Title: P. v. Lancaster
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S073596
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: May 24, 2007

Filed 5/24/07 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S073596 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
ANDREW LANCASTER, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BA131909 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
A jury sentenced defendant Andrew Lancaster to death, after finding him 
guilty of first degree murder and kidnapping for purposes of extortion.  The jury 
found true the special circumstance allegation that the murder was committed 
during the commission of a kidnapping, and also found that defendant  personally 
used a firearm.  This appeal is automatic. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
A.  Guilt Phase 
 
The victim, Michael Taylor, was a former reporter and producer for radio 
station KPFK in Los Angeles.  After leaving KPFK, he planned to start an 
unlicensed microwave radio station along with Robert Marston and Tyrone Floyd 
(who were also former KPFK employees).  In January 1996, Taylor told Marston 
and Floyd that he had found a financial backer named Mzee Shambulia.  Marston 
ordered equipment for assembling a transmitter, an amplifier, and an antenna.  He 
used his own money, having received no funding from Shambulia.  The parts for 
the amplifier did not arrive until mid-April. 
 
2
 
Defendant, who went by the name “Hodari Lumumba,” was an associate of 
Shambulia.  He attended several meetings between Shambulia and Taylor’s group 
in early 1996.  At one of those meetings, Shambulia pulled Marston aside and 
asked him if the equipment was going to be delivered on time.  Marston told him 
that he was having some trouble, but could arrange for a loan of equipment if 
necessary.  Shortly after this meeting, Taylor called Marston and referred to a 
$2,000 payment he thought Shambulia had given to Marston to buy equipment.  
Marston had not received that payment, and he expressed a “high degree of 
anxiety” to Taylor.  Taylor assured him he would correct the situation, and in a 
subsequent phone call said he was seeking alternative financing. 
 
Marston and Taylor became more concerned when Shambulia showed 
Taylor a site for installing the station’s equipment that Taylor considered a “phony 
location.”  After that, Marston decided not to deliver any equipment to 
Shambulia’s group.  Taylor and Floyd were also troubled by Shambulia’s plan to 
sell commercial air time on the station.  Taylor and Floyd were contemplating a 
“people’s radio station” funded by donations.  They wrote Shambulia what Floyd 
described as “basically . . . a Dear John letter saying we [were] going to keep the 
microwave station, that we had the transmitter and we were going to start our own 
station and they were welcome to do whatever . . . .” 
 
At some point, Shambulia did give Marston a money order for $220.  
Marston returned the money order by registered mail on Friday, April 19.  Taylor 
then received a phone call informing him that Shambulia was extremely angry.  
On April 21, Taylor told Marston that defendant had telephoned, saying to tell 
Marston that “if they don’t get their equipment, things are going to get rough.” 
The same day, Taylor told Floyd that defendant had “stated that if he didn’t get the 
transmitter back, that it would get nasty.” 
 
Floyd testified that Taylor was quite frightened after defendant’s warning.  
On the afternoon of April 21, Taylor and Floyd went to a party together.  Floyd 
noted at one point that Taylor was so nervous he was shaking.  The next day, 
 
3
Floyd spoke with Taylor twice about their plans for the station.  During the first 
call, around 8:00 p.m., Taylor was excited about the project.  Around midnight, 
however, Floyd received a call from Taylor that he described as “very strange.”  
Taylor asked him to call some social activists in Philadelphia.  Floyd was puzzled, 
both because it was odd for Taylor to call that late and because his request to call 
people in Philadelphia made no sense.  Floyd said Taylor’s demeanor was unusual, 
and different from their earlier conversation. 
 
Floyd and Taylor were to meet the next morning, but Floyd was unable to 
reach Taylor by telephone.  He went to see Taylor, and noticed his car was gone.  
He called and paged Taylor repeatedly.  In the evening, he got a call from 
someone who hung up when he answered.  Floyd called back using the “star 69” 
function.  The person who answered said they had heard Floyd was trying to start 
a radio station, and offered to come to his house with a $3,000 donation.  Floyd 
refused to disclose where he lived, but agreed to meet the person at a coffee shop.  
When he arrived, Floyd recognized defendant’s car parked on the street, and saw a 
man wearing a baseball cap sitting in the car. 
 
Floyd went to the front of the coffee shop and made a telephone call.  When 
he hung up and turned around, defendant was standing a foot or two away, 
wearing a baseball cap.  Defendant looked from side to side and moved his index 
finger back and forth near his belt, where Floyd saw a bulge that appeared to be a 
gun.  Floyd asked defendant when he had last seen Taylor.  Defendant “froze” and 
said he had seen him that day at a homeless center.  Floyd left quickly and moved 
his family to a safe place.  The next day, he filed a missing person report for 
Taylor.  Shortly thereafter, he learned that Taylor had been killed. 
 
The events immediately preceding the murder were related primarily 
through the testimony of defendant’s accomplices, Shawn Alexander and Jornay 
Rodriguez.1  Alexander was 19 years old in April 1996.  He became friends with 
                                              
 
1  Alexander and Rodriguez were originally charged as codefendants.  
Before trial, Alexander pleaded guilty to manslaughter and accepted an offer of a 
 
4
defendant in 1996, and visited Taylor’s house several times with him.  On April 
21, defendant told Alexander that Shambulia was going to pay defendant to kill 
Taylor.  Alexander would get $1,000 for helping.  Nevertheless, the next day when 
defendant asked him to help pick up some stereo equipment from Taylor, 
Alexander said that he thought he would only be loading the equipment into 
defendant’s car.  Defendant, Rodriguez, and Alexander went together to see 
Taylor.  Alexander had known Rodriguez for a long time, and had introduced him 
to defendant.  
 
Taylor was not home when they arrived.  When they returned around 
midnight, Alexander remained in defendant’s car while Rodriguez and defendant 
went inside.  They came back with Taylor in 10 or 15 minutes.  Defendant had a 
gun, which Alexander described as a 9-millimeter.  Rodriguez and Taylor got into 
Taylor’s car, while defendant returned to his own car.  Defendant told Alexander 
they would follow Taylor, and that Taylor “was going down that night.”  
Defendant followed Taylor’s car to a secluded area near some train tracks. 
 
When they arrived, defendant told Alexander they would be “paid for this.”  
Defendant took a rope, a container of liquid, and duct tape from his trunk; he also 
had his gun.  The four men walked to a spot near the tracks, and defendant asked 
Taylor where the equipment was.  Taylor did not reply.  Defendant asked another 
question, and angrily pushed Taylor to the ground.  After making another inquiry, 
defendant threw liquid from the container onto Taylor’s face.  Taylor shook his 
head, as if his eyes were burning.  Defendant told Alexander to tape Taylor’s 
mouth.  Alexander tried, but the tape slipped.  After looking at Taylor’s face, 
Alexander said he could not do it.  Rodriguez tied Taylor up.  Defendant had his 
gun drawn; Alexander did not see Rodriguez with a gun. 
                                                                                                                                      
 
15-year prison term in exchange for his testimony.  Rodriguez pleaded guilty to 
first degree murder, and understood he was to be sentenced to a term of 25 years 
to life. 
 
5
 
Defendant told Alexander to check Taylor’s pockets.  Alexander took a 
pager, a pack of cigarettes, and a lighter from Taylor.  Defendant told Taylor he 
would ask one last time where the equipment was.  When Taylor said that Floyd 
had it, defendant responded, “you lied to me.”  He then gave his car keys to 
Alexander and Taylor’s keys to Rodriguez, and told them to meet him at his 
house, which was nearby.  As Alexander walked away, he heard several gunshots.  
He turned and saw defendant holding the gun. 
 
Alexander went to defendant’s house, and defendant drove him home.  
Alexander asked why defendant shot Taylor.  Defendant said only that Taylor had 
tried to get up, and he shot him in the head and chest.  Alexander kept Taylor’s 
pager.  Several days later, defendant inquired about it, and Alexander told him he 
had been “cutting off the number” when he received pages.  Defendant said that 
was a stupid thing to do, because he needed some information.  He told Alexander 
he was going to call the numbers on the pager. 
 
Rodriguez was about 20 years old on April 22, 1996.  He had known 
defendant for less than a month.  He did not know why they were visiting Taylor, 
whom he had never met, but he went with defendant into Taylor’s house.  
Rodriguez did not recall the initial conversation, but said that eventually defendant 
raised his shirt, exposing a 9-millimeter gun, and told Taylor, “we’re going to take 
a little ride.”  Taylor was speaking on the telephone at that point.  After Taylor 
hung up, defendant demanded to know where “the radio equipment” was.  Taylor 
said nothing, and left the house with Rodriguez and defendant walking behind 
him. 
 
One of Taylor’s housemates testified that as she left her room on the night 
of April 22, 1996, she saw Taylor on the phone in his room with two men facing 
him.  She waved to him, but he did not respond, which was unusual.  She was 
downstairs when the three men left the house.  She saw them go out together and 
heard Taylor’s car driving away. 
 
6
 
Rodriguez testified that defendant told him and Taylor to get into Taylor’s 
car, and instructed Taylor where to drive.  Defendant went back to his car.  
Rodriguez pointed a .25 caliber automatic handgun as Taylor drove.  When they 
reached their destination, Rodriguez put his gun away.  Defendant had his gun out, 
and pushed Taylor toward a mound of dirt.  Defendant was asking about the radio 
equipment.  Taylor was saying, “let’s talk about this . . . we don’t need to do this.”  
Defendant splashed some liquid into Taylor’s face.  Rodriguez gagged Taylor with 
duct tape, and bound his hands and legs.  After Rodriguez took Taylor’s keys, he 
and Alexander walked away.  Rodriguez heard two or three gunshots, then drove 
away in Taylor’s car. 
 
A day later, Rodriguez met defendant at Alexander’s house; they did not 
discuss the killing.  Subsequently, the three met with Shambulia.  Defendant told 
Shambulia what had happened to Taylor, saying “it was about the radio 
equipment.”  On another occasion, defendant went to Shambulia’s house and 
returned with a check, saying “I got the money.”  Rodriguez understood the 
payment was for killing Taylor, but he did not know how much the check was for.  
Rodriguez was never given any money, though defendant had promised to pay 
him. 
 
At 12:35 on the morning of April 23, 1996, Los Angeles police officers 
arrived at the crime scene.  A witness who had heard gunshots directed them to the 
body.  Taylor’s hands and legs were bound, and there was duct tape around the 
neck.  An open bottle of Liquid-Plumr lay nearby; it appeared new and still 
contained some liquid.  Taylor’s black T-shirt had white stains on the chest and 
upper back, consistent with the damage that Liquid-Plumr would cause.  Three 
fingerprints and a palm print were lifted from the bottle and matched to defendant. 
 
Four 9-millimeter casings were found near the body, and three 9-millimeter 
slugs were recovered.  All were fired from the same weapon.  Taylor sustained 
gunshot wounds to the face, neck, shoulder, and chest. 
 
Defendant presented no evidence at the guilt phase. 
 
7
 
B.  Penalty Phase 
 
Taylor’s mother, two brothers, and daughter testified about the impact of 
his murder on them and other family members. 
 
The prosecutor introduced evidence of two other crimes committed by 
defendant.  In 1986, when he was 14 years old, he raped a 9-year-old girl in 
Maryland.  The victim testified that defendant pulled her from her bicycle and 
forced her into the back of a van, where, with the assistance of an older 
accomplice, he tried to force her to orally copulate him.  He beat her, raped her, 
and threatened to kill her if she told anyone.  The victim said she was “torn my 
whole life” as a result of this incident, and had avoided sex altogether.  In 1992, 
defendant and another man conducted a home invasion robbery, leaving the 
terrified victim bound, gagged, and tied to her mattress. 
 
The jury also heard about two incidents occurring while defendant was in 
custody after his arrest for Taylor’s murder.  In December 1997, a sheriff’s deputy 
handcuffed and searched defendant when he refused to return to his cell.  A 
makeshift knife or “shank” was found in his pocket.2  Defendant told the deputy 
he had been caught with a shank on three other occasions, but the resulting 
charges were dismissed each time.  In May 1998, another deputy discovered three 
jail-made handcuff keys, fashioned from small pieces of metal, in defendant’s cell. 
 
The defense presented testimony from a clinical and forensic psychologist, 
Dr. Richard Romanoff.  Dr. Romanoff had reviewed defendant’s penal and 
medical records, met with him several times, and conducted various tests.  He 
concluded that defendant has an antisocial personality, characterized by a 
predisposition toward criminal behavior, deceitfulness, impulsivity, 
aggressiveness, recklessness, and lack of remorse.  Defendant’s personality 
disorder might have a genetic component, and related problems began in his 
childhood, which was characterized by domestic violence and failure to bond with 
                                              
 
2   Hereafter, we adopt the terminology used by the parties and refer to this 
implement as a shank. 
 
8
his parents.  He had never received proper intervention; at one point he was part of 
a National Institute of Health drug treatment program, but Dr. Romanoff 
characterized that experience as “mostly being a guinea pig.”  The doctor believed 
that although defendant’s disorder was difficult to treat, it could be overcome 
through self-motivation.  Defendant’s current involvement with Islam was the 
most likely source of an eventual recovery, in Dr. Romanoff’s opinion. 
 
Reverend Richard Byrd was a minister who had a weekly radio program at 
KPFK.  He knew both Taylor and defendant.  He had spoken with defendant 
“fairly often” about spiritual matters, and said defendant had been conscientiously 
trying to transform his life.  He viewed defendant and Taylor as “co-activists,” and 
was shocked to learn that defendant was implicated in Taylor’s murder.  He had 
never seen defendant behave inappropriately. 
 
Omar Rashad, an imam at a Los Angeles mosque, became acquainted with 
defendant while visiting the jail, and helped  him “with his growth and 
development in the religion of Islam.”  Defendant demonstrated a sincere 
commitment to Islam, asking serious questions and responding to counseling.  The 
imam was unaware of any acts of violence by defendant. 
 
Defendant testified, accusing the witnesses against him of lying.  He did not 
trust attorneys or psychiatrists.  He said he would not ask the jury to spare his life 
because only God can give life.  Defendant disparaged Dr. Romanoff’s testimony, 
telling the jury, “this antisocial syndrome bull stuff, don’t fall for that.”  He 
professed his innocence, claiming it was Shambulia who had a confrontation with 
Taylor.  Defendant said their differences were over politics, and had nothing to do 
with himself or the radio station.  On cross-examination, defendant admitted 
telling Taylor that “things would get rough” if Shambulia did not get his 
equipment, but claimed he was merely passing along a message from Shambulia.  
The prosecutor questioned defendant at length about statements he gave to the 
police. 
 
 
9
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
A.  Pretrial Issues 
 
 
1.  Defendant’s Legal Representation 
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by undermining his effort to 
represent himself, denying his request to appoint an attorney of his choice, and 
denying that attorney’s motion for the appointment of second counsel.  His claims 
require a discussion of the underlying circumstances at some length. 
 
 
 
a.  Background 
 
On May 23, 1996, defendant appeared in municipal court to enter a plea 
and set his preliminary hearing.  Although accompanied by a public defender, 
defendant asked to represent himself.  The court granted the request after warning 
him about the disadvantages of self-representation, as required by Faretta v. 
California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 835 (Faretta). 
 
At the outset of a hearing on June 6, defendant reaffirmed his desire to 
represent himself.  Later in the hearing, however, he moved for the appointment of 
counsel.  When the court told him “you can’t have it both ways,” defendant asked 
for an in camera hearing, but the court continued the matter.  At a hearing on June 
13, defendant requested the appointment of Rowan Klein as his cocounsel.  The 
court denied the motion without prejudice, explaining that defendant had not made 
a sufficient showing for the appointment.  The court did appoint an investigator 
and legal runner.  On June 25, defendant appeared in court and declared, “I want 
to keep my pro per status.”  The preliminary hearing was set for July 23. 
 
At a hearing on July 1, 1996, defendant was present when the district 
attorney made a record of the discovery she had provided to him.  On July 23, 
defendant appeared for the preliminary hearing with Attorney Michael Artan.  
Artan told the court that defendant did not feel competent to go forward and 
wanted Artan to represent him, but had not paid Artan.  The court noted that 
defendant had repeatedly expressed his desire to represent himself, and never 
indicated he would be unable to proceed.  Defendant told the court, “I feel very 
 
10
uncomfortable right now, and I’m not prepared to proceed today.”  He also said he 
had not received full discovery.  The prosecutor responded that defendant had 
received all discovery pertaining to Floyd, the witness who was appearing that 
day.  The hearing went forward, with defendant representing himself. 
 
Defendant was arraigned in superior court on August 6, 1996.  Artan 
appeared and was permitted to assist defendant with the arraignment.  The court 
gave defendant the forms he needed to complete to proceed in propria persona, 
and set a hearing for August 9 to resolve the question of Artan’s status.  At that 
hearing, defendant told the court he needed an attorney but had a conflict with the 
public defender’s office.  Defendant felt his public defender had been 
incompetent, overworked, and disrespectful.  Even if another public defender were 
appointed, defendant believed “I couldn’t get justice with that.”  He had not hired 
Artan, and could not afford to.  He requested appointed counsel. 
 
The court explained that it was required to appoint the public defender, who 
would then determine whether there was a conflict.  Artan said he did not believe 
the public defender’s office had conducted a conflict check, but he suspected there 
was a conflict.  Artan had met with defendant approximately 10 times, spent about 
50 hours on his case, and believed they had developed a level of trust.  Defendant 
had asked Artan to seek appointment as defense counsel.  Artan conceded he was 
not on the panel of qualified capital defense attorneys.  However, he said he met 
some of the criteria and suggested the court had discretion to appoint him.  He 
recommended that the court have the public defender do a conflict check, then 
consider appointing him upon a written application. 
 
The court said it would entertain such a motion, but noted that Artan’s 
appointment was problematic because he was not on the qualified panel, and 
because the public defender could not do a conflict check unless defendant 
permitted the public defender to be appointed.  The court asked whether defendant 
would give up his right to represent himself.  After conferring with Artan, 
defendant said that if it was “not appropriate right now” for Artan to be appointed, 
 
11
he wanted to remain in propria persona.  The court reviewed the forms submitted 
by defendant and gave him Faretta warnings. 
 
Artan told the court he would do what he could to ascertain whether the 
public defender’s office had a conflict.  The court approved, but noted again that 
Artan’s chances of appointment were poor because he was not on the qualified 
panel.  The court also explained to defendant that standby counsel would be 
appointed, for the sole purpose of taking over “if something happens to your pro 
per status.”  Standby counsel would not interfere with defendant’s handling of the 
case, though defendant could request consultation and “it will be up to the trial 
judge of your case to determine with you how you want the standby counsel to 
relate to your case.”  Defendant said he understood. 
 
On September 10, Ron Rothman appeared with defendant as appointed 
standby and advisory counsel.  Rothman said he expected defendant to abandon 
self-representation and accept him as his attorney, but said he would like 
defendant to remain in propria persona “temporarily,” because it was “enabling me 
to establish a rapport with him.”  Rothman had visited defendant several times in 
jail.  He asked for “a full set of discovery.”  The prosecutor expressed concern 
whether she would be dealing with Rothman or defendant, and noted that 
defendant had already wavered on the question of his legal representation.  She 
said her office had not yet decided whether to seek the death penalty, and 
suggested waiting to decide the discovery issue until that question, and Rothman’s 
status as counsel, were resolved.  The court pointed out that even standby counsel 
would need discovery.  Defendant agreed that for the time being, the prosecutor 
could turn over discovery materials to Rothman. 
 
At a trial-setting conference on October 16, Rothman appeared as standby 
and advisory counsel.  Defendant reaffirmed his desire to represent himself.  The 
prosecutor reported that no decision regarding penalty had been reached, and 
repeated her concern about the uncertainty over defendant’s representation.  On 
November 26, the prosecutor announced that she would seek the death penalty.  
 
12
Rothman was present, but defendant told the court he had found another attorney 
to act as advisory and standby counsel.  The court informed him that he could not 
“just substitute someone else in.”  Defendant then said that he had privately 
retained Artan to “take over this case,” and assured the court that Artan’s fee had 
“all been taken care of.”  Artan came late to the hearing, and told the court that he 
had not been paid, but was nevertheless “on the case.”  The court relieved 
defendant and Rothman of their status as counsel.  Rothman agreed to turn over all 
case materials to Artan. 
 
Artan appeared for pretrial hearings in December 1996 and February, April, 
and May 1997.  On May 29, the court indicated it wanted to begin trial in August.  
Artan was concerned about his readiness.  He explained that he had been in trial, 
was a sole practitioner, and was still receiving discovery from the prosecutor.  The 
court warned that trial could not be delayed for counsel, and that Artan could be 
relieved if he were unable to prepare.  Artan thought he could be ready in 
September.  He noted that although he was retained, he was not being paid. 
 
On July 7, Artan again expressed reservations about his preparation, even 
for a trial in September.  He had other cases that were scheduled for trial soon, and 
conceded that if he were being paid he might not have taken them.  He mentioned 
the possibility of appointing cocounsel.  The court was not receptive to that idea 
and said it was inclined to relieve Artan.  Defendant objected, saying he and Artan 
had a good relationship.  He felt he could not receive a fair trial with an attorney 
appointed from the qualified panel.  The court accommodated defendant’s desire 
for Artan to remain as counsel, and set September 22 as the trial date. 
 
On August 29, it was evident that Artan’s problems with preparation 
persisted.  He had filed an application for the appointment of second counsel, 
which would be heard by another judge.  The court suggested it was unlikely the 
application would be granted, and again mentioned the possibility of replacing 
Artan. 
 
13
 
In the application for appointment of cocounsel, Artan declared that 
defendant was indigent, Artan was a sole practitioner with four cases set for trial 
before defendant’s, substantial work remained on defendant’s case, and this was 
Artan’s first capital case, necessitating extra preparation time.  Artan noted that 
appointment of second counsel was authorized by Keenan v. Superior Court 
(1982) 31 Cal.3d 424.  He argued that an unusual circumstance justified his 
application.  Because he was not being compensated by public funds, the county 
would be paying no more than it would for a single appointed counsel. 
 
The court denied the application on September 8, ruling that Artan had 
failed to provide any specific or compelling justification.  The court stated that the 
application raised questions regarding Artan’s ability to handle defendant’s case, 
given his other commitments and inexperience.  It directed Artan to bring these 
concerns to the trial court’s attention. 
 
 On September 17, 1997, Artan told the trial court he would seek 
reconsideration of his application.  In that motion, Artan argued that the case was a 
complex one.  He noted that the prosecution intended to present evidence of four 
felonies in Maryland, which had occurred in 1986 and 1987, and that defendant’s 
prison records reflected psychological conditions that “may require motion 
practice.”  Artan also suggested that his inability to handle the case alone was 
itself a compelling justification for additional counsel.  On September 22, Artan 
told the court he anticipated seeking writ relief if his motion failed.  The court told 
Artan that if he was unsuccessful, he would be relieved. 
 
The motion for reconsideration was denied on October 9.  The court found 
that defendant’s case was not “complex or voluminous,” and concluded that 
Artan’s busy schedule and inexperience were not grounds for the appointment of 
second counsel.  The Court of Appeal denied Artan’s writ petition challenging the 
court’s ruling. 
  
On November 26, Artan informed the trial court that he would have to 
withdraw, and that defendant hoped to have someone appointed in his place.  The 
 
14
court allowed Artan to withdraw but asked him to remain on the case until 
successor counsel could be appointed.  The court also told defendant it would 
investigate his claim that his legal materials had been confiscated in jail.  On 
December 1, the court reappointed the public defender. 
 
On December 3, the public defender reported that his office had not yet 
completed a conflict check.  Defendant was unhappy with the public defender’s 
appointment, expressed a desire “to hurry up and get this case to trial so I can get 
it over with,” and again asked to represent himself.  The court advised defendant 
to wait for the result of the conflict check.  Defendant was concerned that even if 
alternate counsel were appointed, he might not be able to work with that attorney, 
and said he would prefer to “put my life in my own hands.”  When asked if he 
wanted to represent himself even if he received appointed counsel, defendant said 
yes.  The court granted his request, again giving him Faretta warnings.  Defendant 
complained about his missing legal materials; the court assured him that they 
would be returned.  The court directed Artan to return his discovery materials to 
the prosecutor so she could itemize what she would be turning over to defendant. 
 
On December 17, Ron Rothman appeared as standby counsel.  Defendant’s 
in propria persona privileges in jail had been revoked after he was found with a 
shank.  Defendant asked for temporary suspension of his in propria persona status 
so that Rothman could represent him for a hearing on the shank incident.  The 
court agreed.  Defendant conceded his possession of the shank, contesting only the 
restrictions on his privileges.  A deputy from the jail explained that defendant 
could not visit the library and his movements in jail would be restricted, but he 
could meet with advisory counsel and a licensed investigator.  He could see 
witnesses during regular visiting hours, and would have limited telephone access. 
 
Defendant said he was concerned not so much with the telephone as with 
the ability to keep his legal materials private; he also complained that he still had 
not received all the confiscated material and was concerned that their contents 
might become known.  The court told defendant that any jailhouse informants who 
 
15
had invaded his privacy would not be allowed to testify.  It refused to interfere 
with the jail’s security measures, but obtained the deputy’s assurance that 
defendant would have access to his legal materials.  The court agreed to appoint a 
legal runner, order telephone access, and direct the return of defendant’s legal 
materials. 
 
On January 8, 1998, defendant appeared and reconfirmed his desire to 
proceed in propria persona with Rothman as standby counsel.  Rothman said that 
defendant had led him to believe that he would turn over the defense to Rothman.  
Rothman had prepared motions, but could not present them now that defendant 
had kept him on standby status.  Rothman also explained that Artan’s attempt to 
return the case materials to the district attorney had been unsuccessful due to a 
delivery problem.  Rothman agreed with the court’s suggestion that he follow up 
personally with Artan. 
 
Defendant moved for sanctions based on the continued failure to return his 
legal materials.  The court told defendant that problems with lost materials in jail 
were not unusual, and promised to do what it could to have his returned, or to 
“regenerate” them to the extent possible.  Defendant noted that the jail had placed 
him with other in propria persona inmates, but he was still not allowed to go to the 
law library.  He asked to be placed in a special module where he would be 
searched going in and coming out, to resolve the security problem.  The court 
noted defendant’s failure to make this request at the last hearing when 
representatives from the jail were present.  It declined to revisit the question of his 
jail privileges.  It also reminded defendant of its previous admonitions on the 
disadvantages of self-representation, including the limitations that his custody 
status would impose. 
 
On January 22, defendant reported that all his materials had been returned, 
and dropped his sanctions motion.  Defendant then told the court:  “Your Honor, I 
would desire to give up my pro per status and have Mr. Rothman represent me.”  
The court expressed some uncertainty over whether Rothman could properly do 
 
16
so, because the last time defendant relinquished self-representation the master 
calendar court had reappointed the public defender.  However, the court ultimately 
agreed to Rothman’s appointment, observing that the case needed to “move 
faster.”  It warned defendant that he could not keep alternating between self-
representation and appointed counsel.  Defendant replied that he understood. 
 
 
 
b.  Faretta Claims 
 
Defendant contends his rights to due process and self-representation under 
the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution were 
violated when the trial court “compelled” him to relinquish his in propria persona 
status by (1) permitting the jail authorities to confiscate his legal materials; (2) 
permitting the prosecutor and defense counsel to withhold discovery; (3) 
improperly overruling objections and restricting defendant’s questioning at the 
preliminary hearing; (4) denying him access to the law library, telephone, 
witnesses, and special jail housing; (5) denying him the effective assistance of 
advisory counsel; and (6) disparaging his decision to represent himself. 
 
Because defendant never made this claim below, it is questionable whether 
he may properly raise it now.  (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 999-
1000.)  In any event, the claim is meritless.  The record reflects no compelled 
abandonment of self-representation.  Defendant relinquished his right to self-
representation without prompting from the court, just after the jail authorities 
returned his legal materials. 
 
Defendant’s claims of incomplete discovery are groundless.  He refers to 
matters withheld by the prosecutor in advance of the preliminary hearing.  At a 
July 16, 1996 hearing held in defendant’s absence, the prosecutor explained that 
she had not turned over witness names and addresses.  She had also withheld tapes 
and statements by Alexander and Rodriguez implicating defendant.  Although they 
were housed separately from defendant, she was concerned about retaliation by 
other members of Shambulia’s organization.  The court found good cause for 
withholding this material, under Penal Code section 1057.  Defendant does not 
 
17
challenge the propriety of that finding.  Defendant also complains of the delay in 
obtaining discovery material from Artan after he withdrew.  However, the court 
consistently sought  to make practical arrangements for the return of that material.3   
 
Defendant refers in passing to evidentiary rulings at the preliminary 
hearing.  However, he offers no legal argument regarding these rulings.  If any 
were improper, he fails to explain how they might have affected his right to 
represent himself. 
 
After defendant lost his law library privileges because of his possession of a 
weapon, the court ensured that he had advisory counsel and a legal runner.  He 
was granted access to witnesses, the services of an investigator,4 and a telephone.  
Regarding his housing assignment, the court properly deferred to the jail 
authorities on security matters, while providing alternate means for legal research 
and investigation.  These measures sufficiently protected his opportunity to 
prepare a defense.  (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 733-734; People v. 
Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1001.) 
 
Defendant’s claim that he was deprived of Rothman’s effective assistance 
as advisory counsel is based partly on the fact that Rothman did not have the  
discovery materials during the two months between Artan’s withdrawal and 
defendant’s abandonment of self-representation.  We have discussed the discovery 
situation above.  In any event, defendant points to no impact on Rothman’s ability 
                                              
 
3  Rothman offered two explanations for the delay.  Artan had told Rothman 
that he sent the discovery material to the prosecutor, but FedEx returned it because 
they could not locate her.  Rothman also told the court he believed Artan thought 
some of the material was privileged.  The court noted that the material could not 
be given directly to defendant, without first allowing the prosecutor to delete the 
names and addresses of certain witnesses.  Defendant, while he was representing 
himself, recognized that such redaction was proper.  The prosecutor had agreed to 
perform the necessary review once she received the material from Artan. 
 
4  Defendant complains that there is no record of any bills showing an 
investigator actually worked on his case.  However, there is also no showing that 
defendant directed an investigator to do anything.  The record is clear that the 
court was consistently willing to provide defendant with the services of an 
investigator. 
 
18
to provide advice.  Defendant also relies on Rothman’s January 8, 1998 comment 
that he had prepared motions in the expectation that defendant would relinquish 
his own representation, but was unable to present them because defendant wanted 
to continue with Rothman as advisory counsel.  This circumstance in no way 
supports defendant’s claim that he was deprived of the effective assistance of 
advisory counsel. 
 
Defendant accuses the court of disparaging his right to represent himself.  
However, several of the remarks defendant complains about were part of the 
warnings required by Faretta.  (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835; People v. Blair, 
supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 708.)  The others, with one minor exception, were entirely 
proper under the circumstances of this case.  Defendant finds two admonitions 
particularly objectionable.  On January 8, 1998, when defendant complained about 
the restriction of his library privileges, the court said:  “Again, your status is kind 
of a questionable one.  It was made clear to you at the time [when the restrictions 
were imposed] the limitations you would face as a pro per in the jail, and that’s 
why I suggested and strongly do suggest that you accept appointed counsel to let 
that counsel act for you.  That’s the best way to do it. 
 
“Even if you were a trained attorney, you’d be a fool to represent yourself 
because you’re emotionally involved in the issues.  And what you’ve got at your 
side is an experienced attorney that can do an excellent job for you, but it is your 
choice under the Constitution.” 
 
These comments were appropriate.  The court had a duty to remind 
defendant of the “dangers and disadvantages of self-representation” (People v. 
Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 708), and it tailored that advice to defendant’s 
current situation.  The court expressly recognized defendant’s constitutional right 
to conduct his own defense.  Defendant inaccurately describes the court’s 
comments as suggesting that his Faretta right could be revoked based on his 
misconduct in jail.  The court said nothing about revocation; it merely noted that 
defendant’s status in jail entailed some practical limitations. 
 
19
 
On January 22, 1998, after defendant relinquished his Faretta right and 
accepted Rothman’s representation, the court stated:  “I do need to advise Mr. 
Lancaster that you cannot continue to change between representing yourself and 
having appointed counsel represent you.  The reason for it is that we’ve got to 
move forward, and that doesn’t allow us to do that. 
 
“I think it’s a very wise move on your part, as I said.  Even if you were a 
trained attorney, you still don’t have access to the same evidence that Mr. 
Rothman would have . . . .  But having originally had an attorney, gone pro per, 
had an attorney, gone pro per, now you’re back to an attorney, I can’t let you 
continue to change from one to the other.  It has to be a permanent decision on 
your part. 
 
“Even if at some point you have some disagreement with what Mr. 
Rothman is doing, you can’t just say now I’m back pro per.  That’s a decision for 
the court to make, and it probably would not be in your favor.” 
 
Defendant mischaracterizes these comments as a “preemptive denial” of his 
Faretta right, and fundamental error under People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213.    
Under the circumstances, including the court’s protracted grappling with the 
logistics of providing defendant with discovery materials and access to legal 
resources, the court’s concern with his repeated alternation between self-
representation and the services of counsel was warranted.  A defendant’s “prior 
proclivity to substitute counsel” is a legitimate factor for the court to consider in 
connection with an assertion of the right to self-representation.  (People v. Roldan 
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 684; People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 128.)  The 
court’s reference to the need for a “permanent decision” was, however, 
precipitous.  Trial was not imminent, and a renewed and timely Faretta motion 
would have been entitled to the court’s full consideration.  (See People v. Dent, 
supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 221-222.)  Nevertheless, the court did not entirely 
foreclose the possibility of defendant’s future self-representation; it told him it 
 
20
would make a decision on any renewed application, though the request would 
probably not be viewed with favor. 
 
In Dent, the court erred by unequivocally ruling out the possibility of self-
representation.  (People v. Dent, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 219.)  Nothing of the sort 
occurred here.  The court never denied a Faretta motion.  Defendant exercised and 
abandoned his Faretta right several times.  He gave no indication his ultimate 
decision to accept Rothman’s representation was influenced by anything the court 
had said or done.  The record amply demonstrates the difficulties posed by 
defendant’s intermittent assumptions of his own defense.  The court’s attempt to 
discourage defendant from perpetuating those difficulties is understandable.  
While the court should not have warned defendant that he needed to make “a 
permanent decision” at that point, the impropriety was slight and caused neither 
fundamental nor prejudicial error. 
 
No authority cited by defendant supports his claim of  interference with the 
right of self-representation.  The cases on which he relies involved either outright 
denial of the right (People v. Dent, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 219; Bribiesca v. 
Galaza (9th Cir. 2000) 215 F.3d 1015, 1019), or improper restriction on a 
defendant’s ability to present his own defense (Milton v. Morris (9th Cir. 1985) 
767 F.2d 1443, 1446).  Defendant suffered neither of these deprivations. 
 
 
 
c.  Failure to Appoint Artan as Defense Counsel 
 
Defendant contends that by refusing to appoint Artan, the trial court abused 
its discretion and deprived him of due process and the right to counsel.  However, 
defendant never properly requested Artan’s appointment.  When the question 
arose on August 9, 1996, the court explained that Penal Code section 987.2 
required the initial appointment of the public defender.  Only if the public 
defender found a conflict could the court consider appointing other counsel.  Artan 
told the court he would inquire further and make a motion providing the court with 
“some of the factors that would support my appointment on the case.”  The court 
 
21
was skeptical but said it would allow Artan to file a motion for his appointment 
under Harris v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 786 (Harris).5 
 
Defendant decided to proceed in propria persona.  Artan never filed a 
Harris motion; instead, he appeared on November 26, 1996, and agreed to 
represent defendant pro bono.  Under these circumstances, defendant cannot now 
claim error.  He does not challenge the court’s ruling that it was statutorily 
required to appoint the public defender and wait for a conflict check before 
considering the appointment of alternate counsel.6  He notes that the court 
ultimately failed to comply with that requirement, appointing Rothman without 
any intervening participation by the public defender.  However, the fact remains 
that defendant never objected to the court’s view of the statutory scheme, and 
agreed to continue representing himself while Artan explored the possibility of a 
Harris appointment.  That avenue, abandoned below, cannot be reopened on 
appeal. 
 
 
 
d.  Refusal to Appoint Cocounsel 
 
Defendant claims the trial court erroneously denied his motion for the 
appointment of counsel to assist Artan, violating his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and article I, section 15 of 
the California Constitution. 
 
A decision denying the appointment of second counsel under Penal Code 
section 987 is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  “The abuse of discretion standard 
                                              
 
5  In Harris, this court held that a trial court’s discretion in appointing 
counsel for an indigent defendant when the public defender declares a conflict is 
not constrained by the defendant’s preference for a particular attorney.  (Harris, 
supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 799, reaffirming the rule of Drumgo v. Superior Court 
(1973) 8 Cal.3d 930, 934-935.)  Under the specific and unusual facts presented, 
however, the Harris court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in 
declining to appoint the counsel requested by the defendants.  (Harris, supra, at 
pp. 795-799.) 
 
6  This court has not yet decided whether Harris permits the appointment of 
private counsel  when the public defender is available to represent the defendant.  
(See People v. Cole (2005) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1186.)  
 
22
is used in many other contexts and reflects the trial court’s superior ability to 
consider and weigh the myriad factors that are relevant to the decision at hand.  A 
trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion unless it ‘exercised its 
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that results in a 
manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ”  (People v. Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 688.)  
The right of a capital defendant to the resources necessary for a full defense must 
be carefully considered, and the demands of pretrial preparation in a complex case 
weigh in favor of appointing an additional attorney.  (Keenan v. Superior Court, 
supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 430-432.)  Nevertheless, it is the defendant’s burden to 
make a specific showing of necessity.  (People v. Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 
687.)  “The appointment of a second counsel in a capital case is not an absolute 
right protected by either the state or the federal Constitution.  [Citations.]”  
(People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 997, fn. 22; accord, People v. Williams 
(2006) 40 Cal.4th 287, 300.) 
 
No abuse of discretion appears here.  Citing People v. Jackson (1980) 28 
Cal.3d 264 (Jackson; disapproved on another ground in People v. Cromer (2001) 
24 Cal.4th 889, 901, fn. 3), defendant argues that Artan’s inexperience was a 
compelling reason to appoint cocounsel.  The defendant in Jackson relied on 
Pierce v. United States (D.C.App. 1979) 402 A.2d 1237, to support his claim that 
the court abused its discretion by summarily denying his request for second 
counsel.  In Pierce, the trial court erred by not inquiring into the reasons for 
counsel’s inability to handle the defense alone.  The Jackson court distinguished 
Pierce because there counsel had admitted his lack of prior experience might 
necessitate additional legal assistance.  (Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 287; see 
Pierce v. United States, supra, 402 A.2d at p. 1245.)  No such admission was 
made in Jackson, and the trial court had extensive opportunity to evaluate 
counsel’s ability before it ruled on the motion for additional counsel.  (Jackson, 
supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 282, 287-288.) 
 
23
 
Jackson was concerned with the scope of the trial court’s inquiry into the 
need for additional counsel.  In both Jackson and Pierce, the counsel seeking 
assistance was himself appointed by the court.  (Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 
282; Pierce v. United States, supra, 402 A.2d at pp. 1242-1243.)  Thus, Jackson 
does not stand for the proposition that inexperience on the part of retained counsel 
justifies the appointment of cocounsel.  In any event, it was not only Artan’s 
inexperience that created difficulties in his pretrial preparation, but also the fact 
that he had four other cases set for trial before defendant’s expected trial date.  
Under these circumstances, the court was justified in concluding it would be better 
to replace Artan, rather than appoint a second attorney.7 
 
Defendant contends his case was especially complex, in both the guilt and 
penalty phases.  He points out that Artan’s requests for an investigator, a 
fingerprint expert, and a psychologist had been granted, and that the credibility of 
two accomplice witnesses required investigation.  He notes a prosecutor’s 
comment that it was “quite a complicated case.”  He observes that the evidence of 
aggravating and mitigating factors involved crimes committed in Maryland, and 
raised questions about his psychiatric condition.  However, a review of the entire 
record fully supports the trial court’s conclusion that this was not an especially 
complex case.  The prosecutor who said the case “seems to be quite . . . 
complicated” was merely standing in for the prosecutor who was handling the 
case, at an early stage of the proceedings when Alexander and Rodriguez were still 
joined as defendants. 
 
Defendant also asserts his request should have been granted because the 
appointment of second counsel would not have resulted in any unusual strain on 
                                              
 
7  The Pierce court held that if, after a proper inquiry, the court decides 
existing counsel is unable to conduct an adequate defense, it may provide relief by 
appointing either cocounsel or substitute counsel.  (Pierce v. United States, supra, 
402 A.2d at p. 1245.) 
 
24
public resources, given that Artan was representing him pro bono.8  The argument 
fails.  Artan’s pro bono status did not compensate for his lack of experience and 
his inability to prepare for trial because of conflicting obligations.  The court was 
not required to ensure that defendant was represented by the counsel he preferred.  
It was required to take steps to provide him with an effective advocate, at public 
expense if necessary.  (People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1184.)  Artan’s own 
representations to the court raised considerable doubt that he could be an effective 
advocate.  It was well within the court’s discretion to conclude that the 
appointment of second counsel was not an appropriate solution. 
 
Defendant claims the court’s decision amounted to a de facto removal of 
retained counsel.  It was, however, Artan’s decision to take other cases that 
prevented him from preparing adequately for defendant’s trial, and it was Artan’s 
own determination that it would be impossible for him to represent defendant 
without assistance.  The trial court cannot be faulted for these circumstances.  
 
 
2.  Jury Selection 
 
 
 
a.  Batson/Wheeler Claims 
 
During jury selection, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s 
“apparent systematic exclusion of black female jurors.”  The objection was made 
under People v. Wheeler (1978) 33 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler), but on appeal defendant 
also asserts error under the federal standard announced in Batson v. Kentucky 
(1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson).  An objection under Wheeler suffices to preserve a 
                                              
 
8  Defendant makes a cursory suggestion that equal protection principles 
entitle all indigent capital defendants to one attorney appointed at public expense, 
and that it was discriminatory for the trial court to deny him this benefit as an 
addition to Artan’s services.  This claim is not sustainable.  Defendant was seeking 
an extraordinary accommodation, not equal treatment.  The demands of equal 
protection are satisfied by granting the trial court discretion to determine whether 
it is appropriate under the particular circumstances to appoint additional counsel at 
public expense.  (Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 286-287; see also Keenan v. 
Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 429.) 
 
25
Batson claim on appeal.  (People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 184, fn. 2; People 
v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 66, fn. 3.) 
 
Defense counsel ultimately specified three African-American prospective 
jurors he suspected were peremptorily challenged for discriminatory reasons, 
though at first he mentioned only two, Prospective Jurors T3147 and C1752.  
Both, he argued, appeared to be bright, articulate women who had expressed 
equivocal views on both penalty and guilt issues, making them “exactly the type of 
jurors we’re looking for.”  He asked the court to explore the prosecutor’s reasons 
for excluding them.  Presumably, counsel’s grounds for objection as to the third 
prospective juror, W3441, were the same, because he told the court he had no 
additional arguments when her exclusion was discussed. 
 
The court noted that each of these prospective jurors had attitudes or family 
experiences making them “distinctive,” and that four African-American women 
remained in the jury box.  Accordingly, the court ruled that defendant had failed to 
make a prima facie case of discrimination.9 
 
Both the California and United States Constitutions are violated by the 
exercise of peremptory challenges based on group bias, instead of reasons specific 
to the challenged prospective juror.  (People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 
66.)  The procedure governing objections on this ground is settled:  “First, the 
defendant must make out a prima facie case by ‘showing that the totality of the 
relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’  [Citations.]  
Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the ‘burden shifts to 
the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion’ by offering permissible race-
neutral justifications for the strikes.  [Citations.]  Third, ‘[i]f a race-neutral 
                                              
 
9  At oral argument, defendant’s appellate counsel asserted that six jurors, 
including another African-American woman and two African-American men, 
were improperly challenged by the prosecutor.  Defendant forfeited any claim of 
error as to these additional jurors by failing to object at trial.  The trial court had 
no occasion to consider whether they were dismissed for a discriminatory purpose.  
(People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 709-710.) 
 
26
explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent 
of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.’  [Citation.]”  (Johnson v. 
California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168, fn. omitted (Johnson); People v. Cornwell, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 66-67.) 
 
A defendant establishes a prima facie case of discrimination “by producing 
evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that 
discrimination has occurred.”  (Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 170.)  An inference 
is a logical conclusion based on a set of facts.  (Id. at p. 168, fn. 4.)  When the trial 
court concludes that a defendant has failed to make a prima facie case, we review 
the voir dire of the challenged jurors to determine whether the totality of the 
relevant facts supports an inference of discrimination.  (Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. 
at p. 168; People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 186.) 
 
Here, the record supports the trial court’s finding.  Before reviewing the 
record of voir dire, we address two preliminary claims raised by defendant.  First, 
he contends the court applied an erroneous standard to the prima facie 
determination.  Defendant bases this argument on the following caution the trial 
court gave to defense counsel:  “[I]t’s got to be not simply that you don’t see the 
reasons but that they are much like other jurors that have been left on the panel 
that are of different races, and so that the only conclusion that could be drawn or 
logical conclusion to draw is that they were excused because of their race and 
gender.” 
 
Defendant claims the “only logical conclusion” standard is more onerous 
than the “strong likelihood” standard in effect at the time of his trial in 1998.  (See, 
e.g., Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 
1188, and fn. 7.)  Moreover, he notes that the “strong likelihood” standard itself, 
which we later explained meant only that “the objector must show that it is more 
likely than not the other party’s peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based 
on impermissible group bias” (People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1318), 
has been deemed “an inappropriate yardstick by which to measure the sufficiency 
 
27
of a prima facie case” by the United States Supreme Court.  (Johnson, supra, 545 
U.S. at p. 168.)  As noted, a defendant need only make a showing sufficient to 
support an inference of discrimination.  (Id. at p. 170.) 
 
In this case the trial court apparently realized it had overstated the 
requirement, because it quickly restated the standard as “[a] logical conclusion to 
draw is that they were excused because of their race and gender.”  That alternate 
phrasing is fully consistent with Johnson.  In any event, as in other post-Johnson 
cases, we are able to review the record to resolve the legal question whether 
defendant’s showing supported an inference that the prosecutor excused a 
prospective juror for an improper reason.  (People v. Avila  (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 
554; People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1101; People v. Gray, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 187; People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 73.) 
 
Defendant also contends the trial court was required to seek reasons from 
the prosecutor for the peremptory challenges at issue, rather than offering its own 
explanations.  He cites Johnson for the proposition that the trial judge should 
“have the benefit of all relevant circumstances, including the prosecutor’s 
explanation, before deciding whether it was more likely than not that the challenge 
was improperly motivated.”  (Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 170.)  He also quotes 
Johnson as follows:  “The Batson framework is designed to produce actual 
answers to suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the 
jury selection process.  [Citation.]  The inherent uncertainty present in inquiries of 
discriminatory purpose counsels against engaging in needless and imperfect 
speculation when a direct answer can be obtained by asking a simple question.”  
(Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 172.) 
 
Defendant’s reliance on these passages is misplaced.  The high court was 
discussing the considerations applicable at the third step of the Batson inquiry, 
after a prima facie case has been established.  “ ‘It is not until the third step that 
the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant — the step in which the 
trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of 
 
28
proving purposeful discrimination.’ ”  (Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 171, quoting 
Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 767, italics in Purkett.)  As we explained in 
People v. Cornwell, “[o]nce the trial court concludes that the defendant has 
produced evidence raising an inference of discrimination, the court should not 
speculate as to the prosecutor’s reasons — it should inquire of the prosecutor, as 
the high court directed.  But there still is a first step to be taken by the defendant, 
namely producing evidence from which the trial court may infer ‘that 
discrimination has occurred.’ ”  (People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 73-
74, quoting Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 170.) 
 
Here, defendant’s showing was meager.  This is not a case like Johnson, 
where a “suspicious” appearance was created by the prosecutor’s removal of all 
prospective jurors in a cognizable group.  (Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 173; 
People v. Johnson, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1326.)  Defendant concedes that three of 
the four African-American women who remained on the panel at the time of his 
Wheeler motion ultimately served on the jury.10  However, he argues it was 
inappropriate for the trial court to rely on the presence of those four prospective 
jurors, because the prosecutor had not yet accepted them.  To the contrary, the 
court properly noted that the percentage of African-American women challenged 
by the prosecutor had not reached a level that suggested an inference of 
discrimination, a point that was conceded by defense counsel below.  (See People 
v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 556; People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 187-
188; People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 69-70.) 
 
Counsel premised the Wheeler motion only on the ground that the 
challenged prospective jurors seemed to be intelligent and had expressed 
equivocal views on issues relevant to both the guilt and penalty phases.  Certainly 
these qualities were attractive to defense counsel, but by themselves they hardly 
                                              
 
10  Defendant also acknowledges that the seated jury was quite diverse, 
consisting of the three African-American women, three Caucasian men, three 
Caucasian women, two Hispanic men, and one Hispanic woman.  The four 
alternates were a Hispanic man and woman, and a Caucasian man and woman. 
 
29
suggest the prosecutor was exercising her peremptory challenges based on race 
and gender.  A tendency toward equivocation is seldom the first quality sought in 
a prospective juror by the party bearing the burden of proof.  Moreover, the views 
or family experiences disclosed by these women were more than sufficient to 
overcome any inference of improper discrimination. 
 
Prospective Juror T3147’s brother was convicted of robbery in 1996.  She 
believed the police did not do a thorough investigation.  She maintained that police 
officers had “coached” a witness to identify him.  The court noted this was a “very 
distinctive feature” showing “clear bias.”  Defendant observes that this prospective 
juror said she would not hold her brother’s experience against any officer who 
might testify, that a cousin of hers was a Los Angeles police officer, and that other 
relatives had been crime victims.  Defendant also points out that she personally 
had had a positive experience with a police officer.  Nevertheless, under these 
circumstances, no inference of discrimination arises from the removal of a 
prospective juror whose brother had a recent negative experience with the criminal 
justice system. 
 
Prospective Juror W3441’s husband was convicted of robbery in 1994.  She 
felt the public defender had not presented the proper evidence.  She said she was 
strongly opposed to the death penalty, and thought it was imposed too often.  
While she said she would not always vote against the death penalty for a defendant 
found guilty of intentional first degree murder with a special circumstance, she 
also answered “no” when asked if she could impose the death penalty in a case 
involving the charges against defendant.  She said she could see herself rejecting 
the death penalty in favor of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, 
but could not see herself choosing the death penalty instead of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole. 
 
The trial court referred primarily to this prospective juror’s attitude toward 
capital punishment, but also mentioned her husband’s conviction and experience 
with the public defender.  Defendant notes that Prospective Juror W3441 
 
30
equivocated when questioned by the court, saying it would be possible for her to 
change her mind about the death penalty, depending on the circumstances.  She 
also said her concern about her husband’s legal representation would not affect her 
consideration of this case.  Defendant points out that this prospective juror had 
relatives working in law enforcement, and previous jury experience.  However, 
under all the relevant facts, including the prospective juror’s strongly stated 
antipathy to the death penalty and her husband’s conviction four years earlier, no 
inference of discrimination can be drawn from the record. 
 
Prospective Juror C1752’s nephew was serving life sentence without the 
possibility of parole for a murder committed in Los Angeles County.  Another 
nephew and a stepson had been imprisoned for drug offenses.  The trial court 
questioned her about the nephew in prison for murder.  The prospective juror had 
mistakenly identified him as a murder victim on her questionnaire.11  She knew 
about his case only from speaking with relatives.  She understood that her nephew 
was found with the victim’s credit card, and that other people were involved in the 
crime.  She knew nothing about the prosecution and said it would not affect her 
judgment.  Addressing defendant’s Wheeler claim, the court said that the 
nephew’s conviction for a robbery-murder in the county made Prospective Juror 
C1752 “distinctive from the rest of the group.”12  Again, on this record no 
                                              
 
11  Prospective Juror C1752 made other mistakes on her questionnaire in 
response to questions about the penalty for murder.  The court clarified her 
answers during voir dire. 
 
12  In his reply brief, defendant disputes the trial court’s observation that the 
nephew’s conviction made this prospective juror “distinctive.”  He claims that a 
seated juror also had a close relative who was convicted of  a crime, and another 
juror who served had a nephew who was accused of robbery.  Defendant does not, 
however, identify these jurors or provide record cites to support his claims.  Nor 
are either of the circumstances alleged by defendant analogous to the situation of a 
prospective juror for a murder trial with a relative who was convicted of murder in 
the same county. 
 
This court has refrained from deciding whether comparative juror analysis 
is appropriate for the first time on appeal.  (See People v. Williams, supra, 40 
Cal.4th at p. 312; People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 546.)  Defendant’s 
 
31
inference of group bias appears from the prosecutor’s decision to challenge a 
prospective juror whose family members were serving or had served prison terms. 
 
Defendant fell far short of “showing that the totality of the relevant facts 
[gave] rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.”  (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at 
p. 94; see also Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 168; People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 66.)  The trial court correctly determined that he failed to make a 
prima facie showing of a Batson/Wheeler violation. 
 
 
 
b.  Challenges for Cause 
 
Defendant contends the court erroneously excused two prospective jurors 
for cause because of their concerns about the death penalty.  Under the applicable 
state and federal constitutional provisions, prospective jurors may be excused for 
cause if their views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their 
duties.  (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424; People v. Griffin (2004) 33 
Cal.4th 536, 558.) 
 
“ ‘Assessing the qualifications of jurors challenged for cause is a matter 
falling within the broad discretion of the trial court.  [Citation.]  The trial court 
must determine whether the prospective juror will be “unable to faithfully and 
impartially apply the law in the case.”  [Citation.]  A juror will often give 
conflicting or confusing answers regarding his or her impartiality or capacity to 
serve, and the trial court must weigh the juror’s responses in deciding whether to 
remove the juror for cause.  The trial court’s resolution of these factual matters is 
binding on the appellate court if supported by substantial evidence.  [Citation.]’ ”  
(People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 416; accord, People v. Moon (2005) 37 
Cal.4th 1, 14.) 
 
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings in this case.  Both 
the prospective jurors in question gave equivocal and conflicting responses to 
questions about capital punishment. 
                                                                                                                                      
 
belatedly and insufficiently briefed claim does not require us to consider that 
question here. 
 
32
 
Prospective Juror G3442 stated on his questionnaire that he was “strongly 
against” the death penalty.  Asked for his general feelings on the subject, he wrote 
“I think it is wrong.”  He said he would always vote against the death penalty at 
one point, but later wavered, writing on two occasions that “I never say never, but 
probably not.”  He noted that he might agree to the death penalty if a friend of his 
were killed. 
 
When questioned by the court, Prospective Juror G3442 said he was “not a 
big fan” of the death penalty.  He first told the court he thought he could impose 
the death penalty as a “realistic, practical possibility,” but then said he was not 
sure and “wouldn’t want to say I definitively could,” concluding that it was 
“probably not possible.”  However, under questioning by defense counsel he 
conceded he would have to follow the law even if he did not like it.  When asked 
if he could follow the court’s instructions on the death penalty, he said “I believe 
so.”  Pressed for an unequivocal answer, he said he would be able to follow the 
law, adding that he was “unequivocal about that.”  Counsel then asked if he would 
be able to impose the death penalty.  He replied, “yes, I think I might be.”  
Counsel sought a firmer answer, saying “when you say yes, you think,” and the 
juror responded “yes, yes.”  Prospective Juror G3442 confirmed his strong 
opposition to the death penalty when questioned by the prosecutor, but said it was 
“possible” he could vote for death, adding, “realistic and practical standard, don’t 
know if I could hold myself up to that, but it’s possible.”  The prosecutor asked 
about his questionnaire response that he would always vote against the death 
penalty.  He replied, “perhaps I’ve changed my mind since then.” 
 
Prospective Juror M6949 stated on his questionnaire that he was 
“moderately against” the death penalty, and would prefer life in prison without the 
possibility of parole.  He was “not sure” if he would always vote against the death 
penalty, either in general or in light of the charges against defendant.  He said he 
could see himself rejecting the death penalty and choosing a life term, but could 
 
33
not see himself rejecting a life term in favor of the death penalty.  However, he 
also indicated that the determination “depends on the circumstances.” 
 
Prospective juror M6949 told the court he had “mixed emotions” about 
capital punishment.  Asked to explain, he said he did not know how he would 
react when the time came to make a decision.  The court asked if imposing death 
would be “a realistic, practical possibility or only a very remote possibility that 
isn’t very real.”  The prospective juror replied “it’s a remote possibility.”  He told 
defense counsel he did not believe in the death penalty as a general principle, 
explaining this was “just a personal feeling.”  Asked about his statement that it 
“depends on the circumstances,” he said, “since then, I’ve been thinking about it,” 
and “I just have difficulty with it.  That’s all.”  Asked if he could follow the 
instructions and impose the death penalty based on the evidence, he said “I guess I 
could do it.” 
 
Defendant contends the responses of these prospective jurors showed only 
that they might have a higher than average threshold for imposing the death 
penalty, not that their ability to properly deliberate would be substantially 
impaired.  He argues that reversal of the penalty judgment is required under 
People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 446-447, and People v. Heard (2003) 31 
Cal.4th 946, 964-966.  However, unlike the prospective jurors in those cases, 
Prospective Jurors G3442 and M6949 gave answers during voir dire indicating 
there was only a slim possibility they could vote for the death penalty, regardless 
of the state of the evidence.  While they also made more equivocal statements, we 
will not interfere with the trial court’s resolution of the conflicts.  “[W]e pay due 
deference to the trial court, which was in a position to actually observe and listen 
to the prospective jurors.  Voir dire sometimes fails to elicit an unmistakably clear 
answer from the juror, and there will be times when ‘the trial judge is left with the 
definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and 
impartially apply the law. . . .  [T]his is why deference must be paid to the trial 
judge who sees and hears the juror.’ ” (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 60; 
 
34
accord, People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 331; People v. Griffin, supra, 33 
Cal.4th at p. 559.) 
 
B.  Guilt Phase Issues 
 
 
1.  Alexander’s Testimony About Defendant’s Violent Past 
 
Defense counsel cross-examined Shawn Alexander briefly about the terms 
of his plea agreement, and at length about his knowledge of defendant’s intentions 
and his willingness to participate in the course of events.  Alexander admitted that 
when he saw defendant emerge from Taylor’s house with a gun, he knew 
something other than loading stereo equipment into the car was involved.  
Alexander said he had considered leaving but was “too afraid,” “because he had a 
gun, and I didn’t want to take no chances.” 
 
Alexander also acknowledged that he knew “something ugly was going to 
take place” when he saw defendant take a rope, tape, and a bottle of chemicals 
from the trunk of the car.  He conceded he had done nothing to stop what was 
about to happen.  Counsel suggested that he did not intervene because he had 
expected to be paid, which Alexander denied.  Alexander agreed, however, that he 
could have walked away from the scene of the murder. 
 
On redirect examination, the prosecutor established that Alexander had not 
walked away from the scene because he was afraid of defendant.  Alexander 
referred again to the gun, and said he didn’t want to “take no chance on leaving.”  
The prosecutor asked if defendant had said anything to make Alexander believe 
defendant would use the gun on him.  Alexander said defendant had threatened to 
kill him if he said anything about the murder.  The prosecutor asked if Alexander 
regretted not walking away.  Alexander said no; he explained at first that he had 
felt his life was in danger, but then said that was not really the case, and that he 
simply “didn’t want to take any chances on leaving because of Mr. Lancaster.” 
 
On recross examination, defense counsel established that defendant did not 
threaten to kill Alexander until after the shooting, and pressed him about why he 
had not left the scene earlier.  Alexander repeated that he was afraid because 
 
35
defendant had the gun.  The prosecutor in turn asked Alexander if defendant had 
seemed angry or upset on the way to the scene.  Alexander said no.  The 
prosecutor inquired whether Alexander “had any knowledge at that time that the 
defendant had been violent in his past?”  Alexander said yes, defendant had told 
him that “when he was 14, he had just got out of jail from murdering a cop.”  
Asked if that had been a factor in his fear of defendant at the crime scene, 
Alexander said no, he did not have that in mind.  He was fearful because 
defendant had a gun. 
 
Defense counsel did not object to this line of questioning.  Rather, he 
challenged whether Alexander really believed defendant had shot a policeman.  
Counsel asked Alexander if he thought someone who did that would be released 
from jail.  Alexander said no.  Counsel observed that defendant must have been 
lying, but Alexander explained that defendant had been a juvenile at the time, and 
may have been released on that basis. 
 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting the 
“inflammatory” testimony regarding defendant’s murder of a police officer.  He 
also claims his attorney’s failure to object amounted to ineffective assistance of 
counsel, and the trial court’s failure to intervene on its own motion violated his 
right to a fair trial.  These arguments are meritless.  Defendant’s failure to object 
forfeited any claim of prosecutorial misconduct or error by the trial court.  (People 
v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 96; People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 
1187.)  Nor can defense counsel be faulted for failing to object, a tactical decision 
that rarely establishes ineffective assistance.  (People v. Chatman (2005) 38 
Cal.4th 344, 384.) 
 
Certainly it was a reasonable tactic for counsel to attack Alexander’s 
credibility by showing he was a willing participant in the crime, and to discredit 
his claims that he was afraid of defendant.  The prosecutor was entitled to try to 
rehabilitate her witness by establishing the grounds for his professed fear.  (People 
v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 745-746.)  Thus, any objection by defense 
 
36
counsel was quite likely to have been overruled.  Instead, counsel made another 
reasonable tactical decision to use Alexander’s answer to further challenge his 
believability.  The notion that a juvenile would be released at age 14 after killing a 
police officer is certainly questionable.  By making this point, counsel not only 
attacked Alexander’s credibility, but also cast doubt on the accuracy of the claim 
itself.  Defendant falls far short of overcoming the strong presumption that 
counsel’s strategy fell within “the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.”  (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 688, 689.) 
 
 
2.  Marston’s Testimony About the Threat to Taylor 
 
As Robert Marston began his testimony, defense counsel asked for a 
sidebar conference.  He anticipated that Marston would relate defendant’s 
statement to Taylor that things would “get rough” if Shambulia’s group did not get 
the radio equipment.  Counsel argued that this testimony was double hearsay.  The 
prosecutor contended the threat was relevant to show Taylor’s state of mind when 
he left his home with defendant.  Defense counsel responded that the threat was 
actually directed at Marston, so its tendency to prove Taylor’s state of mind was 
speculative.  The court noted that Taylor and Marston were working together to set 
up the radio station, and overruled the objection.  Marston testified that when he 
spoke with Taylor the day before the murder, Taylor reported that defendant had 
“told me to tell you that if he — if they don’t get this equipment, things are going 
to get rough.” 
 
This testimony was clearly relevant to establish that Taylor was taken 
against his will, an element of the kidnapping offense.  (People v. Hill (2000) 23 
Cal.4th 853, 856; People v. Kozlowski (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 853, 864.)  
However, defendant claims it was inadmissible under People v. Lew (1968) 68 
Cal.2d 774.  The Lew court held that testimony about the defendant’s threats was 
relevant to explain the murder victim’s conduct, but was nevertheless improperly 
admitted, partly because it was not sufficiently “trustworthy and credible.”  (Id. at 
p. 780; see also Evid. Code, § 1252.)  Defendant argues that the threat here was 
 
37
vague, Marston was a witness interested in the conviction of his friend’s killer, 
and there was no corroboration that the phone call between Marston and Taylor 
had occurred or that Marston had accurately related the threat.  These claims are 
manifestly inadequate.  Counsel did not raise the question of corroboration below, 
no doubt because he knew Tyrone Floyd would testify that Taylor also told him 
about the threat.  Floyd’s testimony was more than sufficient to establish the 
trustworthiness of Marston’s version of the event. 
 
In his reply brief, defendant expands his argument to include Floyd’s 
testimony as well, contending the adverse ruling on his objection to Marston’s 
testimony justified counsel’s failure to object when Floyd mentioned the threat 
made by defendant.  Defendant asserts that because Taylor himself was not 
threatened, the threat was irrelevant to the forcible asportation element of 
kidnapping.  These contentions are as meritless as they are belated.  Floyd did not 
testify that the threat was meant for Marston, and his account of Taylor’s behavior 
the next day clearly established Taylor’s fearful reaction.13  In any event, as the 
trial court pointed out and as defendant concedes, Marston and Taylor were 
working closely together.  Defendant’s statement was reasonably understood as an 
attempt to intimidate both of them. 
 
Defendant contends the testimony was unduly prejudicial.  Trial courts 
have broad discretion to weigh the prejudicial impact of testimony against its 
probative value.  (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124.)  Defendant 
fails to show any abuse of discretion.  The testimony about the threat was highly 
relevant to show the deteriorating relationship between Taylor’s and Shambulia’s 
groups, and to refute the theory that Taylor may have voluntarily accompanied 
defendant the night he was killed. 
                                              
 
13  Floyd said Taylor told him that “he received a phone call from Hodari 
[i.e., defendant] and that Hodari stated that if he didn’t get the microwave 
transmitter back, that it would get nasty.”  Floyd described Taylor as “very 
nervous” when he relayed the threat, and also the next day when they attended a 
party together. 
 
38
 
Finally, defendant argues that his hearsay objection put Taylor’s 
trustworthiness in question.  Defendant speculates at length about the relations 
between Taylor, Marston, and Floyd to suggest that Taylor had a motive to convey 
the threat in slightly different terms to these two witnesses.  This claim is 
unsustainable.  Two witnesses described essentially the same threat in the same 
time-frame.  The testimony was relevant to explain Taylor’s conduct and was 
properly admitted. 
 
 
3.  Asserted Griffin Error 
 
During closing argument, the prosecutor reminded the jury about the Liquid 
Plumr bottle found at the scene, and observed:  “It was new, it still had liquid in it, 
and had the defendant’s prints all over it.  There’s been no explanation offered as 
to how they possibly could have been there.”  Defendant claims this was an 
improper comment on his failure to testify under Griffin v. California (1965) 380 
U.S. 609. 
 
Defendant failed to object or seek an admonition below; thus this claim of 
error was not preserved.  (People v. Turner (2004) 34 Cal.4th 406, 420.)14  In any 
event, the prosecutor’s statement was a fair comment on the state of the evidence, 
rather than a comment on defendant’s failure to personally provide an alternative 
explanation.  (Turner, at p. 419; see also People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 
1266, citing cases; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 372-374.) 
 
 
                                              
 
14  Defendant suggests there was no waiver because an objection would 
merely have drawn further attention to his failure to testify.  No authority supports 
this notion.  Defendant cites People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 758-759, 
disapproved on another ground in People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 773.  In 
Murtishaw, however, we held that counsel’s failure to object to the first instance 
of claimed Griffin error barred the defendant from raising the issue on appeal.  We 
noted that objection to repeated improper references might be excused, but that 
there was no reason to believe an initial curative instruction would not have put an 
end to the prosecutor’s comments.  Here, defendant does not complain about 
repeated references.  
 
39
 
 
4.  The CALJIC No. 2.11.5 Instruction 
 
At the prosecutor’s request, the court gave the jury a modified version of 
CALJIC No. 2.11.5, as follows: 
 
“There has been evidence in this case indicating that a person other than the 
defendant, Shawn Alexander and Jornay Rodriguez, was or may have been 
involved in the crime for which the defendant is on trial.  There may be many 
reasons why that person is not here on trial.  Therefore do not discuss or give any 
consideration as to why the other person is not being prosecuted in this trial or 
whether he or she has been or will be prosecuted.  Your duty is to decide whether 
the People have proved the guilt of the defendant on trial.” 
 
Defendant acknowledges this instruction was intended to apply to Mzee 
Shambulia, and claims no error in that regard.  He asserts, however, that the jurors 
may have improperly inferred that they should not consider or discuss why 
Alexander and Rodriguez were not being prosecuted.  Defendant contends the 
instruction should have affirmatively informed the jurors that they were obligated 
to consider the fact that Alexander and Rodriguez were not being tried along with 
him, and to “consider the implications of prosecutorial leniency.” 
 
Defendant sought no such modification below.  Even if the assignment of 
error was not waived (see People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1218), his 
argument fails on the merits.  Alexander and Rodriguez were specifically and 
properly excepted from the scope of the instruction.  (See, e.g., People v. Williams 
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 226-227.)  Moreover, the jury was instructed on witness 
credibility and accomplice testimony, which properly informed its consideration of 
their testimony.  (People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 88.)  Defendant cites 
no authority for the proposition that the trial court should have, on its own motion, 
directed the jury to deliberate about the implications of Alexander’s and 
Rodriguez’s guilty pleas. 
 
 
 
40
 
 
5.  Failure to Instruct on Second Degree Murder 
 
Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court declined to instruct the jury 
on second degree murder.  The court found no evidence to support the theory that 
Taylor left his home voluntarily, so it concluded his killing was necessarily a first 
degree murder committed during a kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 189). 
 
Defendant contends there was substantial evidence from which the jury 
could have found that Taylor had agreed to go with defendant to discuss the 
transmitter dispute, and defendant only later decided to kill him on a sudden 
impulse.  This is a tenuous argument, but we need not resolve it on the merits.  It 
is well established that “[e]rror in failing to instruct the jury on a lesser included 
offense is harmless when the jury necessarily decides the factual questions posed 
by the omitted instructions adversely to defendant under other properly given 
instructions.”  (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 646; accord, People v. 
Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 906; see also, e.g., People v. Earp (1999) 20 
Cal.4th 826, 885-886.) 
 
Here, the jury returned a true finding on the kidnapping-murder special 
circumstance (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(B)), and therefore necessarily 
rejected the factual theory on which defendant’s argument for a second degree 
murder instruction rests.  Defendant argues that the jury’s finding was not 
conclusive on this point, because it was reached in the absence of alternative 
possible verdicts.  However, as in People v. Horning, “[i]f the jury had had any 
doubt that this was a felony murder, it did not have to acquit but could have 
simply convicted defendant of first degree murder without special circumstances.”  
(People v. Horning, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 906.) 
 
 
6.  Amendment of the Information 
 
Count One of the information originally charged defendant with murder 
during “the commission of the crime of Kidnapping, and/or Kidnapping for 
Ransom, within the meaning of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17).”  Count One also 
included the special circumstance allegation that the murder was done for financial 
 
41
gain.  (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(1).)  Count Two charged defendant with “the 
crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, in violation of PENAL CODE 
SECTION 209(a),” and alleged that he and his accomplices seized and detained 
Taylor “for ransom, reward, extortion, and to exact from relatives and friends of 
said MICHAEL TAYLOR money.” 
 
During a discussion on jury instructions, the trial court raised the issue of 
whether the kidnapping could be said to have been for the purpose of ransom.  The 
prosecutor suggested instructing the jury in terms of intent “to extract from 
another any money or a valuable thing.”  Defense counsel argued that defendant 
had only sought information from Taylor.  The court agreed with the prosecutor 
that information could be a “valuable thing,” but remained troubled by the term 
“ransom.” 
 
When the court said it intended to instruct the jury on simple kidnapping, 
kidnapping for extortion, and the definition of extortion, defense counsel objected 
that the court was “adding another special circumstance for financial gain.  I think 
that should have been pled . . . .”  The court responded that the special 
circumstance of murder for financial gain was alleged in the information.  Defense 
counsel then argued that kidnapping for extortion did not include a situation where 
the victim was the subject of the extortion.  However, counsel did not press this 
point after the prosecutor said she had case authority to the contrary.  (See People 
v. Kozlowski, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 853, 871.) 
 
The court then noted that the prosecutor had asked for instruction on bodily 
harm or death in connection with the kidnapping count, but the information did not 
allege the infliction of bodily harm or death.  The prosecutor moved to amend the 
information to include that allegation.  Defense counsel objected, claiming the 
request was untimely.  The court and the prosecutor mentioned that an amendment 
to allege personal use of a firearm was also anticipated.  At this point, defense 
counsel renewed his argument on the extortion element of kidnapping, arguing 
 
42
that a demand for the address where the transmitter could be found did not amount 
to extortion.  The court told counsel he was free to make that argument to the jury. 
 
Addressing the amendments both as to firearm use and bodily harm or 
death, counsel complained that the prosecution had long known the underlying 
facts.  He contended it was unfair to add these allegations at such a late date, 
depriving the defendant of the opportunity to defend against them.  The court 
observed that the victim’s death in the course of a kidnapping was already alleged 
as part of Count One, and overruled the objection. 
 
After the prosecution rested, defense counsel moved for a judgment of 
acquittal on Count Two “for the reasons heretofore articulated, unless your Honor 
wants me to go through them again.”  The court framed the issue as follows:  the 
information referred to kidnapping for ransom in count one, and count two 
designated the offense as kidnapping for ransom, but the evidence supported only 
the crime of kidnapping for the purpose of extortion.  However, Count Two also 
specifically alleged extortion as a purpose of the kidnapping.  For that reason, the 
court denied the motion for acquittal, though it acknowledged the evidence did not 
support kidnapping for ransom.  Following this ruling, the defense rested its case. 
 
The information was amended to omit any mention of ransom in Count 
One, referring simply to murder committed during “the commission of the crime 
of KIDNAPPING, within the meaning of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17).”  
Count Two, however, still designated the kidnapping charge as “KIDNAPPING 
FOR RANSOM,” though the prosecutor added “and other valuable things” to the 
“money” defendant was charged with intending to extort and extract from Taylor’s 
relatives and friends. 
 
Defendant claims he was prejudiced by these amendments.  He argues that 
his counsel had determined not to present a defense to the charge of kidnapping 
for ransom because it lacked any factual basis.  He contends he was deprived of 
the opportunity to prepare a defense to the different charge of kidnapping for 
extortion.  However, as the court noted in ruling on the motion for acquittal, 
 
43
extortion was originally pleaded in Count Two.  It is clear that Count Two, in both 
the original and amended informations, referred to kidnapping for ransom as a 
shorthand way of designating the aggravated kidnapping offenses enumerated in 
Penal Code section 209, as opposed to “simple kidnapping” under Penal Code 
section 207.  Defense counsel’s objection below was not to the addition of an 
extortion element, which in fact was not accomplished by the amendments to the 
information.  Rather, he took the position that the events shown by the evidence 
did not amount to extortion.  His timeliness objection was directed at the addition 
of special circumstance allegations for firearm use and the infliction of bodily 
harm and death, not at the extortion aspect of the kidnapping charge. 
 
Thus, the record fails to support defendant’s argument that counsel’s 
strategy for defending against the kidnapping charge was unfairly disrupted by the 
amendment of the information. 
 
 
7.  Failure to Instruct on a Claim-of-right Defense 
 
As noted above, during a discussion of the kidnapping instructions defense 
counsel maintained that defendant’s attempt to discover where the transmitter was 
located did not amount to extortion.  Counsel said at one point, “I don’t think 
that’s what kidnapping for ransom or extortion is.  They were asking for 
something that he was probably entitled to, and I just don’t see where that falls 
under that.” 
 
Defendant claims the trial court should have instructed on claim of right as 
a defense to kidnapping for extortion.  Yet defendant did not seek such an 
instruction, and any such request would have been improper.  The claim-of-right 
defense does not extend to the crime of extortion.  (People v. Beggs (1918) 178 
Cal. 79, 84; accord, People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 955-956.)  
Therefore, it cannot be raised as a defense to a charge of kidnapping for ransom or 
extortion.  (People v. Serrano (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1672, 1677-1678.) 
 
Defendant argues that because he was attempting to recover specific 
personal property, his case comes within the rationale of Tufunga, where we 
 
44
limited the claim-of-right defense in the robbery context to forcible takings 
intended to recover personal property.  (People v. Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 
956.)  In Tufunga, however, we approved the holding in Beggs that the wrongful 
means employed in extortion cannot be justified by a claim of right.  (People v. 
Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 955-956.)  We upheld the claim-of-right defense 
to robbery based on our conclusion that the Legislature had codified the common 
law recognition of the defense in robbery prosecutions where the defendant sought 
to recover specific personal property.  (Id. at p. 950.)  Thus, Tufunga does not help 
defendant.  He refers us to nothing suggesting  a similar codification of the 
common law claim-of-right defense for either extortion or kidnapping. 
 
 
8.  Modification of CALJIC No. 8.80.1 
 
The trial court gave the jury the following version of CALJIC No. 8.80.1: 
 
“If you find the defendant in this case guilty of murder of the first degree, 
you must then determine whether either or both of the following special 
circumstances are true or not true: 
 
“One, murder during the perpetration of kidnapping; 
 
“And, two, intentional murder for financial gain. 
 
“The People have the burden of proving the truth of a special circumstance.  
If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether a special circumstance is true, you 
must find it to be not true. 
 
“Unless an intent to kill is an element of a special circumstance, if you are 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant actually killed a human 
being, you need not find that the defendant intended to kill in order to find the 
special circumstance to be true. 
 
“You must decide separately each of the special circumstances alleged in 
this case.  If you cannot agree on both of the special circumstances but can agree 
as to one, you must make your finding as to the one upon which you do agree. 
 
“In order to find a special circumstance alleged in this case to be true or 
untrue, you must agree unanimously.  You will state your special finding as to 
 
45
whether this special circumstance is or is not true on the form that will be 
supplied.” 
 
The trial court omitted the following paragraphs from the standard 
instruction: 
 
“If you find that a defendant was not the actual killer of a human being, [or 
if you are unable to decide whether the defendant was the actual killer or [an aider 
or abettor] [or] [co-conspirator],] you cannot find the special circumstance to be 
true [as to that defendant] unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 
such defendant with the intent to kill [aided,] [abetted,] [counseled,] 
[commanded,] [induced,] [solicited,] [requested,] [or] [assisted] any actor in the 
commission of the murder in the first degree] [.] [, or with reckless indifference to 
human life and as a major participant, [aided,] [abetted,] [counseled,] 
[commanded,] [induced,] [solicited,] [requested,] [or] [assisted] in the commission 
of the crime of ____(Penal Code, § 190.2(a)(17) crime)____ which resulted in the death 
of a human being, namely _________. 
 
“A defendant acts with reckless indifference to human life when that 
defendant knows or is aware that [his] [her] acts involve a grave risk of death to an 
innocent human being.” 
 
Defendant claims the omission violated the requirements imposed by 
Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, and Tison v. Arizona (1986) 481 U.S. 
137.  The Enmund court held that the Eighth Amendment does not permit 
imposition of the death penalty on one “who aids and abets a felony in the course 
of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to 
kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed.”  
(Enmund v. Florida, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 797.)  The Tison court held that “major 
participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to 
human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.”  (Tison v. 
Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 158.) 
 
46
 
Instruction on these factors is required only when the evidence would 
support a finding that the defendant was an accomplice rather than the actual 
killer.  If the evidence and the theory on which the case was tried leave no doubt 
that the jury found the defendant to be the actual killer, there is no constitutional 
violation.  (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1204.)  Defendant argues that 
because his counsel attempted to shift responsibility for the actual killing from 
defendant to Rodriguez, the other armed participant in the kidnapping, the issue of 
defendant’s vicarious liability for felony murder was before the jury.  The 
argument lacks merit. 
 
There was no evidence that anyone but defendant shot Taylor.  Defense 
counsel’s suggestions to the contrary were simply speculation, and certainly were 
not intended to establish defendant’s vicarious liability for felony murder.  The 
prosecutor mentioned in passing that for purposes of felony murder “it doesn’t 
matter which of the participants actually pulled the trigger,” but she consistently 
argued that defendant was the actual killer.  She relied on the felony murder rule 
only for the purpose of establishing the intent required for a first degree murder 
verdict, not to argue that defendant could be held vicariously liable.  The court did 
not instruct on the liability of an aider and abetter for felony murder.  (See 
CALJIC No. 8.27.)  It instructed that “the unlawful killing of a human being 
whether intentional, unintentional or accidental which occurs during the 
commission or attempted commission of the crime of kidnapping is murder of the 
first degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit kidnapping.”  
(CALJIC No. 8.21.)  The verdict form reflects a finding that “the murder of 
MICHAEL TAYLOR was committed by defendant, ANDREW LANCASTER, 
while the defendant was engaged in the commission of the crime of kidnapping.” 
 
The evidence, argument, jury instructions, and verdict all reflected that 
defendant’s guilt depended on his role as the actual killer.  The trial court’s 
modification of CALJIC No. 8.80.1 was proper. 
 
 
47
 
C.  Penalty Phase Issues 
 
 
1.  Defendant’s Possession of Handcuff Keys 
 
 
 
a.  Background 
 
In determining whether to impose the death penalty, the jury may consider 
as an aggravating factor “criminal activity by the defendant which involved the 
use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use 
force or violence.”  (Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (b).)  At the beginning of the 
penalty phase here, the prosecutor informed the court and defense counsel that she 
intended to file an amended notice of evidence in aggravation, including a report 
that defendant had been found in possession of a handcuff key in jail.  Defense 
counsel objected that possession of a handcuff key did not “pertain to violence.”  
The item was not an actual handcuff key, but a manufactured implement that “they 
construe to be able to be a handcuff key.” 
 
The court suggested the evidence might relate to an attempted escape.  
Defense counsel responded that mere possession of something that might be used 
as a handcuff key did not amount to attempted escape.  The court asked counsel to 
research whether handcuff key evidence was admissible.  Subsequently, the court 
decided the handcuff key evidence was admissible under Penal Code section 
190.3, factor (b), based on a statement in People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375 
(Howard).  The court recognized that the Howard court had refrained from 
deciding the admissibility issue, due to the overwhelming evidence of other 
criminal activity committed by the defendant.  However, it quoted the following 
passage: 
 
“Arguably, under the circumstances, the possession of the handcuff key and 
its implied intended use to permit defendant to free himself from handcuffs, 
normally worn during defendant’s transportation in the custody and presence of 
law enforcement personnel, constituted criminal activity which posed an ‘implied 
threat’ to use force or violence.”  (Howard, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 428.)  The 
prosecutor adopted this rationale for presenting the handcuff key evidence.  
 
48
Defense counsel argued that defendant had made no attempt to escape, nor was 
there any record that he had ever removed his handcuffs.  The court noted, as 
recognized in Howard, that not all escapes are violent offenses.  (Id. at pp. 427-
428.)  Nevertheless, it concluded that the circumstances under which jail inmates 
are handcuffed are such that any resulting escape would be forceful or violent. 
 
A sheriff’s deputy testified that he had seen handcuff keys “several times.”  
He described them as small, slim pieces of metal, usually box staples.  Inmates 
straightened them, sharpened one end, and formed a hook at the other.  Inmates 
had used such keys to escape from their handcuffs “several times.”  The deputy 
had found three such keys in defendant’s cell, but did not remember where in the 
cell they were.  His written report did not include the location of the keys, which 
had been “disposed of.”  The deputy did not have with him the records showing 
how long it had been since another inmate occupied the cell.  However, the cell 
would have been thoroughly searched before defendant was housed in it. 
 
During a discussion of jury instructions, the court indicated it was 
contemplating an instruction on escape, explaining:  “What I’m trying to do is 
relate a criminal offense to the possession of the handcuff keys so that that can be 
an implied threat to use force or violence.”  The court noted that mere possession 
of a handcuff key in jail is not a crime.  Defense counsel renewed his objection 
that there was an insufficient connection between possession of the keys and any 
escape or violence.  He conceded that the court had already ruled on the point 
when it admitted the handcuff key evidence, but said he would prefer to leave the 
subject out of the instructions.  The court, however, proposed instructing the jury 
on escape by force or violence, in order to connect the possession of handcuff keys 
with a crime involving a threat of force or violence.  It noted that the instruction 
was not required, if counsel did not want it.   He decided not to request the 
instruction, on the theory that “the less that’s said about it the better.” 
 
The court instructed that the jury could consider the following criminal acts 
allegedly committed by defendant as aggravating circumstances:  “Rape, robbery, 
 
49
possession of a weapon in jail and possession of a handcuff key in jail which 
involved the . . . express or implied use of force or violence or the threat of force 
or violence.”  The jury was told it must find that defendant committed these 
criminal acts beyond a reasonable doubt.  The court gave instructions on the 
elements of rape, robbery, and possession of a dirk, dagger, or sharp instrument in 
jail.  It gave no instruction on escape or possession of handcuff keys. 
 
 
 
b.  The Court’s Error 
 
Defendant raises several arguments regarding the handcuff keys, including 
that the evidence was insufficient to establish a threat of violence.  He observes 
that in Howard, we quoted People v. Lopez (1971) 6 Cal.3d 45, 52, for the 
proposition that “ ‘[t]he possibility of violence during an escape can become an 
actuality only when, under the facts of the particular case, the escapee attempts 
violent resistance or, in his efforts to elude capture, conducts himself in a reckless 
manner.’ ”  (Howard, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 427-428.)  Defendant contends that 
mere possession of handcuff keys does not rise even to the level of an attempted 
escape, and thus cannot be said to involve any “express or implied threat to use 
force or violence” under Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b).  We review the trial 
court’s ruling for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th 536, 
587.)  Defendant’s claim is correct. 
 
The criminal activity contemplated by Penal Code section 190.3 is conduct 
that constitutes an offense proscribed by statute.  “ ‘Evidence of prior criminal 
behavior is relevant under section 190.3, factor (b) if it shows “conduct that 
demonstrates the commission of an actual crime, specifically, the violation of a 
penal statute . . . .” ’  (People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1259; People v. 
Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 588 [§ 190.3, factor (b) requires that conduct be 
‘criminal in fact’ in order to constitute valid penalty evidence].)”  (People v. 
Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th 287, 382; see also, e.g., People v. Combs (2004) 34 
Cal.4th 821, 859; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 672.)  As the trial court 
also recognized, possession of makeshift handcuff keys is not such an offense. 
 
50
 
The Attorney General argues that attempted escape is criminal activity for 
purposes of Penal Code section 190.3, and the only reason for defendant to have 
had the handcuff keys would have been to use them to escape.  This argument 
finds some support from the dicta in Howard, but ultimately is not sustainable.  In 
Howard, we acknowledged that escape is not an inherently dangerous crime, 
quoting People v. Lopez, supra, 6 Cal.3d 45, a felony murder case.15  (Howard, 
supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 427-428.)  Nevertheless, we observed that “[a]rguably, 
under the circumstances” the defendant’s “possession of a handcuff key and its 
implied intended use” to facilitate an escape from the immediate custody of law 
enforcement officers would amount to criminal activity posing an implied threat of 
force or violence.  (Id. at p. 428.)  We did not reach the question of admissibility, 
however, nor did we examine the circumstances of the defendant’s handcuff key 
possession in any detail.16 
 
For evidence of handcuff key possession to be admissible in connection 
with an attempted escape, the prosecution must show that the defendant made such 
an attempt.  In People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, for instance, the 
defendant’s threat to kill a sheriff’s deputy was not “criminal activity” under Penal 
Code section 190.3, having occurred before the statute criminalizing such threats 
took effect.  However, we held it was properly admitted as evidence of the 
defendant’s attempt to escape.  (Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1133.)  Here, 
                                              
 
15  In People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, we made it clear that whether 
escape is a dangerous crime for purposes of the felony murder rule has no bearing 
on whether a particular escape or escape attempt involves an “express or implied 
threat to use force or violence” for purposes of Penal Code section 190.3, factor 
(b).  That is a question that “can only be determined by looking to the facts of the 
particular case.”  (Mason, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 955.) 
 
16  Similarly, in People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, disapproved on 
another point in People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 263, footnote 14, we 
noted that possession of a handcuff key might “evince an express or implied threat 
to use force or violence,” under the reasoning of Howard.  (Ochoa, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at p. 447.)  However, as in Howard, we refrained from resolving the 
question, noting that there was also “abundant additional evidence of violent 
activity” by Ochoa.   (Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 448.) 
 
51
defendant’s possession of  handcuff keys was not sufficient to establish an escape 
attempt.  Attempted escape requires a “direct, unequivocal act to effect that 
purpose.”  (People v. Gallegos (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 512, 517.)  Such an act 
“must go beyond mere preparation, and it must show that the perpetrator is putting 
his or her plan into action.”  (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 376; accord, 
People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 230.)17  The presence of handcuff keys in 
defendant’s cell showed, at most, mere preparation.  There was no evidence of an 
actual escape attempt, or any other crime related to the keys.  Accordingly, the 
court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence of handcuff key possession.18 
 
 
 
c.  Prejudice 
 
The error is reversible if there is a reasonable possibility it affected the 
verdict.  This standard is essentially the same as the harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.  (People v. 
Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1264, fn. 11; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 
1164, 1232.)  Given the insignificant impact of the handcuff key evidence as a 
demonstration of conduct involving a threat of violence, the minimal role it played 
                                              
 
17  “Although an attempt to escape is made punishable under Penal Code 
section 4532 and not under Penal Code section 664 (People v. Siegel [(1961)] 198 
Cal.App.2d 676; People v. Diaz [(1962)] 208 Cal.App.2d 41, 51), the general 
section which prescribes punishment for an attempt to commit a crime where no 
provision for punishment is otherwise made, the essential elements of an attempt 
to commit a crime, so as to make the attempt itself punishable, are present in an 
attempt to escape as well as in those attempts made punishable under Penal Code 
section 664.”  (People v. Gallegos, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d  at p. 516.) 
 
18 Defendant’s claim of instructional error is imperfectly stated, but we note 
that the court did indeed err by instructing the jury that it could consider handcuff 
key possession as evidence of conduct involving the implied threat of violence.  
The court is not required to give instructions on the identity or elements of 
criminal activity introduced under Penal Code section 190.3, but if it does it must 
instruct the jury accurately.  (People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 383.)  
Here, as in Hughes, the court erroneously instructed the jury that it could consider 
conduct that was not a crime.  (Ibid.) 
 
We need not consider defendant’s other arguments regarding the handcuff 
key evidence.  As discussed next, no prejudice resulted from the trial court’s 
ruling.   
 
52
in the prosecutor’s argument, and the other compelling evidence presented during 
the penalty phase, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was 
harmless. 
 
Defendant contends reversal is required because the prosecutor was 
permitted to argue that he posed a threat of violence if he escaped from his 
handcuffs; the handcuff key evidence tended to undercut the notion that his 
possession of a shank in jail was for purposes of his own protection; and the 
evidence of his other criminal conduct did not establish a persistent pattern of 
escalating violence and was not so overwhelming as to render the error harmless.  
These arguments do not persuade. 
 
We have noted that escape evidence may be particularly prejudicial if used 
to suggest to the jury that the death penalty is the only means of protecting the 
public from a defendant who poses a significant escape risk.  (People v. Jackson, 
supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 1232-1233.)  Here, however, the prosecutor made no such 
insinuation.  Her argument on the point was almost perfunctory.  She contended 
that the “jail-made keys” found in defendant’s cell showed some sophistication on 
his part, and noted the testimony that inmates do get out of their handcuffs.  She 
then said:  “Why would the defendant need to get out of handcuffs?  Under this, 
ladies and gentlemen, you can show evidence of threat of violence.  If he gets out 
of those handcuffs, there’s a threat of violence, there is a threat of escape, and you 
can take that into consideration.”  Later, she briefly mentioned the keys and the 
shank, and stated:  “There are people in custody that don’t deserve the death 
penalty at the hands of this defendant.”  The prosecutor did not mention the keys 
at all in her rebuttal argument. 
 
The threat posed by defendant’s possession of handcuff keys was not a 
major part of the prosecutor’s penalty phase case.  Much more direct and graphic 
evidence of defendant’s violent conduct was before the jury.  As a teenager, he 
brutally raped a 9-year-old girl.  The victim testified, describing the crime and its 
dramatic impact on her life.  Defendant and an accomplice had surprised another 
 
53
witness inside her home, bound and gagged her, stole her car and other items, and 
left her tied to a mattress.  The testimony about the handcuff keys, and the implied 
threat of violence arising from their possession, paled in comparison to this 
testimony relating defendant’s actual violent behavior, and to the evidence of 
Taylor’s kidnapping and murder. 
 
Nor does the record reflect that the handcuff key evidence had a significant 
impact on defendant’s explanation for possessing a shank in jail.  The keys were 
discovered months after the shank was confiscated.  The deputy who found the 
shank testified on cross-examination that defendant had told him it “was for his 
protection,” but defense counsel did not mention this testimony in his closing 
argument.  Instead, he noted that defendant had not hurt anyone while in custody. 
 
Considered in light of the record as whole, the erroneously admitted 
handcuff key evidence was trivial.  There is no reasonable possibility that it 
affected the penalty verdict. 
 
 
2.  Taylor’s Opinion on the Death Penalty 
 
Defense counsel’s proposed penalty phase witnesses included two persons 
he described as Taylor’s friends and fellow activists.  They had approached 
counsel and asked to testify about Taylor’s opposition to the death penalty.  
Defense counsel contended this evidence was admissible under Penal Code section 
190.3, factor (k), which permits the jury to take into account “[a]ny other 
circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a 
legal excuse for the crime.”  He argued that Taylor’s view on the death penalty 
was highly relevant to the jury’s determination.  According to counsel, Taylor was 
closer to his fellow activists than he was to his family, who would be testifying for 
the prosecution.  Counsel said it would be the “ultimate irony” for his client to be 
executed for killing someone who had made it his life’s work to oppose the death 
penalty.  He proffered two exhibits:  a press release prepared by an activist 
 
54
organization announcing the witnesses’ intention to testify on defendant’s behalf, 
and a tape recording of various statements made by Taylor.19 
 
The court excluded this evidence, concluding that Taylor’s views were not 
a relevant mitigating factor, because they did not pertain to the defendant’s 
character or the circumstances of the crime.  The court also deemed the evidence 
unduly prejudicial. 
 
Nevertheless, Taylor’s views were briefly reflected in the testimony of one 
witness.  Reverend Richard Byrd testified that he knew both Taylor and defendant.  
He had worked with Taylor at KPFK, and joined in Taylor’s efforts to start an 
unlicensed radio station.  Both men had both taken an interest in the Mumia Abu-
Jamal case.  Counsel asked him if “one of [Taylor’s] causes was opposition to 
certain things, the death penalty, things of that nature?”  The witness answered, 
“indeed.”  When asked if this stance made Taylor controversial, he replied “very 
much so.” 
 
The prosecutor asked the court to bar defense counsel from arguing 
Taylor’s death penalty opinions.  The court granted this request, noting that 
despite the court’s ruling defense counsel had “snuck [the evidence] in.”  The 
court conceded that there was “some fairness” in allowing the jury to be informed 
on this point, but admonished counsel not to argue it. 
 
Defendant contends the exclusion of this evidence was error.  He 
acknowledges that in People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581 (Smith), this court 
affirmed a ruling barring one of the defendant’s victims from testifying that she 
                                              
 
19  The proffered evidence actually fell well short of establishing Taylor’s 
opposition to capital punishment as a matter of principle.  The press release noted 
only that he opposed the death penalty in the Pennsylvania case of Mumia Abu-
Jamal.  The transcript of Taylor’s statements included many declarations 
supporting Jamal, but none opposing capital punishment in general.  Defendant’s 
own testimony at the penalty phase indicated that Taylor was primarily concerned 
with Jamal’s case.  Defendant stated:  “Them people that spoke up about Michael 
Taylor, most of them didn’t even know nothing about Michael Taylor.  He wasn’t 
fighting for Mumia Abu Jamal’s freedom point blank for the death penalty [sic].  
He was fighting against it because the man was wrongfully convicted.” 
 
55
did not believe the death penalty was appropriate.  Defendant attempts to 
distinguish Smith on several grounds, none of which is persuasive. 
 
In Smith, evidence of defendant’s numerous assaults against women, 
including rapes, was presented during the penalty phase as evidence in 
aggravation.  (Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 599-600.)  The defense obtained a 
protective order barring the prosecution from asking the victims of these crimes 
for their opinions on the appropriate punishment.  As it happened, however, one of 
the victims was opposed to the death penalty and refused to testify unless she 
could express her view on the defendant’s punishment.  Over the defendant’s 
objection, the trial court ruled that the victim’s opinion was inadmissible.  (Id. at p. 
622.) 
 
As we stated in Smith:  “It is clear that the prosecution may not elicit the 
views of a victim or victim’s family as to the proper punishment.  (Booth v. 
Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496, 508-509.)  The high court overruled Booth in part, 
but it left intact its holding that ‘the admission of a victim’s family members’ 
characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate 
sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.’  (Payne v. Tennessee [(1991)] 501 U.S. 
[808,] 830, fn. 2.)  That court has never suggested that the defendant must be 
permitted to do what the prosecution may not do.  The views of a crime victim . . . 
regarding the proper punishment has no bearing on the defendant’s character or 
record or any circumstance of the offense.  (Skipper v. South Carolina [(1986)] 
476 U.S. [1,] 4.)  Hence, the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
does not compel admission of those views.  (Robison v. Maynard (10th Cir. 1991) 
943 F.2d 1216, 1216-1217 [even after Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. 808, 
‘testimony from a victim’s relative that she did not want the jury to impose the 
death penalty was improper mitigating evidence and inadmissible at the penalty 
phase hearing’].) 
 
“Citing [Penal Code] section 190.3 and the United States Constitution, we 
have held that testimony from somebody ‘with whom defendant assertedly had a 
 
56
significant relationship, that defendant deserves to live, is proper mitigating 
evidence as “indirect evidence of the defendant’s character.” ’  (People v. Ervin 
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 102; see also People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 194; 
People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 194.)  This evidence is admitted, not 
because the person’s opinion is itself significant, but because it provides insights 
into the defendant’s character.  (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 456.)”  
(Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 622-623, original italics.)  The Smith court 
concluded that the victim’s testimony was inadmissible because she had no 
relationship with the defendant other than being his rape victim.  (Id. at p. 623.) 
 
Defendant argues that, unlike the victim in Smith, he had a significant 
working relationship with Taylor in the months preceding the murder, involving 
their social activism and including opposition to the death penalty.  He contends 
that admission of Taylor’s view on capital punishment would have provided 
“insights into an altruistic quality of [defendant’s] character.”  The argument fails.  
As noted in Smith, testimony from persons who know a defendant and wish his 
life to be spared is admissible as evidence of the defendant’s character.  
Defendant, of course, could not provide testimony regarding Taylor’s opinion on 
whether defendant deserved to live.  Taylor’s opposition to the death penalty as a 
matter of principle, if indeed it could have been established (see fn. 19, ante, p. 
54), was not evidence of defendant’s character.  If Taylor’s asserted view on this 
subject cast any reflection on defendant it was not a complimentary one.  It would 
have shown that defendant was willing to kill a fellow activist over disputed radio 
equipment, despite their purported stand against the death penalty.   
 
Defendant also claims that evidence of Taylor’s opinion should have been 
admitted to rebut the testimony of Taylor’s mother, brother, and daughter, who 
spoke of the effects his killing had on the family.  Defendant notes that such 
“victim impact” testimony was admissible as a “circumstance of the crime of 
which [he] was convicted.”  (Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (a); see People v. Edwards 
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 835; People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1180.)  He 
 
57
argues that Taylor’s opinion was a similar “circumstance of the crime.”  Rebuttal 
evidence, however, must relate to the subject matter of the opponent’s evidence.  
(People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 579.)  Defendant fails to explain how 
evidence of Taylor’s views on the death penalty would have operated to rebut his 
family members’ testimony about the loss of their loved one.  He merely repeats 
his contention that Taylor’s views would have illuminated the “better angels” of 
defendant’s character.  There is no material, logical, or moral connection between 
the effects of defendant’s crime on the victim’s family and the victim’s views on 
capital punishment, whatever they may have been, and to whatever extent they 
were shared by defendant.  (Cf. People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 833.) 
 
Finally, defendant asserts that the evidence was admissible under Penal 
Code section 190.3, factor (k), as a “circumstance which extenuate[d] the gravity 
of the crime even though it [was] not a legal excuse for the crime.”  He suggests 
that Taylor’s own choice to “embrace mercy and compassion” was a mitigating 
circumstance the jury should have been allowed to consider.  This claim also lacks 
merit.  The gravity of defendant’s crime was not extenuated by his victim’s 
idealism. 
 
The evidence of Taylor’s opinion on the death penalty was properly 
excluded. 
 
 
3.  Claims Regarding Defendant’s Testimony 
 
Defendant raises four arguments related to his testimony at the penalty 
phase.  He contends the trial court failed to adequately advise him of the limited 
scope of his testimony and the potential pitfalls of testifying; erroneously limited 
the scope of his testimony; improperly overruled defense objections to the scope 
of cross-examination; and unfairly required defendant to testify before his 
psychologist had finished testifying.  None of these claims is meritorious. 
 
 
 
a.  Failure to Advise 
 
 At the beginning of the penalty phase, defense counsel told the court that, 
against his advice, defendant wanted to testify.  Counsel said he assumed 
 
58
defendant had that right, just as at the guilt phase.20  The following exchange 
ensued: 
 
“The Court:  It’s equally or more important in the penalty phase that he has 
a right to testify. 
 
“[Defense Counsel]:  If he does, I’d like the admonition from the court that 
he’s doing it without my advice and in direct contravention to what I think would 
be my position on him doing that, but he has an absolute right to do it if he wants 
to. 
 
“The Court:  Okay.  Well, you’ve advised him now on the record. 
 
“And again, Mr. Lancaster, that’s your personal choice to make.  No one 
can prevent you from testifying.  At the end of the case I’ll check to make sure if 
you haven’t testified whether or not you want to testify.” 
 
The court added, “This is a more personal decision on your part than it is 
during the guilt phase, because one advantage to testifying is obviously that they 
know you as a person instead of somebody that’s just been sitting there. 
 
“But your attorney has given you contrary advice, and you’ve got to 
consider both sides in making your personal decision.” 
 
Defendant decided to testify.  He now contends the court’s advisement was 
inadequate and misleading, because the court did not admonish him about the risks 
of testifying, failed to revisit the matter immediately before defendant took the 
stand, held no hearing to explore defendant’s disagreement with counsel over the 
decision, and did not warn him that the scope of his testimony would be limited.  
The court was not required to do any of those things. 
 
Defendant relies on People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, and People 
v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915 (overruled on another point in Price v. Superior 
Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13).  These cases are inapposite.  The 
Nakahara trial court gave the admonishments and held the hearing that defendant 
claims he should have received.  Nakahara complained that the court did not 
                                              
 
20  Defendant had accepted counsel’s advice not to testify at the guilt phase. 
 
59
sufficiently protect his right to counsel and failed to caution him against testifying 
in narrative fashion.  This court concluded the court’s admonishments were 
adequate, but did not hold they were required.  (People v. Nakahara, supra, 30 
Cal.4th at p. 717.)  The Guzman trial court gave a more extensive set of warnings, 
but Guzman faulted his counsel for forcing him to testify in narrative fashion, and 
the court for not telling him that the jury was likely to infer he was lying.  We 
rejected these arguments.  (People v. Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 942, 946.)  
However, as the Nakahara court noted, “nowhere in our Guzman opinion did we 
suggest that such an array of admonishments was a necessary or constitutional 
prerequisite to receiving a defendant’s testimony against advice of counsel.”  
(People v. Nakahara, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 717.) 
 
A defendant has a fundamental right to testify on his own behalf.  (People 
v. Nakahara, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 717; see Rock v. Arkansas (1987) 483 U.S. 
44, 49-53.)  “[A] defendant may be allowed to exercise, or not to exercise, the 
right to testify, without advisement by the trial court.”  (People v. Barnum (2003) 
29 Cal.4th 1210, 1223.)  Defendant refers us to no authority requiring an 
admonition in this situation.  Indeed, he cites cases holding that the court should 
not interfere with the defendant’s decision.  (United States v. Teague (11th Cir. 
1992) 953 F.2d 1525, 1533, fn. 8; United States v. Campione (7th Cir. 1991) 942 
F.2d 429, 439; United States v. Martinez (9th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 750, 757, 
vacated on another ground (9th Cir. 1991) 928 F.2d 1470.)  Defendant suggests 
the court’s comments in this case improperly encouraged him to testify.  Not so.  
The court’s brief observation that there was an advantage to testifying at the 
penalty phase was balanced by its advice that defendant should consider his 
attorney’s contrary view. 
 
 
 
b.  Limitations on the Testimony 
 
Defendant embarked on his narrative testimony by claiming the accusations 
against him were false, and based on testimony that was “bought” by the 
prosecution.  He then referred to Taylor’s advocacy on behalf of Mumia Abu-
 
60
Jamal, and attempted to draw a parallel between Jamal’s case and his own, as 
follows: 
 
“[T]he man was wrongfully convicted by a jury.  The police said he killed 
somebody in Philadelphia.  The police said this.  Just like in this case the 
prosecution lied, intimidated witness [sic] to testify against me, yeah, to convict 
him.  They put his fingerprints on the gun —”  The prosecutor objected at this 
point, claiming the testimony was irrelevant.  The court sustained the objection.  A 
little later, defendant described his experience in prison after a previous 
conviction, and attempted to connect it with other cases.  “They tried to dope me 
up with medication.  Didn’t work.  Whenever a black man talks about revolution 
or up rising or fighting for his own rights, they label him crazy.  That’s what they 
did to Mumia Abu-Jamal.  That’s their excuse.  There ain’t no excuse for that.  
They do it to Ron, Huey P. Newton.  They experiment on black people.”  Again, 
the court sustained a relevance objection. 
 
Defendant argues first that the court erroneously barred him from 
expressing his view that the prosecutor had manipulated and bribed the witnesses 
against him.  This claim is not supported by the record; defendant’s testimony 
regarding the conduct of his own prosecution was neither objected to nor 
excluded.  The court sustained objections only to his statements regarding other 
cases.  Defendant also contends those statements should have been admitted, 
because they demonstrated his “political awareness and aspiration to fight against 
racial discrimination” and his “own view of himself and his place in the world.” 
 
Defendant relies on People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, for the 
proposition that “a defendant’s absolute right to testify cannot be foreclosed or 
censored based on content.”  (Id. at p. 535.)  That statement must be understood in 
context; it addressed Webb’s contention that the trial court should not have 
allowed him to testify in favor of a death sentence.  The relevance of the testimony 
was not challenged.  It is beyond cavil that evidence presented in mitigation must 
be relevant to the defendant’s character and prior record, or the circumstances of 
 
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the charged offense.  (E.g., People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 988-989; 
Kansas v. Marsh (2006) __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 2525.)  “Evidence of third 
persons’ having been wrongfully convicted of capital offenses is irrelevant to the 
jury’s function in the case before them and is therefore inadmissible.  [Citations].”  
(People v. Alcala (1993) 4 Cal.4th 742, 807.)  Testimony that other prisoners had 
been “label[led] crazy” and “experiment[ed]” upon was similarly irrelevant to 
defendant’s character, record, and the circumstances of his offense. 
 
Defendant claims his counsel explained to the court that his client was 
about to discuss the relevant topic of why the radio station was being started, but 
his testimony was nevertheless precluded.  However, the record discloses no such 
explanation during defendant’s direct testimony, and in any event defendant was 
permitted to testify about the radio station without objection. 
 
 
 
c.  The Scope of Cross-examination 
 
Over objection, the prosecutor cross-examined defendant about his 
statements to the police shortly before and after his arrest.  Defendant contends the 
scope of this examination exceeded that of his direct testimony.  He also claims it 
was unfair to use this evidence because he had no access to the tapes or transcripts 
of the statements before he took the stand. 
 
“It is settled that the trial court is given wide discretion in controlling the 
scope of relevant cross-examination.”  (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 128, 
187.)  The court did not abuse its discretion here.  Defendant testified that the 
witnesses against him had been bribed, that it was a lie to say he had killed Taylor, 
and that he would not “cop to something I didn’t do.”  The prosecutor’s cross-
examination was properly directed at defendant’s taped statements about the 
witnesses, and his responses to police questioning about the crime and the 
evidence.  Defendant was allowed to refresh his memory by reading the transcript 
when he had difficulty remembering the interviews.  He fails to establish any 
impropriety in the cross-examination. 
 
 
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d.  Sequence of the Testimony 
 
During a discussion regarding the scheduling of witnesses, defense counsel 
told the court that “my whole penalty phase has been set up predicated on having 
Dr. Romanoff testify first, and he won’t be available until tomorrow.”  Counsel 
did call Dr. Romanoff as his first witness the next morning.  After the direct 
examination was completed, however, counsel reported that the doctor had 
changed his schedule to appear that morning, a Friday, but was leaving for a 
camping trip in the afternoon.  Counsel was concerned that this would not leave 
the prosecutor enough time to complete her cross-examination.  The doctor would 
be available again on Monday.  The court extended the Friday morning session 
until 12:30, but the prosecutor indicated she would need to continue with the 
doctor on Monday. 
 
Reluctant to “wast[e] half a day,” the court inquired whether defendant had 
decided to testify.  Counsel replied:  “He’s told me he still wants to.  The only 
reason I am so accommodating of Dr. Romanoff is he has been incredibly 
accommodating to me, to the court, as you know.  He came in to the court, he’s 
been in jail several times, he’s had problems with Mr. Lancaster being reticent.  
He’s gone there at times when he’s refused to see him, and he’s gone through all 
of that and he’s been very patient.  Any latitude that he wants, I think he’s entitled 
to.  That’s the only reason I would ask.”  The prosecutor had no objection to 
continuing her questioning on Monday.  Defendant testified on Friday afternoon. 
 
Defendant contends he was denied the right to make a fully informed 
decision whether to testify at the close of the defense case.  He cites Brooks v. 
Tennessee (1972) 406 U.S. 605, in which the court declared unconstitutional a 
statute requiring criminal defendants to testify before any other defense witness.  
The court held that the statute impermissibly deprived defendants of the ability to 
assess the testimony of other defense witnesses before deciding whether to testify 
and risk cross-examination.  (Id. at pp. 609-612.)  The court further held that the 
statute violated defendants’ due process right to the advice of counsel, by 
 
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requiring counsel to make an important tactical decision without the opportunity to 
evaluate the testimony of the other defense witnesses.  (Id. at pp. 612-613.)   
 
Brooks does not support defendant’s claim.  It did not arise from the 
penalty phase of a capital trial.  Moreover, defendant was not forced to testify first.  
The court granted his counsel’s request to permit Dr. Romanoff to leave before the 
doctor’s cross-examination could be completed.  This is not a case like People v. 
Cuccia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 785, in which the court effectively compelled the 
defendant to take the stand by threatening to consider his case completed after a 
defense witness failed to appear.  (Id. at p. 790-791.)  Here, the court merely 
exercised its discretion to regulate the order of proof (Evid. Code, § 320) in 
response to defense counsel’s desire to accommodate a witness’s vacation plans.  
The Brooks court noted that its holding did not “curtail[] in any way the ordinary 
power of a trial judge to set the order of proof.”  (Brooks v. Tennessee, supra, 406 
U.S. at p. 613.) 
 
 
4.  Admission of the Taped Statements 
 
Before Dr. Romanoff began his testimony, defense counsel objected to the 
prosecutor’s plan to play the tapes of defendant’s statements to the police around 
the time of his arrest.  He claimed the prosecutor’s only purpose was to show that 
defendant was a liar, which counsel was willing to concede.  The prosecutor said 
she had provided the doctor with copies of the statements and asked him to listen 
to the tapes.  She wanted to use them to rebut any suggestion by Dr. Romanoff that 
defendant was “more of a follower,” to show that he was a habitual liar, and to 
demonstrate why he may have refused to answer some of the doctor’s questions.  
Defense counsel argued that it was improper at this point in the trial to bring up 
defendant’s lies to the police.  The court overruled the objection, observing that 
the tapes might be relevant either to impeach the doctor’s testimony or to explore 
whether his opinion might change based on the tapes.  It invited counsel to revisit 
the matter before Dr. Romanoff’s cross-examination. 
 
64
 
The parties did so during a break in the doctor’s direct testimony.  The 
prosecutor said she intended to play the tapes in their entirety.  Defense counsel 
vigorously objected, claiming the prosecutor was simply trying to prejudice his 
client by demonstrating unpleasant aspects of his character.  At counsel’s urging, 
the court reviewed the transcripts of the tapes before ruling.  It observed that the 
tapes covered many subjects, and asked the prosecutor why they needed to be 
played.  The prosecutor said she they supported her theory that defendant was a 
habitual liar, who was likely to have lied to the doctor, and who may have tried to 
use the doctor to find “a new way out.”  The court accepted this explanation and 
overruled the objection. 
 
The prosecutor did not introduce the tapes into evidence until Dr. Romanoff 
returned to the stand on Monday.  During her cross-examination of defendant on 
Friday afternoon, however, the prosecutor questioned defendant at length about 
the taped statements.  During a break in this cross-examination, defense counsel 
asked the court to exclude one particular statement:  when asked what he was 
doing the night Taylor was murdered, defendant had replied “I fuck the shit out of 
my wife like I do every night.”  Counsel argued that this statement had little 
evidentiary value and was unduly inflammatory.  The prosecutor responded that it 
was part of defendant’s alibi.  The court overruled the objection.  It noted that 
some prejudice was created by the way defendant expressed himself, but decided 
the statement was “more probative than prejudicial.”  Nevertheless, when the 
prosecutor questioned defendant about his statements regarding his whereabouts 
on the night of Taylor’s murder, she did not mention the statement to which 
defense counsel had objected. 
 
On Monday, before Dr. Romanoff’s cross-examination resumed, counsel 
raised a final objection to the tapes.  Again, he conceded that defendant made 
many “misstatements of fact,” and contended the tapes were unduly prejudicial.  
The prosecutor submitted the matter, noting that defendant had opened the door to 
the admission of his statements by taking the stand and discussing the crime.  The 
 
65
court again overruled the objection, observing that the statements were admissible 
regarding both the offense itself and the doctor’s opinion.  Dr. Romanoff testified 
that he had listened to the tapes, but only after he completed his report.  He said 
they were consistent with his view of defendant.  After the tapes were played, the 
prosecutor asked the doctor only a few questions and did not address defendant’s 
alibi. 
 
Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error by allowing 
the tapes to be played without excluding his alibi statement regarding marital sex.  
He argues that this statement did not fall within any permissible category of 
aggravating evidence, because the acts involved were not criminal and did not 
tend to prove any factor listed in Penal Code section 190.3.  He claims his 
statement merely portrayed him in an unpleasant way, and asserts that its 
prejudicial impact outweighed any value it may have had in assessing Dr. 
Romanoff’s conclusions. 
 
These arguments are meritless.  In the first place, defendant did not ask the 
court to redact the marital sex alibi before playing the tapes; he specifically 
objected to the admission of that statement only during his own cross-examination.  
Although the objection was unsuccessful, the prosecutor refrained from bringing 
up the sexual aspect of the alibi during her questioning.  Furthermore, by testifying 
and asserting his innocence, defendant placed at issue his statements regarding the 
circumstances of the crime.  The alibi evidence was not offered in aggravation, but 
to impeach both defendant and Dr. Romanoff.  A trial court has broad latitude to 
weigh the prejudicial impact of defendant’s statement against its probative value.  
(People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 625-626.)  Furthermore, it is well 
settled that the scope of cross-examination of an expert witness is especially 
broad; a prosecutor may bring in facts beyond those introduced on direct 
examination in order to explore the grounds and reliability of the expert’s opinion.  
(People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 358-359; People v. Dennis (1998) 17 
Cal.4th 468, 519; People v. Nye (1969) 71 Cal.2d 356, 374-375.) 
 
66
 
 
5.  The Statement About the Robbery 
 
In connection with the prior home invasion robbery defendant committed 
with an accomplice, the prosecutor unsuccessfully solicited a statement made after 
the two were arrested.  An officer transporting defendant and his accomplice to 
juvenile hall testified that she overheard a conversation between the suspects in the 
back seat of the patrol car.  The officer stated that the two were laughing, and one 
of them (she was not sure which) said “the bitch deserved it because she left her 
door open.”  Defense counsel promptly moved to strike this testimony.  The court 
sustained the objection and struck the answer.  Subsequently, the court sustained 
counsel’s objection to the entire line of questioning.  The jury was later instructed 
not to consider any evidence that was stricken by the court. 
 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury more 
specifically to disregard the stricken testimony.  He provides no authority to 
support this argument, and in any event his claim of prejudice is manifestly 
meritless.  The stricken testimony did not establish that it was defendant who 
made the comment in question, and the comment itself was not particularly 
prejudicial, compared to the other evidence in aggravation. 
 
 
6.  Standard of Proof for Aggravating Factors 
 
Defendant argues that the jury should have been instructed to make its 
findings on all aggravating factors unanimously, and by the standard of beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  He contends such an instruction is required under Apprendi v. 
New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, and 
Blakely v. Washington (2000) 542 U.S. 296.  We have repeatedly rejected this 
argument, and do so again here.  (E.g., People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 
143; People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th 50, 104; People v. Morrison, supra, 34 
Cal.4th 698, 730-731.) 
 
In his reply brief, defendant refers to the high court’s more recent decision 
in United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220.  He does not, however, argue that 
Booker adds anything to the analysis; he merely notes that it reaffirmed the 
 
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holding in Apprendi.  (Booker, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 244.)  Thus, defendant 
provides us with no reason to reconsider our earlier holdings on this point. 
 
 
7.  Denial of Modification 
 
Defendant’s final argument has been filed under seal.  He contends that, in 
ruling on the application for modification of his death sentence (Pen. Code, 
§ 190.4, subd. (e)), the court improperly relied on evidence he had no opportunity 
to deny or explain, in violation of Gardner v. Florida (1977) 430 U.S. 349.  He 
bases this claim on sealed transcripts of two hearings.  At a July 16, 1996 hearing, 
the prosecutor appeared ex parte and explained to the court why she had not given 
defendant, then representing himself, certain discovery materials.  The trial judge 
did not preside at this hearing.  At a May 29, 1997 hearing, held before the trial 
judge, counsel for Rodriguez and Alexander appeared ex parte seeking access to 
defendant’s confidential prison medical records.  Rodriguez and Alexander were 
then codefendants; counsel wanted to show that they were coerced or intimidated 
by defendant.  The request was denied. 
 
Defendant argues that he was cast in a very damaging light at these 
hearings, and claims the trial court must have considered the allegations about his 
character made by counsel when it refused to modify his sentence.  He notes that 
counsel’s comments portrayed him as a member of a Black paramilitary group, an 
“executioner,” and a threatening figure who coerced his accomplices and 
attempted to intimidate witnesses.  He contends the court’s findings at the 
modification hearing that Alexander and Rodriguez were “clear followers,” that 
Alexander was “slow-witted,” and that both were “easily led” by defendant, who 
was “very smart,” were tainted by information disclosed at the ex parte hearings.  
However, the court expressly referred to the trial testimony of Alexander and 
Rodriguez, and its notes on that testimony, when it made its findings.  It is highly 
unlikely that the court would have considered remarks made by counsel at brief 
pretrial hearings, one held over two years earlier before a different judge and the 
 
68
other held over a year previously, when it had just heard the extensive testimony at 
trial, including defendant’s own.  
 
We have reviewed the sealed transcripts, and the trial court’s detailed 
statement of its reasons for denying modification.  As in People v. Sakarias (2000) 
22 Cal.4th 596, 649, the record “provides not the slightest reason to suppose the 
trial court here relied on or considered” the information defendant complains 
about.  When the court makes no mention of improper material when denying 
modification, we will not conclude there was any improper influence.  (People v. 
Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 383.)21 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment is affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
                                              
 
21  Defendant notes that at the May 29, 1997 hearing, Alexander’s counsel 
referred to “an earlier declaration of some of my client’s background.”  In a 
footnote to his brief, he asks us to unseal this declaration in case it might bolster 
his showing.  Even if defendant had complied with the procedural requirements 
for unsealing a record (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.160(f)), it is inconceivable that 
this item would assist him.  As stated above, the court expressly based its findings 
on Alexander’s trial testimony.  We deny the request. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Lancaster 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S073596 
Date Filed: May 24, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: William R. Pounders 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Roger Teich and David Groom, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Sharlene A. Honnaka and Zee Rodriguez, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Roger Teich 
1328 Fell Street 
San Francisco, CA  94117 
(415) 346-6074 
 
Zee Rodriguez 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 576-1342