Title: MARTIN B BREIGHNER III V MICHIGAN HIGH SCHL ATHLETIC ASSN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 123529
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 29, 2004

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 29, 2004 
MARTIN B. BREIGHNER III and 
KATHRYN BREIGHNER, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v 
No. 123529 
MICHIGAN HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Defendant-Appellee. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
YOUNG, J.   
At issue in this case is whether defendant Michigan 
High School Athletic Association, Inc. (MHSAA), a private, 
nonprofit 
entity 
that 
organizes 
and 
supervises 
interscholastic athletic events for its voluntary members, 
is a “public body” as that term is defined at MCL 
15.232(d) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL 
15.231 et seq. 
Plaintiffs contend that the MHSAA is a 
public body within the meaning of the FOIA because (1) it 
is “primarily funded by or through state or local 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
authority,” MCL 15.232(d)(iv); (2) it is “created by state 
or local authority,” MCL 15.232(d)(iv); and (3) it is an 
“agency” of a school district, MCL 15.232(d)(iii). 
The trial court held that the MHSAA was “primarily 
funded by or through state or local authority” and that it 
was therefore subject to the FOIA as a public body under § 
232(d)(iv). 
The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding 
that neither § 232(d)(iv) nor § 232(d)(iii) applied to the 
MHSAA. Because we agree that the MHSAA does not qualify as 
a public body under § 232(d)(iii) or (iv), we affirm. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. THE MHSAA 
The MHSAA was originally founded in 1924 to exercise 
control over the interscholastic athletic activities of 
all public schools in the state through agreement with the 
State Superintendent of Public Instruction. 
The MHSAA was 
housed within the Michigan Department of Education, and 
its handbook, rules, and regulations were part of the 
Administrative Code of the state of Michigan. 
In 1972, the MHSAA became an incorporated, nonprofit 
membership organization. 
In that year, the Legislature 
transferred control of interscholastic athletics from the 
State Board of Education to the individual school boards, 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
but retained the status of the MHSAA as the official 
association of the state. 
See MCL 340.379 (repealed by 
1976 PA 451, § 1851); MCL 380.1289 (before its amendment 
by 1995 PA 289, § 1); MCL 380.1521 (repealed by 1995 PA 
289, § 2).1  In 1995, the Legislature adopted the Revised 
School Code, MCL 380.1 et seq., which repealed and amended 
several statutes. 
Through the Revised School Code, the 
MHSAA was removed as the “official” organization overseeing 
interscholastic sports. 
Under MCL 380.11a(4), a school 
district’s membership in any athletic organization remains 
entirely voluntary (school districts “may . . . join 
organizations as part of performing the functions of the 
school district” [emphasis supplied]). 
1 MCL 380.1289(1) provided, until 1995, that “[a]
board of a school district . . . may join an organization,
association, or league which has as its object the 
promotion and regulation of sport and athletic . . .
contests . . . .” Section 1289(2) further provided: 
An association established for the purpose
of organizing and conducting athletic events,
contests, or tournaments among schools shall be 
the official association of the state. 
The 
association is responsible for the adoption and
enforcement 
of 
regulations 
relative 
to 
eligibility 
of 
pupils 
in 
schools 
for 
participation in interscholastic athletic events,
contests, or tournaments. [Emphasis supplied.] 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
The MHSAA is governed by a representative council made 
up of nineteen voting members, including fourteen members 
elected by member schools, four members appointed by the 
council, 
and 
one 
representative 
of 
the 
state 
superintendent of education. 
The council has control of 
interscholastic 
athletic 
policies, 
and 
a 
five-member 
executive committee makes rules necessary for the control 
and government of interschool activities. 
The 
MHSAA 
regulates 
interscholastic 
athletic 
competition between member schools and sets standards for 
school 
membership 
and 
eligibility 
of 
students 
to 
participate in interscholastic athletics. Apparently, the 
vast majority of high schools in Michigan are members of 
the MHSAA. 
Approximately seven hundred Michigan high 
schools are members of the MHSAA and more than eighty 
percent of those schools are public. 
Member schools pay 
no membership dues and no tournament entry fees. The only 
funds collected from schools are (1) payments for the cost 
of publications provided to a school in excess of the 
quantity already provided to members and (2) meeting 
expenses (for example, the cost of lunch). 
The majority——approximately ninety percent——of the 
MHSAA’s revenues are gate receipts at post-season athletic 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tournaments for football and basketball. The gate receipt 
revenues come directly from the sale of the MHSAA’s tickets 
to members of the public who attend MHSAA-sponsored events. 
In some cases, the MHSAA itself does not sell the tickets, 
but member schools remit to the 
MHSAA gate receipts 
collected from tickets sold by the schools for the MHSAA­
sponsored events. 
Because no revenues are derived either during the 
regular season or from most of the tournaments sponsored 
by the MHSAA, the positive cash flow from the football and 
basketball tournaments is used to fund these other 
activities. 
Services provided by the MHSAA to its members 
include the provision of medical insurance for student­
athletes; dissemination of play rule books; organization 
of meetings for coaches and officials; provision of 
several school and officials publications; provision of 
trophies and medals; training; direction and management of 
tournaments; and the services of the MHSAA staff. 
B. PLAINTIFFS’ FOIA PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiffs are the parents of a high school student 
who was prohibited from participating in a ski meet 
sponsored 
by 
the 
MHSAA 
because 
he 
had 
previously 
participated in an unsanctioned event in violation of MHSAA 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rules. 
Plaintiffs filed a request under the FOIA seeking 
information related to that decision. The MHSAA refused to 
comply with the request, asserting that it was not a 
public body and was therefore not subject to the FOIA. 
The trial court granted summary disposition to 
plaintiffs, holding that the MHSAA is “primarily funded by 
or through state or local authority” within the meaning of 
§ 232(d)(iv) because the vast majority of its funding 
comes from gate receipts at the athletic events it 
sponsors. 
The trial court held that the gate receipts 
that comprised the majority of the MHSAA’s revenue were 
received 
“through” 
the 
schools 
because 
the 
MHSAA 
essentially “’enjoys the schools’ moneymaking capacity as 
its own,’” quoting Brentwood Academy v Tennessee Secondary 
School Athletic Ass’n, 531 US 288; 121 S Ct 924; 148 L Ed 
2d 807 (2001). 
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the MHSAA 
was not a public body under either § 232(d)(iv) or § 
232(d)(iii). 255 Mich App 567, 581-582, 583; 662 NW2d 413 
(2003). 
The majority first addressed plaintiffs’ argument 
that the MHSAA was “created by state or local authority” 
under § 232(d)(iv). 
The majority held that, although it 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
was originally created under such authority, the modern 
incarnation of the MHSAA was a unique, private entity that 
had ceased being the official athletic association for the 
state. 
This unique entity was not “created” by state or 
local authority. 
The majority further rejected the trial court’s 
conclusion that the MHSAA is primarily funded by or through 
state or local authority. 
The panel noted that the state 
provides no financial resources to fund the 
MHSAA’s 
activities, and that the MHSAA actually paid fees for the 
use of host facilities. 
Member schools pay no fees or 
dues to the MHSAA. 
The MHSAA is a private, nonprofit 
organization that hires and trains its own officials and 
pays its own employees; furthermore, its revenues are 
derived from the sale of its own tickets for its own 
events. 
The majority further noted that schools are not 
forced 
to 
join 
the 
MHSAA 
and 
that 
member 
schools 
voluntarily chose to engage the MHSAA’s services. 
The 
individual 
schools 
have 
authority 
over 
their 
own 
interscholastic events and have no independent authority 
over the MHSAA. 
Finally, the majority rejected plaintiffs’ argument 
that the MHSAA is an “agent” of the state and therefore 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
subject to the FOIA under § 232(d)(iii). 
The majority 
looked to Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed), where “agency” 
was defined as “[a] fiduciary relationship created by 
express or implied contract or by law, in which one party 
(the agent) may act on behalf of another party (the 
principal) and bind that other party by words or actions.” 
The majority further noted that, pursuant to St Clair 
Intermediate School Dist v Intermediate Ed Ass’n, 458 Mich 
540, 
558 
n 
18; 
581 
NW2d 
707 
(1998), 
“an 
agency 
relationship arises only where the principal ‘has the 
right to control the conduct of the agent with respect to 
matters entrusted to him.’” (citations omitted).  The 
majority held that the MHSAA was governed by its board of 
directors, not the individual schools who voluntarily 
became its members. 
No one school or district could 
control the MHSAA, because it was controlled by its own 
board. 
Therefore, the majority held, the MHSAA was not an 
“agent” of its member schools. 
Judge Jansen dissented, opining that the public 
policy behind the FOIA favored disclosure and that the MHSAA 
was primarily funded by or through state or local 
authority because its gate receipts came to it only 
through or by means of the schools’ authority to regulate 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sporting events. 
Judge Jansen opined that the majority’s 
holding was contrary to two cases, State Defender Union 
Employees v Legal Aid & Defender Ass’n of Detroit, 230 
Mich App 426, 432; 584 NW2d 359 (1998), and Kubick v Child 
& Family Services, 171 Mich App 304; 429 NW2d 881 (1988), 
in which the Court of Appeals had held, respectively, that 
(1) “funded” for purposes of the FOIA definition of “public 
body” meant the receipt of a governmental grant or subsidy 
and (2) funding that amounted to less than half the total 
funding of a corporation did not amount to primary 
funding. 
Judge Jansen opined that the gate receipts 
remitted to the MHSAA were the functional equivalent of a 
grant or subsidy and that virtually the entire budget of 
the MHSAA came from gate receipts. 
Finally, Judge Jansen 
opined that the majority’s holding was contrary to the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Brentwood that the Tennessee 
Secondary 
School 
Athletic 
Association 
(TSSAA), 
an 
organization that is allegedly analogous to the MHSAA, was 
a state actor for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. 
We granted plaintiffs’ application for leave to 
appeal. 469 Mich 952 (2003). 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This 
case 
involves 
questions 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, which are reviewed de novo. 
Roberts v 
Mecosta, 466 Mich 57, 62; 642 NW2d 663 (2002). We review 
the trial court’s grant of summary disposition de novo. 
Id. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The FOIA generally requires disclosure, upon written 
request, of public records in the possession of a “public 
body.” 
MCL 15.233(1). 
“Public body” is defined in MCL 
15.232(d) as follows: 
(i) 
A state officer, employee, agency,
department, division, bureau, board, commission,
council, 
authority, 
or 
other 
body 
in 
the 
executive branch of the state government, but
does not include the governor or lieutenant
governor, the executive office of the governor
or lieutenant governor, or employees thereof. 
(ii) 
An agency, board, commission, or
council in the legislative branch of the state
government. 
(iii) 
A county, city, township, village,
intercounty, intercity, or regional governing
body, 
council, 
school 
district, 
special
district, or municipal corporation, or a board,
department, 
commission, 
council, 
or 
agency 
thereof. 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(iv) 
Any other body which is created by
state or local authority or which is primarily
funded by or through state or local authority. 
(v) The judiciary, including the office of
the county clerk and employees thereof when
acting in the capacity of clerk to the circuit
court, is not included in the definition of 
public body. [Emphasis added.] 
B.  THE MHSAA IS NOT PRIMARILY FUNDED BY OR THROUGH 
STATE OR LOCAL AUTHORITY 
We agree with and adopt the reasoning of the Court of 
Appeals majority in holding that the MHSAA is not a “public 
body” as that term is defined by MCL 15.232(d)(iv). 
In granting summary disposition for plaintiffs, the 
trial court held that the MHSAA was “primarily funded 
through state or local authority” and thus qualified as a 
public body under § 232(d)(iv). The court, noting that it 
was required to give effect to each word and provision of 
the statute, held that the use of the terms “by” and 
“through” indicated that funds received both directly and 
indirectly would be considered in determining whether an 
entity was a public body under § 232(d)(iv). 
The court 
concluded that, although the MHSAA did not receive money 
directly from the schools, it “’enjoy[ed] the schools’ 
moneymaking capacity as its own,’” quoting Brentwood, 
supra, and was therefore publicly funded. 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although we agree that the statutory terms “by” and 
“through” must each be accorded their unique meanings, and 
that this terminology suggests that even indirect public 
funding might satisfy the requirements of § 232(d)(iv), we 
find persuasive the analysis of the Court of Appeals 
majority: 
We read “by or through” to distinguish
between the different meanings of the word 
“authority,” that is, funding “by” a governmental
authority 
(an 
entity) 
and 
funding 
“through”
governmental decision-making authority (the power
to regulate). 
Under our reasoning, the former
refers to an entity that directly distributes its
financial resources to the disputed organization,
while 
the 
latter 
refers 
to 
the 
disputed
organization indirectly receiving funds through
some action or decision of the governmental body.
[255 Mich App 579-580 (emphasis in original).] 
The MHSAA is funded neither “by” nor “through” a 
governmental authority. 
As our Court of Appeals held in 
State Defender Union Employees, "funded," as used in § 
232(d)(iv), means “the receipt of a governmental grant or 
subsidy.” 
The 
MHSAA is not the recipient of any 
governmental grant or subsidy. 
The MHSAA’s member schools 
do not distribute their financial resources to the MHSAA; 
nor do the schools indirectly fund the MHSAA through 
allocations of public monies. 
Rather, the 
MHSAA——an 
independent, nonprofit corporation——is primarily funded by 
the sale of its own tickets to private individuals who 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
 
have voluntarily paid a fee to observe an MHSAA-sponsored 
athletic event. Member schools pay no dues or fees to the 
MHSAA, the MHSAA pays fees for the use of host facilities, 
and it receives no funds from host concessions; thus, the 
state provides absolutely no public resources to the 
[2]
MHSAA.
2 
The 
dissent 
has 
extracted 
broad 
dictionary
definitions of the words “by” and “through” to suggest
that the receipt of any monies “by virtue of” an entity’s
relationship with a state or local governmental body is
sufficient to render that entity “funded by or through
state or local authority.” 
The dissent’s analysis, aside
from conflating the distinct meanings of the words “by”
and “through,” completely disregards the meaning of the
statutory term “funded.” 
As we have explained, the word
“funded” does not connote the simple receipt of payment in
return for services or materials provided; it connotes
receipt of an allocation of resources or a subsidization.
See State Defender Union Employees, supra at 432; Random 
House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). 
Yet the 
dissent does not even require that an entity doing 
business with the government collect fees for goods or
services in order to qualify as a public body; the
relationship alone seems critical. 
Such an extreme 
position is neither warranted by the language of the
statute nor fathomable within the bounds of common sense. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, the dissent’s version of
the statute would place within the ambit of § 232(d)(iv)
any contractor or other business that obtains a majority
of its income from sales made or services rendered to 
governmental bodies. See Brentwood, supra at 311 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (“the [Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association’s] ‘fiscal relationship with the State is not
different 
from 
that 
of 
many 
contractors 
performing
services 
for 
the 
government.’”). 
(citation 
deleted). 
Consider, for example, the non-profit College Board, which
administers the SAT to hundreds of Michigan students in the
Footnotes continued on following page. 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
Nor, contrary to the holding of the trial court and 
the opinion of our dissenting colleague, does the MHSAA 
“enjoy[] the schools’ moneymaking capacity as its own.”3 
classrooms of participating public schools each year.
Public school students pay the examination fee directly to
the College Board, but under the dissent’s rationale the
Board would be a “public body” subject to FOIA disclosure 
requirements simply because it derives income “by virtue”
of the fact that the public schools have facilitated an
opportunity for the Board to administer this test in the
schools. 
3 Our holding today is limited to the specific
question whether the MHSAA is a “public body” within the
meaning of the FOIA. We express no opinion concerning the
relevance of Brentwood, supra, insofar as it may apply to
the due process implications of the actions of the MHSAA.
We have before us no constitutional question and decline
to address whether the MHSAA is a “state actor” for 
purposes of 42 USC 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, as
it would be inappropriate to import the concept of and
analysis relevant to state action into our statutory
analysis. 
Rather, we are constrained to apply the plain
language 
of 
the 
FOIA’s 
definitional 
provisions 
in 
determining 
whether 
the 
MHSAA 
is 
subject 
to 
the 
requirements of the FOIA. 
While our dissenting colleague acknowledges this 
fact, see post at 9, she nevertheless appears to contend
that the definition of “state actor” under federal law is 
“pertinent” in defining “public body” under the FOIA. 
This is particularly true of Justice Weaver’s focus on
“entwinement” as a relevant inquiry for defining “public
body.” 
There is a rather straightforward answer to the
dissent’s utilization of “state actor” analysis: it is
possible for MHSAA to be a state actor under § 1983 and the
Fourteenth Amendment without being a “public body” under
the FOIA if the Legislature has defined “public body” in a 
manner 
inconsistent 
with 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
Footnotes continued on following page. 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
 
 
 
The MHSAA organizes postseason tournaments, rents the game 
venues and sells tickets for those games. 
Without the 
MHSAA's leadership and organizational effort, no revenue 
from tournament games would be generated for any entity, 
including MHSAA member schools. In short, MHSAA creates its 
own "market" and revenue therefrom that would otherwise 
not exist without its effort. Finally, it is worth noting 
that member schools have voluntarily relinquished to the 
MHSAA any interest they may have had in ticket sales for 
athletic tournaments sponsored by the MHSAA, and the MHSAA, 
jurisprudence in the FOIA. 
The dissent apparently cannot
accept the possibility that the Legislature has the 
discretion to define “public body” in any way it chooses;
yet she offers no support for the proposition that the
Legislature was bound by or had in mind the definition of
“state actor” under federal law when it drafted the FOIA. 
And, of course, there is no support for that proposition.
The Legislature was free to define “public body” in the
FOIA as narrowly or broadly as it wished. We give meaning
to the Legislature’s terms while the dissent is in search
of alternate meanings. 
The dissent not only conflates the meaning of “state
actor” under § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment with the
definition of a “public body” under the FOIA, but she goes
on to extract from Brentwood the concept that the 
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (TSSAA)
(and, 
by 
analogy, 
the 
MHSAA) 
“enjoys 
the 
schools’ 
moneymaking capacity as its own.” As stated supra in note 
2, the MHSAA is not “funded” by participating school
districts but provides services in the activities it
conducts and for which it collects gate receipts. 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in turn, is fully responsible for the organization and 
administration of the tournament. 
In this vein, we agree with the reasoning of the 
Court of Appeals in State Defender Union, supra at 432­
433, that 
an otherwise private organization is not “funded
by or through state or local authority” merely
because public monies paid in exchange for goods
provided or services rendered comprise a certain
percentage of the organization's revenue. Earned 
fees are simply not a grant, subsidy, or funding
in any reasonable, common-sense construction of
those synonymous words. 
Rather, it is clear
that, in the FOIA, funded means something other
than an exchange of services or goods for money,
even if the source of money is a governmental
entity [emphasis in original]. 
The MHSAA, as noted, provides numerous services for its 
member schools, such as medical insurance for students, 
publications, training, and many other benefits that 
schools would not otherwise be in a position to provide. 
Here, even assuming that the private ticket-sale revenue 
at issue somehow passes “through” a governmental entity, 
these funds are received by the MHSAA in exchange for the 
multitude of services it performs for its members, most 
significantly the administration of the tournaments for 
which the tickets are sold. 
The MHSAA is therefore not 
“funded” by or through a governmental entity within the 
meaning of § 232(d)(iv). 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
C. THE MHSAA IS NOT CREATED BY STATE OR LOCAL AUTHORITY 
Plaintiffs contend that the MHSAA is a “creature” of 
the schools and that it is therefore “created by state or 
local authority” within the meaning of § 232(d)(iv). 
In 
support of this rather tenuous argument, plaintiffs cite 
Kirby v MHSAA, 459 Mich 23, 39 n 17; 585 NW2d 290 (1998), 
in which this Court stated that the MHSAA “is a creature of 
its members, with no independent authority over schools or 
students. The schools can and should exercise appropriate 
oversight of the MHSAA.” 
Plaintiffs additionally, and 
inconsistently, argue that the MHSAA is a “de facto public 
body” because it has retained much of the same authority 
that was originally bestowed upon it in 1924: the 
authority to exercise control over the interscholastic 
athletic activities of all high schools of the state. 
Plaintiffs stress that high schools have no practical 
choice but to join the MHSAA if they want to participate in 
interscholastic sports. 
We agree with the Court of Appeals majority that the 
MHSAA is no longer the same entity that was arguably 
“created” by state authority in 1924. 
Rather, the modern 
incarnation of the MHSAA is a wholly different organization 
from the entity that was at one time legislatively 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
designated as the official organization for the regulation 
of interscholastic sports in Michigan and that was housed 
within the Michigan Department of Education. 
The MHSAA is 
now a private corporation that is wholly self-regulated. 
Membership is, by statute, completely voluntary. 
See MCL 
380.11a(4) (providing that “[a] . . . school district may 
join organizations as part of performing the functions of 
the school district”). 
In short, the MHSAA in its current 
form is not “created by state or local authority.” 
We further note that our comment in Kirby—that the 
MHSAA “is a creature of its members, with no independent 
authority over schools or students”—merely lends further 
credence to our conclusion that the MHSAA is not a public 
body. 
Michigan schools are in no way obligated to join 
the MHSAA, and they remain free to join other athletic 
organizations in lieu of, or in addition to, the MHSAA. 
Member schools do not relinquish authority or decision­
making capacity to the MHSAA, nor does the MHSAA have any 
independent authority over its members.4  There is simply 
4 Justice Weaver’s assertion that the school districts 
“have delegated the authority to the MHSAA to make policy
decisions,” post at 19, is flatly incorrect. 
As noted 
above, the school districts have voluntarily assumed the 
athletic eligibility conditions set by the MHSAA. 
Again,
Footnotes continued on following page. 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
no basis for concluding that this private corporation is 
“created” by any governmental authority.5 
D. THE MHSAA IS NOT AN AGENCY OF THE SCHOOLS 
Finally, plaintiffs contend that the MHSAA acts as an 
“agent” for its member schools and that it is therefore a 
public body as defined by § 232(d)(iii): 
A 
county, 
city, 
township, 
village,
intercounty, intercity, or regional governing
body, 
council, 
school 
district, 
special
district, or municipal corporation, or a board,
department, 
commission, 
council, 
or 
agency
thereof. [Emphasis added.] 
The Court of Appeals majority and the parties appear 
to have assumed that § 232(d)(iii) includes “agents” of 
enumerated governmental entities in the definition of 
while “entwinement” may be a relevant constitutional 
inquiry for defining who might be a state actor, it has no
relevance to our obligation to give meaning to “public
body” as the Legislature has defined it. 
5 The dissent’s analysis suffers for placing undue
emphasis on the historical connection between what is now
a private, not-for-profit corporation and its previous
incarnation as a state-controlled entity. 
See post at 9­
10. 
This historical connection to the state, however
interesting, is irrelevant to the question currently 
before the Court. 
At issue is not whether the 1924 
incarnation of the MHSAA is a “public body,” but whether
today’s private corporation composed of voluntary members 
is a “public body” under the FOIA. 
When one engages in
this inquiry without conflating the present private
corporation with its public ancestor, it is manifest that
the MHSAA is not a “public body” under the FOIA. 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
“public body.” 
We disagree and believe that there is a 
fundamental difference between the terms “agent” and 
“agency” as the latter term is used in the statute. 
As we have noted on many occasions, a statutory term 
cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be construed in 
accordance with the surrounding text and the statutory 
scheme. 
“Contextual understanding of statutes is 
generally grounded in the doctrine of noscitur a 
sociis: ‘it is known from its associates,’ see
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed), p 1060. 
This 
doctrine 
stands 
for 
the 
principle 
[of
interpretation] that a word or phrase is given
meaning by its context or setting." . . . 
Although a phrase or a statement may mean one
thing when read in isolation, it may mean 
something substantially different when read in
context. . . . 
[Sweatt v Dep't of Corrections,
468 Mich 172, 179-180; 661 NW2d 201 (2003)
(citations omitted).] 
Although the noun “agency” may be used to describe a 
business or legal relationship between parties, it is 
wholly evident from the context of § 232(d)(iii) that this 
is not the sense in which that term is used. 
Section 
232(d)(iii) designates several distinct governmental units 
as public bodies, and proceeds to include in this 
definition any “agency” of such a governmental unit. 
In 
this specific context, the word “agency” clearly refers to 
a unit or division of government and not to the 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
relationship between a principal and an agent. 
Had the 
Legislature 
intended 
any 
“agent” 
of 
the 
enumerated 
governmental entities to qualify under § 232(d)(iii), it 
would have used that term rather than “agency.”6  Thus, we 
reject plaintiffs’ argument that the MHSAA acts as an 
“agent” of its member schools and that it thus qualifies 
as an “agency” under § 232(d)(iii).7 
6 The Department of Labor and Economic Growth, for
example, is a governmental “agency,” but a real estate
office hired to sell governmental property is not a 
governmental “agency.” 
Indeed, it would defy logic (as
well as the plain language of § 232[d][iii]) to conclude
that the Legislature intended that any person or entity
qualifying as an “agent” of one of the enumerated 
governmental bodies would be considered a “public body”
for purposes of the FOIA. 
7 Moreover, even if we were to conclude that the term
“agency” as used in § 232(d)(iii) includes agents of the
enumerated 
governmental 
entities, 
the 
MHSAA 
is 
an 
independent body that is in no way the “agent” of its
members. 
As noted by the Court of Appeals majority in
this case, “[i]t is a fundamental principle of hornbook
agency law that an agency relationship arises only where
the principal ‘has the right to control the conduct of the
agent with respect to matters entrusted to him.’” 
St 
Clair 
Intermediate 
School 
Dist, 
supra 
at 
557-558 
(citations omitted). 
The MHSAA is governed by its own
internal board. 
The individual school members have no 
authority over the actions of the MHSAA. 
Moreover, by
joining 
the 
MHSAA, 
member 
schools 
are 
required 
to 
relinquish to the MHSAA complete authority over the rules
and officiating of MHSAA-sponsored athletics. 
21  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The MHSAA, a private, nonprofit organization having a 
wholly voluntary membership of private and public schools, 
is not a “public body” within the meaning of the FOIA and 
is 
therefore 
not 
subject 
to 
the 
FOIA’s 
provisions. 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Clifford W. Taylor
Stephen J. Markman 
22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MARTIN B. BREIGNER III AND 
KATHRYN BREIGHNER, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
No. 123529 
MICHIGAN HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC 
ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
WEAVER, J. (dissenting) 
Plaintiffs in this case seek information pursuant to 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq., 
regarding 
how 
the 
Michigan 
High 
School 
Athletic 
Association, Inc. (MHSAA), determines which alpine ski 
races and racers are sanctioned from or for participation. 
The MHSAA disqualified plaintiffs’ son from competing with 
his public high school ski team during the 2002 season 
because he skied in one race that the MHSAA did not 
sanction. 
The question in this case is whether the MHSAA is a 
public 
body 
that 
must 
comply 
with 
the 
disclosure 
requirements of the FOIA. Until the revision of the public 
school code by 1995 PA 289, there was no dispute that the 
 
 
MHSAA was subject to the FOIA. However, the majority holds 
that the 1995 revision of the school code insulated the 
MHSAA from public scrutiny previously available under the 
FOIA. I disagree and would hold that the MSHAA is a public 
body subject to the FOIA because it is both created by and 
primarily funded by or through public school districts. 
I 
The FOIA was enacted to continue the common-law right 
Michigan citizens have traditionally possessed to access 
government documents. See Walen v Dep’t of Corrections, 443 
Mich 240, 253; 505 NW2d 519 (1993) (RILEY, J. concurring in 
part); Evening News Ass'n v Troy, 417 Mich 481, 494-495; 
339 NW2d 421 (1983) (discussing Michigan's established 
history of requiring public agency disclosure). As Nowack v 
Auditor General, 243 Mich 200, 203-204; 219 NW 749 (1928) 
explained: 
If there be any rule of the English common
law that denies the public the right of access to
public records, it is repugnant to the spirit of
our democratic institutions. Ours is a government
of the people. Every citizen rules. . . . 
Undoubtedly, it would be a great surprise to the
citizens and taxpayers of Michigan to learn that
the law denied them access to their own books for 
the purpose of seeing how their money was being
expended 
and 
how 
their 
business 
was 
being
conducted. There is no such law and never was 
either in this country or in England. Mr. Justice
MORSE was right in saying: 
"I do not think that any common law ever
obtained in this free government that would deny 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to the people thereof the right of free access
to, and public inspection of, public records."
Burton v. Tuite, 78 Mich 363, 374 (7 LRA 73) [44
NW 282 (1889)]. 
There is no question as to the common-law
right of the people at large to inspect public
documents and records. The right is based on the
interest which citizens necessarily have in the
matter to which the records relate. 
This right to access provides the policy foundation 
underlying the FOIA. 
“The FOIA was enacted to continue 
this tradition of openness.” 
Walen, supra at 254 (Riley, 
J.). 
The FOIA specifically provides that 
all persons . . . are entitled to full and
complete information regarding the affairs of 
government and the official acts of those who
represent them as public officials and public
employees, consistent with this act. 
The people
shall 
be 
informed 
so 
that 
they 
may 
fully
participate in the democratic process. 
[MCL
15.231(2).] 
The FOIA subjects “public bodies” to its public records 
disclosure requirements. 
MCL 15.235. 
The FOIA provides 
several definitions of “public body,” any one of which 
subjects an entity to the FOIA’s public record disclosure 
requirements. 
MCL 15.232(d)(iv) defines one sort of 
public body as “[a]ny other body which is created by state 
or local authority or which is primarily funded by or 
through state or local authority.” 
I would hold that the 
MHSAA is a public body because it is both “created by state 
3  
 
 
or local authority” and “primarily funded by or through 
state or local authority.” 
Statutory language is to be read according to its 
ordinary and generally accepted meaning. 
Tryc v Michigan 
Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 135; 545 NW2d 642 (1995). 
If 
the language at issue is plain and unambiguous, we assume 
the Legislature intended its plain meaning and enforce the 
statute as written. Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370, 
376; 483 NW2d 844 (1992). It is appropriate to refer to a 
dictionary to discern a statute’s plain meaning. 
State ex 
rel Wayne Co Prosecuting Attorney v Levenberg, 406 Mich 
455, 465-466; 280 NW2d 810 (1979). 
II 
Public school districts are expressly listed as public 
bodies under the statute. MCL 15.232(d)(iii).  Moreover, 
the provision of interscholastic athletics has long been 
and now remains a proper function of public school 
districts, and the MHSAA’s relationship with the public 
schools in the provision of interscholastic athletics is 
firmly established. 
A 
The MHSAA is ”Created By” School Districts 
Under 1923 PA 237, the superintendent of public 
instruction was delegated the authority to supervise and 
4  
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
control interscholastic athletic activities. The MHSAA was 
first organized in 1924 for the purpose of coordinating and 
regulating interscholastic athletic activities.1  Within the 
first 
year 
of 
its 
creation, 
the 
MHSAA 
presented 
a 
“Suggested Set of Standards and Practices of Athletic 
Administration.” 
Regarding 
these 
standards, 
the 
superintendent of public instruction wrote: 
Any athletic program to be worth having at
all must contribute something to the educational
value to its board. 
To do that it must be the 
result of the cooperative effort on the part of
the 
superintendent, 
principal, 
althletic 
director, and student body. 
Complete control of
the program must remain in the school itself.
Any set of standards and practices must guide all
these various groups.[2] 
Until 1972, the MHSAA was apparently “housed within the 
Michigan 
Department 
of 
Education, 
and 
its 
Executive 
Director was known as the ‘State Director of Athletics.’” 
Communities for Equity v Michigan High School Athletic 
Ass’n, 178 F Supp 2d 805, 810-811 (WD Mich, 2001).  The 
1 
Since 
the 
founding 
of 
the 
MHSAA 
the 
state 
superintendent of public instruction has been as an ex­
officio member of the Representative Council that governs
the MHSAA. 
See, Lewis L. Forsythe, Athletics in Michigan
High Schools—The First Hundred Years, (Prentice-Hall, Inc
1950), which documents the development of high school 
athletics and the creation of organizations to coordinate
interscholastic athletics since 1848. 
2 Id. at 172. 
5  
   
 
 
 
 
 
MHSAA’s handbook, rules, and regulations were part of the 
Michigan Administrative Code. Id. at 811. 
In 1972, the School Code was amended and the authority 
over interscholastic athletics was moved from the State 
Board of Education to individual school districts. 
Id. 
The Legislature expressly provided that school districts 
could join “an organization, association or league which 
has as its object the promotion of sport . . . and 
regulation of athletic . . . contests . . . .”  Former MCL 
340.379. 
Although the statute did not expressly 
designate the MHSAA as the official organization for 
interscholastic 
athletics, 
it 
did 
provide 
that 
“An 
association established for the purpose of organizing and 
conducting athletic events, contests, or tournaments among 
schools shall be the official association of the state.” 
Id. (emphasis added). 
It has been assumed that the 
Legislature was referencing the MHSAA. See Communities for 
Equity, supra at 811. 
Also in 1972, the MHSAA reorganized as a private not­
for-profit corporation. 
The MHSAA’s purpose remained 
essentially unchanged after 1972. 
As stated in the 1972 
articles of incorporation, the MHSAA was intended 
to create, establish and provide for, supervise
and conduct interscholastic athletic programs
throughout 
the 
state 
consistent 
with 
the 
6  
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
educational values of the high school curriculums
[sic]. . . .[3] 
As under the former law, membership in the MHSAA was 
voluntary. 
Nevertheless, once a school district joins the 
MHSAA, it was and is bound by the MHSAA’s rules.4 
There is no express mention of athletics in the school 
code as revised in 1995. 
The law now simply authorizes 
school 
districts 
to 
“join 
organizations 
as 
part 
of 
performing the functions of the school district.” 
MCL 
380.11a(4) (emphasis added). 
However, the Revised School 
Code further provides that the powers of school districts 
are not diminished “[u]nless expressly provided in the 
3 This description is from the MHSAA’s April 18, 1972,
articles of incorporation. 
4 When a school district joins the MHSAA, it must
annually adopt the MHSAA membership resolution. 
That 
resolution provides that the school district: 
Accepts the Constitution and By-Laws of 
[MHSAA] 
and 
adopts 
as 
its 
own 
the 
rules,
regulations 
and 
interpretations 
(as 
minimum 
standards), as published in the current HANDBOOK 
and qualifications as published in the BULLETIN 
as the governing code under which the said 
school(s) 
shall 
conduct 
its 
program 
of 
interscholastic activities and agrees to primary
enforcement 
of 
said 
rules, 
regulations,
interpretations and qualifications. 
In addition,
it is hereby agreed that schools which host or
participate 
in 
the 
association’s 
meets 
and 
tournaments 
shall 
follow 
and 
enforce 
all 
tournament policies and procedures. 
7  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
amendatory act . . . .” 
MCL 380.11a(9). 
Thus, it can be 
concluded that the provision of athletics remains a proper 
function of school districts. 
It is also undisputed that 
the MHSAA remains the primary statewide organization that 
coordinates the interscholastic athletics for public school 
districts in Michigan.5 
Given this history, the majority’s suggestion that the 
MHSAA is “a wholly different organization from the entity 
that was at one time legislatively designated as the 
official organization for the regulation of interscholastic 
sports in Michigan and that was housed within the Michigan 
Department of Education,” ante at 18, is inaccurate. 
As 
noted above, the MHSAA was not expressly named in the 
statute 
as 
the 
“official” 
state 
interscholastic 
organization after 1972. 
Further, the majority suggests 
that the “voluntary” nature of membership in the MHSAA is a 
new reality under the 1995 Revised School Code. 
This is 
not 
true. 
Membership 
has 
always 
been 
and 
remains 
voluntary. 
At any point since 1924, a school district 
could 
decide 
to 
not 
participate 
in 
interscholastic 
athletics and to not join the MHSAA. 
5 The MHSAA’s comprehensive control that it has 
retained over interscholastic athletics is reviewed in 
Communities for Equity, supra at 810-814. 
8  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
School districts allow the MHSAA to coordinate sports 
events 
because 
the 
MHSAA 
is 
the 
dominant 
statewide 
organization of interscholastic athletics, and failure to 
join and comply with the MHSAA rules would effectively 
prevent the schools from participating in interscholastic 
athletics. 
Moreover, 
the 
MHSAA’s 
written 
materials 
demonstrate that the MHSAA is intertwined with the school 
districts. Specifically included in the MHSAA’s eligibility 
guidelines are requirements that the student athlete passes 
at least twenty credit hours and not have been enrolled in 
more than eight semesters in high school.6  Thus, not only 
is the MHSAA involved in the athletic activities of the 
students, 
it 
also 
establishes 
rules 
concerning 
the 
scholastic performance of the student athletes. 
As noted in Communities for Equity, supra at 811, the 
1995 amendment of the Revised School Code, “resulted in no 
substantive changes in the structure or operation of the 
MHSAA or in its relationships with its member schools.” 
The MHSAA was created by school districts that came 
together in 1924 to organize interscholastic athletics, and 
the organization of interscholastic athletics remains the 
6 
(accessed July 28, 2004). 
9  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
MHSAA’s purpose. 
When school districts join the MHSAA 
through annual resolutions passed by the school boards, 
they adopt the MHSAA’s constitution, by-laws, rules and 
regulations “as their own.”7  Therefore, under the FOIA the 
MHSAA should be treated as a “public body” because it is 
“created by state or local authority.” 
The United States Supreme Court case of Brentwood 
Academy v Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 531 US 
288; 121 S Ct 924; 148 L Ed 2d 807 (2001), supports the 
conclusion that the MHSAA is a public body that was created 
by state or local authority. 
In Brentwood, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the Tennessee Secondary 
School Athletic Association (TSSAA) was a state actor 
subject to constitutional limitations. 
While it is 
unnecessary to decide whether the MHSAA is a state actor to 
determine whether the MHSAA is subject to the FOIA, the 
Brentwood Court’s discussion of the TSSAA is of interest 
and 
relevant 
to 
this 
case 
because 
of 
the 
TSSAA’s 
similarities to the MHSAA. 
In Brentwood, the TSSAA, like 
the MHSAA, was a not-for-profit corporation that was formed 
7 As we have noted before, the MHSAA is a “creature of 
its members”. Kirby v MHSAA, 459 Mich 23, 39 n 17; 585 NW2d
290 (1998). 
10  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
to oversee the interscholastic sports programs among public 
and private high schools in the state. 
The TSSAA imposed 
sanctions against plaintiff Brentwood Academy based on 
recruiting violations. 
In finding that the TSSAA was a 
state actor, the United States Supreme Court noted that 
“the nominally private character of the Association is 
overborne 
by 
the 
pervasive 
entwinement 
of 
public 
institutions and public officials in its composition and 
workings. . .” Id. at 298. 
Brentwood also noted the 
TSSAA’s 
membership 
consisted 
of 
predominantly 
public 
schools, its revenue came from its membership dues and gate 
receipts from tournaments held at member schools, state 
officials were given ex officio status on the legislative 
council, and TSSAA employees were eligible for the state 
employees retirement system. 
Id. at 298-300.8  It is  
8 Interestingly, the United States District Court, in
Communities for Equity, supra subsequently held that, under
the United States Supreme Court decision in Brentwood, the 
facts presented in Communities for Equity necessitated a 
finding that the MHSSA was a state actor. Id. at 847. 
The United States District Court explained: 
The 
purpose 
of 
the 
MHSAA—to 
create,
establish and provide for, supervise and conduct
interscholastic athletic programs throughout the
state—is virtually the same as its Tennessee 
counterpart. 
The MHSAA has a membership of 
predominantly public schools and almost every
eligible public school belongs. 
Its revenue is 
derived from gate receipts from tournaments held
Footnotes continued on following page. 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
notable that before the United States Supreme Court in 
Brentwood reversed the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that the 
TSSAA was not a state actor, the MHSAA argued that it was 
“very similar in structure” to the TSSAA and “that the 
nature and function of the MHSAA is virtually identical to 
that of the TSSAA.” 
See Communities for Equity, supra at 
846-847. To suggest that an entity like the MHSAA could be 
a state actor, but not also a “public body” under the FOIA 
would undercut the stated purpose of the FOIA that “[a]ll 
persons . . . are entitled to full and complete information 
regarding the affairs of government . . . .” 
MCL 
15.231(2). 
at member schools and broadcast fees, among other
items, revenues to which schools would otherwise
be entitled. 
The membership of the MHSAA’s 
Representative Council includes a representative
of 
the 
superintendent 
of 
education 
and 
is 
comprised 
of 
mostly 
public 
school 
employees
acting as representatives for their schools. 
Some MHSAA employees continue to be eligible for
participation in the state employee retirement
system. 
Moreover, 
the 
MHSAA 
exercises 
adjudicative power over the schools with its 
ability 
to 
investigate 
and 
determine 
rules 
violations and resultant sanctions. 
Just as the Supreme Court recognized that a
mechanism 
is 
required 
to 
implement
interscholastic sports schedules and competition
rules 
governing 
Tennessee’s 
schools, 
that 
mechanism in the State of Michigan takes the form
of public school officials acting together under
the auspices of the MHSAA. [Id. at 847.] 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
B 
The MHSAA is Primarily Funded
by or through School Districts 
The MHSAA is “primarily funded” as a result of its 
relationship with the public school districts. 
The 
majority definition of “funded” as narrowly pertaining only 
to “the receipt of a governmental grant or subsidy,” ante 
at 9, 12, defies common sense. 
The majority’s definition 
originates in a Court of Appeals decision9 that first cites 
a dictionary definition of “fund” (as a verb), and then 
skips to a synonym, “subsidize,” that the panel discovered 
in a thesaurus. 
Apparently preferring “subsidize” to 
“fund,” even though the term “fund” was used by the 
Legislature,10 the panel then turned to a dictionary 
definition of “subsidy” (a noun) and discovered that a 
“subsidy” is defined as “a direct financial aid furnished 
by a government . . . [or] any grant or contribution of 
money.” 
Thus, by mixing verbs and nouns and substituting 
words for those employed by the Legislature, the panel 
9 For its definition of “funded,” the majority relies
on an interpretation conceived in State Defender Union 
Employees v Legal Aid and Defender Ass’n of Detroit, 230
Mich App 426; 584 NW2d 359 (1998), a decision written by
the author of the majority opinion while serving on the
Court of Appeals. 
10 Apparently the panel also preferred “subsidize” over
other common synonyms of “fund” such as “endow” or 
“finance.” Webster’s Collegiate Thesaurus (1976). 
13  
 
 
                                                 
 
creatively narrowed “is . . . funded” under the statute to 
mean the “receipt of a government grant or subsidy.” While 
it is appropriate to refer to dictionary definitions to 
understand the ordinary meaning of words, it is not 
appropriate to pick and choose among synonyms that may only 
have “nearly the same” or “similar”11 meaning and substitute 
those 
for 
the 
words 
specifically 
employed 
by 
the 
Legislature. 
I would conclude, that a “fund” can be understood to 
be “money available for use” so that when something “is 
funded” it is provided for “by a fund,” i.e. by “money 
available for use . . .” 
Webster’s New World Dictionary 
(3d ed). 
Michigan public schools represent eighty percent 
of the MHSAA’s membership and approximately ninety to 
ninety-five percent of the MHSAA’s funding is from gate 
receipts from postseason athletic tournaments for football 
and basketball involving public school teams. 
Without the 
voluntary participation of the public school districts in 
the MHSAA organized interscholastic athletic season and 
postseason tournaments, as well as the school districts’ 
relinquishment of the gate receipts to MHSAA, it would 
11 
Webster’s, 
supra, 
defining 
“synonym” 
and 
“synonymous.” 
14  
 
 
  
                                                 
cease to exist because its primary source of money 
available for its use would disappear. 
However, the question remains whether the MHSAA’s gate 
receipt funding is derived “by or through” public school 
districts. 
There are many inapplicable definitions of the 
terms “by” and “through.” 
But in the context of MCL 
15.232(d)(iv), the most applicable definition of “by” in 
Webster’s addresses the term as used to express permission 
or sanction. 
In that sense, “by” is defined as “with the 
authority or sanction of [by your leave].”12  The applicable 
definitions of “through” in Webster’s are “by means of 
[through her help]” and “as a result of; because of [done 
through error].”13 
Id. 
Thus, the plain meaning approach to “by” or “through” 
in the context of the statute at issue is whether the gate 
receipts amount to funding that the MHSAA receives with the 
authority or sanction of the school districts or by means 
12 In Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), “by” is 
similarly defined as “[t]hrough the means, act, agency or
instrumentality of.” 
13 In Black’s, supra, “through” is defined similarly as
“[b]y means of, in consequence of, by reason of [and] [b]y
the intermediary of; in the name or as the agent of; by the
agency of; because of.” 
15  
 
 
 
                                                 
  I 
of, as a result of, or because of the school districts.14
would hold that because the MHSAA receives its primary 
funding as with the authority of (by) and as a result of 
(through) 
the 
voluntary 
membership 
of 
public 
school 
districts in the MHSAA and the school districts’ voluntary 
participation in the interscholastic athletic seasons and 
postseason tournaments organized by the MHSAA, the MHSAA is 
primarily funded “by or through” the schools and is a 
public body under MCL 15.232(d)(iii) of the FOIA. 
Rather than look at the plain meaning of the words at 
issue, the majority suggests that the terms “by” and 
“through” must refer to different kinds of governmental 
authority. 
The majority adopts the analysis of the Court 
of Appeals and concludes that “by” refers to an entity that 
directly 
distributes 
its 
financial 
resources 
to 
the 
disputed organization. 
The majority then says “through” 
refers to the disputed organization indirectly receiving 
funds through some action or decision of the governmental 
14 The terms “by” and “through” are often combined in 
the phrase “by and through.” 
Garner, A Dictionary of
Modern Legal Usage (2d ed), described “by and through” as
“typical LEGALESE” that “can be replaced with either by or
through.” 
MCL 8.3a (emphasis added) provides that “[a]ll
words and phrases shall be construed and understood 
according to the common and approved usage of the language
. . . .” 
Thus, the majority’s assertion that these words
in this context must each be accorded “its unique meaning,”
ante at 11, is incorrect. 
16  
 
 
 
 
  
body. 
Ante at 11-12. 
However, to understand the statute, 
it is not necessary to engraft concepts of direct and 
indirect funding or to conclude that the Legislature 
intended to reference different kinds of governmental 
authority when it only used the term authority once. 
The 
majority’s approach defies the plain language of the 
statute and unduly constricts the definitions of “public 
body” and of “funded.” 
In Brentwood, the Unite States Supreme Court addressed 
the nature of gate receipts received by a similar state 
school athletic organization for its organization and 
sponsorship of public school athletic tournaments and 
stated: 
Unlike 
mere 
public 
buyers 
of 
contract 
services, whose payments for services rendered do
not convert the service providers into public
actors, . . . the schools here obtain membership
in the service organization and give up sources
of 
their 
own 
income 
to 
their 
collective 
association. 
The Association . . . exercises 
the authority of the predominantly public schools
to 
charge 
admission 
to 
their 
games; 
the 
Association does not receive this money from the
schools, but enjoys the moneymaking capacity as
its own. [Brentwood, supra at 299.] 
Like the TSSAA, the MHSAA is more than a public contractor 
exchanging payments for services. 
By collecting gate 
17  
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
receipts at tournaments, the MHSAA enjoys the schools’ 
moneymaking capacity as its own.15 
This 
underscores 
the 
conclusion 
that 
the 
MHSAA 
receives its primary funding “by or through” the schools’ 
authority. The majority argues that the MHSAA “creates its 
own ‘market,’” and stresses that without the MHSAA’s effort 
“no revenue from tournament games would be generated for 
any entity, including MHSAA member schools.” 
Ante at 12­
13, 15. 
The majority thus concludes that the MHSAA is 
merely a service provider and that the gate receipts are 
simply fees paid for services. 
However, as noted above, the MHSAA is not simply in a 
situation where the organization provides a fee for a 
particular 
service. 
True, 
the 
MHSAA 
does 
organize 
interscholastic seasons and postseason tournaments. 
It 
also provides medical insurance, publications, and training 
to its members. 
However, schools do not join the MHSAA or 
allow it to sell tickets to events featuring student 
athletes 
simply 
because 
the 
MHSAA 
provides 
medical 
insurance, 
publications, 
or 
training. 
As 
already 
explained, school districts allow the MHSAA to coordinate 
15 Justice Thomas’s dissenting perspective regarding
the relationship of the association to the schools in
Brentwood did not prevail. 
The majority’s citation of it,
ante at 13 n 2, is not persuasive. 
18  
 
 
 
events and relinquish related gate receipts to the MHSAA 
because the MHSAA is the dominant statewide organization of 
interscholastic athletics, and failure to join and comply 
with MHSAA rules would effectively prevent the schools from 
participating in interscholastic athletics. 
It should be noted that the MHSAA is distinguishable 
from ordinary service providers to the schools. The school 
districts have delegated the authority to the MHSAA to make 
policy decisions. 
These decisions are within the proper 
function of school districts to regulate athletics, MCL 
380.11a(4); MCL 380.11a(9), such as athletic eligibility 
and training, participation in outside sports activities 
and 
required 
scholastic 
achievement 
for 
participating 
athletes. 
This intertwinement between the MHSAA and the 
school districts makes the MHSAA subject to the FOIA where 
an ordinary service provider would not be. 
II 
Conclusion 
It has been and remains the submission of public 
school districts to the rules and regulations of the MHSAA 
that allows the MHSAA to exist. 
It can thus be concluded 
that the MHSAA was created by the school districts. 
MCL 
15.232(d)(iv). 
It is similarly by and through the MHSAA’s 
relationship with the schools that it may sell tickets for 
19  
 
 
 
 
tournaments featuring public school athletes. 
It follows 
that the gate receipts the MHSAA receives for those events 
are received “by or through” the authority of the schools 
as those words are used in MCL 15.232(d)(iv). 
The purpose 
of the FOIA is to allow citizens to fully participate in 
the democratic process regarding the affairs of government 
and the official acts of those who represent them. MCL 
15.231(2). The school districts have effectively delegated 
the responsibility for those official acts, as they pertain 
to school athletics, to the MHSAA by repeatedly adopting 
its rules as their own. 
Thus, both to follow the language of the FOIA and 
remain true to the purpose behind its enactment, I would 
hold that the MHSAA is a public body that must comply with 
the disclosure requirements of the FOIA. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
20