Title: Gunter v. Martin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 100305
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 2011

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, 
JJ., and Lacy and Koontz, S.JJ. 
 
DONALD L. GUNTER 
 
v.  Record No. 100305 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
 
April 21, 2011 
ROBBIE S. MARTIN 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF COLONIAL HEIGHTS 
Herbert C. Gill, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal we consider the application of the doctrine 
of res judicata as it existed prior to July 1, 2006, the 
effective date of Rule 1:6. 
BACKGROUND 
 
Donald L. Gunter (“Gunter”) originally filed an action on 
May 27, 2005 (“the 2005 action”) against Robbie S. Martin 
(“Martin”) individually and in her capacity as administrator of 
the estate of George F. Martin, the decedent.  Gunter alleged 
that the decedent died intestate on June 1, 2004; that Martin, 
his widow, qualified as administrator of his estate and filed a 
list of heirs indicating she was the decedent’s sole heir; that 
Martin filed an inventory of assets in the estate; that Gunter 
was the biological child of the decedent; and that the list of 
heirs therefore was incorrect. 
In his prayer for relief, Gunter asked the circuit court 
to: 
allow an amended list of heirs to be filed and 
recorded, indicating that your petitioner is the 
biological child of the deceased and, as such is 
an heir and beneficiary of the estate of the 
deceased, that the Court determine the rights of 
the parties hereto, that the Administrator be 
ordered to make distribution of the estate in 
accordance with such determination of the Court 
and for such other and further relief as may be 
necessary and proper. 
 
 
Martin filed a motion to dismiss.  She asserted that 
Gunter failed to satisfy the requirements of Code § 64.1-5.1.  
Specifically, Martin asserted that Gunter failed to file an 
affidavit of parenthood within one year of the decedent’s date 
of death and an appropriate action seeking adjudication of 
parenthood.  The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed 
the action. 
 
In 2009, Gunter filed the current action, entitled 
“Complaint to Quiet Title & for Allotment or Sale of Real 
Property in Lieu of Partition.”  He named Martin in her 
individual capacity as the sole defendant.  Proceeding under 
Code §§ 8.01-81, -83, and 55-153, Gunter alleged, inter alia, 
that the decedent died intestate and seized of two parcels of 
real property; that Martin survived as his widow; that he was 
the biological son of the decedent and not of Martin; that the 
decedent was survived by no relatives other than his brother 
Gilbert C. Martin; that there were no other liens or 
encumbrances on the property; and that the real property 
consisted of a single family residence and a commercial retail 
building, neither of which could be partitioned conveniently.  
 
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In his prayer for relief, Gunter requested that the circuit 
court order the sale or allotment of both properties, and for 
compensation for his share of the properties from the sale 
proceeds, or from a cash payment from Martin in the case of 
allotment. 
 
Martin filed a plea in bar of res judicata.  She asserted 
that “[a]ll of the relief sought by . . . Gunter . . . is 
dependent upon a determination that he is the biological child 
of [decedent].”  She argued that the circuit court had 
previously decided that matter in the 2005 action.  She further 
argued that the circuit court’s dismissal of that suit for 
failure to comply with the requirements of Code § 64.1-5.1 was 
a determination on the merits, and therefore the issue of 
paternity was a “thing decided.” 
In reply to the plea in bar, Gunter argued that the suit 
was not barred by res judicata because he was not seeking the 
same remedy as he had in the 2005 action, because the quality 
of the parties to the two cases was not the same, and because 
the two suits were not the same cause of action under the “same 
evidence” test set forth in Davis v. Marshall Homes, Inc., 265 
Va. 159, 167-72, 576 S.E.2d 504, 507-10 (2003).   The circuit 
court sustained the plea in bar.  It found that “both cases 
involve the same cause of action since they arise out of the 
 
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same transaction or occurrence, the paternity-status of the 
decedent.”  We awarded Gunter this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Gunter argues that the circuit court erred in its 
application of the doctrine of res judicata.  He argues that 
Martin failed to meet the requirements set forth in State Water 
Control Board v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 261 Va. 209, 214, 542 
S.E.2d 766, 769 (2001).  Specifically, he argues that the 
circuit court erred in holding that res judicata is a bar when 
Martin did not establish an identity of remedies, quality of 
the parties, or cause of action.  See id. 
 
The parties agree that Rule 1:6 does not apply, since 
Gunter’s first action was filed in May 2005 and the Rule 
applies only to judgments entered in civil actions commenced 
after July 1, 2006.  Therefore, to prevail upon a plea of res 
judicata, Martin was required to establish four elements: 
“identity of the remedies sought, identity of the cause of 
action, identity of the parties, and identity of the quality of 
the persons for or against whom the claim is made.”  Smithfield 
Foods, 261 Va. at 214, 542 S.E.2d at 769.   
 
Gunter argues that the remedy sought in the 2005 action 
was different from the remedy in the current case.  We agree.  
In the 2005 action, Gunter asked the circuit court to declare 
him an heir to the decedent’s estate.  See Code § 64.1-5.1.  
 
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Had Gunter prevailed, he would have been recognized as a child 
of the decedent in the settlement of the decedent’s estate.  
Jenkins v. Johnson, 276 Va. 30, 35, 661 S.E.2d 484, 486 (2008). 
 
By contrast, the remedy for which Gunter prayed in the 
current case was for the proceeds from his two-thirds interest 
in real estate that would have passed to him as the decedent’s 
son outside of the decedent’s estate.  The requested remedy 
would have required transfer of Gunter’s interest to Martin for 
payment or the outright sale of the properties to a third 
party.  In either scenario, it is clear that the remedy prayed 
for in this action was not the same “identity” as the remedy in 
the 2005 action.  Martin thus failed to establish a required 
element to prevail on the plea of res judicata as that doctrine 
was applied prior to the effective date of Rule 1:6.  See 
Smithfield Foods, 261 Va. at 214, 542 S.E.2d at 769.  Because 
the failure to establish any one element is fatal to the plea 
of res judicata, the Court need not address Gunter’s other 
assignments of error regarding the circuit court’s application 
of the doctrine.  See id.; see also Mowry v. City of Virginia 
Beach, 198 Va. 205, 211, 93 S.E.2d 323, 327 (1956) (“there must 
be a concurrence of [the] four” elements to prevail on res 
judicata plea). 
 
 
 
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CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we will reverse the judgment 
of the circuit court and remand the case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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