Title: Commonwealth v. Medina
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12987
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 9, 2021

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SJC-12987 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  VICTOR MEDINA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 8, 2021. - June 9, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Probation, Revocation of 
probation, Double jeopardy.  Constitutional Law, Sentence, 
Double jeopardy, Sex offender.  Due Process of Law, 
Sentence, Probation revocation, Sex offender.  Sex 
Offender.  Practice, Civil, Sex offender, Civil commitment. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 20, 2006. 
 
A motion to dismiss a notice of alleged probation 
violation, filed on April 24, 2018, was heard by William F. 
Sullivan, J., and a proceeding for revocation of probation was 
heard by Robert N. Tochka, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Jason M. Stelmack for the defendant. 
Kathryn Sherman, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
BUDD, C.J.  The defendant, Victor Medina, pleaded guilty to 
indecent assault and battery on a child and received a sentence 
that included two separate periods of incarceration, the latter 
of which was to be suspended for three years during which time 
the defendant would serve probation.  After serving the first 
incarceration period, the defendant spent eight years confined 
to the Massachusetts Treatment Center (treatment center) as a 
sexually dangerous person (SDP).  See G. L. c. 123A, §§ 1, 14.  
Upon his release from confinement, he began serving the 
probation phase of his sentence.  Approximately one year later, 
he was found to have violated conditions of his probation.  His 
probation was revoked, and he was required to serve the portion 
of his sentence that previously had been suspended. 
The defendant now appeals from a denial of his motion to 
dismiss the revocation proceedings, arguing, as he did in his 
motion to dismiss, that his probationary term was meant to begin 
immediately upon the completion of the first incarceration phase 
of his sentence, during his confinement as a sexually dangerous 
person, and that it therefore should have terminated prior to 
the occurrence of the violations.1  We affirm the denial of the 
defendant's motion. 
 
1 The defendant does not otherwise challenge the finding 
that he violated his probation. 
3 
 
 
 
Background.  The defendant was indicted on four counts of 
rape of a child with force, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 22A.  
Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pleaded guilty to four counts 
of the lesser included offense of indecent assault and battery 
on a child under fourteen, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13B.2  
In return, the Commonwealth agreed to join the defendant in 
making a sentencing recommendation to the judge as follows:  on 
the first two counts, the defendant would serve concurrent two-
year terms of imprisonment; and, on the third and fourth counts, 
the defendant would receive concurrent two-year terms of 
imprisonment to be suspended for three years, during which time 
he was to serve a term of probation pursuant to a series of 
special conditions largely focused on preventing his contact 
with children.3 
At the change of plea and sentencing hearing, the judge 
reviewed the recommended sentence with the defendant.  The judge 
 
2 Certain portions of the record indicate that the defendant 
instead pleaded guilty to indecent assault and battery on a 
person fourteen years or older in violation of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13H.  We assume that is an error; however, our decision does 
not hinge on the crimes to which he pleaded guilty. 
 
 
3 The special conditions prohibited the defendant from 
contacting his victims or their families, residing with children 
under the age of sixteen, being employed in a position where he 
would have contact with children under the age of sixteen, doing 
volunteer work or coming into contact with children under the 
age of sixteen, and having unsupervised contact with children 
under the age of sixteen.  The defendant also was required to 
undergo counselling as directed by the probation department. 
4 
 
 
advised the defendant of the rights he would forgo by pleading 
guilty, and informed him of the potential consequences of his 
plea, including that the Commonwealth could petition to have him 
civilly committed to the treatment center as an SDP for an 
indeterminate period of time pursuant to G. L. c. 123A.4  The 
judge accepted and imposed the disposition jointly recommended 
by the parties. 
One month before the defendant was due to complete his 
sentences on the first two counts and be released from 
incarceration, the Commonwealth petitioned to have him declared 
to be an SDP.  After a hearing, the defendant was found to be 
sexually dangerous and was committed to the treatment center.  
See G. L. c. 123A, § 14.  During his time at the treatment 
center, the defendant consistently informed qualified examiners 
(i.e., psychiatrists or psychologists who periodically examined 
him for purposes of assessing his sexual dangerousness) that he 
expected, intended, and was preparing to serve his three-year 
probationary term upon his release to the community.  Eight 
years after his initial SDP commitment, the defendant 
successfully petitioned for discharge from the treatment center.  
See G. L. c. 123A, § 9.  Upon his release, he immediately 
 
4 Indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen, 
G. L. c. 265, § 13B, is a predicate "sexual offense" for 
purposes of the sexually dangerous person (SDP) statute.  See 
G. L. c. 123A, § 1. 
5 
 
 
reported to the probation department and began serving his 
probationary term on the third and fourth counts. 
 
Approximately one year later, a notice of surrender was 
filed, alleging that the defendant had violated conditions of 
his probation, including by contacting one of his victims and 
that victim's family members.  Several months after the initial 
surrender hearing, the defendant filed the subject motion to 
dismiss the probation violation proceedings, wherein he took the 
position for the first time that his probation actually was 
supposed to have commenced upon the completion of his term of 
imprisonment on the first two counts and that it therefore 
should have terminated during his confinement at the treatment 
center, well before the time of the alleged violations.  The 
motion was denied.  After a subsequent hearing, the defendant 
was found to have violated his probation and was ordered to 
serve the previously suspended period of incarceration on the 
third and fourth counts.  The defendant appealed from the denial 
of his motion to dismiss, and we granted his application for 
direct appellate review. 
Discussion.  1.  Commencement of probationary term.  "When 
construing a sentencing order we look to the intent of the 
judge."  Commonwealth v. Bruzzese, 437 Mass. 606, 615 (2002).  
Where, as here, the record consists entirely of documentary 
6 
 
 
evidence, our review of the motion judge's decision is de novo.  
See Commonwealth v. Mazza, 484 Mass. 539, 547 (2020). 
The Appeals Court has had occasion to consider an appeal 
that similarly involved a defendant's claim that his sentence of 
probation, imposed "from and after any sentence [he] is now 
serving," commenced immediately upon the completion of his 
incarceration, even though he remained civilly committed to the 
treatment center as an SDP.  See Commonwealth v. Sheridan, 51 
Mass. App. Ct. 74, 75 (2001).  The court concluded that the 
sentencing judge intended for the defendant's probation to 
commence upon the defendant's release into the community, i.e., 
after his civil confinement, rather than immediately upon his 
release from incarceration.  Id. at 77. 
In Sheridan, the Appeals Court emphasized that probation 
has a dual purpose:  "rehabilitation of the probationer and 
protection of the public."  Id. at 76, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Power, 420 Mass. 410, 414 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1042 
(1996).  The court observed that probation "allows a criminal 
offender to remain in the community subject to certain 
conditions and under the supervision of the court."  Sheridan, 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 111 
(1990).  It further noted that the ultimate goal is for the 
probationer to "rehabilitate himself or herself under the 
7 
 
 
supervision of the probation officer."  Sheridan, supra at 77, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Olsen, 405 Mass. 491, 493 (1989). 
The Appeals Court went on to conclude that because the 
sentencing judge imposed the probation to follow the defendant's 
incarceration, the judge "clear[ly] . . . intended the defendant 
to be supervised by a probation officer at the time he was 
released from custody and returned to the community."  Sheridan, 
supra.  The court further concluded that "the fact that the 
defendant's release to the community was delayed because of an 
intervening civil commitment did not change the sentencing 
judge's intent to have the defendant supervised upon his release 
from custody."  Id.  Ultimately, the court concluded that 
serving probation while confined in a secure facility nullifies 
the goals of probation, i.e., "rehabilitation under the 
supervision of a probation officer" and "protection of society."  
Id. 
We cited Sheridan with approval over a decade ago, see 
Commonwealth v. Bunting, 458 Mass. 569, 570 n.3, 571 n.5 (2010), 
and continue to find its reasoning persuasive.  By its nature, 
probation is meant to be served while a probationer is living in 
the community.  See Durling, 407 Mass. at 111.  Thus, absent a 
clear indication to the contrary, we assume that when a judge 
sentences a defendant to probation following (e.g., "from and 
after" or "on and after") a term of incarceration, he or she 
8 
 
 
intends that the probationary term be served upon the 
defendant's release into the community.5  See Bunting, supra at 
573 ("when a defendant has been sentenced to incarceration to be 
followed 'from and after' by a sentence of probation, if the 
defendant is to be held accountable for compliance with any of 
the conditions of the probationary sentence during the period of 
incarceration and before the probationary term has commenced, he 
must be so notified"). 
The defendant argues that, here, the sentencing judge made 
his intention clear regarding the timing of the probationary 
period because the judge was aware of the possibility that the 
 
5 In Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 664 (2019), 
which addressed this same issue, the Appeals Court came to a 
different conclusion.  Focusing solely on the language used at 
sentencing, the court determined that because the defendant was 
ordered to begin his probation "from and after the release from 
incarceration on [a particular offense]," the judge intended 
that the defendant begin probation upon his release from 
incarceration rather than upon his release from the treatment 
center (which was approximately ten years later).  Id. at 665-
668.  The court suggested that the result might have been 
different if the sentencing judge "had said explicitly that 
probation did not commence until release to the community."  Id. 
at 668 n.6. 
 
We take the opposite view; that is, given the purpose and 
goals of probation, we presume that if a judge intends for a 
term of probation to be served regardless of whether the 
defendant has been released into the community, he or she would 
make that clear.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 453 Mass. 474, 480 
(2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Juzba, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 457, 
459 (1998) (although judges are "'not barred from placing a 
defendant on probation during the period of his incarceration,' 
there must be evidence that the judge in fact did so"). 
9 
 
 
defendant could be committed as an SDP, yet did not order that 
the probationary term be stayed during any such commitment.  The 
defendant points to the docket and clerk's log, both of which 
indicate that the probationary term was to be served "from and 
after" the "sentence" on the first count, as unambiguous 
evidence of that intent.  We are not convinced. 
First, the transcript reveals that the issue was not raised 
by either of the parties at the change of plea and sentencing 
hearing, nor was it referenced by the judge at the time of 
sentencing.  At the outset, the prosecutor described the joint 
recommendation, stating, "The first two indictments the 
Commonwealth recommends two years direct to the house, and with 
regard to the latter two indictments, we are recommending two 
years to the house of correction, suspended for three years with 
six special conditions."  The judge then reviewed that 
recommendation with the defendant: 
Q.:  "So two years in the house of correction to serve?" 
 
A.:  "Yes, sir." 
 
Q.:  "And then . . . on [the third and fourth counts], two 
years in the house of correction, suspended for a period of 
three years, and that you be placed on probation for that 
period of time with the conditions of probation." 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the clerk pronounced the 
sentences on the third and fourth counts as follows:  "[Y]ou are 
10 
 
 
sentenced to the [house of correction] for two years on each 
case.  That two years is suspended, and you are ordered on 
probation for three years." 
The potential for civil commitment was raised by the judge, 
but only in the context of making sure the defendant understood 
that that was one of the possible consequences of his guilty 
plea.6  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c) (3) (A) (ii) (b), 12 (d) (3) 
(A) (ii) (b), 378 Mass. 866 (1979).  In addition, the special 
conditions attached to the probationary term were of the sort 
that are usually imposed to regulate the behavior of a 
probationer who is living in the community.  See Commonwealth v. 
Howard, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 757, 761 (2012) (conditions of 
probation imposed by sentencing judge, including prohibiting 
unsupervised contact with minors, further evidenced judge's 
intention for defendant to be subject to probation upon release 
from treatment center into community).  Regardless, as discussed 
supra, if the intent had been for any of those conditions to 
apply before the defendant was released to the community, due 
process would have required that to be explicitly stated for the 
 
6 Importantly, at the time of sentencing in this case, SDP 
proceedings had not been initiated against the defendant and, 
thus, were not a certainty.  See Commonwealth v. Roberts, 472 
Mass. 355, 363 (2015) ("Civil confinement as a sexually 
dangerous person, although tangentially connected to the 
criminal process, is not a 'virtually mandatory' consequence of 
a sexual offense conviction"). 
11 
 
 
defendant's own benefit.  See Bunting, 458 Mass. at 573.  See 
also Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 453 Mass. 474, 475, 484 (2009) 
(defendant sentenced to "from and after" term of probation could 
not be held to have violated condition prohibiting contact with 
victim during incarceration phase of sentence where defendant 
did not receive "clear notice" that condition was in effect at 
that time). 
Sentencing judges understand the purposes of probation.  
See Sheridan, 51 Mass. App. Ct. at 76-77.  We see no indication 
in the record that the judge here had any other intention than 
for the defendant's three-year probationary term to commence 
upon his release to the community, whenever that release 
occurred.  See id. at 77 (release delayed by intervening SDP 
commitment found not to alter judge's intent regarding 
probationary supervision in community). 
We also are mindful of the defendant's own acts and 
omissions, which are relevant given that his sentence was 
imposed pursuant to a joint recommendation.  Despite being aware 
of the potential for an SDP commitment, the defendant did not 
insist as part of the joint recommendation that his probation 
run during any subsequent civil commitment.7  In addition, at no 
 
7 The Sheridan decision had been issued approximately six 
years prior to the defendant's change of plea.  Thus, if he 
truly wanted his probation to run immediately upon his release 
12 
 
 
point during his civil commitment did he report to the probation 
department or insist that his probation commence.  To the 
contrary, he repeatedly stated during his time at the treatment 
center that he would be serving three years of probation upon 
his release to the community.  Accordingly, upon his release 
from the treatment center, the defendant reported to the 
probation department and began to serve his probationary term.  
It would not be until months after he was charged with violating 
conditions of his probation that the defendant would take the 
position he now espouses.  In short, the defendant's words and 
conduct reflect his own understanding of the terms of his 
sentence, i.e., that his probation was intended to commence upon 
his release to the community.8 
 
2.  Legality of delay.  The defendant contends that for 
multiple reasons, regardless of the intention of the sentencing 
 
from incarceration, the defendant was on notice that he should 
have raised the issue with the court. 
 
8 In opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss, the 
Commonwealth argued that the defendant was estopped from arguing 
that his probationary term was intended to run during his SDP 
commitment because he had taken the opposite position before the 
jury at the trial on his petition for discharge from the 
treatment center.  See G. L. c. 123A, § 9.  The motion judge 
noted the inconsistencies in the positions the defendant 
adopted, but did not conclude expressly that judicial estoppel 
should apply.  On appeal, the parties agree that there is an 
insufficient basis for determining what position the defendant 
took at that trial and whether judicial estoppel should apply 
because the transcript from that trial has not been included in 
the record.  We therefore need not reach this issue. 
13 
 
 
judge, the delay in the start of his probation due to his civil 
commitment for an indeterminate period of time resulted in an 
illegal sentence.  We do not agree. 
a.  Double jeopardy.  The defendant first contends that a 
failure to commence his probation once he was committed as an 
SDP for an indeterminate period of time violated the prohibition 
against double jeopardy by increasing the severity of his 
original sentence9 and interfering with his right to finality.10  
This argument fails. 
 
We begin by noting that the guarantee against double 
jeopardy applies only to criminal punishment.  See Hill, 
petitioner, 422 Mass. 147, 152, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 867 
(1996).  Commitment to the treatment center is meant to 
rehabilitate one who has been declared to be sexually dangerous, 
not to punish him or her.  See Commonwealth v. Curran, 478 Mass. 
630, 637 (2018) (Kafker, J., concurring).  Because civil 
commitment for sexual dangerousness occurs as a result of, not 
punishment for, certain sexual offenses, the principles of 
 
9 In addition to protecting against a second prosecution for 
the same offense, the prohibition against double jeopardy 
protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.  Luk 
v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 415, 419 (1995). 
 
 
10 "The constitutional prohibition against placing a 
defendant twice in jeopardy represents a constitutional policy 
of finality for the defendant's benefit in criminal proceedings" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Aldoupolis v. Commonwealth, 
386 Mass. 260, 274, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 864 (1982). 
14 
 
 
double jeopardy do not apply.  Hill, petitioner, supra at 151-
154.  See Luk v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 415, 422 (1995) 
("Double jeopardy is not implicated if the sanctions can be 
entirely explained by a nonpunitive purpose").  Thus, the fact 
that the defendant was declared to be sexually dangerous and 
consequently civilly committed to the treatment center, thereby 
delaying the probationary portion of his criminal sentence, does 
not implicate his double jeopardy rights. 
In any case, contrary to the defendant's claim, the delay 
in the start of his probation did not amount to an "eight-year 
extension" of his original probationary sentence.11  As discussed 
supra, the three-year probationary portion of his sentence was 
intended to, and did, commence upon his release into the 
community.  Although the defendant's probation was delayed by 
his SDP commitment, he nevertheless received the same punishment 
that he and the Commonwealth jointly recommended, and that the 
sentencing judge imposed.  No additional conditions, severe or 
otherwise, were added after the fact.  See Commonwealth v. 
Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11, 12 (2010) (absent violation of condition, 
judge may add or modify conditions that increase scope of 
 
 
11 The defendant also refers, at times, to the probationary 
period as having been "stayed" during his civil commitment.  
This, too, is inaccurate, as no judge affirmatively intervened 
to adjust the defendant's sentence when he was committed to the 
treatment center. 
15 
 
 
original probation only where there has been material change in 
probationer's circumstances and added or modified conditions are 
not so punitive as to significantly increase severity of 
original probation).  The defendant, therefore, was not 
subjected to a punishment more severe than that for which he 
bargained.12 
 
 
12 The defendant also argues that because there was no 
mention at the time of sentencing of the potential for a delay 
in the commencement of his probation due to any subsequent SDP 
commitment, he was somehow deprived of the right to withdraw his 
guilty plea, see Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c) (4) (B), 378 Mass. 866 
(1979) (judge must give defendant notice and opportunity to 
withdraw change of plea if sentence will exceed terms of joint 
recommendation), or subsequently to file a motion to revise or 
revoke his sentence on those grounds, see Mass. R. Crim. P. 
29 (a), 378 Mass. 899 (1979) (motion to revise or revoke must be 
filed within sixty days after imposition of sentence).  This 
argument ignores the fact that the defendant, jointly with the 
Commonwealth, recommended the sentence he received, and that he 
was apprised of the possibility of being declared an SDP and 
being committed to the treatment center for an indeterminate 
period of time.  Prior to his guilty pleas, therefore, the 
defendant possessed the information he needed to question 
whether commitment as an SDP would affect the commencement of 
the probationary portion of his sentence and to take any 
resulting action, be it withdrawing his guilty pleas or 
otherwise. 
 
This argument also ignores the fact that once the defendant 
realized that his probation had not commenced during his 
commitment to the treatment center, he failed to move to correct 
his sentence on the basis that it violated double jeopardy 
principles.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a), as appearing in 435 
Mass. 1501 (2001) (allowing for filing of motion to correct 
sentence then being served upon ground it was imposed in 
violation of Constitution or laws of United States or 
Commonwealth).  See also Commonwealth v. Azar, 444 Mass. 72, 76–
77 (2005) (defendant serving probation on suspended sentence can 
file rule 30 [a] motion to challenge legality of sentence).  We 
note that doing so would have allowed the sentencing judge to 
16 
 
 
Similarly, the finality of the defendant's sentence was not 
affected by his civil commitment.  The defendant was sentenced 
to probation for a period of three years; the length of his 
probation never changed.  Had he adhered to its terms, his 
probation would have terminated three years from the time it 
commenced, regardless of when it commenced.  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Selavka, 469 Mass. 502, 506 (2014) (although 
judge may correct sentence by imposing statutorily required 
global positioning system monitoring, he or she may not do so 
one year after sentence was imposed where defendant already had 
served entire period of incarceration and had legitimate 
expectation of finality in sentence as initially imposed). 
 
b.  Due process.  The defendant contends (for the first 
time on appeal) that the eight-year delay in the commencement of 
his probation also violated his constitutional rights to due 
process and fundamental fairness.  This argument fairs no 
better.  The cases to which he cites to support his claim, 
 
vacate any illegal portions of the sentence (had there been any) 
and restructure the entire sentencing scheme on the third and 
fourth counts.  See Commonwealth v. Sallop, 472 Mass. 568, 570 
(2015) (judge not merely obligated to vacate illegal portion of 
sentence, but also permitted to restructure over-all sentence, 
provided new sentence does not violate double jeopardy).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Cumming, 466 Mass. 467, 471 (2013) 
(defendant "does not have a reasonable expectation of finality 
in any one part or element of [an interdependent] bundle of 
sentences, but rather, in the entirety of the scheme" [citation 
omitted]). 
17 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Vith Ly, 450 Mass. 16 (2007), and Commonwealth 
v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 506 (2000), are inapposite. 
In Vith Ly, 450 Mass. at 16, a defendant's State prison 
sentences had been stayed pending an appeal that the defendant 
ultimately lost.  Due to an error, the stay was not lifted 
following the appeal, and the Commonwealth did not seek to 
execute the sentences until sixteen years later.  Id. at 16-17.  
After reviewing "the totality of the defendant's circumstances 
over [those] sixteen years," id. at 21, this court "conclude[d] 
that requiring the defendant to serve his sentences, at [that] 
point in time and on [those] facts, would violate the concept of 
fundamental fairness that is at the core of due process," Id. at 
22.  In so doing, the court noted that "[i]t is a basic 
principle that a defendant sentenced to incarceration has a due 
process right to serve the sentence promptly and continuously."  
Id. (execution of sentence must be "pursued with reasonable 
diligence"). 
In McLaughlin, 431 Mass. at 507, the defendant was found 
guilty of involuntary manslaughter and arson, but not criminally 
responsible of murder in the first degree.  At sentencing, the 
judge stayed the defendant's State prison sentences on the 
involuntary manslaughter and arson convictions until his release 
from his civil commitment to Bridgewater State Hospital.  Id. at 
514.  Without addressing any constitutional questions, this 
18 
 
 
court held that the "stay was unwarranted" because there were no 
"exceptional" circumstances to justify straying from the "basic 
rule" that "[s]entences are to be executed forthwith" (citation 
omitted).  Id. at 514, 520. 
 
In contrast to both Vith Ly and McLaughlin, here, as 
discussed supra, the defendant's sentence was delayed by an 
intervening event that was unrelated to his criminal sentence in 
order to realize the intent of the sentencing judge.  See 
Sheridan, 51 Mass. App. Ct. at 77-78 ("The defendant did not 
suffer any adverse consequence with respect to his liberty due 
to the delayed commencement of his probation sentence, because 
[during the delay] he was still committed to the treatment 
center as a sexually dangerous person").  In addition, unlike in 
Vith Ly and McLaughlin, the portion of the defendant's sentence 
that is at issue here is probation, not incarceration.  The 
question is whether, in the totality of the circumstances, it 
was fundamentally unfair to delay the commencement of the 
defendant's probationary term until he was released from the 
treatment center to the community.  Having considered the 
purposes and goals of probation, as well as the "special" 
probation conditions the defendant bargained for, all as 
discussed supra, we conclude that it was not.13 
 
 
13 The defendant also asserts that permitting a period of 
probation to commence after his release from his SDP confinement 
19 
 
 
 
Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's motion to 
dismiss, and the finding that he violated conditions of his 
probation, are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
violates the equal protection clause because he was treated 
differently, on the basis of his mental condition (i.e., his 
sexual dangerousness), from defendants who receive similar 
sentences for similar crimes, but are not committed to the 
treatment center.  This claim, raised for the first time on 
appeal, is contained in a single, short, conclusory paragraph 
that lacks legal analysis and thus presents no more than a "bald 
assertion[] of error" (citation omitted).  See Commonwealth v. 
Cassidy, 470 Mass. 201, 209 n.9 (2014).  We therefore decline to 
consider it.  See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 
481 Mass. 1628 (2019).