Title: In Re Estate of Ricklefs
Citation: 211 Kan. 713, 508 P.2d 866
Docket Number: 46,640
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 7, 1973

211 Kan. 713 (1973)
508 P.2d 866
In the Matter of the Estate of Anna B. Ricklefs, Deceased.
(JOHN ATWATER, Administrator, c.t.a., et al., Appellees,
v.
KATHLEEN MEEKS, ALBERTA CANTER, FLOYD CORDONIER, HOWARD CANTER, ANDREW CANTER, DARLENE MEIDINGER, JERRY CANTER, ROBERT CANTER, FREDA CANTER, MRS. HAROLD THOMPSON, FRANCES FOX, MARILYN Y. GEORGE, GERTRUDE BAUMAN, WANDA CHAPLIN, W.J. CANTER, DONNA MOLLENKOPF and MAXINE CHRISTMAS, Appellants.)
No. 46,640

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 7, 1973.
Robert F. Duncan, of Atchison, argued the cause, and Richard P. Senecal, of Atchison, was with him on the brief for appellants.
Robert A. Reeder, of Troy, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee administrator with the will annexed.
Jack R. Euler, of Euler and Euler, of Troy, argued the cause, and J.D. Euler, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for appellees BARBARA L. RICKLEFS, Executor of the Last Will and Testament of the Estate of Theodore D. Ricklefs, deceased; DELUS W. RICKLEFS; NORA ANN HIBSMAN.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FATZER, C.J.:
This appeal presents a single question for the court's determination  did a devise under a will lapse because the death of the beneficiary occurred prior to the death of the testatrix?
*714 Anna B. Ricklefs executed her last will and testament on April 12, 1960. She was a widow without children. The will provided, in part:
In the fifth paragraph of the will the testatrix "gave, devised and bequeathed" the sum of $35,500 to sixteen beneficiaries ranging in amounts from $1,000 to $15,000. Except for gifts to four charitable institutions in Kansas and Nebraska, all bequests were to individuals. Of the remaining twelve bequests, one was to Anna Mae Staudenmaier for $15,000, and one was to Theodore D. Ricklefs for $8,000. Nora Ann Ricklefs, Theodore's daughter, was bequeathed $1,000, and each of Anna Mae Staudenmaier's six children were bequeathed $1,000.
The sixth paragraph of the will reads:
The testatrix then named 47 beneficiaries. Theodore D. Ricklefs was nominated executor to serve without bond.
On July 3, 1968, Anna B. Ricklefs declared and published a codicil to her last will and testament in which she declared,
There was a controversy in the probate court as to whether the devise and bequest to Theodore D. Ricklefs lapsed because of his death previous to the death of the testatrix. The matter came before the probate court on the petition of the administrator c.t.a. for an order construing the last will and testament. The probate court held the devise did not lapse and an appeal was taken to the district court by nine beneficiaries under the residuary clause.
It was stipulated in the district court:
The district court also, over the objection of the appellants, permitted testimony as to the relationship which existed between the testatrix and Anna Mae Staudenmaier and Theodore D. Ricklefs, and the assistance which they gave her, that "[s]he did not rely on anyone else for assistance or personal business matters other than Ted and Anna Mae." The district court concluded, in part:
An appeal was then taken to this court. Neither party suggests there are any conflicting provisions or ambiguities in the will or codicil  in fact the appellees concede there are no words or language employed by the testatrix which are unclear and ambiguous. Likewise, reference to the district court's memorandum opinion fails to disclose its use of the words "ambiguous," "ambiguity," or words of similar import. In fact, the district court's reason was predicated in part upon the fact that testatrix "... did not attach a survival clause to the validity of the bequest or devise," rather than on any ambiguity discovered within the words employed in her will. Construction does not become necessary unless it appears the terms of the will are so uncertain and ambiguous as to require judicial construction.
In In re Estate of Graves, 203 Kan. 762, 457 P.2d 71, we restated the responsibility of this court when the meaning of language in a will is challenged, and held:
See, also, In re Estate of Freshour, 185 Kan. 434, 345 P.2d 689, where we stated:
This court finds no conflicting provisions or ambiguities in the language of the will or the codicil. As indicated, the last will and testament made specific bequests to Anna Mae, the testatrix' niece, and to Theodore, nephew of the testatrix' deceased husband. It then provided that all the rest of the money remaining in the estate, *717 all assets having been sold and converted to cash, was to be paid to "the following named persons who survive me." There were 47 beneficiaries named, 22 of whom were the testatrix' blood relatives, and 25 were blood relatives of her deceased husband. In the same paragraph, the will specifically provided that:
We think the provisions of her will devising the remainder of the major portion of her estate between her surviving blood relatives and the surviving blood relatives of her deceased husband clearly express her intention to dispose of the residue of her estate almost equally between their blood relatives.
Some eight years later Anna B. Ricklefs made a codicil to her last will and testament in which she ratified and reaffirmed her last will and testament in all respects as modified by the codicil. The codicil devised and bequeathed 200 acres of land (description omitted) to Anna Mae, the testatrix' niece, and also devised and bequeathed 160 acres of land to Theodore, nephew of her deceased husband. No attempt was made to designate whether the devise to Theodore would lapse if his death occurred before that of the testatrix.
We find nothing in the will or the codicil which would indicate what disposition should be made of the devises in case the devisees died before the death of the testatrix. Under such circumstances, we find the general rule is stated in 57 Am. Jur., Wills, § 1425, p. 956, as follows:
Under such circumstances the rule to be followed is well stated in In re Estate of Zimmerman, 207 Kan. 354, 485 P.2d 215, where this court approved the general rule, and said:
K.S.A. 59-615 as it provided at the time the will was executed (1960) reads:
The statute was amended in 1968 and again in 1970, but the amendments only pertained to a more specific definition of issue and did not affect the provision applicable here.
As Theodore was not a relative of the testatrix by lineal descent or adoption, neither he nor his issue were furnished any relief by the statute and the bequest or devise to him lapsed on his death before that of the testatrix. Hence, this court concludes that no different disposition was made or required by the language of the will. In 57 Am. Jur., op. cit., supra, the rule is stated:
The district court in considering whether a different disposition was made or required by the will, stated in its memorandum opinion:
..............
It would appear the district judge admitted extrinsic evidence from which he inferred an intention of the testatrix, and then proceeded to modify her will to make it conform to his individual opinion. This, a court cannot do. For this court to hold the testatrix intended that the devise to Theodore would not lapse even though he predeceased her, would require us to add words to her will providing for the substitution of a beneficiary.
In Graves, supra, we held:
And in the opinion it was said:
In the opinion we quoted with approval from Volume 4 of the Bowe-Parker Revision of Page on Wills, as follows:
"`In construing a will ...'"
..............
This court must presume the testatrix knew the law of Kansas at *720 the time she signed her will and codicil. In In re Estate of Sowder, 185 Kan. 74, 340 P.2d 907, this court stated:
Applying the foregoing rule to the facts and circumstances, the testatrix is presumed to know that under the law of this state the devise of land to her niece, Anna Mae would stand because she was blood relative by lineal descent, but that the devise to Theodore, the nephew of her deceased husband, would lapse if he predeceased her, unless there was a clearly expressed intention in her codicil plainly declaring otherwise. We find no language in her codicil expressing such intention. Certainly she would not have left such intention to be derived from a field of speculation and conjecture.
While the ascertainment of the intention of the testator is the polestar in interpreting a will, fixed rules should not be disregarded. Every testator, when he uses legal language having a common and accepted meaning, should be supposed to use it in its legal sense unless he plainly declares otherwise. If courts should indulge an unlimited latitude of forming conjectures on wills by continually placing themselves in the position of the testator to ascertain his intentions, instead of attending to their grammatical and legal construction, the consequences must be endless litigation. If we depart from the established rules of interpretation, without an abiding conviction the meaning of the testator's will requires that we do so, no interpretation, with respect to the title to an estate that depends upon a will can be safe until it has received the approval of the court. Lawyers and testators of the state should be able to rely with confidence upon rules of property in preparing and executing wills, and be assured the intent of the testator as expressed therein will be carried out, instead of a will being made the instrument of introducing a vague discretionary law formed upon the occasion from the circumstances, to which no precedent can be applied, and from which no rule can be deduced.
The judgment is reversed with instructions to the district court to enter judgment in conformity with this opinion.
*721 OWSLEY, J., dissenting:
Despite the many rules and guidelines quoted in the opinion for the court with which I fully agree, the fact remains that probably no two wills were ever written in precisely the same language. Neither is it likely that any two testators would die under the same circumstances with respect to their estates, families, or other objects of their bounty. Thus, even though general rules and guidelines are to be recognized, the fact remains that each will must be construed by its own terms and with regard to the circumstances under which it was written. This simple fact is recognized in Giese v. Smith, 195 Kan. 607, 408 P.2d 687, wherein we said:
The intention of the testatrix is easily gleaned from a reading of her will and codicil. The primary objects of her bounty were Anna Mae Staudenmaier and Theodore D. Ricklefs and their respective children. The children were designated beneficiaries in the will. The testatrix intended that Anna Mae and Theodore receive legacies generally equal in nature and further that her estate be divided one-half to her relatives and one-half to her husband's. In her will she specifically provided for the lapse of residuary legacies. Likewise, in the third paragraph of her codicil she again directed that no bequest made in her will be paid unless the named beneficiary survived her. It is significant that in the preceding paragraph the devise is made to Theodore "to be his absolutely" without mention of survivorship. The words and phrases read together in the light of what was said and what was omitted clearly manifest the intention and testamentary scheme of testatrix; i.e., substantial bequests, approximately equal in value, to Anna Mae and Theodore, neither to lapse, the remainder after specific bequests divided in approximately equal portions between the surviving Staudenmaiers on the one hand and the Ricklefs on the other. The specific bequests to Anna Mae and Theodore were made in identical language, each devise ending in the phrase "to be his [hers] absolutely." I am unable to presume the testatrix knew that under the law Anna Mae's devise would not lapse, but Theodore's would. The presumption is much stronger that had she intended either or both to lapse she would have said so as she did with respect to those bequests which she intended to lapse. The addition of the phrase "to be his absolutely" was unnecessary in composing a simple devise, but it, like *722 all other portions of a will and codicil, must be given effect if possible. Admittedly, the phrase cannot be construed to be a substitution  the usual method employed to expressly provide against lapsing. The effect to be given the phrase is that it expresses an intention to give the devises to which it was attached a higher quality than that of all of the other bequests and devises from which it was omitted. Furthermore, to hold otherwise would result in a substantial part of her estate falling into the residue contrary to her intention that the residuary legatees would receive only a nominal portion of the estate.
As noted in the opinion for the court, the general rule is stated in 57 Am. Jur., Wills, § 1428, p. 958: "While it is everywhere recognized that the question whether a legacy or devise shall lapse or not is subject to the testatorial intention...."
It is apparent from the language in the first codicil the testator directed its preparation for two purposes. First, to devise a farm to Anna Mae Staudenmaier and a farm to Theodore D. Ricklefs; and second, to provide that if any of the named beneficiaries in her first will died before her death the bequest would lapse and be paid to those named beneficiaries who survived her. Since she was concerned with those beneficiaries who died and those who might die before her death it is not realistic to say she did not have in mind the possibility that Theodore D. Ricklefs might not survive her. The language employed in the third paragraph of her codicil makes the omission of the imposition of survivorship on the devise to Theodore D. Ricklefs a glaring expression of intention. An accumulation of all the language used by the testatrix and giving each word and phrase its proper contribution and significance to the total, manifests an intention that the requirement of survivorship was not to be imposed upon the devise to Theodore D. Ricklefs.
The judgment of the trial court that the property passed to the children of Theodore D. Ricklefs is correct. We do not find any statute specifically controlling the descent of property under the facts disclosed in this case. We do find, however, that the holding of the trial court is in harmony with the statutes of this state and such case law as exists relating to substituted beneficiaries.
K.S.A. 1972 Supp. 59-615 provides for issue to take when there is prior death of an adopted child or blood relative within the sixth degree. Although Theodore D. Ricklefs is not an adopted child or blood relative within the sixth degree, which would prevent the lapse of his devise according to statute, it is my opinion that the *723 devise did not lapse under a proper construction of the will and codicil for the reasons hereinbefore stated. Since the legislature has spoken on the subject of substituted beneficiaries of a devise which does not lapse, we see no reason why the statutory expression should not be applied to this will and codicil. Such a finding is also consistent with K.S.A. 59-506 which provides the issue of a previously deceased child of an intestate shall take to the exclusion of the spouse of the previously deceased child. Such a holding would also be in harmony with our statute, now repealed (Gen. Stat. 1915, § 11811) and the case law construing that statute. (Corbett v. Skaggs, 111 Kan. 380, 207 Pac. 819.)
The reasoning supporting this conclusion is that these children are substituted beneficiaries or heirs in the sense that the prior decedent was the primary beneficiary and because of his prior death his issue are substituted. The rights of issue of a prior deceased beneficiary or heir are acquired not because such person is a distributee or heir-at-law of a deceased person, but because he or she stands in the place of the prior deceased person and represents him as a blood descendant. (26A C.J.S., Descent &amp; Distribution, § 23, p. 564.)
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
SCHROEDER and KAUL, J.J., join in the foregoing dissent.