Title: Timothy Mason, Sr. v. Load King Manufacturing Co
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC93-356
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 11, 2000

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC93356
____________
TIMOTHY MASON, SR.,
Petitioner,
vs.
LOAD KING MANUFACTURING COMPANY and the FLORIDA
UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION,
Respondents.
[May 11, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review Mason v. Load King Manufacturing Co., 715 So. 2d 279
(Fla. 1st DCA 1998), on the basis of express and direct conflict with the opinion in
Blumetti v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 675 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 5th DCA
1996).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  For the following
reasons, we approve the rule in Mason finding that unemployment benefits are
appropriately denied when an employer can clearly demonstrate substantial and
excessive unexcused absenteeism by an employee as the basis for discharge,
regardless of whether the incident immediately precipitating the employee's actual
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termination is excused.
PROCEEDINGS TO DATE
Timothy Mason worked as a shear operator for Load King Manufacturing
Company from September 26, 1996, until his discharge for repeated attendance
violations on February 13, 1997.  Load King has a progressive disciplinary policy
which prohibits excessive absenteeism and tardiness.  Pursuant to the policy, the
employer applies a point system to each employee's attendance record.  If, for
example, an employee accumulates a total of ten points within a twelve-month
period, that employee may be subject to discipline, including termination.  Mason
signed Load King's company manual representing that he had read and understood
Load King's policies and rules, which included this attendance policy.   
From September 26, 1996, through February 1, 1997, a period of
approximately four months, Mason received eleven points, all resulting from
numerous absences and late arrivals.  Hence, his point total during the four-month
period already exceeded the maximum points allowed for a one-year period.  On
January 29, 1997, his supervisor counseled him about his attendance and gave him a
written warning.  Subsequently, Load King suspended him from work on February 3
and 4, and warned him that his job was in jeopardy.  After this suspension, on
February 8, 1997, Mason left work early, although with the approval of his
1An employee can be disqualified from receiving compensation benefits under section
443.101, Florida Statutes (1995), if it is found that the employee was terminated for misconduct
as defined in section 443.036(26), Florida Statutes (1995).  Under section 443.036(26),
misconduct is defined as:
     (a) Conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interests
as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the
employer has the right to expect of his employee; or 
     (b) Carelessness or negligence of such a degree or recurrence as to manifest
culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design or to show an intentional and substantial
disregard of the employer's interests or of the employees duties and obligations to
his employer.
-3-
immediate supervisor, because of personal illness.  Five days later, on February 13,
Mason was late because the individual with whom he rode to work did not pick him
up and he was forced to walk.  Mason was discharged on February 13 due to his
attendance problems.  
On February 20, 1997, Mason filed a claim for unemployment compensation
benefits.  In a Notice of Claims Determination dated March 13, 1997, Mason was
found to be disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits because of
misconduct connected with his work.1  Mason appealed, but this decision was
affirmed by the appeals referee, and then subsequently affirmed by the
Unemployment Appeals Commission.  Finally, Mason sought review in the First
District, which affirmed the prior rulings and held that an employer's burden of
proving misconduct on the part of the employee can be met by proof of the worker's
employment history of excessive and unauthorized absenteeism, which may
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otherwise be tantamount to misconduct.  See Mason, 715 So. 2d at 280-81.  
Mason has sought review here based on alleged conflict with the Fifth
District's decision in Blumetti, which found that the employer had not satisfied its
burden of proving misconduct in a similar situation because it found the incidents of
alleged misconduct immediately precipitating the employee's termination excusable. 
See Blumetti, 675 So. 2d at 691.  Both Blumetti and Mason rely on our decision in
Tallahassee Housing Authority v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 483
So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1986).  
Tallahassee Housing Authority
In Tallahassee Housing Authority, an employee, Barron, applied for
unemployment compensation after his discharge from the Tallahassee Housing
Authority.  The claims adjudicator found that Barron was discharged for excessive
absenteeism, which constituted misconduct connected with work; therefore, he was
not entitled to benefits.  Subsequently, at an evidentiary hearing before the appeals
referee, the Tallahassee Housing Authority presented a three-page summary of
Barron's attendance records as proof of his excessive absenteeism.  Based on the
attendance record reflected in this summary, the referee affirmed the claims
adjudicator's finding that Barron was guilty of misconduct and not entitled to
unemployment compensation.  The Unemployment Appeals Commission reversed,
2The definition of misconduct as provided in section 443.036(24) is the same as it was in
1985.  
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finding that the summary relied on by the referee was inadmissable hearsay.2 
On appeal, the First District rejected the Housing Authority's argument that a
showing of continued absenteeism alone is sufficient to justify termination.  See
Tallahassee Housing Auth. v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 463 So. 2d
1216 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).  More specifically, the court wrote: 
     Even accepting the summary as admissible evidence,
we affirm the commission's reversal of the appeals referee
on the basis of the commission's application of the law to
this case.  In our view, although excessive absenteeism or
tardiness may constitute misconduct which justifies
termination of employment and therefore precludes
collection of unemployment compensation benefits,
Sanchez v. Department of Labor, Etc., 411 So. 2d 313
(Fla. 3d DCA 1982), an employer has the burden under
section 443.036(24), Florida Statutes, to show misconduct
with a preponderance of proof that the absences were
indeed unexcusable and in detriment to the employer's
interests.
Id. at 1218.  However, upon review in this Court, we expressly rejected the
reasoning of the First District and held:
     We reject the reasoning of the district court in the
instant case.  In our view, excessive unauthorized
absenteeism presumptively hampers the operation of a
business and is inherently detrimental to an employer.  We
hold, therefore, that a finding of misconduct under section
443.036(24) is justified when an employer presents
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substantial competent evidence of an employee's
excessive unauthorized absenteeism.  Once excessive
unauthorized absenteeism is established, the burden is on
the employee to rebut the presumption that his
absenteeism can be characterized as "misconduct" within
the meaning of the statute.
Tallahassee Housing Authority, 483 So. 2d at 414 (emphasis added).  Even though
we ultimately found no competent, substantial evidence to support a finding of
misconduct, our ruling was based on the fact that the summary prepared by the
Housing Authority was not admissible evidence.  See id. at 415-16.  
Blumetti
In Blumetti, the employee Jay Blumetti appealed the Unemployment Appeals
Commission's denial of unemployment compensation benefits due to Blumetti's
excessive tardiness.  On appeal, the Fifth District noted that Blumetti had been
terminated because of his tardiness record in June, July and August.  At the end of
June, he had received a written warning that any further tardiness or infractions
could result in termination.  On July 20, he received another written warning for
leaving his job without permission.  However, the court found that the employer
relied primarily on two instances occurring on July 20 and August 6 to justify
Blumetti's termination, and the court found inadequate evidence to support a
conclusion that these incidents were unexcused and Blumetti's fault.
-7-
The court cited our decision in Tallahassee Housing Authority, and held that
in tardiness cases, the employer "must establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the former employee's tardiness was inexcusable and detrimental to the
employer's interest."  675 So. 2d at 690.  Finding that neither of the two most recent
instances on which the employer relied to justify Blumetti's termination could be
characterized as wanton disregard for the employer's interests or a deliberate
violation of the employer's rules to constitute misconduct, the court reversed the
denial of Blumetti's unemployment compensation benefits.  See id. at 691.   
THIS CASE
In Mason, the First District was faced with a situation somewhat similar to
the one faced by the Fifth District in Blumetti.  Mason's two prior incidents before
he was terminated–leaving work early because of personal illness and reporting to
work late because his transportation failed to pick him up, were found to be
excusable by the referee.  Notwithstanding, the referee found that Mason's prior
record evidenced a deliberate disregard of his duties and obligations to the
employer.  The First District agreed.  The First District also acknowledged the
decision in Blumetti, but found that it applied the wrong standard.  Specifically, it
stated: "We cannot agree with Blumetti that an employer's burden in establishing
misconduct is met only by a showing that the conduct immediately precipitating the
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employee's termination from employment was inexcusable."  Mason, 715 So. 2d at
280.  
