Title: Alabama Department of Revenue v. Panama City Wholesale, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1190321
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 5, 2020

REL:  June 5, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1190321
____________________
Vernon Barnett, in his official capacity as Commissioner of
the Alabama Department of Revenue
v.
Panama City Wholesale, Inc.
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-19-134)
PARKER, Chief Justice.
Vernon Barnett, as Commissioner of the Alabama Department
of Revenue ("the 
Department"), appeals from a summary judgment
entered in favor of Panama City Wholesale, Inc. ("PCW").  We
reverse.
1190321
I. Facts
The State of Alabama imposes a license or privilege tax
on tobacco products stored or received for 
distribution within
the State ("the tobacco tax").  See § 40-25-1 et seq., Ala.
Code 1975.  Under § 40-25-8 ("the confiscation statute"), the
Department may confiscate certain tobacco products on which
the tobacco tax has not been paid.
PCW was a wholesale tobacco-products distributor located
in Panama City, Florida, and owned by Ehad Ahmed.  One of
PCW's customers, Yafa Wholesale, LLC ("Yafa"), was an Alabama
tobacco distributor owned by Sayeneddin Thiab ("Thiab").
In March 2018, agents of the Department began conducting
surveillance of Thiab's residence, Yafa's business location,
and storage units at Extra Space Storage ("Extra Space") in
Vestavia Hills.  One of the units had been leased in 2010 by
Sami Berriri, a driver for Yafa.  The agents observed Thiab's
son, Saed Sayeneddin Thiab ("Saed"), making multiple trips to
PCW's warehouse in Florida, where he loaded tobacco products
into delivery vehicles owned by Yafa.  After Saed returned to
Alabama, Thiab, Saed, and other individuals unloaded the
products into the storage units.  The agents also observed
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1190321
Thiab and Saed retrieving tobacco products from the units and
delivering them to more than 80 convenience stores across
Alabama.
On October 10, 2018, Hurricane Michael destroyed the roof
on PCW's warehouse.  Over the next few days, Thiab's daughter,
Ghadir Sayeneddin Thiab ("Ghadir"), and Saed leased three
additional units from Extra Space.   On October 19, the agents
observed two of Thiab's vehicles and a rented moving truck
traveling to Pensacola, Florida.  The vehicles were loaded
with tobacco products at Southeastern Freight Company and 
were
observed at Yafa's business location that night.  The next
day, agents observed one of Thiab's vehicles being unloaded at
two of the recently rented storage units.  The day after that,
agents observed one of Thiab's delivery vehicles being loaded
with tobacco products from the other recently rented unit.
On October 23, 2018, the Department confiscated 1,431,819
cigars from four storage units leased by persons connected to
Yafa and Thiab.  It is undisputed that the tobacco tax had not
been paid on the cigars.  Ahmed filed an action in the
Montgomery Circuit Court against Barnett, as Commissioner of
the Department, seeking a judgment declaring that the cigars
3
1190321
were Ahmed's and that they were not subject to confiscation. 
The case was transferred to the Jefferson Circuit Court, PCW
was substituted for Ahmed, and the parties were realigned to
make the Commissioner of the Department the plaintiff and PCW
the defendant in a civil forfeiture action.  On PCW's motion,
the circuit court entered a summary judgment in PCW's favor,
ruling that the Commissioner failed to present substantial
evidence that the cigars were in the possession of a retailer
or semijobber, as the court believed was required by the
confiscation statute.  The Commissioner appeals.
II. Standard of Review
"This Court reviews a summary judgment de novo.  Turner
v. Westhampton Court, L.L.C., 903 So. 2d 82, 87 (Ala. 2004).
...  [T]his Court reviews the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant.  Turner, supra."  Muller v. Seeds,
919 So. 2d 1174, 1176 (Ala. 2005).
III. Analysis
This is the first time this Court has interpreted the
confiscation statute in its current form.  The confiscation
statute permits the Department to confiscate certain untaxed
tobacco products, as follows:
4
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"Any ... cigars ... or other products taxable
under this article found at any point within the
State of Alabama, which ... cigars ... shall have
been within the State of Alabama for a period of two
hours, or longer, in possession of any retailer or
semijobber not having affixed to the package the
stamps as provided in this article, or in the case
of products not requiring a stamp to be affixed
where 
purchase 
invoices 
do 
not 
itemize 
the
applicable tobacco taxes, are declared to be
contraband goods and may be seized by the Department
....  Any of the goods, wares, or merchandise, when
offered for sale, either at wholesale or retail
without the stamps having been first affixed, or in
the case of products not requiring a stamp to be
affixed where purchase invoices do not itemize the
applicable tobacco taxes, shall be subject to
confiscation as hereinabove provided.  Any untaxed
... cigars ... or other products taxable under this
article found at any location within the State of
Alabama, other than the primary location of the
permitted 
wholesaler 
or 
jobber, 
registered
semijobber, registered retailer or tobacco products
manufacturer who stores tobacco products at a bonded
warehouse in this state for resale, are declared to
be contraband goods, and those goods may be seized
by the Department ...."
§ 40-25-8, Ala. Code 1975. 
In its summary judgment, the circuit court ruled that the
Commissioner "failed to present substantial evidence that the
tobacco products that [the Department] seized from [PCW]
[were] in the possession of a retailer or semi-jobber as
defined by [the confiscation statute]."  The court apparently
interpreted the statute as allowing the Department to
5
1190321
confiscate only products that are in the possession of a
retailer or semijobber.
"'When a court construes a statute, "[w]ords used in
[the] statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary,
and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is
used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean
exactly what it says."'" Ex parte Rodgers, 141 So. 3d 1038,
1041 (Ala. 2013) (quoting Ex parte Berryhill, 801 So. 2d 7, 10
(Ala. 2001)).  Further, "we must examine the statute as a
whole and, if possible, give effect to each [provision]."  Ex
parte Exxon Mobil Corp., 926 So. 2d 303, 309 (Ala. 2005). 
"'"There is a presumption that every word, sentence, or
provision [of a statute] ... has some force and effect and ...
that no superfluous words or provisions were used."'"
Richardson v. Stanford Props., LLC, 897 So. 2d 1052, 1058
(Ala. 2004) (quoting Sheffield v. State, 708 So. 2d 899, 909
(Ala. Crim. App. 1997)).
As an initial matter, the confiscation statute, by its
own terms, applies only to "products taxable under this
article."  § 40-25-8.  Taxable products under Article 1 of
Chapter 25 of Title 40 are tobacco products that are in
6
1190321
Alabama "for the purpose of distribution ... within the
State."   § 40-25-2(a).  
Within the structure of the confiscation statute, our
first analytical point of reference is the general language of
the third sentence: "Any untaxed ... cigars ... or other
products taxable under this article found at any location
within the State of Alabama ... are declared to be contraband
goods, and those goods may be seized by the Department ...." 
This language generally allows the Department to confiscate
any untaxed tobacco product found at any location within the
State.  The third sentence also contains a "primary-location"
exception to this general authorization: the Department may
not confiscate tobacco products that are found at "the primary
location of the permitted wholesaler or jobber, registered
semijobber, 
registered 
retailer 
or 
tobacco 
products
manufacturer who 
stores tobacco products at a bonded warehouse
in this state for resale." (Emphasis added.)1 
1"Wholesale dealer and jobber" is defined as "[p]ersons,
firms, or corporations who buy tobacco products direct from
the manufacturer or an affiliate of the manufacturer and sell
at wholesale only ... to licensed wholesale dealers, jobbers,
semijobbers, and retail dealers for the purpose of resale
only."  § 40-25-1(1).  "Semijobber" is defined as "[p]ersons,
firms, or corporations who 
buy tobacco products from permitted
7
1190321
To give effect to each provision of the statute, its
first and second sentences must then be read as exceptions to
the primary-location exception.  The first sentence provides: 
"Any ... cigars ... or other products taxable
under this article found at any point within the
State of Alabama, which ... cigars ... shall have
been within the State of Alabama for a period of two
hours, or longer, in possession of any retailer or
semijobber not having [paid the tobacco tax on them]
are declared to be contraband goods and may be
seized by the Department ...."
(Emphasis added.)  This two-hour "exception to the exception"
allows the Department to confiscate any untaxed tobacco
products that have been in Alabama, in the possession of a
retailer or semijobber, for two hours or longer.  Under this
provision, retailers and semijobbers who store tobacco
products at their primary locations must still pay the tobacco
tax within two hours of their possession of the products in
Alabama.  
wholesalers or obtain tobacco from any other source and sell
at wholesale ... to licensed retail dealers for the purpose of
resale only."  § 40-25-1(3).  "Retailer dealer" is defined as
"[e]very person, firm, or corporation, other than a wholesale
dealer or jobber, who shall sell or offer for sale any one or
more of the [tobacco products] taxed herein ...; and all
persons operating under a retail dealer's license."  § 40-25-
1(2).
8
1190321
Similarly, the second sentence of the statute provides:
"Any of the [tobacco products], when offered for sale, either
at wholesale or retail without the [tobacco tax having been
paid on them] shall be subject to confiscation ...." 
(Emphasis added.)  This sale "exception to the exception"
allows the Department to confiscate any untaxed tobacco
products that are offered for sale, at either wholesale or
retail.  Under this provision, dealers who store tobacco
products at their primary locations must still pay the tobacco
tax before the products are offered for sale.  Our
interpretation of how each of these provisions in the statute
relates to the others is summarized in the diagram attached as
an appendix.
PCW argues that the circuit court's interpretation of the
confiscation statute -- as applying only to products in the
possession of a retailer or semijobber -- was correct.  But
the problem with that interpretation is that it fails to give
effect to each provision of the statute.  By limiting the
Department's confiscation power to tobacco products in the
possession of retailers and semijobbers, that interpretation
would 
render 
superfluous 
the 
third 
sentence's 
primary-location
9
1190321
exception 
as 
to 
permitted 
wholesalers, 
jobbers, 
and
manufacturers, because products in the possession of those
types of dealers would not be subject to confiscation in the
first place.  Rather, as explained above, the first sentence's
reference to a retailer or semijobber functions as an
exception to the primary-location exception, not as a limit on
the third sentence's general rule of confiscation.  The
circuit 
court's 
interpretation would 
turn 
the 
first 
sentence's
reference on its head, incorrectly reading an exception to an
exception as a restriction on the general rule.  In contrast,
the interpretation of the 
confiscation statute set forth above
is the only reasonable way to ascribe meaning to each
provision 
without 
rendering 
any 
provision 
logically
superfluous.  See Exxon, 926 So. 2d at 309 (holding that we
give effect to each provision of a statute); Deutsche Bank
Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Walker Cty., [Ms. 1160926, June 28, 2019] ___
So. 3d at ___ (Ala. 2019) (stating that we presume that every
provision of a statute has some effect and that no provision
is superfluous).
We now apply this interpretation of the confiscation
statute to the facts here.  In response to PCW's motion for a
10
1190321
summary judgment, the Commissioner presented substantial
evidence that the cigars were subject to confiscation.  It is
undisputed that the tobacco tax had not been paid on the
confiscated cigars.  Moreover, the Commissioner presented
substantial evidence that the cigars were in Alabama for the
purpose of distribution.  As noted above, on multiple
occasions, Department agents observed Thiab, Saed, and other
individuals loading boxes of tobacco products from 
the storage
units, including units leased after Hurricane Michael, into
Yafa's delivery vehicles.  Thiab or Saed then transported the
products first to Yafa's business location, then to more than
80 convenience stores across Alabama.  From this evidence, a
reasonable finder of fact could conclude that the cigars
confiscated from the storage units were in Alabama for the
purpose of distribution and thus subject to the tobacco tax. 
Thus, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the cigars fell within the general scope of the confiscation
statute.
PCW argues that the cigars were not in Alabama for the
purpose of distribution, pointing to evidence that Saed
brought the cigars to Alabama to store them as a personal
11
1190321
favor to Ahmed after PCW's warehouse was damaged by Hurricane
Michael.  However, this evidence merely conflicted with the
contrary evidence summarized above, creating a genuine issue
of material fact.
Further, the 
statute's primary-location exception did 
not
apply.  It is undisputed that the storage units from which the
cigars were confiscated were leased by Saed, Ghadir, and
Berriri, none of whom were permitted wholesalers or jobbers,
registered 
semijobbers, 
registered 
retailers, 
or
manufacturers.  The only registered tobacco dealer that
arguably could have had possession of the storage units was
Yafa, but Extra Space was not Yafa's primary location. 
Because the primary-location exception did not apply, we need
not address whether the two-hour and sale "exceptions to the
exception" applied.
IV. Conclusion
Because the circuit court erred in interpreting the
confiscation statute to 
apply only to untaxed tobacco products
in the possession of retailers and semijobbers, and because
the Commissioner presented substantial evidence that the
cigars were subject to confiscation under a correct
12
1190321
interpretation of the statute, we reverse the summary judgment
and remand the cause for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ.,
concur.
Mendheim, J., concurs in the result.
Sellers, J., dissents.
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1190321
SELLERS, Justice (dissenting).
I do not believe the Alabama Department of Revenue ("the
Department") 
has 
presented 
sufficient 
evidence 
indicating 
that
the tobacco products at issue in this case are contraband that
can be confiscated.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent from
the Court's decision to reverse the trial court's summary
judgment against the Department.
Panama City Wholesale, Inc. ("PCW"), is a tobacco-
products supplier located in Panama City, Florida.  Chapter 25
of Title 40 of the Alabama Code of 1975 imposes a "license or
privilege tax" on tobacco products sold in Alabama or held for
sale in Alabama, which the main opinion refers to as "the
tobacco tax."  See § 40-25-2(a), Ala. Code 1975.  It is
undisputed that the State of Florida does not impose a similar
tax on tobacco products.2
In October 2018, the Department executed search warrants
at a storage facility in Jefferson County.  Pursuant to those
warrants, the Department seized approximately 1.4 million
small cigars from four individual units in the storage
2I note that Alabama also has a statutory scheme that
imposes a tax on the storage, use, or consumption of tobacco
products, purchased at retail, if those products are not
subject to the tobacco tax.  See § 40-25-41, Ala. Code 1975.
14
1190321
facility.  PCW claims that the seizure was unlawful and that
it owns those cigars.  According to the Department, however,
the cigars are contraband because the tobacco tax has not been
paid on them.
With respect to some tobacco products, the payment of the
tobacco tax is evidenced by the presence of stamps affixed to
the packaging of the products.  See § 40-25-4 and § 40-25-4.1,
Ala. Code 1975.  Apparently, however, cigars like the ones at
issue here are sold individually in packaging that varies so
much that it is impractical to use mechanical stampers to
affix stamps to the individual packages.  According to the
Department, the payment of the tobacco tax on this type of
cigar, rather than evidenced by stamps, is self-reported and
evidenced by documents submitted to the Department along with
payment of the tax.  See § 40-25-2(e), Ala. Code 1975
(authorizing the Commissioner of Revenue to "require a 
monthly
report without use of a stamp to report the amount of taxes
due").  The Department asserts that Alabama has a "tobacco
smuggling problem" with respect to this type of cigar. 
According to the Department, unscrupulous tobacco-product
sellers "are buying the product in states like Florida that do
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not tax little cigars and smuggling them back to Alabama for
resale."3
The Department has alleged that a business run by an
individual named Sayeneddin Thiab ("Thiab"), which sells
tobacco products to retailers in Alabama, is a customer of
PCW.  According to an affidavit submitted by the Department,
computer records seized from PCW show that, from October 2013
through May 2017, Thiab's business purchased more than $5
million worth of tobacco products from PCW in Florida.  The
Department asserts that representatives of Thiab's business
transported those cigars into Alabama for sale to retailers in
Alabama without paying the tobacco tax.  The affidavit
submitted by the Department states additionally that, from
March 2018 until October 2018 when the particular cigars at
issue were confiscated, agents of the Department observed
representatives of Thiab's business make multiple trips to
PCW's location in Florida and back to Thiab's office and to
the storage facility in Jefferson County.
3The Department suggests that the boxes in which cigars
like the ones at issue here are distributed to retailers in
Alabama are stamped when the tobacco tax is paid, but that
tobacco retailers often simply refill those boxes 
with untaxed
individual cigars after selling the taxed cigars.
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1190321
The 
Department's affidavit suggests 
that 
Thiab's business
has used some of the units in the storage facility in
Jefferson County to temporarily store tobacco products before
they are sold to Alabama retailers.  It appears undisputed,
however, that the particular storage units from which the
cigars at issue in this case were confiscated were not rented
in the name of Thiab or his business.  Rather, they were
rented by three other individuals –- Saed Sayeneddin Thiab,
Ghadir Sayeneddin Thiab, and Sami Berriri.  The record
indicates that Saed is Thiab's son and that he has been
involved in Thiab's tobacco-sales business.  Although the
Department avers that Ghadir is Thiab's daughter and that Sami
was a vehicle driver for Thiab's business, the portions of the
record the Department cites do not support those averments. 
It is undisputed that the storage units were rented and
the cigars in question were moved from PCW's warehouse in
Florida shortly after that warehouse was severely damaged by
Hurricane Michael in October 2018.  It also appears that some
of the cigars confiscated by the Department had been damaged. 
PCW alleges that the cigars were moved to Alabama for
temporary storage until  permanent storage in Florida could be
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1190321
secured.  PCW also claims that the individuals who rented the
storage units in Jefferson County are friends of PCW's owner,
Ehad Ahmed.  As noted, there is evidence indicating that
Thiab's business has purchased cigars from PCW in the past,
but we have not been directed to any evidence indicating that
PCW was paid for the particular cigars confiscated here. 
Nothing before us suggests that title to or ownership of the
cigars was transferred from PCW to any other individual or
entity.
The Department relies on § 40-25-8, Ala. Code 1975, which
allows for the seizure of tobacco products when the tobacco
tax has not been paid.  That statute provides:
"Any cigarettes, smoking tobacco, cigars,
stogies, cheroots, chewing tobacco, snuff, or other
products taxable under this article found at any
point within the State of Alabama, which the
cigarettes, 
smoking 
tobacco, 
cigars, 
stogies,
cheroots, chewing tobacco, snuff, or other products
taxable under this article shall have been within
the State of Alabama for a period of two hours, or
longer, in possession of any retailer or semijobber
not having affixed to the package the stamps as
provided in this article, or in the case of products
not requiring a stamp to be affixed where purchase
invoices do not itemize the applicable tobacco
taxes, are declared to be contraband goods and may
be seized by the Department of Revenue, or its
agents or by any peace officer of the State of
Alabama, without a warrant and the goods shall be
delivered 
to 
the 
Department 
of 
Revenue 
for
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destruction. Any of the goods, wares, or merchandise
when offered for sale, either at wholesale or retail
without the stamps having been first affixed, or in
the case of products not requiring a stamp to be
affixed where purchase invoices do not itemize the
applicable tobacco taxes, shall be subject to
confiscation as hereinabove provided. Any untaxed
cigarettes, 
smoking 
tobacco, 
cigars, 
stogies,
cheroots, chewing tobacco, snuff, or other products
taxable under this article found at any location
within the State of Alabama, other than the primary
location of the permitted wholesaler or jobber,
registered 
semijobber, 
registered 
retailer 
or
tobacco products manufacturer who stores tobacco
products at a bonded warehouse in this state for
resale, are declared to be contraband goods, and
those goods may be seized by the Department of
Revenue, or its agents or by any peace officer of
the State of Alabama, without a warrant and the
goods shall be delivered to the Department of
Revenue for destruction. Any vehicle, not a common
carrier, used for the transportation for the purpose
of sale of unstamped articles as hereinabove
enumerated shall likewise be subject to confiscation
and sale at public auction to the highest bidder
after due advertisement and notice to the title
owner of the vehicle. The proceeds of sale for any
vehicle sold hereunder shall be deposited into the
State Treasury by the Department of Revenue to be
credited in the same manner as the tax otherwise due
on the tobacco products being transported. The cost
of confiscation and sale shall be paid out of the
proceeds derived from the sale before making
remittance to the Treasurer. Should any unstamped
tobaccos be found in any vehicle which is engaged in
the sale, distribution, or delivery of taxable
tobaccos, the same shall be prima facie evidence
that it was there for sale."
(Emphasis added.)  
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PCW argued in its summary-judgment motion that the
Department's confiscation power under § 40-25-8 is limited to
tobacco products in the possession of retailers or 
semijobbers
and that the cigars confiscated here were not in the
possession of a retailer or semijobber.  In response to PCW's
motion, the Department pointed to the provision in the latter
part of § 40-25-8 stating that
"[a]ny untaxed ... cigars ... or other products
taxable under this article found at any location
within the State of Alabama, other than the primary
location of the permitted wholesaler or jobber,
registered 
semijobber, 
registered 
retailer 
or
tobacco products manufacturer who stores tobacco
products at a bonded warehouse in this state for
resale, are declared to be contraband goods."
The Department appears to suggest to this Court that, pursuant
to the above-quoted portion of § 40-25-8, nearly all untaxed
tobacco products in Alabama are contraband unless they are
kept in a bonded warehouse, regardless of who possesses the
products.4  According to the Department, the clause is
"designed to allow the storage of the product in a bonded
warehouse by people that might need to use a bonded warehouse
4The Department does appear to acknowledge the two-hour
"window" afforded retailers and semijobbers under the initial
portion of § 40-25-8 but argues that it does not apply in this
case.
20
1190321
without paying the tobacco tax until they are pulled from the
bonded warehouse for sale in Alabama."  It is not clear,
however, why the clause uses the term "the primary location"
if it is simply aimed at allowing untaxed tobacco products to
be stored in bonded warehouses.  It also is not clear that the
reference to "a bonded warehouse" applies to tobacco products
stored by someone other than a tobacco-products manufacturer. 
Indeed, in its response to PCW's summary-judgment motion, the
Department argued to the trial court that, "if the product is
stored in Alabama in a bonded warehouse of a manufacturer then
it is not contraband."  (Emphasis added.)
I cannot escape the conclusion that, when considered with
the rest of § 40-25-8, the meaning of the portion upon which
the Department relies is simply not clear.  If statutory
language is ambiguous, this Court must endeavor to determine
legislative intent.  Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Walker
Cty., [Ms. 1160926, June 28, 2019] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala.
2019).  In doing so, it is helpful to consider other statutes
set out in Chapter 25 of Title 40.  See Long v. Bryant, 992
So. 2d 673, 684 (Ala. 2008) ("Courts do not interpret
statutory provisions in isolation, but consider them in the
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1190321
context of the entire statutory scheme."); James v. McKinney,
729 So. 2d 264, 267 (Ala. 1998) ("In determining legislative
intent, a court should examine related statutes.").  I also
note that "taxing statutes should be strictly construed
against the taxing power."  Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins.
Co. v. City of Hartselle, 460 So. 2d 1219, 1223 (Ala. 1984). 
Because the provision here is not clear, we must strictly
construe it against the Department.
Chapter 25 of Title 40 is not aimed at taxing all tobacco
products that are located within Alabama.  Rather, the tobacco
tax is levied on tobacco products that are going to be sold in
Alabama. 
 
See 
§ 
40-25-2(a) 
("[E]very 
person, 
firm,
corporation, club, or association, within the State of
Alabama, who sells or stores or receives for the purpose of
distribution to any person, firm, corporation, club, or
association within the State of Alabama, [tobacco products]
shall pay ... a license or privilege tax which shall be
measured by and graduated in accordance with the volume of
sales of such person, firm, corporation, club, or association
in Alabama." (emphasis added)); Snow v. State, 259 Ala. 579,
582, 67 So. 2d 822, 824 (1953) (considering a prior version of
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1190321
§ 40-25-2 and concluding that, "when that statute imposes a
license or privilege tax on a person who 'sells or stores or
receives for the purpose of distribution,' it means as to the
storage as well as to the receipt of the cigarettes, that it
must be for distribution, such as a sale" (emphasis added)). 
In light of that purpose, I read the confiscation power
acknowledged in the latter portion of § 40-25-8, upon which
the Department relies, as limited to untaxed tobacco products
possessed by the persons or entities referenced in the statute
who sell tobacco products in Alabama, i.e., wholesalers,
jobbers, semijobbers, retailers, and manufacturers.  The
existence of an alternative statutory scheme imposing a tax on
the storage, use, or consumption of tobacco products, as
opposed to their sale, buttresses that conclusion.  See § 40-
25-41, Ala. Code 1975 (imposing a tax on "the storage, use or
other consumption in this state of tobacco products purchased
at retail" unless the tax imposed by § 40-25-2 has been paid).
The Court in Snow held that a person possessing a large amount
of cigarettes he intended to sell in Alabama was subject to
the tobacco tax, that the cigarettes in his possession were
contraband because that tax had not been paid, and that the
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cigarettes would have been subject to the tax currently
imposed by § 40-25-41 and not the tobacco tax if they had been
held for personal use.  259 Ala. at 582, 67 So. 2d at 824-25.5
The latter portion of § 40-25-8 uses the term "the
primary location."  Although the statute is not a model of
clarity, I believe that, in using that term, the legislature
was concerned with the Department's ability to inspect stored
tobacco products and to ensure that the tobacco tax has been
paid.  After all, because the Department is charged with
enforcing the tobacco-tax statutes, it must have knowledge of,
and ready access to, locations where tobacco products are
kept.  See, e.g., § 40-25-12, Ala. Code 1975 (acknowledging
the Department's authority to conduct inspections to enforce
the taxing statutes and making it a crime to improperly
interfere with inspections); § 40-25-26, Ala. Code 1975
(stating that the Department has the duty to enforce the
tobacco-tax statutes and has "the power to enter upon the
premises of any taxpayer and to examine, or cause to be
examined, ... any books, papers, records, or memoranda, etc.,
bearing upon the amount of taxes payable, and to secure other
5The 
Department does 
not 
argue 
that 
the 
cigars 
confiscated
in this case were subject to a tax other than the tobacco tax.
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information 
directly 
or 
indirectly 
concerned 
in 
the
enforcement of this article").  Thus, I would interpret the
clause at issue to mean that, if a wholesaler, jobber,
semijobber, or retailer stores untaxed tobacco products
somewhere other than their "primary location," the products
immediately become contraband.6 
Accordingly, I cannot agree with the Department's
apparent assertion that the latter portion of § 40-25-8 is
aimed at declaring nearly all untaxed tobacco products in
Alabama, regardless of who possesses them, to be contraband. 
As an alternative to that argument, the Department suggests
6It is not necessary to decide in this case whether
untaxed tobacco products stored by a tobacco-products
manufacturer somewhere other than the manufacturer's "primary
location" are contraband, because it is undisputed that the
cigars confiscated here were not in the possession of a
manufacturer.  I also note that § 40-25-8 appears to exempt
from the Department's confiscation power some untaxed tobacco
products that are stored in a bonded warehouse, at least by
tobacco-products manufacturers.  Black's Law Dictionary
defines "bonded warehouse" as "[a] special type of private
warehouse used to store products subject to customs duties." 
Black's Law Dictionary 1898 (11th ed. 2019).  See also
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 250 (1961)
(defining "bonded warehouse" as "a warehouse under bond to the
government for payment of customs duties and taxes on goods
stored or processed there").  It is not necessary, however, to
construe that portion of the statute, because it is undisputed
that the cigars at issue in this case were not stored in a
bonded warehouse.
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that it submitted substantial evidence that the cigars at
issue were indeed possessed by one of the entities referenced
in § 40-25-8.  Specifically, the Department asserts that it
presented sufficient evidence indicating that the cigars were
in the possession of Thiab's business, which the Department
suggests is a semijobber under the definition of that term in
§ 40-25-1, Ala. Code 1975.  It appears the main opinion agrees
with that assertion.7
As noted, the storage units from which the cigars were
confiscated were not rented in the name of Thiab or his
business; they were rented by Saed, Ghadir, and Sami.  The
Department does not argue that those individuals are
themselves tobacco-products sellers who intended to sell the
cigars.  Rather, the Department asserts that they were acting
as agents of Thiab's business and that they were holding the
cigars "in furtherance of the tobacco wholesale business of
the Thiab family."  According to the Department, Thiab's
business was "in constructive or apparent physical control of
7For purposes of this opinion, I assume that Thiab's
business fits within the definition of a "semijobber" under §
40-25-1, Ala. Code 1975, and that the storage units where the
cigars were stored do not constitute "the primary location" of
Thiab's business.
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the cigars."  Respectfully, I do not believe the Department
has met its burden on appeal.
First, I note that the Department does not point to any
evidence 
indicating 
exactly 
what 
Ghadir's 
or 
Sami's
relationship is to Thiab or his business.  The assertions in
the Department's brief to this Court that Ghadir is Thiab's
daughter and that Sami was a driver for Thiab's business are
simply not supported by the portions of the record referenced
in the Department's brief.  Likewise, the Department's
assertions that Ghadir and Sami "had been observed performing
the critical functions of the business under investigation at
this storage facility for several months before the
confiscation" and that Ghadir "was known to be utilizing the
storage units to further the tax evasion of the Thiab tobacco
wholesale business" are not supported by the portions of the
record the Department cites. 
As for Saed, the record does contain evidence indicating
that he is Thiab's son and that he has been involved in trips
to PCW's location in Florida and in deliveries of untaxed
tobacco products by Thiab's business to various sellers in
Alabama.  However, we have not been directed to any evidence
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indicating that Thiab's business or anyone else actually
purchased from PCW the particular cigars at issue here.  For
all that appears, PCW still owns them.  As noted, it is
undisputed that the cigars were moved from PCW's warehouse in
Florida shortly after it was damaged by Hurricane Michael. 
Finally, the Department's conclusory assertion that, simply
because Saed assisted with aspects of Thiab's business, that
business was in "constructive or apparent physical control" of
the particular cigars at issue in this case is not supported
by legal authority.  See Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So.
2d 248, 251 (Ala. 1994) (indicating that this Court will
disregard arguments that are based on undelineated general
propositions not supported by sufficient authority).
The Department bears the burden on appeal.  Johnson v.
Life Ins. Co. of Alabama, 581 So. 2d 438, 444 (Ala. 1991).  It
has failed to point to evidence indicating that Ghadir, Sami,
or Saed were acting on behalf of Thiab's business in renting
the storage units and storing the cigars at issue.  Thus, the
Department 
has not 
demonstrated 
that 
evidence 
exists
indicating that the cigars were in the possession of Thiab's
business for purposes of § 40-25-8.  The Department's
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purported justification for exercising its confiscation power
is based on speculation.  I would affirm the trial court's
judgment.8
8The Department does not argue that the cigars were in the
possession of PCW for purposes of § 40-25-8 and were, for that
reason, subject to seizure under the statute. 
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Appendix
30