Title: State v. Hollars
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 324A19
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: December 18, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 324A19 
Filed 18 December 2020 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
v. 
JACK HOWARD HOLLARS 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of 
the Court of Appeals, 266 N.C. App. 534, 833 S.E.2d 5 (2019), remanding the case for 
a hearing on defendant’s competency based on judgments entered on 12 January 2018 
by Judge William H. Coward in Superior Court, Watauga County.  Heard in the 
Supreme Court on 31 August 2020. 
 
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Matthew W. Sawchak, Solicitor 
General,1 Ryan Y. Park, Deputy Solicitor General, and Nicholas S. Brod, 
Assistant Solicitor General, for the State-appellant. 
 
Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Anne M. Gomez, Assistant Appellate 
Defender, for defendant-appellee. 
 
 
MORGAN, Justice. 
 
Defendant was arrested on 10 February 2012 for allegedly sexually assaulting 
his stepdaughter for a period consisting of the late 1970s and early 1980s. He was 
brought to trial on 8 January 2018 for three counts each of second-degree sexual 
offense and taking indecent liberties with a child following almost six years of 
                                            
1 On 30 March 2020, we allowed a motion by Matthew W. Sawchak to withdraw as 
counsel for the State of North Carolina. 
STATE V. HOLLARS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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fluctuating determinations of defendant’s competency to stand trial. At the end of the 
third day of the trial, defense counsel apprised the trial court of a brief conversation 
which the attorney had just had with defendant and, based on concerns that the 
exchange raised with defense counsel, he asked the trial court to inquire into 
defendant’s competency. No inquiry of defendant was performed by the trial court at 
the time, the trial was recessed for the day shortly thereafter, and the trial court 
stated that the matter would be addressed on the next morning. During the inception 
of the trial proceedings on the following day and upon the trial court’s inquiry to 
defense counsel about any more information or arguments about defendant’s 
capacity, defense counsel replied that there were no existing concerns. The trial 
resumed, and upon its conclusion, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on all six 
charges on 12 January 2018. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing 
that the events on the third day of trial combined with defendant’s lengthy history of 
mental illness, which included periods of incompetence to stand trial, created a duty 
upon the trial court to inquire sua sponte into the competency of defendant to stand 
trial. See State v. Hollars, 266 N.C. App. 534, 537–38, 833 S.E.2d 5, 7–8 (2019). The 
Court of Appeals held that substantial evidence existed before the trial court to create 
a bona fide doubt as to defendant’s competency, and therefore the trial court’s failure 
to make inquiry into defendant’s competency at trial violated his due-process rights. 
Id. at 542, 833 S.E.2d at 10. The State appeals to our Court based on the dissent of a 
member of the Court of Appeals panel in which the dissenting judge opined that there 
STATE V. HOLLARS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-3- 
was no bona fide doubt as to defendant’s competency, and therefore defendant’s due-
process rights were not implicated by the trial court’s lack of inquiry into the matter. 
See id. at 545, 833 S.E.2d at 11–12 (Berger, J., dissenting). We agree with the 
conclusion of the Court of Appeals majority that substantial evidence existed so as to 
create a bona fide doubt about defendant’s competency. As a result, we affirm the 
decision of the lower appellate court which includes remanding the matter to the trial 
court pursuant to the instructions contained within the Court of Appeals majority 
opinion. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
In January 2012, the alleged victim in this case—a female minor—reported to 
the Watauga County Sheriff’s Office that for a period of time spanning the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, when she was between twelve and fifteen years of age, defendant 
sexually assaulted the minor on virtually a weekly basis. Defendant was initially 
arrested and charged with a single count of statutory sexual offense on 10 February 
2012. Subsequently, a grand jury indicted defendant on three counts of second-degree 
sexual offense and three counts of taking indecent liberties with a child. Following 
his arrest, defendant initially waived his right to court-appointed counsel at his first 
appearance on 23 February 2012, but the trial court nevertheless appointed counsel 
to defendant two months later, citing its observation that defendant was 
unresponsive to questioning by the trial court at defendant’s probable cause hearing 
on 23 April 2012. Defendant’s appointed counsel met with defendant while defendant 
STATE V. HOLLARS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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was in custody in the Watauga County Jail on 1 May 2012. Defense counsel reported 
to the trial court three days later that defendant had presented a scattered and 
random thought process and had made multiple paranoid statements concerning God 
and the effects of exposure to chemicals on his brain during defendant’s tenure in the 
Marine Corps. On 4 May 2012, the trial court ordered Daymark Recovery Services to 
complete a forensic evaluation of defendant to determine his competency to stand 
trial. This assessment of defendant became the first in a series of seven evaluations 
which are pertinent to this appeal.2  
Dr. Hawkinson with Daymark Recovery Services completed his evaluation 
report on 9 May 2012, which noted that defendant appeared “psychotic and 
delusional” with a “limited ability to cooperate in even basic discussion of his case.” 
Based on his observations, Dr. Hawkinson concluded that defendant was incompetent 
to stand trial. Following the receipt and review of the Hawkinson 5/9/2012 report, the 
trial court ordered that defendant be committed to the custody of Central Regional 
Hospital in Butner, North Carolina, or another designated facility for further 
evaluation and safekeeping. Once in the custody of Central Regional Hospital, 
another competency evaluation report was authored by Dr. Bartholomew on 9 August 
2012. While the Bartholomew 8/9/2012 report agreed with the Hawkinson 5/9/2012 
                                            
2 In order to facilitate ease of reading and for reference to each of the competency 
evaluations, this opinion refers to each evaluation by the healthcare provider who completed 
the evaluation and the date upon which the evaluation report is signed by the provider. 
STATE V. HOLLARS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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report that defendant was incompetent to proceed to trial, Dr. Bartholomew also 
noted that defendant “may gain capacity if he receives mental health treatment.” 
Upon review of the Bartholomew 8/9/2012 report, the trial court entered an order 
finding defendant incapable to proceed and ordered defendant to be committed to 
Broughton Hospital in Morganton, North Carolina.   
During his time at Broughton Hospital, defendant responded well to his 
provider’s efforts to have defendant engage in mental health treatment, medication, 
and vocational occupations like exercise classes and work duties. Seven months after 
defendant’s commitment to Broughton Hospital, Dr. Bartholomew again evaluated 
defendant for his capacity to stand trial and detailed the results of the evaluation in 
a report dated 14 May 2013. The Bartholomew 5/14/2013 report concluded that, due 
in part to defendant’s adherence to a medication regimen, defendant “demonstrated 
an adequate understanding of the nature of criminal legal processes” and was “able 
to assist in his defense in a rational and reasonable manner.” Dr. Bartholomew 
considered defendant to be capable to proceed to trial at this juncture. On 3 
September 2013, a Watauga County grand jury handed down a first set of 
indictments, charging defendant with four counts each of statutory sex offense and 
taking indecent liberties with a child; correspondingly, the trial court appointed new 
trial counsel to represent defendant. Superseding indictments were issued on 4 May 
2015 which charged defendant with three counts each of second-degree sexual offense 
and taking indecent liberties with a child.  
STATE V. HOLLARS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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On 15 December 2014, defendant was transported from Broughton Hospital to 
the Watauga County Jail to discuss a plea offer with his appointed counsel. While 
defendant first appeared to understand his circumstances in his initial discussions 
with counsel upon defendant’s arrival at the jail, defense counsel noted that when he 
met with defendant on the following day and defendant was “unable to discuss plea 
or trial options and insisted his millionaire sister would spend thousands” on his 
defense, despite the fact that defendant had no sisters with such resources. Defense 
counsel relayed this information to the trial court in open court on 2 March 2015, 
upon which the trial court granted the request of defense counsel for another 
competency evaluation of defendant. Pursuant to the trial court’s order, Dr. 
Bartholomew conducted another evaluation of defendant. Dr. Bartholomew’s report 
of 14 April 2015 again concluded that defendant was competent to proceed to trial, 
while explaining that defendant’s confusing statements at the Watauga County Jail 
were likely attributable to a temporary decomposition of his mental faculties due to 
the change in his sleeping arrangements. However, Dr. Bartholomew predicated his 
determination that defendant was competent to stand trial at the time that Dr. 
Bartholomew signed the Bartholomew 4/14/15 report on two caveats: first, Dr. 
Bartholomew advised that defendant should be housed at Broughton Hospital and 
transported to court each day for the duration of the trial in order to prevent a similar 
change in mental state as witnessed by defense counsel in December 2014; and 
STATE V. HOLLARS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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second, Dr. Bartholomew noted that defendant’s “condition may deteriorate with the 
stress of trial so vigilance is suggested if his case proceeds to trial.”  
Dr. Bartholomew testified about the predications and conclusions in his report 
at a competency hearing held by the trial court on 5 May 2015. At the close of the 
hearing, the trial court acknowledged Dr. Bartholomew’s determination of 
defendant’s competency but advised that the conditions asserted in the Bartholomew 
4/14/2015 report required “the [c]ourt to give [defendant] special treatment which is 
not normally considered in other criminal actions.” Concerned about the conditional 
nature of Dr. Bartholomew’s determination of defendant’s competency, on 27 July 
2015 the trial court ordered an additional independent forensic evaluation to be 
completed by Dr. Bellard. Following his completion of an evaluation of defendant 
which was conducted pursuant to the trial court’s order, Dr. Bellard issued a report 
on 4 November 2015 in which the examiner concluded that, while defendant 
experienced improved mental capacity while housed at Broughton Hospital, 
defendant’s “difficulty relating to defense counsel” and general inability to tolerate 
the stress of waiting for trial rendered defendant incompetent to stand trial. Dr. 
Bellard also chronicled that defendant had recently had the antipsychotic 
medications prescribed to him by defendant’s providers at Broughton Hospital cut in 
half and opined that defendant “could improve to a position where he was competent 
to stand trial if the medications were taken back” to their original levels. In accepting 
STATE V. HOLLARS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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the report of Dr. Bellard, the trial court instructed defense counsel to prepare an order 
to be entered which found defendant to lack capacity to stand trial. 
During his continued commitment at Broughton Hospital, defendant was 
evaluated by Dr. Bartholomew on two more occasions, once in December 2016 and 
once in August 2017. Citing the success of defendant’s continued treatment, Dr. 
Bartholomew concluded in a report dated 8 December 2016 that defendant was 
capable of proceeding to trial and assisting in his own defense. Dr. Bartholomew was 
joined by Dr. Utterback in conducting a final evaluation of defendant in August 2017. 
In their joint report dated 24 August 2017, Dr. Bartholomew and Dr. Utterback 
advised that “given the stability of [defendant’s] mental status and functioning for 
the last year or more at Broughton Hospital, we believe it is reasonable to assume he 
will maintain this functioning in the foreseeable future and during trial.” Thus, Dr. 
Bartholomew and Dr. Utterback concluded that defendant was capable of proceeding 
to trial. At a competency hearing held on 5 September 2017, the State proffered to 
the trial court for consideration this final report jointly generated by Dr. 
Bartholomew and Dr. Utterback and advised the trial court that Dr. Bartholomew 
was in the courtroom and available to be called as a witness if necessary. Defense 
counsel concurred with the State that defendant was capable of proceeding to trial at 
that point, adding that defense counsel’s agreement was due in part to a conference 
with Dr. Bellard earlier on the morning of the hearing. According to defense counsel, 
Dr. Bellard had reported to the courtroom for the competency hearing, had engaged 
STATE V. HOLLARS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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in dialogue with defendant prior to the hearing’s commencement, and had advised 
defense counsel that he agreed with the determination by Dr. Bartholomew and Dr. 
Utterback that defendant had the capacity to proceed on 5 September 2017.  
The trial court reviewed the Bartholomew and Utterback 8/24/2017 report 
before finding that defendant was competent to stand trial and before setting 
defendant’s trial date for 2 October 2017. Four days before the trial was scheduled to 
begin, however, defense counsel filed a motion to continue the trial because a recent 
death in the attorney’s family necessitated his presence in another state on the date 
of the trial. More than four months passed between the last discussion of defendant’s 
competency to stand trial and the first day of defendant’s rescheduled trial on 8 
January 2018. In the meantime, defense counsel filed several pretrial motions which 
referenced defendant’s complex and fluctuating mental health history.  
The trial proceedings began with a hearing on several of defendant’s pretrial 
motions on 8 January 2018; the State called its first witness to render testimony at 
the trial on the afternoon of 10 January 2018. The State’s first witness was the alleged 
victim. She testified about the first episodes of sexual abuse that she alleged that 
defendant committed upon her. Defense counsel lodged an objection to this testimony, 
arguing that the acts to which the alleged victim was testifying fell outside of the 
offense date ranges of the indictments. Outside of the presence of the jury, the trial 
court discussed with the parties the prospect that the alleged victim’s testimony could 
be treated as “404(b) evidence,” referring to Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules 
STATE V. HOLLARS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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of Evidence which governs circumstances concerning the admissibility or 
inadmissibility of other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by the defendant. N.C. R. 
Evid. 404(b) (2019). 
Upon its completion of the discussion of the cited evidentiary rule with the 
parties, the trial court brought the jurors back into the courtroom and administered 
a Rule 404(b) instruction before allowing the State to continue with its direct 
examination of the victim. Just before 5:00 p.m. on the afternoon of 10 January 2018, 
defense counsel made another objection to the alleged victim’s testimony. The trial 
court sustained the objection before deciding to recess the proceedings for the 
evening. The trial court then instructed the State and defense counsel to be prepared 
to discuss the Rule 404(b) evidence issue on the following morning. The trial court 
recessed at 5:03 p.m. before coming back on the record less than a minute later. At 
that time, defense counsel advised the trial court of the following:  
Your Honor, . . . I just had a brief conversation with 
[defendant] during which I began to have some concerns 
about his capacity and I would ask the Court to address 
him regarding that. 
 
