Title: Burd Management v. State of Indiana
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 49S02-0411-CV-476
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 28, 2005

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Joseph W. Hammes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Steve Carter 
Tabbert Hahn Earnest & Weddle, LLP 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
David L. Steiner 
Karl L. Mulvaney 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
Nana Quay-Smith 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Candace L. Sage 
Bingham McHale, LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S02-0411-CV-476 
 
BURD MANAGEMENT, LLC, 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49D12-210-PL-1827 
The Honorable Robyn Moberly, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-307-CV-572 
_________________________________ 
 
June 28, 2005 
 
Sullivan, Justice. 
 
A property owner whose land is being taken for a highway project argues that the state 
transportation department must, to prevail in condemnation proceedings, prove that it made a 
good-faith offer to purchase the property prior to filing suit.  We hold that Indiana Code Section 
 
32-24-1-13(a) exempts the transportation department from any such requirement, thereby over-
ruling Decker v. State, 426 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). 
 
Background 
 
The Indiana Department of Transportation (“INDOT”) is in the process of improving 
public highway U.S. 36 in Marion County, also known as Pendleton Pike.  Burd Management, 
LLC (“Burd”), owns real estate in Marion County adjacent to Pendleton Pike.  INDOT deter-
mined that it needed to appropriate part of Burd’s real estate for the public purpose of improving 
the highway.  The State obtained two appraisals for the real estate.  Based on those appraisals, 
the State, through INDOT, presented a Uniform Land Acquisition Offer to purchase Burd’s real 
estate for $57,950.  Burd rejected the offer, and the State initiated a condemnation action.  Burd 
filed objections to the appropriation proceedings, claiming that: (1) the State failed to comply 
with the procedures for appropriating Burd’s real estate; (2) the State failed to make a good-faith 
offer or effort to purchase Burd’s property; and (3) the State improperly alleged in its Complaint 
that its highway improvement project benefits Burd’s remaining property after the condemna-
tion.  Burd also served the State with discovery requests.  The State objected to all requests, ex-
cept one interrogatory and one admission, and filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue 
of a good-faith offer requirement.  Burd then filed a motion to compel responses to its discovery 
requests. 
 
The trial court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment, determining that the 
State was not required to prove that an offer to purchase was made prior to filing the condemna-
tion action.  The trial court also denied Burd’s motion to compel discovery requests and issued a 
protective order shielding the State’s appraisals from discovery. 
 
The Court of Appeals, finding that the State was required to make a good-faith offer, re-
versed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the State and remanded this 
case to the trial court with instructions to determine whether a good-faith offer had been made by 
the State for all of the land appropriated from Burd.  The State petitioned to, and we granted, 
transfer.  Burd Management v. State, 822 N.E.2d 981 (2004) (mem.). 
 
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Discussion 
 
I 
 
The central issue before this Court is whether there is a conflict between two statutes 
governing the condemnation of property in Indiana.  The first statute, which Burd argues is con-
trolling, provides: 
 
As a condition precedent to filing a complaint in condemnation,     
. . . a condemnor may enter upon the property as provided in this 
chapter and must, at least thirty (30) days before filing a complaint, 
make an offer to purchase the property in the form prescribed in 
subsection (c). 
 
Ind. Code § 32-24-1-5(a) (2004) (emphasis added) (“Section 5”).  A “condemnor” for the pur-
poses of this statute is defined as “any person authorized by Indiana law to exercise the power of 
eminent domain.”  Ind. Code § 32-24-1-1. 
 
The second statute, relied on by the State, provides: 
 
The Indiana department of transportation or any state board, 
agency, or commission that succeeds the department in respect to 
the duties to locate, relocate, construct, reconstruct, repair, or 
maintain the public highways of Indiana, having the right to exer-
cise the power of eminent domain for the public use, in its action 
for condemnation is not required to prove that an offer of purchase 
was made to the property owner in an action under this article. 
 
Ind. Code § 32-24-1-13(a) (emphasis added) (“Section 13”). 
 
 
Here is the history of these two statutes.  In 1905, the Indiana Legislature enacted a pro-
vision as part of the general statute governing condemnation (the “Condemnation Act”) that pro-
vided in part, “[A]ny person, corporation, or other body having the right to exercise the power of 
eminent domain” must, “[b]efore proceeding to condemn, . . . make an effort to purchase” the 
land.  1905 Ind. Acts 48, § 1 at 59.  This Court, in State v. Pollitt, held that the language of this 
 
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statute was broad enough to include the State and any of its administrative agencies.  220 Ind. 
593, 600, 45 N.E.2d 480, 482 (1942). 
 
 
In 1961, without expressly amending the 1905 Condemnation Act, the Legislature added 
a provision to the Indiana Code, which provided that the State Highway Department “shall not be 
required to prove that an offer to purchase was made to the land owner.”  1961 Ind. Acts 317, § 2 
at 887; Ind. Code § 32-11-1-9 (1961) (now codified as Section 13).  This Court in Sadlier v. Sta-
te interpreted this language to mean that the State, as legal representative for the Highway De-
partment, is exempted from the requirement that condemnors make an offer to purchase land be-
fore proceeding to condemn.  252 Ind. 525, 529, 251 N.E.2d 27, 29 (1969). 
 
 
In 1977, the Condemnation Act was amended by the addition of a new code section, 
which provided, “As a condition precedent to filing a complaint in condemnation, . . . a condem-
nor may enter upon the property or interest therein as provided in this chapter, and shall at least 
thirty (30) days prior to filing such complaint make an offer to purchase the property . . . .”  Ind. 
Code § 32-11-1-2.1(b) (1977) (now codified as Section 5).  The Legislature defined “condem-
nor” as “any person or entity authorized by this state to exercise the power of eminent domain.”  
Ind. Code § 32-11-1-2.1(a)(2) (1977) (now codified as Ind. Code § 32-24-1-1 (2004)). 
 
In 1981, the Indiana Court of Appeals in Decker v. State found that the statutes were “re-
pugnant in . . . their provisions,” and interpreted them together to mandate that the State make, as 
a condition precedent to filing a condemnation action, a good-faith offer to purchase.  426 
N.E.2d 151, 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).  The court reasoned that the obligation to make a good-
faith offer “necessarily requires the State not only to allege an offer was made, but also when a 
timely objection is interposed, to prove such offer was tendered in the manner anticipated by the 
statute.”  Id. at 154 (emphasis in original).  The court went on to say that “[i]t may not be pre-
sumed the Legislature intended the illogical or absurd result of requiring the State to ‘make’ an 
offer to purchase, while relieving it of the obligation of establishing such offer as a condition 
precedent to condemnation.”  Id.  Transfer was not sought in Decker, and we have never had oc-
casion to visit its holding. 
 
 
4
 
In the present case, the Court of Appeals, following Decker, held that INDOT must prove 
that it made a good-faith offer before condemning Burd Management’s real estate.  The State 
argues that the Court of Appeals erred in following Decker because recodifications made subse-
quent to Decker revitalize Section 5 and repeal Section 13, thus eliminating the requirement for 
the State to prove that it made a good-faith offer.  We will address each argument in turn. 
 
II 
 
A 
 
Burd argues that “[t]he Legislative preference for the expeditious resolution of State emi-
nent domain actions does not—and cannot—trump Burd’s right to object to the taking of its 
property.”  Br. in Response to Pet. for Reh’g at 4.  Burd goes on to argue that “Burd’s procedural 
due process rights require an opportunity to contest the legality of the State’s action to take its 
property.”  Id. (citing Cemetery Co. v. Warren Sch. Twp. of Marion County, 236 Ind. 171, 178, 
139 N.E.2d 538, 541 (Ind. 1957). 
 
Burd cites Cemetery Co. to support this proposition.  There this Court said: 
 
At some place in the proceedings, and by some method the land-
owner is entitled to contest the legality of the condemnation pro-
ceedings, and question the authority under which the attempt is be-
ing made to take his property including the issue of whether or not 
it is a private or public purpose. 
 
Cemetery Co., 236 Ind. at 178, 139 N.E.2d at 541 (emphasis added).  However, the Court in 
Cemetery Co. was discussing the right to challenge the legality of the condemnation proceedings 
in the context of whether the condemnor had the legislative authority to condemn the property in 
dispute.  Burd is not challenging INDOT’s authority to condemn its property for the improve-
ment of Pendleton Pike.1  Instead, Burd is contesting whether the State has to prove that it made 
a good-faith offer for the property.  Therefore, Burd’s reliance upon Cemetery Co. is misplaced. 
 
                                                 
1 Section 13, supra, confirms INDOT’s legislative authority to condemn land for public use.  
 
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B 
 
The State contended that because the Legislature recodified the Indiana Eminent Domain 
Act after the Decker decision was handed down,2 the court’s holding in Decker should no longer 
apply.  The State argued, “[T]he Indiana General Assembly’s amendment of a statute that an ap-
pellate court decided was implicitly repealed must be construed as a response to that appellate 
decision.  Further, it is simply absurd that the Indiana General Assembly would amend a statute 
that it intended to repeal.”  Br. of Appellee at 14. 
 
We disagree with the State’s explanation of the effect of the General Assembly’s recodi-
fication.  According to the Legislature, the recodification of the statutes did not act as a response 
to an appellate decision. 
 
The purpose of the recodification act of the 2002 regular session of 
the general assembly is to recodify prior property law in a style 
that is clear, concise, and easy to interpret and apply. Except to the 
extent that: 
(1) the recodification act of the 2002 regular session of the 
general assembly is amended to reflect the changes made in 
a provision of another bill that adds to, amends, or repeals a 
provision in the recodification act of the 2002 regular ses-
sion of the general assembly; or 
                                                 
2 In 1990, the Indiana General Assembly amended Indiana Code Section 32-11-1-9(a).  The amendments 
are as follows: 
 
In all proceedings by the state Indiana department of highways transpor-
tation, or any state board, agency, or commission which has succeeded 
said the department in respect to the duties duly charged by law to locate, 
relocate, construct, reconstruct, repair, or maintain the public highways 
of the state of Indiana, having the right to exercise the power of eminent 
domain for such the public use, the said department in its action for con-
demnation shall is not be required to prove that an offer of purchase was 
made to the landowner. 
 
1990 Ind. Acts, Pub. L. No. 18, § 287 at 916-17.  Then in 2002, the General Assembly recodified the 
Indiana Domain Act, including Indiana Code Section 32-11-1-9 and its 1990 amendments, at Indiana 
Code Sections 32-24-1-1 through 32-24-6-2.  The relevant recodified statute continues to provide that 
“[t]he Indiana department of transportation . . . is not required to prove that an offer of purchase was made 
to the property owner in an action under this article.”  Ind. Code § 32-24-1-13(a) (2004). 
 
6
(2) the minutes of meetings of the code revision commis-
sion during 2001 expressly indicate a different purpose; 
the substantive operation and effect of the prior property law con-
tinue uninterrupted as if the recodification act of the 2002 regular 
session of the general assembly had not been enacted. 
 
Ind. Code § 32-16-1-2 (2004) (emphasis added).  Therefore, absent an amendment or express 
indication of the code revision committee, the recodification had no effect on the statutes at issue 
here. 
 
C 
 
Though we disagree with the State’s view on the effects of the post-Decker 
recodifications, we nonetheless find that the Decker court erred in holding that the two statutes at 
issue were repugnant in their provisions.  Sections 5 and 13 can, and should, be read in harmony 
with one another.3
 
As already discussed, the Legislature has given the State authority to condemn the land; 
the State need only give just compensation.  And the Legislature has an interest in expediting the 
process of determining how much compensation is “just.”  So, as the State suggests in its brief, it 
would be sound policy for the Legislature—in an effort to divert parties from resorting to timely 
and costly litigation—to require the State to make a good-faith offer.  If the State makes an offer 
that the landowner finds acceptable, the time and resources that would otherwise be consumed in 
litigation would be saved.  Such policy encourages the State to present an offer that might well 
be acceptable to a landowner. 
 
And it would also be sound policy for the Legislature to spare the State the burden of 
proving that it made a good-faith offer.  Proving that an offer was made in good faith might well 
be costly and time consuming.  In any event, by the time that proof would be required, the parties 
                                                 
3 “In construing a statute our main objective is to determine, give effect, and implement the intent of the 
legislature.”  Neal v. DeKalb County Div. of Family & Children, 796 N.E.2d 280, 284 (Ind. 2003) (citing 
Melrose v. Capitol City Motor Lodge, Inc., 705 N.E.2d 985, 989 (Ind. 1998)).  Also, “[w]here two or 
more statutes contradict each other or are in apparent conflict, we attempt to construe them in harmony.”  
Id. (citing Purcell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 220, 223 (Ind. 1999)). 
 
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will already be before a court whose main purpose is to decide what compensation is “just.”  At 
that stage, the amount and character of the initial offer is irrelevant. 
 
So long as two statutes can be read in harmony with one another, we presume that the 
Legislature intended for them both to have effect.4  See Poehlman v. Feferman, 717 N.E.2d 578, 
582 (Ind. 1999) (“[W]e recognize a strong presumption that when the legislature enacted a par-
ticular piece of legislation, it was aware of existing statutes relating to the same subject.”) (citing 
Glick v. Dep’t of Commerce, 180 Ind. Ct. App. 12, 18, 387 N.E.2d 74, 78 (1979)).  We therefore 
disapprove the Court of Appeals’s decision in Decker, give effect to both Sections 5 and 13, and 
hold that the State need not prove that it made a good-faith offer.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Though Section 5 required INDOT to make a good-faith offer to Burd Management, Sec-
tion 13 dictates that INDOT was not required to prove in subsequent condemnation litigation that 
it made such an offer.  The trial court was correct to deny Burd’s motion to compel responses to 
its discovery requests and to grant summary judgment in favor of the State.  We affirm the trial 
court. 
 
Shepard, C.J., and Boehm and Rucker, JJ., concur.  Dickson, J., dissents, believing Decker v. 
State, 426 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), to have been correctly decided. 
                                                 
4 We see little basis for finding legislative acquiescence to the Decker decision.  No appellate court has 
subsequently cited Decker for the proposition that the State must prove that it made a good-faith offer 
before condemning property.  There is no evidence that either landowners or condemnors have relied on 
Decker. And, Burd does not make this argument. 
 
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