Title: Ex parte Aletha Brown Thomas. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Aletha Brown Thomas v. Brian Thomas)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1081447
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: July 16, 2010

REL: 07/16/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2010
____________________
1081447
____________________
Ex parte Aletha Brown Thomas
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: Aletha Brown Thomas
v.
Brian Thomas)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-07-266;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2071171)
SMITH, Justice.
1081447
The lead opinion was authored by Judge Thomas, with Judge
1
Pittman concurring, Presiding Judge Thompson and Judge Moore
concurring in the result, and Judge Bryan dissenting.
2
Aletha Brown Thomas ("the wife") sued her brother-in-law
Brian Thomas ("the brother") in the Montgomery Circuit Court
seeking to recover the proceeds of a term life-insurance
policy owned by John T. Thomas, Aletha's husband ("the
husband").  After a bench trial, the trial court entered a
judgment in favor of the brother.  The wife appealed, and the
Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial
court.  Thomas v. Thomas, [Ms. 2071171, July 17, 2009] ___ So.
3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2009).   We granted the wife's petition
1
for certiorari review. 
Facts and Procedural History
At issue in this case are the proceeds from a 30-year
term 
life-insurance 
policy ("the policy") the husband
purchased on himself while he was married to the wife.  In
1998 the husband and the wife married, and, in 2001, the
husband purchased the policy and named the wife as the
beneficiary.   
Sometime in late 2003 or 2004 the husband filed for a
divorce from the wife in the domestic-relations division of
1081447
3
the Montgomery Circuit Court ("the family court").  While the
divorce action was pending, the family court, at the request
of the husband and the guardian ad litem appointed to
represent the couple's child, issued a temporary retaining
order ("TRO"), stating, among other things, that "both parties
are restrained from removing and disposing of any marital
asset of the parties."  When the divorce action was still
pending and the TRO was still in effect, the husband changed
the beneficiary of the policy from the wife to the brother.
Several months after the husband named the brother as the
beneficiary of the policy and while the divorce action was
pending, the husband died.  The brother subsequently filed a
claim under the policy, and the insurance company provided him
with the proceeds of the policy.
The wife then filed the underlying separate action
against the brother in the Montgomery Circuit Court ("the
trial court") "seeking a declaratory order or decree by [the
trial court] that she is the true beneficiary and owner of the
proceeds of the [policy]."  In the complaint, the wife also
sought the creation of a constructive trust on the proceeds on
the policy for her benefit.  The wife claimed that she is
1081447
4
entitled to the proceeds of the policy because, she said, the
policy was a marital asset of a type the husband was enjoined
from removing or disposing of under the terms of the TRO
issued by the family court; she also claimed that the brother
had been unjustly enriched by the receipt of the proceeds of
the policy. 
The wife moved for a summary judgment in the trial court.
The trial court denied the motion.  The wife then moved for
reconsideration of the denial of the summary-judgment motion,
which the trial court also denied.  The wife then filed a
"renewed motion for summary judgment," which the trial court
also denied.
The trial court conducted a bench trial on July 8, 2008.
On August 20, 2008, the trial court issued a judgment in favor
of the brother.  The trial court found that "the central issue
in this matter is whether or not a term-life insurance policy
is marital property in Alabama" and then answered this
question in the negative, concluding that "[the husband] did
not violate the [TRO] entered by the [family court], and the
proceeds of the life insurance policy shall remain with the
rightful beneficiary." The order of the trial court also notes
1081447
Section 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975, provides that "[t]he
2
Supreme Court shall have authority ... [t]o transfer to the
Court of Civil Appeals, for determination by that court, any
civil case appealed to the Supreme Court and within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court ...."
5
that "[b]ecause the restraining order was temporary, there
were many issues left to be decided by the [family] court[;]
thus [the husband's] death abated the action and the temporary
order, and the life-insurance proceeds were properly payable
to the most recently designated beneficiary as interpreted in
[Ex parte Parish, 808 So. 2d 30 (Ala. 2001)]."  
The wife appealed the trial court's judgment to this
Court.  We transferred the appeal to the Court of Civil
Appeals under § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975.   That court
2
affirmed the judgment of the trial court in a two-judge
opinion having no precedential value.  Judge Thomas authored
the lead opinion, in which only Judge Pittman concurred.
Presiding Judge Thompson concurred in the result with a
writing in which Judge Moore concurred.  Judge Bryan wrote a
dissenting opinion.  
The lead opinion in the Court of Civil Appeals frames the
dispositive issue in this case as "whether a party [to a
divorce action], by changing the beneficiary of a term
1081447
6
life-insurance policy, violates a TRO restraining that party
from removing or disposing of marital assets."  Thomas, ___
So. 3d at ___.  The lead opinion ultimately concludes that
"[a] term life-insurance policy is not a marital asset" and
that, therefore, "the husband in this case did not violate the
TRO, and the trial court's judgment is due to be affirmed."
Thomas, ___ So. 3d at ___.  Presiding Judge Thompson's opinion
concurring in the result asserts that the lead opinion
unnecessarily decides whether a term life-insurance policy
constitutes a marital asset because, Presiding Judge Thompson
believed, regardless of whether the policy is a marital asset,
"the husband's change of the beneficiary of the policy to
[the] brother did not constitute removing and disposing of the
insurance policy, and the question whether that policy
constituted a marital asset need not be resolved."  Thomas,
___ So. 3d at ___ (Thompson, P.J., concurring in the result).
Judge Bryan's dissenting opinion states his belief that the
policy constituted a marital asset and, therefore, that the
husband violated the TRO by changing the beneficiary on the
policy.  Thomas, ___ So. 3d at ___ (Bryan, J., dissenting). 
1081447
7
The wife petitioned this Court for certiorari review of
the Court of Civil Appeals' decision. 
Standard of Review
"On certiorari review, this Court accords no presumption
of correctness to the legal conclusions of the intermediate
appellate court.  Therefore, we must apply de novo the
standard of review that was applicable in the Court of Civil
Appeals."  Ex parte Toyota Motor Corp., 684 So. 2d 132, 135
(Ala. 1996).  The lead opinion in the Court of Civil Appeals
applied a de novo standard of review because it found that the
issues in this case involve only the application of law to
undisputed facts.  See Thomas, ___ So. 3d at ___.  We agree
that a de novo standard of review was appropriate in the Court
of Civil Appeals; therefore, we apply the same standard of
review.
Discussion
The threshold issue in this case is not, as framed by the
lead opinion in the Court of Civil Appeals, whether the
husband violated the TRO by changing the beneficiary of the
policy from the wife to the brother; rather, the threshold
issue 
is 
whether 
the 
trial 
court 
had 
subject-matter
1081447
8
jurisdiction over this action.  This inquiry is essential
because "[a] judgment entered by a trial court without
subject-matter jurisdiction is void."  Faith Props., LLC v.
First Commercial Bank, 988 So. 2d 485, 490 (Ala. 2008). 
"A court is obligated to vigilantly protect against
deciding cases over which it has no jurisdiction
because '[i]t would amount to usurpation and
oppression for a court to interfere in a matter over
which it has no jurisdiction, and its pronouncements
in respect thereto would be without force, and its
decrees and judgments would be wholly void.  This is
a universal principle, as old as the law itself.'"
Crutcher v. Williams, 12 So. 3d 631, 635 (Ala. 2008) (quoting
Wilkinson v. Henry, 221 Ala. 254, 256, 128 So. 362, 364
(1930)).  Thus, if the trial court in this action lacked
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the judgment entered was
void and must be set aside. 
The subject matter of this action is the TRO entered by
the family court.  Each of the wife's claims against the
brother are contingent on a finding that the wife is entitled
to the proceeds of the policy because the husband allegedly
violated the TRO by changing the beneficiary of the policy
from the wife to the brother.  Therefore, we must first
consider whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the TRO
1081447
9
in view of husband's death and the subsequent abatement of the
divorce action in the family court.  
It is clear that the divorce action between the wife and
the husband in the family court abated upon the death of the
husband.  Alabama law is well settled that "[a] marriage is
dissolved by the death of a party to the marriage, and a
pending action for dissolution by divorce is necessarily
terminated and absolutely abated."  Jones v. Jones, 517 So. 2d
606, 608 (Ala. 1987) (citing Cox v. Dodd, 242 Ala. 37, 4 So.
2d 736 (1941); and Killough v. Killough, 373 So. 2d 336 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1979)).  Further, this Court has held that not only
does a pending divorce action abate upon the death of a party
to the marriage, but that the interlocutory orders by the
divorce court dividing marital property also have no effect
upon the death of a party to the marriage.  See Ex parte
Parish, 808 So. 2d 30, 33 (Ala. 2001); and Jones, 517 So. 2d
at 608. 
In Jones, the trial court in a divorce action issued a
temporary order regarding the disposition of the marital home
pending final resolution of the divorce action.  517 So. 2d at
606-07.  While the action was pending and the temporary order
1081447
Section 30-2-8.1(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides: "A court
3
shall not enter a final judgment of divorce until after the
expiration of 30 days from the date of the filing of the
summons and complaint."
10
was in effect, the husband died.  517 So. 2d at 606.  Upon the
motion of the wife, the trial court dissolved the temporary
order and dismissed the action based on the husband's death.
517 So. 2d at 607.  The administratrix of the husband's estate
appealed, and this Court affirmed the judgment of the trial
court, concluding that the husband's death abated the divorce
action and nullified the temporary order.  517 So. 2d at 607-
08.  In so holding, this Court reasoned:  "An action for
divorce, alimony, attorney fees, and an equitable division of
marital property in which there has not been a final judgment
does not survive the death of a party."  517 So. 2d at 608. 
In Parish, the husband filed a divorce complaint in the
trial court.  808 So. 2d at 31.  Several days thereafter, the
trial court entered a divorce judgment, which adopted the
terms of a property-settlement agreement between the husband
and the wife.  808 So. 2d at 31.  The divorce judgment stated
that pursuant to § 30-2-8.1, Ala. Code 1975, the terms of
judgment would become final 30 days after the date on which
the summons and complaint had been filed.   The husband
3
1081447
11
committed suicide 7 days after the trial court entered the
divorce judgment--less than 30 days after the complaint had
been filed--and the wife moved the trial court to set aside
the judgment.  The trial court denied the motion and ordered
that the divorce judgment "'shall remain in full force and
effect.'"  808 So. 2d at 32 (quoting the trial court's order).
The wife appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, and, relying
upon Jones, that court reversed the judgment of the trial
court, holding that "the divorce action was abated by the
husband's death and ... the trial court erred in denying the
wife's postjudgment motion to set aside the divorce judgment."
Connell v. Parish, 808 So. 2d 27, 29 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000).
Implicit in this holding is the conclusion that the property-
settlement agreement within the divorce judgment was a
temporary order that had no effect upon the death of the
husband.  This Court agreed and affirmed the judgment of the
Court of Civil Appeals.  Parish, 808 So. 2d at 33.
Alternatively, if a trial court in a divorce action
enters a final judgment that affects the property rights of
the parties to the marriage and a party to the marriage then
dies, "'the judgment as it relates to property rights may be
1081447
12
altered or modified upon a timely motion.'"  Boudreau v.
Slaton, 9 So. 3d 495, 498 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (quoting
Goodloe v. LaRoche Indus., Inc., 686 So. 2d 335, 337 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1996)).  See also Ex parte Riley, 10 So. 3d 585, 587
(Ala. Civ. App. 2008) ("Alabama law generally holds that
abatement does not divest a court of jurisdiction to act on a
judgment affecting the parties' property rights." (citing Hill
v. Lyons, 550 So. 2d 1004, 1006 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989))).  In
Hill v. Lyons, the husband died 10 days after the trial court
had entered the judgment in a divorce action.  550 So. 2d at
1005.  The wife filed a timely postjudgment motion under Rule
59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., requesting the trial court either to
modify or to set aside the divorce judgment.  The trial court
subsequently 
nullified 
the 
divorce 
judgment. 
 
The
administrator of the husband's estate appealed to the Court of
Civil Appeals; that court reversed the judgment of the trial
court, holding that "upon timely motion the trial court had
jurisdiction to amend, alter, or modify the [divorce
judgment]."  550 So. 2d at 1006.  That court reasoned that the
divorce judgment made final division of the couple's marital
property and that "[a]batement does not occur when the
1081447
In Riley, the Court of Civil Appeals included the
4
following discussion from Aither v. Estate of Aither, 180 Vt.
13
[divorce judgment] affects property rights, and matters
touching the parties' property rights under the divorce
[judgment] are amenable to alteration or modification upon
timely motion, or upon appeal."  550 So. 2d at 1006 (citing
Cox, 242 Ala. at 39, 4 So. 2d at 737 (noting that "[i]t is a
further general rule that the death of a party, pending an
appeal or writ of error, furnishes no grounds for the
abatement of the suit"), and Stapleton v. Stapleton, 282 Ala.
62, 209 So. 2d 202 (1968)).  
This Court has not directly addressed the issue of
whether an interlocutory order, which only requires parties to
a divorce action to preserve their assets before division of
the marital property, becomes a nullity when a party to a
marriage dies while the divorce action is pending.  However,
in Ex parte Riley, the Court of Civil Appeals considered this
issue and concluded that this Court's decisions in "Parish and
Jones suggest that an interlocutory order affecting the
property rights of the parties to a divorce action may not be
enforced after the death of one of the parties due to the
abatement of that action."  10 So. 3d at 588-89.   In Riley,
4
1081447
472, 476-77, 913 A.2d 376, 379 (2006), regarding the split of
authority among states on the issue of abatement of
interlocutory orders upon the death of a party to the action
in which the order was entered:
"'Several states follow the rule that abatement also
divests the trial court of the equitable power to
enforce its pre-abatement orders. See, e.g., Am.
Family Life Ins. Co. v. Noruk, 528 N.W.2d 921, 923
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) ("When one of the parties dies
... a temporary restraining order has no effect and
the court's jurisdiction to enforce it ends.");
[Estate of] Hackler [v. Hackler], [44 Va. App. 51,]
602 S.E.2d [426,] 437 [(2004)] (holding that trial
courts do not have jurisdiction to remedy violations
of injunctions when divorce has been abated by a
party's death).  Other courts have determined that
the abatement of a divorce by a party's death does
not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to
enforce pre-abatement orders. See, e.g., Cent.
States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Howell,
227 F.3d 672, 675-76 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying
Michigan law); Candler v. Donaldson, 272 F.2d 374,
377 (6th Cir. 1959) (applying Michigan law); Webb v.
Webb, 375 Mich. 624, 134 N.W.2d 673, 674-75 (1965)
("Transfers 
of 
property 
in 
violation 
of 
an
injunction are invalid and may be set aside by the
party to a divorce suit, and subsequent death of the
injunction violator does not prevent the court from
exercising such power."); Lindsey v. Lindsey, 342
Pa. Super. 72, 492 A.2d 396, 398 (1985) (holding
that, even after the death of a party, "the lower
court had the authority to void the disposal of any
marital property in violation of its injunction");
Standard Ins. Co. v. Schwalbe, 110 Wash. 2d 520, 755
P.2d 802, 805 (1988) (holding that a trial court had
equitable 
power 
to 
enforce 
its 
preliminary
injunction 
prohibiting 
a 
change 
in 
insurance
beneficiaries, despite the death of the violator).
A federal district court, similarly, has noted that
transfers in violation of temporary injunctions,
14
1081447
while not per se void, may be voided based on a
balancing of equities.  Valley Forge Life Ins. Co.
v. Delaney, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1309 (M.D. Fla.
2002) (citing Wilharms v. Wilharms, 93 Wis. 2d 671,
287 N.W.2d 779, 784 (1980), in which the Wisconsin
Supreme Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing to
consider 
relevant 
equitable 
factors 
affecting
validity of transfer in violation of pre-abatement
temporary order).'"
10 So. 3d at 588.  
15
the trial court issued an interlocutory order in a divorce
action stating that the parties to the action were to preserve
all their assets in anticipation of a future division of the
marital property.  While the divorce action was pending and
the interlocutory order was in effect, the husband died.  10
So. 3d at 588.  The Court of Civil Appeals held that the
divorce action abated upon the husband's death and, therefore,
that court concluded that the trial court lost jurisdiction to
act on the interlocutory order.  10 So. 3d at 589. 
Like Riley, the present case presents the question
whether a court may enforce an interlocutory order, which
prohibits the parties to a divorce action from removing or
disposing of marital assets, after the abatement of the action
in which the order was entered.  We agree with the Court of
1081447
In her dissenting opinion, the Chief Justice asserts that
5
she believes that the trial court had subject-matter
jurisdiction over this action because, she says, the subject
matter of this action is not the TRO but "the proceeds from a
policy that was created by [the wife's] marital estate."  ___
So. 3d at ___.  We disagree with the Chief Justice's
conclusion that the wife's alleged entitlement to the proceeds
of the policy is not dependent on the TRO.  Indeed, the
premise for the wife's alleged entitlement to the imposition
of a constructive trust on the proceeds of the policy is
16
Civil Appeals' decision in Riley that this Court's decisions
in Jones and Parish support the conclusion that, not only does
an interlocutory order that divides marital property dissolve
upon the death of a party to the pending divorce action, an
interlocutory order that "affect[s] the property rights of the
parties to a divorce action may not be enforced after the
death of one of the parties due to the abatement of that
action."  Riley, 10 So. 3d at 588-89.  Here, upon the
husband's death and the subsequent abatement of the divorce
action in the family court, the TRO became a nullity, which
could no longer be enforced.  Because the subject matter of
this action is an alleged violation of a nullity (the TRO),
the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this
action; therefore, the judgment of the trial court is void.
See Faith Props., 988 So. 2d at 490 ("A judgment entered by a
trial court without subject-matter jurisdiction is void.").5
1081447
predicated on her allegation that the husband violated the
TRO.  Further, the Chief Justice's application of Rau v. Rau,
429 So. 2d 593 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982), to the facts of this
case is misguided.  Rau is distinguishable from the present
case because the plaintiffs in Rau "filed suit seeking to
enforce the terms of their parents' divorce judgment," 429 So.
2d at 594 (emphasis added), whereas here the wife filed suit
seeking to enforce the terms of a temporary order entered in
a divorce action that had abated.
17
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is void for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and is due to be vacated.  Because
an appeal does not lie from a void judgment, the appeal in the
Court of Civil Appeals was due to be dismissed.  Therefore,
the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is also void for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and we quash the
previously granted writ of certiorari.  The Court of Civil
Appeals is instructed to vacate its judgment and to dismiss
the appeal, with instructions to the trial court to vacate its
judgment.  
WRIT QUASHED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Murdock, and Shaw,
JJ., concur.  
Cobb, C.J., dissents.
1081447
18
COBB, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I do not agree that the trial court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue relating to the
proceeds of the life-insurance policy of Aletha Brown Thomas's
husband.  The majority states: "[t]he subject matter of this
action is the TRO entered by the family court." ___ So. 3d at
___ .  I disagree. The subject matter of this action is the
proceeds from the life-insurance policy.  Thomas asserts that
her husband's brother was unjustly enriched by the receipt of
the proceeds from a policy that was created by her marital
estate with the intention that she receive the benefits.
Although I agree that the divorce action abated with the
death of Thomas's husband, it does not follow that the death
of the husband or the abatement of the divorce action work to
deprive the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction in
Thomas's separate action seeking to impose a constructive
trust on the insurance proceeds.  Jurisdiction has many
applications that are dependent on the nature of the case
before a court, but the concept of subject-matter jurisdiction
ultimately devolves to "the extent to which a court can rule
on the conduct of persons or the status of things," Black's
1081447
19
Law Dictionary 870 (8th ed. 2004).  Until this case, it was
well settled that Alabama trial courts had the authority to
impose a constructive trust where a party has been unjustly
enriched.
"'Whenever the legal title to property, real or
personal, has been obtained through actual fraud,
misrepresentation, concealments, or through undue
influence, 
duress, 
taking 
advantage 
of 
one's
weakness or necessities, or through any other
similar means which render it unconscientious for
the holder of the legal title to retain and enjoy
the 
beneficial 
interest, 
equity 
impresses 
a
constructive trust on the property thus acquired in
favor of the one who is truly and equitably entitled
to the same, although he may never perhaps have had
any legal estate therein; and a court of equity has
jurisdiction to reach the property in the hands of
the original wrong-doer or in the hands of a
subsequent holder, until a purchaser of it in good
faith and without notice acquires a higher right,
and takes the property relieved of the trust.'"
Knowles v. Canant, 255 Ala. 331, 333, 51 So. 2d 355, 357
(1951) (quoting 2 John N. Pomeroy, a Treatise on Equity
Jurisprudence §§ 1053, 1055 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed.
1941)).  See also Grace Murphy Long, The Sunset of Equity:
Constructive Trusts and the Law, 57 Ala. L. Rev. 875 (Spring
2006).
Thomas's action for a constructive trust might have been
strengthened by proof that Mr. Thomas had violated the TRO
1081447
20
issued by the divorce court, but that fact does not operate to
deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to adjudicate Thomas's
claim.  The case of Rau v. Rau, 429 So. 2d 593 (Ala. Civ. App.
1982), provides a useful example. In Rau, the Court of Civil
Appeals reviewed the claim of the children, through their
mother, for a constructive trust over the proceeds of a policy
on the life of the father.  In the divorce judgment from the
children's mother, the father was ordered to maintain a
presently existing life-insurance policy on his life for the
children's benefit.  When the father remarried and changed
employers, his new employer provided him with a life-insurance
policy; there was no further mention of the life-insurance
policy described in the divorce judgment.  However, the
beneficiary of the new policy was the father's new wife.  When
the father died, the children asserted that the new policy
should have taken the place of the old policy specified in the
divorce judgment and brought the action seeking to impose a
constructive trust.  The trial court agreed, but the Court of
Civil Appeals determined that the children had no equitable
interest in the proceeds of the second policy that was created
separately from the original marriage.  The judgment imposing
1081447
21
the constructive trust was reversed.  There was never an
implication in Rau that because the facts did not support the
constructive trust, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
adjudicate the matter.  As in Rau, this case involves a claim
seeking a constructive trust.  As the Court of Civil Appeals
did in Rau, this Court might well determine that the facts
supporting the claim are insufficient.  See also Berryman v.
Adams, 883 So. 2d 214 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003), and Brown v.
Brown, 604 So. 2d 365 (Ala. 1992).  However, when the parties
are properly before the court on an adversarial claim, the
presence or absence of facts in support of that claim does not
affect the trial court's authority, i.e., jurisdiction, to
adjudicate that claim.  I respectfully dissent.