Title: People v. Madej
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 87574, 87725, 87726, 87752
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: August 10, 2000

Docket Nos. 87574, 87725, 87726, 87752 cons.-Agenda 8 -May 								2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
GREGORY MADEJ, Appellant (Consul General for the Republic
								 of Poland in Chicago, Appellant).
Opinion filed August 10, 2000.
	JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Gregory Madej, appeals from the decision of the
circuit court of Cook County denying his petition for relief from
judgment (see 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 1998)) and denying his
petition for writ of mandamus (see 735 ILCS 5/14-101 et seq.
(West 1998)). Intervenor, Consul General for the Republic of
Poland in Chicago, also appeals from the dismissal of the petition
for writ of mandamus. Moreover, the Consul General appeals the
trial court's denial of the Consul General's motion to intervene in
the section 2-1401 proceeding.
BACKGROUND
Original Criminal Proceedings
	This case began in 1981 when the police arrested defendant
after he led them on a car chase through Chicago. When the
officers arrested defendant, his hands and head had blood on them,
and his shirt, pants, and undershorts were heavily stained with
blood. Defendant also had deep scratches on his face and scratches
on his chest, arms, and back.
	Shortly thereafter, Barbara Doyle, the owner of the car in
which defendant fled from the police, was found in an alley on the
northwest side of Chicago. Doyle was naked and had died from
multiple stab wounds. Her missing clothes were found in the car
defendant was driving.
	After defendant was arrested, he told the police that a friend
named Hojamoto was driving the victim's car. Defendant rode
around with Hojamoto, who jumped from the car a block before
the police overtook the car. At trial, defendant testified that he was
in the car with the victim and twice had consensual sex with her.
He explained that the victim pulled a knife during an argument
over drugs. They struggled, and the victim began bleeding. He
then threw her from the car and left the scene.
	Defendant was convicted of murder, armed robbery, rape, and
deviate sexual assault and sentenced to death. This court affirmed
defendant's conviction and sentence. People v. Madej, 106 Ill. 2d 201 (1985). Thereafter, defendant filed a post-conviction petition
and amended it in 1993. The trial court dismissed defendant's
petition, and this court affirmed that dismissal. People v. Madej,
177 Ill. 2d 116 (1997). Subsequently, defendant sought leave from
this court to file a petition for writ of mandamus. This court denied
that motion.
Current Proceedings
	In July 1998, defendant filed the current action. Defendant
filed his section 2-1401 petition in the criminal division. Because
of local court rules, defendant filed his petition for writ of
mandamus in the chancery division.
	Defendant's section 2-1401 petition alleged that his rights
under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24,
1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, and the Consular Convention of 1972 between
Poland and the United States,(1) May 31, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 1231,
were violated when the police failed to inform defendant that, as
a Polish citizen, he had a right to contact a consular official from
Poland. Defendant also alleged that, after he was arrested, the
United States had a duty to notify the Polish consular that a Polish
national had been arrested and detained.(2) Defendant's mandamus
petition alleged that he was entitled to relief because his
conviction and sentence are void under international law.
	In December, the Consul General sought leave to intervene in
both actions. Judge Albert Green, who was presiding over the
mandamus proceedings, granted the Consul General's petition.
Thereafter, Judge Green transferred the mandamus proceedings to
Judge Thomas Fitzgerald, who was presiding over the section
2-1401 proceedings. Thereafter Judge Fitzgerald denied the
Consul General's motion to intervene in the section 2-1401
proceeding. Subsequently, Judge Fitzgerald denied both petitions.
Defendant and the Consul General now appeal.
	While this appeal was pending, this court granted leave to the
United Mexican States, the Human Rights Committee of the Bar
of England and Wales, and the Consulate General of the Federal
Republic of Germany in Chicago to file briefs as amici curiae.
ANALYSIS
Section 2-1401 Proceeding
	Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides a
method for obtaining relief from a judgment after more than 30
days have passed. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(a) (West 1998). A
section 2-1401 petition must be filed "not later than 2 years after
the entry of the order or judgment." 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c) (West
1998). Relief sought more than two years after the entry of
judgment will not be considered absent a showing that the
petitioner was under duress, or a legal disability, or that the
grounds for relief were fraudulently concealed. People v.
Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 211 (1997).
	Here, judgment was entered in 1982. Defendant filed his
petition in 1998, approximately 14 years after the limitation period
expired. Defendant and the Consul General acknowledge that the
petition is untimely, but argue that this court can consider the
merits of the petition because (1) under international law
defendant's conviction and sentence are void; (2) the Consul
General was never told of the treaty violation and thus could not
preserve its rights sooner; (3) the State fraudulently concealed
from defendant his rights under the Vienna Convention; and (4)
the reliance on a state procedural rule to bar an action violates
international law.
Voidness
	Defendant contends that the principle restitutio in integrum,
which is well established in international law, renders his
conviction and sentence void. Restitutio in integrum is defined as:
			"In the civil law, restoration or restitution to the
previous condition. This was effected by the pr¦tor(3) on
equitable grounds, at the prayer of an injured party, by
rescinding or annulling a contract or transaction valid by
the strict law, or annulling a change in the legal condition
produced by an omission, and restoring the parties to their
previous situation or legal relations. The restoration of a
cause to its first state, on petition of the party who was
cast, in order to have a second hearing." Black's Law
Dictionary 1313 (6th ed. 1990).
	Although we acknowledge the important role that restitutio in
integrum plays in international law, defendant has not cited any
authority to support a conclusion that the principle renders
defendant's conviction and death sentence void. Instead, both the
quotation from Black's, upon which defendant relies, and the other
authorities cited by defendant support the conclusion that restitutio
in integrum is an equitable remedy for violations of a treaty. To
say that the proper remedy for a treaty violation is to annul the act
that caused the violation is a far cry from concluding that the
remedy means that a court's decision is void.
	This court has explained that an order is void if it was entered
by a court that lacked jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject
matter or that lacked the inherent power to make or enter the
particular order involved. R.W. Sawant &amp; Co. v. Allied Programs
Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 304, 309 (1986). Here, the trial court clearly had
jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter and it had the
inherent power to make or enter the orders involved.
Consequently, we see no basis upon which to conclude that
defendant's conviction and sentence are void.
The Consul General's Knowledge
	The Consul General argues that the trial court erred in
denying its motion to intervene in the section 2-1401 petition. It
further argues that the limitation period does not apply to bar its
claim because it "only recently became aware that the State of
Illinois had tried and sentenced its national to death." If we accept,
without deciding, that the Consul General can intervene in the
section 2-1401 petition (a proposition that the State vigorously
disputes), we must conclude that the action would be time-barred.
	Although a petitioner must demonstrate due diligence to
obtain relief pursuant to section 2-1401 (Smith v. Airoom, Inc.,
114 Ill. 2d 209, 221 (1986)), a showing of due diligence does not
obviate the need to file a section 2-1401 petition within the
applicable limitation period. Our case law is clear:
		"[T]he two-year limitation mandated by section 2-1401
and its predecessor, section 72 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch.
110, par. 72), must be adhered to in the absence of a clear
showing that the person seeking relief is under legal
disability or duress or the grounds for relief are
fraudulently concealed." Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d  at 211.
	Here, the Consul General does not allege that it was under
duress or a legal disability or that the grounds for relief were
fraudulently concealed. Consequently, we are unable to conclude
that it is entitled to seek relief under section 2-1401 outside the
limitation period simply because it did not discover the underlying
facts until after the limitation period had expired.
Fraudulent Concealment
	Defendant argues that the limitation period was tolled for him
because the State fraudulently concealed from him the fact that the
Vienna Convention gave him the right to consular assistance.
Defendant argues that he has certain rights under the Vienna
Convention and that the State had the duty to inform him of these
rights. Defendant concludes that the State's failure to inform him
of these rights constitutes fraudulent concealment. We disagree.
	To toll the limitation period, the alleged fraud must consist of
"affirmative acts or representations designed to prevent discovery
of the cause of action or ground for relief." Crowell v. Bilandic, 81 Ill. 2d 422, 428 (1980). Here, the fact that defendant was entitled
to be informed of his rights under the Vienna Convention is a
matter of international law. The rights that defendant asserts the
State was obliged to inform him of are rights that are, by
defendant's own admission, contained in treaties that are public
documents not only in this state, but also in countless countries
around the world.
	Even if we accept defendant's contention that the State was
obligated to inform defendant of these rights, we are unable to
conclude that this failure can constitute fraud when the rights are
a matter of public record. Consequently, we are unable to conclude
that, by failing to inform defendant of his rights, the State
fraudulently concealed defendant's grounds for relief.
State Procedural Rule
	Defendant also contends that the limitation period must be
tolled because a state procedural rule cannot prevent defendant
from seeking a remedy for a violation of international law.
Defendant acknowledges that the Supreme Court has held that, to
determine whether a state's procedural rules govern, a court must
look to the treaty's text and drafting history. See Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700, 100 L. Ed. 2d 722, 731, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 2108 (1988); see also Breard v. Greene,
523 U.S. 371, 375, 140 L. Ed. 2d 529, 537, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 1354
(1998) (holding that, "absent a clear and express statement to the
contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the
implementation of the treaty in that State").
	Here, the Vienna Convention provides that the rights
expressed in the Convention, "shall be exercised in conformity
with the laws and regulations of the receiving State subject to the
proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable
full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights
accorded under this Article are intended." 21 U.S.T. at 101; see
also Breard, 523 U.S.  at 375, 140 L. Ed. 2d  at 537, 118 S. Ct.  at
1355 (reaching a similar conclusion).
	Defendant provides no explanation as to how section
2-1401's limitation period prevents "full effect" from being given
to the purposes of the Vienna Convention. Defendant had ample
opportunity to raise his claim and have it considered on the merits
during his trial, on direct appeal, and during the two years
following the entry of judgment. We do not believe that a
reasonable limitation period designed to preserve the public's
interest in the finality of judgments can be construed as a rule that
frustrates the purposes of the Vienna Convention. Because the
treaty specifically states that the forum court's rules and
regulations will govern, we have no basis to conclude that the
reasonable limitation period violates international law.
Mandamus Proceeding
	In the mandamus proceeding, defendant and the Consul
General argue that mandamus relief is appropriate because (1)
defendant's conviction and sentence are void; and (2) they raise
issues of great public importance and of great importance to the
administration of justice.
	We have already rejected the argument relating to voidness
and need not consider it further.
	Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to compel a public
officer to perform a nondiscretionary act. Lewis E. v. Spagnolo,
186 Ill. 2d 198, 229 (1999). This court will not issue a writ of
mandamus absent a showing of "a clear, affirmative right to relief,
a clear duty of the [public officer] to act, and clear authority in the
[public officer] to comply with the writ." Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d  at
229.
	Although this action may involve issues of "great public
importance and of great importance to the administration of
justice," that, in and of itself, is not a reason to grant mandamus
relief. Here, defendant and the Consul General have not
demonstrated that they have a clear, affirmative right to relief.
Absent such a showing, we will not issue a writ.
CONCLUSION
	We affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
The clerk of this court is directed to enter an order setting
Wednesday, November 22, 2000, as the date on which the
sentence of death entered by the circuit court shall be
implemented. Defendant shall be executed in the manner provided
by law (725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1998)). A certified copy of the
mandate of this court shall be transmitted by the clerk of this court
to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms
Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution where
defendant is confined.
Affirmed. 
	JUSTICE BILANDIC, specially concurring:
	I agree that defendant's claim is procedurally barred and that
the judgment of conviction is not void. I therefore join the
majority opinion. I write separately, however, to address an issue
that was raised during oral argument-the repatriation of defendant
to the Republic of Poland.
	Defendant was born in Poland. However, as the circuit court
observed, defendant has lived in this country for all but the first 18
months of his life. Defendant has attended school here, has earned
a living here, and has even served in the United States army.
Defendant has committed numerous other crimes for which he was
imprisoned in the United States. In short, defendant's life history
reflects that he would be a stranger in Poland-without immediate
family, friends, and social roots.
	A significant interest of the Polish government in this case is
to spare defendant from the death penalty. At the time of
defendant's arrest in 1981 for the rape and murder of Barbara
Doyle, Poland employed the death penalty. Poland abolished its
death penalty, effective January 1, 1998. Amnesty International
Report, The Death Penalty Worldwide: Developments in 1997,
ACT 50/04/98, April 1998, at 5-6.
	Defendant has received nearly 20 years of due process from
the Illinois courts. We have treated defendant in precisely the same
manner as we would treat a United States citizen, and we have
given defendant every constitutional right and protection that we
would give a United States citizen. Nevertheless, I note that,
although such a decision is not within the province of this court,
I would favor the repatriation of defendant, a convicted murderer
and rapist, to Poland. The Polish government, however, has never
requested the return of defendant to Poland. It is up to the Polish
government to initiate discussions in this regard with the
appropriate authorities of the United States government.
	JUSTICE McMORROW, concurring in part and dissenting in
part:
	Like Justice Heiple, I believe that the State's admitted
violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is a
serious matter which requires remedy by this court. However,
unlike Justice Heiple, I believe that the remedy in this case should
be to vacate defendant's death sentence but not his convictions. I
therefore concur in the majority's affirmance of defendant's
convictions but dissent from the majority's affirmance of
defendant's death sentence.
	Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations provides that
		"if the accused so requests, the competent authorities of
the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the
consular post of the sending State if, within its consular
district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to
prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any
other manner. Any communication addressed to the
consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or
detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities
without delay. The said authorities shall inform the
person concerned without delay of his rights under this
sub-paragraph." (Emphasis added.) Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261.
The Vienna Convention makes no distinction between resident
foreign aliens and recently arrived or visiting foreign nationals.
The language of the treaty "is mandatory and unequivocal,
evidencing the signatories' recognition of the importance of
consular access for persons detained by a foreign government."
Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J.,
concurring). Further, "[t]he provisions of the Vienna Convention
have the dignity of an act of Congress and are binding upon the
states. See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99, 5 S. Ct. 247,
253-54, 28 L. Ed. 798 (1884). The Supremacy Clause mandates
that rights conferred by a treaty be honored by the states." Breard,
134 F.3d  at 622 (Butzner, J., concurring). In the case at bar, there
is no question that the State failed to inform defendant, a citizen
of Poland, of his right, under article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna
Convention, to contact the Polish consulate at the time of his
arrest.
	Nor is there any issue that the State's failure to inform
defendant of his right to consular notification is a serious violation
of international law, particularly since a sentence of death was
imposed. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights(4) has recently
held that "failure to observe a detained foreign national's right to
information, recognized in Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, is prejudicial to the due
process of law and, in such circumstances, imposition of the death
penalty is a violation of the right not to be deprived of life
'arbitrarily', as stipulated in the relevant provisions of the human
rights treaties (v.g. American Convention on Human Rights,
Article 4; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Article 6), with the juridical consequences that a violation of this
nature carries, in other words, those pertaining to the State's
international responsibility and the duty to make
reparation."(Emphasis added.) The Right to Information about
Consular Assistance Within the Framework of the Guarantees of
Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, par. 141.7, October 1, 1999.
This holding mirrors this court's own recognition that death
penalty cases require "a high standard of procedural accuracy."
People v. Walker, 91 Ill. 2d 502, 517 (1982).
	Further, a violation of the consular notification provisions of
the Vienna Convention affects both the rights of the detainee and
the interests of the foreign state, in this case, the Republic of
Poland. Unquestionably, Poland has a strong state interest in this
case. Poland does not have a death penalty. It, therefore, is
justifiably interested in aiding and assisting those of its citizens
who are subject to the possible imposition of that penalty while
abroad. Indeed, as the Consul General for the Republic of Poland
in Chicago has frankly acknowledged to this court, it is solely
because the Republic of Poland is officially opposed to the death
penalty that the Polish government has intervened on behalf of
defendant in this case. According to the Consul General, Poland
has no intention of adopting a policy of intervention in non-death-penalty cases.
	Moreover, Poland is not alone in its concern regarding
violations of the right to consular notification in death penalty
cases. In the case at bar, amici the Federal Republic of Germany
and the United Mexican States, both signatories to the Vienna
Convention, have taken the position that the violation of the
consular notification provisions in the instant case must be
remedied because of the severity and finality of the death sentence.
Before the Inter-American Court, numerous countries, including
Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic,
Honduras, Paraguay and Costa Rica supported the principle of
judicial enforcement of the Vienna Convention in death penalty
cases. See The Right to Information about Consular Assistance
Within the Framework of the Guarantees of Due Process of Law,
Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, October 1, 1999.
	I am fully aware of the procedural obstacles which confront
defendant's claim in the case at bar. But this is an extraordinary
case. More is at stake here than the rights of a single defendant.
"The protections afforded by the Vienna Convention go far beyond
[defendant's] case. United States citizens are scattered about the
world-as missionaries, Peace Corps volunteers, doctors, teachers
and students, as travelers for business and for pleasure. Their
freedom and safety are seriously endangered if state officials fail
to honor the Vienna Convention and other nations follow their
example. Public officials should bear in mind that 'international
law is founded upon mutuality and reciprocity... .' Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113, 228, 16 S. Ct. 139, 168, 40 L. Ed. 95 (1895). ***
The importance of the Vienna Convention cannot be overstated.
It should be honored by all nations that have signed the treaty and
all states of this nation." Breard, 134 F.3d  at 622 (Butzner, J.,
concurring). As Justice Heiple correctly observes, we cannot
expect that the citizens of this country, while abroad, will be
afforded their rights under the Vienna Convention, or indeed,
under any treaty, if we do not afford those same international
rights to foreign nationals here in the United States. Through no
fault of its own, the Polish government is only now able to assist
its citizen in his death penalty defense. It is in our own self-interest
to uphold the principle of international comity, acknowledge the
notification violation that occurred in the case at bar, and provide
a remedy.
	Accordingly, because defendant's right to consular
notification under the Vienna Convention was, in fact, violated in
this case; because that violation is an extremely serious matter
under international law; because the sovereign state of Poland has
a strong and legitimate interest in aiding and assisting its citizens
who are subject to death penalty proceedings; and because it is in
the self-interest of the citizens of this state to uphold the rights
provided by the Vienna Convention and remedy the error that
occurred in this case; I would exercise this court's equitable
powers and vacate defendant's death sentence and remand for a
new sentencing hearing. I would further hold that, at the remand
sentencing hearing, the State may again pursue the death penalty
while the Consul General may assist defendant in his defense.
	I believe that the unique and compelling circumstances of this
case require a remedy for the State's violation of the Vienna
Convention. I express no opinion, however, on what effect a
violation of the right to consular notification would have outside
the context of the death penalty or the facts of this case.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
	I join in Justice Heiple's dissent. I write separately simply to
express my view that regardless of the outcome on retrial,
defendant cannot be sentenced to death. For the reasons set forth
in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S.
Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). It is therefore void and
unenforceable.
	JUSTICE HEIPLE, also dissenting:
	Defendant, a Polish citizen residing in the United States as a
permanent resident alien, was, along with other offenses, tried and
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. This court affirmed
defendant's convictions and sentence on direct appeal.
Subsequently, defendant filed a section 2-1401 petition for relief
from judgment and a petition for a writ of mandamus based upon
an alleged violation of his rights under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (Vienna Convention). Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261.
	The Vienna Convention is a binding international treaty to
which the United States and the Republic of Poland are parties.
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention required the State to inform
defendant of his right to contact a Polish consular official at the
time of his arrest. This was not done. Upon belatedly learning of
the defendant's situation, however, the Polish government has now
intervened on defendant's behalf.
	Although there is no dispute that the State violated the Vienna
Convention by failing to provide defendant the required consular
notification, the majority declines to provide defendant any relief
for this violation. Because this case raises important issues of
international relations and the rights of all persons, domestic and
foreign, I respectfully dissent.
	The State suggests that a letter of apology to the Polish
government would rectify this oversight. Whether this apology
would be sent before or after defendant's execution was not
specified.
	What is cavalierly dismissed here is that the consular
notification requirement is meant to ensure that foreign nationals
imprisoned abroad have adequate legal representation and that
they should be tried in accordance with principles of justice
generally recognized in the international community by allowing
consular officials to consult with the defendant and with attorneys,
court officials and prosecutors. It is important to note that this
protection is designed for Americans abroad as well as for foreign
nationals in the United States. In the instant case, however, the
Polish Consul General was not even aware of defendant's situation
until 1998, some 16 years after his conviction and sentence.
	The question arises, how can we expect protection under this
treaty for American citizens abroad if we do not extend equal
protection to foreign nationals residing in the United States? The
answer is, we cannot. The decision reached in this case thus has
implications reaching far beyond the execution of this defendant.
	For the breach of this international convention, defendant's
convictions and sentence should be reversed and the cause
remanded for a new trial in compliance with the solemn treaty
obligations of the United States, which, under our constitution, are
the supreme law of the land.
	For the reasons given, I respectfully dissent.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON joins in this dissent.
1.      1Unless otherwise noted, we will refer to both treaties singularly as
the Vienna Convention.

2.      2Article 36 of the Vienna Convention provides, in relevant part:
			"(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with
nationals of the sending State and to have access to them.
Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom
with respect to communication with and access to consular
officers of the sending State;
			(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the
receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post
of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national
of that state is arrested or committed to prison or to custody
pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any
communication addressed to the consular post by the person
arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be
forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said
authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of
his rights under this sub-paragraph." 21 U.S.T. at 101.
	The Consular Convention provides, in relevant part:
			"The appropriate authorities of the receiving State shall
immediately inform a consular officer of the sending State of
the detention or arrest of any national of the sending State who
has not been admitted to permanent residence in the receiving
State. In the case of the detention or arrest of a national of the
sending State who has been admitted to permanent resident in
the receiving State, the appropriate authorities of the receiving
State, on the request of such national, shall immediately inform
a consular officer of the sending State of such detention or
arrest." 24 U.S.T. at 1260.

3.      3A Roman municipal officer who possessed "extensive equitable
jurisdiction." Black's Law Dictionary 1175 (6th ed. 1990).

4.      4The Inter-American Court was established under the authority of the
American Convention on Human Rights, a treaty which entered into
force in 1978. Located in Costa Rica, the Court has seven judges,
elected for renewable six-year terms by the 24 states parties to the
American Convention. See generally T. Buergenthal, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 76 Am. J. Int'l L. 231 (1982); T.
Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human
Rights Court, 79 Am. J. Int'l L. 1 (1985). The State Department of the
United States actively participated before the Inter-American Court in
briefing and oral argument in the proceedings on Advisory Opinion OC-16/99.