Title: County of Dane v. LIRC
Citation: 2009 WI 9
Docket Number: 2006AP002695
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 23, 2009

2009 WI 9 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP2695 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
County of Dane, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Labor and Industry Review Commission and Gloria 
N. Graham, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
2007 WI App 262 
Reported at: 306 Wis. 2d 830, 744 N.W.2d 613 
(Ct. App. 2007-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 23, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 10, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Maryann Sumi   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
filed by Timothy J. Yanacheck and Bell, Gierhart & Moore, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Timothy J. Yanacheck. 
 
For 
the 
defendant-respondent 
Labor 
Industry 
Review 
Commission, there was a brief and oral argument by David A. 
Hart, III, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent Gloria N. Graham, there was a 
brief by Raymond G. Clausen and Clausen & Severson, Madison, and 
oral argument by Raymond G. Clausen. 
 
An amicus curiae was filed by Steven D. Hintzeman, Debra A. 
DeLeers, and Stellpflug Law, S.C., De Pere, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Association for Justice. 
 
 
 
2009 WI 9
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP2695  
(L.C. No. 
2006CV233) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
County of Dane, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Labor and Industry Review Commission and Gloria 
N. Graham, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 23, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a decision 
of the court of appeals1 affirming the circuit court's decision,2 
which affirmed the Labor and Industry Review Commission's (LIRC) 
order directing that Gloria Graham (Graham) is eligible to 
receive a statutory award for permanent disfigurement under 
Wisconsin worker's compensation law, Wis. Stat. § 102.56(1) 
                                                 
1 County of Dane v. LIRC, 2007 WI App 262, 306 Wis. 2d 830, 
744 N.W.2d 613. 
2 The Honorable Maryann Sumi of Dane County presided. 
No. 
2006AP2695   
 
2 
 
(2005-06)3 even though she suffered no visible burns, scars or 
amputations.  In affirming LIRC's interpretation of § 102.56(1) 
and the corresponding award of compensation to Graham, the 
circuit court held that LIRC was entitled to great weight 
deference, while the court of appeals held that due weight 
deference was appropriate.   
¶2 
The dispositive issue in this case is whether the 
result of Graham's workplace injury is compensable under Wis. 
Stat. § 102.56(1).  We conclude that LIRC's interpretation of 
§ 102.56(1) is entitled to no deference due to its inconsistent 
past interpretations that provide no real guidance, but we 
nevertheless affirm LIRC's order directing that Graham is 
eligible to receive an award under § 102.56(1) based on the 
statute's plain meaning as applied to the result of Graham's 
workplace injury.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
The following undisputed facts are based on the 
findings of the administrative law judge (ALJ) that LIRC 
adopted, unless otherwise noted.  Graham began working for Dane 
County as a food service worker at the Dane County Consolidated 
Food Services Kitchen at Badger Prairie on April 23, 2001.  She 
previously had been employed as a cook, a hotel maid, a paper 
delivery person, a textile worker and a companion for elderly 
                                                 
3 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version, unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2006AP2695   
 
3 
 
and disabled persons.  On July 9, 2001, Graham slipped and fell 
on a wet floor while working at the County's kitchen, and her 
leg was twisted behind her back resulting in a significant knee 
injury. 
¶4 
On September 25, 2001, Graham underwent arthroscopic 
surgery and other medical procedures to her knee.  Her post-
operative recovery did not go well, and she was left with 
persistent pain and significant strength loss in her knee.  In 
addition, she suffered a loss of balance and can no longer walk 
without a cane.  Graham now walks with a severely pronounced, 
foot-dragging limp.  She is currently unemployed and is actively 
seeking employment without success. 
¶5 
Dane County agreed to pay Graham temporary disability, 
medical expenses and 25 percent permanent partial disability for 
loss of function at the knee.  Graham also sought to recover 
additional compensation, claiming she had sustained a permanent 
disfigurement under Wis. Stat. § 102.56(1).  Section 102.56(1) 
provides in relevant part: 
If an employee is so permanently disfigured as to 
occasion potential wage loss, the department may allow 
such sum as it deems just as compensation therefor 
. . . .  In determining the potential for wage loss 
and the sum awarded, the department shall take into 
account the age, education, training and previous 
experience 
and 
earnings 
of 
the 
employee, 
the 
employee's 
present 
occupation 
and 
earnings 
and 
likelihood of future suitable occupational change.  
Consideration for disfigurement allowance is confined 
to those areas of the body that are exposed in the 
normal course of employment.  The department shall 
also 
take 
into 
account 
the 
appearance 
of 
the 
disfigurement, its location, and the likelihood of its 
No. 
2006AP2695   
 
4 
 
exposure in occupations for which the employee is 
suited. 
¶6 
Dane County argued that historically, only those 
injuries resulting in visible amputations, scarring or burns 
constituted disfigurements under Wis. Stat. § 102.56(1), based 
on LIRC's decision in Spence v. POJA Heating & Sheet Metal Co., 
Claim No. 88-018562 (LIRC Jan. 20, 1994).  In Spence, LIRC held 
that Spence's limp was not a disfigurement under § 102.56(1) 
because scarring and swelling were visible only when he removed 
his shoe and sock, and that Wis. Stat. § 102.52(12), under which 
Spence 
had 
already 
recovered 
for 
his 
limb's 
loss 
of 
functionality, was the sole avenue of recovery.  Based on 
Spence, Dane County argued that since Graham did not have 
visible 
scarring 
when 
fully 
clothed, 
her 
limp 
was 
not 
compensable as a disfigurement under § 102.56(1). 
¶7 
In 
response, 
Graham 
looked 
to 
an 
earlier 
LIRC 
decision, Jorgensen v. Wisconsin Department of Veterans Affairs, 
Claim No. 84-27383 (LIRC Oct. 10, 1986), for support.  In 
Jorgensen, LIRC held that Jorgensen was disfigured under Wis. 
Stat. § 102.56(1) because she had three separate scars on her 
ankle, had to wear a brace and walked with a limp.  Since this 
would affect Jorgensen's future employability, LIRC awarded 
$10,000 in disfigurement compensation.  Graham argued that 
LIRC's interpretation of the statute in Jorgensen mandated the 
conclusion that her limp be considered a disfigurement.4 
                                                 
4 Graham argued that, as in Jorgensen, her foot-dragging 
limp was a physical manifestation in addition to the limping 
motion. 
No. 
2006AP2695   
 
5 
 
¶8 
After 
considering these arguments, the ALJ made 
findings that LIRC adopted.  The ALJ found that Graham's "walk 
was a mixture of a limp and a foot drag, her legs looked 
imperfect and asymmetrical, and watching her [walk] with such 
difficulty was painful."  In addition, the ALJ found that "[t]he 
look of her legs and her altered gait will negatively affect her 
potential employability and the wage she will earn."  Based on 
these 
findings, 
LIRC 
concluded 
that 
Graham's 
injury 
was 
compensable under Wis. Stat. § 102.56(1), and she was awarded 
$15,000. 
¶9 
LIRC also expressly reversed its decision in Spence, 
reaffirmed its conclusions in Jorgensen and rejected the 
argument that disfigurement awards are limited to visible burns, 
scars and amputations.5  LIRC explained that in tracking the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 102.56(1), the focus of the inquiry 
should be on whether the disfigurement occurs on those areas of 
the body that are exposed in the normal course of employment and 
whether the injury occasions potential wage loss. 
¶10 The circuit court, in reviewing LIRC's decision, 
determined that the commission's interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.56(1) was entitled to great weight deference, even though 
all of the criteria6 necessary for such deference were not 
                                                 
5 One commissioner dissented, and would have reversed the 
ALJ's order based on LIRC's decision in Spence v. POJA Heating & 
Sheet Metal Co., Claim No. 88-018562 (LIRC Jan. 20, 1994). 
6 One missing criterion was that the agency interpretation 
be "one of long standing," which the circuit court acknowledged 
was not present here. 
No. 
2006AP2695   
 
6 
 
present.  Applying this standard of review, the circuit court 
affirmed 
LIRC's order, holding that LIRC's interpretation 
advanced the statute's purpose, was not unreasonable, and was 
not contrary to the plain language of § 102.56(1).  The court 
further supported its conclusion by noting that nothing in 
§ 102.56(1) limits disfigurement awards to those situations 
involving only visible burns, scars or amputations. 
¶11 The court of appeals, in affirming LIRC's and the 
circuit court's decisions, differed from the circuit court in 
its analysis of the level of deference due LIRC's interpretation 
of Wis. Stat. § 102.56(1).  County of Dane v. LIRC, 2007 WI App 
262, ¶18, 306 Wis. 2d 830, 744 N.W.2d 613.  Because LIRC's 
interpretation was not one of long standing, which is a 
prerequisite for great weight deference, LIRC was not entitled 
to great weight deference.  Id., ¶12.  However, the court of 
appeals determined that LIRC's interpretation was entitled to 
due weight deference, because LIRC is the agency charged with 
enforcement of the worker's compensation statute, its change in 
position in classifying a limp as a statutory disfigurement 
under § 102.56(1) was clearly explained, and it acknowledged its 
prior decisions in Jorgensen and Spence.  Id., ¶¶15, 17-18.   
¶12 Applying due weight deference, the court of appeals 
held that LIRC's interpretation was reasonable under the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 102.56(1) and was consistent with the 
statutory purpose.  Id., ¶¶20-24.  In considering whether Dane 
County's interpretation, which relied on Spence, was more 
reasonable, the court of appeals held that it was not, noting 
No. 
2006AP2695   
 
7 
 
that 
there 
was 
no 
basis 
for 
Spence's 
declaration 
that 
disfigurement historically has been limited to visible burns, 
scars or amputations.  Id., ¶26.  Since LIRC's interpretation 
was reasonable, and the County's interpretation was not more 
reasonable, LIRC's interpretation was upheld, and the court of 
appeals affirmed the grant of disfigurement compensation to 
Graham under § 102.56(1).  Id., ¶27. 
¶13 We granted review and now affirm. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶14 In reviewing this worker's compensation claim, we 
review LIRC's decision, not the decisions of the court of 
appeals or the circuit court.  Liberty Trucking Co. v. DILHR, 57 
Wis. 2d 331, 342, 204 N.W.2d 457 (1973).  Here, LIRC interpreted 
Wis. Stat. § 102.56(1).  The construction of a statute and its 
application to undisputed facts are questions of law that we 
generally review independently.  Watton v. Hegerty, 2008 WI 74, 
¶6, 311 Wis. 2d 52, 751 N.W.2d 369 (citing Marder v. Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 286 Wis. 2d 
252, 706 N.W.2d 110).  However, depending on the circumstances, 
an agency's interpretation of a statute is entitled to one of 
the 
following 
three 
levels 
of 
deference: 
 
great 
weight 
deference, due weight deference or no deference.  Clean Wis., 
Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 2005 WI 93, ¶37, 282 Wis. 2d 
250, 700 N.W.2d 768 (citing Hutson v. Wis. Pers. Comm'n, 2003 WI 
97, ¶31, 263 Wis. 2d 612, 665 N.W.2d 212); Tannler v. DHSS, 211 
Wis. 2d 179, 184, 564 N.W.2d 735 (1997).   
No. 
2006AP2695   
 
8 
 
¶15 One 
rationale 
for 
according 
LIRC's 
statutory 
interpretation deference comes from Wis. Stat. § 227.57(10), 
which states that in reviewing an agency's decision, "due weight 
shall be accorded the experience, technical competence, and 
specialized knowledge of the agency involved, as well as 
discretionary authority conferred upon it."  See Racine Harley-
Davidson, Inc. v. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 2006 WI 86, ¶13, 
292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184.  Our past decisions often have 
discussed these three levels of deference:  great weight 
deference, due weight deference and de novo review, which is 
also 
known 
as 
no 
deference, 
when 
examining 
an 
agency's 
interpretation and application of a statute.  UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 
201 Wis. 2d 274, 284, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996); Buettner v. DHFS, 
264 Wis. 2d 700, 708, 663 N.W.2d 282 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing 
Tannler, 211 Wis. 2d at 184). 
¶16 Great weight deference is given to an agency's 
interpretation of a statute if the following four requirements 
are met:   
(1) the agency was charged by the legislature with the 
duty 
of 
administering 
the 
statute; 
(2)[] 
the 
interpretation of the statute is one of long-standing; 
(3)[] the agency employed its expertise or specialized 
knowledge in forming the interpretation; and (4)[] the 
agency's interpretation will provide uniformity and 
consistency in the application of the statute. 
Clean Wis., 282 Wis. 2d 250, ¶39 (quoting Hutson, 263 Wis. 2d 
612, 
¶32). 
 
Under 
great 
weight 
deference, 
the 
agency's 
interpretation will be upheld if it is reasonable, even if there 
are other, more reasonable interpretations.  Id., ¶41. 
No. 
2006AP2695   
 
9 
 
¶17 An agency's interpretation of a statute is entitled to 
due weight deference when "the agency has some experience in an 
area, but has not developed the expertise which necessarily 
places it in a better position to make judgments regarding the 
interpretation of the statute than a court."  Id., ¶42 (quoting 
Hutson, 263 Wis. 2d 612, ¶33).  This intermediate standard of 
review is also based on the recognition that the legislature has 
entrusted the agency with the duty to apply the statute under 
consideration.  Id.  Under due weight deference, we will uphold 
the agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute as long as 
another interpretation is not more reasonable.  Id. 
¶18 Finally, we will give no deference to an agency's 
interpretation of a statute when "the issue before the agency is 
clearly one of first impression . . . or when an agency's 
position on an issue has been so inconsistent as to provide no 
real guidance."  UFE, 201 Wis. 2d at 285.  As we noted above, 
this "level of deference" is often referred to as an independent 
or de novo review of the agency's interpretation of the statute.  
Clean Wis., 282 Wis. 2d 250, ¶43.   
¶19 We note here that there is little difference between 
due weight deference and no deference, since both situations 
require "us to construe the statute ourselves.  In so doing, we 
employ judicial expertise in statutory construction, and we 
embrace a major responsibility of the judicial branch of 
No. 
2006AP2695   
 
10 
 
government, deciding what statutes mean."  Racine Harley-
Davidson, 292 Wis. 2d 549, ¶105 (Roggensack, J., concurring).7 
¶20 Application of the above principles leads us to 
conclude that LIRC is entitled to no deference in this case.  
LIRC's decisions in Spence, Jorgensen and this case apply Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.56(1) 
inconsistently 
to 
very 
similar 
factual 
situations.  Accordingly, by concluding that a limp is, and then 
is not, a disfigurement under § 102.56(1), LIRC demonstrates 
that even though this issue is not one of first impression, its 
decisions provide no real guidance.  As a result, we give no 
deference to LIRC's interpretation.  Clean Wis., 282 Wis. 2d 
250, ¶43; Marten Transp., Ltd. v. DILHR, 176 Wis. 2d 1012, 1019, 
501 N.W.2d 391 (1993); UFE, 201 Wis. 2d at 285.   
B. 
Interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 102.56(1) 
1. 
General principles 
¶21 Statutory interpretation begins "with the language of 
the statute."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
Statutory language "is given its common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning."  Id.  If the statute's meaning is plain, there is no 
ambiguity, and the statute is applied according to its terms.  
Id., ¶46.  However, if a statute "is capable of being understood 
                                                 
7 See also Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Div. of Hearings 
& Appeals, 2006 WI 86, ¶20, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184 
("Under both due weight deference and no deference, the 
reviewing court may adopt, without regard for the agency's 
interpretation, 
what 
it 
views 
as 
the 
most 
reasonable 
interpretation of the statute.").   
No. 
2006AP2695   
 
11 
 
by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses," the 
statute is ambiguous, and we may consult extrinsic sources, such 
as legislative history.  Id., ¶47-48. 
2. 
Statutory disfigurement 
¶22 A statute providing compensation for disfigurement has 
been a part of Wisconsin worker's compensation law since 1915.8  
Though various limitations on recovery have been put in place by 
the original statute and its subsequent amendments, all versions 
have required that the employee be permanently disfigured; 
however, none have defined disfigurement.   
¶23 "[W]ords that are not defined in a statute are to be 
given their ordinary meanings."  Spiegelberg v. State, 2006 WI 
75, ¶19, 291 Wis. 2d 601, 717 N.W.2d 641.  In determining the 
ordinary meaning of undefined words, "[w]e may consult a 
dictionary to aid in statutory construction."  Id.  However, 
consulting a dictionary to ascertain the meaning of undefined 
words in a statute does not mean that those words are ambiguous.  
State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 499-500, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998) 
(citing State ex rel. Smith v. City of Oak Creek, 139 Wis. 2d 
788, 798 n.6, 407 N.W.2d 901 (1987)). 
¶24 Webster defines disfigure as "to make less complete, 
perfect, or beautiful in appearance" and disfigurement as "the 
state of being disfigured."  Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary, 649 (1961 ed.).  The current version of Black's Law 
Dictionary has a similar definition.  It defines disfigurement 
                                                 
8 Wis. Stat. § 2394-9(5)(f) (1915). 
No. 
2006AP2695   
 
12 
 
as "[a]n impairment or injury to the appearance of a person or 
thing."  Black's Law Dictionary 501 (8th ed. 2004).  A more 
contemporaneous version of the same publication from 1933 
defined disfigurement as "that which impairs or injures the 
beauty, symmetry, or appearance of a person or thing; that which 
renders unsightly, misshapen, or imperfect, or deforms in some 
manner."  Black's Legal Dictionary 589 (3d ed. 1933).  This 1933 
definition is a quote from a 1923 opinion of the Illinois 
Supreme Court, wherein it addressed disfigurement under the 
Illinois workmen's compensation law.  Superior Min. Co. v. 
Indus. Comm'n, 141 N.E. 165, 166 (Ill. 1923).  Superior was 
decided only eight years after the Wisconsin disfigurement 
statute's original enactment.  It evidences an interpretation of 
the term, disfigurement, that is contemporaneous with the 
creation of the Wisconsin statute that first employed that same 
term.  We also note that while these definitions may differ to 
some extent, the term, appearance, is a common term in all 
definitions.  
¶25 Accordingly, we conclude that the plain meaning of 
disfigurement 
encompasses 
an 
impairment 
that 
significantly 
affects the appearance of a person.  Though Dane County argues 
that disfigurement awards historically have been limited to 
visible burns, scars and amputations, there is nothing inherent 
in the plain meaning of disfigurement that supports such a 
restrictive interpretation.  Instead, Graham's severe limp and 
foot drag, in combination with the ALJ findings that "her legs 
No. 
2006AP2695   
 
13 
 
looked imperfect and asymmetrical," constitute a disfigurement 
under the plain meaning of the term. 
¶26 However, the statute does not compensate employees for 
all disfigurements.  Rather, there are additional statutory 
requirements that must be satisfied in order to constitute a 
statutory disfigurement.  All the requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.56(1) must be met.  We shall address these additional 
statutory requirements below. 
3. 
Statutory history 
¶27 "A review of statutory history is part of a plain 
meaning analysis" because it is part of the context in which we 
interpret statutory terms.  Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 
2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581; see also 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶52 n.9 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, 
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 
405, 430 (1989)).  The materials reviewed when considering 
statutory history consist of "the previously enacted and 
repealed provisions of a statute."  Richards, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 
¶22.  "By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over 
the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at 
the meaning of a statute."  Id. 
¶28 The first statutory provision to compensate injured 
workers for a disfigurement injury under Wisconsin worker's 
compensation law was enacted in 1915 as Wis. Stat. § 2394-
9(5)(f) (1915), and reads as follows: 
If an employe is seriously permanently disfigured 
about the face or head, the commission may allow such 
No. 
2006AP2695   
 
14 
 
sum for compensation on account thereof, as it may be 
deem just, not exceeding seven hundred fifty dollars. 
As is apparent from the statutory language, only disfigurements 
occurring "about the face or head" were compensable.  Under this 
version, Graham's limp that resulted from a leg injury would not 
satisfy that statutory requirement, and no compensation would be 
available. 
¶29 Subsequent revisions to the statute in 1919 and 1923 
expanded the language to include those disfigurements occurring 
"about the face, head, neck, hand or arm" (emphasis added), and 
no longer required that the claimant be "seriously" disfigured, 
but they also required that disfigurements "occasion loss of 
wage."  See Wis. Stat. § 2394-9(5)(f) (1919); Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.09(5)(fn) (1923).  Despite this expansion of statutory 
disfigurements, Graham's injury would not have been compensable 
because it is not located "about the face, head, neck, hand or 
arm."  
¶30 Following the statute's original enactment in 1915, 
and subsequent revisions in 1919 and 1923, the next major change9 
to the statute occurred in 1971, when the language was amended 
to read as follows: 
If an employe is so permanently disfigured as to 
occasion potential loss of wage, the department may 
allow such sum for compensation on account thereof, as 
                                                 
9 Minor revisions in 1931, 1959, and 1969 made cosmetic 
changes (including renumbering) to the statute, but did not 
affect its central wording.  See Wis. Stat. § 102.56 (1931) 
(renumbering); 
§ 102.56 
(1959) 
(requiring 
a 
showing 
of 
"potential" wage loss); § 102.56 (1969) (relabeling "commission" 
as "department"). 
No. 
2006AP2695   
 
15 
 
it deems just, not exceeding his average annual 
earnings as defined in s. 102.11. 
Wis. Stat. § 102.56 (1971).  Compensation for disfigurement 
under this version of the statute was not limited to any 
particular area of the body.  The only additional statutory 
requirement was that the disfigurement "occasion potential loss 
of wage."  Id. 
¶31 The 1971 version of the disfigurement statute is not 
the current version of the disfigurement statute, however, and 
the subsequent revision in 1978 introduced several additional 
requirements, narrowing the scope of statutory coverage.  The 
current version of Wis. Stat. § 102.56(1), essentially unchanged 
from the 1978 version,10 provides in relevant part: 
If an employee is so permanently disfigured as to 
occasion potential wage loss, the department may allow 
such sum as it deems just as compensation therefor 
. . . .  Consideration for disfigurement allowance is 
confined to those areas of the body that are exposed 
in the normal course of employment.  The department 
shall also take into account the appearance of the 
disfigurement, its location, and the likelihood of its 
exposure in occupations for which the employee is 
suited. 
¶32 The 
statutory history of Wis. Stat. § 102.56(1) 
demonstrates that a statutory disfigurement award is based on 
the permanent appearance of the employee that he or she presents 
to others, which appearance may cause others to believe that the 
                                                 
10 There were two amendments to the statute between 1978 and 
the present that are insignificant for our purposes.  In 1987, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.56 
was 
renumbered 
as 
§ 102.56(1), 
and 
§ 102.56(2) was added.  § 102.56 (1987-88).  In 1999, the word 
"employe" was changed to "employee."  § 102.56(1) (1999-2000). 
No. 
2006AP2695   
 
16 
 
worker is less capable.  It is not based on an actual permanent 
loss 
of 
functionality 
of 
the 
employee's 
body, 
which 
is 
compensated under other statutory provisions such as Wis. Stat. 
§§ 102.52 to 102.555 and Wis. Stat. § 102.565. 
4. 
Requirements of Wis. Stat. § 102.56(1) 
¶33 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.56(1) contains a number of 
requirements that must be satisfied before a claimant may be 
compensated for a statutory disfigurement.  However, contrary to 
the interpretation Dane County urges, none of these requirements 
limit recovery to situations where the claimant's injuries 
consist of visible burns, scars or amputations.  We will not 
read into the statute a limitation the plain language does not 
evidence.  State v. LIRC, 136 Wis. 2d 281, 288, 401 N.W.2d 585 
(1987) ("Worker's compensation acts . . . are not to be 
interpreted in a manner as to transform their intent or to 
change their meaning.") (citing Frisbie v. DILHR, 45 Wis. 2d 80, 
87, 172 N.W.2d 346 (1969)).  Furthermore, rather than adopt an 
interpretation that is more narrow than the plain meaning 
suggests, worker's compensation statutes are "to be liberally 
construed to effectuate their stated purpose."  Id. (citing 
Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v. DILHR, 72 Wis. 2d 26, 37, 240 
N.W.2d 422 (1976)).   
¶34 A purpose of the worker's compensation statute is to 
"provide prompt justice for injured workers and to prevent, as 
far as possible, the delays that might arise from protracted 
litigation."  Bosco v. LIRC, 2004 WI 77, ¶48, 272 Wis. 2d 586, 
681 N.W.2d 157 (quoting Employers Health Ins. Co. v. Tesmer, 161 
No. 
2006AP2695   
 
17 
 
Wis. 2d 733, 738, 469 N.W.2d 203 (Ct. App. 1991)).  As a result, 
an injured employee is guaranteed "recovery irrespective of his 
own fault and irrespective of the employer's absence of fault."  
Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 95 Wis. 2d 173, 180, 290 N.W.2d 
276 (1980).  However, in exchange for this guarantee, the 
employee 
is 
"obliged 
to 
accept 
a 
limited 
and 
scheduled 
compensation award."  Id.  This is the exclusive remedy 
available to the employee against the employer.11  Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.03(2) ("[T]he right to the recovery of compensation under 
this 
chapter 
shall 
be 
the 
exclusive 
remedy 
against 
the 
employer.").  As a result, the statute must be broadly construed 
in order to best promote its statutory purposes.  Johnson v. 
Wis. Lumber & Supply Co., 203 Wis. 304, 310, 234 N.W. 506 
(1931); see also, State v. LIRC, 136 Wis. 2d at 288.  As Johnson 
explained,  
Where an injured workman would, in the absence of the 
act, have a right of action at common law for damages, 
his possible damages are no doubt reduced by the 
application of the act.  On the other hand, in a very 
much larger number of cases, workmen are given 
compensation where at common law they would be 
entitled to none.  The legislature must have weighed 
the benefits and detriments of this situation and made 
the provisions of the law broad and inclusive as it is 
in order to do the greatest good to the greatest 
number, and enjoined upon the courts a liberal 
construction of the act to secure the ends for which 
it was adopted.  
                                                 
11 For claims against third parties see Wis. Stat. § 102.29. 
No. 
2006AP2695   
 
18 
 
Johnson, 203 Wis. at 310.  Accordingly, we must reject Dane 
County's narrow construction of disfigurements as being limited 
to visible scars, burns or amputations. 
¶35 However, although we are to broadly construe worker's 
compensation statutes, we must also interpret the statute's 
language "where possible to give reasonable effect to every 
word, in order to avoid surplusage."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶46.  Here, the statute contains a number of requirements which 
must be satisfied before disfigurement compensation will be 
awarded, and we must give those requirements effect.   
¶36 First, the statute requires that the employee have a 
permanent 
disfigurement.  Second, such disfigurement must 
"occasion potential wage loss . . . tak[ing] into account the 
age, education, training and previous experience and earnings of 
the employee, the employee's present occupation and earnings and 
likelihood of future suitable occupational change."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.56(1).  Third, the disfigurement must occur on an area of 
the body that is exposed during the normal course of employment.  
Id.  Fourth, "the appearance of the disfigurement, its location, 
and the likelihood of its exposure in occupations for which the 
employee is suited" must be taken into account in order to 
determine whether to award compensation.  Id.   
¶37 Based on a consideration of these four requirements, 
compensation will not be available for every disfigurement.  
However, if these requirements are satisfied, the statute's 
plain language requires compensation. 
No. 
2006AP2695   
 
19 
 
 
C. 
Application of Wis. Stat. § 102.56(1) 
¶38 Cognizant of the requirements Wis. Stat. § 102.56(1) 
has put in place, we apply those requirements to Graham.  First, 
we 
have 
already 
concluded 
that 
Graham's 
condition 
is 
a 
disfigurement under that term's plain meaning.  Supra, ¶25.  In 
addition, its permanency has been undisputed. 
¶39 Second, in determining whether Graham's disfigurement 
will occasion potential wage loss, we note that it was 
undisputed that several potential employers refused to hire 
Graham because of her disfigurement.  Furthermore, LIRC found 
that "the look of [Graham's] legs and her altered gait will 
negatively affect her potential employability and the wage she 
will earn."  LIRC considered the "applicant's age, education, 
training, previous work experience, previous earning, [and] 
likelihood of future suitable occupational change" in making its 
findings.  Based on LIRC's factual findings, we conclude that 
Graham's injury is sufficient to "occasion potential wage loss." 
¶40 Third, 
we 
must 
determine 
whether 
Graham's 
disfigurement occurs on an area of the body exposed during the 
normal course of employment.  Again, looking to the findings, we 
note that Graham's "walk was a mixture of a limp and a foot 
drag, her legs looked imperfect and asymmetrical, and watching 
her walking with such difficulty was painful."  The fact that 
Graham's legs look "imperfect and asymmetrical" demonstrates 
that her disfigurement occurs on an area of the body, her legs, 
that is exposed during the normal course of employment.  We 
No. 
2006AP2695   
 
20 
 
note, 
however, 
that 
not 
every 
limp 
will 
satisfy 
this 
requirement, as a limp is merely a motion.  Here the limp was 
combined with a foot drag and "imperfect and asymmetrical" 
looking legs.  This disfigurement was also "exposed in the 
normal course of employment," and viewing her leg-dragging walk 
caused discomfort for the ALJ as he watched Graham walk.  It is 
reasonable 
to 
conclude 
that 
a 
prospective 
employer 
may 
experience the same discomfort, thereby negatively affecting 
Graham's opportunities for employment.  The third requirement is 
satisfied. 
¶41 Finally, "the appearance of the disfigurement, its 
location, and the likelihood of its exposure in occupations for 
which the employee is suited" must be taken into account in 
order to determine whether to award compensation.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.56(1).  Here, Graham's past occupations as a cook, hotel 
maid, paper delivery person and companion for those needing 
assistance involve walking, such that her foot-dragging limp 
will be apparent.  One prospective employer asked her if she had 
multiple sclerosis or if she had suffered a stroke.  In 
addition, 
her 
"legs 
looked 
imperfect 
and 
asymmetrical."  
Therefore, 
Graham's 
disfigurement 
satisfies 
the 
fourth 
requirement. 
 
All 
four 
requirements 
of 
§ 102.56(1) 
are 
fulfilled. 
¶42 In sum, we conclude that Graham has:  (1) a permanent 
disfigurement (2) that will occasion potential wage loss, (3) 
which occurs on an area of the body that is exposed during the 
normal course of employment and (4) that is apparent to current 
No. 
2006AP2695   
 
21 
 
or potential future employers in occupations for which she is 
suited.  Therefore, she has sustained a statutory disfigurement 
that 
satisfies 
all 
of 
the 
requirements 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.56(1).  Accordingly, we affirm the award of $15,000 under 
the provisions of § 102.56(1).12 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶43 The dispositive issue in this case is whether the 
result of Graham's workplace injury is compensable under Wis. 
Stat. § 102.56(1).  We conclude that LIRC's interpretation of 
§ 102.56(1) is entitled to no deference due to its inconsistent 
past interpretations that provide no real guidance, but we 
nevertheless affirm LIRC's order directing that Graham is 
eligible to receive an award under § 102.56(1) based on the 
statute's plain meaning as applied to the result of Graham's 
workplace injury.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
                                                 
12 No party has argued that an award of $15,000 is not 
reasonable if Graham's permanent disfigurement satisfies the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 102.56(1).  Therefore, we have not 
addressed the amount of the award. 
No.  2006AP2695.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶44 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the majority opinion that Graham's workplace injury is 
compensable under Wis. Stat. § 102.56(1).  
I 
¶45 The majority opinion, at ¶36, explains how the 
worker's compensation remedy provided by Wis. Stat. § 102.56(1) 
applies to a limp.  The limp must be a permanent disfigurement.  
It must occasion potential wage loss taking into account the 
age, education, training and previous experience and earnings of 
the employee; the employee's present occupation and earnings; 
and the likelihood of future suitable occupational change.  
Furthermore, the limp must occur on an area of the body that is 
exposed during the normal course of employment.  Finally, the 
Department of Workforce Development must take into account the 
appearance 
of 
the 
disfigurement, 
its 
location, 
and 
the 
likelihood of its exposure in occupations for which the employee 
is suited when determining the award of compensation.   
¶46 Relating to the requirement that a limp occur on an 
area of the body that is exposed during the normal course of 
employment, the majority opinion draws a puzzling distinction 
between a limp that "occurs on an area of the body" (namely the 
leg) and a second kind of limp that is "merely a motion."  
Majority op., ¶40.  The majority opinion does not explain this 
distinction or how to determine whether a limp falls into one or 
the 
other 
category. 
 
Because 
I 
do 
not 
understand 
the 
distinction, I would not adopt it. 
No.  2006AP2695.ssa 
 
2 
 
II 
¶47 Purporting to adopt a plain meaning approach to 
statutory interpretation, the majority opinion states that "'[a] 
review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning 
analysis.'"1  I do not agree that statutory history is part of a 
plain meaning analysis.2 
¶48 A statute's meaning is "plain" when the meaning is so 
readily apparent from the statute's text that inquiry beyond the 
text is unnecessary.3  In seeking a plain meaning, the court 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶27.   
2 A review of repealed statutory provisions is useful 
because "[b]y analyzing the changes the legislature has made 
over time, a court may infer [legislative] intent" that is not 
expressed in the statute's plain text.  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶69, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 
N.W.2d 110 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring) 
(footnote 
omitted).    
See, 
e.g., 
Hughes 
v. 
Chrysler 
Motors 
Corp., 
197 
Wis. 2d 973, 979-82, 542 N.W.2d 148 (1996) ("examin[ing] the 
history of lemon laws in general," as well as the history 
underlying Wisconsin's lemon law statute, to determine whether 
to include the purchase price of the car as pecuniary damages 
under the statute); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739-41 
(2001) (although "[e]ach of the parties [argued] that the plain 
meaning 
of 
the 
[statutory] 
words 
'remedies' 
and 
'available' . . . [was] controlling," statutory history yielded 
an inference of Congressional intent that the statute's words 
did not).   
3 In State v. Peters, 2003 WI 88, ¶14, 263 Wis. 2d 475, 665 
N.W.2d 171, for example, this court characterized the plain 
meaning analysis as follows: "If the language of a statute is 
clear on its face, we need not look any further than the 
statutory text to determine the statute's meaning."  See 
also State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 
WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("[S]tatutory 
interpretation begins with the language of the statute.  If the 
meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the 
inquiry.") (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
No.  2006AP2695.ssa 
 
3 
 
seeks 
a 
meaning 
that 
anyone——a 
lawyer, 
a 
party, 
an 
administrator, or any reader——could discern simply by examining 
the text of the statute, perhaps with the aid of a dictionary, a 
book generally available to all. 
¶49 The majority opinion cites two authorities in support 
of its position that a plain meaning analysis may encompass the 
review of statutory history: Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 
2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581; and State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶52 
n.9, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Neither of the cited 
authorities supports the proposition that the majority opinion 
sets forth.  
¶50 Richards, authored by the author of the majority 
opinion in the present case, cites ¶69 of my concurring opinion 
in Kalal (without noting that the cited paragraph appears in my 
concurrence and not in Justice Sykes' majority opinion) as 
support for the position that a review of statutory history is 
part of the plain meaning analysis.  Richards, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 
¶22.  Nothing in my Kalal concurrence states that statutory 
history is part of a plain meaning analysis.  Rather my Kalal 
concurrence at ¶69 (cited by the Richards court) provides a 
"nonexhaustive 
list 
of 
the 
various 
forms 
of 
'history,'" 
including both statutory history and legislative history, "that 
have been and will be helpful in interpreting a statute."4   
                                                 
4 Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
¶69 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring). 
No.  2006AP2695.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶51 The majority opinion's second reference is to footnote 
9 of the Kalal majority opinion, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶52.  Kalal's 
footnote 9 simply explains the scholarship of Professor Cass 
Sunstein.  Professor Sunstein distinguishes statutory history 
from legislative history and advocates some degree of caution in 
relying upon the latter.  The Kalal majority opinion states 
neither that statutory history is part of a plain meaning 
analysis nor that Professor Sunstein considers statutory history 
to be part of a plain meaning analysis.5 
¶52 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶53 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
                                                 
5 In his article, Professor Sunstein characterizes the 
"plain 
meaning 
approach" 
to 
statutory 
interpretation 
as 
requiring courts to "rely on the words [in a statute] or on 
their ordinary meaning . . . ." Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting 
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 418-19 
(1989).  See also id. at 410, 416 ("[S]ome courts and observers 
see the text or 'plain meaning' of statutory language as the 
exclusive or principal guide to meaning. . . .  Some textualists 
emphasize the 'plain meaning' or dictionary definition of 
statutory terms; others are more sensitive to the particular 
settings. . . .").  Professor Sunstein does not suggest that the 
plain 
meaning 
approach 
to 
statutory 
interpretation 
may 
incorporate a review of statutory history. 
No.  2006AP2695.ssa 
 
 
 
1