As previously mentioned, the statutory provisions defining misconduct are the
same today as they were in 1985.  Section 443.036(26) defines misconduct as:
     (a) Conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard
of an employer's interests as is found in deliberate
violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the
employer has the right to expect of his employee; or 
     (b) Carelessness or negligence of such a degree or
recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or
evil design or to show an intentional and substantial
disregard of the employer's interests or of the employees
duties and obligations to his employer.
In Tallahassee Housing Authority we held that an employer satisfies his burden of
proving "misconduct under section 443.036(24) . . . when an employer presents
substantial competent evidence of an employee's excessive unauthorized
absenteeism."  483 So. 2d at 414.  Once an employer has proven an employee's
excessive unauthorized absenteeism, the burden is properly shifted to the employee
to rebut the presumption that his absenteeism can be characterized as misconduct. 
See id. 
The shifting of the burden to the employee to disprove misconduct in
Tallahassee Housing Authority was predicated upon the presentation of satisfactory
proof by an employer of a serious and identifiable pattern of excessive absenteeism
3Although Tallahassee Housing Authority dealt with absenteeism and Blumetti dealt with
tardiness, they both deal with attendance problems and are sufficiently analogous to be treated the
same.  In fact, excessive tardiness has been held to constitute misconduct under the statute.  See,
e.g., Martinson v. Breit's Tower Service, Inc., 680 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Sumlar v.
Intermodal Services, Inc., 429 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Sanchez v. Department of Labor
& Employment Security, 411 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).    
4In C. F. Industries, the employee was discharged for excessive tardiness, excessive
absenteeism, violation of safety rules, failing to report an accident involving injury, and
unsatisfactory performance.  See id. at 865.  In each case, the employee was given a warning.  See
id.  The employee argued that because the final act leading to his termination (an accusation that
the employee had falsified records) was not proven, he could not be found to have been
discharged for misconduct associated with his work as defined by the statute.  See id.  However,
even though the referee found that the employer had failed to prove that the employee had
falsified records, the court held there was competent and substantial evidence to support the
referee's finding that the employee was discharged for misconduct connected with his work.  See
id. at 866.
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or late arrivals.3  For example, to prove "excessive unauthorized absenteeism," an
employer must prove more than one act.  See e.g., Higgins v. Iowa Dep’t of Job
Service, 350 N.W.2d 187, 192 (Iowa 1984) (stating that the determination of
whether "unexcused absenteeism" is "excessive" necessarily requires the
consideration of past acts and warnings).  It logically follows that the employee's
entire course of conduct must be considered, not just the acts immediately
precipitating the employee's discharge.  In fact, at least one Florida case has found
misconduct and denied unemployment compensation even when the final act leading
directly to the employee's discharge was not proved by the employer.  See C.F.
Industries, Inc. v. Long, 364 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).4  
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In order to prove misconduct under Tallahassee Housing Authority,
employers have the burden of demonstrating both excessiveness and wilfulness in
the employee's actions.  The term "unauthorized" implicitly connotes an element of
wilfulness because it means that the absences were unexcused and without the
permission of the employer.  By “unauthorized absences,” we are generally referring
to those absences where the employee has wilfully chosen to violate her
fundamental obligation to an employer to come to work and carry out her assigned
duties.  Obviously, the failure of an employee to carry out his or her obligation can
be devastating to the functioning of an employer's business.  Excessiveness must
also be proven.  While we realize that excessiveness may well depend on factors
such as the particular employment context and presence or absence of workplace
guidelines, we do not deem it unreasonable to require an employer who seeks to
deny a former employee unemployment compensation benefits to meet this burden.  
In defining misconduct, courts are required to liberally construe the statute in
favor of the employee.  See Roberts v. Diehl, 707 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998);
Baptiste v. Waste Management, Inc., 701 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Gilbert
v. Department of Corrections, 696 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Foote v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 659 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). 
Additionally, awards determinations must be made against the backdrop that the
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remedial aspect of the unemployment compensation statutory scheme requires a
liberal construction in favor of awarding benefits.  See St. Joe Paper Co. v.
