Title: Ridgway v. County of Hennepin
Citation: 182 N.W.2d 674
Docket Number: 42274
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: January 8, 1971

182 N.W.2d 674 (1971) Robert G. RIDGWAY, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF HENNEPIN, Respondent. No. 42274. Supreme Court of Minnesota. January 8, 1971. *675 Rosen, Ravich &amp; Summers and Philip W. Getts, St. Paul, for appellant. George Scott, County Atty., John K. Harvey, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent. Heard before KNUTSON, C. J., and NELSON, MURPHY, KELLY, and ROSENGREN, JJ. CHESTER G. ROSENGREN, Justice.[*] This case is before the court on an appeal from the order of the district court denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial. Robert G. Ridgway had sued for specific performance of an alleged contract to convey certain real property which defendant, Hennepin County, had advertised for sale and for which plaintiff's bid had been accepted by the county board. The district court found, in essence, that because of an attempted oral modification of the conditions on which bids were sought, no enforceable contract had been created. We affirm. The essential facts of the case are as follows: On May 11, 18, and 25, 1968, Hennepin County published a notice that sealed bids would be received for certain parcels of real property. Included among the advertised descriptions of such parcels was the following: In addition to the foregoing advertised descriptions, the county mailed to plaintiff, among others, a circular inviting bids on those properties. That document provided as follows: The circular included forms for the bids. Plaintiff submitted on those forms a bid for Parcel M-15, and enclosed his check for $19,705. The bids were opened June 4, 1968. When the bids for parcel M-15 were to be opened, the bidders were advised that an intended reservation of a restriction on access had not been included in the notices inviting proposals. The bids were opened, and plaintiff's bid was the highest received for Parcel M-15. Thereafter, in a letter dated July 1, 1968, Mr. Richard Bardon, Jr., Hennepin County purchasing manager, recommended acceptance of certain bids, including that of plaintiff. On July 2, 1968, the Hennepin County Board of Commissioners by resolution accepted that written recommendation, and directed that the chairman be authorized to sign the bills of sale on behalf of Hennepin County conveying the parcels bid for to the respective bidders. On July 3, 1968, Mr. Bardon mailed a quitclaim deed to plaintiff. Pursuant to the advertisement for bids, that deed recited the legal description as on file in the County Auditor's office; in addition, however, it included the following limitation: That restriction, in effect, would necessitate moving the driveway entrance from the northwest corner of the property to the northeast. After having complained to the county without success, plaintiff on July 30, 1968, filed in Hennepin County District Court a complaint against the county seeking specific performance of an alleged agreement to convey all defendant's interest in the property except mineral rights. The court denied specific performance, holding, in essence, that no enforceable contract had been created because of an absence of any meeting of the minds of the parties involved. The court based this conclusion largely upon testimony which had been admitted at trial over plaintiff's objection that such testimony should be excluded under the parol evidence rule. The testimony in question indicated that after the invitations for bids had been advertised, county officials became aware that they had neglected to include in the description of the property an intention to restrict access to the property. It appeared that the parcel had originally been acquired by the county in connection with the construction of County State Aid Highway No. 18 and its interchange with County State Aid Highway No. 16. The parcel in question is located on a corner near the intersection of those highways, and the driveway existing at the time of the advertisement for bids entered the abutting road (County Road No. 16) near the corner. Mr. Donald Lalor of the Hennepin County Highway Department testified *677 as to the need to restrict access at that point for purposes of traffic safetyspecifically, that existing usage of the driveway tended to restrict visibility for traffic using the improved roadways. Accordingly, after the oversight in the specifications was discovered, Mr. Lalor, after consulting Mr. Stanley Cowle, Hennepin County administrator, contacted Mr. Sheldon Weinberg, who was to conduct the opening of the bids. Weinberg announced to the bidders in attendance at the opening of the bids that a problem existed with respect to the specific parcel here in question. He then indicated that use of the driveway would be restricted due to retention of ingress and egress by the county and inquired whether, in view of such restriction, the bidders on that parcel wished to withdraw their bids. There was a dispute in the testimony concerning what was said with respect to the specific restriction. Plaintiff testified that he was told at the opening of the bids that the restriction would entail only "drifting" the driveway access 10 or 15 feet to the east, but as the deed was ultimately drawn access was restricted all the way to the northeastern end of the property. However, there was testimony from Lalor and Weinbergand the court so foundthat they informed plaintiff that they did not have information available respecting the actual extent of the restriction and that upon an inquiry of Weinberg, plaintiff indicated that he desired his bid to be opened even in view of the restrictions to be imposed. On the basis of such testimony, the court concluded that in view of the imposition of the additional restriction, no definite proposal had been tendered, with the result that there had been no meeting of the minds of the parties and no contract created. The basic issue presented is whether there was created an enforceable contract to convey particular real estate without restriction on ingress and egress. We agree with the trial court that no contract was created. 1. It should be noted first that the procedure which the county officials attempted to follow was not in accordance with that prescribed by statute for the public sale of real estate owned by the county. Minn.St. 373.01(3) empowers counties to sell, lease, and convey real property owned by the county, but provides that It is apparent that the general rule in most jurisdictions with respect to statutes such as the foregoing is that such statutes are to be strictly construed and applied. In 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 172, it is stated that In the case at hand, the attempted oral alteration of the terms of the sale at the time of the opening of the bids clearly was not consistent with the spirit of the public-notice statute, and under a strict construction of that statute, any contract so consummated could be subject to invalidation *678 for failure to comply with statutory requirements. 2. Thus, there can be no question that the transaction as conducted by the county could not be enforced against the purchaser. The purchaser, however, is seeking to enforce against the county a contract limited to the terms of the advertised description. It might be argued that this is justified in that it would seem worthwhile to encourage counties to adhere strictly to the sales procedures required by statute. Those who deal with county officials in such situations ought to be able to do so with confidence that the statutory procedures will be followed, with no last-minute alterations in terms by the county after the bids have been submitted. Considered reflection indicates that such a result would not be desirable. Public-notice statutes presumably have been enacted primarily to protect taxpayers of the county and only secondarily to protect purchasers of public property. Hence, to penalize the county for the inadvertent mistakes of its officials would be inconsistent with the spirit of the statute. It seems, therefore, that public policy in such cases would dictate that where the statutory requirements have not been met, or there has been an attempted evasion of such requirements, no effective contract has been created. Under the circumstances presented in this particular case, it appears that to enforce the contract asserted by the purchaser would permit him to profit from the mistake of the county officialsa mistake which was at least partly induced by the actions of plaintiff-purchaser himself, for it was only upon his indicated assent to the attempted modification that the bid was submitted to the county board for approval. Moreover, the circumstances of the bidding were such as to indicate that at no time was there between the parties the mutual agreement which is necessary to the formation of a valid contract. For practical purposes, it must be recognized that, at the time of the bidding, the county employees were acting for and as the county. The relevant statute contains the express reservation that the county board could reject any bids. The invitation also contained the express reservation that the county administrator could reject bids. Aside from that fact, it appears that the county administrator, at the time of opening the bids, retained the discretionary authority to reject any and all bids, for in Hennepin County much of the administrative power traditionally exercised by the county board has been delegated to the county administrator. L.1967, c. 588, authorized the board of commissioners of Hennepin County to employ an administrator to "be the administrative head of the county government" and to "perform all administrative duties and services as the county board may by resolution designate." L.1967, c. 588, § 2, subd. 1. The law further provides that "[a]ll administrative matters which require the approval or review of the county board shall be submitted through the county administrator." § 2, subd. 3. Thus, even though, as plaintiff points out, Minn.St. 373.02 provides that "[t]he powers of a county as a body politic and corporate shall only be exercised by the county board, or in pursuance of a resolution by it adopted * * *," it is apparent that it is contemplated by L.1967, c. 588, § 2, subd. 3, that in Hennepin County an initial screening function is to be performed by the county administrator. Hence, in the proceeding in question, when it became apparent that a mistake had been made in advertising for bids, the initial decision of whether to submit the bids to the county board or to reject them and advertise anew lay with the county administrator. It is here that the element of inducement on the part of plaintiff enters: When apprised that the property would be subject to some restriction and asked whether he wished to have his bid considered under *679 those conditions, plaintiff responded affirmatively. Hence, it was partly because of this oral representation on his part that the bid was submitted to the county board for approval. Whether the county administrator simply neglected to include in his submission to the board notice of the restriction, or whether the official felt he possessed delegated authority to insert the restriction after favorable action by the county board does not appear. What is apparent is that but for the affirmative reply of plaintiff the bid would never have been submitted to the board of commissioners. Despite that, plaintiff seemingly would have this court ignore the conditions which existed at the time of bidding and enforce against the county an asserted contract, the conditions of which, in all fairness, cannot be said to have been contemplated by either party at the time of opening the bids. Under such circumstances, it is apparent that there was no meeting of the minds, no mutual assent, to the "contract" now urged by plaintiff. Moreover, as indicated above, any contract which might otherwise have been created through oral agreement is not cognizable under the public-notice statute. 3. Plaintiff argues that judicial consideration of the occurrences at the time of the bidding is improper because of an asserted application of the parol evidence rule. It is true that looking only to the advertisement for bids, the bid, and the resolution of acceptance, one could infer that there was a contract sufficiently free from verbal ambiguity that consideration of parol evidence varying the terms thereof would be improper. However, we are of the opinion that the parol evidence rule has no application to the present situation, in which the effect of introducing the parol testimony is not to vary the terms of a written agreement, but rather to demonstrate that there never was a valid contract created. It is well established that the parol evidence rule does not exclude evidence offered to invalidate an instrument. In 30 Am.Jur.(2d) Evidence § 1035, it is stated: See, also, 7 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 3376. In the present case, introduction of parol testimony established that in fact there had been no mutual agreement between the parties here involved such that no valid contract was created. The decision of the trial court is accordingly affirmed. Affirmed. KELLY, Justice (concurring specially). I concur in the result. [*] Acting as Justice of the Supreme Court by appointment pursuant to Minn.Const. art. 6, § 2, and Minn.St. 2.724, subd. 2.