Title: Westmas v. Selective Insurance Co. of South Carolina
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2015AP001039
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 7, 2018

2018 WI 12 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP1039 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
John Y. Westmas Individually and as Special 
Administrator of the Estate of Jane L. Westmas 
and Jason Westmas, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Creekside Tree Service, Inc., 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
Selective Insurance Company of South Carolina 
and ABC Insurance Company, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 372 Wis. 2d 683, 889 N.W.2d 178 
PDC No:  2016 WI App 92 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 7, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 3, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth 
 
JUDGE: 
Phillip A. Koss 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
R.G. BRADLEY, J. and KELLY, J. (coauthor) 
dissent (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, J. did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Benjamin A. Sparks, Patrick W. Brennan, Sarah Fry 
Bruch, and Crivello Carlson S.C., Milwaukee.  There was an oral 
argument by Patrick W. Brennan. 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there was a brief filed by 
Christopher A. Duesing, Susan R. Tyndall, and Habush Habush & 
Rottier, S.C., Waukesha.  There was an oral argument by Susan 
Tyndall and Cristopher Duesing.  
 
 
 
2018 WI 12
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP1039 
(L.C. No.  2013CV813) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John Y. Westmas Individually and as Special 
Administrator of the Estate of Jane L. Westmas 
and Jason Westmas, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Creekside Tree Service, Inc., 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
Selective Insurance Company of South Carolina 
and ABC Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 7, 2018 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a published decision of the court of appeals.  
Affirmed.   
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   Jane Westmas was 
killed when a tree branch cut by Creekside Tree Service, Inc. 
("Creekside") fell on her while she and her adult son were 
walking on a public path through the property of Conference 
Point Center.  Conference Point had contracted with Creekside to 
trim and remove trees from its property.  Jane's husband, John 
No. 
20151039 
 
 
2 
 
Westmas, and her son, Jason Westmas, sued Creekside and its 
insurer, 
Selective 
Insurance 
Company 
of 
South 
Carolina.1  
Creekside moved for summary judgment on the ground that the 
recreational immunity statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.52 (2013-14),2 
barred claims against it.  The circuit court3 granted Creekside 
summary judgment, and the court of appeals reversed.  Westmas v. 
Selective Ins. Co. of S.C., 2016 WI App 92, 372 Wis. 2d 683, 889 
N.W.2d 178. 
¶2 
We review two issues.  First, we consider whether 
Creekside, as the entity hired by Conference Point to complete a 
tree-trimming project, is protected from liability as an "agent" 
of Conference Point under Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(b).  Section 
895.52(2)(b) provides that "no owner and no officer, employee or 
agent of an owner is liable for the death of, any injury to, or 
any death or injury caused by, a person engaging in a 
                                                 
1 Creekside and Selective Insurance brought a third-party 
action against Conference Point Center and its insurer, West 
Bend Mutual Insurance Company, alleging that Conference Point 
was a joint tortfeasor.  The Westmases subsequently filed a 
direct action against both Conference Point and West Bend.  
Conference Point and West Bend moved for summary judgment, 
asserting that the recreational immunity statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52, barred claims against Conference Point.  The Westmases 
did not oppose the motion.  The circuit court granted Conference 
Point and West Bend's motion for summary judgment, dismissing 
all claims against them.  Conference Point is not a party to 
this review. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 The Honorable Phillip A. Koss of Walworth County presided. 
No. 
20151039 
 
 
3 
 
recreational activity on the owner's property."  The second 
issue is whether Creekside is entitled to recreational immunity 
as an occupier of the Conference Point property, such that it 
was a statutory "owner" of the property at the time of the 
accident.  "Owner" is defined to include "[a] person . . . that 
owns, leases or occupies property."  § 895.52(1)(d)1.   
¶3 
As to the first issue, we conclude that Creekside was 
not an agent of Conference Point because Conference Point had 
neither control of, nor the right to control, the details of 
Creekside's work, including the acts that caused injury to Jane 
Westmas.  We further conclude that Creekside was not an occupier 
of Conference Point's property because its presence on the 
property exhibited no "degree of permanence, as opposed to mere 
use." 
¶4 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
Conference Point Center is a faith-based youth camp 
and conference center located on the shores of Lake Geneva in 
southeastern Wisconsin.  With the exception of a shoreline path, 
Conference Point's property is not open to the public.  In early 
2012, Conference Point requested bids to perform tree-trimming 
work on its property, which included pruning and removing trees 
No. 
20151039 
 
 
4 
 
located along the shoreline path.  Creekside was one of the 
contractors who bid on the project.4 
¶6 
Before preparing its bid, Jonathan Moore, Creekside's 
sales/consultant and foreman, met with Brian Gaasrud, the vice 
chairperson of Conference Point's board, to conduct a walk-
through of the property and to discuss Conference Point's 
project.  Gaasrud did not provide plan specifications from which 
to bid, but instead provided a verbal description of the project 
and showed Moore the areas requiring work, including the public 
shoreline path.  Gaasrud testified at his deposition that he 
described to each prospective bidder "the vision and the concept 
of what we wanted to accomplish, the thinning, the repairing, 
the pruning."  Gaasrud informed each bidder that Conference 
Point had safety signs available if the contractor wanted to use 
them.  Gaasrud had no training, experience, or special knowledge 
regarding how a tree-trimming company should handle safety 
issues.  He testified at his deposition that he expected the 
contractor would conduct itself in a safe manner "follow[ing] 
normal procedure, whatever [the] procedure is for tree services 
when they're cutting, to create a safe perimeter."  Gaasrud left 
the "means and methods" by which trees would be pruned or 
removed to each contractor.  
                                                 
4 Creekside had contracted with Conference Point in the 
past.  That separate contract is not relevant to the issues now 
before us. 
No. 
20151039 
 
 
5 
 
¶7 
In its February 7, 2012 bid, Creekside stated that it 
would "provide labor, material, equipment and incidentals 
required for the completion of the above" tree-trimming.  The 
bid described, in general terms, tree-trimming that Creekside 
would complete in several locations of Conference Point's 
property.  For the east shoreline location where Jane Westmas 
was injured, the bid provided:  
*Removal of 10 dead or hazardous trees, on hill or 
overhanging shoreline path, to grade level.   
*Pruning to reduce weight for trees overhanging 
water's 
edge 
or 
to 
improve 
structure/reduce 
competition.   
*Remove large deadwood overhanging path from canopy 
trees (4" diameter and larger).   
*Prune canopy trees to thin and/or reduce weight for 
additional 
sunlight, 
focusing 
on 
shoreline 
trees 
between Sunrise and Chapin Houses.   
The bid provided no details about how these tasks were to be 
accomplished. 
¶8 
Conference Point did not initially hire Creekside, but 
when the company Conference Point had hired unexpectedly quit, 
Creekside 
was 
brought 
in 
to 
complete 
the 
tree-trimming, 
including the portions along the public shoreline path.  At that 
time, 
Gaasrud 
and 
Creekside 
owner 
Joel 
Strauss 
modified 
Creekside's bid by reducing the scope of the tree-trimming so it 
would 
come 
within 
Conference 
Point's 
remaining 
budget.  
Creekside's February 7, 2012 bid is the only writing that 
describes 
the 
tree-trimming 
services 
Creekside 
agreed 
to 
provide.   
No. 
20151039 
 
 
6 
 
¶9 
Although Gaasrud knew Creekside would be working on 
the project, he was not aware of specific dates of work, nor did 
he have any knowledge of what was being done to block off the 
shoreline path or divert pedestrian traffic.  No one at 
Conference Point was assigned to check in with Creekside or to 
provide assistance to Creekside in any way.   
¶10 Moore testified at his deposition that he was the 
person responsible for training Creekside employees.  In 
general, once Creekside was hired for a tree-trimming project, 
Moore would take his crew to the job site, instruct them as to 
what needed to be done, pre-mark trees for removal, and identify 
trees that needed to be pruned.  Moore explained how he trained 
Creekside employees on safety: 
If you are working in a close proximity or over a 
sidewalk, we need to put cones in the sidewalk.  We 
need to put up some form of sign, or there needs to be 
a person in the sidewalk or path to stop either the 
person cutting the branch, the potential pedestrian, 
or both.  Specifically the pedestrians, but you would 
also need to get the attention of the person in the 
tree or -- or the person that's doing some form of 
work.  
¶11 On about May 8 or 9, 2012, Moore and three other 
Creekside employees began work on the Conference Point project.  
Moore and the crew leader walked to various portions of the 
property to discuss specifics and safety concerns, including the 
need to watch out for foot traffic on the shoreline path.  Moore 
testified at his deposition that Creekside was told no detours 
or barricades on the path were permitted.  Regarding the path, 
Moore testified: 
No. 
20151039 
 
 
7 
 
We had talked about pedestrians from the time the work 
began on the path.  There had been already issues with 
pedestrians on the path where we had redirected 
them . . . . 
In a given instance, there was a gentleman that 
was -- I think he was running a section of the path, 
and I asked him to go back.  He was upset.  I had told 
him, "I'm sorry, it's not safe for you to progress." 
. . . . 
The day that I was there working with them the 
majority of the day, . . . I'm sure there was more 
than one pedestrian that was on the path . . . . 
¶12 Moore instructed Creekside employees to set up two 
orange traffic cones, one on each side of the path.  In 
addition, Creekside utilized its employees as spotters, who were 
assigned to warn and divert approaching pedestrians, and to halt 
the tree work if necessary.  Moore testified that even if 
Conference 
Point 
had 
taken 
steps 
to 
redirect 
or 
alert 
pedestrians, Creekside "still would have used cones in the path 
and a spotter . . . used our own protocol" to protect the public 
and Creekside employees.  Moore did not believe Creekside had 
the authority to shut down the path or detour pedestrians 
through Conference Point's private property. 
¶13 On May 10, 2012, Jane Westmas and her son, Jason 
Westmas, were walking on the public path that runs along 
Conference Point's east shoreline.  A tree branch cut by 
Creekside fell and hit Jane, causing severe injuries that 
resulted in her death.  Moore had marked the specific branch 
that hit Jane for removal and noted it for its dangerous 
position.  The location of this branch was particularly 
No. 
20151039 
 
 
8 
 
hazardous due to the overhang of a nearby building, which 
obscured the views of both the pedestrian and the tree-cutter.  
Moore testified he "show[ed] [the crew leader] the branch that 
was to be removed . . . [and] explained to him the necessity to 
have someone in the path watching for potential pedestrians 
. . . ." 
¶14 Creekside used no barriers or caution tape to warn 
pedestrians.  At the time of the accident, Moore was not present 
at the site, although he had noted in the days prior that 
pedestrians had walked up to or into the work zone.  Moore 
agreed that two spotters would have been better.   
¶15 John 
Westmas, 
individually 
and 
as 
special 
administrator for the Estate of Jane L. Westmas, and Jason 
Westmas, sued Creekside, alleging that Creekside's negligence 
was a cause of Jane's death.  The Westmases further alleged 
that, as a result of watching his mother die, Jason suffered 
severe and permanent emotional distress.  Before the circuit 
court, Creekside prevailed on summary judgment on the ground 
that the recreational immunity statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.52, 
barred claims against it.  The court of appeals reversed.5  We 
granted review and now affirm the court of appeals.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
                                                 
5 Westmas v. Selective Ins. Co. of S.C., 2016 WI App 92, 372 
Wis. 2d 683, 889 N.W.2d 178. 
No. 
20151039 
 
 
9 
 
¶16 This case requires us to review summary judgment that 
denied dismissal of John and Jason Westmas's claims against 
Creekside.  We review a grant or denial of summary judgment 
independently, applying the same standard employed by the 
circuit court and court of appeals, while benefitting from their 
discussions.  Dufour v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 2016 WI 
59, ¶12, 370 Wis. 2d 313, 881 N.W.2d 678 (citing Preisler v. 
Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 135, ¶16, 360 Wis. 2d 129, 857 
N.W.2d 136).  Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is 
no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party has 
established his or her right to judgment as a matter of law. 
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2); Wadzinski v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 
WI 75, ¶10, 342 Wis. 2d 311, 818 N.W.2d 819.   
¶17 Here, 
the 
material 
facts 
are 
not 
disputed.  
Accordingly, we focus on whether the application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52 to undisputed facts bars the Westmases's claims.  
Statutory interpretation and application are questions of law 
that we review independently, while benefitting from the 
analyses of the circuit court and the court of appeals.  
Highland Manor Assoc. v. Bast, 2003 WI 152, ¶8, 268 Wis. 2d 1, 
672 N.W.2d 709.  
B.  Statutory Interpretation 
1.  General principles 
¶18 The 
purpose 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
is 
to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be properly 
applied.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 
No. 
20151039 
 
 
10 
 
2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Statutory 
interpretation begins with the language of the statute.  Id., 
¶45.  "If the words chosen for the statute exhibit a 'plain, 
clear statutory meaning,' without ambiguity, the statute is 
applied according to the plain meaning of the statutory terms." 
State v. Grunke, 2008 WI 82, ¶22, 311 Wis. 2d 439, 752 
N.W.2d 769 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46).  However, 
where the statute is "capable of being understood by reasonably 
well-informed persons in two or more senses[,]" the statute is 
ambiguous.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47. 
¶19 A statutory provision must be read "in the context in 
which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in 
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related 
statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results."  Id., ¶46.  An interpretation should give effect to 
every word.  Id.  Statutory purpose is important in discerning 
the plain meaning of a statute.  Id., ¶48.  Therefore, in 
construing a statute, we favor a construction that fulfills the 
purpose of the statute over one that defeats statutory purpose.  
Cty. of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶34, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 
N.W.2d 571.   
¶20 If we determine that the language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52 is ambiguous, we may then consult extrinsic sources, 
such as legislative history.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶50.  
However, even where the statutory language bears a plain 
meaning, "we nevertheless may consult extrinsic sources 'to 
No. 
20151039 
 
 
11 
 
confirm or verify a plain-meaning interpretation.'"  Grunke, 311 
Wis. 2d 439, ¶22 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51). 
2.  Wisconsin Stat. § 895.52 
¶21 In 1983, the Wisconsin legislature enacted Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52, which dramatically expanded liability protection for 
landowners 
who 
open 
their 
private 
property 
for 
public 
recreational use.  Section 895.52(2) provides: 
(2) No Duty; Immunity from Liability.  (a) Except 
as provided in subs. (3) to (6), no owner and no 
officer, employee or agent of an owner owes to any 
person who enters the owner's property to engage in a 
recreational activity: 
1.  A 
duty 
to 
keep 
the 
property 
safe 
for 
recreational activities. 
2.  A duty to inspect the property, except as 
provided under s. 23.115(2). 
3.  A 
duty 
to 
give 
warning 
of 
an 
unsafe 
condition, use or activity on the property. 
(b) Except as provided in subs. (3) to (6), no 
owner and no officer, employee, or agent of an owner 
is liable for the death of, any injury to, or any 
death or injury caused by, a person engaging in a 
recreational activity on the owner's property.[6] 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.52 replaced a previous recreational 
immunity statute, Wis. Stat. § 29.68 (1963), which had been 
interpreted to grant immunity only to landowners whose land was 
used for activities typically reliant on land "in its natural 
undeveloped state."  See Laesch v. L&H Indus. Ltd., 161 Wis. 2d 
887, 900, 469 N.W.2d 655 (Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that 
§ 29.68 did not grant immunity to a contractor working to 
deconstruct an abandoned railroad right-of-way because neither 
the activity, which was riding an ATV, nor the modified 
condition of the land, fell within the purview of the statute). 
No. 
20151039 
 
 
12 
 
¶22 The legislative purpose of the statute is stated in 
1983 Wis. Act. 418, § 1.  The session law provides: 
The legislature intends by this act to limit the 
liability of property owners toward others who use 
their 
property 
for 
recreational 
activities 
under 
circumstances in which the owner does not derive more 
than a minimal pecuniary benefit. 
"As our cases have explained, 'the impetus for this law is the 
continual shrinkage of the public's access to recreational land 
in the ever more populated modern world.'"  Roberts v. T.H.E. 
Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, ¶28, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492 
(citing Hall v. Turtle Lake Lions Club, 146 Wis. 2d 486, 489, 
431 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1988)).  The legislature explained that 
the statute is to be "liberally construed in favor of property 
owners to protect them from liability."  See Ervin v. City of 
Kenosha, 
159 
Wis. 2d 
464, 
476, 
464 
N.W.2d 
654 
(1991).  
Accordingly, courts have interpreted the protections of Wis. 
Stat. § 895.52 expansively. 
¶23 Generally, "owners" under Wis. Stat. § 895.52 do not 
owe a duty of care to keep their properties safe for entry or 
recreational use.7  See Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 
Wis. 2d 624, 635, 547 N.W.2d 602 (1996).  Section 895.52(1)(d)1. 
                                                 
7 There are, of course, potential modifications to this 
premise, including where a landowner maliciously fails to warn 
against an unsafe condition on the property, of which the 
landowner was aware.  See Wis. Stat. § 895.52(6) (regarding 
private 
property 
owners); 
§ 895.52(3)(b) 
(regarding 
state 
immunity); § 895.52(4)(b) (regarding other governmental bodies); 
§ 895.52(5) (regarding nonprofit immunity). 
No. 
20151039 
 
 
13 
 
defines "owner" as "[a] person, including a governmental body or 
nonprofit organization, that owns, leases or occupies property."   
¶24 It is undisputed that while Jane and Jason Westmas 
were walking along the public path, they were engaging in a 
recreational 
activity 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.52(1)(g).8  It is also undisputed that Conference Point, a 
non-profit 
organization 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
26 
U.S.C. 
§ 501(c)(3), properly was granted summary judgment as an "owner" 
under § 895.52(1)(d)1.   
¶25 Because Creekside claims to be an agent of Conference 
Point, or in the alternative, an occupier that qualifies as a 
statutory owner for immunity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(d)1., 
we determine whether Creekside fits the statutory meaning of 
agent or, in the alternative, whether Creekside was a statutory 
occupier of recreational land such that it, too, is protected by 
the provisions of § 895.52.   
a.  Agency 
¶26 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.52 does not define agent or 
occupier.  We begin with determining the statutory meaning of 
agent as employed in § 895.52(2).  To do so, we employ the 
principles of statutory interpretation delineated above, wherein 
we examine the language, context, and scope of § 895.52.  State 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.52(1)(g) provides that recreational 
activity means "outdoor activity undertaken for the purpose of 
exercise, 
relaxation 
or 
pleasure, 
including 
practice 
or 
instruction in any such activity."  Subsection (1)(g) also lists 
32 examples of activities that come within the statute.  
No. 
20151039 
 
 
14 
 
v. Soto, 2012 WI 93, ¶20, 343 Wis. 2d 43, 817 N.W.2d 848 
(concluding that "the statutory context in which a term is used, 
including the language and structure of surrounding or closely 
related statutes, is often highly instructive in determining a 
term's meaning.").  As we do so, we determine whether "agent" 
has a plain and ordinary meaning, or whether it is ambiguous.  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶46-47. 
¶27 As we read Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(a) and (b), we note 
that agent is included in a list of those who may have immunity 
from liability, such as "officer, employee or agent of an 
owner."  Section 895.52(3), relating to liability for injuries 
sustained on state property, again uses agent in a listing of 
persons:  "officer, employee or agent of this state," as does 
§ 895.52(4) relating to liability of other governmental units.  
Section 895.52(5), which is one of our foci because it relates 
to nonprofit organizations, employs the same list:  "officers, 
employees or agents."    
¶28 An officer of a corporate entity "is under a fiduciary 
duty of loyalty, good faith and fair dealing in the conduct of 
corporate business."  Modern Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Tooling 
Specialists, Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 435, 442, 557 N.W.2d 835 (1996) 
(citing Racine v. Weisflog, 165 Wis. 2d 184, 190, 477 N.W.2d 326 
(Ct. App. 1991)).  An officer "is vested with policy-making 
authority or has the ability to make decisions which bind the 
company."  Modern Materials, 206 Wis. 2d at 444.    
No. 
20151039 
 
 
15 
 
¶29 An officer also may be an employee.  Those employees 
who are not officers may or may not have management functions 
that are performed for the employer, depending on the business 
structure of the employer.  See Burbank Grease Servs., LLC v. 
Sokolowski, 2006 WI 103, ¶3, 294 Wis. 2d 274, 717 N.W.2d 718.  
An employee, acting within the scope of his employment, may 
incur liability for his employer.  Milwaukee Transp. Servs., 
Inc. v. Family Dollar Stores of Wis., Inc., 2013 WI App 124, ¶8, 
351 Wis. 2d 170, 840 N.W.2d 132.   
¶30 An agent has a fiduciary relationship with his 
principal.  The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines "agency" 
as:  "the 
fiduciary 
relation 
which 
results 
from 
the 
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other 
shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent 
by the other so to act."  Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1(1) 
(1958).  A fiduciary relationship is a consensual relationship 
where the agent voluntarily places the interests of his 
principal before his own interests.  Zastrow v. Journal 
Commc'ns, Inc., 2006 Wis. 72, ¶28, 291 Wis. 2d 426, 718 N.W.2d 
51.  Under certain circumstances, an agent acting within the 
scope of his agency can bind his principal.  Arsand v. City of 
Franklin, 83 Wis. 2d 40, 48-49, 264 N.W.2d 579 (1978).   
¶31 An agent may be either an employee or an independent 
contractor.  Romero v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2016 WI App 59, 
¶39, 371 Wis. 2d 478, 885 N.W.2d 591 (citing Arsand, 83 Wis. 2d 
at 48-49).  An independent contractor is one "who contracts with 
No. 
20151039 
 
 
16 
 
another to do something for him but who is not controlled by the 
other nor subject to the other's right to control with respect 
to his physical conduct."  Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2(3) 
(1958).  "[A]n independent contractor may or may not be an 
agent."  Romero, 371 Wis. 2d 478, ¶40.  
This means that when an independent contractor has no 
fiduciary obligations to and is not subject to control 
by the principal, no agency relationship has formed.  
However, despite the lack of physical control over an 
independent contractor, an agency relationship may 
still exist when the fiduciary relationship has formed 
and the principal has control over certain activities. 
Id. (citation omitted).  Examples of independent contractors 
include "the attorney at law, the broker, the factor, the 
auctioneer, and other similar persons employed either for a 
single transaction or for a series of transactions . . . ."  
Arsand, 83 Wis. 2d at 48 (citing Meyers v. Matthews, 270 Wis. 
453, 467, 71 N.W.2d 368 (1955)).  They also are agents because 
they have a fiduciary relationship with their principal, who has 
the right to control their acts that are done within the scope 
of the agency.  Romero, 371 Wis. 2d 478, ¶42.   
¶32 Although the precise issue before us is one of first 
impression, we often have examined the scope of a principal's 
control of another when determining whether that person (or 
organization) is an agent of the principal.  As the court of 
appeals recently said, "[an] important factor in determining 
whether a person is an agent is the extent of control retained 
over the details of the work."  Id., ¶38 (citing Kablitz v. 
Hoeft, 25 Wis. 2d 518, 521, 131 N.W.2d 346 (1964)).    
No. 
20151039 
 
 
17 
 
¶33 In Romero, the court of appeals examined whether an 
employee of Badger State Auto Auction, Inc., who injured three 
men while driving a vehicle Badger State was preparing to 
auction for Fairview Auto, Inc., was an officer, agent, or 
employee of Fairview.  The court of appeals determined that the 
driver was not an agent of Fairview because, although Fairview 
exercised control over Badger State with respect to the terms 
for auctioning the vehicles, Fairview had no right to control 
the movement of vehicles which was the conduct that caused the 
harm.  Romero, 371 Wis. 2d 478, ¶42.   
¶34 In order to secure governmental immunity under Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(4), the governmental entity must have established 
reasonably precise standards of control for the task at issue 
and the person who is performing the task must be adhering to 
those standards 
at the time of the accident.  
Showers 
Appraisals, LLC v. Musson Bros., 2013 WI 79, ¶37, 350 Wis. 2d 
509, 835 N.W.2d 226.  However, absent "reasonably precise 
specifications" established by the governmental body, there 
could be neither control nor the right to control the conduct 
that caused the injury.  Id.     
¶35 In 
Kablitz 
v. 
Hoeft, 
we 
considered 
whether 
an 
orthopedic surgeon who had been retained by defendant insurance 
company's counsel as an independent contractor to examine the 
extent of plaintiff's injury, was an agent of the insurance 
company.  In concluding that he was not, we stated "[t]here was 
no proof [] that Farmers Mutual reserved any right to control 
No. 
20151039 
 
 
18 
 
the details of the examination or exerted any influence over 
such examination."  Kablitz, 25 Wis. 2d at 521.   
¶36 The above decisions demonstrate the basic principles 
of agency law in the State of Wisconsin.  To summarize, an agent 
is one who acts on behalf of and is subject to reasonably 
precise control by the principal for the tasks the person 
performs within the scope of the agency.  Whether an independent 
contractor is an agent is a fact-specific inquiry.  We therefore 
turn to the facts of the present case, and apply these 
principles accordingly. 
3.  Application 
¶37 It 
is 
evident 
from 
the 
record 
before 
us 
that 
Creekside's employees were not the employees of Conference Point 
and that Conference Point did not control or attempt to control 
the 
physical 
conduct 
of 
Creekside's 
employees. 
 
Rather, 
Creekside was an independent contractor, hired by Conference 
Point to complete tree-trimming work in identified locations on 
Conference Point's property.  To determine whether Creekside was 
the agent of Conference Point for the tree-cutting that caused 
the injury, we focus on the level of control that Conference 
Point either exerted or had the right to exert over the tree-
cutting task that caused the injury.  We give particular 
attention to whether the injury-causing conduct occurred when 
Creekside was following Conference Point's specific directions.   
¶38 We conclude that no facts were presented supportive of 
the conclusion that Conference Point either controlled or had 
No. 
20151039 
 
 
19 
 
the 
right 
to 
control 
the 
details 
of 
Creekside's 
work.  
Accordingly, Creekside was not Conference Point's agent within 
the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 895.52. 
¶39 The following undisputed facts support our conclusion.  
First, the written agreement between Conference Point and 
Creekside described the work to be done on the east shoreline 
where Jane was injured in general terms.  No means or methods 
were set out in regard to how "Removal of 10 dead or hazardous 
trees, on hill or overhanging shoreline path, to grade level" 
was to be accomplished, or in regard to how "Pruning to reduce 
weight for trees overhanging water's edge or to improve 
structure/reduce competition" were to be undertaken.   
¶40 Second, Gaasrud testified that he left the "means and 
methods" for conducting the tree-trimming, including any safety 
precautions, to Creekside.  Gaasrud had no training, experience, 
or knowledge regarding how a tree-trimming company should 
operate, and although he notified Creekside that the path was 
public, 
he 
testified 
at 
his 
deposition 
that 
monitoring 
pedestrian 
traffic 
was 
"[Creekside's] 
determination."  
Conference Point did not assign anyone to oversee Creekside's 
work, nor did Conference Point provide any tools, equipment, or 
assistance to Creekside.  Moreover, Gaasrud was not aware 
Creekside would be working on the day of the accident. 
¶41 The court of appeals correctly analyzed the undisputed 
material facts when it concluded that Creekside was not an agent 
of Conference Point:   
No. 
20151039 
 
 
20 
 
From the decision regarding whether or not to use a 
rope to bring down the branch that killed Jane, to 
where safety cones would be placed, to how "spotters" 
would be utilized, the record is clear that Creekside, 
not Conference Point, maintained control over the 
details of its work, particularly the actions that led 
to Jane's death. 
Westmas, 372 Wis. 2d 683, ¶21.   
¶42 These factors demonstrate that not only did Conference 
Point lack control over Creekside's tree-trimming, but it also 
lacked the right to control the details of Creekside's tree-
trimming.  In its analysis, the court of appeals discussed 
whether Conference Point had "the right to control the tasks 
performed 
by 
[Creekside] 
with 
'reasonably 
precise 
specifications.'"  Id., ¶16 (quoting Showers, 350 Wis. 2d 509, 
¶37).  While recognizing that an agent could be an independent 
contractor, the court of appeals correctly concluded that 
Creekside 
was 
not 
an 
agent 
of 
Conference 
Point 
because 
Conference Point did not control, or have the right to control, 
the means or methods of the work that caused the injury.  We 
agree with this conclusion.  With no background or knowledge on 
how to perform tree-trimming, Conference Point could not have 
controlled or had the right to control the methods of work 
including safety specifications employed for tree-trimming.  All 
Conference Point could do was describe the "vision and concept" 
of the project, which it did.  It was left to Creekside to 
decide 
the 
specifics 
of 
how 
the 
tree-trimming 
would 
be 
accomplished.   
¶43 Creekside contends that the court of appeals' decision 
will summarily deny agency status, and therefore immunity, to 
No. 
20151039 
 
 
21 
 
all independent contractors of a landowner who lacks employees 
with the expertise to control and supervise the details of the 
contractor's work.  This argument is unpersuasive.  As the court 
of appeals acknowledged, whether an independent contractor is an 
agent is a fact-bound inquiry.  Westmas, 372 Wis. 2d 683, ¶16.   
4.  Statutory "owner" 
¶44 We now turn to Creekside's alternate argument, namely, 
whether Creekside qualifies as a statutory owner because it 
occupied Conference Point's property within the meaning of Wis. 
Stat. § 895.52(1)(d)1.  Our decision in Roberts v. T.H.E. 
provides guidance for applying the term "occupies" within the 
recreational immunity context.   
¶45 In Roberts, plaintiff was injured when one of the 
lines tethering a hot air balloon to the ground snapped, causing 
the basket of the balloon to collide with Roberts, knocking her 
to the ground.  Roberts, 367 Wis. 2d 386, ¶10.  Roberts had been 
attending a charity event sponsored by Green Valley Enterprises 
and 
hosted 
on 
a 
shooting 
range 
owned 
by 
Beaver 
Dam 
Conservationists, LLC.  Id., ¶5.  Sundog Ballooning, LLC, was 
the owner and operator of the hot air balloon providing tethered 
rides at the event.  Id., ¶6.  On review, we considered whether 
Sundog had "occupied" the shooting range such that Sundog was a 
statutory owner and thereby entitled to recreational immunity 
under Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(d)1.   
¶46 We began our discussion in Roberts by acknowledging 
that the definition of "occupy" in the context of recreational 
No. 
20151039 
 
 
22 
 
immunity is "to take and hold possession."  Id., ¶34 (citing 
Doane v. Helenville Mut. Ins. Co., 216 Wis. 2d 345, 355, 575 
N.W.2d 734 (Ct. App. 1998)).  In Doane, the court of appeals 
explained that the term "occupy" as it is used in Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52 requires "a degree of permanence, as opposed to the 
mere use of the property in question."  Doane, 216 Wis. 2d at 
351.   
¶47 In Roberts, we also noted that the purpose of the 
recreational immunity statute is to encourage landowners to open 
land for public use.  Defining Sundog as an occupier "would not 
further the policy which underlies the statute . . . because the 
. . . 
property 
was 
already 
open 
for 
public 
recreational 
purposes."  Roberts, 367 Wis. 2d 386, ¶35.  This is so because 
regardless of whether Sundog was immune, the owner of the 
property, Beaver Dam Conservationists, was protected and would 
therefore not be discouraged from opening its land to the 
public.   
¶48 In the present case, we agree with Westmases that 
Creekside's presence on Conference Point's property did not 
exceed "mere use" and did not approach "a degree of permanence," 
nor did it have any effect on whether Conference Point's 
property would be open to the public for recreational purposes.  
As the court of appeals correctly explained: 
In the few days it was on the property, Creekside 
moved from temporary location to temporary location 
for the limited purpose of trimming trees as needed to 
satisfy 
its 
contract 
with 
Conference 
Point.  
Furthermore, 
Creekside 
was 
"not 
responsible 
for 
No. 
20151039 
 
 
23 
 
opening up the land to the public," and indeed did not 
have authority to do so. 
Westmas, 372 Wis. 2d 683, ¶27 (footnote omitted).  Based on 
these uncontested facts, we conclude that Creekside was not an 
occupier of the Conference Point property and is therefore not a 
statutory owner of the property for purposes of Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52.   
C.  Limits of Recreational Immunity 
¶49 Although we conclude that the definitions of "agent" 
and "occupies" to be plainly discernible from the statutory 
context in which they occur, we nevertheless consult legislative 
history underlying Wis. Stat. § 895.52 to confirm our plain 
meaning interpretation.  As discussed above, we note that 
§ 895.52 was enacted to limit the liability of property owners 
in order to encourage them to open their lands to the public for 
recreational 
purposes. 
 
Our 
statutory 
interpretation 
and 
application above are consistent with that purpose.  
¶50 Creekside argues that any limitation on the definition 
of "owner" will undermine the purpose of the statute.  We 
disagree.  Although we have previously stated that the statute 
is to be liberally construed in favor of immunity, we have 
likewise concluded that this immunity is not absolute.  See, 
e.g., Roberts, 367 Wis. 2d 386, ¶39; Linville v. City of 
Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, 719, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994).  
¶51 In Linville, we considered whether granting immunity 
to city paramedics would create limitless immunity for all 
medical services provided for injuries sustained while engaging 
No. 
20151039 
 
 
24 
 
in a recreational activity at a City-owned pond.  Id. at 718 
(citing Ervin, 159 Wis. 2d at 472-76).9  In Linville, we narrowed 
the focus of our inquiry to "whether the City as employer of the 
paramedics is, in the eyes of the law, the same entity that owns 
the Pond."  Linville, 184 Wis. 2d at 718.  We concluded that 
"[e]xtending immunity to landowners for negligently performing 
in a capacity unrelated to the land or to their employees whose 
employment activities have nothing to do with the land will not 
contribute to a landowner's decision to open the land for public 
use."  Id. at 719.  
In addition, granting immunity to the landowner 
when the landowner and the employer of the negligent 
employee are functioning in two different capacities 
and are therefore not the same entity in the eyes of 
the law would produce absurd consequences.  In Ervin, 
we stated that the statute was intended to "shif[t] 
some of the risk of injury from the landowner to the 
entrant."  But, it "was not enacted to provide 
indiscriminate immunity for landowners without regard 
to possible consequences." 
Id. (citation omitted).  
¶52 We therefore concluded that to interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52(2)(b) to extend immunity to negligent rescue and 
treatment 
efforts 
by 
paramedics 
would 
produce 
absurd 
consequences, including the possibility that a health care 
provider employed by the City would remain immune even if he or 
                                                 
9 In Ervin, we concluded that Wis. Stat. § 895.52 granted 
immunity to landowners with respect to the condition of the land 
and to the landowners' (or its employees') actions with respect 
to the land.  Ervin v. City of Kenosha, 159 Wis. 2d 464, 472-76, 
464 N.W.2d 654 (1991). 
No. 
20151039 
 
 
25 
 
she provided negligent care once the victim had been transported 
to the hospital.  Id. at 720. 
¶53 Here, it was Conference Point that was responsible for 
opening the land to the public, not Creekside.  As we stated in 
Roberts, "[g]ranting immunity to third parties that are not 
responsible for opening up the land to the public is unsupported 
by our prior case law."  Roberts, 367 Wis. 2d 386, ¶41.  
Further, the legislature has expressly stated that the purpose 
of Wis. Stat. § 895.52 is to limit liability of property owners 
under circumstances "in which the owner does not derive more 
than a minimal pecuniary benefit."  1983 Wis. Act. 418, § 1.  
Given these observations, denying immunity to Creekside does not 
conflict with the legislative history or purpose of § 895.52, 
nor does it contravene the legislature's mandate to interpret 
the statute broadly in favor of landowners.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶54 There were two issues on this review.  First, we 
considered whether Creekside, as the entity hired by Conference 
Point to complete the tree-trimming project, is protected as an 
"agent" of Conference Point under Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(b).  
Section 895.52(2)(b) provides that "no owner and no officer, 
employee or agent of an owner is liable for the death of, any 
injury to, or any death or injury caused by, a person engaging 
in a recreational activity on the owner's property."  The second 
issue was whether Creekside is entitled to recreational immunity 
as an occupier of the Conference Point property, such that it 
No. 
20151039 
 
 
26 
 
was a statutory "owner" of the property at the time of the 
accident.  "Owner" is defined to include "[a] person . . . that 
owns, leases or occupies property."  § 895.52(1)(d)1.   
¶55 As to the first issue, we conclude that Creekside was 
not an agent of Conference Point because Conference Point had 
neither control of, nor the right to control, the details of 
Creekside's work, including the acts that caused injury to Jane 
Westmas.  We further conclude that Creekside was not an occupier 
of Conference Point's property because its presence on the 
property exhibited no "degree of permanence, as opposed to mere 
use." 
¶56 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶57 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
J., 
withdrew 
from 
participation. 
 
No.  2015AP1039.rgb&dk 
 
1 
 
¶58 REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J. 
and 
DANIEL 
KELLY, 
J.   (dissenting).  Jane Westmas' death was tragic.  Occurring 
in front of her son as they walked along an ordinarily idyllic 
lakeshore path, a tree branch cut by Creekside Tree Service, LLC 
suddenly crashed down upon her, causing fatal injuries.  If 
tragic circumstances controlled our decisions, we would join the 
court's opinion.  However, this case, like all others, must be 
decided based on the law.  
¶59 This case presents a statutory question of law:  is 
Creekside entitled to recreational immunity under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52(2)(b) because it qualifies as either an "agent" under 
§ 895.52(2)(b), or as an "owner" by "occup[ying]" Conference 
Point's property under § 895.52(1)(d)(1)?  The court concludes 
Creekside is neither and therefore not immune from liability.  
But it reaches that decision by overlooking one branch of the 
definition of "agent" and disregarding the plain meaning of 
"occupies."  In doing so, the court perpetuates its preference 
for a narrow scope of immunity not reflected in the words of the 
law we interpret.  Because we would instead apply the broad 
scope of immunity chosen by the legislature, we respectfully 
dissent.   
I. CREEKSIDE WAS AN "AGENT" 
¶60 An agency relationship exists, as relevant to this 
case, when one person either controls or has the right to 
control the activity of another.  If such a relationship existed 
between Conference Point and Creekside, then the latter would 
enjoy the same immunity as the former under Wis. Stat. § 895.52.  
No.  2015AP1039.rgb&dk 
 
2 
 
We believe such a relationship did exist, and so Creekside was 
entitled to immunity in this case.  The court reached the 
opposite conclusion because it focused almost exclusively on 
whether Conference Point actually controlled Creekside.  Because 
it performed no meaningful analysis of whether Conference Point 
had the right to control Creekside, it overlooked the agency 
relationship that undoubtedly obtained between the two. 
A. Agency Principles 
¶61 As the court correctly noted, Wis. Stat. § 895.52 does 
not tell us who qualifies as an "agent."  When the statute we 
are applying provides no working definition, we frequently look 
for one in the Restatement of Agency.  We did just that in 
Meyers v. Matthews, 270 Wis. 453, 467, 71 N.W.2d 368 (1955), 
where we observed that an agent can be either a "servant" or an 
"independent contractor."  An agent, we said, is: 
a person authorized by another to act on his account 
and under his control.  Included within its meaning 
are both those who, whether or not servants . . . act 
in business dealings and those who, being servants, 
perform manual labor.  An agent may be one who, to 
distinguish him from a servant in determining the 
liability of the principal is called an independent 
contractor.  Thus, the attorney at law, the broker, 
the factor, the auctioneer, and other similar persons 
employed either for a single transaction or for a 
series of transactions are agents, although as to 
their 
physical 
activities, 
they 
are 
independent 
contractors.  
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Restatement of Agency ch. 1, 
topic 1, § 1 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1933)). 
¶62 The court has held, frequently, that an agency 
relationship exists when the principal "controls" or has the 
No.  2015AP1039.rgb&dk 
 
3 
 
"right to control" the agent's actions.  "In determining whether 
agency exists, the matter of control or the right of control, by 
the person alleged to be the principal over the person alleged 
to be the agent, is deemed of great importance by the courts."  
Renich v. Klein, 230 Wis. 123, 127, 283 N.W. 288 (1939).  That 
is to say, a principal is one who "has the right to control the 
conduct of the agent with respect to matters entrusted to 
him. . . . "  Id. at 128 (quoting Restatement of Agency ch. 1, 
topic 3, § 14 (Am. Law Inst. 1933)); see also Schmidt v. Leary, 
213 Wis. 587, 590, 252 N.W. 151 (1934) (finding agency because 
"[t]he plaintiff as the owner of the car had the right to 
control the actions of the driver in driving it on the trip, 
whether she had occasion to exercise it or not."); Arsand v. 
City of Franklin, 83 Wis. 2d 40, 49, 264 N.W.2d 579 (1978) 
("[I]t was necessary for the [plaintiff] to allege and prove 
that . . . the City controlled or had the right to control [the 
tortfeasor's] physical conduct in the performance of his 
services."). 
¶63 The court's opinion went awry because it focused on 
whether 
Conference 
Point 
actually 
controlled 
Creekside's 
activities to the exclusion of any meaningful inquiry into 
whether the former had the right to control the latter.  
"Control" and the "right to control" are not the same things, 
and either one is sufficient to create an agency relationship.  
The court has said so before.  In Schmidt we had to decide 
whether the driver of a car was the agent of the owner, who was 
a passenger.  213 Wis. at 588.  If actual control were the sine 
No.  2015AP1039.rgb&dk 
 
4 
 
qua non of an agency relationship, the answer would have been a 
simple and obvious "no."  If the passenger had actually 
exercised 
control——which 
would 
mean, 
in 
that 
context, 
manipulating 
the 
automobile's 
steering, 
acceleration, 
and 
braking systems——the passenger wouldn't have been the passenger, 
but the driver.  And yet we concluded the driver was nonetheless 
the passenger's agent, because the passenger had the right to 
control operation of the vehicle, regardless of whether she 
exercised it:  "The plaintiff as the owner of the car had the 
right to control the actions of the driver in driving it on the 
trip, whether she had occasion to exercise it or not."  
Id. at 590.  
¶64 The court said essentially the same thing in Gehloff 
v. De Marce, 204 Wis. 464, 234 N.W. 717 (1931).  There, the 
defendant asked a neighbor to drive a car on a business errand, 
during which an accident occurred.  Id. at 464-65.  If liability 
were to attach, the court said, it would be via an agency 
relationship.  Id. at 465.  It said the driver was the 
defendant's agent because the defendant had "the right of 
control and direction" of the vehicle.  Id.  It was undisputed 
that the defendant was not present in the car at the time of the 
accident, see id., so the court was quite obviously not limiting 
agency to situations in which the principal actually "exerted 
control."   
¶65 Indeed, it is the right to control that explains the 
Restatement's 
description 
of 
the 
"independent 
contractor" 
relationship.  In such relationships, there are two components——
No.  2015AP1039.rgb&dk 
 
5 
 
the purpose for which the contractor was retained, and the 
physical activity in which he engages to accomplish that 
purpose.  As the Restatement says, he is an agent with respect 
to the former, but not the latter:  "Thus, the attorney at law, 
the broker, the factor, the auctioneer, and other similar 
persons employed either for a single transaction or for a series 
of transactions are agents, although as to their physical 
activities, they are independent contractors."  See Meyers, 270 
Wis. at 467 (quoting Restatement of Agency ch. 1, topic 1, § 1 
cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1933)).  It is the attorney and broker's 
representation, and the factor1 and auctioneer's financial 
arrangements, that the principal has the right to control.  
Consequently, with respect to those matters, the actors relate 
to each other and the world as principal and agent (as the 
Restatement recognizes).  But the physical actions of the 
attorney, broker, factor, and auctioneer are outside the 
contemplation of the contractual relationship, which puts them 
beyond the right to control and, consequently, the agency 
relationship. 
¶66 The court, however, appears to be intent on reading 
the "right to control" branch of the agency analysis out of our 
jurisprudence.  In narrowing the inquiry to merely the "control" 
branch, the court relies on our government immunity line of 
                                                 
1 Factor, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) ("[a]n 
agent who is employed to sell property for the principal and who 
possesses or controls the property; a person who receives and 
sells goods for a commission").  
No.  2015AP1039.rgb&dk 
 
6 
 
cases in which we describe who qualifies as an agent under Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(4).  But those cases have no explanatory power 
here because they are trying to identify something entirely 
different——something that is defined (erroneously, in our view) 
by the principal's exercise of control.  Governmental immunity 
exists for "the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions." 
 
§ 893.80(4).  
Notwithstanding this language, the court has concluded that what 
the statute really protects is the exercise of governmental 
discretion.  Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶21, 
253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314 ("The statute immunizes against 
liability for legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, and 
quasi-judicial acts, which have been collectively interpreted to 
include any act that involves the exercise of discretion and 
judgment." (first citing Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of 
Shelby, 2000 WI 56, ¶25, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693; then 
citing Kierstyn v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 81, 
90, 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999); then citing Scarpaci v. Milwaukee 
Cty., 96 Wis. 2d 663, 683, 292 N.W.2d 816 (1980); then citing 
Lifer v. Raymond, 80 Wis. 2d 503, 512, 259 N.W.2d 537 (1977))).  
Therefore, if only governmental discretion is entitled to 
immunity, then it necessarily follows that the government's 
agents receive no immunity to the extent they exercise their own 
discretion.  So the test we developed to identify which 
government agents were entitled to immunity focused on how much 
control the government actually exercised over the agent.  
Immunity attaches, we said, only so long as "the governmental 
No.  2015AP1039.rgb&dk 
 
7 
 
entity approved reasonably precise specifications that the 
governmental contractor adhered to when engaging in the conduct 
that caused the injury . . . ."  Showers Appraisals, LLC v. 
Musson Bros., 2013 WI 79, ¶37, 350 Wis. 2d 509, 835 N.W.2d 226.  
In other words, there is immunity only when the government 
entity exercised enough actual control over the agent that it 
would be accurate to say the agent was not exercising his own 
discretion. 
¶67 That test has nothing to say in the recreational 
immunity context.  Here, immunity relates to a duty, not the 
exercise of governmental authority.  Recreational immunity 
relieves a person from the duty to "keep the property safe for 
recreational 
activities[;] . . . inspect 
the 
property[; . . . and] . . . give warning of an unsafe condition, 
use or activity on the property."  Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(a).  
So there is no need to locate the exercise of discretion in 
either the owner or the agent, because the exercise of 
discretion does not define the thing entitled to immunity under 
this statute.  And because the inquiry into control was 
important in the governmental immunity context only for the 
purpose of identifying who exercised discretion, there is no 
necessary 
connection 
between 
control 
and 
agency 
in 
the 
recreational immunity context. 
B. Application 
¶68 If the court had analyzed this matter under the "right 
to control" rubric, the conclusion that Creekside was Conference 
Point's agent would have followed as a matter of course.  
No.  2015AP1039.rgb&dk 
 
8 
 
Conference Point authorized Creekside to enter the property and 
trim certain trees that met the conditions specified by 
Conference Point.  And Creekside agreed to trim the trees 
described by those conditions.  Nothing in the contract gave 
Creekside the right to refuse Conference Point should it decide 
to change the description of the trees to be trimmed, when they 
would be trimmed, the safety precautions to take when trimming, 
the state of pedestrian traffic when they were trimmed, or any 
other relevant aspect of Creekside's activity.  That is to say, 
there is nothing in the contract to suggest that Conference 
Point ceded the right to control activity taking place on its 
own property, a right vouchsafed to it by ancient principles of 
real property law.  Indeed, even the court had to recognize the 
contract did no such thing:  "The bid provided no details about 
how these tasks were to be accomplished."  Majority op., ¶7. 
¶69 But we need not rely just on the contract's silence 
with respect to Conference Point's right to control Creekside's 
activities.  The record reveals not only that Creekside 
acknowledged Conference Point's right to control activity on its 
own property, but that it actually expected Conference Point to 
exercise it.  Jonathan Moore, Creekside's sales consultant and 
foreman, expected that Conference Point would take affirmative 
steps to ensure pedestrian safety by redirecting traffic or 
otherwise alerting pedestrians to the danger posed by the tree 
trimming.  Further, it was his understanding that, with respect 
to certain safety precautions, such as shutting the path to 
pedestrian 
traffic, 
the 
"right 
to 
control" 
rested 
with 
No.  2015AP1039.rgb&dk 
 
9 
 
Conference Point, not Creekside.  There is no evidence in the 
record——none——to contradict this. 
¶70 The court's reference to the "right to control" branch 
of agency law was so spartan that it lacked any analysis.  Here 
is the whole of its attention to this, the dispositive issue:  
"These factors demonstrate that not only did Conference Point 
lack control over Creekside's tree-trimming, but it also lacked 
the right to control the details of Creekside's tree-trimming."  
Majority op., ¶42.  To which factors was the court referring?   
 The contract's silence with respect to the right 
to control (Majority op., ¶39);  
 Creekside's 
exercise 
of 
control 
over 
its 
activities (Majority op., ¶40); and  
 Conference Point's lack of expertise in tree-
trimming (Majority op., ¶¶41-42).   
These factors all share two salient characteristics.  First, 
they are conceptually incapable of affecting Conference Point's 
right to control Creekside's activities on its own property.  
And second, they lack any accompanying analysis to explain how 
they are supposed to accomplish the effect the court ascribes to 
them.   
¶71 Under the best of circumstances, it's really difficult 
to tease meaning out of silence.  Here, the court discerned in 
it some truly remarkable conclusions.  In the silence, the court 
heard Conference Point tender to Creekside unfettered control 
and occupancy of its property for the purpose of tree-trimming 
whenever and in whatever manner Creekside might choose.  If a 
Conference Point employee had perceived the danger into which 
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Mrs. Westmas was walking, presumably this contractual silence 
would have prevented him from ordering Creekside to temporarily 
halt its work until Mrs. Westmas had passed.  Or, if there were 
peaks and valleys in pedestrian traffic, Creekside could have 
used this silence to rebuff an instruction to trim only during 
certain times of the day.  Or Creekside could have told 
Conference Point to mind its own business if it had said that no 
tree-trimming could take place until Conference Point barricaded 
the path.  In silence, the court discerned the type of exclusive 
control over real property that normally requires a tenancy 
agreement or a deed.   
¶72 The second factor on which the court relied is not 
even in the right category of considerations.  The fact that 
Conference Point did not actually exercise control is irrelevant 
as a matter of law——the whole point of analyzing the "right to 
control" is to consider the existence of an agency relationship 
when no such control occurred.  If the right to control exists, 
then even when Conference Point doesn't exercise it, Creekside 
would nonetheless be "a person authorized by [Conference Point] 
to act on his account and under his control . . . ."  See 
Meyers, 270 Wis. at 467 (quoting Restatement of Agency ch. 1, 
topic 1, § 1 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1933)).  So, pace the court's 
conclusion, the absence of actual control does nothing but 
signal it is time to start the "right to control" analysis, 
something the court didn't do.   
¶73 The court's reliance on Conference Point's lack of 
tree-trimming expertise is also a category error.  If Conference 
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Point had endeavored to tell Creekside how to trim trees, it is 
certainly possible, and maybe even likely, that its lack of 
expertise would cause it to exercise that control unwisely, or 
ineffectually.  But lack of competency does not negate the right 
to control, it just makes it imprudent.  And apropos of that 
point, let's not forget that the danger presented in this case 
has nothing to do with expertise in tree-trimming.  It is the 
danger of a heavy object falling on someone walking by.  There 
is no gnosis passed down through generations of tree-trimming 
guilds about the implications of heavy branches falling to the 
ground.  This danger, and the means of avoiding it, are known to 
quite literally everyone:  Do not be where the branch falls.  In 
any event, nothing in the court's opinion describes how 
Conference Point could even conceivably lose the right to 
control activity on its own property just because it might 
exercise that control in a less than optimal manner. 
¶74 So the extent of the court's "right to control" 
analysis was a bare, analysis-free reference to three factors 
that have nothing to do with Conference Point's right to control 
activities on its own property.  Because nothing in the contract 
or the circumstances presented to us suggest that Conference 
Point relinquished that right, a right it owns as a matter of 
real property law, Creekside was its agent.  
¶75 We find confirmation for our conclusion in the reasons 
the court gave for finding agency in Gehloff——specifically, the 
relationships between the principal, agent, and injury-causing 
instrument.  Gehloff observed:  
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The rule is accepted in this state that, where a 
plaintiff seeks to hold the owner of a car liable for 
injuries inflicted when the car was being operated by 
another, proof of the ownership makes out a prima 
facie case.  This is on the theory that the fact of 
ownership 
justifies 
an 
inference 
or 
raises 
a 
presumption that the driver of the car is the agent of 
the owner and that he is driving it in pursuit of the 
owner's business. 
Gehloff, 204 Wis. at 465-66. 
¶76 The relationships between the owner, the agent, and 
the injury-producing object in Gehloff were exactly as they are 
here.  Conference Point owned the property and the fatality-
causing tree limb——just as Mrs. Kandler owned the car in 
Gehloff.2  Conference Point asked Creekside to trim trees for 
Conference Point's own benefit——just as the driver was asked to 
drive the car for the owner's benefit.  And Mrs. Westmas died 
when Creekside cut the limb from a tree owned by Conference 
Point on Conference Point's property, just as injury followed 
from the manner in which the agent drove Mrs. Kandler's car in 
Gehloff.  The Gehloff court said that when a person uses the 
owner's property for the owner's purposes, and in the process of 
doing so causes injury to another, there arises a presumption of 
agency.  And that was quite apart from any question of whether 
the principal exercised actual control over the agent. 
                                                 
2 We refer to Mrs. Kandler as the car's owner, although 
technically it belonged to her son and was on loan to her at the 
time of the accident.  Nonetheless, for purposes of our analysis 
in Gehloff v. Kandler, 204 Wis. 464, 234 N.W. 717 (1931), Mrs. 
Kandler stood in the shoes of the owner, so we will not make any 
further distinction here. 
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¶77 Conference Point either had the right to control 
Creekside's activity, or it did not.  If it did, then Creekside 
was an agent.  But if Creekside's authority was so perfectly 
exclusive that Conference Point had no right or ability to 
interfere with its work, then it necessarily follows that 
Creekside occupied Conference Point's property while it pruned 
the trees. 
II.  CREEKSIDE WAS AN "OWNER" 
¶78 The court should have adopted the plain meaning of 
"occupies" articulated in the dissent from Roberts v. T.H.E. 
Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492 (R. G. 
Bradley, J., dissenting).  Instead, the court requires Creekside 
to both establish a "degree of permanence" on Conference Point's 
property and play a role in opening the property to the public 
for recreational purposes.  Majority op., ¶54-55.  The court 
imposes these obstacles to immunity not by construing the 
statutory text, but instead by consulting legislative history 
and prior case law that likewise disregards the actual words 
enacted by the legislature.  Just like the defendant in Roberts, 
Creekside meets the ordinary and accepted meaning of "occupies," 
entitling it to the immunity the court erroneously denies it.  
A. Plain Meaning of "Occupies" 
¶79 In Roberts, this court held that Sundog Ballooning, 
LLC, which provided hot air balloon rides on land open to the 
public for recreational purposes, was not entitled to statutory 
immunity as an "owner" under Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(b) when a 
hot air balloon struck and injured Patti Roberts while she was 
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engaged in a recreational activity.  Roberts, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 
¶¶25-41.  Sundog argued it was an occupier entitled to immunity 
by virtue of § 895.52(1)(d)(1)'s definition of "owner," which 
includes 
"[a] 
person . . . that . . . occupies 
property," 
particularly because "Wisconsin courts have concluded private 
organizations hosting an event on land they did not own are 
entitled to recreational immunity."  Id., ¶30 (citing Hall v. 
Turtle Lake Lions Club, 146 Wis. 2d 486, 487-90, 431 N.W.2d 696 
(Ct. App. 1988)).  The Roberts court rejected Sundog's argument 
by eschewing the plain meaning of "occupies" in favor of a 
definition gleaned from case law advancing a cramped view of 
what it means to occupy land, one that finds no support in the 
statute's text.   
¶80 The Roberts court relied on the statute's stated 
"[l]egislative intent," expressed in the legislative history of 
1983 Wis. Act 418, to contravene the plain meaning of 
"occupies."  As divined by the Roberts court, that legislative 
purpose seeks "to limit liability in order to encourage property 
owners to open their lands to the public."3  Id., ¶28.  The court 
                                                 
3 The full text of 1983 Wis. Act 418, § 1, reads: 
The legislature intends by this act to limit the 
liability of property owners toward others who use 
their 
property 
for 
recreational 
activities 
under 
circumstances in which the owner does not derive more 
than a minimal pecuniary benefit.  While it is not 
possible to specify in a statute every activity which 
might constitute a recreational activity, this act 
provides examples of the kinds of activities that are 
meant to be included, and the legislature intends 
that, where substantially similar circumstances or 
activities exist, this legislation should be liberally 
(continued) 
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refused to "grant[ ] immunity [under Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(b)] 
to a third party not responsible for opening up the land to the 
public."  Id., ¶33 (footnote omitted).  Adopting the court of 
appeals' definition from Doane v. Helenville Mut. Ins. Co., the 
Roberts court concluded "occupies" meant "to take and hold 
possession," which in the court's view necessitates a person or 
entity not only to open the land to the public, but also to 
achieve "a degree of permanence, as opposed to mere use" 
thereon.  Id., ¶34 (quoting 216 Wis. 2d 345, 355, 575 N.W.2d 734 
(Ct. App. 1998)). 
¶81 Applying this court-created rule, the court in Roberts 
held that Sundog did not open the land to the public.  Id., ¶41.  
Rather, it identified the event organizer as the entity that 
opened the land and the only one entitled to the classification 
of occupier.4  Id., ¶37.  Holding this element to be dispositive, 
the court did not reach the issue of whether Sundog attained the 
requisite "degree of permanence" on the property.   
¶82 The Roberts dissent determined that "Sundog meets the 
statutory 
requirements 
to 
obtain 
recreational 
immunity 
because . . . it falls within the definition of 'owner,' which 
                                                                                                                                                             
construed in favor of property owners to protect them 
from liability.  
4 The court also identified the titled owner of the property 
as one with the responsibility of opening the land, cloaking it 
too with statutory immunity.  Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 
WI 20, ¶37, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492. 
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includes 
'a 
person . . . that . . . occupies 
property.'"5  
Id., ¶132 (R. G. Bradley, J., dissenting).  Undertaking a plain-
meaning analysis, the dissent ascertained the ordinary and 
accepted meaning of "occupies" from the dictionary definition of 
"occupant," as "[o]ne that resides in or uses a physical space."  
Id., ¶134 (citing Occupant, The American Heritage Dictionary of 
the English Language (5th ed. 2015)).  "There is no temporal 
requirement embedded in the definition of occupy."  Id., ¶144.  
Nor is immunity limited "to those who 'host' or 'organize' an 
event on the land."  Id.  Instead, "a person who occupies 
property is one who has actual use of the property."  Id., ¶134.  
Under § 895.52(2)(b), such an occupier is not "liable for the 
death of . . . a person engaging in a recreational activity" on 
the occupied property.  
¶83 This definition was first adopted in Hall, 146 
Wis. 2d at 491.  One who "occupies" property includes: 
persons who, while not owners or tenants, have the 
actual use of land. . . . While "occupant" includes 
[an] owner and lessee, it also means one who has the 
actual use of property without legal title, dominion 
or tenancy.  In order to give meaning to [occupies], 
                                                 
5 Justice David T. Prosser concurred in part and dissented 
in part.  Id., ¶83 (Prosser, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).  His purpose in dissenting was "to reinforce the 
inexorable logic of Justice [Rebecca Grassl] Bradley's dissent."  
Id.  Justice Prosser joined all but footnote 4 of Justice 
Rebecca Grassl Bradley's dissent.  Id.  Footnote 4 disagreed 
with the court that a hot air balloon was not "property" within 
the meaning of the statute.  Id., ¶132 n.4 (R. G. Bradley, J., 
dissenting).  Chief Justice Patience Drake Roggensack, author of 
the court's opinion in this case, joined Justice Prosser's 
separate writing without qualification.  Id., ¶131 (Prosser, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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the term should be interpreted to encompass a resident 
of land who is more transient than either a lessee or 
an owner. 
Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Smith v. 
Sno Eagles Snowmobile Club, Inc., 823 F.2d 1193, 1197 (7th Cir. 
1987)); see also Leu v. Price Cty. Snowmobile Trails Ass'n, 
Inc., 2005 WI App 81, ¶11, 280 Wis. 2d 765, 695 N.W.2d 889; Held 
v. Ackerville Snowmobile Club, Inc., 2007 WI App 43, ¶16, 300 
Wis. 2d 498, 730 N.W.2d 428; Milton v. Washburn Cty., 2011 
WI App 48, ¶9, 332 Wis. 2d 319, 797 N.W.2d 924. 
¶84 The court of appeals in Doane, 216 Wis. 2d at 351-52, 
however, altered this longstanding definition of "occupies" to 
mean "has actual possession of the property," with the added 
requirement that one must achieve a "degree of permanence" on 
the property.  As aptly stated by Justice David T. Prosser in 
his separate writing in Roberts, "[t]he court of appeals reached 
the correct decision in Doane, but it did so, at least in part, 
for the wrong reason."  Roberts, 367 Wis. 2d 386, ¶101 (Prosser, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  "Until Doane, 
no Wisconsin case had ever used the phrase 'degree of 
permanence.'"  Id.  As the court of appeals in Hall "never 
discussed 'a degree of permanence' because . . . Hall clearly 
sidestepped the 'permanence' part of the Seventh Circuit's 
opinion [in Smith v. Sno Eagles Snowmobile Club, Inc., 823 
F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1987)]," the court in Doane was wrong to 
rely on Hall to support its adoption of the "degree of 
permanence" test.  Id.  Justice Prosser explained: 
This court cannot adopt the "permanence" test from the 
Seventh Circuit decision without overruling Hall and 
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numerous other cases, and also effectively ruling that 
[the event organizer] did not "occupy" the property.  
If a "permanence" test disqualifies Sundog, it would 
disqualify [the event organizer] as well because [the 
event organizer] did not own or lease the property——it 
occupied the property.  [The event organizer's] few 
extra hours of occupancy at the shooting range cannot 
realistically be viewed as being more "permanent" than 
Sundog's occupancy.  
Id., ¶106.   
¶85 The "degree of permanence" test created in Doane rests 
on shaky ground.  Not only does the test deviate from prior case 
law, it violates the ordinary-meaning canon of construction, 
which instructs that "[w]ords are to be understood in their 
ordinary, everyday meanings . . . ."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. 
Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 69 
(2012).  The ordinary meaning of "occupies" implies no temporal 
element, much less one approaching permanence, to any degree. 
¶86 Applying the plain meaning of "occupies," without 
reading into the statute a "degree of permanence" test invented 
by the court of appeals with no foundation in the statutory 
text, the Roberts dissent reasoned that by using the property to 
provide a recreational activity, Sundog occupied the property 
within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(d)(1).  Roberts, 
367 Wis. 2d 386, ¶135 (R. G. Bradley, J., dissenting).  To hold 
otherwise "creates a distinction between Sundog on the one hand, 
and [the event organizer] and the [property owners] on the 
other, that is not only unsupported by the broad legislative 
purpose of the recreational immunity statute but wholly absent 
from the statutory definition of the term 'owner.'"  Id., ¶138.  
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B.  Application 
¶87 The Westmas court decides in a single conclusory 
paragraph that Creekside failed to establish either element of 
the new test the Roberts' court concocted, which requires a 
would-be occupier to both establish "a degree of permanence" on 
the property and have an effect on whether the property "would 
be open to the public for recreational purposes."  Majority 
op., ¶48.  First, the court concludes that Creekside's presence 
on the property never exceeded "mere use."  Id.  Rather, "[i]n 
the few days it was on the property, Creekside moved from 
temporary location to temporary location for the limited purpose 
of trimming trees as needed to satisfy its contract with 
Conference Point."  Id.  The court holds that by establishing 
only temporary sites of use on the same property over the course 
of consecutive days Creekside was not an occupier.  Under the 
court's logic, we are left to wonder what "degree of permanence" 
even means.  Would the court require Creekside employees to 
spend the night on the property to establish "a degree of 
permanence"?  Would it require Creekside's operations to remain 
fixed in one place over the course of its contract with 
Conference Point?  How would the court rule if Creekside spent 
365 days at Conference Point but each day worked on a different 
tree?  We cannot be sure.  And neither can the court without 
creating new law that deviates further from the plain meaning of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 895.52(1)(d)(1) and 895.52(2)(b) in the court's 
ongoing 
quest 
to 
further 
limit 
the 
statutory 
scope 
of 
recreational immunity.   
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¶88 Second, the court determines "Creekside was 'not 
responsible for opening up the land to the public,' and indeed 
did not have authority to do so."  Id.  This conclusory 
assertion 
derives 
from 
another 
infirmity 
of 
the 
Roberts 
analysis, which forecloses immunity for anyone other than the 
titled owner once the land has been opened to the public.  Of 
course, the actual text of the statute does no such thing.   
¶89 Applying 
the 
plain 
meaning 
interpretation 
of 
"occupies" to mean "actually use," it is logically impossible to 
conclude that Creekside is anything other than an occupier of 
Conference Point's property.  Creekside actually used Conference 
Point's property by establishing and maintaining its presence on 
the 
property 
during 
the 
execution 
of 
its 
contract 
with 
Conference Point, up until the date of the accident.  It brought 
its tree-trimming supplies and set up the area along the lake 
shore path and elsewhere on the property to perform its 
services.  It even went so far as to alert pedestrian traffic 
along the path that it was using the property to perform its 
services.   
¶90 The court here, as in Roberts, relies heavily on 
legislative history to conjure a legislative "purpose" in 
support its denial of immunity for Creekside.  However, the 
court's 
interpretive 
approach, 
as 
in 
Roberts, 
violates 
fundamental principles of statutory interpretation.  First, 
"[t]he words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and 
what they convey, in their context, is what the text means."  
Scalia & Garner, supra ¶87, at 56.  If language is ambiguous, 
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consideration of a statute's purpose may be helpful but "the 
purpose must be derived from the text, not from extrinsic 
sources such as legislative history or an assumption about the 
legal drafter's desires."  Id.  Importantly, the purpose of a 
statute "cannot be used to contradict text or to supplement it."  
Id. at 57.  Here, the court uses legislative history to identify 
a statutory purpose that both contradicts and supplements the 
text. 
¶91 Nevertheless, even the proffered legislative purpose 
of opening the land for public use cannot save the court's 
erroneous holding.  The court cites Linville v. City of 
Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, 719, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994), for 
declining to extend immunity to entities that negligently 
perform services unrelated to the land:  "Extending immunity to 
landowners for negligently performing in a capacity unrelated to 
the land or to their employees whose employment activities have 
nothing to do with the land will not contribute to a landowner's 
decision to open the land for public use."  Majority op., ¶51.  
Here, Creekside's activity was incontrovertibly related to the 
land, as the trees to be trimmed are of course physically rooted 
in 
the 
land 
and 
tree 
trimming 
enhances 
the 
property's 
aesthetics, functionality, and indeed its usability for the 
public.  In this regard, Creekside's services were akin to the 
groomers of snowmobile trails in Leu, which the court of appeals 
concluded were occupiers under the statute, in part because 
their work "makes it possible to maintain and expand Wisconsin's 
system of snowmobile trails."  280 Wis. 2d 765, ¶15.  Similarly, 
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Creekside's tree-grooming services made it possible for the 
public to traverse the shoreline path on Conference Point's 
property. 
¶92 Refusing to recognize immunity for Creekside may force 
companies like it to weigh the risk of liability to the public 
when performing their tasks, dissuading them from working at 
these sites.  This could create a domino effect of discouraging 
landowners, like Conference Point, from opening their land to 
the public because of the unsafe conditions arising from 
neglected maintenance the landowner is unwilling, unable, or 
unqualified to perform.   
¶93 The court's interpretation of "occupies" in Roberts 
reads 
substantial 
language 
into 
the 
text 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 895.52(1)(d)(1) and (2)(b).  Neither "degree of permanence" 
nor "responsible for opening up the land to the public" appear 
anywhere in the applicable statute, much less as prerequisites 
for immunity to attach.  Regrettably, the court perpetuates its 
erroneous constriction of recreational immunity in this case. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶94 The text of Wis. Stat. § 895.52 is plain.  Here, 
Creekside was an agent subject to Conference Point's control of 
its activity.  Additionally, the statutory definition of 
"owners" 
includes 
a 
person 
who 
"occupies" 
property, 
and 
Creekside occupied the property on which Jane Westmas tragically 
died while engaging in a recreational activity.  By virtue of 
its status as Conference Point's agent or as an entity that 
"occupie[d]" Conference Point's property, Creekside is immune 
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from liability.  The legislature chose to immunize entities like 
Creekside, a result the court may not like, but the only outcome 
the law allows.   
 
 
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