Title: Valentine v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC20-1805
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 7, 2022

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC20-1805 
____________ 
 
TERANCE VALENTINE, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
April 7, 2022 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Terance Valentine, a prisoner under sentence of death, 
appeals the circuit court’s order summarily denying his second 
successive motion for postconviction relief, filed under rule 3.851 of 
the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.1  For the reasons that 
follow, we affirm. 
I. 
Background 
Valentine brutally tortured and murdered Ferdinand Porche in 
1988.  The evidence from Valentine’s third trial establishes the 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
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following sequence of events on the day Porche was murdered.  
Porche arrived home from work in the early afternoon.  Upon his 
entry into the home, Valentine shot him in the back, paralyzing him 
from the waist down.  Valentine announced, “[T]his is my revenge.”  
Valentine v. State, 688 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 1996). 
Valentine then forced Porche to crawl into a bedroom “where 
he found his wife nude, bound, and gagged and his baby crying and 
covered in blood.”  Id.  In that bedroom, Valentine bludgeoned 
Porche in the head at least three times with a gun, which broke 
Porche’s jaw and caused him to lose several teeth.  After that 
beating, Valentine told Porche, “I’m gonna kill you, but you’re gonna 
suffer.  This is not going to be easy.”  Id.  He then stabbed Porche in 
the buttocks and bound him with baling wire. 
Following the brutal attack in the home, Valentine took Porche 
and his wife2 to a remote location nine miles away.  There, 
Valentine again confronted Porche who was bound, helpless, and in 
severe agony.  Valentine pointed a gun at one of Porche’s eyes from 
 
2.  We are aware that Livia Romero was not legally married to 
Porche.  But we use the designation “wife” as it is in keeping with 
our past opinions in Valentine’s case. 
 
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point-blank range and then pulled the trigger.  That shot finally 
killed Porche.  Remarkably, Porche’s wife—whom Valentine also 
shot in the head—survived and would later become a key State 
witness. 
The State charged Valentine with the first-degree murder of 
Porche and other crimes.  Valentine’s first trial resulted in a 
mistrial.  Following his second trial, a jury found him guilty of 
first-degree murder and recommended a sentence of death.  
However, due to a jury-selection error, we reversed Valentine’s 
convictions and vacated his sentences.  Valentine v. State, 616 So. 
2d 971, 974-75 (Fla. 1993). 
On remand, a jury again found Valentine guilty of several 
crimes, including first-degree murder.  Valentine waived a 
penalty-phase jury, and the trial court ultimately sentenced him to 
death.  We affirmed the first-degree murder conviction and death 
sentence.  Valentine, 688 So. 2d at 318. 
Since that time, Valentine has sought relief in both state and 
federal court, but has had no success in either forum.  
See Valentine v. State, 98 So. 3d 44, 58 (Fla. 2012) (affirming denial 
of initial postconviction motion and denying habeas petition); 
 
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Valentine v. State, 296 So. 3d 375, 376 (Fla. 2020) (affirming 
summary denial of first successive postconviction motion). 
Valentine has now filed his second successive motion for 
postconviction relief asserting three claims that all involve an 
eyewitness named Terry Spain who recently completed an affidavit.  
Valentine’s primary claim seeks relief on the ground that Spain’s 
affidavit constitutes newly discovered evidence which entitles him to 
a new trial.  In his affidavit, Spain states that he saw a white male 
standing roughly 40 to 50 yards away from him.  After hearing two 
gunshots, Spain fled from the scene and called for police 
assistance—ultimately speaking with police on multiple occasions.  
Later, during Valentine’s first trial, law enforcement provided Spain 
a hotel room, meals, and $300 in cash.  According to the affidavit, 
Spain did not testify at that trial or the subsequent trials, nor did 
trial counsel or any defense investigator ever contact him. 
In addition to the newly discovered evidence claim, Valentine 
alleged that the State violated Brady and Giglio in its handling of 
Spain during the first trial.  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
 
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The circuit court summarily denied Valentine’s motion in its 
entirety.  As an initial matter, the court ruled that all the claims 
were procedurally barred for not being timely raised.  In addition, 
applying the standard set forth in Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512 
(Fla. 1998), the court ruled that the allegations in the affidavit did 
not constitute newly discovered evidence, and, even if they did, that 
evidence was not of such a nature as would likely produce an 
acquittal on retrial—stressing the overwhelming evidence of guilt.  
As for the other claims, the court found that the record refuted the 
Brady claim and that the Giglio claim was legally insufficient. 
This appeal follows. 
II. 
Analysis 
Valentine argues that the circuit court erred in denying his 
postconviction motion without first holding an evidentiary hearing.  
We disagree. 
 
“A circuit court should hold an evidentiary hearing on a rule 
3.851 motion ‘whenever the movant makes a facially sufficient 
claim that requires a factual determination.’ ”  Rogers v. State, 327 
So. 3d 784, 787 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Pardo v. State, 108 So. 3d 558, 
 
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560 (Fla. 2012)).3  In contrast, a circuit court may summarily deny 
a claim that is legally insufficient or refuted by the record.  Id. at 
787-88; McDonald v. State, 296 So. 3d 382, 383 n.2 (Fla. 2020).  
With these principles in mind, we turn to Valentine’s claims. 
As noted above, Valentine’s first claim sought a new guilt 
phase based on newly discovered evidence.  To be facially sufficient, 
a claim of newly discovered evidence must meet the two-part Jones 
test.  We have described that test as follows: 
First, the evidence must not have been known by the trial 
court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it 
must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could 
not have known of it by the use of diligence.  Second, the 
newly discovered evidence must be of such [a] nature 
that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. 
 
Long v. State, 183 So. 3d 342, 345 (Fla. 2016) (quoting Tompkins v. 
State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1086 (Fla. 2008)). 
We agree with the circuit court that the record conclusively 
refutes Valentine’s newly discovered evidence claim.  That claim is 
based on Spain’s affidavit.  However, as the circuit court noted, 
police reports and the transcript from the second trial contain 
 
3.  “The standard of review here is de novo.”  Rogers, 327 So. 
3d at 787 n.5. 
 
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much of the information in Spain’s affidavit.  Information available 
from those sources clearly does not meet the first prong of Jones.  
The only “new” information in the affidavit was that law 
enforcement provided Spain a hotel room, meals, and $300 in cash 
during Valentine’s first trial.  However, the record demonstrates 
that trial counsel was aware of Spain’s involvement in the case and 
could have ascertained these additional facts if due diligence had 
been exercised.  See Rogers, 327 So. 3d at 788.  Thus, Valentine 
failed to meet prong one of the Jones test as to all the allegations in 
Spain’s affidavit.4  Accordingly, the circuit court properly denied 
Valentine’s newly discovered evidence claim. 
Valentine’s Brady claim fares no better.  To prevail on a Brady 
claim, Valentine must demonstrate that (1) favorable evidence 
which is exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was suppressed by the 
State, and (3) because the evidence was material, he was 
prejudiced.  See Sweet v. State, 293 So. 3d 448, 451 (Fla. 2020). 
 
4.  Based on our review of the record, we conclude that 
evidence of the State’s handling of Spain during Valentine’s first 
trial would not likely produce an acquittal on retrial—especially 
given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.  Accordingly, the record 
also refutes the second prong of Valentine’s Jones claim. 
 
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As noted above, Valentine’s Brady claim is also premised on 
information in Spain’s affidavit—primarily the State’s handling of 
Spain during Valentine’s first trial.  However, Valentine does not 
allege that the State prevented him from calling Spain at the third 
trial—i.e., the trial resulting in the first-degree murder conviction he 
is now challenging.  Thus, at a minimum, Valentine failed to 
demonstrate suppression of evidence in relation to the relevant 
trial.  Accordingly, the circuit court properly denied the Brady 
claim.5 
 
5.  As noted above, Valentine asserted a Giglio claim in his 
motion, but he failed to identify any false testimony by a state 
witness.  See Jimenez v. State, 265 So. 3d 462, 479 (Fla. 2018).  
The circuit court found the claim legally insufficient.  On appeal, 
Valentine has made no argument specifically challenging that 
ruling.   Thus, he has abandoned any argument as to the denial of 
the claim.  See Doorbal v. State, 983 So. 2d 464, 482-83 (Fla. 2008) 
(conclusory argument insufficient to support reversal); Ward v. 
State, 19 So. 3d 1060, 1061 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (en banc) (finding 
issues abandoned where appellant did not “address[] them in his 
brief”). 
 
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III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s 
summary denial of Valentine’s second successive motion for 
postconviction relief. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, 
COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County, 
Michelle Sisco, Judge – Case No. 291988CF012996000AHC 
 
Marie-Louise Samuels Parmer and Maria DeLiberato of Parmer 
DeLiberato, P.A., Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Appellant 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Rick A. 
Buchwalter, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Appellee