Title: Berry v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 545, 2012
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 3, 2013

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WILLIAM A. BERRY,  
§ 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 545, 2012  
 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
§ 
 
Appellant 
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Court Below:  Superior Court  
 
  
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and  
v.  
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for New Castle County  
 
 
§  
 
STATE OF DELAWARE 
§  
ID No. 1106011736 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
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Appellee 
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Submitted:  February 22, 2013 
Decided:  April 3, 2013 
 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.  
 
O R D E R 
 
On this 3rd day of April 2013, it appears to the Court that:  
(1)  Defendant-below/Appellant William A. Berry appeals from a Superior 
Court jury conviction of Aggravated Menacing, Possession of a Firearm During 
the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”) and Possession of a Firearm by a Person 
Prohibited (“PFPP”).  Berry claims the trial court erred in finding that the out-of-
court statements admitted into evidence under 11 Del. C. § 3507 were voluntary.  
Berry also claims the trial court erred in admitting the out-of-court statement of 
Anthony Monroe Jr. (“Junior”) under § 3507 as the foundational requirements 
were not met.  We find no merit to Berry’s appeal and affirm.  
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(2)  In June of 2011, Berry and his paramour, Dina Laws, drove to the home 
of Anthony Monroe, Sr. (“Senior”).  Berry accused Senior of taking his property 
and demanded it back.  Senior denied the accusation and Berry drove away.  
Sometime later, Senior’s son, Junior, noticed Berry had returned.  Senior went 
outside to confront Berry.  An argument ensued.  Berry threatened to shoot Senior, 
and asked Laws to bring him his handgun.  Laws handed Berry a black bag from 
which Berry pulled a handgun and pointed it at Senior.  Senior struggled with 
Berry over the gun and the weapon discharged.  No one was injured.  Det. Michael 
Bradshaw was assigned to investigate the incident.  During the investigation, he 
interviewed Senior and Junior and recorded statements from each about the 
incident.  
(3)  Berry was charged with two counts of Reckless Endangering First 
Degree, Aggravated Menacing, three counts of each PFDCF, PFPP and Possession 
of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited (“PAPP”).  During the trial, the State called 
Junior and Senior to the witness stand.  Junior testified that he had no memory of 
the events.  Junior said that the police “made” him leave his girlfriend’s graduation 
party to go to the police station and make a statement and he acknowledged that he 
was driven to the station by his mother and that he told the police the truth.  
Specifically, the record shows the following exchange: 
Prosecutor:  I’m going to ask you now.  On June 12, 2011, what 
happened while you were there that made the police want to 
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talk to you? 
Junior:  They wanted me to tell what’s going on.  But I honestly 
don’t remember.  That was six, seven months ago.  
… 
Prosecutor:  And you voluntarily answered [Det. Bradshaw’s] 
questions? 
Junior:  No.  I was forced to.  I didn’t want to go out there and 
make a statement at all.  I was forced to.  
Prosecutor:  Were you under arrest when you spoke to him? 
Junior:  It made it seem like I was going to be arrested.  I had to 
leave my girlfriend’s party.  I just got there and had to leave 
early and make a statement.  I didn’t want to.  My mother asked 
him, “Do we have to come down?”  He said, “Yes, you have to 
come down.  You can come by the cops, or your Mom can 
bring you voluntarily.”  I said, “I’ll have my Mom do it.” 
Prosecutor:  So you went voluntarily with your mother? 
Junior:  Right. 
Prosecutor:  And then you spoke voluntarily with Det. 
Bradshaw?  
Junior:  Right. 
… 
Prosecutor:  Let me just ask you this, plain and simple.  When 
you were questioned by the police officer and asked these 
questions, did you answer them voluntarily? 
Junior:  Yes. 
Prosecutor:  You did? 
Junior:  Yes. 
4 
 
 (4)   “Our review of a ruling on the admissibility of a Section 3507 
statement is for abuse of discretion.”1  Title 11, Section 3507 states in relevant part:  
(a) In a criminal prosecution, the voluntary out-of-court prior 
statement of a witness who is present and subject to cross-
examination may be used as affirmative evidence with 
substantive independent testimonial value. 
(b) The rule in subsection (a) of this section shall apply 
regardless of whether the witness' in-court testimony is 
consistent with the prior statement or not. The rule shall 
likewise apply with or without a showing of surprise by the 
introducing party.2 
“The draftsmen of § 3507 expressly contemplated a circumstance where a witness 
voluntarily gives a prior statement but later denies the substance of the statement at 
trial.”3  In Woodlin v. State, we reiterated the foundational requirements for the 
admission of a § 3507 statement: 
The basic procedure for admitting a statement under section 
3507 was first announced ... in Keys v. State [337 A.2d 18 
(Del.1975) ]. In [Keys], we held: “In order to offer the out-of-
court statement of a witness, the Statute requires [that] the 
direct examination of the declarant ... [touch on] both the events 
perceived or heard and the out-of-court statement itself.” Three 
weeks later, we supplemented Keys in Hatcher v. State [337 
A.2d 30 (Del.1975) ], where we addressed another foundational 
requirement for the admission of a witness' statement pursuant 
to section 3507–voluntariness.... In Ray v. State [587 A.2d 439 
(Del.1991) ], we also explained (and cited Johnson) in holding 
in order to conform to the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an 
                                          
 
1 Johnson v. State, 878 A.2d 422, 427 (Del. 2005) (citing Barnes v. State, 858 A.2d 942, 944 
(Del. 2004)).  
2 11 Del. C. § 3507.  
3 Collins v. State, 56 A.3d 1012, 1018 (Del. 1012) (citing Johnson v. State, 338 A.2d 124, 127 
(Del. 1975).  
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accused's right to confront witnesses against him, the declarant 
must also be subject to cross-examination on the content of the 
statement as well as its truthfulness.4 
(5)  In his opening brief, Berry argued that Senior’s prior, out-of-court 
statement was involuntarily made.  But, in his reply brief, Berry acknowledged that 
his trial counsel withdrew any objection to the admissibility of Senior’s prior 
statement.  Berry now concedes he is not entitled to review of his challenge to 
Senior’s prior statement, and we do not consider it.5   
(6)  Berry claims that Junior’s prior, out-of-court statement was improperly 
admitted under § 3507 because it was involuntarily given and his testimony did not 
touch on the events perceived. Though Junior’s testimony is inconsistent, he 
ultimately acknowledged that he voluntarily spoke to the police.  When directly 
questioned on the issue of whether he spoke voluntarily, Junior answered “Yes.”  
The trial judge also reviewed the videotape of Junior’s statement and determined 
that “[i]t’s clear from the tape that [Junior’s] conversation with the police was 
voluntary.”  On this record, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to 
find Junior’s statement was voluntary. 
(7)  Junior’s testimony also touched on the events he perceived.  He gave an 
                                          
 
4 Woodlin v. State, 3 A.3d 1084, 1087 (Del. 2010) (internal citations omitted)).   
5 Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4.  (“[T]he State is correct that Mr. Berry is not entitled to review on 
this claim.”)  See Williams v. State, 34 A.3d 1096, 1098 (Del. 2011) (finding that when defense 
counsel fails to object or withdraws an objection in the face of a known justiciable issue, he or 
she intentionally relinquishes a known right and therefore waives judicial review); Hickman v. 
State, 801 A.2d 10, 2002 WL 1272154, at *1 (Del. 2002) (finding that defense counsel’s tactical 
decision to not raise an objection waived judicial review).   
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out-of-court statement recalling certain events, and then when he was on the 
witness stand he claimed he had no memory of those same events when questioned 
about them.  Berry argues this case is similar to Ray v. State, in which this Court 
found that the testimony of a victim of sexual assault who refused to testify as to 
her attack did not touch on the events perceived.6  We disagree.  In this case, Junior 
was a turncoat witness.  As we said in Johnson v. State, “[T]here is nothing in the 
Statute or its intent which prohibits the admission of the statements on the basis of 
limited courtroom recall.”7 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.  
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                          
 
6 Ray v. State, 587 A.2d 439, 443-444 (Del. 1991).  
7 Johnson v. State, 338 A.2d at 127.  See also Collins v. State, 56 A.3d 1012 (Del. 2012); Turner 
v. State, 5 A.3d 612 (Del. 2010); Hall v. State, 788 A.2d 118 (Del. 2001).