Title: the Florida Bar v. Robert E. Hughes, Sr.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC01-617
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 2002

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC01-617
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
ROBERT E. HUGHES, SR.,
Respondent.
[July 11, 2002]
PER CURIAM. 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that Robert E. Hughes,
Sr., be found guilty of indirect criminal contempt for engaging in the unlicensed
practice of law in violation of this Court’s injunction issued in Florida Bar v.
Hughes, 697 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1997), and also recommending that Hughes be
incarcerated for five months.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. 
For the reasons that follow, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and continue to enjoin Hughes from engaging in the unlicensed
1.  Black’s Law Dictionary 1516 (7th ed. 1999) defines an Illinois land trust
as a “land-ownership arrangement by which a trustee holds both legal and equitable
title to land while the beneficiary retains the power to direct the trustee, manage the
property, and draw income from the trust.”  
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practice of law, but we modify the referee’s recommended sentence.  
FACTS
The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Hughes alleging that he has
continued to engage in the unlicensed practice of law, despite this Court’s 1997
injunction in Hughes.  In that decision, Hughes was enjoined “from counseling,
advising and preparing documents for individuals in the creation and transfer of
land trusts, or from otherwise engaging in the practice of law in Florida until he is
licensed to do so.”  697 So. 2d at 503.  
The referee issued a report in the instant case after conducting proceedings
for indirect criminal contempt according to rule 10-7.2(a)(1) of the Rules Governing
the Investigation and Prosecution of the Unlicensed Practice of Law.  The facts as
found by the referee are as follows:
Hughes admitted knowing that, in July 1997, this Court enjoined him from
counseling, advising, and preparing documents for individuals in the creation and
transfer of land trusts.  However, Hughes considers himself an expert in the Illinois-
type land trust.1  Despite the injunction, Hughes advised others, including Mr. Larry
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Bunting and Mr. Keith Barbour, about land trusts.  Also, Hughes has drafted land
trust forms that he uses to create or transfer land trusts.  Further, Hughes manages
property wherein he either has an interest in the property or he is the trustee under a
land trust agreement, and he buys and sells real estate either as a beneficial owner or
as the trustee.  
The Bunting Property.  Mr. Bunting purchased property from Mr. Angel
Johns, with Bunting providing a mortgage note to Johns.  When Johns died,
attorney Browder represented Johns’ estate, and Bunting made regular mortgage
payments to Browder until a fire destroyed the rental units on the property. 
Browder performed a title search of the property, which revealed that Bunting had
transferred the property by quit claim deed to Hughes as trustee under a land trust. 
Hughes transferred a portion of the property by quit claim deed from the land trust
to another land trust and again listed himself as trustee.  Attorney Browder filed a
foreclosure action on the mortgage note.  He served Hughes with the foreclosure
action as trustee of the land trusts and he also served Bunting because Bunting
signed the mortgage note.  Hughes filed an answer, affirmative defenses, and
counterclaim to the foreclosure action, and a response to a notice to produce. 
Hughes indicated in his pleadings to that action that Bunting had been forced to
employ Hughes to represent the interests of the trust in the litigation.  The referee
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found that in Hughes’ pleadings in the foreclosure action, Hughes alleged
cancellation of the note, concealment, fraud, lack of a note from which to
foreclose, lack of fire insurance, and failure to disclose, and demanded a trial by
jury.  Bunting failed to file an answer and a judgment of default was entered against
him.  Bunting did not answer the foreclosure complaint because he relied upon the
letters that Hughes wrote in response to the foreclosure.  Although Hughes did not
have any ownership interest in Bunting’s property, he prepared and signed
pleadings in defense of the foreclosure action on Bunting’s behalf.
The Barbour Properties.  Mr. Barbour met Hughes in July 1997, the month
this Court issued its decision enjoining Hughes.  At their first meeting, Hughes held
himself out as an expert in land trusts and explained to Barbour how land trusts
could be used.  At their second meeting, Hughes convinced Barbour to use land
trusts when purchasing investment property.  Hughes told Barbour he would take
care of everything and, if there was any litigation or any problems, Hughes would
“represent” Barbour.  Hughes also told Barbour that there were significant tax
benefits to using land trusts.
Barbour relied on Hughes’ advice and agreed to go into business with him. 
From September 1997 to March 1998, Hughes purchased twenty-one properties
for Barbour using land trust agreements.  Hughes found the properties for Barbour,
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attended the closings on his behalf, prepared the land trust agreements, collected
the rents, and made the mortgage payments.  Barbour paid Hughes $3500
commission per property and a yearly $250 trustee fee per property.  In 1999, when
their business relationship deteriorated, Barbour filed a lawsuit against Hughes
seeking to force Hughes to transfer the beneficial interest in the properties back to
Barbour.  
The Behr Property.  In November 1997, Ms. Benita Pagac, a licensed real
estate salesperson, represented Mr. and Mrs. Behr in the sale of their home in
Pinellas Park, Florida.  Pagac received a purchase agreement indicating that Hughes
would purchase the Behrs’ property and transfer it into a land trust.  In her
discussion with Hughes, he held himself out as an expert in land trusts and
explained how the land trust agreement would operate.  Pagac relied on Hughes’
representations regarding land trusts and subsequently recommended to the Behrs
that they enter into a land trust agreement.  Hughes attended the real estate closing
wherein the Behrs entered into a land trust agreement with him.  Hughes then
assigned the Behrs’ interest in the land trust to a corporation owned by Barbour.  
Hughes told Mrs. Behr that he was acting as a trustee to purchase her
property, that he would take over making the payments on the Behrs’ home, and
that in two years everything would be out of their names.  At the closing, Hughes
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told Mrs. Behr that he could represent the Behrs as an attorney if anything ever
happened.  As a result of the land trust agreement with Hughes, Mrs. Behr’s credit
rating dropped drastically and she was denied a second mortgage because the
payments on her Pinellas Park property were not made.
Having made the aforementioned findings of fact, the referee determined that
Hughes was not and is not a member of The Florida Bar and, therefore, he was not
licensed to engage in the practice of law.  Based on these findings, the referee
found Hughes guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of engaging in the unlicensed
practice of law in violation of the injunction.  The referee also found that Hughes
used the designation of trustee as a means to practice law in Florida by engaging in
conduct that included buying, selling, managing, and conveying real property and
representing individuals in legal matters when he was not licensed or otherwise
authorized to do so.  Further, the referee found that the evidence proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that Hughes continued to: counsel, advise, and prepare
documents for individuals in the creation and transfer of land trusts; hold himself
out as an expert in land trust agreements; and allow individuals to rely on him to
prepare legal documents that affected important legal rights.  
The referee recommended that Hughes be sentenced for indirect criminal
contempt of the injunction order of this Court as follows: (1) five months’
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detention in the Pinellas County Jail; (2) payment of a $500 fine; and (3) costs of
the proceeding taxed against Hughes in the amount of $1,923.62.  The referee also
recommended that Hughes be ordered not to engage in the practice of law and that
the injunction enjoining him from engaging in the unlicensed practice of law in
Florida shall continue in its present form.
Hughes petitioned for review, raising three issues: (1) whether the referee
erred by not granting Hughes’ request for a continuance; (2) whether the referee’s
failure to exclude the testimony of several witnesses violated Hughes’ due process
rights; and (3) whether the evidence supports the referee’s finding that Hughes
engaged in the unlicensed practice of law.  Further, we examine the referee’s
recommended sentence.
ANALYSIS
First, Hughes argues that the referee erred by not granting his request for a
continuance.  He claims that if the referee had granted his request, he would have
been able to disprove the charges against him. 
In Florida Bar v. Lipman, 497 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 1986), Lipman argued that
the referee should not have denied his request for a continuance.  In upholding the
referee’s denial of the motion, this Court stated that it is within the sound discretion
of a referee to grant or deny a motion for continuance and that “[s]uch a ruling will
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not be disturbed by this Court absent a clear abuse of discretion.”  Id. at 1167-68.  
Like the attorney in Lipman, Hughes argues that his position might have been
better presented before the referee if he had been given more time.  Lipman filed his
motion for continuance two weeks before the hearing, claiming that he had just
received funds to retain counsel.  In upholding the referee’s decision in Lipman,
this Court held that the “referee’s denial of this eleventh hour motion cannot be said
to constitute a clear abuse of discretion.”  Id. at 1168.  
In the instant case, the Bar filed the petition against the unlicensed practice of
law on March 19, 2001.  On April 12, 2001, this Court ordered Hughes to appear
before the referee at the hearing scheduled for June 15, 2001.  On June 13, 2001,
two days before the hearing, Hughes filed his motion for continuance, which the
referee denied because he concluded that Hughes had waited until the last minute to
retain counsel.  The referee stated that Hughes knew about the hearing since April
2001, and had sufficient time to secure an attorney and discuss the ramifications
involved.  Also, Hughes filed his motion for continuance a mere two days before
the hearing, even closer to the hearing date than Lipman’s “eleventh hour motion.” 
After examining the facts in the instant case and in Lipman, we find that the referee
in the instant case did not abuse his discretion and we uphold his denial of the
motion for continuance.
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Second, Hughes argues that the referee’s failure to exclude the testimony of
several witnesses violated his due process rights.  Hughes claims that the
testimonies of Browder, Bunting, Pagac, and Behr are irrelevant because they have
nothing to do with the petition and that the referee’s consideration of their
testimonies violates due process.  After making these general claims, Hughes does
not supply any facts or arguments to support his position.
In considering Hughes’ arguments, we have reviewed the record and we
conclude that the process under which these proceedings were held did not violate
due process.  In State ex rel. Giblin v. Sullivan, 26 So. 2d 509, 518 (Fla. 1946), this
Court held that due process of law in the prosecution of criminal contempt requires
that the accused be advised of the charge and be given a reasonable opportunity to
meet it by way of defense or explanation, which includes the assistance of counsel,
if requested, and the right to call witnesses to give testimony relevant to the issues. 
These due process requirements were met in the instant case.  
Also, the instant proceeding was held pursuant to rule 10-7.2, which states
that this Court may issue an order directed to a respondent, stating the essential
allegations charged and requiring the respondent to appear before a referee to show
why he or she should not be held in contempt for the unlicensed practice of law.  A
reasonable time must be allowed for the preparation of the defense.  The record in
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the instant case indicates that the procedural due process safeguards required in
rule 10-7.2 were followed.  The Bar filed the petition against the unlicensed practice
of law and prayer for contempt citation on March 19, 2001.  Hughes was served
with an order that stated the essential allegations charged and required him to
appear before the referee to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of
court.  The hearing was held on June 15, 2001.  Because Hughes was given notice
of the charges, a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense, an opportunity to
confront the witnesses against him, and could have presented witnesses on his own
behalf, we find that his due process rights were not violated.  
Hughes also challenges the relevance of the testimonies of these witnesses. 
However, the record demonstrates that the referee only considered those
testimonies as they related to the matters before the referee.  Therefore, we find that
the testimony was relevant for the referee to determine if Hughes’ activities
constituted the unlicensed practice of law. 
Third, Hughes argues that the evidence does not support the referee’s
finding that he engaged in the unlicensed practice of law.  Hughes argues that
Barbour was informed that he needed an attorney and that Barbour actually relied
on an attorney to assist him in trust matters.  Also, Hughes claims that since this
Court’s July 1997 ruling, he has worked closely with a licensed Florida attorney
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who drafts the trust documents and provides the legal advice regarding land trusts. 
This Court has held that the referee, as the finder of fact, has the
responsibility to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and resolve any conflicts in
the evidence.  See Florida Bar v. Lipman, 497 So. 2d 1165, 1168 (Fla. 1986). 
Further, this Court has stated that in an indirect criminal contempt proceeding, a
referee’s findings must be approved unless they are erroneous or wholly lacking in
evidentiary support.  See Florida Bar v. Furman, 451 So. 2d 808, 812 (Fla. 1984).
In Hughes, 697 So. 2d at 503, this Court enjoined Hughes “from counseling,
advising and preparing documents for individuals in the creation and transfer of
land trusts.”  The record supports the referee’s conclusion that Hughes violated the
injunction.  This Court has “repeatedly held that the preparation of legal documents
by a nonlawyer for another person to a greater extent than typing or writing
information provided by the customer on a form constitutes the unlicensed practice
of law.”  Florida Bar v. Miravalle, 761 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Fla. 2000).  Barbour
testified that Hughes continued to complete land trust forms for Barbour and that
Hughes did so without the supervision or assistance of an attorney.  We find that
Hughes also violated the injunction by continuing to advise people “in the creation
and transfer of land trusts.”  Pagac and Behr testified that Hughes advised them
about land trusts in relation to the Behr property.  Barbour also testified that
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Hughes advised him about land trusts.  Although Hughes might have advised
Barbour at one point to get an attorney, and even occasionally consulted with an
attorney himself, such actions do not negate the fact that Hughes continued to
counsel and advise people about land trusts and draft documents for them.  We
find that the record supports the referee’s findings of fact, which in turn support
the referee’s conclusion that Hughes continued to engage in the unlicensed practice
of law in violation of this Court’s order.  
Finally, we examine the referee’s recommended sentence.  This Court has
noted that a critical factor in prohibiting the unlicensed practice of law is protecting
the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by unqualified
persons.  See Florida Bar v. Schramek, 616 So. 2d 979, 983 (Fla. 1993); Florida
Bar v. Furman, 376 So. 2d 378, 381 (Fla.1979).  This Court takes the responsibility
of protecting the public very seriously.  Therefore, we agree with the referee that the
injunction enjoining Hughes from engaging in the unlicensed practice of law should
continue in its present form.  Hughes’ compliance with the injunction is necessary
to protect the public.  
The referee also recommended that Hughes serve five months’ imprisonment
and pay a $500 fine.  Chapter 10 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar governs
the investigation and prosecution of the unlicensed practice of law.  According to
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rule 10-7.2(e), if the referee finds the respondent guilty of indirect criminal
contempt, “[t]he punishment . . . shall be by fine, not to exceed $2500,
imprisonment of up to 5 months, or both.”  Thus, the rules permit imprisonment
and a fine for indirect criminal contempt for the unlicensed practice of law.
Further, this Court has ordered imprisonment for individuals who continued
to engage in the unlicensed practice of law in violation of an injunction.  However,
in most of these cases, this Court initially suspended the imprisonment in part or in
full conditioned upon the respondent completing other conditions of the sentence
successfully.  See Florida Bar v. Schramek, 670 So. 2d 59, 61 (Fla. 1996) (ninety-
day imprisonment imposed, but last sixty days of imprisonment suspended
contingent on condition that Schramek not further violate the laws of the State of
Florida or the prior injunction entered by this Court); Florida Bar v. Valdes, 507
So. 2d 609, 610 (Fla. 1987) (five-month imprisonment imposed, but imprisonment
suspended contingent upon Valdes’ successful completion of 100 hours of
community service and full compliance with the terms set forth in referee's report);
Florida Bar v. Furman, 451 So. 2d 808, 816 (Fla. 1984) (120-day imprisonment
imposed, but last ninety days of imprisonment suspended contingent on condition
that Furman not violate for a period of two years the prior injunction entered by this
Court); Florida Bar v. Heller, 298 So. 2d 357, 361 (Fla. 1974) (thirty-day
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imprisonment imposed, but imprisonment suspended contingent upon payment of
$250 fine).  Also, in Furman and Heller this Court modified the recommended
sentences, demonstrating that this Court has the discretion to impose a sentence
that requires the individual to serve only a portion of a recommended period of
imprisonment.  
We agree with the referee that Hughes should be held in contempt of court. 
While we do not view Hughes’ violations of the injunction lightly, we note that most
of Hughes’ violations occurred almost five years ago.  It appears that he has
observed the injunction since that period.  Therefore, considering the timing of
events in the instant case, we conclude that a less severe sentence is appropriate
and we sentence Hughes to ninety days’ imprisonment.  Further, we suspend
execution of that sentence contingent upon Hughes’ compliance with the injunction
and the other terms recommended by the referee.  Because Hughes has violated the
injunction in the past, any additional failures to comply with the injunction or the
terms set forth herein shall result in enforcement of the ninety-day imprisonment or
the imposition of a greater sentence.  See Florida Bar v. Valdes, 507 So. 2d 609,
610 (Fla. 1987); Florida Bar v. Furman, 451 So. 2d 808, 815-816 (Fla. 1984).  We
put Hughes on express notice that this Court will not tolerate further violations of
the injunction. 
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we agree with the referee that Robert E. Hughes, Sr., continued
to engage in the unlicensed practice of law, thereby violating the injunction issued
by this Court in Florida Bar v. Hughes, 697 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1997).  Robert E.
Hughes, Sr., is hereby found in indirect criminal contempt and is sentenced to
ninety days’ imprisonment.  However, that sentence is suspended contingent upon
Hughes’ full compliance with the injunction and the other terms recommended by
the referee, including payment of the $500 fine.  Further, Hughes shall not engage in
the practice of law and the injunction enjoining him from engaging in the unlicensed
practice of law in Florida shall remain in effect.  Judgment is entered for The
Florida Bar, 650 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399, for recovery of
costs from Robert E. Hughes, Sr., in the amount of $1,923.62, for which sum let
execution issue.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
R. Lee Bennett, Chair, Standing Committee on Unlicensed Practice of Law, John F.
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Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and Loris S. Holcomb, Unlicensed Practice of
Law Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida; and Loretta Comiskey O’Keeffe, Branch
Unlicensed Practice of Law Counsel, Tampa, Florida,
for Complainant
Robert E. Hughes, Sr., pro se, Clearwater, Florida,
for Respondent