Title: Kurzmann v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 381, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 13, 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MICHAEL H. KURZMANN,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 381, 2005 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 0312007348 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  June 14, 2006 
Decided: July 13, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Michael R. Abram, Law Office of Edward C. Gill, P.A., Georgetown, 
Delaware for appellant. 
 
 
Kim Ayvazian, Department of Justice, Georgetown, Delaware for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
 
 
 
2
 
Several years ago, the defendant appellant, Michael Kurzmann pleaded 
guilty to assaulting his wife and to several other charges. A Superior Court judge 
sentenced him to seven years at Level 5, suspended for six months at Level 4, 
followed by Level 3 probation. On July 4, 2005, while he was still on probation, 
Kurzmann allegedly assaulted his wife. The State brought a violation of probation 
proceeding against Kurzmann based on the alleged assault contending, among 
other things, that Kurzmann violated his probation by committing a new criminal 
offense. After a contested VOP hearing at which both the State and Kurzmann 
presented testimony, a Superior Court judge found that Kurzmann violated his 
probation by assaulting his wife. The Superior Court judge then sentenced 
Kurzmann to serve seven years at Level 5, the full suspended Level 5 term of the 
original sentence. Kurzmann now appeals the judgment that he violated his 
probation claiming that the prosecutor engaged in egregious misconduct at the 
VOP hearing; that the Superior Court judge sentenced him with a closed mind; that 
the Superior Court judge should not have found a violation of probation when the 
State never charged him with a criminal offense arising out of the alleged assault; 
and that the Superior Court judge impermissibly relied upon “medical testimony” 
from a non-expert witness. We have concluded that Kurzmann’s arguments are 
without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the Superior Court.  
 
 
3
FACT AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On April 21, 2004, Kurzmann pleaded guilty to one Count of Second Degree 
Assault and three Counts of Endangering the Welfare of a Child for an incident in 
which he assaulted his wife, Lea Kurzmann. On the Assault charge, Kurzmann 
received a sentence of four years at Level 5, with credit for time served, suspended 
for six months at Level 4 home confinement, followed by one year of probation at 
Level 3. On each of the three Endangering charges to which he pleaded guilty, 
Kurzmann received a sentence of 1 year at Level 5 suspended for 1 year of 
probation at Level 3. The probation for the Endangering charges ran concurrently 
with that for the Assault charge.  
 
On February 25, 2005, while he was still on Level 3 probation, Kurzmann 
was arrested and charged with one Count of Terroristic Threatening, three Counts 
of Endangering the Welfare of a Child, and two Counts of Offensive Touching. 
Kurzmann’s probation officer filed a report alleging a violation of probation, in 
part, based on the new charges. After a trial in Family Court, Kurzmann was found 
not guilty of the Terroristic Threatening charge and a Family Court Commissioner 
dismissed the remaining charges.  Because of the outcome in Family Court, 
Kurzmann’s probation officer withdrew the violation report on June 22, 2005. 
Thereafter, Kurzmann continued on Level 3 probation.  
 
4
 
Robin Williams and her fiancé, Kevin Walls, a retired Probation and Parole 
Officer, were at Back Bay Skillets, a restaurant in Long Neck, Delaware on July 4, 
2005. Williams was previously employed as a domestic violence advocate case 
manager at the Division of Family Services. During the course of her employment 
at DFS, Williams worked with Lea Kurzmann for about nine months while Lea 
was a DFS client. During the nine months, Williams had “quite a bit of contact 
with Lea.” While Williams was in the restaurant, Lea abruptly rushed inside 
“clutching” her two-year old child. Lea was crying, her eye was almost swollen 
shut, her lip was “busted” and there was blood on her and “all over the child.” Lea 
was hysterical, “definitely in fear,” and said: “Don’t let him come in here. Please 
don’t let him come in here.” Lea put down her child, and Williams then picked up 
the child. Shortly thereafter, Kurzmann walked into the restaurant and demanded to 
know who Williams was and why she was holding his child. Kurzmann denied that 
he had hurt Lea, but Lea looked at her child and said “Tell Ms. Robin, Joanna, that 
daddy – tell Ms. Robin what daddy did. Daddy hit mommy.” The child did not 
respond.  
 
Williams gave the child back to Lea and Walls asked Kurzmann to step 
outside of the restaurant. After some prodding, Kurzmann left. Williams stayed 
and talked with Lea for over an hour. Lea told Williams that she and her husband 
had an argument the previous day, during which Kurzmann poked Lea in the neck. 
 
5
After the argument Lea left her home and spent the evening in her vehicle. When 
Lea came back home the next day, she refused to get out of the vehicle. Kurzmann 
came out of the residence screaming at Lea. He then approached the van and hit 
Lea with his fist on the side of her face. The two-year old child was with Lea in the 
van during the assault.  
 
During the hour in which Lea talked with Williams, she “remained upset” 
and “never stopped crying.” Williams unsuccessfully tried to convince Lea to go to 
a battered women’s shelter, but Lea did not want to go because she feared DFS 
would be involved and she would “end up losing her children.” After the 
conversation with Williams, Lea went back to her home, which was across the 
street from the restaurant. Kurzmann arrived back at the home a few minutes later. 
Once Williams saw Kurzmann go back into the home, she called the police to 
report the incident. Before the police arrived, Lea left in a van and drove to her 
nearby friend’s house. One of the police officers that responded to the scene later 
told Williams that she had spoken with Lea over the phone and that both Lea and 
Kurzmann said that Kurzmann had been playing football with their dog and that 
the football hit Lea when she came outside with the child.  
 
In an attempt to “get some information” about the July 4th incident, two 
probation officers, Debbie Benton and James Ayers, went to the Kurzmann 
residence on July 7, 2005. Benton observed that Lea had a black eye and bruising 
 
6
on her right cheek, upper lip, and on her shoulder and arms. Ayers confirmed that 
Lea had a black eye, some swelling, and discoloration of her lip. Ayers also 
observed that Lea had finger marks on her arms. Lea explained that she sustained 
her facial injuries when Kurzmann drop-kicked a football that struck her in the 
face. According to Lea, the finger marks on her arms were from “rough sex.”  
 
