Title: Christ/Tauman v. Myers
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S52664
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: November 18, 2005

FILED:  November 18, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
THOMAS M. CHRIST,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent.
CHARLES S. TAUMAN,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S52664 (Control), S52667)
(Cases Consolidated)
En Banc
On petitions to review ballot title.
Submitted on the record September 30, 2005.
Thomas M. Christ, Portland, filed the petition for himself.
Steven C. Berman, of Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting &amp; Shlachter,
P.C., Portland, filed the petition for petitioner Tauman.
Ryan Kahn, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed the
answering memorandum for respondent.  With him on the memorandum
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
GILLETTE, J.
Ballot title referred to Attorney General for modification.
GILLETTE, J.
This ballot title review proceeding brought under ORS
250.085(2) concerns the Attorney General's certified ballot title
for a proposed initiative measure, denominated by the Secretary
of State as Initiative Petition 41 (2006).  Petitioners are
electors who timely submitted written comments to the Secretary
of State concerning the content of the Attorney General's draft
ballot title and who therefore are entitled to seek review of the
resulting certified ballot title in this court.  See ORS
250.085(2) (stating that requirement).  We review the Attorney
General's certified ballot title to determine whether it
substantially complies with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2)(a)
to (d).  ORS 250.085(5).  For the reasons that follow, we
conclude that it does not.  Accordingly, we refer the ballot
title to the Attorney General for modification.
The proposed measure is set out in its entirety in the
Appendix.  For purposes of introduction, the following summary
suffices.  The proposed measure begins as follows:
"Be it Enacted by the People of the State of
Oregon:
"1[.] This Act shall be known as The Peoples'
Court Act[.]
"2[.] The seven judges of the Supreme Court of
Oregon shall be elected from districts within the
state.  Six judges shall be elected from each of six
geographic districts,[\fn,1\] and one judge shall be
elected in a statewide district.  The judge elected
statewide shall be the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court."
The proposed measure goes on in eight additional numbered
paragraphs to provide, inter alia, how the six geographic
districts will be formed (viz., by combining certain Oregon
Senate districts), how the judges will be elected from those
districts, and how incumbent members of the court fit into the
proposed system.  The proposed measure also provides that the
Chief Justice will be elected in the state at large and will have
administrative authority over the state Judicial Department.
We do not think it useful to set out the Attorney
General's certified ballot title in its entirety.  Instead, we
limit our recitation of the ballot title to those parts that are
at issue.  The Attorney General's caption for the Initiative
Petition 41 states:
"AMENDS CONSTITUTION: REQUIRES ELECTION OF SIX OREGON
SUPREME COURT JUDGES BY GEOGRAPHIC DISTRICTS; CHIEF
JUSTICE ELECTED STATEWIDE"
The Attorney General's summary for the proposed measure also
begins with the phrase "Amends Constitution."  
Both petitioners challenge the caption and the summary
in the Attorney General's certified ballot title on the same
ground.  They assert that the Attorney General's caption and
summary should not begin with the words, "Amends Constitution,"
because the proposed measure is, in fact, a proposed statute and
not a proposed constitutional amendment.
Ordinarily, a caption for the ballot title for a
proposed initiative measure consists of "not more than 15 words
that reasonably identif[y] the subject matter of the state
measure."  ORS 250.035(2)(a).  However, when the proposed
initiative measure would amend the constitution, 
"[t]he caption of an initiative or referendum amendment
to the constitution shall begin with the phrase,
'Amends Constitution,' which shall not be counted for
purposes of the 15-word limitation."\fn,2\
Id. (emphasis added).  Thus, as a part of his statutory
obligation to prepare ballot titles, the Attorney General is
required to determine in each case involving a proposed
initiative measure whether that measure would amend the state
constitution and, if it would, to include the phrase "Amends
Constitution" in the caption.  The question in this case is
whether the Attorney General properly chose to label the proposed
initiative measure as such a constitutional amendment.
We have little difficulty in concluding that the
Attorney General erred.  We begin with the text of Initiative
Petition 41 itself.  We note that nothing in that proposed
measure states, suggests, or even fairly may be said to imply
that the measure is intended to be a constitutional amendment,
either by changing existing wording in the Oregon Constitution or
by adding new wording or provisions to it.  
In contrast to what the proposed initiative measure
does not say, what it does say is telling.  As noted, the
proposed measure twice characterizes itself in its first
paragraph as an "Act":  "This Act shall be known as The Peoples'
Court Act[.]"  (Emphasis added.)  Similarly, the fourth paragraph
of the proposed initiative measure states that "[t]his Act shall
not have the effect of shortening the term of any incumbent
judge," the ninth paragraph offers the assurance that "[t]his Act
is intended to bring the Supreme Court of Oregon closer to the
people," and the tenth paragraph provides that "[t]his Act takes
effect upon Passage [and] * * * [c]ertain parts of the Act are
operative on delayed dates as specified in the Act."  (Emphasis
added.)  
The proposed measure's repeated self-characterization
is important, because the term "act" has a special and well-recognized meaning in the area of lawmaking:  An "act" ordinarily
is a legislatively passed statute.  Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary 20 (unabridged ed 2002) defines an "act" as
"the formal product of a legislative body: the formally
declared will of a legislature the final requirement of
which is usu[ally] the signature of the proper
executive officer: STATUTE  * * *."
Thus, taking the proposed initiative measure at its word, the
most reasonable reading of it is that it is intended to be a
statute, not a constitutional amendment.
In addition to the foregoing, context within chapter
250 of the Oregon Revised Statutes confirms that the legislature
recognizes that the meaning of "act" on which we rely is apt in
cases involving proposed initiative measures.  ORS 250.005(3),
one of the provisions in chapter 250 setting out definitions,
provides that, for purposes of an initiative, the term "measure"
includes:
"(a) A proposed law.
"(b) An Act or part of an Act of the legislative
assembly.
"(c) A revision of or amendment to the Oregon
Constitution."
That is, "Acts" are different than constitutional amendments.
In response, the Attorney General relies on the
Secretary of State's form (a form denominated "SEL 310") that the
sponsors of Initiative Petition 41 filed with the Secretary of
State respecting the proposed measure.  That form offered the
sponsors two boxes, one labeled "statutory" and the other labeled
"constitutional."  The sponsors checked the box labeled
"constitutional."  Such a choice, the Attorney General asserts,
designates the measure as a "constitutional amendment," and "the
Attorney General must adhere to that designation."
We cannot accept that explanation, which would make the
Attorney General the prisoner of a choice -- perhaps informed,
perhaps not, perhaps even intentionally duplicitous -- by a
measure's sponsor to check one or another box on a form.  As our
earlier recitation of the pertinent statutory tasks assigned to
the Attorney General shows, that officer is charged by
legislation with drafting a ballot title that properly labels a
proposed initiative measure.  No piece of paper, indeed no rule,
created by the Secretary of State can relieve or excuse the
Attorney General from that statutory obligation. 
The Attorney General, relying on various older opinions
of this court,\fn,3\ argues that he is not permitted, in the
ballot title process, to "interpret" the "practical effect" of a
proposed initiative measure.  That argument is not well taken. 
The statutory framework in which the Attorney General performs
the ballot title preparation function may deny the Attorney
General the right to speculate as to a proposed initiative
measure's meaning, where two or more reasonable interpretations
are possible.  But the statutory standards in ORS 250.035(2)(a)
(requiring Attorney General to prepare caption "that reasonably
identifies the subject matter" of the proposed measure); (2)(b)
(requiring a "simple and understandable statement * * * that
describes the result if the state measure is approved"); (2)(c)
(requiring a "simple and understandable statement * * * that
describes the result if the state measure is rejected"); and
(2)(d) (requiring a statement "summarizing the state measure and
its major effect") all require a degree of interpretive effort by
the Attorney General.  See, e.g., Kain/Waller v. Myers, 337 Or
36, 93 P3d 62 (2004) (interpreting ORS 250.035(2)(a) and (b), and
illustrating proposition).  The Attorney General should not in
the future rely on apparently contrary statements from our older
decisions.  Instead, the Attorney General must recognize that his
or her statutory obligation includes a certain amount of basic
interpretation including, in this case, an independent assessment
of what the proposed initiative measure in this case is --
statutory enactment or constitutional amendment.  He or she must
make that identification in order to inform potential signers of
the initiative petition as to what the "practical effect" of the
proposed measure will be if it is adopted. 
The noted textual and contextual points all lead
inevitably in the same direction.  The lack of any mention of the
Oregon Constitution in Initiative Petition 41, the proposed
measure's self-characterization as an "Act," the ordinary meaning
of that term, and the specific legislative recognition in ORS
chapter 250 of the meaning of "Act" as something different from a
constitutional amendment establish that Initiative Petition 41 is
a proposed statute, not a proposed constitutional amendment.  The
Attorney General's contrary arguments are unavailing.
We hold that the caption and the summary of the
Attorney General's certified ballot title fail to meet the
requirement of ORS 250.085(5) that they substantially comply with
the requirements set out in ORS 250.035(2)(a) and (d).  The
ballot title must be referred to the Attorney General for
modification.  See ORS 250.085(8) (authorizing such disposition).
One other issue requires mention.  Petitioner Tauman
asserts that the Attorney General's "no" result statement also
fails to meet the standard of ORS 250.085(5) because it
incorrectly indicates that current Oregon law contains no
residency requirement for members of the Oregon Supreme Court. 
See ORS 250.035(2)(c) (setting out standards for "no" result
statement).  The Attorney General concedes that his "no" result
statement is deficient in that respect, and we agree.  By
statute, members of the Oregon Supreme Court must have resided in
the state for at least three years before assuming office.  ORS
2.020(1).  The Attorney General's certified ballot title,
therefore, is referred to the Attorney General for modification
on that ground as well.
Ballot title referred to Attorney General for
modification.
APPENDIX
PROPOSED MEASURE
Be It Enacted by the People of the State of Oregon:
1 This Act shall be know[n] as the Peoples'
Court Act
2 The seven judges of the Supreme Court of
Oregon shall be elected from districts within
the state.  Six judges shall be elected from
each of six geographic districts, and one
judge shall be elected in a statewide
district.  The judge elected statewide shall
be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
3 The seven existing positions on the Supreme
Court of Oregon shall be assigned to the
following geographic districts, consisting of
the following State Senate districts:
4 Any judge who is in office or is a judge-elect as of January 1, 2007 shall remain
assigned to the court position to which the
judge was elected until the conclusion of the
term for which the judge was elected.  This
Act shall not have the effect of shortening
the term of any incumbent judge.
5 Any candidate for election as judge of the
Supreme Court of Oregon must reside in the
geographic district assigned to the
respective position at the time of filing for
election to the position.
6 Any judge of the Supreme Court of Oregon must
reside in the geographic district assigned to
the judge's position throughout the judge's
term of office.  This residency requirement
does not apply for the immediate term of any
judge who is already in office, or is a
judge-elect, as of January 1, 2007.
7 Current law relating to selection of the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Oregon
shall remain in effect until such time as
position number 7 on the Supreme Court is
next filled by election.  The next regular
election to fill position number 7 shall be
for the statewide district and the judge who
takes office upon such election shall be
Chief Justice upon taking office.
8 At any time that the Chief Justice position
is vacant, the other members of the Supreme
Court may elect, from among the judges of the
Supreme Court, an Acting Chief Justice, who
shall so serve until the Chief Justice is
duly selected by interim appointment by the
governor of by election.
9 This Act is intended to bring the Supreme
Court of Oregon closer to the people by
having each of six judges elected by
geographic district, and by having the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court directly elected
by all the people.  The Chief Justice shall
have equal authority to decide cases with
each of the six other judges, but shall
exercise the power, inherent in the office of
Chief Justice, to manage the administrative
affairs and organization of the Judicial
Department.  Powers held by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of Oregon as of November
1, 2006 shall remain with any Chief Justice
elected under this Act.  Such powers may not
be diminished except by vote of the
Legislative Assembly or by vote of the
people.
10  This Act takes effect upon Passage.  Certain
parts of the Act are operative on delayed
dates as specified in the Act.
1. We recognize the unfortunate imprecision inherent in
the phrase, "[s]ix judges shall be elected from each of six
geographic districts":  Read literally, the wording calls for the
election of a total of 36 Supreme Court judges (six "from each"
of six specified geographic districts).  However, the overall
context in which the phrase appears makes it clear that the
sponsors of the proposed measure do not intend to expand the size
of the court from seven to 37.  What is intended is that one
judge shall be elected "from each" of the six specified
geographic districts.
2. There is no similar statutory requirement respecting
the content of the Attorney General's summary, which is described
in ORS 250.035(2)(d) simply as a "concise and impartial statement
of not more than 125 words summarizing the state measure and its
major effect."  Neither is there a similar statutory exemption
from the word limit for the use of the phrase "Amends
Constitution."  However, it is difficult to imagine a summary of
a state measure proposing to amend the constitution that would be
adequate without including that information in some form.
3. The Attorney General cites Kouns v. Paulus, 296 Or 826,
828, 680 P2d 385 (1984) (not Attorney General's role in ballot
title process to interpret words of proposed measure); Hand v.
Roberts, 309 Or 430, 438, 788 P2d 446 (1990) ("[t]his court * * *
assiduously attempts to avoid deciding questions of the practical
effect of initiative * * * measures in its review of a certified
ballot title"); and ACLU v. Paulus, 282 Or 539, 544, 580 P2d 168
(1978) (inappropriate for Attorney General to speculate on
meaning of wording of the proposed measure).