Title: Meenen v. Meenen
Citation: 178 Kan. 510, 289 P.2d 766
Docket Number: 39,842
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: November 12, 1955

178 Kan. 510 (1955)
289 P.2d 766
ALLAN ROGER MEENEN, Appellant,
v.
LUDOLPH MEENEN, also known as L.E. Meenen, FRITZ MEENEN, also known as F.H. Meenen; BERTHA MEENEN GERRIETS, HENRY J. MEENEN, FRIEDRICK MEENEN, HENRIETTA MOREY, Appellees.
No. 39,842

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed November 12, 1955.
C. Vincent Jones, of Clay Center, argued the cause, and Wayne W. Ryan, of Clay Center, was with him on the briefs for the appellant.
W.M. Beall, of Clay Center, argued the cause, and was on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARVEY, C.J.:
This was an action for the partition of certain real property, and for an accounting of rents and profits. The appeal by plaintiff is from an order of the trial court overruling his demurrer to certain parts of the defendants' answer. The pleadings may be summarized, and quoted, as follows:
The petition filed June 29, 1954, was in two counts. In the first count it was alleged that plaintiff is a resident of Nebraska; that *511 Johanna Meenen died, a widow, a resident of Clay County, Kansas, July 11, 1934, intestate; that her estate was never administered upon; that she was the mother of six children, three of whom were living at the time the action was brought: a daughter, Bertha Meenen Gerriets, and two sons, L.E. Meenen and F.H. Meenen. That a son, Bajo Meenen, died in 1893, a single man, without issue; that another son, Peter J. Meenen, died intestate in May, 1930, leaving as his sole issue, a son, Allan Roger Meenen, the plaintiff herein; that a third son, John H. Meenen, a resident of Clay County, Kansas, died intestate June 23, 1942, leaving as his sole issue, two sons, Henry J. Meenen and Friedrick Meenen, and a daughter, Henrietta Morey. That at the time of the death of Johanna Meenen she owned certain described real estate in Clay County, Kansas, which was not a homestead and was subject to partition among the living children and grandchildren, in shares set out in the petition, and should be set out to them in severalty, or if the same could not be done without manifest injury, the land should be sold and the proceeds divided, as provided by law.
In the second cause of action the allegations of the first cause of action were made a part thereof, and it was alleged that since the death of Johanna Meenen, F.H. Meenen, as co-tenant, for the benefit of himself and all the other co-tenants, had been handling the real estate, collecting the rents and profits therefrom, holding the same in trust for the benefit of all co-tenants, paying the taxes, and had collected more than $30,000. which belonged to all the co-tenants; that at all times F.H. Meenen, and all other defendants, recognized that plaintiff had the same share in the funds which had been so accumulated; that his share in the $30,000. was $6,000; that on June 7, 1954, F.H. Meenen, on behalf of himself and the other co-tenants, turned over to plaintiff $2,000. on said $6,000, and failed and refused to turn over to him any more, and gave as his sole excuse that plaintiff's father, Peter J. Meenen, had owed a note to Johanna Meenen, which note was dated March 1, 1928, for $8,750. and bore no interest. That since June, 1954, F.H. Meenen, in his said capacity, had accumulated in rents and profits a further amount which plaintiff alleged is in excess of $8,000. for which no accounting or distribution has been made. The prayer was for the partition of the real property, and that F.H. Meenen be required to make a true accounting so the plaintiff might have his full share of all rents and *512 profits according to his interest in the land. All the living children and grandchildren of Johanna Meenen were made party defendants.
Defendants filed a joint answer in which they admitted the allegations of the first cause of action and by reference made it a part of their answer. The answer contained a general denial of all matters alleged in the second cause of action except such matters as were specifically set forth and admitted. The answer further reads:
...............
Exhibit "A" attached to the answer shows a balance of cash on hand of $10,407.41, and 931 bushels of wheat, and 1,300 bushels of corn.
Plaintiff filed a demurrer to all that portion of the answer of defendants which followed the general denial, upon the grounds (1) the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant the relief asked by defendants; (2) defendants had no legal capacity to maintain said portion of the answer; and (3) said portion of the answer did not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to plaintiff's second cause of action.
This demurrer was duly presented to the court and argued, and taken under advisement. The court requested counsel to furnish written briefs, which was done. Later, February 2, 1955, the court, having fully considered the arguments and briefs of counsel, found the demurrer should be in all respects overruled, and made an order to that effect. This order is the one that forms the basis for plaintiff's appeal.
Counsel for appellant rely heavily on the statute of nonclaim, and contend that we must assume the law of Nebraska to be the same as that of Kansas. This statement is not quite correct. See, Poteet v. Simmons, 172 Kan. 310, 240 P.2d 147, where the same principle was relied upon. In 1947 our legislature enacted a statute, now found in G.S. 1949, which reads:
This was one of the acts recommended by the Commission on Uniform Laws, and may be found in 9 U.L.A., p. 401, where it states:
See, also, Franzen v. Equitable Life, &amp;c., Society, 130 N.J.L. 457, 33 A.2d 599.
While not identical with our statute, G.S. 1949, 59-2239, the Revised Statutes of Nebraska, 1943, § 30-609, treats, in part, the same matter, as follows:
As indicating that the Nebraska court has declined to apply the above statute in equitable actions, see, Crawford State Bank v. McEwen, 132 Neb. 399, 272 N.W. 226; Bratt v. Wishart, 136 Neb. 899, 287 N.W. 769; and, Stander v. Pankonin, 141 Neb. 738, 4 N.W. (2d) 895.
That is substantially what this court has held when construing G.S. 1935, 22-702, cited by appellant as the applicable statute here. We have held the statute is not applicable to actions in the district court, Robertson v. Tarry, 85 Kan. 450, 116 Pac. 486; nor stock-holder's double liability, Farmers State Bank v. Callahan, 123 Kan. 638, 256 Pac. 961; nor when administration has been had in any other state, Toner v. Conqueror Trust Co., 131 Kan. 651, 293 Pac. 745; nor in an action by surviving partner, Burris v. Burris, 137 Kan. 831, 22 P.2d 976; nor in partner estates and accounting action, Burris v. Burris, 140 Kan. 208, 34 P.2d 127. Many other cases might be cited.
Counsel for appellant say the law concerning advancements is not applicable to this case, as the alleged note purports to evidence a debt. The fact that a "note" was given does not, of itself, preclude the idea of it being an advancement. The instrument is peculiar. The payment date named in the instrument is "90 days after demand." There had never been a demand for payment prior to *516 June, 1954. The interest was at the rate of "no percent." On the back of the instrument were endorsements indicating the items which made up the amount of the note. These indicate that the maker had received $2,000. at one time in 1917, $4,000. another time that same year, $1,500. in 1921, and $2,250. in 1927. These figures total $9,750. He paid $1,000. in 1919, leaving a balance of $8,750.
Passing the right of Johanna Meenen to make a demand for payment, which right was never exercised, the instrument may be construed as nothing more than a statement in writing of the amount Peter J. Meenen had received from his mother and actually intended it be taken into consideration in the final settlement of her estate.
Johanna Meenen was under no obligation to go into the state of Nebraska where there was no administration pending on her son's estate, and initiate such proceedings. Indeed, it would have been futile if she had done so.
This is not a suit upon the "note." It is an action by one of the heirs at law to certain real property, to have it partitioned among co-tenants, and for an accounting for rents and profits, brought under our Code of Civil Procedure, G.S. 1949, 60-2101, et seq., in which the court has authority to make orders to secure a just and equitable partition. In considering any controverted claim between the parties as to their respective rights, if the matter is not covered by statutes, equitable principles apply.
In Peterson v. Peterson, 173 Kan. 636, 251 P.2d 221, it was held:
While the appellant normally is not chargeable with the debts of his father, since his father's estate was not administered and he is the only child, he unquestionably received what benefit occurred by his father receiving the sums evidenced in this instrument, and unless they have been lost in some way, he still has them.
The statutes of nonclaim have no bearing on the case. The statutes of limitations do not run against a sum due the common ancestor in the settlement of an account between the heirs at law. See, Bartlett's Kansas Probate Law and Practice (Rev. Ed.), Vol. 1, §§ 343, 344, and authorities cited. Apparently the son recognized *517 this when he authorized the $4,000. to be paid June 7, 1954. In any event, it was a moral obligation and he could assume the liability. Whatever controversy may arise about the facts pleaded, certainly the district court is not without jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
We have examined all authorities cited by counsel but find no necessity of further extending the opinion. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.