Title: In re a Grand Jury Investigation
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11697
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 2015

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11697 
 
 
IN THE MATTER OF A GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 4, 2014. - January 12, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Grand Jury.  Subpoena.  Cellular Telephone.  Constitutional Law, 
Grand jury, Subpoena, Self-incrimination.  Practice, 
Criminal, Grand jury proceedings, Subpoena duces tecum, 
Warrant.  Evidence, Grand jury proceedings.  Attorney at 
Law, Attorney-client relationship.  Search and Seizure, 
Warrant, Probable cause.  Probable Cause. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on April 7, 2014.  
 
 
The case was reserved and reported by Botsford, J.  
 
 
 
Aaron M. Katz (Patrick Welsh with him) for the petitioner. 
 
James L. Sultan (Charles W. Rankin with him) for the amicus 
curiae. 
 
Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney (Patrick M. 
Haggan, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  This appeal arises from a petition brought under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, challenging a Superior Court judge's order 
approving the issuance of a grand jury subpoena duces tecum that 
2 
 
compels a law firm to produce a cellular telephone.  The single 
justice reserved and reported the matter to this court, and our 
analysis is confined to the limited record before us.   
 
The Commonwealth contends that the telephone belonged to 
John Doe,1 the target of a grand jury investigation; that it was 
transferred from Doe to the law firm to obtain legal advice; and 
that it contains in the information stored on its memory, 
particularly in its record of text messages, evidence of a crime 
under investigation by the grand jury.  The Superior Court judge 
determined that, while a subpoena served on Doe would violate 
his right against self-incrimination, and a subpoena served on 
the law firm would violate the attorney-client privilege, a 
subpoena compelling the law firm to produce the telephone could 
be served upon an ex parte showing by the Commonwealth of 
probable cause sufficient for the issuance of a search warrant.  
We conclude that, on the record before us, the attorney-client 
privilege protects Doe against compelled production of the 
telephone by the law firm, and that the protection afforded by 
the attorney-client privilege may not be set aside based on a 
showing of probable cause.  We therefore reverse the Superior 
Court judge's order.   
                                                          
 
1 A pseudonym. 
3 
 
 
1.  Background.  The law firm began representing Doe in 
April, 2013.  According to the Commonwealth, in June, 2013, Doe 
transferred the telephone to the law firm in connection with its 
provision of legal services to him.2  In March, 2014, the 
Commonwealth moved under Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (f), 426 Mass. 
1397 (1998), for judicial approval of a grand jury subpoena 
compelling the law firm to produce the telephone.3  A Superior 
                                                          
 
2 The Commonwealth asserts that the judge made a specific 
factual finding that the cellular telephone exists and is in the 
possession of the law firm.  We discern no such finding in the 
judge's decision.  In the "Facts" portion of his decision, the 
judge indicated specifically that "[t]he Commonwealth asserts 
that on or about June 16, 2013, [Doe] delivered his cell phone 
to [his] attorneys in connection with their provision of legal 
services to him."  The factual findings that the Commonwealth 
identifies involve either the judge's summary of uncontested 
issues concerning the supposed telephone (e.g., that, if it was 
transferred at all, it was transferred to obtain legal advice), 
or his reprise of the representations of the parties.   
 
The Commonwealth further contends that, in opposing the 
Commonwealth's subpoena for the telephone, the firm has 
implicitly conceded that it has possession of the device.  In 
other words, the Commonwealth would place the law firm in a 
"Catch-22":  to assert that the attorney-client privilege 
protects against compelled production of the telephone, the firm 
must implicitly disclose the client's privileged communication 
that the telephone belongs to him, or at least that it was 
previously in his possession.  We reject this suggestion.   
 
3 Rule 3.8 (f) of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 426 Mass. 1397 (1998), provides that a prosecutor 
shall: 
 
 
"not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other 
criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or 
present client unless: 
 
 
4 
 
Court judge held a hearing on the motion and issued a ruling 
from the bench, followed by a written decision a few days 
thereafter.  The judge denied the motion, but noted that his 
denial was without prejudice to refiling.  The judge indicated 
that, if he determined upon such refiling that the Commonwealth 
had, through an ex parte proceeding, established probable cause 
sufficient to justify a search under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, he would allow the Commonwealth to 
issue a subpoena compelling the law firm to produce the 
telephone.  At a subsequent hearing, the judge allowed the 
Commonwealth's second motion for judicial approval of the grand 
jury subpoena directed at the law firm, but stayed issuance and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
"(1)  the prosecutor reasonably believes:  
"(i)  the information sought is not protected from 
disclosure by any applicable privilege; 
"(ii)  the evidence sought is essential to the 
successful completion of an ongoing investigation or 
prosecution; and 
"(iii)  there is no other feasible alternative to 
obtain the information; and 
 
"(2)  the prosecutor obtains prior judicial approval 
after an opportunity for adversarial proceeding . . . ." 
 
Doe contends that the process by which the judge determined 
that the requirements of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (f) were met, and 
that the Commonwealth had established probable cause that the 
telephone contained evidence of a crime and was in the 
possession of the law firm, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (f) 
and standards of constitutional due process.  Because we 
conclude that the attorney-client privilege precluded the 
issuance of a subpoena given the facts of this case, we need not 
reach this argument.  
 
5 
 
execution of the subpoena to allow Doe to file a petition for 
relief in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  The 
judge also ordered that, if the law firm indeed had the device 
in its possession, it not alter, transfer, dispose of, return, 
or otherwise render the telephone unavailable pending further 
court order.    
 
After Doe filed his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, the law 
firm filed a motion to intervene.  In response to a request by 
the single justice, the law firm submitted an affidavit 
indicating that, if the petition were dismissed, and if the 
Commonwealth served the subpoena on the law firm, it would 
refuse to comply, subjecting itself to a finding of contempt.  
Based on this affidavit, the single justice reserved and 
reported the matter to this court.4  
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  While we review a 
trial judge's decisions on discovery matters for an abuse of 
discretion, our review of mixed questions of fact and law, 
including questions of the validity of an assertion of the 
privilege against self-incrimination, is de novo.  McCarthy v. 
                                                          
 
4 Notwithstanding the Commonwealth's contention that 
extraordinary relief would not be available under G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, until the law firm disobeys the subpoena, subjecting itself 
to a contempt order, "[w]here," as here, "the single justice 
has, in [her] discretion, reserved and reported the case to the 
full court, we grant full appellate review of the issues 
reported."  Martin v. Commonwealth, 451 Mass. 113, 119 (2008).  
6 
 
Slade Assocs., Inc., 463 Mass 181, 190 (2012) (citation 
omitted).  Our review of a decision involving the attorney-
client privilege is likewise de novo.  Clair v. Clair, 464 Mass. 
205, 214 (2013), quoting Commissioner of Revenue v. Comcast 
Corp., 453 Mass. 293, 302 (2009).   
 
b.  The right against self-incrimination, the act of 
production doctrine, and the attorney-client privilege.  We 
conclude that the subpoena was issued improperly.  This 
conclusion derives from the application of three well-
established principles:  the privilege against self-
incrimination, the act of production doctrine, and the attorney-
client privilege.   
 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o person . . . shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."  
Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights similarly 
provides that "[n]o subject shall . . . be compelled to accuse, 
or furnish evidence against himself."  
 
The United States Supreme Court has "made it clear that the 
act of producing documents in response to a subpoena may have a 
compelled testimonial aspect," because production may constitute 
an admission "that the papers existed, were in [the witness's] 
possession or control, and were authentic."  United States v. 
Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36 (2000).  With respect to art. 12, we 
7 
 
similarly have held "that the act of production, quite apart 
from the content of that which is produced, may itself be 
communicative."  Commonwealth v. Doe, 405 Mass. 676, 679 (1989).  
By turning over evidence in response to a subpoena, a defendant 
may be "making implicitly a statement about its existence, 
location and control," and "[t]he implied statement would also 
function as an authentication."  Commonwealth v. Hughes, 380 
Mass. 583, 592, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980).  See 
Commonwealth v. Doe, supra (by turning over materials in 
response to subpoena, witness "would be testifying, in effect, 
as to the existence and location of those materials, as well as 
to the control that he had over them," and implicitly would be 
"authenticating those materials").   
 
Indeed, the protection against the implicit self-
incrimination involved in compelled production stands on even 
firmer ground under art. 12 than it does under the Fifth 
Amendment.  Unlike the Fifth Amendment, art. 12 specifically 
prohibits compelling a defendant to "furnish evidence against 
himself."  We have long recognized, based on the "difference in 
the phraseology between the Massachusetts Constitution and the 
Fifth Amendment," Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201, 1210 
(1992), that "the protections of art. 12 extend beyond the 
safeguards afforded by the United States Constitution."  See 
Doe, 405 Mass. at 678.  The requirement that a subject not be 
8 
 
forced to "furnish evidence against himself," we have observed, 
"may be presumed to be intended to add something to the 
significance of" the preceding protection against compelled 
self-accusation.  Opinion of the Justices, supra.  Accordingly, 
we have more broadly construed the protections afforded by the 
act of production doctrine under art. 12, in comparison with the 
Fifth Amendment.  See id. at 1210-1211; Commonwealth v. Burgess, 
426 Mass. 206, 218 (1997). 
 
In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402 (1976) 
(Fisher), the United States Supreme Court held "that compelled 
production of documents from an attorney does not implicate 
whatever Fifth Amendment privilege the [target of an 
investigation] might have enjoyed from being compelled to 
produce them himself."  The Court went on to conclude, however, 
that, apart from the right against self-incrimination, the 
attorney-client privilege protects certain materials from 
production by an attorney.  If a client "transferred possession 
of . . . documents . . . from himself to his attorney in order 
to obtain legal assistance, . . . the papers, if unobtainable by 
summons from the client, are unobtainable by summons directed to 
the attorney by reason of the attorney-client privilege."  Id. 
at 405.  
 
"Under the facts and circumstances presented" in this case, 
the motion judge was "satisfied that had a subpoena been served 
9 
 
on [Doe] personally, he would be able to assert a privilege 
against production of his [tele]phone based on the Fifth 
Amendment and/or art. 12."  In its brief, the Commonwealth 
acknowledges that Doe could not be compelled to produce the 
telephone had he retained possession of it.   Nonetheless, the 
Commonwealth offers several arguments that would avoid the 
inevitable implications of that concession under the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Fisher.  In essence, these 
arguments seek to sever the chain that links the determination 
that Doe could not be compelled to produce the telephone, had he 
retained possession of it, with the conclusion that the law firm 
likewise cannot be compelled to produce the telephone, after 
purportedly receiving the telephone from Doe for the purpose of 
rendering legal advice. 
 
The Commonwealth contends, for instance, that although 
Doe's act of producing the telephone in response to the subpoena 
would be testimonial and incriminating under the Fifth Amendment 
and art. 12, the law firm's act of producing the telephone in 
response to a subpoena would be "trivial and non-testimonial."  
That argument rests on a mistaken understanding of the Fisher 
rule.  The Fisher Court made clear that its analysis hinged not 
on the law firm's act of producing the telephone, but rather on 
the client's hypothetical act of producing evidence in response 
to a subpoena; where materials were transferred to the attorney 
10 
 
"for the purpose of obtaining legal advice," and where "the 
client himself would be privileged [f]rom production" of the 
materials had he retained them, "the attorney having possession 
of the document is not bound to produce."  Fisher, 425 U.S. at 
404, quoting 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2307, at 592 (McNaughton 
rev. 1961). 
 
The focus on whether Doe would be protected against 
compelled production had he maintained possession of the 
materials reflects the policy underlying the Fisher rule.  
"Fisher's rule arose from the policy of promoting open 
communications between lawyers and their clients."  Application 
of Sarrio, S.A., 119 F.3d 143, 146 (2d Cir. 1997).  "Exposing 
documents -- not otherwise subject to production -- to discovery 
demands after delivery to one's attorney . . . would produce a 
curious and unacceptable result."  Ratliff v. Davis Polk & 
Wardwell, 354 F.3d 165, 169 (2d Cir. 2003).  It would mean that 
"[t]he price of an attorney's advice would be disclosure of 
previously protected matters," thereby "chill[ing] open and 
frank communications between attorneys and their clients."  Id.  
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 
explained, "The attorney-client privilege and the interests it 
protects would be ill-served by holding that [the client] walked 
into his attorney's office unquestionably shielded with the 
[F]ifth [A]mendment's protection, and walked out with something 
11 
 
less."  In re Grand Jury Proceedings on Feb. 4, 1982, 759 F.2d 
1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1985).  Accordingly, under the Fisher 
analysis, the law firm stands in its client's shoes; if a client 
could not be compelled to produce materials because of the right 
against self-incrimination, and if the client transfers the 
materials to the attorney for the provision of legal advice, an 
attorney likewise cannot be compelled to produce them.   
 
The policy underlying the Fisher rule reveals the 
inadequacy of the Commonwealth's suggestion that "the firm could 
appoint an alternate third party designee to logistically 
present the [tele]phone to the grand jury."  The Fisher rule 
serves to protect open communication between attorneys and 
clients by ensuring that a client does not sacrifice the 
protection that evidence otherwise would receive against 
compelled production by transferring it to an attorney.  The 
damage to the attorney-client relationship would result whenever 
previously unobtainable materials become obtainable as a result 
of being transferred to the attorney, regardless of whether the 
materials were handed over by a third-party designee or by the 
law firm itself.  
 
The Commonwealth cites In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Mr. S.), 
662 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 43 (2012), 
in support of its attempt to distinguish between the testimonial 
character of the law firm's act of production and the client's 
12 
 
act of production.  But that case is inapposite.  Unlike Fisher 
and unlike the instant case, the client in In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena (Mr. S.) had not transferred any materials to his 
attorney.  Instead, the client had approached the attorney to 
complete a real estate transaction, prompting the attorney to 
prepare a set of standard transaction documents.  Id. at 73.  
Because the client there never had possession of the documents 
sought, the Fisher rule, which protects documents that could not 
be obtained by a subpoena directed at the client from compelled 
production once transferred to an attorney, played no role in 
the case.  
 
Finally, the Commonwealth seeks to distinguish between the 
telephone as "physical evidence" and the concededly documentary 
materials that the telephone contains.  The Commonwealth insists 
that it "only sought a grand jury subpoena for production of the 
physical item of evidence," and asserts that, once it acquires 
the telephone, "it will seek a search warrant to authorize a 
forensic examination of the device."  But if we were to embrace 
this distinction, the result would empty the Fisher rule and the 
act of production doctrine of any effect:  the Commonwealth 
could compel the production of any document based on the 
assertion that the subpoena was directed merely at the document 
as a "physical item" -- an amalgam of paper, binding, and ink -- 
13 
 
and that it would get a separate search warrant before actually 
opening the document and reading the pages.  
 
The extrajurisdictional case law that the Commonwealth 
cites in support of its distinction between the telephone as a 
"physical item" and the telephone's contents almost exclusively 
involves items -- typically either the instrumentalities or 
proceeds of crime -- whose evidentiary value to the prosecution 
had nothing to do with their communicative contents.  See In re 
Ryder, 381 F.2d 713, 714 (4th Cir. 1967) (stolen money and 
sawed-off shotgun); Hitch v. Pima County Superior Court, 146 
Ariz. 588, 590 (1985) (wrist watch allegedly stolen from 
victim); People v. Lee, 3 Cal. App. 3d 514, 521, 524-525 (1970) 
(bloody shoes); Anderson v. State, 297 So. 2d 871, 871 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (stolen dictaphone and calculator that 
defendant was alleged to have received before turning over to 
attorney); Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 565 (1992) (gun and 
bullets allegedly used in murder); People v. Nash, 418 Mich. 
196, 216 (1983) (wallet allegedly taken from victim and 
revolver, ammunition, and holster allegedly used in killing); 
Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 356 Pa. Super. 5, 10 (1986) (broken 
stock of rifle allegedly used in killing); State ex rel. Sowers 
v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 829 (1964) (knives allegedly used in 
crime).  But see State v. Bright, 676 So. 2d 189, 193-194 (La. 
Ct. App. 1996) (diary).   
14 
 
 
By contrast, the Commonwealth concedes that many of the 
materials contained on a cellular telephone are documentary.  As 
the United States Supreme Court has observed, "The term 'cell 
phone' is itself misleading shorthand; many of these devices are 
in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to 
be used as a telephone," and "could just as easily be called 
cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, 
libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers."  
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014).  Furthermore, 
though the Commonwealth asserts that it will acquire a separate 
warrant before searching the contents of the telephone, the 
evidentiary value of the telephone for the prosecution clearly 
inheres in its documentary contents, rather than in the 
telephone as a "physical item."  Indeed, in its initial motion 
for judicial approval of the grand jury subpoena, the 
Commonwealth indicated that the "cell phone, specifically the 
information contained therein and accessible through a forensic 
examination of the phone, constitutes evidence that is essential 
to the successful completion of the . . . ongoing grand jury 
investigation."   
 
Additionally, the Commonwealth notes that Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 3.4 (a), 426 Mass. 1389 (1998), which prohibits a lawyer from 
"unlawfully obstruct[ing] another party's access to evidence or 
unlawfully alter[ing], destroy[ing], or conceal[ing] a document 
15 
 
or other material having potential evidentiary value," requires 
that the firm produce the telephone.  Because the firm is now 
"aware of the [telephone's] import and that it has evidentiary 
value," the Commonwealth contends, the firm "cannot circumvent 
its ethical obligations" by invoking the attorney-client 
privilege.  But that argument begs the question.  Rule 3.4 (a) 
of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a 
lawyer from obstructing a party's access to evidence only where 
that obstruction is "unlawful."  The law firm asserts that its 
refusal to produce the telephone is not "unlawful," but is 
instead required by the attorney-client privilege.    
 
Because the Commonwealth does not contest that Doe's 
privilege against self-incrimination would prohibit it from 
compelling Doe to produce the telephone had he retained it, and 
because under Fisher the law firm cannot be compelled to produce 
materials transferred to it by a client for the provision of 
legal advice if the client could not have been compelled to 
produce them, we conclude on the record before us that the 
attorney-client privilege protects against compelled production 
of the telephone.   
 
c.   Superior Court judge's decision.  Although the judge 
approved the issuance of the subpoena, he did so on the basis of 
a logic that differs from the arguments advanced by the 
Commonwealth on appeal.  Unlike the Commonwealth, the judge 
16 
 
correctly interpreted Fisher to mean that the law firm "could 
refuse to comply with [the subpoena] based on the attorney-
client privilege if, had the subpoena been served directly on 
[Doe], he would be able to assert a Fifth Amendment protection 
(or parallel protections under art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights)."  The judge nevertheless determined that 
the law firm could be compelled to produce the telephone.   
 
The judge observed that, had Doe not transferred the 
telephone to his attorney, nothing would prevent the police from 
finding and seizing the telephone under a properly issued search 
warrant.  The judge noted, however, that, because Doe had 
transferred the telephone to his lawyers, there was a "fly in 
the ointment" of the search warrant approach.  General Laws 
c. 276, § 1, a general provision governing the issuance of 
search warrants, includes in its final paragraph a restriction 
on the issuance of search warrants for evidence in the 
possession of lawyers, psychotherapists, and clergymen.  It 
provides, in part, that "no search warrant shall issue for any 
documentary evidence in the possession of a lawyer . . . 
unless . . . a justice is satisfied that there is probable cause 
to believe that the documentary evidence will be destroyed, 
secreted, or lost in the event a search warrant does not issue," 
or unless "there is probable cause to believe that the lawyer 
17 
 
. . . in possession of such documentary evidence has committed, 
is committing, or is about to commit a crime."   
 
The judge thus confronted a situation in which the Fisher 
rule and G. L. c. 276, § 1, appeared, in combination, to place 
the telephone beyond the reach of law enforcement.  Concluding 
that G. L. c. 276, § 1, "cannot . . . be used as a shield to 
protect clearly inculpatory evidence . . . from the reach of the 
law," the judge determined that a subpoena could issue 
compelling the law firm to turn over the telephone, but only 
upon a showing of the probable cause that ordinarily would be 
sufficient, were it not for G. L. c. 276, § 1, to acquire a 
warrant to search the law firm's offices and seize the 
telephone.  In essence, the judge crafted a new rule through an 
aggregation of the procedures that would be permitted were it 
not for the Fisher rule and G. L. c. 276, § 1.  In the absence 
of the Fisher rule, the law firm could be compelled to produce 
the telephone under subpoena upon the prosecution's satisfying 
the requirements of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (f).  In the absence 
of G. L. c. 276, § 1, the police could acquire a warrant to 
search the law firm's offices if the prosecution established 
probable cause to believe that the telephone was located in the 
law firm's offices and contained evidence of a crime.  
Consequently, the judge concluded that the law firm could be 
compelled to produce the telephone under subpoena, but only if 
18 
 
the Commonwealth could establish probable cause to believe that 
the telephone was located in the law firm's offices and 
contained evidence of a crime. 
 
This approach, however, contradicts both case law and the 
relevant statute.  The judge's approach is built on conflating 
search warrants and subpoenas.  Yet the act of production 
doctrine's underlying premise is that being compelled to produce 
evidence in response to a subpoena may involve a forced 
incriminating statement that would not occur if law enforcement 
simply found the evidence while executing a search.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 380 Mass. at 593. 
 
Because the act of production doctrine derives from the 
privilege against self-incrimination, moreover, it may not be 
set aside based on a showing of probable cause.  We have 
emphasized the distinction between the protection against 
unreasonable searches afforded by the Fourth Amendment and the 
more absolute protection afforded by the privilege against self-
incrimination.  "[U]nlike the more limited protections of the 
Fourth Amendment prohibition against searches and seizures that 
are 'unreasonable,'" Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753, 
761 (1977), the privilege against self-incrimination admits "no 
balancing of State-defendant interests" and does not "yield[] to 
'reasonable' intrusions."  Id.  Law enforcement, for instance, 
plainly could not compel a defendant to disclose where he 
19 
 
allegedly hid a murder weapon, even if the police could 
establish probable cause to believe that the weapon was hidden 
somewhere in his house and that, if given a warrant, they would 
likely be able to find the weapon eventually anyway.  To the 
contrary, "where the privilege [against self-incrimination] 
applies, it may be overcome only by either (1) a 
constitutionally adequate grant of immunity; . . . or (2) a 
valid waiver of the privilege by the person who possesses it."  
Id. (citation omitted).   
 
Under Fisher, the protection that a client enjoys under the 
attorney-client privilege is coterminous with the protection 
that a client would have enjoyed under the privilege against 
self-incrimination.  Consequently, just as the right against 
self-incrimination may not be set aside based on judicial 
speculation about what the prosecution might be able to find 
with a valid search warrant, neither may the Fisher rule.  In 
short, neither the privilege against self-incrimination nor the 
attorney-client privilege may be extinguished on the basis of a 
"would've, could've" analysis that invites courts to hypothesize 
upon what police might be able to find and seize, if given 
enough time and a valid search warrant. 
 
The judge based his decision on a provision in G. L. 
c. 276, § 1, that states, "Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to abrogate, impair, or limit powers of search and 
20 
 
seizure granted under other provisions of the General Laws or 
under the common law."  Again, however, this conclusion rests on 
conflating subpoenas with search warrants, and the prosecution's 
ability to compel production of evidence with the prosecution's 
power merely to look for it.  The Commonwealth did not seek to 
obtain the telephone through its "powers of search and seizure."  
Instead, it has sought to obtain the telephone via a subpoena.  
And the basis upon which we have decided that the Commonwealth 
cannot obtain the telephone via subpoena has nothing to do with 
G. L. c. 276, § 1, or any other limitation on the Commonwealth's 
"powers of search and seizure."  Instead, our holding is based 
on our determination that the compelled production of the 
telephone via a subpoena directed at Doe would violate the act 
of production doctrine, and consequently that the compelled 
production of the telephone via a subpoena directed at the law 
firm would violate the attorney-client privilege under Fisher.  
Because the Commonwealth here sought, and the judge allowed, a 
subpoena compelling production of the telephone, the provision 
of G. L. c. 276, § 1, relating to "powers of search and seizure" 
has no bearing on the analysis.  
d.  Availability of a search warrant under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 1.  Although the Commonwealth has consistently sought to 
acquire the telephone via a subpoena, it does indicate that, if 
we decline to authorize the issuance of a subpoena compelling 
21 
 
the law firm to produce the telephone, it "will seek a search 
warrant to seize the evidence from the law firm."  Even if the 
Commonwealth were to pursue that approach, however, it would not 
gain any support from the provision of G. L. c. 276, § 1, 
preserving "powers of search and seizure."  That provision 
precedes, rather than follows, the paragraph prohibiting 
searches of documentary evidence in the possession of lawyers.5  
                                                          
 
5 The provisions relevant to our discussion appear at the 
end of G. L. c. 276, § 1, and provide in full: 
 
 
"Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
 
abrogate, impair or limit powers of search and seizure 
 
granted under other provisions of the General Laws or under 
 
the common law. 
 
 
"Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this 
section, no search and seizure without a warrant shall be 
conducted, and no search warrant shall issue for any 
documentary evidence in the possession of a lawyer, 
psychotherapist, or a clergyman, including an accredited 
Christian Science practitioner, who is known or may 
reasonably be assumed to have a relationship with any other 
person which relationship is the subject of a testimonial 
privilege, unless, in addition to the other requirements of 
this section, a justice is satisfied that there is probable 
cause to believe that the documentary evidence will be 
destroyed, secreted, or lost in the event a search warrant 
does not issue.  Nothing in this paragraph shall impair or 
affect the ability, pursuant to otherwise applicable law, 
to search or seize without a warrant or to issue a warrant 
for the search or seizure of any documentary evidence where 
there is probable cause to believe that the lawyer, 
psychotherapist, or clergyman in possession of such 
documentary evidence has committed, is committing, or is 
about to commit a crime.  For purposes of this paragraph, 
'documentary evidence' includes, but is not limited to, 
writings, documents, blueprints, drawings, photographs, 
computer printouts, microfilms, X-rays, files, diagrams, 
 
22 
 
See G. L. c. 276, § 1.  The latter paragraph opens, 
"Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section," 
making it clear that it in fact does limit the powers of search 
and seizure.  See id.  Indeed, because the paragraph prohibits 
the issuance of search warrants for documentary evidence except 
under certain narrowly drawn circumstances, it plainly does 
"abrogate, impair, or limit powers of search and seizure granted 
under other provisions of the General Laws or under the common 
law."  Id.   
The Commonwealth offers two reasons why a search for the 
telephone would not violate the restrictions that G. L. c. 276, 
§ 1, imposes on searches of law offices.  First, the 
Commonwealth asserts that the search and seizure it contemplates 
is not for any "documentary evidence," and thus falls outside 
the scope of the statute.  Second, the Commonwealth contends 
that, even if the statute did apply to the contemplated search 
for the telephone, the search falls within the statute's 
exceptions for situations where "documentary evidence will be 
destroyed, secreted, or lost in the event a search warrant does 
not issue."  G. L. c. 276, § 1.  We address each in turn. 
i.  The Commonwealth's first argument is easily dismissed.  
General Laws c. 276, § 1, contains a broad definition of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ledgers, books, tapes, audio and video recordings, films or 
papers of any type or description." 
23 
 
"documentary evidence."  It provides that, "[f]or purposes of 
this paragraph, 'documentary evidence' includes, but is not 
limited to, writings, documents, blueprints, drawings, 
photographs, computer printouts, microfilms, X-rays, files, 
diagrams, ledgers, books, tapes, audio and video recordings, 
films or papers of any type or description."  Id.  The 
Commonwealth concedes that "the modern cell phone may contain 
any and all of the above listed categories of evidence."   
The Commonwealth's contention that a search for the 
cellular telephone would not constitute a search for 
"documentary evidence" relies upon the same misplaced 
distinction between the telephone as a "physical item" and the 
telephone's undeniably documentary contents that the 
Commonwealth advances in arguing that the Fisher rule does not 
apply, and the distinction fails here for similar reasons.  For 
instance, while "files" are specifically identified as 
"documentary evidence" in the statute, the statute itself does 
not refer to file cabinets.  If we were to accept the 
Commonwealth's distinction between the telephone as a "physical 
item" and the documentary materials that the telephone contains, 
then the Commonwealth also could acquire a warrant to search an 
attorney's office and seize a file cabinet, including the files 
it contains, as a "physical item."  The Commonwealth conceded in 
its motion for issuance of a subpoena that the evidentiary value 
24 
 
of the telephone for purposes of investigation derives from the 
"documentary" materials contained on the telephone, rather than 
from any aspect of the telephone as a "physical item."  Under 
these circumstances, it is clear that a search for the telephone 
is a search for "documentary evidence" within the meaning of 
G. L. c. 276, § 1.   
 
ii.  The Commonwealth next asserts that a search warrant 
may issue in this case because "there is probable cause to 
believe that the documentary evidence will be destroyed, 
secreted, or lost in the event a search warrant does not issue."  
For several reasons, we are unconvinced by the Commonwealth's 
argument that, "in the event that the Commonwealth cannot 
otherwise obtain the item, the evidence will effectively be 
'secreted' and 'lost.'"   
 
The interpretation offered by the Commonwealth diverges 
from any accepted definition of "secreted" or "lost."  An item 
is "secreted" when it is "hid[den]," "conceal[ed]," or 
"remove[d] from observation or the knowledge of others"; an item 
is "lost" when it is "not be found; missing" or "no longer held 
or possessed; parted with."  Webster's New Universal Unabridged 
Dictionary 1640, 1069 (2d ed. 1983).  The Commonwealth's 
argument would require that we add to these familiar definitions 
a new, distinctly unfamiliar definition:  "unobtainable by law 
25 
 
enforcement because of the combined effect of a legal privilege 
and a statute."   
 
The interpretation offered by the Commonwealth, moreover, 
ignores the statute's requirement for a factual showing.  To 
obtain a search warrant for a lawyer's office, the prosecutor 
must make a showing of "probable cause to believe that the 
documentary evidence will be destroyed, secreted, or lost in the 
event a search warrant does not issue," or that "there is 
probable cause to believe that the lawyer . . . in possession of 
such documentary evidence has committed, is committing, or is 
about to commit a crime."  G. L. c. 276, § 1.  Under the 
interpretation urged by the Commonwealth, this requirement of a 
factual showing of probable cause disappears.  Instead, whether 
an item is "secreted" or "lost" becomes a purely legal issue, on 
which the Commonwealth can prevail simply by showing that the 
lawyer holding the evidence has invoked a privilege against 
compelled production.  
 
 
The Commonwealth's overarching contention is that the 
exception applies to any situation where the application of 
G. L. c. 276, § 1, renders documentary materials whose contents 
are not themselves privileged unobtainable by law enforcement.  
Nothing in the language of the exception supports this view, and 
it gains no support from the legislative history of the act that 
amended G. L. c. 276, § 1, to add the provision at issue here.   
26 
 
 
The legislative history indicates that the provision was 
inserted for two main reasons.  First, the provision sought to 
ensure that "the holder [of material sought by law enforcement] 
has the opportunity to argue that the material is privileged" 
before the material is seized, an opportunity unavailable with 
search warrants because they are "granted ex parte with no 
notice to the holder of the material."  Memorandum from Patricia 
A. Boies, Deputy Chief Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, to then 
Governor, Michael S. Dukakis (Dec. 18, 1986).  Just so, here, 
confronted by a subpoena seeking the telephone, the law firm 
responded by asserting the attorney-client privilege, as 
articulated in Fisher.  Fisher had been the law for more than a 
decade when the provision was enacted.  Because we presume that 
the Legislature acts against the backdrop of already-existing 
law, see Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy 
Facilities Siting Bd., 457 Mass. 663, 673 (2010), it is 
reasonable to think that Fisher would supply one possible basis 
for a claim of privilege.  
 
Second, the legislative history indicates that the 
provision sought to counteract the disruptive effect that police 
searches could have on "the private, confidential relationships 
between the professionals covered and their clients, patients, 
or penitents."  Boies memorandum, supra.  In particular, the 
provision was "designed to protect against the situation in 
27 
 
which police executing a search warrant may look through many 
documents, both privileged and unprivileged, relating to clients 
who are not even the subject of the documents sought, and then 
must make on-the-spot decisions as to what should or should not 
be seized."  1986 House Doc. 6574 (Letter from then Governor 
Michael S. Dukakis to the Senate and House of Representatives 
[Dec. 24, 1986]).  The risk that law enforcement will 
inadvertently see or seize private, confidential documents 
related to uninvolved third-parties exists whenever law 
enforcement executes a search, regardless of whether the 
documents that law enforcement is looking for are privileged.   
 
Accordingly, we reject the Commonwealth's contention that 
documentary evidence is "secreted" whenever an attorney invokes 
the Fisher rule to resist its compelled production.  Instead, we 
conclude that the exception applies, as it says, only where 
"there is probable cause to believe that the documentary 
evidence will be destroyed, secreted, or lost in the event a 
search warrant does not issue."  As indicated, this is a fact-
specific determination.  Were the Commonwealth to seek a search 
warrant on the same record that was before the Superior Court 
judge in March, 2014, when the Commonwealth moved for judicial 
approval for a subpoena, it would not satisfy the "secreted" 
exception.  At that time, the Commonwealth agreed that the 
telephone had been given to the law firm for purposes of 
28 
 
acquiring legal advice.  Nothing in the record suggests that in 
March, 2014, the law firm was no longer engaged in providing the 
requested advice.  The privileged retention of client documents 
in such circumstances cannot be said to be the secretion of 
those documents.  Hence, in this case, on this record, there is 
no evidence suggesting secretion of the documents.  We leave for 
another day the question whether and under what circumstances 
the prolonged retention by counsel of client documents 
unprotected or no longer protected by any privilege might 
qualify as secreting under the meaning of G. L. c. 276, § 1.   
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, we are mindful of the 
concern that, if evidence possibly obtainable via a search when 
it was in the client's hands were to become immune from both 
search and subpoena when placed in an attorney's hands, the 
result will be, as the Superior Court judge noted, "a race . . . 
to the lawyer's office."  We make several observations.  
 
First, G. L. c. 276, § 1, only operates to bar the search 
of an attorney's offices in a narrow set of circumstances.  The 
statute is limited to searching for documentary evidence and 
would not typically encompass situations where a client seeks to 
hide the instrumentalities or proceeds of a crime at an 
attorney's office.  While the telephone at issue here 
constitutes "documentary evidence" under the statute, the 
statute also provides explicit exceptions for circumstances 
29 
 
where the evidence "will be destroyed, secreted or lost in the 
event a search warrant does not issue," or for circumstances 
where the holder of the evidence "has committed, is committing, 
or is about to commit a crime."   
 
Second, it is the act of producing the telephone by the law 
firm, rather than the telephone itself, that is covered by the 
attorney-client privilege.  The client's right against compelled 
production by his or her attorney is not absolute.  To fall 
under the Fisher rule, materials whose contents are not 
themselves privileged must have been transferred to counsel "for 
the purpose of obtaining legal advice."  Fisher, 425 U.S. 
at 404.  Accordingly, when a client transfers materials to an 
attorney for purposes of shielding them from law enforcement's 
reach, the Fisher rule offers no protection.6  
 
Third, nothing we have said suggests that a lawyer, having 
received materials whose contents are not themselves privileged 
for purposes of rendering legal advice, may retain such 
materials indefinitely, absent a continuing bona fide need and 
purpose related to the provision of legal advice.  Any 
                                                          
 
6 The act of production doctrine is itself not absolute and 
admits of the "foregone conclusion" exception.  See Commonwealth 
v. Gelfgatt, 468 Mass. 512, 522 (2014) (Commonwealth may compel 
a testimonial and incriminating act of production if it can 
establish that "the information that would be disclosed by [a] 
defendant is a 'foregone conclusion'").  The Commonwealth does 
not argue that the exception has any application to the facts of 
record here.  
30 
 
assessment of whether and, if so, when client materials would 
cease to be protected by the Fisher rule is, of course, a 
complex matter, involving factual determinations that will 
depend on the specific circumstances presented.  Because the 
Commonwealth has never argued that either Doe's initial transfer 
of the telephone or the law firm's continued retention of it are 
not justifiable "for the purpose of obtaining legal advice" 
under Fisher, and the parties have not provided briefing on the 
issue, we do not address the availability of a subpoena 
compelling the production of evidence in other circumstances.7 
 
3.  Conclusion.  Confining ourselves to the record that was 
before the Superior Court judge in March, 2014, we conclude that 
Doe's attorney-client privilege protects against compelled 
production of the telephone by the law firm.  We remand the 
matter to the single justice for entry of a judgment allowing 
Doe's petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, ordering the 
Superior Court to reverse the order approving the issuance of a 
grand jury subpoena duces tecum, and for such other proceedings 
as are consistent with this opinion.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.   
                                                          
 
7 We note that the concurrence proposes a protocol in 
circumstances that are not before us, and we take no view as to 
its propriety. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J. (concurring, with whom Gants, C.J., and Spina, 
J., join).  John Doe is the target of a grand jury 
investigation.  According to evidence gathered in the course of 
that investigation, Doe's cellular telephone contains evidence 
of the criminal activities under investigation.  In June, 2013, 
Doe transferred his cellular telephone to a law firm that was 
providing him legal advice.  After demonstrating that the 
Commonwealth had probable cause to believe that the cellular 
telephone contained evidence of the crimes under investigation, 
the judge below authorized the issuance of a subpoena to the law 
firm requiring it to produce the cellular telephone before the 
grand jury. 
 
In objecting to the issuance of the subpoena, neither Doe 
nor the law firm contends that the cellular telephone contains 
any communications or other information stored on its memory 
that might be protected by the attorney-client or any other 
privilege.  Rather, they contend that because the cellular 
telephone may contain incriminating evidence, compelling Doe to 
produce it before the grand jury by means of a subpoena would 
essentially compel a testimonial acknowledgement from him that 
the cellular telephone was his.  Consequently, the law firm 
argues, having come into possession of the cellular telephone in 
the course of giving Doe legal advice, it also cannot be 
compelled by subpoena to produce the cellular telephone before 
2 
 
 
the grand jury.  The law firm and Doe further argue that G. L. 
c. 276, § 1, the statute governing the issuance of search 
warrants, does not permit the Commonwealth to search for and 
seize the cellular telephone while it remains in the possession 
of the law firm, even though it could be obtained from Doe 
through that mechanism.  Thus, they argue, the Commonwealth is 
effectively precluded from obtaining any of the nonprivileged 
information on the cellular telephone relevant to the criminal 
investigation, at least on the record before the judge below. 
 
I agree with the court that Fisher v. United States, 425 
U.S. 391, 402 (1976), controls the subpoena question in this 
case.  Where the cellular telephone (cell phone) was turned over 
to the law firm for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, and 
Doe himself could not have been compelled to produce the phone 
in response to a similar subpoena because the act of production 
would be both testimonial and incriminating, the umbrella of the 
attorney-client privilege protects it from compelled production.  
I also agree that the record below is inadequate to make a 
judgment about the propriety of issuing a search warrant.  I 
write separately, however, to emphasize that placing the cell 
phone (or any other incriminating documentary evidence) in the 
hands of an attorney does not sequester it under Massachusetts 
law from the reach of law enforcement pursuant to G. L. c. 276, 
§ 1, where it is not claimed that the cell phone itself is 
3 
 
 
privileged or contains privileged material, where there is 
probable cause to believe that it contains evidence of crimes 
under investigation by the grand jury, and where it is no longer 
being retained for the purpose of rendering legal advice.  To 
interpret G. L. c. 276, § 1, otherwise would stand completely at 
odds with clear legislative intent. 
 
General Laws c. 276, § 1, was amended by c. 691 of the Acts 
of 1986 to provide special protections for documentary evidence 
in the possession of lawyers, psychotherapists, and clergymen, 
from the intrusions that might be caused by the execution of 
search warrants, except in circumstances where the failure to 
issue such a warrant might result in the evidence being 
unavailable through secretion, destruction, or loss.1  The 1986 
amendment identified these professionals and provided unique 
protections for documents in their files precisely because the 
law provides special privileges to the consultations they have 
with their clients, patients, or parishioners.  The Legislature 
recognized that a search of their files for nonprivileged 
documents (pursuant to a search warrant) would pose a 
significant risk that the privileges of innocent third parties 
                                                          
 
1 The amendment also provided that a search warrant for such 
documentary evidence could be obtained if there was probable 
cause to believe that the lawyer, psychotherapist, or clergyman 
in possession of the evidence had committed, was committing, or 
was about to commit a crime. 
4 
 
 
would be compromised.  See, e.g., 1986 House Doc. No. 6574 
(Letter from then Governor, Michael S. Dukakis, dated December 
24, 1986, explaining purpose of amendment is to protect 
confidential relationship of covered professionals and their 
clients); Letter from Karen Hudner, Legislative Agent, Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts, to then Governor, Michael S. 
Dukakis (Dec. 9, 1986) (Hudner letter) (arguing amendment would 
protect privacy of third persons in confidential relationships 
with covered professionals); Memorandum from Patricia A. Boies, 
Deputy Chief Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, to the then 
Governor, Michael S. Dukakis (Dec. 18, 1986) (Boies memorandum) 
(highlighting proponents' concern that police, while executing a 
search warrant, look through privileged and unprivileged 
documents that are both related and unrelated to subject of 
search). 
 
As repeatedly articulated by the proponents of the 
legislation, over the many years it was under consideration by 
the Legislature, the legislation was intended "to protect 
innocent third parties in a confidential legal or medical 
relationship . . . [and] would affirm that in Massachusetts 
. . . the privacy of innocent people is protected against 
unnecessary intrusion."  Hudner letter, supra.  The proponents 
also proclaimed that the amendment would not impede the 
legitimate interests of law enforcement because "their right to 
5 
 
 
subpoena the very same material would still be available to 
them."  Letter from James T. Hilliard, Counsel, Massachusetts 
Psychiatric Society, to then Governor, Michael S. Dukakis (Dec. 
16, 1986).  In other words, there would be "no harm from this 
[amendment], which would merely shift [the gathering of 
evidence] to the usage of a subpoena duces tecum," a more 
surgical instrument, thereby "permit[ting] orderly litigation of 
the issue of privilege."  Letter from Arnold R. Rosenfeld, Chief 
Counsel, Committee for Public Counsel Services, to then 
Governor, Michael S. Dukakis (Dec. 10, 1986).  See Letter from 
Nathan A. Talbot, Committee on Publication for Massachusetts, 
The First Church of Christ, Scientist, to then Governor, Michael 
S. Dukakis (undated) (stating amendment would not hinder 
investigations).  Indeed, in proposing amended language that 
narrowed the breadth of the amendment and ultimately became the 
statutory language, the Governor urged the General Court to 
adopt his language because it would accomplish the purpose of 
protecting privileged relationships without having "the 
unintended effect of resulting in the loss of evidence not 
protected by any privilege."  1986 House Doc. No. 6574.  There 
is, however, nothing in the extensive legislative history 
leading to the adoption of the amendment to suggest that the 
Legislature (or the proponents) considered the circumstances of 
the present case -- where a subpoena is not available as an 
6 
 
 
alternative to the Commonwealth for reasons unrelated to the 
privileged nature of the documents themselves. 
 
To interpret the 1986 amendment to bar the seizure upon 
warrant of unprivileged evidence of a crime, where the evidence 
cannot be obtained by subpoena only because of the incriminating 
nature of the act of compelled production, runs counter to (not 
in accord with) the purposes of its enactment as articulated by 
the Governor and its proponents.  See, e.g., Boies memorandum, 
supra (explaining opportunity to litigate privilege issue before 
seizure was crucial to proponents).  Simply put, the amended law 
was never intended to permanently shield from seizure 
unprivileged evidence of criminal activity placed in the hands 
of an attorney by a client under investigation, or to create a 
depository for the secretion or sequestration of such evidence 
from law enforcement.  See, e.g., 1986 House Doc. No. 6574 
(proposing language -- ultimately accepted -- that avoids 
unintended protection of unprivileged materials).  Indeed, the 
exclusions in the amendment for documents that might become 
destroyed, lost, or secreted from the Commonwealth is consistent 
with the Legislature's intention not to make unprivileged 
material unavailable to the Commonwealth. 
 
In light of the extensive legislative history at our 
disposal laying out the contrary intentions of all parties to 
the legislative process, our responsibility is to interpret the 
7 
 
 
statute in accord with those intentions if at all possible.  
Commonwealth v. Parent, 465 Mass. 395, 409 (2013), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Rahim, 441 Mass. 273, 278 (2004) ("[court] need 
not adhere strictly to the statutory words if to do so would 
lead to an absurd result or contravene the clear intention of 
the Legislature"). 
 
I am of the view that both the interests protected by the 
amendment and the Commonwealth's interest in securing evidence 
not intended to be protected by the amendment can be reconciled, 
and I would not preclude such a reconciliation on an adequate 
record.  I would conclude that in the circumstances where it 
appears that an item of evidence sought by the Commonwealth 
cannot be obtained from the law firm by the issuance of a 
subpoena because of its client's privilege regarding production, 
and where, as a consequence, a search warrant would ordinarily 
be necessary, the warrant application should be presented to a 
judge, with those circumstances set out in an affidavit.  The 
judge should then issue a short order of notice to the law firm, 
giving it an opportunity to raise any privilege that might 
protect the item from seizure.  Along with the short order of 
notice, the judge should issue an order barring the law firm 
from transferring or destroying the item pending further ruling 
of the court.  In this manner, the unprivileged and relevant 
evidence is not lost to the Commonwealth, and there is an 
8 
 
 
opportunity prior to a search for privileges to be raised and 
litigated.  If the judge concludes that no privilege applies to 
the item and that its retention by the law firm is no longer for 
the purpose of or necessary to the rendering of legal advice, 
the judge may properly order the warrant to issue.2  In such 
circumstances, the continued retention of the evidence would 
constitute its concealment within the meaning of the term 
"secreted" as used in G. L. c. 276, § 1.3  The judge may further 
direct the parties to fashion a protocol unlikely to pose a risk 
to the privileges of other documents or clients or to result in 
a production that is testimonial and incriminating.  See, e.g., 
Preventive Med. Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 810, 
824-25, 828 (2013) (summarizing court's ordered procedure for 
privilege review); Commonwealth vs. Ellis, Mass. Super. Ct. Nos. 
97-192, 97-562, 98-355, 97-193, 97-561, 97-356, and 97-563, slip 
op. at 44-45 (Aug. 18, 1999) (outlining procedure used to search 
                                                          
 
2 The Restatement (Third) of the Law:  The Law Governing 
Lawyers § 119 comment (c) (Physical Evidence of a Client Crime) 
(2000), provides that although it may be reasonably necessary 
for purposes of representation to take possession of evidence 
for the time necessary to examine it, "physical evidence of a 
client crime in possession of the lawyer may not be retained to 
a point at which its utility as evidence for the prosecution is 
significantly impaired." 
 
3 "Secrete" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary 1557 (10th 
ed. 2014), as "to remove or keep from observation, . . . to 
conceal . . . to hinder or prevent officials . . . from finding 
it." 
9 
 
 
law firm records).  See also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 
§ 4-4.6 (Physical Evidence) (3d ed. 1993) ("If defense counsel 
retains the item [of evidence], he or she should retain it in 
his or her office in a manner that does not impede the lawful 
ability of law enforcement authorities to obtain the item"). 
 
Accordingly, while I would reverse the judge's order 
authorizing the issuance of a grand jury subpoena, I would not 
preclude the issuance of a search warrant on a more complete 
record with regard to the status of the cellular telephone 
evidence, its utility as evidence of a crime, and whether its 
continued retention is necessary for the purpose of rendering 
legal advice.