Title: Neuvert v. Woodman
Citation: 185 Kan. 373, 343 P.2d 206
Docket Number: 41,273
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: August 10, 1959

185 Kan. 373 (1959)
343 P.2d 206
D.G. NEUVERT, Appellant,
v.
K.T. WOODMAN and D.J. IANNITTI, partners d/b/a Woodman-Iannitti Drilling Co., Appellees.
No. 41,273

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed August 10, 1959.
Marvin E. Thompson, of Russell, argued the cause, and George W. Holland and Clifford R. Holland, Jr., both of Russell, were with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Boyce P. Hardman, of Great Bend, argued the cause, and Herbert Diets, of Great Bend, was with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This is an appeal from an order striking an amended petition from the files.
The facts necessary to a proper understanding of the controversy between the parties, as well as those essential to a proper disposition of the appellate issues involved, are not in dispute and appear from the pleadings and motions, the contents of which should be set forth at length.
Plaintiff, D.G. Neuvert, commenced the action by filing a petition against defendants, K.T. Woodman and D.J. Iannitti. Omitting averments, relating to identity of the parties, legal description of real estate, and the prayer, that pleading reads:
So far as here pertinent Exhibit "A" of the petition, the agreement entered into by the parties on July 9, 1956, reads:
Exhibits "B" to "H," inclusive, of the petition, are oil and gas lease assignments covering the acreage listed in the second paragraph of the agreement. These were alike in form and each contained the following provision:
In due course defendants demurred to the petition on the ground it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. After a hearing this demurrer was sustained under an order allowing plaintiff ten days in which to amend.
Instead of appealing from the ruling on the demurrer plaintiff filed an amended petition within the time granted by the trial court. This pleading, in all respects, was identical in form and language with the original petition except for the addition of two sentences. These sentences, which were inserted following the semicolon and before the word "that" as they appear in Paragraph Seven of the original petition, heretofore quoted, read:
Following the filing of the amended petition, in manner and form as indicated, defendants filed a motion to strike that pleading from the files. Such motion, as filed and presented in the court below, is set forth in the abstract. Since, as will presently appear, it discloses the reasons on which that tribunal based its subsequent ruling, and there is some quibble between the parties on that subject, we deem it necessary to quote pertinent portions of the motion. They read:
After due consideration the trial court, on April 12, 1958, found that the motion to strike the amended petition should be sustained for the reasons set forth in such motion and entered its order accordingly. Thereupon plaintiff perfected the instant appeal by giving notice he was appealing from the findings, orders and judgment rendered by the district court on April 12, 1958, and from any and all other adverse rulings.
*378 Appellant's claim the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the petition, on the ground it failed to state a cause of action, should be disposed of at the outset. That ruling was an appealable order (G.S. 1949, 60-3302; Standard Steel Works v. Crutcher-Rolfs-Cummings, Inc., 176 Kan. 121, 269 P.2d 402). No appeal was taken therefrom within the time prescribed by G.S. 1949, 60-3309, and error with respect thereto is not specified in the involved notice of appeal. In that situation it is clear that, under our decisions, such ruling is not subject to appellate review. (See Kerr v. Carson, 133 Kan. 289, 291, 299 Pac. 929; Hamill v. Hamill, 134 Kan. 715, 717 8 P.2d 311; Rodenberg v. Rodenberg, 149 Kan. 142, 143, 86 P.2d 580; Lane v. Franco-Central Oil Co., 184 Kan. 789, 339 P.2d 1; Pennington v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 180 Kan. 638, 639, 305 P.2d 849; Hill v. Lake, 182 Kan. 127, 318 P.2d 1050; Holmes v. Kalbach, 173 Kan. 736, 252 P.2d 603; Daniels v. Wood Construction Co., 175 Kan. 877, 267 P.2d 517; Schindler v. Ross, 182 Kan. 277, 283, 320 P.2d 813.) It is equally clear that, under his notice of appeal, appellant is limited to review of the order sustaining the motion to strike his amended petition from the files.
At this point the force and effect to be given the ruling sustaining the demurrer to the petition, while disposing of the appellate issue here involved, may well be noted. Throughout the years this court has held that, unappealed from, such a ruling becomes the law of the case and must be treated as an adjudication the petition in question did not state a cause of action. (See, e.g., Hendricks v. Wichita Federal Savings &amp; Loan Ass'n, 156 Kan. 124, 131 P.2d 889; Turner v. Benton, 183 Kan. 97, 102, 325 P.2d 349; Lane v. Franco-Central Oil Co., 789, 790, supra; McGee v. City of Kansas City, 184 Kan. 797, 799, 800, 339 P.2d 2.) Moreover, it is committed to the rule that, unappealed from, such a ruling remains the law of the case in the absence of a changed ruling by the trial court or an amendment to the petition which materially affects the cause of action attempted to be pleaded. (Hendricks v. Wichita Federal Savings &amp; Loan Ass'n, 126, supra.) In passing it may be stated that here the trial court made no change in its ruling on the demurrer.
Another claim advanced by appellant is that the court erred in its order of April 12, 1958, in using appellees' motion to strike the petition from the files to test the sufficiency of the amended petition. The premise on which this contention is based is fallacious and wholly unfounded. In the face of the reasons set forth in the *379 motion and the trial court's action in sustaining such motion for the reasons therein set forth, it becomes apparent that tribunal, contrary to appellant's position, gave consideration to and ruled on the motion in its true light, i.e., as a motion to strike the amended petition from the files on the basis its allegations were repetitious, contained no additional substantial facts which would affect the ruling on the original petition, and required it to either ignore its previous ruling or again review and pass upon what it had already determined by that adjudication. By the same token it is obvious an additional argument made by appellant to the effect the trial court may have treated the motion as a demurrer in ruling thereon, thus making the question of the sufficiency of the amended petition subject to review in the instant appeal, lacks merit and cannot be upheld.
Nor can it be successfully argued, as appellant contends, that appellees did not make repetition one of the grounds for the sustaining of their motion to strike. Inherent in a claim of res judicata, present in the motion to strike and relied on by the trial court in its ruling sustaining the motion for the reasons therein set forth, is the proposition that the same question had been previously ruled on and decided under conditions and circumstances so similar in character that the trial court should not be required to again adjudicate it.
Moreover when faced by the trial court's ruling sustaining the motion to strike for the reasons therein set forth, it cannot be denied, indeed we must assume, that tribunal based its decision on the premise that, in sustaining the demurrer to the original petition, it had previously determined and adjudicated such pleading failed to state a cause of action because the forfeiture provision in each of the lease assignments attached thereto created only a conditional promise to drill an oil well which would not support the cause of action therein attempted to be pleaded; and that, since the amended petition contained no additional material facts which would affect its prior ruling, it was not required to again pass upon what it had already determined by its previous adjudication.
Having established the manner in which the trial court treated the motion to strike, and the premises on which it based its ruling with respect thereto, we can now turn to appellant's over-all claim to the effect that, under the confronting conditions and circumstances, the trial court committed reversible error in sustaining the involved motion. As we approach this question it may be *380 stated that in this jurisdiction its decision does not require that we here plow any virgin field or announce new and startling principles of law.
In Fidelity Hail Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 172 Kan. 253, 239 P.2d 830, while dealing with a like question, involving conditions and circumstances so similar that decision can almost be said to be a controlling precedent, we held:
And in the opinion said:
The opinion in the above case is replete with authorities supporting what is there said and held. For that reason, and to avoid burdening our reports with undue citation of authorities, we make pages 254, 255 and 256 of that opinion a part of this opinion by reference.
For a more recent decision of similar import see Farran v. Peterson, 181 Kan. 145, 150, 309 P.2d 677. See, also, Rine Drilling Co. v. Popp, 184 Kan. 13, 19, 20, 334 P.2d 426, where, as in the Farran case, Fidelity Hail Ins. Co. v. Anderson, supra, is cited with approval and the syllabus quoted at length.
Based on what has been heretofore stated and held we are satisfied (1) that the record presented establishes that the trial court sustained the demurrer to the original petition solely on the premise the forfeiture provision included in each of the assignments, attached to and made a part of that pleading, precluded appellant's *381 recovery for failure to drill a well, hence such pleading failed to state a cause of action; (2) that the only allegations added to the amended petition, i.e., of an oral release by the appellant of the restriction in the lease assignments of the location for the drilling site and the fact appellees had engaged in certain activities preliminary to actual drilling, did not affect or change the forfeiture provision contained in any of the assignments; (3) that, since they did not do so, such allegations failed to add any material facts to the amended petition which would affect the result as against a demurrer; and (4) that, for all practical purposes, the filing of the amended petition in form, as heretofore described, required the trial court to either again review and pass upon what it had already determined or ignore its former ruling.
Furthermore, in view of what has just been stated and for other reasons set forth at length in the opinion, we are convinced the rule, announced and adhered to in the decisions, to which we have last above referred, is applicable and that application thereof compels a conclusion the trial court did not commit reversible error in sustaining the motion to strike under the heretofore related conditions and circumstances.
In reaching the conclusion just announced we have not been unmindful of decisions relied on by appellant holding that under our code of civil procedure great liberality is allowed in the amendment of pleadings. Quite true. The difficulty, from his standpoint, in this case, is that in this jurisdiction it is well-established such rule is not to be extended to the point where  as here  the confronting conditions and circumstances are such they make it appear the purpose to be served by the filing of the amended pleading is to require the trial court to either again review or else ignore the unappealed from appealable order theretofore directly involved and determined.
Finally it should be stated, as we have heretofore pointed out, this appeal is limited to a review of the order sustaining the motion to strike the amended petition from the files. It follows we have no right to reach out and here determine questions raised by appellant, touching the sufficiency of the amended petition, which, in final analysis, seek to have this court review the propriety of the trial court's order sustaining the demurrer to the original petition.
The judgment is affirmed.