Title: Morgan v. City of Overland Park
Citation: 207 Kan. 188, 483 P.2d 1079
Docket Number: 46,187
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 10, 1971

207 Kan. 188 (1971)
483 P.2d 1079
HOWARD M. MORGAN and GRACE L. MORGAN, Appellees,
v.
THE CITY OF OVERLAND PARK, KANSAS, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant.
No. 46,187

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 10, 1971.
Donald C. Amrein, of Mission, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
George A. Lowe, of Lowe, Lowe and Lowe, of Olathe, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellees.
*189 The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered on a jury verdict in a condemnation proceeding.
The appellant, the city of Overland Park, Kansas, through eminent domain proceedings, acquired approximately twelve acres of land of the appellees for a municipal park. About six acres of this tract was covered by a lake or pond. Both parties appealed from the award of the appraisers. The matter was tried to a jury resulting in a verdict very substantially increasing the award. The facts will be presented in more detail as we discuss the issue to which they apply.
The appellant first complains that the trial court erred in admitting as an exhibit a map depicting other sales of land without a showing that such tracts were comparable to the landowners' tract, and in admitting testimony about such sales for the same reason.
The map designated as Exhibit 7 was prepared by one of appellees' expert witnesses. He testified:
The witness then designated ten properties which had been sold in the vicinity of the land in question. He gave the size of the tracts, the location, date of sale and sale price. The tracts varied in size from one-third acre to thirty-five acres. The sales ranged in time from 1961 to 1966. The witness testified further:
*190 We find no basis for the appellant's complaint. In City of Wichita v. Jennings, 199 Kan. 621, 433 P.2d 351, we held:
It was stated in the opinion:
The expert's opinion of value is the primary evidence under submission to the jury. Sales of comparable properties are offered in condemnation cases more often as supportive of the reasoning by which the expert arrives at his opinion rather than a direct indicia of value. In the recent case of City of Bonner Springs v. Coleman, 206 Kan. 689, 481 P.2d 950, we state:
It must also be understood, however, that the responsibility of defining the extent of compensable rights is in the courts and if it is established that value testimony was based on noncompensable items or the credibility of the testimony is otherwise destroyed the testimony should be stricken in response to a proper motion.
In Sacramento, etc. Drainage Dist. ex rel. State Reclamation Bd. v. Reed, 215 C.A.2d 60; 29 Cal. Rptr. 847, we find the rule stated as follows:
*191 The same rule would apply to appellant's suggestion that the expert witness should not have been permitted to adjust the sale price of other lands considered to reflect price increase.
The appellant's next four contentions are closely related and may be combined.
The appellant contends that the court erred in admitting an exhibit and testimony in connection therewith, the exhibit being an architectural rendition of a five-story, sixty-three foot high apartment building when on the date of the taking the maximum height permitted by the zoning ordinance was two and one-half stories, thirty-five feet high; the court should have directed a verdict in favor of appellant as all of the appellees' evidence as to highest and best use was based on a five story apartment building, and the court failed to properly instruct the jury under the circumstances.
It appears to us that the instruction properly states the law. It followed PIK 11.11. The appellant complains that "It was prejudicial to the appellant not to have the jury told by the Court that such use was illegal." The question was not so much the fact that the existing zoning prohibited the suggested use but rather was there a reasonable probability of it being later rezoned to permit such use.
In Orgel on Valuation Under Eminent Domain, relied on by appellant, we find the following statement in Volume 1, Section 34, page 165:
Also in Section 34, at page 167, it is stated:
In Nichols on Eminent Domain, Volume 4, § 12.322 [1], p. 238, we find the rule stated as follows:
The facts here are somewhat unusual. At the date of the taking, the general zoning ordinance limited apartment buildings to a height of thirty-five feet and two and one half stories. In less than a year after the taking, and before this case was tried, the zoning ordinance was changed permitting high-rise and semi-high-rise apartment structures.
It would appear that appellant's planning consultant was working on a recodification of the new zoning code at the time the land was taken.
We see no merit in appellant's contention that there was no reasonable probability that rezoning would take place permitting high-rise apartments. The fact that the zoning was so changed in less than a year speaks with more emphasis than the testimony of experts to the effect that there is a reasonable probability that a zoning ordinance will be changed. However, there was substantial competent evidence that the zoning ordinance would have been recodified to permit five-story apartments and there was also substantial competent evidence of a reasonable probability that the tract under consideration would have been rezoned for apartment construction. The planning consultant for appellant testified:
The testimony of one of appellees' witnesses is summarized in the record:
Another of appellees' witnesses testified:
Appellant contends that James W. Starnes has acquired a contractual interest in the property and is a real party in interest. The record does not disclose what interest he may have, if any. As the matter was not presented to the trial court it will not be considered by this court on appeal, particularly where there would have to be an investigation outside the record to determine the nature of the interest, if any.
In no way could the rights of appellant be affected. Under the provisions of K.S.A. 26-502, the only obligation as to parties insofar as the condemner is concerned is to name in the petition the owners and all lienholders of record and the name of any party in possession. If Starnes had an equitable interest and did not disclose it, appellant's rights would not be affected.
A careful examination of the record and the errors alleged by appellant disclose no prejudicial error which would justify the granting of a new trial.
The judgment is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.
FONTRON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:
While I approve of the disposition made of this appeal, I disagree with the legal concept expressed in Syllabus No. 2. The rule embodied therein is far too broad, as I see it.
In my view an expert witness should be required to base his conclusions on factors which are relevant, and his testimony should be so restricted. To decree that a court cannot regulate the factors used by an expert in forming his opinion is tantamount to giving him free rein to consider any and all factors which may please his fancy. Certainly this cannot be a valid or a salutary rule.
The determination of relevancy, materiality and the admissibility *194 of evidence is a judicial function and courts should not abrogate their responsibilities in such regard without sober reflection. The obligation of a trial court to rule on evidentiary matters pertains to the testimony of all witnesses, expert and common alike. The rule expressed in the offending syllabus is a novel departure from that principle.
Accordingly, I must record my dissent from what is said in Syllabus No. 2 and in the corresponding portion of the opinion. In so doing I recognize that identical language appears in City of Bonner Springs v. Coleman, 206 Kan. 689, 481 P.2d 950, the import of which unfortunately escaped me when the opinion was handed down. The language was not, however, essential to the decision in the Bonner Springs case, and I take this early opportunity to rectify my inadvertent error.
FROMME, J., joins in the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.