Title: RESNER v N P RAILWAY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12104
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 1973

No. 12104 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A CHAROLETTE L. RESNER, Administratrix of t h e Estate of Herbert R e Resner, Deceased, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, T H E N O R T H E R N PACIFIC RAILWAY, a Wisconsin Corporation, Defendant and Respondent, Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l District, Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Daniel J. Shea argued, Missoula, Montana. For Respondent: Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana. J. C. Garlington appeared and Lawrence F. Daly, argued, Missoula, Montana. Submitted: September 20, 1972 Decided : JAN 12 197. Filed: J A N 12 1973 K r r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This appeal arose out of a wrongful death action brought under the Federal ~ m ~ l o ~ e r s ' L i a b i l i t y Act, 45 U.S.C.A. 5 51 e t seq. Herbert R. Resner and h i s section foreman, Benny Adams, w e r e k i l l e d when the track motor c a r on which they were r i d i n g collided with a Northern Pacific f r e i g h t t r a i n on August 15, 1967. The c o l l i s i o n occurred between Alberton and Cyr, Montana, be- tween Mileposts 158 and 159 on the Northern Pacific tracks. A t the time of t h e i r death, both Resner and Adams were employees of the defendant railroad company and were acting within t h e scope of t h e i r employment. Charolette L. Resner, widow of Herbert R. Resner and administratrix of h i s e s t a t e , brought t h i s action f o r h i s wrongful death on behalf of herself and t h e i r children. T r i a l with a jury was held i n the d i s t r i c t court of the fourth j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , Mineral County, Hon. Jack L. Green, presiding. B y special verdict, the jury found Northern Pacific Railway negligent i n two ways: (1) Failure t o enforce, observe and obey the safety r u l e s of the railroad f o r obtaining and using t r a i n lineups and operating track motor c a r s , and (2) f a i l u r e , by and through i t s agent Adams,to see and observe the approaching t r a i n and avoid the c o l l i s i o n . Resner was found t o be ten percent contributorily negligent. The jury returned a verdict f o r plain- t i f f i n the amount of $175,000. In answer t o special verdict questions, the jury found f i v e percent t o be a reasonable r a t e of increase i n wages and prices t o determine future damages, and ECve percent t o be a reasonable r a t e of discount t o be used i n determining the present worth of future damages. The evidence concerning future earnings was introduced through the testimony of p l a i n t i f f ' s witness D r . George B. Heliker, a recognized expert i n the f i e l d of labor economics. He gave several opinions with regard t o future damages a s concerns t h i s case. One opinion was t h a t Herbert Resner could reasonably have expected an annual f i v e percent increase i n wages during the remainder of h i s work l i f e expectancy. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t since World War I1 wages have increased a t l e a s t f i v e percent per year and t h a t a s applied t o Resner, h i s wages a s a section man kept pace with the increases of section men throughout the United States. Too, wages f o r section men continued t o increase a f t e r Resner ' s death. Resner ' s base hourly wage a t the time of h i s death was $2.6699. B y December 1970, t h i s r a t e had increased t o $3.4444. This testimony was not controverted a t t r i a l by defendant railroad company, D r . Heliker a l s o t e s t i f i e d extensively on the discount r a t e t o be applied i n reducing future earnings t o present worth, The process of discounting involved taking the product of the base earning capacity plus the growth r a t e of wages and applying a discount r a t e t o reduce those amounts t o present worth. As a r e s u l t of h i s calculations, he concluded t h a t a f i v e percent discount r a t e was most reasonable. I n so finding, he noted t h a t If i t was s t r i c t l y accidentalff t h a t the wage growth r a t e equaled the discount r a t e . He f u r t h e r concluded t h a t future economic losses could best be estimated by projecting them on a f l a t r a t e b a s i s , t h a t is, no increase f o r wage growth and no decrease f o r discount. On February 23, 1971, defendant f i l e d a motion f o r entry of judgment, requesting the jury's verdict be reduced, The motion s t a t e d (1) it was erroneous f o r the jury t o be allowed t o speculate on future wage increases and t o o f f s e t those in- creases against t h e discount t o present worth, (2) by the wording of the special interrogatories t o the jury the future damages would be increased, by f a i l u r e t o apply the discount r a t e , t o a figure not supportable by the evidence. On April 20, 1971, Judge Green granted defendant's motion f o r entry of judgment and recomputed the p l a i n t i f f ' s award t o be $91,740.49, plus costs. A number of p l a i n t i f f ' s motions were denied, O n April 30, 1971, defendant sent p l a i n t i f f a check ror the amount of the judgment, plus costs. P l a i n t i f f refused tender and returnedthe check t o defendant. On May 3, 1971, p l a i n t i f f moved t o a l t e r or amend the judgment, s t a t i n g t h a t the defendant had previously agreed t o have the i n t e r e s t on the judgment run from February 10, 1971, and t h a t i n t e r e s t was not included i n the check. Defendant deposited t h e check f o r the amount of the judgment plus c o s t s i n a savings account i n p l a i n t i f f ' s name a t the Southside National Bank, Missoula, Montana on Play 19, 1971. Defendant contended the deposit of the check i n the bank constituted compliance with section 58-423, R.C.M. 1947, r e l a t i n g t o the extinction of money obligations, and thereby the i n t e r e s t on the judgment was terminated. P l a i n t i f f , on the other hand, maintained t h a t since the defendant did not deposit t h e amount of i n t e r e s t on the judgment along with the judgment, the s t a t u t e was not s a t i s f i e d and the i n t e r e s t did not terminate. Defendant conceded t h a t it had been previously agreed t h a t i n t e r e s t should run from February 10, 1971. The court ruled t h a t p l a i n t i f f should receive i n t e r e s t from February 10, 1971 through May 24, 1971, and l a t e r overruled p l a i n t i f f ' s objections t o the court deducting ten percent f o r Herbert Resner's contributory negligence. O n June 21, 1971, f i n a l judgment f o r $91,740.49, plus costs and i n t e r e s t was entered by the court. P l a i n t i f f appeals from t h a t f i n a l judgment and a l l r e l a t e d rulings. The basic issue here is whether the t r i a l court was correct i n granting defendant's motion f o r entry of judgment, I n granting the motion, the court recomputed the jury's award, reducing i t considerably. A t the hearing on p l a i n t i f f ' s motion t o amend, May 28, 1971, the court indicated t h a t the reason f o r not using the f i v e percent figure deduced by the jury t o be a reasonable I I figure f o r determining future wage increases was t h a t a s a matter of law * 9~ the question of i n f l a t i o n is speculative, conjectural, uncertain, and is an improper element of damages # , , , , , " " ".I' W e hold the t r i a l court was i n e r r o r i n granting de- fendant's motion. The jury was allowed t o consider extensive expert testimony on the subject of future wage increases. D r . Heliker t e s t i f i e d a t length concerning future wage increases. Based on h i s appraisal of past economic h i s t o r y of t h i s country, he indicated why wages and prices w i l l continue t o r i s e i n the future: lIJc L . 5: because prices have been increasing, the value of money has been decreasing o r declining. It i s necessary t o pay higher wages i n order t o maintain purchasing power and because output per man hour has been increased s t e a d i l y , you see * * * it [man's productivity] has been r i s i n g the e n t i r e period very s t e a d i l y a t a steady r a t e . A t the present time, it i s r i s i n g around about 3 percent per year, which means t h a t even i f prices didn't increase a t a l l , t h a t wages would tend t o r i s e about 3 percent per year simply because labor i s more active. It turns out more per man hour, so it i s possible t o pay higher wages. Two reasons why wages w i l l go up i s because productivity in- creases and they go up a l s o because i t i s necessary t h a t they go up, prices go up, I I This Court, a s well a s others, has allowed t h e testimony of actuaries and economists t o produce testimony on future earning capacity, recognizing t h a t such testimony removes considerable speculation and conjecture from the jury's deliberation, Krohmer v, Dahl, 145 Mont. 491, 495, 402 P.2d 979; Scruggs v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, 320 F.Supp. 1248, 1251; Magill v. Westinghouse E l e c t r i c Corporation, 327 F.Supp. 1097, 1105. The jury determined t h a t f i v e percent was a reasonable figure t o determine future wage increases. It apparently accepted D r . ~ e l i k e r ' s testimony i n f u l l on t h a t point, which it had a r i g h t t o do. Defendant did not produce expert testimony demon- s t r a t i n g a d i f f e r e n t figure t o be more appropriate. D r . Heliker explained how he arrived a t the f i v e percent figure: ''I?ow actually i f you add together the r a t e s of increase of prices and productivity i n post-war periods, post-second World War period, you add them together, you would get j u s t about exactly the r a t e of increase of wages t h a t we have had over t h i s period since the second World War and increased prices between 1 and a h a l f t o 2 percent, much higher a t the present time. Over t h a t whole period, it has averaged somewhere around 1 and a half t o 2 percent. Productivity has increased a t somewhere around 3 t o 3 and a h a l f percent. '"ow i f you add those two things together and you get j u s t about exactly the r a t e of increase c ~ r o m wages, about 5 percent o r a l i t t l e more. 11 D r . Heliker's computations were extensive and involved, but e s s e n t i a l l y he said: "* fc * here i s what happened i n the past and, a s f a r a s I can see, t h i s same thing i s going t o , . happen i n the future. + C +C "'I A t the same time D r . Heliker predicted a f i v e percent wage growth r a t e , he foresaw f i v e percent t o be a reasonable discount r a t e . Although the wage growth r a t e and the discount r a t e were both f i v e percent, the figures were arrived a t independently. I n selecting the f i v e percent figure, D r . Heliker rejected the h i s t o r i c a l four percent figure used a s a discount r a t e . As a r e s u l t , the wage growth r a t e equaled the discount race, thereby canceling each other. O f necessity, the e f f e c t would have been t h a t the jury's special verdict would only be reduced by Resner's ten percent contributory negligence. How- ever, the t r i a l judge's ruling a f t e r the special verdict was returned t h a t i n f l a t i o n was speculative and not a proper element of damages, removed the cancellation e f f e c t . The judgment ignored the f i v e percent future wage growth r a t e , but used the f i v e percent discount r a t e . Defendant repeatedly asserted i n i t s motion f o r entry of judgment and i n i t s b r i e f before t h i s Court, t h a t future wage increases a r e speculative and conjectural. This i s not enough. This Court's function i n a Federal ~ r n ~ l o ~ e r s ' L i a b i l i t y Act case i s c l e a r . I n Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653, 66 S.Ct. 740, 90 L.Ed 916, 923, a Federal Employers' L i a b i l i t y case, the United States Supreme Court said: I I It i s no answer to say t h a t the jury's verdict involved speculation and conjecture. Whenever f a c t s are i n dispute or the evidence i s such t h a t Fair-minded men may draw d i f f e r e n t inferences, a measure of speculation and conjecture i s required on the part of those whose duty i t i s t o s e t t l e the dispute by choosing what seems t o them t o be he most reasonable inference. Only when there i s a complete absence of probative f a c t s t o support the conclusion reached does a reversible e r r o r appear. But where f : 9 : there i s an evidentiary basis f o r the jury's v e r d i c t , the jury i s f r e e t o discard o r disbelieve whatever f a c t s a r e inconsistent with i t s conclusion. And the appellate c o u r t ' s function i s exhausted when t h a t evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it being immaterial t h a t the court might draw a con- t r a r y inference or f e e l t h a t another conclusion i s more reasonable." (Emphasis added). Here, the evidentiary basis f o r determining the discount r a t e and the future wage growth r a t e i s apparent t o us, and most certainly it was t o the jury. Furthermore, the testimony of D r . Heliker was not the only evidentiary basis on which the jury could make i t s award, There was other evidence equally a s convinchg. For example, c e r t a i n wage agreements, not yet finalized a t the date of t r i a l , per- taining t o contracts between the Brotherhood of Maintenance of W a y Employees and Burlington Northern Railway, were introduced i n t o evidence. The wage increases i n those contracts have now been scheduled and indicate substantial wage growth over even a short period of time. Such evidence offered the jury an evidentiary basis f o r i t s decision, independent of D r . ~ e l i k e r ' s testimony. It would be s u f f i c i e n t t o reverse the t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on the b a s i s of Lavender alone. However, since both p l a i n t i f f and defendant r a i s e issues concerning future wage increases, we s h a l l determine them. W e a r e aware t h a t federal law governs damages i n a Federal ~ m p l o ~ e r s ' L i a b i l i t y Act case. Further, a s defendant pointed out, the United States Supreme Court held i n Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company v. Kelly, 241 U. S. 485, 4-91, l Ifc - ik t h a t when future payments or other pecuniary benefits are t o be anticipated, the verdict should be made upon the basis of t h e i r present value only. 1 1 Defendant r e l i e d heavily on Kelly and on the more recent case of Sleeman v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, 414 F.2d 305, 307, wherein the court said: "To date [the Kelly case] has not been amended or overruled, and i t was error t o f a i l t o apply it t o the computation of future earnings. ' 1 However, there t h a t court went on t o point out: "As t o the inflationary trend o f f s e t , t h i s record provides no evidentiary b a s i s f o r the decision of the D i s t r i c t Judge." (Emphasis added). That cannot be said i n the i n s t a n t case; c l e a r l y , there was an e v i d e n ~ i a r y basis f o r the jury's finding of f i v e percent t o be a reasonable r a t e of increase i n future wages. Therefore, we find Sleeman not applicable. W e a r e not persuaded by the cases c i t e d by defendant holding f u t u r e wage growth a s speculative. I n Scruggs v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, 320 F.Supp. 1248, 1250, 1251, a Federal Employers' L i a b i l i t y Act case c i t e d by p l a i n t i f f , the opposite point of view i s taken. There the court said: "Courts have s p l i t on the question whether j u r i e s should be allowed t o consider future trends i n the purchasing power of money. "The question before the jury was the pecuniary l o s s which would be suffered by the p l a i n t i f f and her son i n the future. The probability of increases i n decedent's income was c e r t a i n l y relevant t o t h a t issue. It seems unlikely t h a t t h e i r conclusion w i l l be any l e s s v a l i d from having heard the testimony objected t o , and they may be much more correct than otherwise. I n f l a t i o n i s a topic of almost universal discussion and it seems improbable t h a t the jury could avoid taking i t i n t o account even i n the absence of any testimony about i t . The defendant cross-examined D r . Sandridge and a l s o argued i t s analysis of the trends, which the jury apparently did not accept. Each day j u r i e s a r e required t o assess damages f o r future pain and suffering, which a r e a l s o somewhat speculative, and the court believes t h a t the defendant was not unfairly prejudiced by the admission of D r . sandridge's testimony. I I W e find the s i t u a t i o n i n Scruggs and the i n s t a n t case t o be analogous. Also, we find further support f o r allowing the j u r y ' s determination t o stand undiminished i n Grunenthal v. Long Island K.Co., 393 U.S. 156, 89 S.Ct. 331, 21 L ed 2d 309, 312, 313. There, i n the original action, 292 F.Supp. 813, 815, the p l a i n t i f f moved t o amend the ad damnum clause of the complaint t o increase it i n conformity with the higher verdict rendered by the jury. I n granting the motion, the judge indicated there was a likelihood, on the b a s i s of the evidence presented, t h a t the discount r a t e may be setoff by future increases. As i n the i n s t a n t case, the t e s t i - nloi-iy went unrefuted. I n a 2 t o 1 decision, the court of appeals remanded the case f o r a new t r i a l unless the p l a i n t i f f agreed t o accept a reduction i n the amount of the award. Grunenthal v. Long Island R.Co., 388 F.2d 480,484. The United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, agreed with the d i s t r i c t court decision and reversed the court of appeals. Judge Brennan, delivering the opinion f o r the court, noted t h a t the t r i a l judge considered the p e t i t i o n e r ' s present salary "plus l i k e l y increases over a l i f e expectancy of 27.5 years" and then went on t o say: "The t r i a l judge 9 ; J ; -?; appraised the evidence on future earnings a s s u f f i c i e n t t o support an award of $150,000 f o r loss of future wages i n l i g h t of the I convincing testimony not refuted J ; demonstrating the steady wage increases i n recent time f o r work equivalent t o t h a t rendered by p l a i n t i f f , and the strong likelihood t h a t similar increases would con- t inue . I " W e cannot say t h a t the t r i a l judge's view t h a t the jury might properly have awarded $150,000 for loss of future earnings i s without support i n the evidence. I I The court more than t a c i t l y approved a calculated and expert investigation of future wage increases t o be a proper and neces- sary element i n awarding future damages. To do otherwise i s t o ignore r e a l i t y . Here, defendant would have t h i s Court take the position of an o s t r i c h with h i s head i n the sand. Economic r e a l i t y requires us t o consider not only what the p l a i n t i f f i s t o receive i n theory, but i n f a c t . Abstract r u l e s of law a r e of l i t t l e com- f o r t t o a p l a i n t i f f whose i n j u r i e s remain unrequited. The United States Supreme Court has recognized t h a t where competent expert testimony supported by mathematical data i s presented concerning future damages, more c e r t a i n t y i s added t o the jury's deliberation. In Krohmer v. Dahl, 145 Mont. 491, 496, 402 P.2d 979, t h i s I I Court recognized t h a t the testimony of a s p e c i a l i s t [ i n economics] presented the jury a reasonable basis llpvn which ilo -.sti~naLe with some degree of c e r t a i n t y the probable future earnings of the 1 1 deceased. In Krohmer, the Court c i t e d with approval the N e w Nexico case of Turrietta v. Wyche, 54 N.M, 5 , 212 P.2d 1041, 1047, 11 wherein it was said the probability of i t s [a man's future earning capacity] increase or decrease i n the future ought t o be admitted." I f it i s admitted, it ought t o be considered by the jury. Surely here, the defendant had a s much opportunity t o r e f u t e the future wage increase of a r a i l r o a d section hand a s the p l a i n t i f f had the opportunity t o prove it. The Alaska Supreme Court i n a recent non-Federal Employers' L i a b i l i t y Act case, Beaulieu v. E l l i o t t , (Alaska 1967), 434 P.2d 665, 671, considered the subject of future wage increase: "Annual i n f l a t i o n a t a varying r a t e i s and has been with us for many years. There i s no reason t o expect that it w i l l not be with us i n the future. This r a t e : ~ f depreciation o f f s e t s the i n t e r e s t t h a t could be 1 earned on government bonds and many other safe' in- vestments. As a r e s u l t the p l a i n t i f f , who through no f a u l t of h i s own i s given h i s future earnings re- duced t o present value must, i n order t o r e a l i z e h i s f u l l earnings and not be penalized by reduction of future earnings t o present value, invest h i s money i n dnter r i s e s , other than those which a r e considered I : ' s a f e investments, which promise a return i n i n t e r e s t Jr dividends greater than the o f f s e t t i n g r a t e of annual inflation. I I no There can belquestion t h a t the award i n the i n s t a n t case was a generous one, but not so generous a s t o take i t out of the realm of p o s s i b i l i t y presented by the evidence. It i s not f o r t h i s Court t o determine the award t o be given t o p l a i n t i f f , but only whether the jury had a reasonable b a s i s , supported by the evidence, t o award the sum. W e believe the jury had t h a t basis. P l a i n t i f f contends defendant's f a i l u r e t o object t o c e r t a i n j u r y instructions waived the defendant's r i g h t t o l a t e r complain. The specific instructions referred t o were (1) Instruction No. 26, regarding what the jury might consider i n awarding damages, and (2) Instruction No. 34, the special verdict form. Defendant awaited the jury's verdict before asserting, i n defendant's motion for entry of judgment, t h a t the jury should not have been allowed t o speculate on future wage increases and t h a t the special interrogatories were improperly worded. It i s fundamental t h a t f a i l u r e t o object t o the giving of instructions a t t r i a l precludes r a i s i n g the issue on appeal. In t h i s case defendant raised the issue t o the t r i a l judge a f t e r the jury had rendered i t s verdict. W e cannot allow defendant t o wager on the outcome of the jury's deliberation before availing i t s e l f of the proper procedural remedies. Since the objection cannot be raised on appeal, then, likewise, i t cannot be raised a t the p o s t - t r i a l level. P l a i n t i f f r a i s e s the issue of i n t e r e s t on the judgment contending t h a t since defendant's deposit i n t o the bank account did not include the i n t e r e s t from February 10, 1971, a s agreed, then the deposit did not s a t i s f y the s t a t u t e and i n t e r e s t con- tinued t o run. The s t a t u t e , section 58-423, R.C.M. 1947, reads: I I A n obligation f o r the payment of money i s ex- tinguished by a due o f f e r of payment, i f the amount i s immediately deposited i n the name of the c r e d i t o r , with some bank of deposit within t h i s s t a t e , of good r e u t e , and notice thereof i s ~ i v e n t o the creditor. R ? l a i n t i f f r e l i e s on the word obligation, implying t h a t i t s d e i i n i t i o n includes a l l i n t e r e s t t o the date of deposit. Plain- t i f f had, p r i o r t o the date of deposit, refused tender of the de- posited amount on the same ground--that i n t e r e s t from February 10, 1371 was not included. P l a i n t i f f , however, i s merely arguing r h e t o r i c , Uefendant i n good f a i t h made an attempt a t substantial compliance with the s t a t u t e i n order t h a t future i n t e r e s t would not continue t u increase. The t r i a l c o u r t ' s ruling i n the f i r s t amended judgment, that the defendant pay i n t e r e s t on the $91,740.49, from February 10, 1971 t o Nay 24, 1971, s h a l l remain in effecc, The r e s u l t i s t h a t a l l i n t e r e s t on t h a t amount terminated on May 24, 1971, by the terms of the s t a t u t e and by order of the t r i a l court. Our decision r e i n s t a t e s the jury's award of $175,000, l e s s ten percent f o r Resner's contributory negligence, resulting i n a judg- ment of $157,500. The r u l e s f o r i n t e r e s t on judgments were correctly stated by the California Supreme Court i n Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo, 55 Cal.2d 439, 1 1 Cal.Rptr. 580, 582, 360 P.2d 76: "A judgment bears l e g a l i n t e r e s t from the date of i t s entry i n the t r i a l court even though i t i s s t i l l subject t o d i r e c t attack. 9 : * When a judgment i s modified upon appeal, whether upward o r downward, the new sum draws i n t e r e s t from the date of entry of the o r i g i n a l order, not from the date of the new judgment. ; I < 9; - f . db O n the other hand, when a judgment i s reversed on appeal the new award subsequently entered by the c r i a l court can bear i n t e r e s t only from the date of entry of such new judgment. 1 I The second r u l e enunciated i s applicable here. This cause i s returned t o the d i s t r i c t court t o compute the i n t e r e s t t o be granted i n accordance with the law, not in- consistent with t h i s decision. / / y s o c i a t e J u s t i c e ' / Chief J u s t i c e ................................. Associate Justices. M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles dissenting: L dissent. The majority opinion s t a t e s thac the jury rerurned a verdict i n the amount of $175,000. This is not 1-egally accurate. Rather, the jury answered a special verdict 4 question i n t h a t amount. And, a s the t r i a l court carefully pointed out i n i t s closing remarks, the jury was t o answer only Che specific questions posed i n the special verdict. The court, n o t the jury, was t o make the determination of f i n a l damages and enter judgment accordingly. A s provided i n the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, i f a matter i s submitted t o the jury i n the form of a special verdict an issue not specifically included i n the special verdict may be decided by the court, and each party i s deemed t o have waived i t s r i g h t t o t r i a l by jury on t h a t specific issue. The vice of the majority opinion i s t h a t it approves speculative, highly speculative, i n f l a t i o n trends f o r t h i r t y years a s t o future wage increases. Speculation on the future of r a i l r o a d s , much l e s s the future of jobs and wage increases, i s a never-never land. Except f o r one Federal D i s t r i c t Court case, Scruggs v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, 320 F.Supp. 1248, I have been unable t o find any Federal Employers' L i a b i 1 i . t ~ Act case t o support the majority opinion. I believe the correct law t o be t h a t s t a t e d by the 6th Circuit i n 1969 i n Sleeman v. Chesapeake 6 Ohio Railway Company, 414 F.2d 305,308, where t h a t court sai.d: I 1 Nor do we encourage the t r i a l courts of our c i r c u i t t o explore such speculative influences on future damages a s i n f l a t i o n and deflation. "Of course, the nation's economic h l s t o r y since the 1930's would appear t o make the use of present wages a s the standard for l o s s of fu- ture earnings somewhat unfair t o p l a i n t i f f s . 8ut a s t o the future, the i n f l a t i o n versus de- Elation debate rages inconclusively a t the highest policy l e v e l s of our government, i n national e l e c t o r a l campaigns, i n learned eco- 110mi.c journals and i s exemplified in the daily syrations of the stock markets. The debate seems unlikely t o be resolved s a t i s f a c t o r i l y i n one personal tnjury t r i a l . And i r t e s t i - monial resolution of t h i s factor bearing on the future i s attempted, the door i s opened t o similarly speculative and debatable o f f s e t s tending i n other directions. See McWeeney v. N e w York N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d C i r . 1960). If In Sleeman the court found the following quotation from 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts, 5 25.11, t o be applicable: 11 1 Future trends i n the value of money a r e neces- s a r i l y unlcnown and so always render such damages speculative i n a way we cannot escape. I f the estimates represent a s t r a i g h t - l i n e projection of present living c o s t s , they w i l l be frustrated by fluctuations e i t h e r way. I f prophecy of change i s heeded, f r u s t r a t i o n w i l l follow i f no change, or the opposite change, occurs. When courts have c o n ~ c ~ o u s l y grappled with the problem they have e i t h e r found a l l prophecy too speculative and so, perforce, have taken the equally speculative course of b e t t i n g on a continuance of the s t a t u s quo; o r they have made intuitive and not always very wise judgments t h a t present conditions repre- sent a departure from some imaginary norm t o which they thinlc we s h a l l rapidly return. It i s not a t a l l c l e a r t h a t courts would be willing t o hear experts on the matter, o r t h a t they would get much r e a l help i f they did. For the most p a r t che problem--which i s inevitably present i n every case of future loss--is not analyzed and the pres- ent value of money i s assumed t o be the proper basis. 1 I 1 Sleeman was confirmed by the 6th Circuit in 1970 i n Peticion of United States Steel Corporation, 436 F.2d 1256, 1280: "It i s equally well s e t t l e d i n t h i s Circuit t h a t the prospect of a future decline i n the purchasing power of the d o l l a r may not be used t o o f f s e t the reduction t o present value. I 1 L would affirm the judgment. ~ s s o c i b d e J u s t i c e .