Title: MARRIAGE OF OWEN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14956
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: March 31, 1980

No. 14956 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JAY F. OWEN, Petitioner and Respondent, IDALENE OWEN, a/k/a IDALENE L. OWEN, Respondent and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, Honorable Alfred B. Coate, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Berger, Anderson,Sinclair & Murphy, Billings, Montana For Respondent : William F. Meisburger, Forsyth, Montana !jT!- 5 - * L C . - ?.C!:? Filed: P Submitted on briefs: February 27, 1980 Decided: APR I - f9@ M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment entered i n t h e Rosebud County D i s t r i c t Court, Sixteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , disposing of t h e m a r i t a l property of t h e p a r t i e s . The p a r t i e s h e r e i n w e r e married on November 30, 1948. A t t h e t i m e of t h e marriage t h e husband owned a ranch near Ashland, Montana. This ranch was s o l d a f t e r t h e p a r t i e s ' marriage and t h e proceeds used t o acquire t h e p a r t i e s ' cur- r e n t ranch property from t h e w i f e ' s parents. The ranch was purchased i n t h e j o i n t names of t h e p a r t i e s i n 1949. During t h e marriage t h e p a r t i e s worked together on t h i s ranch. I n 1952 an a d d i t i o n a l 172 a c r e s was purchased a s an a d d i t i o n t o t h e ranch. A house was b u i l t on t h i s property during t h e s a m e year. I n March 1978 respondent husband p e t i t i o n e d f o r d i s s o l u - t i o n of t h e marriage. The d i s s o l u t i o n w a s granted without c o n t e s t , b u t t h e District Court i n i t s decree reserved t h e property d i v i s i o n f o r l a t e r adjudication. T r i a l was held on t h i s matter on A p r i l 16, 1979. After making f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law, t h e D i s t r i c t Court entered judgment on May 25, 1979, e f f e c t i v e l y rendering a 60/40 percent s p l i t of t h e m a r i t a l property, r e s p e c t i v e l y between t h e husband and wife. From t h i s judgment t h e wife appeals. The i s s u e s presented t o t h i s Court f o r review a r e a s follows : 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n i t s f i n d i n g s and conclusions t h a t t h e husband had contributed 60 percent and t h e wife 40 percent t o t h e accumulated m a r i t a l a s s e t s ? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err by n o t giving s u f f i c i e n t weight t o t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s of a p p e l l a n t ? 3. Did t h e District Court err by abusing i t s d i s c r e - t i o n i n concluding, a s a matter of law, t h e method of pur- chase of t h e marital e s t a t e , o r i n f a i l i n g t o allow a p p e l l a n t t h e b e n e f i t of meeting a good f a i t h p a r t y purchase o f f e r ? 4. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n f a i l i n g t o consider respondent's d i s s i p a t i o n of a s s e t s ? 5. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n f a i l i n g t o award a t - torney f e e s t o a p p e l l a n t ? The substance of t h i s appeal i s whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused its d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . " I t i s well s e t t l e d i n Montana t h a t a d i s t r i c t c o u r t has f a r reaching d i s c r e t i o n i n resolving property d i v i s i o n s and i t s judgment w i l l not be a l t e r e d unless a c l e a r abuse of t h a t d i s c r e - t i o n is shown. . . The c r i t e r i a f o r reviewing t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n is: Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n t h e e x e r c i s e of i t s d i s c r e t i o n a c t a r b i t r a r i l y without employment of conscien- t i o u s judgment, o r exceed t h e bounds of reason i n view of a l l t h e circumstances." ( C i t a t i o n s omitted.) Z e l l v. Z e l l (1977), 172 Mont. 496, 570 P.2d 33, 35. Appellant contends t h a t it w a s an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n f o r t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o only award her 40 percent of t h e m a r i t a l property i n s t e a d of t h e one-half i n t e r e s t she sought. She contends t h a t her c o n t r i b u t i o n s a s a homemaker, as w e l l a s ranch hand and handy person, when coupled with respon- d e n t ' s d i s s i p a t i o n of m a r i t a l a s s e t s , e n t i t l e her t o a 50 percent s h a r e of t h e m a r i t a l property. "Although t h e D i s t r i c t Court may equally d i v i d e t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s , such a d i s t r i b u t i o n i s n o t mandated by s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA. . . Section 40-4-202 i s f l e x i b l e and it v e s t s a good d e a l of d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court . . . W e have s t a t e d , before and a f t e r t h e adoption of t h e s t a t u t e , t h a t each case must be looked a t i n d i v i d u a l l y , with an eye t o i t s unique circum- stances. . . " ( C i t a t i o n s omitted. ) I n R e Mar- r i a g e of Aanenson (1979)r Mont. - 598 P.2d 1120, 1123, 36 St.Rep. 1525. The duty of t h e District Court i s t o consider t h e s t a t u t o r y criteria and equitably apportion t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s . To accomplish t h i s , it should consider t h e d u r a t i o n of t h e marriage and t h e age, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational s k i l l s , employability, e s t a t e , and t h e l i a b i l i t i e s and needs of each p a r t y . I n R e Marriage of Aanenson, supra, 598 P.2d a t 1123. W e f i n d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court here properly followed t h e d i c t a t e s of s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA. The f i n d i n g s of a t r i a l judge w i l l n o t be disturbed on appeal where they a r e based on s u b s t a n t i a l though c o n f l i c t i n g evidence, unless t h e r e i s a c l e a r preponderance of evidence a g a i n s t such findings. Cameron v. Cameron (1978), - Mont. , 587 P.2d 939, 35 St-Rep. 1723. Here, t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e D i s - t r i c t Court a r e based on s u b s t a n t i a l evidence and t h e evi- dence does not preponderate a g a i n s t them. The District Court, t h e r e f o r e , d i d n o t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n apportion- i n g t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . Appellant's next contention e s s e n t i a l l y questions t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s v a l u a t i o n and method of purchase of t h e m a r i t a l property. Appellant seeks t o preserve and maintain t h e family ranch and submits t h a t t h i s Court has approved t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y of allowing her t o do so, most r e c e n t l y i n I n R e Marriage of Jacobson (1979), - Mont. - , 600 P.2d 1183, 36 s t . ~ e p . 1773. She argues t h a t t h e District Court's d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e m a r i t a l property and v a l u a t i o n thereof prevent her from purchasing t h e ranch. A c o u r t i n d i s t r i b u t i n g t h e property of t h e marriage i s t o consider t h e c u r r e n t value of a l l property acquired during t h e marriage. Kruse v. Kruse (1978), - Mont. I 586 P.2d 294, 298, 35 St.Rep. 1502. The ~ i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d p r e c i s e l y t h a t here. I t accepted testimony, a l b e i t c o n f l i c t - ing, a s t o t h e c u r r e n t value of t h e property before conclud- i n g t h e property was worth $566,200. W e f i n d t h a t t h i s procedure w a s not unreasonable. Appellant is c o r r e c t t h a t Montana cases have accepted t h e premise t h a t a ranch o r farm should be kept i n t a c t and operated a s a u n i t . This policy i s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e follow- i n g d e c i s i o n s involving t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of farming and ranch- i n g property: I n R e Marriage of Jacobson, supra; I n Re Mar- r i a g e of Brown (1978), Mont . , 587 P.2d 361, 35 St.Rep. 1733; Biegalke v. Biegalke (1977), 172 Mont. 311, 564 P.2d 987; Hunnewell v. Hunnewell (1972), 160 Mont. 125, 500 P.2d " I t must be remembered t h a t t h e primary r i g h t t o be considered i n disposing of m a r i t a l property is t h e r i g h t of each p a r t y t o an e q u i t a b l e appor- tionment of t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s . While it is t h e policy of t h e c o u r t s of t h i s state t o avoid s p l i t t i n g up a ranch o r forcing i t s sale where t h e r e i s any reasonable a l t e r n a t i v e , t h a t policy, however commendable, cannot be used t o o v e r r i d e [a p a r t y ' s ] r i g h t t o an e q u i t a b l e s h a r e of t h e m a r i t a l property." I n R e Marriage of Jacobson, supra, 600 P.2d a t 1187-88. I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e both p a r t i e s were given t h e option t o buy t h e o t h e r ' s r e s p e c t i v e share of t h e ranch provided t h a t t h e r i g h t be exercised within s i x months of t h e judgment. Other than t h i s condition, it was l e f t up t o t h e p a r t i e s t o reach t h e i r own terms on a purchase. W e can f i n d no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s methods. The f i n a l contention of a p p e l l a n t i s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o award her a t t o r n e y f e e s . Section 40-4-110, MCA, provides: "The c o u r t from time t o t i m e , a f t e r considering t h e f i n a n c i a l resources of both p a r t i e s , may o r d e r a p a r t y t o pay a reasonable amount f o r t h e c o s t t o t h e o t h e r p a r t y of maintaining o r defending any proceeding under Chapters 1 and 4 of this title and for attorney's fees, including sums for legal services rendered and costs in- curred prior to the commencement of the proceed- ing or after entry of judgment . . ." Here the District Court, after considering the financial resources of both parties, determined that each should bear their own legal costs. It was not an abuse of discretion to do so. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. Justice d b y - We concur: Chief ~usti%e w Q & 0. Justices