Title: D’Agastino v. City of Miami
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC16-645
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 22, 2017

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-645 
____________ 
 
FREDDY D’AGASTINO, et al.,  
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
THE CITY OF MIAMI, et al.,  
Respondents. 
 
[June 22, 2017] 
 
LEWIS, J. 
 
The many and multiple complexities and conflicts generated in today’s 
society have produced numerous difficulties inherent in the delivery of police work 
and services.  The City of Miami, along with other governmental units, have 
responded to some of those difficulties inherent in modern police work by creating 
citizen review and investigative panels.  The present case has been generated by 
the creation of and powers given to a group known as the City of Miami Civilian 
Investigative Panel (CIP), which is an independent body designed to investigate 
and review instances of alleged police misconduct, and review police policies and 
procedures, with the ultimate goal of making recommendations to the relevant law 
 
 
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enforcement agency.  Today we consider a challenge to some of the CIP’s 
authority, in which Lieutenant Freddy D’Agastino and the Fraternal Order of 
Police seek review of the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in 
D’Agastino v. City of Miami, 189 So. 3d 236 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016), on the basis 
that it expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal in Demings v. Orange County Citizens Review Board, 15 So. 3d 604 (Fla. 
5th DCA 2009), on a question of law.  The policy or wisdom of such investigative 
panels is not before us.  Specifically, the only question before us involves the 
operative effect of the Police Officers’ Bill of Rights (PBR), codified in sections 
112.531-.535, Florida Statutes (2008), and whether those state statutes have any 
preemptive force with regard to the activities of other review panels.  Due to the 
conflict of decisions, we have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
FACTUAL, LEGAL, AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On March 5, 2009, a complaint was filed with the CIP against Lt. 
D’Agastino for alleged misconduct that had occurred the day before during a 
traffic stop.  The City of Miami Police Department’s Internal Affairs Division 
(Internal Affairs) subsequently fully investigated the matter, interviewing under 
oath the complainant, Lt. D’Agastino, and two other officers who were present 
during the traffic stop.  On April 8, 2009, Internal Affairs mailed a letter to the 
complainant indicating that it had completed its investigation and that its findings 
 
 
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were “inconclusive” as to the alleged misconduct “because insufficient evidence 
exists to prove or disprove the allegation.”  Specifically, the Internal Affairs report 
indicated that there were no independent witnesses to corroborate either conflicting 
account of the incident that emerged from the sworn interviews conducted by 
Internal Affairs. 
 
On April 17, 2009, nine days after the letter indicating Internal Affairs had 
completed its investigation, the CIP issued a subpoena to Lt. D’Agastino ordering 
him to appear before the CIP to testify.  However, on May 22, 2009, Lt. 
D’Agastino filed an action in the circuit court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit 
alleging that the CIP as an investigative authority conflicts with a component of the 
PBR, section 112.533(1), Florida Statutes.  As a result, Lt. D’Agastino requested 
that the subpoena issued by the CIP be quashed and a protective order entered.  
Separately, the Fraternal Order of Police had filed a declaratory action also 
alleging that the CIP was in conflict with section 112.533(1), Florida Statutes.  The 
two cases were consolidated and the trial court ultimately ruled in favor of the City 
of Miami and the CIP on cross-motions for summary judgment.  Lt. D’Agastino 
then appealed the trial court’s decision to the Third District Court of Appeal.  The 
Third District affirmed, entertained a motion for rehearing for three years, but 
ultimately issued a substituted opinion once again affirming the trial court’s order.  
The Third District’s decision was by a vote of two to one.  Before we delve into 
 
 
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the details of the legal reasoning at issue, however, it is helpful to understand the 
state law and municipal ordinances that are at issue and under consideration here. 
The Police Officers’ Bill of Rights 
We begin with the Police Officers’ Bill of Rights, codified in Part VI of 
Chapter 112 of the Florida Statutes.  Most relevant here, section 112.533 is titled 
“Receipt and processing of complaints,” and provides in pertinent part: 
(1)(a)  Every law enforcement agency and correctional agency 
shall establish and put into operation a system for the receipt, 
investigation, and determination of complaints received by such 
agency from any person, which shall be the procedure for 
investigating a complaint against a law enforcement and correctional 
officer and for determining whether to proceed with disciplinary 
action or to file disciplinary charges, notwithstanding any other law or 
ordinance to the contrary.  When law enforcement or correctional 
agency personnel assigned the responsibility of investigating the 
complaint prepare an investigative report or summary, regardless of 
form, the person preparing the report shall, at the time the report is 
completed:  
 
1.  Verify pursuant to s. 92.525 that the contents of the report 
are true and accurate based upon the person’s personal knowledge, 
information, and belief.  
 
2.  Include the following statement, sworn and subscribed to 
pursuant to s. 92.525:  
 
“I, the undersigned, do hereby swear, under penalty of perjury, that, to 
the best of my personal knowledge, information, and belief, I have not 
knowingly or willfully deprived, or allowed another to deprive, the 
subject of the investigation of any of the rights contained in ss. 
112.532 and 112.533, Florida Statutes.”  
 
The requirements of subparagraphs 1. and 2. shall be completed prior 
to the determination as to whether to proceed with disciplinary action 
 
 
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or to file disciplinary charges.  This subsection does not preclude the 
Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission from exercising 
its authority under chapter 943.  
 
(b)1.  Any political subdivision that initiates or receives a 
complaint against a law enforcement officer or correctional officer 
must within 5 business days forward the complaint to the employing 
agency of the officer who is the subject of the complaint for review or 
investigation.  
 
2.  For purposes of this paragraph, the term “political 
subdivision” means a separate agency or unit of local government 
created or established by law or ordinance and the officers thereof and 
includes, but is not limited to, an authority, board, branch, bureau, 
city, commission, consolidated government, county, department, 
district, institution, metropolitan government, municipality, office, 
officer, public corporation, town, or village. 
 
§ 112.533(1), Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added).1 
Immediately preceding is section 112.532, titled “Law enforcement officers’ 
and correctional officers’ rights.”  Section 112.532 introduces several rights 
afforded to law enforcement officers2 with the following language, “All law 
enforcement officers . . . employed by or appointed to a law enforcement agency  
                                          
 
 
1.  Although the complaint was filed in 2009, the decision below analyzed 
the 2007 Florida Statutes.  There were no amendments to any section of the PBR in 
2008, and the 2009 amendments were not effective until July 1, 2009, well after 
this action was filed on May 22, 2009.  Ch. 2009-200, § 4, at 6, Laws of Fla. (“This 
act shall take effect July 1, 2009.”). 
 
2.  “Law enforcement officer” is defined as “any person, other than a chief 
of police, who is employed full time by any municipality or the state or any 
political subdivision thereof and whose primary responsibility is the prevention 
and detection of crime or the enforcement of the penal, traffic, or highway laws of 
 
 
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. . . shall have the following rights and privileges.”  § 112.532(1), Fla. Stat.  Those 
rights and privileges are enumerated in six subsections and many subparagraphs. 
The first set of rights and privileges are those “Rights of Law Enforcement 
Officers and Correctional Officers While Under Investigation,” enumerated in 
subsection 112.532(1): 
Whenever a law enforcement officer or correctional officer is under 
investigation and subject to interrogation by members of his or her 
agency for any reason which could lead to disciplinary action, 
demotion, or dismissal, such interrogation shall be conducted under 
the following conditions:  
 
(a)  The interrogation shall be conducted at a reasonable hour, 
preferably at a time when the law enforcement officer or correctional 
officer is on duty, unless the seriousness of the investigation is of such 
a degree that immediate action is required.  
 
(b)  The interrogation shall take place either at the office of the 
command of the investigating officer or at the office of the local 
precinct, police unit, or correctional unit in which the incident 
allegedly occurred, as designated by the investigating officer or 
agency.  
 
(c)  The law enforcement officer or correctional officer under 
investigation shall be informed of the rank, name, and command of 
the officer in charge of the investigation, the interrogating officer, and 
all persons present during the interrogation.  All questions directed to 
the officer under interrogation shall be asked by or through one 
interrogator during any one investigative interrogation, unless 
specifically waived by the officer under investigation.  
 
                                          
 
this state; and includes any person who is appointed by the sheriff as a deputy 
sheriff pursuant to s. 30.07.”  § 112.531(1), Fla. Stat. 
 
 
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(d)  The law enforcement officer or correctional officer under 
investigation shall be informed of the nature of the investigation prior 
to any interrogation, and he or she shall be informed of the names of 
all complainants.  All identifiable witnesses shall be interviewed, 
whenever possible, prior to the beginning of the investigative 
interview of the accused officer.  The complaint and all witness 
statements shall be provided to the officer who is the subject of the 
complaint prior to the beginning of any investigative interview of that 
officer.  An officer, after being informed of the right to review witness 
statements, may voluntarily waive the provisions of this paragraph 
and provide a voluntary statement at any time.  
 
(e)  Interrogating sessions shall be for reasonable periods and 
shall be timed to allow for such personal necessities and rest periods 
as are reasonably necessary.  
 
(f)  The law enforcement officer or correctional officer under 
interrogation shall not be subjected to offensive language or be 
threatened with transfer, dismissal, or disciplinary action.  No promise 
or reward shall be made as an inducement to answer any questions.  
 
(g)  The formal interrogation of a law enforcement officer or 
correctional officer, including all recess periods, shall be recorded on 
audio tape, or otherwise preserved in such a manner as to allow a 
transcript to be prepared, and there shall be no unrecorded questions 
or statements.  Upon the request of the interrogated officer, a copy of 
any such recording of the interrogation session must be made 
available to the interrogated officer no later than 72 hours, excluding 
holidays and weekends, following said interrogation.  
 
(h)  If the law enforcement officer or correctional officer under 
interrogation is under arrest, or is likely to be placed under arrest as a 
result of the interrogation, he or she shall be completely informed of 
all his or her rights prior to the commencement of the interrogation.  
 
(i)  At the request of any law enforcement officer or 
correctional officer under investigation, he or she shall have the right 
to be represented by counsel or any other representative of his or her 
choice, who shall be present at all times during such interrogation 
 
 
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whenever the interrogation relates to the officer’s continued fitness for 
law enforcement or correctional service.  
 
(j)  Notwithstanding the rights and privileges provided by this 
part, this part does not limit the right of an agency to discipline or to 
pursue criminal charges against an officer. 
 
§ 112.532(1)(a)-(j), Fla. Stat. 
 
Section 112.532, subsection (6), titled “Limitations Periods for Disciplinary 
Actions,” provides an elaborate limitations and tolling framework that prohibits 
“disciplinary action, demotion, or dismissal” if the “investigation is . . . not 
completed within 180 days after the date the agency receives notice of the 
allegation.”  § 112.532(6), Fla. Stat.  The subsection enumerates five exceptions 
that toll the 180-day limitations period.3  Further, subsection 112.532(6)(b) 
provides that an investigation may nevertheless be reopened if: 
1.  Significant new evidence has been discovered that is likely to 
affect the outcome of the investigation. 
 
2.  The evidence could not have reasonably been discovered in the 
normal course of investigation or the evidence resulted from the 
predisciplinary response of the officer. 
 
                                          
 
 
3.  The exceptions are for (1) when the officer waives the limitation period 
in writing; (2) the pendency of a criminal investigation or prosecution; (3) 
incapacity of the officer; (4) facilitating multijurisdictional investigations; and (5) 
when the Governor has declared a state of emergency.  § 112.532(6)(a)1.-5., Fla. 
Stat. 
 
 
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§ 112.532(6)(b)1.-2., Fla. Stat.  However, “[a]ny disciplinary action resulting from 
an investigation that is reopened pursuant to this paragraph must be completed 
within 90 days after the date the investigation is reopened.”  § 112.532(6)(b), Fla. 
Stat.4 
Relevant City of Miami Charter and Code Provisions 
The CIP’s history began with Section 51 of the Miami Charter which 
authorized the city commission to create a CIP “to act as independent citizens’ 
oversight of the sworn police department.”  Miami, Fla., Charter § 51 (2012).  In 
relevant part, the CIP is authorized to “(1) conduct independent investigations of 
police misconduct,” and “(3) make recommendations to the city manager and/or 
directly to the police chief, to which a timely written response shall be received 
within 30 days.”  Id. 
 
Directly challenged by Lt. D’Agastino here, the enabling ordinances 
empower the CIP to execute subpoenas for investigation of allegations of police 
misconduct: 
Sec. 11.5-32. - Subpoena power. 
 
                                          
 
4.  Section 112.532 also provides for complaint review boards, a statutory 
right to bring a civil action for damages arising from false complaints, a 
prohibition against disciplinary action without first affording an officer notice and 
an opportunity to respond, and protection from even the threat of retaliation for the 
exercise of the rights contained in the PBR.  §§ 112.532(2)-(5), Fla. Stat. 
 
 
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(a)  The CIP may subpoena witnesses and documents when 
conducting an independent investigation of allegations of police 
misconduct as follows: 
 
(1)  A request for a subpoena must be presented to and 
reviewed by the CIP independent counsel; 
 
(2)  The CIP independent counsel may deny or approve the 
request after consulting with the state attorney’s office; 
 
(3)  If approved by the CIP independent counsel, the CIP may 
issue the subpoena with an affirmative vote of seven of its members. 
 
(b)  The subpoena shall be valid only within the jurisdictional limits of 
the city.  However, the CIP may seek enforcement and extraterritorial 
domestication of its subpoenas in accordance with general law. 
 
§ 11.5-32, Miami, Fla., Code ch. 11, art. II, § 11.5-32 (2012).  The ordinances also 
list several procedures to be followed in connection with such subpoenas: 
Sec. 11.5-33. - Procedures related to city employees and witnesses. 
 
(a)  When a city employee appears before the CIP in response 
to a subpoena, such employee shall be formally advised prior to the 
commencement of testimony that if the employee has a good-faith 
belief that the testimony would tend to be self-incriminating, and if, in 
reliance upon that good-faith belief, the employee declines to answer 
any question, that the employee’s decision not to provide testimony 
will not subject him or her to any adverse employment consequences.  
Any employee who, after receiving such advice, decides to testify or 
provide evidence, must sign a statement acknowledging that the 
employee understands the advice and is testifying or providing 
evidence voluntarily and knowingly. 
 
(b)  A police officer who is the subject of an investigation shall 
be informed of the nature of the investigation and provided with a 
copy of the complaint prior to being interrogated. 
 
 
 
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(c)  A person who appears before the CIP in response to a CIP 
request for testimony may be represented by counsel or any other 
representative of his or her choice, which representative may be 
present at all times during the subject’s appearance before the CIP. 
 
(d)  The CIP may hold evidentiary hearings requiring witnesses 
in the manner set forth in section 11.5-30.  Only the subject of the 
complaint, witnesses, their attorneys or representatives and CIP 
members may participate in evidentiary hearings. 
 
(e)  Policies and procedures shall be established to ensure 
compliance with Chapters 112 and 119 of the Florida Statutes and any 
other applicable laws.[5] 
 
Id. at § 11.5-33, Miami, Fla., Code.  Also relevant here, a two-way comingling 
interaction between the CIP and the City of Miami Police Department is 
prominently featured in the local ordinances.  For one, “the police department shall 
be notified of complaints received by the CIP within two working days.”  § 11.5-
31(1)b.  Additionally, “[a]t the conclusion of the internal affairs investigation, the 
internal affairs report prepared for the Chief of Police shall be transmitted to the 
CIP within three working days.”  Id. at § 11.5-31(2)(b), Miami, Fla., Code.  
Continuing the two-way comingling interaction, the CIP’s ultimate findings and 
conclusions are forwarded to the Chief who must then respond within thirty days: 
At the conclusion of its review or investigation the CIP shall forward 
its written findings and conclusions to the chief of police and to 
affected officers and, to the extent permitted by law, to the 
complainants to which a timely written response shall be received 
from the chief of police within 30 days. 
                                          
 
 
5.  The record before us does not reveal any such policies or procedures. 
 
 
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§ 11.5-31(5), Miami, Fla., Code.  Furthermore, after reviewing an Internal Affairs 
report, the code provisions grant the CIP five options, three of which involve 
interacting directly with the police department: 
1.  Request that the chief of police conduct further 
investigation, or 
 
2.  Obtain further case-specific information from the 
chief of police, including written materials, audio or 
video tapes, and related documents, or 
 
3.  Conduct an independent investigation, such 
investigation to be concluded within 120 days, or 
 
4.  Notice and hold a hearing to gather evidence, or 
 
5.  Report its written findings and conclusions to the city 
manager and/or the chief of police; 
 
§ 11.5-31(2)(c)1.-5., Miami, Fla., Code. 
 
Legal Analysis in Decision Below and Relevant Legal Analysis of the Conflict 
Case 
 
 
With that background law, the analysis of the decision below can be 
properly understood.  To begin, the decision below held that the CIP did not 
conflict in any way with section 112.533(1) because the CIP is independent, 
external, and cannot directly impose discipline, whereas that particular section and 
the PBR in general only govern internal investigations by the employing law 
enforcement agency.  See D’Agastino, 189 So. 3d at 240-42.  The court below 
reasoned that the CIP acts independently of the police department and is granted 
 
 
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limited power to act in response to its investigations, and may only propose 
recommendations to the City Manager or Police Chief.  See id. at 240.  The court 
was of the view that the CIP does not interfere with any pending or potential 
criminal investigations or prosecution or with other investigations.  See id. at 240-
41.  The district court also deemed it important that before investigating a 
complaint, the CIP must consult with its independent counsel who consults with 
appropriate prosecutorial agencies.  See id. at 241.  It was also important that the 
CIP provides a mechanism for other agencies to obtain a stay for purposes of 
challenging a CIP investigation in a court of competent jurisdiction.  See id.  The 
decision below also emphasized that the PBR is limited to investigations conducted 
by the officer’s employing law enforcement agency and makes no reference to 
external investigations.  See id.  Ultimately, the district court reasoned that there is 
no conflict because the CIP lacks authority to make the types of police 
management decisions addressed in the PBR or to impact the obligations imposed 
on the police department by the PBR.  See id.  The court further suggested that Lt. 
D’Agastino had conceded that there was no express preemption.  See id. at 240. 
 
Similarly, the Fifth District in Demings considered whether the Orange 
County Citizen’s Review Board (CRB) had the power to compel deputies of the 
Orange County Sheriff to appear and testify in CRB investigations by subpoena.  
15 So. 3d at 610.  However, in conflict with the decision below, the Demings court 
 
 
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did not find that the CRB was reconcilable with section 112.533 because it 
understood the plain language of section 112.533 to authorize only one local 
government entity to investigate a complaint of officer misconduct—the officer’s 
employing agency.  Id. at 608-10.  Specifically, the Demings court considered 
section 112.533 unambiguous and conveying a clear and definite directive that the 
employing agency is the only local government entity authorized to investigate a 
complaint registered against a law enforcement officer.  Id. at 608.  The Demings 
court was of the view that amendments enacted in 2003 and 2007 confirmed this 
reading, primarily due to its addition of language in 2003 mandating that the law 
enforcement agency investigation amendments “shall be the procedure” for 
investigating complaints against local law enforcement “notwithstanding any other 
law or ordinance to the contrary,” as well as the language added in 2007 directing 
local government entities to forward complaints against an officer to the officer’s 
employing agency.  Id.6 
 
The dissent in the decision below agreed with Demings.  See D’Agastino, 
189 So. 3d at 247-48 (Rothenberg, J., dissenting).  The dissent was of the view that 
express preemption applied.  Id. at 248 (Rothenberg, J., dissenting).  In addition to 
                                          
 
 
6.  In a section titled “Other Problems with the CRB Charter Provision and 
Implementing Ordinances,” the Demings court held alternatively that the CRB was 
unconstitutional due to the Sheriff’s position as a constitutional officer.  Demings, 
15 So. 3d at 610-11. 
 
 
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the reasoning offered in Demings, the dissent in the decision below concluded that 
the CIP impermissibly creates an exception to the statutory scheme of the PBR.  
See id. (Rothenberg, J. dissenting) (citing City of Palm Bay v. Wells Fargo Bank 
N.A., 114 So. 3d 924 (Fla. 2013)).  Specifically, the dissent noted that the PBR 
contains an exception for the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission 
(CJSTC) and authorizes criminal investigations conducted by the State Attorney’s 
Office, state and federal grand juries, state and federal courts, the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the 
United States Department of Justice.  Id. at 248 (Rothenberg, J., dissenting).  Thus, 
noting that citizen review and investigatory panels are conspicuously missing from 
those exceptions, the dissent concluded they are preempted and unconstitutional.  
Id. at 250 (Rothenberg, J., dissenting) (citing City of Palm Bay, 114 So. 3d at 929 
(“Fundamental to the doctrine of preemption is the understanding that local 
governments lack the authority to craft their own exceptions to general state laws  
. . . concurrent power does not mean equal power.”)). 
We resolve the conflict between Demings and the decision below. 
ANALYSIS 
In Florida, the power of a municipal government to legislate is derived from 
both constitutional provisions and statute.  Generally speaking, the Florida 
 
 
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Constitution authorizes and empowers municipalities to exist and conduct 
municipal powers except as otherwise provided by law: 
(b)  POWERS.  Municipalities shall have governmental, 
corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal 
government, perform municipal functions and render municipal 
services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes except 
as otherwise provided by law.  Each municipal legislative body shall 
be elective.  
 
Art. VIII, § 2(b), Fla. Const.7   
Acting on its constitutional authority to address municipal powers, the 
Legislature clarified the powers of municipal government by enacting the 
Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, which is now codified in section 166.021 of the 
Florida Statutes.  Specifically, section 166.021(1) provides in full: 
166.021  Powers.--  
 
(1)  As provided in s. 2(b), Art. VIII of the State Constitution, 
municipalities shall have the governmental, corporate, and proprietary 
powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform 
municipal functions, and render municipal services, and may exercise 
any power for municipal purposes, except when expressly prohibited 
by law. 
 
                                          
 
 
7.  With regard to municipalities located within Miami-Dade County, there 
are several other constitutional provisions largely to the same effect from the 1885 
Constitution that have been retained and incorporated by reference.  See art. VIII, 
§6(a), (e), Fla. Const. (1968); art. VIII, § 11, Fla. Const. (1885, as amended 1967). 
 
 
- 17 - 
§ 166.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2008).  However, these powers are subject to limitations; 
among others, municipalities may not enact legislation concerning subjects 
expressly preempted to the state by general law: 
(3)  The Legislature recognizes that pursuant to the grant of 
power set forth in s. 2(b), Art. VIII of the State Constitution, the 
legislative body of each municipality has the power to enact 
legislation concerning any subject matter upon which the state 
Legislature may act, except:  
 
(a)  The subjects of annexation, merger, and exercise of 
extraterritorial power, which require general or special law pursuant to 
s. 2(c), Art. VIII of the State Constitution;  
 
(b)  Any subject expressly prohibited by the constitution;  
 
(c)  Any subject expressly preempted to state or county 
government by the constitution or by general law; and  
 
(d)  Any subject preempted to a county pursuant to a county 
charter adopted under the authority of ss. 1(g), 3, and 6(e), Art. VIII of 
the State Constitution.  
 
§ 166.021(3), Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added).   
Against this backdrop, in Sarasota Alliance for Fair Elections, Inc. v. 
Browning, 28 So. 3d 880, 885-86 (Fla. 2010), we discussed the manner in which a 
local government enactment may be inconsistent with state law.  Relevant here, a 
local government enactment may be inconsistent with state law where the 
 
 
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Legislature has preempted a particular subject area.8  Id. at 886 (quoting Lowe v. 
Broward Cty., 766 So. 2d 1199, 1206-07 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)).  Florida law 
recognizes both express preemption and implied preemption.  Id.  On one hand, 
express preemption requires a specific legislative statement—it cannot be implied 
or inferred—and the preemption of a field is accomplished by clear language.  Id.  
On the other hand, implied preemption occurs when the state legislative scheme is 
pervasive and the local legislation would present a danger of conflict with that 
pervasive scheme.  Id.  In other words, preemption is implied when the legislative 
scheme is so pervasive as to virtually evidence an intent to preempt the particular 
area or field of operation, and where strong public policy reasons exist for finding 
such an area or field to be preempted by the Legislature.  Id.  Thus, preemption 
does not require explicit words so long as it is clear from the language utilized that 
the Legislature has clearly preempted local regulation of the subject.  Barragan v. 
City of Miami, 545 So. 2d 252, 254 (Fla. 1989).  The test for implied preemption 
requires that we look “to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and 
policy.”  Browning, 28 So. 3d at 886 (citing State v. Harden, 938 So. 2d 480, 486 
(Fla. 2006)).  Further, “[t]he nature of the power exerted by the Legislature, the 
                                          
 
 
8.  Under Florida law, a separate and distinct way for a local enactment to be 
inconsistent with state law is where the local enactment conflicts with a state 
statute.  Browning, 28 So. 3d at 885-86. 
 
 
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object sought to be attained by the statute at issue, and the character of the 
obligations imposed by the statute are all vital to this determination.”  Id. (citing 
Harden, 938 So. 2d at 486). 
 
However, we must be careful and mindful in attempting to impute intent to 
the Legislature to preclude a local elected governing body from exercising its 
home rule powers.  Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Tallahassee Med. 
Ctr., Inc., 681 So. 2d 826, 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).  Nevertheless, as we 
reemphasized in City of Palm Bay, because the Legislature is ultimately superior to 
local government under the Florida Constitution, preemption can arise even where 
there is no specifically preclusive language.  114 So. 3d at 928  (“But we have 
never interpreted either the constitutional or statutory provisions relating to the 
legislative preemption of municipal home rule powers to require that the 
Legislature specifically state that the exercise of municipal power on a particular 
subject is precluded.”).  We further reaffirmed in City of Palm Bay that the 
language “except as otherwise provided by law” contained in the constitutional 
provision “establishes the constitutional superiority of the Legislature’s power over 
municipal power.”  Id.   
  In sum, under this framework, “[l]egislative statutes are relevant only to 
determine limitations of authority.”  City of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So. 2d 25, 28 
(Fla. 1992) (quoting State v. City of Sunrise, 354 So. 2d 1206, 1209 (Fla. 1978)).  
 
 
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Finally, we review questions of preemption and the validity of an ordinance de 
novo.  City of Hollywood v. Mulligan, 934 So. 2d 1238, 1241 (Fla. 2006). 
Lt. D’Agastino contends that the PBR expressly preempts the CIP.  
According to Lt. D’Agastino, the Legislature employed such explicit preemption 
of the investigation of all complaints against law enforcement officers through the 
first sentence of section 112.533(1), particularly through the inclusion of the words 
“Every law enforcement agency . . . shall establish . . . a system,” “which shall be 
the procedure for investigating a complaint,” and “notwithstanding any . . . 
ordinance to the contrary”: 
Every law enforcement agency and correctional agency shall 
establish and put into operation a system for the receipt, investigation, 
and determination of complaints received by such agency from any 
person, which shall be the procedure for investigating a complaint 
against a law enforcement and correctional officer and for 
determining whether to proceed with disciplinary action or to file 
disciplinary charges, notwithstanding any other law or ordinance to 
the contrary. 
 
§ 112.533(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).   
Although one might fairly read that plain language as evincing intent for the 
exclusivity of investigation of police complaints, it simply does not convey 
preemption with the sufficient explicit language and clarity of intent that courts 
have traditionally found necessary to be “express preemption” statutes in the past 
cases.  The fact remains that a finding of express preemption—that the Legislature 
has specifically expressed its intent to preempt a subject through an explicit 
 
 
- 21 - 
statement—is a very high threshold to meet.  See Masone v. City of Aventura, 147 
So. 3d 492, 495-97 (Fla. 2014) (express preemption found in language “no local 
authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance on a matter covered by this chapter 
unless expressly authorized” (quoting § 316.007, Fla. Stat. (2008))); see also § 
166.044, Fla. Stat. (2002) (“No municipality may adopt any ordinance relating to 
the possession or sale of ammunition.”).  For example, on the other hand, we have 
previously acknowledged that the words “shall utilize” alone in a statute do not 
necessarily express preemption.  Mulligan, 934 So. 2d at 1244.  Moreover, as the 
CIP contends, one reading of the language “notwithstanding any . . . ordinance to 
the contrary” might be interpreted solely to limit a municipality’s authority to alter 
the procedures of the law enforcement agency pertaining to internal affairs 
investigations of complaints rather than preclude the formation of a separate 
procedure outside the agency.  
Lt. D’Agastino further contends that two other sentences in section 
112.533(1) sufficiently evince the requisite explicit intent.  First, Lt. D’Agastino 
relies on the language requiring a municipality to forward complaints to an 
officer’s employing law enforcement agency: 
Any political subdivision that initiates or receives a complaint 
against a law enforcement officer or correctional officer must within 5 
business days forward the complaint to the employing agency of the 
officer who is the subject of the complaint for review or investigation. 
 
 
 
- 22 - 
§ 112.533(1)(b)1., Fla. Stat.  Second, Lt. D’Agastino refers this Court to the 
exception carved out in the statute for the CJSTC: “This subsection does not 
preclude the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission from exercising 
its authority under chapter 943.”  § 112.533(1)(a), Fla. Stat. 
Lt. D’Agastino’s contentions with regard to these two additional provisions 
are not without some merit and certainly provide some support for his contention 
that the Legislature, through section 112.533(1), has expressly preempted the 
investigation of complaints against officers to the officer’s employing law 
enforcement agency.  However, to the extent the provision requiring forwarding of 
complaints by a political subdivision can be understood as preclusive, it would 
require an inference as it does not actually contain express language prohibiting 
other investigations.  Likewise, to find the language with regard to the CJSTC to 
establish express preemption as to non-law enforcement agencies would also 
require an inference because the CJSTC is considered a law enforcement agency.  
See § 943.11(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008) (“There is created a Criminal Justice 
Standards and Training Commission within the Department of Law 
Enforcement.”).  Thus, because Lt. D’Agastino’s express preemption claim 
requires certain inferences, it does not satisfy the test for express preemption.  See 
Mulligan, 934 So. 2d at 1243 (“Express pre-emption requires a specific statement; 
the pre-emption cannot be made by implication nor by inference.” (internal citation 
 
 
- 23 - 
omitted)); see also Phantom of Clearwater, Inc. v. Pinellas Cty., 894 So. 2d 1011, 
1018 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“Express preemption . . . must be accomplished by clear 
language stating that intent.”); Edwards v. State, 422 So. 2d 84, 85 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1982) (“An ‘express’ reference is one which is distinctly stated and not left to 
inference.”).  Therefore, although it is a very close question, we cannot hold that 
section 112.533(1) contains language sufficient to establish express preemption 
here. 
However, as we have explained, Florida law also recognizes implied 
preemption.  Although implied preemption involving a municipality’s home rule 
powers may be disfavored, we must carefully consider the intent of the Legislature 
with regard to preemptive operation even though it may not be expressly stated.  
As with his express preemption argument, Lt. D’Agastino contends that the 
Legislature has intended to preempt the investigation of all complaints against law 
enforcement officers by requiring that they only be investigated by the employing 
law enforcement agency.  Although we agree with Lt. D’Agastino that section 
112.533 evinces an intent to implicitly preempt a field, the field is much more 
narrow than the expansive reading the officer desires. 
The question of implied preemption contained in section 112.533(1) was 
addressed by the Third District recently in Miami-Dade County v. Dade County 
Police Benevolent Ass’n, 154 So. 3d 373 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).  There, the specific 
 
 
- 24 - 
issue before the district court was whether section 112.533(1) functioned to 
implicitly preempt a report from the Miami-Dade Office of Inspector General 
(OIG) that concerned some members of the Miami-Dade Police Department.  Id. at 
375.  As the first part of its analysis, the district court recognized the field to be 
preempted by the Legislature was that of discipline-related investigations.  Id. at 
379-80 (“Here, other than evidencing an intent to leave discipline related 
investigations to a police officer’s employing agency, no other intent is 
evidenced.”); cf. id. at 379 (noting in express preemption analysis that “while 
section 112.533(1)(a) does require every law enforcement agency to establish a 
‘system’ for receiving, investigating and determining complaints against law 
enforcement officers and states that this system is to constitute ‘the’ procedure for 
investigating complaints against law enforcement officers, it also makes clear that 
this system is to be used for determining disciplinary action . . . .  In fact, the PBR 
taken as a whole focuses on an officer’s rights during proceedings conducted by 
his or her employing agency which might lead to discipline.” (emphasis in 
original)); Fraternal Order of Police v. Rutherford, 51 So. 3d 485, 487 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2010) (“We conclude that an investigation within the meaning of section 
112.532(4)(b) occurs whenever a law enforcement or correctional officer faces 
possible dismissal, demotion, or suspension without pay . . . .”).  We agree with the 
Third District panel in Dade County Police Benevolent Ass’n that there is a field 
 
 
- 25 - 
related to disciplinary investigations because as that court explained, the field of 
disciplinary investigations is readily apparent throughout the text of the PBR.  See, 
e.g., § 112.532(1), Fla. Stat. (stating “[w]henever a law enforcement officer . . . is 
under investigation and subject to interrogation by members of his or her agency 
for any reason which could lead to disciplinary action, demotion, or dismissal, such 
interrogation shall be conducted under the following conditions”); § 112.532(4)(a), 
Fla. Stat. (titled “Notice of Disciplinary Action”); § 112.532(5), Fla. Stat. 
(providing that no law enforcement officer may be “discharged; disciplined; 
demoted; denied promotion, transfer, or reassignment” in retaliation for exercising 
his or her rights under the PBR); § 112.532(6), Fla. Stat. (titled “Limitations Period 
for Disciplinary Actions”); 112.533(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (stating that after a complaint 
is received for investigation by “the” procedure established by the PBR, a number 
of requirements must be met “prior to the determination as to whether to proceed 
with disciplinary action or to file disciplinary charges”); § 112.533(2)(a)1.-2., Fla. 
Stat. (providing that complaints filed against law enforcement officers are 
confidential until either the investigation is concluded with a finding “not to 
proceed with disciplinary action or to file charges” or concluded with a finding “to 
proceed with disciplinary action or to file charges”); § 112.535, Fla. Stat. (stating 
that the PBR “shall not be construed to restrict or otherwise limit the discretion of 
the sheriff to take any disciplinary action . . . against a deputy sheriff, including the 
 
 
- 26 - 
demotion, reprimand, suspension, or dismissal thereof”).  Further, consistent with a 
preemptive field for disciplinary investigations, the PBR expressly contemplates a 
distinction between disciplinary and criminal investigations.  See § 112.533(2)(c), 
Fla. Stat. (“Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, the complaint and 
information shall be available to law enforcement agencies, correctional agencies, 
and state attorneys in the conduct of a lawful criminal investigation.”). 
Moreover, the amendment history of section 112.533(1) confirms an 
increasing effort to funnel complaints that could lead to discipline to the officer’s 
employing agency for investigation and interrogation.9  Prior to 2003, section 
112.533(1) provided in full: 
(1)  Every law enforcement agency and correctional agency 
shall establish and put into operation a system for the receipt, 
investigation, and determination of complaints received by such 
agency from any person. 
 
§ 112.533(1), Fla. Stat. (2002).  Then, in 2003, the Legislature made the following 
amendment: 
(1)  Every law enforcement agency and correctional agency 
shall establish and put into operation a system for the receipt, 
investigation, and determination of complaints received by such 
agency from any person, which shall be the procedure for 
investigating a complaint against a law enforcement and correctional 
officer and for determining whether to proceed with disciplinary 
action or to file disciplinary charges, notwithstanding any other law or 
                                          
 
 
9.  None of the bill analyses from the Legislature concerning the relevant 
amendments addressed the issue of external investigations. 
 
 
- 27 - 
ordinance to the contrary.  This subsection does not preclude the 
Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission from exercising 
its authority under chapter 943. 
 
Ch. 2003-149, §2, at 3, Laws of Fla.  The preemptive force in this new language is 
notable when considering that the language “[t]his subsection does not preclude the 
Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission from exercising its authority 
under chapter 943” was added simultaneously with the language “which shall be 
the procedure for investigating a complaint against a law enforcement and 
correctional officer and for determining whether to proceed with disciplinary 
action or to file disciplinary charges, notwithstanding any other law or ordinance to 
the contrary.”  Id. 
As further indication of its attempt to funnel investigations of misconduct by 
police to the employing agency, in 2007, the Legislature amended section 
112.533(1), requiring political subdivisions and any of their subcomponents to 
forward complaints they initiate or receive to the employing agency: 
(1)(a)  Every law enforcement agency and correctional agency 
shall establish and put into operation a system for the receipt, 
investigation, and determination of complaints received by such 
agency from any person, which shall be the procedure for 
investigating a complaint against a law enforcement and correctional 
officer and for determining whether to proceed with disciplinary 
action or to file disciplinary charges, notwithstanding any other law or 
ordinance to the contrary.  This subsection does not preclude the 
Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission from exercising 
its authority under chapter 943. 
 
 
 
- 28 - 
(b)1. Any political subdivision that initiates or receives a 
complaint against a law enforcement officer or correctional officer 
must within 5 business days forward the complaint to the employing 
agency of the officer who is the subject of the complaint for review or 
investigation. 
 
2.  For purposes of this subparagraph, the term “political 
subdivision” means a separate agency or unit of local government 
created or established by law or ordinance and the officers thereof and 
includes, but is not limited to, an authority, board, branch, bureau, 
city, commission, consolidated government, county, department, 
district, institution, metropolitan government, municipality, office, 
officer, public corporation, town, or village. 
 
Ch. 2007-110, §2, at 2-3, Laws of Fla. 
  
The CIP would have us end our inquiry here because it embraces the view of 
the decision below that the CIP lacks any managerial or disciplinary authority 
because it merely makes recommendations.  Thus, the CIP contends that it does not 
in any way interact with the field preempted by the PBR.  We disagree. 
 
A core component of the disciplinary investigations conducted by law 
enforcement agencies arising from a complaint of alleged misconduct is the ability 
to interrogate the subject officer.  However, law enforcement agencies cannot 
interrogate an officer by any means but must comply with the elaborate 
interrogation framework of rights and obligations imposed by the Legislature in the 
PBR.  See § 112.532, Fla. Stat. (2008).  Thus, by passing the PBR and devoting an 
elaborate section of it to regulating these interrogations and conferring many rights 
upon officers, it is plain that, in part, the objective of the PBR is to protect the 
 
 
- 29 - 
officers to a degree from certain means of interrogation.  See, e.g., § 112.532, Fla. 
Stat. (“Law enforcement officers’ and correctional officers’ rights.—All law 
enforcement officers and correctional officers employed by or appointed to a law 
enforcement agency or a correctional agency shall have the following rights and 
privileges”) (emphasis added); id. at § 112.532(1) (“RIGHTS OF LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS WHILE 
UNDER INVESTIGATION.—Whenever a law enforcement officer or 
correctional officer is under investigation and subject to interrogation by members 
of his or her agency for any reason which could lead to disciplinary action, 
demotion, or dismissal, such interrogation shall be conducted under the following 
conditions”) (emphasis added); id. at (1)(j) (“Notwithstanding the rights and 
privileges provided by this part, this part does not limit the right of an agency to 
discipline or to pursue criminal charges against an officer.”) (emphasis added); id. 
at (5) (“RETALIATION FOR EXERCISING RIGHTS.—No law enforcement 
officer or correctional officer shall be discharged; disciplined; demoted; denied 
promotion, transfer, or reassignment; or otherwise discriminated against in regard 
to his or her employment or appointment, or be threatened with any such treatment, 
by reason of his or her exercise of the rights granted by this part.”) (emphasis 
added); § 112.533(3), Fla. Stat. (“A law enforcement officer or correctional officer 
 
 
- 30 - 
has the right to review his or her official personnel file at any reasonable time 
under the supervision of the designated records custodian.”) (emphasis added).    
As a result, we cannot reconcile the CIP’s subpoena power—as it pertains to 
the officer under investigation—with the PBR.  Any holding otherwise would 
render the rights conferred upon officers by the PBR meaningless because the CIP 
provides the police department with a mechanism to circumvent the operation of 
the PBR’s protective measures, ultimately rendering the PBR an initial 
investigatory protection façade.  Thus, to uphold the CIP’s authority to issue 
subpoenas to officers in connection with investigations of their conduct would 
impermissibly countermand the rights conferred by the PBR upon the officer.  See 
City of Miami Beach v. Rocio Corp., 404 So. 2d 1066, 1070 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) 
(“An ordinance which supplements a statute’s restriction of rights may coexist with 
that statute . . . whereas an ordinance which countermands rights provided by 
statute must fail.” (citations omitted)).  Indeed, the power to issue a subpoena to a 
citizen and to enforce it with the power of contempt is among the most powerful 
tools a government may wield.  Moreover, if we were to hold otherwise, nothing 
would preclude the formation of other bodies similar to the CIP by other 
governmental units with concurrent geographical jurisdiction over an officer, all 
empowered with subpoena power and potentially subjecting an officer to repeated 
 
 
- 31 - 
governmental pressure over an extended time, rendering the limitations provision 
in the PBR meaningless.   
 
We therefore hold that the CIP’s invocation of its subpoena power as applied 
to police officers is unconstitutional because compelled interrogation of police 
officers in investigations that could lead to their discipline is preempted by the 
PBR.  When confronted with an ordinance enacted pursuant to home rule authority 
that operates in an unconstitutional manner, we have a duty to construe the 
ordinance in a manner that maintains its constitutionality, if possible.  See Rinker 
Materials Corp. v. City of N. Miami, 286 So. 2d 552, 553 (Fla. 1973) (“Statutes or 
ordinances should be given that interpretation which renders the ordinance valid 
and constitutional.”).  Here, we need not sever the provisions granting the 
subpoena power to ensure the CIP acts constitutionally.  Instead, we find section 
11.5-27(2) of the Miami Code of Ordinances is an adequate means of ensuring the 
subpoena power, as it applies to non-officers, may continue to exist undisturbed:  
“The purpose, powers, and duties of the CIP are to: . . . (2) Exercise its powers so 
as to . . .  conduct its activities consistent with applicable law, including the Florida 
Government in the Sunshine Law and with applicable law and labor contracts.”  
By its own ordinance, the CIP has a duty to conduct its activities consistent with 
the PBR, which, as we hold today, precludes political subdivisions from issuing 
subpoenas to law enforcement officers in connection with investigations of 
 
 
- 32 - 
complaints against them and precludes these other groups from compelling officers 
to appear and testify before them. 
 
We therefore quash the decision below to the extent that it affirmed the trial 
court’s order upholding the validity of the subpoena issued to Lt. D’Agastino and 
denying Lt. D’Agastino a protective order.   
While we do not comment on the policy merits of more or less civilian 
oversight, we do recognize that law enforcement officers remain very much 
exposed to public scrutiny despite our holding that the subpoena power of the CIP 
is preempted.  Specifically, officers, of course, remain subject to criminal 
investigations, investigations conducted by their own agency, the State Attorney, 
the FBI, and the United States Department of Justice.  They are also subject to the 
disciplinary investigations conducted by their own internal affairs department and 
the CJSTC. 
Further, to be clear, our holding today does not address any other functions 
of the CIP in its mission of acting as an “independent citizens’ oversight of the 
sworn police department.”  Miami, Fla., Charter, § 51 (2012).  For instance, 
internal affairs investigations become public record once they are complete or are 
no longer active.  § 112.533(2)(a), Fla. Stat.  As a result, the CIP has ready access 
to all of the investigatory materials arising from the investigation conducted by 
Internal Affairs.  Thus, the subsequent review of an investigation of a complaint 
 
 
- 33 - 
against a law enforcement officer, without subpoena power, is not inconsistent 
with the structure of the PBR.   
For this reason, we also approve of the ultimate conclusion of the Third 
District in Dade County Police Benevolent Ass’n that the Miami-Dade County 
OIG report was not implicitly preempted by the PBR.  154 So. 3d at 380.   
Consistent with our holding today, there “[n]o police officers were interviewed or 
subpoenaed.”  Id. at 375.  Instead, the OIG investigation “for the most part, 
consisted of an audit of the County’s own records, as well as some records from 
the MDPD, [the private company allegedly giving benefits], and the U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency, and a few interviews of State 
Department and American Airlines employees.”  Id.  This type of reliance on 
otherwise available information can easily be reconciled with the protections 
conferred upon police officers in the PBR. 
 
Due to the limited challenges presented, the limited nature of our holding 
today, and the myriad of functions these varying non-law enforcement agency 
boards perform, we reemphasize that our holding does not preclude future 
challenges to other functions that might intrude on the field of disciplining officers, 
or specific cases, including future matters concerning the CIP.  Specifically, our 
holding today is merely that the PBR preempts the authority of a political 
subdivision as defined in section 112.533(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes, to compel 
 
 
- 34 - 
an officer to testify in connection with a complaint of misconduct through a 
subpoena. 
CONCLUSION 
 
We quash the decision below to the extent it affirmed the CIP’s authority to 
issue a subpoena to Lt. D’Agastino.  We remand to the district court for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and 
LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring. 
I concur because the majority opinion is narrowly written to find only one 
portion of the City of Miami Civilian Investigative Panel (CIP) ordinance 
preempted by the Legislature through the Police Officers’ Bill of Rights (PBR) 
(§§ 112.531-.535, Fla. Stat. (2008)).10  Indeed, Justice Lewis, writing for the 
majority, emphasizes the importance of the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act 
                                          
 
 
10.  I also recognize, as does the amicus in support of the City of Miami and 
its CIP, the importance of the CIP to promote transparency and trust in the justice 
system, which is an entirely different purpose than the legislative scheme for 
uniformity in police internal investigations to protect the rights of our law 
enforcement officers. 
 
 
- 35 - 
(§ 166.021, Fla. Stat. (2008)) and the general rule that legislative preemption 
should be express.  Majority op. at 16-19; see art. VIII, § 2(b), Fla. Const.  I write 
separately to reiterate that courts should narrowly approach concluding that a 
municipal ordinance is unconstitutional based on implied legislative preemption 
and to urge the Legislature to make its preemptive intent clear.  
Unquestionably, article VIII, section 2(b), of the Florida Constitution grants 
municipalities broad powers to govern “except as otherwise provided by law.”  The 
“law” enacted by the Legislature recognizes the wide latitude granted to 
municipalities to enact ordinances pursuant to the Home Rule Powers Act and 
recognizes that the municipality has the power to act except with respect to “[a]ny 
subject expressly preempted to state or county government by the constitution or 
by general law.”  § 166.021(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added);11 see 
majority op. at 16-17.  If the Legislature intended to preempt the entire field of 
investigation into potential police misconduct, the preferable course—which 
appears to have been explicitly recognized by the Legislature, through its 
enactment of the Home Rule Powers Act—is that the Legislature should expressly 
indicate such intent.   
                                          
 
 
11.  The current version of this statute is the same.  See § 166.021(3)(c), Fla. 
Stat. (2016). 
 
 
- 36 - 
As I previously explained, with the Home Rule Powers Act, the Legislature 
“intended for municipal governments to have the power to enact local legislation 
on the same subjects and to the same extent as the state government, except in 
narrow circumstances where the Legislature has preempted a specific area of law 
to the state or where the local law conflicts with state law.”  Masone v. City of 
Aventura, 147 So. 3d 492, 503 (Fla. 2014) (Pariente, J., dissenting).  Thus, I adhere 
to my view that our recent jurisprudence “unnecessarily broadens the Court’s 
interpretation of legislative preemption, while, at the same time, limiting the home 
rule authority granted to municipal governments by the Florida Constitution.”  Id. 
at 499 (Pariente, J., dissenting).   
Although the Home Rule Powers Act would appear to require a specific 
statement by the Legislature indicating its intent to preempt local regulation in a 
certain field, this Court has determined that preemption also occurs where it is 
clear that the Legislature has preempted the field or topic through statutes.  See 
majority op. at 18.  While express preemption is preferred because it ensures that 
municipalities have clear direction on any subject matter where they are prohibited 
from legislating, the Court has also recognized that a municipal ordinance 
conflicting with the Legislature’s clear regulation of a topic or field is prohibited.  
As this Court unanimously held in 2006: 
In Florida, a municipality is given broad authority to enact 
ordinances under its municipal home rule powers.  Art. VIII, § 2(b), 
 
 
- 37 - 
Fla. Const.; § 166.021(1), (3)(c), (4), Fla. Stat. (1999).  Under its 
broad home rule powers, a municipality may legislate concurrently 
with the Legislature on any subject which has not been expressly 
preempted to the State.  Wyche v. State, 619 So. 2d 231, 237-38 (Fla. 
1993) (citing City of Miami Beach v. Rocio Corp., 404 So. 2d 1066, 
1069 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)); see also Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 
So. 2d 252, 254 (Fla. 1989) (stating that the municipal home rule 
powers act “limits cities from legislating on any subject expressly 
preempted to state government by general law”).  “Preemption 
essentially takes a topic or a field in which local government might 
otherwise establish appropriate local laws and reserves that topic for 
regulation exclusively by the legislature.”  Phantom of Clearwater, 
Inc. v. Pinellas County, 894 So. 2d 1011, 1018 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).  
“Express pre-emption requires a specific statement; the pre-emption 
cannot be made by implication nor by inference.”  Fla. League of 
Cities, Inc. v. Dep’t of Ins. & Treasurer, 540 So. 2d 850, 856 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1989) (quoting Bd. of Trs. v. Dulje, 453 So. 2d 177, 178 (Fla. 
2d DCA 1984)); see also Phantom of Clearwater, Inc., 894 So. 2d at 
1018 (“Express preemption . . . must be accomplished by clear 
language stating that intent.”); Edwards v. State, 422 So. 2d 84, 85 
(Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (“An ‘express’ reference is one which is 
distinctly stated and not left to inference.”).  However, “[t]he 
preemption need not be explicit so long as it is clear that the 
legislature has clearly preempted local regulation of the subject.”   
Barragan, 545 So. 2d at 254 (citing Tribune Co. v. Cannella, 458 So. 
2d 1075 (Fla. 1984)). 
City of Hollywood v. Mulligan, 934 So. 2d 1238, 1243 (Fla. 2006) (footnote 
omitted).  Following the standard from Mulligan, the Third District determined that 
“the PBR does not purport to expressly preempt other investigative bodies or 
means of oversight” and therefore concluded that the CIP is not preempted by the 
PBR.  D’Agastino v. City of Miami, 189 So. 3d 236, 240, 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). 
Despite this Court’s long-standing recognition of preemption by implication, 
it is clear to me that implied preemption should be construed narrowly to comport 
 
 
- 38 - 
with the Home Rule Powers Act and the Florida Constitution.  The test “is not 
whether the Legislature has expressly authorized municipal power, but whether 
such power has been expressly prohibited.”  City of Palm Bay v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A., 114 So. 3d 924, 929-30 (Fla. 2013) (Perry, J., dissenting); see City of 
Ocala v. Nye, 608 So. 2d 15, 17 (Fla. 1992).  Thus, as the majority recognizes, 
courts should be “careful in imputing an intent on behalf of the Legislature to 
preclude a local elected governing body from exercising its home rule powers.”  
Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Tallahassee Med. Ctr., Inc., 681 So. 2d 
826, 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); see majority op. at 19.   
We should primarily rely on the Legislature to express its preemptive intent, 
when applicable, as it has in various contexts since enacting the Home Rule 
Powers Act in 1973.  See, e.g., § 24.122(3), Fla. Stat. (2016) (preempting matters 
related to the state lottery); § 320.8249(11) (preempting regulation of mobile home 
installers and installation); § 386.209 (preempting regulation of smoking).  Indeed, 
after this Court’s decision in Masone regarding the use of red light cameras, the 
Legislature enacted comprehensive legislation that included an express statement 
of preemption.  See § 316.0076 (“Regulation of the use of cameras for enforcing 
the provisions of this chapter is expressly preempted to the state.”). 
Therefore, in this case, I agree that “compelled interrogation of police 
officers in investigations that could lead to their discipline is preempted by the 
 
 
- 39 - 
PBR.”  Majority op. at 31.  However, I continue to urge courts to take an extremely 
narrow approach before concluding that a municipal ordinance is unconstitutional 
based on implied legislative preemption, by giving due consideration to the broad 
grant of authority to municipalities set forth in article VIII, section 2(b), of the 
Florida Constitution and the extremely narrow exception to Home Rule Powers 
Act set forth by statute.  The best solution would be for the Legislature to include 
an express statement of preemption when it, in fact, intends to preempt municipal 
action. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D10-2704 
 
 
(Miami-Dade County) 
 
Robert C. Buschel and Eugene G. Gibbons of Buschel Gibbons, P.A., Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida; and Ronald J. Cohen of Rice Pugatch Robinson Storfer & 
Cohen PLLC, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioners 
 
Victoria Méndez, City Attorney, and John A. Greco, Deputy City Attorney, Miami, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent City of Miami 
 
Edward G. Guedes, John J. Quick, and Adam A. Schwartzbaum of Weiss Serota 
Helfman Cole & Bierman, P.L., Coral Gables, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent City of Miami Civilian Investigative Panel 
 
 
 
- 40 - 
G. “Hal” Johnson, General Counsel, Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc., 
Tallahassee, Florida; and Robert D. Klausner, Adam P. Levinson, and Paul A. 
Daragjati of Klausner Kaufman Jensen & Levinson, Plantation, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc. 
 
Richard A. Sicking and Mark A. Touby of Touby, Chait & Sicking, P.L., Coral 
Gables, Florida, 
 
for Amicus Curiae Florida Professional Firefighters, Inc., International 
Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO 
 
Nancy G. Abudu of American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Miami, 
Florida; and Jeanne Baker of Jeanne Baker Attorney at Law, PA, Miami, Florida, 
 
for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Greater Miami 
Chapter of American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Miami-Dade Branch 
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and 
National Association of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement