Title: The Florida Bar Re: Brian John Murtha
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC19-1886
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 21, 2021

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
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No. SC19-1886 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR 
RE: BRIAN JOHN MURTHA 
 
October 21, 2021 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
 
This case is before the Court on the petition of Brian John 
Murtha for reinstatement to the practice of law.  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  For the reasons explained 
below, we disapprove of the referee’s findings and recommendation 
and deny the petition for reinstatement. 
I 
 
Pursuant to this Court’s order approving the recommendation 
of a referee in two consolidated cases, Murtha was suspended from 
the practice of law for ninety-one days, effective thirty days after 
October 13, 2016.  Fla. Bar v. Murtha, Nos. SC15-2011 & SC16-
581, 2016 WL 5944709 (Fla. Oct. 13, 2016).  In those cases, 
Murtha was found to have violated Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 
 
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(rules) 4-1.15 (Safekeeping Property); 4-1.3 (Diligence); 4-1.4 
(Communication); 4-8.4(g) (Misconduct); 5-1.1(b) (Trust Accounts; 
Application of Trust Funds or Property to Specific Purpose); 5-1.1(j) 
(Disbursement Against Uncollected Funds); and former 5-1.2(b)(3), 
(5), (6), and (c)(1) (Trust Accounting Records and Procedures).  
Pursuant to the suspension order, Murtha was ordered to comply 
with rule 3-5.1(h), under which he was required to notify his clients 
and the courts in which he was counsel of record of his suspension 
and provide a sworn affidavit to the Bar listing those who were 
notified. 
Murtha did not notify the courts in at least three separate 
cases in which he was counsel of record.  The Court held Murtha in 
contempt for his noncompliance with the suspension order, and on 
October 16, 2017, suspended him from the practice of law for one 
additional year.  Fla. Bar v. Murtha, No. SC17-1452, 2017 WL 
4585663 (Fla. Oct. 16, 2017). 
 
On November 6, 2019, Murtha filed a petition for 
reinstatement.  This is Murtha’s third petition for reinstatement; he 
voluntarily dismissed two prior petitions.  See Fla. Bar re Murtha, 
No. SC17-988, 2017 WL 5898506 (Fla. Nov. 30, 2017); Fla. Bar re 
 
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Murtha, No. SC18-1737, 2019 WL 2587841 (Fla. Jun. 24, 2019).  
Murtha’s petition now before us was referred to a referee, who, over 
the Bar’s objections, ordered the Bar and Murtha to engage in 
formal civil mediation.  In ordering mediation, the referee noted that 
the Bar could agree to stipulate to the issue of reinstatement and 
fully resolve the case.  Alternatively, the referee hoped that 
mediation would facilitate the Bar and Murtha agreeing to narrow 
any issues in contention before the final hearing.  The mediation 
resulted in a joint pretrial statement wherein Murtha and the Bar 
stipulated to the admissibility of exhibits and agreed on certain 
mitigation but there was no agreement on the issue of disqualifying 
conduct or as to reinstatement. 
After mediation, the referee held a final hearing and submitted 
a report recommending that Murtha’s petition be granted and that 
he be reinstated to the practice of law.  The referee found that there 
was no evidence that Murtha engaged in the practice of law during 
his suspension and that he had proven his rehabilitation and 
fitness to resume the practice of law by clear and convincing 
evidence, which outweighed any evidence of potentially 
disqualifying conduct.  The referee indicated that the underlying 
 
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misconduct for which Murtha was suspended was due to his 
“sloppy” procedures in running his law practice of debt collection 
and business litigation and in handling his personal finances.  This 
sloppiness stemmed from stress, anxiety, and depression related to 
Murtha’s wife having suffered a serious medical condition, his 
mother-in-law having suffered a serious medical issue that resulted 
in her death, and a friend having recently died.  The referee also 
noted that the witnesses who testified at the final hearing, including 
the original complaining witness, had positive interactions with 
Murtha.  He was described as a “pleasant, personable, and 
knowledgeable attorney” who positively contributed to his 
community and is remorseful for his misconduct.  Further, the 
referee highlighted that Murtha did not misappropriate client funds 
for personal gain but instead was merely “sloppy” with record 
keeping. 
Beyond these limited findings of fact, the referee’s report did 
not directly address the elements of rehabilitation in rule 3-
7.10(f)(3), other than to say that they were met.  Nor did the referee 
address the Bar’s allegations that Murtha engaged in disqualifying 
 
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conduct,1 other than to note that Murtha’s evidence of 
rehabilitation outweighed any such conduct. 
 
The referee recommended that Murtha be reinstated 
conditioned on an eighteen-month probationary period, requiring 
Murtha to comply with seven conditions during that time.  The 
conditions were:  (1) not writing or depositing checks for his law 
practice; (2) hiring a CPA to review his accounts every two months; 
(3) having the CPA report to the Bar any violations and prepare any 
tax returns; (4) completing five CLE credits each month starting 
October 1, 2020, focused on trust accounting or mental health 
issues; (5) meeting with a licensed mental health counselor at least 
twice a month and filing of a monthly notice of compliance; (6) 
giving a presentation once a month, starting in October 2020, to 
other Florida lawyers about failing to seek treatment for depression 
and anxiety and filing a monthly notice of compliance; and (7) 
 
 
1.  The Bar claimed that while suspended, Murtha engaged in 
the following conduct which the Bar argued was disqualifying under 
rule 3-7.10(f)(1): misconduct in employment; financial 
irresponsibility; neglect of professional obligations; violation of an 
order of a court; and evidence of mental or emotional instability.  
The specific instances of disqualifying misconduct are discussed 
below. 
 
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agreeing that any violation of these terms would allow the Bar to 
seek additional discipline from this Court.  Since the referee 
directed in his report that these conditions start in October 2020, 
rather than upon approval by the Court, Murtha has filed multiple 
notices with the Court stating his compliance with the conditions.  
The Bar seeks review of the referee’s findings and recommendation 
that Murtha be reinstated, raising two issues. 
II 
First, the Bar argues that the referee erred in ordering formal 
civil mediation prior to the final hearing in this reinstatement 
proceeding.  The Bar asks this Court to make clear that formal civil 
mediation is inappropriate in Bar proceedings.  We conclude that 
the referee’s order of civil mediation in this case was inappropriate 
and merely delayed the proceedings.  We decline at this time to 
address whether formal civil mediation is appropriate in any Bar 
proceeding. 
Rule 3-7.10 governs the procedures for reinstatement of a 
lawyer who is ineligible to practice law due to a court-ordered 
disciplinary suspension of ninety-one days or more.  Rule 3-7.10(d) 
provides that after the suspended lawyer files a petition for 
 
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reinstatement, the chief justice refers the petition to a referee for 
hearing.  Rule 3-7.10(f) states that the “referee to whom the petition 
for reinstatement is referred must conduct the hearing as a trial” 
and the “referee must decide the fitness of the petitioner to resume 
the practice of law.”  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.10(f) (emphasis 
added).  The rule’s use of the word “must” makes clear that the 
referee’s discretion is restrained and that he or she is required to 
conduct a hearing and decide the fitness of the petitioner. 
The exception to the requirement for a formal hearing is that 
the Bar can stipulate to the issue of reinstatement in a summary 
procedure.  Such a stipulation can occur only if “after the 
completion of discovery bar counsel is unable to discover any 
evidence on which denial of reinstatement may be based.”  R. 
Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.10(g)(4). 
Here, according to the record, the referee believed that the Bar 
could stipulate to the issue of Murtha’s reinstatement.  However, 
because there was evidence of disqualification on which the denial 
of reinstatement could be based, the Bar did not in fact have that 
authority.  Thus, the referee erred in referring the Bar and Murtha 
to civil mediation, since the referee was required to hold a final 
 
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hearing and to make a determination on Murtha’s fitness to return 
to the practice of law.  Because the case could not be “settled” in a 
mediation proceeding and any narrowing of issues required might 
have occurred before the referee, civil mediation was inappropriate 
in this case.  As to the joint pretrial stipulation, the Bar routinely 
makes such agreements without being ordered to formal mediation. 
The Bar asks the Court to reject the use of civil mediation in 
all Bar proceedings.  However, since rule 3-7.6(f)(1) states that the 
Rules of Civil Procedure apply to Bar proceedings except as 
otherwise provided, and civil mediation is not prohibited elsewhere 
in the rule, the issue of whether civil mediation should be 
prohibited in Bar cases would be more appropriately addressed 
through a rule change.  Therefore, we will separately refer the issue 
to the Bar for consideration. 
 
The Bar also argues that, since Murtha has engaged in 
disqualifying conduct while suspended, he has not demonstrated 
that he has been rehabilitated.  The Bar contends, therefore, that 
the referee’s report and recommendation that Murtha be reinstated 
should be disapproved and the petition should be denied.  We agree 
with the Bar. 
 
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A petitioner seeking reinstatement to the Bar must establish 
by clear and convincing evidence that he or she has satisfied the 
criteria in rule 3-7.10.  Under rule 3-7.10(f), a referee must 
determine a petitioner’s fitness to resume the practice of law.  “In 
making this determination, the referee will consider whether the 
petitioner has engaged in any disqualifying conduct, the character 
and fitness of the petitioner, and whether the petitioner has been 
rehabilitated . . . .”  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.10(f).  Specific 
categories of disqualifying conduct are set out in the rule, as well as 
factors to be considered in assigning weight and significance to 
prior conduct and specific “elements of rehabilitation.”  R. 
Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.10(f)(1)-(3). 
 
Before this Court, “the party seeking review of the referee’s 
recommendation has the burden to demonstrate that the report is 
erroneous, unlawful, or unjustified.”  Fla. Bar re Dunagan, 775 So. 
2d 959, 961 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Fla. Bar re Grusmark, 662 So. 2d 
1235, 1236 (Fla. 1995)).  With “regard to the referee’s legal 
conclusions and recommendations, the Court’s scope of review is 
wider because we have the ultimate responsibility to enter the 
appropriate judgment.”  Id. (quoting Grusmark, 662 So. 2d at 1236).  
 
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Here, since the referee is recommending that Murtha has met the 
criteria and should be reinstated, the burden is on the Bar to 
demonstrate that the referee’s report is erroneous, unlawful, or 
unjustified. 
We find that the Bar has met that burden.  Without 
referencing rule 3-7.10(f), the referee concluded in his report that 
Murtha had satisfied all the elements for reinstatement.  The referee 
found that Murtha had proven “his rehabilitation and his fitness to 
resume the practice of law” by “clear and convincing evidence that 
outweighs any evidence of potentially disqualifying conduct.”  
Despite this legal conclusion, the referee does not specifically 
address the disqualifying conduct alleged by the Bar or provide any 
analysis as to how the evidence of rehabilitation outweighs the 
disqualifying conduct. 
At the final hearing, the Bar presented evidence of 
disqualifying conduct that occurred while Murtha was suspended.  
In violation of rule 3-7.10(f)(1)(D), misconduct in employment, while 
suspended, Murtha failed to provide quarterly reports as required 
by rule 3-6.1(e) based on his drafting of legal complaints and 
conducting legal research for cases for his brother’s law firm.  
 
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Although Murtha initially filed the reports, he stopped doing so 
because he did not believe that the work he was providing for his 
brother necessitated the continued filing of reports. 
Further, under rule 3-7.10(f)(1)(G), financial irresponsibly, 
Murtha filed late and incorrect tax returns during the period of 
suspension.  Murtha did not hire a CPA to prepare his taxes; 
instead, he used TurboTax and appears to have neglected to report 
income from his law firm on his personal taxes and filed incorrect 
forms for his law firm.  Murtha claimed he was advised that he did 
not need to file based on his level of income, and that his tax 
returns “looked okay,” but no one testified at the final hearing that 
they advised Murtha on his taxes.  Murtha’s tax forms were not, in 
fact, “okay.”  Especially in light of the condition of his suspension 
requiring regular consultation with a CPA, prudence would have 
dictated that he obtain the advice of a professional. 
Additionally, while suspended, Murtha left his operating 
account overdrawn for 524 days, which resulted in bank fees of 
approximately $18,000.  Compounding the imprudence reflected in 
having managed his affairs this way is the fact that he was 
 
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overdrawn by approximately $1,500, less than a tenth of the 
amount in fees he ultimately incurred. 
This conduct occurred well into Murtha’s suspension, and 
even after he had previously petitioned for reinstatement.  As the 
Bar correctly argues, this behavior does not demonstrate that 
Murtha has been rehabilitated and since the underlying misconduct 
that caused the original suspension was financial in nature, this 
factor “weighs especially heavy here because this same weakness 
caused or contributed to the conduct that led to [Petitioner’s] 
suspension in the first place.”  Fla. Bar re Wolf, 21 So. 3d 15, 18 
(Fla. 2009). 
Moreover, despite having been suspended in November 2016, 
Murtha continued to make deposits and write checks from his trust 
account until at least February 2017, and he did not arrange for an 
inventory attorney.  Funds remained in his trust account until 
September 2019, long after they should have been disbursed.  
Murtha claims that he was unaware that he was violating the 
suspension order by continuing to use his trust account and was 
unaware that he needed to hire an inventory attorney.  All members 
of the Bar are “within the jurisdiction and subject to the 
 
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disciplinary authority” of this Court and are “charged with notice 
and held to know the provisions of this rule and the standards of 
ethical and professional conduct prescribed by this court.”  R. 
Regulating Fla. Bar 3-4.1.  As mentioned above, this factor weighs 
heavily because trust accounting irregularities were part of the 
original underlying misconduct. 
All these violations of the suspension order refute the referee’s 
assertion that all of the elements for reinstatement have been met. 
For this reason, we find the referee’s recommendation lacks a basis 
in the rules and existing case law.  See Wolf, 21 So. 3d at 18 
(denying reinstatement of a lawyer who practiced law while under 
suspension and was financially irresponsible); Fla. Bar re Shores, 
587 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 1991) (same).  While suspended, Murtha used 
his trust account, did not file the required quarterly reports of the 
legal work performed for his brother’s firm, mismanaged his 
operating account, and self-filed late and incorrect tax forms that 
have not been corrected.  Accordingly, Murtha has failed to 
demonstrate that he has been rehabilitated and the referee’s 
conclusion in opposition is not supported by the record. 
 
 
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III 
The referee’s recommendation is disapproved.  Brian John 
Murtha’s petition for reinstatement is hereby denied.  Judgment is 
entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, 
Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Brian John Murtha, 
in the amount of $9,951.96, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, 
COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
Brett Alan Geer of The Geer Law Firm, L.C., Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff 
Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, and Daniel James 
Quinn, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Orlando, Florida; and Chris 
W. Altenbernd of Banker Lopez Gassler P.A., Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent