Title: People v. Lee
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 93221, 93363
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: August 21, 2003

Docket Nos. 93221, 93363 cons.-Agenda 1-March 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant, v. CHRISTOPHER LEE, Appellant and Cross- Appellee.
Opinion filed August 21, 2003.
	 
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	The principal question presented in these consolidated appeals
is whether a postconviction petitioner may raise a claim based on
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), in a successive postconviction petition. In light
of our recent decision in People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d 426
(2003), we answer this question in the negative.
BACKGROUND
	On January 27, 1988, the defendant, Christopher Lee, was
found guilty of first degree murder by a jury in the circuit court of
Tazewell County. At defendant's sentencing hearing, the circuit
court found that the murder was accompanied by exceptionally
brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. See Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3.2(b)(2). Based on this
finding, defendant was sentenced to an extended-term sentence of
80 years' imprisonment. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par.
1005-8-2(a)(1). Defendant's conviction and sentence were
affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Lee, No. 3-89-0145 (1990)
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	On September 12, 1994, defendant filed his first petition for
postconviction relief. The State filed a motion to dismiss the
petition as untimely, which was granted by the circuit court. On
appeal, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. People v. Lee,
292 Ill. App. 3d 941 (1997).
	On August 10, 2000, defendant filed a second postconviction
petition. In this petition, which is the subject of the instant appeal,
defendant argued that his extended-term sentence was
unconstitutional under Apprendi because the aggravating factor on
which the extended term sentence was based, i.e., exceptionally
brutal and heinous behavior, was not found beyond a reasonable
doubt by a jury. The circuit court summarily dismissed the
petition.
	The appellate court reversed the dismissal. 326 Ill. App. 3d
882. The appellate court initially concluded that, although
defendant's Apprendi claim was raised in a successive
postconviction petition, the claim was neither untimely nor
procedurally barred by waiver and res judicata because defendant
could not have presented the claim in any earlier proceeding. The
court also concluded that Apprendi applied retroactively to cases
on collateral review and, further, that defendant's extended-term
sentence violated the constitutional requirements of Apprendi.
Finally, relying on the authority provided by Supreme Court Rule
615(b)(4) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(4)), the appellate court reduced
defendant's sentence to the maximum nonextended term of 60
years' imprisonment.
	Defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal from that part of
the appellate court's judgment which modified defendant's
sentence to a term of 60 years' imprisonment. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
The petition was allowed and the case was docketed in this court
as cause No. 93221. The State filed a petition for leave to appeal
from that portion of the appellate court's judgment which reversed
the circuit court's dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition.
The State's petition for leave to appeal was also allowed and the
case was docketed as cause No. 93363. The two cases were
consolidated for review.

ANALYSIS
	In cause No. 93221, defendant contends that the appellate
court erred in reducing his sentence to the maximum nonextended
term available. According to defendant, once the appellate court
concluded that his Apprendi claim was meritorious, the court
should have remanded the cause to the circuit court for
resentencing. In cause No. 93363, the State contends that the
appellate court erred in reversing the circuit court's dismissal of
defendant's postconviction petition. In the view of the State,
defendant's Apprendi claim is procedurally barred from
consideration on the merits and, therefore, defendant's petition
was properly dismissed.
	A decision in favor of the State in its appeal would necessarily
render defendant's appeal moot. Accordingly, we first consider the
appeal in cause No. 93363.


Cause No. 93363


	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act prohibits the filing of
successive postconviction petitions. 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West
1994). See People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 273 (1992) ("The
Post-Conviction Hearing Act contemplates the filing of only one
post-conviction petition"), citing People v. Free, 122 Ill. 2d 367,
375 (1988). However, the statutory bar to a successive
postconviction petition will be relaxed when fundamental fairness
so requires. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 274. To establish that
fundamental fairness requires that a successive postconviction
petition be considered on the merits, the defendant must show both
cause and prejudice with respect to each claim presented. See
People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444 (2002). "For purposes of
this test, 'cause' is further defined as some objective factor
external to the defense that impeded counsel's efforts to raise the
claim in an earlier proceeding, and 'prejudice' is defined as an
error which so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction
violates due process. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 279." People v. Jones,
191 Ill. 2d 194, 199 (2000). In the case at bar, defendant cannot
satisfy the prejudice prong of the cause and prejudice test.
	Defendant was sentenced to an extended term of
imprisonment in 1988. Apprendi was decided in 2000.
Defendant's extended-term sentence would be invalid, and
defendant would suffer prejudice, only if the rule announced in
Apprendi applied retroactively to the sentencing proceedings
conducted in 1988. However, we have recently held, in De La Paz, 
204 Ill. 2d 426, that "Apprendi does not apply retroactively to
causes in which the direct appeal process had concluded at the
time that Apprendi was decided." De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d  at 429.
Defendant therefore cannot establish prejudice in this case.
Accordingly, defendant's Apprendi claim is procedurally barred
from consideration and the appellate court erred in reversing the
circuit court's dismissal of defendant's second postconviction
petition.

Cause No. 93221
	In light of our disposition of the State's appeal in cause No.
93363, defendant's appeal in cause No. 93221 is rendered moot.
We therefore dismiss defendant's appeal as moot. See, e.g., In re
H.G., 197 Ill. 2d 317, 336 (2001).

CONCLUSION
	For the forgoing reasons, in cause No. 93363, the judgment of
the appellate court reversing the circuit's court's dismissal of
defendant's postconviction petition is reversed. The judgment of
the circuit court is affirmed. The appeal in cause No. 93221 is
dismissed as moot.
	No. 93363-Appellate court reversed;
	circuit court affirmed.
No. 93221-Appeal dismissed.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting:
	For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and partial
dissent in People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d 426 (2003), I disagree
with the majority's conclusion that defendant cannot avail himself
of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Apprendi. The
requirement that each element necessary to prove a crime be
submitted to the trier of fact for proof beyond a reasonable doubt
has been in place for at least two centuries. See De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d  at 454-55 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368,
373-74, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1071 (1970) (though expressed from
ancient times, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard seems to
have developed by 1798 and is now the accepted " 'measure of
persuasion by which the prosecution must [prove] all the essential
elements of guilt,' "quoting C. McCormick, Evidence §321, at
681-82 (1954)). I continue to believe that the failure to comply
with this basic tenet of constitutional law is an error so injurious
to our fundamental civil liberties that no sentence meted out in
derogation of Apprendi should be allowed to stand. See People v.
Swift, 202 Ill. 2d 378, 392 (2002) (finding that defendant's crime
was brutal and heinous unconstitutionally made by a trial judge);
People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 378 (2003) (Kilbride, J.,
dissenting); People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 351 (2003)
(Kilbride, J., dissenting). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.