Title: In the Matter of William R. Hendrickson, Jr., Department of Community Affairs
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: September 18, 2018

In the Matter of William R. Hendrickson, Jr., Department of Community Affairs Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary William Hendrickson, Jr. worked as a fire safety inspector with the Department of Community Affairs. While on duty, he uttered an obscene and belittling remark about a female supervisor overheard by two of his colleagues. The DCA brought three disciplinary charges against Hendrickson. In September 2014, after a departmental hearing on the disciplinary charges, the DCA issued an order terminating Hendrickson’s employment. The ALJ held that Hendrickson uttered a gender slur in a workplace environment and therefore violated the State’s policy prohibiting gender discrimination and engaged in conduct unbecoming a public employee. Although the ALJ was troubled by Hendrickson’s failure to acknowledge his wrongdoing, she reasoned that removal was “too harsh” a punishment given Hendrickson’s lack of a disciplinary record in the fifteen months before and nine months after the incident. She instead ordered Hendrickson suspended for six months. The ALJ forwarded the decision to the Civil Service Commission, and both parties filed exceptions. Hendrickson argued that the discipline was too severe, and the DCA argued that termination was the appropriate punishment. Failing to reach a quorum, the ALJ's decision was deemed adopted by the Civil Service Commission. The Appellate Division reversed the ALJ’s decision and reinstated the DCA’s termination of Hendrickson’s employment, acknowledging the ALJ’s decision “was 'deemed-adopted’ as the Commission’s final decision. Nevertheless, the panel held that because the vacancies on the Commission disabled it from forming a quorum and acting, “the deemed-adopted statute does not require traditional deferential appellate review of the ALJ’s decision.” The New Jersey Supreme Court determined the Appellate Division erred in suggesting appellate review of a disciplinary sanction imposed by a judge was de novo and different from traditional appellate review of an agency determination. Consequently, and based on a deferential standard of review, the Supreme Court could not conclude the ALJ's decision was shocking to a sense of fairness, and affirmed the ALJ's decision. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) In the Matter of William R. Hendrickson, Jr., Department of Community Affairs (A-12-17) (079885)Argued April 9, 2018 -- Decided September 18, 2018ALBIN, J., writing for the Court. Under N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c), when an agency, such as the Civil Service Commission, does not modify or reject the decision of an administrative law judge within a prescribed period, “the decision of the administrative law judge shall be deemed adopted as the final decision of the head of the agency.” This appeal raises the following question: What is the judicial standard of review when the disciplinary decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) is deemed adopted by the Civil Service Commission (the Commission) because the political branches did not appoint a sufficient number of Commissioners to form a quorum to review the decision? William R. Hendrickson, Jr., began his employment as a fire safety inspector with the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) in August 2012. While on duty on December 1, 2013, Hendrickson uttered an obscene and belittling remark about a female supervisor overheard by two of his colleagues. The DCA brought three disciplinary charges against Hendrickson. In September 2014, after a departmental hearing on the disciplinary charges, the DCA issued an order terminating Hendrickson’s employment. Hendrickson appealed to the Commission, and his matter was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for an evidentiary hearing. The ALJ held that Hendrickson uttered a gender slur in a workplace environment and therefore violated the State’s policy prohibiting gender discrimination and engaged in conduct unbecoming a public employee. She found that Hendrickson became angry at his supervisor, Senior Inspector Knight, when he received her work order, and out of her presence, “in a loud voice [Hendrickson] called [Knight] a 'c**t,’” a remark overheard by two coworkers. According to the ALJ, the use of the gender slur was “disrespectful, sexist, discriminatory, unprofessional, in bad taste, improper, and extremely offensive.” Such disparaging language, the ALJ noted, has the capacity to undermine workplace morale and, in this case, may have been overheard by members of the public. Although the ALJ was troubled by Hendrickson’s failure to acknowledge his wrongdoing, she reasoned that removal was “too harsh” a punishment given Hendrickson’s lack of a disciplinary record in the fifteen months before and nine months after the incident. She instead ordered Hendrickson suspended for six months. 1 The ALJ forwarded the decision to the Civil Service Commission, and both parties filed exceptions. Hendrickson argued that the discipline was too severe, and the DCA argued that termination was the appropriate punishment. In accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c), the Commission had forty-five days to “adopt, reject or modify” the ALJ’s findings and render a final decision. N.J.S.A. 11A:2-3 provides that the Commission “shall consist of five members” and that three members “shall constitute a quorum.” The Commission, however, did not have a sufficient number of appointed Commissioners to form a quorum. Without a quorum, the Commission could not operate to adopt, reject, or modify the ALJ’s decision. Because the Commission did not and could not modify or reject the ALJ’s report within the prescribed period, the ALJ’s decision was “deemed adopted as the final decision of the head of the agency.” See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c). The DCA appealed the Commission’s final agency decision to the Appellate Division. The contested issues concerned the quantum of discipline imposed by the ALJ and the level of deference that should be afforded to an ALJ’s deemed-adopted decision by a reviewing court. The Appellate Division reversed the ALJ’s decision and reinstated the DCA’s termination of Hendrickson’s employment. 451 N.J. Super. 262, 266 (App. Div. 2017). The panel acknowledged that the ALJ’s decision “was 'deemed-adopted’ as the Commission’s final decision.” Ibid. Nevertheless, the panel held that because the vacancies on the Commission disabled it from forming a quorum and acting, “the deemed-adopted statute does not require traditional deferential appellate review of the ALJ’s decision.” Ibid. In rejecting agency deference as its approach, the panel instead resorted to “the equally familiar standard of review for bench trials.” Id. at 273. In doing so, it stated that it would affirm the ALJ’s factual findings “to the extent they are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record,” but accord no deference to and review de novo the ALJ’s legal conclusions. Ibid. It determined that the ALJ’s factfindings were “supported by the record” but that “the propriety of the disciplinary sanction” was “a question of law” subject to de novo review. Id. at 274. The panel concluded, as a matter of law, that “the doctrine of progressive discipline should be bypassed” because “[t]he incident violated the State’s anti-discrimination policy and societal norms,” thus justifying the reinstatement of Hendrickson’s termination. Ibid. The Court granted Hendrickson’s petition for certification. 231 N.J. 143 (2017).HELD: The appellate tests for reviewing an administrative disciplinary sanction and a criminal sentence are virtually the same. Therefore, the Appellate Division erred in suggesting that appellate review of a disciplinary sanction imposed by a judge is de novo and different from traditional appellate review of an agency determination. Additionally, merely because the factual findings and rulings made by ALJs are oftentimes contingent on whether an agency accepts, rejects, or modifies an ALJ’s decision does not mean that ALJs are second-tier players or hold an inferior status as factfinders. Based on its deferential standard of review, the Court cannot conclude that the ALJ’s decision is shocking to one’s sense of fairness. 2 1. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10 generally sets forth the procedures for resolving contested agency cases submitted to the OAL. The current version of subsection (c) is the product of a 2014 amendment that set a strict deadline for administrative agencies to “adopt, reject or modify” an ALJ’s decision -- unless all the parties agreed to an extension. Ibid. Under the amendment, when the agency does not act within the forty-five-day statutory timeframe -- or within the single extension period not to exceed forty-five days -- the ALJ’s decision is “deemed adopted as the final decision of the head of the agency.” Ibid. In this way, the Legislature ensured that there would always be a timely final agency decision. (pp. 14-15)2. Traditionally, courts give substantial deference to an agency’s imposition of a disciplinary sanction, based on its “expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field.” In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007). “In light of the deference owed to such determinations, when reviewing administrative sanctions, 'the test . . . is whether such punishment is so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness.’” Id. at 28-29. In the present case, the Appellate Division held that a different standard of review should apply to an ALJ’s disciplinary decision that becomes a final agency determination because the Commission was unable to form a quorum to act. The panel opted to apply the standard of review for bench trials and declared that it would defer to the ALJ’s factfindings, but not to the ALJ’s conclusions of law. The panel evidently classified the ALJ’s disciplinary sanction as a legal conclusion and therefore erroneously engaged in a de novo review. An abuse of discretion standard, however, applies to the judicial imposition of a sentence, State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984), or a disciplinary sanction, In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 28-29. Appellate deference extends to a trial judge’s imposition of a sentence, whether the judge or a jury sits as the trier of fact. Appellate courts will not exercise judicial power to modify a sentence unless “the application of the facts to the law is such a clear error of judgment that it shocks the judicial conscience.” Roth, 95 N.J. at 364. The appellate tests for reviewing an administrative disciplinary sanction and a criminal sentence are virtually the same. Therefore, the Appellate Division erred in suggesting that appellate review of a disciplinary sanction imposed by a judge is de novo and different from traditional appellate review of an agency determination. (pp. 16-19)3. Given the deferential standard of review applicable here, the ALJ’s six-month suspension must be sustained. A belittling gender insult uttered in the workplace by a state employee is a violation of New Jersey’s policy against discrimination and Hendrickson’s conduct was unbecoming a public employee. The ALJ rebuked Hendrickson’s language in the strongest terms in sustaining the charges against him. Nevertheless, in setting the appropriate discipline, the ALJ found that Hendrickson’s behavior amounted to an isolated incident and warranted a lesser penalty than the extreme sanction of termination. The Court cannot conclude that the ALJ’s decision is shocking to one’s sense of fairness. (pp. 19-21) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the judgment of the Administrative Law Judge is REINSTATED.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 12 September Term 2017 079885IN THE MATTER OF WILLIAM R. HENDRICKSON, JR., DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS. Argued April 9, 2018 – Decided September 18, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 451 N.J. Super. 262 (App. Div. 2017). Arnold Shep Cohen argued the cause for appellant William Hendrickson (Oxfeld Cohen, attorneys; Arnold Shep Cohen, of counsel and on the brief). Melanie R. Walter, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent New Jersey Department of Community Affairs (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and Melanie R. Walter, on the brief). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. Under N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c), when an agency, such as theCivil Service Commission, does not modify or reject the decisionof an administrative law judge within a prescribed period, “thedecision of the administrative law judge shall be deemed adoptedas the final decision of the head of the agency.” This appealraises the following question: What is the judicial standard ofreview when the disciplinary decision of the administrative lawjudge (ALJ) is deemed adopted by the Civil Service Commission 1 (the Commission) because the political branches did not appointa sufficient number of Commissioners to form a quorum to reviewthe decision? In this case, the Department of Community Affairs (DCA)terminated from employment Fire Inspector William R.Hendrickson, Jr., for various disciplinary infractions.Hendrickson appealed that decision to the Commission, and thematter was referred to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) tobe heard as a contested case. An ALJ conducted a hearing andsustained the disciplinary charges, but rejected termination asthe appropriate discipline and instead imposed a six-monthsuspension. The ALJ’s decision was then submitted to the Commission.At the time, the political branches had not appointed therequisite number of Commissioners to constitute a quorum.Without a quorum, the Commission could not adopt, reject, ormodify the ALJ’s decision within the prescribed period, andtherefore that decision was “deemed adopted” as the Commission’sfinal decision. The DCA appealed the discipline imposed by the ALJ. TheAppellate Division held that the historical deference due to anagency’s decision on appellate review does not apply “when anagency’s inability to act on a timely basis is entirelyinvoluntary.” In re Hendrickson, 451 N.J. Super. 262, 272 (App. 2 Div. 2017). The panel concluded that, “at a minimum, an ALJ’sdeemed-adopted decision should not be reviewed deferentially.”Id. at 273. Nevertheless, the panel afforded deference to theALJ’s factual findings, as it would in the case of a benchtrial. Ibid. The panel, however, maintained that no deferencewould be accorded to the ALJ’s legal conclusions -- thediscipline imposed. Id. at 273-74. The panel reviewed thedisciplinary sanction de novo, reversed the ALJ’s determination,and reinstated the DCA’s termination of Hendrickson as theappropriate discipline. Id. at 274-75. We now reverse. The ALJ’s decision was “deemed adopted” asthe final agency determination pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c). In this unusual setting, the ALJ’s decision was deemedadopted because a shorthanded Commission was disabled fromacting. Whether we apply the traditional standard of appellatedeference to an agency’s imposition of discipline or thedeferential standard of appellate review to a trial court’ssentencing decision, the test remains the same -- was thediscipline imposed by the ALJ so disproportionate that it shocksthe conscience or one’s sense of fairness? See In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28-29 (2007) (appellate review of agency’sdisciplinary sanction); State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65(1984) (appellate review of trial court’s sentence). No onedisputes that this appeal is from a final agency determination. 3 Because the appellate standard of review is practicallyidentical whether the ALJ’s deemed-adopted decision is comparedto a trial court’s sentencing or an agency’s disciplinarydetermination, in this instance giving the name “agencydeference” to the standard is a sensible approach. In applying a deferential standard, we do not substituteour judgment for that of the ALJ merely because we might havecome to a different outcome. So long as reasonable minds mightdiffer about the appropriateness of the disciplinary sanction,we have no charge to second-guess the call made by the ALJ. Because we do not find that the discipline imposed by theALJ shocks one’s sense of fairness, we vacate the AppellateDivision’s judgment terminating Hendrickson and reinstate thesix-month suspension. I. A. William R. Hendrickson, Jr., began his employment as a firesafety inspector with the DCA in August 2012. While on duty onDecember 1, 2013, Hendrickson uttered an obscene and belittlingremark about a female supervisor overheard by two of hiscolleagues. The DCA brought three disciplinary charges againstHendrickson: conduct unbecoming a public employee, N.J.A.C.4A:2-2.3(a)(6); engaging in prohibited gender discrimination,N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(9); and violating New Jersey’s policy 4 against discrimination in the workplace, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12) (“An employee may be subject to discipline for . . .[o]ther sufficient cause.”). In September 2014, after a departmental hearing on thedisciplinary charges, the DCA issued an order terminatingHendrickson’s employment. Hendrickson appealed to the CivilService Commission, and his matter was transmitted to the OALfor an evidentiary hearing. At the ALJ hearing, the DCA called five witnesses, two firesafety inspectors with firsthand knowledge of the incident andthree other DCA employees with information related todepartmental policy and its imposition of discipline.Hendrickson testified on his own behalf. Although the testimonyis consistent in many respects, Hendrickson and his colleagueshad differing accounts of the words he uttered. The following narrative is formed from the testimony andevidence presented at the June 2015 ALJ hearing. B. On Sunday, December 1, 2013, inspectors from the DCA’sDivision of Fire Safety were assigned to MetLife Stadium in theMeadowlands, which was hosting a New York Jets football game.The inspectors’ task was to ensure that the stadium compliedwith applicable safety codes. Three of the fire inspectors,Christopher Reier, Vincent Lombardi, and Hendrickson met in the 5 stadium’s parking lot before taking on their assignments. Theirsupervisor was Senior Inspector Margaret Knight, who was notpresent with the three men at that time. While in the parking lot, Hendrickson received word thatKnight had assigned him to inspect the pyrotechnics display --the fireworks -- on the roof that day. Reier testified that herelayed the assignment to Hendrickson, who became irate over theposting, and called Knight a “c**t.” According to Reier,Hendrickson did not direct the remark to either Reier orLombardi, but rather made the comment to himself in a voice thatwas overheard. Lombardi, in his testimony, essentiallycorroborated this account, although he recalled that Hendricksonreferred to Knight as a ”f***ing c**t.” Both men were offendedby Hendrickson’s obscene remark and eventually reported theincident. In his testimony, Hendrickson gave a different account ofhis reaction to the rooftop pyrotechnic assignment. He statedthat Reier informed him of his assignment and then walked away.While four inspectors were fifteen to twenty feet away, he“muttered” to himself, in a rather loud voice that he attributedto his military background, “I hope she gets a disease.” Healso admitted that he “said a few words [he’s] not proud of,”but claimed to have no recollection of using the “'C’ word.” 6 According to a report filed by Knight, after her arrival,Reier informed her of Hendrickson’s outburst. Knight announcedto a number of the inspectors, including Hendrickson, “that ifanyone had any issues with [her], to please respect [her]position and come to [her] and the problem would be discussedand hopefully resolved.” After Knight concluded her remarks,Hendrickson walked away without saying a word and did hisassigned task without incident. C. At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ issued a writtendecision. The ALJ held that Hendrickson uttered a gender slurin a workplace environment and therefore violated the State’spolicy prohibiting gender discrimination and engaged in conductunbecoming a public employee. She found that Hendrickson becameangry at his supervisor, Senior Inspector Knight, when hereceived her work order and “in a loud voice [Hendrickson]called [Knight] a 'c**t.’” The ALJ rejected Hendrickson’saccount as not credible. According to the ALJ, the use of thegender slur was “disrespectful, sexist, discriminatory,unprofessional, in bad taste, improper, and extremelyoffensive.” Such disparaging language, the ALJ noted, has thecapacity to undermine workplace morale and, in this case, mayhave been overheard by members of the public. 7 Although the ALJ was troubled by Hendrickson’s failure toacknowledge his wrongdoing, she reasoned that removal was “tooharsh” a punishment given Hendrickson’s lack of a disciplinaryrecord in the fifteen months before and nine months after theincident. In determining the appropriate quantum of discipline,the ALJ considered “the nature of the offense, the concept ofprogressive discipline, and [Hendrickson’s] prior work record.”With those factors in mind, she concluded that removal fromoffice would be excessive and instead ordered Hendricksonsuspended for six months. D. The ALJ forwarded the decision to the Civil ServiceCommission, and both parties filed exceptions. Hendricksonargued that the discipline was too severe, and the DCA arguedthat termination was the appropriate punishment. In accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c), the Commissionhad forty-five days to “adopt, reject or modify” the ALJ’sfindings and render a final decision. N.J.S.A. 11A:2-3 providesthat the Commission “shall consist of five members” and thatthree members “shall constitute a quorum.”1 The Commission,however, did not have a sufficient number of appointed1 The members of the Civil Service Commission are “appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate.” N.J.S.A. 11A:2-3. 8 Commissioners to form a quorum. Without a quorum, theCommission could not operate to adopt, reject, or modify theALJ’s decision. See ibid. For that reason, at the request ofthe Commission’s chairperson, the Chief Administrative Law Judgeissued a forty-five-day extension to the Commission “to make afinal determination and issue a written opinion.” As that deadline approached, the Commission -- with onlyone serving member -- still could not form a quorum. Anyadditional extension of time required “the unanimous agreementof the parties.” See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c). Hendricksonrejected the Commission’s request for another forty-five-dayextension. Because the Commission did not and could not modify orreject the ALJ’s report within the prescribed period, the ALJ’sdecision was “deemed adopted as the final decision of the headof the agency.” See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) (“Unless the head ofthe agency modifies or rejects the report within such period,the decision of the administrative law judge shall be deemedadopted as the final decision of the head of the agency.”). The DCA appealed the Commission’s final agency decision tothe Appellate Division. The contested issues concerned thequantum of discipline imposed by the ALJ and the level ofdeference that should be afforded to an ALJ’s deemed-adopted 9 decision by a reviewing court. The Commission took no positionon the merits of the appeal. E. The Appellate Division reversed the ALJ’s decision andreinstated the DCA’s termination of Hendrickson’s employment.In re Hendrickson, 451 N.J. Super. at 266. The panelacknowledged that the ALJ’s decision “was 'deemed-adopted’ asthe Commission’s final decision” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c). Ibid. Nevertheless, the panel held that because thevacancies on the Commission disabled it from forming a quorumand acting, “the deemed-adopted statute does not requiretraditional deferential appellate review of the ALJ’s decision.”Ibid. On that basis, the panel applied “the standard of reviewapplicable to bench trials” and vacated the ALJ’s six-monthsuspension. Ibid. The panel contended that “automatic approval statutes areheld in disfavor,” and reasoned that given the historicaldeference “to an agency’s expertise on appellate review, someaccommodation should be made when an agency’s inability to acton a timely basis is entirely involuntary.” Id. at 272. Thepanel presumed that the Legislature did not intend, in enactingthe present version of N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10, to alter thetraditional “allocation of [regulatory] responsibilities.”Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Election Law Enf’t 10 Comm’n v. DiVincenzo, 445 N.J. Super. 187, 199 (App. Div.2016)). In rejecting agency deference as its approach, the panelinstead resorted to “the equally familiar standard of review forbench trials.” Id. at 273. In doing so, it stated that itwould affirm the ALJ’s factual findings “to the extent they aresupported by substantial credible evidence in the record,” butaccord no deference to and review de novo the ALJ’s legalconclusions. Ibid. It determined that the ALJ’s factfindingswere “supported by the record” but that “the propriety of thedisciplinary sanction” was “a question of law” subject to denovo review. Id. at 274. Having accepted that premise, the panel maintained thatHendrickson’s “lack of candor and remorse do not inspireconfidence in his ability to conduct himself in a measuredfashion in an undoubtedly demanding position.” Id. at 275. Itadded, “[t]his incident, at the very beginning of Hendrickson’scareer, augured ill for his future.” Ibid. The panelconcluded, as a matter of law, that “the doctrine of progressivediscipline should be bypassed” because “[t]he incident violatedthe State’s anti-discrimination policy and societal norms,” thusjustifying the reinstatement of Hendrickson’s termination.Ibid. 11 We granted Hendrickson’s petition for certification. 231 N.J. 143 (2017). II. A. Hendrickson submits that the Appellate Division was“obligated to provide the same degree of deference to [an ALJ’sdeemed-adopted] decision as it would any other final agencydecision,” and if the Legislature intended a different standardof review, it would have said so. Hendrickson noted that theCommission was unable to assemble a quorum for at least tenmonths because the Governor and Legislature had failed to fillvacancies, and therefore the only method for final agencydeterminations was through the ALJs’ deemed-adopted decisions.Hendrickson maintains that the 2014 amendment to N.J.S.A.52:14B-10 was intended “to eliminate the use of unlimitedextensions before an agency issued a final decision” and thatthe Appellate Division, “without any statutory authority,narrowed the well-settled limited review of a decision by anadministrative agency.” Hendrickson contends that his remark, “althoughobjectionable, was not so egregious to warrant removal 'as amatter of law.’” In support of this argument, he points to hisotherwise “unblemished record” and to the context of his“objectionable” statement: it “was not directed to anyone”; 12 “Knight was not in the vicinity when the statement was made”;and that as a subordinate, he had “no power relationship over”Knight. He also states that “he clearly 'learned his lesson’”and “gets it” and that the Appellate Division disregarded themitigating factors. He therefore seeks reinstatement of hissix-month suspension. B. The DCA does not dispute that “the ALJ’s decision in effectbecomes the agency’s decision” under the deemed-adoptedprovision of N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c); rather, it contends that theALJ’s decision is not entitled to agency deference because theCommission, due to vacancies, was unable to muster a quorum andapply “its technical and legal expertise” in reviewing the ALJ’sfindings. The DCA maintains that deference is afforded to anadministrative agency because of its “special 'expertise andsuperior knowledge of a particular field,’” quoting In reStallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 195 (2011). That, according to theDCA, contrasts with the determination of an ALJ, who “is notconsidered a subject matter expert.” The DCA contends that the Appellate Division, in conductingits de novo review of the discipline imposed by the ALJ,correctly concluded that “[t]ermination was the only appropriatesanction for Hendrickson’s gross unbecoming conduct and seriousviolation of the State’s zero tolerance policy against gender 13 based discrimination and harassment.” The DCA concurs with thepanel’s rejection of “progressive discipline” in favor oftermination because Hendrickson’s gender slur toward asupervisor occurred in a public place and because Hendrickson’sduties involved public safety and interaction with the public. III. A. The sole legal issue before this Court is the appropriatelevel of deference to be afforded to an ALJ’s disciplinarydecision that becomes a final agency determination through thedeemed-adopted provision of N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c). That issue,of course, must be viewed in light of the fact that the CivilService Commission was unable to form a quorum and function dueto the failure of the political branches to fill vacancies inthe Commission’s membership. The standard of review of an ALJ’s deemed-adopted decisionis a question of law, and therefore we owe no deference to thelegal conclusions of the Appellate Division. Willingboro Mall,Ltd. v. 240/242 Franklin Ave., L.L.C., 215 N.J. 242, 253 (2013).Accordingly, our charge is to review this matter de novo. Ibid. B. We begin with the statute that is at the heart of thecontroversy. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10 generally sets forth theprocedures for resolving contested agency cases submitted to the 14 Office of Administrative Law. Subsection (c) -- the “deemed-adopted” portion of the statute -- provides: The head of the agency, upon a review of the record submitted by the administrative law judge, shall adopt, reject or modify the recommended report and decision no later than 45 days after receipt of such recommendations. . . . Unless the head of the agency modifies or rejects the report within such period, the decision of the administrative law judge shall be deemed adopted as the final decision of the head of the agency. The recommended report and decision shall be a part of the record in the case. For good cause shown, upon certification by the director and the agency head, the time limits established herein may be subject to a single extension of not more than 45 days. Any additional extension of time shall be subject to, and contingent upon, the unanimous agreement of the parties. [ N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) (emphasis added).] The current version of subsection (c) is the product of a2014 amendment. L. 2013, c. 236, § 2. The Legislature amendedsubsection (c) of N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10 to set a strict deadlinefor administrative agencies to “adopt, reject or modify” anALJ’s decision -- unless all the parties agreed to an extension.Ibid. Under the amendment, when the agency does not act withinthe forty-five-day statutory timeframe -- or within the singleextension period not to exceed forty-five days -- the ALJ’sdecision is “deemed adopted as the final decision of the head ofthe agency.” Ibid. In this way, the Legislature ensured thatthere would always be a timely final agency decision. 15 Construing the pre-2014 version of N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c),this Court in King v. Racing Commission declined to strictlyenforce the forty-five-day time limit to the deemed-adoptedprovision because there was no showing in that case that theagency’s delay to act was in “bad faith,” “inexcusablenegligence,” “gross indifference,” or complete inaction. 103 N.J. 412, 421 (1986). In a belated but apparent response toKing, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) and“eliminate[d] any consideration of whether the failure to actwithin the prescribed time period is due to circumstances beyondthe agency’s control.” DiVincenzo, 445 N.J. Super. at 199;accord Sponsor’s Statement to A. 1521 (L. 2013, c. 236, § 2)(“[A]mendment would eliminate the provision authorizing theunlimited extension of this 45-day time period, and provide,instead, for a single extension of no more than 45 days for goodcause shown, and upon certification by the director and agencyhead.”). The DCA does not contest that the ALJ’s decision is a finalagency determination pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c). It onlyclaims that an appellate court should afford the ALJ’s decisionless deference than an actual agency determination. Here,specifically, we review a challenge to the discipline imposed ona state employee by an ALJ, whose decision has become a finalagency determination. Traditionally, we give substantial 16 deference to an agency’s imposition of a disciplinary sanction,based on its “expertise and superior knowledge of a particularfield.” In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 28. “In light of thedeference owed to such determinations, when reviewingadministrative sanctions, 'the test . . . is whether suchpunishment is so disproportionate to the offense, in light ofall the circumstances, as to be shocking to one’s sense offairness.’” Id. at 28-29 (alteration in original) (quoting Inre Polk, 90 N.J. 550, 578 (1982)). That standard gives theagency a wide berth of discretion. Our task is not tosubstitute our judgment for that of the agency, but rather tostay our hand even if we would have reached a different result.Ibid. Only a patently unreasonable sanction would call for thisCourt’s intervention. In the present case, the Appellate Division held that adifferent standard of review should apply to an ALJ’sdisciplinary decision that becomes a final agency determinationbecause the Commission was unable to form a quorum to act. Thepanel opted to apply the standard of review for bench trials anddeclared that it would defer to the ALJ’s factfindings, but notto the ALJ’s conclusions of law. The panel, however, failed todraw the parallel between an ALJ’s imposition of discipline anda trial court’s imposition of sentence. The panel overlooked 17 the full scope of deference afforded to a trial judge whoimposes sentence after a bench trial or jury trial. The panel evidently classified the ALJ’s disciplinarysanction as a legal conclusion and therefore erroneously engagedin a de novo review. An abuse of discretion standard, however,applies to the judicial imposition of a sentence, Roth, 95 N.J.at 364-65, or a disciplinary sanction, In re Herrmann, 192 N.J.at 28-29. Appellate deference extends to a trial judge’simposition of a sentence, whether the judge or a jury sits asthe trier of fact. We have made clear that we will not exerciseour judicial power to modify a sentence unless “the applicationof the facts to the law is such a clear error of judgment thatit shocks the judicial conscience.” Roth, 95 N.J. at 364. InRoth, we indicated that we did not “anticipate that we [would]be required to invoke this judicial power frequently.” Ibid. We do not see any material difference between the appellatestandard of review of an agency’s disciplinary sanction and atrial judge’s imposition of a sentence. In both instances, weafford a high degree of deference. Indeed, in fashioning anappellate standard of review for sentencing, we relied in parton the appellate standard of review of administrative agencydeterminations, particularly in Civil Service Commission cases.Id. at 364. In Roth, for sentencing review purposes, we citedto and quoted from Campbell v. Department of Civil Service, 39 18 N.J. 556, 562 (1963), a case involving a Civil ServiceCommission decision, stating: “[W]e will not upset adetermination . . . in the absence of a showing that it wasarbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or that it lacked fairsupport in the evidence, or that it violated legislativepolicies expressed or implicit in the civil service act.” Roth, 95 N.J. at 364 (alterations in original). The appellate tests for reviewing an administrativedisciplinary sanction and a criminal sentence are virtually thesame. Therefore, the Appellate Division erred in suggestingthat appellate review of a disciplinary sanction imposed by ajudge is de novo and different from traditional appellate reviewof an agency determination. Additionally, merely because thefactual findings and rulings made by ALJs are oftentimescontingent on whether an agency accepts, rejects, or modifies anALJ’s decision does not mean that ALJs are second-tier playersor hold an inferior status as factfinders. IV. The standard of review would be no different if we affordan ALJ the same level of deference that a trial judge enjoyswhen imposing a sentence -- to which a disciplinary sanction iscomparable. Accordingly, we will apply the standard of reviewfor disciplinary sanctions set forth in In re Herrmann, andassess whether the sanction imposed by the ALJ here “is so 19 disproportionate to the offense, in light of all thecircumstances, as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness.” 192 N.J. at 28-29 (quoting In re Polk, 90 N.J. at 578).2 Given that deferential standard of review, the ALJ’s six-month suspension must be sustained. The issue is not whether wewould have imposed different discipline if we were thedecisionmakers in the first instance, but whether the ALJ’sdisciplinary sanction is “shocking to one’s sense of fairness.”See ibid. Reasonable people may have differing opinionsregarding the appropriate quantum of discipline in this case.However, so long as the discipline here falls within a continuumof reasonable outcomes, we must defer, for we have no charge tosubstitute our judgment for that of the statutorily authorizeddecisionmaker. Hendrickson’s use of a highly offensive gender slur in apublic place and overheard by co-workers must be firmlycondemned, even if Hendrickson was just “muttering” to himselfin a loud voice about his female supervisor. A belittlinggender insult uttered in the workplace by a state employee is a2 Our holding is limited to the issue before us -- the appellate standard of review of an ALJ’s imposition of a disciplinary sanction in the circumstances presented here, where the ALJ’s decision becomes the final agency determination. We do not address the standard of review that applies when an agency is shorthanded and disabled from action on issues other than disciplinary sanctions. 20 violation of New Jersey’s policy against discrimination andHendrickson’s conduct was unbecoming a public employee. ThatHendrickson engaged in disrespectful, sexist, and unprofessionalconduct -- as the ALJ found -- is beyond question. The ALJrebuked Hendrickson’s language in the strongest terms insustaining the charges against him. Without an appropriatepenalty, such an insult would have a corrosive effect on moralein the workforce. Nevertheless, in setting the appropriate discipline, theALJ found that Hendrickson’s behavior amounted to an isolatedincident. Hendrickson had an otherwise unblemished disciplinaryrecord during the fifteen months before and nine monthsfollowing the incident. She determined that those mitigatingfactors warranted a lesser penalty -- a six-month suspension --rather than the extreme sanction of termination. Ultimately,she found that Hendrickson was redeemable. Based on our deferential standard of review, we cannotconclude that the ALJ’s decision is shocking to one’s sense offairness. V. For the reasons expressed, we reverse the judgment of theAppellate Division and reinstate the ALJ’s determinationsuspending Hendrickson for a period of six months from hisposition as fire safety inspector. 21 CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. 22