Title: TERESA KAY COLLIER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2004-SC-000955-MR
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: September 21, 2006

NOT TO BEPUBLISHESOPINION THIS OPINIONISDESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULCATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE CITED OR USEDASAUTHORITYINANY OTHER CASE INANYCOURT OF THISSTATE. V TERESA KAY COLLIER 1 Ky . Const . § 110(2)(b) . uyrrwr Caurf n£ 14~ 2004-SC-000955-MR RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 21, 2006 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ON APPEAL FROM BALLARD CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE WILLIAM LEWIS SHADOAN, JUDGE NO . 04-CR-00007 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING Appellant, Teresa Kay Collier, was convicted in the Ballard Circuit Court of complicity to manufacture methamphetamine and engaging in organized crime. Appellant was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. This appeal is as a matter of right.' Appellant alleges five claims of error in this appeal: 1) insufficiency of the evidence on the KRS 506.120 (engaging in organized crime) charge ; 2) Appellant's convictions violate double jeopardy principles; 3) the trial court erred in denying a directed verdict of acquittal on the complicity to manufacture methamphetamine charge because Appellant did not posses all of the requisite chemicals to support the conviction ; 4) the trial court erred in allowing amendment of the date of occurrence listed on the indictment ; and 5) the trial court erred in denying Appellant's co- defendant's motion to separate witnesses . In late October or early November 2003, James Swann and Amy Wilson, fugitives from Missouri, arrived in Kentucky to stay at Appellant's home . James Swann agreed to show John Britt, Appellant's son, how to manufacture methamphetamine. James Swann and John Britt asked Appellant for permission to manufacture methamphetamine at Appellant's residence, and Appellant ultimately agreed . The group involved in the methamphetamine manufacturing operation, consisting of James Swann, Amy Wilson, John Britt, Teresa Summers, Jerry Layton, James Copeland, Angela Penrod, and Appellant, also used a house on Hazelwood Road to cook methamphetamine . James Swann made methamphetamine at least every other day, and a number of different people in the group, including Appellant, routinely took turns purchasing ingredients for manufacturing methamphetamine . The group kept some of the methamphetamine for personal use, and sold some of the batch to purchase additional ingredients . On November 10, 2003, the manager at a local farm supply store called the Ballard County Sheriff's Office to report the purchase of a product containing iodine by two females. The store manager obtained the license plate number of the car, and the car was registered to Appellant . On December 8, 2003, the farm supply store manager reported another suspicious purchase of iodine to the sheriff's office and again obtained the license plate number, which belonged to Amy Wilson . The next day, on December 9, 2003, the pharmacist at a local drugstore contacted the sheriff's office regarding the purchase of a decongestant containing pseudoephedrine tablets, an ingredient required to manufacture methamphetamine . The pharmacist gave the police a physical description of the woman and the license plate number of her vehicle . About twenty minutes later, Deputy Jerry Jones located the car and pulled it over . Teresa Summers was driving the car and told the deputy sheriff she had delivered the pills to Appellant's residence . Summers permitted Deputy Jones to search the car, and no pills were found. Deputy Jones allowed Summers to leave and called the Ballard County Sheriff for further instructions . The sheriff directed Deputy Jones to go to Appellant's residence, attempt to secure the premises, and wait for the sheriff to obtain a search warrant . When Deputy Jones arrived at Appellant's residence, John Britt, Amy Wilson, and James Swann were present . Britt permitted Deputy Jones to enter the house, and when he entered, he could hear noises from the bathroom ; Swann and Wilson were attempting to flush the pseudoephedrine pills down the toilet . Appellant arrived a short time later and consented to the search. A number of items relating to the manufacture of methamphetamine were seized . The police also searched the Hazelwood house and found matchbooks without their striker pads, which methamphetamine manufacturers use to extract red phosphorous . In a taped interview with the police, Appellant admitted that she knew methamphetamine was being made inside her residence . Appellant also admitted to driving Wilson to the local farm supply store to purchase iodine and observing Wilson and Swann make methamphetamine in her home . Appellant first asserts that the Commonwealth failed to prove she was involved in illegal trafficking of a controlled substance, as required to satisfy the engaging in organized crime statute, KRS 506.120(3) . The trial court overruled Appellant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of all the evidence . Appellant's central complaint involves the definition of "traffic" found in KRS 218.010(28) : "Traffic, except as provided in KRS 218A.1431, means to manufacture, distribute, dispense, sell, transfer, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or sell a controlled substance."2 Appellant asserts that KRS 218A.1431, rather than KRS 218.010(28), was the appropriate definition to be used . KRS 218A.1431 defines "traffic" as "to distribute, dispense, sell, transfer, or possess with intent to distribute, dispense, or sell methamphetamine." If Appellant is correct, she could not be convicted of organized crime because she was aiding and abetting the manufacture of methamphetamine, not trafficking in a controlled substance, as such an element of the statute would be missing. We find no merit in Appellant's argument. In Hill v. Commonwealth, we said that "the Commonwealth was not required to prove that Appellant actually trafficked in marijuana to convict him of engaging in organized crime ."4 The Court further said that "[c]ollaborating to promote or engage in trafficking in a controlled substance is, inter atia, a part of the definition of a criminal syndicate."5 Thus, as long as Appellant participated in organizing a criminal syndicate, even if she did not promote or engage in the syndicate's activities, she is subject to conviction under KRS 506.120(1)(a) .6 Illegal trafficking is only part of the definition of "criminal syndicate," and evidence of trafficking 2 Appellant cites the former version of KRS 218A.010; in 2005 the definitions were renumbered and subsection 28 is now subsection 34. 3 125 S.W.3d 221 (Ky. 2004). 4 Id . at 233. 5 Id . (citin KRS 506.120(3)(e)) (emphasis in original) . 6 See id . goes to prove the group qualified as a criminal syndicate under KRS 506 .120(3)(e) .' Appellant violated the organized crime statute when she "provided material aid" to maintain the criminal syndicate under KRS 506.120(1)(b) . The Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence to present this issue to the jury . Appellant next argues her convictions of complicity to manufacture methamphetamine and engaging in organized crime violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 13 of the Kentucky Constitution . The alleged error was preserved. Appellant contends the organized crime charge and complicity charge both arise from one incident of manufacturing methamphetamine. Our interpretation of Section 13 of the Kentucky Constitution which proscribes against multiple prosecutions for the same course of conduct parallels the federal rule announced in Blockburger v. United States .8 If "the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not."9 We have recently held that "neither the United States nor the Kentucky Constitution proscribes the imposition of multiple punishments for separate offenses committed during the course of a single criminal episode."' ° The General Assembly codified the Blockburger test in KRS 505.020 . The Commonwealth offered sufficient proof to show Appellant furthered the activities of the criminal syndicate and manufactured methamphetamine with her co- 7_Id . At 304 . 8 284 U .S . 299, 52 S.Ct . 180, L. Ed . 306 (1932) . 9 _Id . at 182 . 1° Beaty v. Commonwealth , 125 S.W .3d 196, 210 (Ky. 2003) . defendants . The statutory offenses of engaging in organized crime and complicity to manufacture methamphetamine each require proof of facts the other does not . Therefore, Appellant's convictions do not constitute double jeopardy . Appellant next argues that the trial court improperly denied her motion for directed verdict of acquittal on the complicity to manufacture methamphetamine charge . Appellant argues that she cannot stand convicted of complicity to manufacture because she did not possess all of the chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine as required by Kotila v . Commonwealth." In Kotila , we held that KRS 218A.1432(1)(b)'s "possesses the chemicals or equipment" element required the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant possessed not merely some but either all of the chemicals or all of the equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine . 12 However, Kotila proved to be short-lived for less than three years after its rendition, Kotila was overruled in Matheney v . Commonwealth. The Mathenev court noted that Kotila actually survived for only about six months as the Court began almost immediately to avoid the bright-line rule Kotila had established . 14 "Therefore, we go one step further and hold that Kotila's construction of KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) was incorrect . We do not reverse Kotila lightly."15 The Mathenev court duly acknowledged the principle of stare decisis, but concluded that it must yield when a prior statutory construction decision is found to be " 114 S .W.3d 226 (Ky. 2003) (superseded by statute in KRS 218A .1432(1)(b) (2005) (now requiring possession of two or more chemicals or two or more items of equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine)) . 12 Id. 13 191 S.W.3d 599 (Ky . 2006) . 14 Varble v . Commonwealth , 125 S .W.3d 246, 254 (Ky . 2004). 15 Mathenev, 191 S .W.3d at 603 . erroneous . Announcing a new, and the prevailing, construction of the statute, the Court said : We construe the language in KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) that states "the chemicals or equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine" to mean that one must possess two or more chemicals or items of equipment with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine to fall within the statute . This construction is based on a common sense approach that gives proper import to the use of the plural "chemicals ." Of course, any conviction must also satisfy the scienter requirement contained in KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) . In light of this construction, we need not consider Appellant's argument regarding palpable error, because no error occurred regarding jury instructions . Returning to Appellant's directed verdict claim, our law is well settled . "On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal . Appellant contends there was no red phosphorus found at her residence, which is a necessary ingredient for the "red phosphorus" method of manufacturing methamphetamine . However, there was testimony that Appellant and her co defendants manufactured methamphetamine at two different locations : Appellant's house and the Hazelwood house. At the Hazelwood house, police found numerous matchbooks without striker pads, allowing the inference that the striker pads had been removed to extract red phosphorous, a chemical used in methamphetamine manufacture . The chemicals do not have to be found in one place for one or more of the participants in the group to be in actual or constructive possession of the chemicals . 16 Commonwealth v . Benham , 816 S .W .2d 186,187 (Ky . 1991). In Pate v . Commonwealth," this Court upheld a manufacturing methamphetamine conviction when the last ingredient was kept in a different location .' $ The Commonwealth introduced ample evidence for a jury to convict Appellant of complicity to manufacture methamphetamine . While our decision in Mathenev relaxed the quantum of proof required, even if Kotila were still the law, the Commonwealth met its burden . Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal . Appellant next argues the trial court erred by allowing the Commonwealth to amend the date of occurrence listed on the indictment from December 9, 2003, to include the month of November through December 9, 2003 . Appellant specifically argues "other bad acts" evidence was admitted and the amended indictment was highly prejudicial . RCr 6.16 provides : "The court may permit an indictment, information, complaint, or citation to be amended any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced."19 We do not find Appellant was substantially prejudiced by the amendment . The Commonwealth only introduced evidence at trial to prove elements of charged crimes, not of uncharged offenses committed during the revised time period . In Gilbert v . Commonwealth ,2° we upheld the amendment of an indictment altering the year the offense occurred from 1985 to 1986 . This Court noted, "[the " 134 S .W.3d 593 (Ky . 2004) . 18 Id . at 596 . 19 RCr 6.16 . 20 838 S.W 2d 376, 378 (Ky . 1992). defendants] were not surprised or misled by the indictment or its amendment . ,2' In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing amendment of the indictment. Appellant's final allegation is that the trial court erred by denying her co- defendant's motion to separate witnesses . After two of the Commonwealth's witnesses testified, co-defendant Jerry Layton moved to separate witnesses . The trial court overruled the motion because the motion should have been made before any of the witnesses testified . However, the trial court did grant Layton's motion to separate and exclude witnesses James Swann and Amy Wilson . Appellant did not join in either of these motions . RCr 9.22 states a party claiming error must "mak[e] known to the court the action which that party desires the court to take or any objection to the action of the court . . . ." Appellant's claim is not preserved for our review because she failed to request separation of witnesses from the trial court . For the foregoing reasons the judgment and sentence of the Ballard Circuit Court are affirmed . Lambert, C.J ., and Graves, McAnulty, Minton, Roach, Scott, and Wintersheimer, JJ ., concur . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT : Karen Maurer Assistant Public Advocate Department of Public Advocacy Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane' Frankfort, KY 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : Gregory D . Stumbo Attorney General of Kentucky James C . Shackelford Assistant Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division Office of the Attorney General 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601-8204