Title: P. v. Casper
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S114285
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: June 3, 2004

1
Filed 6/3/04 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S114285 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/1 D038550 
DAVID JAMES CASPER, 
) 
 
) 
San Diego County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SCD151173 
___________________________________ ) 
 
In this case involving the three strikes law, the trial court dismissed the strike 
allegation as to 34 of 35 counts.  (Pen. Code,1 §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12; 
People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 499, 503-504 (Garcia).)  The issue here 
is whether the trial court had discretion to sentence defendant concurrently on 
those counts for which the strike allegation had been dismissed, and which did not 
arise on the same occasion or under the same set of operative facts, or whether it 
was required to sentence all such counts consecutively under section 667, 
subdivision (c).2  We conclude the trial court must impose consecutive sentences 
                                             
 
1  
All further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated. 
2  
The relevant portions of the initiative version of the three strikes law 
adopted by the voters in November 1994 (§ 1170.12) and the March 1994 
legislative version (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)) are virtually identical.  For convenience, 
we refer to section 667, subdivisions (b)-(i). 
 
 
2
under these circumstances pursuant to the clear language of the three strikes law.  
We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The underlying facts are not important to the issue in this case.  Suffice it to 
say that beginning in October 1999 with the burglary of his parents’ home, 
defendant David James Casper embarked on a month-long crime spree.  He was 
ultimately apprehended and charged with 35 felony counts, including carjacking, 
residential burglary, 25 robbery counts, four attempted robbery counts, numerous 
personal use of a firearm enhancements, two prior prison term allegations, and one 
prior serious or violent felony strike allegation. 
Defendant pled guilty and admitted all allegations.  The trial court dismissed 
the strike allegation as to all counts except the carjacking count.  (§ 1385.)  It 
sentenced defendant to 104 years eight months in state prison.  In particular, the 
trial court selected the carjacking as the principal term, imposing the low term of 
three years to be doubled (§ 667, subd. (e)(1)), consecutive to a 10-year term for 
use of a firearm and a five-year term for the prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, 
subd. (a)), for a total of 21 years.  For the remaining 34 counts, the trial court 
grouped the counts essentially by the separately occurring crimes and sentenced 
without reference to section 667, subdivision (e). 
As for those crimes arising on different occasions, the trial court stated that a 
“consecutive sentence is required . . . .  I am not able to allow concurrent 
sentences.  I do want the record to reflect that if I had the ability to exercise my 
discretion it would be my attempt to fashion a sentence that would give 
Mr. Casper the chance of maybe some day getting out of prison, not to say he 
definitely would but would give him the chance and that would be talking about an 
 
3
age . . . somewhere between the age of 68 or 70, now being 29. . . .  However, I 
cannot give him that opportunity under the law because Garcia says I cannot.”3 
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for resentencing.  Relying on 
our opinion in Garcia, supra, 20 Cal.4th 490, it held the consecutive sentencing 
requirements of the three strikes law did not apply to those counts on which the 
strike allegation had been dismissed, and hence consecutive sentencing was not 
required under that law even if the counts were not committed on the same 
occasion and did not arise under the same set of operative facts. 
We granted the Attorney General’s petition for review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
The three strikes law is a comprehensive, integrated sentencing scheme 
which applies to all cases coming within its terms.  (See § 667, subd. (f)(1) 
[“Notwithstanding any other law, subdivisions (b) to (i), inclusive, shall be applied 
in every case in which a defendant has a prior felony conviction as defined in 
subdivision (d)”]; People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 [in determining 
whether to strike a prior serious or violent felony conviction pursuant to section 
1385, courts “must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of 
his present felonies and prior [strike] convictions, and the particulars of his 
background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the 
[three strikes] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as 
though he had not previously been convicted”; “bare antipathy to the 
consequences for any given defendant” should play no part in the determination]; 
see also People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 980.) 
                                             
 
3  
Defendant’s sentence was later recalled.  After further briefing and 
argument regarding the issue of consecutive sentencing, the trial court declined to 
alter the earlier imposed sentence. 
 
4
As we delineated at length in People v. Hendrix (1997) 16 Cal.4th 508 
(Hendrix), by its terms, section 667, subdivision (c)(6) and (7) requires 
consecutive sentences whenever a defendant with one or more qualifying prior 
convictions is convicted, as here, of multiple serious or violent felonies “not 
committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the same set of operative 
facts.”4  (§ 667, subd. (c)(6); Hendrix, at pp. 512-513; People v. Deloza (1998) 18 
Cal.4th 585, 594 [“Making mandatory consecutive sentences for those current 
crimes committed on different occasions is consistent with the focus of the three 
strikes law, which is recidivism”].)  Consecutive sentencing is discretionary under 
section 667, subdivision (c) only if the current felony convictions are “committed 
on the same occasion” or “aris[e] from the same set of operative facts.”  (§ 667, 
subd. (c)(6) & (7); Hendrix, at pp. 512-513; see People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 
Cal.3d 1002, 1007-1008 [When the statutory “language is clear and unambiguous, 
there is no need for construction”].) 
In addition, section 667, subdivision (c)(6) and (7) applies to “a current 
conviction” for more than one “felony.”  As the Attorney General notes, the “term 
                                             
 
4 
Section 667, subdivision (c) provides in relevant part: 
 
“(c)  Notwithstanding any other law, if a defendant has been convicted of a 
felony and it has been pled and proved that the defendant has one or more prior 
felony convictions as defined in subdivision (d), the court shall adhere to each of 
the following:  [¶] . . . . [¶] 
 
“(6) If there is a current conviction for more than one felony count not 
committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the same set of operative 
facts, the court shall sentence the defendant consecutively on each count pursuant 
to subdivision (e). 
 
“(7) If there is a current conviction for more than one serious or violent 
felony as described in paragraph (6), the court shall impose the sentence for each 
conviction consecutive to the sentence for any other conviction for which the 
defendant may be consecutively sentenced in the manner prescribed by law.” 
 
5
‘felony’ is not modified, explicitly or implicitly, by any requirement that these 
multiple felonies be ones to which strike allegations attach.”  Here, while the 
strike allegation was dismissed as to 34 of the 35 counts, defendant nevertheless 
remained subject to the consecutive sentencing requirements of section 667, 
subdivision (c) by virtue of the one count that retained the strike allegation. 
Defendant asserts that a contrary conclusion is compelled by our decision in 
Garcia, supra, 20 Cal.4th 490.  In Garcia, this court held that the trial court was 
not bound by the length of sentence provisions of section 667, subdivision (e) for 
those current convictions as to which the strike allegations had been dismissed.  
(Garcia, at pp. 495, 499-500.)  In that case the trial court had imposed consecutive 
sentences for the two burglary counts that arose on different occasions, and thus 
we did not directly address whether such consecutive sentencing was required 
under the three strikes law.  (Id. at pp. 495, 500.)  It is axiomatic that cases are not 
authority for propositions not considered.  (People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 
236, 243.) 
Moreover, in Garcia, in response to an argument by the Attorney General, 
we stated, “The Attorney General . . . points to the requirement in the Three 
Strikes law that sentencing on distinct current offenses be consecutive (§§ 667, 
subd. (c)(6)-(8), 1170.12, subd. (a)(6)-(8)) and without any aggregate term 
limitation (§§ 667, subd. (c)(1), 1170.12, subd. (a)(1)).  The Attorney General 
argues that striking prior conviction allegations with respect to one count, but not 
with respect to another, undermines this principle of consecutive Three Strikes 
sentences.  Again, we disagree.  A requirement that a defendant serve the 
individual sentences for different current felonies consecutively does not indicate 
how the trial court should determine the lengths of those individual sentences.  
Here, for example, the trial court conformed to the consecutive sentencing 
requirement by ordering that the 16-month sentence for the Gantt burglary be 
 
6
served consecutively to the 30-year-to-life sentence for the Kobel burglary.  
Therefore, we see nothing in the trial court’s action that is inconsistent with the 
consecutive sentencing requirement in the Three Strikes law.  Rather, the court 
expressly applied that requirement.”  (Garcia, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 500.)  Thus, 
Garcia did not anticipate that its holding regarding section 667, subdivision (e) 
would have any effect on the consecutive sentencing requirements of section 667, 
subdivision (c). 
In sum, there can be no doubt after examining the language of section 667, 
subdivision (c) but that consecutive sentences are required for all current felony 
convictions, regardless of whether a strike allegation attaches to them, if the 
crimes did not arise on the same occasion or under the same set of operative facts.  
Reaching a different conclusion here as to this requirement would distort the 
statutory language, eviscerate the three strikes law, and return to trial judges a 
discretion in sentencing both the Legislature and the electorate sought to severely 
curtail.5 
                                             
 
5  
Given our resolution of this issue, we need not address the Attorney 
General’s further argument that it would be an abuse of discretion to impose 
concurrent sentences in this case for those crimes that were not committed on the 
same occasion and did not arise from the same set of operative facts. 
 
7
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the case remanded to 
that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
This case presents a sentencing issue under the highly complex “Three 
Strikes and You’re Out Law” (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12, hereafter 
the Three Strikes law).1  The issue is this:  When a court at sentencing exercises its 
discretion under section 1385 to dismiss a prior felony conviction alleged as a 
strike, and it dismisses that conviction as to some but not all counts of which the 
defendant was convicted, does the Three Strikes law nonetheless require the court 
to impose consecutive sentences on all counts?  Otherwise stated, does the 
dismissal of the prior conviction as to a particular count free that count from all or 
only some of the restrictions that the Three Strikes law imposes? 
The majority holds that the Three Strikes law requires consecutive 
sentences on all counts, even those as to which the only qualifying prior 
conviction has been dismissed under section 1385.  I disagree.  When a prior 
conviction alleged as a strike has been dismissed as to a particular count, the effect 
of the dismissal is to release that count entirely from the restrictions imposed by 
the Three Strikes law, including the consecutive sentencing requirement. 
                                             
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2 
I 
During a one-month period in late 1999, defendant David James Casper 
committed 19 separate robberies and one residential burglary.  For these crimes, 
he pled guilty to 35 felony counts and admitted, among other things, one prior 
felony conviction alleged under the Three Strikes law.  At sentencing, the court 
exercised its authority under section 1385 to dismiss the prior conviction as to all 
but one of the counts.  Believing it was nonetheless required by the Three Strikes 
law to impose consecutive sentences on all offenses committed during separate 
incidents, the court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 104 years and 
eight months in state prison—effectively imprisonment for life without possibility 
of parole.  The court noted for the record that it would have sentenced more of the 
terms concurrently had it possessed the discretion to do so. 
The Court of Appeal vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing.  
It concluded that the Three Strikes law does not require consecutive sentencing of 
counts as to which the only qualifying prior conviction has been dismissed under 
section 1385. 
II 
Section 1385, enacted in 1872, authorizes a judge “in furtherance of 
justice” to “order an action to be dismissed.”  Because “[t]he authority to dismiss 
the whole includes, of course, the power to dismiss or ‘strike out’ a part” (People 
v. Burke (1956) 47 Cal.2d 45, 51), the trial court’s power under section 1385 to 
dismiss the entire action necessarily includes the power to dismiss a part of the 
action, including a prior conviction alleged for purposes of increasing the 
sentence.  Accordingly, this court has held that section 1385’s dismissal power 
extends to a prior conviction alleged for purposes of sentencing, and that the trial 
court may exercise this power either before or after the prior conviction has been 
3 
admitted or established by the evidence.  (People v. Burk, supra, at p. 51; accord, 
People v. Thomas (1992) 4 Cal.4th 206, 209.) 
The Three Strikes law requires the prosecution to allege certain prior 
convictions for sentencing purposes.  (§§ 667, subd. (f)(1) [“[t]he prosecuting 
attorney shall plead and prove each prior felony conviction . . . .”], 1170.12, subd. 
(d)(1) [same].)  A defendant with one qualifying prior conviction (see §§ 667, 
subd. (d) [specifying which prior felony convictions qualify], 1170.12, subd. (b) 
[same]), commonly known as a second strike defendant, is subject to various 
sentencing consequences, two of which are relevant here.  First, the punishment 
for a new offense is doubled.  (§§ 667, subd. (e)(1) [“the determinate term or 
minimum term for an indeterminate term shall be twice the term otherwise 
provided as punishment for the current felony conviction.”], 1170.12, subd. (c)(1) 
[same].)  Second, consecutive sentences are mandatory if there is more than one 
new offense, unless the offenses are interrelated.  (§§ 667, subd. (c)(6) [“If there is 
a current conviction for more than one felony count not committed on the same 
occasion, and not arising from the same set of operative facts, the court shall 
sentence the defendant consecutively on each count . . . .”], 1170.12, subd. (a)(6) 
[same].) 
Prior convictions alleged under the Three Strikes law are subject to the trial 
court’s dismissal power under section 1385.  (People v. Superior Court (Romero) 
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 529-530.)  Noting that “the statutory power to dismiss in 
furtherance of justice has always coexisted with statutes defining punishment,” 
this court explained that a statute defining punishment will not be construed as 
eliminating a court’s dismissal power “ ‘absent a clear legislative direction to the 
contrary.’ ”  (Id. at p. 518.)  This court found no such direction in the Three 
Strikes law.  (Id. at pp. 519-529.)  Indeed, the wording of subdivision (f)(2) of 
section 667, which expressly recognizes the court’s dismissal power under section 
4 
1385, and the legislative history of the Three Strikes law, which included the 
rejection of an amendment that would have permitted the court to exercise the 
power only on the prosecutor’s motion, persuaded this court that the Legislature 
deliberately chose not to eliminate or restrict the trial court’s power to dismiss 
prior felony convictions.  (People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, at p. 520.) 
Under the Three Strikes law, a qualifying prior conviction need not be 
alleged separately as to each count, but may be alleged once as to all counts.  
(People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 502.)  Nevertheless, a qualifying prior 
conviction alleged once as to all counts may be stricken selectively as to 
individual counts.  (Ibid.)  In reaching this conclusion, this court again relied on 
the principle that the power to dismiss the whole includes the power to dismiss a 
part.  “[T]hough a defendant’s prior conviction status does not change from one 
count to another, and though it is appropriate to allege that status only once as to 
all current counts, the effect under the Three Strikes law of a defendant’s prior 
conviction may change from one count to another.”  (Ibid.) 
What is the purpose of the trial court’s dismissal power under section 1385 
as applied to prior conviction allegations?  This court has explained that the 
“purpose of striking a sentencing allegation under section 1385 is to effectuate the 
decision that ‘ “in the interest of justice” defendant should not be required to 
undergo a statutorily increased penalty which would follow from judicial 
determination of that fact.’ ”  (People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 
Cal.4th at p. 524, fn. 11, quoting People v. Burke, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 50.)  
Thus, the purpose of the power is to allow the sentencing court some discretion to 
reduce the sentence that would otherwise be imposed to a level that is consistent 
with defendant’s individual culpability and society’s interests in punishing and 
deterring criminal behavior.  (See People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 160-
161 [discussing factors a trial court may consider when exercising its section 1385 
5 
discretion in a Three Strikes case].)  In short, “the underlying purpose of striking 
prior conviction allegations is the avoidance of unjust sentences.”  (People v. 
Garcia, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 500.) 
The majority concludes that when a trial court exercises its section 1385 
power to dismiss a prior conviction alleged under the Three Strikes law, and it 
dismisses the prior conviction as to some but not all of the new offenses, the effect 
of the dismissal is to free the affected counts from the term-doubling requirement 
but not from the consecutive-sentencing requirement.  Yet nothing in the language 
of the Three Strikes law or section 1385 requires or justifies this conclusion.  On 
the contrary, the effect of dismissing the prior conviction as to a particular count is 
to place that count beyond the reach of the Three Strikes law, and to permit the 
trial court to impose sentence on that count as if defendant had no prior 
conviction. 
The majority notes that consecutive sentences are mandatory under the 
Three Strikes law unless the current convictions are “committed on the same 
occasion” or “arise[e] from the same set of operative facts” and that this provision 
requiring consecutive sentences is not qualified by any requirement that prior 
conviction allegations attach to the particular counts.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 4-5.)  
But these observations are beside the point.  The Three Strikes law nowhere refers 
to prior conviction allegations attaching to particular counts because, as this court 
has explained, the Three Strikes law permits the prior conviction to be alleged 
“once as to all counts” (People v. Garcia, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 502) and does not 
expressly provide for the selective application of the Three Strikes sentencing 
scheme to some counts but not others.  The lack of such an express provision, 
however, did not prevent this court from rejecting the argument that “prior 
conviction allegations describe a status that a defendant either does or does not 
have, but cannot have with respect to one count and not another.”  (Ibid.)  This 
6 
court concluded, to the contrary, that a prior conviction allegation may be 
dismissed selectively, on a count-by-count basis.  (Ibid.) 
The majority does not deny that a trial court may dismiss a prior conviction 
selectively, on a count-by-count basis, but it imposes an additional and irrational 
form of selectivity, over which the trial court has no control.  According to the 
majority, the dismissal of a prior conviction on a count-by-count basis operates 
selectively in the sense that, as to the affected counts, the prior conviction 
allegation ceases to exist for one purpose (term doubling) but not for another 
purpose (consecutive sentencing).  This interpretation is not only confusing and 
conceptually awkward, it is also inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the 
section 1385 dismissal power in the Three Strikes context, which is to avoid unjust 
sentences by allowing some or all of the current offenses to be punished outside 
the Three Strikes sentencing scheme.  Under the majority’s holding, the trial court 
must dismiss the prior conviction as to all counts to avoid mandatory consecutive 
sentencing on any of the counts. 
The majority’s holding substantially and unnecessarily impairs trial court 
discretion to impose just punishment under the Three Strikes law by dismissing 
prior conviction allegations or findings selectively, on a count-by-count basis.  
Under the majority’s holding, the affected counts are at once inside and outside the 
purview of the Three Strikes law.  Agreeing with the Court of Appeal here, I 
would hold that the affected counts are not subject to either the term-doubling or 
the mandatory-consecutive-sentencing requirements of the Three Strikes law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
I CONCUR: 
WERDEGAR, J. 
1 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Casper 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 105 Cal.App.4th 1373 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S114285 
Date Filed: June 3, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Frederic L. Link 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Michael B. McPartland, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, 
Assistant Attorney General, Pamela A. Ratner Sobeck, Steven T. Oetting, Anthony Da Silva, Arlene 
Aquintey Sevidal and Kevin R. Vienna, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Michael McPartland 
P.O. Box 4509 
Palm Desert, CA  92261-4509 
(760) 776-4243 
 
Kevin R. Vienna 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West “A” Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2204