Title: Schmidt v. Mt. Angel Abbey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S056261
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: December 24, 2009

FILED: December 24, 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
DAVID SCHMIDT, 
Petitioner on Review, 
and 
N. M., 
Plaintiff,
v. 
MT. ANGEL ABBEY,
an Oregon not for profit corporation, 
Respondent on Review, 
and 
ARCHDIOCESE OF PORTLAND IN OREGON,
an Oregon corporation;
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF PORTLAND IN OREGON,
dba Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon
and Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon,
and successors,
a corporation sole;
and LOUIS CHARVET,
deceased, 
Defendants-Respondents,
and 
SWISS-AMERICAN CONGREGATION OF THE ORDO SANCTI BENEDICTI, 
Defendant.
(CC
020403531; CA A124850; SC S056261)
En Banc
On review from the
Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted
March 3, 2009.
Kathryn H. Clarke,
Portland, argued the cause for petitioner on review.  Erin K. Olson, Law Office
of Erin Olson PC, Portland, filed the brief for petitioner on review.  
Lisa E. Lear,
Bullivant Houser Bailey PC, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for
respondent on review.  With her on the brief were Richard J. Whittemore and
Beth Cupani.
Walter J. Ledesma,
Woodburn, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association.
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
Walters,
J., concurred and filed an opinion.
*Appeal from Multnomah
County Circuit Court, John A. Wittmayer, Judge. 218 Or App 661, 180 P3d 160 (2008).        
BALMER, J. 
This tort action requires us
to consider the proper interpretation of the terms "sexual
exploitation" and "cruelty" as used in ORS 12.117, which extends
the statute of limitations for certain tort actions.  Plaintiff's complaint
alleges that, while plaintiff was a student at Mt. Angel Seminary, a priest
questioned plaintiff about sexuality and reproduction and began masturbating
under his cassock while plaintiff was present.  Plaintiff averred that the
priest's actions constituted a tort and caused him physical and emotional harm,
and, for present purposes, defendant does not dispute those allegations.  Defendant,
however, moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff's claim was
time-barred and that ORS 12.117 did not extend the statute of limitations
because the priest's alleged conduct was neither "sexual
exploitation" nor "cruelty" within the meaning of that statute. 
The trial court agreed and granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  Schmidt v. Archdiocese
of Portland in Oregon, 218 Or App 661, 180 P3d 160 (2008).  For the reasons
set out below, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the
case to that court for further proceedings.
Because this case comes to us
on summary judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences that may
be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party --
here, plaintiff.  See Oregon Steel Mills, Inc. v. Coopers &amp; Lybrand, LLP,
336 Or 329, 332, 83 P3d 322 (2004) (stating standard).  In 1958, when plaintiff
was a high school freshman at Mt. Angel Seminary, Father Charvet -- plaintiff's
freshman advisor -- asked plaintiff to meet Charvet in his office at a specific
time.  When plaintiff arrived, Charvet was sitting behind his desk and told
plaintiff to stand in front of the desk.  Charvet then began questioning
plaintiff as to what he knew about sexuality and reproduction.  Among other
things, Charvet asked plaintiff whether he had ever masturbated and explained
to plaintiff "what that was about."  At that point, Charvet became
"less technical" and began using "street or gutter talk as
opposed to clinical [terms]."  During Charvet's questioning, plaintiff
"could see that there was a lot of motion going on under his cassock,"
and, according to plaintiff, it was "pretty obvious" that Charvet was
masturbating.  Although Charvet never instructed plaintiff to remain in the room,
plaintiff stated that his training as a student in the seminary prevented him
from leaving and that he "felt in a locked situation."  The incident
lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes.
In 2002, plaintiff filed this action
against Charvet and Mt. Angel Abbey, Charvet's employer, seeking damages for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and for breach of a fiduciary duty.(1) 
As noted, defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff's action
was barred by the statute of limitations.  Defendant argued that ORS 12.117(1),(2)
which extends the statute of limitations for tort actions based on conduct that
constitutes "child abuse," did not apply because Charvet's alleged
conduct was not "child abuse" within the meaning of that statute.(3)
 Plaintiff responded that Charvet's conduct fell within two examples of child
abuse enumerated in ORS 12.117(2).(4) 
Plaintiff argued that the conduct was covered by ORS 12.117(2)(a)(B), which defines
as child abuse any "[i]ntentional conduct by an adult that results in * *
* [a]ny mental injury to a child which results in observable and substantial
impairment of the child's mental or psychological ability to function caused by
cruelty to the child, with due regard to the culture of the child."  (Emphasis
added.)  Plaintiff also argued that Charvet's conduct came within ORS
12.117(2)(d), which provides that child abuse includes
"[s]exual exploitation of a child, including
but not limited to:
"(A) Conduct constituting [a] violation of
ORS 163.435 and any other conduct which allows, employs, authorizes, permits,
induces or encourages a child to engage in the performing for people to observe
or the photographing, filming, tape recording or other exhibition which, in
whole or in part, depicts sexual conduct or contact; and 
"(B) Allowing, permitting, encouraging or
hiring a child to engage in prostitution, as defined in ORS chapter 167." 
(Emphasis added.)  The trial
court agreed with defendant that Charvet's actions did not come within either
of those provisions and therefore did not constitute "child abuse" as
defined in ORS 12.117.  Accordingly, the trial court concluded that plaintiff's
action was barred by the statute of limitations and granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment.  
Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations extension did not apply
and that plaintiff's claims therefore were time-barred.  The majority agreed
with the trial court that Charvet's actions did not constitute
"cruelty" or "sexual exploitation" as those terms are used
in ORS 12.117(2).  Judge Edmonds dissented in part,(5)
concluding that Charvet's conduct constituted "cruelty" under ORS
12.117(2)(a)(B).  We begin with a discussion of whether a reasonable factfinder
could find that Charvet's conduct falls within the "cruelty"
provision of ORS 12.117(2)(a)(B).  We then consider whether a reasonable factfinder
could find that Charvet's conduct constitutes "sexual exploitation"
under ORS 12.117(2)(d).  
As
noted, under ORS 12.117(2)(a)(B), an action is subject to the extended statute
of limitations if it is based on conduct that (1) is intentional, (2) results
in a mental injury to the child that results in "observable and
substantial impairment of the child's mental or psychological ability to
function," and (3) constitutes "cruelty to the child." 
Defendant does not argue that Charvet's conduct was not intentional or that plaintiff
did not suffer the requisite mental injury; instead, defendant argues only that
Charvet's conduct was not "cruelty to the child."  We therefore limit
our analysis of ORS 12.117(2)(a)(B) to that issue, turning first to the
analysis of the Court of Appeals.
The majority initially looked to
dictionary definitions of "cruelty" and "cruel" and
determined, based on those definitions, that the phrase "cruelty to the
child" has several possible meanings.  The majority began with the
question whether the term "cruelty" refers to the mental state of the
person engaging in the conduct or to a particular type of conduct.  Because ORS
12.117 applies to "action[s] based on conduct that constitutes child
abuse" and generally defines child abuse in terms of conduct, the majority
determined that the phrase "cruelty to the child" refers to a type of
conduct rather than to a particular mental state.  The majority then turned to
an analysis of the nature of that conduct.  
The majority determined, after
analyzing the plain meaning of "cruel," that the term refers to relatively
extreme or severe conduct; however, because the precise nature of the conduct
was still unclear, the majority examined legislative history.(6) 
That history demonstrated, in the majority's view, that the legislature
intended "cruelty" to encompass a "narrow" range of severe
or extreme conduct and that, generally speaking, the legislature was concerned
with verbal conduct -- such as shouting at a child -- that occurs repeatedly.  Finally,
because the meaning of the phrase "cruelty" was still unclear, the
majority looked to the general purpose of the statute.  Although the primary
purpose of the statute was the protection of children, the majority determined that
the legislature had "made a significant effort to enact specific, detailed
criteria giving rise to * * * the entitlement to an extended limitations
period," again demonstrating that it intended the word "cruelty"
to refer to "a narrow range of extreme or severe conduct."  Schmidt,
218 Or App at 681-82.  Ultimately, the majority concluded that, given the
nature of Charvet's conduct, including the fact that the masturbation itself
lasted only 10 minutes and occurred on only one occasion, a reasonable jury could
not have found that that conduct constituted "cruelty to [a] child." 
Id. at 682-83.
Judge Edmonds dissented from the
majority's holding that Charvet's conduct did not constitute "cruelty to
[a] child" under the statute.  He concluded that, in 1989, when the
legislature enacted ORS 12.117(2)(a)(B), "cruelty" had a well-defined
legal meaning.  Looking to case law that existed when ORS 12.117 was enacted
and the definition of "cruelty" contained in Black's Law Dictionary
at that time, the dissent concluded that the legislature intended to
include two categories of conduct with the phrase "cruelty to [a]
child":  (1) conduct that was "specifically intended to inflict harm
on a child by an actor" and (2) acts that "by their very nature expressed
a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child such that they evidenced an
'evil mind.'"  Schmidt, 218 Or App at 701-02 (Edmonds, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).  Judge Edmonds then concluded, "[a]s a
matter of common sense," that masturbating in front of a child is the kind
of conduct that by its very nature "evidenc[es] a wanton disregard for the
welfare of the child and an 'evil mind.'"  Id. at 704.  
We begin, as the Court of Appeals
did, with the text of the statute, specifically, the term "cruelty." 
As the majority noted, that term could refer to conduct that is performed with
a purpose of inflicting pain or injury or to conduct that is by its very nature
"inhuman" or causes extreme pain or distress.  See Schmidt,
218 Or App at 672 (describing dictionary definitions).(7) 
The majority concluded that it must choose between those two general
interpretations and selected the latter after a text and context analysis.  We
do not find it necessary, however, to choose between the two.  Rather, for the
reasons set out below, we conclude that a person has engaged in "cruelty
to [a] child" when that person engages in conduct with the specific intent
of injuring or harming the child and the conduct is capable of producing those
results or when the person engages in conduct toward the child that is
so extreme or severe that the act demonstrates a willful and wanton disregard
for the welfare of the child.
In concluding that the term
"cruelty" referred only to the specific nature of the conduct, the
Court of Appeals' majority noted that ORS 12.117, as a whole, is concerned with
specific "conduct," rather than with the mental state of the person
who engages in that conduct.  We agree that, as a general matter, ORS 12.117
defines "child abuse" in terms of conduct.  Nonetheless, nothing in
the statute suggests that the legislature was concerned only with
"conduct" and not also with the intent of the actor.  Indeed, other
provisions of the statute suggest precisely the opposite.  For instance, under
ORS 12.117(2)(c), the term "child abuse" is defined as including
"[s]exual abuse, as defined in ORS chapter 163, when the victim is a
child."  To commit third-degree sexual abuse, the actor must touch the
victim's "intimate parts * * * for the purpose of arousing or gratifying
the sexual desire of either party."  ORS 163.305 (so defining "sexual
contact"); see ORS 163.415 (defining third-degree sexual abuse in
terms of "sexual contact").  In other words, determining whether a
specific act constitutes "child abuse" under ORS 12.117(2)(c)
requires an analysis of both the nature of the act itself and the actor's
purpose or mental state.  Similarly, as discussed below, "sexual
exploitation" under ORS 12.117(2)(d) requires that the actor use the child
for his or her own profit or advantage, again requiring an investigation into
the actor's purpose in addition to the nature of the conduct itself.
An interpretation of the term
"cruelty" that includes consideration of the mental state of the
actor, rather than solely the nature of the conduct itself, is supported by
this court's interpretation of that term in other contexts prior to the
enactment of ORS 12.117(2)(a)(B).  For instance, in Chaffin v. Chaffin,
239 Or 374, 387, 397 P2d 771 (1964), this court held that an "act of
cruelty" by a parent towards a child -- but not a mere negligent act --
would permit a right of action against the parent.  The court further described
such an act of "cruelty" as "an act which is done with an intention
to injure the child or is of such a cruel nature in and of itself as to
evidence not a reasonably normal parental mind, but an evil mind."(8) 
Id. (emphasis added). 
This court has similarly interpreted
the term "cruel" in the context of divorce proceedings.  Before 1971,
an individual seeking a dissolution of marriage was required to assert one of
several "causes" for the dissolution, among them "[c]ruel and
inhuman treatment" by his or her spouse.  Former ORS 107.030
(1969), repealed by Or Laws 1971, ch 280, § 28.  This court interpreted
that phrase as indicating "a purpose of one spouse to injure the other, or
such gross and callous want of consideration for the sensibilities and
legitimate wishes and interests of the other as to amount in law to such a
purpose."  Guinn v. Guinn, 188 Or 554, 562, 217 P2d 248 (1950)
(emphasis added); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 221 Or 117, 119, 350
P2d 702 (1960) (same).  
We conclude, based on the context
described above, that the term "cruelty to [a] child," as used in ORS
12.117(2)(a)(B), most reasonably is interpreted to include (1) acts that are
performed with the specific intent of injuring or harming the child and that
are capable of producing those results and (2) acts that, by their very
nature, demonstrate a willful and wanton disregard for the child's welfare,
such that one can infer a willingness to have the child injured.
Applying that standard, a jury could
reasonably determine, based on the relationship between Charvet and plaintiff
and the nature of the conduct at issue, that Charvet's actions toward plaintiff
fall within the "cruelty" provision of ORS 12.117(2)(a)(B).  Charvet
was a priest -- a celibate spiritual adviser and leader -- and was plaintiff's
freshman advisor and dormitory proctor while the 14-year-old plaintiff attended
seminary.  Plaintiff presented evidence that Charvet, using his position as a
priest and advisor, summoned plaintiff to his office, where Charvet engaged in an
explicit explanation of sexuality and masturbated while plaintiff watched.(9) 
Because of his training in the Catholic church, plaintiff felt that he could
not leave the room and therefore remained there for 30-45 minutes.  Because of
the duration of the encounter, the nature of Charvet's conduct and its
potential for inflicting severe emotional injury, and the nature of Charvet and
plaintiff's relationship, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could
find that the conduct described above demonstrates a wanton disregard for
plaintiff's welfare and a willingness to have plaintiff suffer psychological
harm as a result of Charvet's acts.  There is therefore sufficient evidence to
create an issue of material fact as to whether Charvet's conduct constituted
"cruelty to [a] child."
We turn next to plaintiff's
claim that Charvet's conduct constituted "sexual exploitation" as
that term is used in ORS 12.117(2)(d).  As discussed above, ORS 12.117(2)(d)
provides that "child abuse" means, among other things, "[s]exual
exploitation of a child, including but not limited to [three specific examples]." 
As a result, the Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff's argument that it should
rely on the "common sense" meaning of the words "sexual"
and "exploitation," stating that "where the legislature has
provided that a general term 'includ[es] but [is] not limited to' expressly
enumerated items -- here, specific types of conduct -- that is not the
applicable textual analysis."  Schmidt, 218 Or App at 684-85
(alterations in original).  Instead, the majority applied the principle of ejusdem
generis -- that is, the majority construed "sexual exploitation"
by analyzing the "basic characteristics" of the enumerated examples.  Id.
at 683.   
The majority first examined ORS
163.435(10)
-- contributing to the sexual delinquency of a minor -- which is the first
example of "sexual exploitation" listed in ORS 12.117(2)(d).  A basic
characteristic of the activities comprising the crime of contributing to the
sexual delinquency of a minor, the majority determined, is "sexual
intercourse -- that is, actual sexual contact -- between the perpetrator and
the victim."  Schmidt, 218 Or App at 683.  Next, the majority
examined the second example of "sexual exploitation" listed within
the statute:  "conduct which allows, employs, authorizes, permits, induces
or encourages a child to engage in the performing for people to observe or the
photographing, filming, tape recording or other exhibition which, in whole or
in part, depicts sexual conduct or contact[.]"  ORS 12.117(2)(d)(A).  That
example, the majority explained, includes only actions that are "directed
at causing a child to perform sexual conduct or contact or to participate in
the 'exhibition' of such conduct or contact."  Schmidt, 218 Or App
at 684.  Because the record in this case did not demonstrate that Charvet had engaged
in sexual intercourse with plaintiff or that Charvet had encouraged plaintiff
to perform sexual conduct or contact or to participate in the exhibition of
such conduct or contact, the majority determined that a jury could not find
that Charvet had sexually exploited plaintiff.(11) 
Id.
On review, plaintiff renews his
argument that the ordinary meaning of the term "sexual exploitation"
is broad enough to cover Charvet's conduct.  Defendant responds that the Court
of Appeals correctly interpreted that term by using the principle of ejusdem
generis and determining its meaning, in part, by examining the specific
examples that follow the term.  The issue on review, then, is the correct
interpretation of the term "sexual exploitation" as used in ORS
12.117(2)(d).
Plaintiff begins by pointing to the plain
and ordinary meaning of the term "sexual exploitation."  See State v. Briney, 345 Or 505, 511, 200 P3d 550 (2008) (court gives words of common
usage their plain, ordinary meaning).  The dictionary defines
"exploitation" as "an unjust or improper use of another person
for one's own profit or advantage."  Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary 801-02 (unabridged ed 2002).(12)
 Plaintiff asserts that Charvet's conversation with plaintiff and his masturbation
in plaintiff's presence constitute "an unjust or improper use" of
plaintiff in a sexual way for Charvet's own "advantage."  According
to plaintiff, the inquiry should end at that point.  He argues that the Court
of Appeals erred in limiting the plain meaning of "sexual
exploitation" to encompass only conduct that is similar to the specific
examples listed in the statute and that the principal of ejusdem generis
should not be applied to ORS 12.117.   
We agree with plaintiff that the
appropriate starting point is the ordinary meaning of "sexual
exploitation."  However, we disagree with plaintiff's assertion that the
dictionary is the only source we should consider in interpreting that term.  We
consider not only the dictionary definition of the terms that the legislature
chooses to use, but also the context in which those terms are used.  When, as
here, the legislature uses a general term in a statute and also provides
specific examples, those specific examples provide useful context for
interpreting the general term.  
For example, in Vannatta v. Keisling,
324 Or 514, 533, 931 P2d 770 (1997), we used the principle of ejusdem
generis in determining whether the legislature had authority under the
Oregon Constitution to enact laws that restricted campaign contributions and
expenditures.  The relevant constitutional provision granted the legislature
the authority to enact laws prohibiting "all undue influence [in
elections], from power, bribery, tumult, and other improper conduct."  Id.
at 528.  As noted, we applied the principle of ejusdem generis and
concluded that the phrase "other improper conduct" referred only to
improper conduct "of the same kind" as that in the specific
examples.  Id. at 533.  
Again, in Lewis v. CIGNA
Ins. Co., 339 Or 342, 351, 121 P3d 1128 (2005), we used the principle of ejusdem
generis to examine the correct interpretation of a statute that imposed a
penalty for failing to cooperate with "personal and telephonic interviews
and other formal or informal information gathering techniques."  In
deciding that the phrase "other * * * information gathering
techniques" did not include independent medical examinations, we relied,
in part, on the principle of ejusdem generis:
"[The relevant statute] lists 'personal and telephonic
interviews' as examples of 'formal and informal information gathering
techniques,' which suggests that 'information gathering techniques' in this
context share the basic characteristics of personal and telephonic interviews. 
'[W]hen the legislature chooses to state both a general standard and a list of
specifics, the specifics do more than place their particular subjects beyond
the dispute; they also refer the scope of the general standard to matters of
the same kind, often phrased in Latin as "ejusdem generis."'"
Id. at 350 (quoting Bellikka v. Green, 306 Or
630, 636, 762 P2d 997 (1988)).  As Vannatta and Lewis demonstrate,
we are not free, as plaintiff suggests, to ignore the examples that the legislature
set forth in ORS 12.117(2)(d) when interpreting the term "sexual
exploitation."  Instead, we examine the ordinary meaning of the general
term "sexual exploitation" as well as the specific examples that the
legislature has given to help in understanding the meaning of that more general
term.(13)
Plaintiff argues that reliance on the
principle of ejusdem generis is incorrect here because that principle
applies only when "a nonspecific or general phrase * * * appears at the
end of a list of items in a statute."  See Vannatta, 324 Or at
533 (so describing ejusdem generis) (emphasis added).  Because the
general phrase in ORS 12.117 -- "[s]exual exploitation * * *, including but
not limited to" -- appears before the list of examples, plaintiff
contends, the examples do not limit the general phrase.  We disagree.  In
interpreting a general term, we have considered the context provided by
specific examples when those examples fall after the general term, as well as
when they are placed before that term as they were in Vannatta and Lewis. 
See Liberty v. State Dept. of Transportation, 342 Or 11, 20, 148 P3d 909
(2006) (applying ejusdem generis when interpreting the phrase
"outdoor activities such as hunting, fishing, [and other specified
activities]").
Plaintiff next argues that this court
need not apply the principle of ejusdem generis because the legislature
chose to connect the general term "sexual exploitation" with the
specific examples by using the phrase "including but not limited
to."  Plaintiff cites United States v. Migi, 329 F3d 1085, 1088
(9th Cir 2003), where the Ninth Circuit refused to apply ejusdem generis when
the plain meaning of the statutory text was "apparent."  The court
also noted that use of the phrase "including but not limited to"
helps to mitigate "the sometimes unfortunate results of rigid application
of the ejusdem generis rule."  Id. at 1089 (internal
quotation marks omitted).  Regardless of whether we are constrained by the
"rule" of ejusdem generis, we will apply the principle when,
as here, it provides useful guidance in interpreting a statutory term.  In doing
so, we give interpretive weight to all the words that the legislature used --
including both the term "sexual exploitation" and the specific
examples of sexual exploitation.  That does not mean, of course, that the
specific examples constitute the universe of items to which the general term
refers; rather, it means only that our interpretation of the general term includes
consideration of those specific examples.(14)
Having established that the principle
of ejusdem generis may help us understand the legislature's intent in
this case, we turn to the proper application of that principle.  The Court of
Appeals correctly noted that, when applying the principle, the court "examine[s]
the 'basic characteristics' of the enumerated items."  Schmidt, 218
Or App at 683 (quoting Lewis, 339 Or at 350).  However, in examining the
"basic characteristics" of the activities, we do not look at each
activity individually, glean a basic characteristic from that activity,
and then determine whether the conduct at issue in this case shares that basic
characteristic.  If we simply looked at each example individually and
determined that no sexual exploitation occurred because plaintiff's conduct did
not fall within the listed examples, we would be disregarding other words of
the statute.  The legislature provided that "sexual exploitation"
includes, but is not limited to, the conduct enumerated in the statute. 
As a result, we cannot interpret the term as encompassing only the
conduct in the listed examples.  
Instead, when using the principle of ejusdem
generis, the court seeks to find, if it can, a common characteristic
among the listed examples.  We then determine whether the conduct at issue,
even though not one of the listed examples, contains that characteristic and,
thus, falls within the intended meaning of the general term.  See Liberty,
342 Or at 20-21 (describing and applying principle); see also Vannatta,
324 Or at 533 (finding common characteristic).  That can be done here.  The
three examples of sexual exploitation offered by the legislature are:  (1)
contributing to the sexual delinquency of a minor, which occurs when an adult
engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with someone under
the age of 18 or causes someone under the age of 18 to have deviate sexual
intercourse; (2) "conduct which allows, employs, authorizes, permits,
induces or encourages a child to engage in the performing for people to observe
or the photographing, filming, tape recording or other exhibition which, in
whole or in part, depicts sexual conduct or contact," or, in simpler
terms, allowing or encouraging child pornography; and (3) "[a]llowing, permitting, encouraging or hiring a child
to engage in prostitution, as defined in ORS chapter 167."(15) 
Here, we seek
to identify, if we can, a common characteristic of the examples that helps us
in determining, at a minimum, what conduct the legislature intended to include
within the general term "sexual exploitation."  Obviously, "sexual
exploitation" necessarily requires some conduct of a sexual nature, and, as
discussed above, the dictionary definition of exploitation is "an
unjust or improper use of another person for one's own profit or advantage." 
As a result, identifying the relevant common trait in
the listed examples as the fact that each activity is sexual in nature or the
fact that each involves an adult improperly using a child for his own purposes
would not help us to better understand the meaning of the term "sexual
exploitation" as used in ORS 12.117(2)(d).  
Defendant
offers a more limiting alternative common characteristic:  each example given
in ORS 12.117(2)(d), defendant argues, "addresses a child either touching
himself or someone else."  Defendant is incorrect, however, because not
all the enumerated examples necessarily involve a child touching him or herself
or someone else.  The second example requires only that the perpetrator
"encourage[]" a child to engage in a performance that "depicts
sexual conduct or contact" for others to observe or record.  ORS
12.117(2)(d)(A) (emphasis added).  "Sexual contact" clearly requires
some sort of physical contact with the child.  But the term "sexual
conduct" does not necessarily require that the child touch him or herself
or someone else.  It could, for example, involve a child's partial or complete
nudity, without any touching of the child or another.  See ORS 163.665(3)(f)
(for purposes of child pornography statutes, "sexually explicit
conduct" includes "[l]ewd exhibition of sexual or other
intimate parts").  Although, to be useful, the
common trait must be narrow enough to provide some context for the proper
interpretation of "sexual exploitation," we cannot adopt a trait unless
it is common to all the listed examples.  
Although
defendant's proposed "common characteristic" is incorrect, we find
the examples that the legislature provided helpful in another way:  in each
situation, an adult causes -- or attempts to cause -- a child to be personally involved
in a sexual act.  We therefore conclude that conduct qualifies as "sexual
exploitation of a child" under ORS 12.117(2)(d) if an individual uses a
child in a sexual way for his or her own gratification or benefit, and the
child is personally involved.
Here, plaintiff
presented evidence that Charvet called plaintiff into his office and, with the
door shut, began asking plaintiff questions about sexuality and describing
masturbation using "street or gutter talk."  Charvet then began
masturbating.  While Charvet was masturbating, plaintiff was physically present
and could see -- and did see -- what Charvet was doing.  Further, plaintiff
felt that he could not leave the situation and that he was forced to watch
Charvet masturbate.  Considering Charvet's role as a priest and spiritual
advisor -- and his role as plaintiff's advisor within the seminary --
plaintiff's belief was not unreasonable.  
From that
evidence, a jury reasonably could find that Charvet was using plaintiff's
presence and plaintiff's reactions to Charvet's questioning for his own sexual
stimulation.  Charvet intentionally exposed plaintiff to Charvet's own sexual
conduct, with full awareness that plaintiff could observe what Charvet was
doing, and plaintiff did, in fact, observe and understand what Charvet was
doing.  Indeed, a trier of fact could infer that Charvet needed to have
plaintiff present for Charvet to masturbate, or at least that Charvet required
plaintiff's presence to facilitate the act.  In that way, Charvet personally
involved plaintiff in Charvet's masturbation, a sexual act.
For
the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence
for a reasonable factfinder to find that Charvet's conduct constituted
"cruelty to [a] child" under ORS 12.117(2)(a)(B).  We also conclude
that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to find that
that conduct constituted "sexual exploitation of a child" under ORS 12.117(2)(d).  Accordingly, the trial court erred in
concluding that plaintiff's action was time-barred and granting defendant's
motion for summary judgment on that ground.
Because a
majority of the Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff's claim was
time-barred, it did not reach defendant's alternative argument that Charvet's
alleged conduct was insufficient to support respondeat superior
liability.(16) 
We therefore remand the case to that court so that it may consider that issue.
The
decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings. 
WALTERS, J., concurring.
I concur in the majority's decision. 
I write separately to note a small, but I think important, point about the
application of the principle of ejusdem generis.  Under the principle of
ejusdem generis, a general statutory phrase is not given its plain and
ordinary meaning; its meaning is limited or narrowed by the specific examples
that the legislature provides in conjunction with that general term.  Lewis v. CIGNA Ins. Co., 339 Or 342, 351, 121 P3d 1128 (2005).  In this
case, the majority decides that it is not always constrained by the principle
of ejusdem generis when the legislature precedes the specific examples
with the phrase "including but not limited to."  ___ Or at ___ (slip
op at 17).    
I agree with the majority that the
principle of ejusdem generis may not apply in that circumstance, but I
want to explain why.  The assumption underlying the principle of ejusdem
generis is that the legislature intentionally has used specific examples to
limit or narrow the meaning of a general term.  In my experience, however, that
is not always the case.  The legislature may instead use examples to illustrate
the applicability of a term, without intending to limit or narrow its common
meaning, or to broaden the common meaning of a term.  It is understandable to
think that the phrase "including but not limited to," followed by a
list of examples, conveys an intent to illustrate or to broaden, rather than to
limit the meaning of a general term.  After all, the phrase says that the
general term is not limited to the examples.  But as this case
demonstrates, that phrase can mean that the examples given are not the only
application of a general term, and in that sense, that the examples are not
limiting, without also meaning that the examples do not perform a different
narrowing function.  In other words, a general statutory term may be limited by,
even though it is not limited to, specific statutory examples.  I write
to point out that the phrase "including but not limited to" is itself
imprecise, and to urge that the legislature both decide the purpose for which
it uses examples and convey that purpose as clearly as it can.  
Let me illustrate the various purposes
to which examples may be put.  Suppose that the legislature were to enact a
statute prohibiting the "cutting of all trees, including but not
limited to oak, maple, and birch."  One common meaning of the word
"tree," as stated in the dictionary, is "a woody perennial
plant, having a single main stem that may be short but is usu[ally]
considerably elongated, has generally few or no branches on its lower part, and
is crowned with a head of branches and foliage or (as in palms) of foliage
only."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2435 (unabridged ed
2002).  By giving three examples of plants the legislature considers to fall
within the definition of the word "tree," the legislature could be
seeking to narrow the dictionary definition of the general term "tree,"
or it could be using the examples to illustrate the application of that
definition, or even to broaden that definition.  
If the legislature intended to use
the examples to limit the dictionary definition of "tree" to plants
that share common characteristics with oak, maple, and birch, we would apply
the principle of ejusdem generis when faced with a question of whether
the statute prohibits the cutting of a certain plant that might not be
considered a tree.  We would look, as we do in this case, for a common
characteristic that those three examples share beyond the fact that all are
tall, woody, and crowned with foliage.  We would then determine if the plant at
issue also shared that characteristic.  
If, alternatively, the legislature
intended to protect all plants that fall within the dictionary definition of
the word "tree," but used the examples to ensure that certain trees,
the only ones actually growing in the area subject to statutory protection,
would not be cut, we might take a different approach.  We might understand the
examples as illustrative and not examine whether the plant at issue had
characteristics in common with oak, maple, or birch, other than those required
by the dictionary definition of the word "tree."   
Still another possibility is that the
legislature used the examples to expand, rather than to contract, the
dictionary definition of "tree."  A "maple" is "a tree
or shrub of the genus Acer."  Id. at 1379 (first
emphasis added; second emphasis in original).  By specifically including
"maple" in its list of protected plants, the legislature could have
intended to broaden the dictionary definition of "tree" to prohibit
the cutting of all maples, including small Japanese maples, which might not
otherwise be considered "trees." 
Examples serve no right or wrong
purpose, and the legislature may use examples in one statute to establish
limits on an ambiguous term, and in another to illustrate or expand.  Precisely
because there are so many ways in which the legislature may use examples, I
write to urge that the legislature consider the distinctions that I have drawn,
use care in selecting examples, and express as clearly as possible the office
that it expects its examples to serve.  With that assistance, courts will be
better able to carry out the legislature's intent.
1. Plaintiff
also asserted a claim against the Archdiocese of Portland and Mt. Angel Abbey
for sexual battery arising out of an incident where a different priest (Father
Frank) allegedly had sodomized plaintiff.  The trial court granted summary
judgment on that claim, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to
support respondeat superior liability for Father Frank's conduct.  The
Court of Appeals agreed.  Schmidt v. Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon,
218 Or App 661, 696, 180 P3d 160 (2008).  We limited our review of the Court of
Appeals decision to the statute of limitations issue, ORAP 9.20(2), and
therefore express no opinion as to the respondeat superior issue. 
Because plaintiff's claims against the archdiocese related only to the incident
involving the other priest, the archdiocese is not a party on review. 
Additionally, in November 2008, this court granted plaintiff's stipulated
motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims against Charvet individually.  As a
result, the only respondent on review is Mt. Angel Abbey.  
2. ORS
12.117(1) provides:
"Notwithstanding ORS 12.110, 12.115 or 12.160, an
action based on conduct that constitutes child abuse or conduct knowingly
allowing, permitting or encouraging child abuse accruing while the person who
is entitled to bring the action is under 18 years of age shall be commenced not
more than six years after that person attains 18 years of age, or if the injured
person has not discovered the injury or the causal connection between the
injury and the child abuse, nor in the exercise of reasonable care should have
discovered the injury or the causal connection between the injury and the child
abuse, not more than three years from the date the injured person discovers or
in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered the injury or the
causal connection between the child abuse and the injury, whichever period is
longer."
(Emphasis added.)  The legislature amended ORS 12.117(1) in
the 2009 legislative session in ways unrelated to our analysis.  See Or
Laws 2009, ch 879 (setting out amendments).
3. Defendant
does not challenge plaintiff's contention that the other requirement of ORS
12.117 is met -- i.e., that plaintiff, exercising reasonable care, did
not "discover[] the injury or the causal connection between the injury and
the child abuse" more than three years before bringing this action.
4. ORS
12.117(2) provides:
"As used in
subsection (1) of this section, 'child abuse' means any of the
following:
"(a) Intentional conduct by an adult that
results in: 
"(A) Any
physical injury to a child; or 
"(B) Any
mental injury to a child which results in observable and substantial impairment
of the child's mental or psychological ability to function caused by cruelty to
the child, with due regard to the culture of the child;
"(b) Rape of
a child, which includes but is not limited to rape, sodomy, unlawful sexual
penetration and incest, as those acts are defined in ORS chapter 163;
"(c) Sexual
abuse, as defined in ORS chapter 163, when the victim is a child; or
"(d) Sexual
exploitation of a child, including but not limited to: 
"(A) Conduct
constituting [a] violation of ORS 163.435 and any other conduct which allows,
employs, authorizes, permits, induces or encourages a child to engage in the
performing for people to observe or the photographing, filming, tape recording
or other exhibition which, in whole or in part, depicts sexual conduct or
contact; and
"(B)
Allowing, permitting, encouraging or hiring a child to engage in prostitution,
as defined in ORS chapter 167." 
5. Judge
Edmonds concurred in the majority's decision regarding the incident involving
the other priest.  As noted, we do not address that issue on review.
6. The
legislature took the text of ORS 12.117(2)(a)(B) almost verbatim from former
ORS 418.740 (1987), repealed by Or Laws 1993, ch 546, § 141, and renumbered
as ORS 419B.005 (1993), the statute defining "abuse" for purposes
of mandatory child abuse reporting.  The majority therefore looked to the
legislative history of former ORS 418.740.  See Schmidt, 218 Or
App at 675-76 (explaining legislative history).
7. The
majority also noted an alternative dictionary definition:  "causing or
conducive to injury, grief, or pain."  Schmidt, 218 Or App at 672
(quoting Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 546 (unabridged ed
2002)).  However, ORS 12.117(2)(a)(B)  requires, by its terms, that
"cruelty" cause "mental injury" to the child that
"results in observable and substantial impairment of the child's mental or
psychological ability to function."  We cannot interpret the term
"cruelty" as referring to any act that causes injury because,
were we to use that interpretation, the term would add nothing to the meaning
of the statute that is not conveyed by the other words.  See ORS 174.010
("[W]here there are several provisions or particulars such construction is,
if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.").
8. As
Judge Edmonds noted in his dissent, the Court of Appeals later used the Chaffin
test to interpret the phrase "cruelty" as used in former ORS
416.030(2)(c) (1987), repealed by Or Laws 2001, ch 900, § 261, which
dealt with exemptions from liability concerning public assistance payments.  See
Kerr v. Welfare Comm., 3 Or App 27, 31, 470 P2d 167, rev den (1970),
cert den, 402 US 950 (1971) (so interpreting "cruelty").  
9. Defendant
argues that plaintiff's statements regarding Charvet's masturbation are
insufficient to create an issue of material fact because it is "mere
speculation" that Charvet actually masturbated.  Defendant points to the
fact that plaintiff stated at one point in his deposition that he had
"assumed" that Charvet was masturbating.  However, plaintiff also
testified that he could see "a lot of motion going on," that
"[i]t went on for a long time," that it was "pretty
obvious" that Charvet was masturbating, and that plaintiff therefore had
concluded that Charvet was masturbating.  On this record, there is a genuine
dispute as to that material fact, among others, that cannot be decided on
summary judgment.  
10. ORS
163.435(1) provides:
"A person 18 years of age or older commits
the crime of contributing to the sexual delinquency of a minor if:
"(a) Being a
male, he engages in sexual intercourse with a female under 18 years of age; or
"(b) Being a
female, she engages in sexual intercourse with a male under 18 years of age; or
"(c) The
person engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person under 18 years
of age or causes that person to engage in deviate sexual intercourse." 
11. The
court did not address the third example in the statute:  "[a]llowing,
permitting, encouraging or hiring a child to engage in prostitution, as defined
in ORS chapter 167."  See ORS 12.117(2)(d)(B) (providing example).
12. There
are other definitions, none of which applies to this case.  
13. Plaintiff's
position that the term "sexual exploitation" should be interpreted
independently of the specific examples given in ORS 12.117 would be correct if
the legislature had placed the term in a separate sentence or had, through
another grammatical device, demonstrated that the different grounds for extending
the statute of limitations were unrelated.  
14. Many
other courts interpret statutes that use the phrase "including but not
limited to" and then provide specific examples in the same way; that is,
they interpret the general term in light of (although not limited to) the
specific examples.  See State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 486-87,
80 P3d 1083, 1087-88 (2003) (interpreting phrase "any lewd or lascivious
act or acts * * * including but not limited to, genital-genital contact,
oral-genital contact, anal-genital contact, oral-anal contact, manual-anal
contact, or manual-genital contact" to not include kissing a child's
chest); Board Chosen Freeholders v. State, 159 NJ 565, 570, 576-77, 732
A2d 1053, 1056, 1059 (1999) (interpreting phrase judicial costs, "including
but not limited to the following costs:  salaries, health benefits and pension
payments of all judicial employees, juror fees and library material costs"
to not include the capital costs of judicial facilities); Peralta Community
College Dist. v. FEHC, 52 Cal3d 40, 48-50, 801 P2d 357, 362 (1990)
(interpreting phrase "to take such action, including, but not limited to,
hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees, with or without back pay, and
restoration to membership in any
respondent labor organization" to not include unlimited compensatory
damages).  But see United States v. Migi, 329 F3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir
2003) (ejusdem generis does not apply when Congress connects the general
term and the specific examples with the phrase "including but not limited
to").
15. ORS
167.007(1)  provides:
"A person commits the crime of prostitution
if:
"(a) The person engages in or offers or
agrees to engage in sexual conduct or sexual contact in return for a fee; or
"(b) The person pays or offers or agrees to
pay a fee to engage in sexual conduct or sexual contact."
For purposes of ORS 167.007, "sexual conduct" means
"sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse," and "sexual
contact" means "any touching of the sexual organs or other intimate
parts of a person not married to the actor for the purpose of arousing or
gratifying the sexual desire of either party."  ORS 167.002.
16. As
noted, the court did reach the issue of respondeat superior liability
for Father Frank's conduct.  We express no opinion as to that issue.