Title: State v. Burnett
Citation: 194 Kan. 126, 397 P.2d 346
Docket Number: 43,977
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: December 12, 1964

194 Kan. 126 (1964)
397 P.2d 346
THE STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
MELVIN LEE BURNETT, Appellant.
No. 43,977

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 12, 1964.
W.C. Jones of Olathe, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
Howard Hudson, Special Prosecutor, of Fort Scott, argued the cause, and William M. Ferguson, Attorney General, and Charles M. Warren, County Attorney, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
This is an appeal by defendant, Melvin Lee Burnett, from a conviction of the offenses of kidnapping in the first degree (G.S. 1961 Supp., 21-449) and forcible rape (G.S. 1949, 21-424).
As a result of events occurring on the night of August 20, 1962, six men were charged in the district court of Bourbon county with the offenses of kidnapping in the first degree and forcible rape. Among them were Gerald Lee Woods, Allan Davis, and this defendant, Burnett. Woods was the first to be tried and was found guilty by a jury on both charges. Upon appeal to this court the judgment was affirmed in State v. Woods, 191 Kan. 433, 381 P.2d 533. Our opinion was filed on May 11, 1963. On February 17, 1964, the Supreme Court of the United States denied his petition *127 for a writ of certiorari (376 U.S. 919, 11 L. ed 2d 615, 84 S.Ct. 676).
A brief narration of the horrible details of the case is contained in the opinion in the Woods appeal. They will not be repeated here.
It also appears that Davis has been tried and convicted.
In the meantime the defendant in the instant case, Burnett, hereafter referred to as defendant, had been confined in the county jail awaiting trial.
On November 6, 1963, the matter came on for hearing. Defendant was present in the court in person and by Chester I. Lewis of Wichita, his employed attorney. Whereupon, in open court, the following written stipulation was entered into:
"STIPULATION
The record shows that on this date Dale Kinnell and Dennis Ayers, charged with the same offenses, also were present in court in person and by counsel, and that they also had entered into identical stipulations. We are concerned, however, with only the case of defendant Burnett.
At the time the stipulation was entered into the record also shows the following:
The trial judge stated that he had carefully studied the stipulations and that on the previous day he had re-read the transcripts of the Woods and Davis trials. Defendant was asked if he had had an opportunity to read and examine the stipulation and to go over its terms with his attorney. He replied in the affirmative.
Mr. Lewis, his attorney, stated:
and that the case was submitted on the record without additional evidence.
Defendant was given until November 12, 1963, to file a motion for a new trial. On November 20, 1963, defendant was present in court in person and by counsel. His motion for a new trial was overruled. Upon being asked by the Court if he had any legal cause to show why judgment and sentence should not be pronounced, defendant answered "No."
Accordingly, on the charge of kidnapping in the first degree defendant was sentenced to confinement in the state penitentiary for life, and on the charge of forcible rape he was sentenced to confinement for a term of not less than five years nor more than twenty-one years, such sentences to run concurrently. It was further ordered that defendant be given credit on the sentences for the time he had been confined in the county jail awaiting trial.
Subsequently, defendant, pro se filed a notice of appeal. At defendant's request Mr. W.C. Jones, a capable and experienced attorney of Olathe was appointed by the trial court to represent defendant in his appeal. Mr. Jones filed an abstract and brief and orally argued the appeal on November 2, 1964.
Five specifications of error are asserted, the first being the order overruling defendant's motion for a new trial. This specification is, however, for all practical purposes, abandoned  defendant's contention being that he did not have a "trial" in the first instance.
The second and third specifications of error are that the trial court erred in assenting to a waiver of a jury being entered by defendant *130 when he stood charged with a capital offense punishable by death, and that the trial court erred in permitting defendant to submit his case on the records of the Woods and Davis cases, particularly after the conviction in the Woods case had already been upheld by this court.
It is contended that by waiving his right to a trial by jury defendant, among other things, "frittered away" his right to a voir dire examination of prospective jurors so as to ascertain their backgrounds and feelings in the matter; his right to insist that the rules of reasonable doubt, burden of proof, and the presumption of innocence, would prevail throughout the trial; that he thus was denied the opportunity to confront the witnesses, and that a jury trial would have required a verdict of all twelve of his peers. It also is contended that this court should denounce G.S. 1961 Supp., 62-1401 (quoted later herein) as being unconstitutional on the ground it is contrary to public policy. It further is argued that a jury trial cannot be waived on a plea of "not guilty" where, as here, the statute (G.S. 1961 Supp., 21-449) directs that the jury shall determine the punishment.
We believe that under the facts presented the foregoing contentions are without merit and cannot be sustained.
From 1868 until 1955 the statute (G.S. 1949, 62-1401) applicable to trial by jury in criminal cases read:
In State v. Scott, 156 Kan. 11, 131 P.2d 664 (1942), one of the jurors become ill during the trial. The defendant consented that the trial proceed with the remaining eleven jurors, and that was done. Defendant was charged with a felony but was convicted of a misdemeanor, and appealed. It was held:
In discussing the statute (62-1401, above) it was said in State v. Ricks, 173 Kan. 660, 250 P.2d 773 (1952):
In 1955 the legislature repealed the mentioned statute and enacted the following, which now appears as G.S. 1961 Supp., 62-1401:
The language of this statute is clear, and simply means that a jury may be waived in any criminal trial, including one for felony  provided the defendant, the state, and the trial court, assent to such waiver. No exception is made for a capital case. On the question as to the validity of such statutes see the Annotation in 48 A.L.R. 767, at p. 772.
At both his preliminary examination and in the trial court, defendant was represented by his own experienced attorney. Mr. Lewis also had represented both Woods and Davis, and thus was thoroughly familiar with the records of their trials. The facts before us are such that he could have entered a binding plea of guilty for defendant (State v. Spain, 193 Kan. 1, 4, 5, 391 P.2d 1001). The record clearly discloses that defendant knew and understood what he was doing  he voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty, waived a trial by jury, and consented that he be tried by the court on the record of the Woods and Davis trials. No valid reason has been presented, and we know of none, why, under the circumstances, defendant and his counsel could not proceed as they did. It is true that the kidnapping statute (G.S. 1961 Supp., 21-449) provides that if there is a jury trial the jury shall determine the punishment, and that if there is a plea of guilty the court shall fix the punishment and in doing so shall hear evidence. It also is true that G.S. 1961 Supp., 62-1401, above, is silent on the subject of determining punishment. But, construing the two statutes together, it is clear that the trial judge, in a case where the plea is "not guilty" and a jury is waived  is empowered to fix the punishment. Who else could? In passing, we mention the fact that the trial judge in *132 this case was the same trial judge who presided in the Woods and Davis trials  and thus was thoroughly familiar with the entire matter.
The fourth specification of error is that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct in the Woods case concerning the testimony of an accomplice.
Defendant concedes  and the record shows  that no such instruction was requested in the Woods case. In view of the fact defendant submitted the case against him on the record of the Woods case  the question is not now before us for review.
In his fifth and last specification of error defendant contends that the entire proceedings in the lower court constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights and are contrary to public policy, and that this court should not place its stamp of approval upon such a "travesty of justice."
In this connection it is argued that because the trial judge re-read the transcripts of the Woods and Davis trials on the day before defendant's case came up for hearing, defendant was, in fact, tried in absentia in violation of G.S. 1949, 62-1411, which provides that no person can be tried for a felony unless he be personally present during the trial.
This contention likewise is without merit and cannot be sustained. Entirely aside from the fact that defendant, in open court, voluntarily stipulated to submit his case on the records of the Woods and Davis trials, it is clear that from a practical standpoint the trial judge did the only proper thing  on the day before defendant's case was to be called he re-read the records of those cases so as to refresh his memory on all details. The trial was not "held" in defendant's absence. Furthermore, defendant not only raised no objections to the entire procedure followed  he acquiesced in and agreed to it.
We find no error in the proceedings below and the judgment is affirmed.
SCHROEDER, J., dissents.