Title: Commonwealth v. Barlow-Tucker
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13408 &amp; 13409
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 8, 2024

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SJC-13408 
SJC-13409 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CASSANDRA L. BARLOW-TUCKER. 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MATTHEW J. TUCKER. 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     October 4, 2023. - January 8, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Reckless Endangerment of a Child.  Grand Jury.  
Evidence, Grand jury proceedings.  Probable Cause.  
Practice, Criminal, Grand jury proceedings, Dismissal. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 23, 2021. 
 
 
Motions to dismiss were heard by John A. Agostini, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the cases from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Jennifer K. Zalnasky, Special Assistant District Attorney, 
for the Commonwealth. 
 
Joshua M. Daniels for Matthew J. Tucker. 
Nancy A. Dolberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for Cassandra L. Barlow-Tucker. 
 
 
2 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  In March 2021, a grand jury returned 
indictments charging the defendants, Cassandra L. Barlow-Tucker 
(Cassandra) and Matthew J. Tucker (Matthew) (collectively, 
Tuckers), with one count each of involuntary manslaughter by way 
of wanton or reckless conduct, G. L. c. 265, § 13, and reckless 
endangerment of a child, G. L. c. 265, § 13L, in connection with 
their alleged failure to seek medical treatment for Garrett,1 a 
foster child who died in their care from complications of group 
A beta hemolytic streptococcus (strep throat), bronchopneumonia, 
and a collection of fluid in one of his lungs.2  Following a 
nonevidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge allowed the 
defendants' motions to dismiss the indictments on grounds that 
(1) the evidence presented to the grand jury was insufficient to 
justify the return of the indictments, see Commonwealth v. 
McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 163 (1982); and (2) the integrity of 
the grand jury proceeding was impaired by the Commonwealth's 
presentation of improper evidence, see Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 
392 Mass. 445, 446-447 (1984).  In so concluding, the judge 
determined that the evidence was insufficient to support a 
finding of probable cause to believe that the Tuckers were 
wanton or reckless, or knew or should have known that Garrett 
 
 
1 We refer to children in this opinion by pseudonyms. 
 
 
2 For ease of identification, we refer to the defendants by 
their given names. 
3 
 
was in grave danger from his illness and failed in their duty to 
seek medical care that could have saved his life; the judge also 
determined that the grand jury were impaired by the admission of 
improper evidence.  The Commonwealth appealed, and we 
transferred the cases sua sponte from the Appeals Court. 
 
On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that the motion judge 
erred in dismissing the indictments because (1) viewed in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence provided 
probable cause to support the indictments for involuntary 
manslaughter and reckless endangerment of a child; and (2) the 
integrity of the grand jury was not impaired where the evidence 
presented was not untruthful or misleading, and where the 
prosecutor provided limiting instructions before the grand jury 
deliberated.  The Commonwealth also argues that the judge 
incorrectly applied the McCarthy and O'Dell analyses in his 
determinations. 
 
Because we conclude that the evidence before the grand jury 
was sufficient to support the defendants' prosecution for 
involuntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment of a child 
and that the integrity of the grand jury was not impaired, we 
reverse the order of the judge in the Superior Court. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the evidence presented to the 
grand jury in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see 
4 
 
Commonwealth v. Clinton, 491 Mass. 756, 758 (2023), reserving 
some details for subsequent discussion.3 
 
On the morning of February 18, 2020, Cassandra discovered 
their ten month old foster child, Garrett, nonresponsive in his 
crib.  She immediately alerted Matthew to call 911.  Emergency 
personnel responded but were unable to revive him. 
 
The investigation into Garrett's death revealed that he had 
been sick with a severe respiratory cold in the weeks leading up 
to his death.  Video footage from the Tuckers' home surveillance 
cameras recorded his last night alive, February 17. 
 
a.  Video footage.  The Tuckers described February 17 as 
the best day Garrett had had in a long time.  He had a better 
appetite, drank more fluids, and was more active than he had 
been recently. 
 
 
3 The grand jury heard testimony from five witnesses over 
the course of three days:  Detective Travis Cunningham, the 
detective who first arrived at the scene after Garrett's body 
had been discovered; Sergeant Ryan Dickinson, the lead 
investigator on the case; Dr. Irini Scordi-Bello, the forensic 
pathologist who conducted the autopsy; Dr. Sandeep Kumar, 
Garrett's pediatrician; and Tracy (a pseudonym), a speech 
language pathologist who asked Cassandra whether Garrett had 
seen a doctor.  The grand jury also saw recorded interviews of 
Cassandra and Matthew that were conducted by the police, as well 
as surveillance video footage of the children's room where 
Garrett was discovered.  The grand jurors were provided with 
recorded interviews of four Department of Children and Families 
(DCF) social workers, interviews of the Tuckers' two eldest 
children, and various medical and DCF records to assist them in 
their deliberations. 
 
5 
 
 
That night, Adam, the Tuckers' eldest son, put Garrett to 
bed.4  The motion-activated video camera in the room showed Adam 
put Garrett in his crib at 6:23 P.M.  From the video recording 
(video), Garrett can be heard coughing prominently, wheezing, 
and gasping for air.  Between 6:30 and 7:17 P.M., Matthew 
entered the room to put Bobby, the Tuckers' adopted son, to bed.  
In order to do so, Matthew walked by Garrett's crib to Bobby's 
bed.  Matthew then left the room without checking on Garrett.  
While Matthew was in the room, Garrett continued to cough, 
wheeze, and gasp for air.  At around 7:30 P.M., the video showed 
Garrett moving and making noise.  It appeared that the last time 
Garrett moved was 7:34 P.M.  The camera next activated at around 
12:30 to 12:44 A.M., when Adam got out of bed and left the room.  
Garrett appeared on the surveillance video in the crib, 
motionless and not making any noise, in the same position he was 
in at 7:34 P.M.  Adam last activated the camera at 1:44 A.M.  At 
around 8:30 A.M., Cassandra discovered Garrett and contacted 
emergency officials. 
 
When interviewed by police, Cassandra provided a detailed 
statement recalling how she had put Garrett to bed that night.  
However, the surveillance video showed that it was Adam, not 
 
 
4 At the time, the Tuckers lived with their two biological 
children -- Darlene, an eleven year old girl, and Adam, a ten 
year old boy -- as well as their two adopted children:  Bobby, a 
three year old boy, and Jessica, a two year old girl.  
6 
 
Cassandra, who put Garrett into his crib.  She also stated that, 
at around 3 or 3:30 A.M., she observed Garrett moving and 
coughing on the surveillance video.  Officers noted that this 
statement was inconsistent with the video footage, which showed 
Garrett in the exact same position from 7:34 P.M. until he was 
discovered the following morning.  
 
b.  Weeks preceding death.  According to the Tuckers, 
around January 25, 2020, the household members became stricken 
with a cold that their eldest daughter, Darlene, had brought 
home from school.  Garrett's symptoms included a fever, cough, 
dry diapers, noisy breathing, lethargy, mucus, and congestion.  
His fever lasted for two weeks but fluctuated depending on the 
amount of food he ate.  When he was able to drink fluids, 
Garrett made a "gasping" type sound.  To treat Garrett's 
illness, the Tucker's alternated giving him children's ibuprofen 
and Tylenol, one as an anti-inflammatory and one as a pain 
reliever; hydrated him by administering liquids into his mouth 
with a syringe; gave him nebulizer treatments with albuterol; 
and attempted to hydrate and feed him when he was able to 
consume meals.5  At one point, the Tuckers called a doctor about 
 
 
5 On December 10, 2019, Garrett's pediatrician prescribed a 
nebulizer with albuterol to treat a suspected environmental or 
pet allergy from Garrett's former foster placement.  The DCF 
social worker who took him to the appointment, Helen (a 
pseudonym), filled the prescription and returned Garrett to the 
Tuckers with instructions about the nebulizer.  Cassandra began 
7 
 
their two year old daughter, Jessica, to inquire about treatment 
for her illness, because she also contracted a cold during this 
time and had preexisting medical conditions.  Her cold symptoms 
included a cough and runny nose for a week, lethargy, and a 
temperature that never exceeded 100.4 degrees.  The doctor 
advised them to remain at home because he did not want to 
introduce Jessica to the germs in the doctor's office.  The 
doctor provided assistance over the telephone. 
 
While the other children recovered from the illness, 
Matthew noted that Garrett was taking longer to recuperate.  
Cassandra stated that she contacted people at the Department of 
Children and Families (DCF) in the first week of February to 
notify them that Garrett was sick and needed to see a doctor.  
According to her, Helen, a DCF social worker, took Garrett to a 
doctor's appointment in February and, after the appointment, was 
told to continue the nebulizer treatments.  However, police were 
unable to locate any information to corroborate that Cassandra 
contacted DCF or that Garrett saw a medical professional.  Helen 
stated she did not take Garrett to the doctor in February. 
 
On February 14, Tracy, a speech pathologist, visited the 
home to perform services with the Tuckers' youngest daughter.  
 
administering the nebulizer as needed and noted that Garrett 
appeared to be responding well.  By early January 2020, Garrett 
was healthy and doing well. 
8 
 
While in the home, Tracy saw that Garrett was ill and struggling 
with a persistent cough and a respiratory cold.  She observed 
Cassandra give him a nebulizer treatment.  Tracy recalled 
inquiring whether Garrett had seen a doctor.  Cassandra 
commented that if his condition worsened, she intended to call 
or bring him to a doctor.  Between themselves, the Tuckers noted 
that if Garrett did not improve, they should take him to see a 
medical professional.  Cassandra "half-jokingly" mentioned on 
Sunday, February 16, that they should take one of the other 
children to the doctor and have the doctor examine Garrett while 
at the office.  There is no record that Garrett was seen by a 
medical professional between a December 10, 2019, doctor's 
appointment and death.6 
 
c.  Autopsy and medical testimony.  Dr. Irini Scordi-Bello, 
the forensic pathologist who performed Garrett's autopsy, 
 
 
6 For unknown reasons, Garrett missed a December 18 follow-
up appointment, and an administrative transfer of his medical 
provider to a closer office was delayed and may not have 
occurred.  According to Cassandra, with respect to her other 
foster children, depending on the social worker, either the 
Tuckers or the social worker would take the foster child to 
doctor's visits.  In this case, according to Cassandra, either 
the assigned social worker or a social worker on the unit would 
take Garrett to his appointment.  Cassandra stated that she 
never took Garrett to the doctor.  If Garrett required a 
doctor's visit, the Tuckers would contact DCF to make the 
arrangements.  However, based on their training, the Tuckers 
were aware that, in an emergency, they could take the child to 
the emergency room or urgent care and possessed the authority, 
delegated from DCF, to arrange for medical care on the child's 
behalf. 
9 
 
determined the cause of death to be complications from strep 
throat, bronchopneumonia, and a collection of fluid in his right 
lung.  She noted that he had a "massive overwhelming infection 
in the right lung" and bacteria in his bloodstream indicating 
sepsis, which meant that the bacteria had circulated to his 
other organs.  The infection caused the right lung to be 
"shrunken and collapsed," and pus filled the entire right chest 
cavity.  A toxicology report indicated that no drugs or 
medications were found in his system.7 
 
After reviewing Garrett's medical records, Scordi-Bello 
suggested that a wheezing diagnosis from December was unrelated 
to the cause of death.  She did not see evidence of asthma or 
other changes that would suggest his condition at death was 
related to wheezing, asthma, or other allergies he was diagnosed 
with in December.  Similarly, she did not believe a 
gastrointestinal rotavirus that he had had in December was 
related to or caused the pneumonia and fluid collection in his 
lung.  That Garrett was substance exposed at birth also did not 
change the determination of the cause of death.  Scordi-Bello 
noted that at the time of the December 10 appointment, Garrett's 
 
 
7 Tylenol would show on a toxicology report, although 
Scordi-Bello was unsure whether ibuprofen or albuterol would.  
Even if Garrett had been administered albuterol, she did not 
believe that it would have made an impact, because Garrett's 
improperly functioning lung was not able to receive air from the 
airway that the albuterol opened. 
10 
 
doctor described equal breath sounds on both sides of his lungs.  
That finding was inconsistent with the autopsy results, which 
showed that, in the days before his death, Garrett would not 
have had equal breath sounds because no air would have been 
circulating due to his shrunken right lung. 
 
Scordi-Bello could not state definitively how the symptoms 
would manifest but believed that, in the days leading up to his 
death, Garrett would have exhibited varying degrees of fever, a 
cough, and difficulty breathing, which could "wax and wane." 
 
Scordi-Bello added that Garrett likely was lethargic 
because of the overwhelming infection.  She could not comment on 
whether he was improving or eating, but she thought that he 
would have been ill in the days prior to death.  Last, she noted 
that the condition was treatable by administering antibiotics 
and draining the fluid from the lung and chest cavity. 
 
Dr. Sandeep Kumar, Garrett's pediatrician, testified that 
he had not seen Garrett since his December 10, 2019, appointment 
when Kumar prescribed albuterol for Garrett's wheezing with 
instructions to the DCF worker to use the nebulizer for two more 
days.  Kumar reviewed the autopsy report and noted that strep 
throat was rare in infants Garrett's age but treatable with 
penicillin.  Kumar stated that bronchopneumonia, also treatable 
with antibiotics, commonly developed as a secondary infection 
when a child had a cold and would cause the fever to spike over 
11 
 
101 degrees after five to seven days of illness.  Based on 
Garrett's laboratory results, Kumar would expect Garrett to have 
had a worsened cough, poor appetite, difficulty breathing, and 
lethargy.  Kumar opined that a lay person may see a nonstop, 
persistent cough.  Further, if a child presented to his clinic 
with Garrett's X-rays, Kumar immediately would have transferred 
the child to the emergency room. 
 
Kumar also reviewed the video of Garrett in his crib the 
night before he was discovered dead.  Kumar opined, based on his 
medical expertise, that the persistent, nonstop coughing was 
caused by the fluid in Garrett's chest pushing the breathing 
tube to one side, narrowing the airway and forcing Garrett to 
cough to breathe, which was also known as "air hunger."  Kumar 
further opined that Garrett would have been exhibiting symptoms 
of "air hunger" for at least five to seven days.  If Kumar had 
seen a patient with the "air hunger" breathing combined with 
Garrett's X-rays, Kumar would have called 911. 
 
None of these symptoms was present when Kumar last saw 
Garrett in December. 
 
After a grand juror requested that a portion of the crib 
video be played, Kumar stated that the nonstop cough exhibited 
in the video was a sign that Garrett's airway was about to be 
blocked, and that he was in obvious respiratory distress based 
on the heavy breathing and head nodding that would be apparent 
12 
 
to a caregiver whether or not the caregiver had child care 
experience.  If a patient presented with these symptoms, along 
with the symptoms described by the Tuckers, including fever over 
the course of two weeks, dehydration, and an unproductive cough 
that turned to a phlegmy cough, Kumar would have taken the child 
to the emergency room. 
 
2.  Discussion.  "Our review of the propriety of any 
indictment is limited to determining whether the grand jury 
received sufficient evidence to find probable cause for arrest 
. . . and whether the integrity of the grand jury proceedings 
was impaired."  Commonwealth v. McGahee, 393 Mass. 743, 746-747 
(1985).  "In considering a judge's decision to dismiss for lack 
of sufficient evidence [to support an indictment], we do not 
defer to the judge's factual findings or legal conclusions. 
. . .  Rather, our review is de novo" (quotation and citations 
omitted).  Clinton, 491 Mass. at 765.  Likewise, because the 
judge decided the motions following a nonevidentiary hearing, we 
review the judge's decision to dismiss for impairment of the 
grand jury de novo.  See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 492 Mass. 36, 
41-42 (2023). 
 
a.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  Although, in general, a 
"court will not inquire into the competency or sufficiency of 
the evidence before the grand jury" (citation omitted), 
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 373 Mass. 591, 592 (1977), a "grand 
13 
 
jury must hear sufficient evidence to establish the identity of 
the accused . . . and probable cause to arrest him [or her]" for 
the charged offense, McCarthy, 385 Mass. at 163.  "Probable 
cause is a 'considerably less exacting' standard than that 
required to support a conviction [beyond a reasonable doubt] at 
trial."  Commonwealth v. Stirlacci, 483 Mass. 775, 780 (2020), 
quoting O'Dell, 392 Mass. at 451.  It requires only "sufficient 
facts to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing 
that an offense has been committed."  Commonwealth v. Levesque, 
436 Mass. 443, 447 (2002). 
 
i.  Involuntary manslaughter.  The elements of manslaughter 
are derived from common law, as Massachusetts has not defined 
the offense by statute.  See Levesque, 436 Mass. at 447.  
Involuntary manslaughter is "an unlawful homicide, 
unintentionally caused . . . by an act which constitutes such a 
disregard of probable harmful consequences to another as to 
constitute wanton or reckless conduct" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Catalina, 407 Mass. 779, 783 (1990).  Wanton or 
reckless conduct usually consists of an intentional act but may 
be satisfied by an intentional omission where there is a duty to 
act.  See Commonwealth v. Hardy, 482 Mass. 416, 421 (2019); 
Levesque, supra at 448.  Wanton or reckless conduct "does not 
require that the actor intended the specific result of her 
conduct, only that he or she intended to do the wanton or 
14 
 
reckless act," Hardy, supra, "which conduct involves a high 
degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to 
another," Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 399 (1944). 
See Commonwealth v. Dawson, 490 Mass. 521, 533 (2022).  Either 
the defendant must have realized the risk of harm or a 
reasonable person, who knew what the defendant knew, would have 
realized such risk.  Hardy, supra. 
 
In concluding that the Commonwealth failed to establish 
probable cause to support the indictments for involuntary 
manslaughter, the motion judge stated that the evidence was 
insufficient to believe that the Tuckers knew or reasonably 
should have known that, by caring for Garrett at home without 
seeking urgent medical care, they were putting him at risk of 
substantial harm.  Our de novo review of the record convinces us 
that, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence that Garrett was 
gravely ill in the weeks preceding his death and that the 
Tuckers' failure to take him to a medical professional put him 
at risk that substantial harm would result.  Garrett, a ten 
month old infant, exhibited symptoms of a persistent cough, 
noisy, raspy breathing, a fluctuating fever that occasionally 
exceeded 102 degrees, dehydration, loss of appetite, lethargy, 
and congestion that lasted for at least two weeks.  Despite 
these symptoms, the Tuckers failed to seek medical attention.  
15 
 
Instead, the Tuckers treated Garrett by alternating ibuprofen 
and Tylenol, hydrating Garrett with a syringe to put drops into 
his mouth, administering albuterol with a nebulizer, and 
providing extra liquids when Garrett could consume them.  
Although Cassandra stated that she contacted DCF to arrange for 
a social worker to take Garrett to the doctor, no evidence was 
located to corroborate that Garrett was seen by a doctor in 
February or that Cassandra contacted DCF.  Helen stated that she 
never took Garrett to the doctor in February. 
 
The Tuckers were aware that Garrett required medical 
attention -- they joked that they should take one of their 
children to the doctor and bring Garrett along as an extra child 
to be examined.  The grand jury also could infer that the 
Tuckers had the ability to recognize when to seek medical care 
but decided to forgo such care in Garrett's case.  When Jessica 
became ill with symptoms less severe than Garrett's, the Tuckers 
contacted her doctor for treatment advice but did not do the 
same for Garrett despite knowing that he had a pediatrician in 
Berkshire county.  Additionally, Tracy commented to Cassandra 
that Garrett should be seen by a doctor.  Due to their foster 
parent training, the Tuckers were aware that they could seek 
emergency medical treatment, as needed. 
 
Last, the surveillance video footage of the children's 
bedroom supports probable cause to believe that the defendants 
16 
 
were wanton or reckless in their failure to seek medical 
attention.  In the video, Garrett's pronounced breathing is 
notable.  Kumar testified that the sound of the persistent 
nonstop coughing was "air hunger" as Garrett struggled to 
breathe.  The footage from the camera showed that Matthew walked 
by Garrett's crib, put another child to bed, and walked back out 
of the room without checking on him.  From this alone, a grand 
jury could conclude that a reasonable person in Matthew's 
position would have understood the high degree of risk and 
responded to Garrett's gasping breath by seeking immediate 
medical care.  The jury could infer, and Kumar testified, that 
Garrett exhibited this symptom for a period of time preceding 
the video footage and that the Tuckers were aware of the sound.  
The grand jury were permitted to discredit the Tuckers' 
statement that Garrett improved that day.  Additionally, 
Cassandra's statements that she put Garrett to bed and saw him 
moving at around 3 A.M. were contradicted by the surveillance 
footage showing that Garrett had stopped moving at around 7:34 
P.M. after Adam had put him in his crib at around 6:30 P.M.  The 
grand jury heard sufficient evidence to support probable cause 
for the indictment.  See Commonwealth v. Riley, 73 Mass. App. 
Ct. 721, 727 (2009) ("The weight and credibility of the evidence 
is wholly for the grand jury"). 
17 
 
 
This determination is supported by our case law.  In 
Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 416 Mass. 114, 116 (1993), we 
recognized that a parent may be convicted of involuntary 
manslaughter as a result of a wanton or reckless failure to seek 
medical attention for a child in the parent's care.  In so 
holding, we relied on Commonwealth v. Gallison, 383 Mass. 659, 
665 (1981), where a conviction of manslaughter was upheld after 
a parent made no effort to obtain medical help despite knowing 
that her child was gravely ill, and the evidence supported the 
determination that the parent's omission constituted a failure 
to meet her duty to provide for the care and welfare of her 
child. 
 
The Tuckers do not argue that they did not owe Garrett a 
duty of care.  Rather, they argue that the evidence presented to 
the grand jury was insufficient to show that the Tuckers or 
other parents in their position would have been aware that 
caring for a child at home created a high likelihood that grave 
danger would result.  However, Kumar testified that a lay person 
could see that the nonstop persistent cough was a sign of 
respiratory distress that was not normal breathing.  For the 
reasons stated above, the evidence provided probable cause to 
believe that the Tuckers knew or reasonably should have known 
that Garrett required immediate medical attention. 
18 
 
 
"To constitute wanton or reckless conduct, as distinguished 
from mere negligence, grave danger to others must have been 
apparent, and the defendant must have chosen to run the risk 
rather than alter his [or her] conduct so as to avoid the act or 
omission which caused the harm."  Welansky, 316 Mass. at 398.  
However, "[w]hether certain behavior is properly categorized as 
reckless or negligent is ordinarily left for the jury."  
Levesque, 436 Mass. at 452.  Where, as here, the grand jury 
returned indictments against the defendants and there was 
sufficient evidence to support those indictments, we decline to 
substitute our judgment for the grand jury's.  That is not to 
say that the evidence will be sufficient to support guilty 
verdicts at trial.  See Commonwealth v. Flynn, 420 Mass. 810, 
815 (1995); Commonwealth v. Michaud, 389 Mass. 491, 498-499 
(1983).  Rather, we conclude only that, in the unique 
circumstances of these cases, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, the grand jury were presented 
with sufficient evidence to support indictments for involuntary 
manslaughter. 
 
ii.  Reckless endangerment of a child.  A product of the 
Legislature, reckless endangerment of a child requires the 
Commonwealth to prove that the child under the age eighteen 
suffered a substantial risk of serious bodily injury and that 
the defendant wantonly or recklessly (i) engaged in conduct that 
19 
 
created the substantial risk or (ii) "failed to take reasonable 
steps to alleviate that risk where a duty to act exists."  
Commonwealth v. Coggeshall, 473 Mass. 665, 667-668 (2016).  
Unlike involuntary manslaughter, which requires the Commonwealth 
to prove that either the defendant or a reasonable person in the 
same circumstances would have realized the gravity of the 
danger, reckless endangerment of a child requires that the 
defendant actually be aware of the risk.  Hardy, 482 Mass. at 
421-422.  Because we conclude that the Commonwealth presented 
sufficient evidence for probable cause to believe that the 
Tuckers were aware that their conduct created a substantial risk 
of harm and, therefore, to support indictments for involuntary 
manslaughter, the evidence also was sufficient to support 
indictments for reckless endangerment of a child.  See id. at 
422. 
 
b.  Grand jury impairment.  In addition to finding 
insufficient evidence to support the alleged offenses, the 
motion judge dismissed the indictments because he concluded that 
the Commonwealth improperly introduced evidence of DCF 
overpayments, financial remunerations, and Cassandra's blog 
posts with no purpose other than to portray the Tuckers in a 
negative light.  On appeal, the Commonwealth asserts that the 
dismissal constitutes reversible error because the financial 
information and blog posts were relevant, were not untruthful or 
20 
 
misleading, and did not impair the integrity of the jury, as the 
prosecutor provided limiting instructions.  The Commonwealth 
argues that the motion judge erred by ignoring the established 
standard for grand jury impairment as outlined in O'Dell, 392 
Mass. at 446-447, and Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 398 Mass. 615, 
621 (1986). 
 
Matthew filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictments 
on grounds that the integrity of the grand jury proceedings was 
impaired by the Commonwealth's presentation of "irrelevant" DCF 
financial records and blogs posts written by Cassandra.  
Cassandra's pretrial motion to dismiss was confined to the 
sufficiency argument.  On appeal, Matthew raises one argument 
that was not raised below, and Cassandra raises multiple 
arguments that were not made in the Superior Court.  Because 
their arguments differ from those made before the motion judge 
and each other, we address Matthew's and Cassandra's arguments 
separately. 
 
An indictment may be dismissed when "the integrity of the 
grand jury proceeding was impaired by an unfair and misleading 
presentation to the grand jury."  O'Dell, 392 Mass. at 446-447.  
"To demonstrate that such impairment occurred, a defendant must 
establish that (1) the evidence was presented knowingly or with 
reckless disregard for its truth; (2) the evidence was presented 
with the purpose of obtaining an indictment; and (3) the 
21 
 
improper evidence probably influenced the grand jury's decision 
to indict."  Commonwealth v. Brown, 490 Mass. 171, 181 (2022), 
citing Mayfield, 398 Mass. at 621.  "Reckless disregard of the 
truth leading to the presentation of false or deceptive evidence 
could also warrant dismissal of an indictment" (citation 
omitted).  Brown, supra at 182, quoting Mayfield, supra. 
 
i.  Matthew's arguments.  On the last day of the grand jury 
presentation, the Commonwealth presented evidence that DCF 
overpaid the Tuckers for Garrett's placement, that the Tuckers 
reimbursed DCF, and that the Tuckers received payments for 
Garrett and other adopted children in their care. 
 
The Commonwealth argued that the evidence was relevant to 
establish that the Tuckers possessed a duty of care to Garrett.  
Our review of the record establishes that Matthew has not 
demonstrated that the integrity of the grand jury was impaired 
by the evidence. 
 
Under Mayfield, Matthew was required to demonstrate that 
the evidence was presented knowingly or with reckless disregard 
for its truth, for the purpose of obtaining an indictment, and 
probably influenced the jury.  Here, the financial records were 
not false, as they accurately portrayed the financial history 
between the Tuckers and DCF.  Nor were they introduced 
recklessly.  Cf. Brown, 490 Mass. at 184.  As a whole, the 
22 
 
financial information was relevant to establish that the Tuckers 
possessed a duty of care to Garrett. 
 
However, information regarding the overpayments that the 
Tuckers received and information that the Tuckers were required 
to reimburse DCF could demonstrate improper prior bad act or 
character evidence.  Assuming, without deciding, that the 
overpayment information was improper, the brief mention of the 
overpayment does not rise to the level of "recklessness" to 
satisfy the first prong of Mayfield.  For example, in Brown, the 
first prong was satisfied where the prosecutor introduced a 
"voluminous" number of the defendant's and a possible 
accomplice's Department of Correction records that demonstrated 
prior bad acts, proclivity to violence, and other general bad 
character of both defendants.  Brown, 490 Mass. at 182-184.  
There, we agreed with the motion judge that the prosecutor "was 
reckless in introducing such improper, unfairly prejudicial, and 
irrelevant evidence to the grand jury in order to obtain an 
indictment" without first weighing the fairness of the offering.  
Id. at 184.  Here, the momentary mention of the overpayments 
does not equate to the "voluminous" number of records introduced 
in Brown, and thus does not constitute recklessness under the 
first prong of Mayfield.  Therefore, the integrity of the grand 
jury was not impaired by the introduction of the financial 
records. 
23 
 
 
Similarly, the Commonwealth's introduction of blog posts 
does not satisfy the "heavy burden" that the defendants must 
demonstrate to establish impairment of the grand jury 
proceeding.  See Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 483 Mass. 1, 7 
(2019).  After the presentation of the financial records, the 
Commonwealth presented six blog posts that were read to the 
grand jury; further, the Commonwealth provided the entire blog 
as an exhibit to use in the grand jury's deliberation.  The blog 
posts detailed Cassandra's frustrations and experiences as a 
foster parent and, in the portion read to the grand jury, 
exhibited her experience with the MassHealth system, obtaining 
medical care for foster children, and dealing with a 
noncommunicative sick child who had serious unknown medical 
conditions.  Again, under Mayfield, Matthew is unable to 
establish that the posts were presented falsely or recklessly, 
or that they likely influenced the grand jury's decision.  The 
posts were relevant to Cassandra's knowledge as a foster parent 
and described her experiences with the foster care system and 
medical providers.  Although an argument could be made that the 
posts, written two years before Garrett arrived in the home, 
were too remote in time to be relevant, at the grand jury stage 
the rules of evidence are less stringent than at trial.  See 
Commonwealth v. Kater, 432 Mass. 404, 412 (2000).  Even 
assuming, without deciding, that the introduction of the 
24 
 
entirety of the blog was improper, Matthew cannot show that the 
evidence had an impact on the grand jury's determination. 
 
As the Commonwealth noted, by this time in the 
presentation, the grand jury had reviewed the powerful video 
footage of Garrett in his crib, had heard testimony from two 
medical experts, and had posed thoughtful questions to the 
witnesses about Garrett's illness and ability to breath.  As 
there was substantial other evidence of probable cause, the 
arguably improper evidence probably did not influence the grand 
jury's decision to indict.  See Commonwealth v. Hall, 485 Mass. 
145, 160 (2020); Commonwealth v. Vinnie, 428 Mass. 161, 175, 
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1007 (1998). 
 
Matthew argues that the presentation to the grand jury of 
the financial records and the blog posts, in contrast to the 
inclusion of interviews with DCF social workers referring to the 
Tuckers in a positive light only as exhibits on disc not 
specifically played for the grand jury, created a negative 
portrayal of the Tuckers.  Similarly, in stating that the 
Commonwealth presented "one-sided" testimony by failing to 
highlight the positive statements of a social worker 
complimenting the Tuckers and the social worker's statement that 
the blog posts had "nothing to do with kids," the motion judge 
classified the evidence as "exculpatory."  However, this 
evidence was not "exculpatory," as it did not contradict the 
25 
 
evidence presented by the Commonwealth and thus was not material 
evidence that the Commonwealth was required to highlight.  The 
statements consisted only of information that was not a required 
element of the offenses charged.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Washington 
W., 462 Mass. 204, 212-213 (2012) (evidence withheld from grand 
jury regarding necessary element of charged offense tainted 
integrity of grand jury proceedings, as evidence was material to 
question of probable cause for required element and likely 
influenced grand jury's decision to indict). 
 
For the first time on appeal, Matthew raises a concern 
regarding the impropriety of a statement made by Sergeant Ryan 
Dickinson, the lead investigator on the case, that the motion 
judge did not address in his decision.  Because this alleged 
flaw was not "seasonably asserted" at the trial court level, it 
is waived, and we review to determine whether there was error 
and, if so, whether a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice resulted.  See Mayfield, 398 Mass. at 622 n.4; 
Commonwealth v. Gant, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 314, 320-321 (2001).  "A 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice exists when we have 
a serious doubt whether the result . . . might have been 
different had the error not been made" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Curran, 488 Mass. 792, 794 (2021). 
 
Sergeant Dickinson testified that, when interviewed, the 
Tuckers' eldest daughter, Darlene, stated that Garrett "had a 
26 
 
slight cough" and was "struggling to breath."  However, 
examination of the interview indicates that Darlene told police 
that Garrett was getting better and was "coughing a little bit 
and that's really what he was doing.  He was having a little 
trouble breathing."8  The Commonwealth did not correct 
Dickinson's statement.  The Commonwealth also omitted Darlene's 
statement that Garrett "seemed fine, and pretty cheerful." 
 
Arguably, this is a slight mischaracterization of Darlene's 
statements and could satisfy the first two prongs of Mayfield; 
however, this is a minor misstep in the context of overwhelming 
evidence concerning Garrett's condition, including the video of 
him struggling to breathe and then stopping and remaining still 
for hours.  See Brown, 490 Mass. at 184-186 (Commonwealth's 
introduction of "inflammatory" evidence without responsibly 
weighing its fairness satisfied reckless behavior prong but did 
not require vacation of indictments where grand jury were 
presented with sufficient evidence to establish probable cause).  
Cf. O'Dell, 392 Mass. at 449 (distortion of defendant's 
statements by omitting key portions of statement impaired grand 
jury's understanding of facts, thereby impairing grand jury's 
integrity).  Notwithstanding this possible impropriety, and that 
 
 
8 The Commonwealth did not play the interview for the grand 
jury, but provided the videos as an exhibit that the grand jury 
could review at their discretion. 
27 
 
a grand juror commented on the daughter's ability to recognize 
Garrett's health issue where Matthew seemingly could not, for 
the reasons stated above, when viewed in the context of the 
entire proceeding, the evidence probably did not influence the 
grand jury's decision to indict.  Therefore, we discern no 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See Vinnie, 428 
Mass. at 175. 
 
ii.  Cassandra's arguments.  For the first time on appeal, 
Cassandra raises a litany of errors that, she alleges, the 
Commonwealth committed in its presentation of evidence to the 
grand jury.  In addition to the arguments raised by Matthew -– 
namely, the prejudicial impact of the financial records, the 
blog posts, Darlene's statement, and the failure to highlight 
positive statements from the social workers -- Cassandra asserts 
error in the Commonwealth's statement that DCF took 
"disciplinary action" against the Tuckers because of the blog, 
the presentation of the missed December 18 doctor's appointment, 
and the Commonwealth's failure to correct a witness's testimony 
about the medical condition of the Tuckers' youngest daughter.  
The combination of these errors, she argues, requires an 
affirmance of the dismissal of the indictments.  Again, because 
these alleged flaws were not raised at the trial court level, 
they are waived, and we review to determine whether there was 
error and, if so, whether a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
28 
 
justice resulted.9  See Mayfield, 398 Mass. at 622 n.4; Gant, 51 
Mass. App. Ct. at 320-321. 
 
We begin with Cassandra's argument that the "disciplinary 
action" statement presented by the Commonwealth was false.  See 
Mayfield, 398 Mass. at 621-622.  The prosecutor asked Sergeant 
Dickinson, "So, was there a point in time where [DCF] took 
disciplinary action against the Tuckers during their tenure as 
foster parents?"  The sergeant replied in the affirmative, and 
the prosecutor asked, "And what was the reason for this 
discipline?"  The witness then discussed the blog posts.  
Cassandra argues that the Commonwealth was aware that DCF did 
not take disciplinary action against the Tuckers, and thus 
presented false questions and testimony to the grand jury.  See 
Commonwealth v. Salman, 387 Mass. 160, 161, 167 (1982).  
However, upon review of the transcript, the prosecutor expanded 
on the "action" taken by DCF.  She asked, "So, Ms. Barlow-Tucker 
did stop posting her blog after DCF raised their concerns with 
her, correct?"  The witness replied, "I believe so."  Contrary 
to Cassandra's arguments, the Commonwealth represented that the 
action taken by DCF was to engage in a conversation about the 
 
 
9 For the reasons we set forth rejecting Matthew's 
arguments, Cassandra's arguments about the impact of the 
financial records, the blog posts, Darlene's statement, and the 
failure to highlight positive statements from the social 
workers, when viewed in the context of the entire proceeding, 
probably did not influence the grand jury's decision to indict. 
29 
 
appropriateness of the blog posts.  There was no attempt to 
mislead the grand jury and thus no error.  See Commonwealth v. 
Jewett, 442 Mass. 356, 364-365 (2004). 
 
Next, Cassandra asserts that the Commonwealth's 
presentation of the DCF policy and Garrett's missed December 18 
follow-up appointment, along with the Commonwealth's failure to 
highlight her December 20 e-mail message to DCF checking on the 
status of the December 18 appointment, created a false and 
misleading impression that she could not be bothered to take 
Garrett to the doctor, which prejudiced her.  She maintains that 
the Commonwealth misled the grand jury by focusing on portions 
of the Model Approach to Partnership in Parenting manual that 
stated the foster family agreed to schedule and keep any follow-
up appointments, despite the Commonwealth's knowledge that the 
arrangement of who would take the child to the appointments was 
an appointment-by-appointment or case-by-case basis.  We 
disagree.  The portion of the manual read to the grand jury 
stated that DCF delegated the authority to the foster parent to 
arrange medical care on the child's behalf.  It did not state 
that it was the foster parents' sole responsibility to arrange 
the medical care.  In fact, the grand jury heard testimony 
indicating the opposite.  The grand jury heard that the social 
worker, Helen, took Garrett to his December 10 appointment and 
knew about the December 18 follow-up appointment. 
30 
 
 
Although the Commonwealth did not present live testimony 
about Cassandra's follow-up e-mail message to DCF regarding the 
missing appointment, the Commonwealth did present discs 
containing the information for the grand jury to review.  
Further, through the recorded police interview, the grand jury 
heard Cassandra's statements that the responsibility for taking 
the children to the doctor's appointments depended on the social 
worker, which was corroborated by Dickinson's and Kumar's 
statements that a social worker took Garrett to his December 10 
appointment -- which was after Garrett began residing with the 
Tuckers on December 5.  Moreover, the issue presented in these 
cases was not whether the Tuckers provided follow-up medical 
care.  The issue was whether they provided medical care after 
they became aware that he had a serious illness.  By all 
accounts, in December 2019, Garrett was relatively healthy.  It 
was not until late January or early February 2020 that he became 
seriously ill and, as the Commonwealth argues, required medical 
attention to address his ailments.  That the Commonwealth did 
not highlight the December 20 e-mail message for a routine 
appointment was neither false nor misleading. 
 
Last, Cassandra asserts that the Commonwealth's failure to 
correct a witness's testimony about the medical condition of the 
Tuckers' youngest daughter, Jessica, was prejudicial.  On the 
last day of testimony, a grand juror asked the witness, a speech 
31 
 
pathologist, whether the daughter had a certain medical 
condition.  The medical condition that the juror mentioned was 
not the accurate condition that the daughter had.  Nonetheless, 
the witness replied, "Yes.  I mean, she has a lot of complex 
medical."  The juror prodded, "And that's a respiratory issue, 
right," to which the witness responded, "I don't think, yeah."  
The juror inquired later, "So that one could assume that the 
foster parents would have some understanding of a respiratory 
ailment, toward like the sound of one?"  The prosecutor gave an 
instruction that the witness provide only an answer from her 
personal knowledge or medical expertise as a speech pathologist.  
The witness responded, "Yeah.  So, I wouldn't know."  The 
Commonwealth did not correct the misimpression regarding the 
daughter's medical condition. 
 
"Evidence submitted in response to a question by a grand 
juror . . . is less problematic than evidence submitted 'by the 
prosecutor's design.'"  Brown, 490 Mass. at 185, quoting Vinnie, 
428 Mass. at 174-175.  The grand juror's statements about the 
medical condition, and the witness's response, were inaccurate.  
Thus, arguably, the first prong of Mayfield, i.e., that false 
evidence was presented to the grand jury, was met.  See 
Mayfield, 398 Mass. at 621. 
 
However, Cassandra is unable to meet the remaining two 
prongs -- that the evidence was presented for the purpose of an 
32 
 
indictment and probably influenced the jury.  "The record is 
devoid of evidence that the . . . [witness's] responses . . . 
were presented to the grand jury in bad faith.  Nor do we find 
any evidence that the factual discrepancies were knowing or 
purposeful."  Commonwealth v. Mathews, 450 Mass. 858, 876 
(2008).  It appeared that the witness, a speech pathologist, 
confused one ailment with another.  When the prosecutor realized 
that the witness's responses to the juror's questions may have 
been at the brink of the witness's personal knowledge or 
professional expertise, the prosecutor provided a limiting 
instruction, after which the witness stated that she did not 
know the answer to the juror's question.  The evidence was not 
presented for the purpose of an indictment, nor did it probably 
influence the jury.  Additionally, given the evidence presented 
against the Tuckers, the statement probably did not have an 
impact on the grand jury's decision to indict, and thus did not 
create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  
Therefore, Cassandra has failed to show that the Commonwealth's 
alleged misconduct created a substantial risk of a miscarriage 
of justice.  See id. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  Based on the foregoing, we reverse the 
order allowing the defendants' motions to dismiss.  We remand 
the cases to the Superior Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
33 
 
So ordered.