Title: Commonwealth v. German
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12601
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 13, 2019

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12601 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CHRISTIAN GERMAN. 
 
 
 
Essex.     February 4, 2019. - November 13, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Robbery.  Assault by Means of a Dangerous Weapon.  Firearms.  
Identification.  Due Process of Law, Identification.  
Constitutional Law, Identification.  Evidence, 
Identification, Expert opinion.  Witness, Expert. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 3, 2015. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by James 
F. Lang, J., and the cases were tried before Timothy Q. Feeley, 
J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
David F. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Anthony Mirenda, K. Neil Austin, Caroline S. Donovan, 
Madeleine K. Rodriguez, & Meagen Monahan, for New England 
Innocence Project & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant 
of the armed robbery of a restaurant owner and her employees in 
Lawrence.  In this appeal, the defendant contends that his 
motion to suppress evidence of a showup identification should 
have been allowed because the procedure was so unnecessarily 
suggestive and conducive to mistaken identification as to deny 
him due process of law.  The defendant also challenges several 
of the trial judge's evidentiary rulings on eyewitness 
identification.     
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the motion judge's 
denial of the motion to suppress, and discern no reversible 
error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings.  Accordingly, 
the defendant's convictions shall be affirmed.  We conclude 
further, however, that, for showup identification procedures 
conducted after the issuance of the rescript in this case, the 
officers conducting the showup will be required to provide 
instructions similar to those used in identifications through 
photographic arrays. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts presented at the 
hearing on the motion to suppress, based on the findings of the 
motion judge, supplemented with undisputed facts in the record 
that are not contrary to the judge's findings.  See Commonwealth 
v. Torres, 433 Mass. 669, 670 (2001).   
3 
 
On a night in June 2015, Maria, a restaurant owner in 
Lawrence, and three of her wait staff -- Ruth, Jeannie, and 
Carolyn -- left work at 3 A.M.1  Carolyn had called a taxicab, 
which the three servers intended to share; Maria had driven to 
work.  After the women left the restaurant, Carolyn got into the 
front passenger seat of the taxicab, while Jeannie and Ruth 
stood with Maria as she locked the door to the restaurant.  As 
the three turned toward the taxicab, a man approached to within 
a few feet and demanded, "Give me everything." 
When the women did not respond, the man pulled out a 
firearm.  He appeared to focus on Jeannie, who was holding a 
purse, a cellular telephone, and a laptop computer.  Maria told 
her to "throw him everything," and Jeannie tossed the items on 
the ground near the man.  The robber appeared temporarily 
startled, allowing Maria a chance to run around the corner to 
her parked vehicle, where she telephoned 911.2  The taxicab, with 
Carolyn in the front seat, was driven away at approximately the 
same time, while Ruth and Jeannie started walking across the 
                     
 
1 The record does not include the last names of some of the 
employees.  For consistency, we refer to all by their first 
names. 
 
 
2 Maria described the assailant as a Hispanic man wearing a 
black jacket with a hood.  The area was lit by street lights, 
and the robber's face was unobscured.  The motion judge found, 
"The three women were able to see him clearly."   
 
4 
 
street.  The robber followed them, continuing to demand their 
property.  A group of men, who were standing on the roof of a 
nearby building, began yelling at the robber.  He fired his 
weapon toward the men, and then turned and walked away. 
Ruth and Jeannie started walking toward the police station, 
in the opposite direction from the robber.  The taxicab driver, 
who had circled the block, picked them up nearby.3  They all 
drove back to the restaurant to attempt to retrieve Jeannie's 
property, and encountered the defendant, who was walking down 
the street.  He fired the weapon twice in their direction, while 
Ruth was speaking to 911 dispatchers on her cellular telephone.  
The taxicab was driven to a nearby parking lot, so the women 
could meet up with Maria.  Ruth got out of the taxicab and into 
Maria's vehicle.  The taxicab driver drove off with Carolyn and 
Jeannie still inside the vehicle, while Maria, at the request of 
police, returned to the restaurant.  
While these events were unfolding, Lawrence police Officers 
Ryan Guthrie and Michael Colantuoni, each driving a marked 
police cruiser, searched the area for a Hispanic male wearing a 
black hooded jacket.  Guthrie, who had heard gunshots from a few 
blocks away, encountered two parked taxicabs on a street corner.  
One of the drivers spoke to him in Spanish, which Guthrie did 
                     
 
3 The police were unable to locate the taxicab driver. 
 
5 
 
not understand, and pointed in a specific direction.4  Guthrie 
broadcast this information on his police radio, and headed in 
the direction indicated.  When Guthrie stopped briefly, the 
taxicab driver pulled alongside Guthrie's cruiser and indicated 
that the suspect had entered a park.   
Guthrie and Colantuoni drove through the park.  Within 
minutes of the 911 call, Guthrie saw a man in a black jacket, 
later identified as the defendant, walking just south of the 
park.  The man was the first pedestrian Guthrie had encountered 
during his search.5  Guthrie activated his lights and siren and 
tried to head the suspect off.  When Guthrie reached a cross 
street, he observed the defendant emerging from another, in the 
process of removing his jacket.  Upon seeing the police cruiser, 
the defendant ran away, heading east toward Jackson Street.  
Guthrie pursued him, yelling for the defendant to stop.  
Ultimately Colantuoni and another police officer apprehended the 
defendant on Jackson Street.  A pat frisk for weapons revealed a 
single round of .45 caliber ammunition in the defendant's pants 
pocket.  After being advised of the Miranda rights, and without 
prompting, the defendant said, "It wasn't me, it was the other 
                     
 
4 Guthrie was unaware at that point that the passengers in 
that taxicab were Ruth and Jeannie. 
 
 
5 The judge found that no one "was out and about" in those 
early morning hours.   
6 
 
guy."  He added that if the officers uncuffed him, he would tell 
them who it was.   
Guthrie went to the restaurant to interview Maria and Ruth.  
Maria translated for Ruth, who did not speak English.  Guthrie 
was able to elicit only the same bare bones description of the 
robber that had been broadcast by the police dispatcher, i.e., a 
Hispanic man in a black hooded jacket.  Both witnesses said that 
they would be able to identify the suspect if they saw him.  
Guthrie instructed Maria and Ruth that the police had a man in 
custody, that they did not know if he was the robber, and that 
they needed the witnesses to tell them whether or not he was the 
robber.  Guthrie wanted to transport Maria and Ruth separately 
to see the defendant on Jackson Street, where he was being 
detained for purposes of a showup identification.  Guthrie 
advised the witnesses that he intended to transport them one at 
a time, in the rear seat of his police cruiser.  Both protested.  
Due to their fear of the suspect, they wanted to be together, 
and asked for assurances that the individual would not be able 
to see them.  Ultimately, Guthrie acquiesced and drove to 
Jackson Street with both Maria and Ruth in the rear seat. 
The defendant was standing in front of a wall, handcuffed, 
and amidst several police officers.  Guthrie illuminated the 
area with the spotlight of his cruiser.  Before Guthrie could 
pose a question, Maria and Ruth simultaneously identified the 
7 
 
defendant as the robber, Maria in English, and Ruth in Spanish, 
in words to the effect of, "That's him."  When asked about their 
level of certainty, Maria told Guthrie she was one hundred 
percent; Ruth, as translated by Maria, said the same thing.  The 
identifications took place within ten minutes of the initial 
police dispatch.  
2.  Prior procedure.  In August 2015, the defendant was 
indicted on one count of armed robbery, G. L. c. 265, § 17; 
three counts of assault by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. 
c. 265, § 15B (b); and carrying a firearm without a license, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  Prior to trial, he filed a motion to 
suppress the showup identifications.  After an evidentiary 
hearing, the motion judge denied the motion in a written 
memorandum and order.  In June 2017, the defendant was tried 
before a Superior Court jury.  Although he was able to call an 
expert on eyewitness identification, his motion in limine to 
allow the introduction of certain expert testimony relative to 
witness certainty was denied.  The defendant was convicted of 
all counts.  He filed a timely notice of appeal, and we allowed 
his petition for direct appellate review. 
3.  Discussion.  The defendant contends that suppression is 
required because the police allowed the two witnesses to 
participate in the showup identification together, and because 
the officers did not provide the witnesses with adequate 
8 
 
instructions prior to the showup identification.  He argues also 
that the judge denied the motion to suppress by improper 
reliance on the Federal standard of admissibility, rather than 
the appropriate test under art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  In addition, the defendant challenges 
two of the judge's evidentiary rulings at trial:  the admission 
of evidence of the witnesses' degree of certainty of their 
identification, and the denial of his motion to introduce expert 
testimony with respect to the question of a witness's degree of 
certainty in an identification. 
 
a.  Showup identification procedure.  Although disfavored 
as inherently suggestive, a showup identification conducted in 
the immediate aftermath of a crime is not necessarily 
impermissible.  Commonwealth v. Dew, 478 Mass. 304, 306 (2017).  
"[S]uggestiveness alone is not sufficient to render a showup 
identification inadmissible in evidence" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 235 (2014).  Under both 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
art. 12, a defendant seeking suppression of a showup 
identification must establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the procedure was unnecessarily suggestive.  Id.  See Perry 
v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 238-239 (2012); Manson v. 
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110, 113-114 (1977).  Under Federal due 
process requirements, if an identification procedure was 
9 
 
unnecessarily suggestive, yet nonetheless was reliable in the 
totality of the circumstances, it may still be admissible.  See 
Perry, supra at 239; Manson, supra.  Under the more protective 
requirements of art. 12, an identification procedure that is 
unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken 
identification is per se excluded.  Commonwealth v. Johnson, 473 
Mass. 594, 597 (2016). 
There may be good reason for police to conduct a showup 
identification, notwithstanding its inherent suggestiveness, due 
to "the nature of the crime involved and corresponding concerns 
for public safety; the need for efficient police investigation 
in the immediate aftermath of a crime; and the usefulness of 
prompt confirmation of the accuracy of investigatory 
information, which, if in error, will release the police quickly 
to follow another track."6  Commonwealth v. Austin, 421 Mass. 
357, 362 (1995).  Otherwise put, in such circumstances, an 
inherently suggestive procedure may not be unnecessarily 
suggestive.   
In general, a defendant may challenge a showup 
identification as unnecessarily suggestive in two ways.  First, 
                     
 
6 The defendant does not challenge the motion judge's 
determination that "there is no question that the police had 
good cause for conducting a showup identification procedure with 
the witnesses."   
 
10 
 
a defendant may attempt to show that the police did not have a 
good reason to conduct this type of disfavored, inherently 
suggestive, one-on-one identification procedure.  Id. at 361.  
See Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204, 217 (2014); 
Commonwealth v. Martin, 447 Mass. 274, 282 (2006).  Second, a 
showup identification is unnecessarily suggestive if the 
procedure utilized by the police includes "special elements of 
unfairness" (citation omitted).  Crayton, 470 Mass. at 236.  
 
i.  Whether motion judge applied incorrect standard.  The 
defendant contends that, in denying his motion to suppress the 
identifications from the showup, the motion judge erroneously 
applied the less stringent Federal due process test.  The 
defendant maintains that the judge's finding that the two 
witnesses simultaneously identified the robber meant, "[i]n 
effect," that the judge ruled the identification admissible 
because he concluded it was unnecessarily suggestive but 
otherwise reliable.  This argument is without merit.   
 
In determining whether the police procedures rendered the 
identification unnecessarily suggestive, the motion judge was 
required to examine "the totality of the circumstances attending 
the confrontation."  Commonwealth v. Odware, 429 Mass. 231, 235 
(1999), quoting Commonwealth v. Otsuki, 411 Mass. 218, 232-233 
(1991).  It is evident he did so here, and did not rest his 
decision merely on his view of the witnesses' reliability.  In 
11 
 
his detailed decision, the judge properly focused on the police 
officer's justification for allowing the witnesses to view the 
suspect at the same time.  The judge recognized that, in 
general, witnesses should be shown a suspect separately.  Here, 
however, without the security of being able to remain together, 
the witnesses otherwise seemed unlikely to participate in the 
identification procedure, minutes after the traumatic events, 
and with a possible armed suspect walking around the 
neighborhood.  While the judge properly noted the concern with 
having two witnesses view a suspect at the same time, their 
virtually simultaneous responses obviated the risk that one's 
response could have been formed based on the other's reaction.  
See Commonwealth v. Cavitt, 460 Mass. 617, 632 (2011) (question 
raised by motion to suppress identification is whether possible 
mistaken identification was product of improper police 
procedures).   
 
ii.  Joint participation in the identification procedure.  
Under art. 12, "[e]ven where there is a good reason to conduct a 
one-on-one identification procedure, the evidence must be 
excluded if there are special elements of unfairness, indicating 
a desire on the part of the police to stack the deck against the 
defendant" (quotations and alteration omitted).  Dew, 478 Mass. 
at 307, quoting Commonwealth v. Leaster, 395 Mass. 96, 103 
(1985).  See Commonwealth v. Moon, 380 Mass. 751, 756-759 (1980) 
12 
 
(out-of-court identification suppressed where police identified 
the defendant by name in front of percipient witness, produced 
single photograph from automobile presumably operated by 
assailant, and asked witness to identify suspect).  
 
The defendant argues that there "simply was no 
justification" for the officers to depart from best practices 
and allow the witnesses to view the robbery suspect together.  
See Supreme Judicial Court Study Group on Eyewitness Evidence:  
Report and Recommendations to the Justices 86 (July 25, 2013) 
(Study Group Report) ("Witnesses should not participate in 
identification procedures together").  The Commonwealth agrees 
that joint witness participation in an identification procedure 
is "not ideal," but maintains that police had little choice in 
this case because the witnesses were scared and refused to be 
separated. 
Absent extraordinary circumstances, police should follow 
best practices and separate witnesses participating in 
identification procedures.  See United States v. Corgain, 
5 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1993), citing United States v. Bagley, 772 
F.2d 482, 494 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1023 
(1986).  A failure to separate percipient witnesses may result 
in a finding that the showup identification is unnecessarily 
suggestive because the response of one witness influenced 
13 
 
another witness.  See Commonwealth v. Soares, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 
612, 615 (2010).   
That more than one witness is present during an 
identification procedure does not, however, by itself, render 
the procedure unnecessarily suggestive.  "While there are 
obvious pitfalls in permitting victims to view photographs in 
each other's presence, the practice is not ipso facto invalid so 
as to preclude an identification made as a result thereof" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Moynihan, 376 Mass. 468, 
476 (1978).  See Commonwealth v. Cincotta, 379 Mass. 391, 394 
(1979); Commonwealth v. Marks, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 511, 515 
(1981).  
In this case, the motion judge recognized that the 
"simultaneous viewing of the defendant by [Maria] and [Ruth] as 
they were seated together in the back of . . . Guthrie's 
cruiser" was "concerning."  The judge observed that such a 
practice should be avoided, because there is an "obvious risk 
that each might influence the identification of the other."  
Nonetheless, he determined that, in these unusual circumstances, 
police had a good reason for not conducting separate showup 
identifications.  We agree that, in the extraordinary 
circumstances presented, the officer's decision to allow the 
witnesses to view the suspect together was justified by a 
"difficult investigative problem" involving reluctant witnesses 
14 
 
who had been frightened by a violent crime.  See Martin, 447 
Mass. at 284 (examining reasons why police utilized particular 
showup identification procedure).  
 
The officer intended to separate the witnesses and made a 
good faith effort to do so.  The witnesses, however, "balked at 
[the officer's] request to be transported one at a time to view 
the suspect in custody."  They requested to stay together 
because they were "scared," and "didn't want the suspect to see 
them."  There was no abuse of discretion in the judge's finding 
that the officer's acquiescence in the request that the 
witnesses view the suspect together was justified "[g]iven [the 
witnesses'] understandable fear, having minutes earlier been 
menaced by a gunman who fired his weapon in their presence 
outside [the restaurant] and again at the cab in which [Ruth] 
was riding."   
For similar reasons, the evidence also supports the judge's 
finding that "[i]t is not clear whether either witness would 
have been willing to engage in the immediate identification 
procedure otherwise."7  This was not, as the defendant contends, 
                     
 
7 The Commonwealth argues that there was a practical need to 
keep the witnesses together -- so that Maria could translate for 
Ruth.  The record does not indicate whether a Spanish-speaking 
officer was available, and, if not, how long it would have taken 
to secure the services of a translator.  Moreover, in deciding 
that the police were justified in allowing the witnesses to be 
together when they viewed the suspect, the judge did not address 
15 
 
a matter of speculation.  The witnesses told police that they 
were fearful of identifying the robber and did not want to be 
seen.  Other percipient witnesses, including the two other wait 
staff, left the area before officers had an opportunity to speak 
with them.  Maria described her employees as "shaken up," and 
added that one had been so frightened that she vomited.  The 
taxicab driver, another percipient witness, was never located, 
as the taxicab company declined to track down or provide any 
information about which drivers were working in the area that 
night.  See Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 426 Mass. 703, 706 (1998) 
(motion judge entitled to draw reasonable inferences from 
testimony).    
On this record, there was no abuse of discretion in the 
judge's determination that Maria and Ruth's joint viewing of the 
suspect did not render the identification procedure 
unnecessarily suggestive.  The judge concluded that the positive 
identifications were not "affected in any way" by the 
participation of both witnesses, given the "consistent and 
unequivocal testimony of both witnesses and of . . . Guthrie 
that, as soon as [Maria] and [Ruth] saw the defendant, they 
simultaneously declared that he was the robber."  See Johnson, 
                     
Maria's role as Ruth's translator.  We therefore decline to 
consider the issue further.   
16 
 
473 Mass. at 597 (examining analysis of totality of 
circumstances surrounding identification procedure).8     
 
iii.  Instructions prior to showup identification.  The 
defendant argued that the failure to provide instructions prior 
to the showup identification similar to those employed when 
conducting identification procedures using photographic arrays, 
as mandated by Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 
797-798 (2009), rendered the showup unnecessarily suggestive.  
The judge determined that the procedural requirements of Silva-
Santiago "[a]t present" apply only to photographic arrays.  He 
concluded that, while it may be "advisable for police 
departments to develop written instructions for use in showup 
identifications that mirror" the photographic array 
instructions, "[t]he failure to promulgate or give such 
instructions . . . is not a fatal flaw."  
In Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 797, we established "a 
protocol to be employed before a photographic array is provided 
                     
 
8 Pointing to the best practices set forth in the Study 
Group Report, the defendant argues that the police added to the 
suggestiveness of the identification by failing to elicit a more 
specific description of the suspect, and by positioning him 
handcuffed "amidst a bevy of attendant uniformed police officers 
and marked cruisers."  The judge found that these "purported 
infirmities, either alone or collectively," did not render the 
showup unnecessarily suggestive.  He noted that "[n]one is 
atypical of showup procedures generally," and that "the heavy 
presence of the police officers in this instance was justified 
by the defendant's obstreperousness."  We discern no reason to 
disturb the judge's findings.      
17 
 
to an eyewitness."  To reduce the risks of unnecessary 
suggestiveness and misidentification, the officer conducting the 
identification procedure should inform the witness, at a 
minimum, that  
"he will be asked to view a set of photographs; the alleged 
wrongdoer may or may not be in the photographs depicted in 
the array; it is just as important to clear a person from 
suspicion as to identify a person as the wrongdoer; 
individuals depicted in the photographs may not appear 
exactly as they did on the date of the incident because 
features such as weight and head and facial hair are 
subject to change; regardless of whether an identification 
is made, the investigation will continue; and the procedure 
requires the administrator to ask the witness to state, in 
his or her own words, how certain he or she is of any 
identification." 
 
Id. at 797-798, citing United States Department of Justice, 
Eyewitness Evidence:  A Guide for Law Enforcement 19, 31-32, 33-
34 (1999). 
The defendant argues that, in Commonwealth v. Thomas, 476 
Mass. 451 (2017), this court "implicitly" held that any 
identification procedure that does not follow the Silva-Santiago 
protocol is unnecessarily suggestive.  We do not agree.  In that 
case, we examined "what consequence, if any, is appropriate 
where a police officer who is showing a photographic array to an 
eyewitness fails to use the protocol that we outlined in [Silva-
Santiago, 453 Mass. at 797-798]" (emphasis added).  Thomas, 
supra at 452.  We did not determine that the failure to provide 
a percipient witness with an instruction prior to the showup 
18 
 
identification would render any showup identification 
inadmissible.  
In any event, while he was not required to do so, Guthrie 
provided the witnesses a critical part of the Silva-Santiago 
identification instruction prior to the showup identification.  
As the judge noted, Guthrie's statement informed the witnesses 
"that the police had a man in custody, that they did not know if 
he was the robber, and that they needed the witness to tell them 
whether or not he was the robber."  The judge concluded that 
this instruction served to counteract any perception that the 
police were "directing the witnesses to confirm a police 
determination of the suspect's culpability."  We see no reason 
to disturb the judge's conclusion.  See Study Group Report, 
supra at 92 (most significant of pre-identification warnings is 
that "the offender may or may not be in the photo array or 
lineup, or the person being shown in a showup").  See also State 
v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 261 (2011) ("showup administrators 
should instruct witnesses that the person they are about to view 
may or may not be the culprit and that they should not feel 
compelled to make an identification").  
iv.  Expansion of the Silva-Santiago protocol.  We turn to 
the question whether the Silva-Santiago protocol should be 
expanded to include a requirement for an instruction prior to 
the showup identification.  In 2013, the Study Group Report, 
19 
 
supra at 23-24, recommended that, before a police officer 
conducts "a lineup, a showup, or a photo array, he or she should 
instruct the witness in accordance with [Silva-Santiago], 453 
Mass. at 797-798."  The Study Group also issued model forms for 
use by Massachusetts police departments in eyewitness 
procedures, which included instructions to be used before 
conducting the showup identification.  See id. at 106.  
The defendant urges us to mandate this recommended best 
practice for showup identifications.  It makes little sense, he 
argues, to require "fewer procedural safeguards prior to an 
inherently suggestive and potentially unreliable showup than are 
required prior to an otherwise non-suggestive photo array" 
(emphasis added).  The Commonwealth recognizes that, in many 
instances, instructions prior to the showup identification are 
"practicable and may be preferable."  It argues, however, that a 
failure to provide such instructions "should be deemed . . . a 
relevant factor in determining, under the totality of the 
circumstances, whether police engaged in a procedure so 
unnecessarily suggestive as to deny due process."   
A review of our existing jurisprudence suggests that pre-
showup instructions appear to be in current use by many 
Massachusetts police departments.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Moore, 480 Mass. 799, 804 (2018) (officers instructed witnesses 
prior to showup identification that it was just as important to 
20 
 
clear innocent person as it was to identify guilty one, and that 
individuals witnesses were about to see might or might not be 
wearing same clothing); Dew, 478 Mass. at 306 (using 
instructions prior to showup identification, including that 
robber may or may not be person shown to witness); Commonwealth 
v. Bresilla, 470 Mass. 422, 425 (2015) (officer provided witness 
with "precautionary advisements" prior to showup 
identification); Commonwealth v. Meas, 467 Mass. 434, 438, cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 150 (2014) (officer provided witnesses with 
instructions prior to showup identification in accordance with 
"Show-up Identification Checklist" prepared by district 
attorney's office); Commonwealth v. Pearson, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 
720, 722 (2015) (police read eyewitness instructions from card 
prior to conducting showup identification ).  See also Study 
Group Report, supra at 99 ("Over the past few years, 
Massachusetts police departments have begun to issue their 
officers cards containing standardized showup instructions").  
We conclude that it is prudent, going forward, to require 
that police provide witnesses with an instruction prior to a 
showup identification as recommended by the Study Group Report.  
"Not only would such a protocol provide important information to 
the eyewitness that may reduce the risk of a misidentification, 
but adhering to it would permit the law enforcement officer 
following the protocol to testify more accurately and with 
21 
 
greater precision as to what the witness was told prior to the 
identification."  Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 798.  Prior to a 
showup identification, the officer conducting the procedure will 
be required to instruct the witness as follows:9  
"You are going to be asked to view a person; the alleged 
wrongdoer may or may not be the person you are about to 
view; it is just as important to clear an innocent person 
from suspicion as it is to identify the wrongdoer; 
regardless of whether you identify someone, we will 
continue to investigate; if you identify someone, I will 
ask you to state, in your own words, how certain you are."  
  
See Study Group Report, supra at 106.  The failure to instruct a 
witness prior to a showup identification will carry the same 
consequences as a failure to follow the Silva-Santiago 
protocols.  See Thomas, 476 Mass. at 459 ("[I]t affects a 
judge's evaluation of the admissibility of the identification; 
and, where it is found admissible, it affects the judge's 
instructions to the jury regarding their evaluation of the 
accuracy of the identification").   
b.  Introduction of certainty evidence at trial.  The 
defendant argues that the trial judge erred in allowing 
testimony by both of the percipient witnesses that they were one 
hundred percent certain they had identified the robber.   
                     
9 Because a showup identification is conducted in the 
immediate aftermath of a crime, this instruction differs 
slightly from the instruction provided where a witness is to be 
shown a photographic array.  Compare Commonwealth v. Silva-
Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 797-798 (2009).  
22 
 
The defendant moved in limine to exclude any testimony 
regarding the witnesses' confidence or certainty in their 
identifications.  As grounds for the exclusion, the defendant 
argued that, absent testimony from a "certified expert" of a 
strong correlation between witness confidence and witness 
accuracy, the testimony was not relevant; rather, it was 
misleading, and constituted improper opinion evidence.  The 
defendant also argued that jurors place unwarranted reliance on 
statements of confidence when assessing eyewitness 
identification testimony.  The motion was denied.    
Maria testified, over the defendant's objection, that she 
informed the police that she was one hundred percent sure that 
she recognized the defendant as the robber.  She also testified 
that, when asked about her degree of certainty, Ruth had 
responded "[one] hundred percent."  In addition, Guthrie 
testified that both witnesses answered that they were one 
hundred percent certain of their identifications.   
It is well established that an eyewitness may be permitted 
to testify as to his or her level of certainty, and the weight 
of this evidence is for the jury.  See Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 
472 Mass. 16, 32 n.25 (2015), citing Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 
Mass. 589, 596 (2005), and Commonwealth v. Watkins, 63 Mass. 
App. Ct. 69, 74-75 (2005).  Indeed, the Silva-Santiago protocol 
requires police to ask an eyewitness "to state, in his or her 
23 
 
own words, how certain he or she is of any identification."  
Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 798.  Because witness certainty has 
been shown not to be a reliable estimate of accuracy, however, 
this evidence must be treated with caution.  "Where an 
eyewitness makes a positive identification and expresses a level 
of certainty immediately after the identification procedure, 
there is some correlation between certainty and accuracy, but 
there is not yet a near consensus regarding the strength of that 
correlation."  Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 370 (2015), 
S.C., 478 Mass. 1025 (2018).  To the contrary, "under most 
circumstances, witness confidence or certainty is not a good 
indicator of identification accuracy" (citation omitted).  Id.  
Accordingly, we require a trial judge to provide a cautionary 
instruction warning jurors not to afford too much weight to a 
statement of witness certainty.  Id.     
Here, the trial judge properly instructed, verbatim with 
our model instruction, 
"You may consider a witness's identification even where the 
witness is not free from doubt regarding its accuracy, but 
you should also consider that a witness's expressed 
certainty in an identification standing alone may not be a 
reliable indicator of the accuracy of the identification, 
especially where the witness did not describe that level of 
certainty when the witness first made the identification."    
 
In his motion in limine, the defendant argued that the 
certainty evidence should be excluded because of the lack of 
correlation between witness confidence and identification 
24 
 
accuracy, and the improper weight jurors place on eyewitness 
confidence.  He argued also that certainty testimony constitutes 
inadmissible opinion evidence.  On appeal, the defendant raises 
a different issue concerning the role of confirmatory feedback 
on statements of witness certainty.   
The defendant acknowledges that, while generally 
discouraging the introduction of certainty evidence, the Study 
Group recommended that certainty testimony be admitted in 
evidence "where the statement of certainty occurred immediately 
after [an] out-of-court identification" or "within the judge's 
discretion, on redirect[,] rebuttal, or in other circumstances 
where the defendant challenges the witness's certainty."  Study 
Group Report, supra at 113.  This recommendation, he argues, is 
"generally sound, with one caveat:  certainty testimony should 
only be admissible where it is elicited immediately after a non-
suggestive double-blind lineup pursuant to the Silva-Santiago 
protocol."  In this context, the witness's confidence has not 
been "corrupted by implicit or explicit confirmatory feedback."  
Because it is conducted in the aftermath of a crime, a showup 
identification is unlikely to be double-blind.  Thus, the 
defendant argues, a showup "is always suspect," and statements 
of certainty provided during a suspect identification procedure 
should not be admissible.   
25 
 
The defendant argues also that the confidence testimony 
should have been excluded in this case because the witnesses, 
not the police, were the source of improper confirmatory 
feedback.  He maintains that "[e]ach victim was reinforced by 
witnessing the other victim's identification prior to being 
asked how certain she was of her own."  
Because the defendant did not argue at trial that the 
statements of certainty were inadmissible due to potential 
confirmatory feedback, we review this claim to determine whether 
any error created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.  See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 409 Mass. 675, 678-679 
(1991); Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 518 n.8 (1987).  
We discern no error in the introduction of this testimony.  The 
police elicited certainty statements from the witnesses, as set 
forth in the Silva-Santiago protocol.  See Silva-Santiago, 453 
Mass. at 798.  See also Study Group Report, supra at 106 (showup 
procedure includes requirement that police ask witnesses to 
state level of certainty).  In his final charge, the judge 
instructed the jury on limitations in this type of evidence and 
how they should consider a witness's assertions of certainty. 
See Silva-Santiago, supra (discussing appropriate limiting 
instructions).  See also Gomes, 470 Mass. at 372.  While joint 
witness participation in the identification procedure clearly 
raises the possibility of improper confirmatory feedback, and 
26 
 
such identifications ordinarily are strongly discouraged, the 
identifications here were both simultaneous and immediate upon 
seeing the defendant, minutes after the crime.10 
c.  Trial judge's rulings on expert opinion testimony.  The 
defendant called Dr. John Bulevich, an associate professor of 
psychology at Stockton University, as an expert witness.  
Bulevich teaches experimental and cognitive psychology, and 
specializes in the study of the retrieval process within human 
memory.   
 
Prior to Bulevich's testimony, the prosecutor objected to 
proposed testimony that a general, broad description of a 
suspect is more likely to produce a false identification than 
where a witness is able to provide a much more detailed, 
individual description.  Defense counsel represented that 
Bulevich would testify "when a person is stopped who matches a 
general description, which I would say that this clearly is, 
that it's more likely to produce a false identification."  The 
judge expressed concern about allowing an expert to testify to 
the correlation between stopping a person who matches a general 
description and the likelihood of a false identification.  He 
commented that the likelihood that the police stopped the 
                     
 
10 We note as well that the judge who considered the 
defendant's motion to suppress before trial determined after an 
evidentiary hearing, and stated explicitly in his decision, that 
neither witness's certainty had been affected by the other. 
27 
 
robber, as opposed to an innocent person walking in the 
vicinity, depended upon many factors, including when and where 
the suspect was stopped in relation to the location of the 
crime, and how many people were out on the street at the time of 
the stop.  The judge concluded that an expert cannot comment on 
the accuracy of the particular showup identification at issue, 
"and that's exactly what this is trying to do."  Accordingly, he 
ordered that portion of the proposed testimony excluded, but 
allowed Bulevich to testify as an expert.  
 
The defendant argues that the judge's exclusion of this 
portion of Bulevich's testimony violated his fundamental right 
to present a defense.  See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 
284, 302 (1973).  The judge's decision to exclude certain 
testimony, however, did not preclude the expert from testifying 
to the significance of the witness's ability to describe the 
perpetrator.  The judge explained, "[Y]ou can certainly ask 
about general descriptions, but, as I understand your proffer, 
it goes to the police conduct [in stopping the defendant based 
on the description], not the witness['s] conduct or . . . 
witness reliability."   
Bulevich testified that memory works in three stages:  
encoding (the initial perception of an event); storage (when 
information is stored in the mind prior to recall); and 
retrieval (when the information is extracted).  Errors often 
28 
 
occur at the encoding stage of memory, as a result of a lack of 
attention to details as individuals navigate through a complex 
environment.  At the retrieval stage, complex events must be 
pieced together from scratch, resulting in the possibility that 
the event may be assembled incorrectly, and therefore 
misremembered.  Because stored information can be pieced 
together incorrectly; memory does not function in the same way 
as an audio-visual recording which may be replayed. 
Bulevich also testified to his opinions regarding the 
suggestiveness of showup identification procedures, confirmation 
bias, and "the weapon focus effect."  He testified, based on 
research in this field, that showup identification procedures 
are inherently suggestive.  "[A] witness who has . . . seen a 
crime and you show a single individual and you say is this the 
person who did it.  It's more likely in that particular case for 
the person to essentially respond in the affirmative."  Bulevich 
explained that confirmation bias exists where "people become 
more sure or more confident of a judgment they've made with 
regard typically to an identification after they've been given 
confirming feedback."  In addition, Bulevich described research 
on the "weapon focus effect," which shows that a weapon tends to 
draw witnesses' attention away from the perpetrator, such that 
they are able to describe firearms used in an offense accurately 
29 
 
and in detail, but may have poor memories concerning other 
aspects of the event, including the perpetrator.   
 
The defendant maintains that his defense of mistaken 
identification was supported by "three pillars":  the victims' 
inability accurately to observe the robber given the 
circumstances of the offense; the inadequate general description 
used by police to arrest him; and the suggestive nature of the 
showup identification procedure.  The defendant contends that 
the judge's ruling "left one of those three pillars bereft of 
evidentiary support, rendering the entire foundation wobbly."   
 
Qualified expert testimony is admissible if it "will assist 
the trier of fact in determining a fact in issue or in 
understanding the evidence" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Little, 453 Mass. 766, 768 (2009).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 702 
(2019).  In the area of eyewitness identification, expert 
witness testimony "may be an important means of explaining 
counterintuitive principles."  Commonwealth v. Snyder, 475 Mass. 
445, 451 (2016).  "Eyewitness identification expert testimony 
also may be an important means of explaining how other variables 
relevant in a particular case can affect the reliability of the 
identification at issue."  Id.  See Gomes, 470 Mass. at 366 
(discussing value of expert testimony "accurately [to] discern 
the reliable eyewitness identification from the unreliable").  
30 
 
 
A trial judge retains discretion in deciding whether to 
allow the introduction of expert testimony.  See Snyder, 475 
Mass. at 451-452.  See also Commonwealth v. Watson, 455 Mass. 
246, 257 (2009) ("expert testimony concerning the reliability of 
eyewitness identification is not admissible as of right, but is 
left to the discretion of the trial judge"); Commonwealth v. 
Kent K., 427 Mass. 754, 762 (1998); Commonwealth v. Santoli, 424 
Mass. 837, 838 (1997).  We review the exclusion of expert 
testimony under an abuse of discretion standard, and consider 
whether the judge made a "clear error of judgment in weighing" 
the relevant factors "such that the decision falls outside the 
range of reasonable alternatives" (citation omitted).  L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).     
 
We conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion 
here.  The defendant was permitted to elicit expert testimony 
concerning the correlation between a witness's ability to 
describe a suspect and the reliability of a subsequent 
identification.  At a sidebar, the judge also ruled that the 
defendant could ask, 
"about the effect that the extent of the description has or 
has been found to have on eyewitness identifications, the 
reliability of them, but I don't want to hear those words 
it's more of a general description makes it more likely 
that it will be an erroneous one."  
 
When counsel responded that she was not sure how to ask the 
question without the witness answering as the judge described, 
31 
 
the judge clarified, "You can inquire about whether it affects 
identification, but I don't want an answer, an opinion that it 
makes it more likely that it's wrong."  Given these limitations, 
and counsel's repeated statement that the witness likely would 
respond as the judge had precluded, counsel chose not to enter 
into that area of questioning. 
The judge's comments at sidebar indicate his concern that 
the testimony could have been misleading had the expert 
testified, as counsel represented would be likely, that, in the 
expert's opinion, the police did not have an adequate basis to 
stop the defendant.  The exclusion of this testimony did not 
deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to a defense.  
As stated, counsel elicited significant other testimony 
concerning scientific studies on how memories may be confused, 
distorted, or jumbled in retrieval, including the particularly 
relevant testimony on the "weapons effect" and a witness's 
insufficient observations of other aspects of the crime when 
confronted by a firearm being pointed at the witness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.