Title: Dwayne Irwin Parker v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC02-1471
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 24, 2005

Supreme Court of Florida 
____________ 
Nos. SC02-1471 & SC03-1045 
____________ 
DWAYNE IRWIN PARKER, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
_________________________ 
DWAYNE IRWIN PARKER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR., 
Respondent. 
 
[March 24, 2005] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Dwayne Parker, a prisoner under a sentence of death, appeals an order of the 
trial court denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.851, and he petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons stated 
 
 
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below, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s summary denial of 
Parker’s initial motion for postconviction relief and remand for an evidentiary 
hearing on several issues.  We also deny Parker’s request for habeas relief.     
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Shortly after 11 p.m. on April 22, 1989, Ladson Marvin Preston and Dwayne 
Parker entered a Pizza Hut in Pompano Beach.  Preston was unarmed, but Parker 
was armed with both a small pistol and a semiautomatic machine pistol.  They 
forced the manager to open the safe at gunpoint, and Parker then returned to the 
dining room and robbed the customers of money and jewelry.  Sixteen customers 
and employees were in the restaurant at the time.  Parker fired six shots from the 
semiautomatic machine pistol during the robberies, wounding two customers. 
While Parker was in the dining room, an employee escaped from the 
restaurant and telephoned 911 from a nearby business.  Broward County deputies 
arrived shortly, and first Preston and then Parker left the restaurant.  Deputy Robert 
Killen confronted Parker in the parking lot, and Parker fired five shots at him with 
the semiautomatic machine pistol.  Parker then ran into the street and tried to 
commandeer a vehicle occupied by Keith Mallow, his wife, and three children.  
Parker fired the machine pistol once into the car and then fled. 
When an unknown person entered a nearby bar and told the patrons that the 
Pizza Hut was being robbed, several of those patrons, including William 
 
 
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Nicholson, the homicide victim, left the bar and went out into the street.  Tammy 
Duncan left her house when she heard the shots.  Duncan saw Parker carrying a 
gun and running down the street with Nicholson chasing after him.  Duncan heard 
another shot and then saw Nicholson clutch his midsection and fall to the ground. 
Eventually, deputies Edward Baker, Killen, and Kevin McNesby cornered 
Parker between two houses.  McNesby’s police dog subdued Parker, and he was 
taken to the sheriff’s station.  The machine pistol and some of the stolen jewelry 
were found on the ground when Parker was taken into custody.  At the station, 
money and more stolen jewelry were found on Parker. 
A Broward County grand jury indicted Parker on one count of first-degree 
murder, two counts of attempted first-degree murder, and nine counts of armed 
robbery.  Six shell casings were found inside the restaurant, five in the parking lot, 
and one in the street near the spot where Nicholson fell.  The State’s firearms 
expert testified that all twelve shell casings as well as the bullet recovered from 
Nicholson’s body had been fired from Parker’s semiautomatic machine pistol.  The 
defense argued, however, that the bullet was misidentified and that a deputy had 
shot Nicholson.  The jury found otherwise and convicted Parker of murder and 
armed robbery, and on the two counts of attempted murder found him guilty of the 
lesser offense of aggravated battery with a firearm.  The jury recommended a 
sentence of death by a vote of eight to four.  The trial court agreed with the jury’s 
 
 
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recommendation and sentenced Parker to death.  The trial judge found four 
aggravating factors: (1) Parker had a prior conviction of a violent felony; (2) 
Parker knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons; (3) the murder was 
committed while Parker was engaged in committing, or during flight after 
committing, a robbery; and (4) the murder was committed to avoid or prevent 
arrest.  The court found that no statutory or nonstatutory mitigating circumstances 
had been established.  This Court affirmed the convictions and sentences.  Parker 
v. State, 641 So. 2d 369, 372-78 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1131 (1995). 
In 1996, pursuant to chapter 119 of the Florida Statutes, Parker requested 
that the sheriff provide public records relevant to the investigation of Parker’s case.  
In response, the sheriff made certain records available on June 4, 1996.  Parker 
filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to rules 3.850 and 3.851 of the 
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure on March 24, 1997, and requested leave to 
amend the motion once the State complied with all outstanding public records 
requests.  Subsequently, in 1998, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852(h)(2) 
was enacted.  Rule 3.852(h)(2) permitted capital defendants who were represented 
by collateral counsel as of October 1, 1998, and who had already initiated the 
public records process to file within ninety days of October 1, 1998, a written 
demand for additional public records that had not previously been the subject of a 
request for public records.  On December 29, 1998, pursuant to rule 3.852(h)(2), 
 
 
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Parker filed multiple, written requests for additional public records, including four 
separate written requests asking the sheriff to provide certain additional public 
records that had not been the subject of a previous public records request.  The 
sheriff objected, and the trial court sustained the objection.  On June 5, 2000, 
Parker filed an amended postconviction motion. 
The trial court scheduled a Huff1 hearing for April 18, 2001.  Meanwhile, in 
March 2001, Parker filed requests for additional public records under rule 3.852(i) 
based upon newly discovered information of allegations of improper conduct by 
the sheriff’s office in several murder cases.  Included in the information were 
allegations against some of the detectives that investigated Parker’s case.  At the 
April 18 hearing, the court denied Parker’s requests for additional public records.  
The court also denied Parker’s renewed requests for the personnel and internal 
affairs files of the officers involved in the investigation of his case.  However, the 
sheriff agreed to provide internal affairs records of two detectives.  On February 8, 
2002, the court issued a written order summarily denying all of Parker’s claims.  
Parker filed a motion for rehearing and an amendment to the motion for rehearing, 
which were denied.  Parker filed a timely notice of appeal.  Simultaneously with 
the filing of Parker’s initial brief in this case, he filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
                                          
 
1 Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
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DISCUSSION 
While Parker raises fourteen issues in this appeal from the denial of 
postconviction relief,2 we reverse the order of the trial court solely with respect to 
portions of the first issue, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt and 
penalty phases, and remand for an evidentiary hearing.  We affirm the order with 
respect to the remaining issues.3 
                                          
 
2.  The issues raised are:  (1) whether the trial court erred by summarily 
denying Parker's claims of ineffective assistance of guilt and penalty phase 
counsel; (2) whether the trial court improperly denied Parker access to public 
records; (3) whether the trial court's denial of Parker's claims of ineffectiveness of 
counsel regarding juror misconduct and the rule prohibiting juror interviews was 
proper; (4) whether Parker's claim of ineffectiveness of counsel relating to voir dire 
examination of jurors was properly denied; (5) whether counsel was ineffective for 
failing to preserve for appeal a claim of systematic discrimination in the selection 
of the jury; (6) whether the trial court properly denied Parker's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel regarding the penalty phase instructions; (7) whether counsel 
was ineffective in failing to prove that Parker’s claim of a Caldwell v. Mississippi, 
472 U.S. 320 (1985), violation was improperly denied; (8) whether Parker's death 
penalty sentence is disproportionate to the crime for which he was convicted; (9) 
whether Parker's sentence of death is being exacted pursuant to a pattern and 
practice to discriminate on the basis of race in the administration of the death 
penalty; (10) whether counsel was ineffective in providing the jury with adequate 
guidance concerning the aggravating circumstances instructions; (11) whether 
Florida's capital sentencing statute is constitutional; (12) whether execution by 
electrocution or lethal injection is constitutional; (13) whether the combination of 
all errors deprived Parker of a fair trial guaranteed under the Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments; and (14) whether Parker is insane and cannot be 
executed. 
3.  We do not address issues (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), and (11) in this 
opinion.  Issues (5), (7), (9), and (11) are not addressed because they are bare-
bones, conclusory allegations.  See Gordon v. State, 863 So. 2d 1215, 1218 (Fla. 
2003) (“A defendant may not simply file a motion for postconviction relief 
containing conclusory allegations that his or her trial counsel was ineffective and 
 
 
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Issue 1:  Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 
Parker alleges that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt and penalty phases of his trial.  In 
his amended postconviction motion, Parker set forth a number of claims which he 
contends require an evidentiary hearing: (1) trial counsel failed to present expert 
testimony (a) to show that the color of the photographs showing the fatal bullet 
was subject to manipulation and did not reflect the true color of the bullet and (b) 
to refute the claim that the bullet that killed the victim was fired from Parker’s gun; 
(2) trial counsel failed to present evidence that there were bullets fired from 
Parker’s gun that were not accounted for and that this evidence would have 
supported Parker’s defense that the police recovered one of these unaccounted-for 
bullets and switched it with the silver bullet that the medical examiner removed 
from the victim;4 (3) trial counsel failed to effectively impeach the witness, 
                                                                                                                                        
then expect to receive an evidentiary hearing.”).  Issues (4), (6), (8), and (10) were 
addressed on direct appeal and are not cognizable in a proceeding under rule 3.850.  
See Torres-Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So. 2d 1321, 1323 (Fla. 1994) (holding 3.850 
proceedings are not to be used as a second appeal for issues which were raised on 
direct appeal and holding it is not appropriate to use a different argument to 
relitigate the same issue).    
 
4.  Both of these allegations represent what Parker calls the “copper bullet 
theory.”  This theory is in essence Parker's defense, namely that Deputy McNesby 
shot Nicholson, believing Nicholson to be involved in other local robberies, and 
that McNesby and the Broward Sheriff's Office conspired with both the medical 
examiner and the prosecutor to frame Parker for the murder.  Parker chose this 
 
 
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Duncan, as there were inconsistencies between her testimony at trial and her prior 
sworn statement regarding the presence of Deputy McNesby at the time the fatal 
bullet was fired; and (4) trial counsel failed to competently investigate and present 
significant mitigation evidence of Parker’s abusive childhood and serious mental 
illness.  The trial court refused to grant an evidentiary hearing and summarily 
denied these claims.  Parker contends the court erred in summarily denying these 
claims because he has made facially sufficient allegations that are not conclusively 
rebutted by the record which demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Therefore, Parker argues, we should reverse the court’s order and remand for an 
evidentiary hearing.  We agree in part and remand for an evidentiary hearing on 
counsel’s failure to present expert testimony pertaining to the fatal bullet and on 
counsel’s failure to fully investigate and present mitigating evidence concerning 
Parker’s abusive childhood and his alleged mental illness.  
As a general proposition, a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on 
any well-pled allegations in a motion for postconviction relief unless (1) the 
motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled 
to no relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient.  See 
Maharaj v. State, 684 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1996); Anderson v. State, 627 So. 2d 1170 
(Fla. 1993); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850.  The defendant bears the burden of establishing 
                                                                                                                                        
name for his theory because the bullets in Parker's gun were copper, while the 
bullets issued to the officers in the Broward's Sheriff's Office were silver.  
 
 
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a prima facie case based upon a legally valid claim.  Mere conclusory allegations 
are insufficient to meet this burden.  See Kennedy v. State, 547 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 
1989).  However, in cases where there has been no evidentiary hearing, the court 
must accept the factual allegations made by the defendant to the extent that they 
are not refuted by the record.  See Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1999); Valle 
v. State, 705 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1997).  We must examine each claim to determine if 
it is legally sufficient and, if so, determine whether or not the claim is refuted by 
the record.  It is apparent from the record that Parker’s allegations of ineffective 
assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to present expert testimony 
concerning the fatal bullet and counsel’s failure to fully investigate and present 
mitigation evidence merit an evidentiary hearing. 
When a defendant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, he must establish 
the two prongs outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984):   
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 
deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This 
requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a 
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction 
or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process 
that renders the result unreliable. 
 
 
- 10 - 
Id. at 687.  In reviewing counsel’s performance, “a court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance.”  Id. at 689. 
Parker asserts that trial counsel should have presented expert testimony in 
photography and tool-marking to demonstrate that the color of the photographs 
depicting the bullet lodged in the victim’s lower spine was subject to manipulation 
and did not necessarily reflect the true color of the bullet shown in the 
photographs.  Parker alleges that it could not be established with any certainty that 
the bullet that killed the victim was the same bullet that was fired from Parker’s 
gun. 
Parker’s claim stems from the fact that the medical examiner, Dr. Michael 
Bell, wrote in his autopsy report that the bullet extracted from the victim was “a 
large caliber silver-colored bullet recovered with very little deformation.”  Dr. Bell 
later testified that the prosecutor had called him on the telephone after the autopsy 
and asked him to both project the picture of the bullet and analyze that projection.  
After doing so, Dr. Bell “realized” that he had made a mistake in his autopsy report 
and that the bullet was, in fact, gold-colored with a cut.  The medical examiner 
changed his testimony during his second deposition, approximately two weeks 
before trial; yet defense counsel did not get an expert to examine this important 
piece of evidence.  The medical examiner’s first analysis was favorable to Parker 
 
 
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but became unfavorable when the medical examiner changed his testimony.  This 
fact is significant because the bullets issued to the police officers by the Broward 
County Sheriff’s Office are silver-colored, while the bullets in Parker’s gun were 
copper-colored.  Furthermore, this contradiction bolsters Parker’s claim that he 
was at least twenty feet from the victim at the time the witness, Duncan, heard the 
fatal shot, and thus he could not have been the shooter.  As Dr. Bell testified, the 
gun that fired the fatal bullet was no more than two feet away from the victim 
when the fatal shot was fired. 
Parker also asserts that defense counsel should have fully investigated and 
presented additional substantial mitigating evidence at the penalty phase.  Though 
the record shows counsel did investigate and present mitigating evidence of 
Parker’s childhood and intellectual capacity,5 Parker asserts that he can present 
                                          
 
5.  On direct examination by defense counsel, Parker’s mother testified that: 
(1) Parker's parents separated when he was only three months old; (2) Parker's 
mother was first committed to a mental institution when Parker was six years old; 
(3) Parker was raised by the State of Florida Department of Health and 
Rehabilitative Services and babysitters while Parker's mother was committed; (4) 
Parker lived in foster homes and was separated from his sister; (5) Parker was 
abused by a babysitter; and (6) Parker's mother was repeatedly committed, causing 
Parker to be sent back and forth from his mother's care to foster homes.  Howard 
Finkelstein, the assistant public defender in Broward County, testified that Parker's 
childhood was dysfunctional and that Parker was abused.  Ladson Marvin Preston, 
Jr., the codefendant in this case, testified that Parker was intoxicated on the night 
of the Pizza Hut robbery.  Dr. Glenn Ross Caddy, a psychologist who interviewed 
Parker, testified that: (1) Parker had a dysfunctional childhood and was abused; (2) 
Parker is of below normal intelligence; (3) Parker had lived on the streets after age 
twelve; (4) Parker was shuffled back and forth from different foster homes; (5) 
 
 
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new facts and details at an evidentiary hearing which counsel failed to present at 
his trial.  The additional mitigation would include the facts that: (1) Parker suffers 
from mental illness and possible organic brain damage; (2) Parker was diagnosed 
as borderline retarded at age fourteen and has a mental age of seven years which 
would likely regress under pressure; (3) test results indicated that Parker has 
weaknesses in his logical and abstract thinking ability along with difficulty in 
interpreting social situations; (4) Parker suffered from head injuries and physical 
trauma as a child; (5) Parker received little or no mental health assistance as a child 
due to his mother’s own schizophrenic condition; (6) Parker suffered from severe 
mental distress as a direct result of his being in and out of foster homes throughout 
his childhood because of his mother’s schizophrenia; (7) Parker’s mother treated 
him with detachment and hostility and inflicted physical abuse, including beating 
him with an electric cord and pouring hot water on him; (8) Parker’s mother was 
unduly critical or, in the alternative, absolutely doting; (9) Parker was gang raped 
at nine years old and, on other occasions, molested by a man living in his 
neighborhood; (10) Parker was raped by an older man when he was fourteen years 
                                                                                                                                        
Parker abused alcohol and marijuana; (6) Parker reported that he was intoxicated 
when he committed the Pizza Hut robbery; (7) Parker had a poor self image which 
caused him to be unable to secure a legitimate job and forced him to engage in 
illegal acts; and (8) Parker has sociopathic tendencies.  Carlton Moore, a part-time 
investigator for the Public Defender's Office of Broward County, testified that: (1) 
he investigated Parker's childhood and confirmed that it was dysfunctional, and (2)  
that Parker was abused. 
 
 
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old; (11) Parker was forced to have sexual contact with animals; (12) Parker was 
the victim of a two-year sexual relationship with his own legal guardian when he 
was sixteen years old; and (13) Parker was routinely forced to submit to sexual 
activity with men in return for shelter when he was homeless.  In comparing the 
mitigation evidence presented at trial with the mitigation evidence that Parker 
indicates he can now present, it appears that there is significant information that 
was never presented to the trial court which expounds upon both the abuse Parker 
suffered as a child and Parker’s mental infirmities.  He is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing to present this evidence. 
Parker also alleges that trial counsel failed to discover and present “available 
evidence” that there were bullets fired from Parker’s gun that were never 
accounted for by police investigators.  Parker contends that this evidence would 
have supported his defense that the police secretly recovered one of these 
unaccounted-for bullets and switched it with the silver bullet that the medical 
examiner removed from the victim.  Parker asserts that his gun had the capacity to 
hold thirty-three bullets, and since only twelve spent cartridges were recovered at 
the scene and his gun had only twenty unspent cartridges remaining, then either the 
police planted one of the twelve spent cartridges on the victim’s body in order to 
frame him, or the police found a thirteenth spent cartridge and planted this 
cartridge on the victim’s body.  Parker provides no factual support for these 
 
 
- 14 - 
allegations but simply asserts that either one of these theories might be true.  As we 
stated in Kennedy v. State, 547 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1989): 
A defendant may not simply file a motion for postconviction relief 
containing conclusory allegations that his or her trial counsel was 
ineffective and then expect to receive an evidentiary hearing.  The 
defendant must allege specific facts that, when considering the totality 
of the circumstances, are not conclusively rebutted by the record and 
that demonstrate a deficiency on the part of counsel which is 
detrimental to the defendant. 
Id. at 913.  Parker’s claim is conclusory, and Parker has not cited to specific facts 
to support his theory.  Thus, Parker has not shown that counsel was ineffective, and 
he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim. 
Parker also alleges that trial counsel failed to effectively impeach the witness 
Tammy Duncan, as there were inconsistencies between her testimony at trial and 
her prior sworn statement regarding the presence of Deputy McNesby at the time 
the fatal bullet was fired.  However, the record refutes Parker’s claim.  Defense 
counsel thoroughly cross-examined Duncan, eliciting from Duncan the 
contradiction between her prior sworn statement that Deputy McNesby was in 
close proximity to the victim when the shot was fired and her testimony at trial that 
Deputy McNesby was sixty to seventy feet away from the victim at the time the 
shot was fired.  Furthermore, defense counsel elicited from Duncan the fact that 
she could not identify who had shot the victim.  Therefore, based upon the record, 
 
 
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Parker’s contention that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to properly 
cross-examine Duncan has no merit. 
Because Parker’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on 
counsel’s failure to present expert testimony on photography and toolmarking and 
failure to present significant mitigation evidence at the penalty phase are not 
refuted by the record, we must accept the factual allegations made by Parker and 
remand for an evidentiary hearing on these matters.  See Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 
253 (Fla. 1999); Valle v. State, 705 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1997). 
Issue 2:  Public Records 
Parker claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his requests 
for records from the Broward County Sheriff’s Office in the form of personnel files 
and internal affairs files of the law enforcement officers involved in the 
investigation.  As we stated in State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 2003): 
A circuit court’s ruling on a public records request filed 
pursuant to a rule 3.850 motion will be sustained on review absent an 
abuse of discretion. . . . 
 
Discretion is abused only when the judicial action is 
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way 
of saying that discretion is abused only where no 
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the 
trial court. 
Id. at 137 (quoting White v. State, 817 So. 2d 799, 806 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 
U.S. 1091 (2002)).  In the instant case, Parker made a blanket request for the files 
 
 
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of forty-five officers.  However, Parker was only able to specifically name two 
officers, Detective Scheff and Detective Wiley, who were involved in his case. He 
stated that he needed the files “to see if there is any impeachment evidence or 
anything of that nature in there.”  In response to the requests, the State offered 
Parker the opportunity to question the attorneys from each of the agencies involved 
regarding the records demanded. 
The trial court granted Parker’s request for Detective Scheff’s and Detective 
Wiley’s files but denied Parker’s requests for all other public records, finding that 
the prejudicial effect to the administration of justice outweighed any possible 
probative value to the defendant.  The trial court’s decision to deny Parker’s 
motion was reasonable because Parker could only name two individuals at the 
Broward County Sheriff’s Office whose files were relevant to his case, and 
because the State offered Parker the opportunity to question the attorneys from 
each of the agencies involved.  We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion.  Therefore, Parker is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
In addition, Parker claims that the trial court also abused its discretion in 
refusing to unseal records submitted by the State Attorney’s Office based on 
claims that the records were exempt from public records disclosure.  The trial court 
reviewed these records and determined that they did not contain any Brady6 
                                          
 
6 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
 
- 17 - 
material.  Thus, the record reveals that the court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Parker access to the sealed records submitted by the State Attorney’s 
Office. 
Issue 3:  Jury Misconduct/Juror Interviews 
Parker argues that defense counsel failed to effectively raise and preserve for 
review a claim that the jury engaged in misconduct by reaching its penalty phase 
recommendation to impose the death penalty in an improper manner based upon 
extrinsic considerations.  The record, however, refutes Parker’s argument.  First, 
counsel brought to the court’s attention an article from The Miami Herald which 
stated that a reporter for the Herald had talked with a member of the jury who 
indicated that the jury’s initial seven-to-five vote was in favor of a life sentence.  
Second, counsel attempted to raise and preserve this issue for review.  Third, 
counsel called a witness, Carlton Moore, to address this issue further.  Moore 
testified that he had talked with a member of the jury and that this person stated 
that the jury had initially voted seven-to-five for a life sentence but the vote 
changed because one of the members of the jury was “in a hurry.”  Because 
counsel did raise this issue at trial, Parker’s claim of ineffective assistance has no 
merit. 
Parker also challenges the denial of his claim related to juror interviews and 
the trial court’s failure to declare rule 4-3.5(d)(4) of the Rules Regulating the 
 
 
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Florida Bar unconstitutional.  This claim should have been raised on direct appeal.  
As a result, Parker is procedurally barred from raising this issue here.  See Torres-
Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So. 2d 1321, 1323 (Fla. 1994) (holding that “issues that 
could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, are not cognizable through 
collateral attack”); accord Arbelaez v. State, 775 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2000).   
Additionally, we have cautioned against permitting jury interviews to 
support post-conviction relief for allegations which focus upon jury deliberations.  
Mitchell v. State, 527 So. 2d 179, 181 (Fla. 1988) (“It is a well settled rule that a 
verdict cannot be subsequently impeached by conduct which inheres in the verdict 
and relates to the jury’s deliberations.”).  Thus, counsel could not inquire into the 
jury’s deliberations as Parker asserts. 
Issue 4:  Lethal Injection 
Parker claims that execution by lethal injection or electrocution is cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  
However, this Court has repeatedly held that neither form of execution is cruel and 
unusual punishment.  See, e.g., Provenzano v. State, 761 So. 2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 
2000) (concluding that “execution by lethal injection does not amount to cruel 
and/or unusual punishment”); Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413, 415 (Fla. 
1999) (stating that “Florida’s electric chair is not cruel or unusual punishment”), 
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1182 (2000).  Therefore, relief on this claim is denied. 
 
 
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Issue 5:  Cumulative Error 
Parker claims that he did not receive the fundamentally fair trial to which he 
was entitled under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because the sheer 
number and types of errors involved, when considered as a whole, virtually 
dictated the sentence that he would receive.  However, where the individual claims 
of error alleged are either procedurally barred or without merit, the claim of 
cumulative error also necessarily fails.  See Downs v. State, 740 So. 2d 506, 509 
n.5 (Fla. 1999).  As discussed in the analysis of the individual issues above, the 
alleged errors are either insufficiently pled, meritless, or procedurally barred or do 
not meet the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel.  Because the 
alleged individual errors are without merit, the contention of cumulative error is 
similarly without merit. 
Issue 6:  Incompetence for Execution 
Parker argues that he may be incompetent to be executed.  However, he 
concedes that the claim is premature.  Under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 
3.811 and 3.812, the issue of competency for execution cannot be raised until the 
Governor has issued a death warrant.  See, e.g., Cole v. State, 841 So. 2d 409, 430 
(Fla. 2003); Brown v. Moore, 800 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla. 2001).  While Parker is 
under a death sentence, no death warrant has been signed and his execution is not 
 
 
- 20 - 
imminent.  Parker’s concession that this issue is not yet ripe is accurate, and we 
deny relief on this claim. 
HABEAS CORPUS PETITION 
Issue 1:  Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
In his petition for habeas corpus relief, Parker raises three claims.  Parker 
first argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise several 
issues on appeal.  “The proper method by which to raise a claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel is by petition for writ of habeas corpus directed to 
the appellate court which considered the direct appeal.”  Ragan v. Dugger, 544 So. 
2d 1052, 1054 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); see also Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 
643 (Fla. 2000) (“Habeas petitions are the proper vehicle to advance claims of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  However, claims of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel may not be used to camouflage issues that should 
have been raised on direct appeal or in a postconviction motion.”).  Thus, Parker 
properly raises these claims in this habeas petition.   
Parker alleges appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on direct 
appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to disqualify the prosecutor based upon 
the prosecutor being a witness to the medical examiner’s alleged realization that he 
had made a mistake regarding the appearance of the bullet removed from the 
victim.  Parker claims that the prosecutor violated the “witness-advocate” rule 
 
 
- 21 - 
when Dr. Bell testified that the prosecutor prompted him to realize that he had 
looked at the bullet at the autopsy and mistakenly reported the bullet was silver-
colored with no deformations instead of copper-colored with a large cut.  Dr. Bell 
testified that he did not realize his mistake until the prosecutor called him on the 
telephone and asked him to look at a slide photograph of the bullet.  Although 
Parker concedes that the prosecutor never actually testified before the court, Parker 
claims that the prosecutor testified indirectly by implying to the jury that he had 
special knowledge or insight during his examination of Dr. Bell on the witness 
stand.   
This argument has no merit.  The prosecutor never testified in the case.  In 
addition, trial counsel did not object to Dr. Bell’s testimony on this basis.  
Therefore, appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a 
nonmeritorious issue and an issue not preserved for appeal.  See Freeman v. State, 
761 So. 2d 1055, 1071 (Fla. 2000) (“Appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for 
failing to raise these issues because the claims are without merit.”).   
Parker also claims that the penalty phase testimony of Deputy Robert Cerat, 
FBI Agent Jerry Richards, and Dr. Patrick Besant-Matthews resulted in re-
litigating the guilt phase issues, that the testimony was irrelevant to the issue of the 
great risk to others aggravator, and that the testimony constituted unconstitutional 
nonstatutory aggravating factors that violated the Eighth Amendment and 
 
 
- 22 - 
prevented the constitutionally required narrowing of the sentencer’s 
discretion.  Therefore, Parker claims, appellate counsel was ineffective for not 
raising this issue on direct appeal.  The State, on the other hand, claims that, 
because the testimony was admissible and relevant evidence confirming the 
identity of the person who created a great risk to others, there was no violation of 
Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992), or Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 
(1988), both of which address the impact on the death sentence when the jury is 
instructed on a vague, unconstitutional aggravating factor.   
The record demonstrates that the testimony of these penalty phase witnesses 
was elicited in an attempt to support the State’s assertion that all of the bullets 
came from Parker’s gun in order to prove that Parker knowingly created a great 
risk of death to many persons.  Though defense counsel objected to their testimony 
and moved for a mistrial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion either in 
overruling counsel’s objection to their testimony or in denying counsel’s motion 
for a mistrial based upon their testimony.  See Dennis v. State, 817 So. 2d 741, 758 
(Fla.) (“We review a trial court’s ruling on the relevance of evidence under an 
abuse of discretion standard.”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1051 (2002); Rivera v. State, 
859 So. 2d 495, 512 (Fla. 2003) (explaining that “the standard of review of a 
motion for mistrial is the abuse of discretion standard”).  Appellate counsel cannot 
 
 
- 23 - 
be deemed ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal.  See Freeman, 
761 So. 2d at 1070. 
Parker also asserts appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue on 
appeal that Parker was denied his right to due process of law, to confront witnesses 
against him, and to the effective assistance of counsel when he was involuntarily 
absent from the suppression hearing at the beginning of the trial.  He claims that 
his absence during the suppression hearing violated his Eighth Amendment right 
and rendered his trial proceedings fundamentally unfair.  In Muehleman v. State, 
503 So. 2d 310, 315 (Fla. 1987), this Court held that a suppression hearing is not a 
crucial stage of a trial.  See also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679 
(1980) (“[T]he interests at stake in a suppression hearing are of a lesser magnitude 
than those in the criminal trial itself. . . .  We conclude that the process due at a 
suppression hearing may be less demanding and elaborate than the protections 
accorded the defendant at the trial itself.”).  Therefore, we find no Eighth 
Amendment violation in this regard. 
Furthermore, as the State points out, the initial suppression hearing pertained 
only to the codefendant, Ladson Marvin Preston, Jr.  Parker was given the 
opportunity to review the transcript and determine whether he wished to have the 
State recall its first witness, Deputy Sheriff Chris Michael Presley.  Parker’s 
counsel, in Parker’s presence, had thoroughly cross-examined that witness.  Parker 
 
 
- 24 - 
was given an opportunity to recall the State’s witness but elected not to do 
so.  Thus, the claim was not properly preserved, and appellate counsel cannot be 
deemed ineffective for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal.  See Freeman, 761 
So. 2d at 1070. 
Finally, Parker asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
challenge the lack of a specific charge against him because the State was permitted 
to charge and prosecute him for both premeditated murder and felony first-degree 
murder.  Parker claims that the lack of notice of a specific charge violated his 
rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.  It is well established that an indictment which charges premeditated 
murder permits the State to prosecute under both the premeditated and felony 
murder theories.  See Kearse v. State, 662 So. 2d 677, 682 (Fla. 1995) (“The State 
need not charge felony murder in an indictment in order to prosecute a defendant 
under alternative theories of premeditated and felony murder when the indictment 
charges premeditated murder.”).  This claim is without merit, and appellate counsel 
cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to have raised it on direct appeal.  See 
Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1070. 
Issue 2:  Ring Claim 
Parker next challenges the constitutionality of his death sentence because the 
recommendation for death and the aggravating circumstances were not found by a 
 
 
- 25 - 
unanimous jury.  This Court has repeatedly held that it is not unconstitutional for a 
jury to recommend death on a simple majority vote.  See Whitfield v. State, 706 
So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1997); Thompson v. State, 648 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1994); Brown v. 
State, 565 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1990); Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1975).  
Moreover, this Court has rejected claims that Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002), requires aggravating circumstances to be individually found by a 
unanimous jury verdict.  See Hodges v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 359 n.9 (Fla. 2004); 
Blackwelder v. State, 851 So. 2d 650, 654 (Fla. 2003); Porter v. Crosby, 840 So. 
2d 981, 986 (Fla. 2003).  Moreover, one of the aggravating factors found to exist in 
this case is a prior violent felony, a factor that was determined by a unanimous jury 
and which satisfies the constitutional requirements of Ring.  See Doorbal v. State, 
837 So. 2d 940, 963 (Fla.), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 962 (2003) (noting that prior 
violent conviction aggravator was supported by contemporaneous felonies charged 
in the indictment and of which the jury found the defendant unanimously guilty).  
Therefore, relief on Parker’s Ring claim is denied. 
Issue 3:  Indictment/Aggravating Circumstances 
Parker claims that the failure to allege the aggravating circumstances in the 
indictment renders his sentence unconstitutional under Ring and Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  This Court has consistently rejected this claim.  See 
Porter v. Crosby, 840 So. 2d 981, 986 (Fla. 2003) (rejecting claim that Apprendi 
 
 
- 26 - 
requires that the aggravating circumstances be charged in the indictment, submitted 
to the jury, and individually found by a unanimous jury verdict); Blackwelder v. 
State, 851 So. 2d 650, 654 (Fla. 2003); Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 963 (Fla. 
2003).  Likewise, we deny relief here. 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the order of the trial court solely with respect to the claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on counsel’s handling of the bullet 
evidence and counsel’s presentation of mitigating evidence at the penalty phase 
and remand for an evidentiary hearing on these issues.  We otherwise affirm the 
trial court’s order denying postconviction relief with respect to the other issues 
raised.  We also deny habeas corpus relief. 
It is so ordered. 
WELLS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, J., concur. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
LEWIS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
I concur with regard to reversing the summary denial of relief and ordering 
an evidentiary hearing.  However, I do not agree and dissent with regard to the 
limitation imposed on the guilt phase evidentiary hearing as to any available 
 
 
- 27 - 
evidence concerning the accounting of projectiles discharged from weapons during 
the underlying event and the interaction of such evidence with the changed 
testimony of the medical examiner, which was a very serious alteration of critical 
evidence.  In my view, all of these questions are totally interrelated, and any fair 
analysis should be open for the presentation of all available evidence directed to 
the manner in which counsel addressed this very critical aspect of the case and the 
evidence which may hold the key to guilt or innocence.  Complete consideration of 
the ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be accomplished with the limitation 
imposed that prohibits exploration of the alleged “available evidence” with regard 
to the manipulation of evidence. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, J., concur. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County,  
Leroy H. Moe, Judge - Case No. 89-8897 CF10A 
and an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-South and Dan D. 
Hallenberg, Assistant CCRC, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Leslie T. 
Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent