Title: Speier v. Brace
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S252473
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: July 23, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re CLIFFORD ALLEN BRACE, JR., Debtor 
 
 
STEVEN M. SPEIER, as Trustee in Bankruptcy, etc., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
CLIFFORD ALLEN BRACE, JR., Individually and as Trustee, 
etc., et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
S252473 
 
Ninth Circuit 
17-60032 
 
Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California 
6:11-bk-26154-SY 
 
 
July 23, 2020 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
and Groban concurred. 
 
Justice Kruger filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. 
 
 
1 
In re BRACE 
S252473 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
Many married couples in our state use community funds 
to acquire real estate and take title in joint tenancy.  Does that 
property presumptively belong to the community because the 
couple acquired the property during marriage with community 
funds?  Or is the property presumptively the separate property 
of the spouses because they took title in joint tenancy?  The 
Legislature has enacted a presumption that characterizes this 
property as community in a divorce.  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has asked us to determine which 
presumption governs the characterization of joint tenancy 
property in a dispute between a couple and the bankruptcy 
trustee of one of the spouses.   
More precisely, the question here is whether the form of 
title presumption set forth in Evidence Code section 662 applies 
to the characterization of property in disputes between a 
married couple and a bankruptcy trustee when it conflicts with 
the community property presumption set forth in Family Code 
section 760.   (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.548(f)(5) [this court 
may restate a question posed to it by a court of another 
jurisdiction]; see also Peabody v. Time Warner Cable, Inc. (2014) 
59 Cal.4th 662, 665, fn. 1 (Peabody) [example and explanation 
of rule 8.548(f)(5) in context].)  The answer determines how 
much property a bankruptcy trustee can reach to satisfy a 
spouse’s debts.  If the property is separate, then the trustee can 
only reach the debtor spouse’s 50 percent share.  If the property 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
 
is community, then the trustee can reach all the property, 
including the non-debtor spouse’s share. 
The issue in this case requires us to untangle a “snarl of 
conflicting presumptions” (Estate of Luke (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 
1006, 1010) in the evolution of California’s treatment of joint 
tenancies alongside the development of our community property 
system.  Ultimately, we hold that Evidence Code section 662 
does not apply when it conflicts with the Family Code section 
760 community property presumption.  Further, we hold that 
when a married couple uses community funds to acquire 
property with joint tenancy title on or after January 1, 1975, the 
property is presumptively community property under Family 
Code section 760 in a dispute between the couple and a 
bankruptcy trustee.  For property purchased before January 1, 
1975, the Legislature left intact a presumption that separate 
property interests arise from joint tenancy title. 
Because these presumptions are default rules, they are 
not always conclusive.  Just as the presumptions themselves 
have evolved over time, the cognizable ways of rebutting the 
presumptions have also evolved.  We thus answer a further 
question:  When a married couple uses community funds to 
acquire property as joint tenants, is the joint tenancy deed alone 
sufficient to transmute the community character of the property 
into the separate property of the spouses?  Family Code section 
852 provides that for property acquired on or after January 1, 
1985, a transmutation “is not valid unless made in writing by 
an express declaration that is made, joined in, consented to, or 
accepted by the spouse whose interest in the property is 
adversely affected.”  (Fam. Code, § 852, subd. (a); see id., 
subd. (e).)  We hold that under this rule, joint tenancy titling of 
property acquired by spouses using community funds on or after 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
 
January 1, 1985 is not sufficient by itself to transmute 
community property into separate property.  For joint tenancy 
property acquired between January 1, 1975 and December 31, 
1984, the act of taking title as joint tenants is, in itself, 
insufficient to prove a transmutation; however, a court may 
consider the manner of taking title in determining whether the 
spouses had an oral agreement or common understanding.  
Finally, as noted, joint tenancy property acquired with 
community funds before January 1, 1975 is presumptively 
separate property. 
As we elucidate below, “California’s treatment of joint 
tenancies has a long and tortuous history and is still the subject 
of considerable legal concern and disagreement.”  (Blumberg, 
Community Property in California (1987) p. 157.)  The 
Legislature may wish to examine whether current statutes are 
aligned with the expectations of married couples and third 
parties when spouses use community funds to acquire property 
as joint tenants.  That said, we emphasize that nothing in our 
decision today precludes spouses from holding separate property 
as joint tenants or from transmuting community property into 
separate property held in joint tenancy as long as the applicable 
transmutation requirements are met.  Nor does our opinion 
disturb the operation of the right of survivorship that typically 
accompanies joint tenancy title at death. 
I. 
This case arises from a petition under Chapter 7 of the 
United States Bankruptcy Code filed by Clifford Brace in 2011.  
Clifford and Ahn Brace married in 1972.  Around 1977 or 1978, 
the couple acquired a residence in Redlands.  At some point 
before Clifford Brace declared bankruptcy, the couple acquired 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
 
a rental property in San Bernardino.  The Braces acquired both 
properties with community funds and took title to each property 
as “ ‘husband and wife as joint tenants.’ ”  (In re Brace (9th Cir. 
2018) 908 F.3d 531, 534.) 
A Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition creates an estate to 
satisfy creditors’ claims.  The estate generally includes “[a]ll 
interests of the debtor and the debtor’s spouse in community 
property” at the time the bankruptcy case is filed.  (11 U.S.C. 
§ 541(a)(2).)  The Bankruptcy Code specifies that community 
property is part of the estate; bankruptcy courts look to state 
law to determine what property counts as community property.  
(See Butner v. United States (1979) 440 U.S. 48, 54.) 
The bankruptcy trustee in this case sought a declaration 
that the Redlands and San Bernardino properties are 
community property under Family Code section 760.  The 
distinction between community and separate property matters 
because Ahn Brace has not joined in her husband’s bankruptcy 
petition.  If the properties are community, then the entirety of 
the Braces’ interests in the properties becomes part of Clifford 
Brace’s bankruptcy estate.  If the properties are separate, then 
only Clifford Brace’s one-half property interest becomes part of 
the estate.  (In re Reed (9th Cir. 1991) 940 F.2d 1317, 1332; see 
Code Civ. Proc., § 704.820.) 
The bankruptcy court found that “ ‘the properties were 
acquired by [Clifford and Ahn] Brace during the marriage with 
community 
assets 
and 
they 
presumptively 
constitute 
community property under applicable law.  Defendants failed to 
establish that the . . . [p]ropert[ies] were not community in 
nature and, therefore, they constitute property of the 
Estate. . . .’ ”  (In re Brace (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2017) 566 B.R. 13, 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
 
17.)  The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed.  
(Id. at p. 16.)  Citing In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 
1396 (Valli), which held that property acquired during marriage 
from a third party with community funds is community property 
upon divorce unless the statutory transmutation requirements 
have been met, the panel reasoned that public policy and 
statutory construction support the extension of Valli’s holding 
to the bankruptcy context.  (In re Brace, supra, 566 B.R. at 
pp. 21–27.)  The Braces appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which 
certified the question to this court.  (In re Brace, supra, 908 F.3d 
at p. 535.) 
II. 
A central point of disagreement between the parties 
concerns the applicability of two statutes:  Family Code section 
760 and Evidence Code section 662.  Beginning with the text of 
these statutes, we explain the nature of the dispute. 
Family Code section 760 provides:  “Except as otherwise 
provided by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever 
situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage 
while domiciled in this state is community property.”  As Justice 
Chin explained in Valli, “[t]he presumption, . . . that property 
acquired during the marriage is community, is perhaps the most 
fundamental principle of California’s community property law,” 
reflecting the “ ‘general theory . . . that the husband and wife 
form a sort of partnership, and that property acquired during 
the marriage by the labor or skill of either belongs to both.’ ”  
(Valli, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 1408–1409 (conc. opn. of Chin, 
J.).) 
 
Statutory 
exceptions 
to 
the 
community 
property 
presumption explicitly provide for separate property treatment.  
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
 
For example, property that a person acquired before marriage is 
that person’s separate property.  (Fam. Code, § 770, 
subd. (a)(1).)  All property acquired by a person after marriage 
by gift, bequest, devise, or descent is that person’s separate 
property.  (Id., § 770, subd. (a)(2).)  Property that is earned or 
accumulated after the spouses are separated is also separate.  
(Id., § 771, subd. (a).)  And a spouse may rebut the Family Code 
section 760 presumption by tracing the source of funds used to 
acquire the property to separate property.  (In re Marriage of 
Lucas (1980) 27 Cal.3d 808, 815 (Lucas).)  Furthermore, for 
property acquired on or after January 1, 1985, married persons 
may change — i.e., transmute — the character of property from 
community to separate, or vice versa, if the transmutation is 
“made in writing by an express declaration that is made, joined 
in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose interest in the 
property is adversely affected.”  (Fam. Code, § 852, subd. (a); see 
id., subd. (e).) 
In 1965, the Legislature enacted Evidence Code section 
662, which provides:  “The owner of the legal title to property is 
presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title.  This 
presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing 
proof.”  The purpose of this presumption “is to promote the 
public policy in favor of ‘the stability of titles to property.’ ”  
(Valli, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1410 (conc. opn. of Chin, J.).) 
In drafting Evidence Code section 662, the Law Revision 
Commission noted that the provision codifies the common law 
form of title presumption.  (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 
reprinted at 29B pt. 2A West’s Ann. Evid. Code (2019 ed.) foll. 
§ 662, p. 267.)  But the cases cited by the Commission did not 
involve the characterization of property acquired by spouses in 
actions between themselves or in actions with third-party 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
 
creditors.  (See Olson v. Olson (1935) 4 Cal.2d 434, 438 [common 
law form of deed presumption characterized property conveyed 
by parties who were not married at the time]; Rench v. 
McMullen (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 872, 874–875 [common law 
form of title presumption not rebutted by oral evidence of 
resulting trust between two business associates].)  Evidence 
Code section 662 does not reference the Family Code, nor does 
it explicitly characterize property as separate so as to provide 
an exception to Family Code section 760. 
 
Evidence Code section 662 is not a separate property 
exception to Family Code section 760, and no party argues 
otherwise.  The question here is whether the form of title 
presumption in Evidence Code section 662, and not the 
community property presumption in Family Code section 760, 
applies outside the context of marital dissolutions, specifically 
in a dispute between a bankruptcy trustee and a debtor spouse. 
In Valli, we briefly addressed the intersection of the 
Family Code and Evidence Code section 662.  In that case, a 
husband used community funds during marriage to buy a life 
insurance policy that named his wife as the policy’s sole owner 
and beneficiary.  (Valli, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1399.)  Upon 
dissolution of the marriage, the husband argued that “the policy 
is community property because it was purchased during the 
marriage with community funds,” while the wife argued that 
“the policy is her separate property because husband arranged 
for the policy to be put solely in her name, thereby changing the 
policy’s character from community property to separate 
property.”  (Id. at p. 1400.)  We first held that the statutory 
transmutation requirements apply not only to interspousal 
transactions, but also to “purchases made by one or both spouses 
from a third party during the marriage” using community funds.  
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
 
(Id. at p. 1405.)  We then held that to the extent that “Evidence 
Code section 662’s form of title presumption ever applies in 
marital dissolution proceedings,” “it does not apply when it 
conflicts with the transmutation statutes.”  (Id. at p. 1406.)  In 
other words, the community character of the insurance policy 
could not be altered except by “an express written declaration” 
by the husband that “he gave up his community interest in the 
policy bought with community funds,” as required by the 
transmutation statute.  (Ibid.)  The fact that the insurance 
policy was put in the wife’s name was not “sufficient to satisfy 
the express declaration requirement”; thus, the policy was 
community property.  (Ibid.) 
In the case before us, the bankruptcy trustee contends 
that Valli’s rule extends beyond the marital dissolution context 
to preclude application of Evidence Code section 662 when it 
conflicts with the Family Code section 760 presumption in a 
dispute between a bankruptcy trustee and a debtor spouse.  The 
Braces, by contrast, argue that Family Code section 760 applies 
in actions between the spouses to “protect[] the innocent spouse 
from undue influence by the other spouse,” whereas Evidence 
Code section 662 applies to “maintain the stability of title 
outside of dissolution actions.”  Further, amici curiae  
Christopher Melcher and Professor Grace Blumberg (author of 
Blumberg, supra) point to a joint tenancy form of title principle 
first recognized in Siberell v. Siberell (1932) 214 Cal. 767 
(Siberell) that may govern characterization in certain 
situations.  Although caselaw has sometimes conflated Siberell 
and other presumptions arising from joint title with Evidence 
Code section 662 (see In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 
33 Cal.App.4th 277, 291–292 (Haines); In re Marriage of Brooks 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
 
& Robinson (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 176, 185–187; Estate of 
Gallio (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 592, 597), they are in fact distinct. 
In order to understand the applicability of these various 
rules, it is necessary to examine the history of the relevant 
statutes and their consequences for various property ownership 
arrangements.  As we explain, the history reveals the gradual 
evolution of common-law separate property concepts based on 
form of title into a unified community property framework. 
III. 
“In community property [s]tates, ownership turns on the 
method and timing of acquisition, while the traditional view in 
common-law [s]tates is that ownership depends on title.”  
(Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo (1979) 439 U.S. 572, 578.)  Although 
California has always been a community property state, “for 
most of the state’s history California’s marital property law has 
contained strong elements of a separate property system.”  
(Prager, The Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in 
California’s Community Property System, 1849-1975 (1976) 
24 UCLA L.Rev. 1, 81.)  For example, the Family Code provides 
that spouses may hold property “as joint tenants or tenants in 
common, or as community property, or as community property 
with a right of survivorship.”  (Fam. Code, § 750; see also Civ. 
Code, former § 161, enacted in 1872 [“A husband and wife may 
hold property as joint tenants, tenants in common, or as 
community property.”].)  These various forms of title give rise to 
different incidents of ownership.  Joint tenancy creates a right 
of survivorship, whereby title passes to the surviving spouse 
without going through probate.  (See Siberell, supra, 214 Cal. at 
p. 773.)  In addition, joint tenants typically have separate 
interests in the property.  (Riddle v. Harmon (1980) 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
 
102 Cal.App.3d 524, 527 (Riddle).)  This means that one joint 
tenant’s interest cannot be reached by the creditors of the other 
joint tenant.  One joint tenant can also unilaterally sever the 
joint tenancy or alienate his or her share.  (Ibid.) 
Community real property, by contrast, generally cannot be 
alienated by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse.  
(Fam. Code, § 1102.)  In addition, “the community estate is liable 
for a debt incurred by either spouse before or during marriage” 
except as otherwise expressly provided by statute.  (Id., § 910, 
subd. (a).)  At death, there is no automatic right of survivorship; 
half of the community property belongs to the surviving spouse, 
and the other half belongs to the decedent.  (Prob. Code, § 100, 
subd. (a).)  In the absence of a will, however, the decedent’s 
share of the community property passes through intestacy to the 
surviving spouse.  (Id., § 6401, subd. (a).) 
The various forms in which a married couple can vest title 
to property do not invariably reflect the underlying nature of the 
couple’s ownership.  The Braces’ situation is not uncommon:  
Many couples use community funds to purchase a home and 
take title as “husband and wife as joint tenants” without an 
additional indication in the deed as to whether the property is 
community or separate.  In a 1965 Final Report on Domestic 
Relations, the Assembly Interim Committee on the Judiciary 
noted:  “The major problem . . . is the fact that husbands and 
wives take property in joint tenancy without legal counsel but 
primarily because deeds prepared by real estate brokers, escrow 
companies, and by title companies are usually presented to the 
parties in joint tenancy form.  The result is that they don’t know 
what joint tenancy is, that they think it is community property, 
and then find out upon death or divorce that they didn’t have 
what they thought they had all along. . . .”  (Assem. Interim 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
 
Com. on Judiciary, Final Rep. Relating to Domestic Relations 
(Jan. 11, 1965) p. 124 (Domestic Relations).) 
This lack of clarity has created difficulties for courts 
attempting to harmonize common-law presumptions based on 
form of title with the statutory community property framework.  
Over the years, the Legislature has “so alter[ed] the original 
provisions of each of the systems as to allow them both a place 
in our jurisprudence.”  (Siberell, supra, 214 Cal. at p. 771.)  The 
evolution of various statutory presumptions is relevant to 
understanding the operation of community property law as it 
relates to this case. 
A. 
The general community property presumption in Family 
Code section 760 is a product of legislative developments that 
over time granted the wife an increasing role in the 
management and control of community property.  (See Prager, 
supra, 24 UCLA L.Rev. at pp. 68, 73–74.)  The Legislature first 
enacted the general community property presumption in 1850.  
(Stats. 1850, ch. 103, § 2, p. 254 [“All property acquired after the 
marriage by either husband or wife, except such as may be 
acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, shall be common 
property.”].)  In 1872, the Legislature codified this general 
community property presumption in Civil Code former section 
164:  “All other property acquired after marriage, by either 
husband or wife, or both, is community property.”  (Civ. Code, 
former § 164, enacted in 1872.)  As originally enacted, 
California’s community property system afforded the wife no 
management or control over community property, but she was 
able to control the disposition of her separate property during 
marriage.  (Stats. 1850, ch. 103, §§ 1, 6, 9, p. 254.) 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
 
Against this backdrop of unequal control over community 
property, the Legislature sought “to facilitate the wife’s 
management of property” by expanding her ability to acquire 
and manage separate property.  (Blumberg, supra, at p. 155.)  
To this end, the Legislature enacted presumptions that 
subordinated the community property time-of-acquisition rule 
to the common law form of title rule.  Specifically, the 
Legislature in 1889 amended Civil Code former section 164 to 
add the married woman’s presumption:  “All other property 
acquired after marriage by either husband or wife, or both, is 
community property; but whenever any property is conveyed to 
a married woman by an instrument in writing, the presumption 
is, that the title is thereby vested in her as her separate 
property.  And in case the conveyance be to such married woman 
and to her husband, or to her and any other person, the 
presumption is, that the married woman takes the part 
conveyed to her as tenant in common, unless a different 
intention is expressed in the instrument.”  (Stats. 1889, ch. 219, 
§ 1, p. 328, codified at Civ. Code, former § 164.)  “These statutory 
qualifications superimpose[d] the common law technical 
reliance on title upon the community property reliance upon 
actual ownership and the presumptions relating thereto.”  (de 
Funiak, Principles of Community Property (1943) § 60, p. 143 & 
fn. 24 (Principles of Community Property) [describing Civil Code 
former section 164].) 
These presumptions did not always fit neatly together.  
The married woman’s presumption, when applied together with 
the community property presumption, sometimes led to claims 
by married women for more than a half interest in property 
jointly deeded to husband and wife.  Our court first addressed 
this issue in Dunn v. Mullan (1931) 211 Cal. 583 (Dunn), a 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
 
dispute between the administrator of a deceased husband’s 
estate and the administrators of his deceased wife’s estate.  
Whether the wife’s property was separate or community at her 
death would determine how the property passed to the 
respective estates.  Applying Civil Code former section 164, the 
trial court found that the wife had a separate interest in half of 
the property as a tenant in common and that the husband and 
wife had a community interest in the remaining half of the 
property.  The trial court ordered the husband’s one-fourth 
interest to be probated to his heirs and the wife’s three-fourths 
interest to be probated to her heirs.  On appeal, the husband 
argued that if the wife could have a 50 percent interest as a 
tenant in common, it must necessarily follow that the remaining 
50 percent interest was the husband’s as a tenant in common.  
(Dunn, at p. 587.)  This court disagreed, holding that a deed that 
names “husband and wife” presumptively creates a tenancy in 
common in which the wife holds a 50 percent separate interest 
with the remaining interest being community.  (Id. at p. 588; see 
also Miller v. Brode (1921) 186 Cal. 409, 414 [a deed describing 
the couple as husband and wife presumptively created a tenancy 
in common]; In re Regnart’s Estate (1929) 102 Cal.App. 643, 
645–646 [same].) 
A year later, this court in Siberell considered a dissolution 
action in which the wife, invoking Civil Code former section 164, 
claimed a 75 percent interest in a home purchased with 
community funds and titled as a joint tenancy.  (Siberell, supra, 
214 Cal. at p. 769.)  The court declined to extend Dunn’s rule to 
joint tenancy deeds in the context of divorce for two reasons:  
“First, from the very nature of the estate, as between husband 
and wife, a community estate and a joint tenancy cannot exist 
at the same time in the same property.  The use of community 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
 
funds to purchase the property and the taking of title thereto in 
the name of the spouses as joint tenants is tantamount to a 
binding agreement between them that the same shall not 
thereafter be held as community property but instead as a joint 
tenancy with all the characteristics of such an estate.  It would 
be manifestly inequitable and a subversion of the rights of both 
husband and wife to have them in good faith enter into a valid 
engagement of this character and, following the demise of 
either, to have a contention made that his or her share in the 
property was held for the community, thus bringing into 
operation the law of descent, administration, rights of creditors 
and other complications which would defeat the right of 
survivorship, the chief incident of the law of joint tenancy.  A 
joint tenancy is one estate and in it the rights of the spouses are 
identical and coextensive. 
“Secondly, on its face section 164 has no application to a 
case where ‘a different intention is expressed in the instrument’ 
and it seems to us to be clear . . . that a joint tenancy, the 
evidence of which the law requires to be on the face of the 
conveyance creating it, is of necessity an expression of the 
intention to hold the property otherwise than as community 
property and that the equal interest of the spouses must 
therefore be classed as their separate but joint estate in the 
property.”  (Siberell, supra, 214 Cal. at p. 773.) 
Although Siberell seemed to speak in sweeping terms of 
the incompatibility of community property and joint tenancy, we 
do not read Siberell so broadly for two reasons.  First, Siberell 
addressed a peculiar circumstance arising from the tension 
between the married woman’s presumption and fundamental 
concepts of joint tenancy.  Unlike tenancy in common deeds 
where spouses can have unequal interests (Dunn, supra, 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
 
211 Cal. at pp. 587–588), a joint tenancy “is one estate [in which] 
the rights of the spouses are identical and coextensive” (Siberell, 
supra, 214 Cal. at p. 773).  In “the situation of a wife holding 
half the property as her separate estate and the husband 
holding the other half as community property, it will be at once 
noted that there can be no unity of interest present, for the 
interest of the wife would be unequal to and more than that of 
the husband.”  (Id. at pp. 771–772.)  The application of Dunn’s 
rule to joint tenancy, the court said, “would be manifestly 
inequitable” in its division of marital property at divorce and 
also “would defeat the right of survivorship, the chief incident of 
the law of joint tenancy.”  (Id. at p. 773.) 
In rejecting the wife’s contention that her claim of a 75 
percent interest followed directly from Civil Code former section 
164, Siberell observed that “on its face section 164 has no 
application to a case where ‘a different intention is expressed in 
the instrument.’ ”  (Siberell, supra, 214 Cal. at p. 773.)  The 
titling of the spouses’ ownership as a joint tenancy “on the face 
of the conveyance creating it,” the court explained, was “an 
expression of the intention to hold the property otherwise than 
as community property,” and “the equal interest of the spouses 
must therefore be classed as their separate but joint estate in 
the property.”  (Ibid.)  In appealing to the statutory carveout for 
a “different intention . . . expressed in the instrument,” Siberell 
harmonized the dictates of Civil Code former section 164 with 
the statute that authorized married couples to acquire and hold 
property as joint tenants (Civ. Code, former § 161).  Had Siberell 
held otherwise, the married woman’s presumption would have 
made it impossible for spouses to acquire and hold property as 
joint tenants, contrary to Civil Code former section 161.  It was 
in that context — i.e., a wife’s claim under the married woman’s 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
 
presumption for a 75 percent interest in property deeded to 
husband and wife as joint tenants (Siberell, at p. 769) — that 
Siberell said that “a community estate and a joint tenancy 
cannot exist at the same time in the same property” (id. at 
p. 773). 
Second, the court in Siberell expressly limited its decision 
to actions between the spouses:  “It should be noted here that we 
are dealing strictly with the situation as between the parties to 
the marriage and are not dealing with the characteristics of the 
property as against the claims of judgment creditors or other 
third persons as was the case in Hulse v. Lawson.”  (Siberell, 
supra, 214 Cal. at p. 772.)  Less than a year before Siberell, in 
Hulse v. Lawson (1931) 212 Cal. 614 (Hulse), this court reached 
a different conclusion in a dispute between a wife and her 
husband’s creditor over property that the spouses had acquired 
during marriage as joint tenants.  Hulse held that because the 
married couple used community funds to acquire the property, 
the property was community property, and as such, the 
husband’s creditor could attach the couple’s entire interest.  (Id. 
at p. 620.)  Whereas the source of the purchase funds played no 
role in Siberell, it was dispositive in Hulse.  (See Hulse, at p. 620 
[“It would thus appear that practically the entire purchase price 
of the property was derived from the community earnings and 
effort of Chester A. Lawson during the period when he and the 
appellant Gertrude B. Lawson were living together as husband 
and wife.”].)  The fact that Siberell reached a different result in 
the dissolution context — without disavowing what Hulse had 
held just one year earlier outside the dissolution context — 
indicates the limited scope of Siberell’s holding. 
In 1935, the Legislature added language to Civil Code 
former section 164 to provide that joint conveyances to husband 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
 
and wife created a presumption of community property unless 
the form of title indicated otherwise:  “[W]hen any of such 
property is acquired by husband and wife by an instrument in 
which they are described as husband and wife, unless a different 
intention is expressed in the instrument, the presumption is that 
such property is the community property of said husband and 
wife.”  (Stats. 1935, ch. 707, § 1, p. 1912, italics added.)  This 
language, adopted shortly after Siberell and Dunn, appeared to 
supersede Dunn by making clear that property deeded to 
spouses as “husband and wife” is presumptively community 
property.  At the same time, the addition of the phrase “unless 
a different intention is expressed in the instrument” suggests 
that the Legislature approved of Siberell’s interpretation of Civil 
Code former section 164:  An instrument that vests title as a 
joint tenancy expresses a “ ‘different intention’ ” by the parties 
than to hold the property as community property.  (Siberell, 
supra, 214 Cal. at p. 773.)  In 1969, the Legislature moved this 
language, together with the general community property 
presumption (enacted in 1872) and the married woman’s 
presumption (enacted in 1889), to Civil Code section 5110.  
(Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, p. 3339.) 
B. 
In the wake of Siberell and these evolving statutory 
presumptions, courts tended to treat joint tenancy title as 
signifying separate property interests between the spouses, 
even when the property was acquired during marriage with 
community funds.  Like Siberell, these cases typically dealt with 
divorce or other interspousal disputes.  (See, e.g., Delanoy v. 
Delanoy (1932) 216 Cal. 23, 25 [dispute between wife and 
husband’s mother over husband’s conveyance of his joint 
tenancy interest to his mother; wife had previously obtained a 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
 
judgment against husband]; Machado v. Machado (1962) 
58 Cal.2d 501, 506 (Machado) [divorce]; Gudelj v. Gudelj (1953) 
41 Cal.2d 202, 213–214 (Gudelj) [same]; Tomaier v. Tomaier 
(1944) 23 Cal.2d 754, 757 [same]; Schindler v. Schindler (1954) 
126 Cal.App.2d 597, 604 [same].)  The court in Schindler made 
a point of quoting Siberell’s limiting language:  “As cautioned in 
Siberell, [214 Cal. at page 772], it should be noted that we are 
dealing here strictly with the controversy between the parties to 
the marriage and are not determining standards by which the 
characteristics of the property are ascertained when the claims 
of judgment creditors or the rights of third persons are 
involved.”  (Schindler, at p. 604.) 
Notwithstanding this express limitation of Siberell’s 
holding, some courts applied Siberell’s rule to disputes involving 
third-party creditors.  (See Application of Rauer’s Collection Co. 
(1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 248, 258–259 [community property held as 
joint tenancy is separate property for the purpose of creditor 
claim on homestead]; Oak Knoll Broadcasting v. Hudgings 
(1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 563, 568–569 [presumption of separate 
property from joint tenancy title rebutted where couple used 
community funds and had no intent to take separate property 
interests]; Hansford v. Lassar (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 364, 373 
(Hansford) [same].)  Courts also applied Siberell’s rule at death 
to give effect to the right of survivorship.  (See Socol v. King 
(1950) 36 Cal.2d 342, 346 (Socol) [probate case where “a true 
joint tenancy is created by a conveyance to husband and wife in 
that form, although the property is purchased with community 
funds”].) 
At the same time, courts struggled to reconcile community 
property presumptions with the incidents of separate property 
in joint tenancy when dividing ownership of the family home at 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
 
divorce.  Because a joint tenancy deed was sufficient to create a 
presumption of separate property, courts were often unable to 
award the family home to one of the spouses.  (See Machado, 
supra, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 506–507.)  To more closely conform 
property division with couples’ expectations, the Legislature in 
1965 amended Civil Code former section 164 to extend the 
community property presumption to single-family homes held in 
joint tenancy at divorce.  (Stats. 1965, ch. 1710, § 1, pp. 3843–
3844 [“[W]hen a single family residence of a husband and wife 
is acquired by them during marriage as joint tenants, for the 
purpose of the division of such property upon divorce or separate 
maintenance only, the presumption is that such single family 
residence is the community property of said husband and 
wife.”].)  The codification of this presumption superseded 
Siberell and other cases that had treated single-family homes 
held in joint tenancy as separate property upon divorce.  (See 
Lucas, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 813–815 [discussing history of 
this enactment].)  This presumption was later added to Civil 
Code section 5110 without substantive change.  (Stats. 1969, 
ch. 1608, § 8, p. 3339.)  In 1983, the Legislature expanded this 
presumption to cover all property held in joint title, not just 
single-family residences, and established a writing requirement 
for rebuttal.  (Stats. 1983, ch. 342, § 1, p. 1538, codified at Civ. 
Code, former § 4800.1.) 
In 1973, the Legislature made a more far-reaching change 
to the community property system.  Consistent with evolving 
norms of gender equality, the Legislature enacted landmark 
reforms that allocated equal management rights to the wife over 
community property.  Whereas previously “[t]he husband ha[d] 
the management and control of the community real property” 
subject to certain veto rights by the wife (Stats. 1917, ch. 583, 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
 
§ 2, p. 829 [Civil Code former section 172a]), now “either spouse 
has the management and control of the community real 
property, but both spouses either personally or by duly 
authorized agent, must join in executing any instrument by 
which such community real property or any interest therein is 
leased for a longer period than one year, or is sold, conveyed, or 
encumbered.”  (Stats. 1973, ch. 987, § 15, p. 1901, codified at 
Civ. Code, former § 5127.)  “[T]he concept of equal management 
was a radical and significant change in community property law 
and was a landmark step toward recognizing equality of the 
spouses.  Accordingly, the 1975 reform legislation marked a 
significant dividing line between the husband-dominated 
community property law of the past and the equal managerial 
rights of the present day.”  (Droeger v. Friedman, Sloan & Ross 
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 26, 35.) 
By securing to both spouses equal management rights 
over community property, the Legislature eroded the original 
impetus for facilitating the wife’s ownership of separate 
property.  Accordingly, the Legislature in the same bill amended 
Civil Code section 5110 to prospectively eliminate the married 
woman’s presumption as well as the additional language 
adopted in 1935.  (Stats. 1973, ch. 987, § 5, pp. 1898–1899.)  
Under this amendment, the statutory provisions that 
“superimpose[d] the common law technical reliance on title upon 
the community property reliance upon actual ownership” 
(Principles of Community Property, supra, at p. 143) do not 
apply to property acquired on or after January 1, 1975.  The 
prospective repeal of the married woman’s presumption 
eliminated the original basis of claims for an unequal interest in 
joint tenancy property that had precipitated Siberell’s rule 
privileging the form of title.  And the prospective repeal of the 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
 
1935 language of Civil Code former section 164 (i.e., that 
property jointly deeded to “husband and wife” is presumptively 
community property “unless a different intention is expressed 
in the instrument”) signaled that ownership interests in marital 
property can no longer be directly inferred from form of title, as 
Siberell had held.   
Justice Kruger reads Siberell as entirely unaltered by the 
1973 amendments because Siberell established a “common law 
transmutation rule.”  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 6.)  While one 
may reasonably debate the extent to which Siberell was 
grounded in the statutory text of Civil Code former section 164 
or the common law, Siberell was unquestionably a reaction to 
the strictures of the former married woman’s presumption and 
the resulting inequities at dissolution.  (See ante, at pp. 14–16.)  
If Siberell did establish a common law rule, that rule was 
reconcilable with the statutory presumptions only to the extent 
that the presumptions permitted the title instrument to express 
“a different intention.”  (Siberell, supra, 214 Cal. at p. 773.)  
Moreover, although Siberell can be understood as resting on “a 
transmutation theory” (conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 4; id. at 
pp. 9–10 & fn. 5), this court has treated it as a title “presumption 
arising from the form of the deed” that applies regardless of the 
source of the funds or the intentions of either spouse.  (Gudelj, 
supra, 41 Cal.2d at p. 212; see Socol, supra, 36 Cal.2d at p. 345.)  
The Legislature eliminated the carveout for such title 
presumptions in 1973.   
Thus, as a result of the 1973 legislation, the form of title 
in property jointly held by a married couple can defeat the 
general community property presumption only for property 
acquired before 1975.  For property acquired during marriage 
on or after January 1, 1975, the earlier form of title 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
 
presumptions no longer apply; instead, the general community 
property presumption applies. 
After the 1973 amendments, a number of courts relied on 
the “different intention” language in Civil Code former section 
5110 to determine the character of property acquired before 
1975.  (See Kane v. Huntley Financial (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 
1092, 1097, fn. 2 [creditor case reasoning that “[s]ince the grant 
deed by which the Kanes acquired the property [in 1969] 
provides that title is in joint tenancy, a different intent is 
expressed and the community property presumption does not 
apply”]; Estate of Petersen (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1742, 1747 
[probate case finding that joint tenancy property acquired in 
1960 “rebuts the community property presumption found in 
Civil Code section 5110” because “the instrument specifically 
states otherwise”]; see also Abbett Electric Corp. v. Storek (1994) 
22 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1466 [creditor case relying on both the 
statutory language of Civil Code former section 5110 and 
Siberell to find that “the form of title here at issue creates a 
presumption that Storek and Cook hold the residence as joint 
tenants . . . [s]ince the instrument by which [the couple] 
acquired the residence [in 1973] [expresses] ‘a different intent 
. . . and the community property presumption does not apply’ ”].)  
But, as Justice Kruger details (conc. & dis. opn., post, at 
pp. 10–11), not all observers understood the 1973 amendments 
to abrogate Siberell.  During the 1983 amendments to the 
predecessor of Family Code section 2581, a committee analysis 
asserted that “the Siberell [form of title] presumption still holds 
even though a general presumption favoring community 
property was raised with the 1973 statutory change which gives 
a wife equal management and control of the community assets.”  
(Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 26 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
 
