Title: Ex parte Meadowbrook Insurance Group, Inc. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Charles H. Andrews v. Meadowbrook Insurance Group, Inc., Directions Management Services, and Francis Powell Enterprises, Inc.)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1061493
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 21, 2007

REL: 12/21/07
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1061493
_________________________
Ex parte Meadowbrook Insurance Group, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Charles H. Andrews
v.
Meadowbrook Insurance Group, Inc., et al.)
_________________________
1061592
_________________________
Ex parte Francis Powell Enterprises, Inc.
2
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Charles H. Andrews
v.
Meadowbrook Insurance Group, Inc., et al.)
(Clarke Circuit Court, CV-05-111)
WOODALL, Justice.
In the current action by Charles H. Andrews against
Francis Powell Enterprises, Inc. ("Francis Powell"), and
Meadowbrook Insurance Group, Inc. ("Meadowbrook"), alleging
the 
tort 
of 
outrage, 
Meadowbrook 
and 
Francis 
Powell
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "the petitioners")
petition this Court for writs of mandamus directing the Clarke
Circuit Court to vacate its order compelling the petitioners
to produce documents from the claims file of Meadowbrook and
from the litigation file of William E. Pipkin, Jr., the
petitioners' attorney, which files were originated in regard
to Andrews's earlier worker's compensation action against his
employer, Francis Powell.  We deny the petitions.
I. Factual Background
The factual allegations of this dispute as of June 23,
2005, when Andrews sued the petitioners alleging the tort of
outrage, are set out in the complaint:
1061493 and 1061592
3
"2. [Meadowbrook] is a Michigan corporation
doing business in the state of Alabama that provides
risk 
management 
services. 
 
In 
that 
regard,
Meadowbrook administers, manages, and provides claim
services to the Alabama Forest Production Industry
Worker's Compensation Fund, which provides worker's
compensation coverage to [Francis Powell].
"....
"5. On or about November 3, 2003, [Andrews] was
severely and permanently injured by an on-the-job
accident while working for [Francis Powell] as a
truck driver. ...
"6. Following his ... accident injuring his back
and left leg, [Andrews] received medical treatment
from numerous doctors, which included surgery. ...
[From] the date of his injury and up until May 31,
2005, 
Meadowbrook 
... 
paid 
[Andrews] 
weekly
temporary total disability benefits based on an
average weekly wage of $704.65.
"7. One of the physicians who provided medical
treatment to [Andrews] is Dr. Edward Schnitzer, a
physical medicine and rehabilitation physician.  On
May 14, 2004, Dr. Schnitzer released [Andrews] to
return to light duty to work with restrictions.  At
that time, Dr. Schnitzer also referred [Andrews] to
see Dr. J. Patrick Couch, a pain specialist, who
[Andrews] began seeing soon after his release from
Dr. Schnitzer.  [Andrews] is currently being treated
by Dr. Couch.
"8. [Andrews] filed a worker's compensation
lawsuit against [Francis Powell] on April 30, 2004.
"9. On or about May 25, 2004, [Andrews]
attempted to return to work at [Francis Powell], but
was told that the company had no light duty work for
him to perform.  Thereafter, Meadowbrook continued
1061493 and 1061592
According to Meadowbrook, Pipkin has served, and
1
continues to serve, as legal counsel for both it and Francis
Powell "with regard to the worker's compensation case."
4
to 
pay 
[Andrews's] temporary total disability
benefits.
"10. Since being released by Dr. Schnitzer in
May 
2004, 
[Andrews's] 
medical 
condition 
has
continued to deteriorate.  [He] continues to suffer
from severe pain, has no feeling in his leg below
his knee and is being treated for fecal incontinence
by Dr. Keith Lloyd in Birmingham.  Dr. Couch is
treating [Andrews] as his primary physician and is
of the opinion that [he] is not able to return to
work. ...
"11. On or about April 15, 2005, Denise Arnold,
on behalf of ... Meadowbrook, sent a medical
questionnaire to Dr. Schnitzer, who had not treated
[Andrews] for over one year, requesting information
as to whether [Andrews] had reached maximum medical
improvement 
and 
inquiring 
as 
to 
any 
work
restrictions.  Denise Arnold knew at the time that
[Andrews's] primary treating physician was Dr.
Couch, not Dr. Schnitzer.  Dr. Schnitzer responded
stating that [Andrews] had reached maximum medical
improvement on May 14, 2004, could return to light
duty and listed his restrictions. ...
"12. After receiving a response from Dr.
Schnitzer dated May 16, 2005, William Pipkin ...,
[Francis 
Powell's] 
legal 
counsel 
hired 
by
Meadowbrook to defend [Andrews's] ... worker's
compensation lawsuit, sent Bryan Duhé, Andrews's
counsel in the worker's compensation lawsuit, a
letter dated May 31, 2005, stating that [Andrews's]
temporary total disability benefits were no longer
being provided because Dr. Schnitzer had determined
that 
[Andrews] 
had 
'reached 
maximum 
medical
improvement 
....' 
 
Pipkin 
also 
requested 
a
settlement demand from [Andrews].[1]
1061493 and 1061592
Meadowbrook's petition, at 1.  Pipkin does not represent
Francis Powell or Meadowbrook in the trial court in the under-
lying tort-of-outrage case.  According to Francis Powell,
Meadowbrook is a "service company for a self-insurer," namely,
Francis Powell, and, consequently, is also an "employer," as
that term is defined in Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-1(4).  Francis
Powell's petition, at 14.  Francis Powell gave Meadowbrook
"authority to obtain professional legal services or to act on
legal advice rendered on behalf of [Francis Powell]," within
the meaning of Ala. R. Evid. 502(a)(2).  Francis Powell's
petition, at 15.
5
"13. Immediately 
after 
receiving 
the 
letter, 
Mr.
Duhé contacted Mr. Pipkin and informed him that Dr.
Schnitzer had not treated [Andrews] for over a year
and that Dr. Couch was [Andrews's] primary treating
physician, that Dr. Couch was still treating
[Andrews], that Dr. Couch had not released [Andrews]
to return to work, and that [Andrews] had not
reached maximum medical improvement according to Dr.
Couch.  Pipkin responded that Meadowbrook had made
its decision as to how it was handling the matter;
it 
wanted 
to 
settle 
[Andrews's] 
worker's
compensation claim and was not going to continue
temporary total disability benefits."
(Emphasis added.)
The complaint alleged that Francis Powell and Meadowbrook
"refuse[d] [Andrews] temporary total disability benefits in an
effort to coerce [him] into a settlement of his worker's
compensation claim."  According to the complaint, Francis
Powell and Meadowbrook "committed the tort of outrage by
engaging in an unlawful mental and financial assault on
[Andrews] with the intent to cause [him] severe emotional
1061493 and 1061592
6
distress."  (Emphasis added.)  Andrews sought compensatory and
punitive damages.
Andrews served Meadowbrook with a copy of the complaint,
which was accompanied by interrogatories and a request for
production of documents.  One interrogatory requested "the
name, address and position of employment of each and every
person involved in the decision to terminate [Andrews's]
temporary total disability benefits in May 2005."  Andrews
also requested the "entire claims file relating to [Andrews's]
worker's compensation claim, including, but not limited to,
medical 
records, 
medical 
bills, 
checks, 
correspondence, 
notes,
memorandums, 
adjuster's 
notes, 
e-mail 
transmissions, 
all 
notes
or entries made on any and every computer, claim notes or any
other documents."  
In November 2005, Meadowbrook objected to the production
of its worker's compensation file, stating: 
"[Meadowbrook] objects to the production of
'your entire claims file relating to [Andrews's]
worker's compensation claim ...'  Said file contains
confidential 
and 
privileged 
documents 
and
communications 
between 
[Meadowbrook] 
and 
its
attorneys.  The claims file also contains notations
of mental impressions and confidential notations
made 
in 
anticipation 
and 
furtherance 
[of]
litigation.  All such documents and notations are
privileged."
1061493 and 1061592
7
In response to the interrogatory, Meadowbrook named Pipkin as
one of two persons who were "involved in the decision to
terminate [Andrews's] temporary total disability benefits in
May 2005."
Andrews's 
counsel 
sent 
Meadowbrook's 
counsel 
the
following letter, dated November 4, 2005:
"Thank 
you 
for 
responses 
to 
[Andrews's]
interrogatories and requests for production.  As you
and I discussed yesterday, it is [Andrews's]
position that we are entitled to all correspondence
and e-mails exchanged between Meadowbrook and Bill
Pipkin since Meadowbrook is using advice of counsel
as partial defense.  Please let me know if you are
firm in this position so that I can file a Motion to
Compel to let the judge decide the matter." 
(Emphasis added.)  According to Andrews, Meadowbrook did not
respond to the inquiry regarding its intent to rely on the
advice of counsel as a defense.  
At that time, Andrews also served Pipkin with a subpoena
seeking "[a]ny and all documents contained in [his] file
pertaining 
to 
[Andrews's 
worker's 
compensation 
case],
including, 
but 
not 
limited to, correspondence, notes,
memorandums, e-mail transmissions, phone records, medical
records and summaries, reports, or any other documents."  On
November 18, 2005, Andrews filed a motion to compel
1061493 and 1061592
8
Meadowbrook to produce its claims file.  By correspondence
dated that same day from Andrews's counsel to Meadowbrook's
counsel, Andrews requested a list, as contemplated by Ala. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(5), identifying all materials that were being
withheld under a claim of privilege ("the privilege log").  On
December 28, 2005, the trial court granted Andrews's motion.
On January 9, 2006, Meadowbrook filed a "Motion for
Reconsideration of Motion to Compel 
and 
for 
Protective Order."
In February or March 2006, Francis Powell filed a motion
to quash the subpoena to Pipkin.  On April 26, 2006, after
hearing oral argument, the trial court granted Meadowbrook's
relief and stayed all pending production motions until the
worker's compensation litigation was concluded.  A final
judgment was entered in that case on February 6, 2007.
Subsequently, on March 13, 2007, Andrews filed another
motion, seeking an order compelling Meadowbrook to produce its
claims file and compelling Pipkin to produce Francis Powell's
litigation file.  On April 26, 2007, the trial court scheduled
oral argument on the second motion to compel for June 25,
2007.  However, on May 8, 2007, the trial judge granted the
motion to compel and ordered compliance within 30 days.  
1061493 and 1061592
9
On May 16, 2007, Meadowbrook filed a motion for
reconsideration 
"reassert[ing]" 
the 
arguments 
it 
"presented 
in
its Motion for Reconsideration of Motion to Compel and for
Protective Order, filed ... January 9, 2006, and in response
to [Andrews's] first Motion to Compel."  Similarly, on May 22,
2007, Pipkin filed a "Renewed Objection to Alias Civil
Subpoena 
for Production 
of 
Documents, Motion 
to 
Quash 
Subpoena
and Motion to Reconsider," which expressly adopted "all
responses and objections filed by Meadowbrook."  On June 22,
2007, 
Andrews filed a 
"Response 
and Objection to Meadowbrook's
and Pipkin's Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order Granting
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel."  
The trial court entertained those motions at a hearing on
June 25, 2007, as originally scheduled.  That day, the court
entered 
an 
order, 
stating: 
"[Andrews's] 
response 
and 
objection
to 
Meadowbrook's 
and 
Pipkin's 
motion 
to 
reconsider 
the 
court's
order 
granting 
[Andrews's] 
motion to compel filed by [Andrews]
is hereby DENIED."  However, on July 12, 2007, the trial court
entered 
an 
"Amended 
Order," 
stating: 
"[Andrews's] 
response 
and
objection to Defendants' motion to reconsider the court's
order granting [Andrews's] motion to compel is hereby
1061493 and 1061592
10
sustained and Defendants' motion to reconsider is hereby
denied."  Meadowbrook and Francis Powell filed these
petitions for the writ of mandamus on July 18, 2007, and
August 3, 2007, respectively.
Preliminarily, Andrews contends that the petitions were
not filed within 42 days of the May 8 order and that the
petitioners did not move for a protective order in response to
the May 8 order.  For either reason, Andrews insists, the
petitions are untimely.  We disagree that the petitions are
untimely.
It is true that a petition for a writ of mandamus must
ordinarily be filed within 42 days of the challenged order.
See Ex parte Troutman Sanders, LLP, 866 So. 2d 547 (Ala. 2003)
(a "motion to reconsider" an interlocutory order does not toll
the period in which to file a petition for a writ of
mandamus); see also Ala. R. App. P. 21(a).  Moreover, a
petition challenging an order compelling discovery is timely
only if (1) a protective order is sought, pursuant to Ala. R.
Civ. P. 26(c), within the time set for compliance with the
order, Ex parte Orkin, Inc., 960 So. 2d 635, 640 n.5 (Ala.
2006) (citing with approval Wang v. Hsu, 919 F.2d 130, 131
1061493 and 1061592
11
(10th Cir. 1990)), and (2) the mandamus petition is filed no
more than 42 days after the denial of the protective order.
960 So. 2d at 640.
In this case, however, each petitioner sought a
protective order within 30 days of the May 8, 2007, order.
Specifically, on May 16, 2007, Meadowbrook filed its motion
for reconsideration, which expressly "reassert[ed] the legal
arguments and case precedent ... presented in its [original
motion for protective order filed on January 9, 2006]."
Similarly, on May 22, 2007, Pipkin filed a "renewed objection
to 
the ... subpoena," 
which 
expressly "adopt[ed] 
all responses
and objections filed by Meadowbrook by reference, as if set
forth [there]in."  Those motions were not patently denied
until July 12, 2007, when the trial court entered its "Amended
Order."  Indeed, the May 8, 2007, order was  essentially
vacated, sub silentio, when the petitioners' motions were
argued on June 25, 2007, in lieu of complying with the order.
Additionally, the order entered on June 25 actually favored
the petitioners.  It was not until July 12, 2007, that the
trial court entered an order expressly adverse to the
1061493 and 1061592
12
petitioners.  Consequently, the petitions filed on July 18 and
August 3 are timely.
II. Discussion
At issue in this case, as Andrews concedes, is his right
to "(1) [the] adjuster's claims notes made after Andrews's
worker's compensation case was filed on April 30, 2004, up to
the filing of this case, and (2) correspondence and e-mails
exchanged between Meadowbrook and Pipkin" within that time
period pertaining to the decision to terminate Andrews's
worker's compensation benefits.  Andrews's brief, at 15.  The
petitioners contend that the claims notes are protected under
the work-product doctrine and that the correspondence is
protected under the attorney-client privilege.
A. Standard of Review
"Discovery matters are within the trial court's
sound discretion, and this Court will not reverse a
trial court's ruling on a discovery issue unless the
trial court has clearly exceeded its discretion.
Home Ins. Co. v. Rice, 585 So. 2d 859, 862 (Ala.
1991).  Accordingly, mandamus will issue to reverse
a trial court's ruling on a discovery issue only (1)
where there is a showing that the trial court
clearly exceeded its discretion, and (2) where the
aggrieved party does not have an adequate remedy by
ordinary appeal.  The petitioner has an affirmative
burden to prove the existence of each of these
conditions."
1061493 and 1061592
13
Ex parte Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 872 So. 2d 810, 813 (Ala.
2003).  
Moreover, this Court will review by mandamus only those
discovery matters involving (a) the disregard of a privilege,
(b) the ordered production of "patently irrelevant or
duplicative 
documents," 
(c) 
orders 
effectively 
eviscerating 
"a
party's entire action or defense," and (d) orders denying a
party the opportunity to make a record sufficient for
appellate review of the discovery issue.  872 So. 2d at 813-
14.  The order challenged in this case involving alleged work
product and the attorney-client privilege is reviewable under
category (a). 
B. Work Product
According to the petitioners, "[t]he documents requested
by Andrews fall squarely within the protection provided by
[Ala. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)], as Andrews is seeking information
about 
'the 
mental 
impressions, 
conclusions, 
opinions, 
or 
legal
theories' 
surrounding 
the 
decision 
to 
terminate 
[his] 
worker's
compensation benefits."  Francis Powell's petition, at 16.
Rule 26(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in pertinent part:
"Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of
this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents
1061493 and 1061592
14
and tangible things otherwise discoverable under
subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for
another party or by or for that other party's
representative 
(including 
the 
other 
party's
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer,
or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking
discovery has substantial need of the materials in
the preparation of the party's case and that the
party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means.  In ordering discovery of such materials when
the required showing has been made, the court shall
protect 
against 
disclosure 
of 
the 
mental
impressions, 
conclusions, 
opinions, 
or 
legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of
a party concerning the litigation."
(Emphasis added.)  
Andrews contends that the petitioners have "failed to
meet [their] burden of [showing] that the adjuster's notes are
work product."  Andrews's brief, at 17.  This is so, because,
he argues, the petitioners have presented no evidence
indicating that the claims notes, or anything else in their
files, were "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial."  We agree.
"'Under Rule 26(b)(3), the party objecting to discovery
bears the burden of establishing the elements of the work-
product exception.'"  Ex parte Cummings, 776 So. 2d 771, 774
(Ala. 2000) (quoting Ex parte Garrick, 642 So. 2d 951, 952-53
1061493 and 1061592
15
(Ala. 1994)).  Those elements are "that (1) the materials
sought to be protected are documents or tangible things; (2)
they were prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial;
and (3) they were prepared by or for a party or a
representative of that party."  Johnson v. Gmeinder, 191
F.R.D. 638, 643 (D. Kan. 2000); see also 8 C. Wright, A.
Miller & R. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2024, at
336 (1994).
Once "'the parties are "at issue as to whether the
document[s] sought [were], in fact, prepared in anticipation
of litigation,"'" the objecting party must make "'[a]n
evidentiary showing.'"  Ex parte Cummings, 776 So. 2d at 774
(quoting Ex parte State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 761 So. 2d 1000,
1002-03 (Ala. 2000), quoting in turn Ex parte Garrick, 642 So.
2d at 953) (emphasis added)).  It is Andrews's position -- and
the petitioners do not deny -- that Andrews's motions to
compel placed the parties "at issue" as to whether the claims
file was prepared in anticipation of litigation.
In such a case, "[a] 'blanket claim' as to the
applicability of the work product doctrine does not satisfy
the [objecting parties'] burden of proof."   Disidore v. Mail
1061493 and 1061592
16
Contractors of America, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 410, 413 (D. Kan.
2000).  "'That burden cannot be discharged by mere conclusory
or ipse dixit assertions.'"   Id. (quoting McCoo v. Denny's,
Inc., 192 F.R.D. 675, 680 (D. Kan. 2000)).  Where the record
contains "no affidavits, memorandums, or reports to support
the [objecting parties' contentions]," the court can only
"speculate" as to whether the materials "fall under the work-
product exception."  Ex parte Fuller, 600 So. 2d 214, 216
(Ala. 1992).  See also Nutmeg Ins. Co. v. Atwell, Vogel &
Sterling, a Div. of Equifax Servs., Inc., 120 F.R.D. 504, 510
(W.D. La. 1988) ("A clear showing must be made which sets
forth the items or categories objected to and the reason for
that objection. ... Accordingly, the proponent must provide
the court with enough information to enable the court to
determine privilege, and the proponent must show by affidavit
that precise facts exist to support the claim of privilege.").
In that connection, Francis Powell argues that the
"[p]etitioners 
need 
not 
prove 
that 
there 
was 
any
'anticipation' of litigation, because litigation had already
commenced when these documents were created."  Francis
Powell's reply brief, at 17.  We disagree.
1061493 and 1061592
17
"Where an insurer has a separate and independent
contractual duty to investigate a claim, the insurer must
satisfy the requirements of Rule 26(b)(3)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,]
... by showing more than simply when a document was prepared.
The insurer ... must show why each document was prepared and
how it was used."  Ex parte State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
761 So. 2d 1000, 1004 (Ala. 2000) (Lyons, J., concurring
specially) (emphasis added).  There is a "requirement [in]
Rule 26(b)(3) of a causal relationship between the impending
litigation and the production or use of the documents."  Id.
The inquiry "'"should be whether, in light of the nature of
the document and factual situation in the particular case, the
document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained
because of the prospect of litigation."'" 761 So. 2d at 1002
(opinion of the Court)(quoting Sims v. Knollwood Park Hosp.,
511 So. 2d 154, 157 (Ala. 1987), quoting in turn Brinks Mfg.
Co. v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 1109, 1119 (7th
Cir. 1983)).  Thus, "the purpose for which a party created a
document is the fundamental requirement of the Rule, and
[regardless of whether] litigation is reasonably anticipated,
certain, or even underway, a court must still undertake an
1061493 and 1061592
18
examination of why a document was produced."  Harper v. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co. 138 F.R.D. 655, 661 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (some
emphasis added).  See also Stout v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co.,
150 F.R.D. 594, 597 (S.D. Ind. 1993); Schmidt v. California
State Auto. Ass'n, 127 F.R.D. 182, 184 (D. Nev. 1989)  ("The
majority of cases that have dealt with the issue of whether
investigative 
materials 
prepared 
by 
insurance 
claims 
adjusters
is work-product prepared in anticipation of litigation have
held that since insurance companies have a routine duty to
investigate accidents, such materials are not prepared in
anticipation of litigation but are prepared in the ordinary
course of business absent unique circumstances showing the
contrary.").
In this case, the petitioners had an independent duty to
handle and administer Andrews's worker's compensation claim.
Consequently, they cannot satisfy Rule 26(b)(3) by a blanket
objection to discovery on the basis that the materials sought
are work product.
Meadowbrook also contends that it cannot comply with the
requirement that it present "evidence that the contents of the
adjuster's notes fall within the ... definition of work
1061493 and 1061592
A similar provision is contained in Ala. R. Civ. P.
2
45(d)(2), which deals with discovery from nonparties.  That
section provides: 
"When information subject to a subpoena is withheld
on a claim that it is privileged or subject to
protection as trial preparation materials, the claim
shall be made expressly and shall be supported by a
description 
of 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
documents,
communications, or things not produced that is
sufficient to enable the demanding party to contest
the claim."
19
product privilege .... without disclosing the communication
itself, which is precisely what is sought to be protected."
Meadowbrook's reply brief, at 11-12.  Again, we disagree.
Rule 26(b)(5) states, in pertinent part:
"When 
a 
party 
withholds information otherwise
discoverable under these rules on a claim that it is
privileged or subject to protection as trial-
preparation materials, the claim shall be made
expressly and, upon written request by any other
party, shall be supported by a description of the
nature of the documents, communications, or things
not produced sufficient to enable the demanding
party to contest the claim."
(Emphasis added.)   
2
Compliance with Rule 26 does not obviate the protection
at issue.  As the federal counterpart to Rule 26 provides:
"When 
a 
party 
withholds information otherwise
discoverable by claiming that the information is
privileged or subject to protection as trial-
preparation material, the party must:
1061493 and 1061592
20
"(i) expressly make the claim; and
"(ii) describe the nature of the
documents, 
communications, 
or 
tangible
things not produced or disclosed -- and do
so in a manner that, without revealing
information 
itself 
privileged 
or 
protected,
will enable other parties to assess the
claim."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A).  In other words, these rules
contemplate that an objecting party's showing need not
"reveal[] information itself privileged or protected," but
must include enough information regarding each document for
which the protection is claimed to "enable the court to
determine" the validity of the objections.  That has not been
done in this case.
Here, although Meadowbrook submitted a privilege log
listing 56 documents, there is no information -- of an
evidentiary nature or otherwise -- regarding the circumstances
under which any of those documents was generated or as to
which privilege allegedly applies to which document.  On the
contrary, as to the claims notes, for example, the only
notation on the log as to some 16 "claim note pad[s]" withheld
is that they were allegedly created after Andrews filed his
worker's compensation action.  As noted above, this ground is
1061493 and 1061592
21
legally insufficient, and the record contains nothing of an
evidentiary nature that would allow the court to go beyond
pure speculation as to whether the materials "fall under the
work-product exception."  Ex parte Fuller, 600 So. 2d at 216.
Accordingly, the trial court did not exceed its discretion in
ordering production of the "adjuster's claims notes made after
Andrews's worker's compensation case was filed on April 30,
2004, up to the filing of this case."
C. Attorney-client Privilege
It is undisputed that the "correspondence and e-mails
exchanged between Meadowbrook and Pipkin, [Francis] Powell's
worker's compensation lawyer hired by Meadowbrook," are
subject to the attorney-client privilege.  "The general rule
is that an attorney cannot disclose the advice he gave to his
client about matters concerning which he was consulted
professionally, nor can the client be required to divulge the
advice that his attorney gave him."  Ex parte Great American
Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 540 So. 2d 1357, 1358 (Ala. 1989).  
However, "the attorney-client privilege 'may be waived,
either directly or [indirectly], by the client.'" 540 So. 2d
at 1359 (quoting Swain v. Terry, 454 So. 2d 948, 954 (Ala.
1061493 and 1061592
22
1984) (emphasis added)).  An indirect waiver may occur where
"'the privileged communication is injected as an issue in the
case by the party which enjoys its protection.'"  Ex parte
Malone Freight Lines, Inc., 492 So. 2d 1301, 1303 (Ala. 1986)
(quoting Garfinkle v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 64 F.R.D. 688, 689
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (emphasis added)); see also Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994)
("A defendant may ... waive the privilege by asserting
reliance on the advice of counsel as an affirmative
defense."). 
Andrews 
argues 
that 
the 
petitioners 
have
indirectly waived the attorney-client privilege by injecting
reliance on the advice of Pipkin into their defense to his
tort-of-outrage claim.
A party asserting that he relied on the advice of counsel
must show "that he: (1) made a complete disclosure of the
facts to his attorney; (2) requested the attorney's advice as
to the legality of the contemplated action; (3) received
advice that it was legal; and (4) relied upon the advice in
good faith."  Powers v. Goodwin, 174 W. Va. 287, 291, 324
S.E.2d 701, 705 (1984); see also Delchamps, Inc. v. Bryant,
738 So. 2d 824, 835 (Ala. 1999).
1061493 and 1061592
23
The petitioners argue that no waiver occurred.  They
insist that Meadowbrook's response to the interrogatory naming
Pipkin as one of the two persons who were "involved in the
decision to terminate [Andrews's] temporary total disability
benefits in May 2005" did not suffice to waive the attorney-
client privilege.  With that argument, we agree.
The mere admission "that one relied on legal advice in
making a legal decision [does not] put the communications
relating to the advice at issue."  Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 249 Conn. 36, 54, 730 A.2d 51,  61
(1999).  Instead, the "'determination turns on whether the
actual content of the attorney-client communication has been
placed in issue such that the information is actually required
for the truthful resolution of the issues raised in the
controversy.'"  Ex parte State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 794 So.
2d 368, 375 (Ala. 2001) (quoting Mortgage Guarantee & Title
Co. v. Cunha, 745 A.2d 156, 160 (R.I. 2000)).  Where  advice
of counsel is asserted in defense to culpability for a
decision, the "'[p]laintiff is entitled to all relevant
documents bearing on the decision.'"  Ex parte Malone Freight
1061493 and 1061592
24
Lines, Inc., 492 So. 2d at 1303 (quoting Garfinkle v. Arcata
Nat'l Corp., 64 F.R.D. at 690).
The petitioners' problem here is that waiver is not
predicated upon Meadowbrook's interrogatory answer, but on
evidence that the petitioners affirmatively intend to assert
the advice of counsel in defense of Andrews's tort-of-outrage
claim.  In his correspondence of November 4, 2005, Andrews
expressed his understanding that Meadowbrook intended to rely,
in part,  on Pipkin's advice, and he asked Meadowbrook to
confirm or deny that fact.  Meadowbrook did neither.
Moreover, in his brief in response to these petitions for the
writ of mandamus, Andrews invited the petitioners to disclaim
reliance on Pipkin's advice.  Specifically, Andrews stated:
"[I]t is now time as it was before the trial court for
Meadowbrook to jump off the fence and declare whether advice
of counsel will be asserted as a defense or not in this case."
Andrews's brief, at 24 (emphasis added).  In their reply
briefs, neither petitioner responded to the invitation.
Consistent with their burden to show that the trial court
exceeded 
its 
discretion in compelling production, the
petitioners cannot stand mute as to whether the advice of
1061493 and 1061592
25
counsel is at issue in this action.  For all that appears,
Pipkin's advice is at issue in the claims against both
petitioners, and the petitioners are not entitled to use the
attorney-client privilege "as both a sword and a shield."  Ex
parte Malone Freight Lines, 492 So. 2d at 1303.
III. Conclusion 
For these reasons, the petitioners have failed to
demonstrate that the trial court exceeded its discretion in
compelling production of the adjuster's claims notes and the
correspondence between Meadowbrook and Pipkin.  Consequently,
the petitions are denied.
1061493 -- PETITION DENIED.
1061592 -- PETITION DENIED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and
Murdock, JJ., concur.
See, J., concurs in the result.