Title: State v. Burruell
Citation: 401 P.2d 733, 98 Ariz. 37
Docket Number: 1494
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: May 5, 1965

98 Ariz. 37 (1965) 401 P.2d 733 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Antonio Tapia BURRUELL, Appellant. No. 1494. Supreme Court of Arizona. En Banc. May 5, 1965. *38 Darrell F. Smith, Atty. Gen., Phoenix, Norman E. Green, Pima County Atty., Carl Waag, Deputy County Atty., Tucson, for appellee. Ted Pedersen, Tucson, for appellant. McFARLAND, Justice: This is an appeal from a judgment and sentence for illegal sale of narcotics in violation of A.R.S. § 36-1002.02, as amended. The appellant, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, on April 24, 1964, was adjudged guilty on two counts of illegal sale and sentenced to twelve (12) to fifteen (15) years on each count, the terms to run concurrently. The pertinent facts are as follows: Defendant was arrested on November 17, 1963, in the city of Tucson, Pima County, Arizona, and was subsequently charged with two counts of illegal sale of narcotics. After a preliminary hearing and arraignment, at which defendant pleaded not guilty, a trial date of February 19, 1964, was set. At the trial, a jury was duly impaneled and sworn, after which the deputy county attorney made an opening statement. Immediately thereafter, counsel for defense made his opening statement. Defense counsel's statement was delivered without objection by either the court or opposing counsel. Shortly thereafter, the deputy county attorney moved for a mistrial on the grounds that defense counsel's opening statement caused "irreputable harm" to the trial of the case, and that no instruction from the court could "wipe the slate clean" with reference to the objectionable statements. Defense counsel objected to the motion, but a mistrial was granted. A new trial date was set for April 13, 1964. On March 12, 1964, defendant filed a motion to quash the information and to suppress the testimony of the state's star witness, one Henry Lugo, Jr., an informer, who had made the alleged purchase from defendant. Defendant's motion asserted that to try *39 him again would constitute double jeopardy in violation of the United States and the Arizona constitutions. Further, defendant claimed that Mr. Lugo was an incompetent witness due to Lugo's heavy use of narcotics, and due to pressures brought to bear upon him by the county attorney and the sheriff's office. The motion was denied, and defendant stood trial on April 13, 1964, and was thereafter adjudged guilty on both counts. Defendant contends that it was error for the court to grant the deputy county attorney's motion for mistrial, claiming there existed no legal cause for such action, and therefore his trial on April 13, 1964, for the same offense placed him in double jeopardy. In United States v. Tateo, 216 F. Supp. 850, the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York stated: In State v. Puckett, 92 Ariz. 407, 377 P.2d 779, this court held: Therefore, the reviewing court must examine the record to determine whether or not "legal reason," in the nature of prejudicial remarks, existed in the opening statement of the defense which necessitated a mistrial and the granting of a new trial. In order to make a determination as to the sufficiency of the "legal reason" for the granting of the mistrial, several questions must first be considered, viz.: 1. What is the purpose of the opening statement? 2. What is the latitude afforded counsel in presenting his opening statement? In other words, did defense counsel have the right to make the remarks he did? 3. Was defendant's opening statement a fair statement of evidence, and did he exceed the bounds permitted under Rule 255, Subs. 3, of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. 474? The purpose of an opening statement is properly set forth by the court in State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285: In Turley v. State, 48 Ariz. 61, 59 P.2d 312, this court held as follows: Defense counsel's statement contained the following elements which he stated he intended to prove: The basis for the mistrial as contended by the deputy county attorney is set forth in his motion which reads as follows: The portion of the opening statement referred to by the defense counsel in his motion reads as follows: The question as set forth in the Puckett case, supra, is whether there was legal reason for granting a mistrial. In the event an improper statement is made, there are two courses of action open to a court. One would be to instruct the jury to disregard the objectionable portions, and the other would be to declare a mistrial. The court in the instant case found that there were objectionable features in the opening statement, and exercised its discretion under the latter and granted mistrial. As we have pointed out, the purpose of an opening statement is to advise the jury of facts upon which the defense would rely in his defense. So the question here is whether the deputy county attorney was correct in stating in effect that the evidence set forth in the defense opening statement was not admissible in the trial. In passing upon this question it is not for this court to decide as to the truth of the statement of defense counsel in regard to the facts but whether, if the facts did exist, they would be proper evidence. The gist of the statement here is that defendant had been "framed up" on by the witness Lugo that his reason for "framing" defendant was that Lugo had committed other crimes that the sheriff's office knew of these crimes and had reported to the county attorney, and that this was an axe over Lugo's head. We have held in other cases such evidence was admissible. In the case of *43 State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295, 350 P.2d 756, 86 A.L.R.2d 1120 we said: In State v. Holden, 88 Ariz. 43, 352 P.2d 705, we said: *44 In State v. Aldrich, 75 Ariz. 53, 251 P.2d 653, this court, in holding it was reversible error not to permit cross-examination of the officer in regard to his acquaintance with defendant's wife as to whether he had personal reasons for wishing to see defendant in jail, we stated: While in the instant case, as pointed out in the Aldrich case, supra, the evidence set forth in defense counsel's opening statement with reference to the sheriff's office and the county attorney's office might well not have been true, he still had the right to introduce such evidence in his defense. For the purpose of this case, we must assume that he could have produced the evidence as set forth in his opening statement. If the evidence would be admissible in court a defense attorney has the right to outline such evidence in his opening statement. Having examined the opening statement of defense counsel, this court finds that there was not sufficient legal cause to grant the prosecution's motion for mistrial. On February 19, 1964, the jury had been sworn, and the trial of the case begun. It was stopped by the court's ruling of mistrial, which was not based upon proper "legal reason" or sufficient "exceptional circumstances." The second trial, on April 13, 1964, had the legal effect of placing defendant in double jeopardy. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 83 S. Ct. 1033. Defendant objected to the mistrial. The ruling of the court in granting the mistrial would have the effect of preventing defendant from offering the same evidence at the next trial. He wanted to proceed in the first trial with the jury that had been selected. He had a right to offer the evidence as stated in his opening statement, and the right to be tried by the jury which had already been sworn. Having once been placed in jeopardy, defendant cannot again be tried for the same offense. Therefore, the second trial of defendant was illegal. State v. Puckett, supra. The judgment and sentence of the court are reversed and it is hereby ordered that *45 the case be dismissed and defendant be relieved from further proceedings in the case. LOCKWOOD, C.J., STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and BERNSTEIN and UDALL, JJ., concurring.