Title: Child v. BOARD OF REVIEW OF INDUS. COM'N
Citation: 657 P.2d 1375
Docket Number: 18169
State: Utah
Issuer: Utah Supreme Court
Date: January 28, 1983

657 P.2d 1375 (1983) Julie M. CHILD, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, Defendant. No. 18169. Supreme Court of Utah. January 28, 1983. Julie M. Child, pro se. David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Floyd G. Astin, K. Allan Zabel, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant. HOWE, Justice: Plaintiff Julie M. Child (claimant) seeks reversal of a decision by the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah (the Board) which denied unemployment benefits to her. The facts are uncontroverted. After having been employed as a secretary for seven months at Weber State College, claimant resigned her employment in order to move to California with her husband who had been accepted to attend a law school there. Her resignation was made contingent upon leaving Utah; and, she did not search for employment prior to her move because she was not certain of when she would (or whether she would) move until within a week of doing it. However, upon her arrival in California, she immediately began seeking employment and obtained a position one month after having terminated working at Weber State College. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, § 35-4-5(a) provides: Claimant contends that the Board's determination that plaintiff lacked good cause for voluntarily leaving her employment was arbitrary, unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence and not in compliance with its own regulations of the Utah Employment Security Act. The resolution of this issue turns on the definition of "good cause." The General Rules of Adjudication of the Utah Department of Employment Security at Voluntary Leaving, § 210, defines what constitutes "good cause" stating: In Denby v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, Utah, 567 P.2d 626 at 630 (1977), citing another jurisdiction, Justice Maughan explained: The responsibility of a lawful marriage and family relationship notwithstanding, it was not unreasonable for the Board to conclude that a married couple's exercise of a choice to move their family to a location where a spouse may attend school is simply not an instance where "the unemployment is caused by external pressures so compelling" that quitting was justified. In his decision the appeals referee stated: While "good cause" is not limited to resigning in order to join a spouse who is accepting substantial employment, there is no indication here that the Board's determination regarding "good cause" was either arbitrary, unreasonable, or beyond its discretion. Competent evidence in the record supported the Board's decision. Whitcombe v. Dept. of Employment Security, Industrial Comm., Utah, 563 P.2d 807 (1977); Martinez v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 25 Utah 2d 131, 477 P.2d *1377 587 (1970). The record paralleled the referee's finding that: We reject claimant's premise that in order to preserve her marriage she had no choice except to accompany her husband. Quitting work so that a spouse may attend school involves a personal lifestyle consideration rather than an external pressure. It is not the same as joining a spouse who has secured employment in another location. Higher education is a praiseworthy goal but a personal, unforced one nonetheless. On the other hand, employment at another locality in the workforce is in the nature of an external pressure much more necessary for a family's immediate economic survival. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Labor and Employment, 38 Colo. App. 298, 559 P.2d 252 (1976) is unpersuasive because it is distinguishable from the case at bar since Colorado's statutes are dissimilar to Utah's. Other cases relied upon by claimant such as Briggs v. Industrial Commission, 36 Colo. App. 292, 539 P.2d 1303 (1975) and Ayers v. Employment Security Dept., 85 Wash. 2d 550, 536 P.2d 610 (1975) are not compelling since in those cases the claimant left employment to join a spouse who had secured other employment rather than to join a spouse who was pursuing an advanced degree. Claimant also contends that the Board determined that it was not contrary to "equity and good conscience" to impose a disqualification against her, and that this determination was unsupported by the evidence. However, we have reviewed the facts which were presented to the appeals referee in relation to the "equity and good conscience" standard and find competent evidence to support the Board's ruling against claimant. In light of the purposes of the Employment Security Act and the reasonableness of claimant's actions, the Board did not abuse its discretion. The case is affirmed. No costs are awarded. HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and DURHAM, JJ., concur.