Title: William Todd Larimore v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC06-139
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 29, 2009

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-139 
____________ 
 
WILLIAM TODD LARIMORE,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[December 11, 2008] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District 
Court of Appeal in Larimore v. State, 917 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).  The 
district court certified that its decision was in direct conflict with the decision of 
the Second District Court of Appeal in Gordon v. Regier, 839 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2003).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
 
In this case, we interpret the Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually 
Violent Predators Act, sections 394.910-.931, Florida Statutes (2004), commonly 
known as the “Jimmy Ryce Act” (the Act), and conclude that the Act requires that 
 
 
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an individual be in lawful custody when the State takes steps to initiate civil 
commitment proceedings in order for the circuit court to have jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the commitment petition.  For the reasons expressed below, we quash 
the district court‟s decision in Larimore and approve of the Second District‟s 
decision in Gordon.   
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case arises from the First District‟s decision denying Larimore‟s 
petition for writ of prohibition, in which Larimore sought to prevent civil 
commitment proceedings against him by the State pursuant to the Act.  Larimore, 
917 So. 2d at 355.  The facts are summarized in the First District‟s opinion:   
On August 29, 1991, after pleading guilty to lewd and 
lascivious acts on a child under 16 years of age in two separate cases, 
Larimore was sentenced pursuant to the guidelines to 15 years in 
prison in one case followed by five years of probation in the second 
case.  On October 10, 1998, Larimore was released from prison due 
to the award of gaintime, and began serving probation.  On February 
29, 2000, Larimore‟s probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to 
five years in prison.  On August 12, 2002, [the First District] held that 
Larimore was entitled to credit pursuant to Tripp v. State, 622 So. 2d 
941 (Fla. 1993), for the 15 years served on his prison sentence (which 
included both actual prison time served and gaintime) which had the 
effect of erasing his five-year sentence for violating probation.  
Larimore v. State, 823 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).  Shortly 
thereafter, based on the revocation of probation, the Department of 
Corrections forfeited the gaintime (2,830 days) earned on Larimore‟s 
15-year prison sentence, relying on section 944.28(1), Florida 
Statutes.   
On November 23, 2004, the state filed a petition to have 
Larimore declared a sexually violent predator and involuntarily 
committed pursuant to the Jimmy Ryce Act.  However, on December 
 
 
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10, 2004, [the First District] held that Larimore was entitled to 
immediate release from custody because forfeiture of Larimore‟s 
gaintime was not authorized pursuant to section 944.28(1) where 
Larimore‟s offense occurred before the effective date of the 
amendment to section 944.28 authorizing the forfeiture of gaintime 
upon revocation of probation.  Larimore v. Fla. Dep‟t of Corr., 910 
So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), review denied, 905 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 
2005).  Larimore then filed a motion to dismiss the state‟s 
commitment petition under the Jimmy Ryce Act, arguing that he was 
not in lawful custody on the effective date of the Act.  After the trial 
court denied the motion to dismiss, this petition for writ of 
prohibition followed [in the First District].   
 
Larimore, 917 So. 2d at 355.  The district court correctly concluded that even 
though Larimore was not in custody when the Jimmy Ryce Act was enacted, his 
subsequent incarceration in 2000 generally subjected him to application of the Act.  
Id. at 356-57.  However, the district court also concluded that the fact that 
Larimore was not in lawful custody when the commitment petition was filed in 
2004 was not grounds upon which to grant the writ of prohibition.  See id. at 356.  
It is this latter point upon which our decision turns. 
Relying on provisions of the Act that provide that compliance with certain 
requirements and time limitations are not jurisdictional, the district court held that 
“jurisdiction under the amended Act is not conditioned on a person being „in 
custody‟ on the date the petition is filed.”  Id. at 357.  The First District therefore 
concluded that although Larimore was not in lawful custody when the State filed 
its petition on November 23, 2004, id. at 356, the trial court nevertheless had 
 
 
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jurisdiction to adjudicate the commitment petition.  Id. at 358.  The First District 
explained: 
While the Act as amended clearly contemplates that a 
commitment petition should be filed before a person is released from 
total confinement, there is nothing in the Act that provides that the 
petition must be filed before the person‟s release.  Rather, the Act 
clearly states that its time limitations are not jurisdictional and do not 
prevent the state from proceeding pursuant to the Act even if the 
person is released from custody.     
 
Id. at 357.  The First District also certified conflict on this issue with the Second 
District‟s decision in Gordon, in which the Second District concluded that 
proceedings under the Act could not be initiated against a person who was no 
longer held in lawful custody by the State.  Larimore, 917 So. 2d at 357-58.   
The court in Gordon had before it a case in which the individual had been 
released from the custody of the Department of Corrections and was in the civilian 
population when, two days after his release, the State obtained a warrant for his 
arrest in order that commitment proceedings could be filed against him.  Gordon, 
839 So. 2d at 717.  Only after he was placed back into custody did the 
multidisciplinary team make its evaluation and recommendation, after which an 
order of probable cause under the Act was entered.  Id.  Gordon filed a motion to 
dismiss alleging that he “was not in custody for purposes of the Act at the time the 
petition for involuntary commitment was filed.”  Id.  The Second District agreed 
and held that “for the Act to apply, the person must be in custody or in „total 
 
 
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confinement,‟” id., which the court interpreted to mean “that the person in question 
is being held at a secure facility.”  Id. at 718.  The Second District also concluded 
that the seizure of Gordon in order to commence commitment proceedings was 
unlawful and could not qualify as custody for purposes of the Act.  See id. & n.4. 
 
 The Gordon court reasoned that “the Act contemplates that the circuit court 
make a determination prior to the expiration of the incarcerative sentence as to 
whether probable cause exists to hold the person as a sexually violent predator.  
This is consistent with our legal historical precedents requiring a probable cause 
determination prior to a person‟s seizure.”  Id. at 719.  The Gordon court also 
found that section 394.9135 provides a “safety valve for a situation where „the 
anticipated release from total confinement of a person who has been convicted of a 
sexually violent offense becomes immediate.‟”  Id.  As to the jurisdictional 
disclaimer provisions, the Gordon court stated: “We do not interpret subsection (4) 
to mean that the state attorney or the DCF [Department of Children and Family 
Services] may start proceedings against a person who is not in custody, since, as 
stated, that person would not be subject to the provisions of the Act.”  Id. at 720.  
The Second District concluded that “[t]here is no provision in the Act for 
commencing proceedings against a person under the Act where he or she is not in 
custody and is, in fact, living in society.”  Id. at 719.    
 
 
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The First District in Larimore chose not to follow Gordon because, in its 
view, Gordon did not follow the plain statutory language of the Act and could not 
be reconciled with this Court‟s decision in Tanguay v. State, 880 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 
2004).  Larimore, 917 So. 2d at 358.  We conclude, however, that Tanguay does 
not control the analysis in this case and, as explained below, that lawful custody is 
required to initiate Jimmy Ryce proceedings; and further that the provisions of the 
Act relied on by the First District, which state that certain provisions and time 
limitations are not jurisdictional, do not constitute a statutory waiver of the lawful 
custody requirement contained within the overall legislative scheme.  
ANALYSIS 
Larimore asserts that under the terms of the Act a person must be in lawful 
custody for the State to initiate commitment proceedings against that individual.  
Because this issue is a matter of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo.  
See Kephart v. Hadi, 932 So. 2d 1086, 1089 (Fla. 2006).  Because Larimore‟s 
claim is predicated solely upon a construction of the provisions of the Act, we must 
give great deference to the actual language used by the Legislature.     
A court‟s purpose in construing a statute is to give effect to legislative intent, 
which is the polestar that guides the court in statutory construction.  Bautista v. 
State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003).  To discern legislative intent, a court 
must look first and foremost at the actual language used in the statute.  Id. (citing 
 
 
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Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432, 435 (Fla. 2000)).  Moreover, a 
“statute should be interpreted to give effect to every clause in it, and to accord 
meaning and harmony to all of its parts.”  Jones v. ETS of New Orleans, Inc., 793 
So. 2d 912, 914-15 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Acosta v. Richter, 671 So. 2d 149, 153-54 
(Fla. 1996)).  “The doctrine of in pari materia is a principle of statutory 
construction that requires that statutes relating to the same subject or object be 
construed together to harmonize the statutes and to give effect to the Legislature‟s 
intent.”  Fla. Dep‟t of State v. Martin, 916 So. 2d 763, 768 (Fla. 2005).  Similarly, 
“[r]elated statutory provisions must be read together to achieve a consistent whole, 
and . . . „[w]here possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions 
and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.‟”  Heart of 
Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 199 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Woodham v. 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 829 So. 2d 891, 898 (Fla. 2002)). 
We have long recognized that “[i]f a part of a statute appears to have a clear 
meaning if considered alone but when given that meaning is inconsistent with 
other parts of the same statute or others in pari materia, the Court will examine the 
entire act and those in pari materia in order to ascertain the overall legislative 
intent.”  Fla. Dep‟t of Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LLC, 986 So. 2d 
1260, 1265-66 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Fla. State Racing Comm‟n v. McLaughlin, 102 
So. 2d 574, 575-76 (Fla. 1958)).  Equally important is the “elementary principle of 
 
 
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statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, 
phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should 
not be construed as mere surplusage.”  Gulfstream Park Racing Ass‟n v. Tampa 
Bay Downs, Inc., 948 So. 2d 599, 606 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Hechtman v. Nations 
Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So. 2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003)). 
Within the framework of these longstanding principles of statutory 
construction, we will first examine the provisions of the statutes at issue here to 
determine if the legislative intent was to require that a person be in lawful custody 
when steps are taken by the State to commit that person as a sexually violent 
predator.  We will next examine whether any provisions of the Act dispense with 
the custody requirements of the Act and allow Jimmy Ryce proceedings to be 
initiated against a person not in lawful custody.  We will also explore our prior 
precedent in the area of the Jimmy Ryce Act to determine if it is dispositive of the 
issues now before the Court. 
The Jimmy Ryce Act 
The Florida Legislature first passed the Act in 1998, and it went into effect 
on January 1, 1999.  See ch. 98-64, § 24, at 455, Laws of Fla.  As originally 
enacted, the Act appeared in chapter 916, which pertains to mentally ill defendants 
in criminal cases.  See §§ 916.31-.49, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998); ch. 98-64, §§ 1-24, at 
445-55, Laws of Fla.  The Act was later transferred to chapter 394, Florida 
 
 
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Statutes, which pertains to civil mental health commitments.  See ch. 99-222, §§ 1-
29, at 1372-89, Laws of Fla.  Although based on a criminal conviction for a 
sexually violent offense, Jimmy Ryce commitment proceedings have been held to 
be “civil in nature.”  See Mitchell v. State, 911 So. 2d 1211, 1213 (Fla. 2005).  
Even so, we have repeatedly emphasized the procedural safeguards provided by 
the Act that ensure an individual‟s constitutional rights are protected.  In holding 
the Act constitutional in the plurality opinion in Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 
93 (Fla. 2002), we specifically relied on the “range of procedural safeguards to the 
individuals” provided by the Act: 
The parties being subjected to this state action are limited to those 
who have exhibited “past sexually violent behavior and [have] a 
present mental condition that creates a likelihood of such conduct in 
the future if the person is not incapacitated.”  Although the 
individual‟s liberty interest is at stake, that “interest is not absolute” 
and the “individual‟s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding 
physical restraint may be overridden even in the civil context” 
provided that “the confinement takes place pursuant to proper 
procedures and evidentiary standards.”  Confinement under the Ryce 
Act is limited to those individuals who are likely to engage in acts of 
sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term 
control, care, and treatment.  Further, the act provides a range of 
procedural safeguards to the individuals, including the assistance of 
counsel and mental health professionals at commitment proceedings, 
the right to a jury trial, the right to appeal a sexually violent predator 
determination, at least a yearly mental health examination to 
determine whether the person‟s condition has so changed that it is safe 
for the person to be discharged, the right to petition for release, and in 
court hearings for the release of a committed person, the state bears 
the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the 
person‟s mental condition requires continued confinement. 
 
 
 
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Id. at 104-05 (citations and footnotes omitted) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 
U.S. 346, 356-57 (1997)).   
Although Larimore has not raised a constitutional challenge to the Act, 
because the Act can impose on an individual a substantial deprivation of liberty—
one that is of indeterminate duration—our construction of the Act must be 
conducted with due regard to “the basic tenets of fairness and due process.”  State 
v. Atkinson, 831 So. 2d 172, 174 (Fla. 2002).  In this light, we first examine the 
provisions of the Act to determine if the Legislature intended that persons against 
whom civil commitment proceedings are brought must be in lawful custody when 
those proceedings are initiated. 
Custody Under the Act 
As has previously been noted by this Court, as well as by the First District 
Court of Appeal below, the Legislature appears to have specifically contemplated 
that an individual would be lawfully in the State‟s custody when civil commitment 
proceedings are commenced under the Act.  State v. Goode, 830 So. 2d 817, 825 
(Fla. 2002) (“[I]t appears that the Legislature intended that the State would initiate 
commitment proceedings while the inmate is still incarcerated.” (citing § 
394.915(1), Fla. Stat. (1999))); Larimore, 917 So. 2d at 357 (“[T]he Act as 
amended clearly contemplates that a commitment petition should be filed before a 
person is released from total confinement . . . .”).  The Act provides that the 
 
 
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commitment process is initiated by the “agency with jurisdiction.”1  This is done in 
one of two ways—either by giving notice to the multidisciplinary team and state 
attorney under section 394.913(1), Florida Statutes (2004), which begins the 
detailed process under that section, see §§ 394.913(1)-(4), or by transferring the 
individual to the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services upon 
that person‟s “immediate release from total confinement” under section 
394.9135(1), Florida Statutes (2004).  This latter procedure is followed to initiate 
commitment proceedings where it is anticipated that the individual will be 
immediately released from “total confinement” for any reason.   See § 394.9135(1), 
Fla. Stat. (2004).2      
                                          
 
1.  “Agency with jurisdiction” is defined in section 394.912(1), Florida 
Statutes (2004), as follows: 
 
[T]he agency that releases, upon lawful order or authority, a person 
who is serving a sentence in the custody of the Department of 
Corrections, a person who was adjudicated delinquent and is 
committed to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice, or a 
person who was involuntarily committed to the custody of the 
Department of Children and Family Services upon an adjudication of 
not guilty by reason of insanity.   
 
§ 394.912(1), Fla. Stat. (2004).  This definition of “agency with jurisdiction” 
presupposes that the person is in custody.   
  
2.  “Total confinement” is defined in section 394.912(11), Florida Statutes 
(2004), as follows: 
 
[T]he person is currently being held in any physically secure facility 
being operated or contractually operated for the Department of 
 
 
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Section 394.913(1)(a) indicates that the person is to be in custody when 
proceedings are commenced because it specifically provides that the notice must 
be given to the multidisciplinary team and the state attorney at least 545 days prior 
to the person‟s anticipated release from total confinement if the person is in 
custody of the Department of Corrections.3  Notice must be given at least 180 days 
prior to release from a residential commitment if the person is in custody of the 
Department of Juvenile Justice or, where the person has been found not guilty of a 
sexually violent offense by reason of mental incapacity or insanity, from the 
custody of the Department of Children and Family Services.  See § 394.913(1)(b)-
(c), Fla. Stat. (2004).   
                                                                                                                                        
Corrections, the Department of Juvenile Justice, or the Department of 
Children and Family Services.  A person shall also be deemed to be in 
total confinement for applicability of provisions under this part if the 
person is serving an incarcerative sentence under the custody of the 
Department of Corrections or the Department of Juvenile Justice and 
is being held in any other secure facility for any reason. 
 
§ 394.912(11), Fla. Stat. (2004).  
 
3.  Section 394.913(1) provides in pertinent part:  
 
Except as provided in s. 394.9135, the written notice [to the 
multidisciplinary team] must be given:  (a) At least 545 days prior to 
the anticipated release from total confinement of a person serving a 
sentence in the custody of the Department of Corrections, except that 
in the case of persons who are totally confined for a period of less 
than 545 days, written notice must be given as soon as practicable. 
 
§ 394.913(1), Fla. Stat. (2004). 
 
 
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Specifically, section 394.913(1) provides that the agency with jurisdiction 
“shall give written notice to the multidisciplinary team, and a copy to the state 
attorney of the circuit where that person was last convicted of a sexually violent 
offense.”  Subsection (1) further provides that if the person was never convicted of 
a sexually violent offense in Florida, but has been convicted of such an offense in 
another state or federal court, a copy of the notice shall be given to the state 
attorney of the circuit where the person was last convicted of any offense in this 
state.  Subsection (1) provides that if the person is being confined in this state 
pursuant to interstate compact, notice shall also be given to the state attorney “of 
the circuit where the person plans to reside upon release” or, if no residence in this 
state is planned, the state attorney “in the circuit where the facility from which the 
person to be released is located.”  Id. (emphases added).   
Subsection (2) of section 394.913 sets forth the information that the agency 
with jurisdiction must provide to the multidisciplinary team, including information 
such as the individual‟s name, identifying characteristics, criminal history, mental 
health, mental status, and documentation of institutional adjustment.  Subsection 
(2)(e) states that, “[i]f the person was returned to custody after a period of 
supervision, documentation of adjustment during supervision and any treatment 
received” shall be provided to the multidisciplinary team.    
 
 
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Section 394.913(3) provides for establishment of the multidisciplinary team 
or teams, and states that each team shall include at least two licensed psychiatrists 
or psychologists.  Subsection (3) also provides that the assessment and evaluation 
shall include a review of the individual‟s institutional history and treatment record, 
the person‟s criminal background, and any other relevant factor.  Subsection (3)(e) 
provides that within 180 days after receiving notice, there shall be a written 
assessment and recommendation, which shall be provided to the state attorney and 
to the Department of Children and Family Services.  Following the receipt of the 
written assessment and recommendation from the multidisciplinary team, the state 
attorney may file a petition in the circuit court alleging that the person is a sexually 
violent predator.  § 394.914, Fla. Stat. (2004).  Section 394.915(1) then provides 
that upon finding probable cause to believe that an individual is a sexually violent 
predator, “the judge shall order that the person remain in custody and be 
immediately transferred to an appropriate secure facility if the person‟s 
incarcerative sentence expires.”  § 394.915(1), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added).  
Similarly, section 394.9135(3), which applies in cases where the individual 
is in total confinement but subject to immediate release, instructs that upon finding 
probable cause in a proceeding initiated under that section, “the judge shall order 
the person be maintained in custody and held in an appropriate secure facility for 
further proceedings in accordance with this part.”  § 394.9135(3), Fla. Stat. (2004) 
 
 
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(emphasis added).  Section 394.9135 is predicated on the underlying premise that 
the individual is in custody when initial steps are taken in the commitment process, 
addressing what must happen when “the anticipated release from total confinement 
of a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense becomes 
immediate for any reason.”  § 394.9135(1), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added).  
This would occur, for example, where the inmate obtains an order for release from 
an incarcerative sentence.4  Additionally, this section would apply where an inmate 
is about to be immediately released from an incarcerative sentence and the detailed 
procedures of section 394.913 and section 394.915(1)5 have not yet been followed 
to initiate commitment proceedings and retain the person in custody. 
                                          
 
 
4.  This interpretation is confirmed by Senate staff analyses on chapter 99-
222, Laws of Florida, which added section 394.9135.  The Florida Senate 
Committee on Children and Families‟ staff analysis stated that the section 
addresses situations where, “because of unforeseen circumstances, it is anticipated 
that a person‟s release from total confinement will become immediate.  This 
section . . . would assist in dealing with cases such as when inmates successfully 
challenge gain-time and early release statutes and win early judicially mandated 
release from prison.”  Fla. S. Comm. on Child. & Fams., CS for SB 2192 (1999) 
Staff Analysis 25 (Mar. 30, 1999) [hereinafter Child. & Fams. Comm. SB 2192 
Analysis]; see also Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary, CS for SB 2192 (1999) Staff 
Analysis 12 (Apr. 8, 1999) (stating that section 394.9135 “provide[s] an expedited 
involuntary civil commitment process for a person whose release becomes 
imminent due to factors such as successful gain-time challenges and early release 
statutes”) [hereinafter Judiciary Comm. SB 2192 Analysis].  The section is 
intended to assist the Department of Children and Families and state attorneys with 
expediting cases in such circumstances.  Child. & Fams. Comm. SB 2192 Analysis 
at 25; Judiciary Comm. SB 2192 Analysis at 12. 
 
5.  Section 394.915(1) provides: 
 
 
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Section 394.9135(1) provides that where an individual currently in total 
confinement is about to be released, “the agency with jurisdiction shall upon 
immediate release from total confinement transfer that person to the custody of the 
Department of Children and Family Services to be held in an appropriate secure 
facility.”  § 394.9135(1), Fla. Stat. (2004).  This provision allows the 
multidisciplinary team seventy-two hours after this transfer to “assess whether the 
person meets the definition of a sexually violent predator.”  § 394.9135(2), Fla. 
Stat. (2004).  If the multidisciplinary team determines that the person does not 
meet the definition of a sexually violent predator, the person is immediately 
released.  If the team determines that the person does meet the definition, “the team 
shall provide the state attorney . . . with its written assessment and 
recommendation within the 72-hour period or, if the 72-hour period ends on a 
weekend or holiday, within the next working day thereafter.”  Id.  After that, 
within forty-eight hours of receipt of the written assessment and recommendation 
                                                                                                                                        
When the state attorney files a petition seeking to have a 
person declared a sexually violent predator, the judge shall 
determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the 
person named in the petition is a sexually violent predator.  If 
the judge determines that there is probable cause to believe that 
the person is a sexually violent predator, the judge shall order 
that the person remain in custody and be immediately 
transferred to an appropriate secure facility if the person‟s 
incarcerative sentence expires. 
§ 394.915(1), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphases added). 
 
 
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from the team, the state attorney has the option of filing a petition with the circuit 
court alleging that the person is a sexually violent predator.  § 394.9135(3), Fla. 
Stat. (2004).  “If a petition is not filed within 48 hours after receipt of the written 
assessment and recommendation by the state attorney, the person shall be 
immediately released.”  Id.  If a petition is timely filed pursuant to this section and 
the judge determines that there is probable cause, then “the judge shall order the 
person to be maintained in custody and held in an appropriate secure facility for 
further proceedings in accordance with this part.”  § 394.9135(3), Fla. Stat. (2004).  
These provisions of the Act all demonstrate legislative intent that the individual be 
in lawful custody when civil commitment proceedings are initiated.   
 
 
Therefore, as to the question of custody, we conclude that it is clear from a 
reading of all of the related provisions that the legislative intent of the Jimmy Ryce 
Act is that the person is in lawful custody at the time any initial steps are taken in 
the commitment process under either section 394.913 or 394.9135.  There are no 
provisions in the Act that expressly provide or even imply that the State may 
initiate a civil commitment proceeding after a person has been released from 
custody and is living in society.  We will next consider whether any sections of the 
Act constitute a statutory waiver of this custody requirement to allow the state to 
initiate Jimmy Ryce proceedings against an individual who is not in lawful 
custody. 
 
 
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Jurisdiction Under the Act 
Because the First District based its conclusion that custody is not required 
under the Act on sections 394.913(4) and 394.9135(4), Florida Statutes (2003), a 
close examination of the text of those and the other provisions of sections 394.913 
and 394.9135 is required to determine the legislative intent and legal effect of 
subsection (4) of each statute in the context of the entire statute.  We must 
endeavor to ascertain the intent of the entirety of both statutes because all parts of a 
statute must be read together to discern the intent apparent in the whole.  See GTC, 
Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So. 2d 781, 787 (Fla. 2007).  This is in accord with the 
requirement that we “give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related 
statutory provisions in harmony with one another.”  Heart of Adoptions, 963 So. 
2d at 199 (quoting Woodham, 829 So. 2d at 898).  These principles are especially 
applicable here where the disclaimer subsections expressly refer to the provisions 
or time limitations contained in the specific statute of which each subsection is a 
part. 
We will first set forth the actual text of each of the subsections relied upon 
by the district court because “[w]e endeavor to construe statutes to effectuate the 
intent of the Legislature.”  Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 
(Fla. 2006).  We have said many times that “legislative intent is the polestar” that 
guides the Court‟s inquiry and “is determined primarily from the language of the 
 
 
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statute.”  Maggio v. Fla. Dep‟t of Labor & Employment Sec., 899 So. 2d 1074, 
1076-77 (Fla. 2005).  Accordingly, “we begin with the „actual language used in the 
statute.‟”  Continental Cas. Co. v. Ryan Inc. Eastern, 974 So. 2d 368, 374 (Fla. 
2008) (quoting Borden, 921 So. 2d at 595).   
The text of section 394.913(4), Florida Statutes (2004), provides as follows: 
     (4)  The provisions of this section are not jurisdictional, and failure 
to comply with them in no way prevents the state attorney from 
proceeding against a person otherwise subject to the provisions of this 
part. 
 
Section 394.9135(4), Florida Statutes (2004), also relied on by the First District 
Court of Appeal, states: 
     (4) The provisions of this section are not jurisdictional, and failure 
to comply with the time limitations, which results in the release of a 
person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, is not 
dispositive of the case and does not prevent the state attorney from 
proceeding against a person otherwise subject to the provisions of this 
part. 
 
These provisions remain unchanged in the 2008 statutes.   
We first turn to section 394.913(4).  The language of the “jurisdictional 
disclaimer” provision in that section does not make any reference to the inmate 
being out of custody.  The subsection refers only to the fact that the “failure to 
comply” with the “provisions of this part” will not prevent the state attorney from 
proceeding against a person otherwise subject to the statute.  The provisions of the 
section to which the subsection refers involve notice to the multidisciplinary team, 
 
 
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with a copy to the state attorney, of certain details regarding an individual who has 
been convicted of a sexually violent offense, including deadlines for the notice, 
specification of information to be contained in the notice, establishment of the 
multidisciplinary team, deadlines for its written assessment, and other time frames 
to be met by the state attorney.   
The entire statute is predicated on the inmate being in custody, as is 
evidenced by its very title, which includes the words “Notice to state attorney and 
multidisciplinary team of release.”  This is also an appropriate consideration 
because the title of an act is properly considered in determining legislative intent.  
See Horowitz v. Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd. P‟ship, 959 So. 2d 176, 182 (Fla. 
2007).  Based on the text of section 394.913(4) and the provisions contained in the 
larger part to which it refers, we conclude that the provisions of this section for 
which compliance is waived by subsection (4) deal only with time frames for 
notice of the inmate‟s release, the composition, duties and deadlines for the 
multidisciplinary team, and other specific matters relating to the assessment of the 
person—not the fact of the release or status of custody.   
 
 
We now turn to section 394.9135(4).  Even though section 394.9135 is 
replete with references to the individual being in custody, the First District read the 
provisions of section 394.9135(4) to dispense with all custody requirements in the 
section.  A close reading of the actual text of subsection (4), however, shows that it 
 
 
- 21 - 
refers only to “failure to comply with the time limitations, which results in the 
release of a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense.”  § 
394.9135(4), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added).  The time limitations in section 
394.9135 all pertain to actions that occur after the inmate has come into the 
custody of the Department of Children and Family Services directly from his or her 
incarcerative sentence, to be held in a secure facility by that department.  The 
subsection (4) jurisdictional disclaimer, when given a plain reading in the context 
of the entire statute, can refer only to the two sections that provide time 
limitations—subsection (2) (seventy-two hours for the multidisciplinary team to 
make an assessment) and subsection (3) (forty-eight hours for the state attorney to 
file the petition).6  The only time limitation in section 394.9135 that would result in 
                                          
 
6.  The Senate staff analyses support this reading of the section.  The 
Florida Senate Committee on Children and Families‟ staff analysis explains: 
 
If the state attorney does not file a petition within 48 hours after 
receipt of the written assessment and recommendation from the 
team, the person must be immediately released from custody.  
However, simply because a person is released from custody 
because the petition was not filed within 48 hours does not 
mean that it would be dispositive of the case.  Rather, the state 
attorney may still file a petition in the case and follow the 
procedures set out in the act to involuntarily commit a sexually 
violent predator.  It is anticipated that if the person is released 
because the state attorney did not file a petition within 48 hours, 
a person could be taken back into custody and be held in an 
appropriate secure facility until there is a trial verdict if the 
judge finds probable cause on a late-filed petition. 
 
 
 
- 22 - 
release if not met is the requirement that the state attorney file the petition within 
forty-eight hours pursuant to subsection (3).  If the state attorney fails to file the 
petition within forty-eight hours after receipt of the written assessment, and the 
individual is released, subsection (4) would allow the state attorney to file a 
petition after the release.  However, this jurisdictional disclaimer does not come 
into play until after the individual has been kept in secure custody by the 
Department of Children and Family Services, after a multidisciplinary team has 
made an assessment, and after the state attorney has failed to comply with a time 
limitation applicable to the filing of the petition, where that failure has resulted in 
the offender‟s release.  The Legislative intent of section 394.9135(4) appears to be 
a “safety valve” solely to prevent persons from bringing challenges to civil 
commitment proceedings on technical grounds, such as the giving of late notice of 
the anticipated release that is mandated by section 394.9135(1)(a) or the late filing 
by the state attorney.  The status of an inmate who has been lawfully released and 
                                                                                                                                        
Child. & Fams. Comm. SB 2192 Analysis at 25 (emphases added).  Similarly, the 
Florida Senate Committee on Judiciary staff analysis explains:  
 
If the state attorney does not file a petition within 48 hours after 
receipt of the written assessment and recommendation from the 
team, the person must be immediately released from custody. 
However, the state attorney retains the discretion to file a 
petition at any later time against the person subject to the Act. 
 
Judiciary Comm. SB 2192 Analysis at 12 (emphases added). 
 
 
 
- 23 - 
is no longer in custody, where no steps have been taken in the commitment 
process, is no mere technical requirement that the Legislature has indicated is 
waived under subsection (4).  
 
 
Therefore, based on the actual text of the jurisdictional disclaimer, the 
legislative intent of section 394.9135(4) is that the state attorney retains the right to 
file a petition even if the person is released as a result of the state attorney‟s failure 
to comply with the forty-eight hour time limitation after the multidisciplinary team 
has acted.  This is also supported by the title of the section: “Immediate releases 
from total confinement; transfer of person to department; time limitations on 
assessment, notification, and filing petition to hold in custody; filing petition after 
release.”  § 394.9135, Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphases added); see Horowitz, 959 So. 
2d at 182.  Even under the circumstances described in section 394.9135 where the 
person is released as a result of the state attorney‟s failure to comply with the time 
limitations, steps in the commitment proceedings would have already been taken 
while that person was still in custody, pursuant to sections 394.9135(1) and (2).  
Thus, the jurisdictional disclaimer contained in section 394.9135(4) should not be 
extended beyond its actual text to dispense with the custody requirement where no 
steps in the proceedings have been initiated.   
 
Neither section 394.913(4) nor section 394.9135(4) can be read in isolation.  
Rather, all parts of each statute should be read together, as we have endeavored to 
 
 
- 24 - 
do in this analysis, in order to achieve a consistent whole.  GTC, Inc., 967 So. 2d at 
787.  This is in accord with the principle that “[e]very statute must be read as a 
whole with meaning ascribed to every portion and due regard given to the semantic 
and contextual interrelationship between its parts.”  Forsythe v. Longboat Key 
Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Fleischman 
v. Dep‟t of Prof‟l Reg., 441 So. 2d 1121, 1123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)).  This requires 
us, as we have done here, to “look not only to the words themselves but also to „the 
context in which the language lies.‟”  Horowitz, 959 So. 2d at 182 (quoting Miele 
v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 656 So. 2d 470, 472 (Fla. 1995)).    
 
To construe sections 394.913(4) and 394.9135(4) to allow proceedings to be 
initiated after a person has been released from custody and is living in society, 
where no part of the process was begun while the person was in lawful custody, 
would require us to look only at those discrete subsections in isolation; and under 
the construction placed on the provisions by the First District, would also render 
without effect the other, detailed requirements of sections 394.913 and 394.9135.  
This would violate the “basic rule of statutory construction  . . . that the Legislature 
does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that 
would render part of a statute meaningless.”  Goode, 830 So. 2d at 824.  We cannot 
read a statutory subsection in isolation, “but must read it within the context of the 
entire section in order to ascertain legislative intent for the provision.”  
 
 
- 25 - 
ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LLC, 986 So. 2d at 1265.  We conclude that when each 
statutory section is read in context, as a whole, to give effect to every clause, it is 
apparent that the jurisdictional disclaimers contained in the two subsections are not 
intended to and do not waive or dispense with the underlying requirement, 
otherwise clearly present in the Act, that the individual against whom commitment 
proceedings are brought must be in lawful custody when steps are taken to 
commence those proceedings in order for the circuit court to have jurisdiction. 
Tanguay v. State 
 
 
 
The First District also relied on the decision of Tanguay v. State, 880 So. 2d 
533 (Fla. 2004), in reaching its decision in this case and the State relies on 
Tanguay here.  Therefore, we must conduct a careful examination of that precedent 
to determine if it controls our decision in this case.  For the reasons explained 
below, we conclude that Tanguay does not determine the question before the 
Court.   
 
 
In Tanguay, the individual was actually in custody, although the custody was 
found to be unlawful.  In holding that the circuit court had jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the commitment petition under the statute in effect at that time, a 
plurality of this Court in Tanguay stated that there was no “in custody” 
requirement in the applicable statute, specifically section 916.35(1), Florida 
Statutes (Supp. 1998).  880 So. 2d at 537.  That section provided: “If the judge 
 
 
- 26 - 
determines that there is probable cause to believe that the person is a sexually 
violent predator, the judge shall direct that the person be taken into custody and 
held in an appropriate secure facility.”  § 916.35(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998) 
(emphasis added).  In its holding in Tanguay, the plurality Court specifically 
pointed out that it was dealing with a version of the Jimmy Ryce Act that existed 
prior to its amendment in 1999.  Tanguay, 880 So. 2d at 535.  Significantly, the 
statute in effect in Tanguay spoke in terms of the individual being “taken into 
custody,” a provision that does not appear in the text of the current section 394.915 
or 394.9135.  
 
 
In 1999, the Jimmy Ryce Act was moved to chapter 394 and former section 
916.35 was renumbered to section 394.915.  See ch. 99-222, § 9, Laws of Fla.  
Although the title of section 394.915 remained the same, and includes the 
reference to “respondent taken into custody” as did the title to section 916.35, the 
text of section 394.915 was amended and no longer refers to the person being 
“taken into custody.”  Instead, section 394.915 states:   
 
(1)  When the state attorney files a petition seeking to have a 
person declared a sexually violent predator, the judge shall determine 
whether probable cause exists to believe that the person named in the 
petition is a sexually violent predator.  If the judge determines that 
there is probable cause to believe that the person is a sexually violent 
predator, the judge shall order that the person remain in custody and 
be immediately transferred to an appropriate secure facility if the 
person‟s incarcerative sentence expires.  
 
(2)  Upon the expiration of the incarcerative sentence and 
before the release from custody of a person . . . . 
 
 
- 27 - 
 
§ 394.915, Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphases added).  Moreover, former section 916.35 
made no reference to the expiration of the person‟s incarcerative sentence, as does 
the amended version of the statute.7   
 
Section 394.9135 was also added in 1999, providing procedures to be 
followed where the anticipated release of an inmate from total confinement 
becomes immediate for any reason—statutory procedures which were not 
applicable to the Court‟s decision in Tanguay.  See ch. 99-222, § 7, Laws of Fla.  
Since the Legislature added a section providing for special procedures where 
immediate release is anticipated, and amended section 394.915 to state that the 
person “remain in custody” rather than be “taken into custody,” there is no longer 
any statutory basis on which to hold that there is no “in custody” requirement in 
                                          
 
7.  In discussing the effect of a jurisdictional disclaimer contained in section 
916.33, the predecessor statute to section 394.913(4), the Tanguay Court explained 
the provision in terms relating only to the failure to meet certain specified time 
deadlines:  
 
The Legislature expressly provided that the requirements of section 
916.33 are not jurisdictional and that failure to comply with these 
requirements would not prevent the State from proceeding under the 
Act. Id. § 916.33(1).  Therefore, if the State fails to strictly adhere to 
the provisions of this section (i.e., if the State does not provide the 
multidisciplinary team with notice precisely within 180 or ninety 
days, or if the multidisciplinary team fails to provide its 
recommendation within forty-five days), the State may still proceed 
against the person.   
 
Tanguay, 880 So. 2d at 536 (emphasis added).    
 
 
 
- 28 - 
the Jimmy Ryce Act.  Accordingly, Tanguay does not control our construction of 
the 2004 statutes or the jurisdictional disclaimers, first, because section 394.9135 
now clearly spells out what is to occur when an inmate is to be immediately 
released and is expressly premised on the inmate being in custody; second, because 
section 394.915 has been amended to state that the person for whom probable 
cause has been found will “remain” in custody; and finally, because Tanguay was a 
plurality opinion and construed a statute that has now been amended to expressly 
refer to the person being in custody.  
Moreover, it is important to remember that nothing in the Jimmy Ryce Act 
expressly grants a circuit court jurisdiction over a commitment petition filed 
against a person not in lawful custody when the proceedings were initiated.  We 
have previously interpreted the term “custody” as used in the Jimmy Ryce Act to 
mean “lawful custody.”  See Atkinson, 831 So. 2d at 174 (holding that the Jimmy 
Ryce Act is limited to persons who were in lawful custody on its effective date).  
As we stated in Atkinson in interpreting the “applicability” provision of the Act, 
“[a] basic tenet of statutory construction compels a court to interpret a statute so as 
to avoid a construction that would result in unreasonable, harsh, or absurd 
consequences” and “[i]t would be contrary to the basic tenets of fairness and due 
process” to interpret provisions of the Act as requiring only actual custody.”  Id.  
Similarly, interpreting the Jimmy Ryce Act as not requiring lawful custody for 
 
 
- 29 - 
individuals who had been incarcerated at some point after the effective date of the 
Act but are not in lawful custody when commitment proceedings are initiated 
would be contrary not only to the overall intent of the Act but “would be contrary 
to the basic tenets of fairness and due process.”  Id.  Therefore, we will also 
consider, as we did in Atkinson, whether our interpretation of the Act is in accord 
with fairness and due process considerations.   
Due Process Considerations 
In accordance with our precedent, we must read the provisions of the Act 
consistent with basic tenets of fairness and due process.  See Atkinson, 831 So. 2d 
172, 174.  We conclude that our reading of the Act is consistent with due process 
considerations.  The Florida Legislature modeled the Jimmy Ryce Act after 
Kansas‟s similar statutory scheme.  Goode, 830 So. 2d at 821.  In Kansas v. 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), the United States Supreme Court held that 
Kansas‟s Sexually Violent Predator Act “comports with due process requirements 
and neither runs afoul of double jeopardy principles nor constitutes an exercise in 
impermissible ex post facto lawmaking.”  521 U.S. at 371.  A plurality of this  
Court likewise found the Jimmy Ryce Act to be constitutional in Westerheide.  831 
So. 2d at 112 (plurality opinion); id. at 113 (Quince, J., concurring in result only); 
id. at 114 (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
 
 
- 30 - 
Although we upheld the constitutionality of the Jimmy Ryce Act in 
Westerheide, we have repeatedly emphasized the importance of procedural 
safeguards and time constraints within the Act to ensure that an individual‟s 
constitutional rights are protected.  For example, this Court‟s plurality opinion in 
Westerheide noted the “range of procedural safeguards” provided by the Act, 
including the assistance of counsel and mental health professionals, the right to a 
jury trial, the right to appeal, at least an annual review of the person‟s condition, 
the right to petition for release, and the State‟s burden of proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that the person requires commitment.  831 So. 2d at 105; see 
also §§ 394.916(3)-(5), 394.917(1), (3), 394.918, 394.920, Fla. Stat. (2004).   
As repeatedly recognized by the United States Supreme Court, “civil 
commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that 
requires due process protection.”  Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).  
We explained in Goode, “Civil commitment proceedings involve a serious 
deprivation of liberty and, thus, such proceedings must comply with the due 
process clauses of the Florida and United States Constitutions.”  830 So. 2d at 825-
26.  We noted in Goode that under the statutory scheme, “the State would have 
multiple opportunities to initiate and pursue these commitments before the 
respondent‟s criminal sentence expires” and “when circumstances cause a 
 
 
- 31 - 
legitimate delay but the inmate is scheduled to be released, the statute provides that 
a person can still be detained pending trial.”  Id. at 826 & n.8. 
In Mitchell v. State, 911 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 2005), we reiterated a concern we 
expressed in Goode that while “the Legislature intended that „the review process of 
potential sexual predators would be concluded while the person was still in prison‟. 
. . „there is evidence that in practice this is not occurring and that often people are 
being detained for long periods after their scheduled release date without being 
taken to trial.‟”  Mitchell, 911 So. 2d at 1219 (quoting Goode, 830 So. 2d at 825 & 
n.7).  We further “emphasize[d] that the State should make every effort to initiate 
the commitment trial „well in advance of the [detainee‟s] date of release from 
prison[, so that] the due process concerns of commitment beyond imprisonment 
would be substantially alleviated.”  Mitchell, 911 So. 2d at 1219 (quoting Goode, 
830 So. 2d at 826). 
 
Finally, in Kephart v. Hadi, 932 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 2006), we examined the 
Jimmy Ryce Act‟s “numerous safeguards to ensure that a prisoner‟s due process 
rights are protected.”  Id. at 1092.  We explained, “The confinement of an 
individual past the expiration of his or her incarcerative sentence requires 
„scrupulous compliance‟ with the Act‟s requirements.”  Id. at 1093.   
Because the Jimmy Ryce Act, by its express terms, is founded upon the 
concept that the individual be in lawful custody when any portion of the 
 
 
- 32 - 
commitment proceedings are initiated, and because of the due process 
considerations set forth above, we conclude that the Act requires that the individual 
be in lawful custody when commitment proceedings are initiated.8 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis conducted in accord with our longstanding 
principles of statutory construction, we hold that an individual must be in lawful 
custody when the State takes steps to initiate commitment proceedings pursuant to 
the Jimmy Ryce Act in order for the circuit court to have jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the commitment petition.  When effect is given to all the provisions of sections 
394.913 and 394.9135, we conclude that the Legislature clearly intends that the 
individual be in lawful custody when steps are taken to initiate civil commitment 
proceedings under the Act.  This is buttressed by the fact that the Legislature 
amended the Act to provide an expedited procedure where an inmate is to be 
immediately released.  That amendment would not have been necessary if the 
Legislature did not fully intend for the proceedings to be initiated while the inmate 
was still in custody.  We simply cannot construe each jurisdictional disclaimer 
subsection in isolation but must consider the entirety of not only each section but 
                                          
 
 
8.  In this case Larimore‟s entire resentencing was unlawful.  Thus, we do 
not reach the question of whether section 394.9135, Florida Statutes, would allow 
the State to take steps to initiate a commitment proceeding against a person who 
while in lawful custody obtains an order for immediate release for any reason.  
That issue is not before us.   
 
 
- 33 - 
of the Act itself.  After doing so, we find that the jurisdictional disclaimer 
provisions do not waive or dispense with the custody requirements of the Act.    
Accordingly, we quash the decision of the First District in Larimore and 
approve the decision of the Second District in Gordon.  Because Larimore was not 
in legal custody when initial steps were taken to initiate civil commitment 
proceedings against him in this case, the State‟s commitment petition is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice and Larimore shall be immediately released from any 
custody or commitment imposed as a result of the Jimmy Ryce Act proceedings 
that are the subject of this decision.  
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, and LEWIS, JJ., concur. 
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
WELLS, J., dissenting. 
 
I would approve the well-reasoned decision of the First District Court of 
Appeal in this case, which I conclude correctly applied the statute as intended by 
the Legislature. 
 
 
 
 
- 34 - 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D05-3525 
 
 
(Duval County) 
 
Bill White, Public Defender, and Ward L. Metzger, Assistant Public Defender, 
Jacksonville, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Robert R. Wheeler, Assistant Attorney General, 
Bureau Chief Criminal Appeals, and Charles Richey McCoy, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent