Title: Seramone-Isaacs v. Mells
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 34, 2003
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: April 28, 2005

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
PAULA SERAMONE-ISAACS, 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 34, 2003 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
§  
 
 
Appellant,  
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   C.A. No. 01C-06-132 
VICTORIA MELLS and  
 
§  
RASHIDA BERRY, 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
Plaintiffs Below,  
§  
 
 
Appellees.  
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  February 2, 2005 
 
 
 
 
     Decided:   April 28, 2005 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.   
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
James A. Haley, Jr., Esquire, Ferrara, Haley, Bevis & Solomon, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Keith E. Donovan, Esquire, Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, 
Dover, Delaware, for appellees. 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
2
 
This is an appeal from a final judgment that was entered in the 
Superior Court following a jury trial.  The plaintiffs-appellees, Victoria 
Mells and Rashida Berry, filed a civil action for negligence against the 
defendant-appellant, Paula Seramone-Isaacs, as a result of a motor vehicle 
accident.  The jury awarded Rashida Berry $25,000 and awarded her 
husband, Larry Piper, $1,000 for loss of consortium.  We have concluded 
that those judgments must be affirmed. 
Defendant’s “Theory” Excluded 
 
In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial judge’s rulings on 
the plaintiffs’ motion in limine prevented the defendant from presenting her 
theory of the case to the jury, to wit:  “a very minimal impact had occurred 
between the parties’ vehicles, which has caused the plaintiff [Rashida 
Berry], at most, minimal muscle strain.”  According to the defendant, that 
theory was developed by way of expert analysis and would have been 
presented by expert opinions from Peter A. Cripton, Ph.D. and David C. 
Stephens, M.D.  The defendant represents that “Dr. Cripton’s analysis 
depended in significant part upon his evolution of post-accident photographs 
of the parties’ vehicles.  Likewise, Dr. Stephens reviewed and relied on [the 
same photographs].” 
 
3
Motion in Limine 
 
The Superior Court granted the plaintiffs’ multi-faceted pretrial 
motion in limine.  The trial judge excluded the testimony of the defendant’s 
biomechanical expert, Peter A. Cripton, Ph.D., in its entirety.  In addition, 
the trial judge limited the testimony of the defense medical expert, Dr. 
Stephens, by directing that he not mention either damage to the plaintiffs’ 
vehicle or the absence of air bag deployment.  The trial judge also excluded 
all photographs of the damaged vehicle.  Finally, the trial judge limited the 
permissible scope of the proffered testimony of the defendant. 
 
The plaintiffs’ motion in limine was presented in open court in the 
presence of a court reporter.  The defendant acknowledges, however, that 
there is no record of either the parties’ arguments or the trial judge’s ruling 
on the motion in limine.  Apparently, the parties neither requested nor did 
the trial judge direct the court reporter to take down the arguments and the 
ruling.  Unaware that the proceedings on the motion in limine had not been 
recorded, the trial judge simply memorialized his rulings in a short order.  
On appeal, the defendant has presented this Court only with what purports to 
be an unsigned copy of that order. 
 
4
Issues on Appeal 
 
The defendant has raised four issues on appeal, and all of them relate 
to the trial judge’s rulings on the plaintiffs’ motion in limine.  The 
defendant’s first contention is that the trial judge committed an error of law 
and also abused his discretion when he completely precluded her 
biomechanical engineering expert, Dr. Peter Cripton, from testifying.  
Second, the defendant argues that the trial judge committed an error of law 
and also abused his discretion when he precluded her medical expert, Dr. 
David Stephens, from testifying about certain portions of his expert opinion.  
Third, the defendant submits that the trial judge abused his discretion when 
he precluded the defendant, Paula Isaacs, from testifying that there was 
minimal impact when she struck Victoria Mells’ vehicle.  Finally, according 
to the defendant, the trial judge abused his discretion because his rulings 
collectively eliminated the defendant’s theory of the case on the morning of 
trial.  
In this appeal, the defendant seeks to have this Court apply our 
decisions in Davis v. Maute,1 Mason v. Rizzi2 and Eskin v. Carden,3 to issues 
involving the admissibility of crash vehicle photographs and the expert 
                                          
 
1 Davis v. Maute, 770 A.2d 36 (Del. 2001). 
2 Mason v. Rizzi, 843 A.2d 695 (Del. 2004). 
3 Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d 1222 (Del. 2004). 
 
5
testimony proferred by the defendant’s medical doctor and biomechanical 
engineer.  The trial in this matter took place after this Court’s decision in 
Davis v. Maute, but before this Court’s decisions in Mason v. Rizzi and 
Eskin v. Carden.  The defendant argues that the trial judge failed to apply 
Delaware Rule of Evidence 702.  The defendant further submits that the trial 
judge misconstrued the holdings of this Court in Davis v. Maute4 and the 
Superior Court’s decision in Rizzi v. Mason5 that was pending on appeal at 
the time of trial and subsequently affirmed by this Court.6   
Inadequate Appellate Record 
Supreme Court Rules 9(e)(ii) and 14(e) “direct all parties to order a 
transcript and to include in their appendix those portions of the record which 
are relevant to any claims on appeal.”7  The record provided to this Court by 
an appellant “‘must include a transcript of all evidence relevant to the 
challenged finding or conclusion.’”8  Our rules also place the burden upon 
the appellant of producing “‘such portions of the trial transcript as are 
necessary to give this Court a fair and accurate account of the context in 
which the claim of error occurred.’”9   
                                          
 
4 Davis v. Maute, 770 A.2d 36 (Del. 2001). 
5 Rizzi v. Mason, 799 A.2d 1178 (Del. Super. Ct. 2002). 
6 Mason v. Rizzi, 843 A.2d 695 (Del. 2004). 
7 Tricoche v. State, 525 A.2d 151, 154 (Del. 1987). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
 
6
 
In this case, the defendant, as the appellant, had the burden of 
providing this Court with a transcript of the pretrial hearing on the plaintiffs’ 
motion in limine so that this Court has “‘a fair and accurate account of the 
context in which the claim of error occurred.’”10  It is undisputed that there 
is no transcript of the pretrial hearing at which the plaintiffs’ pretrial motion 
in limine was presented and ruled upon.  Therefore, this Court has no 
adequate basis for evaluating the merits of the defendant’s claims on 
appeal.11   
 
The defendant submits that she was unable to provide a transcript of 
the hearing and ruling on the plaintiffs’ motion in limine because the court 
reporter did not record the proceeding.  Where no transcript is made of a 
proceeding, Rule 9(g) of this Court provides the appellant with a remedy.  
That subsection states:   
(g)  Record in lieu of transcript.  In any case in which the 
testimony 
or 
other 
pertinent 
matter 
has 
not 
been 
stenographically recorded, any factual material which shall be 
necessary to the disposition of the issues may be certified by the 
trial court, and, when filed with the clerk of that court shall 
become part of the record.  In any such case, the matter so 
incorporated in the record shall be so prepared as to present 
only the rulings of the trial court on matters of law and shall 
contain only such statements of fact as may be necessary to 
                                          
 
10 Id. 
11 Slater v. State, 606 A.2d 1334, 1336-37 (Del. 1992); Tricoche v. State, 525 A.2d 151, 
154 (Del. 1987).  See also Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 
714 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 
7
review those rulings.  The parties may enter into a stipulation as 
to the substance of testimony or other proceedings as may be 
essential to a decision of the issues to be presented on the 
appeal, whether or not a stenographic record has been made.  
The stipulation shall be approved by the judge of the trial court 
and certified to this Court in lieu of a transcript and without the 
necessity of the directions required under subparagraphs (ii) and 
(iii) of paragraph (e) above.  Delay in the preparation of such 
statement shall not enlarge any of the time periods established 
hereunder.     
 
In this appeal, the defendant did not utilize the provisions in Rule 9(g) 
that permit the filing of a certification from the trial court or a stipulation 
approved by the trial judge.  Although Rule 9(g) procedures are not 
mandatory, without a record of the hearing and the trial judge’s ruling on the 
plaintiffs’ motion in limine, we are unable to review the issues raised by the 
defendant in this appeal.12  All of the defendant’s claims of error on appeal 
are inextricably intertwined with the unrecorded hearing and ruling on the 
plaintiffs’ motion in limine.  The record which does exist reflects that 
whenever the defendant asked the trial judge to modify his prior rulings, 
during the course of trial, the rationale of the unavailable decision on the 
motion in limine was determinative.   
                                          
 
12 Slater v. State, 606 A.2d 1334, 1336-37 (Del. 1992) and Tricoche v. State, 525 A.2d 
151, 154 (Del. 1987).  See also Barilaro v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 876 F.2d 260 (1st 
Cir. 1989); Sil Flo v. SFHC, 917 F.2d 1507 (10th Cir. 1990).   
 
8
Conclusion 
 
It is the appellant’s responsibility to provide this Court with a record 
of the trial proceedings that are relevant to the claims of error raised on 
appeal.13  The appellant must bear the consequence of not discharging that 
duty.14  In the absence of a record to review, it is impossible for this Court to 
discharge its appellate function and determine whether there was either an 
error of law or an abuse of discretion in any of the trial judge’s rulings on 
the plaintiffs’ motion in limine.  Accordingly, the judgments of the Superior 
Court must be affirmed. 
 
                                          
 
13 Supreme Court Rules 9(e)(ii) and 14(e). 
14 Slater v. State, 606 A.2d 1334, 1336-37 (Del. 1992) and Tricoche v. State, 525 A.2d 
151, 154 (Del. 1987).  Accord United States v. First National Bank, 691 F.2d 386 (8th 
Cir. 1982). 
 
9
 
No. 34, 2003 
 
Honorable Richard R. Cooch 
Superior Court of Delaware 
500 N. King Street, Suite 10400 
Wilmington, DE   19801 
 
James J. Haley, Jr., Esquire 
Ferrara, Haley, Bevis & Solomon 
P.O. Box 188 
Wilmington, DE   19899 
 
Keith E. Donovan, Esquire 
Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams 
29 N. State Street, Suite 100 
Dover, DE  19901