Title: Commonwealth v. Watt
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12689
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 20, 2019

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SJC-12689 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JERMAINE WATT. 
 
 
 
August 20, 2019. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Costs, Fees and costs, Restitution.  
Restitution.  Imprisonment, Imposition of fees. 
 
 
 
In 2010, Jermaine Watt pleaded guilty to two counts of 
distribution of cocaine.  He was sentenced to concurrent State 
prison terms of from three to five years.  In addition, he paid 
a drug analysis fee of $150, which was imposed pursuant to G. L. 
c. 280, § 6B.  He filed a motion for a new trial, seeking to 
withdraw his guilty plea due to the misconduct of Sonja Farak, a 
chemist at the Department of Public Health's State Laboratory 
Institute in Amherst who analyzed the substances seized in his 
case.  See generally Committee for Public Counsel Servs. v. 
Attorney Gen., 480 Mass. 700 (2018).  That motion was initially 
denied, but ultimately, after the defendant was released at the 
end of his sentence, the indictments were dismissed with 
prejudice on the Commonwealth's motion.  The defendant 
thereafter filed a motion seeking a refund of fees associated 
with the vacated convictions, namely, the drug analysis fee and 
certain fees incurred on the inmate account he was obligated to 
maintain while he was incarcerated.  See G. L. c. 124, § 1 (u); 
103 Code Mass. Regs. § 405.06 (2017).1  A judge in the Superior 
                     
 
1 The statute, G. L. c. 124, § 1 (u), authorizes the 
commissioner of correction to "charge each inmate reasonable 
fees for the maintenance and administration of inmate accounts 
and [to] deduct such fees from each inmate's accounts."  The 
regulation, 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 405.06, provides in relevant 
part: 
 
2 
 
Court denied the motion, and the defendant appeals.  We allowed 
the Commonwealth's application for direct appellate review. 
 
 
The Commonwealth concedes on appeal that the drug analysis 
fee should be refunded under the reasoning of our decision in 
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 480 Mass. 777 (2018), a case we 
decided after the judge denied the defendant's motion.2  That is 
                     
"(1) All inmate funds in the possession of the Department 
of Correction shall be maintained on the Department of 
Correction's [Inmate Management System] Trust Fund 
Accounting Module.  All inmate savings bonds previously 
purchased shall stay in the custody of the institution in 
which the inmate is incarcerated. 
 
"(2) Pursuant to [G. L. c. 124, § 1 (u)], inmates shall be 
assessed reasonable fees for the maintenance and 
administration of inmate accounts.  The Commissioner shall 
establish the amount of the fee assessed.  Fees shall be 
deducted from inmate personal accounts that meet the 
criteria established in 103 [Code Mass. Regs. §] 
405.06(2)(a) and (b). 
 
"(a) A fee shall be assessed if an account has had activity 
during the month to be charged.  Activity shall be defined 
as execution of at least one of the following transactions, 
ML income, VI income, IT income, or EX external 
disbursement. 
 
"(b) A fee shall be assessed for each check for which a 
stop payment request is executed. . . ." 
 
 
As far as we are able to discern, the terms "ML income," 
"VI income," "IT income," and "EX external disbursement," that 
is, the types of transactions that result in fees, are not 
defined anywhere in the regulations.  Moreover, the judge did 
not make any findings as to the meaning of any of these terms or 
as to whether any fees imposed on the defendant's inmate account 
were related to any of these types of transactions.  The 
Commonwealth has provided documents in an effort to explain the 
various types of transactions, but these documents, which were 
not before the judge, do not use the abbreviations listed in the 
regulation. 
 
 
2 The question whether a defendant is entitled to a refund 
of drug analysis fees imposed as a result of a subsequently 
invalidated conviction was not presented in Martinez, and we 
3 
 
an appropriate concession, and, after an independent review of 
the issue, see Commonwealth v. Poirer, 458 Mass. 1014, 1015 
(2010), and cases cited, we agree that the same due process 
principles that underlie our decision in Martinez also require a 
refund of the drug analysis fee.  The sole remaining issue 
before us, therefore, is whether the account fees should be 
refunded, either by statute or under the due process principles 
set forth in Martinez, supra, and Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 
1249 (2017).3  As we shall explain, neither the statute nor due 
process requires that those fees be refunded. 
 
 
Facts.  In ruling on the defendant's motion, the judge did 
not make findings of fact.  We glean the following facts from 
the record before us and from the parties' representations.  
While he was incarcerated, the defendant was required to have an 
inmate account for retention of his funds.  See 103 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 405.06(1).  Pursuant to G. L. c. 124, § 1 (u), and 103 
Code Mass. Regs. § 405.06(2), a monthly maintenance and 
administration fee of one dollar was assessed on his account in 
each month in which certain types of transactions occurred.  The 
Commonwealth represents that such fees are charged when 
correction personnel are needed to process a transaction, such 
as when a visitor brings money to be deposited in an inmate's 
account, but not when a transaction occurs without the need for 
such processing, such as when an inmate earns money from prison 
employment or when an inmate's family member makes a direct 
deposit using the secure deposit system.  The defendant does not 
generally dispute this, but represents that on two occasions, a 
fee was incurred when he was transferred from the house of 
correction to the State prison, a circumstance beyond his 
control.  According to the defendant, the fees totaled thirty-
two dollars over the term of his incarceration.4 
 
 
Statute.  The defendant argues that the account fees must 
be refunded under G. L. c. 278, § 14, which provides: 
 
                     
therefore did not address it at that time.  Commonwealth v. 
Martinez, 480 Mass. 777, 792 (2018). 
 
3 We do not have before us other fees that might be imposed 
after a conviction, such as parole fees, and we therefore do not 
address them. 
 
 
4 The Commonwealth states that the total amount was thirty-
three dollars.  The defendant explains the discrepancy by 
stating that one dollar was charged in error and refunded to 
him. 
4 
 
"No prisoner or person under recognizance, acquitted by 
verdict or discharged because no indictment has been found 
against him, or for want of prosecution, shall be liable 
for any costs or fees or for any charge for subsistence 
while he was in custody." 
 
 
By its terms, the statute applies to three categories of 
people:  those who are "acquitted by verdict," those who are 
"discharged because no indictment has been found," and those who 
are "discharged . . . for want of prosecution."  Each category 
consists of individuals in pretrial status who are eventually 
released without having been found guilty of any offense.  The 
statute does not apply to those who, like the defendant here, 
were convicted of one or more offenses.  We specifically reject 
the defendant's assertion that he is in the third category 
("discharged . . . for want of prosecution") merely because the 
indictments were ultimately dismissed on the Commonwealth's 
motion.  The Commonwealth did in fact prosecute him, he pleaded 
guilty, and the account fees were incurred while he served his 
term.  As the defendant was not in pretrial status when the fees 
were incurred, G. L. c. 278, § 14, does not apply to him. 
 
 
Due process.  The defendant next argues that the account 
fees must be refunded to him under the due process principles 
set forth in the Martinez and Nelson decisions.  As we explained 
in Martinez, "the State is obligated under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to refund monies where three 
elements are satisfied: (1) the monies were 'exacted from the 
defendant' upon conviction and as a consequence of the 
conviction; (2) the amounts 'exacted' were actually paid by the 
defendant; and (3) the conviction has been 'invalidated by a 
reviewing court and no retrial will occur.'"  Martinez, 480 
Mass. at 784-785, quoting Nelson, 137 S. Ct. at 1252.  At issue 
here is the first element, that is, whether the maintenance and 
administration fees for his prison account were "'exacted from 
the defendant' upon conviction and as a consequence of the 
conviction."5  "The overriding principle is that where a 
defendant has been ordered to make a payment because of a 
conviction, the invalidation of that conviction erases the 
State's claim to that payment, and any amount paid must be 
restored to the defendant as a matter of due process" (emphasis 
added).  Martinez, supra at 785.  We thus determined in Martinez 
                     
 
5 The Commonwealth does not dispute the remaining elements 
of Martinez and Nelson, namely, that the defendant actually paid 
the fees, that his conviction has been invalidated by a 
reviewing court, and that no retrial will occur. 
5 
 
that probation fees ordered under G. L. c. 276, § 87A, victim-
witness assessments ordered under G. L. c. 258B, § 8, and fines 
and surfines paid as part of a sentence must be refunded to the 
extent they were paid solely as a consequence of invalidated 
convictions.  Martinez, supra at 785-787, 790.  We also 
recognized the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in 
Nelson that "[d]ue process requires the refund of restitution 
paid as a consequence of an invalidated conviction," Martinez, 
supra at 787, citing Nelson, supra at 1252, while observing that 
differences between the Colorado law at issue in Nelson and 
Massachusetts law, as well as the difficulties involved in 
obtaining a refund from the victim to whom restitution was paid, 
would raise complex issues.  Martinez, supra at 787-790.  Not 
all fees imposed on defendants must be refunded, however.  For 
example, we rejected a defendant's claim for a refund of money 
civilly forfeited pursuant to G. L. c. 94C, § 47, at a plea 
hearing, as forfeiture was a separate civil proceeding outside 
the scope of the criminal matter, and we stated that court costs 
were ordinarily not refundable, as G. L. c. 280, § 6, prohibits 
their imposition as a penalty for a crime.  Martinez, supra at 
790-792. 
 
 
Under the principles set forth in Martinez and Nelson, the 
defendant is not entitled to a refund of the account maintenance 
and administration fees.  Unlike probation fees, victim-witness 
assessments, restitution, and fines paid as penalties, the fees 
at issue here were not ordered solely as a consequence of the 
defendant's convictions, but withdrawn from his inmate account 
in connection with certain financial transactions.  They cannot 
fairly be said to be part of the penalty imposed by the court as 
a punishment for the offenses of which the defendant was 
convicted.  Moreover, like monies that are subject to civil 
forfeiture, the fees were imposed by a process outside the scope 
of the criminal proceeding.  We conclude that these fees were 
not exacted from the defendant upon conviction and solely as a 
consequence of his convictions.  The defendant is therefore not 
entitled to have them refunded. 
 
 
Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's motion for a 
refund of fees is reversed to the extent that the order denied a 
refund of the drug analysis fee.  In all other respects, it is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
6 
 
 
Rebecca A. Jacobstein, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, for the defendant. 
 
David L. Sheppard-Brick, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth.