Title: Delaware Board of Nursing v. Gillespie
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 661, 2011
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 30, 2012

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DELAWARE BOARD OF  
 
§ 
NURSING,  
 
 
 
§  No. 661, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee Below,  
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for Kent County 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  C.A. No. K10A-06-007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
MICHELE BICE GILLESPIE,  
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  March 21, 2012 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  March 30, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Barbara J. Gadbois, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Michael W. Arrington, Esquire, Parkowski, Guerke & Swayze, P.A., 
Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
The appellant, Delaware Board of Nursing (the “Board”), appeals 
from a Superior Court decision reversing the Board’s decision to suspend the 
nursing licenses of the appellee, Michele Gillespie (“Gillespie”).  The Board 
suspended Gillespie’s licenses for two years based on a finding that 
Gillespie violated title 24, section 1922(a)(8) of the Delaware Code and 
Board Rule 10.4.1 by failing to report child sexual abuse as required by title 
16, section 903 of the Delaware Code.1  The Superior Court held that the 
Board erred as a matter of law in interpreting section 903 to impose the 
mandatory reporting requirement on nurses for information learned outside 
of their employment. 
 
The Board raises two arguments on appeal.  First, the Board contends 
that it did not err in finding that Gillespie committed the above-referenced 
violations by failing to report child sexual abuse as required by title 16, 
section 903 of the Delaware Code.  Second, the Board submits that its 
decision finding a violation of the applicable provisions was supported by 
substantial evidence.  Gillespie argues that the Board’s appeal is barred by a 
conflict of interest. 
                                          
 
1 At the time Gillespie’s case was pending before the Board, section 903 imposed a 
mandatory reporting requirement on “[a]ny physician, and any other person in the healing 
arts including any person licensed to render services in medicine, osteopathy, dentistry, 
any intern, resident, nurse, school employee, social worker, psychologist, medical 
examiner or any other person . . . .”  Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 903 (2003). 
3 
 
 
We have concluded that the Board’s contentions are without merit.  
Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court must be affirmed.  
Accordingly, we need not reach the conflict of interest issue raised by 
Gillespie. 
Facts and Procedural History2 
 
Gillespie is a licensed registered nurse and family nurse practitioner.   
In December 2009, Gillespie was arrested and charged by the State with 
Endangering the Welfare of a Child in violation of title 11, section 1102 of 
the Delaware Code.   Three months later, the State filed a Complaint with 
the Board alleging that Gillespie was guilty of unprofessional conduct for 
failing to report “several incidents of sexual abuse inflicted by two young 
boys on three younger children” to the children’s parents or any other 
authority enumerated in title 16, section 903 of the Delaware Code.  All of 
the children involved were Gillespie’s grandchildren. 
A Panel of the Board held an evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether Gillespie had violated title 24, section 1922(a)(8) and Board Rule 
10.4.1 relating to the report of child abuse.  The parties stipulated to the facts 
alleged in six paragraphs of the complaint.  Thus, Gillespie admitted that she 
                                          
 
2 Unless otherwise noted, the relevant facts are taken from the Superior Court opinion.  
Gillespie v. Delaware Bd. of Nursing, 2011 WL 6034789 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 
2011). 
4 
 
was a nurse, that she was aware of incidents of sexual abuse among her 
grandchildren, and that she did not notify any authority enumerated in 
section 903. 
The Panel heard brief testimony from Gillespie and Gillespie’s ex-
daughter-in law.  Gillespie testified that her other daughter-in-law told her 
about the sexual abuse.  Her daughter-in-law had heard about the abuse, in 
turn, from her own son.  Gillespie testified that she immediately called 
Nicole Fonseca, her ex-daughter-in-law and the mother of the other children 
involved.  Gillespie testified that she informed Fonseca of the reported abuse 
and advised her to take the children to A.I. DuPont Children’s Hospital for 
examination.  Fonseca testified that Gillespie never told her to go to the 
hospital, but merely said “the kids need counseling.”  It was undisputed that 
all information regarding the abuse came to Gillespie through third-hand 
recitations, and that the parents of all the children involved—as abuser or 
abused—were informed.  
 
