Title: Walton v. Capital Land Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 952244
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 1, 1996

Present:  All the Justices 
 
NORMAN E. WALTON 
 
v.   Record No. 952244 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                                November 1, 1996 
CAPITAL LAND, INC. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HANOVER COUNTY 
 
Richard H. C. Taylor, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we determine the scope of an easement 
described as an "exclusive easement of right of way." 
 
In 1980, Willow Investment Corporation conveyed a tract of 
land east of Overhill Lake in Hanover County to Norman E. Walton. 
 The grantor reserved an easement in gross described as 
 
AN EXCLUSIVE EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY FOR PURPOSE OF  
INGRESS AND EGRESS TO STATE ROUTE 33, FIFTY FOOT  (50') 
IN WIDTH ALONG THE ENTIRE NORTHERN BOUNDARY OF  THE 
PROPERTY HEREIN CONVEYED. 
 
Capital Land, Inc. (Capital) subsequently acquired an adjacent 
tract consisting of 34.028 acres including Overhill Lake and 
acquired the easement in gross over Walton's land.  Capital 
operates a recreational facility on its tract and approximately 
30,000 patrons use the easement each year. 
 
In 1990, Capital filed this action against Walton, alleging 
that Walton erected a barricade across the easement, harassed 
those trying to use the easement, and blocked drainage through 
his property in order to flood the easement.  Capital sought to 
enjoin Walton from interfering with the free and unfettered 
access of Capital and its patrons to its property.  Capital also 
sought a declaratory judgment that it had the exclusive right to 
use the easement, including the ability to exclude Walton's use 
 
 
 
 
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of the easement.
1
 
The trial court granted a temporary injunction and referred 
the matter to a commissioner in chancery to determine the rights 
and interests of the parties.  The commissioner concluded that 
the easement gave Capital the exclusive right to grant to anyone 
it chose the authority to use the easement for ingress and 
egress, but that the easement was not a grant of a fee.  The 
commissioner found that Walton, as the owner of the fee, retained 
the right to use the easement area but could not use it in a 
manner which interfered with Capital's rights in the easement. 
 
Capital filed exceptions to the commissioner's report, 
challenging his determination that Walton could continue to use 
the area encumbered by the exclusive easement.  The trial court 
sustained Capital's exceptions and entered an order declaring 
that Capital has the exclusive right to determine who may use the 
exclusive easement and may exclude the owner of the servient 
estate, Walton.  We awarded Walton an appeal to consider the 
scope of the easement. 
 
In determining the scope of an easement, we have repeatedly 
held that the owner of the servient estate retains the right to 
 
     
     1The northern 20 feet of Walton's property is also subject 
to a non-exclusive right of way easement created in 1956.  Both 
Walton and Capital are entitled to use this non-exclusive 
easement and Capital did not challenge Walton's right to use 
the northern 20 feet of the 50 foot easement created in 1980.  
Therefore, this opinion only addresses the parties' respective 
rights to use of the southern 30 feet of the 50 foot easement. 
 
 
 
 
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use his land in any manner which does not unreasonably interfere 
with the use granted in the easement.  Preshlock v. Brenner, 234 
Va. 407, 410, 362 S.E.2d 696, 698 (1987); Brown v. Haley, 233 Va. 
210, 216, 355 S.E.2d 563, 568 (1987); Hartsock v. Powell, 199 Va. 
320, 324, 99 S.E.2d 581, 585 (1957).  None of our prior cases, 
however, specifically addresses the legal right of the easement 
owner to exclude the servient owner's use of the land based on 
the phrase "exclusive easement" in the language creating the 
easement. 
 
Ruling that the language creating the easement was 
unambiguous, the trial court looked to the dictionary definition 
of "exclusive" and concluded that the phrase "exclusive easement" 
gives the easement owner the legal right to control who may use 
the easement, including the legal right to exclude the servient 
landowner from using the easement.
2  The trial court's resolution 
of the issue effectively transmuted a grant of an easement into 
the grant of a possessory interest or an estate by allowing the 
owner of the easement to deprive the servient estate owner of the 
use of his land.  
 
If a conveyance grants the right to exclusive use of all or 
part of the servient estate for all purposes, the owner of the 
servient estate is stripped of his right to use the land.  
Conveyances of this sort are generally considered to effectively 
                     
     
     2 Walton did not assign error to the trial court's 
determination that the language creating the easement was 
unambiguous.  
 
 
 
 
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transfer an interest in fee, not an easement, and are not 
favored.  If, however, the conveyance limits exclusive use of all 
or part of the servient estate to a particular purpose, the 
conveyance is an easement and the servient landowner retains the 
right to use the land in ways not inconsistent with the uses 
granted in the easement.   Restatement of Property § 471, cmt. a, 
b, e (1944); 7 Thompson on Real Property, Thomas Edition (David 
A. Thomas ed. 1994) § 60.04(b)(1)-(2).  
 
In this case, the language creating the easement limited its 
use in two ways.  First, the easement is limited to use as a 
"right of way" and second, the right of way can only be used for 
the "purpose of ingress and egress to State Route 33."   This 
limiting language is consistent with the category of conveyances 
which are true easements and leaves the servient owner with the 
right to use his land in a manner not inconsistent with the 
nature of the uses granted to the owner of the easement. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse that portion of the judgment of 
the trial court sustaining Capital's exceptions to the report of 
the commissioner and its holding that Capital has the right to 
exclude the owner of the servient tract from using the easement. 
 We will enter final judgment here specifying that Walton retains 
the right to use the easement but in a manner that does not 
interfere with Capital's right to use the easement for the 
purpose of ingress and egress to State Route 33. 
                                              Reversed in part,
                                        
and final judgment.