Title: State ex rel. Williams-Scott v. Penny
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1180700
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 20, 2019

REL: December 20, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1180700
____________________
State ex rel. Shirley Williams-Scott
v.
Eddie Penny
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division
(CV-19-900226)
SELLERS, Justice.
The State of Alabama, on the relation of Shirley
Williams-Scott, appeals from an order entered by the Jefferson
Circuit Court denying Williams-Scott's petition for a writ of
1180700
quo warranto seeking to declare that Eddie Penny does not hold
office as the mayor of the City of Fairfield.  We affirm.
 
Pursuant to Act No. 1991-699 ("the local act"),
Fairfield, which before the 2010 federal census had a
population of over 12,000, has  operated under a mayor-council
form of government; the mayor and council president are
elected at large, and 6 council members are elected from
single-member districts. It appears undisputed that, before
the most recent federal census in 2010, the population of
Fairfield was more than 12,000.  Section 11-43-2(a), Ala. Code
1975, provides:
"[I]n all cities and towns at the general election
to be held on the fourth Tuesday in August, 1984,
and quadrennially thereafter, there shall be elected
a mayor, who, in cities having a population of
12,000 or more according to the last or any
subsequent federal census, shall not sit with the
council nor have a vote in its proceedings, and he
or she shall have the power and duties conferred in
this chapter."
(Emphasis added.)
The 2010 federal census indicated that the population of
Fairfield had dropped below 12,000.  Section 11-43-2(b), Ala.
Code 1975, provides:
"In all cities and towns having a population of less
than 12,000 inhabitants according to the last or any
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subsequent federal census, the legislative functions
shall be exercised by the mayor and five aldermen.
The mayor shall preside over all deliberations of
the council. At his or her discretion he or she may
vote as a member of the council on any question
coming to a vote, except in case of a tie, in which
event he or she must vote."
(Emphasis added.)  Another statutory provision states that,
"[i]n all towns or cities, a majority of the whole number of
members to which such corporation is entitled, including the
mayor in towns and cities of less than 12,000 population,
shall be necessary to constitute a quorum."  § 11-43-48, Ala.
Code 1975. 
In the 2016 election cycle, Ed May II was elected to the
position of mayor of Fairfield, and Penny was elected to the
position of council president.  It is undisputed that May did
not attend any council meetings for 90 consecutive days,
beginning October 1, 2018.1  Section § 11-40-25(b), Ala. Code
1975, provides that "[a]ny elected municipal official who
misses all regular and special called council or commission
1The trial court noted that both May and the council had
received notice of the applicability of § 11-43-2(a) and (b)
via an order in a previous case, dated September 24, 2018, in
which the Jefferson Circuit Court ruled that the council's
ordinance changing the structure of the governing body of
Fairfield to a manager-council form of government was invalid
because then mayor May had not been given an opportunity to
vote on the ordinance as mandated by § 11-43-2(b).   
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meetings for 90 consecutive days, beginning on the date of any
absence, shall be removed from office by operation of law." 
An "elected municipal official" includes "any mayor ...
elected or appointed to municipal office whose presence at
council 
or 
commission 
meetings 
is 
counted 
towards 
establishing
a quorum."  § 11-40-25(a), Ala. Code 1975.
During its January 22, 2019, meeting, the council relied
on the above-referenced statutes to justify approving a
resolution providing that May was removed from the office of
mayor as a matter of law. Penny was subsequently proclaimed
mayor by a vote of the council. 
 Williams-Scott filed a quo warranto action pursuant to
§ 6-6-591(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, seeking a declaration that
Penny did not hold the office of mayor.2  Following a hearing,
the trial court entered an order holding that May had been
removed from the office of mayor by operation of law pursuant
2Section 6-6-591(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, states:
"(a) An action may be commenced in the name of
the state against the party offending in the
following cases:
"(1) When any person usurps, intrudes into or
unlawfully holds or exercises any public office ...
within this state or any office in a corporation
created by the authority of this state ...."
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to § 11-40-25, that Penny lawfully held the office of mayor,
and that a vacancy existed in the office of council president. 
This appeal followed.
 
The facts of this case are undisputed. Therefore, this
Court, applying a de novo standard of review, must determine
whether the trial court misapplied the law to those undisputed
facts.  Kendrick v. Advertiser Co., 213 So. 3d 573 (Ala.
2016). According to Williams-Scott, the local act 
provides for
the composition and election process for the governing body of
Fairfield.  Williams-Scott appears to argue that the local act
requires that the office of mayor be totally independent of
the council and that, therefore, the mayor is prohibited from
voting at or presiding over council meetings.3 To that extent,
Williams-Scott argues that the local act conflicts with § 11-
43-2 and § 11-43-48. Assuming Williams-Scott is correct that,
in the event of a conflict, the local act would control over
3Williams-Scott also asserts that Fairfield is a Class 6
municipality 
operating 
with 
a 
mayor-council form 
of 
government
and that the provisions of § 11-44D-4, Ala. Code 1975, are
applicable in this case. The trial court, however, stated in
its order that § 11-44D-4 was inapplicable to its analysis
because Chapter 44D concerns abandonment of a commission form
of government in Class 6 municipalities.  Williams-Scott does
not sufficiently address that conclusion, so we must accept
the trial court's analysis. 
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the more general statutes, she simply has not demonstrated
that anything in the local act forbids the mayor from
participating 
in 
the 
council's 
legislative 
functions. 
Williams-Scott cites only one section of the local act
establishing that the mayor-council form of government
consists of "six single-member districts with one at-large
member, to be designated as president of the city council,
which shall be in addition to the office of the mayor." 
Accordingly, Williams-Scott has not demonstrated that the
trial court erred in concluding that the local act did not
preclude the mayor from participating with the council in its
legislative functions pursuant to another applicable law such
as § 11-43-2(b).4 
    Williams-Scott argues alternatively that, to the extent
that § 11-43-2 did change the legislative function of the
mayor and the council by requiring the mayor to vote at and
preside over council meetings, the mayor and the council did
not comply with § 11-43-2(c), which, she says, required the
4The 
trial 
court 
specifically concluded that 
§ 
11-43-2 
did
not purport to change the mayor-council form of government;
rather, the trial court concluded, it mandated certain
procedures when Fairfield's population fell below 12,000.
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mayor and the council together to adopt an ordinance, within
30 days of the 2010 federal census, electing to operate
pursuant to § 11-43-2(b).  Even assuming, without deciding,
that Williams-Scott's interpretation of § 11-43-2(c) is
correct, when the  2010 federal census was released,
subsection (c) and its subparts were nonexistent; subsection
(c) was added effective June 1, 2018. In short, Williams-
Scott's argument fails because the revisions made in 2018
could not apply retroactively but are prospective--governing
the form of government based on the results from the 2020
federal census and beyond.5 
As alternative relief, Williams-Scott asserts in a single
paragraph, without any supporting authority or citations to
the record, that any change in the legislative functions of
5Moreover, it appears from the record that counsel for
Williams-Scott conceded at the hearing that subsection (c) was
inapplicable:
"[The court]: See, you're under (c).
"[Counsel for Williams-Scott]: Yes, subsection (c).
"[The court]: I think we can all agree that (c)
doesn't apply.
"[Counsel for Williams-Scott]: Does not apply."
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the mayor and the council predicated on § 11-43-2(b) would be
barred based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. We decline
to consider this argument. See Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App.
P.; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Motley, 909 So.
2d 806 (Ala. 2005).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court
did not err in denying Williams-Scott's petition for a writ of
quo warranto seeking to declare that Penny does not hold
office as mayor of Fairfield.
AFFIRMED. 
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Wise, and Stewart, JJ., concur.
  
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