Title: Daniels v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 071065
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 29, 2008

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Agee, and 
Goodwyn, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
ROBERT KAREEM BASHIR DANIELS 
 
v.   Record No. 071065 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    February 29, 2008 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
In this case we consider whether the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying a proposed jury instruction on 
eyewitness identification. 
FACTS 
 
The following events occurred in Norfolk, Virginia.  On 
the evening of December 29, 2004, Kay Goldsmith opened her car 
door, entered the driver’s seat, and, when she reached to 
close the door, a tall, slender male approached her.  He 
ordered Goldsmith to unlock the doors to the backseat, got 
into the backseat, and demanded that Goldsmith drive to a 
bank’s automated teller machine (ATM), threatening that he 
would hurt her if she did not follow his orders.  While 
driving to the ATM, Goldsmith looked in the rearview mirror.  
The man became angry and pushed her rearview mirror to a 
position where she could not see him in the backseat.  When 
they reached the ATM, the man lay down in the backseat; 
Goldsmith withdrew $100 and gave it to the man, who then gave 
her directions to take him to the Huntersville neighborhood.  
The man got out of the car, grabbed Goldsmith’s purse and 
removed her driver’s license, taking it with him and saying 
that he now knew where she lived.  The police later found 
Goldsmith’s driver’s license on Hunter Street.  Goldsmith was 
unable to positively identify the perpetrator. 
 
Around midnight the same evening, Jessica Laz was 
removing bags from the backseat of her parked car when a man 
jumped out of the bushes a few feet from her.  Within a few 
seconds he was close to her and ordered her not to look at 
him.  The man told Laz to get in the car and if she followed 
his orders he would not hurt her.  The man got into the 
backseat and leaned forward to move the rearview mirror to a 
position where Laz could not see him.  Laz followed the man’s 
instructions to drive to an ATM.  There she withdrew $100 and 
gave it to the man who then directed Laz through a short 
drive, and he got out of the car on Hunter Street.  The man 
left the car with Laz’s purse, which contained her personal 
checks showing her parents’ telephone number.  Laz drove away 
and reported the crime.  With the police, she drove the route 
she took with the man.  Prior to trial, Laz was shown a photo 
array, and she identified an individual other than the 
defendant, Robert Kareem Bashir Daniels, as the person who 
robbed her.  At a later date, Laz viewed a physical lineup, 
 
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and she identified Daniels as the perpetrator.  Laz again 
identified Daniels as her attacker at trial. 
 
During the early hours of December 30, 2004, two men 
entered the bedroom of Brian Thiede, where he and his 
girlfriend, Emily C. Bean, were asleep.  Holding a knife to 
Thiede, the men directed Bean to retrieve money from Thiede’s 
wallet.  The men took the money and took Bean’s cellular 
telephone before they left the premises. 
 
Later in the morning on December 30, 2004, Marcia Laz, 
Jessica Laz’s mother, answered the phone at her home, and a 
man demanded her “pin” number, threatening that he knew where 
she lived.  The evidence at trial showed this call was made 
from Emily Bean’s cellular telephone two hours after the 
Thiede/Bean robbery. 
 
On the evening of February 24, 2005, Kathryn Gresham was 
exiting her vehicle when a man approached her and ordered her 
to get back inside the car and to drive him to an ATM.  
Gresham gave him her keys and her purse, but he forced her 
into the car and got in the backseat.  He again told her to 
drive to an ATM, and Gresham responded that she had given him 
the keys.  While he was “fumbling” for the keys, Gresham 
escaped and ran away.  Daniels appeared in a police lineup 
viewed by Gresham, but she identified another man in the 
lineup as her attacker. 
 
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On February 25, 2005, at approximately midnight, Michelle 
Pereira was leaving her vehicle when a man approached her and 
ordered her back inside the car.  The man got in the backseat, 
adjusted her rearview mirror so she could not see him, and 
ordered her to drive to an ATM.  After Pereira withdrew $200 
from the ATM and gave it to the man, he gave her directions to 
drop him off on a street that Pereira described as a street 
with a name starting with “H.”  Pereira identified Daniels 
from a photo array and stated she was 70% certain of his 
identity.  At a physical lineup, Pereira identified Daniels as 
the perpetrator. 
 
Daniels was charged with the abduction and robbery of Kay 
Goldsmith, Kathryn Gresham, Brian Thiede, Emily Bean, Jessica 
Laz, and Michelle Pereira, and the burglary of the dwelling of 
Brian Thiede.  Following the presentation of the 
Commonwealth’s evidence, the trial court granted Daniels’ 
motion to strike the abduction charges related to Brian Thiede 
and Emily Bean, and the trial court dismissed those charges.  
Daniels asked the trial court to give a jury instruction on 
eyewitness identification.  The Commonwealth argued that the 
jury instructions addressing reasonable doubt, presumption of 
innocence, and credibility of witnesses sufficiently covered 
the same principles presented in the proffered jury 
instruction.  The trial court ruled that the proffered 
 
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instruction was “duplicative” and “somewhat confusing” and 
ultimately rejected the instruction. 
The jury found the defendant not guilty of the abduction 
and robbery of Kay Goldsmith and Kathryn Gresham.  The jury 
convicted the defendant of the burglary of the dwelling of 
Brian Thiede, the robbery of Brian Thiede and Emily Bean, and 
the abduction and robbery of Jessica Laz and Michelle Pereira.  
Daniels’ appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied by a per 
curiam opinion.  Daniels v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1911-06-1 
(April 23, 2007). 
DISCUSSION 
In this appeal, Daniels argues, as he did in the Court of 
Appeals, that the trial court erred in refusing the proffered 
jury instruction on eyewitness identification.  Daniels claims 
that eyewitness identification was crucial to his convictions, 
and thus, the general instructions were not adequate. 
 
Courts have long recognized dangers inherent in 
eyewitness identification testimony.  In 1967, the United 
States Supreme Court observed that  
[t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-
known; the annals of criminal law are rife with 
instances of mistaken identification.  Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter once said: “What is the worth of 
identification testimony even when uncontradicted?  
The identification of strangers is proverbially 
untrustworthy.” 
 
 
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United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (footnotes 
omitted).  Of particular concern has been the circumstances 
surrounding prosecution presentation of suspects for pre-trial 
identification.  Id. at 229-230.  Because of the possibility 
of improper influence at police lineups, whether intentional 
or unintentional, and the subsequent use of an identification 
made under such circumstances, the Supreme Court has concluded 
that a defendant is entitled to counsel for post-indictment 
prosecution identification procedures, id. at 236-37, and that 
the trial court should consider certain criteria when 
determining whether the eyewitness testimony is sufficiently 
reliable to be admitted in evidence, Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 
188, 199-200 (1972). 
More recently some state and federal courts, citing 
continued research on eyewitness identification, have opined 
that courts should guard against a jury assuming that admitted 
eyewitness identification testimony is unquestionably reliable 
and credible simply because it was admitted in evidence.  
Accordingly, these jurisdictions have allowed a specific jury 
instruction alerting the jury to the dangers of eyewitness 
identification testimony both with regard to the circumstances 
of the identification and the possibility of a sincere mistake 
in identification.  In some jurisdictions, such instructions 
are required in cases in which the defendant requests the 
 
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instruction and identification of the defendant is a central 
part of the prosecution’s case.  See State v. Dyle, 899 S.W.2d 
607, 612 (Tenn. 1995), State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 
1986).  In others, such cautionary instructions are 
permissible, but not required, if the circumstances warrant.  
See State v. Guster, 421 N.E.2d 157, 161-62 (Ohio 1981), State 
v. Kasper, 404 A.2d 85, 100 (Vt. 1979). 
We have not adopted a rule like that imposed by Tennessee 
and Utah which requires a cautionary instruction on eyewitness 
identification in every case in which it is requested and the 
identification of the defendant is central to the 
prosecution’s case.  Neither have we opined that such an 
instruction would never be appropriate, nor that a court would 
abuse its discretion by granting such an instruction.  See 
Lincoln v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 370, 375, 228 S.E.2d 688, 692 
(1976) (if an instruction could have been given, the trial 
court’s refusal to give such an instruction is not necessarily 
an abuse of discretion).  We have affirmed judgments in which 
the trial court refused to give a cautionary instruction on 
eyewitness identification because the matters contained in the 
proposed instructions were covered by other instructions.  See 
Graham v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 79, 87, 459 S.E.2d 97, 101 
(1995), Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 256, 421 S.E.2d 
821, 843 (1992), Poole v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 258, 261, 176 
 
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S.E.2d 821, 824 (1970), Ives v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 877, 
879, 36 S.E.2d 904, 904-05 (1946); but see Noblett v. 
Commonwealth, 194 Va. 241, 247, 72 S.E.2d 241, 244-45 (1952), 
overruled by Poole, 211 Va. at 261, 176 S.E.2d at 824. 
In this case, Daniels does not ask us to adopt a rule 
requiring a cautionary instruction on eyewitness 
identification.  Rather, Daniels contends that such an 
instruction should have been given in this case because, in 
addition to the lack of forensic evidence tying him to the 
crimes charged, the witnesses were unsure of their 
identifications, were inconsistent in their identifications, 
and because the instructions given did not inform the jury of 
the inherent dangers of eyewitness identification testimony or 
the possibility of the witness making a sincere mistake. 
The instruction proffered by Daniels stated: 
You have heard testimony of an identification of a 
person.  Identification testimony is an expression 
of belief or impression by the witness.  You should 
consider whether, or to what extent, the witness 
had the ability and the opportunity to observe the 
person at the time of the offense and to make a 
reliable identification later.  You should also 
consider the circumstances under which the witness 
later made the identification.  
 
The government has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person 
who committed the crime charged. 
 
Nothing in this instruction addresses the concept of sincere 
mistake or the inherent dangers of eyewitness identification 
 
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testimony.  Accordingly, we do not consider those arguments 
when considering whether the trial court abused its discretion 
in refusing this proposed instruction.  Daniel’s proposed 
instruction was refused because, in the trial court’s words, 
it was “duplicative” and “somewhat confusing.”  Our review 
then is limited to whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying the proposed instruction for those 
reasons. 
“When granted instructions fully and fairly cover a 
principle of law, a trial court does not abuse its discretion 
in refusing another instruction relating to the same legal 
principle.”  Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 145, 314 
S.E.2d 371, 384 (1984).  In this case, the jury received 
instructions on the burden of proof, inconsistent statements, 
and the witnesses’ credibility.  The burden of proof contained 
in the proposed instruction was fully covered in the 
instruction given on burden of proof.  The instruction on 
credibility of witnesses, like the proposed instruction, told 
the jury to consider the circumstances of the witnesses’ 
observation of the defendant and their ability to identify 
him. 
The proposed instruction also referred to the 
circumstances surrounding the later identification of Daniels; 
however, in this case, there was no suggestion of improper 
 
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procedures by the police in conducting the lineups or photo 
arrays.  The issues raised by Daniels relating to the 
circumstances of the identifications at the police station 
involved inconsistent descriptions and identifications by the 
witnesses.  Consideration of this testimony by the jury was 
addressed in the instruction on inconsistent statements. 
A final element in the proposed instruction was that the 
“[i]dentification testimony is an expression of belief or 
impression by the witness.”  The meaning of this statement is 
not at all clear and was not explained further by Daniels 
either at trial or in this Court, nor did the instruction go 
on to clarify this statement as pertaining to an eyewitness’ 
possible sincere mistake.  See, e.g., Long, 721 P.2d at 494-95 
n.8. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the instructions given 
"fully and fairly" covered the legal principles addressed in 
the proposed instruction and therefore the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing the proposed instruction.  We 
will therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed.