Title: McDade v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC13-1248
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 11, 2014

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC13-1248 
_____________ 
 
RICHARD R. McDADE,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[December 11, 2014] 
 
CANADY, J. 
 
In this case, we consider a certified question of great public importance 
concerning the application of the prohibition under chapter 934, Florida Statutes 
(2010), on intercepting certain oral communications.  Specifically, we consider 
whether the prohibition applies to recordings of solicitation and confirmation of 
child sexual abuse when the recordings were surreptitiously made by the child in 
the bedroom of the accused. 
In McDade v. State, 114 So. 3d 465, 467 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), the Second 
District Court of Appeal rejected McDade’s argument that two recordings of 
conversations he had in his bedroom with his stepdaughter should have been 
 
 
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suppressed under chapter 934’s statutory exclusionary rule.  The court also rejected 
McDade’s argument that testimony of the stepdaughter’s boyfriend recounting 
statements of the stepdaughter that McDade had raped her should have been 
excluded as hearsay.  Regarding the recorded conversations, the Second District 
held “that the narrow factual circumstances of this case do not fall within the 
statutory proscription of chapter 934.”  Id. at 469.  The Second District concluded 
that the boyfriend’s testimony was non-hearsay because the statements made by 
the stepdaughter “were introduced to show why the boyfriend encouraged the 
victim to make the recordings,” not for the truth of the matter asserted.  Id. at 468-
69. 
The Second District certified the following question as one of great public 
importance: 
DOES A RECORDING OF SOLICITATION AND 
CONFIRMATION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE MADE BY THE 
MINOR CHILD VICTIM FALL WITHIN THE PROSCRIPTION OF 
CHAPTER 934, FLORIDA STATUTES (2010)? 
Id. at 471.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  In line with the 
analysis we adopt, we rephrase the certified question as follows: 
DOES A RECORDING OF SOLICITATION AND 
CONFIRMATION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
SURREPTITIOUSLY MADE BY THE CHILD VICTIM IN THE 
ACCUSED’S BEDROOM FALL WITHIN THE PROSCRIPTION 
OF CHAPTER 934, FLORIDA STATUTES (2010)? 
 
 
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For the reasons we explain, we answer the rephrased certified question in the 
affirmative.  We also conclude that the Second District erred regarding the 
boyfriend’s testimony concerning statements made by the stepdaughter.  We quash 
the Second District’s decision. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
McDade was arrested and charged with various sex crimes after his then 
sixteen-year-old stepdaughter reported that he had been sexually abusing her since 
she was ten years old.  Prior to McDade’s arrest, his stepdaughter recorded two 
conversations with McDade.  The stepdaughter provided these recordings to law 
enforcement, and McDade was arrested that same day.  Prior to trial, McDade 
moved to suppress the recordings under chapter 934, Florida Statutes.  The trial 
court denied McDade’s motion, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.  The 
recordings were introduced at trial over McDade’s objection. 
 
At trial, the State presented the testimony of McDade’s stepdaughter, her 
boyfriend, and multiple law enforcement officers.  The State did not introduce any 
forensic evidence.  In defense, McDade testified on his own behalf, and he 
presented the testimony of his wife and his treating physician.  The Second District 
summarized the facts as follows: 
The victim in this case was born in Mexico in 1994.  In 2001, 
she and her mother moved to Florida.  Though their immigration 
status was a matter of dispute during the trial, the victim testified that 
she believed that they were illegally in the country.  In 2005, the 
 
 
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mother married McDade, who was approximately sixty years of age at 
the time.  The mother testified that the couple never had a sexual 
relationship because they both had health issues.  Indeed, McDade and 
the mother both testified that he suffered from erectile dysfunction.  
However, the victim alleged that he sexually abused her over a period 
of years, threatening that she and her mother would be returned to 
Mexico if she reported what he was doing. 
McDade operated an ice cream truck, and the victim’s mother 
worked as a janitor.  During the period of time when the alleged abuse 
occurred, the victim was typically home alone with McDade for 
several hours in the afternoon each school day.  She testified that on 
one such afternoon McDade instructed her to come into his bedroom 
and told her to take off her clothes.  He covered her face with a 
blanket and he penetrated her with both his finger and his penis.  She 
was ten years old at the time.  McDade allegedly continued to engage 
in this conduct weekly until April 2011, when she was sixteen. 
Over the years, the victim claimed that she reported this abuse 
to several people, including her mother, a doctor, and two ministers at 
her church.  Her mother admitted that her daughter reported this abuse 
to her and that she took her daughter to a doctor.  The mother 
adamantly did not believe her daughter.  When pressed about her 
accusations, the victim recanted on more than one occasion.  Perhaps 
because of her retractions, no one reported her claims even though any 
person who has reasonable cause to suspect child abuse must report it.  
See § 39.201, Fla. Stat. (2012).  She explained that she retracted her 
claims due to the fear of being sent to Mexico. 
In October 2010, the victim started going out with a boy.  Her 
mother and McDade did not like the boyfriend, and this created 
conflict within the family.  In an effort to prevent her from sneaking 
out of the house, her mother and McDade made her sleep in a closet 
near their bedroom.  She told her boyfriend that McDade was raping 
her, and he encouraged her to gather proof of the abuse.  He loaned 
her his MP3 player to use as a recording device.  In April 2011, with 
the MP3 player hidden in her shirt, she approached McDade in his 
bedroom on two occasions when they were alone after school.  She 
was essentially conducting her own investigation, hoping to prompt 
McDade into making incriminating statements that she could secretly 
record as evidence of abuse. 
The recordings supported the victim’s testimony that McDade 
would regularly ask her to have sex with him after school.  On both 
 
 
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occasions, though he did not use sexually explicit language, he 
appeared to be asking her to have sex with him.  He pressured her by 
suggesting that if she did not have sex with him he would get 
physically sick.  McDade also indicated he was doing her a favor by 
not telling her mother that they were having sex because if the mother 
knew she would take the victim back to Mexico. 
Id. at 467-68. 
The jury convicted McDade on two counts of sexual battery on a child 
younger than twelve, two counts of sexual activity with a child by a person in a 
position of familial or custodial authority, and one count of solicitation of sexual 
activity with a child by a person in a position of familial or custodial authority.  
McDade was sentenced to two sentences of life imprisonment for the counts of 
sexual battery on a child younger than twelve, two sentences of fifteen years of 
imprisonment for the counts of sexual activity with a child by a person in a 
position of familial or custodial authority, and five years of imprisonment for the 
count of solicitation of sexual activity with a minor by a person in familial or 
custodial authority, with the sentences to run concurrently. 
McDade appealed to the Second District, arguing that the trial court erred 
when it admitted the recordings into evidence and when it permitted the boyfriend 
to testify about the stepdaughter telling him that McDade raped her.  The district 
court first addressed McDade’s hearsay argument.  The district court concluded 
that “[b]ecause the statements in question were introduced to show why the 
boyfriend encouraged the victim to make the recordings,” the boyfriend’s 
 
 
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statements did “not constitute hearsay and thus the court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting them.”  Id. at 468-69. 
The Second District then rejected McDade’s argument that the trial court 
should have suppressed the recordings under the exclusionary rule of section 
934.06, Florida Statutes (2010).  The district court relied on State v. Inciarrano, 
473 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1985)—a case involving an audio recording of a murder 
taking place—to conclude “that the narrow factual circumstances of this case do 
not fall within the statutory proscription of chapter 934.”  McDade, 114 So. 3d at 
469, 470.  The Second District explained that “the statutory proscription [on 
recording oral communications] of chapter 934 only applies where the person 
uttering the communication has a reasonable expectation of privacy in that 
communication under the circumstances.”  Id. at 470.  The district court then 
reasoned that: 
As in Inciarrano, this case involves recordings made by a victim 
of the very criminal acts by which she was victimized.  The minor 
victim recorded McDade soliciting her for sexual acts, as he had done 
for years.  And though the conversation took place in McDade’s 
home, it was also the victim’s home.  Considering these circumstances 
and consistent with the analysis and holding in Inciarrano, we 
conclude that any expectation of privacy McDade may have had is not 
one which society is prepared to accept as reasonable. 
Id.  (Emphasis added.) 
However, two of the judges on the Second District panel expressed concerns 
with this Court’s decision in Inciarrano and its application to this case.  See id. at 
 
 
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471-77 (Altenbernd, J., concurring specially; Villanti, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  Judge Villanti concurred in the panel’s decision regarding 
McDade’s hearsay argument but dissented as to resolution of McDade’s argument 
regarding the recordings.  Id. at 475 (Villanti, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part).  According to Judge Villanti, section 934.06 is unambiguous and the 
recordings clearly fall within the statute’s plain language.  Id.  Further, Judge 
Villanti reasoned that the majority erroneously relied on Inciarrano to reach its 
result because the cases are factually distinguishable.  Id. at 475-76.  In Inciarrano, 
“the court considered ‘the quasi-public nature of the premises within which the 
conversations occurred, the physical proximity and accessibility of the premises to 
bystanders, and the location and visibility to the unaided eye of the microphone 
used to record the conversations.’ ”  Id. at 476 (quoting Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d at 
1274).  Conversely, the recording in this case was made while the defendant “was 
inside his own bedroom in his own residence.”  Id. 
Judge Altenbernd agreed with the panel’s resolution of both issues on 
appeal, but with reservations: 
Under the “society is prepared to recognize” test, I conclude 
that in 2011 a person who regularly and consistently abused a 
teenager in a bedroom of their shared home had no reasonable 
expectation that their conversations about the abuse would never be 
recorded.  In this modern digital world, any such adult should have 
expected that eventually a teenage victim would record such 
conversations in self-defense.  Accordingly, I concur in this decision 
 
 
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because Mr. McDade could not reasonably expect his statements to be 
protected oral communications. 
Despite my concurrence, I frankly share some of Judge 
Villanti’s concerns about the direction that Inciarrano takes us in 
today’s decision. 
Id. at 471-72 (Altenbernd, J., concurring specially). 
II.  ANALYSIS 
In the analysis that follows, we examine the governing statutory provisions 
in chapter 934, Florida Statutes, discuss the decision in Inciarrano, and answer the 
rephrased certified question in the affirmative.  We then discuss and accept 
McDade’s argument that the trial court erroneously admitted the boyfriend’s 
testimony concerning the stepdaughter’s statements. 
A.  Chapter 934 and the Recordings 
 
Whether the provisions of chapter 934, Florida Statutes, apply to the 
recordings at issue in this case—where the facts relevant to the recordings are 
undisputed—is a question of statutory interpretation.  “Judicial interpretations of 
statutes are pure questions of law subject to de novo review.”  Johnson v. State, 78 
So. 3d 1305, 1310 (Fla. 2012) (citing State v. Sigler, 967 So. 2d 835, 841 (Fla. 
2007)).  “In construing this statute, this Court must give the ‘statutory language its 
plain and ordinary meaning,’ and is not ‘at liberty to add words . . . that were not 
placed there by the Legislature.’ ”  Exposito v. State, 891 So. 2d 525, 528 (Fla. 
2004) (quoting Seagrave v. State, 802 So. 2d 281, 286 (Fla. 2001); Hayes v. State, 
 
 
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750 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999)).  “Where the statute’s language is clear and 
unambiguous, courts need not employ principles of statutory construction to 
determine and effectuate legislative intent.”  Johnson, 78 So. 3d at 1310 (quoting 
Fla. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. P.E., 14 So. 3d 228, 234 (Fla. 2009)). 
Section 934.03(1), Florida Statutes (2010), contains a general prohibition on 
the interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communications.  Section 
934.02(2), Florida Statutes (2010), defines the term “oral communication” for 
purposes of chapter 934 as “any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting 
an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under 
circumstances justifying such expectation and does not mean any public oral 
communication uttered at a public meeting or any electronic communication.” 
Section 934.03(2), Florida Statutes (2010), contains a list of specific 
exceptions to the general prohibition in section 934.03(1).  One of these exceptions 
is for situations in which all parties to the conversation have consented. 
§ 934.03(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2010).  None of the exceptions allow for the interception 
of conversations based on one’s status as the victim of a crime.  The State does not 
argue that any of the exceptions listed in section 934.03(2) are applicable in this 
case. 
Section 934.06 provides that the contents of any improperly intercepted 
communication may not be used as evidence: 
 
 
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Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no 
part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived 
therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other 
proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, 
agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of 
the state, or a political subdivision thereof, if the disclosure of that 
information would be in violation of this chapter.  The prohibition of 
use as evidence provided in this section does not apply in cases of 
prosecution for criminal interception in violation of the provisions of 
this chapter. 
This Court analyzed these statutory provisions in State v. Walls, 356 So. 2d 
294 (Fla. 1978).  In Walls, “the alleged victim of extortionary threats, 
electronically recorded a conversation” between himself and the defendants.  Id. at 
295.  The Court concluded that the recording was inadmissible under section 
934.06, Florida Statutes (1975).  The Court explained: 
We agree with the trial court that an extortionary threat 
delivered personally to the victim in the victim’s home is an “oral 
communication” within the definition of Section 934.02(2), Florida 
Statutes (1975); that pursuant to Section 934.03, Florida Statutes 
(1975), the electronic recording of such “oral communication” 
without the consent of all parties to the communication was 
prohibited; and that Section 934.06, Florida Statutes (1975), expressly 
prohibits the use of such electronic recording as evidence.  The 
subject electronic recording did not fall within any of the situations 
permitting interception delineated in Section 934.03(2), Florida 
Statutes (1975).  Section 934.06, Florida Statutes (1975), contains no 
exception to the prohibition against use of the illegally intercepted 
wire or oral communication as evidence. 
Id. at 296. 
Similarly, under the definition of oral communication provided by section 
934.02(2), Florida Statutes (2010), McDade’s conversations with his stepdaughter 
 
 
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in his bedroom are oral communications.  The facts related to the recorded 
conversations support the conclusion that McDade’s statements were “uttered by a 
person exhibiting an expectation that [his] communication [was] not subject to 
interception” and that McDade made those statements “under circumstances 
justifying” his expectation that his statements would not be recorded.  § 934.02(2), 
Fla. Stat. (2010).  The recordings were made surreptitiously.  McDade did not 
consent to the conversations being recorded, and none of the other exceptions 
listed in section 934.03(2) apply.  The recordings, therefore, were prohibited.  
Because the recordings impermissibly intercepted oral communications, the 
recordings are inadmissible under section 934.06, Florida Statutes (2010). 
The facts of Inciarrano are in important ways different from those in both 
Walls and the instant case.  In Inciarrano, the trial court had determined that the 
“statements were not made under circumstances justifying an expectation to 
privacy,” based on factual circumstances including “the quasi-public nature of the 
premises within which the conversations occurred, the physical proximity and 
accessibility of the premises to bystanders, and the location and visibility to the 
unaided eye of the microphone used to record the conversations.”  473 So. 2d at 
1274.  Thus, the recording was made in the victim’s place of business—a “quasi-
public” place—and the recording device was visible.  In addition, the recording 
contained sounds of the crime that were not “oral communications.”  Arguably, the 
 
 
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recording was admitted at trial not for the “contents” of any “oral 
communications.”  The recording simply revealed the presence of the defendant—
from the sound of his voice—and the sounds that accompanied the commission of 
the crime—that is, “five shots being fired . . . several groans by the victim, the 
gushing of blood, and the victim falling from his chair.”  Id.  Conversely, the 
recordings at issue in this case were made in McDade’s bedroom, the recording 
device was hidden under the stepdaughter’s shirt, and the recordings contain 
conversations between McDade and his stepdaughter.  Because of the differences 
in the location, visibility of the recording device, and content of the recordings at 
issue in Inciarrano, it presented a set of circumstances that are starkly different 
from those present here. 
The reasoning of Inciarrano turns, however, on the Court’s conclusion that 
any subjective expectation of privacy that Inciarrano had was unjustified because it 
was not an expectation “that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”  Id. at 
1275.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court focused on the fact that Inciarrano 
went to the victim’s office “to do him harm” and on Inciarrano’s resulting status as 
a “trespasser.”  Id.  The holding of Inciarrano thus is a narrow holding based on the 
view that a trespasser cannot have a justified expectation that his utterances in the 
premises where he trespasses are not subject to interception.  Cf. United States v. 
Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 2011) (concluding that defendant who had 
 
 
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previously been evicted from residence had “no legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the residence”); United States v. McRae, 156 F.3d 708, 711 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that defendant who squatted in a vacant house “did not have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of having stayed a week in the vacant 
premises that he did not own or rent”); United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d 192, 195-96 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (concluding trespassing defendant “lacked the ‘legitimate 
expectation of privacy’ in the premises required to challenge the search”); United 
States v. Carr, 939 F.2d 1442, 1446 (10th Cir. 1991) (concluding that defendant 
who occupied motel room that was not registered to defendant or someone he was 
sharing it with lacked a “legitimate expectation of privacy” under the Fourth 
Amendment in the motel room). 
Inciarrano therefore is not based on a general rule that utterances associated 
with criminal activity are by virtue of that association necessarily uttered in 
circumstances that make unjustified any expectation that the utterances will not be 
intercepted.  Nor can the holding in Inciarrano be used as a basis for the decision 
reached by the Second District, which turns on McDade’s status as a person 
engaged in crimes involving the sexual abuse of a child.  We thus do not 
understand the references in Inciarrano to “whether society is prepared to 
recognize [an expectation of privacy] as reasonable” to provide a basis for either 
 
 
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such a general rule or the view adopted by the Second District.  Inciarrano, 473 So. 
2d at 1275. 
The whether-society-is-prepared-to-recognize formulation has its genesis in 
the Fourth Amendment context.  It first appears in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), in his 
discussion of the objective expectation of privacy element of Fourth Amendment 
analysis.  This formulation cannot be understood to justify a categorical rule that 
persons involved in criminal activities have no justified expectation of privacy in 
conversations related to those activities.  Such a categorical rule makes no sense 
either in the Fourth Amendment context or under the definition of “oral 
communication” in section 934.02(2).  The result in Katz itself—the suppression of 
recordings made by the government of telephone conversations relating to illegal 
gambling—illustrates this point regarding the meaning of the whether-society-is-
prepared-to-recognize formulation. 
“Privacy expectations do not hinge on the nature of [a] defendant’s 
activities—innocent or criminal.  In fact, many Fourth Amendment issues arise 
precisely because the defendants were engaged in illegal activity on the premises 
for which they claim privacy interests.”  United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313, 321 
(2d Cir. 1997) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. Pitts, 322 F.3d 
449, 458-59 (7th Cir. 2003) (“We may not justify the search after the fact, once we 
 
 
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know illegal activity was afoot; the legitimate expectation of privacy does not 
depend on the nature of the defendant’s activities, whether innocent or criminal. . . 
.  If this were the case, then the police could enter private homes without warrants, 
and if they find drugs, justify the search by citing the rule that society is not 
prepared to accept as reasonable an expectation of privacy in crack cocaine kept in 
private homes.”). 
It may well be that a compelling case can be made for an exception from 
chapter 934’s statutory exclusionary rule for recordings that provide evidence of 
criminal activity—or at least certain types of criminal activities.  But the adoption 
of such an exception is a matter for the Legislature.  It is not within the province of 
the courts to create such an exception by ignoring the plain import of the statutory 
text. 
B.  Hearsay 
 
McDade’s argument that the trial judge erroneously permitted the boyfriend 
to testify about inadmissible hearsay statements is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard.  “A trial judge’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will 
not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.  The trial court’s discretion is 
constrained, however, by the application of the rules of evidence and by the 
principles of stare decisis.”  Hayward v. State, 24 So. 3d 17, 29 (Fla. 2009) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 
 
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In Penalver v. State, 926 So. 2d 1118, 1131-32 (Fla. 2006), the Court 
explained that: 
Hearsay is defined in section 90.801(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2005), as 
“a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at 
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted.”  (Emphasis added.)  See also Hernandez v. State, 863 So. 
2d 484 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).  Thus, if the statement is offered for the 
truth of the facts contained in the statement, then the statement is 
hearsay and must fall within one of the recognized hearsay exceptions 
outlined in section 90.803 to be admitted into evidence.  See 
Hutchinson v. State, 882 So. 2d 943, 950-51 (Fla. 2004).  However, if 
the statement is offered for some purpose other than its truth, the 
statement is not hearsay and is generally admissible if relevant to a 
material issue in the case.  See Harris v. State, 843 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 
2003); State v. Baird, 572 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1990). 
Here, the boyfriend’s testimony that the stepdaughter “told me that she was being 
raped when she was younger” was hearsay. 
The Second District concluded that the boyfriend’s testimony was offered 
not to establish the truth of the matter asserted by the stepdaughter but to show 
why the boyfriend assisted the stepdaughter in making the recordings.  See 
Krampert v. State, 13 So. 3d 170, 174 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (concluding that out of 
court statements were not hearsay when they were introduced to explain 
subsequent conduct rather than to prove the truth of the matter asserted).  Given 
our determination that the recordings were not admissible, this justification for the 
admission of the stepdaughter’s statement collapses.  The boyfriend’s explanation 
of why he assisted the stepdaughter in making the inadmissible recordings is 
 
 
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totally irrelevant.  The State asserted no other basis in its brief to this Court for 
admitting the testimony.  Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
McDade’s hearsay objection. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
We thus conclude that the recordings should have been suppressed under 
section 934.06, and the boyfriend’s testimony should have been excluded.  We 
answer the rephrased certified question in the affirmative, quash the decision of the 
Second District, and remand this case to the Second District to reverse McDade’s 
convictions and sentences.  McDade is entitled to a new trial. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D11-5955 
 
 
(Lee County) 
 
Christopher E. Cosden, Fort Myers, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
 
 
 
 
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Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Robert Jay Krauss, 
Bureau Chief, and Christina Zuccaro, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Thomas Richard Julin and Patricia Acosta of Hunton & Williams LLP, Miami, 
Florida, on behalf of the Florida Press Association and the Florida Society of News 
Editors,  
 
 
for Amici Curiae