Title: Vanessa Van Vorgue v. Mara M. Rankin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC08-2255
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 1, 2010

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-2255 
____________ 
 
VANNESSA VAN VORGUE,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
MARA M. RANKIN,  
Respondent. 
 
[April 1, 2010] 
 
POLSTON, J. 
 
Petitioner Vannessa Van Vorgue seeks review of the decision of the Third 
District Court of Appeal in Rankin v. Van Vorgue, 994 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2008), that reversed a trial court’s order denying release of funds held in escrow 
and remanded with instructions to allow disbursement to respondent Mara Rankin 
of fifty percent of the funds held in escrow from the sale of their Miami Beach 
home.1  We agree with Van Vorgue that the trial court erred by applying injunctive 
principles of law to the escrow funds, which were required under an escrow 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida 
Constitution. 
 
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agreement to be held until the parties’ disputes were resolved.  Therefore, we 
quash the Third District’s decision.   
I. BACKGROUND 
Mara Rankin and Vannessa Van Vorgue formed a corporation, Van Vorgue 
Enterprises, holding equal amounts of stock, and purchased a Miami Beach home, 
holding title as joint tenants.  Rankin, 994 So. 2d at 464.  In 2004, Rankin was 
transferred to California, and subsequently Rankin and Van Vorgue entered into a 
contract for sale of their Miami Beach home to a third party.  Id.  Sometime later, 
Van Vorgue signed two instruments:  (1) a quitclaim deed of the Miami Beach 
home, giving title to Rankin; and (2) an assignment of stock in Van Vorgue 
Enterprises, transferring her interest to Rankin.  Id.   
   
Before closing on the house sale, Van Vorgue sued Rankin on eight counts, 
claiming that, among other things, the quitclaim deed was not properly witnessed 
and she was fraudulently induced into signing both instruments.2  Id.  In order for 
the home sale to proceed, Van Vorgue signed a warranty deed on the home, and 
she and Rankin executed an escrow agreement providing that the proceeds from 
                                          
 
2.  Van Vorgue made several specific claims:  accounting and dissolution of 
corporate partnership; establishment of equitable lien on the house sale proceeds; 
cancellation of quitclaim deed and corporate transfer documents; fraud in the 
inducement; fraudulent misrepresentation; partition; restitution; and accounting, 
receivership, and dissolution of corporation.  Rankin, 994 So. 2d at 464 n.1.  
 
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the home sale would be held for a period of three weeks, during which time the 
parties would endeavor to reach an agreement regarding disbursement of the funds.   
The escrow agreement, in pertinent part, reads as follows: 
1.  The closing of the above transaction [home sale] was scheduled to 
occur on August 17, 2004.  A title defect arose due to the filing of a 
Notice of Lis Pendens by Vannessa Van Vorgue, filed in Case No. 
2004-17520 (CA 10), filed in the Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial 
Circuit, in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida.  The claim of 
Vannessa Van Vorgue includes a request for cancellation of a 
(disputed) Quit Claim Deed filed of record whereby Vannessa Van 
Vorgue appears to have released her interest in the property to Rankin, 
said Deed having been recorded . . . and a claim to her portion of the 
proceeds from the sale of the property as a co-owner.  This agreement 
shall also not constitute a waiver by either Vannessa Van Vorgue or 
Mara M. Rankin of their respective rights or claims to either seek 
cancellation of the disputed Quit Claim Deed or to seek enforcement 
of the same.  
 
2.  In order to clear title and allow the closing transaction to be 
completed, the parties have agreed as follows: 
 
 
A.  After closing the total Sellers proceeds in the amount of 
$753,232.12 (herein “Escrow Deposit” or “Deposit”) are to be placed 
in Escrow with Chicago Title Insurance Company, who shall hold the 
funds for a period of approximately three (3) weeks, until September 
10, 2004.  The parties shall endeavor to reach an agreement as to the 
disbursement of said funds within said three (3) week period. 
 
 
B.  Upon written authorization and instruction to disburse, 
signed, witnessed (by two witnesses) and notarized by Vannessa Van 
Vorgue, and her counsel, and Mara M. Rankin, and her counsel, or 
upon receipt of a Court Order instructing and authorizing Escrow 
Agent to disburse the funds, Escrow Agent shall disburse the funds in 
accordance with said written authorization or Court Order, provided 
however that notice of such Order shall be delivered to all parties to 
the escrow, and their counsel, in writing, by facsimile and by U.S. 
Certified Mail, return receipt requested; and only after the time to file 
 
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a motion for rehearing and to file a notice of appeal to such Order 
(and if an appeal is filed then the expiration of the time to file a 
motion for rehearing and to file a notice of appeal to such appeal) 
have all expired.  
 
