Title: Thomas Best v. C&M Door Controls, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: October 14, 2009

Thomas Best v. C&M Door Controls, Inc. Annotate this Case SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Thomas Best v. C&M Door Controls, Inc. (A-57-08)Argued March 10, 2009 -- Decided October 14, 2009PER CURIAM Before the Court is the interplay between fee-shifting statutes, in particular the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA) and the Prevailing Wage Act (PWA), and the offer-of-judgment rule. In 2004, Thomas Best sued his former employer, C&M Door Controls, for violations of the PWA and the CEPA, claiming that he had been underpaid on PWA work and that, when he complained, his employer retaliated against him. Invoking Rule 4:58, the offer-of-judgment rule, Best offered to take judgment in the amount of $100,000, inclusive of counsel fees against C&M. C&M countered with two offers ­ one for $15,000 and one for $25,000, also inclusive of fees, which Best rejected. A jury awarded Best $2,600 on the PWA claim and returned a verdict of no cause for action on the CEPA claim. Best thereafter sought counsel fees of $122,000 plus costs under the fee-shifting provision of the PWA. C&M sought fees under Rule 4:58-3(b) because the jury verdict was less than eighty percent of its offer of judgment. In addition, C&M requested an award under the frivolous-claim provision of CEPA. Citing Rule 4:58-3(c)(4), the judge denied fees to C&M, declaring that such an award would contravene the policies of fee shifting. He further denied C&M fees under CEPA's frivolous-claim provision because there had been no finding that Best's action was instituted "without a basis in law or fact," as required under N.J.S.A 34:19-6. The judge went on to award Best fees under the fee-shifting provisions of the PWA, limited to those that had accrued up until C&M's "more than adequate offer of judgment." That award, which was in the amount of $62,529.65, reflected a reduction of forty percent based on Best's "limited success" in the case. Both parties appealed. In a published opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of C&M's fee application under the frivolous-claim provision of CEPA for the reasons expressed by the trial judge and, additionally, because the denial of C&M's motion to dismiss the CEPA claim prior to trial obviated the possibility that the litigation could be proved frivolous. The panel further identified CEPA as the kind of statute contemplated by the exception in Rule 4:58-3, thus eliminating an offer-of-judgment award in a CEPA case. However, it distinguished the PWA from CEPA, declaring that because the PWA was intended to benefit both employers and employees, it would not be undermined by application of Rule 4:58-3. Accordingly, the panel permitted C&M to recover fees based on its offer of judgment and reversed and remanded the trial judge's contrary ruling. The panel also reversed and remanded the award to Best under the PWA because the judge had failed to make specific findings regarding the forty percent reduction based on "limited success." Finally, the panel affirmed the trial judge's decision to limit Best's award to the fees accrued prior to the July 2006 offer. The Court granted Best's petition for certification. C&M did not file a cross-petition, thus abandoning the claims for relief that it had advanced before the Appellate Division.HELD: A defendant can never be awarded fees under Rule 4:58, the offer-of-judgment rule, in a case involving the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), the Prevailing Wage Act (PWA), or a similar fee-shifting statute. However, a trial judge may take into account a plaintiff's unreasonable rejections of an offer of judgment in calculating plaintiff's award under such a statute.1. A fee-shifting statute is one that permits a deviation from the so-called American Rule that requires each party to bear its own litigation costs. Fee shifting affords access to the judicial process to persons who have little or no money with which to hire a lawyer by providing an incentive to lawyers to undertake litigation. Under CEPA, aprevailing employee is entitled to an award of reasonable counsel fees. A prevailing employer may also be awarded fees, but only where a judge determines that the action was instituted by plaintiff "without basis in law or in fact." The PWA provides a fee-shifting remedy to a prevailing employee. The purpose of that provision has been recognized as an effort to vindicate the public policy underlying the PWA by ensuring that "competent counsel" will represent "plaintiffs with bona fide claims," even if the amount in controversy is not great. (Pp. 5-7)2. The offer-of-judgment rule permits a party to offer to take a monetary judgment or to allow judgment to be taken against it for a sum certain. The fundamental purpose of the rule is to induce settlement by discouraging the rejection of reasonable offers of compromise. That goal is achieved through the imposition of financial consequences (the award of fees and costs) where a settlement offer turns out to be more favorable than the ultimate judgment. Under Rule 4:58, an offer of judgment must distinguish between the substantive claim and any fee component. Rule 4:58-3(c) seeks to reconcile the offer-of-judgment rule with fee shifting by assuring that the palliative fee-award provisions that provide an incentive to lawyers to take on public interest litigation are not diluted by an award of fees to a defendant under Rule 4:58. (Pp. 7-10)3. The trial judge and the Appellate Division properly recognized the applicability of the fee-shifting exception to a CEPA case. Although CEPA entitles a prevailing employee to the benefits of fee shifting, the Act does not permit a prevailing employer to receive an award of fees except in a narrow band of cases in which "the court determines that an action brought by an employee under this act was without basis in law or in fact." N.J.S.A. 34:19-6. In other words, the employer must be vindicated and the employee must have proceeded without basis in law or in fact in order for the employer to recover fees. Because a rule can never trump a statute, it is clear that an employer cannot obtain an award of fees under the offer-of-judgment rule where the employer would not be entitled to such an award under CEPA. The Court reaches a similar conclusion with respect to the PWA. Under the PWA, only the employee can obtain an award of fees. The reason is obvious: employers generally have the wherewithal to defend an employee's claim. Fee shifting evens the playing field for employees who may have been denied the prevailing wage, and whose damages may be small, by providing an incentive to lawyers to take their cases. There is nothing in the fee-shifting provision of the PWA that would place it outside the reach of the exception in Rule 4:58-3(c). The award of fees to C&M on Best's PWA claim was barred by Rule 4:58-3(c) and the Appellate Division's contrary holding cannot stand. (Pp. 10-13)4. The Appellate Division agreed with the trial judge that Best's award should have been limited to the fees accrued at the point at which an "entirely reasonable" offer of judgment had been proffered. The Court is in accord, in theory, with that approach. The Court agrees with the courts below that if a judge determines, under all the circumstances, that defendant proffered a reasonable offer of judgment that plaintiff unjustifiably rejected, that is a factor to be taken into account in determining plaintiff's entitlement to fees. The problem with the application of that modality in this case is twofold. First, the offer was a global one that did not distinguish the substantive claims from the fees, but included all damages for plaintiff's CEPA and PWA claims "and any and all costs, expenses and/or attorneys fees." As a result, on this record the Court does not know what was offered on Best's PWA claim. More importantly, the Court cannot reconcile the judge's award of $62,529.65 in fees and costs accrued up to the time of C&M's offer with his conclusion regarding the reasonableness of the offer. On this point there is a disconnect requiring a reversal and remand for reconsideration of the issue of whether, under all relevant circumstances, C&M's offer, in fact, was reasonable and whether Best rejected it without cause. Finally, the Appellate Division was on solid ground in requiring the trial judge to explain why he reduced Best's award by forty percent. (Pp. 13-15)5. Summing up, with respect to C&M, the Court affirms insofar as the Appellate Division approved the trial judge's denial of C&M's application for fees under CEPA. The Court reverses insofar as the panel declared the offer-of- judgment rule to warrant an award of fees to C&M under Rule 4:58-3 on Best's PWA claim. Regarding Best, the Court affirms the Appellate Division's order that he be awarded fees under the PWA, but remands the fee calculation for reconsideration in respect of the percentage reduction related to the failed CEPA claim, the reasonableness of C&M's offer of judgment, and, ultimately, the reasonableness of the fee award in its totality. The matter is remanded for a recalculation of Best's fee in accordance with the principles to which the Court has adverted. (Pp. 15-16) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. 2 CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE, RIVERA- SOTO, and HOENS join in this opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 57 September Term 2008THOMAS BEST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.C&M DOOR CONTROLS, INC., Defendant-Respondent, andCHRISTOPHER O'KEEFE and MICHAEL CRAVEN, Defendants. Argued March 10, 2009 ­ Decided October 14, 2009 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 402 N.J. Super. 229 (2008). Steven J. Greenstein argued the cause for appellant (Tobin, Reitman, Greenstein, Caruso, Wiener & Konray, attorneys). John F. Casey argued the cause for respondent (Wolff & Samson, attorneys; Mr. Casey and Kiran V. Somashekara, on the briefs). Lewis H. Robertson submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Mr. Robertson, Jeanne Locicero, and Edward L. Barocas, attorneys). PER CURIAM In 2004, Thomas Best sued his former employer, C&M DoorControls, for violations of the Prevailing Wage Act (PWA),N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.25 to -56.47, and the Conscientious EmployeeProtection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14, claiming that hehad been underpaid on PWA work and that, when he complained, hisemployer retaliated against him. Invoking Rule 4:58-3, theoffer-of-judgment rule, Best offered to take judgment in theamount of $100,000, inclusive of counsel fees against C&M. C&Mcountered with two offers -- one for $15,000 and one for$25,000, also inclusive of fees, which Best rejected. A juryawarded Best $2,600 on the PWA claim and returned a verdict ofno cause for action on the CEPA claim. Best thereafter sought counsel fees of $122,000 plus costsunder the fee-shifting provisions of the PWA, N.J.S.A. 34:11- C&M sought fees under Rule 4:58-3(b) because the jury 56.40.verdict was less than eighty percent of its offer of judgment.In addition, C&M requested an award under the frivolous-claimprovision of CEPA, N.J.S.A. 34:19-6. Citing Rule 4:58-3(c)(4), which provides an exception fromthe operation of the offer-of-judgment rule in cases in which "afee allowance would conflict with the policies underlying a fee-shifting statute," the judge denied fees to C&M, declaring thatsuch an award would contravene the policies of fee shifting. Hefurther denied C&M fees under CEPA's frivolous-claim provision 2because there had been no finding that Best's action wasinstituted "without a basis in law or fact," as required underN.J.S.A. 34:19-6. The judge went on to award Best fees under the fee-shiftingprovisions of the PWA, limited to those that had accrued upuntil C&M's "more than adequate offer of judgment." That award,which was in the amount of $62,529.65, reflected a reduction offorty percent based on Best's "limited success" in the case.According to the judge, "others prosecuting similar claims havespent approximately forty percent of their time on the CEPAclaim." Both parties appealed. In a published opinion, theAppellate Division affirmed the denial of C&M's fee applicationunder the frivolous-claim provision of CEPA for the reasonsexpressed by the trial judge and, additionally, because thedenial of C&M's motion to dismiss the CEPA claim prior to trialobviated the possibility that the litigation could be proved Best v. C&M Door Controls, Inc., 402 N.J. Super. frivolous.229, 239 (2008). The panel further identified CEPA as the kind of statutecontemplated by the exception in Rule 4:58-3, thus eliminatingan offer-of-judgment award in a CEPA case. Id. at 246-47.However, it distinguished the PWA from CEPA, declaring thatbecause the PWA was intended to benefit both employers and 3employees, it would not be undermined by application of Rule4:58-3. Id. at 244-45. Accordingly, the panel permitted C&M torecover fees based on its offer of judgment and reversed and Id. at 247-48. The remanded the trial judge's contrary ruling.panel also reversed and remanded the award to Best under the PWAbecause the judge had failed to make specific findings regardingthe forty percent reduction based on "limited success." Id. at248. Finally, the panel affirmed the trial judge's decision tolimit Best's award to the fees accrued prior to the July 2006offer. Id. at 249. We granted Best's petition for certification. 197 N.J. 13(2008). Best essentially argues that C&M was not entitled to anaward of fees under Rule 4:58 because the rule is inapplicablein a fee-shifting case and that his own fees should not havebeen cut off at the point of C&M's offer of judgment. C&M didnot file a cross-petition for certification, thus abandoning theclaims for relief that it had advanced before the AppellateDivision. What is before us is the interplay between fee-shiftingstatutes, in particular CEPA and the PWA, and the offer-of-judgment rule. We hold that a defendant can never be awardedfees under Rule 4:58 in a case involving CEPA, the PWA, or asimilar fee-shifting statute. However, a trial judge may take 4into account a plaintiff's unreasonable rejection of an offer ofjudgment in calculating plaintiff's award under such a statute. I. A fee-shifting statute is one that permits a deviation fromthe so-called American Rule that requires each party to bear its See, e.g., R. 4:42-9. Fee shifting own litigation costs.affords access to the judicial process to persons who havelittle or no money with which to hire a lawyer by providing anincentive to lawyers to undertake litigation. Coleman v. FioreBros., Inc., 113 N.J. 594, 597 (1989) (quoting Carlstadt Educ.Ass'n v. Mayor & Council of Carlstadt, 219 N.J. Super. 164, 166(App. Div. 1987)). From matters involving consumer fraud, N.J.S.A. 56:8-19, to instances of discriminatory treatment, N.J.S.A. 10:5- 27.1, the New Jersey Legislature has promulgated a "substantial number of statutes authorizing an award of a reasonable counsel fee to the attorney for the prevailing party." Although the underlying purpose of those statutes may vary, they share a common rationale for incorporating a fee-shifting measure: to ensure "that plaintiffs with bona fide claims are able to find lawyers to represent them[,] . . . to attract competent counsel in cases involving statutory rights, . . . and to ensure justice for all citizens." [New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 185 N.J. 137, 152-53 (2005) (citations omitted).] 5In the main, CEPA and the PWA are typical fee-shifting statutes.1 A. CEPA "seek[s] to overcome the victimization of employeesand to protect those who are especially vulnerable in theworkplace from the improper or unlawful exercise of authority by Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ., 138 N.J. employers."405, 418 (1994). The counsel-fee element of CEPA was enacted toensure that plaintiffs have access to the judicial system and to See New guarantee the availability of competent counsel.Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium, supra, 185 N.J. at 152-53 (quoting Coleman, supra, 113 N.J. at 598). Thus, underCEPA, a prevailing employee is entitled to an award ofreasonable counsel fees. N.J.S.A. 34:19-5(e). A prevailingemployer may also be awarded fees, but only where a judgedetermines that the action was instituted by plaintiff "withoutbasis in law or in fact." N.J.S.A. 34:19-6. B. The PWA was enacted to "establish a prevailing wage levelfor workmen engaged in public works in order to safeguard theirefficiency and general well-being and to protect them as well as1 We do not include in our analysis statutes which allow fees to be awarded to any prevailing party. Those "winner take all" enactments are not typical fee-shifting statutes insofar as their purpose is not to attract counsel to pursue public interest litigation, but only to make the prevailing party whole. 6their employers from the effects of serious and unfaircompetition resulting from wage levels detrimental to efficiencyand well-being." N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.25. See Dep't of Labor v.Titan Constr. Co., 102 N.J. 1, 6 (1985) (recognizing PWA'sintent to protect employers and employees). In furtherance ofits goals, the PWA provides a fee-shifting remedy to aprevailing employee. N.J.S.A. 34:11-56.40. The purpose of thatprovision has been recognized as an effort to vindicate thepublic policy underlying the PWA by ensuring that "competentcounsel" will represent "plaintiffs with bona fide claims," evenif the amount in controversy is not great. See New Jerseyansfor a Death Penalty Moratorium, supra, 185 N.J. at 152-53(quoting Coleman, supra, 113 N.J. at 598). II. The offer-of-judgment rule permits a party to offer to takea monetary judgment or to allow judgment to be taken against it R. 4:58-3. The fundamental purpose of the for a sum certain.rule is to induce settlement by discouraging the rejection ofreasonable offers of compromise. See, e.g., Palmer v. Kovacs,385 N.J. Super. 419, 425 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 356 (2006); Sovereign Bank v. United Nat. Bank, 359 N.J. Super. 534, 542 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 177 N.J. 489 (2003);Firefreeze v. Brennan & Assoc., 347 N.J. Super. 435, 441 (App.Div. 2002). That goal is achieved through the imposition of 7financial consequences (the award of fees and costs) where asettlement offer turns out to be more favorable than theultimate judgment. Firefreeze, supra, 347 N.J. Super. at 441. Rule 4:58-1(a) provides generally for the making andacceptance of an offer of judgment: Except in a matrimonial action, any party may, at any time more than 20 days before the actual trial date, serve on any adverse party, without prejudice, and file with the court, an offer to take a monetary judgment in the offeror's favor, or as the case may be, to allow judgment to be taken against the offeror, for a sum stated therein (including costs). The offer shall not be effective unless, at the time the offer is extended, the relief sought by the parties in the case is exclusively monetary in nature. Rule 4:58-2(a) sets forth the consequences of the non-acceptance of a claimant's offer: If the offer of a claimant is not accepted and the claimant obtains a money judgment, in an amount that is 120% of the offer or more, excluding allowable prejudgment interest and counsel fees, the claimant shall be allowed, in addition to costs of suit: (1) all reasonable litigation expenses incurred following non-acceptance; (2) prejudgment interest of eight percent on the amount of any money recovery from the date of the offer or the date of completion of discovery, whichever is later, but only to the extent that such prejudgment interest exceeds the interest prescribed by R. 4:42- 11(b), which also shall be allowable; and (3) a reasonable attorney's fee, which shall belong to the client, for such subsequent services as are compelled by the non- acceptance. 8 [(Emphasis added).]It goes without saying that the comparative calculationalrequirements of Rule 4:58 necessitate that an offer of judgmentunder that rule must distinguish between the substantive claimand any fee component. Concomitantly, Rule 4:58-3 governs the non-acceptance bythe non-claimant and provides: (a) If the offer of a party other than the claimant is not accepted, and the claimant obtains a monetary judgment that is favorable to the offeror as defined by this rule, the offeror shall be allowed, in addition to costs of suit, the allowances as prescribed by R. 4:58-2, which shall constitute a prior charge on the judgment. (b) A favorable determination qualifying for allowances under this rule is a money judgment in an amount, excluding allowable prejudgment interest and counsel fees, that is 80% of the offer or less. (c) No allowances shall be granted if (1) the claimant's claim is dismissed, (2) a no-cause verdict is returned, (3) only nominal damages are awarded, (4) a fee allowance would conflict with the policies underlying a fee-shifting statute or rule of court, or (5) an allowance would impose undue hardship. If, however, undue hardship can be eliminated by reducing the allowance to a lower sum, the court shall reduce the amount of the allowance accordingly.22 Originally, Rule 4:58-3(c) did not include the fee-shifting exception. In 2006, the rule was amended to its present form. Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1 on R. 4:58 (2009). Lurking in the margins of this case was the question of which version of the rule applied to the offers and judgment, which 9 [(Emphasis added).]The underscored language in Rule 4:58-3(c) seeks to reconcilethe offer-of-judgment rule with fee shifting by assuring thatthe palliative fee-award provisions that provide an incentive tolawyers to take on public interest litigation are not diluted byan award of fees to a defendant under Rule 4:58. Itsapplicability to CEPA and the PWA is what is before us. III. We turn first to the award to C&M under the offer-of-judgment rule. The question presented is a straightforward one:whether a fee allowance to a non-claimant under the offer-of-judgment rule "would conflict with the policies underlying" CEPAand the PWA. R. 4:58-3(c). A. The trial judge and the Appellate Division properlyrecognized the applicability of the fee-shifting exception to aCEPA case. Indeed, although CEPA entitles a prevailing employeeto the benefits of fee shifting, the Act does not permit apreceded the amendment. We agree with the Appellate Division that the amendment is the operative rule. In particular, we adopt the reasoning expressed in Judge Stern's concurring opinion, for we discern the amendment not as a change in the rule, but a clarification to expressly state what had always been implied -- that a court rule can never be applied in contravention of the goals underlying a statute. Best, supra,402 N.J. Super. at 253-54 (Stern, J., concurring); accord Pressler, supra, comment 1 on R. 4:58. 10prevailing employer to receive an award of fees except in anarrow band of cases in which "the court determines that anaction brought by an employee under this act was without basisin law or in fact." N.J.S.A. 34:19-6. In other words, underCEPA, the employer must be vindicated and the employee must haveproceeded without basis in law or in fact in order for theemployer to recover fees.3 Those are the only circumstancesunder which the Legislature declared that an employer may beawarded fees under that statute. On its face, that standard issignificantly higher than that contained in Rule 4:58-3, whichwould permit an award to an employer who has not beenvindicated. Because a rule can never trump a statute, it isclear that an employer cannot obtain an award of fees under theoffer-of-judgment rule where the employer would not be entitledto such an award under CEPA.4 B. We have reached a similar conclusion with respect to thePWA. We begin by expressing our disagreement with the Appellate3 The Law Against Discrimination (LAD) similarly provides that no fees can be awarded to a prevailing respondent "unless there is a determination that the complainant brought the charge in bad faith." N.J.S.A. 10:5-27.1. 4 We note that, by its express terms, Rule 4:58-3(c) prohibits an allowance of fees to a non-claimant "when a no-cause verdict is returned." Because the jury returned such a verdict on Best's CEPA claim, any award to C&M in this case is barred on entirely separate grounds. 11Division's determination that the PWA is not a typical fee-shifting statute because of its twin goals of protectingemployers and employees. That is only part of the analysis.The issue is not only whose rights the PWA was drafted toprotect, but also for whose benefit the fee-shifting provisionwas intended. Under the PWA, only the employee can obtain anaward of fees. The reason is obvious: employers generally havethe wherewithal to defend an employee's claim. Fee shiftingevens the playing field for employees who may have been deniedthe prevailing wage, and whose damages may be small, byproviding an incentive to lawyers to take their cases. In otherwords, there is nothing about the fee-shifting provision of thePWA that would place it outside the reach of the exception inRule 4:58-3(c). The text of the statute supports that view. The PWAprovides that an employee who is successful in connection withhis claim is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees for the N.J.S.A. 34:11- institution and maintenance of the action.56.40. The PWA makes absolutely no provision for the payment ofcounsel fees to a prevailing employer and we take from theabsence of such a provision a legislative intention to precludesuch fees. Indeed, other sections of Title 34 of the New JerseyStatutes, of which the PWA is a part, specifically allow fees to 12a prevailing employer who has been sued by an employee. See,e.g., N.J.S.A. 34:11B-12 (Family Leave Act). Yet, no suchallowance has been provided in a PWA case. Where theLegislature affords a remedy in one part of a statute, butexcludes it in another, we ordinarily deem the omission to bepurposeful and apply the statute accordingly. Higgins v.Pascack Valley Hosp., 158 N.J. 404, 419 (1999) (citing GE SolidState, Inc. v. Div. of Taxation, 132 N.J. 298, 307-08 (1993)).In short, we do not perceive in the legislative scheme anintention to permit an employer to recover fees under the PWA,presumably because the employer, unlike the employee, has theresources to support such litigation. That said, the award offees to C&M on Best's PWA claim was barred by Rule 4:58-3(c) andthe Appellate Division's contrary holding cannot stand. IV. We turn then to the award to Best under the fee-shiftingprovision of the PWA. A. The Appellate Division agreed with the trial judge thatBest's award should have been limited to the fees accrued at thepoint at which an "entirely reasonable" offer of judgment had Best, supra, 402 N.J. Super. at 249-50. We are been proffered.in accord, in theory, with that approach. 13 Although, for the reasons we have explained, a defendantcannot be awarded fees in a PWA case for a plaintiff's refusalto accept a settlement offer, plaintiff's application must bescrutinized, as are all statutory fee claims, against areasonableness standard, including an assessment of plaintiff'srejection of a reasonable offer of judgment in favor of thecontinuation of litigation. In short, we agree with the courtsbelow that if a judge determines, under all the circumstances,that defendant proffered a reasonable offer of judgment thatplaintiff unjustifiably rejected, that is a factor to be takeninto account in determining plaintiff's entitlement to fees. The problem with the application of that modality in thiscase is twofold. First, the offer was a global one that did notdistinguish the substantive claims from the fees, but includedall damages for plaintiff's CEPA and PWA claims "and any and allcosts, expenses and/or attorneys fees." As a result, on thisrecord we do not know what was offered on Best's PWA claim. More importantly, we cannot reconcile the judge's award of$62,529.65 in fees and costs accrued up to the time of C&M'soffer with his conclusion regarding the reasonableness of theoffer. How could a global offer of $25,000 for Best's CEPA andPWA claims and all costs and fees (even assuming some compromiseon the fees) be reasonable if the judge ultimately determinedthat the reasonable fees and costs accrued up to that point, 14standing alone, were over $62,000? Conversely, how could feesof $62,000 be deemed reasonable, if the $25,000 offer, inclusiveof fees, was reasonable? That disconnect requires a reversaland remand for reconsideration of the issue of whether, underall relevant circumstances, C&M's offer, in fact, was reasonableand whether Best rejected it without cause. B. We turn finally to the Appellate Division's reversal of thetrial judge's order reducing Best's award by forty percent basedon his "limited success" in the litigation. Little need be saidof that point, except that the appellate panel was on solidground in requiring the trial judge to explain his calculationas required by our Court Rules. R. 1:6-2(f). V. Summing up, the judgment of the Appellate Division isaffirmed in part and reversed in part. With respect to C&M, weaffirm insofar as the Appellate Division approved the trialjudge's denial of C&M's application for fees under CEPA. Wereverse insofar as the panel declared the offer-of-judgment ruleto warrant an award of fees to C&M under Rule 4:58-3 on Best'sPWA claim. Regarding Best, we affirm the Appellate Division'sorder that he be awarded fees under the PWA, but remand the feecalculation for reconsideration in respect of the percentagereduction related to the failed CEPA claim, the reasonableness 15of C&M's offer of judgment, and, ultimately, the reasonablenessof the fee award in its totality. The matter is remanded for arecalculation of Best's fee in accordance with the principles towhich we have adverted. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO, and HOENS join in this opinion. 16 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEYNO. A-57 SEPTEMBER TERM 2008ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior CourtTHOMAS BEST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.C&M DOOR CONTROLS, INC., Defendant-Respondent, andCHRISTOPHER O'KEEFE and MICHAEL CRAVEN, Defendants.DECIDED October 14, 2009 Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING OPINION BY Per Curiam CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY AFFIRM IN PART/ CHECKLIST REVERSE IN PART/ REMAND CHIEF JUSTICE X RABNER X JUSTICE LONG X JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X JUSTICE ALBIN X JUSTICE WALLACE X JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO X JUSTICE HOENS TOTALS 7