Title: J.R. v. Palmer
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC13-1549
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 14, 2015

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC13-1549 
_____________ 
 
J.R., 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
BARBARA PALMER, etc., 
Appellee. 
 
[May 14, 2015] 
 
LABARGA, C.J. 
 
In this case we consider three questions of law certified by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concerning the agency review 
requirements for the continued involuntary admission of developmentally disabled 
individuals to residential services under chapter 393, Florida Statutes (2011).  We 
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const.  Specifically, the Eleventh 
Circuit certified the following questions: 
1) Does “support plan” review under Fla. Stat. § 393.0651 require the 
Agency for Persons with Disabilities to consider the propriety of a 
continued involuntary admission to residential services order entered 
under Fla. Stat. § 393.11? 
2) Is the Agency for Persons with Disabilities required, pursuant to 
Fla. Stat. § 393.0651 and/or Fla. Stat. § 393.11, to petition the circuit 
 
 
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court for the release from an involuntary admission order in cases 
where the APD determines that the circumstances that led to the initial 
admission have changed? 
3) Does Fla. Stat. § 393.062 et. seq. provide a statutory mandate to 
meaningfully periodically review involuntary admissions to non-
secure residential services consistent with the commitment schemes 
discussed in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 99 S. Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 
101 (1979) and Williams v. Wallis, 734 F.2d 1434 (11th Cir. 1984)? 
 
J.R. v. Hansen (J.R. II), 736 F.3d 959, 974 (11th Cir. 2013).  For the reasons we 
explain, we answer the first two certified questions in the negative and decline to 
answer the third certified question. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
J.R. is an intellectually disabled man with an IQ of 56, who functions at the 
level of a seven-year-old.  In 2000, J.R. was charged with sexual battery in Lee 
County, Florida.  In 2001, the circuit court concluded that J.R. was incompetent to 
stand trial and involuntarily committed him to the Department of Children and 
Family Services.1,2  In 2004, J.R. was involuntarily admitted to nonsecure 
residential services under section 393.11, Florida Statutes.  The involuntary 
admission order does not include an end date for J.R.’s involuntary admission. 
                                          
 
 
1.  Prior to October 2004, the Agency for Persons with Disabilities existed as 
the Developmental Disabilities Program within the Department of Children and 
Family Services.   
 
2.  In 2007, the Legislature authorized the use of the name Department of 
Children and Families.  See ch. 2007-174, Laws of Fla. 
 
 
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Upon his admission to nonsecure residential services, J.R. was given a 
support plan, and that plan is periodically reviewed and revised under section 
393.0651, Florida Statutes.  Under section 393.0651, the Agency for Persons with 
Disabilities (Agency) is required to conduct an annual support plan review for each 
person who receives services from the Agency.  As a result, while J.R. has lived in 
multiple group homes since his commitment, the limitations on his activities have 
varied—and will continue to change—with the periodic revisions to his support 
plan.  The circuit court, however, has not held a hearing on J.R.’s continued 
involuntary admission since 2005. 
On August 25, 2011, J.R. filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida against the 
Director of the Agency.  Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any 
person who deprives another of rights under the color of law.  Section 1988 
governs proceedings in vindication of civil rights and provides for prevailing party 
attorney’s fees for section 1983 claims.  J.R. sought a declaratory judgment that 
Florida’s statutory scheme for involuntarily admitting intellectually disabled 
persons to residential services under section 393.11, Florida Statutes, is facially 
unconstitutional.  J.R. argued that the statutory scheme violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it does not provide people who have 
been involuntarily admitted to nonsecure residential services with periodic review 
 
 
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of their continued involuntary confinement by a decision-maker who has authority 
to release them.  Both J.R. and the Agency filed motions for summary judgment. 
The district court granted the Agency’s motion for summary judgment and 
denied J.R.’s motion for summary judgment.  J.R. v. Hansen (J.R. I), No. 
4:11cv417-WS, 2012 WL 1886438, at *14-15 (N.D. Fla. May 22, 2012).  The 
court noted that a plaintiff in a procedural due process claim “must prove three 
elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property 
interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.”  Id. at *7.  
The court concluded that the first two elements—deprivation of a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest and state action—were “easily proved.”  Id. at *7-8.  
However, after analyzing section 393.11 in light of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319 (1976), Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), and Williams v. Wallis, 734 F.2d 
1434 (11th Cir. 1984), the court determined that the third element—
constitutionally inadequate process—was not established.  J.R. I, 2012 WL 
1886438 at *13.  As a result, the district court concluded that section 393.11, 
Florida Statutes, is constitutional.  Id. at *15.  The court explained: 
Here, the Florida Legislature has fashioned what, in essence, is 
a nonadversarial scheme that (1) allows section 393.11 clients and 
their family members or advocates to provide input into the 
development and annual revision of support plans that detail “the most 
appropriate, least restrictive, and most cost-beneficial environment for 
accomplishment of the objectives for client progress and a 
specification of all services authorized,” § 393.0651; (2) authorizes 
[the Agency]—through the advice of specialists and without court 
 
 
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involvement—to decide what is “the most appropriate, least 
restrictive, and most cost-beneficial environment” suitable for a 
client’s individual needs and behaviors; (3) authorizes [the Agency]—
with client input and without court approval—to move a client to 
progressively less restrictive environments as the client’s needs and 
behaviors change; and (4) places an implicit burden on [the Agency], 
rather than the client, to petition the court for release from an order of 
involuntary admission when the conditions for release are indicated. 
 
Id. at *14. 
J.R. appealed the district court’s decision to the Eleventh Circuit.  After 
explaining the elements of a claim brought under section 1983, the Eleventh 
Circuit concluded that “the first two elements of the test for a claim of the denial of 
due process are easily established here.”  J.R. II, 736 F.3d at 965.  The Eleventh 
Circuit then addressed whether section “393.11 provides constitutionally adequate 
process” regarding review of involuntary admission orders.  Id.  The Eleventh 
Circuit noted that J.R. did not challenge the constitutionality of his initial 
involuntary admission.  Id. at 962 n.2. 
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by noting that “[t]he [Agency] has 
pointed to nothing explicit in the statute indicating that an obligation exists and has 
offered no evidence of procedures in place to require periodic review of the 
involuntary commitment status of these people.”  Id. at 971.  Based primarily on 
Parham and Williams, the Eleventh Circuit determined that there are “at least four 
guiding principles . . . in analyzing Florida’s involuntary admission to residential 
services scheme.”  Id. at 968.  First, some form of periodic review is required to 
 
 
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protect against the erroneous deprivation of liberty.  Id.  “Second, adversarial 
judicial review is not necessary to protect against the erroneous deprivation of 
liberty where medical professionals are well positioned and mandated to consider 
the propriety of ongoing commitment.”  Id.  “Third, adversarial judicial review is 
not necessary . . . where medical professionals are well positioned and mandated to 
act when an ongoing commitment is no longer proper.”  Id. at 969.  And “[f]ourth, 
the availability of adversarial judicial review in the form of habeas proceedings 
serves as a backup plan to protect against erroneous deprivations of liberty.”  Id. 
The Eleventh Circuit expressed doubt regarding whether Florida’s scheme 
satisfies these factors.  Id. at 971-73.  First, the Eleventh Circuit questioned 
whether the statutes require the Agency to periodically review involuntary 
admission orders.  Id. at 971.  Section 393.0651 does not explicitly require the 
Agency to periodically review involuntary admission orders to determine whether 
an admitted person continues to meet the standard for involuntary admission set 
out in section 393.11.  Id.  Instead, section 393.0651 requires the Agency to 
annually review whether the client has been placed in “the most appropriate, least 
restrictive, and most cost-beneficial environment for accomplishment of the 
objectives for client progress.”  Id. at 971.  Based on this discrepancy, the Eleventh 
Circuit concluded that “periodic support plan reviews consider only half of the 
 
 
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ultimate question of whether it is necessary for someone to be involuntarily 
admitted to residential services.”  Id. at 972. 
Second, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that section 393.0651 “does not 
provide procedures for the [Agency] if it were to decide someone should be 
released from an involuntary admission order.”  Id.  The Eleventh Circuit 
explained that “[n]othing on the face of § 393.0651 mandates that the [Agency], 
having found a client to no longer be a danger to himself or to others, should 
petition the circuit court [for a client’s release], the only body with the power to 
alter the order.”  Id.  The court pointed out that other sections in chapter 393 
require judicial review of “an involuntary admission order to non-secure residential 
services” under specific circumstances involving minors.  Id. (discussing §§ 
393.11(9)(b), 393.115, Fla. Stat.).  The Eleventh Circuit also noted “that the 
Florida legislature has required periodic judicial review in other contexts,” such as 
secure detention of intellectually disabled persons under section 916.303(3), 
Florida Statutes, involuntary commitment of persons with mental illness under 
sections 394.4655(7) and 394.467(7), Florida Statutes, and involuntary 
commitment of sexually violent predators under sections 394.918(1), (3), Florida 
Statutes.  J.R. II, 736 F.3d at 972-73. 
The Eleventh Circuit certified three questions to this Court because it was 
“not comfortable merely affirming [the district court’s] ruling based on implied 
 
 
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obligations not explicit on the face of the statute,” and the Florida Supreme Court, 
rather than a federal court, is “the arbiter[] of Florida law.”  Id. at 973.  In the 
analysis that follows, we first set out the arguments presented by J.R. and the 
Agency.  We then review the specific relevant provisions of chapter 393 and 
answer the first two certified questions in the negative.  Finally, we explain why 
we decline to answer the third certified question. 
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS 
J.R. contends that each of the certified questions should be answered in the 
negative.  He argues that the first certified question should be answered in the 
negative because support plan review under section 393.0651, Florida Statutes 
(2011), does not require the Agency to consider the continued propriety of an 
involuntary admission order.  J.R. then argues that the second certified question 
should be answered in the negative because neither section 393.0651 nor section 
393.11 requires the Agency to petition the circuit court for an individual’s release 
from an involuntary admission order when the circumstances that led to the initial 
involuntary admission have changed.  Finally, J.R. argues that the third certified 
question should be answered in the negative because chapter 393 does not provide 
a statutory mandate for meaningful periodic review of involuntary admission 
orders in accordance with Parham and Williams. 
 
 
- 9 - 
The Agency argues that each of the certified questions should be answered 
in the affirmative because the obligations implicit in sections 393.0651 and 393.11 
require the Agency to review the continued propriety of an initial involuntary 
admission order during annual support plan review and petition the circuit court if 
an individual’s circumstances have changed to the point that involuntary admission 
is no longer appropriate.  The Agency maintains that support plan review provides 
the necessary meaningful periodic review.  The Agency further contends that this 
Court is required to interpret sections 393.0651 and 393.11 in a way that upholds 
their constitutionality. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
 
Chapter 393, Florida Statutes (2011), addresses the treatment of 
developmentally disabled individuals.  A “client” of the Agency is “any person 
determined eligible by the agency for services under this chapter.”  § 393.063(5), 
Fla. Stat. (2011).  The Agency provides both voluntary and involuntary services to 
persons with developmental disabilities.  See §§ 393.065, 393.11, Fla. Stat. (2011). 
Section 393.11 governs the involuntary admission of developmentally 
disabled individuals to residential services.  In order for an individual to be 
involuntarily admitted to residential services, the circuit court must find that: 
1.  The person is mentally retarded or autistic; 
2.  Placement in a residential setting is the least restrictive and 
most appropriate alternative to meet the person’s needs; and 
 
 
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3.  Because of the person’s degree of mental retardation or 
autism, the person: 
a.  Lacks sufficient capacity to give express and informed 
consent to a voluntary application for services pursuant to s. 393.065 
and lacks basic survival and self-care skills to such a degree that close 
supervision and habilitation in a residential setting is necessary and, if 
not provided, would result in a real and present threat of substantial 
harm to the person’s well-being; or 
b.  Is likely to physically injure others if allowed to remain at 
liberty. 
 
§ 393.11(8)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011).  Within forty-five days of receiving an order 
involuntarily admitting a person to residential services, the Agency must “provide 
the court with a copy of the person’s family or individual support plan and copies 
of all examinations and evaluations, outlining the treatment and rehabilitative 
programs.  The agency shall document that the person has been placed in the most 
appropriate, least restrictive and cost-beneficial residential setting.”  
§ 393.11(8)(e), Fla. Stat. (2011).  The circuit court that enters the initial 
involuntary admission order 
has continuing jurisdiction to enter further orders to ensure that the 
person is receiving adequate care, treatment, habilitation, and 
rehabilitation, including psychotropic medication and behavioral 
programming.  Upon request, the court may transfer the continuing 
jurisdiction to the court where a client resides if it is different from 
where the original involuntary admission order was issued.  A person 
may not be released from an order for involuntary admission to 
residential services except by the order of the court. 
 
§ 393.11(11), Fla. Stat. (2011).  An involuntary admission order may be appealed 
by “[a]ny party to the proceeding who is affected by an order of the court, 
 
 
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including the agency.”  § 393.11(12), Fla. Stat. (2011).  In addition, an 
involuntarily admitted person may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “to 
question the cause, legality, and appropriateness of the person’s involuntary 
admission” at any time.  § 393.11(13), Fla. (2011). 
 
All clients of the Agency must have their support plans reviewed and revised 
annually.  § 393.0651(7), Fla. Stat. (2011).  Section 393.0651 governs support plan 
review for clients enrolled in the Agency’s services and states that: 
Each plan must include the most appropriate, least restrictive, and 
most cost-beneficial environment for accomplishment of the 
objectives for client progress and a specification of all services 
authorized.  The plan must include provisions for the most appropriate 
level of care for the client.  Within the specification of needs and 
services for each client, when residential care is necessary, the agency 
shall move toward placement of clients in residential facilities based 
within the client’s community.  The ultimate goal of each plan, 
whenever possible, shall be to enable the client to live a dignified life 
in the least restrictive setting, be that in the home or in the 
community. 
 
“In developing a client’s annual family or individual support plan, the individual or 
family with the assistance of the support planning team shall identify measurable 
objectives for client progress and shall specify a time period expected for 
achievement of each objective.”  § 393.0651(6), Fla. Stat. (2011).  “The agency 
shall develop and specify by rule the core components of support plans.”                
§ 393.0651(1), Fla. Stat. (2011).  Clients or their parents, guardians, or client 
 
 
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advocates are permitted to administratively challenge the results of a support plan 
or a revision to a support plan.  § 393.0651(8), Fla. Stat. (2011). 
ANALYSIS 
 
In the first two certified questions, this Court is asked to interpret provisions 
of chapter 393, Florida Statutes.  In Diamond Aircraft Industries, Inc. v. 
Horowitch, 107 So. 3d 362, 367 (Fla. 2013), we explained that: 
Legislative intent is the polestar that guides our analysis regarding the 
construction and application of the statute.  See Bautista v. State, 863 
So. 2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003).  Our statutory analysis begins with the 
plain meaning of the actual language of the statute, as we discern 
legislative intent primarily from the text of the statute.  See Heart of 
Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 198 (Fla. 2007).  If statutory 
language is “clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite 
meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory 
interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and 
obvious meaning.”  Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) 
(quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 
1931)). 
 
Further, “courts of this state are ‘without power to construe an unambiguous statute 
in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable 
and obvious implications.  To do so would be an abrogation of legislative     
power.’ ”  Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d at 219 (quoting Am. Bankers Life Assurance 
Co. of Fla. v. Williams, 212 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)).  When a 
specific provision is not included in a statute, we have explained that: 
“[W]here the legislature has inserted a provision in only one of 
two statutes that deal with closely related subject matter, it is 
reasonable to infer that the failure to include that provision in the 
 
 
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other statute was deliberate rather than inadvertent.”  2B Norman J. 
Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction     
§ 51:2 (7th ed. 2008).  “In the past, we have pointed to language in 
other statutes to show that the legislature ‘knows how to’ accomplish 
what it has omitted in the statute [we were interpreting].”  Cason v. 
Fla. Dep’t of Mgmt. Services, 944 So. 2d 306, 315 (Fla. 2006); see 
also Horowitz v. Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd. P’ship, 959 So. 2d 176, 
185 (Fla. 2007); Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So. 2d 294, 298 (Fla. 2000). 
 
Olmstead v. FTC, 44 So. 3d 76, 82 (Fla. 2010). 
 
We reject the Agency’s argument that we are required to find the implied 
obligations in sections 393.0651 and 393.11 because we must interpret the statutes 
in a way that upholds their constitutionality.  Certified questions one and two ask 
us to interpret the provisions of section 393.0651 and 393.11 in order to assist the 
Eleventh Circuit in resolving this case.  Certified questions one and two do not ask 
us to resolve the ultimate issue in this case—whether section 393.11 is facially 
unconstitutional.  See Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 1206 
(Fla. 2010) (distinguishing “the subject of the certified question from the issue of 
whether exercising jurisdiction over Marshall would violate due process”). 
Support Plan Review 
We answer the Eleventh Circuit’s first certified question in the negative 
because support plan review under section 393.0651 does not require the Agency 
to consider the continued propriety of an involuntary admission order entered 
under section 393.11.  As the Agency conceded before the Eleventh Circuit, the 
 
 
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requirements for involuntary admission are not explicitly discussed anywhere in 
section 393.0651.  See J.R. II, 736 F.3d at 971. 
Section 393.0651 provides a comprehensive scheme regarding annual 
support plan review for the Agency’s clients.  Section 393.0651 details who is 
involved in a client’s annual support plan review, the factors that must be 
considered during the support plan review, and the order in which the various 
residential placement options must be considered.  Section 393.0651 also requires 
that the support plan establish measurable goals for client progress; support plans 
for clients who are public school students are coordinated with individual 
education plans; and the Agency promulgate rules regarding the core components 
of support plans.  The statutory scheme also affords the right to an administrative 
appeal of the decision reached following annual review of a support plan.  Even 
though section 393.0651(1) mandates that the Agency “shall develop and specify 
by rule the core components of support plans,” the Agency has not pointed to any 
rule in its brief to this Court or the Eleventh Circuit that requires consideration of 
whether the elements required for involuntary admission are still satisfied during a 
client’s annual support plan review.  See J.R. II, 736 F.3d at 971. 
 
Nothing within the text of section 393.0651 can be construed to include 
consideration of the elements that must be established in order for a person to be 
involuntarily committed under section 393.11(8)(b).  Nor can section 393.0651 be 
 
 
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construed to include consideration of whether a client is a danger to himself or 
others to satisfy the third element for involuntary admission in section 
393.11(8)(b)3.  All clients of the Agency—both voluntarily and involuntarily 
admitted clients—receive annual support plan review.  Nothing in section 
393.0651 indicates that support plan review for involuntarily admitted clients 
differs in any way from support plan review for voluntarily admitted clients. 
The Agency’s reliance on section 393.0651’s requirement that each support 
plan “must include the most appropriate, least restrictive, and most cost-beneficial 
environment for accomplishment of the objectives for client progress and a 
specification of all services authorized” does not take into account the continued 
appropriateness of an involuntary admission order.  The text of section 
393.11(8)(b)2, which sets forth the second element that must be found by a circuit 
judge in order for a person to be involuntarily admitted, substantially overlaps with 
the requirement regarding support plan review relied on by the Agency—
“[p]lacement in a residential setting is the least restrictive and most appropriate 
alternative to meet the person’s needs.”  If the Legislature intended for support 
plan review to require consideration of all of the elements for involuntary 
admission, section 393.0651 would have expressly provided for it.  See Olmstead, 
44 So. 3d at 82. 
 
 
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The Agency contends that the statement of legislative purpose behind 
chapter 393 supports the finding of an implied obligation; however, the legislative 
purpose does not support that proposition.  The legislative purpose stated in section 
393.062 provides 
the development and implementation of community-based services 
that will enable individuals with developmental disabilities to achieve 
their greatest potential for independent and productive living, enable 
them to live in their own homes or in residences located in their 
communities, and permit them to be diverted or removed from 
unnecessary institutional placements. 
 
The legislative purpose fails to address continued review of the appropriateness of 
an involuntary admission order because it does not take into account section 
393.11(8)(b)3, which requires finding that an individual would be a danger to 
himself or others if he is allowed to remain at liberty.  Section 393.0651 contains a 
stated goal similar to the legislative purpose discussed above:  “The ultimate goal 
of each plan, whenever possible, shall be to enable the client to live a dignified life 
in the least restrictive setting, be that in the home or in the community.”  Like 
chapter 393’s statement of legislative purpose, this goal does not address or imply 
the continued review of the appropriateness of an involuntary admission order.  
The Agency’s argument that support plan review includes an implied requirement 
to review whether an involuntarily admitted person still qualifies for involuntary 
admission would require this Court to impermissibly rewrite the requirements of 
support plan review adopted by the Legislature. 
 
 
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Accordingly, we answer the first certified question in the negative because 
support plan review under section 393.0651 does not require the Agency to 
consider the continued propriety of an involuntary admission order entered under 
section 393.11. 
Circuit Court Release from Involuntary Admission 
 
We next answer the Eleventh Circuit’s second certified question in the 
negative because the Agency is not required under either section 393.0651 or 
section 393.11, Florida Statutes, to petition the circuit court for a person’s release 
from an involuntary admission order in cases where the Agency determines that 
the circumstances that led to the initial admission order have changed.  Neither 
section 393.0651 nor section 393.11 can be construed to impose an implicit 
obligation on the Agency to petition the circuit court for a person’s release from an 
involuntary admission order when the Agency determines that the circumstances 
that led to the initial admission order have changed. 
Section 393.11(11) does not indicate who may petition the circuit court for a 
person’s release from an involuntary admission; however, other subsections of 
section 393.11 explicitly provide for two circumstances for challenging 
involuntary admission orders.  First, section 393.11(13) explicitly permits an 
involuntarily admitted person to petition the circuit court for a writ of habeas 
corpus to challenge the appropriateness of his involuntary admission.  Second, 
 
 
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section 393.11(9)(b) explicitly provides that “[a]ny minor involuntarily admitted to 
residential services shall, upon reaching majority, be given a hearing to determine 
the continued appropriateness of his or her involuntary admission.”  Section 
393.115(1)(b) builds on the procedure for dealing with minors in residential 
services upon reaching the age of majority.  It provides that in the case of a 
voluntarily admitted minor turning eighteen, “[i]f the resident appears to meet the 
criteria for involuntary admission to residential services, as defined in s. 393.11, 
the agency shall file a petition to determine the appropriateness of continued 
residential placement on an involuntary basis.”  § 393.115(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011).  
As such, the Legislature explicitly provided for the Agency to file a petition with 
the circuit court to determine the appropriateness of involuntary admission in the 
case of a voluntarily admitted minor turning eighteen. 
The Legislature, however, did not include a provision in section 393.11 
regarding the Agency filing a petition with the circuit court under any 
circumstances.  Instead, section 393.11 provides one reference to a petition being 
filed with the circuit court—the involuntarily admitted person’s right to file a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging an involuntary admission order 
contained in section 393.11(13).  Further, section 393.11 provides for one 
circumstance—a minor reaching the age of majority—in which an involuntarily 
admitted person is entitled to a review hearing.  Nothing in section 393.11 
 
 
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indicates that the Agency has an obligation to file a petition with the circuit court 
for any reason.  Because requiring the Agency to file a petition with the circuit 
court would impose an obligation on the Agency to undertake a specific act not 
required by statute, finding an implied obligation within section 393.11 that 
requires the Agency to file a petition based on an involuntary admission order no 
longer being appropriate would modify the express terms of an unambiguous 
statute. 
Similarly, section 393.0651 does not contain any provisions that can be 
construed as requiring the Agency to file a petition with the circuit court for any 
reason.  Section 393.0651 requires the Agency to do multiple things, such as 
consider specific factors during a support plan review, consider various residential 
placement options in a specified order, establish measurable goals for a client’s 
progress, coordinate support plans for clients who are public school students with 
individual education plans, promulgate rules regarding the core components of 
support plans, and annually provide a written report to a client or the client’s 
parent, guardian, or client advocate regarding the client’s “habilitative and medical 
progress.”  Nowhere, though, in section 393.0651, is the Agency required—or 
even advised—to petition the circuit court for any reason. 
The only reference to any type of review procedure mentioned in section 
393.0651 is that a client or the client’s parent, guardian, or client advocate may 
 
 
- 20 - 
seek administrative review of a support plan or the outcome of an annual support 
plan review.  However, a successful administrative challenge to a support plan 
would presumably lead to a revised support plan rather than a petition being filed 
by the Agency with the appropriate circuit court for the client’s release. 
While neither section 393.0651 nor section 393.11 mentions who may 
petition the circuit court for review of an involuntary admission order when a 
client’s circumstances change, other provisions of Florida law specifically address 
the periodic judicial review of various types of involuntary commitment orders.  
The Legislature has specifically addressed periodic judicial review in the context 
of secure detention of intellectually disabled persons under section 916.303(3), 
involuntary commitments of persons with mental illness under sections 
394.4655(7) and 394.467(7), Florida Statutes, and involuntary commitments of 
sexually violent predators under sections 394.918(1), (3), Florida Statutes.  
Therefore, in certain contexts, the Legislature has exercised its prerogative to 
require periodic judicial review of involuntary commitment orders.  See Olmstead, 
44 So. 3d at 82.  And we decline to assume that the Legislature forgot how to 
address periodic judicial review of involuntary admissions to residential services 
under chapter 393. 
Further, as discussed above regarding the first certified question, the Agency 
is not required to even consider all of the elements required for involuntary 
 
 
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admission when conducting an annual support plan review under section 393.0651.  
Because requiring the Agency to file a petition with the circuit court would impose 
an obligation on the Agency to undertake a specific act not required by statute, 
finding an implied obligation within section 393.0651 that requires the Agency to 
petition the circuit court for the release from an involuntary admission order would 
modify the express terms of an unambiguous statute.  Accordingly, we answer the 
second certified question in the negative because nothing in either section 
393.0651 or section 393.11 can be construed to impose an implicit obligation on 
the Agency to petition the circuit court for a person’s release from an involuntary 
admission order when the Agency determines that the circumstances that led to the 
initial admission order have changed. 
Analysis of Federal Constitutional Case Law 
We decline to answer the Eleventh Circuit’s third certified question.  Unlike 
the first two certified questions that ask us to interpret provisions of chapter 393, 
the third certified question asks us to analyze chapter 393 in light of federal 
constitutional case law and effectively resolve J.R.’s underlying federal 
constitutional claim.  Because this certified question asks us to interpret federal 
law, we decline to answer it. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
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Based on the foregoing, we answer certified questions one and two in the 
negative and decline to answer certified question three.  Having answered the first 
two certified questions and declining to answer the third, we return this case to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion. 
CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
PARIENTE, J., dissenting. 
 
I agree with the statutory construction analysis set forth in Justice Canady’s 
dissent, which appropriately relies upon both the plain language of the statute and 
the interpretation of the statutory phrase “least restrictive” in the context of the 
statutory scheme to explain why the well-reasoned opinion of Judge Stafford in 
J.R. v. Hansen, No. 4:11cv417-WS, 2012 WL 1886438 (N.D. Fla. May 22, 2012), 
correctly interpreted chapter 393, Florida Statutes.  I write to add to that matrix of 
statutory construction the cardinal principle that statutes should, whenever 
possible, be construed to ensure a constitutional outcome.  
The clear and indisputable result of the majority’s statutory interpretation, 
despite the majority’s avoidance of it, will be a finding that the statute is 
unconstitutional.  Yet, even though the constitutional question is at the heart of this 
 
 
- 23 - 
case, the majority declines in its statutory interpretation analysis to consider one of 
the fundamental principles of statutory construction—that courts must strive “to 
construe challenged legislation to effect a constitutional outcome whenever 
possible.”  Scott v. Williams, 107 So. 3d 379, 384 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Fla. Dep’t 
of Revenue v. Howard, 916 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. 2005)).  Further, courts are 
obligated to give statutes “a fair construction that is consistent with the federal and 
state constitutions as well as with the legislative intent.”  Caple v. Tuttle’s Design-
Build, Inc., 753 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. 2000) (quoting State v. Stalder, 630 So. 2d 
1072, 1076 (Fla. 1994)).  
The majority claims that because the first two certified questions do not ask 
this Court to resolve the ultimate issue of whether the statute is facially 
unconstitutional, it does not need to apply the presumption of constitutionality.  
See majority op. at 13 (declining to apply the principle that statutes should be 
interpreted in a way to uphold their constitutionality because the first two certified 
questions do not ask this Court to resolve the ultimate issue of constitutionality).  
However, the third certified question, which the majority declines to answer, asks 
exactly whether this statute is constitutional, and that is the ultimate issue the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to decide.  See J.R. v. Hansen, 736 
F.3d 959, 971-73 (11th Cir. 2013).      
 
 
- 24 - 
I simply do not see how the majority can ignore the constitutional 
implications of its analysis of a state statute that is being specifically attacked as 
facially unconstitutional and fail in its statutory interpretation to view the statute 
through the lens of the presumption of constitutional validity.  For all these 
reasons, I join in Justice Canady’s dissent.  I would answer the first two certified 
questions in the affirmative and ensure that this Court’s analysis of the statute is 
faithful to our obligation to construe statutes in a manner that upholds their 
constitutionality. 
CANADY, J., dissenting. 
I disagree with the majority’s decision regarding the first two questions 
certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.  I would 
answer both of those questions in the affirmative.  I agree, however, with the 
majority’s decision to decline to answer the third certified question, which is a 
question of federal law rather than Florida law. 
The powers and duties of a state agency “include both those expressly given 
and those given by clear and necessary implication from the provisions of the 
statute” under which the agency operates.  City Gas Co. v. Peoples Gas Sys., Inc., 
182 So. 2d 429, 436 (Fla. 1965).  It is an elementary principle of Florida law that 
“[w]hen authority is given by statute to accomplish a stated governmental purpose, 
there is also given by implication authority to do everything necessary to 
 
 
- 25 - 
accomplish the purpose that is not a violation of law or public policy.”  Bailey v. 
Van Pelt, 82 So. 789, 792 (Fla. 1919).  These principles regarding the 
interpretation of the statutory powers and duties of governmental entities are, of 
course, based on a more general principle regarding the interpretation of statutory 
rights (or powers) and duties: “ ‘If a statute grants a right or imposes a duty, it also 
confers, by implication, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the 
one or the performance of the other.’  . . . That which is clearly implied is as much 
a part of the law and is as effectual as that which is expressed.”  Girard Trust Co. v. 
Tampashores Dev. Co., 117 So. 786, 788 (Fla. 1928) (quoting Newcomb v. City of 
Indianapolis, 40 N.E. 919, 921-22 (Ind. 1895)).  A statutory duty obviously carries 
with it a duty to take the particular steps reasonably necessary for the performance 
of the duty. 
In his order granting the Agency’s motion for summary judgment, Judge 
Stafford made the crucial determination that the statutory scheme “places an 
implicit burden on [the Agency], rather than the client, to petition the court for 
release from an order of involuntary admission when the conditions for release are 
indicated.”  J.R. v. Hansen, No. 4:11cv417-WS, 2012 WL 1886438, at *14 (N.D. 
Fla. May 22, 2012).  The correctness of this determination flows ineluctably from 
three indisputable points.  The first two points are based on express provisions of 
 
 
- 26 - 
the statute.  The third point is based on the meaning of “least restrictive” in the 
context of the statute. 
First, section 393.0651(7), Florida Statutes (2011), requires that the Agency 
provide for an annual revision of each client’s individual support plan.  There is no 
suggestion that a revised individual support plan is not intended to determine the 
provision of services by the Agency.  Second, under section 393.0651, a crucial 
focus of the individual support plan process is the identification of the least 
restrictive environment for the provision of services to a client.  Section 393.0651 
leaves no doubt about the importance of identifying the least restrictive 
environment for the provision of services:  
Each plan must include the most appropriate, least restrictive, and 
most cost-beneficial environment for accomplishment of the 
objectives for client progress . . . .  The ultimate goal of each plan, 
whenever possible, shall be to enable the client to live a dignified life 
in the least restrictive setting, be that in the home or in the 
community. 
§ 393.0651 (Emphasis added).  Third, services provided to an involuntarily 
admitted individual are provided in a more restrictive setting than are services 
provided to individuals who are not involuntarily admitted.  Indeed, the most 
restrictive setting for the provision of services is under an involuntary admission. 
To reject Judge Stafford’s conclusion, it must be assumed that the 
Legislature intended to require the Agency to have individual support plans 
developed and revised with a focus on ensuring that services are provided in the 
 
 
- 27 - 
least restrictive appropriate setting but did not intend to (a) require the annual 
review process to take into account that the context of an involuntary admission is 
more restrictive than other contexts, or (b) require the Agency to take the steps 
necessary to implement an individual support plan by seeking termination of an 
individual’s involuntary admission when the statutory requirements for involuntary 
admission are no longer satisfied.  This is nonsensical. 
There is no cogent reason that the annual review process should be 
allowed—or required—to ignore the undeniable reality that an involuntary 
admission is more restrictive than other contexts in which services are provided.  
The annual review process for an involuntarily admitted individual can only 
determine the “least restrictive” appropriate setting for services if it considers 
whether the legal requirements for involuntary admission are still satisfied.  
Similarly, once it is determined that a less restrictive context than involuntary 
admission is the appropriate context for the provision of services, it necessarily 
follows that the Agency has a duty to take the steps necessary to ensure that 
services are provided in the less restrictive context, including petitioning the court 
for termination of the involuntary admission. 
The “stated governmental purpose,” Bailey, 82 So. at 792, of the statute is 
the provision of services in “the most appropriate, least restrictive” setting 
possible, section 393.0651, Fla. Stat. (2011).  The duty placed on the Agency to 
 
 
- 28 - 
carry out that purpose necessarily carries with it “by implication” both the 
authority and the duty “to do everything necessary to accomplish the purpose that 
is not a violation of law or public policy.”  Bailey, 82 So. at 792.  The Agency’s 
consideration in the annual individual support plan review process of the 
appropriateness of continued involuntary admission and the Agency’s action to 
obtain judicial termination when continued involuntary admission no longer 
constitutes the “most appropriate, least restrictive” environment for the provision 
of services are both essential to carrying out the unequivocal mandate of the 
statute.  § 393.0651, Fla. Stat. (2011).  There is no express provision of law or any 
public policy that stands in the way of such action by the Agency.  Recognizing 
these aspects of the statutory scheme is simply acknowledging the plain import of 
the statute.  Failing to recognize them results from a cramped, unreasonable 
reading of the statutory text. 
The view that the legislative purpose set forth in section 393.0651 “does not 
take into account section 393.11(8)(b)3, which requires finding that an individual 
would be a danger to himself or others if he is allowed to remain at liberty[,]” 
majority op. at 16, improperly imports incoherence into chapter 393.  There is 
absolutely no authority, however, to support the assumption that in enacting one 
statutory provision the Legislature is ignorant of other related statutory provisions.  
On the contrary, it is axiomatic that the Legislature is presumed to know the law.  
 
 
- 29 - 
See Holmes Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Duffell, 651 So. 2d 1176, 1179 (Fla. 1995).  And it 
is axiomatic that absent a clear inconsistency courts “must . . . construe related 
statutory provisions in harmony with one another.”  Villery v. Fla. Parole & Prob. 
Comm’n., 396 So. 2d 1107, 1111 (Fla. 1980) (superseded by statute as recognized 
by Van Tassel v. Coffman, 486 So. 2d 528, 529 (Fla. 1986)).  The various 
provisions of chapter 393 therefore must be read harmoniously in light of the 
whole chapter. 
Finally, the duty of the Agency under section 393.0651 is in no way 
circumscribed by the statutory provisions related to judicial review of involuntary 
admissions when a client reaches the age of majority, see § 393.115, Fla. Stat. 
(2011), or the provisions authorizing an involuntarily admitted person to petition 
for release, see § 393.11(13), Fla. Stat. (2011).  These specific provisions are in no 
way inconsistent with the broad duty imposed by section 393.0651.  The 
implication that they limit the reach of the duty imposed by section 393.0651 is not 
reasonable.  That implication effectively rewrites the clearly established statutory 
duty of the Agency under section 393.0651.  The annual review process is a critical 
feature of the statutory scheme designed to ensure the ongoing protection of the 
rights of the Agency’s clients.  It is neither necessary nor appropriate to truncate 
that process because the Legislature has adopted other specific statutory measures 
to help protect the rights of clients in particular circumstances. 
 
 
- 30 - 
I therefore dissent. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs. 
Certified Question of Law from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit - Case No. 12-14212 
 
Peter P. Sleasman and Kristen Cooley Lentz of the Florida Institutional Legal 
Services Project, Florida Legal Services, Inc., Newberry, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General and Allen C. Winsor, Solicitor General, 
Tallahassee, Florida; and Juan Ricardo Collins of the Agency for Persons with 
Disabilities, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee