Title: Commonwealth v. Tweed
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 012506
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 1, 2002

Present:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
            OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 012506 
November 1, 2002 
 
LONNIE L. TWEED, JR., 
s/k/a LONNIE LEE TWEED 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
I. 
 
 
In this appeal of a judgment from the Court of Appeals, 
we consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing a 
criminal defendant's convictions and granting the defendant a 
new trial based upon purported after-discovered evidence. 
II. 
 
Lonnie L. Tweed, Jr., was indicted by a Chesterfield 
County grand jury for the following offenses:  the first-
degree murder of James Monroe Hoover in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-32; the use and display in a threatening manner of a 
firearm during the commission of murder in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-53.1; the attempted robbery of James Hoover in 
violation of Code §§ 18.2-58 and 18.2-26; and the use and 
display in a threatening manner of a firearm during the 
commission of an attempted robbery in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-53.1. 
 
The following evidence was presented at a jury trial.  On 
the evening of June 25, 1998, Tweed, Ryan Bennett, Roger 
Narragon, David Joseph Sanchez, Jr., and Shaun Holmes, 
attended a party at the home of a woman in the City of 
Hopewell.  The men drank beer and some of them, including 
Sanchez, ingested LSD and other illegal drugs.  The men left 
the woman's home sometime around midnight and got into 
Narragon's car.  Narragon sat in the driver's seat, and Holmes 
sat in the front passenger seat.  Tweed sat in the backseat 
immediately behind Holmes.  Bennett sat in the middle of the 
backseat, and Sanchez sat in the backseat directly behind the 
driver.  Sanchez had a pistol in his hand.  The pistol was 
described as "Tech Nine," and it was wrapped in "wash rags."   
 
Before the men left the house to get into the car, Tweed 
made the statement, "[t]ime to get paid."  Bennett understood 
that this statement meant that Tweed intended to commit a 
robbery.  
 
The men "rode around in Hopewell" for a few hours.  They 
traveled into Chesterfield County, which is adjacent to 
Hopewell.  While on Route 10 in Chesterfield County, the men 
saw Hoover, who was on a motorcycle at a gasoline station.  
Narragon, who was still driving the car, made two "U-turns" 
and began to follow Hoover.   
 
Bennett testified that as Narragon drove his car behind 
Hoover's motorcycle, Tweed told Bennett "[t]o rob the man."  
Bennett responded, "No."  Sanchez stated, "I'll do it."  
 
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Sanchez "leaned out the [car] window and shot [Hoover]" 
several times.  The men panicked, and Narragon drove the car 
away from the crime scene.  Hoover was shot at approximately 
4:30 a.m.  After he was shot, Hoover managed to drive his 
motorcycle "to the side of the road and cut his lights out" 
before he died. 
 
Dr. Deborah Kay, who qualified as an expert witness in 
the subject of forensic science, performed an autopsy on the 
victim's body.  She testified that Hoover sustained three 
gunshot wounds to his body and that his death was caused by 
injuries from those wounds. 
 
At the conclusion of the jury trial, the jury convicted 
Tweed of the charged offenses and fixed his punishment at 30 
years imprisonment for the first-degree murder conviction, 
three years imprisonment for the use of a firearm in the 
commission of murder, ten years imprisonment for attempted 
robbery, and five years imprisonment for the use of a firearm 
in the commission of attempted robbery.  After the trial, but 
before the entry of the circuit court's final judgment, the 
defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on his 
purported discovery of new evidence.  Sanchez was tried for 
the capital murder of Hoover approximately two months after 
the date of Tweed's trial.  During a hearing on Tweed's motion 
for a new trial, Sanchez' counsel testified that he would not 
 
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have permitted Sanchez to testify at Tweed's trial.  
Additionally, Sanchez testified at his trial as follows: 
"[W]hen we was heading towards, westbound towards 
Richmond, we came across – well, to me when we got 
up beside the motorcycle, what I seen was I had a 
hallucination due to the LSD, so what I seen was 
when we pulled up beside [the motorcycle], it was a 
demon on flames, and it was laughing and it was 
calling my name.  And, Your Honor, I just leaned out 
the window and started shooting at that." 
 
Sanchez also testified that he did not make any remarks about 
the commission of a robbery before or after the victim's 
death.  The circuit court denied the motion for a new trial 
and entered judgment confirming Tweed's convictions. 
 
The defendant appealed the judgment of the circuit court 
to the Court of Appeals and argued, among other things, that 
he was entitled to a new trial based on the so-called after-
discovered evidence.  The defendant also asserted in the Court 
of Appeals, and the Commonwealth concedes, that the defendant 
is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because during the 
jury's sentencing deliberations, the jury asked the circuit 
court whether parole was possible for each sentence, and the 
court instructed the jury that it should not be concerned with 
parole. 
 
The Court of Appeals held that our decision in Fishback 
v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 104, 532 S.E.2d 629 (2000), is 
controlling and that the defendant is entitled to a new 
 
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sentencing proceeding.  Tweed v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 
363, 369, 550 S.E.2d 345, 348 (2001).  The Court of Appeals 
also held, however, that the defendant is entitled to a new 
trial because of the so-called after-discovered evidence, and 
the Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and remanded the 
case for a new trial.  Id. at 374-75, 550 S.E.2d at 350-51.  
The Commonwealth appeals. 
III. 
A. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the Court of Appeals erred 
because it considered an excerpt from the transcript of 
Sanchez' testimony given in his capital murder trial and that 
transcript was not made a part of the record in this case.  We 
will not consider the Commonwealth's contention because the 
Court of Appeals held that the transcript had been made a part 
of the record, and the Commonwealth failed to assign error to 
that holding of the Court of Appeals. 
B. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the Court of Appeals erred 
in concluding that Tweed is entitled to a new trial based upon 
after-discovered evidence.  The Commonwealth contends that 
Tweed failed to establish that had Sanchez' testimony been 
admitted in Tweed's trial, the result in Tweed's trial would 
have been different.  Responding, Tweed contends that, had 
 
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Sanchez' testimony been presented to the jury, "there is a 
reasonable probability of a different result."  We disagree 
with Tweed, and we note that he urges the application of an 
erroneous standard in this appeal. 
 
We have repeatedly and consistently stated that 
"[m]otions for new trials based on after-discovered evidence 
are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, are 
not looked upon with favor, are considered with special care 
and caution, and are awarded with great reluctance."  Stockton 
v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 149, 314 S.E.2d 371, 387 (1984); 
Odum v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 123, 130, 301 S.E.2d 145, 149 
(1983); accord Payne v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460, 472, 357 
S.E.2d 500, 507 (1987); Starks v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 48, 
56, 301 S.E.2d 152, 157 (1983); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 
602, 608, 166 S.E.2d 248, 253 (1969); Reiber v. Duncan, 206 
Va. 657, 663, 145 S.E.2d 157, 161-62 (1965).  A party who 
seeks a new trial based upon after-discovered evidence  
"bears the burden to establish that the evidence (1) 
appears to have been discovered subsequent to the 
trial; (2) could not have been secured for use at 
the trial in the exercise of reasonable diligence by 
the movant; (3) is not merely cumulative, 
corroborative or collateral; and (4) is material, 
and such as should produce opposite results on the 
merits at another trial."   
 
Stockton, 227 Va. at 149, 314 S.E.2d at 387; Odum, 225 Va. at 
130, 301 S.E.2d at 149; accord Payne, 233 Va. at 472, 357 
 
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S.E.2d at 507; Starks, 225 Va. at 56, 301 S.E.2d at 157; 
Fulcher v. Whitlow, 208 Va. 34, 37-38, 155 S.E.2d 362, 365 
(1967).  The moving party must establish each of these 
mandatory criteria. 
 
The issue before this Court is whether the circuit court 
abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a 
new trial.  In the exercise of its discretion, the circuit 
court must consider whether the party who seeks the new trial 
on the basis of after-discovered evidence has established the 
mandatory criteria that we enumerated in Odum and other cases.  
We hold that in this case, the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion because the defendant failed to establish that 
Sanchez' testimony was "such as should [have] produce[d] 
opposite results on the merits at another trial." 
 
The jury accepted Bennett's testimony that Tweed stated 
it was "[t]ime to get paid," which meant that Tweed and his 
cohorts planned to leave the woman's house in Hopewell and 
commit a robbery.  The jury rejected Tweed's evidence at trial 
that he had not intended to commit a robbery.  Tweed, who was 
seated in the backseat with Sanchez and Bennett, knew that 
Sanchez was armed with a pistol. 
 
Bennett testified at Tweed's trial that he had not 
expected Sanchez to shoot Hoover and, thus, Sanchez' testimony 
that he shot Hoover unexpectedly would, at best, have been 
 
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cumulative, corroborative, or collateral.  The jury was also 
aware that Tweed and his cohorts planned to rob someone, that 
they selected the victim as he innocently sat on a motorcycle 
in a gas station parking lot, and that Narragon turned the car 
around so that the defendant and his companions could follow 
the victim.  While they followed the unsuspecting victim, the 
defendant asked Bennett "[t]o rob the man," and only after 
Bennett said "No," did Sanchez respond, "I'll do it," and he 
"leaned out the [car] window" and shot the victim several 
times. 
IV. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse that portion of the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals that awarded the defendant a new trial 
because of the purported after-discovered evidence, and we 
will reinstate the defendant's convictions.  We will remand 
the case to the Court of Appeals with directions that it 
remand the case to the circuit court for a new sentencing 
proceeding because of the circuit court's erroneous 
instruction to the jury regarding parole that was in violation 
of our decision in Fishback v. Commonwealth.  We will affirm 
the remaining portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
and remanded. 
 
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