Title: Ferguson v. Hjelle
Citation: 180 N.W.2d 408
Docket Number: 8646
State: north-dakota
Issuer: north-dakota Supreme Court
Date: September 21, 1970

180 N.W.2d 408 (1970) Clara B. FERGUSON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Walter R. HJELLE, as North Dakota State Highway Commissioner, and the North Dakota State Highway Department, Defendants and Appellants. Civ. No. 8646. Supreme Court of North Dakota. September 21, 1970. *409 Helgi Johanneson, Atty. Gen., and Myron E. Bothun, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Bismarck, for appellants. Tenneson, Serkland, Lundberg &amp; Erickson, Fargo, for respondent. ERICKSTAD, Judge. Walter R. Hjelle, as the North Dakota Highway Commissioner, and the North Dakota State Highway Department appeal from the order of the district court of Traill County, dated July 18, 1969, which granted a new trial to Clara B. Ferguson, a landowner, in an eminent domain proceeding. We shall hereinafter refer to the latter-named person as Mrs. Ferguson and to the former-named parties as the Commissioner. The pertinent part of the order granting the motion for a new trial reads: *410 The Commissioner asserts the following specifications of error: The motion on which the trial court acted to grant a new trial is in three parts. It asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict; (2) that the verdict is against the law; and (3) that the verdict of $4,975 for severance damages is so inadequate as to show disregard for the instructions rendered, evincing a verdict which was the result of confusion and misunderstanding on the part of the jury. In support of the three asserted reasons for granting a new trial, Mrs. Ferguson in Paragraphs a. through i. compares the Buringrud property with the Ferguson property and attempts with this comparison to show the inadequacy of the award of severance damages for the Ferguson property. It is to be noted that the case of the condemnation of the Buringrud property, involving land lying adjacent to the Ferguson property, was consolidated for trial with the Ferguson condemnation case. The motion for new trial concludes with a paragraph relative to the application of Rule 59(g) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, which paragraph follows: Subsections (b), par. 6, (g) and (i) of Rule 59 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure are pertinent to the determination of the issues in this case. Because we consider the comparison between the Buringrud land and the Ferguson land and the severance awards to each as immaterial, we shall not consider in this appeal the Buringrud transcript which the trial court has certified to this court, nor those parts of the specifications of error contained in the motion for new trial, as they relate to said comparisons, the said cases being separate and distinct and having been consolidated only for purposes of trial. *411 In support of specifications of error No. 1 and 2, the Commissioner refers us to Section 28-18-09, N.D.C.C., which reads: In support of his position that the insufficiency of the evidence was not set forth with sufficient particularity to comply with Section 28-18-09, N.D.C.C., the Commissioner refers us to a decision rendered by this court in 1961, wherein we said: On the other hand, Mrs. Ferguson points out that if the objection as to particularity is not made in the trial court, it should not prevail in the supreme court, as the requirement of specifying with particularity is intended basically to aid the trial court in determining whether or not the motion should be granted in the first instance. That Mrs. Ferguson is correct in this position is sustained by an earlier paragraph in the same case. Our review of the reply to the motion for new trial and the brief filed in the trial court convinces us that the Commissioner insufficiently asserted the failure on the part of Mrs. Ferguson to specify with particularity the insufficiency of the evidence. In construing the predecessor to Section 28-18-09, N.D.C.C., this court said: Notwithstanding our willingness to review the evidence in light of the specifications of error filed with Mrs. Ferguson's motion for a new trial, we find no basis for the trial court's action in granting the new trial. Mr. Harry Arneson, the appraiser called by Mrs. Ferguson, testified that the Ferguson land consisted of 364.32 acres, of which 49.66 acres was taken by the Highway Department for the right-of-way of Interstate 29, leaving 314.66 acres. He valued the Ferguson land at $300 per acre for a total of $109,296 before taking, and $71,299 after taking, resulting in damages of $37,997. Notwithstanding that testimony, he later testified that the land taken was worth $15,000 and that the severance damages were $15,231. This left a discrepancy in damages of $7,766. Under cross-examination Mr. Arneson testified that he diminished the value of the land by taking the 314.66 acres remaining and multiplying it by $50. That results in damages of $15,733 and leaves a discrepancy of $502. Mr. Kenneth Ziegler, the appraiser for the Commissioner, testified that the Ferguson land was worth $270 per acre, or $98,366.40 before the taking, and $80,762.62 after the taking. In itemizing the damages he listed $13,408.20 as the value of the land taken; $4,090.58 as severance damages; and $75 for the detour or easement area. Mr. Ziegler's figures include a $30 discrepancy. The Commissioner points out that the jury brought in a verdict of $14,898 for the land taken; $4,975.56 for the severance damages, and $75 for the easements. He stresses that both the damages for the land taken and the severance damages are within the limits of the evidence submitted to the jury, the jury accepting the value of the land as testified to by Mrs. Ferguson's appraiser and arriving at a figure for the severance damages, which is between the figures testified to by the two appraisers. The Commissioner inquires how the trial court could possibly be "shocked" by the verdict, in light of the state of the evidence and its instructions to the jury which, in connection with that point, read: The Commissioner recognizes that a motion for new trial is not confined to the question of whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict, but asserts that there must be facts in the record showing legal grounds for a new trial. He refers us to a part of what this court said in an earlier decision, concerning the specification of insufficiency of the evidence. In response to this contention, Mrs. Ferguson asserts that this court has adopted a more liberal philosophy since the Bigelow case and that the mere fact that the verdict is within the limits of the evidence does not require that a court sustain it against an assertion that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. In support of her position, she refers us to what this court said in a case not involving a condemnation proceeding, relative to the issue of the insufficiency of the evidence. The Commissioner answers by inquiring how the trial court could possibly have given greater weight to the testimony of Mr. Arneson (who arrived at severance damages with variance in his computations) than to the testimony of Mr. Ziegler, without some reasonable explanation for doing so. Although, as this writer attempted to point out in the dissent in Muhlhauser v. Archie Campbell Construction Co., 160 N.W.2d 524, at page 531 (N.D.1968), this court is more reluctant to overturn an order of the trial court granting a new trial than it is an order denying a new trial, there must be some basis in the record for the granting of the new trial. In Syllabus 2 of that case, the majority of the court said: *414 In this case, prior to the taking of a strip of land extending north and south through the center of section 28, Mrs. Ferguson owned the E 1/2 of section 28, less a strip of land for Highway 81 and the Great Northern Railway rights-of-way, and the E 1/2 of the SW 1/4 of section 28, which she farmed as a unit. With the taking for Interstate 29 the E 1/2 of the SW 1/4 was cut off from the rest of her land. Prior to the taking of the land for Interstate 29, Mrs. Ferguson could come onto her land at the southeast corner of the SE 1/4 and from that point farm all of the land which she owned west of U.S. Highway 81 and the Great Northern Railway rights-of-way. From that point now to reach that 80 acres from the south she must go south one mile, traverse the diamond exchange, proceed one mile west, one mile north, and then one-quarter of a mile east. She may reach the southwest corner of the 80 acres by proceeding from the north by crossing at the overhead bridge on the north, then proceeding west one-half mile, then south one mile, then east one-quarter of a mile. Admittedly, this is a circuitous route for her to travel to reach the 80 acres, but of this fact the jury was fully cognizant, and for this inconvenience, among other things, they have awarded Mrs. Ferguson her severance damages. Since the determination of damages in a condemnation case is primarily the responsibility of the jury, it is our view that the trial court abused its discretion in setting aside that verdict with no more explanation than that it was shocked with the verdict. We are likewise of the opinion that no basis was shown for the application of Rule 59(g) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, there being no evidence that the jury disregarded the instructions of the court or that it operated under a misapprehension of the instructions, or that it was influenced by passion or prejudice. Accordingly, the order of the trial court granting a new trial is reversed and the case is remanded for the entry of judgment, consistent with the verdict of the jury and this opinion. TEIGEN, C. J., and STRUTZ, PAULSON and KNUDSON, JJ., concur.