Title: People v. Lopez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S099549
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: June 28, 2018

Filed 6/28/18 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S099549 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
   
MICHAEL AUGUSTINE LOPEZ, 
) 
 
) 
Alameda County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. H28492A 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
A jury convicted defendant Michael Augustine Lopez of the first degree 
murder of Ashley D., his girlfriend’s 21-month-old granddaughter (Pen. Code, 
§ 187, subd. (a); further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code), 
assault resulting in the death of a child under eight years old (§ 273ab), and 
committing lewd and lascivious conduct on a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, 
subd. (b)(1)).  The jury found true the special circumstance allegation that the 
murder involved torture (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)) and the enhancement that he 
inflicted great bodily injury while committing lewd and lascivious conduct 
(§ 12022.8, subd. (b)).  The jury also found true that Lopez suffered five prior 
prison terms.  (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)  The jury returned a verdict of death.  The trial 
court sentenced Lopez to death on the murder count and stayed Lopez’s remaining 
sentence. 
 
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This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment in 
its entirety. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On June 4, 1999, Sandra Harris, Lopez’s live-in girlfriend, brought Ashley 
to the hospital.  Ashley was unconscious and badly bruised all over her body; she 
had suffered extensive trauma to her genitalia and a serious head injury.  Ashley 
never regained consciousness and died from her injuries later that day.  
Lopez was tried jointly with Harris, who was found guilty of first degree 
murder and willful infliction of cruelty on a child (§ 237a, subd. (a)).  The jury 
further found true that she willfully caused and permitted a child to be injured, 
resulting in unjustifiable pain and death (§ 12022.95).  The trial court sentenced 
Harris to 25 years to life with the possibility of parole.  Harris is not a party in this 
appeal. 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution Case 
a.  Family Overview 
Lopez and Harris lived together with their three-and-a-half-year-old son, 
M.L., in Hayward.  Harris had two daughters from prior relationships:  24-year-old 
Nicole and 17-year-old Laurie.  Nicole had lost custody of her three children, 
including Ashley and five-year-old S.B., because of a drug problem.  S.B. lived 
with Lopez and Harris, while Ashley lived with Harris’s stepfather, Jesse Lopez 
(no relation to defendant Lopez).  Laurie also lived with Jesse, although she 
visited her mother almost every day to smoke methamphetamine together.  Lopez 
also regularly smoked methamphetamine.   
 
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Lopez worked at a window manufacturing company.  His usual shift started 
at 6:00 a.m. and concluded at 2:30 p.m., with a 30-minute lunch break at 10:00 
a.m.  Lopez often went home on his lunch break.   
Harris worked as the co-manager of her apartment complex in an office 
adjacent to the apartment she shared with Lopez.  She typically worked from 3:00 
p.m., after Lopez returned home from his job, until around 8:00 p.m.   
b.  Ashley’s Stay with Laurie 
On May 26, 1999, Jesse developed a medical condition and needed to be 
hospitalized for a few days.  He called Harris, asking for Laurie to pick up Ashley 
and take care of her for a few days.  Jesse gave Laurie a check for $400 to cover 
Ashley’s expenses.  Because Laurie had plans for the upcoming holiday weekend, 
Laurie asked her mother and Lopez to watch Ashley instead.  But they refused, 
saying they could not afford it.   
Laurie watched Ashley from Wednesday, May 26, through Saturday, May 
29.  Ashley maintained her regular sleep schedule of sleeping through the night 
and waking up at 7:30 or 8:00 a.m.  During the three nights that Ashley stayed 
with Laurie, Ashley never woke up in the middle of the night needing her diaper 
changed.  
Laurie’s friend Kelly R. helped her take care of Ashley on May 28 and May 
29.  Kelly bathed Ashley and changed her diaper, and did not notice any injuries 
or diaper rash at that time.  
c.  Ashley’s Stay with Lopez and Harris 
Laurie brought Ashley to Lopez and Harris’s apartment on May 29, again 
asking them to take care of the baby.  They refused, saying they could not afford 
to take care of Ashley.  Lopez eventually told Laurie that they would take care of 
Ashley if Laurie gave them the money that Jesse had left her.  Laurie asked Jesse 
 
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if she could give Lopez and Harris the remaining money in exchange for watching 
Ashley, but he told her to wait until he was discharged from the hospital.  
Nonetheless, Lopez and Harris accepted the care and custody of Ashley later that 
day.   
The following morning, on Sunday, May 30, Harris visited her daughter 
Nicole in jail.  While Harris was away, Ashley played outdoors with other children 
in the apartment complex.  A neighbor testified that she saw Ashley playing 
outdoors on and off for approximately three hours, during which time Ashley 
appeared to be enjoying herself.  She was walking normally and did not appear to 
be injured.  When Harris returned at approximately 2:00 p.m., Ashley was asleep.  
When Ashley awoke, Harris noticed that she was walking strangely and in a 
bowlegged fashion.  Harris thought Ashley probably had a diaper rash because she 
had a history of having severe diaper rashes that caused blistering.  Harris took 
Ashley’s diaper off and noticed that instead of a diaper rash, the baby “was 
bruised down there.”  Sometime later that afternoon, Lopez visited Laurie at 
Jesse’s house to pick up the money remaining for Ashley’s care, approximately 
$200.   
The next day, on Monday, May 31, Harris briefly visited Laurie and her 
boyfriend, David S., at Jesse’s house.  Harris told David that Ashley suffered 
bruising from riding a bicycle the previous day.   
The following day, on Tuesday, June 1, the apartment complex manager 
Luz Arzate arrived at the office next door to Harris and Lopez’s apartment at 9:00 
a.m.  Arzate heard Ashley crying on and off all morning in what she described as a 
painful cry.  When she asked Harris about the cries, Harris responded that Ashley 
was vomiting and had a fever.  Sometime that day, Harris told Laurie that Ashley 
had injured herself on a bicycle.  When Laurie asked Harris if she planned to take 
Ashley to the hospital, Harris said no because she did not have medical insurance.   
 
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Later that afternoon, Harris went to work next door.  Harris heard noises 
coming from her apartment at approximately 4:00 p.m. and went home to 
investigate.  Harris walked toward the bedroom shared by S.B., M.L., and Ashley.  
She observed Lopez standing in the doorway; S.B., Ashley, and M.L. inside the 
bedroom; and two neighbor children, Rouslen and Andy, also in the bedroom.  
Harris saw Ashley lying on the floor, crying, with Rouslen standing over her 
holding a stick.  Harris heard Lopez say, “Why is this baby on the floor with no 
diaper on and you poking her and hitting her with the stick?”  Lopez told Rouslen 
and Andy, “Get the hell out of here.”  
A few hours later, Harris left their apartment to lock the complex’s laundry 
room door.  She heard a commotion coming from inside her apartment.  Harris 
walked into her bedroom and saw Lopez holding Ashley.  Ashley had diarrhea and 
was vomiting at the same time.  Lopez was trying to change her diaper, and S.B. 
was gathering toilet paper, trying to help him clean up.  Harris believed that 
Ashley was getting the flu. 
On Wednesday, June 2, Arzate arrived at her office at 9:00 a.m.  She again 
heard Ashley crying and believed the crying had intensified from the previous day.  
When she asked Harris if Ashley was all right, Harris responded that she believed 
Ashley was sick.  Harris told Arzate that Ashley bore more bruises every day.  
Harris further explained that she thought M.L. was hitting Ashley. 
When Laurie visited Harris later that morning, Harris showed Laurie 
Ashley’s bruised genital area for the first time.  Laurie testified that Ashley “was 
just bruised badly, very badly.  It was red and purple and blue. . . .  It was awful.”  
Laurie also saw a little bit of blood in Ashley’s diaper.  Laurie asked her mother 
“if there were any perverts that lived around there.”  When she told Harris to take 
Ashley to the doctor, Harris replied that she could not afford to take her. 
 
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Lopez returned home from work at some point while Laurie was visiting 
her mother.  Ashley suddenly became very clingy toward Laurie and screamed 
when Laurie tried to separate herself from Ashley. 
Later that evening, Lopez and Harris left the house for one to two hours.  
They asked their teenage neighbor, Leonora M., to babysit S.B. and Ashley while 
they were out.  Leonora noticed bruises on Ashley’s face.  She testified that 
Ashley appeared scared, tired, confused, and dazed.   
On Thursday, June 3, Arzate returned to work at 9:00 a.m.  She heard 
Ashley crying again and described it as “a weak and a help cry.”  Around the same 
time, Laurie visited her mother while Lopez was at work.  Laurie believed the 
bruising on Ashley’s genitals remained the same from the previous day, but she 
noticed new bruising on the side of Ashley’s head.  Laurie left her mother’s 
apartment at noon, at which time Harris put the children down for a nap.  Shortly 
after, Harris heard Ashley crying.  Harris walked into the children’s bedroom and 
saw S.B. sitting on top of Ashley, holding Ashley’s ears and pounding her head 
into the pillow.  When Harris walked in, S.B. exclaimed that she did not like 
Ashley and wanted her to go home.   
Later that afternoon, Leonora returned to babysit S.B. and Ashley for a 
couple of hours while Harris worked next door.  Leonora noticed more bruising on 
Ashley’s face.  When Harris returned home from work at approximately 5:30 p.m., 
Ashley started vomiting again.  At some point, Harris changed Ashley’s diaper 
and showed Leonora Ashley’s genital bruising.  Leonora told Harris that the 
bruising did not look normal and that she needed to take Ashley to the hospital.  
Harris responded that she did not want to take Ashley to the hospital because she 
was afraid people would think she had hurt Ashley and because she did not have 
medical insurance.  Leonora asked Harris how Ashley obtained the bruises on her 
face.  Harris responded that Ashley had rolled off the bed and hit the side of her 
 
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face on the dresser.  Leonora testified that she thought it was “impossible” for a 
baby to roll over far enough on the bed to fall off.  Leonora further testified that 
Ashley appeared tired and confused, and remained inactive while Leonora was at 
the apartment.  
Harris had trouble falling asleep that night and stayed awake until 4:00 a.m. 
the following morning, June 4.  She testified at trial that she woke up at 5:30 a.m. 
to find Lopez still asleep; she woke him up and sent him off to work.  However, 
Harris told detectives on June 4 that she woke up to Ashley crying at 4:45 a.m. 
while Lopez was changing her diaper.  Harris told the detective this was unusual 
because Ashley never needed her diaper changed in the middle of the night, and 
she questioned why Lopez had done it every night while Ashley was with them.  
When the prosecutor questioned her on cross-examination, she claimed this 
incident had happened on Thursday, June 3 and the detective wrote down the 
wrong date. 
Laurie arrived at her mother’s apartment around 9:00 a.m.  She walked into 
the children’s bedroom to check on Ashley after she arrived; it appeared Ashley 
was still asleep.  Shortly after Lopez arrived home on his lunch break around 
10:30 a.m., Harris walked into the bedroom to check on Ashley.  Harris walked 
toward Ashley and realized the baby was not responding.  She picked up Ashley, 
whose body was limp.  At that point, Laurie walked into the bedroom and realized 
that Ashley was comatose.  Lopez walked in and took Ashley away from Harris, 
who became hysterical.  Lopez began shaking Ashley and saying she was okay.  
Laurie exclaimed that they needed to take Ashley to the hospital.  Lopez told 
Harris that she could not take the baby to the hospital because “they will think you 
beat the shit out of this baby.  They will arrest you, Sandra.”  Lopez lifted 
Ashley’s eyelids and said, “Look, she’s responding,” although she remained 
 
8 
unresponsive.  Laurie grabbed her car keys while Harris took Ashley back from 
Lopez.  Laurie drove Harris and Ashley to the hospital. 
d.  The Hospital 
Dr. Bernice Rodrigues was the emergency medicine physician at St. Rose 
Hospital.  When Ashley came into Dr. Rodrigues’s care on June 4, she was 
unconscious, badly bruised all over her body, had suffered a very serious head 
injury and extensive trauma to the genitalia, and was “essentially close to dying.”  
Ashley was unresponsive to verbal or painful stimuli.  The emergency room nurse 
believed Ashley showed signs of abuse and filed a report with the police. 
At some point that day, Ashley was transported to Children’s Hospital 
Oakland (CHO).  Dr. James Crawford, the medical director of CHO’s Center for 
Child Protection, examined Ashley that evening.  He testified that she “had bruises 
on virtually any part of the body you looked at.”  Dr. Crawford opined that many 
of the bruises were consistent with being punched by an adult fist.  The bruises on 
Ashley’s torso were consistent with an adult grabbing her and squeezing her chest, 
leaving fingerprint impressions.  In addition, Ashley’s right ear had suffered a tear 
about the width of a thumbnail, consistent with someone pulling or squeezing her 
ear.  
Dr. Crawford described the bruising and swelling to Ashley’s genitalia as 
“the result of some very massive blunt force trauma”; he did not believe the 
injuries had resulted from a straddle injury on a bicycle.  Dr. Crawford explained 
that in addition to bruising, Ashley’s genitalia “was ripped and torn” from her 
vaginal opening to her anus.  Dr. Crawford noted that whatever had caused the 
trauma was not forced into the vagina itself, but rather was forced into the 
genitalia and then tore the tissue.  He acknowledged that an erect male penis could 
have caused the tear if forced into Ashley’s genitalia.  Dr. Crawford opined that 
 
9 
such a tear would “absolutely” cause bleeding and that it would be “quite painful 
for an infant, or toddler, or an adult, to have this much tissue torn.”  He believed 
that the injuries had occurred within three to seven days before his examination.  
He explained that a child with the described injuries “would have walked funny” 
and “in a manner to try to minimize the discomfort to herself.”   
Dr. Crawford also testified that Ashley’s brain was “very abnormal” in 
appearance and “very swollen.”  In addition to blood around her brain, Ashley had 
suffered a large skull fracture to the back right side of her brain, indicating “very 
significant” blunt trauma to the head.  He believed the injury had occurred 
sometime Friday morning.  He did not believe another child could have wielded 
enough force to cause Ashley’s head injury.   
During the evening of June 4, Nicole made the decision to remove Ashley 
from life support, and she died.  Dr. Crawford testified that the pressure inside 
Ashley’s skull from the brain swelling had prevented blood from flowing to her 
brain in the hours before she was removed from life support.   
e.  Subsequent Events and Investigation 
Lopez returned to work on June 4 after his lunch break ended, bringing S.B. 
and M.L. with him.  Shortly after returning, Lopez indicated that he had a family 
emergency and left work.  He did not return.  Sometime later that afternoon, 
Lopez brought M.L. to his sister’s house in Modesto.  Lopez asked his sister for 
directions to a local freeway and left shortly after.   
On June 5, Leonora found Lopez’s pajamas in Harris’s bathroom.  Leonora 
noticed a spot of blood on the pajama shirt and alerted Harris.  Harris called the 
police, who arrived the following day to retrieve the shirt.  Forensic testing 
“strongly suggest[ed]” that Ashley was the source of the blood stain on Lopez’s 
shirt.   
 
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A few days later, Lopez drove with M.L. to visit his friend and former 
brother-in-law Isaac Corrales in Monte Rio.  Lopez and his son stayed with 
Corrales for three or four days.  Lopez told Corrales and his girlfriend, Kelley 
Matheson, that he and Harris “were having troubles” and sent Corrales and 
Matheson to pick up his final paycheck.  Lopez also told his friends that M.L. had 
hit Ashley on the head with a toy and that Ashley had hurt herself on a bicycle.  
He did not tell them where he was going next when he left a few days later. 
On June 29, Lopez returned to his apartment complex with M.L. during the 
middle of the night.  A neighbor heard him banging on a door and called the 
police.  Officers arrived at the scene and arrested Lopez.  
Sometime after Ashley’s death, S.B. was removed from Harris’s care and 
placed in emergency foster care.  Child Protective Services (CPS) permitted S.B. 
to attend Ashley’s funeral, at which time she informed Laurie that she had seen 
Lopez thrusting his torso on Ashley.  In mid-July, S.B.’s great-aunt Cindy Jardin 
was awarded temporary custody of S.B.  While in Jardin’s care, S.B. told her aunt 
that she had seen Lopez punch Ashley in the chest, stomach, and genital area.  
S.B. told her next foster mother that Lopez had previously broken her leg.  When 
her foster mother asked S.B. if Lopez had ever touched “his private part to [her] 
private part,” S.B. said that “he only did that to Ashley.”  M.L., who was also 
placed into foster care, told his foster mother that Ashley was in heaven because 
Lopez “cracked her head on the hard floor.”   
2.  Defense Case 
Lopez did not testify.  The defense recalled Dr. Thomas Rogers, who 
performed Ashley’s autopsy.  Dr. Rogers testified that he could not opine on the 
cause of Ashley’s bruises.  The defense called a neighbor who testified that she 
saw Lopez interact with the children and never saw him hit them.  She further 
 
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testified that Rouslen was a tough kid who made suggestive remarks to other 
children.  The defense relied on testimony from Harris to imply that M.L. or 
Rouslen, or both, could have caused Ashley’s injuries.  Lopez also presented 
evidence through a detective’s testimony that Harris hit her children and may have 
contributed to Ashley’s injuries.  During closing argument, Lopez’s counsel 
argued that he was too high on methamphetamine to form the required intent to 
commit murder.  Counsel further argued that both Harris and Laurie had a motive 
and the opportunity to inflict injuries upon Ashley, and suggested they may have 
acted in concert.   
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Case in Aggravation 
The prosecutor presented evidence of six instances of prior acts of violence, 
five of which resulted in arrest and prosecution.  These five priors were:  (1) a 
1992 shoplifting incident during which Lopez assaulted the store clerk and became 
violent with police, (2) a 1986 shoplifting incident during which Lopez attacked 
the arresting officer and threatened another officer at the jail, (3) a 1991 knife 
assault on his estranged wife and her 15-year-old son, (4) a 1994 assault on his ex-
wife, and (5) a 1990 assault on an officer following an arrest for driving under the 
influence.  A neighbor testified about the one prior bad act that did not result in 
arrest and prosecution, which involved Lopez hitting M.L. with a stick “like a 
piñata.”   
The prosecutor also presented victim impact testimony from Jesse Lopez, 
Laurie, and Ashley’s paternal great-grandmother.  The family members described 
Ashley’s kind and good-natured spirit, how difficult her funeral was, and how her 
death affected them as individuals.   
 
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2.  Case in Mitigation 
In his case in mitigation, Lopez introduced evidence regarding his low 
mental capacities and good nature.  Clinical neuropsychologist Nell Riley, Ph.D., 
administered several tests to Lopez and interviewed him, his mother, and his 
sister.  Her testing revealed that Lopez had a very low IQ score typically 
associated with people who are intellectually disabled, but she opined that Lopez 
was not actually intellectually disabled.  Riley explained that for a person to be 
considered intellectually disabled, he or she must have a low IQ but also be unable 
to function well in the community without assistance or supervision.  Riley noted 
that Lopez held a job, rented an apartment, drove a car, and was generally able to 
“do what pretty much normal people do.” 
Two of Lopez’s coworkers, a neighbor, and several family members also 
testified on his behalf.  The coworkers explained that Lopez occasionally brought 
his children to work to celebrate coworkers’ birthdays and that he would bring 
people flowers or cake on special occasions.  The neighbor spoke of Lopez’s 
church attendance.  Lopez’s mother testified that Lopez was in a car accident 
when he was younger, which left him in a coma for four days.  She said after he 
woke up from the coma, he was “different” and “not as happy as he used to be.”  
Lopez’s father spoke about Lopez’s upbringing.  Both of his parents expressed 
their love for their son and asked the jury to spare his life.  Additional family 
members testified about Lopez’s care for the children and other family members.   
3.  Rebuttal Evidence 
In rebuttal, the prosecutor presented evidence that Lopez had committed 
welfare fraud by failing to report income for seven months while he received 
welfare grants.  Lopez was not arrested because he cooperated and agreed to pay 
the money back.   
 
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II.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Admission of Testimony by Child Witnesses  
S.B. was five years old at the time of Ashley’s death; she was six and a half 
years old when she testified at trial.  M.L. was three and a half years old when 
Ashley died; he was one month shy of his fifth birthday when he testified at trial.  
S.B. testified that she had seen Lopez punch Ashley “in her privates” and 
thrust himself against Ashley’s body.  S.B. indicated that the night before Ashley 
died, she saw Lopez hold Ashley above his head and throw her onto the ground.  
S.B. hid under the covers and did not see where Lopez went after he threw Ashley.  
She heard Ashley crying before Lopez picked her up, but Ashley did not cry again 
after he threw her down.   
M.L. testified that on the night before Ashley died, his father walked into 
their bedroom, picked up Ashley, and threw her down on the floor.  M.L. 
explained that Lopez “cracked her head.”  On cross-examination, M.L. testified 
that other people told him to say that his dad hurt Ashley by picking her up and 
throwing her down.  
1.  Evidence Code Section 702 
Lopez filed pretrial motions challenging the admission of S.B.’s testimony, 
arguing it violated Evidence Code section 702.  Lopez argued that her statements 
were based on “brainwashing” by the adults caring for the children, not personal 
knowledge as required under Evidence Code section 702.   
The Evidence Code provides that “the testimony of a witness [at trial] 
concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of 
the matter.”  (Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a).)  “[T]he capacity to perceive and 
recollect particular events is subsumed within the issue of personal knowledge 
. . . .”  (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 573 (Anderson).)  “ ‘[T]he 
 
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court may exclude the testimony of a witness for lack of personal knowledge only 
if no jury could reasonably find that he has such knowledge.’ ”  (Ibid.)  “[I]f there 
is evidence that the witness has those capacities, the determination whether he in 
fact perceived and does recollect is left to the trier of fact.  [Citation.]”  (Id. at 
pp. 573–574, italics omitted; see id. at p. 574 [“A witness challenged for lack of 
personal knowledge must nonetheless be allowed to testify if there is evidence 
from which a rational trier of fact could find that the witness accurately perceived 
and recollected the testimonial events.  Once that threshold is passed, it is for the 
jury to decide whether the witness’s perceptions and recollections are credible.” 
(italics omitted)].)  We review a trial court’s determination to admit testimony for 
abuse of discretion.  (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 124.)  
At the hearing on Lopez’s motion to exclude S.B.’s testimony, the trial 
court concluded that S.B. was competent to testify based on the magistrate’s 
finding from the preliminary hearing that she was qualified under Evidence Code 
section 701.  (See Evid. Code, § 701, subd. (a) [a person is disqualified to be a 
witness if she is incapable of expressing herself and incapable of understanding 
the duty to tell the truth].)  The trial court expressed concern about “put[ting] this 
child through another preliminary proceeding outside the presence of the jury.”  
The trial court stated, “We have the judge’s findings, factual findings.  He listened 
to her.  And unless counsel can furnish me with some authority that indicates I’m 
required to conduct my own hearing as to her competency, I’m not going to do 
so.”  The trial court denied Lopez’s motion to exclude the testimony and noted 
that Lopez’s suggestion of brainwashing and potential inconsistent statements 
would be “fair game” during cross-examination.   
Lopez indicated at the hearing on S.B.’s competency that he would make a 
similar motion to exclude M.L.’s testimony if the prosecutor decided to call him to 
testify.  Lopez subsequently filed the motion, and the trial court held a hearing 
 
15 
before M.L. was to take the stand.  The court asked M.L. several questions 
regarding his ability to distinguish between the truth and a lie, and the 
consequences of telling a lie, and ultimately permitted M.L. to testify.   
The core of Lopez’s argument is that the children were not qualified to 
testify because they lacked personal knowledge as evidenced by their inconsistent 
testimony.  “Inconsistencies in testimony and a failure to remember aspects of the 
subject of the testimony, however, do not disqualify a witness.  [Citation.]  They 
present questions of credibility for resolution by the trier of fact.”  (People v. 
Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 444.) 
The record reveals no abuse of discretion because sufficient evidence 
supported a finding of personal knowledge.  Several witnesses testified that S.B., 
M.L., and Ashley shared a bedroom, which meant the children had the opportunity 
to perceive the abuse inflicted on Ashley.  S.B. testified that she saw Lopez punch 
and thrust his torso onto Ashley’s private parts.  She also testified that she saw 
Lopez raise Ashley above his head and throw her onto the ground, both of which 
were corroborated by Dr. Crawford’s testimony regarding Ashley’s injuries.  
Moreover, S.B.’s testimony supported a finding that her failure to answer several 
questions was due to a fear of Lopez, and she acknowledged as much during direct 
examination.  On cross-examination, the defense exhaustively questioned S.B. 
about any inconsistencies between her trial testimony and her preliminary hearing 
testimony, potential bias, and the possibility that she had been coached.   
M.L. also testified at trial that he saw Lopez pick up Ashley and throw her 
onto the ground, cracking her head.  He had no prior testimony with which the 
defense could impeach him, but he was cross-examined about possible coaching.   
We reject Lopez’s argument that a competency ruling under Evidence Code 
section 701 was not sufficient and that the trial court was required to hold a 
hearing under Evidence Code section 702.  Here, as in People v. Dennis (1998) 17 
 
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Cal.4th 468, 526 (Dennis), “[the child witness] was an eyewitness to the events.  
Consequently, once the trial court properly determined [the witness] was 
competent to testify under Evidence Code section 701, it had no basis for 
excluding her testimony for lack of personal knowledge.” 
2.  Due Process  
Lopez contends that if the trial court’s ruling under Evidence Code section 
702 was not error, the children’s testimony was nonetheless unreliable and 
violated his right to due process under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution.  Lopez asserts the trial court failed to consider the 
effects of “brainwashing” and suggestive questioning. 
In Dennis, we rejected the defendant’s argument that the child witness’s 
testimony was unreliable because of gaps in her memory and her discussions of 
the events with the prosecutor and others.  (Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 526.)  
The witness’s limited memories, we said, did not violate the defendant’s right to 
confrontation; that right “secures to an accused an adequate opportunity to cross-
examine adverse witnesses; it does not guarantee testimony free from 
forgetfulness, confusion, or even evasion.”  (Ibid.)  We further rejected the notion 
that the witness’s testimony was insufficiently reliable to satisfy the heightened 
standards of a capital case:  “Also without merit is defendant’s claim that [the 
child’s] testimony was unreliable and, because it contributed to a judgment of 
death, it violated his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  Defendant was fully afforded the protections of the procedures 
constitutionally required to ensure reliability in the factfinding process.  As we 
have previously remarked in rejecting essentially the same contention, defendant 
‘ “was given an opportunity to be heard and to cross-examine in a judicial 
forum.” ’ ”  (Ibid.) 
 
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Lopez asks that we reconsider Dennis in light of studies that “conclude 
children are highly susceptible to suggestive questioning techniques like 
repetition, guided imagery, and selective reinforcement.”  (Kennedy v. Louisiana 
(2008) 554 U.S. 407, 443.)  But credibility is an issue for the trier of fact, and in 
the present case, the defense’s cross-examination, which thoroughly explored the 
possibility of coaching or brainwashing, provided the jury with sufficient 
information to determine the credibility of S.B. and M.L.  Additionally, the jury 
heard testimony from several other witnesses that supported the children’s 
testimony; the jury did not have to rely on their testimony alone to determine that 
Lopez had committed the charged offenses.  Harris and Laurie testified about 
Lopez’s actions and Ashley’s reactions during the week leading up to her death, 
and Dr. Crawford explained Ashley’s injuries and their likely causes.  The 
admission of the testimony from S.B. and M.L. did not violate Lopez’s due 
process rights. 
B.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Lopez contends the evidence is insufficient to support his first degree 
murder conviction, the torture-murder special-circumstance finding, his conviction 
for committing lewd and lascivious conduct, and the enhancement for causing 
great bodily injury.  We inquire whether evidence was presented from which a 
reasonable trier of fact could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
prosecution sustained its burden of proof.  (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 
479.)  We assess whether the evidence is inherently credible and of solid value, 
and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict.  
1.  Murder and Torture-Murder Special Circumstance  
Lopez contends insufficient evidence supports a finding of deliberation and 
premeditation, murder by torture, or felony murder.  Because we find sufficient 
 
18 
evidence to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation, we need not 
address Lopez’s remaining contentions as to the sufficiency of the evidence of first 
degree murder.  (See People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 168 [when 
murder conviction is sufficiently supported under one theory, we need not 
consider additional claims].)  However, because Lopez challenges the torture-
murder special-circumstance finding, we will address the related question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting murder by torture. 
a.  Premeditation and Deliberation  
“An intentional killing is premeditated and deliberate if it occurred as the 
result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash 
impulse.”  (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 543.)  The reflection may be 
arrived at quickly; it need not span a specific or extended period of time.  (Ibid.)  
We have found planning activity, preexisting motive, and manner of killing to be 
relevant, although these factors do not “ ‘exclude all other types and combinations 
of evidence that could support a finding of premeditation and deliberation.’ ”  
(People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 812.) 
The evidence here supported an inference that Lopez abused Ashley during 
times when Harris was asleep or not home.  Harris testified that Lopez woke 
Ashley up every morning before he left work under the guise of changing her 
diaper, despite the fact that Ashley normally slept until much later without needing 
her diaper changed.  A neighbor testified that Ashley was walking normally while 
playing outdoors on the morning of May 30, but by the time Harris returned from 
visiting Nicole in jail, Ashley was walking “funny.”  Lopez created several 
explanations throughout the week regarding the cause of Ashley’s injuries:  he told 
Harris that Ashley fell off the bed and injured herself on a bicycle, and he accused 
other children of hitting her.  Laurie testified that Lopez did not want to take care 
 
19 
of Ashley and was unhappy with the financial strain it placed on his family.  The 
jury heard evidence that Lopez may have assaulted Ashley as an attempt to punish 
Harris for allowing Ashley to stay with them.  S.B. and M.L. testified that on the 
night before Ashley died, Lopez threw Ashley onto the floor, cracking her skull.  
Lopez returned Ashley to her bed and, the next day, tried to prevent Harris and 
Laurie from seeking medical care for Ashley.   
A reasonable jury could conclude Lopez’s actions showed his premeditated 
and deliberate intent to kill Ashley.  He complained of the financial strain from 
having to take care of Ashley, suggesting a motive to harm the child.  His 
continuing and escalating acts of abuse caused Ashley prolonged pain, he looked 
for opportunities to abuse her, and he made up excuses to explain the bruising or 
blamed other people for hurting her.  (See People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 
174, 201–202 (Whisenhunt) [the defendant’s continuing and escalating acts of 
abuse showed his premeditated and deliberate intent to eventually kill her].)  A 
deliberate intention to kill is supported by the fact that Ashley was a small toddler, 
already weakened by several days of extreme abuse, when Lopez lifted her over 
his head and threw her to the ground.  Lopez personally inflicted the injuries on 
Ashley that caused her weakened state, which placed him in a heightened sense of 
awareness of her fragility, further supporting a finding of premeditation in the act 
of harming her. 
From this evidence of Lopez’s escalating acts of abuse and conscious 
efforts to conceal his actions and prevent Ashley from receiving needed medical 
attention, a reasonable jury could conclude Lopez intentionally killed Ashley with 
preexisting thought and reflection. 
 
20 
b.  Murder by Torture 
“To prove torture murder, the prosecution must establish ‘ “a willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated intent to cause extreme pain or suffering for the 
purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or another sadistic purpose.” ’ ”  
(People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 237.)  “The jury may infer the intent to 
inflict extreme pain from the circumstances of the crime, the nature of the killing, 
and the condition of the victim’s body.”  (Ibid.)  A perpetrator need not have any 
intent to kill, nor does the prosecution need to prove that the victim suffered pain.  
(People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 716.) 
The prosecutor presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to 
conclude, based on Ashley’s injuries and the nature of the abuse she suffered, that 
Lopez intended to inflict extreme and prolonged pain.  Harris and Laurie testified 
that Ashley’s bruising increased nearly every day leading up to Ashley’s death, 
while Dr. Crawford testified that at the time of death she had more than 100 
bruises over every part of her body.  Dr. Crawford further testified that Ashley 
“was repetitively exposed to multiple episodes of blunt trauma, with pain being 
associated with each one.”  Dr. Crawford also testified that the bruising and tear 
on Ashley’s genitals resulted from massive blunt force trauma and would have 
been very painful.  Arzate testified that she repeatedly heard Ashley’s “painful” 
cries in the days before her death, suggesting Lopez was aware that the child was 
in pain.  Laurie testified that Lopez did not want to care for Ashley and felt 
burdened by the financial strain.  The evidence is sufficient to show Lopez’s 
willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain 
for the purpose of revenge or another sadistic purpose. 
Lopez’s reliance on People v. Steger (1976) 16 Cal.3d 539 is misplaced.  
There, the defendant continuously beat her three-year-old stepdaughter and did so 
daily during the final week of her life.  Like Ashley, the victim in Steger 
 
21 
ultimately died from a fatal head injury.  The defendant admitted to beating the 
victim, telling the police she did so in an attempt to discipline the girl because she 
was frustrated with her behavior.  In Steger, we found insufficient evidence that 
the defendant beat her stepchild with the intent to inflict extreme and prolonged 
pain.  Rather, “several distinct ‘explosions of violence’ ” took place whenever the 
child misbehaved.  (Id. at p. 548.)  Here, there is no evidence that Lopez’s abuse 
of Ashley was a reaction to her misbehavior or was otherwise provoked.  
We further conclude that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s true 
finding on the torture-murder special-circumstance allegation.  The special 
circumstance requires that a murder be “intentional” and “involv[e] the infliction 
of torture,” which includes a torturous intent.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18); Whisenhunt, 
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 202.)  As discussed, the evidence supports the jury’s 
conclusion that Lopez intended to kill Ashley and that the murder involved the 
infliction of torture. 
2.  Lewd and Lascivious Conduct and Great Bodily Injury 
Enhancement  
Lopez contends that because insufficient evidence supports a finding that 
he was the cause of Ashley’s injuries, his conviction for forcible lewd or 
lascivious conduct (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)) and the enhancement for committing great 
bodily injury under section 12022.8 must be reversed. 
Dr. Crawford testified that Ashley suffered a laceration extending from her 
vagina to her anus as well as severe bruising.  He opined that the laceration would 
have occurred between 72 hours and at most one week before he saw Ashley on 
Friday, June 4, 1999.  Dr. Crawford testified that the status of Ashley’s injury on 
Friday was consistent with it having occurred on Sunday, May 30.   
The evidence adduced at trial supported an inference that while Harris 
visited her daughter Nicole in jail on Sunday, May 30, Lopez tried to insert his 
 
22 
erect penis into Ashley’s vagina, resulting in the laceration that extended from her 
vagina to her anus.  The neighbor’s testimony that Ashley appeared to be enjoying 
herself while playing outdoors Sunday morning is inconsistent with Lopez’s 
assertion that Ashley’s injury could have occurred before Laurie dropped her off 
the previous day.  Harris noticed that Ashley was walking “funny” when she 
returned home, and she observed redness and bruising when she changed Ashley’s 
diaper that afternoon.  Lopez told Harris that Ashley had been playing outdoors 
without a diaper and injured herself on a bicycle that was missing a seat.  Laurie 
saw blood on Ashley’s diaper as late as Wednesday, which was the first time she 
had seen Ashley’s genitalia since Saturday, May 29. 
Similarly, the evidence supports an inference that the injury on Sunday 
produced the initial bruising, which was then exacerbated by ongoing trauma.  
Harris testified that the bruising appeared to worsen throughout the week, and S.B. 
testified that she saw Lopez punch Ashley in the genitals.  S.B. further testified 
that she saw Lopez thrusting his pelvis against Ashley in the middle of the night, 
suggesting a separate incident from Sunday.   
Finally, for the reasons above, sufficient evidence supports the jury’s 
finding that Lopez inflicted great bodily injury.  (§ 12022.7, subd. (f).)   
C.  Admission of Evidence of Witness’s Broken Leg  
Lopez contends the erroneous admission of irrelevant and inflammatory 
evidence that he had broken S.B.’s leg and threatened to kill her rendered his trial 
fundamentally unfair.  
S.B. suffered a broken femur in November 1998.  S.B. told Harris, who did 
not see the injury occur, that she was sitting on her bed with her stomach against 
the footboard and her legs dangling between the footboard’s vertical slats.  S.B. 
tried to stand up too quickly; her body fell forward but her right leg stayed wedged 
 
23 
between two slats.  S.B. crawled into the hallway toward the living room, where 
Harris was standing.  An ambulance took S.B. to the hospital, where she stayed for 
21 days.  CPS conducted an investigation, after which S.B. returned to Harris’s 
care.   
Detective Bobbie Koller interviewed S.B. on June 4, 1999.  In addition to 
discussing the events surrounding Ashley’s death, Koller asked S.B. what had 
happened to her leg.  S.B. told Koller that she broke it on her bunk bed in an 
accident.  At a second interview on July 7, 1999, S.B. told Koller that Lopez had 
grown angry with her, picked her up, and threw her down, resulting in her broken 
leg.  S.B. appeared afraid of Lopez and told Koller that Lopez threatened to hurt 
her again if she ever disclosed the source of her injury.   
Shortly after Ashley’s death, S.B. told other people that Lopez had broken 
her leg.  Following Ashley’s funeral, S.B. told Laurie that Lopez had broken her 
leg but had threatened that if she told anyone, he would kill her and Harris.  Laurie 
testified that S.B. appeared “very very scared” during this conversation.  Later that 
month, S.B. told her great-aunt Cindy Jardin that Lopez had broken her leg.  S.B. 
also explained that she had not said anything sooner because Lopez had threatened 
to kill her.  S.B. told her next foster mother, Debra Karavias, that Lopez had 
broken her leg and showed Karavias where she had screws in her knee.  A few 
months later, S.B. explained to Karavias that Lopez had broken her leg by 
throwing her onto the floor.   
S.B. moved to foster mother Beth Hanson’s home in August 2000.  When 
Hanson’s daughter asked S.B. about the scar on her knee, S.B. replied, “That’s 
when [Lopez] broke my leg.”  Hanson heard S.B. explain that Lopez “took her by 
the arms and threw her and that’s how her leg broke.”  Occasionally, Hanson 
heard S.B. crying out from nightmares in the middle of the night.  One night, S.B. 
 
24 
explained that Lopez was chasing her and going to kill her.  On another night, she 
explained that Lopez was going to hurt her.  
Before trial, defense counsel moved to exclude evidence regarding S.B.’s 
broken leg and Lopez’s subsequent threats under Evidence Code section 1101, 
subdivision (b).  The prosecutor responded that the evidence was being offered not 
under Evidence Code section 1101(b) but rather to show why S.B. initially lied 
about the cause of her injury, and was admissible on the issue of S.B.’s credibility 
and “her motivation for testifying the way she did.”  The trial court stated the 
evidence “would probably come in on redirect examination,” assuming there 
would be inconsistencies between S.B.’s statements on direct and cross-
examination.  After hearing argument from both parties, the court ruled that the 
prosecutor could not refer to S.B.’s broken leg during his opening statement or 
question any witness about the leg on direct examination, but the evidence could 
be admissible depending on the cross-examination.   
Just before S.B. took the stand, Lopez renewed his objection to any 
evidence of threats or abuse against S.B.  On direct examination, S.B. testified that 
she saw Lopez punch Ashley and throw her onto the floor.  On cross-examination, 
defense counsel questioned S.B. about inconsistencies with her testimony at the 
preliminary hearing.  S.B. admitted that her great-aunt, Cindy Jardin, had told her 
to call Lopez “Wicked Mike.”  While acknowledging she spoke with Koller about 
Lopez hurting Ashley, S.B. said she did not recall most of their conversations.  
S.B. indicated she did not remember certain questions that had been asked of her 
in the past.   
On redirect, S.B. answered affirmatively when the prosecutor asked if she 
was “nervous and afraid.”  When the prosecutor asked if she was afraid of Lopez, 
she did not answer.  After the third attempt at asking that question with no 
 
25 
response, the prosecutor asked, “You don’t want to answer that question, do you?”  
S.B. replied, “I don’t.”   
Over Lopez’s objection, the court allowed the prosecutor to ask S.B. 
whether Lopez had ever done anything to her.  The court instructed the jury that 
the testimony was “limited strictly to the witness’s state of mind, not for the truth 
of any answer the witness might give.”  When the prosecutor asked S.B. who 
broke her leg, again over objection, S.B. did not answer.  The prosecutor asked 
S.B. if she remembered telling him, Laurie, Cindy, or her former foster mother 
Debra Karavias that Lopez had broken her leg.  After each question, S.B. either 
did not answer or indicated that she did not remember.  At the conclusion of 
redirect, defense counsel moved for a mistrial.  The court denied the motion 
without prejudice and told defense counsel that he could argue the motion after the 
completion of S.B.’s testimony.  
Defense counsel later renewed his motion, arguing that he never opened the 
door to the prosecutor’s line of questioning.  The court disagreed and denied the 
motion for a mistrial.  Both Karavias and Laurie later testified regarding the 
statements S.B. made about her leg.  In rebuttal, Dr. Crawford testified regarding 
his examination and treatment of S.B.’s broken leg.   
“ ‘Evidence a witness is afraid to testify is relevant to the credibility of that 
witness and is therefore admissible.  [Citations.]  Testimony a witness is fearful of 
retaliation similarly relates to that witness’s credibility and is also admissible. 
[Citation.]  It is not necessary to show threats against the witness were made by 
the defendant personally, or the witness’s fear of retaliation is directly linked to 
the defendant for the evidence to be admissible.’ ”  (People v. Williams (2013) 58 
Cal.4th 197, 270 (Williams).)  The trial court must balance the evidence’s 
probative value against its prejudicial effect under Evidence Code section 352.  
(Williams, at p. 270.)  The court has discretion to exclude evidence “if its 
 
26 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission 
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of 
undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”  (Evid. Code, 
§ 352.) 
We find no abuse of discretion.  The trial court appropriately found that the 
evidence was probative in that it would explain to the jury why S.B. was afraid to 
testify against Lopez, allowing the jury to accurately assess S.B.’s credibility and 
the inconsistencies in her testimony.  The trial court limited any prejudicial effect 
by allowing the evidence to come in only on redirect pending the cross-
examination.  Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury that the evidence 
could be considered only for a limited purpose, and we presume the jury followed 
the trial court’s instruction. 
D.  Failure to Give Unanimity Instruction on Theory of Guilt  
The trial court instructed the jury on three theories of first degree murder:  
premeditated and deliberated murder (CALJIC No. 8.20), murder by torture 
(CALJIC No. 8.24), and felony murder (CALJIC No. 8.21).  Lopez contends the 
trial court committed reversible error by failing to require the jury to unanimously 
agree on the theory of first degree murder.  We have previously rejected this 
argument (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 592; People v. Cole (2004) 33 
Cal.4th 1158, 1221; People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1132), and Lopez 
offers no persuasive reason for us to revisit this precedent. 
E.  Instruction on First Degree Murder  
Lopez contends that the instructions permitting him to be convicted of first 
degree murder on any of the three theories presented violated his rights under the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because he was not charged with first degree 
murder.  Lopez asserts that because he was charged only with second degree 
 
27 
murder under section 187, he cannot be found guilty of first degree murder.  Lopez 
further contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try him for first degree 
murder.  His argument rests on the premise that under People v. Dillon (1983) 34 
Cal.3d 441, felony murder and premeditated murder are separate crimes and that 
Dillon implicitly overruled People v. Witt (1915) 170 Cal. 104, in which we held 
that a defendant may be convicted of felony murder even though the information 
charged only murder with malice. 
But we have repeatedly rejected the claim that first degree murder and 
murder with malice are separate offenses.  (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 
287, 369; People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 367; People v. Carpenter (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 312, 394–395.)  We have likewise reaffirmed “that an accusatory 
pleading charging a defendant with murder need not specify the theory of murder 
upon which the prosecution intends to rely.”  (Hughes, at p. 369.)  Lopez offers no 
persuasive reason for us to revisit these holdings. 
F.  Constitutionality of Special Circumstance  
Lopez contends that the torture-murder special circumstance 
(§ 190.2(a)(18)) is unconstitutional because it fails to perform the narrowing 
function required by the Eighth Amendment and fails to ensure that there is a 
meaningful basis for distinguishing cases in which the death penalty is imposed 
from those in which it is not.  He further contends that the special circumstance is 
overbroad.  We have previously rejected these arguments (People v. Bemore 
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 843), and Lopez provides no persuasive reason to revisit 
this precedent.  
 
28 
III.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Coercion to Reach a Verdict  
Lopez argues that the trial court improperly coerced a death verdict by 
refusing to address multiple assertions of deadlock from the jury and by failing to 
dismiss a juror who could no longer serve impartially. 
The jury began penalty phase deliberations at 10:05 a.m. on Thursday, 
March 1, 2001.  The jury deliberated until 4:10 p.m., including a break for lunch, 
and then adjourned for the weekend.  The jury resumed deliberations without 
incident on Monday, March 5, and Tuesday, March 6.  On Wednesday, March 7, 
the jury submitted a note to the court at 3:00 p.m., stating, “Jury is deadlocked.”  
The court informed counsel of the note and indicated its intention to instruct the 
jury to break for the remainder of the day and to return the following morning to 
resume deliberations.  Defense counsel asked the court to question the jurors to 
determine whether further deliberations would be helpful and, in the alternative, 
moved for a mistrial.  The court declined to question the jury and denied 
defendant’s motion, asserting it was too early in the process to warrant a mistrial. 
The jury resumed deliberations on Thursday, March 8.  At 11:20 a.m., the 
jury sent the court a note seeking clarification regarding which acts of violence 
could be considered an aggravating circumstance.  The court conferred with 
counsel that afternoon and sent the jury a written response; this issue is discussed 
further below.  The jury continued deliberating until 3:30 p.m. and then adjourned 
for the weekend.   
The jury continued deliberations on Monday, March 12.  On Tuesday, 
March 13, the jury began deliberating at 9:20 a.m.  At 10:50 a.m., the jury sent the 
court a note stating, “This jury is a deadlocked jury, with no hope of resolution!  
Juror #5 has a prepaid trip to Arizona planned for the week of 3-19 to 3-25-01.  #5 
 
29 
will not be available.”  At some point that day, the jury sent a second note to the 
court requesting that the alternates be allowed to return to work until needed, 
citing adverse impact on career growth for one juror.   
The trial court asked the foreperson a series of questions regarding the 
number, timing, and division of the votes taken since the jury began deliberating.  
The foreperson estimated that the group had taken eight votes throughout the 
week.  The foreperson indicated that the first vote resulted in a five-seven split and 
the two most recent votes resulted in a six-six split each, but could not recall the 
specific breakdown for the remaining votes.   
The court then asked the foreperson if he felt there was a reasonable 
probability that the jurors could arrive at a verdict.  The foreperson replied, “No, I 
do not.”  The trial court asked whether it could assist the jury by providing any 
additional instructions or having the reporter read back any testimony.  The 
foreperson stated that additional instructions or guidance might be helpful, but he 
did not believe there was confusion in the minds of the jurors.  The court asked 
Juror No. 1 if she agreed that further deliberations would not result in a verdict; 
the juror agreed.  The court asked the same question of Juror No. 3, who replied, 
“I’m not sure that I do [agree].”  At that point, the court instructed the jury to 
continue deliberating and said it would await further communication from the jury.  
Later that afternoon, the jury sent a note seeking clarification of the definitions of 
“extreme duress” and “lingering doubt.”  The court conferred with counsel and 
sent a written response defining “duress” and directing the jurors to the 
instructions for the definition of “lingering doubt.”   
The jury deliberated on Wednesday, March 14, without incident.  The 
following morning, on March 15, Juror No. 8 requested to speak with the court 
privately.  With the court and counsel convened in chambers, Juror No. 8 asked to 
be dismissed from the jury.  Juror No. 8 said she had “reached a level of 
 
30 
intolerable stress” and “felt as though [she] was going to snap.”  She explained 
that the stress of the long trial and deliberation process was affecting her health 
and made her “more and more tense every day.”  She said it was affecting her job 
because she tried to do a full day’s worth of work in an hour or two each day after 
deliberating, but she struggled to keep up and remember what work she had done.  
She told the trial court, “I wake up crying at night because of the gravity of this 
case, and how I take it seriously, and I just want to ask to be taken off the case.”  
The court acknowledged that the jurors had been working hard and asked Juror 
No. 8 to continue to participate.  The court said that if after further deliberations 
“you still feel that it’s just too stressful and it’s at the point again where it’s 
interfering with your health, tell the bailiff, again, and we’ll talk to you, again.”  
Juror No. 8 expressed a willingness to try and returned to the jury room. 
After the juror left chambers, the prosecutor stated his belief that the juror 
should be removed.  The court responded, “If she had indicated a reluctance to 
continue — I’m not saying that she was enthusiastic about it — I would have 
granted her request.  But I — it’s hard to know when, you know, when frustration 
kind of goes beyond that level.”  The prosecutor responded that the juror did 
indicate reluctance and “almost broke down into tears.  I could see the lips 
quivering.”  The court replied that it “didn’t see that” and said that if Juror No. 8 
spoke up again, she would be dismissed, but “not at this point.”  Defense counsel 
did not object to the court’s ruling or otherwise indicate any concerns with the 
court’s action.  
Defense counsel reminded the court that Juror No. 5 had a prepaid vacation 
starting the following Monday.  The court responded, “I expect something to 
happen today, at least as far as Juror No. 8 is concerned.  If she asks to be excused 
again for the reasons she’s indicated, I’m going to grant her request.  Obviously, 
I’ll notify counsel if I hear anything further from her.  I believe after hearing about 
 
31 
[Juror No. 5] having to leave, something is going to happen today.  Let’s just stay 
tuned.”  The jury returned with a death verdict at 2:20 p.m. that afternoon.   
1.  Pressure to Reach a Verdict 
Section 1140 provides in relevant part that a “jury cannot be discharged” 
without having rendered a verdict unless, “at the expiration of such time as the 
court may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears that there is no reasonable 
probability that the jury can agree.”  “The decision whether to declare a hung jury 
or to order further deliberations rests in the trial court’s sound discretion.”  (People 
v. Debose (2014) 59 Cal.4th 177, 209.)  “However, a court must exercise its power 
under section 1140 without coercing the jury, and ‘avoid displacing the jury’s 
independent judgment “in favor of considerations of compromise and 
expediency.” ’  [Citation.]  As this court has explained, ‘[a]ny claim that the jury 
was pressured into reaching a verdict depends on the particular circumstances of 
the case.’ ”  (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 88.) 
We conclude that the trial court did not coerce the jury to reach a verdict.  
Lopez emphasizes the court’s failure to respond to the jury’s multiple declarations 
of deadlock and concerns about their personal circumstances.  But the court 
responded to the second note of deadlock by questioning individual jurors on 
whether he or she believed the jury was deadlocked and whether the court could 
do anything to assist the process.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1036(a) [when a 
deadlock is reported, the judge should ask jurors whether they have “specific 
concerns which, if resolved, might assist the jury in reaching a verdict”].)  The 
foreperson acknowledged that “additional instructions or guidance . . . may be of 
some assistance,” and another juror indicated that further deliberations could result 
in a verdict.  The court did not abuse its discretion when it ceased the questioning 
at that point and ordered the jury to continue deliberating.  The trial court had 
 
32 
sufficient basis to conclude there was a reasonable probability a verdict could be 
reached.  The court did not state or imply to the jury that it must reach a particular 
outcome, nor did it coerce the jury to reach a verdict. 
The trial court’s failure to address Juror No. 5’s upcoming prepaid trip 
likewise did not coerce the jury to reach a verdict.  Lopez asserts this failure could 
have led the juror to believe she would not be dismissed for her vacation and could 
have led the jury to believe it would be forced to continue to deliberate until a 
verdict was reached.  However, at the time Juror No. 5 reminded the court of her 
vacation, the jury was seven days into its deliberations, alternate jurors were 
available, and more than two full days of deliberation remained before Juror No. 5 
would become unavailable.  It is unlikely the jury would have understood the trial 
court’s failure to respond specifically to Juror No. 5’s situation as a command to 
keep deliberating indefinitely until a verdict was reached.  
2.  Refusal to Discharge Juror 
The trial court may discharge a juror at any time if good cause exists to find 
that the juror is unable to perform his or her duty.  (§ 1089.)  “The trial court’s 
decision whether or not to discharge a juror under section 1089 is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion and will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence; to 
warrant discharge, the juror’s bias or other disability must appear in the record as a 
demonstrable reality.”  (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 124–125.)  A 
reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence but “must be confident that the trial 
court’s conclusion is manifestly supported by evidence on which the court actually 
relied.”  (People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1053.) 
The court did not abuse its discretion by leaving Juror No. 8 on the panel.  
Although the juror explained that the trial had caused her stress and prevented her 
from doing her job, at no time did she indicate that she could no longer serve 
 
33 
impartially as a juror.  It is true that Juror No. 8 asked to be excused from the jury.  
But when the trial court asked her to continue participating and assured her that 
the court would talk to her again if she continued to feel the deliberations were too 
stressful and were interfering with her health, the juror was willing to continue.  
Although the trial court did not specifically ask the juror if she was able to 
continue deliberating impartially or permit counsel to ask questions, the juror’s 
responses indicate a willingness to continue to deliberate as she was originally 
instructed to do.  In these circumstances, the trial court’s decision not to dismiss 
the juror was not an abuse of discretion. 
B.  Trial Court’s Response to Jurors’ Question  
Lopez contends that the trial court’s response to a jury question regarding 
its consideration of acts of violence, coupled with the prosecutor’s argument, 
allowed the jury to consider inadmissible evidence during its penalty 
determination. 
As noted, the prosecutor introduced evidence of five prior violent incidents 
at the penalty phase under section 190.3, factor (b):  an October 1992 incident 
involving an alleged assault and resisting arrest; a May 1986 incident involving 
alleged assaults and resisting arrest; an August 1991 incident involving Lopez’s 
ex-wife and her son, alleging an assault with a deadly weapon; a June 1999 
incident involving an alleged assault on M.L.; and a December 1990 incident 
involving an alleged assault and resisting arrest.  The record contained evidence of 
additional instances of violence, including allegations that Lopez physically 
assaulted and threatened S.B., physically and verbally abused Harris, and hit 
Harris’s grandson.  During his opening statement, the prosecutor told the jurors 
they could “consider anything you heard in the first part of the trial in arriving at 
your verdict.”   
 
34 
The trial court instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.85:  “In 
determining which penalty is to be imposed on the defendant, you shall consider 
all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case, 
except as hereafter instructed.”  Pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.87, the court instructed 
the jury that it could consider the five violent criminal acts as aggravating 
circumstances, but it “may not consider any evidence of any other criminal acts as 
an aggravating circumstance.”   
On the fifth day of deliberations, the jury sent the court a note seeking 
clarification regarding the prior acts of violence.  The note read, “Can any acts of 
violence be considered as an aggravating circumstance or are we limited to the 5 
acts of violence listed on 8.87 of the jury instructions?  ‘A juror may not consider 
any evidence of any other criminal acts as an aggravating circumstance’ vs. C8841 
[sic] ‘you must determine what the facts are from the evidence received during the 
entire trial unless you are instructed otherwise.’ ”  Defense counsel requested a 
simple “no” to the question regarding consideration of any acts of violence, and a 
“yes” to the question of whether the jurors were limited to the five acts of violence 
listed in CALJIC No. 8.87.   
Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court sent the following response 
to the jury:  “You have asked if any acts of violence may be considered as an 
aggravating circumstance, or, are you limited to the 5 acts of violence listed in 
8.87 of the jury instructions.  [¶] Under instruction 8.85, you are limited to the 5 
acts of violence alleged to have occurred and listed in instruction 8.87 as 
aggravating circumstances.  Before a juror may consider any such criminal act as 
an aggravating circumstance in this case, a juror must first be satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant did in fact commit the criminal act.  [¶] Under 
instruction 8.85, you shall consider all the evidence which was received during 
both the guilt and penalty trials in determining which penalty is to be imposed on 
 
35 
the defendant.  You shall consider, take into account and be guided by all the 
factors in that instruction which you find to be applicable.”  Lopez specifically 
objected to inclusion of the third paragraph.  On appeal, he asserts that the trial 
court’s response, coupled with the prosecutor’s opening statement during the 
penalty phase, erroneously led the jury to believe it could consider inadmissible 
evidence as aggravating factors. 
The trial court did not erroneously lead the jury to believe it could consider 
inadmissible evidence as aggravating factors.  The court’s response correctly 
summarized the instructions.  CALJIC No. 8.85 authorizes the jury to consider all 
evidence presented in determining an appropriate penalty, but as the trial court 
made clear, this instruction is subject to a limitation:  “Under instruction 8.85, you 
are limited to the 5 acts of violence alleged to have occurred and listed in 
instruction 8.87 as aggravating circumstances.”  (First italics added.)  Although 
the trial court’s response generally summarized CALJIC No. 8.85’s directive that 
“[i]n determining which penalty is to be imposed on the defendant, you shall 
consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of 
this case, except as hereafter instructed,” it left out the statement “except as 
hereafter instructed.”  Even without that phrase, however, the court’s response did 
not expressly contradict or impliedly conflict with CALJIC No. 8.85.   
The court’s response also reminded the jury that the aggravating 
circumstances were “limited” to the five acts of violence listed in CALJIC 
No. 8.87, and the jury was told to consider the factors “which you find to be 
applicable.”  The trial court’s use of the word “limited” conveyed that only the 
five acts in CALJIC No. 8.87 could be considered aggravating.  The jury thus 
presumably understood that it could not consider other violent acts as aggravating 
circumstances.  Notwithstanding the prosecutor’s opening statement, the trial 
court’s instructions and response to the jury’s questions correctly stated the law.  
 
36 
Lopez points to nothing in the record suggesting the jury did not follow the trial 
court’s instructions regarding proper consideration of the evidence presented. 
C.  Griffin Error  
Lopez contends that the prosecutor committed error under Griffin v. 
California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 (Griffin) when he improperly referred to Lopez’s 
failure to testify and lack of remorse. 
In his closing argument, the prosecutor referred to the defense witnesses 
who gave mitigating character evidence, stating, “Other than the fact that Michael 
Lopez was kind to them, brought them flowers, drew cards and cartoons for them, 
babysat for them, I didn’t hear any one of them say Michael Lopez had any 
remorse for this crime.  Not one.”  The prosecutor then discussed the testimony of 
Lopez’s parents, arguing, “Did you ever hear Mr. or Mrs. Lopez say:  Michael 
Lopez told me, sorry, Mom, for breaking your heart.  Sorry, Mom, for putting you 
through this all these years.  Sorry, Mom, for having you come to court and having 
you beg for my life.  Sorry, Mom, for—”  The court sustained defense counsel’s 
objection and told the prosecutor to “move on.”  The prosecutor continued, “Did 
you ever hear one word of remorse from him?”  Defense counsel again objected, 
citing Griffin.  The court responded, “I had sustained your objection.  [Prosecutor], 
move on.”  The court denied Lopez’s motion for a mistrial.  The prosecutor moved 
on to a discussion of sympathy and lingering doubt.   
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o 
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself.”  This provision “forbids either comment by the prosecution on the 
accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of 
guilt.”  (Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 615; see People v. Thompson (2016) 1 
Cal.5th 1043, 1117.)  But there is a difference between a prosecutor’s comment 
 
37 
that a defendant failed to take the stand to express remorse and a prosecutor’s 
comment that there was no evidence that a defendant had ever expressed remorse.  
(See People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1174 [“the prosecutor did not 
comment that defendant had failed to take the stand to express remorse; he simply 
said there was no evidence that defendant had ever expressed remorse”].)  “So 
long as the prosecutor’s argument does not amount to a direct or indirect comment 
on the defendant’s invocation of the right to silence at the penalty phase 
[citations], it does not violate constitutional principles.”  (People v. Lewis (2001) 
25 Cal.4th 610, 674.)  Here the prosecutor did not comment on Lopez’s decision 
not to take the stand.  Rather, he pointed out that none of the mitigation witnesses 
testified that they heard Lopez express remorse at any point when he asked the 
jury, “Did you ever hear one word of remorse from him?”  This comment was in 
reference to statements Lopez had made to his parents outside of proceedings; it 
was not referring to his failure to show remorse to the jury directly by not 
testifying.  Such commentary was not improper. 
D.  Admission of Rebuttal Character Evidence 
Lopez contends that the evidence he had committed welfare fraud was 
improperly admitted and violated his rights to a fair trial and reasonable penalty 
determination. 
After Lopez’s case in mitigation, the prosecutor sought to introduce 
evidence that he had previously committed welfare fraud.  Over defense objection, 
Jennifer Hazeltine, a welfare fraud inspector with the district attorney’s office, 
testified that in June 1996 she received a referral regarding possible welfare fraud 
by Lopez.  Hazeltine discovered that for seven months, while receiving food 
stamps and general assistance, Lopez had failed to report his income.  Lopez 
 
38 
unlawfully received a total of $2,705.  Lopez admitted his failure to report his 
income and arranged to repay the amount at $40 per month.   
If a defendant introduces character evidence during the penalty phase, the 
prosecution may respond with character evidence of its own to undermine the 
defendant’s claim that his good character weighs in favor of mercy.  (People v. 
Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 709 (Loker).)  “The scope of proper rebuttal is 
determined by the breadth and generality of the direct evidence.  If the testimony 
is ‘not limited to any singular incident, personality trait, or aspect of [the 
defendant’s] background,’ but ‘paint[s] an overall picture of an honest, intelligent, 
well-behaved, and sociable person incompatible with a violent or antisocial 
character,’ rebuttal evidence of similarly broad scope is warranted.”  (Ibid.) 
At the same time, we have rejected the notion that any good character 
evidence introduced by the defendant will open the door to any bad character 
evidence.  (Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 709; see People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 
Cal.3d 730, 792, fn. 24.)  “When a witness does ‘not testify generally to 
defendant’s good character or to his general reputation for lawful behaviors, but 
instead testifie[s] only to a number of adverse circumstances that defendant 
experienced in his early childhood,’ it is error to ‘permit[ ] the prosecution to go 
beyond these aspects of defendant’s background and to introduce evidence of a 
course of misconduct that defendant had engaged in throughout his teenage years 
that did not relate to the mitigating evidence presented on direct examination.’  
[Citations.]”  (Loker, at pp. 709–710; see People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 
1158, 1193.)   
Lopez contends the evidence was improperly admitted because he did not 
introduce evidence concerning his reputation for honesty.  But Lopez did present 
testimony concerning his strong Christian beliefs, church attendance, and daily 
prayers.  (See People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1113, 1173 [in light of evidence 
 
39 
of the defendant’s religious recommitment, the prosecutor properly could 
introduce evidence of acts tending to contradict that impression]; People v. 
Siripongs (1988) 45 Cal.3d 548, 578 [evidence that the defendant was a “ ‘devout 
Buddhist’ ” opened the door to inquiry on prior convictions].)  Additionally, 
Lopez introduced testimony from a mental health expert regarding his low IQ.  He 
did not object when the prosecutor asked the expert if such a person could be 
capable of committing welfare fraud.  The expert acknowledged that a person with 
Lopez’s IQ could lie.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the 
prosecution to introduce the welfare fraud evidence to rebut Lopez’s character 
evidence.  
IV.  OTHER ISSUES 
A.  Challenges to the Death Penalty  
Lopez mounts a number of challenges to California’s death penalty law that 
our prior decisions have considered and rejected.  He provides no persuasive 
reason for us to reexamine the following conclusions: 
“California’s death penalty law ‘adequately narrows the class of murderers 
subject to the death penalty’ and does not violate the Eighth Amendment.  
[Citation.]  Section 190.2, which sets forth the circumstances in which the penalty 
of death may be imposed, is not impermissibly broad in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.”  (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 294.)   
“ ‘[T]he California death penalty statute is not impermissibly broad, 
whether considered on its face or as interpreted by this court.’  [Citation.]  We 
further ‘reject the claim that section 190.3, factor (a), on its face or as interpreted 
and applied, permits arbitrary and capricious imposition of a sentence of death.’ ”  
(People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 552–553.) 
 
40 
The death penalty statute “is not invalid for failing to require (1) written 
findings or unanimity as to aggravating factors, (2) proof of all aggravating factors 
beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) findings that aggravation outweighs mitigation 
beyond a reasonable doubt, or (4) findings that death is the appropriate penalty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 126 (Snow).)  
The United States Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 
U.S. 466 and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 have not altered these 
conclusions.  (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 41 (Demetrulias).)   
The trial court need not instruct the jury that it must return a sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole if it finds that mitigation outweighs aggravation.  
(People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978.) 
The death verdict need not be based on unanimous jury findings.  “While 
all the jurors must agree death is the appropriate penalty, the guided discretion 
through which jurors reach their penalty decision must permit each juror 
individually to assess such potentially aggravating factors as the circumstances of 
the capital crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)), prior felony convictions (id., factor (c)), and 
other violent criminal activity (id., factor (b)), and decide for him- or herself ‘what 
weight that activity should be given in deciding the penalty.’  [Citation.]”  
(Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 41.)  A unanimous finding regarding the 
mitigating factors is similarly not required.  (People v. Bryant (2014) 60 Cal.4th 
335, 457.) 
CALJIC No. 8.88 is not impermissibly broad.  (People v. Breaux (1991) 1 
Cal.4th 281, 316, fn. 14.) 
 
41 
Instructions on the meaning of a sentence of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole and on the “ ‘presumption of life’ ” were not constitutionally 
required.  (Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 43.)   
“Comparative intercase proportionality review by the trial or appellate 
courts is not constitutionally required.”  (Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 126.) 
“The trial court has no obligation to delete from CALJIC No. 
8.85 inapplicable mitigating factors, nor must it identify which factors are 
aggravating and which are mitigating.”  (People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 
618.)  
“The capital sentencing scheme does not violate equal protection by 
denying to capital defendants procedural safeguards that are available to 
noncapital defendants.”  (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 836 (Thomas).) 
California’s death penalty does not violate international law or international 
norms of decency.  (Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 837.) 
B.  Cumulative Error  
Lopez contends that the cumulative effect of the errors during his trial 
mandates reversal.  Because we have found no error, there is no cumulative 
prejudice to evaluate. 
 
42 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J.  
 
WE CONCUR:  
 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
FYBEL, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, 
Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 
the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Lopez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S099549 
Date Filed: June 28, 2018 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: Philip V. Sarkisian 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Evan Young and Janet 
R. Gilger, Deputy State Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Glenn R. Pruden and Alice B. Lustre, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Evan Young 
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, 10th Floor 
Oakland, CA  94607 
(510) 452-8712 
 
Alice B. Lustre 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 510-3821