Title: Porter v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 32, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 15, 2005

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
BRUCE L. PORTER, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 32, 2005 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID. 90001246DI 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 17, 2005 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: August 15, 2005 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 15th day of August 2005, upon consideration of the parties’ 
briefs and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Bruce Porter, filed this appeal from 
the Superior Court’s denial of his motion for correction of sentence.  The 
State concedes that Porter’s 2001 sentence violates the ex post facto clause 
of the United States Constitution and must be corrected.  We agree.  
Accordingly, this matter is reversed and remanded for further action by the 
Superior Court consistent with this order. 
(2) 
The record reflects that Porter pled guilty in 1990 to Murder in 
the Second Degree.  On February 15, 1991, the Superior Court sentenced 
 
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Porter to twenty years imprisonment to be suspended after ten years of 
“mandatory incarceration pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4204(k).”  The sentencing 
order also provided, among other things, that “if defendant refuses to be 
tested or has a bad urine test result this will result in a violation of probation 
and an additional 10 years of incarceration” pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 
4204(k).  Porter did not appeal his sentence. 
(3) 
On August 14, 2001, Porter was arrested on criminal charges 
and tested positive for alcohol at the time of his arrest.  As a result, a 
violation of probation report was filed.  After a hearing, the Superior Court 
found Porter in violation of the probationary portion of his 1991 sentence.  
The Superior Court sentenced Porter on the VOP charge to “ten years at 
Level V, pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4202(k) [sic] without benefit of parole or 
good time or any other credits.”  Porter did not appeal his VOP conviction or 
sentence.  He did file a motion for sentence modification and a motion for 
postconviction relief, which were both denied.  In December 2004, Porter 
filed a motion for correction of sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal 
Rule 35(a), which also was denied.  This appeal followed. 
 
(4) 
The gist of Porter’s claim on appeal is that the Superior Court 
imposed a more onerous sentence on his VOP charge than was authorized by 
law.  Porter asserts that 11 Del. C. § 4204(k), as it existed when he originally 
 
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was sentenced in 1991, did not prohibit a defendant from earning good time 
credits or being paroled.1  Porter argues that when the Superior Court 
sentenced him on the VOP charge in 2001 and ordered that the sentence be 
served pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4204(k), as amended in 1997,2 without 
benefit of parole or good time or any other credits, it violated the ex post 
facto clause of the United States Constitution.  The State concedes that 
Porter’s 2001 sentence, which was ordered to be served without benefit of 
parole or good time or any other credits, is illegal. 
 
(5) 
After careful consideration of the parties’ arguments, we agree 
that Porter’s VOP sentence must be vacated and this matter remanded for 
reimposition of sentence consistent with this order.  Although revocation of 
probation is within the sound discretion of the trial court,3 it is well settled 
that in sentencing a defendant on a VOP charge, the trial court may neither 
enlarge the period of probation nor impose a sentence greater than that 
                                                 
1 At the time of his sentencing in 1991, Section 4204(k) provided, in its entirety, “The 
court may direct as a condition to any sentence of imprisonment that the Department of 
Correction shall not permit an offender to be furloughed or be allowed to participate in 
work release or supervised custody outside the prison institution or facilities.”  11 Del. C. 
§ 4204(k) (1987). 
2 After its amendment in 1997, Section 4204(k) provided, among other things, that the 
sentencing court could order “all or a specified portion of said sentence shall be served 
without benefit of any form of early release, good time, furlough, work release, 
supervised custody or any other form of reduction or diminution of sentence.” 
3 Brown v. State, 249 A.2d 269, 271 (Del. 1968). 
 
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originally imposed.4  In this case, by imposing Porter’s VOP sentence 
pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4204(k), as amended in 1997, the Superior Court 
precluded Porter from earning good time, which was not a limitation on the 
original sentence.  By eliminating Porter’s ability to earn good time, the 
Superior Court’s 2001 sentence necessarily increased “the quantum of 
punishment”5 attached to Porter’s original crime.  The retroactive 
application of 11 Del. C. § 4204(k) (1997) thus violates the ex post facto 
clause. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is REVERSED.  This matter is hereby REMANDED to the 
Superior Court to resentence Porter in accordance with this order.  
Jurisdiction is not retained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
4 Ingram v. State, 567 A.2d 868, 869 (Del. 1989).  Pavulak v. State, ___ A.2d ___, No. 
20, 2005, Ridgely, J. (Aug. 8, 2005). 
5 Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 33 (1981).  See also Gasby v. State, 429 A.2d 165 
(Del. 1981).