Title: Com. v. Iacino
Citation: 415 A.2d 61, 490 Pa. 119
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: May 30, 1980

490 Pa. 119 (1980) 415 A.2d 61 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. Joseph P. IACINO, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued March 7, 1980. Decided May 30, 1980. *120 Charles F. Gilchrest, Routman, Moore, Goldstone &amp; Valentino, Sharon, for appellant. Samuel J. Orr, IV, Dist. Atty., David B. Douds, Asst. Dist. Atty., Mercer, for appellee. Before EAGEN, C.J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY and KAUFFMAN, JJ. O'BRIEN, Justice. Appellant, Joseph P. Iacino, was convicted by a jury of misapplication of entrusted property and conspiracy. Post-verdict motions were denied and appellant was ordered to pay fines totaling $1,000 and sentenced to a prison term of eleven and one-half to twenty-three months. The Superior Court affirmed, Commonwealth v. Iacino, 265 Pa.Super. 375, 401 A.2d 1355 (1979), and we granted appellant's petition for allowance of appeal. Appellant's conviction was based on the disappearance of a high-lift owned by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT). At the time of the disappearance, appellant was employed as a maintenance supervisor for PennDOT in Mercer County. Appellant was charged with improperly causing the sale of the high-lift and conspiring with three other individuals.[1] The instant prosecution was initiated by way of presentments issued by a special investigating grand jury impaneled to investigate a widespread series of crimes by supervisory personnel of PennDOT in Mercer County. The same grand jury was involved in the cases, decided today, of Commonwealth v. Bestwick, 489 Pa. 603, 414 A.2d 1373 (1980), and Commonwealth v. Skarica, 489 Pa. 636, 414 A.2d 1390 (1980). Consequently, a number of appellant's allegations of error can be disposed of on the basis of Bestwick, supra. Appellant first argues that the indictments should have been quashed because of the failure to afford him a preliminary hearing. We decided this issue adversely to appellant in Part II of Commonwealth v. Bestwick, supra, and we thus find this allegation of error meritless. Appellant asserts that the indictments should have been quashed because the district attorney's petition for an investigative *122 grand jury was insufficient as a matter of law to justify impanelment of the grand jury. As a corollary, appellant argues that the insufficient written petition could not legally be supplemented by the presentation of evidence at the in camera hearing. We find both arguments without merit. Commonwealth v. Bestwick, id. (Part I). Appellant next argues that the court order authorizing the grand jury investigation did not limit the scope of the investigation with sufficient definiteness and precision and thus authorized an investigation broader in scope than requested in the petition for an investigative grand jury. As a necessary corollary, appellant alleges that the investigative grand jury unlawfully exceeded its lawful scope of inquiry by investigating the disappearance of the high-lift. As authority for both arguments, appellant cites Commonwealth v. Soloff, 175 Pa.Super. 423, 107 A.2d 179 (1954), where the court held that an indictment may be challenged because the investigative grand jury's investigation went beyond the scope of the petition seeking impanelment of said grand jury. That petition alleged: The defendants in Soloff were city policemen charged with acts of police brutality. The court stated: We believe Soloff is distinguishable from the instant controversy. The petition seeking impanelment of the instant grand jury alleged: The petition further alleged: The court's order granting the district attorney's petition stated: In the instant case, the petition requesting impanelment of the investigative grand jury sought to uncover, inter alia, crimes involving official corruption by supervisory personnel of PennDOT in Mercer County whereby those individuals received monetary gain for either themselves or their political party. Furthermore, the order which impaneled the grand jury was of similar scope. Finally, the grand jury's investigation into the disappearance of the high-lift was proper, as the sale of the high-lift was made possible because appellant had submitted false reports to authorities in Harrisburg, alleging that the high-lift had been dismantled. *125 The instant case thus differs from Soloff, where that grand jury investigated a single instance of police brutality where the scope of the investigation was aimed at the protection of criminals by public officials for financial gain. As we stated in Commonwealth v. Columbia Investment Corp., 457 Pa. 353, 369, 325 A.2d 289, 298 (1974): Along the same line of inquiry, appellant asserts that the court below erred in refusing his request for an evidentiary hearing into the investigative process used by the grand jury. Appellant claims that the disappearance of the high-lift could have been investigated by normal police methods. As we find that the grand jury's investigation into the instant crime was proper, we believe the court did not err in refusing appellant's request for an evidentiary hearing. Finally, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to sever his trial from the trials of his co-defendants. In essence, he argues that he was prejudiced because the case was so strong against co-defendant Fontana that the jury could not keep the evidence separate. Appellant further argues that since Fontana was prejudiced by the conduct of his attorney, Commonwealth v. Fontana, supra, he (appellant) was also prejudiced. As we stated in Commonwealth v. Tolassi, 489 Pa. 502, 413 A.2d 1003 (1980): The jury verdict in the instant case shows that appellant was not prejudiced in the way he asserts, i.e., that the jury confused evidence presented against his co-defendants with the evidence presented against him. The instant jury acquitted two co-defendants of all charges. Fontana was convicted of four of the five charges while appellant was convicted of two of the five charges. As the jury was able to sift through the evidence before it, appellant's claim of prejudice is without merit. Order of the Superior Court is affirmed. [1] Two co-defendants were acquitted of all charges while the third, Joseph Fontana, was convicted of misapplication of entrusted property, theft by receiving stolen property, tampering with a witness and conspiracy. We recently, however, granted Fontana a new trial. Commonwealth v. Fontana, 490 Pa. 7, 415 A.2d 4 (1980).