Lea told the probation officers that she and her husband had an argument on 
July 3rd. She left the house in a car and parked somewhere. When Lea returned 
home the next day, the argument with Kurzmann continued. During this argument, 
Kurzmann hit her with the football. Ayers did not remember asking Lea how many 
times the football had hit her; however, it seemed to him that there was “more than 
one blow or strike” on Lea’s face.  
 
Williams, Ayers, and Benton testified at the contested VOP hearing 
consistent with the foregoing facts. The defense called only Lea Kurzmann. 
According to Lea’s testimony, she and her husband were out back playing 
“monkey in the middle” by throwing a football back and forth and having the dog 
chase the football. Kurzmann allegedly kicked the football, it bounced off the 
fence, and hit Lea in the face. Kurzmann found this incident funny, which made 
Lea very angry and upset. Lea went inside, grabbed her daughter, and left for the 
restaurant across the street “to get a soda.” Inside the restaurant she ran into 
Williams, who “automatically assumed the worse because she knew about the 
 
7
history between Mike and [Lea].” Lea refused to let Williams call the police and 
testified that she never told Williams that Kurzmann hit her. Notably, Lea did not 
testify that she told Williams that Kurzmann hit her with a football. According to 
Lea, she had a “bit of a black eye” from being hit by the football. She explained 
that she was anemic and bruised easily, and that the bruises on her arms were from 
“rough sex.”    
 
After hearing the testimony from Williams, Ayers, Benton, Lea, and several 
other witnesses, the Superior Court judge who presided over the VOP hearing (the 
“VOP judge”) concluded that Kurzmann violated his probation by assaulting Lea 
on July 4th, 2005.1 The judge expressly based his finding on William’s testimony, 
noting that “I found … Williams to be a very credible witness based, on large part, 
upon my observations of her manner when she testified.”  Even though Williams 
related Lea’s hearsay statements, the judge concluded that the statements fell 
within the present sense impression and excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay 
rule. In contrast to his credibility finding about Williams, the VOP judge expressly 
concluded that Lea was not a credible witness. Having carefully considered the 
evidence, the judge concluded “I do not think that Lea’s getting hit accidentally 
with a football would have caused her to behave as she did in front of … Williams. 
                                                 
1  
The judge also concluded that Kurzmann committed a technical violation of his probation 
by failing to fulfill the requirement that he cooperate with DFS. In resentencing Kurzmann, 
however, the judge stated that he “did not hold the non-cooperation” against the defendant.  
 
8
I do think getting assaulted violently by Kurzmann would produce that kind of 
behavior….”  
 
The VOP judge also relied upon the nature of Lea’s injuries to support his 
finding: “Lea had multiple points of trauma to her face, including a black eye, a 
busted lip, and a swollen cheek.” The multiple points of trauma, in the judge’s 
view, were inconsistent with getting hit by a football.  Accordingly, the VOP judge 
revoked Kurzmann’s probation. For the suspended Second Degree Assault charge, 
the judge resentenced Kurzmann to four years at Level 5, with credit for time 
served, the full term of the original sentence. For the first two of the suspended 
Endangering charges, the judge sentenced Kurzmann to 1 year at Level 5; and for 
the last suspended Endangering charge, to one year at Level 5, followed by six 
months at Level 4 work release. Kurzman now appeals claiming that the VOP 
judge committed numerous errors. We address these claims seriatim. 
DISCUSSION 
1. Alleged prosecutorial misconduct 
 
Kurzmann argues that we should reverse his conviction because of the 
prosecutor’s alleged misconduct throughout the VOP hearing. He cites three 
instances of alleged misconduct in which the prosecutor “repeatedly misstated the 
evidence and argued facts not in evidence.” It is well-established that prosecutors 
 
9
may not misstate or misrepresent the evidence presented at trial.2 According to 
Kurzmann, the judge that presided over the VOP hearing relied on these false 
statements as if they were evidence when he rendered his decision and that, 
therefore, we should reverse and remand for a new VOP hearing.  
 
As a general matter, we review claims of prosecutorial misconduct de novo 
to determine whether the conduct was improper or prejudicial.3 “Not every 
improper remark, however, requires reversal.”4 To the extent we determine that 
prosecutorial misconduct occurred, we then engage in a four-factor inquiry to 
determine the prejudicial impact of the improper conduct examining: (1) the 
closeness of the case; (2) the centrality of the issue affected by the alleged error; 
(3) the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the alleged error; and (4) whether the 
                                                 
2  
Flonnory v. State, 893 A.2d 507, 540 (Del. 2006) (citing Hunter v. State, 815 A.2d 730, 
735 (Del. 2002)); Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 567 (Del. 1981) (“It is unprofessional conduct 
for the prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it 
may draw.”) (quoting ABA Standards, Prosecution and Defense Functions (1971)).  See  also 
ABA Criminal Justice Standards, Prosecution Function, Standard 3-5.5, Opening Statement 
(“The prosecutor's opening statement should be confined to a statement of the issues in the case 
and the evidence the prosecutor intends to offer which the prosecutor believes in good faith will 
be available and admissible. A prosecutor should not allude to any evidence unless there is a 
good faith and reasonable basis for believing that such evidence will be tendered and admitted in 
evidence.”); Standard 3-5.6(b), Presentation of Evidence (“A prosecutor should not knowingly 
and for the purpose of bringing inadmissible matter to the attention of the judge or jury offer 
inadmissible evidence, ask legally objectionable questions, or make other impermissible 
comments or arguments in the presence of the judge or jury.); Standard 3-5.8(a), Argument to the 
Jury (“In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from 
evidence in the record. The prosecutor should not intentionally misstate the evidence or mislead 
the jury as to the inferences it may draw.”) available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/ 
standards/pfunc_toc.html  
 
3  
Flonnory, 893 A.2d at 538  (citations omitted). 
 
4  
Daniels v. State, 859 A.2d 1008, 1011 (Del. 2004) (citation omitted).  
 
10
prosecutor's statements were repetitive errors that require reversal because they 
cast doubt on the integrity of the judicial process.5 If the defense counsel does not 
object to the prosecutor’s misconduct and the trial judge does not intervene sua 
sponte, however, we will review for plain error.6   
 
This case presents a variation on the usual theme addressing the law 
governing prosecutorial misconduct, because here the alleged instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct occurred during a contested VOP hearing at which a 
Superior Court judge sat as the trier of fact. Most cases involving prosecutorial 
misconduct arise when the alleged misconduct occurs in front of a jury. This 
variation is important because “[a] judge, sitting as a trier of fact, is presumed to 
have made his verdict only on the admissible evidence before him and to have 
disregarded that which is inadmissible.”7 Thus, in order to obtain reversal on the 
grounds of prosecutorial misconduct in this VOP hearing, Kurzmann must: (1) 
                                                 
5  
Flonnory, 893 A.2d at 538 (citing Hughes, 437 A.2d at 569; Hunter, 815 A.2d at 738). 
 
6  
Morris v. State, 795 A.2d 653, 657 (Del. 2002) (“Because defense counsel did not object 
at trial to the prosecutor’s statements and the Superior Court did not interview sua sponte, we 
review for plain error.”) (citing Supr. Ct. R. 8; Trump v. State, 753 A.2d 963, 964-65 (Del. 
2000); Robertson v. State, 596 A.2d 1345, 1356 (Del. 1991) (parentheticals omitted)); Williams 
v. State, 803 A.2d 927, 928 (Del. 2002). 
 
7  
Burke v. State, 1997 Del. LEXIS 95, *5-6 (Del. 1997) (quoting United States v. 
Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1156 (5th Cir.1993)); See e.g., Liggett v. People, 135 P.3d 725, 2006 
Colo. LEXIS 441, *25 (Colo. 2006) (“In the context of a bench trial, the prejudicial effect of 
improperly admitted evidence is generally presumed innocuous. [T]here is a presumption that all 
incompetent evidence is disregarded by the court in reaching its conclusions, and the judgment 
will not be disturbed unless it is clear that the court could not have reached the result but for the 
incompetent evidence.”)(citations and quotations omitted);  
 
 
11
show that the prosecutor did in fact engage in misconduct by misstating the 
evidence and arguing facts not in evidence; (2) he must rebut the presumption that 
the VOP judge made his decision only on the admissible evidence before him and 
disregarded the allegedly inadmissible and improper prosecutorial statements by 
making a showing that the trial judge actually relied upon these misstatements in 
reaching his result; and (3) he must show that the VOP judge’s reliance was either 
plain error or unfairly prejudicial under the Hughes-Hunter analysis. If Kurzmann 
fails to establish any one, the VOP judge’s decision must stand.  
A. Opening Statement. 
 
In her opening statement – the first instance of alleged misconduct – the 
prosecutor said: 
 
This defendant … has been dealing with issues of violence and 
substance abuse for many, many years. He has had difficulty in 
dealing with relationships for all that time.  
 
 
He [Kurzmann] is continuing to offend. Even after he pled 
guilty in Superior Court, there were two more arrests that went to 
Family Court, and those charges [sic] ultimately we couldn’t go 
forward because Lea wouldn’t appear. During the case that I have 
pending in Superior Court, DFS became involved. This was a result of 
that incident where the children witnessed both assaults.  
 
 
It is difficult to determine exactly which statements Kurzmann alleges are 
objectionable because he did not expressly quote the statements.  Moreover, he 
cited and provided only one page in the appendix for each alleged instance of 
misconduct. Because he cited and provided only one page in the appendix for each 
 
12
allegedly improper statement, it is difficult to determine with certainty the 
objectionable statements, because in his briefs Kurzmann loosely paraphrased the 
improper comments.  
 
When deciding whether a comment is improper prosecutorial misconduct, 
our cases often turn on the nuances of the language and the context in which the 
statements were made.8 Because prosecutorial misconduct claims are very fact 
specific and sensitive, in the future, an appellant alleging improper prosecutorial 
comment in any context should quote in his opening brief the entire allegedly 
improper statement, specifically indicate the objectionable portions of that 
statement, and append to the brief all relevant portions of the transcript where the 
“misconduct” can be confirmed. 
 
Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s statement, either during or 
after she finished. Contrary to Kurzmann’s suggestion on appeal, in her opening 
statement, the prosecutor never once stated or argued that “the defendant has a 
consistent history of battering his wife.”9 The prosecutor’s statements that arguably 
lend themselves to the defendant’s interpretation were that Lea Kurzmann was a 
                                                 
8  
Compare Thompson v. State, 2005 Del. LEXIS 423, *4   (Del. 2005) (Order) (addressing 
the improper comment “The State asks that you go back not seeking to find reasonable doubt, 
but to seek the truth.”) and Smith v. State, 2006 Del. LEXIS 218, *33-36 (Del. 2006) (addressing, 
among other things, the comment “It is your duty to find the truth in this case. To look at the 
totality of the case, the case as a whole, to decide what you believe about this case and decide 
what the truth is” and distinguishing Thompson). 
 
9  
Opening Br. Pg 5.  
 
 
13
domestic violence victim, “who is living with abuse, [and] has been living [page 
break]10 with abuse for a number of years…,” that Kurzmann “has been dealing 
with issues of violence and substance abuse for many, many years,” and that 
Kurzmann is “continuing to offend.” In his reply brief, Kurzmann does not dispute 
that the State offered evidence “that there was a past history of domestic 
violence….” Nevertheless, Kurzmann contends, the State offered no evidence that 
Lea failed to cooperate with the prosecution or police investigations.11 
Accordingly, we will assume that Kurzmann’s focus on the alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct during the opening statement is limited to the allegedly false statement: 
“Even after [Kurzmann] pled guilty in Superior Court, there were two more arrests 
that went to Family Court, and those charges [sic] ultimately we couldn’t go 
forward because Lea wouldn’t appear.” We are satisfied that there was competent 
evidence in the record to support that statement.  
                                                 
10  
This statement began on A-3 of the transcript and continued onto A-4. Kurzmann 
provided only A-4 in his appendix to this appeal, therefore, we assume that Kurzmann is not 
claiming that the last clause of this sentence is improper because he did not include the previous 
page of the transcript, which included the first part of this sentence. In any event, the statement is 
not improper or prejudicial given the context of this case.  
 
11  
Reply Br. Pg 1. (“… [T]he state offered no evidence that Lea Kurzmann failed to 
cooperate with [the] prosecution. The state did offer evidence that there was a past history of 
domestic violence, which is not disputed, but the state did not offer proof that Lea Kurzmann in 
any way failed to cooperate with any police investigations.” (emphasis added).  
 
 
14
 
James Ayers testified that Lea had recanted her story of abuse in previous 
incidents. Ayers further testified that after the arrest of February 28, “similar 
things” (i.e., recantation) happened:  
They [Lea and Kurzmann] were both charged. There is [sic] no 
witnesses. People don’t show up. There is also a violation report 
issued back in 2001 in which the very same thing happened that Lea 
called probation after [Kurzmann] hit her. She was afraid. Another 
day or two later, she goes out to the residence, and the story changes. 
She hits a log or branch and hits her face, her head on the picnic table. 
There was a history of this type of denial. (emphasis added).  
 
We note that the prosecutor’s opening statement came before the testimony of the 
witnesses, was relatively short, and was informal. Her opening statement 
anticipated Ayers’s testimony. The prosecutor’s statement “we couldn’t go 
forward” was arguably inconsistent with the fact that the State did in fact elect to 
prosecute Kurzmann in Family Court on the February 2005 charge, but in his 
opening statement defense counsel quickly pointed this fact out to the VOP judge. 
Moreover, it is possible to interpret “we couldn’t go forward” in a manner 
consistent with Ayers’s testimony. As defense counsel indicated in his opening 
statement, there was “zero evidence” before the Family Court Commissioner when 
she dismissed five of the charges against Kurzmann. The prosecutor may have 
been implying that the State could not go forward successfully because Lea 
recanted, did not show up, or did not cooperate. As Ayers testified, there were no 
witnesses, “people [including Lea] [did not] show up.” Nevertheless, even if this 
 
15
one statement was misconduct because it misstated facts and “argued facts not in 
evidence,” as we discuss below, Kurzmann still has not overcome the presumption 
that the VOP judge did not rely upon this fact in rendering his decision.  
B. Summation 
 
Kurzmann complains that the prosecutor argued in her summation that the 
State “was concerned about the safety of the [Kurzmanns’] children because there 
are repeated incidents of violence in front of the children.” Kurzmann never 
explains why this was prejudicial, cites to the record to show why it was a 
misstatement, or attempts to indicate that the trial judge improperly relied upon the 
statement. The Statement at issue follows: 
….The State’s concern is for the safety of the children. The State is 
convinced that the children, specifically Joanna, Mr. Kurzmann’s 
child, is [sic] being repeatedly exposed to domestic violence…. She 
has been present for a number of incidents for which he has been both 
convicted and simply arrested for in the past. She was a witness for 
the charges that he is on probation for before this Court. 
 
 
Defense counsel did not object at the time of the statement or after the 
prosecutor finished. Nor did he attempt to set the record straight. Defense counsel 
simply argued that there was no allegation in the violation report regarding the 
children and that it was not fair for him to be required to defend against something 
that was not alleged in the report.12  
                                                 
12  
Although Kurzmann did not argue that this particular statement raised due process issues, 
we are satisfied that Kurzmann was not in fact required to defend against an allegation about 
 
16
 
Defense counsel did not object, perhaps, because the record largely supports 
the prosecutor’s statement. Williams testified that when Lea related the details of 
the July 4 incident to her, Lea recalled that “the child was in the van, and that is 
when [Kurzmann] assaulted her while she was in the van.” Williams further 
testified that when Lea walked into the restaurant with Joanna that there was 
“blood all over the child.” Clearly there is evidence to support the fact that Joanna 
observed the July 4 incident. There is also evidence in the record to support the 
fact that Joanna observed the assault to which Kurzmann pleaded guilty in April 
2004 and for which he was on probation at the time of the July 4th incident. One  
Count in the indictment to which Kurzmann pleaded guilty in April 2004 stated 
that he “did commit assault against Lea Kurzmann knowing that the crime was 
witnessed by a child, Joanna Kurzmann, a member of victims [sic] family.” We are 
satisfied that there is record support for the prosecutor’s statement and that she did 
not misstate evidence or argue facts not in evidence.  Again, even assuming this 
statement was improper, Kurzmann has not overcome the presumption that the 
VOP judge only relied upon admissible evidence when rendering his decision. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
harm to the children not alleged in the violation report. From the record in its entirety, it is clear 
that the State proceeded against Kurzmann based on his assault on Lea and various other 
technical probation violations.  
 
17
C. Sentencing Statement 
 
In his opening brief, Kurzmann suggests that, before sentencing, the 
prosecutor misstated the facts and argued facts not in evidence by “argu[ing] that 
[Kurzmann] has a complete history of systematic battering that cannot be 
controlled.” The prosecutor actually said: 
The pattern here is that he is going to hurt her and she is simply 
unable or willing at this point to resist the battering. If it was just the 
two of them, perhaps none of us should be concerned, but there are 
three small children involved. They are so involved that the two of 
them [the Kurzmanns] thought it was fitting to bring them here today, 
which I find extremely offensive. 
 
The State’s position is that he needs to be in jail. The only way the 
children won’t be exposed to violence is if he is in jail, because she is 
not going to keep them away from him.13  
                                                 
13  
One page earlier in the transcript the prosecutor stated:  
 
Your honor, Mr. Kurzmann, I don’t believe, will ever change his spots. He is a 
batterer. He has been a batter for years and he will continue to be a batterer until 
he either gets too old or too infirmed to hit or there is some other kind of miracle 
that occurs in his life…. He has been a [sic] battering Lea for many years. The file 
in my office is contained in a box because there have been so many arrests. Most 
of them have not [begin page cited in transcript] resulted in convictions because 
Lea has either not appeared because she has fought with us every time we tried to 
serve her or she came in and recanted on the stand every time. 
 
 
Kurzmann did not cite this statement in its entirety (although the page of the transcript he 
did cite includes the fragment at the end). Given the relevant portion of the transcript included in 
his appendix, we assumed that Kurzmann was concerned with the statement we quoted in the 
main text of this opinion, particularly in light of the fact that Kurzmann included the statement 
quoted in this footnote at a later portion in the appendix to support a different argument (A-21). 
The statement quoted in this footnote, nevertheless, includes some of the same type of alleged 
misconduct we discussed above. Kurzmann did not argue on appeal that this statement was an 
additional instance of misconduct. For the reasons cited throughout this opinion, even if 
Kurzmann had argued that this statement was improper, we are satisfied that it did not constitute 
reversible error.  
 
 
18
 
The prosecutor’s comments might be hyperbolic argument,14 in which the 
prosecutor made legitimate inferences from the evidence at the VOP hearing,15 but 
they are supported by the record, are not misstatements, and, in context, are not 
improper in any way. Moreover, as noted above, Kurzmann expressly conceded in 
his reply brief that “the state did offer evidence that there was a past history of 
domestic violence….” For these reasons we are satisfied that Kurzmann cannot 
establish that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by misstating the evidence.  
 
Kurzmann misconstrues the prosecutor’s statements by implying that the 
state argued that “Kurzmann [was] guilty of a charge after a court has found him 
not guilty….” He focuses on the February 2005 incident and the disposition in 
Family Court and suggests that the State argued and consequently the VOP judge 
impermissibly relied upon this incident to establish Kurzmann’s history of violence 
when the State offered “actual evidence of only one conviction for domestic 
violence.”16  
                                                 
14  
See Flonnory, 893 A.2d at 540. 
 
15  
See Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 204 (Del. 1980) (“The prosecutor in his final 
summation should not be confined to a repetition of the evidence presented at trial. He is allowed 
and expected to explain all the legitimate inferences of the appellants’ guilt that flow from that 
evidence.”) (citation omitted); Morris, 795 A.2d at 659. 
 
16  
Reply Br., pg 2 (emphasis added).  
 
 
19
 
The foregoing analysis of the actual statements about which Kurzmann 
complains notwithstanding, Kurzmann has simply failed to offer sufficient record 
support to rebut the presumption that the VOP judge made his verdict only upon 
the admissible evidence before him and that he disregarded the prosecutor’s 
allegedly false statements.17 In an attempt to rebut this presumption, Kurzmann 
argues that the VOP judge impermissibly relied upon multiple assaults when 
rendering his decision (including the February 2005 assault that went to trial in 
Family Court). In so doing, Kurzmann, perhaps mistakenly, misinterprets the VOP 
judge’s statements. When he discussed Lea’s credibility the VOP judge noted:  
Morever, [Lea] had multiple motives not to tell the truth. It is obvious 
to me, given Kurzmann’s prior assaults on this woman which led to a 
conviction for assault in the second degree, that she had many reasons 
to fear him and many reasons to accommodate her testimony to fit his 
view of what happened.  
 
Kurzmann quotes the italicized portion of the above statement to argue that the 
VOP judge relied upon the February 2005 incident as support for his decision and 
sentence. We cannot accept Kurzmann’s interpretation. His focus on the “s” at the 
end of “assaults” in a phrase where the VOP judge is clearly discussing the second 
degree assault charge to which Kurzmann pleaded guilty does not rebut the 
presumption. Because Kurzmann has (1) failed to show that the prosecutor actually 
engaged in misconduct at all and (2) failed to rebut the presumption that the VOP 
                                                 
17  
Burke, 1997 Del. LEXIS 95, *5-6. 
 
 
20
judge rendered his decision only upon the admissible evidence before him, we 
need not engage in a Hughes-Hunter or plain error analysis. For these reasons, 
Kurzmann’s first argument fails. 
 
Before discussing Kurzmann’s second claim, we think it necessary to 
discuss briefly claims of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal in general. The phrase 
“prosecutorial misconduct” is not a talismanic incantation, the mere invocation of 
which will automatically lead to a reversal. This Court has always taken claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct very seriously and will continue to do so in the future.18 
Nevertheless, we do not condone the magic bullet approach to appeals loosely 
based on “prosecutorial misconduct.” Before making a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct on appeal, defense counsel should be sure that there are ample grounds 
for the claim, because accusing a prosecutor of prosecutorial misconduct has 
potentially serious implications. 19 
2. The Superior Court judge did not sentence Kurzmann with a closed mind 
 
In his second argument on appeal, Kurzmann contends that the VOP judge 
sentenced him with a closed mind.  We review the Superior Court’s sentencing of a 
criminal defendant for an abuse of discretion. 20 It is well-established that appellate 
                                                 
18  
See e.g. Hunter, 815 A.2d 730. 
 
19  
See Price v. State, 858 A.2d 930 (Del. 2004). 
 
20  
Walt v. State, 727 A.2d 836, 840 (Del. 1999). 
 
 
21
review of sentences is extremely limited.21 Thus, generally speaking, our review 
ends upon a determination that the sentence is within the statutory limits prescribed 
by the legislature.22 Where the sentence falls within the statutory limits, we 
consider only whether it is based on factual predicates which are false, 
impermissible, or lack minimal reliability, judicial vindictiveness or bias, or a 
closed mind.23 “A judge sentences with a closed mind when the sentence is based 
on a preconceived bias without consideration of the nature of the offense or the 
character of the defendant.”24 Moreover, “the judge must have an open mind for 
receiving all information related to the question of mitigation.”25 
 
Kurzmann contends that the VOP judge erred by (1) relying upon 
“impermissible and false evidence” when sentencing him; and (2) imposing an 
unduly harsh sentence for Kurzmann’s first violation.  
 
Immediately before he sentenced Kurzmann the judge stated: 
Mr. Kurzmann, you have a long history of violence toward Lea 
Kurzmann. It appears to me that the first time that you had pretty 
much unrestrained access to her, another incident of violence 
                                                 
21  
Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1992). 
 
22  
Id. (quoting Ward v. State, 567 A.2d 1296, 1297 (Del.1989)). 
 
23  
Weston v. State, 832 A.2d 742, 746 (Del. 2003) (citing Siple v. State, 701 A.2d 79, 83 
(Del. 1997); Mayes, 604 A.2d at 842-43). 
 
24  
Weston, 832 A.2d at 746 (citing Ellerbe v. State, 755 A.2d 387, 2000 WL 949625, at *1 
(Del. 2000)). 
 
25  
Weston, 832 A.2d at 746 (citing Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 465, 513 (Del. 1999)) 
 
22
occurred. I have no reason to believe, based on what you have actually 
done, that anything is going to change. Given that, I am going to 
sentence you as follows…. 
 
Kurzmann cites the italicized portion of the above statement to support his 
argument:  
In sentencing [Kurzmann] the [judge] relied upon facts that were 
argued by the State but for which they offered no evidence. 
Specifically the [judge] states “Mr. Kurzmann, you have a long 
history of violence towards Lea Kurzmann.” While not expanding on 
why [he] came to this conclusion, it is reasonable to assert that [the 
judge] relied upon the statements of the State which were unsupported 
by any facts. They [sic] facts are that Mr. Kurzmann was on probation 
for almost a year and half [sic] with no actual violations when he was 
violated for the matter under review which allegedly involved 
domestic violence. While it is impossible to determine exactly what 
the Judge relied upon when he noted that Mr. Kurzmann has a long 
history of Domestic Violence, it is improbable to believe that he only 
relied on [Kurzmann’s] conviction and his first violation of probation. 
It is more likely that the [judge] used the arguments by the state, 
which used false evidence and in fact mislead [sic] the [judge].26 
 
First, this statement in Kurzmann’s opening brief appears to be inconsistent with 
his statement in the reply brief: “the state did offer evidence that there was a past 
history of domestic violence, which is not disputed….” That statement in the reply 
brief is, however, consistent with the VOP judge’s remark at sentencing. Second, 
even looking only to the assault charge to which Kurzmann pleaded guilty and the 
                                                 
26  
Opening Br. pgs. 7-8. (emphasis added).  
 
 
23
July 4th incident, the evidence in the record supports the trial judge’s statement.27  
Third, and most importantly, Kurzmann attempts to flip the presumption that we 
discussed above.28 He would have us interpret the VOP judge’s statement, which 
even he concedes is ambiguous,29 to conclude that the VOP judge relied upon 
incompetent and inadmissible evidence when he rendered Kurzmann’s sentence. 
That we will not do. The VOP judge did not rely upon an impermissible factual 
basis when he sentenced Kurzmann and Kurzmann has failed to convince us 
otherwise.  
 
We are also satisfied that the VOP judge did not sentence Kurzmann with a 
closed mind. Kurzmann suggests that the VOP judge ignored the fact that he had 
not been convicted of a new offense and was a “productive member of society for a 
year and half.” We disagree. The VOP judge heard from defense counsel and twice 
from Kurzmann himself before he imposed the sentence. It is clear that the VOP 
judge considered the nature of the offense and the character of the defendant and 
that he received information from Kurzmann and defense counsel on the question 
                                                 
27  
See also Williams’s testimony (“When I first came, I attending a hearing in Family Court 
when they gave Lea full custody of the children and absolutely no custody to Mr. Kurzmann 
because of the history of domestic violence.”); Lea Kurzmann’s testimony (In response to a 
question from defense counsel on direct examination about speaking with Williams in the 
restaurant on July 4th: “[Williams] automatically assumed the worse because she knew about the 
history between Mike and I.”) 
 
28  
See Supra pgs. 10-11. 
 
29  
“[I]t is impossible to determine exactly what the Judge relied upon when he noted that 
Mr. Kurzmann has a long history of Domestic Violence….” Opening Br. pgs. 7-8, Supra. pg. 22. 
 
24
of mitigation. Moreover, there is nothing in the record that supports the conclusion 
that the VOP judge had a preconceived bias. Accordingly, the VOP judge did not 
act with a closed mind nor did he abuse his discretion when he sentenced 
Kurzmann to the unexecuted portion of his suspended sentences for Second Degree 
Assault and three counts of Endangering the Welfare of a Child with credit for 
time served.  
3. The Superior Court judge properly revoked Kurzmann’s probation even 
though the State never charged Kurzmann with a new criminal offense 
 
 
The VOP judge concluded that Kurzmann violated his probation by 
assaulting Lea on July 4, 2005, thereby committing a new criminal offense. 
Kurzmann argues on appeal, that he “should not have had his probation violated 
for committing a new criminal offense when he [was] not … cahrged [sic] with 
any criminal offenses.” Kurzmann claims that it is reasonable to believe that the 
State did not file new charges because the State did not believe that it could obtain 
a conviction. Because the State opted to file a VOP rather than a formal 
prosecution, Kurzmann was allegedly deprived of the constitutional rights 
(including specifically the Sixth Amendment) that would otherwise have been 
available at a criminal trial. As Kurzmann summarizes his argument:  
While a defendant does not enjoy the same rights to a trial when 
having a probation hearing, it should be of concern to the [C]ourt that 
if the State is unable to convict someone of a new crime because of 
lack of evidence, they can rely on hearsay to prove their case and 
violate that probation instead of given [sic] a defendant a formal 
 
25
opportunity to defend themselves [sic]. The Judge in this case should 
not have violated the Defendant [sic] probation based on committing a 
crime that was not charged….  
 
 
It is unclear to us exactly what Kurzmann is arguing. He appears to suggest 
that we should adopt a bright line rule that requires the State to charge a 
probationer with a crime before proceeding with a VOP petition alleging that a 
probationer violated the terms of his probation by committing a new criminal 
offense. In his reply brief, Kurzmann argues that whenever the State cannot 
proceed to trial against a probationer because it does not have sufficient evidence 
to convict him beyond a reasonable doubt that it is “contrary to justice” for the 
State to “cho[o]se to violate his probation instead where a lower standard of proof 
and lack of evidence rules apply.” Finally, Kurzmann may be arguing that 
Williams’s testimony relating Lea’s hearsay statements was insufficient to support 
a finding that Kurzmann committed a new criminal offense. In any of these 
scenarios, Kurzmann is mistaken.30  
 
It is well established that probation is an “act of grace” and that a VOP judge 
has broad discretionary power when deciding whether or not to revoke probation.31 
                                                 
30  
The State suggests that Kurzmann did not raise these arguments before the Superior 
Court judge who presided over the VOP hearing, and that, accordingly, we should review for 
plain error. Sup. Ct. Rul. 8. The standard of review in this case is not dispositive because even 
under the de novo standard Kurzmann proffers, Kurzmann’s arguments clearly have no merit.   
 
31  
Collins v. State, 897 A.2d 159, 160 (Del. 2006) (quoting Brown v. State, 249 A.2d 269, 
271 (Del. 1968).  
 
 
26
Accordingly, we review a Superior Court judge’s revocation of a defendant’s 
probation for an abuse of discretion.32 The State bears a lower burden of proof 
during a VOP hearing than during a criminal trial.33 In a VOP proceeding, the State 
need prove by only a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of probation 
occurred.34 To do so the State must present “some competent evidence” to 
“reasonably satisfy the judge that the conduct of the probationer has not been as 
good as required by the conditions of probation.”35 Furthermore, “the rules of 
evidence applicable to criminal trials are relaxed” in VOP proceedings, and 
hearsay evidence is admissible.36  
 
 
From the foregoing statement of law it should be clear that Kurzmann’s first 
argument is without merit. The State can proceed against a probationer by filing a 
VOP petition alleging a new criminal offense, even if the State concedes that it 
does not have enough evidence to prosecute the probationer and to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he has committed the underlying criminal offense. 
Because probation is an “act of grace,” the State need only present “some 
                                                 
32  
Id. (quoting Brown v. State, 249 A.2d at 272).  
 
33  
Jenkins v. State, 2004 Del. LEXIS 549, * 10 (Del. 2004)(Order).  
 
34  
Id. (citing Weaver v. State, 779 A.2d 254, 259 (Del. 2001); Mann v. State, 768 A.2d 470 
2001 Del. LEXIS 91, *5 (Del. 2001)(Order).  
 
35  
Collins, 897 A.2d at 160 (citation omitted); Jenkins, 2004 Del. LEXIS 549 at *10-11 
(citing Brown, 249 A.2d at 272).  
 
36  
Collins, 897 A.2d at 160.  
 
 
27
competent evidence” to prove the violation asserted and to reasonably satisfy the 
VOP judge that the probationer’s conduct has not been as good as required under 
the conditions of probation. There is nothing in our case or statutory law that 
supports Kurzmann’s argument. We see little purpose in requiring the State to 
charge and prosecute a probationer with a crime arising out of the conduct for 
which the State could also proceed in VOP hearing when the State has only enough 
evidence to prove by a preponderance that the probationer committed the 
underlying act. Although the probationer may have lesser constitutional safeguards 
at a VOP hearing than at a trial, the probationer can only be subjected to the 
sentence originally “imposed, or any lesser sentence, [or] if imposition of sentence 
was suspended, [may be subject] to any sentence which might originally have been 
imposed.”37 The probationer cannot be sentenced as if convicted of the new 
criminal offense, but merely loses the probationary status granted for the 
underlying criminal offense to which he pleaded guilty or for which he was 
convicted at a time when his full panoply of constitutional rights did apply.  
 
Kurzmann’s second argument – that Williams’s testimony relating Lea’s 
hearsay statements was insufficient to support a finding that he committed an 
assault – is also misplaced. In Collins v. State, we recently considered whether a 
                                                 
37  
11 Del. C. §4334(c).  
 
 
 
28
police officer’s testimony at a VOP hearing relating hearsay statements of two eye-
witnesses was sufficient to link the probationer to the crime he allegedly 
committed.38 There, the probationer was charged with violating the conditions of 
his probation by committing burglary, criminal mischief, and terroristic 
threatening.39 At the VOP hearing, the State called one witness, the investigating 
police officer, who testified that the probationer’s ex-girlfriend: 
told him that the [probationer] had come to her home, argued with her, 
broke her telephone and then left. She said he later returned, kicked in 
the door, threatened her and smashed a figurine on the floor before he 
fled. [The police officer] further testified that he observed scuffmarks 
on the ex-girlfriend's front door, the shattered figurine on the floor, a 
hole in the wall from the door handle, and a broken telephone.   He 
also testified that he questioned the downstairs neighbor, [the 
probationer’s] aunt, who explained to him that she saw [the 
probationer] throw a beer can down the stairs and threaten his ex-
girlfriend before fleeing to another apartment building…. 
 
[The probationer] denied the charges at his violation of probation 
hearing. Neither [the probationer’s] ex-girlfriend nor his aunt testified, 
nor did the State produce any eyewitnesses or physical evidence 
linking [the probationer] to the alleged crime….40 
 
We first noted the rule that “probation cannot be revoked solely upon the testimony 
of a witness with no first-hand knowledge of the events constituting the 
                                                 
38  
897 A.2d 159.  
 
39  
Id. at 160.  
 
40  
Id.  
 
 
29
violations.”41 Moreover, “where the defendant has not admitted violating his 
probation, some competent evidence linking the defendant to the crime is 
necessary.”42 Applying this law, we held that the State had not presented sufficient 
competent evidence to link the probationer to the crime: 
Although physical evidence of the damage to the apartment may have 
indicated that criminal conduct had occurred, it did not connect [the 
probationer] to that crime. Without more, [the police officer’s] 
testimony at the hearing was not sufficient competent evidence to 
prove that [the probationer’s] conduct violated his probation 
requirements.43 
 
 
 
We are satisfied that Collins is distinguishable on its facts. Here, as in 
Collins, Williams related Lea’s hearsay statements and Lea’s statements directly 
implicated Kurzmann in the alleged criminal offense. Williams also testified that 
she observed Lea’s physical injuries. That testimony is similar to the police 
officer’s testimony about physical damages in Collins. Unlike in Collins, however, 
Williams testified about Lea’s demeanor as Lea related her statements. Williams’s 
testimony about Lea’s demeanor gave the VOP judge a basis to conclude that 
Lea’s hearsay statements fell within the present sense and excited utterance 
exceptions to the hearsay rule. Kurzmann did not appeal these rulings. Moreover, 
Williams testified that Kurzmann followed Lea into the restaurant and “denied that 
                                                 
41  
Id. (citation and quotation omitted).  
 
42  
Id. at 161 (citations omitted).  
 
43  
Id. at 162.  
 
 
30
he hurt [Lea].” Finally, Lea’s testimony established that Kurzmann was the one 
who injured her, even though she testified that he did so by drop-kicking a football 
and hitting her in the face. These facts, taken together, are “sufficient competent 
evidence” to link Kurzmann to the alleged assault on Lea. Accordingly, 
Kurzmann’s third argument on appeal fails.  
4. The Superior Court judge did not err by using medical testimony from a non-
expert to establish a fact. 
 
 
Kurzmann’s final argument on appeal is that the VOP judge erred by relying 
on medical testimony from a non-expert to establish a fact upon which he based his 
conclusion that Kurzmann assaulted his wife. Kurzmann specifically refers to 
James Ayers’s testimony. The relevant testimony follows:  
Q (prosecutor): 
So her [Lea’s] explanation to you on [July 7th] was 
that he did hit her with a football accidentally, but 
that it was during this continued argument? 
 
A (Ayers): 
Continued argument. 
 
Q: 
Which had actually caused her to flee from the 
argument the night before? 
 
A: 
Correct. It seemed implausible. She said she was a 
very good athlete in high school. As a matter of fact 
on the softball team and talking about catching 
balls. This seemed implausible that she was doing 
this and could not have blocked a football. 
 
Q: 
Did you ever ask her how many times the football 
had hit her? 
 
 
31
A: 
I may have, but I don’t remember specifically. It 
did seem that there were more than one blow or 
strike on her face.  
 
Based in part on Ayers’s testimony, the judge concluded: 
 
The other factor I relied upon [in finding that Kurzmann 
assaulted Lea], in addition to … Williams’ testimony, is the nature of 
Lea’s injuries. Lea had multiple points of trauma to her face, 
including a black eye, a busted lip, and a swollen cheek. 
 
 
Jim Ayers, who observed these injuries, testified that, in his 
view, these injuries were inconsistent in getting hit with a football. I 
agree and conclude that Lea’s injuries were consistent with an assault, 
but not with a football hitting her. (emphasis added).  
 
Kurzmann argues, first, that the trial judge abused his discretion when he relied on 
Ayers’s “expert” medical testimony to establish multiple points of trauma because 
“Ayers did not testify to any prior experience in the field of medicine” and was not 
“competent to determine the cause of a physical injury based on visual 
representations.” Second, Kurzmann contends, that the “evidence … in this case 
simply does not substantiate” the VOP judge’s findings that Lea’s injuries were the 
result of an assault and were inconsistent with getting hit by a football.  
 
Kurzmann never objected to the admissibility of Ayer’s “medical 
testimony,” nor did he attempt to explore Ayer’s “medical opinion” that there was 
more than “one blow or strike” on Lea’s face during cross-examination. 
Accordingly, we review the admission of this testimony for plain error.44 “Plain 
                                                 
44  
Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
 
32
error is limited to material defects that are apparent on the face of the record and 
that are basic, serious and fundamental in their character, and which clearly 
deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest 
injustice.”45 Moreover, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to 
substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.46 
The VOP judge did not plainly err by relying on Ayer’s testimony that Lea 
appeared to have “more than one blow or strike on her face.” Moreover, we agree 
with the State that Ayers testimony was not of the sort that required any scientific, 
technical or other specialized knowledge and thus was not “expert” testimony.47 
 
 
Kurzmann’s second argument is more troubling. When the VOP judge made 
his findings of fact he noted that Ayers testified that, “in his view, [Lea’s injuries] 
were inconsistent in getting hit with a football.” Ayers actually testified that it 
seemed implausible that a good high school athlete, who played softball and caught 
balls could not have blocked a football. Even though we are constrained to 
conclude that Ayers’s testimony does not support one sentence of the VOP judge’s 
interpretation of the testimony, that does not require a reversal. Immediately after 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
45  
Jones v. State, 2005 Del. LEXIS 328, *2 (Del. 2005) (quoting Wainwright v. State, 504 
A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869, 93 L. Ed. 2d 161, 107 S. Ct. 236 
(1986)). (quotation omitted).  
 
46  
Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100. 
 
47  
See D.R.E. 701.  
 
 
33
insignificantly misstating Ayer’s testimony, the VOP judge noted that he agreed 
with what he mistakenly thought was Ayers’s opinion testimony: that Lea’s 
injuries – “multiple points of trauma to her face, including a black eye, a busted 
lip, and a swollen cheek” – were inconsistent with getting hit by a football. The 
VOP judge was free to rely on Ayers’s un-objected-to testimony to establish that 
there was more than “one blow or strike on Lea’s face.” From this testimony, the 
VOP judge could have inferred and concluded that the multiple points of trauma 
were inconsistent with getting hit by a football – despite the fact that he may have 
incorrectly recalled Ayers’s testimony.  
 
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the VOP judge erroneously 
relied upon Ayer’s testimony to conclude that Lea’s injuries were inconsistent with 
getting hit by a football, we are satisfied that the record still supports the VOP 
judge’s conclusion that Kurzmann violated his probation. To justify his finding 
that Kurzmann violated his probation by assaulting Lea, the VOP judge primarily 
relied upon Williams’s testimony about Lea’s statements and Lea’s demeanor at 
the time she entered into the restaurant. He found that Williams’s testimony was 
consistent with the undisputed facts: (1) that Lea entered the restaurant with fresh 
injuries; (2) that Lea admitted to being angry with Kurzmann at the time of the 
alleged assault; and (3) that three days after the assault Benton and Ayers observed 
 
34
injuries that were consistent with a physical assault.48 The VOP judge also found 
that Lea’s statements to Williams fell within hearsay exceptions and were 
competent evidence to establish the violation. Finally, the VOP judge reasoned that 
he did not “think that Lea’s getting hit accidentally with a football would have 
caused her to behave as she did in front of … Williams. I do think getting assaulted 
violently by Kurzmann would produce that kind of behavior on Lea’s part.” The 
VOP judge could have stopped there. The finding that Lea’s injuries were 
inconsistent with being hit by a football was essentially superfluous. The facts in 
the record and the foregoing rationale constitute sufficient grounds for the VOP 
judge’s conclusion that Kurzmann violated his probation. The “other factor” that 
the VOP judge relied upon merely bolstered this conclusion. In other words, even 
if the VOP judge’s reliance on Ayer’s testimony about the nature of Lea’s injuries 
was misplaced, there is simply no reversible error in this case.   
 
Kurzmann also contends that he was denied the minimum requirements of 
due process because the evidence cited by the trial judge “simply [did] not 
substantiate his findings.” We have concluded that Kurzmann is mistaken and that 
the evidence cited by the VOP judge did substantiate his findings. Thus, there was 
                                                 
48  
It is important to note the distinction between Lea’s injuries being consistent with a 
physical assault and being inconsistent with getting hit by a football. Even if Ayers’s testimony 
did not establish that Lea’s injuries were inconsistent with getting hit with a football, Ayers’s, 
Benton’s, and Williams’s testimony clearly established that Lea’s injuries – a busted lip, a black 
eye, and a swollen cheek –  were consistent with a physical assault, and the VOP judge could 
have so concluded.  
 
35
no error. Again, even if we assume that the VOP judge erred by impermissibly 
relying upon the nature of Lea’s injuries, there was still sufficient evidence in the 
record to support the conclusion that Kurzmann violated his probation by 
assaulting Lea, entirely independent of the VOP judge’s conclusion that Lea’s 
injuries were inconsistent with getting hit by a football.  
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is 
AFFIRMED.