Title: Sass v. Cohen
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: and
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: December 24, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
DEBORAH SASS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
THEODORE COHEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S255262 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Two 
B283122 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BC554035 
 
 
December 24, 2020 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the 
Court, in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger, 
Groban, and Guerrero* concurred. 
 
 
 
 
________________________ 
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate 
District, Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article 
VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
SASS v. COHEN 
S255262 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
Section 580, subdivision (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure 
provides that “[t]he relief granted to the plaintiff, if there is no 
answer, cannot exceed that demanded in the complaint . . . .”1  
Thus, “in all default judgments the demand sets a ceiling on 
recovery,” and a judgment purporting to grant relief beyond that 
ceiling is void for being in excess of jurisdiction.  (Greenup v. 
Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 824 (Greenup).)  In an accounting 
action, however, a plaintiff does not know the sum certain owed 
by the defendant.  (See, e.g., Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009) 
173 Cal.App.4th 156, 179 (Teselle) [“An action for accounting is 
not available where the plaintiff alleges the right to recover a 
sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by calculation”].)  
As such, a complaint seeking an accounting cannot state the 
precise amount of damages sought. 
At issue in this case is how to reconcile the restrictions of 
section 580 with the limitations inherent in an action for 
accounting.  Specifically, we must resolve whether a court may 
award monetary damages in a default judgment to a plaintiff 
who seeks an accounting when the complaint does not demand 
a specific amount of monetary damages but instead asserts a 
proportional interest in specified property. 
 
1  
All further unspecified statutory references are to the 
Code of Civil Procedure. 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
Applying our usual rubrics of statutory construction, we 
conclude that in cases where plaintiffs seek monetary relief, the 
mere fact that they have pleaded an accounting action does not 
insulate them from the obligation to notify defendants of the 
dollar amounts sought before such relief may be granted in 
default.  True, the text of section 580 does not point unerringly 
to this result.  Nonetheless, when section 580 is considered in 
light of its purpose — “to guarantee defaulting parties adequate 
notice of the maximum judgment that may be assessed against 
them” (Greenup, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 826) — and in 
conjunction with other statutes related to pleadings and default 
judgments, we find the most reasonable interpretation of section 
580 is that it requires plaintiffs to have alleged their “relief” in 
terms of dollars if they are to receive monetary recovery.  (§ 580, 
subd. (a).) 
Our conclusion is bolstered by other considerations.  
Among these is the recognition that despite their relative lack 
of knowledge about the precise amounts owing, plaintiffs 
bringing accounting claims (1) are generally able to estimate 
their damages, (2) must ultimately prove the sums to which they 
are entitled after default, and (3) may request that the trial 
court take an accounting in circumstances where an accounting 
is necessary to discover the information needed to determine the 
amount owing.  In other words, plaintiffs’ inability to state a 
precise amount of damages does not justify allowing pleadings 
that, in the event of defaults, will not have apprised defendants 
of the maximum dollar amounts to which they may be held 
liable. 
Accordingly, we hold, consistent with the Court of Appeal 
below, that a plaintiff seeking an accounting is not excused from 
section 580’s requirement to state a specific dollar amount to 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
support a default judgment granting monetary relief.  In 
particular, it is not enough that the complaint identifies the 
assets in a defendant’s possession and requests some fraction of 
their value. 
The Court of Appeal reached a second, subsidiary issue as 
to which we also granted review:  the proper method by which a 
court determines whether the amount awarded in a default 
judgment exceeds that demanded.  (See Sass v. Cohen (2019) 
32 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1035 (Sass) [holding that “the amounts of 
damages awarded and demanded are to be compared on an 
aggregate basis”].)  On closer examination, however, we find we 
need not resolve that question in order to dispose of the matter 
before us.  As we shall explain, neither the trial court’s nor the 
Court of Appeal’s calculation of damages implicated the 
aggregate versus claim-by-claim subsidiary issue.  This case 
does not raise that question, and although we offer some words 
of guidance to the courts, we reserve judgment on that issue for 
another day. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
The facts of this case are taken from plaintiff Deborah 
Sass’s second amended complaint, the operative pleading upon 
which she obtained a default judgment.  (See, e.g., Title Ins. & 
Trust Co. v. King Land & Improv. Co. (1912) 162 Cal. 44, 46 
(Title Insurance) [“ ‘A default confesses all the material facts in 
the complaint’ ”]; 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2019) 
Proceedings Without Trial, § 176 [“the defendant’s failure to 
answer has the same effect as an express admission of the 
matters well pleaded in the complaint”].) 
 
In 2006, while still married, defendant Theodore Cohen 
met and began a romantic relationship with plaintiff.  In an 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
attempt to persuade plaintiff to move to Los Angeles with him, 
Cohen made a number of promises.  Plaintiff committed to 
moving after reaching an “agreement” with Cohen that he 
“would pay for all her living expenses for the rest of her life” and 
that “all property and income acquired by them during their 
relationship would be joint property.”  During this time, Cohen 
told plaintiff he was “buying us a house.”  Cohen then proceeded 
to purchase a property on Hollywood Boulevard (the Hollywood 
property). 
 
A short time thereafter, plaintiff moved to Los Angeles.  
Cohen initially kept his promises, including by providing 
plaintiff with a credit card and paying “all of the bills and all of 
Plaintiff’s expenses.”  Cohen also formed a company, Tag 
Strategic LLC (Tag).  Plaintiff “help[ed] out” at Tag, generating 
through her efforts “approximately $1.4 million revenue for 
Tag.”  Despite her work, Cohen did not share Tag’s profits with 
plaintiff.  Instead, he told her he “was going to pay her $5,000 a 
month as a ‘token gesture.’ ”  Cohen, however, did not honor that 
promise and instead paid plaintiff $2,000 a month for a span of 
ten months. 
 
By April 2011, plaintiff had become dissatisfied with the 
relationship and left Los Angeles.  In response to Cohen’s 
importuning her to return, plaintiff sent Cohen an e-mail with 
“a list of items that needed to be satisfied for her to consider 
returning to him.”  Cohen “agreed to Plaintiff’s list.”  Plaintiff 
understood from this that “Tag would be owned 50% by her and 
Cohen, equally, as was all of the other income and property 
obtained during the relationship.” 
 
Mollified, plaintiff returned to Los Angeles, at which point 
Cohen told her, “I am buying you a house.”  Cohen then 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
purchased a house located on Oakley Drive (the Oakley 
property).  Sometime thereafter, Cohen sold the Hollywood 
property.  “Upon information and belief,” plaintiff alleged that 
Cohen “made a profit of more than $300,000” from the sale. 
 
At around the same time that Cohen bought the Oakley 
property, plaintiff “purchased $25,000 worth of Class B shares 
in Rock & Reilly’s LLC,” a company located in Los Angeles.  
Although plaintiff made the purchase, the shares were held in 
Cohen’s name. 
 
Despite the couple’s various financial entanglements, 
Cohen still had not divorced his wife.  In December 2012, 
plaintiff moved out of the Oakley property.  For a while 
thereafter, Cohen “continued to perform his agreement to 
provide Plaintiff with financial support and pay all of her 
expenses.”  Eventually, Cohen stopped paying.  Plaintiff sued. 
 
Plaintiff’s complaint, brought against Cohen, Tag, and 
multiple Doe, alleged seven causes of action.  The first asserted 
that Cohen breached the couple’s so-called Marvin agreement, 
or a contract between nonmarital partners.  (See Marvin v. 
Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 665 (Marvin) [holding that “courts 
should 
enforce 
express 
contracts 
between 
nonmarital 
partners”].)  Although demanding consequential damages for 
that breach “in an amount to be determined at trial,” plaintiff 
also requested “a constructive trust over (1) all of the property 
purchased during the term of the relationship, (2) all of the 
income earned by Tag since May 30, 2006, and (3) all income 
earned by [Cohen] since May 2006.” 
 
Plaintiff’s second cause of action was brought against Tag 
for its “failure to pay wages.”  Plaintiff also brought a claim for 
the “waiting time penalties” she alleged she was “entitled to 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
[under] Labor Code § 203, equal to thirty (30) days wages.”  
Plaintiff next asserted a claim for quantum meruit against all 
defendants, seeking to “recover the reasonable value of the 
services she provided to Tag.” 
 
Plaintiff’s next claim is the focus of this case.  In this cause 
of action, she demanded “an accounting of all property 
purchased and income earned during the relationship, including 
but not limited to:  (1) the Hollywood House, (2) the Oakley 
House, (3) the Rock & Reilly stock, (4) Tag, and (5) all income 
earned by [Cohen].” 
 
Plaintiff’s final causes of action were for fraud and 
fraudulent transfer of assets from Tag to Cohen.  She alleged 
within these causes of action that Cohen “repeatedly” made false 
representations 
to 
her. 
 
As 
a 
result 
of 
Cohen’s 
misrepresentations, plaintiff asserted she “suffered actual 
damages in a sum to be determined at trial, which Plaintiff 
alleges is in excess of at least the sum of $700,000, which 
represents 50% of the revenue brought to Tag by Plaintiff, along 
with an unknown sum which represents 50% of all profits 
earned by Tag, and the additional sum of no less than 
$3,000,000, which represents 50% of the fair market value of 
(a) the Hollywood House received by defendant Cohen when he 
sold that house without Plaintiff’s consent, and (b) the Oakley 
House.”  In addition to her actual damages, plaintiff prayed for 
“special damages in a sum to be determined at trial.” 
 
Plaintiff included a prayer for relief in her complaint, but 
the prayer did not state any specific dollar figures.  Instead, the 
complaint asked for damages “in a sum to be proven at trial.”  
Plaintiff served the complaint on Tag and Cohen and 
subsequently served Cohen “a notice of punitive damages in 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
which she ‘reserve[d] the right to seek $4,000,000 in punitive 
damages.’ ”  (Sass, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1037.) 
 
Defendants failed to respond to the complaint.  After the 
entry of default, the trial court held a prove-up hearing at which 
plaintiff introduced the testimony of a forensic accountant to 
prove her damages.  (Sass, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1037–
1038.)  The court ultimately awarded plaintiff the following:  
(1) $126,504 as plaintiff’s 50 percent share in the profits from 
the sale of the Hollywood property; (2) $2,099,610, or half the 
value of Tag, calculated via a “discounted cash flow approach of 
valuation”; (3) $444,918, which is “one-half of the balance of the 
funds remaining in the accounts” of Tag, an amount the court 
awarded “for the breach of the agreement to share 50% of the 
income received by Tag”; (4) $120,000 as unpaid wages for the 
work plaintiff performed; (5) $5,000 in waiting time penalties; 
and (6) $10,500 as compensation for the investment in Rock & 
Reilly’s LLC.  In addition, the court declared a constructive trust 
over the Oakley property, ordering Cohen to transfer to plaintiff 
a 50 percent interest in the property.  The court also awarded 
plaintiff $88,984 in punitive damages, a sum amounting to ten 
percent of Cohen’s “balance in [various] bank accounts,” which 
the court took as a proxy for Cohen’s net worth.  Finally, the 
court awarded prejudgment interest and costs. 
 
The court denied plaintiff some of the relief sought.  Most 
notably, the court held that because plaintiff had pleaded that 
she was a salaried employee of Tag, she was not entitled to the 
$700,000 she asserted was the half of “the business she ‘brought 
in’ to Tag.” 
 
Three months after the default judgment was entered, 
Cohen filed a motion to vacate the entry of default and default 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
judgment.  Cohen argued that the judgment was void because 
the sum granted in default exceeded what was demanded in the 
complaint.  The trial court denied the motion on the ground that 
“it has been held [in Cassel v. Sullivan, Roche & Johnson (1999) 
76 Cal.App.4th 1157] where a plaintiff alleges a cause of action 
for accounting and knowledge of the debt due is within the 
possession of the defendant, there is no notice requirement for 
damages sought before entry of default judgment.” 
 
Cohen appealed, arguing that contrary to Cassell, he was 
entitled to such notice.  The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that 
“actions alleging an accounting claim . . . are not excused from 
limitations on default judgments,” which means such judgments 
may not “be entered for an amount in excess of the demand in 
the operative pleadings.”  (Sass, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1035.)  The court acknowledged that Cassel held otherwise, 
but after a careful examination of the case, the court “join[ed] 
the growing majority of cases rejecting Cassel.”  (Id. at p. 1043.) 
 
The Court of Appeal thus reversed the trial court and 
vacated its default judgment.  (Sass, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1047.)  The appellate court also recomputed the amount of 
damages plaintiff could recover.  Of note, unlike the trial court, 
the Court of Appeal concluded that plaintiff was entitled to 
collect 
the 
$700,000 
referenced 
in 
the 
complaint, 
conceptualizing it as the demand she had made “for the value of 
Tag.”  (Id. at p. 1046.)  It remanded the case “with instructions 
for the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to 
(1) reinstate the default judgment after reducing the amount of 
compensatory damages awarded [in accordance with the Court 
of Appeal’s holding and calculations], or (2) vacate the 
underlying default and allow plaintiff to file and serve an 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
amended complaint demanding the type and amount of relief 
she seeks.”  (Id. at pp. 1047–1048.) 
 
In light of the conflict between Cassel and the decision 
below, we granted review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Whether Section 580 Bars Monetary Recovery 
When a Plaintiff Bringing an Accounting Action 
Fails To Plead a Specific Amount of Damages 
 
Determining how section 580 applies to an accounting 
action requires us to grapple with several strands of law, 
including the nature of accounting actions, the constraints of 
section 580, and our own authorities.  We examine the threads 
individually before proceeding to weave them together. 
1.  An action for an accounting 
An action for an accounting has two elements:  (1) “that a 
relationship exists between the plaintiff and defendant that 
requires an accounting” and (2) “that some balance is due the 
plaintiff that can only be ascertained by an accounting.”  
(Teselle, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 179; see also 5 Witkin, Cal. 
Procedure, supra, Pleading, § 820.)  The action carries with it an 
inherent limitation; an accounting action “is not available where 
the plaintiff alleges the right to recover a sum certain or a sum 
that can be made certain by calculation.”  (Teselle, at p. 179; see 
also St. James Church of Christ Holiness v. Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County (1955) 135 Cal.App.2d 352, 359.) 
An action for an accounting has been characterized as “a 
means of discovery.”  (Teselle, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 180 
[“the purpose of the accounting is, in part, to discover what, if 
any, sums are owed to the plaintiff, and an accounting may be 
used as a discovery device”].)  This characterization is consistent 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
with the idea that a plaintiff seeking an accounting cannot 
“allege[] the right to recover a sum certain” because he or she 
lacks the information necessary to determine the precise 
amount that may be due.  (Id. at p. 179.)  The plaintiff’s lack of 
knowledge drives the need for discovery; and the fact that the 
gap can be filled via discovery implies the information is within 
the control of the defendant.  In other words, the defendant in 
an accounting action possesses information unknown to the 
plaintiff that is relevant for the computation of money owed. 
Although we infer that a defendant in an accounting 
lawsuit has pertinent private information, there are limits to 
this inference.  We do not know that a defendant will always 
have all the information necessary to compute the amount 
owing to the plaintiff.  (See Warren v. Warren (2015) 
240 Cal.App.4th 
373, 
378–379 
(Warren) 
[noting 
that 
“[g]enerally, the defendant, not the plaintiff, in an accounting 
action has the information necessary to determine its liability 
for damages,” and “[g]enerally, the plaintiff does not have equal 
access to that information” but finding that the case before the 
court “does not fall under that general rule” (italics added)].)  
Plaintiff in this case, although pleading for an accounting and 
alleging that the assets are in Cohen’s possession, acknowledges 
that such allegations give rise only to the assumption that 
Cohen “has knowledge of the property as great, or greater than, 
that of . . . plaintiff.”  Even by plaintiff’s reckoning then, 
accounting actions subsume cases in which the parties possess 
equal amounts of information. 
In short, the underpinning of an accounting action is an 
information asymmetry between the parties, an asymmetry that 
generally favors the defendant but never the plaintiff.  Our goal 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
is to probe the consequences of this asymmetry in the context of 
defaults. 
2.  Section 580 and related statutes 
Section 580 is one of several statutory provisions 
governing default.  In relevant part, it states:  “The relief 
granted to the plaintiff, if there is no answer, cannot exceed that 
demanded in the complaint, in the statement required by 
Section 425.11, or in the statement provided for by Section 
425.115; but in any other case, the court may grant the plaintiff 
any relief consistent with the case made by the complaint and 
embraced within the issue.”  (§ 580, subd. (a).) 
Section 580, subdivision (a) thus specifies two instances in 
which the relief awarded in a default judgment is not limited to 
“that demanded in the complaint”:  those that fall within the 
scope of section 425.11 or 425.115.  Section 425.11 controls 
actions “to recover damages for personal injury or wrongful 
death.”  (Id., subd. (b).)  In such actions, “the amount demanded 
shall not be stated” in a complaint.2  (§ 425.10, subd. (b).)  
Instead, the plaintiff must serve on the defendant “a statement 
setting forth the nature and amount of damages being sought.”  
(§ 425.11, subd. (b).)  As is relevant here, the plaintiff must serve 
such a statement of damages “before a default may be taken.”  
(Id., subd. (c).)  Similarly, section 425.115 requires a plaintiff 
seeking punitive damages to serve upon the defendant a form 
statement “or its substantial equivalent” that gives the 
defendant notice of the specific amount of punitive damages 
 
2  
The purpose behind this rule is to “ ‘protect the defendants 
from adverse publicity resulting from inflated demands, 
particularly in medical malpractice cases.’ ”  (Schwab v. Rondel 
Homes, Inc. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 428, 431.) 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
sought.3  (§ 425.115, subd. (b).)  As with section 425.11, the 
statement contemplated by section 425.115 must be served 
“upon the defendant . . . before a default may be taken.”  
(§ 425.115, subd. (f).) 
Section 580, subdivision (a)’s requirement that the relief 
granted “cannot exceed that demanded in the complaint” is 
echoed by other statutory provisions.  Section 425.10, for 
instance, sets forth “the front-end statutory requirements for 
pleading” that are enforced by the “back-end limitations” 
imposed by section 580.  (Sass, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1040.)  Section 425.10 stipulates that a complaint “shall 
contain . . . [a] demand for judgment for the relief to which the 
pleader claims to be entitled.”  (Id., subd. (a)(2).)  Moreover, “[i]f 
the recovery of money or damages is demanded, the amount 
demanded shall be stated.”4  (§ 425.10, subd. (a)(2).) 
 
3  
The form statement laid out in section 425.115 looks like 
this: 
NOTICE TO _________  (Insert name of defendant or 
cross-defendant):  _________  (Insert name of 
plaintiff or cross-complainant) reserves the right to 
seek $_________  (Insert dollar amount) in punitive 
damages when _________  (Insert name of plaintiff 
or cross-complainant) seeks a judgment in the suit 
filed against you. 
(Insert name of attorney or party appearing in 
propria persona) 
(Date) 
(Id., subd. (b).) 
4  
An exception to this requirement applies when an action 
“is brought to recover actual or punitive damages for personal 
injury or wrongful death.”  (§ 425.10, subd. (b).)  In such a case, 
 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
Section 585, which describes the procedure for obtaining a 
default judgment, contains similar language.  The section 
divides cases in which “the defendant fails to answer” into 
different categories.  (§ 585.)  In “an action arising upon contract 
or judgment for the recovery of money or damages only,” when 
the defendant has been served “other than by publication,” “the 
clerk, upon written application of the plaintiff . . . shall enter the 
default of the defendant . . . and immediately thereafter enter 
judgment for the principal amount demanded in the complaint, 
in the statement required by Section 425.11, or in the statement 
provided for in Section 425.115 . . . .”  (Id., subd. (a).)  Thus, in a 
case in which the amount of damages is immediately 
ascertainable, the default and default judgment are entered by 
the clerk, almost simultaneously, “for the principal amount 
demanded in the complaint” or in a statement of damages.  
(Ibid.) 
In all other cases, a plaintiff must seek a default judgment 
from the court.  In such cases, “[t]he court shall hear the 
evidence offered by the plaintiff, and shall render judgment in 
the plaintiff’s favor for that relief, not exceeding the amount 
stated in the complaint, in the statement required by Section 
425.11, or in the statement provided for by Section 425.115, as 
appears by the evidence to be just.”5  (§ 585, subd. (b); see also 
 
the amount of damages must be set out, not in a complaint, but 
in a statement of damages in accordance with sections 425.11 
and 425.115.  (See §§ 425.11, 425.115.) 
5  
Subdivision (b) of section 585 also mentions “the taking of 
an account.”  (Ibid. [“If the taking of an account, or the proof of 
any fact, is necessary to enable the court to give judgment or to 
carry the judgment into effect, the court may take the account 
 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
id., subd. (c).)  Here too, the judgment rendered in default cannot 
“exceed[] the amount stated in the complaint” or the statement 
of damages.  (§ 585, subd. (b).) 
3.  Interpretative case law 
Turning now to the case law, we see that our decisions 
have consistently demanded a “strict construction” of section 
580 — a construction that is informed by the text of section 580, 
the language of surrounding pertinent provisions, and the 
animating purpose of the statute.  (Greenup, supra, 42 Cal.3d at 
p. 826.) 
We begin our overview of the case law with Burtnett v. 
King (1949) 33 Cal.2d 805 (Burtnett).  There, we held that a 
complaint in which the plaintiff identified certain real estate as 
“ ‘the community property of plaintiff and defendant’ ” (id. at 
p. 806) but failed to request that the community property “be 
awarded to anyone” (ibid.) did not give the defendant “notice or 
warning that the property would be affected by a default 
judgment” (id. at p. 811).  Accordingly, the trial court — which 
had granted the plaintiff the property — “wholly lacked 
jurisdiction to render [such] a judgment.”  (Id. at p. 807.)  Our 
analysis quoted the text of sections 580 and 585, emphasizing 
that “[t]he statutes are very specific in their requirements for a 
judgment following a default.”  (Burtnett, at p. 806.)  Given “the 
 
or hear the proof, or may, in its discretion, order a reference for 
that purpose.  If the action is for the recovery of damages, in 
whole or in part, the court may order the damages to be assessed 
by a jury; or if, to determine the amount of damages, the 
examination of a long account is involved, by a reference as 
above provided.”].)  Neither of the parties relies on this language 
or suggests that this case implicates a reference for the “taking 
of an account” under this provision.  (Ibid.) 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
15 
mandatory 
language” 
of 
these 
provisions, 
“the 
court’s 
jurisdiction to render default judgments can be exercised only in 
the way authorized by statute,” and the court “cannot act except 
in a particular manner” so specified.  (Id. at p. 807.)  In short, a 
court has no power to enter a default judgment other than in 
conformity with the provisions governing default. 
We next had occasion to interpret section 580 in Becker v. 
S.P.V. Construction Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489 (Becker).  The 
complaint filed in the case “sought damages ‘in excess of $20,000 
. . . or according to proof.’ ”  (Id. at p. 491.)  The plaintiffs argued 
that such a pleading “was sufficient under section 580 to provide 
adequate notice of defendants’ potential liability for $26,457.50,” 
which was the amount of compensatory damages the trial court 
awarded after default.  (Id. at pp. 492–493.)  We rejected the 
argument.  “In effect,” we said, “[the plaintiffs] argue that 
section 580 requires notice of the type of relief sought, but does 
not restrict the award of damages to the specific amount stated 
in the complaint.”  (Id. at p. 493.)  That argument cannot prevail 
because “the language of section 580 does not distinguish 
between the type and the amount of relief sought.”  (Ibid.) 
Our ruling rested not only on the text of section 580 but 
also its purpose and the language of other pertinent provisions, 
specifically, sections 425.10 and 585.  Sections 425.10 and 585 
both refer to the amount pleaded in the complaint and therefore 
“support the view that defaulting defendants should not be 
subject to damages in excess of an amount specifically set out in 
the complaint.”  (Becker, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 494 [“Section 
425.10 requires that the amount of damages be pleaded in 
causes of action . . . .  In actions other than at contract, section 
585, subdivision 2, provides that a default judgment may be 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
16 
awarded only ‘for such sum (not exceeding the amount stated in 
the complaint)’ ”].) 
Regarding the purpose of section 580, we stated that the 
primary intent of the provision “is to insure that defendants in 
cases which involve a default judgment have adequate notice of 
the judgments that may be taken against them.”  (Becker, supra, 
27 Cal.3d at p. 493.)  We explained that a prayer like that found 
in Becker, i.e., one that sought damages according to proof, 
“cannot insure adequate notice of the demands made upon the 
defendant.”  (Id. at p. 494.)  We acknowledged that it might 
sometimes appear “reasonable” to find that such a prayer 
“provided adequate notice of a defaulting defendant’s potential 
liability.”  (Ibid.)  Yet, “no matter how reasonable it might 
appear in a particular case,” “fundamental fairness” would be 
“undermined if the door were opened to speculation” regarding 
how such a prayer afforded requisite notice.  (Ibid.)  We thus 
held that “a prayer for damages according to proof passes 
muster under section 580 only if a specific amount of damages 
is alleged in the body of the complaint.”  (Ibid.) 
We reiterated this principle in Greenup, supra, 42 Cal.3d 
822.  As we there stated, “no matter how reasonable an 
assessment of damages may appear in the specific case, we 
cannot open the door to speculation on this subject without 
undermining due process . . . .”  (Id. at p. 829.)  Moreover, 
adequate notice of the judgment that may be assessed in default 
is “a protection to which every defendant is entitled,” even those 
who “deliberately thwarted [the opposing party’s] discovery 
efforts.”  (Ibid.)  Referring again to the “aim” of section 580 and 
“related sections,” including sections 425.10 and 585, we said 
that these provisions are intended “to ensure that a defendant 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
17 
who declines to contest an action does not thereby subject 
himself to open-ended liability.”  (Greenup, at p. 826.) 
Along the same lines, we explained that a defendant has 
the right to choose to default, but the plaintiff must provide the 
defendant with notice of potential damages so that the 
defendant’s choice is an informed one.  (See Greenup, supra, 
42 Cal.3d at p. 829.)  We also made clear that the notice afforded 
to a defendant must be “formal notice of potential liability,” 
which cannot be supplanted by “actual notice.”  (Id. at p. 826.) 
Finally, our most recent case concerning the matter, In re 
Marriage of Lippel (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1160 (Lippel), offers a clear 
articulation of the significance of section 580.  Lippel concerned 
a divorce obtained after the enactment of the Family Law Act.  
(Civ. Code, former § 4000 et seq.; see also Ceja v. Rudolph & 
Sletten, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1113, 1121, fn. 5; In re Marriage 
of Cantarella (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 916, 919, fn. 1.)  When the 
plaintiff filed for dissolution, she used “a standard printed form 
petition, which was statutorily authorized, that provided blank 
spaces for the entry of certain statistical information and 
contained boxes to be checked to indicate what relief was being 
requested.”6  (Lippel, at p. 1163.)  The plaintiff “checked the box 
that indicated she was requesting child custody” but left blank 
the box “relating to the issue of child support.”  (Ibid.)  Under 
these circumstances, we found that the trial court’s order 
requiring the defaulted defendant husband “to pay $100 per 
 
6  
The current version of the standard form petition may be 
found on the judicial branch website.  (Judicial Council Forms, 
form FL-100  
[as of Dec. 24, 2020] (hereafter Form FL-100).)  All Internet 
citations in this opinion are archived by year, docket number 
and case name at . 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
month in child support” violated section 580.  (Lippel, at 
p. 1164.) 
Our decision in Lippel reinforced the principle that there 
was no exception to the requirements of section 580, save for 
those instances as to which the Legislature has manifested a 
clear intent to provide an exemption.  In particular, Lippel 
refused to “perpetuate an exception to section 580 in [marriage] 
dissolution cases based on the idea that a prayer for general 
relief in such cases supports an award of support.”  (Lippel, 
supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1171.)  A line of cases predating the 
Family Law Act had done just that, upholding default 
judgments awarding monetary support to former spouses even 
when the complaints did not demand such support or stated no 
amount that would be requested as support.  (See, e.g., Cohen v. 
Cohen (1906) 150 Cal. 99, 101 [upholding a default judgment 
awarding wife $10 a month in alimony although the wife’s 
prayer only requested “a divorce and . . . ‘such other relief as 
may be just and meet in the premises and within the jurisdiction 
of the court’ ”]; Horton v. Horton (1941) 18 Cal.2d 579, 583 [“it is 
our opinion that the judgment awarding to the wife $200 per 
month . . . was directly responsive to the wife’s prayer for 
reasonable sums for support and maintenance . . . and as so 
framed this judgment cannot be said to transgress the limitation 
of section 580”].)  Lippel concluded that the “continued validity 
[of such decisions] can no longer be supported.”  (Lippel, supra, 
51 Cal.3d at p. 1169.) 
The above survey reveals that section 580 has been 
interpreted strictly, “in accordance with its plain language,” in 
conformance with its purpose, and as informed by other 
statutory provisions governing default.  (Lippel, supra, 
51 Cal.3d at p. 1166.)  Applying such a construction, we have 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
never (outside the marriage dissolution context) upheld a 
default judgment under section 580 that awarded compensatory 
damages in excess of the dollar amount demanded in the 
operative pleading.  The question before us is whether an 
accounting action is sufficiently unique to warrant different 
treatment. 
4.  Synthesis 
In reconciling section 580’s constraints with the nature of 
an accounting action, we begin with the text of the statute itself.  
(See, e.g., Meza v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (2019) 
6 Cal.5th 844, 856 [“ ‘ “When we interpret a statute, . . . ‘[w]e 
first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and 
commonsense meaning.  We do not examine that language in 
isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a 
whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to 
harmonize the various parts of the enactment. . . . If the 
statutory language permits more than one reasonable 
interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the 
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’ ” ’ ”].)  
As noted, section 580 states in relevant part that “[t]he relief 
granted to the plaintiff, if there is no answer, cannot exceed that 
demanded in the complaint, in the statement required by 
Section 425.11, or in the statement provided for by Section 
425.115 . . . .”  (Id., subd. (a).)  On its face, section 580 simply 
refers to “[t]he relief . . . demanded in the complaint” and does 
not directly resolve the question of whether a plaintiff alleging 
an accounting action must plead a dollar amount to recover 
monetary relief in case of default.  (Ibid.) 
This does not mean, however, that section 580 
affirmatively sanctions default judgments awarding money 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
damages when the operative pleading omits the amount 
demanded.  Because section 580 is not limited to complaints in 
which money is requested, the Legislature’s use of the broad 
term “relief” is understandable.  After all, in cases in which only 
equitable relief is prayed for, “[t]he relief granted to plaintiff[s]” 
would not encompass any money judgment (ibid.), and, as such, 
it would not make sense to say in those circumstances that “[t]he 
amount granted to plaintiffs . . . cannot exceed that demanded 
in the complaint.”  In other words, because the Legislature did 
not separately address instances in which money damages are 
at stake in drafting section 580, it is sensible that the statute 
uses the more encompassing word “relief.”   
The language of section 580 itself is nonetheless revealing.  
It points us to two additional statutory provisions, sections 
425.11 and 425.115.  When we examine these provisions, which 
deal specifically with situations in which monetary relief is 
requested, we see that the statutes require plaintiffs to give 
notice to the defendants of the “amount” sought.  (See § 425.11, 
subd. (b) [“When a complaint is filed in an action to recover 
damages for personal injury or wrongful death, the defendant 
may at any time request a statement setting forth the nature 
and amount of damages being sought”]; § 425.115, subd. (b) 
[directing plaintiffs who seek punitive damages to serve upon 
defendants a statement that requires the insertion of a dollar 
figure as the amount demanded, or the “substantial equivalent” 
of such a statement]; § 425.115, subd. (c) [referring to “the 
amount set forth” in the statement described in subd. (b)].)  
Section 425.115 is especially clear that by the term “amount,” 
the Legislature means a dollar amount.  (See § 425.115, subds. 
(b), (c).)  When section 580 is read in conjunction with sections 
425.11 and 425.115, the prohibition imposed by section 580 is 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
21 
apparent:  The amount of monetary relief awarded in default — 
whether as compensation in personal injury or wrongful death 
actions or as punitives — cannot exceed the amount demanded 
in the statement of damages. 
Although sections 425.11 and 425.115 address a narrow 
set of cases (those involving personal injury, wrongful death, or 
punitive damages), the requirement that plaintiffs put 
defendants on notice of “the amount demanded” is much 
broader.  (§ 425.10, subd. (a)(2).)  Section 425.10 addresses the 
content of complaints in general and requires that “[i]f the 
recovery of money or damages is demanded, the amount 
demanded shall be stated” in the complaint.  (§ 425.10, subd. 
(a)(2); see also § 425.10, subd. (b) [exempting cases covered by 
§§ 425.11 or 425.115].)  Again, when sections 425.10 and 580 are 
considered together, section 580 is reasonably understood to 
require that the amount of damages granted in default shall not 
exceed “the amount demanded” in the complaint.  (§ 425.10, 
subd. (a)(2); see also Greenup, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 827 [“It 
would undermine this concern for due process [inhering in the 
requirement that plaintiffs put defendants on formal notice of 
their demands] to allow the [default] judgment herein to stand 
despite plaintiff’s failure to meet the requirements of sections 
425.10 or 425.11”].) 
The meaning of section 580 is likewise illuminated when 
we consider section 585.  (Accord Burtnett, supra, 33 Cal.2d at 
p. 806 [interpreting § 580 in conjunction with § 585]; Becker, 
supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 494; Greenup, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 826.)  
As mentioned, section 585 articulates the procedures by which 
a default judgment may be entered against a defendant.  
Subdivision (a) of section 585 allows the clerk, in certain 
instances, to “enter judgment for the principal amount 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
22 
demanded in the complaint.”  The statute thus makes clear that 
should a plaintiff seek “the recovery of money,” he or she must 
have demanded a “principal amount” of damages in the 
operative pleading.  (§ 585, subd. (a).)  Moreover, because the 
clerk is able to simply enter the judgment “for the principal 
amount demanded,” it appears inescapable that the “amount 
demanded” refers to a dollar amount.  (Ibid.) 
Because the word “amount” carries this meaning in 
subdivision (a) of section 585, we infer that it carries the same 
meaning when used in subdivision (b).  (See, e.g., People v. 
Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 987 [“ ‘ “ ‘ “identical words used 
in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same 
meaning” ’ ” ’ ”].)  Subdivision (b) addresses those instances 
where, as here, the court enters the default judgment.  
Subdivision (b) provides that in the case of a default, “[t]he 
plaintiff thereafter may apply to the court for the relief 
demanded in the complaint.  The court shall hear the evidence 
offered by the plaintiff, and shall render judgment in the 
plaintiff’s favor for that relief, not exceeding the amount stated 
in the complaint, in the statement required by Section 425.11, 
or in the statement provided for by Section 425.115, as appears 
by the evidence to be just.”  Subdivision (b) thus equates the 
“relief demanded in the complaint” with “the amount stated in 
the complaint,” indicating that when money damages are 
involved, the two terms mean the same thing.  And, as we have 
inferred from the textual evidence, the word “amount” in this 
context means “dollar amount.”  In short, when money damages 
are involved, section 585, subdivision (b) is best understood to 
mean that in the case of a default, the court shall render 
judgment for an amount proved by evidence, so long as that sum 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
23 
does not exceed the dollar amount stated in the complaint or 
statement of damages. 
Ironically, plaintiff points us to a 2007 amendment to 
section 585 that only bolsters this conclusion.  (Assem. Bill 
No. 310 (2007–2008 Reg. Sess.).)  Prior to the 2007 amendment, 
section 585 stated, “The plaintiff [after an entry of default] may 
apply to the court for the relief demanded in the complaint; the 
court shall hear the evidence offered by the plaintiff, and shall 
render judgment in his or her favor for such sum (not exceeding 
the amount stated in the complaint, in the statement required 
by Section 425.11, or in the statement provided for by Section 
425.115), as appears by such evidence to be just.”  (§ 585, former 
subd. (b).)  Plaintiff concedes that the term “such sum” as 
employed by the statute “refer[s] . . . to a dollar figure.”  
However, because that term was removed and replaced with 
“the relief,” plaintiff contends that section 585 no longer 
requires her to plead “a dollar figure.”  (See § 585, subd. (b).)  
The legislative history materials behind the 2007 amendment, 
however, make clear that the amendment effected only 
“technical and minor changes.”  (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. 
Bill No. 310 (2007–2008 Reg. Sess.), 5 Stats. 2007, Summary 
Dig., p. 126.)  As such, insofar as the term “such sum” references 
a dollar amount, so does the term “the relief” as set out in the 
current version of section 585. 
The standard forms that litigants must file for entry or 
judgment of default or to state damages in accordance with 
section 425.11 reflect the same reading of the statutes.  (See 
Judicial 
Council 
Forms, 
form 
CIV-100 
 
[as 
of 
Dec. 24, 2020]; Judicial Council Forms, form CIV-050 
 
[as 
of 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
24 
Dec. 24, 2020].)  These forms, which must be completed and filed 
before default may be taken, make clear that plaintiffs are 
required to state a specific dollar amount as the relief 
demanded. 
To summarize, section 580 speaks of the “[t]he relief . . . 
demanded in the complaint.”  (Id., subd. (a).)  When monetary 
relief is involved, we have seen that the term “relief demanded” 
means the “amount demanded.”  Furthermore, the most natural 
interpretation of “amount” is “dollar amount.”  As such, in cases 
in which a plaintiff seeks money damages, section 580 limits a 
plaintiff’s relief in default to the dollar amount that has been 
demanded in the operative pleading. 
Plaintiff reads the statutes differently.  In her reply brief, 
she argues that because the various statutes refer to the 
“amount demanded” or “principal amount demanded” instead of 
“dollar amount,” they do not “preclude stating the amount in 
other terms [than dollars], such as those used here:  the value 
or a stated portion of the value of a specific piece of property.”  
We are not persuaded.  Not only does such a reading seem less 
consistent with the language of the pertinent provisions, but it 
is also poorly suited for advancing the purpose of section 580.  
That purpose — as our cases have reiterated — “is to insure that 
defendants in cases which involve a default judgment have 
adequate notice of the judgments that may be taken against 
them.”  (Becker, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 493; see also Greenup, 
supra¸ 42 Cal.3d at p. 826.)  In many circumstances, a request 
for “a stated portion of the value of a specific piece of property” 
will not enable defendants to ascertain their potential liability 
without the plaintiff providing an estimate of the value of the 
property. 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
25 
To illustrate, suppose that a plaintiff alleges an 
accounting claim that seeks to recover 50 percent of a closely 
held company.  That allegation would do little to inform 
defendants of “the maximum judgment that may be assessed 
against them.”  (Greenup, supra¸ 42 Cal.3d at p. 826.)  Due to 
the lack of reliable market data, it can be difficult to value a 
closely held company.  (See In re Marriage of Micalizio (1988) 
199 Cal.App.3d 662, 673–674.)  Defendants thus may be 
legitimately uncertain about the dollar value of their exposure. 
Moreover, in the absence of an agreed-upon market value, many 
factors could affect a person’s perceived monetary value of the 
company, including varying accounting methodologies.  (Barry 
M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How 
Courts Determine Fair Value (1998) 47 Duke L.J. 613, 629 
[“Each appraisal technique is but a way of estimating the ‘fair 
value’ or ‘true value’ or ‘intrinsic value’ of a company, and 
undeniably, ‘ “[v]aluation is an art rather than a science.” ’  The 
valuation ‘answer’ given by each of these techniques is very 
dependent on the assumptions underlying the calculations 
employed.”].)  Because defendants cannot predict which 
methodology the plaintiff will select, such defendants would not 
have notice of the damages “that may be assessed against them.”  
(Greenup, at p. 826.) 
Although our analysis thus far has not touched on the 
accounting action, our conclusion remains the same when we 
take the elements of an accounting claim into consideration.  As 
a preliminary matter, we observe that there is no inherent 
conflict between the requirements of section 580, as we have 
interpreted that provision, and the nature of an accounting 
action.  As plaintiff admits, even though parties seeking an 
accounting cannot state a sum certain to which they are 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
26 
entitled, they “are not precluded from providing an estimate of 
the maximum value they may recover.”  In other words, 
although a plaintiff bringing an accounting action is not able to 
say, “I am owed $7,248.61,” there is nothing about the action 
that prevents him or her from pleading, “I believe I am owed an 
amount in the neighborhood of $10,000” — an allegation that 
would limit his or her recovery in case of default to $10,000.  (See 
Sass, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1043 [“Because a plaintiff’s 
ability to estimate a maximum value does not preclude the 
necessity to fix the actual value, the nature of an accounting 
claim does not justify a departure from section 580’s plain 
language”]; Ely v. Gray (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1257, 1262 (Ely) 
[observing that accounting “actions often include an estimate of 
the amount of money due the complaining party although an 
absolute amount is not specified”]; accord San Pedro Lumber Co. 
v. Reynolds (1896) 111 Cal. 588, 592 [averring in an action 
requesting an accounting “ ‘that plaintiff is unable to state the 
precise amount of the several items, but, according to his 
information and belief, charges that the full amount thereof 
equals in the aggregate sixty-five thousand dollars, or 
thereabouts’ ”]; Brea v. McGlashan (1934) 3 Cal.App.2d 454, 
458–459 [describing similar pleading of a damages amount].) 
 
Insofar as plaintiff’s argument has bite, it rests largely on 
the fact that individuals alleging an accounting action lack the 
necessary information to compute their damages whereas the 
defendants in such actions may have that information.  Under 
this view, it appears unjust to require plaintiffs to give 
defendants notice of their maximum exposure by pleading a 
specific amount of damages when plaintiffs do not know what 
that amount may be, but the defendants presumably do. 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
27 
 
Although seemingly attractive, this argument fails for a 
number of reasons.  First, because individuals need to include 
only an estimate of their maximum damages and plaintiffs 
alleging accounting claims have been able to include such an 
estimate in their complaints, this suggests that plaintiffs’ 
relative lack of knowledge does not pose an insurmountable 
obstacle to such pleadings.  (See, e.g., Ely, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d 
at pp. 1262–1263 [“A plaintiff may be able to include in the 
complaint or prayer for relief an estimate of the amount due 
him, be willing to be bound by that amount, and receive a default 
judgment limited to that amount.  Such a situation seems to 
satisfy the due process notice requirement as well as the 
accounting requirement that plaintiff not be able to figure a 
specific amount.”].) 
 
Furthermore, plaintiffs in default cases must still prove 
their damages to obtain monetary recovery.  (§ 585, subd. (b) 
[specifying that when a plaintiff applies to the court for a default 
judgment, “[t]he court shall hear the evidence offered by the 
plaintiff, and shall render judgment . . . as appears by the 
evidence to be just”]; see also, e.g., Kim v. Westmoore Partners, 
Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 288 [“ ‘damages must be proved 
in the trial court before the default judgment may be entered’ ”]; 
Ostling v. Loring (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1731, 1745 (Ostling) 
[“damages . . . despite default, require proof”]; Barragan v. 
Banco BCH (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 283, 302 (Barragan) 
[“Plaintiffs in a default judgment proceeding must prove they 
are entitled to the damages claimed”].)  Because relief awarded 
in default must be established by evidence, this means that all 
plaintiffs — even those alleging an accounting action — must at 
some point have a concrete idea of how much the defendants owe 
them.  At this juncture, the information asymmetry inherent in 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
28 
an accounting action does not appear to pose an obstacle to 
plaintiffs’ ability to state a sum. 
 
Accordingly, requiring accounting plaintiffs to plead a 
specific dollar amount to support a default money judgment is 
not obviously onerous or unjust.  (See Ely, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d 
at pp. 1263–1264 [“We do not find such a requirement 
burdensome since a plaintiff must be able, as this plaintiff was, 
to prove some level of defendant’s financial liability to receive 
an award of damages upon default”]; Van Sickle v. Gilbert (2011) 
196 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1527 (Van Sickle) [following Ely]; Finney 
v. Gomez (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 527, 544 (Finney) [same].)  
Plaintiffs can provide the required information in at least two 
ways:  (1) by including an estimate of the amount of damages in 
the original complaint, “be willing to be bound by that amount, 
and receive a default judgment limited to that amount” (Ely, 
supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 1262); or (2) by amending the 
complaint to state the amount of damages more accurately once 
they have gathered the necessary information to prove 
damages.7 
 
It is true that amending complaints in this fashion would 
open the default and give defendants another opportunity to 
respond.  (See, e.g., Cole v. Roebling Constr. Co. (1909) 156 
 
7  
Ely approved of a third option:  the use of a statement of 
damages akin to those served in personal injury or wrongful 
death cases.  (Ely, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 1263.)  As the 
court below recognized, whether a statement of damages may be 
used when the plaintiff does not plead a personal injury or 
wrongful death action is an issue that has split the Courts of 
Appeal.  (See Sass, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1040, fn. 10.)  
Cohen has not pressed for this third option, and we do not 
address that issue here. 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
29 
Cal. 443, 446 [“where, after the default of a defendant has been 
entered, a complaint is amended in matter of substance as 
distinguished from mere matter of form, the amendment opens 
the default, and unless the amended pleading be served on the 
defaulting defendant, no judgment can properly be entered on 
the 
default”]; 
Engebretson 
& 
Co. 
v. 
Harrison 
(1981) 
125 Cal.App.3d 436, 440 [“An amendment which significantly 
increases the amount of damages sought is an amendment of 
substance which must be served before a default can be 
entered”]; Ostling, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 1744 [similar]; 
Leo v. Dunlap (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 24, 28 [similar].)  However, 
we do not find such a result discouraging, given that “the policy 
of the law [is] to favor, wherever possible, a hearing on the 
merits . . . .”  (Weitz v. Yankosky (1966) 63 Cal.2d 849, 854 
(Weitz) [making this statement in the context of vacating a 
default].)  When individuals amend their complaints to 
incorporate new information, it is reasonable to permit the 
targets of those complaints to answer, and by so doing, allow the 
litigation to proceed to “a hearing on the merits.”  (Ibid.)  The 
alternative — permitting plaintiffs to proceed straight to default 
without putting defendants on notice of sums that plaintiffs will 
claim are owing — would be contrary to the purpose of section 
580.  (See, e.g., Becker, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 493.) 
Second, not only has the Legislature forgone exempting 
accounting actions from the scope of section 580, it has made 
clear that plaintiffs pleading claims involving an information 
asymmetry like that found in accounting actions are required to 
give defendants notice of a specific amount of damages before a 
default may be taken.  Recall that individuals who seek punitive 
damages must file a statement of damages in accordance with 
section 425.115.  This statement, as can be seen from the 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
30 
template set out in the provision, requires plaintiffs to state that 
they reserve the right to seek a maximum dollar amount as 
punitives.  (§ 425.115, subd. (b).)  Crucially here, an important 
factor in determining the proper amount of punitive damages is 
a defendant’s financial condition.  (See, e.g., Adams v. 
Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 109 [holding that “an award of 
punitive damages cannot be sustained on appeal unless the trial 
record contains meaningful evidence of the defendant’s financial 
condition” and “the plaintiff rather than the defendant [is 
required] to introduce this evidence”]; Simon v. San Paolo U.S. 
Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1159, 1185; Neal v. Farmers 
Ins. Exchange (1978) 21 Cal.3d 910, 928.)  A defendant’s 
financial wherewithal is information uniquely within a 
defendant’s knowledge and likely unknown to a plaintiff.  Yet 
despite plaintiffs’ relative lack of knowledge and the difficulty 
some plaintiffs may experience in estimating their opponents’ 
financial worth, the Legislature still requires all plaintiffs to 
inform the persons sued of the amount of punitive damages 
being sought.  In the face of such legislative choices, we see no 
basis to infer that the Legislature intends for accounting actions 
to be treated differently merely because some accounting 
plaintiffs may likewise have difficulty approximating the 
amounts owing. 
Third, a feature of California law makes notice of damages 
especially important for defendants contemplating default.  
Unlike federal law,8 California law does not give defaulting 
 
8  
See, e.g., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 8(b)(6) 
(28 U.S.C.) [“An allegation — other than one relating to the 
amount of damages — is admitted if a responsive pleading is 
 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
31 
defendants the right to contest the amount of damages.  Our 
authorities indicate that a defendant who defaults is “out of 
court” and not entitled to participate in the prove-up hearing.  
(Christerson v. French (1919) 180 Cal. 523, 525 [“A defendant 
against whom a default is entered is out of court and is not 
entitled to take any further steps in the cause affecting 
plaintiff’s right of action”]; see also, e.g., Title Insurance, supra, 
162 Cal. at p. 46 [same]; Harbour Vista, LLC v. HSBC Mortgage 
Services Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1502 [explaining that 
in “the ordinary default prove-up, . . . a defendant has no right 
to participate”]; Garcia v. Politis (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1474, 
1479 [“a case in which a defendant’s default has been taken 
necessarily has no adversarial quality and the defaulted 
defendant would have no right to participate in the motion”]; 
Barragan, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at pp. 302–303 [despite 
ordering a second judgment hearing to ascertain the defendant’s 
net worth, stipulating that the defendant “is not entitled to 
participate in any manner in the second judgment hearing”]; 
Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc. (1984) 
155 Cal.App.3d 381, 385 [stating that the defendant “having 
defaulted, knew it could not participate in a judgment hearing”]; 
 
required and the allegation is not denied”]; Bonilla v. Trebol 
Motors Corp. (1st Cir. 1998) 150 F.3d 77, 82 [“The ordinary rule 
is that a defaulting defendant is entitled to contest damages and 
to participate in a hearing on damages, should one be held”]; 
Cement & Concrete Workers Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Metro 
Found. Contrs. Inc. (2d Cir. 2012) 699 F.3d 230, 234 [similar]; 
Geddes v. United Fin. Group (9th Cir. 1977) 559 F.2d 557, 560 
[similar]; 10 Moore’s Federal Practice — Civil (2019) § 55.32  [“A 
party who defaults by failing to plead or defend does not admit 
the allegations in the claim as to the amount of damages.  The 
claimant must establish the amount of damages, and the 
defaulting party is entitled to be heard on the matter.”]. 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
32 
Don v. Cruz (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 695, 702 [observing that the 
defaulting defendant “did not and could not participate in the 
judgment hearing”]; but see Cassel v. Sullivan, Roche & 
Johnson, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 1159 (Cassel) [noting, 
without comment, that a “ ‘prove-up’ hearing was held, in which 
the [defendant] fully participated by presenting its own 
witnesses and evidence, and cross-examining [the plaintiff’s] 
witnesses”].)  In light of the fact that defendants who are sued 
in California courts do not appear to have the right to contest 
damages after default, we must take special care to preserve the 
notice given to such defendants. 
 
Finally, we are mindful that excusing accounting actions 
from the limitations on default judgments might encourage 
strategic pleading of such actions.  In this case, for example, 
plaintiff prayed for an accounting of both the Hollywood and 
Oakley properties.  Yet, given that sales of real estate are 
publicly recorded, the estimates of their market value are 
readily available, and plaintiff has pleaded she simply wants 
half the value of the properties (with no offsets for the fact that 
Cohen borne all the acquisition costs or any mention of 
differentiated maintenance costs), it is unclear why plaintiff 
needed an accounting from Cohen to estimate the amount of 
damages she was entitled to with regard to these assets.  Were 
we to rule for plaintiff, we would be giving her — and other 
litigants — an additional incentive to plead such an action, 
regardless of whether they are truly without means to estimate 
the amount of dollars owing. 
 
For these reasons, we hold that to support a default 
judgment awarding monetary relief, a party alleging an 
accounting action must have included in the operative pleading 
an estimate of a specific amount of money.  We acknowledge that 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
33 
in some cases plaintiffs may truly have no idea of the amount of 
damages they have suffered and can include no estimates of 
damages in their complaints.  In such instances, we recognize 
the inequity to litigants who may be barred from recovery in 
default proceedings because they lack the knowledge to assess 
their damages. 
 
Still, 
the 
inequity 
in 
such 
presumably 
unusual 
circumstances does not justify allowing all plaintiffs alleging an 
accounting action to sidestep the requirements of section 580 — 
and this is especially so when other mechanisms exist to 
ameliorate the unfairness that may inhere in some cases.  When 
a defendant fails to answer a complaint that seeks an accounting 
but does not provide an estimate of damages, the trial court need 
not proceed straight to a prove-up hearing.  Assuming that the 
plaintiff has demonstrated an entitlement to an accounting, the 
court can order an accounting.  (See § 585, subd. (b); Weiss v. 
Blumencranc (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 536, 538 [in a case in which 
the plaintiff sought dissolution of a partnership, appointment of 
a receiver, and an accounting, the court rendered a default 
judgment finding there was a partnership, appointing a 
receiver, “order[ing] a full accounting of all partnership assets 
. . . [and holding] in abeyance the determination as to punitive 
damages until the accounting of the assets of the partnership 
was completed”].)  The accounting affords the plaintiff “a means 
of discovery,” furnishing him or her with information to 
determine his or her damages.  (Teselle, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 180.)  In this way, a plaintiff’s initial lack of knowledge 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
34 
need not mean he or she is without remedy because of the 
defendant’s default.9 
Plaintiff urges us to a different conclusion.  Her argument 
relies on a line of cases that began with Lippel and cumulated 
in Cassel.  As noted previously, Lippel was a marriage 
dissolution case in which the plaintiff “initiated the action by 
filing a standard printed form petition.”  (Lippel, supra, 
51 Cal.3d at p. 1163.)  The issue in Lippel was whether, in 
checking and not checking certain boxes contained in the 
standard form, the plaintiff put the defendant on notice that she 
was seeking a particular type of relief (child support).  (Ibid.)  
We did not there address whether such a plaintiff must, in 
addition to checking the box for child support, give notice of a 
specific amount of support sought (e.g., “$100 per month”).  (Id. 
at p. 1164.)  However, in explaining our holding regarding the 
type of relief requested, we said, “Coupled with the requirement 
that the respondent be served with a copy of the petition 
[citation], the manner in which these boxes are checked, or not 
checked, informs and puts the respondent on notice of what 
specific relief the petitioner is, or is not, seeking.”  (Id. at 
pp. 1169–1170.) 
 
Seizing on this line, the Court of Appeal in In re Marriage 
of Andresen (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 873 (Andresen) held that a 
plaintiff using a standard form petition to dissolve her marriage 
need only put the defendant on notice that she was seeking a 
 
9  
Because the parties make no argument regarding the 
availability of such an accounting procedure, we do not further 
elaborate on its contours, including whether, following an 
accounting, a plaintiff would need to amend the complaint and 
thus reopen the default. 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
35 
type of relief, and not a specific amount.  (Id. at p. 879 [“due 
process is satisfied and sufficient notice is given for section 580 
purposes in marital dissolution actions by the petitioner’s act of 
checking the boxes and inserting the information called for on 
the standard form dissolution petition,” which does not solicit 
specific dollar amounts].) 
 
Plaintiff invites us to extend Andresen by applying it to 
her case.  Just as the plaintiff wife in Andresen was not required 
to give the defendant husband notice of the amount of money 
damages sought, plaintiff argues that she — a litigant in an 
“accounting case also seeking equal division of the value of the 
property in the defendant’s possession” — need not state a 
specific amount of damages in her complaint either. 
 
Even if we assume that Andresen was correctly decided, 
the case is inapposite to the matter at hand.  Andresen was a 
marriage dissolution action;10 this litigation is not.  Plaintiff and 
Cohen were never married, and when plaintiff sued Cohen, she 
did so by drafting a complaint, not by using a “standard printed 
form petition.”  (Lippel, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1163; see also 
Marvin, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 665 [“[t]he provisions of the 
Family Law Act do not govern the distribution of property 
acquired during a nonmarital relationship; such a relationship 
remains subject solely to judicial decision”].)  This difference is 
significant. 
 
10  
Even within the context of “a form complaint in a marital 
dissolution action,” Andresen has not been uniformly applied.  
(In re Marriage of Kahn (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1119 
[reasoning that “[i]t would be stretching Andresen too far to 
apply it in this case”].) 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
36 
 
Andresen takes for granted that the “statutorily mandated 
form . . . does not provide the ability to indicate an exact 
amount” of relief sought.  (Finney, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 537; see Andresen, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 879.)  The 
implication is that a party using the standard form is not able 
to disclose such information.  A plaintiff filing a complaint is not 
similarly constrained.  Because a plaintiff using a complaint 
faces no legal and few practical impediments to stating the 
amount of damages, there is little reason to excuse the litigant 
from doing so. 
 
Plaintiff protests that distinguishing marriage dissolution 
cases from accounting cases in this way “elevates form over 
substance.”  We do not think so.  We are here called upon to 
interpret a statute to determine whether it applies to require a 
plaintiff seeking an accounting to plead a specific amount of 
damages to support a default judgment.  The language of section 
580 carves out no exception for such a litigant.  Accordingly, for 
plaintiff’s argument to prevail, she must point us to other indicia 
that the Legislature intended to treat accounting actions 
differently from other claims.  (See Lippel, supra, 51 Cal.3d at 
pp. 1168–1171.)  In the case of marriage dissolution, the 
Legislature has arguably manifested such an intent by 
“empower[ing] and direct[ing] the Judicial Council to create, as 
a substitute for the traditional complaint, a mandatory printed 
standard form petition.”  (Id. at p. 1169.)  The Legislature has 
also specified that, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, 
“the trial court . . . must value and divide the community estate 
of the parties equally.”  (Andresen, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 880; see Fam. Code, § 2550.)  In so doing, the Legislature may 
have placed marriage dissolution actions outside the ambit of 
section 580.  But the Legislature has not taken similar steps 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
37 
with respect to accounting actions, and it is hardly an elevation 
of form over substance to find significance in such legislative 
choices. 
 
Furthermore, the substance of accounting actions seeking 
equal division of property is not sufficiently analogous to a 
marriage dissolution such that those actions should be exempt 
from the strictures of section 580.  To assert otherwise, plaintiff 
appears to make a two-step leap.  First, she argues that an 
accounting action like the one she brought is, at its core, 
litigation over a breach of a Marvin agreement.  Second, she 
asserts that litigation concerning a Marvin agreement is akin to 
a marital dissolution.  Thus, she maintains, accounting actions 
under which plaintiffs seek half of specifically identified assets 
should be treated as if they are marital dissolution actions. 
 
We reject plaintiff’s argument.  Breaches of Marvin 
agreements are not substantively the same as dissolutions of 
marriages.  Litigation regarding Marvin agreements proceeds 
as a contract dispute.  (See Marvin, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 684.)  
The terms of the parties’ agreement — and not the default rules 
and presumptions of property ownership legislated in the 
Family Law Act — set the nonmarital couple’s obligations.  
(Marvin, at p. 681.)  In contrast to marital relationships, the 
Family Law Act imposes no presumption that property acquired 
during a nonmarital relationship is jointly owned or that upon 
dissolution of the relationship, the property is to be divided 
equally among the former partners.  Marvin agreements, then, 
are insufficiently analogous to marriages in terms of their 
posttermination resolution to support a conclusion that they are 
exempt from section 580’s requirement. 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
38 
Moreover, even if we were to assume, arguendo, that 
accounting actions seeking half of identified assets are to be 
treated like marital dissolutions, plaintiff still has not 
persuaded us that she should prevail.  After all, it is far from 
clear that a less onerous standard applies in marital dissolution 
cases, particularly given the current statutorily mandated forms 
and the statutory disclosure obligations governing marital 
dissolution actions. 
True, marital dissolutions are subject to pleading 
requirements different from those imposed by section 425.10.  
More precisely, the current form governing marital dissolutions 
(Form FL-100) instructs the petitioner to identify assets without 
requiring information indicating the monetary value of those 
assets.  Nonetheless, the form provides an option to list assets 
and debts in a property declaration.11  The property declaration, 
Form FL-160, instructs that when used as an (optional) 
attachment to a petition or response, the party is to complete 
the portions of the form listing the assets and debts and proposal 
for division of those assets and debts in monetary terms 
(columns A and F).  By contrast, when a party completes this 
form in connection with a request to enter default, all columns 
on the form must be completed, including the “date acquired,” 
“gross fair market value,” “amount of debt,” “net fair market 
value,” and, again, a proposal for division stated in dollars 
(columns B through F).  (See Form FL-160.)  In addition, with 
limited exceptions, a petitioner in a marital dissolution action is 
obligated to make extensive disclosures regarding all assets and 
 
11  
Judicial 
Council 
Forms, 
form 
FL-160 
 [as of Dec. 24, 
2020] (hereafter Form FL-160). 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
39 
debts and serve the other party with this information “either 
concurrently with the petition for dissolution or legal 
separation, or within 60 days of filing the petition.”  (Fam. Code, 
§ 2104, subd. (f); see also Fam. Code, §§ 2103, 2110; Judicial 
Council 
Forms, 
form 
FL-140 
<https://www.courts.ca.gov/ 
documents/fl140.pdf> [as of Dec. 24, 2020]; Judicial Council 
Forms, form FL-142 <https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ 
fl142.pdf> [as of Dec. 24, 2020].)  It is thus unclear that when 
marital dissolutions end in defaults, the disclosures required are 
anything less than what is required by section 580. 
 
Plaintiff 
also 
seeks 
to 
rely 
on 
Cassel, 
supra, 
76 Cal.App.4th 1157.  Cassel extended Andresen to the context 
of an accounting action, holding that “in an action seeking to 
account for and value a former partner’s partnership interest 
and for payment of that interest, the complaint need only specify 
the type of relief requested, and not the specific dollar amount 
sought.”  (Id. at pp. 1163–1164.)  The court in Cassel may have 
been persuaded by the facts of the case, which, as alleged, led 
the court to conclude that the defendant was “armed with [such] 
information” that it “could precisely calculate the amount for 
which it would be liable if it chose to default.”  (Id. at p. 1163.)  
Under such circumstances, the court reasoned that complaints 
for accounting need not state “the specific dollar amount sought” 
in order to satisfy section 580, because there is no foreseeable 
“danger that defaulting defendants will be taken by surprise by 
judgments entered against them, [since], like spouses facing 
property division, they will be in possession of the essential 
information necessary to calculate their potential exposure.”  
(Cassel, at p. 1164.) 
 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
40 
 
Adherence to this aspect of Cassel has been spotty in the 
decades since it was decided.  Of the two published opinions that 
have seemingly endorsed Cassel, both narrowed Cassel’s holding 
so it did not apply to the facts of their case.  (Warren, supra, 
240 Cal.App.4th at p. 375 [“Although we agree with cases 
finding that a plaintiff in an action for accounting need not give 
notice of damages before a defendant’s default is entered, we 
also find that an exception to that rule applies:  where, as here, 
plaintiff knew what his damages were and defendants did not 
have access to that information, notice must be given before 
default is entered”]; Schwab v. Southern California Gas Co. 
(2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1326 [Cassel “is a limited 
exception to the statutory notice provisions, which does not 
apply in the present case”].) 
 
Other Courts of Appeal, including the court below, have 
flatly refused to follow Cassel.  (Sass, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1043 [joining “the growing majority of cases rejecting Cassel”]; 
Van Sickle, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1527 [“we reject 
Cassel”]; Finney, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 541–542 [“the 
rationale of Cassel runs counter to the primary purpose of 
section 580 of ensuring notice and fundamental fairness”]; see 
also Ely, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1263–1264 [a decision 
preceding Cassel with which Cassel disagrees but other Courts 
of Appeal have continued to follow].) 
 
We do not find Cassel persuasive.12  If all that is needed to 
satisfy section 580 is a lack of surprise to the defendants, then 
 
12  
We disapprove of Cassel v. Sullivan, Roche & Johnson, 
supra, 76 Cal.App.4th 1157 — and the two cases following it, 
Warren v. Warren, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th 373 and Schwab v. 
 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
41 
there would be no reason to insist on formal notice of potential 
liability.  Actual notice should suffice.  After all, when a 
defendant actually knows what is owed, there is no “danger” of 
surprise by a default judgment.  (Cassel, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 1164.)  Yet, this is not our law.  (See, e.g., Greenup, supra, 
42 Cal.3d at p. 826 [“due process requires formal notice of 
potential liability; actual notice may not substitute for service of 
an amended complaint”]; Airs Aromatics, LLC v. CBL Data 
Recovery Technologies, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1013, 1019 
[“courts have set aside default judgments that award more 
damages than requested in the complaint even where a 
defendant had actual notice of the damages the plaintiff 
sought”]; Stein v. York (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 320, 326 
[“Plaintiff argues defendant received notice of the potential 
damages that could be entered against him by virtue of his 
[participation in this action].  This argument does not persuade 
because constructive notice of potential liability does not satisfy 
section 580.”].) 
At its core, Cassel pointed to nothing other than a relative 
informational imbalance between plaintiffs and defendants in 
accounting actions to justify its holding.  (Cassel, supra, 
76 Cal.App.4th at p. 1163.)  As we previously explained, 
however, this is not enough. 
 
Plaintiff alternatively argues that “even if the relevant 
statutes are read to require notice of a sum certain, an exception 
is warranted” for “accounting actions seeking equal division of 
specified assets in the defendant’s hands.”  As a preliminary 
matter, we note that courts have no power to act in 
 
Southern California Gas Co., supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 1308 — to 
the extent they are inconsistent with our opinion. 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
42 
contravention of the relevant statutes, especially when those 
statutes delimit their jurisdiction.  (See Burtnett, supra, 
33 Cal.2d at p. 807 [“[T]he court’s jurisdiction to render default 
judgments can be exercised only in the way authorized by statute.  
It cannot act except in a particular manner, that is, by keeping 
the judgment within the bounds of the relief demanded.”].) 
At the heart of plaintiff’s argument, however, is a 
contention that we must address — if only to ultimately reject.  
The contention is that, regardless of how close they hew to the 
statutory text, accounting complaints that identify the assets in 
defendants’ possession and request half of their value give the 
defaulting parties “adequate notice of the maximum judgment 
that may be assessed against them.”  (Greenup, supra, 42 Cal.3d 
at p. 826.)  And, the argument goes, that is all section 580 
requires. 
Although we have said that “[n]otice is at the heart of the 
provision[s]” governing default, we have never endorsed the idea 
that these provisions are necessarily satisfied whenever notice 
has been given.  (Greenup, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 827.)  “The 
statutes are very specific in their requirements for a judgment 
following a default” (Burtnett, supra, 33 Cal.2d at p. 806), and 
by their terms, they require that relief granted in default cannot 
exceed “that demanded in the complaint” (§ 580, subd. (a)) or 
“the amount stated in the complaint” (§ 585, subd. (b)).  At the 
very least then, the provisions require not mere notice, but 
notice of a specific type:  that of the amount requested.  Put 
differently, plaintiff has not persuaded us that the requirements 
of the default statutes and the demands of due process for notice 
are coterminous. 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
43 
Furthermore, we can draw no principled line that would 
allow us to say that plaintiff’s pleading gives Cohen adequate 
notice without opening the door to “speculation” regarding 
whether functionally equivalent pleadings would also satisfy the 
due process notice requirement embedded in section 580.  
(Becker, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 494.)  In this case, plaintiff asks 
for half the value of the assets in Cohen’s possession.  If a 
request for a one-half share gives a defendant adequate notice 
of the maximum judgment that may be taken, then perhaps a 
demand for a rightful share should be adequate as well — at 
least when the rightful share in the circumstances presented 
may be exactly one half.  Yet, whether we may presume that 
individuals sued will know that the law as applied to the facts 
of their case will translate “rightful share” to “one-half share” is 
not at all clear.  Similarly, the question of whether we may 
assume that defendants know (or can readily determine) the 
value of any asset in their possession — no matter how esoteric, 
little transacted, or subject to differing, and perhaps subjective, 
valuations — is fraught as well.  In short, this is an area where 
due process may be best protected by a bright-line rule, one that 
states that if an individual requests money damages in a default 
judgment, the individual must have demanded an amount of 
said money in the operative pleadings. 
 
Finally, plaintiff argues that requiring litigants to plead a 
specific amount of damages will simply tempt them into naming 
“exorbitant figures” in their complaints.  Although we cannot 
guarantee that no plaintiff will fall prey to such reckless 
pleading, we believe a countervailing consideration is at play.  
A pleading of potential damages affords a defendant notice, 
which “enables [the] defendant to exercise his right to choose” 
whether to default.  (Greenup, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 829.)  The 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
44 
higher the figures an individual names in a complaint, the less 
likely it is that the defendant will “giv[e] up his right to defend.”  
(Ibid.)  Thus, insofar as litigants think of defaults as an easy 
win,13 they make the possibility of such a win more remote by 
pleading “exorbitant figures.” 
Furthermore, should a plaintiff provide an amount of 
damages at the high end of estimates, this may have the benefit 
of incentivizing a defendant to participate in the litigation, and 
thus serving the law’s preference to resolve litigation on the 
merits.  (See, e.g., Weitz, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 854; Waybright 
v. Anderson (1927) 200 Cal. 374, 377; Berri v. Rogero (1914) 
168 Cal. 736, 740.)  As we have discussed, a plaintiff may also 
amend a complaint in advance of a prove-up hearing in order to 
increase potential relief available through a default award.  
A defendant may choose to participate if the increased relief 
proves steep enough, and this, too, vindicates the judicial 
preference to resolve litigation on the merits.   
In short, individuals face various incentives in drafting 
complaints, and we do not think that our holding here is likely 
to warp their decisionmaking.  To the extent our ruling might in 
practice push some plaintiffs to increase estimates of their 
damages, such a change in behavior is not without benefit — as 
it may well encourage defendants to answer the complaints and 
thus put the litigation on track to be resolved on the merits. 
 
13  
But see, e.g., Heidary v. Yadollahi (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 
857, 868 [emphasizing that trial courts must “act as 
gatekeeper[s]” in default situations, “ensuring that only the 
appropriate claims get through”]; Grappo v. McMills (2017) 
11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1013–1014 [similar]. 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
45 
B.  Remaining Contentions 
 
After concluding — as we do — that the default judgment 
in this case violated section 580, the Court of Appeal proceeded 
to address and resolve an additional issue.  The Court of Appeal 
considered a situation in which “a plaintiff has specifically 
enumerated separate items of compensatory damages in her 
complaint” and asked, “[H]ow [under such circumstances] is a 
court to assess whether the amount of such damages obtained 
in a default judgment exceeds the amount demanded in the 
complaint?  Is the court to undertake this inquiry on an item-
by-item basis (comparing the amount awarded in the default 
judgment for each item against the amount demanded for that 
item in the complaint)?  Or is the court instead to conduct a more 
aggregated inquiry (comparing the total default judgment to the 
total amount demanded in the complaint)?”  (Sass, supra, 
32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1044.) 
 
We observe that the issue the Court of Appeal identified 
arises in only a limited set of circumstances.  Cohen concedes 
that had plaintiff “simply asserted the total amount she sought 
in the complaint’s prayer,” that total amount would set the 
ceiling on the sum recoverable in default.  If that is true, then 
when the prayer for relief includes a total amount demanded, 
there would be no question concerning the maximum sum the 
trial judge may grant in default and, as such, no question as to 
how a court should compare the default judgment against the 
demand.  Furthermore, even when a plaintiff fails to “assert[] 
the total amount she sought in the complaint’s prayer,” the 
proper method of comparison is an issue only when some of the 
plaintiff’s claims (or items within a claim) are ultimately 
unrecoverable. 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
46 
 
Such circumstances were not presented here.  The trial 
court in this case calculated its damage awards without regard 
to the amounts demanded in the operative complaint.  When 
Cohen later challenged the amount of monetary damages 
awarded in the default judgment, the court cited Cassel and 
explained that when a plaintiff alleges a cause of action for 
accounting, “there is no notice requirement for damages sought 
before entry of default judgment.”  This was incorrect, but the 
trial court’s calculation did not implicate the issue of how the 
default judgment should be compared against the complaint.  In 
the court’s view, no comparison was necessary because plaintiff 
did not need to put Cohen on notice of the “damages sought 
before entry of default judgment” by including such a figure in 
the complaint. 
 
The Court of Appeal’s calculation of damages likewise does 
not tread on the issue — but for a different reason.  Based on 
the allegation that she “brought to” Tag $1.4 million, the 
appellate court awarded plaintiff $700,000 as her half share of 
Tag’s value.  According to the Court of Appeal, plaintiff 
“demanded $700,000 for the value of Tag” and thus could be 
granted this amount in default.  (Sass, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1046.)  An examination of the complaint, however, reveals 
that plaintiff did not demand $700,000 as her entitlement to the 
value of Tag.  Instead, she demanded $700,000 as part of her 
fraud claim, alleging that Cohen had falsely promised he would 
give her “equity in Tag” (id. at p. 1036) and that this 
misrepresentation caused her to “suffer[] actual damages,” 
including “at least the sum of $700,000, which represents 50% 
of the revenue brought to Tag by Plaintiff.”  The revenue that 
plaintiff, a single employee, generated for Tag — with no 
mention regarding the cost of generating that revenue — has no 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
47 
clear and defensible relation to the actual value of the company.  
In short, plaintiff never alleged a figure for “the value of Tag.”  
(Id. at p. 1046.)  The question thus is whether she may recover 
her half share of Tag’s value despite never alleging what that 
value may be. 
This question may be taken up by the trial court when, in 
accordance with the Court of Appeal’s order, the case is 
remanded to it.  We thus affirm the Court of Appeal’s decision 
without passing judgment on whether an aggregate approach or 
a claim-by-claim (or item-by-item) basis is the proper method for 
comparing an amount demanded in a complaint to an amount 
awarded in default. 
SASS v. COHEN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
48 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
We hold that a plaintiff alleging an accounting action must 
plead a specific dollar amount to support a default judgment 
awarding monetary relief.  We express no view on the proper 
method — whether that be on a claim-by-claim (or item-by-item) 
or an aggregate basis — for comparing the amount granted in 
default with the amount demanded in the complaint.  Because 
the Court of Appeal’s opinion accords with our own holding here, 
we affirm its judgment. 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
GUERRERO, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________ 
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate 
District, Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article 
VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Sass v. Cohen 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion  
Original Appeal   
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted  XXX 32 Cal.App.5th 1032 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S255262 
Date Filed: December 24, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Frederick C. Shaller 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Snell & Wilmer, Keith M. Gregory, Daniel G. Seabolt and Todd E. Lundell for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Law Offices of Robert S. Gerstein, Robert S. Gerstein; Law Offices of James P. Wohl, James P. Wohl and 
Eileen P. Darroll for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Todd E. Lundell 
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. 
600 Anton Blvd., Suite 1400 
Costa Mesa, CA 92626 
(714) 427-7000 
 
Robert S. Gerstein 
Law Offices of Robert S. Gerstein 
171 Pier Avenue, #322 
Santa Monica, CA 90405 
(310) 820-1939