Title: Jason D. Miller v. State of Indiana
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 08S02-1102-CR-108
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: February 24, 2011

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Steven Knecht  
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory Zoeller 
Lafayette, Indiana  
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nicole M. Schuster 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 08S02-1102-CR-108 
 
 
JASON D. MILLER, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff  below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Carroll Circuit Court,  
No. 08C01-0803-FA-1 
The Honorable Donald E. Currie, Judge  
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 08A02-1002-CR-129 
_________________________________ 
 
February 24, 2011 
 
Per Curiam. 
 
Jason Miller was convicted of one count of child molesting as a class A felony and one 
count of child molesting as a class C felony.   With respect to the class A felony, the trial court 
initially imposed a sentence of thirty years with ten years suspended to probation.  The trial court 
amended Miller’s sentence to thirty years executed with no portion suspended after the State 
asserted that Indiana Code section 35-50-2-2(i) required a minimum sentence of thirty years and 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Feb 24 2011, 1:02 pm
 
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permitted suspension only of the part of a sentence longer than thirty years.  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the sentence in Miller v. State, No. 08A02-1002-CR-129, slip op. (Ind. Ct. 
App. Oct. 8, 2010).  We grant transfer to address the application of Indiana Code section 35-50-
2-2(i) to the sentence for the class A felony conviction.   
 
 
Generally, a trial court may impose any sentence between twenty and fifty years for a 
class A felony, and may suspend any part of the sentence imposed.  See I.C. §§  35-50-2-2(a) & 
35-50-2-4.  When the class A felony is child molesting, however, “the court may suspend only 
that part of the sentence that is in excess of the minimum sentence,” i.e., the portion in excess of 
twenty years.  See I.C. §  35-50-2-2(b)(4).  Furthermore, as relevant here, if the convicted person 
was over the age of twenty-one and the victim was younger than twelve, “the court may suspend 
only that part of the sentence that is in excess of thirty years.”   I.C. § 35-50-2-2(i) (“section 
2(i)”).   
 
 
The State asserts that section 2(i) requires a trial court to impose a minimum sentence of 
thirty years.  As the State acknowledges, the issue was decided against it in Hampton v. State, 
921 N.E.2d 27, 30-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied, 929 N.E.2d 795 (table) (Ind. Jun. 17, 
2010).  There, the Court of Appeals concluded that section 2(i) “dictates only the discretion trial 
courts have in designating which portions of a defendant's sentence may be suspended and does 
not expressly set sentencing minimums,” 921 N.E.2d at 31, and that trial courts have discretion 
“whether to sentence defendants to the advisory sentence, and require those so sentenced to serve 
thirty years of executed time, or to sentence defendants to a sentence below the advisory level 
under certain circumstances.”  Id. at n.5.  We conclude Hampton correctly decided the issue.   
 
 
Here, the trial court’s original sentence for the Class A conviction was thirty years (the 
advisory sentence) with ten years suspended.  As explained above, this sentence was not 
authorized because section 2(i) specifies that only that portion of a sentence in excess of thirty 
years may be suspended.  The trial court amended the sentence to thirty years with no time 
suspended.  This sentence was authorized, but the transcript suggests the trial court did so  
because it thought the State was correct in asserting that section 2(i) required a minimum 
sentence of thirty years.  (Tr., Mot. to Correct Error Hrg., at 4-5.)  As indicated, however, a 
 
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sentence of less than thirty years could have been imposed because section 2(i) does not set a 
minimum sentence.     
 
 
Accordingly, we grant transfer and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing 
consistent with this opinion.  The remainder of the Court of Appeals memorandum decision 
(reversing the trial court’s determination of Miller’s credit time classification, finding no 
violation of double jeopardy principles, and finding sufficient evidence supported the 
convictions) is summarily affirmed.  See  Appellate Rule 58(A)(2). 
 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan, Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.