Title: New Jersey v. Sanchez-Medina
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: January 18, 2018

New Jersey v. Sanchez-Medina Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary A jury convicted defendant Alexis Sanchez-Medina of various sexual-assault crimes that involved four separate victims: R.D., D.J., A.M., and A.B. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review centered on whether defendant was denied his right to a fair trial on sexual assault charges. The prosecution asked defendant whether he had come to the United States legally. Over an objection, the jury learned that defendant had not. Next, although the allegations related to different incidents that involved four separate victims, the case rested heavily on an identification by a single witness. Despite that, neither party requested a jury charge on eyewitness identification, and the trial court did not instruct the jury on the subject. On appeal, the State acknowledged that the prosecution should not have elicited testimony about defendant’s immigration status. The panel found that defendant was not prejudiced by the testimony in light of the trial court’s limiting instructions. The Appellate Division also found that the trial court should have charged the jury on identification. The panel, though, concluded that the omission did not constitute plain error in light of the strong evidence that corroborated R.D.’s identification, specifically, defendant’s statement. The Supreme Court determined the cumulative effect of both errors denied defendant his right to a fair trial, reversed the conviction, and remanded for further proceedings. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) State v. Alexis Sanchez-Medina (A-10-16) (077883)Argued October 10, 2017 -- Decided January 18, 2018RABNER, C.J., writing for the Court. The Court considers whether defendant was denied his right to a fair trial on sexual assault charges. First, the prosecution asked defendant whether he had come to the United States legally. Over an objection, the jury learned that defendant had not. Second, although the allegations related to different incidents that involved four separate victims, the case rested heavily on an identification by a single witness. Despite that, neither party requested a jury charge on eyewitness identification, and the trial court did not instruct the jury on the subject. A jury convicted defendant Alexis Sanchez-Medina of various sexual-assault crimes that involved four separate victims: R.D., D.J., A.M., and A.B. (1) On July 27, 2012, in Englewood, a man on a bicycle approached R.D. from behind, tried to push her, and grabbed her buttocks. R.D. described her assailant as a Hispanic male with a ponytail. R.D. was the only witness to identify defendant. She selected his picture out of an array of six photographs. R.D. also identified defendant in court. (2) D.J. was inside her basement apartment in Englewood on August 9, 2012, at about 11:00 p.m., when she noticed the window air conditioner unit move. She went outside to investigate but did not see anyone. As D.J. walked back to her apartment, someone pinned her down. The attacker reached down her pants and inside her underwear, then got up and ran away. D.J. admitted that she did not get a good look at the attacker. She described him as a light-skinned African American or Hispanic male who wore his curly black hair in a ponytail. (3) At about 10:00 p.m. on August 10, 2012, A.M. was walking in Dumont. She saw a “shadow of a guy” approach her from behind. The man grabbed both of her arms from behind and gripped them tightly. He eventually released her and ran away. A.M. did not see her attacker’s face. She said he appeared to be about 5’3” to 5’7” in height, had a medium build, and had short dark hair. She noted that he wore a sweatshirt and cargo pants. (4) About twenty minutes after the prior incident, A.B. was assaulted in Dumont. A man charged at A.B. from behind, forced her to the ground, and put his fingers up her shorts and inside her vagina. A.B. screamed and tried to push the attacker off of her, and he ran away. A.B. never saw the man’s face. As he ran, she saw the back of his head and his silhouette. She did not describe him other than to note that he wore dark shorts and a dark shirt. As part of an investigation into the attacks, the police detained defendant, who repeatedly denied any involvement in the attacks. He also made certain admissions. All four victims testified at trial and relayed the above details. Defendant testified as well. He denied that he had ever seen any of the victims or done anything to them. His defense was misidentification. The prosecution began its cross-examination of defendant with this question: “You’re from Honduras, right?” After defendant said “yes,” the prosecution asked, “And you didn’t come into the United States legally?” Defense counsel objected, and the trial judge overruled the objection. Defendant then confirmed that he had not “come into this country legally.” The judge gave conflicting limiting instructions about that evidence. In addition, although R.D.’s identification of defendant was central to the case, neither party asked the judge to instruct the jury on how to evaluate the evidence. The court did not instruct the jury specifically on that point on its own. On appeal, the State acknowledged that the prosecution should not have elicited testimony about defendant’s immigration status. The panel found that defendant was not prejudiced by the testimony in light of the trial court’s limiting instructions. The Appellate Division also found that the trial court should have charged the jury on identification. The panel, though, concluded that the omission did not constitute plain error in light of the strong evidence that corroborated R.D.’s identification, specifically, defendant’s statement. 1 The Court granted defendant’s petition for certification limited to the following issues: the admissibility of defendant’s immigration status for impeachment purposes; and the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on identification. 228 N.J. 57 (2016).HELD: The cumulative effect of both errors denied defendant his right to a fair trial.1. The State rightly concedes that it was improper to question defendant about his immigration status. As a general rule, that type of evidence should not be presented to a jury. To be admissible at trial, evidence must be relevant. N.J.R.E. 401. Whether a defendant entered the country legally tells a jury nothing about whether he committed an act of sexual assault. Even if relevant, “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of . . . undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury.” N.J.R.E. 403. Both today and in late 2013 when this trial took place, evidence of a defendant’s undocumented immigration status could appeal to prejudice, inflame certain jurors, and distract them from their proper role in the justice system: to evaluate relevant evidence fairly and objectively. A defendant’s immigration status is not proof of character or reputation that can be admitted under Rules 404 or 608. Proof of status alone is also not evidence of a prior criminal conviction. See N.J.R.E. 609. Nor is a person’s immigration status admissible as a prior bad act under Rule 404(b). (pp. 13-17)2. In this case, the error was significant. The prosecution’s first questions on cross-examination focused on defendant’s status and set the tone for what followed. To compound the error, the trial court issued conflicting instructions about whether jurors could consider the evidence to determine whether defendant “follows the rules of society.” Without a clear instruction to disregard the evidence entirely, we cannot be certain whether and how the jury might have relied upon it during deliberations. (pp. 17-18)3. The State also appropriately recognizes that the failure to instruct the jury on identification evidence was an error. R.D.’s identification of defendant was central to this case. She was the sole witness to identify defendant, and his defense at trial was misidentification. When eyewitness identification is a “key issue,” the trial court must instruct the jury how to assess the evidence—even if defendant does not request the charge. State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 325 (2005). The jury in this case should have been instructed about some of the factors discussed in State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011). At a charge conference, the parties and the court should have considered whether charges on memory decay, confidence, stress, duration, lighting, and other factors were warranted. To be sure, the judge should have given the charge on his own because R.D.’s identification was a “key issue.” But counsel for the State and the defense are very much a part of the trial process as well. It is imperative that both sides carefully evaluate and propose relevant jury instructions before and during trial, rather than after a verdict. (pp. 18-21)4. Defendant’s convictions rest largely on the testimony of four victims, only one of whom could identify him. No forensic evidence linked defendant to the crimes charged, and no other witnesses observed or could corroborate any of the incidents. The witnesses’ descriptions of their assailants varied. In addition, although the assaults shared some similarities, they differed from one another in key ways. The assaults were not “signature” crimes that, on their own, suggest the same person carried out each attack. Defendant’s statement to the police, which he recanted at trial, offers some corroboration. Yet he also denied the core of the accusations during the interview. Looking at all of the proofs together, the evidence against defendant was not overwhelming, as the State suggests. (pp. 21-23)5. Even if an individual error does not require reversal, the cumulative effect of a series of errors can cast doubt on a verdict and call for a new trial. Here, the jury received no guidance about how to assess the single identification of defendant—a critical issue at trial that defendant disputed. And the jurors were not told to ignore provocative evidence about defendant’s immigration status. Together, those errors undermined defendant’s right to a fair trial. They raise serious questions about whether the outcome was just, particularly in light of the strength of the evidence presented. See R. 2:10-2. The Court therefore has no choice other than to vacate defendant’s convictions. (p. 23) Defendant’s convictions are VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for a new trial consistent with this opinion. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 10 September Term 2016 077883STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.ALEXIS SANCHEZ-MEDINA, Defendant-Appellant. Argued October 10, 2017 – Decided January 18, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Tamar Y. Lerer, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Tamar Y. Lerer, of counsel and on the briefs). Elizabeth R. Rebein, Assistant Bergen County Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney; Gurbir S. Grewal, of counsel and on the brief). Ronald K. Chen argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Edward L. Barocas, Legal Director, and the Rutgers University School of Law- Newark Constitutional Rights Clinic, attorneys; Ronald K. Chen, Edward L. Barocas, Jeanne M. LoCicero and Alexander R. Shalom, of counsel and on the brief). CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court. This criminal case involves charges of sexual assault.Defendant testified on his own behalf at trial and denied the 1 allegations. At the start of his cross-examination, theprosecution asked whether he had come to the United Stateslegally. Over an objection, the jury learned that defendant hadnot. That highly charged evidence was irrelevant and should nothave been admitted, as the State now concedes. Only in a rare case will it be appropriate for a prosecutorto elicit testimony about a defendant’s immigration status. Inmost instances, that type of evidence has no bearing on thecrimes charged or a witness’s credibility. It can alsosubstantially prejudice the accused because of the inflammatorynature of the issue. This appeal presents a second issue as well. Although theallegations related to different incidents that involved fourseparate victims, the case rested heavily on an identificationby a single witness. No other victim could identify herassailant. Despite that, neither party requested a jury chargeon eyewitness identification, and the trial court did notinstruct the jury on the subject. In light of the overallstrength of the proofs presented, that error was significant. The cumulative effect of both errors denied defendant hisright to a fair trial. We are therefore required to vacatedefendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial. 2 I. A jury convicted defendant Alexis Sanchez-Medina of varioussexual-assault crimes that involved four separate victims:R.D., D.J., A.M., and A.B. We refer to the victims by theirinitials to protect their identity. To recount the distinctcriminal episodes, we rely on the victims’ testimony at trial. A. On July 27, 2012, at around 8:30 p.m., R.D. was walkingwith her three-year-old son in Englewood. A man on a bicycleapproached R.D. from behind, tried to push her, and grabbed herbuttocks. He then rode up and down the street for severalblocks, threw kisses at her, and again tried to push her. Healso made comments in Spanish that R.D. did not follow. R.D. was headed to her boyfriend’s house and, as sheapproached it, the man shoved her onto the lawn and kept movingon his bicycle. R.D. later noticed that a pink dress she hadbeen carrying in a bag was missing. Days after, she saw thedress on a pole where she had last seen her assailant. R.D. contacted the police almost three weeks later aftershe watched a news report “about a rapist” in the area. Thenext day, she met with detectives from the Englewood PoliceDepartment and gave a statement. She described her assailant asa Hispanic male with a ponytail. She said he wore a royal blue 3 hat and t-shirt, short blue jeans, and sneakers at the time ofthe attack. R.D. was the only witness to identify defendant. Sheselected his picture out of an array of six photographs. Atfirst, she told a detective that she was 75 percent certain thatthe person in the photo had attacked her. Soon after, she saidshe was 100 percent sure. R.D. also identified defendant incourt. B. D.J. was inside her basement apartment in Englewood onAugust 9, 2012, at about 11:00 p.m., when she noticed the windowair conditioner unit move. She went outside to investigate butdid not see anyone. As D.J. walked back to her apartment andcalled a friend, someone lifted her from behind, “slammed [her]into the concrete,” and pinned her down. The attacker reacheddown her pants and inside her underwear, touched her clitoris,and smelled his hand. The man then got up and ran away. D.J. admitted that she did not get a good look at theattacker, who was behind her the whole time. She described himas a light-skinned African American or Hispanic male. She addedthat he had muscular arms, wore his curly black hair in aponytail, and was dressed in dark clothing and white sneakers. 4 C. At about 10:00 p.m. on August 10, 2012, A.M. was walking toa convenience store in Dumont. She saw a “shadow of a guy”approach her from behind. The man grabbed both of her arms frombehind and gripped them tightly. She tried to resist, and heeventually released her and ran away. A.M. did not see her attacker’s face. She said he appearedto be about 5’3” to 5’7” in height, had a medium build, and hadshort dark hair. She noted that he wore a sweatshirt and cargopants. D. About twenty minutes after the prior incident, A.B. wasassaulted in Dumont. After she took out the garbage and placedit in a dumpster near her apartment, a man charged at A.B. frombehind, forced her to the ground, and put his fingers up hershorts and inside her vagina. A.B. screamed and tried to pushthe attacker off of her, and he ran away. A.B. never saw the man’s face. As he ran, she saw the backof his head and his silhouette. She did not describe him otherthan to note that he wore dark shorts and a dark shirt. E. As part of an investigation into the attacks, the policedetained an individual on August 14, 2012, who partially fit thevictims’ descriptions. Officers questioned the suspect, 5 defendant Sanchez-Medina, at the Dumont Police Department. Theinterrogation began at about 11:40 p.m. and lasted until closeto 4:00 a.m. At the outset, defendant disclosed that he was born inHonduras. After he waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), he explained that he had been in the UnitedStates since 2008 and provided additional backgroundinformation. Defendant repeatedly denied any involvement in the attacks.He also made certain admissions. Because no one referred to thevictims by name, some of defendant’s comments cannot be readilymatched to particular victims. The early part of the interview appears to have focused onthe incidents in Dumont. Defendant said that he might have hurta woman when he knocked her to the ground while running.Because she screamed, he ran on. At another point, defendantsaid a woman “got caught on the bicycle” and tripped. Afterrepeated denials, defendant admitted that he accidentally fellon a second woman when she tripped, and he grabbed her waist.Defendant did not admit touching the genitalia of either woman. The interview later turned to the incidents in Englewood,and defendant consistently denied any involvement. Afterextended questioning, he admitted that he hit a woman with abicycle while he was drunk. The woman was with a child. 6 Defendant said that he wanted to touch her “butt” but insteadpassed her on the bicycle and grabbed only a shopping bag. Hesaid the woman was carrying pants. Defendant also admitted that he grabbed a woman by thestomach, from behind, while she was talking on a phone. Towardthe end of the interview, a detective asked, “And when she wason the ground, you tried to put your hand on her vagina?”Defendant responded, “yes,” and added that he put his hand onher to touch her and left when she screamed. He did not admitthat he penetrated her. None of defendant’s statements appear to match A.M.’saccount of her attack. A Bergen County grand jury returned an indictment againstdefendant that charged him with three counts of second-degreeattempted sexual assault, against R.D., D.J., and A.M., contraryto N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:14-2(c)(1) (counts one, three, andfive); two counts of fourth-degree criminal sexual contact,against R.D. and D.J., contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b) (countstwo and four); and one count of second-degree sexual assault,against A.B., contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1) (count six). F. All four victims testified at trial and relayed the abovedetails. Defendant testified as well. He denied that he hadever seen any of the victims or done anything to them. His 7 defense was misidentification. Defendant also claimed he madefalse admissions to the police. The prosecution began its cross-examination of defendantwith this question: “You’re from Honduras, right?” Afterdefendant said “yes,” the prosecution asked, “And you didn’tcome into the United States legally?” Defense counsel objected, and the trial judge overruled theobjection. Both the court and the prosecution mistakenlyrecalled that defendant had testified he had no priorinvolvement with the police and no record.1 The court explainedthat defendant could not “have it both ways” and improperlyallowed the line of inquiry to test defendant’s credibility.Defendant then confirmed that he had not “come into this countrylegally.” The judge gave conflicting limiting instructions about thatevidence. After defendant’s testimony, the judge instructed thejury as follows: You heard testimony from the defendant and there was a reference to his illegal status. You’re not to use that as proof of guilt[] concerning the offenses listed in the indictment. You can, however, use that information to test the credibility of the defendant as to whether or not he follows the rules of society and therefore it could make a difference concerning the issue of credibility, but not as proof of the underlying offenses.1 Our holding does not turn on this mistake. 8 Later in the day, after closing arguments, the trial judge gavefinal instructions to the jury and advised them on the issueagain: [E]arlier I gave you an instruction as to [the] immigration status of the defendant. I want you to disregard the earlier instruction and completely focus on this particular limiting instruction, all right, limiting instruction slash charge. You have heard evidence that the defendant is in this country illegally. You may not use the mere fact that the defendant may be illegally in the country to conclude that he is less likely to comply with our society’s rules and therefore committed the crimes in the indictment.The judge did not instruct the jury on how it might use thetestimony in the record about defendant’s immigration status. In addition, although R.D.’s identification of defendantwas central to the case, neither party asked the judge toinstruct the jury on how to evaluate the evidence. The courtdid not instruct the jury specifically on that point on its own. The jury found defendant not guilty of attempted sexualassault of R.D. (count one), but guilty of the lesser-includedoffense of simple assault. The jury reached the same verdict asto the attack against A.M. (count five). The jury founddefendant guilty of criminal sexual contact with R.D. (counttwo), attempted sexual assault against D.J. (count three), 9 criminal sexual contact with D.J. (count four), and sexualassault against A.B. (count six). The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term ofimprisonment of 18.5 years, with 13.6 years of paroleineligibility. G. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmedin part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.Defendant raised nine issues, only two of which are relevant atthis time. On appeal, the State acknowledged that the prosecutionshould not have elicited testimony about defendant’s immigrationstatus. The panel found that defendant was not prejudiced bythe testimony in light of the trial court’s limitinginstructions. The Appellate Division also found that the trial courtshould have charged the jury on identification. The panel,though, concluded that the omission did not constitute plainerror in light of the strong evidence that corroborated R.D.’sidentification, specifically, defendant’s statement. The panel vacated defendant’s conviction on count three --attempted sexual assault against D.J. -- because the juryinstruction on attempt was erroneous. 10 We granted defendant’s petition for certification limitedto the following issues: the admissibility of defendant’simmigration status for impeachment purposes; and the trialcourt’s failure to instruct the jury on identification. 228 N.J. 57 (2016). II. This appeal presents an unusual situation in that bothparties now agree that it was error to question defendant abouthis immigration status and error not to give the jury aninstruction on eyewitness identification. The parties andamicus have different views on the effect of those errors. Defendant contends that evidence of his immigration statuswas not only inadmissible but also so prejudicial andinflammatory that it deprived him of his right to a fair trial.He contends that the cross-examination was improper under therules of evidence and undermined his credibility before thejury. He also submits that the trial court’s limitinginstructions failed to cure the error. Defendant adds that an identification charge was requiredbecause identification was the key issue in the case. Hemaintains the charge was also needed to enable the jury toevaluate the reliability of the single eyewitness victim. Indefendant’s view, because the State’s case “rested on anunreliable identification and an incomplete and inconsistent 11 statement” to the police, the failure to charge the jury oneyewitness identification constituted reversible error. In the alternative, defendant argues that the cumulativeeffect of both errors warrants a new trial. The State argues that, although defendant’s immigrationstatus should not have been admitted for impeachment purposes,defendant was not denied a fair trial. According to the State,the evidence against defendant was overwhelming, the prosecutiondid not dwell on his immigration status, and the judge’slimiting instructions cured the error. The State also claims that the lack of an identificationcharge was not plain error. The State points to “strongcorroborating evidence” linking defendant to the attacks and todefendant’s statement. In addition, the State maintains that ifthe estimator variables outlined in State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011), apply to this case, they support the reliability ofR.D.’s identification. We granted the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey(ACLU) leave to appear as amicus curiae. The organizationaddresses the immigration issue and reinforces defendant’sposition. The ACLU stresses that evidence of a defendant’sfederal immigration status is rarely probative of a relevantsubstantive issue and can “arous[e] public passion and prejudiceagainst undocumented immigrants.” The ACLU also contends that 12 the jury instruction in this case exacerbated the error. Thegroup instead highlights a recent model jury charge on thetopic. III. The State rightly concedes that it was improper to questiondefendant about his immigration status. As a general rule, thattype of evidence should not be presented to a jury. To be admissible at trial, evidence must be relevant --that is, it must have “a tendency in reason to prove or disproveany fact of consequence to the determination of the action.”N.J.R.E. 401. Whether a defendant entered the country legallytells a jury nothing about whether he committed an act of sexualassault. In this case, it is simply not relevant to theoffenses for which defendant Sanchez-Medina was on trial. Even if relevant, “evidence may be excluded if itsprobative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of . . .undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury.”N.J.R.E. 403. Both today and in late 2013 when this trial tookplace, evidence of a defendant’s undocumented immigration statuscould appeal to prejudice, inflame certain jurors, and distractthem from their proper role in the justice system: to evaluaterelevant evidence fairly and objectively. In limited circumstances, proof of a person’s immigrationstatus can be admissible. If the prosecution, for example, 13 promised a witness favorable immigration treatment in exchangefor truthful testimony, a jury would be entitled to assess thewitness’s credibility in light of that promise. Or if adefendant had lied about his immigration status to obtaingovernment benefits as part of a scheme to defraud, his truestatus would be relevant to the crime charged. Still,exceptions like those are rare. In most cases, the immigrationstatus of a witness or party is simply irrelevant, and a juryshould not learn about it. Before attempting to introduce this type of evidence,parties should raise the issue with the court outside of thejury’s presence, under N.J.R.E. 104. If the evidence isadmitted, the court should give an appropriate limitinginstruction. See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Credibility --Immigration Consequences of Testimony” (rev. June 6, 2016). Other federal and state courts have reached the sameconclusion about the relevance of a witness’s immigrationstatus. See, e.g., Solis v. SCA Restaurant Corp., 938 F. Supp. 2d 380, 401 n.11 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that “immigrationstatus was irrelevant to issues in the case and not probative onthe issue of the credibility of the witnesses”); Velasquez v.Centrome, Inc., 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 150, 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015)(“[I]mmigration status alone has no tendency in reason to proveor disprove any fact material to the issue of a party’s 14 credibility.”); Ayala v. Lee, 81 A.3d 584, 598 (Md. Ct. Spec.App. 2013) (“Immigration status alone does not reflect upon anindividual’s character and is thus not admissible forimpeachment purposes.”); see also Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76,79 (4th Cir. 1989) (“An individual’s status as an alien, legalor otherwise . . . does not entitle the Board [of ImmigrationAppeals] to brand him a liar.”). Courts have also highlighted the prejudicial effect of theevidence. In Serrano v. Underground Utilities Corp., forexample, the Appellate Division upheld a protective order thatrestricted discovery relating to the plaintiffs’ immigrationstatus. 407 N.J. Super. 253, 258 (App. Div. 2009). As thepanel observed, courts “must be cognizant of the risks of undueprejudice if [the parties’] illegal immigration status isdisclosed to a jury at the time of trial. . . . Their illegalstatus in this country is very likely to trigger negativesentiments in the minds of some jurors.” Id. at 274. Other jurisdictions agree. See, e.g., Andrade v.Walgreens-OptionCare, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 2d 533, 535 (E.D. Pa.2011) (“Many courts have opined that references to a party’simmigration status expose that party to a substantial risk ofunfair prejudice.”); Escamilla v. Shiel Sexton Co., 73 N.E.3d 663, 675 (Ind. 2017) (recognizing that plaintiff’s immigrationstatus carries risk of unfair prejudice); TXI Transp. Co. v. 15 Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230, 244 (Tex. 2010) (finding that“prejudicial potential” of party’s immigration status“substantially outweighed any probative value”); Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, 230 P.3d 583, 587 (Wash. 2010) (finding lowprobative value of plaintiff’s undocumented status, with regardto lost future earnings, “is substantially outweighed by thedanger of unfair prejudice”); Gonzalez v. City of Franklin, 403 N.W.2d 747 , 760 (Wis. 1987) (noting “the obvious prejudicialeffect” of party’s undocumented status); see also Sandoval v.State, 442 S.E.2d 746, 747 (Ga. 1994) (noting that “an appeal to. . . prejudice is improper in a court of justice”). A defendant’s immigration status is likewise not admissibleunder other rules of evidence. It is not proof of character orreputation that can be admitted under Rules 404 or 608.2 Proofof status alone is also not evidence of a prior criminal2 Subject to a few exceptions, Rule 404(a) bars the admission of character evidence to prove that a person “acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.” Rule 608 is one of the exceptions to the rule. N.J.R.E. 404(a)(3). Rule 608(a) allows character evidence in the form of reputation or opinion testimony only as it relates to the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Specific instances of conduct are generally not admissible to prove a character trait. N.J.R.E. 608(a). There are two exceptions to that rule: proof that a “witness made a prior false accusation against any person of a crime similar to the crime with which defendant is charged,” N.J.R.E. 608(b); and proof of a criminal conviction, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 609. Neither exception applies here. 16 conviction. See N.J.R.E. 609. Nor is a person’s immigrationstatus admissible as a prior bad act under Rule 404(b). To beadmissible, such evidence must be “relevant to a materialissue,” and its probative value “must not be outweighed by itsapparent prejudice.” State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992)(factors one and four of multi-factor test). Proof of adefendant’s immigration status fails on both counts. In this case, the error was significant. Although counseldid not dwell on defendant’s undocumented status, the evidencewas hard to miss. The prosecution’s first questions on cross-examination focused on defendant’s status and set the tone forwhat followed. To compound the error, the trial court issuedconflicting instructions about whether jurors could consider theevidence to determine whether defendant “follows the rules ofsociety.” The final instruction correctly told the jury not toconsider defendant’s immigration status “to conclude that he isless likely to comply with our society’s rules and thereforecommitted the crimes in the indictment.” But the jury was nottold that it could not rely on the evidence to assessdefendant’s credibility. The better course would have been to strike the evidencealtogether and tell the jury not to consider it at all.Instead, the evidence remained part of the trial record.Without a clear instruction to disregard the evidence entirely, 17 we cannot be certain whether and how the jury might have reliedupon it during deliberations. IV. We turn now to the failure to instruct the jury onidentification evidence, which the State appropriatelyrecognizes was an error. R.D.’s identification of defendant wascentral to this case. She was the sole witness to identifydefendant, and his defense at trial was misidentification. Wheneyewitness identification is a “key issue,” the trial court mustinstruct the jury how to assess the evidence -- even ifdefendant does not request the charge. State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 325 (2005). A. This Court has addressed the topic of eyewitnessidentification on a number of occasions in recent years. In1999, in State v. Cromedy, the Court considered social sciencestudies that revealed that identifications are less reliablewhen a witness and a perpetrator are of different races. 158 N.J. 112, 121 (1999). The Court concluded that juryinstructions on the reliability of cross-racial identificationsare required in certain cases. Id. at 132. Years later, inState v. Romero, the Court recognized that “[j]urors likely willbelieve eyewitness testimony 'when it is offered with a highlevel of confidence, even though the accuracy of an eyewitness 18 and the confidence of that witness may not be related to oneanother at all.’” 191 N.J. 59, 75 (2007) (quoting Watkins v.Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 , 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).Based on additional social science evidence, the Court orderedthat juries be instructed on that point when appropriate. Ibid. In 2011, the Court examined expert testimony and scientificstudies about a number of variables that affect human memory.Henderson, 208 N.J. 208. Based on that body of evidence, theCourt directed that new jury instructions be developed. Id. at298-99. The following year, the Court approved new model jurycharges on eyewitness identification, which addressed variousfactors like memory decay, stress, and the duration of thecrime. Model Jury Charge (Criminal), “Identification: In-Courtand Out-Of-Court Identifications” (rev. July 9, 2012). Thecharges went into effect on September 4, 2012 -- more than ayear before the trial in this case began. Even though the alleged assaults here took place before theeffective date of the new model charge, the court should haveused the revised charge at trial in 2013. In much the same way,new rules of evidence that do not lower the level of proofneeded to convict a defendant generally apply at trial, even ifthey are adopted after the commission of a crime but beforetrial. See State v. Rose, 425 N.J. Super. 463, 468-70 (App.19 Div. 2012) (discussing Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 , 522(2000)). The jury in this case should have been instructed aboutsome of the factors discussed in Henderson. R.D. initially madean identification several weeks after the offense. At first,she said she was 75 percent certain; soon after, she stated thatshe was 100 percent sure. In her direct examination at trial,R.D. told the jury that she was “[a] hundred percent sure.” Ata charge conference, the parties and the court should haveconsidered whether charges on memory decay, confidence, stress,duration, lighting, and other factors were warranted.Henderson, 208 N.J. at 261-62, 264, 267, 296-99. The jury, however, did not hear any charge onidentification. Neither the defendant nor the public are well-served when that happens in a case like this. To be sure, thejudge should have given the charge on his own because R.D.’sidentification was a “key issue.” Cotto, 182 N.J. at 325. Butcounsel for the State and the defense are very much a part ofthe trial process as well. It is imperative that both sidescarefully evaluate and propose relevant jury instructions beforeand during trial, rather than after a verdict. That practicehelps protect defendants against unfair trials, avoids puttingwitnesses through the ordeal of testifying twice, and respectsthe jury’s time. 20 The Judiciary has compiled model criminal jury charges thatare available online. https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/attorneys/criminalcharges.html. We invite the State and thePublic Defender to consider how best to use those resources in asystematic way in advance of trial.3 B. The missing instruction on identification is reviewed forplain error. State v. Cole, 229 N.J. 430, 455 (2017); Cotto,182 N.J. at 326. The error must be evaluated “in light of theoverall strength of the State’s case.” State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 388 (2012) (quoting State v. Walker, 203 N.J. 73, 90(2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Defendant’s convictions rest largely on the testimony offour victims, only one of whom could identify him. No forensicevidence linked defendant to the crimes charged, and no otherwitnesses observed or could corroborate any of the incidents. The witnesses’ descriptions of their assailants varied.Two described a man with a ponytail, one said he had short hair,and the fourth did not describe his features. Only two victimsdescribed the attacker’s race: one said he was a Hispanic male,3 The trial court ably instructed the jury that the State had the burden to prove each element of the offenses charged and that defendant was the actor who committed the crimes. As a result, we need not address at length defendant’s argument, based on Cotto, 182 N.J. at 326, that that aspect of the charge was insufficient. 21 and the other described a light-skinned African American orHispanic male. For the Dumont attacks, which were twentyminutes apart, the first victim said her assailant wore asweatshirt and cargo pants, and the second described a darkshirt and dark shorts. In addition, although the assaults shared somesimilarities, they differed from one another in key ways. R.D.testified that a man grabbed her buttocks from behind. D.J. andA.B. each explained how a man reached into her pants and touchedher genitalia. And A.M. recounted how a man grabbed her armstightly behind her. Only one incident involved a bicycle. Theassaults were not “signature” crimes that, on their own, suggestthe same person carried out each attack. See Cofield, 127 N.J.at 336. One of the victims, in fact, did not describe a sexualassault. Defendant’s statement to the police, which he recanted attrial, offers some corroboration. Yet he also denied the coreof the accusations during the interview. In addition, as theState conceded at oral argument, the statement contains nodetails about the assault on A.M. In fact, there was noevidence introduced at trial of an attempted sexual assaultagainst A.M. The jury properly acquitted defendant on thatcharge. 22 Looking at all of the proofs together, the evidence againstdefendant was not overwhelming, as the State suggests. V. Even if an individual error does not require reversal, thecumulative effect of a series of errors can cast doubt on averdict and call for a new trial. State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 473 (2008). For that reason, we need not decide if eithererror in isolation warrants reversal. Here, the jury received no guidance about how to assess thesingle identification of defendant -- a critical issue at trialthat defendant disputed. And the jurors were not told to ignoreprovocative evidence about defendant’s immigration status.Together, those errors undermined defendant’s right to a fairtrial. They raise serious questions about whether the outcomewas just, particularly in light of the strength of the evidencepresented. See R. 2:10-2. We therefore have no choice otherthan to vacate defendant’s convictions. VI. For the reasons set forth above, we vacate defendant’sconvictions and remand the case to the Law Division for a newtrial. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. 23