Title: Ratzlaff v. Franz Foods of Arkansas
Citation: 468 S.W.2d 239
Docket Number: 5-5600, TO 5-5602
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: June 21, 1971

468 S.W.2d 239 (1971) Arthur RATZLAFF et al., Appellants, v. FRANZ FOODS OF ARKANSAS, Appellee. Nos. 5-5600 to 5-5602. Supreme Court of Arkansas. June 21, 1971. *240 John O. Maberry, Eureka Springs, and Putman, Davis &amp; Bassett, Fayetteville, for appellants. Crouch, Blair, Cypert &amp; Waters, Springdale, for appellee. BYRD, Justice. Appellants Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Ratzlaff, Mr. and Mrs. Harold C. Collins and Mr. and Mrs. S. D. Molter brought separate actions against appellee Franz Foods of Arkansas, a subsidiary of Tyson's Foods, an Arkansas Corporation, to recover damages for certain noxious wastes discharged into the sewer system of the city of Green Forest, Arkansas, that allegedly polluted Dry Creek, a stream running through appellants' properties. The trial court sustained a demurrer and dismissed each of the complaints. The three causes have been consolidated in this court because of the identity of the issues. The complaints set forth that appellants are dairy farmers owning lands through which Dry Creek runs and then allege: In determining whether or not the complaints state a cause of action we find that we must consider and analyze three established principles of law. The first proposition is the general rule that one who creates a nuisance such as pollution of a stream is liable to lower riparian owners for the direct and probable consequence of the nuisance. See Smith v. Magnet Cove Barium Corp., 212 Ark. 491, 206 S.W.2d 442 (1947) and Spartan Drilling Co. v. Bull, 221 Ark. 168, 252 S.W.2d 408 (1952). The second proposition is that a user of a city sewer is clothed with immunity from liability once he lawfully deposits his sewage in the sewage system. The theory upon which immunity from liability is granted to the user is that once the sewage is deposited in the city's conduit, the user no longer has control of the disposal of the sewage because by law the city is given the exclusive right to control and dispose of sewage. See Carmichael v. City of Texarkana, 8 Cir., 116 F. 845, 54 C.C.A. 179 (1902). It was upon this theory, apparently, that the trial court dismissed appellants' complaints. The third principle of law is that a party who owes no obligation to third persons or the public in general may by contract assume an obligation to use due care towards such third persons or the public in general. See Hogan v. Hill, 229 Ark. 758, 318 S.W.2d 580 (1958) and Collison v. Curtner, 141 Ark. 122, 216 S.W. 1059 (1919). When this principle is read in connection with the complaint allegations that the appellee violated its contract with the city to remove certain refuse to prevent oversaturation of the city's sewage disposal facilities, we find that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrers and dismissing the complaints. This is supported by both logic and authority. The very essence of the immunity from liability, stated in the second principle above, is that the user of the city's conduit loses control of sewage once it is deposited and that exclusive control thereafter is in the city. However here the allegation is that the user who contracted not to oversaturate the city's treatment facilities violated such contract and thereby caused a pollution of the appellants' lands. Under such allegations it does not logically follow that a user in violation of his contract can wrest the control of the city's sewage facilities from the city and at the same time stand behind the immunity which the law accords in the second principle stated above. Furthermore, in Carmichael v. City of Texarkana, supra, it was recognized that a user under some circumstances could be liable. It was there stated: Reversed and remanded.