Title: Clay Anthony Ford v. State of Arkansas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: CR00-302
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: October 11, 2001

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION PER CURIAM OCTOBER 11, 2001 CLAY ANTHONY FORD APPELLANT v. STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE CR 00-302 AN APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MISSISSIPPI COUNTY, NO. CR 81-64 HONORABLE RALPH E. WILSON, CIRCUIT JUDGE AFFIRMED Clay Anthony Ford was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for having killed Sergeant Glen Bailey, an Arkansas State Policeman. We affirmed the conviction and sentence. Ford v. State, 276 Ark. 98, 633 S.W.2d 3 (1982). We denied a stay of execution, Ford v. State, 278 Ark. 106, 644 S.W.2d 252 (1982), but the execution was stayed by a federal court after Mr. Ford began proceedings there. Ultimately, a writ of habeas corpus was granted, and Mr. Ford's conviction and sentence were vacated. Ford v. Lockhart, 861 F. Supp. 1447 (E.D. Ark. 1994). That decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162 (8th Cir. 1995). The State retried Mr. Ford on the capital murder charge in July 1997. He was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. We affirmed his conviction and sentence in Ford v. State, 334 Ark. 385, 976 S.W.2d 915 (1998). Ford subsequently filed a petition pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied Ford's petition after a hearing, and this appeal followed. Ford argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to comments made by the prosecutor in his rebuttal closing argument during the penalty phase of Ford's trial. We disagree. The criteria for assessing the effectiveness of counsel were enunciated by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Strickland provides that when a convicted defendant complains of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Judicial review of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, and a fair assessment of counsel's performance under Strickland requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Missildine v. State, 314 Ark. 500, 863 S.W.2d 813 (1993). A reviewing court must indulge a strong presumption that the conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. To prevail on any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show first that counsel's performance was deficient. Thomas v. State, 322 Ark. 670, 911 S.W.2d 259 (1995). This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment. Id. Secondly, the petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial. Id. Unless a petitioner makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversarial process that renders the result unreliable. Id. In reviewing the denial of relief under Rule 37, this court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. The petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, butfor counsel's errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt in that the decision reached would have been different absent the errors. Id; Huls v. State, 301 Ark. 572, 785 S.W.2d 467 (1990). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052; Thomas, 322 Ark. 670, 911 S.W.2d 259. During the State's rebuttal closing argument at the end of the sentencing phase of Ford's trial, the prosecutor made the following comments: The instructions tell you about good time. What you need to know is that if this Defendant gets forty years, okay? He's eligible for parole, it says, `Clay Anthony Ford has one previous incarceration in a correctional institute,' which he does, he was incarcerated in Tennessee. `Then he will be eligible for parole after he serves one half of any sentence imprisonment you impose.' So after he serves twenty years, he's eligible for parole, okay? Then the term of imprisonment may be reduced further to one-fourth of the period imposed if he earns the maximum amount of meritorious good time during his imprisonment. So this forty-years sentence, rather than just being reduced to one-half, can be reduced to ten years if he received meritorious good time. Now he wasn't eligible for meritorious good time while he was on Death Row, but once he becomes, once he's no longer on Death row, as he is now that he's not sentenced under Capital Murder, he accumulates that meritorious good time on his seventeen-year sentence. So the seventeen years he's served, he has acquired with good time thirty-six years' credit right now. Okay? He's sitting on top of the equivalent of thirty-six years' credit toward a forty-year sentence. So if you give him a forty-year sentence for this murder, he's got thirty-six years' credit and he's going to have four years, basically, remaining on that sentence to serve, which is out of that sentence, he's going to serve, based on that calculation, one-half and possibly one-fourth, if he gets good time. So you're talking about an additional time of imprisonment of approximately one year. And I'm not making this up. You'll have the instruction that will tell you this. But it, when it says that if Clay Anthony Ford has one previous incarceration, then he will be eligible for parole after he has served on-half of any sentence of imprisonment you impose. That's eligible for parole, after he serves one-half. It may be reduced to one-fourth of the period you impose if he earns good time. But, remember, this amount here, the seventeen years that he served, if he gets, if a forty-year sentence is reduced to twenty years, then that seventeen years that he's already served will just about flatten that sentence in terms of actually serving time. Not parole, but serving that twenty years that he'll actually receive. Does that make sense? I ask you to read this real carefully. What this means is, if you give this Defendant anything less that [sic] life imprisonment, and that's your decision, but you're basically giving him the keys to the prison door when you do it. Because it's going to open up in a real, real, real short period of time. If you give him anything less than thirty-five years, in effect, you've handed him a ticket out of the Department of Correction, because he's gone within a real, real short period of time. Ford contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to these comments made by the prosecution because there was no basis in the facts or law to support the prosecutor's statements. Experienced advocates might differ about when, or if, objections are called for since, as a matter of trial strategy, further objections from counsel may have succeeded in making the prosecutor's comments seem more significant to the jury. Sasser v. State, 338 Ark. 375, 993 S.W.2d 901 (1999); Neff v. State, 287 Ark. 88, 696 S.W.2d 736 (1985). Because many lawyers refrain from objecting during opening statement and closing argument, absent egregious misstatements, the failure to object during closing argument and opening statement is within the wide range of permissible professional legal conduct. Cohen v. United States, 996 F. Supp. 110 (D. Mass. 1998). At the Rule 37 hearing, Ford's trial counsel admitted that he was ineffective in failing to object to the prosecutor's comments. Despite trial counsel's admissions, the record indicates that had counsel objected to the prosecutor's closing argument the objection probably would have been overruled. During Ford's closing argument in the sentencing phase, counsel stated: But his interest is entitled to some consideration by you. He has been punished. He has spent sixteen or seventeen years on Death Row and you heard theliving conditions he has been under. He will serve more time and it is probably true that if he gets a term of years, he will be released at some point in the future, or at least, he will be eligible for parole. Nobody can tell you when he will be released, but he will be eligible for parole at some point in the future. I expect Mr. Davis to get up here and say that he will be eligible for parole in a year and a half. Nobody knows that for sure, because whatever good time he has has not been computed, but Mr. Davis, nor I, nor Clay or anybody else can tell you exactly when Clay Anthony would be eligible for parole if he was sentenced to a term of years, but at some point in the future, if he is sentenced to a term of years, he will be eligible for parole. It is clear from the record, that Ford opened the door to the subject of his parole eligibility date and good time.1 Specifically, Ford's counsel even referenced that the prosecutor would tell the jury that Ford would be eligible for parole in a year and a half. We have recognized that the prosecution is granted more leeway to respond to a defense argument when the defendant has "opened the door" with his closing. See Sheridan v. State, 313 Ark. 23, 852 S.W.2d 772 (1993). Under the circumstances in the instant case, we do not find that the closing argument was improper, and it certainly was not so flagrantly improper and so highly prejudicial as to require the trial judge to intervene without an objection by Ford's trial counsel. Therefore, the trial court's finding that Ford had failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the decision reached in the penalty phase would have been different is not clearly erroneous. For his second point on appeal, Ford argues that counsel failed to invoke the appropriate federal constitutional provisions when counsel offered evidence on Ford's behalf. Ford raised this issue in his Rule 37 petition; however, in the order appealed from the circuit court did not rule on this issue. The record indicates that in a letter dated May 17, 1999, the circuit court denied appellant's request for a hearing on this point and indicated that it intended to deny and dismiss thisallegation. From the abstract of the Rule 37 hearing, there is no indication that this issue was discussed or specifically denied by the circuit court. Thus, we cannot reach this issue on appeal. Failure to obtain a ruling on an issue when the trial court denies a petition for postconviction relief precludes appellate review. See Beshears v. State, 340 Ark. 70, 8 S.W.3d 32 (2000); Matthews v. State, 333 Ark. 701, 970 S.W.2d 289 (1998). Affirmed. 1 We note that Ford does not raise an ineffective counsel claim relating to trial counsel opening the door to the issues of parole eligibility or good time.