Title: Jensen v. Sire
Citation: 352 P.2d 263
Docket Number: 10124
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: May 2, 1960

352 P.2d 263 (1960) Josephine JENSEN and Clarence J. Jensen, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Kenneth J. SIRE and Jessie T. Sire, Defendants and Appellants. No. 10124. Supreme Court of Montana. May 2, 1960. Jones, Olsen, Dowlin &amp; Pease, Billings, for appellants. Harlow Pease and Paul G. Olsen, Billings, argued orally for appellants. Jeremy G. Thane, Missoula, for respondents. Jeremy G. Thane, Missoula, argued orally for respondents. CASTLES, Justice. This is an appeal from a judgment for plaintiffs tried before the court without a jury. The record on appeal consists of the judgment roll, and the specifications of error go to the ruling on demurrer and entry of judgment as to whether or not a cause of action was stated in the complaint. The complaint was for a balance due with interest on a contract of sale and purchase of certain chattels, consisting mainly of farm machinery and leases of real estate. The contract was set out in haec verba. The complaint alleged that the defendants took possession of the property, paid the down payment of $7,000, and a further payment of $3,000 due on January 1, 1956, but failed to make the other two payments provided in the contract of $3,000 on January 1, 1957. and $2,000 due on January 1, 1958. The complaint was filed April 30, 1958, and was for the principal sum of $5,000. As stated by the appellants, defendants below, the whole case on appeal is contained in the contract which was pleaded by respondents and admitted by appellants, and in the failure of the complaint to allege (1) that the notice of default was given and 30 days ran before action commenced, and (2) failure to allege that there was any repossession or attempt to repossess or otherwise to exhaust security, before action commenced. Or stated another way, were the respondents limited in their remedy to repossession of the security under conditions of the contract and were they obligated to give 30 days written notice even after the entire amount had become due? *264 The paragraphs of the conditional sales contract which give rise to the questions are: We note that there is no question of forfeiture or acceleration of payments involved. The complaint sought a remedy of payment of the entire amount due under the contract after all payments became due. It is the appellants' position that paragraph 15 makes the remedy contained in paragraph 6 exclusive and further requires 30-day notice. *265 This court has said in J.M. Hamilton Co. v. Battson, 99 Mont. 583, 591, 44 P.2d 1064, 1067, 101 A.L.R. 520, that "It was nowhere provided in the contract in direct terms that the remedies therein mentioned were deemed to be exclusive. Where a contract specifically provides that the remedies enumerated therein shall be the only course of settlement thereunder, a party to it is limited to the remedies provided therein. Wing v. Brasher, 59 Mont. 10, 194 P. 1106. Although, when a contract provides for a definite and specific remedy in the case of breach, without any limitation making such enumerated remedy or remedies exclusive, a party is entitled to pursue the remedy specified in the contract, he may also pursue any other remedy which the law affords, in addition to those provided for in the contract. Alexander v. Wingett, 63 Mont. 254, 206 P. 1088; Wandell v. Johnson, 71 Mont. 73, 227 P. 58." Emphasis supplied. The foregoing quotation was relied upon by the district court in its memorandum. In the case of White v. Jewett, 106 Mont. 416, 420, 78 P.2d 85, 87, this court said: The foregoing principle is well-established. Thus we look to the provisions of the contract as shown in the previously quoted paragraphs. Obviously, the remedy of paragraph 6 is not made exclusive in so many words. Paragraph 15 reads in part, "That notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained to the contrary, that in the event of default hereunder by the second parties * * * the first parties may, as aforesaid, after giving to second parties 30-days written notice of such default, declare the entire unpaid balance * * * to be immediately due and payable". This surely could not apply except as an acceleration clause, but as said before we are not concerned here with any acceleration of payments. The suit for the entire balance due was not brought until after all payments were due. It seems, too, that paragraph 17 strengthens the version that the 30-day notice provision and the remedy contained in paragraph 6 were not intended nor worded to be exclusive remedies. Under the facts of this case, where suit is brought after all payments become due under a conditional sales contract and where the contract does not delineate an exclusive remedy by its terms, suit may be brought for the balance due as was done here. The judgment is affirmed. HARRISON, C. J., and ADAIR and ANGSTMAN, JJ., concur. BOTTOMLY, J., not participating.