(1983–1984 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 4, 1983, p. 2.)  And 
some cases, mostly in the probate context, appeared to treat 
Siberell’s form of title presumption as a rule of common law 
existing separate and apart from the community property 
framework.  (See Estate of Castiglioni (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 
367, 386 [applying form of title presumption to property 
transferred to joint tenancy in 1989]; Estate of Gallio, supra, 33 
Cal.App.4th at p. 597 [applying form of title presumption to joint 
tenancy property acquired between 1949 and 1989]; Estate of 
Levine (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 701, 705 [joint tenancy home 
purchased in April 1975 was spouses’ separate property]; see 
also In re Marriage of Leversee (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 891, 895 
[applying Siberell progeny to joint tenancy properties that 
couple acquired before marriage in 1977].)  But these courts, in 
citing Siberell or its progeny, did not engage in any analysis of 
the evolving statutory framework, including the 1973 
elimination of the married woman’s presumption, which was 
central to the issue in Siberell. 
The same is true of our opinion in Lucas, supra, 27 Cal.3d 
808, which could be read as continuing the effect of the married 
woman’s presumption.  (See Recommendation Relating to 
Marital Property Presumptions and Transmutations (Jan. 
1984) 17 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1984) pp. 209–210 & 
fn. 9 [describing Lucas as one of the cases that “continue[d] the 
effect of the title presumptions by creating an inference of a gift 
as to property acquired before or after January 1, 1975”].)  In 
Lucas, the divorcing couple bought a motorhome in 1976 using 
community funds to pay 25 percent of the price and separate 
funds of the wife to pay 75 percent.  The purchase contract was 
made out in the husband’s name, but title and registration were 
put in the wife’s name.  (Lucas, at p. 817.)  The court noted that 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
 
the wife “wished to have title in her name alone, and [the 
husband] did not object.”  (Ibid.)  Lucas held that the trial court’s 
award of the motorhome to the wife as her separate property 
was supported by substantial evidence because “[t]itle was 
taken in [the wife’s] name alone” and the husband “was aware 
of this and did not object.”  (Id. at p. 818.)  The decision made no 
mention of how Civil Code former section 5110 applied to the 
motorhome, and its conclusion seemed to continue the effect of 
the married woman’s presumption notwithstanding the 1973 
amendment eliminating that presumption for property acquired 
on or after January 1, 1975.  We disapprove In re Marriage of 
Lucas, supra, 27 Cal.3d 808 to the extent it implies that the 
married woman’s form of title presumption continues to apply 
to marital property acquired on or after January 1, 1975. 
Justice Kruger underscores the reliance interests arising 
from these applications of Siberell and its progeny.  (Conc. & dis. 
opn., post, at pp. 11–12.)  But prior cases have made little or no 
effort to trace the convoluted history of the law of joint 
tenancies.  When we examine that history, we find it difficult to 
discern any settled expectations that married couples could 
have had.  The Legislature recognized as much in 1965 when it 
enacted the predecessor of Family Code section 2581 to abate 
the confusion that couples encountered at death and divorce 
when title and underlying expectations of ownership diverged.  
(See Domestic Relations, supra, at p. 124; ante, at pp. 10–11.)  
The confusion arising from Siberell and its relationship to a 
complex statutory history is regrettable.  But when we consider 
Siberell’s actual ruling — which by its terms “deal[t] strictly” 
with dissolution only (Siberell, supra, 214 Cal. at p. 772) — 
against the evolution of our community property regime after 
1975, there is no longer a basis to apply its presumption of 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
 
separate property in a dispute between a couple and a 
bankruptcy trustee. 
C. 
Against the backdrop of the reformed default rules 
governing characterization of marital property, the Legislature 
in 1984 substantially altered the mechanism for couples to 
depart from those default rules.  Seeking to curb the risk of 
fraud, undue influence, and litigation arising from informal 
agreements between spouses that purported to change the 
character of property, the Legislature enacted our present-day 
transmutation statutes.  (Recommendation Relating to Marital 
Property Presumptions and Transmutations, 17 Cal. Law 
Revision Com. Rep. (1984) pp. 224–225; see Estate of 
MacDonald (1990) 51 Cal.3d 262, 269 (MacDonald).)  The 
legislation provides that for property acquired on or after 
January 1, 1985, a transmutation “is not valid unless made in 
writing by an express declaration that is made, joined in, 
consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose interest in the 
property is adversely affected.”  (Stats. 1984, ch. 1733, § 3, 
p. 6302, codified at Civ. Code, former § 5110.730, subds. (a), (e).)  
This requirement is more stringent than prior law, which 
allowed a transmutation to be shown by an oral or written 
agreement or a common understanding between the spouses.  
(Estate of Blair (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 161, 167.) 
Finally, the Legislature in 1992 enacted the Family Code 
to unify “the dispersion of family law in several codes.”  (22 Cal. 
Law Revision Com. Reports, Fam. Code (1992) p. 7.)  The 
Legislature assigned the various rules and presumptions 
discussed above to different sections of the Family Code:  The 
transmutation requirements in the former sections of the Civil 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
26 
 
Code were moved, without substantive change, to Family Code 
sections 850 to 853; the requirement of an express written 
declaration now appears at Family Code section 852, 
subdivision (a).  (Stats. 1992, ch. 162, § 10, pp. 491–492.)  The 
community property presumption applicable at divorce, 
previously codified at Civil Code section 5110 and then at Civil 
Code section 4800.1, now appears at Family Code section 2581 
and extends to all “property acquired by the parties during 
marriage in joint form, including property held in tenancy in 
common, joint tenancy, or tenancy by the entirety, or as 
community property.”  (Stats. 1993, ch. 219, § 111.7, p. 1619.)  
The married woman’s presumption and the post-Siberell/Dunn 
rule allowing form of title to rebut the community property 
presumption, both previously codified at Civil Code section 
5110, now appear at Family Code section 803 and apply only to 
property acquired before 1975.  (Stats. 1992, ch. 162, § 10, 
p. 491.)  And the general community property presumption, also 
previously codified at Civil Code section 5110, now appears as a 
stand-alone provision at Family Code section 760 and applies to 
all property acquired during marriage “wherever situated,” 
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute.”  (Stats. 1992, 
ch. 162, § 10, p. 488.) 
IV. 
As this history shows, our community property system has 
gradually evolved toward one that affords both spouses equal 
interests and control over community assets.  At the same time, 
the rules characterizing property as community or separate 
based on form of title have faded in the contemporary statutory 
framework.  The provisions of Civil Code former section 5110 
(Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, p. 3339) that had allowed “a different 
intention . . . expressed in the instrument” conveying jointly 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
27 
 
held property to rebut the community property presumption no 
longer apply; their applicability is confined to property acquired 
before 1975.  (See Fam. Code, § 803.)  The characterization of 
property acquired in joint form on or after January 1, 1975 is 
instead governed by the comprehensive language of Family 
Code section 760:  “Except as otherwise provided by statute, all 
property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a 
married person during the marriage while domiciled in this 
state is community property.”  Unlike Civil Code former section 
5110, Family Code section 760 does not permit the community 
property presumption to be rebutted simply by the manner in 
which a married couple takes title. 
As noted, the form of title presumption in Evidence Code 
section 662 is not an exception to the community property 
presumption in Family Code section 760.  The Braces principally 
contend here that the community property presumption is 
limited to the context of marital dissolution.  But against a 
historical backdrop in which our community property 
framework has become more encompassing, while rules 
characterizing marital property based on form of title have 
receded, we find no indication that this is so.  Nothing in the text 
of Family Code section 760 expresses such a limitation.  
Moreover, when we look to other statutes that refer to 
community property, we find that the Legislature has explicitly 
applied the Family Code section 760 presumption to define 
third-party rights, such as creditor rights, against one or both 
spouses.  (Code of Civ. Proc., § 695.020, subd. (a) [“Community 
property is subject to enforcement of a money judgment as 
provided in the Family Code.”].)  The Civil Code incorporates 
Family Code section 760 into its definition of joint property 
interests.  (Civ. Code, §§ 682, 687.)  And if spouses want to 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
28 
 
transact with each other, the Legislature subjects these 
agreements to the laws governing fraudulent transfers.  (Fam. 
Code, §§ 851, 852.)  “These [Family Code] provisions presuppose 
that, as a general rule, third parties are entitled to rely on the 
community property presumption in transactions involving 
marital property.”  (In re Brace, supra, 566 B.R. at p. 24.) 
In Valli, we held that the statutory transmutation 
requirements apply to purchases made by one or both spouses 
from a third party using community funds and that Evidence 
Code section 662, assuming it “ever applies in marital 
dissolution proceedings,” “does not apply when it conflicts with 
the transmutation statutes.”  (Valli, supra, 58 Cal.4th at 
p. 1406.)  In that case, the form of title on an insurance policy 
purchased with community funds and put in the wife’s name 
was not sufficient to alter its characterization as community 
property under Family Code section 760. 
The Braces urge us to limit Valli to the context of marital 
dissolutions.  But we see no basis in the text, purpose, or history 
of Family Code section 760 to confine Valli’s holding in this way.  
It would carve a major hole in the community property system 
to hold that Evidence Code section 662, a general statute that 
addresses the import of legal title — and not Family Code 
section 760, a statute that specifically addresses the 
characterization of property acquired during marriage — 
governs the characterization of property acquired during 
marriage for all purposes other than divorce.  (See Rader v. 
Thrasher (1962) 57 Cal.2d 244, 252 [“a special provision relating 
to a particular subject will govern against a general provision”]; 
Haines, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 301 [“where two 
presumptions are in conflict, the more specific presumption will 
control over the more general one”]; cf. Estate of Bibb (2001) 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
29 
 
87 Cal.App.4th 461, 469–470 (Bibb) [“[T]he more general form 
of title presumption created by Vehicle Code sections 4150.5 and 
5600.5 should not be used to negate the requirements of section 
852, subdivision (a), which assure that a spouse’s separate 
property entitlements are not undermined.”].)  In the absence of 
a statute that expressly restricts the applicability of the 
community property presumption to dissolution actions, we 
decline to engraft such a major limitation onto Family Code 
section 760.  Indeed, to conclude that Evidence Code section 662 
and not Family Code section 760 applies outside the context of 
divorce would run counter to the intent of the pivotal 1973 
legislation that prospectively eliminated separate property 
inferences from form of title. 
The Braces argue that Family Code section 2581 implies 
the existence of “a sort of ‘hybrid estate’ where joint tenancy 
retains its historic character as constituting two separate 
estates for some purposes and a unitary estate in dissolution 
matters.”  That provision says:  “For the purpose of division of 
property on dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the 
parties, property acquired by the parties during marriage in 
joint form, including property held in tenancy in common, joint 
tenancy, or tenancy by the entirety, or as community property, 
is presumed to be community property.”  (Fam. Code, § 2581.)  
In the Braces’ view, the fact that Family Code section 2581 
establishes a community property presumption specifically 
“[f]or the purpose of division of property on dissolution of 
marriage or legal separation of the parties” means that spouses 
“hold property as joint tenants in their dealings with third 
parties,” while the property “retains its community nature in 
dissolution proceedings.” 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
30 
 
Family Code section 2581 is a special presumption at 
divorce that “ ‘specifically governs real property designated as 
joint tenancy.’ ”  (In re Brace, 566 B.R. at p. 24, quoting Valli, 
supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1412 (conc. opn. of Chin, J.); see ante, at 
pp. 19, 26.)  Unlike the general community property 
presumption, the Family Code section 2581 presumption cannot 
be rebutted by tracing; it can only be rebutted by (1) a clear 
statement in the deed or other documentary evidence of title 
that the property is separate property and not community 
property, or (2) proof that the parties have made a written 
agreement that the property is separate property.  (Fam. Code, 
§ 2581, subds. (a), (b); see Haines, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 291.)  In discussing this presumption, we have explained that 
“the affirmative act of specifying a form of [joint] ownership in 
the conveyance of title . . . removes such property from the more 
general [community property] presumption” and places it under 
the specific community property presumption now stated in 
Family Code section 2581.  (Lucas, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 814–
815.)  “It is because of this express designation of [joint] 
ownership that a greater showing is necessary to overcome the 
[special] presumption arising therefrom than is necessary to 
overcome the more general presumption that property acquired 
during marriage is community property.”  (Id. at p. 815.) 
Thus, the import of Family Code section 2581 is that it 
establishes a stronger presumption of community property at 
dissolution when title is held in joint form, while the general 
community property presumption, rebuttable by tracing, applies 
at dissolution to property not held in joint form.  Nothing in the 
text, purpose, or history of Family Code section 2581 suggests 
an intent to limit the applicability of Family Code section 760 to 
dissolution matters, although, as Justice Kruger notes, the 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
31 
 
legislative history of the 1983 amendments suggests that some 
believed Siberell still controlled outside dissolution.  (Conc. & 
dis. opn., post, at pp. 10–11.)  If anything, Family Code section 
2581 demonstrates that when the Legislature intends to limit a 
provision affecting the character of property to the marital 
dissolution context, it is capable of saying so.  The absence of 
any such language in Family Code section 760 confirms that its 
scope is not limited to marital dissolution.   
The Braces also rely on Hansford, supra, 53 Cal.App.3d 
364, a dispute between a wife and her husband’s creditor who 
was trying to reach their home held in joint tenancy.  The court 
held that “[i]n view of the express language of [the predecessor 
statute to Family Code section 2581], the community-property 
presumption has no application to the instant case as it involves 
a dispute with a third party, rather than one between husband 
and wife in a dissolution of marriage or legal separation 
proceeding.  The presumption that is applicable in this case at 
bench is that of a joint-tenancy ownership that is the presumed 
fact which flows from the basic fact of a deed that is joint tenancy 
in form.”  (Id. at p. 371.)  But the property at issue was acquired 
well before 1975, and at the time, the relevant statutes provided 
that a designation of joint tenancy on the conveyance served to 
displace the general community property presumption.  (Ante, 
at pp. 14–16, 19–21.)  The presumptions in effect today are 
different.  The rule displacing the community property 
presumption when “a different intention is expressed in the 
instrument” conveying title jointly to “husband and wife” is now 
confined to property acquired before 1975.  (Fam. Code, § 803, 
subd. (c).)  For property acquired on or after January 1, 1975, 
the general community property presumption of Family Code 
section 760 applies and, as noted, the special presumption of 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
32 
 
Family Code section 2581 does not imply any limitation of 
Family Code section 760 to dissolution actions. 
The Braces further contend that limiting the application 
of community property presumptions to interspousal disputes 
would promote stability of title.  By presumptively giving effect 
to form of title, Evidence Code section 662 serves to “protect[] 
parties to a real property transaction, as well as creditors.”  
(Haines, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 294.)  Whereas “concerns of 
stability of title are lessened in characterization problems 
arising from [interspousal] transmutations” (id. at p. 295), the 
Braces argue, such concerns have more weight in disputes 
involving third parties or the rights of creditors. 
But when property is held in joint tenancy, both tenants 
are on record title.  And recorded deeds commonly indicate the 
marital status of the grantees; in this case, for example, the 
Braces took title as “husband and wife as joint tenants.”  (See, 
e.g., Lucas, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 811 [title taken as “ ‘Gerald E. 
Lucas and Brenda G. Lucas, Husband and Wife as Joint 
Tenants’ ”]; Bibb, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 463 [grant deed 
signed by husband conveying separate property home to himself 
“and his wife as joint tenants”]; Estate of Mitchell (1999) 
76 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1382 [title taken as “ ‘Robert S. Mitchell 
and Shirley C. Mitchell, husband and wife as joint tenants’ ”]; In 
re Marriage of Scherr (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 314, 316 [wife chose 
to title deed as “ ‘husband and wife as joint tenants’ ”].)  If the 
joint tenants are married, a creditor or third-party purchaser 
will be on notice that the property is presumptively community 
and that an alienation or encumbrance of that property must be 
joined by both parties.  The third party can inquire whether a 
written transmutation agreement rebuts the community 
property presumption; such an agreement, in order to be 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
33 
 
“effective as to third parties without notice thereof,” must be 
recorded.  (Fam. Code, § 852, subd. (b).)  We do not think this 
approach puts third parties at risk of not being able to determine 
who owns the property and the nature of the ownership. 
It is true that Family Code section 760 also applies to 
situations where community property is titled in one spouse’s 
name.  But the risk to stability of title is mitigated by Family 
Code section 1102, subdivision (c)(2), which validates leases, 
contracts, mortgages, and deeds between the spouse holding 
record title to community real property and a third party acting 
in good faith with no knowledge of the marital relationship.  
This provision is an exception to the general rule that an 
adversely affected spouse may void unilateral conveyances of 
community real property.  (Fam. Code, § 1102, subds. (a), (d).)  
The law thus protects innocent third parties who transact with 
the spouse holding record title to community property in 
circumstances where failure to do so would undermine stability 
of title.  (Cf. Valli, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1413 (conc. opn. of 
Chin, J.).) 
Further, our approach does not undermine the stability of 
title in the context of probate.  The Braces argue that the 
inapplicability of Evidence Code section 662 to this bankruptcy 
dispute would mean that at death “title companies could not 
insure title to the surviving spouse based upon a death 
certificate, but, instead would run the risk that a non-spousal 
heir might challenge title based upon allegations that the 
property was community in nature and not joint tenancy.”   
Courts have consistently held that for property titled in 
joint tenancy, the form of title controls at death.  (See, e.g., 
Estate of Gallio, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 597; Estate of 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
34 
 
Levine, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d at p. 705.)  Although these cases 
often relied on Siberell or its progeny, we see no indication that 
the abrogation of Siberell in 1973 or any subsequent 
development suggests an intent by the Legislature to disturb 
the rule that the form of title controls the disposition of joint 
tenancy property at death. 
To the contrary, the Legislature has acted in a manner 
consistent with the case law.  In 1994, the Legislature amended 
Family Code section 2040 to specify that when one party files 
for divorce, “the summons shall contain the following notice:  
‘WARNING:  California law provides that, for purposes of 
division of property upon dissolution of marriage or legal 
separation, property acquired by the parties during marriage in 
joint form is presumed to be community property.  If either party 
to this action should die before the jointly held community 
property is divided, the language of how title is held in the deed 
(i.e., joint tenancy, tenants in common, or community property) 
will 
be 
controlling 
and 
not 
the 
community 
property 
presumption.’ ”  (Stats. 1994, ch. 1269, § 13, pp. 8034–8035; 
Fam. Code, § 2040, subd. (c).)  This reflects the common 
expectation that “holding property in joint tenancy will allow the 
surviving spouse to avoid probate when [his or] her partner 
dies.”  (Estate of Luke, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 1015.) 
In addition, the rule that form of title controls at death 
was a key motivation for the Legislature’s 2000 enactment of 
Assembly Bill No. 2913, which created a new form of title:  
community property with a right of survivorship.  (Assem. Bill 
No. 2913 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) ch. 645, § 1, pp. 4203–4204, 
codified at Civ. Code, § 682.1.)  This form of ownership combines 
the tax benefits of holding community property at the death of 
one spouse — a stepped-up basis in the full value of the 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
35 
 
community property — with the right of survivorship in a joint 
tenancy.  (See Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d 
reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2913 (1999–2000 Reg. Sess.) 
as amended August 18, 2000, pp. 2–4.)  In its analysis of 
Assembly Bill 2913, the Senate Rules Committee noted that it 
was necessary to create a new form of title because “[e]xisting 
law provides that if either spouse should die before any jointly 
held community property is divided, the language of how title is 
held in the deed (i.e., joint tenancy, tenants in common, or 
community property) will be controlling and not the community 
property presumption.”  (Id. at p. 2.) 
Moreover, the Legislature has imported community 
property characterization rules into the Probate Code to prevent 
full operation of the right of survivorship in certain situations.  
Probate Code former section 228 provided that when a person 
died intestate with no surviving spouse or issue, “the [portion of 
the] estate . . . [that] was community property of the decedent 
and a previously deceased spouse” did not pass to the heirs of 
the decedent but instead to the children of the previously 
deceased spouse.  (Stats. 1939, ch. 1065, § 1, p. 2992.)  Probate 
Code former section 229 adopted a similar approach for the 
separate property of the previously deceased spouse.  (Id., at 
pp. 2992–2993.)  In characterizing property under these 
statutes, courts held that “it is the source of its acquisition and 
not the nature of its ownership immediately before death, which 
is controlling.”  (Hudspeth v. Earlywine (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 
759, 762; see Estate of Luke, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 1015 
[“We conclude the community property presumption, not the 
form-of-the-title presumption, should apply in cases arising 
under former section 229.”]; In re Abdale’s Estate (1946) 
28 Cal.2d 587, 591–592; In re Taitmeyer’s Estate (1943) 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
36 
 
60 Cal.App.2d 699, 705, 712.)  In 1983, the Legislature 
consolidated these statutes into Probate Code section 6402.5.  
Although the Legislature altered the statute’s applicability to 
certain property, the rules for determining  “ ‘the portion of the 
decedent’s estate attributable to the decedent’s predeceased 
spouse’ ” are the same.  (Recommendation Proposing New 
Probate Code (Dec. 1989) 20 Cal. Law. Rev. Com. Rep. (1990) 
p. 1466.)  By enacting specific source of acquisition rules to 
govern this scenario, the Legislature implicitly confirmed that 
unless otherwise specified, form of title controls the disposition 
of joint tenancy property at death. 
The coexistence of the general community property 
presumption and the form of title rule at death highlights a 
precept implicit in the various legislative enactments we have 
discussed:  The particular manner in which property is acquired, 
titled, or held by a married couple is conceptually and legally 
distinct from the underlying character of the spouses’ ownership 
of the property as separate or community.  Our decision in 
Siberell elided these concepts in order to avoid the “manifestly 
inequitable” division of marital property arising from the 
married woman’s presumption.  (Siberell, supra, 214 Cal. at 
p. 773.)  Today, with that presumption no longer in effect for 
property acquired during marriage on or after January 1, 1975, 
there is nothing inequitable in a general presumption that such 
property held in joint tenancy is community property.  (See id. 
at p. 773 [“A joint tenancy is one estate and in it the rights of 
the spouses are identical and coextensive.”]; Fam. Code, § 751 
[“The respective interests of each spouse in community property 
during continuance of the marriage relation are present, 
existing, and equal interests.”].)  The Legislature has expressly 
recognized that characterization of joint tenancy property as 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
37 
 
community property does not “defeat the right of survivorship.”  
(Siberell, at p. 773; see Fam. Code, § 2040, subd. (c).)  Each 
spouse’s right of survivorship arising from joint tenancy title 
remains an “expectancy” that is realized upon the other spouse’s 
death.  (Riddle, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at p. 526.) 
To be sure, the rule that form of title controls at death is 
not absolute.  In practice, putative heirs or devisees have sought 
to rebut this form of title presumption in order to access the 
decedent’s share of real property through intestacy or devise.  
(See Socol, supra, 36 Cal.2d at pp. 345–346; Estate of Petersen, 
supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 1747; Estate of Blair, supra, 
199 Cal.App.3d at p. 167; Bibb, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 464–465.)  But such litigation is not an artifact of what we 
hold in this case.  Our decision today does not alter the well-
established default rule that form of title controls at death, nor 
does it alter the procedures through which a surviving joint 
tenant may clear title to real property held in joint tenancy.  
(Prob. Code, §§ 210–212.)  Compliance with these procedures 
entitles title insurers and third parties to rely on the affidavit of 
death as prima facie evidence of the surviving joint tenant’s 
ownership.  (Id., § 212.)   
Finally, the Braces argue that our holding will undermine 
the expectations of spouses and third-party creditors.  Applying 
the community property presumption to third-party disputes 
outside of the dissolution context, the Braces say, “would . . . 
subject the interests of innocent spouses to the debts of their 
spouses, and in the case of bankruptcy subject their one-half 
interest to administration by the bankruptcy court.” 
But it is a basic feature of the community property system 
that “the community estate is liable for a debt incurred by either 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
38 
 
spouse before or during marriage, regardless of which spouse 
has the management and control of the property and regardless 
of whether one or both spouses are parties to the debt or to a 
judgment for the debt,” unless a statute expressly provides 
otherwise.  (Fam. Code, § 910, subd. (a).)  In contrast to the 
indications from the Legislature that form of title controls the 
disposition of joint tenancy property at death, there is no 
indication that the Legislature intended to permit spouses to 
avoid community debts by the mere acceptance of a joint tenancy 
deed from a third party.  Nor could Siberell be read to stand for 
such a proposition; as noted, Siberell expressly declined to opine 
on third-party claims and distinguished a prior case holding 
that a husband’s creditor could reach the couple’s entire interest 
in joint tenancy property acquired during marriage with 
community funds.  (Siberell, supra, 214 Cal. at p. 772, citing 
Hulse, supra, 212 Cal. at p. 614.) 
Importantly, our decision today does not prevent an 
innocent or estranged spouse from protecting his or her interests 
in separate property.  For purposes other than dissolution, a 
spouse can prove separate ownership in jointly titled property 
and rebut the Family Code section 760 community property 
presumption by tracing.  (Lucas, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 815.)  A 
spouse can convert jointly held property acquired with 
community funds into separate property through a written 
transmutation agreement.  (Fam. Code, §§ 850, subd. (a), 852.)  
A spouse can hold his or her earnings in an account outside of 
the other spouse’s control in order to protect those earnings from 
liability for the other spouse’s pre-marital debts.  (Id., § 911.)  
And couples can opt out of this system altogether through pre-
marital agreements.  (Id., § 1600 et seq.)  In light of these 
options, the Braces’ concerns about stability and expectations do 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
39 
 
not persuade us that the default rule governing the community’s 
liability for the debts of either spouse should differ according to 
the nature of the action. 
 
In sum, we hold that the community property presumption 
in Family Code section 760 applies not only to dissolution 
actions but also to a dispute between one or both spouses and a 
bankruptcy trustee, and that Evidence Code section 662 does 
not apply when it conflicts with the Family Code section 760 
presumption. 
V. 
Having elucidated the default rules that govern 
characterization of property during marriage, we now answer a 
further question posed by the bankruptcy trustee and amici in 
this case:  When spouses use community funds to acquire 
property from a third party and take title in a joint tenancy 
deed, does the form of the deed constitute an express declaration 
that transmutes the community funds into separate property?  
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.548(f)(5); see also Peabody, 
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 665, fn. 1.)   
 
As noted, spouses can change the character of property 
during marriage by satisfying the transmutation requirements.  
(Fam. Code, §§ 850, 852.)  For transmutations that occurred 
before 1985, a written agreement is not required; a valid 
transmutation can be demonstrated by substantial evidence of 
an oral or written agreement or a common understanding 
between the spouses.  (Estate of Blair, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 167; see ibid. [the conduct of the spouses is relevant 
evidence].)   
For property acquired on or after January 1, 1985, a 
“transmutation of real or personal property is not valid unless 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
40 
 
made in writing by an express declaration that is made, joined 
in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose interest in the 
property is adversely affected.”  (Fam. Code, § 852, subd. (a); see 
id., subd. (e).)  The Legislature enacted the writing requirement 
“to remedy problems which arose when courts found 
transmutations on the basis of evidence the Legislature 
considered unreliable.”  (MacDonald, supra, 51 Cal.3d at 
p. 269.) 
 
In MacDonald, we explained that the transmutation 
requirements are not satisfied by just “any writing.”  
(MacDonald, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 269.)  The adversely affected 
party must make an “ ‘express declaration’ ” in an instrument 
that “contains language which expressly states that the 
characterization or ownership of the property is being changed.”  
(Id. at p. 272.)  We reasoned that an IRA account consent 
agreement did not satisfy this requirement because it could not 
be determined from the face of the document whether the wife 
was “aware that the legal effect of her signature might be to 
alter the character or ownership of her interest in the pension 
funds.”  (Id. at pp. 272–273.)  Similarly, we held in Valli that the 
act of putting a life insurance policy in the name of one spouse 
was not sufficient because the “[h]usband never expressly 
declared in writing that he gave up his community interest in 
the policy bought with community funds.”  (Valli, supra, 
58 Cal.4th at p. 1406.) 
By contrast, the Court of Appeal in Bibb found the express 
declaration requirement satisfied where a husband signed a 
grant deed conveying his interest in his separate property to him 
and his wife as joint tenants.  (Bibb, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 468–469.)  The court reasoned that the deed was in the 
statutory form required to convey an interest in property.  (Id. 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
41 
 
at p. 468; see Civ. Code, § 1092 [prescribing statutory form of 
deed required to convey title].)  Because the deed contained 
language that expressly conveyed the husband’s interest to his 
wife, the court explained, the property was validly transmuted 
from his separate property to property held in joint tenancy by 
the couple.  (Bibb, at p. 469.) 
In this case, we do not address interspousal deeds by 
which one spouse conveys his or her separate property to both 
spouses as joint tenants, as in Bibb, or by which both spouses 
deed their community property to each other as joint tenants.  
Instead, we focus here on the common scenario of a married 
couple using community funds to buy property from a third 
party.  Such a conveyance typically occurs through a grant deed 
signed by the third-party grantor.  (Civ. Code, § 1092.)  The deed 
conveys the third party’s interest in the property to the spouses, 
and the spouses, as grantees, accept the interest of the grantor.  
Although the deed may “ ‘expressly declare[]’ ” that title is vested 
as joint tenants (id., § 683), the deed does not “contain[] 
language which expressly states that the characterization or 
ownership of the property is being changed” between the 
spouses.  (MacDonald, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 271–272.) 
Professor Blumberg, as amicus curiae, argues that the 
Braces relinquished “the incidents of community property 
ownership . . . when the parties accepted title in a deed 
specifying an alternative and mutually exclusive form of joint-
and-equal ownership.”  (See Blumberg, supra, at p. 150 [joint 
tenancy “title creates a presumption of transmutation”]; see id. 
at p. 156.)  But the Legislature and the courts have repeatedly 
lamented that spouses do not understand what effect, if any, 
joint tenancy title has on the characterization of property 
purchased with community funds.  (See In re Marriage of Buol 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
42 
 
(1985) 
39 Cal.3d 
751, 
762–763; 
Schindler, 
supra, 
126 Cal.App.2d at p. 601; ante, at pp. 10–11.)  If anything, we 
have observed that the 1965 enactment of the special 
community property presumption applicable at divorce had the 
effect of “more closely matching the intent and assumptions of 
most spouses who acquire and hold their residence in joint 
tenancy.”  (Lucas, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 814 [discussing 
predecessor to Family Code § 2581].) 
Against this backdrop, we see no basis to assert that 
married couples intend joint tenancy title to result in separate 
property interests with regard to third-party claims.  Indeed, the 
mere fact that spouses choose to take title as joint tenants 
appears to be the kind of “unreliable” evidence that the 
Legislature intended to target with the transmutation statute.  
(MacDonald, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 269; see Schindler, supra, 
126 Cal.App.2d at p. 601 [“It is common knowledge that 
innumerable husbands and wives with little or no information 
about estates in real property acquiesce without reflection in the 
suggestion that they place purchased property in joint 
tenancy.”].)  Under Family Code section 852, the question is 
whether it is apparent solely from the titling of a deed as a joint 
tenancy that the spouses understood the writing to change the 
character of property acquired with community funds into 
separate property.  We conclude the answer is no because a joint 
tenancy deed does not itself constitute “language which 
expressly states that the characterization or ownership of the 
property is being changed.”  (MacDonald, at p. 272.) 
Nor is a joint tenancy deed exempt from the express 
declaration requirement on the ground that neither spouse’s 
ownership interest is adversely affected.  It is true that holding 
property as joint tenants does not completely deprive one spouse 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
43 
 
of possession, as is the case when one spouse takes community 
property with sole title.  (See Valli, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1399.)  
Taking title in joint tenancy also does not change the 50 percent 
interest that each spouse has in community property.  But a 
property right is not simply the percentage share a person holds 
in a particular asset.  It encompasses a “bundle of rights and 
privileges as well as of obligations” (Union Oil Co. v. State Bd. 
of Equal. (1963) 60 Cal.2d 441, 447, fn. omitted), such as the 
right to possess, lease, encumber, or alienate the property.  
Shared management and control is a defining feature of our 
community property system and has driven the evolution of our 
community property laws.  (Fam. Code, §§ 1100, 1102.)  With 
few exceptions, “either spouse has the management and control 
of the community real property.”  (Id., § 1102, subd. (a).)  
Spouses must act as fiduciaries to one another in the 
management and control of the community assets.  (Id., § 1100, 
subd. (e).)  And both spouses must “join in executing an 
instrument by which that community real property or an 
interest therein is leased for a longer period than one year, or is 
sold, conveyed, or encumbered.”  (Id., § 1102, subd. (a).)  By 
contrast, a “married person may, without the consent of the 
person’s spouse, convey the person’s separate property.”  (Id., 
§ 770, subd. (b).)  Although the ability to unilaterally convey 
community property or the absence of fiduciary duties may be 
advantageous to a spouse in certain situations, the law 
presumes that couples desire the protections above. 
Indeed, it is not difficult to see why a spouse’s claim of a 
separate interest arising from joint tenancy title causes the 
other spouse’s interest to be “adversely affected.”  (Fam. Code, 
§ 852, subd. (a).)  If a husband collateralizes his half of the 
couple’s family home without his wife’s consent, the wife’s 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
44 
 
ability to collateralize her half is probably not much relief for 
her.  Such concerns are heightened by the fact that the right of 
survivorship — the main incident of joint tenancy title — may 
be unilaterally severed.  (See Civ. Code, § 683.2; Riddle, supra, 
102 Cal.App.3d at p. 526.) 
In sum, for property acquired with community funds on or 
after January 1, 1985, the titling of a deed as a joint tenancy is 
not an express written declaration sufficient to transmute the 
property into separate property under Family Code section 852. 
CONCLUSION 
 
We answer the Ninth Circuit’s question as follows:  
Evidence Code section 662 does not apply to property acquired 
during marriage when it conflicts with Family Code section 760.  
For joint tenancy property acquired during marriage before 
1975, each spouse’s interest is presumptively separate in 
character.  (Fam. Code, § 803; Siberell, supra, 214 Cal. at 
p. 773.)  For joint tenancy property acquired with community 
funds on or after January 1, 1975, the property is presumptively 
community in character.  (Fam. Code, § 760.) 
If such property was acquired before 1985, the parties can 
show a transmutation from community property to separate 
property by oral or written agreement or a common 
understanding.  (Fam. Code, § 852, subd. (e); Estate of Blair, 
supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at p. 167.)  Although a joint tenancy deed 
is insufficient to effect a transmutation, a court may consider 
the form of title in determining whether the parties had a 
common agreement or understanding under the pre-1985 rules.  
(See MacDonald, supra, 51 Cal. 3d at p. 270 & fn. 6.)  For joint 
tenancy property acquired with community funds on or after 
January 1, 1985, a valid transmutation from community 
In re BRACE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
45 
 
property to separate property requires a written declaration 
that expressly states that the character or ownership of the 
property is being changed.  (Fam. Code, § 852, subd. (a); 
MacDonald, at p. 272).  A joint tenancy deed, by itself, does not 
suffice. 
Nothing in our decision precludes spouses from holding 
separate property as joint tenants or from transmuting 
community property into separate property held in joint tenancy 
as long as the applicable transmutation requirements are met.  
Nor does our decision alter the operation of the right of 
survivorship that is the main incident of joint tenancy title. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
1 
In re BRACE 
S252473 
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kruger 
 
A married couple uses community funds to purchase real 
estate and takes title as joint tenants.  Decades later, one spouse 
declares bankruptcy.  Now, to determine just how much of the 
real estate the bankruptcy trustee can reach, the bankruptcy 
court must decide:  Under California law, is the real estate the 
spouses’ community property (and therefore reachable in full), 
or is it instead the jointly held but separate property of the 
spouses (and therefore reachable only as to the debtor spouse’s 
one-half interest)? 
I agree with much of the majority’s answer to the question.  
At one time the law presumed that real estate acquired in this 
manner was the jointly held, separate property of the spouses.  
(See Siberell v. Siberell (1932) 214 Cal. 767 (Siberell).)  But 
today, the presumption runs in the other direction:  When a 
couple purchases property with community funds, the property 
generally continues to belong to the community unless the 
spouses 
expressly 
declare 
an 
intent 
to 
change—or 
“transmute”—it to separate property under Family Code section 
852.  (See Fam. Code, §§ 760, 852.)  This express declaration 
requirement applies no matter how the couple takes title, 
whether as joint tenants or otherwise.  (See maj. opn., ante, at 
pp. 2–3, 39 [form of title presumption in Evidence Code section 
662 does not control the inquiry]; In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 
58 Cal.4th 1396, 1406 [property titled in one spouse’s name 
In re BRACE 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
2 
must satisfy statutory transmutation requirements to overcome 
community property presumption].)1 
Where I part ways with the majority is on the timing of 
this change in the governing law.  I would identify that date as 
1985, when the transmutation rule presently codified in Family 
Code section 852 first took effect.  This is because the old 
separate property presumption was itself a transmutation rule; 
the Legislature changed the rule when it changed the 
requirements for transmuting community property to separate 
property. 
The majority, by contrast, identifies the relevant moment 
of change as 1975, when the Legislature implemented other 
reforms that “eroded the original impetus” for the old rule.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 20; see id. at pp. 20–21.)  But unlike the passage 
of the modern transmutation rule, the 1975 reforms had no 
direct effect on the old separate property presumption; “eroding 
the original impetus” for a rule is not the same thing as 
overruling it.  And for the Braces and other married couples who 
purchased property in joint tenancy sometime between 1975 
and 1985, the difference matters.  These couples were entitled 
to depend on the law as it had existed before the present 
transmutation rule took effect in 1985.  By backdating the 
relevant changes by a decade, the majority risks upending the 
                                        
1  
Under a provision of the Family Code originally enacted 
in the Civil Code in 1983, an express declaration is not sufficient 
to transmute joint tenancy property into separate property for 
purposes of dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the 
spouses.  (Fam. Code, § 2581; see Civ. Code, former § 4800.1, 
added by Stats. 1983, ch. 342, § 1, p. 1538.)  But because the 
Braces’ action does not involve dissolution or separation, that 
rule is inapplicable here. 
In re BRACE 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
3 
reasonable expectations of individuals who structured their 
purchases in reliance on the law as the courts had then 
described it. 
The relevant history begins with our 1932 decision in 
Siberell, which established the separate property presumption.  
Siberell was decided against the backdrop of various statutory 
presumptions governing the characterization of marital 
property.  One of these presumptions, still substantively in 
effect today, was the presumption that property acquired by 
spouses during marriage is community property.  (Civ. Code, 
former § 164, added by Stats. 1889, ch. 219, § 1, p. 328 [enacted 
in 1889].)  A second presumption, known as the married 
woman’s presumption, dictated that, despite the general 
community property presumption, “whenever any property is 
conveyed to a married woman by an instrument in writing, the 
presumption is that the title is thereby vested in her as her 
separate property.  And in case the conveyance be to such 
married woman and her husband, or to her and any other 
person, the presumption is that the married woman takes the 
part conveyed to her as tenant in common, unless a different 
intention is expressed in the instrument . . . .”  (Ibid.)  The 
juxtaposition of these two statutory presumptions sometimes 
led to spouses holding different interests in the same piece of 
property.  For example, in Dunn v. Mullan (1931) 211 Cal. 583, 
we held that a deed conveyed to “husband and wife” 
presumptively created a tenancy in common in which the wife 
held a half interest as her separate property and the husband 
held the remaining half as community property.  (Id. at p. 588.) 
The question in Siberell was whether the relevant statutes 
required the same result when spouses acquired property 
deeded in joint tenancy.  We said no, for reasons specific to joint 
In re BRACE 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
4 
tenancies.  We explained, as an initial matter, that the spouses 
could not have different interests in the same property because 
joint tenancies require unity of interest, meaning that the joint 
tenant spouses must have identical and coextensive interests in 
the property.  This unity of interest, we explained, would be 
destroyed if “a wife hold[s] half the property as her separate 
estate and the husband hold[s] the other half as community 
property, . . . [because] the interest of the wife would be unequal 
to and more than that of the husband.”  (Siberell, supra, 214 Cal. 
at pp. 771–772.)  Specifically, in some instances, the wife would 
“own[] three-fourths of the property” and the husband would 
own “the remaining one-fourth,” as was the result in Dunn.  
(Siberell, at p. 772.)  But we went on to explain that a decision 
to take title in joint tenancy is “tantamount to a binding 
agreement between [the spouses] that the [property] shall not 
thereafter be held as community property but instead as a joint 
tenancy with all the characteristics of such an estate,” under 
which “the equal interest of the spouses” is “classed as their 
separate but joint estate in the property.”  (Id. at p. 773.)  Such 
an 
agreement 
was 
sufficient 
to 
rebut 
any 
contrary 
presumption—be it the married woman’s presumption or the 
general community property presumption—that might arise by 
operation of statute.  (Ibid.) 
This latter point was at the core of Siberell’s holding, and 
it rested on what was, fundamentally, a transmutation theory—
namely, that when spouses use community funds to purchase 
property titled in joint tenancy, they are agreeing to transmute 
their community property into separate, jointly held property.  
Indeed, Siberell itself used this very term in describing the 
issue, asking whether, when the spouses took title as joint 
tenants, “was not the common property, by the consent of the 
In re BRACE 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
5 
spouses, then and there transmuted into one estate, the 
separate property of each and held jointly by them?”  (Siberell, 
supra, 214 Cal. at p. 769, italics added.) 
To be sure, Siberell’s transmutation reasoning was not 
beyond reproach.  The Siberell court evidently believed that 
spouses could claim the chief benefit of a joint tenancy—the 
right of survivorship at death—only if they also intended to 
claim the property as separate during life.  (Siberell, supra, 214 
Cal. at p. 773.)  So the court refused to treat the spouses’ 
property as community during life, lest it deprive them of the 
right of survivorship at death.  To hold otherwise, Siberell said, 
would have been “manifestly inequitable and a subversion of the 
rights of both husband and wife,” because “following the demise 
of either,” community interests in the property would “bring[] 
into operation the law of descent, administration, rights of 
creditors and other complications which would defeat the right 
of survivorship.”  (Ibid.)  This particular concern was misplaced, 
for reasons the majority alludes to:  A couple who takes property 
in joint tenancy may secure the right of survivorship and other 
incidents of separately held property at death, even if the 
property belongs to the community during life.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at pp. 36–37.) 
But whatever concerns underlay Siberell’s reasoning, the 
critical point is that we instructed courts to presume that joint 
tenancy property is separate property because the spouses 
implicitly agreed to a transmutation—and not because the 
statutory scheme required this result.  That is not to say the 
statutory scheme was entirely irrelevant to the outcome.  The 
transmutation rule in Siberell did have the happy effect of 
equalizing 
the 
spouses’ 
interests 
in 
the 
property, 
notwithstanding a set of statutory presumptions that sometimes 
In re BRACE 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
6 
created a peculiar imbalance in the spouses’ relative interests.  
But even though the statutory scheme may have partly 
motivated the Siberell transmutation rule, it was not the basis 
for the rule.  In fact, Siberell expressly held that the statutes did 
not control the question, noting that the statutory married 
woman’s presumption does not apply “to a case where ‘a 
different intention is expressed in the instrument,’ ” including 
where the spouses agree to hold title in joint tenancy.2  (Siberell, 
supra, 214 Cal. at p. 773, quoting Civ. Code, former § 164.) 
Over the next 50 years, both this court and the Courts of 
Appeal repeatedly applied Siberell’s common law transmutation 
rule in a variety of contexts to hold that joint tenancy property 
was presumptively the separate property of the spouses.  It is 
worth noting that none of this case law describes Siberell as 
rooted 
in 
any 
particular 
operation 
of 
the 
statutory 
presumptions; the cases instead describe Siberell in the 
language of transmutation.3  (See, e.g., Delanoy v. Delanoy, 
                                        
2  
The same language was included in the presumption 
added in 1935, which abrogated Dunn’s rule for tenancies in 
common.  (See Stats. 1935, ch. 707, § 1, p. 1912 [“[W]hen any of 
such property is acquired by husband and wife by an instrument 
in which they are described as husband and wife, unless a 
different intention is expressed in the instrument, the 
presumption is that such property is the community property of 
said husband and wife.”  (Italics added.)].)  Because a joint 
tenancy deed had been understood to express a different 
intention—that is, an intention to hold the property as the 
separate property of the spouses—the 1935 amendment had no 
effect on the Siberell presumption.  (Siberell, supra, 214 Cal. at 
p. 773; but see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 20–21.) 
3  
The Legislature, too, apparently considered Siberell’s rule 
to be a common law transmutation rule.  (See, e.g., Assem. 
 
In re BRACE 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
7 
supra, 216 Cal. 23, 26 [citing Siberell for the proposition that 
when spouses purchase joint tenancy property with community 
funds, “the community interest must be deemed severed by 
consent”]; Tomaier v. Tomaier, supra, 23 Cal.2d 754, 757–758 
[applying transmutation principles to hold that spouses could 
rebut the Siberell presumption with evidence that they intended 
to retain community interests in the property]; Socol v. King 
(1950) 36 Cal.2d 342, 345–346 [holding that, under established 
transmutation principles, the Siberell presumption controls 
unless both spouses intended to hold community interests in the 
property]; Schindler v. Schindler (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 597, 
602 [“ ‘The form of the conveyance is itself some evidence of the 
intent to change it from community property, and creates a 
rebuttable presumption to that effect.’ ”].) 
Nor was the Siberell transmutation rule confined to 
actions between spouses, as the majority suggests.  (See maj. 
opn., ante, at pp. 16, 24, 38.)  Siberell did say that it was dealing 
with an interspousal action (Siberell, supra, 214 Cal. at p. 772), 
but nothing in Siberell’s transmutation reasoning was limited to 
that context.4  Unsurprisingly, then, none of the cases applying 
                                        
Interim Com. on Judiciary, Final Rep. on Relating to Domestic 
Relations (Jan. 11, 1965) p. 118 [“The result of Siberell, Delanoy 
[v. Delanoy (1932) 216 Cal. 23] and Tomaier [v. Tomaier (1944) 
23 Cal.2d 754] has been to create in the joint tenancy deed a 
presumption that the property has been changed from 
community property to joint tenancy . . . .”].) 
4  
The majority highlights Siberell’s reference to Hulse v. 
Lawson (1931) 212 Cal. 614, but the Hulse citation is not 
particularly telling.  Although the majority understands Hulse 
as using tracing, and not a form-of-title presumption, in the 
context of a creditor suit to characterize the spouses’ joint 
 
In re BRACE 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
8 
Siberell suggested the rule was limited to the context of 
dissolution or other interspousal disputes.  Indeed, the Siberell 
rule was regularly applied outside the dissolution context, 
including to claims made by third party creditors.  (See, e.g., 
Hansford v. Lassar (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 364, 371–373 [third 
party creditor claim]; Oak Knoll Broadcasting Corp. v. Hudgings 
(1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 563, 568–569 [same]; see also Socol v. 
King, supra, 36 Cal.2d at pp. 345–346 [claim at death].)  This 
understanding of Siberell’s breadth was evidently shared by the 
Legislature, which in 1965 effectively abrogated the Siberell 
presumption for certain joint tenancy property, but solely for 
purposes of dissolution—a limitation that would have been 
meaningless if Siberell did not already apply outside the 
dissolution context.  (See Civ. Code, former § 164, amended by 
Stats. 1965, ch. 1710, § 1, pp. 3843–3844 [“[W]hen a single 
family residence of a husband and wife is acquired by them 
during marriage as joint tenants, for the purpose of the division 
of such property upon divorce or separate maintenance only, the 
presumption is that such single family residence is the 
community property of said husband and wife.”].) 
                                        
tenancy property (maj. opn., ante, at p. 16), Hulse has generally 
been understood as standing for the very different proposition 
that a presumption based on how spouses take title can be 
rebutted by other evidence of the spouses’ intent.  (See Hulse, at 
pp. 616, 619–620 [framing question as whether property 
acquired in joint tenancy “had become” the community property 
of the spouses and relying on fact that spouses made mortgage 
payments with community property after the purchase]; 
Tomaier v. Tomaier, supra, 23 Cal.2d at p. 757 [citing Hulse for 
proposition that “evidence is admissible to show that husband 
and wife who took property as joint tenants actually intended it 
to be community property”].)   
In re BRACE 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
9 
This brings us to 1973, when the Legislature prospectively 
eliminated the married woman’s presumption for property 
acquired on or after January 1, 1975.  This amendment changed 
the legal background against which Siberell was decided.  But 
nothing in the 1973 amendments changed the Siberell rule 
itself—that spouses who take title to property as joint tenants 
are presumed to have intended to transmute their community 
property to separate property.  It was not until the precursor to 
Family Code section 852 was passed in 1984 that the 
Legislature changed the transmutation rules, and even then 
only for transmutations occurring on or after January 1, 1985.  
(See Civ. Code, former § 5110.730, added by Stats. 1984, 
ch. 1733, § 3, p. 6302.)  Though the 1973 amendments 
eliminated the statutory presumptions that would have created 
unequal interests in joint tenancy property absent Siberell’s 
rule, they did not speak to the core premise of the rule.5 
                                        
5  
The majority claims that the Siberell rule could not have 
survived the 1973 amendments because those amendments 
eliminated the “carveout” to statutory presumptions for titles 
that expressed “ ‘a different intention.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 21; see also id. at pp. 26–27.)  But Siberell’s transmutation 
rule did not depend on a statutory “carveout” any more than did 
any other common law transmutation rules in effect before 
1985—all of which, by their nature, operated to overcome the 
statutory presumption that property acquired by spouses during 
marriage is community property.  There is no dispute that, as a 
general matter, transmutation principles survived the 1973 
amendments and were used to overcome the statutory 
community property presumption until the Legislature 
tightened the requirements for transmutations effected on or 
after January 1, 1985.  If common law transmutation rules in 
general survived the 1973 amendments, it is hard to see why 
Siberell’s rule alone would be an exception. 
In re BRACE 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
10 
It makes sense, then, that contemporary authorities  
assumed Siberell’s transmutation rule survived the 1973 
amendments.  Lower courts continued to apply the Siberell rule 
to property acquired after January 1, 1975.  (See, e.g., Estate of 
Levine (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 701, 705 [applying Siberell 
presumption to joint tenancy property acquired after January 1, 
1975]; cf. Estate of Blair (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 161, 167, quoting 
Levine, at p. 705 [“Before January 1, 1985, the form of title 
presumption”—i.e., Siberell’s presumption—“could be rebutted 
by showing the character of the property had been changed by 
oral or written ‘agreement or common understanding between 
the spouses.’ ”]; maj. opn., ante, at pp. 22–23.)  Legislative 
history accompanying relevant statutory amendments in 1983 
suggests the Legislature held the same understanding.  (See 
Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 26 (1983–
1984 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 4, 1983, p. 2 [“The Siberell 
[form-of-title] presumption still holds even though a general 
presumption favoring community property was raised with the 
1973 statutory change which gives a wife equal management 
and control of the community assets.”]; Annual Rep. (Dec. 1983) 
17 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1984) appen. VII, p. 864 
[noting that Civ. Code, former § 4800.1, the precursor to Fam. 
Code, § 2581, would “reverse[] the common law presumption”—
i.e., Siberell’s presumption—“that property acquired by the 
spouses during marriage in joint tenancy form is joint tenancy 
property”].)6 
                                        
6  
Academic commentary from the time is also in accord.  
(See, e.g., Reppy, Debt Collection from Married Californians:  
Problems 
Caused 
by 
Transmutations, 
Single-Spouse 
Management, and Invalid Marriage (1981) 18 San Diego L.Rev. 
 
In re BRACE 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
11 
These authorities demonstrate that, while the “history of 
the law of joint tenancies” may have been “convoluted” (maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 24), the governing rule was clearly understood:  
Notwithstanding the 1973 amendments, property acquired by 
spouses as joint tenants before 1985 was generally presumed to 
be their jointly held, separate property.  This understanding 
should come as no surprise, since this rule was not based on the 
statutory married woman’s presumption, or any other element 
of the statutory scheme.  Before today’s opinion, few would have 
ventured the view that Siberell’s transmutation rule had been 
effectively overruled by a set of property law reforms that had 
nothing to do with transmutation. 
Again, the underpinnings of Siberell’s transmutation 
reasoning were open to question, for reasons the majority 
correctly identifies and now clarifies.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 36–
37.)  But this clarification comes too late for those who, like the 
Braces, acquired property in joint tenancy between 1975 and 
1985 with the reasonable expectation that the property would 
                                        
143, 164 [“Case law has firmly established, however, that the 
mere recital of joint tenancy raises a presumption that [the 
spouses] 
by 
agreement 
transmuted 
the 
community 
consideration to joint tenancy property.”  (Citing Siberell.)]; 
Sterling, Joint Tenancy and Community Property in California 
(1983) 14 Pacific L.J. 927, 960 [“Title in joint tenancy creates a 
rebuttable presumption that the property is in fact owned in 
joint tenancy rather than as community property.”]; Bruch, The 
Definition and Division of Marital Property in California: 
Towards Parity and Simplicity (1982) 33 Hastings L.J. 769, 830, 
fn. 238 [noting that Siberell “still controls” and that the 
Legislature that enacted the 1973 amendments “signaled its 
understanding that Siberell’s presumption of equal separate 
property interests remains”].) 
 
In re BRACE 
Kruger, J., concurring and dissenting 
 
12 
be presumed separate under Siberell’s longstanding rule.7  
Because the Braces were entitled to rely on the law as it then 
stood, I would hold that, in a suit against a bankruptcy trustee, 
property acquired by spouses in joint tenancy on or before 
December 31, 1984, is presumptively the spouses’ separate 
property, while property acquired since then is presumptively 
the property of the community. 
 
 
 
 
 
      KRUGER, J. 
                                        
7 
Though some of those couples might have been 
“confus[ed]” about the effects of their decision to take title as 
joint tenants (maj. opn., ante, at p. 24), surely it is safe to 
presume that others were aware of the state of the law at the 
time and took title expecting its protections. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  In re Brace  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX on request pursuant to rule 8.548, Cal. Rules of Court 
Review Granted   
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S252473  
Date Filed: July 23, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:    
County:    
Judge:    
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel:    
 
Law Offices of Stephen R. Wade, Stephen R. Wade; Law Office of W. Derek May and W. Derek May for 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Grace Ganz Blumberg as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Tara Twomey for National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys and National Consumer 
Bankruptcy Rights Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Marshack Hays, D. Edward Hays, Matthew W. Grimshaw and Judith E. Marshack for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
Walzer Melcher and Christopher C. Melcher as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Stephen R. Wade 
Law Offices of Stephen R. Wade 
405 N. Indian Hill Blvd. 
Claremont, CA 91711 
(909) 985-6500 
 
D. Edward Hays 
Marshack Hays LLP 
870 Roosevelt 
Irvine, CA 92620 
(949) 333-777 
 
Christopher C. Melcher 
Walzer Melcher LLP 
5941 Variel Avenue 
Woodland Hills, CA 91367 
(818) 591-3700