Title: People v. Robinson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 97267
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 20, 2005

Docket No. 97267-Agenda 2-May 2005.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant and Cross-
Appellee, v. EMMANUEL ROBINSON, Appellee and Cross-							
Appellant.  
Opinion filed October 20, 2005.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Petitioner, Emmanuel Robinson, filed a pro se petition under the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.
(West 2000)), challenging his convictions for first degree murder and
attempted first degree murder. The circuit court of Cook County
summarily dismissed his petition as frivolous or patently without
merit. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2000). Twelve days after
the order of dismissal was entered, the clerk served the order on
petitioner by certified mail. However, the Act provides that such an
order "shall be served upon the petitioner by certified mail within 10
days of its entry." 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2000). Thus,
service was two days late. Nevertheless, petitioner timely filed a notice
of appeal. The appellate court reversed and remanded. 343 Ill. App.
3d 910. The appellate court held the Act's 10-day service provision
is mandatory, and therefore the clerk's failure to timely serve
petitioner required that the petition be remanded for further
proceedings. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 921. The State sought leave to
appeal, which we allowed. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. Petitioner seeks
cross-relief, arguing the circuit court erred in dismissing his petition
as frivolous or patently without merit.
BACKGROUND
	Petitioner was convicted after a bench trial of first degree murder,
attempted murder, and aggravated battery with a firearm. The charges
stemmed from a shooting in which Tommy McNeal was killed and
Tommy's brother, Raleigh McNeal, was wounded. At trial, Raleigh
testified that early in the afternoon of July 10, 1997, he and Tommy
were standing in front of their mother's house at 5656 South Paulina
in Chicago, near the corner of Paulina and 57th. Raleigh was selling
heroin on the corner that day, but Tommy was not. A car pulled up,
and petitioner, his codefendant Arthur Wilson, known as "Ton Ton,"
and a man named Troy got out. Raleigh had known petitioner for
three or four years because they lived in the same neighborhood, and
had known Wilson for six to eight months. Petitioner told Raleigh and
Tommy they had to stop selling drugs on that corner. Tommy replied
that they were not selling drugs, and they would not leave the corner
because they lived there. Petitioner replied that if they did not stop
selling drugs on that corner he would return after dark and "air
out"-which Raleigh understood to mean kill-everyone he found there.
Petitioner, Wilson and Troy then left.
	That evening at about 9 p.m. Raleigh and Tommy were standing
on the same corner. Raleigh noticed a light attached to a motion
sensor at 5650 Paulina come on. This caused him to look toward the
gangway between that house and his sister's house, at 5652 Paulina,
because he knew that when the light came on someone was moving
either behind the house or in the gangway. He saw three men dressed
in black, wearing black skull caps, come out of the gangway onto
Paulina and begin walking south toward him. Raleigh identified
petitioner and his codefendant Wilson as two of the men. He testified
he could not identify the third man. He noticed all three carried guns.
At that point, the three began shooting and Raleigh turned and ran,
trying to reach shelter behind a tree near the corner. He was hit in the
left leg and fell. As he was lying on the ground, he noticed that
Tommy had also been shot and appeared to be dead.
	Shortly thereafter police officers arrived at the scene. Over
petitioner's objection, Raleigh testified he told the responding officers
that petitioner and "Ton Ton" shot him. Raleigh was then taken to a
hospital, where he received treatment and learned that Tommy was
dead. After about three hours he left the hospital and went home. On
July 13 he went to the police station to view two lineups, in which he
identified petitioner and his codefendant Wilson.
	A second eyewitness, Raleigh and Tommy's sister Claire McNeal,
described the shooting in substantial agreement with Raleigh's
testimony. Claire had not been present during the confrontation earlier
in the day, nor did she know petitioner or Wilson prior to the
shooting. Like Raleigh, she identified petitioner and Wilson as
shooters in lineups conducted on July 13.
	The trial court found petitioner guilty of first degree murder,
attempted first degree murder, and aggravated battery with a firearm.
Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of 45 years for the
murder and 20 years each for attempted murder and aggravated
battery. On direct appeal, the appellate court vacated the aggravated
battery conviction, based on the one act, one crime doctrine, and
affirmed the other convictions and sentences. People v. Robinson, No.
1-99-2348 (2001) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
While the direct appeal was pending, petitioner filed a pro se
postconviction petition in which he alleged, on numerous grounds,
that his trial counsel and appellate counsel had been ineffective, that
his trial was unfair, and that he was not proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
	In reversing the summary dismissal of defendant's petition, the
appellate court noted that section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act provides
that an order of dismissal "shall" be served within 10 days of entry and
that "shall" is generally indicative of mandatory intent. 343 Ill. App.
3d at 919-20. The court then noted that in People v. Porter this court
had addressed a different timing requirement in section 122-2.1,
namely, that the circuit court shall enter an order of dismissal within
30 (now 90) days, and held it to be mandatory. 343 Ill. App. 3d at
920, citing People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 85 (1988). The court
emphasized that Porter distinguished the timing requirement from
another requirement in section 122-2.1, which purported to require
the court to issue a written order with findings of fact and conclusions
of law. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 920-21, quoting Porter, 122 Ill. 2d  at 82.
Porter reasoned that the written-order requirement intruded upon the
judicial function of the court, and therefore to read the written order
requirement as mandatory would violate the doctrine of separation of
powers. 343 Ill. App. 3d 920-921, citing Porter, 122 Ill. 2d  at 82.
Applying Porter, the appellate court reasoned that, because the 10-day service requirement involves a ministerial function, not a judicial
function, and because the 10-day service requirement appears within
the same section of the Act as the 90-day requirement, the 10-day
requirement is also mandatory. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 921. Because it is
mandatory, the court concluded, the clerk's failure to comply required
the petition be remanded for further proceedings. 343 Ill. App. 3d at
921.

ANALYSIS
I. The State's Appeal
	The pertinent part of section 122-2.1 of the Act provides as
follows:
			"If *** the court determines the petition is frivolous or is
patently without merit, it shall dismiss the petition in a written
order, specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of law
it made in reaching its decision. Such order of dismissal is
final and shall be served upon the petitioner by certified mail
within 10 days of its entry." 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West
2000).
Before this court, petitioner stresses the fact that the statute provides
the clerk "shall" serve him within 10 days, and points out that "shall"
generally indicates the legislature's intent to impose a mandatory
obligation. See People v. O'Brien, 197 Ill. 2d 88, 93 (2001).
	In this case, however, there is no genuine dispute that the 10-day
notice requirement has the force of a command and that it imposed a
mandatory obligation on the clerk. We do not understand the State to
argue that the legislature meant merely to grant the clerk permission
to effect service within 10 days, if the clerk so chooses, or that the
legislature only meant to suggest it might be a good idea to effect
service within 10 days. In short, there is no dispute that "shall" means
shall, and therefore the clerk failed to do something that was
obligatory. The issue is the consequence of the clerk's failure.
	It is entirely understandable why petitioner would argue as he
does. The issue in this case can be stated as whether the statute is
mandatory or directory. That question is easily confused with the
separate question whether statutory language is mandatory or
permissive. Because the word "mandatory" appears in both, it is
natural to suppose they are really the same question and that the
words "permissive" and "directory" must be synonyms. However, as
courts have occasionally pointed out, they are not the same question
at all.
	For example, in Morris v. County of Marin, 18 Cal. 3d 901, 559 P.2d 606, 136 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1977), the question was whether a
California statute, which provided that every county that issues
building permits "shall" require all applicants for such permits to file
a certificate of worker's compensation insurance, qualified as a
"mandatory duty" within the meaning of a second California statute,
which provided that governmental entities could be liable for damages
due to breach of certain mandatory duties. The Morris court carefully
distinguished that question from the separate question whether the
statute was mandatory or directory:
			"[D]efendant simply confuses the 'mandatory duty'
terminology of [the second statute] with the entirely distinct
and unrelated legal doctrine pertaining to 'directory' or
'mandatory' provisions. *** [T]he term 'mandatory' refers
to an obligatory duty which a governmental entity is required
to perform, as opposed to a permissive power which a
governmental entity may exercise or not as it chooses. By
contrast, the 'directory' or 'mandatory' designation does not
refer to whether a particular statutory requirement is
'permissive' or 'obligatory,' but instead simply denotes
whether the failure to comply with a particular procedural
step will or will not have the effect of invalidating the
governmental action to which the procedural requirement
relates." Morris, 18 Cal. 3d  at 908, 559 P.2d  at 610-11, 136 Cal. Rptr.  at 255-56.
