Title: 1631 Second Avenue North, L.L.C. v. Sam Raine III and Antoinette Raine
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1051463
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 9, 2007

REL: 02/09/2007
Second Avenue v. Raine
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
____________________
1051463
____________________
1631 Second Avenue North, L.L.C.
v.
Sam Raine III and Antoinette Raine
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court 
(CV-05-4917)
SEE, Justice.
A purchaser sought damages and specific performance pro
tanto of his contract with the sellers, who owned only part of
the property they had contracted to sell.  The trial court,
after 
considering 
the 
contractual 
relationship 
between
1051463
Sam Raine III's ownership interest in lot 8 is unclear
1
in the record.  The trial court's summary-judgment order
states that Sam Raine III owns "a one-half interest in Lot 8."
However, it also states that Judy Lynn Blotcky owns a "one-
half of the east half of Lot 8" and that the Lewis Family
Trust owns "the west one-half of Lot 8."  These property
2
purchaser and the seller and the potential resulting cotenancy
among strangers, declined to order specific performance pro
tanto.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Facts and Procedural History
This case concerns the sale of a hotel building in
downtown Birmingham.  Sam Raine, Jr., Norman Ceravalo, and
Sammy Ceravalo purchased the Thomas Jefferson Hotel, which was
later renamed the Cabana Hotel.  These three individuals sold
the hotel twice and then repurchased it after the purchasers
went bankrupt.  When Sam Raine, Jr., died, most of his
interest in the hotel passed to his wife, Antoinette Raine. 
The hotel occupies lots 1, 2, and 3, block 96, Survey of
Birmingham prepared by Elyton Land Survey Company, and an
annex to the hotel occupies lots 4 and 5.  The adjacent
parking lot occupies lots 8, 9, and 10.  Today, Antoinette
Raine owns two-thirds of the hotel and one-third of the annex.
Antoinette Raine's son and codefendant, Sam Raine III, owns
one-half of the eastern half of lot 8  and one-half of the
1
1051463
interests total more than the whole of lot 8.  The Raines,
however, state that Sam Raine III owns "one-half of the East
one-half of Lot 8."
3
eastern 25 feet of lot 10.  Sammy Ceravalo and Norman Ceravalo
own the remaining one-third of the hotel and the remaining
two-thirds of the annex.  Judy Lynn Blotcky owns one-half of
the eastern half of lot 8 and one-half of the eastern 25 feet
of lot 10.  The Lewis Family Trust owns the western half of
lot 8, all of lot 9, and the western 75 feet of lot 10.
Jeff Notrica, doing business as 1631 Second Avenue North,
L.L.C. ("Second Avenue"), decided to purchase the Cabana Hotel
building.  He authorized his real-estate agent, Bill Arant, to
assist him in preparing an offer.  Arant, knowing that Sam
Raine, Jr., had owned part of the hotel before his death in
2003, telephoned Steve Salter, Sam's son-in-law, to inquire
about the property.  Salter referred him to Bill Beavert, who
showed the property to prospective buyers and acted as an
intermediary between purchasers and the Raine family.  
Beavert showed Arant the property, and Beavert told Arant
that "young Sam and his mother are the ones that need to sign
[the contract]."  Beavert notified Sam Raine III that someone
was interested in purchasing the property.  Raine told Beavert
1051463
4
to contact Antoinette Raine and that she and Sam III would be
receptive to an offer.  Notrica executed a contract to
purchase the property for $750,000, agreeing to deposit
$50,000 as earnest money, and Beavert delivered the offer to
Antoinette Raine.  The contract identified the "seller" as
"Cabana Hotel Group," a nonexistent entity whose name was
inserted into the contract by Arant, who intended to determine
the actual owners of the Cabana Hotel at a later time.  Sam
III and Antoinette Raine made some changes to the contract,
initialed it, and sent it back to Notrica for his signature.
It is not apparent from the record how many times the contract
passed between the purchaser and the sellers, but at some
point the purchase price increased to $1.1 million.  Also, the
Raines added Exhibit B to the contract, which contains a
warranty providing that "Seller is the fee owner of the
Property or is authorized to execute this document for the fee
owner."  Antoinette Raine's initials appear on every page of
the contract, and Sam Raine III signed it.  The last date on
the contract is June 24, 2004, when Notrica last signed the
contract.  The contract provided that "time is of the essence"
and that "[t]he sale shall be closed and a deed delivered on
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5
or before September 15, 2004, except Seller shall have a
reasonable length of time within which to perfect title or
cure defects in the title of the property."
Early 
in 
the 
negotiations, 
it 
was 
apparent 
that
delinquent state taxes in the amount of $237,000 had to be
paid in order to clear the title to the property.  The taxes
were not paid by September 15, 2004, and that date passed
without a closing.  Second Avenue states that it agreed to
give the Raines time to settle the tax issue with the State.
Second Avenue also states that Arant and Beavert spoke
frequently about resolving the tax issue, both on the
telephone and at Arant's office.
On March 18, 2005, Arant wrote Beavert a letter
confirming the validity of the June 2004 contract and
confirming that "the Seller is working toward clearing up the
title to the property."  The letter indicated that Notrica was
ready to begin environmental testing on the property and would
do so when he knew that the title could be, and would be,
cleared.  The letter included a space for Beavert to sign to
indicate his agreement with the letter.  Although Beavert
never signed the letter, Arant testified that Beavert told
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The Raines claim that Beavert at all times represented
2
to Arant that the Ceravalos would have to sign any contract
for purchase, but they offer as proof an unsigned affidavit by
Beavert.  Sam Raine III also testified that he "kept telling
Mr. Arant" to present the contract to the Ceravalos, but he
does not remember when he told Arant that he needed to contact
the Ceravalos about the purchase of the hotel.
  
Arant testified that he obtained a tax assessment of the
property on the Internet, which showed Sammy Ceravalo's name.
Arant testified that he believed Ceravalo to be related to the
Raines because Beavert referred to everyone involved,
including himself, as family.  Arant also received a title
binder from Beavert, dated approximately 1990.  The title
binder showed Sammy Ceravalo's name as an owner of the hotel,
along with Antoinette Raine.
6
him, in response to the letter, that "he was very close to
having that done."  On March 21, 2005, after Arant heard
rumors that Watts Realty Company was working on a deal
involving the Cabana Hotel, Arant met with Beavert, Antoinette
Raine, and Sam Raine III at Antoinette Raine's house to
discuss the contract.  Antoinette Raine testified that, at
that meeting, she informed Arant that the other owners, Norman
Ceravalo and Sammy Ceravalo, had to sign any contract by which
the property would be sold.   In April 2005, the Raines and
2
the Ceravalos entered into a new contract to sell the Cabana
Hotel to LeerCorp for $1.3 million; LeerCorp agreed to deposit
$100,000 in earnest money.
1051463
7
In May 2005, Arant wrote Antoinette Raine to inform her
that Second Avenue was ready to proceed with closing and that
Beavert had indicated that the tax issue was close to being
settled.  In the letter, Arant proposed a closing date of July
15, 2005, on the contract with Second Avenue.  Antoinette
Raine contacted Beavert and her attorney, both of whom advised
her not to attend the closing with Second Avenue.  Also, an
agent at Watts Realty told Antoinette Raine that the contract
with Second Avenue was invalid because the Ceravalos did not
sign it.  Neither the closing with Second Avenue nor the
closing with LeerCorp occurred.
Second Avenue sued Sam Raine III and Antoinette Raine for
specific performance pro tanto, seeking to enforce the
contract as to the property interests the Raines actually
owned for a price prorated to reflect their ownership
interest.  LeerCorp moved to intervene, and the trial court
granted its motion.  Second Avenue and LeerCorp both moved for
a summary judgment; the Raines moved to join LeerCorp's motion
for a summary judgment.  The trial court entered a summary
judgment in favor of the Raines and LeerCorp and denied Second
Avenue's motion.  LeerCorp moved the trial court to certify
1051463
We note that, although LeerCorp moved the trial court to
3
certify as final its determination as to the "enforceability
of the contract," the trial court certified as final its order
"as to plaintiff's claim for specific performance pro tanto";
the issue of damages remained pending in the trial court.
8
its order as a final judgment, which the trial court did.3
Second Avenue appeals.
Analysis
In its summary-judgment order, the trial court found that
the contract between the Raines and Second Avenue was invalid
for several reasons: a lack of certainty as to the parties, a
lack of mutuality, and estoppel.  The court also held that
"even if the contract were valid, a remedy of specific
performance pro tanto would not be equitable in this case."
The trial court certified its order as final and appealable
"as to [Second Avenue's] claim for specific performance pro
tanto."  Because the question of the validity of the contract
is not before us, we do not express an opinion regarding the
court's holdings on estoppel, mutuality, or certainty grounds.
Specific performance pro tanto "has been a recognized
remedy in equity from our earliest history."  Saliba v.
Brackin, 260 Ala. 103, 108, 69 So. 2d 267, 271 (1953).  The
doctrine provides:
1051463
9
"'[A] vendor whose estate is less than or different
from that which he agreed to sell, or who cannot
give the exact subject-matter embraced in his
contract, will not be allowed to set up his
inability as a defense against the demand of a
purchaser who is willing to take what he can get
with a compensation.  The vendee may, if he so
elect, enforce a specific performance to the extent
of the vendor’s ability to comply with the terms of
the agreement ....'"
Saliba, 260 Ala. at 108, 69 So. 2d at 270 (quoting Pomeroy's
Specific Performance of Contracts § 438, p. 903 (3d ed.)).
"The decision to grant specific performance rests largely in
the discretion of the trial judge."  Stringfellow Materials,
Inc. v. Lee, 438 So. 2d 1387, 1390 (Ala. 1983).  Moreover, the
trial court "will be overturned, on appeal, only if shown to
be palpably erroneous."  Stringfellow Materials, 438 So. 2d at
1390.    
We have held that "'"[n]either party to a contract is
entitled to specific performance as a matter of right,"'" but
"'whether relief shall be granted depends upon an equitable
consideration of the particular circumstances of each case.'"
Dendy v. Anchor Constr. Co., 294 Ala. 120, 122-23, 313 So. 2d
164, 165 (1975) (quoting Lee v. Crane, 270 Ala. 651, 653, 120
So. 2d 702, 703 (1960); and Carlisle v. Carlisle, 77 Ala. 339,
341 (1884)).  In the present case, the trial court, after
1051463
10
considering the circumstances of this case, held that "the
court would be causing more problems for these parties than it
would solve if it ordered Sam Raine III and Antoinette A.
Raine to convey their interest in the property to [Second
Avenue.  Second Avenue] would then be a joint owner of the
property with several people who are perfect strangers to it."
Second Avenue points out that this Court dealt with similar
circumstances in Pearce v. Third Avenue Improvement Co., 221
Ala. 209, 128 So. 396 (1930).  
In Pearce, the Court granted specific performance pro
tanto when three sellers executed a contract to sell property
and the contract was void as to one of the sellers, Pearce.
Pearce was a married woman, and her husband had not signed the
contract; thus, the tenants argued that, "as to her, the
contract was void for want of the joinder of her husband."
221 Ala. at 212, 128 So. at 398.  The Court enforced the
contract as to the remaining two sellers, even though doing so
meant that the purchaser would become a cotenant with Pearce.
This Court explained:
"The main objection seems to be that such
partial performance will bring about a cotenancy
between Mrs. Pearce and strangers, rather than those
of her own choice.  It is said this should not be
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11
done because the other owners never intended such
result.  In no case of part performance do the
parties accomplish what they intend.  The entire
doctrine rests upon the fact that the vendors have
intended 
and 
undertaken 
more 
than 
they 
can
accomplish.  Equity steps in to say if you cannot
live up to the full terms of the contract, you will
be held to performance so far as you can."
221 Ala. at 214, 128 So. at 399-400.  In Pearce, the Court
reviewed a trial court's order granting specific performance
pro tanto.  The Court afforded the trial court deference and
found that the trial court committed "no error" in ordering
specific performance.  In this case, however, this Court
reviews for palpable error a trial court's decision not to
grant specific performance.  Although we did not consider a
newly created cotenancy among strangers enough to reverse a
trial court's order granting specific performance pro tanto in
Pearce, we did not hold, and have not held, that a trial court
cannot consider such a circumstance in making its initial
decision.  Therefore, the fact that the trial court considered
the potential cotenancy among the Ceravalos and Second Avenue
does not constitute palpable error in this case.
Moreover, the trial court's order reflects that the trial
court considered other aspects of the contractual relationship
between Second Avenue and the Raines in refusing to order
1051463
12
specific performance.  Specifically, the trial court discussed
the fact that the contract named the nonexistent entity
"Cabana Hotel Group," rather than the Raines, as the "seller."
The court mentioned that no closing had ever occurred, despite
the language in the contract indicating that "time [was] of
the essence."  Also, the court discussed Antoinette Raine's
statement to Second Avenue and to Arant that no binding sale
of the property could be made until the Ceravalos agreed to
sign a sales contract.
Given the circumstances of this case, we find no palpable
error by the trial court in declining to order specific
performance pro tanto of the contract.  The court properly
exercised its discretion in denying the remedy of specific
performance against the Raines.
Conclusion
Because we find no palpable error by the trial court as
to its ruling on specific performance pro tanto, we affirm the
summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.