Title: Thompson v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 151, 2018
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2018

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MARTIN W. THOMPSON, 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 151, 2018 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§    
§  Cr. ID 1508021572 (N) 
§   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: May 8, 2018 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: July 9, 2018 
 
Before VAUGHN, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
Upon consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion 
to affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Martin Thompson, filed this appeal 
from the Superior Court’s order sentencing him for his third violation of 
probation (VOP).  The State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the 
judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Thompson’s 
opening brief that his appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that Thompson pled guilty in March 2016 to 
second degree robbery and second degree conspiracy.  The Superior Court 
immediately sentenced him as follows: (i) for second degree robbery, five 
 
2 
years at Level V imprisonment, suspended entirely for one year at Level III 
probation followed by one year at Level II probation; and (ii) for second 
degree conspiracy, two years at Level V imprisonment suspended for one year 
at Level III probation.  Thompson did not file a direct appeal.   
 
(3) 
Thompson was found in violation of his probation on August 17, 
2016 and again on March 8, 2017.  In sentencing him on both his first and 
second VOP, the Superior Court suspended all of Thompson’s Level V time 
for lower levels of supervision.   
(4) 
On November 30, 2017, while on Level III probation, police 
issued warrants for Thompson’s arrest for harassment, theft, and unlawful use 
of a credit card.  As a result of these new charges, Thompson was charged 
with his third VOP.  The VOP report alleged that Thompson had violated his 
probation by committing new criminal offenses, by failing to report to his 
probation officer on two occasions, by failing to attend court-ordered 
programs and obtain employment, and by breaking curfew. 
 
(5) 
Thompson failed to appear at the VOP hearing scheduled for 
January 24, 2018, and a capias was issued for his arrest.  On March 6, 2018, 
the Superior Court found Thompson in violation of probation and sentenced 
him as follows: (i) for second degree robbery, four years and ten months at 
Level V imprisonment (with credit for 19 days previously served), to be 
 
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suspended upon successful completion of the Key Program for two years at 
Level IV Crest, to be suspended upon successful completion of Level IV Crest 
for one year at Level III Crest Aftercare; and (ii) for second degree conspiracy, 
two years at Level V imprisonment, suspended entirely for two years at Level 
III probation.  Thompson appeals this sentence. 
 
(6) 
In his opening brief on appeal, Thompson contends that he 
should not have been found in violation of his probation because the new 
criminal charges against him were dismissed by the Family Court.  
Furthermore, he argues that his technical violations of his probation did not 
warrant the Superior Court sentencing him to complete the Key/Crest 
program.  Thompson contends he only failed to report because his mother was 
diagnosed with brain cancer and he was her sole caretaker and that his 
probation officer was aware of his situation. 
 
(7) 
We review the Superior Court’s revocation of a defendant’s 
probation for abuse of discretion.1  In a VOP hearing, unlike a criminal trial, 
the State is only required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant violated the terms of his probation.2  A preponderance of evidence 
means “some competent evidence” to “reasonably satisfy the judge that the 
                                                 
1 Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 716 (Del. 2006). 
2 Id. 
 
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conduct of the probationer has not been as good as required by the conditions 
of probation.”3  Because proof of a VOP is less than the “reasonable doubt” 
standard of a criminal trial, we have held that Superior Court has the authority 
to revoke a defendant’s probation for incurring new criminal charges 
notwithstanding the later dismissal of those charges.4   
 
(8) 
Thus, we find no merit to Thompson’s argument that the 
Superior Court could not find him in violation of his probation based on new 
criminal conduct when the charges were later dismissed.  To the extent that 
Thompson may be challenging the sufficiency of the State’s evidence to prove 
his VOP based on new criminal conduct, we are unable to review that claim 
because Thompson failed to request and provide a transcript of the VOP 
hearing to support such a claim.5  Moreover, Thompson does not dispute that 
he violated probation by his failure to report, which alone forms a sufficient 
basis for the Superior Court’s VOP finding. 
 
(9) 
Moreover, we find no merit to Thompson’s argument 
challenging the severity of his VOP sentence.  In sentencing a defendant for a 
VOP, the trial court is authorized to impose any period of incarceration up to 
                                                 
3 Id. (quoting Collins v. State, 897 A.2d 159, 160 (Del. 2006)). 
4 Hearn v. State, 2011 WL 6808013, *1 (Del. Dec. 21, 2011).  See also Gibbs v. State, 760 
A.2d 541, 544 (Del. 2000) (holding that the trial court may revoke probation 
notwithstanding the defendant’s acquittal on the underlying charges that gave rise to the 
VOP charge). 
5 Tricoche v. State, 525 A.2d 151, 154 (Del. 1987). 
 
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and including the balance of the Level V time remaining to be served on the 
original sentence.6  In this case, the Superior Court sentenced Thompson to 
complete the Level V Key Program, followed by decreasing levels of 
supervision at Level IV Crest and Level III Crest Aftercare.  Under the 
circumstances, the sentence was far less than the Level V time remaining on 
Thompson’s original sentence.  We conclude that the sentence was neither 
arbitrary nor excessive and does not reflect any evidence of a closed mind by 
the sentencing judge.  
 
 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
6 11 Del. C. § 4334(c).