Title: In re Kenney
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 123589
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 16, 2021

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 123,589 
 
 
In the Matter of KEVIN W. KENNEY, 
Respondent. 
 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed July 16, 2021. Disbarment. 
 
Krystal L. Vokins, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Matthew J. Vogelsberg, 
Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, was on the formal complaint for the petitioner. 
 
John J. Ambrosio, of Morris, Laing, Evans, Brock & Kennedy, Chtd., of Topeka, argued the 
cause, and Kevin W. Kenney, respondent, argued the cause pro se. 
 
PER CURIAM:  This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the 
Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent, Kevin W. Kenney, of Prairie Village, 
an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1996. 
 
 
On June 18, 2020, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal 
complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct (KRPC). The respondent timely filed an answer to the complaint on June 29, 
2020. The Disciplinary Administrator and respondent entered into a joint stipulation 
agreement on August 3, 2020, where the respondent admitted to the facts and stipulated 
that his conduct violated KRPC 3.1 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 384), 3.3 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 
385), and 8.4 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 427). Respondent personally appeared and was 
represented by counsel at the complaint hearing before a panel of the Kansas Board for 
Discipline of Attorneys, which was conducted on August 13, 2020.  
 
2 
 
 
 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the panel determined that respondent had 
violated KRPC 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions); 3.3(a)(1) (making a false 
statement of fact or law to a tribunal); 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice). The panel set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
along with its recommendation on disposition, in a final hearing report, the relevant 
portions of which are set forth below. 
 
"Findings of Fact 
 
 
. . . .  
 
 
"11. 
The respondent is an attorney at law, Kansas attorney registration 
number 17448. His last registration address with the clerk of the appellate courts of 
Kansas is 7301 Mission Road, Suite 243, Prairie Village, Kansas 66208. The Missouri 
Supreme Court admitted the respondent to the practice of law in the State of Missouri on 
September 29, 1995. The respondent's license to practice law in Missouri is in good 
standing. The Kansas Supreme Court admitted the respondent to the practice of law in the 
State of Kansas on May 15, 1996. The respondent's license to practice law in Kansas is in 
good standing. The respondent has been actively engaged in the practice of law since 
admission.  
 
"Adoption of C.L. 
 
 
"12. 
On September 13, 2016, C.L. was born in Topeka, Kansas. While in the 
hospital, C.L.'s biological mother put C.L. up for adoption through Kansas Children's 
Service League (hereinafter 'KCSL'). On September 15, 2016, the biological mother 
signed relinquishment papers.  
 
 
3 
 
 
"13. 
That same day, KCSL placed the infant with a couple living in the 
Kansas City area who hoped to adopt C.L. The adoptive couple retained the respondent to 
assist them with adopting C.L. 
 
 
"14. 
On the evening of September 15, 2016, Melinda Kline, a KCSL social 
work supervisor, contacted C.L.'s biological father by phone and told him about C.L.'s 
birth and that he was believed to be the father.  
 
 
"15. 
Ms. Kline told the biological father that C.L. was placed with prospective 
adoptive parents and explained she was asking him to relinquish his parental rights. The 
biological father asked Ms. Kline who the baby's mother was. Ms. Kline refused to 
answer over the phone, preferring instead to meet with the biological father to sign 
relinquishment papers. The biological father asked if he would be able to meet with the 
prospective adoptive parents or see the baby. Ms. Kline's written log indicated that she 
responded, 'this is usually dependent on trust with the adoptive family.'  
 
 
"16. 
The next day, Friday, September 16, 2016, Ms. Kline again spoke to the 
biological father by phone. The biological father's mother joined the conversation. They 
told Ms. Kline that the biological father had an attorney, they provided the attorney's 
contact information, and they asked for a paternity test. The biological father's mother 
said if the baby was the biological father's baby, they wanted to receive custody of the 
baby.  
 
 
"17. 
The following Monday, September 19, 2016, the respondent filed a 
petition for adoption on behalf of the couple in Wyandotte County District Court. The 
petition sought to terminate the biological father's parental rights.  
 
 
"18. 
The petition alleged that the biological father's parental rights should be 
terminated because: 
 
a. 
The identified biological father, after having knowledge of the 
pregnancy, failed without reasonable cause to provide support for the 
biological mother during the six months prior to the Child's birth; 
 
 
4 
 
b. 
The identified biological father abandoned the biological mother after 
having knowledge of the pregnancy; 
 
c. 
The identified biological father has made no reasonable efforts to support 
or communicate with the Child after having knowledge of the birth of the 
Child; 
 
d. 
The identified biological father abandoned or neglected the Child after 
having knowledge of the Child's birth; 
 
e. 
The identified biological father is unfit; and 
 
f. 
Termination of the parental rights of the identified biological father is in 
the best interests of the Child. 
 
 
"19. 
The alleged grounds for terminating the biological father's parental rights 
were made without prior factual investigation. Furthermore, the termination allegations 
were substantively false when filed because the biological father only learned of the 
biological mother's pregnancy after C.L.'s birth and only four days before the respondent 
filed the petition seeking to terminate the biological father's parental rights.  
 
 
"20. 
The respondent had his clients sign a verification, affirming under oath 
that the allegations contained in the petition were true. The respondent also signed the 
petition.  
 
 
"21. 
On September 20, 2016, without knowing that a petition for adoption had 
been filed in Wyandotte County, the biological father filed a paternity action in Shawnee 
County, Kansas, stating that he was 'willing and able to meet the financial and emotional 
needs of the minor child' and was 'a fit and proper person to be awarded the care, custody, 
and control of the minor child.' 
 
 
"22. 
On October 5, 2016, the biological mother filed a motion to stay the 
Shawnee County paternity action until the Wyandotte County adoption proceeding was 
concluded.  
 
5 
 
 
 
"23. 
On October 25, 2016, the Wyandotte County district court ordered a 
hearing on the adoption petition and scheduling the hearing for November 29, 2016. On 
November 4, 2016, counsel for the biological father entered his appearance in the 
adoption proceeding. For unknown reasons, the biological father was not served with 
notice of the hearing until November 26, 2016, less than three days before the hearing on 
the adoption petition.  
 
 
"24. 
At the November 29, 2016, hearing, the biological father appeared in 
person and by counsel. The biological father objected to the adoption. The district court 
ordered the biological father to arrange and pay for genetic testing. It also granted the 
prospective adoptive parents' request that the biological father and his attorney have no 
access to the documents in the district court's case file other than a redacted copy of the 
petition for adoption.  
 
 
"25. 
On December 6, 2016, the Shawnee County district court stayed the 
paternity action because the Wyandotte County district court achieved jurisdiction first 
and had already ordered paternity testing.  
 
 
"26. 
Subsequent DNA testing established the biological father's paternity of 
C.L.  
 
 
"27. 
While the adoption case was pending, the biological father was 
prevented from learning the identity of the prospective adoptive parents or where they 
were residing with C.L.  
 
 
"28. 
The matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing on March 24, 2017. The 
biological mother testified at the hearing that she learned she was pregnant the morning 
she gave birth and that she never told anyone, including the biological father, that she 
was pregnant before that day. She also stated that she did not inform the biological father 
of C.L.'s birth.  
 
 
6 
 
 
"29. 
On April 26, 2017, the district court terminated the biological father's 
parental rights, reasoning that the biological father, while the adoption case was pending, 
did not attempt to support or communicate with C.L. or ask about the child's welfare. 
Accordingly, the district court concluded that two statutory grounds for terminating the 
biological father's parental rights were established:  (1) the biological father abandoned or 
neglected C.L. after having knowledge of the birth and (2) the biological father had made 
no reasonable efforts to support or communicate with C.L. after having knowledge of his 
birth.  
 
 
"30. 
The biological father appealed the district court's termination of parental 
rights to the Court of Appeals. In an unpublished opinion, on February 23, 2018, the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of the biological father's parental rights, 
concluding that evidence supported the district court's conclusion that the biological 
father failed to make reasonable efforts to support or communicate with C.L. while the 
case was pending. The panel concluded, however, that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the district court's other basis for terminating parental rights.  
 
 
"31. 
Judge Tom Malone filed a concurring opinion, stating:  
 
'What troubles me most about the case are the allegations against [the 
biological father] included in the adoption petition. The adoption petition, 
prepared by legal counsel, alleged the existence of almost every legal basis for 
termination of parental rights set forth in K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 59-2136(h)(1)(A)-
(G). However, the petition alleged no specific facts supporting any of the 
allegations. The petition alleged, in the language of the statute, that [the 
biological father], after having knowledge of the pregnancy, failed to provide 
support to the mother and abandoned the mother while she was pregnant, even 
though these allegations obviously were untrue. The petition also alleged, in the 
language of the statute, that [the biological father] had made no reasonable 
efforts to support or communicate with the child and that he had abandoned or 
neglected the child after having knowledge of the child's birth. But at the time the 
petition was filed, there was no evidence to support these allegations because the 
petition was filed only four days after [the biological father] had been informed 
of C.L.'s birth. In fact, the only information available to the parties when the 
 
7 
 
adoption petition was filed was that [the biological father] had communicated his 
desire to assume his parental responsibilities and raise the child. Basically, the 
petition alleged almost every legal ground for termination of parental rights set 
forth in the statute, without any evidence at the time to support the allegations, in 
the hope that something would stick by the time the case was heard in court. 
 
'At the evidentiary hearing on March 24, 2017, [the biological mother] 
testified that during her relationship with [the biological father], he had problems 
with drugs, alcohol, and depression. [The biological father] testified and denied 
any problems with drugs or alcohol, and he stated that his mental health issues 
were behind him. The district court made no findings as to those allegations, and 
in fact, the district court did not make any findings that termination of [the 
biological father's] parental rights was in C.L.'s best interest. Instead, the district 
court terminated [the biological father's] parental rights based on its findings that 
he abandoned or neglected C.L. after he was made aware of the child's birth and 
that he made no reasonable efforts to support or communicate with C.L. after 
having knowledge of the child's birth. The evidence to support these findings 
developed after the adoption petition was filed and while the case was pending in 
district court, but none of the evidence actually existed or was known when the 
petition was filed. Had [the biological father] insisted on receiving a hearing 
immediately after the adoption petition was filed, it appears there would have 
been little or no evidence to support the termination of his parental rights. 
 
 
 
 
. . . . 
 
'In light of the preference recognized in the law favoring a biological 
parent's right to raise his or her child, assuming the parent is fit, it seems to me 
like this case went off track from the moment C.L. was born. Only three days 
later, [the biological father] expressed his desire to assume his parental 
responsibilities. At that point, instead of rushing to the courthouse to file an 
adoption petition, all parties involved in the case should have at least temporarily 
put the adoption plans on hold. In the meantime, KCSL or some other 
appropriate agency could have conducted an investigation of [the biological 
father's] home and background to see if he would have been a suitable placement 
 
8 
 
option for C.L. Assuming that [the biological father] passed the initial 
investigation and background check, C.L. could have been temporarily placed 
with [the biological father] for a trial period to be monitored by the appropriate 
agency or the courts. Then, if any evidence developed that [the biological father] 
was not properly caring for C.L., a petition for termination of parental rights 
could have been filed with the court. Giving [the biological father] more of a 
chance to prove his fitness as a father would have been a better approach than 
rushing into an adoption proceeding and finding out later if there was any 
evidence to support it.' [In re Adoption of C.L., No. 117,723, 2018 WL 1022887, 
at *7-8 (Kan. App. 2018) (unpublished opinion) (Malone, J., concurring).] 
 
 
"32. 
The biological father petitioned the Supreme Court for review. The 
Supreme Court granted review on June 19, 2018. At oral arguments on September 12, 
2018, the respondent was questioned by the Supreme Court about the allegations 
contained in the adoption petition: 
 
'JUSTICE JOHNSON: And let's look at that. The petition alleged grounds for 
termination, that the identified biological father, after having knowledge of the 
pregnancy, failed, without reasonable cause, to provide support for the biological 
mother during the six months prior to the child's birth. Is that true? 
 
'MR. KENNEY: That was alleged, yes. 
 
'JUSTICE JOHNSON: How could that be when he didn't find out until after the 
child was—was born? 
 
'MR. KENNEY: Your Honor, it's a reasonable question. 'Um, you know, I was 
informed by the birth mother that she didn't know that she was pregnant until she 
had arrived at the hospital. 
 
'JUSTICE JOHNSON: She didn't know she was pregnant until she went to the 
hospital and had the baby? 
 
'MR. KENNEY: Correct. 
 
9 
 
 
'JUSTICE JOHNSON: But you're alleging that the putative father had knowledge 
for six months before the mother knew? 
 
'MR. KENNEY: Let me explain. Your Honor, I've been doing adoptions for a 
long time and birth mothers have been untruthful to me in the past. And I don't 
know why she would have said she didn't know she was pregnant until she 
showed up at the hospital, but out of an abundance of caution we alleged that 
specific statutory ground just in case. 
 
'JUSTICE JOHNSON: And what are your facts for the second allegation, that the 
biological father abandoned the mother—biological mother after having 
knowledge of the pregnancy? What's your facts that would support that 
allegation? 
 
'MR. KENNEY: Again, Your Honor, birth mother[s] have lied to me in the past. 
We alleged all prebirth grounds, as it were, out of an abundance of caution. 
 
'JUSTICE BILES: I guess I don't understand the abundance of caution, 
particularly since this is a verified petition. You have to have a factual basis to 
make a claim in a petition, regardless of whether it's an adoption case, or any 
case. Right? 
 
'MR. KENNEY: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
'JUSTICE BILES: And so, you're saying that your factual basis for making this 
allegation was that you thought it was possible that the birth mother was lying to 
you and so you claimed facts that you didn't know whether they were true or not? 
 
'MR. KENNEY: That's essentially correct, Your Honor, but— 
 
'JUSTICE BILES: Then let me go one step further, the adoptive parents, these 
people that want to have this child, are verifying, under oath, that there are facts 
to support something that nobody knows is true. How does that happen? 
 
10 
 
 
'MR. KENNEY: Your Honor, as I explained, we alleged that— 
 
'JUSTICE BILES: I know what you did, I'm trying to figure out how it happens. 
It's not enough to just say this is a statutory allegation and I'm going to throw it 
into a petition and put my name on it, as a licensed lawyer, or to have my clients 
verify that that is true without a factual basis, is it? 
 
'MR. KENNEY: That's correct, Your Honor.' 
 
 
"33. 
The Supreme Court issued its opinion on October 5, 2018, reversing the 
termination of the biological father's parental rights and remanding the case with 
directions that custody of C.L. be given to the biological father.  
 
 
"34. 
The Supreme Court stated: 
 
'The record is also undisputed that by the next day—a Friday—Father 
was acting to protect his parental rights. He advised Kline he wanted custody, 
had retained a lawyer to accomplish this, and gave Kline his lawyer's contact 
information. Notably, instead of prompting a cooperative opportunity to work 
with that attorney to explore Father's potential relationship with his child, this 
news apparently triggered a one-sided, 'first strike' race to the courthouse to 
initiate adoption proceedings in another county that would preempt any lawsuit 
by Father to establish paternity and support obligations. 
 
'The tactical move by the prospective adoptive parents had the desired 
result, but they admittedly got there by filing a lawsuit without appropriate 
factual investigation and by alleging false grounds for terminating Father's 
parental rights. They claimed, for example, that Father had failed to support 
Mother during the six months prior to C.L.'s birth and abandoned her after having 
knowledge of the pregnancy, even though he did not learn of the pregnancy and 
birth until two days after the fact. Worse yet, the prospective adoptive parents, 
under oath, verified these false accusations as being true. As Judge Malone  
 
 
11 
 
observed in his concurrence, "these allegations obviously were untrue" given the 
fact that no one—not even Mother—was aware of the pregnancy. [Citation 
omitted.]' [In re Adoption of C.L., 308 Kan. 1268, 1283, 427 P.3d 951 (2018).] 
 
 
"35. 
On October 12, 2018, the respondent sent a letter to the disciplinary 
administrator, regarding his conduct in In re Adoption of C.L. In the letter, the respondent 
stated: 
 
 
'An adoption case of mine was reversed by the Supreme Court on Friday, 
October 5th. The opinion is In the Matter of C.L. 
 
'Although it was not the basis for the reversal, the Court was unhappy 
that the adoption petition included an allegation that the birth father had failed to 
support the birth mother during the last six months of her pregnancy, when birth 
mother claimed she didn't know she was pregnant until she delivered. I explained 
at oral argument that I am accustomed to birth mothers lying and I included the 
allegation out of an abundance of caution. Because the opinion mentioned this 
issue, my explanation does not appear to have appeased the Justice who inquired 
at oral argument. 
 
'While I do not believe I violated the rules, I am concerned that the 
Justice might file an ethics complaint against me. Consequently, I have chosen to 
be proactive and bring this matter to your attention. 
 
'Coincidentally, I learned for the first time Monday that the birth mother 
appears to have known she was pregnant before she delivered. The information 
was provided to me by the girlfriend/fiancée of birth mother's father.' 
 
 
"36. 
On October 16, 2018, the disciplinary administrator sent the respondent a 
letter, notifying him that the matter was being docketed as DA13,205 and referred to the 
Johnson County Ethics Committee for investigation.  
 
 
12 
 
 
"37. 
On October 22, 2018, the disciplinary administrator received a letter 
from Douglas T. Shima, Clerk of the Appellate Courts, stating that he had been asked by 
the Supreme Court to transmit a copy of the court's In re Adoption of C.L. opinion 'for 
investigation and consideration of possible violation of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct by counsel.'  
 
 
"38. 
On October 24, 2018, the disciplinary administrator sent the respondent a 
copy of Mr. Shima's letter and asked him to verify in 20 days that he had received the 
letter and to include any information he believed was necessary to respond to the letter.  
 
 
"39. 
On November 12, 2018, the respondent sent a letter in response, stating: 
 
'As I understand it, the issue as framed by the opinion of the Kansas 
Supreme Court . . . is whether alleging "the father had failed to support [the 
biological mother] during the six months prior to C.L.'s birth and abandoned her 
after having knowledge of the pregnancy" constituted "false grounds for 
terminating [the biological father]'s parental rights." [Citation omitted.] [the 
biological father] allegedly did not learn of [the biological mother]'s pregnancy 
until after C.L. was born. [Citation omitted.] 
 
'At oral argument, I attempted to respond to the Supreme Court's 
concerns regarding inclusion of the pre-birth grounds described above. As I 
explained to the Court, it has been my experience in my almost 24 years of 
handling adoptions that birth mothers lie about a variety of issues. Thus, I felt it 
most prudent to include the pre-birth termination grounds in the event that C.L.'s 
mother had lied. 
 
'I also relied on the following legal analysis. First, adoption is a creature 
of statute, In the Matter of the Adoption of L.M., 48 Kan. App. 2d 343, 344-345 
(Kan. App. 2012), and the grounds for termination of parental rights under the 
Kansas Adoption and Relinquishment Act are set forth at K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(1). 
Kansas adoption statutes are strictly construed in favor of preservation of 
parental rights. In re Adoption of B.M.W. 268 Kan. 871, 882 (Kan. 2000). Finally, 
Kansas is a notice pleading state, which requires a "short and plain statement of a 
 
13 
 
claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and 
the ground upon which it rests." Kinsley v. Frydman, 221 Kan. 297, 301-02 (Kan. 
1977). Thus, it seemed fairest to place a young, unwed father on immediate 
notice of all possible grounds available under K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(1) for 
termination of his parental rights.' 
 
 
"40. 
In his response and at the hearing on the formal complaint, the 
respondent indicated that generally biological mothers often lie and that he was skeptical 
about the biological mother's claim that she was unaware she was pregnant until giving 
birth to C.L. and that his skepticism was 'warranted.' The respondent stated:  
 
'After having read about the Supreme Court's decision in a Topeka newspaper, 
[the girlfriend of the biological mother's father] sent me the enclosed email . . . 
[and] it appears that the birth mother may have known she was pregnant before 
she delivered the child.' 
 
The information the respondent received after the Supreme Court opinion was released 
was never investigated nor cross-examined. Because the information was not 
investigated, it is difficult to say whether the information was true or false. The receipt of 
this information does not make the false statements in the adoption petition true, nor does 
it mitigate the respondent's misconduct. At the time the respondent filed the adoption 
petition, he had no factual basis for the assertions made in the petition.  
 
"Adoption of Baby Boy F 
 
 
"41. 
In May, 2016, the biological mother and the biological father of Baby 
Boy F, began dating. The biological father moved into the biological mother's residence 
and shortly thereafter, the couple learned that the biological mother was pregnant.  
 
 
"42. 
The biological mother and the biological father's relationship deteriorated 
by November, 2016, and the biological father moved out of the shared residence. A few 
days later, he returned to the residence to find that the biological mother had moved.  
 
 
14 
 
 
"43. 
On January 21, 2017, the biological mother gave birth to Baby Boy F. 
The next day, the biological mother signed documents relinquishing her parental rights 
and agreeing to have Catholic Charities of Northeast Kansas place Baby Boy F with 
adoptive parents.  
 
 
"44. 
In the documents, the biological mother identified the biological father as 
the Baby Boy F's father, stated that he had accompanied her to one doctor's appointment 
and one sonogram appointment while she was pregnant, and asserted that he had not 
provided her with any financial support during the pregnancy.  
 
 
"45. 
Catholic Charities placed Baby Boy F with a prospective adoptive 
couple. The adoptive couple retained the respondent to assist them with adopting Baby 
Boy F.  
 
 
"46. 
Two days after Baby Boy F's birth, on January 23, 2017, the respondent 
filed a petition on behalf of the adoptive couple in Wyandotte County district court to 
terminate the biological father's parental rights and approve the adoption of the child. 
 
 
"47. 
Among other allegations, the petition alleged that the biological father 
'made no reasonable efforts to support or communicate with the child after having 
knowledge of the birth of the child' and had 'abandoned or neglected the child after 
having knowledge of the child's birth.'  
 
 
"48. 
At the time the adoption petition was filed, the biological father did not 
know that Baby Boy F had been born. He learned of the birth of Baby Boy F when he 
was served with the adoption petition a few days later.  
 
 
"49. 
An initial hearing was scheduled for February 28, 2017. Prior to the 
hearing, the biological father asked the respondent if he could see his child. The record 
does not establish what he was told, but he was not given any visits. At the initial hearing, 
the respondent informed the district court that he had spoken to the biological father and 
that the biological father indicated to him that he wanted to assume parental 
responsibilities of Baby Boy F.  
 
 
15 
 
 
"50. 
At the hearing, the biological father agreed to submit to genetic testing to 
determine paternity. Genetic testing later confirmed the biological father's paternity of 
Baby Boy F.  
 
 
"51. 
The respondent requested at the hearing that all information about the 
adoptive couple be sealed and not available to the biological father. The district court 
granted the request.  
 
 
"52. 
After the initial hearing, the biological father retained counsel to 
represent him. 
 
 
"53. 
On November 10, 2017, the district court conducted an evidentiary 
hearing in the adoption case. Following the hearing, the district court terminated the 
biological father's parental rights on the basis that, while the case was pending, the 
biological father failed to make reasonable efforts to support or communicate with the 
child after having knowledge of the child's birth. At that same time, the district court 
approved the adoptive couple's adoption of Baby Boy F. The biological father appealed 
the termination of his parental rights to the Court of Appeals.  
 
 
"54. 
On December 7, 2018, the Court of Appeals issued its opinion, 
concluding that the evidence presented at the hearing was insufficient to support the 
conclusion that the biological father had failed to make reasonable efforts to support or 
communicate with Baby Boy F after having knowledge of his birth. Accordingly, the 
Court of Appeals reversed the termination of the biological father's parental rights and 
remanded the case with directions that custody of Baby Boy F be given to the biological 
father.  
 
 
"55. 
Notably, in support of its decision, the Court of Appeals cited the 
Supreme Court's decision in In re Adoption of C.L.  
 
 
"56. 
While the disciplinary action regarding the respondent in the C.L. case 
was pending, the disciplinary administrator's office became aware of the case involving 
Baby Boy F. On November 27, 2019, the disciplinary administrator sent the respondent a 
letter, asking him to address specific questions regarding the Baby Boy F case:  
 
16 
 
 
'I would like you to explain the facts surrounding your decision in Baby Boy F. to 
allege in the adoption petition that the biological father "made no reasonable 
efforts to support or communicate with the Child after having knowledge of the 
birth of the Child" and that the biological father had "abandoned or neglected the 
Child after having knowledge of the Child's birth." If you did not have a factual 
basis for making these allegations at the time you filed the adoption petition, did 
you note in the adoption petition that your allegations would "likely have 
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity to further investigation or 
discovery?" See K.S.A. 60-211(b)(3).' 
 
 
"57. 
On December 5, 2019, the respondent provided a response, stating: 
 
'Before this disciplinary action started, it was my practice to simply quote 
verbatim the provisions of K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(1) in my adoption petitions. 
Because Kansas is a notice pleading state, I included all applicable or potentially 
applicable provisions of the statute for termination of the birth father's parental 
rights in my initial pleading. Because a respondent/birth father is generally young 
and sometimes unsophisticated, I thought it fairest to inform the young man as 
soon as possible what was at stake. My intent was never to mislead the birth 
father or the court. 
 
'Since the inception of the disciplinary claim, I have refined my pleading 
practice as you suggest in your letter. For example, in a recent petition filed after 
the child's birth I alleged that the birth father "has made or is expected to make 
no reasonable efforts to support or communicate with the Child after having 
knowledge of the Child's birth."' 
 
"Conclusions of Law 
 
 
"58. 
The respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 3.1 (meritorious claims 
and contentions), KRPC 3.3 (candor to the tribunal), and KRPC 8.4 (professional 
misconduct). Based on the above findings of fact and the respondent's stipulations, the  
 
 
17 
 
hearing panel concludes as a matter of law that the respondent violated KRPC 3.1 
(meritorious claims and contentions), KRPC 3.3 (candor to the tribunal), and KRPC 8.4 
(professional misconduct). 
 
"KRPC 3.1 
 
 
"59. 
A lawyer may not 'bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert 
an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous.' KRPC 3.1. The 
respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 3.1. In this case, the respondent included 
issues in both of the adoption petitions without a factual basis for doing so. The 
respondent argued that he did so 'in an abundance of caution.' However, an attorney may 
not include allegations in a petition without factual support. As such, based on the 
respondent's stipulation and the evidence presented, the hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent violated KRPC 3.1. when he did not have a good faith basis for doing so.  
 
 
"60. 
The hearing panel is concerned that the respondent's current practice 
does not sufficiently correct the situation. The respondent indicated that in a recent 
adoption petition, he alleged that the birth father 'has made or is expected to make no 
reasonable efforts to support or communicate with the Child after having knowledge of 
the Child's birth.' The respondent must not make allegations in any petitions that lack a 
factual basis. 
 
"KRPC 3.3(a)(1) 
 
 
"61. 
Rule 3.3(a)(1) provides that '[a] lawyer shall not knowingly make a false 
statement of material fact or law to a tribunal.' The respondent made false statements of 
material fact to the Court when he included allegations in the two adoptions petitions that 
were not true.  
 
 
"62. 
Specifically, in In re Adoption of C.L., the respondent included the 
following allegations: 
 
 
18 
 
a. 
The identified biological father, after having knowledge of the 
pregnancy, failed without reasonable cause to provide support for the 
biological mother during the six months prior to the Child's birth; 
 
b. 
The identified biological father abandoned the biological mother after 
having knowledge of the pregnancy; 
 
c. 
The identified biological father has made no reasonable efforts to support 
or communicate with the Child after having knowledge of the birth of the 
Child; 
 
d. 
The identified biological father abandoned or neglected the Child after 
having knowledge of the Child's birth; 
 
e. 
The identified biological father is unfit; and 
 
f. 
Termination of the parental rights of the identified biological father is in 
the best interests of the Child. 
 
However, the alleged grounds for terminating the biological father's parental rights were 
made without prior factual investigation and were substantively false when filed, as the 
biological father only learned of the biological mother's pregnancy after C.L.'s birth and 
only four days before the respondent filed the petition seeking to terminate the biological 
father's parental rights. The respondent made false allegations in the adoption petition.  
 
 
"63. 
In Baby Boy F.'s adoption petition, the respondent asserted that the 
biological father 'made no reasonable efforts to support or communicate with the child 
after having knowledge of the birth of the child' and had 'abandoned or neglected the 
child after having knowledge of the child's birth.' However, at the time the adoption 
petition was filed, the biological father did not know that Baby Boy F had been born. He 
learned of the birth of Baby Boy F when he was served with the adoption petition a few 
days later. Thus, the respondent made false allegations in the adoption petition.  
 
 
19 
 
 
"64. 
Because the respondent provided false information to the Court, the 
hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 3.3(a)(1).  
 
"KRPC 8.4(c) 
 
 
"65. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.' Rule 8.4(c). As detailed above, 
the respondent engaged in conduct that involved dishonesty when he made false 
allegations in the two adoption petitions. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent violated Rule 8.4(c).  
 
"KRPC 8.4(d) 
 
 
"66. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that 
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' Rule 8.4(d). This disciplinary case is based 
on two adoption cases where, as a result of the respondent's misconduct, two adoptions 
were overturned. In both of those cases, the respondent included allegations in the 
adoption petitions which were not supported by any facts in existence at the time of 
filing. As Judge Malone stated, the respondent: 
 
'alleged almost every legal ground for termination of parental rights set forth in 
the statute, without any evidence at the time to support the allegations, in the 
hope that something would stick by the time the case was heard in court.' [C.L., 
2018 WL 1022887, at *7 (Malone, J., concurring).] 
 
As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated Rule 8.4(d).  
 
"American Bar Association 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
 
 
"67. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
 
20 
 
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors.  
 
 
"68. 
Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to his clients, the legal 
profession, and the legal system to maintain his personal integrity. 
 
 
"69. 
Mental State. The respondent negligently and knowingly violated his 
duty. The respondent's pattern of alleging the statutory grounds in adoption petitions 
without any factual support was careless, sloppy, and negligent. In addition, in these two 
particular cases, the respondent knew that some of the factors clearly did not apply. 
 
 
"70. 
Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused 
serious injury to his clients, the birth mothers, the birth fathers, and the two children 
whose adoptions were overturned. The injury caused by the respondent cannot be 
remedied and will be long lasting. 
 
"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
 
"71. 
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
aggravating factors present: 
 
a. 
A Pattern of Misconduct. Based on the respondent's written response and 
testimony, the respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct throughout his 
career. It was his pattern and practice, in an 'abundance of caution,' to include all 
the statutory grounds in his petitions for adoptions regardless of the evidence 
involved in the case.  
 
b. 
Vulnerability of Victim. The respondent's clients, the biological mothers, 
the biological fathers, and children whose adoptions were set aside were 
vulnerable to the respondent's misconduct. By the nature of the cases in which 
the respondent's violations occurred, it is clear that these clients, as well as the 
necessary parties, are highly vulnerable. Given the respondent's many years of 
 
21 
 
experience in filing adoption pleadings, that vulnerability was well-known to the 
respondent. 
 
c. 
Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Missouri Supreme 
Court admitted the respondent to the practice of law in Missouri in 1995 and the 
Kansas Supreme Court admitted the respondent to the practice of law in the State 
of Kansas in 1996. At the time of the misconduct, the respondent had been 
practicing law for approximately 20 years.  
 
 
"72. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
mitigating circumstances present: 
 
a. 
Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record. The respondent has not 
previously been disciplined.   
 
b. 
The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or Her 
Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free Acknowledgment 
of the Transgressions. The respondent self-reported the misconduct. The 
respondent fully cooperated with the disciplinary process. Additionally, the 
respondent admitted the facts and the rule violations.  
 
c. 
Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community Including 
Any Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in Support of the Character and 
General Reputation of the Attorney. The respondent is an active and productive 
member of the adoption bar. The respondent also enjoys the respect of his peers 
and generally possesses a good character and reputation as evidenced by several 
letters received by the hearing panel.  
 
d. 
Remorse. At the hearing on this matter, the respondent expressed genuine 
remorse for having engaged in the misconduct.  
 
 
22 
 
 
"73. 
In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards:  
 
'6.12 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that false 
statements or documents are being submitted to the court or that material 
information is improperly being withheld, and takes no remedial action, 
and causes injury or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or 
causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding.  
 
'6.13 
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent either in 
determining whether statements or documents are false or in taking 
remedial action when material information is being withheld, and causes 
injury or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes an 
adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding.  
. . . . 
 
'7.2 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in 
conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes 
injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.  
 
'7.3 
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently engages 
in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes 
injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.'  
 
"Recommendation of the Parties 
 
 
"74. 
The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent's 
license to practice law be suspended for a period of 18 months. Counsel for the 
 
23 
 
respondent recommended that the respondent be censured and that the censure be 
published in the Kansas Reports." 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the 
hearing panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of the 
KRPC exist and, if they do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 
258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 226(a)(1)(A) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 276). 
Clear and convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the 
truth of the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 
610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]). 
 
The respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint, to which he 
filed answers; he filed no exceptions to the hearing panel's final hearing report, but did 
enter into a joint stipulation agreement where he admitted to the facts as outlined in the 
agreement and to violating KRPC 3.1, 3.3, and 8.4. The finding of facts as set forth in the 
hearing panel's final hearing report are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule 228(g)(1), 
(2). The evidence before the hearing panel clearly established the charged misconduct 
violated KRPC 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions); 3.3(a)(1) (making a false 
statement of fact or law to a tribunal); 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice). 
 
The final hearing report recommended we suspend respondent's license to practice 
law for a six-month period. Before us, the Disciplinary Administrator recommended an 
18-month suspension. Neither the hearing panel nor the Disciplinary Administrator 
requested a Supreme Court Rule 232 reinstatement hearing to follow the suspension. See 
 
24 
 
2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 287. Respondent requested the hearing panel's recommendation of a 
six-month suspension be followed.  
 
These recommendations are just that—recommendations. See In re Biscanin, 
305 Kan. 1212, 1229, 390 P.3d 886 (2017). The respondent's admitted pattern of conduct 
in these cases is egregious. He knowingly made false statements to a court with the intent 
to circumvent a father's constitutional rights to parent his own child and to obtain a 
fraudulent termination of that father's parental rights. In so doing, he "won" adoptions of 
the children for his clients which a significant time later had to be overturned due to the 
respondent's fraud.  
 
In effect, respondent used the legal process to traffic children. It is not hyperbole 
to put the matter this starkly, and we can think of no breach of trust more significant or 
damaging than this. Our legal system depends on the highest standards of 
professionalism, integrity, truthfulness, and trustworthiness of our lawyers. Without this, 
we cannot be said to have a system of law, only a corrupt game of power and 
manipulation with a façade of lawfulness. A lawyer cannot come back from a breach of 
trust so grave. The confidence of the public and the sanctity of the rule of law can only be 
protected and preserved by meting out the most serious sanction available to us—
disbarment. 
 
Disbarment is the appropriate sanction when "a lawyer, with the intent to deceive 
the court, makes a false statement . . . and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a 
party, or causes a significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the legal 
proceeding." ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, § 6.11 (1992). The harm 
respondent caused can hardly be understated—to his own clients (who were forced to 
suffer the heartbreaking judicial reversal of the adoptions of their children); to the fathers 
(who lost years of crucial parenting time with their children); to the children (who 
 
25 
 
doubtless will suffer early childhood trauma which may reverberate through their lives); 
and to the people of Kansas (whose confidence in our legal system's ability to arrive at 
just and equitable resolutions to such disputes is seriously undermined by such 
misconduct). In the past, we have dealt similarly with other cases of fraud and 
dishonesty. See In re Nwakanma, 306 Kan. 704, 397 P.3d 403 (2017); In re Williams, 
302 Kan. 990, 362 P.3d 816 (2015). We hold that respondent is disbarred from the 
practice of law in the state of Kansas and enter judgment as follows.  
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Kevin W. Kenney be and he is hereby disbarred 
from the practice of law in the state of Kansas, effective the date of this opinion, in 
accordance with Supreme Court Rule 225(a)(1) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 275) for violations 
of KRPC 3.1, 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d).  
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall comply with Supreme Court 
Rule 231 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 286). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports. 
 
 
STANDRIDGE, J., not participating.