Title: Chochorowski v. Home Depot U.S.A.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC92594
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: July 30, 2013

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JANET CHOCHOROWSKI,  
 
     ) 
INDIVIDUALLY and as the 
 
     ) 
REPRESENTATIVE OF A CLASS 
     ) 
OF SIMILARLY-SITUATED PERSONS,   ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     ) 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
     ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
     ) 
No.  SC92594 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     ) 
HOME DEPOT U.S.A., d/b/a  
 
     ) 
THE HOME DEPOT, 
 
 
     ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     ) 
 
 
 
Respondent.  
     ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY 
The Honorable Maura B. McShane, Judge 
 
Opinion issued July 30, 2013 
 
 
Janet Chochorowski filed a class-action lawsuit against Home Depot, claiming 
that Home Depot violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA), section 
407.010 et seq.,1 by automatically including a damage waiver fee in its tool rental 
agreement that Ms. Chochorowski signed when she rented a garden tiller.  She also 
claimed the tool rental contract did not make clear that the damage waiver fee was 
optional and the damage waiver was of no value, allegedly unfair practices in violation of 
the MMPA.  Home Depot filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court 
sustained.   Ms. Chochorowski appealed.  After an opinion by the court of appeals, this 
 
1 All citations to statute herein are to RSMo 2000 unless otherwise indicated. 
 
Court granted transfer.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.  Because the damage waiver in the 
rental contract was clearly optional and provided a benefit of value to Ms. Chochorowski, 
the undisputed material facts show that Home Depot did not engage in any unfair practice 
prohibited by MMPA and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  The trial court’s 
judgment is affirmed. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
On April 27, 2002, Janet Chochorowski and her husband went to a Home Depot 
store in Brentwood to rent a garden tiller.  Before renting the tiller to Ms. Chochorowski, 
a Home Depot employee presented her with a rental agreement for the tiller. 
At the top of the first page of the rental agreement was personal information for 
Ms. Chochorowski that had been stored in Home Depot’s computer system from previous 
transactions and printed onto the form.  As Ms. Chochorowski reviewed the agreement, 
she noticed that the address and driver’s license information printed on the form was out 
of date.  She wrote her current address next to the out-of-date address, lined through and 
corrected the state designation next to the driver’s license number, and lined through and 
corrected her address in a second place on the form. 
 
Below Ms. Chochorowski’s personal information was a description of the 
equipment being rented and fees for the possible terms of the rental.  On the lower half of 
the first page of the rental agreement was a box titled “SPECIAL TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS.”  To the right of the box were listed the charges Ms. Chochorowski was 
incurring.  Specifically, the charges were an “agreement subtotal” charge of $25 that was 
the per-day rental fee, a “damage waiver” charge of $2.50, sales tax in the amount of 
$1.83, and an estimated total of $29.33.   
The terms and conditions inside the box, which appear on all standard Home 
Depot tool rental agreements, read as follows: 
 
1.  I HAVE BEEN OFFERED OPERATING MANUALS ON THE 
ABOVE LISTED RENTAL EQUIPMENT AND HAVE ACCEPTED 
THEM. 
 
2.  I ACCEPT THE BENEFIT OF THE DAMAGE WAIVER (IF 
APPLICABLE) DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 11 IN THE TERMS 
AND CONDITIONS OF THE RENTAL AGREEMENT. 
 
3.  A CLEANING CHARGE OF $25.00 WILL BE ASSESSED IF 
THE ABOVE LISTED RENTAL EQUIPMENT IS NOT RETURNED 
CLEAN. 
 
I HAVE READ AND AGREE, AS INITIALED TO THE RIGHT, 
TO THESE SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS. 
 
Paragraph 11, referenced in the second enumerated paragraph in the box, appeared on the 
agreement’s second page and stated: 
If I pay the damage waiver charge for any Equipment, this agreement 
shall be modified to relieve me of liability for accidental damage to it, 
but not for any losses or damage due to theft, burglary, misuse or abuse, 
theft by conversion, intentional damages, disappearances or any loss due 
to my failure to care properly for such Equipment in a prudent manner 
(including without limitation by using proper fuel, oil and lubricants and 
not exceeding such Equipment’s rated capacity, if applicable). 
  
At the bottom of the box was written: “I HAVE READ AND AGREE, AS INITIALED 
TO 
THE 
RIGHT, 
TO 
THESE 
SPECIAL 
TERMS 
AND 
CONDITIONS.”                      
Ms. Chochorowski initialed the box in the blank provided.   
Finally, at the bottom of the agreement’s first page was a paragraph that also 
appears on all standard Home Depot tool rental agreements.  The paragraph contains a 
merger clause, acknowledges the renter’s receipt of the tool, states that the renter agrees 
 
3
“to the terms and conditions printed on this page and on the other page(s) of the 
agreement,” and provides a procedure for modifying the agreement.  The paragraph read: 
I understand and agree that no representative of THE HOME DEPOT is 
authorized to make any oral or written promise, affirmation, warranty or 
representation to me other than those reflected in writing in this agreement.  
I acknowledge that I have received the above-listed Equipment and that I 
agree to the terms and conditions printed on this page and on the other 
page(s) of the agreement.  I understand and agree that this agreement 
cannot be modified, amended, rescinded or otherwise changed except by a 
writing signed by THE HOME DEPOT and me, and that I have read and 
understand this provision regarding modification of the agreement. 
 
Below the paragraph on a blank provided, Ms. Chochorowski signed her name. 
After initialing and signing the agreement, Ms. Chochorowski returned it to the 
Home Depot employee and retained a copy for herself.2  She also gave the employee her 
credit card information but, pursuant to the rental agreement, she was not charged 
anything at that time.  She and her husband left the store with the tiller.   
In the car on the way home from the store, Ms. Chochorowski examined the rental 
agreement more carefully.  For the first time, she read the special terms and conditions in 
the box on the first page and noticed the charge of $2.50 for the damage waiver.  When 
                                             
 
2 In Ms. Chochorowski’s petition, she alleged that Home Depot did not provide her with 
a copy of the agreement at the time she rented the garden tiller.  At oral argument before 
this Court, she asserted that she did not receive the agreement’s second page at that time.  
However, the record before the trial court when it ruled on Home Depot’s motion for 
summary judgment was Ms. Chochorowski’s deposition testimony that she first noticed 
the special terms and conditions box and the damage-waiver charge when she read the 
agreement on her way home from the store.   In response to the specific question whether 
she received the second page of the agreement, she testified that she did not remember.  
Additionally, by signing the agreement’s first page, Ms. Chochorowski acknowledged, in 
part, that she agreed to terms and conditions on “the other page(s) of this agreement,” 
including paragraph 11. 
 
 
4
she read the special terms and conditions, she understood them.  The next day when she 
returned the tiller, she asked a Home Depot employee about the damage waiver fee and 
was told “by the girl at the counter that it was insurance, and that they charge everybody 
this insurance.  That if I would have damaged the tiller or did anything to it, it would 
have been covered.  And I said, but I didn’t damage it.”  Ms. Chochorowski paid the bill 
without asking that the damage waiver fee be removed. 
 
In March 2008, Ms. Chochorowski filed a class action petition against Home 
Depot in Madison County, Illinois.  The petition included two counts.  Count I alleged 
that Home Depot violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (“MMPA”) by 
deceiving Ms. Chochorowski into believing that the damage waiver charge was not 
optional.  Count II alleged that Home Depot violated the MMPA by imposing 
automatically the damage waiver charge, which Ms. Chochorowski claimed was 
worthless.  On Home Depot’s motion, the case was dismissed on the basis of forum non 
conveniens.  Ms. Chochorowski refiled the case in St. Louis County.  Home Depot filed a 
notice of removal to federal district court.  In federal court, Ms. Chochorowski moved to 
remand the case back to St. Louis County.  The federal district court sustained her 
motion.  Chochorowski v. Home Depot USA, 585 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1096 (E.D. Mo. 
2008). 
  In St. Louis County circuit court, Home Depot moved to dismiss both counts of 
Ms. Chochorowski’s petition for failure to state a claim.  The circuit court granted its 
motion.  The court of appeals reversed, finding that the circuit court, in evaluating Home 
Depot’s motion, had considered materials outside Ms. Chochorowski’s petition, namely 
 
5
the rental agreement and damage waiver.  Chochorowski v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 295 
S.W.3d 194, 198-99 (Mo. App. 2009).  The court of appeals remanded the cause to the 
circuit court.  Id. at 199.  On remand, Home Depot moved for summary judgment, 
claiming that the written terms of the rental agreement and its damage waiver provisions 
contradicted and disproved Ms. Chochorowski’s allegations.  The circuit court sustained 
Home Depot’s motion for summary judgment and entered a final judgment in its favor. 
Ms. Chochorowski appealed.  After opinion by the court of appeals, this Court 
granted transfer.  On appeal, Ms. Chochorowski claims that the circuit court erred in 
granting summary judgment for Home Depot because Home Depot automatically 
included the damage waiver charge in its tool rental contracts and required her to insist 
on its removal, in violation of the MMPA and 15 CSR 60-8.060.  She also claims that 
Home Depot’s form contract did not make clear that the damage waiver charge was 
optional and that the damage waiver was worthless.   
Standard of Review 
 
This Court’s review of summary judgment is de novo.  Roberts v. BJC Health 
System, 391 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Mo. banc 2013).  On review, the record is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered.  Id.  A defendant is 
entitled to summary judgment if the defendant demonstrates, on the basis of facts as to 
which there is no genuine dispute, a right to judgment as a matter of law.  Id.  This can be 
done by showing (1) facts negating any one of the claimant’s elements necessary for 
summary judgment; (2) that the claimant, after an adequate period of discovery, has not 
been able to and will not be able to produce evidence sufficient to allow the trier of fact 
 
6
to find the existence of one of the claimant’s elements; or (3) facts necessary to support 
the defendant’s properly pleaded affirmative defense.  Id. 
Damage Waiver Not a Negative Option 
 
Ms. Chochorowski claims that Home Depot’s tool rental agreement automatically 
included a damage waiver fee in violation of section 407.020 of the MMPA and 15 CSR 
60-8.060.  The MMPA was enacted by the legislature to protect consumers.  Huch v. 
Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 290 S.W.3d 721, 724 (Mo. banc 2009).  Specifically, section 
407.020 was intended to “‘supplement the definitions of common law fraud in an attempt 
to preserve fundamental honesty, fair play and right dealings in public transactions.’”  Id. 
(quoting State ex rel. Danforth v. Independence Dodge, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 362, 368 (Mo. 
App. 1973)).  The MMPA makes unlawful “[t]he act, use or employment . . . of any 
deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice or the 
concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact in connection with the sale or 
advertisement of any merchandise . . . .”  Section 407.020.1. Although deceptive 
practices are not defined in the MMPA, the act empowers the attorney general to 
promulgate rules necessary to administer and enforce it.  Section 407.145.   
One of the rules promulgated by the attorney general is 15 CSR 60-8.020(1), 
which defines an unfair practice as a one that “(A) [e]ither –1.  [o]ffends any public 
policy as it has been established by the Constitution, statutes or common law of this state, 
or by the Federal Trade Commission, or its interpretive decisions; or 2.  [i]s unethical, 
oppressive or unscrupulous; and (B) [p]resents a risk of, or causes, substantial injury to 
consumers.”  15 CSR 60-8.020(1) (emphasis added).  Another rule promulgated by the 
 
7
attorney general under the MMPA is 15 CSR 60-8.060, titled “Unsolicited Merchandise 
and Negative Option Plans,” which states: “[i]t is an unfair practice for any seller in 
connection with the advertisement or sale of merchandise to bill, charge or attempt to 
collect payment from customers, for any merchandise which the customer has not 
ordered or solicited.”  A rule properly adopted and promulgated by the attorney general 
has independent power as law.  Huch, 290 S.W.3d at 725.  Therefore, “the act of charging 
for unsolicited merchandise is an unfair practice [that is] unlawful under the act.”  Id.  
Ms. Chochorowski claims that Home Depot’s damage waiver is a “negative 
option” prohibited by 15 CSR 60-8.060  because it requires payment of a fee for a service 
she did not solicit.  The act defines “merchandise” as “any objects, wares, goods, 
commodities, intangibles, real estate or services.”  Section 407.010(4).  It defines “sale” 
as “any sale, lease, offer for sale or lease, or attempt to sell or lease merchandise for cash 
or on credit.”  Section 407.010(6).  Home Depot does not contest that                      
Ms. Chochorowski’s rental of the garden tiller and the damage waiver from Home Depot 
is a sale of merchandise under the act or that it charged Ms. Chochorowski a fee for the 
damage waiver.  The only disputed issue is whether Ms. Chochorowski ordered or 
solicited the damage wavier. 
The sales clerk did not discuss the damage waiver with Ms. Chochorowski prior to 
presenting her with Home Depot’s rental agreement, so the issue is whether the terms of 
the written agreement demonstrate, as a matter of law, that Home Depot did not charge 
Ms. Chochorowski for a damage waiver that she did not order or solicit.  In considering 
the language of Home Depot’s rental agreement, the primary rule of contract 
 
8
interpretation is that courts seek to determine the parties’ intent and give effect to it.  
Triarch Indus., Inc. v. Crabtree, 158 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Mo. banc 2005).  The parties’ 
intent is presumed to be expressed by the plain and ordinary meaning of the language of 
the contract.  Id.  When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, the intent of 
the parties will be gathered from the contract alone, and a court will not resort to a 
construction where the intent of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous 
language.  Dunn Indus. Group, Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, 112 S.W.3d 421, 428-29 (Mo. 
banc 2003). 
The initial reference to the damage waiver in the rental agreement is on its first 
page.  On that page, in a box titled “SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS,” the 
agreement provides, “I ACCEPT THE BENEFIT OF THE DAMAGE WAIVER (IF 
APPLICABLE) DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 11 IN THE TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS OF THIS RENTAL AGREEMENT.”  Paragraph 11 of the terms and 
conditions appears on the next page and provides, “If I pay the damage waiver charge for 
any Equipment, this agreement shall be modified to relieve me of liability for accidental 
damage to it.”  These two provisions unambiguously provide that a customer wishing to 
be relieved of liability for accidental damage to a rented tool could accept the benefit of 
the damage waiver by paying the damage waiver charge.    
Additional provisions of the rental agreement reinforce the parties’ intent that the 
damage waiver is a provision in the contract that the customer must accept affirmatively.  
The agreement requires the customer to accept affirmatively the waiver’s benefits by 
initialing in a provided blank.  The blank is within the special terms and conditions box 
 
9
and follows the statement “I HAVE READ AND AGREE, AS INITIALED TO THE 
RIGHT, TO THESE SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS.”3  To the right of the 
special terms and conditions box, the agreement sets out a charge of $2.50 for the damage 
waiver that is listed separately from the $25 per-day rental fee and the $1.83 sales tax. 
Nevertheless, Ms. Chochorowski argues that by printing the rental agreement and 
presenting it to her, Home Depot required her to elect affirmatively not to purchase the 
damage agreement, which she characterizes as an unfair practice prohibited by the 
MMPA.  She asserts that Home Depot should not be permitted “to use the fine print in its 
adhesion contract to nullify the express provisions of 15 CSR 60-8.060.”  The only 
authority she cites in support of her argument is this Court’s decision in Huch v. Charter 
Communications, Inc.  290 S.W.3d 721 (Mo. banc 2009).   
In Huch, a cable television provider began sending paper television programming 
guides to its customers, even though the customers did not request that product.  Id. at 
723.  Without any notice to the customers, the cable provider billed its customers for the 
unsolicited guides by including a fee on the customers’ monthly bills.  Id.  The actions of 
the cable television provider did not permit the customers to accept or decline the guides 
and the applicable charge.  Id.  Two customers sued as class representatives, claiming 
that the cable provider’s act was a negative option under the MMPA and 15 CSR            
6-08.060 and seeking monetary damages including punitive damages.  Id.  The cable 
                                             
 
3 In addition to the damage waiver, the box also asked Ms. Chochorowski to 
acknowledge that she had been offered and had accepted operating manuals for the 
equipment she was renting and that she would be charged a $25 cleaning fee if she did 
not return the equipment clean. 
 
10
provider moved to dismiss the case, asserting that because the customers paid their 
monthly bill, which included the charge for the unsolicited guides, the customers’ claims 
were barred under the equitable “voluntary payment” doctrine.  Id.  The circuit court 
granted the provider’s motion to dismiss, and the customers appealed.  Id. 
This Court reversed the dismissal, holding that the customers’ voluntary payments 
to the cable provider were not a bar to their action because “[t]o allow [the cable 
provider] to avoid liability for this unfair practice through the voluntary payment doctrine 
would nullify the protection of the act and be contrary to the intent of the legislature.”  Id. 
at 727.  Ms. Chochorowski asserts that this holding supports her claim that Home Depot 
should not be able to utilize in its defense “the legal principle that a party to a contract 
has a ‘duty to read the contract’ before signing and cannot claim to be misled by oral 
statements that are contrary to the contract.”  This Court does not agree. 
In contrast to the actions of the cable provider in Huch, Home Depot made an 
offer to rent the garden tiller to Ms. Chochorowski that she accepted, as evidenced by 
their written contract.  The written contract presented to Ms. Chochorowski provided 
obvious and unambiguous notice to her of the existence of the damage waiver and that 
she was affirmatively expressing her intention to purchase it by initialing and signing the 
rental agreement.  If Ms. Chochorowski did not agree to any of the terms of Home 
Depot’s offer, she could have refused to accept its offer by not signing the rental 
agreement.  Specifically, if she did not want to purchase the damage waiver, she could 
have rejected that provision of the offer by not initialing the statement in the special 
 
11
terms and conditions box stating that she had read and agreed to the special terms and 
conditions.       
Contrary to Ms. Chochorowski’s claim that customers would not know they could 
decline the damage waiver when renting tools from Home Depot, there was undisputed 
evidence that, when Home Depot customers declined the damage waiver, a different 
contract was generated expressly stating that the customer “DECLINED THE 
BENEFITS” of the damage waiver and that, through Home Depot’s 2005 fiscal year, 
customers in over 40,000 transactions in Missouri declined the damage waiver.   
There is no conflict between the intention of the legislature in enacting the MMPA 
and the application of the basic tenets of contract law to the transaction in this case.  
While Ms. Chochorowski wants relief from her failure to read the rental agreement 
before she executed it, she is held to the terms of the contract she signed despite her 
failure to read it.  A signer’s failure to read or understand a contract is not, without fraud 
or the signer’s lack of capacity to contract, a defense to the contract.  Robinson v. Title 
Lenders, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 505, 509 n.4 (Mo. banc 2012) (citing Sanger v. Yellow Cab 
Co., Inc., 486 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Mo. banc 1972).  See also Nunn v. C.C. Midwest, 151 
S.W.3d 388, 402 (Mo. App. 2004) (stating that a party who claims to have signed a 
contract without reading or understanding it is nevertheless charged with knowledge of 
its contents); Binkley v. Palmer, 10 S.W.3d 166, 171 (Mo. App. 1999) (finding a party 
who claimed not to have read or understood documents from a real estate broker is 
nevertheless charged with knowledge of the documents the party signs).  This Court 
presumes Ms. Chochorowski knew the agreement’s terms and accepted them.  Wallach v. 
 
12
Joseph, 420 S.W.2d 289, 294 (Mo. 1967); Cowbell, LLC v. Borc Bldg. & Leasing Corp., 
328 S.W.3d 399, 406 (Mo. App. 2010). 
Though Ms. Chochorowski asserts that the contract’s “fine print” should not 
permit Home Depot to evade the MMPA’s consumer protections, the executed agreement 
itself contradicts Ms. Chochorowski’s assertion that she had difficulty reading the 
contract’s “itty bitty print.”  When she reviewed the agreement in the store before signing 
it, she recognized the address at the top of the contract was incorrect and wrote her 
correct address next to it.  She also noticed that the form printed an incorrect address in a 
second place next to incorrect driver’s license information.  Her address and driver’s 
license number were printed in a font the same size and style as the terms of the damage 
waiver just a few lines below.  She corrected the address a second time and corrected the 
driver’s license information.  Ms. Chochorowski’s edits show the print was of sufficient 
size that she was able to read and understand these portions of the contract and correct it 
when necessary.  While the provisions in paragraph 11 were in smaller print, they were in 
the same font size as most of the provisions on page 2. 
Additionally, there was evidence that Ms. Chochorowski noticed the damage 
waiver and its related fee when she further examined the contract in her car after leaving 
the store.  She conceded that, on reading it, she understood its meaning.                      
Ms. Chochorowski’s clearer understanding of the damage waiver and fee on reading the 
contract on the drive home shows that her election of the damage waiver was either a 
deliberate choice or an oversight for which she is responsible and not a defect of the 
contract itself.     
 
13
Home Depot offered Ms. Chochorowski the damage waiver and explained its 
benefits to her in the separate box on the agreement’s front page that required her initials 
to elect the damage waiver and in paragraph 11 on the second page.  She elected it and 
agreed to pay the damage waiver fee by initialing the special terms and conditions and 
signing the agreement.  Moreover, she consented to the agreement’s terms, including the 
damage waiver, a second time by signing her name at the bottom of the agreement’s first 
page.  The agreement provided that, by signing, Ms. Chochorowski “agree[d] to the terms 
and conditions printed on this page and on the other page(s) of this agreement.”  The 
damage wavier, therefore, is not a negative option under the MPAA. 
Damage Waiver Clearly Optional 
Ms. Chochorowski also claims that Home Depot’s rental agreement did not 
disclose that the damage waiver was optional.  She acknowledges that the terms and 
conditions required her to pay the damage waiver fee only “if applicable” but argues that 
the phrase “if applicable” discourages any effort to read further and does not suggest a 
party has any choice in the matter.  She also acknowledges the box labeled “SPECIAL 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS” refers to paragraph 11 on the second page, which 
includes a more comprehensive description of the charge, but claims the terms in the box 
do not suggest the damage waiver is optional and argues paragraph 11 is virtually 
illegible and “buried on the second page.”  Finally, she argues that she believed she could 
not avoid paying the damage waiver fee because a Home Depot employee told her the 
company “charges everybody” the fee. 
 
14
 
This Court will construe a contract as a whole so as not to render any terms 
meaningless.  State ex rel. Riverside Pipeline Co., L.P. v. Public Service Com’n, 215 
S.W.3d 76, 84 (Mo. banc 2007).  A construction that gives a reasonable meaning to each 
term and harmonizes all provisions is preferred over a construction that renders some 
provisions without function or sense.  Id. 
In this case, the agreement’s first mention of the damage waiver, in the box 
labeled “SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS,” which Ms. Chochorowski initialed, 
states that the person renting the tool will accept the benefit of the damage waiver “(IF 
APPLICABLE)” as described in paragraph 11 on the next sheet.  Paragraph 11 states, “If 
I pay the damage waiver charge for any Equipment, this agreement shall be modified to 
relieve me of liability for accidental damage to it . . . .”   
While Ms. Chochorowski is correct that these provisions do not expressly state the 
damage waiver is “optional,” it is clear from the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
language used, when the contract is considered as a whole, that the parties intended the 
damage waiver to be optional.  State v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 340 S.W.3d 161, 182 
(Mo. App. 2011) (a reviewing court relies on the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
words in the contract and considers the document as a whole to determine the parties’ 
intent).  Both the box Ms. Chochorowski initialed and the fuller explanation of the 
damage waiver on the next page indicate that the damage waiver’s benefits and fee were 
conditioned on her electing the waiver.  The phrase “if applicable” suggests that there are 
some circumstances under which the damage waiver does not apply.  Likewise, the 
phrase “if I pay the damage waiver” suggests that a customer is permitted not to pay the 
 
15
damage waiver.  When read together, these conditional statements make clear that the 
party renting a tool may elect the damage waiver option or decline it.  Any interpretation 
to the contrary would render these conditional statements meaningless.  This Court will 
avoid such a construction of a contract’s terms.  Dunn Indus. Group, 112 S.W.3d at 428.  
Therefore, the rental agreement unambiguously contradicts Ms. Chochorowski’s claim 
that she had no choice but to accept the waiver and pay the fee. 
Ms. Chochorowski argues that even if the language of the rental agreement 
notified her that the damage waiver was optional, she could not have declined it because, 
when she asked about the nature of the charge, a Home Depot employee told her it was 
“insurance” and that “everybody gets charged” the fee.  The employee’s statement could 
not have modified the agreement or misled Ms. Chochorowski, however, because the 
statement was made after the transaction was completed except for her payment of the 
rental fees.  Ms. Chochorowski made her inquiry about the damage waiver after she had 
used the garden tiller and was returning the unbroken tiller the next day.  At that point, 
she could not have declined the damage waiver because she had received the benefit of it.  
Having received the benefit of the waiver, she was required to pay for it.  See 21 West, 
Inc. v. Meadowgreen Trails, Inc., 913 S.W.2d 858, 879 (Mo. App. 1995) (“Where a 
contractual party has fully performed its obligations under [a] contract, that party has a 
vested right to performance by the other party in accordance with the contract’s terms.”).  
Additionally, the rental agreement also expressly stated that it is the parties’ entire 
agreement and could not be changed without the parties’ mutual consent.  It further stated 
that “no representative of THE HOME DEPOT is authorized to make any oral or written 
 
16
promise, affirmation, warranty or representation to me other than those reflected in 
writing in this agreement.”  In light of these provisions, any representations the Home 
Depot employee made to Ms. Chochorowski could not alter the rental agreement’s 
unambiguous description of the damage waiver as an option that she was free either to 
elect or decline. 
Damage Waiver Confers a Benefit of Value 
Finally, Ms. Chochorowski claims that the damage waiver was of no value and 
that selling something of no value is a violation of the MMPA’s prohibition against unfair 
practices.  She argues that the rental agreement’s terms provide no clear coverage, 
rendering the waiver’s benefits illusory.   
Unlike the clear ban on negative options in 15 CSR 60-8.060, there is no 
corresponding regulation that expressly makes selling merchandise of no value an unfair 
practice under the MMPA.  Assuming, without finding, that selling worthless 
merchandise is an unfair practice under the MMPA, Ms. Chochorowski cannot show that 
Home Depot’s damage waiver is worthless.  On its face, the damage waiver purports to 
relieve customers that elect its coverage from “accidental damage to [the rented tool], but 
not for any losses or damage due to theft, burglary, misuse or abuse, theft by conversion, 
intentional damages, disappearances or any loss due to” negligence.  Ms. Chochorowski 
argues that the liability exceptions listed in the rental agreement leave the customer who 
elects the damage waiver with no enforceable protection against loss. 
This Court has addressed the question of whether particular events are “accidents” 
under liability insurance policies.  The key question in such cases is “whether the insured 
 
17
foresaw or expected the injury or damages.”  D.R. Sherry Const., Ltd. v. Am. Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 316 S.W.3d 899, 905 (Mo. banc 2010); see also Todd v. Mo. United Sch. Ins. 
Council, 223 S.W.3d 156, 162 (Mo. banc 2007) (interpreting the term “accident” in its 
ordinary sense, as an event neither expected nor intended by the covered party).  An 
accident does not include expected or foreseeable damages.  D.R. Sherry Const., 316 
S.W.3d at 905. 
This Court’s applied definition is consistent with other authority that has defined 
“accident” in an insurance context as “an event which takes place without one’s foresight 
or expectation.”  1A John Alan Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and 
Practice § 360, at 455 (rev. vol. 1981), quoted in Black’s Law Dictionary 16 (9th ed. 
2009).  Accident may also be “an occurrence which is unforeseen, unexpected, 
extraordinary, either by virtue of the fact that it occurred at all, or because of the extent of 
the damage.”  John F. Dobbyn, Insurance Law in a Nutshell 128 (3d ed. 1996), quoted in 
Black’s Law Dictionary 16 (9th ed. 2009).  The term “accidental damages” is therefore 
one of legal significance the meaning of which has been recognized and applied 
consistently by this Court and other authority. 
The provisions in Home Depot’s rental agreement that exclude coverage for 
damage other than accidental damage do not render the damage waiver’s protections 
illusory.  In Todd, this Court examined a liability policy that provided coverage for 
accidents but not “liability of an insured who knowingly committed an unlawful act . . . 
or who intentionally caused damage, harm, or injury.”  Todd, 223 S.W.3d at 162 
(omission in original).  This Court found that the policy was not ambiguous and, though 
 
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in that case the policy operated to deny a payout for an intentional act, this Court noted 
that the policy would have limited an insured’s liability for other acts that were accidental 
in nature.  Id. at 163-64; cf. D.R. Sherry Const., 316 S.W.3d at 906 (accidental damage 
insurance policy commits insurer to pay damages within policy’s terms).  Exclusions 
therefore provide valid liability coverage limits but do not render the remaining liability 
coverage illusory. 
To support her claim that the waiver’s benefits are illusory, Ms. Chochorowski 
also cites deposition testimony offered by a Home Depot employee that the damage 
waiver meant only that if a customer who paid the damage waiver fee damaged a tool 
Home Depot “is going to work with that customer.”  This assertion cannot alter the plain 
and unambiguous meaning of the damage waiver itself.  Dunn Indus. Group, 112 S.W.3d 
at 428 (“Extrinsic evidence may not be introduced to vary or contradict the terms of an 
unambiguous agreement or to create ambiguity.”).  The damage waiver unambiguously 
covers damage caused by accident, conferring a benefit of value on the insured that is not 
rendered illusory by the waiver’s liability exclusions. 
Conclusion 
 
Home Depot offered Ms. Chochorowski the benefit of the damage waiver in its 
rental agreement.  Though Ms. Chochorowski elected the damage waiver’s benefit by 
initialing the agreement’s special terms and conditions and signing the agreement, the 
agreement itself made clear that she had the option to decline the waiver.  Because Ms. 
Chochorowski was free to elect or decline the damage waiver, the waiver is not a 
negative option under the MMPA.  Additionally, the damage waiver’s plain language 
 
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confers a real benefit on a customer who elects the waiver by relieving the customer of 
liability for accidental damage to the rented tool, so it does not violate the act or 
regulations enacted pursuant thereto.  The circuit court’s grant of summary judgment for 
Home Depot is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE  
 
 
 
Russell, C.J., Fischer, Stith and 
Teitelman, JJ., concur.  Draper 
and Wilson, JJ., not participating.