 
C.  In the event no Court Order or written authorization and 
instruction to disburse is received by Escrow Agent within three (3) 
weeks, to wit:  on or before September 10, 2004, Escrow Agent is 
hereby authorized to immediately place the funds in the Registry of 
the Clerk of the Court for Miami-Dade County, Florida, pursuant to 
Case No. 2004-17520 (CA 10).  The Sellers understand and 
acknowledge that they will be completely responsible for any and all 
attorney’s fees, costs or expenses reasonably incurred by Escrow 
Agent related to having to place the funds in the Registry of the Court.  
 
(Emphasis added.)   
The parties’ escrow agreement also “requir[ed] the proceeds from the sale to 
remain in escrow until the claims of the suit were resolved.”  Rankin, 994 So. 2d at 
464.3   When, after several weeks, no determination had been made for disbursing 
the funds, Rankin filed a motion to transfer the escrow funds into an interest-
bearing account instead of into the registry of the clerk of the court.4  The trial 
court granted this motion, stating in its order that the escrow agent was “authorized 
(1) to continue holding the proceeds from the sale of the real property . . . pending 
                                          
 
 
3.  The escrow agreement states that the escrow agent, “[Chicago Title 
Insurance Company,] shall have no authority to release any of the escrowed 
deposit if there exists any dispute or claim of dispute between the parties to this 
escrow, not withstanding counsel’s opinion.” 
4.  In her motion, Rankin stated, “It is in the parties’ interests that the 
Escrow Agent continue to hold the funds and to place same in an interest bearing 
account for the benefit of the parties.”  Rankin also asserted that “[n]o prejudice 
will result to either party from the granting of this Motion.”  
 
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the resolution of the claims between the parties,[5] and (2) to deposit said proceeds 
in an interest-bearing account at a financial institution located in Miami-Dade 
County.”  (Emphasis added.)  The order further mandated that “[t]he funds held in 
said interest bearing account shall not be disbursed, pledged, borrowed against, or 
otherwise removed from said account except pursuant to the written authorization 
of the parties, or pursuant to further Order of this Court.”  The provisions of the 
trial court’s order requiring the funds to be held by the escrow agent until 
resolution of the claims between the parties are consistent with the terms of the 
escrow agreement.  Pursuant to the order, the escrow funds were transferred into an 
interest-bearing account.   
After two years passed, “Rankin filed a motion to release half of the 
escrowed funds, as well as a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking to 
enforce the instruments conveying interest in the property and assets” to her.  
Rankin, 994 So. 2d at 464.  The trial court denied both motions, and Rankin 
appealed to the Third District.  Id. 
 
The Third District dismissed as premature Rankin’s appeal of the trial 
court’s denial of her motion for partial summary judgment, but reversed the trial 
                                          
 
5.  The “claims” were not then defined by the trial court but were described 
in the escrow agreement as Van Vorgue’s claims to cancel the quitclaim deed and 
for her portion of the home sale proceeds.  Van Vorgue subsequently filed an 
amended complaint asserting various new causes of action.  
 
 
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court’s denial of Rankin’s motion to release fifty percent of the proceeds in 
escrow.  Id. at 464-65.  The Third District held that “[t]o order retention of 100% 
of the escrowed money until the parties resolve the other claims would be, 
essentially, an improper injunction.”  Id. at 465 (citing Konover Realty Assocs. v. 
Mladen, 511 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Pianeta Miami, Inc. v. 
Lieberman, 949 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Rosasco v. Rosasco, 641 So. 2d 
493 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)).  Accordingly, the Third District reversed the order 
denying Rankin’s motion for release of the sale proceeds and “remand[ed] to the 
trial court to allow disbursement to Rankin of fifty percent of the funds held in 
escrow from the sale of the Miami Beach home.”  Id.   
II. ANALYSIS 
Because the funds are being held until the parties’ claims are resolved, 
pursuant to the terms of an escrow agreement, the Third District’s treatment of the 
trial court’s order denying the release of funds as an improper injunction is 
incorrect.  As discussed below, the cases relied on by the Third District are not 
analogous to Rankin and therefore do not support its decision to reverse the trial 
court’s order.   
First, the Third District relied on Konover, 511 So. 2d at 706, in which the 
trial court ordered the defendants “to deposit $500,000 in the court registry 
pending the outcome of the case.”  No escrow fund had been established at any 
 
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point by the parties in Konover.  See Konover, 511 So. 2d at 706 n.1.  The Third 
District reviewed this order “as one granting an injunction” and reversed.  Id. at 
706.  The Third District in Konover relied on the following principle: 
It is entirely settled by a long and unbroken line of Florida cases that 
in an action at law for money damages, there is simply no judicial 
authority for an order requiring the deposit of the amount in 
controversy into the registry of the court or indeed for any restraint 
upon the use of a defendant’s unrestricted assets prior to the entry of 
judgment. 
 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).   
The Third District also relied on Rosasco, 641 So. 2d 493, in which the First 
District Court of Appeal held that the trial court lacked proper authority to order 
the husband in a divorce proceeding to deposit proceeds from a land sale into an 
escrow account pending the determination of attorneys’ fees he owed his wife.  
The First District called this nonfinal order “in the nature of an injunction” because 
it “required the Husband to accomplish the affirmative act of placing certain funds 
in an escrow account and thereby lose control and use of the funds pending the 
resolution of this litigation.”  Rosasco, 641 So. 2d at 494-95. 
 
Finally, the Third District cited Pianeta Miami, 949 So. 2d 215, which 
involved various claims and counterclaims between Pianeta Miami, Inc. and the 
Liebermans.  During the litigation, the trial court granted the Liebermans’ motion 
to order Pianeta Miami “to deposit $500,000 from the proceeds of the upcoming 
sale of the hotel into an escrow account.”  Pianeta, 949 So. 2d at 216.  After a final 
 
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judgment was entered for the Liebermans, but while further litigation was pending, 
Pianeta filed a motion to release the funds in escrow in excess of the judgment 
amount.  Id. at 217.  The trial court denied the motion, and on appeal, the Third 
District reviewed this order “as one granting an injunction.”  Id.  The Third District 
stated that “an injunction cannot be used to restrain the use of a party’s unrestricted 
assets prior to the conclusion of an action at law.”  Id. (citing Konover, 511 So. 2d 
at 706; Leight v. Berkman, 483 So. 2d 476, 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Supreme 
Serv. Station Corp. v. Telecredit Serv. Ctr., Inc., 424 So. 2d 844, 844 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1982)).  Because “the non-final order effectively restrains the use of Pianeta’s 
unrestricted assets, the funds in escrow . . . in excess of the new final judgment, 
plus prejudgment interest, . . . [are] being used to improperly secure the collection 
of a greater award of money damages in the future.”  Id. at 217-18.  Accordingly, 
the Third District reversed, holding that the trial court “unjustifiably denied the 
release of Pianeta’s unrestricted assets” from court-ordered escrow.  Id. at 218. 
In contrast, the trial court’s order denying the release of funds in Rankin was 
not in the nature of an injunction because it did not restrict previously unrestricted 
funds.  Here, unlike in the three cases relied on by the Third District, the funds 
were restricted funds, already being held in escrow by a third party by agreement 
of the parties.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 624 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “escrow” 
as “[a] legal document or property delivered by a promisor to a third party to be 
 
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held by the third party for a given amount of time or until the occurrence of a 
condition, at which time the third party is to hand over the document or property to 
the promisee”); Smith v. Macbeth, 161 So. 721, 724 (Fla. 1935) (“To constitute a 
binding escrow, there must be an instrument embodying conditions mutually 
beneficial to both parties, agreed to by both parties, and it must be communicated 
to and deposited with a third party.”). 
Because the disputed funds were held pursuant to the terms of an escrow 
agreement created to facilitate a sale and protect the parties’ interests by holding 
the funds while disputes were pending, the Third District erred by relying on 
injunctive principles of law that apply when there are no such escrow agreements.  
Accordingly, we agree with Van Vorgue that the Third District erred by reversing 
the trial court’s order denying the motion to release the escrow funds.  Therefore, 
we quash the Third District’s decision.    
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D07-378 
 
 
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(Dade County) 
 
Albert D. Rey and Raymond Carrero, Miami, Florida 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Alan Rosenthal and Natlie J. Carlos of Carlton Fields, P.A., Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent