Title: Laughlin v. Perry
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC98012
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 2020

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
DWIGHT LAUGHLIN, 
) 
Opinion issued June 30, 2020 
) 
Respondent, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC98012 
) 
DEWAYNE PERRY AND  
) 
ELLEN FLOTTMAN, 
) 
) 
Appellants. 
) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NEWTON COUNTY 
The Honorable James V. Nichols, Judge 
Public defenders Dewayne Perry (hereinafter, “Perry”) and Ellen Flottman 
(hereinafter “Flottman”) appeal the circuit court’s judgment affirming a jury’s verdict in 
favor of Dwight Laughlin (hereinafter, “Laughlin”) on his legal malpractice claim.  Perry 
and Flottman argue the circuit court erred in overruling their motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) because they had official immunity from being sued 
for legal malpractice and because Laughlin failed to make a submissible case.  This Court 
holds public defenders are entitled to official immunity from suit.  Because this point is 
2 
 
dispositive, this Court does not reach Perry and Flottman’s other claim of error.  The circuit 
court’s judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.1 
Factual and Procedural History2 
 
 
In 1933, the United States acquired land in Neosho, Missouri, on which to build a 
United States post office, and the State of Missouri ceded jurisdiction over the land to the 
federal government.3  The United States Constitution provides, if a state cedes jurisdiction 
over federal property within the state, the United States has exclusive jurisdiction to hear 
cases involving offenses committed on that federal property, depriving that state’s courts 
of the authority to enforce state law on federal property.  U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 17.    
 
In 1993, Laughlin burglarized the Neosho post office and caused property damage.  
The federal government declined to prosecute Laughlin, but state charges were filed.  Perry 
and another public defender, Mark White (hereinafter, “White”), were assigned to 
represent Laughlin at his trial.  Neither public defender challenged jurisdiction although 
Laughlin thought the state “did not have the right to prosecute” him.  Perry spoke with the 
prosecuting attorney about the issue.  Perry, White, and the prosecuting attorney all 
believed concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute Laughlin existed, and none of them could 
recall an instance in which the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction in a similar 
criminal case.  After a jury trial, Laughlin was found guilty and sentenced to thirty years’ 
                                              
1 This Court has jurisdiction.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10. 
2 This recitation incorporates portions of State ex rel. Laughlin v. Bowersox, 318 S.W.3d 
695 (Mo. banc 2010), and State v. Laughlin, 900 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995), 
without further attribution or citation. 
3 Section 12.010.  All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 unless otherwise indicated. 
3 
 
imprisonment on the burglary count and ten years’ imprisonment on the property damage 
count, to be served consecutively.   
Laughlin appealed.  While his direct appeal was pending, Laughlin’s appointed 
appellate public defender, James Martin (hereinafter, “Martin”), filed a Rule 29.15 post-
conviction motion, alleging “the trial court did not have jurisdiction to try [his] case since 
it was a federal offense thereby preempting state court jurisdiction.”  The motion court 
denied his claim because “[n]o evidence was adduced showing the offense was not a state 
offense or that the federal government had pre-empted jurisdiction.”   
The court of appeals consolidated Laughlin’s direct appeal and his post-conviction 
appeal.  Flottman represented Laughlin in this proceeding.  Laughlin sent Flottman a letter 
stating, “My charges were originally federal because the building was a post office” and 
cited cases he alleged demonstrated “due process flaws.”  However, Flottman could not 
glean that Laughlin was conveying his desire to assert a jurisdictional challenge.  She 
believed there was concurrent jurisdiction and did not believe jurisdiction was a “good 
issue.”  Neither appeal challenged the circuit court’s jurisdiction to try his case.  Both 
judgments were affirmed.  State v. Laughlin, 900 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995). 
While incarcerated and after the appeals were final, Laughlin discovered the deed 
to the post office and the federal and state provisions conferring exclusive federal 
jurisdiction in his criminal case.  Laughlin began filing pro se motions to secure his release 
that were denied routinely until 2009.  In November 2009, Laughlin petitioned for a writ 
of habeas corpus to determine whether his criminal convictions were void because the 
circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter.  The state argued whether 
4 
jurisdiction was proper was litigated years ago, Laughlin was bound by the circuit court’s 
judgment, and relief was barred due to his failure to raise the matter on appeal.  After the 
circuit court and court of appeals denied Laughlin relief, this Court issued a writ of habeas 
corpus, holding Missouri did not have jurisdiction over offenses occurring in the Neosho 
post office; therefore, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Laughlin for 
burglary or property damage.  State ex rel. Laughlin v. Bowersox, 318 S.W.3d 695, 703 
(Mo. banc 2010).  Laughlin was discharged from custody. 
In August 2011, Laughlin sued Perry, White, Martin, and Flottman, alleging legal 
malpractice and breach of fiduciary obligation for their failure to assert the jurisdictional 
challenge during their representation of him at trial, on appeal, and in his post-conviction 
proceedings.4  All defendants raised official immunity as an affirmative defense, 
contending official immunity applied to them because they were being sued for the 
performance of their official duties as state agents, officers, or employees while performing 
functions requiring a broad degree of discretion.   
Laughlin submitted the legal malpractice claims at trial.  Laughlin presented 
testimony from an expert who opined the defendants breached the standard of care by 
failing to pursue the jurisdictional challenge, which the expert characterized as “obvious.” 
The jury returned its verdict in Laughlin’s favor against Perry and Flottman and in Martin’s 
favor against Laughlin.  Perry and Flottman filed a JNOV motion alleging they were 
4 Laughlin also sued another attorney who represented him in an appeal before the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 1997.  Laughlin voluntarily 
dismissed that attorney and White prior to trial.   
5 
shielded from liability due to official immunity.  The circuit court overruled their motion, 
and they now appeal. 
Standard of Review 
“The standard of review for the denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
(JNOV) is essentially the same as review of the denial of a motion for directed verdict.” 
Spalding v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 463 S.W.3d 770, 778 (Mo. banc 2015) (quoting 
All Am. Painting, LLC v. Fin. Sols. & Assocs., Inc., 315 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Mo. banc 2010)). 
When reviewing the overruling of a JNOV motion, “[t]his Court must determine whether 
the plaintiff presented a submissible case by offering evidence to support every element 
necessary for liability.”  Barron v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 529 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Mo. banc 
2017) (quoting Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 95 (Mo. banc 2010)). 
This Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.  W. Blue 
Print Co., LLC v. Roberts, 367 S.W.3d 7, 12 (Mo. banc 2012). 
Official Immunity 
Perry and Flottman argue the circuit court erred in overruling their motion for JNOV 
because they have official immunity from Laughlin’s legal malpractice claim.  Perry and 
Flottman maintain that, as public defenders, they are public employees employed by the 
state of Missouri and were acting within the scope of their authority as public defenders 
when choosing which strategies and defenses to pursue in Laughlin’s case.  Perry and 
Flottman contend foregoing the jurisdictional challenge was a discretionary decision 
entitling them to official immunity.   
6 
This Court thoroughly explained the official immunity doctrine in State ex rel. Alsup 
v. Kanatzar, 588 S.W.3d 187 (Mo. banc 2019).  Alsup noted this Court has long held
official immunity “protects a public official from liability if that official acts within the 
course of his [or her] official duties and without malice.”  Id. at 190; see also Southers v. 
City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Mo. banc 2008) (stating official immunity 
protected “public employees” in the same manner).  “Courts and legal commentators have 
long agreed that society’s compelling interest in vigorous and effective administration of 
public affairs requires that the law protect those individuals who, in the face of imperfect 
information and limited resources, must daily exercise their best judgment in conducting 
the public’s business.”  Kanagawa v. State ex rel. Freeman, 685 S.W.2d 831, 836 
(Mo. banc 1985).  “Courts applying the doctrine of official immunity must be cautious not 
to construe it ‘too narrowly lest they frustrate the need for relieving public servants of the 
threat of burdensome litigation.’”  Alsup, 588 S.W.3d at 191 (quoting Kanagawa, 685 
S.W.2d at 836).  
Public Defenders Are Public Employees 
The question of whether official immunity applies to public defenders is an issue of 
first impression for this Court.5  A public defender’s duty to represent indigent individuals 
5 Although three appellate decisions have broached the topic, none of them resolved the 
issue.  See Johnson v. Schmidt, 719 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Mo. App. W.D. 1986) (finding the 
client’s malpractice claim was premature and did not reach or rule on whether a public 
defender was protected by official immunity); Costa v. Allen, No. WD67378, 2008 WL 
34735, at *5 (Mo. App. W.D. Jan. 2, 2008) (finding official immunity did not apply to 
public defenders, but after this Court accepted transfer of the case, this holding no longer 
held any precedential value); Kuehn v. Hogan, 321 S.W.3d 337, 344 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) 
7 
is mandated by both the United States and Missouri constitutions, caselaw, and prescribed 
by Missouri statute.  The Sixth Amendment provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” 
“Because this right is ‘fundamental and essential to a fair trial,’ the constitutional guarantee 
of counsel is ‘protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.’”  State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 605 
(Mo. banc 2012) (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341, 83 S. Ct. 792, 
9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963)).  The Missouri Constitution provides, “in criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall have the right to appear and defend, in person and by counsel.”  Mo. Const. 
art. I, sec. 18(a).   
“To fulfill Gideon’s promise that ‘every defendant stands equal before the law,’ the 
Missouri General Assembly has enacted an elaborate public defender system to provide 
legal services to indigent defendants.”  Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n, 370 S.W.3d at 606 (internal 
citations omitted).  Section 600.019.1 provides that the Office of State Public Defender 
(hereinafter, “OSPD”) is “an independent department of the judicial branch of state 
government.”  See also State ex rel. Francis v. McElwain, 140 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Mo. banc 
2004).  The OSPD’s “complete budget” must be provided for “through an annual 
appropriation 
subject to approval 
by the governor 
and the general 
assembly.” 
Section 600.040.2, RSMo Supp. 2013.  The OSPD is headed by the Public Defender 
Commission, comprised of members “appointed by the governor with the advice and 
(Ellis, J., concurring) (positing public defenders should be shielded from liability by 
official immunity). 
8 
consent of the senate.”  Section 600.015.1.  The Public Defender Commission determines 
compensation for public defenders.  Section 600.021.3.  Public defenders are prohibited 
from limiting the availability of their services “based on a determination that the office has 
exceeded a caseload standard” and “may not refuse to provide representation required 
under [chapter 600] without prior approval from a court of competent jurisdiction.”  
Section 600.062, RSMo Supp. 2013. 
When construing the Missouri rules of professional conduct concerning conflicts of 
interest requiring disqualification, this Court characterized a public defender as a “public 
officer or employee” and a “governmental attorney.”  State v. Lemasters, 456 S.W.3d 416, 
420 (Mo. banc 2015).  Moreover, section 600.040.3, RSMo Supp. 2013, provides, “Any 
person who is a public defender or employee of a public defender shall be entitled to all 
benefits of the Missouri state employees’ retirement system” as defined by statute. 
There is no dispute state employee public defenders Perry and Flottman were acting 
pursuant to their constitutionally and statutorily mandated duties by representing Laughlin 
during his trial, appeal, and post-conviction proceedings.  Laughlin did not allege or prove 
Perry or Flottman acted with malice toward him during the representation. 
While Laughlin concedes public defenders are state employees for purposes of 
coverage under the State Legal Expense Fund (hereinafter, “SLEF”) as discussed below, 
Laughlin argues public defenders are not “public officers” entitled to official immunity 
based on the holding in State ex rel. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gaertner, 619 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. App. 
E.D. 1981).  In Eli Lilly, the Eastern District declined to extend official immunity to a
physician employed by a state mental health hospital who was sued for medical 
9 
malpractice.  Id. at 766.  The court determined that, even if the physician were a state 
employee compensated by the state, “the performance of [his] duties does not require the 
exercise of ‘discretion’ in the legal sense of that term” because “[s]hielding officials for 
decisions other than those made in the exercise of the sovereign’s power which go to the 
essence of governing, extends the doctrine of official immunity beyond its original intent 
to promote smooth and effective government.”  Id. at 764-65.  Hence, the court concluded 
only the discretionary decisions “which are a manifest exercise of the sovereign’s power 
[are] those decisions which ‘go to the essence of governing.’”  Id. at 765 (quoting Jones v. 
State Highway Comm’n, 557 S.W.2d 225, 230 (Mo. banc 1977)). 
Laughlin argues Eli Lilly remains valid law because it was not analyzed or overruled 
in Southers when this Court explained the official immunity doctrine.  Laughlin argues 
Southers stated the goal of official immunity is “to permit public employees to make 
judgments affecting public safety and welfare without concerns about possible personal 
liability.”  Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 611.  While Southers did not overrule Eli Lilly, this 
Court did not restrict official immunity only to those public officials’ actions that “go to 
the essence of governing.”  Id. at 610-11.  When carefully examining Jones, which was the 
quoted source of the “essence of governing” language relied on in Eli Lilly, it is clear Jones 
was discussing sovereign immunity, not official immunity.  Further, this Court has not 
adopted Eli Lilly’s interpretation of official immunity in any case.  Notably, this Court did 
not make such a distinction in Alsup when extending official immunity to a teacher after 
his implementation of restrictive behavioral intervention techniques resulting in a student 
being injured.  It is evident the teacher was not a “public official” engaged in the “essence 
10 
of governing” when interacting with the student.  Alsup, 588 S.W.3d at 193.  Hence, 
Laughlin’s reliance on the “essence of governing” language from Eli Lilly to restrict official 
immunity to public officials and not public employees is misplaced and has no applicability 
here.   
Public Defenders’ Duties Constitute Discretionary Acts 
Perry and Flottman are not entitled to official immunity merely because they are 
state or public employees conducting official duties.  Official immunity only “protects 
public employees from liability for alleged acts of negligence committed during the course 
of their official duties for the performance of discretionary acts.”  Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 
610; Alsup, 588 S.W.3d at 190.  The official immunity doctrine does not protect public 
employees for alleged acts of negligence for the performance of ministerial duties. 
Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 610.  Hence, this Court must determine whether Perry and 
Flottman’s decisions to forego challenging state jurisdiction were discretionary or 
ministerial acts.   
“Whether an act can be characterized as discretionary depends on the degree of 
reason and judgment required.”  Id.  “A discretionary act requires the exercise of reason in 
the adaption of means to an end and discretion in determining how or whether an act should 
be done or course pursued.”  Id.  By contrast, Alsup defined a ministerial act as follows: 
Generally, a ministerial act has long been defined as merely clerical.  And 
this Court has noted that a ministerial duty compels a task of such a routine 
and mundane nature that it is likely to be delegated to subordinate officials. 
For more than a century, this Court has held that a ministerial or clerical duty 
is one in which a certain act is to be performed upon a given state of facts in 
a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, and 
without regard to … judgment or opinion concerning the propriety or 
11 
impropriety of the act to be performed.  Thus, the central question is whether 
there is any room whatsoever for variation in when and how a particular task 
can be done.  If so, that task–by definition–is not ministerial. 
Alsup, 588 S.W.3d at 191 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Perry and Flottman contend practically any decision or action taken by an attorney 
in representing his or her client is discretionary in nature, including which defenses to assert 
at trial and which legal arguments to present on appeal.  Laughlin, however, characterizes 
the jurisdictional challenge as a ministerial task because, once he advised Perry and 
Flottman of his desire to challenge the circuit court’s jurisdiction, they had no discretion to 
refuse to explore that defense.  Laughlin discounts Perry’s testimony acknowledging there 
was a jurisdictional issue in this case and he discussed the issue with the prosecuting 
attorney and White, who all reached the same conclusion that concurrent jurisdiction 
existed.  Laughlin also discounts Flottman’s testimony that, in her opinion, the 
jurisdictional challenge was not a “good issue” to raise on appeal.   
“As a practical matter, virtually any decision or action taken by an attorney during 
trial involves the exercise of professional judgment and is clearly discretionary in nature.” 
Kuehne, 321 S.W.3d at 347 n.8 (Ellis, J., concurring).  It is undisputed attorneys exercise 
discretion and judgment in formulating which strategies and defenses to present on their 
clients’ behalf.  State v. Basile, 942 S.W.2d 342, 355 (Mo. banc 1997) (holding “[d]efense 
lawyers are given a broad range of leeway in determining what strategy to follow”); 
Hawkins v. State, 512 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (holding “[c]ounsel is 
allowed wide latitude in conducting a defense and may use his [or her] best judgment”). 
Further, “appellate counsel does not have a duty to raise every appealable issue; counsel 
12 
may strategically decide to forgo certain arguments in favor of others.”  Meiners v. State, 
540 S.W.3d 832, 838 (Mo. banc 2018).  Hence, a public defender’s decision concerning 
which defenses to raise or which issues to present on appeal “requires the exercise of reason 
in the adaption of means to an end and discretion in determining how or whether an act 
should be done or course pursued.”  Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 610.  These decisions are not 
clerical in nature with no regard to the public defender’s judgment or opinion concerning 
the propriety of raising the defenses or issues on appeal.  Perry and Flottman had no clear 
and unequivocal duty to assert the jurisdictional challenge.  These decisions, therefore, are 
not ministerial.  Alsup, 588 S.W.3d at 191. 
Laughlin claims Perry’s and Flottman’s assumptions concurrent jurisdiction existed 
without further researching the issue was negligent because any competent attorney would 
have done so, especially after he brought this claim to their attention.  This argument 
conflates whether Perry’s and Flottman’s actions were discretionary in nature for official 
immunity purposes with whether they violated the standard of care in performing those 
discretionary acts to be found negligent.  Whether a party is immune from suit precedes 
whether a party has violated the standard of care.  Nevertheless, Laughlin equates 
researching the jurisdictional issue with a doctor’s function when he or she is diagnosing a 
medical condition and determining a treatment plan, which he argues could be considered 
ministerial acts.  To support this argument, Laughlin relies on a concurring opinion in 
Canon v. Thumudo, 422 N.W.2d 688, 705 (Mich. 1988), which relied on Eli Lilly, and 
opined: 
13 
A government doctor should not be deemed immune from tort liability 
merely because he is employed by the government.  His actions and decisions 
should be deemed immune only when he is acting as a uniquely 
governmental doctor, such as when he is determining the scope of the 
government’s involvement with a particular patient.  While decisions to 
admit or release patients from government facilities may thus be deserving 
of immunity, routine medical decisions—diagnoses, prescriptions, and 
structuring of treatment plans—should not be so shielded by this Court in the 
declaration of the common law of this state from accountability for 
malpractice. 
The majority in Canon stated otherwise:  “To adopt such a definition for ‘ministerial’ would 
come close to eliminating all immunity for professionals by confusing the issues of 
immunity and negligence.  The distinction is significant.  If every act which deviates from 
a professional norm were to be categorized as ‘ministerial,’ immunity would seldom shield 
professional discretion.”  Id. at 691.  Hence, this case does not aid Laughlin or persuade 
this Court to find Perry’s and Flottman’s decisions concerning whether to raise the 
jurisdictional challenge were ministerial.  Public defenders are the epitome of “individuals 
who, in the face of imperfect information and limited resources, must daily exercise their 
best judgment in conducting the public’s business.”  Kanagawa, 685 S.W.2d at 836.  
Choosing which defenses to raise and arguments to pursue on appeal on behalf of indigent 
clients constitute discretionary acts entitled to official immunity. 
Other Jurisdictions Support Public Defender Immunity  
While the application of Missouri’s official immunity jurisprudence affords Perry 
and Flottman protection, this Court’s decision also is in line with decisions from other 
jurisdictions.  Initially, this Court recognizes the United States Supreme Court has held 
federal public defenders are not entitled to absolute immunity under federal law for state 
14 
 
malpractice actions.  Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 205, 100 S. Ct. 402, 410, 62 L.Ed.2d 
355 (1979).  Ferri did not extend this holding to the states, however, explaining: 
We are not concerned with the elements of a state cause of action for 
malpractice and need not speculate about whether a state court would 
consider [a] petitioner’s allegations sufficient to establish a breach of duty or 
a right to recover damages.  Nor are we concerned with the question whether 
[a state] may conclude as a matter of state law that [a] respondent is 
absolutely immune.  For when state law creates a cause of action, the State 
is free to define the defenses to that claim, including the defense of immunity, 
unless, of course, the state rule is in conflict with federal law. 
 
Id. at 197-98 (footnotes omitted).  In Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923, 104 S. Ct. 2820, 
2826, 81 L.Ed.2d 758 (1984), the United States Supreme Court held state public defenders 
are not immune from federal suit brought pursuant to section 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 
intentional misconduct.  Yet Tower recognized:  
Immunities in this country have regularly been borrowed from the English 
precedents, and the public defender has a reasonably close ‘cousin’ in the 
English barrister.  Like public defenders, barristers are not free to pick and 
choose their clients.  They are thought to have no formal contractual 
relationship with their clients, and they are incapable of suing their clients 
for a fee. 
 
Id. at 921.  Hence, while no jurisdiction—including Missouri—extends immunity to public 
defenders for intentional misconduct, several jurisdictions have extended immunity in 
some manner to public defenders for alleged negligent acts, whether through judicial 
immunity, official immunity, statutory immunity or some other variation thereof.   
The seminal case extending judicial immunity to public defenders is Dziubak v. 
Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993).  The Minnesota Supreme Court relied on several 
public policy reasons to support its decision: 
15 
 
Immunity from suit for public defenders best serves the indigent population 
in preserving the resources of the defender’s office for the defense of the 
criminally accused.  Immunity also aids in the recruitment of qualified 
attorneys to represent indigent clients in criminal proceedings.  Immunity 
preserves the criminal justice system which relies upon the judge, prosecutor 
and public defender as essential participants.  This serves the best interests 
of indigent defendants and of society as a whole .... 
 
Since justice demands that a defense be provided to criminal defendants who 
are not able to afford privately retained counsel, it is essential that a sufficient 
number of qualified attorneys be willing and able to provide this defense.  
Immunity will aid in the continued recruitment of attorneys to perform this 
service in our criminal justice system; such service is eagerly sought by most 
attorneys.  The accused defendant is not the sole beneficiary.  Society as a 
whole depends on the role of defense counsel to secure an ordered system of 
liberty and justice, as ordained by our Constitution. 
 
The extension of immunity to public defenders will ensure that the resources  
available to the public defender will be used for the defense of the accused, 
rather than diminished through the defense of public defenders against civil 
suits for malpractice.  Immunity will conserve these resources to provide an 
effective defense to the greatest number of indigent defendants. 
 
Id. at 777-78; see also Scott v. City of Niagara Falls, 407 N.Y.S.2d 103, 106 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1978) (granting public defenders judicial immunity but not extending immunity to 
negligent performance of ministerial tasks requiring no judgment or discretion).6 
Kentucky extended qualified immunity to public defenders, engaging in a very 
similar analysis as this Court concerning public defenders engaging in discretionary 
functions.  See Jacobi v. Holbert, 553 S.W.3d 246, 256 (Ky. 2018) (holding public 
                                              
6 Two states declined to extend judicial immunity to public defenders.  See Schreiber v. 
Rowe, 814 So.2d 396, 398-99 (Fla. 2002) (rejecting extension of judicial immunity to 
public defenders but noting the legislature extended the waiver of sovereign immunity to 
public defenders, which exempted them from personal liability); Shubert v. Ada Cty., 
461 P.3d 740, 749 (Idaho 2020) (declining to extend common law quasi-judicial immunity 
to public defenders because they do not act as an arm of the court).   
 
16 
 
defenders have qualified immunity when acting in good faith and within the scope of their 
employment).  Pennsylvania, however, rejected qualified immunity.  Reese v. Danforth, 
406 A.2d 735, 737 (Pa. 1979).  Reese is distinguishable from Missouri’s approach because 
Reese holds qualified immunity applies only to policymaking officials and does not extend 
to mere public employees.  Id. 
Several states have extended immunity to public defenders through statutory 
enactment.  In some instances, jurisdictions enacted statutes expressly protecting public 
defenders or include public defenders explicitly within the definition of state or public 
employee.  See Gross v. Rell, 40 A.3d 240, 251 n.7 (Conn. 2012) (noting public defenders 
were added to the definition of state officers and employees entitled to qualified statutory 
sovereign immunity under Connecticut General Statute § 4-141(5)(B)); Johnson v. 
Halloran, 742 N.E.2d 741, 744 (Ill. 2000) (recognizing public defenders do not have 
sovereign immunity but enjoy qualified immunity under chapter 745 ILCS 19/1, Illinois’ 
public and appellate defender immunity act, except for willful and wanton misconduct); 
Wright v. Elston, 701 N.E.2d 1227, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (holding public defenders 
were entitled to statutory immunity pursuant to the Indiana Tort Claim Act, Indiana Code 
§ 34-6-2-38(b), defining them as state and public employees); Ramirez v. Harris, 773 P.2d 
343, 344-45 (holding Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.0307.4(b) defined public defenders as public 
officers and precluded them from being sued for malpractice); Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-14-
109 (providing absolute immunity for “any act of negligence arising from the execution of 
the [public defender’s] official duties as an employee of the district public defenders ….”); 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-14-108 (defining public defenders as state employees); and Mooney 
17 
 
v. Frazier, 693 S.E.2d 333, 337 (W. Va. 2010) (citing Public Defender Services Act, W. 
Va. Code § 29-21-20, providing court-appointed counsel immunity from legal malpractice 
claims). 
In other instances, courts construed statutory language defining public employees 
to include public defenders.  See Wallin v. McCabe, 293 P.3d 81, 83 (Colo. App. 2011) 
(characterizing public defenders as public employees who have immunity derived from 
Colorado statute); Vick v. Haller, 512 A.2d 249, 252 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding public 
defenders have qualified immunity under Delaware’s state tort claims act and reaffirmed 
by Browne v. Robb, 583 A.2d 949, 951 (Del. 1990), and Hanson v. Morton, 67 A.3d 437, 
441 (Del. 2013)); Nieves v. Office of the Pub. Def., No. 082262, 2020 WL 1870253, at *7-
8 (N.J. Apr. 15, 2020) (holding legal malpractice claims against public defenders are 
subject to the New Jersey Torts Claim Act, N.J. Stat. § 59:2-1(a)—which places conditions 
and limits on the ability to recover damages—because the office of the public defender is 
a public entity and its public defenders are public employees); Coyazo v. State, 897 P.2d 
234, 238 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (finding public defenders are public employees for purposes 
of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, N.M. Stat. § 41-4-3F, and have immunity from legal 
malpractice claims); Wooten v. Vogele, 769 N.E.2d 889, 893-94 (Ohio 2001) (defining 
public defenders as employees of a political subdivision who perform a governmental 
function under Ohio Tort Liability Act, Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6), holding public 
employees liable only for conduct that is manifestly outside the scope of employment or 
for conduct that is malicious, reckless, or done in bad faith); Bradshaw v. Joseph, 666 A.2d 
18 
 
1175, 1176-77 (Vt. 1995) (determining public defenders are state employees under statute 
governing tort claims against the state and had immunity from being sued for negligence). 7   
SLEF Coverage Does Not Preclude Official Immunity Application 
The final question this Court must address is whether SLEF coverage for public 
defenders is a valid basis to deny them official immunity.  The General Assembly created 
the SLEF in 1983.  State ex rel. Hawley v. City of St. Louis, 531 S.W.3d 602, 604 (Mo. App. 
E.D. 2017).  The fundamental purpose of the SLEF is  
to protect the covered employees from the burden and expense of civil 
litigation relating to the performance of their duties.  The purposes are 
apparent.  A competent employee, who is in demand elsewhere, may be 
unwilling to work for the state without protection.  Those who do serve may 
be unwilling to take necessary risks for fear of litigation. 
 
Cates v. Webster, 727 S.W.2d 901, 907 (Mo. banc 1987) (Blackmar, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  “[Section] 105.711 applies to lawsuits brought against any officer 
or employee ‘arising out of and performed in connection with his or her official duties on 
                                              
7 Three states declined to extend statutory immunity to public defenders based on the nature 
of their duties.  See Barner v. Leeds, 13 P.3d 704, 714 (Cal. 2000) (holding public defenders 
are not entitled to statutory immunity from malpractice claims because the nature of their 
representation did not involve policy decisions and discretionary acts as contemplated 
under California’s immunity statute); Shubert, 461 P.3d at 750-51 (holding public 
defenders are not entitled to statutory immunity under the discretionary function exemption 
of the Idaho immunity statute); Trobaugh v. Sondag, 668 N.W.2d 577, 585 (Iowa 2003) 
(declining to extend statutory immunity to public defenders because a legal malpractice 
claim was not the functional equivalent of other causes of action specifically exempted 
under the Iowa Tort Claims Act, Iowa Code § 669.14).  Further, Michigan declined to 
extend immunity for appointed criminal attorneys, finding no rationale to distinguish 
between appointed and private counsel.  Donigan v. Finn, 290 N.W.2d 80, 82 (Mich. App. 
1980). 
 
19 
 
behalf of the state, or any agency of the state’ ….”  Smith v. State, 152 S.W.3d 275, 280 
(Mo. banc 2005).  This section further provides: 
The [SLEF] shall be the exclusive remedy and shall preclude any other civil 
actions or proceedings for money damages arising out of or relating to the 
same subject matter against the state officer or employee, or the officer’s or 
employee’s estate.  No officer or employee of the state or any agency of the 
state shall be individually liable in his or her personal capacity for conduct 
of such officer or employee arising out of and performed in connection with 
his or her official duties on behalf of the state or any agency of the state.    
 
Section 105.711.5, RSMo Supp. 2014.  This section reinforces the SLEF’s purpose to 
protect state employees by limiting the circumstances in which they may be sued and held 
liable for conduct arising out of and in connection with their official duties. 
The parties do not dispute Laughlin’s damages award against Perry and Flottman 
would have been paid from the SLEF because they are state employees whose alleged 
malpractice arose out of their official duties on the state’s behalf.  See Johnson, 719 S.W.2d 
at 828 (stating payment of any award against a public defender for a client’s successful 
malpractice claim would have been made from the SLEF).  However, Perry and Flottman 
argue SLEF coverage does not preclude their assertion of official immunity pursuant to 
section 105.726.1.  Laughlin disagrees, arguing the SLEF creates blanket immunity for all 
state employees, regardless of whether they are acting in a discretionary or ministerial 
capacity, but waives sovereign immunity for those actions by creating a legal defense fund 
that compensates individuals injured by state employees.   
Section 105.726.1 provides in pertinent part, “Nothing in sections 105.711 to 
105.726 shall be construed to broaden the liability of the State of Missouri … nor to abolish 
or waive any defense at law which might otherwise be available to any agency, officer, or 
20 
 
employee of the State of Missouri.”  Although a state employee may be afforded protection 
from personal liability for damages under the SLEF, section 105.726.1’s plain language 
expressly provides this protection does not preclude a state employee from asserting any 
and all available defenses, including official immunity that could relieve a state employee 
of liability or prevent the suit from proceeding.   
“‘Immunity’ connotes not only immunity from judgment but also immunity from 
suit.”  Alsup, 588 S.W.3d at 190 (quoting State ex rel. Mo. Dep’t of Agric. v. McHenry, 
687 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Mo. banc 1985)).  Laughlin fails to cite any case holding SLEF 
coverage precludes a party from asserting official immunity as a defense to suit or any case 
in which exposure to personal liability was a factor in determining whether a party may 
assert official immunity.  If this Court construed section 105.726.1 as Laughlin contends 
and declined to extend official immunity to public defenders solely because they have 
SLEF coverage, this would effectively end SLEF coverage for other state employees who 
are entitled to assert official immunity.  Laughlin’s assertions that SLEF coverage affords 
injured parties a means to recover monetary damages and that he will be left without a 
remedy if this Court applies official immunity to public defenders are also unpersuasive.  
Having no remedy or recourse occurs in every case in which official immunity applies and 
serves as no reason to carve out an exception for malpractice claims against public 
defenders solely on that basis.   
To adopt Laughlin’s argument is to fail to acknowledge protection from personal 
liability for a judgment differs significantly from a suit being initiated.  Protection from 
personal liability still subjects a public defender to all of the burdens of litigation—from 
21 
 
discovery to trial—which can be complex, time-consuming, and serve as a distraction from 
an overwhelming caseload.  Consequently, if these cases were permitted to go to trial, the 
benefits of immunity from suit would be lost even if, ultimately, the public defenders were 
not liable personally for any costs or judgments that resulted.  Finally, this Court is mindful 
that the SLEF is a statutory creation, subject to appropriation by the legislature, which may 
choose to amend, defund, or eliminate this coverage at any time.   
Conclusion 
 
Public defenders are entitled to official immunity because they are public employees 
whose official statutory duties concern the performance of discretionary acts.  The circuit 
court’s judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded. 
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE W. DRAPER III, CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
 
All concur.