Title: Bassichis v. Flores
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13175
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 1, 2022

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-13175 
 
MICHAEL J. BASSICHIS & others1  vs.  MICHAEL I. FLORES. 
 
 
 
Barnstable.     January 5, 2022. - July 1, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Privileged Communication.  Attorney at Law.  Fraud.  Practice, 
Civil, Motion to dismiss, Conduct of counsel. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 10, 2020. 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Mark C. Gildea, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Peter S. Farber for the plaintiffs. 
J. William Chamberlain, Jr., for the defendant. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Steven E. Kramer, pro se. 
Richard M. Novitch & Kimberley J. Joyce, pro se. 
 
 
 
 
1 Lower Cape Plastering LLC, Max Makowsky, and Sylvia E. 
Freed. 
2 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  This case concerns the scope of the litigation 
privilege, which precludes civil liability based on 
communications made by a party, witness, or attorney in 
connection with judicial proceedings or contemplated litigation.  
In particular, we are asked to determine whether the protection 
afforded by the litigation privilege applies where the 
statements at issue are fraudulent misrepresentations, and also 
whether the litigation privilege extends to actions taken during 
the course of litigation, or whether it is limited to written 
and oral statements. 
 
The plaintiffs seek to hold the defendant attorney liable 
for his conduct while representing a client in divorce 
proceedings, and for purported fraudulent misrepresentations he 
made to the court during the divorce trial that formed the basis 
for the trial judge's disposition of the marital estate to the 
defendant's client, the wife, thereby preventing the husband's 
creditors from attaching any of the marital assets.  We conclude 
that the litigation privilege applies in these circumstances, 
and therefore affirm the allowance of the defendant attorney's 
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint. 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts as set forth in the 
plaintiffs' complaint.  See Galiastro v. Mortgage Elec. 
Registration Sys., Inc., 467 Mass. 160, 164 (2014). 
3 
 
 
The plaintiffs are creditors of William von Thaden,2 who was 
married to Kimberly von Thaden until their divorce in 2017.  The 
defendant, Michael I. Flores, represented Kimberly in the 
divorce proceedings.  Prior to the filing of the complaint in 
the present action, the plaintiffs each had filed separate 
complaints against William and Kimberly, asserting a number of 
claims arising from contract disputes involving William's 
construction business.  After William filed a petition for 
bankruptcy and was granted a discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727, 
the plaintiffs jointly commenced this action against Flores, 
Kimberly's former attorney. 
 
a.  Prior proceedings involving debts owed by William and 
Von Thaden Builders.  During much of the marriage between 
William and Kimberly, William owned and operated a successful 
construction business, Von Thaden Builders, Inc. (Von Thaden 
Builders), that was the primary source of income for his family.  
By 2014, however, the business was no longer profitable.  The 
complaint alleges that despite these financial difficulties, 
William "continued to withdraw large sums from his business 
account to maintain his family at the standard of living they 
had been accustomed to."  He used the money he received from new 
 
 
2 Because they share a last name, we refer to former husband 
and wife William von Thaden and Kimberly von Thaden by their 
first names. 
4 
 
customers to pay debts from previous jobs.  By June of 2016, 
William was unable to continue conducting the business in this 
manner.  He closed Von Thaden Builders and liquidated its few 
remaining assets, leaving multiple debts unpaid. 
 
One such debt was owed to plaintiff Max Makowsky, who had 
lent William $50,000 in October of 2015, and had been repaid 
only $5,000 by the time that Von Thaden Builders closed.  
William had received a short-term loan of $50,000 from Makowsky 
once previously, and had repaid that loan in less than two 
months.  In this instance, however, when Makowsky asked that the 
loan be repaid in May of 2016, William paid only $5,000 toward 
the outstanding balance.  By June of 2016, the $45,000 balance 
still had not been paid; at that point, Makowsky demanded 
payment, and William told him that Von Thaden Builders was 
struggling.  William closed the business shortly thereafter.  In 
August of 2017, Makowsky commenced an action against William and 
Kimberly in the Superior Court. 
 
William also owed money to plaintiff Lower Cape Plastering 
LLC (Lower Cape Plastering), which had completed work for Von 
Thaden Builders in June and July of 2016 but had not been paid 
the full amount invoiced.  In August of 2016, Lower Cape 
Plastering commenced an action against William in the District 
Court, seeking repayment of $20,500 for work that had been 
performed.  After a jury trial in June of 2017, judgment was 
5 
 
entered in favor of Lower Cape Plastering in the amount of 
$31,281.26.  In October of 2017, Lower Cape Plastering filed a 
complaint in the Superior Court to enforce the District Court 
judgment.  See note 4, infra. 
 
Plaintiffs Michael J. Bassichis and Sylvia E. Freed had 
hired Von Thaden Builders in February of 2016 to demolish the 
existing residence and to build a new single-family home on 
their property in Wellfleet.  After Von Thaden Builders closed, 
work on the project ceased, and Bassichis was forced to act as 
the general contractor to complete the job.  Bassichis and Freed 
commenced an action in the Superior Court in April of 2017 
against William and Von Thaden Builders, seeking $55,386.35 in 
damages, which was the amount that Bassichis had been required 
to expend, above the agreed contract price, in order to finish 
the project. 
 
b.  Divorce proceedings.  Kimberly did not become aware of 
her husband's financial difficulties until the business closed 
in June of 2016.  At that time, Kimberly obtained a promise from 
her husband to cooperate in what the complaint labels a 
"collusive divorce," through which she would receive all of the 
marital property.  She then hired the defendant, Flores, to 
represent her in the divorce.  According to the plaintiffs, the 
agreement among William, Kimberly, and Flores was that all of 
the marital assets, which included three parcels in Orleans (two 
6 
 
buildable lots and one single-family home), three condominium 
units in Orleans, several motor vehicles, and an eighteen-foot 
Boston Whaler, "would be transferred to [Kimberly] by way of a 
judgment of divorce, and once the divorce decree became final, 
[William] would declare bankruptcy."  In this way, the assets 
that were transferred to Kimberly would be shielded from 
William's creditors. 
 
In October of 2016, Flores filed a complaint for divorce, 
on behalf of Kimberly, in the Probate and Family Court.  In 
accordance with William's and Kimberly's plan, Flores requested 
a trial on the complaint be scheduled for June of 2017.  Prior 
to trial, Flores submitted proposed findings of fact, supporting 
documentation, and a proposed judgment that awarded all marital 
assets to Kimberly.  At trial, Flores represented Kimberly, 
while William appeared pro se.  Flores informed the judge in his 
opening statement that William was in agreement with all of the 
proposed findings of fact and the proposed judgment.  Flores 
explained that he had submitted the case as an "adversarial 
matter" because it was William's intent to file for bankruptcy 
after the divorce became final.  The complaint quoted Flores's 
opening statement explaining that the couple had decided not to 
settle the case by agreement, because, due to the planned 
bankruptcy filing, 
7 
 
"settling this case by agreement would be perilous for both 
parties . . . because the trustee has the ability to claw 
back, as it were, and void [S]tate court agreements, 
judgments that are based on agreements, so we are seeking a 
ruling from you, a judgment from you, that allocates to my 
client under . . . [G. L. c. 208, § 34], her share of 
marital assets, as well as an award of alimony, to 
essentially insure that any future bankruptcy proceeding -- 
the bankruptcy court gives due deference to the fact that a 
[S]tate court has divided the assets and awarded alimony, 
which is a little different than a negotiated agreement." 
 
 
Flores later argued that William had "dissipated" 
approximately $896,000 of marital property by withdrawing that 
sum from retirement and college savings accounts, such that 
Kimberly was entitled to all of the remaining assets.  According 
to the plaintiffs, Flores "purposefully withheld" information 
from the judge that could have been used to challenge the claim 
of dissipation, including records showing that the vast majority 
of the money that William withdrew from the marital accounts was 
used to pay legitimate business expenses, mortgages on the 
properties owned by the couple, real estate taxes, car loans, 
and other family expenses.  William introduced no evidence at 
trial and told the judge that he was in agreement with all of 
Flores's representations.  Presented with only the evidence 
submitted by Flores, in July of 2017, the judge entered a 
judgment transferring all marital assets to Kimberly. 
 
Following the entry of judgment, William and Kimberly sold 
the three Orleans properties and paid the net proceeds of 
$638,552.48 directly to Flores.  William then conveyed his fifty 
8 
 
per cent interest in the Orleans condominium units to Kimberly 
for one dollar.  After the judgment nisi became final, William 
filed a petition for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Massachusetts, naming the plaintiffs 
as creditors in that proceeding.  The bankruptcy case was closed 
in May of 2019, without any distribution to William's creditors. 
 
The plaintiff creditors' separate actions against William 
and Kimberly in the Superior Court have been consolidated for 
trial.3  The amended complaint in the consolidated cases alleges, 
among other claims, that both William and Kimberly are liable 
under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, G. L. c. 109A, for 
carrying out a scheme to defraud the plaintiff creditors by 
transferring all marital assets to Kimberly through collusive 
divorce proceedings.  Flores is not a party to those actions. 
 
c.  Prior proceedings against Flores.  In July of 2020, the 
plaintiff creditors commenced a parallel action in the Superior 
Court against Flores based on his representation of Kimberly in 
her divorce; the plaintiffs' complaint alleged active 
participation in a fraudulent transfer, civil conspiracy, and 
violations of G. L. c. 93A. 
 
 
3 See Makowsky vs. von Thaden; Lower Cape Plastering LLC vs. 
von Thaden; and Bassichis vs. von Thaden (Superior Court Docket 
Nos. 1772CV00148, 1772CV00402, & 1772CV00490). 
9 
 
 
Flores moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that 
the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the litigation privilege.  
In their opposition to Flores's motion, the plaintiffs 
maintained that the litigation privilege protects only 
communications made in the course of litigation and does not 
protect conduct.  According to the plaintiffs, their claims were 
based on Flores's "conduct in effectuating the unlawful transfer 
of [William's] assets to his wife."  Consequently, they argued, 
the litigation privilege does not apply. 
 
After a hearing in September of 2020, a Superior Court 
judge allowed Flores's motion to dismiss.  In rejecting the 
plaintiffs' contention that their claims sought to hold Flores 
liable for his conduct, rather than for his communications, the 
judge reasoned that "it is the defendant's statements made in 
court, his misrepresentations, that constitute the basis of [the 
plaintiffs'] claims.  Characterizing the defendant's statements 
as 'orchestrating' fraud does not allow the plaintiffs to 
redefine the 'statements' as 'conduct' to avoid the privilege."  
The plaintiffs filed an appeal in the Appeals Court, and we 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  We review the allowance of a motion to 
dismiss de novo.  See Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 
Mass. 674, 676 (2011).  In conducting our review, we accept as 
true all of the facts alleged in the complaint and draw all 
10 
 
reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor.  See Flagg v. 
AliMed, Inc., 466 Mass. 23, 26 (2013), citing Marram v. Kobrick 
Offshore Fund, Ltd., 442 Mass. 43, 45 (2004). 
 
The crux of the complaint is that Flores "orchestrated the 
scheme," resulting in all of the marital assets being 
transferred to Kimberly through a judgment of divorce that 
William's creditors could not challenge.  The plaintiffs 
emphasize that William cooperated with the scheme by appearing 
pro se during the trial, introducing no evidence with respect to 
his substantial financial contributions to the marriage, and 
acknowledging his agreement with the award of the entirety of 
the marital estate to Kimberly.  The plaintiffs also argue that 
Flores fraudulently misrepresented to the judge that William had 
dissipated a significant amount of the marital assets, which 
provided the basis for the judge's order awarding all remaining 
assets to Kimberly. 
 
The motion judge's ruling focused on the allegation 
regarding fraudulent misrepresentations.  As the motion judge 
noted, this allegation is not based on conduct, but on 
statements that Flores made in court, to which the litigation 
privilege squarely applies.  Nonetheless, the plaintiffs 
maintain, without citation to apparent authority, that the 
privilege does not attach where the contested statements were 
made "for a purpose perverse to the search for truth," and that, 
11 
 
where the proceeding is a "collusive suffering of judgment by a 
debtor to effect a transfer of assets to his spouse" or 
otherwise related to "insider" fraud, it "is not the type of 
legal proceeding[] that would satisfy the requirement of being 
'sufficiently judicial in nature' to allow the parties or their 
counsel to assert the litigation privilege."  The motion judge 
did not address the plaintiffs' other claims, which involve 
alleged actions that were taken by Flores to obtain a favorable 
outcome for his client.  See Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 
420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995).  The plaintiffs argue that where an 
"attorney is personally engaged in tortious conduct with his 
clients," as they contend Flores was here, "the privilege does 
not protect the attorney from liability for such conduct." 
 
Because we conclude that the litigation privilege is 
applicable both to Flores's alleged misrepresentations during 
the course of the divorce proceedings and to his purported 
"actions," such as scheduling a trial in the von Thaden divorce 
despite the fact that the case was in no sense adversarial, the 
order allowing Flores's motion to dismiss must be affirmed. 
 
a.  Litigation privilege.  The roots of the litigation 
privilege can be found in English common law, with the first 
reported decision dismissing an action against an attorney on 
the ground of the privilege issued in 1606.  See Brook v. 
Montague, 79 Eng. Rep. 77, 77 (K.B. 1606); Anenson, Absolute 
12 
 
Immunity From Civil Liability:  Lessons for Litigation Lawyers, 
31 Pepp. L. Rev. 915, 918 (2004) (Anenson).  In that case, an 
English court held that an attorney accused of slandering his 
client's adversary during a previous trial -- by asserting that 
the adversary was a convicted felon -- was immune from suit.  
See Anenson, supra at 919.  The court decided that "[a] 
counsellor in law retained hath a privilege to enforce any thing 
which is informed him by his client, and to give it in evidence, 
it being pertinent to the matter in question, and not to examine 
whether it be true or false."  See id., quoting Brook, supra. 
 
Courts in the United States adopted this doctrine in the 
Nineteenth Century and frequently cited the early English cases 
in doing so.  See, e.g., Marsh v. Elsworth, 36 How. Pr. 532, 535 
(N.Y. Super. Ct. 1869), citing Brook, 79 Eng. Rep. at 77; Mower 
v. Watson, 11 Vt. 536, 540-541 (1839), citing Buckley v. Wood, 
76 Eng. Rep. 888 (K.B. 1591).  Over time, the scope of the 
doctrine has broadened.  See Hayden, Reconsidering the 
Litigator's Absolute Privilege to Defame, 54 Ohio St. L.J. 985, 
991 (1993).  Nearly every State, including Massachusetts, has 
adopted the formulation of the privilege set forth in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides: 
"An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish 
defamatory matter concerning another in communications 
preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the 
institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a 
13 
 
judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if 
it has some relation to the proceeding." 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 (1977).  "The privilege 
applies regardless of malice, bad faith, or any nefarious 
motives on the part of the lawyer so long as the conduct 
complained of has some relation to the litigation."  Anenson, 
supra at 918.  See Sriberg v. Raymond, 370 Mass. 105, 109 (1976) 
(adopting formulation of litigation privilege described in 
Restatement). 
 
In Massachusetts, as in all States that have adopted this 
formulation, application of the privilege extends beyond 
statements that are made in the court room itself to 
"communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding."  
See Sriberg, 370 Mass. at 108.  In Sriberg, supra at 105, 109, 
for instance, this court held that an attorney was immune from 
liability for allegedly defamatory statements contained in a 
letter that the attorney mailed to the plaintiff, in which the 
attorney threatened to pursue litigation.  Although formal 
proceedings had yet to begin, we observed that "[i]t appears 
desirable to install the privilege where such statements are 
made by an attorney engaged in his [or her] function as an 
attorney[,] whether in the institution or conduct of litigation 
or in conferences and other communications preliminary to 
litigation" (emphasis added).  Id. at 109. 
14 
 
 
Moreover, under the formulation set forth in the 
Restatement, the litigation privilege protects defamatory 
statements made in the course of judicial proceedings "even if 
uttered maliciously or in bad faith."  See Mezullo v. Maletz, 
331 Mass. 233, 236 (1954).  This court has reasoned that if the 
privilege were conditioned on the speaker's honest intentions, 
"he or she [might] still have to go to court to prove the 
absence of malice or recklessness."  See Correllas v. Viveiros, 
410 Mass. 314, 320 (1991).  "[T]he privilege would afford small 
comfort . . . if there was a possibility that [the speaker] 
would be subjected in every instance to an inquiry as to his [or 
her] motives."  Mezzulo, supra at 237. 
 
Although the privilege developed to protect lawyers from 
defamation suits, its scope has expanded in many States to bar 
additional claims, because "[a] privilege which protected an 
individual from liability for defamation would be of little 
value if the individual were subject to liability under a 
different theory of tort."  Correllas, 410 Mass. at 324.  See 
Lark Hill, The Litigation Privilege:  Its Place in Contemporary 
Jurisprudence, 44 Hofstra L. Rev 401, 404 (2016).  In 
Massachusetts, for example, it is well established that "[t]he 
privilege applies not only to defamation claims brought against 
[an] attorney, but to civil liability generally."  See Bartle v. 
Berry, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 378 (2008).  Thus, the privilege 
15 
 
has been applied in Massachusetts to bar claims for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, see Correllas, supra; abuse of 
process and negligence, see Robert L. Sullivan, D.D.S., P.C. v. 
Birmingham, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 359, 360, 367-368 (1981) 
(Sullivan); invasion of privacy, violations of G. L. c. 93A, and 
violations of the Civil Rights Act, G. L. c. 12, §§ 11H-11J, see 
Doe v. Nutter, McClennen & Fish, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 137, 140-141 
(1996). 
 
The litigation privilege promotes zealous advocacy by 
allowing attorneys "complete freedom of expression and candor in 
communications in their efforts to secure justice for their 
clients."  Sriberg, 370 Mass. at 108.  As Chief Justice Lemuel 
Shaw observed, 
"[I]t is, on the whole, for the public interest, and best 
calculated to subserve the purposes of justice, to allow 
counsel full freedom of speech, in conducting the causes, 
and advocating and sustaining the rights, of their 
constituents; and this freedom of discussion ought not to 
be impaired by numerous and refined distinctions." 
 
Hoar v. Wood, 3 Met. 193, 197-198 (1841).  "An essential 
ingredient of zealous representation is the freedom to err in 
favor of the client."  Mallen & Roberts, The Liability of a 
Litigation Attorney to a Party Opponent, 14 Willamette L.J. 387, 
390 (1978).  "Implicit in [the] duty of zealous representation 
is a recognition that there may be occasions when, in the heat 
of advocacy, statements may be made that are injudicious."  
16 
 
State v. Boyd, 166 W. Va. 690, 697 (1981).  Without the immunity 
afforded by the litigation privilege, an attorney's 
representation of his or her client would be compromised by the 
"fear of having to defend [him- or herself] in a subsequent 
civil action for misconduct."  Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, 
Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 
639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994) (Levin).  See Haynes & Boone, 
LLP v. NFTD, LLC, 631 S.W.3d 65, 79 (Tex. 2021) ("Attorney 
immunity exists to promote such loyal, faithful, and aggressive 
representation by alleviating in the mind of the attorney any 
fear that he or she may be sued by or held liable to a non-
client for providing such zealous representation" [quotation and 
citation omitted]). 
 
Similarly, the litigation privilege allows witnesses to 
testify without fear of civil liability, thereby encouraging 
full disclosure.  As this court noted almost 150 years ago, "in 
order to promote the most thorough investigation in courts of 
justice, public policy requires that witnesses shall not be 
restrained by the fear of being vexed by actions at the instance 
of those who are dissatisfied with their testimony."  Rice v. 
Coolidge, 121 Mass. 393, 395-396 (1876).  On balance, we have 
decided that "it is more important that witnesses be free from 
the fear of civil liability for what they say than that a person 
17 
 
who has been [harmed] by their testimony have a remedy."  Aborn 
v. Lipson, 357 Mass. 71, 72 (1970). 
 
In addition to fostering freedom of expression, the 
litigation privilege furthers the efficient administration of 
justice by preempting frivolous actions brought by disgruntled 
individuals in the wake of unfavorable judgments.  "[I]t is not 
a desire to prevent actions from being brought in cases where 
they ought to be maintained, but the fear that if the rule were 
otherwise, numerous actions would be brought against persons who 
were acting honestly in the discharge of a duty" (citation 
omitted).  See Sullivan, 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 367.  On the 
whole, it is preferable to bar all actions based on statements 
made in the course of litigation, rather than to open the 
floodgates to groundless lawsuits that would clog the courts 
with pointless litigation and force attorneys to expend time and 
resources that otherwise could be spent on representing clients, 
in their own defense.  See Jacob B. v. County of Shasta, 40 Cal. 
4th 948, 955 (2007) (litigation privilege "give[s] finality to 
judgments" and "avoid[s] unending litigation" [citation 
omitted]); Surace v. Wuliger, 25 Ohio St. 3d 229, 235 (1986) 
(litigation privilege avoids "clog[ging] court dockets with a 
multitude of lawsuits based upon alleged defamatory statements 
made in other judicial proceedings").  In this way, the 
litigation privilege has been understood to be "the backbone to 
18 
 
an effective and smoothly operating judicial system."  See 
Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 215 (1990), quoting 
McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 3d 
961, 970 (1987). 
 
At the same time, the privilege does not shield attorneys 
from their own wrongdoing.  "[T]here are remedies other than a 
cause of action for damages that can be imposed" to discourage 
and sanction attorney misconduct.  See Simms v. Seaman, 308 
Conn. 523, 536 (2013).  A trial judge has the inherent authority 
to sanction an attorney for his or her misconduct in the court 
room, see Wong v. Luu, 472 Mass. 208, 219 (2015), or to hold the 
attorney in contempt of court, see Sussman v. Commonwealth, 374 
Mass. 692, 695 (1978).  Separately, the Board of Bar Overseers 
may institute disciplinary proceedings against an attorney for a 
violation of the rules of professional responsibility.  See 
S.J.C. Rule 4:01.  Thus, "[a]lthough the result may be harsh in 
some instances and a party to a lawsuit may possibly be harmed 
without legal recourse, . . . [s]ufficient protection from gross 
abuse of the privilege is provided" by a judge's inherent powers 
and the specter of disciplinary proceedings.  See Surace v. 
Wuliger, 25 Ohio St. 3d 229, 234 (1986), quoting Justice v. 
Mowery, 69 Ohio App. 2d 75, 77 (1980).  See also Levin, 639 So. 
2d at 608-609 (trial court's inherent contempt powers may be 
used to punish "tortious conduct occurring during litigation"); 
19 
 
Clark v. Druckman, 218 W. Va. 427, 434 (2005) (rules of civil 
procedure, rules of professional conduct, and court's inherent 
authority "provide adequate safeguards to protect against 
abusive and frivolous litigation tactics"). 
 
With these considerations in mind, we turn to the question 
whether the plaintiffs' claims here are barred by the litigation 
privilege.  As the motion judge's ruling focused only on the 
purported fraudulent misrepresentations by Flores during the 
divorce proceedings, we first consider whether Flores is 
protected from liability based on these statements.  Because we 
accept every allegation in the complaint as true at this stage 
of the litigation, we then address the question whether the 
litigation privilege is applicable not just to statements made, 
but also to actions assertedly taken by Flores during the course 
of the divorce proceedings. 
 
b.  Litigation privilege and fraudulent misrepresentation.  
A court determines whether the litigation privilege is 
applicable "on a case-by-case basis, after a fact-specific 
analysis, with a proper consideration of the balance between a 
plaintiff's right to seek legal redress for injuries suffered 
and the public policy supporting the application of such a 
strong protection from the burdens of litigation."  See Fisher 
v. Lint, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 360, 365-366 (2007). 
20 
 
 
Although, as discussed, it is well settled that statements 
made during the course of litigation are protected by the 
litigation privilege, the plaintiffs contend that the privilege 
is inapplicable where an attorney's statements are designed to 
hinder, rather than to enhance, the "truth-seeking function of 
the adversary system."  They maintain that "the policy 
considerations underlying the litigation privilege all focus on 
the truth-seeking function of the adversary system of justice," 
and that the privilege therefore only applies where it supports 
this function. 
 
We have long recognized, in the context of defamation 
claims, that the litigation privilege applies regardless of bad 
faith or malicious intent.  See Mezullo, 331 Mass. at 236; Laing 
v. Mitten, 185 Mass. 233, 235 (1904).  As we noted in Aborn, 357 
Mass. at 73, "[t]o hold that a false statement, knowingly made" 
is not subject to the litigation privilege "would render the 
privilege illusory and of little value."  "The privilege would 
depend on the knowledge or lack of it possessed by the person 
making the defamatory statement," id., which would become known 
only through litigation challenging the statements. 
 
The same rationale applies where an attorney is accused of 
making fraudulent misrepresentations in the course of 
representing a client.  If the protection of the litigation 
privilege was not in effect where an attorney knowingly 
21 
 
misrepresented material facts, at the client's behest, during 
the course of litigation, the fear of civil liability could 
limit the attorney's ability to function as a zealous advocate 
for his or her client.  The Connecticut Supreme Court, for 
instance, determined that two attorneys were protected by the 
litigation privilege against claims that they intentionally 
concealed their client's true financial circumstances during an 
appeal from a court order that modified the amount of required 
alimony payments.  See Simms, 308 Conn. at 568-569.  The court 
explained that "[t]he privilege is not intended to give 
offending attorneys immunity for making fraudulent statements 
but to protect the overwhelming number of innocent attorneys 
from unjust claims of fraudulent conduct."  Id. at 563 n.25.  
The litigation privilege thus serves "to encourage robust 
representation of clients and to protect the vast majority of 
attorneys who are innocent of wrongdoing from harassment in the 
form of retaliatory litigation by litigants dissatisfied with 
the outcome of a prior proceeding."  Id. at 562-564. 
 
This reasoning, which has deep roots in English and 
American common law, is persuasive.  See, e.g., Gregoire v. 
Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 
949 (1950) ("[it is] better to leave unredressed the wrongs done 
by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their 
duty to the constant dread of retaliation"); Munster v. Lamb, 11 
22 
 
Q.D.B. 588, 604 (1883) ("it is better to make the rule of law so 
large that an innocent counsel shall never be troubled, although 
by making it so large counsel are included who have been guilty 
of malice and misconduct").  In deciding that the litigation 
privilege is applicable to claims of fraud, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court examined the well-established pattern of expansion 
of the litigation privilege to similar claims in other States: 
"Thus, courts have applied the privilege to bar causes of 
action for, among others, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress; interference with contractual 
relationship; fraud; invasion of privacy; abuse of process; 
and negligent misrepresentation.' . . .  [An] objective [of 
this expansion] simply has been to recognize that the 
privilege should apply to other acts associated with an 
attorney's 'function as an advocate.'  Dory v. Ryan, [25 
F.3d 81, 83 (1994).  See also [Abanto vs. Hayt, Hayt & 
Landau, P.L., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 11–24543–CIV (S.D. Fla. 
Oct. 18, 2012) (litigation privilege applied to statutory 
cause of action under Florida Consumer Collection Practices 
Act); Hahn vs. United States Dep't of Commerce, U.S. Dist. 
Ct., No. 11–6369(ES) (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2012); Rickenbach v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 635 F. Supp. 2d 389, 401–402 
(D.N.J. 2009)] (litigation privilege applies to claims 
against attorney for negligence and breach of duty of good 
faith and fair dealing because privilege is 'broadly 
applicable' and implied abrogation of privilege is not 
favored); Linder v. Brown & Herrick, 189 Ariz. 398, 405–
406 . . . (App. 1997) (litigation privilege applies to 
claims of fraud); Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & 
Frappier v. Cole, [950 So. 2d 380], 384 (Fla. 2007) ('the 
litigation privilege applies in all causes of action, 
whether for common-law torts or statutory violations,' 
including alleged violations of Florida Consumer Collection 
Practices Act and Florida Unfair and Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act); [Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608] (litigation 
privilege applies to claim of tortious interference with 
business relationship because 'absolute immunity must be 
afforded to any act occurring during the course of a 
judicial proceeding, regardless of whether the act involves 
a defamatory statement or other tortious behavior . . . 
23 
 
[as] long as the act has some relation to the proceeding'); 
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, [2003 UT 9, 
¶ 77] (litigation privilege applies to claim of deceit when 
complaint alleges that attorneys made statements with 
intent to deceive courts)." 
 
