Title: Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co. v. Northfield Ins. Co
Citation: 351 N.C. 293
Docket Number: 10PA99
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: February 4, 2000

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 10PA99
GASTON COUNTY DYEING MACHINE COMPANY, TAX I.D. NO. 56-02-32800,
Plaintiff
v.
NORTHFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY, LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
ROSENMUND, INC., ALLENDALE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, STERLING
WINTHROP, INC., and STERLING PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., AND
INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants,
and
UNITED CAPITOL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Intervenor
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a
decision of the Court of Appeals, 131 N.C. App. 438, 509 S.E.2d
778 (1998), affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding
an order signed 3 February 1997 by Jones (Julia V.), J., in
Superior Court, Mecklenburg County.  Heard in the Supreme Court
17 September 1999.
Yates, McLamb & Weyher, L.L.P., by Barbara B. Weyher; and
Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal & Banker, P.A., by
Tracy R. Gunn, pro hac vice, for defendant-appellant
Northfield Insurance Company.
Dean & Gibson, L.L.P., by Rodney Dean and Barbara J. Dean,
for defendant-appellee Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.
Lustig & Brown, L.L.P., by James J. Duggan, pro hac vice;
and Henson & Henson, L.L.P., by Perry Henson, Jr., for
defendant-appellee International Insurance Company.
Golding, Meekins, Holden, Cosper & Stiles, L.L.P., by
Harvey L. Cosper, Jr.; and Sedgwick, Detert, Moran, &
Arnold, by Sidney Rosen, pro hac vice, for intervenor-
appellant United Capital Insurance Company.
Parker, Poe, Adams & Bernstein L.L.P., by Josephine H.
Hicks, on behalf of Hoechst Celanese Corporation, amicus
curiae.
Rivkin, Radler & Kremer, by Richard S. Feldman, pro hac
vice; and Bennett & Guthrie, L.L.P., by Richard Bennett, on
behalf of Commercial Union Insurance Company and Fireman’s
Fund Insurance Company, amici curiae.
FRYE, Chief Justice.
In this case, the trial court reformed primary and excess
policies covering plaintiff so as to afford full coverage to
defendant Rosenmund, Inc. (Rosenmund); applied the “injury-in-
fact” date in determining when damage to property occurred;
concluded that the applicable policy period was a one year period
beginning 1 July 1991; and ruled that the policy issued by
intervenor was excess to all other coverage available to
Rosenmund.  The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in
part the trial court’s order.  We allowed discretionary review to
determine the correctness of the Court of Appeals’ decision.
This case arises out of a products liability action that was
originally filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico on 17 December 1992.  Sterling
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Sterling); Sterling Winthrop, Inc.; and
Allendale Mutual Insurance Company filed the underlying action to
recover damages in excess of $20 million from Gaston County
Dyeing Machine Company (Gaston), Rosenmund, and their insurers. 
The original complaint alleged defects in the design and
manufacture of pressure vessels fabricated by Gaston for
Rosenmund and sold by Rosenmund to Sterling for use in 
production of contrast media dyes for diagnostic medical imaging. 
On 21 June 1992, Sterling modified the production process,
increasing the operating pressure in one of the pressure vessels. 
On 31 August 1992, Sterling discovered that ethylene glycol, a
chemical used in connection with the heating process, had leaked
into the vessel and contaminated over sixty tons of the contrast
media dye.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual),
Northfield Insurance Company (Northfield), and International
Insurance Company (International) had issued policies insuring 
Gaston effective for the policy periods 1 July 1991 to 1 July
1992 and 1 July 1992 to 1 July 1993.  For each policy period,
Liberty Mutual issued to Gaston a comprehensive general liability
(CGL) policy providing $1 million in primary coverage per
occurrence and a commercial umbrella excess liability policy
providing $1 million coverage per occurrence.  Rosenmund
purported to be an additional named insured on the Liberty Mutual
policies.  Northfield issued to Gaston commercial excess
liability policies providing $5 million coverage for the 1991-92
policy period and $9 million for the 1992-93 policy period. 
International issued to Gaston commercial excess liability
policies providing $9 million coverage for the 1991-92 policy
period and $5 million for the 1992-93 policy period.  The Liberty
Mutual, Northfield, and International policies are all
“occurrence-based” policies, and the Northfield and International
excess policies “follow the form” of the Liberty Mutual umbrella
policies.  United Capital Insurance Company (United) issued to
Rosenmund a separate CGL policy providing $2 million coverage on
a “claims-made” basis for claims reported during the 4 October
1991 to 4 October 1992 policy period.
In February 1994, Gaston brought this action for declaratory
judgment against all its insurers, the plaintiffs from the
underlying action, and Rosenmund.  As an additional insurer for
Rosenmund, United was allowed to intervene.  Northfield filed a
parallel declaratory judgment action in Puerto Rico.
Liberty Mutual provided defense to Rosenmund in the
underlying action from 8 July 1993 until 23 August 1993, when
Liberty Mutual withdrew after determining that the “additional
insured” endorsements of the Gaston policies did not cover
Rosenmund for products liability.  United assumed Rosenmund’s
defense in the underlying action under its 4 October 1991 to
4 October 1992 CGL policy until 26 January 1996, when Liberty
Mutual resumed Rosenmund’s defense pursuant to a partial 
settlement agreement between the two parties.
Later in 1995, the underlying action was resolved by
settlement agreement, and Gaston and Rosenmund dismissed their
claims against the insurers.  The four insurance carriers
contributed to a settlement fund of $11 million as follows: 
Liberty Mutual, $2 million; United, $2 million; Northfield,
$5 million; and International, $2 million.  Pursuant to a
stipulation of the insurers, the following issues were reserved
for judicial determination:  choice of law and forum; trigger of
coverage; priority of coverage; allocation of payments among
insurers; and whether Rosenmund was afforded the same coverage as
Gaston under the Liberty Mutual, International, and Northfield
policies.
In 1996, following settlement of the underlying action,
Liberty Mutual, International, and United filed motions for
summary judgment in the North Carolina declaratory judgment
action.  The summary judgment motions were heard at the
5 December 1996 Civil Session of Superior Court, Mecklenburg
County, and an additional hearing was held on 17 January 1997.
After determining that there were no issues of material fact
and that North Carolina law was applicable to all issues, the
trial court found as follows:
4.
. . . [O]n June 21, 1992 damage occurred to
products being manufactured by Sterling Pharmaceuticals
as the result of pressure vessel leakage, and that
damage continued to result from the same or
substantially the same leaking condition from June 21,
1992 until discovery of the damage on August 31, 1992.
5.
. . . [T]here was one “occurrence” as that
term is used in all applicable insurance policies.
6.
. . . [T]he “occurrence” of damages in this
case took place on June 21, 1992 when the leak damage
commenced.
7.
. . . [T]he damages in this case resulted
from continuous or repeated exposure to substantially
the same general harmful conditions, i[.]e., pressure
vessel leakage resulting in the contamination of
pharmaceutical dye with ethylene glycol during the
manufacturing process at Sterling Pharmaceuticals.
8.
. . . [T]he date upon which damage occurred
can be established without question or uncertainty even
though the existence of the damage was not immediately
discovered.  Under these circumstances, the Court finds
that applicable North Carolina law is that the “injury-
in-fact” that took place on June 21, 1992 triggers the
coverages applicable on that date and that the
liability of the respective insurance carriers is for
the coverages applicable on June 21, 1992 . . . .
9.
. . . [T]he Liberty Mutual policies, the
Northfield policy, and the International policy for the
period July 1, 1992 to July 1, 1993 are not applicable
to the loss in question.
. . . . 
12.
. . . Rosenmund is entitled to coverage for
the claims of Sterling Pharmaceuticals as an additional
insured under the Liberty Mutual primary and excess
policies; as such, Rosenmund is also entitled to full
coverage for the claims of Sterling Pharmaceutical[s]
under the Northfield and International . . . policies
which the Court finds follow form to the Liberty Mutual
excess policies.
13.
. . . [T]he policies of insurance issued by
Liberty Mutual, Northfield, and International are
“occurrence” policies, while the policy of insurance
issued by United Capitol is a “claims made” policy. 
The facts are undisputed that the claim made in this
case was during the pendency of the United Capitol
policy that provided coverage from a period of
October 4, 1991 to October 4, 1992.  It is undisputed
that not only did all damages take place during that
period of time, but claims were also duly made to
United Capitol during that same policy period. 
However, the Court finds that the United Capitol policy
is excess above the other coverage available to
Rosenmund, therefore its coverage is not reached.
. . . .
15.
. . . [T]he coverage obligations of the
carriers for funding the $11 million settlement on
behalf of Gaston and Rosenmund are as follows:
a.
Liberty Mutual - primary coverage -
$1 million
b.
Liberty Mutual - excess coverage - $1 million
c.
Northfield - $5 million
d.
International n/k/a Westchester - $4 million
16.
. . . United Capitol is entitled to
reformation of the Liberty Mutual policies to provide
Rosenmund with product liability coverage and to a
declaration of coverage for Rosenmund for the claims of
Sterling Pharmaceuticals as an additional insured under
the Liberty Mutual primary and excess policies and
under the Northfield and International n/k/a
Westchester policies, which follow form to the Liberty
Mutual excess policies; and that United Capitol’s
policy is excess over all other coverages available to
Rosenmund.  Accordingly, Liberty Mutual must pay all
costs of defense for Rosenmund, United Capitol is
entitled to reimbursement from Liberty Mutual for its
costs of defending Rosenmund, and United Capitol is
entitled to reimbursement from International n/k/a
Westchester for its contribution toward the settlement
of Sterling Pharmaceuticals’ claims.
Based on its findings and conclusions, the trial court ordered
that United recover $453,443 from Liberty Mutual in defense costs
for Rosenmund and $2 million from International, plus interest on
both amounts.  From this order, International and Liberty Mutual
appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed that part of the trial court’s
order reforming the primary and excess policies covering Gaston
so as to afford Rosenmund full coverage.  However, the Court of
Appeals reversed those portions of the trial court’s order
(1) applying the “injury-in-fact” date in determining when the
damage to Sterling’s property occurred, (2) concluding that the
applicable policy period was 1 July 1991 to 1 July 1992 rather
than 1 July 1992 to 1 July 1993, and (3) ruling that the United
policy was excess to all other coverage available to Rosenmund. 
This Court allowed petitions for discretionary review by
Northfield and United on 8 April 1999.
We must decide the following issues raised by the two
petitions for discretionary review:  whether application of an
“injury-in-fact” or a “date-of-discovery” trigger of coverage is
appropriate where the date of property damage is known and
undisputed; whether there was a single occurrence or multiple
occurrences triggering the first policy year, the second policy
year, or both; and whether Rosenmund’s own policy issued by
United should be considered excess to or contributing with the
Liberty Mutual and International policies issued to Gaston and
under which Rosenmund was an additional insured.  For the reasons
stated below, we reverse the Court of Appeals as to these issues.
We begin by noting the well-established principle that “an
insurance policy is a contract and its provisions govern the
rights and duties of the parties thereto.”  Fidelity Bankers Life
Ins. Co. v. Dortch, 318 N.C. 378, 380, 348 S.E.2d 794, 796
(1986).  The rules of construction for insurance policies are
likewise familiar:
As with all contracts, the goal of construction is to
arrive at the intent of the parties when the policy was
issued.  Where a policy defines a term, that definition
is to be used.  If no definition is given, non-
technical words are to be given their meaning in
ordinary speech, unless the context clearly indicates
another meaning was intended.  The various terms of the
policy are to be harmoniously construed, and if
possible, every word and every provision is to be given
effect.  If, however, the meaning of words or the
effect of provisions is uncertain or capable of several
reasonable interpretations, the doubts will be resolved
against the insurance company and in favor of the
policyholder.  Whereas, if the meaning of the policy is
clear and only one reasonable interpretation exists,
the courts must enforce the contract as written; they
may not, under the guise of construing an ambiguous
term, rewrite the contract or impose liabilities on the
parties not bargained for and found therein.
Woods v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 295 N.C. 500, 505-06, 246
S.E.2d 773, 777 (1978); see also C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v.
Industrial Crankshaft & Eng’g Co., 326 N.C. 133, 142, 388 S.E.2d
557, 563 (1990).  We apply these principles to the insurance
policies in this case.
The Liberty Mutual CGL policies issued to Gaston contain the
following coverage provisions:
SECTION I -- COVERAGES
COVERAGE A.  BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE
LIABILITY
1.
Insuring Agreement.
a.
We will pay those sums that the insured
becomes legally obligated to pay as damages
because of “bodily injury” or “property
damage” to which this insurance
applies. . . .
b.
This insurance applies to “bodily injury” and
“property damage” only if:
(1) The “bodily injury” or “property damage”
is caused by an “occurrence” that takes
place in the “coverage territory”; and
(2) The “bodily injury” or “property damage”
occurs during the policy period.
The Liberty Mutual CGL policies also contain the following
definitions in Section V:
9.
“Occurrence” means an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially
the same general harmful conditions.
. . . .
12.
“Property damage” means:
a.
Physical injury to tangible property,
including all resulting loss of use of that
property.  All such loss of use shall be
deemed to occur at the time of the physical
injury that caused it; or
b.
Loss of use of tangible property that is not
physically injured.  All such loss shall be
deemed to occur at the time of the
“occurrence” that caused it.
The Liberty Mutual umbrella excess liability policies
contain the following provisions:
SECTION I -- COVERAGE -- EXCESS LIABILITY
1.
Insuring Agreement.
a.
We will pay those sums in excess of the
retained limit that the insured becomes
legally obligated to pay as damages because
of:
(1)  bodily injury;
(2)  property damage;
. . . .
to which this policy applies and caused by an
occurrence.
. . . .
SECTION IV -- DEFINITIONS
. . . .
5.
Occurrence means:
a.
With respect to bodily injury or property
damage[]:  an accident, including continuous
or repeated exposure to substantially the
same harmful conditions . . . .
. . . .
Although there was some suggestion by one party that the
1
date of the rupture could not be determined, the complaint
alleges and the trial court found the date to be 21 June 1992,
and no exception was taken to this finding of fact.
9.
Property damage means:
a.
Physical injury to tangible property,
including all resulting loss of use of that
property . . . .
The International and Northfield excess liability policies
provided coverage for amounts in excess of coverage in the
underlying Liberty Mutual policies and “follow the form” of the
Liberty Mutual umbrella excess liability policy.
We begin by examining the two related issues regarding 
trigger of coverage.  There is no dispute  that the contamination
1
of Sterling’s contrast media dye commenced on 21 June 1992, as a
result of the rupture of the pressure vessel and subsequent
leakage, and continued until discovery on 31 August 1992. 
Applying the principles of insurance contract interpretation set
forth above, we conclude that the trial court correctly
determined that there was one “occurrence” that took place on
21 June 1992 when the leak commenced.
Under the insurance policies at issue in this case, coverage
is triggered by “property damage” when the property damage is
caused by an “occurrence” and when the property damage occurs
during the policy period.  The property damage alleged in this
case was the contamination of sixty tons of Iohexol, a contrast
media dye used for diagnostic medical imaging, valued in excess
of $20 million.  The applicable Liberty Mutual primary policy
defines an “occurrence” as “an accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful
conditions.”  Because the term “occurrence” is defined in the
policy, we use the specific definition.
However, nontechnical words are to be given their ordinary
meaning.  An accident is generally considered to be an unplanned
and unforeseen happening or event, usually with unfortunate
consequences.  See, e.g., Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
7 (10th ed. 1993); Black’s Law Dictionary 15 (7th ed. 1999).  The
sudden, unexpected leakage from the pressure vessel, causing
release of a contaminant into Sterling’s dye product, certainly
comes within the ordinary meaning of the term “accident.” 
Further, there is no dispute that all the damage occurred as a
result of exposure to the same harmful condition -- continued
leakage of the contaminant into the dye product.  Thus, under the
plain language of the insurance policies, the property damage was
caused by an occurrence, and property damage occurred on 21 June
1992 when the pressure vessel ruptured.  Stated differently, the
“injury-in-fact” in this case can be determined with certainty
because the cause of the property damage occurred and property
damage resulted on 21 June 1992.  Therefore, the 1 July 1991 to
1 July 1992 policy period is triggered, even though the
contamination continued until discovery of the leak on 31 August
1992.
Although our Court of Appeals has addressed the trigger of
coverage issue, it is an issue of first impression for this
Court.  We conclude that where the date of the injury-in-fact can
be known with certainty, the insurance policy or policies on the
risk on that date are triggered.  This interpretation is logical
and true to the policy language.  Further, although other
jurisdictions have adopted varied approaches in determining the
appropriate trigger of coverage, the injury-in-fact approach is
widely accepted.  See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Associated Indem.
Corp., 724 F. Supp. 474, op. supplemented, 727 F. Supp. 1524
(E.D. Mich. 1989).
We find unconvincing the approach adopted in West Am. Ins.
Co. v. Tufco Flooring East, 104 N.C. App. 312, 409 S.E.2d 692
(1991), disc. rev. improvidently allowed, 332 N.C. 479, 420
S.E.2d 826 (1992), and relied upon by the Court of Appeals in the
instant case.  In Tufco, the Court of Appeals analyzed a CGL
policy containing a pollution-exclusion clause to determine
whether coverage was available for damage to chicken stored in a
cooler and contaminated with styrene released during floor
resurfacing work.  The Court of Appeals stated four different
bases upon which to affirm the trial court’s ruling that the
pollution-exclusion clause did not exclude coverage.  One of the
reasons given by the Court of Appeals was its conclusion that
“for insurance purposes property damage ‘occurs’ when it is first
discovered or manifested.”  Id. at 318, 409 S.E.2d at 696.  As
discussed above, it is well-established North Carolina law that
the language of the insurance policy controls, and in the instant
case, we determine that property damage occurred for purposes of
the applicable policies at the time of the injury-in-fact.  To
the extent that Tufco purports to establish a bright-line rule
that property damage occurs “for insurance purposes” at the time
of manifestation or on the date of discovery, that decision is
overruled.
International asserts that if the manifestation or date-of-
discovery approach is not accepted, this Court should find that
both policy periods are triggered under a “continuous” or
“multiple trigger” theory.  We decline to do so.  In determining
whether there was a single occurrence or multiple occurrences, we
look to the cause of the property damage rather than to the
effect.  As noted previously, an “occurrence” is an accident,
“including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the
same general harmful conditions.”  In this case, the rupture of
the pressure vessel caused all of the ensuing property damage,
even though the damage continued over time, contaminating
multiple dye lots and extending over two policy periods. 
Therefore, when, as in this case, the accident that causes an
injury-in-fact occurs on a date certain and all subsequent
damages flow from the single event, there is but a single
occurrence;
 and only policies on the risk on the date of the injury-causing
event are triggered.  We believe this interpretation is the most
faithful to the language and terms of the insurance policy.
For the foregoing reasons, we therefore reverse the Court of
Appeals and affirm the decision of the trial court “that the
‘injury-in-fact’ that took place on June 21, 1992 triggers the
coverages applicable on that date and that the liability of the
respective insurance carriers is for the coverages applicable on
June 21, 1992.”
Next, we note again the trial court’s ruling that Rosenmund
was entitled to reformation of the Liberty Mutual primary and
excess policies to provide it with products liability coverage
and that Rosenmund was also an additional insured under the
International and Northfield excess policies, which follow the
form of the Liberty Mutual policies.  In its new brief to this
Court, Northfield asserts that this issue was decided in error. 
However, Northfield did not present this issue in its petition
for discretionary review, nor has the issue been raised for
review by any other party.  Further, Northfield simply announces
that it “reaffirms that it joins the positions of Liberty Mutual
and International regarding this issue, as stated in the Court of
Appeals briefs,” and does not make an argument or cite authority
in support of its position.  As this issue is not properly before
this Court for review, the decision of the Court of Appeals on
the issue of reformation remains undisturbed.
Finally, the trial court ruled that United’s policy is
excess over all other coverages available to Rosenmund and,
therefore, ordered Liberty Mutual to reimburse United for the
costs of defending Rosenmund and ordered International to
reimburse United for its contribution to the settlement of the
Sterling claims.  Because the Court of Appeals concluded that the
1992-93 policy year was triggered, it held that the trial court
erred in ruling that United’s policy was excess.  We now must
interpret the applicable policies in view of our decision that
coverage was triggered in the 1991-92 policy period by a single
occurrence.  For the reasons that follow, we reverse the Court of
Appeals as to this final issue.
As discussed above, Liberty Mutual issued to Gaston
“occurrence-based” policies for the policy year 1 July 1991 to
1 July 1992 that provided primary and umbrella excess insurance
coverage to Rosenmund as an additional insured.  International
also issued an occurrence-based policy for the 1 July 1991 to
1 July 1992 policy year that provided excess insurance to
Rosenmund as an additional insured.  These policies were
triggered by the property damage that occurred as a result of the
21 June 1992 pressure vessel leak.  Additionally, United issued
to Rosenmund a “claims-made” policy that provided coverage for
certain claims made during its 4 October 1991 to 4 October 1992
policy year.  The claim in this case, based on the pressure
vessel leak, was made during this policy period.
United contends that its claims-made policy is excess to all
occurrence-based policies providing coverage for the 1991-92
policy year, while Liberty Mutual and International argue that
United’s policy provides primary coverage and that United is
therefore not entitled to reimbursement.  Again, we look to the
language of the applicable insurance policies to decide the
issue.
Where multiple policies appear to provide coverage to a
common insured for the same risk, the insurers’ respective
obligations to pay are determined by examining each policy on its
own terms.  This Court stated the general principle in Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.C. 341, 152 S.E.2d 436
(1967).
The terms of another contract between different
parties cannot affect the proper construction of the
provisions of an insurance policy.  The existence of
the second contract, whether an insurance policy or
otherwise, may or may not be an event which sets in
operation or shuts off the liability of the insurance
company under its own policy.  Whether it does or does
not have such effect, first[,] requires the
construction of the policy to determine what event will
set in operation or shut off the company’s liability
and, second, requires a construction of the other
contract, or policy, to determine whether it
constitutes such an event.
Id. at 346, 152 S.E.2d at 440; see also Reliance Ins. Co. v.
Lexington Ins. Co., 87 N.C. App. 428, 436, 361 S.E.2d 403, 408 
(1987) (noting North Carolina rule of construing insurance
policies independent of one another).
We begin with the Liberty Mutual CGL policy, which provides,
in part, as follows:
SECTION IV -- COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY CONDITIONS
. . . .
4.
Other Insurance.
If other valid and collectible insurance is
available to the insured for a loss we cover under
Coverage A or B of this Coverage Part, our
obligations are limited as follows:
a.
Primary Insurance
This insurance is primary except when b.
below applies.  If this insurance is primary,
our obligations are not affected unless any
of the other insurance is also primary. . . .
b.
Excess Insurance
This insurance is excess over any of the
other insurance, whether primary, excess,
contingent or on any other basis:
(1)
That is Fire, Extended Coverage,
Builder’s Risk, Installation Risk or
similar coverage for “your work”;
(2)
That is Fire insurance for premises
rented to you; or
(3)
If the loss arises out of the
maintenance or use of aircraft, “autos”
or watercraft to the extent not subject
to Exclusion g. of Coverage A
(Section I).
By its express terms, the Liberty Mutual CGL policy is primary
unless there exists other insurance as identified in subsection
(1) or (2), set out above, or if the loss is of a specific type
identified in subsection (3).  The United CGL policy issued to
Rosenmund is not “other insurance” of the type specified in the
Liberty Mutual policy, nor is the loss of a type that would cause
the Liberty Mutual policy to be considered excess.  Therefore,
the Liberty Mutual CGL policy provides primary insurance for the
covered property damage in this case.
Nonetheless, Liberty Mutual contends that United is a co-
primary insurer because United issued a CGL policy to Rosenmund
intended to provide primary liability coverage, including
products liability coverage, and charged Rosenmund a premium
consistent with that coverage.  Therefore, contends Liberty
Mutual, United must share the cost of defending Rosenmund. 
However, United’s policy also contains an “other insurance”
clause, which is identical to the one in the Liberty Mutual
policy except for the following additional provisions under
section 4.b.:
b.
Excess Insurance
This insurance is excess over any of the
other insurance, whether primary, excess,
contingent or on any other basis:
(1)
That is effective prior to the beginning
of the policy period shown in the
Declarations of this insurance and
applies to “bodily injury” or “property
damage” on other than a claims-made
basis, if:
(a)
No Retroactive Date is shown in the
Declarations of this insurance; or
(b)
The other insurance has a policy period
which continues after the Retroactive
Date shown in the Declarations of this
insurance[.]
(Emphasis added.)  Therefore, we examine United’s “other
insurance” clause to determine what event(s) bring it into
operation.  See Allstate Ins. Co., 269 N.C. at 346-47, 152 S.E.2d
at 440-41.
There is no dispute that the 1 July 1991 to 1 July 1992
policy issued by Liberty Mutual was “effective prior to” United’s
4 October 1991 to 4 October 1992 policy.  Likewise, it is clear
that the occurrence-based policy issued by Liberty Mutual applies
to property damage “on other than a claims-made basis.”  However,
the parties contest the meaning of section 4.b.(1)(b) in United’s
policy.  Liberty Mutual asserts that its policy does not have a
policy period that “continues after” 4 December 1986, the
retroactive date in the United policy, because the Liberty Mutual
policy did not exist before that date.  United, on the other
hand, asserts that the Liberty Mutual policy does continue after
4 December 1986, because the words “continues after” do not
necessarily imply “begins before.”
Following the usual rules of construction, we use a  term’s
ordinary meaning if no specific definition is contained within
the policy.  See Woods, 295 N.C. at 505-06, 246 S.E.2d at 777. 
The word “continue” is not defined in the policy, but continue is
generally understood to mean to maintain without interruption. 
See, e.g., Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 251.  The
Liberty Mutual policy was in effect from 1 July 1991 to 1 July
1992 and, therefore, was maintained without interruption after
4 December 1986, the retroactive date of United’s policy.  It is
unnecessary to imply a requirement that the other insurance begin
before the retroactive date in order to effectively determine
that other insurance “continues after” the retroactive date.
Further, we consider a policy provision in context so that
various terms of a policy are harmoniously construed.  See Woods,
295 N.C. at 506, 246 S.E.2d at 777.  In section 4.b.(1), the
United policy contains a requirement that the other insurance “is
effective prior to the beginning of the policy period shown in
the Declarations of this insurance,” which is 4 October 1991. 
Thus, the United policy defines the time frame within which the
existence of “other insurance” causes United’s coverage to be
excess.  The other insurance must be effective prior to 4 October
1991, and it must continue after 4 December 1986.  Therefore, the
Liberty Mutual CGL policy effective 1 July 1991 to 1 July 1992 is
“other insurance” under the United policy.
Because the existence of the Liberty Mutual primary policy
causes United’s “other insurance” clause to be effective, the
United policy is not co-primary as contended by Liberty Mutual. 
The United policy, by operation of its other insurance provision,
is excess to the Liberty Mutual policy.  Therefore, even though
the United policy contains a standard insuring agreement found in
most primary CGL policies, which would require it to defend
Rosenmund against any suit for damages, in this case the
following provision in the United policy takes precedence:
b.
Excess Insurance
. . . .
When this insurance is excess, we will have no
duty under Coverages A or B to defend any “claim”
or “suit” that any other insurer has a duty to
defend.
International also contends that United provided primary
coverage to Rosenmund and asserts that because its policy is a
“pure” excess policy, it can never be made primary to United’s
“primary” policy.  International is correct that its 1 July 1991
to 1 July 1992 occurrence policy is an “excess” insurance policy. 
Its insuring agreement provides that International will
“indemnify the insured for that amount of loss which exceeds the
amount of loss payable by underlying policies described in the
Declarations.”  Clearly, the International policy was intended to
cover losses only in excess of those covered by underlying
insurance.  However, the United policy is not listed in the
International policy’s declarations as an “underlying policy,”
and therefore, International did not issue its excess policy
contingent upon the existence of the United policy.  We disagree
with International’s assertion that its policy is in some way
inherently excess to the United policy.
Further, for the same reasons articulated earlier, the
International 1991-92 policy is “other insurance” by the terms of
the United policy.  The International policy is an occurrence-
based policy, effective before 4 October 1991, and it continues
after 4 December 1986.  The United policy specifically provides
that it is excess over any other insurance “whether primary,
excess, contingent or on any other basis.”  (Emphasis added.)
The International policy also contains an “other insurance”
clause, which provides as follows:
K.  Other Insurance.  If other valid and collectible
insurance is available to the insured which covers a
loss also covered by this policy, other than insurance
that is specifically purchased as being in excess of
this policy, this policy shall operate in excess of,
and not contribute with, such other insurance.
However, in this case, because the United policy is excess, it is
not “available” within the meaning of the International policy’s
“other insurance” clause.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeals
on the issue of whether the United policy was excess to other
coverage available to Rosenmund.
In sum, the portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision
holding that reformation of the Liberty Mutual policies to
provide Rosenmund with products liability coverage was
appropriate remains undisturbed.  We reverse the remainder of the
Court of Appeals’ decision and hold (1) that an “injury-in-fact”
trigger of coverage is appropriate in this case, where the date
of property damage is known and undisputed; (2) that there was a
single occurrence triggering the 1 July 1991 to 1 July 1992
policy year; and (3) that the policy issued to Rosenmund by
United is excess to the Liberty Mutual and International policies
issued to Gaston and under which Rosenmund was an additional
insured.
REVERSED.
Justice MARTIN did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.