Title: Ex parte Victor Chin, M.D., and Sportsmed Orthopedic Specialists, P.C.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1210175
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 5, 2023

Rel:   May 5, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.  
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections 
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023 
____________________ 
 
1210175 
____________________ 
 
Ex parte Victor Chin, M.D., and Sportsmed Orthopedic 
Specialists, P.C.  
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
 
(In re: Malik Landen Woodard 
 
v. 
 
Sentry Insurance et al.) 
 
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-21-902470) 
 
PARKER, Chief Justice. 
 
Victor Chin, M.D., and Sportsmed Orthopedic Specialists, P.C. 
(collectively "the Sportsmed defendants"), are defendants in an action 
 
 
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brought by their patient, Malik Landen Woodard. Woodard alleged that, 
against his wishes, Dr. Chin obtained records of Woodard's prior 
psychological treatment. The Sportsmed defendants seek mandamus 
relief from (1) the Jefferson Circuit Court's order denying their motion to 
change venue based on the Alabama Medical Liability Act, § 6-5-480 et 
seq., Ala. Code 1975, and the Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1987, § 6-
5-540 et seq. (collectively "AMLA"), and (2) the court's order prohibiting 
them from using the psychological records (and certain related 
documents) in the case and requiring them to return or destroy those 
records and documents ("the protective order").1 As to the venue order, 
we deny the petition because the Sportsmed defendants do not argue that 
the complaint did not support an inference that Dr. Chin had no medical 
reason for obtaining the psychological records. As to the protective order, 
we deny the petition because the Sportsmed defendants do not 
demonstrate that the order is subject to mandamus review. 
 
1Dr. Chin and Sportsmed were represented by the same counsel, 
both in the circuit court and before this Court. 
 
 
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I. Facts 
 
The following historical facts are summarized from the facts alleged 
in Woodard's operative complaint, which are taken as true at this 
procedural juncture. See Ex parte Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 712 So. 2d 
733, 734, 736 (Ala. 1998). 
In March 2018, a one-ton battery cabinet that Woodard was 
installing while working fell on him, causing serious crush injuries. 
Woodard was airlifted to a hospital for emergency surgery. Several days 
later, he was transferred to a rehabilitation center.  After his release and 
as part of his follow-up care, he attended therapy sessions with a 
psychologist. 
 
In October 2019, Woodard saw Dr. Chin for pain management. Dr. 
Chin was a licensed physician with Sportsmed Orthopedic Specialists, 
P.C., at its center in Huntsville. At Woodard's first appointment, he 
signed a medical-records-release form generally authorizing other 
health-care providers to release their medical records to Dr. Chin. During 
the appointment, Dr. Chin asked Woodard for consent to obtain records 
of the psychologist's treatment. Woodard said that he did not want Dr. 
 
 
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Chin to obtain them. Nevertheless, Dr. Chin later sought and obtained 
the psychological records from a medical-case manager who had been 
retained by Woodard's employer's workers' compensation insurer.  
Based on Dr. Chin's obtaining the records, Woodard sued the 
Sportsmed defendants in the Jefferson Circuit Court. Woodard asserted 
claims of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, invasion of 
privacy, the tort of outrage, and civil conspiracy. The Sportsmed 
defendants moved to change venue to the Madison Circuit Court, 
pointing out that a section of AMLA, § 6-5-546, Ala. Code 1975, requires 
that "any action for injury or damages … against a health care provider 
based on a breach of the standard of care ... be brought in the county 
wherein ... the alleged breach ... occurred." The court denied the motion. 
 
Woodard moved for a protective order, asserting that the 
psychological records were confidential and privileged. He requested that 
the court prohibit the Sportsmed defendants from disclosing the 
psychological records in discovery or using them at trial or otherwise. He 
further asked the court to order the Sportsmed defendants to return or 
destroy all copies of the psychological records in their possession and any 
 
 
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notes or documents summarizing them. The court granted the motion. 
The Sportsmed defendants now seek mandamus relief from this 
Court. 
II. Standard of Review 
 
"A writ of mandamus will be issued only when (1) the petitioner has 
a clear legal right to it, (2) a respondent has refused to perform a duty, 
(3) there is no other adequate remedy, and (4) the petitioned court has 
jurisdiction." Ex parte Boone Newspapers, Inc., 337 So. 3d 1187, 1189 
(Ala. 2021).  
III. Analysis 
 
The Sportsmed defendants seek relief from two orders: the order 
denying their motion to change venue under AMLA and the protective 
order prohibiting them from using or disclosing the psychological records 
and certain related documents and requiring them to return or destroy 
them. 
A. Venue 
 
A trial court's refusal to change venue is reviewable by mandamus. 
Ex parte Sawyer, 892 So. 2d 898, 901 (Ala. 2004). Ordinarily, we review 
 
 
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the denial of a motion to change venue by assessing whether the trial 
court exceeded its discretion. Ex parte Flexible Prods. Co., 915 So. 2d 34, 
51 (Ala. 2005). Nevertheless, we review questions of law de novo. Ex 
parte Hughes, 51 So. 3d 1016, 1018 (Ala. 2010).  
The Sportsmed defendants argue that the circuit court erred in 
denying their motion to change venue because, they contend, Woodard's 
claims are governed by AMLA, which requires that medical-malpractice 
claims be adjudicated in the county in which the alleged breach occurred, 
§ 6-5-546, Ala. Code 1975. Woodard concedes that, if AMLA applies, then 
the venue motion should have been granted. Thus, the dispositive 
question is whether AMLA applies to Woodard's claims for purposes of 
the venue motion. 
 
AMLA applies to claims (1) against a health-care provider (2) for 
"medical injury" (3) based on a breach of the standard of care. See §§ 6-5-
540, -543(a), -544(a), -546, -548(a), (d), -549, -550, -551; Ex parte 
Vanderwall, 201 So. 3d 525, 537 (Ala. 2015); Ex parte Addiction & Mental 
Health Servs., Inc., 948 So. 2d 533, 535-36 (Ala. 2006); Jenelle Mims 
Marsh, Alabama Law of Damages § 36:45, at 948-49 (6th ed. 2012). 
 
