Title: State Ex Rel. Williams v. Adams
Citation: 219 S.E.2d 198, 288 N.C. 501
Docket Number: 32
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: November 5, 1975

219 S.E.2d 198 (1975)
288 N.C. 501
STATE of North Carolina on relation of George Johnnie WILLIAMS, Jr., Administrator of George Johnnie Williams, Deceased,
v.
W. I. ADAMS et al.
No. 32.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
November 5, 1975.
*199 Turner &amp; Harrison by Fred W. Harrison, Kinston, for plaintiff appellant.
Smith, Anderson, Blount &amp; Mitchell by R. Daniel Rizzo, Raleigh, for defendant appellee.
MOORE, Justice.
The sole question presented for determination by this Court is whether the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's entry of judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendant Fidelity.
Fidelity contends that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the one-year statute of limitations set out in G.S. 1-54(1) and G.S. 1-54(2), which are as follows:
(G.S. 1-54(1) repealed by Session Laws of 1975, c. 252, s. 5, effective January 1, 1976.)
Fidelity maintains, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the actions of the sheriff here constitute a trespass under G.S. 1-54(1). Fidelity further contends that plaintiff relies on G.S. 109-34 to recover on the sheriff's bond, that G.S. 109-34 does not contain a limitation period, and therefore the one-year limitation period of G.S. 1-54(2) prevails.
*200 G.S. 109-34 gives plaintiff a cause of action against the officers and the surety. Pertinent portions of that statute are as follows:
G.S. 1-50(1) allows a party aggrieved under G.S. 109-34 to institute suit on the official bond of the officer within six years from the breach of the bond.
G.S. 109-34 has been broadly construed over its long history to cover not only acts done by the officer but also acts that should have been done. Daniel v. Grizzard, 117 N.C. 105, 23 S.E. 93 (1895). The last clause of the statute has been held to enlarge the conditions of the official bond to extend to all official duties of the office. Price v. Honeycutt, 216 N.C. 270, 4 S.E.2d 611 (1939); Kivett v. Young, 106 N.C. 567, 10 S.E. 1019 (1890). This Court, in Dunn v. Swanson, 217 N.C. 279, 7 S.E.2d 563 (1940), specifically held that under this statute the sheriff and the surety on his official bond are liable for the wrongful death of a prisoner resulting from the negligence of the jailer in locking the prisoner, in a weakened condition, in a cell with a person whom the sheriff and jailer knew to be violently insane and who assaulted the prisoner, causing his death. There, Justice Seawell, speaking for the Court, said:
In commenting on this decision, the author of a note in 19 N.C.L.Rev. 101 (1940-1941) states that Dunn v. Swanson, supra, is in accord with the general rule that "a prison official is liable when he knows of, or in the exercise of reasonable care should anticipate, danger to the prisoner, and with such knowledge or anticipation fails to take the proper precautions to safeguard his prisoners."
Other jurisdictions have upheld wrongful death actions against a sheriff and his surety for negligent failure to provide medical care to a prisoner known to be in need of such care. State of Mississippi v. Durham, 444 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1971); LaVigne v. Allen, 36 A.D.2d 981, 321 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1971); Farmer v. State, 224 Miss. 96, 79 So. 2d 528 (1955); Magenheimer v. State, 120 Ind.App. 128, 90 N.E.2d 813 (1950); Smith v. Slack, 125 W.Va. 812, 26 S.E.2d 387 (1943); State v. National Surety Co., 162 Tenn. 547, 39 S.W.2d 581 (1931); 14 A.L.R.2d 353.
Plaintiff's complaint is clearly a claim for wrongful death caused by the negligence of the defendant officers in not providing medical attention for the plaintiff's intestate, in breach of their duty under G.S. 153-52 and G.S. 153-53.2 (repealed *201 by Session Laws of 1973, c. 822, effective February 1, 1974, now codified as G.S. 153A-221 and G.S. 153A-225).
Although a cause of action was available to the plaintiff under G.S. 109-34, with its attendant six-year statute of limitations, plaintiff chose to bring a wrongful death action. In North Carolina, a right of action to recover damages for wrongful death is purely statutory and exists only by virtue of the statutes. Stetson v. Easterling, 274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E.2d 531 (1968); In re Miles, 262 N.C. 647, 138 S.E.2d 487 (1964); Graves v. Welborn, 260 N.C. 688, 133 S.E.2d 761 (1963). Such an action is barred by G.S. 1-53(4), the two-year statute of limitations. The record shows that plaintiff's intestate was imprisoned on 13 September 1971 and died the following day. This action was commenced on 12 September 1973, within the two-year period. Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to his day in court on his wrongful death action and the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's entry of judgment on the pleadings.
The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with direction to remand to Wayne County Superior Court for trial in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.