Title: Maslankowski v. Carter
Citation: 277 So. 2d 91
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 5, 1973

277 So. 2d 91 (1973)
Ex parte John A. Maslankowski.
In re John A. MASLANKOWSKI
v.
Eugene W. CARTER, as Judge of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama.
SC 127.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 5, 1973.
Rehearing Denied May 10, 1973.
*92 Richard A. Ball, Jr., Montgomery, for petitioner.
Frank W. Riggs and Richard H. Gill, Montgomery, for respondent.
BLOODWORTH, Justice.
An original petition for mandamus was filed in this court praying that an alternative writ issue, directed to the Honorable Eugene W. Carter, as Judge of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, commanding him to set aside an order entered by him on September 25, 1972, in the case of Sue C. Beam, a minor who sues by and through her mother and next friend, Barbara F. Quernemoen, v. John A. Maslankowski, or, in the alternative, to show cause why he should not do so. The petition prays for a peremptory writ upon the final hearing and for general relief.
This court granted the rule nisi on October 19, 1972. In response to the rule nisi, Judge Carter filed his answer on November 17, 1972, praying that the petition for writ of mandamus be dismissed and that the rule nisi be discharged. Petitioner has filed a motion to strike the answer, a demurrer to the answer and a replication to the answer.
Since neither the demurrer nor the motion are adequately argued in brief, we proceed to address ourselves to the merits of the case. Moreover, our cases hold it is unnecessary to demur or to move to quash the answer in order to raise the issue of its sufficiency. Longshore, Judge, etc. v. State ex rel. Turner, 137 Ala. 636, 34 So. 684 (1902); Guaranty Funding Corp. v. Bolling, 288 Ala. 319, 260 So. 2d 589 (1972). We might say we consider the answer to be sufficient.
The petition, answer and replication disclose the following. A judgment was rendered against petitioner, John A. Maslankowski, on May 7, 1970, after a jury verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $125,000. On August 10, 1970, petitioner's insurance company paid the sum of $11,952.06 to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, representing the policy limits and interest on the entire judgment to that date. (While we attach no significance to it, the judge's answer recites that the payment was made to avoid further interest on the entire judgment. Petitioner maintains respondent could not know its motives.) These funds were paid *93 over to the Probate Judge of Montgomery County by the circuit clerk and were ultimately expended by Sue Beam's guardian in Sue Beam's behalf, the payments having been authorized by the Probate Court. On appeal, this court reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County. See Maslankowski v. Beam, 288 Ala. 254, 259 So. 2d 804 (1972). Subsequently, in response to petitioner's motion for restitution of the $11,952.06, the Circuit Court of Montgomery County ordered the restitution of the funds in an order dated July 31, 1972. Following this order, petitioner sought by motion to require restitution of the funds as a condition precedent to the further prosecution of the cause. This motion was denied by order dated September 25, 1972. It is this order which the petitioner seeks to have set aside.
Petitioner argues in brief that a party who pays funds into court under a judgment which is subsequently reversed is entitled to restitution before the party receiving the money can proceed with a retrial of the case, citing Ex Parte Walter Bros., 89 Ala. 237, 7 So. 400 (1889); Ex Parte Wellden, 148 Ala. 429, 42 So. 632 (1906); Carroll v. Draughon, 173 Ala. 338, 56 So. 209 (1911).
In Ex Parte Walter Bros., supra, this court did hold that restitution was a right which was absolute after reversal, but that case was overruled by Carroll v. Draughon, supra. In Carroll, this court held, viz:
It is to be noted that in neither Ex Parte Wellden, nor in Carroll v. Draughon, both cited by the petitioner, was restitution compelled prior to retrial.
We believe that the case of McCall v. McCurdy, 69 Ala. 65 (1881), best states the rule with regard to restitution after reversal, as follows:
Respondent, Judge Eugene Carter, in his answer to the rule nisi states that it would constitute a "grave injustice" and would be "contrary to equitable principles" to require the minor to make restitution as a condition precedent to the further prosecution of this case. The answer states the minor has no funds with which to support herself and no assets except this chose in action against petitioner.
In Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 55 S. Ct. 713, 79 L. Ed. 1451 (1935), the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Cardozo, stated the rule to be as follows:
We believe that the decision of this court in McCall v. McCurdy, supra, is in harmony with the rule just quoted, and that restitution after reversal is a matter which rests in the exercise of a sound discretion by the trial court. We are unwilling to grant the writ of mandamus in this case and to direct the trial court what conclusion it ought to reach.
In Ex Parte State, 251 Ala. 665, 38 So. 2d 560 (1949), this court held:
See also East v. Todd, 284 Ala. 495, 226 So. 2d 153 (1969).
Here, Judge Carter has ordered the restitution of the monies paid. Thus, he has acted with regard to the matter of restitution. The fact that Judge Carter refused to make the restitution of the funds a condition precedent to the further prosecution of the lawsuit, does not appear to us to have been an abuse of discretion, particularly in view of the uncontroverted assertions contained in his answer.
The rule nisi is discharged and the writ of mandamus is denied.
Writ denied.
HEFLIN, C. J., and MERRILL, HARWOOD, MADDOX, McCALL, FAULKNER and JONES, JJ., concur.
COLEMAN, J., dissents.