Title: Matter of Hillis
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 321, 2003
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: March 24, 2004

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE  
 
) 
PETITION OF 
 
 
 
)  No. 321, 2003 
EDMUND M. HILLIS,  
 
) 
ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER, ) 
FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION 
) 
AND/OR CERTIORARI  
 
) 
 
Submitted:  January 27, 2004 
Decided:  March 24, 2004 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, STEELE and 
JACOBS, Justices, constituting the court en banc. 
 
 
For a Writ of Prohibition and/or Certiorari.  DENIED. 
 
 
Angelo Falasca, Wilmington, Delaware; Bernard J. O’Donnell and James 
Brendan O’Neill of the Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, for 
Edmund M. Hillis. 
 
 
Loren C. Meyers of the Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for 
State of Delaware. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Per curiam:
 
2
 
Edmund M. Hillis, Assistant Public Defender, petitions this Court for a writ 
of prohibition or certiorari challenging the authority of a Superior Court judge to 
sanction him through the imposition of costs of transporting prisoners to court and 
confining him for one hour to a courthouse “holding area.”  Hillis contends that:  
(i) a trial judge does not have the authority, absent a finding of contempt, to impose 
on defendant’s counsel the costs of transporting an incarcerated defendant to court; 
(ii) a trial judge does not have the authority, absent a finding of contempt, to 
incarcerate counsel; and (iii) even assuming, arguendo, that a trial judge does have 
such authority, it is a violation of due process and fundamental fairness for a trial 
judge to take these actions without an opportunity for counsel to be heard.  For the 
reasons set forth below, we decline to issue the writs requested. 
On May 27, 2003, Hillis had ten cases scheduled for case review in the New 
Castle County Superior Court.  Six of those cases were “final” case reviews, while 
the remaining four were “first” case reviews.  Those cases involved the 
representation of nine individual clients, three of whom were in the custody of the 
Delaware Department of Corrections. 
By approximately 12:30 p.m. on May 27, all of the morning case reviews 
had been completed except for the three cases involving incarcerated individuals 
with whom Hillis had not yet had the opportunity to consult.  These incarcerated 
defendants were transported to the courthouse by the DOC, and were brought to a 
 
3
holding area adjacent to the courtroom where the trial judge’s morning case 
reviews were taking place.  The trial judge, wanting to ensure that Hillis had 
sufficient time to speak with these three defendants, called a recess to allow Hillis 
to talk with his clients in the holding area.  The trial judge stated that the court 
would reconvene at 2:00 p.m. to review the three remaining cases.  The record 
reflects that Hillis had no scheduled afternoon case reviews and that the trial court 
considered that fact in rescheduling Hillis’ case reviews for 2:00 p.m.     
The trial judge asserts that Hillis acknowledged this 2:00 p.m. start time.  
However, Hillis raises a factual dispute about whether he could have 
acknowledged the start time.  He maintains that he was in the holding area 
consulting with his clients at the time the trial judge rescheduled for 2:00 p.m.  
While our review of the transcript confirms the inconsistency, we believe it is 
unnecessary to resolve this factual dispute in order to address the issues presented 
by Hillis’ petition.       
The same courtroom that was used for morning case reviews was used for 
Hillis’ three case reviews at 2:00 p.m.1  When the case reviews reconvened at 2:00 
p.m., the trial judge observed that Hillis was not present.  After waiting until 2:10 
p.m., the trial judge directed the bailiff to call Hillis from the courtroom telephone.  
                                                          
 
1 Afternoon cases reviews with another Superior Court judge were scheduled for this courtroom 
at 2:30 p.m.  This is, apparently, a common start time for afternoon case reviews in the Superior 
Court.  The trial judge used the same courtroom for Hillis’ 2:00 p.m. case reviews because he 
 
4
The bailiff reached Hillis at his office, and informed Hillis that he was due in court.  
Hillis arrived at the courtroom sometime between 2:20 p.m. and 2:25 p.m.  
Although the trial judge was obviously on the bench when Hillis arrived, Hillis 
offered no apology or explanation to the court for not being present at 2:00 p.m.  
Hillis instead went directly through the courtroom to the holding area adjacent to 
the courtroom.   
The trial judge, believing that Hillis’ delay would impede the afternoon case 
reviews scheduled before another judge, instructed the bailiff to find Hillis.  After 
Hillis returned to the courtroom, the following exchange occurred: 
 
THE COURT:  Tell Mr. Hillis to come out now.  Ed, we are a half an 
hour late.  Let’s move it along.  I don’t want to hear anything from 
sidebar.   
Kevin, excuse me.  We are in session.  We need to get started with 
something.  Regrettably, we are 30 minutes late getting started, so I 
need your help.  Just hold on for a few minutes.  Thank you. 
 
MR. HILLIS:  Your Honor, we can take care of them now, if you’d 
like.  Just set them for trial or final case review.   
 
THE COURT:  What? 
 
MR. HILLIS:  My cases. 
 
THE COURT:  Why? 
 
MR. HILLIS:  Because, Your Honor, I have worked too hard this 
morning.  I had too many cases on.  I’m not going to be abused this 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
believed that they would be completed by 2:30 P.M. and would not interfere with the afternoon 
case reviews handled by another judge.     
 
5
way.  I was not a half an hour late.  I was trying to track down 
prosecutors so I could bring these cases to fruition.  Each of these 
cases involved a situation where I had -- 
 
THE COURT:  We reset this for 2:00.  I had the court reporter check 
it.  The bailiff knew it.  The guards knew it.  We were all here.  You 
were in your office.  We set it at 2:00 because you did not have any 
reviews in the afternoon, and I said we’d be back here at 2:00, and 
that was 12:30 –  
 
MR. HILLIS:  Your Honor -- 
 
THE COURT:  -- and now you take a nonapologetic tone and accuse 
me of working you too hard.  That is unacceptable.  You walked in 
here a half an hour late – that’s it.   
 
MR. HILLIS:  Well -- 
 
THE COURT:  These will be on the calendar for next week.   
 
MR. HILLIS:  Very well. 
 
THE COURT:  And you will reimburse the Department of 
Corrections at $89 per prisoner who was unnecessarily transported 
here.  That is your sanction.   
 
MR. HILLIS:  We will take an appeal of that, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT:  There is no appeal.  It is not a contempt finding, Mr. 
Hillis.  You were a half an hour late.  If you want to appeal that, fine. 
 
MR. HILLIS:  Your Honor -- 
 
THE COURT:  It is not a contempt finding.  It is a sanction for being 
a half an hour late, walking in here, not apologizing for being a half an 
hour late, Mr. Hillis, when we set this at 2:00, specifically for your 
schedule because you didn’t have anything this afternoon.   
 
We have three prisoners out there.  That costs the Department of 
Correction a lot of money to bring them here and back.  The last I 
 
6
heard, the average cost per trip is $89 a trip.  It’s $89 per each of those 
three defendants.   
 
You’ve had Judge Alford waiting.  We have another court reporter 
sitting here.   
 
MR. HILLIS:  Your Honor, may I explain why I wasn’t here at 2:00. 
 
THE COURT:  No, you may not, because you weren’t.  And we 
called you and you were in your office and not here.   
 
MR. HILLIS:  Yes, sir.   
 
THE COURT:  You can’t explain that.   
 
MR. HILLIS:  I could if you’d give me a chance. 
 
THE COURT:  Nope.  Here is your sanction.   
 
MR. HILLIS:  Thank you. 
 
That’s a very reasonable approach to take, Your Honor.   
 
THE COURT:  Mr. Hillis, you can stay in there for another hour.2 
 
We address two issues raised by Hillis’ petition.  The first is under what 
circumstances a trial judge may find a person in contempt without providing 
notice and a hearing.  The second is whether, here, the trial judge’s sanction 
was a reasonable response to Hillis’ conduct.        
Under Delaware’s Criminal Code, all criminal offenses are defined by 
statute.3  While the Criminal Code does not address civil contempt, it has 
                                                          
 
2 Transcript of Portions of Colloquy at Case Reviews, pp. 4-7.   
3 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 202 (2004). 
 
7
codified criminal contempt in 11 Del. C. § 1271.4  The pertinent statutes 
with respect to Hillis’ petition are 11 Del. C. §§ 12715 and 1272.6     
Under 11 Del. C. § 1271(1), “[a] person is guilty of criminal contempt 
when the person engages in … [d]isorderly, contemptuous or insolent 
                                                          
 
4 Pitts v. State, 421 A.2d 901, 903 (1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 202(b) (2004).     
5 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1271 (2004).  This section states: 
 
A person is guilty of criminal contempt when the person engages in any of the 
following conduct: 
(1) Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior, committed during the 
sitting of a court, in its immediate view and presence, and directly tending 
to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due to its authority; or 
(2) Breach of the peace, noise or other disturbance directly tending to 
interrupt a court's proceedings; or 
(3) Intentional disobedience or resistance to the process, injunction or 
other mandate of a court; or 
(4) Contumacious refusal to be sworn as a witness in any court proceeding 
or, after being sworn, to answer any proper interrogatory; or 
(5) Knowingly publishing a false or grossly inaccurate report of a court's 
proceedings; or 
(6) Intentional refusal to serve as a juror; or 
(7) Intentional and unexcused failure by a juror to attend a trial at which 
the person has been chosen to serve as a juror; or 
(8) Intentional failure to appear personally on the required date, having 
been released from custody, with or without bail, by court order or by 
other lawful authority, upon condition that the person will subsequently 
appear personally in connection with a criminal action or proceeding. 
Criminal contempt is a class A misdemeanor, except for violations of subdivision 
(1) of this section. A violation of subdivision (1) of this section shall be a class B 
misdemeanor.  
 
6 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1272 (2004).  This section states: 
 
A person who commits criminal contempt as defined by § 1271(1) of this title 
may in the discretion of the court be convicted and sentenced for that offense 
 
8
behavior, committed during the sitting of a court, in its immediate view and 
presence, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the 
respect due to its authority ….”7  The Delaware General Assembly 
“deliberately granted the trial judge a wide discretion to balance all the 
factors in determining whether or not to use the summary contempt power 
[under 11 Del. C. § 1271(1)].”8  Further, it is this Court’s view that 11 Del. 
C. § 1272 unambiguously stands for the principle that a judicial officer may 
find any person guilty of criminal contempt where that person’s 
inappropriate conduct occurs in the immediate view and presence of the 
court.  When making a finding of summary contempt under 11 Del. C. § 
1271(1), the trial judge must follow the procedures established in Superior 
Court Criminal Rule 42(a).9  The Rule itself is not complex and means 
precisely what it says.  Therefore, the only question is whether the procedure 
for a finding of summary contempt satisfies the requirements of due process.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
without further criminal proceedings during or immediately after the termination 
of the proceeding in which the act constituting criminal contempt occurred. 
 
7 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1271(1) (2004).   
8 Pitts, 421 A.2d at 904. 
9 DEL. SUPER. CT. CR. R. 42(a) (2004) “Summary disposition. A criminal contempt under 11 
Del.C. § 1271(1) may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that the judge saw or heard 
the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the 
court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of 
record”. 
 
9
There is a long history of upholding summary adjudication “committed 
in the face of the court.”10  The United States Supreme Court has held that 
courts have “an inherent contempt authority … as a power ‘necessary to the 
exercise of all others.’”11  The United States Supreme Court has further 
stated: 
That the power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts, has 
been many times decided and may be regarded as settled law. It is 
essential to the administration of justice. The courts of the United 
States, when called into existence and vested with jurisdiction over 
any subject, at once became possessed of the power.12  (emphasis 
added).      
     
The traditional justification for judicial contempt power has been necessity.13  
“Courts independently must be vested with ‘power to impose silence, 
respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful 
mandates, and ... to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach 
and insults of pollution.’”14  This Court, in DiSabatino v. Salicete,15 has held 
that a court’s inherent contempt authority is settled law, reasoning that 
contempt power is “essential to the administration of justice.”16   
                                                          
 
10 See 2 G. Sharswood, Blackstone’s Commentaries, Book IV, ch. 20, p. 286 (1895); In re Terry, 
128 U.S. 289 (1888); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 
(1948); In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962).    
11 Id. (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812)).   
12 Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 795 (1987). 
13 United Mine Workers of America, 512 U.S. at 831. 
14 Id. (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 227 (1821)).   
15 671 A.2d 1344 (Del. 1996). 
16 Id. at 1348. 
 
10
The United States Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Mississippi,17 held 
that “[i]nstant action may be necessary where the misbehavior is in the 
presence of the judge and is known to him, and where immediate corrective 
steps are needed to restore order and maintain the dignity and authority of 
the court.”18  Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that 
“[t]he flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper 
conduct should not and cannot be tolerated.”19  That Court provided the 
following rationale:   
To preserve order in the courtroom for the proper conduct of business, 
the court must act instantly to suppress disturbance or violence or 
physical obstruction or disrespect to the court, when occurring in 
open court. There is no need of evidence or assistance of counsel 
before punishment, because the court has seen the offense. Such 
summary vindication of the court's dignity and authority is necessary. 
It has always been so in the courts of the common law, and the 
punishment imposed is due process of law.20  
 
Delaware courts have adopted the same approach for a trial judge 
making a finding of summary contempt.21  Accordingly, we reaffirm the trial 
judge’s inherent authority to find a person guilty of criminal contempt  
                                                          
 
17 403 U.S. 212 (1971). 
18 Id. at 214 (citing Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925); Harris v. United States, 
382 U.S. 162, 165 (1965)).   
19 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970). 
20 Cooke, 267 U.S. at 534 (emphasis added).  
21 Pitts, 421 A.2d at 905.    
 
11
without providing a hearing where that person’s inappropriate conduct 
occurred in the immediate view and presence of the court. 
We are not unmindful of the fact the trial judge did not wish to 
formally find Hillis in criminal contempt.  The trial judge imposed each of 
his sanctions without articulating any formal legal regime for the imposition 
of either sanction.  We recognize that this opinion need only address the 
precise issues raised by the Hillis petitions, but we note the trial judge’s 
authority at common law to impose sanctions summarily for civil contempt 
when due process standards equally applicable to criminal contempt are met.  
We further note that most often criminal contempt is imposed for disorderly 
or disrespectful conduct.  “If the primary purpose of the contempt 
proceeding, summary or otherwise, is to coerce, so that the “keys to the jail 
are in defendant’s hands,” then the proceeding is civil in nature.22 
Here, the transcript clearly shows that the trial judge did not give 
Hillis an opportunity to explain his reasons for not appearing at 2:00 p.m. as 
the judge had ordered.  The transcript also reflects the sarcastic and 
disrespectful tone Hillis took in open court toward the trial judge.  Members 
                                                          
 
22 State v. Mancari, 223 A.2d 81,82 (Del. 1966); See also Legal Memoranda of the Chief 
Magistrate of the Justice of the Peace Courts 80-25 (October 16, 1980), 80-25 Supplement 
(August 4, 1997), 84-118 (April 11, 1984), 84-118 Supplement (May 9, 1984), 84-118 Second 
Supplement (July 5, 1984) and 84-118 Third Supplement (January 10, 1996) (discussing the 
differences between civil contempt and criminal contempt). 
 
 
12
of the public, several unincarcerated criminal defendants, and members of 
the Delaware Bar were present in the courtroom during the exchange 
between the trial judge and Hillis.  Members of the Bar, the trial judge and  
Hillis knew that the comment “we can take care of them now, if you’d like.  
Just set them for trial or final case review,” reflected frustration and an “in-
your-face” response to the trial judge’s desire to dispose of the cases at case 
review, if possible, on the day scheduled.  Indeed, the entire purpose of case 
review is to exhaust every opportunity to dispose of cases before valuable 
trial days are set aside for no purpose.  The miscommunication between 
Hillis and the trial judge on scheduling and the frustration Hillis evidently 
felt in being chastised for being late when he did not know that he had been 
rescheduled for 2:00 p.m., while understandable, did not justify the 
insolence and sullen pique directed at the trial judge.  Hillis’ final comment:  
“That’s a very reasonable approach to take, Your Honor” reflects the 
contumacious, “nonapologetic” tone that the trial judge noted immediately 
before imposing the first sanction.23   
                                                          
 
23While the facts of this case predate this Court’s November 1, 2003 adoption of the 
“PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM FOR DELAWARE JUDGES” and the “PRINCIPLES OF 
PROFESSIONALISM FOR DELAWARE LAWYERS,” both “PRINCIPLES” reflect a conscious effort by 
the Bench and Bar to reinvigorate our long standing commitment to civility.  Had Hillis not 
walked through the courtroom upon his return at the bailiff’s beckon, but instead stopped, and 
then offered his reason for not appearing precisely at 2:00 p.m., we trust that the trial judge 
would have entertained his explanation and no further confrontation would have occurred.  
Had the events unfolded as above described, then the trial judge would, no doubt, have taken 
 
13
We are mindful of the case load of the Office of the Public Defender 
and we recognize the resulting strain on our State’s public defenders.  We 
know that case review days, despite their utility for efficiently managing a 
docket, can be frenetic.  Trial judges, deputy attorneys general and defense 
counsel face pressures that require the utmost patience and civility from all 
participants.  Nevertheless, the substance and the tone that must be inferred 
from Hillis’ conduct in the context of this case review day, cannot be 
tolerated in the courtrooms of our State.  Here, the trial judge “acted 
instantly to suppress . . .disrespect to the court, when [it] occur[ed] in open 
court.” 
We recognize the trial judge disclaimed that he was making a finding 
of contempt.  The trial judge followed all of the procedures, nevertheless, for 
making a summary finding of contempt under Superior Court Criminal Rule 
42(a).24  The record reflects that the trial judge certified that he saw and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the preferable course of “. . . allow[ing] a lawyer . . . to present a cause properly and to make a 
complete and accurate record . . .,” consistent with PRINCIPLE No. 6.  Had Hillis attempted to 
explain immediately upon returning, he would have satisfied his commitment under 
PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM FOR DELAWARE LAWYERS No. 4, which states: “Professional 
civility is conduct that shows respect not only for the courts and colleagues, but also for all 
people encountered in practice.  Respect requires promptness in meeting appointments, 
consideration of the schedules and commitments of others, adherence to commitments whether 
made orally or in writing, promptness in returning telephone calls and responding to 
communications, and avoidance of verbal intemperance and personal attacks.”  
24 DEL. SUPER. CT. CR. R. 42(a) (2004).  This rule states: 
 
Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the 
Judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that 
 
14
heard Hillis’ inappropriate comments and that Hillis’ conduct occurred in his 
presence.  The trial judge then recited the facts before making his summary 
finding of contempt.  Thus, we believe that despite his disclaimer the trial 
judge did, in fact, make a summary finding of contempt, and we must treat 
Hillis’ petition in that context regardless of the trial judge’s professed 
attempt to avoid a formal finding of contempt. 
Here, Hillis’ due process rights were not implicated.  His comments 
constituted disruptive and insolent behavior.  He demonstrated disrespect to 
a sitting judge in the presence of the Bar, the public and criminal defendants 
pending action in the Superior Court.  Moreover, his conduct as an officer of 
the court disrupted the afternoon case reviews and assaulted the dignity and 
respect due the Superior Court and its sitting judges.  We conclude that the 
trial judge, acting out of necessity, appropriately found Hillis in contempt.  
The trial judge acted immediately to maintain respect and decorum in the 
courtroom, to protect the court and his office from further insult, and to 
discourage future petulant behavior by other members of the Delaware 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
it was committed in the actual presence of the Court. The order of contempt shall 
recite the facts and shall be signed by the Judge and entered of record. 
 
15
Bar.25  The trial judge’s actions, that is, were “essential to the administration 
of justice.”26   
We note a troubling increase in the number of reported incidents of 
incivility by counsel in the courtroom.27  Although an attorney’s obligation 
is to zealously represent his or her clients, “to be aggressive is not a license 
to ignore the rules of evidence and decorum; and to be zealous is not to be 
uncivil.”28   
Incivility in open court infects the process of justice in many ways.  It 
compromises the necessary public trust that the system will produce fair and 
just results; it negates the perception of professionalism in the legal 
community, and it erodes respect for all people involved in the process.29  In 
other words, “An attorney who exhibits a lack of civility, good manners and 
common courtesy tarnishes the image of the legal profession ...”30   
In this case, the facts support a finding of contempt and the trial judge’s 
sanction was a reasonable response to the gravity of Hillis’ disrespectful in-
                                                          
 
25 United Mine Workers of America, 512 U.S. at 831. 
26 DiSabatino, 671 A.2d at 1348 (citing  Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 
U.S. 787, 795 (1987)). 
27 See Allan K. Harris, The Professionalism Crisis – The “Z” Words and Other Rambo Tactics: 
The Conference of Chief Justices’ Solution, 53 S.C. L.REV. 549, 589 (2002); Jean M. Cary, 
Teaching Ethics and Professionalism in Litigation: Some Thoughts, 28 STETSON L.REV. 305, 308 
(1998). 
28 In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394, 397 (Minn. 1987).   
29 See Ty Tasker, Sticks and Stones: Judicial Handling of Invective in Advocacy, The Judges’ 
Journal 19-20 (2003).   
30 Principe v. Assay Partners, 586 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).   
 
16
court conduct.  The trial judge imposed a fine of $267 ($89 per defendant) 
based on numerous factors.  First, the trial judge found Hillis was late to the 
2:00 p.m. case review.  Second, Hillis failed to acknowledge the trial judge 
when he did arrive, knew that the trial judge believed that he had “blown 
off” the 2:00 p.m. rescheduled case reviews, but nonetheless made no 
immediate effort to apologize or explain his 2:20-2:25 arrival.  Third, Hillis’ 
conduct occurred in the presence of members of the public, criminal 
defendants, prosecutors and defense attorneys.  Finally, the trial judge in an 
October 23, 2003 letter report requested by this Court, stated his belief that 
other judges of the Superior Court had previously warned and sought to 
counsel Hillis about similar disrespectful outbursts made in open court.     
 
Finally, Hillis’ sarcastic comment, “That’s a very reasonable approach 
to take, Your Honor” showed a deliberate lack of respect for the trial judge 
and his ruling.  Intentional sarcasm is the only reasonable interpretation of 
Hillis’ statement, and this comment prompted an immediate order by the 
trial judge that Hillis remain in the prisoner holding area for one hour.  
Faced with a disruption that threatened to spill over into another trial judge’s 
afternoon case review session, and with open hostility to the earlier, milder 
sanction, the trial judge’s response was reasonable.  Hillis’ detention was an 
appropriate attempt to cure the perception created in the eyes of those 
 
17
present that open-court incivility by anyone, even an attorney, would be 
tolerated. 
 
The Delaware Bench and Bar have long been admired for the 
collegiality among and between its members.  Members of the Bench and 
the Bar will no doubt, even in the sometimes frenetic and intense arena of 
open court criminal work, continue to work toward exchanges that reflect 
mutual respect and consideration.  When, however, situations present 
themselves where misunderstandings cause passions to flare, the ultimate 
focus is and must be to reflect respect and confidence in the court’s 
authority.  Nothing less will suffice for the efficient administration of justice.    
Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, Hillis’ Petition for Writ of Prohibition or Certiorari 
is DENIED.