Title: Stockham v. Stockham
Citation: 168 So. 2d 320
Docket Number: 33350
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 21, 1964

168 So. 2d 320 (1964)
Elizabeth R. STOCKHAM, Appellant,
v.
William H. STOCKHAM, Appellee.
No. 33350.

Supreme Court of Florida.
October 21, 1964.
Rehearing Denied November 20, 1964.
James M. McEwen of Gibbons, Tucker, McEwen, Smith &amp; Cofer, Tampa, for appellant.
Edwin J. Kennedy, Sarasota, for appellee.
ERVIN, Justice.
In the circuit court, Elizabeth R. Stockham, the plaintiff, sued her husband, William H. Stockham, defendant, for a divorce on the ground of cruelty. He answered and asserted an affirmative defense that she was guilty of adultery. Pursuant to Rule 1.30, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 F.S.A., he requested admissions of plaintiff concerning his affirmative defense. She declined to answer, claiming privilege under Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A. because she said her answers might tend to incriminate her. The chancellor in the circuit court upheld plaintiff in her refusal to answer. Upon interlocutory appeal to the District Court of Appeal, Second District, it reversed, holding plaintiff should answer the request for admissions within a reasonable time, and failing to do so her suit for divorce would be dismissed. See Stockham v. Stockham, Fla.App. 1963, 159 So. 2d 481. Mrs. Stockham, appellant, seeks reversal here of the decision of the District Court of Appeal.
Our jurisdiction of this appeal arises from the provisions of Section 4(2) of Article V of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A., which provides "Appeals from district courts of appeal may be taken to the supreme court, as a matter of right, only from decisions initially * * * construing a controlling provision of the Florida or *321 federal constitution." This appeal comes within the language quoted because the construction placed upon Section 12, DR, by the District Court of Appeal in Stockham v. Stockham, supra, constitutes an initial construction of said Section 12 in this cause. The District Court of Appeal held that Section 12 would not preclude an equity court from refusing relief to a litigant who chooses to hide behind Section 12 in situations where it is obvious it would work palpable inequity. In passing, it is noted appellant also petitioned us for certiorari, but our holding in this appeal is dispositive of the case and renders it unnecessary for us to determine whether our certiorari jurisdiction might have been invoked.
Upon careful consideration of the modern trend of authority, we find that justice in our state will be served by confirming the decision of the District Court of Appeal. Equity considerations appear to require answers to said request for admissions under Rule 1.30, Fla.R.C.P., in default of which a plaintiff in a divorce action should not be permitted to further prosecute his or her action.
We find that the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution does not operate as a shield in all situations. For example, in Levine v. Bornstein, 13 Misc.2d 161, 174 N.Y.S.2d 574, the defendant therein alleged the plaintiff, an attorney, solicited the action to collect a judgment. Plaintiff attempted to take the Fifth Amendment in response to said allegation and referred to decisions where it was properly interposed, but the Court stated:
In Franklin v. Franklin, 365 Mo. 442, 283 S.W.2d 483 (1955), the question was whether plaintiff, after refusing to answer certain interrogatories propounded under discovery provisions of the Missouri Civil Code, or to testify concerning the status of a prior marriage on the grounds that her answers might tend to incriminate her, is entitled to maintain an action for divorce or even a motion for temporary alimony. The Supreme Court of Missouri stated:
In Independent Productions Corporation v. Loew's, Inc., USDA SD New York 1958, 22 F.R.D. 266, 276, 277, a private, treble damage antitrust action in which pretrial examination of corporate plaintiffs' president was had, this witness claimed immunities under the First Amendment and the Fifth Amendment. The Court stated:
The Court continued as follows:
Florida cases [Blais v. Blais, Fla.App. 1959, 112 So. 2d 860; State ex rel. Mitchell v. Kelly, Fla. 1954, 71 So. 2d 887; Boynton v. State, Fla. 1954, 75 So. 2d 211] relied upon by appellant where the rule against self-incrimination was involved appear distinguishable from the facts and issues of this case.
The distinction made in the cases is that the privilege against self-incrimination operates as a protection against one being required to incriminate himself in a criminal or other proceeding which might degrade him, however, in civil litigation where it is manifest the exercise of the privilege would operate to further the action or claim of the party resorting to the privilege against his adversary contrary to equity and good conscience, the party asserting privilege will not be permitted to proceed with his claim or action. In this latter situation *323 it appears that if a party chooses to make admissions after claiming privilege, such admissions may not thereafter be used against him in any other proceedings, civil or criminal.
We re-emphasize the stress the District Court laid upon Section 1.30(b), Fla.R.C.P. which provides: "* * * admission made by a party pursuant to such request is for the purpose of the pending action only and neither constitutes an admission by him for any other purpose nor may be used against him in any other proceeding."
Finding that the privilege asserted should not be interposed under the circumstances involved in this case, we affirm the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal.
Affirmed.
DREW, C.J., and THORNAL, O'CONNELL and CALDWELL, JJ., concur.