Title: Estate of Paternaster v. Lee, M.D. & Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund (Concurring Opinion)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 154MAP2002
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: December 23, 2004

[J-80-2004] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT LORRAINE PATERNASTER, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF DAMON PATERNASTER, Appellant v. DONG P. LEE, M.D., COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY CATASTROPHE LOSS FUND, Appellees : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 154 MAP 2002 Appeal from the Order and Opinion of the Commonwealth Court dated October 4, 2002, granting Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment ARGUED: May 11, 2004 CONCURRING OPINION MR. JUSTICE SAYLOR Decided: December 22, 2004 I concur in the majority disposition, because I believe that it comports with the Court’s decision in Dellenbaugh v. CAT Fund, 562 Pa. 558, 756 A.2d 1172 (2000), which relieved the CAT Fund of its obligation in the nature of excess coverage in circumstances in which the health care provider had not paid the required surcharges.1 1 As the CAT Fund notes, it is undisputed that, since Dr. Lee did not maintain the basic liability portion of the statutorily prescribed coverage by purchasing the necessary tail coverage, he also paid no corresponding surcharge to the Fund relative to Appellant’s claim against it. See 40 P.S. §1301.701(e)(1) (superseded) (prescribing for the surcharge in terms of payment by health care providers of a percentage of the cost “for maintenance of professional liability insurance” (emphasis added)). The CAT Fund expressly relies on Dellenbaugh as controlling law in such circumstances. See Brief of Appellee at 17-19. [J-80-2004] - 2 I joined the dissent in Dellenbaugh, however, which emphasized that the pertinent provisions of the Health Care Services Malpractice Act did not require the result that was directed by the Dellenbaugh majority, and that the majority’s approach was in substantial tension with one prominent purpose of the enactment, namely, to protect the interests of those injured by tortious conduct of (or breach of contract by) their health care providers. See Dellenbaugh, 562 Pa. at 565-69, 756 A.2d at 1176-78 (Nigro, J., dissenting). I believe that those considerations apply similarly in the present situation and, in the absence of Dellenbaugh’s effect (which I regard as controlling), I would also assume a dissenting posture here.