Title: MAHMOODJANLOO v. MAHMOODJANLOO
Citation: 160 P.3d 951, 2007 OK 32
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: May 15, 2007

MAHMOODJANLOO v. MAHMOODJANLOO Annotate this Case MAHMOODJANLOO v. MAHMOODJANLOO 2007 OK 32 160 P.3d 951 Case Number: 101196 Decided: 05/15/2007 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA TAMMY D. MAHMOODJANLOO, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY Patricia G. Parrish, Trial Court ¶0 In post-decree proceeding brought pursuant to the provisions of ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT IS REVERSED AND THE CAUSE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS DECISION Floyd Taylor, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellant Janice Logan Morrow of Riggs, Abney, Neal, Turpen, Orbison & Lewis, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellee. EDMONDSON, V.C.J.: ¶1 This is an appeal by Behrooz Mahmoodjanloo, father and custodial parent of two daughters, from the trial court's order denying his post-decree effort to relocate with his children to New York. Father argues the trial court misapplied the statutory burden of proof set forth in I. ¶2 The right of a custodial parent to relocate to a distant new home with his or her child when that move is opposed by the noncustodial parent is governed by two different statutes: ¶3 In Kaiser v. Kaiser, That statute reads: A parent entitled to the custody of a child has a right to change his residence, subject to the power of the district court to restrain a removal which would prejudice the rights or welfare of the child. ¶4 We held in Kaiser that a noncustodial parent objecting to a proposed relocation must meet the same heavy burden of proof required to satisfy the test to change a custody award set forth in Gibbons v. Gibbons, ¶5 We recognized the necessity of judicial deference to family decisions made by the custodial parent, and we embraced the view expressed by other courts that limiting judicial intervention in post-divorce parental decision making is an overriding goal, because to "micromanage" everyday parenting decisions by trial courts does not serve the interests of the parties, the judiciary or the public. Kaiser, 23 P.3d 287. ¶6 Kaiser was handed down by the Court on April 3, 2001. On June 5, 2002, the Legislature enacted ¶7 Unlike the burden of proof required under II. ¶8 Father and mother, Tammy Mahmoodjanloo, were divorced in 1993 and were awarded joint custody of their two daughters. By default order entered in 1996, father was awarded sole custody of the children and mother was given supervised visitation. Father remarried in early 2004 and in July of that year he notified mother through her lawyer that he planned to move the children with him to Buffalo, New York, to join his wife, a member of the faculty of the State University of New York School of Dental Medicine there. ¶9 Pursuant to §112.3, mother filed an objection to father's proposed move of the children and requested a hearing in the matter. She alleged father had in fact already moved the children to New York and complained he had not complied with the notice requirement. She sought temporary custody of the children based on the lack of required timely notice, ¶10 The order of the trial court (1) found the new relocation statute, ¶11 Father contends the trial judge erred in her allocation of the burden of proof required by §112.3, as she incorrectly imposed the burden upon him to show not only that his proposed relocation of his daughters was undertaken in good faith - which he did - but also to show that the move would be in the best interest of the girls. The trial court stated: Once that burden was established, the burden then shifted to Mrs. Mahmoodjanloo to show that it was not in the best interest of the child to, in fact, move. Or, I take that back. It was Mr. Mahmoodjanloo's burden at that point to show that it was in the best interest of the children to move. Tr. 172. This, father points out, is directly contrary to §112.3.K., which states: The relocating parent has the burden of proof that the proposed relocation is made in good faith. If that burden of proof is met, the burden shifts to the nonrelocating person to show that the proposed relocation is not in the best interest of the child. (Emphasis added) III. ¶12 We agree with father. The statute plainly and unambiguously places the burden on the relocating parent to show the move is proposed in good faith and, once that burden is met, as it was in this case, shifts the burden of proof to the opposing parent to show the proposed move is not in the best interest of the children. The trial court's imposition of the added burden on father was error and we reverse for that reason. Accordingly, we find it unnecessary to consider the additional arguments urged by father which concern the constitutionality of § 112.3 and its alleged failures to follow Kaiser, to be in harmony with ¶13 Mother's request for legal fees for appeal-related services is denied. We find the record supports no overriding or compelling equitable considerations in favor of either litigant. After the post-remand proceedings have concluded, the parties may request the trial court to entertain pleas for legal services and appropriate expenses for that phase of the proceedings. See Jones v. Jones, ¶14 This matter is reversed and remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of all issues consistent with this opinion. ¶15 WINCHESTER, C.J., EDMONDSON, V.C.J., LAVENDER, WATT, TAYLOR, COLBERT, JJ. - Concur ¶16 HARGRAVE, KAUGER, JJ. - Concur in Result ¶17 OPALA, J. - Dissents FOOT