Title: Steven V. Wright v. State of Indiana
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 49S02-0506-CR-285
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 22, 2005

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Michael R. Fisher 
 
 
 
 
Steve Carter 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maureen Ann Bartolo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
________________________________ 
 
No. 49S02-0506-CR-285 
 
STEVEN V. WRIGHT, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
 
________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, 49G01-0211-FB-276086 
The Honorable Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge 
 
__________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-0405-CR-405 
 
__________________________________ 
 
 
June 22, 2005 
 
 
Shepard, Chief Justice. 
 
 
 
1
Even in the substantial flow of cases reflecting child abuse, Steven V. Wright’s 
appeal stands out.  Wright was the stay-at-home caregiver for four very young children, 
whom he battered and neglected over a substantial period of time.  In sentencing Wright 
on six counts, the trial court ordered enhanced sentences based on aggravating 
circumstances we now know must be admitted or proven to a jury based on Blakely v. 
Washington.  We remand for a new sentencing hearing. 
 
 
When the Marion County Sheriff’s Department went to Wright’s home on 
September 2, 2001, to investigate the concern of an alarmed relative who had recently 
seen the children, it was not the first indication that Wright was abusing and neglecting 
the children in his care.  In April 1999, Ma. W., then five months old, arrived at the 
hospital with a fever, but medical examination revealed she also had seven right rib 
fractures and two left rib fractures and a healing fracture in her right femur. (Tr. at 121.)  
Wright told investigating officers that the leg was broken when an uncle had lost his grip 
while holding the child and grabbed her to prevent her from falling.  (Ex. at 16.)  At that 
time, Wright had no explanation for the broken ribs, except to suggest that he had, 
perhaps, held Ma. W. too tightly. (Ex. at 24.)  At trial, however, Wright suggested the 
possibility that both the ribs and femur were broken when the uncle grabbed his daughter 
to prevent her from falling.  (Tr. at 581-82.) 
 
The scene observed by the sheriff’s deputies thirty months later was a chilling 
one.  Two twins lying on a couch presented such a shocking appearance that the officers 
immediately called an ambulance. (Tr. at 54.)   The children’s heads were enlarged and 
swollen; their bodies were malnourished and thin; their eyes were popping out of their 
heads. (Tr. 38, 70).  Medical examination showed that each child had suffered at least 
seventeen fractures on various parts of their bodies. (Tr. 129-40; 141-50.)  At seven 
months of age, they weighed barely ten pounds apiece. (Tr. 379, 389.)  The record is 
replete with details of brain injury and other damage to the twins.  (See, e.g. Tr. 660.) 
Upstairs, the deputies found Ma. W. and her sister, ages three and two, in somewhat less 
distressful condition. 
 
 
2
 
The State filed two counts of neglect of a dependent, Ind. Code Ann. § 35-46-1-
4(b)(2) (West 2004), and six counts of battery, Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-2-1(a)(4) (West 
2004), all class B felonies.  Medical experts testified at trial that the injuries to the 
children were the product of intentional acts rather than falls or other accidents.  (See, 
e.g. Tr. at 150-51.)  Wright testified that he had not taken the children for medical 
attention because there was no medical insurance, although Wright’s wife, the children’s 
mother, worked for the United States Postal Service, and it provided medical insurance.  
(Tr. at 588-91.) 
 
 
The trial court found Wright guilty on both neglect counts and on four of the 
battery charges.  It found a considerable list of aggravating circumstances, including:  
Wright’s role as a primary caregiver, the obvious need for medical attention that the 
children’s very appearance presented, Wright’s practice of isolating the children from 
other adults who might render aid, the severity of the injuries inflicted, and the medical 
and law enforcement testimony to the effect that this was among the most severe case of 
child abuse they had ever encountered. (Tr. at 677-81.)  As a mitigating circumstance, the 
court found that Wright had no previous criminal record. (Tr. at 680.) 
 
 
The trial court sentenced Wright to fifteen years on every count, five years more 
than the standard term for class B felonies.  Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-5 (West 2004).  It 
ordered three of the fifteen year terms served consecutively and the remaining three terms 
concurrent to the consecutive sentence.  In effect, Wright received a forty-five year 
executed sentence. 
 
 
Wright appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the 
appropriateness of the sentence.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  Wright v. State, No. 
49A02-0405-CR-405 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2004) vacated.  We grant transfer and 
summarily affirm their rejection of his contentions about the adequacy of the evidence.  
Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).   
 
 
3
The sentencing requires further attention.  Examining Indiana’s sentencing 
scheme under the recent decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S.Ct. 2531 
(2004), we recently held that when a trial court adds years beyond the fixed, standard 
term provided in our code, the aggravating circumstances identified for that enhancement 
must be either proved beyond a reasonable doubt, admitted by the defendant, or represent 
prior criminal convictions. Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 682-83 (Ind. 2005).   
 
Wright admitted at trial to taking care of the children for extended periods of time 
while his wife was at work, and this admission is sufficient to make the “primary 
caregiver” aggravator permissible.  (Tr. at 584-85.)  The great weight of the aggravating 
circumstances found, however, was plainly with the remainder of the findings.  Grievous 
and obvious as the remaining aggravating circumstances in this case are, they do not fit 
under any of the categories identified in Blakely and noted in Smylie and cannot support 
the imposition of the enhanced sentences.   
 
They are, however, more than adequate to sustain consecutive counts.  A trial 
judge may find facts and render conclusions under Indiana’s sentencing scheme without 
running afoul of the Sixth Amendment as explained in Blakely.  Smylie, 823 N.E.2d at 
686. 
 
 
We thus affirm the convictions.  We affirm the trial court’s finding that the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are adequate to sustain consecutive sentences.  
We remand for a new sentencing proceeding.  The State may elect to prove aggravating 
circumstances to a jury or it may accept standard terms on each count and ask the trial 
court to reassess how many and which punishments should be served consecutively. 
 
 
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, Rucker, JJ., concur 
 
4