Title: State v. Higginbotham
Citation: 351 N.W.2d 513
Docket Number: 83-1090
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: July 18, 1984

351 N.W.2d 513 (1984) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Randy HIGGINBOTHAM, Appellant. No. 83-1090. Supreme Court of Iowa. July 18, 1984. *514 F.J. Kraschel of Kraschel &amp; Comes, Council Bluffs, for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Roxann M. Ryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., David Richter, County Atty., and E.A. Westfall, Asst. County Atty., for appellee. Considered by REYNOLDSON, C.J., and UHLENHOPP, HARRIS, McGIVERIN, and CARTER, JJ. HARRIS, Justice. This direct appeal from sentence following a guilty plea to second-degree murder challenges the adequacy of defendant's guilty plea proceeding. We affirm. According to the minutes attached to the trial information, defendant killed his two-year old stepdaughter. At the guilty plea hearing defendant gave his version. He said he "was trying to keep her active because she was running a fever, for a couple of days so we were playing with her dolls and stuff and she had struck me with a toy and, out of reflex, I pushed her and she hit the closet door and that's when she resulted in death." The minutes indicated there was a three and one-half inch round indentation in a closet door in the child's room. The surface of the door consisted of mahogany plywood that was one-eighth inch thick. The indentation was splintered and had several strands of blonde hair in it. The hair was similar to the child's. The officer and physicians who later examined the child were expected to testify. They observed bruises of varying ages on the child's head, ear, face, cheeks, neck, and back. The State's pathologist, who conducted the autopsy, was expected to describe multiple contusions and petechiae involving the face, forehead, neck, and back, and of extensive hemorrhages in various parts of the child's brain. Other testimony would have established the existence of bruises on the child during the months preceding her death. I. There is not a shadow of a doubt concerning the adequacy of a factual basis for the plea, under the foregoing. We give no further consideration to an assignment which challenges the factual basis. See State v. Johnson, 234 N.W.2d 878, 879 (Iowa 1979). II. A plea must be voluntarily and intelligently made. In State v. Boone, 298 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Iowa 1980), we explained: We have also stated as a separate requirement that there be compliance with Iowa rule of criminal procedure 8(2)(b) through (d). Compliance with the rule: Defendant argues he did not sufficiently understand the plea he entered and that there was no showing of such understanding as required by the rule. He points especially to his lack of understanding of "malice aforethought." In the plea hearing the following occurred: Contrary to defendant's contention, we think sufficient intelligence and understanding were demonstrated under the circumstances here. This is not to suggest that we are satisfied with the record explanation of malice aforethought. Certainly, the prosecutor's definition did not suffice. See State v. McCollom, 260 Iowa 977, 988, 151 N.W.2d 519, 525 (1967) ("malice does not mean mere spite, hatred, or ill will"). In State v. Sharpe, 304 N.W.2d 220, 226 (Iowa 1981), we defined malice aforethought as being: Defendant thinks the absence of an accurate record definition of malice aforethought means he was not advised of the specific intent element of the crime. We, however, find that, under all the circumstances considered together, defendant's challenge fails. In this proceeding the element of malice aforethought was explained to defendant in the presence of the courtthough off the record. It is significant that the proceedings were stopped for the specific purpose of having defendant's counsel advise him on the meaning of this element. *516 This case therefore differs from State v. Fluhr, 287 N.W.2d 857, 867-68 (Iowa 1980), where a majority of this court rejected the contention that a trial court could rely on a defense attorney's general assertion that the accused had been advised on the nature of the charges. Here, the missing advice was given on assignment, in the courtroom. Defendant acknowledged this had been done. We have no reason to presume the explanation was wrong. It was defendant's burden in moving for arrest of judgment to show he was misinformed. He did not bear this burden. We think an adequate record was made, in this plea proceeding, to establish that defendant was advised of and understood the nature of the offense. III. We have not ignored defendant's other contentions. He claims to have been unaware of the lesser included offenses of which he may have been convicted at a trial. We have said we are satisfied that defendant knew the nature of the offense to which he pled. This finding, plus defendant's stated and valid fear that a jury might well convict him of first-degree murder, makes it unnecessary that he understand the details of lesser included offenses. Compare Stovall v. State, 340 N.W.2d 265, 267 (Iowa 1983) (to vitiate a guilty plea, a court's misstatement must be "material in the sense that it is part of the inducement for the defendant's decision to plead guilty."). Defendant also seeks to urge a constitutional challenge against section 707.3 on the basis of vagueness. Contrary to his contention, he did not raise this challenge in district court. He can point only to the language in a memorandum brief filed in that court. A matter is not preserved for review on appeal if it is mentioned in district court only in the memorandum brief. Such a document is not a part of the record for purposes of error preservation. See Powell v. Khodari-Intergreen Co., 303 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Iowa 1981); Insurance Co. of North America v. Sperry &amp; Hutchinson Co., 168 N.W.2d 753, 757 (Iowa 1969). Other contentions are flatly contradicted by the record. We have carefully considered them and find them to be without merit. AFFIRMED.