Title: In the Matter of Zankowski
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12850
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 25, 2021

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SJC-12850 
 
IN THE MATTER OF DOREEN M. ZANKOWSKI. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 7, 2020. - March 25, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Attorney at Law, Disciplinary proceeding, Suspension, Deceit. 
 
 
 
 
Information filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the 
county of Suffolk on January 7, 2019. 
 
 
The case was heard by Gaziano, J. 
 
 
 
Pamela A. Harbeson, Assistant Bar Counsel. 
 
Thomas A. Mullen for the respondent. 
 
Elizabeth N. Mulvey, for former members of the Board of Bar 
Overseers, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  In a disciplinary case involving intentional 
overbilling of multiple clients, bar counsel appeals from the 
order of a single justice of this court suspending the 
respondent attorney, Doreen M. Zankowski, from the practice of 
2 
 
law for six months.1,2  The single justice acknowledged the 
respondent's "admittedly cavalier attitude toward client 
billing," but concluded that "the large number of hours she 
reported in 2015 is not substantial evidence that all or even 
most of the 450 hours at issue in this case were fraudulently 
billed."  Our focus, however, is not on the quantum of excessive 
fees that were billed, but on the fundamental dishonesty 
inherent in the respondent's client billings themselves.  It is 
not the sheer number of unworked hours that establishes the 
misconduct but, rather, the dishonesty manifested by billing for 
them at all. 
 
The evidence establishes unequivocally that the respondent 
intentionally billed for services that were not rendered.  It 
supports the hearing committee's conclusion, adopted by the 
Board of Bar Overseers (board), that the respondent's conduct 
involves "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation," in 
violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c), as appearing in 471 
Mass. 1483 (2015), and adversely reflects on her fitness to 
practice law, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (h).  The 
 
 
1 This bar discipline appeal is subject to S.J.C. Rule 2:23, 
471 Mass. 1303 (2015).  After review of the preliminary 
memorandum and record appendix filed pursuant to the rule, we 
directed the appeal to proceed in the regular course. 
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief filed by former members of 
the Board of Bar Overseers. 
3 
 
evidence also establishes violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.5 (a), as appearing in 463 Mass. 1320 (2012).  In the 
circumstances, we accept the board's recommendation that a two-
year term suspension is both appropriate and consistent with 
sanctions imposed in comparable cases. 
 
1.  Prior proceedings.  On February 27, 2017, bar counsel 
filed a one-count petition for discipline against the respondent 
alleging that, during 2015, she intentionally inflated the 
amount of attorney time billed to her four largest clients by 
approximately 450 hours, falsely ascribing to herself and other 
attorneys work that was not actually performed.  By adding these 
hours to her bills, the petition alleged, the respondent caused 
her firm to charge and collect more than $200,000 in fees that 
were not earned, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (a) 
(charging and collecting clearly excessive fees); Mass R. Prof. 
C. 8.4 (c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation); and Mass R. Prof. C. 8.4 (h) (conduct that 
reflects adversely on fitness to practice law). 
 
After four days of hearing, at which the respondent and 
eight other witnesses testified, on May 29, 2018, the hearing 
committee issued a report detailing its findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and recommended disciplinary sanction.  A 
majority of the committee concluded that bar counsel proved that 
the respondent "intentionally added to her bills time for work 
4 
 
that was not performed," and recommended that she be suspended 
from the practice of law for one year and a day.3  Both bar 
counsel and the respondent appealed to the board. 
 
After review, the board denied the respondent's request for 
a new evidentiary hearing and adopted most of the hearing 
committee's factual findings and conclusions of law.4  It 
concluded, however, that based on the established misconduct, a 
one-year suspension was too lenient.  The board voted to file an 
information in the county court recommending a two-year 
suspension from the practice of law. 
 
A single justice of this court held a hearing and, after 
receiving additional briefing, issued a decision concluding that 
a six-month suspension was appropriate.  The single justice 
reasoned that while the evidence established that the respondent 
increased the hours attributed to other attorneys on her bills, 
her testimony was that she had worked those hours herself.  In 
the single justice's view, although the bills were false and 
 
 
3 A dissenting member agreed that the respondent's bills 
were inaccurate but concluded that the respondent "lacked the 
intent to deceive or to defraud her clients."  The member would 
have imposed a public reprimand for her "billing protocols." 
 
 
4 As discussed infra, the board rejected two factors the 
hearing committee found in aggravation.  It determined that 
restitution was not due, because the respondent did not herself 
receive the wrongfully billed amounts, and the firm returned 
those amounts to the clients.  Also, the board determined that 
it did not need to reach the issue whether the respondent was 
motivated by "greed and self-interest." 
5 
 
misleading -- to the extent they did not accurately identify the 
attorney who had rendered services -- the high number of 
billable hours that she reported did not constitute substantial 
evidence that the services were not rendered at all.  The single 
justice declined to weigh the respondent's failure to express 
remorse in aggravation, and he concluded that her clients' 
satisfaction with her services should be weighed in mitigation.  
In the circumstances, the single justice concluded that a six-
month suspension was warranted.  Bar counsel appeals. 
 
2.  Factual background.  We summarize the background facts 
found by the hearing committee and adopted by the board, 
concluding that they are supported by substantial evidence.  See 
S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (6), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1310 
(2009).  We reserve certain details concerning the respondent's 
billing practices for later discussion. 
 
The respondent was admitted to the bar of the Commonwealth 
in 1991.  After working in the legal department of an 
international engineering firm, and after more than a decade in 
the construction practice of one law firm, on October 1, 2011, 
she began her employment at a different law firm (firm) as an 
"income/salaried partner in the commercial litigation 
department."  In late 2014 or early 2015, the respondent became 
an equity partner of the firm, effective January 1, 2015.  
Unlike associate attorneys and income or salaried partners, the 
6 
 
firm's equity partners were paid based on their placement each 
January in a compensation "tier" for the coming year.  Equity 
partners also received a percentage of the firm's profits for 
the prior year, and merit bonuses based on their prior year's 
performance.  Decisions about tier placement and merit bonuses 
were based, in part, on fee receipts generated or anticipated by 
each partner. 
 
Before her January 1, 2015, transition to equity partner, 
the respondent earned approximately $700,000 as an income or 
salaried partner, exclusive of merit bonuses.  As an equity 
partner, however, she was placed in a lower base salary tier of 
$575,000.  Although she was eligible for a share of the firm's 
profits and a bonus, and had the potential to earn more than she 
had as an income or salaried partner, her salary tier as an 
equity partner was $125,000 less than she had been receiving as 
an income or salaried partner. 
 
During 2015, the respondent generally did not enter or 
maintain contemporaneous billing records of her time.  Instead, 
she directed her assistant to draft time entries for her review.  
The assistant, who often had no knowledge of the time the 
respondent spent on tasks, attempted to reconstruct the 
respondent's daily activities using handwritten notes that did 
not, for the most part, attribute specific amounts of time to 
the described tasks.  She also used e-mail messages, 
7 
 
correspondence, pleadings, and calendar entries.  The assistant 
"guess[ed]" at the amount of time spent on tasks, creating daily 
time reports on a weekly basis for the prior week's work. 
 
Each week, the respondent reviewed the daily time reports 
created by her assistant, adjusted the time charged for each 
task, and submitted the reports to the firm's accounting 
department.  On a monthly basis, the accounting department 
provided the respondent with draft bills for the matters on 
which she was the billing partner.  In addition to her own time 
entries, the draft bills included the time entries for the other 
attorneys who had worked on the matter.  The respondent edited 
the draft bills by adding, subtracting, or consolidating time 
entries for herself and the other attorneys who worked on her 
clients' matters. 
 
Between March 2015 and November 2015, the respondent added 
more than 450 hours of time to the hours reflected on her 
clients' draft bills, primarily with respect to two complex 
litigation matters, amounting to approximately eight to ten 
hours per week added to time previously entered.  She added 
approximately one hundred hours to her own time, 110 hours to 
one senior associate attorney's time, and 240 hours to the 
entries of five other associate attorneys.  Although the 
respondent testified that the additional hours reflected her own 
time spent working on those matters, the hearing committee 
8 
 
declined to credit the testimony, finding instead that the 
clients were intentionally, dishonestly, and excessively billed 
for the time. 
 
According to the firm's records for 2015, the actual amount 
of the respondent's final bills to clients exceeded the original 
amount reflected on the draft bills by approximately $216,000.  
Concluding that the bills apparently had been inflated beyond 
the work actually performed, the firm reported the matter to the 
board.  The firm either refunded to the clients the amounts it 
considered to have been overbilled or credited them that amount. 
 
3.  Standard of review.  On appeal, bar counsel contends 
that the single justice erred in determining that certain of the 
hearing committee's findings (as adopted by the board) were not 
supported by substantial evidence.   Bar counsel also contends 
that the sanction imposed was markedly disparate from the 
discipline imposed in comparable cases.  See Matter of Segal, 
430 Mass. 359, 367 (1999).  We "review the record to determine 
whether the single justice's decision is supported by sufficient 
evidence, free from errors of law, and free from any abuse of 
discretion."  Matter of Tobin, 417 Mass. 92, 99 (1994), citing 
Matter of Kenney, 399 Mass. 431, 434 (1987). 
 
The subsidiary facts found by the board must be upheld "if 
supported by substantial evidence, upon consideration of the 
record, or such portions as may be cited by the parties."  
9 
 
S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (6).  See Matter of Abbott, 437 Mass. 384, 
393-394 (2002).  It is error to do otherwise.  In addition, 
"[o]ur rules concerning bar discipline . . . accord to the 
hearing committee the position of 'the sole judge of the 
credibility of the testimony presented at the hearing.'"  Matter 
of Saab, 406 Mass. 315, 328 (1989), quoting S.J.C. Rule 4:01, 
§ 8 (3), as appearing in 381 Mass. 784 (1980).  In short, 
"[w]hile we review the entire record and consider whatever 
detracts from the weight of the board's conclusion, as long as 
there is substantial evidence, we do not disturb the board's 
finding, even if we would have come to a different conclusion if 
considering the matter do novo."  Matter of Segal, 430 Mass. at 
364. 
 
In this case, the evidence is such "as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support" the board's conclusion that 
the respondent's conduct violated the rules of professional 
discipline.  Matter of Segal, 430 Mass. at 364, quoting G. L. 
c. 30A, § 1.  We determine that the board's findings are 
supported by substantial evidence, conclude that the misconduct 
charged in the petition has been established, and accept the 
board's recommendation as to sanction. 
 
4.  Evidence of misconduct.  Although we summarized the 
respondent's billing practices above, we describe them in 
10 
 
greater detail here as they relate to the misconduct charged and 
the evidence that establishes it. 
 
There is no dispute that the respondent did not keep a 
contemporaneous log of her work.5  Although she made notes 
concerning her work on one of several notepads, the notations 
rarely reflected the time she devoted to any particular task.  
In her answer to the petition for discipline, the respondent 
explained that "it was her practice to satisfy the firm's 
requirement of weekly submission of her time by having her 
[assistant] prepare preliminary draft time sheets based on [the 
respondent's e-mail system] calendar, email in-box, 
correspondence [file], pleadings and notes."  She was aware that 
the assistant "usually had no idea how much time [the 
respondent] spent on each matter."  The product of the 
assistant's efforts "was not intended to be comprehensive with 
respect to the work it described (as it was based on fragmentary 
data) and more importantly it was never intended to be accurate 
as to the amount of time spent (since most of the time entries 
 
 
5 The record indicates that some of the firm's lawyers kept 
contemporaneous electronic time entries.  Others kept manual 
time records, and their assistants input that information into 
the firm's timekeeping software. 
 
11 
 
were meant as generic place holders to be replaced later by [the 
respondent] with specific periods of time)."6 
 
At the end of each week, the respondent's assistant printed 
a copy of the time entries she had drafted, which the respondent 
regarded as "tentative drafts intended to be heavily edited" 
particularly as to "the attribution of specific periods of time 
for individual items of work."  The respondent made handwritten 
notes on the printed weekly reports, most of which adjusted the 
amount of time associated with each recorded task to "substitute 
solid numbers for the place holders with respect to time spent 
. . . based on her specific recollections and her general 
knowledge of how long particular tasks typically took her."  
Less frequently, she edited the narrative description of the 
work performed.  At the hearing, the respondent testified that, 
during this weekly phase, she "was only looking at the 
information on the time entry report [rather than] looking for 
what was missing[,] because [she] didn't have the time to do 
it." 
 
At the beginning of each month, the respondent received a 
draft or "pre-bill" from the firm's accounting department for 
 
 
6 At the hearing, the assistant testified that the 
timekeeping software required a user to enter some amount of 
time greater than zero in order to log a time entry.  Unless a 
specific amount of time was blocked out on the respondent's 
calendar for a specific task, she typically entered two tenths 
of an hour for this purpose, or sometimes guessed. 
12 
 
each client matter on which she was the designated billing 
partner.  These prebills chronologically listed all the work 
performed by attorneys who worked on the client matter during 
the prior month.  According to the respondent, her billing 
practice anticipated that her review of a prebill would be the 
first time that she "looked at what was there in the context of 
what [she] missed for [her] own time."  The respondent explained 
that when she made additions to her prebills, she "drew on 
materials that her secretary did not utilize, including text 
messages, outbound emails, records of telephone calls, 
miscellaneous notes, and her own memory." 
 
At the hearing, the respondent testified that she added 450 
hours to the draft or prebills, allocating that time to time her 
associates billed even though she performed the work.  She 
testified that she did this for two reasons:  (1) it would have 
been administratively burdensome to create new time entries for 
herself; and (2) it gave the clients the benefit of her work, 
but at a lower hourly rate billed by associate attorneys.  The 
hearing committee declined to credit those explanations and 
concluded that the evidence established that the respondent 
billed for services that were not provided. 
 
We recognize, as the single justice also observed, that the 
respondent worked exceedingly hard, and her clients testified 
that they were satisfied with her work.  The single justice 
13 
 
concluded that while there was "substantial evidence to support 
at least some subsidiary findings underpinning the board's 
decision that the respondent intentionally billed clients for 
time she did not work," the evidence did not support the finding 
that "the respondent necessarily over-billed clients 
intentionally for all or substantially all of the hours for 
which the firm refunded fees or credited to clients." 
 
Regardless of the precise number of the hours overbilled, 
however, the evidence amply established that the respondent 
added fictional hours to her clients' bills.  The hearing 
committee concluded, and the board accepted, that the 
respondent's client bills were intentionally false and 
fraudulent in two aspects.  With respect to the first aspect, 
there is no dispute that the respondent's client bills failed 
accurately to reflect work performed by the identified attorney.  
We agree with the single justice that the bills were false and 
fraudulent to that extent.  Even if the work was done, it was 
not done by the attorney identified on the bill. 
 
With respect to the second aspect, the petition for 
discipline charged that the respondent intentionally charged 
multiple clients for legal services that were not rendered.  To 
be sure, as the single justice recognized, the respondent 
testified that she added time to her associates' hours for 
services she rendered that were "not captured on my calendar, 
14 
 
not on my notepad and not in my inbox and not in my 
correspondence file," but that she nonetheless worked each of 
those 450 added hours. 
 
Other than the respondent's own testimony, however, there 
is nothing to support her claim.  The hours were not reflected 
on the respondent's records and somehow "missed" by her 
assistant when she entered the respondent's time in the firm's 
timekeeping system.  There were no documents or other work 
product that substantiated the claim.  On twelve different 
dates, if the hours the respondent claimed she worked but 
attributed to associate attorneys were added to the hours the 
respondent billed under her own name (which the respondent 
testified would have been the correct allocation of time), she 
would have worked more than twenty-four hours. 
 
In declining to credit the respondent's testimony, the 
hearing committee relied on the respondent's billing records and 
the testimony of other attorneys.  It observed: 
"We note that, in 2015, the respondent made three non-
business trips to Hawaii and took a vacation in Europe from 
September 11-25.  In 2015, she also went to San Diego, 
Denver, Chicago, New York, and several cities in Texas.  
Generating 3,600 billable hours in a year would require 
working over 9.86 billable hours a day, seven days a week, 
for 365 days.  Between the respondent's vacations and her 
nonbillable client activities [totaling over 700 non-
billable hours], we do not credit that she worked a total 
of 3,600 billable hours in 2015." (Citation omitted.) 
 
15 
 
When the more than 700 additional nonbillable hours that the 
respondent reported working are added to her billable hours, the 
respondent would have had to work an average of 11.78 hours 
every day for the entire year.  Because the hearing committee's 
decision not to credit the respondent's testimony is not "wholly 
inconsistent with another implicit finding" (quotation and 
citation omitted), Matter of Murray, 455 Mass. 872, 880 (2010), 
it should not have been rejected. 
 
This is not a case in which the hearing committee's 
findings rested on mere disbelief of the respondent's testimony.  
Rather, the evidence adduced at the hearing amply supports the 
conclusion that the respondent intentionally inflated the hours 
billed well beyond those that were worked.  On thirteen 
occasions, for example, the respondent added an hour or more to 
a senior associate attorney's hours, without changing the 
billing narrative or providing an explanation for modifying the 
associate's hours.  This amounted to twenty-seven hours.  The 
hearing committee credited the testimony of the senior associate 
attorney that his time entries were made contemporaneously, and 
that the entries were accurate when he entered them.  The 
respondent either provided no explanation or the hearing 
committee determined that the explanation she did provide lacked 
candor. 
16 
 
 
In addition, the hearing committee found that the 
respondent added a total of 143.1 hours to three other associate 
attorneys' time because, she said, reviewing those entries weeks 
later "jogged her memory" of work she herself performed even 
though she had not recollected the time during her weekly review 
of her own bills.  The hearing committee declined to credit that 
explanation.  That determination is not inconsistent with the 
hearing committee's other findings. 
 
In addition to adding time to her associate attorneys' 
entries, on at least seven different days, the respondent billed 
her clients for her attendance at depositions that she did not 
attend.  This accounted for an additional 51.40 hours.  Although 
the respondent testified that she worked on items related to the 
depositions during that time, the senior associate attorney who 
took the depositions testified that, apart from minor edits and 
brief discussions, he received nothing substantive from the 
respondent.  While the respondent testified that she listened to 
the depositions by telephone, not only did the hearing committee 
credit the associate's testimony that that did not occur, but 
there was evidence that the respondent was involved in other 
depositions or hearings at the relevant times.  In the 
circumstances, the hearing committee was warranted in drawing an 
"adverse inference from the respondent's failure to offer 
17 
 
materials, readily available to her, that would presumably 
support her version of the facts if true." 
 
In short, the substantial evidence supports the hearing 
committee's findings, adopted by the board, that the respondent 
intentionally billed her clients for legal services that were 
not rendered by adding hundreds of hours to the bills.  To 
establish the misconduct, bar counsel was not required to prove 
that each of the 450 hours intentionally added to the draft 
bills was fraudulent.  It suffices to say that fraudulent 
billing was established and supported by the substantial 
evidence.  See Matter of Goldstone, 445 Mass. 551, 564-565 
(2005) (fraudulent billing established based on sample of 
attorney's files).  As the board concluded, the "conclusion that 
the respondent intentionally overbilled her clients finds ample 
support in the overall record." 
 
5.  Appropriate sanction.  Turning to the question of 
sanction, we review "the sanction ordered by the single justice 
[to ensure that it] is not markedly disparate from what has been 
ordered in comparable cases," mindful that the board's 
recommendation is entitled to substantial deference.  Matter of 
Sharif, 459 Mass. 558, 563 (2011), quoting Matter of Doyle, 429 
Mass. 1013, 1013 (1999).  See Matter of Anderson, 416 Mass. 521, 
526 (1993).  Each bar discipline case is decided on its own 
merits, see Matter of Strauss, 479 Mass. 294, 300-301 (2018), 
18 
 
and each attorney receives the disposition that is "most 
appropriate in the circumstances," Matter of the Discipline of 
an Attorney, 392 Mass. 827, 837 (1984).  In making that 
determination, we "consider what measure of discipline is 
necessary to protect the public and deter other attorneys from 
the same behavior."  Matter of Concemi, 422 Mass. 326, 329 
(1996).  See Matter of Foley, 439 Mass. 324, 333 (2003); Matter 
of Kerlinsky, 428 Mass. 656, 664, cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1160 
(1999), quoting Matter of Finnerty, 418 Mass. 821, 829 (1994) 
("primary factor" is "the effect upon, and perception of, the 
public and the bar"). 
 
We agree with the board and the single justice that the 
admitted facts concerning the respondent's billing procedures as 
intentionally practiced, particularly respecting her intentional 
inflation of the time accurately ascribed to tasks performed by 
her associates, are, in and of themselves, enough to demonstrate 
that a clearly excessive fee was charged.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.5 (a).  The bills dishonestly misrepresented the legal work 
described and who performed it, and this dishonesty reflects 
poorly on the respondent's fitness to practice as a member of 
the legal profession.  Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c), (h). 
 
The hearing committee also determined, and the board 
accepted, that by billing her clients and causing her firm to 
collect fees for hours not actually worked, the respondent 
19 
 
violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (a).  See Matter of Rickles, 30 
Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 340, 345 (2014); Matter of Barach, 
22 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 36, 48 (2006) (two-year 
suspension for excessive billing); Matter of Broderick, 20 Mass. 
Att'y Discipline Rep. 53, 54 (2004) (two-year suspension for 
charging excessive fees, failing to returned unearned portion of 
fee, and other misconduct).  A majority of the committee also 
found, and the board accepted, that by submitting bills that 
were inaccurate, inflated, or false, and by billing and 
collecting fees to which she and the firm were not entitled, the 
respondent engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 
8.4 (c), and conduct adversely reflecting on her fitness to 
practice law, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (h).  See 
Matter of Beaulieu, 29 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 33, 34 
(2013).  We agree. 
 
Bar counsel contends that the six-month term suspension 
from the practice of law imposed by the single justice fails to 
recognize the gravity of the respondent's intentional, dishonest 
misconduct.  More specifically, bar counsel contends that the 
six-month suspension (1) is markedly disparate from the 
penalties imposed in comparable cases; (2) was premised upon the 
single justice's improper substitution of his own de novo 
credibility findings for those of the committee, and his 
20 
 
insufficiently deferential review of the sufficiency of evidence 
to support the board's findings; and (3) reflected irrelevant 
and unproved mitigating factors, particularly the satisfaction 
of the respondent's clients with the representation they 
received and their belief that the fees charged were fair and 
reasonable. 
 
In our assessment, it is the established dishonest nature 
of the respondent's billing that differentiates this case from 
cases involving charging "excessive" fees.  See Matter of 
Fordham, 423 Mass. 481 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Fordham v. 
Massachusetts Bar Counsel, 519 U.S. 1149 (1997).  In Matter of 
Fordham, supra at 486, a sophisticated corporate client agreed 
"with open eyes after interviewing other lawyers with more 
experience in such matters" to hire an attorney, knowing that he 
would be learning a new area of law.  The parties stipulated 
that the lawyer "acted conscientiously, diligently, and in good 
faith in representing [the client] and in his billing in this 
case."  Id. at 484.  He achieved an acquittal in the case.  In 
the circumstances, the attorney received a public reprimand for 
charging, but not collecting, an excessive fee.  Id. at 495. 
 
Knowing submission of false or fraudulent bills, however, 
is not equivalent to charging an excessive fee.  In Matter of 
Goldstone, 445 Mass. at 552, for example, an attorney was 
disbarred for conduct including overbilling and collecting from 
21 
 
a corporate client "hundreds of thousands of dollars in fees and 
costs to which he was not entitled."  In that case, we concluded 
that "[w]here an attorney lacks a good faith belief that he [or 
she] has earned and is entitled to the monies, such conduct 
constitutes conversion and misappropriation of client funds."  
Id. at 566.  Where the attorney's misconduct was aggravated by 
his "threat[s] to retain more funds to which he was not entitled 
unless [the client] paid," id., and where the attorney failed to 
make restitution to the client until bar counsel filed a 
petition for discipline, and then only repaid a portion of what 
was due, the court concluded that disbarment was warranted.  Id. 
at 566-567.  See Matter of Schoepfer, 426 Mass. 183 (1997) 
(indefinite suspension of attorney who temporarily converted 
estate's funds for his own use). 
 
Other cases involving intentional overbilling, but less 
egregious misconduct than in Matter of Goldstone, have warranted 
to two-year suspension.  See Matter of Burghardt, 29 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline Rep. 70 (2013) (stipulation to one year and a day 
suspension for submitting $6,300 in false invoices to firm for 
reimbursement of personal expenses; lawyer reimbursed firm); 
Matter of Beaulieu, 29 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. at 34 (four-
year suspension where attorney made restitution); Matter of 
Broderick, 20 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. at 54-56 (two-year 
suspension for refusing to return unearned portion of advance 
22 
 
fee and generating false billing records to justify total fee, 
in violation of Mass. R. Prof. 1.5 [a], and 8.4 [c], [d], and 
[h]; and other misconduct).  In Matter of Burghardt, not only 
was the amount considerably less than is involved in this case, 
but it did not involve a pattern of billing for services not 
rendered.  Although Matter of Broderick, 20 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline Rep. at 54-55, included some additional misconduct 
that might have warranted an admonition or public reprimand by 
itself, the respondent's billing misconduct in this case is more 
egregious than that in Matter of Broderick because of its 
repetitive nature, involving multiple clients, over a period of 
months. 
 
Like both the hearing committee and the board, we have 
considered the facts asserted by the respondent in mitigation 
and agree that mitigation of sanction is not warranted.  That 
said, we recognize that -- by all accounts -- the respondent 
performed an extraordinary volume of work in 2015.  She 
testified that, to carry that workload, "[s]he neglected her 
physical health and was often sleep-deprived" due to "routinely 
work[ing] over 12 hours a day, and regularly . . . on holidays, 
weekends and even when nominally on vacation."  By all accounts, 
her legal work was of high quality.  Her clients, who were in 
constant contact with her and aware of the work she was doing 
for them, did not complain about the amount of time she billed 
23 
 
to their matters.  In addition, the respondent's sister was 
diagnosed with a serious illness. 
 
The hearing committee considered the respondent's 
testimony.  It observed, as we do, that there was no medical 
testimony or other evidence connecting in any causal manner the 
respondent's testimony about the stress she suffered, and the 
misconduct in which she engaged.  While her circumstances are 
troubling, the evidence does not demonstrate that these factors 
were a substantial contributing cause of the misconduct, and 
they cannot be weighed in mitigation.  See Matter of Strauss, 
479 Mass. at 302 n.11; Matter of Luongo, 416 Mass. 308, 311 
(1993).  See also Matter of Corbett, 478 Mass. 1004, 1006 (2017) 
(pattern of misconduct demonstrated respondent's psychological 
condition did not "have had a substantially contributing role 
. . . instead [the misconduct] demonstrates a relatively clear 
and calculating [attorney], aware of [her] misdeeds"). 
 
In addition, the respondent also asserted, and the single 
justice accepted, that her clients were sophisticated consumers 
of legal services and that their failure to object to the bills 
should be considered in mitigation.  The hearing committee and 
the board correctly declined to weigh that factor in mitigation.  
Not only did the clients not testify that they were aware that 
time had been added to their bills, but advance consent to 
excessive fees is not mitigating.  See Matter of Fordham, 423 
24 
 
Mass. 481.  Likewise, "good work is to be expected of attorneys; 
it is not a factor ordinarily considered in mitigation."  Matter 
of Corbett, 478 Mass. at 1006.  Finally, while the respondent 
has no previous disciplinary record, and has provided pro bono 
services, neither mitigates misconduct.  The absence of prior 
discipline is to be expected, see Matter of Alter, 389 Mass. 
153, 157 (1983), and community service, a favorable reputation, 
and provision of pro bono services, while laudable, do not 
offset the effects of misconduct.  See Matter of Kennedy, 428 
Mass. 156, 159 (1998). 
 
Although they found no special mitigating factors, the 
hearing committee and the board weighed in aggravation the 
respondent's substantial experience in the practice of law, see 
Matter of Moran, 479 Mass. 1016, 1022 (2018), and that she 
testified evasively and demonstrated a lack of candor in her 
testimony.7  See Matter of Eisenhauer, 426 Mass. 448, 455-456, 
cert. denied, 524 U.S. 919 (1998).  They also weighed in 
aggravation that the respondent had not acknowledged the nature, 
effects, or implications of her misconduct.8  See Matter of 
 
 
7 The hearing committee also weighed in aggravation that the 
respondent was motivated by greed and self-interest.  See Matter 
of Pike, 408 Mass. 740, 745 (1990).  The board did not adopt 
that finding and did not weigh it in aggravation of sanction.  
We do not, either. 
 
 
8 Although the hearing committee also weighed in aggravation 
the respondent's failure to provide "restitution," the board 
25 
 
Bailey, 439 Mass. 134, 152 (2003).  While an attorney is 
entitled to defend against allegations of a petition for 
discipline, the hearing committee may determine whether to 
credit the testimony and evidence, and it may consider in 
aggravation any lack of candor it finds.  See Matter of Hoika, 
442 Mass. 1004, 1006 (2004).  See also Matter of Corbett, 478 
Mass. at 1006.  Like the board, we accept those factors in 
aggravation. 
 
In considering the appropriate sanction, "the board's 
recommendation is entitled to substantial deference."  Matter of 
Tobin, 417 Mass. 81, 88 (1994).  In the totality of the 
circumstances present here, see Matter of McInerney, 389 Mass. 
528, 531 (1983), we conclude that a two-year suspension from the 
practice of law is warranted. 
 
6.  Attorney well-being.  As stated, the evidence offered 
in mitigation in this case does not demonstrate a causal 
connection between the respondent's workload and familial 
pressures, and her misconduct.  Although the evidence is 
dispositive here, we take the opportunity to acknowledge the 
role that lawyer well-being plays in the context of both fitness 
to practice and administration of justice. 
 
rejected the finding.  The firm refunded the overcharged fees, 
and the respondent received no portion of them.  Because the 
overcharged fees were not retained by the respondent or the 
firm, restitution is not at issue. 
26 
 
 
The troubled state of lawyer well-being, including "major 
issues negatively affecting well-being in the legal profession," 
has been well documented.  See Supreme Judicial Court Steering 
Committee on Lawyer Well-Being:  Report to the Justices, at 5 
(July 15, 2019), https://www.mass.gov/doc/supreme-judicial-
court-steering-committee-on-lawyer-well-being-report-to-the-
justices [https://perma.cc/N63N-2KSX] (Well-Being Report).  
Among the issues identified in the report are the "relentless 
pace [that] makes it very difficult for lawyers to set 
boundaries between work and the rest of life"; the "pure volume 
of work expected."  Id. at 8.  Those issues appear amply 
illustrated in this case.  The Well-Being Report also cites 
stigma associated with seeking help on a variety of well-being 
issues.  Id. at 5-8. 
 
It is not just lawyers' health and personal life that pay 
the price for this troubled state.  As the Well-Being Report 
makes plain, lawyer well-being is connected to competence, 
ethical behavior, and professionalism.  See Well-Being Report, 
Appendix 11, at 1.  See also The Path to Lawyer Well-Being:  The 
Report of the National Task Force on Lawyer Well-Being, at 8 
(August 14, 2017), https://lawyerwellbeing.net/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/Lawyer-Wellbeing-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D2DG-KL7K] (National Well-Being Report) 
("lawyer well-being influences ethics and professionalism").  
27 
 
Recognizing that connection, taking steps to promote lawyer 
well-being, and supporting the lawyers who avail themselves of 
those measures will surely enhance the physical and mental 
health of individual lawyers and improve the quality and ethical 
standing of the profession as a whole. 
 
To be clear, the pressures faced by lawyers in practice, 
including those described in the well-being report, do not 
excuse professional misconduct.  They may, however, help to 
"explain and put into perspective the underlying reasons" for 
some of it.  Matter of Balliro, 453 Mass. 75, 88 (2009).  We 
recognize that "[if] a disability caused a lawyer's conduct, the 
discipline should be moderated, and, if that disability can be 
treated, special terms and considerations may be appropriate."  
Matter of Schoepfer, 426 Mass. at 188.  See Matter of Sharif, 
459 Mass. at 562; Matter of Ring, 427 Mass. 186, 191 (1998) 
(attorney's depression causally related to misconduct).9 
 
7.  Conclusion.  By all accounts, the respondent worked 
exceptionally hard, was one of the firm's highest revenue 
producers, and achieved excellent results for her clients.  Some 
of her large, institutional clients testified to their 
 
 
9 We urge leaders of the bar, supervisors in the public 
sector, partners in law firms, private employers, and individual 
attorneys to be mindful that attorney well-being and competence 
are interconnected, and that "lawyer well-being influences 
ethics and professionalism."  National Well-Being Report at 8. 
28 
 
satisfaction with her work and her availability to them.  But 
intentionally billing for work that was not performed, or not 
performed by the person to whom it is ascribed, is professional 
misconduct.  Like the board, "we would hesitate to censure the 
occasional, innocent mistake in timekeeping."  The evidence in 
this case, however, establishes that the respondent 
intentionally engaged in billing practices so prone to error as 
to display "reckless indifference to whether . . . clients [a]re 
honestly charged for [an attorney's] services," and added 
hundreds of hours of time to client bills for services that were 
not rendered.  Attorneys must adhere to honesty in their billing 
practices.  In a relationship premised on trust, clients are 
entitled to nothing less. 
 
The case shall be remanded to the county court, where an 
order suspending the respondent for a period of two years shall 
enter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.