Title: CHARLES SINGTON V CHRYSLER CORP
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 119291
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 31, 2002

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 31, 2002  
CHARLES SINGTON,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 119291  
CHRYSLER CORPORATION, also known as 
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
TAYLOR, J.  
This 
case  
concerns 
eligibility 
for 
worker’s 
compensation  
benefits pursuant to the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act  
(WDCA) definition of disability at MCL 418.301(4) and  the  
reasonable 
employment 
provisions, 
MCL 
418.301(5), 
of 
that 
act.  
The Court of Appeals effectively concluded that under  
§ 301(4)’s definition of disability as interpreted in Haske v  
Transport Leasing, Inc, 455 Mich 628; 566 NW2d 896 (1997),  
plaintiff was disabled and entitled to wage loss benefits.  We  
conclude that the Haske definition of disability is erroneous  
and should be overruled.  Accordingly, we vacate the decision  
of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the WCAC for  
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
I  
A  
A 
review 
of 
the 
relationship in the worker’s compensation  
statute between “disability” and “favored work” (or as it is  
now formally called in the WDCA, “reasonable employment”) is  
helpful in understanding what is at issue in this case.  
There are circumstances in which a work-related injury  
might prevent an employee from continuing to perform one or  
even more of the complex of tasks in the job he was performing  
at the time of the injury, but in which, even with such a  
limitation, that  employee may still be able to perform the  
job sufficiently so that his wage earning capacity is not  
affected in that job.  For example, such an injury might  
render an employee unable to perform a job that requires  
continuous 
standing, 
but 
nevertheless 
leaves 
the 
employee 
able  
to perform a job suitable to his qualifications and training  
in which the  employee can sit while performing most or all  
his job duties to the degree that his ability to earn  
equivalent wages is not different than before the injury.  
Historically, such a situation posed a dilemma for the  
2  
 
worker’s compensation system.  As the courts dealt with  
difficult cases in which an employee could suffer a work­
related injury and be limited, to one degree or another, in  
his ability to perform work, but not rendered altogether  
unable to work, judges developed the common-law mitigation  
doctrine of “favored work.” Under the favored-work doctrine,  
an employer could generally require an injured employee,  
eligible for worker’s compensation benefits, to do other work  
that the employee was reasonably capable  of performing. The  
wages earned in the “easier” job could be used by the employer  
as a setoff, or mitigation, against the employer’s worker’s  
compensation liability.  If the employee unreasonably refused  
to participate in the favored work, i.e., the “easier job,”  
the penalty was loss of worker’s compensation benefits.1  
1 This Court described the former favored-work doctrine  
as follows:  
The favored-work doctrine is a purely judicial 
creation.  Favored, or light, work can be loosely 
defined as less strenuous post-injury work. Wages 
from favored work may be used as a setoff against 
an employer’s compensation liability, but favored­
work wages do not establish an earning capacity, 
and when such wages cease, they neither suspend nor 
bar compensation.  
The primary purpose of the doctrine is that of 
mitigation.
 It allows an employer to reduce or 
completely eliminate compensation payments by 
providing work within the injured employee’s  
physical capacity.  At the same time, it encourages 
the employee to return to productive employment 
(continued...)  
3  
 
 
There were also common-law protections that the courts  
developed to protect the employee from being exploited during  
the period he was engaged in favored work.2  This approach to  
favored work, with its emphasis on mitigation, was felt to  
advance the interests of the employee by encouraging his  
reentry into the workplace, as well as the interests of the  
employer in limiting its ongoing worker’s compensation  
liability.  
In 1982, the Legislature effectively displaced the  
common-law 
doctrine 
with the enactment of a statutory approach  
that drew heavily upon the favored-work doctrine3 (now called  
“reasonable employment”4). 
Importantly, the legislation  
1(...continued) 
rather than to remain idle, thus also serving a 
rehabilitative function. 
[Bower v Whitehall  
Leather Co, 412 Mich 172, 182; 312 NW2d 640 (1981) 
(citations omitted).]  
2 For example, reasonable employment in a “make work” 
position not reflective of earning capacity in the ordinary 
job market could not be abused by an employer to “establish” 
a wage earning capacity to allow the employer to discharge the 
employee while escaping further liability for benefits. See  
Pulley v Detroit Engineering & Machine Co, 378 Mich 418; 145 
NW2d 40 (1966).  
3 In particular, the Legislature made provisions, as set 
forth in n 5, providing generally for resumption of worker’s 
compensation 
benefits 
if 
an 
employee 
lost 
reasonable  
employment.  
4 The current version of the WDCA provides the following 
definition of “reasonable employment”:  
(continued...)  
4  
stated that, as a prerequisite to being considered  a  
participant in reasonable employment (MCL 418.301[5])5 an  
4(...continued) 
“Reasonable employment”, as used in this  
section, means work that is within the employee’s 
capacity to perform that poses no clear and  
proximate threat to that employee’s health and 
safety, and that is within a reasonable distance 
from that employee’s residence.  The employee’s 
capacity to perform shall not be limited to jobs in 
work suitable to his or her qualifications and 
training. [MCL 418.301(9).]  
5 MCL 418.301(5), the reasonable employment section, 
provides:  
If disability is established pursuant to  
subsection (4), entitlement to weekly wage loss 
benefits shall be determined pursuant to this 
section and as follows:  
* * *  
(d) If the employee, after having been  
employed pursuant to this subsection for 100 weeks 
or more loses his or her job through no fault of 
the 
employee, 
the 
employee 
shall 
receive  
compensation under this act pursuant to the  
following:  
(i) If after exhaustion of unemployment 
benefit eligibility of an employee, a worker’s 
compensation magistrate or hearing referee, as 
applicable, determines for any employee covered 
under this subdivision, that the employments since 
the time of injury have not established a new wage 
earning capacity, the employee shall receive  
compensation based upon his or her wage at the 
original date of injury.  There is a presumption of 
wage earning capacity established for employments 
totalling 250 weeks or more.  
(ii) The employee must still be disabled as 
determined pursuant to subsection (4).   
If the  
(continued...)  
5 
employee must first suffer a “disability,” as defined in MCL  
418.301(4).6
 Because 
an employee 
engaged in reasonable  
employment 
is 
afforded 
significant 
statutory 
protections7 
once  
the reasonable employment commences, it is critical to  
employers and employees alike that it be clear which workers  
5(...continued) 
employee is still disabled, he or she shall be 
entitled to wage loss benefits based on the  
difference between the normal and customary wages 
paid to those persons performing the same or 
similar employment, as determined at the time of 
termination of the employment of the employee, and 
the wages paid at the time of the injury.  
(iii) If the employee becomes reemployed and 
the employee is still disabled, he or she shall 
then receive wage loss benefits as provided in 
subdivision (b).  
(e) If the employee, after having been  
employed pursuant to this subsection for less than 
100 weeks loses his or her job for whatever reason, 
the employee shall receive compensation based upon 
his or her wage at the original date of injury.  
6 MCL 418.301(4) in full provides the following 
definition of “disability”:  
As used in this chapter, “disability” means a 
limitation of an employee’s wage earning capacity 
in work suitable to his or her qualifications and 
training resulting from a personal injury or work 
related disease.  The establishment of disability 
does not create a presumption of wage loss.  
7 
 Section 301(5)(e) provides that, if reasonable  
employment is lost “for whatever reason” within one hundred 
weeks, the employee shall receive compensation on the basis of 
the employee’s wage when injured.  Similarly, § 301(5)(d) 
generally provides for resumption of worker’s compensation 
benefits if reasonable employment is lost after one hundred 
weeks “through no fault of the employee.”  
6  
 
are  considered disabled under § 301(4). It is this condition  
precedent to “reasonable employment”—disability—that is the  
central issue in this case.  
B  
Plaintiff, Charles Sington, was employed by defendant,  
Chrysler Corporation, from July 1971 until March 1997.  During  
his last fifteen years, he performed various production­
related jobs as a “floater.” 
Until he was injured,  
plaintiff’s physical activities in the course of his  
employment included reaching and stretching out above head  
level, and bending and picking up parts weighing up to thirty  
pounds.  
In June 1994, plaintiff slipped and fell at work,  
injuring his left shoulder.  It is undisputed that the 1994  
injury arose in the course of his employment and that  
defendant voluntarily paid wage loss benefits following that  
injury.  Plaintiff underwent surgery on his left shoulder.  
Upon returning to work in January 1995, he was restricted from  
performing work requiring him to reach above the left  
shoulder.  He continued working as a floater with this work  
restriction until his right shoulder was injured outside his  
employment.  
Plaintiff underwent surgery on his right shoulder  
in August 1996 for a non-work-related injury and was off work  
until November 1996 when he returned to work as a floater.  
7  
Defendant then honored plaintiff’s expanded work restrictions  
that precluded him from lifting, pushing, or pulling over  
twenty pounds.  It is uncontested that plaintiff’s average  
weekly wage was the same before and after both the shoulder  
injuries.  
Plaintiff continued as a floater until March 1997 when he  
suffered a non-work-related stroke.  After the stroke,  
plaintiff 
received 
sickness and accident benefits and was then  
granted 
a 
permanent 
and total disability pension by defendant.  
Thereafter, plaintiff sought worker’s compensation  
benefits related to his inability to work.  Plaintiff asserted  
that he was working in “reasonable employment” under the WDCA  
when he performed his job with a work restriction after the  
left shoulder injury, and that he became entitled to worker’s  
compensation benefits when he lost this reasonable employment  
because of the stroke.  This claim 
is grounded in the  
interaction  between § 301(4) and § 301(5). 
As mentioned  
earlier, note 5, if an employee is disabled under § 301(4) and  
then is afforded reasonable employment under § 301(5), should  
that employment be terminated before one hundred weeks pass,  
the employee receives worker’s compensation benefits on the  
basis of the wage at the date of injury under § 301(5)(e).  
If, on the other hand, one hundred or more weeks have passed  
and the worker loses the employment through no fault of his  
8  
own, 
eligibility 
for 
benefits is determined under § 301(5)(d).  
While, in this case, no one disagrees with the rules of  
reasonable 
employment, 
there 
is 
dispute 
over 
whether  
plaintiff was “disabled” under § 301(4).  Plaintiff asserts he  
was disabled because his left shoulder injury precluded him  
from performing all the tasks he performed as a “floater”  
before that injury.  Defendant’s position is that, before the  
stroke, plaintiff was not disabled because the left shoulder  
injury had not reduced his “wage earning capacity” as that is  
understood in § 301(4), and, thus, once returned to work,  
plaintiff was not engaged in reasonable employment, with all  
its attendant benefits, at the time of the stroke.  
Accordingly, defendant asserts that, as with any other  
employee who became unable to work because of a non-job­
related injury, plaintiff has no remedy in the worker’s  
compensation system.  
Faced with the question whether plaintiff was disabled  
under § 301(4), the worker’s compensation magistrate ruled  
that plaintiff was not engaged in reasonable employment under  
§ 301(5).  The magistrate opined that plaintiff had been  
“performing a regular plant job” after his left shoulder  
injury and that he was convinced that plaintiff “did not  
experience any wage loss, whatsoever” because of that injury.  
The magistrate further concluded that plaintiff was disabled  
9  
 
 
because of his non-work-related stroke and that, but for  the  
stroke, plaintiff “would have continued at his regular job, a  
job 
which 
was 
conveniently 
within 
his 
recommended  
restrictions.”  
Because 
plaintiff’s 
wage 
loss 
was 
attributable  
to his stroke rather than his shoulder injury, “his partial  
disability, based on his . . . workplace injury, [was] not  
compensable . . . .”  
The WCAC affirmed the magistrate’s decision. 
It  
concluded that the factual record supported the magistrate’s  
determination that plaintiff was performing his “regular job”  
when he returned to work after the left shoulder injury.  
Thus, the WCAC stated, the job “did not constitute an  
accommodation 
of 
[plaintiff’s] injury, so as to be ‘reasonable  
employment’ under Section 301(5).” Accordingly, the WCAC  
further stated that plaintiff did not have a compensable  
disability when he continued to “perform his regular job”  for  
defendant after his left shoulder injury because “it was the  
stroke which clearly and directly was the reason for his  
subsequent wage loss.”  
The Court of Appeals reversed the WCAC. 245 Mich App 535;  
630 NW2d 337 (2001).  The panel held “as a matter of law that  
defendant 
offered 
plaintiff 
‘reasonable 
employment’ 
within 
the  
meaning of” MCL 418.301(9).  Id. at 552. It further concluded  
that, once an injured employee is engaged in reasonable  
10  
 
 
 
employment, the specific provisions pertaining to reasonable  
employment found in § 301(5)(e) take precedence over the  
general requirement of Haske that, to be compensable, wage  
loss must be causally linked to work-related injury. Thus, the  
Court concluded that plaintiff was engaged in reasonable  
employment at the time of the stroke.  Thereafter, we granted  
defendant’s application for leave to appeal.  
Critical to the proper resolution of this appeal is how  
“disability” is defined in the WDCA, MCL 418.301(4).  
In  
Haske, this Court adopted an interpretation of “disability”  
that encompassed any work-related injury that renders an  
employee unable to do one or more particular jobs within the  
employee’s qualifications and training.  Because plaintiff in  
this case had to be accommodated to some degree in his  
“floater” position, it can be argued that, under the Haske  
definition, plaintiff was working at—and “disabled” from—a  
different job before his left shoulder injury than the  
reconfigured “floater” job to which he returned after his  
injury.  Thus, when he suffered the stroke, as  an employee  
entitled to reasonable employment status,  plaintiff could  
claim the benefits that flow to an employee performing  
reasonable employment  who, through no fault of his own, loses  
11  
 
his ability to continue to perform reasonable employment.8 
 An alternative view of disability advanced by defendant  
requires a reduction in  an employee’s actual wage earning  
capacity  in all work suitable to his qualifications and  
training.  Under this approach, 
an employee would not be  
disabled if a work-related injury rendered him unable to  
perform a particular job, but where that limitation did not  
affect the wages that he could earn.  In particular, with  
regard to plaintiff, defendant argues that, if one examines  
overall wage earning capacity, plaintiff  was not disabled  
because his postinjury work as a floater caused him no  
reduction in wage earning capacity.  Thus, he was not entitled  
to be considered a participant in reasonable employment at the  
time of the stroke and, because the stroke was not  work  
related, he is not entitled to benefits under § 301(5).  
II  
We review questions of law in final orders from the WCAC  
de novo.  DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 401;  
8 It is not clear how many weeks plaintiff worked at what  
he alleged to be “reasonable employment” job. As indicated  
previously, if an employee loses reasonable employment “for 
whatever reason” within one hundred weeks, he is entitled to 
worker’s compensation benefits on the basis of his wage at the 
time of injury under § 301(5)(e).  If one hundred or more  
weeks have passed, determination of eligibility for worker’s 
compensation benefits if an employee loses reasonable  
employment “through no fault of the employee” is based on the 
more complex factors set forth in § 301(5)(d).  
12  
605 NW2d 300 (2000).  
III  
A  
We 
begin 
our 
analysis with the definition of “disability”  
in the WDCA:  
As used in this chapter, “disability” means a 
limitation of an employee’s wage earning capacity 
in work suitable to his or her qualifications and 
training resulting from a personal injury or work 
related disease.  The establishment of disability 
does not create a presumption of wage loss.  [MCL 
418.301(4).]  
As 
this 
language plainly expresses, a “disability” is, in  
relevant part, a limitation in “wage earning capacity” in work  
suitable to an employee’s qualifications and training. The  
pertinent definition of “capacity” in a common dictionary is  
“maximum output or producing ability.”  Webster’s New World  
Dictionary (3d College ed).  Accordingly, the plain language  
of MCL 418.301(4) indicates that a person suffers a disability  
if an injury covered under the WDCA results in a reduction of  
that person’s maximum reasonable wage earning ability in work  
suitable to that person’s qualifications and training.  
So understood, a condition that rendered an employee  
unable to perform a job paying the maximum salary, given the  
employee’s qualifications and training, but leaving the  
employee free to perform an equally well-paying position  
suitable to his qualifications and training would not  
13  
 
 
 
constitute a disability.9  
Our analysis in this regard is consistent with the  
following conclusion of this Court in Rea v Regency  
9 We recognize that pre-1987 Michigan case law once drew 
a distinction with regard to wage earning capacity  between  
“skilled” and “unskilled” workers.  A skilled worker was  
considered to have an impairment of earning capacity, and thus 
would be entitled to compensation, if a work-related injury 
rendered  the employee unable to continue earning the same 
level of wages in his particular skilled employment, even if 
the same wages could be earned at another type of employment. 
See, e.g., Kaarto v Calumet & Hecla, Inc, 367 Mich 128, 131; 
116 NW2d 225 (1962); Geis v Packard Motor Car Co, 214 Mich  
646, 648-649; 183 NW 916 (1921). Similarly, an unskilled or 
“common” laborer had to show a limitation in wage earning 
capacity in the entire field of “unskilled” labor.  See Leitz  
v Labadie Ice Co, 229 Mich 381; 201 NW 485 (1924); Kling v  
National Candy Co, 212 Mich 159; 180 NW 431 (1920).  This  
dichotomy between skilled and unskilled labor led to some 
anomalous results.  In Geis, the plaintiff was held to have a 
compensable 
disability because of an injury that precluded him 
from performing the skilled employment he was performing at 
the time of his injury even though he worked for higher wages 
in somewhat related employment.  See Kaarto, supra at 131  
(discussing Geis). Conversely, in Leitz, the plaintiff was 
held entitled to continuation of a disability award on the 
basis of being disabled from common labor even though he was 
earning higher wages as a bookkeeper and accountant.  
However, when the present definition of disability was 
adopted in 1987, the Legislature replaced its prior reference 
to a limitation in wage earning capacity in “the employee’s 
general field of employment” with “work suitable to his or her 
qualifications and training.” This means that the inquiry is 
now focused on an employee’s qualifications and training, not 
merely the general field of employment in which the employee 
happened to work at the time of a work-related injury.  Thus, 
the prior common-law skilled/unskilled dichotomy has no 
significance under the current statutory language . Because  
there is no textual basis in the statute for the selection and  
application of either historical definition of “wage earning 
capacity,” we examine the plain meaning of the words found in 
the statute.  
14  
 
 
 
Olds/Mazda/Volvo, 450 Mich 1201; 536 NW2d 542 (1995):  
A majority of the Court is of the opinion that 
the 1987 definition of disability in the Worker’s 
Disability Compensation Act[10] requires a claimant 
to demonstrate how a physical limitation affects 
wage-earning capacity in work suitable to the 
claimant’s qualifications and training. It is not  
enough for the claimant claiming partial disability 
to show an inability to return to the same or 
similar 
work. 
If 
the 
claimant’s 
physical 
limitation does not affect the ability to earn 
wages in work in which the claimant is qualified 
and trained, the claimant is not disabled.  
The Rea formulation implicitly drew upon an earlier  
articulation on this topic in Pulley v Detroit Engineering &  
Machine Co, 378 Mich 418, 423; 145 NW2d 40 (1966), in which  
this Court stated:  
[T]he method of determining the employee’s 
earning capacity, as that term is used in the act, 
is a complex of fact issues which are concerned 
with the nature of the work performed and the 
continuing availability of work of that kind, and 
the nature and extent of the disability and the 
wages earned.  
While we recognize that Pulley was decided before the adoption  
of the current definition of “disability” in § 301(4) and,  
thus, some particulars of that opinion may not be controlling  
with regard to the current statutory scheme, we believe that  
this language is instructive in indicating that worker’s  
compensation magistrates and the WCAC may have to consider  
various factual matters in determining whether an employee is  
10 That is the current definition of disability in the 
WDCA, MCL 418.301(4).  
15  
disabled.  Such matters could include the particular work that  
an employee is both trained  and qualified to perform, whether  
there continues to be a substantial job market for such work,  
and the wages typically earned for such employment in  
comparison to the employee’s wage at the time of the work­
related injury.  If the employee is no longer able to perform  
any of the jobs that pay the maximum wages, given the  
employee’s training and qualifications, a disability has been  
established under § 301(4).  
Under 
the 
Pulley and Rea approach, rather than concluding  
that any employee who is unable to perform a single job  
because of a work-related injury has a “disability” under §  
301(4), a worker’s compensation magistrate or the WCAC should  
consider whether the injury has actually resulted in a loss of  
wage earning capacity in work suitable to the employee’s  
training and qualifications in the ordinary job market.  
In sum, we conclude, as did the Rea Court before us, that  
“disability” as defined in MCL 418.301(4) cannot plausibly be  
read as describing an employee who is unable to perform one  
particular job because of a work-related injury, but who  
suffers no reduction in wage earning capacity.  
B  
This conclusion stands in contrast to the one the Haske  
majority reached.  In Haske, supra at 634, this Court  
16  
concluded that § 301(4) defined disability as “a personal  
injury or work-related disease that prevents an employee from  
performing any work, even a single job, within his  
qualifications and training . . . .”  Because of the words the  
Legislature used in § 301(4), the Haske definition of  
disability is untenable.  The plain meaning of the definition  
of “disability” in § 301(4) as “a limitation of an employee’s  
wage earning capacity in work suitable to his qualifications  
and training” precludes regarding a person as disabled when an  
inability to perform one particular job does not, in fact,  
reduce that person’s wage earning capacity in other, equally  
well-paying work suitable to his qualifications and training.  
Section 301(4) specifically directs the reader to a  
consideration of whether there is a limitation in wage earning  
capacity, not of whether a person is merely limited in  
performing one (or more) particular jobs.  
In this regard, Justice Weaver astutely observed in  her  
partial dissent in Haske:  
I believe that the most basic interpretation 
of “wage earning capacity” is that it describes an 
employee’s ability to earn wages. Perhaps because 
an employee is theoretically able to earn wages in 
a great variety of ways, the Legislature restricted 
consideration to “work suitable to [an employee’s] 
qualifications and training.”  Where an employee is 
qualified and trained in more than one job, then 
his wage-earning capacity includes consideration of 
all those jobs under the plain meaning of  
subsection 301(4).  Whether “a limitation” exists  
in an individual’s “wage earning capacity” where  
17  
 
 
 
that individual is qualified and trained in more 
than one job therefore requires consideration of 
the effect of the work-related disease or injury on 
earning capacity in all those jobs in which the  
individual is qualified and trained.  The statute  
does not state or imply that inability to perform 
one job within the individual’s qualifications and 
training necessarily results in “a limitation [in] 
wage earning capacity.” Thus, I cannot agree with 
the majority’s conclusion that “an employee is 
disabled if there is at least a single job within 
his qualifications and training that he can no 
longer 
perform.” 
I 
believe 
the 
majority’s 
conclusion fails to consider whether the overall  
wage-earning 
capacity 
of 
the 
individual 
was  
actually limited and, therefore, is not true to the 
plain language of subsection 301(4). [Haske, supra 
at 668 (Weaver, J., concurring in part and  
dissenting in part) (first emphasis in original, 
second emphasis added; citation omitted).]  
We agree with Justice Weaver that the language of § 301(4)  
requires a determination of overall, or in other words,  
maximum, wage earning capacity in all jobs suitable to an  
injured employee’s qualifications and training.  
We recognize that the Haske majority placed substantial  
reliance on the second sentence of § 301(4), which states that  
“[t]he establishment of disability does not create a  
presumption of wage loss.”  The Haske  majority stated that  
this 
sentence 
 
“eliminates the possibility that disability and  
wage loss are defined the same way . . . .” Haske, supra at  
654-655.  Apparently, the concern of the Haske majority was  
that there would be no distinction between “wage loss” and  
“disability” if a showing of disability required an overall  
18  
 
limitation in “wage earning capacity” in all work suitable to  
an employee’s qualifications and training.  That is, the Haske  
majority was concerned that reading the first sentence in  
accordance with its plain meaning would render the second  
sentence nugatory.  
However, we do not believe that this concern was  
justified.  As an initial matter, the focus of the inquiry is  
not 
on 
every 
single 
job 
suitable 
to 
an 
employee’s  
qualifications and training—only those that produce the  
maximum income.  Further, the second sentence reflects an  
understanding that there may be circumstances in which an  
employee, 
despite 
suffering 
a 
work-related 
injury 
that 
reduces  
wage earning capacity, does not suffer wage loss.11
 For  
example, an employee might suffer a serious work-related  
injury on the last day before the employee was scheduled to  
retire with a firm intention to never work again. In such a  
circumstance, the employee would have suffered a disability,  
i.e., a reduction in wage earning capacity, but no wage loss  
because, even if the injury had not occurred, the employee  
would not have earned any further wages.  
11 We note that, once it is found that an employee is 
disabled under § 301(4), the employee must then establish wage 
loss in order to compute wage loss benefits under MCL 418.361. 
The clear language of the second sentence of § 301(4) 
militates against any holding that the terms “wage earning 
capacity” and “wage loss” are synonymous.  
19  
 
In light of the inconsistency of Haske with the plain  
language of § 301(4), we overrule it and return to the rule  
established in Rea, which was harmonious with the language of  
the statute.  
C  
In overruling the Haske interpretation of disability, we  
return to the proper understanding of disability in case law  
that  preceded Haske and that, in our judgment, was  more  
faithful to the WDCA’s statutory language.  
We 
recognize 
that following prior decisions of this Court  
under the doctrine of stare decisis is generally the preferred  
course of action “‘because it promotes the evenhanded,  
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles,  
fosters 
reliance 
on 
judicial decisions, and contributes to the  
actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.’”  
Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 463; 613 NW2d 307 (2000),  
quoting Hohn v United States, 524 US 236, 251; 118 S Ct 1969;  
141 L Ed 2d 242 (1998). Nevertheless, stare decisis is “not  
to be applied mechanically to forever prevent the Court from  
overruling 
earlier 
erroneous 
decisions 
determining 
the 
meaning  
of statutes.”  Robinson, supra at 463. Rather, it is “‘our  
duty to re-examine a precedent where its reasoning . . . is  
fairly called into question.’” Id. at 464, quoting Mitchell  
v W T Grant Co, 416 US 600, 627-628; 94 S Ct 1895; 40 L Ed 2d  
20  
 
 
406 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).  In the present case, the  
treatment of the term “disability” as used in § 301(4) of the  
WDCA has been fairly called into question.  
In considering whether to overrule a prior decision of  
this Court, the first inquiry, of course, is whether that  
prior 
decision 
was 
wrongly 
decided. 
Robertson 
 
DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich 732, 757; 641 NW2d 567 (2002);  
Robinson, supra at 464. For the reasons we have previously  
discussed, Haske was wrongly decided because it is clearly  
inconsistent with the plain language of the definition of  
“disability” in § 301(4).  
Nevertheless, as we recognized in Robinson, that a prior  
case was wrongly decided “does not mean overruling it is  
invariably appropriate.”  Robinson, supra at 465. 
We must  
consider whether overruling a prior erroneous decision would  
work an undue hardship because of reliance interests or  
expectations and, conversely, whether the prior decision  
defies “practical workability.”  Robertson, supra at 757;  
Robinson, supra at 466. In particular,  
the Court must ask whether the previous decision 
has 
become 
so 
embedded, 
so 
accepted, 
so  
fundamental, to everyone’s expectations that to 
change it would produce not just readjustments, but 
practical real-world dislocations. 
It is in  
practice a prudential judgment for a court. [Id.] 
 In the present case, we see no significant reliance interest  
21  
v 
 
 
 
 
or expectation that will be disrupted by overruling Haske.  
Obviously, 
a 
work-related 
injury 
potentially 
compensable 
under  
the worker’s compensation system is an unexpected event, so it  
is difficult to imagine actions that an employee would take in  
reliance on Haske.  Moreover, it is doubtful that there could  
be a legitimate expectation interest in receiving worker’s  
compensation wage loss benefits on the basis of an earlier  
work-related injury that did not, in fact, result in any  
overall reduction in wage earning capacity in work suitable  
to one’s qualifications and training.  Also, while a less  
significant factor, we see reason for concern about the  
“practical workability” of Haske, particularly in terms of  
deciding what constitutes a single job for the purpose of  
applying that decision.  
Further, it is particularly appropriate to overrule a  
prior erroneous decision of this Court that has failed to  
apply the plain language of a statute.  As we observed in  
Robinson, supra at 467, “it is to the words of the statute  
itself that a citizen first looks for guidance in directing  
his actions.” Indeed, when a court confounds the legitimate  
expectations of a citizen by misreading a statute, “it is that  
court itself that has disrupted the reliance interest.” Id.  
As we observed in Robertson, supra at 756, the values  
underlying 
general 
respect for stare decisis are also enhanced  
22  
 
 
 
  
“by a legal regime in which the public may read the plain  
words of its law and have confidence that such words mean what  
they say and are not the exclusive province of lawyers.”  
Because Haske failed to apply the plain language of the  
definition of “disability” in § 301(4), and in light of the  
lack of a significant reliance interest in the Haske decision,  
we are impelled to overrule it.  
IV  
In our order granting leave to appeal in this case, we  
further directed the parties to address “whether Haske . . .  
and Powell v Casco Nelmor Corp, 406 Mich 332[; 279 NW2d 769]  
(1979), are reconcilable.”  465 Mich 940 (2002). However, in  
light of our determination that the Haske definition of  
disability is erroneous and should be overruled, it is no  
longer necessary to consider whether Haske and Powell may be  
reconciled.  
Moreover, Powell was decided under the old common-law  
“favored work” doctrine, before that doctrine was effectively  
codified by the Legislature in the WDCA in its “reasonable  
employment” provisions. 
Codification of common-law rules  
makes those rules of no consequence if they are inconsistent  
with the codification. In Perez v Keeler Brass Co, 461 Mich  
602, 606; 608 NW2d 45 (2000), we discussed the effect of  
codification on common-law rules regarding favored work:  
23  
 
Subsection (5) [of the WDCA, related to  
reasonable employment] was added to the statute in 
1982.
 Before that time, the statute did not 
address “reasonable employment,” and this issue was 
governed by an area of the common law known as the 
“favored-work doctrine.” Now, however, the quoted 
statutory provisions establish the law in this 
area.  The Legislature chose the words of the 
statute, and we are bound by them.  Any cases 
decided under the common law before subsection (5) 
was enacted are essentially irrelevant; to the 
extent that the common-law favored work doctrine is  
inconsistent with the plain language of the  
statute, the Legislature has changed the common 
law. [Citations omitted.]  
Accordingly, in considering whether a person who has ceased  
working in a “reasonable employment” position is entitled to  
worker’s 
compensation 
wage 
loss 
benefits, 
worker’s  
compensation magistrates and the WCAC should examine the  
provisions 
of 
MCL 
418.301(5)(d) and (e), rather than decisions  
under the old common-law favored work doctrine such as Powell.  
In short, as Perez indicates, Powell is now “essentially  
irrelevant.”  
V  
We now turn to the circumstances of this case.  Plaintiff  
was qualified and trained as a “floater,” although there is no  
indication in the record regarding whether plaintiff was  
qualified and trained in any other jobs.  To illustrate the  
application of our analysis, we will assume for the moment  
that plaintiff’s job as a floater produced the maximum wages  
in work suitable to plaintiff’s qualifications and training,  
24  
although the WCAC on remand may find otherwise.  Plaintiff was  
evidently able to perform a variety of production-related  
tasks as a “floater.”  His physical restriction after his left  
shoulder 
injury 
that 
precluded him from lifting above shoulder  
level is the only relevant restriction because the right  
shoulder injury was not work-related. In order to establish  
that he had a “disability” because of the left shoulder  
injury, plaintiff had to show that that injury resulted in a  
limitation in his wage earning capacity in work suitable to  
his qualifications and training.  
The magistrate and WCAC did not apply this test.  Rather,  
they focused, pursuant to Haske, on the fact that plaintiff  
was working in a “regular job” after his left shoulder injury.  
While that may be a strong indication that the left shoulder  
injury did not amount to a disability, it is not, standing  
alone, dispositive.  An inquiry must be made regarding whether  
the “regular job” was suitable to plaintiff’s qualifications  
and training at the time of the injury.  Also, if plaintiff’s  
injuries only enabled him to perform that “regular job”  
because of accommodations provided by defendant, his wage  
earning capacity might be less than his actual wages.12  
12 However, a work-related injury that has a de minimus 
effect on an employee’s job-related duties might not amount to 
a disability.  This is because many employers might disregard 
such 
minor 
limitations 
in 
hiring 
applicants 
generally, 
meaning 
(continued...)  
25  
  
