Title: Bocock v. Rose
Citation: 373 S.W.2d 441
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: December 5, 1963

373 S.W.2d 441 (1963) George Bradford BOCOCK v. Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth ROSE, Sr., et al. Supreme Court of Tennessee. December 5, 1963. *442 Robert H. Polk, Nashville, for plaintiff in error. Hayes &amp; Swafford, Winchester, Clinton H. Swafford, Winchester, of counsel, for defendants in error. DYER, Justice. In this opinion George Bradford Bocock will be referred to as plaintiff. Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth Rose, Sr., Mr. and Mrs. Ben Rose and Mr. and Mrs. Ray Garrett, Sr., as defendants. The plaintiff sued defendants jointly and severally, for $25,000.00 damages as a result of an alleged assault and battery made upon the person of plaintiff, without cause or provocation, by the minor sons of defendants. The declaration alleged defendants had a duty to discipline their minor sons when they have knowledge of said sons' propensities to assault others; that defendants knew or should have known their sons had such propensity to assault and batter others; that defendants having such knowledge had failed to restrain their sons; that plaintiff's injuries and damages were due to the assault upon him by defendants' sons; and that as direct result of defendants' failure to restrain or discipline their sons plaintiff was injured. Defendants filed a demurrer to this declaration which was sustained by the Trial Judge and plaintiff has seasonably appealed to this Court. The question for decision is whether this declaration states a cause of action; or more particularly whether defendants owe plaintiff a duty to supervise and control their minor sons under the circumstances alleged. Construing the declaration in its most favorable light such would appear to state a cause of action; if there is such duty as alleged. Otherwise the declaration will fail. In Norton v. Payne, 154 Wash. 241, 281 P. 991 (1929) an action was brought against the parents of a child who had injured a second child. The appellate court in this case said: *443 In Ryley v. Lafferty, 45 F.2d 641 (9 Cir.1930), the complaint against the parents alleged the defendants' son's vicious disposition, his habit of beating smaller boys, the parents' knowledge of such a habit, their failure to restrain their son, and their failure to heed the admonitions of other parents who knew of the child's habit which it was alleged amounted to encouraging the child. The Court in overriding a demurrer to the complaint holding that there was a cause of action stated: The language in the Ryley case that the parents encouraged the child is misleading, as it is apparent any encouragement was due to the failure to restrain the child when his parents had knowledge of his dangerous habit. In Condel v. Savo, 350 Pa. 350, 39 A.2d 51, 155 A.L.R. 81 (1944) the Court dealing with a similar situation presented in the case at bar said: Bieker v. Owens, 234 Ark. 97, 350 S.W.2d 522 (1961) was a suit against parents for an alleged assault by their child upon another child. The Supreme Court in Arkansas said: The cases of Landis v. Condon, 95 Ohio App. 28, 116 N.E.2d 602 (1952) and Caldwell v. Zaher, 344 Mass. 590, 183 N.E.2d 706 (1962) are recent cases where parents have been held liable for their children's willful assaults, when the parents knew of the children's propensities to assault others, but failed to take any steps to correct or restrain the children. 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 68 has this to say: There are three jurisdictions which would apparently hold the declaration in the case at bar would not state a cause of action. They are Missouri, Kentucky and Ontario. See Baker v. Haldeman, 24 Mo. 219, 69 Am. Dec. 430 (1857); Paul v. Hummel, 43 Mo. 119, 97 Am.Dec. 381 (1868); Haunert v. Speier, 214 Ky. 46, 281 S.W. 998 (1926); Thibodeau v. Cheff, 24 Ont.L. Rep. 214 (1911); Corby v. Foster, 29 Ont. L.Rep. 83 (1913). The Missouri cases apparently rely upon the common law rule, that a parent is not liable for the torts of his child. The Kentucky court speaks of a principal-agent relationship between parent and child, or the child must be a "conduit" of the parent's negligence, before there is any liability. In the Kentucky case cited the court said the "conduit" theory would not apply since the son was not insane or otherwise mentally irresponsible. The Ontario Court also relied upon the fact of the child's irresponsible nature and mental incapacity in finding liability. The courts on this matter speak in terms of a parent being liable for the child's torts, which suggest vicarious liability based on the family relationship. This is not the case. The parent is actually being held liable for his own negligence which is the proximate cause of the injury. The parent-child relationship does not make the parent liable in and of itself. This distinction is well stated in 43 Yale Law Journal 893, as follows: Although the present case is apparently one of first impression, two cases have been cited in the briefs which are said to be controlling in Tennessee. An analysis of these cases indicates they are not controlling. Highsaw v. Creech, 17 Tenn. App. 573, 69 S.W.2d 249 (1933) and Smith v. Salvaggio, 4 Tenn.Civ.App. 727 (1914), the cases relied upon, are situations involving parents' negligence for allowing minors to possess weapons, an air rifle in Highsaw and a .22 rifle in Smith. These cases are not in point with a situation involving a parent's negligence in failing to restrain a minor who has a known propensity to assault, except, as perhaps, as an indication there may be parental liability in some instances. We find and so hold parents may be held liable for the dangerous habits of their minor children causing injuries and damages to others, when, (1) the parent has opportunity and ability to control the child, and (2) the parent has knowledge, or in the exercise of due care should have knowledge, of the child's habit, propensity or tendency to commit specific wrongful acts, and (3) the specific acts would normally be expected to cause injury to others, and (4) the parent fails to exercise reasonable means of controlling or restraining the child. The action of the Trial Judge in sustaining the demurrer is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.