Title: Ammons v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.
Citation: 663 So. 2d 961
Docket Number: 1940038
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: July 7, 1995

663 So. 2d 961 (1995)
Carmen Ray AMMONS
v.
MASSEY-FERGUSON, INC.
No. 1940038.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 7, 1995.
James H. Tipler of The Tipler Law Offices, Andalusia, for appellant.
Peter V. Sintz of Sintz, Campbell, Duke &amp; Taylor, Mobile, for appellee.
*962 PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED. NO OPINION.
See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A), Ala. R.App.P.
MADDOX, ALMON, SHORES, and COOK, JJ., concur.
HOUSTON, J., concurs specially.
BUTTS, J., dissents.
HOUSTON, Justice (concurring specially).
The plaintiff appeals from a judgment based on a directed verdict for the defendant manufacturer of a tractor. The plaintiff sought damages based on the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine ("AEMLD"), alleging that the tractor was defective. The tractor was owned by Covington County; the plaintiff, who was an employee of the county, was injured while operating the tractor, when he was hit either by a tree branch or by an object thrown by a mower being drawn by the tractor.
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow Herbert Bogert to testify as an expert witness. "[W]hether a particular witness will be allowed to testify as an expert is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be disturbed on appeal except for abuse of that discretion." Townsend v. General Motors Corp., 642 So. 2d 411, 423 (Ala.1994).
The record reveals the following colloquy between the trial court, Bogert, and the attorneys:
A witness must be qualified as an expert before being allowed to give an opinion as an expert. To qualify as an expert, the witness must have such knowledge, skill, experience, or training that his or her opinion will be considered in reason as giving the trier of fact light upon the question to be determined. Townsend v. General Motors Corp., supra. In addition, a witness, even one qualified as an expert, must have a factual basis for an opinion. Although any challenge to *965 the adequacy of the factual basis for an expert's opinion normally goes to the weight rather than to the admissibility of the evidence, if the facts relied on by the witness clearly are insufficient to support an opinion, then the challenge may go even to the admissibility of the opinion. Morris v. Young, 585 So. 2d 1374 (Ala.1991); Alabama Power Co. v. Robinson, 447 So. 2d 148 (Ala.1983); see, also, J. Colquitt, Alabama Law of Evidence, § 7.3 (1990). A witness's testimony cannot be based on mere speculation and conjuncture. Townsend v. General Motors Corp., supra.
After carefully reviewing the record, I cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Bogert's opinion that the tractor was defective because it lacked a metal screen or a plastic shield behind the driver's seat. "Defectiveness" under the AEMLD has been defined by this Court to mean that the product does not meet the reasonable expectations of an ordinary consumer as to its safety, i.e., that the product is not reasonably safe for its intended purpose and use. Townsend v. General Motors Corp., supra; Casrell v. Altec Industries, Inc., 335 So. 2d 128 (Ala.1976). The record suggests to me that although Bogert had an academic background in agricultural education and had general experience in safety-related matters, he failed to demonstrate that he would be able to assist the jury in determining whether the Massey-Ferguson Model 290 tractor on which Ammons was injured was unreasonably dangerous. The undisputed evidence indicates that the tractor met the county's stated safety specifications. Thus, nothing in the evidence suggests that the tractor did not meet the reasonable expectations of the county. The tractor in question was a multi-purpose agricultural tractor that was designed to be used with a number of attachments (e.g., a plow, a baler, a backhoe) that could be incompatible with Bogert's proposed screen or shield. Bogert, who was not an engineer and who lacked experience in tractor design, could present no statistics (other than the fact that he and certain other unspecified individuals had been struck by objects while driving tractors with no screen or shield) or test results on which to base his opinion that the risk of harm was unreasonable without the addition of a screen or shield, or any evidence suggesting a reason why Massey-Ferguson, the manufacturer of the tractor, as opposed to the county, was in a better position to know how the tractor would ultimately be used on a daily basis and, thus, whether such a device would be practical. Furthermore, Bogert provided no explanation as to why it would be unreasonable for Massey-Ferguson to rely on the standard practice of manufacturers of tractor-drawn mowers to make available "chain guards" to deflect objects thrown by the mower's blades.
Massey-Ferguson was not an insurer against any and all harm to which Ammons was exposed while operating the tractor. Bogert seemed to place great emphasis on his belief that Ammons would not have been injured if the tractor had been equipped with a screen or a shield and on his belief that such a device would have made the tractor safer. Based on the evidence presented in this case, I think these beliefs would probably be shared by most jurors. It is well settled, however, that proof of an accident and an injury is not in itself sufficient to establish liability under the AEMLD. Townsend v. General Motors Corp., supra. Logically, then, such proof cannot form the basis for an opinion that a product is "defective" within the terms of the AEMLD. Bogert's testimony, lacking a factual foundation, was speculative at best and of no apparent help to the factfinder. The record reflects that the trial court sensed this. See Macon County Comm'n v. Sanders, 555 So. 2d 1054 (Ala. 1990) (expert must possess knowledge beyond that of the average person so that his or her testimony will aid the factfinder); Ex parte Hill, 553 So. 2d 1138 (Ala.1989) (expert testimony is admissible if the subject matter is beyond the normal knowledge or experience of the average person and the testimony is helpful to the factfinder in making a finding in accordance with the evidence and the applicable law).
I agree that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Bogert's opinion that the tractor was unreasonably dangerous; and, because there was no other evidence creating a fact question as to whether the *966 tractor was defective within the terms of the AEMLD, I agree that the trial court properly directed a verdict for Massey-Ferguson.