Title: McGowan v. State
Citation: 269 So. 2d 645
Docket Number: 46952
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: November 27, 1972

269 So. 2d 645 (1972) George McGOWAN v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 46952. Supreme Court of Mississippi. November 27, 1972. W.S. Moore, Charles O. Jones, Jackson, for appellant. A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by J.B. Garretty, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. PATTERSON, Justice. This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Jefferson Davis County wherein George McGowan was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor, third offense, in violation of Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated section 2613 (1956). From this verdict and a sentence of four years in the state penitentiary, three of which were suspended, he appeals. *646 The primary issue before this Court is whether the indictment properly charged the defendant with a violation of Section 2613, as a third offender. The indictment complained of is as follows: Similar indictments have been before this Court on several occasions. The difficulties in drawing a proper indictment under Section 2613 are occasioned by the unusual terms of the statute. It provides by gradient subsections (a), (b) and (c) to impose a more severe punishment for subsequent convictions than for the first. A conviction under subsection (a) of the statute is a misdemeanor; a conviction under subsection (b) of the statute is also a misdemeanor, but permits greater punishment than (a); however, a third conviction under subsection (c) of the statute is a felony punishable by a term in the penitentiary. Section 2613 is as follows: In comparing the charge in the indictment for a first offense, "having previously been convicted of the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor first offense on November 7, 1970, in the Justice of the Peace Court of Beat One of said County," with subsection (a) of the statute, it is noted that the indictment does not charge that the first conviction was "under this section" as provided by the terms of the statute. In comparing the charge in the indictment relating to a second conviction which appears as "and having previously been convicted of the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor to Nolan Jackson in said County, being a second offense, on January 21, 1971, in Cause No. 3065 on the docket of the Circuit Court of said County," it is again noted that the indictment does not charge the conviction to have been "for the second conviction for violating this section" as expressed in subsection (b) thereof. The only reference to the section is found in the conclusion of the indictment wherein it charges "said wilful, unlawful and felonious sale to *647 Bill McKinney being a third offense as prohibited by Section 2613 of Mississippi Code of 1942... ." In determining whether an indictment correctly charged a felony under subsection (c) of this statute, the rule of law was established in Brewsaw v. State, 168 Miss. 371, 151 So. 475 (1933), also on demurrer on the ground that it improperly charged the previous two convictions, we held: In Millwood v. State, 190 Miss. 750, 1 So. 2d 582 (1941), Justice Griffith, speaking for this Court, expounded upon the rule: The rule thus announced in construction of the statute instead of settling the law, seemed to aggravate it since it reappeared in Rogers v. State, 198 Miss. 495, 22 So. 2d 550 (1945), wherein we stated once again: The rule of law having been "tidied up" by three solid decisions, nevertheless refused repose. Its resurgence appears in McGowan v. State, 200 Miss. 270, 25 So. 2d 131, 26 So. 2d 70 (1946). We there held that an indictment under subsection (b), second offense, of the act which referred to the section number was sufficient even though the charge in the indictment relating to the first offenses, one in 1939 and another in 1944, did not specify these convictions to have been under Section 2613. The decision noted the three cases hereinabove cited, but pushed them aside for the moment and established the "modicum of comprehension" rule. We stated: Chief Justice Smith, Justices L.A. Smith, Sr. and Roberds dissented from this opinion by expressing their belief that Brewsaw, Millwood and Rogers, supra, were controlling. Outvoted, the Chief Justice nevertheless formulated in a footnote to his dissenting opinion a proper form for indictment under the statute, evidently hoping that this would attract the eye of attorneys and accomplish that which the opinions had failed to do, namely, establish a proper indictment under the section. This was necessitated by the opinion holding to the contrary of, but not reversing, the previous decisions of Brewsaw, Millwood and Rogers, supra, leaving their status in limbo by these words: "The lines with which we have heretofore bound this statute are too taut to be subjected to further strain." McGowan, supra. (200 Miss. at 279, 25 So.2d at 133). Somewhat later in Riley v. State, 204 Miss. 562, 37 So. 2d 768 (1948), the Court again acknowledged that it ordinarily is not necessary for an indictment which properly sets forth the commission of a crime in language that brings it within the provisions of the statute to refer specifically to the statute, but noted that indictment under Section 2613 was an exception and required this reference, citing Brewsaw and Rogers, supra. It further held that nothing stated in McGowan, supra, was inconsistent with the former cases, stating: Later, in Miles v. State, 51 So. 2d 214 (Miss. 1951), a conviction under Section 2613 was affirmed. The indictment charged that the first offense was in violation of Section 2613. It charged that the second offense was in violation of Section 2613 and that the third violation was under Section *649 2613. It evoked this language by the Court: The rule of law now having survived McGowan, supra, and having been reacclaimed by Riley and Miles, supra, remained dormant until the case of White v. State, 214 Miss. 235, 58 So. 2d 510 (1952), wherein we again determined the same question as follows: Finally, this line of cases, until the present, culminated in Barnes v. State, 239 Miss. 756, 125 So. 2d 293 (1960), with reference to an indictment evidently drawn under Section 2613, wherein we stated: From these authorities we are of the opinion that a proper indictment must make specific and express reference to the statute. Otherwise it will not support a judgment of conviction. The indictment before us does not specifically refer to the section in either its first or second charge. We are of the opinion therefore that the demurrer to the indictment should have been sustained and since it was not, the trial court erred and the cause must be reversed and remanded to the Circuit Court of Jefferson Davis County to await the further action of the grand jury. Since we are of the opinion the indictment was invalid, requiring a reversal, we do not reach the question relating to the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the State in support of a first conviction other than to state that the best evidence of a previous conviction is the judgment of conviction. Brown v. State, 222 Miss. 863, 77 So. 2d 694 (1955). Reversed and remanded. All Justices concur except SUGG, J., and GILLESPIE, C.J., and ROBERTSON, J., who dissent. BROOM, J., took no part. SUGG, Justice (dissenting): With deference, I dissent from the majority opinion in this case because the indictment *650 shows clearly that appellant was convicted on November 7, 1970 in the Justice of the Peace Court of District No. 1 of Jefferson Davis County, Mississippi as a "first offense;" that appellant was convicted on January 21, 1971 in the Circuit Court of Jefferson Davis County, "being a second offense," and that he was charged with the unlawful and felonious sale of intoxicating liquor, `being a third offense," as prohibited by Section 2613 of Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956). The indictment clearly and succinctly charges the essential elements of the offense without unnecessary redundancy or prolixity. In Westmoreland v. State, 246 So. 2d 487 (Miss. 1971), this Court stated: This Court in McGowan v. State, 200 Miss. 270, 25 So. 2d 131, 26 So. 2d 70 (1946) stated: The indictment specifically refers to Section 2613 Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956), such reference being sufficient to charge the first and second offenses as having been committed under the statute. GILLESPIE, C.J., and ROBERTSON, J., join in this dissent.