Title: Johnson v. State Farm Mutual
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 450, 2017
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 27, 2018

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DONALD R. JOHNSON, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE FARM MUTUAL 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
 
Defendant Below,  
Appellee. 
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No.  450, 2017 
 
Court Below:  Superior Court  
of the State of Delaware 
 
C.A. No. N17C-03-206 
 
 
Submitted:  May 2, 2018 
Decided:  June 27, 2018 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices.  
 
O R D E R 
On this 27th day of June 2018, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and 
the record on appeal, it appears that: 
(1) 
Appellant, Donald R. Johnson, appeals from a Superior Court opinion 
granting Appellee, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, summary 
judgment.  Johnson makes one claim on appeal.  He contends the Superior Court 
erred when it found he did not qualify as an “insured” for purposes of an 
underinsured motorist claim against a State Farm policy insuring a vehicle which 
struck him while he was walking across the street as a pedestrian. 
 
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(2) 
On October 22, 2014, Fredia Brinkley struck Johnson with her vehicle 
while Johnson was crossing the street on foot.  Johnson struck the hood of the 
vehicle and rolled off, landing on the road.  At the time of the accident, Brinkley 
was insured by State Farm.  On September 8, 2015, State Farm paid Johnson the 
policy limit for Brinkley’s liability coverage.  He also sought underinsured 
motorist coverage (“UIM”) on the theory that he was an insured under Brinkley’s 
State Farm policy, but such coverage was denied by State Farm.  Johnson then filed 
suit against State Farm in the Superior Court. 
(3) 
Brinkley’s State Farm policy provides for underinsured coverage for 
persons insured under the policy.  The policy defines “insured” as: “[the named 
insured]”; “resident relatives”; and “any other person while occupying . . . [the name 
insured’s] car.”1 The policy goes on to state “[b]oth the use and actual operation of 
such vehicle must be within the scope of [the named insured’s] consent.”2   The 
policy defines occupying as “in, on, entering, or exiting [the vehicle].”3 
(4) 
On August 17, 2017, State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment 
arguing that Johnson does not qualify as an insured under the policy.  On October 
16, 2017, State Farm was granted summary judgment, and this appeal followed. 
                                                 
1 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A23. 
2 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A23 (emphasis added). 
3 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A15. 
 
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(5) 
“This Court reviews de novo the Superior Court’s grant or denial of 
summary judgment ‘to determine whether, viewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party has demonstrated that there are 
no material issues of fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.=@4  “When interpreting a statute, Delaware courts must ‘ascertain 
and give effect to the intent of the legislature.’”5 
(6) 
Appellant contends the Superior Court erred by finding he was not 
entitled to UIM coverage as an “insured” under the language of Brinkley’s State 
Farm policy.  Under his theory, he qualified as an insured under the plain language 
of the State Farm policy because he was occupying Brinkley’s vehicle in the sense 
that he was “in, on, entering, or exiting” the vehicle.  He considers himself an 
occupant by way of the physical contact he made when getting struck by the vehicle 
and being on the vehicle’s hood.   
(7) 
Appellant believes the Superior Court erred in applying the 
“geographic perimeter” test when it found that he was not “occupying” the vehicle 
even though he was touching the vehicle when he was struck.  We have fashioned 
a two-prong test to determine if a person is an “occupant” of a vehicle.  The 
claimant must either be “within a reasonable geographic perimeter of an insured 
                                                 
4 Brown v. United Water Del., Inc., 3 A.3d 272, 275 (Del. 2010) (quoting Estate of Rae v. Murphy, 
956 A.2d 1266, 1269-70 (Del. 2008)).  
5 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 80 A.3d 628, 632 (Del. 2013) (citations omitted). 
 
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vehicle or engaged in a task related to the operation of a vehicle at the time injuries 
are sustained.”6  To be within a reasonable geographic perimeter, the claimant need 
be “in, entering, exiting, touching or within reach of the covered vehicle.”7 
(8) 
The “geographic perimeter” test was never meant to apply to a 
pedestrian who is struck by a vehicle. 
(9) 
Even though Appellant may have been “on” or “touching” Brinkley’s 
vehicle for a brief second when he was hit, he fails to recognize that we have found 
that Delaware’s UIM statute provides that coverage is personal to the insured.8  The 
purpose of that statute “is to protect innocent parties injured by the negligence of 
unknown tortfeasors or from those who have no means for compensating the injured 
persons.”9  Title 18, Section 3902 allows “a risk adverse person to establish a fund 
to protect against losses caused by [others].”10  
(10) Appellant has cited no case law, or persuasive authority, that warrants 
extending UIM insurance to pedestrians.  Brinkley carried UIM insurance to 
protect herself, her “resident relatives,” and “any other person . . . occupying” her 
                                                 
6 Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Fisher, 692 A.2d 892, 896 (Del. 1997). 
7 Id. at 897. 
8 Frank v. Horizon Assur. Co., 553 A.2d 1199, 1202-03 (Del. 1989); see 18 Del. C. § 3902(a) 
(“unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto for the protection of persons insured 
thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages . . .”). 
9 Fisher, 692 A.2d at 896. 
10 Hurst v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 652 A.2d 10, 14 (Del. 1995). 
 
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vehicle “within the scope of [her] consent”11, from harm caused by “unknown 
tortfeasors,”12 not pedestrians injured by her own negligence.  The mere fact that 
Johnson was in physical contact with Brinkley’s vehicle because he was struck by it 
does not make him an insured occupant of the vehicle able to claim benefits under 
Brinkley’s personal UIM coverage. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
/s/  James T. Vaughn, Jr. 
Justice 
 
                                                 
11 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A23. 
12 Fisher, 692 A.2d at 896.