Title: Commonwealth v. Caruso
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-09656
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 13, 2017

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us. 
 
SJC-09656 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  STEVEN CARUSO. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     September 9, 2016. - January 13, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Confrontation of witnesses, 
Assistance of counsel.  Evidence, Expert opinion, 
Information stored on computer, Of agency, Prior consistent 
statement, Testimony at prior proceeding, Videotape, 
Impeachment of credibility.  Agency, What constitutes.  
Witness, Expert, Impeachment.  Practice, Criminal, Capital 
case, Confrontation of witnesses, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 23, 2000. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Charles 
M. Grabau, J., and the case was tried before him. 
 
 
 
David A.F. Lewis for the defendant. 
 
Jessica Langsam, Assistant District Attorney (Elizabeth 
Dunigan, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  On January 20, 2000, Sandra Berfield, the victim, 
received a package containing a pipe bomb, which exploded when 
she opened it, blowing her body asunder and killing her 
2 
 
instantly.  A jury in the Superior Court found the defendant, 
Steven Caruso, guilty of murder in the first degree on theories 
of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity and cruelty. 
 
The defendant appeals from his conviction, claiming that 
(1) the admission of testimony by a jailhouse informant violated 
the defendant's confrontation rights; (2) a ballistics expert 
improperly testified to a report prepared by an unavailable 
expert; (3) the testimony of the Commonwealth's wire expert 
should have been excluded; (4) the Commonwealth failed to 
establish adequately the reliability of computer forensics 
evidence; and (5) the admission of the victim's prior recorded 
testimony and limitations on the defendant's ability to attack 
its veracity violated the defendant's confrontation rights.  We 
conclude that no reversible error occurred, and we affirm the 
jury's verdict. 
 
Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have 
reasonably found in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, reserving certain details for our analysis of the 
issues. 
 
1.  Defendant's relationship with victim.  The defendant 
was a long-time regular customer at a restaurant in Medford 
where the victim worked as a server.  The defendant often 
patronized the restaurant more than once daily, and typically 
requested a particular server.  When the defendant became angry 
3 
 
after a long wait for his previously preferred server, the 
victim became the defendant's server of choice.  The defendant 
and the victim established an amicable relationship. 
 
The defendant was closely connected with many events taking 
place at the restaurant and with many of the people who worked 
there.  The defendant, a handyman by trade, did repair work at 
the restaurant and in the homes of its employees.  He also 
attended some social events organized for employees of the 
restaurant. 
 
Eventually, the relationship between the defendant and the 
victim took a negative turn.  The defendant asked the victim on 
a date.  The victim declined, and the defendant's demeanor 
changed.  Although the defendant had a reputation among the 
restaurant's staff for staring at people, he began to stare 
exclusively at the victim and in a hateful manner. 
 
Tension between the defendant and the victim escalated.  On 
two occasions, the defendant poured battery acid into the 
gasoline tank of the victim's motor vehicle, for which the 
defendant was convicted of destroying the victim's property.  He 
was sentenced to eighteen months in the house of correction, 
with six months to serve and the balance suspended for two 
years.  He also was ordered to make monthly restitution 
payments.  A payment was due in January, 2000.  The defendant 
4 
 
also was charged with, but not convicted of, slashing the 
victim's tires. 
 
In addition, the victim had obtained a restraining order 
against the defendant after the first battery acid incident.  
After the second battery acid incident, the victim returned to 
court regarding the restraining order violation.  At the end of 
the ensuing proceeding, the judge told the defendant the 
restraining order was still in full effect.  Nevertheless, 
immediately after the hearing, the defendant approached the 
victim, coming within about two feet of her in a nearby parking 
lot.  A few months later, the defendant drove by the restaurant 
again. 
 
2.  Victim's death.  On the morning of Thursday, January 
20, 2000, at approximately 12:30 P.M., the victim was instantly 
killed in her apartment when she opened a package containing a 
pipe bomb.  The victim lived on the second level of an owner-
occupied home in Everett. 
 
The defendant left the package containing the pipe bomb on 
the victim's porch just after 9:30 A.M.1  At around 12:30 P.M., 
                                                          
 
1 The defendant rejects the timeline of events presented by 
the Commonwealth and argues that he could not have delivered the 
package.  However, in determining what facts a reasonable juror 
could have found, we view the facts in the light most favorable 
to the Commonwealth.  Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 
676-677 (1979).  The Commonwealth established that the defendant 
could have delivered the package shortly after 9:30 A.M. before 
5 
 
the homeowner retrieved the mail and, on her way back into her 
apartment, examined the package containing the bomb.  She saw 
the name "Passanisi" with a Malden return address.  Her husband 
heard the victim go down to the basement and then return to her 
apartment.  Shortly thereafter, they felt the explosion. 
 
The homeowner and her husband responded with alacrity.  
They went to the second-floor apartment and opened the door. 
They saw smoke, smelled an odor, and saw the victim's body on 
the floor.  They telephoned 911. 
 
Police arrived at the scene promptly.  A responding officer 
identified the odor as similar to gunpowder.  From the doorway 
to the apartment, the officer saw human tissue and blood spatter 
on the wall, floors, and ceiling.  He called to the victim, 
whose body he saw at the end of a hallway.  There was no 
response.  The cause of death was later determined to be massive 
blast injuries. 
 
Based on the defendant's troubled history with the victim, 
the police promptly sought to question him that same day.  The 
defendant provided police with two inconsistent descriptions of 
his whereabouts on earlier that morning.  First, he told the 
police he had gone from his home to a library around 10 A.M., 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
he was identified by a witness at a café, approximately ten 
minutes away from the victim's home, at 10 A.M. 
6 
 
then to a café.  Later, he told the police that he had gone to 
the café first, followed by the library. 
 
Later that same evening, the police returned to the 
defendant's home to secure it, pending the issuance of a 
warrant, which was subsequently executed.  Again, the defendant 
voluntarily answered the questions policed asked.  He knew that 
the police were there "about that girl that got blown up in 
Everett," who had "caused [the defendant] a lot of problems."  
He also stated that he did not like the victim anymore.  When 
asked what he thought should happen to a person who committed 
such a crime, the defendant responded, "Well, you don't know all 
the facts." 
 
3.  Search of crime scene and defendant's home.  From the 
crime scene, police recovered, among other things, battery 
parts, pieces of pipe, metal fragments with human tissue or 
blood on them, pieces of copper, and wires.  After the police 
conducted their search, a private company cleaned the premises 
and delivered additional items in bags to the fire marshal. 
 
In executing the warrant at the defendant's home, the 
police discovered a number of items that were introduced as 
evidence at trial.  The police found drill bits, an electronics 
wiring tool kit, batteries, copper wire, pieces of pipe, and 
ammunition.  The wire, pipe fragments, batteries, and gunpowder 
7 
 
obtained at the defendant's home were consistent with similar 
materials found at the scene of the explosion. 
 
In the defendant's bedroom, police recovered various 
documents containing detailed information about the victim, her 
family and past boy friends, including documents with the 
victim's date of birth, Social Security number, home address and 
place of employment.  Police also recovered correspondence 
between a former boy friend and the victim, and a document 
containing a postal service code referring to the mail route to 
the victim's home.  Shortly after the search, the defendant's 
sister informed police that she had discovered a booklet 
entitled, "High-Low Boom Explosives," in the defendant's room. 
 
During a forensic investigation of the defendant's 
computer, police discovered information related to the victim 
and her family that had been accessed by the defendant in the 
days leading up to her death, including that the defendant had 
used an astrology program and a family tree program containing 
the victim's personal information, such as her telephone number 
and former addresses.  Through the family tree program, the 
police accessed a mailing label containing the name "Sebastiano 
Passanisi," the victim's brother-in-law, with a Malden address, 
consistent with the return address on the package containing the 
bomb.  Neither the victim's sister nor her brother-in-law had 
8 
 
lived in Malden for approximately thirty years.  Police found no 
information related to any other family in the program. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Testimony of jailhouse informant.  
Following his arrest, the defendant encountered Michael A. 
Dubis, another prisoner, in a holding cell at a hospital.2  Dubis 
recognized the defendant's name and face from the newspaper and 
asked him questions about the victim's death.  For approximately 
ninety minutes, Dubis talked to the defendant, intending to find 
out what had happened.  Dubis sought to win the defendant's 
trust and asked questions to elicit information he could pass on 
to law enforcement. 
 
The defendant made numerous incriminating statements to 
Dubis.  The defendant told Dubis that he had learned about 
making bombs from a friend, that he had used batteries and a 
pipe, and that the package would only explode when it was opened 
due to a "basic separation device."  The defendant also said 
that he "got [the bomb] there," that he used the return address 
of the victim's sister on the package, and that he knew the bomb 
would kill anyone who opened it.  In addition, the defendant 
described his relationship with the victim, including the 
incidents involving damage to the victim's vehicle and that the 
                                                          
 
2 Again, disregarding testimony put forth by the 
Commonwealth's witnesses, the defendant argues that he and Dubis 
never met and that the conversation never occurred.  The jury 
were entitled to credit the testimony that the meeting took 
place.  See Latimore, 378 Mass. at 676-677. 
9 
 
victim had a video recording of him "messing with" her vehicle.  
The defendant said that the victim would not go out with him and 
that he was mad at her and called the victim a "bitch." 
 
Dubis relayed this information to a State trooper, Sergeant 
James Plath, to whom Dubis had previously provided information.  
Plath informed law enforcement officials involved in the 
defendant's case.  Following a motion to suppress, which was 
denied, Dubis testified to the defendant's statements at trial. 
 
The defendant argues that the motion judge, who also was 
the trial judge, erred in denying the motion to suppress his 
statements to Dubis, and therefore Dubis's testimony was 
improperly admitted at trial; the defendant also argues that the 
judge erred at trial by allowing the Commonwealth to use prior 
consistent statements to rehabilitate Dubis after cross-
examination.  We reject each argument. 
 
a.  Motion to suppress informant's testimony.  In his 
pretrial motion to suppress Dubis's testimony, the defendant 
argued that Dubis was a government agent who questioned the 
defendant in violation of his right to counsel -- which had 
attached at his arraignment -- in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
 
"The court accepts the findings of fact from a suppression 
hearing absent clear error," but independently applies 
10 
 
constitutional principles to determine whether an informant was 
a government agent.  Commonwealth v. Murphy, 448 Mass. 452, 459 
(2007), citing Commonwealth v. Harmon, 410 Mass. 425, 429 
(1991).  We conclude that the judge properly denied the motion 
to suppress because Dubis was not the Commonwealth's agent when 
he spoke to the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Tevlin, 433 
Mass. 305, 320 (2001); Harmon, supra at 428-429. 
 
In a written decision, the judge made the following 
findings related to Dubis's previous involvement as a government 
informant.  Dubis first acted as a government informant in 1988, 
while serving a sentence in a house of correction.  He also 
testified for the Commonwealth in two murder trials.  See 
Commonwealth v. Tevlin, 433 Mass. 305 (2001); Commonwealth v. 
Bennett, 424 Mass. 64 (1997).  Following Dubis's testimony in 
one of the cases, his attorney asked Plath for assistance in 
securing house of correction sentences for Dubis, rather than 
State prison sentences, out of concern for Dubis's safety.  
Plath agreed to speak with law enforcement responsible for the 
relevant prosecutions.  In a separate matter, when Dubis was not 
in jail, Dubis provided information to Plath and received 
twenty-five dollars as reimbursement for gasoline. 
 
The judge also found that no one, including Plath, promised 
Dubis any assistance in return for information he provided.  
Between his 1998 sentencing and his testimony at the motion to 
11 
 
suppress hearing in 2003, Dubis sought parole three times.  
Dubis was denied parole on each occasion, and no law enforcement 
official spoke on his behalf at any parole hearing.  
 
The Sixth Amendment and art. 123 prohibit the Commonwealth 
from "deliberately elicit[ing]" incriminating statements from an 
individual who has been charged with a crime, without the 
individual's counsel present.  Tevlin, 433 Mass. at 320, quoting 
United States v. Massiah, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).  In addition 
to direct questioning, the government deliberately elicits 
statements by "intentionally creating a situation likely to 
induce" the charged individual to make incriminating statements 
in the absence of counsel.  United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 
264, 274 (1980); Harmon, 410 Mass. at 428, citing Massiah, supra 
at 206.  There is no dispute that Dubis intentionally elicited 
incriminating statements from the defendant to pass on to law 
                                                          
 
3 We have recognized that the art. 12 may provide broader 
protection of the right to counsel than the Sixth Amendment in 
circumstances in which "the informant has an articulated 
agreement with the government that contains a specific benefit 
or promise."  Murphy, 448 Mass. at 467.  This requirement 
ensures that the Commonwealth observes its "affirmative 
obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents and thereby 
dilutes the protection afforded by the right to counsel."  Id., 
quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 171 (1985).  However, 
the court has not yet had to consider circumstances involving a 
jailhouse informant in which art. 12 provides broader protection 
than the Sixth Amendment.  See id. at 467-468 (informant was 
agent for purposes of both Sixth Amendment and art. 12).  On the 
facts of this case, we decline to extend the protections of art. 
12 further. 
12 
 
enforcement for his own advantage.  The only question is whether 
Dubis was a government agent. 
 
"The United States Supreme Court has not clearly defined 
the point at which agency arises."  Murphy, 448 Mass. at 460.  
Yet, at a minimum, there must be some arrangement between the 
Commonwealth and the informant before the informant's actions 
can be attributed to the Commonwealth.  See id. at 463-464, 467 
(articulated agreement between informant and Commonwealth 
containing specific benefit creates agency relationship 
[citation omitted]).  An inmate's "unencouraged hope to curry 
favor" by informing does not establish an agency relationship, 
even if the informant subsequently receives a benefit (citation 
omitted).  Harmon, 410 Mass. at 428.  See Commonwealth v. 
Rancourt, 399 Mass. 269, 274 (1987).  See also Moulton, 474 U.S. 
at 176.  Nor does the fact that an informant provided 
information in the past establish an agency relationship.  
Rancourt, supra at 272, 274. 
 
No agency relationship exists in the absence of a prior 
arrangement between the Commonwealth and the informant.  For 
example, no agency relationship forms when the Commonwealth does 
not promise a benefit to an informant, even where -- as in this 
case -- the informant has provided information to a particular 
police officer on multiple prior occasions.  Harmon, 410 Mass. 
at 429-430  By contrast, in the Murphy case, an informant was a 
13 
 
government agent, because an assistant United States attorney 
offered to file a motion to reduce the informant's sentence "if 
he gave 'substantial assistance' to the government."  Murphy, 
448 Mass. at 465, 467-468.  In the Henry case, the government 
paid an informant on a contingency fee basis for information, 
encouraging the informant to elicit incriminating information 
from other inmates.  Henry, 447 U.S. at 270-271, 274.  Even 
though the government instructed the informant not to question 
the defendant in the Henry case, the Supreme Court concluded 
that keeping the informant near Henry in prison and utilizing 
the contingency fee arrangement for information, tended to show 
that the government "intentionally creat[ed] a situation likely 
to induce Henry to make incriminating statements."  Id. at 266, 
270-271, 274.  See United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 423-424  
(3d Cir. 1994) (intentional placement of known informant in cell 
may constitute deliberate effort to elicit incriminating 
information). 
 
Based on the facts established at the motion to suppress 
hearing, Dubis was not an agent of the Commonwealth.  No 
evidence suggests that the Commonwealth put the defendant and 
Dubis in the same cell in order to elicit information from the 
defendant.  Nor does the evidence show that any law enforcement 
official involved in the defendant's case knew that Dubis and 
the defendant would be placed in the same cell or that their 
14 
 
encounter was the result of anything but happenstance.  That 
Dubis had provided information to a particular officer on more 
than one occasion does not demonstrate that he was a government 
agent.  Harmon, 410 Mass. at 429.  Dubis is unlike the informant 
in the Harmon case, who had reached out to the officer after 
making first contact with the defendant.  Id. at 429.  The 
defendant in the Harmon case confessed his guilt to the 
informant only after the officer told the informant to "keep his 
ears open."  Id.  We concluded that the informant in the Harmon 
case was not a government agent, and the evidence suggesting 
Dubis was a government agent is even weaker.  See id. at 429-
430.  Although Plath similarly told Dubis to "keep his ears 
open," all of Dubis's contact with law enforcement regarding the 
defendant's case took place after Dubis's sole conversation with 
the defendant. 
 
Dubis's conduct as an informant is also unlike the 
informants in Murphy, 448 Mass. at 457, and Henry, 447 U.S. at 
271, 274, because each of them had in place, before eliciting 
incriminating information, an articulated agreement with the 
government, pursuant to which the informants received specific 
benefits.4  As referenced above, the facts in this case do not 
                                                          
 
4 The defendant argues that Dubis is receiving a continuing 
benefit by being placed in a house of correction, rather than a 
State prison.  However, Dubis secured this arrangement nearly 
two years before Dubis's encounter with the defendant.  We 
15 
 
even suggest that the Commonwealth planned for Dubis and the 
defendant to share a cell.  Cf. Henry, 447 U.S. at 274; Brink, 
39 F.3d at 423-424. 
 
The judge properly denied the defendant's motion to 
suppress.  The record does not show the Commonwealth engaged in 
any conduct in contravention of its "affirmative obligation not 
to act in a manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the 
protection afforded by the right to counsel."  Murphy, 448 Mass. 
at 467, quoting Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171. 
 
b.  Rehabilitation of informant through prior consistent 
statements.  The defendant also claims that it was error to 
permit the Commonwealth to rehabilitate Dubis at trial using 
prior consistent statements, where the trial judge failed to 
make an explicit finding that Dubis had made the prior 
consistent statements before his motive to fabricate arose.  We 
disagree. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
considered whether Dubis was an agent of the government in the 
Tevlin case, and we concluded that "the evidence was that 
[Dubis] was moved for safety reasons and that it is common 
practice to move inmates to prevent retaliation against those 
who provide information."  Tevlin, 433 Mass. at 321.  The trial 
judge in this case made similar findings.  Moving an informant 
to mitigate dangers arising from the very fact that he provided 
information is not the type of benefit with which the Sixth 
Amendment and art. 12 are concerned.  Cf. Henry, 447 U.S. at 
270-271; Murphy, 448 Mass. at 457.  Because no evidence suggests 
an intentional plan by the government to put Dubis and the 
defendant together, any subsequent benefit Dubis received is not 
sufficient independently to establish an agency relationship.  
See Rancourt, 399 Mass. at 274. 
16 
 
 
Prior consistent statements are generally inadmissible.  
Mass. G. Evid. § 613(b)(1) (2016).  However, an exception exists 
where a trial judge makes a preliminary finding (1) that the 
witness's in-court testimony is claimed to be the result of a 
recent fabrication or contrivance, improper influence or motive, 
or bias; and (2) that the prior consistent statement was made 
before the witness had a motive to fabricate, before the 
improper influence or motive arose, or before the occurrence of 
the event indicating a bias.  Commonwealth v. Kater, 409 Mass. 
433, 448 (1991), S.C., 412 Mass. 800 (1992) and 432 Mass. 404 
(2000).5  Although such a finding is required and it should be 
made on the record, outside the presence of the jury, here such 
a finding is implicit in the judge's decision.  See Commonwealth 
v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543, 547 (1981) (even without explicit 
findings, record supported trial judge's decision to permit 
admission of confession); Commonwealth v. Brady, 380 Mass. 44, 
                                                          
 
5 Recently, we have articulated that the use of prior 
consistent statements to rehabilitate a witness is permissible 
when a court finds that a party has claimed that a witness's in-
court testimony is the result of recent contrivance or bias, so 
long as the prior consistent statement was made before the 
witness had a motive to fabricate or the occurrence of an event 
indicating a bias.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 613(b)(2) (2016).  Our 
formulation in this case departs only slightly from our more 
recent articulations, but more precisely reflects the underlying 
purposes for which prior consistent statements may be used for 
rehabilitative purposes.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nova, 449 
Mass. 84, 93 (2007); Commonwealth v. Brookins, 416 Mass. 97, 
102-103 (1993); Kater, 409 Mass. at 448; Commonwealth v. 
Zukoski, 370 Mass. 23, 26-27 (1976).  See also Mass. G. Evid. 
613(b)(2). 
17 
 
52 (1980) ("Failure to make explicit findings does not in and of 
itself constitute reversible error" [citation omitted]).  In 
addition, trial judges have broad discretion to determine 
whether circumstances warrant the admission of prior consistent 
statements to rebut a claim of a recent fabrication or 
contrivance, improper influence or motive, or bias.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 430 Mass. 91, 100 (1999); Commonwealth 
v. Zukoski, 370 Mass. 23, 27 (1976). 
 
During the defendant's cross-examination of Dubis, defense 
counsel used prior inconsistent statements from Dubis's 
testimony at the motion to suppress hearing.  Defense counsel 
elicited that, until the week of the trial, Dubis had not seen 
the report generated by his initial interview with police 
regarding the defendant.  Defense counsel also suggested that 
Dubis was expecting assistance at upcoming parole hearings and 
that Dubis intended to ask the prosecution in this case to 
assist him with obtaining release from prison early and being 
placed on a bracelet.  Defense counsel then asked Dubis, "So all 
of a sudden you were shown what they want you to say, isn't that 
right?"  This question suggested a recent contrivance, improper 
influence or bias, and the trial judge permitted the 
Commonwealth to rehabilitate Dubis using his initial statement. 
 
The defendant argues that the rehabilitation was improper 
because Dubis had the same motive to fabricate (i.e., to 
18 
 
ingratiate himself with law enforcement) at the time he made his 
prior statement.  Although that may be true, defense counsel 
indicated a particular event influenced Dubis's testimony by 
alleging the Commonwealth showed Dubis "what they want[ed] [him] 
to say" in the week leading up to trial.  The Commonwealth was 
entitled to rebut that suggestion.  See Rivera, 430 Mass. at 
100; Zukoski, 370 Mass. at 27.  The pertinent question is thus 
whether Dubis's prior statement predates the specific event 
allegedly giving rise to the event that had an impact on Dubis's 
testimony at trial.  Mass. G. Evid. § 613 (b) (2). 
 
The record shows that Dubis's prior consistent statements 
predated the time at which the defendant implied the 
Commonwealth told Dubis what to say.  Dubis made his original 
statements to the police on June 29, 2000.  Dubis did not 
testify until July 31, 2003.  The prior consistent statements 
were admissible to corroborate Dubis's testimony, and the trial 
judge provided a limiting instruction during the final charge. 
 
2.  Propriety of substitute testimony for unavailable 
witness.  At trial, State Trooper Michael R. Arnold testified in 
place of Captain John Busa, who was unavailable due to illness, 
regarding ammunition seized at the defendant's home.  Busa had 
seized ammunition from the defendant's home and emptied the 
gunpowder into bags, which he delivered to a State police 
19 
 
chemist.  Busa also concluded that the ammunition was "reload"6 
ammunition.  Arnold was not present when police retrieved the 
ammunition or during Busa's examination, but Arnold had an 
opportunity to examine the evidence before testifying.  The 
defendant objected at trial to Arnold's substitution for Busa 
and argues on appeal that his inability to cross-examine Busa 
violated his confrontation rights.7  There was no reversible 
error. 
 
Criminal defendants in Massachusetts must have a 
"meaningful opportunity" to cross-examine an expert regarding 
his or her opinion.  Commonwealth v. Tassone, 468 Mass. 391, 399 
(2014).  An expert's opinion may be based on personal knowledge; 
"evidence already in the record [or which the parties represent] 
                                                          
 
6 "Reload" ammunition is ammunition that has been 
repackaged, usually by putting a new projectile, new gunpowder, 
and a new priming compound into a previously fired cartridge 
casing.  An individual can repackage the ammunition him or 
herself, or purchase reload ammunition from a manufacturer. 
 
7 For the first time on appeal, the defendant argues that 
the introduction of evidence collected from the crime scene by a 
private company also violated his confrontation rights.  
However, the introduction of physical items does not constitute 
hearsay, and therefore does not implicate the defendant's 
confrontation rights.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 
53 (2004).  Further, although there was no testimony to 
establish a full chain of custody, that goes to the weight of 
the evidence, not its admissibility.  Commonwealth v. Hogg, 365 
Mass. 290, 294-295 (1974).  The jury were aware of weaknesses in 
the chain of custody and the Commonwealth's expert did not rely 
on the company's evidence to conclude that the items from the 
crime scene were consistent with the items found in the 
defendant's home. 
20 
 
will be presented during the course of the proceedings, which 
facts may be assumed to be true in questions put to the 
witness"; and on "facts or data not in evidence if the facts or 
data are independently admissible and are a permissible basis 
for an expert to consider in formulating an opinion."  Mass. G. 
Evid. § 703 (2016).  See Commonwealth  v. Jones, 472 Mass. 707, 
713 (2015).  The prosecution may not elicit the facts underlying 
an expert's opinion on direct examination, if the opinion is 
based on information not admitted in evidence.  Tassone, 468 
Mass. at 399.  Because the defendant objected at trial to 
Arnold's testimony, we must be "satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt that [any] tainted evidence did not have an effect on the 
jury and did not contribute to the jury's verdicts."  
Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 701 (2010). 
 
Arnold's testimony that the ammunition was reload was 
admissible.  It was relevant to support the Commonwealth's 
theory that the defendant used gunpowder from ammunition to 
construct the pipe bomb.  Arnold permissibly based his opinion 
on his own observation of three boxes of ammunition.  Arnold 
concluded the ammunition was reload because otherwise identical 
projectiles had branding marks from different manufacturers, 
indicating that the ammunition had been repackaged.  The 
defendant had the opportunity to -- and did -- cross-examine the 
21 
 
witness regarding the formulation of his opinion.  Tassone, 468 
Mass. at 399.8 
 
3.  Expert testimony concerning electrical wire.  Based on 
items seized from the defendant's home, the Commonwealth sought 
the expertise of Dennis Toto.  Toto was a licensed electrician, 
an electrical consultant to the State fire marshal, and formerly 
the chief wire inspector in Revere.  He conferred with a State 
police chemist, who showed him wire with white insulation and a 
red stripe, retrieved from the crime scene, and asked for Toto's 
assistance to locate similar wire. 
 
At trial, Toto testified to three primary opinions on 
direct examination:  (1) the wire he examined from the crime 
scene was not fit for use in household wiring; (2) the wire 
recovered from the crime scene would not have come from a coffee 
maker that was destroyed in the explosion; and (3) he located 
wire that appeared to be "the exact same" or "extremely similar" 
                                                          
 
8 The remainder of Arnold's testimony, regarding chain of 
custody and the contents of Busa's report, was either cumulative 
or not material.  See Commonwealth v. Dagraca, 447 Mass. 546, 
552-553 (2006) (inadmissible evidence may not be prejudicial 
when cumulative of other evidence).  Arnold should not have been 
permitted to testify to Busa's report.  Mass. G. Evid. § 703.  
However, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, where 
the critical testimony was from the State police chemist, who 
stated that the gunpowder retrieved from the crime scene was 
consistent with gunpowder seized from the defendant's home.  Any 
weakness in the chain of custody speaks only to the weight of 
the evidence, not its admissibility.  See Hogg, 365 Mass. at 
294-295.  Defense counsel adequately exposed Arnold's lack of 
personal knowledge regarding chain of custody on cross-
examination. 
22 
 
at a small electronics store, which he subsequently sent to the 
chemist.9  The defendant now argues that Toto's underlying 
methodology was unreliable. 
 
"The trial judge has a significant function to carry out in 
deciding on the admissibility of a scientific expert's opinion."  
Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 25 (1994).  The expert 
must "have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of 
his discipline."  Id., citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).  If the trial judge determines 
that "the process or theory underlying a scientific expert's 
opinion lacks reliability, that opinion should not reach the 
trier of fact."  Id. at 26.  In Canavan's Case, 432 Mass. 304, 
313-314 (2000), an opinion published two days after the jury 
rendered their verdict in this case, we held that the same 
gatekeeping determination applies where an expert's testimony is 
based on clinical experience and personal observation, rather 
                                                          
 
9 The defendant also argues that Toto's opinion -- regarding 
the rarity of that type of white wire with a red stripe -- was 
unreliable, and should have been excluded.  This argument is 
misguided for two reasons.  First, defense counsel elicited 
Toto's opinion regarding the so-called "rarity" of the wire on 
cross-examination, in an effort to undermine the credibility of 
Toto's investigation.  See Commonwealth v. Perez, 405 Mass. 339, 
344 (1989) (defendant "cannot now complain of [the] prejudicial 
effect" of testimony elicited by defendant on cross-examination 
[citation omitted]).  Second, the defendant misconstrues the 
true nature of Toto's opinion.  Although not responsive to the 
question asked, Toto testified that the wire at issue was not 
widely available for purchase in electronics stores, not that 
the wire was rarely used in appliances. 
23 
 
than on scientific knowledge.  Cf. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 
526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (under Federal rules of evidence, 
Daubert analysis applies to expert testimony based on 
"technical" and "other specialized" knowledge). 
 
For the first time on appeal, the defendant argues that the 
methodology underlying Toto's opinions was unreliable.  In order 
to preserve an objection to an expert's methodology, a defendant 
must file a pretrial motion stating the grounds for its 
objection.  Commonwealth v. Sparks, 433 Mass. 654, 659-660 
(2001).  Because the defendant did not seek a Lanigan hearing, 
we have no record upon which to determine that the methodology 
did not satisfy the Daubert/Lanigan gatekeeper reliability 
requirements. 
 
Even if we were able to discern that Toto's methodology was 
not sufficiently reliable, his testimony created no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  First, Toto adequately 
explained physical differences between household and appliance 
wiring to the jury.  Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 
848 n.30 (2001) (role of expert to help jury determine facts).  
Second, the jury could have inferred that the defendant was the 
source of the wire used in the bomb, because the State police 
chemist testified that the wire from the crime scene was 
consistent with wire from the defendant's home.  Third, the jury 
learned from the chemist's direct testimony and extensive and 
24 
 
effective cross-examination that Toto's wire from the 
electronics store was not consistent with the wire used in the 
bomb. 
 
4.  Evidence derived from searches of defendant's computer.  
Detective Lieutenant John McLean of the Medford police 
department conducted two searches of the defendant's computer.  
As a result, the Commonwealth introduced two types of evidence, 
the admission of which the defendant argues constitutes 
reversible error:  (1) dates upon which certain files on the 
computer were last accessed; and (2) still images of files 
displayed on the computer monitor (screen shots).  No reversible 
error occurred. 
 
a.  Last access dates.  McLean testified to a number of 
dates on which files on the defendant's computer were accessed 
and on which electronic mail messages were transmitted.  In 
particular, the defendant objects to the introduction of the 
last access date of an astrology program on the defendant's 
computer.  When McLean launched the program, it contained the 
victim's horoscope information.  McLean testified that the 
information was last accessed on January 19, 2000 -- the day 
before the victim's death.  McLean did not enter the victim's 
name into the program, nor did his investigation alter the 
access date.  The Commonwealth invoked this access date in its 
25 
 
closing argument to suggest that the defendant was obsessed with 
the victim. 
 
The defendant argues the last access dates should not have 
been admitted in evidence because the Commonwealth did not 
establish the accuracy or reliability of the computer's time-
keeping function.  There was no error. 
 
Jurors may rely on their own common sense and life 
experience in their role as fact finders.  Even in the year 
2000, people commonly and reasonably relied on the accuracy of 
time-keeping mechanisms on computers, cellular telephones, and 
other electronic devices.  Evidence that a time stamp indicates 
a particular time is a sufficient basis for a jury to conclude 
that the relevant activity took place at that time, particularly 
when there is no evidence to the contrary in the record.10 
 
b.  Screen shots.  McLean testified regarding a number of 
screen shots taken from the defendant's computer.  The defendant 
objects to the admission of screen shots from the astrology 
program and the family tree program. 
 
When McLean opened the astrology program, the default 
screen showed the victim's name at the top.  McLean did not 
                                                          
 
10 The lack of a meaningful, limiting principle is another 
basis to reject the defendant's reasoning.  Must a Swiss 
watchmaker have to testify every time the owner of a Swiss watch 
relies on his watch to testify as to the time of day?  Must the 
city planner be called to verify a witness's reference to a 
street sign as a basis for testifying what street occupies a 
particular location?  To ask the question is to answer it. 
26 
 
enter the victim's name.  He explained that the default screen 
was determined by data and settings for the program contained in 
other files on the computer.  Without entering any other 
information, McLean scrolled down through the menu choices that 
the program displayed, which showed the victim's name, birth 
horoscope, birth date, time of birth, and birth location.  
McLean then chose "select" on the victim's name, causing the 
program to display additional information. 
 
McLean similarly explained that the family tree program 
referenced data contained in other files in the computer, 
including files labeled using the victim's last name.  When 
McLean opened the family tree program, it defaulted to the 
victim's information based on the computer's existing settings.  
The Commonwealth introduced several screen shots from the 
program that displayed only when McLean himself made certain 
selections within the program.  McLean could not determine 
whether the defendant had made the same selections. 
 
The defendant objects to the admission of the screen shots 
that only displayed following McLean's selections in each of the 
programs.  The defendant argues the screen shots were 
inadmissible because the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate (1) 
the reliability of the software; and (2) that the defendant used 
the software in the manner represented by the Commonwealth. 
27 
 
 
No reversible error occurred.  We reject the defendant's 
first argument and partially reject the second.  McLean's 
testimony sufficiently demonstrated how the software worked.  
However, all but one of the screen shots were inadmissible 
because the Commonwealth could not demonstrate that the 
defendant actually accessed the same information.  One screen 
shot -- the only one directly inculpating the defendant -- was 
properly admitted.  The remainder were either cumulative or 
innocuous and did not prejudice the defendant. 
 
The Commonwealth established the reliability of the 
programs.  See Commonwealth v. Torres, 453 Mass. 722, 723, 737 
(2009).  McLean carefully explained how each of the programs 
worked, as relevant to this case.  He stated how the programs 
incorporate settings and data stored in other files on the 
computer, and that the settings and data on the defendant's 
computer caused the programs to display the victim's information 
by default.  The defendant presented no evidence to the 
contrary, and the jury were entitled to credit McLean's 
explanation.  Commonwealth v. James, 424 Mass. 770, 785 (1997). 
 
The erroneously admitted screen shots did not prejudice the 
defendant.  In Commonwealth v. Williams, 456 Mass. 857, 868-869 
(2010), we found an electronic message inadmissible when the 
proponent provided no foundation identifying who sent the 
message, even though foundational testimony established that the 
28 
 
sender must have had access to a particular Web page.  
Similarly, McLean did not know whether the defendant had ever 
accessed the information depicted in the screen shots.  Without 
evidence that the defendant had accessed the screen shots, they 
had no tendency to affect the probability of any material fact.  
See Mass. G. Evid. § 401 (2016). 
 
However, most of the improperly admitted screen shots 
contained only general information regarding the victim and her 
family that was cumulative of much more compelling evidence from 
a multiplicity of sources that the defendant was obsessed with 
the victim.  Given the wealth of other admissible evidence on 
that point, the screen shots admitted in error were cumulative.  
See Commonwealth v. Esteves, 429 Mass. 636, 640 (1999) 
(inadmissible hearsay may not be prejudicial where cumulative); 
Commonwealth v. Davis, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 756, 765 (2002) (same). 
 
The only screen shot that was properly admitted depicted a 
mailing label from the family tree program.  The label contained 
the name "Sebastiano Passanisi" and a Malden address.  The 
victim's downstairs neighbor testified the mailing label on the 
package contained the name "Lois Passanisi" (Sebastiano's wife 
and the victim's sister) with a Malden address.  Lois Passanisi 
had not lived in Malden in the roughly thirty years prior to the 
victim's death.  Even when she did live in Malden, her last name 
was not Passanisi, and the home where she resided was not in her 
29 
 
name.  Nor had Sebastiano Passanisi lived in Malden at any point 
in the preceding thirty years.  The defendant also told Dubis 
that he had used the address of the victim's sister as the 
return address on the package.  Even though McLean could not 
testify that the defendant had seen the mailing label, the jury 
reasonably could have inferred that the source of the inaccurate 
information on the package containing the bomb was the family 
tree program on the defendant's computer.  Cf. Williams, 456 
Mass. at 868-869. 
 
5.  Use of victim's testimony from prior proceedings.  At 
trial, the Commonwealth introduced in evidence transcripts of 
the victim's testimony from earlier proceedings involving both 
the defendant and the victim.  One transcript came from a 
pretrial dangerousness hearing stemming from charges against the 
defendant for malicious destruction of property.  The other 
transcript contained the victim's testimony from a bail 
revocation hearing, following the defendant's violation of the 
victim's restraining order against him.11 
                                                          
 
11 For the first time on appeal, the defendant objects to 
the manner in which the transcript was presented to the jury. 
The victim's testimony was read aloud by an assistant district 
attorney (ADA), while another ADA read the questions on direct 
and defense counsel read the questions on cross-examination.  
The defendant argues that allowing an ADA to read the victim's 
answers risked confusing the jury as to the prosecutor's role in 
the case.  We disagree.  The ADA was not sworn as a witness, and 
the trial judge instructed the jury that the ADA was reading 
from a transcript containing the victim's testimony.  "We 
30 
 
 
In her testimony from each proceeding, the victim 
identified the defendant as an individual committing certain 
prior bad acts, which were admissible "to show motive . . . and 
to show the entire relationship between the defendant and the 
victim" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Drew, 397 Mass. 
65, 79-80 (1986).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b) (2016).  In her 
testimony from one transcript, the victim identified the 
defendant as the individual who, on two occasions, poured 
battery acid into the gasoline tank of her motor vehicle.  In 
the other transcript, she testified that the defendant drove by 
the restaurant where she worked, in violation of his restraining 
order. 
 
The defendant makes two arguments related to the admission 
of the transcripts.  First, the victim's testimony from the 
hearings was not admissible because it does not fall within the 
prior recorded testimony exception  to the rule against hearsay 
and its introduction violated his confrontation rights under the 
Sixth Amendment and art. 12.  The defendant did not object at 
trial to the transcripts based on the limits of the prior 
recorded testimony exception or constitutional grounds.  We 
review any error to determine whether it created a substantial 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
generally presume that a jury understand and follow limiting 
instructions . . . and that the application of such instructions 
ordinarily renders any potentially prejudice harmless" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 251 (2014). 
31 
 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Cintron, 438 Mass. 779, 783 n.2 (2003).  The admission of the 
victim's prior testimony under oath did not create such a 
likelihood. 
 
Second, the defendant argues that the trial judge 
improperly restricted his ability to impeach the victim's prior 
testimony using video recordings she had made of the defendant 
purportedly pouring battery acid into the gasoline tank of her 
vehicle.  At trial, the defendant objected to the denial of the 
requested use of the recordings.  There was no error. 
 
a.  Admissibility of victim's prior testimony.  "We need 
not decide the admissibility of [the victim's] testimony as 
prior recorded testimony under our common law rule.  If the 
standards of the confrontation clause are met in the admission 
of [the victim's] testimony, the interests of justice test 
applied under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is also met."  Commonwealth 
v. Trigones, 397 Mass. 633, 638 (1986).  Accordingly, we review 
the admission of the prior recorded testimony only to determine 
whether it offends the defendant's confrontation rights.  We 
conclude it does not. 
 
Admitting prior testimony does not violate the defendant's 
confrontation rights when the declarant is unavailable, as a 
matter of law, to testify and "the defendant has had an adequate 
prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant."  Commonwealth 
32 
 
v. Hurley, 455 Mass. 53, 60 (2009), citing Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57-59 (2004).  Under the Sixth 
Amendment and art. 12,12 five factors determine whether the 
defendant had a sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant at the prior proceeding:  (1) the declarant was under 
oath, (2) the defendant was represented by counsel, (3) the 
proceeding took place before a record-keeping tribunal, (4) the 
prior proceeding addressed substantially the same issues as the 
current proceeding, and (5)13 the defendant had reasonable 
opportunity and similar motivation on the prior occasion for 
cross-examination of the declarant.  Hurley, supra at 60.  The 
only dispute in this case is whether the prior proceedings were 
addressed to "substantially the same issues" for which the prior 
recorded testimony was admitted at trial, and whether the 
defendant had a similar motive to cross-examine the witness.  We 
answer both questions in the affirmative. 
                                                          
 
12 In Hurley, 455 Mass. at 59-60 & n.12, we dealt only with 
the Sixth Amendment, not art. 12.  However, "in cases like this 
one involving the hearsay rule and its exceptions, we have 
always held that the protection provided by art. 12 is 
coextensive with the Sixth Amendment."  Commonwealth v. 
Housewright, 470 Mass. 665, 670 n.7 (2015), quoting Commonwealth 
v. DeOliveira, 447 Mass. 56, 57 n.1 (2006).  On the facts of 
this case, we similarly decline to extend the protections of 
art. 12 beyond the Sixth Amendment's protections. 
 
13 In Hurley, 455 Mass. at 60, we treated the fourth and 
fifth factors as one factor.  Here, we acknowledge they are 
distinct requirements. 
33 
 
 
The prior proceeding need not be addressed to precisely the 
same issue and the defendant need not have had precisely the 
same motive for cross-examination.  See id. at 60.  The 
similarity must be sufficient to provide the "trier of fact 
. . . a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior 
statement."  Id. at 62-63.  The defendant's right to 
confrontation does not guarantee "cross-examination that is 
'effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense 
might wish.'"  Id. at 62, quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 
U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam).  Rather, the confrontation 
clause protects the defendant's right to test the evidence 
presented against him by the sovereign through the crucible of 
cross-examination. 
 
We previously have considered whether a defendant had a 
sufficiently similar motive on cross-examination in a prior 
proceeding for purposes of the confrontation clause, when the 
prior proceeding arose from the same underlying conduct.  For 
example, a declarant's prior testimony from a pretrial 
dangerousness hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A, may be 
sufficiently similar when introduced at a subsequent trial of 
criminal charges for the same conduct.  Hurley, 455 Mass. at 61-
62. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Canon, 373 Mass. 494, 500-501 (1977), 
cert. denied, 435 U.S. (1978), we affirmed the admission of 
34 
 
prior testimony from a civil contract dispute, in which the 
burden of proof requires only a finding by a preponderance of 
the evidence, in a subsequent criminal proceeding.14  During the 
contract dispute, one of the contracting parties defended an 
allegation of breach of contract by arguing that the contract 
was illegal and therefore unenforceable.  Id.  The plaintiff in 
the civil dispute -- a public official -- was subsequently 
prosecuted for violating a conflict of interest law by entering 
into the contract.  Id. at 495.  The legality of the agreement 
was at issue in both cases.  Id. at 500-501.  We concluded the 
issues and motivation on cross-examination were sufficiently 
similar for confrontation purposes, notwithstanding differences 
in the burdens of proof and the tactical direction of cross-
examination.  Id. 
 
In this case, the issues and the defendant's motive on 
cross-examination at the prior proceedings were sufficiently 
similar to satisfy the confrontation clause.  See Hurley, 455 
Mass. at 61-62; Canon, 373 Mass. at 500-501.  Although the 
victim's testimony at the prior proceedings dealt with different 
underlying conduct -- whether the defendant had damaged her 
                                                          
 
14 Although we decided Commonwealth v. Canon, 373 Mass. 494 
(1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. (1978), prior to Crawford, we 
nonetheless considered the similarity of the motive on cross-
examination to determine whether the prior testimony was 
sufficiently reliable, under the former rule of Ohio v. Roberts, 
448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980). 
35 
 
vehicle and not whether the defendant had murdered her -- her 
testimony was admitted at the current proceeding to establish 
only that the defendant had in fact damaged the victim's 
vehicle.  The prior testimony focused on her identification of, 
and her hostile relationship with, the defendant.  These issues 
had been subject to adequate cross-examination at the prior 
proceedings.  The defendant was permitted to introduce that 
cross-examination, in addition to other inconsistent statements, 
to undermine the victim's credibility, the reliability of her 
identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the prior 
bad acts, and the hostile nature of their relationship.  In many 
instances, the cross-examination of the victim in the prior 
proceedings closely resembled the defendant's cross-examination 
of other witnesses at trial who had personal knowledge of the 
defendant's relationship with the victim. 
 
The prior recorded testimony was admitted at trial only to 
prove the bad act, as relevant to the hostile relationship, 
rather than the conduct forming the basis of the murder charges.  
The issues at the prior proceedings and at the murder trial were 
therefore sufficiently similar to permit the jury to determine 
the credibility of the victim's testimony from those earlier 
proceedings, Hurley, 455 Mass. at 60, satisfying the 
confrontation clause and our review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 
36 
 
33E.15  See Canon, 373 Mass. at 500-501.  See also People v. 
Sierra, 482 Mich. 1107, 1109-1110 (2008) (Kelly, J., dissenting) 
(dissenting from denial of appeal, because lower court may have 
erred in finding that testimony from trial of different 
defendant on related drug charges did not satisfy similarity 
requirement); State vs. Stein, Court of Appeals of Wash., Nos. 
31980-2-II & 32982-4-II, slip op. at pars. 105-111 (August 7, 
2007, amended August 21, 2007) (affirming admission of prior 
testimony from real estate dispute in subsequent murder trial). 
 
b.  Restriction on use of video recordings to impeach 
victim's prior testimony.  At trial, the defendant moved to 
introduce two video recordings, created by the victim, that 
purportedly showed the defendant pouring battery acid into the 
gasoline tank of her vehicle.  Originally, the Commonwealth 
sought to introduce the recordings, but the defendant objected 
                                                          
 
15 When the Commonwealth offers an out-of-court statement in 
a criminal case, the evidentiary and potential confrontation 
clause issues can prove challenging.  The following conceptual 
approach may be helpful:  First, is the out-of-court statement 
being offered to establish the truth of the words contained in 
the statement?  In other words, is the out-of-court statement 
hearsay?  If the out-of-court statement is offered for any 
purpose other than its truth, then it is not hearsay and the 
confrontation clause is not implicated.  Second, if the evidence 
is hearsay, does the statement fall within an exception to the 
rule against hearsay?  Third, if the hearsay falls within an 
exception, is the hearsay "testimonial"?  Fourth, if the hearsay 
is testimonial, has the out-of-court declarant been previously 
subject to cross-examination and is the out-of-court declarant 
"unavailable" as a matter of law, such that the testimonial 
hearsay does not offend the confrontation clause? 
37 
 
on the grounds that they were "dark and murky" such that the 
"person's face is unable to be seen."  The trial judge excluded 
the recordings. 
 
Subsequently, the defense sought to admit the recordings 
for two purposes:  (1) to impeach the victim's prior recorded 
testimony in which she identified the defendant, and (2) to 
demonstrate in the defense's case that the defendant was not the 
individual captured in the recordings.  On appeal, the defendant 
argues only that the trial judge erred with respect to the first 
purpose.16  The trial judge did not err in denying the 
defendant's motion.   
 
A trial judge has discretion to determine the scope of 
cross-examination.  Mass. G. Evid. § 611(a), (b) (2016).  The 
trial judge permissibly determined that the recordings served 
little, if any, value to impeach the victim's identification of 
the defendant as the individual pouring battery acid into her 
vehicle's gasoline tank.  The victim's testimony was based on 
her own observations, which differed from what the recordings 
captured, as she did not remain at the same vantage point as the 
                                                          
 
16 Any error as to the second purpose did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  The defense 
would have used the recordings only in an effort to disprove a 
prior bad act, a collateral matter cumulative of other evidence 
showing a hostile relationship.  See Commonwealth v. Perez, 411 
Mass. 249, 260-261 (1991) (even if erroneously admitted, 
evidence that was merely cumulative was harmless beyond 
reasonable doubt). 
38 
 
video recorder.  See Commonwealth v. Pettijohn, 373 Mass. 26, 30 
(1977) (misidentification by one witness properly excluded as 
irrelevant for purposes of impeaching identification by another 
witness); Pettijohn v. Hall, 599 F.2d 476, 480 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 946 (1979) (same).  The trial judge reasonably 
determined that the defense should not be permitted to use the 
recordings solely for impeachment purposes. 
 
Conclusion.  We have reviewed the entire record on both the 
law and the facts pursuant to our obligation under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E.  We have determined that any errors identified above do 
not, individually or cumulatively, entitle the defendant to 
relief, as the interests of justice do not require the entry of 
a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt or a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.