Title: Wright v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 18S-CR-166
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: October 4, 2018

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 18S-CR-00166 
David Wright,  
Appellant (Defendant below), 
–v– 
State of Indiana,  
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
Argued: May 17, 2018 | Decided: October 4, 2018 
Appeal from the Blackford Circuit Court, No. 05C01-1601-F1-36 
The Honorable Dean A. Young, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, 
No. 05A02-1610-CR-02397 
Opinion by Justice Goff 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices David, Massa, and Slaughter concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Oct 04 2018, 1:55 pm
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Goff, Justice. 
Nearly a century ago, this Court adopted and applied the exclusionary 
rule to Indiana’s jurisprudence. The rule provides: When, in violation of 
Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, the State gains evidence 
by illegal means (i.e., an unreasonable search or seizure), it may not then 
use that evidence against the defendant. Through the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine, we’ve extended the exclusionary rule to exclude 
evidence directly or derivatively obtained from the illegal conduct. This 
present case tests that rule’s limits. Specifically, this case asks, as a matter 
of Indiana constitutional law, does an illegal seizure and search 
irreparably stain all derivative evidence the police gain afterwards, 
making it inadmissible under the exclusionary rule, or can the evidence be 
sufficiently separated from that primary taint to be admissible? In simpler 
terms, does the attenuation doctrine apply in Indiana constitutional law?  
 While the Court of Appeals previously confronted these questions—
and split over the answers—they are novel questions for us that we 
answer today. We hold the attenuation doctrine can apply under the 
Indiana Constitution. Evidence found after an unreasonable search or 
seizure can become attenuated from that illegality, meaning the evidence 
itself or the circumstances in which the evidence was discovered were 
sufficiently distinguishable or separated from the search or seizure. In this 
particular case, we find the challenged evidence—the defendant’s 
statements to law enforcement—were amply attenuated from the illegal 
search. We, therefore, affirm the defendant’s child-molestation 
convictions.   
Factual and Procedural History  
Defendant David Wright lived with his best friend’s young family in an 
apartment located at 220 East Water Street in Hartford City, Indiana. 
Wright and the family were home on the afternoon of Friday, January 22, 
2016, when the FBI and Indiana State Police SWAT, in the course of a 
federal child pornography investigation, knocked on the door.   
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Based upon information that an IP address located and billed to 220 ½ 
East Water Street, Hartford City, Indiana, accessed known child 
pornography websites, FBI Special Agent Jeffrey Robertson secured a 
federal search warrant for the home. Upon arriving, Robertson realized 
the large home housed two smaller apartments, upstairs and downstairs 
units. The upstairs apartment’s street address being 220 ½ East Water 
Street and the downstairs apartment’s address being 220 East Water 
Street—Wright’s residence.   
While searching the upstairs apartment and seizing the computer 
equipment therein, Agent Robertson learned both apartments shared the 
same internet connection, all occupants knew the password, and all 
occupants used the connection. Rather than securing a second search 
warrant for 220 East Water Street and instead of having 220’s occupants 
sign written consent forms he kept in his vehicle, Robertson gave 220’s 
occupants (including Wright) two options: (1) verbally consent to a search 
of their computer equipment, surrender those devices that day, and 
receive them back quickly; or (2) leave the residence and stay away until 
he secured and executed another federal search warrant. 220’s occupants 
(including Wright) verbally consented to the search, handed over their 
computers, and provided Agent Robertson with their usernames and 
passwords.   
Agent Robertson seized the equipment and searched them over the 
weekend. The search—done by running software called OS Triage on the 
seized devices—revealed Wright’s computer contained hash values 
matched to known child pornography images. Equipped with this 
information, Agent Robertson returned to the East Water Street 
apartments on Monday, January 25th, and released all the seized 
computer equipment, except Wright’s.   
When Wright inquired about his devices, Agent Robertson asked to 
speak with him privately, giving him the option of talking inside or 
outside the house. Wright chose to talk outside. Agent Robertson and 
Wright went to the former’s car parked in front of the house. Agent 
Robertson sat in the driver’s seat, Wright sat in the front passenger seat, 
and another officer sat in the backseat. Before beginning a conversation, 
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Robertson told Wright the car was unlocked, and he could leave at any 
point. Agent Robertson informed Wright he was not under arrest.  
After Wright indicated he understood those warnings, Agent Robertson 
confronted him with the search results. He asked Wright if he used the 
TOR network1 to search for child pornography and Wright answered 
affirmatively. Agent Robertson informed Wright that standard protocol 
required him to conduct a forensic interview with any children living in 
the home “just to make sure that no [sexual] contact has occurred.” Wright 
then admitted having sexual contact with two children living in the home.   
With this disclosure, Agent Robertson immediately stopped the 
interview, exited the vehicle, and phoned Hartford City Police to report 
what Wright just told him. The police asked Robertson to place Wright 
under arrest and take him to the station. Robertson returned to the car, 
informed Wright he was now under arrest, and handcuffed him. After 
transporting Wright to the Hartford City Police Department, Robertson 
handed Wright over to Detective Cody Crouse, but he stuck around to sit 
through the interview. 
Detective Crouse read Wright the standard Miranda warnings. Wright 
signed a waiver form and agreed to talk to Crouse. During that interview, 
Wright admitted to repeatedly molesting two children, W.S. (age 11) and 
F.S. (age 4) over a year’s span, with the most recent sexual contact 
occurring within the last two weeks.  
The State charged Wright with four counts of Level 1 felony child 
molesting: two counts for the sexual contact with W.S. and two counts for 
the sexual contact with F.S.  
                                                 
1 Agent Robertson testified that “TOR” stands for The Onion Router. Tr. 16. He likened TOR 
to the “dark web” where websites are theoretically “completely anonymous and completely 
unidentifiable.” Id. at 17. He explained that when a person accesses a website via the TOR 
network the site’s identifying information “will bounce between hundreds of servers across 
the world,” making it nearly impossible for law enforcement to track and subpoena every 
server. Id.   
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Wright moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the FBI search 
and subsequent police interviews. Invoking the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana 
Constitution, Wright alleged he’d been illegally detained and searched. 
Specifically, he argued he did not give valid consent to search his 
computers because Agent Robertson failed to inform him that he had the 
right to refuse consent. Following a hearing on Wright’s motion, the trial 
court granted in part, and denied in part. Finding that Wright’s consent to 
the search proved invalid under both the federal and state constitutions, 
the trial court suppressed evidence obtained from searching Wright’s 
computer and electronic equipment. But the court denied suppression of 
Wright’s statements to Agent Robertson and Detective Crouse, concluding 
they were sufficiently independent and attenuated from the illegal search.  
Wright’s incriminating statements were admitted during the 
subsequent bench trial. The court found Wright guilty as charged, and, 
after identifying aggravators and mitigators, imposed an aggregate sixty-
year sentence. The court deemed Wright a sexually violent predator and a 
credit restricted felon.  
Wright appealed, arguing the trial court erred by only partially 
granting his suppression motion and by admitting his statements to law 
enforcement. He also argued his sixty-year sentence proved inappropriate 
since he had no criminal history, he admitted his crimes, he appreciated 
the wrongfulness of his conduct, and he had been victimized as a child.  
The Court of Appeals reversed Wright’s convictions, holding the trial 
court improperly admitted Wright’s confessions to Agent Robertson and 
Detective Crouse. Wright v. State, 92 N.E.3d 1127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). The 
court focused its analysis on Article 1, Section 11, particularly whether 
Indiana’s jurisprudence recognized the attenuation doctrine as an 
exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 1131–33. It ultimately rejected the 
attenuation doctrine for Indiana. Id. at 1132–33.            
Upon removing attenuation from its legal calculus, the court 
concluded: “[T]here is no dispute that Wright’s incriminating statements 
to the officers on January 25, 2016, about touching the children directly 
resulted from or derived from the unconstitutional search and seizure of 
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Wright’s computers.” Id. at 1133. The court deemed Wright’s statements 
fruit of the poisonous tree and, therefore, inadmissible evidence. Id. 
Because the Court of Appeals reversed Wright’s convictions, it did not 
address the parties’ arguments about the appropriateness of Wright’s 
sentence. Id.  
The State sought transfer, arguing the Court of Appeals had divided 
over this issue. In order to resolve the split in authority, we granted 
transfer, thereby vacating this Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. Appellate 
Rule 58(A).  
Standard of Review  
The primary issue before us is whether Wright’s statements to law 
enforcement constitute admissible evidence against him. The trial court 
answered that query in the affirmative and admitted the statements. Since 
decisions to admit or exclude evidence fall within the trial court’s sound 
discretion, we afford those decisions deference and review them for an 
abuse of discretion. Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind. 2014). We will 
reverse a trial court’s decision to admit evidence only if the decision was 
“clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the 
error affects [the defendant’s] substantial rights.” Id.  
However, to the extent the issue of admissibility turns upon a 
constitutional query, we review the issue de novo, paying no deference to 
the lower court’s constitutional determinations. Id. at 40–41. 
Discussion and Decision  
Rooted deeply within Indiana constitutional law lies the principle that 
when police obtain evidence by way of an unreasonable search or seizure 
the evidence is excluded at the defendant’s trial. Callender v. State, 193 Ind. 
91, 96, 98, 138 N.E. 817, 818–19 (1923). The exclusionary rule is not 
required by the Indiana Constitution’s text—meaning, Article 1, Section 11 
itself does not expressly mandate that courts suppress evidence got by 
illegal means. Rather, the exclusionary rule represents a judicially-created 
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remedy aimed first at deterring police misconduct and second at securing 
Hoosiers’ rights. See Membres v. State, 889 N.E.2d 265, 273–74 (Ind. 2008) 
(identifying “deterrence as the primary objective of [Indiana’s] 
exclusionary rule,” but recognizing our exclusionary rule also protects 
citizens’ privacy). Our exclusionary rule dates back ninety-five years, 
nearly forty years before the United States Supreme Court made the 
federal exclusionary rule applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Membres, 889 N.E.2d at 274 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961)). See also Callender, 138 N.E. 817.  
One branch of Indiana’s exclusionary rule—universally known as the 
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine—operates to omit from trial evidence 
directly or derivatively obtained from an illegal search or seizure. Gyamfi 
v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1131, 1136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Once a defendant 
establishes that a search or seizure was unreasonable, he can invoke the 
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine by moving to suppress direct and 
derivative evidence. Id.  
Over the years, Indiana courts have occasionally cultivated the rule to 
achieve the purpose of deterring police misconduct. For example, Indiana 
law recognizes two exceptions to the exclusionary rule and fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine. One being the good-faith exception, where 
illegally obtained evidence is not excluded if law enforcement acted in 
“objectively reasonable reliance” on what they thought was a valid 
warrant. Mers v. State, 482 N.E.2d 778, 782–83 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) 
(quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 927 (1984) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring)). See also Hopkins v. State, 582 N.E.2d 345, 351 (Ind. 1991) 
(recognizing Mers held the federal good-faith exception applicable to 
Article 1, Section 11 claims); Ind. Code § 35-37-4-5 (2014 Repl.) (codifying 
the good-faith exception). The other being the new-crime exception, which 
allows for the admission of “evidence that defendants committed new and 
distinct crimes in response to illegal searches or seizures by law 
enforcement.” C.P. v. State, 39 N.E.3d 1174, 1183 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). With 
these exceptions, we note that Indiana’s exclusionary rule does not 
countenance but-for exclusion where any and all evidence obtained after 
an illegal search or seizure is automatically excluded, no matter what. 
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Indeed, such a broad application would choke out the rule’s narrow 
purposes. 
Today we must decide whether to further prune our exclusionary rule 
to include the attenuation doctrine.2 This concept, accepted within federal 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, holds that “not . . . all evidence is ‘fruit 
of the poisonous tree’ simply because it would not have come to light but 
for the illegal actions of the police[;]” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 487–88 (1963), rather, the objected-to evidence will be excluded as 
fruit of the poisonous tree if police obtained it by exploiting the primary 
illegality, id. at 488. Alternatively, evidence will be admitted if it is 
attenuated from the illegality—if it is obtained by “means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Id. (citation omitted). 
See also Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 266–73 (Ind. 2013) (considering 
whether federal attenuation doctrine applied to a search and seizure that 
violated the Fourth Amendment).  
But just because federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence accepts and 
applies the attenuation doctrine does not necessarily mean Indiana’s 
Article I, Section 11 jurisprudence will follow suit. The Indiana 
Constitution demands from this Court independent analysis considering 
that charter’s uniqueness. Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 940 (Ind. 2006). 
And so, before we can resolve whether Indiana constitutional law 
embraces attenuation, we must first reflect upon Indiana’s distinctive 
                                                 
2 Whether Indiana’s exclusionary rule includes the attenuation doctrine is a matter of first 
impression for this Court, although the Court of Appeals splintered when considering the 
question. Compare Trotter v. State, 933 N.E.2d 572, 583 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“[W]e hold that the 
attenuation doctrine has no application under the Indiana Constitution.”), and Gyamfi, 15 
N.E.3d at 1137 (“[T]he attenuation doctrine has no place in the jurisprudence of Article 1, 
Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.”), with Turner v. State, 862 N.E.2d 695, 700–02 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2007) (applying the attenuation doctrine, but suppressing evidence obtained from an 
illegal search because the evidence was not sufficiently attenuated from the original taint), and 
State v. Foster, 950 N.E.2d 760, 763 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (finding attenuation applicable to 
an Article 1, Section 11 challenge, but also acknowledging the Trotter court rejected the 
attenuation doctrine).   
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approach to securing Hoosiers’ rights against unreasonable searches or 
seizures.  
I. Reasonableness provides the animating principle 
for all Article 1, Section 11 inquiries and must 
guide the decision on attenuation.  
 This Court has said many times that although Article 1, Section 11 of 
the Indiana Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution share vocabulary, they part company in application. When 
developing Indiana’s Article 1, Section 11 test for evaluating a challenged 
search or seizure, this Court eschewed the federal reasonable-expectation-
of-privacy test, Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359–60 (Ind. 2005), opting 
instead for a test “focused on whether the actions of the government were 
‘reasonable’ under the ‘totality of the circumstances,’” Shotts v. State, 925 
N.E.2d 719, 726 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 359). 
Consequently, Indiana courts evaluate a search or seizure on a case-by-
case basis, asking whether the police behaved reasonably considering the 
totality of the circumstances. Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind. 1995). 
See also Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 359–61. And this Court often emphasizes 
how reasonableness is the touchstone for Article 1, Section 11 inquiries. 
See, e.g., id; Shotts, 925 N.E.2d at 726; Holder, 847 N.E.2d at 940. Likewise, 
“[t]he focus of the exclusionary rule under the Indiana Constitution is the 
reasonableness of police conduct.” C.P., 39 N.E.3d at 1182.  
Reasonableness, therefore, should shape our answer to the attenuation 
question. Is it reasonable to admit evidence obtained after an illegal search 
or seizure if the State shows that evidence was sufficiently attenuated 
from the initial police misconduct? We answer yes, for two important, 
intertwining reasons—the exclusionary rule’s purpose and the attenuation 
doctrine’s function as the natural limit to exclusion.   
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A. Adopting the attenuation doctrine into Indiana 
constitutional law would not thwart the exclusionary 
rule’s purpose.  
Article 1, Section 11’s purpose “is to protect from unreasonable police 
activity, those areas of life that Hoosiers regard as private.” Mitchell v. 
State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 786 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d at 
79). The exclusionary rule, especially the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine, furthers this purpose through discouraging unreasonable police 
activity by excluding illegally obtained evidence. Indeed, “[t]he 
exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct.” State v. Spillers, 
847 N.E.2d 949, 957 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Hensley v. State, 778 N.E.2d 484, 
489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)).  The deterrence objective, though, is a binary 
concept. The necessary complement to deterrence is protecting citizens 
from constitutional violations. By deterring police intrusions on Hoosiers’ 
privacy, the exclusionary rule also helps secure citizens’ constitutional 
rights. See Membres, 889 N.E.2d at 273 (“We . . . exclude [evidence] because 
we consider it necessary to protect the privacy of all citizens from 
excessive intrusion by law enforcement.”); id. at 277 (“[T]he exclusionary 
rule was adopted not only to deter police misconduct but also to protect 
the integrity of the judicial process and to protect the rights of criminal 
defendants.”) (Sullivan, J., dissenting).   
But deterrence-based exclusion is not a one-size-fits-all remedy that 
merits but-for application in every situation. There could be some 
situations where excluding evidence would not fulfill the rule’s purpose 
of deterring future constitutional violations. Sometimes the police realize 
their mistake and correct the behavior before securing new evidence.  In 
some cases, derivative evidence becomes so remote in time, place, or 
agency from the original taint that excluding it would not deter future 
police misconduct.   
No matter how principled the purpose behind exclusion, it exacts a 
heavy societal cost, which cautions against applying it as a but-for rule. 
We’ve acknowledged that excluding evidence impairs “the truth-finding 
objective of trials” because excluded evidence is often relevant, reliable, 
and probative. Membres, 889 N.E.2d at 272. Omitting this evidence from 
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trial can result in a guilty person going free—which undoubtedly 
undercuts society’s interest that criminals be punished. And so we’ve 
cautioned that “[b]ecause there is this cost to enforcing the exclusionary 
rule, it should be done only where appropriate to advance its [deterrent] 
purpose.” Id. at 274 (emphasis added).  
This tension between deterring police misconduct and punishing guilty 
criminals only strengthens our view that the attenuation doctrine strikes 
the right balance between these competing interests.     
B. By evaluating the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding an illegal search or seizure, the attenuation 
doctrine acts as a reasonable check on the exclusionary 
rule’s fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.  
The United States Supreme Court recently explained “[t]he attenuation 
doctrine evaluates the causal link between the government’s unlawful act 
and the discovery of evidence.” Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 
2061 (2016). The federal attenuation doctrine distills that causation 
evaluation to a three-factor test: (1) “[T]he temporal proximity between 
the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence,” in other 
words, “how closely the discovery of evidence followed the 
unconstitutional search[;]” (2) “[T]he presence of intervening 
circumstances[;]” and, most importantly, (3) “[T]he purpose and flagrancy 
of the official misconduct.” Id. at 2062 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975)). In application, the 
federal attenuation doctrine essentially considers the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the illegality and the discovered evidence.  
By parsing the causal chain between the illegal search or seizure and 
the derivative evidence, the attenuation doctrine necessarily poses 
important questions like when, what, where, why, how the police 
obtained the objected-to evidence. Asking these questions helps courts 
examine the means by which police gained evidence following the initial 
illegality. When did police find the evidence? How much time passed 
between the illegality and securing the evidence? What intervening events 
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occurred in that time frame? Did the police discover the evidence where 
the illegality occurred? How did the evidence present itself, through 
police action or through the defendant or through a third party? If 
answering these questions reveals the means of discovering the evidence 
were sufficiently separated from the illegal search or seizure by time, 
circumstances, location, and agency, then the link between the initial 
unreasonable search or seizure and the derivative evidence becomes 
sufficiently attenuated that the evidence is admissible.   
As we see it, by examining the causal chain between the illegality and 
the discovered evidence or looking at the totality of the circumstances, 
attenuation is the natural, reasonable limit to the exclusionary rule’s fruit 
of the poisonous tree doctrine. See State v. Eserjose, 259 P.3d 172, 179–80 
(Wash. 2011) (reasoning “the attenuation doctrine defines the parameters 
of the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine” since the two “stem from the 
same source”); Commonwealth v. Damiano, 828 N.E.2d 510, 518 (Mass. 2005) 
(citation omitted) (explaining that since the attenuation doctrine asks 
whether the police exploited the illegality to gain evidence, “the 
attenuation rule is ‘not an exception to the exclusionary rule but a test of 
its limits’”); Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487–88 (announcing the first iteration of 
the attenuation doctrine).  
C. Indiana constitutional law embraces the attenuation 
doctrine.   
Considering Indiana’s unique constitution and our emphasis on 
reasonableness in the totality of the circumstances, we think the 
attenuation concept fits nicely within our jurisprudence. Indiana law has 
not endorsed a but-for exclusionary rule that automatically excludes all 
derivative evidence acquired from an illegal search or seizure. And the 
attenuation doctrine sets the outer limits for exclusion by tailoring the rule 
to its purpose—deterring police misconduct and defending Hoosiers’ 
privacy rights. Today we hold the attenuation doctrine applies to claims 
challenging the reasonableness of a search or seizure under Article 1, 
Section 11.  
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II.  Indiana’s attenuation doctrine parallels the federal 
doctrine to the extent it considers the totality of the 
circumstances.     
Having decided the attenuation doctrine applies to claims brought 
under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, we must determine 
how to evaluate if evidence is sufficiently distinguishable or attenuated 
from the illegal search or seizure to become admissible at trial. In other 
words, what should Indiana’s attenuation doctrine look like?  
Thus far, Indiana’s exclusionary rule parallels the federal rule in three 
areas. First, the two rules share similar origins and histories. Mers, 482 
N.E.2d at 782 n.6. Early iterations of the federal rule cited the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination and Fourth Amendment right 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures as bases for excluding 
illegally obtained evidence. Id. Likewise, Indiana’s nascent exclusionary 
rule relied upon the Indiana Constitution’s counterparts: Article 1, Section 
14 (self-incrimination) and Article 1, Section 11 (unreasonable searches 
and seizures). Id. Second, the rules already share two familiar exceptions. 
Like federal jurisprudence, Indiana law adopted the good-faith and new-
crime exceptions. Third, the federal and state exclusionary rules share the 
same prime purpose—deterring police from illegal conduct. Membres, 889 
N.E.2d at 273 (citing Spillers, 847 N.E.2d at 957) (“Indiana search and 
seizure jurisprudence, like federal Fourth Amendment doctrine, identifies 
deterrence as the primary objective of the exclusionary rule.”).  
Since Indiana’s exclusionary rule compares to the federal rule, it 
reasons that our attenuation doctrine parallel (but not parrot) the federal 
exception. The theoretical and practical differences between Article 1, 
Section 11 and the Fourth Amendment prevent us from simply copying 
the federal rule. As we have said, the two provisions differ in both 
application and scope. Because Article 1, Section 11 hinges upon 
reasonableness considering the totality of the circumstances, this “Indiana 
provision in some cases confers greater protections to individual rights 
than the Fourth Amendment affords.” Shotts, 925 N.E.2d at 726. These 
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differences, however, do not demand a different attenuation test for 
Indiana.   
Precisely because Indiana places as paramount what is reasonable in 
light of the totality of the circumstances and because the Indiana 
Constitution can offer more protection, it follows that Indiana’s 
attenuation exception begin with the federal three-part test but not 
necessarily end there. An attenuation inquiry under Article 1, Section 11 
will begin by considering three elements: (1) the timeline—particularly, 
the time elapsed between the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence; 
(2) the intervening circumstances—what, if any, intervening 
circumstances occurred in that time; and (3) the police misconduct. This 
third element, like the federal test, scrutinizes the purpose and 
egregiousness behind the official misconduct. It examines whether the 
police exploited the initial illegality to gain more evidence against the 
defendant and then whether “the evidence came from the ‘exploitation of 
that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be 
purged of the primary taint.’” Turner v. State, 862 N.E.2d 695, 701 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2007) (citation omitted). See also Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488; Brown, 
422 U.S. at 603.  
 We anticipate that most of the facts and circumstances in any given 
case will fall into one of these three categories. We, therefore, see this 
three-part test as a good starting point for considering attenuation because 
it essentially looks at the totality of the circumstances. To be sure, the 
above test considers the entire timeline, what happens during that 
timeline, and scrutinizes the police’s misconduct—which comports with 
Indiana’s Article 1, Section 11 precedent. See Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d at 
79 (focusing on the police activity). But even so, we will not rigidly limit 
ourselves to only these three factors. Every case must be considered on the 
totality of the circumstances. If other factors present themselves, they will 
be considered.   
III. Wright’s confessions were admissible evidence. 
Turning to these particular facts and applying the above totality-of-the-
circumstances test, we find Wright’s statements to Agent Robertson and 
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Detective Crouse sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search that we 
will not exclude them. Specifically, the timing of Wright’s statements, the 
intervening circumstances between the search and the statements, and the 
non-flagrant, non-exploitative police misconduct, amply attenuate the 
evidence from the illegal search and seizure. Wright’s incriminating 
statements, therefore, constituted admissible evidence at his trial.   
A. The timeline  
A weekend passed between the illegal search and seizure. Agent 
Robertson took possession of Wright’s computers on a Friday afternoon 
and Wright’s incriminating statements came on the following Monday. He 
had two full days, free from police presence, to mull his options or decide 
what to say when Robertson returned. Yet he did not seek counsel from 
friends, family, or an attorney. Wright did not have to make a split-second 
decision on whether to speak with police; he had the benefit of time. His 
confessions cannot be attributed to mid-search nervous ramblings. 
Wright’s statements were temporally detached from the illegality.  
B. The intervening circumstances  
Much happened between the search and Wright’s confessions. Wright 
initiated a conversation with law enforcement by inquiring into when he 
would get back his computer equipment. Though not under arrest, he 
voluntarily spoke with Agent Robertson. And, without being asked, 
Wright admitted that he had sexual contact with W.S. and F.S.  
Only after this disclosure did Agent Robertson formally arrest Wright 
and take him to the Hartford City Police Department. There Wright 
received Miranda warnings (both written and oral) and waived Miranda. 
Then he participated in a voluntary discussion with Detective Crouse 
where he admitted to the molestations. These are compelling intervening 
circumstances supporting attenuation. 
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C. The police misconduct 
The police did not commit flagrant misconduct here or exploit the 
illegal search. Based on his testimony at the suppression hearing, Agent 
Robertson believed he presented Wright with two constitutional options: 
give verbal consent or wait for a federal search warrant. In fact, he 
testified that FBI procedure allowed him to get either written or verbal 
consent to a warrantless search. Although he thoroughly discussed the 
two options with 220’s occupants, Agent Robertson failed to inform them 
(and Wright) that they could refuse consent. That omission prompted the 
trial court to suppress the evidence from the search. While we certainly 
don’t condone Robertson’s oversight, especially when he had consent 
forms in his vehicle, his failure to tell Wright he could refuse consent does 
not strike us as flagrant misconduct.  
What’s more, this record does not suggest the police manipulated 
Wright’s invalid consent to search his computers in order to coerce him 
into confessing to child molestation. Agent Robertson arrived at Wright’s 
home in the course of a federal child-pornography investigation. He did 
not suspect Wright to be a child molester.  
When Agent Robertson spoke with Wright on the Monday following 
the search and seizure, he took pains to make sure Wright understood he 
was not under arrest and not required to talk to him. He allowed Wright 
to choose where they spoke. Once in the car, he reminded Wright the car 
doors were unlocked, and Wright could stop the conversation and leave at 
any time.  
Only after Wright admitted to having child pornography on his 
computers did Agent Robertson say that FBI protocol required him to 
speak to any children living in the home. He did not ask Wright if he had 
any sexual contact with the children, but Wright voluntarily confessed to 
the molestations. Robertson immediately ended the interview and sought 
direction from local police because his federal investigation just gained a 
state layer.   
Upon taking custody of Wright, the Hartford City Police behaved 
reasonably. The record does not suggest Detective Crouse exploited the 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-CR-00166 | October 4, 2018 
Page 17 of 19 
illegal search. Detective Crouse Mirandized Wright and obtained a written 
waiver from him before interviewing him.  
Considering the totality of the circumstances—the timeline, the 
intervening circumstances, and the police misconduct—we conclude that 
Wright’s confessions were sufficiently attenuated from the unreasonable 
search so as to be purged of the primary taint. There was a meaningful 
time gap between the search and Wright’s confessions during which he 
had no further contact with law enforcement. Once he did encounter law 
enforcement again, Wright voluntarily spoke with Agent Robertson and 
Detective Crouse and disclosed he molested two children. And 
scrutinizing the police conduct here shows that law enforcement did not 
flagrantly flout Wright’s constitutional right against unreasonable 
searches and the police did not exploit that illegal search to secure his 
confessions. Accordingly, Wright’s statements amounted to admissible 
evidence, and the trial court rightly admitted them.  
IV. Wright’s 60-year sentence is not inappropriate.  
Since it reversed the convictions, the Court of Appeals did not address 
Wright’s argument that his sixty-year sentence proved inappropriate 
considering his crime and character. Wright requested we revise his 
sentence downward to thirty years and the State countered by asking us 
to revise the sentence upward to 120 years. Having granted transfer and 
taking jurisdiction over this matter, we are duty-bound to address these 
arguments now. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 6 (guaranteeing the right to one 
appeal); Ind. Crim. Rule 11; Clark v. State, 506 N.E.2d 819, 821 (Ind. 1987).  
The Indiana Constitution gives this Court the power to review and 
revise criminal sentences. art. 7, § 4. “We may revise a sentence authorized 
by statute, if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find 
the sentence inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the 
character of the offender.” Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204, 215 (Ind. 2016) 
(citing App. R. 7(B)). The defendant “bears the burden of persuading us 
that his sentence is inappropriate.” Id. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-CR-00166 | October 4, 2018 
Page 18 of 19 
We find that Wright did not meet his burden here. He argued his 
character alone merited a lesser sentence; specifically, Wright noted he 
had no criminal history, he admitted his crimes, he appreciated the 
wrongfulness of his conduct, and he had been victimized as a child. We 
find these reasons unconvincing, especially in light of the crimes he 
committed. Over the course of a year, Wright repeatedly molested two of 
his best friend’s young children. He occasionally filmed himself abusing 
four-year-old F.S. and showed it to eleven-year-old W.S. During this time 
Wright also viewed and downloaded child pornography. No positive 
character traits, no matter how admirable or sympathetic, can redeem 
these crimes.    
The State rightly points out that our constitutional authority to review 
and revise criminal sentences under Article 7, Section 4 also includes the 
power to increase a defendant’s sentence. See Kimbrough v. State, 979 
N.E.2d 625, 630 (Ind. 2012); Carpenter v. State, 950 N.E.2d 719, 721 (Ind. 
2011); Akard v. State, 937 N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ind. 2010); McCullough v. State, 
900 N.E.2d 745, 750 (Ind. 2009). But we decline to exercise that power here. 
Wright’s sixty-year sentence essentially amounts to a life-sentence for this 
thirty-three-year-old credit restricted felon. Even though Wright 
committed unspeakable crimes against children, we think his sixty-year 
sentence not inappropriate.   
Conclusion  
Today we hold that the Indiana Constitution embraces the attenuation 
doctrine. In our view, the attenuation concept settles well into Indiana’s 
distinctive constitutional landscape since it essentially considers what is 
reasonable given the totality of the circumstances. By grafting the 
attenuation doctrine onto our Article 1, Section 11 jurisprudence we fix it 
as the reasonable, natural limit to the exclusionary rule. In application, our 
attenuation test will begin by examining the timeline between the 
illegality and finding the derivative evidence, the intervening 
circumstances occurring over that timeline, and the initial police 
misconduct. But if other circumstances arise strengthening or weakening 
attenuation, then they must also be considered. Applying this test here, 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-CR-00166 | October 4, 2018 
Page 19 of 19 
we conclude Wright’s statements to law enforcement were sufficiently 
attenuated from the illegal search so as to be purged of the original taint 
and these were admissible at trial. We, therefore, affirm Wright’s 
convictions.    
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur.  
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLA N T 
Chris M. Teagle 
Muncie, Indiana  
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L E E 
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 
Attorney General of Indiana  
Ellen H. Meilaender  
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana