Title: People v. Rogers
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S080840
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 25, 2013

SEE CONCURRING OPINION 
Filed 7/25/13 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
S080840 
 
v. 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
Los Angeles County 
GLEN ROGERS, 
 ) 
Super. Ct. No. BA109525 
 
 
 ) 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
 
A jury convicted defendant Glen Rogers of the first degree murder of 
Sandra Gallagher (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 and arson of property (§ 451, 
subd. (d)).  One special circumstance was found true; that defendant was 
previously convicted of first degree murder.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2) [prior-murder-
conviction special circumstance].)  Following a penalty trial, the jury returned a 
verdict of death.  The trial court denied the automatic motion to modify the 
penalty verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and imposed the death sentence for the murder 
and a determinate term of two years for the arson conviction.  This appeal is 
automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
 
2 
I.  FACTS 
Guilt Phase 
A.  Introduction 
On September 29, 1995, defendant Glen Rogers, a drifter from Ohio who 
had frequented McRed‟s bar in Van Nuys for several weeks, picked up Sandra 
Gallagher at the bar and strangled her to death several hours later, burning her 
body in the passenger compartment of her pickup truck.  Defendant fled from 
California to Mississippi,2 then to Bossier City, Louisiana, where, on November 2, 
1995, he picked up Andy Lou Sutton at the It‟ll Do Lounge.  Defendant spent the 
night with Sutton in her apartment and left the following day, telling her he had to 
go to Jackson, Mississippi, to retrieve a truck, but would return.  Instead, 
defendant traveled to Tampa, Florida, where, on November 5, he picked up Tina 
Cribbs at the Showtown bar in Gibsonton, on the outskirts of Tampa.  Defendant 
took Cribbs to his Tampa motel room where he stabbed her to death that same day.  
The following day defendant, driving Cribbs‟s car, returned to Sutton‟s apartment 
in Bossier City, Louisiana.  The next night, on or about November 7, defendant 
stabbed Sutton to death in the bedroom of her apartment. 
                                              
2  
On October 9, 1995, defendant met Linda Price in Jackson, Mississippi, 
and murdered her three weeks later, on October 31.  The prosecution sought to 
admit evidence of three out-of-state murders committed by defendant in the six-
week period following Gallagher‟s murder in Van Nuys—the murder of Price in 
Jackson, Mississippi, on October 31, 1995; the murder of Tina Cribbs in Tampa, 
Florida, on or about November 5, 1995; and the murder of Andy Lou Sutton in 
Bossier City, Louisiana, on November 8, 1995—to establish that Gallagher‟s 
murder was pursuant to a common design or plan and premeditated.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 1101, subd. (b).)  The trial court ruled evidence of the Cribbs and Sutton 
murders admissible on that basis, but excluded evidence of the Price murder from 
the guilt phase.  Evidence of that murder was, however, admitted as part of the 
prosecution‟s case in aggravation at the penalty phase.  Accordingly, the facts 
surrounding the Price murder are only relevant to the penalty phase and will be 
considered below along with the other penalty phase evidence. 
 
 
3 
Defendant fled in Cribbs‟s car from Louisiana through Tennessee to 
Kentucky, where he was ultimately apprehended by Kentucky state police after a 
high-speed pursuit through several towns. 
B.  Prosecution Evidence. 
1.  Defendant murders Sandra Gallagher in Van Nuys. 
On September 28, 1995, Sandra Gallagher, age 33, had lunch with her 
husband Stephen at a restaurant in West Los Angeles.  Gallagher was happy, as 
she had won approximately $1,200 in the state lottery.  She showed her husband 
the lottery ticket claim form, indicating she was going to the lottery office to 
submit the form.  Gallagher was driving a black and silver Ford F-150 pickup 
truck with Colorado license plates she had obtained from her recently deceased 
father, who lived in Colorado.  Her husband testified she was wearing a pair of 
distinctive earrings she had purchased from a Ross department store.  An 
employee at the California State Lottery office in Van Nuys testified Gallagher 
came into the office that afternoon to claim her $1,279 in prize winnings. 
In September 1995, Mamdouh Saliman owned McRed‟s bar on Victory 
Boulevard in Van Nuys.  McRed‟s was a full service bar that served all varieties of 
drinks.  Saliman also owned CJ‟s, another bar on Victory Boulevard, one block 
west of McRed‟s, that only served beer and wine.  Saliman went to McRed‟s on 
the afternoon of September 28.  When he parked his car, he noticed a truck with 
Colorado license plates in the parking lot.  Around 3:00 or 4:00 p.m., Gallagher 
walked into McRed‟s and said hello to Saliman, asking, “Don‟t you remember 
me?”  Saliman, who remembered Gallagher because she had previously been a 
host at one of his other bars, replied, “I remember your face, but I don‟t recall your 
name.”  Gallagher told Saliman her nickname, “Sam,” and he gave her a hug.  
Gallagher told Saliman she had won a lottery prize.  When he asked where she had 
 
 
4 
been, she replied that she had moved to Colorado after she left her employment 
with him. 
Rein Keener worked as a bartender at McRed‟s in September 1995.  Keener 
arrived at work at between 5:30 and 6:00 p.m. on September 28 and noticed a 
truck with Colorado license plates parked in the lot.  Upon entering the bar, 
Keener saw Gallagher standing with Saliman, who called her over and introduced 
her to Gallagher.  Saliman told Keener that Gallagher used to live in the 
neighborhood and that she was a “really nice gal.”  He asked Keener to look after 
Gallagher and “steer [her] away from the loser leeches” at the bar.  After Saliman 
left the bar, Keener ate dinner and Gallagher played pool.  At one point the two 
began conversing and Gallagher told Keener her father had passed away and that 
she had just gotten back from Colorado.  Gallagher also told Keener she had just 
won the lottery and was planning to go to Sacramento the following day to see her 
three sons. 
At approximately 7:00 p.m. that evening, defendant arrived at McRed‟s.  
He had recently become a frequent customer of the bar, showing up two or three 
times a week during the latter part of September 1995.  The first time defendant 
patronized McRed‟s, he approached Keener and asked for her phone number.  
Keener told defendant she did not go out with men she did not know.  Defendant 
showed up at McRed‟s during each of Keener‟s shifts for the next three weeks, 
repeatedly asking for her phone number.  During one conversation with defendant, 
Keener told him she was in law school and wanted to be a prosecutor.  Defendant 
responded that he thought women made “lousy prosecutors.”  He produced a 
laminated badge and claimed he worked for the government and traveled from 
state to state “looking for people.”  Keener did not believe defendant and felt he 
was just trying to impress her.  Defendant began buying roses for Keener from a 
flower lady who frequented the bar.  He also tried to impress her by pulling out 
 
 
5 
what appeared to be “wads of hundred dollar bills” and buying drinks for everyone 
in the bar. 
When defendant entered McRed‟s on the evening in question he was 
wearing cowboy boots, blue jeans, and a brown leather belt with “a fancy cowboy-
style buckle.”  His bleached-blond hair was long and feathered, and he had a 
neatly trimmed beard and moustache.  He approached Gallagher, who “brushed 
him off” and continued to play pool.  Defendant then left the bar.  Gallagher‟s 
husband testified she called him at around 8:00 or 8:30 p.m. to tell him she was at 
McRed‟s and was thinking of staying and singing with the band. 
On September 28, 1995, Cristina Walker and her boyfriend, Michael Flynn, 
were staying at defendant‟s apartment at 6645 Woodman Avenue.  Walker and 
Flynn had moved into defendant‟s apartment a few days earlier after he had 
offered to rent them his spare bedroom.  September 28 was Flynn‟s birthday, and 
he, Walker and defendant had made plans to meet that evening to celebrate.  
Walker and Flynn drove to CJ‟s bar and subsequently met defendant in front of the 
bar.  Walker was driving her car and had her two dogs with her.  Defendant, 
Walker and Flynn stayed at CJ‟s for approximately one and one-half to two hours.  
While there, Walker had two beers and defendant and Flynn each had 
approximately four beers.  When Walker indicated she liked “mixed drinks,” 
defendant told her he knew a bar up the street that served cocktails.  Walker told 
defendant she was not yet 21 years of age.  Defendant told her not to worry, 
stating he would tell the bartender (Keener), whom he knew “real well,” that she 
was his sister.  Defendant told Walker he had spent prior weekends with Keener 
and was planning on spending the upcoming weekend with her.  Walker drove the 
short distance to McRed‟s, where the three arrived at approximately 8:00 to 8:30 
p.m.  When they arrived the bar was crowded.  When Keener saw defendant arrive 
 
 
6 
she gave him an “irritated look.”  Defendant told Keener that Walker was his sister 
and the three ordered drinks. 
At some point in the evening defendant asked Keener for a ride home, 
stating that because he worked for the government he “couldn‟t get caught with a 
DUI.”  Keener declined.  Shortly afterwards, defendant approached her again, 
“pinned” her up against the door to the storage room, and put his arm around her 
back, “trying to be kissy and huggy.”  Defendant told Keener, “I always get what I 
want.”  Keener ducked out of defendant‟s reach and went back to work. 
Later in the evening defendant pointed to Gallagher, commenting to Walker 
and Flynn that he thought she was “cool” and “pretty.”  Defendant announced that 
he was going to buy Gallagher a drink and approached her table.  Walker saw 
Gallagher look up at defendant with a “big smile” on her face.  Gallagher then 
turned toward Walker and Flynn and invited them to join her and defendant at her 
table in front of the band.  Gallagher introduced herself and defendant began 
ordering drinks for everyone at the table.  Thereafter, Gallagher joined the group 
“off and on,” playing pool and then returning to the table whenever defendant 
ordered more drinks. 
Sometime between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m., Gallagher sat down with 
defendant, Walker, and Flynn, and remained with the group for the rest of the 
evening.  Defendant had had approximately six to eight beers; Flynn 
approximately three to four beers.  Walker was served approximately three to four 
mixed drinks, and Gallagher was drinking vodka and grapefruit juice.  Keener 
testified that after three rounds, she began diluting Gallagher‟s drinks because she 
was watching out for her.  Between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., Keener “cut [Gallagher] 
off.”  Defendant and Gallagher were observed talking, dancing together, and 
“being playful.”  Keener testified that defendant tried to pull Gallagher onto his 
lap and tried to kiss the back of her neck, with Gallagher “playfully” resisting.  
 
 
7 
Keener later saw Gallagher kiss defendant on the cheek and sit on his lap.  Keener 
put Gallagher‟s large black purse behind the bar for safekeeping. 
Towards the end of the evening, Gallagher and Walker went to the ladies 
room where Gallagher told Walker, “I really like your brother,” indicating 
defendant had asked her to go home with them.  She asked Walker if that would 
be all right; Walker said it would be okay.  At approximately 1:20 a.m., defendant, 
Gallagher, Walker, and Flynn left McRed‟s.  Their plan was to return to CJ‟s, then 
go to the 7-Eleven to buy some beer, and then go to defendant‟s apartment. 
Defendant and Gallagher left together in Gallagher‟s truck; Walker and 
Flynn drove in Walker‟s car.  They went to CJ‟s, stayed a short while, then went 
to the 7-Eleven store.  Walker pulled alongside Gallagher‟s truck while defendant 
and Flynn went inside and returned with cigarettes and beer.  Walker and Flynn 
then drove back to defendant‟s apartment in Walker‟s car; Gallagher followed 
with defendant in her truck.  Upon arriving, Walker was unable to find a parking 
space and double-parked on Woodman Avenue.  Walker was not feeling well; 
Flynn told her he would park her car and clean it out because the dogs had made a 
mess, and meet her up at defendant‟s apartment. 
Defendant and Gallagher, who were also double-parked on Woodman 
Avenue, stayed inside Gallagher‟s truck while Flynn, who saw an empty parking 
space across the street, attempted to make a U-turn to park Walker‟s car.  At that 
point, approximately 2:00 a.m., Los Angeles Police Department Officer David 
Hovey saw Flynn make an illegal U-turn and detained him.  The officer testified 
Flynn was “extremely drunk.”  He was arrested for driving under the influence and 
placed in the back of the patrol car.  Flynn testified that as the police car drove off 
with him, he looked back towards Gallagher‟s truck and saw silhouettes that 
looked like defendant and Gallagher were arguing or fighting, with one of them 
holding their arms high over the other‟s head or neck.  Flynn testified he told the 
 
 
8 
arresting officer that “something weird” was going on and pointed at Gallagher‟s 
truck.  Officer Hovey did not recall Flynn trying to draw his attention to anything 
as they pulled away. 
Sometime during the night, Walker awoke in her room inside defendant‟s 
apartment.  She saw defendant lying on the carpet next to her, with no shirt on and 
his pants unbuttoned.  Defendant was awake and staring at Walker.  She asked 
defendant, “What the hell are you doing?”  Defendant replied, “Where is your 
boyfriend?”  Walker jumped up and said, “What do you mean, where is my 
boyfriend?  What time is it?”  Defendant told Walker it was 5:00 a.m.  Walker ran 
to the window and looked for her car, which had been impounded upon Flynn‟s 
arrest. 
Walker asked defendant what he was doing in her room.  Defendant told 
her he went into her room to “check” on her, and asked again, “Where is your 
boyfriend?”  Walker, believing Flynn had taken her car, began to shout 
profanities.  Defendant responded, “Oh, don‟t worry, honey, he went to jail.”  
Walker asked defendant what he was talking about and began to cry.  Defendant 
told her Flynn was “a real idiot” and had made an illegal U-turn in front of a cop.  
He related that Flynn had been handcuffed and arrested, and her car impounded.  
Walker then asked defendant, “Where is that girl?,” meaning Gallagher.  
Defendant had a “blank look on his face,” and responded, “I got bigger problems 
than you, honey, I got bigger problems.”  When Walker asked what he meant, 
defendant repeated two or three more times, “I got bigger problems,” and stated, “I 
am just going to have to call some people in, I am going to have to do it.”  Walker 
again asked, “What do you mean?  Where is Sam?  Where is that girl at?”  
Defendant looked at Walker and stated, “She‟s dead.” 
Walker stopped crying because defendant “had this look in his eye.”  
Walker asked defendant, “What did she [Gallagher] do to you, what is going on?,” 
 
 
9 
trying to make it seem like she was “on [defendant‟s] side.”  Defendant just stared 
back at her.  Walker tried to act normally by changing the subject and stating she 
was unsure how to get Flynn out of jail.  Defendant put his arm around her and 
leaned forward to kiss her.  Walker told defendant “no,” saying she loved Flynn.  
Defendant apologized and told Walker that he loved her like a “sister.”  Defendant 
then stated he was going to try to get Flynn out of jail, and left the room. 
Walker dozed off to sleep; when she awoke it was light outside.  She 
dressed “as fast as [she] could,” put leashes on her dogs, and opened the door into 
the living room where defendant was lying on the living room floor in his 
underwear, appearing to be “out cold.”  Walker saw Gallagher‟s purse, a 
distinctive yellow pack of cigarettes she had been smoking, and her Ford truck 
keys on the kitchen bar or counter.  Walker took her dogs, left the apartment at 
approximately 8:00 a.m., ran to the 7-Eleven store and called her grandmother‟s 
house.  Her mother‟s boyfriend, Stewart, came to the phone and Walker told him 
to come get her right away.  He arrived within 15 minutes and Walker got into his 
truck with her dogs.  She asked him to help get her “stuff” out of defendant‟s 
apartment, explaining that Flynn was in jail and that, “I think this guy I am staying 
with, he killed this girl last night.” 
Walker and Stewart went back to defendant‟s apartment.  Stewart waited in 
the hallway while she entered the apartment.  Defendant was still sleeping on the 
floor.  Walker stated, “Glen, Glen, wake up,” and touched his shoulder.  
Defendant “came to his feet quickly,” seemed embarrassed his pants were off, and 
put his blue jeans on.  Walker told him her grandmother was sick in the hospital 
and that she needed to go home immediately to babysit her sisters.  She told 
defendant that her mother‟s boyfriend was outside and that she needed to get her 
stuff out of the apartment.  Defendant told Walker she did not need to leave, as he 
 
 
10 
was going to Las Vegas and she could have the apartment to herself.  She declined 
the invitation. 
Stewart assisted Walker in collecting most of Flynn‟s and her belongings 
from the apartment and loading them into his truck.  Because the truck was full 
and Walker wanted to remove all of Flynn‟s and her belongings from the 
apartment as soon as possible, she went down the street to the residence of her 
friend, Cindy Keller, who also had a truck.  Walker explained the situation to 
Keller and asked her to help her move the rest of her things out of defendant‟s 
apartment right away.  Walker and Keller went back to defendant‟s apartment and 
got the remainder of Walker‟s belongings as defendant stood in the hallway near 
the door watching them.  At one point, when Keller was in the hallway and 
defendant was in the kitchen, Walker asked defendant, “What happened to that girl 
last night?”  Defendant told Walker, “You know what, she ran off with some 
Mexican last night . . . some Mexican walked up and she walked away with him.” 
Defendant then began going through Gallagher‟s large black purse, 
removing numerous items and nonchalantly tossing them over his shoulders with 
both hands, which conduct made Walker even more nervous.  Walker observed 
defendant remove a wallet and checkbook from the purse.  Defendant left the 
room briefly; during that time Walker looked inside Gallagher‟s purse and also 
noticed Gallagher‟s earring on the floor. 
On September 29, 1995, at approximately 6:30 a.m., Hoora Kushan, a nurse 
at the Laurel Wood Convalescent Hospital located at 13000 Victory Boulevard, 
arrived at work and drove into the hospital‟s rear parking lot.  She observed a 
pickup truck parked near some trash cans in an area of the lot where no other cars 
were parked.  The driver‟s side door was partially open, and she could see the arm, 
elbow, and part of a leg of a man who was leaning into the truck towards the 
passenger side, as if he was reaching for something from the dashboard.  He had 
 
 
11 
shoulder-length “blondish” hair and was wearing blue jeans and a shirt with 
rolled-up or short sleeves.  Kushan testified the man‟s hair resembled defendant‟s 
hair.  Kushan parked, got out of her car, and again looked toward the pickup truck 
and saw the same man with long blond hair leaning towards the passenger side, 
but slumped over.  As she looked more closely, Kushan saw smoke coming from 
the dashboard on the passenger side.  She observed that the pickup had Colorado 
license plates. 
Kushan went inside the hospital and asked the nurses if they knew who 
owned the truck.  One of the nurses suggested they go back outside and get the 
license plate number so they could announce it on the hospital‟s public address 
system.  When Kushan went back outside, she saw flames coming from the hood 
of the pickup.  Another hospital employee tried to put out the fire using a fire 
extinguisher.  Kushan ran back inside the hospital and asked someone to call 911. 
At approximately 6:40 a.m., fire department personnel arrived and 
extinguished the fire.  Los Angeles Fire Department arson investigator Tim 
Hamson arrived at the scene of the fire at approximately 7:20 a.m.  Hamson was 
informed by firefighters at that time that there was a body in the cab of the pickup, 
which he confirmed.  Hamson noted the truck was a 1977 Ford half-ton extended 
cab pickup with Colorado license plates. 
Hamson smelled gasoline in the passenger compartment of the pickup.  The 
lower extremities of the female body inside the truck were charred to the bones, 
but the floor carpet underneath the body was mainly intact, indicating gasoline had 
been poured over the body and surrounding areas of the passenger compartment 
and ignited.  In Hamson‟s opinion, the fire had been intentionally set to conceal a 
homicide.  About 7:10 a.m., Los Angeles Police Department Detective Michael 
Coblentz arrived at the scene.  A purse containing documents and photographs, as 
well as a marriage certificate, was found inside a locked metal compartment in the 
 
 
12 
bed of the pickup.  Detective Coblentz discovered that the victim in the truck was 
Sandra Gallagher. 
On October 1, 1995, Dr. Frisby, a forensic pathologist with the Los Angeles 
County Coroner‟s Office, performed an autopsy on Gallagher‟s body.  Dr. Frisby 
was supervised by Dr. James Ribe.  Dr. Ribe performed most of the dissection of 
the neck and Dr. Frisby dissected most of the other parts of the body.  Dr. Frisby 
prepared the autopsy report and Dr. Ribe reviewed the report.  Gallagher‟s back 
was “severely charred” down to the muscle.  The front portion of her body was 
“less charred.”  Gallagher‟s right lower leg was severely burned, down to the 
muscle and bone. 
Drs. Frisby and Ribe concluded Gallagher died from asphyxia due to 
manual strangulation.  This conclusion was based on the presence of red bruising 
or bleeding on the right and left sternohyoid muscles, a hemorrhage on the right-
hand side of the lower part of the voice box and on the left side of the voice box, 
bruising to the thyroid gland, broken cartilage on the left side of the throat, and 
multiple hemorrhages inside Gallagher‟s tongue.  Drs. Frisby and Ribe also 
concluded that Gallagher was already dead at the time her body was burned, as 
determined from the lack of carbon monoxide in her bloodstream and the absence 
of black material in her windpipe.  The absence of any petechiae (blood spots) in 
Gallagher‟s eyes suggested there was no shifting or loosening of the position of 
the hand at the time of the strangulation.  Dr. Ribe opined it would have taken at 
least one minute of “continuous compression” for the victim to die of 
strangulation, and that the victim would likely lose consciousness within six to 10 
seconds of complete neck compression.  Gallagher‟s killer would therefore have 
needed to continue to strangle her after he saw her lose consciousness in order to 
ensure her death.  Gallagher was found to have .10 percent by volume of alcohol 
in her bloodstream. 
 
 
13 
On October 5, 1995, at 10:30 a.m., Detective Coblentz served a search 
warrant at defendant‟s apartment on Woodman Avenue.  Nobody was inside the 
apartment, which had little furniture.  A yellow metal hoop earring belonging to 
Gallagher was recovered from the kitchen floor.  The earring was identified by 
Gallagher‟s husband as one of a set she had purchased at a Ross department store 
and which she was wearing when they had met for lunch the day before her 
murder.  A yellow pack of cigarettes was also found on the kitchen counter.  Both 
Walker and Flynn testified the pack of cigarettes looked like the type Gallagher 
had been smoking when they were together with her and defendant on the night of 
her murder. 
2.  Defendant travels to Louisiana and meets Andy Lou Sutton. 
In early November 1995, Andy Lou Sutton was living in a one-bedroom 
apartment with her roommate, Theresa Whiteside, at the Port Au Prince apartment 
complex in Bossier City, Louisiana.  Whiteside testified Sutton was a “very 
beautiful girl” who had red hair and an “outgoing personality.” 
On November 2, 1995, Whiteside and Sutton went to the It‟ll Do Lounge in 
Bossier City.  While they were sitting at the bar defendant walked in.  He was 
dressed in blue jeans, a striped dress shirt, and had long blond hair.  Sutton 
commented to Whiteside, “I like that.”  Whiteside then left to go to Mr. Bill‟s 
Lounge, where she worked as a bartender.  Later that evening, Sutton called 
Whiteside and told her she would have “someone staying over that night,” and that 
Whiteside‟s pillow and blanket would be on the couch.  Whiteside returned to 
their apartment at approximately 3:00 a.m. on November 3, 1995.  At that time, 
Sutton introduced defendant to Whiteside. 
At approximately 10:00 a.m., Whiteside, Sutton and defendant woke up, 
“sat around,” and talked.  Defendant told Whiteside and Sutton he was a truck 
 
 
14 
driver and drove “18 wheelers.”  Later that day, Sutton told Whiteside that 
defendant had to go to Jackson, Mississippi, to retrieve his “18 wheeler,” and 
asked if the red pickup defendant was driving would be all right if left in the 
apartment complex parking lot.  Whiteside told Sutton “yes.”  Sutton had no car; 
she and Whiteside subsequently drove defendant in Whiteside‟s car to the 
Greyhound bus terminal in Shreveport, Louisiana.  Defendant told them he would 
return in several days and gave Sutton a kiss upon exiting Whiteside‟s car.  Sutton 
gave defendant her telephone number and defendant asked Whiteside to “take 
care” of Sutton. 
3.  Defendant travels to Florida and murders Tina Cribbs. 
On the afternoon of November 4, 1995, defendant arrived by taxi and 
checked into the Tampa 8 Inn on East Columbus Drive in Tampa, Florida.  He 
rented a room for two days, indicating his name was Glen Rogers and giving a 
home address in Jackson, Mississippi.  The clerk on duty testified defendant had 
long blond hair and “gorgeous blue eyes.”  Defendant claimed his truck had 
broken down and stated he was very tired and would “probably sleep the first 
day.” 
On the morning of November 5, taxi driver Donald Daughtry picked up 
defendant from the motel and drove him to the Showtown bar in Gibsonton, 
Florida, a small town on the outskirts of Tampa where a community of carnival 
workers spent their winter break.  Defendant asked Daughtry to let him off a short 
distance away from the bar.  Defendant entered the bar a little before 1:00 p.m.  At 
that time Lynn Jones was working as the bartender.  She testified defendant 
appeared tall and “good looking,” with long blond hair and “beautiful blue eyes.”  
When Jones asked defendant in local parlance if he was “with it,” meaning with 
the carnival, defendant did not understand her question.  When she explained what 
 
 
15 
she meant, he told Jones he “drove trucks for the carnival,” and began acting 
“flirtatious” with her.  Defendant stayed at the bar nearly five hours.  
Late in the afternoon, Tina Cribbs and three female friends entered the bar.  
Cribbs was 34 years old, had “reddish” hair, and was driving a white Ford Festiva 
her mother had purchased for her earlier that year.  Cribbs and her friends sat at a 
table together.  Defendant sent over a round of drinks to the women.  Although 
defendant had told bartender Jones his name was Glen, she overheard him tell the 
women that his name was “Randy.”  At one point defendant approached one of 
Cribbs‟s friends, Jeanie Fuller, and asked if she was married or single.  When 
Fuller replied that she had a boyfriend, defendant stated he did not date married 
women or girls with boyfriends.  Cribbs‟s three friends left the Showtown bar late 
in the afternoon; Cribbs remained at the bar with defendant where they talked for 
another hour.  Cribbs was expecting her mother to meet her at the bar that evening.  
At approximately 6:30 p.m., Cribbs told Jones she was going to give defendant a 
ride and asked Jones to tell her mother she would return in 20 minutes.  Cribbs and 
defendant were then seen leaving the bar together. 
Cribbs‟s mother, Mary Dicke, arrived at the bar approximately 20 to 30 
minutes after Cribbs had left.  Jones told Dicke that her daughter had given 
someone a ride and would “be right back.”  Dicke waited another 30 to 45 
minutes, then began calling Cribbs‟s pager at between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m.  Dicke 
received no response and became worried.  Dicke and Cribbs had a system 
whereby if there was an emergency she would input the number 69.  Over the 
course of the evening, Dicke paged Cribbs with their emergency code over 30 
times, getting no response.  Dicke eventually returned home and called the police 
because she instinctively knew her daughter was “in trouble.” 
At approximately 9:00 p.m. that same evening, Chenden Patel, the owner of 
the Tampa 8 Inn, noticed defendant leaning into a small white car in front of his 
 
 
16 
room.  Patel walked past the room and saw defendant standing at the door with 
two suitcases.  A short while later, defendant came into the office and paid Patel 
for two additional days, extending his rent to Tuesday morning, November 7.  He 
asked Patel for a “Do Not Disturb” sign; she told him she did not have one.  
Defendant then told Patel he did not want any maid service or anyone going into 
his room.  The next morning, Monday, November 6, at approximately 9:00 a.m., 
Patel observed defendant drive away in the white car.  Later that morning she 
noticed a handwritten note on the door of his room that read, “Do Not Disturb.” 
Later that same morning, Monday, November 6, Cribbs‟s purse was found 
by an attendant on top of a trash can at a rest stop on Interstate 10, just east of 
Tallahassee.  At that time, unsuccessful attempts were made to call the telephone 
number listed on the identification in the purse. 
On Tuesday, November 7, at approximately 10:00 a.m., a housekeeper 
found Cribbs‟s body in the bathtub of the motel room defendant had rented.  
Responding Tampa police officers found the handwritten “Do Not Disturb” sign 
still on the front door.  The bed was unmade and the television was on.  Blood-
soaked shoes, pants, and towels were piled on the bathroom floor next to the toilet.  
The officers observed blood smeared on a counter and floor of the foyer, as well as 
on the bathroom shower stall.  Blood had also dripped down from the sink counter 
and bathtub and toilet fixtures.  Cribbs‟s body was found face-up in the bathtub 
with articles of clothing in between her legs.  Several cigarette butts and a small 
gold bracelet were found in the sink drain. 
Tampa Police Homicide Detective Julie Massuchi examined Cribbs‟s body 
and noted numerous stab wounds, including a “very significant stab wound to the 
right buttocks area,” a “large stab wound under the left breast,” and smaller nicks 
on the chest area.  There was also a long “defensive” scratch wound on the wrist 
area, as well as numerous bruises to the arms and back.  A pair of black jeans and 
 
 
17 
a shirt with tears in them were found in the pile of blood-soaked clothing on the 
bathroom floor.  The stab wounds on the body corresponded to the tears in the 
jeans and shirt.  Based on this finding, Detective Massuchi believed the victim was 
clothed at the time she was stabbed to death.  It appeared the homicide happened 
“some time” prior to the discovery of the body, as the body showed lividity, 
indicating it had been in the bathtub for some time. 
On that same day, Cribbs‟s mother Mary Dicke was watching the news on 
television and learned that a “Jane Doe” had been found murdered in a motel.  
Dicke knew from the description of the victim that it was her daughter, and 
notified the police.  Ernest Bruton, who had possession of Cribbs‟s purse found at 
the freeway rest stop, was also alerted to the newscast of the homicide and turned 
the purse over to authorities. 
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of the first degree murder 
of Tina Cribbs in Florida on May 7, 1997. 
4.  Defendant returns to Louisiana and murders Andy Lou Sutton. 
On Wednesday morning, November 8, 1995, Theresa Whiteside woke up 
and Andy Sutton told her defendant had returned to Bossier City and was outside 
in the parking lot cleaning up a car he had purchased for her.  A neighbor, Sterling 
Fontenont, testified he saw defendant walking back and forth between a white 
Ford Festiva and a red truck that morning.  Defendant entered the women‟s 
apartment and, when Whiteside asked what kind of car he had purchased for 
Sutton, he replied “some kind of Ford,” “some ‟90 model,” stating he had paid a 
friend $8,400 for it.  Whiteside made arrangements to meet defendant and Sutton 
later that day at the It‟ll Do Lounge, and left the apartment. 
At approximately 3:00 p.m., the three met up at the It‟ll Do Lounge.  When 
Whiteside arrived, she saw defendant‟s red truck outside the bar.  Defendant 
 
 
18 
approached Whiteside, put his arm around her, and told the bartender to get her 
“whatever [she] wanted.”  Whiteside, who felt uncomfortable with defendant‟s 
arm around her, extricated herself and sat down with Sutton, while defendant 
remained at the end of the bar.  Whiteside told Sutton she did not want defendant 
staying at the apartment anymore and that he “needed to go.”  Sutton responded 
she would “take care of that.”  The three then decided to go to the Touch of Class 
bar. 
Defendant and Sutton stopped for cigarettes and then met Whiteside at the 
second bar at approximately 4:00 p.m.  They ordered beers.  Defendant began 
playing with the back of Whiteside‟s hair.  Whiteside motioned that she did not 
want defendant to touch her, and told him, “If you can‟t hang, you don‟t need to 
be hanging around us,” by which she meant he should leave if he could not handle 
his alcohol.  By then, defendant appeared drunk.  Sutton asked if she could take 
defendant back to the apartment and let him “sleep it off.”  Whiteside told Sutton 
that would be okay, indicating she would call Sutton later.  At approximately 4:30 
p.m., defendant and Sutton left the bar together and Whiteside went to work. 
Between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. that night, neighbor Sterling Fontenont 
arrived at the apartment complex and observed defendant and Sutton park their 
vehicle in the lot, get out of the car, and walk together towards Sutton‟s apartment. 
Despite defendant‟s earlier representation that he and Sutton would meet 
Whiteside at the bar where she worked later that night, they never showed up.  At 
approximately 11:00 p.m., Whiteside called Sutton, but the phone rang 
unanswered 10 to 12 times and the answering machine did not pick up the call.  
Whiteside arrived home at between 3:00 and 3:30 a.m. on Thursday morning and 
noticed defendant‟s red truck still parked in the lot.  She had to unlock the 
deadbolt to gain entry into her apartment; Sutton was not in the habit of using the 
deadbolt.  As Whiteside entered the apartment, she heard another door shut.  The 
 
 
19 
lights were on in all the rooms, but it appeared to Whiteside that no one was in the 
apartment.  Whiteside hollered for Sutton, who did not answer.  The bedroom door 
was shut, but the blanket and pillow had not been left out on the couch for 
Whiteside.  She turned on the television, lay down on the couch in the living room 
and fell asleep. 
Around 8:00 or 9:00 a.m., Whiteside awoke because the television volume 
had been turned up to “maximum capacity.”  She grabbed the remote control from 
the coffee table, turned off the television, and fell back to sleep.  At approximately 
10:00 a.m. she heard a knock on the door, got up, and let Sutton‟s ex-boyfriend, 
Thomas Bryant, into the apartment.  Bryant related that he had repeatedly 
attempted to call the apartment, only to receive a recording that the phone was out 
of service.  Whiteside went to the bedroom, knocked on the door, and receiving no 
answer, entered the room. 
Sutton‟s bedding was “all wrapped up tightly like a present.”  Whiteside 
called out “Andy,” then pulled off the bedding and found a body with a pillow 
over the head and so much blood around the chest area that Whiteside was unable 
to tell if it was a man or a woman.  She pulled the pillow off the head and saw “the 
most horrible agonizing facial features that she had ever seen.”  Sutton‟s arm was 
back behind her head and there were cut marks on her right wrist.  Bryant entered 
the bedroom and attempted to turn on the light, but found it inoperable.  The 
telephone was on the floor with the receiver uncradled.  When Whiteside tried to 
call 911 from the telephone in the living room, she was unable to get a dial tone. 
Whiteside and Bryant ran out to the parking lot and called 911 from 
Bryant‟s cell phone.  While outside, Whiteside noticed defendant‟s red truck was 
still parked in the lot.  Bossier City police officers arrived and found a knife in the 
bedroom under a pile of clothing.  The knife had been removed from a butcher 
block knife set in the kitchen. 
 
 
20 
An autopsy performed on Sutton‟s body revealed 14 stab wounds, 
including defensive wounds on her fingers and wrist, one of which had penetrated 
the muscles.  There were stab wounds to Sutton‟s abdomen, upper body, back, 
shoulders, and torso.  The cause of death was determined to be multiple stab 
wounds, some of which were more than six inches deep. 
5.  Defendant’s flight to Kentucky, where he is apprehended. 
A registration check on the red pickup left in Sutton‟s apartment complex 
parking lot revealed it was registered to defendant in Mississippi.  A warrant was 
obtained for defendant‟s arrest and an all-points bulletin broadcast for his 
apprehension. 
On November 13, 1995, Kentucky State Police set up surveillance on state 
Highway 52 in Ravenna, Kentucky, near where defendant was visiting a relative.  
Defendant was observed in Cribbs‟s white Ford Fiesta with a Tennessee license 
plate and the officers gave chase.  Defendant, who was drinking while driving, 
began throwing half-full beer cans at the pursuing officers‟ vehicles.  The high-
speed pursuit continued for 50 miles, through four towns, with defendant running 
red lights and driving on the wrong side of the highway, until his vehicle was 
rammed and he was taken into custody.  Numerous items recovered from Cribbs‟s 
Ford Fiesta were identified as belonging to her.  Florida and Mississippi license 
plates were recovered from the vehicle.  Additional items in the car, including a 
cooler packed with food, a comforter, and Social Security cards belonging to 
Whiteside‟s two sons, were identified by Whiteside as having been stolen from the 
apartment she shared with victim Sutton. 
C.  Defense Evidence. 
Defendant took the stand in his own defense.  On September 28, 1995, he 
had been living at 6645 Woodman Avenue in Los Angeles for a period of several 
weeks.  His girlfriend was the apartment building manager and he was the 
 
 
21 
maintenance man; when they broke up, he lost the job and sold his furniture.  He 
confirmed that on September 28 he began drinking beer at CJ‟s at 11:00 a.m.  
Christina Walker and Michael Flynn were staying in his apartment.  Defendant 
called his friend Steve Kele, met him at a bank, and received $1,000 from Kele.  
Defendant returned to CJ‟s, then went to his apartment to change clothes, then 
went back to CJ‟s and drank more beer.  Walker and Flynn met him at CJ‟s at 
approximately 5:30 p.m., where they stayed and drank beer for several hours.  
They then drove in Walker‟s car the one block to McRed‟s, arriving at 
approximately 7:30 p.m. 
Inside McRed‟s, defendant approached Gallagher, who introduced herself 
as “Sam,” and invited the three to join her.  The four sat together at a table, 
defendant purchasing approximately six to eight rounds of drinks for the group.  
Defendant and Gallagher danced, and Gallagher kissed him and sat on his lap.  
Defendant claimed he had been intimately involved with bartender Rein Keener 
during the prior few weeks, and that if she appeared irritated with him it was 
because she did not want to reveal her personal life while at work.  He denied 
Keener resisted his advances at one point in the evening, and denied telling her, “I 
always get what I want.” 
Gallagher agreed to leave McRed‟s with defendant, Walker and Flynn, and 
the four left shortly before closing, at approximately 1:20 a.m.  They went back to 
CJ‟s, where defendant intended to meet Steve Kele.  Defendant rode in 
Gallagher‟s truck; Flynn was with Walker in her car.  After having a round of 
drinks at CJ‟s, they went in both vehicles to a nearby 7-Eleven, where Flynn and 
defendant purchased beer.  Flynn and Walker then sped off in Walker‟s car toward 
the apartment.  According to defendant, Kele pulled up in his Lincoln, and he told 
Kele, “Follow us.  We‟re going to the apartment.”  Kele agreed.  As Gallagher and 
defendant approached defendant‟s apartment building in Gallagher‟s truck, 
 
 
22 
defendant saw police lights and heard sirens in front of the building.  Defendant 
testified Gallagher told him there was a warrant out for her arrest for failing to 
appear in court and she did not want to be arrested or have her truck impounded.  
Gallagher and defendant pulled into a nearby strip mall parking lot, with Kele 
pulling in behind them.  Defendant and Gallagher got out of the truck and spoke to 
Kele, then they both got into Kele‟s car and the three drove to defendant‟s 
building, parking in the underground garage. 
According to defendant, Kele and Gallagher went up to the apartment with 
him.  Walker was lying on her bed with her door open, so he closed the door, and 
Kele and Gallagher entered the apartment.  The three talked, and at one point 
Gallagher stated she wanted to go back down to her truck to change her clothes.  
Kele took Gallagher back to her truck.  Defendant stayed in the apartment, drank a 
few more beers, then passed out.  After Kele left with Gallagher, defendant never 
saw Gallagher again. 
Defendant woke up at approximately 6:00 a.m.  When he awoke, neither 
Kele nor Gallagher were in the apartment.  At approximately 6:30 a.m., he spoke 
with Walker.  Defendant admitted telling Walker he had “bigger problems” than 
her problem of Flynn being arrested for drunk driving, and admitted telling her 
Gallagher was dead.  He did not call the police because he did not know “for sure” 
if Gallagher was dead.  Walker then “passed right back out” or fell asleep.  
Defendant denied that Gallagher‟s purse or keys were in the apartment, or that he 
searched her purse.  Defendant left the apartment, walked to a pay phone, and 
called Kele.  At approximately 11:00 a.m., Kele went to defendant‟s building and 
picked him up.  The two then spent the day together. 
Two days after the murder, defendant left on a bus for Jackson, Mississippi, 
where he planned to renew his truck driver‟s license, and then head back to his 
hometown of Hamilton, Ohio.  He had no plans to return to California.  He 
 
 
23 
stopped to gamble in Las Vegas, then took a bus to Jackson, Mississippi.  Two 
weeks after arriving in Jackson, he drove his red truck to Ohio, staying in Ohio for 
“a week or two” and then returning to Mississippi.  Defendant insisted he did not 
kill Gallagher.  He confirmed he had been convicted of first degree murder in 
Florida in 1997, and of forgery in Ohio in 1987. 
Penalty Phase 
A.  Prosecution Evidence. 
1.  The Murder of Linda Price in Jackson, Mississippi. 
On October 9, 1995 [ten days after Gallagher‟s murder but prior to the 
murders of Cribbs in Florida and Sutton in Louisiana], Kathy Carroll, her husband, 
her son, and her younger sister, Linda Price, went to the Mississippi State Fair in 
Jackson, Mississippi.  Price was 34 years old, and Carroll testified she “had long 
red hair, and she was slim.  She was real pretty.  She smiled all the time.”  They 
arrived at between 6:30 and 7:30 p.m., went to the beer tent, sat at a table drinking 
and listening to the band.  An hour or two after arriving, Carroll noticed defendant 
standing nearby.  Defendant had long blond hair and blue eyes.  Carroll and her 
husband got up from their table and danced.  When they returned, defendant was 
sitting at the table with Price.  Price introduced defendant to Carroll and her 
husband.  Price asked Carroll “over and over,” “Ain‟t he real good looking?”  
Carroll observed defendant and Price drinking beer and dancing before she and her 
husband left. 
Three days later, on October 12, Price called her mother, Carolyn Wingate, 
and asked her to come to the Sun-N-Sand Motel in downtown Jackson.  When 
Wingate arrived, Price ran down the stairs and stated, “Mother, I have someone I 
want you to meet,” adding, “You will just love him to death.  He is precious.  I 
found the love of my life.”  Defendant came down the stairs and Price introduced 
him to Wingate as Glen Rogers.  Defendant indicated his truck had been stolen at 
 
 
24 
the state fair and asked Wingate if she could give them a ride to “the place where 
they take the stolen vehicles.”  Wingate, Price and defendant drove in Wingate‟s 
car to the impound lot.  Defendant and Price looked around the lot and located 
defendant‟s red truck.  The three went to the police station where defendant 
obtained a receipt to retrieve his vehicle, then returned to the impound lot and 
recovered the truck. 
On October 16, 1995, defendant and Price rented a two-bedroom apartment 
in Jackson, Mississippi.  Carroll visited her sister at the apartment five to six 
times, and on each occasion Carroll saw defendant‟s truck parked in the lot.  Price 
drove defendant‟s truck while defendant did some work for a construction 
company.  Price and defendant went to Wingate‟s house “quite often” during the 
following two weeks. 
Wingate went to Price‟s apartment early on the morning of October 30.  
She told Price she had been contacted regarding a job Price had applied for, and 
that Price was to start work the next morning.  Price told her mother she would 
stop by her house early the next morning before heading to the job.  Caroll also 
went to Price‟s apartment on October 30, to tell her an appliance store had called 
her as a reference for Linda Price and Glen Rogers in connection with a stereo 
they had rented.  At that time defendant stated to Carroll in “a mean way,” “I‟m 
Glen Rogers.”  Carroll made plans to bring her children over to Price‟s apartment 
the following evening, which was Halloween. 
That same day, October 30, Price called her second older sister, Marilyn 
Reel, who came over with her family and “sat with her all day.”  At one point 
defendant appeared and stated to Price, “I know that was you talking because I 
could hear your big mouth everywhere.”  Price was upset by the comment and 
cried.  Later that evening, Reel‟s husband asked Price if she wanted to go out with 
them for a few beers.  Price asked defendant if he would come and he stated, “It 
 
 
25 
don‟t matter,” “[w]e can go with him.”  The group went to the Sportsmen‟s 
Lounge on Highway 80 in Jackson.  When defendant overheard Price tell her sister 
that she loved her, he commented to Price, “Don‟t be telling her that.”  Price 
replied, “Glen, I'm always telling my sister that.”  Price and her sister then went to 
the ladies room, where Price started crying.  Price asked Reel to bring her children 
to the apartment the next evening for Halloween. 
On the morning of October 31, Price did not go to her mother‟s house as 
expected.  Wingate went to her daughter‟s apartment at approximately 9:00 a.m.  
At that time, Wingate did not see defendant‟s truck in front and no one answered 
when she knocked on the door.  Wingate waited for Price, but Price never showed 
up.  As it was out of character for Price not to keep an appointment, Wingate 
began looking for her.  Later in the evening, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Carroll 
brought her children to Price‟s apartment.  At that time, Carroll did not see 
defendant‟s truck.  She knocked on the door but there was no answer.  Carroll left 
the apartment and called her mother, telling Wingate she could not find Price. 
The next day, November 1, Wingate returned to the apartment and looked 
into a window.  The apartment was “dimly lit,” but Wingate could see that the 
shower curtain in the bathroom was drawn closed around the bathtub.  Wingate 
became more concerned, as Price was an “immaculate housekeeper” who never 
kept the shower curtain drawn around the tub.  Wingate called the police and filed 
a missing person‟s report the following morning. 
On November 3, Wingate and the police went to the apartment, were 
admitted by a maintenance man, and found Price dead in the bathtub.  Jackson 
Police Detective Chuck Lee arrived and found the living room in “disarray,” with 
cassette tapes, beer cans, and ashtrays full of cigarette butts scattered on the floor.  
There were blood smears on the kitchen floor and a garbage can that contained 
bloody paper towels.  A mop on the kitchen counter had blood on the mop head. 
 
 
26 
Written on the bathroom mirror in red lipstick were the words, “Glen, we 
found you.”  The shower curtain was drawn closed around the bathtub.  Detective 
Lee pulled the curtain aside and found Price in the bathtub completely nude, on 
her back, with a washcloth covering her face.  Her body had several stab wounds, 
including a cut to her neck “from ear to ear” that was “completely slashed open,”  
two stab wounds under her right breast, one stab wound above her right breast, one 
stab wound on her right side just below the armpit, and one stab wound to her 
right shoulder blade area. 
When Wingate returned to her house following the funeral several days 
later, she received a phone call from a man who asked, “Is this Linda‟s mother?”  
When she replied, “Yes it is,” the caller stated, “I‟m Glen‟s brother.  I am looking 
for Glen Rogers.”  Wingate told the caller, “We are looking for him, too.”  When 
the caller responded, “Why?,” Wingate stated, “My daughter has ended up dead.  I 
want to know where he is.”  The caller then commented, “I am not surprised that 
your daughter is dead because anybody that has been around Glen for the last 
seven years has ended up dead.”  When Wingate replied, “What?  What are you 
doing?  Why are you calling me?,” the caller responded, “Your f—ing daughter is 
dead, isn‟t she?”  Wingate, who had spoken with defendant “a lot of times” since 
meeting him several weeks earlier, then recognized the voice as his. 
2.  Other Prior Violent Crimes Evidence. 
The People presented evidence that in March 1991, in his hometown of 
Hamilton, Ohio, police were summoned to defendant‟s house twice in one day on 
reports that he was “inside tearing up the house,” and later, that he had a gun, had 
threatened a live-in girlfriend, and planned to “blow away anybody that came near 
his house.”  During the initial call, police found the interior walls of the house 
broken up from blows with a hammer, with defendant passed out on his bed.  
During the second call later that day, defendant was found to be in an 
 
 
27 
“uncontrollable rage” and threatened to “blow away anyone that came to the 
door.”  Residents from surrounding houses were evacuated.  At one point 
defendant put the nozzle of a lit acetylene blow torch through a hole in the front 
door, within two feet of the face of an officer who was attempting to negotiate his 
surrender.  When the door caught fire, officers entered the house and arrested 
defendant.  He was charged with aggravated menacing inducing panic and 
attempted arson as a result of the incident. 
In 1994, defendant and Maria Gyore were living together in Hollywood, 
California.  On one occasion that year, when defendant learned of Gyore‟s former 
boyfriend, he beat her up, giving her a black eye and “all kinds of bruises.”  
Defendant was arrested as a result of the incident.  On another occasion, while still 
living with Gyore in Hollywood, defendant again beat up Gyore with his hands 
and fists.  There was also a fire reported in the apartment that year.  In 1995, 
defendant and Gyore moved to the Woodman Avenue apartment in Van Nuys, 
where Gyore became the apartment manager and defendant the “maintenance 
guy.”  In August 1995, defendant told Gyore to move out of the apartment, 
threatening to kill her, her brother, and her two young sons.  Family members 
became fearful for Gyore‟s safety and encouraged her to leave the country.  Gyore 
traveled to Hungary two days later. 
3.  Victim Impact Evidence. 
Gallagher‟s mother, Jan Baxter, and a younger sister, Jeri Vallicella, 
testified how her murder “totally destroyed” the whole family.  Gallagher was 33 
years old at the time of her death.  She had three sons who were seven, eight, and 
15 at that time.  When she was 23 years old, Gallagher had joined the Navy, 
scoring the highest score in Butte County on the Navy‟s intelligence test.  She 
worked for the Navy as an aviation electronics technician, and after four years, left 
the Navy with an honorable discharge.  She met her husband Stephen while both 
 
 
28 
were in the Navy, and they were married in 1985.  Gallagher then worked at a 
submarine base for a military contractor, where she was in charge of all the 
electronics at the base.  The couple then moved to San Diego, where she worked 
for another military contractor, Ford Aerospace, for two to three years, and then 
for Southern Illinois University‟s contracting facility at the San Diego Navy base.  
Gallagher‟s sister Jeri, who was five years younger than she, testified Gallagher 
had been like a “second mother” to her.  Gallagher‟s oldest son, Dustin, was 
“devastated” by the loss of his mother and “closed up” emotionally after her death. 
B.  Defense Evidence. 
1.  Family Background. 
Defendant was one of seven children born to Edna and Claude Rogers.  
They lived in Hamilton Ohio, a working-class town north of Cincinnati.  The 
father, who worked at a paper mill for 16 years, was an alcoholic who drank every 
day and was “rarely sober.”  He routinely beat his wife and children.  He once 
threatened to kill his wife if she left him; during one beating he broke her nose and 
rendered her unconscious.  He kept several guns in the home.  He was fired from 
the mill for “drinking on the job.” 
Defendant was born shortly after his father lost his job.  The family lost 
their home and moved to the worst part of Hamilton.  The house they moved into 
was “rundown,” with only two bedrooms and one bathroom, with peeling paint 
and frozen pipes in the winter.  Defendant and his siblings were beaten up by other 
neighborhood children; their father encouraged them to fight back.  There was 
testimony that defendant, as a young child, ate paint chips and dirt, wet his bed, 
and banged his head on the edge of his bed.  Defendant was held back in third 
grade and placed in several learning disability classes. 
Defendant‟s oldest brother, Clay, introduced him to alcohol and drugs at 
the age of 12.  Defendant was beaten by his father more frequently than his 
 
 
29 
siblings because he was “a little more rebellious.”  When defendant was 16 years 
old, his father became disabled from a heart attack.  The defense presented 
testimony from several of defendant‟s siblings to establish that he, like several of 
them, eventually grew up to become alcoholics. 
2.  Mental Health Expert Testimony. 
The defense also presented the testimony of several mental health 
professionals.  Dr. Roger Light, a neuropsychologist, performed a number of tests 
on defendant, and reviewed various educational, hospital and police reports.  He 
concluded defendant exhibited certain areas of cortical dysfunction in his right 
frontal and temporal lobe areas that could account for impulsive behavior.  Dr. 
Light, however, acknowledged that defendant‟s I.Q. test results were “pretty 
average,” and that “for the most part” he performed in the average to “high 
average” range of functioning on the administered tests.  Dr. Light also reviewed a 
CAT scan taken in 1991 when defendant was hospitalized after having been struck 
on the head with a pool cue.  He concluded the scan revealed a “closed head 
[brain] injury” that would have made it more difficult for defendant to control his 
behavior, make the “right” decisions, or stop using alcohol.  Dr. Michael Gold, a 
neurologist, performed a PET scan on defendant‟s brain that revealed diminished 
metabolic activity in areas of his frontal lobes corresponding to the injury he 
suffered when struck with a pool cue.  Psychologist Stuart Hart, who specialized 
in the maltreatment and emotional abuse and neglect of children, interviewed 
defendant‟s mother and several of his siblings, but not defendant, and reviewed 
some of defendant‟s school and criminal history records.  Hart concluded 
defendant grew up in a “toxic” or “poisonous” social environment which, 
combined with poverty and the lack of family values, was likely to produce a 
negative outcome for a child.  Dr. Jeffrey Wilkins, a psychiatrist, testified that 
 
 
30 
defendant‟s “chronic alcoholism” would affect brain function over the years and 
correlate with an inability to control rage. 
3.  Seeking Clergy During Flight. 
Last, there was testimony that defendant, while fleeing through Kentucky 
immediately following the Sutton murder, briefly stopped at the Kentucky 
Mountain Mission, a youth haven Bible camp.  He entered the mission, asked for a 
chaplain, was told there was none there, and returned to his car looking “really 
troubled.”  A worker who went outside to talk to defendant reported that when she 
approached him he “just sort of grunted and shook his shoulders” and “gave her 
the creeps.” 
II.  Discussion 
A.  Pretrial/Jury Selection Issue 
 
Excusal for cause of Prospective Juror No. 3156. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in granting the prosecution‟s 
challenge for cause against prospective juror No. 3156.  He asserts the prospective 
juror‟s responses to the written jury questionnaire, and his follow-up responses 
during oral voir dire by the court, at most showed he was uninformed about the 
death penalty, and not that he was categorically opposed to voting for a death 
sentence.  Defendant urges there was insufficient evidence to establish that his 
ability to serve as an impartial juror was substantially impaired. 
“Although „a criminal defendant has the right to an impartial jury drawn 
from a venire that has not been tilted in favor of capital punishment by selective 
prosecutorial challenges for cause,‟ „the State has a strong interest in having jurors 
who are able to apply capital punishment within the framework state law 
prescribes.‟  (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 9.)  „[T]o balance these 
interests, a juror who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the 
death penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for cause; but if the 
 
 
31 
juror is not substantially impaired, removal for cause is impermissible.‟  (Ibid.; see 
Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424.)”  (People v. McKinzie (2012) 54 
Cal.4th 1302, 1328 (McKinzie).)  “ „[T]he law permits a prospective juror to be 
challenged for cause only if his or her views in favor of or against capital 
punishment “would „prevent or substantially impair the performance of his [or 
her] duties as a juror‟ ” in accordance with the court‟s instructions and the juror‟s 
oath.  [Citations.]‟  (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 741.)”  (People v. 
Duenas (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1, 10 (Duenas).) 
“ „The trial court is in the best position to determine the potential juror‟s 
true state of mind because it has observed firsthand the prospective juror‟s 
demeanor and verbal responses.‟  (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 895 
(Clark); see People v. Garcia (2011) 52 Cal.4th 706 (Garcia), 743; see also 
Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 9 [„Deference to the trial court is appropriate 
because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the 
individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude 
and qualifications of potential jurors.‟].)”  (McKinzie, supra, 54 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1328-1329.)  Accordingly, “ „[w]hen the prospective juror‟s answers on voir 
dire are conflicting or equivocal, the trial court‟s findings as to the prospective 
juror‟s state of mind are binding on appellate courts if supported by substantial 
evidence.  (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 779 (Wilson); see Wainright v. 
Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 (Witt); accord, People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 
415, 483 (Lewis) [trial court‟s determination as to prospective juror‟s true state of 
mind is binding].)”  (Duenas, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 10.) 
Prospective Juror No. 3156 completed the juror questionnaire distributed to 
potential jurors prior to oral voir dire.  His written responses reflect he was 27 
years old, single, resided in Los Angeles, and was employed as a concierge for the 
Regal Biltmore Hotel.  In the section of the questionnaire entitled, “Attitudes 
 
 
32 
Toward Capital Punishment,” he indicated, “I don‟t know what to think about 
capital punishment, if it is good or bad, right or wrong.”  He indicated he felt that 
way “because there has been a lot of people who received capital punishment who 
did not deserve [it,] and then there were others who did.”  He characterized the 
strength of his views as “like many people whom I talk with.”  In response to the 
question asking about his views on life without the possibility of parole, he stated, 
“Well if you do the crime you must do the time and if you are not capable to be in 
city life anymore I am all for it.”  In response to the question asking which 
penalty, death or life in prison without parole, was “more severe,” he responded, 
“you lose your life either way,” and then indicated he would not “always” vote for 
one penalty or the other in a given case.  When asked if he would want to “hear 
and review all of the circumstances and facts of a case” before deciding the 
appropriate penalty, as well as “all the circumstances concerning the defendant 
and his background,” he answered yes.  When asked in what types of cases, and 
for which offenses, the death penalty should be imposed, he responded, “I don‟t 
know” because “I never had to make that kind of decision.”  In response to a 
question on whether the death penalty was imposed too frequently in California, 
he stated, “I never hear about the death penalty in California.”  When asked if he 
had any religious views on the death penalty, he responded, “I don‟t follow any 
religion.”  Last, he stated that if selected to be on a jury he would “just want to do 
what is right by law.” 
During oral voir dire, and after both sides had chosen and accepted the jury, 
Prospective Juror No. 3156 was orally voir dired as a potential alternate juror.  He 
elaborated on his response in the questionnaire regarding people who received the 
death penalty who “did not deserve it,” explaining that this response was based on, 
“[j]ust growing up and just knowing about the few people that I‟ve known that, 
you know, just didn‟t get a fair chance.”  He then explained, “At this time I really 
 
 
33 
don‟t know too much about the death penalty so I‟m not for it or against it.  Well, 
I‟m not for it.”  When asked by the court, “Are you against it?  Your inclination 
would be against it?,” he responded, “Yeah.  Against it.”  He agreed that if the 
mitigating evidence was more substantial than the aggravating evidence, it “would 
be easy” not to vote for death, but then suggested he could not even vote for life 
without parole in that situation.  When asked by the court, “Can you conceive of 
anything that might cause you to vote for death?,” he responded, “No.”  When 
asked, “Under any circumstances?,” he responded, “Not at any.”  When the court 
pointed out that the prospective juror‟s opinions seemed to have become “a lot 
stronger” than those he had indicated on his questionnaire, he responded that his 
views had changed because, “I had time to think about it, to really think about it.  
It‟s a difference when you are talking with your friends.”  He then stated, “To 
actually have to make that decision, I couldn‟t do it,” further suggesting it would 
be “hard” to vote for death even if the defendant was “Jeffrey Dahmer or Richard 
Ramirez.” 
Prospective Juror No. 3156 then again reaffirmed that even if the 
aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors he could not vote for life 
without parole, explaining, “I just don‟t feel like I‟m in the position to really make 
a decision on what punishment one should get for their crime.”  When the court 
observed that earlier it thought the prospective alternate juror had just made a 
misstatement when indicating he could not vote for life without parole if the 
mitigating evidence outweighed the aggravating evidence, he responded, “I 
couldn‟t see myself voting for life or the death penalty.”  When asked if it was 
“the penalty you don‟t want to deal with?,” he responded, “Exactly.” 
Following oral voir dire, the prosecution challenged Prospective Juror No. 
3156 for cause.  Defense counsel declined to “argue for him,” choosing to simply 
submit the matter to the court.  The court found good cause to excuse the 
 
 
34 
prospective juror on the basis that his views had evolved from his answers to the 
written questionnaire to the point where it was clear he would refuse to vote for 
either life imprisonment without parole or the death penalty. 
The record thus reveals that Prospective Juror No. 3156‟s answers to the 
written jury questionnaire and to his oral voir dire were plainly in conflict.  We 
find substantial evidence that his expressed reticence to deliberate on penalty in a 
death case “ „ “would „prevent or substantially impair the performance of his . . . 
duties as a juror‟ ” in accordance with the court‟s instructions and the juror‟s oath.  
[Citations.]‟  [Citation.]”  (Duenas, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 10.) 
B.  Guilt Phase Issues 
1.  Admission of evidence of Florida & Louisiana murders. 
Defendant contends the trial court improperly admitted evidence of the 
Florida (Cribbs) and Louisiana (Sutton) murders as probative on intent and 
common design or plan in the commission of Gallagher‟s murder.  He asserts the 
uncharged murders were inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1101, 
subdivision (b) (Evidence Code section 1101(b)) because they were insufficiently 
similar to the charged murder, because he did not concede identity, i.e., that he 
murdered Gallagher, and because he did not dispute that the charged murder, 
viewed objectively, was premeditated, and offered to stipulate as much.  He 
further asserts that evidence of the uncharged murders should have been excluded 
under Evidence Code section 352 (Evidence Code section 352) as unduly 
prejudicial, and that admission of such evidence violated his federal constitutional 
right to a fair trial.  We reject each of these arguments and find the other crimes 
evidence properly admitted at the guilt phase. 
The guiding principles are set forth in the following three paragraphs from 
People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1328, 1329 (Foster):  “ „Evidence that a 
defendant has committed crimes other than those currently charged is not 
 
 
35 
admissible to prove that the defendant is a person of bad character or has a 
criminal disposition; but evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove, 
among other things, the identity of the perpetrator of the charged crimes, the 
existence of a common design or plan, or the intent with which the perpetrator 
acted in the commission of the charged crimes.  (Evid. Code, § 1101.)  Evidence 
of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove identity, common design or plan, or 
intent only if the charged and uncharged crimes are sufficiently similar to support 
a rational inference of identity, common design or plan, or intent.  [Citation.]‟  
(People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369.) 
“ „The least degree of similarity (between the uncharged act and the 
charged offense) is required in order to prove intent.  [Citation.]  . . . In order to be 
admissible to prove intent, the uncharged conduct must be sufficiently similar to 
support the inference that the defendant “ „probably harbor[ed] the same intent in 
each instance.‟  [Citations.]”  [Citation.]‟  (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 
402 (Ewoldt).)  „A greater degree of similarity is required in order to prove the 
existence of a common design or plan. . . .  [E]vidence of uncharged misconduct 
must demonstrate “not merely a similarity in the results, but such a concurrence of 
common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a 
general plan of which they are individual manifestations.” ‟  (Ibid.)  „The greatest 
degree of similarity is required for evidence of uncharged misconduct to be 
relevant to prove identity. . . .  [T]he uncharged misconduct and the charged 
offense must share common features that are sufficiently distinctive so as to 
support the inference that the same person committed both acts.  [Citation.]  “The 
pattern and characteristics of the crimes must be so unusual and distinctive as to be 
like a signature.”  [Citation.]‟  (Id. at p. 403.)  „ “ „The highly unusual and 
distinctive nature of both the charged and [uncharged] offenses virtually 
eliminates the possibility that anyone other than the defendant committed the 
 
 
36 
charged offense.‟  [Citation.]” ‟  (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1003 
(Hovarter).) 
“If evidence of prior conduct is sufficiently similar to the charged crimes to 
be relevant to prove the defendant‟s intent, common plan, or identity, the trial 
court then must consider whether the probative value of the evidence „is 
“substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission [would] . . . create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the 
jury.”  (Evid. Code, § 352.)‟  (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 404.)  „Rulings made 
under [Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352, including those made at the guilt 
phase of a capital trial] are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  [Citation.]‟  
(People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1130.)  „Under the abuse of discretion 
standard, “a trial court‟s ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal . . . is not 
required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, 
or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.”  
[Citation.]‟  (Hovarter, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1004.)”  (Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th 
at pp. 1328-1329.) 
The prosecution argued below that there were numerous common and 
distinctive features between the charged murder of Gallagher and the out-of-state 
murders so as to warrant the latter‟s admissibility on the issues of intent and 
common design or plan.3  These included that:  (1) the victims were all women of 
approximately the same age (31 to 37 years old); (2) in each instance defendant 
went to a local bar to select his victim; (3) in each instance he sought out a woman 
                                              
3  
The prosecution did not seek to introduce the other crimes evidence to 
prove identity, i.e., that defendant was Gallagher‟s killer.  Moreover, at defense 
counsel‟s request, the instructions given to the jury on the limited purpose for 
which the Florida and Louisiana murders were being admitted into evidence 
instructed them that such evidence was to be considered solely on the question of 
intent. 
 
 
37 
unknown to him, and unaccompanied by a man; (4) in each instance he socialized 
with the victim, danced and/or talked with her, and bought her drinks in an effort 
to gain her trust; (5) in each instance defendant then convinced the victim to give 
him a ride or to accompany him to his residence or lodging; (6) each murder was 
perpetrated in a room or small enclosed area when defendant and the victim were 
alone (the cab of Gallagher‟s pickup truck; Sutton‟s bedroom while roommate 
Whiteside was at work; defendant‟s Tampa motel room); (7) after each murder 
defendant took property from the victim, including jewelry, money, handbags, 
keys, and personal identification documents; (8) after each murder defendant 
attempted to conceal the victim‟s body, clean up the crime scene, or otherwise 
conceal evidence of the crime in order to buy himself time to escape; (9) after each 
murder defendant quickly left town, in each instance crossing state lines within a 
few days to thwart his apprehension; and (10) all of the murders were perpetrated 
within a short six-week period.  The trial court ultimately ruled evidence of the 
Cribbs and Sutton murders (but not the Price murder)4 admissible on the issue of 
intent, and thereafter reaffirmed that ruling in the face of continued defense 
objections on various grounds. 
The trial court was well within its discretion in ruling that the combination 
of distinctive marks and similarities in all three murders was sufficient to meet the 
standard for admissibility of the other crimes evidence on the element of intent, 
i.e., whether the murder of Gallagher was premeditated and deliberate and 
committed with express malice.  Defendant selected each of his victims in a 
                                              
4  
As noted (ante, at p. 2, fn. 2), shortly after Gallagher‟s murder but before 
the murders of Cribbs in Florida and Sutton in Louisiana, defendant traveled to 
Mississippi, where he met Linda Price at a “beer tent” at the state fair.  The two 
cohabitated in a rented apartment in Jackson, Mississippi, for approximately two 
weeks before Price was found murdered in the apartment.  The trial court ruled 
evidence of the Price murder inadmissible at the guilt phase under Evidence Code 
section 1101(b). 
 
 
38 
similar manner, used a common ploy to lure them to a place where they would be 
alone before murdering them, then acted in similar fashion after each murder; 
cleaning up the murder scenes or otherwise attempting to conceal the victims‟ 
bodies to buy himself time to escape, taking personal property from each victim, 
and fleeing across state lines.  “ „[T]he recurrence of a similar result . . . tends 
(increasingly with each instance) to negat[e] accident or inadvertence or self-
defense or good faith or other innocent mental state, and tends to establish 
(provisionally, at least, though not certainly) the presence of the normal, i.e., 
criminal, intent accompanying such an act . . . .‟  (2 Wigmore[, Evidence] 
(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979) § 302, p. 241.)”  (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at 
p. 402 (Ewoldt); see also People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1194; People v. 
Lewis (2001) 25 Ca1.4th 610, 636-637; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 
312, 379.)  The Cribbs and Sutton murders were “sufficiently similar [to the 
Gallagher murder] to support the inference that the defendant „ “probably 
harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance.” [Citations.]‟  (People v. Robbins 
[(1988)] 45 Cal.3d 867, 879.)”  (Ewoldt, at p. 402.) 
Defendant urges that the trial court‟s findings of similarity between the 
three murders were overstated and renews his argument that the Cribbs and Sutton 
murders were not sufficiently similar to the charged Gallagher murder to warrant 
their admission below.  He argues that the fact that he met his victims “in a bar” 
was an insufficient ground of similarity because “there was nothing distinctive 
about the fact that he „talked, danced and drank‟ in bars with women his own age.”  
His argument misses the mark.  The “features of substantial but lesser 
distinctiveness may yield a distinctive combination when considered together.”  
(People v. Miller (1990) 50 Cal.3d 954, 987.)  Although several of the factors 
considered below, e.g., drinking, dancing, and socializing with persons close to 
one‟s age in bars, when viewed in isolation, may not appear particularly unusual 
 
 
39 
or distinctive, it was the combination of similar factors common to all three 
murders—defendant‟s socializing, drinking, or dancing with women in their 30‟s, 
unaccompanied by a male companion, in local bars; buying them rounds of drinks 
to gain their trust; convincing them to give him a ride, or to accompany him back 
to his home or lodging; killing them in a confined or secluded space (Sutton‟s 
bedroom, defendant‟s Tampa motel room to which Cribbs had given him a ride, 
and in the case of Gallagher‟s murder, the cab of her pickup under cover of 
darkness late at night); hiding the bodies (or in the case of Gallagher, burning her 
body) so as to avoid detection and buy further time to escape; fleeing from each 
crime scene with the victim‟s property; crossing state lines, in each instance within 
two days, to further facilitate his escape; and the fact that all three murders were 
committed within the very short time span of approximately six weeks—that 
rendered evidence of the out-of-state murders admissible to show that Gallagher‟s 
murder was both premeditated and deliberate and committed with express malice. 
Defendant specifically challenges the trial court‟s finding of similarity 
between the charged murder of Gallagher and the murder of Andy Lou Sutton in 
Louisiana, arguing there was no evidence that Sutton gave him a ride home from a 
bar before she was murdered.  But the evidence showed that on November 2, 
1995, defendant initially met Sutton and her roommate Whiteside at the It‟ll Do 
Lounge in Bossier City, Louisiana, and that he spent the night with Sutton in the 
women‟s apartment.  He then convinced Sutton and Whiteside to give him a ride 
to the Shreveport bus terminal, told them he would return in a few days, kissing 
Sutton and telling Whiteside to “take care” of her, traveled to Tampa, Florida, 
where he murdered Tina Cribbs, and then returned to Louisiana less than a week 
later in Cribbs‟s car, telling Sutton he had bought the vehicle for her.  Defendant, 
Sutton and Whiteside again went out drinking, first to the It‟ll Do Lounge, then to 
the Touch of Class bar, and after defendant became intoxicated, Sutton obtained 
 
 
40 
Whiteside‟s permission to take defendant back to their apartment so he could 
“sleep it off.”  The evidence strongly supported the inference that defendant stayed 
in their apartment and murdered Sutton in her bedroom that same night, before 
Whiteside returned home from work at 3:00 a.m. 
Thus, although there was a period of approximately one week between the 
time defendant first met Sutton in a bar and convinced her to let him spend the 
night in her apartment and the point at which he returned to Louisiana after 
murdering Cribbs in Florida and murdered Sutton, there was little merit to defense 
counsel‟s argument that the facts of Sutton‟s murder did not “fit the pattern of 
picking somebody up in a bar and taking somebody home and killing them.” 
Defendant also renews his argument that his offer to stipulate that the 
Gallagher murder was “a first degree or nothing type of a case” should have been 
accepted by the prosecutor and the trial court because the stipulation would have 
“eliminate[d] the need for proving intent . . . or proving premeditation and 
deliberation.”  Defense counsel represented to the court that the strategy behind 
his offer to so stipulate was “a way to keep . . . the Louisiana and Florida fact 
pattern[s] out of the guilt phase.”  The prosecution objected on several grounds, 
including that the other crimes evidence being offered under Evidence Code 
section 1101(b) was “much larger in a sense than just first degree murder.” 
The claim is without merit.  Neither the prosecutor nor the trial court was 
legally obligated to accept defendant‟s proffered stipulation.  Indeed, the trial 
court was unauthorized to enforce such a stipulation over the prosecutor‟s 
objection.  A trial court cannot compel a prosecutor to accept a stipulation that 
would deprive the state‟s case of its evidentiary persuasiveness or forcefulness.  
(People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 721, fn. 5; People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 
Cal.4th 596, 629; People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 16-17; People v. Arias 
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 96, 131; People v Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1007.)  
 
 
41 
“[A] criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full 
evidentiary force of the case as the Government chooses to present it.”  (Old Chief 
v. United States (1997) 519 U.S. 172, 186-187.) 
Although the circumstantial evidence that defendant premeditated 
Gallagher‟s murder with express malice was strong, the prosecution had the right 
to present all available evidence to meet its burden of proving the requisite mens 
rea for first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.  (See Mullaney v. Wilbur 
(1975) 421 U.S. 684, 704; People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 462.)  Although 
evidence was presented that Flynn saw “silhouettes” of defendant and Gallagher 
possibly fighting in the cab of Gallagher‟s pickup, with one of them holding his or 
her hands high above the other‟s head or neck, Flynn was intoxicated when he 
made that observation from the backseat of a patrol car after being arrested for 
drunk driving.  Even though the autopsy evidence revealed Gallagher had been 
strangled to death with considerable force by an assailant who held a steady grip 
on her neck for at least a minute before she expired, Flynn remained the only 
possible eyewitness to a physical altercation that might have led to Gallagher‟s 
death.  Finally, although a witness testified she saw a man with long blond hair 
like defendant‟s leaning into Gallagher‟s pickup and setting fire to the passenger 
compartment, this was not a full, positive identification of defendant.  And 
although considerable other circumstantial evidence pointed to defendant as 
having killed Gallagher with premeditation and deliberation and express malice, 
including his repeated statement to Walker that he had “bigger problems” than she 
did, immediately followed by his admission of knowledge that “[Gallagher] is 
dead,” and his callous rifling through Gallagher‟s purse in Walker‟s presence a 
short time later, still, it remained the prosecution‟s burden to prove premeditation 
and malice beyond a reasonable doubt (See Mullaney v. Wilbur, at p. 704; People 
v. Rios, at p.  462), and its right to introduce all relevant and admissible evidence 
 
 
42 
toward that end.  As explained, evidence of the Cribbs and Sutton murders was 
such additional substantial evidence, admissible under Evidence Code section 
1101(b) to further prove that Gallagher‟s murder was premeditated and deliberate 
and committed with express malice. 
Defendant also contends that evidence of the out-of-state murders was 
inadmissible to prove intent because the identity of Gallagher‟s killer remained in 
dispute at the guilt phase.  He relies on a civil case, Hassoldt v. Patrick Media 
Group, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 153, in which it was suggested that “where the 
identity of the actor is in dispute and the uncharged misconduct fails to satisfy the 
stringent „so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature‟ standard enunciated 
in Ewoldt, the uncharged conduct is not admissible on such issues as intent, 
motive or lack of mistake or accident . . . .”  (Id., at p. 166.) 
We have since clarified that the passage from Hassoldt is an incorrect 
statement of the law.  (Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1332 [“Defendant contends 
. . . the evidence could not be admitted for a purpose other than identity if the 
identity of the perpetrator was in dispute.  We have rejected this argument.”]; 
People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 778 [“There is no requirement . . . that the 
defendant was the perpetrator in both sets of offenses.”]; see also Alcala v. 
Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1222-1227; People v. Spector (2011) 194 
Cal.App.4th 1335, 1392.) 
We further conclude the trial court did not “ „exercise[] its discretion in an 
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner . . . result[ing] in a manifest 
miscarriage of justice[]‟ ” (Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1328-1329) when it 
refused to exclude the evidence of the two out-of-state murders as unduly 
prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352.  Defendant suggests the other crimes 
evidence unfairly characterized him as a “serial killer.”  But defendant was never 
labeled a “serial killer” by the prosecution.  Because all other crimes evidence in a 
 
 
43 
sense may be viewed as “inherently prejudicial” (see Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at 
p. 404), “ „uncharged offenses are admissible only if they have substantial 
probative value.‟ ”  (Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1331, quoting People v. 
Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 318.)  We have explained that although the other 
circumstantial evidence that Gallagher‟s murder was perpetrated with 
premeditation, deliberation and express malice was strong, the People were not 
limited to presenting such evidence to the exclusion of the material and probative 
other crimes evidence.  Evidence of the Florida and Louisiana murders, which 
shared numerous distinctive features and similarities with Gallagher‟s murder, and 
which were committed within six weeks of her murder, had substantial probative 
value to show that her murder was premeditated and committed with express 
malice. 
Nor did the possibility of undue consumption of time render the uncharged 
murders inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352.  A trial court has 
discretion to exclude evidence if it concludes presentation of the evidence will 
“necessitate undue consumption of time.”  (Evid. Code, § 352.)  Here, the court 
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that admitting this probative evidence 
would not be unduly time consuming. 
Moreover, the limiting instructions ultimately given to the jury, as modified 
at defense counsel‟s request, ensured that the other crimes evidence would not be 
considered for any improper purpose.  The jury was specifically instructed only to 
consider evidence of the Florida and Louisiana murders for the “limited purpose of 
determining if it tend[ed] to show whether defendant committed the murder [of 
Gallagher] with express malice aforethought and with premeditation and 
deliberation, and not as a result of rage or provocation or other heat of passion.”  
In his closing argument, defense counsel emphasized that the cautionary 
instructions required the jurors to “follow the law and follow this instruction about 
 
 
44 
evidence admitted for a limited purpose and set aside the emotions and make your 
decision based on the facts.” 
Defendant also argues that admission of evidence of the Florida and 
Louisiana murders rendered his trial fundamentally unfair in violation of the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constituion.  
Not so.  Because the evidence was material, probative, and admitted under 
Evidence Code section 1101(b) on the legitimate issue of intent, defendant‟s due 
process right to a fair trial was not transgressed by the admission of such evidence.  
(See People v. Caitlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 122-123.) 
2.  Instruction on flight (CALJIC No. 2.52) 
Section 1127c provides, in relevant part, “In any criminal trial or 
proceeding where evidence of flight of a defendant is relied upon as tending to 
show guilt, the court shall instruct the jury substantially as follows:  [¶]  The flight 
of a person immediately after the commission of a crime . . . is not sufficient in 
itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, the jury may consider in 
deciding his guilt or innocence.  The weight to which such circumstance is entitled 
is a matter for the jury to determine.” 
Pursuant to this section, and without any objection by the defense,5 the trial 
court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.52, Flight After Crime, as follows:  
“The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime, or after he is 
accused of a crime, is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact 
which, if proved, may be considered by you in the light of all other proved facts in 
                                              
5  
Challenges to the flight instruction given pursuant to section 1127c are 
cognizable on appeal even in the absence of a contemporaneous objection.  (See 
People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055; People v. Visciotti (1992) 
2 Cal.4th 1, 60.) 
 
 
45 
deciding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty.  The weight to which this 
circumstance is entitled is a matter for you to decide.” 
Defendant challenges the facial validity of the standard flight instruction on 
several asserted due process grounds.  He argues the instruction is “unfairly 
partisan and argumentative,” permits the jury to draw irrational permissive 
inferences of guilt, and is unnecessary because it improperly duplicates the 
circumstantial evidence instructions.  The claims that the instruction is 
argumentative and permits the jury to draw arbitrary and/or biased inferences from 
isolated items of evidence have long since been rejected and will not be 
reconsidered here.  (See People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 127-128.)  
The instruction “properly advised the jury of inferences that could rationally be 
drawn from the evidence,” and “[t]he jury could properly infer consciousness of 
guilt from defendant‟s efforts to leave California [citation].”  (Id., at p. 128.)  Nor 
was the flight instruction duplicative of other circumstantial evidence instructions, 
as it served to “ „ma[ke] clear to the jury that certain types of deceptive or evasive 
behavior on a defendant‟s part could indicate consciousness of guilt, while also 
clarifying that such activity was not of itself sufficient to prove a defendant‟s guilt, 
and allowing the jury to determine the weight and significance assigned to such 
behavior.‟ ”  (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 438, quoting People v. 
Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1224.) 
Defendant claims the flight instruction, as applied to him, “was not 
constitutional under the facts of this case” because it invited the jury to conflate 
evidence of his flight from the Florida and Louisiana murders with his prior flight 
from California after Gallagher‟s murder.  The argument borders on the specious.  
The evidence ruled admissible at the guilt phase showed that defendant committed 
three murders in three different states over the course of six weeks.  After each 
murder he fled with the victim‟s property, inferentially so after Gallagher‟s murder 
 
 
46 
because although her earring was found in defendant‟s apartment, her large black 
purse and its contents, which Walker observed defendant rifling through, was not 
left behind in the apartment and was never recovered.  Defendant ultimately fled 
through two more states (Tennessee and Kentucky) until finally being 
apprehended after a high-speed chase through four towns that ended with police 
cruisers ramming his vehicle in order to force him off the road. 
Moreover, defendant took the stand in his own behalf and testified that after 
leaving California he was traveling home to Hamilton, Ohio, but stopped off at 
Las Vegas, Nevada, to gamble, and then at Jackson, Mississippi, to renew his 
truck driver‟s license, before returning to Ohio.  The prosecution was entitled to 
counter this testimony with evidence that defendant remained in continuous flight 
from the time he murdered Gallagher in California until he was apprehended in 
Kentucky approximately six weeks later.6  The standard flight instruction given 
below properly left it to the jury “ „to determine the weight and significance 
assigned to such behavior.‟ ”  (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 438.)  
There was no error in so charging the jury. 
3.  Instruction on possession of stolen property as it related to murder and 
arson charges (CALJIC No. 2.15) 
The jury was instructed at the guilt phase with CALJIC No. 2.15, as 
follows, “If you find that [defendant] was in conscious possession of recently 
stolen property, the fact of that possession is not by itself sufficient to permit an 
inference that the defendant is guilty of the crime of murder or arson.  Before guilt 
may be inferred, there must be corroborating evidence tending to prove his guilt.  
However, this corroborating evidence need only be slight, and need not by itself 
                                              
6  
The prosecutor argued to the jury, “He‟s out of there immediately after 
killing a person.  [¶]  He is out of there.  He‟s out of Florida, and he‟s out of 
Louisiana, and he‟s on the run, and he‟s just not on the run when he‟s arrested 
from Louisiana, from Florida, he‟s on the run from all of them.” 
 
 
47 
be sufficient to warrant an inference of guilt.  [¶]  As corroboration, you may 
consider the attributes of possession—time, place and manner, that the defendant 
had an opportunity to commit the crime charged, the defendant‟s conduct, or any 
other evidence which tends to connect him with the crime charged.” 
Defendant contends that the giving of CALJIC No. 2.15, regarding 
inferences to be drawn from evidence of his possession of stolen property, was 
reversible error because it “permitted the jury to draw an irrational permissive 
inference that improperly lightened the state‟s burden of proof” and “gave the jury 
a fundamentally incorrect theory of culpability.”  Specifically, he asserts the 
instruction impermissibly allowed the jury to find him guilty of murder or arson 
“based solely on the alleged fact that he was „in conscious possession of recently 
stolen property,‟ ” subject only to the condition that there be “ „slight‟ ” 
corroborating evidence of guilt.  As explained below, under decisions of this court 
filed after defendant‟s trial, the giving of CALJIC No. 2.15 in this murder case 
was erroneous.  As will further be explained, on this record the instructional error 
was manifestly harmless. 
During the prosecutor‟s guilt phase closing argument, he argued that 
defendant could be convicted on several theories of first degree murder, including 
the theory that Gallagher was killed during the commission of a felony, i.e., 
robbery.  The prosecutor specifically referenced the court‟s instruction with 
CALJIC No. 2.15, arguing there was sufficient corroborating evidence to support 
an inference of guilt based on defendant‟s possession of recently stolen property.  
The prosecutor emphasized that defendant was seen with Gallagher‟s purse in his 
apartment on the morning of the murder, and that Walker saw Gallagher‟s earring 
drop out of the purse.  He pointed out the earring was later found in the apartment.  
The prosecutor argued further that Walker‟s testimony concerning defendant‟s 
 
 
48 
admission that he had a “bigger problem,” followed by his statement to Walker 
that Gallagher was dead, further corroborated the inference of guilt. 
Following the giving of the instruction and the prosecutor‟s argument, 
defense counsel indicated he was objecting to the instruction as “improper” on the 
ground that “all you need is slight corroboration to go from being in possession of 
some stolen property to get to murder and arson.”  The court indicated the 
instruction was applicable to evidence regarding defendant‟s possession of 
Gallagher‟s purse, keys, and other property, as well as his possession of property 
owned by Sutton‟s roommate Whiteside and Cribbs that was recovered upon his 
arrest.  The court concluded the prosecution had carried its burden of proof as to 
those facts and that the giving of the instruction was proper. 
CALJIC No. 2.15 is based on the long-standing rule allowing a jury to infer 
guilt of a theft-related crime from the fact that a defendant is found in possession 
of recently stolen property when such evidence is accompanied by slight 
corroboration of other inculpatory circumstances tending to show guilt.  (See 
People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 754-758.)  It is a permissive, 
cautionary instruction “generally favorable to defendants; its purpose is to 
emphasize that possession of stolen property, alone, is insufficient to sustain a 
conviction for a theft-related crime.  (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 131; 
People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 176-177; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 
Cal.4th 1, 37; cf. People v. Najera (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1132, 1135-1136 [defendant 
argued he was prejudiced because the trial court had a duty to give CALJIC No. 
2.15 sua sponte in all theft-related cases and failed to do so].)”  (People v. 
Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 375 (Gamache).) 
On the other hand, in cases decided subsequent to the trial in this case, “we 
have . . . cautioned that the instruction is inappropriate for non-theft-related 
crimes, and instructing that possession of stolen property may create an inference 
 
 
49 
that a defendant is guilty of murder, as was done here, is error.  (People v. 
Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 101; People v. Prieto [(2003)] 30 
Cal.4th [226] at pp. 248-249.)”  (Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 375.)  The 
People recognize as much and concede that it was error to give CALJIC No. 2.15 
in this case. 
As for defendant‟s argument that instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 
2.15 “improperly lightened the state‟s burden of proof,” “we have previously 
rejected it.  The instruction does not establish an unconstitutional mandatory 
presumption in favor of guilt (People v. Yeoman, 31 Cal.4th at p. 131) or 
otherwise shift or lower the prosecution‟s burden of establishing guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt (People v. Parson [(2008)] 44 Cal.4th [332] at pp. 355-356; 
People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 248).”  (Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at 
p. 376.)  Defendant offers no persuasive reason to reconsider these decisions. 
Defendant argues that instructing a jury with CALJIC No. 2.15 in a non-
theft case is reversible error because it results in “the prosecution present[ing] its 
case to the jury on alternate theories, some of which are legally correct and others 
legally incorrect, and the reviewing court cannot determine from the record on 
which theory the ensuing general verdict of guilt rested.”  (People v. Green (1980) 
27 Cal.3d 1, 69.)  However, “it is well established the People v. Watson (1956) 46 
Cal.2d 818, 836, test applies.  (People v. Parson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 357-358; 
People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 101; People v. Prieto, 
supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 249.)”  (Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 376.)  Under that 
test — whether it is reasonably probable defendant would have obtained a more 
favorable result had the instruction not been given — the error here in extending 
CALJIC No. 2.15 to the murder and arson charges was clearly harmless.  
Gallagher was last seen alive together with defendant in her pickup truck; Flynn, 
although intoxicated at the time, thought he saw defendant and Gallagher in a 
 
 
50 
physical altercation inside the pickup; a short time later Walker woke up in 
defendant‟s apartment and he told her, “I got bigger problems than you, honey, I 
got bigger problems,” and admitted knowledge that Gallagher was dead; and a 
short while after that a man closely resembling defendant was seen setting fire to 
the passenger compartment of Gallagher‟s pickup truck, in which her burned body 
was later found.  Additionally, the other crimes evidence, which established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that defendant murdered Tina Cribbs in Florida and 
Andy Lou Sutton in Louisiana within six weeks of Gallagher‟s murder in a 
manner that shared many distinctive features and similarities to Gallagher‟s 
murder, and the forensic results of Gallagher‟s autopsy, which showed that she 
was forcibly strangled for a period of at least one minute until she expired, further 
supported an inference that Gallagher‟s murder was premeditated, deliberate, and 
committed with express malice. 
4.  Instruction on burden of proof for out-of-state murders. 
 
(CALJIC Nos. 2.50 & 2.50.1) 
Defendant contends the other crimes evidence instructions given below 
require reversal because they permitted the jury to find him guilty of Gallagher‟s 
murder, and find true the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance, by a 
preponderance of the evidence rather than by the constitutionally compelled proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard.  The claim is without merit. 
After the court determined to admit the evidence of the Florida and 
Louisiana murders, defense counsel submitted a modified version of CALJIC No. 
2.50, which read, “Evidence was introduced for the purpose of showing that 
[defendant] committed crimes other than that for which he is on trial.  This 
evidence relates to two homicides alleged to have been committed by [defendant] 
in November of 1995 in the states of Florida and Louisiana.  [¶]  Except as you 
will otherwise be instructed, this evidence, if believed, may not be considered by 
 
 
51 
you to prove that the defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a 
disposition to commit crimes.  It may be considered by you only for the limited 
purpose of determining if it tends to show whether [defendant] committed the 
murder alleged in Count 1 with express malice aforethought and with 
premeditation and deliberation, and not as a result of rage or provocation or other 
heat of passion.  [¶]  For the limited purpose for which you may consider such 
evidence, you must weigh it in the same manner as you do all other evidence in 
the case.  [¶]  You are not permitted to consider such evidence for any other 
purpose.”  The instruction was read to the jury both before presentation of the 
other crimes evidence and again before closing arguments and deliberations. 
The jury was further instructed pursuant to former CALJIC No. 2.50.1 (6th 
ed. 1996), which read, “Within the meaning of the preceding instruction [CALJIC 
No. 2.50, as modified], the prosecution has the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the homicides other 
than that for which he is on trial.  [¶]  You must not consider this evidence for any 
purpose unless you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 
committed the other homicides.”7  Finally, the jury was instructed with CALJIC 
No. 2.50.2, which read, in relevant part, “ „Preponderance of the evidence‟ means 
evidence that has more convincing force than that opposed to it.  If the evidence is 
so evenly balanced that you are unable to find that the evidence on either side of 
an issue preponderates, your finding on that issue must be against the party who 
had the burden of proving it.” 
                                              
7  
Subsequent to the trial in this case, CALJIC No. 2.50.1 was amended with 
the addition of the following language:  “If you find other crime[s] were 
committed by a preponderance of the evidence, you are nevertheless cautioned and 
reminded that before a defendant can be found guilty of any crime charged [or any 
included crime] in this trial, the evidence as a whole must persuade you beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of that crime.”  (CALJIC No. 2.50.1 
(7th ed. 2005).) 
 
 
52 
It is well settled that evidence of other crimes presented in the guilt phase 
of a criminal trial may be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.  (People v. 
Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 763 (Medina); People v. McClellan (1969) 71 
Cal.2d 793, 804.)  “Prior cases explain that the facts tending to prove the 
defendant‟s other crimes for purposes of establishing his criminal knowledge or 
intent are deemed mere „evidentiary facts‟ that need not be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt as long as the jury is convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, of 
the truth of the „ultimate fact‟ of the defendant‟s knowledge or intent.  (People v. 
Lisenba [(1939)] 14 Cal.2d [403] at pp. 430-431, and cases cited.)”  (Medina, at 
p. 763.) 
The jury below was fully instructed on the burden of proof required to 
convict defendant of Gallagher‟s murder, arson, and to find true the prior-murder-
conviction special-circumstance allegation.  They were charged with the standard 
instruction on the presumption of innocence and the prosecution‟s burden to prove 
defendant‟s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  (CALJIC Nos. 2.90, 2.91.)  They 
were instructed on the requisite elements of murder and arson.  (CALJIC Nos. 
8.10, 8.11, 8.20, 14.80.)  They were instructed that the prosecution had the burden 
of proving the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance true beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  (CALJIC No. 8.80.1.)  They were specifically instructed that 
“each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to 
establish the defendant‟s guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  In other 
words, before an inference essential to establish guilt may be found to have been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or circumstance on which the 
inference necessarily rests must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (CALJIC 
No. 2.01.)  And they were further admonished, “Do not single out any particular 
sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others.  Consider the 
instructions as a whole, and each in light of all the others.”  (CALJIC No. 1.01.) 
 
 
53 
This court has expressly approved of former CALJIC No. 2.50.1 insofar as 
it informed juries that other crimes evidence may be proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence.  (See People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 383; Medina, 
supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 763-764.)  Those decisions further specifically recognize 
that the People‟s burden to prove a criminal defendant‟s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt is not diminished by such an instruction where it is given in conjunction 
with CALJIC Nos. 2.90 (presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, 
prosecution‟s burden of proof) and 2.01 (each fact essential to complete a set of 
circumstances necessary to establish guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt).  (Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 383; Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at 
pp. 763-764; see also Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72-73.)8 
5.  Failure to give a unanimity instruction on theory of first degree 
 
murder. 
Defendant next argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that 
“if it found the [charged Gallagher] murder was of the first degree, it had to agree 
unanimously on the type of first degree murder.”  He acknowledges the many 
decisions of this court rejecting the claim and urges us to reconsider them, but 
provides no good reason to do so.  We decline the invitation to do so.  “[A]s long 
as each juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty of 
murder as that offense is defined by statute, it need not decide unanimously by 
which theory he is guilty.”  (People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 918; see 
                                              
8  
Defendant‟s reliance on Gibson v. Ortiz (9th Cir. 2004) 387 F.3d 812) is 
misplaced.  That case involved the giving of former CALJIC No. 2.50.01, an 
instruction specifically tailored to prior sexual offenses, along with a modified 
version of CALJIC No. 2.50.1, which instructions together permitted the jury to 
“infer that the defendant committed the charged crime if it found „that the 
defendant committed a prior sexual offense.‟ ”  (Gibson, at p. 822.)  The facts and 
particular instructions at issue in that case are therefore inapposite to those in issue 
here. 
 
 
54 
People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 616-617; quoting People v. Nakahara 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 712 [“ „jurors need not unanimously agree on a theory of 
first degree murder as either felony murder or murder with premeditation and 
deliberation. [Citations.]‟ ”)  The trial court was under no obligation to give a 
unanimity instruction in this murder case.9 
6.  Instruction on “anti-jury nullification” (CALJIC No. 17.41.1). 
The jurors in this case were instructed at the guilt phase with the so-called 
“anti-jury nullification” instruction (see CALJIC No. 17.41.1 (1998 new) (6th ed. 
1996)), which advised them that, “The integrity of a trial requires that jurors, at all 
times during their deliberations, conduct themselves as required by these 
instructions.  Accordingly, should it occur that any juror refuses to deliberate or 
expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based on penalty 
or punishment, or any other improper basis, it is the obligation of the other jurors 
to immediately advise the Court of the situation.” 
Defendant contends that “[t]he instruction . . . assures the jurors that their 
words might be used against them and that candor in the jury room could be 
punished.  The instruction therefore chills speech and free discourse in a forum 
where „free and uninhibited discourse‟ is most needed.  [Citation.]  The instruction 
virtually assures „the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion‟ in the 
jury room.  [Citation.]  Accordingly, the instruction improperly inhibits the free 
expression and interaction among the jurors which is so important to the 
deliberative process.  [Citation.]” 
As defendant acknowledges, although this court, in People v. Engelman 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 436 (Engelman), out of “caution” disapproved the giving of 
                                              
9  
Defendant‟s jurors were instructed that if they agreed defendant was guilty 
of murder, they must unanimously agree whether the murder was first or second 
degree.  (See CALJIC No. 8.71.) 
 
 
55 
CALJIC No. 17.41.1 in future criminal trials in California (Engelman, at p. 440), 
we nonetheless concluded “the instruction does not infringe upon [a] defendant‟s 
federal or state constitutional right to trial by jury or his [or her] state 
constitutional right to a unanimous verdict” (id. at pp. 439-440; see also People v. 
Barnwell (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1038, 1055).  We explained that the instruction 
properly informed the jury it had a duty to follow the court‟s instructions, and that 
“[a] juror who actually refuses to deliberate is subject to discharge by the court 
(People v. Cleveland [(2001)] 25 Cal.4th [466] at p. 484), as is a juror who 
proposes to reach a verdict without respect to the law or the evidence.  (People v. 
Williams [(2001)] 25 Cal.4th [441] at p. 463.)”  (Engelman, supra, 28 Cal.4th at 
p. 442.)  We observed that where CALJIC No. 17.41.1 is given together with 
CALJIC Nos. 17.40 (“ „The People and the defendant are entitled to the individual 
opinion of each juror.  [¶]  Each of you must decide the case for yourself . . . .‟ ”) 
and 17.50 (“instructing that in order to reach a verdict, „all twelve jurors must 
agree to the decision‟ ”), the jury is “fully informed . . . of its duty to reach a 
unanimous verdict based upon the independent and impartial decision of each 
juror.”  (Engelman, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 444.)10  And we explained that the 
instruction “is not directed at a deadlocked jury” (Engelman, at p. 444) nor does it 
encourage “jurors who find themselves in the minority, as deliberations progress, 
[to] join the majority without reaching an independent judgment.”  (Ibid.)11  
                                              
10  
Both CALJIC Nos. 17.40 and 17.50 were given below. 
11  
In Engelman, we disapproved giving CALJIC No. 17.41.1 in future 
criminal trials because “[t]here is risk that the instruction will be misunderstood or 
that it will be used by one juror as a tool for browbeating other jurors.”  
(Engelman, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 445.) 
 
 
56 
 C.  Special Circumstance 
 
Challenges to the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance. 
The single special circumstance found true in this case was that “[t]he 
defendant was convicted previously of murder in the first or second degree.”  
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2).)  The allegation was based on defendant‟s capital conviction 
in Florida, on May 7, 1997, of the murder of Tina Cribbs on or about November 7, 
1995.  Defendant murdered Cribbs in Florida approximately five weeks after he 
murdered Sandra Gallagher in California.  Defendant‟s Florida conviction was not 
yet final on appeal at the time his capital trial for the murder of Gallagher 
commenced in California. 
Defendant contends the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance was 
invalid on two grounds:  (1) the Cribbs murder in Florida was committed after the 
murder of Gallagher in California, and (2) the Florida conviction was not yet final 
when alleged as a prior-murder-conviction special circumstance in this case.  He 
argues the invalid special-circumstance finding violated his Eighth Amendment 
right to be free from an arbitrary and capricious death sentence.  (See Spaziano v. 
Florida (1984) 468 U.S. 447, 460, fn. 20.)  Respondent asserts that defendant 
forfeited or waived the claim on appeal by failing to raise these two specific legal 
challenges to the special circumstance allegation in the trial court, and by rejecting 
the prosecution‟s offer to continue the trial until the Florida murder conviction was 
final on appeal if he would waive time.  Respondent further contends both legal 
challenges to the special circumstance finding are unsupported at law.  We agree 
with respondent that the claims are devoid of legal merit. 
1.  Procedural Background 
Prior to commencement of trial, defendant filed a motion to strike the prior-
murder-conviction special-circumstance allegation.  The motion did not expressly 
 
 
57 
allege the two legal grounds now urged on appeal as invalidating the special 
circumstance.  Instead, defendant argued the Florida conviction was invalid due to 
“numerous errors of federal constitutional dimension” as outlined in defendant‟s 
opening brief filed by his attorneys in the Florida capital appeal, a copy of which 
was appended to defense counsel‟s two-page motion to strike. 
A full hearing was conducted on the motion with defendant present.12  
Defense counsel argued the merits of several federal constitutional claims raised in 
the opening brief in the Cribbs murder appeal, urging they required that the special 
circumstance allegation based on that Florida conviction be stricken.13  The 
prosecutor refuted the merits of each claim in the Florida brief relied on by 
defendant as a ground for striking the special circumstance allegation.  The 
prosecutor nonetheless offered to continue the trial until the Florida high court 
decided the merits of the Florida appeal if defendant would waive his right to a 
speedy trial in this proceeding.  The trial court properly refused to predict how the 
Florida Supreme Court might rule on the issues before it in the Florida appeal.  
                                              
12  
“ „[W]hen a defendant seeks to collaterally attack the validity of a prior 
conviction underlying a prior-murder special circumstance, he must first allege 
facts sufficient to justify a hearing on his motion to strike the special 
circumstance—i.e., “allege actual denial of his constitutional rights.”  (People v. 
Sumstine [(1984)] 36 Cal.3d [909,] 922.)  The court shall thereupon conduct an 
evidentiary hearing in the manner set forth in Coffey and Sumstine.‟  (Curl v. 
Superior Court [(1990)] 51 Cal.3d [1292,] 1306, italics added; see People v. 
Coffey [(1967)] 67 Cal.2d [204,] 215 [„the issue must be raised by means of 
allegations which, if true, would render the prior conviction devoid of 
constitutional support.‟].)”  (People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 892-893.) 
13  
In particular, defense counsel argued at some length regarding a claim in 
the Florida brief alleging that Florida prosecutors had repeated the same improper 
closing argument to a number of juries in Florida capital cases, including the 
penalty phase of defendant‟s capital trial.  As argued by the prosecutor, however, 
this claim, even if meritorious, at most would have invalidated the Florida penalty 
determination and would not have invalidated defendant‟s underlying conviction 
of the Cribbs murder. 
 
 
58 
Addressing defendant directly, the court stated, “At this point, Mr. Rogers, you 
have the option of keeping the jurors from hearing about it [the Florida conviction] 
by waiving [your right to a speedy trial].  That‟s your call.”  Defendant nodded, 
signaling to the court that he understood his choice.  The prosecutor‟s offer to 
continue the trial if defendant would waive time was declined by the defense.  The 
court went on to deny the motion to strike the special circumstance allegation. 
2.  Discussion 
Both grounds asserted on appeal in support of this claim present pure 
questions of law.  Respondent urges us to find that defendant forfeited or waived 
each ground now asserted as invalidating the special circumstance.  We do not 
find forfeiture or waiver of the claim.  Although defendant did not specifically 
argue, either in his written motion to strike the special circumstance allegation or 
at the hearing on the motion, that a prior murder conviction must be final on 
appeal before it can support a prior-murder-conviction special circumstance, the 
gist of his argument conveyed that position insofar as he sought to convince the 
court that reversal of the Florida conviction for any of the federal constitutional 
errors alleged in the opening brief would necessarily invalidate the prior-murder-
conviction special-circumstance finding.  Fundamentally, had the Florida Supreme 
Court subsequently reversed defendant‟s conviction of the Cribbs murder for 
federal constitutional error, such would have undermined the validity of this prior-
murder-conviction special-circumstance finding regardless of defendant‟s refusal 
to waive time below or specifically argue these two grounds in support of his 
motion to strike the special circumstance allegation.  (See Johnson v. Mississippi 
(1988) 486 U.S. 578, 584-586 [holding it would violate the Eighth Amendment to 
allow “petitioner‟s death sentence to stand although based in part on a reversed 
conviction.”].) 
 
 
59 
In any case, neither ground now urged in support of invalidation of the 
special circumstance finding has legal merit.  With regard to the first ground—the 
fact that the murder of Cribbs in Florida was committed after the murder of 
Gallagher in California—numerous decisions of this court have concluded the 
controlling factor under the express language of section 190.2(a)(2) is whether 
“[t]he defendant was convicted previously of murder in the first or second degree” 
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2), italics added.)  The “order of the commission of the 
homicides is immaterial.”  (People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, 596 
(Hendricks); see also People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 879; People v. 
Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 636; People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 97, 107-
108; People v. Grant (1988) 45 Cal.3d 829,848.) 
As explained in Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d 584, “Penal Code section 
190.2, subdivision (a)(2) (hereafter section 190.2(a)(2)) defines the relevant 
special circumstance as, „the defendant was previously convicted of murder in the 
first or second degree.‟  The language of the provision is clear:  on its face, it 
refers simply and unequivocally to previous convictions.  Moreover . . . section 
190.2(a)(2) refers to convictions in prior proceedings, in contrast to subdivision 
(a)(3) of the same section, which defines another special circumstance as, „The 
defendant has in this proceeding been convicted of more than one offense of 
murder in the first or second degree.‟  Far from superfluous, the word „previously‟ 
is thus essential to a harmonious reading of these two subdivisions of section 
190.2. 
“The function of section 190.2(a)(2) is also clear—to circumscribe, as the 
Eighth Amendment requires (Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 878), the 
classes of persons who may properly be subject to the death penalty.  Defendant 
misconstrues the purpose of the provision, which he inaptly analogizes to statutes 
aimed at the habitual criminal.  [Citations.]  Unlike recidivism statutes, however, 
 
 
60 
section 190.2(a)(2) is directed neither to deterring misconduct nor to fostering 
rehabilitation. 
“The unambiguous language and purpose of section 190.2(a)(2) thus 
require that a person such as defendant, already convicted of murder in a prior 
proceeding, must be considered eligible for the death penalty if convicted of first 
degree murder in a subsequent trial.  The order of the commission of the 
homicides is immaterial.”  (Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 595-596, 
fn. omitted.) 
Indeed, defendant acknowledges these settled authorities and has conceded 
in his opening brief that “[s]ection 190.2, subdivision (a)(2), as interpreted by this 
Court, applies even when the murder resulting in the previous conviction was 
committed after the charged murder.  (People v. Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at 
pp. 595-596.)”  He states further, “As [this] Court has ruled, the „convicted 
previously‟ phrase simply requires that the conviction be rendered before the trial 
on the charged murder.  (Ibid.)  Thus, the prior-murder-conviction special 
circumstance premises death-eligibility on a fact that arises after commission of 
the charged murder for which the State seeks to execute the defendant.  This Court 
has rejected both state law and federal constitutional challenges to the subdivision 
(a)(2) special circumstance.  (People v. Hinton [, supra,] 37 Cal.4th 839, 879; 
People v. Gurule [, supra,] 28 Cal.4th 555, 634-638; People v. McLain [, supra,] 
46 Cal.3d 97, 107-108; People v. Grant [, supra,] 45 Cal.3d 829, 848.)  Although 
[defendant] disagrees with the Court‟s construction of the „convicted previously‟ 
language of the special circumstance, there is no point in seeking reconsideration 
of a ruling the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed.  Instead, [defendant] asserts his 
federal constitutional claims in order to preserve them for federal habeas corpus 
review in the event he does not obtain an order for a new trial in this Court.” 
 
 
61 
Regarding finality of the prior murder conviction, respondent points to the 
absence of any express language in section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2) ascribing a 
“finality of judgment” requirement to the term “convicted” as used in the section.  
Respondent also argues that “a plain reading of the statute . . . does not support 
such an interpretation, as the subsection immediately following section 190.2(a)(2) 
permits . . . a special circumstance allegation if „[t]he defendant, in this 
proceeding, has been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or 
second degree.‟  (See Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(3).)  As „convictions‟ arising 
from the same proceeding would be appealed at the same time, Penal Code section 
190.2, subdivision (a)(3) would have no force or application if the statute were 
interpreted to require finality in the sense of exhaustion of appellate remedies.” 
Additionally, respondent points out that in the criminal law context, 
relevant California decisional law generally treats the term “conviction” as the 
entry of a verdict rather than a final judgment:  “Thus, in People v. Castello (1998) 
65 Cal.App.4th 1242, the appellate court found that „the ordinary legal meaning of 
“conviction” is a verdict of guilty or the confession of the defendant in open court, 
and not the sentence or judgment‟ (id. at p. 1253), and that the term „conviction is 
used throughout the Penal Code to indicate the jury verdict‟ (id. at p. 1254).  
Similarly, in People v. Martinez [(1998)] 62 Cal.App.4th [1454] at pp. 1460-1463, 
it was concluded that the word „conviction‟ as used in the Evidence Code referred 
to an adjudication of guilt for impeachment purposes.  (People v. Martinez, supra, 
62 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1460-1463.)  Indeed, this Court adopted the narrower 
definition of the term for purposes of the Three Strikes Law.  (People v. Rosbury 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 206, 210; see also People v. Laino (2004) 32 Cal.4th 878, 898.)  
In People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, this Court also held that for the purpose 
of determining if the defendant had acquired the status of a person convicted of a 
felony, one is „convicted‟ when a verdict is entered.  (Id. at p. 391.)” 
 
 
62 
Defendant acknowleges this court has never ruled that a prior murder 
conviction alleged under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2) must be “final,” i.e., 
affirmed on appeal or no longer subject to appeal.  There is good reason for that.  
The statute refers to “convicted previously,” not convicted previously and final on 
appeal.  (Ibid.)  “When the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further.”  
(People v. Flores (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1059, 1063.)  Even criminal convictions final 
on appeal remain subject to being overturned many years later in habeas corpus 
proceedings.  If the Legislature (or electorate) had intended an additional 
requirement of finality on appeal, or finality after exhaustion of all avenues of 
habeas corpus relief, it could have easily said so.  It did not.  The plain language of 
the statute must control. 
We further take judicial notice of the subsequent decision of the Florida 
Supreme Court in Rogers v. State of Florida (2001) 783 So.2d 980, in which the 
Florida high court rejected all claims in defendant‟s appeal and affirmed his 
convictions of the first degree murder of Tina Cribbs, armed robbery, and grand 
theft of a motor vehicle, as well as the judgment of death imposed in that 
proceeding. 
D.  Penalty Phase Issues 
1.  Exclusion of “negative victim impact evidence.” 
At the penalty phase, the prosecution introduced victim impact evidence 
regarding Sandra Gallagher, including testimony from her mother and younger 
sister, Jeri Vallicella, establishing that she had three sons, ages 7, 8, and 15 years 
old at that time of her death; that she had worked for the Navy as an aviation 
electronics technician and received an honorable discharge; that she thereafter 
worked at a submarine base for a military contractor where she was in charge of 
all the electronics at the base; that she subsequently held jobs with two military 
 
 
63 
contractors (Ford Aerospace and Southern Illinois University‟s contracting facility 
at the San Diego Navy base); that she was like a “second mother” to Vallicella; 
and that her murder “totally destroyed” the whole family and “devastated” her 
oldest son. 
Defendant argues the trial court improperly thwarted his efforts to introduce 
“ „negative victim impact‟ evidence” about Gallagher “to counter the „false 
impression‟ ” created by the People‟s victim impact evidence, including evidence 
of Gallagher‟s alleged involvement with a motorcycle gang; her prior convictions 
and/or arrests for drunk driving; the alleged circumstance that she was on felony 
probation for possession of a firearm at the time of her murder; evidence that she 
was a “less-than-perfect mother and spouse”; and evidence that she once came to 
work with “black eyes after „moonlighting at a biker bar.‟ ” 
“[A] defendant‟s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense includes the 
right not to have the trial court interfere with a defendant‟s ability to receive a fair 
trial.  The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require the jury in a capital case to 
hear any relevant mitigating evidence that the defendant offers, including „ “any 
aspect of a defendant‟s character or record and any of the circumstances of the 
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” ‟  
([People v.] Frye [(1998)] 18 Cal.4th [894] at p. 1015.)  In turn, the court does 
have the authority to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence that does not bear on the 
defendant‟s character, record, or circumstances of the offense.  (Ibid.) „[T]he 
concept of relevance as it pertains to mitigation evidence is no different from the 
definition of relevance as the term is understood generally.‟  (Id. at pp. 1015-
1016.)  Indeed, „excluding defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does 
not impair an accused‟s due process right to present a defense.‟  (People v. Fudge 
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1103 (Fudge).)”  (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 
528 (Ramos).) 
 
 
64 
We first consider the “negative victim impact evidence” the jury was 
permitted to consider at the penalty phase of defendant‟s trial.  Evidence presented 
to the jury separate and apart from the excluded evidence gave them an accurate 
picture of Gallagher, her relationship to her husband Stephen Gallagher and her 
three children (who were not fathered by him), and the fact that she frequented 
bars and drank alcohol to excess.  For example, the jury learned from the 
testimony of Gallagher‟s sister that “sometimes [Gallagher and her husband] 
would have problems.”  The jury learned from the guilt phase testimony of the 
owner of McRed‟s bar that Gallagher had worked for him in one of his bars in the 
past.  The jury knew from the testimony of McRed‟s bartender Rein Keener that at 
one point during the evening of her murder Gallagher was “cut off” from being 
served additional alcoholic beverages.  The jury knew from the forensic expert 
testimony that Gallagher was found to have a .10 percent blood-alcohol level in 
her bloodstream as measured shortly after her death.  As suggested to defense 
counsel by the trial court at the side bar, “The jury already knows she drinks.  The 
jury already knows she goes to bars.  The jury already knows she is apparently 
playing around on her husband and he is playing around on her.  There‟s no goody 
two-shoes portrait here.” 
Additionally, the jury learned from the testimony of sister Jeri Vallicella 
that Gallagher had been hospitalized for psychiatric problems for a short period of 
time sometime during the year prior to her murder.  Vallicella also testified that 
once Gallagher had come to her home to pick up a camping trailer the Vallicellas 
had borrowed from her, and on that occasion she was accompanied by men with a 
pickup truck who indicated they belonged to the Devil‟s Disciples, a motorcycle 
riding group the members of whom Vallicella characterized as “wannabes.” 
The defense also presented the testimony of Sidney Klessinger, the 
Assistant Coordinator for Southern Illinois University at the North Island, San 
 
 
65 
Diego Naval Station.  Klessinger was Gallagher‟s supervisor in 1989 when she 
worked at the facility, six years prior to her murder.  The defense was permitted to 
elicit testimony from Klessinger that Gallagher was terminated from her 
employment after six months, prior to the expiration of her probationary period, on 
grounds that she dressed inappropriately in the office, used foul language, was 
tardy, exhibited inappropriate displays of affection, argued with her boss, and 
made computing errors.  As part of Gallagher‟s responsibilities on that job, she 
was charged with handling the billing of student accounts.  Klessinger testified 
Gallagher made “multiple errors” costing “over a hundred thousand dollars,” 
requiring the paperwork to be redone and resulting in the late payment of tuition to 
the school. 
Against this backdrop of both positive and negative evidence admitted at 
the penalty phase to characterize the murder victim, we find no abuse of discretion 
and no violation of defendant‟s constitutional rights in the trial court‟s 
determination to exclude certain additional evidence, related to the matters 
outlined above, as collateral, of marginal probative value, and unduly 
inflammatory under Evidence Code section 352.  Of course, since Gallagher was 
deceased, her credibility was not at issue.  Although defense counsel wanted to ask 
Klessinger if Gallagher had duplicated “score sheets from pool games at . . . biker 
bars” during work hours, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding 
such evidence under Evidence Code section 352 as cumulative to Vallicella‟s 
testimony that she had once seen her sister in the company of members of a 
motorcycle group, as well as cumulative to guilt phase testimony that Gallagher 
played pool while at McRed‟s, and to Klessinger‟s penalty phase testimony 
regarding her questionable performance while employed with Southern Illinois 
University. 
 
 
66 
Similarly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code 
section 352 in excluding evidence that Gallagher had at some point in her past 
been arrested and convicted of misdemeanor drunk driving, which was cumulative 
to evidence already before the jury that she could drink to excess, or that a gun 
was found in her possession on that occasion, which led to a probationary term 
and apparently a subsequent probation violation, which evidence was 
inflammatory and bore no direct relevance to the circumstances of the offense or 
the defendant‟s character and record (see § 190.3; Skipper v. South Carolina 
(1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4-8; Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 112-166; 
Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 528), and which further bore no relevance to the 
testimony of her family members regarding their devastating loss of their loved 
one. 
Finally, assuming defendant‟s right to present relevant mitigating evidence 
included the “negative victim impact evidence” excluded below, we conclude 
there is no reasonable possibility the penalty verdict would have been different had 
defendant presented the additional evidence.  (See People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 
Cal.4th 932, 961.)  The jury convicted defendant of Gallagher‟s murder beyond a 
reasonable doubt at the guilt phase.  His Florida conviction of Cribbs‟s murder 
was also proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  Additionally, evidence of 
his murder of Andy Lou Sutton in Louisiana and Linda Price in Mississippi was 
before the jury at the penalty phase, as was evidence of his prior acts of violence 
toward a former girlfriend that prompted her to leave the country in fear.  
Moreover, defense counsel was given considerable leeway to refute the positive 
victim impact evidence regarding Gallagher‟s career and family life through 
vigorous cross-examination of witnesses before the trial court ruled that any 
further such evidence would be excluded as unduly inflammatory, cumulative or 
irrelevant to the circumstances of the offense or defendant‟s character and record.  
 
 
67 
(§ 190.3.)  There is no reasonable possibility that presentation of additional 
evidence in that same vein would have resulted in a different penalty verdict. 
2.  Refusal to instruct on lingering doubt. 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury a 
requested instruction on “lingering doubt” at the penalty phase.  There was no 
error.  “Such an instruction is not required by the federal Constitution.  (Franklin 
v. Lynaugh (1988) 487 U.S. 164, 174.)  „[W]e repeatedly have held that although it 
is proper for the jury to consider lingering doubt, there is no requirement that the 
court specifically instruct the jury that it may do so.  [Citations.]‟  (People v. 
Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1219.)”  (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 
771, 826 (Thomas).) 
The trial court did instruct the jury that in making its penalty determination, 
it could consider “[t]he circumstances of the crime of which defendant was 
convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstance 
found to be true,” as well as “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the 
gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any 
sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant‟s character or record that the 
defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to 
the offense for which he is on trial.”  (CALJIC No. 8.85.)  “These instructions 
sufficiently encompassed the concept of „lingering doubt,‟ and the trial court was 
under no duty to give a more specific instruction.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Hines 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1068.) 
Last, defense counsel was permitted to argue lingering doubt in his closing 
argument to the jury, and he did so, informing the jurors they could consider any 
lingering doubt on the question whether death was the appropriate penalty in this 
case.  (See People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1068.) 
 
 
68 
3.  Constitutional challenges to death penalty statute. 
Defendant contends that numerous features of California‟s death penalty 
law, alone or in combination with each other, violate the federal Constitution 
because the category of offenders who are eligible for the death penalty is 
impermissibly broad and because there are insufficient safeguards in the penalty 
phase process to ensure a reliable outcome.  As he acknowledges, this court has 
previously rejected each of his contentions. 
In particular, he contends section 190.3, factor (a), and the jury instructions 
pertaining to that factor, are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.  He 
additionally urges the following subclaims with regard to the death penalty statute 
and accompanying instructions:  (1) the penalty phase instructions are 
unconstitutional in that they failed to assign to the State the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an aggravating factor; (2) the State was 
required to bear some burden of proof at the penalty phase, and if not, then the 
jury should have been instructed there was no such burden; (3) the instructions 
failed to required juror unanimity as to the aggravating factors and “unadjudicated 
criminal activity”; (4) the instructions were impermissibly broad by providing that 
the aggravating circumstances must be “so substantial” in comparison with the 
mitigating factors; (5) the instructions failed to inform the jurors that the central 
determination is whether death is the appropriate punishment; (6) the instructions 
failed to inform the jury that if they determined that mitigation outweighed 
aggravation they were required to return a sentence of life without the possibility 
of parole; (7) the instructions failed to inform the jury that even if they determined 
aggravation outweighed mitigation, they could still return a sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole; (8) the instructions failed to inform the jury 
regarding the standard of proof and lack of need for unanimity as to mitigating 
 
 
69 
circumstances; and (9) the instructions failed to inform the jury on the 
presumption of life. 
Defendant further contends that the federal Constitution requires the jury to 
make written findings regarding the aggravating factors; that the instructions on 
mitigating and aggravating factors were unconstitutional because they used 
“restrictive adjectives in the list of potential mitigating factors,” failed to delete 
inapplicable sentencing factors, and failed to inform the jury that “statutory 
mitigating factors were relevant solely as potential mitigators”; that the absence of 
intercase proportionality review from California‟s death penalty law violates the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be protected from the arbitrary and 
capricious imposition of the death penalty; and that California‟s death penalty law 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution because noncapital 
defendants are afforded more procedural safeguards than are capital defendants. 
Each of the foregoing claims has been repeatedly rejected by this court.  
(See, e.g., Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 835-836, and citations therein to 
decisions rejecting each specified claim on their merits.)  Defendant offers no 
sound reasons for this court to reconsider those decisions here. 
Defendant also urges that California‟s death penalty statute violates 
international law and norms of decency.  That claim too has been repeatedly 
rejected by this court.  (Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 837; People v. Jennings 
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 690; People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 82, 403-404.) 
4.  Cumulative prejudice. 
We have found one instance of instructional error at the guilt phase, the 
giving of CALJIC No. 2.15 on possession of stolen property as it related to the 
murder and arson charges, but found the error harmless.  We have found no 
penalty phase errors.  Accordingly, contrary to defendant‟s final argument, we 
 
 
70 
have no occasion here to make an assessment of the cumulative impact of multiple 
guilt and/or penalty phase errors on the penalty determination reached in this case. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The judgment is affirmed. 
BAXTER, J. 
 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
 
I agree entirely with the majority opinion, which I have signed.  I write 
separately only to comment on defendant‟s argument that the trial court erred in 
admitting, at the guilt phase, evidence of two uncharged murders.  (See maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 34-44.)  In my view, admitting evidence of only two uncharged 
murders, and only for a limited purpose, was unnecessarily favorable to defendant. 
The evidence presented at the guilt and penalty phases shows that 
defendant committed four murders in four different states over a six-week period:  
the charged murder in California and later uncharged murders in Mississippi, 
Florida, and Louisiana.  But the trial court admitted at the guilt phase evidence of 
only two of the uncharged murders — those committed in Florida and Louisiana.  
Evidence of the Mississippi murder was not presented until the penalty phase.  
Moreover, the court instructed the guilt phase jury it could consider the two 
uncharged murders solely on the question of intent.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 2, fn. 
2, 36, fn. 3, 37 & fn. 4.) 
The trial court had discretion, however, to admit evidence of all three 
uncharged murders on the question of defendant‟s identity as the killer. 
The following facts alone provide a compelling inference that defendant 
committed all four murders:  Within a six week period four women in four 
different states on four different occasions were murdered shortly after they met 
defendant, previously a stranger to them, in a bar and socialized with him; and 
 
2 
defendant suddenly disappeared from the area at precisely the time each murder 
occurred.  (As the majority opinion explains (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 36-38), there 
were yet other similarities among the murders.)  I can conceive of only two 
possible scenarios consistent with defendant‟s not being the killer under these 
circumstances, both unreasonable:  (1) Another person, who left behind no 
evidence of his or her existence, followed defendant from state to state and 
murdered the women with whom defendant began to socialize at just the time he 
chose to leave the area; or (2) it is sheer coincidence that each of the four women 
was murdered by someone else shortly after defendant began socializing with 
them, and that defendant happened to disappear at precisely the time of each 
murder.  Perhaps one might accept as coincidence two murders in two different 
states under these circumstances.  But when the third and then the fourth murders 
are added, coincidence cannot be a reasonable explanation. 
The compelling — and entirely legitimate — inference from these facts is 
that defendant committed all four murders, including the charged California 
murder.  The evidence “ „virtually eliminates the possibility that anyone other than 
the defendant committed the charged offense.‟ ”  (People v. Gray (2005) 37 
Cal.4th 168, 203.)  These similarities “lead[] to the reasonable inference that 
defendant was the person who committed all three [here, four] crimes.”  (People v. 
Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 748.) 
Because the trial court had discretion to admit evidence of all three 
uncharged murders for all purposes, including identity, it certainly did not err to 
defendant‟s prejudice by admitting evidence of only two of those murders for 
limited purposes.  Accordingly, I agree with the court‟s rejection of defendant‟s 
arguments to the contrary. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Rogers 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S080840 
Date Filed: July 25, 2013 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Jacqueline A. Connor 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
William Hassler, under appointment by the Supreme Court;  and Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, 
under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, John R. Gorey, G. Tracey Letteau 
and Keith H. Borjon, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
William Hassler 
P.O. Box 2708 
Mckinleyville, CA  95519 
(7070) 362-1485 
 
Keith H. Borjon 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2366