Title: People v. Eroshevich
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S210545
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 2014

1 
Filed 11/3/14 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S210545 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/5 B231411 
KHRISTINE ELAINE  
) 
EROSHEVICH et al.,   
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. BA353907 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
After a jury trial that resulted in defendant Howard K. Stern‟s convictions 
on two counts of conspiracy, the trial court granted defendant‟s motion for a new 
trial and dismissed the charges on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that defendant intended to commit a crime.  The Court of Appeal 
reversed, reinstating the jury‟s verdict, and ordered that the trial court could 
consider defendant‟s remaining grounds for a new trial, but that double jeopardy 
precluded defendant from being retried.  We granted review on the sole issue of 
whether the state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy 
would preclude a retrial if defendant‟s new trial motion is granted.  We conclude 
that the Court of Appeal erred when it ordered that double jeopardy precluded 
defendant from being retried and hold that, if the trial court grants defendant a new 
trial on any of his remaining claims, he may be retried. 
 
2 
I.   
The People filed an 11-count information against defendant Howard K. 
Stern.  All of the charges arose out of allegations that defendant Stern and 
codefendant Dr. Khristene Eroshevich had conspired to and did provide 
prescription drugs to Anna Nicole Smith (also known as Vicki Lynn Marshall) 
under a variety of false names.1  The jury convicted defendant on two counts of 
conspiracy (counts 1 and 3) to commit two target crimes — obtaining a controlled 
substance by fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in violation of Health and Safety 
Code section 11173, subdivision (a), and giving a false name in a prescription for 
a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11174; one 
conspiracy was alleged to have occurred between September 11, 2006, and 
February 8, 2007, and the other between June 5, 2004, and September 10, 2006.  
Defendant was acquitted on the remaining nine counts.   
                                              
1  
Although codefendant Eroshevich‟s name appears in the title of this case, 
our decision does not affect her.  She was charged with the same 11 counts as 
defendant.  The jury convicted her on the same two conspiracy charges, plus two 
additional charges.  The trial court concluded that its dismissal of the charges 
against defendant, the only other conspirator, foreclosed any conspiracy 
convictions against Eroshevich.  Therefore, the trial court dismissed counts 1 and 
3, the conspiracy charges, against Eroshevich in furtherance of justice under 
section 1385.  The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court‟s dismissal of the 
conspiracy counts and concluded that Eroshevich could be retried if her retrial 
motion is granted.  The Court of Appeal reasoned that because the trial court did 
not state that it found the evidence insufficient to support Eroshevich‟s convictions 
under the substantial evidence standard, the dismissal did not amount to a legal 
acquittal of codefendant.  (See People v. Lagunas (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1030, 1038, 
fn. 6.)  The People‟s petition for review did not take issue with any part of the 
Court of Appeal‟s ruling regarding Eroshevich.   
 
3 
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial asserting several grounds pursuant 
to Penal Code section 1181,2 and asked the court to exercise its discretion to 
dismiss the charges under section 1385.  Based on the insufficiency of the 
evidence, the trial court granted defendant‟s motion for a new trial and also 
dismissed the two conspiracy counts.  The trial court concluded that “no 
reasonable trier of fact could find that Howard Stern had a specific intent to violate 
either of these target crimes” and that the evidence supported the conclusion that 
defendant had provided prescription drugs to Ms. Marshall under false names only 
to protect her privacy.  After reviewing all the evidence, “in a light most favorable 
to upholding the verdict,” the trial court found the evidence to be “clearly 
insufficient.”   
The People appealed and the Court of Appeal, in a published opinion, 
reversed the trial court‟s rulings on the motions.  The Court of Appeal held that the 
evidence regarding defendant‟s knowledge and involvement in the provision of 
drugs to Ms. Marshall in the names of other persons was sufficient such that “the 
jury could reasonably conclude Mr. Stern, a lawyer, knowingly participated in the 
ongoing illegal practice of securing illegal prescriptions.”   
The Court of Appeal held that “the new trial and dismissal orders must be 
set aside; the verdicts as to counts 1 and 3 must be reinstated; and, upon remittitur 
issuance, the trial court must proceed to rule on other new trial issues, dismissal 
grounds and, if appropriate, sentence [defendant]; but under no circumstances may 
he be retried.”  (Italics added.)  The Court of Appeal concluded that federal and 
state double jeopardy protections prevented retrial of defendant, finding Hudson v. 
Louisiana (1981) 450 U.S. 40, 44, to be controlling.  The Court of Appeal 
                                              
2  
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
4 
reasoned that because the trial court granted the new trial motion and dismissed 
the charges based on the insufficiency of the evidence, the dismissal order had the 
legal effect of an acquittal; therefore, even though the trial court‟s order was 
erroneous, that order barred retrial of defendant.  In light of its conclusion, the 
Court of Appeal discussed several avenues the trial court might consider upon 
remand:  (1) deny the new trial motion and proceed to sentence defendant; (2) 
deny the new trial motion, but dismiss the case on alternative section 1385 
grounds; (3) grant the new trial motion using the “13th juror” standard, but 
defendant would be barred from retrial; or (4) dismiss counts 1 and 3 on other 
grounds.  The Court of Appeal emphasized that “under no circumstances may a 
retrial occur.”   
We granted the People‟s petition for review, which contended that the 
Court of Appeal erred in concluding defendant may not be retried should his 
motion for new trial be granted by the trial court.  
II.   
The principles of double jeopardy are of federal and state constitutional 
origin.  The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that 
“[n]o person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb . . . .”  (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.)  Similarly, the California 
Constitution provides that “[p]ersons may not twice be put in jeopardy for the 
same offense . . . .”  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.)  Unless sound reason exists, 
California courts will not interpret the California double jeopardy clause more 
broadly than its federal counterpart.  (Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 
353.)   
At its core, the double jeopardy clause “protect[s] an individual from being 
subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an 
alleged offense.”  (Green v. United States (1957) 355 U.S. 184, 187.)  The policy 
 
5 
underlying the double jeopardy protection “is that the State with all its resources 
and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an 
individual . . . thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and 
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity.”  (Id. at 
pp. 187-188.)   
“The constitutional protection against double jeopardy unequivocally 
prohibits a second trial following an acquittal,” because the “public interest in the 
finality of criminal judgments is so strong that an acquitted defendant may not be 
retried even though „the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous 
foundation.‟ ”  (Arizona v. Washington (1978) 434 U.S. 497, 503.)  Consequently, 
the People cannot appeal from a jury‟s verdict acquitting a defendant, seeking a 
reversal in order to retry the defendant.3  “This is justified on the ground that, 
however mistaken the acquittal may have been, there would be an unacceptably 
high risk that the Government, with its superior resources, would wear down a 
defendant, thereby „enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be 
found guilty.‟ ”  (United States v. DiFrancesco (1980) 449 U.S. 117, 130.)   
Similarly, a trial court‟s action amounting to the legal equivalent of an 
acquittal prior to the jury’s verdict cannot be appealed by the People because a 
successful appeal would result in a second trial, which would violate the 
protection against double jeopardy.  (Evans v. Michigan (2013) 568 U.S. ___ [133 
S.Ct. 1069, 1074] (Evans).)  The trial court‟s action is the legal equivalent of an 
                                              
3  
In California, the People‟s ability to appeal is delineated in section 1238.  
Any appeal falling outside section 1238 is prohibited.  (People v. Salgado (2001) 
88 Cal.App.4th 5, 11.)  Section 1238, subdivision (a)(8), allows the People to 
appeal “[a]n order or judgment dismissing or otherwise terminating all or any 
portion of the action including such an order or judgment after a verdict or finding 
of guilty . . . .”   
 
6 
acquittal if it constitutes a ruling that the prosecution‟s evidence was insufficient 
to support a conviction, regardless of whether that ruling is legally correct.  (Ibid. 
[although trial court erred in directing verdict of acquittal at close of prosecution‟s 
case, defendant was acquitted for double jeopardy purposes and could not be 
retried]; see, e.g., Smalis v. Pennsylvania (1986) 476 U.S. 140 [trial court‟s order 
granting defendant‟s demurrer after close of the prosecution‟s case on grounds that 
the evidence was insufficient constituted an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes 
and barred appeal and retrial]; Sanabria v. United States (1978) 437 U.S. 54, 64 
[trial court‟s order striking certain evidence and granting judgment of acquittal 
could not be appealed even if based on erroneous legal conclusions]; United States 
v. Martin Linen Supply Co. (1977) 430 U.S. 564 [double jeopardy clause barred 
appeal of trial court‟s judgment of acquittal, entered after jury was discharged 
because it had been unable to agree on a verdict]; Fong Foo v. United States 
(1962) 369 U.S. 141, 143 [trial court‟s order directing jury to return verdicts of 
acquittal, resulting in judgments of acquittal, barred retrial even if trial court was 
without power to direct acquittals under the circumstances of the case].)4 
On the other hand, if a trial court rules that evidence was insufficient to 
support a conviction after the jury has returned a verdict the People may appeal 
                                              
4 
Sometimes when a trial court grants a motion for new trial, it is unclear 
whether it found the evidence to be legally insufficient or whether it concluded, 
reviewing the evidence independently as the “13th juror,” that the jury‟s verdict 
was against the weight of the evidence.  (See § 1181; People v. Lagunas, supra, 8 
Cal.4th at p. 1038, fn. 6.)  In such situations, the reviewing court “must determine 
whether the ruling . . . , whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct 
or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.”  (United 
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra, 430 U.S. at p. 571.)  In the present case, 
however, the record leaves no doubt that the trial court found the evidence to be 
legally insufficient. 
 
7 
that ruling “because reversal would result in reinstatement of the jury verdict of 
guilt, not a new trial.”  (Evans, supra, 568 U.S. at p. ___ [133 S.Ct. at p. 1081, 
fn. 9]; accord, United States v. Wilson (1975) 420 U.S. 332, 353 [prosecution may 
appeal from trial court‟s dismissal of indictment after a jury had returned its 
verdict].)  “[W]here a Government appeal presents no threat of successive 
prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended.”  (United States v. 
Martin Linen Supply Co., supra, 430 U.S. at pp. 569-570.)   
Under these decisions, in the present case, double jeopardy principles did 
not preclude the People from appealing the trial court‟s judgment dismissing the 
charges on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient.  A successful appeal by 
the People under such circumstances would merely require reinstatement of the 
jury‟s verdict and would not result in a new trial.  (See Evans, supra, 568 U.S. at 
p. ___, fn. 9 [133 S.Ct. at p. 1081, fn. 9].)  The Court of Appeal found the 
evidence to be sufficient and reversed the trial court‟s ruling, thereby reinstating 
the jury‟s verdict of conviction; because the People‟s appeal and the appellate 
court‟s reversal did not require a new trial, neither implicated double jeopardy 
principles.  The question remains whether, as the Court of Appeal concluded, 
double jeopardy principles would preclude a retrial if, on remand, the trial court 
were to grant defendant‟s motion for a new trial or dismissal on defendant‟s 
remaining grounds other than insufficiency of the evidence.   
The double jeopardy rules are well known.  The protection against double 
jeopardy generally precludes retrial for the same offense after a conviction or an 
acquittal.  (People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 563.)  An exception to this 
rule applies if the judgment of conviction is reversed as a result of defendant‟s 
appeal, motion for new trial, or other challenge by a defendant to his or her 
conviction.  (People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1, 6-7.)  Like other 
constitutional guarantees, double jeopardy protections are not absolute, and may 
 
8 
be waived by a defendant.  A defendant who files a motion for a new trial, like a 
defendant who moves for a mistrial, waives state and federal double jeopardy 
protections.  (Porter v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 125, 136; see Oregon v. 
Kennedy (1982) 456 U.S. 667, 672-673.)  By seeking reversal of a judgment of 
conviction on appeal, “ „in effect, [a defendant] assents to all the consequences 
legitimately following such reversal, and consents to be tried anew.‟ ”  (People v. 
Sachau (1926) 78 Cal.App. 702, 706; see People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 7 
[double jeopardy does not bar retrial when conviction is reversed because of a trial 
court‟s erroneous replacement of a juror]; Tibbs v. Florida (1982) 457 U.S. 31, 42 
[state appellate court‟s reversal because of the weight of the evidence, rather than 
the insufficiency of the evidence, does not bar retrial].)  Additionally, two policy 
considerations support allowing retrial in this situation.  First, “society would pay 
too high a price „were every accused granted immunity from punishment because 
of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to 
conviction.‟  [Citation.]”  (Tibbs, supra, at p. 40.)  “Second, the Court has 
concluded that retrial after reversal of a conviction is not the type of governmental 
oppression targeted by the Double Jeopardy Clause.”  (Ibid.)   
There is an exception to the rule permitting retrial after the defendant‟s 
successful challenge to his conviction:  the defendant may not be retried if the 
judgment is reversed because, as a matter of law, the evidence was insufficient to 
support a conviction.  “[W]hen a reversal rests upon the ground that the 
prosecution has failed to produce sufficient evidence . . . , the Double Jeopardy 
Clause bars the prosecutor from making a second attempt at conviction.”  (Tibbs v. 
Florida, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 42.)  When the evidence is legally insufficient, it 
means that “ „the government‟s case was so lacking that it should not have even 
been submitted to the jury.‟ ”  (Id. at p. 41, citing Burks v. United States (1978) 
437 U.S. 1, 16.)  Furthermore, when the defendant seeks a reversal on appeal 
 
9 
based on insufficient evidence, or moves for acquittal in the trial court, the 
defendant does not consent to a disposition that contemplates retrial and therefore 
does not waive double jeopardy protections.  (Evans, supra, 568 U.S. at p. ___ 
[133 S.Ct. at p. 1079].)  Even if the defendant moves for a new trial, retrial will 
nevertheless be barred if the defendant‟s motion was granted on grounds that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the conviction.  (See Burks, supra, at p. 17 
[“[i]n our view it makes no difference that a defendant has sought a new trial as 
one of his remedies, or even as the sole remedy”].) 
In the present case, the Court of Appeal contemplated that, on remand, the 
trial court could consider the defendant‟s remaining grounds for his motion for a 
new trial and could consider dismissal under section 1385 on grounds other than 
the insufficiency of the evidence.  As the above discussion makes clear, double 
jeopardy principles would not preclude a retrial if defendant were successful in 
obtaining a new trial or a dismissal of charges, because in seeking to overturn his 
conviction on grounds other than insufficiency of the evidence he would impliedly 
waive double jeopardy protections and consent to be retried.  (See Porter v. 
Superior Court, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 136.) 
Although these rules seem clear and well established, the Court of Appeal‟s 
conclusion that defendant cannot be retried under any circumstances was based on 
an oft-quoted passage from our decision in People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260:  
“ „If a trial court rules the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law, then the 
ruling bars retrial even if it is patently erroneous or the court has no statutory 
authority to make it.  (See Sanabria v. United States[, supra,] 437 U.S. [at p.] 64 
[a trial court finding of legal insufficiency based on an erroneous foundation is 
still an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes]; People v. Valenti (1957) 49 Cal.2d 
199, 203, 209 [a trial court dismissal for legal insufficiency made without statutory 
authorization bars retrial under the California Constitution], disapproved on other 
 
10 
grounds in People v. Sidener (1962) 58 Cal.2d 645, 647; see also Fong Foo v. 
United States[, supra,] 369 U.S. [at p.] 143 [a ruling by a trial court acquitting a 
defendant bars retrial even if the ruling is “egregiously erroneous” and the court 
lacks the power to make the ruling].)‟  (People v. Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 
270-271).”  (Citing also Evans v. Michigan, supra, 568 U.S. at p. ___ [133 S.Ct. at 
p. 1075]; Mannes v. Gillespie (9th Cir. 1992) 967 F.2d 1310, 1313-1316.)   
This principle, although often stated unequivocally, does not apply in the 
context of the present case.  All of the cases cited in the quotation from Hatch, 
upon which the Court of Appeal relied, involved rulings by the trial court before 
the jury returned a verdict.  In such cases, the prosecution cannot appeal the trial 
court‟s ruling even if it is erroneous because a successful appeal would require a 
retrial, which is barred by double jeopardy.  (See Sanabria v. United States, supra, 
437 U.S. at pp. 59-60 [trial court granted defendant‟s motion for acquittal after 
presentation of the defense case but before the case went to the jury]; People v. 
Valenti, supra, 49 Cal.2d at pp. 203, 209 [trial court dismissed the information in 
the middle of trial]; Fong Foo v. United States, supra, 369 U.S. at p. 143 [trial 
court directed jury to return verdicts of acquittal]; see also Evans, supra, 568 U.S. 
at p. ___ [133 S.Ct. at p. 1073 [trial court directed verdict of acquittal at close of 
prosecution‟s case]; Mannes v. Gillespie, supra, 967 F.2d at pp. 1313-1316 [after 
jury was dismissed because it deadlocked on murder charge, trial court dismissed 
the charges on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient].)   
Arizona v. Rumsey (1984) 467 U.S. 203, upon which defendant relies, is 
distinguishable for the same reason.  In Rumsey, the high court held that the trial 
court‟s judgment imposing a life sentence rather than the death penalty was the 
equivalent of an acquittal on the merits and precluded defendant from being 
resentenced to death after the state supreme court reversed the trial court‟s 
decision for legal error.  In Rumsey, there was no jury; the trial court in that case 
 
11 
was the “sole decisionmaker” in the proceeding.  (Id. at p. 211.)  Thus, “there was 
no verdict of „guilty‟ for the appellate court to reinstate.”  (Id. at p. 212.)  
Consequently, the appellate reversal in Rumsey would have subjected the 
defendant to a second sentencing trial, in violation of double jeopardy principles.  
In contrast, in the present case reversal of the trial court‟s judgment of “acquittal” 
will allow reinstatement of the jury‟s guilty verdict.   
The Court of Appeal relied on two additional cases for the proposition that 
an order granting a new trial motion on the ground of insufficient evidence bars 
retrial even if the trial court erred:  Hudson v. Louisiana, supra, 450 U.S. 40, and 
Freer v. Dugger (11th Cir. 1991) 935 F.2d 213.5  These cases are similarly 
inapposite because, in each, the trial court‟s ruling regarding the insufficiency of 
the evidence was never reversed and stood as a final judgment.  In Hudson, the 
trial court granted the defendant‟s motion for retrial on grounds that the evidence 
was legally insufficient to support the verdict.  The state did not appeal that ruling, 
but simply retried the defendant, presented evidence that had not been presented in 
the first trial, and obtained a conviction.  The high court held that the double 
jeopardy clause barred the retrial, just as it would if an appellate court had 
reversed the defendant‟s conviction because of insufficient evidence.  (Hudson, 
supra, at p. 43; see Burks v. United States, supra, 437 U.S. 1 [double jeopardy 
precluded retrial after the reviewing court held the evidence insufficient to sustain 
the jury‟s verdict of guilty].)  In Freer, a state trial court granted the defendant‟s 
                                              
5  
The Court of Appeal also cited People v. Lagunas, supra, 8 Cal.4th at 
page 1038, footnote 6, but that case is not on point.  In Lagunas we cited Hudson 
v. Louisiana, supra, 450 U.S. 40, for the rule that double jeopardy bars retrial if 
the trial court determines that the prosecution‟s evidence was legally insufficient, 
but we concluded that the trial court had not determined the evidence to be 
insufficient in that case.   
 
12 
motion for a new trial on grounds that the evidence was insufficient, the 
prosecution appealed that ruling, and the state appellate court affirmed.  
Subsequently, the defendant was retried and again convicted.  (Freer, supra, at 
p. 215.)  On habeas corpus, the federal appellate court held that the retrial violated 
the defendant‟s double jeopardy rights.  (Id. at p. 222.) 
Under these authorities, the trial court‟s order in the present case would 
have precluded a retrial had the People chosen not to appeal it or had it been 
affirmed on appeal.  But the People did appeal and the Court of Appeal reversed 
the trial court‟s ruling and reinstated the jury verdict.  “It is well settled that the 
reversal of a judgment or order ordinarily leaves the proceeding in the same 
situation in which it stood before the judgment or order was made.”  (Odlum v. 
Duffy (1950) 35 Cal.2d 562, 564; see 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) 
§ 869, p. 928 [reversal of an order granting a new trial “leaves the judgment as if 
no such order had been made, i.e., as if the motion had been denied”].)  “When an 
order has been reversed the effect is that „it no longer ha[s] any vitality or 
force . . . .‟ ”  (Estate of Pusey (1918) 177 Cal. 367, 371, quoting Estate of 
Mitchell (1899) 126 Cal. 250.)  The effect of the Court of Appeal‟s order barring a 
retrial upon remand was to improperly give legal force and effect to a ruling of the 
trial court that it had reversed.   
 
 
13 
III. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed to the extent that it bars 
defendant from being retried should the trial court grant his motion for a new trial 
or dismissal on grounds other than the insufficiency of the evidence. 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CORNELL, J.*
                                              
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned 
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.  
 
1 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Eroshevich 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 214 Cal.App.4th 1335 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S210545 
Date Filed: November 3, 2014 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Robert J. Perry 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Steve Cooley and Jackie Lacey, District Attorneys, Irene T. Wakabayashi, Head Deputy District Attorney, 
Brentford J. Ferreira, Shirley Sui-Nin Sun, Natasha Cooper, Gilbert Wright, Phyllis C. Asayama and 
Serena R. Murillo, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Janyce Keiko Imata Blair, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Respondent 
Khristine Elaine Eroshevich. 
 
Peter Gold, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Respondent Howard Kevin Stern. 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Serena R. Murillo 
Deputy District Attorney 
320 West Temple Street, Suite 540 
Los Angeles, CA  90012 
(213) 893-0632 
 
Janyce Keiko Imata Blair 
321 Richmond Street, Suite A 
El Segundo, CA  90245 
(310) 606-9262 
 
Peter Gold 
5758 Geary Boulevard, #160 
San Francisco, CA  94121 
(510) 872-6305