Title: Kirkley v. Tyson Foods, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1110931
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 24, 2013

REL: 05/24/2013 
Notice: T h i s 
o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l 
r e v i s i o n b e f o r e 
p u b l i c a t i o n i n 
t h e advance 
s h e e t s o f 
Southern Reporter. 
R e a d e r s a r e 
r e q u e s t e d t o 
n o t i f y t h e 
Reporter of Decisions, 
Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229¬
0 6 4 9 ) , o f 
any 
t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n 
o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may 
be 
made b e f o r e 
t h e o p i n i o n i s 
p r i n t e d i n 
Southern Reporter. 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 
1110931 
Ex parte Tyson Foods, Inc., 
e t a l . 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
(In re: 
Reba K i r k l e y , as administratrix of 
the 
estate of 
A l l e n Hayes, deceased 
v. 
Tyson Foods, Inc., 
e t a l . ) 
(Blount C i r c u i t Court, CV-2008-900082) 
MOORE, C h i e f 
J u s t i c e . 
Tyson Foods, I n c . , 
R i c k y 
Walker, and Mike 
G r a f f i n o 
( h e r e i n a f t e r 
r e f e r r e d 
t o 
c o l l e c t i v e l y 
as " t h e Tyson 
1110931 
p e t i t i o n e r s " ) p e t i t i o n 
t h i s 
C o u r t 
f o r a w r i t 
of mandamus 
d i r e c t i n g the B l o u n t 
C i r c u i t C o u r t t o d i s m i s s Reba K i r k l e y ' s 
a c t i o n 
a g a i n s t 
them, 
b r o u g h t 
i n 
her 
c a p a c i t y 
as 
a d m i n i s t r a t r i x , i . e . , p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , of her f a t h e r ' s 
e s t a t e , on the g r o u n d t h a t K i r k l e y l a c k s s t a n d i n g . Because the 
Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s have not d e m o n s t r a t e d a c l e a r l e g a l r i g h t t o 
the remedy t h e y seek, we deny the 
p e t i t i o n . 
I . F a c t u a l and P r o c e d u r a l 
H i s t o r y 
On 
A p r i l 
15, 
2008, 
A l l e n Hayes 
d i e d 
i n 
a 
w o r k p l a c e 
a c c i d e n t a t the Tyson Foods p l a n t i n B l o u n t County. Hayes, 
who 
was 
w o r k i n g as a s e c u r i t y g u a r d , was 
h i t by a t r a c t o r b e i n g 
o p e r a t e d by 
an employee of Tyson Foods. H i s widow 
M i l d r e d 
Hayes 
c o l l e c t e d $40,964.19 
i n w o r k e r s ' compensation 
d e a t h 
b e n e f i t s a g a i n s t the a c c o u n t of DSI S e c u r i t y S e r v i c e s , A l l e n ' s 
employer 
a t 
the 
time 
of 
the 
a c c i d e n t . 
On 
June 
26, 
2008, 
K i r k l e y , 
the 
p e r s o n a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of A l l e n ' s e s t a t e 
and 
A l l e n and M i l d r e d ' s d a u g h t e r , 
f i l e d a w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n 
a g a i n s t the Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s , who 
answered and removed 
the 
case t o f e d e r a l c o u r t . In e a r l y March 2011, 
the f e d e r a l c o u r t 
remanded the case t o s t a t e c o u r t . S i x months l a t e r , the Tyson 
p e t i t i o n e r s 
f i l e d amended answers and a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s 
on 
2 
1110931 
the b a s i s t h a t K i r k l e y l a c k e d s t a n d i n g t o b r i n g t h e w r o n g f u l -
d e a t h a c t i o n . The t r i a l j u d g e , on K i r k l e y ' s m o t i o n , s t r u c k t h e 
amended answers and d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s . The Tyson 
p e t i t i o n e r s t h e n sought a w r i t o f mandamus from t h i s C o u r t . 
N e i t h e r 
a w r o n g f u l - d e a t h 
a c t i o n 
nor an 
a c t i o n f o r 
w o r k e r s ' compensation d e a t h b e n e f i t s e x i s t e d a t common law. 
B o t h a r e p u r e l y 
s t a t u t o r y 
causes o f a c t i o n .
1 The 
s t a t u t e 
p r o v i d i n g f o r 
a w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n , § 6-5-410(a), A l a . Code 
1975, a l l o w s o n l y a p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e deceased's 
e s t a t e t o b r i n g such an a c t i o n . The w o r k e r s ' compensation 
s t a t u t e , by c o n t r a s t , a l l o w s t h e 
deceased employee's 
p e r s o n a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o b r i n g a t h i r d - p a r t y a c t i o n o n l y when t h e 
c o v e r e d 
employee 
d i e s 
w i t h o u t dependents. 
I f dependents 
s u r v i v e , t h e r i g h t t o sue t h i r d p a r t i e s a l l e g i n g t h e 
w r o n g f u l 
d e a t h o f t h e employee 
l i e s s o l e l y w i t h them. § 25-5-11, 
A l a . 
Code 1975; Tucker v. Molden, 761 So. 2d 996, 998 ( A l a . 2000); 
and Johnson v. H u x f o r d P o l e & Timber Co., 983 So. 2d 
1133, 
1138-39 ( A l a . 
C i v . 
App. 2007). Under t h e 
w o r k e r s ' compensation 
s t a t u t e , 
A l l e n had o n l y one dependent a t t h e time o f 
h i s 
1 " T h e r e was no r i g h t t o r e c o v e r f o r d e a t h a t common 
l a w . " 
A k i n s v. Drummond Co., 628 So. 2d 591, 592 ( A l a . 1993). 
3 
1110931 
d e a t h - - h i s w i f e M i l d r e d . K i r k l e y , b e i n g over t h e age o f 19 and 
not 
i n c a p a c i t a t e d 
a t t h e time o f A l l e n ' s 
d e a t h , d i d n o t 
q u a l i f y as a dependent. §§ 25-5-61 and -65, A l a . 
Code 1975. 
T h i s " q u i r k , " as t h e Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s d e s c r i b e 
i t , meant t h a t 
K i r k l e y 
d i d n o t q u a l i f y t o p r o s e c u t e 
t h e w r o n g f u l - d e a t h 
a c t i o n . 
In November 2011, the Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s f o r t h e 
f i r s t 
time b r o u g h t t h i s 
f a c t t o t h e a t t e n t i o n o f K i r k l e y and t h e 
t r i a l 
c o u r t i n t h e i r 
f i r s t amended answers and a companion 
m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s . E m p h a s i z i n g t h a t t h e 
w r o n g f u l - d e a t h s t a t u t e 
had a s p e c i f i c two-year s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s , 
§ 6-5-410(d), 
A l a . Code 1975, t h e Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s argued t h a t the time i n 
w h i c h M i l d r e d 
c o u l d be s u b s t i t u t e d as t h e p l a i n t i f f i n t h e 
w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n had e x p i r e d . Thus, t h e y contended, t h e 
t r i a l c o u r t had no c h o i c e b u t t o d i s m i s s t h e a c t i o n f o r l a c k 
of a p r o p e r 
p l a i n t i f f . 
K i r k l e y responded t h a t t h e Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s ' 
r e q u e s t 
f o r 
a d i s m i s s a l was b a r r e d by t h e d o c t r i n e o f l a c h e s because t h e y 
d i d n o t a s s e r t t h e i r r i g h t s u n t i l a f t e r t h e two-year s t a t u t e 
of l i m i t a t i o n s f o r a w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n had e x p i r e d . She 
a l s o asked t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o add M i l d r e d as a p l a i n t i f f under 
4 
1110931 
R u l e 
1 7 ( a ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., and t o e x e r c i s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n 
under R u l e 
1 5 ( a ) , A l a . 
R. C i v . 
P., t o s t r i k e t h e amended 
answers. 
On March 7, 2012, t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t 
s t r u c k t h e Tyson 
p e t i t i o n e r s ' amended answers, d e n i e d t h e i r motion t o d i s m i s s , 
and g r a n t e d K i r k l e y ' s m o t i o n t o 
add M i l d r e d as a p l a i n t i f f . On 
A p r i l 18, 2012, 
t h e Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s 
f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r a 
w r i t o f 
mandamus i n 
t h i s C o u r t , s e e k i n g an o r d e r d i r e c t i n g t h e 
t r i a l c o u r t t o d i s m i s s t h e case. The Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s argued 
t h a t K i r k l e y l a c k e d s t a n d i n g t o p r o s e c u t e t h e w r o n g f u l - d e a t h 
a c t i o n and t h a t t h e 
motion t o 
add M i l d r e d as a p l a i n t i f f came 
too l a t e . 
I I . S t a n d a r d o f Review 
T h i s C o u r t has p r e v i o u s l y a l l o w e d mandamus r e v i e w t o hear 
a 
c h a l l e n g e t o s t a n d i n g . See, e.g., Ex p a r t e 
H e a l t h S o u t h 
Corp. , 974 So. 2d 288 ( A l a . 2007); Ex p a r t e C h e m i c a l Waste 
Mgmt., I n c . , 929 So. 2d 1007, 1010 ( A l a . 2005) . The t h r e s h o l d 
f o r g r a n t i n g t h e p e t i t i o n , however, i s h i g h : 
"Mandamus i s 
a d r a s t i c and e x t r a o r d i n a r y w r i t , 
t o be i s s u e d o n l y where t h e r e i s (1) a c l e a r 
l e g a l 
r i g h t i n 
t h e p e t i t i o n e r t o t h e o r d e r sought; (2) 
an 
i m p e r a t i v e 
d u t y 
upon t h e r e s p o n d e n t t o 
p e r f o r m , 
accompanied by a r e f u s a l t o do so; (3) t h e l a c k o f 
5 
1110931 
a n o t h e r adequate remedy; and (4) p r o p e r l y 
i n v o k e d 
j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e c o u r t . " 
Ex p a r t e I n t e g o n , 672 So. 2d 497, 499 ( A l a . 1995). 
I I I . 
A n a l y s i s 
A. 
C l e a r L e g a l R i g h t t o Order Sought: S t a n d i n g v. C a p a c i t y 
The 
Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s ' r e q u e s t f o r r e l i e f 
i m p l i c a t e s a 
l e g a l 
q u e s t i o n 
t h i s 
C o u r t 
has 
r e f e r r e d 
t o as " t h e 
s t a n d i n g / c a p a c i t y dichotomy." D a n i e l v. O.F. R i c h t e r & Sons, 
I n c . , 385 So. 2d 1308, 1309 ( A l a . 
1980) 
. I f t h e i s s u e o f 
K i r k l e y ' s 
r i g h t t o f i l e a w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n i s one o f 
c a p a c i t y under R u l e 17, A l a . R. C i v . 
P., as she argues, r a t h e r 
than a q u e s t i o n o f s t a n d i n g , as t h e 
Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s i n s i s t , 
then 
K i r k l e y may 
w e l l 
p r e v a i l . 
Lack o f c a p a c i t y 
i s an 
a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e t h a t i s w a i v e d i f n o t r a i s e d
2 and 
i s o f t e n 
c u r a b l e .
3 Lack o f s t a n d i n g , however, cannot be w a i v e d and 
can 
2"When a p a r t y d e s i r e s t o r a i s e an i s s u e as t o t h e ... 
c a p a c i t y o f any p a r t y t o 
sue ... 
, t h e 
p a r t y d e s i r i n g t o r a i s e 
the i s s u e s h a l l do so 
by s p e c i f i c n e g a t i v e averment 
" R u l e 
9 ( a ) , 
A l a . 
R. C i v . 
P. 
3See 
R u l e 
1 7 ( a ) , 
A l a . R. C i v . P. 
( p r o v i d i n g 
t h a t 
s u b s t i t u t i o n o f t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t " s h a l l have t h e 
same e f f e c t as i f t h e 
a c t i o n had 
been commenced i n 
t h e 
name 
o f 
the r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t " ) . 
6 
1110931 
be r a i s e d a t any t i m e . Sexton v. Bass Comfort C o n t r o l , I n c . , 
63 So. 3d 656, 664 ( A l a . C i v . 
App. 2 0 1 0 ) .
4 
T h i s 
C o u r t has p r e v i o u s l y 
s t a t e d 
t h a t 
"the Workers' 
Compensation Chapter 
l i m i t s 
s t a n d i n g t o sue t o the i n j u r e d 
employee h i m s e l f o r h e r s e l f o r h i s o r h e r dependents 
" 
Tucker v. Molden, 761 So. 2d a t 998 (emphasis added). That 
s t a t e m e n t , however, was 
d i c t u m , 
u n n e c e s s a r y t o t h e i s s u e 
d e c i d e d i n Tucker. No p a r t y d i s p u t e d 
t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f i n 
Tucker had s t a n d i n g ; 
nor d i d Tucker 
d i s c u s s 
c a p a c i t y . By 
c o n t r a s t , i n 
Alabama Power Co. v. White, 377 So. 2d 930 ( A l a . 
1979), t h i s C o u r t e x p r e s s l y h e l d t h a t s u r v i v i n g dependents o f 
a deceased employee have the c a p a c i t y t o b r i n g an a c t i o n and 
4 J u s t i c e 
Lyons, 
a t t e m p t i n g 
t o c l a r i f y t h e 
d i s t i n c t i o n 
between 
l a c k o f c a p a c i t y 
( c u r a b l e ) 
and l a c k o f 
s t a n d i n g 
( i n c u r a b l e ) , n o t e d t h a t " [ i ] m p r e c i s i o n i n l a b e l i n g a p a r t y ' s 
i n a b i l i t y 
t o p r o c e e d as a s t a n d i n g 
p r o b l e m 
u n n e c e s s a r i l y 
expands t h e u n i v e r s e 
o f cases 
l a c k i n g i n 
s u b j e c t - m a t t e r 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . " Hamm v. N o r f o l k S. Ry., 52 So. 3d 484, 499 
( A l a . 2010) (Lyons, J . , 
c o n c u r r i n g s p e c i a l l y ) . An Alabama law 
p r o f e s s o r r e c e n t l y argued t h a t s t a n d i n g , i f 
c a s u a l l y i n v o k e d , 
may w r o n g l y t r e a t a c u r a b l e c a p a c i t y q u e s t i o n as an i n c u r a b l e 
s t a n d i n g 
i s s u e , thus " r e n d e r i n g t h e f i l i n g o f i l l - c o n c e i v e d 
but 
not 
i r r e d e e m a b l e 
p r i v a t e 
law 
c o m p l a i n t s 
n o t 
m e r e l y 
m i s t a k e n 
a c t s , 
r e p a r a b l e by amendment, b u t v o i d a c t s , n o t 
r e p a r a b l e by amendment." Jerome A. Hoffman, The 
M a l i g n a n t 
 
M y s t i q u e o f " S t a n d i n g , " 73 A l a . Law. 360, 362 
(2012). 
7 
1110931 
t h a t a d e f e n d a n t w a i v e s t h e c h a l l e n g e 
t o c a p a c i t y by n o t 
r a i s i n g i t . 
"[W]e 
h o l d t h a t § 2 5 - 5 - 1 1 ( a ) [ , A l a . Code 1975,] by 
the p h r a s e 'the 
employee, o r h i s dependents i n case 
of h i s d e a t h , may p r o c e e d 
a g a i n s t 
t h e employer' 
g i v e s 
t o t h e dependents CAPACITY t o b r i n g 
s u i t 
a g a i n s t t h e 
employer under c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
We 
h o l d t h a t dependency i s c a p a c i t y under § 25-5-11(a) 
w h i c h must be d e n i e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t by s p e c i f i c 
n e g a t i v e averment 
" 
377 
So. 2d a t 936. As d i s c u s s e d 
below, 
o t h e r 
cases a r e 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s 
h o l d i n g . 
In B o a r d o f Water & Sewer Commissioners o f t h e C i t y o f 
M o b i l e v. McDonald, 56 A l a . App. 426, 322 So. 2d 717 ( C i v . 
App. 
1975), t h e 
p l a i n t i f f , f a c i n g a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s f o r l a c k 
of s t a n d i n g , sought t o amend t h e c o m p l a i n t t o j o i n h i s w i f e , 
the 
a c t u a l owner o f t h e p r o p e r t y a t i s s u e , as a 
p l a i n t i f f . 
R u l e 1 7 ( a ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., s t a t e s : 
"No a c t i o n s h a l l be d i s m i s s e d on t h e ground t h a t 
i t 
i s n o t p r o s e c u t e d i n 
t h e 
name o f t h e r e a l p a r t y i n 
i n t e r e s t 
u n t i l a r e a s o n a b l e time has been 
a l l o w e d 
a f t e r o b j e c t i o n f o r 
r a t i f i c a t i o n o f commencement o f 
the 
a c t i o n by, o r j o i n d e r o r s u b s t i t u t i o n o f , t h e 
r e a l 
p a r t y 
i n i n t e r e s t ; and such 
r a t i f i c a t i o n , 
j o i n d e r , o r s u b s t i t u t i o n s h a l l have t h e 
same e f f e c t 
as i f 
t h e a c t i o n had been commenced i n 
t h e 
name o f 
the r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t . " 
R u l e 17 a l l o w s t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n o r j o i n d e r o f p l a i n t i f f s i n 
the same way t h a t R u l e 15, A l a . 
R. C i v . 
P., p e r m i t s t h e 
8 
1110931 
s u b s t i t u t i o n o f d e f e n d a n t s t o r e l a t e back t o t h e date o f 
t h e 
f i l i n g o f t h e o r i g i n a l p l e a d i n g . See R u l e 17, A l a . R. C i v . P. 
(Committee Comments on 1973 A d o p t i o n ) . 
N o t i n g t h e a d m o n i t i o n 
i n R u l e 15 t h a t "amendments a r e 
t o 
be a l l o w e d 
' f r e e l y ... when 
j u s t i c e so r e q u i r e s , ' " McDonald, 56 A l a . App. a t 429, 322 So. 
2d a t 720, t h e C o u r t o f C i v i l A p p e a l s h e l d t h a t "the 
amendment 
was p r o p e r l y a l l o w e d even i f i t 
worked t o a v o i d t h e s t a t u t e o f 
l i m i t a t i o n s . " 56 A l a . App. a t 430, 322 So. 2d a t 720. The 
c o u r t 
a p p l i e d 
t h e 
c o n d i t i o n s 
on t h e 
r e l a t i o n 
back o f 
amendments t o d e f e n d a n t s under R u l e 15(c) 
t o t h e a d d i t i o n o f 
a r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t as a p l a i n t i f f under R u l e 
1 7 ( a ) : 
"An 
amendment c h a n g i n g 
p a r t i e s 
p l a i n t i f f 
r e l a t e s 
back i f 
t h e c l a i m o f t h e new p a r t y a r o s e out o f 
t h e 
same t r a n s a c t i o n , conduct o r o c c u r r e n c e as t h a t s e t 
f o r t h 
i n t h e 
o r i g i n a l 
p l e a d i n g , 
and 
i f t h e 
d e f e n d a n t , 
w i t h i n t h e p e r i o d p r o v i d e d by law 
f o r 
commencing t h e a c t i o n a g a i n s t him (1) has r e c e i v e d 
such n o t i c e o f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n t h a t he 
w i l l not 
be p r e j u d i c e d i n 
m a i n t a i n i n g h i s 
defense on 
the m e r i t s , and (2) knew o r s h o u l d have known t h a t , 
but f o r a m i s t a k e c o n c e r n i n g t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e 
p r o p e r p a r t y , t h e s u b s t i t u t e d o r j o i n e d p a r t y would 
have b r o u g h t t h e a c t i o n a g a i n s t him." 
McDonald, 56 A l a . App. a t 430, 322 So. 2d a t 721. The c o u r t 
then quoted " t h e sense o f t h e r u l e " from a l e a d i n g 
t r e a t i s e : 
"'As 
l o n g as d e f e n d a n t i s f u l l y 
a p p r i s e d o f t h e 
c l a i m a r i s i n g from s p e c i f i e d conduct and has 
f u l l y 
p r e p a r e d t o d e f e n d t h e a c t i o n 
a g a i n s t 
him, h i s 
9 
1110931 
a b i l i t y t o 
p r o t e c t h i m s e l f w i l l n o t 
be p r e j u d i c i a l l y 
a f f e c t e d i f 
a new p l a i n t i f f i s 
added, and 
he s h o u l d 
not be p e r m i t t e d t o i n v o k e a l i m i t a t i o n s d e f e n s e . ' " 
I d . 
( q u o t i n g 6 C h a r l e s A. W r i g h t & A r t h u r R. M i l l e r , 
F e d e r a l 
P r a c t i c e and Procedure § 1501) 
. F i n a l l y , t h e 
c o u r t a p p l i e d 
t h e 
r e l a t i o n - b a c k r u l e t o 
t h e f a c t s b e f o r e 
i t , h o l d i n g t h a t t h e r e 
was "no change i n t h e c l a i m as o r i g i n a l l y 
f i l e d , " 
t h a t t h e 
d e f e n d a n t "knew o r s h o u l d have known t h a t t h e r e was a m i s t a k e 
i n t h e 
name o f t h e 
p r o p e r p a r t y b r i n g i n g t h e o r i g i n a l c l a i m " 
as was e v i d e n t i n 
t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s own p l e a d i n g , and t h a t t h e 
d e f e n d a n t had s u f f e r e d no p r e j u d i c e . 56 A l a . 
App. a t 431, 
322 
So. 2d a t 
721. 
A p p l y i n g t h e same r e a s o n i n g t o t h i s 
case, we c o n c l u d e 
t h a t t h e 
a d d i t i o n as a p l a i n t i f f o f M i l d r e d , A l l e n ' s dependent 
and t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t , 
c r e a t e d "no change i n 
t h e 
c l a i m as o r i g i n a l l y 
f i l e d . " As i s e v i d e n t i n t h e amended 
answers, t h e 
Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s knew o r s h o u l d have known t h a t 
a m i s t a k e was made " c o n c e r n i n g 
t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e p r o p e r 
p a r t y . " A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e 
Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s 
were n o t p r e j u d i c e d 
i n 
p r e p a r i n g 
t h e i r 
d e f e n s e . 
Thus, 
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g 
t h e 
e x p i r a t i o n o f t h e w r o n g f u l - d e a t h 
s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s , t h e 
10 
1110931 
a d d i t i o n of M i l d r e d as a p l a i n t i f f p r o p e r l y r e l a t e d back t o 
the o r i g i n a l 
p l e a d i n g .
5 
In B l u e S t a r Ready Mix v. C l e v e l a n d , 
473 So. 2d 497, 
499 
( A l a . 
1985), 
t h i s 
C o u r t 
q u o t e d 
the 
McDonald 
a n a l y s i s 
a p p r o v i n g l y a t l e n g t h . In Ex p a r t e S i n g l e t o n , 475 So. 2d 
186, 
189-90 
( A l a . 
1985), 
t h i s 
C o u r t 
a g a i n 
quoted 
s u b s t a n t i a l 
p o r t i o n s 
of McDonald, a p p l y i n g 
i t s p r i n c i p l e s t o a l l o w 
the 
s u b s t i t u t i o n 
of 
a 
r e a l - p a r t y 
a p p e l l a n t . 
In 
H o l y f i e l d 
v. 
 
Moates, 
565 
So. 
2d 
186 
( A l a . 
1990), 
a 
case 
w i t h 
many 
s i m i l a r i t i e s 
t o 
t h i s 
one, 
the 
c i r c u i t 
c o u r t 
d i s m i s s e d 
a 
w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n because the p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
of 
the deceased was, 
c o n t r a r y t o law, a n o n r e s i d e n t 
of Alabama, 
and 
s u b s t i t u t i o n was 
a t t e m p t e d a f t e r the 
l i m i t a t i o n s 
p e r i o d 
5The Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s a l s o argue t h a t the w r o n g f u l - d e a t h 
s t a t u t e 
c o n t a i n s 
i t s own 
l i m i t a t i o n s 
p e r i o d 
and 
t h u s i s a 
" s t a t u t e 
of 
c r e a t i o n " not 
s u b j e c t 
t o 
t o l l i n g . 
See 
§ 
65-5-
4 1 0 ( d ) , A l a . Code 1975; 
C o f e r v. E n s o r , 473 
So. 
2d 984, 
991 
( A l a . 1985). T h i s f a c t , however, does not a f f e c t the c a p a c i t y 
a n a l y s i s . R u l e 17(a) does not t o l l the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s . 
" [ A ] p p l i c a t i o n of r e l a t i o n back does not e x t e n d the 
l i m i t a t i o n 
p e r i o d " but m e r e l y a l l o w s s u b s t i t u t i o n of a p a r t y i n a 
s u i t 
o t h e r w i s e 
t i m e l y 
f i l e d . Chumney v. U.S. 
R e p e a t i n g Arms 
Co., 
196 F.R.D. 419, 
427 
(M.D. 
A l a . 2000). " [ I ] f the e x p i r a t i o n of 
the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s does not bar the c o r r e c t i o n of 
an 
' i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l 
p l e a d i n g 
e r r o r ' from 
r e l a t i n g back, 
then 
n e i t h e r 
does 
the 
e x p i r a t i o n 
of 
a 
s t a t u t e 
of 
c r e a t i o n ' s 
l i m i t a t i o n p e r i o d . " I d . 
11 
1110931 
had 
e x p i r e d . 
T h i s 
C o u r t 
r e v e r s e d 
t h e 
c i r c u i t 
c o u r t ' s 
d i s m i s s a l , n o t i n g t h a t "our 
h o l d i n g i s 
mandated by R u l e 1 7 ( a ) , 
[ A l a . ] R. C i v . P." 565 So. 2d a t 189. 
As a u t h o r i t y , t h i s C o u r t 
q u o t e d a case d e c i d e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o u r t o f A p p e a l s 
f o r 
t h e E l e v e n t h 
C i r c u i t 
i n t e r p r e t i n g and 
a p p l y i n g t h e 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g 
f e d e r a l r u l e : 
"'The 
p l a i n language o f [Rule 17, Fed. R. C i v . 
P.,] 
c l e a r l y p r o v i d e s t h a t when an a c t i o n i s b r o u g h t by 
someone o t h e r than t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t w i t h i n 
the 
l i m i t a t i o n s 
p e r i o d 
and t h e 
r e a l 
p a r t y i n 
i n t e r e s t 
j o i n s o r r a t i f i e s 
t h e a c t i o n 
a f t e r t h e 
l i m i t a t i o n s 
p e r i o d 
has 
r u n , t h e amendment 
o r 
r a t i f i c a t i o n 
r e l a t e s back t o t h e time 
s u i t 
was 
o r i g i n a l l y 
f i l e d 
and t h e 
a c t i o n 
need 
n o t be 
d i s m i s s e d as time b a r r e d . ' " 
565 So. 2d a t 189 ( q u o t i n g Hess v. Eddy, 689 F.2d 977, 980 
(11th C i r . 1 9 8 2 ) ) . 
The 
a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n - b a c k r u l e i s t h e same 
h e r e . 
K i r k l e y , 
a l t h o u g h 
n o t t h e r e a l 
p a r t y i n 
i n t e r e s t , 
b r o u g h t t h e a c t i o n w i t h i n t h e l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d . The a d d i t i o n 
of M i l d r e d as t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t a f t e r t h e l i m i t a t i o n s 
p e r i o d had run thus 
" ' r e l a t e s back t o t h e time 
s u i t was 
o r i g i n a l l y 
f i l e d and t h e a c t i o n need n o t 
be d i s m i s s e d as time 
b a r r e d . ' " See 1991 A d v i s o r y Committee Note t o R u l e 15, Fed. R. 
C i v . P. ( n o t i n g t h a t t h e g o a l o f r e l a t i o n - b a c k p r i n c i p l e s i s 
12 
1110931 
"to 
p r e v e n t p a r t i e s a g a i n s t whom c l a i m s a r e 
made from t a k i n g 
u n j u s t advantage o f o t h e r w i s e i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l p l e a d i n g e r r o r s 
to s u s t a i n a l i m i t a t i o n s 
d e f e n s e " ) . 
The 
t r i a l 
c o u r t p r o p e r l y t r e a t e d K i r k l e y ' s s t a t u s as a 
c a p a c i t y i s s u e and g r a n t e d a c u r a t i v e motion f i l e d p u r s u a n t t o 
R u l e 17, A l a . R. C i v . P., s t a t i n g : " [ K i r k l e y ' s ] M o t i o n t o 
Add 
M i l d r e d Hayes as an A d d i t i o n a l R e a l 
P a r t y i n I n t e r e s t i s 
GRANTED based upon Alabama R u l e o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e 17(A) and 
M i l l e r v. J a c k s o n H o s p i t a l & C l i n i c , 776 So. 2d 122 ( A l a . 
2000)." ( C a p i t a l i z a t i o n i n 
o r i g i n a l . ) I n M i l l e r , an a t t o r n e y -
i n - f a c t , 
p r o c e e d i n g 
under a power o f a t t o r n e y , 
i m p r o p e r l y 
f i l e d an a c t i o n i n 
h i s own name r a t h e r than i n 
t h e 
name o f t h e 
r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t , i . e . , t h e p a r t y who had s u f f e r e d 
t h e 
i n j u r y . 776 So. 2d a t 125-26. The t r i a l 
c o u r t 
r e j e c t e d an 
amendment t o s u b s t i t u t e t h e 
r e a l p a r t y i n 
i n t e r e s t o u t s i d e t h e 
l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d . 776 So. 2d a t 123. T h i s C o u r t 
r e v e r s e d . 
The 
p l u r a l i t y o p i n i o n i n M i l l e r quoted a case o f t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s C o u r t o f A p p e a l s f o r t h e Second 
C i r c u i t : 
"'"The 
s u b s t i t u t i o n o f such 
p a r t i e s 
a f t e r t h e 
a p p l i c a b l e 
s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s may have r u n i s 
not s i g n i f i c a n t when t h e 
change i s m e r e l y f o r m a l and 
i n no way a l t e r s t h e 
known f a c t s and i s s u e s on w h i c h 
the a c t i o n i s 
based. The c o u r t s have f r e e l y 
u p h e l d 
13 
1110931 
the 
f i l i n g 
of 
an 
amended 
c o m p l a i n t 
under 
t h e s e 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . " ' " 
776 
So. 
2d 
a t 
127 
( q u o t i n g 
Advanced 
M a g n e t i c s , 
I n c . 
v. 
B a y f r o n t 
P a r t n e r s , 
I n c . , 
106 
F.3d 
11, 
19 
(2d C i r . 1997), 
q u o t i n g i n t u r n S t a r e n v. American N a t ' l Bank & T r u s t Co., 
529 
F.2d 
1257, 
1263 
(7th C i r . 
1 9 7 6 ) ) . 
The 
p l u r a l i t y o p i n i o n i n M i l l e r n o t e d t h a t the m o t i o n t o 
d i s m i s s 
" ' f o r l a c k of s t a n d i n g ' " 
i n Advanced M a g n e t i c s 
was 
r e a l l y a c l a i m t h a t the named p l a i n t i f f was not the r e a l p a r t y 
i n 
i n t e r e s t . 
776 
So. 
2d 
a t 
127. 
As 
such, 
" ' t h e r e 
p l a i n l y 
s h o u l d be no d i s m i s s a l where " s u b s t i t u t i o n of the r e a l 
p a r t y 
i n i n t e r e s t i s n e c e s s a r y t o a v o i d i n j u s t i c e . " ' " I d . 
( q u o t i n g 
Advanced M a g n e t i c s , 106 F.3d 
a t 20). The 
p l u r a l i t y n o t e d t h a t 
the 
p l a i n t i f f 
i n M i l l e r 
had 
f i l e d 
the 
c o m p l a i n t 
under 
the 
" m i s t a k e n b e l i e f " t h a t he c o u l d r e p r e s e n t 
the 
r e a l p a r t y i n 
i n t e r e s t and 
t h a t the e r r o r was 
not 
d e l i b e r a t e and 
d i d 
not 
m i s l e a d 
the 
d e f e n d a n t 
i n 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
the 
c l a i m . 
I d . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , s u b s t i t u t i o n would be a l l o w e d under R u l e 17, 
and 
the 
c l a i m would 
r e l a t e back 
t o 
the 
date 
of 
the 
o r i g i n a l 
f i l i n g , even though the l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d had r u n . 
I d . 
The 
M i l l e r 
o p i n i o n 
a l s o 
s t a t e d 
t h a t 
s u b s t i t u t i o n 
was 
v a l i d where a " j u r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p " e x i s t e d between the 
p a r t y 
14 
1110931 
t h a t commenced t h e a c t i o n and t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t . 776 
So. 
2d a t 126.
6 I n t h i s 
case, 
K i r k l e y , 
as t h e p e r s o n a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f A l l e n ' s 
e s t a t e , had a " j u r a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p " 
w i t h M i l d r e d , a dependent o f A l l e n ' s 
and a b e n e f i c i a r y 
who 
would be a r e c i p i e n t o f any funds r e c o v e r e d i n 
t h e w r o n g f u l -
d e a t h 
a c t i o n . 
"Because 
mandamus 
i s an 
e x t r a o r d i n a r y 
remedy, t h e 
s t a n d a r d by w h i c h t h i s C o u r t r e v i e w s a p e t i t i o n f o r 
t h e w r i t 
of mandamus i s t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t has 
c l e a r l y 
[exceeded] 
i t s d i s c r e t i o n . " Ex p a r t e 
F l i n t 
C o n s t r .  
Co., 
775 So. 2d 805, 808 
( A l a . 
2000) . Because t h e 
t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s g r a n t i n g t h e motion t o add M i l d r e d as a 
p l a i n t i f f 
under R u l e 17 was p r o p e r , t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d 
n o t exceed i t s 
d i s c r e t i o n i n a d d i n g M i l d r e d as t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t . 
B. T r i a l C o u r t ' s D i s c r e t i o n t o S t r i k e Amended Answers 
The 
Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s d i d 
not r a i s e a s t a n d i n g / c a p a c i t y 
d e f e n s e 
u n t i l 
t h e y 
f i l e d 
t h e i r 
f i r s t 
amended answers on 
November 8, 2011, 
over t h r e e y e a r s a f t e r t h e case began. They 
a s s e r t e d i n t h o s e 
answers 
" t h a t 
[ K i r k l e y ] 
does n o t have 
6 " [ O ] u r r e l a t i o n s t o our f e l l o w men a r e commonly 
c a l l e d 
l e g a l (or j u r a l ) 
r e l a t i o n s . " A r t h u r C o r b i n , 
J u r a l 
R e l a t i o n s  
and 
T h e i r C l a s s i f i c a t i o n , 30 Y a l e L . J . 226, 227 (1921). 
15 
1110931 
s t a n d i n g o r c a p a c i t y t o b r i n g t h i s a c t i o n . " T h e i r 
o r i g i n a l 
answers, 
f i l e d 
J u l y 30, 2008, d i d not r a i s e t h e i s s u e o f 
s t a n d i n g 
o r 
c a p a c i t y . 
The 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
was 
w i t h i n i t s 
d i s c r e t i o n t o s t r i k e t h e f i r s t amended answers on t h e grounds 
of undue d e l a y and a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e . As t h e c o u r t s t a t e d : 
"6. Alabama Rule o f C i v i l 
P r o c e d u r e 15 a l l o w s t h e 
C o u r t 
d i s c r e t i o n t o s t r i k e Amended Answers, 
e i t h e r 
upon i t s own motion o r by motion o f a n o t h e r 
p a r t y , 
when t h e p r o p o s e d amendment would r e s u l t i n a c t u a l 
p r e j u d i c e t o t h e o p p o s i n g 
p a r t y o r f o r r e a s o n s o f 
undue d e l a y . 
"7. The [Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s ] u n d u l y d e l a y e d 
f i l i n g 
t h e i r 
F i r s t Amended Answers. The d e l a y o f y e a r s i s 
i n e x c u s a b l e and would cause a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e on t h e 
o p p o s i n g 
p a r t y . " 
The 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e a s o n i n g echoes t h i s C o u r t ' s s t a n d a r d f o r 
u p h o l d i n g t h e s t r i k i n g o f an amendment t o a p l e a d i n g . "The 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
a c t s 
w i t h i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n 
so 
l o n g 
as 
i t s 
d i s a l l o w a n c e o f t h e amendment t o t h e p l e a d i n g s i s 
based upon 
some v a l i d ground, such as a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e o r undue d e l a y . " 
Ex p a r t e Thomas, 628 So. 2d 483, 486 ( A l a . 1993). 
The Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s ' motion t o d i s m i s s on a l i m i t a t i o n s 
ground i s p r i m a f a c i e e v i d e n c e o f a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e . The l e n g t h 
of 
t h e 
d e l a y 
i n 
f i l i n g 
t h e amended 
answers 
i s 
a l s o 
i n d i s p u t a b l e . The t r i a l c o u r t a c t e d w e l l w i t h i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n 
16 
1110931 
i n d e c i d i n g t o s t r i k e t h e amended answers and t o deny t h e 
m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s . See Thomas, 628 So. 2d a t 486 ( f i n d i n g t h a t 
d e l a y o f seven t o e i g h t months j u s t i f i e d c o u r t ' s 
r e f u s a l t o 
p e r m i t amendment t o p l e a d i n g s ) . 
IV. 
C o n c l u s i o n 
The 
t r i a l 
c o u r t p r o p e r l y added M i l d r e d as a 
p l a i n t i f f 
under R u l e 
1 7 ( a ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., and a c t e d 
w i t h i n i t s 
d i s c r e t i o n under R u l e 1 5 ( a ) , A l a . R. C i v . 
P., i n s t r i k i n g t h e 
Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s ' 
l a t e and p r e j u d i c i a l amendment o f t h e i r 
answers. Because the Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s 
do n o t have a 
c l e a r 
l e g a l 
r i g h t 
t o d i s m i s s a l o f t h e case on t h e ground o f 
s t a n d i n g , 
t h e i r p e t i t i o n f o r 
a w r i t o f mandamus i s d e n i e d . 
PETITION DENIED. 
S t u a r t , P a r k e r , Main, and B r y a n , J J . , c o n c u r . 
Murdock and Wise, J J . , concur 
s p e c i a l l y . 
B o l i n and Shaw, J J . , concur i n t h e r e s u l t . 
17 
1110931 
MURDOCK, J u s t i c e ( c o n c u r r i n g 
s p e c i a l l y ) . 
I concur i n t h e main o p i n i o n . 
In so d o i n g , I note t h a t 
the main o p i n i o n uses b o t h t h e term " c a p a c i t y " and t h e term 
" r e a l 
p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t " i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o t h e term 
" s t a n d i n g . " 
I b e l i e v e a q u e s t i o n 
e x i s t s as t o whether t h e 
i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e use o f t h e terms " c a p a c i t y " and " r e a l p a r t y i n 
i n t e r e s t " 
i s a p p r o p r i a t e . 
F u r t h e r 
e x p l o r a t i o n 
o f 
t h i s 
q u e s t i o n 
can 
a w a i t 
a n o t h e r 
day, 
however, 
i n 
t h a t 
t h e 
d i s p o s i t i v e 
c o n c l u s i o n f o r p u r p o s e s o f t h e p r e s e n t case i s 
t h a t the i s s u e p r e s e n t e d i s n o t one o f 
" s t a n d i n g . "
7 
That s a i d , t h e p r i n c i p a l r e a s o n I w r i t e s e p a r a t e l y i s 
t o 
a d d r e s s an i s s u e 
r e g a r d i n g t h e p r o p e r c o n s t r u c t i o n o f 
A l a . 
Code 1975, § 25-5-11. 
As i n d i c a t e d i n t h e main o p i n i o n , our 
p r e c e d e n t s appear t o s t a n d f o r 
the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e r i g h t 
t o b r i n g an a c t i o n a g a i n s t a t h i r d - p a r t y t o r t f e a s o r f o r 
t h e 
w r o n g f u l d e a t h o f an employee who a l s o i s e n t i t l e d t o b e n e f i t s 
under t h e Workers' Compensation A c t r e s i d e s e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h 
the former dependents o f the deceased employee. 
I 
q u e s t i o n 
7 A l s o , I e x p r e s s no view as t o the i s s u e b r o a c h e d i n 
note 5 o f t h e main o p i n i o n , 
i . e . , whether t h e l i m i t a t i o n s 
p e r i o d found i n 
§ 6-5-410, A l a . Code 1975, i s 
i n 
t h e n a t u r e o f 
a s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s o r a s t a t u t e o f " c r e a t i o n . " 
So. 3d a t 
. 
18 
1110931 
t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of § 25-5-11 and i t s impact on w r o n g f u l -
d e a t h c l a i m s p r e s c r i b e d by A l a . Code 1975, § 6-5-410. 
C l a i m s 
under § 6-5-410 are f o r the b e n e f i t of the h e i r s as d e t e r m i n e d 
under our i n t e s t a c y laws (see §§ 43-8-41 and -42, A l a . Code 
1975), and t h a t s t a t u t e s t a t e s t h a t the r i g h t t o f i l e such a 
c l a i m l i e s w i t h the p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the decedent's 
e s t a t e . 
My c o n c e r n i s r o o t e d i n the f a c t t h a t , 
g i v e n the 
d e f i n i t i o n of "dependents" under the Workers' 
Compensation 
A c t , see A l a . Code 1975, § 25-5-61 e t seq., the "dependent" 
who has an i n t e r e s t i n p u r s u i n g a c l a i m f o r d e a t h b e n e f i t s 
under the Workers' Compensation A c t may not q u a l i f y as an h e i r 
under our i n t e s t a c y laws and t h e r e f o r e may have no i n t e r e s t i n 
p u r s u i n g an a c t i o n under § 6-5-410 f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t h o s e 
who a r e h e i r s . 
The p r e c e d e n t s t h a t a p p a r e n t l y c o n t e m p l a t e 
such an u n u s u a l , and a r g u a b l y unworkable, arrangement and the 
manner 
i n w h i c h 
t h e y have 
i n t e r p r e t e d 
§ 25-5-11 
o f the 
Workers' 
Compensation 
A c t 
i n 
o r d e r 
t o 
a r r i v e 
a t 
t h i s 
arrangement, however, have not been c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n i n 
the p r e s e n t c a s e . 
I , t h e r e f o r e , concur i n the main 
o p i n i o n . 
Wise, J . , c o n c u r s . 
19 
1110931 
SHAW, J u s t i c e ( c o n c u r r i n g i n the r e s u l t ) . 
T h i s case i n v o l v e s an a c t i o n under A l a . Code 1975, § 25¬
5-11, a p r o v i s i o n of the Workers' Compensation A c t , A l a . Code 
1975, § 25-5-1 e t s e q . , s e e k i n g damages f o r the d e a t h of an 
employee. 
S e c t i o n 25-5-11(a) 
s t a t e s t h a t "the employee, or  
h i s 
or her dependents i n case o f d e a t h , may p r o c e e d a g a i n s t 
the employer t o r e c o v e r compensation under t h i s c h a p t e r 
... 
and a t the same t i m e , may b r i n g an a c t i o n a g a i n s t the o t h e r 
p a r t y 
t o 
r e c o v e r 
damages 
f o r the 
i n j u r y 
o r d e a t h 
" 
(Emphasis added.) 
The d e f e n d a n t s below, Tyson Foods, I n c . , 
R i c k y 
Walker, and Mike 
G r a f f i n o 
( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o 
c o l l e c t i v e l y as "the Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s " ) , 
f i l e d a motion t o 
d i s m i s s i n the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t , c o n t e n d i n g t h a t the 
p l a i n t i f f , 
Reba K i r k l e y , the 
a d m i n i s t r a t r i x o f the deceased employee's 
e s t a t e , was not a "dependent" under § 25-5-11 and thus l a c k e d 
" s t a n d i n g " t o p r o s e c u t e the c a s e .
8 The t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e d the 
motion t o d i s m i s s . 
"When a p a r t y w i t h o u t 
s t a n d i n g p u r p o r t s 
t o commence an 
a c t i o n , 
the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
a c q u i r e s 
no 
s u b j e c t - m a t t e r 
8 K i r k l e y 
has 
s i n c e 
s u b s t i t u t e d 
M i l d r e d 
Hayes, 
the 
employee's widow, as the 
p l a i n t i f f . 
20 
1110931 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . " 
S t a t e v. P r o p e r t y 
a t 2018 Rainbow D r i v e , 
740 
So. 2d 1025, 
1028 
( A l a . 1999). 
F u r t h e r , "[m]andamus r e v i e w i s 
a v a i l a b l e where the p e t i t i o n e r c h a l l e n g e s 
the 
s u b j e c t - m a t t e r 
j u r i s d i c t i o n 
of 
the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
based 
on 
the 
p l a i n t i f f ' s 
a l l e g e d 
l a c k of 
s t a n d i n g 
t o b r i n g 
the 
l a w s u i t . " 
Ex 
p a r t e 
 
H e a l t h S o u t h Corp., 974 So. 2d 288, 
292 
( A l a . 2007) . Thus, the 
Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s r e q u e s t e d t h a t t h i s C o u r t i s s u e a w r i t of 
mandamus d i r e c t i n g the 
t r i a l c o u r t t o d i s m i s s the 
u n d e r l y i n g 
a c t i o n based on 
K i r k l e y ' s p u r p o r t e d 
l a c k of 
s u b j e c t - m a t t e r 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
In Alabama Power Co. 
v. 
White, 
377 
So. 
2d 
930 
( A l a . 
1979), t h i s C o u r t e x p l i c i t l y h e l d t h a t the r e q u i r e m e n t i n § 
25-5-11(a) t h a t "dependents" of a deceased employee b r i n g 
an 
a c t i o n under t h a t Code s e c t i o n was 
an i s s u e of " c a p a c i t y " t h a t 
need not be proven i f not 
c h a l l e n g e d : 
"[W]e 
h o l d 
t h a t 
§ 25-5-11(a) 
by 
the 
p h r a s e 
'the 
employee, or h i s dependents i n case of h i s d e a t h , 
may 
p r o c e e d 
a g a i n s t 
the 
employer' 
g i v e s 
t o 
the 
dependents 
CAPACITY 
t o 
b r i n g 
s u i t 
a g a i n s t 
the 
employer under c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
We 
h o l d 
t h a t 
dependency i s c a p a c i t y under § 25-5-11(a) which must 
be 
d e n i e d 
by 
the 
d e f e n d a n t 
by 
s p e c i f i c 
n e g a t i v e 
averment 
377 
So. 
2d a t 936. 
B l a c k ' s 
Law 
D i c t i o n a r y has 
d e s c r i b e d 
the 
" c a p a c i t y 
t o 
sue" 
as 
" [ t ] h e 
l e g a l 
a b i l i t y of 
a 
p a r t i c u l a r 
21 
1110931 
i n d i v i d u a l or e n t i t y t o sue 
i n ... 
the c o u r t s of a forum." 
B l a c k ' s Law 
D i c t i o n a r y 207 
(6th ed. 1990). 
" S t a n d i n g , on the o t h e r hand, t u r n s on 'whether the 
p a r t y 
has 
been 
i n j u r e d i n 
f a c t 
and 
whether 
the 
i n j u r y i s t o a l e g a l l y p r o t e c t e d r i g h t . ' Romer v.  
B o a r d of County Comm'rs of the County of Pueblo, 95 6 
P.2d 566, 581 
( C o l o . 1998) 
( K o u r l i s , J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) 
(emphasis added). 
'One 
has 
s t a n d i n g t o b r i n g h i s 
c o m p l a i n t i n t o c o u r t " i f h i s s t a k e i n the r e s o l u t i o n 
of t h a t c o m p l a i n t assumes the p r o p o r t i o n s 
n e c e s s a r y 
t o 
ensure 
t h a t 
he 
w i l l 
v i g o r o u s l y 
p r e s e n t 
h i s 
c a s e . " ' Smith v. P o t t s , 293 A l a . 419, 
422, 
304 
So. 
2d 578, 
580 
(1974) (emphasis added)." 
P r o p e r t y 
a t 
2018 
Rainbow 
D r i v e , 
740 
So. 
2d 
a t 
1027-28 
( c i t a t i o n 
o m i t t e d ) . 
" S t a n d i n g " 
and 
" c a p a c i t y " 
are 
two 
d i s t i n c t i s s u e s : "There i s a d i f f e r e n c e between c a p a c i t y t o 
sue and s t a n d i n g t o sue." 
M o b i l e , A l a b a m a - P e n s a c o l a , F l o r i d a 
B l d g . & C o n s t r . Trades C o u n c i l v. W i l l i a m s , 346 
So. 2d 
964, 
966 
( A l a . 
1977) 
( F a u l k n e r , 
J . , 
d i s s e n t i n g ) , 
c i t e d 
w i t h 
a p p r o v a l i n P e n i c k v. Most W o r s h i p f u l P r i n c e H a l l Grand Lodge 
F & A M of Alabama, I n c . , 46 So. 3d 416, 
426 
( A l a . 2010) . 
As 
n o t e d 
i n 2018 
Rainbow D r i v e , 
s u p r a , 
the 
l a c k of 
s t a n d i n g 
d e p r i v e s 
the 
t r i a l 
c o u r t 
of 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
The 
l a c k 
of 
c a p a c i t y 
i n an 
a c t i o n under 
§ 2 5 - 5 - 1 1 ( a ) , however, 
i s 
an 
a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e s u b j e c t t o w a i v e r . 
Alabama Power Co. 
v. 
White, 
s u p r a . 
22 
1110931 
In Tucker v. Molden, 
761 So. 2d 996 
( A l a . 2000), 
which 
the Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s c i t e , 
t h i s C o u r t d i s c u s s e d the 
a b i l i t y 
t o b r i n g an a c t i o n under § 25-5-11 i n g e n e r a l terms as b e i n g 
a q u e s t i o n o f " s t a n d i n g " ; however, i t was u n d i s p u t e d i n t h a t 
case 
t h a t the p e r s o n who 
f i l e d 
the a c t i o n was 
the p r o p e r 
p e r s o n t o do so. 
The d e s c r i p t i o n i n Tucker of the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
a b i l i t y under § 25-5-11 t o pursue the a c t i o n embraced no l e g a l 
r u l i n g and was not n e c e s s a r y t o the r a t i o n a l e o f t h i s C o u r t ' s 
d e c i s i o n , which a d d r e s s e d a d i f f e r e n t l e g a l i s s u e . 
T h e r e f o r e , 
the d i s c u s s i o n r e g a r d i n g s t a n d i n g was 
s i m p l y s u r p l u s a g e and 
d i c t a and does not c a l l i n t o q u e s t i o n the e x p l i c i t h o l d i n g i n 
Alabama Power Co. v. White. 
Thus, under Alabama Power Co. v.  
White, K i r k l e y ' s p u r p o r t e d l a c k of c a p a c i t y t o f i l e the a c t i o n 
under 
§ 25-5-11 i s not a 
f a i l u r e o f j u r i s d i c t i o n , 
and 
the 
p e t i t i o n i s due t o be d e n i e d .
9 
B o l i n , J . , c o n c u r s . 
9 O t h e r p r i o r a p p e l l a t e d e c i s i o n s have a t t i m e s used the 
word " s t a n d i n g " i n d i s c u s s i n g 
the 
a b i l i t y 
t o m a i n t a i n an 
a c t i o n under § 25-5-11. 
See R a g s d a l e v. A l t e c Indus., I n c . , 
456 So. 2d 54 ( A l a . 1984) 
( u s i n g b o t h the terms " s t a n d i n g " and 
" c a p a c i t y " t o d e s c r i b e the a b i l i t y t o sue under § 25-5-11), 
and Johnson v. H u x f o r d P o l e & Timber 
Co., 
983 So. 2d 
1133 
( A l a . 
C i v . App. 
2007) 
( p l u r a l i t y 
o p i n i o n ) ; 
however, 
l i k e 
Tucker, and u n l i k e Alabama Power Co. v. White, t h e s e cases do 
not a n a l y z e or r u l e on t h e p r e c i s e l e g a l n a t u r e of a p a r t y ' s 
a b i l i t y t o m a i n t a i n such an a c t i o n . 
23