Title: Ex Parte Flodin
Citation: 822 So. 2d 372
Docket Number: 1001618
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 9, 2001

822 So. 2d 372 (2001)
Ex parte Nestor W. FLODIN et al.
Nestor W. Flodin et al.
v.
Community Health Systems, Inc., et al.
1001618.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 9, 2001.
George R. Irvine III of Stone, Granade &amp; Crosby, P.C., Daphne, for petitioners.
Allan R. Chason of Chason &amp; Chason, P.C., Bay Minette, for Community Health Systems, Inc., and Community Senior Life, Inc.; and Elizabeth S. Wills of Wills &amp; Simon, Bay Minette, for intervenors Lionel Simpson, Mary Ann Simpson, Hoyt Greenbury, Ruth Greenbury, Jule Moon, and David Schmidt (power of attorney for Edith Schmidt).
HARWOOD, Justice.
Nestor W. Flodin and five other owners of units in the Williamsburg Square condominium development are plaintiffs in a declaratory-judgment action filed April 19, 2000, against Community Health Systems, Inc., and Community Senior Life, Inc., as defendants, in the Circuit Court of Baldwin County. They petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing Baldwin County Circuit Judge James H. Reid to vacate his order setting the trial of the case on the trial court's nonjury docket. The petition for the writ of mandamus is denied.
This Court has held that "[a] petition for a writ of mandamus is the appropriate method of challenging a trial court's denial of a demand for trial by jury." Ex parte Jackson, 737 So. 2d 452, 453 (Ala.1999) (citing *373 Ex parte Holt, 599 So. 2d 12 (Ala. 1992)). This Court has also stated:
Ex parte Empire Fire &amp; Marine Ins. Co., 720 So. 2d 893, 894 (Ala.1998).
In September 1994, each of the plaintiffs entered into a "condominium agreement" with Neil Liechty, Inc., the developer of the Williamsburg Square development; that agreement stated, in pertinent part:
The plaintiffs state that in 1995, Neil Liechty, Inc., began to fail to provide the services promised in the condominium agreement. They also state that they came to believe that they could obtain the services promised in their agreements for less than the $250 per month that Neil Liechty, Inc., charged. The plaintiffs allege that they attempted to have Neil Liechty, Inc., comply with the agreements and deliver the promised services, but that these attempts proved unsuccessful. Thereafter, the Williamsburg Square property owners' association sent a letter on February 14, 1996, terminating the condominium agreements. The plaintiffs further say that each resident individually reaffirmed with Neil Liechty, Inc., on or about April 5, 1996, the termination of his or her agreement.
In a subsequent unrelated lawsuit, David Dukes was appointed receiver for Homestead Village of Fairhope; no receiver was appointed for Neil Liechty, Inc.[1] On *376 October 27, 1999, Homestead Village of Fairhope, through David Dukes as its receiver, and Community Health Systems, Inc., entered into an agreement of purchase, pursuant to which Community Health Systems, Inc., purchased Homestead Village.[2] The plaintiffs allege that that agreement contained no assignment of the duties contained in their agreements with Neil Liechty, Inc., and that no such assignment of the rights and responsibilities of Neil Liechty, Inc., under the condominium agreements ever took place.[3] The plaintiffs state that following the sale they "have received bills from Community Senior Life, Inc., purporting to charge $250.00 per month as a `maintenance fee' [and they have] refused to pay said bills."
The April 19, 2000, complaint filed by the plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that Community Health Systems, Inc., and Community Senior Life, Inc. (hereinafter jointly referred to as "the defendants"), have no right to collect a monthly fee for the services described in the plaintiffs' respective condominium agreements with Neil Liechty, Inc.[4] The plaintiffs requested a jury trial.
In their petition for the writ of mandamus, the plaintiffs make no mention of, and fail to attach, the answer filed by the defendants, but they have attached the defendants' amended answer containing a counterclaim that was filed on January 5, 2001. The plaintiffs filed a motion to strike the counterclaim on January 16, 2001, that the trial court has not ruled on. On February 6, 2001, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a summary judgment. The defendants filed a motion to strike the plaintiffs' jury demand on February 8, 2001, and on February 15, 2001, they filed a motion in opposition to the plaintiffs' summary-judgment motion. The plaintiffs state in their petition that the trial court heard argument on the defendants' motion to strike the jury demand on more than one occasion. The plaintiffs' petition, however, does not contain any materials showing the substance of such arguments. The plaintiffs state that although the trial court did not explicitly grant the defendants' motion to strike the jury demand, it transferred the case to its nonjury docket on April 30, 2001. On June 8, 2001, the plaintiffs filed an answer to the defendants' amended answer and counterclaim that requested a jury trial on the counterclaim asserted by the defendants.[5]
The plaintiffs allege that the trial court erred in transferring this case to its nonjury docket because, they say, their complaint raises issues of fact, and their complaint, while seeking declaratory relief, *377 could otherwise have been brought as a breach-of-contract action. They rely on this Court's holding that a "party to a bill seeking a declaratory judgment is entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right if he would have had such a right in the cause of action for which the declaratory relief may be considered a substitute." Sherer v. Burton, 393 So. 2d 991, 991 (Ala.1981) (citing Hanks v. Hanks, 281 Ala. 92, 97, 199 So. 2d 169, 173 (1967); Reed v. Hill, 262 Ala. 662, 663, 80 So. 2d 728, 729 (1955); and § 6-6-228, Ala.Code 1975).
To determine whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a writ of mandamus, the main question to be resolved is the underlying nature of the plaintiffs' action. As the Court of Civil Appeals has aptly stated:
Poston v. Gaddis, 335 So. 2d 165, 167 (Ala. Civ.App.1976), cert. denied, 335 So. 2d 169 (Ala.1976).
The plaintiffs characterize the underlying nature of their action as breach of contract; the defendants characterize it as presenting purely the legal question whether certain covenants in the original condominium agreements between the plaintiffs and Neil Liechty, Inc., created equitable servitudes on each condominium unit, which could be assigned. The defendants cite cases decided by this Court to support their argument that the issue presented by the plaintiffs is a question of law, such as Oxford Lumber Co. v. Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Co., 472 So. 2d 973, 976 (Ala.1985), in which this Court stated:
The defendants argue that the pleadings do not show that the plaintiffs' action could otherwise be brought as a breach-of-contract action. In the complaint, after a statement of the factual bases, the plaintiffs request the following relief:
The plaintiffs do not seek a declaration that either Neil Liechty, Inc., who is not a defendant in this action, or the named defendants breached the condominium agreements. They request only that the trial court declare that the agreements were terminated by the notices of termination undisputedly given on February 14 and April 5, 1996, and that the defendants have no right to collect the $250 per month fee.
The plaintiffs argue that we should consider their motion for a summary judgment as a pleading and look to it for additional support for their contention that the nature of this action is a breach of contract. A motion for a summary judgment is not a "pleading." "Pleadings" are distinguished from "motions and other papers" in Rule 7, Ala. R. Civ. P., which states:
The plaintiffs have failed to show that this action could otherwise be brought as a breach-of-contract action against these named defendants or that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the plaintiffs took actions to terminate their condominium agreements. The question is whether the plaintiffs legally terminated their agreements. Moreover, they have failed to attach "copies of any order or opinion or parts of the record that would be essential to an understanding of the matters set forth in the petition." See Rule 21(a), Ala. R.App. P. In sum, they have failed to show that they have a clear legal right to have this action placed back on the trial court's jury docket. See Ex *379 parte Empire Fire &amp; Marine Ins. Co., supra. Therefore, the petition for the writ of mandamus is denied.
PETITION DENIED.
MOORE, C.J., and SEE, BROWN, and STUART, JJ., concur.
[1]  Neil Liechty, Inc., developed and operated Homestead Village of Fairhope until Dukes was named receiver. The defendants state in their response to this Court that "[a]s a result of the settlement of litigation filed by the Receiver against Liechty [The Homestead Garden Apartments of Fairhope, Limited v. Neil Liechty, Inc., Case No. CV-96-804], Liechty forfeited to the Receiver all of his right, title or interest in Homestead."
[2]  Before the sale, Dukes, on behalf of Homestead Village of Fairhope, sued the plaintiffs for their refusing to pay the monthly fee. That lawsuit was settled on February 21, 2000, through the execution of a document entitled "Confidential Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement."
[3]  The plaintiffs' petition does not contain a copy of the agreement of purchase between Homestead Village of Fairhope and Community Health Systems, Inc.
[4]  On December 20, 2000, the owners of the four remaining condominium units in Williamsburg Square filed a motion to intervene in this lawsuit as defendants.
[5]  The issue whether the trial court erred by placing the defendants' counterclaim on its nonjury docket is not properly before us because a jury demand on the counterclaim was not made by the plaintiffs until after the court had transferred the cause to its nonjury docket. The plaintiffs have submitted no ruling by the trial court on their jury demand on the defendants' counterclaim. Therefore, at the time the case was transferred, the only jury demand was contained in the plaintiffs' complaint.