Title: Willie Sanders v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC96-398
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 1, 2001

1See § 775.082(8), Fla. Stat. (1997).
Supreme Court of Florida
 
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No. SC96398
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WILLIE SANDERS,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[February 1, 2001]
LEWIS, J.
We have for review the decision in Sanders v. State, 737 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1999), in which the Fifth District affirmed Sanders’ concurrent life  sentences
under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act1 (the “Act”), citing, inter alia, Woods v.
State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), approved sub nom. State v. Cotton, 769
So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
Sanders challenges his concurrent life sentences under the Act on several
2In its decision in Sanders, the Fifth District cited to its decision in Speed v. State, 732 So. 2d 17
(Fla. 5th DCA 1999), approved, No. SC95706 (Fla. Feb. 1, 2001).  In our decision in Cotton, we
disapproved the opinion in Speed to the extent that it implied, in dicta, that a subsection of the Act gives
to each victim a veto over the imposition of the mandatory sentences that are prescribed in other parts of
the Act.
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grounds, all of which have already been addressed by this Court in other opinions. 
See McKnight v. State,769 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 2000) (holding that a defendant has
the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for
sentencing under the Act and to challenge the State’s evidence regarding the
defendant’s eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender); Grant v.
State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act);
Ellis v. State, 762 So. 2d 912, 912 (Fla. 2000) (recognizing that, “[a]s to notice,
publication in the Laws of Florida or the Florida Statutes gives all citizens
constructive notice of the consequences of their actions”) (quoting State v.
Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139, 142 (Fla. 1991)); State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 
2000) (holding that the Act does not violate separation of powers, is not void for
vagueness, and does not violate principles of due process by allowing a “victim
veto” precluding application of the Act).  Accordingly,  the decision in Sanders is
approved to the extent it is consistent with Cotton,2 Ellis, McKnight, and Grant. 
It is so ordered.
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WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ, concur.
QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
QUINCE, J., dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d
345, 358-59 (Fla. 2000).
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Statutory Validity
 Fifth District - Case No. 5D98-1523
(Seminole County)
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Susan A. Fagan, Assistant Public Defender,
Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Kellie A. Nielan and Kristen L.
Davenport, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent