Title: State v. Bartlett
Citation: 355 S.E.2d 913
Docket Number: 17060
State: west-virginia
Issuer: west-virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 1, 1987

355 S.E.2d 913 (1987) STATE of West Virginia v. James L. BARTLETT, II. No. 17060. Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. April 1, 1987. *915 Harry G. Deitzler, P.A., Parkersburg, for appellee. William E. Kiger, Parkersburg, for appellant. *914 NEELY, Justice: On the evening of 30 April 1984, the petitioner, James L. Bartlett, II, and his friends Stephanie Spindle and Laurine Tuell, became intoxicated at the home of Gerald L. Bartlett. At about 1:15 a.m. on 1 May 1984, while returning from Gerald Bartlett's home, petitioner drove his pickup truck into a telephone pole on East Street in Parkersburg. Stephanie Spindle was killed as a result of the collision. Petitioner was indicted on counts of speeding, reckless driving, driving under the influence of alcohol, involuntary manslaughter, and violations of W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(a) [1983] and W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(b) [1983], respectively the felony and misdemeanor provisions relating to the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol, which is a contributing cause of a fatality.[1] Petitioner was tried in the Circuit Court of Wood County. Petitioner contended that he was run off the road by an on-coming vehicle and that he skidded on gravel and sand on the berm. The State introduced evidence that defendant was speeding and that defendant was not run off the road. The State's case was based on the contention that the speeding was the cause of the accident. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the charge of violating W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(a) [1983]. On appeal, petitioner raises numerous counts of error, each of which *916 we find without merit. We therefore affirm. Petitioner contends initially that the trial court erred in failing to include in its jury charge defendant's proposed Instruction No. 5, which provided: The petitioner similarly contends that the trial court erred in excluding from its jury charge defendant's proposed Instruction No. 2 regarding the definition of the term "contributing cause", which provided: The definition of contributing cause given by the trial court provided: The "unavoidable or inevitable accident" instruction was not an instruction the trial court was required to give. Saying that the accident was unavoidable or inevitable is merely another way of saying that the petitioner's misconduct was neither a proximate nor a contributing cause of the accident. The court instructed the jurors that, in order to convict the petitioner under W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(a) [1983], they must find both that: (1) Mr. Bartlett's driving at a speed greater than was reasonable and *917 prudent under the circumstances proximately caused Stephanie Spindle's death; and, (2) Mr. Bartlett's intoxication was a contributing cause of Ms. Spindle's death. Petitioner sought to prove a lack of causation by eliciting testimony regarding the presence of sand and gravel on the shoulder of the road and the proximity of the telephone pole to the edge of the road. Petitioner also offered testimony that he was run off the road by another vehicle. However, this testimony was contradicted by testimony offered by the State, and the jury was entitled to draw its own conclusions based on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. In any event, the jury was clearly aware that the petitioner was seeking through this evidence to negate the element of causation. Counsel for the defense was permitted to argue extensively during closing statements that the accident would have occurred even had Mr. Bartlett not been intoxicated, and that, therefore, his intoxication could not have been a contributing cause of the death of Stephanie Spindle. Although the court was required to instruct the jury regarding every material element of the offense, State v. Parks, 161 W.Va. 511, 243 S.E.2d 848 (1978), the court was not required to paraphrase and recast an instruction that adequately set forth the causation requirements. As we held at Syl. pt. 4 of State v. Johnson, 157 W.Va. 341, 201 S.E.2d 309 (1973): We find that the jury charge adequately set forth and defined the requirements of proximate and contributing causation. We therefore hold that the court did not err in refusing defendant's Instructions Nos. 2 and 5. Petitioner also contends that the trial court erred in failing to include in its jury charge his proposed Instruction No. 1 defining the term "reckless disregard for the safety of others." This proposed instruction provided: We do not believe that the trial court's refusal to include this instruction in the charge denied petitioner a fair trial. We have never held that every term in a jury instruction must be defined, nor does the petitioner direct us to any authority requiring that the term in question be defined. "Reckless disregard" is not so arcane a term that the lack of a definitional instruction left the jury entirely without guidance. The jurors were informed that "reckless disregard" was a material element of the offense and that a finding of "reckless disregard" was a prerequisite to conviction under W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(a) [1983]. The twelve jurors obviously reached a common understanding of what constitutes "reckless disregard", and agreed that the defendant's conduct fell within the ambit of that term. We cannot see that their verdict in this regard was clearly wrong. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's refusal to give defendant's Instruction No. 1. The petitioner further contends that the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal at the close of the evidence because the State had not presented any evidence of the speed at which Mr. Bartlett's vehicle was travelling at the time of the accident, nor had the State presented any evidence regarding what speed would have been reasonable and prudent under the conditions prevailing at the scene of the accident. But petitioner's contention is not supported by the evidence. Witness Clark Simmons estimated the speed of Mr. Bartlett's vehicle to be approximately fifty or sixty miles per hour at the time of the accident. Witness Everett Freeland estimated the speed of the truck to be between sixty and eighty miles per hour. It was undisputed that there was a considerable amount of sand and gravel on the shoulder of the road where Mr. Bartlett lost control of the car. The accident occurred at night, and there was substantial evidence of Mr. Bartlett's considerable intoxication. Under these circumstances, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have inferred that Mr. Bartlett was driving at a speed that was not reasonable and prudent under the circumstances. Petitioner also argues that the trial court erred in not directing a verdict of acquittal at the close of the State's case in chief because, the petitioner contends, the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to support the conviction. Specifically, petitioner argues that the State did not present any medical or scientific evidence regarding the affect the consumption of alcohol would have had on the petitioner's ability to operate a motor vehicle at the time of the accident, and therefore that the State failed to show that the petitioner's consumption of alcohol was a "contributing cause" to the accident and the resulting death of Stephanie Spindle. This contention is also without merit. We take judicial notice of the fact that the ingestion of alcohol has an adverse affect on one's ability to drive. The State was not required to put on medical or scientific evidence of a causal link between the petitioner's intoxication and the accident. In this regard the State was required to prove only that the petitioner was intoxicated, that petitioner drove negligently, and that there was an accident. From this proof the jury could infer a causal link between the intoxication and the accident. The State introduced evidence that petitioner's breathalyzer test, administered shortly after the accident, revealed a blood alcohol content of 0.16%. Moreover, the petitioner conceded on the alcoholic influence report form that he was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The inference by the jury of a causal connection between the intoxication and the accident was therefore permissible. Petitioner next argues that Instruction No. 1 was incomplete because it did not instruct the jury that petitioner could be convicted of the lesser included offense of violation of W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(b) [1983], the misdemeanor version of W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(a) [1983]. We held at Syl. pt. 2 of Berkeley Homes, Inc. v. Radosh, ___ W.Va. ___, 310 S.E.2d 201 (1983): We noted in Radosh that, "[w]ith certain exceptions, this principle extends even to criminal cases." ___ W.Va. ___, 310 S.E.2d at 203. As we held in Syl. pt. 5 of State v. Cobbs, 40 W.Va. 718, 22 S.E. 310, overruled on other grounds, State v. Chaney, 117 W.Va. 605, 186 S.E. 607 (1936): Petitioner did not offer the court a proposed instruction on W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(b) [1983]. Nor did petitioner object to the lack of an instruction on W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(b) [1983]. The two elements of W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(a) [1983] lacking in W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(b) [1983] are reckless disregard for the safety of others and alcohol being a contributing cause to a death. Petitioner's principal defense to the charge of violating W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(b) [1983] was his assertion that these two distinguishing elements were lacking. Evidence of intoxication, speeding, and the death of Stephanie Spindle would have been sufficient to convict under W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(b) [1983]. The petitioner clearly made a strategic choice not to offer an instruction on W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(b) [1983] in the hope that he would be convicted of nothing greater than driving under the influence of alcohol. This strategy was unsuccessful. The petitioner may not now claim that his own knowing and intelligent strategic maneuver denied him a fair trial. In the absence of a request by petitioner's counsel, the trial court was not obliged to give an instruction on W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(b) [1983]. Petitioner's next assignment of error arises out of an alleged inconsistency in the jury verdict. The jury found the petitioner not guilty of involuntary manslaughter, yet found him guilty of violating W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(a) [1983]. The instruction given the jury on involuntary manslaughter provided: The petitioner contends that, because the jury found him not guilty of involuntary manslaughter, they must have found that his conduct did not constitute "reckless disregard." Because "reckless disregard" is a material element of W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(a) [1983], petitioner contends, the jury's acquittal of Mr. Bartlett on the involuntary manslaughter charge was by implication an acquittal on the charge of violating W.Va. Code, 17C-5-2(a) [1983]. We disagree. We held in State v. Hall, ___ W.Va. ___, 328 S.E.2d 206 (1985), that we will generally not review claims of inconsistent jury verdicts. In so holding we followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court set forth in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 105 S. Ct. 471, 83 L. Ed. 2d 461 (1984). In Powell, the Court unanimously concluded that appellate review of a claim of inconsistent verdicts is not generally available. The Court relied on its earlier case of Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S. Ct. 189, 190, 76 L. Ed. 356, 358-59, 80 A.L.R. 161, 163 (1932), where Justice Holmes had written for the Court: `The most that can be said in such cases is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were *920 not convinced of the defendant's guilt. We interpret the acquittal as no more than their assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity.'" The Court in Powell went on to give a number of policy reasons why review is impractical. These policy considerations led the Court to conclude that: We went on to note in Hall that: We remain convinced by the logic of Powell, and therefore decline petitioner's invitation to reverse his conviction on the grounds of an inconsistent verdict. Furthermore, we believe in this case that the jury understood that the defendant could not be convicted both of involuntary manslaughter and a violation of W.Va. Code, 17C-5-2(a) [1983], because all the elements of involuntary manslaughter are contained in the offense of violating W.Va. Code, 17C-5-2(a) [1983]. The jury convicted on the greater offense and acquitted on the lesser included offense, and if the court had provided a clearer jury form that mental process would have been entirely obvious. Finally, petitioner assigns three additional errors, each of which we find without merit. Petitioner contends that: (1) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a statement made by the petitioner before he was fully advised of his Miranda rights; (2) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the results of the breathalyzer test administered to the petitioner following his arrest because the test was not administered in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the State Department of Health; and (3) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the results of the breathalyzer test because the test procedure and results were not properly authenticated by the State of West Virginia. *921 When Officer Fluharty arrived at the scene of the accident, he asked Mr. Bartlett, before advising him of his Miranda rights, whether he was the driver of the truck. Petitioner answered in the affirmative, and his response was admitted at trial over objection. Petitioner contends that admission of the statement constitutes reversible error. Officer Fluharty testified at trial that Laurine Tuell had told him immediately after the accident that Mr. Bartlett had been the driver. Moreover, petitioner himself conceded at trial that he was driving at the time of the accident. On these facts, it is difficult to understand how petitioner could have been prejudiced by the admission of his earlier statement. Error not prejudicial to a defendant does not require reversal. State v. Lane, 168 W.Va. 490, 285 S.E.2d 138 (1981). Petitioner does not specify how the administration of the breathalyzer test failed to comply with the rules and regulations promulgated by the State Department of Health; nor does he specify which rules or regulations were violated. Likewise, the petitioner does not apprise us of the manner in which the test procedure and results were improperly authenticated. In any event, it is again difficult to see how the petitioner was prejudiced by the introduction of the breathalyzer test results. The results were surely offered for the purpose of proving that the petitioner was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. For this proposition there was ample independent proof. Petitioner testified at trial that he had imbibed three beers and possibly one or two shots of tequila just before the accident occurred. Moreover, the petitioner admitted on the alcohol influence report form that he had been under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. Given this separate proof of Mr. Bartlett's intoxication, any conceivable error in admitting the breathalyzer test results was not sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal. State v. Lane, supra. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Wood County is affirmed. Affirmed. [1] W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2 [1983] provides in pertinent part: (a) Any person who: (1) Drives a vehicle in this State while he is: (A) Under the influence of alcohol, or (B) Under the influence of any controlled substance, or (C) Under the influence of any other drug, or (D) Under the combined influence of alcohol and any controlled substance or any other drug, and (2) When so driving does any act forbidden by law or fails to perform any duty imposed by law in the driving of such vehicle, which act or failure proximately causes the death of any person within one year next following such act or failure, and (3) Commits such act or failure in reckless disregard of the safety of others, and when the influence of alcohol, controlled substances or drugs is shown to be a contributing cause to such death, (4) Shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than three years and shall be fined not less than one thousand dollars nor more than three thousand dollars. (b) Any person who: (1) Drives a vehicle in this State while he is: (A) Under the influence of alcohol, or (B) Under the influence of any controlled substance, or (C) Under the influence of any other drug, or (D) Under the combined influence of alcohol and any controlled substance of any other drug, and (2) When so driving does any act forbidden by law or fails to perform any duty imposed by law in the driving of such vehicle, which act or failure proximately causes the death of any person within one year next following such act or failure, (3) Shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the county jail for not less than ninety days nor more than one year and shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars.