Title: People v. Patterson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 98641
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 15, 2005

Docket No. 98641-Agenda 6-May 2005.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 
Appellee, v. RICKY 							A. PATTERSON, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 15, 2005.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Champaign County,
defendant Ricky A. Patterson was convicted of first degree murder
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2002)), concealment of a homicidal
death (720 ILCS 5/9-3.1(a) (2002)), and arson (720 ILCS 5/20-1(a)
(West 2002)). Defendant was sentenced to 55 years in prison. On
appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that the circuit court erred in
admitting the grand jury testimony of Migdalia Rivera, who declined
to testify at trial. The appellate court held that, under Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004),
the admission of Rivera's grand jury testimony violated defendant's
sixth amendment right to be confronted with the witnesses against him
(U.S. Const., amend. VI). 347 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 1051. The appellate
court concluded, however, that this error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Defendant's conviction and sentence were affirmed.
347 Ill. App. 3d at 1056. We allowed defendant's petition for leave to
appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315). We affirm the judgment of the appellate
court.
BACKGROUND
	In October 2002 defendant was charged with first degree murder
in the death of Derrick Prout, with whom defendant had met on June
17, 2002, for a drug transaction. Defendant also was charged with
arson in the burning of defendant's rented residence in rural
Champaign. In addition, defendant was charged with concealment of
a homicidal death. According to the State's theory of the case, Prout
was killed at defendant's residence, and defendant thereafter removed
Prout's body from the residence to a remote location and set fire to
the residence to conceal evidence of the killing.
	In June 2002 when the offenses were committed, defendant was
living in a rented house on the outskirts of Champaign with his
girlfriend, Migdalia Rivera, and their young daughter. The $900
monthly rent had not been paid for four months. As of June 17, the
date of the victim's disappearance, defendant still lived in the house
but had told his landlord that he would be moving in a few days.
	Prout, who lived in Indianapolis in June 2002, drove to
Champaign the night of June 16. At about 4 p.m. on Monday, June
17, Prout visited his girlfriend, Candice Johnson, who lived in an
apartment in Champaign. Prout brought with him a duffel bag
containing cannabis. At about 8 p.m. on June 17, defendant came to
Johnson's apartment and spoke briefly with Prout. According to
Johnson, Prout then took the bag of cannabis and left in his Dodge
Intrepid, and defendant followed in his Blazer. Johnson called Prout
later in the evening on his cell phone but there was no answer. Prout
was missing for the next five days. His body was found on June 22 in
Lake County, near Chicago.
	According to defendant, on June 17 he and Prout left Johnson's
apartment in separate vehicles and drove to a nearby car wash where
they conducted a drug transaction. Defendant testified that Prout gave
him 30 pounds of cannabis and defendant paid Prout $16,000.
Defendant asserted that Prout then left in his Dodge Intrepid and
defendant stayed and washed his own vehicle. Defendant stated that,
at that point, he went back to his residence, and went to bed at about
10:30 or 11 p.m. According to defendant, the next evening (June 18)
he and Rivera and their daughter left Champaign at 8 or 8:30 p.m. and
drove to Chicago, where defendant was due in court at 9 a.m. on
Wednesday, June 19. Defendant testified that they stayed the night of
June 18 at the Rand Motel near the Chicago suburb of Palatine,
arriving at the motel at about 10:30 or 10:45 p.m. Defendant added
that, prior to arriving at the motel, he stopped in Schaumburg, which
is south of Palatine, and sold eight pounds of cannabis to a man named
Chris Smith. Defendant stated that the next morning, June 19, his car
would not start, and he was therefore late for his court date. The court
appearance was rescheduled for the next day, June 20, and defendant
stated that he and Rivera and their daughter began driving back to
Champaign. Defendant testified that, while they were en route, he
received a telephone call from his brother saying that defendant's
residence had burned. This call was received on the couple's cell
phone, which defendant acknowledged at trial was registered to
Rivera. According to defendant, he and Rivera and their daughter
arrived in Champaign at about 6:30 or 7 p.m. on June 19, went to
their residence to survey the damage, and stayed the night at
defendant's parents' home in Champaign. Defendant stated that the
next morning he and Rivera and their daughter returned to Chicago
for the rescheduled court date. Defendant testified that the next
evening, June 21, he and Rivera and their daughter drove to St. Louis,
arriving at about 10:15 or 10:30 p.m. The next day, June 22,
defendant and Rivera were arrested by police in St. Louis.
	The fire at defendant's residence in Champaign was discovered
at about 3:20 a.m. on June 19. After the fire was suppressed,
authorities looked in the living room and found two plastic containers
with an odor similar to gasoline. An investigator for the Illinois fire
marshal concluded that the fire was intentionally set. That evening, at
about 7:30 p.m., an investigator for the Champaign County sheriff's
office spoke to defendant in the yard of the residence. Defendant was
asked his whereabouts at the time of the fire. Defendant told the
investigator he had left Champaign about 8 p.m. the previous night,
June 18, and had gone to Chicago. Defendant also told the
investigator that he first learned of the fire the next afternoon, June
19, while he was en route from Chicago to Champaign.
	On Saturday, June 22, 2002, five days after Prout's
disappearance, authorities were alerted to a car fire in a rural area of
Lake County, near Chicago. The fire was discovered at about 8:50
a.m. The automobile, a Dodge Intrepid, was registered to the victim,
Derrick Prout. After the fire was suppressed, officials looked in the
trunk and found Prout's charred body. It was wrapped in a blanket
with a "whitish background" and a "bluish print." An autopsy revealed
that the burns on Prout's body occurred postmortem, and he had been
dead "for some time." The victim had been stabbed eight times and
shot twice. The coroner's physician who performed the autopsy
concluded that Prout died of "multiple stab wounds with multiple
gunshot wounds contributing to his death."
	Lake County authorities contacted the police in St. Louis and
directed them to pick up defendant and Rivera, who were in St. Louis
at the time. Early the next morning, June 23, Lake County sheriff's
detectives interviewed defendant at a police station in St. Louis. After
being advised of his Miranda rights, defendant told the detectives: "I
guess I'll answer some of your questions." Defendant told the
detectives that he did not own a cellular telephone. He refused to
provide them with Rivera's telephone number. The detectives
questioned defendant as to his whereabouts in the early morning of
June 19, the time of the fire at defendant's residence in Champaign.
Defendant gave essentially the same explanation he had given to the
Champaign County sheriff's police the evening of June 19. Defendant
told the detectives that he had left Champaign at 9:30 or 10 p.m. the
night before the fire, June 18, and drove to Chicago for a court date
the next morning. Defendant declined to state specifically where in
Chicago he stayed that night, but he "ma[d]e it clear" that he was not
in Champaign at the time of the fire at his residence. Defendant told
the detectives he learned of the fire the next day when a family
member called him in Chicago. Following the questioning by Lake
County detectives, defendant and Rivera were released and they drove
back to Champaign.
	The next day, June 24, authorities in Champaign County executed
a search warrant at defendant's burned residence. Under the terms of
the warrant, investigators were authorized to seize "any and all items
of physical evidence related to the commission of the offense[ ] of
Murder, including but not limited to *** bodily fluids, including
blood; weapons; cutting instruments; *** any items indicating the
presence of Derrick A. Prout [in the residence]; and photographs of
the above-described items, and the residents." Pursuant to this
warrant, a number of items were recovered from defendant's
residence, including a section of the living room carpet with a large,
"reddish brownish" stain that tested positive for blood. Investigators
said the carpet had a strong odor of cleaning solution such as Pine-Sol. In the padding underneath they found what appeared to be "soap
suds." Other items recovered from the residence included an empty
Pine-Sol bottle, an empty Clorox bottle, a plastic bucket, a spray
bottle of Clorox cleaner, and a film canister with a roll of film inside.
	Kelly Gannon, the State's expert on deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA), testified that, based on her analysis of the human DNA in the
carpet sample from defendant's living room, the blood found on the
carpet matched that of the victim, Derrick Prout. According to
Gannon, the probability that the DNA profile found in the carpet
would appear again in the general population was one in 38.3
quadrillion for Caucasians, one in 16.3 quadrillion for African
Americans, and one in 51.9 quadrillion for Hispanics.
	The roll of film in the film canister that was recovered from
defendant's residence was developed, and the prints were forwarded
to George Boise, an investigator with the Champaign County sheriff's
office. At trial, Boise identified and described three of those
photographs. One showed defendant with a small child on a couch.
Defendant and the child were wrapped in a "whitish" blanket with a
"fairly distinct" blue pattern. A second photo showed Rivera with the
same child, wrapped in the same blanket. A third photo, a close-up of
the same child, apparently being held by Rivera, showed the same
blanket.
	Charles Ogle, a detective with the Champaign County sheriff's
office, also testified regarding these photos. According to Ogle, the
blanket shown in the photos of defendant and Rivera appeared to be
the same as the blanket that was recovered from the trunk of the car
where Prout's body was found.
	On September 10, 2002, Champaign County authorities arrested
defendant for the murder of Prout. On October 3, 2002, defendant
was indicted by a Champaign County grand jury on charges of first
degree murder, arson, and concealment of a homicidal death.
	At defendant's trial, which took place in April 2003, the State
attempted to call Rivera as a witness. Out of the presence of the jury,
Rivera acknowledged that she had been subpoenaed to testify as a
witness in the case at bar, and acknowledged that she had testified
before a Champaign County grand jury on January 16, 2003.
However, Rivera then invoked her right under the fifth amendment of
the United States Constitution not to answer questions. The State
argued that, pursuant to section 115-10.2 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-10.2 (West 2002)), Rivera was
unavailable to testify, and the State therefore asked that Rivera's
grand jury testimony be read to the jury. Section 115-10.2 provides
that, where a witness refuses to testify despite a court order to do so,
prior statements of the witness may be admissible under certain
circumstances. The circuit court agreed with the State that Rivera was
unavailable to testify within the meaning of section 115-10.2. Over
defendant's objection, the court allowed Rivera's grand jury testimony
to be read to the jury.
	In her grand jury testimony, Rivera gave essentially the same
account as did defendant regarding their June 18-19 and June 20 trips
to Chicago for defendant's court appearance. Rivera's testimony also
agreed with defendant's as to the couple's June 21-22 trip to St.
Louis.
	Rivera testified in addition about the couple's cell phone, which
was registered to Rivera. She told the grand jury that the cell phone
was their only telephone, and it was defendant who usually carried it.
They had no land line. Rivera also stated that, to the best of her
knowledge, she and defendant were the only ones who had access to
the cell phone between June 17 and June 21, 2002.
	Rivera's grand jury testimony about the cell phone differed from
defendant's testimony at trial. Under cross-examination, defendant
conceded that Rivera's cell phone was usually in either his or Rivera's
possession. However, defendant testified that neither he nor Rivera
had possession of the cell phone for about 24 hours between June 18
and 19 (the period during which defendant's residence in Champaign
was burned). According to defendant, he met with Chris Smith in
Champaign at about 3 or 3:30 p.m. on June 18, and accidentally left
the cell phone in Smith's car. Defendant acknowledged that Chris
Smith was the same person to whom he sold cannabis later that night
in Schaumburg, near Chicago. Defendant stated that Smith returned
the cell phone to him at about 2:30 p.m. the next day, June 19, as
defendant was leaving court in Chicago. When asked why he did not
simply retrieve the cell phone from Smith the night of June 18, when
he met him in Schaumburg, defendant answered: "Didn't really cross
my mind." When counsel pressed defendant further, reminding him
that this cell phone was his only telephone, defendant responded that
he had another cell phone. This contradicted defendant's earlier
statement to Lake County sheriff's detectives on June 23, 2002, that
he did not own a cellular telephone. It also contradicted Rivera's
grand jury testimony that her cell phone was the couple's only
telephone.
	The State presented evidence at trial that contradicted
defendant's testimony regarding the cell phone. Monique Adams,
Prout's sister, testified that she learned on Tuesday, June 18, 2002,
that her brother might be missing. Adams stated that she contacted
defendant by telephone that evening and asked him about any
information he might have regarding her brother. Adams contacted
defendant by calling the number of Rivera's cell phone. According to
Adams, this telephone conversation with defendant took place at
about 8 p.m. on June 18. This contradicted defendant's claim that it
was Chris Smith, not defendant, who had possession of Rivera's cell
phone from 3:30 p.m. June 18 to 2:30 p.m. June 19. The State also
introduced records for Rivera's cell phone showing that, during the
period when the phone allegedly was in Smith's possession, calls were
made from this phone to defendant's brother and defendant's mother.
	During defendant's direct examination at trial, defendant denied
that Prout had ever been in his home in Champaign. Defendant also
denied stabbing or shooting Prout, or putting Prout's body in the
trunk of Prout's Dodge Intrepid and setting the vehicle on fire. On
cross-examination, defendant denied setting fire to his home in
Champaign.
	During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge asking for
a copy of Rivera's grand jury testimony. After conferring with the
parties, the judge sent a response to the jury stating: "You will not
receive a copy of, or transcript of the Migdalia Rivera testimony. You
should rely on your collective recollection of the testimony presented
to you at trial."
	On April 23, 2003, the jury found defendant guilty of first degree
murder, arson, and concealment of a homicidal death. On May 29,
2003, following a sentencing hearing, the circuit court sentenced
defendant to 50 years in prison for first degree murder; 5 years'
imprisonment for concealment of a homicidal death, to run
consecutively with the sentence for murder; and 5 years' imprisonment
for arson, to run concurrently with the other two sentences imposed.
	Defendant filed a posttrial motion arguing that: (1) the evidence
presented was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, and (2) the admission of Rivera's grand jury testimony, without
any opportunity for cross-examination, violated defendant's
constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.
During the hearing on the posttrial motion, defense counsel argued
that Rivera's grand jury testimony, particularly her testimony about
the couple's cell phone, had impacted defendant's decision on whether
to testify at trial. Counsel stated: "[T]he Defendant was placed in a
similarly impossible situation, Judge, having to elect to take the stand
and testify in his own behalf to rebut testimony that was allowed in
through the Grand Jury testimony of Migdalia Rivera." Defendant's
posttrial motion was denied.
	Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, arguing that his
sentence was excessive. That motion also was denied.
	On appeal, defendant argued, as he had in his posttrial motion
and his motion to reduce sentence, that: (1) the circuit court's
admission of Rivera's grand jury testimony violated the sixth
amendment's confrontation clause (U.S. Const., amend. VI); (2) the
evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) defendant's sentence was
excessive. Defendant also raised additional arguments of ineffective
assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant
contended that his counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to file a
motion to suppress photographs obtained from the roll of film seized
at defendant's residence; and (2) failing to challenge effectively the
State's DNA evidence. With regard to prosecutorial misconduct,
defendant argued that the State violated his right to a fair trial by: (1)
eliciting testimony about defendant's refusal to answer certain
questions when he was interviewed by authorities in St. Louis; and (2)
eliciting testimony from the State's DNA expert that the DNA
evidence was available for retesting by defendant, but he did not ask
that it be retested.
	With regard to defendant's confrontation clause argument, the
appellate court held that the admission of Rivera's grand jury
testimony violated the confrontation clause. In reaching this decision,
the appellate court looked to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), which was decided
subsequent to briefing in the appellate court. The appellate court
noted that, prior to Crawford, the admissibility of prior witness
statements such as Rivera's grand jury testimony was governed by
section 115-10.2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS
5/115-10.2 (West 2002)). Under section 115-10.2, previous hearsay
statements of a witness who refused to testify were admissible, even
where the defendant had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the
witness, so long as the statements met certain requirements. 725 ILCS
5/115-10.2(a) (West 2002). However, the appellate court concluded
that, in light of Crawford, section 115-10.2 "can no longer be said to
incorporate the relevant constitutional standard" for admitting prior
hearsay statements of a non-testifying witness. 347 Ill. App. 3d at
1050. Under Crawford, the appellate court observed, such statements
are admissible "only where the defendant had a prior opportunity for
cross-examination." 347 Ill. App. 3d at 1050. In the case at bar, where
Rivera's grand jury testimony was admitted but she declined to testify,
"defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine her." 347 Ill. App. 3d
at 1051. The appellate court held that, under Crawford, "the State's
use of [Rivera's grand jury] testimony therefore violated the
confrontation clause." 347 Ill. App. 3d at 1051. The court concluded,
however, that the circuit court's error in allowing Rivera's grand jury
testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
	The appellate court rejected defendant's remaining arguments,
and affirmed his convictions and sentence. We allowed defendant's
petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315), and we now affirm
the judgment of the appellate court.
ANALYSIS
	Before this court, defendant makes essentially the same
arguments that he did in the appellate court below. Defendant argues
that: (1) the admission of Rivera's grand jury testimony violated
defendant's constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective (a) for failing to file
a motion to suppress the photographs obtained from the undeveloped
film that was seized at defendant's residence, and (b) for failing to
challenge effectively the State's DNA evidence; (3) the State violated
his right to a fair trial by (a) eliciting testimony about defendant's
refusal to answer certain questions when he was interviewed by
authorities in St. Louis, and (b) eliciting testimony from the State's
DNA expert that the DNA evidence was available for retesting by
defendant, but he did not ask that it be retested; (4) the evidence of
defendant's guilt was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (5)
defendant's sentence was excessive.
A. Rivera's Grand Jury Testimony
	The sixth amendment's confrontation clause, which applies to
both federal and state prosecutions (Crawford, 541 U.S.  at 42, 158 L. Ed. 2d  at 187, 124 S. Ct. at 1359), provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right *** to be confronted
with the witnesses against him ***." U.S. Const., amend. VI. In
Crawford, the Supreme Court reinterpreted the confrontation clause
and held that the testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who is
unavailable at trial may not be admitted against a criminal defendant
unless the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
Crawford, 541 U.S.  at 68, 158 L. Ed. 2d  at 203, 124 S. Ct.  at 1374.
While the Court in Crawford declined to spell out a comprehensive
definition of "testimonial," it nevertheless noted: "Whatever else the
term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to
police interrogations." (Emphasis added.) Crawford, 541 U.S.  at 68,
158 L. Ed. 2d  at 203, 124 S. Ct.  at 1374. In the case at bar, Rivera's
testimony was given before a grand jury, and defendant had no
opportunity to cross-examine her. Under Crawford, the admission of
this testimony violated the confrontation clause.
	The question before us is whether a Crawford violation is subject
to harmless-error review. Defendant answers this question in the
negative. According to defendant, "the constitutional violation in this
case is so substantial, and the right to confront the witnesses against
him so fundamental, that a harmless error analysis is simply
inappropriate." We disagree.
	In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967), the Supreme Court adopted the general rule that a
constitutional error does not automatically require reversal of a
conviction. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302, 329, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1263 (1991). Since Chapman, "the Court
has applied harmless-error analysis to a wide range of errors and has
recognized that most constitutional errors can be harmless."
Fulminante, 499 U.S.  at 306, 113 L. Ed. 2d  at 329, 111 S. Ct.  at
1263. The Court has acknowledged that there are some constitutional
errors, such as trial before a judge who is financially interested, or the
total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial, which are not subject
to harmless-error review.
			"These are structural defects in the constitution of the trial
mechanism, which defy analysis by 'harmless-error'
standards. The entire conduct of the trial from beginning to
end is obviously affected by the absence of counsel for a
criminal defendant, just as it is by the presence on the bench
of a judge who is not impartial." Fulminante, 499 U.S.  at
309-10, 113 L. Ed. 2d  at 331, 111 S. Ct.  at 1265.
However, most constitutional errors are not structural defects. Rather,
they are "trial errors," which the Court defines as "error[s] which
occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which
may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other
evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Fulminante, 499 U.S.  at 307-08, 113 L. Ed. 2d  at 330, 111 S. Ct.  at 1264. Examples of such trial
errors include, e.g., a jury instruction that misstates an element of an
offense; the restriction of a defendant's right to cross-examine a
witness for bias, in violation of the sixth amendment's confrontation
clause; and the denial of a defendant's right to be present at trial.
Fulminante, 499 U.S.  at 306-07, 113 L. Ed. 2d  at 329-30, 111 S. Ct. 
at 1263 (collecting cases).
	Confrontation clause violations such as the one that occurred in
the case at bar are not "structural defects in the constitution of the
trial mechanism" that affect "[t]he entire conduct of the trial from
beginning to end." Fulminante, 499 U.S.  at 309, 113 L. Ed. 2d  at
331, 111 S. Ct.  at 1265. Rather, the violation at issue here-the
improper admission of Rivera's grand jury testimony-is more
accurately described as a "trial error," i.e., an "error which occurred
during the presentation of the case to the jury." Fulminante, 499 U.S. 
at 307-08, 113 L. Ed. 2d  at 330, 111 S. Ct.  at 1264.
	Prior to the decision in Crawford, it was well settled that
confrontation clause violations were subject to harmless-error
analysis. In Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284,
89 S. Ct. 1726 (1969), the Supreme Court "expressly rejected the
claim that the admission into evidence of a statement made by a
nontestifying codefendant *** can never be harmless." Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 682, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674, 685, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (1986), citing Harrington, 395 U.S.  at 254, 23 L. Ed. 2d 
at 288, 89 S. Ct.  at 1728. According to Van Arsdall, the decision in
Harrington "demonstrates that the denial of the opportunity to cross-examine an adverse witness does not fit within the limited category of
constitutional errors that are deemed prejudicial in every case." Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S.  at 682, 89 L. Ed. 2d  at 685, 106 S. Ct.  at 1437.
	Defendant in the case at bar argues, however, that, as a result of
the decision in Crawford, it is no longer appropriate to apply
harmless-error review to violations of the confrontation clause. We do
not agree.
	The Supreme Court in Crawford declined to address whether
harmless-error analysis could be applied to a Crawford violation.
Crawford, 541 U.S.  at 42 n.1, 158 L. Ed. 2d  at 187 n.1, 124 S. Ct.  at
1359 n.1. However, in his concurring opinion in Crawford, Chief
Justice Rehnquist suggested that such analysis would be appropriate.
"Likewise to the Court's credit is its implicit recognition that the
mistaken application of its new rule by courts which guess wrong as
to the scope of the rule is subject to harmless-error analysis."
Crawford, 541 U.S.  at 76, 158 L. Ed. 2d  at 208, 124 S. Ct.  at 1378
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring, joined by O'Connor, J.).
	Since March 2004, when Crawford was decided, a number of
courts have addressed Crawford violations. In People v. Thompson,
349 Ill. App. 3d 587 (2004), a domestic battery case, the written
statements of the victim, made in the course of obtaining an order of
protection, were admitted in the defendant's trial. The defendant had
no prior opportunity for cross-examination. The appellate court in
Thompson held that, under Crawford, the admission of the victim's
statements violated the confrontation clause. The appellate court then
applied harmless-error analysis to determine whether the Crawford
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court answered
this question in the negative.
	Other courts that have confronted Crawford violations have also
applied harmless-error review. They include, e.g., New Mexico v.
Alvarez-Lopez, 136 N.M. 309, 98 P.3d 699 (2004); Vigil v. Wyoming,
98 P.3d 172 (Wyo. 2004); United States v. Rodriguez-Marrero, 390 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Gilbert, 391 F.3d 882 (7th
Cir. 2004); Guidry v. Dretke, 397 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2005).
	Notwithstanding the foregoing, defendant argues that, since
Crawford was decided, "courts have questioned whether a harmless
error analysis is appropriate" in addressing Crawford violations.
Defendant points to Minnesota v. Courtney, 682 N.W.2d 185 (Minn.
App. 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 696 N.W.2d 73 (Minn. 2005),
a domestic assault case in which the defendant was convicted of
assaulting his former girlfriend. At the defendant's trial, a videotaped
interview between the victim's six-year-old daughter and a child-protection worker was played for the jury. The child did not testify at
trial, and the defendant had no prior opportunity for cross-examination. The Minnesota court of appeals held that, under
Crawford, the admission of the child's videotaped interview violated
the defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation. The court
noted that Crawford declined to address whether harmless-error
analysis could be applied to Crawford violations. However, the court
asserted that, even if such analysis did apply, the error at issue was not
harmless. The court stated: "[G]iven the circumstances in this case
and the Supreme Court's emphasis on a criminal defendant's right to
confrontation, the error was not harmless, if even a harmless error
analysis can be reached by the state." (Emphasis added.) Courtney,
682 N.W.2d  at 197.(1)
	Defendant's reliance on Courtney is unavailing. Even if we
assume that the emphasized portion of the statement quoted above is
not obiter dictum, it still amounts to only a questioning of whether
harmless-error analysis applies to Crawford violations. It does not
(nor could it) constitute an overturning of the rule that confrontation
clause violations are subject to harmless-error review.
	What defendant is arguing, in essence, is that Crawford implicitly
overruled Harrington, Van Arsdall, and any other Supreme Court
decision holding that confrontation clause violations are subject to
harmless-error review. Crawford does not explicitly overrule these
decisions, and we may not assume an implicit overruling of a previous
Supreme Court decision. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237, 138 L. Ed. 2d 391, 423, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2017 (1997) (reaffirming rule
that it is the prerogative of the Supreme Court to overrule its own
decisions). In view of the well-established rule, pre-Crawford, that
confrontation clause violations were subject to harmless-error
analysis, and the numerous post-Crawford decisions applying
harmless-error review to Crawford violations, as well as the Supreme
Court's admonition not to assume the implicit overruling of a
Supreme Court decision, we conclude that Crawford violations are
subject to harmless-error analysis.
	We turn now to the question of whether the confrontation clause
violation in the case at bar was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In determining whether a constitutional error is harmless, the test to
be applied is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error at issue did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 124 L. Ed. 2d 182, 189, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081 (1993); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258-59, 100 L. Ed. 2d 284, 295, 108 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (1988); Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710, 87 S. Ct. 824,
828 (1967). The State bears the burden of proof. Sullivan, 508 U.S. 
at 278-79, 124 L. Ed. 2d  at 189, 113 S. Ct.  at 2081; Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353, 368, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1717 (1993); Satterwhite, 486 U.S.  at 258, 100 L. Ed. 2d  at
295, 108 S. Ct.  at 1798. In People v. Wilkerson, 87 Ill. 2d 151 (1981),
this court listed three different approaches for measuring error under
this harmless-constitutional-error test: (1) focusing on the error to
determine whether it might have contributed to the conviction, (2)
examining the other evidence in the case to see if overwhelming
evidence supports the conviction, and (3) determining whether the
improperly admitted evidence is merely cumulative or duplicates
properly admitted evidence. Wilkerson, 87 Ill. 2d  at 157. See also
People v. Collins, 85 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1060 (1980).
	Before applying these approaches to the case at bar, we first
address defendant's argument that the admission of Rivera's grand
jury testimony "all but forced" defendant to testify at trial. According
to defendant, the State introduced Rivera's grand jury testimony in
order to "impute a false alibi" to defendant, which the State was then
able to refute with cell-phone records. The "false alibi" to which
defendant refers is that he was in Chicago at the time when his
residence was set afire and therefore could not have committed the
arson. Defendant maintains that he never asserted this alibi, and that
once it had been presented through Rivera's testimony and refuted by
the State, defendant had little choice but to testify in his own behalf to
attempt to answer it. Defendant states: "[H]ad Rivera's grand jury
testimony not been admitted, [defendant] would not have been
compelled to testify."
	If we accepted this argument as fact, it would call into question
the admissibility of defendant's trial testimony, which would have been
induced by the erroneously admitted grand jury testimony of Rivera.
However, we do not accept defendant's argument as fact.
	First, we question the accuracy of defendant's assertion that the
alibi came in only through Rivera's testimony. The record shows that
defendant himself claimed, on at least two occasions, that he was in
Chicago during the period (early morning on June 19) when the arson
at his residence in Champaign took place. At about 7:30 p.m. on June
19, a Champaign County sheriff's investigator spoke to defendant in
the yard of the residence. Defendant was asked his whereabouts at the
time of the fire, and defendant answered that he was in Chicago,
where he had gone the night before, June 18. Defendant told the
investigator that he learned of the fire the afternoon of June 19, while
he was en route from Chicago to Champaign. Defendant stated that
a family member called him by cell phone. Four days later, when
defendant was interviewed in St. Louis by Lake County detectives,
defendant gave the detectives essentially the same account as to his
whereabouts at the time of the fire. Defendant told the detectives he
was in Chicago.
	Notwithstanding the foregoing, our rejection of defendant's
forced-to-testify argument is based on reasons other than the
discrepancy between defendant's claim that he never asserted the alibi
and the account he gave to Champaign County and Lake County
authorities. The record before us contains neither testimony nor
documentary evidence establishing that defendant's decision to testify
at trial was motivated by Rivera's grand jury testimony. Lacking some
sort of factual basis for concluding that defendant was forced to testify
in his own behalf, we can only speculate as to the reason for
defendant's decision. We decline defendant's invitation to engage in
such speculation.
	We now turn to an analysis of whether the admission of Rivera's
grand jury testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Much
of Rivera's testimony dealt with defendant and Rivera's trips together
on June 18-19 and June 20 to Chicago for defendant's court
appearance, as well as their trip together to St. Louis on June 21-22.
Rivera's account of these trips agreed with defendant's account. For
example, Rivera testified that she and defendant and their child left
Champaign at about 8 or 9 p.m. on January 18, the night before the
fire at their residence, and drove to Chicago for defendant's court date
the next morning, June 19. Rivera stated that they left Chicago the
afternoon of June 19 to drive back to Champaign. While they were en
route, Rivera testified, they received a telephone call from defendant's
brother notifying them of the fire at their residence in Champaign.
Rivera stated that this call was received on their cell phone. This
account of the June 18-19 trip is essentially the same as what
defendant told the Champaign County sheriff's investigator the night
of June 19 and the Lake County detectives the morning of June 23 in
St. Louis.
	Rivera's grand jury testimony also indicated that the couple's cell
phone, which she stated was their only telephone, was in their
possession during the trips to Chicago. Rivera stated that, to the best
of her knowledge, no one other than she and defendant had access to
the cell phone between Monday, June 17, and Friday, June 21. This
includes the period (3:30 p.m. June 18 to 2:30 p.m. June 19) when,
according to defendant's testimony at trial, Rivera's cell phone was in
the possession of Chris Smith, not Rivera and defendant.
	Rivera testified further that she had never met the victim, Derrick
Prout, and he was never in their home. Rivera also identified a blanket
shown in a photo of defendant and their child as their blanket. Rivera
stated that the blanket was a gift. When shown a photo of the blanket
in which the victim's body was found wrapped, Rivera agreed that it
appeared to be the same as the blanket in the photo of defendant and
their daughter.
	Rivera's testimony that the couple's cell phone was in their
possession during the trips to Chicago contradicted defendant's
testimony that the phone was not in their possession between 3:30
p.m. June 18 and 2:30 p.m. June 19. However, Rivera's grand jury
testimony was not the only evidence contradicting defendant on this
point. Monique Adams, the victim's sister, testified that she contacted
defendant by telephone at about 8 p.m. June 18 and asked him about
any information he might have regarding her missing brother. Adams
reached defendant by calling the number of Rivera's cell phone.
Adams' testimony is at odds with defendant's claim that Rivera's cell
phone was, at that time, in the possession of Chris Smith, not
defendant or Rivera.
	Additional evidence, in the form of Rivera's cell-phone records,
cast doubt on the claim that the cell phone was with Smith, not
defendant. According to these records, on Tuesday evening, June 18,
two calls were placed from Rivera's cell phone in the Champaign-Urbana area to defendant's brother. These calls were placed at 7:45
p.m. and 7:53 p.m., more than four hours after 3:30 p.m., the time
when the phone allegedly was left with Smith. The next morning, June
19, two calls were made from Rivera's phone in the Champaign-Urbana area to the Cook County courthouse in Chicago where
defendant had a court date that morning. The calls to the courthouse
were placed at 7:23 a.m. and 8:11 a.m., shortly before defendant's
scheduled 9 a.m. court appearance. The next outgoing call from
Rivera's phone, at 8:18 a.m., was made to defendant's mother.
	Additional points in Rivera's grand jury testimony were
established by other, properly admitted evidence. Rivera's assertion
that the victim was never in their home was echoed by defendant, who
said the same thing on direct examination at trial. Moreover, the
similarity between the blanket in the photo of defendant and his child
and the blanket found with the body of the victim was asserted in
other evidence, as well. On direct examination at trial, Charles Ogle,
a Champaign County sheriff's detective, was shown, inter alia,
People's exhibit 2, a photo of defendant and his daughter with a
blanket also visible, and People's exhibit 5, a photo of the blanket that
was taken from the trunk of the car in which the victim's body was
found. The following colloquy took place between the assistant
State's Attorney and Ogle regarding the blankets shown in these
photos.
			"Q. Do those blankets appear to be substantially similar to
you?
			A. Yes, sir.
			Q. Do you see similar background color in both of those
blankets?
			A. Yes, I do.
			Q. Do you see similar marks in both of these blankets?
			A. Yes.
			Q. Do they contain one or more triangular shaped objects,
and I am pointing to Exhibit 5, triangles with squares, with
circles in the center and circles at the corners?
			A. Yes, sir.
			Q. Pointing to [Exhibit] 2, does that image appear at one
location in Exhibit 2?
			A. Yes, sir.
			Q. Is there also in Exhibit 5 a circle with a multipointed
star in it, the area that I am pointing to?
			A. Yes.
			Q. I am pointing to Exhibit 2[.] [D]oes this same image
reoccur [sic] in at least two places in Exhibit 2?
			A. Yes, sir."
	Defendant was shown the same two exhibits on cross-examination at trial. He acknowledged that he formerly owned a
blanket similar to the one shown in exhibit 5, the photo of the blanket
found with the victim. Defendant agreed that the blanket he owned
was shown in exhibit 2, the photo of defendant and his daughter.
Defendant stated, as did Rivera in her grand jury testimony, that the
blanket was a gift.
	We turn now to an examination of the evidence other than
Rivera's grand jury testimony to determine if there was overwhelming
evidence to support defendant's conviction. Defendant was the last
person seen with the victim before he disappeared. Testimony at trial
showed that defendant met with the victim on Monday, June 17, 2002,
at the victim's girlfriend's apartment in Champaign. The two men left
the apartment at about 8 p.m. in separate vehicles, one following the
other, to engage in a drug transaction. Five days later, the victim's
body was found in the trunk of his burned-out vehicle in Lake County
near Chicago. Along with the body, authorities found a blanket that
was similar to a blanket owned by defendant. Charles Ogle, a
Champaign County sheriff's detective, was shown photographs of the
blanket found with the victim and the blanket owned by defendant.
Ogle testified in detail regarding the similarities between them. After
the victim's body was found, authorities in Champaign County
searched defendant's residence, which had sustained serious damage
several days earlier in an arson fire. In the living room of defendant's
residence, authorities found a stain on the carpet that tested positive
for blood. An analysis revealed that DNA from this stain matched that
of the victim. However, defendant insisted at trial that the victim had
never been in defendant's home.
	As previously noted, the State also presented testimony and
telephone records that contradicted defendant's claim that Rivera's
cell phone was not in his or Rivera's possession for about a 24-hour
period from 3:30 p.m. June 18 until 2:30 p.m. June 19. The State also
introduced phone records showing that Rivera's cell phone was in the
Champaign-Urbana area at least from the evening of June 17 until
about noon on June 19. The arson fire at defendant's Champaign
residence was reported at about 3:20 a.m. June 19, which was within
this period. The records for Rivera's cell phone also showed that, by
early afternoon on Wednesday, June 19, Rivera's cell phone was
about an hour north of Champaign, and it kept moving along I-57
until it reached Chicago. Later in the afternoon, the phone began
moving southward from Chicago toward Champaign. These records
appeared to contradict defendant's claim that he and Rivera and their
daughter drove to Chicago the evening of Tuesday, June 18.
	In our view, the evidence in support of defendant's convictions
is overwhelming. However, defendant challenges this evidence on the
ground that it is circumstantial. Defendant notes, for example, that
"there were no witnesses who testified to having seen [defendant]
harm the victim in any way; no murder weapon was ever recovered;
there was no evidence to suggest that [defendant] and the victim had
anything but a very amicable relationship." We acknowledge that not
all of the evidence in this case was direct. However, this court has
consistently held that a conviction may be based solely on
circumstantial evidence. "A conviction can be sustained upon
circumstantial evidence as well as upon direct, and to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean that the jury must disregard
the inferences that flow normally from the evidence before it." People
v. Williams, 40 Ill. 2d 522, 526 (1968); see also People v. Locascio,
106 Ill. 2d 529, 537 (1985); People v. Huff, 29 Ill. 2d 315, 320
(1963). We reject defendant's circumstantial evidence argument.
	Defendant also notes that, during deliberations, the jury asked for
a copy of Rivera's grand jury testimony. After consulting with counsel
for the parties, the judge denied this request. Defendant argues that
the fact that the jury requested a copy of Rivera's testimony "creates
more than a reasonable probability that Rivera's improperly admitted
testimony contributed to the guilty verdict." We disagree.
	The jury's request for a copy of Rivera's testimony might suggest
that the jury was curious about the testimony or that the jury had
questions about it. However, the mere fact that the jury asked for a
copy of the testimony does not create a reasonable probability, or
even a reasonable possibility, that the jury relied on this testimony in
reaching its verdict. To contend that it does is, in our view,
speculative. Rather than engage in such speculation, we base our
harmless-error decision on the analysis outlined in Wilkerson for
assessing error under the harmless-constitutional-error test. We
believe this is the better approach.
	Defendant also points to cases where courts have refused to find
a Crawford error harmless. An example is People v. Thompson, 349
Ill. App. 3d 587 (2004), a domestic battery case. At trial, the State
introduced written statements of the victim which were made in the
course of obtaining an order of protection. These statements named
the defendant as the attacker and described the attack in some detail.
Also introduced at trial were inculpatory statements that were
attributed to the defendant by police officers. However, the defendant
denied these statements. The appellate court held that, under
Crawford, the admission of the victim's written statements was a
violation of the confrontation clause. The appellate court also found,
after applying the analysis outlined in Wilkerson, that the error was
not harmless. The court explained that the victim's statements were
the only evidence, other than the inculpatory statements attributed to
the defendant, which identified the defendant as the attacker. As
noted, the defendant denied the inculpatory statements attributed to
him by the police. The appellate court concluded: "There is a
reasonable probability the admission of [the victim's] statements
contributed to the conviction." Thompson, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 594-95.
	Thompson is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. In
Thompson, the improperly admitted evidence consisted of statements
by the victim identifying the defendant as her attacker and describing
the attack. The only other evidence identifying the defendant as the
attacker consisted of the inculpatory statements attributed to the
defendant by police officers but denied by the defendant. The
statements of a victim identifying her attacker and describing the
attack are extremely powerful evidence of a defendant's guilt. It
would be difficult to argue that such statements did not contribute to
the jury's verdict.
	Here, by contrast, the improperly admitted evidence did not
identify defendant as the killer or the arsonist, nor did it describe the
killing or the arson. Indeed, much of Rivera's grand jury testimony
agreed with defendant's account of where he was at the time of the
arson. Rivera's testimony did conflict with defendant's account as to
where the couple's cell phone was between June 18 and 19, but, as
noted, this point was established by other, properly admitted evidence.
In addition, while Rivera's testimony identified the blanket in the
photo of defendant and their child as belonging to them, and agreed
that there were similarities between that blanket and the one found
with the victim's body, these points also were established by other
evidence. Notably, a Champaign County sheriff's detective testified in
detail as to the similarities between defendant's blanket and the one
found with the victim.
	Having carefully analyzed the evidence in the case at bar, we
believe that the admission of Rivera's grand jury testimony was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Given the presence and strength
of the other evidence establishing the points raised in Rivera's grand
jury testimony, as well as the overwhelming nature of the evidence,
other than Rivera's testimony, supporting defendant's convictions, we
conclude that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the
admission of Rivera's testimony did not contribute to the verdict
obtained. See Chapman, 386 U.S.  at 24, 17 L. Ed. 2d  at 710, 87 S. Ct.  at 828.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
1. Failure to File a Motion to Suppress
	Defendant next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to file a motion to suppress the photographs obtained from the
undeveloped film that was seized at defendant's residence. Defendant
contends that the search warrant authorized the seizure of
"photographs" and that undeveloped film does not constitute
photographs. Defendant therefore argues that the film was improperly
seized. Defendant contends, in addition, that the police needed a
separate warrant in order to develop the film into photographic prints.
	In determining whether a defendant was denied the effective
assistance of counsel, we apply the familiar two-prong test set forth
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, a
defendant must show that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient,
and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant such that
he was deprived of a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064. The failure to satisfy either prong of the
Strickland test precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 699, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069.
	In order to establish prejudice resulting from failure to file a
motion to suppress, a defendant must show a reasonable probability
that: (1) the motion would have been granted, and (2) the outcome of
the trial would have been different had the evidence been suppressed.
People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 153 (1995). The failure to file a
motion to suppress does not establish incompetent representation
when the motion would have been futile. See People v. Wilson, 164 Ill. 2d 436, 454 (1994).
	The first question is whether there is a reasonable probability that
the circuit court would have granted a motion to suppress the
photographs if counsel had filed such a motion. The warrant at issue
authorized the seizure of
			"any and all items of physical evidence related to the
commission of the offense[ ] of Murder including but not
limited to: Fingerprints, hair, fiber, trace evidence, bodily
fluids, including blood; weapons; cutting instruments; items
which may be used as ligatures including but not limited to
silver colored duct tape; indicia of occupancy or ownership
of the above-described residence; insurance and financial
records for the above-described property, its owners or
occupants; any items indicating the presence of Derrick A.
Prout in the above-described property; and photographs of
the above-described items, and the residents." (Emphasis
added.)
	The appellate court below held that the undeveloped film was the
"functional equivalent" of photographs and thus fell within the scope
of the warrant. "The warrant clearly authorized the seizure of
photographs, and it is difficult to imagine any use for exposed but
undeveloped film other than to develop it into photographs." 347 Ill.
App. 3d at 1053. Defendant argues, to the contrary, that undeveloped
film is not the functional equivalent of photographs because the police
could not have known when they seized the film whether it contained
photographs depicting items and persons that were within the scope
of the warrant. Defendant contends that the undeveloped film taken
from his residence was not within the scope of the warrant and
therefore should not have been seized. Defendant's argument is
without merit.
	The term "photograph" is defined as "a picture, image, or
likeness obtained by photography." Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 1702 (2002). "Photography," in turn, is
defined as "an art or process of producing a negative or positive image
directly or indirectly on a sensitized surface by the action of light or
other form of radiant energy." Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1702 (2002). Based on these definitions, we conclude that
"a photograph is the exposure of the film at the time the picture is
snapped." Schneider v. Florida, 700 So. 2d 1239, 1240 (Fla. App.
1997). The undeveloped film seized in defendant's residence was
within the scope of the search warrant.
	In a related argument, defendant contends that the police needed
a second warrant in order to process the undeveloped film. This
argument is also without merit.
	 In our view, the authority granted by the warrant to seize the
photographs/film included as a necessary component the authority to
develop the film. Wisconsin v. Petrone, 161 Wis. 2d 530, 545, 468 N.W.2d 676, 681 (1991) ("Because the undeveloped film was lawfully
seized pursuant to the warrant, the deputies were justified in
developing and viewing the film"), rev'd in part on other grounds,
272 Wis. 2d 444, 681 N.W.2d 479 (2004). We find support for this
view in the reasoning of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which stated:
			"Developing the film is simply a method of examining a
lawfully seized object. Law enforcement officers may employ
various methods to examine objects lawfully seized in the
execution of a warrant. For example, blood stains or
substances gathered in a lawful search may be subjected to
laboratory analysis. [Citation.] The defendant surely could
not have objected had the deputies used a magnifying glass to
examine lawfully seized documents or had enlarged a lawfully
seized photograph in order to examine the photograph in
greater detail. Developing the film made the information on
the film accessible, just as laboratory tests expose what is
already present in a substance but not visible with the naked
eye. Developing the film did not constitute, as the defendant
asserts, a separate, subsequent unauthorized search having an
intrusive impact on the defendant's rights wholly independent
of the execution of the search warrant. The deputies simply
used technological aids to assist them in determining whether
items within the scope of the warrant were in fact evidence of
the crime alleged." Petrone, 161 Wis. 2d at 545, 468 N.W.2d 
at 681.
	In the case at bar, there was no need for the authorities to obtain
a second warrant in order to develop and view the film seized from
defendant's residence. The authority to develop the film was included
within the authority granted by the original warrant to seize the
photographs/film.
	Defendant has failed to show a reasonable probability that the
circuit court would have granted a motion to suppress the
photographs. Accordingly, counsel's failure to move to suppress the
photographs did not prejudice defendant. Therefore, no ineffective
assistance of counsel has been established.
2. Failure to Challenge Effectively the State's DNA Evidence
	Defendant's second ineffective-assistance argument is that his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge effectively the
State's DNA evidence. Defendant contends that his counsel (1) should
have challenged the qualifications of the State's DNA expert, and (2)
should have challenged more vigorously the DNA evidence itself, such
as by retaining his own expert.
	As previously indicated, in order to succeed on a claim of
ineffective assistance, a defendant must meet both prongs of the
Strickland test. The defendant must show that: (1) his counsel's
performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance
prejudiced the defendant such that he was deprived of a fair trial.
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.
In considering whether counsel's performance was deficient, " a court
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the
defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial
strategy.' " Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 694-95, 104 S. Ct.  at 2065, quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 100 L. Ed. 83, 93, 76 S. Ct. 158, 164 (1955). Generally, matters of trial
strategy will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
unless counsel failed to conduct any meaningful adversarial testing.
People v. Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381, 394 (1995).
	In the case at bar, defendant argues, first, that the State's DNA
expert, Kelly Gannon, lacked sufficient qualifications to be considered
an expert. Defendant objects that Gannon (1) had no graduate degree,
nor was she working toward earning such a degree; (2) her two
publications were in reality "poster presentations," i.e., printed
versions of two presentations she had given at the same symposium;
and (3) she had testified as an expert on only two previous occasions.
Defendant also objects that Gannon's training had been "simply on-the-job with periodic proficiency tests," and he complains that his
counsel did not question Gannon as to her performance on those
proficiency tests.
	Defense counsel raised the first two of these points in his cross-examination of Gannon before the trial judge allowed her to testify as
an expert. With regard to the third point, there was no need for
counsel to question Gannon about the number of times she had
testified as an expert. The State had elicited this information during
direct examination. There was also no reason for counsel to question
Gannon about her performance on proficiency tests. The State had
already elicited testimony from Gannon that she had passed her twice-yearly proficiency tests. We conclude that, with regard to the
challenging of Gannon's qualifications as an expert, it cannot be said
that counsel failed to conduct meaningful adversarial testing.
Defendant has failed to show that his counsel's performance was
deficient.
	Defendant next argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing
to challenge effectively the DNA evidence presented by Gannon.
Defendant complains, for example, that his counsel failed to retain his
own DNA expert, and failed to "test the validity of the DNA
evidence" presented at trial by inquiring into the methods of validation
and verification used by Gannon's lab.
	The decision whether to call particular witnesses is a matter of
trial strategy and thus will not ordinarily support an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 54
(1992). Moreover, defense counsel did question Gannon on cross-examination about validation and verification. In response to counsel's
questions about the validation methods used by her lab, Gannon stated
that two such methods were utilized-peer validation and
administrative validation. Gannon explained what each method
entailed. Counsel also asked Gannon if an independent laboratory had
reviewed her work in the case at bar. She answered this question in
the negative.
	Defendant argues further that, with regard to challenging the
DNA evidence, his trial counsel failed to question Gannon as to "the
admitted degradation of the [carpet] sample[,] which had been
exposed to heat (fire and sun), rain and toxic cleaning compounds,
including bleach." We disagree. As the appellate court below
observed, "[c]ounsel cross-examined Gannon extensively on *** the
deterioration of the DNA sample caused by exposure to the elements
and to cleaning solutions." 347 Ill. App. 3d at 1054.
	Defendant has failed to establish that his trial counsel's
performance in challenging the State's DNA evidence fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. People v. Lawton, 212 Ill. 2d 285, 302 (2004). No ineffective assistance of counsel has been shown.
C. Instances of Prosecutorial Misconduct
	Defendant next argues that the State committed reversible error
by commenting on defendant's right to remain silent, and by implying,
in the State's questioning of the State's DNA expert, that the DNA
evidence was available to the defense to conduct its own analysis. The
State points out that defendant has forfeited these two issues by failing
to object at trial and failing to raise them in his posttrial motion.
People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). However, defendant
argues that his challenge should be considered under the plain error
doctrine. "Under the plain error doctrine, a reviewing court may
consider a trial error not properly preserved when (1) the evidence in
a criminal case is closely balanced or (2) where the error is so
fundamental and of such magnitude that the accused was denied the
right to a fair trial." People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 348-49
(2000). However, an initial step in determining whether the plain error
doctrine applies is to determine whether there has been reversible
error. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d  at 349 ("Absent reversible error ***, there
can be no plain error").
1. The State's Questioning of Law Enforcement Officials
	Defendant urges us to find prosecutorial misconduct first in the
State's questioning of the two Lake County officers who interviewed
defendant in St. Louis. During this interview, defendant answered
most of the officers' questions but declined to answer three of them.
Defendant argues that the State "repeatedly questioned" the officers
about defendant's refusal to answer these questions, in violation of the
rule set forth in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976). Under Doyle, the prosecution may not impermissibly
comment on the defendant's silence when he has invoked the right to
remain silent. Doyle, 426 U.S.  at 619, 49 L. Ed. 2d  at 98, 96 S. Ct.  at
2245.
	According to the testimony of the two officers, defendant was
advised of his Miranda rights but agreed to speak to the officers.
Specifically, defendant told the officers: "I guess I'll answer some of
your questions." During the ensuing interview, defendant gave the
officers information about a number of matters, including, for
example, the fire at his home in Champaign and where he was at the
time of the fire. Defendant told the officers he was in Chicago when
the fire occurred, but he declined to say where he was, specifically, in
Chicago. Defendant also refused to give the officers Rivera's
telephone number. In addition, defendant informed the officers that he
was unemployed, but refused to provide them with information about
his previous employment.
	Doyle applies only when a defendant invokes his right to remain
silent. People v. Henson, 58 Ill. App. 3d 42, 46 (1978). Here,
defendant waived his right to remain silent and answered most of the
officers' questions. Once the right to remain silent has been waived,
it can be invoked only by a defendant's positive assertion that he
wants to remain silent. People v. Trumbull, 67 Ill. App. 3d 262, 265
(1978). Defendant did not tell the detectives that he wanted to remain
silent. The Doyle rule, therefore, does not apply in this instance.
People v. Mata, 243 Ill. App. 3d 365, 376 (1993) ("where a defendant
has expressly waived his right to remain silent and made a statement,
the Doyle rule is generally inapplicable").
	Because there is no reversible error, there can be no plain error.
Defendant's argument as to this issue is forfeited.
2. The State's Redirect Examination of Its DNA Expert
	Defendant also claims that there was prosecutorial misconduct in
the State's redirect examination of the State's DNA expert, Kelly
Gannon. In its redirect examination of Gannon, the State established
that the blood sample used by Gannon in her analysis was also
available to the defense for independent testing but no request for
such testing had been made. According to defendant, this line of
questioning implied that the defense could have conducted an
independent DNA analysis but chose not to for fear of the results. In
defendant's view, this impermissibly shifted the burden of proof from
the State to defendant.
	Prior to the State's questions regarding the availability of the
DNA sample, defense counsel, on cross-examination, repeatedly
questioned Gannon as to the degradation of the sample and whether
the lab's validation procedures corroborated her results. Defense
counsel's last question to Gannon came in this colloquy.
			"Q. As I understand your testimony, *** an independent
laboratory in this particular case[ ] did not review your work,
is that correct?
			A. That's correct."
	Immediately thereafter, the State began its redirect with the
following exchange:
			"Q. Ms Gannon, you indicated earlier that you retained
documentation and samples in this case in the laboratory[,
and] even now, continue to retain certain of the samples in
this case, is that right?
			A. That's correct.
			Q. Those standards and samples are available for review
and retesting by the state or by the defense if requested,
correct?
			A. Correct.
			Q. Was any request made of you by anyone to retest in
this case?
			A. No, there was not."
	In his cross-examination of Gannon, defense counsel emphasized
the degradation of the DNA sample and the validation methods used
to verify Gannon's test results, thus casting doubt on those results.
The purpose of the State's questioning on redirect, which was invited
by defense counsel's questioning on cross-examination, was to answer
the doubts raised by that cross-examination. In such situations, error
cannot normally be claimed. People v. Dixon, 91 Ill. 2d 346, 350-51
(1982) ("a defendant cannot ordinarily claim error where the
prosecutor's remarks are in reply to and may be said to have been
invited by defense counsel's argument").
	The State's reference to the availability of the DNA samples to
the defense was brief and was not repeated. Moreover, during his
closing argument, defense counsel referred to the State's questioning
of Gannon on redirect and argued forcefully that the burden of
establishing guilt remains at all times with the State. This concept was
reinforced by the jury instructions.
	We conclude that the State's questioning of Gannon regarding
the availability of the DNA sample did not constitute reversible error.
Accordingly, the plain error rule does not apply. Defendant has
forfeited his argument on this issue.
D. Sufficiency of the Evidence
	Defendant next argues that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to sustain his conviction. According to defendant, he was
not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
	When reviewing an insufficiency of the evidence claim in a
criminal conviction, a court determines whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 209
(2004). "We will not reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so
unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory that it raises a reasonable
doubt of defendant's guilt." Evans, 209 Ill. 2d  at 209.
	In our harmless-error analysis in this case, we held that the
evidence presented at trial, though largely circumstantial, nevertheless
was overwhelming in support of defendant's convictions. This analysis
excluded Rivera's grand jury testimony. Looking at this evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. In our view, the evidence
is not so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory that it raises a
reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. We therefore reject defendant's
claim that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
E. Sentence
1. First Degree Murder
	Finally, defendant raises three issues with respect to his sentence.
He argues first that his sentence for first degree murder was excessive.
As the appellate court noted, a trial court has broad discretion in
sentencing and should be reversed only when it abuses that discretion.
347 Ill. App. 3d at 1056, citing People v. Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d 247,
258 (1995). In arriving at defendant's sentence, the circuit court
considered a broad range of information, including arguments in
aggravation and mitigation, the presentence report, and letters written
in support of defendant. The sentence of 50 years is within the
statutory range of 20 to 60 years for first degree murder. 730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a) (West 2002). We find no abuse of discretion.
2. Concealment of a Homicidal Death
	Defendant also contends that his five-year sentence for
concealment of a homicidal death should have been ordered served
concurrently with the murder sentence rather than consecutively
because the two offenses were part of the same course of conduct. As
the State points out, however, a consecutive sentence was statutorily
mandated here. Section 5-8-4(a)(i) of the Unified Code of
Corrections provides, in pertinent part:
		"The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for
offenses which were committed as part of a single course of
conduct ***, unless:
				(i) one of the offenses for which defendant was
convicted was first degree murder *** and the defendant
inflicted severe bodily injury, ***
			in which event the court shall enter sentences to run
consecutively." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a)(i) (West 2002).
	Defendant concedes that his convictions for first degree murder
and concealment of a homicidal death were part of a single course of
conduct and the victim in this case sustained severe bodily injury. The
sentencing judge was required to impose consecutive sentences.
3. Elements of the Crime Considered as an Aggravating Factor
	Defendant also argues that "the trial court erred in the
determination of his sentence by considering as an aggravating factor
elements which were inherent [in] and essential to the crime and the
nature of the offense." Specifically, defendant contends that the trial
court improperly considered steps that defendant took to avoid being
caught. In support of this argument, defendant cites to a page from
the transcript of the sentencing hearing. However, there is no mention
on this page of any attempt by defendant to avoid being caught.
Indeed, an examination of the transcript of the sentencing hearing
reveals no mention by the trial judge of defendant's attempt to avoid
being caught. Defendant's argument has no basis. Accordingly, we
reject it.
CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court, which affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence.
	Affirmed.
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