 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that this case should be remanded to  
the WCAC for reconsideration in accordance with this opinion.  
VI  
Justice Kelly’s dissent merits a response.  
As Justice  
Kelly has pointed out, in the last three and a half years,  
there have been cases reversing past precedent of this Court.  
She cites sixteen.13  These should be seen in the context of  
the overall number of dispositions by this Court during the  
same period.  From January 1, 1999 to June 30, 2002, there  
were 8,198 dispositions by this Court.14  Thus, it is rare (in  
fact, a frequency of under one-fifth of one percent) when  
12(...continued) 
that such minor conditions would not effect an employee’s 
ability to perform his top paying job and would therefore not 
limit  his wage earning capacity. A useful perspective for 
the WCAC in considering this case on remand might be 
considering whether plaintiff’s injuries would prevent him 
from competing in the marketplace with other workers for the 
“regular job.”  The WCAC might also consider whether defendant 
would have continued plaintiff in the “regular job” at the 
same rate of pay if he was injured in a non-work-related 
incident.
 If plaintiff would have been hired or retained 
despite his injury, this would indicate that plaintiff did not 
suffer a disability because the pertinent injury did not 
impair his wage earning capacity.  Conversely, if defendant 
would not have hired plaintiff or would not have accommodated 
plaintiff’s injury except for it being work related, that 
would be indicative of a limitation in wage earning capacity.  
13 See slip op at n 2.  
14 
The 
Supreme 
Court Clerk’s data reflects that there were 
2,571 dispositions 
in 1999, 2,302 in 2000, 2,359 in 2001, and 966 from January 1 
to June 30, 2002.  Dispositions include opinions of this 
Court, peremptory orders, dismissals, and denials of leave.  
26  
 
 
 
 
precedent is overturned, but it does sometimes happen.  During  
this period, the issue of treatment of precedent has arisen  
primarily in 
review of earlier Supreme Court cases  
interpreting statutes.  In fact, of the cases that Justice  
Kelly has cited where precedent has been overruled, eleven are  
within this category.15  As the dissents to these actions have  
been forceful, so as  to inform as to the doctrine of stare  
decisis and its limits, this Court in Robinson chose to  
discuss the doctrine in depth as well as its proper 
application. 
Repeatedly, since Robinson was decided, the rules 
established in that case, which it should be  noted are 
themselves entitled to respect as precedents of this Court,  
have been disregarded in dissents authored by Justice Kelly  
without any indication of what part of the rules set  forth in  
Robinson she would alter.16  Even more consequentially, she has  
15 People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335; 646 NW2d 127 (2002); 
Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich 335; 645 NW2d 34;  
Robertson, supra; Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 4465 Mich  
675; 641 NW2d 219 (2002); Hanson v Mecosta Co Rd Comm, 465  
Mich 492; 638 NW2d 396 (2002); Brown v Genesee Co Bd of  
Commr’s, 464 Mich 430; 628 NW2d 471 (2001), People v Glass, 
464 Mich 266; 627 NW2d 261 (2001); Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd  
Comm, 463 Mich 143, 615 NW2d 702 (2002); Mudel v Great  
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691; 614 NW2d 607 (2002);  
Robinson, supra; People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484; 596 NW2d 607 
(1999).  
16 See People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417; 646 NW2d 158 
(2002) (Kelly, J., dissenting); Cornell, supra (Kelly, J., 
(continued...)  
27  
 
 
  
failed to make clear what rules, if any, she would follow in  
determining when to affirm or reject precedents.  What is it,  
for example, that distinguishes  Lesner v Liquid Disposal, 466  
Mich 95; 643 NW2d 553 (2002), in which Justice Kelly would  
overrule an interpretation of a statute, from those cases in  
which she would not?   Today, however, she has apparently set  
down her rules, and that is to be welcomed.  She appears to  
approve the Robinson standard that stare decisis should not be  
applied mechanically to forever prevent the Court from  
overruling 
earlier 
erroneous 
decisions 
determining 
the 
meaning  
of statutes.  As to implementing this approach, the Robinson  
test asserts that it is a supreme court’s duty to reexamine  
a precedent where its reasoning is fairly called into question  
or, to put it more simply, when it is wrong.  Justice Kelly  
differs in this regard, however, because, as we understand  
her position, she would not reexamine a precedent unless the  
prior decision was “utterly nonsensical,” slip op at 10, n 7,  
or reflected a “drastic error,” slip op at 10.  Otherwise, she  
would allow that which even she would concede to be erroneous  
interpretations of the law to prevail.  
Further,  under Robinson, if the prior Court 
decided  
16(...continued) 
dissenting); 
Pohutski, 
supra 
(Kelly, 
J., 
dissenting); 
Nawrocki, supra (Kelly, J., dissenting); Mudel, supra (Kelly, 
J., dissenting).  
28  
wrongly , that was not the end of  the stare decisis inquiry,  
because the Court  must also consider 
whether there  are  
reliance interests such that, to overrule the prior case,  
would produce real world dislocations. Id. at 466. If that  
were
 so, then even though 
a case had been decided  
incorrectly, stare decisis should be respected and the case  
should not be overruled.  As to this point, Justice Kelly  
would seem to agree, more or less, as she states in her  
dissent that she would determine if customs had changed or  
there were unforeseen practices. Slip op at 9-10.  
These, then, are the differences between the Robinson  
approach and Justice Kelly’s approach. Robinson would allow  
the overruling of a prior case interpreting a statute if it  
was wrong unless there were reliance interests so great that  
overruling the prior decision would produce real world  
dislocations.  Justice Kelly, on the other hand, would not  
overrule such a decision unless the earlier Court was not  
merely in error, but “drastically” in error, or had rendered  
a decision that was nonsensical.  If so, then Justice Kelly  
would examine customs and unforeseen practices to determine  
if overruling was appropriate.  
She  
claims, 
correctly we acknowledge, that her approach,  
as 
contrasted 
with 
the Robinson approach, would likely produce  
fewer cases overruling  precedent. Yet, is that the proper  
29  
 
 
measure of the merits of these two approaches?  We think not.  
We  think not because the proper measure of  tests of  
stare decisis is not whether one approach reverses more than  
another, but rather which approach  is more consistent with  
American constitutionalism.  We believe the constitutional  
arrangement in our state and nation reposes in the legislative  
body the role of making public policy.  That arrangement is  
distorted when the judiciary misconstrues statutes. The  
majority’s view is that its approach to stare decisis, in  
overruling our prior erroneous interpretations of statutes,  
respects 
the 
democratic 
process 
by 
yielding 
to 
the  
constitutional authority of the Legislature its right to  
establish the state’s policy.  
Justice Kelly’s approach is flawed because it gives  the  
earlier Court and its judges far too much power—power  beyond  
that which the constitution gave them.  Nothing is clearer  
under our constitution than that the Legislature, when it has  
enacted a statute within its constitutional authority and,  
thus, has established public policy, must be obeyed even by  
the courts.  Said more plainly, the difference in these  
approaches is that Justice Kelly feels less obligation to  
adhere to the direction of the people’s representatives in the  
Legislature, and more obligation to defend past judges’  
errors.  We respectfully believe that this approach of Justice  
30  
 
 
Kelly misunderstands who governs in a republic.  It is not  
judges; rather, it is the people.  In this case, we have  
restored the law to what was enacted by the people’s  
representatives. It is our duty to do so.  
As to Justice Cavanagh’s criticism of our response to  
Justice Kelly, it is important that the reader understand  
that, in the ordinary course of things on an appellate court,  
majority opinions are written and then dissents follow. The  
majority then responds to the dissent. In the instant case,  
this was the pattern of things.  To fully argue the approaches  
of Robinson and Justice Kelly is not unseemly nor does it  
indicate a “manic sensitivity to criticism.”  Rather, to  
respond fully to a dissent indicates that the majority is  
sufficiently respectful of the dissent, and those who could be  
persuaded by it, to want to ensure that the issue is fully  
understood.  Justice Cavanagh, on the occasions when he writes  
for the majority in the face of dissent, does no less—nor  
should he.17  We claim the same prerogative when he is not in  
17 The examples are many, but, to just take one from this  
term on the topic of departure from precedent, Justice 
Cavanagh authored the majority opinion in Allstate Ins Co v  
McCarn, 466 Mich 277, 284-291; 645 NW2d 20 (2002), in which I 
joined, and chose to respond, strongly, to the dissent.  
Lest there be confusion that only Justice Cavanagh and I 
respond to dissents, see Justice Kelly’s defense of her 
majority in People v Randolph, 466 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ 
(2002).  The truth is it is quite unusual for justices not to 
(continued...)  
31  
the majority.  
On the merits of this case, that is whether Haske was  
wrong, we consider Justice Kelly’s critique of the majority  
opinion to be highly unconvincing.  Contrary to the dissent’s  
position, there obviously is a distinction between “wages  
earned” and “wage earning capacity.”  See slip op at 5-6. It  
is simply inaccurate to state that “capacity to earn wages and  
wages earned will rarely differ.”  Slip op at 5. 
On the  
contrary, it can clearly be the case that an individual might  
earn wages below his wage earning capacity.  With regard to  
the second sentence of § 301(4), which establishes that  
disability does not create a presumption of wage loss, one  
likely explanation for this sentence is the provision of  
reasonable employment with full wages to an injured employee  
despite a reduction in wage earning capacity.  That is, a  
person might suffer a disability under § 301(4), i.e., a  
reduction in wage earning capacity in work suitable to his  
qualifications and training, because of an inability to  
actually earn wages in the ordinary job market, but be paid  
full wages by an employer for the performance of reasonable  
employment.  In such a situation, the employee would be  
“disabled,” but not suffer wage loss.  
17(...continued) 
respond to dissents.  
32  
 
We are frankly at a loss to understand the distinction  
that Justice Kelly would draw between “wage earning capacity”  
and “earning capacity.”  Slip op at 
7. 
An employee earns  
wages for his work.  We cannot see any sensible distinction  
between “wage earning” and “earning” in the present context,  
let alone what difference such a distinction makes to the  
practical application of the definition of “disability” in  
§ 301(4).  Similarly, we do not see the point of somehow  
attempting to equate the phrase “wage earner,” which refers to  
a person, with the phrase “wage earning,” which is used in §  
301(4) as an adjectival phrase to modify the term “capacity”  
for the purpose of effectively concluding that disability  
requires a showing of only an inability to perform one  
particular job suitable to a person’s qualifications and  
training. Id.  
We emphatically disagree with Justice Kelly’s statement  
that “the proper definition of disability focuses on a  
limitation in the capacity to perform the work, not on a  
limitation in the capacity to earn wages . . . .”  Slip op at  
8 (emphases removed).  While that might be a definition she  
would prefer, the plain language of § 301(4) defines  
“disability” as, in pertinent part, “a limitation of an  
employee’s wage earning capacity in work suitable to his or  
her qualifications and training” (emphasis added). Thus, a  
33  
judicial “definition” of disability, such as the one in Haske,  
that does not focus on the employee’s capacity to earn wages,  
i.e., the employee’s wage earning capacity, is simply  
inconsistent with the plain language of the controlling  
statute.  
VII  
For these reasons, we overrule the Haske definition of  
“disability” as that term is used in MCL 418.301(4).  
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals  
and remand this case to the WCAC for reconsideration  
consistent with this opinion.  
34  
___________________________________ 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
CHARLES SINGTON,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 119291  
CHRYSLER CORPORATION, also known 
as DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
WEAVER, J. (concurring).  
The dissents and the majority have chosen to engage in  
responses to each other that contain some inappropriate and  
unnecessary assertions.  For this reason, and to emphasize  
this Court’s treatment of the worker’s compensation act’s  
definition of disability since the Legislature amended the  
definition to its current form in 1987, I write separately.  
I concur with the result and the reasoning of parts one  
through five of the majority opinion. The majority decision  
is consistent with my partial concurrence and partial dissent  
in Haske v Transport Leasing, Inc, 455 Mich 628; 566 NW2d 896  
 
   
 
 
 
(1997),1 
and 
follows 
consistently 
from 
this 
Court’s  
interpretations 
of 
the definition of disability under the WDCA  
that preceded Haske. See, e.g., Rea v Regency Olds, 450 Mich  
1201; 536 NW2d 542 (1995), and Michales v Morton Salt Co, 450  
Mich 479; 538 NW2d 11 (1995).2  
MCL 418.301(4) as amended in 1987 states:  
As used in this chapter, “disability” means a 
limitation of an employee’s wage earning capacity 
in work suitable to his or her qualifications and 
training resulting from a personal injury or work 
related disease.  The establishment of disability 
does not create a presumption of wage loss.  
Addressing this language for the first time at this level, the  
Rea Court stated as follows:  
A majority of the Court is of the opinion that 
the 1987 definition of disability in the Worker’s 
Disability Compensation Act requires a claimant to 
demonstrate how a physical limitation affects wage­
earning capacity in work suitable to the claimant’s 
qualifications and training. It is not enough for 
the claimant claiming partial disability to show an 
inability to return to the same or similar work. 
If the claimant’s physical limitation does not 
affect the ability to earn wages in work in which 
the claimant is qualified and trained, the claimant 
is not disabled. [Id. at 1201.]  
1  The Haske decision was decided by a four to two to one  
split.  
2 
 I joined the dissent in Rea because I agreed with  
Justice Riley that the Rea majority unnecessarily remanded in 
that case for further factfinding. I joined the majority in 
Michales.  
2  
 
Addressing the same language as it appears at MCL 418.401(1),3  
the Michales decision noted the language’s focus is on wage­
earning capacity:  
The relevant inquiry is not whether there is a 
theoretical job in the employee’s general field of 
employment that the employee is no longer able to 
perform.  Instead, the question is whether the 
employee’s wage-earning capacity, i.e., ability to 
earn wages, has been limited, considering the 
employee’s qualifications and training. [Id. at  
493, n 19.][4]  
The majority decision in Haske abruptly broke from these  
prior interpretations of the WDCA definitions of disability.  
It held that “an employee is disabled if there is at least a  
single job within his qualifications and training that he can  
no longer perform.” Haske, p 662.  
The problem with the Haske majority’s holding is that, as  
I noted in my opinion, it returned disability analysis to its  
pre-1981 
and 
1987 
state 
rendering 
the 
Legislature’s 
amendments  
in those years meaningless.  See, e.g., Powell v Casco Nelmor  
Corp, 406 Mich 332, 350; 279 NW2d 769 (1979)(holding that  
3 Subsection 401(1) is part of Chapter 4 of the worker’s 
compensation act addressing occupational diseases.  
4In 
his 
Michales 
concurrence, 
Justice 
Cavanagh 
summarized 
the statute’s focus on wage-earning capacity:  
[B]oth an injury and a limitation in wage­
earning capacity must be shown.  A complete failure 
to introduce any evidence of a limitation in wage­
earning capacity resulting from the injury simply 
precludes an award of benefits as a matter of law. 
[Id. at 496.]  
3  
disability is the inability to perform work the claimant was  
doing when injured), and Pique v General Motors Corp, 317 Mich  
311, 315; 26 NW2d 900 (1947)(finding total disability where an  
employee was unable to do the same work after the injury).  
4  
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
CHARLES SINGTON,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 119291  
CHRYSLER CORPORATION, also known as 
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
I agree with the majority regarding the continuing  
viability of Powell v Casco Nelmor Corp, 406 Mich 332; 279  
NW2d 769 (1979). I further agree with the majority that the  
Court of Appeals erroneously substituted MCL 418.301(9)’s  
reasonable 
employment 
definition 
for 
MCL 
418.301(4)’s  
disability requirement. However, I write separately because  
I disagree with the majority’s decision to overrule Haske v  
Transport Leasing, Inc, 455 Mich 628; 566 NW2d 896 (1997).  
The Haske Court found that the first sentence of MCL  
418.301(4) was ambiguous, and examined the law and the  
 
Legislature’s changes to resolve this ambiguity.  Haske at  
643-653.  After such examination, the Court determined that  
the Legislature must have intended to adopt the definition of  
disability that “an employee is disabled whenever he can no  
longer perform a job suitable to his qualifications and  
training as a result of his injury.” Id. at 655. The Court  
reasoned:  
Subsection 301(4) . . . requires the employee 
to prove a disability, i.e., that he is eligible 
for compensation, and then prove wage loss, i.e., 
that he is entitled to an award.  This language 
codifies the prior approach in Michigan that injury 
is not compensable without wage loss.  If the  
employee establishes a disability, he must further 
prove a wage loss because wage loss will not be 
presumed.  See subsection 301(4).  However, in  
order to prove a wage loss, under the language of 
the statute and on the basis of our longstanding 
interpretation of related precedent, most recently 
confirmed in Sobotka [v Chrysler Corp (After  
Remand), 447 Mich 1, 17; 523 NW2d 454 (1994) 
(Boyle, J., lead opinion)], the employee must 
establish a reduction in earning capacity.  
With this conclusion, the definition of  
disability in subsection 301(4) cannot then be 
logically interpreted as a reduction of wage­
earning capacity as long as wage loss is also 
measured by a reduction in wage-earning capacity. 
See Lawrence v Toys R Us, 453 Mich 112, 121; 551 
NW2d 155 (1996) (Levin, J., plurality opinion). 
Subsection 301(4)’s second sentence eliminates the 
possibility that disability and wage loss are 
defined the same way when it provides that proof of 
a “disability does not create [a] presumption of 
wage 
loss.” 
[Haske 
at 
654-655 
(emphasis 
in  
original).]  
Because I remain committed to the Court’s decision in  
Haske, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to  
2  
 
I 
overrule Haske.  
I 
also 
must 
express my disappointment with the majority’s  
lengthy response to Justice Kelly’s dissenting opinion.   
appreciate that my colleagues feel the need to defend and  
substantiate their respective positions, after all, that is  
our duty as justices.  However, I am uncomfortable with the  
majority’s 
overzealous 
attack 
of 
Justice 
Kelly’s 
discussion 
of  
stare decisis. It is completely unnecessary to add numerous  
pages defending the majority’s decision to overrule precedent  
and attacking Justice Kelly’s positions in previous cases.  
These lengthy sections have nothing to do with the merits of  
this case and do not add anything to the resolution of the  
question at hand. They do, however, speak volumes about the  
majority’s manic sensitivity to criticism.  
3  
 
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
CHARLES SINGTON,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 119291  
CHRYSLER CORPORATION, also known 
as DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I join Justice Cavanagh dissenting in the overruling of  
Haske v Transport Leasing, Inc.1  I write separately to point  
out that the majority's pronouncement on the respect to be  
accorded the precedent of this Court is at best misleading.  
I. The Majority Again Disdains Precedent  
Today the majority once again discards a prior decision  
1455 Mich 628; 566 NW2d 896 (1997). The Michigan Reports 
erroneously failed to show me as "not participating" in the 
companion case to Haske. To correct that, I should be listed  
as not participating in Bailey v Leoni Twp (After Remand) 
decided sub nom Haske v Transport Leasing, Inc.  
 
 
 
 
 
and replaces it with its preferred interpretation of the law.2  
In announcing its new vision of disability law, it refers to  
its recent pronouncements about the value of precedent in  
Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), and  
Robertson v DaimlerChrysler, 465 Mich 732; 641 NW2d 567  
(2002).  However, the sheer volume of this majority's  
decisions overturning precedent in the past four years raises  
serious questions about the degree to which the majority  
values the principle of stare decisis.  Time after time,  
established law has been discarded on the basis that it was  
"wrongly decided."3  It is an amazement to me how frequently  
the members of this majority have found that esteemed justices  
2See, e.g., People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417; ___ NW2d ___  
(2002); People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335; ___ NW2d ___ (2002); 
Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304; 645 NW2d 34 
(2002); Robertson v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich 732; 641 
NW2d 567 (2002); Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675; 
641 NW2d 219 (2002); Hanson v Mecosta Co Rd Comm'rs, 465 Mich 
492; 638 NW2d 396 (2002); Brown v Genesee Co Bd of Comm’rs, 
464 Mich 430; 628 NW2d 471 (2001); People v Glass, 464 Mich 
266; 627 NW2d 261 (2001); Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 
Mich 143; 615 NW2d 702 (2000); Mudel v Great Atlantic &  
Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691; 614 NW2d 607 (2000); Stitt v  
Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591; 614 NW2d 88  
(2000); Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439; 613 NW2d 307 (2000); 
People v Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 411; 605 NW2d 667 (2000);  
McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15; 597 NW2d 148 (1999); People  
v Lukity, 460 Mich 484; 596 NW2d 607 (1999); Ritchie-Gamester  
v Berkley, 461 Mich 73; 597 NW2d 517 (1999). This listing is 
intended to be representative, not exhaustive.  
3See, e.g., Robertson, supra at 758; Pohutski at 694; 
Nawrocki, at 180; Mudel, supra at 713; Robinson, supra at 464­
465; Kazmierczak, supra at 425.  
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
who came before them simply misunderstood the law.4  
In the five-year period from 1993 through 1997, there  
were approximately twelve cases in which precedent was  
overturned by this Court.5  In the five-year period from 1998  
through 2002, at least twenty-two cases were overturned.6  
4In most of the cases in footnote 2, the majority 
overruled precedent because of its disagreement with earlier 
Courts' interpretations of statutory or constitutional  
principles.  See, e.g., Cornell, supra; Koontz, supra; 
Robertson, supra; Pohutski, supra; Glass, supra; Nawrocki,  
supra; 
Brown, 
supra; 
Mudel, 
supra; 
Lukity, 
supra; 
Kazmierczak,  
supra; McDougall, supra. 
In only two of them does the 
majority believe that precedent was rendered obsolete by the 
evolution of the law. Hardiman, supra; Robinson, supra. In  
others, it does not even acknowledge that precedent is being 
overturned, although the dissent points it out.  Hanson,  
supra; Ritchie-Gamester, supra.  
5Bradley v Saranac Comm Schs Bd of Ed, 455 Mich 285; 565 
NW2d 650 (1997); People v Bailey, 451 Mich 657; 549 NW2d 325 
(1996); W T Andrew Co Inc v Mid-State Surety Corp, 450 Mich 
655; 545 NW2d 351 (1996); Corl v Huron Castings, Inc, 450 Mich 
620; 544 NW2d 278 (1996); People v Wood, 450 Mich 399; 538  
NW2d 351 (1995); Sokolek v General Motors Corp, 450 Mich 133; 
538 NW2d 369 (1995); People v Kevorkian, 447 Mich 436; 527 
NW2d 714 (1994); Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125; 521 NW2d 
230 (1994); People v Vandervliet, 444 Mich 52; 508 NW2d 114 
(1993); Auto Club Ins Ass'n v Frederick & Herrud, Inc, 443 
Mich 358; 505 NW2d 820 (1993); In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426;  
505 NW2d 834 (1993); People v Fisher, 442 Mich 560; 503 NW2d 
50 (1993).  
6Sington, 
Hardiman, 
supra; 
Cornell, 
supra; 
Koontz, 
supra; 
Robertson, supra; Pohutski, supra; Hanson, supra; Brown,  
supra; Glass, supra; Nawrocki , supra; Mudel , supra; Stitt ,  
supra; 
Robinson 
, 
supra; 
Kazmierczak, 
supra; 
McDougall, 
supra; 
Lukity, supra; Ritchie-Gamester, supra; People v Graves, 458  
Mich 476; 581 NW2d 229 (1998); McKenzie v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 
458 Mich 214; 580 NW2d 424 (1998); People v Kaufman, 457 Mich  
266; 577 NW2d 466 (1998); AFSCME v Highland Park Bd of Ed, 457 
Mich 74, 577 NW2d 79 (1998); People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625; 
(continued...) 
3  
 
  
 
However, the number of dispositions went down.7  
The test for overturning precedent articulated in  
Robinson, and again in Robertson includes two prongs: 
The  
first is whether the earlier decision was wrongly decided.  
The majority has ruled Haske was wrongly decided.8  
(...continued)
576 NW2d 129 (1998).  
7According to the clerk's office, the Court disposed of 
13,682 cases between 1993 and 1997.  Between 1998 and June 30,  
2002, it disposed of 11,190 cases.  
8The simplicity of this prong as stated in Robinson and  
applied to legislative interpretation gives rise to a large 
part of the differences between the majority and myself. It  
appears that the majority believes itself gifted with  
prodigious and unprecedented insight into the mind of the 
Legislature.  The recent sharp increase in reversals of 
precedent is alarming because it suggests that this majority 
believes that only it, not present dissenters nor many past 
majorities of this Court, can discern the true intent of the 
Legislature.  
It is not, as the majority alleges here, a matter of my 
not understanding "who governs in a republic."  Nor is it a  
matter of defending "past judges' errors" or feeling less 
obligation than they to "adhere to the direction of the 
people's representatives . . . ."  Slip op at 32.  Rather, it 
is a matter of exercising judicial restraint and of avoiding 
concluding too easily that other experienced justices wrongly 
interpreted  legislation. It is a matter of not falling prey 
to a zealot's conviction that what has been done in the past 
by others has been simply wrong.  
Stare decisis is not an argument intended to resuscitate 
the dead hand of the judiciary. Adherence to it contributes  
to, not detracts from, the integrity of our constitutional 
system. As Justice Marshall once pointed out:  
That doctrine permits society to presume that 
bedrock principles are founded in the law rather 
than in the proclivities of individuals, and  
thereby contributes to the integrity of our  
(continued...)  
4  
 
 
The second Robinson prong is whether overruling the  
precedent of this Court would work an undue hardship on the  
basis of reliance interests.  In considering that question,  
the majority labels a worker's reliance on a disability  
determination under Haske an illegitimate and insignificant  
expectation. Slip op at 23. It has apparently decided that  
the Haske decision strayed so far into error that no one  
should ever have relied on it. It seems to assume that even  
those having no legal education can and do distinguish between  
which court precedent should be followed and which should not.  
Contrary to the majority's assertions, I do not consider  
stare decisis a conclusive barrier to change.  The majority's  
effort challenging me to explain some disagreement with  
Robinson would be better spent explaining the facility with  
which 
it 
excuses 
itself from exercising the judicial restraint  
Robinson embraces.  
Stare decisis has long been venerated in the law and with  
good reason.  Adherence to this doctrine promotes the  
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal  
principles and contributes to the integrity of the judicial  
process, both actual and perceived.  Robinson, supra at 463,  
8(...continued) 
constitutional system of government, both 
in  
appearance and in fact.  [Vasquez v Hillery, 474 US 
254, 265-266; 106 S Ct 617; 88 L Ed 2d 598 (1986).]  
5  
 
 
 
n 21, citing Hohn v United States, 524 US 236, 251; 118 S Ct  
1969; 141 L Ed 2d 242 (1998).  It is a bedrock principle.  
When a Court pays no more than lip service to it, the basic  
integrity of the legal system itself is shaken.  
II. Haske was not wrongly decided.  
Haske was correctly decided. 
The definition of  
disability that it adopted is supported by the fact that the  
statute treats "disability" and "wage loss" as separate  
concepts.  Examining the language of MCL 418.301(4), one finds  
that the first sentence defines disability. The second makes  
clear that it cannot be presumed that one has suffered a wage  
loss merely because one has become disabled.  Of course, that  
is because one may be disabled but not suffer a wage loss,  
hence, not be qualified for benefits.  
The majority's new definition of disability is:  an  
incapacity after work-related injury or illness to earn  
maximum wages in work for which the claimant is qualified and  
trained.
 As a practical matter, this definition means  
disability is an incapacity after work-related injury or  
illness to earn the same or greater wages in work for which  
the claimant is qualified and trained.  
The starting point in analyzing this is the statutory  
expression "wage earning capacity." The majority attempts to  
convince that a distinction exists between "wages earned" and  
6  
"wage earning capacity."  In truth, capacity to earn wages and  
wages earned will rarely differ. This is illustrated by the  
fact that, when applying its definition to Charles Sington,  
the majority assumes they are the same.  Slip op at 24.  Also,  
it cites with approval Justice Weaver's words:  "the most  
basic interpretation of 'wage earning capacity' is that it  
describes an employee's ability to earn wages."  Slip op at  
18.  
The 
majority 
provides no persuasive examples how it could  
be that an employee would be earning at under capacity if not  
disabled.  By definition, normally, what the employee earns is  
what the job will pay at any given time.  Hence, "wage earning  
capacity" and "wages earned" are, practically speaking,  
synonymous. It follows, then, that as the majority reads it,  
the first sentence in § 301(4) contradicts the second.  It  
reads:  "The establishment of disability does not create a  
presumption of wage loss."  
If one must prove a wage loss to make out a disability,  
the second sentence of § 301(4) is rendered nugatory.  If one  
cannot be disabled absent a wage loss, the establishment of a  
disability relies on a wage loss.  The majority confirms this  
by quoting with approval from Pulley to the effect that "the  
wages earned" are one of the "complex of fact issues" used to  
determine wage earning capacity.  Slip op at 16.  Pulley v  
7  
 
 
Detroit Engineering & Machine Co, 378 Mich 418, 423; 145 NW2d  
40 (1966). Of course, Haske disagreed with Pulley.  
The Haske decision is based on the proposition that §  
301(4), properly defined, treats "disability" and "wage loss"  
as distinct concepts. Defining a disability as the majority  
does, as a loss of capacity to earn maximum wages in one's  
field, when there can be no presumption of a wage loss in the  
definition, is nonsense.  
The 
majority 
has defined "earning capacity" using a rigid  
textualist approach to statutory interpretation (and, as I  
have pointed out, it makes no meaningful distinction from  
"wages earned"). However, the statutory expression is not  
"earning capacity." Rather, it is "wage earning capacity."  
A 
plain 
meaning 
interpretation of that expression is that  
"wage earning" is an expression akin to "wage earner," which  
is defined as "a person who works for wages."  Random House  
Webster's College Dictionary (1995). 
Hence "wage earning  
capacity" means "the capacity of a person who works for  
wages."  Using that, the proper interpretation of the first  
sentence of § 301(4) becomes "disability is a limitation after  
work-related injury or illness in the capacity of a person who  
works for wages in work for which the person is qualified and  
trained."
 Then, the second sentence of §301(4), "[t]he  
establishment of disability does not create a presumption of  
8  
 
 
wage loss," is not rendered nugatory or contradictory.  Also,  
the holding in Haske is shown to be correct. 
See Haske at  
653-654 and slip op at 2 (Cavanagh, J.).  
Even if "wage earning capacity" were defined as if it  
read "earning capacity," the majority's definition is off the  
mark.  Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed) defines "earning  
capacity," inter alia, as the "Fitness, readiness and  
willingness 
to 
work, 
considered 
in 
connection 
with 
opportunity  
to work." The emphasis is on capacity to perform the work.  
Using that, the proper interpretation of the first sentence of  
§ 301(4) becomes "disability is a limitation after work­
related injury or illness in the fitness of an employee to  
work for wages in work for which the person is qualified and  
trained."  As with my earlier analysis, the proper definition  
of disability focuses on a limitation in the capacity to  
perform the work, not on a limitation in the capacity to earn  
wages, as the majority insists.  
The majority's opinion is a study in confusion in other  
respects, in addition to its reading of § 301(4).  For  
example, it correctly recognizes that a prerequisite to being  
considered a participant in reasonable employment under MCL  
418.301(5) is a determination that the employee has suffered  
a disability under § 301(4).  Slip op at 5-6. However, later  
it states that, in order to determine whether plaintiff was  
9  
disabled after his left shoulder injury and before his stroke,  
the WCAC must inquire whether the work he was doing then was  
reasonable employment. Slip op at 24.  
It concludes, "if defendant . . . would not have  
accommodated plaintiff's injury, except for it being work  
related, that would be indicative of a limitation in wage  
earning capacity."  Slip op at 25, n 14.  Hence, the fact that  
the employee obtained reasonable employment under § 301(5) is  
a factor to be used to determine if the employee was disabled.  
III. Conclusion  
The majority's reading of MCL 418.301(4) is incorrect.  
It 
creates 
contradictions 
between 
the 
definition 
of 
disability  
and other parts of the statute.  Also, the majority opinion is  
internally contradictory.  
Haske 
accurately 
interpreted 
the 
statute.  
The 
majority's  
rationale for overturning it gives no deference to precedent.  
It simply replaces its interpretation of the first sentence of  
§ 301(4) with the interpretation of a different group of  
justices.  
Appellate courts, in the normal course of their work, are  
called upon continuously to reevaluate the lasting vigor of  
prior courts' binding opinions.  Of necessity, some must be  
found to be no longer valid because of subsequent legislative  
alterations of the law or changing customs and practices  
10  
 
  
unforeseen by an earlier court.  Very occasionally, a prior  
decision is found to work unexpected hardship.  And rarely, a  
drastic error may be shown to have been made by a prior court  
in its reasoning or reading of a statute.9  
So it is that, in the history of this and of the vast  
majority of supreme courts across the land, overrulings of  
precedent are infrequent.  Yet, quite the opposite is true of  
the present Michigan Supreme Court.  It is for that reason  
that, 
the 
majority's 
pronouncements 
to 
the 
contrary  
notwithstanding, one may wonder whether reasoned adherence to  
stare decisis may properly be considered a policy of this  
Court.  
The decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.  
9For instance, in Lesner v Liquid Disposal, Inc, 466 Mich  
95; 643 NW2d 553 (2002), I found, as did the majority, that it 
was necessary to overrule Weems v Chrysler, 448 Mich 679; 533 
NW2d 287 (1995).  This is because Weems provided a formula for 
the 
calculation 
of 
death benefits that was utterly nonsensical 
when multiple partial dependents were considered.  
11