Title: Town of Sudbury v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12738
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 22, 2020

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12738 
 
TOWN OF SUDBURY  vs.  MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY 
& another.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 1, 2019. - September 22, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ.2 
 
 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority.  Easement.  Real 
Property, Easement.  Public Utilities, Electrical 
transmission line. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on 
September 27, 2017. 
 
 
Motions to dismiss were heard by Gordon H. Piper, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
George X. Pucci (Audrey A. Eidelman also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
Thaddeus A. Heuer for Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority. 
Joshua A. Lewin for NSTAR Electric Company. 
                     
1 NSTAR Electric Company, doing business as Eversource 
Energy. 
 
2 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
2 
 
Mark R. Rielly & Rachel C. Thomas, for New England Power 
Company & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Jessica Gray Kelly & Daniel C. Johnston, for NAIOP 
Massachusetts & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In this appeal, we consider the scope of the 
common-law doctrine of "prior public use."  Under this long-
standing doctrine, public lands acquired for one public use may 
not be diverted to another inconsistent public use unless the 
subsequent use is authorized by plain and explicit legislation.  
Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 355 Mass. 328, 330 (1969).  
Here, we are asked to extend this doctrine and to determine that 
the prior public use doctrine bars the diversion of public land 
devoted to one public use to an inconsistent private use.  
Because such a sweeping change would not advance the purposes of 
the doctrine, and would create widespread uncertainty concerning 
numerous existing holdings of private land that were transferred 
by public entities, we decline to adopt the municipality's 
proposed reworking of the doctrine.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
Land Court judge's decision dismissing the complaint, albeit, in 
part, on somewhat different grounds.3 
                     
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by NAIOP 
Massachusetts, the Real Estate Bar Association for 
Massachusetts, Inc., and The Abstract Club; and New England 
Power Company and Massachusetts Electric Company, both doing 
business as National Grid. 
3 
 
1.  Prior proceedings.  In November 2017, the town of 
Sudbury (town) filed an amended complaint in the Land Court 
seeking to prevent defendant Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority (MBTA) from entering into an option agreement with 
defendant NSTAR Electric Company, doing business as Eversource 
Energy (Eversource), for an easement to install an electric 
transmission line underneath about nine miles of a disused right 
of way (ROW), approximately 4.3 miles of which extend through 
the town.  The town argued that the prior public use doctrine 
precludes the MBTA from transferring public land to another 
public entity for an inconsistent use, here, changing the use of 
the ROW from the purpose set forth in the eminent domain 
transfer -- the extension and operation of mass transportation 
services -- to the installation and maintenance of underground 
electric transmission lines, absent legislative authorization. 
The first count of the complaint sought a judgment 
declaring that the "inconsistent public use is illegal under the 
Massachusetts prior public use doctrine unless and until it is 
specifically authorized by legislation."  The second count 
sought to enjoin MBTA's diversion of the inactive ROW to an 
inconsistent public use.  The defendants moved to dismiss the 
complaint based on the town's lack of standing and the failure 
to state a claim for a violation of the prior public use 
4 
 
doctrine.  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (1), (6), 365 Mass. 754 
(1974). 
A Land Court judge denied the defendants' motions to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, see Mass. R. Civ. P. 
12 (b) (1), after concluding that the town had standing to bring 
the claim, albeit that "the [t]own's standing appears at the 
precipice of adequacy."  The judge then allowed the defendants' 
motions to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  See Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 12 (b) (6).  In so doing, the judge ruled that 
Eversource is a private corporation and not, as the town 
claimed, a public entity.  The judge declined the town's urging 
that he extend the long-established doctrine of prior public use 
to situations involving the diversion of an authorized public 
use of land to an inconsistent private use.  The town appealed 
to the Appeals Court, and we transferred the case to this court 
on our own motion. 
 
2.  Background.4  The MBTA acquired the ROW in part through 
an indenture from the trustees of the property of the Boston and 
Maine Corporation (B&M), subject to an easement for B&M's 
                     
 
4 The facts are drawn from the complaint, the exhibits 
attached to the complaint, and undisputed documents provided by 
the parties in connection with the proceedings.  See Lipsitt v. 
Plaud, 466 Mass. 240, 241 (2013); United States ex rel. 
Winkelman v. CVS Caremark Corp., 827 F.3d 201, 208 (1st Cir. 
2016). 
5 
 
continued use of the ROW as a freight railroad, and subsequently 
through a taking by eminent domain for purposes of providing and 
extending mass transportation services.  The MBTA has not 
constructed an extension of its transportation system through 
the ROW, and the ROW has been inactive as a rail line for over 
forty years.  Although the rails and rail beds are still extant, 
the area has become heavily wooded.  Multiple sections of the 
ROW abut environmentally sensitive areas, such as Federal, 
State, and private conservation areas, a farm, a fishery, 
streams, ponds, and wetlands.  Numerous other sections abut 
"dense" areas of private properties, some of which are subject 
to conservation restrictions under G. L. c. 184, §§ 31-33.  
Parts of the ROW currently are used by the public as a walking 
or hiking trail, and other stretches generally serve as wooded 
areas of wildlife habitat.  The railroad tracks and railroad 
beds formerly used by B&M have not been removed, and continue to 
extend through the ROW. 
The 1976 indenture from B&M provided that, for 
consideration of $36,549,000, B&M granted the MBTA "all of 
[B&M's] right, title and interest . . . sufficient to permit the 
[MBTA] to operate a passenger and freight rail service over the 
rail line rights of way . . . and to [B&M's] rights of way and 
other lands thereon and including all track, signals, bridges, 
buildings, shops, towers, and other improvements affixed 
6 
 
thereto."  B&M "reserve[d] unto themselves, their successors and 
assigns, the right and easement as are appropriate and necessary 
to the continuance of [B&M's] freight transportation business." 
In 1977, the MBTA acquired title to the ROW in fee simple, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 161A, § 3 (o), "for[, among other things,] 
the purpose of providing and extending mass transportation 
facilities for public use."  The order of taking was made 
subject to the same freight easement that was reserved to B&M in 
the indenture, as well as "all easements for wires, pipes, 
conduits, poles, and other appurtenances for the conveyance of 
water, sewerage, gas, oil, and electricity." 
On June 9, 2017, the MBTA entered into an option agreement 
with Eversource.  The agreement entitles Eversource to lease an 
easement in the ROW and to install an underground 115-kilovolt 
electrical transmission line, subject to obtaining "any 
necessary permits or approvals."  The option agreement further 
provides that the MBTA reserves the right to relocate the 
transmission lines to anywhere within the ROW if the MBTA 
determines that the lines are interfering with its use of the 
ROW for transportation purposes.  If exercised, the agreement is 
expected to generate $9.3 million for the MBTA over the 
subsequent twenty years. 
The preferred route for the underground transmission line, 
through the entire length of the ROW, is approximately nine 
7 
 
miles.5  The route begins at Eversource's Sudbury substation and 
travels through the ROW northwest through Sudbury, Marlborough, 
Hudson, Stow, and then Hudson again.  In Hudson, the 
transmission line would proceed underneath public roadways to 
Eversource's Hudson substation. 
The MBTA also has entered into a lease agreement with the 
Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR) to allow for the 
construction of a segment of the Massachusetts Central Rail 
Trail (MCRT) over the buried transmission lines to be placed in 
the ROW.  Under the terms of the option agreement, the easement 
granted to Eversource is subject to the provisions of the DCR 
lease, and Eversource is precluded from "materially 
interfer[ing] with or disturb[ing] the DCR's use of its leased 
premises."  According to the complaint, "Eversource and DCR are 
entering into a memorandum of understanding in an effort to 
memorialize agreements related to design, permitting, 
construction, operation, and maintenance of both the underground 
electric transmission line and the above-ground publicly 
accessible rail trail within the MBTA ROW.  Eversource has 
                     
 
5 An alternative route, which Eversource believes would be 
much more expensive than using the ROW, would be placed under 
existing streets in Sudbury.  Another alternative to provide the 
increase in electric transmission in this area that Eversource 
believes will be necessary to prevent power outages would 
involve modifying or replacing above-ground power lines.  This 
option is not preferred for a number of reasons. 
8 
 
stated that it expects that DCR will be responsible for 
maintenance of the ROW following completion of the transmission 
project." 
The proposed transmission project is subject to regulatory 
approval from the Energy Facilities Siting Board (EFSB) and the 
Department of Public Utilities (DPU), as well as review under 
the Massachusetts Environmental Protection Act (G. L. c. 30, 
§§ 61 et seq.) and the Wetlands Protection Act (G. L. c. 131, 
§ 40), and by the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental 
Affairs and the Sudbury conservation commission.  Eversource has 
undertaken the approval process with respect to the EFSB and the 
DPU, who have consolidated their proceedings in the matter. 
In support of the town's argument that the transmission 
project is a diversion of one public use to another, the 
complaint states that Eversource's applications to regulatory 
entities describe the proposed service and Eversource as public.  
In its petition to the EFSB, Eversource maintains that the 
proposed transmission lines would serve a "compelling public use 
and purpose."  The new transmission lines are necessary, 
Eversource asserts, in order to meet its customers' growing 
energy needs and to avoid service outages, which are estimated 
to occur given the current facilities and increasing demand.  
Eversource also maintains that coupling the underground 
9 
 
transmission line with the MCRT would confer a "public benefit," 
thus justifying approval of the project. 
 
3.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "We review the 
denial of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting the facts 
alleged in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable 
inferences in the plaintiff's favor."  Edwards v. Commonwealth, 
477 Mass. 254, 260 (2017), citing Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, 
Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011).  In assuming the facts as 
alleged, however, "[w]e do not regard as 'true' legal 
conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations."  Leavitt 
v. Brockton Hosp., Inc., 454 Mass. 37, 39 n.6 (2009).  To 
survive a motion to dismiss, the "[f]actual allegations must be 
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level . . . [based] on the assumption that all the allegations 
in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)."  
Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), 
quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).  
The facts alleged must "'plausibly suggest[] (not merely [be] 
consistent with)' an entitlement to relief."  Iannacchino, 
supra, quoting Bell Atl. Corp., supra at 557.  See Revere v. 
Massachusetts Gaming Comm'n, 476 Mass. 591, 609 (2017) 
(complaint survives motion to dismiss "if it includes enough 
factual heft" to raise basis for relief beyond speculation).  
"[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it appears 'that 
10 
 
a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'"  Bell Atl. Corp., 
supra at 556, quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 
(1974). 
 
b.  Standing.  The MBTA urges us to affirm the Land Court 
judge's decision, but on the alternative ground that the town 
lacked standing to bring a claim under the prior public use 
doctrine.  "The issue of standing may be raised at any time."  
See Matter of the Receivership of Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, 
Inc., 434 Mass. 51, 56 (2001), quoting Ginther v. Commissioner 
of Ins., 427 Mass. 319, 322 (1998).  According to the MBTA, the 
judge erred in finding "an automatic rule of injury-free 
municipal standing." 
 
"To have standing in any capacity, a [plaintiff] must show 
that the challenged action has caused the [plaintiff] injury."  
Slama v. Attorney Gen., 384 Mass. 620, 624 (1981).  See Enos v. 
Secretary of Envt'l Affairs, 432 Mass. 132, 135 (2000), quoting 
Bonan v. Boston, 398 Mass. 315, 320 (1986) ("standing requires 
'a definite interest in the matters in contention in the sense 
that [a plaintiff's] rights will be significantly affected by a 
resolution of the contested point'").  Although "it is settled 
that G. L. c. 231A does not provide an independent statutory 
basis for standing," Enos, supra, citing Pratt v. Boston, 396 
Mass. 37, 42-43 (1985), a party has standing under the statute 
where the defendant has "violated some duty owed to the 
11 
 
plaintiff[]," Enos, supra, quoting Penal Insts. Comm'r for 
Suffolk County v. Commissioner of Correction, 382 Mass. 527, 532 
(1981), and where the plaintiff "can allege an injury within the 
area of concern of the statute or regulatory scheme."  Service 
Employees Int'l Union, Loc. 509 v. Department of Mental Health, 
469 Mass. 323, 328 (2014), quoting Enos, supra.  See Northbridge 
v. Natick, 394 Mass. 70, 75 (1985) ("An injury alone is not 
enough; a plaintiff must allege a breach of duty owed to it by 
the public defendant"). 
 
In prior cases, this court generally has held that cities 
and towns lack standing to challenge zoning board decisions.  
See Hingham v. Department of Hous. & Community Dev., 451 Mass. 
501, 506 n.9 (2008) ("The town is not a 'person aggrieved' 
within the meaning of this statutory provisions"); Burlington v. 
Bedford, 417 Mass. 161, 165 (1994) (no standing where there was 
no duty owed to town, and town's injury was too "remote, 
speculative, and undefined").  See also Planning Bd. of Hingham 
v. Hingham Campus, LLC, 438 Mass. 364, 368 (2003) (town's 
planning board was not "person aggrieved" as required to have 
standing under statute).  At the same time, in cases involving 
zoning and permitting, abutting landowners are afforded a 
rebuttable presumption of standing.  See Standerwick v. Zoning 
Bd. of Appeals of Andover, 447 Mass. 20, 33-34 (2006). 
12 
 
 
As the town points out, we have considered a case involving 
a change in a prior public use where the plaintiff was a 
municipality, see Selectmen of Braintree v. County Comm'rs of 
Norfolk, 399 Mass. 507 (1987) (Braintree).  The town contends 
that this court's decision in Braintree "establishes that the 
[t]own has stated a valid claim upon which relief can be granted 
under the prior public use doctrine."  In finding that the town 
had standing to bring its claims under the prior public use 
doctrine, the judge relied on the argument the town advances 
concerning our decision in Braintree, id. at 510-513.  He 
reasoned that we "implicitly" must have conferred standing on 
the municipality in that case because we decided the case 
without any discussion of the municipality's standing to bring 
its claim. 
 
Our holding in Braintree, 399 Mass. at 510-513, however, 
did not establish, as the town argues and the Land Court judge 
appears to have adopted, "an automatic rule of injury-free 
municipal standing."  Nothing in Braintree should be read to 
confer automatic standing where a town brings a claim under the 
doctrine of prior public use.  To survive a motion to dismiss 
under the prior public use doctrine, any entity, including a 
town, must establish standing, i.e., a claim of individualized 
harm.  The question then becomes whether the complaint in this 
case sufficiently asserted an individualized harm to the town, 
13 
 
see Hingham, 451 Mass. at 506 n.9; Slama, 384 Mass. at 624, so 
as to withstand the motion to dismiss. 
 
At the outset, we note that the town has no ownership 
interest in the ROW itself.  The town asserts an individualized 
injury to town lands that abut the ROW, cf. Standerwick, 447 
Mass. at 33-34, as well as apparently implicitly asserting 
representative standing on behalf of numerous others:  Federal 
authorities who oversee Federal wildlife refuges, State and 
private trustees of conservation land and farms, and many 
private owners of residential properties, all of which also abut 
the ROW at some point.  See Slama, 384 Mass. at 624. 
 
The noted harms listed in the complaint, but not further 
discussed after having been identified, include the loss of 
27.96 acres of trees, the loss of wildlife habitat, danger to 
certain species already designated as at risk, loss of 
recreational space, loss of aesthetic value, and reduction in 
property values.  For most of these claims, the town either does 
not have standing to assert them, or the asserted harm is not 
legally cognizable. 
 
Of the 4.3 miles (or 22,704 feet) of the ROW that run 
through the town, the town asserts that it owns various parcels, 
totaling 6,145 linear feet of land, that abut the ROW, that is, 
approximately twenty-seven percent of the total length of the 
land abutting the ROW within the town.  The complaint delineates 
14 
 
two Federal wildlife refuges, a farm that is run as a joint 
State and private project, several areas of conservation land 
held under private trusts as well as town-owned conservation 
parcels, wetlands, ten vernal pools, and eight perennial streams 
as at risk of harm from the transmission project.6  The complaint 
also asserts the diminution in property values for the many 
"dense[ly]" located residential parcels that abut the ROW, and 
loss of aesthetic view.7 
 
The town has no standing to bring a claim under the prior 
public use doctrine concerning the majority of the land abutting 
the ROW in which the town has no property interest.  See Slama, 
384 Mass. at 624 ("[o]rdinarily, one may not claim standing in 
this Court to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third 
party"; "[r]epresentative standing is generally limited to cases 
in which it is difficult or impossible for the actual 
rightholders to assert their claims" [citation omitted]).  The 
individual property owners and the government entities who own 
                     
 
6 The water, wetland, and conservation areas enumerated abut 
or are proximate to the ROW; none is actually within the ROW. 
 
 
7 The complaint also presents as alleged harm that, if the 
project were to include certain types of fill around bridge 
abutments that affect floodplains, additional permits and agency 
review would be necessary.  Any asserted harm that might result 
if particular mandated remediation procedures were not followed 
is entirely speculative.  Moreover, the planned work as 
described in the complaint involves the electric wires remaining 
within the existing bridge footprint for the three bridges at 
issue, obviating any need for fill around newly dug abutments. 
15 
 
or manage these properties are not in that position.  They 
could, and in some cases already have, pursued their own claims 
regarding the transmission project before the EFSB and the DPU. 
 
Similarly, "[d]iminution in the value of real estate is a 
sufficient basis for standing only where it is 'derivative of or 
related to cognizable interests protected by the applicable 
zoning scheme.'"  Kenner v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Chatham, 
459 Mass. 115, 123 (2011), citing Standerwick, 447 Mass. at 31–
32.  "Zoning legislation 'is not designed for the preservation 
of the economic value of property, except in so far as that end 
is served by making the community a safe and healthy place in 
which to live.'"  Kenner, supra at 123-124, citing Tranfaglia v. 
Building Comm'r of Winchester, 306 Mass. 495, 503–504 (1940).  
Thus, the "alleged diminution in value of [town] property is not 
a basis for standing."  Kenner, supra at 124. 
 
While the complaint says little other than listing the 
assertedly affected land and stating that loss of habitat and 
harm to wildlife will result, with respect to at least a few of 
the asserted losses,8 the complaint sets forth specific, legally 
cognizable injuries, so long as we accept that the injury 
                     
 
8 These include the claim that the cold water fishery at Hop 
Brook will be negatively affected by loss of tree cover and the 
resulting rise in water temperature, the potential contamination 
of drinking water resource areas during removal of the railroad 
tracks, and the potential danger to certain protected species 
whose habitat encompasses town conservation land. 
16 
 
resulting from the change to the ROW depends on some type of 
legally cognizable interest that the ROW remain in its current, 
disused, and overgrown condition. 
 
As to that injury, the town seeks injunctive and 
declaratory relief for harm that purportedly would arise if the 
trees on the ROW were cleared to create an access road and rail 
trail, and the transmission wires and containers were installed.  
Only if one starts with the premise that the ROW will continue 
to be a rarely used strip of woodland with occasional 
recreational uses is it possible to infer any type of harm from 
the proposed clearing of a strip of land within the ROW, the 
placement of the underground conduits and the electrical wires, 
and the permanent paving of a narrower strip within the ROW.  
Indeed, if the MBTA chose to resume or extend rail or bus 
service along the ROW, it necessarily would have to remove, 
permanently, more than double the area of trees that Eversource 
contemplates removing for this project.  The complaint does not 
state any ground on which the town would be entitled to insist 
that the ROW remain unused, or would be able to preclude the 
MBTA from using the ROW for the explicitly authorized purposes 
of operating freight and passenger rail service, as well as 
other mass transportation activities, for which the MBTA paid 
B&M $36,549,000. 
17 
 
 
Undoubtedly it is for all of these reasons that the motion 
judge found that "the [t]own's standing appears at the precipice 
of adequacy" before he dismissed the case on other grounds.  In 
these circumstances, we assume without deciding that the town 
would be able to establish some individualized harm, and 
therefore has standing.  See Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556. 
 
c.  Doctrine of prior public use.  The doctrine of prior 
public use is a "firmly established" creation of the common law, 
dating back to the Nineteenth Century.  See Smith v. Westfield, 
478 Mass. 49, 60-61 (2017), citing Old Colony R.R. v. Framingham 
Water Co., 153 Mass. 561, 563 (1891), and Boston Water Power Co. 
v. Boston & W.R. Corp., 23 Pick. 360, 398 (1839).  Under this 
doctrine, "public lands devoted to one public use cannot be 
diverted to another inconsistent public use without plain and 
explicit legislation authorizing the diversion."  Robbins, 355 
Mass. at 330.  See, e.g., Brookline v. Metropolitan Dist. 
Comm'n, 357 Mass. 435, 440 (1970) ("The principle that land 
appropriated to one public use cannot be diverted to another 
inconsistent use without plain and explicit legislation to that 
end has been well established in our decisions"); Sacco v. 
Department of Pub. Works, 352 Mass. 670, 672 (1967) (specific 
statutory language is required to divert land devoted to one 
public purpose to another inconsistent public purpose); 
Higginson v. Treasurer & Sch. House Comm'rs of Boston, 212 Mass. 
18 
 
583, 591 (1912) (public purpose for which city has acquired land 
by eminent domain may be changed to another inconsistent public 
use by "plain and explicit legislation to that end"); Old Colony 
R.R., supra ("There can be no doubt that the Legislature may 
take, or authorize a corporation to take, land for a public use, 
which has previously been appropriated by legislative authority 
to a different public use . . . [b]ut it will not be deemed to 
have done so unless its intention so to take such land is 
plainly manifested in the statute"). 
 
To survive the defendants' motions to dismiss, the town was 
required to plead sufficiently that the option agreement met all 
four elements of the doctrine of prior public use:  (1) a 
subsequent public use; (2) previous devotion of the property to 
only "one public use"; (3) an inconsistent subsequent use; and 
(4) a lack of legislative authorization.  See Smith, 478 Mass. 
at 60, quoting Robbins, 355 Mass. at 330.  See, e.g., Higginson, 
212 Mass. at 591, citing Eldredge v. County Comm'rs of Norfolk, 
185 Mass. 186 (1904). 
On appeal, as they did before the Land Court judge, the 
MBTA and Eversource raise a number of grounds in support of 
their motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, e.g., failure to show that the option 
agreement violated the doctrine of prior public use.  The 
defendants argue that dismissal was required because the public 
19 
 
uses for which the ROW initially was acquired by the MBTA were 
not a single use; Eversource's right under the option agreement 
to use the ROW to construct and operate an underground 
transmission line is not inconsistent with the MBTA's rights to 
use the ROW for mass transportation services; the subsequent 
inconsistent use must be public, not private, and here, 
Eversource is a private entity; and the MBTA's enabling 
legislation, G. L. c. 161A, contains specific provisions 
authorizing the MBTA to grant easements that do not interfere 
with rail service, and further obligates the MBTA to maximize 
its nontransportation revenue.9 
                     
 
9 Even if a subsequent use is inconsistent, the prior public 
use doctrine is satisfied where the Legislature has adopted the 
subsequent public use by plain and explicit legislation.  See 
Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 355 Mass. 328, 330 (1969).  
The MBTA argues that its enabling statute, G. L. c. 161A, 
satisfies that requirement here, either by explicitly allowing 
the MBTA to grant the easement to Eversource, or by abrogating 
the common-law doctrine by necessary implication.  See Ferriter 
v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 521 (1980) 
(discussing repeal of common law by direct enactment or 
necessary implication).  Under its enabling statute, the MBTA 
has the authority to grant easements over "any real property 
held by the authority" that do not "unduly" interfere with mass 
transportation facilities, G. L. c. 161A, § 3 (m); and to 
"develop, finance and operate the mass transportation facilities 
and equipment in the public interest," including the disposition 
of real property without any further legislative approval, G. L. 
c. 161A, § 5 (a)-(b).  In addition, the MBTA is obligated to 
"[e]stablish and implement policies that provide for the 
maximization of nontransportation revenues from all sources."  
G. L. c. 161A, § 11.  Because of the result we reach, we need 
not address these arguments by the MBTA further. 
20 
 
 
As stated, in allowing the motions to dismiss, the judge 
relied on his determination that Eversource is a private entity, 
the use at issue is a private use, and the doctrine of prior 
public use does not apply to a subsequent inconsistent private 
use.  Based on this, the judge did not reach the defendants' 
arguments concerning the other three elements of the prior 
public use doctrine:  prior devotion of the property to only 
"one public use"; an inconsistent subsequent use;10 and the 
absence of legislative authorization.  See, e.g., Smith, 478 
Mass. at 60, quoting Robbins, 355 Mass. at 330. 
On appeal, the town contends that the judge's decision was 
erroneous for two reasons.  First, while Eversource is a private 
corporation, its use of the ROW for an underground electrical 
transmission line to service its customers is in reality a 
public use.  Second, the judge's narrow construction of the 
prior public use doctrine "would defeat the purpose of the 
[doctrine], which is to protect public land acquired for a 
                     
 
10 While the complaint states that railroad use would be 
impossible if the underground transmission wires were to be 
constructed, the MBTA asserts that it currently operates 
commuter rail service on some lines over such underground 
conduits.  The judge did not reach the issue whether 
Eversource's proposed use is inconsistent with the prior use, 
and, for purposes of the motions to dismiss, we must accept the 
town's assertion that the use would be inconsistent.  See Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007), quoting Scheuer 
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 
21 
 
particular public use . . . without the required legislative 
awareness and specific authorization." 
i.  Public use of the ROW.  For the prior public use 
doctrine to be applicable under our existing law, we must accept 
the town's contention that the option agreement in reality is a 
diversion to a public use.  The town maintains that the prior 
public use doctrine focuses on the "use" of the land, not on the 
corporate status of the user.  The town points out that 
Eversource represented in its petition before the EFSB and the 
DPU that the project serves "a compelling public use and 
purpose,"11 and that the construction of the MCRT walking and 
biking trail through the ROW confers a further "public benefit."  
Moreover, the town argues, Eversource is able to pass along the 
costs of the project to its public ratepayers. 
Relying on this asserted public use, the town contends, as 
it did in the Land Court, that this court's decision in 
Braintree, 399 Mass. at 509, "establishes that the [t]own has 
stated a valid claim upon which relief can be granted under the 
prior public use doctrine."  The comparison is inapt.  First, 
                     
 
11 In its brief, Eversource contests some of the town's 
assertions about the content of Eversource's statements to the 
EFSB, and points to a published set of documents it says do not 
contain the asserted language.  For purposes of a motion to 
dismiss, however, we assume "that all the allegations in the 
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)."  Iannacchino v. 
Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. 
22 
 
the judge properly rejected the contention that Eversource is a 
public entity, or that the transmission project is a public use.  
Second, our holding in Braintree, supra, did not suggest that 
the doctrine of prior public use applies to a subsequent private 
use. 
The judge rejected the town's efforts "to paint the 
[p]roject as one of public use."  He recognized that, in 
regulatory proceedings, Eversource argues that laying the 
transmission lines underneath the ROW will afford a public 
benefit with respect to power grid enhancements and, later, the 
construction of the MCRT in concert with the DCR.  Nonetheless, 
he concluded, "[t]hat a utility, owned by its shareholders, is 
subject to considerable public oversight does not make it a 
public entity for purposes of the legal doctrine. . . .  Nor 
does the fact that a utility such as Eversource only can proceed 
to build and operate power lines with the approval of public 
regulatory agencies, and has its rates reviewed in a public 
manner." 
We agree.  Eversource's proposed use of the MBTA ROW to 
construct and operate underground transmission lines is not a 
public use.  Eversource, a domestic corporation, privately owns 
and operates its electric transmission and distribution systems.  
See ENGIE Gas & LNG LLC v. Department of Pub. Utils., 475 Mass. 
191, 206 (2016) ("The business of electric distribution 
23 
 
companies is to plan for, build, and operate distribution 
infrastructure . . . ; deliver electricity; and be compensated 
for doing so").  Eversource will pay taxes on the transmission 
line as an asset, see G. L. c. 59, § 18, Fifth, and is entitled 
to earn a profit on its investment through rates approved by the 
DPU.  See G. L. c. 164, § 94.  See Higginson, 212 Mass. at 589 
(court focuses on "character of the use"); Abbott v. Inhabitants 
of Cottage City, 143 Mass. 521, 525 (1887) ("[public] use is in 
the public at large"). 
Like many other privately owned corporations doing business 
in the Commonwealth, such as banks and common carriers, 
Eversource is publicly regulated.  In order to site a new 
electric transmission line, Eversource is required to 
demonstrate to the EFSB and the DPU that the project "will or 
does serve the public convenience and is consistent with the 
public interest" and is "reasonably necessary for the 
convenience or welfare of the public."  See G. L. c. 164, § 72; 
G. L. c. 40A, § 3.  A statutory requirement that regulators 
consider the public's interest in siting transmission lines, 
however, does not convert the construction and operation of a 
four-mile segment of a privately owned electric transmission 
grid into a public use. 
ii.  Extension of doctrine to diversion to private use.  
The town's second argument rests on the mistaken premise that 
24 
 
the sole purpose of the prior public use doctrine is to prevent 
the diversion of public land acquired for a particular public 
use to any inconsistent use without specific legislative 
awareness and approval. 
Although the prior public use doctrine undoubtedly protects 
public land, it developed in our common law as a means to 
resolve conflicts over the use of public lands between State-
chartered corporations, municipalities, or other governmental 
agencies that might claim authority to use another government 
entity's land, or to take the land by eminent domain, in a 
potentially never-ending cycle of takings.12  See, e.g., 
Brookline, 357 Mass. at 436-437 (dispute between town and State 
agency over taking of property previously acquired as parkland 
for road construction); Needham v. County Comm'rs of Norfolk, 
324 Mass. 293, 295-297 (1949) (dispute between town and county 
commissioners over relocation of public way on strips of land 
                     
 
12 The prior public use doctrine has been applied 
particularly stringently to protect public lands acquired as 
"parkland."  Smith v. Westfield, 478 Mass. 49, 61 (2017).  "The 
policy of the Commonwealth has been to add to the common law 
inviolability of parks express prohibition against 
encroachment."  Higginson v. Treasurer & Sch. House Comm'rs of 
Boston, 212 Mass. 583, 591-592 (1912).  See Robbins, 355 Mass. 
at 330; Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 419 
(1966).  We noted in Mahajan v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 
464 Mass. 604, 616 (2013), that the "spirit" of art. 97 of the 
Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution derived from the 
public use doctrine, and that the protections of inconsistent 
subsequent use in that doctrine in large part were intended to 
ensure that public parkland remain parkland. 
25 
 
previously appropriated for school and library); Bauer v. 
Mitchell, 247 Mass. 522, 525 (1924) (dispute between trustees of 
agricultural school and county commissioners over attempt to 
take portion of school land for hospital sewage system); Boston 
& Albany R.R. v. City Council of Cambridge, 166 Mass. 224, 224 
(1896) (dispute between city and railroad over city's taking of 
land to build park); Old Colony R.R., 153 Mass. at 563-564 
(dispute between railroad and water company over operation of 
pumping station on land previously acquired for rail use). 
The doctrine of prior public use prevents the absurd result 
of public entities, each with the authority to exercise eminent 
domain, taking and retaking the same property from each other 
"ad infinitum."13  Commonwealth v. Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., 
346 Mass. 250, 254-255 (1963).  See Appleton v. Massachusetts 
Parking Auth., 340 Mass. 303, 310 (1960) (specific legislative 
authority required in order to prevent governmental agency from 
engaging in "roving eminent domain").  See generally Comment, 
Judicial Balancing of Uses for Public Property:  The Paramount 
                     
 
13 The doctrine of prior public use also promotes "fiscal 
and social stability" by protecting the long-term interests of a 
municipality or other government agency which "may have expended 
resources for the improvement of property in reliance on a 
continued right to use that property."  Somerset v. Dighton 
Water Dist., 347 Mass. 738, 742 (1964).  See Norfolk So. Ry. v. 
Intermodal Props., LLC, 215 N.J. 142, 162-163 (2013) (common-law 
rule developed to create certainty among public entitles, each 
with authority to exercise power of eminent domain over same 
property). 
26 
 
Public Use Doctrine, 17 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 893, 896 n.35 
(1990) (prior public use doctrine was developed to avoid 
"impropriety of the [S]tate's nullifying its own prior 
dedication of property to public use, without specific 
consideration of the superseding public use"); Wilson, The 
Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts Land Law, 11 B.C. Envtl. 
Aff. L. Rev. 839, 866-867 (1984) (prior public use doctrine 
establishes priorities between multiple governmental entities 
each possessing power of eminent domain).  See also Georgia 
Dep't of Transp. v. Jasper County, 355 S.C. 631, 635 (2003) 
(prior public use doctrine is "a rule of law limited to 
controversies between two [entities] each possessing a 
delegated, general power of eminent domain" [citation omitted]); 
In re Vt. Gas Sys., Inc., 2017 VT 83, ¶ 19 (purpose of common-
law doctrine is to "protect public uses and to prevent land from 
being condemned back and forth between competing condemners, 
which would result in a lack of consistent public use of the 
land"). 
 
In this case, involving a transaction between public and 
private entities for a subsequent private use of land, we are 
not called upon to resolve a conflict over eminent domain 
authority.  The common-law prior public use doctrine has never 
been applied to bar a subsequent private use carried out by a 
private entity.  While the town urges that we extend the 
27 
 
doctrine of prior public use to encompass a diversion to an 
inconsistent private use, the town has not demonstrated that the 
benefits of expanding the prior public use doctrine to encompass 
subsequent inconsistent private uses outweigh the value of 
adhering to our long-standing common-law formulation.  To adopt 
a vastly expanded view of the doctrine in order to add a similar 
requirement for diversion to an inconsistent private use would 
not serve the purposes of the doctrine we have discussed, and 
would lead to numerous deleterious consequences.  Among other 
things, countless prior transfers of interests in land, 
including many easements for utility wires and pipes, and water 
and sewage pipes, would be called into question.  Yet, as the 
town itself recognizes, these types of transactions between 
government and private entities are frequent and critical to 
maintaining a municipality's infrastructure.  See Somerset v. 
Dighton Water Dist., 347 Mass. 738, 742 (1964).  Moreover, it 
would render future developments between public and private 
entities, which, according to the amici, have been blossoming in 
the Commonwealth,14 prohibitively expensive and time consuming to 
undertake. 
                     
 
14 The amici point to several very recent housing projects 
involving public and private entities to create hundreds of 
units of much-needed affordable housing that also generates 
revenue for the government entities involved, affordable child-
care facilities to address severe shortages, and the leasing of 
28 
 
As the Land Court judge explained, "at both the local and 
[S]tate level, transfers of government-owned property to private 
ownership happen with frequency, and at times in cases where the 
land's title was acquired by the public owner for an express 
public purpose which may be at odds with the private grantee's 
ensuing use."  Thus, an expansion of the doctrine of prior 
public use to include subsequent private uses would "give rise 
to a significant number of lawsuits challenging the public 
disposition of . . . real estate."  The concerns raised by the 
amici that "[i]mposing upon the Legislature a new common law 
requirement to provide site-specific approval before any such 
project could commence construction would add great uncertainty 
as to schedule (and, therefore, project costs), making 
development involving public land or rights therein far less 
attractive to the private sector than it is today" also are 
persuasive. 
4.  Conclusion.  Because we decline to extend our long-
standing doctrine of prior public use to include a diversion 
from public use to an inconsistent private use, the town cannot 
prevail on either of its claims, and we accordingly affirm the 
Land Court judge's decision allowing the defendants' motions to 
dismiss. 
                     
land along State highways to support electrical panels that save 
the Department of Transportation millions of dollars annually. 
29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.