Title: State v. Lopez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 105601
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: May 9, 2014

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 105,601 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
JUAN LOPEZ, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, an appellate 
court's standard of review is whether, after reviewing all the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the prosecution, the reviewing court is convinced a rational factfinder could 
have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. An appellate court does not 
reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make witness credibility 
determinations. 
 
2. 
 
An appellate court presumes juries have the knowledge and experience to 
determine the reliability of an eyewitness identification. Neither inconsistent statements 
nor conflicting testimony support an appellate court declaration that an eyewitness was 
unreliable as a matter of law. Rather, the procedural mechanism for testing how 
inconsistencies impact a witness' credibility is through cross-examination.  
 
2 
 
 
 
3. 
 
Where the State proceeds on an aiding and abetting theory of criminal 
responsibility for first-degree premeditated murder, the State must prove the aiding and 
abetting defendant also possessed the specific intent of premeditation. 
 
4. 
 
Premeditation may be proved by circumstantial evidence.  
 
5. 
 
When determining whether to impose a hard 50 life sentence, a district court is not 
restricted to only considering matters relating to an aggravated circumstance; rather, 
K.S.A. 21-4635(c) allows a district court to consider a broad spectrum of evidence.  
 
6. 
 
In determining whether to impose a hard 50 life sentence, a district court should 
not take judicial notice of information that the court acquired from prior proceedings 
without making a record of those facts upon which the court is relying and permitting the 
defendant an opportunity for rebuttal.  
 
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; ERNEST L. JOHNSON, judge. Opinion filed May 9, 2014. 
Affirmed. 
 
Michael G. Highland, of Bonner Springs, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.  
 
Edmond D. Brancart, chief deputy district attorney, argued the cause, and Jennifer L. Myers, 
assistant district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were 
with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
3 
 
 
 
 
JOHNSON, J.:  Juan Lopez directly appeals from his jury convictions for two counts 
of premeditated first-degree murder and one count of fleeing or attempting to elude a 
police officer. The State alleged that Lopez drove the vehicle from which his 
codefendant, Eldier Molina, shot and killed two rival gang members in another car. 
Lopez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on two bases:  (1) The eyewitness 
identification witnesses were unreliable; and (2) there was no evidence Lopez possessed 
the requisite premeditated intent to kill the victims when he aided and abetted Molina. 
Lopez also raises two issues regarding the imposition of a life sentence pursuant to 
K.S.A. 21-4635 with a mandatory minimum term of 50 years (hard 50), to-wit:  (1) The 
district court erroneously considered irrelevant information about a previous murder trial 
in which Lopez was acquitted; and (2) the district court improperly weighed the 
statutorily prescribed aggravating and mitigating circumstances before imposing the hard 
50 sentence. We affirm. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW 
 
On the evening of November 13, 2009, two Kansas City, Kansas, police officers, 
Jason Pittman and Darrell Forrest, were in a marked patrol car, following a vehicle 
pursuant to an unrelated drug investigation. While stopped at the intersection of 18th and 
Central, Officer Pittman saw a silver Honda drive into the oncoming lane to pull 
alongside a black sedan, placing the Honda's passenger side next to the sedan's driver 
side. The officer heard several gunshots fired in quick succession and saw a muzzle flash 
coming from a gun that was extended out of the open passenger side window of the 
Honda. The shots hit and killed two occupants of the sedan, Gerson Diaz-Turcios and 
Jose Diaz-Turcios, who were brothers and ostensibly members of the Florence (F13) 
gang. 
 
4 
 
 
 
After the shooting, the Honda proceeded through the intersection in front of the 
officers, who had activated the patrol car's lights and siren. Officer Pittman would testify 
that he saw the Honda's driver well enough that he could see the driver mouth a 
scatological expletive. The officers gave chase and were joined by other pursuing officers 
until the Honda came to a dead end near a wooded area. The driver and front-seat 
passenger fled afoot, while the backseat passenger, later identified as 12-year-old Max 
Palomino, surrendered to the police.  
 
 
The front-seat passenger, later identified as Molina, was tracked by a trained 
canine to a residence where he was found face down on the ground underneath a deck. 
The driver eluded capture that evening. But early the next morning, Palomino told a 
detective that Lopez was driving the Honda and Molina was the shooter. Officer Pittman, 
upon learning from the detective that Lopez was involved, located a police photograph 
and positively identified Lopez as the person he saw driving the Honda at the scene of the 
shooting. 
 
The State charged Molina and Lopez with premeditated first-degree murder for the 
killings of the Diaz-Turcios brothers. Molina was also charged with criminal possession 
of a firearm, and Lopez was charged with fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer. 
They were tried together, and both were convicted on all counts. 
 
Palomino testified at trial that Molina and Lopez were members of the Surenos 
Por Vida (SPV) gang with whom he associated, albeit he was not a member. On the night 
of the incident, Palomino accompanied Molina and Lopez, who were en route to a gang 
meeting in the Honda. They stopped for gasoline at 18th and Grandview, where they 
encountered five members of the rival F13 gang. Palomino testified at trial that he 
watched from inside the Honda as Molina and Lopez argued with the F13 gang members. 
5 
 
 
 
He admitted that in his initial statement to the police he had lied about exiting the Honda 
to pump gasoline.  
 
Palomino related that when they left the station with Lopez driving the Honda, the 
vehicle containing the F13 gang members (F13s) followed. Palomino suspected that 
Molina and Lopez had told the F13s to follow them. At some point, Lopez turned one 
way and the F13s' car went the other way; Lopez made a U-turn and ended up right 
behind the F13s at the 18th and Central stoplight. At that point, Lopez drove alongside 
the F13s' vehicle to allow Molina to shoot from the Honda's passenger seat into the 
driver's side of the F13s' vehicle. Palomino testified that Molina fired three rounds at the 
F13s before Lopez "peeled out" and proceeded through the intersection. 
 
Palomino testified that he believed Lopez knew the drive-by shooting was going to 
occur. He based that belief on his own knowledge that someone was going to get shot 
after he saw the SPV gang members encounter the rival F13 gang members at the 
gasoline station and observed that Molina had a handgun. He related that everyone in the 
SPV gang knows that if an SPV runs into an F13, the SPV is expected to either fight the 
F13 or shoot the rival if a firearm is available. He further related that the F13 gang 
members are expected to shoot someone on a Friday the 13th, which was the day and 
date of this occurrence. Accordingly, Palomino said, "[W]e were out that day trying to 
see if we can catch somebody."  
 
On the other hand, Palomino admitted he initially told police he thought that he, 
Molina, and Lopez were just going to drive around and he did not know they were going 
to shoot anyone. Further, on cross-examination at trial, Palomino contradicted his direct 
testimony by saying that until the shooting occurred, he did not see the gun and he 
thought the three of them were only going to fistfight with the F13s.  
 
6 
 
 
 
The State presented a surveillance videotape from the gasoline station that 
corroborated some of Palomino's testimony. Although the videotape has not been 
included in the record on appeal, we do have some discussion of the videotape by the 
witnesses. Those witnesses clearly put the Honda at the 18th and Grandview gasoline 
station, although the faces of Molina and Lopez were not displayed on the recording. The 
evidence did depict two men talking to the F13 group and then getting back into the 
Honda, who were identified by Palomino as Molina and Lopez. Further, Detective Mike 
Lucas testified that he could identify the two victims as being on the videotape from the 
station.  
 
 Molina testified on his own behalf. He admitted he was a member of the SPV 
gang and he knew Palomino through Palomino's older brother. But Molina denied that he 
had ever been in the Honda on that day or that he had been involved in any manner with 
the drive-by shooting. Instead, he related an alibi scenario that placed him in the vicinity 
of his apprehension with marijuana in his pocket. He said the presence of police in the 
area prompted him to hide under the deck to avoid being caught with the drugs. Molina's 
girlfriend, Sandra Rueda, and her 16-year-old sister corroborated portions of Molina's 
alibi.  
 
Lopez did not present any evidence in his defense. The jury convicted Molina and 
Lopez as charged. The district court imposed a hard 50 sentence for Lopez' first count of 
first-degree murder and a hard 25 sentence for the second count, to run consecutively. 
The district court also sentenced Lopez to 6 months for fleeing or attempting to elude a 
police officer, to run concurrent with the first count. Lopez filed a timely appeal. This 
court has jurisdiction over Lopez' appeal under K.S.A. 22-3601(b)(1) (maximum 
sentence of life imprisonment imposed).  
 
7 
 
 
 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
 
As noted, Lopez makes two sufficiency of the evidence challenges. First, he 
attacks all of his convictions by contending Officer Pittman and Palomino provided such 
unreliable testimony that no rational jury could have based any conviction on that 
evidence and there was no other evidence presented to even place Lopez in the Honda. 
Second, with respect to the premeditated first-degree murder convictions, Lopez argues 
the State presented no evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that Lopez knew Molina 
was going to shoot the victims. 
 
Standard of Review  
 
 
 
"When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard 
of review is whether, after reviewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, the appellate court is convinced a rational factfinder could have found the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, 
resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations." State v. Harris, 
297 Kan. 1076, 1081, 306 P.3d 282 (2013) (citing State v. Qualls, 297 Kan. 61, Syl. ¶ 1, 
298 P.3d 311 [2013]).  
 
Analysis 
 
Driver of the Honda 
 
 
Lopez first contends there were only two items of evidence that placed Lopez 
behind the wheel of the Honda during the shooting:  Officer Pittman's eyewitness 
identification and Palomino's accomplice testimony. Lopez argues both witnesses were so 
unreliable that we must ignore their testimony in assessing evidence sufficiency. To 
clarify, Lopez does not argue that the district court should have performed the 
gatekeeping function of excluding Officer Pittman's eyewitness identification testimony 
8 
 
 
 
because of a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Cf. State v. Corbett, 281 Kan. 
294, 304-06, 130 P.3d 1179 (2006) (considering whether eyewitness identification should 
have been excluded from jury consideration). Rather, in essence, Lopez asks us to find 
that the jury in this case was simply incorrect in its assessment of witness credibility. We 
decline that invitation. 
 
To review, Officer Pittman testified the Honda slowed as it went through the 
intersection in front of the patrol car; the officer saw the driver's face turn toward the 
patrol car and mouth, "Oh, shit"; and the officer could positively identify Lopez as the 
Honda's driver. Lopez points out that Officer Pittman's written report did not mention 
those important facts, i.e., that the Honda slowed down, that the officer saw the driver's 
face, or that the driver mouthed an expletive. Further, Officer Pittman's partner, Officer 
Forrest, who was a passenger in the patrol car, testified that the Honda sped through the 
intersection at a high rate of speed and that he was unable to identify the driver. Lopez 
also points out that Officer Pittman was occupied with driving the patrol car and 
activating the emergency lights, whereas Officer Forrest would not have had those 
distractions. 
 
Lopez outlines some very good arguments to present to the jury. Indeed, those 
arguments were made to Lopez' jury after defense counsel had zealously cross-examined 
the State's witnesses. Now, Lopez asks us to declare Officer Pittman an unreliable 
witness as a matter of law. Neither inconsistent statements nor conflicting testimony 
supports such a result. To the contrary, we trust juries to resolve those credibility and 
weighting questions. Corbett, 281 Kan. at 306 ("juries have the knowledge and 
experience to determine the reliability of an eyewitness identification"). In Corbett, we 
approvingly quoted Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 53 L. Ed. 2d 
140 (1977): 
 
9 
 
 
 
"'We are content to rely upon the good sense and judgment of American juries, for 
evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill. 
Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of 
identification testimony that has some questionable feature.'" Corbett, 281 Kan. at 305. 
 
Likewise, Lopez' unreliability challenge to Palomino's testimony would require 
this court to invade the province of the jury. Lopez points to Palomino's admission that he 
lied to the police about some of the superfluous details of the incident, such as his 
whereabouts before joining Lopez and Molina in the Honda and whether he exited the 
Honda at the gasoline station. Pointedly, the critical facts of both accounts did not 
change, such as Palomino's presence in the Honda and Lopez' role as driver. But 
regardless of the relevancy of the inconsistencies between a witness' statements to law 
enforcement interviewers and his or her trial testimony, the procedural mechanism for 
testing how those inconsistencies impact the witness' credibility is through cross-
examination. Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 
2d 177 (2004) (Confrontation Clause guarantees procedural right to assess reliability "by 
testing in the crucible of cross-examination"). Here, defense counsel took full advantage 
of defendant's procedural right to test the reliability of Palomino's testimony in the 
crucible of cross-examination. Then, it was up to the jury to assess Palomino's credibility 
and to assign the weight to be given to his trial testimony. 
 
Lopez appears to suggest that his case is different from the many others involving 
a witness' prior inconsistent statement because there was a lack of forensic or video 
evidence to support Palomino's statements. Lopez cites to no authority to support the 
notion that an accomplice's testimony requires corroborating physical or visual evidence. 
Perhaps that omission is because there is no such precedent. To the contrary, even the 
"uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is sufficient to sustain a conviction." State v. 
Bey, 217 Kan. 251, 260, 535 P.2d 881 (1975); see State v. Mclaughlin, 207 Kan. 594, 
10 
 
 
 
598, 485 P.2d 1360 (1971). Moreover, in this case, there was evidence to corroborate 
much of Palomino's version of events, including the gasoline station videotape and 
Officer Pittman's identification of Lopez as the driver. 
 
In conclusion, we refuse to second guess the jury by reassessing witness 
credibility, resolving conflicting testimony, or reweighing the evidence. Viewed in the 
light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to 
determine that Lopez was driving the Honda during the drive-by shooting. 
 
Premeditation 
 
Lopez also claims that the State failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he premeditated the two murders. He was prosecuted on an aiding 
and abetting theory based upon his role as the driver of the Honda from which Molina 
shot and killed the victims. Nevertheless, we have clarified that, even on an aiding and 
abetting theory of criminal responsibility, the State must prove that the defendant 
"possessed the specific intent of premeditation in order to convict [the defendant] of first-
degree murder." State v. Trussell, 289 Kan. 499, 503, 213 P.3d 1052 (2009) (citing State 
v. Overstreet, 288 Kan. 1, 11, 200 P.3d 427 [2009]; State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, 
132, 119 P.3d 1148 [2005]).  
 
Lopez points to that portion of Palomino's testimony where he said he thought the 
SPVs were merely going to fistfight the F13s, apparently suggesting Lopez would have 
had the same belief. But, of course, Palomino was not privy to the conversation between 
the SPVs and F13s at the gasoline station or any discussion between Molina and Lopez. 
Given that Lopez did not testify, we do not know what he believed to be the plan.  
 
11 
 
 
 
Further, Lopez criticizes the lack of any direct testimony about prior discussions 
that may have occurred about the proposed shooting or about any threats that may have 
been exchanged by the respective gang members. He seems to intimate that the State 
must present direct evidence that the defendant thought over the matter beforehand. But 
we have "noted that direct evidence of premeditation is rare." State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841, 
859, 257 P.3d 272 (2011). "Unless a person actually communicates his or her reasons for 
taking another's life, evidence of premeditation must be proved by circumstantial 
evidence. Such evidence, however, is sufficient to establish even the gravest 
offenses . . . ." State v. Doyle, 272 Kan. 1157, 1162, 38 P.3d 650 (2002).  
 
In some cases, this court has looked at certain factors to aid in determining 
whether the evidence gives rise to an inference of premeditation. Those factors include: 
"(1) the nature of the weapon used; (2) lack of provocation; (3) the defendant's conduct 
before and after the killing; (4) threats and declarations of the defendant before and 
during the occurrence; and (5) the dealing of lethal blows after the deceased was felled 
and rendered helpless." Qualls, 297 Kan. at 66-67 (citing State v. Scaife, 286 Kan. 614, 
617-18, 186 P.3d 755 [2008]). While use of a deadly weapon alone is insufficient to 
establish premeditation, "in some cases one factor alone may be compelling evidence of 
premeditation." Qualls, 297 Kan. at 67. 
 
Here, the jury heard Palomino describe the animus existing between the rival 
gangs to which Lopez and the victims belonged and that, especially on a Friday the 13th, 
they were inclined to shoot at each other. He further described how the gangs had a 
confrontation at the gasoline station, after which they followed each other in their 
respective vehicles until Lopez drove the Honda into a position in the wrong lane of 
traffic that gave his partner a shooting lane at the victims. One would expect that if the 
goal was to engage in a fistfight, the Honda would have blocked the forward progress of 
the victims' vehicle to force them to exit their vehicle. A jury would have been justified in 
12 
 
 
 
drawing the same inference to which Palomino testified, i.e., Lopez knew exactly what he 
was doing when he pulled the Honda alongside the victims' car. He was executing a 
premeditated plan to shoot and kill the victims.  
  
Reiterating, this court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence or pass on the 
credibility of witnesses. See Harris, 297 Kan. at 1081. Viewing the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the State, a rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Lopez acted with a premeditated intent to kill. 
 
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR ACQUITTAL 
 
As noted, the district court imposed a hard 50 life sentence on one of the murder 
convictions. "To impose the hard 50 sentence, the district court must find one or more of 
the aggravated circumstances enumerated in K.S.A. 21-4636 exist and that the 
aggravating factors are not outweighed by any mitigating factors. K.S.A. 21-4635(d)." 
State v. Nelson, 291 Kan. 475, 486, 243 P.3d 343 (2010). Here, the district court found 
the aggravating circumstance set forth in K.S.A. 21-4636(b), i.e., the defendant 
"knowingly or purposely killed or created a great risk of death to more than one person." 
Lopez does not challenge that finding, but he complains the sentencing court considered 
another homicide case in which he was acquitted as part of the weighing analysis. 
 
Lopez' arguments are based on the following exchange: 
 
 
"MS. WASSON [Prosecutor]:  . . . This defendant is known to this court, not 
only because of his criminal history but because two weeks prior to this offense he was 
acquitted in this court of another homicide. 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
"MR. HIGHLAND [Lopez' Counsel]:  Relevance, Judge. I don't think that's 
relevant at all. If he was acquitted, it shouldn't even be brought up today for sentencing 
purposes. I know this is the court it took place in— 
 
 
"MS. WASSON:  Your Honor, it dovetails with my arguments concerning the 
danger he poses to the community. And perhaps I'm mixing this up too much. I realize it 
doesn't go directly to the Hard 50 factor. But if, for instance—and, again, I have to 
speculate to some degree—if Mr. Highland is going to argue that his minor involvement 
indicates a violent nature of something, then I think it is relevant. So I guess I'll reserve 
and wait to hear Mr. Highland's argument. 
 
 
"THE COURT:  Well, I think we all know that I know that the jury in that case 
had certain evidence that indicated Mr. Lopez was the shooter in a gang-related situation 
that resulted in the death of one child and the wounding of another. And we know that 
there was testimony that said he was the shooter. It was by virtue of a deposition, because 
the witness didn't appear at the jury trial, but I found that the deposition was admissible. 
The jury in that case, again, under our system, was required to agree unanimously on 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. And regardless of the State's evidence that inculpated 
Mr. Lopez, the jury found him not guilty. So I recall all of that. 
 
 
"MS. WASSON:  Judge— 
 
 
"THE COURT:  So I, I overrule the objection but I, as to relevance, but I sustain 
it as to any implication you thought Ms. Wasson was giving me that Mr. Lopez was 
guilty. He was found not guilty. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"MS. WASSON:  Judge, I don't mean to interrupt. I guess I—and if I'm mistaken, 
please let me know—but I guess I'm in the position where I'm arguing for the sentence. 
And that would include—well, aside from Hard 50, it would include factors such as to 
why the defendant poses a danger to the community. So that was the reason I brought it 
up. And if it was at all improper, I apologize and withdraw the comment. 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
"THE COURT:  I'm fine with it. I've overruled the relevance objection."  
 
Later in the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor reiterated that she did not mention 
the prior acquittal because she thought it constituted an aggravating factor. She explained 
that she only mentioned the case because she thought it was relevant to whether Lopez' 
conduct in the current case was minor and because it was relevant to Lopez' "knowledge 
of what happens when his gang goes driving around looking for people in cars."  
 
On appeal, Lopez continues to argue that "[d]efendant's acquittal of a previous 
charge, even a previous charge of murder, has zero probative value at sentencing and 
even less materiality as to the sole aggravating circumstance that the prosecutor was 
attempting to prove up." He points out that if a different judge had presided over the 
current case, that judge would not have had any knowledge of the prior case because 
there was no evidence of it presented at the trial in this case. 
 
To clarify what we are not deciding, we would point out that Lopez has not raised 
an issue as to whether the sentencing judge impermissibly made factual findings in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See State v. Soto, 
No. 106,306, 299 Kan. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (April 11, 2014); State v. Hilt, No. 105,057, 
299 Kan. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (April 18, 2014). Further, he does not argue that the 
collateral estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause should bar the State from 
admitting evidence of his prior acquittal. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156, 
117 S. Ct. 633, 136 L. Ed 2d 554 (1997) (applying Dowling and finding Double Jeopardy 
Clause does not preclude sentencing judge from considering issues decided in prior case 
where defendant was acquitted when the subsequent action was a lower standard of 
proof); Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348-49, 110 S. Ct. 668, 107 L. Ed. 2d 
708 (1990) (holding that collateral estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause 
15 
 
 
 
did not preclude Government from introducing defendant's prior acquittal at trial because 
Government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case); 21 Am. Jur. 
2d, Criminal Law § 384. The only question that Lopez presents on appeal is whether the 
evidence of his prior trial in which he was acquitted was relevant to the determination of 
the appropriate sentence to impose in this case.  
  
 Standard of Review 
 
Lopez appears to challenge both the probative and materiality components of 
relevancy. Those components are subject to different standards of review:  "Whether 
evidence is probative is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard; materiality is 
judged under a de novo standard." State v. Bridges, 297 Kan. 989, Syl. ¶ 2, 306 P.3d 244 
(2013).  
 
Analysis 
 
Lopez' relevance argument does not take into consideration that K.S.A. 21-4635(c) 
gives a district court wide latitude with respect to the information it can consider when 
determining whether to impose a hard 50 sentence:   
 
 
"In order to make such determination, the court may be presented evidence 
concerning any matter that the court deems relevant to the question of sentence and shall 
include matters relating to any of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in K.S.A. 
21-4636 and amendment thereto and any mitigating circumstances. Any such evidence 
which the court deems to have probative value may be received regardless of its 
admissibility under the rules of evidence, provided that the defendant is accorded a fair 
opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 21-4635(c). 
 
In State v. Richardson, 256 Kan. 69, 883 P.2d 1107 (1994), the defendant 
complained that the district court, in sentencing him to a hard 40 life sentence, 
16 
 
 
 
erroneously allowed the State to introduce irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of a prior 
crime where the defendant had completed a diversion program and of another crime 
where the defendant was not charged. In concluding that the prior crimes evidence was 
admissible, Richardson declared:  
 
 
"Richardson's contention that evidence of her prior criminal activity is not 
relevant to any of the aggravating circumstances appears in part to be accurate. However, 
the legislature authorized the introduction of a broad spectrum of evidence which 'shall 
include matters relating to any of the aggravating circumstances' but expressly is not 
limited to matters relating to those circumstances. K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4624(3). In fact, 
the legislature authorized the introduction of evidence 'concerning any matter that the 
court deems relevant to the question of sentence.' K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4624(3). The 
trial court deemed the evidence of prior criminal activity relevant and properly so as to 
21-4625(3)." 256 Kan. at 79. 
 
Later, in State v. Moncla, 262 Kan. 58, 936 P.2d 727 (1997), the defendant 
similarly challenged his hard 40 sentence under K.S.A. 21-4635, arguing the district court 
improperly considered police reports detailing a prior conviction and bad acts. This court 
followed Richardson and "conclude[d] that issues regarding aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances make up only one portion of the evidence the trial court may consider 
when making its determination under K.S.A. 21-4635. The trial court did not err when it 
considered the defendant's prior conviction and bad acts." Moncla, 262 Kan. at 78.  
 
Arguably, the prior prosecution may have revealed undisputed matters that a 
sentencing court would deem relevant to sentencing in the current case, notwithstanding 
the defendant's acquittal. But the problem, as we see it, is that the district court did not 
require the State to make a record of the matters it professed to be relevant and the 
district court should not have effectively taken judicial notice of such unstated facts 
without giving the defendant an opportunity for rebuttal. 
17 
 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, Lopez does not make a due process argument, and the district court, 
in pronouncing its sentence, made no indication it was relying on any information 
revealed at the prior trial. In other words, any error in the manner in which the district 
court handled the information from the prior trial was harmless. See State v. Ward, 292 
Kan. 541, 552-65, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012) (discussing 
tests for harmlessness). 
 
WEIGHING AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
Lopez raises a separate issue challenging the propriety of the district court's 
weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. But in essence, he rehashes 
his complaint about the district court erroneously considering his prior acquittal. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
For a hard 50 sentence, appellate courts review the district court's weighing of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances for an abuse of discretion. State v. Nelson, 296 
Kan. 692, 694, 294 P.3d 318 (2013).  
 
"'Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, 
i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is 
based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; 
or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does not support 
a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is 
based.' State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 
1594 (2012)." 296 Kan. at 694. 
 
18 
 
 
 
Analysis  
 
As indicated, the State relied on the aggravating circumstance that Lopez 
knowingly and purposely killed two people. For mitigators, Lopez asserted that his role 
as an accomplice was a relatively minor one and that he was only age 18 at the time. See 
K.S.A. 21-4637(d) and (g). When imposing a hard 50 life sentence, the district judge 
recited:  
 
 
"In this case, two people were killed. That is an aggravating factor. While I'm 
aware of the mitigating factors, I am convinced that those mitigating factors do not 
outweigh the aggravating factor that you participated in a multiple killing.  
 
"That you should be subject to the Hard 50 is, to me, more complex than Mr. 
Molina, who I also believe was the one who pulled the trigger, taking the lives. But I do 
believe that as you aided and abetted in these killings, you did so actively in the 
following fashions: 
 
"There was a time when you could have driven the other way, and you chose to 
follow the vehicle.  
 
"Then the way you operated the vehicle. According to the evidence, the vehicle 
was driven to just the right location where gunshots could be fired from that vehicle into 
the victims' vehicle. 
 
"And then immediately the getaway was made. To me, that puts you in the same 
class punishment-wise as Mr. Molina and, therefore, since the aggravating factors 
outweigh the mitigated, mitigating factors, I also require that you spend at least 50 years 
in prison before you're parole eligible."  
 
Earlier in the sentencing proceeding, the district court noted that Lopez' criminal 
history page reflected seven entries, including one adult drug conviction and six juvenile 
adjudications. The juvenile adjudications included charges for aggravated assault and 
aiding a felony arising from a drive-by shooting in which Lopez drove a vehicle while 
Molina shot the victim. Pointedly, the district court did not mention anything about the 
previous acquittal being part of the court's calculus.  
19 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, there was certainly sufficient relevant evidence without the prior 
acquittal to lead a reasonable person to reach the same result as this sentencing court. "It 
is well established that '"[w]eighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not a 
numbers game. 'One aggravating circumstance can be so compelling as to outweigh 
several mitigating circumstances'" or vice versa.'" Nelson, 296 Kan. at 695 (quoting 
Engelhardt, 280 Kan. at 144). In short, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm Lopez' 
sentence. 
 
Affirmed.