. . . . 
  
. . . I’ve been asking him how he’s doing and if he knows 
what’s going on. And up until just now he’s been able to tell 
me what’s been going on. He just told me just a few minutes 
ago that he didn’t know what was going on. 
 
The trial court responded that “when we start throwing around [Rule] 404(b) 
and [Rule] 403, you’d have to have graduated from law school to have any inkling of 
STATE V. HOLLARS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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what we’re talking about.” The trial court then asked defense counsel for further 
specificity as to his concerns. In response, defense counsel reiterated the following:  
I asked him if he understood what was going on. He said, 
no, he didn’t know what she was talking about. And that 
has not been the way he has been responding throughout 
this event, either yesterday or earlier today. And in light of 
the history with him, I just want to make sure. I just—I 
feel we need to make sure. And I’m not asking for an 
evaluation. I would just ask for the Court to query him 
quickly to make sure that I’m just not—make sure I’m 
seeing something that is not there. 
 
The trial court decided to address this matter as well on the following morning, 
surmising that the source of defendant’s confusion was the previous discussion of the 
potential Rule 404(b) evidence. The trial court conjectured that “[w]e could take a poll 
around here of non-lawyers and see if they understood [Rule 404(b)]. I doubt many of 
them would.” The trial court stated that if it determined in the morning that 
defendant understood what was happening during the trial, “then I would say that 
the capacity situation hasn’t changed any.” Upon the resumption of court proceedings 
on the following morning on 11 January 2018, the trial court did not address 
defendant directly as defense counsel had requested toward the end of the previous 
day’s trial session; instead, the trial court queried defense counsel as to whether 
defense counsel had “any more information or arguments” that he wanted to make 
concerning defendant’s capacity. Defense counsel responded with the following:  
No, Your Honor. When he came in this morning he greeted 
me like he has other mornings. I interacted with him 
briefly and he interacted like he has been interacting every 
STATE V. HOLLARS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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morning. And I’ve not had any questions about his capacity 
this morning. I just had some yesterday evening because 
he kind of looked at me and the look in his face was like he 
had no idea who I was. 
 
The trial court once again associated defendant’s expressed confusion and vacant 
expression which concerned defense counsel on the previous day with the discussion 
between the trial court and the parties regarding the Rule 404(b) evidence. The trial 
court stated “[y]eah, well, any time you get to—like I said, any time you get to talking 
about [Rule] 404(b) and [Rule] 403 everybody in the courtroom is going to look like 
that.” The trial court then allowed the State to resume the presentation of its case-
in-chief without further inquiry into defendant’s capacity to proceed. 
 
On 12 January 2018, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on three counts of 
taking indecent liberties with a child and three counts of second-degree sexual 
offense. The trial court sentenced defendant to a total of 150 years in prison: ten years 
for each offense of taking indecent liberties with a child and forty years for each 
offense of second-degree sexual offense, with the terms of incarceration to run 
consecutive to one another. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.  
A majority of the Court of Appeals panel agreed with defendant’s contention, 
as framed in the lower appellate court’s opinion, that “the trial court erred by failing 
to conduct sua sponte a competency hearing either immediately before or during the 
trial because substantial evidence existed before the trial court that indicated 
[d]efendant may have been incompetent.” Hollars, 266 N.C. App. at 541, 833 S.E.2d 
STATE V. HOLLARS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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at 9. The Court of Appeals majority summarized its reasons for concluding that “the 
trial court was presented with substantial evidence raising a bona fide doubt as to 
[d]efendant’s competency to stand trial” in the following manner:  
In light of [d]efendant’s extensive history of mental illness, 
including schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar 
disorder, and mild neurocognitive disorder, his seven prior 
forensic evaluations with divergent findings on his 
competency, the five-month gap between his competency 
hearing and his trial, the concerns expressed by physicians 
and other trial judges about the potential for [d]efendant 
to deteriorate during trial and warning of the need for 
vigilance, the concerns his counsel raised to the trial court 
regarding his conduct and demeanor on the third day of 
trial, and the fact that the trial court never had an 
extended 
colloquy 
with 
[d]efendant, 
we 
conclude 
substantial evidence existed before the trial court that 
raised a bona fide doubt as to [d]efendant’s competency to 
stand trial. Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to 
institute sua sponte a competency hearing for [d]efendant. 
 
Id. at 542–43, 833 S.E.2d at 10–11. 
 
With this outcome, the majority decided that the appropriate remedy here 
would be to “remand to the trial court for a determination of whether a meaningful 
retrospective hearing can be conducted on the issue of [d]efendant’s competency at 
the time of his trial.” Id. at 544, 833 S.E.2d at 11. As guidance to the trial court 
regarding the focus and the direction of the proceedings upon remand, the Court of 
Appeals instructed that  
if the trial court concludes that a retrospective 
determination is still possible, a competency hearing will 
be held, and if the conclusion is that the defendant was 
competent, no new trial will be required. If the trial court 
STATE V. HOLLARS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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determines that a meaningful hearing is no longer possible, 
defendant’s conviction must be reversed and a new trial 
may be granted when he is competent to stand trial. 
 
Id. (quoting State v. McRae, 139 N.C. App. 387, 392, 533 S.E.2d 557, 561 (2000)). 
 
The dissenting judge of the Court of Appeals panel viewed the issues of the 
case in the following regard:  
There was no bona fide doubt as to [d]efendant’s 
competence to stand trial, and there was not substantial 
evidence before the trial court that [d]efendant was 
incompetent. Thus, the trial court did not err when it began 
[d]efendant’s trial, and proceeded with the trial, without 
undertaking another competency hearing . . . . 
 
Id. at 545, 833 S.E.2d at 11–12 (Berger, J., dissenting). Specifically, the dissenting 
judge opined that the record did not contain any evidence “of irrational behavior or 
change in demeanor by [d]efendant at trial.” Id. at 545, 833 S.E.2d at 12 (Berger, J., 
dissenting). The dissenting judge considered the examiners’ opinions that were 
contained in the evaluation reports, that the stability of defendant’s mental status 
and functioning would be maintained in the foreseeable future and during a trial, 
were sufficient to indicate there was “nothing in the record that would have required 
the trial court to conduct another pre-trial hearing.” Id. at 547, 833 S.E.2d at 13 
(Berger, J., dissenting). As for the majority’s determination that, as described in the 
dissenting opinion, “the trial court erred by failing to intervene sua sponte following 
an exchange between defense counsel and the trial court,” id., the dissenting judge 
disagreed by noting that “[t]he ‘brief conversation’ by [d]efendant and defense counsel 
STATE V. HOLLARS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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[during trial on 10 January 2018] did not produce ‘substantial evidence before the 
court indicating that the accused may be mentally incompetent’ ” because “there was 
[a] very real probability that [d]efendant did not understand the intricacies of 404(b) 
testimony, and that he had in fact heard and understood the victim’s testimony,” id. 
at 550, 833 S.E.2d at 15 (Berger, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge concluded that 
there was no bona fide doubt as to defendant’s competence, that there was not 
substantial evidence before the trial court that defendant was incompetent, and that 
the trial court did not err when it began defendant’s trial and proceeded with the trial 
without undertaking another competency hearing. Id. at 551, 833 S.E.2d at 15 
(Berger, J., dissenting). 
 
The State’s appeal of the decision of the Court of Appeals majority in this case 
brings the matter to us for consideration.  
Analysis 
 
The Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the United States shields 
criminal defendants who are incompetent to stand trial for charges levied against 
them by the State from being compelled to do so while they remain incompetent. 
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996). In order to possess the competence 
necessary to stand trial, a defendant must have the “capacity to understand the 
nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to 
assist in preparing his defense.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). While 
“a competency determination is necessary only when a court has reason to doubt the 
STATE V. HOLLARS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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defendant’s competence,” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 n.13 (1993), North 
Carolina criminal courts have a “constitutional duty to institute, sua sponte, a 
competency hearing if there is substantial evidence before the court indicating that 
the accused may be mentally incompetent.” State v. Badgett, 361 N.C. 234, 259, 644 
S.E.2d 206, 221 (2007) (quoting State v. King, 353 N.C. 457, 467, 546 S.E.2d 575, 585 
(2001)).  
Substantial evidence which establishes a bona fide doubt as to a defendant’s 
competency may be established by considering “a defendant’s irrational behavior, his 
demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial.” Drope, 
420 U.S. at 180. While this Court has determined that some evidence of mental health 
treatment for issues unrelated to the defendant’s competency does not constitute the 
substantial evidence necessary to trigger the trial court’s duty to hold a competency 
hearing, King, 353 N.C. at 467, 546 S.E.2d at 585, the presence of any one of the 
factors cited above from Drope has the potential to give rise to a bona fide doubt as to 
the defendant’s competency in some circumstances. See Drope, 420 U.S. at 180. 
Regardless of the circumstances that constitute substantial evidence of a defendant’s 
incompetence, the relevant period of time for judging a defendant’s competence to 
stand trial is “at the time of trial.” State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 565, 213 S.E.2d 305, 
316 (1975), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Leonard, 300 N.C. 223, 266 
S.E.2d 631 (1980). As a result, the trial court must remain on guard over a 
defendant’s competency; even when the defendant is deemed competent to stand trial 
STATE V. HOLLARS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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at the commencement of the proceedings, circumstances may arise during trial 
“suggesting a change that would render the accused unable to meet the standards of 
competence to stand trial.” Drope, 420 U.S. at 181. 
The State argues that following the trial court’s determination that defendant 
was competent to stand trial at the 5 September 2017 competency hearing, defendant 
presented no substantial evidence raising a bona fide doubt as to his competency. 
Thus, the State contends that the trial court’s determination which was made four 
months prior to trial that defendant was competent to stand trial served to suppress 
any duty on the part of the trial court to conduct another competency hearing either 
immediately preceding the start of the trial or after the events of the trial’s third day. 
The Court of Appeals majority disagreed with this argument, opining that “[g]iven 
the temporal nature of [d]efendant’s mental illness, the appropriate time to conduct 
a competency hearing was immediately prior to trial.” Hollars, 266 N.C. App. at 542, 
833 S.E.2d at 10. The lower appellate court found it “significant” that “[d]efendant’s 
prior medical records disclosed numerous concerns about the potential for 
[d]efendant’s mental stability to drastically deteriorate over a brief period of time and 
with the stress of trial.” Id. Consequently, the lapse of several months between the 
trial court’s 5 September 2017 determination of defendant’s competency to stand trial 
and the 8 January 2018 inception of defendant’s trial required the conduction of 
another competency hearing immediately before trial. Id. at 542–43, 833 S.E.2d at 
10. The Court of Appeals characterized the events of the afternoon of the trial’s third 
STATE V. HOLLARS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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day and the morning of the trial’s fourth day as “additional support for this 
conclusion” because the basis for defendant’s expressed confusion which was also 
detected and confirmed by defense counsel operated to reinforce the need for vigilance 
on the part of the trial court. Id. at 543, 833 S.E.2d at 10–11. 
Adherence to the principles espoused by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in its decisions rendered in Cooper, Godinez, and the progenitor case Drope, 
along with our Court’s precedent established in Badgett, King, and Cooper, support 
the determinations reached by the Court of Appeals in the present case. Although the 
trial court was required to initiate an inquiry into the competency of defendant to 
stand trial only in the event that there was reason to doubt the accused’s competency, 
there was substantial evidence existent before the trial court which indicated that 
defendant might be mentally incompetent to stand trial. We have already recounted 
the panoply of matters and circumstances which the majority of the lower appellate 
court properly considered in concluding that there was a sufficient amount of 
evidence—contrary to the dissenting judge’s view—to constitute a bona fide doubt 
concerning defendant’s competency to stand trial. Therefore, the trial court was 
obligated to protect the due-process rights of defendant by initiating, sua sponte, a 
competency hearing in order to ensure that defendant possessed the capacity to 
understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with his 
counsel, and to assist in the preparation of his defense.  
STATE V. HOLLARS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Even assuming, arguendo, that the State’s contention bears some merit that 
there was not substantial evidence existent at the outset of the trial that raised a 
bona fide doubt concerning defendant’s competency due to the “near-dispositive 
weight” which the Court of Appeals gave to “three psychiatric evaluations that found 
[defendant] incompetent” and that “the court’s reliance on outdated evaluations 
caused it to overlook more recent, probative record evidence that refuted any need to 
hold another competency hearing before the trial” which included “evidence from 
three different psychiatrists, who unanimously agreed that [defendant] was 
competent . . . [and a]n evaluation admitted at the [same 5 September 2017] hearing 
also stated that [defendant] was likely to maintain his competency throughout the 
trial,” this depiction by the State of defendant’s perceived competency to proceed at 
the outset of the trial is significantly eroded by the occurrences which transpired on 
the third day of the trial. Despite defense counsel’s unequivocal concerns on the trial’s 
third day about defendant’s capacity, defense counsel’s articulated basis for these 
concerns which centered upon defendant’s representation that defendant “didn’t 
know what was going on” after being able to tell defense counsel just prior to that 
juncture “what’s been going on,” and “in light of the history with him,” the trial court 
refrained from conducting a competency hearing even after defense counsel’s 
recapitulation of his concern, which was described to the trial court on the next day 
of trial, that during the transpiration of events on the trial’s previous day, “the look 
in [defendant’s] face was like [defendant] had no idea who [defense counsel] was.” 
STATE V. HOLLARS 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-20- 
While the State and the dissenting judge below attribute defendant’s apparent 
confusion, as did the trial court, to defendant’s unfamiliarity with the intricacies of 
the admissibility or inadmissibility into evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
committed by him, nonetheless, such a potentially logical explanation for the 
apparent confusion of a defendant who has a documented history of mental illness 
and resulting multiple determinations of an incapacity to stand trial must yield to 
the necessity of the criminal justice system to ensure that a defendant’s due-process 
rights are protected from a demand to stand trial at a time when the defendant is 
incompetent. To this end, under the facts and circumstances presented in the instant 
case, we hold that the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to conduct a 
competency hearing for defendant in light of the existence of substantial evidence 
which was sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt regarding defendant’s competency to 
stand trial. 
Conclusion 
 
Based upon the foregoing statements, we affirm the decision of the Court of 
Appeals.  
AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice NEWBY dissenting. 
 
This case asks whether the trial court was presented with substantial evidence 
that defendant was incompetent such that it was required to hold a competency 
hearing during trial. Defense counsel had a history of interacting with his client and 
was in the best position to assess his client’s competency. While initially raising a 
concern, defense counsel subsequently assured the trial court that his client was 
competent. The trial court, after personally observing defendant’s behavior and the 
courtroom circumstances, made its independent determination. Defendant’s seeming 
confusion during a technical and complex explanation of the rules of evidence in light 
of all the other circumstances does not constitute substantial evidence of 
incompetence. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it decided that it would 
proceed without a competency hearing. The majority, however, takes one isolated 
incident, disregards the perspective of defense counsel and the trial court, and places 
its review of the cold record above the perspective of those actually present. Because 
these circumstances do not present substantial evidence of defendant’s incompetency 
sufficient to trigger a hearing, I respectfully dissent. 
Before trial, defendant had been extensively evaluated for years. Four months 
before the trial was to begin, defendant was deemed competent to stand trial by three 
doctors who had evaluated him multiple times in the past. The doctors’ competency 
determinations were based on several factors, including that defendant was finally 
STATE V. HOLLARS 
 
Newby, J., dissenting 
 
 
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taking his medication consistently. The doctors’ reports contained no suggestion of 
defendant’s need for another evaluation before trial.  
Defendant’s trial began on 10 January 2018 at around 9:30 a.m. Jury selection 
took more than half the day until the jury was released for lunch at about 12:35 p.m. 
At that time, defense counsel had no concerns about defendant’s competence. After 
lunch, the trial court resumed its session around 2:00 p.m. After the jury was 
impaneled shortly around 3:00 p.m., the trial court gave instructions to the jury and 
the State and defense gave opening statements. The State then called its first 
witness, who was the victim. The victim started testifying about incidents of sexual 
abuse that preceded the dates of those charged in the indictment. Defense counsel 
objected to this portion of the testimony and asked to be heard outside of the jury’s 
presence. The jury left the courtroom at 4:27 p.m. The trial court and counsel 
discussed the possibility that the victim’s testimony concerning incidents not alleged 
in the indictment could be admitted as evidence under Rule 404(b) of the North 
Carolina Rules of Evidence, and the jury came back into the courtroom at 4:34 p.m. 
The trial court then gave a limiting instruction to the jury about how Rule 404(b) 
evidence may be considered by the jurors, and the State continued questioning the 
victim. The trial court then gave another instruction before the jury was released at 
5:00 p.m., and the trial court took a very brief recess. At 5:03 p.m., the following 
exchange occurred: 
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Newby, J., dissenting 
 
 
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . I just had a brief conversation 
with [defendant] during which I began to have some 
concerns about his capacity and I would ask the Court to 
address him regarding that. 
 
. . . .  
 
I asked him—I’ve been asking him how he’s doing and if he 
knows what’s going on. And up until just now he’s been able 
to tell me what’s been going on. He just told me just a few 
minutes ago that he didn’t know what was going on. 
 
THE COURT: Well, when we start throwing around 404(b) 
and 403, you’d have to have graduated from law school to 
have any inkling of what we’re talking about. So I’m not 
sure what it is you—I want you to be more specific. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He said—I asked him—he said—
I asked him if he understood what was going on. He said 
no, he didn’t know what she was talking about. And that 
has not been the way he has been responding throughout 
this event, either yesterday or earlier today. And in light of 
the history with him, I just want to make sure. I just—I 
feel we need to make sure. And I’m not asking for an 
evaluation I would just ask for the Court to query him 
quickly to make sure that I’m just not—make sure I’m 
seeing something that is not there. 
 
THE COURT: Well, I tell you what, it’s been a long day, 
and I’d rather inquire of [defendant] in the morning and 
give everyone a chance to rest. Give you a chance to talk to 
him and try to explain to him what’s going on, especially 
with all of these rule numbers. I don’t know if anybody 
could explain that to a non-lawyer and have them 
understand it.  
We could take a poll around here of non-lawyers and 
see if they understood it. I doubt many of them would. But, 
you know, essentially what is going on is that the victim in 
this case has been telling everybody what he did, and that’s 
about a simple concept as you can imagine. Now, if he 
surely does not understand that for some reason, not that 
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Newby, J., dissenting 
 
 
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he remembers it or not, or whether he can think of some 
defense or something, that is not the case. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I understand. 
 
THE COURT: But if the information coming from this 
woman about what he did, if he can understand that is 
what is happening, then I would say that the capacity 
situation hasn’t changed any. We’ve got one, two—I 
counted them before, three, four, five, six, capacity 
evaluations. The latest one was August 15, 2017, and this 
latest one found him capable of proceeding. We’ll talk about 
it in the morning. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, sir. 
 
The following day, as soon as the trial court reconvened, it noted that it must 
discuss and evaluate whether there was the need for “any further inquiry as to 
[defendant’s] capacity.” The trial court asked defense counsel whether he “ha[d] any 
more information or arguments [he] want[ed] to make as to [defendant’s] capacity.” 
Defense counsel responded as follows: 
No, Your Honor. When he came in this morning he greeted 
me like he has other mornings. I interacted with him 
briefly and he interacted like he has been interacting every 
morning. And I’ve not had any questions about his capacity 
this morning. I just had some yesterday evening because 
he kind of looked at me and the look in his face was like he 
had no idea who I was. 
 
At that point, the trial court reemphasized the confusing nature of the Rule 404(b) 
discussion, which occurred immediately before defense counsel expressed his concern. 
Defense counsel reiterated that he no longer had any concerns. Thus, the trial court 
chose to proceed without a competency hearing. 
STATE V. HOLLARS 
 
Newby, J., dissenting 
 
 
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“[A] conviction cannot stand where the defendant lacks capacity to defend 
himself.” State v. King, 353 N.C. 457, 467, 546 S.E.2d 575, 585 (2001). Therefore, the 
“trial court has a constitutional duty to institute, sua sponte, a competency hearing if 
there is substantial evidence before the court indicating that the accused may be 
mentally incompetent.” Id. (quoting State v. Young, 291 N.C. 562, 568, 231 S.E.2d 
577, 581 (1977)). A trial court should consider evidence of “a defendant’s irrational 
behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand 
trial.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180, 95 S. Ct. 896, 908 (1975).  
 
Here the proceedings, when taken as a whole, do not show substantial evidence 
of defendant’s incompetence. The pretrial reports concluded defendant was 
competent. Though defense counsel raised a concern late in the day about defendant’s 
competency after a technical evidentiary discussion, the next morning, defense 
counsel’s concerns completely dissipated. His repeated assurances gave the trial court 
no reason to believe that defendant’s brief confusion the evening before would be 
attributable to something other than the technical explanation of Rule 404(b) 
evidence relating to events that occurred outside the timeframe alleged in the 
indictments and the long day in court. Defense counsel was in the best position to 
observe any issues regarding competency as he interacted with his client. 
Additionally, the trial court, after presiding over an entire day of trial, observing 
defendant, and hearing the State’s questioning of the victim, was well equipped to 
evaluate whether its explanation of Rule 404(b) would be confusing to a listener, 
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Newby, J., dissenting 
 
 
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including defendant. The trial court is in the best position to consider and weigh the 
facts and circumstances and to make the appropriate determination as to whether 
substantial evidence of incompetence exists to require a hearing.  
 
The majority does not appear to take issue with the premise that the trial court 
acted within its authority to delay any potential competency hearing until the next 
day. Nonetheless, the majority believes that defense counsel’s brief concern and 
defendant’s mental history warranted a competency hearing. Despite the trial court’s 
personal observations of defendant and the circumstances, the majority prefers its 
review of the cold record over the trial court’s actual observation of the events and 
conversations that occurred on the day of trial. Trial courts, however, have 
institutional advantages unavailable to appellate courts which place them in a better 
position to judge a defendant’s demeanor and the events that occur during trial. In 
short, the trial court is certainly best equipped, having observed defendant in that 
moment, to determine whether a competency hearing should be held. Moreover, the 
trial court had the repeated assurances of defense counsel that he no longer had 
concerns about defendant’s competency to stand trial. As previously stated, defense 
counsel is in the best position to assess defendant’s competency given his extensive 
interaction with his client.  
 
The trial court is in a better position than an appellate court to determine 
whether there was substantial evidence of defendant’s incompetence. The trial court’s 
view was supported by defense counsel’s assurances, who is in the best position to 
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Newby, J., dissenting 
 
 
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appreciate if his client is having difficulty understanding the proceedings. The trial 
court proceeded appropriately here. I respectfully dissent.