Title: Gaskin v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC2023-0415, SC2023-0440
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 6, 2023

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC2023-0415 
____________ 
 
LOUIS B. GASKIN, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC2023-0440 
____________ 
 
LOUIS B. GASKIN, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
RICKY D. DIXON, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
April 6, 2023 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Louis B. Gaskin, a prisoner under sentences of death and an 
active death warrant, appeals the circuit court’s denial of his third 
successive motion for postconviction relief.  He also petitions this 
 
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Court for a writ of habeas corpus, moves for a stay of execution, 
and requests oral argument.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, 
§§ 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  As we explain below, we affirm the 
summary denial of Gaskin’s postconviction motion, and we deny his 
habeas petition, motion for stay of execution, and request for oral 
argument. 
BACKGROUND 
 
The following facts were set forth in this Court’s opinion on 
direct appeal: 
The convictions arise from events occurring on the 
night of December 20, 1989, when Gaskin drove from 
Bunnell to Palm Coast and spotted a light in the house of 
the victims, Robert and Georgette Sturmfels.  Gaskin 
parked his car in the woods and, with a loaded gun, 
approached the house.  Through a window he saw the 
Sturmfels[es] sitting in their den.  After circling the house 
a number of times, Gaskin shot Mr. Sturmfels twice 
through the window.  As Mrs. Sturmfels rose to leave the 
room, Gaskin shot her and then shot Mr. Sturmfels a 
third time.  Mrs. Sturmfels crawled into the hallway, and 
Gaskin pursued her around the house until he saw her 
through the door and shot her again.  Gaskin then pulled 
out a screen, broke the window, and entered the home. 
He fired one more bullet into each of the Sturmfels[es]’ 
heads and covered the bodies with blankets.  Gaskin 
then went through the house taking lamps, video 
cassette recorders, some cash, and jewelry. 
Gaskin then proceeded to the home of Joseph and 
Mary Rector, whom he again spied through a window 
sitting in their den.  While Gaskin cut their phone lines, 
 
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the Rectors went to bed and turned out the lights.  In an 
effort to roust Mr. Rector, Gaskin threw a log and some 
rocks at the house.  When Mr. Rector rose to investigate, 
Gaskin shot him from outside the house.  The Rectors 
managed to get to their car and drive to the hospital in 
spite of additional shots fired at their car as they sped 
away.  Gaskin then burglarized the house. 
Gaskin’s involvement in the shootings was brought 
to the attention of the authorities by Alfonso Golden, 
cousin of Gaskin’s girlfriend.  The night of the murders, 
Gaskin had appeared at Golden’s home and asked to 
leave some “Christmas presents.”  Gaskin told Golden 
that he had “jacked” the presents and left the victims 
“stiff.”  Golden learned of the robberies and murders after 
watching the news and called the authorities to report 
what he knew.  The property that had been left with 
Golden was subsequently identified as belonging to the 
Sturmfels[es]. 
Gaskin was arrested on December 30, and a search 
of Gaskin’s home produced more of the stolen items. 
After signing a rights-waiver form, Gaskin confessed to 
the crimes and directed the authorities to further 
evidence of the crime in a nearby canal. 
 
Gaskin v. State, 591 So. 2d 917, 918 (Fla. 1991). 
After a jury trial, Gaskin was convicted of nine of the ten 
counts for which he was indicted.  As to Mr. and Mrs. Sturmfels, 
Gaskin was convicted of two counts of first-degree premeditated 
murder, two counts of felony murder, one count of armed robbery, 
and one count of burglary.  Id.  As to Mr. and Mrs. Rector, Gaskin 
was convicted of one count for the attempted first-degree murder of 
Joseph Rector, one count of armed robbery, and one count of 
 
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burglary.  Id.  The jury acquitted Gaskin of the attempted first-
degree murder of Mary Rector.  Id. 
 
During the penalty phase, the State presented evidence in the 
form of a ballistics demonstration, “firing various types of bullets 
from the rifle used in the murders to demonstrate that the 
ammunition Gaskin chose to use in the murders supports a finding 
that the murders were heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”  Id. at 918-19.  
The defense presented penalty phase testimony of “Janet Morris, 
Gaskin’s cousin, who testified that she and Gaskin were raised by 
their great-grandparents, who were very strict, and that Gaskin 
never gave anyone any trouble during his formative years.”  Id. at 
919. 
The jury recommended that Gaskin be sentenced to death for 
the Sturmfelses’ murders by votes of eight to four.  Id.  For 
additional consideration in sentencing, the trial court also received 
“a certified judgment and sentence for an unrelated burglary, a 
copy of Gaskin’s statement, and a copy of a psychiatric report.”  Id. 
The trial court found three aggravating factors as to both 
murders: (1) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated, 
without any pretense of moral or legal justification, (2) Gaskin was 
 
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previously convicted of another capital offense or of a felony 
involving the use or threat of violence (prior violent felony based on 
the contemporaneous murders of the Sturmfelses and the other 
felony convictions relating to the Sturmfelses and the Rectors), and 
(3) the murders were committed while Gaskin was engaged in the 
commission of a robbery or burglary.  Id.  A fourth aggravating 
factor, that the murder was especially wicked, evil, atrocious, or 
cruel, was found as to victim Georgette Sturmfels.  Id. 
The trial court found as mitigating circumstances that (1) the 
murders were committed while Gaskin was under extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance, and (2) Gaskin suffered a deprived 
childhood.  Id. 
 
Gaskin challenged his convictions and sentences on direct 
appeal.  Because he was improperly convicted of and sentenced for 
four counts of first-degree murder—premeditated and felony 
murder as to each of the Sturmfelses—this Court affirmed two of 
the first-degree murder convictions and sentences, remanded to the 
trial court to vacate the other two, and affirmed the remaining 
convictions and sentences.  Id. at 922.  Gaskin then successfully 
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review, which, due 
 
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to the unconstitutionally vague jury instruction on the “especially 
wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating factor, remanded the 
case to this Court for reconsideration in light of Espinosa v. Florida, 
505 U.S. 1079 (1992).  See Gaskin v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1216 (1992).  
Upon remand, this Court held that Gaskin did not preserve the 
issue but that even if it had been preserved, the error was harmless 
as to the murder of Georgette Sturmfels given the other aggravating 
factors in the case.  See Gaskin v. State, 615 So. 2d 679, 680 (Fla. 
1993). 
Since that time, Gaskin has unsuccessfully challenged his 
convictions and sentences in state and federal court.  See Gaskin v. 
State, 737 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1999) (initial postconviction appeal 
affirming the denial of relief on certain claims and remanding for an 
evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel claims); 
Gaskin v. State, 822 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2002) (initial postconviction 
appeal upon remand, affirming the denial of relief on Gaskin’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims); Gaskin v. State, 218 So. 3d 
399 (Fla. 2017) (opinion affirming the denial of first successive 
postconviction motion); Gaskin v. State, 237 So. 3d 928 (Fla. 2018) 
(opinion affirming the denial of second successive postconviction 
 
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motion); Gaskin v. State, 2020 WL 57987 (Fla. Jan. 6, 2020) (order 
dismissing pro se all writs petition); Gaskin v. State, 2020 WL 
2467112 (Fla. May 13, 2020) (order dismissing pro se all writs 
petition); Gaskin v. Sec’y, Dept. of Corr., 494 F.3d 997 (11th Cir. 
2007) (opinion affirming the denial of federal habeas petition). 
Governor Ron DeSantis signed Gaskin’s death warrant on 
March 13, 2023.  Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.851, Gaskin filed a third successive motion for postconviction 
relief and argued the following claims: (1) Gaskin’s death sentences 
violate his constitutional rights because his jury was never 
presented with mitigation that would have resulted in 
recommendations of life imprisonment; (2) Gaskin’s constitutional 
rights were violated because the jury was not unanimous in finding 
applicable aggravating circumstances and in recommending death, 
and this Court’s decision on the partial retroactivity of Hurst1 was 
arbitrary and capricious; (3) the delay between Gaskin’s clemency 
proceedings and the denial of clemency without any updated 
proceedings violated Gaskin’s constitutional rights; and (4) it is 
 
 
1.  Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016). 
 
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unconstitutional to execute Gaskin after almost thirty-three years of 
living on death row in near-total solitary confinement. 
After holding a Huff2 hearing, the circuit court summarily 
denied relief on all four claims.  Gaskin now appeals that denial and 
raises three issues.  He also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas 
corpus, moves for a stay of execution, and requests oral argument. 
ANALYSIS 
Gaskin’s Third Successive Motion for Postconviction Relief 
 
Gaskin argues that the circuit court erred in its summary 
denial of his third successive motion for postconviction relief, and 
he raises three issues in this appeal: (1) Gaskin’s death sentences 
and execution are unconstitutional because the mitigating 
circumstances in his case outweigh the aggravating factors, 
exempting him from the class of persons subject to the death 
penalty; (2) Gaskin’s death sentences and execution are 
unconstitutional because his jury failed to make specific findings 
regarding the aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances, 
and the jury did not unanimously recommend that he be sentenced 
 
 
2.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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to death (Hurst claim); and (3) executing Gaskin after more than 
thirty years on death row violates the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 
Standard of Review 
Gaskin’s successive postconviction claims are governed by 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  In particular, a motion 
for postconviction relief must set forth the type of relief the 
defendant seeks, see rule 3.851(e)(1)(C), and it must include “a 
detailed allegation of the factual basis for any claim for which an 
evidentiary hearing is sought.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(1)(D).  
Whenever the movant makes a facially sufficient claim that requires 
a factual determination, the movant is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing.  However, rule 3.851(f)(5)(B) permits the denial of a 
successive postconviction motion without an evidentiary hearing 
“[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that 
the movant is entitled to no relief.” 
Because the circuit court denied Gaskin’s third successive 
rule 3.851 motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, this 
Court reviews the circuit court’s decision de novo, “accepting the 
movant’s factual allegations as true to the extent they are not 
 
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refuted by the record, and affirming the ruling if the record 
conclusively shows that the movant is entitled to no relief.”  Pardo v. 
State, 108 So. 3d 558, 561 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Gore v. State, 91 So. 
3d 769, 774 (Fla. 2012)). 
Mitigating Circumstances 
Gaskin argues that his death sentences are unconstitutional 
because the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating 
factors in his case.  In particular, he contends that the jury was not 
presented with mitigating evidence that had it been presented, 
would have resulted in sentences of life imprisonment for the 
murders.  Gaskin asserts that defense counsel failed to investigate 
and present mental health mitigation in the form of expert and lay 
testimony that would have more fully informed the jury of various 
mental health challenges.  Additionally, he contends that the 
defense mental health expert, who was hired by defense counsel but 
never called to testify at trial, was not provided the information 
necessary to develop a full mental health profile.  During the death 
warrant proceedings in the circuit court, Gaskin sought an 
evidentiary hearing to present mental health expert testimony, but 
postconviction counsel acknowledged at the Huff hearing that the 
 
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expert’s testimony would not have been offered as newly discovered 
evidence. 
The circuit court did not err in summarily denying this claim 
because it is procedurally barred.  Gaskin raised this claim in his 
initial motion for postconviction relief, and it was fully considered 
by the circuit court and this Court.  Although the circuit court 
summarily denied the claim at first, this Court remanded Gaskin’s 
case for an evidentiary hearing to consider whether defense counsel 
was ineffective for (1) failing to investigate and present certain 
mitigating evidence, (2) failing to provide information to defense 
experts, and (3) failing to call certain witnesses to testify on his 
behalf.3  Following the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied 
Gaskin’s initial motion for postconviction relief, and this Court 
affirmed. 
 
Even if Gaskin’s claim was not procedurally barred, he still 
would not be entitled to relief.  In denying initial postconviction 
relief, the circuit court concluded that defense counsel made 
 
 
3.  An additional claim, regarding counsel’s status as a deputy 
sheriff, was also granted an evidentiary hearing, but Gaskin did not 
later appeal the circuit court’s denial of that claim. 
 
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reasonable strategic decisions not to present certain evidence and 
the testimony of certain witnesses because that would have resulted 
in the jury hearing highly negative information about Gaskin.  This 
Court explained: 
In the order denying relief, the trial court addressed 
Gaskin’s allegation that trial counsel should have called 
mental health experts to testify at the penalty phase 
about mental mitigation.  The trial court noted that 
Dr. Krop, one of the defense mental health experts at 
trial, testified at the evidentiary hearing that he expressly 
told counsel before trial that he would not be of much 
help to the defense because he would have to testify 
about Gaskin’s extensive history of past criminal 
conduct, sexual deviancy, and lack of remorse.  The trial 
court also stated that trial counsel testified at the hearing 
that he made a strategic decision not to present mental 
health experts precisely because Gaskin’s background 
contained many negatives (including Dr. Krop’s proposed 
testimony). 
 
Gaskin, 822 So. 2d at 1247-48.  The trial court found that counsel 
conducted a reasonable investigation before trial and “made a 
reasonable, strategic decision not to present this information to the 
jury and not to present Dr. Krop’s findings to the judge.”  Id. at 
1248. 
 
As to Gaskin’s argument that counsel should have presented 
the testimony of additional lay witnesses, the trial court observed 
 
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that the testimony of such witnesses, offered at the evidentiary 
hearing, produced the following: 
[T]here was testimony regarding the Defendant sexually 
forcing himself on a six-year-old boy, the Defendant’s 
consensual, incestuous relationships and sexual 
deviancy, including bestiality, the Defendant’s violent 
attempt to sexually force himself on his former girlfriend, 
the Defendant’s admission that he loved to kill and that 
he killed cats and snakes, and his history of stealing at 
school and from his great-grandparents. 
 
Id.  The trial court concluded that counsel reasonably decided not 
to present testimony relating to Gaskin’s violent past and criminal 
conduct because the jury may have considered it additional 
aggravation.  Id. 
 
This Court affirmed, concluding that counsel’s strategy 
regarding mitigating evidence was reasonable: “It is apparent from 
the record that the witnesses who Gaskin alleges should have 
testified on his behalf were subject to being cross-examined about 
disturbing information about Gaskin, which would have defeated 
trial counsel’s strategy.”  Id. at 1249. 
Gaskin concedes in his initial brief that this issue is 
procedurally barred but argues that constitutional infirmities afflict 
his case and are sufficient to overcome a procedural bar.  However, 
 
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we reject this argument and conclude that Gaskin’s constitutional 
arguments are insufficient to overcome the procedural bar.  The 
circuit court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing on this 
claim, which was previously raised and considered, and is 
conclusively refuted by the record. 
Hurst 
Gaskin next argues that he is entitled to relief pursuant to 
Hurst v. Florida and section 921.141, Florida Statutes.  He 
maintains that he was unconstitutionally denied a jury 
determination, proof of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable 
doubt, unanimity as to aggravating factors, and unanimous jury 
recommendations of death.  He argues that this amounts to a 
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and his right to equal 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
This issue is procedurally barred, as it was raised and 
addressed in Gaskin’s first and second successive motions for 
postconviction relief.  Gaskin first sought postconviction relief 
following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. 
Florida, and again following this Court’s decision in Hurst v. State, 
202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016).  Appealing the circuit court’s denial of 
 
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both successive motions, this Court affirmed on the grounds that 
Hurst is not retroactive to Gaskin’s sentences, which became final 
before Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), was decided.  See 
Gaskin, 218 So. 3d at 401 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 471 
(2017); Gaskin, 237 So. 3d at 929 (Fla. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. 
Ct. 327 (2018). 
This Court has repeatedly rejected similar arguments relating 
to the retroactivity of Hurst.  See, e.g., Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 
216, 217 (Fla. 2017); Lambrix v. State, 227 So. 3d 112, 113 (Fla. 
2017); Bogle v. State, 213 So. 3d 833, 855 (Fla. 2017); Asay v. 
State, 210 So. 3d 1, 22 (Fla. 2016). 
 
Moreover, in State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 504-05 (Fla. 
2020), this Court held that unanimous jury recommendations of 
death are not required.  Rather, what is required is the finding of 
one or more aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  See id. 
at 502-03 (“Under longstanding Florida law, there is only one 
eligibility finding required: the existence of one or more statutory 
aggravating circumstances.”).  The jury found Gaskin guilty of the 
contemporaneous murders of the Sturmfelses, in addition to 
multiple other felonies including armed robbery and burglary.  
 
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These unanimous findings by the jury establish the existence of two 
aggravating factors: prior violent felony and murder committed 
while engaged in the commission of a robbery or burglary.  Thus, 
these findings satisfy the requirements in Poole. 
Additionally, Gaskin’s equal protection argument is a further 
attempt to challenge this Court’s consistent holding on Hurst 
retroactivity.  This argument is also procedurally barred and has 
previously been rejected by this Court.  See Lambrix, 227 So. 3d at 
113.  The circuit court’s summary denial of Gaskin’s Hurst claim 
was proper. 
Length of Time on Death Row 
Gaskin also argues that executing him after he has spent more 
than three decades on death row, and most of that time in what he 
deems solitary confinement, constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
However, this Court has repeatedly rejected the argument that 
a lengthy stay on death row amounts to cruel and unusual 
punishment.  Gaskin concedes that recently, this Court observed 
that “[n]o federal or state court has accepted the argument that a 
prolonged stay on death row constitutes cruel and unusual 
 
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punishment.”  Dillbeck v. State, 48 Fla. L. Weekly S32 (Fla. Feb. 16, 
2023) (quoting Booker v. State, 969 So. 2d 186, 200 (Fla. 2007)).  
Gaskin has argued no grounds for departing from this precedent. 
We also reject Gaskin’s arguments regarding what he 
characterizes as solitary confinement on death row.  In fact, noting 
the similarities to the recent Dillbeck death warrant case, Gaskin 
further concedes: “Mr. Gaskin recognizes that his conditions were 
similar, if not identical, to Mr. Dillbeck’s, up to and including the 
length of their stays on death row, however, he asserted this claim 
to exhaust for further review.”  The circuit court properly summarily 
denied relief. 
Habeas Claim 
In his habeas petition, Gaskin argues that he is entitled to 
relief because during the penalty phase, the jury was 
unconstitutionally instructed that it may consider whether “the 
crime for which the Defendant is to be sentenced was especially 
wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel.”  The trial court found the 
existence of the aggravating factor as to Georgette Sturmfels but 
rejected it as to Robert Sturmfels. 
 
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After the United States Supreme Court remanded Gaskin’s 
case for reconsideration in light of Espinosa, this Court concluded 
that the issue was not preserved.  This Court further concluded 
that even if the issue had been preserved, any error in finding the 
aggravating factor as to the murder of Georgette Sturmfels was 
harmless. 
Presently, Gaskin challenges this Court’s conclusion that he 
did not properly preserve the jury instruction issue and contends 
that he did argue the unconstitutionality of the aggravating factor 
in a pretrial motion.  He also argues that this Court’s conclusion 
that he did not object at trial cannot be conclusively determined 
because relevant discussions may be missing from the record.  
Gaskin maintains that the jury improperly considered the 
unconstitutionally vague instruction as to both murders, and that 
he is entitled to relief. 
Habeas corpus is not to be used to litigate or relitigate issues 
which could have been, should have been, or were previously 
raised.  See, e.g., Breedlove v. Singletary, 595 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 
1992). 
 
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Where this Court has previously ruled that the Espinosa error 
as to Georgette Sturmfels was harmless, see Gaskin, 615 So. 2d at 
680, we do not revisit that ruling. 
However, we recognize that this Court did not address the 
Espinosa error as to Robert Sturmfels, even though the following 
argument was made by appellate counsel in the initial brief on 
remand from the United States Supreme Court: 
The fact that the trial court did not find HAC 
present in one of the murders does not render the error 
harmless as to that sentence.  Even though the trial 
court did not find it, the jury returned a death 
recommendation (eight to four on both murders) after 
hearing the unconstitutional Espinosa instruction.  
Sochor, supra.  Likewise, after hearing the trial court’s 
“blanket” statement that he would impose the death 
penalty even if this aggravating circumstance were 
stricken, means absolutely nothing. 
 
We must presume that this Court rejected this argument.  However, 
because the jury was given the unconstitutional instruction as to 
both murders, we will explain the harmless error analysis implicit 
in this Court’s earlier decision. 
Although the jury was erroneously instructed on the 
“especially wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating factor, the 
error is also harmless as to Robert Sturmfels.  Affirmance of 
 
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Gaskin’s sentence is required if “there is no reasonable possibility 
that the error contributed to the” death sentence.  State v. DiGuilio, 
491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986). 
We conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the 
error contributed to the death sentence for the murder of Robert 
Sturmfels in light of the substantial aggravation in this case: the 
extremely weighty (1) prior violent felony, and (2) cold, calculated, 
and premeditated factors, see Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d 179, 215 
(Fla. 2020), and (3) the murder occurred during the commission of a 
robbery or burglary factor. 
As such, we deny Gaskin’s habeas petition. 
Motion for Stay of Execution 
Gaskin argues that more time is needed to resolve the complex 
issues he raises in his appeal and habeas petition.  However, we 
disagree.  Because Gaskin has failed to raise substantial grounds 
upon which relief might be granted, a stay is not appropriate here.  
See Buenoano v. State, 708 So. 2d 941, 952 (Fla. 1998) (denying 
motion for stay of execution where movant failed to establish 
“substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted”). 
 
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CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we affirm the denial of Gaskin’s third 
successive motion for postconviction relief.  We also deny his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus and his motion for a stay of 
execution.  We also deny his request for oral argument. 
No rehearing will be entertained by this Court, and the 
mandate shall issue immediately. 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, and 
FRANCIS, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Flagler County, 
Terence R. Perkins, Judge 
Case No. 181990CF000001AXXXXX 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Eric Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Tracy M. Henry 
and Cortney L. Hackett, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional 
Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Doris 
Meacham, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, 
Florida, and Patrick Bobek, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona 
Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent