Title: Commonwealth v. Dones
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13271
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 23, 2023

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13271 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MIGUEL REMI DONES. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     December 7, 2022. – June 23, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Youthful Offender Act.  Firearms.  Practice, Criminal, Sentence.  
Department of Youth Services.  Juvenile Court, Probation.  
Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 8, 2021. 
 
Following transfer to the Hampden County Division of the 
Juvenile Court Department, a motion to revise the sentence was 
heard by David B. Paradis, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Cynthia Cullen Payne, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Debbie F. Freitas for the defendant. 
Sara LoPresti, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  At issue in this case is the question whether 
a Juvenile Court judge may commit a youthful offender to the 
2 
 
custody of the Department of Youth Services (DYS) until his 
twenty-first birthday, and then suspend that commitment with 
conditions of probation.  We conclude that a judge in the 
Juvenile Court has such discretion to suspend a commitment in 
that manner, and that the judge in this case did not abuse his 
discretion in doing so.  We therefore affirm the denial of the 
Commonwealth's motion to revise the juvenile's sentence.1 
 
1.  Background.  During a motor vehicle stop, a State 
police trooper saw a firearm in plain view in the vehicle driven 
by the juvenile, who was then seventeen years old.  The trooper 
removed the juvenile from the vehicle and arrested him.  The 
juvenile subsequently was indicted as a youthful offender, see 
G. L. c. 119, § 54, on a charge of carrying a firearm without a 
license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  Because the juvenile's family 
was unable to post bail, the juvenile was held at a DYS facility 
for eight months prior to entering into a plea agreement. 
 
In tendering his plea, the juvenile recommended a 
continuation without a finding, with supervised probation and a 
condition that he possess no weapons, until his nineteenth 
birthday.  The Commonwealth recommended that the juvenile be 
found guilty as a youthful offender and sentenced to eighteen 
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the youth 
advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
Attorney Naoka Carey, and Citizens for Juvenile Justice. 
3 
 
months in a house of correction.  After a plea colloquy, the 
Juvenile Court judge adjudicated the juvenile to be a youthful 
offender and ordered him committed to DYS until he reached the 
age of twenty-one, pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 58 (c).  The 
judge then suspended the commitment pursuant to G. L. c. 279, 
§ 2, with conditions of probation, see G. L. c. 276, § 87, until 
the day before the juvenile's twenty-first birthday. 
 
As required by G. L. c. 119, § 58, fourth par.,2 prior to 
imposing sentence, the judge conducted a sentencing 
recommendation hearing and made a number of findings.  The 
record shows that the judge considered all of the statutory 
factors set out in that paragraph to the extent that they were 
 
 
2 General Laws c. 119, § 58, fourth par., provides in 
relevant part: 
 
"In making [a] determination [of a youthful offender,] the 
court shall conduct a sentencing recommendation hearing to 
determine the sentence by which the present and long-term 
public safety would be best protected.  At such hearing, 
the court shall consider, but not be limited to, the 
following factors:  the nature, circumstances and 
seriousness of the offense; victim impact statement; a 
report by a probation officer concerning the history of the 
youthful offender; the youthful offender's court and 
delinquency records; the success or lack of success of any 
past treatment or delinquency dispositions regarding the 
youthful offender; the nature of services available through 
the juvenile justice system; the youthful offender's age 
and maturity; and the likelihood of avoiding future 
criminal conduct.  In addition, the court may consider any 
other factors it deems relevant to disposition." 
4 
 
applicable to the juvenile's offense.  The Commonwealth does not 
dispute any of the judge's findings. 
 
The judge found that the juvenile lived with his mother, 
father, and four brothers.  He was welcome in the family home 
and got along with all of his family members.  He had a two year 
old child and took an active role in raising that child.  With 
respect to the juvenile's age and maturity level, the judge 
noted that, at eighteen years old, the juvenile enjoyed playing 
basketball, "hang[ing] out" with friends, and playing video 
games.  The judge found that even though the juvenile was 
"immature" for his age, he was young enough that "probation 
and/or DYS" would "have time to work with him and assist in his 
maturing process." 
 
With respect to the eight months that the juvenile spent in 
a DYS facility awaiting disposition, the judge found that the 
juvenile had done very well.  The juvenile was able to maintain 
the highest behavioral level and earned recognition as the 
"group member of the week" multiple times.  The juvenile met 
with his clinician daily and actively participated in daily 
psycho-educational groups, including substance use disorder 
prevention, interpersonal effectiveness, and "DBT Mindfulness."  
He did not instigate any problems, and if he was targeted by 
peers, he was able to express his concerns to staff and to ask 
5 
 
for help.  The judge also considered the Juvenile Court's 
policies on dispositional and sentencing best practices. 
 
Based on his considerations of the sentencing policies and 
all of his findings, the judge determined that, pursuant to 
G. L. c. 119, § 58, the present and long-term safety of the 
public would best be served by committing the juvenile to DYS 
until he reached the age of twenty-one, with the commitment 
suspended and conditions of probation imposed.  In addition to 
the standard conditions of probation, the judge added a number 
of special conditions:  that the juvenile must either obtain 
employment or work toward a general equivalency diploma; that he 
not possess drugs or alcohol and must submit to random screens; 
and that he not possess firearms or other dangerous weapons. 
 
The Commonwealth then timely moved for a revision of the 
juvenile's sentence.  Specifically, the Commonwealth challenged 
the judge's decision to suspend the juvenile's commitment to DYS 
and to place him on probation.  The judge denied the motion, and 
the Commonwealth appealed to the Appeals Court.  We transferred 
the matter to this court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  This case requires us to consider the 
interplay of four statutes:  G. L. c. 119, § 58, which, inter 
alia, sets forth dispositional options for youthful offenders; 
G. L. c. 279, § 2, which generally authorizes a Juvenile Court 
judge to suspend a juvenile's commitment to DYS; G. L. c. 276, 
6 
 
§ 87, which generally permits a judge of certain Trial Court 
departments, including the Juvenile Court, to place a defendant 
on probation; and G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), which prescribes 
punishments for unlawful possession of a firearm.  Whether these 
statutes provide a Juvenile Court judge with the discretion to 
suspend a youthful offender's commitment to DYS, with probation 
being imposed in lieu of the committed sentence, is a legal 
issue that we consider de novo.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Beverly, 485 Mass. 1, 11 (2020). 
 
"As with all matters of statutory construction, our goal in 
construing [a] . . . statute is to ascertain and effectuate the 
intent of the Legislature."  Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 489 Mass. 
589, 593 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Newberry, 483 Mass. 
186, 192 (2019).  "[T]he language of the statute[s] . . . is 
'the principal source of insight' into the intent of the 
Legislature."  Id.  "Therefore, we start with the language of 
the statute[s themselves] and presume, as we must, that the 
Legislature intended what the words of the statute[s] say" 
(quotations omitted).  Rossetti, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Williamson, 462 Mass. 676, 679 (2012).  If the legislation is 
found to be ambiguous, we give the juvenile the benefit of the 
ambiguity.  Commonwealth v. Connor C., 432 Mass. 635, 642 
(2000), citing Charles C. v. Commonwealth, 415 Mass. 58, 70 
(1993). 
7 
 
 
We begin with G. L. c. 119, § 58, a statute that is to "be 
liberally construed so that the care, custody and discipline of 
the children brought before the court shall approximate as 
nearly as possible that which they should receive from their 
parents, and that, as far as practicable, they shall be treated, 
not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement 
and guidance."  G. L. c. 119, § 53.  When a child is adjudicated 
to be a youthful offender, G. L. c. 119, § 58, requires the 
sentencing judge to impose one of three dispositional options: 
"(a) a sentence provided by law [for the criminal offense 
charged in the indictment]; or 
 
"(b) a combination sentence which shall be a commitment to 
the department of youth services until [the child] reaches 
the age of twenty-one, and an adult sentence to a house of 
correction or to the [S]tate prison as is provided by law 
for the offense.  The adult sentence shall be suspended 
pending successful completion of a term of probation, which 
shall include, but not be limited to, the successful 
completion of the aforementioned commitment to the 
department of youth services. . . . ; or 
 
"(c) a commitment to the department of youth services until 
[the child] reaches the age of twenty-one." 
 
Otherwise put, paragraph (a) authorizes the judge to impose the 
most severe option, namely, "the punishment the child would 
receive were [the child] an adult"; paragraph (b) authorizes an 
intermediate "combination sentence"; and paragraph (c), "the 
least severe option," authorizes a commitment to DYS until the 
child reaches the age of twenty-one.  Connor C., 432 Mass. at 
638. 
8 
 
 
Here, the judge determined that, given all of the 
circumstances, the least severe option, commitment to DYS, was 
appropriate.  The Commonwealth does not contest the judge's 
decision to commit the juvenile to DYS pursuant to G. L. c. 119, 
§ 58 (c), instead of imposing a more severe adult or combination 
sentence under G. L. c. 119, § 58 (a) or (b).  Rather, the 
Commonwealth takes issue with the judge's decision to suspend 
the commitment to DYS and to place the juvenile on probation. 
 
As the Commonwealth points out, nothing in G. L. c. 119, 
§ 58, expressly authorizes such a disposition.  At the same 
time, however, nothing in the language of that section prohibits 
a judge from suspending a commitment to DYS that has been 
imposed upon a youthful offender pursuant to G. L. c. 119, 
§ 58 (c).  By contrast, G. L. c. 119, § 58, seventh par.,3 
expressly prohibits the suspension of a commitment to DYS 
 
 
3 General Laws c. 119, § 58, seventh par., provides: 
 
"Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, a 
person adjudicated a delinquent child by reason of a 
violation of [G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), (c), or (d), or G. L. 
c. 269, § 10E], shall be committed to the custody of the 
commissioner of youth services who shall place such child 
in the custody of a facility supported by the 
[C]ommonwealth for the care, custody and training of such 
delinquent children for a period of at least [180] days or 
until such child attains his eighteenth birthday or his 
nineteenth birthday in the case of a child whose case is 
disposed of after he has attained his eighteenth birthday, 
whichever first occurs, provided, however, that said period 
of time shall not be reduced or suspended" (emphasis 
added). 
9 
 
imposed on a juvenile who has been adjudicated a delinquent 
child by reason of a violation of, inter alia, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a), the provision under which the juvenile here was 
convicted as a youthful offender.  We held in Connor C., 432 
Mass. at 645, that the seventh paragraph of G. L. c. 119, § 58, 
by its plain language, applies only to delinquent children and 
not to youthful offenders.  Accordingly, this provision does not 
deprive a judge of the authority to suspend a youthful 
offender's commitment to DYS.  Moreover, the fact that the 
Legislature expressly prohibited the suspension of a delinquent 
child's commitment to DYS shows that it knew how to preclude 
suspension of a commitment to DYS if it chose to do so.  In the 
nearly twenty-three years since this court's decision in 
Connor C., the Legislature has not seen fit to do so with 
respect to youthful offenders.  Cf. DiMasi v. Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, 491 Mass. 186, 197 (2023), quoting Casseus v. 
Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 786, 796 (2018) (if Legislature had 
intended different meaning from how statute was written, then 
"the wording of the statute could have easily reflected [the 
Legislature’s intent]"). 
 
The Commonwealth argues that because G. L. c. 119, 
§ 58 (b), authorizes a Juvenile Court judge to suspend the adult 
portion of a combination sentence, the Legislature could have 
also authorized the suspension of a commitment to DYS in G. L. 
10 
 
c. 119, § 58 (c), but chose not to do so.  We do not agree.  
General Laws c. 119, § 58 (b), does not bestow on a judge 
discretionary authority to decide whether to suspend the adult 
portion of such a sentence; the provision rather requires that 
"[t]he adult sentence shall be suspended pending successful 
completion of a term of probation, which shall include, but not 
be limited to, the successful completion of the aforementioned 
commitment to" DYS until the juvenile reaches the age of twenty-
one (emphasis added).  That a judge is required to suspend the 
adult portion of a combination sentence under G. L. c. 119, 
§ 58 (b), says nothing about a judge's discretion to suspend a 
commitment to DYS under G. L. c. 119, § 58 (c). 
 
At first glance, it might appear incongruous to conclude 
that where a juvenile violates G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), the 
commitment to DYS may not be suspended if the juvenile is 
adjudicated a delinquent child, but may be suspended if the 
juvenile is found to be a youthful offender.  The Legislature, 
however, rationally could require a delinquent child to serve 
out a commitment to DYS until the child reaches the age of 
eighteen (or, in some cases, nineteen) while permitting judges 
to decide to suspend the longer commitment of a youthful 
offender until the age twenty-one. 
 
"[I]t is evident from the Legislature's over-all approach 
to the sentencing of youthful offenders that it intended to give 
11 
 
the sentencing judge wide latitude in fashioning a sentence that 
best serves the needs of the community and the youthful 
offender."  Commonwealth v. Lucret, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 624, 629 
(2003).  Moreover, the Legislature presumably has been aware, at 
least since our decision in Connor C., 432 Mass. at 638, 645-
646, that G. L. c. 119, § 58, seventh par., applies only to 
delinquent children, and not to youthful offenders, and it has 
not chosen to amend that provision.  "We do not read into the 
statute a provision which the Legislature did not see fit to put 
there, nor add words that the Legislature had an option to, but 
chose not to include."  Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 Mass. 799, 
807-808 (2019), quoting Commissioner of Correction v. Superior 
Court Dep't of the Trial Court for the County of Worcester, 446 
Mass. 123, 126, (2006). 
 
In addition, we note that certain other statutes expressly 
provide a Juvenile Court judge the authority to suspend a 
commitment to DYS and then to impose probation.  In particular, 
G. L. c. 279, § 2, provides: 
"In all cases the execution of orders of commitment to any 
training school or reformatory, however named, the 
department of youth services, or the department of public 
welfare may be suspended, and such suspension continued or 
revoked, in the same manner and with the same effect as the 
execution of sentences in criminal cases." 
 
This provision, by its plain terms, authorizes a Juvenile Court 
judge to suspend an order committing a juvenile to DYS "[i]n all 
12 
 
cases."  Contrary to the Commonwealth's argument, we do not read 
the final phrase of G. L. c. 279, § 2 -- "in the same manner and 
with the same effect as the execution of sentences in criminal 
cases" -- as limiting a judge's authority to suspend a 
commitment to DYS only in instances where an ordinary criminal 
sentence could be suspended. 
 
The statutory language provides that a commitment to DYS 
may be suspended "in the same manner and with the same effect" 
as a criminal sentence, not that it may be suspended in the same 
circumstances as a criminal sentence (emphasis added).  G. L. 
c. 279, § 2.  In other words, the provision simply analogizes 
the suspension of a DYS commitment to the suspension of a 
criminal sentence, without limiting the judge's authority to 
suspend the DYS commitment by any restrictions on suspension 
that are enumerated in the criminal statute.4  In construing the 
provision in this manner, we are mindful that juvenile justice 
laws "shall be liberally construed," and that "[p]roceedings 
against children under said sections shall not be deemed 
 
 
4 General Laws c. 279, § 2, authorizes a Juvenile Court 
judge to suspend a DYS commitment in all cases, except, of 
course, where a suspension of a DYS commitment is specifically 
prohibited.  As discussed supra, such a prohibition does not 
exist for the cases of juveniles adjudicated as youthful 
offenders for violations of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). 
 
13 
 
criminal proceedings."  G. L. c. 119, § 53.5  Restricting 
juvenile sentencing, even for youthful offenders, to adult 
sentencing provisions, would be contrary to the plain statutory 
language, as well as the Legislature's intent in adopting this 
provision.  See Connor C., 432 Mass. at 641-642 (noting that 
language of G. L. c. 119, § 53, "does not label a 'youthful 
offender' proceeding as 'criminal'").  See also Commonwealth v. 
Anderson, 461 Mass. 616, 630, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 946 (2012) 
("an adjudication of a juvenile as a youthful offender . . . 
does not transform [the juvenile's] illegal act from an act of 
delinquency into a crime").  If the Legislature had intended to 
limit a judge's authority in the manner the Commonwealth 
 
 
5 "Independent of the rule of lenity, we have said that 
interpreting an ambiguous statute against a juvenile would 
conflict with the statutory command of G. L. c. 119, § 53."  
Commonwealth v. Samuel S., 476 Mass. 497, 506 (2017), citing 
Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 810-813 (2013).  
General Laws c. 119, § 53, "requires a liberal construction of 
the juvenile justice laws in order to ensure that juveniles who 
commit offenses are 'treated[] not as criminals, but as children 
in need of aid, encouragement, and guidance.'"  Samuel S., 
supra, quoting G. L. c. 119, § 53. 
 
 
To be sure, G. L. c. 119, § 53, mandates that liberal 
construction shall apply to G. L. c. 119, §§ 52-63, and G. L. 
c. 279, § 2, is not included within those sections.  However, 
this case requires us to consider G. L. c. 279, § 2, a provision 
concerning the suspension of sentences to DYS, in light of our 
interpretation of G. L. c. 119, § 58, and other juvenile justice 
statutes.  Therefore, the command of G. L. c. 119, § 53, is 
instructive here.  See Samuel S., 476 Mass. at 506. 
14 
 
suggests, then it would have done so in plain and unambiguous 
language. 
 
In determining whether the juvenile's sentence was 
permissible, we also must consider the effect of certain 
language in G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  General Laws c. 269, 
§ 10 (a), first par., which prohibits unlawful possession of a 
firearm, provides that a person who violates it shall be 
punished by a minimum term in State prison or in a house of 
correction, and that "[t]he sentence imposed on such person 
shall not be reduced to less than [eighteen] months, nor 
suspended."  This language plainly precludes a judge from 
suspending an adult offender's committed sentence to less than a 
period of eighteen months.  Two paragraphs later, the provision 
states: 
"The provisions of [G. L. c. 276, § 87,6] shall not 
apply . . . to any child between ages fourteen and 
[eighteen] so charged, if the court is of the opinion that 
the interests of the public require that [the child] should 
be tried as an adult for such offense instead of being 
dealt with as a child." 
 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (6), third par. 
 
 
6 General Laws c. 276, § 87, permits a Juvenile Court judge 
to place 
 
"on probation in the care of [the court's] probation 
officer any person before it charged with an offense or a 
crime for such time and upon such conditions as it deems 
proper, with the defendant's consent, before trial and 
before a plea of guilty, or in any case after a finding or 
verdict of guilty." 
15 
 
 
Reading the paragraphs of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (6), in 
harmony with one another, see Hovagimian v. Concert Blue Hill, 
LLC, 488 Mass. 237, 241 (2021), we conclude that the statutory 
language in no way prohibits a Juvenile Court judge from 
suspending a youthful offender's commitment to DYS.  While there 
is such a prohibition for juveniles adjudicated delinquent for 
violations of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), here, the Juvenile Court 
judge sentenced the defendant as a youthful offender under the 
"least severe" option under G. L. c. 119, § 58 -- commitment to 
DYS.  Connor C., 432 Mass. at 638.  We again note that the 
declared policy of G. L. c. 119, § 53, is that the "operative 
provisions of the [juvenile sentencing] statutes shall be 
liberally construed to require rehabilitative 'aid, 
encouragement and guidance' rather than criminal dispositions 
for children who offend."  Id. at 641 ("the provisions of the 
1996 amendments [to the juvenile sentencing provisions of G. L. 
c. 119, §§ 52-63,] did not eviscerate the longstanding principle 
that the treatment of children who offend our laws are not 
criminal proceedings"). 
 
Accordingly, a judge's determination that a juvenile should 
be sentenced as a youthful offender under G. L. c. 119, § 58, 
does not amount to an adjudication of the juvenile in a criminal 
proceeding that would implicate adult sentencing requirements.  
See Connor C., 432 Mass. at 646 ("an 'adjudication' that a child 
16 
 
has violated a law generally is not a 'conviction' of a crime").  
Here, the judge was not bound by the language in G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a), that prohibited suspended sentences for "any person 
convicted under [that] subsection."7  Cf., Commonwealth v. Hanson 
H., 464 Mass. 807, 813-814 (2013) (for purposes of sentencing 
statute, phrase "[a]ny person" did not include juveniles, but 
only adults, due to "the inherent differences between juvenile 
and adult offenders").  As a result, the judge was within his 
discretion in suspending the juvenile's commitment pursuant to 
G. L. c. 276, § 87.  In so holding, we bear in mind that the 
ultimate "goal of our juvenile system is to act in the best 
interests of children by encouraging and helping them to become 
law-abiding and productive members of society, and not to label 
and treat them as criminals."  Connor C., supra. 
 
 
7 Nor does the language in G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), third 
par., apply.  That paragraph prohibits a judge from placing a 
juvenile aged fourteen to eighteen, who has been charged with a 
violation of § 10 (a), on probation before or after a trial or 
before a guilty plea, where the "court is of the opinion that 
the interests of the public require that [the juvenile] should 
be tried as an adult for such offense instead of being dealt 
with as a child."  Under the youthful offender regime created by 
the 1996 legislation, a juvenile proceeded against as a youthful 
offender and sentenced under G. L. c. 119, § 58 (c), is still 
considered a child within the juvenile justice system, not an 
adult.  See St. 1996, c. 200, §§ 2, 7; G. L. c. 119, § 53 
("Proceedings against children under said sections shall not be 
deemed criminal proceedings").  Thus, a judge is not statutorily 
barred from placing on probation a juvenile who has been 
adjudicated as a youthful offender and sentenced to the least 
severe sentencing option for a firearms charge. 
17 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The order denying the Commonwealth's 
motion to revise the juvenile's sentence is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.