Title: Orientale v. Jennings
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: September 23, 2019

Orientale v. Jennings Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Plaintiff Barbara Orientale brought a personal-injury lawsuit against defendant Darrin Jennings for allegedly setting off an automobile accident that caused her to suffer permanent injuries. The trial court entered partial summary judgment against Jennings, finding that he was at fault for causing the accident. Orientale and Jennings then settled the lawsuit for $100,000, the full amount of liability coverage on Jennings’s vehicle. Orientale maintained an underinsured motorist policy with defendant Allstate New Jersey Insurance Company (Allstate) that provided coverage for damages up to $250,000. Orientale initiated a claim for her personal-injury damages in excess of $100,000 allegedly caused by the accident. Although the jury returned a verdict finding that Orientale suffered a permanent injury, it awarded damages in the amount of only $200. Because the jury award did not exceed Orientale’s $100,000 settlement with Jennings, Allstate’s underinsured motorist coverage policy was not triggered. Orientale moved for a new damages trial or an additur. The judge vacated the damages award, finding that it constituted a miscarriage of justice, and granted an additur in the amount of $47,500, the lowest award in his estimation that a reasonable jury could have returned in light of the evidence presented at trial. Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of additur on the basis that the judge acts as a “super jury” in setting a damages award in violation of the right to a jury trial. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that when a damages award is deemed a miscarriage of justice requiring the grant of a new trial, the acceptance of a damages award fixed by the judge must be based on the mutual consent of the parties. "Going forward, in those rare instances when a trial judge determines that a damages award is either so grossly excessive or grossly inadequate that the grant of a new damages trial is justified, the judge has the option of setting a remittitur or an additur at an amount that a reasonable jury would award given the evidence in the case. Setting the figure at an amount a reasonable jury would award -- an amount that favors neither side -- is intended to give the competing parties the greatest incentive to reach agreement. If both parties accept the remittitur or additur, then the case is settled; if not, a new trial on damages must proceed before a jury." Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here .This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. Barbara Orientale v. Darrin L. Jennings (A-43-17) (079953)Argued October 9, 2018 -- Re-Argued April 24, 2019 -- Decided September 23, 2019ALBIN, J., writing for the Court. In this case, the Court considers the practices of additur and remittitur. Currently, when a jury’s damages award is so grossly excessive that it shocks the judicial conscience, the trial judge may, with the consent of the plaintiff, grant a remittitur -- the highest award that, in the judge’s view, could be sustained by the evidence. If the plaintiff accepts the remitted amount, the defendant is bound by that judicial finding, subject to the right to appeal. Likewise, when a jury’s damages award is so grossly inadequate that it shocks the judicial conscience, the trial judge may, with the consent of the defendant, grant an additur -- an increased award that, in the judge’s view, could be sustained by the evidence. If the defendant accepts the additional amount, the plaintiff is bound by that judicial finding, subject to the right to appeal. Plaintiff Barbara Orientale brought a personal-injury lawsuit against defendant Darrin Jennings for allegedly setting off an automobile accident that caused her to suffer permanent injuries. The trial court entered partial summary judgment against Jennings, finding that he was at fault for causing the accident. Orientale and Jennings then settled the lawsuit for $100,000, the full amount of liability coverage on Jennings’s vehicle. Orientale maintained an underinsured motorist policy with defendant Allstate New Jersey Insurance Company (Allstate) that provided coverage for damages up to $250,000. Orientale initiated a claim for her personal-injury damages in excess of $100,000 allegedly caused by the accident. Although the jury returned a verdict finding that Orientale suffered a permanent injury, it awarded damages in the amount of only $200. Because the jury award did not exceed Orientale’s $100,000 settlement with Jennings, Allstate’s underinsured motorist coverage policy was not triggered. Therefore, the judge entered a no-cause-of-action judgment. Orientale moved for a new damages trial or an additur. The judge vacated the damages award, finding that it constituted a miscarriage of justice, and granted an additur in the amount of $47,500, the lowest award in his estimation that a reasonable jury could have returned in light of the evidence presented at trial. Allstate accepted the additur. Because Orientale’s damages did not exceed $100,000, the judge again entered a 1 judgment in favor of Allstate, which the Appellate Division affirmed in an unpublished decision. The Court granted Orientale’s petition for certification. 232 N.J. 154 (2018).HELD: The Court brings the use of remittitur and additur in line with basic notions of fair play and equity. When a damages award is deemed a miscarriage of justice requiring the grant of a new trial, then the acceptance of a damages award fixed by the judge must be based on the mutual consent of the parties. Going forward, in those rare instances when a trial judge determines that a damages award is either so grossly excessive or grossly inadequate that the grant of a new damages trial is justified, the judge has the option of setting a remittitur or an additur at an amount that a reasonable jury would award given the evidence in the case. Setting the figure at an amount a reasonable jury would award -- an amount that favors neither side -- is intended to give the competing parties the greatest incentive to reach agreement. If both parties accept the remittitur or additur, then the case is settled; if not, a new trial on damages must proceed before a jury.1. In the early English common law, additur did not exist, and remittitur did not bear any resemblance to how it is practiced today. In 1822, United States Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, sitting as a Circuit Justice, upheld a verdict on liability but found the damages award was excessive. Blunt v. Little, 3 Mason 102, 102 (1822). Justice Story noted, “I believe that I go to the very limits of the law,” in concluding “that it is reasonable, that the cause should be submitted to another jury, unless the plaintiff is willing to remit $500 of his damages. If he does, the court ought not to interfere farther.” Ibid. Justice Story did not seek the defendant’s consent to the remittitur. In time, Justice Story’s use of remittitur was accepted by the United States Supreme Court. Nonetheless, in a case involving a constitutional challenge to additur, the Court reexamined the validity of the then-accepted practice of remittitur and reasoned that Justice Story’s use of remittitur rested on a shaky legal foundation. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 , 482-86 (1935). In the end, additur was deemed unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment because it requires the plaintiff “to forego his constitutional right to the verdict of a jury,” while remittitur survived, primarily due to its long-standing history in federal jurisprudence. Id. at 484-85, 487-88. (pp. 13-21)2. As of 1917, both remittitur and additur were accepted practices in New Jersey. Forty years later, the Court addressed a constitutional challenge to additur based on the Dimick decision. See Fisch v. Manger, 24 N.J. 66, 72-73, 80 (1957). The Court explained that the “constitutional right of trial by jury relates to substance rather than form and does not preclude efficient procedural devices,” id. at 75, and was “satisfied that the practices of remittitur and additur violate none of our constitutional interdictions” when fairly invoked to resolve a “manifest denial of justice.” Id. at 80. Although the doctrines of remittitur and additur have long been a part of our jurisprudence, remittitur in particular has come under increasing scrutiny. The arguments presented in this appeal have compelled the Court to look anew at the fairness of a trial judge granting a remittitur or additur without the mutual assent of the parties. (pp. 21-25) 2 3. Remittitur and additur allow just one party the option of avoiding the unnecessary expense and delay of a new trial. The other party is bound by a judge’s setting the quantum of damages and denying a new trial -- subject only to an appeal challenging the trial court’s exercise of discretion in granting or setting the remittitur or additur amount. The heart of the problem is lack of mutual consent to the judge’s assessment of the proper quantum of damages. Because both parties are not required to accept the remittitur or additur, a new trial can be denied without the mutual consent of the parties. Under New Jersey’s court rules, however, both parties generally have the right to demand and receive a jury trial on damages. See R. 4:35-1(a), (d). A party entitled to a new damages trial because of a grossly excessive or inadequate damages award should be in no different position. The Court now holds that in the unusual case where a damages award was grossly excessive or grossly inadequate, the trial court retains the power to declare that a jury’s damages award shocks the conscience and to grant a new trial or offer the parties a remittitur or an additur. Going forward, however, unless both parties consent to a remittitur or an additur, the court must grant a new trial. The Court modifies additur and remittitur based on its authority over the common law and practices and procedures of the courts; it does not address the constitutional right-to-jury-trial argument. (pp. 25-29)4. Under this new scheme, a remittitur and an additur are essentially settlement figures suggested by the trial court. This settlement scheme will not work effectively if the court sets the figure at the highest or lowest damages award that could be sustained by the evidence. In setting the remittitur or additur, the court should not accord any deference to a damages award that shocks the judicial conscience. Instead, the court must attempt the difficult task of determining the amount that a reasonable jury, properly instructed, would have awarded. Even if the parties do not consent to the remittitur or additur, the court’s evaluation of the damages may spur the parties to reach a settlement on their own terms. In any event, when a trial court declares that a damages award is so grossly excessive or inadequate that it shocks the judicial conscience, the parties are entitled to a new trial, unless the court offers a remittitur or additur that the parties mutually accept. Although the party objecting to the court’s grant of a new trial may appeal that decision, no appeal may be filed from the court’s setting of the remittitur or additur amount. The parties have the power simply to reject the amount fixed by the court. (pp. 30-32)5. Because the trial court in this case declared that the damages award was so grossly inadequate that it shocked the judicial conscience and because Orientale did not consent to the court’s additur, Orientale is entitled to a new trial on damages. (p. 32) The matter is REMANDED for further proceedings.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 43 September Term 2017 079953 Barbara Orientale, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Michael Orientale, Plaintiff, v. Darrin L. Jennings, Defendant, and Allstate New Jersey Insurance Company, Defendant-Respondent. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Re-Argued Decided October 9, 2018 April 24, 2019 September 23, 2019 Christina Vassiliou Harvey argued the cause for appellant (Lomurro, Munson, Comer, Brown & Schottland, 1 attorneys; Christina Vassiliou Harvey, on the briefs, and Jonathan H. Lomurro, of counsel and on the briefs).Frederic J. Regenye argued the cause for respondent (Law Office of Kenneth N. Lipstein, attorneys; Frederic J. Regenye, on the briefs).Amos Gern argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (Starr, Gern, Davison & Rubin, attorneys; Amos Gern, of counsel and on the briefs, and Ana Rita Ferreira, on the briefs).William S. Bloom argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Defense Association (Methfessel & Werbel, attorneys; William S. Bloom and Leslie A. Koch, of counsel and on the brief, and Natale Donis and James V. Mazewski, on the brief).David R. Kott argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Business & Industry Association (McCarter & English, attorneys; David R. Kott, Edward J. Fanning, and Amanda M. Munsie, of counsel and on the brief).Emily A. Kaller argued the cause for amicus curiae Trial Attorneys of New Jersey (Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith & Davis and Trial Attorneys of New Jersey, attorneys; Emily A. Kaller and Michael Ricciardulli, on the brief).Thomas J. Manzo argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association (New Jersey State Bar Association, attorneys; John E. Keefe, Jr., President, of counsel and on the brief, and Thomas J. Manzo, Craig J. Hubert, William H. Mergner, Jr., and Brandon C. Simmons, on the brief).JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. 2 Under our common law jurisprudence, when a jury’s damages award isso grossly excessive that it shocks the judicial conscience, the trial judge may,with the consent of the plaintiff, grant a remittitur -- the highest award that, inthe judge’s view, could be sustained by the evidence. If the plaintiff acceptsthe remitted amount, the defendant is bound by that judicial finding, s ubject tothe right to appeal. Likewise, when a jury’s damages award is so grosslyinadequate that it shocks the judicial conscience, the trial judge may, with theconsent of the defendant, grant an additur -- an increased award that, in thejudge’s view, could be sustained by the evidence. If the defendant accepts theadditional amount, the plaintiff is bound by that judicial finding, subject to theright to appeal. The practice of judges setting damages awards through remittitur andadditur -- without the consent of both parties -- has been well established for along period in this State. That practice, however, was not recognized in theearly common law. In the early common law, remittitur did not allow for thereduction of a jury’s damages award as permitted today, and additur did notexist. In the appeal before us, plaintiff has challenged the constitutionality ofadditur on the basis that the judge acts as a “super jury” in setting a damagesaward in violation of the right to a jury trial. We take this occasion to 3 reexamine, with the assistance of many stakeholders in the bar and bench, thecurrent practices of both additur and remittitur. Plaintiff and a number of amici curiae argue that the current practices ofremittitur and additur are in tension with the constitutional right to trial byjury. We need not address the constitutional issue before us, however.Instead, we choose to exercise our superintendence over the common law andour constitutional authority over the practices and procedures of our courts tobring the use of remittitur and additur in line with basic notions of fair playand equity. We hold that when a damages award is deemed a miscarriage ofjustice requiring the grant of a new trial, then the acceptance of a damagesaward fixed by the judge must be based on the mutual consent of the parties. Going forward, in those rare instances when a trial judge determines thata damages award is either so grossly excessive or grossly inadequate that thegrant of a new damages trial is justified, the judge has the option of setting aremittitur or an additur at an amount that a reasonable jury would award giventhe evidence in the case. Setting the figure at an amount a reasonable jurywould award -- an amount that favors neither side -- is intended to give thecompeting parties the greatest incentive to reach agreement. If both partiesaccept the remittitur or additur, then the case is settled; if not, a new trial ondamages must proceed before a jury. 4 We now turn to the facts of this case and the jurisprudence that has ledus to our conclusion. I. A. Plaintiff Barbara Orientale brought a personal-injury lawsuit againstdefendant Darrin Jennings for allegedly setting off a chain-reaction automobileaccident that caused her to suffer permanent injuries. While stopped in traffic,Orientale’s car was struck from behind and propelled into the vehicle in frontof it. The trial court entered partial summary judgment against Jennings,finding that he was at fault for causing the accident. Orientale and Jenningsthen settled the lawsuit for $100,000, the full amount of liability coverageinsuring Jennings’s vehicle. Orientale maintained an underinsured motorist policy with her insurer,defendant Allstate New Jersey Insurance Company (Allstate), that providedcoverage for damages up to $250,000.1 Orientale initiated a claim againstAllstate for her personal-injury damages in excess of $100,000 allegedly1 Underinsured motorist coverage provides coverage to the policyholder if she suffers personal injury or property damage caused by a motorist’s negligent operation of a vehicle and the negligent motorist’s liability insurance is insufficient to reimburse the policyholder’s damages. N.J.S.A. 17:28- 1.1(e)(1); see also French v. N.J. Sch. Bd. Ass’n Ins. Grp., 149 N.J. 478, 482 (1997). 5 caused by the accident. That matter proceeded to a jury trial on damages. Thejury knew nothing about the earlier settlement. Orientale testified that despite undergoing surgery on both her shouldersand receiving nerve-block injections and physical therapy, she remained inconstant pain, suffered limitations in her physical movements, had difficultysleeping, and struggled to perform routine household chores. Although thejury returned a verdict finding that Orientale suffered a permanent injury, itawarded damages in the amount of only $200. Because the jury award did not exceed Orientale’s $100,000 settlementwith Jennings, Allstate’s underinsured motorist coverage policy was nottriggered. Therefore, the judge entered a no-cause-of-action judgment. Based on the alleged inadequacy of the damages award, Orientale movedfor a new damages trial or, in the alternative, an additur. The trial judgevacated the damages award, finding that it constituted a miscarriage of justice.The judge granted an additur in the amount of $47,500, the lowest award in hisestimation that a reasonable jury could have returned in light of the evidencepresented at trial. Under the governing case law, only Allstate had the option of acceptingthe additur or rejecting it and proceeding to a new damages trial. Allstateaccepted the additur. Orientale’s underinsured motorist coverage came into 6 play only if her damages exceeded the $100,000 she had already received fromJennings. In light of Allstate’s decision, the judge again entered a no-cause-of-action judgment in favor of Allstate. B. In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Appellate Division affirmedthe trial court’s judgment. It reasoned that additur and remittitur present“mirror images” of remedies designed to correct a damages award constitutinga manifest injustice. Because, when applying remittitur, an excessive awardshould be remitted to the highest amount supported by the evidence, citingFertile ex rel. Fertile v. St. Michael’s Med. Ctr., 169 N.J. 481, 500 (2001), theAppellate Division reasoned a similar approach should apply to additur -- theinadequate award should be raised to the lowest amount supported by theevidence. It rejected Orientale’s argument that the trial court should have“determin[ed] the amount that a reasonable jury, properly instructed, wouldhave awarded,” quoting Tronolone v. Palmer, 224 N.J. Super. 92, 103 (App.Div. 1988). In determining that the additur award did “not shock the judicialconscience,” the Appellate Division stated that the trial judge not onlyexpressed a “familiarity with the record and 'feel of the case,’” but also notedthat the jury “found credible [Orientale’s] proofs regarding permanency” but 7 less credible her proofs regarding damages. Accordingly, the AppellateDivision did not vacate the additur award. C. We granted Orientale’s petition for certification. 232 N.J. 154 (2018).We also granted the motion of the New Jersey Association for Justice (NJAJ)to participate as amicus curiae. II. A. 1. Orientale argues that “additur is constitutionally infirm because itrequires the judge to be a super jury in awarding [damages] after the jury’sverdict shocked the judicial conscience.” Orientale maintains that if an addituris permissible, the trial court erred in fixing the damages award at the lowestamount that a reasonable jury could have awarded, citing Tronolone, 224 N.J.Super. at 103-04. She asserts that the court had no basis either to assume thatthe jury discounted the credibility of some of her witnesses or, given hersuccess in proving liability, to construe the evidence against her. Orientaletherefore requests a new jury trial on damages. 8 2. Amicus NJAJ encourages this Court to reexamine the constitutionality ofadditur because it essentially delegates factfindings to the trial judge. NJAJrecommends that, in considering an additur, courts should (1) give the plaintiff“the option of either accepting the additur amount or opting for a new trial ondamages”; (2) forgo resolving “factual disputes in favor of one party or theother”; (3) avoid crediting the jury’s factfindings when the damages award is“shockingly” low; and (4) “fix a reasonable amount, not the highest or lowestamount possible supported by the trial record.” B. Allstate urges this Court to affirm the Appellate Division’s approach toadditur and to uphold the trial court’s additur judgment of $47,500. Allstatestresses that this Court recognized in Cuevas v. Wentworth Group, 226 N.J. 480 (2016), “that there is no constitutional infirmity regarding a trial courtredressing a defective jury verdict” and that the trial court’s interventi on insetting a remittitur or additur “protects the interests of all the parties byensuring that a fair and appropriate award is entered.” It contends that thisCourt’s precedents have implicitly rejected the suggestion in Tronolone thatadditur and remittitur should be determined based on “the amount that areasonable jury, properly instructed, would have awarded,” quoting 224 N.J. 9 Super. at 103-04. Allstate maintains that because the trial court made detailedfindings grounded in the record in setting the lowest award sustainable by theevidence, the court’s findings should not be disturbed. III. A. After oral argument, we determined that any reexamination of whetheradditur intrudes on the exclusive factfinding prerogative of the jury in our civiljustice system must encompass a likeminded reevaluation of remittitur.Because no challenge to the validity of remittitur was before the Court, weinvited the parties, as well as a wide array of amici curiae and the Conferenceof Civil Presiding Judges to respond to four discrete questions concerningadditur and remittitur: 1. Should both parties have the right to object to a trial court’s additur, or should only the defendant have that right? 2. Should both parties have the right to object to a trial court’s remittitur, or should only the plaintiff have that right? 3. In additur, should the court set the damages amount as the lowest amount reasonably supported by the record, or a reasonable amount supported by the record? 4. In remittitur, should the court set the damages amount as the highest amount reasonably supported by 10 the record, or a reasonable amount supported by the record?2 B. In addition to answering the four questions, a number of responsesindependently address the constitutionality of remittitur and additur. Somecontend that both violate the constitutional right to trial by jury by permittingjudicial factfinding in an area reserved exclusively for the jury. Othersadvocate that only additur violates that right to a jury trial. In contrast, severalmaintain that neither remittitur nor additur run afoul of any constitutionalmandate and that no satisfactory rationale justifies departing from practicesembedded in our case law for over a century. The parties’ and amici’s responses to the four questions run the gamut.Some argue that when a damages award is either grossly excessive orinadequate, a court should not grant a remittitur or an additur unless both theplaintiff and the defendant consent and, in the absence of mutual consent, thecourt should order a new trial. Others contend that the mutual consent of the2 The following organizations participated as amici curiae, filing briefs addressing the above questions: the NJAJ; the New Jersey State Bar Association; the New Jersey Defense Association; the Trial Attorneys of New Jersey; the New Jersey Business and Industry Association; the New Jersey Civil Justice Institute; the Association for Governmental Responsibility, Ethics, and Transparency; and the National Employment Lawyers Association of New Jersey. 11 parties should apply only in additur cases. A number, however, urge that wenot disturb the current law governing remittitur and additur. Additionally, differing arguments are advanced concerning how a courtshould set the amount of a remittitur or an additur. Some consider remittiturand additur mirror images of each other and therefore advocate that, under ourcurrent jurisprudence, a remittitur should be set at the highest amount and anadditur at the lowest amount reasonably supported by the evidence. Agreeingwith the mirror-image approach, others suggest that a remittitur or an additurshould be fixed not at the highest or lowest amount but at an amount areasonable jury would return. Plaintiff, however, insists that an additur shouldbe set at the highest award sustainable by the record, and one amicusrecommends that only an additur -- not a remittitur -- be set at a reasonableamount. Last, the Conference of Civil Presiding Judges recommends that “bothparties ought to have the right to object to a trial court’s additur or remittitur.”In the Conference’s view, “if a trial judge finds that there has been amiscarriage of justice created by the jury award, the trial judge ought to set thenumber for additur or remittitur only at the point which would cure themiscarriage of justice” -- not at a “reasonable amount.” 12 With that diversity of opinion as a backdrop, we now review thehistorical development of the doctrines of remittitur and additur. We first lookto whether the early common law allowed a trial judge to grant a remittitur oran additur with the consent of just one party. IV. A. In the early English common law, additur did not exist, 3 and remittiturdid not bear any resemblance to how it is practiced today in our jurisprudence.Although in rare circumstances a judge had the authority to vacate a jury’saward of damages and grant a new trial, he could not command that, in itsplace, the parties accept a judicially imposed award. In eighteenth-century England, courts had the power to grant a new trialin an action for personal tort when the jury’s damages award was “monstrousand enormous indeed, and such as all mankind must be ready to exclaimagainst, at first blush.” Beardmore v. Carrington (1764) 95 Eng. Rep. 790,792-93 (K.B.) (acknowledging the “great difference between cases of damageswhich be certainly seen, and . . . where the damages are a matter of opinion,3 “[T]he established practice and the rule of the common law, as it existed in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, forbade the court to increase the amount of damages awarded by a jury. . . .” Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 , 482 (1935). 13 speculation, [or] ideal”); see also Joseph B. Kadane, Mr. Justice Story InventsAmerican Remittiturs: “The Very Limits of the Law,” 3 Brit. J. Am. LegalStud. 313, 318-19 (2014). In such instances, however, the only availableremedy was to send the case to a new jury; the judge could not substitute thejury’s award with his own assessment of damages. See Kadane, 3 Brit. J. Am.Legal Stud. at 319-20. Although judges were empowered to “grant a new trialif the damages appear to be excessive,” see Eyre v. Bank of Eng. (1819) 4 Eng.Rep. 213, 219 (H.L.), the use of “remittitur” to correct errors in a damagesaward was only permissible in three limited circumstances -- none of whichresemble our modern formulation of remittitur. First, remittitur was a procedural device used to reduce the jury’s awardto the amount the plaintiff sought in the complaint -- under the theory that theplaintiff should not receive more than he demanded. Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh Amendme nt,64 Ohio St. L.J. 731, 764-65 (2003). In Pickwood v. Wright, for example, theplaintiff sought in his complaint damages in the amount of £600, but the juryawarded him £611 in damages. (1791) 126 Eng. Rep. 367, 367 (C.P.). Whenthe defendant brought a writ of error claiming the judgment exceeded therequested amount, the Court of Common Pleas permitted a remittitur in theamount of £11. Ibid. 14 Second, a plaintiff could use remittitur “to correct an insubstantialmistake regarding the damages” specified in the plaintiff’s complaint.Thomas, 64 Ohio St. L.J. at 766. For example, in Duppa v. Mayo, the plaintiffwon a judgment for unpaid rent for a period of thirty-seven years. (1671) 85 Eng. Rep. 366, 368-69 (K.B.). Afterwards, the plaintiff recognized that he haderred in calculating damages and was owed rent for only thirty-six-and-three-fourths years. Id. at 369. To avoid an abatement of his entire claim, theplaintiff consented to the removal of the excess damages. Id. at 369, 371-72;see also Incledon v. Crips (1702) 91 Eng. Rep. 560, 560 (K.B.) (concluding ina contract action that “if more be demanded than is due, it may be remitted”). Third, a plaintiff who secured a verdict on multiple counts in acomplaint, one of which was later deemed invalid, could remit damages toreflect only the valid counts to avoid reversal of the entire judgment. Thomas,64 Ohio St. L.J. at 767; see, e.g., Flemming v. Parker (1722) 88 Eng. Rep. 85,85 (K.B.). Other than the uses of remittitur outlined here, there was evidently “norecorded instance of any exercise of power by the Courts to increase or abridgethe damages assessed by a jury upon verdict or writ of inquiry” from 1729through 1819. See Eyre, 4 Eng. Rep. at 219; see also Thomas, 64 Ohio St. L.J.at 770. In short, under the English common law, to remedy an excessive jury 15 verdict, a judge could not “sit as a second jury to fix the damages at a lessersum” but could grant only “a new trial by another jury.” Kadane, 3 Brit. J.Am. Legal Stud. at 323. According to a nineteenth-century learned treatise, judges could not“alter the assessment of [uncertain] damages by their own independentauthority” but could “suggest to counsel to agree on a sum, to prevent thenecessity of a new trial.” John D. Mayne, A Treatise on the Law of Damages:Comprising Their Measure, the Mode in Which They Are Assessed andReviewed, the Practice of Granting New Trials, the Law of Set-Off, andCompensation Under the Land Clauses Act, 303-04, 310 (Phila., T. & J. W.Johnson & Co. 1856). Thus, “[i]n the absence of agreement [between theparties, judges had] no power to reduce the damages to a reasonable suminstead of ordering a new trial.” Mayne’s Treatise on Damages, 589-90 (10thed. 1927). In 1776, New Jersey’s first Constitution declared “that the inestimableright of trial by jury shall remain confirmed, as a part of the law of this colony,without repeal for ever,” and kept mostly intact “the common law of England.”N.J. Const. of 1776 art. XXII.4 Further, in 1791, the then-ratified Seventh4 New Jersey’s 1844 and 1947 Constitutions both reaffirmed that “[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” N.J. Const. of 1844 art. I, ¶ 7; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 9. 16 Amendment to the United States Constitution provided that “[i]n Suits atcommon law . . . , the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact triedby a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,than according to the rules of the common law,” U.S. Const. amend. VII.5During that period, “state and federal courts adhered to the English commonlaw rule regarding new trials for excessive damages.” Thomas, 64 Ohio St.L.J. at 782-83. No state or federal court case mentioned that a judge had theoption to reduce a damages award returned by a jury or “grant[] a new trial forexcessiveness in a case of uncertain damages.” Id. at 783-84. B. Remittitur in its present form -- and the break with the English commonlaw tradition -- is often credited to a seemingly unremarkable case. SeeKadane, 3 Brit. J. Am. Legal Stud. at 313-14; Thomas, 64 Ohio St. L.J. at 731-32. In 1822, United States Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story sat as a CircuitJustice in Blunt v. Little, in which a jury rendered a judgment in favor of theplaintiff, who claimed he was maliciously arrested by the defendant. 3 Mason 5 The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution is “not incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and is therefore not applicable to the states.” In re Application of LiVolsi, 85 N.J. 576, 587 n.7 (1981) (citing Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916); Fisch v. Manger, 24 N.J. 66, 74-75 (1957)). 17 102, 102 (1822). Justice Story upheld the verdict on liability but found thatthe $2000 damages award was excessive. Ibid. He acknowledged hisauthority to “grant a new trial for excessive damages” and then expressed hispersonal belief that the damages should have been lower. Ibid. Justice Storyexplained: It appeared to me at the trial, a strong case for damages; at the same time, I should have been better satisfied, if the damages had been made moderate. I have the greatest hesitation in interfering with the verdict, and in so doing, I believe that I go to the very limits of the law. After full reflection, I am of opinion, that it is reasonable, that the cause should be submitted to another jury, unless the plaintiff is willing to remit $500 of his damages. If he does, the court ought not to interfere farther. [Ibid. (emphases added).]Justice Story did not seek the defendant’s consent to the remittitur. Theplaintiff agreed to the remitted damages, and therefore the defendant’sapplication for a new trial was denied. Ibid. At no point did Justice Story reference either the Seventh Amendment,which states that “no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in anyCourt of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law,”U.S. Const. amend. VII, or English or American common law to support hisfactfinding under the doctrine of remittitur. See ibid. As Justice Storycandidly admitted, “I believe that I go to the very limits of the law.” Ibid. 18 In time, Justice Story’s use of remittitur in Blunt was accepted by theUnited States Supreme Court and “uniformly applied by the lower federalcourts.” Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 , 483 (1935); see N. Pac. R.R. Co. v.Herbert, 116 U.S. 642 , 646 (1886) (“The exaction, as a condition of refusing anew trial, that the plaintiff should remit a portion of the amount awarded bythe verdict was a matter within the discretion of the court.”).6 Nonetheless, ina case involving a constitutional challenge to additur, the Supreme Court inDimick reexamined the validity of the then-accepted practice of remittitur.Dimick, 293 U.S. at 482-86. The Court noted that Blunt, Northern Pacific, andother cases made no “real attempt to ascertain the common law rule on thesubject” of remittitur. Id. at 483. After a review of the common law cases andcommentaries, the Court reasoned that Justice Story’s use of remittitur restedon a shaky legal foundation. Id. at 484-85. The Dimick Court suggested that“if the question of remittitur were now before us for the first time, it would bedecided otherwise.” Id. at 484.6 See, e.g., Gila Valley, Globe & N. Ry. Co. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94 , 103-04 (1914) (stating that a plaintiff could voluntarily remit a jury verdict in response to a motion for new trial); Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co., 158 U.S. 41 , 52 (1895) (holding that when a plaintiff filed for remittitur on part of his judgment as a condition of avoiding a new trial, he “waived all right to object to the order of the court, of the benefit of which he had availed himself”). 19 While the Supreme Court decided not to disturb the doctrine ofremittitur, which had been “accepted as the law for more than a hundredyears,” it did not use a “doubtful precedent” to justify the constitutionality ofadditur. Ibid. The Court acknowledged that whenever a new trial must begranted because a jury’s damages award “is palpably and grossly inadequate orexcessive,” the assessment of damages remains a question of “fact” to bedecided by the jury as in the first trial. Id. at 486. The Court then provided astrained rationale for upholding the constitutionality of remittitur and strikingdown additur. The Court reasoned that in the case of an excessive damagesaward, “the remittitur has the effect of merely lopping off an excrescence” andthat “what remains is included in the verdict . . . found by the jury,” but in thecase of an inadequate damages award, “an increase by the court is a baldaddition of something which in no sense can be said to be included in theverdict.” Ibid. The Court held that additur requires the plaintiff “to forego hisconstitutional right to the verdict of a jury and accept 'an assessment partlymade by a jury which has acted improperly, and partly by a tribunal which hasno power to assess.’” Id. at 487 (emphasis added) (quoting J. Lionel Barber &Co., Ltd. v. Deutsche Bank [1919] AC 304 at 335). The Court did not, andperhaps could not, explain why any part of a grossly excessive damages award 20 -- an award returned by a jury that had “acted improperly” -- was entitled toany deference and why the “lopping off an excrescence” was not the very typeof judicial factfinding of which it disapproved. See id. at 486-87. In the end,additur was deemed unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment whileremittitur survived, primarily due to its long-standing history in federaljurisprudence. Id. at 484-85, 487-88. V. A. By 1917, the practice of remittitur -- “the power of the trial court to putthe plaintiff to an election of accepting a reduced verdict or a new trial” -- was“well settled” in New Jersey. Heinz v. Del., Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co., 90 N.J.L. 198, 200 (E. & A. 1917).7 In Heinz, the plaintiff suffered “damages tohis person and property in a railroad crossing accident,” and a jury awarded averdict of $11,300. Id. at 198-99. On appeal, the Supreme Court determinedthat the verdict was excessive and remitted the award to $9945. Ibid. Theplaintiff accepted the remittitur in lieu of a new trial, and the defendantappealed. Ibid. The Court of Errors and Appeals declared that the defendantwas not deprived of his constitutional right to trial by jury because the remitted7 The Court of Errors and Appeals served as New Jersey’s court of last resort at that time. Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 238 N.J. 157, 166 n.2 (2019). 21 amount “is a part of the damages assessed by the jury [and therefore] thedefendant cannot be heard to say that such reduced damages were not assessedby the jury.” Id. at 201. In 1917, additur was also an accepted practice in this State. Gaffney v.Illingsworth, 90 N.J.L. 490, 492 (E. & A. 1917). Forty years later, for the firsttime, this Court addressed a constitutional challenge to additur based on theDimick decision. See Fisch v. Manger, 24 N.J. 66, 72-73, 80 (1957). Lookingprimarily to New Jersey’s jurisprudential history “in ascertaining whether thehighly desirable practices of remittitur and additur may be adhered to” underArticle I, Paragraph 9 of the New Jersey Constitution, the Court in Fisch tooka pragmatic approach to the right to trial by jury. See id. at 75. The Courtexplained that the constitutional right of trial by jury relates to substance rather than form and does not preclude efficient procedural devices which, though perhaps not strictly part of the English common law, are nevertheless wholly consistent with the fundamental right of the parties to have the facts determined by a fair and impartial jury acting under appropriate judicial guidance and control. [Ibid.]Given “the laudable purpose of avoiding a further trial where substantialjustice may be attained on the basis of the original trial,” the Court was“satisfied that the practices of remittitur and additur violate none of our 22 constitutional interdictions” when fairly invoked to resolve a “manifest denialof justice.” Id. at 80 (quoting Lindroth v. Christ Hosp., 21 N.J. 588, 596(1956)).8 In contrast with the majority, Justice Heher submitted that the additurpractice sanctioned by the Court “contravene[d] the essence of the common-law right of trial by jury at the time of the adoption of [New Jersey’s] 1776Constitution” and the jury-trial right guaranteed in the 1947 Constitution. Seeid. at 86 (Heher, J., concurring).9 Justice Heher maintained that “[t]hequestion is one of constitutional power rather than procedural expediency.” Id.at 87. He reasoned that if a court does not have “an absolute right to assessunliquidated damages in an action at law for a personal tort,” the court shouldnot use the device of additur to impose “its judgment on the unwillingplaintiff” as a substitute for granting a new trial. See ibid.8 The plaintiff in Fisch suffered serious injuries in an automobile accident. 24 N.J. at 67. The jury returned a damages award of $3000, reimbursing the plaintiff’s “actual monetary losses,” but allotting him basically “nothing for his suffering and permanent injuries.” Id. at 71. The trial judge entered an additur to increase the award to $7500, with the consent of only the defendant. Ibid. Plaintiff appealed. Id. at 67. Although the Court affirmed the practice of additur as constitutionally sound, it ultimately concluded that the trial judge’s additur of $7500 was inadequate and therefore “an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 80 (quoting Esposito v. Lazar, 2 N.J. 257, 259 (1949)). Accordingly, the Court granted the plaintiff a new trial on damages. Id. at 81. 9 Justice Heher concurred with the majority that the plaintiff was entitled to a new trial on damages. Id. at 88. 23 B. “Our civil system of justice places trust in ordinary men and women ofvarying experiences and backgrounds, who serve as jurors, to renderjudgments concerning liability and damages.” Johnson v. Scaccetti, 192 N.J. 256, 279 (2007). Although the doctrines of remittitur and additur have longbeen a part of our jurisprudence, remittitur in particular has come underincreasing scrutiny as we have given greater emphasis to the substantialdeference that must be accorded a damages award rendered by a jury. Cuevas, 226 N.J. at 485. That substantial deference derives from the recognition thatwhen a case is entrusted to a jury, the jury is responsible for determining thequantum of damages. See ibid. In recent years, this Court has cautioned that trial courts “must exercisethe power of remittitur with great restraint . . . because in our constitutionalsystem of civil justice, the jury -- not a judge -- is charged with theresponsibility of deciding the merits of a civil claim and the quantum ofdamages to be awarded a plaintiff.” Id. at 499. Our courts have been advisednot to “grant a remittitur except in the unusual case in which the jury’s awardis so patently excessive, so pervaded by a sense of wrongness, that it shocksthe judicial conscience.” Id. at 485. We have stressed that “the judge does notsit as a decisive juror and should not overturn a damages award falling within a 24 wide acceptable range -- a range that accounts for the fact that different juriesmight return very different awards even in the same case.” Id. at 486. The arguments presented in this appeal have compelled this Court tolook anew at the fairness of a trial judge granting a remittitur or additurwithout the mutual assent of the parties. VI. Currently, when a court concludes that a new trial is warranted “basedsolely on the excessiveness of the jury’s damages award, it has the power toenter a remittitur reducing the award to the highest amount that could besustained by the evidence.” Id. at 499 (citing Fertile, 169 N.J. at 500).Although the court has decided that the grossly excessive award is amiscarriage of justice to the defendant, only the plaintiff -- not the defendant --has the choice to accept the remitted amount or proceed to a new damagestrial. Ibid. (citing Fertile, 169 N.J. at 491-92). The inverse is true in the case of additur. Tronolone, 224 N.J. Super. at 97. When the court decides that a grossly inadequate damages award is amiscarriage of justice to the plaintiff, the court has the power to enter anadditur, increasing the award to an amount that could be sustained by the 25 evidence, but only the defendant -- not the plaintiff -- has the choice to acceptthe increased amount or proceed to a new damages trial. See ibid.10 Remittitur and additur allow just one party the option of avoiding theunnecessary expense and delay of a new trial. The other party is bound by ajudge’s setting the quantum of damages and denying a new trial -- subject onlyto an appeal challenging the trial court’s exercise of discretion in granting orsetting the remittitur or additur amount. See Esposito v. Lazar, 2 N.J. 257, 259(1949). Whether by lopping off the excess of an award in a remittitur case orincreasing the deficient amount of an award in an additur case, the judge isfixing the quantum of damages by assessing the evidence -- crediting,discrediting, weighing, and balancing evidence, including witness testimony.The heart of the problem is lack of mutual consent to the judge’s assessment ofthe proper quantum of damages. The wronged party gets the short end of thestick. After the trial court concludes that a jury returned a grossly excessive orinadequate damages award, the party entitled to a new trial is denied a newtrial if the other party accepts the court’s remitted or increased amount. In aremittitur, the plaintiff controls whether the defendant receives a new damages10 Courts have debated whether the increased amount should be the lowest or just a reasonable amount that could be supported by the evidence. See id. at 99-103. 26 trial, and in an additur, the defendant controls whether the plaintiff receives anew damages trial. Because both parties are not required to accept the remittitur or additur,a new trial can be denied without the mutual consent of the parties. Under ourcourt rules, however, both parties generally have the right to demand andreceive a jury trial on damages. See R. 4:35-1(a) (“[A]ny party may demand atrial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury . . . .”); R. 4:35-1(d) (“Whentrial by jury has been demanded . . . the trial of all issues so demanded shall beby jury, unless all parties or their attorneys . . . consent to trial by the courtwithout a jury . . . .”). A party entitled to a new damages trial because of agrossly excessive or inadequate damages award should be in no differentposition. The current practice, which places the parties on an unequal footing,cannot be squared with fundamental notions of fairness and cannot be justifiedin the name of judicial efficiency or cost effectiveness. VII. In reexamining long-accepted common law doctrines, such as remittiturand additur, we understand that adherence to stare decisis promotes importantvalues -- stability and predictability in the law. See Luchejko v. City ofHoboken, 207 N.J. 191, 208-09 (2011). The common law, however, is alsodynamic and allows for the continuing improvement of our system of justice as 27 we seek to correct imperfections in our legal procedures. See State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 505 (1957). As Justice Cardozo explained in his treatise on thecommon law: “Every new case is an experiment; and if the accepted rulewhich seems applicable yields a result which is felt to be unjust, the rule isreconsidered.” Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 23(1921). “[T]he nature of the judicial process requires the power to revise, tolimit, and to overrule if justice is to be done.” State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 440(2015) (quoting State v. Shannon, 210 N.J. 225, 227 (2012)). In addition to our superintendence over the common law to promotegreater equity in our civil justice system, we also exercise constitutionalauthority over the practices and procedures of our courts, pursuant to ArticleVI, Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the New Jersey Constitution, to ensure greaterfairness in the administration of justice. We have exercised our Article VI,Section 2, Paragraph 3 powers, for example, to prohibit ex parte post-verdictcommunication between a trial judge and jurors, Davis v. Husain, 220 N.J. 270, 285-86 (2014), to establish procedures that trial judges must follow toaccept a waiver of the right to trial by jury, State v. Blann, 217 N.J. 517, 518(2014), and to require law enforcement officers to make a written recorddetailing out-of-court identification procedures, State v. Delgado, 188 N.J. 48,63 (2006). 28 Today, we exercise our superintendence over the common law and ourconstitutional authority over the practices and procedures of the courts torevise the doctrines of remittitur and additur. We do so to make our civilsystem of justice fairer -- placing plaintiffs and defendants on a level playingfield after a judge grants a motion for a new damages trial and, as analternative, sets a remittitur or an additur. We now hold that in the unusual case where a damages award wasgrossly excessive or grossly inadequate, the trial court retains the power todeclare that a jury’s damages award shocks the conscience and to grant a newtrial or offer the parties a remittitur or an additur. Going forward, however,unless both parties consent to a remittitur or an additur, the court must grant anew trial. Given our modification of remittitur and additur based on our authorityover the common law and practices and procedures of the courts, we need notaddress the constitutional right-to-jury-trial argument advanced by plaintiffand a number of amici. See Randolph Town Ctr., L.P. v. County of Morris, 186 N.J. 78, 80 (2006) (“Courts should not reach a constitutional questionunless its resolution is imperative to the disposition of litigation.”). 29 VIII. Under this new scheme, we recognize that a remittitur and an additur areessentially settlement figures suggested by the trial court. For this approach towork effectively, the trial court must calculate a remittitur or additur in a waythat maximizes the potential that the parties can reach a mutually acceptablesettlement. That will not occur if the court sets the figure at the highest orlowest damages award that could be sustained by the evidence. In setting theremittitur or additur, the court should not accord any deference to a damagesaward that shocks the judicial conscience. When a judge declares that a jury’s damages award is so grosslyexcessive or grossly inadequate “that it shocks the judicial conscience,” seeCuevas, 226 N.J. at 485, the jury’s appraisal of the evidence leading to anerroneous verdict should not be entitled to any deference. That is so becausewhen the jury’s damages award is “so wrong” that the court must grant either anew trial or, alternatively, a remittitur or an additur, the court cannot assumethat the jury understood its function or the evidence. See Tronolone, 224 N.J.Super. at 103. Because a damages award so grossly disproportionate to theevidence is not entitled to deference, the court should not “resolve all factualdisputes in favor of one party or the other, or try to follow the faulty reasoning 30 of the jury, or fix the highest or lowest amount a reasonable jury could haveawarded without reversal.” Id. at 103-04. Logic suggests that the parties are most likely to mutually agree to aremittitur or an additur that is a fair and reasonable award. A defendantseeking a new trial based on a grossly excessive damages award is unlikely toconsent to a remittitur that is the highest amount that a reasonable jury couldhave awarded the plaintiff, and the same reasoning applies to the lowestamount in the case of additur. If the objective is to encourage settlement, thenthe remittitur or additur must be an amount that both parties would deemreasonable -- not the highest or lowest sustainable amount. The methodology recommended by Judge Cohen in Tronolone is themost sensible way to proceed. In setting “the proper amount of an additur orremittitur, the [trial] court must attempt the difficult task of determining theamount that a reasonable jury, properly instructed, would have awarded.”Tronolone, 224 N.J. Super. at 103. In short, in fixing the remittitur or addituramount, the court must “reach a fair damage verdict on the basis of theevidence it saw and heard.” 11 Id. at 104.11 Trial judges need not place their findings on the record given that the remittitur or additur amount is not binding on the parties and not appealable. 31 Even if the parties do not consent to the remittitur or additur fixed by th ecourt, the court’s evaluation of the damages may spur the parties to reach asettlement on their own terms. When a new trial on damages must be grantedbecause the award was grossly excessive or grossly inadequate, the partiesmay focus on the uncertain outcome of the new trial and perhaps be more riskaverse in venturing another round with a jury. We do not expect our ruling to have a substantial impact on the practicein our civil courts. According to a review by the Conference of Civil PresidingJudges, over the past three years, our trial courts granted only eight remittitursand additurs, and only three were accepted. Setting remittiturs and additurs ata fair and reasonable amount -- even with the additional requirement of mutualconsent -- may elicit a higher acceptance rate. In any event, when a trial courtdeclares that a damages award is so grossly excessive or inadequate that itshocks the judicial conscience, the parties are entitled to a new trial, unless thecourt offers a remittitur or additur that the parties mutually accept. The acceptance of a remittitur or an additur is optional to both parties.The absence of mutual consent means that the case proceeds to a second juryfor a new damages trial. Although the party objecting to the court’s grant of anew trial may appeal that decision, no appeal may be filed from the court’ssetting of the remittitur or additur amount. The parties have the power simply 32 to reject the amount fixed by the court if they disagree with the court’sassessment. Because the trial court in this case declared that the damages award wasso grossly inadequate that it shocked the judicial conscience and becauseOrientale did not consent to the court’s additur, Orientale is entitled to a newtrial on damages. 12 IX. In summary, the trial court may not disturb a damages award entered bya jury unless it is so grossly excessive or so grossly inadequate “that it shocksthe judicial conscience.” See Cuevas, 226 N.J. at 485. 13 If a damages awardmeets that standard, then the court must grant a new trial. The court also hasthe option of recommending to the parties a remittitur or an additur in lieu of anew trial. In setting a remittitur or an additur, the court must determine “theamount that a reasonable jury, properly instructed, would have awarded.”12 In light of our resolution of this issue, we need not examine the particulars of how the trial court determined the additur amount. 13 It bears mentioning that, in some instances, a damages award may be so grossly excessive that it may demonstrate that the jury was swayed by “prejudice, partiality or passion.” See Taweel v. Starn’s Shoprite Supermarket, 58 N.J. 227, 231 (1971); see also Tronolone, 224 N.J. Super. at 98. In such an exceptional case, where the entire verdict is tainted, a new trial on both liability and damages must be granted. Tronolone, 224 N.J. Super. at 98. 33 Tronolone, 224 N.J. Super. at 103. The acceptance of a remittitur or an additurrequires the mutual consent of the parties. If either party rejects a remittitur oran additur, the case must proceed to a new trial on damages. In this case, Orientale did not consent to the additur and therefore she isentitled to a new damages trial. We remand to the trial court for proceedingsconsistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. 34