Title: Ex parte Kendall Tewayne Johnson. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: State of Alabama v. Kendall Tewayne Johsnon) (Montgomery Circuit Court: CC-21-93).
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC-2023-0251
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 15, 2023

Rel: December 15, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0251 
_________________________ 
 
Ex parte Kendall Tewayne Johnson 
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
 
(In re: State of Alabama 
 
v.  
 
Kendall Tewayne Johnson)  
 
(Montgomery Circuit Court: CC-21-93)  
 
 
 
 
SC-2023-0251 
2 
 
MITCHELL, Justice. 
 
This case arises from a shootout in a Montgomery neighborhood, in 
the aftermath of a heated argument between family members.  The 
petitioner, Kendall Tewayne Johnson, exchanged fire with his uncle, 
Cedric Lee Hubbard, eventually striking Hubbard and killing him.  A 
grand jury indicted Johnson for murder.  But before the case could go to 
trial, Johnson filed a motion for self-defense immunity, arguing that 
Hubbard shot first and that he had returned fire only to defend himself 
and others from Hubbard's attack.   
The prosecution opposed Johnson's motion but nonetheless 
stipulated that everyone who witnessed the shooting would testify that 
Hubbard had attacked first.  The prosecution also did not submit any 
evidence suggesting that Johnson had attacked, menaced, or threatened 
Hubbard before the shootout, nor did it argue that additional discovery 
might reveal such evidence.   
Despite the prosecution's stipulations, and despite the absence of 
any evidence that Johnson was the initial aggressor, the Montgomery 
Circuit Court denied Johnson's motion.  That was error.  Because the 
SC-2023-0251 
3 
 
stipulated facts clearly establish Johnson's entitlement to self-defense 
immunity, we grant his petition for a writ of mandamus. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
After a grand jury indicted him for murder, Johnson filed a pretrial 
motion for immunity under § 13A-3-23(d), Ala. Code 1975, arguing that 
he shot Hubbard in self-defense.  Johnson explained that he and his 
cousin, Ayindae Brown, had been outside Hubbard's house in 
Montgomery during the afternoon of May 12, 2019, when Hubbard -- who 
was drunk at the time -- pulled a gun on the two men and told them to 
leave.  Ayindae turned his back to walk away, at which point Hubbard 
opened fire.  It was only after Hubbard had begun firing, Johnson said, 
that he pulled out his own weapon and returned fire in defense of himself 
and his cousin. 
 
The prosecution opposed Johnson's motion.  It pointed out that 
Johnson did not have a valid permit for his firearm at the time of the 
shooting and argued that this unlawful action deprived Johnson of his 
eligibility for immunity under Alabama law.1  The prosecution further 
 
1The permitting requirement for concealed weapons has since been 
repealed.  See Act No. 2022-133, § 9(2), Ala. Acts 2022. 
SC-2023-0251 
4 
 
argued that Johnson and Ayindae were "the initial aggressors because 
they came to [Hubbard's] residence to confront [Hubbard]" regarding an 
earlier family argument shortly before Hubbard started shooting at 
them. 
 
Instead of hearing oral testimony on Johnson's motion, the trial 
court agreed to resolve the motion based on a series of factual stipulations 
jointly submitted by Johnson and the prosecution.  Those stipulations 
provided as follows. 
 
On Mother's Day in 2019, Hubbard got into a heated argument with 
Ayindae's mother, Latoya Brown, outside Hubbard's house in 
Montgomery.  The argument was about money -- specifically, about a 
check belonging to Hubbard and Latoya's daughter, Shaliya Brown.  
Shaliya testified that her father, who had previously announced that "he 
was going to get drunk for Mother's Day," was intoxicated at the time.  
The argument between Hubbard and Latoya escalated until, at one point, 
Hubbard threatened to kill Latoya.  Latoya then fled the house and called 
her adult son, Ayindae, to explain what had happened.   
Later that afternoon, Ayindae and Johnson stopped by Hubbard's 
house so that Ayindae could "talk to Shaliya about the argument."  The 
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two men were accompanied by Ayindae's girlfriend -- a young woman 
named Ventrelya Smith -- and her baby daughter.  As soon as Ayindae 
and Johnson stepped out of their vehicle, Hubbard -- who had been 
visiting with his neighbor, Michael Robinson, at Robinson's house -- 
"came from across the street," walked up to the two men, and demanded 
to know what Ayindae's "problem" was.  Ayindae responded by asking 
whether it was true that Hubbard had threatened to shoot his mother.  
Hubbard answered that it was true and then told Ayindae to leave.   
 
Apart from Hubbard and Johnson, there were six people in the area 
who witnessed all or part of what transpired next: Shaliya, Dekerria 
Johnson (Shaliya's half sister and Hubbard's stepdaughter), Dezi 
Jefferson (the daughters' mutual friend), Robinson, Ayindae, and Smith.   
Only four of those six people -- Dekerria, Jefferson, Ayindae, and 
Smith -- witnessed how the shooting began.  All four of them stated, 
without contradiction, that Ayindae tried to walk away after Hubbard 
told him to leave but that, as soon as Ayindae "turned to go back to his 
vehicle, Hubbard fired a weapon in [Ayindae and Johnson's] direction."  
Johnson then pulled out his own weapon and "returned fire," hitting and 
ultimately killing Hubbard.   
SC-2023-0251 
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Every witness who saw the beginning of the shooting also agreed 
that Johnson had been on the sidelines, standing by Ayindae's car -- 
which was parked across from Hubbard's house -- at the time Hubbard 
began firing.  Several witnesses also stated (again without contradiction) 
that Hubbard was drunk at the time and that he had armed himself with 
two firearms, "a big gun" and "a little gun," before approaching Ayindae.   
 
Finally, every witness who was present that day indicated that they 
saw Ayindae and Johnson running away or attempting to take cover 
while Hubbard was shooting.  Hubbard's friend and neighbor, Robinson, 
said that he saw Hubbard chasing Ayindae and Johnson "into the street 
while shooting" at them, even though the two men were "backing up" and 
away from Hubbard at the time.  Hubbard's stepdaughter, Dekerria, told 
police that Hubbard began firing at Ayindae after Ayindae had "turned 
to leave."  Ayindae and Smith each told police that Ayindae had already 
"turned to walk back to [his] car when [Hubbard] began shooting" at him.  
Jefferson stated that, while she did not see how the shooting began, she 
did see Ayindae and Johnson "running away."  And Hubbard's daughter, 
Shaliya, who also did not see how the shooting began, said that when she 
looked outside, she saw "Hubbard in the street shooting" while Johnson 
SC-2023-0251 
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was "across the street," trying to shield himself "behind a tree," while 
returning Hubbard's fire.   
 
One of Johnson's bullets eventually struck Hubbard in the chest, 
killing him.  After Hubbard stopped shooting, Johnson and Ayindae fled.  
None of Hubbard's bullets struck Johnson or Ayindae, though Dekerria 
and Jefferson both testified that one of Hubbard's stray bullets did "hit 
[an unnamed mutual] friend on the side of her leg" and that the friend 
had to be taken to the hospital for treatment.   
  
Police eventually recovered several bullets from the scene, 
including six .40-caliber casings, which came from Johnson's pistol, and 
eight .45-caliber casings from another gun.  The gun that fired the .45-
caliber casings -- which presumably was the "big gun" that witnesses 
described Hubbard as carrying -- was never recovered.  The police did 
recover Hubbard's small gun, "a 0.25 caliber weapon," but did not recover 
any .25-caliber casings from the scene (though it is unclear from the 
record whether Hubbard's .25-caliber weapon was the type of gun capable 
of ejecting shell casings).  Johnson conceded that he did not have "a 
legally valid pistol permit."  
SC-2023-0251 
8 
 
 
After reviewing these stipulated facts, the trial court denied 
Johnson's request for self-defense immunity in a one-paragraph order, 
which stated that, based on its review of "the facts as stipulated by the 
parties," Johnson was ineligible for self-defense immunity because: (1) 
Johnson and Ayindae were the initial aggressors; (2) Johnson was 
required to retreat from the altercation because he had engaged in illegal 
activity by carrying his pistol without a permit; and (3) the fact that 
Johnson was carrying a pistol without a permit was "prima facie evidence 
of his intent to commit the murder."   
 
Johnson filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Court of 
Criminal Appeals, which denied his petition in a per curiam opinion, over 
the dissent of two judges.  See Ex parte Johnson, [Ms. CR-21-0117, Mar. 
24, 2023] ___ So. 3d ____ (Ala. Crim. App. 2023).  Johnson then sought 
mandamus review in this court, in accordance with Rule 21, Ala. R. App. 
P.  We ordered an answer and briefs.   
Standard of Review 
We review de novo a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals on 
an original petition for a writ of mandamus.  Rule 21(e)(1), Ala. R. App. 
P.; Ex parte Sharp, 893 So. 2d 571, 573 (Ala. 2003).  Mandamus relief is 
SC-2023-0251 
9 
 
appropriate when "'"the petitioner can show (1) a clear legal right to the 
order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, 
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate 
remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court."'"  State 
v. Jones, 13 So. 3d 915, 919 (Ala. 2008) (citations omitted). 
   
In determining whether the petitioner has satisfied that standard, 
"this Court reviews issues of law de novo."  Ex parte Terry, 957 So. 2d 
455, 457 (Ala. 2006).  Accordingly, when "'"the facts before the trial court 
are essentially undisputed"'" -- as they are in cases such as this one, in 
which no oral testimony was heard and the only evidence before the trial 
court was a set of stipulated facts -- "'"the court's judgment carries no 
presumption of correctness."'" Id. (citations omitted).   
Analysis 
Alabama law generally allows a person to use "deadly physical 
force" against another to defend himself or a third person when he 
"reasonably believes" that the other person is "[u]sing or about to use 
unlawful deadly physical force."  § 13A-3-23(a)(1).  But there are some 
important exceptions to that rule.  As relevant here, a person is not 
justified in using physical force to defend himself or a third person if 
SC-2023-0251 
10 
 
"He or she was the initial aggressor, except that his or her 
use of physical force upon another person under the 
circumstances is justifiable if he or she withdraws from the 
encounter and effectively communicates to the other person 
his or her intent to do so, but the latter person nevertheless 
continues or threatens the use of unlawful physical force." 
§ 13A-3-23(c)(2).   
At common law, the victim of a violent attack was required to make 
a reasonable attempt to retreat, if retreat was feasible, before using 
deadly force against his attacker.  Hill v. State, 194 Ala. 11, 26, 69 So. 
941, 947 (1915).  But our self-defense statute modifies that common-law 
rule, giving any victim the right to "stand his or her ground" and refuse 
to retreat, so long as the victim is otherwise justified in using physical 
force under § 13A-3-23(a), is "not engaged in an unlawful activity," and 
is in a "place where he or she ha[s] the right to be."  § 13A-3-23(b). 
Our self-defense statute also provides a procedural safe harbor for 
victims of violent crime, allowing anyone who claims that he was justified 
in defending himself -- either under the common-law approach or under 
the stand-your-ground protection conferred by the Legislature -- to seek 
immunity from criminal prosecution by filing a pretrial motion under 
subsection (d).  A defendant who files a pretrial immunity motion carries 
the burden of demonstrating "by a preponderance of the evidence that he 
SC-2023-0251 
11 
 
or she is immune from criminal prosecution."  § 13A-3-23(d)(2).  But if a 
defendant does not meet his burden of proving his entitlement to self-
defense immunity at the pretrial hearing, he may nonetheless pursue the 
defense at trial, at which point the prosecution bears the burden of 
proving that he did not act in defense of himself or others, along with all 
the other elements of murder. § 13A-3-23(d)(4); Ex parte Johnson, 433 
So. 2d 479, 481 (Ala. 1983).   
As noted above, the trial court provided three justifications for its 
determination that Johnson was ineligible for self-defense immunity.  
First, it held that Johnson was an "initial aggressor" and was therefore 
barred from invoking self-defense immunity under subsection (c).  
Second, it held that Johnson was required to retreat from the altercation 
because he had engaged in an "illegal activity" by carrying his pistol 
without a permit.  Finally, the trial court held that Johnson's decision to 
carry a pistol without a permit was "prima facie evidence of his intent to 
commit the murder."  We address each of those holdings in turn.  
A. Johnson was not the "initial aggressor" 
Everyone seems to agree that Johnson satisfies the baseline 
requirements set out in § 13A-3-23(a)(1) to be eligible for self-defense 
SC-2023-0251 
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immunity.  At the time Johnson killed Hubbard, Hubbard was actively 
firing at Johnson and his cousin.  Johnson, therefore, "reasonably 
believe[d]" that Hubbard was "[u]sing or about to use unlawful deadly 
physical force" against him or another person.  § 13A-3-23(a)(1).  
But the trial court determined that Johnson was ineligible for self-
defense immunity based on the carveout in subsection (c)(2) because, it 
reasoned, Johnson "was one member of a group that initiated the 
aggression" against Hubbard.  In other words, the trial court concluded 
that Ayindae's decision to verbally confront Hubbard about Hubbard's 
threats against Ayindae's mother was an act of initial aggression and 
that Johnson had participated in that aggression by accompanying 
Ayindae during his visit to Hubbard's house.   
The trial court's conclusion reflects a mistaken understanding of 
what constitutes "initial aggress[ion]" under § 13A-3-23(c)(2).  While a 
person who starts an argument might be said to have behaved 
"aggressively" in a loose sense of that word, the term carries a more 
precise meaning in criminal law.  In that context, as the Court of 
Criminal Appeals has elsewhere explained, the term "initial aggressor" 
refers to someone who engaged in a "'forceful action or procedure,'" as in 
SC-2023-0251 
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an "'unprovoked attack,'" against another; it does not encompass 
someone who simply "created [a] controversy" or verbally confronted 
someone else.   Gaines v. State, 137 So. 3d 357, 361 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013) 
(citing Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 272 (11th ed. 2003) 
(defining "aggression")) (emphasis added).  We agree with the court in 
Gaines -- and with the numerous courts in other jurisdictions that have 
considered this question2 -- that an individual does not forfeit his right to 
defend himself and others merely by starting an argument (or, in 
 
2See, e.g., State v. Kee, 6 Wash. App. 2d 874, 881, 431 P.3d 1080, 
1083 (2018) ("words are not adequate provocation to negate self-defense" 
(citing State v. Riley, 137 Wash. 2d 904, 911, 976 P.2d 624, 628 (1999))); 
Castillo v. People, 421 P.3d 1141, 1150 (Colo. 2018) ("insults alone cannot 
make one the initial aggressor"); Commonwealth v. Grassie, 476 Mass. 
202, 210 n.7, 65 N.E.3d 1199, 1206 n.7 (2017) ("words alone cannot make 
one into a first aggressor"); State v. Buckley, 202 Vt. 371, 384, 149 A.3d 
928, 936 (2016) ("'mere words do not justify an assault and battery'" 
(citation omitted)); State v. Jones, 320 Conn. 22, 59, 128 A.3d 431, 455 
(2015) ("as a matter of law, the jury could not have determined that [the 
defendant] was the initial aggressor solely on the basis of his utterance 
of certain words"); In re Mondy E., 121 A.D.3d 785, 786, 994 N.Y.S.2d 
173, 175 (2014) ("[a]n actor is not the initial aggressor where his or her 
conduct consists of 'mere insults as opposed to threats'" (citation 
omitted)); Drennen v. State, 311 P.3d 116, 129 (Wyo. 2013) ("words alone 
do not make a person the aggressor"); Jones v. State, 201 P.3d 869, 886 
(Okla. 2009) ("the use of words alone cannot make a person an 
aggressor"); Salas v. State, No. 14-98-01319-CR, Jan. 11, 2001 (Tex. App. 
2001) ("verbal insults" and "'[w]ords alone do not constitute an act of 
aggression which would permit the use of deadly force'" (quoting Fry v. 
State, 915 S.W.2d 554, 561 (Tex. App. 1995))).     
SC-2023-0251 
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Johnson's case, providing moral support to the person who allegedly 
started an argument).   
Perhaps recognizing the trial court's error, the State's brief 
attempts to justify the trial court's "initial aggressor" determination on 
an alternate basis.  The State hypothesizes that the trial court might 
have refused to credit the unanimous witness testimony that Hubbard 
attacked first.  And absent that witness testimony, the State argues, the 
trial court could have concluded that it was plausible that Johnson -- not 
Hubbard -- shot first, and thus that Johnson really was the initial 
aggressor.   
There are multiple problems with this argument.  The first and 
most obvious is that the State's theory is inconsistent with the trial 
court's own order.  In that order, the trial court explained that it based 
its ruling on "the facts as stipulated by the parties[] and the argument[s] 
of counsel," which would be an unusual thing to say if the trial court had 
actually refused to credit those stipulations and rejected the arguments 
of counsel.  Indeed, everything about the trial court's order indicates that 
-- in keeping with the approach urged by the prosecution -- it treated the 
stipulated facts and testimony as true but reasoned that, "regardless of 
SC-2023-0251 
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which individual shot first, [Johnson] -- and frankly, [Ayindae], too -- 
were the initial aggressors because they came to [Hubbard's] house to 
confront [Hubbard] following the earlier argument [Hubbard] had with 
[Ayindae]'s mother."  In other words, the trial court determined that 
Johnson was the initial aggressor because he had accompanied the 
person who started a verbal argument with Hubbard, not because it 
determined that he had shot first.   
A second problem with the State's theory is that the State provides 
no plausible explanation for why the trial court would have refused to 
credit the uncontradicted testimony of so many witnesses.3  That 
testimony was unanimous on every relevant detail, consistent with the 
 
3The closest the State comes is when it points out -- in an attempt 
to cast doubt on the truthfulness of their testimony -- that some of the 
witnesses in this case were related to Johnson.  We do not see why that 
matters.  After all, every witness who was related to Johnson was also 
related at least as closely to Hubbard.   And the testimony of all the 
individuals who were related to Johnson and Hubbard was consistent 
with the testimony of the three individuals who bore no relation to either 
man (Smith, Jefferson, and Robinson).  Indeed, even the witness who was 
most clearly partial to Hubbard -- Robinson, who was Hubbard's longtime 
friend and neighbor and who did not know Johnson or Ayindae at all -- 
testified that Johnson and Ayindae were trying to back away while 
Hubbard was firing at them.   
SC-2023-0251 
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physical evidence, and unimpeached by the prosecution, and it contained 
no apparent indications of partiality or dishonesty.   
We do not doubt that there may be circumstances in which a trial 
court could properly decline to credit stipulated testimony -- such as if 
the stipulations are incoherent, inconsistent, contradicted by physical 
evidence, or appear to be the product of collusive activity or witness 
intimidation.  But none of those circumstances are present in this case.  
Here, the testimony of all the witnesses was cogent, unanimous, and 
consistent with all the other evidence.  There was nothing in the parties' 
stipulations that could have led a reasonable fact-finder to determine 
that Johnson shot first, and nothing about the trial court's order indicates 
that it made such a determination.   
B.  To the extent the common-law duty to retreat applied, Johnson 
satisfied that duty 
 
The second reason the trial court gave for denying Johnson's 
pretrial immunity motion had to do with Johnson's failure to obtain a 
valid permit for his pistol.  According to the trial court, that failure meant 
that Johnson was "engaged in an unlawful activity" under § 13A-3-23(b) 
and was thus ineligible for Alabama's statutory stand-your-ground 
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protections.  Consequently, the court concluded, Johnson was "required 
to retreat from the altercation."   
We note at the outset that the law requiring gun owners to obtain 
a permit before carrying a concealed weapon, § 13A-11-73, Ala. Code 
1975, was repealed by the Legislature shortly after Johnson's indictment, 
see Act No. 2022-133, § 9(2), Ala. Acts 2022, amidst a nationwide spate 
of litigation challenging permitting restrictions on the right to keep and 
bear arms, see, e.g., New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 
U.S. 1, 12-15 (2022).  Johnson argues that the repeal of § 13A-11-73 
operates retroactively, such that he was not "engaged in an unlawful 
activity" at the time of the shooting after all.  The State does not respond 
to this argument in its briefing.   
We need not address either the constitutional validity of the old 
gun-permitting regime or the retroactive effect of its repeal in order to 
decide this case.  Even if we assume that Johnson was required to comply 
with the common-law duty to make a reasonable attempt at retreat, the 
materials before this Court show that he satisfied that duty.  As noted 
above, everyone who saw how the shootout began indicated that Ayindae 
-- and by all indications, Johnson too -- were already retreating when an 
SC-2023-0251 
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intoxicated Hubbard started shooting at them.  In addition, when 
Hubbard started firing, Johnson and Ayindae were on foot in the middle 
of a street in a residential neighborhood, surrounded by innocent 
bystanders (including Smith's small child) and their homes.  Such a 
situation simply does not leave "open to [the victims] a reasonably safe 
mode" of retreat, Oldacre v. State, 196 Ala. 690, 693, 72 So. 303, 304 
(1916), meaning that -- even under the common-law standard -- Johnson 
was entitled to defend himself and others. 
C. Johnson's possession of a pistol without a license does not 
preclude him from self-defense immunity 
 
The trial court's third and final justification for its ruling rested on 
its view that Johnson's possession of a pistol without a permit was "prima 
facie evidence of his intent to commit the murder."  That statement 
appears to borrow language from an earlier version of § 13A-11-71, Ala. 
Code 1975, which -- at the time Johnson was indicted -- provided that, 
"[i]n the trial of a person for committing or attempting to commit a crime 
of violence, the fact that he was armed with a pistol and had no license 
to carry the same shall be prima facie evidence of his intention to commit 
said crime of violence."  In 2022, the Legislature rewrote the statute to 
SC-2023-0251 
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remove the relevant language, consistent with its decision to repeal the 
permitting requirement outright.  See Act No. 2022-133, § 1.   
As above, we need not comment on the validity of earlier versions 
of § 13A-11-71 or on the retroactive effects of its amendment, because 
even under the old permitting regime, it was well established that § 13A-
11-71's presumption had no relevance once "self-defense ha[d] been 
injected as a defense."  Manuel v. State, 711 So. 2d 507, 513 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 1997) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).  That is 
because, as the dissenting opinion below pointed out, defense of self and 
others is available without regard to whether the defendant intended to 
kill (as opposed to merely wound or repel) his attacker.  See Ex parte 
Johnson, ___ So. 3d at ____ (Cole, J., dissenting).  Even if a defendant 
admits that he intended to kill his attacker, Alabama law still shields 
him from criminal liability so long as his use of force was reasonably 
necessary to defend himself or another person from the attacker's initial 
aggression.  See § 13A-3-23; Hill, 194 Ala. at 26, 69 So. at 947.  Former 
SC-2023-0251 
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§ 13A-11-71 therefore does not prevent Johnson from claiming self-
defense immunity,4 and the trial court erred in concluding otherwise.  
Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, we grant Johnson's petition for a writ 
of mandamus and direct the trial court to grant his motion for self-
defense immunity. 
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED. 
 
 
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, Stewart, and 
Cook, JJ., concur. 
Sellers, J., concurs in the result. 
 
4The State appears to recognize this reality, because it does not 
even attempt to defend this aspect of the trial court's holding in its 
briefing before this Court.