-1s, the CDR-1s fall well within OPRA’s definition of a government record. Further, AADARI’s records request is narrowly tailored and would not constitute research beyond OPRA’s scope.1. New Jersey boasts of a long and proud tradition of openness and hostility to secrecy in government. OPRA was enacted to maximize public knowledge about public affairs in order to ensure an informed citizenry and to minimize the evils inherent in a secluded process. To effectuate its mission to make government records “readily accessible” to the state’s citizens, OPRA substantively provides that “all government records shall be subject to public access unless exempt,” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, and it places on the government the burden of establishing an exemption, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. Although OPRA favors broad public access to government records, it is not intended to be a research tool that litigants may use to force government officials to identify and siphon useful information. Thus, to prompt disclosure under OPRA, requests for information must be properly circumscribed. (pp. 15-17)2. In furtherance of OPRA’s goal of transparency and public access to government records, the Legislature broadly defines a “government record” subject to OPRA to include “information stored or maintained electronically . . . that has been made, maintained or kept on file in the course of his or its official business by any officer, commission, agency, or authority of the State or of any political subdivision thereof.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 (emphases added). “Information” is the key word. Applying those principles to the present case, and bearing in mind OPRA’s goals, it is evident that the CDR-1s sought in this matter are government records subject to disclosure by MPD under OPRA. (pp. 17-18)3. MPD’s argument that members of the Judiciary, not law enforcement officers, “make” the CDR-1 forms obscures the nature of the information being sought here. AADARI is not seeking blank forms that provide zero information regarding arrests made by MPD. It is the substantive information regarding arrests used to populate the CDR-1s that is at issue here, and that information is inputted by MPD and only MPD. The CDR-1 form developed by the Judiciary is nothing but an empty shell until law enforcement officers, in the course of their official business, make that shell into an official government document by inputting the information that is sought in this case. (pp. 18-19) 2 4. Further, MPD’s argument that it is not obligated to produce the CDR-1s because it does not “maintain” the records does not square with the provision that, if a government official makes, maintains, or keeps on file electronic information in the course of his or her official business, it is a “government record” subject to OPRA. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A- 1.1. The use of “or” plainly indicates that any of those three listed actions is sufficient to satisfy the statutory definition. Thus, regardless of who maintains the files, the fact that MPD “makes” the CDR-1s means that it can be called upon to disclose those government records. Nothing in the text of OPRA or Rule 1:38 or the Court’s jurisprudence suggests that information cannot be both a court record and a government record. Indeed, the language of the statute that defines a government record as one that has been “made, maintained, or kept on file” itself suggests the possibility that different government entities, working cooperatively, could be simultaneous custodians of the same information. The statutory language presupposes that there may be more than one proper place where a requestor can submit an OPRA request. That the Judiciary might maintain on its servers the information that MPD made does not absolve MPD of its obligation to produce that information pursuant to a proper OPRA request made to MPD. (pp. 19-22)5. The Court therefore turns to MPD’s argument that the request at issue here was not a proper request for OPRA purposes because it required research. In Paff v. Galloway Township, the Court explained the proper parameters of OPRA requests, stating that “[a] records request must be well defined so that the custodian knows precisely what records are sought. The request should not require the records custodian to undertake a subjective analysis to understand the nature of the request. Seeking particular information from the custodian is permissible; expecting the custodian to do research is not.” 229 N.J. 340, 355 (2017). The Court reviews MAG Entertainment, LLC v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J. Super. 534 (App. Div. 2005), in which the Appellate Division found a request requiring research to be beyond OPRA’s statutory ambit, and Paff, in which the Court found that the challenged request did not require research. The distinction between a research and non-research request lies with whether the plaintiff’s request demands the government agency engage in analysis or the exercise of judgment in identifying responsive records. (pp. 22-25)6. The Court explains why AADARI’s records request is distinguishable from the request at issue in MAG and is instead akin to the permissible request in Paff. The request was well within OPRA’s scope and does not require research by MPD. The Court therefore reinstates the trial court’s order granting AADARI’s OPRA request. MPD must comply with the trial court order and provide the requested documents to AADARI within five business days of the filing of the Court’s opinion. (pp. 25-27) REVERSED. The order of the trial court is REINSTATED.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS’s opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 18 September Term 2020 084695 Baffi Simmons and African American Data and Research Institute (AADARI), Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Wendy Mercado, City of Millville, and City of Millville Police Department, Defendants-Respondents. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 464 N.J. Super. 77 (App. Div. 2020). Argued Decided March 31, 2021 June 17, 2021Rotimi A. Owoh argued the cause for appellants (Rotimi A. Owoh, on the brief).Brock D. Russell argued the cause for respondents (Brock D. Russell, on the brief).Karen Thompson argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Karen Thompson, Alexander Shalom, and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief). 1 Robert E. Levy argued the cause for amici curiae Adelinny Plaza, Town of West New York Police Department, and Town of West New York (Scarinci Hollenbeck, attorneys; Robert E. Levy, of counsel and on the brief, and Jorge R. de Armas and Kevin M. Foltmer, on the brief). JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether a records request forcomplaint-summonses from a municipal police department is proper under theOpen Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13. The key questionis whether the complaint-summonses -- electronic records populated withinformation by local police officers but stored on Judiciary servers -- are thepolice department’s government records under OPRA. If so, we must alsoconsider whether the records request was sufficiently narrow. Plaintiffs Baffi Simmons and the African American Data and ResearchInstitute (collectively, AADARI) submitted a request under OPRA todefendants Millville City Clerk Wendy Mercado, the City of Millville, and theCity of Millville Police Department (collectively, MPD) for complaint-summonses, known as CDR-1s, for certain classes of drug-related offenses.MPD denied the request, explaining that such records could only be obtainedfrom the Judiciary pursuant to Rule 1:38 and that, even if MPD could access 2 the records, such a request was overly broad and would require researchbeyond the scope of OPRA. The trial court ordered MPD to produce the CDR-1s, emphasizing thatalthough MPD did not maintain the records, it was still required to producethem because MPD officers input the information to make the CDR-1s and hadaccess to them. The trial court further found that the request did not requireresearch, as it only required MPD to observe whether a designated offense wasdrug-related or not. The Appellate Division reversed, agreeing with MPD that the recordswere not in its possession. The court acknowledged that police officers inputinformation to trigger the creation of CDR-1s but determined that, because thefinal product is maintained by the Judiciary, MPD was not obligated toproduce the items requested. Finding that the CDR-1s were not MPD’s“government records” under OPRA, the court declined to address whetherAADARI’s request would require research. Because MPD officers create the information contained in the CDR-1s,we find that they fall well within OPRA’s definition of a government record.We further find that AADARI’s records request is narrowly tailored and wouldnot constitute research beyond OPRA’s scope. Accordingly, we reverse and 3 reinstate the trial court’s order mandating that MPD produce the requestedrecords to AADARI. I. A. Pursuant to Rule 3:4-1(a)(1), after making an arrest without a warrant,law enforcement officers are required to immediately prepare a complaintsetting forth the relevant facts and circumstances in support of probable causefor the arrest. As part of the State’s compliance with the Criminal JusticeReform Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26, the Attorney General has directedlocal police departments to utilize the electronic Complaint Disposition Recordsystem (eCDR) to expedite the process of generating such complaints.Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2016-06 (Oct. 11, 2016).Using the eCDR system, law enforcement officers input into a blank electronicform information about the arrest, including the offense allegedly committed,the arrestee’s biographical information, and a description of the facts. Once the pertinent information is entered, the eCDR system allows lawenforcement officers to electronically submit the form to the court. No judgeor member of the Judiciary plays a role in the inputting or submission ofinformation by law enforcement officers through the eCDR system. At thepoint at which a law enforcement officer is submitting the form, an arrest has 4 already been made without any involvement by a judicial officer. The formthat the law enforcement officer submits becomes part of a CDR-1 complaint-summons or a complaint-warrant, known as a CDR-2. R. 3:3-1. For low-leveloffenses, law enforcement officers may issue the CDR-1 to the defendantwithout any judicial input. R. 3:3-1(b)(2). For CDR-2s, once the form issubmitted to the court, an assigned judge makes a probable causedetermination. The information contained in those CDR-1 and CDR-2 formsis stored on Judiciary servers, but because law enforcement officers enter thesubstantive information about the arrests in the forms, local police departmentshave access to the forms in the system. The forms at issue in the present case are CDR-1s, complaint-summonses. CDR-1s are typically issued for low-level offenses that do notinvolve defendants who pose a risk warranting pretrial detention. Suchdefendants are always released, and the complaint-summons directs thedefendant to appear in court on a specified date. Prior to eCDR, the Judiciary manually stored paper files and records,and police departments retained copies of complaint forms in their own recordsdepartments. N.J. State Bar Ass’n, Capitol Report, 223 N.J.L.J. 16 (June 5,2017). Under statewide document retention schedules, even with eCDR it isenvisioned that police departments will maintain their own copies of CDR-1s 5 for thirty days after disposition of the matter. See Div. of Archives & RecordMgmt., Municipal Police Departments: Records Retention & DispositionSchedule, https://www.nj.gov/treasury/revenue/rms/pdf/m900000.pdf. B. On September 10, 2018, a representative from AADARI emailed arecords request pursuant to OPRA 1 to MPD. AADARI requested copies of thefollowing four categories of documents prepared by MPD from January 2017onward: (1) driving while intoxicated/driving under the influence (DWI/DUI)complaints and summonses; (2) drug possession complaints and summonses;(3) MPD’s “Arrest Listings”; and (4) drug paraphernalia complaints andsummonses. AADARI requested those records as part of a comparative dataanalysis on the subject of disparate treatment in the administration andenforcement of marijuana and other drug-related offenses in New Jersey. In response to AADARI’s OPRA request, on September 13, 2018, MPDprovided documents responsive to category 3, the arrest listings. MPD did notprovide any documents responsive to categories 1, 2, or 4, the DUI and drug-1 The original records request was also made pursuant to the common law right of access. The parties, however, never litigated the applicability of the common law right of access in this case. 6 related complaints and summonses, and advised AADARI to request thoseitems from the Millville Municipal Court. On October 2, 2018, AADARI filed a complaint and an order to showcause against MPD, asking for a court order to provide AADARI withimmediate access to the requested records pursuant to OPRA. After AADARIfiled the complaint and order to show cause, MPD, “in an abundance ofcaution,” provided AADARI documents responsive to category 1, the DUIcomplaints and summonses, although MPD continued to maintain that thosedocuments are court records. So when the parties appeared before the trialcourt on the order to show cause, the only outstanding requests were thedocuments in categories 2 and 4 -- the drug-related complaints andsummonses. At oral argument on November 13, 2018, MPD alleged that it did nothave the requested complaints in categories 2 and 4 and submitted an affidavitfrom an MPD lieutenant stating that the police department does not haveaccess to those records. Specifically, MPD contended (1) it was not thecustodian of the eCDR records, so AADARI would need to request the recordsfrom the municipal court, and (2) even if MPD had access to the records, itcould not search by complaint type and, thus, AADARI’s request was overlybroad. 7 AADARI disputed MPD’s lack of access to eCDR, asserting that eachlocal police department had a password to access eCDR and “the governmentis [e]ssentially sending them paper copies. They are stored as a PDF on [an]electronic system,” from which MPD could print the complaints. AADARIfurther emphasized that just because other government officials, includingprosecutors and public defenders, have access to the system, that did notrender MPD exempt from its OPRA obligations. As to MPD’s ability to conduct a specific records search, counsel forAADARI asserted that MPD could use the first and last names of arrestees tonarrow the group of individuals with relevant search results. By using thecharge numbers included on the arrest listings, AADARI explained, MPDwould be able to look up the individual complaints of everyone MPD arrestedfor the class of drug offenses AADARI requested. AADARI represents that itidentified 162 cases from MPD’s arrest listings that corresponded to therequested CDR-1s in categories 2 and 4. The trial court ruled in favor of AADARI, rejecting MPD’s claims that itdid not need to produce the pertinent records because MPD did not maintainthem. The court found that “the issue of whether or not they maintain [therecords] . . . is not a relevant issue for OPRA,” under the statute’s definition ofa government record, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. The judge emphasized that the 8 language of the definition included any record “that has been made,maintained, or kept [] on file . . . in the course of . . . official business”(emphasis added), and that there was no dispute here that MPD made thedocuments in its official business. Relying on Burnett v. County of Gloucester, 415 N.J. Super. 506 (App.Div. 2010), the court held that “even though you don’t maintain [a record], ifit’s a governmental record you still have an obligation to turn it over.”Otherwise, the court cautioned, “a governmental agency seeking to protect itsrecords from scrutiny could simply relinquish possession to third partiesthereby thwarting the policy of transparency that underlies OPRA.” Thus, thecourt held that MPD was in violation of OPRA for failing to turn over anyCDR-1s it maintained for the thirty-day period mandated by State documentretention policies. The court further found that AADARI was entitled to therest of the requested records but allowed MPD an additional two weeks tosubmit proof that it did not have the ability to access the complaints. At a subsequent hearing on December 18, 2018, MPD conceded that“[t]he police department does have access [to eCDR] -- to be clear it’s notdisputed.” However, MPD relied upon MAG Entertainment, LLC v. Divisionof Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J. Super. 534, 540 (App. Div. 2005),and continued to assert that AADARI’s records request would constitute 9 research for MPD and would go beyond OPRA’s scope. The court disagreed,finding MAG to be distinguishable because there, the records custodian wasasked to read through individual documents to interpret whether they fell intothe category of information that the requestor was seeking. By contrast, here,“the only thing that’s requested is for the custodian of records to see what thecharge is,” which “[d]oesn’t require any thinking, doesn’t require anyinterpretation.” The decision in favor of AADARI was reduced to a formalorder on January 3, 2019. 2 C. MPD appealed from the order and the Appellate Division reversed.Simmons v. Mercado, 464 N.J. Super. 77, 79 (App. Div. 2020). The courtagreed with MPD that it was not obligated to produce the requested recordsunder OPRA because “the manner in which the requested complaint-summonses were created demonstrates that they are not government records intheir possession but are records in the custody of the judiciary.” Id. at 84.Although local police “input the information that triggers the process” of2 Thereafter, MPD filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that complaints and summonses are pleadings within the scope of Rule 1:38 and are not subject to OPRA. The court denied the motion, holding that “even if [the CDR-1s] are court records[,] it doesn’t mean that the requestor has to go through the court” to obtain them. The court emphasized “[t]here’s no exceptions under OPRA . . . if it’s available through the court from some other source.” 10 generating a CDR-1, the fact that “the final product is governed by other forcesand the resulting product is maintained by others” meant, according to thecourt, that a CDR-1 “is, in reality, not a government record maintained by themunicipality but a record maintained by the judiciary.” Ibid. The courthighlighted that judicial officers have the discretion to decide whether theeCDR system will generate a CDR-1 (summons) or a CDR-2 (warrant) basedupon the data input by police. Id. at 85. In the court’s view, Rule 3:4-1(a)(1)did not require a different result because it does not reveal whether acomplaint-summons “constitutes a municipal record or a judiciary record.” Id.at 85. The court further observed that the fact that MPD has access to eCDR“does not alter the fact that the record is maintained by the judiciary.” Id. at86. Although the Appellate Division recounted caselaw to highlight thatOPRA does not require records custodians to conduct research, it ultimatelydid not address the question as to whether AADARI’s request would requireresearch, because “[t]hat presupposes, of course, that the requested record is a'government record.’” Id. at 84. Finding that the requested records were notgovernment records subject to OPRA, the court concluded that AADARI mustdirect its records request to the Judiciary, not MPD. Id. at 86. 11 We granted AADARI’s petition for certification. 244 N.J. 342 (2020).We also granted leave to participate as amici curiae to the American CivilLiberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) and to the Town of West New York,Town of West New York Police Department, and the West New York DeputyClerk Adelinny Plaza (collectively, West New York). II. A. AADARI contends that the trial court properly ordered MPD to producethe requested CDR-1s because MPD has direct access to those summonses andthe ability to retrieve and print them from eCDR. Although AADARIconcedes that eCDR is maintained by the Judiciary, it argues that the publiccould easily gain access to CDR-1s from police departments before they werecomputerized and that technological advancements should not diminish theright to access government records. To find otherwise, AADARI submits,would run counter to the purpose of OPRA: to grant quick and expeditiousaccess to public records as part of promoting transparency in government.AADARI further asserts that its request for the CDR-1s is a valid andidentifiable request for public records in accordance with Burke v. Brandes, 429 N.J. Super. 169 (App. Div. 2012), and that no research is required forMPD to produce the requested records. 12 Amicus ACLU, like AADARI, urges this Court to reverse the AppellateDivision, arguing that its findings are “not supported by the statutory text orcase law” and that its decision “creates unjustifiable limitations on governmenttransparency obligations by fashioning arbitrary boundaries around thepublic’s access to government records.” The ACLU asserts that the CDR-1sare MPD’s government records under OPRA because its officers generate theelectronic information that is sought by AADARI and that the AppellateDivision erred by relying upon where the document is stored. Amicus alsowarns that the Appellate Division’s decision would burden judicial resources“by re-assigning to the judiciary the work of individual police departments . . .forcing the judiciary to dispense aggregated data from nearly 200 municipalpolice departments across the state.” The ACLU asserts that this would stymiethe purpose of OPRA, which is “to maximize public knowledge about publicaffairs so as to build an informed populace and to minimize the evils inherentin a secluded process.” B. MPD asks this Court to affirm the Appellate Division decision. It claimsthat it does not own or maintain the CDR-1s at issue, emphasizing thatalthough officers initiate the process of generating a complaint by inputtinginformation into an electronic form in eCDR, the Judiciary has already 13 completed preprinted fields and the decision of whether to issue a CDR-1 orCDR-2 is made by a judicial officer. Because the information filled in byofficers is “deliberative” and maintained on Judiciary servers, MPD contendsthat CDR-1s are not its government records under OPRA. MPD also assertsthat CDR-1s fall within the definition of court records under Rule 1:38-2(a)(4)and that AADARI should therefore request such pleadings from the Judiciaryunder the framework of Rule 1:38. A ruling to the contrary, according toMPD, would contravene its understanding that “OPRA does not apply to theJudiciary which is a separate and distinct branch of government under the StateConstitution.” Amicus West New York largely echoes MPD’s arguments. West NewYork asserts that municipal clerks are not required under OPRA “to take courtrecords from Judiciary files without authorization, in violation of JudiciaryRules and policy, in order to provide them to an OPRA requestor, all und er thethreat of serious sanction.” Like MPD, West New York argues that the CDR-1s are court records deliberately exempted from OPRA under the New JerseyConstitution and separation of power principles. West New York disputes thatmere access is insufficient to create “legal access” to the requested records andcontends that a ruling in favor of AADARI would create a scenario where any 14 government office could be required to produce otherwise non-discoverablecourt records simply because they have access to them. III. Our state boasts “of a long and proud 'tradition[] of openness andhostility to secrecy in government.’” Educ. Law Ctr. v. Dep’t of Educ., 198 N.J. 274, 283 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting N. Jersey Newspapers v.Passaic Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 127 N.J. 9, 16 (1992)). To furtherenhance government transparency, OPRA was enacted “to maximize publicknowledge about public affairs in order to ensure an informed citizenry and tominimize the evils inherent in a secluded process.” Mason v. City ofHoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 64 (2008) (quoting Asbury Park Press v. Ocean Cnty.Prosecutor’s Off., 374 N.J. Super. 312, 329 (Law Div. 2004)). The Legislaturepassed OPRA in 2001 to replace the then-existing Right to Know Law,L. 1963, c. 73, which “did not keep pace with the vast technological advancesthat changed the ways citizens and public officials communicate and storeinformation.” Paff v. Galloway Township, 229 N.J. 340, 352 (2017). Toeffectuate its mission “to make government records 'readily accessible’ to thestate’s citizens,” OPRA “substantively provides that 'all government recordsshall be subject to public access unless exempt,’ N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, and it 15 places on the government the burden of establishing an exemption, N.J.S.A.47:1A-6.” Gilleran v. Township of Bloomfield, 227 N.J. 159, 170 (2016). Although OPRA favors broad public access to government records, it is“not intended [to be] a research tool [that] litigants may use to forcegovernment officials to identify and siphon useful information.” In re N.J.Firemen’s Ass’n Obligation, 230 N.J. 258, 276 (2017) (alterations in original)(quoting MAG, 375 N.J. Super. at 546). Thus, to prompt disclosure underOPRA, requests for information must be properly circumscribed. Paff, 229 N.J. at 355. In this appeal, we consider, first, whether the requested CDR-1s aregovernment records subject to disclosure under OPRA and, second, whetherthe requests were sufficiently circumscribed. “[D]eterminations about theapplicability of OPRA and its exemptions are legal conclusions and aretherefore subject to de novo review.” In re N.J. Firemen’s Ass’n Obligation, 230 N.J. at 273-74 (citations omitted). “[T]herefore, we owe no deference tothe interpretive conclusions reached by either the trial court or the AppellateDivision.” Paff, 229 N.J. at 351. In our review, we are mindful of theLegislature’s direction that “OPRA 'shall be construed in favor of the public’sright of access’” and “imposes on public agencies 'the burden of proving thatthe denial of access is authorized by law.’” Paff v. Ocean Cnty. Prosecutor’s 16 Off., 235 N.J. 1, 16 (2018) (first quoting N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1; and then quoting N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6). IV. A. In determining whether certain information falls within OPRA’s scope,the plain language of the statute is our best guide. In furtherance of OPRA’sgoal of transparency and public access to government records, the Legislaturebroadly defines a “government record” subject to OPRA as any paper, written or printed book, document, drawing, map, plan, photograph, microfilm, data processed or image processed document, information stored or maintained electronically or by sound-recording in a similar device, or any copy thereof, that has been made, maintained or kept on file in the course of his or its official business by any officer, commission, agency, or authority of the State or of any political subdivision thereof . . . . [ N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 (emphases added).]In Paff, we clarified that this definition includes electronic records, as “[t]heLegislature apparently decided against defining government record[s] asdocuments or files stored or maintained electronically. 'Information’ is thekey word.” 229 N.J. at 353. We noted that “[t]his logical conclusion flowsdirectly from OPRA’s language,” ibid., and that a contrary position could not“be squared with OPRA’s plain language or its objectives in dealing with 17 electronically stored information,” id. at 356. Applying those principles to thepresent case, and bearing in mind OPRA’s goals, it is evident that the CDR -1ssought in this matter are government records subject to disclosure by MPDunder OPRA. MPD’s argument that members of the Judiciary, not law enforcementofficers, “make” the CDR-1 forms completely obscures the nature of theinformation being sought here. AADARI is not seeking blank forms thatprovide zero information regarding arrests made by MPD. We recognize thatthe Judiciary developed the CDR-1 template, or the electronic shell thatcategorizes the substantive information that must be entered by lawenforcement officers. But it is the substantive information regarding arrestsused to populate the CDR-1s that is at issue here, and that information isinputted by MPD and only MPD. No judicial officer or judge plays a role increating the document or inputting any information into the CDR-1s at themoment the law enforcement officer fills out the form and submits it to theJudiciary. That is what AADARI is seeking here -- the actual completedofficial document that contains details of an arrest, probable cause, and anarrestee’s biographical information. As we made clear in Paff, and continue to emphasize, “'[i]nformation’ isthe key word” for purposes of OPRA. 229 N.J. at 353. The CDR-1 form 18 developed by the Judiciary is nothing but an empty shell until law enforcementofficers, in the course of their official business, make that shell into an officialgovernment document by inputting the information that is sought in this case.See Burnett, 415 N.J. Super. at 517 (finding that the requested documents weregovernment records under OPRA because they “were 'made’ by or on behalfof the Board in the course of its official business”). Pursuant to OPRA’sdefinition of “government record,” there is no question that CDR-1s aredocuments that are made in the course of a law enforcement officer’s officialbusiness. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. Because MPD officers create thecompleted CDR-1s by populating the forms with the information necessary togenerate a summons and submit it to the court, there is no question that theCDR-1s are government records subject to disclosure pursuant to OPRA. MPD also argues that it is not obligated to produce the CDR-1s becauseit does not “maintain” the records. The Appellate Division, in line with thatargument, found that the CDR-1s were not government records becausealthough local police input the information, “the resulting product ismaintained by others.” 464 N.J. Super. at 84. But that interpretation of whatconstitutes a government record does not square with the explicit language inOPRA. 19 Any reliance here on the maintenance of the records is misplacedbecause it completely ignores the fact that MPD officers “make” theinformation by inputting substantive data about the arrests into eCDR , as notedabove. The plain language of the statutory provision at issue here is clear: if agovernment official makes, maintains, or keeps on file electronic informationin the course of his or her official business, it is a “government record” subjectto OPRA. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. The use of “or” plainly indicates that anyof those three listed actions is sufficient to satisfy the statutory definition. See,e.g., State v. Frank, 445 N.J. Super. 98, 106 (App. Div. 2016) (noting that theword “or” in a statute generally indicates an alternative and that, “where itemsin a list are joined by a comma, with an “or” preceding the last item, the itemsare disjunctive, meaning distinct and separate from each other” (alterations andquotations omitted)). Thus, regardless of who maintains the files, the fact thatMPD “makes” the CDR-1s means that it can be called upon to disclose thosegovernment records. MPD also appears to argue that, even if it had a disclosure obligation asto the CDR-1s, its obligations under OPRA are preempted because the CDR- 20 1s, once submitted, become court records that can be obtained only from theJudiciary pursuant to Rule 1:38.3 Certainly, once the CDR-1 is created by law enforcement and submittedto the court, the document falls under Rule 1:38-2’s definition of a courtrecord in that it is “information maintained by a court in any form inconnection with a case or judicial proceeding.” But nothing in the text ofOPRA or Rule 1:38 or our jurisprudence suggests that information cannot beboth a court record and a government record. Indeed, the language of thestatute that defines a government record as one that has been “made,maintained, or kept on file” itself suggests the possibility that differentgovernment entities, working cooperatively, could be simultaneous custodiansof the same information. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 (emphasis added). Thestatutory language presupposes that there may be more than one proper placewhere a requestor can submit an OPRA request. 3 Rule 1:38 governs public access to court records, which include “any information maintained by a court in any form in connection with a case or judicial proceeding.” R. 1:38-2(a)(1). Court records also encompass “any information in a computerized case management system created or prepared by the court in connection with a case or judicial proceeding.” Id. at -2(a)(4). Requests for municipal court records under Rule 1:38 must be directed to a “Municipal Court Director or Administrator.” Id. at -10(a)(7). The Rule further lists numerous categories of court records that are excluded from public access. Id. at -3. 21 Moreover, the contention by MPD that because government records maybe available elsewhere an agency can relinquish its obligations under OPRAruns counter to “the State’s policy in favor of broad access to public records”embodied by OPRA. N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Township of Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. 541, 555 (2017). Were we to engraft upon OPRA an exception forwhen a government agency has created but no longer maintains a record, itwould create a perverse incentive for officials to relinquish electronic recordsto a third party in order to prevent their public disclosure. That would conflictwith OPRA’s policy of government transparency and would ignore the factthat modern-day technological advancements have, in many cases, resulted inthe possibility for there to be multiple concurrent or simultaneous custodiansof the same electronic information. That the Judiciary might maintain on itsservers the information that MPD made does not absolve MPD of its obligationto produce that information pursuant to a proper OPRA request made to MPD. That brings us to MPD’s argument that the request at issue here was nota proper request for OPRA purposes because it required research. B. In Paff, we explained the proper parameters of OPRA records requests asfollows: A records request must be well defined so that the custodian knows precisely what records are sought. 22 The request should not require the records custodian to undertake a subjective analysis to understand the nature of the request. Seeking particular information from the custodian is permissible; expecting the custodian to do research is not. [ 229 N.J. at 355.]Thus, a records request must not be so broad as to require the record custodianto exercise subjective judgment in determining which records must beproduced. See N.J. Builders Ass’n v. N.J. Council on Affordable Hous., 390 N.J. Super 166, 171-72 (App. Div. 2007) (finding that an OPRA request for“[a]ny and all documents and data which [were] relied upon, considered,reviewed, or otherwise utilized by any employee or staff member of COAH”was overly broad and did not specify the information sought (alterations inoriginal)). To avoid submitting a broad request outside the scope of OPRA,the requestor must “describe[] the records sought with the requisite specificityand narrow[] the scope of the inquiry to a discrete and limited subject matter.”Burke, 429 N.J. Super. at 177-78. In MAG, the Appellate Division reviewed an order granting MAGEntertainment (MAG) a right under OPRA to obtain documents from theDivision of Alcoholic Beverages Control (ABC). 375 N.J. Super. at 539.ABC had a pending enforcement action against MAG, and MAG was pursuinga selective enforcement defense. Ibid. To substantiate its defense, MAG filed 23 an OPRA request for all documents pertaining to past instances where ABCsought to revoke liquor licenses for certain alcohol-related criminal charges,but “MAG’s request did not identify any specific case by name, date, docketnumber or any other citation.” Id. at 539-40. The Appellate Division reversed the order granting MAG’s OPRArequest, explaining that the request failed to identify with any specificity or particularity the governmental records sought. MAG provided neither names nor any identifiers other than a broad generic description of a brand or type of case prosecuted by the agency in the past. Such an open- ended demand required the Division’s records custodian to manually search through all of the agency’s files, analyze, compile and collate the information contained therein, and identify for MAG the cases relative to its selective enforcement defense in the . . . litigation. Further, once the cases were identified, the records custodian would then be required to evaluate, sort out, and determine the documents to be produced and those otherwise exempted. [Id. at 549.]Accordingly, the court concluded that ABC “was asked to do the very researchand investigation MAG needed to do in the administrative proceeding in orderto establish a 'colorable claim’ of selective enforcement,” which was“decidedly outside [of OPRA’s] statutory ambit.” Id. at 549-50. The courtheld that OPRA does not encompass “[w]holesale requests for general 24 information to be analyzed, collated and compiled by the respondinggovernment entity.” Id. at 549. By contrast, in Paff, we held that a plaintiff’s OPRA request did notrequire research. 229 N.J. at 356. There, Paff submitted an OPRA request toGalloway Township “for specific information in emails sent by the Township’sMunicipal Clerk and Chief of Police over a two-week period,” seeking onlyinformation in the “sender,” “recipient,” “date,” and “subject” fields. Id. at343. We rejected the Township’s analogy to MAG, emphasizing that [u]nlike the request in MAG, Paff circumscribed his request to a two-week period and identified the discrete information he sought. The records custodian did not have to make a subjective judgment to determine the nature of the information covered by the request. The custodian simply had to search for -- not research the identity of -- the records requested. [Id. at 356.]Thus, the distinction between a research and non-research request lies withwhether the plaintiff’s request demands the government agency engage inanalysis or “the exercise of judgment in identifying responsive records.”Burke, 429 N.J. Super. at 177. Here, MPD likens AADARI’s records request to the request rejected inMAG, arguing that it would require research and was thus beyond the scope ofOPRA. The trial court rejected that argument, finding that MPD does not need 25 to interpret any documents to determine whether they need to be produced.We agree. We are not persuaded that AADARI’s records request would requireMPD to engage in any analysis to produce the requested CDR-1s. AsAADARI has explained, because it already has MPD’s arrest listings for therelevant time period, which include drug-related incidents, it has identified 162cases that correspond to the requested CDR-1s. The arrest listings contain thefirst and last names of the offenders, their dates of birth, the dates of eachincident, the incident numbers, and the specific offense charged -- in this case,drug possession. MPD merely needs to use any of those already-provided datapoints to retrieve the corresponding CDR-1s and produce them to AADARI.Such an exercise would not require any subjective judgment, only theobjective activity of producing the CDR-1s referenced in the arrest listings. MPD’s reliance on MAG is misplaced. This is far from a case where therequestor did not provide anything more than a “broad generic description of abrand or type of case prosecuted by the agency in the past.” See MAG, 375 N.J. Super. at 549. Rather, it is akin to the request in Paff, wherein therequestor “circumscribed his request to a two-week period and identified thediscrete information he sought,” 229 N.J. at 356, or Burke, where the request“was confined to a specific subject matter that was clearly and reasonably 26 described with sufficient identifying information,” 429 N.J. Super. at 177.Similar to those cases, we conclude that AADARI’s request was well withinOPRA’s scope and does not require research by MPD. V. For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment of theAppellate Division and reinstate the trial court’s order granting AADARI’sOPRA request. MPD must comply with the trial court order and provide therequested documents to AADARI within five business days of the filing of thisopinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE PIERRE- LOUIS’s opinion. 27