Title: Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 89497, 89511
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 2002

Docket Nos. 89497, 89511 cons.-Agenda 19-May 2001.

MARK OLIVEIRA, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. AMOCO
OIL COMPANY, Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	The plaintiff, Mark Oliveira, filed a one count, amended class
action complaint against the defendant, Amoco Oil Company, in
the circuit court of Champaign County. The complaint alleged that
defendant violated the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act (Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1996)) by
falsely representing in a series of advertisements that the use of its
premium gasolines would improve engine performance and benefit
the environment. The complaint further alleged that defendant's
advertisements increased consumer demand for the premium
gasolines. This, in turn, allegedly permitted defendant to
"command an inflated and otherwise unsustainable price for its
premium gasolines," thereby proximately causing actual damage
to all purchasers of the gasolines, regardless of whether they were
aware of the ads at the time of purchase. The complaint sought
certification of a nationwide class of consumers who had
purchased defendant's premium gasolines.
	Defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint
pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735
ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1996)). The circuit court granted defendant's
motion on the basis that plaintiff's "proximate causation pleading
[was] inadequate to state a cause of action under the Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act." At the same time, the circuit court also
denied plaintiff's request for class certification, finding that there
were no predominating common issues of fact or law with respect
to plaintiff's proposed class. On appeal, the appellate court
reversed the circuit court's dismissal of plaintiff's cause of action
and affirmed the circuit court's denial of class certification. 311
Ill. App. 3d 886. Plaintiff and defendant filed petitions for leave to
appeal from the appellate court's decision. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. We
granted both petitions and consolidated the appeals for review.

