Title: Teague v. Schimel
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2014AP002360
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 8, 2017

2017 WI 56 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP2360 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Dennis A. Teague, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
Linda Colvin and Curtis Williams, 
          Intervening  
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Brad D. Schimel, Walt Neverman, Dennis Fortunato 
and Brian O'Keefe, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 367 Wis. 2d 547, 877 N.W.2d 379 
PDC No: 2016 WI App 20 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 8, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 9, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Juan B. Colas 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
SEPARATE WRITING: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. writes separately, joined by A.W. 
BRADLEY, J. 
GABLEMAN, J. concurs, joined by ROGGENSACK, C.J. 
 
DISSENTED: 
ZIEGLER, J. dissents 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs by Jeffery R. Myer, Sheila Sullivan, and Legal Action of 
Wisconsin, Inc., Milwaukee, and an oral argument by Jeffery R. 
Myer. 
 
For the defendants-respondents, there was a brief filed by 
and an oral argument by Daniel P. Lennington, deputy solicitor 
general, with whom on the brief was Misha Tseytlin, solicitor 
general, 
and 
Brad 
D. 
Schimel, 
attorney 
general.
 
 
2017 WI 56
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP2360 
(L.C. No. 
2010CV2306) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Dennis A. Teague, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Linda Colvin and Curtis Williams, 
 
          Intervening  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Brad D. Schimel, Walt Neverman, Dennis 
Fortunato and Brian O'Keefe, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 8, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   The Wisconsin Department of Justice 
("DOJ") has a policy and practice of creating and disseminating 
criminal history reports in a manner that, at times, indicates 
that some individuals who are wholly innocent of any criminal 
activity have a criminal history.  The DOJ is aware its policy 
and practice can have this effect.  There is, however, no 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
2 
 
procedure by which an affected individual can stop the creation 
and dissemination of these reports.  Petitioners say this occurs 
because the DOJ does not, before releasing the reports, balance 
the public's interest in disclosure against the public interest 
in nondisclosure.1  They also say the DOJ refuses to correct its 
records pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 19.70 (2015–16),2 which results 
in the deprivation of their constitutionally-protected due 
process rights, as well as their right to the equal protection 
of the laws.3 
I. 
Background 
A. 
The DOJ Database 
¶2 
The DOJ maintains a massive, and growing, centralized 
criminal history database that contains and tracks information 
about people who have come into contact with Wisconsin's 
criminal justice system (the "Database").  According to the 
DOJ's website, the Database "contains detailed information of 
arrests, arrest charges, prosecution, court findings, sentences, 
                                                 
1 See Wis. Newspress, Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Sheboygan Falls, 
199 Wis. 2d 768, 786–88, 546 N.W.2d 143 (1996). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 This is a review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals, Teague v. Van Hollen, 2016 WI App 20, 367 Wis. 2d 379, 
877 N.W.2d 379, affirming the circuit court's dismissal of all 
of Mr. Teague's claims, the Honorable Juan B. Colás presiding. 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
3 
 
and state correctional system admissions and releases."4  The 
Database "is an accumulation of information submitted by 
Wisconsin law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, and the 
Wisconsin Department of Corrections as required by applicable 
statutes."  The DOJ has a statutory mandate to gather, store, 
and curate this information:  "[The DOJ] shall:  (a) Obtain and 
file fingerprints, descriptions, photographs and any other 
available identifying data on persons who have been arrested or 
taken 
into 
custody 
in 
this 
state . . . ." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 165.83(2). 
¶3 
As of July 11, 2016, the Database contained criminal 
records on almost 1.5 million people.  Each record is keyed to 
an individual's fingerprint.  The record also contains a "master 
name," which is the name the person gave upon his or her first 
contact with the criminal justice system.  Any name thereafter 
associated with that person is listed as an alias on the record. 
The record may also contain a picture of the individual, a 
physical description, any birth dates supplied by the subject, 
and known residences.  We will refer to all the information 
associated with a record as the "Personal Information." 
¶4 
The Database has many uses critical to the security of 
Wisconsin's residents, one of which is assisting members of the 
public in discovering whether a given individual has a criminal 
                                                 
4 Background Check & Criminal History Information, Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Justice 
(last 
accessed 
May 
25, 
2017), 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/cib/background-check-criminal-
history-information. 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
4 
 
history.  Such knowledge can be valuable to, for example, 
employers, organizations serving children (or other vulnerable 
populations), landlords, and others.5  To determine whether an 
individual has such a history, a person submits a request for a 
criminal history record search to the DOJ, which can be done by 
mail or online through the Wisconsin Online Record Check System 
("WORCS"). 
¶5 
The DOJ's records system can perform two types of 
searches for criminal histories.  The first is fingerprint-based 
and requires submission of a full set of fingerprints for the 
subject in whom the requester is interested.  The second type is 
name-based and requires only the subject's first and last name 
and date of birth (although additional Personal Information can 
be submitted as well).  The DOJ's website describes name-based 
searches as "quicker, cheaper, and easier than fingerprint-based 
searches . . . ."6 
                                                 
5 There are, of course, limitations on how one may use 
knowledge of a person's criminal history.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.31 (declaring the general policy of the state to prohibit 
discrimination based upon many different factors including a 
person's arrest or conviction record); Wis. Admin. Code NR 
§ 51.968(2) (2017) (stating that counties receiving grants to 
acquire property "may not discriminate against any person in the 
use 
and 
enjoyment 
of 
the 
property 
on 
the 
basis 
of . . . conviction record, arrest record . . . ."); Wis. Admin. 
Code Adm § 2.04 (prohibiting discrimination against persons with 
conviction or arrest records when using state office buildings 
and facilities for government business, public meetings, or 
civic activities). 
6 Background Check & Criminal History Information (last 
accessed 
May 
25, 
2017), 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/ 
cib/background-check-criminal-history-information. 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
5 
 
¶6 
Although a person may request a criminal history 
check online, the process is not entirely automated.  The 
DOJ's computer system compares the information provided by 
the requester against the nearly 1.5 million records in the 
Database.  With respect to name-based searches, the system 
employs a sophisticated algorithm to score how closely the 
provided 
information 
relates 
to 
the 
records 
in 
the 
Database.  If the score falls below a certain threshold, 
the DOJ sends the requester a "no record" response, 
indicating the Database contains no information about the 
subject of the inquiry.  If the score is sufficiently 
high, the identified records are automatically sent to the 
requester.  If the score falls in between, then one of 
nineteen DOJ employees must make a judgment as to whether 
the 
search 
has 
identified 
information 
potentially 
responsive to the request.  We will refer to the DOJ's 
named-based record search process as the "Criminal History 
Search." 
¶7 
The information the DOJ provides to the requester 
in response to a Criminal History Search request is 
unreliable, something the DOJ readily admits.  Its website 
warns that "[b]ecause name-based searches are based on 
non-unique identifying data, such as name and date of 
birth, 
they 
are 
less 
reliable 
than 
fingerprint-based 
checks."  In the webpage entitled "Background Check & 
Criminal History Information," the DOJ acknowledges that 
"[i]n some cases, a name-based check may pull up a 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
6 
 
criminal record that does not belong to the subject of the 
search." 
¶8 
The 
WORCS 
training 
material 
also 
notes 
the 
unreliability of a Criminal History Search.  Part of that 
material illustrates how to request a Criminal History 
Search with a series of captured screen images.  Towards 
the end of a typical transaction, after the person has 
entered information related to the subject and paid the 
required fee, a screen appears with certain disclaimers 
displayed in a small font, amongst which is the following: 
Printed below these explanations is a Wisconsin arrest 
record that has been identified as a possible match to 
the identifying data you provided. 
A [sic] arrest search based only on name, date of 
birth, and other identifying data that is not unique 
to a particular person (like "sex" or "race") may 
result in: 
1. Identification of arrest records for multiple 
persons as potential matches for the identifying 
data submitted, or 
2. Identification 
of 
a 
[sic] 
arrest 
record 
belonging 
to 
a 
person 
whose 
identifying 
information is similar in some way to the 
identifying 
data 
that 
was 
submitted 
to 
be 
searched, but is not the same person whose 
identifying data was submitted for searching. 
The Crime Information Bureau (CIB) therefore cannot 
guarantee that the arrest record below pertains to the 
person in whom you are interested. 
* * * 
The arrest reported below is linked by fingerprints to 
the name appearing directly after these explanatory 
sections, following the label "IDENTIFICATION."  That 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
7 
 
name 
is 
the 
name 
that 
was 
provided 
by 
the 
fingerprinted person the first time his or her 
fingerprints were submitted to CIB; it may or may not 
be the real name of the fingerprinted person.  That 
name is called the "Master Name" in these explanatory 
sections.7 
¶9 
The DOJ's instructions on how to read a criminal 
record also testify to the unreliability of the information 
returned by the search.8  They admonish the requester "not just 
[to] assume that a criminal history record pertains to the 
person whose identifying information was submitted to be 
searched," and encourage the requester to "carefully read the 
entire Wisconsin criminal history record response in order to 
determine whether the record returned pertains to the person 
whose identifying information was submitted to be searched."  
The instructions additionally state that if the subject's name 
is different from the "Master Name" on the record, then the 
record "may belong to someone other than the person whose name 
and other identifying data you submitted for searching."  The 
instructions also say that even if the name submitted is the 
                                                 
7 The training material contains commentary on this step of 
the transaction:  "User checks the box on the legalese modal to 
agree with the terms after the request is complete."  As Dr. Sam 
Racine (one of petitioners' experts) testified, this likely 
receives about as much attention as most "legalese" standing 
between the user and his purchase:  "There's clearly a block of 
information that is probably some kind of disclaimer.  I'm going 
to flip through that.  I'm going to flip very quickly because I 
want to get to the information that matters to me which is 
what's in this criminal report." 
8 Instructions on how to read a criminal record and a notice 
to employers appear on a cover page accompanying each search 
response generated and returned to requesters. 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
8 
 
same as the "Master Name" on the record, the response "may 
belong to someone other than the person whose name and other 
identifying data you submitted for searching," because the 
"'Master Name' is the name attached to the initial fingerprint 
submission to [the Crime Information Bureau] that is associated 
with the reported criminal history, and may have been an alias 
name." 
¶10 Notwithstanding the oft-noted unreliability of 
Criminal History Search requests, the DOJ receives over 
900,000 
such 
requests 
a 
year 
from 
individuals 
and 
organizations outside the law enforcement community. 
B. 
The Petitioners 
¶11 This case is not, however, about any of the nearly 1.5 
million people in the DOJ's Database.  It is about those who are 
not.  Most immediately, it is about Dennis A. Teague and two 
others who the Database and its algorithm suggest may have 
criminal histories.  Happily, they do not.  Unhappily, they have 
been unable to get the DOJ's Criminal History Search to stop 
indicating otherwise. 
¶12 Mr. Teague's difficulties started when his cousin (an 
individual to whom we will refer as "ATP") stole his identity 
(according to Mr. Teague).9  As a result, the name "Dennis 
Antonio Teague" was added to ATP's record in the Database as an 
                                                 
9 We refer to ATP by his initials, and understand his 
stealing as "alleged," because he apparently has not had an 
opportunity to contest any representations made about him by the 
parties to this case. 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
9 
 
alias.  Since that time, anyone using Mr. Teague's name and 
birthdate to request a Criminal History Search will receive 
ATP's criminal history report in response.  And this occurs even 
though the birthdate ATP gave for his "Dennis Antonio Teague" 
alias is different from Mr. Teague's. 
¶13 The DOJ recognizes the entirely predictable adverse 
consequences that come from giving a requester a criminal 
history report belonging to someone other than the subject of 
the search.  To address this problem, at least in part, the DOJ 
created a procedure by which individuals may petition for an 
"innocence letter."  To obtain such a letter, a person must 
submit to the DOJ a challenge form and fingerprint card.10  The 
DOJ then performs a fingerprint-based search of the Database 
and, if no matching records exist, it issues to the individual a 
notarized letter stating that he had no criminal history as of 
the date of the letter.11  Mr. Teague, and more than 400 other 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin 
Criminal 
History 
Challenge, 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Justice 
(June 
2014), 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/dles/cib-forms/ 
record-check-unit/DJ-LE-247-fw.pdf. 
11 The DOJ website says it will provide further protections 
in the future for people like Mr. Teague: 
The 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Justice 
will 
be 
implementing the use of a Wisconsin Unique Personal 
Identification Number (WiUPIN) that will be assigned 
to individuals that have successfully challenged a 
criminal history record existing in the Wisconsin 
Criminal History Database.  Once implemented, the 
WiUPIN would be included in the search data provided 
by a requestor and used in searching potential 
matching records, so that any arrest and/or conviction 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
10 
 
people, have received such innocence letters to assist in 
ameliorating the harmful effects of the information disseminated 
by the DOJ.  
¶14 Having successfully established that he is not a 
criminal, Mr. Teague may provide the innocence letter to 
potential employers, landlords, or others who he has reason to 
believe may have requested a Criminal History Search.  The 
letters, of course, will grow stale over time.  Every time the 
actual criminal causes a new entry on the record in the 
Database, people like Mr. Teague will once again have to 
establish their innocence by submitting another challenge form 
and set of fingerprints.  There appears to be no mechanism, 
however, by which an innocent person can know when his criminal 
doppelgänger does something to make his letter moot.  So Mr. 
Teague may learn his letter has lost its effectiveness through, 
for example, a denied housing application, a job offer that 
never comes, or the denial of any of a number of rights or 
opportunities provided or protected by statute. 
¶15 The DOJ's current practice is to place the onus for 
distributing the innocence letters entirely on the innocent 
person.  Although the DOJ creates and maintains the letters, it 
does 
not 
include 
them 
when 
producing 
criminal 
histories 
                                                                                                                                                             
record successfully challenged would not be included 
in a public response. 
Background Check & Criminal History Information, Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Justice, 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/cib/ 
background-check-criminal-history-information. 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
11 
 
implicating the subjects of those letters.12  Thus, when someone 
requests a criminal background check on Mr. Teague, the DOJ will 
provide ATP's criminal history (with Mr. Teague's name listed as 
an alias), but not the innocence letter. 
II. Procedural History 
¶16 Mr. Teague's complaint13 alleged that DOJ officials:  
(I) Failed to properly source and verify information about a 
record subject in violation of Wis. Stat. § 19.67; (II) 
Disseminated information about him without first conducting the 
common-law balancing test; (III) Failed to correct inaccuracies 
in the information provided to requesters pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.365 (now § 19.70); (IV) Violated his rights under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article 1, § 1 of the Wisconsin 
                                                 
12  In a recent development, the DOJ now adds the following 
language (printed in red) to its standard set of disclaimers 
when a person has been issued an innocence letter: 
****RESPONSE CAVEAT**** 
The Wisconsin Department of Justice has received a 
successful fingerprint based challenge to this record 
from an individual whose name is similar to the record 
or whose identity was stolen and used during an 
arrest.  Please ensure the identity of your applicant 
to determine if they are the subject of this record or 
an individual whose name is similar or whose identity 
was stolen.  If you have any questions regarding this 
challenge process, please contact the Criminal History 
Unit of the Crime Information Bureau . . . . 
13 Linda Colvin and Curtis Williams intervened in the action 
after Mr. Teague filed his complaint.  They each present factual 
circumstances that, as relevant here, are indistinguishable from 
each other.  Consequently, our references to Mr. Teague 
encompass all the petitioners. 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
12 
 
Constitution; (V) Violated his substantive due process rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article 1, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution; and (VI) 
Violated his procedural due process rights. 
¶17 The 
parties 
filed 
opposing 
motions 
for 
summary 
judgment, following which the circuit court dismissed claims I 
through IV.  The circuit court conducted a bench trial on the 
substantive and procedural due process claims (V & VI), after 
which it dismissed the remainder of the complaint. 
¶18 Mr. Teague appealed the judgment of the circuit court, 
but presented arguments on only Claims II through VI.  The court 
of appeals, in a published decision, affirmed the circuit 
court.14  In doing so, it determined that Wis. Stat. § 19.356(1) 
prevents judicial review of the DOJ's provision of ATP's 
criminal history in response to a request for a Criminal 
History Search on Mr. Teague.  The Petitioners timely sought 
review, and we now reverse.  
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶19 The proper application of a statute to undisputed 
facts generally presents a question of law.  Pawlowski v. Am. 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI 105, ¶16, 322 Wis. 2d 21, 777 
N.W.2d 67.  We review such questions independently of the 
circuit court and court of appeals, although we benefit from 
their analyses.  Id.  Procedural due process challenges present 
                                                 
14 Teague, 367 Wis. 2d 547. 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
13 
 
a question of law, which we review de novo.  In re Commitment of 
Sorenson, 2002 WI 78, ¶25, 254 Wis. 2d 54, 646 N.W.2d 354. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
¶20 Petitioners assert that Wis. Stat. § 19.70 requires 
the DOJ to correct or supplement its record production when it 
inaccurately ascribes a criminal history to an innocent person.  
Failure to correct or supplement, they say, violates their right 
to procedural and substantive due process, as well as their 
right to the equal protection of the laws.15  We address the 
statutory claim first. 
A. 
Duty to Correct or Supplement 
¶21 The subject of a public record containing personally 
identifiable information may, upon discovering an inaccuracy in 
that record, engage a statutory mechanism to have it corrected.  
The procedure for doing so is as follows: 
(1) Except 
as 
provided 
under 
sub. 
(2),[16] 
an 
individual or person authorized by the individual 
may challenge the accuracy of a record containing 
personally identifiable information pertaining to 
the individual that is maintained by an authority 
if the individual is authorized to inspect the 
                                                 
15 Petitioners also ask us to conclude that, with respect to 
each Criminal History Search request, the DOJ must balance 
the public's interest in disclosure of responsive material 
against the public's interest in non-disclosure.  The DOJ argues 
that the policy it adopted on how to respond to such requests 
satisfies the common-law balancing requirement, and so it need 
not perform a separate evaluation each time it receives a 
background check request.  We need not reach this question 
because of how we resolve this case. 
16 The exceptions do not apply to the records in question. 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
14 
 
record under s. 19.35 (1) (a) or (am) and the 
individual notifies the authority, in writing, of 
the challenge.  After receiving the notice, the 
authority shall do one of the following: 
(a) Concur with the challenge and correct 
the information. 
(b) Deny 
the 
challenge, 
notify 
the 
individual 
or 
person 
authorized 
by 
the 
individual of the denial and allow the 
individual 
or 
person 
authorized 
by 
the 
individual 
to 
file 
a 
concise 
statement 
setting 
forth 
the 
reasons 
for 
the 
individual's disagreement with the disputed 
portion of the record.  A state authority 
that denies a challenge shall also notify 
the individual or person authorized by the 
individual of the reasons for the denial. 
Wis. Stat. § 19.70.17  
1. 
Mr. Teague's requested correction 
¶22 Mr. Teague wants the DOJ to correct its records, but 
has not been entirely clear about what form that correction 
ought to take.  After obtaining his innocence letter, he wrote 
to the DOJ demanding relief under Wis. Stat. § 19.70 (then, Wis. 
Stat. § 19.365).  According to the DOJ letter annexed to the 
complaint, Mr. Teague had asked the DOJ to remove his name as an 
alias from the record in the Database containing ATP's criminal 
history (as distinct from the record created pursuant to a 
Criminal History Search request). 
                                                 
17 "Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined 
words 
or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
15 
 
¶23 The body of Mr. Teague's complaint does not clarify 
what it is he believes needs to be corrected.  It alleges the 
DOJ "has failed to correct the information identified with 
Dennis A. Teague," but says nothing about what, precisely, 
needed correction.  The complaint's ad damnum clause demands, in 
relevant part:  (1) a declaration that the DOJ knowingly failed 
to correct information about Mr. Teague before disseminating it; 
and (2) an order enjoining the DOJ from its continuing violation 
of its duty to correct its records.  The complaint does not 
indicate whether Mr. Teague still believes the DOJ should remove 
his name from ATP's Database record. 
¶24 In his opening brief here, Mr. Teague appears to 
modify the correction he is seeking.  He says the DOJ can 
satisfy its obligation to correct the record by (1) not sending 
ATP's criminal history when someone requests a Criminal History 
Search on Mr. Teague, or (2) including his innocence letter with 
any information the DOJ produces in response to a request for a 
Criminal History Search on Mr. Teague.  The brief also 
acknowledges that he "is not challenging the database or how DOJ 
keeps records; he challenges the correctness of the report made 
in response to a request for a criminal history report about 
him."  In his reply brief, Mr. Teague asserts that "[t]he 
'record' in § 19.70 is the report, not the database."  He then 
appears to concede that the Database itself is accurate, making 
his original correction demand moot:  "The electronic blips of 
the database can be accurate because NOT associated with 
Teague's 
identifiers, 
but 
the 
report, 
which 
makes 
the 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
16 
 
association, 
is 
inaccurate 
when 
printed 
with 
Teague's 
name . . . ."  Having thus identified the report as the record 
in need of correction, as opposed to the information in the 
Database, he says the DOJ can fulfill its statutory duty to 
correct or supplement the record by:  "(a) correct[ing] the 
record (the report) by breaking the association to Teague's 
personal 
identifiers, 
or 
(b) 
deny[ing] 
the 
challenge, 
inform[ing] the challenger, and allow[ing] supplementation with 
a 
'concise 
statement 
setting 
forth 
the 
reasons 
for 
the 
individual's (Teague's) disagreement with the record (the 
report).'" 
¶25 In our view, Mr. Teague has waived his initial demand 
that the DOJ remove his name from the Database's record of ATP's 
criminal history.  That specific request for relief is only 
suggested in an exhibit to the complaint and appears nowhere in 
the briefing before this court.18  The following analysis, 
therefore, assumes Mr. Teague is arguing that the record at 
issue in this case is the report created in response to a 
request for a Criminal History Search, and that the DOJ has a 
duty under Wis. Stat. § 19.70(1) to correct or supplement it. 
2. 
Applicability of Wis. Stat. § 19.70 
¶26 The 
threshold 
question 
is 
whether 
the 
report 
containing ATP's criminal history is a "record" subject to 
                                                 
18 We will not resolve an issue where the issue "has not 
been adequately briefed, and the facts have not been adequately 
developed to allow us to make a reasoned determination."  
Shannon v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 446, 442 N.W.2d 25 (1989). 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
17 
 
correction pursuant to the terms of Wis. Stat. § 19.70 when 
produced in response to a request for a Criminal History 
Search on Mr. Teague.  Our statutes say a "record" is "any 
material on which written, drawn, printed, spoken, visual, or 
electromagnetic 
information 
or 
electronically 
generated 
or 
stored data is recorded or preserved, regardless of physical 
form or characteristics, that has been created or is being kept 
by an authority."  Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) (emphasis added).  An 
"authority" is "any of the following having custody of a record: 
a 
state 
or 
local . . . department . . . ." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.32(1). 
¶27 Depending on how the requester submitted the request 
for a Criminal History Search, the response will be either 
"written" material or "electronically generated" information.  
Either way, the report is created by the DOJ, which is an 
"authority."  And the report was in the DOJ's custody, at least 
until forwarded to the requester.  Thus, ATP's criminal history 
report is a record.  
¶28 Mr. Teague may therefore challenge the accuracy of the 
report if it "contain[s] personally identifiable information 
pertaining to [him] that is maintained by an authority if the 
individual is authorized to inspect the record under s. 19.35 
(1) (a) or (am) . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 19.70(1).  The DOJ 
maintains the information in the report, and Mr. Teague may 
inspect it as readily as those requesting the Criminal History 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
18 
 
Searches,19 so the only real question is whether the report 
contains "personally identifiable information" pertaining to Mr. 
Teague.  A name is a piece of personally identifiable 
information.  Wis. Stat. § 19.62(5) ("'Personally identifiable 
information' means information that can be associated with a 
particular individual through one or more identifiers or other 
information or circumstances.").  Thus, because the report lists 
Mr. 
Teague's 
name 
as 
an 
alias, 
it 
contains 
personally 
identifiable information pertaining to him. 
¶29 If there were any doubt about this conclusion, the 
DOJ's own actions, if not its arguments, would remove it.  The 
DOJ says ATP's criminal history report does not fall within the 
purview 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.70 
because, 
even 
though 
it 
acknowledges the record contains Mr. Teague's name, "the record 
itself does not 'pertain' to Teague."  That, of course, is not 
the standard.  Section 19.70 merely requires that the record 
"contain" personally identifiable information pertaining to him.  
The entire record need not do so.  Even if the entire record 
must pertain to Mr. Teague, the DOJ's actions demonstrate that 
it believes it does.  This case exists only because, in 
providing 
ATP's 
record 
of 
criminal 
activity 
to 
someone 
requesting a Criminal History Search on Mr. Teague, the DOJ 
                                                 
19 "Except as otherwise provided by law, any requester has a 
right to inspect any record."  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a). 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
19 
 
thought it was producing a record pertaining to Mr. Teague.20  
And that, as we describe below, is ultimately what makes the 
report inaccurate. 
3. 
Inaccuracy of the Report 
¶30 The DOJ says there is nothing to correct because the 
report it produces when a person requests a Criminal History 
Search on Mr. Teague is perfectly accurate:  "[A] search for the 
name of 'Dennis Antonio Teague' along with a date of birth will 
accurately return a criminal record associated with that name."  
It also asserts that "DOJ's report is an accurate reflection of 
what information DOJ matched to the information provided by a 
requester."  This is all true, as far as it goes.  But it does 
not go far enough to account for the relationship between what a 
requester seeks when asking for a Criminal History Search, and 
the information the DOJ produces in response. 
¶31 The DOJ misunderstands the question asked by someone 
requesting a Criminal History Search.  It says "[r]equesters 
are getting exactly what they search for:  they are asking 
whether any criminal records match the information they have."  
But that is not what requesters are asking.  The DOJ's 
characterization suggests a merely idle curiosity about whether 
a specific name happens to appear in the Database.  What they 
                                                 
20 It is possible, given the DOJ's many disclaimers, that it 
thought ATP's criminal history might pertain to Mr. Teague, but 
was not sure.  Whatever the level of its metaphysical certainty 
on the question, when it came time to translate beliefs into 
action it resolved its doubts in favor of pertinence. 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
20 
 
are actually asking is whether the people whose names they 
submit have criminal histories. 
¶32 The DOJ must know this is what requesters are asking.  
Its own website, forms, and disclaimers indicate they do.  For 
example, the WORCS website says it "is designed for individuals 
or organizations to submit criminal background checks and 
retrieve results online."21  To request a criminal background 
check by mail, one fills out a form entitled "Wisconsin Criminal 
History Single Name Record Request."  Wisconsin Criminal History 
Single Name Record Request, Wisconsin Department of Justice 
(July 
2011), 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/ 
dles/cib-forms/record-check-unit/DJ-LE-250-single.pdf. 
 
The 
"General Instructions" attached to that form say Wisconsin's 
statutes "provide that any person or entity may request a 
criminal background check."  Id. (emphasis added).  They further 
say one should "[u]se form DJ-LE-250 to request a criminal 
background check on a single individual" and "form DJ-LE-250A to 
request background checks on multiple persons."  Id. (emphases 
added).  The requesters are, indubitably, asking whether the 
identified individuals have criminal backgrounds; they are not 
making abstract inquiries into whether the DOJ's "criminal 
records match the information they have." 
                                                 
21 Wisconsin 
Online 
Record 
Check 
System, 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Justice 
(last 
accessed 
May 
25, 
2017), 
https://recordcheck.doj.wi.gov/ (emphasis added). 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
21 
 
¶33 If the DOJ's characterization of the requesters' 
inquiries were correct, none of its many disclaimers would be 
needed.  The DOJ advises requesters not to "assume that a 
criminal history record pertains to the person whose identifying 
information was submitted to be searched."  Background Check & 
Criminal History Information, Wisconsin Department of Justice 
(last 
accessed 
May 
25, 
2017), 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/cib/background-check-criminal-
history-information.  And it further advises that the record it 
produces "may belong to someone other than the person whose name 
and other identifying data you submitted for searching."  Id.  
The website says the DOJ "cannot guarantee that the information 
furnished pertains to the individual you are interested in."  
And "[i]n some cases, a name-based check may pull up a criminal 
record that does not belong to the subject of the search."  Id.  
None of this would be necessary if requesters were simply asking 
whether the information they submitted appears in the Database.  
But if the question is whether the identified individual has a 
criminal history, then these disclaimers make sense because the 
DOJ knows the information it produces might not relate to that 
person. 
¶34 In this case, the DOJ has known ATP's criminal history 
report does not relate to Mr. Teague ever since it issued Mr. 
Teague's innocence letter.  It necessarily follows that, by 
continuing to produce that report in response to an inquiry into 
whether Mr. Teague has a criminal history, it is providing 
inaccurate information.  The DOJ's briefing admits as much, 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
22 
 
stating that "[t]he record DOJ returns in response to a search 
for 'Dennis Teague' is a report that contains the name as an 
alias for ATP, but the record itself does not 'pertain[]' to 
Teague."  Indeed, it does not.  And because it does not, 
providing ATP's criminal history in response to a Criminal 
History Search on Mr. Teague makes the report an inaccurate 
record by the DOJ's own admission. 
¶35 It is not the information in ATP's criminal history 
report, however, that is inaccurate.  The inaccuracy arises when 
the DOJ provides that report to someone asking whether Mr. 
Teague has a criminal history.  It is the DOJ itself that is 
affirmatively creating the inaccuracy, and Mr. Teague has 
successfully demonstrated that Wis. Stat. § 19.70 entitles him 
to have this inaccuracy corrected.  Because the genesis of the 
inaccuracy is the DOJ's provision of the record to the 
requester, corrections under § 19.70 will likely never have 
anything more than a retroactive effect.  Consequently, we next 
address whether the DOJ's policy and practice violate Mr. 
Teague's due process rights, which holds out the possibility of 
prospective relief.22 
                                                 
22 Justice Gableman would not address the due process claim 
because he believes Wis. Stat. § 19.70 creates not just a remedy 
for correcting inaccurate records, but an affirmative obligation 
to not create inaccuracies in the first place: 
Complying with § 19.70(1)(a) requires "correct[ing] 
the information," and in Teague's case, DOJ is 
providing 
inaccurate 
information 
by 
incorrectly 
presenting ATP's criminal history as Teague's when, in 
fact, DOJ knows that Teague has no criminal history.  
Merely retracting a single report amounts to no 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
23 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
correction at all, because the database will continue 
to 
generate 
the 
same 
report 
with 
the 
same 
inaccuracies. Therefore, under the facts here——where 
DOJ knows its database is repeatedly producing the 
same inaccuracy——I conclude that "correct[ing] the 
information" under § 19.70(1)(a) requires ensuring 
that 
ATP's 
criminal 
history 
will 
no 
longer 
be 
inaccurately reported as Teague's. 
Justice Gableman's concurrence, ¶139. 
The problem with this solution is that § 19.70 does not 
forbid the creation of inaccurate records——it requires only that 
the agency correct inaccuracies previously created, a remedy 
that is wholly retrospective.  It's not just the terms of the 
statute that say so, its entire structure forecloses the relief 
Justice Gableman would supply.  The statute has nothing to say 
to an agency that is thinking about creating an inaccuracy, or 
is even in the process of creating an inaccuracy.  The statute 
does not come into play until an aggrieved individual identifies 
an inaccuracy and demands its correction.  That, of course, 
means the statute focuses exclusively on something the agency 
had already done.  Past perfect tense.  It is enough that the 
statute has purchase only on errors that have already occurred 
to rule out Justice Gableman's proposal; the actual remedy 
portion 
of 
the 
statute, 
however, 
makes 
this 
limitation 
unmistakable.  Upon demonstration that a record is inaccurate, 
the agency's sole statutory obligation is to correct it.  One 
cannot correct what has not yet happened, so the statutory 
language cannot support Justice Gableman's proposition that we 
order the DOJ to prospectively "ensure that ATP's criminal 
history will no longer be inaccurately reported as Teague's." 
 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
24 
 
B. 
Procedural Due Process 
¶36 Mr. Teague says the DOJ deprives him of his right to 
due process of law when it provides ATP's criminal history 
report in response to a Criminal History Search request on his 
name.  The problem Mr. Teague identifies here is more than 
simply the inaccuracy the DOJ creates when it ascribes ATP's 
criminal history to him (however subject to caveats the 
ascription might be).  It is that the DOJ has a policy and 
practice that it knows will predictably, consistently, and 
inaccurately suggest Mr. Teague has a criminal history, and 
there is no procedure by which he can stop this.  Our 
constitutions, he argues, entitle him to at least some minimal 
quantum of process by which to contest the DOJ's policy and 
practice. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Thus, the only way this statute could have prospective 
effect is if the DOJ grew sufficiently weary of issuing 
retractions that it changed its reporting system to eliminate 
false positives.  Failing that, Mr. Teague would have to engage 
the procedure Justice Gableman described:  Contest the report 
under § 19.70, commence a chapter 227 review proceeding if the 
DOJ does not retract the report, initiate a circuit court 
lawsuit if the administrative review process does not provide 
relief, and continue on and on until he gets relief or his 
appellate options end.  And he would have to pursue this 
onerous, expensive, time-consuming process every time the DOJ 
erroneously attributes ATP's criminal history to him.  That is 
why the statutory remedy almost certainly has no prospective 
effect.  It is also why we must proceed to Mr. Teague's 
constitutional claim, because (as Justice Gableman elegantly put 
it), "[m]erely retracting a single report amounts to no 
correction at all . . . ."  Quod erat demonstrandum. 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
25 
 
¶37 The United States Constitution provides, in relevant 
part, that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law."  U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV, § 1.  We can trace the roots of the "due process" guarantee 
back to clause 39 of the Magna Carta, which proclaimed that "No 
free man is to be arrested, or imprisoned, or disseised, or 
outlawed, or exiled, or in any other way ruined, nor will we go 
against him or send against him, except by the lawful judgment 
of his peers or by the law of the land."  It is from the phrase 
"law of the land" that we derive the "due process" obligation:  
"The words, 'due process of law,' were undoubtedly intended to 
convey the same meaning as the words, 'by the law of the land,' 
in Magna Carta.  Lord Coke, in his commentary on those words, 
says they mean due process of law."  Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken 
Land & Imp. Co, 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1855) (citations omitted).  We 
find the same in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which promises 
"[n]o man shall be deprived of his liberty or property, but by 
the judgment of his peers or the law of the land."23  And we 
understand the Wisconsin Constitution as promising due process 
of law under this formulation:  "All people are born equally 
free and independent, and have certain inherent rights; among 
these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 1; Blake v. Jossart, 2016 WI 57, ¶28, 370 
                                                 
23 An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the 
United States north-west of the river Ohio as adapted by An Act 
to provide for the Government of the Territory North-west of the 
river Ohio, art. II, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789). 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
26 
 
Wis. 2d 1, 884 N.W.2d 484, cert denied, 2017 WL 69276 (U.S. Jan. 
9, 2017) (We "treat[] these provisions of the United States and 
Wisconsin Constitutions as consistent with each other in their 
due process and equal protection guarantees.").  
¶38 Yet not all governmental enactments or policies are 
the "law of the land" within the meaning of this concept: 
[C]an a State make any thing due process of law which, 
by its own legislation, it chooses to declare such? To 
affirm this is to hold that the prohibition to the 
States is of no avail, or has no application where the 
invasion of private rights is effected under the forms 
of State legislation. 
Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102 (1877).  It is 
not 
just 
legislative 
activity 
that 
is 
subject 
to 
due 
process/"law of the land" scrutiny.  Executive and judicial 
functions must comport with that requirement as well.  "The 
article [the due process clause] is a restraint on the 
legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of 
the government . . . ."  Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 276. 
¶39 In its most basic sense, procedural due process is the 
requirement 
that 
the 
government 
provide 
notice 
and 
an 
opportunity to be heard when its actions will cause the loss of 
a protected interest.  Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 436 (1901) 
("The essential elements of due process of law are notice and 
opportunity to defend."); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. 
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) ("Many controversies have raged 
about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause 
but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that 
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
27 
 
preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to 
the nature of the case."). 
¶40 The focus here is on procedural safeguards, not on 
whether the State has the authority to take the action under 
review:  "In procedural due process claims, the deprivation by 
state action of a constitutionally protected interest in 'life, 
liberty, or property' is not in itself unconstitutional; what is 
unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without 
due process of law."  Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 
(1990).  This constitutional guarantee protects an individual 
from 
the 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
the 
State's 
authority.  
"Procedural 
due 
process 
rules 
are 
meant 
to 
protect 
persons . . . from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of 
life, liberty, or property."  Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 
(1978).  "Such rules 'minimize substantively unfair or mistaken 
deprivations of' life, liberty, or property by enabling persons 
to contest the basis upon which a State proposes to deprive them 
of protected interests."  Id. at 259–60. 
¶41 We use a two-step process in evaluating due process 
claims.  First, we determine whether the claimant has identified 
an interest protected by the Due Process Clause (life, liberty, 
or property).  Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, 
¶80, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849.  Second, we consider 
whether the procedural safeguards (if any) adequately protect 
the identified interest.  Id. 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
28 
 
1. 
Protected Interest 
¶42 Mr. Teague has asserted an interest in his good name 
and reputation.  There is no doubt that these are assets of 
great value.  And it is a welcome commonplace that people 
typically conduct their lives in a manner calculated to preserve 
those interests.  Ascribing criminal activity to an innocent 
person, however, demeans those assets.  Indeed, it is so clearly 
injurious that doing so constitutes libel per se.  "This is 
elementary:  Any malicious publication, by printing or writing, 
or by signs or pictures, which accuses a person of a crime, 
blackens his character, or tends to expose him to public 
ridicule, contempt or hatred, is libelous . . . ."  Downer v. 
Tubbs, 152 Wis. 177, 180, 139 N.W. 820 (1913) (internal marks 
and citations omitted); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697 (1976) 
("Imputing criminal behavior to an individual is generally 
considered defamatory Per se, and actionable without proof of 
special damages."); Converters Equip. Corp. v. Condes Corp., 80 
Wis. 2d 257, 263, 258 N.W.2d 712 (1977) ("A statement is also 
defamatory if, in its natural and ordinary sense, it imputes to 
the person charged commission of a criminal act."); Scofield v. 
Milwaukee Free Press, 126 Wis. 81, 87–88, 105 N.W. 227 (1905) 
("Written words which subject plaintiff to disgrace or ridicule 
are actionable per se.").24 
                                                 
24 The Restatement (Second) of Torts says that: 
One who publishes a slander that imputes to another 
conduct constituting a criminal offense is subject to 
liability to the other without proof of special harm 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
29 
 
a. 
Defamation 
¶43 Every time the DOJ provides ATP's criminal history in 
response to a Criminal History Search on Mr. Teague, it is 
inaccurately suggesting that Mr. Teague has a criminal history 
when, in fact, he does not.  The impression this creates on the 
requester is open to debate.  It may be that he arrives at a 
definite conclusion that Mr. Teague has a criminal history.  Or 
he may simply presume that he does.  The only conclusion the 
report does not foster is the accurate one:  Mr. Teague has no 
criminal history.  Thus, when the DOJ provides ATP's criminal 
history to those inquiring into Mr. Teague's background, it 
necessarily raises the specter of criminality in the requester's 
mind. 
¶44 A contrary conclusion would be unreasonable.  A 
requester seeks a background check from the DOJ because he 
believes he will receive useful information in response.25  When 
he receives ATP's criminal history, listing Mr. Teague's name as 
an alias, there is nothing in the package that tells him the 
                                                                                                                                                             
if the offense imputed is of a type which, if 
committed in the place of publication, would be 
(a) punishable by imprisonment in a state or federal 
institution . . . . 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 571 (Am. Law Inst. 1977). 
25 If it were otherwise, it would be unlikely the DOJ would 
receive 900,000 background requests each year.  It would be 
irrational to spend the time and money on such requests unless 
the requester assumed the DOJ would provide information related 
to the subject of the request. 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
30 
 
crimes were not committed by Mr. Teague.  According to the DOJ, 
one cannot even tell from the report whether ATP is an alias 
used by Mr. Teague, or if Dennis Teague is an alias used by 
ATP.26  Nor is there anything in the report to suggest they are 
two different people.  So unless the requester knows Mr. Teague 
well enough to discount the information in the report, the DOJ 
has necessarily created a presumption that Mr. Teague has a 
criminal record. 
¶45 In its discussion of the innocence letters, the DOJ 
essentially admits that its reports will create at least a 
presumption of criminality.  In describing the utility of those 
documents, it says "[y]ou can use this letter to prove to 
prospective 
employers 
or 
others 
that 
the 
criminal 
history . . . does not belong to you."  There would be no need 
to prove such a thing if the DOJ had not first created the 
presumption of criminality with its report. 
¶46 The DOJ does not ameliorate in any meaningful sense 
the effect of this inaccurate suggestion of criminality by 
supplying disclaimers along with its imputation of criminal 
behavior, or by advising requesters that the report may not 
                                                 
26 The DOJ explains that the "master name" in the Database 
is just the name given by the subject of the record upon first 
contact with law enforcement——it may not be the person's actual 
name at all.  So if ATP's first contact with police was his 
theft of Mr. Teague's identity, the master name on ATP's record 
in the Database would be "Dennis Teague." 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
31 
 
relate to the subject of the request.  Such hedging does not 
negate the defamation: 
It is true that the letters contained words such as 
"apparently" and "appear to be."  This changes 
nothing.  The authorities agree that communications 
are not made nondefamatory as a matter of law merely 
because they are phrased as opinions, suspicions or 
beliefs.  As this court has held:  "One may be libeled 
by implication and innuendo quite as easily as by 
direct affirmation." 
Converters 
Equipment 
Corp., 
80 
Wis. 2d 257, 
263-64, 
258 
N.W.2d 712 (1977) (quoting Frinzi v. Hanson, 30 Wis. 2d 271, 
277, 140 N.W.2d 259 (1966)).  Further, the DOJ provides these 
disclaimers with all criminal background reports.  They are not 
keyed to the DOJ's level of confidence in the accuracy of the 
match between the report and the subject of the request.  Thus, 
when the DOJ ascribes ATP's criminality to Mr. Teague, it 
provides the same disclaimers as it would if it were providing 
ATP's criminal history to someone requesting a Criminal History 
Search on ATP himself.27  That is to say, the disclaimers are 
unrelated to the specific report the DOJ provides the requester.  
It is no wonder the disclaimers simply fade into the background, 
as one of Mr. Teague's witnesses testified.28 
                                                 
27 The same, that is, with the possible exception that the 
disclaimers accompanying a criminal history report based on 
ATP's name may not include the "response caveat" addressed in 
footnote 10.  The DOJ's supplemental letter brief did not 
indicate whether the "response caveat" disclaimer would appear 
as a consequence of Mr. Teague's name appearing as an alias in 
ATP's record. 
28 See supra note 5. 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
32 
 
¶47 Further, a person requesting a Criminal History Search 
would quite reasonably interpret the DOJ's disclaimers in the 
context of its actions.  Notwithstanding the caveats, the simple 
act of supplying a criminal history report in response to a 
Criminal History Search carries with it an expression of some 
level of confidence that the report is more than a random 
compilation 
of 
information 
in 
the 
Database. 
 
It 
is 
a 
representation that the DOJ believes the report it produces has 
some relation to the subject of the request.  If it believed the 
report did not relate to Mr. Teague, presumably the DOJ would 
not produce it.  It is not unreasonable for the requester, who 
may know no more about the subject of the request than the DOJ, 
and who has no access to the DOJ's search algorithm, to mirror 
the DOJ's belief. 
¶48 The circuit court addressed the defamatory nature of 
the DOJ reports in a context slightly different from our 
analysis in its findings of facts and conclusions of law.  It 
appears to have concentrated on the accuracy of the information 
in the report, without reaching the relationship between what 
the requester sought and the DOJ provided.29  In that context, 
its conclusion was reasonable: 
                                                 
29 The circuit court in its findings of fact and conclusions 
of law said:  "The department can only say that in its database 
there is at least one occurrence of the first and last name and 
that a person with whom that occurrence is associated is also 
linked to an occurrence of the queried date of birth or one 
close to it." 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
33 
 
The 
criminal 
history 
responses 
issued 
by 
the 
Department in response to name-based queries using the 
plaintiff's names and dates of birth could be much 
improved but they are not defamatory.  They are not 
literally false and when taken as a whole and fairly 
and reasonably read do not convey a false and 
defamatory meaning to their intended audience (the 
public making a records request). 
¶49 However, requesters are not simply asking whether a 
certain name appears in the Database.  They are asking whether 
the subject of the request has a criminal history.  And when the 
DOJ produces a criminal history that belongs to someone other 
than the subject of the request, its response is literally 
false, and can be understood in no other way than to create the 
presumption that the subject is a criminal, when in fact he is 
not.  Therefore, because the report falsely ascribes criminality 
to an innocent person, the response conveys a defamatory meaning 
to the intended audience.  To the extent the circuit court's 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
34 
 
finding of fact is inconsistent with this conclusion, it was 
clearly erroneous.30 
b. 
"Stigma Plus" 
¶50 Notwithstanding 
their 
undeniable 
intrinsic 
value, 
one's good name and reputation do not automatically receive 
procedural 
safeguards 
under 
the 
Due 
Process 
Clause.  
Governmental defamation triggers the Due Process Clause only 
when the defamation also harms a more tangible "liberty" or 
"property" interest. 
¶51 Several decades ago, the United States Supreme Court 
considered whether a person labeled as a drunkard by her local 
police department was entitled to some process by which she 
might 
challenge 
the 
department's 
actions. 
 
Wisconsin 
v. 
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).  While recognizing that not 
                                                 
30 It is not altogether clear why the dissent believes the 
criminal history report is not "literally false" when produced 
in response to a Criminal History Search request on Mr. Teague.  
Not even the DOJ was willing to take that position.  It admitted 
that "[t]he record DOJ returns in response to a search for 
'Dennis Teague' is a report that contains the name as an alias 
for ATP, but the record itself does not 'pertain[]' to Teague."  
If the record does not pertain to Mr. Teague, then as a 
purported criminal history report it cannot be anything but 
literally false.  And yet the dissent says that, having received 
the literally false report in response to a request for a 
criminal background check on Mr. Teague, the requester would 
only "accidentally conclude" that he has a criminal history.  
Dissent, ¶155.  If that is an accidental conclusion, it is the 
same one made by the DOJ in supplying the literally false report 
in the first place.  The dissent does not explain how the 
requester might be better equipped than the DOJ——with its 
trained staff and sophisticated algorithms——to avoid that 
accident. 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
35 
 
all governmental action will implicate the due process clause, 
the court recognized that "certainly where the State attaches 'a 
badge of infamy' to the citizen, due process comes into play."  
Id., 400 U.S. at 437.  In such circumstances, "[w]here a 
person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake 
because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an 
opportunity to be heard are essential."  Id. (emphasis added).  
Such procedural protections lie at the root of the rule of law:  
"It is significant that most of the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights are procedural, for it is procedure that marks much of 
the difference between rule by law and rule by fiat."  Id. at 
436. 
¶52 Constantineau would seem to extend procedural due 
process protections to a person's reputation.  However, within 
just a few years, the United States Supreme Court read 
Constantineau as primarily focused on the right affected by the 
government's defamation, not the defamation itself.  Paul, 424 
U.S. 693.  In Constantineau, the police interfered with Ms. 
Constantineau's right to purchase alcoholic beverages by posting 
a notice prohibiting liquor stores from selling such beverages 
to her.  Constantineau, the Paul Court said, required procedural 
safeguards because of her liberty interest in buying alcohol.  
Her reputation, alone, did not engage the procedural protections 
of the Due Process Clause: 
While we have in a number of our prior cases pointed 
out the frequently drastic effect of the "stigma" 
which may result from defamation by the government in 
a variety of contexts, this line of cases does not 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
36 
 
establish the proposition that reputation alone, apart 
from some more tangible interests such as employment, 
is either "liberty" or "property" by itself sufficient 
to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process 
Clause. 
Paul, 424 U.S. at 701.  We have followed suit.  Weber v. City of 
Cedarburg, 129 Wis. 2d 57, 73, 384 N.W.2d 333 (1986) (citing 
Paul, 424 U.S. at 701) ("Reputation by itself is neither liberty 
nor property within the meaning of the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment.  Therefore, injury to reputation alone is 
not protected by the Constitution."). 
¶53 Paul established what has come to be known as the 
"stigma-plus" test.  This doctrine provides that a government-
imposed "badge of infamy" must be accompanied by a more tangible 
interference with a "liberty" or "property" interest before it 
will implicate the Due Process Clause. 
It is apparent from our decisions that there exists a 
variety of interests which are difficult of definition 
but are nevertheless comprehended within the meaning 
of either "liberty" or "property" as meant in the Due 
Process 
Clause. 
 
These 
interests 
attain 
this 
constitutional status by virtue of the fact that they 
have been initially recognized and protected by state 
law, and we have repeatedly ruled that the procedural 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment apply whenever 
the State seeks to remove or significantly alter that 
protected status. 
Paul, 424 U.S. at 710–11. 
¶54 Not all consequences of government defamation receive 
consideration in the stigma-plus analysis.  Those that are the 
natural result of a damaged reputation do not count towards the 
"plus" portion of the test for impaired liberty interests. 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
37 
 
[T]he deleterious effects which flow directly from a 
sullied reputation would normally also be insufficient 
[to establish damage to a liberty interest].  These 
would normally include the impact that defamation 
might have on job prospects, or, for that matter, 
romantic aspirations, friendships, self-esteem, or any 
other typical consequence of a bad reputation.  When 
the Supreme Court stated in Paul v. Davis that injury 
to reputation was not by itself a deprivation of a 
liberty interest, we presume that the Court included 
the normal repercussions of a poor reputation within 
that characterization. 
Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1001 (2d Cir. 1994). 
¶55 Thus, to establish a procedural due process violation 
relating to one's reputation, one must demonstrate (1) a stigma 
created by government action, and (2) "a right or status 
previously recognized by state law [that] was distinctly altered 
or extinguished."  Paul, 424 U.S. at 711.  Mr. Teague has been 
stigmatized, and remains at risk of further stigmatization, by 
the DOJ's policy and practice of providing ATP's criminal 
history to those who request a Criminal History Search on him.  
Whether Mr. Teague has a good due process claim depends, 
therefore, on whether the stigma altered or extinguished a right 
or status founded in state law. 
¶56 The rights and statuses that rise to the level of 
"liberty" 
interests 
are 
not 
susceptible 
of 
exhaustive 
recitation, or easy definition.31  "In a Constitution for a free 
                                                 
31 "It is apparent from our decisions that there exists a 
variety of interests which are difficult of definition but are 
nevertheless comprehended within the meaning of either 'liberty' 
or 'property' as meant in the Due Process Clause."  Paul v. 
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976). 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
38 
 
people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of 'liberty' must 
be broad indeed."  Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 
(1972).  "Broad" is certainly an apt description, given how the 
United States Supreme Court once illustrated the liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause: 
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from 
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual 
to 
contract, 
to 
engage 
in 
any 
of 
the 
common 
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to 
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to 
worship God according to the dictates of his own 
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges 
long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men. 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).   
¶57 Because the DOJ will provide ATP's criminal history in 
response to, quite literally, anyone in the world who requests a 
Criminal History Search on Mr. Teague, the full scope of 
potential harm it creates in doing so is difficult to quantify.  
Certainly, 
employment 
and 
housing 
opportunities 
could 
be 
adversely impacted.  But beyond the effect of inaccurate 
criminal history reports on the economic relationships between 
members of the public, our statutes and regulations either allow 
or require a Criminal History Search as a condition to 
accessing many benefits, rights, and opportunities.  Thus, for 
example, a false criminal history report can burden or foreclose 
rights or opportunities for the following: 
 Physicians. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 448.980 
(criminal 
background check required by Interstate Medical 
Licensure Compact); 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
39 
 
 Applicants for kinship care, kinship care relatives, 
and long-term kinship care relatives.  Wis. Admin. 
Code. 
DCF 
§ 58.04 
(criminal 
background 
check 
required as condition to providing such services); 
 All employees, including contractors, who work at 
private schools participating in the Special Needs 
Scholarship Program.  Wis. Admin. Code. PI § 49.03 
(criminal background check required as condition to 
providing such services); 
 Qualified 
paraprofessionals 
in 
the 
insurance 
industry.  Wis. Admin. Code. Ins. § 3.36 (criminal 
background check required as condition to providing 
such services); 
 Anyone working in a "shelter care facility."  Wis. 
Admin. Code. DCF § 59.04 (criminal background check 
required as condition to providing such services); 
 Everyone working at "Mental Health Day Treatment 
Services for Children."  Wis. Admin. Code. DHS 
§ 40.06 (criminal background check required as 
condition to providing such services); 
 All 
employees 
at 
"residential 
care 
apartment 
complexes."  Wis. Admin. Code. DHS § 89.23 (criminal 
background check required as condition to providing 
such services);  
 All 
volunteers, 
community 
resources, 
contract 
providers, and members of religious groups who 
provide religious services at jails.  Wis. Admin. 
Code. DOC §§ 350.31, 350.32 (criminal background 
check required as condition to providing such 
services); 
 Everyone 
providing 
education 
on 
DNR-regulated 
activities, 
such 
as 
operation 
of 
all-terrain 
vehicles, boating, hunting, trapping, snowmobiling, 
fishing, or aquatics.  Wis. Admin. Code. NR § 19.30 
(criminal background check required as condition to 
providing such services).   
 Respite foster care providers.  Wis. Admin. Code. 
DCF § 56.21 (criminal background check required as 
condition to providing such services); 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
40 
 
 Individuals working in emergency mental health 
services.  Wis. Admin. Code. DHS § 34.21 (criminal 
background check required as condition to providing 
such services); 
 Child-care workers.  Wis. Stat. § 48.685(2)(am)1 
(criminal background check required as condition to 
providing such services); 
 Handgun purchasers.  Wis. Stat. § 175.35 (criminal 
background check required as condition to purchasing 
handgun); 
 Applicants for concealed-carry permits.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 175.60 (criminal background check required as 
condition to obtaining the permit); 
 State employees whose positions involve fiduciary 
responsibilities.  Wis. Stat. § 230.17 (criminal 
background check required as condition to obtaining 
such a position); 
 Burglar alarm installers.  Wis. Stat. § 134.29 
(criminal 
background 
checks 
not 
required, 
but 
permitted); 
 Drivers for ride-sharing services such as Uber and 
Lyft.  Wis. Stat. § 440.445 (criminal background 
check required as condition to providing such 
services); 
 Anyone driving county-provided transportation for 
seniors and those with disabilities.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 85.21 (criminal background check required as 
condition to providing such services); 
 Anyone driving school buses or other transportation 
provided by school boards, counties, or private 
schools.  Wis. Stats. §§ 121.555 & 343.12 (criminal 
background check required as condition to providing 
such services);  
 Elevator contractors, mechanics, and inspectors.  
Wis. Stat. § 101.985 (criminal background check 
required as condition to providing such services); 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
41 
 
 Travelling 
sales 
crews. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 103.34 
(criminal background check required as condition to 
providing such services); 
 DOT employees and contractors with access to vehicle 
or driver's license records.  Wis. Admin. Code.  
Trans. § 195.11 (criminal background check required 
as condition to obtaining such positions); and 
 Anyone 
having 
access 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Donor 
Registry.  Wis. Admin. Code. DHS § 137.07 (criminal 
background check required as condition to obtaining 
access to database).32 
¶58 The amount of impairment to one of these rights or 
statuses necessary to trigger procedural due process protections 
is easy enough to state:  It must be altered or extinguished.  
Mr. 
Teague 
does 
not 
claim 
any 
such 
interest 
has 
been 
extinguished, so we may proceed to determining whether Mr. 
Teague will suffer any alteration of a right or status protected 
by state law. 
¶59 Because 
one's 
character 
and 
reputation 
are 
so 
important in employment decisions, due process claims frequently 
arise in that context following a government-imposed stigma.  
For example, Smith ex rel. Smith v. Siegelman considered the 
employment implications of the State designating an individual 
as a child abuser without notice or a hearing.  322 F.3d 1290 
(11th Cir. 2003).  That court took note of Paul's admonition 
that a person's reputational interest, "apart from some more 
tangible interests such as employment," receives no due process 
                                                 
32 In none of these instances is the State agency required 
to conduct a fingerprint-based, as opposed to a name-based, 
criminal history inquiry. 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
42 
 
protection.  Id. at 1296 (quoting Paul, 424 U.S. at 701).  The 
court concluded that even when the government-imposed stigma 
impacts future employment opportunities, the Due Process Clause 
calls for no procedural protections.  "[D]eleterious effects 
that flow directly from a sullied reputation, such as the 
adverse impact on job prospects," the court said, "are normally 
insufficient."  Id. at 1298.  In the employment context (at 
least in the Eleventh Circuit), there is no "plus" unless the 
stigma causes the actual loss of a job:  "We do not think the 
law of this Circuit has established that defamation occurring 
other than in the course of dismissal from a job . . . will 
suffice to constitute a deprivation [of liberty] sufficient to 
state a claim under section 1983."  Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 
F.2d 572, 582 (11th Cir. 1990). 
¶60 Such a narrow formulation appears to be at odds with 
the Supreme Court's teaching.  In Board of Regents v. Roth, the 
Court 
addressed 
(at 
least 
tangentially) 
whether 
future 
employment prospects could present a liberty interest sufficient 
to engage due process requirements.  408 U.S. 564 (1972).  As it 
turned out, the State had not stigmatized Mr. Roth, but the 
Court observed that if it had done so, "this would be a 
different case" because "[t]here might be cases in which a State 
refused to re-employ a person under such circumstances [such] 
that interests in liberty would be implicated."  Id. at 573.  
Even Paul itself did not preclude the loss of future employment 
opportunities from serving as the "plus":  "Finally, it is to be 
noted that this is not a case where government action has 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
43 
 
operated to bestow a badge of disloyalty or infamy, with an 
attendant foreclosure from other employment opportunity."  Paul, 
424 U.S. at 705-06 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 
U.S. 886, 898 (1961)).33 
¶61 Government-imposed stigmas can also potentially affect 
liberty interests when the State requires a Criminal History 
Search as a condition to government benefits, employment, or the 
exercise of certain rights.  Humphries v. County of Los Angeles 
considered the due process implications of being listed on 
California's Child Abuse Central Index ("CACI").  554 F.3d 1170 
(9th Cir. 2008) rev'd on other grounds sub nom Los Angeles v. 
Humphries, 562 U.S. 29 (2010).  The Humphries were arrested on 
charges of child abuse and felony torture, which automatically 
earned them a listing on the CACI.  The charges were later 
dismissed and, pursuant to two independent tribunals, the 
Humphries were found to be "factually innocent" of the charges.  
Notwithstanding these determinations, the California Department 
of Justice refused to remove the Humphries from the CACI.   
¶62 The Humphries court found that being listed on the 
CACI not only defamed the Humphries, it also altered their 
                                                 
33 See also Zaccagnini v. Morris, 478 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 
(D. Mass. 1979) ("The allegation that defendants, without 
according plaintiff a name-clearing hearing, marked him so as to 
endanger subsequent employment opportunities states a claim 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it alleges that state action, 
without the opportunity of a hearing, 'imposed on (plaintiff) a 
stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take 
advantage of other employment opportunities.'" (quoting Paul, 
424 U.S. at 709–10)). 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
44 
 
rights. California's statutes (at least as they existed when the 
case was decided) required certain state agencies to conduct 
background searches as a precondition to several rights and 
opportunities.  For example, such searches were necessary before 
"gaining approval to care for children in a day care center or 
home, 
obtaining 
a 
license 
or 
employment 
in 
child 
care, 
volunteering in a crisis nursery, receiving placement or custody 
of a relative's child, or qualifying as a resource family."  Id. 
at 1187 (citations omitted).  Access to the CACI was also 
available to state agencies "overseeing employment positions 
dealing 
with 
children, 
persons 
making 
pre-employment 
investigations for peace officers, child care licensing or 
employment, adoption, or child placement, individuals in the 
Court Appointed Special Advocate program conducting background 
investigations for potential Court Appointed Special Advocates, 
and out-of-state agencies making foster care or adoptive 
decisions."  Id. at 1188 (citations and internal marks omitted). 
¶63 With respect to the measurement of alteration, the 
Humphries Court observed that termination of a right or status 
is not necessary to implicate one's liberty interest:  "We 
recognize that being listed on the CACI may not fully extinguish 
the Humphries' rights or status."  Id.  But one's liberty 
interests are altered when the state-imposed stigma imposes a 
"tangible burden on an individual's ability to obtain a right or 
status recognized by state law . . . ."  Id.  The burden 
Humphries identified was that California's laws "effectively 
require[] agencies to check a stigmatizing list" and makes the 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
45 
 
agencies 
responsible 
for 
"drawing 
independent 
conclusions 
regarding the quality of the evidence disclosed."  Id. at 1188 
(internal marks omitted).  
¶64 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a similar 
analysis.  Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1994).  Ms. 
Valmonte found herself listed on New York's Central Register of 
Child Abuse and Maltreatment (the "Register") after slapping her 
daughter for stealing.  The child protective proceedings 
initiated in response to that incident were subsequently 
dismissed, but because there was "some credible evidence" of 
mistreatment, the Department of Social Services refused to 
remove her from the Register.  Id. at 995. 
¶65 After acknowledging that the natural consequences of a 
stigmatized reputation do not, by themselves, justify due 
process protections, Valmonte considered the impact of state law 
on her ability to obtain future employment in the child-care 
field.  Id. at 1001.  Employers in this field must consult the 
Register before extending offers of employment.  Id.  If she is 
in the Register, and the employer still wishes to hire her, it 
would need to draft and maintain a written explanation of its 
decision.  Id.  Inclusion in the Register, therefore, was not an 
absolute bar to employment, but it imposed a significant 
functional barrier:  "Valmonte is not going to be refused 
employment because of her reputation; she will be refused 
employment simply because her inclusion on the list results in 
an added burden on employers who will therefore be reluctant to 
hire her."  Id. (emphasis added).  That consequence, the court 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
46 
 
said, altered Ms. Valmonte's status enough to implicate her 
liberty interest:  "In this case, we find that the requirement 
that puts burdens on employers wishing to hire individuals on 
the list results in a change of that individual's status 
significant enough to satisfy the 'plus' requirement of the 
'stigma plus' test."  Id. at 1002. 
¶66 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agrees with the 
Valmonte analysis: 
Today, we are confronted with circumstances very 
similar 
to 
those 
before 
the 
Second 
Circuit 
in 
Valmonte.  Illinois law requires prospective employers 
to consult the central register before hiring an 
individual and to notify [the Illinois Department of 
Children and Family Services] in writing of its 
decision to hire a person who has been indicated as a 
perpetrator of child abuse or neglect. 
Dupuy v. Samuels, 397 F.3d 493, 511 (7th Cir. 2005).  Inclusion 
on the register "places, by operation of law, a significant, 
indeed almost insuperable, impediment on obtaining a position in 
the entire field of child care."  Id.  The court reasoned that 
"the imposition of this added legal impediment constitutes a 
very tangible loss of employment opportunities due to the 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
47 
 
disclosure of the indicated report," thereby altering the 
individual's status.  Id.34 
¶67 Other states have found that inclusion in a stigma-
inducing state database can work a deprivation of liberty 
interests by burdening the exercise of a person's rights.  In 
North Carolina, the State will add a person to a state-
maintained registry (the "RIL") if he is identified as a person 
responsible for child maltreatment.  In re WBM, 690 S.E.2d 41 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2010).  That list is available to "child caring 
institutions, child placing agencies, group home facilities, and 
other providers of foster care, child care, or adoption services 
that need to determine the fitness of individuals to care for or 
adopt children."  Id. at 43.  The court concluded that 
"inclusion on the RIL deprives an individual of the liberty 
interests guaranteed under our State Constitution by inhibiting 
the individual from using his faculties to adopt, foster, and 
care for children, earning his livelihood in the childcare 
field, or pursuing or securing employment in the childcare 
field."  Id. at 49; see also, Cavarretta v. Dep't of Children & 
                                                 
34 The 
Court 
ultimately 
ruled 
against 
the 
plaintiffs 
because, it said, foster parenting (the plaintiffs' chosen 
field) is not a "career" such that it can give rise to a liberty 
interest.  Depuy v. Samuels, 397 F.3d 493, 514–15 (7th Cir. 
2005).  See also, Behrens v. Regler, 422 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 
2005) (holding that plaintiff, who was listed as a "verified" 
child abuser on a state registry, and so experienced an added 
burden in trying to adopt a child, did not suffer an impairment 
of a liberty interest because not even those who are not on the 
list are guaranteed the ability to adopt a child under Florida 
law). 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
48 
 
Family Servs., 660 N.E.2d 250, 254 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) 
("[B]eing placed on the State register of suspected child 
abusers implicates a Federal liberty interest.  A subject of an 
'indicated' report may be prohibited from working in certain 
professions, such as child care and teaching." (internal 
citations omitted)). 
c. 
Mr. Teague's "plus" 
¶68 We adopt the Humphries/Valmonte/Dupuy analysis and 
hold that, because the stigma caused by the DOJ's Criminal 
History Search report imposes a tangible burden on Mr. Teague's 
ability to obtain 
or exercise 
a variety of rights and 
opportunities recognized by state law, he has suffered an 
alteration of status within the meaning of Paul v. Davis, and so 
has been deprived of a liberty interest. 
¶69 The 
DOJ's 
background 
check 
predictably 
and 
consistently 
provides 
ATP's 
criminal 
history 
to 
people 
requesting a Criminal History Search on Mr. Teague.  This is 
an entirely unwarranted defamation of someone with no criminal 
history at all.  But the injury Mr. Teague (and those similarly 
situated) suffers does not end there.  Wisconsin's statutory and 
regulatory framework mean that the defamation now stands between 
Mr. Teague and the acquisition or exercise of any of a number of 
opportunities or rights. 
¶70 Because of the defamation caused by the DOJ's Criminal 
History Search report, Mr. Teague will experience a tangible 
burden should he wish to work for, e.g., the State of Wisconsin 
(in any position of fiduciary responsibility), the Department of 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
49 
 
Transportation (should he need access to vehicle or driver's 
license records), a company in the insurance industry (as a 
paraprofessional), a shelter care facility, a facility providing 
mental health day treatment services for children, a school 
participating in the Special Needs Scholarship Program, a 
residential care apartment complex, an emergency mental health 
service, an elevator company, a child-care company, or a ride-
sharing company like Uber or Lyft.  He suffers a state-imposed 
tangible burden if he wishes to install burglar alarms, drive 
school buses, work in a travelling sales crew, become licensed 
as a physician in Wisconsin, have access to the Wisconsin Donor 
Registry, purchase a handgun, or obtain a concealed-carry 
permit.  He cannot, without laboring under the additional burden 
created by the state-imposed stigma, provide kinship care, 
respite foster care, religious services at jails, transportation 
to seniors and those with disabilities, or education on DNR-
regulated 
activities 
such 
as 
fishing, 
hunting, 
trapping, 
boating, or snowmobiling. 
¶71 Mr. Teague finds himself in a position no Wisconsin 
citizen ought to occupy.  He and the DOJ both know the DOJ's 
Criminal History Search report is going to defame him.  
Worse, he does not know when and where it will happen, just that 
it will.  So Mr. Teague must constantly monitor his government's 
activity in hopes he will catch each time the Criminal History 
Search suggests he is a criminal.  Worse yet, he can never be 
certain he has caught them all.  He also knows that even when he 
espies a defamation, it means spending his time and resources 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
50 
 
trying to convince the person to whom he was defamed that he is 
not really a criminal. 
¶72 The stigma created by the DOJ's Criminal History 
Search report has altered Mr. Teague's status, and so has 
deprived him of a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  This conclusion is 
consistent with Paul, and does not implicate its concern that 
every government agent's defamatory comment will give rise to a 
due process claim.  We address here a policy and practice that 
consistently and predictably calumnizes innocent people, and 
operates as a burden on their state-based rights.  Mr. Teague is 
entitled to due process in connection with this policy and 
practice.35 
                                                 
35 The dissent says this case presents a dispute we should 
leave to the legislature to settle:  "I depart from Justice 
Kelly's writing, however, because the legislature is the body to 
weigh and consider the need for public access to this 
information with the fact that some innocent bystanders might be 
wronged by such access."  Dissent, ¶151.  While we must be 
careful not to intrude on the legislature's prerogatives, we 
must be equally careful not to cede our own.  When an executive 
agent of the state takes action that violates the statutory or 
constitutional rights of "innocent bystanders," we do not leave 
it to the legislature to "weigh and consider" that injury 
against "the need for public access to this information."  To do 
so would be to abjure our core judicial function.  See Marbury 
v. 
Madison, 
5 
U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 
177 
(1803) 
("It 
is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is.").  Mr. Teague brought us a quintessential 
question of law, and it belongs nowhere else. 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
51 
 
2. 
Process due 
¶73 The second step in our due process analysis is 
determining whether the process available to Mr. Teague is 
adequate when compared to the deprivation of his liberty 
interest.  "Due process, unlike some legal rules, is not a 
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, 
place and circumstances.  Due process is flexible and calls for 
such 
procedural 
protections 
as 
the 
particular 
situation 
demands."  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) 
(internal marks and citations omitted). To determine what 
procedural protections are due Mr. Teague, we consider three 
factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action;  
[S]econd, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and  
[F]inally, the Government's interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail. 
Id. at 335. 
¶74 We see two potential sources of procedural safeguards 
currently available to Mr. Teague.  The first is the opportunity 
to challenge the accuracy of the criminal history reports under 
the auspices of Wis. Stat. § 19.70.  We determined, supra, that 
this statute provides an avenue to correct these reports.  
However, it appears this procedure may provide only incomplete 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
52 
 
relief.  Mr. Teague is still left in the position of cleaning up 
defamations after they occur, and then only when they happen to 
come to his attention. 
¶75 The 
second 
potential 
procedural 
safeguard, 
the 
availability of an "innocence letter," is little better (at 
least as far as we can discern from the record).  This gives Mr. 
Teague a useful tool with which to counteract the DOJ's official 
suggestion that he is a criminal.  But the DOJ does not include 
Mr. Teague's innocence letter with ATP's criminal history when 
it responds to a Criminal History Search on Mr. Teague.  So 
Mr. Teague must still monitor and track each instance in which  
a Criminal History Search report defames him so that he may 
discover to whom he must forward the innocence letter.36 
¶76 Further, his innocence letter has an unknowable shelf-
life.  The letter warrants he is conviction-free as of a date 
certain.  But if ATP should commit another crime after that 
date, Mr. Teague would need a new innocence letter.  So not only 
must Mr. Teague track the DOJ's Criminal History Search so he 
knows each time he is defamed, he must also track ATP so he 
                                                 
36 The DOJ's new red-font "response caveat" makes for a 
slightly more muscular disclaimer, but it is still just a 
disclaimer.  It is likely to have only marginally more impact on 
those who do not take the time to read the rest of the lengthy 
disclaimers the DOJ had already been providing.  Nor does it 
relieve Mr. Teague from the burden of having to monitor the DOJ 
and ATP so that he can determine when, and to whom, he must 
provide positive evidence that he is not the criminal suggested 
by the criminal history report. 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
53 
 
knows when he must, once again, prove to his government that he 
is not a criminal so that he may counter the defamation. 
¶77 Finally, there is this.  We must not forget that Mr. 
Teague finds himself where he is because he is the victim of a 
crime.  His cousin stole his identity.  And because of the way 
the DOJ compiles and disseminates criminal history reports, it 
keeps that injury alive day after day without end, even after 
determining that ATP's criminal history has nothing to do with 
Mr. Teague. 
¶78 Based on the record before us, we conclude that the 
Mathews factors indicate the Wis. Stat. § 19.70 and "innocence 
letter" procedures are inadequate safeguards for Mr. Teague's 
liberty interest.  The DOJ has an admittedly important and 
legitimate interest in making its records available to the 
public.  But it chose this method of doing so because it is 
"quicker, 
cheaper, 
and 
easier 
than 
fingerprint-based 
searches . . . ."  As Mr. Teague demonstrates, however, quick, 
cheap, and easy can be a recipe for unending governmental 
defamations. 
C. 
Remaining Arguments 
1. 
Petitioners' Arguments 
¶79 Mr. Teague presented a common-law challenge to the 
DOJ's 
criminal 
background-check 
program, 
as 
well 
as 
constitutional challenges founded on the Equal Protection Clause 
and the so-called "substantive" component of the Due Process 
Clause.  Because we were able to resolve this case without 
reference to those arguments, we will not address them.  See, 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
54 
 
e.g., Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 
640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) ("As a general rule, when our 
resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not address 
additional issues."). 
2. 
Pre-Production Judicial Review 
¶80 The DOJ argues that Wis. Stat. § 19.35637 bars the part 
of Mr. Teague's claim alleging the DOJ failed to apply the 
"common law balancing test" before providing ATP's criminal 
history report to those who requested a background check on Mr. 
Teague.  It did not assert that bar with respect to Mr. Teague's 
claims pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 19.70 or our constitutions.  
Therefore, because we do not address the "common law balancing 
test," we need not consider the applicability of this statute.  
V. 
CONCLUSION 
¶81 The DOJ's Criminal History Search reports violate 
Mr. Teague's rights, and he is to be afforded prospective relief 
sufficient to protect those rights.    The record is not 
sufficiently developed for us to determine the form that relief 
                                                 
37 This statute provides that: 
Except as authorized in this section or as otherwise 
provided by statute, no authority is required to 
notify a record subject prior to providing to a 
requester access to a record containing information 
pertaining to that record subject, and no person is 
entitled to judicial review of the decision of an 
authority to provide a requester with access to a 
record. 
Wis. Stat. § 19.356(1). 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
55 
 
should take, so we remand to the circuit court for that 
purpose.38  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.39 
                                                 
38 The dissent, perhaps inadvertently, leaves the impression 
that our conclusion may be, in part, some form of judicial 
catharsis:  "The entire court feels sorry for Teague and those 
like him," dissent, ¶150; "I can join these members of the court 
in their pitying Teague for what ATP did to him and the 
injustice that could occur if improper assumptions are made as 
to Teague," id., ¶151; " Members of the court are not wrong to 
wish that there was a remedy for Teague," id., ¶164.  It is the 
court's duty to set aside its "wishes," and emotions, and 
instead render a true decision based on law and fact.  We have 
done that.  The law, not desire, commands relief for Mr. Teague. 
39  With respect to the violation of Mr. Teague's rights, 
six justices agree Mr. Teague's criminal history report is 
inaccurate and in need of correction under Wis. Stat. § 19.70.  
See supra, ¶34 (joined by Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley); 
Justice Abrahamson's writing, ¶¶115-16 (joined by Justice Ann 
Walsh Bradley); Justice Gableman's concurrence, ¶138 (joined by 
Chief Justice Roggensack).  One justice, Justice Ziegler, 
writing in dissent, concludes (1) that the circuit court was not 
clearly 
erroneous 
in 
stating 
that 
"'criminal 
history 
responses . . . are not literally false and . . . do not convey 
a false and defamatory meaning . . . .'" and (2) that "the 
information in the database is correct."  Dissent, ¶¶160, 164. 
With respect to the remedy for the violation of Mr. 
Teague's rights, six justices conclude the court of appeals must 
be reversed and that Mr. Teague is entitled to prospective 
relief sufficient to protect his rights: 
This opinion (joined by Justice Rebecca G. Bradley) 
would remand to the circuit court to determine, based on 
the Mathews trilogy of considerations, what manner of 
procedural 
safeguards 
are 
sufficient 
to 
satisfy 
Mr. 
Teague's right to due process of law. 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2360   
 
56 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson (joined by Justice Ann 
Walsh Bradley) concludes that the supreme court should 
issue a declaratory judgment that the Department of Justice 
"must comply with the mandatory requirements of § 19.70 and 
must hereafter issue correct criminal history records 
pertaining to these petitioners," that the Department of 
Justice is enjoined "from refusing to comply with the 
mandatory 
requirements 
of 
§ 19.70," 
and 
that 
"the 
petitioners may seek further supplementary relief in the 
Dane County Circuit Court based on the declaratory judgment 
'whenever necessary or proper' pursuant to § 806.04(8)."  
Justice Abrahamson's writing, ¶¶87, 88, and 90. 
Justice Michael J. Gableman (joined by Chief Justice 
Patience D. Roggensack) concludes:  "In Teague's case, if 
the action DOJ ultimately takes to correct the criminal 
history reports under § 19.70 is insufficient to remedy 
Teague's injury, then Teague may seek judicial review under 
Wis. Stat. § 227.52. . . .  [R]esolving Teague's statutory 
claim under Wis. Stat. § 19.70 is sufficient to resolve 
this appeal."  Justice Gableman's concurrence, ¶¶143, 144. 
There are, therefore, four votes to remand this matter to 
the circuit court to develop prospective relief sufficient to 
safeguard the petitioners' rights (Justices Patience Drake 
Roggensack, Michael J. Gableman, Rebecca Grassl Bradley, and 
Daniel Kelly).  Four justices conclude that the petitioners are 
entitled to prospective relief based on the violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 19.70, and that the relief should be sufficient to 
prevent the release of inaccurate criminal history reports to 
those who inquire about the petitioners (Justices Shirley S. 
Abrahamson, Ann Walsh Bradley, Patience Drake Roggensack, and 
Michael J. Gableman).   
No proposed form of remedy garnered a majority of the 
justices' votes, but neither has a majority of the court 
foreclosed any particular form of remedy.  On remand, therefore, 
the circuit court will conduct further proceedings to determine 
the nature and extent of prospective relief that will be 
sufficient to protect the petitioners' rights under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.70. 
No.  2014AP2360.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶82 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.1   The Department of Justice 
released a lengthy criminal history record for each of the three 
petitioners, Dennis Teague, Linda Colvin, and Curtis Williams, 
in response to public criminal history search requests.  The 
                                                 
1 Finally, in the last footnote of his opinion, Justice 
Kelly points out the schisms on the court in the instant case 
and their effect.    
My separate writing would end the cause in this court.  I 
do not remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings.  I am not certain from the writings that four 
justices indisputably conclude that the matter is to be remanded 
to the circuit court at this time.   
Because the court has not always been careful in the past 
to explain the separate writings in a case and the effect 
thereof, incorrect references have been made to the first 
opinion as a lead opinion or to a majority opinion.  Indeed, in 
State v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89, the 
first opinion (that was referenced as the lead opinion) was a 
dissent.  For an explanation of the term "lead opinion," see 
State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96, ¶83 n.1, 372 Wis. 2d 202, 887 
N.W.2d 554 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting).   
Because the court has been significantly divided in recent 
months and has issued numerous separate writings, we should be 
very careful in each case to explain the effect of the separate 
writings.  For an analysis of this court's split decisions from 
1996 to present, see Professor Alan Ball, A Spike in Fractured 
Decisions, 
SCOWstats 
(May 
30, 
2017), 
http://www.scowstats.com/2017/05/30/a-spike-in-fractured-
decisions/.  See also Professor Alan Ball, Wisconsin Supreme 
Court Statistics, 2015-16:  Decisions Arranged by Vote Split, 
SCOWstats 
(July 
22, 
2016), 
http://www.scowstats.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Decisions-by-Vote-Split-2015-16.pdf.    
No.  2014AP2360.ssa 
 
2 
 
Department of Justice concedes, however, that none of the 
petitioners has a criminal record.2   
¶83 Nevertheless, the Department of Justice repeatedly 
characterizes the criminal history records pertaining to the 
petitioners as accurate.   This characterization is baseless, as 
Justice Kelly's writing explains.  See Justice Kelly's writing, 
¶¶30-35.3     
¶84 The Department of Justice repeatedly refuses to make 
amends.  The three petitioners have come to court seeking 
forward-looking relief.  They present a number of different 
legal claims, and each claim may lead to a different form of 
relief.   
¶85 The relief that Justice Kelly's writing grants is a 
remand to the circuit court for further judicial proceedings 
under the petitioners' procedural due process claim.       
                                                 
2 Each petitioner's name probably came up because the 
individual with a criminal history used some form of the 
petitioner's name as an alias.  This case involves what is known 
as an alias search.  See Justice Kelly's writing, ¶12.  The 
information the Department of Justice provides a requester when 
the Department uses the alias search may be unreliable, 
"something the [Department] readily admits."  See Justice 
Kelly's writing, ¶7. 
3 I agree with Justice Kelly's writing that we must treat 
the Department as having issued inaccurate criminal history 
records pertaining to the petitioners.  Any attempt voiced by 
the Department to avoid this conclusion is unacceptable.  Only 
one conclusion is acceptable:  The Department has been knowingly 
releasing 
inaccurate 
criminal 
history 
records 
containing 
personally 
identifiable 
information 
pertaining 
to 
the 
petitioners.   
No.  2014AP2360.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶86 I 
would 
grant 
the 
petitioners 
forward-looking 
prospective equitable remedy relief under Wis. Stat. § 19.70.4     
¶87 I would have this court issue a declaratory judgment 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.04, the Uniform Declaratory 
Judgments Act.  The declaratory judgment would be affirmative in 
form and effect, declaring that the Department of Justice must 
comply with the mandatory requirements of § 19.70 and must 
hereafter issue correct criminal history records pertaining to 
these petitioners.  See Wis. Stat. § 806.04(1).   
¶88 The declaratory judgment would also be negative in 
form and effect.  It would include an injunction forbidding the 
Department 
from 
refusing 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
mandatory 
requirements of § 19.70.  See Wis. Stat. § 806.04(1). 
¶89 There are numerous ways that the Department of Justice 
can comply with such a declaratory judgment.  The means of 
compliance are initially for the Department to determine.  The 
legislature has delegated the creation and administration of the 
criminal history database to the Department, and the Department 
has the expertise and institutional capacity to comply with the 
                                                 
4 Judge Blanchard's writing in the court of appeals denying 
the petitioners relief under Wis. Stat. § 19.70 was based on the 
conclusion that the petitioners' request was a request to 
correct or supplement the database.  I agree with Justice 
Kelly's writing that the petitioners' request was a request to 
correct the criminal history record, not the database.   
Judge Higginbotham and Judge Sherman, writing in the court 
of appeals, concluded that the relief the petitioners seek under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.70 is unavailable because the petitioners' 
argument under § 19.70 for declaratory and injunctive relief was 
undeveloped in the court of appeals.  
No.  2014AP2360.ssa 
 
4 
 
declaratory judgment and do justice for these petitioners.  Such 
a declaratory judgment enables the Department to work not only 
with its staff and database experts but also with the 
petitioners, requesters of criminal history records, and members 
of the public interested in technology and privacy to devise 
solutions.5          
¶90 If 
the 
Department's 
efforts 
to 
correct 
the 
inaccuracies in the petitioners' criminal history records fall 
short, the petitioners may seek further supplementary relief in 
the Dane County Circuit Court based on this court's  declaratory 
judgment 
"whenever 
necessary 
or 
proper," 
pursuant 
to 
§ 806.04(8).6 
¶91 The Department of Justice's refusal to acknowledge 
that it is releasing inaccurate criminal history records 
                                                 
5 The Department's difficulty with issuing accurate criminal 
history records apparently results from the algorithm employed 
by the criminal history database.  Justice Kelly's writing, ¶6.  
The use of algorithms in the criminal justice system is being 
debated.  See State v. Loomis, 2016 WI 68, 371 Wis. 2d 235, 881 
N.W.2d 749, petition for cert. filed sub nom. Loomis v. 
Wisconsin, No. 16-6387, 2017WL855946 (Mar. 6, 2017); Jason 
Tashea, Calculating Crime:  Attorneys Are Challenging the Use of 
Algorithms to Help Determine Bail, Sentencing and Parole 
Decisions, ABA Journal, Mar. 2017, at 54. 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.356(1), barring individuals from 
seeking "judicial review," has been referenced and debated by 
the parties.  I do not read this provision as barring judicial 
relief under § 19.70 regarding correcting or augmenting an 
inaccurate criminal history record to which a requester is being 
given access.  Nothing about Wis. Stat. § 19.356 or § 19.70 
leads a reader to examine § 19.356(1) in interpreting and 
applying § 19.70.  See Justice Kelly's discussion of § 19.356(1) 
at ¶80.  
No.  2014AP2360.ssa 
 
5 
 
pertaining to the three petitioners and that it is required to 
comply with Wis. Stat. § 19.70 stirs a sense of outrage.  This 
sense is evident in Judge Sherman's concurring opinion in the 
court of appeals, in which he wrote: "[T]he only response of 
[the Department of Justice] is that it will continue to [release 
inaccurate records] because there is no law that compels it to 
do otherwise.  In essence, we are doing this to you because we 
can.  That is the response of a bully and not an appropriate 
response of the government of a democracy."7  
¶92 I 
shall 
first 
set 
forth 
the 
relevant 
statutes 
applicable to the instant case.  I will then interpret and apply 
Wis. Stat. § 19.70 to the three petitioners.  I conclude that 
the Department has a judicially enforceable duty to correct the 
criminal history records pertaining to the petitioners under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.70.  Lastly, I will consider other issues raised 
by the Department of Justice's alias search policy, the release 
of inaccurate criminal history records, and the plight of 
individuals who may unknowingly be harmed by release to the 
public of inaccurate criminal history records pertaining to 
them. 
I 
¶93 I first set forth the relevant statutes applicable to 
the facts in the instant case.  The most important statutes to 
my analysis are Wis. Stat. § 19.70 and the Open Records Law, 
                                                 
7 Teague 
v. 
Van 
Hollen, 
2016 
WI 
App 
20, 
¶85, 
367 
Wis. 2d 547, 877 N.W.2d 379 (Sherman, J., concurring) (emphasis 
in original).   
No.  2014AP2360.ssa 
 
6 
 
§§ 19.32-.39.  I also briefly summarize the statutes authorizing 
the Department of Justice to compile, retain, and release 
criminal history records to the public for a fee, to provide 
context. 
¶94 I begin with Wis. Stat. § 19.70.8  This statute is part 
of Wis. Stat. §§ 19.62-.80, which make up subchapter IV, 
entitled "Personal Information Practices," of Chapter 19, 
entitled "General Duties of Public Officials."  
¶95 Section 19.70 informs my analysis because it requires 
the Department to correct inaccuracies in records containing 
personally identifiable information.        
¶96 When a challenge is made to the accuracy of a record 
containing 
personally 
identifiable 
information, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.70, using the word "shall," requires the Department of 
Justice to take the following action:  
• It shall concur with the record subject's challenge 
and correct the information (§ 19.70(1)(a)); or  
• It shall deny the challenge, notify the record subject 
of the reasons for denying the challenge, and allow 
the record subject to file a concise statement setting 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.70 was previously numbered § 19.365 
and was part of subchapter II, entitled "Public Records and 
Property" (the Open Records Law), of Chapter 19.  It was 
recently renumbered § 19.70 and became part of subchapter IV, 
entitled "Personal Information Practices," of Chapter 19.  See 
2013 Wis. Act 71.  
No.  2014AP2360.ssa 
 
7 
 
forth the individual's disagreement with the disputed 
portion of the record (§ 19.70(1)(b)).9  
¶97 Section 19.70 thus provides the means for correcting 
an inaccurate criminal history record containing personally 
identifiable information released by the Department of Justice.  
¶98 Section 19.70 must be read in connection with Wis. 
Stat. §§ 19.62-.80, the other provisions in subchapter IV, 
entitled "Personal Information Practices," of Chapter 19.  
¶99 Section 
19.62(5) 
defines 
"personally 
identifiable 
information."10  The criminal history records in the instant case 
indisputably 
contain 
personally 
identifiable 
information 
relating to the three petitioners.11 
¶100 Section 19.67(1)(b) provides that when the Department 
of Justice "maintains personally identifiable information that 
may result in an adverse determination about any individual's 
rights, benefits or privileges[, the Department] shall, to the 
greatest 
extent 
practicable . . . [v]erify 
the 
information . . . ."  
                                                 
9 For the text of Wis. Stat. § 19.70, see Justice Kelly's 
writing, ¶21. 
10 This same definition is used in the open records law.  
See Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1r). 
11 The Department's brief asserts that the criminal history 
records it released in response to requests seeking the criminal 
history records of the petitioners do not pertain to the three 
petitioners.  See Brief and Supplemental Appendix of Defendants-
Respondents at 41.  I agree with Justice Kelly's writing at ¶29 
that because the records list the petitioners' names, they 
contain personally identifiable information pertaining to the 
petitioners. 
No.  2014AP2360.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶101 I now turn to Wis. Stat. §19.35.  This section also 
resides in Chapter 19 but is in subchapter II, which is entitled 
"Public Records and Property" and is popularly known as the Open 
Records Law.  Section 19.35 is referenced in § 19.70.     
¶102 Section 19.70 grants an individual (empowered under 
§ 19.35 (1)(a) and (am) of the Open Records Law to inspect any 
record 
containing 
the 
individual's 
personally 
identifiable 
information) the right to challenge the accuracy of a record 
containing personally identifiable information pertaining to the 
individual.12  The petitioners fall within § 19.70's reference to 
§ 19.35.     
¶103 Finally, I turn to Wis. Stat. §§ 165.82 and 165.83, 
within Chapter 165, entitled "Department of Justice."   
¶104 Wisconsin Stat. § 165.83 directs the Department of 
Justice to maintain a criminal history database.  The statute 
dates back to 1971 and has been amended several times.  Law 
enforcement officers across the state are to provide information 
to the Department of Justice for the maintenance of the 
database.   
¶105 The criminal history database is maintained for law 
enforcement and non-law enforcement purposes.  With regard to 
the latter purposes, various state entities are directed by 
                                                 
12 Section 
19.62 
in 
"Personal 
Information 
Practices" 
explicitly incorporates the definition of "authority" and 
"records" that appear in § 19.32 of the Open Records Law.  See 
Justice Kelley's writing, ¶28 (discussing § 19.62).  The 
Department 
of 
Justice 
is 
an 
authority 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 19.32(1) and 19.62(1). 
No.  2014AP2360.ssa 
 
9 
 
statute or regulation to consult criminal background information 
on persons who apply for permits, licenses, or employment.  See 
Justice Kelly's writing, ¶57.  Some statutes direct persons to 
the 
Department 
of 
Justice 
for 
a 
criminal 
background 
investigation;13 others do not.14   
¶106 Criminal history records compiled under Chapter 165 
are made available to the public under the Open Records Law 
(which I discuss further below).  Fees charged to acquire 
criminal history records under the Open Records Law are governed 
by Wis. Stat. § 165.82, which was enacted in 1987.  This statute 
provides that, in lieu of the fee imposed in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.35(3) (imposed on those who receive open records upon 
request), the Department of Justice shall impose a fee for 
criminal history searches for purposes unrelated to criminal 
justice according to the following fee schedule: $7 for each 
name-based record check; $15 for each fingerprint-based record 
check; and a $5 surcharge if the person requests a paper copy of 
the results of a criminal history requested.15  
¶107 Implicit in the directive under Wis. Stat. § 165.83 to 
the Department to maintain the criminal history database and 
authority under § 165.82 to charge the public for access to this 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 101.985(4). 
14 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 440.445(1)(b).   
15 In 2015-16, the Department of Justice received $7,280,700 
in fees collected under Wis. Stat. § 165.82.  See Wisconsin 
Legislative 
Fiscal 
Bureau, 
Informational 
Paper 
58: 
State 
Criminal Justice Functions at 10 (Jan. 2017).  
No.  2014AP2360.ssa 
 
10 
 
database and criminal history records derived therefrom is a 
need for accuracy.  If the need for accuracy did not exist, why 
would the legislature require the Department to maintain the 
database and charge users for access?   
¶108 In sum, the statutes evidence a relationship between 
the criminal history database, criminal history records derived 
therefrom, personal information practices, and the Open Records 
Law.  The statutes provide that the Department of Justice 
releases criminal history records that are compiled under 
chapter 165 of the Statutes, containing personally identifiable 
information governed by §§ 19.62-.80, reasoning that they are 
"records" subject to the Open Records Law.     
II 
¶109 With this background of applicable, relevant statutory 
provisions in mind, I interpret and apply Wis. Stat. § 19.70, 
the key statute governing the rights of the petitioners.  This 
statute has not been interpreted by this court or the court of 
appeals prior to the instant case.  Thus the instant case is one 
of first impression. 
¶110 The three petitioners complied with the Department's 
existing process for a record subject to challenge the accuracy 
of a criminal history record.  The process is described on the 
Department of Justice's website.16  After each petitioner 
                                                 
16 See Wisconsin Department of Justice, Background Check & 
Criminal 
History 
Information, 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/cib/background-check-criminal-
history-information.   
No.  2014AP2360.ssa 
 
11 
 
submitted his or her fingerprints, the Department confirmed that 
each petitioner had no criminal record and issued an "innocence 
letter" to each petitioner.17   
¶111 Nevertheless, the Department's position is that it 
will continue to adhere to its alias search policy; that it will 
release a criminal history record for each petitioner each time 
it runs a new background check on the petitioner; that it will 
not include in the criminal history record the "innocence 
letter" or any correction or supplementary information provided 
by a petitioner; and that it need not and will not inform the 
requester that the real Teague, Colvin, and Williams have no 
criminal history.18   
                                                 
17 During the pendency of this litigation, the Department of 
Justice has developed what is, in essence, a "new and improved" 
innocence letter——the Wisconsin Unique Personal Identification 
Number (WiUPIN).  The Department gives a WiUPIN to individuals 
who have successfully challenged the accuracy of an entry in the 
Department's criminal history database.  Once an individual 
receives a WiUPIN, the individual may furnish the WiUPIN to 
whatever organization intends to request a criminal background 
check on the individual.  If the requester includes the WiUPIN, 
it "will be used in searching potential matching records, so 
that any arrest and/or conviction record successfully challenged 
will not be included in a public response."  The WiUPIN is 
available to individuals who have a name similar to a criminal's 
or have had their name used by a criminal during an arrest.  See 
Wisconsin Department of Justice, Background Check & Criminal 
History 
Information, 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/cib/background-check-criminal-
history-information. 
18 The Department relies on its disclaimers to warn the 
requester that the record subject may be innocent of any 
criminal violation.  I agree with Justice Kelly's writing that 
the disclaimers are ineffectual and insufficient safeguards in 
the instant case.  See Justice Kelly's writing, ¶¶45-46. 
No.  2014AP2360.ssa 
 
12 
 
¶112 The 
statutes 
envision 
that 
accurate 
personally 
identifiable information will be collected, retained, and 
released by the Department.  As explained previously, see ¶¶96-
97, supra, Wis. Stat. § 19.70 provides a means for providing 
accurate personally identifiable information. 
¶113 When a challenge is made to the accuracy of a record 
containing 
personally 
identifiable 
information, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.70, using the word "shall," requires the Department of 
Justice to take the following action:  
• It shall concur with the record subject's challenge 
and correct the information (§ 19.70(1)(a)); or  
• It shall deny the challenge, notify the record subject 
of the reasons for denying the challenge, and allow 
the record subject to file a concise statement setting 
forth the individual's disagreement with the disputed 
portion of the record (§ 19.70(1)(b)).   
¶114 Indeed, it appears that in future responses to records 
requests about these three petitioners, the Department can 
repair the inaccurate criminal history records with very little 
difficulty or expense.  
¶115 Still, the Department has, in effect, refused to 
comply with Wis. Stat. § 19.70 even though it is fully aware of 
the inaccuracies in criminal history records pertaining to these 
petitioners.  Indeed, the Department, even in this court, has 
not explained why it cannot and will not repair any inaccurate 
criminal history records it releases in the future pertaining to 
the petitioners. 
No.  2014AP2360.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶116 I conclude, as does Justice Kelly's writing, that the 
petitioners have successfully demonstrated that Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.70 entitles them to have the inaccuracies corrected in the 
criminal history records the Department releases in the future.  
See Justice Kelly's writing, ¶35.   
¶117 As I stated previously, I write separately because I 
disagree with Justice Kelly's writing that relief under Wis. 
Stat. § 19.70 "will likely never have anything more than a 
retroactive effect."  See Justice Kelly's writing, ¶35.   
¶118 In contrast, I conclude that a prospective equitable 
remedy is available to the three petitioners under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.70.  Section 19.70 would be an ineffective, worthless 
provision unless each of the three petitioners had a remedy 
under the statute when the Department violated the statute.   
¶119 The legislature could not have intended that the 
Department 
could 
violate 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.70 
with 
no 
consequences.  Implicit in § 19.70 is the concept that if the 
Department does not comply with § 19.70, a court may declare 
rights under the statute and enjoin the Department from 
violating the statute.   
¶120 As I explained previously, I would have this court 
issue a declaratory judgment pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.04, 
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.  The declaratory judgment 
would be affirmative in form and effect, declaring that the 
Department 
of 
Justice 
must 
comply 
with 
the 
mandatory 
requirements of § 19.70.  See Wis. Stat. § 806.04(1).   
No.  2014AP2360.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶121 The declaratory judgment would also be negative in 
form and effect enjoining the Department from refusing to comply 
with the mandatory requirements of Wis. Stat. § 19.70.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 806.04(1).   
¶122 To obtain injunctive relief, a party must generally 
show:  (1) sufficient probability that future conduct will 
violate a right and cause injury; (2) that the injury will be 
irreparable; and (3) that no adequate remedy exists at law for 
the injury.19    
¶123 The requirements for injunctive relief are satisfied 
in the instant case.  First, there is a sufficient probability 
that the Department will not change its conduct of its own 
accord to correct the inaccuracies that have harmed the 
petitioners.  The petitioners' woes will begin anew whenever the 
Department releases criminal history records pertaining to these 
petitioners.  The petitioners' names, absent the injunctive 
relief that I conclude this court should order, will continue to 
be inaccurately associated with a criminal history.  
¶124 Second, the injury to the petitioners is irreparable.  
Every time the Department releases an inaccurate criminal 
history record, "it is inaccurately suggesting that the [record 
subject] has a criminal history when, in fact, he does not."  
See Justice Kelly's writing, ¶43.  The imposition of such a 
"specter of criminality" damages the individual's reputation and 
increases the odds that the individual will lose innumerable 
                                                 
19 See Pure Milk Prods. Co-op. v. Nat'l Farmers Org., 90 
Wis. 2d 781, 280 N.W.2d 691 (1979).   
No.  2014AP2360.ssa 
 
15 
 
opportunities.  See Justice Kelly's writing, ¶43.  Such an 
injury has the likelihood of being extremely widespread.  The 
"Wisconsin Criminal History Single Name Record Request" form 
imposes no limits on who may request a criminal background 
record, and anyone in the "General Public" may request a 
background check for "General Information."20  In 2015, the 
Department processed about 900,000 "public criminal background 
check requests."  The potential for widespread injury cannot 
readily be rectified.  
¶125 Third, no adequate remedy exists at law.  Money 
damages for past or future injury would not curtail the 
Department's future violations of Wis. Stat. § 19.70 or remedy 
the injury.  Only injunctive relief will prevent the Department 
from hereafter releasing inaccurate criminal history records 
pertaining to the petitioners.  
¶126 In sum, I would have this court issue a declaratory 
judgment as I have described.  
III 
¶127 I 
briefly 
discuss 
other 
issues 
raised 
by 
the 
Department of Justice's alias search policy, the release of 
inaccurate 
criminal 
history 
records, 
and 
the 
plight 
of 
individuals who may unknowingly be harmed by release to the 
                                                 
20 This 
form 
and 
instructions 
are 
available 
on 
the 
Department 
of 
Justice's 
website, 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/dles/cib-
forms/record-check-unit/DJ-LE-250-single.pdf.   
No.  2014AP2360.ssa 
 
16 
 
public of inaccurate criminal history records pertaining to 
them.     
¶128 The relief that I would have the court grant in the 
instant case would be precedent and would be available to all 
individuals similarly situated to the petitioners.  But not all 
individuals affected by release of criminal history records will 
be situated similarly to the petitioners. 
¶129 In the instant case, the three petitioners were aware 
of the release of inaccurate criminal history records pertaining 
to 
them, 
obtained 
innocence 
letters, 
and 
requested 
the 
Department 
to 
correct 
criminal 
history 
records 
released 
pertaining to them.   
¶130 Many individuals, however, may not be aware that they 
are the victims of the Department of Justice's release of 
inaccurate criminal history records.  These individuals have no 
opportunity to obtain an innocence letter or to challenge 
inaccurate criminal history records released to requesters 
searching their names and birthdates.21  These individuals would 
not fall within the relief granted in the instant case.   
¶131 Neither Wis. Stat. § 19.70, an innocence letter, nor 
the Wisconsin Unique Personal Identification Number (WiUPIN), 
each of which puts the onus on the record subject to challenge 
                                                 
21 The Department requires a name and birthdate to comply 
with a request for a criminal history record.  Although the 
requester for Teague's criminal history record inaccurately 
advised the Department of Teague's birth date, the Department 
nevertheless released the records using Teague as an alias 
because the Department uses a range of acceptable birthdates.   
No.  2014AP2360.ssa 
 
17 
 
the criminal history record, aids an individual who does not 
know of the inaccurate criminal history record pertaining to him 
or her. 
¶132 A challenge may very well arise in the future to the 
Department of Justice's alias search policy in compiling and 
releasing criminal history records.  There is a significant 
likelihood that as a result of this policy the Department will 
release an inaccurate criminal history record pertaining to an 
individual without giving the record subject an opportunity to 
correct or supplement the record.             
¶133 The interpretation and application of the statutes 
relating to the criminal history database, criminal history 
records, and personally identifiable information may benefit 
from further attention by the Department of Justice.  Further 
legislative attention may also be needed.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 13.92(2)(j).  
¶134 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.  
¶135 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
No.  2014AP2360.mjg 
 
1 
 
¶136 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the lead opinion that the criminal history reports that are at 
issue in this case are inaccurate as a matter of law under Wis. 
Stat. § 19.70.  I further agree that DOJ is required to correct 
the inaccurate information.  I therefore join part of the lead 
opinion1 and concur in the mandate of the court.  I part ways 
with the lead opinion, however, to the extent that it also 
purports to resolve the petitioners' constitutional claims, and 
for that reason I write separately. 
¶137 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.70 provides that a person may 
challenge, 
in 
writing, 
the 
accuracy 
of 
a 
public 
record 
maintained by a government authority when that document contains 
personally identifiable information pertaining to that person.  
Wis. Stat. § 19.70(1).  In response to a challenge under 
§ 19.70, the authority must make a decision: it shall either 
"correct the information" if it concurs with the challenge, or 
it shall issue a written denial if it denies the challenge.  
§ 19.70(1)(a)-(b).  If it denies the challenge, it shall also 
afford the challenger an opportunity to file a concise written 
statement setting forth the challenger's reasons for  disputing 
the accuracy of the record.  § 19.70(1)(b). 
¶138 The lead opinion concludes, and I agree, that "the 
record at issue in this case is the report created in response 
                                                 
1 More specifically, I join Parts I, II, III, IV.A, IV.C, 
and V of the lead opinion, but I do not join Part IV.B or the 
last two sentences of Part IV.A.  I also note that I agree with 
footnote 39 in the lead opinion, describing the effect that this 
court's mandate should have on remand to the circuit court. 
No.  2014AP2360.mjg 
 
2 
 
to a request for a Criminal History Search," lead op., ¶25, and 
that Wis. Stat. § 19.70 applies to the reports because they 
contain personally identifiable information pertaining to Teague 
and the other petitioners, id., ¶¶28-29.  I further agree that, 
because "DOJ has known ATP's criminal history report does not 
relate to Mr. Teague ever since it issued Mr. Teague's innocence 
letter . . . by continuing to produce that report in response to 
an inquiry into whether Mr. Teague has a criminal history, [DOJ] 
is providing inaccurate information."  Id., ¶34.  Not only has 
this inaccuracy occurred in past reports, but it will continue 
to recur unless DOJ makes corrections.  "The inaccuracy arises 
when the DOJ provides that report to someone asking whether Mr. 
Teague has a criminal history.  It is the DOJ itself that is 
affirmatively creating the inaccuracy, and Mr. Teague has 
successfully demonstrated that Wis. Stat. § 19.70 entitles him 
to have this inaccuracy corrected."  Id., ¶35. 
¶139 However, I do not conclude, as the lead opinion does, 
that "corrections under § 19.70 will likely never have anything 
more than a retroactive effect."  Id.  Rather, I interpret Wis. 
Stat. § 19.70(1)(a) to require that, at a minimum, DOJ must make 
corrections sufficient to prevent the same inaccuracy from 
recurring the next time someone requests Teague's criminal 
history 
report. 
 
Complying 
with 
§ 19.70(1)(a) 
requires 
"correct[ing] the information," and in Teague's case, DOJ is 
providing inaccurate information by incorrectly presenting ATP's 
criminal history as Teague's when, in fact, DOJ knows that 
Teague has no criminal history.  Merely retracting a single 
No.  2014AP2360.mjg 
 
3 
 
report amounts to no correction at all, because the database 
will continue to generate the same report with the same 
inaccuracies.  Therefore, under the facts here——where DOJ knows 
its database is repeatedly producing the same inaccuracy——I 
conclude that "correct[ing] the information" under § 19.70(1)(a) 
requires ensuring that ATP's criminal history will no longer be 
inaccurately reported as Teague's.  I agree with Justice 
Abrahamson that § 19.70 "would be an ineffective, worthless 
provision" if Teague did not have a remedy under the statute.  
Justice Abrahamson's opinion, ¶118. 
¶140 Holding that Teague and the other petitioners are 
entitled to this remedy under Wis. Stat. § 19.70 is enough to 
resolve this appeal.2  Consequently, there is no need to address 
the constitutional arguments presented.  It is well established 
that we construe statutes to avoid constitutional infirmities.  
"A court should avoid interpreting a statute in such a way that 
would 
render 
it 
unconstitutional 
when 
a 
reasonable 
interpretation 
exists 
that 
would 
render 
the 
legislation 
constitutional."  Am. Family Mut. Ins. v. DOR, 222 Wis. 2d 650, 
667, 586 N.W.2d 872 (1998).  Similarly, "[t]his court has 
frequently concluded that it need not address a claim of 
constitutional error if the claim can be resolved on statutory 
                                                 
2 DOJ argues that Wis. Stat. § 19.70 has no application to 
this 
case 
because 
the 
petitioners 
never 
challenged 
the 
"accuracy" of any record.  I join a majority of justices in 
rejecting that argument, and I conclude that § 19.70 entitles 
the petitioners to have the inaccuracies corrected.  In my 
opinion, the task of crafting an appropriate order is best left 
to the circuit court. 
No.  2014AP2360.mjg 
 
4 
 
or common law grounds."  State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 533, 
370 N.W.2d 222 (1985); see State v. Bobby G., 2007 WI 77, ¶3, 
301 Wis. 2d 531, 734 N.W.2d 81 ("Because we can resolve the case 
on statutory grounds, we decline to address the constitutional 
issues presented . . . ."). 
¶141 Nevertheless, despite its holding that Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.70 "entitles [Teague] to have this inaccuracy corrected," 
lead op., ¶35, the lead opinion concludes that the § 19.70 
"procedures are inadequate safeguards for Mr. Teague's liberty 
interest," id., ¶78.  The lead opinion speculates that "it 
appears this procedure may provide only incomplete relief."  
Id., ¶74.  This speculation is an inadequate basis upon which to 
resolve matters of constitutional magnitude. 
¶142 If the lead opinion's speculation turns out to be 
correct, the statutes already provide an avenue for relief.  
Petitioners may seek judicial review of DOJ's final decision 
under Wis. Stat. § 19.70.  I conclude——and DOJ acknowledged at 
oral argument——that chapter 227 of the statutes permits judicial 
review of § 19.70 decisions.  Chapter 227 provides for judicial 
review of "[a]dministrative decisions which adversely affect the 
substantial interests of any person, whether by action or 
inaction, whether affirmative or negative in form."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.52.  If DOJ's final decision under § 19.70 adversely 
affects Teague's "substantial interests," then § 227.52 applies 
and Teague would have standing if he could "demonstrate both 
that [he] sustained [an] alleged injury due to the agency 
decision, and that the injury is to an interest which the law 
No.  2014AP2360.mjg 
 
5 
 
recognizes or seeks to regulate or protect."  Waste Mgmt. of 
Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 144 Wis. 2d 499, 505, 424 N.W.2d 685 (1988). 
¶143 Here, the interest protected by Wis. Stat. § 19.70 is 
the interest in having inaccurate information corrected.  As the 
lead opinion aptly describes it, § 19.70 provides a process by 
which the subject of a public record "may, upon discovering an 
inaccuracy in that record, engage a statutory mechanism to have 
it corrected."  Lead op., ¶21.  This mechanism requires DOJ to 
respond to the challenge by issuing a decision and either 
concurring with the challenge or denying the challenge.  See 
§ 19.70(1)(a)-(b).  In Teague's case, if the action DOJ 
ultimately takes to correct the criminal history reports under 
§ 19.70 is insufficient to remedy Teague's injury, then Teague 
may seek judicial review under Wis. Stat. § 227.52. 
¶144 Because the statutes provide the petitioners with a 
remedy, I see no need to decide the constitutional issues 
presented.  Accordingly, I join Parts I, II, III, IV.A, IV.C, 
and V of the lead opinion, but I do not join Part IV.B or the 
last two sentences of Part IV.A.  I write separately to explain 
my view that resolving Teague's statutory claim under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.70 is sufficient to resolve this appeal. 
¶145 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶146 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2014AP2360.akz 
 
1 
 
¶147 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (dissenting).  No one 
disputes, for purposes of this appeal, that Dennis Teague's 
("Teague") cousin, ATP, used the name "Dennis Antonio Teague" as 
an alias and that ATP, not Teague, has a criminal history.  As 
to ATP, then, the Wisconsin Department of Justice's ("DOJ") 
criminal history database is absolutely correct.  The database 
reflects that ATP used the name "Dennis Antonio Teague" as an 
alias.  The database correctly reflects dates of birth not 
shared by Teague, an image that is not Teague's image, ATP's 
name as well as the alias names attributed to him, and ATP's 
criminal history.  It is important, and seemingly accurate, to 
have that information available in the database as concerns ATP.  
The only common information between ATP and Teague is the name. 
¶148 The problem occurs when Teague's name is searched, 
even with Teague's own date of birth (which is different than 
ATP's date of birth); ATP's record (with dates of birth 
attributed to ATP) appears, and ATP's record reflects that he 
used the name "Dennis Antonio Teague" as an alias.  Teague wants 
this court to remedy the wrong that occurs to him when people 
might question whether it is he who has the criminal history.  
Teague is not without recourse.  Teague and some members of this 
court want more.  I do not blame them, but I cannot join this 
constitutional journey in search of a remedy, particularly when 
other relief has been made available, but is, according to 
Teague, unsatisfactory.  The court leaves the circuit court with 
no guidance regarding an appropriate remedy.  In addition, the 
No.  2014AP2360.akz 
 
2 
 
issue of remedy might even be rendered moot given the DOJ's 
implementation of a new search system.   
¶149 In reporting accurate facts as to ATP in its criminal 
history database, the DOJ provides a valuable service to those 
employers, businesses, and members of the general public who may 
want to know more about ATP or the alias he may be using at the 
moment.  It is valuable information, for example, if ATP is 
posing to be Teague with ATP's date of birth, for those who 
search to be able to know that ATP, posing as Teague, has this 
criminal history.  And if Teague were trying to prove that ATP 
has used his name as an alias, he would want that information to 
be available as well.  The information in the database is not 
illegitimate. 
¶150 The difficulty arises under these facts because Teague 
wants his good name to reflect just that.  He apparently is not 
presently in need of proving that ATP has in fact used his name 
as an alias.  In fact, if he found himself in that position, he 
would presumably want to use the database as proof that ATP has 
used his good name as an alias.  While this database reflects 
accurate information as to ATP's alias, it is less than clear as 
to Teague's lack of criminal history, particularly if one does 
not heed the warnings in the database.  In other words, if not 
read thoroughly, as the database warns to do, it could cause 
some to question whether Teague might have a criminal history.  
Teague finds unsatisfactory that those who are aggrieved by the 
results of a database search may obtain relief in the form of an 
official letter to demonstrate that it is not they who possess a 
No.  2014AP2360.akz 
 
3 
 
criminal record.  Teague did, in fact, receive such a letter but 
he nonetheless fears that it is not enough to exculpate him in 
the eyes of others.  I feel sorry for him and for those who find 
themselves in his position.  The entire court feels sorry for 
Teague and those like him.    
¶151 I depart from Justice Kelly's writing,1 however, 
because the legislature is the body to weigh and consider the 
need for public access to this information with the fact that 
some innocent bystanders might be wronged by such access.  Our 
own court has repeatedly faced similar difficult challenges to 
our own website by those who have been wronged by the 
information that is available.  Our court has not seen fit to 
create the kind of remedies for those individuals that certain 
members of the court would create for Teague today.  I can join 
these members of the court in their pitying Teague for what ATP 
did to him and the injustice that could occur if improper 
assumptions are made as to Teague.  I, however, cannot join 
Justice 
Kelly's 
writing 
with 
its 
construction 
of 
a 
constitutional violation where none exists in order to avoid a 
bad outcome and its conclusion that the DOJ's publication of 
truthful, valuable information as to ATP deprives Teague of 
liberty under the state and federal constitutions.   
¶152 As a preliminary, but fundamental, legal matter, the 
circuit court below, acting as factfinder, found that the 
"criminal history responses issued by the [DOJ] in response to 
                                                 
1 Given the votes of my colleagues, I refer to the writing's 
author specifically in order to provide clarity. 
No.  2014AP2360.akz 
 
4 
 
name-based queries using the plaintiff[s'] names and dates of 
birth . . . are not literally false and when taken as a whole 
and fairly and reasonably read do not convey a false and 
defamatory meaning to their intended audience."2  We owe 
deference to that determination.  Unlike Justice Kelly's 
writing, I am unable to conclude that the circuit court's 
finding is clearly erroneous.  Without such a conclusion, 
Teague's procedural due process claim fails from the outset.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.3 
                                                 
2 Although the term "defamation" has been used in Justice 
Kelly's writing, I note that the term has a unique definition 
under the law.  See, e.g., Wis JI-Civil 2500.  Although I will 
use this terminology, I do not necessarily mean to conclude that 
this is indeed a defamation claim. 
3 Like Justice Kelly's writing and the court of appeals, I 
address 
only 
Teague's 
circumstances, 
not 
those 
of 
the 
intervening plaintiffs.  While the petitioners do not face 
identical scenarios, the reasoning in this writing applies 
equally to each of them.  For instance, the criminal history 
report of the individual who apparently stole petitioner L.C.'s 
name lists a birth date that in fact corresponds to L.C.'s birth 
date.  But numerous other aspects of the criminal history report 
make clear that the report does not belong to L.C. 
In addition to Teague's procedural due process claim, 
Justice Kelly's writing also discusses the application of Wis. 
Stat. § 19.70 to this case.  However, the writing ultimately 
appears to reject this statute as the primary avenue of relief.  
The circuit court below concluded both that Teague could not 
challenge the information in the database because it pertained 
to ATP rather than Teague and that even if the criminal history 
report at issue is a record, it is not kept by the authority and 
thus is "not a record that Teague can challenge or with which 
his challenge can be filed."  The court of appeals below 
rejected the matter as undeveloped.  See Teague v. Van Hollen, 
2016 WI App 20, ¶¶71-76, 367 Wis. 2d 547, 877 N.W.2d 379 
(Higginbotham, 
J., 
concurring); 
id., 
¶79 
(Sherman, 
J., 
concurring). 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP2360.akz 
 
5 
 
I 
¶153 "Procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 1 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution protect[s] against government actions 
that deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of the law."  Adams v. Northland Equip. Co., 2014 WI 
79, ¶64, 356 Wis. 2d 529, 850 N.W.2d 272.  The procedural due 
process claim in this case requires the court to "determine 
first whether there exists a liberty interest of which [Teague] 
has been deprived, and if so, whether the procedures used to 
deprive that liberty interest were constitutionally sufficient."  
State v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶39 n.15, 360 Wis. 2d 193, 858 
N.W.2d 346 (quoting State v. West, 2011 WI 83, ¶83, 336 
Wis. 2d 578, 800 N.W.2d 929). 
¶154 Also as a fundamental legal principle, "A plaintiff 
may prove a deprivation of a liberty interest by showing damage 
to her 'good name, reputation, honor, or integrity,' Wisconsin 
v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971), but any stigmatic 
harm 
must 
take 
concrete 
forms 
and 
extend 
beyond 
mere 
reputational interests."  Omosegbon v. Wells, 335 F.3d 668, 675 
(7th Cir. 2003) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 
(1976)).  Put differently, "[e]ssentially, a plaintiff claiming 
a deprivation based on defamation by the government must 
                                                                                                                                                             
Even my colleagues who would grant relief under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.70 do not agree on what that relief should be and who 
should provide it.  As a result, I need not address the issue.  
I also decline to address the other claims Teague has raised. 
No.  2014AP2360.akz 
 
6 
 
establish the fact of the defamation 'plus' the violation of 
some more tangible interest before the plaintiff is entitled to 
invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause."  
Cannon v. City of West Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 701-02).  In this case it 
is unnecessary to inquire into the existence of damage to "some 
more tangible interest" possessed by Teague because Teague has 
not even established the fact of reputational injury.  I cannot 
ignore this important and jugular deficit. 
¶155 I 
recognize 
that 
with 
regard 
to 
the 
issue 
of 
reputational injury, there is in fact little to be gained in 
attempting to refute much of the reasoning in Justice Kelly's 
writing.  Justice Kelly's writing may be quite right that if one 
ignores certain purposes a requester might have for entering 
Teague's information into the criminal history database, ignores 
the DOJ's thorough explanation, in the reports it provides, of 
the information it is actually providing, ignores details 
demonstrating that the record returned in response to a request 
is not Teague's own record (such as a name, image, and/or 
birthdate that do not correspond to Teague's own name, image, 
and/or birthdate), and instead focuses entirely, blinders on, 
upon the single fact that a name corresponding to Teague's own 
name appears somewhere in the criminal history report provided, 
then 
one 
might 
indeed 
accidentally 
conclude 
that 
Teague 
possesses a criminal history.  
¶156 But that, obviously, is not how these criminal history 
reports are to be analyzed.  See, e.g., Leuch v. Berger, 161 
No.  2014AP2360.akz 
 
7 
 
Wis. 564, 571, 155 N.W. 148 (1915) ("The words used must be 
construed in the plain and popular sense in which they would 
naturally be understood.  And the words claimed to be libelous 
must be read in the light of the entire article." (citation 
omitted)).  Begin with the requester's purpose.  In one entirely 
conceivable scenario, a requester receives personal information 
from an individual and wishes to verify, through the criminal 
history database, whether that individual possesses a criminal 
history.  If the individual is, for example, ATP using 
information stolen from Teague, the criminal history database 
will accurately notify the requester that the name the requester 
received has been used as an alias by the individual.  The 
criminal history database has served its purpose.    
¶157 Under other circumstances, the individual who provided 
the personal information will be the individual himself——Teague, 
for 
example. 
 
But 
despite 
this 
eventuality, 
and 
for 
understandable public protection reasons, the DOJ may wish to 
maintain in its database the fact that ATP stole Teague's name.  
The DOJ therefore fully and carefully explains the nature of the 
results it provides to requesters.  The following are just a few 
excerpts of the explanation the DOJ provides that are directly 
relevant to the facts of this case (emphases are in the 
original): 
IMPORTANT EXPLANATION ABOUT HOW TO UNDERSTAND THIS 
RESPONSE 
. . . . 
Read these sections carefully to understand how this 
response relates to the identifying data you provided. 
No.  2014AP2360.akz 
 
8 
 
. . . . 
You must carefully read the entire Wisconsin criminal 
history record below in order to determine whether the 
record pertains to the person in whom you are 
interested. 
Do not just assume that the criminal history record 
below 
pertains 
to 
the 
person 
in 
whom 
you 
are 
interested. 
. . . . 
It is not uncommon for criminal offenders to use alias 
or 
fraudulent 
names 
and 
false 
dates 
of 
birth, 
sometimes known as "identity theft."  
If the name you submitted to be searched is DIFFERENT 
from the "Master Name" [a term defined elsewhere] 
below, the Wisconsin criminal history record below may 
belong to someone other than the person whose name and 
other identifying data you submitted for searching.  
If an alias or fraudulent name used by the person who 
is the "Master Name" is similar to the name you 
submitted for searching, that does not mean that the 
person whose name you submitted for search has a 
criminal history.  It means that the person associated 
by fingerprints with the Wisconsin criminal history 
below has used a name similar to the name you 
submitted for searching. 
. . . . 
To determine whether the Wisconsin criminal history 
below actually belongs to the person whose name and 
other 
identifying 
information 
you 
submitted 
for 
searching, compare the information reported below to 
the other information you have obtained about that 
person. 
 
Inconsistencies 
may 
indicate 
that 
the 
criminal history reported below does not belong to the 
person whose name and other identifying information 
you submitted for searching. 
¶158 This is not "legalese."  It is clear, unembellished 
English.  And if a requester entering Teague's information reads 
and follows these unambiguous instructions, that person will 
know, for instance, to "compare the information reported" in 
No.  2014AP2360.akz 
 
9 
 
ATP's criminal history "to the other information" the requester 
has 
"obtained 
about" 
Teague. 
 
The 
person 
will 
discover 
inconsistent names, birthdates, and perhaps even images.  The 
criminal history database may not have proven very helpful to 
the requester, but it should not have harmed Teague.   
¶159 In sum, it is a bit of an overstatement to conclude, 
in light of the foregoing, that the DOJ's "policy and 
practice . . . consistently and predictably calumnizes innocent 
people."  Justice Kelly's writing, ¶73.  In fact, that 
conclusion is not really one for members of this court to make 
because first, we are not a fact-finding court and second, the 
factfinder below reached the opposite conclusion.  In other 
words, one might argue that despite the explanation the DOJ 
provides, and even considering the context in which a criminal 
history report is requested, a requester may still read one of 
the DOJ's criminal history reports to ascribe a criminal 
background to an individual who does not possess one.  This is 
precisely why the question of the defamatory nature or not of 
the criminal history reports at issue was submitted to a 
factfinder below.   
¶160 Specifically, the circuit court concluded, in its 
findings of fact, that the "criminal history responses issued by 
the 
[DOJ] 
in 
response 
to 
name-based 
queries 
using 
the 
plaintiff[s'] names and dates of birth . . . are not literally 
false and when taken as a whole and fairly and reasonably read 
do not convey a false and defamatory meaning to their intended 
audience."  That finding is not clearly erroneous, and Teague's 
No.  2014AP2360.akz 
 
10 
 
procedural due process claim therefore fails.  The DOJ has not 
defamed Teague.  It reports, for the benefit of the public and 
others, the truthful (for purpose of this appeal) fact that ATP 
has used the name "Dennis Antonio Teague" as an alias.  At 
bottom, the analysis in Justice Kelly's writing rests on fears 
that requesters are either unable or unwilling to follow the 
basic instructions the DOJ gives them in the reports it 
provides.  However, the factfinder considered this possibility 
and rejected it.  I would not upset the circuit court's 
findings.  Moreover, Justice Kelly's writing leaves the circuit 
court to create a remedy and provides it with no guidance 
whatsoever as to what that might be.  Additionally, the other 
litigants have separate concerns but Justice Kelly's writing 
similarly provides the circuit court with absolutely no guidance 
as to what their remedies may be.  The DOJ has referenced a new 
system that will be or has now been implemented.  Perhaps that 
will provide the process that members of this court now believe 
is due. 
II 
¶161 This case is all the more concerning because of how it 
may be used in the future.  Justice Kelly's writing casts doubt 
on the validity of a host of government-run databases similar to 
the one at issue here.  A good example is the Wisconsin Circuit 
Court Access ("WCCA") system, a database that "provides access 
to certain public records of the Wisconsin circuit courts."4  One 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Circuit Court Access, https://wcca.wicourts.gov 
(last visited March 19, 2017). 
No.  2014AP2360.akz 
 
11 
 
need provide only a name to gain access to court-related 
information potentially associated with that name, including 
records of criminal convictions.   
¶162 This court has been less than receptive to requests of 
individuals who have claimed to be victimized by the way WCCA 
information is maintained.  The court has fallen far short of 
finding a due process violation.  On June 30, 2009, the Board of 
Governors of the State Bar of Wisconsin submitted a petition to 
modify the Supreme Court Rules, explaining: 
As this Court is aware, [WCCA] can be reviewed by 
anyone with internet access and the information 
contained on the website is regularly misused. [WCCA] 
publishes 
the 
original 
criminal 
case 
information 
regardless of the outcome of the case. . . . To allow 
continued 
access 
to 
such 
easily 
misunderstood 
information, especially in cases in which the case was 
dismissed or there was a judgment of acquittal, poses 
the risk that such a record could be "a vehicle for 
improper purposes," whether intentional or not. 
In re Petition of the State Bar of Wisconsin to Modify Chapter 
72 of the Supreme Court Rules, Petition 09-07 at 11-12 (quoting 
Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)), 
https://www.wicourts.gov/supreme/docs/0907petition.pdf. Although 
the court's own website has produced its own victims, the court 
does not even provide a letter as relief to those aggrieved.  On 
July 19, 2016, this court dismissed the petition.  S. Ct. Order 
09-07 
(issued 
Jul. 
19, 
2016), 
https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/rulhear/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=
pdf&seqNo=172234. 
¶163 It seems, then, that members of this court are holding 
the DOJ to a stricter standard when it comes to the maintenance 
No.  2014AP2360.akz 
 
12 
 
of the type of information at issue than it does the Wisconsin 
Court System.  One wonders how WCCA, and other databases like 
it, might fare given the constitutional relief Justice Kelly's 
writing seeks to provide today.   
III 
¶164 Members of the court are not wrong to wish that there 
was a remedy for Teague that could address all possible 
scenarios, but Justice Kelly's writing unfortunately errs in 
concluding that the DOJ unconstitutionally deprived Teague of 
liberty.  I would uphold the finding of the circuit court below 
and conclude that Teague has not established that the DOJ 
defamed him.  The information in the database is correct.  It is 
unfortunate that Teague's name has been used as an alias.  
Nonetheless, Teague's procedural due process claim must fail.  
This court should not insert itself further into a dispute that 
is best resolved, if need be, by the legislature.   
¶165 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
No.  2014AP2360.akz 
 
 
 
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