Title: International Union of Operating Engineers Local 148 v. Illinois Department of Employment Security
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 97695
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: March 24, 2005

Docket No. 97695-Agenda 30-September 2004.
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS,

LOCAL 148, AFL-CIO, Appellee, v. THE ILLINOIS

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al., Appellants.

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue in this appeal is whether the members of the International
Union of Operating Engineers, Local 148, AFL-CIO, are entitled to
unemployment compensation benefits for the period of time between
June 22, 1993, and August 28, 1993. The appellate court ruled that
the members of Local 148 were eligible for benefits. 345 Ill. App. 3d
382. The Illinois Department of Employment Security (Department),
and the employer, Central Illinois Public Service Company (CIPS),
filed a petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. We granted the
petition, and now reverse.



BACKGROUND
	CIPS is a public utility furnishing electricity and natural gas to
residential and commercial customers in portions of central and
southern Illinois. CIPS operates three natural gas distribution divisions
designated as the Eastern, Southern and Western divisions. CIPS also
operates five electricity power generating plants known as the
Newton, Coffeen, Meredosia, Hutsonville, and Grand Tower stations.
Local 148 (hereinafter, Engineers' Union) represents approximately
549 production and maintenance employees at the Coffeen,
Meredosia, Hutsonville, and Grand Tower facilities. The International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 702, represents
approximately 950 production, maintenance and operation employees
at the Newton power station and the Eastern, Southern and Western
divisions. Local 702 also represents 12 workers in the production
department at the Grand Tower station, with these employees
included in the Southern division bargaining unit. Each power station
and division is covered by a separate collective-bargaining agreement.
	On June 30, 1992, the collective-bargaining agreements between
CIPS and the unions expired. CIPS and the unions agreed to a series
of contract extensions. In March 1993, CIPS presented "final"
contract proposals to the unions, which both unions rejected. CIPS
management discussed the possibility of a lockout at several meetings,
the earliest being a meeting on April 15, 1993. At the expiration of the
last contract extension on April 24, 1993, union members began to
adhere strictly to company safety and other rules, and to refuse
voluntary over-time work. Although CIPS and the unions continued
to meet, holding negotiation sessions on May 14, 17, and 18, 1993,
CIPS made a decision on or about May 7, 1993, to lock out its
employees. At 4 a.m. on May 20, 1993, CIPS instituted a lockout of
all members of the two unions.
	The negotiations between CIPS and the unions continued during
the lockout. On June 14, 2003, CIPS and Engineers' Union reached
a tentative agreement on the terms of a new contract. The members
of Engineers' Union ratified the contract on June 17 and 18, 1993,
and CIPS and Engineers' Union signed the contract on June 21, 1993.
CIPS ended the lockout of the members of Engineers' Union on June
22, 1993. Although eligible to return to work, the members of
Engineers' Union respected the picket lines established by the
members of Local 702 and stayed off the job. On August 25, 1993,
CIPS announced that it was ending the lockout of the members of
Local 702, even though CIPS and Local 702 had not reached
agreement on new contracts. The members of both unions returned to
work on August 28, 1993. Negotiations continued between CIPS and
Local 702, and in January 1994, CIPS and Local 702 reached
agreement on new contracts.
	During the lockout, members of both unions applied for
unemployment compensation benefits. On June 11, 1993, a
Department claims adjudicator determined that the union members
were not eligible for benefits because their total or partial
unemployment was due to a stoppage of work which was in turn
caused by a labor dispute at the facility at which they were last
employed. The unions appealed the claims adjudicator's decision. On
August 18, 1993, the Director's representative notified all union
members that the unions proposed to represent them in a consolidated
appeal, and allowed each member 10 days to object to consolidation
and/or representation by union attorneys. Sixty-six union members
chose to be represented by a nonunion attorney. Thirteen additional
union members objected to both consolidation of the appeals and
representation by union attorneys.
	Also in August 1993, Engineers' Union moved to sever from the
proceedings issues pertaining to the eligibility of its members to
receive benefits starting June 21, 1993, the date CIPS and Engineers'
Union entered into the new contract. Engineers' Union sought an
administrative determination that its members were eligible for
unemployment compensation beginning on June 21, 1993. CIPS
objected to the motion to sever, arguing that the unemployment of
members of Engineers' Union and Local 702 arose out of the same
work stoppage caused by the same labor dispute involving the same
employer. The Director's representative denied the motion to sever
and consolidated the appeals because the issues to be decided involved
common questions of fact and law.
	On January 11 and 12 and May 3 and 4, 1994, the Director's
representative conducted a hearing on the appeals from the claims
adjudicator's decision. Subsequently, on January 3, 1995, the
Director's representative recommended that the determination of the
claims adjudicator be set aside, and that the union members be found
eligible for benefits for the period from May 20, 1993, through August
28, 1993, subject to recoupment. The Director's representative based
his recommendations on principles of federal preemption. The unions
had filed claims with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
contending that CIPS had violated the National Labor Relations Act
(29 U.S.C. §151 et seq. (1988)) by implementing the lockout in
retaliation for union members "working to rule." Responding that the
union members had participated in a work slowdown, CIPS argued
that the lockout was designed to promote an end to the labor dispute.
The Director's representative noted that the NLRB could yet
determine that the lockout violated the NLRA, in which case the
lockout would be the cause of the work stoppage rather than a labor
dispute. The union members would not be ineligible for benefits
because section 604 of the Unemployment Insurance Act (820 ILCS
405/604 (West 1992)) only applies where the work stoppage is due to
a labor dispute.
	On February 16, 1995, the Director rejected the recommended
decision, finding the union members ineligible for benefits for the
entire period from May 20, 1993, through August 28, 1993.
According to the Director, the relevant question under section 604,
whether the work stoppage was due to a labor dispute, was entirely
different from the issue before the NLRB, whether CIPS acted in
good faith in implementing a lockout in response to concerted union
activity. Having found that federal law did not preempt a
determination by the Department regarding eligibility for
unemployment benefits, the Director went on to rule that the union
members were unemployed due to a work stoppage that resulted from
a labor dispute. Further, members of Engineers' Union had a direct
interest in the ongoing labor dispute between CIPS and Local 702,
and were not eligible for benefits between June 22, 1993, and August
28, 1993.
	On March 22, 1995, Engineers' Union filed a complaint in the
circuit court of Franklin County seeking review of the Director's
decision pursuant to the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS
5/3-101 et seq. (West 1994)). The complaint named the Department
and CIPS as defendants and necessary parties to the action. The
Department and CIPS both filed motions to dismiss the complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Department and CIPS
contended that the complaint was defective because it failed to name
the Director as a defendant, although the Director was a necessary
party to the action. Additionally, the Department and CIPS maintained
that Engineers' Union lacked standing to seek review of the Director's
decision because Engineers' Union was not a party of record in the
administrative proceedings and was not aggrieved by the Director's
decision. On May 17, 1996, the circuit court denied the motions to
dismiss and granted Engineers' Union leave to file an amended
complaint naming the Director as a defendant. The circuit court also
denied defendants' joint motion to reconsider.
	On October 26, 2001, the circuit court set aside the Director's
decision. The court found that the members of Engineers' Union did
not have a direct interest in the labor dispute between CIPS and Local
702 after June 22, 1993. The court also found that the members of
Engineers' Union were not of the same grade or class as the members
of Local 702. The court concluded that the members of Engineers'
Union were eligible for benefits after June 22, 1993, the date CIPS
ended its lockout against them.
	The Department and CIPS appealed. The appellate court affirmed
the decision of the circuit court. 345 Ill. App. 3d 382. The court ruled
that Engineers' Union had standing to bring an action on behalf of its
members. 345 Ill. App. 3d at 387-95. On the merits, the court held
that the members of Engineers' Union did not have a direct interest in
the dispute between Local 702 and CIPS. 345 Ill. App. 3d at 395-96.
The court also held that members of Engineers' Union were not of the
same grade or class as the members of Local 702. 345 Ill. App. 3d at
396-98. Like the circuit court, the appellate court concluded that the
members of Engineers' Union were eligible for benefits after June 22,
1993. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS
I. Union's Standing
	A threshold issue in this appeal is whether Engineers' Union
lacked standing to appeal the decision of the Director denying benefits
to the members of the union. The Department and CIPS moved for
dismissal pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2000)). The circuit court denied the
motions to dismiss.
	Section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for the
involuntary dismissal of a cause of action based on certain defects or
defenses. One of the enumerated grounds for a section 2-619
dismissal is that the claim is barred by affirmative matter which avoids
the legal effect of or defeats the claim. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West
2000). Affirmative matter is "something in the nature of a defense that
negates the cause of action completely or refutes crucial conclusions
of law or conclusions of material fact contained in or inferred from the
complaint." In re Estate of Schlenker, 209 Ill. 2d 456, 461 (2004);
Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 486 (1994). "Our
precedent makes clear that lack of standing qualifies as 'affirmative
matter' within the meaning of section 2-619(a)(9) and may properly
be challenged through a motion to dismiss under that statute."
Schlenker, 209 Ill. 2d  at 461, citing Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 220 (1999).
	Under Illinois law, a plaintiff need not allege facts establishing
standing. Wexler v. Wirtz Corp., 211 Ill. 2d 18, 22 (2004); Chicago
Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Board of Education of the City of
Chicago, 189 Ill. 2d 200, 206 (2000). Rather, it is the defendant's
burden to plead and prove lack of standing. Chicago Teachers Union,
189 Ill. 2d  at 206; Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority,
122 Ill. 2d 462, 494 (1988). Where standing is challenged by way of
a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts
in the plaintiff's complaint and all inferences that can reasonably be
drawn in the plaintiff's favor. Schlenker, 209 Ill. 2d  at 461. A court's
disposition of a section 2-619 motion on lack of standing presents a
question of law which we review de novo. Wexler, 211 Ill. 2d  at 23;
Schlenker, 209 Ill. 2d  at 461; Chicago Teachers Union, 189 Ill. 2d  at
206.
	The Department and CIPS contend that Engineers' Union lacked
standing to appeal the decision of the Director because Engineers'
Union neither was a party to the proceedings in the Illinois
Department of Employment Security nor suffered injury as a result of
the Director's decision denying benefits to the members of the union.
The circuit court and appellate court disagreed. Citing the doctrine of
associational standing, as enunciated by the Supreme Court, the
appellate court held that Engineers' Union could prosecute an appeal
from the Director's decision on behalf of its members. The appellate
court also held that Engineers' Union was a party in the administrative
agency proceedings because Engineers' Union was listed as an
"interested party" by the claims adjudicator, received notice of
hearings, and participated fully at all stages of the proceedings. We
consider first the applicability of the doctrine of associational standing.
	In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975), the Supreme Court considered the standing of various
organizations and individuals to bring an action challenging a town's
zoning ordinance they claimed effectively excluded persons of low and
moderate income from living in the town. Initially the Court observed:
"There is no question that an association may have standing in its own
right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate
whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy.
Moreover, in attempting to secure relief from injury to itself the
association may assert the rights of its members, at least so long as the
challenged infractions adversely affect its members' associational ties."
Warth, 422 U.S.  at 511, 45 L. Ed. 2d  at 362, 95 S. Ct.  at 2211. The
organizations at issue not having sustained direct injury, the Court
next considered the organizations' standing to bring an action on
behalf of their members. The Court held that an association may have
standing to represent its members:
		"The association must allege that its members, or any one of
them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result
of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a
justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit.
[Citation.] So long as this can be established, and so long as
the nature of the claim and of the relief sought does not make
the individual participation of each injured party indispensable
to proper resolution of the cause, the association may be an
appropriate representative of its members, entitled to invoke
the court's jurisdiction." Warth, 422 U.S.  at 511, 45 L. Ed. 2d  at 362, 95 S. Ct.  at 2211-12.
	Later in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n,
432 U.S. 333, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383, 97 S. Ct. 2434 (1977), the Court
further defined the test applicable to an association seeking to
represent the interests of its members in legal proceedings. The Court
explained:
			"[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its
members when: (a) its members would otherwise have
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to
protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c)
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the
participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Hunt, 432 U.S.  at 343, 53 L. Ed. 2d  at 394, 97 S. Ct.  at 2441.
Applying this tripartite test, the Court concluded that the Washington
State Apple Advertising Commission had the requisite standing.
	In United Food &amp; Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v.
Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 134 L. Ed. 2d 758, 116 S. Ct. 1529
(1996), the Court differentiated between the three prongs of the Hunt
associational standing test. The Court noted that the first prong is a
constitutional necessity for an association's representative suit and the
most direct answer to the federal cases or controversies requirements
of injury in fact, causal connection to the defendant's conduct, and
redressability. Brown Group, 517 U.S.  at 555, 134 L. Ed. 2d  at 769,
116 S. Ct.  at 1535. The second prong is, "at the least, complementary
to the first, for its demand that an association plaintiff be organized for
a purpose germane to the subject of its member's claim raises an
assurance that the association's litigators will themselves have a stake
in the resolution of the dispute, and thus be in a position to serve as
the defendant's natural adversary." Brown Group, 517 U.S.  at 555-56,
134 L. Ed. 2d  at 769, 116 S. Ct.  at 1535-36. In contrast, the third
prong is "judicially fashioned and prudentially imposed" (Brown
Group, 517 U.S.  at 558, 134 L. Ed. 2d  at 771, 116 S. Ct. at 1537)
and "is best seen as focusing on matters of administrative convenience
and efficiency, not on elements of a case or controversy within the
meaning of the Constitution." Brown Group, 517 U.S.  at 557, 134 L. Ed. 2d  at 770, 116 S. Ct.  at 1536. Because the third prong is
prudential in nature and not a constitutional necessity, the legislature
may remove it by statute.
	The doctrine of associational standing is firmly established in
federal law. See Brown Group, 517 U.S. 544, 134 L. Ed. 2d 758, 116 S. Ct. 1529; International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, &amp;
Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274,
91 L. Ed. 2d 228, 106 S. Ct. 2523 (1986). The courts of sister
jurisdictions have also recognized the doctrine and have applied the
Hunt tripartite test to determine the standing of associations to
represent their members in legal proceedings. See Alaskans for a
Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 3 P.3d 906 (Alaska 2000);
Brotherhood of Teamsters &amp; Auto Truck Drivers, Local No. 70 v.
California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1515, 236 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1987); Colorado Manufactured Housing
Ass'n v. Pueblo County, 857 P.2d 507 (Colo. App. 1993);
Connecticut Ass'n of Not-For-Profit Providers for the Aging v.
Department of Social Services, 244 Conn. 378, 709 A.2d 1116
(1998); Oceanport Industries, Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc.,
636 A.2d 892 (Del. 1994); NAACP, Inc. v. Florida Board of Regents,
863 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2003); Aldridge v. Georgia Hospitality &amp; Travel
Ass'n, 251 Ga. 234, 304 S.E.2d 708 (1983); Aged Hawaiians v.
Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 78 Haw. 192, 891 P.2d 279 (1995);
Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n v. State ex rel. Andrus, 127 Idaho 239, 899 P.2d 949 (1995); Citizens for Washington Square v. City of
Davenport, 277 N.W.2d 882 (Iowa 1979); Kansas Bar Ass'n v.
Judges of the Third Judicial District, 270 Kan. 489, 14 P.3d 1154
(2000); Meredith v. Ieyoub, 700 So. 2d 478 (La. 1997); Associated
Subcontractors of Massachusetts, Inc. v. University of Massachusetts
Building Authority, 442 Mass. 159, 810 N.E.2d 1214 (2004); State v.
Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 1996); Mississippi
Manufactured Housing Ass'n v. Board of Aldermen, 870 So. 2d 1189
(Miss. 2004); Missouri Bankers Ass'n v. Director of the Missouri
Division of Credit Unions, 126 S.W.3d 360 (Mo. 2003); Forest
Guardians v. Powell, 130 N.M 368, 24 P.3d 803 (App. 2001); Nodak
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ward County Farm Bureau, 2004 N.D. 60,
676 N.W.2d 752 (2004); Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Bicking, 71 Ohio
St. 3d 318, 643 N.E.2d 1088 (1994); Beaufort Realty Co. v. Beaufort
County, 346 S.C. 298, 551 S.E.2d 588 (App. 2001); Curve
Elementary School Parent &amp; Teacher's Organization v. Lauderdale
County School Board, 608 S.W.2d 855 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980); Texas
Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air Control Board, 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex.
1993); Society of Professional Journalists, Utah Chapter v. Bullock,
743 P.2d 1166 (Utah 1987) (applying the first and third prongs of the
test, and discussing the second prong without specifically adopting it);
Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 726 A.2d 477 (1998);
International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 1789 v. Spokane Airports,
146 Wash. 2d 207, 45 P.3d 186 (2002); Snyder v. Callaghan, 168 W.
Va. 265, 284 S.E.2d 241 (1981).
	The Department and CIPS urge this court not to adopt the
doctrine of associational standing. For its part, the Department argues
that Engineers' Union does not meet the requirements for
associational standing, a contention that we disagree with and address
below. In arguing against associational standing, CIPS observes that
a union is not simply the sum of its members, and union leadership
does not necessarily reflect the views of union members. We believe,
however, that the doctrine of associational standing serves important
functions in the vindication of the rights of members of associations
and in the preservation of scarce judicial resources. We agree with the
Supreme Court's reasoning in rejecting a similar argument in Brock,
477 U.S.  at 289-90, 91 L. Ed. 2d  at 242-43, 106 S. Ct. at 2532-33:
		"While a class action creates an ad hoc union of injured
plaintiffs who may be linked only by their common claims, an
association suing to vindicate the interests of its members can
draw upon a pre-existing reservoir of expertise and capital.
'Besides financial resources, organizations often have
specialized expertise and research resources relating to the
subject matter of the lawsuit that individual plaintiffs lack.'
[Citation.] These resources can assist both courts and
plaintiffs. As one court observed of an association's role in
pending litigation: '[The] interest and expertise of this
plaintiff, when exerted on behalf of its directly affected
members, assure "that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult ... questions." '
[Citation.]
			In addition, the doctrine of associational standing
recognizes that the primary reason people join an
organization is often to create an effective vehicle for
vindicating interests that they share with others. 'The only
practical judicial policy when people pool their capital, their
interests, or their activities under a name and form that will
identify collective interests, often is to permit the association
or corporation in a single case to vindicate the interests of
all.' [Citations.] The very forces that cause individuals to
band together in an association will thus provide some
guarantee that the association will work to promote their
interests."
	The circumstances of this case fully illustrate the desirability of
the doctrine of associational standing. The members of Engineers'
Union sought unemployment compensation benefits for the period
from June 22, 1993, until August 28, 1993. Under the Unemployment
Insurance Act, an individual is entitled to maximum benefits of 49.5%
of the statewide average weekly wage for each week the individual
remains unemployed. See 820 ILCS 405/401 (West 1994). Drawing
on the resources of the union facilitated presentation of the relatively
minor claims of each member of Engineers' Union. Moreover, the
resources of the judiciary are scarce and should be preserved where
compatible with the effective administration of justice. As discussed
below, the eligibility of the members of Engineers' Union to
unemployment compensation benefits turns on common questions of
law. Such questions are appropriately resolved in a lawsuit where
Engineers' Union represents the vast majority of the 549 union
members rather than in a multiplicity of lawsuits filed in different
counties of this state. In light of these considerations, it is appropriate
to adopt the doctrine of associational standing in Illinois.
	Applying the Hunt associational standing test, we hold that
Engineers' Union had standing to appeal the decision of the Director.
First, Engineers' Union satisfies the first prong of the Hunt test
because the members of Engineers' Union had standing to appeal the
denial of benefits. The members of Engineers' Union filed individual
claims for benefits and the Director denied the claims. Thus, the
members of Engineers' Union were parties aggrieved by the decision
of the Director and could seek judicial review of the Director's
decision.
	Second, Engineers' Union acted as the sole bargaining agent for
its members with the purpose of furthering their work-related
interests, particularly in income and benefits. In seeking review of the
Director's decision, Engineers' Union sought to protect the interests
of its members to income and benefits. Such a goal could not be more
germane to the purpose of the union. See National Treasury
Employees Union v. United States Merit Systems Protection Board,
743 F.2d 895 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting the interests the union seeks to
protect, the rights of its seasonal workers to adverse action
protections when they are laid off for less than 30 days, are germane
to its purposes as exclusive representative of those workers).
	Third, neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested required
the participation of individual union members. Upon successful
negotiation of a contract, the members of Engineers' Union were
eligible to return to work. Local 702 remained subject to the lockout,
however, and the members of Engineers' Union refused to cross the
picket lines. It is because of their refusal to cross the picket lines and
because of a perceived interest that all members of Engineers' Union
had in contributions by their employer to their health insurance plan,
an interest affected by the outcome of the labor dispute between CIPS
and Local 702, that the Director denied the claims for benefits. Thus,
the suit by Engineers' Union did not require consideration of the
individual circumstances of any aggrieved member of the union.
Rather, the action raised questions of law: whether the members of
Engineers' Union were ineligible to receive benefits because they had
a direct interest in the labor dispute; and whether the members of
Engineers' Union were of the same grade or class as the members of
Local 702.
	The present case is analogous to Brock, 477 U.S.  at 287-88, 91 L. Ed. 2d  at 241-42, 106 S. Ct.  at 2531-32. In Brock, a union and
several of its members filed an action challenging the Secretary of
Labor's interpretation of the eligibility provisions of a statute that
provided benefits to workers laid off because of competition from
imports. Some of the union members had been denied benefits by
cooperating state agencies charged with processing the applications
for benefits, some union members had been awarded benefits, and
some union members were allegedly entitled to benefits but had not
filed claims. The court of appeals determined that the union had failed
to meet the third prong of the Hunt test because the union members
had suffered injury in varying amounts requiring individualized proof,
and the relief sought could not be obtained unless each individual
claimant was a party plaintiff. The Supreme Court rejected this
conclusion, finding participation of individual union members not
necessary because the action involved a question for law. The Court
explained:
		"Neither these claims nor the relief sought required the
District Court to consider the individual circumstances of any
aggrieved UAW member. The suit raises a pure question of
law: whether the Secretary properly interpreted the Trade
Act's TRA eligibility provisions. [Citation.] And the relief
requested, and granted by the District Court, leaves any
questions regarding the eligibility of individual TRA claimants
to the state authorities given jurisdiction over such questions
by 19 U.S.C. §2311(d). [Citation.] Thus, though the unique
facts of each UAW member's claim will have to be
considered by the proper state authorities before any member
will be able to receive the benefits allegedly due him, the
UAW can litigate this case without the participation of those
individual claimants and still ensure that 'the remedy, if
granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the
association actually injured' [citation]." Brock, 477 U.S.  at
287-88, 91 L. Ed. 2d  at 241-42, 106 S. Ct.  at 2531-32.
	Also analogous is Brotherhood of Teamsters, 190 Cal. App. 3d 
at 1515, 236 Cal. Rptr.  at 78. In Brotherhood of Teamsters, the
California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board and several
employers appealed a judgment of the trial court issuing a peremptory
writ of mandate compelling the Board to set aside its decision to deny
unemployment insurance benefits to certain claimants. The Board and
employers maintained that the union did not have standing to
challenge the Board's decision to deny unemployment insurance
benefits to the claimants. The court of appeal rejected this contention,
finding that the union had met the third prong of the Hunt test:
		"Here, as in Brock, the mandate proceeding raises a pure
question of law, i.e., whether the Board properly interpreted
section 1262 in denying its benefits to the union member
claimants. Although the Board may have to determine each
claimant's benefits, the unions may litigate this case without
the participation of its members and still insure that the
remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those union
members who have been injured." Brotherhood of Teamsters,
190 Cal. App. 3d  at 1523, 236 Cal. Rptr.  at 83.
	The Department maintains that participation of the individual
union members is necessary because an individual claimant's
entitlement to benefits hinges on facts specific to that claimant of
which the union would not have knowledge. We are not persuaded.
The judicial proceedings raise pure questions of law. Awards of
benefits are not at issue and would be determined by the
administrative agency if the judicial review process results in a
determination that the union members are eligible for benefits. To the
extent, however, that the argument the Department makes is more
properly described as an assertion that an association can never
establish standing where the association seeks monetary damages on
behalf of its members, we also reject this contention. As noted in
Brown Group, the third prong of the Hunt test is "judicially fashioned
and prudentially imposed." Brown Group, 517 U.S.  at 558, 134 L. Ed. 2d  at 771, 116 S. Ct.  at 1537. It is a matter of "administrative
convenience and efficiency." Brown Group, 517 U.S.  at 557, 134 L. Ed. 2d  at 770, 116 S. Ct.  at 1536.(1) In light of the prudential nature of
the third prong, we agree with the Supreme Court of Washington that
an association may seek purely monetary damages on behalf of its
members where the damages are certain, easily ascertainable, and
within the knowledge of the defendant:
		"[T]here are instances where the lack of individual
participation by an association's members is not fatal to the
association's standing because the amount of monetary
damages sought on behalf of those members is certain, easily
ascertainable, and within the knowledge of the defendant. In
our judgment, this pragmatic view is preferable to a rule that
serves to automatically deny standing to an association that
seeks monetary damages on behalf of its members without
alleging that it has been injured or that it has an assignment
of the members' claim. The rule enunciated by Division Three
in this case is, in our view, entirely reasonable and ensures
fairness in cases where an individual association member's
participation is not necessary to prove the damages that are
asserted on behalf of the members by the association. In sum,
Division Three's analysis affords a practical and sensible
remedy to individual members who belong to an employee
association and, perhaps, lack the means to bring a lawsuit on
his or her own behalf. See Save a Valuable Env't, 89 Wn.2d 
at 867 (In determining associational standing courts consider
the 'individual who is one of many harmed ... [and who] may
be unable to afford the costs of challenging the action
himself.'). If we reached the result advanced by Airport we
would likely burden individual members of the employee
association economically and would almost certainly burden
our courts with an increased number of lawsuits arising out
of identical facts. In short, we see little sense in an ironclad
rule that has the effect of denying relief to members of an
association based upon an overly technical application of the
standing rules." Spokane Airports, 146 Wash. 2d  at 215-16,
45 P.3d  at 190.
	Viewing the relief requested in the proceedings at bar as
monetary damages, we would nevertheless hold that Engineers' Union
had standing to appeal the denial of benefits. Under Illinois law, an
award of benefits is calculated by application of a formula. See 820
ILCS 405/401 (West 1994). Certainly defendants have access to
salary information for the union members and application of the
formula is straightforward. We believe administrative convenience and
efficiency are furthered by a determination, in one proceeding, that the
numerous claimants are eligible, or ineligible, for benefits, even if the
determination as to each individual claimant entails consideration of
a limited number of facts pertinent to the individual. The alternative
is 549 individual proceedings with separate determinations of
eligibility or ineligibility to benefits and separate determinations of the
actual awards of benefits.
	The Department and CIPS maintain that Engineers' Union lacks
standing for the additional reason that it was not a party aggrieved by
the Director's decision. The Department and CIPS note that, pursuant
to section 1100 of the Unemployment Insurance Act (820 ILCS
405/1100 (West 1994)), only the "party aggrieved by the decision of
the Board of Review (or the decision of the Director rendered
pursuant to Sections 800 and 801) may secure judicial review
thereof." The Department and CIPS note further that the
Administrative Review Law defines a decision of an agency as "any
decision, order or determination of any administrative agency rendered
in a particular case, which affects the legal rights, duties or privileges
of parties and which terminates the proceedings before the
administrative agency." 735 ILCS 5/3-101 (West 1994). The
Department and CIPS conclude that Engineers' Union could not
appeal the Director's decision because Engineers' Union was not a
party to the administrative proceedings and could not have been
aggrieved by the Director's decision. We reject this conclusion
because it fails to take into consideration the derivative nature of an
association's standing in seeking review of an administrative agency
ruling adverse to its members.
	As noted above the members of Engineers' Union were proper
parties to the administrative proceedings. Further, the members of
Engineers' Union were aggrieved by the Director's decision denying
their claims for unemployment insurance benefits, and they could
appeal the Director's decision. 820 ILCS 405/1100 (West 1994).
Consequently, the standing requirement limiting review to a party
aggrieved by the agency's decision has been met by the members of
Engineers' Union. It follows that Engineers' Union, as an
organization meeting the requirements of the doctrine of associational
standing, need not meet the standing requirement independently.
Rather, Engineers' Union derives its standing from the standing of its
members.
	We find support in the Unemployment Insurance Act for
application of the doctrine of associational standing. We note that the
Act specifically provides for representation of a claimant by a union
or other authorized agent. Section 820 of the Act provides:
			"Representation. Any individual or entity in any
proceeding before the Director or his representative, or the
Referee or the Board of Review, may be represented by a
union or any duly authorized agent." 820 ILCS 405/806
(West 1994).
Thus, the Act recognizes the particular relationship between a union
and its members, and the benefits to union members of representation
by the union. The Act allows the union to participate in a
representative capacity to vindicate the interest of its members.
	Engineers' Union represented the interests of its members in the
administrative proceedings. As noted above, Engineers' Union
appealed the decision of the claims adjudicator to the Director's
representative. Engineers' Union continued its representation of its
members before the Director, defending CIPS's claim that the union
members were not eligible for benefits. What Engineers' Union sought
to do in prosecuting the appeal to the circuit court was to represent
its members in the same capacity as it represented them before the
administrative agency.
	We also find support in the persuasive analysis employed by the
federal courts in construing the Administrative Orders Review Act,
generally known as the "Hobbs Act." 28 U.S.C. §2341 et seq. (1994).
The Hobbs Act provides direct review by the court of appeals of rules,
regulations, or final orders of certain federal administrative agencies.
28 U.S.C. §2342 (1994). However, section 2344 of the Hobbs Act
limits the right of review to parties to the administrative proceedings
who are aggrieved by the decision of the administrative agency. 28
U.S.C. §2344 (1994); Erie-Niagara R. Steering Committee v. Surface
Transportation Board, 167 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1999); Clark &amp; Reid
Co. v. United States, 804 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1986). In interpreting the
standing requirement of the Hobbs Act, the federal courts have
afforded standing to associations representing the interests of their
members.
	In Committee for Effective Cellular Rules v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 53 F.3d 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the court
determined that an organization whose members were interested in
filing applications for licenses to provide cellular service in unserved
areas had standing to pursue an appeal on behalf of its members. The
court first held that the individual members of the organization had
standing to prosecute the appeal. Applying the Hunt tripartite test, the
court found that the organization had standing to prosecute the appeal
because its individual members had standing; the interests the
organization sought to protect were germane to the organization's
purpose; and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
required the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.
	Likewise, in National Treasury Employees Union, 743 F.2d 895,
the court determined that the union had standing to seek review of an
order of the Merit Systems Protection Board excluding temporary
layoffs of seasonal employees from the adverse action protections
accorded to furloughs by statute. The court first determined that the
interests the union sought to protect, the rights of its seasonal workers
to the adverse action protections when they are laid off for less than
30 days, were germane to its purposes as exclusive representative of
those workers. The court also determined that neither the claim
asserted, that a regulation was invalid on its face, nor the relief
requested, that the regulation be declared invalid, required the
participation of individual union members in the suit. Turning to the
standing requirement of the Hobbs Act, the court determined that the
seasonal workers would have had aggrieved-party standing to sue
because they suffered injury in fact as a result of the agency order, and
the court could provide redress if it held the regulation invalid on
appeal. The court concluded that "[b]ecause the individual employees
represented by the [union] would therefore have been permitted to
bring this suit, the union also has standing to sue the Merit Systems
Protection Board." National Treasury Employees Union, 743 F.2d  at
911.
	At issue in Rockford League of Women Voters v. United States
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 679 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1982), was the
refusal of the Commission's Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
to institute proceedings to revoke Commonwealth Edison Company's
permit to construct a nuclear electrical generating plant. The Rockford
League of Women Voters sought review of the administrative
agency's inaction. The court determined that the League of Women
Voters had standing to maintain the action. The court reasoned:
		"The standing of an organization is derivative of its members'
standing [citation], so we must consider whether members of
the Rockford League of Women Voters would have had
standing to complain about the Director's action if they had
filed this petition personally. They would have if they could
show a threat of physical illness or injury. The League's
request to the Director to initiate a permit-revocation
proceeding alleged, plausibly enough given the proximity of
Rockford to the construction site, that members of the
League 'live near the site of the Byron Station'-near enough
we should think to be endangered should the Byron plant be
unsafe. This does not quite answer the standing question,
because until the plant is actually licensed-there cannot be
any danger to the inhabitants of Rockford. But the League
further alleges that if the safety problems that it raised in its
request to the Director are not solved before construction is
completed they will never be solved-the Commission will be
stampeded into granting a license regardless. This allegation
is sufficient to confer standing ***." Rockford League of
Women Voters, 679 F.2d  at 1221-22.
See also Hunt, 432 U.S.  at 346, 53 L. Ed. 2d  at 396, 97 S. Ct.  at 2443
(noting that "if the Commission has standing to litigate the claims of
its constituents, it may also rely on them to meet the requisite amount
in controversy"); Connecticut Ass'n of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v.
Worrell, 199 Conn. 609, 508 A.2d 743 (1986) (association had
standing because its members were aggrieved persons); Brotherhood
of Teamsters &amp; Auto Truck Drivers, 190 Cal. App. 3d  at 1515, 236 Cal. Rptr.  at 79 (finding that a union had standing to bring an action
as the representative of its constituents where the union members
were beneficially interested in the outcome of the proceeding).
	Here, Engineers' Union filed the complaint for administrative
review to protect the interests of its members. The agency's decision
adversely affected the union members, who were parties to the
administrative proceedings. Because the individual union members had
standing to sue for administrative review, Engineers' Union had
standing to bring the complaint on their behalf. We conclude that the
Department and CIPS failed to show that Engineers' Union lacked
standing to appeal the Director's decision. The circuit court properly
denied their motions to dismiss. Having resolved the issue of standing,
we turn to the merits of the case.

II. Eligibility for Unemployment Insurance Benefits
A. Standard of Review
	We note at the outset our standard of review. The
Unemployment Insurance Act provides that judicial review of the
Director's decision must accord with the Administrative Review Law
(735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 1994)). 820 ILCS 405/1100 (West
1994); Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 141, 148
(1997). In turn, the Administrative Review Law provides that judicial
review extends to all questions of law and fact presented by the entire
record. 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 1994); Bridgestone, 179 Ill. 2d  at
148. The statute specifically limits judicial review to the administrative
record; the court may not hear new or additional evidence in support
of or in opposition to the decision of the administrative agency. 735
ILCS 5/3-110 (West 1994). The statute additionally mandates that the
"findings and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions
of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and correct." 735 ILCS
5/3-110 (West 1994). Accordingly, an administrative agency's
findings of fact should not be disturbed on review unless they are
against the manifest weight of the evidence. City of Belvidere v.
Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 204 (1998);
Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88 (1992).
	In this case, however, the facts are not in dispute. Thus, the issue
before us is not whether the Director's findings of fact were against
the manifest weight of the evidence. Rather, the Director's decision as
to whether the members of Engineers' Union were eligible for
unemployment compensation benefits depends solely on the
application of the appropriate legal standard to the undisputed facts.
This is a question of law (see Bridgestone, 179 Ill. 2d  at 148; Chicago
Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 171 Ill. 2d 263,
271 (1996); City of Chicago v. Department of Revenue, 147 Ill. 2d 484, 491 (1992) (and cases cited therein); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Department of Revenue, 29 Ill. 2d 564, 565-66 (1963)) which we
review de novo. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d  at 205 (and cases cited
therein).

B. Direct Interest in the Dispute
	Citing section 604 of the Unemployment Insurance Act (820
ILCS 405/604 (West 1994)), the Department and CIPS maintain that
the members of Engineers' Union were not eligible for unemployment
compensation benefits because their unemployment was due to a
stoppage of work resulting from a labor dispute. Conversely,
Engineers' Union maintains that the relieving proviso of section 604
applies, and the members of Engineers' Union were eligible for
unemployment compensation benefits.
	Section 604 of the Act provides:
			"Labor dispute. An individual shall be ineligible for
benefits for any week with respect to which it is found that
his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of
work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory,
establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last
employed. ***
			***
			This Section shall not apply if it is shown that (A) the
individual is not participating in or financing or directly
interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of
work and (B) he does not belong to a grade or class of
workers of which immediately before the commencement of
the stoppage there were members employed at the premises
at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating
in or financing or directly interested in the dispute; provided,
that a lockout by the employer or an individual's failure to
cross a picket line at such factory, establishment, or other
premises shall not, in itself, be deemed to be participation by
him in the labor dispute." 820 ILCS 405/604 (West 1994).
There being no disagreement that the members of Engineers' Union
were unemployed due to a stoppage of work which existed because
of a labor dispute, we must determine whether the members of
Engineers' Union fall within the relieving proviso of section 604.(2) The
relieving proviso restores the employee to eligibility if the employee:
(1) is not participating in, financing or directly interested in the labor
dispute; and (2) does not belong to the same grade or class as the
workers participating in or financing or directly interested in the
dispute. It is incumbent upon the employee to prove both
propositions. Shell Oil Co. v. Cummins, 7 Ill. 2d 329, 334 (1955).
	The Director determined on that the members of Engineers'
Union had a direct interest in the labor dispute between CIPS and
Local 702. The perceived interest involved medical health insurance
premiums. CIPS made several medical health plans available to its
employees, including a medical plan with a $100 deductible, several
HMO medical plans, and "Salaried Plan B." In March 1993, the
members of Engineers' Union elected to remain in the medical health
plan with the $100 deductible. That selection was carried into the
agreement for a new contract that CIPS and Engineers' Union entered
into on June 21, 1993. The agreement also provided that CIPS's
contribution for each employee, by coverage category, under the $100
deductible plan would be the same as CIPS's contribution for each
employee, by coverage category, under Salaried Plan B.
	In July 1992, CIPS and Local 702 reached an agreement on the
terms of a new contract. The agreement provided that members of
Local 702 would be insured under Salaried Plan B, like nonunion
salaried employees of CIPS. The agreement, however, unraveled over
the next months, and the parties operated under several extensions to
their previous contracts. Shortly after the last extension expired on
April 23, 1993, CIPS locked the workers out of its facilities.
	As noted above, negotiations between CIPS and the unions
continued during the lockout. In a letter dated August 6, 1993, CIPS
noted that Local 702 had asked CIPS to consider providing insurance
coverage to its members under the $100 deductible plan, while
freezing the employee portion of the premiums through June 30, 1995.
The letter noted further that CIPS offered to freeze employee
premiums under the $100 deductible plan through September 30,
1994. On August 25, 1993, CIPS announced that it was ending the
lockout of the members of Local 702, and the members of both unions
returned to work. Several months later, in January 1994, CIPS and
Local 702 entered into a new contract. The contract provided that
members of Local 702 would be insured under Salaried Plan B. CIPS
agreed to make specific contributions for its employees under Salaried
Plan B, and in accord with the provisions of its contract with
Engineers' Union, CIPS made the same level of contributions under
the $100 deductible plan that the members of Engineers' Union chose.
	In finding that the members of Engineers' Union were directly
interested in the labor dispute between CIPS and Local 702, the
Director relied upon the link between the contributions that CIPS
made for its employees under Salaried Plan B and the contributions
CIPS made under the $100 deductible plan. The contributions CIPS
made for the members of Engineers' Union under the $100 deductible
plan increased to match the contributions CIPS made under Salaried
Plan B. Because the members of Engineers' Union benefitted from the
increased contributions toward their premiums under the $100
deductible plan, the Director concluded that the members of
Engineers' Union had a direct interest in the outcome of the labor
dispute between CIPS and Local 702.
	The appellate court reversed, holding that the members of
Engineers' Union did not have a direct interest in the outcome of the
labor dispute between CIPS and the members of Local 702. The court
reasoned:
		"[W]here one union has a legally enforceable right to a
benefit at issue in another union's dispute, the first union has
a direct interest in the outcome of the dispute. By contrast,
where the union has a mere expectancy in the outcome of
another union's dispute, such as where the employer
historically patterns its collective bargaining agreements with
each of its unions after each other, our courts have not found
a direct interest. [Citations.]
			The situation presented by the instant case does not fit
squarely within either of these categories, however. Local
702 had a choice to either leave Salaried Plan B-in which
case Local 148 would not have a legally enforceable right to
any increase that Local 702 negotiated-or remain in the
plan-in which case Local 148 would have a right to the
increase. Presumably, Local 702 would choose whichever
option afforded its members the greatest benefits. If it were
able to negotiate a better premium payment by leaving
Salaried Plan B, it would not be in Local 148's interest for
Local 702 to succeed in getting the best possible deal. In
short, the interests of the two unions did not directly coincide
because the fortunes of Local 148 did not necessarily rise or
fall with those of Local 702. Viewing this divergence of
interests in light of the policy behind the requirement, we
conclude that Local 148 did not have a direct interest in the
outcome of the labor dispute." (Emphases in original.) 345
Ill. App. 3d at 395-96.
We disagree with the appellate court's conclusion.
	The members of Engineers' Union had a direct interest in the
labor dispute between CIPS and Local 702. Their contract specifically
provided that CIPS would make contributions to their medical plan,
the $100 deductible plan, in the same amounts as the contributions it
made to Salaried Plan B. Thus, the members of Engineers' Union
stood to benefit from any increase in the level of contributions to
Salaried Plan B obtained by Local 702 as a result of the negotiations
ending the labor dispute. To be sure the increase in the contributions
to the $100 deductible plan was contingent upon Local 702 selecting
Salaried Plan B and successfully bargaining for an increase in the level
of contributions to Salaried Plan B. However, a level of contingency
always exists where one union relies upon successful bargaining by
another union for an increase in wages and benefits or an improvement
in work conditions.
	We contrast the present case with the circumstances in General
Motors Corp. v. Bowling, 85 Ill. 2d 539, 542 (1981), and in Cummins,
7 Ill. 2d 329. In General Motors Corp., this court rejected a claim that
the members of a union representing the shop clerks at General
Motors' plants in Chicago and LaGrange, Illinois, had a direct interest
in a labor dispute between General Motors and the members of
another union representing the production workers at the plants. The
court recognized that certain parts of the production workers'
agreement with General Motors would customarily be copied into the
shop clerks' own agreement. The shop clerks, therefore, might
anticipate that the strike by the production workers would influence
their terms of employment. That, however, was at most an indirect
interest. The court explained: "All they had was a hope, not any
assurance. A mere expectancy without any legal right, subject to
GM's views on the fairness and convenience of adopting parts of
another agreement, does not disqualify the shop clerks for
unemployment benefits." General Motors Corp., 85 Ill. 2d  at 543.
	In Cummins, 14 labor unions, including the Electricians, the
Machinists and the Operating Engineers, were represented at a
refinery. In addition to being affiliated with its corresponding
international union, each of the local unions, with the exception of the
Machinists and the Operating Engineers, belonged to the Metal Trades
Council of Wood River. The international unions were affiliated with
the Metal Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor.
The purpose of the council and the department was to assist the
individual unions in the conduct of their affairs and in negotiations
with their employer.
	In accordance with their customary practice and at the suggestion
of the Metal Trades Council, negotiations for a new contract took
place between the employer and a committee representing the Metal
Trades Department and each of the 12 international unions. The
resulting proposed agreement, although for the most part equally
applicable to all the unions, was designed to cover problems peculiar
to each craft. The agreement was signed by each of the local unions
with the exception of the Pipefitters and Asbestos Workers, who
demanded increased wages and different working conditions. The
Pipefitters and Asbestos Workers went on strike, curtailing operations
at the refinery until after negotiations were held between the employer
and the Pipefitters international union, and the strike was called off.
Immediately thereafter, a strike was called and a picket line set up by
the Operating Engineers, who were also demanding a wage
concession. The new strike resulted in the continued shutdown of
refinery operations. While the latter strike was in progress, the
employer informed the Metal Trades Department that, in order to get
all employees back to work, the employer was prepared to offer a
substantial wage increase. Negotiations with the council, the
department, and all 14 local unions resulted in an agreed wage
increase for all employees, and an end to the strike by the Operating
Engineers.
	The claimants were members of the 10 unions which, along with
the Pipefitters and Asbestos Workers, made up the Metal Trades
Council. On appeal, the employer maintained that by participating in
both the original negotiations and the subsequent negotiations on the
wage increase, and by accepting the wage increase, the claimants
made the dispute their own and were, therefore, directly interested in
its outcome. The court rejected the employer's argument, reasoning:
		"Representatives from each of the 12 unions met with the
Company in the spring of 1950 for the purpose of negotiating
a new labor contract, and as a result thereof, such an
agreement was, on June 18, 1950, presented to each union
for ratification. Thereafter, the claimants' unions accepted
this contract and the Company continued to enjoy full
production until the strike was called by the non-ratifying
Pipefitters and Asbestos Unions. Any dispute which the
ratifying unions may have had with the Company was settled
by this agreement. *** It is true that the ratifying unions took
part in the conference of September 21 and 22, and that the
claimants received a wage increase thereafter. However, it
must be noted that this conference was called at the insistence
of the Company and, as its superintendent testified, for the
purpose of offering 'a general wage increase' as a result of 'a
change in economic conditions of the country' which was
brought about by the Korean War. In its reply brief the
appellant admits 'that Shell's policy at the refinery has been
not to make any substantial distinction in the wage rates paid
to the various union crafts. In other words, a wage increase
granted to one union would be granted to all.' On the other
hand, there was no evidence, whatsoever, to show that the
claimants either requested further wage negotiations or,
absent the picket line, would have failed to honor the terms
of their prior agreement had a wage increase not been
forthcoming. From these facts, we feel it was reasonable to
conclude that, as to the ten ratifying unions, any wage
increase which they received was voluntarily tendered by the
employer for the purpose of creating good will and of
promoting harmonious employment relationships. By
accepting this generosity, these claimants cannot be said to
have become directly interested in the labor dispute."
Cummins, 7 Ill. 2d  at 335-36.
	Turning to the case at bar, we conclude that the members of
Engineers' Union had a right to increased contributions to their
medical plans. Although the right depended in part on the actions of
the members of Local 702, it was different in substance and nature
than a mere expectancy. Where the terms achieved by the union
involved in the labor dispute are applied to another union because of
custom traditionally followed by the employer, a mere expectancy is
involved that does not equate to a direct interest in the outcome of the
labor dispute. Likewise, where the employer voluntarily offers better
terms to all union members, the members of a nonstriking union do
not have a direct interest in the outcome of the labor dispute.
However, where one union's contract specifically provides that the
union members will be the beneficiaries of terms negotiated by the
union involved in the labor dispute, an enforceable right is at issue,
although the right is contingent on the successful outcome of the
negotiations. In those circumstances, the members of the union have
a direct interest in the outcome of the labor dispute.
	To be eligible for unemployment insurance benefits under the
relieving proviso of section 604, an employee must prove both that he
is not directly interested in the labor dispute and that he is not of the
same grade or class as employees who are participating in, financing
or who hold a direct interest in the labor dispute. Our ruling that the
members of Engineers' Union were directly interested in the labor
dispute between CIPS and Local 702 renders the members of
Engineers' Union ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits.
Consequently, we need not consider whether the members of
Engineers' Union were of the same grade or class as the members of
Local 702.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the rulings of the
appellate court and the circuit court of Franklin County, finding that
Engineers' Union had standing to appeal the Director's decision.
However, we find that the members of Engineers' Union had a direct
interest in the outcome of the labor dispute between CIPS and Local
702. Consequently, the members of Engineers' Union were ineligible
for unemployment compensation benefits. We therefore reverse the
circuit court's and appellate court's judgments and confirm the
decision of the Department.

Judgments reversed;
Department confirmed.
	JUSTICE THOMAS, specially concurring:
	Although I agree that the members of Engineers' Union were
ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits, that is not why I
join in the decision to reverse the judgments below. Instead, my
decision to reverse is based upon Engineers' Union's lack of standing
to appeal the Director's decision.
	It is well established that "the right to review such administrative
decisions is limited to parties of record before the administrative
agency whose rights, duties or privileges were adversely affected by
the decision." (Emphasis added.) Williams v. Department of Labor,
76 Ill. 2d 72, 78 (1979). This principle is particularly compelling in
this case, where the relevant statutes and regulations specifically
define who may appear as a party before the Department and who
may appeal from that agency's decisions.
	Administrative regulations have the force and effect of law and
are construed according to the same standards that govern the
construction of statutes. Union Electric Co. v. Department of
Revenue, 136 Ill. 2d 385, 391 (1990). The fundamental rule of
statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the
legislature's intent. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of
Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). The best indication of
legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary
meaning. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479
(1994). Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply
the statute without resort to further aids of statutory construction.
Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85
(1999).
	Under both the Unemployment Insurance Act and the
Administrative Review Law, only a party to the administrative
proceeding may seek judicial review of the Director's decision.
Section 1100 of the Unemployment Insurance Act states that "[a]ny
decision of the Board of Review (or of the Director in cases of
decisions made pursuant to Sections 800 and 801) shall be reviewable
only under and in accordance with the provisions of the
Administrative Review Law, provided that judicial review thereof shall
be permitted only after any party claiming to be aggrieved thereby
has exhausted his administrative remedies as provided by this Act."
(Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 405/1100 (West 2002). The
Administrative Review Law, in turn, defines "administrative decision"
as "any decision, order or determination of any administrative agency
rendered in a particular case, which affects the legal rights, duties or
privileges of parties and which terminates the proceedings before the
administrative agency." (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3-101 (West
2002). That judicial review is specifically limited to parties is
significant, as the Illinois Administrative Code specifically defines
"party," for purposes of the Unemployment Insurance Act, as "the
claimant and any employing unit which files a timely and sufficient
protest." 56 Ill. Adm. Code §2720.1 (2002). 
	If the right to seek judicial review is limited to parties, and the
definition of "party" is limited to claimants and employing units, then
it is necessarily true that judicial review is limited to claimants and
employing units who actually appeared before the Department. Here,
there is no dispute that Engineers' Union did not appear as a party
before the Department. As importantly, Engineers' Union could not
have appeared as party before the Department, as it is neither a
claimant nor an employing unit. Accordingly, under both this court's
decision in Williams and the relevant statutes and regulations,
Engineers' Union had no standing to appeal the Director's decision.
The judgments below must therefore be reversed.
	That said, I wish to emphasize that I express no opinion on the
doctrine of collective standing per se, which may or may not deserve
a place in Illinois law. My position is simply that the doctrine has no
place in this particular context.

	JUSTICE GARMAN joins in this special concurrence.

	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
	I concur in part I of the majority's opinion, holding the IUOE,
Local 148, has standing to appeal the Director's decision denying
unemployment benefits to its members. Slip op. at 19-20. I
respectfully dissent, however, to part II of the majority's opinion,
holding the members of Local 148 ineligible for unemployment
benefits. Slip op. at 26.
	Under section 604 of the Act (820 ILCS 405/604 (West 1994)),
the members of Local 148 were "ineligible [for benefits] only if both
(1) their unemployment was due to a stoppage of work which existed
because of a labor dispute at the premises where they worked, and (2)
they or others of their grade or class were participating in, financing,
or directly interested in the labor dispute." (Emphasis added.) General
Motors Corp. v. Bowling, 85 Ill. 2d 539, 542 (1981). Under the facts
of this case, the only issue is whether the members of Local 148
belonged to a grade or class of workers who were directly interested
in the labor dispute between CIPS and Local 702.
	I believe the members of Local 148 were not of the same grade
or class as the members of Local 702. This court's decision in Shell
Oil Co. v. Cummins, 7 Ill. 2d 329 (1955), is directly on point, and I
disagree with the majority that Cummins is distinguishable (slip op. at
26). In Cummins, this court found that although the unions involved
were affiliated by membership in the Metal Trades Council, there was
no evidence to show the unions surrendered their autonomous nature.
Cummins, 7 Ill. 2d  at 337. This court reasoned:
		"Each union was free to act jointly or independently in
presenting and enforcing its employment demands, and
without regard to the wishes of the others. It is true that in
many cases, a single agreement indicates that all employee
parties thereto are of the same grade and class. However, it
is only one factor which must be considered and is not, in and
of itself, conclusive. It is our opinion that these claimants did
not belong to a grade or class of workers who participated in,
financed, or were directly interested in this labor dispute."
Cummins, 7 Ill. 2d  at 337-38.
	In the present case, Local 148 represented employees at the
Coffeen, Meredosia, Hutsonville, and Grand Tower facilities. Local
702 represented employees at the Newton facility and the Eastern,
Southern and Western divisions. The sole overlap occurred at the
Grand Tower facility, where Local 702 represented 12 workers in the
production department. These employees were included in Local
702's Southern division bargaining unit. Nevertheless, each facility
division was covered by a separate collective-bargaining agreement.
Not only did each union enter into separate contracts, each contract
required ratification by the respective members of each union. I
believe each union was autonomous, being "free to act jointly or
independently in presenting and enforcing its employment demands,
and without regard to the wishes of the others." Cummins, 7 Ill. 2d  at
337-38. I would therefore conclude that the members of Local 148
were not of the same grade or class as the members of Local 702.
	I also agree with the appellate court that the members of Local
148 did not have a direct interest in the outcome of the labor dispute
between CIPS and Local 702. Although Local 148 would benefit if
Local 702 elected insurance coverage under Salaried Plan B and
successfully bargained for higher contributions by CIPS to the medical
plan, Local 702 was under no obligation to select coverage under the
plan. Indeed, during the negotiations, Local 702 asked CIPS to
consider providing insurance coverage to its members under the $100
deductible plan, while freezing the employee portion of the premiums
through June 30, 1995. Had Local 702 bargained for coverage under
another medical health plan, Local 148 would not have received an
increase in the contributions toward the $100 deductible plan as a
result of bargaining by Local 702. The appellate court noted:
		"Presumably, Local 702 would choose whichever option
afforded its members the greatest benefits. If it were able to
negotiate a better premium payment by leaving Salaried Plan
B, it would not be in Local 148's interest for Local 702 to
succeed in getting the best possible deal." 345 Ill. App. 3d at
396.
	This court has likewise held that the mere expectancy of better
economic terms does not give rise to a direct interest in a labor
dispute. See General Motors Corp., 85 Ill. 2d 539. In General Motors
Corp., the court rejected a claim that the members of a union
representing the shop clerks at General Motors' plants in Chicago and
LaGrange, Illinois, had a direct interest in a labor dispute between
General Motors and the members of another union representing the
production workers at the plants. The court recognized that certain
parts of the production workers' agreement with General Motors
would customarily be copied into the shop clerks' own agreement.
The shop clerks, therefore, might anticipate that the strike by the
production workers would influence their terms of employment. That,
however, was at most an indirect interest. The court explained: "All
they had was a hope, not any assurance. A mere expectancy without
any legal right, subject to GM's views on the fairness and convenience
of adopting parts of another agreement, does not disqualify the shop
clerks for unemployment benefits." General Motors Corp., 85 Ill. 2d 
at 543. See also Cummins, 7 Ill. 2d 329; Nestle Co. v. Johnson, 68 Ill.
App. 3d 17 (1979).
	Here, Local 148's agreement with CIPS concerning medical
benefits was not contingent in any way on CIPS negotiations with
Local 702, and nothing in the agreement between Local 148 and CIPS
directly tied Local 148 to any benefit Local 702 might receive. Local
148 agreed to accept whatever contributions CIPS gave to all its
employees insured under Salaried Plan B, including nonunion
employees. Local 148 had already reached an agreement with the
employer that was binding, regardless of the outcome of the
negotiations between Local 702 and CIPS. The members of Local 148
had no control over the health insurance agreement reached by Local
702 and CIPS. In fact, the conduct of CIPS in negotiating the final
health insurance agreement was a variable completely outside Local
148's control. If CIPS had never offered the health insurance plan
accepted by Local 702, then Local 148 would have received no
benefit whatsoever from those negotiations. Any benefit Local 148
members may have expected to receive from resolution of the dispute
between CIPS and Local 702 was speculative at best. Consequently,
the mere possibility of increased contributions toward their medical
plan did not equate to a direct interest of the members of Local 148
in the outcome of the labor dispute between CIPS and Local 702.
	It is, therefore, my opinion that the members of Local 148 were
not directly interested in the labor dispute between CIPS and Local
702. Accordingly, I would conclude that the members of Local 148
were eligible to receive unemployment benefits.
	The majority, however, asserts that Local 148 had more than a
mere expectancy of better economic terms because the union members
would have a legally enforceable right to increased contributions
based on the success of negotiations between Local 702 and CIPS.
Slip op. at 24-25. Any such "legally enforceable right," however, was
contingent and tenuous. Nothing in the language of the contract gave
Local 148 any enforceable rights based on Local 702's negotiations.
In fact, the record in this case shows that at the time Local 148
entered into its agreement with CIPS (1) it appeared that Local 702
would not participate in Salaried Plan B; (2) there was no indication
any premium support would be provided under Salaried Plan B; and
(3) there was no indication the lockout of Local 702 was related to
the issue of premium support. As the appellate court correctly
observed: "the interests of the two unions did not directly coincide
because the fortunes of Local 148 did not necessarily rise or fall with
those of Local 702." 345 Ill. App. 3d at 396.
	Moreover, the legislature's declared public policy underlying the
Unemployment Insurance Act is to lighten the burden of involuntary
unemployment that "so often falls with crushing force upon the
unemployed worker and his family." 820 ILCS 405/100 (West 1992);
see Panther Creek Mines, Inc. v. Murphy, 390 Ill. 23, 28 (1945) (the
purpose of unemployment compensation is "to alleviate the distress
and suffering occasioned by involuntary unemployment"); see also
Outboard, Marine &amp; Manufacturing Co., Johnson Motors Division
v. Gordon, 403 Ill. 523, 536-37 (1949) ("the legislature intended to
provide for the innocent victims of a labor dispute by specifically
excluding them from the denial of unemployment compensation").
Accordingly, the Act is to be liberally construed to provide financial
assistance to those who are unemployed through no fault of their own.
Bridgestone, 179 Ill. 2d  at 155; Cummins, 7 Ill. 2d  at 339. The policy
behind the Act mandates the members of Local 148 be eligible for
unemployment compensation benefits.
	For the foregoing reasons, I concur in part and respectfully
dissent in part.
1. Indeed, in Brown Group the Court held that Congress may 
dispense with this requirement by statute. Brown Group, 517 U.S.  at 558, 134 L. Ed. 2d  at 771, 116 S. Ct.  at 1537. The Court expressly reserved a determination 
as to whether, absent congressional action, the third prong may be satisfied, 
noting: "United Food argues that given the simplified nature of the monetary 
ï»¿relief here provided' [citation] the third prong of the Hunt test is satisfied 
despite its claim for damages. In light of our conclusion that in the WARN Act 
Congress has abrogated the third prong of the associational standing test, we 
need not decide whether, absent congressional action, the third prong would bar 
a simplified' claim for damages." Brown Group, 517 U.S.  at 554 n.5, 134 L. Ed. 2d  at 768 n.5, 116 S. Ct.  at 1535 n.5.                
             
             
          
       
             

2. We note that we are not called upon to determine whether 
there was a labor dispute "at the factory, establishment, or other premises" at 
which the claimants were last employed. Although the vast majority of its 
members worked at the power plants, separate facilities from the facilities 
where the members of Local 702 were employed, Engineers' Union does not present 
any argument based upon the situs of the labor dispute. Consequently, we do not 
consider whether there was a labor dispute at the power plants where all union 
employees were members of Engineers' Union.