 
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"Medical injury" is harm that occurs "because of the provision of medical 
services," Vanderwall, 201 So. 3d at 537-38 (emphasis omitted). "Medical 
services," in turn, are conduct that the health-care provider has a 
"therapeutic or medical reason," id. at 538, for engaging in.  
Before considering whether Dr. Chin had a therapeutic or medical 
reason for obtaining Woodard's psychological records, we must first 
consider the procedural standard or lens through which this factual 
question must be viewed. This Court has never squarely addressed the 
standard in the context of a motion to change venue. However, a motion 
challenging venue is analogous to a motion challenging personal 
jurisdiction. In both postures, generally the only "facts" before the trial 
court are the allegations of the complaint and the averments of any 
affidavits filed with or in response to the motion. See Wenger Tree Serv. 
v. Royal Truck & Equip., Inc., 853 So. 2d 888, 894 (Ala. 2002) ("'In 
considering a Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss for want of 
personal jurisdiction, a court must consider as true the allegations of the 
plaintiff's complaint not controverted by the defendant's affidavits.'" 
(citation omitted)); 14D Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
 
 
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Procedure § 3826 (4th ed. 2013) ("In ruling [on a motion challenging 
venue], the court will consider to be true any well-pleaded allegations of 
the complaint that bear on venue, unless contradicted by defendant's 
affidavit evidence." (footnote omitted)). In viewing those facts, the court 
"'"must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff."'" 
Wenger, 853 So. 2d at 894 (citations omitted); see 5B Charles Alan 
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1352 (3d 
ed. 2004) ("[In deciding a motion challenging venue,] the court must draw 
all reasonable inferences and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the 
plaintiff." (footnote omitted)).2  
 
Thus, the Sportsmed defendants had two primary options in 
challenging venue. They could argue that, based on the allegations in 
Woodard's complaint, no reasonable inference could be drawn that Dr. 
 
2As an alternative to viewing the facts regarding venue in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, a trial court may hold an evidentiary 
hearing to resolve factual conflicts. See Ex parte Bloodsaw, 648 So. 2d 
553 (Ala. 1994); 14D Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 3826 (4th ed. 2013); see, e.g., Ex parte Reliance Ins. Co., 484 
So. 2d 414, 415-17 (Ala. 1986) (4th ed. 2013); Ex parte Wiginton, 743 So. 
2d 1071, 1072, 1074-75 (Ala. 1999). The circuit court did not do so here. 
 
 
 
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Chin had no medical reason for obtaining Woodard's psychological 
records. Or the Sportsmed defendants could seek to controvert such an 
inference with affidavit evidence that Dr. Chin had a medical reason. 
However, the Sportsmed defendants did neither. They did not submit any 
affidavits, but relied entirely on Woodard's allegations. See Thompson v. 
Greyhound Lines, Inc., Civil Action No. 12-0576-WS-B, Dec. 13, 2012 
(S.D. Ala. 2012) (not reported in Federal Supplement) ("Neither side 
presented affidavits or other evidence [regarding venue], so the Court's 
review is limited to the complaint."). And they did not argue that those 
allegations did not support an inference that Dr. Chin lacked a medical 
reason for obtaining the psychological records.3 
Instead, they argued that AMLA applied because the alleged harm 
occurred during the course of treatment and in the context of a doctor-
patient relationship. That argument thus relied on this Court's previous 
"time and place" test for determining whether a claim is for "medical 
 
3The dissent does make that argument. But we will not grant 
mandamus relief on the basis of an argument that the Sportsmed 
defendants failed to make in the circuit court. See Ex parte American 
Res. Ins. Co., 58 So. 3d 118, 121 n.2 (Ala. 2010). 
 
 
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injury" for purposes of applicability of AMLA. Under that test, a claim 
was for "medical injury" if the alleged conduct occurred "as part of a 
physician's examination and/or treatment of a patient" and thus "during 
the delivery of professional services," Mock v. Allen, 783 So. 2d 828, 833 
(Ala. 2000). Put another way, "medical injury" was present if the conduct 
occurred "during the course of medical treatment" and the claim arose 
"as a direct result of a particular medical treatment," O'Rear v. B.H., 69 
So. 3d 106, 114 (Ala. 2011). For example, the test asked: "Did the alleged 
[conduct] occur within 'the doctor's office or hospital' and did it occur 
'while [the defendant] was providing professional services'?" Vanderwall, 
201 So. 3d at 536. 
In Vanderwall, however, we expressly rejected that "time and 
place" test and overruled Mock and O'Rear. Id. at 534-38. In its place, we 
applied the medical-reason test set forth above: In short, "medical injury" 
is harm that is caused by conduct that the defendant has a "medical 
reason" for engaging in. See id. at 537-38. 
The Sportsmed defendants' reliance on the previous "time and 
place" test is confirmed by the fact that two of the cases on which the 
 
 
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Sportsmed defendants relied referenced that test. See Allred v. Shirley, 
598 So. 2d 1347, 1349 (Ala. 1992) (summarizing Benefield v. F. Hood 
Craddock Clinic, 456 So. 2d 52 (Ala. 1984), as holding that AMLA applied 
because doctors' conduct occurred "'during the course of [the plaintiff's] 
treatment by her physicians' and ... '... [was] inextricably a part of ... 
doctor-patient consultations'" (citation omitted)); Ex parte Sonnier, 707 
So. 2d 635, 638 (Ala. 1997) ("Claims alleging misrepresentations made 
during the course of a doctor-patient relationship are claims of 
malpractice and are governed by the AMLA."). (The other cases on which 
the Sportsmed defendants relied held that AMLA did not apply to a claim 
that arose outside the context of a doctor-patient relationship. See 
Thomasson v. Diethelm, 457 So. 2d 397 (Ala. 1984); George H. Lanier 
Mem'l Hosp. v. Andrews, 901 So. 2d 714, 720-21 (Ala. 2004). Those cases 
did not hold that AMLA does apply to all claims that arise within the 
context of a doctor-patient relationship.) To the extent that those cases 
applied the "time and place" test and thus are inconsistent with 
Vanderwall, we recognize that they have also been overruled. 
In addition, the Sportsmed defendants argue in their petition that 
 
 
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"there was a medical reason behind [Dr. Chin's] request" and that it was 
a "medically-driven decision." That argument could be read as asserting 
that, from the allegations of the complaint, an inference could be drawn 
that Dr. Chin had a medical reason. But that assertion is premised on an 
inversion of the procedural standard. As explained above, all inferences 
from the complaint must be drawn in Woodard's favor, not the Sportsmed 
defendants' favor. Thus, the Sportsmed defendants would need to argue 
that the allegations of the complaint did not support an inference that 
Dr. Chin lacked a medical reason. The Sportsmed defendants do not 
make that argument. 
Further, the Sportsmed defendants seek to distinguish a case relied 
on by Woodard, Ex parte Addiction & Mental Health Services, Inc., 948 
So. 2d 533 (Ala. 2006). There, we held that AMLA did not apply to a 
patient's claims against a residential mental-health facility based on the 
facility's leaving his confidential records on the floor where others could 
see them and the facility's disclosing his confidential treatment 
information to his employer. We concluded that, although the patient's 
claims alleged a breach of a duty derived from the health-care-provider-
 
 
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patient relationship, they did not allege "medical injury." We reasoned 
that the patient primarily alleged economic and reputational harm and 
that, to the extent that he alleged psychological harm, his causes of action 
were only for invasion of privacy, breach of contract, and breach of 
fiduciary duty.  
The Sportsmed defendants seek to distinguish Addiction on two 
grounds. First, the Sportsmed defendants assert that the disclosures in 
Addiction were inadvertent, whereas Dr. Chin's obtaining the 
psychological records was intentional. However, even if the Addiction 
facility's leaving the records on the floor may have been inadvertent, it is 
not clear from the opinion that the facility's disclosure of the patient's 
treatment information to his employer was inadvertent. Second, the 
Sportsmed defendants contend that the Addiction disclosures were to 
nonmedical third parties, without any medical purpose, whereas Dr. 
Chin's request was for another health-care provider's records and was 
made for a medical reason. But it is clear that, in Addiction, the fact that 
the disclosures were made to nonmedical third parties played no role in 
our analysis. And we have already addressed the Sportsmed defendants' 
 
 
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"medical reason" assertion above.  
More importantly, Addiction was decided before Vanderwall 
established that the test for "medical injury" is whether the defendant 
had a "medical reason" for the conduct. Thus, in Addiction we did not 
consider whether the facility had a medical reason for the disclosures. 
Accordingly, both Addiction's reasoning regarding "medical injury" and 
the Sportsmed defendants' grounds for distinguishing Addiction are 
inapposite. 
 
For 
these 
reasons, 
the 
Sportsmed 
defendants 
have 
not 
demonstrated that AMLA applies at this stage of the case. Accordingly, 
they have not demonstrated that the circuit court erred in denying their 
motion to change venue. 
B. Protective Order 
Next, the Sportsmed defendants contend that the circuit court erred 
in entering the protective order. The order prohibited the Sportsmed 
defendants from "disclosing, using, or offering any evidence or argument 
disclosing or summarizing the substance of privileged and confidential 
communications and/or records made during and for the purpose of 
 
 
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[Woodard's] psychological treatment." This prohibition included all 
psychological "communications and information ... [that had] been 
incorporated into the records of any of the Defendants." The prohibition 
applied to all disclosure or use of the described communications and 
records, including in discovery, in matters involving experts, in 
summary-judgment proceedings, and at trial. The order also required the 
Sportsmed defendants to return or destroy all records in their possession 
that "contain[ed], summarize[d] the substance of, or were created in 
conjunction with" the confidential psychological communications. 
Woodard generally opposes the Sportsmed defendants' mandamus 
petition, although he does not oppose the part of the petition challenging 
the return-or-destroy requirement of the protective order. Regardless, 
the Sportsmed defendants have the burden of showing that the order is 
subject to mandamus review, see Ex parte Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 872 
So. 2d 810, 814 (Ala. 2003); Ex parte Encompass Health Corp., 334 So. 
3d 199, 203 (Ala. 2021); cf. Ex parte Tubbs, 585 So. 2d 1301, 1302 (Ala. 
1991) (explaining that jurisdiction to review a mandamus petition cannot 
be conferred by consent of parties). 
 
 
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The Sportsmed defendants argue that the protective order is 
subject to mandamus review because it requires them to destroy Dr. 
Chin's own notes summarizing the contents of the psychological records. 
The Sportsmed defendants assert that those notes show Dr. Chin's 
reasons for obtaining the psychological records and that, without those 
notes, the Sportsmed defendants "cannot properly defend" against 
Woodard's claims. The Sportsmed defendants rely on the following 
statement by this Court that certain types of discovery orders are subject 
to mandamus review: 
"'"'"[A] discovery order may be reviewed by a petition for a 
writ of mandamus [under certain circumstances]. Such 
circumstances [include] ... when the trial court either imposes 
sanctions effectively precluding a decision on the merits or 
denies discovery going to a party's entire action or defense so 
that, in either event, the outcome of the case has been all but 
determined and the petitioner would be merely going through 
the motions of a trial to obtain an appeal[] or ... when the trial 
court impermissibly prevents the petitioner from making a 
record on the discovery issue so that an appellate court cannot 
review the effect of the trial court's alleged error."'"'" 
 
Ex parte Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 279 So. 3d 1129, 1133 (Ala. 2018) 
(citations omitted). 
 
The Sportsmed defendants do not demonstrate that any of those 
 
 
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circumstances is present here. First, they do not show that the protective 
order's requirement to destroy Dr. Chin's notes that summarized the 
psychological records "effectively preclud[es] a decision on the merits" of 
the Sportsmed defendants' defense against Woodard's claims "so that ... 
the outcome of the case has been all but determined and the [Sportsmed 
defendants] would be merely going through the motions of a trial to 
obtain an appeal," id. Although those notes may be relevant to the 
Sportsmed defendants' defense, it is not at all clear from the Sportsmed 
defendants' petition and reply brief that those notes (and any testimony 
based on them) are the only evidence that could be presented at trial to 
show Dr. Chin's reasons for requesting the psychological records. Nor is 
it clear that Dr. Chin's reasons would be the central factual issue at trial; 
it appears that other issues, such as whether Woodard consented to Dr. 
Chin's obtaining the records, could be equally or more significant.4  
 
4The dissent contends that the protective order's destruction 
requirement caused "the outcome of the case [to be] all but determined," 
as to the parts of the complaint that demanded an injunction requiring 
the Sportsmed defendants to return or destroy all copies of Woodard's 
psychological 
records 
and 
communications, 
because 
the 
order 
prematurely awarded that very relief. But that argument for mandamus 
 
 
 
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Second, the Sportsmed defendants do not explain how the order's 
requirement of destroying those notes "denies discovery," id.  
Third, the Sportsmed defendants do not explain how that 
destruction requirement "prevents [them] from making a record on [a] 
discovery issue so that [this Court] cannot review the effect of the [circuit] 
court's alleged error," id. The relevant content of the subject notes is 
obvious from the scope of the destruction requirement itself: The notes 
summarize confidential communications that were documented by the 
psychological records. And in the circuit court, the Sportsmed defendants 
had ample opportunity to put on the record their contentions about the 
nature and legal relevance of the notes. They do not explain why that 
opportunity was insufficient to make a record on this issue. They do not 
assert, for example, that it was necessary for them to be allowed to file 
with the court the notes themselves. 
 
Accordingly, the Sportsmed defendants have not demonstrated that 
 
review is not raised by the Sportsmed defendants, so we do not consider 
it. See Ex parte Drury Hotels Co., 303 So. 3d 1188, 1193 (Ala. 2020) 
("'"[N]o matter will be considered on ... [... mandamus review] unless 
presented and argued in brief."'" (citations omitted; bracketed language 
in Drury)). 
 
 
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the protective order is subject to mandamus review.5 
IV. Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the Sportsmed defendants' 
petition. 
 
5The dissent contends that the protective order is subject to 
mandamus review because it was entered in violation of due process, was 
void, and deprived the Sportsmed defendants of jury-trial rights. 
 
The Sportsmed defendants assert the due-process and jury-trial 
bases but do not support them with any authority. See Ex parte Showers, 
812 So. 2d 277, 281 (Ala. 2001) ("[The mandamus petitioner's] failure to 
cite authority supporting her arguments, as required by Rule 21, [Ala. R. 
App. P.,] provides this Court an ample basis for refusing to consider those 
arguments ...."). Although the dissent attempts to cure that deficiency, 
we have repeatedly stated that we will not do a party's citation-finding 
work, see Ex parte Drury Hotels Co., 303 So. 3d 1188, 1193 (Ala. 2020); 
Jimmy Day Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Smith, 964 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 
2007). 
 
The dissent's argument based on voidness is built on an incorrect 
premise. The dissent implicitly assumes that a preliminary injunction 
entered in violation of Rule 65, Ala. R. Civ. P., is entered without 
jurisdiction and therefore void. But the requirements of Rule 65 are not 
jurisdictional. See 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 2955 (3d ed. 2013) ("A court's failure to comply with the 
prerequisites in Rule 65(d) as to the proper scope or form of an injunction 
or restraining order does not deprive it of jurisdiction or render its order 
void." (footnote omitted)). Noncompliance with Rule 65's requirements 
may be error, but it does not render an injunction void, i.e., void ab initio 
on the basis that it was entered without jurisdiction. 
 
 
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PETITION DENIED. 
 
Mitchell, J., concurs specially, with opinion.  
 
Shaw, Bryan, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., concur in the result, 
without opinions.  
 
Cook, J., dissents, with opinion, which Sellers, J., joins. 
 
 
 
 
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MITCHELL, Justice (concurring specially). 
I read the main opinion to say only that the petitioners have failed 
here to satisfy our mandamus test, not that the unauthorized obtainment 
of medical records by a medical provider could never fall within the scope 
of the Alabama Medical Liability Act, § 6-5-480 et seq. and § 6-5-540 et 
seq., Ala. Code 1975. With that understanding, I concur with the main 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
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COOK, Justice (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent.  First, I believe that venue is improper in 
Jefferson County because, in my opinion, the Alabama Medical Liability 
Act ("the AMLA"), § 6-5-480 et seq. and § 6-5-540 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, 
applies. The substance of Malik Landen Woodard's claims against Victor 
Chin, M.D., and Sportsmed Orthopedic Specialists, P.C. ("the Sportsmed 
defendants") -- not the label of his claims -- determines whether the 
AMLA applies in this case. Woodard's complaint makes clear that Dr. 
Chin sought Woodard's psychological records for the purpose of providing 
him medical treatment and then used them for that purpose.  It is not 
possible to read the complaint and draw any other inference. In fact, 
neither Woodard's answer to the Sportsmed defendants' mandamus 
petition nor the main opinion denies that Dr. Chin was acting for a 
medical reason and was providing medical treatment when he sought and 
used those records.   
Second, I disagree with the main opinion's conclusion that the 
protective order is not subject to mandamus review.  Both parties agree 
that the requirement that the Sportsmed defendants return or destroy 
 
 
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Woodard's psychological records and any documents summarizing the 
contents of those records should be set aside.  Moreover, there is good 
reason that both parties agree.  The trial court had no power, through 
the issuance of a discovery order, to order the return or destruction of 
documents that the Sportsmed defendants possessed before the lawsuit 
began.  Instead, to issue such an order, the trial court was required to 
follow the procedures set forth in Rule 65, Ala. R. Civ. P., regarding the 
issuance of preliminary injunctions.  Here, the trial court issued the 
protective order within hours of the filing of the motion requesting it, 
without providing the Sportsmed defendants the opportunity to file a 
response in opposition to the motion and without complying with the 
provisions of Rule 65.6  In short, the trial court's order is not a "protective 
order."  
Venue 
The main opinion correctly states that if Woodard's claims are 
 
6There is good reason to doubt the authority of the trial court to 
order the destruction of the psychological records, even under Rule 65, 
given that this would seem impossible to correct if the jury later 
determined that Dr. Chin did have proper consent to obtain those records 
and acted reasonably.  However, we need not reach this issue today. 
 
 
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governed by the AMLA, they must be adjudicated in the county in which 
the alleged breach occurred. See § 6-5-546, Ala. Code 1975 ("[A]ny action 
for injury or damages … against a health care provider based on a breach 
of the standard of care … must be brought in the county wherein … the 
alleged breach … occurred.").  The parties appear to agree that the 
actionable conduct in this case occurred in Madison County -- where Dr. 
Chin treated Woodard -- and not in Jefferson County -- where this action 
is now pending.   
In his complaint, Woodard pleaded only common-law claims, 
including fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, invasion of privacy, and breach 
of contract, in connection to Dr. Chin's obtaining his psychological 
records. However, as stated correctly in the main opinion:  
"AMLA applies to claims (1) against a health-care 
provider (2) for 'medical injury' (3) based on a breach of the 
standard of care. See [Ala. Code 1975,] §§ 6-5-540, -543(a),  
-544(a), -546, -548(a), (d), -549, -550, -551; Ex parte 
Vanderwall, 201 So. 3d 525, 537 (Ala. 2015); Ex parte 
Addiction & Mental Health Servs., Inc., 948 So. 2d 533, 535-
36 (Ala. 2006); Jenelle Mims Marsh, Alabama Law of 
Damages § 36:45, at 948-49 (6th ed. 2012). 'Medical injury' is 
harm that occurs 'because of the provision of medical 
services.' Vanderwall, 201 So. 3d at 537-38 …. 'Medical 
services,' in turn, are conduct that the health-care provider 
has a 'therapeutic or medical reason,' id. at 538, for engaging 
 
 
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in."  
 
____ So. 3d at ____ (emphasis added). As further correctly stated in the 
main opinion, the burden of showing that a cause of action is controlled 
by the provisions of the AMLA is on the movant. The main opinion states 
that, in this case, the Sportsmed defendants could have met that burden 
and, thus, demonstrated the need to change venue either (1) by 
presenting affidavit testimony or (2) by arguing that, "based on the 
allegations in Woodard's complaint, no reasonable inference could be 
drawn that Dr. Chin had no medical reason for obtaining Woodard's 
psychological records." ____ So. 3d at ____. I disagree with the main 
opinion's conclusion that the Sportsmed defendants "did neither." ____ 
So. 3d at ____. 
The Sportsmed defendants argued that "there was a medical reason 
behind [Dr. Chin's] request" and that Dr. Chin's decision to obtain the 
psychological records was a "medically-driven decision." Petition at 17, 
19. The materials before this Court show that, in his complaint, Woodard 
alleged the following:  
• At Dr. Chin's office's request, Woodard executed a "Medical 
Records Release," which his office used to obtain the 
 
 
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records. (Emphasis added.)  
• Dr. Chin is a medical doctor, i.e., a licensed physician.  
• Dr. Chin sought records for his medical treatment of 
Woodard.  
• Woodard was under Dr. Chin's medical treatment. 
• Dr. Chin used the records in his treatment of Woodard. ("Dr. 
Chin's notes for his visit with [Woodward] on November 11, 
2019, contain both Dr. Chin's acknowledgment of his receipt 
and review, as well as a summary … [of the psychological 
records]." (emphasis added)).        
I cannot imagine what inference could be drawn from these 
allegations other than that the psychological records were sought, and 
used, by Dr. Chin for a "medical reason" -- i.e., for the purpose of 
providing Woodard with medical treatment.  
The complaint does not allege that Dr. Chin acted for any reason 
other than to provide Woodard with medical treatment.  Further, there 
were no such facts pleaded.  For instance, there are no facts pleaded 
indicating that Dr. Chin had any personal or ulterior motive for obtaining 
Woodard's psychological records. Because, as the main opinion agrees, a 
venue motion can be based upon the allegations in a complaint, it appears 
in this case that Dr. Chin acted because of a "medical reason" and that, 
 
 
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therefore, Woodard's claims arose under the AMLA.  
The main opinion relies heavily on the Ex parte Vanderwall, 201 
So. 3d 525, 537 (Ala. 2015), which abandoned the "time and place" test 
for determining the application of the AMLA.  As both the main opinion 
and I have noted, Vanderwall holds that a "medical injury" is harm that 
occurs "because of the provision of medical services" and that "medical 
services" are conduct that the health-care provider has a "therapeutic or 
medical reason" for engaging in. 201 So. 3d at 537-38 (second emphasis 
added).   
Here, the alleged wrongful conduct by Dr. Chin is his seeking and 
then using the psychological records. Those acts are the "provision of 
medical services."  The records were requested by a medical provider with 
the use of a "Medical Records Release" for the purpose of using them in 
medical treatment, and they were then used for the purpose of medical 
treatment.  Here, the specific wrongful conduct (obtaining and using the 
records) is part of the provision of medical treatment. This is completely 
unlike the facts in Vanderwall, which concerned a sexual assault, where 
there obviously was no medical reason for the alleged wrongful conduct. 
 
 
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Vanderwall did not overrule past precedent in which this Court has 
held that the substance and not the form of the complaint is what 
determines whether an action is governed by the provisions of the AMLA.  
For example, in Allred v. Shirley, 598 So. 2d 1347, 1348-49 (Ala. 1992), a 
case cited by the Sportsmed defendants in their mandamus petition, a 
patient sought treatment from a physician for an ongoing medical 
problem related to the surgical removal and replacement of prosthetic 
implants. When the physician attempted to replace the prosthetic 
implants and the replacements malfunctioned, the physician allegedly 
promised the patient that he would not be responsible for some of the 
costs associated with taking corrective measures. However, when the 
patient was ultimately charged for those costs, he sued the physician, 
asserting tort-of-outrage, conversion, and breach-of-contract claims and 
seeking damages for lost wages, physical and emotional pain, and 
emotional distress. The trial court granted the physician's motion for a 
summary judgment.  
On appeal, this Court addressed whether the patient's complaint 
alleged a claim of medical malpractice and was, thus, governed by the 
 
 
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AMLA. In addressing this issue, this Court first noted: 
"In Benefield v. F. Hood Craddock Clinic, 456 So. 2d 
52 (Ala. 1984), we stated that it is the substance of the action, 
not the form of the action, that determines whether it is a 
medical malpractice action and whether it is, therefore, 
controlled by the provisions of the Alabama Medical Liability 
Act. Id. at 54." 
 
598 So. 2d at 1348-49 (some emphasis in original; some added). This 
Court then explained:  
"[The patient] complains, in substance, about statements 
made about his treatment during the course of treatment, 
i.e., that prostheses were replaced that he says were in fact 
not replaced …. The injuries he alleges flow from the failure 
of treatment and from discussions about his treatment …." 
 
Id. at 1349 (some emphasis in original; some emphasis added). Based on 
the substance of the claims, this Court concluded that the patient had in 
fact pleaded a claim under the AMLA.  
Allred is just one of many Alabama cases holding that the substance 
and not the form of the complaint controls when determining whether 
the AMLA applies. See, e.g., Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Mental Health & 
Mental Retardation, 723 So. 2d 11, 13 (Ala. 1998) (recognizing that this 
Court has held that "'the substance of an action, rather than its form, 
determines whether an action is a medical malpractice action and, 
 
 
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therefore, controlled by the [AMLA]'" (citation omitted)); Ex parte 
Northport Health Serv., Inc., 682 So. 2d 52, 55 (Ala. 1996) (same); and 
Ex parte Golden, 628 So. 2d 496 (Ala. 1993) (same). 
Here, as alleged in Woodard's complaint, the alleged wrongful 
conduct by Dr. Chin is his seeking and then using Woodard's 
psychological records. Those records were requested by a medical 
provider with the use of a "Medical Records Release" for the purpose of 
using them in medical treatment, and they were then used for the 
purpose of providing a patient -- Woodard -- with medical treatment. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the wrongful conduct at issue 
was engaged in for a "medical reason" -- i.e., as part of the "provision of 
medical services," Vanderwall, 201 So. 3d at 537-38 (emphasis omitted), 
and that, like in Allred, the AMLA applies.  
The main opinion dismisses Allred and its holding on the basis that 
Allred applied the "time and place" test and has, therefore, been 
overruled by Vanderwall. I do not agree.  First, the Court in Vanderwall 
neither stated that it was overruling the "substance over form" standard, 
nor stated that it was overruling Allred.  Second, Allred does not even 
 
 
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mention the "time and place" test.  Instead, as demonstrated above, the 
central issue in Allred was whether the substance of the patient's 
complaint alleged a medical-malpractice claim. In reviewing the 
allegations made by the patient, this Court, focusing on the causal 
connection between the medical treatment and the harm to the patient, 
concluded that the patient had alleged such a claim. This Court had no 
reason to address the finer points of such an analysis, which might have 
included a discussion of the "time and place" test.7   
Woodard does not argue that Dr. Chin lacked a "medical reason" for 
seeking and using the records at issue.  Instead, he concedes that, "from 
 
7Even in Benefield v. F. Hood Craddock Clinic, 456 So. 2d 52 (Ala. 
1984), which was quoted in Allred, this Court made clear that it was not 
merely the happenstance that the alleged misrepresentations occurred 
during medical treatment that determined whether the AMLA applied.  
Instead, the key fact was that the alleged misrepresentations were made 
because of medical treatment.  See also Ex parte Golden, 628 So. 2d 496, 
498 (Ala. 1993) (holding that the fraud claim alleged by the plaintiff was 
really a medical-malpractice claim under the AMLA because the 
"substance" of that claim was that the  misrepresentation made to the 
plaintiff induced her to undergo allegedly unnecessary treatment); 
Johnson v. McMurray, 461 So. 2d 775, 778 (Ala. 1984) (holding that a 
fraudulent-concealment claim about participation of one doctor in 
surgery was, in substance, a medical-malpractice claim under the 
AMLA). 
 
 
 
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32 
 
a pure standpoint of the patient's medical prognosis," a medical-care 
provider's "solicitation or disclosure of confidential information could be 
reasonable in a particular case."  Answer at 20 (emphasis in original).  He 
then goes on to argue that Dr. Chin's motive for his actions is not 
determinative of whether the AMLA applies.  Id. at 18.  Woodard argues 
that there is a duty of confidentiality a medical-care provider owes to his 
or her patient that "may supersede the provider's judgment to disallow a 
disclosure [the provider] might reasonably and in good faith think would 
be 'good' for the patient or his condition …." Id. at 20 (emphasis added).  
Thus, Woodard does not dispute Dr. Chin's medical reason for acting.  
Instead, he argues for adding things to the Vanderwall legal standard. 
Specifically, Woodard argues:  
"Dr. Chin's subjective motive in seeking the records is not 
determinative of whether the AMLA applies. Rather, Ex parte 
Addiction[ & Mental Health Servs., Inc., 948 So. 2d 533 (Ala. 
2006),] teaches that what matters is whether the claim at 
issue alleges (1) a 'medical injury' (2) caused by a breach of 
the standard of care, that is, the duty to exercise reasonable 
care, skill, and diligence in rendering medical treatment. 
Even if Dr. Chin considered obtaining the records over 
[Woodard's] objection to have been 'medically driven' for the 
purpose of facilitating 'medical treatment,' it does not logically 
follow: (1) that Dr. Chin's solicitation was itself 'medical 
treatment'; (2) that [Woodard's] claim is based on a breach of 
 
 
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the standard of care; or (3) that [Woodard] suffered 'medical 
injury.'"   
 
Answer at 18 (some emphasis in original; some emphasis added).  
In support of his "standard," Woodard relies upon Ex parte 
Addiction & Mental Health Services, Inc., 948 So. 2d 533 (Ala. 2006).  
However, that case predated Ex parte Vanderwall and therefore could 
not have engrafted extra requirements for a claim to qualify as an AMLA 
claim. Additionally, this alleged standard -- that is, that the "motive" of 
the medical-care provider for engaging in conduct is not enough to trigger 
the AMLA -- is directly contrary to the standard set in Vanderwall 
providing that "medical injury" is harm that occurs "because of the 
provision of medical services" and that "medical services" are conduct 
that the health-care provider has a "therapeutic or medical reason" for 
engaging in.  Id. at 537-38 (second emphasis added). 
Further, the circumstances surrounding Dr. Chin's actions are 
fundamentally different from the circumstances in Ex parte Addiction. 
There, records were disclosed to the plaintiff's employer and left 
unsecured on the floor of a mental-health facility for anyone to see. Here, 
the psychological records were disclosed to a medical-care provider who 
 
 
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34 
 
used them for the purpose of providing medical care to the plaintiff.  
Thus, here, the records were requested and used because of a "medical 
reason."   As Vanderwall held (almost a decade after Ex parte Addiction): 
"From the foregoing, it is clear that the AMLA is not just concerned with 
who committed the alleged wrongful conduct or when and where that 
conduct occurred, but also with whether the harm occurred because of 
the provision of medical services."  201 So. 3d at 537-38.  
Perhaps most troubling, Woodard's new "standard" imposes 
obligations upon Dr. Chin based upon his medical relationship with 
Woodard and his medical decisions but then takes the position that such 
obligations do not trigger the provisions of the AMLA. This is contrary to 
our caselaw, including Vanderwall. This further illustrates why the 
claims are "because of the provision of medical services." Id. (emphasis 
omitted). For example, in his complaint, Woodard alleged as a basis for 
his fraud claim (and his breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim) that, "Dr. Chin 
and [Woodard], as doctor and patient, had a special relationship of trust 
and confidence, giving rise to a duty on the part of Dr. Chin to disclose 
all material facts related to [seeking and using the psychological 
 
 
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35 
 
records]." (Emphasis added.) He further alleged that Dr. Chin's efforts to 
obtain his psychological records were "in breach of Dr. Chin's fiduciary 
obligations to [Woodard] as his physician."  (Emphasis added.) Woodard 
likewise claims that he "entered into a contract for the provision of 
medical care and treatment by Dr. Chin" and then claims that this very 
contract for "medical care" was breached when Dr. Chin obtained his 
psychological records without his consent, thus giving rise to his breach- 
of-contract claim.  (Emphasis added.)  In fact, Woodard even claims that 
at least part of his injury was continuing to see Dr. Chin for medical 
treatment. 
Woodard cannot have it both ways.  He wants to subject Dr. Chin 
to an enhanced duty because the conduct was undertaken for the purpose 
of medical treatment and then wants to disclaim the applicability of the 
AMLA.  He cannot do this.  The standard Dr. Chin must meet "as a 
doctor" and "as a physician" -- i.e., the duty he owes his patient -- is a 
medical standard of care.     
In short, there is simply no way to read the complaint other than to 
conclude that Dr. Chin decided that he needed additional treatment 
 
 
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36 
 
records to guide his treatment of Woodard and then sought and used 
Woodard's psychological records for that purpose.  This case is about a 
treatment decision made by a physician based upon what he believed was 
needed to provide the correct medical treatment to his patient. Whether 
he was mistaken in such an assessment is irrelevant to whether the 
AMLA applies in the present action. For these reasons, I would grant the 
petition as to the venue issue. 
  
Protective Order 
 
As to the second issue -- concerning the protective order -- I disagree 
with the main opinion's reasoning and conclusion.  In his complaint, 
Woodard requested, as final relief, that the psychological records 
obtained and used by Dr. Chin (and any documents summarizing the 
contents of those records) be returned or destroyed.  Later, he filed a 
motion for a protective order, which nominally dealt with discovery 
matters. Without providing the Sportsmed defendants any opportunity 
to respond, the trial court entered an order granting the motion and 
providing the exact relief requested in the complaint.  The trial court 
entered the order the morning after the motion was filed.  I am concerned 
 
 
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for several reasons about the main opinion's acceptance of these 
circumstances in concluding that the order is not subject to mandamus 
review.   
First, I note that both parties have agreed that this aspect of the 
"protective order" should be set aside. The main opinion does not address 
this crucial fact. Alabama courts routinely accept party stipulations (and 
should do so) for the purpose of judicial economy. Although the refusal to 
accept stipulations by parties before this Court might be warranted when 
an impediment, such as a lack of jurisdiction, prevents us from doing so, 
no such impediment exists in this case.8   
Second, contrary to the main opinion's holding, the Sportsmed 
defendants have adequately alleged that they are entitled to mandamus 
relief on this issue. This Court has recognized that (1) due-process 
 
8The main opinion includes a "cf." citation to Ex parte Tubbs, 585 
So. 2d 1301, 1302 (Ala. 1991), for the proposition that "jurisdiction to 
review a mandamus petition cannot be conferred by consent of parties." 
____ So. 3d at ____.  Ex parte Tubbs is fundamentally different from this 
case because it was not a mandamus proceeding from a trial court.  It 
was an original proceeding in this court seeking mandamus relief 
directed to the Alabama Highway Department.  The main opinion cites 
no additional authority for the proposition that providing mandamus 
relief here would be barred based on a lack of jurisdiction.    
 
 
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violations, (2) void orders, and (3) the deprivation of jury-trial rights are 
all issues that can be subject to mandamus review. See, e.g., Ex parte 
Bashinsky, 319 So. 3d 1240, 1263 (Ala. 2020) (granting mandamus 
review because of violation of "procedural due process," which includes 
"'the opportunity to present evidence and argument, representation by 
counsel, if desired, and information as to the claims of the opposing party, 
with reasonable opportunity to controvert them'" (citation omitted));  Ex 
parte Sealy, L.L.C., 904 So. 2d 1230, 1232 (Ala. 2004) (stating that 
"[m]andamus will lie to direct a trial court to vacate a void judgment or 
order"); Ex parte North American Adjusters, Inc., 205 So. 3d 1215,  1216-
17  (Ala. 2016)  (recognizing that mandamus review is appropriate for 
denial of a right to a jury trial). All three such circumstances are present 
in this case.                         
 The "protective order" was issued within hours of Woodard's 
motion being filed. There was no hearing provided and no notice that the 
order would be issued without the Sportsmed defendants' being given an 
 
 
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39 
 
opportunity to respond to the motion.9 The motion was filed at 3:02 p.m. 
on December 9, 2021, and it was granted at 10:29 a.m. the next day -- 
giving the Sportsmed defendants until Christmas Eve to destroy or 
deliver all copies of the psychological records, including any documents 
that summarized those records.10 Under these circumstances, it cannot 
be said that the Sportsmed defendants were afforded due process. 
Therefore, they are entitled to mandamus relief.  
The "protective order" is also a void order, and certainly not a 
discovery order, because the trial court had no authority to issue such an 
order.  A trial court cannot order a party to destroy something it 
 
9For instance, the Sportsmed defendants had no opportunity to 
argue to the trial court that the signed "Medical Records Release" 
authorized their retention of the records. Woodard claims that the 
"Medical Records Release" is not effective for a number of reasons -- e.g., 
because he revoked it; because a portion of the release was blank; because 
he does not believe it covers these types of records; because he did not 
understand it, etc. I make no judgment on the validity of any of those 
arguments; however, to say the least, the validity of the release is a 
disputed issue of material fact at this point, yet the order was entered 
without the opportunity for the Sportsmed defendants to even make that 
argument.  
10Effectively, this order is a destruction order because, based upon 
the briefing, the records appear to be electronic records.   
 
 
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40 
 
possessed before the commencement of a lawsuit absent its issuing an 
injunction in compliance with Rule 65, Ala. R. Civ. P. (or without actually 
adjudicating the claim).  See Ex parte Waterjet Sys., Inc., 758 So. 2d 505, 
507 (Ala. 1999) (after trial court granted preliminary injunction in trade- 
secrets case to, among other things, require former employee to return 
documents allegedly taken when former employee left employment but 
former employee ultimately prevailed at trial, this Court ordered 
injunction bond to be used to pay damages incurred because of issuance 
of preliminary injunction); HB&G Bldg. Prods. Inc. v. Digger Specialties, 
Inc., Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-329-ECM, June 3, 2022 (M.D. Ala. 2022) 
(not reported in Federal Supplement) (issuing preliminary injunction 
requiring defendant to "sequester, isolate, and maintain" allegedly stolen 
information but refusing to order return of information); Pareto Health 
(AL), LLC v. WeCare TLC, LLC, Case No. 2:21-cv-00530-AMM, Apr. 23, 
2021 (N.D. Ala. 2021) (not reported in Federal Supplement) (refusing to 
issue temporary restraining order requiring transfer of "books and 
records" upon ending of vendor relationship and noting that, when a 
"'preliminary injunction goes beyond the status quo and seeks to force 
 
 
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41 
 
one party to act, it becomes a mandatory or affirmative injunction and 
the burden placed on the moving party is increased'" (quoting  Mercedes-
Benz U.S. Int'l, Inc. v. Cobasys, LLC, 605 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1196 (N.D. 
Ala. 2009), citing in turn Exhibitors Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen 
Serv. Corp., 441 F.2d 560, 561 (5th Cir. 1971) (recognizing that, when 
plaintiff requests "a mandatory preliminary injunction, such relief should 
not be granted except in rare instances .…"))). Because the trial court 
lacked any clear authority to issue such an order, the "protective order" 
is void, and, thus, the Sportsmed defendants are entitled to mandamus 
relief.    
Additionally, the trial court has not adjudicated whether Dr. Chin 
has a legal right to the psychological records. There is a jury-trial demand 
in this case.  Disputed factual questions must normally be answered by 
a jury, and the jury must answer them before any order requiring 
destruction of such records.  The United States Supreme Court long ago 
held that a court may not order equitable relief (except on a preliminary 
injunction) before a jury has determined underlying facts in cases in 
which the jury-trial right applies. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 
 
 
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42 
 
U.S. 469, 479 (1962) ("Since these issues are common with those upon 
which respondents' claim to equitable relief is based, the legal claims 
involved in the action must be determined prior to any final court 
determination of respondents' equitable claims."). Because the 
Sportsmed defendants' right to a jury trial on the issue whether the 
records obtained and used by Dr. Chin should be returned or destroyed 
has been violated, they are also entitled to mandamus relief. 
Third, to the extent that the main opinion claims that the 
Sportsmed defendants are not entitled to mandamus relief from the 
"protective order" because they cannot demonstrate irremediable harm, 
that conclusion is mistaken.  Destruction, by definition, is "irremediable."  
Additionally, the main opinion quotes Ex parte Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 
279 So.3d 1129, 113 (Ala. 2018), for the proposition that mandamus 
review is appropriate only if the "'outcome of the case has been all but 
determined.'" ____ So. 3d at ____. Here, the "protective order" requires 
the Sportsmed defendants to either give the records to Woodard or 
destroy them.  This is the very relief sought in the complaint.  Thus, the 
 
 
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"outcome of the case has been all but determined" by this remedy.11 
Fourth, the main opinion concludes that the Sportsmed defendants 
have not shown how the psychological records are relevant to their 
defense. This conclusion ignores the scope of the "protective order," which 
pertains to all records in the Sportsmed defendants' possession that 
"contain[ed], summarize[d] the substance of, or were created in 
conjunction with" the confidential psychological communications. 
 
11Even if all of my analysis regarding the availability of mandamus 
relief with respect to the "protective order" is mistaken, we can still reach 
a just and proper result. This Court has a long history of treating 
mandamus and appeal interchangeably when justice so demands. See, 
e.g., Kirksey v. Johnson, 166 So. 3d 633 (Ala. 2014) (treating a cross-
appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus because it questioned the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of the probate court and this Court felt that 
such an issue was important to materially advancing the litigation); 
Slamen v. Slamen, 254 So. 3d 188, 192 n.3 (Ala. 2017) (treating an appeal 
as a petition for a writ of mandamus "[f]or expedience"); Ex parte 
Sanderson, 263 So. 3d 681, 685 (Ala. 2018) (treating an appeal from a 
denial of a motion for a summary judgment as a petition for writ of 
mandamus).   
 
Here, the Sportsmed defendants filed a mandamus petition rather 
than appealing the "protective order" because the trial judge labeled it a 
"protective order."  Had the trial judge properly labeled this an 
injunction, the Sportsmed defendants would have had a right of 
immediate appeal.  See Rule 4(a), Ala. R. App. P.  We should certainly 
afford the Sportsmed defendants the right that they would have had if 
the trial judge had correctly labeled his order. 
 
 
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(Emphasis added.) As the complaint expressly alleges, Dr. Chin 
summarized Woodard's psychological records in his treatment records. 
Thus, to comply with the order, Dr. Chin would have to destroy all or at 
least part of his own treatment records for Woodard.  
Moreover, it is clear that the content of the records were the reason 
Dr. Chin believed that he needed them for his treatment of Woodard. At 
the very least, those records are relevant to the Sportsmed defendants to 
help them prove that Dr. Chin's decision to obtain the psychological 
records to assist him in treating Woodard was valid. Therefore, under 
these circumstances, the Sportsmed defendants are entitled to 
mandamus relief.   
 
For these reasons, I would grant the petition as to the protective 
order. 
 
Sellers, J., concurs.