Title: Charles Mendenhall v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC09-400
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 28, 2010

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-400 
____________ 
 
CHARLES MENDENHALL,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[October 28, 2010] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Mendenhall seeks review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal in Mendenhall v. State, 999 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), on the ground 
that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decisions of the Second District 
Court of Appeal in Sousa v. State, 976 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), and the 
First District Court of Appeal in Wilson v. State, 898 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2005).1   
This case concerns section 775.087, Florida Statutes (2004)—commonly 
known as the “10-20-Life” statute—specifically section 775.087(2)(a)(3), which 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
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provides that defendants who discharge a firearm during the commission of certain 
enumerated crimes, including murder and attempted murder, and inflict death or 
great bodily harm as the result of the discharge shall be sentenced to a “minimum 
term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of 
imprisonment of life in prison.”2  The issue before this Court is whether the 
mandatory minimum terms of twenty-five years to life provide the trial judge with 
discretion to impose a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years to life without 
regard to the statutory maximum for the crime contained in section 775.082, 
Florida Statutes (2004). 
For the reasons explained below, we hold that the specific provisions of the 
10-20-Life statute with regard to mandatory minimums control over the general 
provisions of section 775.082 regarding statutory maximums.  This reading of the 
statute avoids rendering part of the statute mere surplusage and effectuates the 
Legislature‟s intent to punish those offenders who possess or use firearms to the 
fullest extent of the law.  Thus, we conclude that the trial court has discretion under 
section 775.087(2)(a)(3) to impose a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years to 
life, even if that mandatory minimum exceeds the statutory maximum provided for 
in section 775.082. 
                                          
 
 
2.  The 2004 version of the 10-20-Life statute is identical to the current 2009 
version of the statute. 
 
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Accordingly, we approve the Fifth District‟s decision in Mendenhall v. 
State, 999 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), and disapprove the decisions of the 
Second District in Sousa v. State, 976 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), and the 
First District in Wilson v. State, 898 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).  We also 
disapprove the decisions of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Collazo v. State, 
966 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), Thurston v. State, 984 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2008), Leary v. State, 980 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), and Johnson v. 
State, 17 So. 3d 847 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), to the extent that those decisions hold 
that section 775.087(2)(a)(3) does not vest discretion in the trial judge to impose a 
mandatory minimum of twenty-five years to life without regard to the statutory 
maximum for the crime.3 
FACTS 
Charles Mendenhall was charged with attempted first-degree murder with a 
firearm.  At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Mendenhall guilty of the lesser 
included offense of attempted second-degree murder with a firearm, a second-
degree felony.  § 782.04(2), Fla. Stat. (2004); § 777.04(4)(c), Fla. Stat (2004).  The 
                                          
 
 
3.  The Fifth District certified conflict with Collazo, Johnson, Thurston, and 
Leary in a case concerning the same issue as this case, which is pending review in 
this Court.  See Booth v. State, 18 So. 3d 1142 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (pending 
currently in this Court as Case No. SC09-1832). 
 
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jury also found that during the commission of the offense, Mendenhall was in 
possession of a firearm, discharged a firearm, and inflicted serious bodily injury. 
On March 2, 2007, the trial court entered a judgment in accordance with the 
jury‟s verdict and sentenced Mendenhall under Florida‟s 10-20-Life statute, 
imposing a sentence of thirty-five years‟ imprisonment, with a thirty-five-year 
mandatory minimum.  Mendenhall then filed a motion to correct sentencing error, 
asserting, inter alia, that his sentence was illegal because under the plain language 
of the 10-20-Life statute, the maximum sentence he could receive was thirty years 
with a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum.  The trial court granted 
Mendenhall‟s motion in part, concluding that it was required to reduce 
Mendenhall‟s sentence to a term of thirty years‟ imprisonment, with a twenty-five-
year mandatory minimum. 
A brief overview of the statutory scheme is helpful to provide context for the 
facts of this case.  Because Mendenhall used a firearm during the commission of 
the offense, his conviction was reclassified from a second-degree felony to a first-
degree felony under section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (2004).  The maximum 
sentence for a second-degree felony is fifteen years, and the maximum sentence for 
a first-degree felony is thirty years.  § 775.082(3)(b)-(c), Fla. Stat. (2004).  The 10-
20-Life statute provides for mandatory minimum sentences for certain enumerated 
offenses, including attempted murder, where a defendant possesses a firearm 
 
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(minimum term of imprisonment of either three years or ten years, depending on 
the offense), discharges a firearm (minimum term of imprisonment of twenty 
years), or discharges a firearm and as the result of the discharge, inflicted death or 
great bodily harm (“minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and 
not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison”).  § 775.087(2)(a)(1)-(3), 
Fla. Stat. (2004).  Section 775.082(3)(b)—which is not part of the 10-20-Life 
statute—provides that a person convicted of a first-degree felony must be punished 
by “a term of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years or, when specifically provided 
by statute, by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment.”  
§ 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004). 
 
Mendenhall appealed to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, asserting that 
“the jury did not make a finding that „death or great bodily harm was inflicted on 
any person.‟ ”  Mendenhall, 999 So. 2d at 666.  The Fifth District rejected this 
argument because the jury‟s use of the term “serious bodily injury” was 
synonymous with “great bodily harm.”  Id. at 667.  That issue is not before the 
Court in this case. 
The State cross-appealed the reduction of the sentence, contending that the 
original sentence of thirty-five years‟ imprisonment with a thirty-five-year 
mandatory minimum was legal and, accordingly, the trial court erred in granting 
the motion to correct sentence.  Id.  The Fifth District agreed with the State, 
 
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holding that its “review of cases which have similar facts to those presented here 
[led it] to conclude that the trial court‟s original sentence of 35 years‟ 
imprisonment, with a 35-year mandatory minimum, was legal.”  Id. at 667.  The 
court outlined the pertinent parts of the 10-20-Life statute, emphasizing a portion 
of the first sentence of subsection (2)(c): 
Pertinent parts of section 775.087 of the Florida Statutes 
provide as follows: 
 
775.087. Possession or use of weapon; aggravated 
battery; felony reclassification; minimum sentence 
 
 
 
. . . . 
(2)(a) 1. Any person who is convicted of a felony or an 
attempt to commit a felony, regardless of whether the use 
of a weapon is an element of the felony, and the 
conviction was for: 
a. Murder; 
. . . . 
3. Any person who is convicted of a felony 
or an attempt to commit a felony listed in 
sub-subparagraphs (a)1.a.-q., regardless of 
whether the use of a weapon is an element 
of the felony, and during the course of the 
commission of the felony such person 
discharged a “firearm” or “destructive 
device” as defined in s. 790.001 and, as the 
result of the discharge, death or great bodily 
harm was inflicted upon any person, the 
convicted person shall be sentenced to a 
minimum term of imprisonment of not less 
than 25 years and not more than a term of 
imprisonment of life in prison. 
. . . . 
(c) If the minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment 
imposed pursuant to this section exceed the maximum 
sentences authorized by s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or the 
 
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Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, then the 
mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed.  If the 
mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment pursuant to 
this section are less than the sentences that could be 
imposed as authorized by s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or the 
Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, then the 
sentence imposed by the court must include the 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment as required in 
this section. 
 
Id. at 667-68 (quoting §§ 775.087(2)(a)(1), (3), 775.087(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004)). 
In arriving at its conclusion that the original thirty-five-year sentence and 
mandatory minimum were legal, the Fifth District noted that this Court affirmed a 
defendant‟s life sentence under factual circumstances similar to those presented in 
the instant case in Sanders v. State, 944 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 2006).  Mendenhall, 999 
So. 2d at 668.  The Fifth District then stated: 
Importantly, upon review, our Supreme Court affirmed the Second 
District‟s opinion [in Sanders] regarding their analysis of the penalty 
for a lesser included offense and, in dicta, the Court made the 
following observation: 
 
The maximum sentence for the core offense of attempted 
first-degree murder is thirty years, while the sentence for 
attempted second-degree murder without any 
enhancements is fifteen years.  However, with the 
application of the ten-twenty-life statute, the resulting 
maximum sentence for both attempted first- and second-
degree murder while discharging a firearm and inflicting 
great bodily harm is the same—life. 
 
Id. (quoting Sanders, 944 So. 2d at 205). 
 
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Finally, the Fifth District found additional support in its earlier decision in 
Brown v. State, 983 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), in which it had “recognized 
that the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence in excess of the maximum 
penalty was indeed permissible based upon special findings such as those found in 
this case.”  Mendenhall, 999 So. 2d at 669.  The Fifth District affirmed the 
judgment, but reversed the sentence and remanded for reimposition of the original 
sentence of thirty-five years‟ imprisonment with a thirty-five-year mandatory 
minimum.  Id. 
 
The Fifth District‟s decision conflicts with the Second District‟s decision in 
Sousa v. State, 976 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), and the First District‟s 
decision in Wilson v. State, 898 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), both of which 
involved defendants convicted of attempted second-degree murder reclassified as a 
first-degree felony under the 10-20-Life statute. 
The Second District in Sousa held that section 775.087(2)(a)(3) does not 
override the language in section 775.082(3)(b) that provides for a thirty-year 
sentence.  976 So. 2d at 640.  The Second District reasoned as follows: 
Mr. Sousa . . . was subject to section 775.087(2)(a)(3) of the 10/20/life 
statute, which required that he be sentenced “to a minimum term of 
imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of 
imprisonment of life in prison.”  It could be argued that the language 
of this statute overrides the language in section 775.082(3)(b) that 
provides for a thirty-year sentence.  The case law, however, interprets 
these statutes in favor of the defendant, so that the maximum term of 
years is thirty.  See Yasin v. State, 896 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 5th DCA 
 
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2005); Badia v. State, 770 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); see also 
Sanders v. State, 912 So. 2d 1286, 1292 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) 
(describing maximum penalty in appendix to opinion). 
Id. at 640 (footnote omitted). 
 
The First District in Wilson also held that the mandatory minimum term 
provided for in section 775.087(2)(a)(3) does not override the statutory maximum 
of thirty years in 775.082(3)(b).  The court reasoned that “[a]ppellant is subject to a 
mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years pursuant to section 775.087(2)(a)3, 
Florida Statutes (2003) . . . .  Notwithstanding the minimum mandatory term, the 
maximum sentence the trial court properly may impose is a sentence of 30 years.”  
898 So. 2d at 192-93.  
ANALYSIS 
The conflict issue before this Court is whether, under the 10-20-Life statute, 
specifically section 775.087(2)(a)(3), a trial court can sentence a defendant to a 
mandatory minimum sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum sentence 
provided for in section 775.082.  More specifically, the issue in this case is whether 
the mandated “minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not 
more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison” under section 775.087(2)(a)(3) 
gives the trial court the discretion to impose a sentence anywhere within the range 
of twenty-five years to life, even if that sentence exceeds the statutory maximum of 
thirty years provided for under section 775.082(2)(c). 
 
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Because the conflict issue involves the interpretation of the 10-20-Life 
statute, resolving this issue requires an analysis of the language of the statute to 
discern legislative intent.  In analyzing this issue, we first set forth the applicable 
statutory provisions.  We next analyze the language and stated purpose of the 
statute to determine whether the statute provides trial courts with the discretion to 
impose a mandatory minimum sentence anywhere in the range of twenty-five years 
to life under section 775.087(2)(a)(3), even if that sentence exceeds the statutory 
maximum provided for in section 775.082.  We conclude that it does.   
The 10-20-Life Statute 
Section 775.087, Florida Statutes, commonly referred to as the 10-20-Life 
statute, provides for mandatory minimum sentences for offenders who possess or 
use a firearm in some manner during the commission of certain crimes.  As 
explained by this Court, in enacting the 10-20-Life statute, the Legislature “has 
very clearly mandated that it is the policy of this State to deter the criminal use of 
firearms.”  McDonald v. State, 957 So. 2d 605, 611 (Fla. 2007).  “This mandate is 
underscored by the widespread promulgation of the 10-20-LIFE law beyond mere 
statutory notice, through television commercials, posters, and other forms of 
advertising.”  Id. 
To that end, the statute requires the imposition of a mandatory minimum 
sentence where a firearm is possessed or used during the commission of certain 
 
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enumerated crimes, including murder and attempted murder.  § 
775.087(2)(a)(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004).  The mandatory minimum sentences differ 
depending on whether the defendant possessed the firearm, discharged the firearm, 
or discharged the firearm and inflicted death or great bodily harm.  If the defendant 
possessed a firearm during the commission of an enumerated offense, he or she 
“shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 10 years” unless the 
enumerated offense is aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a felon, or 
burglary of a conveyance; if so, the defendant “shall be sentenced to a minimum 
term of imprisonment of 3 years.”  § 775.087(2)(a)(1), Fla. Stat.  If the defendant 
discharged a firearm during the commission of an enumerated offense, he or she 
“shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 20 years.”  § 
775.087(2)(a)(2), Fla. Stat.  The statutory provision at issue in this case involves 
the situation where the defendant discharged a firearm that resulted in death or 
great bodily harm, and provides: 
Any person who is convicted of a felony or an attempt to commit a 
felony listed in sub-subparagraphs (a)1.a.-q., regardless of whether the 
use of a weapon is an element of the felony, and during the course of 
the commission of the felony such person discharged a “firearm” or 
“destructive device” as defined in s. 790.001 and, as the result of the 
discharge, death or great bodily harm was inflicted upon any person, 
the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 
imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of 
imprisonment of life in prison. 
 
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§ 775.087(2)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).4 
 
Subsection (2)(b) provides that the mandatory minimum sentences in 
subsections (2)(a)(1), (2)(a)(2), and (2)(a)(3) do not prevent a court from imposing 
a longer sentence as authorized by law in addition to the mandatory minimum 
sentence and that the defendant is not eligible for early release or gain time prior to 
serving the minimum sentence: 
Subparagraph (a)1., subparagraph (a)2., or subparagraph (a)3. does 
not prevent a court from imposing a longer sentence of incarceration 
as authorized by law in addition to the minimum mandatory sentence, 
or from imposing a sentence of death pursuant to other applicable law.  
Subparagraph (a)1., subparagraph (a)2., or subparagraph (a)3. does 
not authorize a court to impose a lesser sentence than otherwise 
required by law. 
Notwithstanding s. 948.01, adjudication of guilt or imposition 
of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld, and the 
defendant is not eligible for statutory gain-time under s. 944.275 or 
any form of discretionary early release, other than pardon or executive 
clemency, or conditional medical release under s. 947.149, prior to 
serving the minimum sentence. 
§ 775.087(2)(b), Fla. Stat. 
                                          
 
 
4.  Section 775.087(2)(a)(3) was added to the statute in 1999, when the 
Legislature increased the minimum sentence from three years for all crimes where 
the defendant possessed a firearm to ten years for possession of a firearm, twenty 
years for discharging a firearm, and “not less than 25 years and not more than a 
term of imprisonment of life in prison” for crimes in which the defendant 
discharged a firearm and the discharge resulted in death or great bodily harm.  See 
ch. 99-12, §1, Laws of Fla.  The Legislature also added the statement of intent 
contained in section 775.087(2)(d).  See id. 
 
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Subsection (2)(c) addresses the situation where the minimum terms of 
imprisonment mandated in subsection (2) either exceed or are less than the 
sentences that could be imposed under section 775.082, section 775.084, Florida 
Statutes (2004), or the Criminal Punishment Code in chapter 921, Florida Statutes 
(2004): 
If the minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant 
to this section exceed the maximum sentences authorized by s. 
775.082, s. 775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 
921, then the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed.  If the 
mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment pursuant to this section 
are less than the sentences that could be imposed as authorized by s. 
775.082, s. 775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 
921, then the sentence imposed by the court must include the 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment as required in this section. 
§ 775.087(2)(c), Fla. Stat. 
 
Subsection (2)(d) clearly states that it is the intent of the Legislature to 
punish those offenders who possess or use firearms to the fullest extent of the law: 
It is the intent of the Legislature that offenders who actually possess, 
carry, display, use, threaten to use, or attempt to use firearms or 
destructive devices be punished to the fullest extent of the law, and 
the minimum terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this 
subsection shall be imposed for each qualifying felony count for 
which the person is convicted.  The court shall impose any term of 
imprisonment provided for in this subsection consecutively to any 
other term of imprisonment imposed for any other felony offense. 
§ 775.087(2)(d), Fla. Stat. 
Interpretation of the 10-20-Life Statute 
 
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Questions of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review.  Heart of 
Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 194 (Fla. 2007).  “A court‟s purpose in 
construing a statute is to give effect to legislative intent, which is the polestar that 
guides the court in statutory construction.”  Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101, 106 
(Fla. 2008).  “As with any case of statutory construction, [the Court must begin] 
with the „actual language used in the statute.‟ ”  Heart of Adoptions, Inc., 963 So. 
2d at 198 (quoting Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 
2006)).  “This is because legislative intent is determined primarily from the 
statute‟s text.”  Id.  This Court has explained: 
[W]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and 
conveys a clear and definite meaning . . . the statute must be given its 
plain and obvious meaning.  Further, we are without power to 
construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, 
modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious 
implications.  To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power.  
A related principle is that when a court interprets a statute, it must 
give full effect to all statutory provisions.  Courts should avoid 
readings that would render part of a statute meaningless. 
 
Velez v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Police Dep‟t, 934 So. 2d 1162, 1164-65 (Fla. 2006) 
(quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 
Section 775.082(3)(b), which is in the general sentencing statute, provides 
the maximum sentence for a first-degree felony: “For a felony of the first degree, 
by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years or, when specifically provided 
by statute, by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment.”  
 
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However, section 775.087(2)(a)(3) clearly states: “[T]he convicted person shall be 
sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not 
more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison.”  Section 775.087(2)(c) makes 
reference to section 775.082 and states that the mandatory minimum, when it 
exceeds the statutory maximum, must be imposed.  
In resolving any perceived conflict between the statutory maximum in the 
general sentencing statute and the mandatory minimum range of twenty-five years 
to life, we conclude that the specific provisions of section 775.087(2)(a)(3) prevail 
over the general provisions of the 775.082 regarding statutory maximums.  We 
have previously stated: 
[I]t is a well settled rule of statutory construction . . . that a special 
statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a 
general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in 
general terms.  In this situation “the statute relating to the particular 
part of the general subject will operate as an exception to or 
qualification of the general terms of the more comprehensive statute 
to the extent only of the repugnancy, if any.” 
McDonald, 957 So. 2d at 610 (quoting Adams v. Culver, 111 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla. 
1959)).  Under this principle of statutory construction, section 775.087(2)(a)(3), 
which specifically addresses a situation where a defendant, in the course of certain 
enumerated felonies, discharges a firearm and, as a result of the discharge, death or 
great bodily harm is inflicted upon any person, prevails over section 775.082(3)(b), 
which is a general sentencing statute and provides the sentences for all first-degree 
 
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felonies.  Section 775.082 covers sentencing for all crimes, including those 
involving the use of a firearm.  The 10-20-Life statute, on the other hand, addresses 
the mandatory minimum sentences for enumerated crimes involving the use or 
possession of a firearm. 
 
The application of this statutory construction principle here is analogous to 
our analysis in McDonald, 957 So. 2d at 610-11, wherein we held that the specific 
provisions of the 10-20-Life statute control over the more general provisions of the 
Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) statute:  
The PRR statute is part of the general sentencing provision of chapter 
775.  It provides the mandatory minimum sentence for anyone 
deemed a prior releasee reoffender within the general sentencing 
scheme.  See § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2000).  In other words, the PRR 
statute covers sentencing for all crimes, including those involving the 
use of a firearm.  On the other hand, the 10-20-LIFE statute addresses 
the mandatory minimum sentence for the use or possession of a 
firearm in some manner during the commission of a specified crime. 
See § 775.087(2)(c).  Accordingly, the Fourth District properly 
concluded that the more specific provisions contained in the 10-20-
LIFE statute should control over the more general provisions of the 
PRR statute . . . . 
 
Our reading of the statute is further supported by the application of the 
“elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be 
given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words 
in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.”  Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach 
Cnty. v. Survivors Charter Sch., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1220, 1233 (Fla. 2009) (quoting 
Gulfstream Park Racing Ass‟n v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 948 So. 2d 599, 606 
 
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(Fla. 2006)).  To adopt Mendenhall‟s interpretation of the statute would render the 
phrase “and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison” meaningless 
and mere surplusage.  We reject this interpretation and adopt the reasoning of 
Judge Farmer‟s dissent in Collazo v. State, 966 So. 2d 429, 433 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2007): 
In subsection (a)3 the words not less than 25 years mean that more 
than 25 years is possible.  But the majority limits the mandatory part 
to not more than 25 years, making the words not less than 25 years 
and not more than life superfluous. 
The majority seem to read into the provision a punctuation 
mark after the words 25 years.  There is no mark at that point; the 
clause presses on without any break.  Then the words not less than 25 
years are followed immediately by the conjunction and which is not 
preceded by a comma, semi-colon or period.  If there had been some 
such punctuation, one might conceivably read the sentence as 
containing two separate thoughts: (1) a mandatory period of 25 years; 
(2) discretion to make the total sentence life.  As actually written and 
punctuated, however, the plain meaning is to conjoin not less than 25 
years with the words not more than a term of life into a single thought.  
As thus written, the mandatory period can be anything from life down 
to 25 years. 
 
Finally, this reading of the statute not only recognizes that specific statutes 
control over general statutes and that words in a statute should not be rendered 
meaningless, but also effectuates the Legislature‟s clearly stated and unambiguous 
intent to punish offenders who possess or use firearms “to the fullest extent of the 
law.”  § 775.087(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2004).  The Legislature, in enacting the 10-20-
Life statute, “very clearly mandated that it is the policy of this State to deter the 
criminal use of firearms.”  McDonald, 957 So. 2d at 611.  This policy is 
 
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underscored by the statement of legislative intent contained in the act enacting 
section 775.087(2)(a)(3):  
WHEREAS, Florida ranks among the most violent states in the 
nation, and 
WHEREAS, in 1975 the Florida Legislature enacted legislation 
requiring a minimum mandatory sentence of three years in prison for 
possessing a gun during the commission or attempted commission of a 
violent felony, and 
WHEREAS, the Legislature enacted this mandatory penalty in 
order to protect citizens from criminals who are known to use guns 
during the commission of violent crimes, and 
WHEREAS, the FBI reports that among persons identified in 
the felonious killings of law enforcement officers in 1997, 71% had 
prior criminal convictions, and one of every four were on probation or 
parole for other crimes when they killed the officers, and 
WHEREAS, criminals who use guns during the commission of 
violent crimes pose an increased danger to the lives, health, and safety 
of Florida‟s citizens and to Florida‟s law enforcement officers who 
daily put their lives on the line to protect citizens from violent 
criminals, and 
 
WHEREAS, the Legislature intends to hold criminals more 
accountable for their crimes, and intends for criminals who use guns 
to commit violent crimes to receive greater criminal penalties than 
they do today, and 
WHEREAS, the Legislature intends that when law enforcement 
officers put themselves in harm‟s way to apprehend and arrest these 
gun-wielding criminals who terrorize the streets and neighborhoods of 
Florida, that these criminals be sentenced to longer mandatory prison 
terms than provided in current law, so that these offenders cannot 
again endanger law enforcement officers and the public, and 
WHEREAS, there is a critical need for effective criminal justice 
measures that will ensure that violent criminals are sentenced to 
prison terms that will effectively incapacitate the offender, prevent 
future crimes, and reduce violent crime rates, and 
WHEREAS, it is the intent of the Legislature that criminals 
who use guns to commit violent crimes be vigorously prosecuted and 
that the state demand that minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment 
be imposed pursuant to this act, NOW, THEREFORE, 
 
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Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida . . . . 
 
Ch. 99-12, at 537, Laws of Fla.  Because the Legislature clearly intended that those 
“who use guns to commit violent crimes be vigorously prosecuted and that the 
state demand that minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment be imposed 
pursuant to this act,” id., we conclude that the Legislature intended for trial courts 
to have discretion to impose a mandatory minimum under section 775.087(2)(a)(3) 
in the range of “a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not 
more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison.”  § 775.087(2)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. 
(2004). 
 
Mendenhall contends that the statute is ambiguous and that this Court should 
apply the rule of lenity.  There is certainly nothing ambiguous about the statute‟s 
language that “the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 
imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment 
of life in prison.”  § 775.087(2)(a)(3), Fla. Stat.  Regardless, we have previously 
recognized “that the rule of lenity is a canon of last resort.”  Kasischke v. State, 
991 So. 2d 803, 814 (Fla. 2008). 
 
We thus conclude that under section 775.087(2)(a)(3), the trial court has 
discretion to impose a mandatory minimum within the range of twenty-five years 
to life.  Consequently, we conclude that Mendenhall was properly sentenced to 
thirty-five years with a thirty-five-year mandatory minimum, notwithstanding the 
 
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statutory maximum of thirty years contained in section 775.082 for Mendenhall‟s 
offense. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we approve the Fifth District‟s decision in 
Mendenhall v. State, 999 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), and disapprove the 
decisions of the Second District in Sousa v. State, 976 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2008), and the First District in Wilson v. State, 898 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2005).  We also disapprove the decisions of the Fourth District in Collazo v. State, 
966 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), Thurston v. State, 984 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2008), Leary v. State, 980 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), and Johnson v. 
State, 17 So. 3d 847 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), to the extent that those decisions hold 
that section 775.087(2)(a)(3) does not vest discretion in the trial judge to impose a 
mandatory minimum of twenty-five years to life without regard to the statutory 
maximum for the crime. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and LEWIS, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which QUINCE and PERRY, JJ., 
concur. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
- 21 - 
PARIENTE, J., dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent to the majority‟s conclusion that the sentences 
provided in section 775.087 always trump the statutory maximums in other 
statutes. 
Although popularly known as the 10-20-Life statute, section 775.087 is 
actually entitled “Possession or use of weapon; aggravated battery; felony 
reclassification; minimum sentence.”  (Emphasis added.)  The very title indicates 
that the statute is not meant to impose new statutory maximums for gun-related 
offenses, but rather the intent was to mandate significant statutory minimum 
sentences.  The answer to the statutory construction question—whether section 
775.087 always trumps the statutory maximums of 775.082—cannot be resolved 
by a plain reading of 775.087(2)(a).  The Legislature could have easily indicated 
that section 775.087(2)(a)(3) overrode all statutory maximums provided in 
775.082.  It did not. 
Rather, reading 775.082 and 775.087 together, as the doctrine of in pari 
materia requires and as the Legislature indicates in section 775.087(2)(c), leads to 
the conclusion that the statutory minimum sentence for a crime in which a firearm 
is discharged is governed by section 775.087, but that the statutory maximums 
provided in 775.082 are not overridden unless the statutory maximums of 775.082 
are less than the statutory minimums of section 775.087.  See § 775.087(2)(c), Fla. 
 
- 22 - 
Stat. (2004).  Simply put, section 775.087, when read together with section 
775.082, does not specify overriding of the statutory maximums in all cases and 
does not provide that the range provided for in section 775.087(2)(a)(3) wholly 
nullifies any statutory maximum.  Therefore, given this ambiguity, the rule of 
lenity should be applied, and the statute should be construed most favorably to 
Mendenhall.  
ANALYSIS 
 
“The doctrine of in pari materia is a principle of statutory construction that 
requires that statutes relating to the same subject or object be construed together to 
harmonize the statutes and to give effect to the Legislature‟s intent.”  Fla. Dep‟t of 
State v. Martin, 916 So. 2d 763, 768 (Fla. 2005).  Similarly, “related statutory 
provisions must be read together to achieve a consistent whole, and . . . „[w]here 
possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related 
statutory provisions in harmony with one another.‟ ”  Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 
101, 106 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 199 
(Fla. 2007)). 
The issue in this case is one of statutory construction that involves the 
interplay between section 775.087(2), which authorizes mandatory minimum 
sentences for certain crimes, and section 775.082, which authorizes a maximum 
sentence of thirty years for the conviction of a first-degree felony.  Section 775.087 
 
- 23 - 
is meant to be read together with other sentencing statutes such as section 775.082 
and is not its own self-contained sentencing scheme.  The statute clearly 
contemplates interplay between itself and other statutes.  The Legislature even 
provided guidance as to how the statute should be read together with section 
775.082.  See § 775.087(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004) (explicitly addressing situations 
where the mandatory minimum is either more or less than the statutory maximums 
provided for elsewhere and specifically referencing section 775.082).  Thus, we 
must read section 775.087(2)(a)(3) together with sections 775.087(2)(c) and 
775.082. 
The majority ignores the principle of reading the statutes together and 
instead utilizes the statutory construction principle that a specific statute controls 
over the general.  However, the statutes address different things and are meant to 
be read together as indicated by section 775.087(2)(c)—section 775.087(2) 
specifies mandatory minimums whereas section 775.082 specifies statutory 
maximums.  Simply put, although section 775.087 is specific as to statutory 
minimums, it is not specific as to statutory maximums. 
Under section 775.087(2)(c), if the “minimum mandatory terms of 
imprisonment imposed pursuant to this section exceed the maximum sentences 
authorized by s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under 
chapter 921, then the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed.”  § 
 
- 24 - 
775.087(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).  On the other hand, if the “mandatory 
minimum terms of imprisonment . . . are less than the sentences that could be 
imposed as authorized by s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code 
under chapter 921, then the sentence imposed by the court must include the 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment as required in this section.”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  Based on section 775.087(2)(c), the minimum sentence to be 
imposed under 775.087 does not trump the statutory maximum provided in 
775.082 unless the minimum sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.  It does not 
change the statutory maximum or negate it all together. 
   
This section is in keeping with the title of the chapter, which addresses 
minimum sentences.  The title of a chapter is properly considered in determining 
legislative intent.  Horowitz v. Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd. P‟ship, 959 So. 2d 176, 
182 (Fla. 2007) (considering the title of the chapter as reflecting the Legislature‟s 
intent); see also Larimore, 2 So. 3d at 112 (“[T]he title of an act is properly 
considered in determining legislative intent.”).  Here, the title of the chapter 
evinces a legislative intent to mandate significant statutory minimum sentences, 
not new statutory maximums irrespective of the statutory maximums provided for 
elsewhere. 
This brings us to the interpretation of the statutory minimum terms provided 
in section 775.087(2)(a).  The first two subsections, (2)(a)(1) and (2)(a)(2), are 
 
- 25 - 
clear and unambiguous and provide for statutory minimum terms of a specific 
number of years.  Subsection (2)(a)(1) provides that a defendant convicted of 
possession of a firearm by a felon “shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 
imprisonment of 10 years” and in certain other circumstances to a “minimum term 
of imprisonment of 3 years.”  Subsection (2)(a)(2) provides that a person who is 
convicted of certain felonies or attempted felonies and uses the firearm during the 
course of the commission of the felony “shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 
imprisonment of 20 years.”  Therefore, when subsections (2)(a)(1) and (2)(a)(2) 
are read in conjunction with subsection (2)(c) and section 775.082, it is easy to 
determine in what circumstances the minimum term specified is greater than the 
statutory maximum or when the mandatory minimum is less than the statutory 
maximum.  It is also clear as to how many years should be imposed or included as 
the mandatory minimum. 
The clash between the statutory maximums of section 775.082 and the 
minimum sentences of 775.087 occurs when applying section 775.087(2)(a)(3), 
which is the only subsection to provide for a range.  Subsection (2)(a)(3) provides 
that a person who discharges a firearm causing death or great bodily harm “shall be 
sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not 
more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison.”  While it is clear that a 
sentence of at least twenty-five years must be imposed as a minimum in all 
 
- 26 - 
circumstances, it is not clear whether the trial court can impose a minimum term in 
excess of the statutory maximum of thirty years in this case. 
  An examination of the language of section 775.087(2)(c) reveals another 
ambiguity: the phrase “the mandatory minimum sentence” as used in subsection 
(2)(c) and as applied to subsection (2)(a)(3) is ambiguous because it is not clear 
whether it refers only to the absolute minimum sentence that must be imposed 
(twenty-five years) or to the entire range.  Further, by explicitly stating that 
statutory maximums in other statutes are trumped by the section 775.087 statutory 
minimums when the minimum sentence exceeds the statutory maximums, the 
Legislature failed to address what occurs where there is a range of sentencing 
options, as there is in section 775.087(2)(a)(3).  In this case, the statutory 
maximum is thirty years, whereas the sentencing range is twenty-five to life.  
Whether the range is meant to be considered as exceeding the statutory maximum 
is unclear.  
The majority concludes that the trial court has discretion to impose a 
mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years to life, irrespective of the 
maximum penalty on the underlying charge under section 775.082.  This 
interpretation nullifies the statutory maximums of section 775.082, without any 
indication that the Legislature intended for this nullification to occur. 
 
- 27 - 
Because the statute is ambiguous as to legislative intent regarding statutory 
maximums, I conclude that it must be construed most favorably to Mendenhall.  As 
this Court has stated, the rule of lenity “is not just an interpretive tool, but a 
statutory directive.  The rule requires that „[a]ny ambiguity or situations in which 
statutory language is susceptible to differing constructions must be resolved in 
favor of the person charged with an offense.‟ ”  Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 
814 (Fla. 2008) (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Byars, 823 So. 2d 740, 742 
(Fla. 2002)).  If the Legislature intended to allow trial courts the discretion to 
impose a mandatory minimum sentence of life even if the statutory maximum is 
much less, it was incumbent upon the Legislature to make that intent clear. 
In my view, this reading of the statute does not render the phrase “and not 
more than . . . life” mere surplusage as the majority contends.  Here, Mendenhall 
was convicted of a second-degree felony that was then enhanced to a first-degree 
felony, which carries a maximum sentence of thirty years.  Thus, the phrase “and 
not more than . . . life” would not apply to this case.  However, the majority 
overlooks situations where the phrase would apply.  For example, if a defendant is 
convicted of a first-degree felony that is enhanced by the 10-20-Life statute to a 
life felony, see § 775.087(1)(a), Fla. Stat., the maximum sentence would then be 
life imprisonment.  See § 775.082(3)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (2004).  In that situation, 
sections 775.087(2)(a)(3) and (2)(c) would allow the trial court to impose a 
 
- 28 - 
mandatory minimum sentence up to life.  Accordingly, while the phrase “and not 
more than . . . life” would not apply in this case, there are situations in which it 
would apply.  Thus, this interpretation of the statute does not render the phrase 
meaningless. 
Further, while section 775.087(2)(d) provides that the Legislature intends 
that offenders who possess and use firearms should be punished “to the fullest 
extent of the law,” that same section also expresses its intent that the “minimum 
terms of imprisonment shall be imposed.”  (Emphasis added.)  Once again, this 
evinces an intent for courts to impose the minimum terms of imprisonment 
provided for in section 775.087(2)(a), even those that might be in excess of a 
statutory maximum in another statute.  But the statutory scheme does not evince an 
intent to set new statutory maximums to override all other statutory maximums. 
We should err on the side of applying the rule of lenity when the alternative 
construction of an ambiguous statute would result in such harsh consequences.  
Mendenhall was convicted of a second-degree felony, which carries a maximum 
sentence of fifteen years.  See § 775.082(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004).  His conviction 
was enhanced by section 775.087(1)(b) to a first-degree felony, the maximum 
sentence for which is thirty years.  See § 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat.  Further 
application of section 775.087 requires an absolute minimum mandatory sentence 
of twenty-five years to be imposed, meaning that Mendenhall will serve at least 
 
- 29 - 
twenty-five years because the 10-20-Life statute provides that a defendant is not 
eligible for gain-time or any other form of discretionary early release (other than 
pardon or executive clemency) prior to serving the minimum sentence. 
Under my view of section 775.087(2)(a)(3), the sentence for Mendenhall‟s 
offense after both enhancements increases from a maximum of fifteen years to a 
maximum sentence of thirty years with a mandatory minimum sentence between 
twenty-five and thirty years.  This is already significantly harsher than his original, 
unenhanced sentence of fifteen years and is in keeping with the legislative intent 
expressed in subsection (2)(d) that offenders who possess and use firearms should 
be punished “to the fullest extent of the law.”  To allow a trial judge unfettered 
discretion to impose a mandatory minimum sentence of life for an offense such as 
Mendenhall‟s without express legislative authorization, but rather by judicial 
construction of the statute, works an injustice and is contrary to our doctrine of 
separation of powers. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Legislature has not evinced a clear intent for section 775.087(2)(a)(3) to 
override all statutory maximums.  Rather, the Legislature gave guidance as to how 
section 775.087(2)(a)(3) should be read together with section 775.082, which is a 
clear indication that statutory maximums were meant to play some role in 
 
- 30 - 
sentencing under the statute.  See § 775.087(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004).  However, this 
guidance is simply unhelpful and ambiguous when applying subsection (2)(a)(3). 
Applying the rule of lenity to this ambiguous statute requires us to interpret 
it most favorably to Mendenhall.  If the Legislature intended to allow trial courts 
the discretion to impose a minimum mandatory sentence of life even if the 
statutory maximum is much less, it was incumbent upon the Legislature to make 
that intent clear. 
For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent.  
QUINCE and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D07-1059 and 5D07-3616 
 
 
(Lake County) 
 
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Meghan Ann Collins, Assistant Public 
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Mary G. Jolley, Wesley 
Heidt and Jeffrey R. Casey, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent