Title: State v. Taylor
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 32A19
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: June 5, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 32A19  
Filed 5 June 2020 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
v. 
QUINTIN SHAROD TAYLOR 
 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of 
the Court of Appeals, No. COA18-55, 2018 WL 6614053 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2018) 
(unpublished), affirming judgments entered on 6 April 2017 by Judge Robert F. Floyd 
Jr. in Superior Court, Robeson County.  Heard in the Supreme Court on 1 October 
2019 in session in the Randolph County Historic Courthouse in the City of Asheboro. 
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Kimberly N. Callahan, Assistant 
Attorney General, for the State-appellee. 
 
Kimberly P. Hoppin for defendant-appellant. 
 
 
MORGAN, Justice.  
 
 
This appeal presents the issue of whether defendant in this case established a 
fair and just reason for the withdrawal of his guilty plea. After careful consideration 
of the factors relevant to this question as set forth in this Court’s decision in State v. 
Handy, 326 N.C. 532, 391 S.E.2d 159 (1990), we agree with the determination made 
by the trial court and affirmed by the North Carolina Court of Appeals that defendant 
failed to demonstrate a fair and just reason for the withdrawal of his guilty plea. As 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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a result, we modify and affirm the lower appellate court’s decision that it rendered in 
this case.  
I.  Factual Background and Procedural History 
 
On 11 July 2011, the Robeson County grand jury returned an indictment 
charging defendant Quintin Sharod Taylor with first-degree murder, robbery with a 
dangerous weapon, and conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon. 
These charges arose from defendant’s alleged participation in the 13 March 2011 
murder of Brandon Lee Hunt in Fairmont, North Carolina. Hunt was shot and killed 
by Taurus Locklear in the course of a robbery that the State believed was planned 
and committed by Locklear, defendant, and another accomplice, Shawn Jones. After 
the State announced its intention to proceed capitally in October 2011, defendant and 
the State negotiated a plea agreement that would allow defendant to avoid the 
possibility of receiving the death penalty in exchange for his continued cooperation 
with the State in the pending prosecutions of Locklear and Jones. At a 24 June 2014 
plea hearing in the Superior Court, Robeson County, defendant pled guilty to second-
degree murder, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and conspiracy to commit robbery. 
By virtue of this guilty plea, defendant acknowledged that he was in fact guilty of the 
charged offenses. Defendant consented to the State’s summarization of the facts 
supporting his guilty plea, which included the following pertinent details: 
During the course of the investigation as well, Mr. Jones[ ] 
was interviewed by law enforcement. He stated that at the 
time of the shooting that there had been a discussion 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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between [defendant] and Mr. Locklear that Mr. Locklear 
was going to rob the victim, Brandon Hunt. He stated that 
he was going to stick him—going to basically hold him up, 
going to rob him of some money. They knew he had some 
money. They knew he kind of sold drugs at a very low level, 
but they knew he—Mr. Locklear knew he had money. And 
so there was an agreement. 
 
They sta[r]ted walking over. Mr. Jones . . . . stated that 
[defendant] walked up first, that he knew the victim. They 
started talking, just standing there kind of hanging out 
talking. That Mr. Locklear approached. Mr. Jones stated 
that he turned to start walking back towards the Subway 
which is located there about a block or so away, and as he’s 
turning around and started to walk away, he heard a shot. 
He started running. He said that Mr. Locklear then caught 
up with him. Mr. Locklear was out of breath. He was in a 
frenzy. That they ultimately were able to call someone to 
come pick them up. . . . 
 
. . . . Mr. Jones reported that Mr. Locklear was agitated. He 
was upset. He was nervous. That he at some point made 
the statement that he had just shot a guy, indicating that 
he shot Mr. Hunt. . . . 
 
Based upon that, officers then went back to [defendant] 
and spoke with him. And after being interviewed, he 
admitted that he knew that there was going to [be] a 
robbery. He knew that they—there was a conversation 
[that] had taken place. He had said that Mr. Jones and Mr. 
Locklear were the ones that were planning to rob Mr. Hunt. 
[Defendant] stated that he knew Mr. Hunt. He knew that 
he wasn’t any—he wasn’t going to do anything if he were 
robbed. He was kind of—he was a very easy going guy. He 
was not the kind of guy that anybody wanted to rob. And 
so his plan was to go along with this up to the point to try 
to get Brandon Hunt away from the situation. 
 
He stated that—in this interview as well as subsequent 
interviews, he stated that when they went over there he 
was trying to get Mr. Hunt alone. There were other 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-4- 
individuals that were around. And ultimately, [by] the 
point he got him alone to try to tell him they needed to 
leave, it was too late. Mr. Locklear was there. Within a 
matter of a minute or so, Mr. Locklear pulled out a gun, 
shot Mr. Hunt, and then everybody scattered at that point. 
 
. . . . [Defendant] did confess to what he knew and it’s his 
involvement which constitute[s] the charges that he is 
pleading guilty to. 
 
The trial court accepted defendant’s guilty plea but deferred imposing sentence 
pending resolution of the State’s case against Locklear, in which defendant was 
obligated to assist under the terms of the plea agreement.  
No trial of Locklear ever occurred in this matter, however. On 25 August 2015, 
all charges against Locklear in connection with Hunt’s murder were voluntarily 
dismissed by the State, due in large part to the unwillingness of key witnesses to 
testify honestly against Locklear at trial. The loss and mislabeling of certain items of 
evidence in the case were also factors which contributed to the State’s election to 
discontinue its prosecution of Locklear. 
Upon learning of the dismissal of Locklear’s charges, defendant began 
attempting to retract the guilty plea that he entered in June 2014. Defendant first 
filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him on 10 November 2015, and then on 
28 December 2015 he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On 7 April 2016, at 
an evidentiary hearing held in the trial court on defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
charges against him, Detective Roy Grant of the Fairmont Police Department and 
Special Agent Paul Songalewski of the State Bureau of Investigation testified about 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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their involvement in the investigation of Hunt’s murder. Detective Grant read into 
evidence a report that he claimed was generated to document the contents of an 
interview that he and Special Agent Songalewski had conducted with defendant. 
Although the interview had taken place in the spring of 2011,1 Detective Grant did 
not prepare the report until August 2012. In pertinent part, the report stated the 
following: 
[Special] Agent Songalewski then started talking to 
[defendant] who told us that he had set the victim up, Mr. 
Brandon Hunt, to be robbed. [Defendant] stated that Bobby 
Deshawn Jones and himself had called or spoke with Mr. 
Hunt and told him to meet them. [Defendant] said he took 
Taurus Locklear with them. There was an exchange of 
words between [Mr. Hunt] and Ta[u]rus, and Ta[u]rus 
pulled out a gun and shot. 
 
In his testimony, Special Agent Songalewski agreed that he had participated in an 
interview of defendant on 25 March 2011, but he rejected the account of defendant’s 
statements set out in Detective Grant’s report, specifically the detective’s claims that 
defendant “told us that he had set the victim up, Mr. Brandon Hunt, to be robbed”; 
“stated that Bobby Deshawn Jones and himself had called or spoke with Mr. Hunt 
and told him to meet them”; and “said he took Taurus Locklear with them.” At the 
conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court orally denied defendant’s motion 
to dismiss. 
                                            
1 The report indicated that the interview took place on 7 April 2011, but Detective 
Grant testified that this date was erroneous and that the interview had actually occurred on 
25 March 2011. 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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On 7 June 2016, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant’s counsel explained that in his capacity as 
defendant’s attorney, he had advised defendant to accept the terms of the plea 
agreement offered by the State because, in counsel’s view, the account of the 
interview contained in Detective Grant’s report indicated that defendant had 
admitted to felony murder, even though defendant had “always denied” making the 
inculpatory statements contained in the report. Defendant’s counsel told the trial 
court during the hearing that he did not realize the discrepancy between Detective 
Grant’s and Special Agent Songalewski’s respective accounts of the 25 March 2011 
interview until counsel undertook a reexamination of the discovery materials that he 
had received from the State, spurred by the dismissal of the charges against Locklear. 
Defendant’s counsel argued that defendant had a right to withdraw his guilty plea 
based upon counsel’s failure to provide defendant with effective assistance in the plea 
agreement process. 
Special Agent Songalewski offered testimony at the hearing on defendant’s 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Special Agent Songalewski explained that during 
the 25 March 2011 interview of defendant, he had confronted defendant concerning  
defendant’s prior inconsistent statements to law enforcement officers about his 
involvement with Locklear and Jones, as well as the attempted robbery and the 
shooting of Hunt. Special Agent Songalewski testified that defendant then recounted 
during the interview that he had overheard Locklear and Jones planning to rob Hunt, 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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with the understanding that Locklear would shoot Hunt if the robbery “did not go 
down right.” According to Special Agent Songalewski, defendant said that he had 
been involved in the confrontation with Hunt only in an effort to prevent the robbery 
from going amiss and Hunt consequently being shot. Detective Grant also testified at 
the hearing, maintaining that defendant had told him and Special Agent Songalewski 
during the interview that defendant had set up Hunt to be robbed. Defendant did not 
testify at the hearing. 
On 5 April 2017, the trial court entered an order denying defendant’s motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court then 
sentenced defendant to serve consecutive terms of imprisonment of 157–198 months 
for the second-degree murder conviction, 64–86 months for the robbery with a 
dangerous weapon conviction, and 25–39 months for the conspiracy to commit 
robbery with a dangerous weapon conviction. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal in 
open court.  
In his argument to the Court of Appeals, defendant contended that the trial 
court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he had 
established a fair and just reason for withdrawal. State v. Taylor, No. COA18-55, 
2018 WL 6614053 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2018) (unpublished). In the alternative, 
defendant asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea 
agreement process. In assessing defendant’s argument regarding the denial of his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the Court of Appeals was expressly guided by the 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-8- 
overarching principle identified in Handy as the measure to utilize in circumstances 
in which a criminal defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing; 
namely, that “the defendant . . . is generally accorded that right if he can show any 
fair and just reason.” Handy, 326 N.C. at 536, 391 S.E.2d at 161 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). The lower appellate court then cited the following 
factors, which this Court articulated in Handy are to be applied in implementing that 
principle: 
Some of the factors which favor withdrawal include 
whether the defendant has asserted legal innocence, the 
strength of the State’s proffer of evidence, the length of 
time between entry of the guilty plea and the desire to 
change it, and whether the accused has had competent 
counsel at all relevant times.  Misunderstanding of the 
consequences of a guilty plea, hasty entry, confusion, and 
coercion are also factors for consideration. 
 
Id. at 539, 391 S.E.2d at 163 (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals continued its 
interpretation of the Handy decision by quoting our outlined procedure which states 
that “[t]he State may refute the movant’s showing by evidence of concrete prejudice 
to its case by reason of the withdrawal of the plea.” Id. In evaluating these so-called 
“Handy factors,” the Court of Appeals determined that (1) although defendant had 
made some inconsistent statements regarding his culpability during the murder 
investigation, he had not sufficiently asserted his legal innocence prior to his attempt 
to withdraw his plea; (2) the State’s proffer of evidence of defendant’s guilt at the plea 
hearing, although not overwhelming, was uncontested and sufficient; (3) the length 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-9- 
of time between the entry of defendant’s guilty plea and the filing of his motion to 
withdraw it—a full eighteen months—weighed against granting defendant’s motion; 
and (4) defendant did not enter into the plea agreement based upon 
misunderstanding, haste, confusion, or coercion.  Taylor, slip op. at 13–19, 2018 WL 
6614053, at *6–8. 
With regard to competency of counsel as a Handy factor, the majority at the 
Court of Appeals expressed an inability, based on the record before the lower 
appellate court, to determine “whether Defendant received effective assistance of 
counsel in deciding to plead guilty.” Taylor, slip op. at 17–18, 2018 WL 6614053, at *8. 
The Court of Appeals majority (1) recognized defendant’s assertion that he lacked 
competent counsel because his defense counsel advised defendant to plead guilty after 
misunderstanding the information provided by Detective Grant and Special Agent 
Songalewski regarding their different respective accounts of the same interview, (2) 
recognized the State’s assertion that defense counsel showed competence in 
successfully eliminating defendant’s exposure to the death penalty through a plea 
agreement that culminated with defendant’s expression of satisfaction with his 
counsel upon the entry of his guilty plea, and (3) subsequently opted to express no 
opinion on the Handy factor pertaining to the competency of counsel. Id. Consistent 
with this competency of counsel determination in its application of the Handy factors 
and in light of defendant’s alternative ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
stemming from the same argument, the Court of Appeals declined to rule upon the 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim “based upon the cold record” 
before the court and dismissed defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
“without prejudice to his right to file a motion for appropriate relief based upon his 
allegations of IAC.”2 Id. at 22, 2018 WL 6614053, at *10. 
As to the ultimate issue of whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea in light of the trial court’s consideration and 
application of the Handy factors, the Court of Appeals majority affirmed the trial 
court’s denial of defendant’s motion and dismissed defendant’s ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim without prejudice to his right to raise it in a future motion for 
appropriate relief. Id. The lower appellate court concluded that defendant “failed to 
demonstrate a fair and just reason for the withdrawal of his plea.” Id. at 19, 2018 WL 
6614053, at *8. The Court of Appeals went further, offering that even if defendant 
could show that he had established a fair and just reason to support the withdrawal 
of his guilty plea, nonetheless “his motion was still properly denied because the State 
presented concrete evidence at the withdrawal hearing of prejudice to its case against 
him should the motion be granted.” Id. 
While concurring with the judgment of the Court of Appeals majority “to 
dismiss defendant’s independent ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim 
without prejudice to his right to reassert it in a motion for appropriate relief (“MAR”) 
                                            
2 “IAC” is a common abbreviation in legal references for “ineffective assistance of 
counsel.” 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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in the superior court,” Judge Elmore, dissenting in part, “disagree[d] with the 
majority’s application and balance of the Handy factors, and believe[d] defendant has 
satisfied his burden of establishing ‘any fair and just reason’ to allow the withdrawal 
of his guilty plea that the State’s showing of concrete prejudice failed to refute.” 
Taylor, slip op. at 1, 2018 WL 6614053, at *10 (Elmore, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). The dissenting judge agreed with defendant’s position on each of 
the four most prominent and individualized Handy factors and concluded that “the 
State failed to demonstrate it would suffer concrete prejudice by its reliance on 
defendant’s plea, and thus failed to tilt the scales against defendant’s considerably 
weighty showing.” Id. at 22, 2018 WL 6614053, at *19. 
Defendant filed his notice of appeal on 22 January 2019, based upon the partial 
dissenting opinion at the Court of Appeals. In the parties’ respective arguments to 
this Court, there is no dispute between defendant and the State as to the 
appropriateness of the application of the Handy factors to resolve the identified issue 
in this case. As elucidated in the majority and dissenting opinions of the lower 
appellate court, the parties’ disagreement here focuses upon the appropriate 
consideration, application, and balance of the specified factors. After carefully 
reviewing the pertinent facts, the procedural circumstances, and the substantive 
legal arguments presented by the parties in this case, we believe that the evaluation 
of the Handy factors and their accorded weight as determined by the Court of Appeals 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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majority was proper and correct. As a result, we affirm this portion of the decision of 
the Court of Appeals majority.   
II.  Examination and Application of the Handy Factors 
 
Handy involved a circumstance in which the defendant originally pled not 
guilty at his arraignment for the charge of murder. Handy, 326 N.C. at 534, 391 
S.E.2d at 160. Two months later, during a hearing which was conducted for the 
resolution of final pretrial motions, the defendant moved to withdraw his plea of not 
guilty in order to enter a plea of guilty to felony murder. Id. The trial court accepted 
and recorded the defendant’s guilty plea. Id. On the following morning, before the 
proceedings reconvened, defense counsel moved to withdraw the defendant’s guilty 
plea. Id. at 535, 391 S.E.2d at 160. The trial court treated the motion to withdraw the 
plea as a motion for appropriate relief and denied the defendant’s motion. Id. In 
ruling that the trial court “erred in treating defendant’s motion made prior to verdict 
as a motion for appropriate relief,” this Court reiterated the principle that “[a] motion 
for appropriate relief is a post-verdict motion,” and therefore, “[a] motion for 
appropriate relief is not proper where made prior to sentencing when there is no jury 
verdict.” Id. at 535–36, 391 S.E.2d at 160–61. We utilized this opportunity to clarify 
and explain the applicable legal standards in such matters by (1) establishing that a 
defendant who seeks to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing occurs is generally 
accorded that right if the defendant can show any fair and just reason, (2) confirming 
that there is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, (3) emphasizing that motions 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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to withdraw a plea made prior to sentencing should be granted with liberality, and 
(4) recognizing ancillary holdings from federal and other state courts which are not 
directly relevant to the instant case. Id. at 536–38, 391 S.E.2d at 161–62. This Court 
then assembled from a variety of court jurisdictions and legal publications a group of 
factors to guide the trial courts in their respective determinations of motions that are 
made by criminal defendants who seek to withdraw their guilty pleas prior to 
sentencing. Just as we applied the governing factors to resolve the identified issue in 
Handy, we now turn to replicate this analytical approach in the present case. 
Factor 1:  Defendant’s Assertion of Legal Innocence 
 
Defendant represents that he asserted his legal innocence of the charges 
against him through proffer of counsel and through defendant’s pre-arrest 
statements. Defendant acknowledges, however, that he made inconsistent 
statements to law enforcement officers during their investigation of the offense. 
Depictions of these statements by defendant included his admission that he had 
advance knowledge of the plan that Locklear and Jones created in order to unlawfully 
take money from Hunt, that defendant had “set up” Hunt to be robbed by Locklear 
and Jones, that defendant was aware of Locklear’s plan to shoot Hunt if the robbery 
of Hunt did not proceed as anticipated, that defendant had agreed to participate in 
the robbery, and that defendant was present during the attempted robbery and the 
actual killing of Hunt. Additionally, at the plea hearing, defendant admitted his guilt 
to the charges against him, did not couch his guilt by virtue of a “no contest” plea or 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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an Alford plea,3 agreed that there were facts to support his guilty plea, and stipulated 
to the sufficiency of the factual basis as rendered in open court by the State. 
 
We agree with the Court of Appeals’ assessment of this factor and we are 
likewise “unpersuaded by Defendant’s argument that his inconsistent statements to 
law enforcement prior to his arrest are sufficient to negate his later guilty plea for 
purposes of the Handy test” and that “this factor does not weigh in favor of 
Defendant.” Taylor, slip op. at 14, 2018 WL 6614053, at *6. 
Factor 2:  The Strength of the State’s Proffer of Evidence 
 
Defendant describes the State’s proffer of evidence at the plea hearing as “not 
overwhelming” and the dissenting judge of the Court of Appeals characterized the 
State’s proffer of evidence as to defendant’s guilt as “weak.” Id. at 4, 2018 WL 
6614053, at *11 (Elmore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Defendant 
extrapolates from the State’s dismissal of the charges against Locklear that “the 
State would have difficulty presenting sufficient evidence of [defendant’s] guilt” since 
defendant was deemed to be “Locklear’s accomplice and co-conspirator.” Issues that 
the State had with regard to some of its tangible and testimonial evidence were also 
cited by defendant as matters which effectively diluted the force of the State’s 
evidence against him. Apart from these representations by defendant, the dissenting 
                                            
3 An Alford plea is a type of guilty plea recognized by North Carolina’s General Court 
of Justice in which a criminal defendant accepts that the State has sufficient evidence to 
convict him, but the defendant does not actually admit his guilt. 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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judge at the Court of Appeals viewed the inadequacy of the State’s proffer of evidence 
from a different perspective through the dissenting judge’s disagreement with the 
trial court’s standard by which to gauge defendant’s challenge to the strength of the 
State’s proffer of evidence. 
 
These approaches of defendant and the dissenting judge at the Court of 
Appeals, which attempt to blunt the strength of the State’s proffer of evidence, fade 
in the face of the observation of the Court of Appeals majority that “the State’s proffer 
of evidence at the plea hearing was uncontested” and “included statements from 
multiple witnesses indicating that they saw Defendant conversing with Locklear and 
Jones during the time period immediately prior to Hunt’s killing.” Id. at 15, 2018 WL 
6614053, at *7. 
 
While all three commentators on the strength of the State’s proffer of 
evidence—defendant, the dissenting judge at the Court of Appeals, and even the 
Court of Appeals majority—employed the phrase “not overwhelming” in describing 
that proffer of evidence, only the lower appellate court’s majority subscribed to the 
assessment term that is dispositive of this Handy factor: “sufficient.” See id. Since 
the strength of the State’s proffer of evidence against defendant that was presented 
as the factual basis at the plea hearing was essentially uncontested and therefore 
sufficient, we agree with the Court of Appeals that “this factor likewise fails to 
support withdrawal of his guilty plea.” Id. 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Factor 3:  The Length of Time Between Entry of the Guilty Plea and the 
Desire to Change It 
 
 
Defendant entered his guilty plea on 24 June 2014. On 28 December 2015—a 
full eighteen months later—defendant expressed his desire to change his guilty plea 
prior to resentencing through his motion filed in the trial court to withdraw his guilty 
plea. He contends that the significant lapse in time between the two events regarding 
his guilty plea was occasioned by the dismissal of all charges against Locklear 
fourteen months after defendant’s entry of his guilty plea, which in turn led to belated 
discoveries about the inconsistencies between the versions of defendant’s statements 
as reported by Detective Grant and Special Agent Songalewski that defense counsel 
made in reviewing the facts and circumstances of the case. Defendant argues that 
this delayed enlightenment, coupled with other intervening events during the time 
period under scrutiny, constitute “changed circumstances” that justify the 
withdrawal of his guilty plea despite the lengthy interim period between the entry of 
his plea and his filing of the motion to withdraw it. Defendant buttresses his stance 
on this Handy factor with the dissenting judge at the Court of Appeals that not only 
agrees with his “changed circumstances” assertion but also advances the premise that 
the “delay clock”—as the dissenting judge coins it—“should start when defendant first 
learned the true import of the vital piece of evidence supporting his decision to accept 
the State’s plea to avoid the death penalty,” thus reducing the length of time between 
the entry of his guilty plea and defendant’s desire to change it through filing his 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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motion to withdraw the plea to a “most conservative calculation” of forty-eight days. 
Taylor, slip op. at 6, 2018 WL 6614053, at *12 (Elmore, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 
In the seminal Handy case, this Court made the following observation: “A 
fundamental distinction exists between situations in which a defendant pleads guilty 
but changes his mind and seeks to withdraw the plea before sentencing and in which 
a defendant only attempts to withdraw the guilty plea after he hears and is 
dissatisfied with the sentence.” Handy, 326 N.C. at 536, 391 S.E.2d at 161. In the 
present case, while defendant attempted to withdraw his guilty plea before he heard 
the sentence which he would receive, nonetheless defendant had already expressed 
dissatisfaction with any sentence which would be imposed in light of the State’s 
dismissal of all charges against Locklear. While defendant and the dissenting judge 
at the Court of Appeals couch the extended length of time between the entry of 
defendant’s guilty plea and the filing of defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea in terms of “changed circumstances” due to defendant’s lack of “the full benefit 
of competent counsel at all relevant times,” we are mindful that defendant has 
acknowledged that his quest to withdraw his guilty plea was prompted by his interest 
“regarding the State’s dismissal with prejudice of the case against co-defendant 
Taurus Locklear.” Taylor, slip op. at 6, 2018 WL 6614053, at *12 (Elmore, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). When defendant was faced with the 
prospect of the State’s potential pursuit of the death penalty for his first-degree 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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murder charge, defense counsel and the State negotiated a plea agreement in which 
defendant was spared a capital murder prosecution in exchange for defendant 
pleading guilty to second-degree murder and other criminal offenses, agreeing that 
he was satisfied with his counsel’s legal services, and accepting the existence of a 
factual basis as grounds for his guilty plea—all before sentencing. After defendant 
learned that the charges against Locklear had been dismissed prior to the imposition 
of judgment, defendant now claims that he was bereft of competent counsel at a 
critical juncture in the proceedings and that “he was misadvised on the vital evidence 
supporting his decision to plead guilty”—all upon the inevitability of sentencing. 
 
It is apparent that defendant’s attempt to withdraw his guilty plea after a 
major passage of time is spawned by his dissatisfaction with the certainty of his 
sentence in light of the State’s dismissal of the charges against Locklear. This 
circumstance fits the logic that this Court employed in Handy in differentiating 
between a defendant’s effort to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing and a 
defendant’s effort to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing when defendant is 
dissatisfied with the sentence. Defendant here was dissatisfied with the sentence 
which he was destined to receive, which compelled him to seek to withdraw his guilty 
plea. The significant length of time between the entry of defendant’s guilty plea and 
his desire to change it through filing his motion to withdraw the guilty plea serves to 
exacerbate this Court’s proven concern in Handy in cases like the current one in 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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which a defendant attempts to withdraw a guilty plea. Hence, this Handy factor does 
not favor the withdrawal of defendant’s plea. 
Factor 4:  Competency of Counsel 
 
As we observed earlier in our review of the decision that was issued in this case 
by the Court of Appeals, the lower appellate court assessed the Handy factor 
regarding the competency of counsel and decided to “express no opinion as to whether 
this factor weighs in favor of Defendant or the State for purposes of the Handy 
factors.” Taylor, slip op. at 18, 2018 WL 6614053, at *8. In weighing both defendant’s 
contention that “he lacked competent counsel because his trial attorney failed to 
realize that the reports written by Detective Grant and Special Agent Songalewski 
recounted the same interview and advised Defendant to plead guilty based upon a 
misunderstanding of the evidence” and the State’s contention that defendant had 
competent counsel available at all relevant times as “his attorneys successfully 
negotiated a plea agreement reducing his charge to second-degree murder—thereby 
eliminating any chance that he would face the death penalty—and that Defendant 
expressed satisfaction with his trial counsel at the 24 June 2014 plea hearing,” the 
Court of Appeals concluded that it was “unable to determine based upon the record 
before [the Court of Appeals] whether Defendant received effective assistance of 
counsel in deciding to plead guilty.” Id. at 17–18, 2018 WL 6614053, at *8. 
 
In our view, the Court of Appeals majority has accurately captured the salient 
points of the parties’ respective positions on the Handy factor concerning the 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-20- 
competency of counsel. The dissenting judge at the Court of Appeals opined that 
“defendant has established he lacked the full benefit of competent counsel at all 
relevant times” and therefore “this Handy factor weighs heavily in favor of 
withdrawal.” Id. at 11, 2018 WL 6614053, at *14 (Elmore, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 
In considering each Handy factor individually, a court is not required to 
expressly find that a particular factor benefits either the defendant or the State in 
assessing whether a defendant has shown any fair and just reason for the withdrawal 
of a guilty plea. In Handy, this Court listed “[s]ome of the factors which favor 
withdrawal.” Handy, 326 N.C. at 539, 391 S.E.2d at 163. This depiction of the 
identification of the Handy factors inherently illustrates that the slate of them is not 
intended to be exhaustive nor definitive; rather, they are designed to be an instructive 
collection of considerations to aid the court in its overall determination of whether 
sufficient circumstances exist to constitute any fair and just reason for a defendant’s 
withdrawal of a guilty plea. 
 
To this end, although the dissenting judge at the Court of Appeals takes issue 
with the majority’s decision to express no opinion on the Handy factor concerning the 
competency of counsel, this Court does not regard the declination of the lower 
appellate court to adopt a position on the factor to be an abdication of the legal forum’s 
duty. We are satisfied that the Court of Appeals has amply shown that it has fully 
appraised the Handy factor concerning the competency of counsel as it evaluates the 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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entire array of factors, and we are unable to find any error in the manner in which 
the lower appellate court has addressed this issue. 
Additional Factors:  Misunderstanding of the Consequences of a Guilty 
Plea, Hasty Entry, Confusion, and Coercion 
 
 
Among the additional factors that this Court mentioned in Handy is the 
existence of coercion in a defendant’s guilty plea as a trial court determines whether 
any fair and just reason has been shown for the withdrawal of the guilty plea. Here, 
defendant submits that there is “some element of coercion” involved when a 
defendant either accepts an offer from the State to plead guilty or otherwise be subject 
to “a death sentence should he lose at trial.” A defendant’s exposure to the death 
penalty does not amount to coercion; as the term is utilized in Handy, regarding 
whether an accused was threatened, pressured, forced, or similarly compelled to enter 
a guilty plea. Defendant also argues that his eighth-grade reading level is also 
“worthy of consideration” for purposes of the additional Handy factors.  
 
Defendant’s answers to the questions posed to him by the trial court from the 
transcript of plea at the plea hearing contradict his representation that his guilty 
plea was coerced or otherwise in contravention of the additional Handy factors. Such 
questions intentionally probed the voluntariness of defendant’s guilty plea and his 
understanding of the consequences of his guilty plea. In responding to these queries 
from the trial court, defendant unequivocally indicated that no one had “promised 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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[him]4 anything or threatened [him] in any way to cause [him] to enter th[e] plea 
against [his] wishes”; that he “enter[ed] th[e] plea of [his] own free will, fully 
understanding what [he was] doing”; and that he understood the various aspects and 
ramifications of his plea. In light of this, neither the additional Handy factor of 
coercion nor any other additional factor operate to advance the cause of defendant to 
withdraw his guilty plea based upon any fair and just reason.  
 
Having examined each of the factors that this Court identified in Handy in 
order to ascertain whether there was any fair and just reason to allow defendant’s 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, we agree with the conclusion of the Court of 
Appeals that defendant has failed to demonstrate that there is a fair and just reason 
for the withdrawal of his plea. 
Prejudice to the State 
 
Upon its conclusion “that Defendant has failed to demonstrate a fair and just 
reason for the withdrawal of his plea,” the Court of Appeals went on to state the 
following:  
Even assuming arguendo that Defendant could show that 
he has established a fair and just reason supporting the 
withdrawal of his guilty plea, his motion was still properly 
denied because the State presented concrete evidence at 
the withdrawal hearing of prejudice to its case against him 
should the motion be granted. 
 
                                            
4 Pronouns in the third person are substituted for pronouns in the second person 
because the trial court’s questions from the transcript of plea were directed to defendant. 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Taylor, slip op. at 19, 2018 WL 6614053, at *8. 
After the delineation of the factors in Handy, we offered further guidance 
concerning the analytical process that a trial court should undertake in its 
determination of a defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. “The State may 
refute the movant’s showing by evidence of concrete prejudice to its case by reason of 
the withdrawal of the plea. Prejudice to the State is a germane factor against granting 
a motion to withdraw.” Handy, 326 N.C. at 539, 391 S.E.2d at 163 (emphasis added). 
Once the Court of Appeals determined that its consideration of the Handy 
factors did not convince that court to conclude that defendant had shown any fair and 
just reason to allow the withdrawal of his guilty plea, the lower appellate court was 
not required to engage in an analysis of any potential prejudice to the State in the 
event that the withdrawal of the guilty plea had been allowed. Since the Court of 
Appeals arrived at the outcome that no fair and just reason existed for such 
withdrawal because the Handy factors had not been met by defendant, prejudice to 
the State did not arise as a germane factor for consideration against granting 
defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The exploration of this unreached 
factor by the Court of Appeals therefore constitutes unnecessary surplusage which 
clutters its learned analysis, so we disavow that portion of the Court of Appeals’ 
decision. 
III.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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For the same reasons that we articulated in our assessment of the Handy factor 
concerning the competency of counsel, in which we deferred to the ability of the Court 
of Appeals to sufficiently consider the factor without a requirement to rule that said 
factor supports the position of defendant or the State, this Court adopts the decision 
of the Court of Appeals majority—with which the dissenting judge at the Court of 
Appeals concurs—to dismiss defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
without prejudice to his right to file a motion for appropriate relief to reassert that 
claim. 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in its 
consideration and application of the factors identified by this Court in Handy and the 
lower appellate court’s resulting determination that the trial court did not err in 
denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea based upon the trial court’s 
ruling that defendant failed to show any fair and just reason for the withdrawal of 
his guilty plea. In light of our holding, we disavow the dicta contained in the decision 
of the Court of Appeals regarding the subject of prejudice to the State after the lower 
appellate court’s stated conclusion that defendant had not satisfied the Handy 
factors. Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is dismissed without 
prejudice to his right to file a motion for appropriate relief in the trial court to reassert 
that claim. The decision of the Court of Appeals is therefore modified and affirmed. 
 
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED. 
STATE V. TAYLOR 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Justice DAVIS did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.