Title: Commonwealth v. Richardson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12375
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 2018

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12375  
 
 
 
 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSHUA A. RICHARDSON. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     December 7, 2017. - April 17, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Marijuana.  Medicine.  Controlled Substances.  Search and 
Seizure, Affidavit, Probable cause, Warrant.  Probable 
Cause.  License. Jury and Jurors.  Evidence, Expert 
opinion, Intent.  Intent.  Practice, Criminal, Affidavit, 
Motion to suppress, Warrant, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Framingham Division 
of the District Court Department on September 9, 2013.  
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Douglas W. Stoddart, J.; a 
pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Martine 
Carroll, J.; and the case was tried before David W. Cunis, J.  
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review.  
 
 
 
Allison Callahan for the defendant. 
 
Elizabeth J. May, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The defendant, a medical marijuana patient, was 
arrested when police discovered twenty-two marijuana plants 
2 
 
growing in his basement.  After a jury trial, he was convicted 
of unlawful cultivation of marijuana and possession with intent 
to distribute marijuana.  On appeal, he argues that (1) the 
criminal complaint and the search warrant lacked probable cause; 
(2) the jury instructions were in error; (3) the evidence was 
insufficient to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and (4) the medical marijuana law's sixty-day supply 
limit is unconstitutionally vague as applied.  For the reasons 
stated below, we reverse in part and affirm in part. 
 
1.  Background.  The defendant, Joshua A. Richardson, was 
an unemployed tattoo artist living in Framingham at the time of 
his arrest.  On July 2, 2013, he obtained a written 
certification from a qualifying physician that approved his use 
of medical marijuana to treat a number of medical conditions.  
The certification constituted a valid hardship cultivation 
registration permitting the defendant to grow up to ten ounces 
of marijuana every sixty days for his personal, medical use.1  
                     
 
1 No medical marijuana dispensaries were operating at this 
time and the Department of Public Health (department) had not 
yet begun to process hardship cultivation registration 
applications.  Commonwealth v. Canning, 471 Mass. 341, 348 & 
n.10 (2015).  Accordingly, every qualifying patient with a 
written certification was authorized to cultivate medical 
marijuana.  Id. at 347-348 & n.8-10, 349.  See St. 2012, c. 369, 
§ 2 (N) (defining a written certification as a "document signed 
by a licensed physician, stating that in the physician's 
professional opinion, the potential benefits of medical use of 
 
3 
 
Approximately two months later, on September 7, 2013, the 
defendant telephoned 911 to report a home invasion at his 
residence.  The defendant told the 911 operator that three men 
had entered his home and "started beating the hell out of 
[him]." 
 
Officer Wayne Jordan reported to the defendant's residence 
within a few minutes of receiving the dispatch.  The defendant 
told Wayne that three men had broken into his house, one of whom 
had a gun.  Approximately twenty officers arrived on scene, 
including a number of Framingham police vehicles; State police 
vehicles and canine units; a State police helicopter; and 
officers from surrounding towns.  The police established a 
perimeter around the house to search for the home invaders.  
Framingham police Sergeant Michael Esposito assembled a team of 
officers to enter the defendant's home to determine whether the 
suspects were still inside.  The team did not find anyone inside 
the house.  However, Sergeant Esposito observed a pressure 
cooker and an autoclave2 in the kitchen.  In a room on the first 
floor, Sergeant Esposito noticed "a fan and blower assembly with 
a hose feeding it air or taking air out."  He observed a plastic 
                                                                  
marijuana would likely outweigh the health risks for the 
qualifying patient"). 
 
 
2 Sergeant Michael Esposito testified that an autoclave is a 
device typically found in a medical facility that is used to 
sterilize equipment. 
4 
 
container with aluminum trays with a brown leafy substance in 
them, which he described at trial as "some type of something 
growing in those trays."3  He also found a blow torch and 
numerous plastic bags in the room.   
 
Sergeant Esposito learned from other officers on the team 
that they had found marijuana growing in the basement.  At that 
point, Esposito ordered everyone out of the house and secured 
the premises.  Once outside, Sergeant Esposito read the 
defendant the Miranda rights.  The defendant indicated that he 
would not speak with police without his attorney present, and 
Esposito stopped asking him questions.  However, the defendant 
then said, unprompted, that the police "only had the right to go 
in my house and look for . . . the guys with the gun.  I never 
                     
 
3 One of the police reports indicated that police believed 
this to be a "psilocybin mushroom grow".  When police asked the 
defendant about the items found in the room on the first floor, 
the defendant said "he was experimenting on how to grow 
mushrooms" and that "he was teaching his [five] year old son how 
to grow things."  He stated that "he had also been trying to 
grow his own mushroom spores and that they were contained in a 
white Styrofoam box in that room."  The police seized the 
mushrooms and sent them for laboratory analysis.  The police 
report states that "charges will be filed [for growing 
psilocybin mushrooms] after analysis" of the mushrooms.  At the 
motion to dismiss hearing, the Commonwealth indicated that it 
made sense to try the mushroom and marijuana charges together, 
but that the Commonwealth did not know the status of the 
laboratory analysis of the mushrooms.  Ultimately, the 
Commonwealth never charged the defendant with a crime related to 
the mushrooms.  The record does not indicate whether this is 
because the laboratory analysis showed that the mushrooms did 
not contain psilocybin or for some other reason. 
5 
 
gave you permission to look for drugs.  This is fucked up."  He 
indicated that he had a license to grow marijuana.  At that 
point, the defendant was placed under arrest and searched.  The 
police found $2,135 in cash in his pocket. 
 
After the defendant was arrested, he was taken to the 
Framingham police station.  He requested to speak with the 
detectives investigating his case.  Detective Robert Lewis of 
the Framingham police department's narcotics unit brought the 
defendant into an interview room and read him the Miranda rights 
again.  The defendant explained to the detective that he had 
recently been given a medical marijuana card and was growing 
marijuana under that registration, referring to the doctor's 
certification issued to him on July 2, 2013.  On the morning of 
his arrest, he was in the basement pruning his marijuana plants 
when he heard a noise coming downstairs.  He saw two 
individuals, one with a gun.  He ran upstairs to the second-
floor bedroom, and noticed a third man coming up the stairs 
toward him.  He escaped the house and telephoned 911, using a 
cellular telephone borrowed from a passing bystander. 
 
Pursuant to a search warrant, Framingham officers seized 
twenty-two plants ranging in height from one foot to three feet 
tall, fertilizer, pots, and soil from the basement.  According 
6 
 
to Officer Lewis, some of the plants were "in full bloom."4  The 
plants were all located in the basement, in a tent designed for 
growing marijuana.  The officers found two large five feet by 
three feet high intensity lights hanging over the marijuana 
plants, a ballast system,5 and other boxes of lights in the 
basement.  There was a "fertilizer grow kit" in the basement as 
well, labeled, "Recipe for Success Starter Kit".  In the room on 
the first floor that Sergeant Esposito had previously examined, 
they found a scale and plastic bags.6  In the kitchen, they found 
fertilizer advertised for growing marijuana.  Detective Lewis 
also testified that they found evidence of a tattoo business in 
the house, specifically a tattoo gun.  However, he did not find 
any physical evidence that a home invasion had occurred or that 
anyone else had been in the house.  Lewis further testified that 
the defendant's account of seeing a third man come up the stairs 
                     
 
4 On cross-examination, Detective Robert Lewis could not 
identify which plants were flowering from a photograph taken of 
the grow operation. 
 
 
5 The Commonwealth's expert testified that ballasts are used 
in conjunction with high intensity lights to "provide light to a 
specific number of plants."  The wattage of the ballasts is 
important because the brightness of the grow lights affects the 
growth cycle of marijuana plants. 
 
 
6 The search warrant return document indicates that the 
scale was found in the master bedroom, but Detective Lewis 
testified that the scale was found in the room on the first 
floor. 
7 
 
to the second floor was inconsistent with the layout of the 
house. 
 
At trial, the defendant's former girl friend, who was 
dating and living with him at the time of his arrest, testified 
for the Commonwealth.  The couple had known each other for 
fourteen months and had dated for eleven months when the 
defendant was arrested.  When asked if the defendant was a 
regular marijuana user at the time of his arrest, she testified, 
"not that I noticed -- maybe a couple times.  I don't know what 
he did when I he [sic] was not around."  She stated that he was 
not working at the time.  She observed him leave the house from 
time to time but didn't know where he went.  She worked five or 
six days per week, and when she came home the defendant was 
often sleeping, hidden in the back room on the first floor, or 
not home.  She acknowledged that the defendant had tattoo 
equipment at the house, and that she saw him "do a couple of 
tattoos."  She also testified that he was typically paid in cash 
by friends for giving them tattoos.  In the whole time she dated 
the defendant, she could recall approximately six times that he 
said he was going to do work at a tattoo parlor.  She did not 
know whether his tattoo equipment included the pressure cooker 
or autoclave found in the house. 
 
The defendant was charged with unlawful cultivation of 
marijuana and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.  
8 
 
Prior to trial, he moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that 
there was no probable cause to believe he had committed the 
crimes charged.  The motion was denied.  The defendant then 
moved to suppress his statements to police and the evidence 
seized, arguing that he did not give police permission to enter 
his house in the first instance, and that there was no probable 
cause to believe that he had committed the crimes charged.  The 
motion to suppress also was denied.  After a jury trial, the 
defendant was convicted on both counts.  The defendant appealed, 
and we granted his application for direct appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  General Laws c. 94C, § 32C (a), provides:  
"Any person who knowingly or intentionally 
manufactures, distributes, dispenses or cultivates, or 
possesses with intent to manufacture, distribute, dispense 
or cultivate a controlled substance in Class D of [§ 31] 
shall be imprisoned in a jail or house of correction for 
not more than two years or by a fine or not less than 
[$500] nor more than [$5,000], or both such fine and 
imprisonment." 
 
The applicability of this section was altered by the 
legalization of medical marijuana in Massachusetts. 
The Commonwealth's medical marijuana scheme, St. 2012, 
c. 369 (act), was passed by ballot initiative in 2012.7  It 
provides in part: 
                     
 
7 Upon the execution of the transfer agreement between the 
department and the Cannabis Control Commission, or on December 
31, 2018, whichever occurs first, St. 2012, c. 369, will be 
codified as G. L. c. 94I.  See St. 2017, c. 55, §§ 44, 82. 
9 
 
"A qualifying patient or a personal caregiver shall 
not be subject to arrest or prosecution, or civil penalty, 
for the medical use of marijuana provided he or she: 
 
"(a) Possesses no more marijuana than is necessary for 
the patient's personal, medical use, not exceeding the 
amount necessary for a sixty-day supply; and 
 
"(b) Presents his or her registration card to any law 
enforcement official who questions the patient or caregiver 
regarding use of marijuana." 
 
St. 2012, c. 369, § 4.  However, "[n]othing in [the act] 
supersedes Massachusetts law prohibiting the possession, 
cultivation, transport, distribution, or sale of marijuana for 
nonmedical purposes."  St. 2012, c. 369, § 7 (E).  The act went 
into effect on January 1, 2013, and corresponding regulations 
became effective May 24, 2013.  St. 2012, c. 369, § 16. 
 
Under the act, qualifying patients may use marijuana for 
medicinal purposes, within certain parameters.  "[T]he principal 
source of medical marijuana is intended to be the nonprofit 
medical marijuana treatment centers, or dispensaries, that are 
to be registered by [the Department of Public Health]" 
(department).  Commonwealth v. Canning, 471 Mass. 341, 345-346 
(2015).  However, the act permits qualifying patients to obtain 
a "hardship cultivation registration" in certain limited 
circumstances.8  St. 2012, c. 369, § 11.  
                     
 
8 A recreational marijuana scheme, St. 2016, c. 334, was 
later passed by ballot initiative in 2016.  Effective December 
15, 2016, an individual may grow up to six marijuana plants, so 
 
10 
 
 
Patients may qualify for a hardship cultivation 
registration if their access to a dispensary is "limited by 
verified financial hardship, a physical incapacity to access 
reasonable transportation, or the lack of a treatment center 
within a reasonable distance of the patient's residence."  St. 
2012, c. 369, § 11.  A hardship cultivation registration allows 
the qualifying patient or the patient's personal caregiver to 
"cultivate a limited number of plants, sufficient to maintain a 
[sixty]-day supply of marijuana."  Id.  A "sixty-day supply" is 
defined by regulation as presumptively ten ounces, unless a 
physician certifies that a larger quantity is necessary to 
provide the patient with a sixty-day supply.  See 105 Code Mass. 
Regs. §§ 725.004, 725.010(I) (2017). 
The hardship cultivation registration was envisioned as "an 
approach of last resort."  Memorandum from DPH Medical Marijuana 
Work Group to Interim Commissioner of Department of Public 
Health and Members of Public Health Council, Informational 
Briefing on Proposed Regulations at 105 CMR 725.000, at 6 (Apr. 
10, 2013).  Recognizing the possible "diversion and security 
complications" that accompany home cultivation, the department 
promulgated medical marijuana regulations with an intent to 
"minimize hardship cultivation by optimizing access through a 
                                                                  
long as no more than twelve plants are grown per household.  See 
G. L. c. 94G, § 7 (a) (2); St. 2016, c. 334, § 12. 
11 
 
variety of [other] approaches."  Id. at 8.  However, at the time 
of the defendant's arrest, there were no medical marijuana 
dispensaries open in Massachusetts, and the department had not 
yet begun to process hardship cultivation registration 
applications.  See Canning, 471 Mass. at 347-348 & n.10.  Thus, 
as a qualifying medical marijuana patient, the defendant was 
permitted to pursue home cultivation under the act.  See id. at 
349 ("when the search at issue here took place, the act was not 
fully implemented; no marijuana treatment centers were 
operating; and therefore, . . . every person who was certified 
as a qualifying patient . . . was authorized to cultivate a 
sufficient quantity of marijuana to produce a sixty-day supply" 
[emphasis in original]).  Accordingly, the defendant was 
protected from prosecution for cultivating marijuana for his 
personal, medical use, provided he did not possess marijuana in 
excess of the amount necessary for a sixty-day supply.  See St. 
2012, c.  369, § 4. 
a.  Probable cause.  The defendant argues that the motion 
to dismiss and the motion to suppress were each improperly 
denied.  On appeal, he provides the same rationale in support of 
both contentions -- that there was insufficient probable cause. 
 
i.  Motion to suppress.  In determining whether the motion 
to suppress was properly denied, we are limited to examining the 
four corners of the search warrant affidavit.  Canning, 471 
12 
 
Mass. at 348.  We must decide whether "the magistrate had a 
substantial basis to conclude that a crime had been committed, . 
. . and that the items described in the warrant were related to 
the criminal activity and probably in the place to be searched."  
Id., quoting Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297-298 
(2003). 
 
A search warrant affidavit that merely sets out facts 
establishing probable cause to believe a homeowner is growing 
marijuana on the property to be searched, without more, does not 
establish probable cause to believe a crime has been committed.  
Canning, 471 Mass. at 352-353.9  Where the target of the warrant 
has a valid hardship cultivation registration, facts indicating 
that the person is selling the marijuana or that "in the opinion 
of a properly qualified affiant, the number of plants exceeded 
the quantity necessary to grow a sixty-day supply of ten ounces" 
can supply probable cause.  Id. at 352 n.15.  The search warrant 
at issue here established both. 
 
The affidavit that Detective Lewis submitted in support of 
the search warrant stated explicitly that based on the number of 
                     
 
9 Our opinion in Canning goes on to say that facts 
indicating that the person does not have a valid hardship 
cultivation registration can supply probable cause.  Canning, 
471 Mass. at 352.  We note, however, that Canning was decided 
before recreational marijuana was legalized, which permits 
individuals to grow a limited number of marijuana plants without 
a hardship cultivation registration.  See G. L. c. 94G, 
§ 7 (a) (2).  See also note 8, supra. 
13 
 
plants found, the conditions under which they were growing, and 
his own experience with the narcotics unit, he believed that the 
"marijuana grow" was in excess of the amount necessary for 
personal medical use.  Moreover, the affidavit indicated that a 
suspected "psilocybin mushroom grow" was found in the house; the 
defendant's long-term girl friend did not know why he was 
growing marijuana given that he did not smoke marijuana on a 
regular basis; and the defendant had said that two men came 
directly into his basement, the exact location of his marijuana 
grow, and that one had brandished a gun.  This was sufficient to 
establish probable cause.10 
                     
 
10 However, we note that the affiant's assertion that "by 
and large it is not worth it for users to invest the necessary 
time and money to create a successful marijuana grow when they 
can simply buy marijuana from somebody else," is not itself a 
proper basis for establishing probable cause.  The act 
contemplates that users with valid hardship cultivation 
registrations will cultivate marijuana.  It would defeat the 
public's purpose in voting for the medical marijuana scheme to 
treat evidence consistent with lawful cultivation as evidence of 
unlawful cultivation or intent to distribute.  Cf. Canning, 471 
Mass. at 352 ("The act's medical marijuana program is structured 
as a licensing or registration system, and expressly 
contemplates the lawful possession, cultivation, and 
distribution of marijuana for medical purposes by a number of 
different individuals [and certain nonprofit entities], as long 
as they are registered to do so.  In light of the statutory and 
regulatory framework created by the act, a search warrant 
affidavit setting out facts that simply establish probable cause 
to believe the owner is growing marijuana on the property in 
question, without more, is insufficient to establish probable 
cause to believe that the suspected cultivation is a crime"); 
Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 570 (2013) ("Where 
[intent to distribute] is not [supported by probable cause], 
 
14 
 
 
The defendant argues that the police were required to 
investigate how much marijuana constituted a sixty-day supply 
under his registration, because "[n]either the statute nor the 
[regulations] provide[s] a presumptive limit on how much 
marijuana a person may legally prescribe."  The defendant 
misstates the law.  Although there is no absolute limit on how 
much medical marijuana can be prescribed, the presumptive limit 
is indeed ten ounces in a sixty-day period.  See note 14, infra.  
Accordingly, there was sufficient probable cause for the search 
warrant. 
 
ii.  Motion to dismiss.  A motion to dismiss for lack of 
probable cause is evaluated from the four corners of the 
application for a complaint.  See Commonwealth v. DiBennadetto, 
436 Mass. 310, 313 (2002); Commonwealth v. Bell, 83 Mass. App. 
Ct. 61, 62 (2013).  Here, the application included police 
reports from Sergeant Esposito and Detective Lewis, which laid 
out substantially the same factual basis as the search warrant 
affidavit.  Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, the 
motion to dismiss also was properly denied. 
                                                                  
criminal prosecution defeats the public's purpose in voting for 
decriminalization because it not only treats simple possession 
of one ounce or less of marijuana as if it were 'a serious 
infraction worthy of criminal sanction,' . . . but it also 
treats a drug user as a drug dealer" [citation omitted]). 
15 
 
b.  Jury instructions.  The defendant argues for the first 
time on appeal that the jury instructions were in error.  
Because he did not object to the instructions at trial, we 
review for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. St. Louis, 473 Mass. 350, 359 (2015). 
i.  Instruction on possession with intent to distribute.  
The judge explained that the Commonwealth was required to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the substance in question was 
a class D substance; (2) the defendant possessed some 
perceptible amount of that substance with the intent to 
distribute it to another person; and (3) the defendant did so 
knowingly or intentionally.  See G. L. c. 94C, § 32C; 
Instruction 7.800 of the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for 
Use in the District Court (2009).  The defendant argues that 
possession with intent to distribute requires possession of 
usable marijuana,11 not simply marijuana, and that the judge 
erred in failing to make this distinction.  The defendant is 
incorrect. 
General laws c. 94C, § 32C, prohibits possessing a class D 
substance with intent to distribute.  "Marihuana" is listed as a 
                     
 
11 Usable marijuana is defined by regulation as "the fresh 
or dried leaves and flowers of the female marijuana plant and 
any mixture or preparation thereof, including [marijuana-infused 
products], but does not include the seedlings, seeds, stalks, or 
roots of the plant, or [marijuana waste product]."  105 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 725.004 (2017). 
16 
 
class D substance, and is defined to include "all parts of the 
plant [c]annabis sativa L., whether growing or not."  See G. L. 
c. 94C, §§ 1, 31.  The medical marijuana act adopted the meaning 
of "marihuana" as defined in G. L. c. 94C, § 1.  See St. 2012, 
c. 369, § 2 (G).  Although the medical marijuana regulations 
contain a definition for "usable marijuana," the term is only 
used to explain certain regulatory requirements and in no way 
alters the meaning of "marihuana" under G. L. c. 94C, § 1.  
Accordingly, the judge did not err in instructing the jury that 
the defendant need only possess marijuana, not usable marijuana, 
for the purposes of possession with intent to distribute. 
The defendant also argues that the instructions were 
improper for failing to clarify what evidence the jury may 
consider where the defendant has a valid home cultivation 
registration.  The judge instructed: 
"Among the factors you may consider in [evaluating intent to 
distribute] are how large a quantity of drugs were possessed, 
how pure in quality the drugs were, what the street value of 
the drugs were, what the defendant's financial resources were, 
how the drugs were packaged, whether there were other items 
that were found along with the drugs which might suggest drug 
sales, such as cutting agents or packaging materials, scale[s] 
or large amounts of cash." 
 
This instruction is primarily derived from our case law prior to 
the enactment of the medical marijuana scheme.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Clermy, 421 Mass. 325, 331 (1995) (packaging of 
drugs in many small packets and possession of telephone pager); 
17 
 
Commonwealth v. Scala, 380 Mass. 500, 511 (1980) (quantity 
possessed); Commonwealth v. Sendele, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 755, 758-
759 (1984) (quantity, purity, packaging, and amount of cash 
possessed). 
 
Here, the defendant asserts that the judge was required to 
include an instruction clarifying that lawful home cultivation 
of medical marijuana requires adhering to "industry best 
practices," pursuant to 105 Code Mass. Regs. § 725.035(I) 
(2017).  The defendant argues that because the jury were unaware 
of the best practices requirement, and because the Commonwealth 
relied heavily on testimony about his equipment, the jury may 
have improperly discerned an intent to distribute from his 
lawful use of grow equipment contemplated by the regulatory 
scheme.  Although the regulations do not define the "industry 
best practices" to which patients must adhere, elsewhere in the 
regulations medical marijuana dispensaries are required to "use 
best practices to limit contamination, including but not limited 
to mold, fungus, bacterial diseases, rot, pests, pesticides not 
approved by the [d]epartment, mildew, and any other contaminant 
identified as posing potential harm."  105 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 725.105(B)(1)(f) (2017).  As indicated by the expert testimony 
at trial, to limit contamination, growers use particularized 
equipment, such as high efficiency particulate air filters, 
ozone generators, and hydrometers.   
18 
 
 
"An error creates a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice unless we are persuaded that it did not 'materially 
influence[]' the guilty verdict" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 13 (1999).  "In applying 
this standard, we analyze the potential impact of the error on 
the verdict, . . . and review the record to determine the 
strength of the Commonwealth's case, absent the improper 
evidence" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Horne, 476 Mass. 
222, 228 (2017). 
 
Although we agree that juries should be informed of the 
"industry best practices" requirement when such an instruction 
is requested,12 here we cannot conclude that its absence 
materially influenced the verdict on possession with intent to 
distribute.  Sophisticated grow equipment designed to increase 
the yield of usable marijuana, in combination with a large 
number of plants, may properly be considered when evaluating 
                     
 
12 In cases involving a defendant with a valid hardship 
cultivation registration, the jury should be instructed that the 
medical marijuana regulations require medical marijuana patients 
and caregivers to adhere to industry best practices in the 
cultivation of marijuana plants and storage of usable marijuana.  
105 Code Mass. Regs. § 725.035(I) (2017).  "Industry best 
practices" is not defined in the regulation, but may be 
understood as those industry practices commonly used to limit 
contamination.  See 105 Code Mass. Regs. § 725.105(B)(1)(f) 
(2017).  A patient or caregiver's use of industry best practices 
is not evidence of criminal intent. 
 
19 
 
intent to distribute.13  The testimony at trial indicated that 
the actual equipment and methods used for the defendant's grow 
operation were primarily associated with increasing yield.  
However, there was no testimony indicating that such equipment 
was associated with limiting contamination.  To the contrary, 
the expert testimony indicated that the defendant lacked 
equipment necessary to limit contamination.  More importantly, 
in addition to the grow equipment, the jury also heard evidence 
of an armed home invasion, a large amount of cash, numerous 
plastic baggies, a digital pocket scale, and the defendant's 
sparing drug use.  Under these circumstances, the failure to 
give a best practices instruction, even if in error, did not 
create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. 
ii.  Unlawful cultivation instruction.  The model jury 
instruction for unlawful cultivation, and the one given in this 
case, albeit with supplementation, is that unlawful cultivation 
consists of three elements:  (1) the substance in question was a 
class D substance; (2) the defendant cultivated some perceptible 
amount of that substance; and (3) the defendant did so knowingly 
                     
 
13 We recognize that there may be overlap between equipment 
designed to increase yield and equipment designed to limit 
contamination.  If fewer plants succumb to contamination, the 
total crop yield of usable marijuana will presumably be higher.  
However, we discern a distinction between equipment whose 
primary purpose is to limit contamination, and equipment whose 
primary purpose is to increase yield, irrespective of 
contamination. 
20 
 
or intentionally.  See G. L. c. 94C, § 32C; Instruction 7.800 of 
the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District 
Court. 
Under this definition, any medical marijuana patient who 
cultivates his or her own supply of medical marijuana, a class D 
substance, pursuant to a hardship cultivation registration would 
be guilty of unlawful cultivation.  However, "[u]nder the 
[medical marijuana] act, cultivation of marijuana is expressly 
permitted if a person . . . is properly registered to do so, and 
the cultivation does not exceed the amount necessary to yield a 
sixty-day supply of medical marijuana" for the patient's 
personal, medical use.  Canning, 471 Mass. at 349; St. 2012, 
c. 369, §§ 4, 7. 
The act creates two theories of unlawful cultivation of 
medical marijuana where the defendant produces evidence of a 
valid hardship cultivation registration:  (1) unlawful 
cultivation of more than a sixty-day supply, and (2) unlawful 
cultivation for nonpersonal use.  See St. 2012, c. 369, § 4.  
Under a theory of unlawful cultivation of more than a sixty-day 
supply, the jury must be instructed as to the three elements of 
unlawful cultivation mentioned above, as well as two additional 
elements:  (a) the defendant cultivated more than the amount 
necessary to provide a sixty-day supply of medical marijuana to 
the patient; and (b) the defendant did so intentionally.  See 
21 
 
Canning, 471 Mass. at 349; St. 2012, c. 369, § 4.  It is not 
enough that the plants happen to yield more than ten ounces in a 
sixty-day period; the medical marijuana regulations contemplate 
a patient's ability to return excess marijuana to a medical 
dispensary.  See 105 Code Mass. Regs. § 725.105(J)(4) (2017).  
Rather, the Commonwealth must show that the defendant was 
intentionally cultivating more than the amount necessary to 
provide ten ounces of usable marijuana in a sixty-day period.14   
By contrast, under a theory of unlawful cultivation for 
nonpersonal use, the jury must instead be instructed as to the 
following additional element:  the defendant cultivated 
marijuana with the intent to distribute.15  See St. 2012, c. 369, 
§§ 4, 7 (E).16 
                     
 
14 The regulations contemplate that a sixty-day supply may 
exceed ten ounces for a particular patient.  St. 2012, c. 369, 
§ 8; 105 Code Mass. Regs. § 725.010(I) (2017).  In such 
instances, the certifying physician must "document the amount 
[that constitutes a sixty-day supply] and the rationale in the 
medical record and in the written certification."  105 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 725.010(I).  For defendants who produce evidence 
establishing that they were validly permitted to grow more than 
ten ounces every sixty days, the Commonwealth must prove that 
they intended to cultivate more than their registration 
permitted them to grow in a sixty-day period. 
 
 
15 The regulations permit home cultivation by a personal 
caregiver on behalf of the patient the caregiver serves.  See 
105 Code Mass. Regs. § 725.020(E) (2017).  In cases where a 
personal caregiver is being tried for unlawful cultivation for 
nonpersonal use, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant 
cultivated marijuana with the intent to distribute it to someone 
other than the patient for whom the defendant served as a 
 
22 
 
To determine whether the unlawful cultivation instruction 
was erroneous such that it created a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice, we must examine the jury instructions as 
a whole.  See Commonwealth v. Shea, 467 Mass. 788, 796 (2014).  
"Isolated misstatements included in a comprehensive charge to 
the jury do not constitute reversible error when there is little 
likelihood that the jury would have misunderstood the correct 
import of the entire charge."  Commonwealth v. Rogers, 459 Mass. 
249, 262, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1080 (2011). 
Although the judge did not use the language set out above, 
he told the jury that the defendant had a valid hardship 
cultivation registration and that it was the Commonwealth's 
burden to prove the defendant "had so many marijuana plants that 
the plant yield was certain to exceed [ten] ounces of usable 
marijuana every [sixty] days or that he intended to sell or 
distribute any of his usable marijuana."  This instruction 
failed to explain that the Commonwealth must show that the 
defendant was intentionally cultivating more than ten ounces of 
usable marijuana in a sixty-day period.  Without such a 
directive, the judge's instructions could have led the jury to 
                                                                  
personal caregiver.  See St. 2012, c. 369, § 4 (personal 
caregivers included in provision protecting personal, medical 
use from prosecution). 
 
 
16 Model jury instructions for unlawful cultivation of 
marijuana is set forth in the Appendix. 
23 
 
convict the defendant even if he was unintentionally cultivating 
more plants than were necessary to yield ten ounces in sixty 
days.  Thus, the jury instructions on unlawful cultivation were 
erroneous. 
We conclude that this error created a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.17  As will be explained in more detail in 
our discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence, there was 
limited expert testimony about how much the defendant's plants 
would yield.  The jury were also tasked with determining whether 
the defendant was a novice or an experienced grower as the two 
experts had contradictory testimony on this point.  In these 
circumstances, whether the defendant was intentionally 
cultivating more than ten ounces was a difficult jury question.  
We are not persuaded that the absence of this jury instruction 
                     
 
17 At oral argument, the Commonwealth insisted that even if 
the jury instructions for unlawful cultivation were erroneous, 
the defendant's conviction should be upheld under a theory of 
unlawful cultivation for nonpersonal use.  The Commonwealth 
reasoned that because the jury found the defendant guilty of 
possession with intent to distribute, he would be guilty of 
unlawful cultivation irrespective of whether he grew more than a 
sixty-day supply.  Without better briefing on the subtle 
distinction between unlawful cultivation for nonpersonal use and 
possession with intent to distribute in these circumstances, we 
decline to consider this theory where it is first raised at oral 
argument.  See Commonwealth v. Palmer, 464 Mass. 773, 777 
(2013); Commonwealth v. Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 511 (2012); 
Warner–Lambert Co. v. Execuquest Corp., 427 Mass. 46, 50 n.7 
(1998); Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 
(1975). 
 
24 
 
did not materially influence the outcome.  See Alphas, 430 Mass. 
at 13.18 
c.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  Next, the defendant 
argues that the evidence was insufficient as to both unlawful 
cultivation and possession with intent to distribute.  In 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine 
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Commonwealth v. 
Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979).  "Under this standard 
of review, we resolve issues of witness credibility in favor of 
the Commonwealth. . . .  In determining whether a reasonable 
jury could find each element of the crime charged, we also do 
not weigh the supporting evidence against conflicting evidence" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 812 
(2017). 
                     
 
18 The defendant also argues that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for helping to write the jury instructions he 
contends are erroneous.  We need not address the defendant's 
claim of ineffective assistance as to the unlawful cultivation 
conviction, as we have already determined that the instruction 
was erroneous and created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.  However, for essentially the same reasons that led us 
to conclude that the jury instructions on possession with intent 
to distribute did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage 
of justice, we also conclude that those instructions did not 
prejudice the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Peters, 429 Mass. 
22, 31 n.12 (1999).  The only error in those instructions 
related to best practices, an issue of marginal relevance in the 
instant case. 
25 
 
 
i.  Evidence of yield in excess of sixty-day supply.  As 
discussed, the jury were not properly instructed as to the 
standard for evaluating whether a defendant exceeded the home 
cultivation limit.  We also conclude that the evidence was 
insufficient to support such a finding. 
 
As the Commonwealth's expert testified, an individual 
marijuana plant's yield depends on a number of factors, 
including the strain, growing conditions, fertilization, 
watering, temperature, ventilation, amount of light, location, 
and humidity.  Yet the Commonwealth's expert never personally 
observed the defendant's marijuana grow.  His testimony was 
instead based on reading the police report, search warrant 
affidavit, and transcript of prior testimony, and on viewing a 
single photograph of the defendant's marijuana plants.  Much of 
the ambiguity in the expert testimony in this case arose out of 
the dependence of both experts on this single photograph. 
 
The jury heard testimony from both experts that the 
defendant's plant yield would depend particularly on the gender 
of the plants grown.  Although female plants produce usable 
marijuana, male plants do not.  Moreover, male plants produce a 
pollen that will "stress the female plants out and take away the 
[tetrahydrocannabinol] factor, if not completely ruin the 
26 
 
crop."19  When asked about the gender of the defendant's 
marijuana plants, the Commonwealth's expert initially testified 
that the plants "would definitely be female."  However, when 
later asked whether he could specifically identify the gender of 
the plants found in the defendant's basement, he said "it would 
be tough to identify" the smaller plants based on the 
photograph.  He said that, from the photograph, the bigger 
plants "look female and [he] would be shocked to see if any of 
them were male."  He reasoned that "you would never have a male 
plant with a female plant under any circumstances."  When asked 
about an inexperienced grower who might cluster male and female 
plants together, he opined that such a grower "would never have 
. . . a gram to smoke if that were the case." 
The defense expert's testimony did not resolve the 
ambiguity.  He testified that generally fifty per cent of 
marijuana seeds develop into female plants, but that the gender 
ratio can vary by up to fifteen per cent.  For example, a cold 
floor could yield a sixty-five per cent male plant population.20 
                     
 
19 Tetrahydrocannabinol is the active ingredient in 
marijuana that would make the marijuana usable for the treatment 
of the defendant's medical condition. 
 
 
20 The testimony also was unclear on whether the defendant 
was using seeds to grow his plants or if he was cloning them.  
Had the defendant cloned his plants, they may have been only 
female, but the testimony was ambiguous on this point. 
27 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most definitive statement the 
Commonwealth could provide as to projected yield was that in a 
"hypothetical situation" with twenty-two marijuana plants in a 
basement grow operation with four lights and the setup found in 
the defendant's house, the plants "would yield over [ten] ounces 
of marijuana, under the proper conditions."  Even construing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 
testimony as to the defendant's yield, based primarily on a 
single photograph of his plants, is too speculative for a 
rational fact finder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant intended to cultivate more than ten ounces of 
usable marijuana in a sixty-day period. 
 
 ii.  Evidence of intent to distribute.  We next examine 
whether there was sufficient evidence of the defendant's intent 
to distribute.  "A person's . . . intent . . . is a matter of 
fact, which may not be susceptible of proof by direct evidence."  
Commonwealth v. Ellis, 356 Mass. 574, 578-579 (1970), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Holiday, 349 Mass. 126, 128 (1965).  However, 
distinguishing between drug possession for personal use and drug 
possession for distribution "is not a matter within the common 
experience of jurors," and is made all the more difficult by the 
legalization of medical, and now recreational, marijuana.  
Commonwealth v. Little, 453 Mass. 766, 769 (2009), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Grissett, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 454, 457 (2006). 
28 
 
 
Typically, "[i]ntent to distribute a drug may be inferred 
from possession of large quantities of that drug."  Commonwealth 
v. Rugaber, 369 Mass. 765, 770 (1976).  However, the legal limit 
on home cultivation, and uncertainties as to its determination 
complicate this inference.  The defendant had twenty-two plants.  
Unfortunately, the regulations do not contain a plant-based 
limit for home cultivation.  Moreover, even in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, the testimony regarding the 
number of ounces the defendant's plants would actually yield was 
contradictory and speculative, as discussed above.  The 
Commonwealth's expert testified, however, that twenty-two plants 
growing in a setup like the one found in the defendant's house 
could yield over ten ounces under the right conditions.  
Although not of much use by itself in determining whether the 
marijuana grow was for personal use or distribution, this 
testimony could properly be considered along with other evidence 
relevant to the issue of intent to distribute.  As discussed, 
use of grow equipment designed to increase the yield of usable 
marijuana, in combination with a large number of plants, can 
properly be considered when evaluating intent to distribute. 
 
Traditionally, drug possession in the absence of drug 
paraphernalia also is probative of intent.  See Commonwealth v. 
Wilson, 441 Mass. 390, 401-402 (2004).  In the context of 
medical marijuana, this evidence must be analyzed carefully to 
29 
 
avoid conflating lawful activity with unlawful activity.  Cf. 
Canning, 471 Mass. at 352.  The Commonwealth's expert testified 
that marijuana users "commonly use rolling papers . . . or pipes 
[or] bongs," but, in reviewing the evidence, he did not see any 
indication that the defendant possessed these items.21  More 
specifically probative is the former girl friend's testimony 
that she did not know the defendant to be a regular marijuana 
user, and had only seen him use marijuana "a couple times."  
Although there was limited testimony as to whether the defendant 
could have cultivated any usable marijuana from his plants by 
the time of his arrest, his former girl friend's testimony 
establishes that he had some supply of marijuana, but rarely 
used it, despite his medical conditions.  Thus, her testimony 
supports a reasonable inference that the defendant did not 
cultivate the marijuana for personal use. 
 
Numerous plastic bags and a digital pocket scale22 were also 
located in the defendant's house, but outside of the kitchen, 
where such bags and scale would more ordinarily be found.  The 
                     
 
21 We note that not all medical marijuana users smoke the 
marijuana they consume.  In fact, the Commonwealth's expert 
stated on direct examination that, "we're beginning to see more 
edible forms" of marijuana, as well as vaporizing. 
 
 
22 Although neither Esposito nor Lewis testified that the 
scale was a digital pocket scale, this fact came out on cross-
examination of the Commonwealth's expert. 
 
30 
 
plastic bags were, however, found on a separate floor from the 
marijuana grow, and no evidence was presented connecting them to 
the marijuana plants, making this evidence of marginal value.  
Contrast Commonwealth v. Clark, 446 Mass. 620, 624 (2006) 
(uniform packaging is evidence of intent to distribute); 
Commonwealth v. Montanez, 410 Mass. 290, 305-306 (1991) (cutting 
powder and drugs packaged in paper folders); Commonwealth v. 
LaPerle, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 424, 427-428 (1985) (cutting powder, 
wrapping paper, and scale with cocaine residue on pan).  
Although there is similarly no evidence connecting the scale to 
the marijuana grow, the Commonwealth's expert testified that 
drug dealers often possess such types of scales.23 
 
More significant than the bags and scale are the initial 
home invasion and the large sum of money found in the 
defendant's pocket when he was arrested.  His former girl friend 
testified that he was unemployed, and that she had seen him do 
very few tattoos in the span of their relationship.  Thus, 
finding $2,135 on his person at the time of his arrest supported 
an inference of intent to distribute.  See Sendele, 18 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 758-759 ("Very indicative is the large miscellany of 
money carried in specie by the defendant, who was otherwise 
                     
 
23 We also recognize that medical marijuana patients may 
need use of a scale to weigh the marijuana they grow, so as to 
ensure they do not exceed ten ounces.  However, no testimony to 
that effect was admitted at trial. 
31 
 
confessedly without any resources and unemployed to boot").  
Contrast Commonwealth v. Sepheus, 468 Mass. 160, 166 (2014) 
(intent to distribute could not be drawn from defendant carrying 
$312, where "[t]here was no evidence that the defendant was 
unemployed and thus unlikely legitimately to have that amount of 
cash").  Moreover, the defendant told police that two men, one 
brandishing a gun, came down into his basement, the very area 
where he was growing his marijuana.  In combination with the 
Commonwealth's expert testimony that violence and theft are 
often associated with drug dealing, the defendant's account of 
the home invasion supports an inference that others had 
knowledge that he was a drug dealer, and intended to rob him. 
Taken together, the home invasion, large amount of cash 
found on the defendant, digital pocket scale, number of plants, 
and testimony that the defendant sparingly used marijuana were 
sufficient for a rational juror to find him guilty of possession 
with intent to distribute beyond a reasonable doubt. 
d.  Constitutionality.  Finally, the defendant asserts that 
the sixty-day supply limit established by the medical marijuana 
laws and corresponding regulations is unconstitutionally vague 
as applied.  Because we conclude that the erroneous jury 
instructions for unlawful cultivation created a substantial risk 
of a miscarriage of justice, and there was insufficient evidence 
of intentional cultivation of more than a sixty-day supply, 
32 
 
precluding retrial as to unlawful cultivation, we need not 
address this argument.  However, we note that of the fifteen 
States that currently permit home cultivation as part of their 
medical marijuana scheme, Massachusetts is the only State that 
defines its limit solely in terms of supply per period.  All 
other such States use plant-based limits.24  The only other State 
to create a home cultivation limit based on supply period, 
Washington, changed to a plant-based limit after widespread 
criticism that the prior rule created uncertainty.  See State 
Rule Clarifies 60-Day Supply of Medical Marijuana, Seattle 
Times, Oct. 3, 2008.  Moreover, even Massachusetts's own 
recreational marijuana scheme has a plant-based limit.  G. L. 
                     
 
24 See Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14(4)(a)(II) (six-plant 
limit, with no more than three mature, flowering plants 
producing usable marijuana).  See also Alaska Stat. § 
17.37.040(a)(4) (six-plant limit, with no more than three 
mature, flowering plants producing usable marijuana); Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 36-2801(a)(ii) (twelve-plant limit); Cal. Health & 
Safety Code § 11362.77(a), (b) (limit of six mature or twelve 
immature plants, although patient may grow more with doctor's 
recommendation); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 329-121 (ten-plant limit); 
Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 22, § 2423-A(1)(B) (limit of six mature 
plants); Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.26424(a) (twelve-plant limit); 
Mont. Code Ann. § 50-46-319(1)(b)(i) (limit of four mature 
plants and four seedlings); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 453A.200(3)(b) 
(twelve-plant limit); Or. Rev. Stat. § 475B.831(1)(a) (limit of 
six mature plants and twelve immature plants); R.I. Gen. Laws 
§ 21-28.6-4(a) (limit of twelve mature plants); Vt. Stat. Ann. 
§ 4472(14) (limit of two mature plants and seven immature 
plants); Wash. Rev. Code § 69.51A.210(1) (six plant limit).  
Finally, see N.M. Code R. § 7.34.4.8(A)(1) (limit of four mature 
plants and twelve seedlings). 
33 
 
c. 94G, § 7 (a) (2) (individuals limited to six plants, 
households limited to twelve plants). 
As is evident from the expert testimony at trial, the 
amount of usable marijuana yielded by a plant depends on a large 
number of variables, including the skill of the grower.  The 
ten-ounce rule provides some additional flexibility for patients 
who may be inept growers, unable to yield much even from a large 
number of plants but, by the same token, it makes enforcement of 
the cultivation limit all the more difficult.  Although the law 
may not be vague in many cases, such as when a defendant grows 
an acre of marijuana, without a plant-based limit, start-up home 
cultivation operations like this one may pose a vagueness 
problem.  Although we need not resolve this issue in the instant 
case, we emphasize that statutory and regulatory clarification 
would be most beneficial in this regard. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The conviction of possession of marijuana 
with intent to distribute is affirmed.  The conviction of 
unlawful cultivation marijuana is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
Appendix. 
 
 
Model Jury Instruction Regarding Unlawful Cultivation with 
Medical Marijuana Hardship Cultivation Registration:  
Sixty-Day Supply 
 
 
Under Massachusetts's medical marijuana act, cultivation of 
medical marijuana is expressly permitted if a person is properly 
registered to do so, and the cultivation does not exceed a 
certain amount.  Here, the defendant had a valid hardship 
cultivation registration allowing him or her to cultivate up to 
ten ounces of marijuana every sixty days.  It is the 
Commonwealth's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant was cultivating more marijuana than was permitted 
by his or her hardship cultivation registration.  If the 
Commonwealth fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was cultivating more marijuana than was permitted by 
his or her hardship cultivation registration, then you must find 
the defendant not guilty. 
 
 
In order to prove the defendant guilty of this offense, the 
Commonwealth must prove four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
 
 
First:  That the substance in question is marijuana;  
 
 
Second:  That the defendant knowingly cultivated the 
substance;  
 
 
Third:  That the defendant cultivated more than the amount 
necessary to provide a sixty-day supply of usable marijuana to 
the patient; and  
 
 
Fourth:  That the defendant intended to cultivate more than 
the amount necessary to provide a sixty-day supply of usable 
marijuana to the patient. 
 
As to the first element, the Commonwealth is required to 
prove that the substance in question is in fact marijuana.  
Marijuana is defined to include all parts of the plant cannabis 
sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; and resin 
extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, 
manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the 
plant, its seeds, or resin.  It does not include the mature 
stalks of the plant, industrial hemp, fiber produced from the 
stalks, oil, or cake made from the seeds of the plant, any other 
compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation 
2 
 
of the mature stalks, except the resin extracted therefrom, 
fiber, oil, or cake or the sterilized seed of the plant which is 
incapable of germination.1  You may consider all the relevant 
evidence in the case, including the testimony of any witness who 
may have testified either to support or to dispute the 
allegation that the substance in question was marijuana. 
 
As to the second element, the term "cultivate" means to 
grow a plant or crop, namely marijuana. 
 
As to the third element, you must determine whether or not 
the defendant was cultivating more than a medical supply of 
marijuana.  Under the medical marijuana act, an individual is 
permitted to produce a sixty-day supply of medical marijuana.  A 
"sixty-day supply" is presumptively ten ounces of usable 
marijuana.  Usable marijuana is defined as "the fresh or dried 
leaves and flowers of the female marijuana plant and any mixture 
or preparation thereof, including marijuana-infused products, 
but does not include the seedlings, seeds, stalks, or roots of 
the plant."  A sixty-day supply may be greater than ten ounces, 
if the defendant's certifying physician has documented (1) the 
greater amount that constitutes a sixty-day supply and (2) the 
rationale for the defendant's sixty-day supply exceeding ten 
ounces.  This documentation must be in the defendant's medical 
record and in the defendant's written certification. 
 
In determining whether the defendant was cultivating more 
than necessary to produce ten ounces of usable marijuana in a 
sixty-day period, you may consider the number of plants being 
cultivated, the defendant's skill at cultivation, and the 
conditions under which the plants were growing. 
 
As to the fourth element, the Commonwealth must prove that 
the defendant not only cultivated more than necessary for a 
sixty-day supply, but that the defendant intended to cultivate 
more than necessary for a sixty-day supply.  You may find that 
the defendant acted intentionally if he or she did so 
consciously, voluntarily, and purposely, and not because of 
ignorance, mistake, or accident.  It is not enough that the 
defendant's marijuana plants happen to be capable of yielding 
more than ten ounces in a sixty-day period.  The Commonwealth 
must prove that the defendant intended to cultivate more than 
ten ounces of usable marijuana in a sixty-day period. 
                     
 
1 Please note that this is the amended definition of 
"marihuana" in G. L. c. 94C, § 1, effective July 28, 2017. 
3 
 
Model Jury Instruction Regarding Unlawful Cultivation with 
Medical Marijuana Hardship Cultivation Registration:  
Nonpersonal Use 
 
 
Under Massachusetts's medical marijuana act, cultivation of 
medical marijuana is expressly permitted if a person is properly 
registered to do so, and the cultivation is for the patient's 
personal use.  Here, the defendant had a valid hardship 
cultivation registration allowing him or her to cultivate 
marijuana for personal medical use.  It is the Commonwealth's 
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
cultivated marijuana in violation of his or her hardship 
cultivation registration by cultivating marijuana with the 
intent to distribute rather than solely for his or her personal 
use.  If the Commonwealth fails to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was cultivating marijuana with the 
intent to distribute, then you must find the defendant not 
guilty. 
 
 
In order to prove the defendant guilty of this offense, the 
Commonwealth must prove three elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt:   
 
 
First:  That the substance in question is marijuana; 
  
 
Second:  That the defendant knowingly cultivated the 
substance; and 
 
 
Third:  That the defendant cultivated the substance with 
the intent to distribute. 
 
As to the first element, the Commonwealth is required to 
prove that the substance in question is in fact marijuana.  
Marijuana is defined to include all parts of the plant cannabis 
sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; and resin 
extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, 
manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the 
plant, its seeds, or resin.  It does not include the mature 
stalks of the plant, industrial hemp, fiber produced from the 
stalks, oil, or cake made from the seeds of the plant, any other 
compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation 
of the mature stalks, except the resin extracted therefrom, 
fiber, oil, or cake or the sterilized seed of the plant which is 
4 
 
incapable of germination.2  You may consider all the relevant 
evidence in the case, including the testimony of any witness who 
may have testified either to support or to dispute the 
allegation that the substance in question was marijuana. 
 
As to the second element, the term "cultivate" means to 
grow a plant or crop, namely marijuana. 
 
As to the third element, if it has been proved that the 
defendant did knowingly cultivate marijuana, you will have to 
determine whether the defendant cultivated the marijuana solely 
for his or her own use, or whether the defendant intended the 
marijuana for distribution to others.  If the defendant is a 
personal caregiver under the medical marijuana law, you may find 
the defendant guilty only if he or she intended to distribute 
marijuana to someone other than the patient for whom the 
defendant served as a personal caregiver. 
                     
 
2 Please note that this is the amended definition of 
"marihuana" in G. L. c. 94C, § 1, effective July 28, 2017.