BACKGROUND

	Plaintiff filed his amended class action complaint in the
circuit court of Champaign County on May 5, 1997. The single
count contained in the complaint alleged that defendant violated
section 2 of the Act (815 ILCS 505/2 (West 1996)) by conducting
a deceptive advertising campaign over a period of several years.
Section 2 of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that "deceptive
acts or practices *** or the concealment, suppression or omission
of any material fact, with intent that others rely upon the
concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact *** in
the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared
unlawful ***." 815 ILCS 505/2 (West 1996).
	According to plaintiff's complaint, defendant ran a series of
television, radio and print advertisements for its premium
gasolines, including "Amoco Ultimate and/or Amoco Silver,"
which touted the gasolines' environmental benefits and high
performance qualities. The advertisements allegedly represented
that:
			"(A) Amoco Ultimate gasoline is superior to all other
brands of premium gasoline with respect to engine
performance or environmental benefits because it is
refined more than all other such brands;
			(B) The clear color of Amoco Ultimate gasoline
demonstrates the superior engine performance and
environmental benefits Amoco Ultimate provides
compared to other premium brands of gasolines that are
not clear in color;
			(C) A single tankful of Amoco Silver or Ultimate
gasoline will make dirty or clogged fuel injectors clean;
			(D) Amoco Silver or Ultimate gasoline provides
superior fuel injector cleaning compared to other brands
of gasoline; and
			(E) Automobiles driven more than 15,000 miles with
regular gasoline generally suffer from lost engine power
or acceleration which will be restored by the higher octane
of Amoco Silver gasoline."
Plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendant's advertisements
omitted material facts and were "false and misleading." According
to plaintiff's complaint, the representations in defendant's ads
were "made without any competent and/or scientific
substantiation" and defendant's premium gasolines were in fact
"no better for the performance of [consumers'] motor vehicles
than [nonpremium] gasolines." The complaint also alleged that
defendant's advertisements were made in the course of trade or
commerce and that defendant intended "that consumers would rely
on these advertisements in making their purchase decisions."
Therefore, according to plaintiff's complaint, defendant's
advertisements violated section 2 of the Act.
	Plaintiff also alleged in his amended complaint that
defendant's advertisements proximately caused him actual
damage. Proximate causation was a necessary element of
plaintiff's complaint because his claim for consumer fraud was
brought under section 10a(a) of the Act (815 ILCS 505/10a(a)
(West 1996)), the provision of the Act which establishes the right
to pursue a private cause of action for consumer fraud. Section
10a(a) states, in part, that "[a]ny person who suffers actual damage
as a result of a violation of [the] Act" may bring a cause of action
against that person for consumer fraud. 815 ILCS 505/10a(a)
(West 1996). The "as a result of" language in section 10a(a)
imposes an obligation upon a private individual seeking actual
damages under the Act to "demonstrate that the fraud complained
of proximately caused" those damages in order to recover for his
injury. Zekman v. Direct American Marketers, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 359, 373 (1998).
	Plaintiff maintained in his complaint that he suffered actual
damage as a result of the allegedly deceptive advertisements when
he purchased defendant's premium gasoline. Plaintiff did not
allege, however, that defendant's advertisements induced him to
buy the gasoline or that he was deceived by the ads. Nor did
plaintiff claim that he saw, heard or read any of the allegedly
deceptive advertisements. Instead, plaintiff alleged that he was
damaged by defendant's advertisements because the ads created an
"artificially inflated" price for the gasoline he purchased. In
support of this allegation, plaintiff advanced a "market theory" of
causation.(1) According to plaintiff's complaint, defendant's
allegedly deceptive advertising scheme increased demand for
defendant's premium gasolines. Because of this increase in
demand, defendant "was able to command an inflated and
otherwise unsustainable price for its premium gasolines."
Therefore, "all purchasers of Amoco's premium gasolines were
injured irrespective of whether they did or did not see or hear the
specific advertisements and marketing materials in question." In
other words, according to plaintiff's complaint, all consumers who
purchased defendant's premium gasolines during the time the
advertisements were running were damaged when they made the
purchase because they paid a higher price for the gasoline then
they would have paid in the absence of the ads.
	In the prayer for relief, plaintiff's complaint requested an
order from the circuit court certifying his action as a class action.
See 735 ILCS 5/2-801 et seq. (West 1996). Plaintiff's proposed
class was defined as "[a]ll retail purchasers in the United States
who purchased Amoco Ultimate and/or Amoco Silver gasoline"
during the time the various advertisements ran, from
approximately November 6, 1991, through January 2, 1996.(2) In
support of his request for class certification, plaintiff submitted the
affidavit of Dr. William R. Latham III, a professor of economics
at the University of Delaware. Taking as a given that defendant's
advertisements were misleading and that they had an effect on
consumers, Latham opined that "there exists a strong economic
likelihood that a substantial part of the price differential between
Ultimate and/or Silver and the other grades of Amoco gasoline
was the result of the greater demand for Ultimate and/or Silver
gasoline caused by the misleading advertisements for the premium
gasolines. A necessary result of the fact that the misleading
advertising led some consumers to demand Amoco premium
gasolines was an increase in demand that permitted Amoco to
maintain a higher price for its premium gasolines." According to
Latham, all individuals who purchased defendant's premium
gasolines paid an increased price because of the allegedly
deceptive ads, regardless of whether they saw or relied upon the
advertisements at issue. Latham also stated that the extent of the
"inflated" price-the difference between the price of the gasoline
with the ads and the price of the gasoline without the ads-could be
determined by "using the basic techniques of econometric
analysis."
	Defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint
pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735
ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1996)). Defendant also contested plaintiff's
request for class certification. On February 24, 1998, in a ruling
issued from the bench, the circuit court concluded that plaintiff's
"marketing theory" of causation was "not a correct statement of
proximate cause under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act."
Accordingly, the circuit court granted defendant's motion to
dismiss "on the basis that the proximate causation pleading is
inadequate to state a cause of action under the Illinois Consumer
Fraud Act."
	Although the circuit court dismissed plaintiff's complaint, the
court nevertheless went on to consider plaintiff's request for an
order certifying a nationwide class of consumers who had
purchased defendant's premium gasolines. On this issue, the
circuit court concluded that there were "so many variables" that
might influence a consumer's decision to buy a particular gasoline,
including, for example, the location of the gas station or other
services available at the station, that the court could not "find that
questions of fact would be common to the class or that the
common questions would predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members." The circuit court also found
that no common questions of law existed because the Act "would
not extend to persons who were not Illinois consumers."
Consequently, because there was "a lack of commonality of
questions of law or fact" with respect to plaintiff's proposed class,
the circuit court denied plaintiff's request for class certification.
	On appeal, the appellate court first considered the propriety of
the circuit court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and, in
particular, the circuit court's conclusion that plaintiff had failed to
adequately plead proximate causation as required under section
10a(a) of the Act. As set forth by the appellate court, the parties'
arguments on this issue focused primarily on this court's holding
in Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 163 Ill. 2d 33 (1994).
	In Martin, this court considered a private cause of action
brought under the Act in which it was alleged that a brokerage
firm misrepresented the nature of a certain securities fee. This
court addressed, among other issues, what type of causation the
plaintiff had to prove to recover damages for the defendant's
misrepresentation. Relying on federal case law, this court adopted
a causation analysis found in federal decisions interpreting Rule
10(b)-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. We
explained:
			"In order for a plaintiff to recover for a violation of
Rule 10(b)-5, the great majority of Federal courts require
plaintiffs to show two types of causation: (1) transaction
causation; and (2) loss causation. [Citation.] Transaction
causation has been defined as meaning that 'the investor
would not have engaged in the transaction had the other
party made truthful statements at the time required.'
[Citation.] Loss causation, on the other hand, has been
defined as meaning 'that the investor would not have
suffered a loss if the facts were what he believed them to
be.' ***
			We find Illinois law to be similar to the analysis used
by these Federal courts which require both transaction
causation and loss causation in order to recover for
misrepresentation in securities cases." Martin, 163 Ill. 2d 
at 60.
See also Adler v. William Blair &amp; Co., 271 Ill. App. 3d 117, 128-29 (1995); Bastian v. Petren Resources Corp., 271 Ill. App. 3d
232, 235 (1995) (in securities fraud, transaction causation occurs
when the defendant's conduct causes the plaintiff to enter into a
transaction; loss causation refers to the reasons for the
investment's decline in value).
	Before the appellate court in the case at bar, defendant argued
that, under Martin, any plaintiff seeking recovery under the Act
must allege "transaction causation." That is, a plaintiff must allege
that he would not have engaged in the transaction that resulted in
damage if the defendant had made truthful statements rather than
misleading ones. Defendant argued that plaintiff in the instant case
had not made any such allegation and, indeed, could not, since he
did not allege that he was even aware of defendant's
advertisements. Therefore, according to defendant, plaintiff's
complaint was properly dismissed.
	The appellate court rejected this argument. The appellate
court concluded that the term "transaction causation," as used in
Martin, was simply another name for reliance. See 311 Ill. App. 3d
at 893. The appellate court noted, however, that this court has
stated in several decisions that reliance is not a separate element
of a plaintiff's cause of action under the Act. 311 Ill. App. 3d at
893 (citing Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482, 501
(1996), Martin, 163 Ill. 2d  at 76, and Siegel v. Levy Organization
Development Co., 153 Ill. 2d 534, 542 (1992)). Attempting to
reconcile Martin's holding requiring proof of transaction causation
with these latter statements, the appellate court concluded that
transaction causation, or reliance, was an element of a plaintiff's
cause of action only in cases involving securities fraud brought
under the Act. 311 Ill. App. 3d at 893. Because plaintiff's cause of
action in the case at bar did not concern securities fraud, the
appellate court concluded that transaction causation was not a
relevant concern.
	Having rejected defendant's argument regarding transaction
causation, the appellate court concluded that plaintiff's marketing
theory of causation satisfied the proximate causation requirement
of the Act. The appellate court noted plaintiff's allegation that, but
for defendant's allegedly deceptive advertisements, defendant's
premium gasolines would have cost less than they actually did.
The appellate court further noted that plaintiff had alleged that he
purchased defendant's gasoline during the time the advertisements
would have had their effect, i.e., after they were published or
broadcast. These allegations, the appellate court determined, set
forth a legally sufficient statement of proximate causation under
the Act. 311 Ill. App. 3d at 896.
	The appellate court rejected defendant's additional arguments
that plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed because it was
not pled with the level of particularity required under the Act and
because it failed to plead a material misrepresentation. 311 Ill.
App. 3d at 894-95. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the
circuit court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.
	With respect to the question of class certification, however,
the appellate court affirmed the circuit court. The appellate court
noted that a suit may not be certified as a class action unless
"[t]here are questions of fact or law common to the class, which
common questions predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members" (735 ILCS 5/2-801(2) (West 1996)).
Addressing this requirement, the appellate court first held, as a
matter of statutory construction, that the Act did not apply to out-of-state consumers. 311 Ill. App. 3d at 897-98. In addition, the
appellate court determined that the members of plaintiff's
proposed class from outside Illinois lacked sufficient contacts with
Illinois to permit application of the Act. The court stated:
			"As the purchase of gasoline in his or her respective
state and the determinants of the price paid for it were
what triggered each potential plaintiff's cause of action,
something that does not affect Illinois commerce or
consumers, no significant connection to Illinois justifies
the use of Illinois law." 311 Ill. App. 3d at 899.
Because the Act could not be applied to out-of-state members of
the proposed class, the appellate court concluded that those
members' claims would be governed by the laws of each state
where the gasoline was purchased. 311 Ill. App. 3d at 899. Thus,
the appellate court held, there was "no common law to apply." 311
Ill. App. 3d at 899. Further, because the elements of the consumer
fraud laws of some other states differ from the Act's, the appellate
court concluded that "[t]he claims of out-of-state plaintiffs would
require individual fact finding and no predominance of common
fact exists." 311 Ill. App. 3d at 899. Accordingly, the appellate
court affirmed the circuit court's denial of class certification.
	Plaintiff filed a petition for leave to appeal the appellate
court's judgment affirming the denial of class certification. 177 Ill.
2d R. 315. The petition was allowed and the case was docketed in
this court as No. 89511. Defendant filed a petition for leave to
appeal the appellate court's judgment reversing the dismissal of
plaintiff's cause of action. That petition was also allowed and the
case was docketed as No. 89497. The two appeals were
consolidated for review.
	We subsequently granted leave to the Illinois Trial Lawyers
Association to file an amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiff's
appeal. We also granted leave to the Product Liability Council, the
National Association of Independent Insurers, the American
Insurance Association and the Alliance of American Insurers, the
Illinois Automobile Dealers Association and the Chicago
Automobile Trade Association, Lawyers for Civil Justice, and the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, to file amicus curiae
briefs in support of defendant.

ANALYSIS

	In No. 89497, defendant contests the appellate court's holding
that plaintiff adequately pled a private cause of action for
consumer fraud under the Act. In No. 89511, plaintiff challenges
the appellate court's holding that the circuit court properly denied
class certification. We first consider defendant's appeal.

No. 89497

	The circuit court granted defendant's motion to dismiss
plaintiff's amended class action complaint pursuant to section
2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West
1996)). A section 2-615 motion attacks the legal sufficiency of a
complaint by asserting that it fails to state a cause of action upon
which relief can be granted. Weatherman v. Gary-Wheaton Bank
of Fox Valley, N.A., 186 Ill. 2d 472, 491 (1999). In determining
whether a complaint states a cause of action, the allegations
contained within the complaint are construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and all well-pleaded facts and reasonable
inferences drawn from those facts are accepted as true.
Weatherman, 186 Ill. 2d  at 491. The standard of review on appeal
from an order granting a section 2-615 motion to dismiss is de
novo. Weatherman, 186 Ill. 2d  at 491.
	Plaintiff's amended class action complaint alleges that
defendant violated section 2 of the Act (815 ILCS 505/2 (West
1996)). Section 2 prohibits deceptive acts or practices which are
committed in the course of trade or commerce and with the intent
that others rely upon them. Section 2 provides, in full:
			"Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices, including but not limited to the use or
employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false
promise, misrepresentation or the concealment,
suppression or omission of any material fact, with intent
that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or
omission of such material fact, or the use or employment
of any practice described in Section 2 of the 'Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act', approved August 5, 1965,
in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby
declared unlawful whether any person has in fact been
misled, deceived or damaged thereby. In construing this
section, consideration shall be given to the interpretations
of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts
relating to Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act." 815 ILCS 505/2 (West 1996).
	When originally enacted in 1961, the Act did not expressly
provide a private cause of action for violations of section 2. But
see Rice v. Snarlin, Inc., 131 Ill. App. 2d 434 (1970) (holding that
the Act impliedly permitted a private cause of action). Unlawful
business practices were generally prosecuted by the Attorney
General, who had the authority to pursue injunctive relief,
restitution and civil penalties. See 815 ILCS 505/3 through 7
(West 1996). In 1973, the General Assembly added section 10a(a)
to the Act (815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West 1996)). Section 10a(a)
expressly authorizes private causes of action for deceptive
business practices proscribed by the Act. Section 10a(a) states, in
relevant part: "Any person who suffers actual damage as a result
of a violation of [the] Act committed by any other person may
bring an action against such person." 815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West
1996).
	Unlike an action brought by the Attorney General under
section 2, which does not require that "any person has in fact been
misled, deceived or damaged" (815 ILCS 505/2 (West 1996)), a
private cause of action brought under section 10a(a) requires proof
of "actual damage" (815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West 1996)). Further,
a private cause of action brought under section 10a(a) requires
proof that the damage occurred "as a result of" the deceptive act
or practice (815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West 1996)). As noted
previously, this language imposes a proximate causation
requirement. See, e.g., Zekman, 182 Ill. 2d  at 373; Martin, 163 Ill. 2d  at 52-54, 58-61. Thus, to adequately plead a private cause of
action for a violation of section 2 of the Act, a plaintiff must
allege: (1) a deceptive act or practice by the defendant, (2) the
defendant's intent that the plaintiff rely on the deception, (3) the
occurrence of the deception in the course of conduct involving
trade or commerce, and (4) actual damage to the plaintiff (5)
proximately caused by the deception. Zekman, 182 Ill. 2d  at 373;
Connick,174 Ill. 2d  at 501.
	Defendant's primary contention on appeal is that plaintiff's
"marketing theory" of causation is a legally insufficient statement
of proximate causation and, therefore, that the circuit court
properly dismissed plaintiff's amended complaint. In support of
this contention, defendant repeats the same arguments which it
raised in the appellate court regarding Martin. Defendant further
argues that it was error for the appellate court to hold that Martin's
requirement of "transaction causation" applies only to cases
involving securities fraud brought under the Act.
	Defendant also raises an additional point regarding Martin.
Defendant emphasizes that Martin's causation analysis was based
on common law principles of causation found in the tort of
fraudulent misrepresentation. See Martin, 163 Ill. 2d  at 58-61.
This fact is significant because, in the common law tort of
fraudulent misrepresentation, the causal link between the
wrongdoer and the damage to the plaintiff is provided by the
concept of reliance. More precisely, in the common law tort of
fraudulent misrepresentation, the element of cause-in-fact is
defined as reliance. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §546,
Comment a, at 103 (1977) ("If the [fraudulent] misrepresentation
has not in fact been relied upon by the recipient in entering into a
transaction in which he suffers pecuniary loss, the
misrepresentation is not in fact a cause of the loss"); 2 D. Dobbs,
Law of Torts §474, at 1358 (2001) ("The requirement of reliance
in fact is a requirement that the defendant's representation is one
of the causes in fact of the plaintiff's harm, although it need not be
the sole cause"). Thus, defendant suggests that reliance, although
not listed as a separate element under section 10a(a) of the Act, is
necessarily subsumed under that section's causation requirement.
See Duran v. Leslie Oldsmobile, Inc., 229 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 1041
(1992); Elipas Enterprises, Inc. v. Silverstein, 243 Ill. App. 3d
230, 235 (1993); M. Polelle &amp; B. Ottley, Illinois Tort Law §9.05,
at 9-32 (3d ed. 2001) ("without any need to prove actual reliance
it is difficult to imagine how a plaintiff who chooses not to can
show *** proximate cause"); see also Weinberg v. Sun Co., 565
Pa. 612, 617, 777 A.2d 442, 445 (2001) (under state consumer
fraud act requiring proof that the plaintiff's damage occurred "as
a result of" the statutory violation, the plaintiff must prove
reliance).
	Although defendant makes the above observations regarding
causation and reliance, defendant maintains that the precise
relationship between those concepts under the Act need not be
decided in order to resolve this appeal. Instead, defendant argues
that the adequacy of plaintiff's "marketing theory" of causation
may be decided under the narrower principles set forth in Zekman
v. Direct American Marketers, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 359 (1998), the
most recent decision of this court to consider the element of
proximate causation required under section 10a(a) of the Act.
	Defendant maintains that, under Zekman, a plaintiff pursuing
a claim for deceptive advertising under the Act must prove that he
was deceived by the ads in order to establish proximate causation.
If the plaintiff is unable to show that he was deceived, defendant
argues, then the plaintiff is too far removed from the wrongdoing
as a matter of law to establish the "immediate" and "direct"
relationship between the wrongdoing and the injury that is
required for proximate causation. See, e.g., Martin, 163 Ill. 2d  at
58 (" 'the injury suffered by the plaintiff must be the natural and
not merely a remote consequence of the defendant's act' "),
quoting Town of Thorton v. Winterhoff, 406 Ill. 113, 119 (1950).
Therefore, according to defendant, because plaintiff's amended
complaint does not allege that he was deceived by defendant's ads,
the complaint was properly dismissed.
	We agree with defendant that Zekman controls this appeal.
We therefore address that case in some detail. In Zekman, the
plaintiff received a series of allegedly deceptive mailings from a
direct mail marketer. These mailings stated that the plaintiff had
won a prize from among a list of prizes contained in the mailing.
Some of the prizes listed were large cash awards, while others
were merely discount coupons for various products or services. To
claim his prize, the mailings indicated that the plaintiff should call
a "900" phone number, although it was also indicated that he
could reply by mail. When the plaintiff phoned the "900" number,
he incurred charges of between $8 to $10 per call. The plaintiff
made several calls to various "900" numbers listed in the mailings
but never won a cash award. AT&amp;T, which reviewed the direct
marketer's mailings to ensure that they complied with its policies
regarding "900" numbers, billed the plaintiff for the phone
charges. The majority of the phone charges went to the direct
marketer but AT&amp;T retained a percentage of the charges for itself.
Zekman, 182 Ill. 2d  at 363-64.
	The plaintiff filed a complaint against AT&amp;T which alleged,
in pertinent part, that AT&amp;T violated section 2 of the Act. Zekman,
182 Ill. 2d  at 372. According to the plaintiff, AT&amp;T violated the
Act by "reviewing, revising, and approving" the "deceptive
solicitations" sent to him by the direct marketer. In addition, the
plaintiff alleged that AT&amp;T violated section 2 of the Act by billing
the plaintiff for his calls to the "900" numbers in a misleading
manner. Zekman, 182 Ill. 2d  at 372. In response, AT&amp;T filed a
motion for summary judgment. In this motion, AT&amp;T argued that
the plaintiff was not deceived by the mailings or the phone bills
and, therefore, could not prove that AT&amp;T's alleged misconduct
caused him injury. In support of its motion for summary judgment,
AT&amp;T relied upon deposition testimony given by the plaintiff
which, according to AT&amp;T, showed that the plaintiff had not been
deceived. The circuit court granted AT&amp;T's motion for summary
judgment and the plaintiff appealed. Zekman, 182 Ill. 2d  at 373.
	Before the appellate court, the plaintiff argued that his
deposition testimony was essentially irrelevant to the question of
whether he had established the element of causation required
under the Act. The plaintiff maintained that, "even if he had been
suspicious of certain deceptions in the solicitations, such
awareness had no bearing on the causal link between his damages
and violations of the Act" because "he reacted reasonably to the
mailings" and "acted in the manner in which defendants intended
a recipient of the mailing to act." Zekman v. Direct American
Marketers, Inc., 286 Ill. App. 3d 462, 468 (1997). The appellate
court construed this argument as an assertion that "parties are not
required under the Act to show that they are actually deceived."
Zekman, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 468. The court rejected this
contention, holding that the element of proximate causation under
the Act is not satisfied "where a party was not deceived." Zekman,
286 Ill. App. 3d at 468. Notably, in so holding, the appellate court
also made additional comments about the nature of proximate
causation and reliance. Like defendant in the case at bar, the
appellate court noted that "the theory of reliance is ambiguously
present within the parameters of the concept of proximate cause."
Zekman, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 468.
	Although the appellate court held that the plaintiff had to
prove that he was deceived by the mailings in order to recover
under the Act, the court nevertheless reversed the circuit court's
entry of summary judgment in favor of AT&amp;T. The appellate court
held that the plaintiff's deposition testimony was not entirely clear
and that there remained "a genuine issue of fact as to whether [the
direct marketer's] mailing caused plaintiff to believe that he had
won an award." Zekman, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 469. Therefore,
according to the appellate court, summary judgment was improper.
AT&amp;T then appealed.
	On appeal, this court did not address the "ambiguity"
regarding the relationship between causation and reliance that was
noted by the appellate court. Instead, our decision turned solely on
the narrower issue of whether the plaintiff was deceived. We did
not disturb the appellate court's holding that a plaintiff asserting
a claim of deceptive advertising under the Act must prove that he
was deceived by that advertising in order to establish proximate
causation. However, we reversed the appellate court's holding that
there existed a question of material fact as to whether the plaintiff
was deceived. After discussing the plaintiff's deposition testimony
at length we stated:
			"On this record, we do not believe that there exists a
genuine issue of material fact whether the allegedly
deceptive nature of the solicitations received by plaintiff
caused him to incur the charges for the '900' number
calls. Rather, it appears that plaintiff understood the
requirements and costs of the program. ***
			The preceding discussion also answers the plaintiff's
further contention that he was deceived by AT&amp;T's
manner of billing for the calls. By his own admission,
plaintiff knew that he had not necessarily won cash prizes,
that he did not have to call a '900' number to learn if [he]
had won such a prize, and that he would incur a charge if
he did choose to learn his prize status by placing the calls.
*** In addition, we note plaintiff's statement in his
deposition that he did not read or pay the bills himself,
delegating those duties to his secretary. Accordingly,
plaintiff could not have been misled by the allegedly
deceptive nature of the bills. ***
			In sum, based on the testimony by plaintiff at his
deposition, we do not believe that there remains a genuine
issue of material fact whether the alleged violations of the
Act by AT&amp;T proximately caused his damage, for
plaintiff's testimony demonstrates that he was not
deceived by AT&amp;T's actions." Zekman, 182 Ill. 2d  at 375-76.
	The plaintiff's claims in Zekman failed as a matter of law
because the plaintiff "was not deceived." Zekman, 182 Ill. 2d  at
376. Plaintiff's amended class action complaint in the case at bar
suffers from a similar infirmity. Plaintiff does not allege that he
was, in any manner, deceived by defendant's advertisements.
Plaintiff does not allege that he received anything other than what
he expected to receive when he purchased defendant's gasoline,
i.e., a certain amount of gasoline, with a certain octane level, for
the price listed on the pump. Indeed, plaintiff could not allege that
defendant's advertisements deceived him or misled him as to what
he was receiving when he made his purchase. Because plaintiff
does not allege that he saw, heard or read any of defendant's ads,
plaintiff cannot allege that he believed that he was buying gasoline
which benefitted the environment or improved engine
performance.
	Plaintiff briefly attempts to distinguish Zekman, stating that
the plaintiff in Zekman "knew the truth when he made the calls
and was not deceived" and that the case is limited to that "specific
situation." But as defendant points out, the "situation" rejected in
Zekman is precisely what plaintiff is asserting in this case. Under
plaintiff's "market theory" of causation, purchasers of defendant's
premium gasolines who saw the ads but never believed them, i.e.,
those who "knew the truth," nevertheless have valid claims under
section 10a(a) of the Act. Moreover, purchasers of defendant's
premium gasolines who never saw the ads and, thus, were "not
deceived" also have valid claims. These results are plainly at odds
with Zekman.
	Zekman makes clear that, to properly plead the element of
proximate causation in a private cause of action for deceptive
advertising brought under the Act, a plaintiff must allege that he
was, in some manner, deceived. Contrary to these principles,
plaintiff's amended class action complaint fails to allege that
plaintiff was deceived by defendant's advertisements.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and
affirm the circuit court's dismissal of plaintiff's amended class
action complaint. Because we affirm the dismissal of plaintiff's
amended complaint on the ground that proximate causation was
not adequately pled, we need not address other arguments raised
by defendant in this appeal.

	No. 89511

	We now turn to plaintiff's appeal. At issue in this appeal is
whether the appellate court erred in affirming the circuit court's
denial of plaintiff's request for class certification.
	Initially, defendant notes that, because this court has
determined that plaintiff's amended class action complaint fails to
state a cause of action under the Act, plaintiff's case has been
"entirely dispose[d] of." Defendant argues, therefore, that any
issues pertaining to class certification are no longer of any
consequence to the resolution of plaintiff's case and, thus, that
plaintiff's appeal has been rendered moot. See, e.g., In re Adoption
of Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362, 364 (1999) (when the resolution of
a question of law cannot affect the result of a case as to the parties,
the question is moot). We agree.
	It is established in Illinois that a circuit court may rule upon
a defendant's motion to dismiss a class action complaint prior to
deciding whether the suit should be certified as a class action. See
Schlessinger v. Olsen, 86 Ill. 2d 314, 320 (1981); Landesman v.
General Motors Corp., 72 Ill. 2d 44, 48-49 (1978); K. Forde &amp; K.
Malloy, State Practice: Illinois' Class Action Statute, in Class
Actions §7.13 (Ill. Inst. for Cont. Legal Educ. 2001). In those cases
where the circuit court first considers a motion to dismiss a class
action complaint and holds, as an initial matter, that no cause of
action has been stated, it is unnecessary for the court to proceed to
the issue of class certification. The granting of the motion to
dismiss fully resolves the question of whether the plaintiff can
obtain relief. Further consideration of the issues pertaining to class
certification will have no effect on the court's conclusion that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action and, hence, no effect on
the result of the case as to the parties. See Schlessinger, 86 Ill. 2d 
at 318. Consequently, "a dismissal for failure to state a cause of
action will render moot the question of certification of the class."
4 R. Michael, Illinois Practice §30.2 n.2 (1989); Schlessinger, 86 Ill. 2d  at 320 (granting of a motion to dismiss a class action
complaint eliminates the need to litigate the requirements of class
certification); see also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 n.3,
38 L. Ed. 2d 674, 682 n.3, 94 S. Ct. 669, 675 n.3 (1974) ("There
was no class determination made in this case as the complaint was
dismissed on grounds [lack of standing] which did not require that
determination to be made"); Cowen v. Bank United of Texas, FSB,
70 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1995).
	In this case, for the reasons stated above, plaintiff's amended
class action complaint failed to state a cause of action for which
relief can be granted under the Act. It is therefore unnecessary for
this court to address the merits of plaintiff's request for class
certification. See Schlessinger, 86 Ill. 2d  at 320. Any statements
or holdings made by the lower courts with respect to the
appropriateness of class certification were wholly advisory, as
would be any statements made by this court on the issue. Advisory
opinions are to be avoided. See Barth v. Reagan, 139 Ill. 2d 399,
419 (1990). For this reason, we express no opinion on the
appropriateness of class certification in this case. We also vacate
those portions of the circuit and appellate court judgments which
addressed the issue of class certification. See Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 
at 366, citing In re Special Prosecutor, 126 Ill. 2d 208 (1988);
Bluthardt v. Breslin, 74 Ill. 2d 246, 251 (1979).

	CONCLUSION

	In No. 89497, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed
and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. In No. 89511, the
judgments of the circuit and appellate court are vacated.
	No. 89497-Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
	No. 89511-Appellate court judgment vacated;
circuit court judgment vacated.



	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:


	Proximate cause is essential to a private right of action for
damages under section 10a(a) of the Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West
1996)). Actual reliance by the plaintiff is not. Connick v. Suzuki
Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482, 501 (1996). The appellate court
correctly applied these concepts to the case before us. See 311 Ill.
App. 3d at 892-95. I would therefore affirm that portion of its
judgment reversing the circuit court's order dismissing Oliveira's
complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
	The majority's justification for reaching a contrary result is
misguided. While it is true that someone must have been deceived
in order to sustain a private right of action for damages under the
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, there is no
requirement in the statute that it be the plaintiff. If others were
deceived and acted in reliance on the deception in a way that
harmed the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to seek recovery for
his damages under the Act even if he, himself, was not misled.
	Our decision in Zekman v. Direct American Marketers, Inc.,
182 Ill. 2d 359 (1998), does not hold otherwise. Although we
rejected the plaintiff's claim in Zekman on the grounds that he had
not been deceived by the defendant telephone company's actions
(Zekman, 182 Ill. 2d at 376), that determination must be read in
context. The plaintiff in Zekman was the only consumer involved,
and, unlike the plaintiff in the present case, he did not assert that
others were misled in a way that harmed him. Accordingly, if he
was not deceived and did not act to his detriment on the basis of
a deception, then no one did. That being so, there was no need for
our court to go further and address the situation alleged in
Oliveira's complaint, namely, that the plaintiff's damages resulted
from reliance by third parties on the defendant's deceptive
conduct. In Zekman, there was simply no reliance by anyone.
Without that, there could be no possible causal link between the
defendant's actions and the damages the plaintiff sought to
recover. 
	The cause of action asserted by Oliveira here does not suffer
from the same impediment. According to Oliveira's complaint,
there was reliance on Amoco's false representations. It came from
the gasoline-purchasing public, who believed Amoco's spurious
claims regarding the company's premium gasoline and bought that
gasoline based on those claims. That reliance, and the purchases
it induced, resulted in damage to Oliveira by increasing demand
for the fuel, thereby driving the cost higher than what he and
others would otherwise have had to pay. Accordingly, if the
factual allegations in Oliveira's complaint are true, as we must
assume them to be (see Jackson v. South Holland Dodge, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 39, 44-45 (2001)), there was a direct causal link between
Amoco's misrepresentations and the actual damages Oliveira
sustained.
	That the reliance involved third parties rather than the
individual plaintiff himself is a factor that sets Oliveira's claim
apart from others we have considered under the Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The novelty of the claim,
however, is no reason to turn it aside. Section 11a of the Act (815
ILCS 505/11a (West 1996)) expressly provides that the Act "shall
be liberally construed" to effectuate its purposes. We have
interpreted this to mean that the Act confers on Illinois courts a
clear mandate to utilize the Act to the utmost degree to eradicate
all forms of deceptive and unfair business practices and to provide
appropriate remedies to defrauded consumers. Warren v. LeMay,
142 Ill. App. 3d 550, 563 (1986). Consistent with these principles,
it is incumbent on our court to remain open to innovative
applications of the law's provisions. Consumer fraud takes endless
forms, and it is imperative that we interpret the statute in such a
way that it remains flexible enough to address new problems as
they arise.
	For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that Oliveira's
complaint was sufficient to allege a private right of action for
damages under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act and should not have been dismissed on the
pleadings. I therefore dissent.
	 
	 
1.    1Plaintiff's theory of causation bears marked similarities to the "fraud
on the market" theory found in federal securities case law. See, e.g.,
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 99 L. Ed. 2d 194 108 S. Ct. 978
(1988); but see Kaufman v. I-Stat Corp., 165 N.J. 94, 113-118, 754 A.2d 1188, 1198-1201 (2000) (discussing criticisms of the theory).

2.    2The record indicates that the end date of the class period, January 2,
1996, was the effective date of a consent decree between defendant and
the Federal Trade Commission. Pursuant to this consent decree, which
does not contain any express finding of wrongdoing, defendant agreed
to cease making the various representations at issue in this appeal
unless, "at the time of making such representation, [defendant]
possesses and relies upon competent and reliable scientific evidence that
substantiates the representation." The actions taken by the Federal
Trade Commission with respect to the advertising conducted by
defendant, as well as other oil companies, have prompted several civil
lawsuits raising claims similar to those presented here. See, e.g.,
Weinberg v. Sun Co., 565 Pa. 612, 777 A.2d 442 (2001); Ex Parte
Exxon Corp., 725 So. 2d 930 (Ala.1998); DeLima v. Exxon Corp., No.
A-3536-99T5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. December 4, 2000)
(unpublished opinion).