The Panel recommended a two-year suspension of Gillespie’s two 
nursing licenses and continuing education on the importance of reporting 
sexual abuse.  The Board adopted the recommendation of the Panel.  On 
appeal, the Superior Court reversed, holding that the Board erred by 
applying section 903 to information learned by a nurse outside the scope of 
5 
 
her employment.  Because there was no violation of section 903, the 
Superior Court also found that the Board’s decision was not supported by 
substantial evidence.  This appeal followed. 
Standard of Review 
We review a decision of the Board for errors of law and determine 
whether substantial evidence exists to support the Board’s findings of fact 
and conclusions of law.3  “Substantial evidence equates to ‘such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.’”4  We will not weigh the evidence, determine questions of 
credibility, or make our own factual findings.5  Errors of law are reviewed de 
novo.6  Absent an error of law, the standard of review for a Board’s decision 
is abuse of discretion.7   
Applicable Statute 
At the time Gillespie’s case was pending before the Board, title 16, 
section 903 of the Delaware Code stated: 
Any physician, and any other person in the healing arts 
including any person licensed to render services in medicine, 
osteopathy, dentistry, any intern, resident, nurse, school 
employee, social worker, psychologist, medical examiner or 
                                          
 
3 Person-Gaines v. Pepco Holdings, Inc., 981 A.2d 1159, 1161 (Del. 2009) (citing 
Stanley v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 2008 WL 2410212, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2008)). 
4 Id. (quoting Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. 1981)). 
5 Id. (citing Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (Del. 1965)). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. (citing Stanley v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 2008 WL 2410212, at *2). 
6 
 
any other person who knows or in good faith suspects child 
abuse or neglect shall make a report in accordance with § 904 
of this title. In addition to and not in lieu of reporting to the 
Division of Family Services, any such person may also give 
oral or written notification of said knowledge or suspicion to 
any police officer who is in the presence of such person for the 
purpose of rendering assistance to the child in question or 
investigating the cause of the child’s injuries or condition.8  
 
This provision was amended in 2010, and now expressly provides that the 
duty to report applies to all persons.9  
Title 24, section 1922(a)(8) of the Delaware Code provides that the 
Board may impose sanctions when it finds a licensee guilty of any offense 
described therein, including “unprofessional conduct as shall be determined 
by the Board, or the willful neglect of a patient[.]”10  Board Rule 10.4.1 
further provides that “[n]urses whose behavior fails to conform to legal 
standards and accepted standards of the nursing profession and who thus 
may adversely affect the health and welfare of the public may be found 
guilty of unprofessional conduct.”11 
Superior Court Decision 
Section 903, as it existed in 2009, was expressly limited to those “in 
the healing arts including any person licensed to render services in 
                                          
 
8 Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 903 (2003).   
9 77 Del. Laws ch. 320, § 1 (2010). 
10 Del. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 1922(a)(8) (2005). 
11 24 Del. Admin. Code § 1900-10.4.1. 
7 
 
medicine.”  The Superior Court determined that the statute was ambiguous 
as to whether the covered persons “were required to report incidents of 
abuse about which they acquire knowledge outside the scope of their 
employment.”12  Thus, the Superior Court considered section 903 in light of 
section 908,13 and determined that the distinguishing feature of section 903’s 
mandatory reporting requirement was its applicability to a narrow set of 
persons—medical service providers.  Because Gillespie learned of the abuse 
in her role as a grandmother, and not as a nurse, the Superior Court found 
that her failure to report could not be grounds for finding unprofessional 
conduct.14     
Board’s Contention 
The Board contends that the statute was not ambiguous, and that it 
correctly applied the literal meaning of the statute in determining that 
Gillespie engaged in unprofessional conduct.  The Board also argues that, 
under the plain terms of the statute, the mandatory reporting duty was 
imposed on those in the medical profession and “any other person who 
                                          
 
12 Gillespie v. Delaware Bd. of Nursing, 2011 WL 6034789, at *3. 
13 Section 908 provides immunity from liability to “[a]nyone participating in good faith 
in the making of a report or notifying police officers” of child abuse.  Del. Code Ann. tit. 
16, § 908 (2003). 
14 The Superior Court also noted that its interpretation was consistent with the 
interpretation of comparable statutes in some other jurisdictions.  Gillespie v. Delaware 
Bd. of Nursing, 2011 WL 6034789, at *4. 
8 
 
knows or in good faith suspects child abuse or neglect.”15  Under this 
interpretation, Gillespie had a duty to report irrespective of her nursing 
license. 
Statute Properly Construed 
 
“The goal of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to 
legislative intent.”16  Where a statute is ambiguous, it should be interpreted 
“in a way that will promote its apparent purpose and harmonize it” with the 
statutory scheme.17   A statute is ambiguous if “it is reasonably susceptible of 
different conclusions or interpretations” or “if a literal reading of the statute 
would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result not contemplated by the 
legislature.”18   
Principles of statutory interpretation support the Superior Court’s 
interpretation here.  The Superior Court did not err in finding the statute 
ambiguous as to whether the reporting duty applied only to information 
obtained in a person’s role as a medical service provider.  Given the narrow 
class of professionals articulated in the statute, it is reasonable to infer that 
the legislature intended to target those persons positioned to learn of child 
                                          
 
15 Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 903 (2003). 
16 LeVan v. Independence Mall, Inc., 940 A.2d 929, 932 (Del. 2007) (quoting Eliason v. 
Englehart, 733 A.2d 944, 946 (Del. 1999)).  
17 Id. at 933 (quoting Eliason v. Englehart, 733 A.2d at 946). 
18 Id. (quoting Newtowne Vill. Serv. Corp. v. Newtowne Rd. Dev. Co., 772 A.2d 172, 175 
(Del. 2001)). 
9 
 
abuse in the course of their work.  The Superior Court had previously 
interpreted section 903 as applicable to a limited set of persons who obtain 
information in the course of their employment, and thus distinguished 
section 903 from section 908—which provides immunity to all persons 
“participating” in reports of child abuse.19   
Likewise, principles of statutory constructions instruct that the general 
phrase “and any other person” following the list of specifically enumerated 
professionals should be interpreted in light of that specific list.  Noscitur a 
sociis provides that “words grouped in a list should be given related 
meaning.”20  Likewise, the well-established principle ejusdem generis 
instructs that, “where general language follows an enumeration of persons or 
things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words 
are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying 
                                          
 
19 See Hedrick v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Labs., Inc., 807 A.2d 584, 593 (Del. Super. 
Ct. 2002) (“[I]mmunity is not granted to just those statutorily-listed persons in § 903 but 
to anyone participating in the making of a report to the Division. The fact that the 
General Assembly, in enacting § 908, made such a choice in granting immunity is 
another indication of the intent to make that grant broad. The difference between § 903 
and § 908 cannot be viewed as an oversight.  The legislature is presumed to have used 
these different provisions for different reasons and intended a distinction.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
20 Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990).  See also Gustafson v. 
Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995). 
10 
 
only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those 
specifically mentioned.”21  
Here, it is reasonable to interpret the statutory phrase “or any other 
person” in light of the preceding, specific enumeration of persons who 
would likely learn of child abuse in the scope of their duties in schools, 
hospitals, and counseling services.  Thus, the statute did not plainly cover 
any person who might learn of sexual abuse in any context.  Moreover, this 
rule of construction supports the Superior Court’s determination that the 
statute should not apply to those enumerated persons who learn of the abuse 
exclusively in a family context.  Accordingly, we hold that the Superior 
Court properly determined that the Board of Nursing erred in its 
interpretation of title 16, section 903 for purposes of applying title 24, 
section 1992(A)(8) and Board Rule 10.4.1.   
No Substantial Evidence 
The Superior Court did not err in concluding that, absent a violation 
of section 903, there was no substantial evidence to support the Board’s 
decision.   Gillespie had no prior disciplinary history, and the Board did not 
articulate any basis for sanctioning Gillespie other than the fact that she 
failed to report the abuse to DFS.  The Superior Court correctly concluded 
                                          
 
21 Aspen Advisors LLC v. United Artists Theatre Co., 861 A.2d 1251, 1265 (Del. 2004) 
(quoting Petition of State, 708 A.2d 983, 988 (Del. 1998)). 
11 
 
that “[a]lthough unprofessional conduct does not require the violation of a 
statute, the Board’s decision was based upon a finding that Appellant did not 
satisfy her statutory duty.”22 
Conclusion 
 
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. 
 
                                          
 
22 Gillespie v. Delaware Bd. of Nursing, 2011 WL 6034789, at *4.