See also State v. $435,000, 842 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. 1992) (where
the defendant in a forfeiture proceeding argued that the judgment was
void due to violation of a statute requiring that a hearing in such
proceedings "shall" be set within 30 days of filing, "the issue is not
whether 'shall' is mandatory, but what consequences follow a failure
to comply"); City of Boston v. Barry, 315 Mass. 572, 577, 53 N.E.2d 686, 688-89 (1944) (where a property owner attempting to redeem
property by paying delinquent taxes argued she was not liable to pay
taxes for years in which the collector failed to comply with a statute
requiring that he "shall" certify certain taxes by September 1, the fact
that the statute is mandatory rather than permissive is "beside the
point. *** The real question is whether the Legislature intended ***
that if certification should not be timely, the tax should be
uncollectible on redemption"). In sum, the mandatory-permissive
dichotomy concerns whether the language of a statute has the force
of a command that imposes an obligation, or is merely a grant of
permission or a suggestion, which therefore imposes no obligation.
The mandatory-directory dichotomy, which is at issue in this case,
concerns the consequences of a failure to fulfill an obligation.
	The United States Supreme Court recently underscored this
distinction. See Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 154 L. Ed. 2d 653, 123 S. Ct. 748 (2003). In Barnhart, the statute at issue
provided that the Commissioner of Social Security "shall," by October
1, 1993, assign each retired coal miner to an existing coal mining
company, which company would then be responsible for funding the
miner's pension benefits. Barnhart, 537 U.S at 152, 154 L. Ed. 2d  at
661, 123 S. Ct.  at 752, citing 26 U.S.C. §9706(a) (2000). The
Commissioner assigned some miners after October 1, 1993. Several
mining companies brought suit alleging the late assignments were
void. The Court explained that "[i]t misses the point simply to argue
that the October 1, 1993, date was 'mandatory,' 'imperative,' or a
'deadline,' as of course it was ***. *** [T]he failure to act on
schedule merely raises the real question, which is what the
consequences of tardiness should be." Barnhart, 537 U.S.  at 157, 154 L. Ed. 2d  at 664-65, 123 S. Ct.  at 754. Similarly, in this case the 10-day service provision is a deadline, and the real question is the
consequence of the clerk's tardiness. It misses the point to stress that
the legislature used "shall" and that "shall" indicates intent to impose
a mandatory obligation.
	We acknowledge that this court helped create the situation we
are now trying to address. We have spoken as if the mandatory-permissive dichotomy were the same as the mandatory-directory. See,
e.g., People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 393 (1997) ("Legislative use of
the word 'may' is generally regarded as indicating a permissive or
directory reading, whereas use of the word 'shall' is generally
considered to express a mandatory reading"). Moreover, we have
cited the rule that the word "shall" generally indicates mandatory
intent, even though the mandatory-directory dichotomy was at issue,
not the mandatory-permissive. See, e.g., Andrews v. Foxworthy, 71 Ill. 2d 13, 21 (1978) (citing the rule in support of invalidating taxes for
failure to timely publish assessments); People v. Youngbey, 82 Ill. 2d 556, 562 (1980) (citing the rule in support of vacating criminal
sentences imposed in violation of a statutory command that the circuit
court consider a written presentence report prior to sentencing).
	However, in no case regarding the mandatory-directory
dichotomy has "shall" controlled the outcome. For example, in
Andrews, we considered the purpose of the statute and stressed that
the purpose of timely publication of tax assessments is to enable each
taxpayer to determine whether his assessment is disproportionate or
excessive. Andrews, 71 Ill. 2d  at 22-23. In Youngbey, instead of
relying on the word "shall," we relied on the fact that the statute
required that a "defendant shall not be sentenced before" the court
considered a presentence report. Youngbey, 82 Ill. 2d  at 561-62,
quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005-3-1. Accordingly we
may now clarify that whenever, as in this case, the mandatory-directory dichotomy is at issue the word "shall" is not determinative.
On the other hand, when the issue is whether the force of the statutory
language is mandatory or permissive, then "shall" does usually indicate
the legislature intended to impose a mandatory obligation. See
O'Brien, 197 Ill. 2d  at 93.
	With that clarification in mind, we return to the merits. Whether
a statutory command is mandatory or directory is a question of
statutory construction, which we review de novo. People v. Ramirez,
214 Ill. 2d 176, 179 (2005). The answer is a matter of legislative
intent. Pullen v. Mulligan, 138 Ill. 2d 21, 46 (1990). The statute's
language is the best evidence of legislative intent. Pullen, 138 Ill. 2d 
at 46. Accordingly, when the statute expressly prescribes a
consequence for failure to obey a statutory provision, that is very
strong evidence the legislature intended that consequence to be
mandatory. See Porter, 122 Ill. 2d at 84-85; Pullen, 138 Ill. 2d  at 46.
	In this case, the State claims the statute does not specify a
consequence for the clerk's tardiness. The petitioner replies that the
consequence is specified in section 122-2.1(b), which provides that if
a petition "is not dismissed pursuant to this Section," it must be
docketed for further consideration. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b) (West
2000). Thus, at issue is whether the clerk's tardiness means the
petition in this case was "not dismissed pursuant to this section."
	On this point, each party relies on Porter. As the State points out,
Porter held that failure to dismiss in a written order with findings of
fact and conclusions of law does not trigger section 122-2.1(b),
despite the fact that section 122-2.1(a)(2) provides that the court
" 'shall dismiss the petition in a written order.' " Porter, 122 Ill. 2d  at
84, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 122-2.1(a).
However, as petitioner points out, Porter also held that failure to
enter an order of dismissal within the time specified in section
122-2.1(a) does trigger section 122-2.1(b), so that an untimely
dismissal is void. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d  at 84. To explain why these two
holdings do not conflict, Porter reasoned that if the requirement
regarding the content of the court's order were read to be mandatory,
it would violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
Porter, 122 Ill. 2d  at 85-86, citing People v. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d 155
(1982).
	Applying Porter to this case, the appellate court reasoned that
effecting service is a ministerial act, not a judicial act. 343 Ill. App. 3d
at 921. We agree. Because effecting service is not a judicial act,
Porter's holding that the legislature may not mandate the content of
a judicial order is inapposite. However, contrary to the appellate
court, it does not follow that Porter's second holding-that an untimely
dismissal is void-controls this case. See Porter, 122 Ill. 2d  at 84. This
case involves untimely service, not untimely dismissal. Although
untimely dismissal does trigger section 122-2.1(b), it does not follow
that timely dismissal followed by untimely service does.
	We find section 122-2.1(b) to be ambiguous as to whether
untimely service triggers the express consequence that the petition
must be docketed for further consideration. A statute is ambiguous if
it permits more than one reasonable interpretation. Reda v. Advocate
Health Care, 199 Ill. 2d 47, 55 (2002). On one hand, it is reasonable
to suppose the legislature meant that a dismissal is "pursuant to this
section," notwithstanding any subsequent error by the clerk, provided
it is dismissed under the authority granted to the court by section
122-2.1(a). Unlike Porter, the timely dismissal in this case was within
the court's statutory grant of authority to examine and summarily
dismiss a petition within the specified time. On the other hand, it is
also reasonable to suppose that a dismissal is not "pursuant to this
section" if any of the legitimate requirements of "this section,"
including timely service, go unfulfilled. The ambiguity arises from the
fact that "pursuant to" may mean either "as authorized by" or "in
compliance with." Black's Law Dictionary 1272 (8th ed. 2004).
	Having found the statute ambiguous on the point at issue, we
may consider other evidence to determine what the legislature
intended. People v. Ross, 168 Ill. 2d 347, 352 (1995). In particular,
we may consider the purpose of the statute. See Reda, 199 Ill. 2d  at
55. It has long been held that "statutory requisitions" directed to
government officials " 'designed to secure order, system and dispatch
in proceedings' " are usually directory rather than mandatory, but if
they " 'are intended for the protection of the citizen, *** and by a
disregard of which his rights might be and generally would be
injuriously affected, they are not directory but mandatory.' " People
v. Jennings, 3 Ill. 2d 125, 127 (1954), quoting French v. Edwards, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 506, 511, 20 L. Ed. 702, 703 (1872). In other words,
commands to government officials regarding procedure are usually
directory, but there is an exception when the official's failure to follow
the procedure will "generally" injure the right the procedure was
designed to protect. For example, in Jennings we held that a provision
requiring publication of property tax assessment rolls was mandatory
rather than directory because, without publication, taxpayers would
generally be unable to enforce their right not to be taxed excessively
or disproportionately. Jennings, 3 Ill. 2d  at 128.
	In this case, the 10-day service provision is a procedural
command to the clerk meant to secure "dispatch in proceedings" for
the sake of protecting the petitioner's right to appeal. See People v.
Adams, 338 Ill. App. 3d 471, 474 (2003). While the right to appeal
might be injured by untimely service in a given case, there is no reason
to believe that it generally would be. The right to appeal is preserved
if notice of appeal is filed within 30 days. 188 Ill. 2d R. 606. Because
30 days minus 10 leaves 20, and because it is not difficult to prepare
a notice of appeal, there are likely to be many cases, like the case at
bar, in which the right to appeal is unaffected by untimely service. We
conclude that a violation of the 10-day service requirement is not so
likely to prejudice the right to appeal as to require an exception to the
general rule that procedural commands to government officials are
directory.
	The passage from French which we cited in Jennings states a
second exception to the general rule that procedural commands to
government officials are directory. Statutory provisions " 'designed to
secure order, system and dispatch in proceedings *** are not usually
regarded as mandatory unless accompanied by negative words
importing that the acts required shall not be done in any other manner
or time.' " Jennings, 3 Ill. 2d  at 127, quoting French, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) at 511, 20 L. Ed.  at 703. We applied this exception, for
example, in In re Application of the County Collector, 132 Ill. 2d 64,
74-75 (1989). That case concerned an ordinance of the City of
Aurora, governing appropriations ordinances, which provided, " 'No
such ordinance shall take effect until ten (10) days after it is ***
published ***.' " (Emphasis omitted.) In re Application of the County
Collector, 132 Ill. 2d  at 71, quoting Aurora, Ill., Code of Ordinances
§2-28. We concluded the negative language established the provision
was mandatory, so that failure to publish with the required lead time
voided the appropriations ordinance and therefore invalidated the tax
levy based on the appropriation. In re Application of the County
Collector, 132 Ill. 2d  at 75-76.
	In this case, the statute does not include negative words
indicating that no dismissal shall occur or become effective unless the
petitioner is timely served. The statute as written indicates the
legislature intended that an order summarily dismissing the petition
would be entered first, with timely service to follow. Had it intended
a different arrangement, the legislature could easily have written, for
example, that no summary dismissal shall be entered unless the clerk
timely serves notice of the court's intent to dismiss, or that no
dismissal shall become a final order unless there is timely service. We
conclude the "negative language" exception does not apply to this
case. Nor is there any other exception that applies to this case to
prevent application of the general rule that procedural commands to
government officials are directory.
	In sum, the statute expressly provides that petitions "not
dismissed pursuant to this Section" must be docketed for further
consideration. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b) (West 2000). However, the
statute is ambiguous as to whether the clerk's failure to effect service
within 10 days brings this case under that express provision. We
therefore consider the purpose of the 10-day requirement and note it
is a procedural command to a government official. As such it is
presumptively directory. Nevertheless, it is mandatory if the right it is
designed to protect would generally be injured under a directory
reading, or if there is negative language prohibiting further action in
case of noncompliance. We find neither exception applies. We
therefore hold that the clerk's duty to effect service within 10 days is
directory, and thus the clerk's tardiness did not invalidate the
judgment of the circuit court.
	Our conclusion is not contrary to our recent decision in Ramirez.
At issue in Ramirez was a statute permitting a defendant to be tried in
absentia even though he was not present in open court when the trial
date was set. Specifically, the statute provided that when the court
sets the case for trial in absentia " 'the clerk shall send to the
defendant, by certified mail at his last known address indicated on his
bond slip, notice of the new date which has been set for trial.' "
(Emphasis added.) Ramirez, 214 Ill. 2d  at 182, quoting 725 ILCS
5/115-4.1(a) (West 1992). The defendant argued he was entitled to
a new trial because notice of his trial date was sent by regular mail,
not certified mail. The State replied that the clerk's error was harmless
because the defendant had constructive notice of the trial date through
his counsel. We agreed with the defendant. We reasoned, first, that
the word "shall" indicated that use of certified mail was a mandatory
obligation of the clerk and that the statute included no exceptions.
Ramirez, 214 Ill. 2d  at 182-83. We then pointed out that the certified
mail requirement was part of a larger legislative scheme. Ramirez, 214 Ill. 2d  at 183. After describing the elements of that scheme, which
included the requirement that the defendant be advised in open court
that failure to appear at trial may result in trial in absentia, and the
requirement that the State prove with substantial evidence that the
defendant was willfully avoiding trial, we concluded that strict
compliance with the certified mailing requirement was one of the
"necessary statutory safeguards" designed to protect the important
constitutional rights that are lost when a person is tried in absentia.
Ramirez, 214 Ill. 2d  at 183-84. We therefore rejected the State's
position that the clerk's failure to use certified mail could be harmless
in some cases. Ramirez, 214 Ill. 2d  at 184. In other words, in Ramirez
we applied the first exception to the general rule that procedural
commands to government officials are directory because we found
that a mandatory reading was necessary to adequately protect the
important trial rights the certified mail requirement was designed to
protect. In this case we reach the opposite conclusion regarding the
relationship between the right to appeal and the 10-day service
deadline.
	The appellate court suggested that to read the 10-day deadline as
directory is to leave the petitioner with a right but no remedy. 343 Ill.
App. 3d at 921-22. As noted above, there is no dispute the clerk had
a statutory duty to serve petitioner on time. Therefore, petitioner had
a right to timely service. In this case, however, petitioner requires no
remedy because he was not prejudiced by the clerk's error. He filed
his notice of appeal on time.
II. The Petitioner's Request for Cross-Relief
	Petitioner requests cross-relief. He claims the circuit court erred
when it summarily dismissed his postconviction petition as frivolous
or patently without merit. We review this question de novo. People v.
Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 247 (2001). A postconviction petition is
frivolous or patently without merit when its allegations, taken as true
and liberally construed, fail to present the gist of a constitutional
claim. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d  at 244. "The 'gist' standard is 'a low
threshold.' " Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d  at 244, quoting People v. Gaultney,
174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996).
	Before this court, petitioner argues he met the "gist" standard by
alleging that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue
on direct appeal that the circuit court committed reversible error by
admitting certain hearsay evidence at trial. Specifically, the court
permitted Raleigh McNeal to testify that he told police officers at the
scene of the shooting that petitioner was one of the shooters. The
court also permitted Officer DuBose, one of the responding officers,
to testify that Raleigh made an identification, either at the scene or at
the hospital. DuBose did not state whom Raleigh identified.
	As a threshold matter, the State points out petitioner's pro se
petition does not allege the court erred by admitting hearsay through
the testimony of Raleigh and DuBose. Rather, the petition only alleges
that hearsay was admitted through the testimony of Detective John
Murray. The State correctly argues that petitioner may not raise a
claim for the first time on appeal from the dismissal of his petition. See
People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498 (2004). In response, petitioner points
out that his petition alleged that the State's eyewitness testimony was
unfairly bolstered by inadmissible hearsay. Petitioner argues that, if
liberally construed, this allegation should not be limited to Murray's
testimony and is therefore sufficient to raise the claim he asserts
before this court.
	For reasons that follow, it is clear the claim petitioner raises
before this court lacks merit. We therefore choose to decide
petitioner's request for cross-relief on the merits. We assume, without
deciding, that the claim petitioner asserts through counsel was
properly raised in his pro se petition.
	A defendant has a constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel during his appeal as of right. People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264,
277 (1992). To establish that appellate counsel was ineffective,
petitioner must show both that counsel's performance was deficient
and that counsel's error was prejudicial. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 283,
citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Counsel's error was prejudicial if there is a
reasonable probability the result of the appeal would have been
different but for the error. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 283, quoting
Strickland 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068.
	Petitioner claims appellate counsel should have argued that
Raleigh's out-of-court statement to police that defendant was one of
the shooters was inadmissible hearsay. However, there is an exception
to the hearsay rule for "spontaneous declarations." See People v.
Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 352 (2000). For a hearsay statement to be
admissible under this exception, (1) there must have been an
occurrence that was sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous
and unreflecting statement, (2) there must have been an absence of
time between the occurrence and the statement for the declarant to
fabricate the statement, and (3) the statement must relate to the
circumstances of the occurrence. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d  at 352. In
applying these elements to determine whether a hearsay statement is
admissible, a court should consider the totality of the circumstances,
including " 'the nature of the event, the mental and physical condition
of the declarant, and the presence or absence of self-interest.' "
Williams, 193 Ill. 2d  at 352, quoting People v. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323,
382 (1990). A reviewing court will not disturb the trial court's
decision regarding the admission of evidence at trial absent a clear
abuse of discretion. People v. Manning, 82 Ill. 2d 193, 211 (1998).
	The record shows Raleigh identified petitioner to police as one
of the shooters mere minutes after being shot and after seeing that his
brother had also been shot and appeared to be dead. These are
sufficiently startling events. There is no indication in the record that
Raleigh had a motive to falsely identify petitioner. Plainly, all three
elements of the exception for spontaneous declarations are satisfied,
and nothing in the totality of the circumstances indicates Raleigh's
statement should not have been admitted. Accordingly, we find it
extremely unlikely that a reviewing court would have concluded the
trial court abused its discretion when it admitted Raleigh's statement
at the scene identifying petitioner. Therefore, appellate counsel's
failure to raise the issue was not an error and did not prejudice
defendant.
	It is questionable whether Officer DuBose's testimony that
Raleigh identified the offenders, without testifying whom he identified,
is hearsay at all. However, because we have concluded that the
identification was clearly admissible as a spontaneous declaration, we
need not address that question. For the same reason, we need not
address the other grounds offered by the State for the admissibility of
the identification.
	In sum, petitioner's claim that he received ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel is patently without merit, and his postconviction
petition was properly dismissed.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the
appellate court remanding Robinson's postconviction petition. The
judgment of the circuit court, dismissing the petition, is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
	
I concur with the majority that petitioner, Emmanuel Robinson,
is entitled to no remedy because the de minimis delay did not deprive
him of the right to file a timely notice of appeal. I dissent, however,
from the majority's review of the merits of petitioner's postconviction
petition because such a review is premature.
	To survive summary dismissal, a postconviction petition need
only present " 'the gist of a constitutional claim.' " People v. Boclair,
202 Ill. 2d 89, 99-100, quoting People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410,
418 (1996). As the majority acknowledges, " '[t]he "gist" standard is
"a low threshold." ' " Slip op. at 12, quoting People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244 (2001), quoting Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 418. At this
stage in the proceedings, the only issue is "whether the petition alleges
constitutional deprivations." See Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d  at 102.
	In his postconviction petition, petitioner alleges, inter alia, that
his trial counsel was ineffective:
			(1) for not moving for a substitution of the judge who
conducted a hearing on his motion to suppress confession;
			(2) for not interviewing a State witness prior to trial and
conducting any investigation to discover other witnesses that
could have impeached the State witness' testimony;
			(3) for failing to object to Detective John Murray's
hearsay testimony concerning police reports prepared by
other police personnel, and failing to impeach Detective
Murray's testimony with other reports, and calling
impeachment witnesses;
			(4) for not objecting to testimony depicting petitioner as
a "drug dealer," when there was no evidence to corroborate
or substantiate that testimony;
			(5) for failing to object to highly inflammatory and
prejudicial testimony, or impeaching a witness with prior
grand jury testimony;
			(6) for withdrawing a motion to quash arrest and suppress
evidence when the trial court had already granted a motion to
suppress petitioner's inculpatory statement made during
custodial interrogation in violation of petitioner's fifth and
sixth amendment rights;
			(7) for failing to secure an expert witness to testify
concerning firearms;
			(8) for failing to move for a suppression hearing based on
suggestive identification procedures;
			(9) for failing to object to in-court identification of
petitioner;
			(10) for failing to provide effective assistance of counsel
at trial when counsel made no opening statement, objected
only twice during the entire trial, cross-examined only two of
the State's seven witnesses, and failed to preserve errors for
appellate review.
	Petitioner further alleges ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel for withdrawing as counsel based on his assumption that if he
pursued the appeal petitioner could receive a lengthier sentence.
	Petitioner's postconviction petition certainly presents the "gist"
of a constitutional claim to survive the first stage of the process for
the adjudication of postconviction petitions. Rather than determining
whether petitioner has presented the "gist" of a constitutional claim,
however, the majority prematurely reviews the merits of those claims,
when the circuit court has not done so.
	The proper procedure at this point in the proceedings is to
remand the cause to the circuit court for second-stage proceedings
where counsel may be appointed to represent the petitioner, and
counsel will then have an opportunity to amend the petition. 725 ILCS
5/122-1 et seq. (West 2000); Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d  at 100, citing People
v. Watson, 187 Ill. 2d 448 (1999). If the petition is not dismissed by
motion of the State at the second stage of the postconviction process,
then an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition will be
conducted in the third stage of the postconviction proceedings. 725
ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2000); Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 100.
	Thus, I would affirm the appellate court judgment, albeit on
different grounds, and remand this cause to the circuit court for
further proceedings. I therefore respectfully concur in part and dissent
in part.