Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. David J. Winkel
Citation: 2015 WI 68
Docket Number: 2012AP001845-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 7, 2015

2015 WI 68 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP1845-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against David J. Winkel, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
David J. Winkel, 
          Respondent-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST WINKEL 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 5, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, C. J., joined by ZIEGLER, J. 
dissent(Opinion filed). 
GABLEMAN, J. dissents (Opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs by Patrick 
F. Koenen and Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Appleton.  Oral argument 
by Patrick F. Koenen. 
 
 
For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief by 
Matthew F. Anich and Dallenbach, Anich & Wickman,  S.C., 
Ashland.  Oral argument by Matthew F. Anich.  
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 68
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP1845-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against David J. Winkel, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
David J. Winkel, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney David J. Winkel appeals the 
report of Reserve Judge Robert E. Kinney, referee, recommending 
discipline of a four-month license suspension and the imposition 
of costs.  The referee found that Attorney Winkel committed all 
of the five charged counts of misconduct that were tried at a 
hearing before the referee.  The ethical violations which the 
referee determined Attorney Winkel committed include incompetent 
representation, 
lack 
of 
diligence, 
failure 
to 
properly 
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
2 
 
communicate with his client, and willful failure to provide 
relevant 
information, 
fully 
answer 
questions, 
or 
furnish 
documents in the course of an Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
investigation. 
¶2 
After our independent review of the record, we approve 
the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law and adopt 
them.  We conclude that Attorney Winkel's misconduct warrants a 
four-month license suspension.  We require Attorney Winkel to 
pay the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding, which total 
$42,634.13 as of February 25, 2015. 
¶3 
Attorney Winkel was licensed to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1984 and practices in Neenah.  Attorney Winkel's 
prior disciplinary history includes a public reprimand in 1998 
for failing to adequately prepare to represent his clients and 
to explain their legal matters to them, for failing to 
competently represent a client in an estate matter, for 
misrepresenting that he had prepared a document, for failing to 
respond to successor counsel's requests for information and for 
the 
client's 
file, 
and 
for 
failing 
to 
respond 
to 
the 
disciplinary investigation.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Winkel, 217 Wis. 2d 339, 577 N.W.2d 9 (1998).  Attorney 
Winkel was publicly reprimanded again in 2005 for submitting a 
fee 
request 
to 
the 
Social 
Security 
Administration 
that 
misrepresented the amount of time spent by his firm in handling 
a case on behalf of a client.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Winkel, 2005 WI 165, 286 Wis. 2d 533, 706 N.W.2d 661. 
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
3 
 
¶4 
In August 2012, the OLR filed a six-count complaint 
against Attorney Winkel.  This court appointed Reserve Judge 
Kinney as referee.  The referee dismissed one count of the 
complaint upon stipulation of the parties.  The referee held an 
evidentiary hearing on the remaining five counts over three days 
in October and November 2013.  Both sides submitted post-hearing 
briefs. 
¶5 
In 
March 
2014, 
the 
referee 
submitted 
a 
report 
containing his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a 
recommendation for discipline.  The referee's findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are summarized below. 
¶6 
All counts in this case arise out of Attorney Winkel's 
representation of P.L., an inmate in the Wisconsin prison 
system.  P.L. hurt his leg during recreational activities in the 
prison yard.  A methicillin—resistant staphylococcus aureus 
(MRSA) infection later developed in the leg.  
¶7 
P.L. was taken to the prison's Health Services Unit 
(HSU).  There, the nurse observed the leg, gave him some 
antibiotics, and, using a marker, drew a circle around the 
visible sore on his leg.  She then advised P.L. to return to the 
HSU if the infection progressed outside the circle.  
¶8 
The next morning, P.L. saw that the infection had 
progressed outside the circle.  At about 11:00 a.m., P.L. called 
a guard and explained the situation.  At about 11:30 a.m., the 
guard contacted the HSU, and a nurse ("Nurse Jane Doe") told the 
guard to have P.L. fill out a "blue slip."  "Blue slips" are 
completed by inmates to request routine health care services.  
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
4 
 
"Blue slips" are only collected once a day at the end of the 
day, and they are not intended to be used in emergency 
situations.  
¶9 
P.L. continued to demand medical attention.  At around 
4:00 p.m., P.L. was taken to the HSU where he was seen by a 
physician.  The physician directed that P.L. be transported to a 
local hospital.  Within two hours of being admitted to the 
hospital, surgery was performed to drain the MRSA infection in 
P.L.'s leg.  P.L. remained in the hospital as an in—patient for 
seven days, all the while being administered intravenous 
antibiotics to control the MRSA infection.  
¶10 P.L., acting pro se, filed an Eighth Amendment ("cruel 
and unusual punishment") civil rights case in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.  P.L. 
sought monetary damages based on his claim that, by delaying his 
treatment, prison officials had been deliberately indifferent to 
his serious medical need.  
¶11 P.L. hired Attorney Winkel to represent him in his 
Eight Amendment civil rights suit.  P.L. knew Attorney Winkel 
because Attorney Winkel had represented him on a number of 
previous occasions.   
¶12 Under a written fee agreement, P.L. agreed to pay 
Attorney Winkel an hourly rate of $200 per hour in this matter, 
but the hourly fee would only be charged if P.L. was entitled to 
attorney fees from the defendants.  If P.L. was not awarded 
attorney fees, Attorney Winkel would receive 40% of any 
recovery.  P.L. paid Attorney Winkel an advance of $2,500 to be 
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
5 
 
used to cover expert witness fees and discovery costs.  The fee 
agreement required that at the conclusion of the representation, 
Attorney Winkel would return all unearned fees and costs 
advanced by P.L.   
¶13 Attorney Winkel formally appeared on P.L.'s behalf but 
did little else of value.  Attorney Winkel never identified 
certain unnamed defendants, such as the identity of "Nurse Jane 
Doe"——the nurse who told the guard to have P.L. submit a "blue 
slip" requesting routine health care services.  Attorney Winkel 
also 
failed 
to 
timely 
disclose 
P.L.'s 
expert 
witnesses.  
Instead, over two months after the expert disclosure deadline 
had passed, Attorney Winkel filed a motion to extend the 
deadline, along with a late-filed expert disclosure. 
¶14 Defendants moved to strike Attorney Winkel's late-
filed expert disclosure.  Defendants also moved for summary 
judgment.   
¶15 Attorney Winkel was in a poor position to respond to 
the defendants' summary judgment motion.  Attorney Winkel had 
not conducted depositions of defendants, had not served any 
discovery demands, had not served any requests for production of 
documents, had not served any interrogatories, and had not 
ascertained the identities of the unnamed defendants.  He also 
had failed to timely answer the defendants' interrogatories, 
even though the defendants had granted him an extension in which 
to do so.   
¶16 Four days after the summary judgment response brief 
was due, Attorney Winkel filed a document entitled "Objection to 
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
6 
 
Motion for Summary Judgment."  This document failed to respond 
in any material way to the defendants' summary judgment motion.  
¶17 The district court, in a September 29, 2009 order 
written by Magistrate Judge Crocker, granted the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment, denied Attorney Winkel's motion to 
extend the expert disclosure deadline, denied the defendants' 
motion to strike Attorney Winkel's expert witness disclosure as 
moot, and directed the clerk of court to enter judgment in favor 
of defendants and to close the case.  In the summary judgment 
order, Magistrate Judge Crocker stated:  
Plaintiff's case has been doomed by his failure, 
through his attorney, to meet several deadlines or to 
respond properly to defendants' motion for summary 
judgment. . . .  
. . . . Plaintiff has never sought to amend his 
complaint to include the names of the [unnamed] 
defendants.  It is impossible to pursue a claim 
against unnamed defendants.  Despite defendants having 
raised this issue on summary judgment, plaintiff did 
not respond to it. . . .   
Further, 
the 
deadline 
to 
disclose 
expert 
witnesses——the type of witnesses who might be critical 
in an Eighth Amendment medical treatment lawsuit——
passed 
without 
plaintiff 
disclosing 
any 
such 
witnesses. Instead of seeking an extension of the 
deadline 
before 
it 
passed, 
plaintiff 
waited 
until . . . over two months after the deadline, to 
file a motion seeking to amend the briefing schedule 
by 
extending 
the 
expert 
disclosure 
deadline. 
Plaintiff's attorney's explanation for the delay is 
that it was "very difficult" to find a doctor.  
Perhaps this is true, but it is unpersuasive.  One 
might logically expect that locating a qualified 
physician and obtaining a useful expert opinion would 
have been at the top of plaintiff's "To Do" list, 
perhaps even ahead of "File Complaint."  
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
7 
 
Regardless of the delay in finding and disclosing 
an expert, extending the expert disclosure deadline 
would not help plaintiff. The expert doctor's proposed 
testimony would be irrelevant to the constitutional 
issues in this civil rights lawsuit.  Plaintiff's 
attorney notes that plaintiff's newly found doctor 
expert will testify regarding "whether there was any 
negligence 
in 
[the] 
medical 
care" 
provided 
by 
defendants. However, establishing a violation of a 
prisoner's rights under the Eighth Amendment requires 
deliberate indifference on part of the officials, and 
deliberate 
indifference 
entails 
more 
than 
"mere 
negligence." . . . 
Plaintiff 
also 
failed 
to 
timely 
respond 
to 
defendants' motion for summary judgment. . . . Despite 
having 30 days to respond to defendants' motion, 
plaintiff did not file anything regarding defendants' 
motion until August 28, 2009.  The document filed, 
"Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment," fails to 
respond in any material way to defendants' motion. 
. . .   
(Docket citations omitted; emphasis added by Magistrate Judge 
Crocker.) 
¶18 Despite the issuance of this order, P.L. remained 
unaware for many weeks that the defendants had moved for summary 
judgment, or that Magistrate Judge Crocker had granted the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment.  Several weeks after 
the court had entered summary judgment against his case, P.L. 
asked Attorney Winkel to try to settle the case for between 
$5,000 and $10,000.  A few weeks later, P.L. sent another letter 
to Attorney Winkel asking what had happened to the scheduled 
trial date, which had just passed.  P.L. asked Attorney Winkel 
whether he had settled the case or had gotten the trial 
postponed without P.L.'s permission.  P.L. also asked Attorney 
Winkel what discovery he had obtained, and whether Attorney 
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
8 
 
Winkel had determined which nurse had been working at the prison 
on the day in question.   
Attorney Winkel wrote back to P.L. with the following:  
I see that you were unable to obtain any useful 
opinions from the hospital; which is the same problem 
I had.  You and I talked about this.  I could not get 
any 
offers 
from 
the 
state 
because 
we 
had 
no 
ammunition.  Sometimes, a party cannot prove in court 
what we know to be true.  This is one of those cases.  
As such, enclosed please find a check from my 
trust account for the balance of your money for the 
lawsuit, since we do not have adequate evidence to 
make it worthwhile to pursue the matter any further, 
nor can we get over Motions for Summary Judgments.  
This will hopefully allow you to concentrate on 
your remaining time and getting out on a good note.  
(Emphasis in original.)  Attorney Winkel handwrote on the bottom 
of the letter a note that states:  "I paid [the medical expert] 
$400, and CBS 6.59 [for collect phone calls], leaving $2,093.41 
for you.  Sorry we couldn't get a settlement offer."   
¶19 In a subsequent letter to Attorney Winkel, P.L. wrote 
that 
he 
had 
never 
authorized 
Attorney 
Winkel 
to 
cease 
litigation; that he wanted the case reopened; and that he wanted 
copies of all discovery so that he could represent himself.     
¶20 On December 21, 2009, P.L. sent a letter to United 
States District Court Judge Barbara B. Crabb, stating that 
Attorney Winkel had stopped litigating the case without P.L.'s 
consent and that he wanted to litigate the case pro se.  A pro 
se case analyst from the Western District wrote back to P.L., 
explaining that the case was closed and enclosing a copy of the 
docket sheet and final order.  
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
9 
 
¶21 P.L. ultimately filed a grievance with the OLR against 
Attorney Winkel.  In his response to the grievance, Attorney 
Winkel told the OLR that he had personally mailed P.L. a copy of 
defendants' 
motion 
for 
summary 
judgment, 
as 
well 
as 
a 
handwritten note asking P.L. if he wanted Attorney Winkel to 
arrange 
for 
medical 
testimony 
to 
rebut 
the 
defendants' 
arguments.  Attorney Winkel also told the OLR that he had 
informed P.L. that the case was dismissed and no trial would be 
held.   
¶22 In August 2012, the OLR filed a complaint against 
Attorney Winkel.  As relevant here, the complaint charged 
Attorney Winkel with the following counts of misconduct. 
• Count One:   By failing to properly oppose 
defendants' motion for summary judgment, and by 
failing 
to 
display 
the 
knowledge 
and 
skills 
necessary to competently represent P.L. in the 
Eighth Amendment civil rights case, Attorney Winkel 
violated Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 20:1.1.1  
• Count Two:  By failing to oppose defendants' motion 
for summary judgment by the court—ordered deadline, 
by failing to file an expert witness disclosure by 
the court-ordered deadline, by failing to amend 
plaintiff's complaint to reflect the name of the 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.1 
provides 
that 
"[a] 
lawyer 
shall 
provide 
competent representation to a client.  Competent representation 
requires 
the 
legal 
knowledge, 
skill, 
thoroughness 
and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." 
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
10 
 
"Jane Doe" defendant, and by failing to conduct any 
meaningful discovery in P.L.'s case, Attorney Winkel 
violated SCR 20:1.3.2 
• Count Three:  By failing to inform P.L. of 
defendants' motion for summary judgment, by failing 
to inform P.L. that the court granted defendants' 
motion for summary judgment, by failing to provide 
P.L. with copies of defendants' motion for summary 
judgment and the order granting defendants' summary 
judgment, and by failing to keep P.L. apprised of 
the status of the case, Attorney Winkel violated 
SCR 20:1.4(a)(3).3 
• Count Five:  By concealing from P.L. that defendants 
made a motion for summary judgment and that the 
court granted defendants' motion, leading to the 
dismissal of the action, Attorney Winkel violated 
SCR 20:8.4(c).4 
• Count 
Six: 
 
Having 
concealed 
from 
P.L. 
that 
defendants made a motion for summary judgment and 
that the court granted defendants' motion, leading 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
3 SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) provides that a lawyer shall "keep the 
client reasonably informed about the status of the matter." 
4 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
11 
 
to the dismissal of the action, and by thereafter 
representing to the OLR that he had informed P.L. of 
the aforesaid events, Attorney Winkel violated 
SCR 22.03(6),5 enforced under SCR 20:8.4(h).6  
¶23 After a three-day hearing, the referee determined that 
Attorney Winkel had committed each of the above five counts of 
misconduct.  The referee's reasoning may be summarized as 
follows. 
¶24 As to Counts One and Two (incompetent representation 
and lack of diligence), the referee found that Attorney Winkel 
had never before litigated a deliberate indifference claim; 
that, although Attorney Winkel claimed to have performed 
research, he did not copy any cases, make any notes, or bill any 
time for legal research; and that he used the wrong legal 
standard in his expert witness disclosure.  The referee noted 
that Attorney Winkel's filings with the district court——
particularly his motion to extend already-expired deadlines and 
his "objection" to the defendants' summary judgment motion——gave 
                                                 
5 SCR 22.03(6) provides that "[i]n the course of the 
investigation, 
the 
respondent's 
wilful 
failure 
to 
provide 
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 
in the grievance." 
6 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 
or SCR 22.04(1)." 
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
12 
 
the impression that he "did not know what he was doing, that he 
was over his head."  The referee noted that there were many 
actions that Attorney Winkel could have taken to advance P.L.'s 
case (e.g., he could have filed an expert affidavit, medical 
literature, and a brief explaining that MRSA infections require 
immediate medical attention), but he failed to do anything of 
substance.  The referee wrote that while Attorney Winkel may not 
have been able to defeat defendants' summary judgment motion, he 
needed to do more than what he did in order to provide competent 
representation. 
¶25 The referee next addressed Counts Three and Five, 
which involve Attorney Winkel's failure to properly communicate 
with P.L.  Attorney Winkel told the referee that he had sent 
P.L. all of the important case documents, as proven by his 
writings on a series of post-it notes directing his secretary to 
send the documents to P.L.  The referee rejected Attorney 
Winkel's claim.  The referee noted that Attorney Winkel's 
secretary testified at deposition that she neither had a 
recollection of sending the documents, nor could she discern 
from the post-it notes whether they had been sent.  The 
secretary also testified at deposition and at the hearing that 
she could not tell if any of thirteen different crucial 
documents had been sent to P.L.  The referee noted that Attorney 
Winkel's post-it note "system" had only a "veneer of documentary 
evidence," and was not the type of contemporaneous written 
evidence on which attorneys and judges customarily rely as proof 
of mailing.   
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
13 
 
¶26 The referee also remarked that one particular letter 
from Attorney Winkel showed both his dishonesty and his failure 
to adequately communicate with P.L.  In a letter to P.L. written 
after the district court had granted summary judgment to the 
defendants, Attorney Winkel stated that "we do not have adequate 
evidence to make it worthwhile to pursue the matter any further, 
nor can we get over Motions for Summary Judgments."  The referee 
reasoned that Attorney Winkel would not have written this 
statement if he had previously advised P.L. of the truth of the 
matter:  that the case had been dismissed on summary judgment 
many weeks earlier.  The referee further reasoned that, given 
P.L.'s litigious nature, Attorney Winkel had an incentive to 
gloss over the already-dismissed status of the case in order to 
avoid a legal malpractice claim. 
¶27 The referee next moved to Count Six, which charged 
Attorney Winkel with willfully failing to provide relevant 
information, fully answer questions, or furnish documents in the 
course of an OLR investigation.  The referee noted that in his 
answers to the OLR's requests for admission, Attorney Winkel 
denied that:  (1) he failed to provide P.L. with a copy of 
defendants' motion for summary judgment; (2) he failed to inform 
P.L. that the district court had granted defendants' motion for 
summary judgment; and (3) he failed to provide P.L. with a copy 
of the order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment.  
The referee held that Attorney Winkel's denials amounted to 
misrepresentation and a willful failure to provide relevant 
information to the OLR.   
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
14 
 
¶28 With that, the referee concluded that Attorney Winkel 
engaged in professional misconduct as set forth in Counts One, 
Two, Three, Five, and Six. 
¶29 The referee next addressed the issue of sanctions.  
The referee found the following aggravating factors to be 
present:  the existence of a prior disciplinary record; a 
pattern of misconduct; the presence of multiple offenses; an 
intentional failure to comply with disciplinary rules or orders; 
the submission of false evidence, statements, or other deceptive 
practices 
during 
the 
disciplinary 
process; 
a 
refusal 
to 
acknowledge 
the 
wrongful 
nature 
of 
conduct; 
substantial 
experience in law practice at the time in question; and harm to 
a client.  Of these aggravating factors, the one that most 
concerned 
the 
referee 
was 
Attorney 
Winkel's 
tendency 
to 
misrepresent the truth.  This tendency was noticeable in 
Attorney Winkel's previous two disciplinary matters, the referee 
noted.  See Winkel, 2005 WI 165; Winkel, 217 Wis. 2d 339.   
¶30 On the mitigating side, the referee found only one 
factor:  the remoteness in time of Attorney Winkel's prior 
offenses. 
¶31 The referee noted the range of sanctions imposed in 
previous, 
arguably 
similar 
cases: 
 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Harris, 2013 WI 8, 345 Wis. 2d 239, 825 N.W. 
2d 285 (five-month suspension for failing to inform client of 
dismissal of matter and misrepresenting status of matter that 
had been dismissed); and In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Hammis, 2011 WI 3, 331 Wis. 2d 19, 793 N.W. 2d 884 (four-month 
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
15 
 
suspension for billing the State Public Defender for work the 
lawyer did not actually perform, continuing to practice law 
after receiving notice of administrative suspension, willingly 
misleading a sitting judge about whether or not he had a valid 
law license, failing to refund unearned fees, and failing to 
respond to the OLR); and In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Lister, 2010 WI 108, 329 Wis. 2d 289, 787 N.W.2d 820 (60-day 
suspension for failing to pursue client's federal civil rights 
action, failing to inform client that court had dismissed 
lawsuit, failing to promptly respond to numerous requests from 
successor counsel to forward client's case file, failing to 
refund to client unused balance of retainer fee, and failing to 
return messages left by the OLR). 
¶32 Ultimately, the referee recommended the imposition of 
a four-month suspension——two months longer than what the OLR had 
proposed in its complaint.  The referee wrote that the 
"aggravating factor which is most concerning to me is [Attorney 
Winkel's] submission of false evidence, false statements or 
other deceptive practices during the disciplinary hearing.  This 
factor would be very serious even if [Attorney Winkel] had no 
prior disciplinary history.  Unfortunately, however, his prior 
disciplinary 
history 
involves 
this 
very 
same 
type 
of 
misconduct."   The referee continued:   
I observed [Attorney Winkel's] testimony over 
most of three (3) days.  In the opinion of this 
referee, he did not help himself.  While his answers 
were generally carefully worded, they were oftentimes 
non-responsive. 
 
Simple 
questions 
were 
met 
with 
circumlocution and prevarication.  [Attorney Winkel's] 
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
16 
 
own attorney asked him at his deposition whether two 
particular 
documents 
had 
been 
mailed 
to 
[P.L.]  
[Attorney Winkel's] answer, that he did not know, and 
he had no contemporaneous evidence on the subject, is 
buried in layers of obfuscation. 
Most 
disturbingly 
. . .  
there 
are 
major 
contradictions between [Attorney Winkel's] deposition 
testimony and his hearing testimony.  It is as if the 
time between the deposition and the hearing was used 
to shore up and correct perceived shortcomings in his 
deposition testimony.   
The OLR's recommendation of a 60-day suspension 
may have been appropriate before the hearing started; 
by the time it ended it was definitely not sufficient.  
Were I to recommend a 60-day suspension here I would 
be undercutting the values of truthfulness and honesty 
which are at the very heart of the legal system.   
(Footnotes and citations omitted.) 
¶33 Attorney Winkel appeals.  In conducting our review, we 
will affirm the referee's findings of fact unless they are found 
to be clearly erroneous, but we will review the referee's 
conclusions of law on a de novo basis.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 
740 N.W.2d 125.  The court may impose whatever sanction it sees 
fit regardless of the referee's recommendation.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 
Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶34 On appeal, Attorney Winkel does not challenge any of 
the factual findings that underlie the counts of misconduct or 
the legal conclusions of misconduct.  Attorney Winkel challenges 
only whether the referee's recommended sanction of a four-month 
suspension is appropriate.   
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
17 
 
¶35 Attorney Winkel maintains that his conduct warrants 
only a public reprimand.  In support of this claim, Attorney 
Winkel levies a number of broad-based attacks on the OLR's 
disciplinary hearing process.  Attorney Winkel argues, first, 
that his disciplinary proceeding should have been bifurcated to 
decide the merits issue separate from the determination of 
sanctions; otherwise, he says, it was impossible for him to 
effectively contest guilt and introduce mitigating evidence at 
the same hearing.  Attorney Winkel argues, second, that the 
referee should not have learned of his disciplinary history 
before deciding the merits of a disciplinary case; he theorizes 
that the referee's knowledge of his disciplinary history 
possibly tainted the referee's fact-finding.  Attorney Winkel 
argues, third, that the referee erred by increasing his sanction 
recommendation based on a finding that Attorney Winkel provided 
unreliable testimony during the disciplinary hearing; he argues 
that any suspicion of untruthfulness on his part could only be 
considered 
in 
the 
context 
of 
a 
brand-new 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
¶36 In addition to these systemic challenges to the OLR's 
disciplinary process, Attorney Winkel levels various criticisms 
at the referee's performance.  Attorney Winkel argues that the 
referee failed to give him credit for returning to P.L. the 
unused portion of the advance fee payment; failed to appreciate 
that he has acknowledged his deficiencies in handling P.L.'s 
case; and failed to note that he did not personally benefit from 
his misconduct.  He posits, as a mitigating factor, that his 
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
18 
 
misconduct did no harm given that——as Attorney Winkel's counsel 
stated in appellate briefing and at oral argument——there was "no 
merit" to P.L.'s Eighth Amendment civil rights case.  Finally, 
Attorney Winkel argues that the referee failed to appreciate 
that he has already been admonished by the district court in its 
summary judgment order; that he has had to incur significant 
legal bills in his defense in this disciplinary matter; and that 
a suspension will hurt him, his clients, and his staff.   
¶37 We reject all of Attorney Winkel's arguments, starting 
first with his systemic challenges to the OLR disciplinary 
process.  Attorney Winkel has forfeited any argument that the 
disciplinary hearing should have been bifurcated to decide the 
merits issue separate from the determination of sanctions.  If 
Attorney Winkel truly believed that the referee——an experienced 
judge and referee——was incapable of differentiating mitigating 
evidence from admissions of misconduct, he should have asked the 
referee to hold a bifurcated hearing.  He did not; he points to 
nowhere in the record where such a request was preserved.  It is 
too late to complain about it now.    See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Netzer, 2014 WI 7, ¶45, 352 Wis. 2d 310, 841 
N.W.2d 820; see also United States v. Boyd, 86 F.3d 719, 722 
(7th Cir. 1996) (defendant cannot "plant an error and grow a 
risk-free trial").   
¶38 We are also unpersuaded by Attorney Winkel's argument 
that it was improper for the referee to learn of Attorney 
Winkel's disciplinary history before deciding the merits of this 
case.  Attorney Winkel speculates that perhaps the referee, in 
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
19 
 
evaluating the merits of this case, improperly assumed that it 
was more likely that Attorney Winkel committed the charged 
misconduct 
simply 
because 
he 
had 
previously 
committed 
misconduct——akin 
to 
the 
forbidden 
inference 
of 
criminal 
propensity that a jury might draw from prior bad act evidence.  
See Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).  But this argument does not square 
with the fact that Attorney Winkel challenges none of the 
referee's factual findings or legal conclusions of misconduct; 
his sole challenge in this appeal is to the amount of discipline 
that the referee recommended.  We also find absolutely no 
evidence to support what Attorney Winkel seems to imply:  that 
the referee prejudged him and denied him a fair opportunity to 
defend against the misconduct charges. 
¶39 Attorney Winkel is also mistaken in arguing that, in 
making a sanctions recommendation, neither the referee nor this 
court may consider the referee's finding that some of Attorney 
Winkel's hearing testimony was unreliable.  There is no dispute 
that Attorney Winkel's testimony during the disciplinary hearing 
would not permit a separate, new misconduct finding in this 
proceeding; due process considerations dictate that attorneys 
receive fair notice of misconduct charges against them and an 
opportunity to respond.   In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550-51 
(1968).  Neither can it be disputed, however, that this court is 
charged with the responsibility of protecting the public from 
attorneys who are not fully truthful.   
¶40 Thus, this court will not simply ignore the referee's 
uncontested findings that Attorney Winkel's hearing testimony 
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
20 
 
was plagued with "non-responsive" answers, "circumlocution and 
prevarication," "layers of obfuscation," and conflicts with 
deposition testimony.  Just as in criminal cases, where a trial 
court may not add an additional term for perjury to a convicted 
defendant's sentence but may consider a defendant's veracity at 
trial as part of the exercise of sentencing discretion, so too 
is it entirely appropriate for this court to consider Attorney 
Winkel's 
attitude 
toward 
the 
truth 
in 
formulating 
its 
disciplinary sanction.  See Lange v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 569, 575, 
196 N.W.2d 680 (1972); see also American Bar Association 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, § 9.22(f) (listing as 
an aggravating factor the "submission of false evidence, false 
statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary 
process"); see also In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Eisenberg, 2013 WI 37, ¶34 n.9, 347 Wis.2d 116, 833 N.W.2d 46 
(referee's comments about the respondent attorney's "conduct and 
testimony in this proceeding are proper subjects of a referee's 
report").   
¶41 We also are unpersuaded by  Attorney Winkel's numerous  
criticisms of the referee's performance.  To begin, the referee 
did not err in declining to credit Attorney Winkel for his 
return to P.L. of the unused portion of the advance fee payment.  
Attorney Winkel was obligated to  return those funds by the 
terms of his fee agreement.   
¶42 The referee similarly did not err in declining to 
credit Attorney Winkel for his supposed regret over the way he 
handled P.L.'s case.  The referee was clearly troubled by 
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
21 
 
Attorney Winkel's demeanor during the disciplinary hearing:  the 
referee 
described 
portions 
of 
his 
hearing 
testimony 
as 
displaying a sense of "exaggerated indignation" that was both 
"specious and misplaced"; as containing "major contradictions 
between [his] deposition testimony and his hearing testimony"; 
and as marked by "circumlocution," "prevarication," and "layers 
of obfuscation."  Given the facts as they unfolded before the 
referee, we do not question the referee's determination that 
Attorney Winkel has not shown that he fully appreciates the 
wrongful nature of his conduct.     
¶43 The referee also did not err in declining to view as a 
mitigating factor Attorney Winkel's lack of personal benefit 
from his misconduct.  Attorney Winkel argues in his appellate 
brief that he "did not stand to gain anything personally by 
making untimely filings or letting the case get dismissed."  
While this statement may be literally true, we do not find it 
particularly comforting, especially given our duty to protect 
the 
public 
from 
attorney 
misconduct. 
 
See 
Preamble 
to 
SCR Chapter 21.   
¶44 We are similarly unpersuaded by Attorney Winkel's 
argument that the meritless nature of P.L.'s civil rights 
lawsuit counteracts his own blameworthiness.  Attorney Winkel 
states explicitly in his briefs, and also stated at oral 
argument, that P.L.'s lawsuit had "no merit."    It would be an 
odd disciplinary system if maintaining a meritless lawsuit 
counted 
as 
a 
mitigating 
circumstance, 
especially 
since 
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
22 
 
maintaining a meritless lawsuit is itself a sanctionable 
offense.  See SCR 20:3.1. 
¶45 Finally, while we acknowledge that a suspension of 
Attorney Winkel's law license may very well hurt his law 
practice, we have previously made clear that such an effect is 
not an appropriate factor in establishing a level of discipline.  
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lamb, 2011 WI 101, 
¶31, 338 Wis. 2d 1, 806 N.W.2d 439 ("Any suspension of an 
attorney's license to practice law is likely to have a 
detrimental impact on the attorney's livelihood."). 
¶46 In the end, it appears that in this disciplinary 
proceeding, Attorney Winkel chose a litigation strategy he now 
regrets:  an "all or nothing" strategy of going for an outright 
exoneration.  The strategy failed, leaving him with a record 
that contains little mitigating evidence, an admonishment from a 
federal magistrate judge, and a referee's report bristling with 
factual findings and credibility determinations adverse to him.  
Having lost the battle on the facts, he hopes to win the war on 
appeal by attacking the fairness of the OLR disciplinary process 
and the referee.  We reject Attorney Winkel's efforts.7 
                                                 
7 To the extent we have not addressed each and every one of 
the many arguments presented by Attorney Winkel during appellate 
briefing and oral argument, such arguments are deemed denied.  
See Libertarian Party of Wis. v. State, 199 Wis. 2d 790, 801, 
546 N.W.2d 424 (1996) (appellate court need not discuss 
arguments 
unless 
they 
have 
"sufficient 
merit 
to 
warrant 
individual attention"). 
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
23 
 
¶47 Turning 
specifically 
to 
the 
level 
of 
discipline 
required, we disagree with Attorney Winkel's argument that a 
public reprimand will suffice.  We must impose the discipline 
needed to protect the public, the courts, and the legal system 
from Attorney Winkel's repetition of misconduct, to impress upon 
him the seriousness of his misconduct, and to deter other 
attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct. See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Arthur, 2005 WI 40, ¶78, 279 
Wis. 2d 583, 694 N.W.2d 910.  We also must bear in mind that 
discipline is generally progressive in nature.  See, e.g., In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nussberger, 2006 WI 111, ¶27, 
296 Wis.2d 47, 719 N.W.2d 501.  Considering these factors, we 
conclude that more than a public reprimand is required.  This is 
the third time the court has had occasion to discipline Attorney 
Winkel for professional misconduct.  Clearly, his two previous 
public reprimands have not sufficiently impressed upon him the 
need to scrupulously adhere to the rules of professional conduct 
for attorneys.  His course of conduct requires a license 
suspension.   
¶48 We further conclude that a suspension greater than the 
60-day minimum suspension is in order.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Grady, 188 Wis. 2d 98, 108–09, 523 N.W.2d 
564 (1994) (explaining that generally the minimum length of a 
license suspension is 60 days).  We are particularly concerned 
with the pattern of misconduct Attorney Winkel has displayed:  
in both this case and in his previous two disciplinary matters, 
Attorney Winkel has shown a willingness to bend the truth to 
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
24 
 
help himself.  We agree with the referee's statement that a 60-
day 
minimum 
suspension 
would 
"undercut[] 
the 
values 
of 
truthfulness and honesty which are at the very heart of the 
legal system."  We therefore conclude, as did the referee, that 
a four-month suspension is an appropriate response, justified by 
our precedent.  See, e.g., Harris, 345 Wis. 2d 239 (five-month 
suspension for lawyer with disciplinary history who failed to 
inform client of dismissal of matter, misrepresented the status 
of the matter that had been dismissed, and failed to cooperate 
with the OLR investigation). 
¶49 Finally, we turn to the issue of costs.  The OLR has 
requested costs in the total sum of $42,634.13.  This amount 
consists of $37,002.13 in pre-appeal costs, and $5,632.00 in 
appellate costs.  Attorney Winkel does not challenge the pre-
appeal costs.  He does, however, challenge the appellate costs, 
claiming that they amount to "piling on."  Attorney Winkel also 
claims that the OLR's appellate costs were needlessly inflated 
by a change in its position regarding the appropriate length of 
suspension:  at oral argument, the OLR asked the court to impose 
the 60-day suspension that it had requested in its complaint, 
whereas in its appellate brief-in-chief, the OLR asked the court 
to 
approve 
the 
referee's 
recommendation 
of 
a 
four-month 
suspension.  Attorney Winkel argues that the OLR probably 
performed some appellate work that was "wasteful" in that it was 
not consistent with the OLR's ultimate position. 
¶50 We deny Attorney Winkel's objection.  Our rules 
require that a respondent who objects to a statement of costs 
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
25 
 
"must state what he or she considers to be a reasonable amount 
of costs."  SCR 22.24(2).  Attorney Winkel did not do so.  He 
apparently believes that a "reasonable amount" of costs for the 
OLR to have incurred on appeal is zero, as he asks this court to 
deny the OLR's appellate costs in their entirety.  We decline to 
do so.  As shown by the discussion above, Attorney Winkel has 
vigorously advocated on appeal for the imposition of only a 
public reprimand.  He has advanced a wide variety of substantive 
and 
procedural 
challenges 
to 
the 
referee's 
report 
and 
recommendation, all of which the OLR has responded to in 
briefing and at oral argument.  The OLR's requested appellate 
costs of $5,632.00 do not strike us as unreasonable or 
unnecessary, nor do we have any reason to believe that they were 
materially 
driven 
up 
by 
the 
OLR's 
arguments 
as 
to 
the 
appropriate suspension length. 
¶51 IT IS ORDERED that the license of David J. Winkel to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of four 
months, effective August 6, 2015. 
¶52 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, David J. Winkel shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  
¶53 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that David J. Winkel shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended.  
No. 
2012AP1845-D   
 
26 
 
¶54 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.28(2). 
 
 
 
No.  2012AP1845-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶55 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
per curiam.  I write separately to point out that Attorney 
Winkel's comments about bifurcating the hearing to determine the 
merits of the violation apart from determining sanctions might 
be a subject of study for the Lawyer Regulation Committee that I 
am proposing.    
¶56 On February 6, 2015, I filed rule petition 15-01 to 
create supreme court rules providing for a Lawyer Regulation 
Committee to review the Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys (chapters 20 and 22 of the supreme court rules) and 
the organization, operation, and procedures of the lawyer 
discipline system, including the OLR, District Committees, 
Preliminary 
Review 
Committee, 
Referees, 
and 
Board 
of 
Administrative Oversight, and to create a Lawyer Regulation 
Review Committee.  The court unanimously agreed to conduct a 
public hearing on this proposal in the fall of 2015.  The 
subject of bifurcation can be a subject of study for the Lawyer 
Regulation Committee, if my rule petition is adopted. 
 
 
 
No.  2012AP1845-D.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶57 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (dissenting).  The 
Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) initially requested that we 
impose 60 days suspension for the six counts of misconduct that 
it alleged.1  The referee recommended four months suspension for 
the five counts that OLR proved and for the referee's conclusion 
that David J. Winkel was not honest in his testimony.  At oral 
argument, which was held subsequent to the parties receiving the 
referee's findings and recommendation, OLR again requested that 
we impose 60 days suspension for the five counts of misconduct.   
¶58 I 
respectfully 
dissent 
because 
by 
imposing 
the 
referee's recommended four month suspension, which is double 
what OLR sought, the majority appears to have adopted the 
referee's conclusion that Attorney Winkel was not honest in his 
testimony at the hearing the referee conducted.  However, Winkel 
was not charged with giving untruthful testimony to the referee.  
Therefore, to increase his punishment based on the referee's 
conclusion that he was untruthful denies Winkel due process of 
law.  
¶59 To explain further, the referee recommended a 100% 
increase in the 60-day suspension that the OLR requested because 
the referee believed that Winkel was not honest in his testimony 
at the referee's hearing.  In that regard the referee said,  
OLR's recommendation of a 60-day suspension may have 
been appropriate before the hearing started; by the 
time it ended it was definitely not sufficient.  Were 
I to recommend a 60-day suspension here I would be 
                                                 
1 OLR dismissed Count 4 prior to the hearing before the 
referee.   
No.  2012AP1845-D.pdr 
 
2 
 
undercutting the values of truthfulness and honesty 
which are at the very heart of the legal system.2 
¶60 While 
the 
referee's 
comments 
about 
Winkel's 
truthfulness may be a basis for a new disciplinary charge, to 
discipline Winkel for a count of misconduct without notice or an 
opportunity to be heard violates Winkel's right to due process.  
As we have held, an attorney has a constitutional due process 
right in a disciplinary proceeding to "prior notice of the 
charges, the right to prepare and defend against the charges, 
and the right to a full hearing" thereon.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Gamino, 2005 WI 168, ¶48, 286 Wis. 2d 558, 
707 N.W.2d 132.  Winkel had no notice of a charge that he gave 
untruthful testimony, nor the right to defend against it, nor a 
hearing on whether the referee's conclusion was correct.  
Because due process is foundational to our disciplinary process, 
and because Winkel was not accorded due process, I respectfully 
dissent.  
¶61 I also write because I have an additional concern 
about what is permitted when OLR proceeds on an ethical 
allegation.  My concern is that by providing proof of past 
disciplinary history of an attorney as he or she attempts to 
defend against current charges, it is possible that a referee's 
opinion of an attorney's alleged misconduct may be prejudiced.   
¶62 Here, the referee commented about Winkel's veracity 
after his review of Winkel's prior disciplinary history.  The 
                                                 
2 Referee's report, p. 60. 
No.  2012AP1845-D.pdr 
 
3 
 
last disciplinary matter arose from 2003 conduct, 12 years ago.3  
However, the referee drew from those two cases as a foundation 
for his conclusion in this case.  He also reviewed the 
underlying reports of the referees on those two cases, even 
though the reports were not in the record of this case.4  As he 
was drawing his conclusions, the referee said, "his prior 
disciplinary history involves this very same type of misconduct.  
In this regard, a review of not only the two prior decisions of 
this Court, but also the underlying referees' reports, is 
instructive."5   
¶63 Winkel's counsel noted the effect of those prior 
proceedings on the referee's consideration of Winkel's defense.  
He suggested that, as with a jury, a fact-finding referee should 
not be able to employ a defendant's past disciplinary history as 
proof of present conduct.  I agree with Winkel's counsel that 
past disciplinary history should not be part of prosecution for 
a new charge, although it is relevant in deciding on the 
sanction if charges are proved.  I urge my colleagues on the 
court to consider whether we need to amend our SCR ch. 20 and 
ch. 22 to address this concern.  
                                                 
3 In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Winkel, 2005 WI 
165, ¶2, 286 Wis. 2d 533, 706 N.W.2d 661 (public reprimand); and 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Winkel, 217 Wis. 2d 339, 
340, 577 N.W.2d 9 (1998) (public reprimand). 
4 Referee's report pp. 52-54. 
5 Id., p. 52.   
No.  2012AP1845-D.pdr 
 
4 
 
¶64 I 
am 
authorized 
to 
state 
that 
Justice 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2012AP1845-D.mjg 
 
1 
 
¶65 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   (dissenting).  I dissent 
from the Court's opinion.  I agree with Chief Justice Roggensack 
that a 60 day suspension is appropriate.   
 
 
No.  2012AP1845-D.mjg 
 
 
 
1