Gautreaux, 180 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965).  The denial of unemployment
benefits is a very serious consequence with very serious repercussions for
employees, adopted by the Legislature only to deter misconduct in the employment
context.  As such, awards determinations under this statutory scheme should not be
taken lightly and should not be made via a mere technical and formalistic procedure. 
Load King hired Mason with the expectation and on the reliance that he
would comply with its attendance policy.  Yet, in a period of just over four months,
Mason was absent four times, late four times and left early one time.  He
accumulated more points under the company's attendance policy in this four-month
period than the allotted yearly amount.  As noted earlier, Mason accepted his
position while on actual notice of the company's attendance policy.  Given his
history of unauthorized absenteeism with the company and the fact that within two
weeks after having served a two-day suspension, Mason left early on one day and
was late on another day, we agree that the record supports a finding of an
established pattern of excessive absenteeism and tardiness sufficient to constitute
misconduct and render Mason ineligible to receive benefits.  See Thurber v. Hillier
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& Wanless, P.A., 642 So. 2d 75 (Fla 4th DCA 1994) (employee's absence from
work without authorization constituted misconduct and rendered him ineligible for
benefits); Sanchez v. Dep’t of Labor & Employment Security, 411 So. 2d 313 (Fla.
3d DCA 1982) (employee's failure to work minimum of forty hours during any of
the four-month period he was employed together with an authorized absence from
work constituted misconduct); Castillo v. Florida Dep’t of Commerce, 253 So. 2d
162 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971) (employee's continued absenteeism severely hampering the
employer in carrying workload of the plant constituted misconduct for which
unemployment compensation could be denied).  Applying the standard espoused in
Tallahassee Housing Authority, we find that Load King Manufacturing satisfied its
burden of proof, and, as a result, Mason was properly terminated for misconduct as
defined in section 443.036(26), Florida Statutes (1995).
Mason alleges that under the rule in C.F. Industries and the District Court’s
decision in the present case, an employer can in essence hold an employee hostage
for any length of time, fire him for any reason, and then deny him unemployment
benefits citing excessive unauthorized absenteeism as the reason.  We find no merit
to Mason's argument.  When dealing with the unemployment compensation scheme,
the referee must factor this length of time into his decision.  In other words, in
absenteeism cases, the more attenuated the precipitating acts leading to the
5As a matter of public policy, adopting the rule of the district court’s decision in this case
may actually favor employees in at least one significant way.  In unemployment compensation
cases, it appears that employers choose disciplinary measures less severe than termination, even in
cases where if the employer had chosen to terminate the employee, a denial of unemployment
benefits would have been justified.  See, e.g., Mason, 715 So. 2d at 279 (employee suspended
before being terminated); Blumetti, 675 So. 2d at 691 (employee received numerous warnings
before finally being terminated); C.F. Industries, Inc., 364 So. 2d at 865 (employee given warning
or layoff after each incident of misconduct before finally being terminated).  In cases where the
employee has already exhibited a history of misconduct, our decision today encourages employers
to continue to issue these warnings and suspensions to employees for violations of company
attendance policies and to continue to work with these employees, rather than simply terminating
them to avoid the liability of unemployment benefits.
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employee's termination are from the established pattern of absenteeism, the harder it
becomes for the employer to prove misconduct under the heavy burden established
in Tallahassee Housing Authority and its progeny.  Conversely, the opposite is true. 
The closer the final act leading to the discharge is to the pattern of absenteeism, the
easier it should be for the employer to prove misconduct under the unemployment
statutory scheme.5  Moreover, as in Tallahassee Housing Authority, we emphasize
that before an award of unemployment benefits can be denied, the employer must
prove misconduct by satisfying the heavy burden of proving "excessive
unauthorized absenteeism."  
We do not believe that the opinion in Blumetti necessarily conflicts with our
holding in Tallahassee Housing Authority or the First District's holding in this case. 
Rather, we read the Blumetti opinion as finding a problem with the evidence of the
employee's misconduct.  In Blumetti the Fifth District acknowledged our holding in
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Tallahassee Housing Authority but held that the employer's proof was insufficient. 
Although in dicta the court stated that it would have probably affirmed the case had
Blumetti's employer terminated him after he arrived to work a few minutes late in
early August, following written warnings in June, the court went on to find that the
employer had not proven that a number of the incidents primarily relied upon to
prove misconduct were the employee's fault as claimed.  See Blumetti, 675 So. 2d at
691.  Accordingly, the court implicitly held that the few instances of alleged
misconduct remaining were insufficient to constitute excessive unauthorized
absenteeism.  Such a record contrasts sharply with the record here demonstrating
misconduct regardless of the incidents immediately preceding Mason's discharge. 
The Blumetti court did not say that the employer must prove that the conduct
immediately precipitating the employee's termination was inexcusable in order to
meet its burden of establishing misconduct.  However, to the extent that the opinion
may be read that way, as it apparently was by the First District here, we disapprove
of such a requirement.
CONCLUSION
In light of this state's prior decisions, especially the standard set out by this
Court in Tallahassee Housing Authority requiring the employer to prove "excessive
unauthorized absenteeism," and the public policy considerations set out above, we
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approve the decision of the district court in this case and disapprove Blumetti to the
extent it conflicts with the views expressed herein.  
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
SHAW, J., dissents with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ.,
concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
SHAW, J., dissenting.
The referee from the Unemployment Compensation Appeals Bureau ruled as
follows:  (1) "[A]ccumulated violations of the employer's interests over the course of
a claimant's employment can show misconduct, even if the final incident leading to
the discharge was not misconduct"; and (2) "[t]he claimant's refusal to report to
work as scheduled for reasons of a noncompelling nature, evidences a deliberate
disregard of his duties and obligations to the employer, and constitutes misconduct
connected with work."  The present majority opinion affirms both these rulings.  I
disagree.
I.  FACTS  
Mason was fired from his job at Load King Manufacturing Company due to
his attendance record, and his application for unemployment compensation benefits
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was denied.  The relevant facts are set forth in the referee's report:
The claimant was employed as a shear operator
from September 27, 1996, until February 13, 1997.  The
employer has a progressive disciplinary policy, and
known employer policy prohibits excessive absenteeism
and lateness reporting for work.  On December 16, 1996,
the claimant was late reporting for work for unspecified
reasons.  The claimant was late reporting for work on
December 18, 1996, with the approval of his immediate
supervisor, because he had to go to school with his son. 
The claimant was late reporting for work on December
20, 1996, for unspecified reasons.  The claimant had car
trouble on occasion which would cause him to be late. 
On December 30, 1996, the claimant was absent for
unspecified reasons.  The claimant had previously been
absent due to marital problems.  The claimant was absent
on January 27, 1997, for unspecified reasons.  The
claimant was absent on January 29, 1997, because he was
trying to find a place to live, and was counseled about his
attendance and given a written warning.  The claimant
was suspended on February 3 and 4, 1997, due to his
attendance, and warned that his job was in jeopardy.  The
claimant left before the end of his shift on February 8,
1997, due to personal illness, with the approval of this
immediate supervisor.  The claimant was late reporting for
work on February 13, 1997, because the individual with
whom he rode to work did not pick him up and he had to
walk.  The claimant was discharged on February 13,
1997, due to his attendance.
The referee affirmed the adjudicator's order denying benefits, the Unemployment
Appeals Commission (the "Commission") affirmed the referee's decision, and the
district court affirmed the Commission's order.  Mason contends that the tribunals
6  See, e.g., DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 1980)
("[W]here the term of employment is discretionary with either party or indefinite, then either party
for any reason may terminate it at any time and no action may be maintained for breach of the
employment contract." (quoting DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So. 2d 134, 136
(Fla. 3d DCA 1978)).
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erred.
II.  THE APPLICABLE LAW
The present case is not a "wrongful discharge" case.  The issue is not whether
Load King had adequate grounds to fire Mason based on his lapses in attendance. 
Under Florida law, barring an agreement to the contrary, an employer generally can
discharge an "at will" employee without cause.6  Rather, the present case is a "denial
of benefits" case.  The issue is whether Mason was improperly denied
unemployment benefits due to his attendance.  The conditions surrounding Mason's
firing are relevant because, under the applicable law, a worker discharged for
"misconduct" is ineligible for benefits.  The decision as to what constitutes
"misconduct" in each case is made not by the employer but by the Commission,
based on statutory criteria.  The standard governing disqualification is far more
rigorous than the standard governing discharge.
The Florida Unemployment Compensation Law (the "Law") is codified in
chapter 443, Florida Statutes (1997).  In determining the scope of coverage under
7  See, e.g., Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass'n v. Florida Div.
of Admin. Hearings, 686 So. 2d 1349, 1354 (Fla. 1997).
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the Law, legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court's inquiry.7  The
legislative statement of policy is broad:
Declaration of public policy.--As a guide to the
interpretation and application of this chapter, the public
policy of this state is declared to be as follows:  Economic
insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the
health, morals, and welfare of the people of this state. 
Unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest
and concern which requires appropriate action by the
Legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden
which now so often falls with crushing force upon the
unemployed worker and her or his family.  The
achievement of social security requires protection against
this greatest hazard of our economic life. . . .  The
Legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered
judgment the public good, and the general welfare of the
citizens of this state require the enactment of this measure,
under the police power of the state . . . for the compulsory
setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the
benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their
own, subject, however, to the specific provisions of this
chapter.
§ 443.021, Fla. Stat. (1997).  The legislature has implemented a rule of liberal
construction for chapter 443:
Rule of liberal construction.--This chapter shall be
liberally construed to accomplish its purpose to promote
employment security . . . .  [A]ll doubts as to the proper
construction of any provision of this chapter shall be
resolved in favor of conformity with such requirements.
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§ 443.031, Fla. Stat. (1997).
A worker may be disqualified from benefits under chapter 443, inter alia, if he
or she is fired for "misconduct":
Disqualification for benefits.--An individual shall be
disqualified for benefits:
(1)  . . . [I]f he or she has voluntarily left his or her
work without good cause attributable to his or her
employing unit or [if] the individual has been discharged
by his or her employing unit for misconduct connected
with his or her work, if so found by the division.  The
term "work," as used in this paragraph, means any work,
whether full-time, part-time, or temporary.
§ 443.101, Fla. Stat. (1997) (emphasis added).  The term "misconduct" is defined
thusly:
MISCONDUCT.--"Misconduct" includes, but is
not limited to the following, which shall not be construed
in pari materia with each other:
(a)  Conduct evincing such willful or wanton
disregard of an employer's interests as is found in
deliberate violation or disregard of the standards of
behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his
or her employee; or
(b)  Carelessness or negligence of such a degree or
recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or
evil design or to show an intentional and substantial
disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's
duties and obligations to his or her employer. 
§ 443.036(26), Fla. Stat. (1997) (emphasis added).
This Court in Tallahassee Housing Authority v. Florida Unemployment
8  See Blumetti v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 675 So. 2d 689, 690 (Fla. 5th DCA
1996) ("[T]he employer in such cases must establish . . . that the former employee's tardiness was
inexcusable . . . .") (emphasis added).
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Appeals Commission, 483 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1986), held that a finding of misconduct
may be based on "excessive unauthorized absenteeism":
In our view, excessive unauthorized absenteeism
presumptively hampers the operation of a business and is
inherently detrimental to any employer.  We hold,
therefore, that a finding of misconduct under section
443.036(24) is justified when an employer presents
substantial competent evidence of an employee's
excessive unauthorized absenteeism.  Once excessive
unauthorized absenteeism is established, the burden is on
the employee to rebut the presumption that his
absenteeism can be characterized as "misconduct" within
the meaning of the statute.
Tallahassee Housing Authority, 483 So. 2d at 414 (emphasis added).  Stated in the
converse:  A finding of misconduct is not justified based on evidence of authorized
absenteeism.8
III.  THE PRESENT CASE
In the present case, the referee reached the following conclusions of law in
her order denying benefits:
The record reflects that the claimant was discharged due
to his attendance.  Employers have a right to expect
employees to report to work as scheduled unless the
employee properly reports the absence and provides a
compelling reason for it.  The claimant was late on
9  See Blumetti v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 675 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
(holding that disqualification cannot be based on Blumetti’s prior record of misconduct if the
precipitating act was excusable).
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February 13, 1997, because he had to walk to work when
his ride to work did not pick him up.  The claimant's
lateness was for a compelling reason.  However,
accumulated violations of the employers's interests over
the course of the claimant's employment can show
misconduct, even if the final incident leading to the
discharge was not misconduct.  By his own testimony, the
claimant was late on occasion due to car trouble, or for
unspecified reasons, and he had been absent due to
marital problems, or because he was trying to find a place
to live.  The claimant had been counseled about his
attendance and warned that his job was in jeopardy.  The
claimant's refusal to report to work as scheduled for
reasons of a noncompelling nature, evidences a deliberate
disregard of his duties and obligations to the employer,
and constitutes misconduct connected with work. 
Accordingly, the claimant is not qualified to receive
unemployment compensation benefits.
(Citation omitted; emphasis added.)  I disagree with these conclusions.  First, under
the plain language of chapter 443, in order to justify disqualification the
precipitating act itself must constitute "misconduct."9  Second, Load King failed to
show that either the precipitating act or Mason's prior record constituted
"misconduct."
A.  The Precipitating Act 
The gist of the referee’s ruling is that a worker can be disqualified from
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benefits based on a prior record of misconduct, even if the conduct that precipitated
the discharge was authorized.  This rule violates the plain language and broad
purpose of chapter 443.  Section 443.101(1) expressly states that disqualification is
justified if the worker is “discharged . . . for misconduct,” and section 443.036(26)
defines misconduct as “willful or wanton” conduct that “deliberately” disregards the
employer’s standards.  When (as in the present case) an employer opts to counsel
rather than fire a worker based on a prior record of misconduct, the employer at that
point elects not to discharge the worker for the prior record standing alone.  If the
employer later fires the worker based on a subsequent precipitating act, the
employer at that point discharges the worker for the precipitating act–either standing
alone or in conjunction with the prior record–not for the prior record.  To say
otherwise is to play word games with chapter 443.
To ignore the plain language of these statutes and hold (as the present
majority opinion does) that disqualification may be based on a precipitating act that
is authorized is to create a workplace governed not by the objective criteria set forth
in chapter 443 but by each employer's subjective criteria for disqualification.  A
counseled worker will be at the mercy of his or her employer and can be
"blindsided" at any time--and denied benefits--based on an authorized or otherwise
innocent act, even if the worker has scrupulously honored any bargain struck at
10  See generally § 443.021, Fla. Stat. (1997).
11  See supra notes 7-8.
12  The referee found that this lapse in attendance was made with "the approval of his
immediate supervisor."
13  The referee found that this lapse in attendance "was for a compelling reason."
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counseling.  This is precisely the evil that chapter 443 was intended to dispel--i.e.,
social insecurity.10  Under the plain language of the above statutes and the rule of
liberal construction contained in section 443.031, the precipitating act itself–either
standing alone or in conjunction with the prior record–must constitute misconduct.
In the present case, the referee found that the two incidents precipitating
Mason's firing were authorized or otherwise comported with chapter 443.11  Mason
was counseled on January 29, 1997, concerning his absenteeism.  He subsequently
left work early due to illness on February 8 with the approval of his supervisor,12
and he arrived late at work on February 13 after his "ride" failed to show and Mason
was forced to walk.13  Neither act constituted the same type of conduct for which he
had been counseled a few days earlier.  The printed counseling form, entitled
“EMPLOYEE WARNING NOTICE,” that was used to counsel Mason on
January 29 contained a box labeled "Lateness/Early Quit," and this box was not
checked off; only the box stating “Excessive Absences” was checked off.  Mason
explained:
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Okay.  They said that I was terminated for
absenteeism . . . .  Okay.  After I got my two day
suspension, I missed no more days, and the day I came to
work 30 minutes--24 min--30 minutes late, they terminate
me.  Well, I had never had no problem being late 'cause I
[had gotten that] straightened out . . . . 
Under the plain language of chapter 443, the referee should not have disregarded the
fact that the two precipitating acts did not constitute misconduct.
B.  The Prior Record
In her order denying benefits, the referee stated that Mason's "refusal to
report to work as scheduled for reasons of a noncompelling nature" constituted valid
grounds for disqualification.  This is the wrong standard for disqualification.  As
noted above, chapter 443 authorizes disqualification based on willful or wanton
conduct that deliberately disregards the employer's standards.  The criterion applied
by the referee--i.e., whether the absence was for a compelling reason--differs vastly
from this statutory definition and injects into the scheme an element of
subjectiveness and uncertainty that the statute seeks to avoid, for who is to say what
constitutes a "compelling" reason?  (How pressing must a transportation problem
be?  How severe must a personal illness or injury be?  How dire a family problem? 
How catastrophic an act of God?)
Pursuant to this Court's holding in Tallahassee Housing, the proper criterion
14   As noted above, the referee made the following findings concerning Mason's lapses in
attendance:  December 16 (tardy; unspecified reasons); December 18 (tardy; excused); December
20 (tardy; unspecified reasons); December 30 (absent; unspecified reasons); January 27 (absent;
unspecified reasons); January 29 (absent; finding a place to live) (counseled); February 3 & 4
(suspended); February 8 (left early; excused); February 13 (tardy; excused).  The record shows
that Mason's supervisor, William Cromity, did not recall why Mason was tardy or absent on
December 16, 20, 30, and January 27.  Mason attributed the lapses in attendance to car trouble
(December 16, December 20), or he too did not recall (December 30, January 27).  Mason
testified that he always called in when he was going to be late or absent:
REFEREE:  Okay.  Let me ask you, Mr. Mason, the times
that you were absent, did you notify someone that you weren't
gonna be reporting for work?
MASON:  Every time I missed a day, I called.
REFEREE:  What if you were gonna be late?
MASON:  When I'm a [sic] be late, I call.
15  On only one occasion (i.e., concerning Mason's leaving work early on February 8,
1997) did the referee ask whether the lapse in attendance was authorized.
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for determining whether a lapse in attendance constitutes misconduct is whether the
lapse was authorized.  In the present case, the referee determined that the two
precipitating acts and several of Mason's prior lapses in attendance were authorized
or otherwise comported with chapter 443.  The referee, however, did not determine
that the remaining lapses in Mason’s prior record were unauthorized.14  Nor could
the referee have done so, for no such inquiry was made at the hearing.  Mason was
tardy or absent on a number of occasions throughout his tenure at Load King, but
the referee asked only whether one specific lapse (on February 8) was approved by
the employer and concluded that this lapse was authorized.15
On the present record, it is entirely possible that Mason was fired for
16  I also would disapprove C. F. Industries, Inc. v. Long, 364 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2d DCA
1978).  I would approve the result in Blumetti v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 675 So.
2d 689 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
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excessive authorized lapses in attendance.  In point of fact, the printed counseling
form that Load King gave Mason on January 29 depicted a number of possible
offenses, but the critical box stating "Unexcused Absence(s)" was not checked off. 
The referee concluded simply that Mason "was discharged due to his attendance." 
Thus, not only did Load King fail to show that the two acts precipitating Mason's
discharge constituted misconduct, but Load King also failed to show that the lapses
in his prior record were unauthorized.
IV.  CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the Commission erred in disqualifying
Mason from unemployment benefits based on "misconduct."  Load King did not
establish by competent substantial evidence that Mason was discharged for
excessive unauthorized lapses in attendance, as required by Tallahassee Housing. 
Rather, Load King established simply that he was fired "due to his attendance." 
While this may have been a legitimate reason for Load King to discharge Mason, it
was not a valid reason for the Commission to disqualify him.
I would quash Mason v. Load King Manufacturing Co., 715 So. 2d 279 (Fla.
1st DCA 1998).16
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ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct
Conflict of Decisions 
First District No. 1D97-2754
Leatrice Williams Walton and Mitchell S. Ritchie, Jacksonville, Florida,
for Petitioner
John D. Maher, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondents