Title: State v. Haye
Citation: 433 P.2d 884, 72 Wash. 2d 461
Docket Number: 39201
State: Washington
Issuer: Washington Supreme Court
Date: November 9, 1967

72 Wn.2d 461 (1967) 433 P.2d 884 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. ARTHUR RAYMOND HAYE, Appellant.[*] No. 39201. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. November 9, 1967. Philip R. McIntosh and James R. Young, for appellant. Charles O. Carroll, Neal J. Shulman, and Gary A. Cunningham, for respondent. DONWORTH, J. Appellant, Arthur Raymond Haye, was charged by justice court complaint on March 11, 1966, as follows: Appellant was arrested pursuant to warrant issued on March 11, 1966, and on March 16, 1966, he appeared with his attorneys in justice court and entered pleas of not guilty to both counts. Witnesses for the state were sworn and testified, and exhibits for the state were introduced and admitted. One witness was sworn and testified for the defense. The record before this court does not reflect the substance of the testimony before the justice court, but appellant's sole defense at the subsequent trial in superior court consisted of his contention that he was not the driver of the automobile at the time of the accident, but rather that the driver of the car was a companion, one McGuinness. At the conclusion of the hearing in justice court, appellant was found guilty of count 2 as charged in the complaint, and the court further found that there was sufficient evidence presented to bind appellant over for trial in superior court on the charge in count 1 (negligent homicide). Appellant was sentenced on count 2 to one year imprisonment *464 in the King County jail, and fined $500. Appellant filed a written notice of appeal. In superior court, appellant urged that the proceedings in justice court were in the nature of an actual trial on the charge of negligent homicide, that the justice court had the power to impose sentence therefor, and that a trial in superior court thereafter for the same offense would constitute double jeopardy, in violation of Const. art. 1, § 9, and of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. Appellant's motion was denied, however, and the two causes (the superior court charge of negligent homicide and the appeal from the justice court conviction on count 2) were joined for trial. After a trial before a jury in the superior court resulted in a verdict of guilty on both counts, appellant was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment on the negligent-homicide charge, and to a term of 1 year in King County jail on count 2, the jail term to be suspended. He has appealed to this court from this judgment and sentence. Appellant contends in this court, as he did before the superior court, that the trial in superior court on the negligent-homicide charge violated appellant's rights under the state and federal constitutions to not be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. [1] One who asserts the bar of double jeopardy under the constitution must affirmatively establish: It is further settled that the crime of negligent homicide, under RCW 46.56.040 (now codified as RCW 46.61.520), constitutes a felony. State v. Harvey, 57 Wn.2d 295, 356 P.2d 726 (1960); State v. Sayward, 66 Wn.2d 698, 404 P.2d 783 (1965). The issue presented, therefore, is whether the justice court is a court "of competent jurisdiction" to hear and *465 determine the merits in a case involving the charge of negligent homicide with a motor vehicle, a felony. The crux of appellant's argument that such jurisdiction is vested in the justice court is based on the enactment of Laws of 1955, ch. 393, § 4 (codified as RCW 46.08.190) which provides that: The title Motor Vehicles, RCW 46, includes several felonies among which is the crime of negligent homicide. While this court has recognized that the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting the above-quoted provision was to vest in justice courts jurisdiction to try and to punish certain types of felonies (State v. Wright, 51 Wn.2d 606, 320 P.2d 646 (1958)), the specific question of whether the legislature has the power to accomplish this intention has never been considered by this court. The decision of this important constitutional question is imperative in the present case. Constitution, art. 4, § 10 (amendment 28) provides that: The proviso above quoted places a clear limitation upon the power of the legislature to grant jurisdiction to justice *466 courts. The next question is: What is the jurisdiction of the superior and other courts of record upon which the jurisdiction granted justices of the peace must not trench? Constitution, art. 4, § 6 (amendment 28) sets forth the jurisdiction of superior courts as follows: May the legislature then vest jurisdiction over a criminal case amounting to a felony in the justice court, notwithstanding the constitutional grant of "original jurisdiction" in such cases to the superior courts, or would such a legislative grant "trench" upon the jurisdiction of the superior courts? *467 In Moore v. Perrott, 2 Wash. 1, 4, 25 Pac. 906 (1891), this court said that: We have consistently adhered to this interpretation (see State v. Schaffer, 31 Wash. 305, 71 Pac. 1088 (1903); State ex rel. Keasal v. Superior Court, 76 Wash. 291, 136 Pac. 147 (1913)), and deem it controlling in the present case. Appellant argues in his reply brief, however (correctly noting that none of the cited cases deals specifically with any attempted grant of criminal felony jurisdiction to the justice courts), notwithstanding such interpretation, that: [2, 3] We are not convinced that appellant's argument states sufficient reason to depart from the clear meaning of the constitutional provision. We hold that the qualifying phrase "not otherwise provided for by law" refers solely to misdemeanors.[1] This interpretation is in accord with the well-settled rule of construction that, where no contrary intention appears, relative and qualifying words and phrases refer, both grammatically and legally, to the last antecedent. See Schneider v. Forcier, 67 Wn.2d 161, 406 P.2d 935 (1965). Appellant next contends that the constitution, in article 4, section 12, provides for the establishment of inferior courts other than justice of the peace courts; that such courts are not subject to the constitutional limitation that the jurisdiction granted shall not trench upon the jurisdiction of the superior and other courts of record (and hence the legislature could vest felony criminal jurisdiction in such courts); and that the original proceeding against appellant in this case was in such an inferior court, i.e. district justice court, established pursuant to Laws of 1961, ch. 299. We need not decide, however, whether appellant is correct in this contention, for if appellant is correct, and such court is not a justice of the peace court (and it certainly is not a "police court"), then the legislature has not attempted to vest jurisdiction over the felony of negligent homicide in such a court. See Laws of 1955, ch. 393, § 4. If such court is a justice of the peace court (and appellant's contention is incorrect), then what we have already said is applicable, *469 and the legislature could not vest jurisdiction over the crime of negligent homicide in such court. [4] We conclude that the district justice court, in which appellant first appeared on the charge of negligent homicide, was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the charge on its merits. It was not a court of "competent jurisdiction." The legislature was without power to confer jurisdiction over the crime, a felony, in a justice of the peace court under our state constitution, article 4, section 10 (amendment 28). Therefore, in so far as it was attempted, by Laws of 1955, ch. 393, § 4, to vest such jurisdiction in justice courts and police courts, such attempt must be deemed ineffective and void.[2] Appellant, not having been once in jeopardy "before a court of competent jurisdiction" was not unconstitutionally placed in jeopardy by his trial on the charge of negligent homicide in superior court.[3] Appellant further assigns error to the court's refusal to grant a mistrial based on the prosecution's demand, made in the presence of the jury, for the production of a written statement by the state's principal witness, McGuinness, which appellant's counsel had in their possession. As was pointed out earlier in this opinion, appellant's main defense was that his companion, McGuinness, and not *470 he, drove the car on the evening and at the time of the accident which resulted in the death of Mr. Apostle. On cross-examination by appellant's counsel, it developed that McGuinness had given to appellant's attorneys a written statement relating to the accident the day following the accident. The first reference to this statement was made by the witness himself, in an unresponsive answer to a question on cross-examination, as follows: The next reference, and the one particularly objected to by appellant, occurred on the redirect examination of the witness, McGuinness, as follows: Thereafter, in the absence of the jury, appellant moved the court to declare a mistrial contending that the demand, in the presence of the jury, unfairly and unconstitutionally prejudiced appellant. The motion was denied, and appellant thereupon moved that the court instruct the jury to disregard the comments of the prosecutor concerning the production of the statement. Regarding this assignment of error, appellant relies chiefly on State v. Jackson, 83 Wash. 514, 516, 145 Pac. 470 (1915), wherein it was held to be reversible error for the prosecutor, in the presence of the court and jury and over the objections of counsel, to demand the production of documents (a statement in writing of a witness) by the accused. The reasoning sustaining the principle was stated to be: *472 However, respondent points out that, in the subsequent case of State v. Lindberg, 125 Wash. 51, 215 Pac. 41 (1923), it was held, at 66, that: [5] The true principle to be gleaned from these decisions, together with others involving the issue presented (e.g. State v. Beck, 56 Wn.2d 474, 349 P.2d 387 (1960); State v. Tanner, 54 Wn.2d 535, 341 P.2d 869 (1959); State v. Morden, 87 Wash. 465, 151 Pac. 832 (1915)) is this: It is improper for the prosecutor, in the presence of the jury, to call upon the defendant or his counsel to produce a document as being in his possession. Such error, however, may be generally cured by proper admonishment or instruction from the court to the jury. *473 It would also seem clear that an accused may waive his objection to such error. See annotation, 110 A.L.R. 101, 106, wherein it is said that: In the present case, although the prosecutor's motion for production was denied by the court, no admonishment was given by the court to the jury, and, although a curative instruction was requested by appellant shortly after the demand was made, none was given by the court. However, appellant's request for an instruction was not later renewed; nor was any exception taken to the court's failure to give such an instruction. Further, near the conclusion of the rebuttal presented by the prosecution, the statement in question was produced by appellant, and McGuinness, who was then on the witness stand, was instructed by defense counsel to read the statement to the jury. After he had done so, he was asked by defense counsel if he wished to revise his testimony on a certain point on which there was a seeming inconsistency between the earlier written statement and his testimony at the trial. In short, appellant sought to impeach the witness, McGuinness, by the use of McGuinness' prior "inconsistent" statement. We cannot but conclude that such an attempt would have been made whether or not the prosecutor had earlier demanded production of the document. Appellant made use of the statement for his own purposes, *474 and not to offset any purported prejudice that might have resulted from the prosecutor's demand. Under the rule quoted above, we hold that appellant waived his right to assign error based on the prosecutor's original demand for the production of the document. This assignment of error, therefore, has been waived by appellant. [6] Appellant next assigns as error the court's permitting the prosecution witness, McGuinness, to testify to the contents of the statement referred to above. The challenged testimony was elicited after the witness, McGuinness, was recalled for additional direct examination after his previous testimony had been attacked on cross-examination by appellant as a recent fabrication. In State v. Pitts, 62 Wn.2d 294, 296, 382 P.2d 508 (1963), we said: The rule is applicable in the present case, and the admission of testimony regarding the witness' prior statement was proper. This assignment of error is likewise without merit. Appellant's next assignment of error relates to a remark by the trial court during cross-examination of McGuinness which appellant contends constituted a comment on the evidence which disparaged appellant's cross-examination of the prosecution's witness in the presence of the jury. The context in which the remark was made was as follows: Article 4, section 16 of the state constitution provides that: [7] In Blackburn v. Groce, 46 Wn.2d 529, 536, 283 P.2d 115 (1955), we noted that it was stated relative to article 4, section 16: In the present case the comment fails the test. The court's comment unmistakably refers to the colloquy between the court and counsel on a collateral matter, and did not relate in any way to what appellant terms the "evasions and inconsistencies" of the witness McGuinness. We *476 cannot but conclude that appellant was not prejudiced by the court's remark, and the assignment of error is without merit. See Blackburn v. Groce, supra. In his next two assignments of error, appellant complains of remarks made by the prosecutor in his closing argument and contends that the court should have instructed the jury to disregard the comment or should have granted a mistrial based upon the prosecutor's misconduct. The statement referred to was as follows: We do not agree with appellant that the statement constitutes a clear expression of personal opinion on the part of the prosecutor. We further conclude that the court's admonition was sufficient to cure any prejudice which could conceivably have resulted from the remarks. The assignment is without merit. The final assignments of error made by appellant relate to appellant's request for and the trial court's refusal to give an instruction bearing on the weight to be given the *477 testimony of an accomplice, it being appellant's contention that the witness, McGuinness, was at least an accomplice. Appellant's requested instruction, which was refused by the court, stated that: The proposed instruction was admittedly based on that proposed by appellant in State v. Pearson, 37 Wash. 405, 415, 79 Pac. 985 (1905), cited by appellant here, wherein this court said: [8] In State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wn.2d 799, 821, 259 P.2d 845 (1953), we held that: The instruction proposed by appellant erroneously states that McGuinness' "participation" with appellant "as a passenger in the defendant's automobile" renders him, in law, an accomplice. The instruction could not properly have been given. McGuinness testified that, immediately after the accident, he urged appellant to stop or to go back, but appellant would not do so. McGuinness' actions thereafter render him, at most, an accessory under RCW 9.01.040. Certainly he is not an accomplice who participated in the commission of the crime. He could not have been indicted for the same crime for which appellant was being tried. We further find that there is corroboration of the witness' testimony through the testimony of Debra Duren, a witness to the accident, who testified that the passenger in the Hillman car wore glasses. (Appellant does not wear glasses. The witness, McGuinness, does.) We hold that the court did not err either in refusing to give appellant's requested instruction, or in failing to give an instruction as to the consideration to be given an accomplice's testimony. Having carefully considered all appellant's assignments of error and finding them to be without merit, we conclude *479 that appellant's conviction, and the judgment and sentence imposed thereon must be, and hereby are, affirmed.[4] All Concur. January 10, 1968. Petition for rehearing denied. [*] Reported in 433 P.2d 884. [1] The differing treatment accorded the matters in Const. art. 4, § 6, may have been due to the differing nature of these matters, i.e. those dealt with in the first portion (separated by commas) are broad areas of law cognizable at common law, while the latter matters (separated by semicolons) are of a special statutory nature. [2] It is not intended, by this opinion, to nullify the statutory provision in its entirety. It is repugnant to the constitution only in so far as it purports to vest felony jurisdiction in the justice of the peace and police courts. The enactment has the further effect of giving police courts the jurisdiction to hear and determine criminal actions for violations of the state motor vehicle code. This power did not exist prior to the 1955 enactment, and this grant of jurisdiction is not affected by this opinion. See AGO 61-62 No. 116. [3] We should hasten to point out that the procedure followed in this case, i.e. the filing of a complaint containing two counts, ostensibly for the purpose of a preliminary hearing only on the first count, but a full trial on the merits as to the second count is wholly undesirable, and is not to be deemed to have received sanction by this opinion. While we perceive no harm under all the circumstances of this case, it should be realized that the procedure is fraught with dangers, and prejudice may readily be found to exist under slightly different circumstances. [4] We have given consideration to respondent's motion for an order striking appellant's reply brief. The motion is denied.