Simms, 308 Conn. at 567-568.  Consistent with the other 
jurisdictions, we conclude that the litigation privilege 
protects Flores from liability based on the allegedly fraudulent 
misrepresentations he made to the judge during the divorce 
trial. 
 
The plaintiff creditors' argument that the litigation 
privilege is applicable only where it fosters truth-seeking 
misconstrues the policies that the litigation privilege is 
designed to advance.  The underlying purpose of the litigation 
privilege is to allow participants in judicial proceedings the 
freedom to speak without fear of subsequent litigation based on 
their words.  See Gillette Co. v. Provost, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 
133, 141 (2017).  Although this freedom is thought to facilitate 
truthful disclosure of testifying witnesses, see Matsuura v. 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 102 Haw. 149, 155 (2003), its 
application to attorneys rests on an additional ground:  to 
ensure that an attorney fulfilling his or her ethical duty to 
advocate for a client is not "hobbled by the fear of reprisal," 
Russell v. Clark, 620 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).  To 
be sure, eliminating such concerns "encourages candor on the 
part of honest attorneys, who greatly outnumber those few 
24 
 
attorneys who choose not to abide by the rules."  See Simms, 308 
Conn. at 563-564.  It does, however, come at the cost of 
potentially protecting an individual attorney who misrepresents 
material facts to further the attorney's clients' interests.  We 
accept this broad protection as necessary to encourage zealous 
advocacy. 
 
c.  Application of litigation privilege to conduct.  In 
assessing whether Flores was immune from liability for his 
representation of Kimberly in her divorce, we also must 
determine whether the litigation privilege extends beyond 
communications made during the course of judicial proceedings to 
actions taken by the attorney.  As stated, the plaintiffs seek 
to hold Flores liable not only for his alleged 
misrepresentations during the course of the divorce proceeding, 
but also for his conduct in "orchestrating" the purported scheme 
to defraud them, which they contend went beyond communications 
and had the effect of taking actions.  This purported conduct 
apparently included scheduling a trial in the divorce case and 
submitting proposed findings of fact to the court. 
 
Although this issue may be a question of first impression 
in Massachusetts, as noted supra, multiple State supreme courts 
have held that the litigation privilege shields an attorney from 
liability for actions taken during the course of litigation.  
See, e.g., Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608; Kahala Royal Corp. v. 
25 
 
Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, LLP, 113 Haw. 251, 271 (2007); 
Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 839 (2010); Cantey Hanger, 
LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 482 (Tex. 2015); Moss v. Parr 
Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, 2012 UT 42, ¶¶ 34-36; Clark, 218 
W. Va. at 433.  These courts have determined that the policies 
justifying application of the litigation privilege to an 
attorney's statements made in the course of litigation apply 
with equal force to the attorney's conduct.  For instance, the 
Florida Supreme Court has observed that 
"absolute immunity must be afforded to any act occurring 
during the course of a judicial proceeding, regardless of 
whether the act involves a defamatory statement or other 
tortious behavior . . . so long as the act has some 
relation to the proceeding.  The rationale behind immunity 
afforded to defamatory statements is equally applicable to 
other misconduct occurring during the course of a judicial 
proceeding.  Just as participants in litigation must be 
free to engage in unhindered communication, so too must 
those participants be free to use their best judgment in 
prosecuting or defending a lawsuit without fear of having 
to defend their actions in a subsequent civil action for 
misconduct." 
 
Levin, supra. 
 
These arguments are compelling.  As discussed, the 
litigation privilege "is based upon a public policy of securing 
to attorneys as officers of the court the utmost freedom in 
their efforts to secure justice for their clients."  Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 586 comment a.  In light of this policy, "we 
see no reason to distinguish between communications made during 
the litigation process and conduct occurring during the 
26 
 
litigation process."  Clark, 218 W. Va. at 433.  The acts of 
preparing and advancing a litigation strategy are as integral to 
the duties of a lawyer as is advocating in the court room.  The 
strategic decisions a lawyer makes in an effort to serve his or 
her client warrant protection from civil liability, regardless 
of whether those decisions require the lawyer to speak or to act 
on the client's behalf.  See Loigman v. Township Committee of 
Middletown, 185 N.J. 566, 587-588 (2006) ("Lawyers necessarily 
exercise a wide degree of discretion in performing their duties 
in the course of judicial proceedings, and must be free to 
pursue the best course charted for their clients without the 
distraction of a vindictive lawsuit looming on the horizon").  
"The litigation privilege must have sufficient breadth to 
advance the best interests of the administration of justice."  
Id. at 588. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the litigation privilege 
applies to an attorney's actions during the course of a judicial 
proceeding, just as it does to the attorney's communications.  
"To find otherwise would invite attorneys to divide their 
interest between advocating for their client and protecting 
themselves from a retributive suit."  Taylor, 149 Idaho at 841.  
See Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 405 
(Tex. App. 2005) ("If an attorney could be held liable to an 
opposing party for statements made or actions taken in the 
27 
 
course of representing his client, [the attorney] would be 
forced constantly to balance his [or her] own potential exposure 
against [the] client's best interest"). 
 
Thus, the plaintiff creditors' argument that the litigation 
privilege does not apply here because Flores was "personally 
engaged in tortious conduct with his clients" is unavailing.  
The plaintiffs rely on the Appeals Court's decision in Kurker v. 
Hill, 44 Mass. App. Ct 184, 192 (1998), in which the court held 
that the litigation privilege did not shield the defendant 
attorneys from liability on a claim for interference with 
advantageous business relations because the privilege did not 
"encompass the defendant attorneys' conduct in counseling and 
assisting their clients in business matters generally."  This 
reliance is inapposite.  The attorneys in Kurker provided legal 
advice and services in connection with the purchase and sale of 
corporate assets; their assistance was not confined to 
litigation and, indeed, primarily was related to "counselling 
and assisting their clients in business matters generally," 
rather than the preparation or conduct of litigation.  Id.  
Here, all of Flores's actions occurred in the context of the von 
Thaden divorce.  The litigation privilege thus applies to 
Flores's advice and to the services he rendered. 
 
That tort liability is not available, however, does not 
preclude those who have been harmed by an attorney's fraudulent 
28 
 
statements or actions from being able to obtain relief,4 nor does 
it deprive the public of a mechanism for discouraging attorney 
misconduct.  Trial judges possess the inherent authority to 
"sanction an attorney for making knowingly false 
misrepresentations to the court, intentionally misleading the 
court, or knowingly concealing information that an attorney has 
a duty to provide to the court."5  Wong, 472 Mass. 219.  Trial 
judges also have inherent "power to sanction an attorney for 
engaging in conduct in the court room that interferes with a 
judge's ability to manage the court room fairly, efficiently, 
and respectfully," or for engaging in other types of misconduct 
 
4 Third parties who allege that they were harmed by the 
actions of an attorney's client also are not precluded by the 
litigation privilege from obtaining financial relief.  For 
instance, here, shortly after he filed his complaint in the 
Superior Court against William and Kimberly, plaintiff Makowsky 
also obtained a real estate attachment in the amount of $53,000 
on all real estate William and Kimberly owned in Barnstable 
County.  When they filed their complaint in the Superior Court, 
Bassichis and Freed also obtained a real estate attachment in 
the amount of $50,000 on all real estate in Barnstable County 
owned by William.  Similarly, on the day that it filed its 
complaint in the District Court, Lower Cape Plastering obtained 
a real estate attachment in the amount of $22,000 on all real 
estate in Barnstable County held in William's name.  Following a 
jury trial, judgment entered for Lower Cape Plastering in the 
amount of $31,281.26.  Lower Cape Plastering received $22,000 of 
that amount, which was being held by the deputy sheriff as a 
result of the prejudgment attachment; it then commenced an 
action in the Superior Court to enforce the remainder of the 
District Court's judgment. 
 
 
5 We do not intend to imply that an attorney in Flores's 
position would have a duty to apprise a court of the attorney's 
view of the client's financial position. 
29 
 
that "threatens a judge's ability to ensure the fair 
administration of justice."  Id.  Such sanctions may be in the 
form of fines designed to compensate the aggrieved person for 
losses incurred by the misconduct of the offending party.  See 
Avelino-Wright v. Wright, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 (2001), citing 
Clark v. Clark, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 737, 744-745 (1999). 
 
Furthermore, an attorney may be subject to disciplinary 
proceedings for his or her misrepresentations to a court or 
other misconduct.  Rule 3.3 of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Professional Conduct, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1416 (2015), for 
example, prohibits the making of a "false statement of fact or 
law to a tribunal," while Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4, as appearing in 
471 Mass. 1483 (2015), deems it to be professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation."  In bar discipline proceedings 
involving an attorney's material misrepresentations to a court, 
the presumptive sanction is a suspension from the practice of 
law in the Commonwealth for a period of one year.  See, e.g., 
Matter of Neitlich, 413 Mass. 416, 420, 425 (1992) (one-year 
suspension where respondent's misrepresentations to Probate and 
Family Court judge and opposing counsel constituted "knowing 
concealment" and were "deliberate, planned attempts . . . to 
conceal from the Court and his opponent the full terms of [a] 
proposed sale").  Where an attorney lies under oath, the 
30 
 
presumptive sanction is a two-year suspension from the practice 
of law.  See Matter of Balliro, 453 Mass. 75, 86-87 (2009), 
quoting Matter of O'Donnell, 23 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 508, 
514 n.3 (2007). 
 
Thus, a determination that an attorney is immune from civil 
liability for making fraudulent misrepresentations about 
material aspects of a client's case, or for engaging in 
misconduct, would not shield the attorney from any applicable 
sanction for conduct contrary to the rules of professional 
responsibility, nor would it suggest to other attorneys that 
such behavior is acceptable. 
Judgment affirmed.