Title: Brooks v. State
Citation: 892 So. 2d 976
Docket Number: 1020344
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: January 16, 2004

892 So. 2d 976 (2004)
Ex parte State of Alabama
(In re Rodgrick Cornilius BROOKS v. STATE of Alabama).
1020344.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 16, 2004.
*977 William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Robin Blevins Scales and G. Ward Beeson III, asst. attys. gen., for petitioner.
Submitted on petitioner's brief only.
HARWOOD, Justice.
The State of Alabama petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted, to address whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in reversing the judgment of the trial court denying Rodgrick Cornilius Brooks's second Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P., petition for postconviction relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Brooks might have been entitled to an out-of-time appeal from the dismissal of his first Rule 32 petition based on the authority of Ex parte Fountain, 842 So. 2d 726 (Ala.2001), and Ex parte Johnson, 806 So. 2d 1195 (Ala.2001). We reverse and remand.
The record reveals the following. On October 20, 1997, Brooks was convicted of murder and first-degree robbery. He was sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment on the murder conviction and to 20 years' imprisonment on the first-degree-robbery conviction, the sentences to be served consecutively. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Brooks's convictions and sentences on direct appeal, in an unpublished memorandum. Brooks v. State (No. CR-97-0540, June 19, 1998), 738 So. 2d 941 (Ala.Crim.App.1998) (table). That court issued a certificate of judgment on July 7, 1998. On March 20, 2000, Brooks filed his first Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P., petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel and the improper empaneling of the petit jury. After the State filed its answer and its motion to dismiss the petition, the trial court summarily dismissed Brooks's Rule 32 petition. The order dismissing the petition concluded with the declaration: "Done this _____ day of August, 2000."
After receiving a copy of the order dismissing his petition, which was not stamped as having been received by the circuit clerk, Brooks sent three letters complaining that the order was undated. The first letter, dated October 4, 2000, was addressed to Judge Eugene W. Reese, the circuit court judge who entered the order, and requested that the circuit court vacate the undated order and issue a new one. The second letter, dated October 23, 2000, was addressed to the clerk of the Montgomery Circuit Court and inquired as to the status of his previous request to have the undated order vacated and a new order issued. The last letter, dated October 30, 2000, was addressed to the Administrative Office of Courts. Brooks did not receive a response to any of his letters.
On November 16, 2000, Brooks filed a "Motion for Correction of Clerical Mistake or Error," which was denied on November 29, 2000. On December 5, 2000, Brooks petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate the undated order. On December 7, 2000, the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the petition because the petition failed to state a proper claim. Ex parte Brooks, 820 So. 2d 183 (No. CR-00-0476, Dec. 7, 2000).
On December 28, 2000, because the trial court had not responded to his requests to issue a dated order, Brooks filed his second Rule 32 petition  the Rule 32 petition that is the subject of the State's instant petition for a writ of certiorari  requesting an out-of-time appeal from the dismissal of his first petition pursuant to Rule 32.1(f), Ala.R.Crim.P. After the State had filed its answer and had moved to dismiss the second Rule 32 petition, the circuit court entered an order on February 8, 2001, summarily dismissing Brooks's second Rule 32 petition. Brooks appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals.
*978 In a per curiam opinion issued on December 21, 2001, the Court of Criminal Appeals treated Brooks's appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus and granted the petition. On January 4, 2002, the State filed an application for rehearing, and on April 26, 2002, the Court of Criminal Appeals issued an opinion on rehearing withdrawing the December 21 opinion and substituting a new opinion. Brooks v. State, 892 So. 2d 969 (Ala.Crim.App.2002). That new opinion, which did not treat the appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus, remanded the case for the trial court "to determine when its order denying Brooks's first Rule 32 petition was entered, i.e., stamped as received by the circuit clerk, and whether Brooks received a copy of that order that was stamped as received by the circuit clerk." 892 So. 2d  at 973-74. The opinion also stated that if the circuit court determined that Brooks received his copy of the order after the 42-day period for filing a notice of appeal had run, or if it determined that he received no notice as to when the order had been entered, "it shall grant Brooks an out-of-time appeal." 892 So. 2d  at 974. On May 10, 2002, the State filed another application for a rehearing. Thereafter, apparently in response to the remand order, the trial court, on May 23, 2002, signed an order in all respects identical to its order entered on the "_____ day of August, 2000," thereby again denying Brooks's first Rule 32 petition. On October 18, 2002, the Court of Criminal Appeals, in an unpublished memorandum, on return to remand and on the State's application for a rehearing, determined that "the circuit court has granted Brooks the relief he requested," dismissed Brooks's appeal as moot, and overruled the State's pending application for rehearing. Brooks v. State (No. CR-00-1134, October 18, 2002), ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.Crim.App.2002) (table). The State filed its third application for rehearing on November 1, 2002, and the Court of Criminal Appeals overruled that application on November 15, 2002; the State now seeks certiorari review.
In its April 26, 2002, opinion, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated, in relevant part:
Brooks v. State, 892 So. 2d 969, 971-73 (Ala. Crim App.2002).
Judge Shaw wrote specially, concurring in the result. He stated:
892 So. 2d  at 974-76.
The legal issues presented here are identical to those presented in Marshall v. State, 884 So. 2d 900 (Ala.2003). In that case we held that the Court of Criminal Appeals had erred in Brooks v. State, 892 So. 2d 969 (Ala.Crim.App.2002), when it recognized "the availability of an `additional' remedy by way of a successive Rule 32 petition." "[W]e reiterate that the writ of mandamus is `the only remedy available' to those who, ... through no fault of their own, fail to receive notice of the dismissal of their Rule 32 petition in time to effect a timely appeal therefrom." Marshall v. State, supra, 884 So. 2d  at 905. Therefore, it follows, the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in concluding in its substituted opinion issued on April 26, 2002, that the trial court had erred in summarily dismissing Brooks's second Rule 32 petition because, the Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned, Brooks could present his grievance by way of a second Rule 32 petition instead of by the exclusive remedy of a petition for a writ of mandamus.
Accordingly, on the authority of Marshall v. State, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case to that court for an order or proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.
JOHNSTONE, J., dissents.
JOHNSTONE, Justice (dissenting).
There are two fundamental and related problems with relegating a defendant solely to a petition for a writ of mandamus instead of a second Rule 32 petition to apply for an out-of-time appeal from the denial of the defendant's first Rule 32 petition. First, the defendant's entitlement to an out-of-time appeal depends on facts about judgments, rulings, entries, notices, filings, and the like, and the dates thereof, that first should be presented to and determined by the trial court. A petition for a writ of mandamus filed directly with an appellate court entirely skips such a presentation and determination in the trial court. Second, a writ of mandamus should issue to a trial judge only to redress his or her refusal to grant relief clearly due the petitioner. Ex parte Carter, 807 So. 2d 534, 536 (Ala.2001). But, if the defendant-petitioner is not allowed first to present an application with a factual and legal showing for an out-of-time appeal to the trial judge, the trial judge cannot be held to have refused to grant clearly due relief so as to warrant a petition for a writ of mandamus against him or her. Id.
If, for example, an incarcerated defendant receives a notice which tells him that, on a date more than 42 days earlier, the trial court denied his first Rule 32 petition a few days after it was filed, against whom should the defendant file a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an out-of-time appeal? Who has refused him an out-of-time appeal? Unless the defendant asks the trial court for an out-of-time appeal and makes a factual and legal showing that clearly justifies one, and unless the trial court then refuses the out-of-time appeal, no grounds for a petition for a writ of mandamus against the trial judge will exist. Ex parte Carter, supra. Nor will any grounds for a petition for a writ of mandamus against the Court of Criminal Appeals exist, for that court, having never even heard of the case at that stage, certainly cannot be deemed to have refused the defendant an out-of-time appeal and thereby to have violated any clear legal right to *985 relief owing to the defendant, as would be prerequisite to mandamus relief. Id.
Is the main opinion holding implicitly that the defendant may effectively demand the out-of-time appeal and make his showing of a clear legal right by writing one or more letters to the trial court so long as the defendant does not call the letters a Rule 32 petition? Is the main opinion now conferring legal status upon letters to the courts?
Is Rule 32 not intended to unify and to simplify the postconviction hodgepodge? See Rule 32.4, Ala. R.Crim. P. Is a Rule 32 petition not the most practicable procedure for a defendant to present and the trial court to decide the defendant's claim to an out-of-time appeal? On the other hand, if the main opinion is implicitly holding that the defendant must write one or more letters asking the trial court for the out-of-time appeal and making the showing of a clear legal right to an out-of-time appeal in order to establish grounds for a petition for a writ of mandamus against the trial judge, then the main opinion is elevating form over substance by not recognizing Brooks's second Rule 32 petition as one more such letter (in addition to those he has already written) and by not recognizing his appeal of the denial of his second Rule 32 petition as his petition for a writ of mandamus in accordance with Ex parte Burch, 730 So. 2d 143 (Ala.1999), and Ex parte Hutto, 720 So. 2d 1051 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), much as the Court of Criminal Appeals did when this same case was before them on original submission.
When Brooks, the defendant-petitioner now before us, filed his second Rule 32 petition on December 21, 2000, it was expressly authorized by Fountain v. State, 842 So. 2d 719 (Ala.Crim.App.2000), as a method to seek an out-of-time appeal of the denial of his first Rule 32 petition. This holding of Fountain was affirmed by this Court in Ex parte Fountain, 842 So. 2d 726, 728, 730 (Ala.2001), as the Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged in their revised opinion in this Brooks case on application for rehearing, Brooks v. State, 892 So. 2d 969, 973-74 (Ala.Crim.App.2002). For the reasons explained in this dissent, Brooks's second Rule 32 petition was the most logical way to seek an out-of-time appeal. Therefore, the Court of Criminal Appeals was correct to follow Ex parte Fountain and to grant Brooks his relief in Brooks v. State, supra. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from reversing the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
I do note that the remand by this Court does not prohibit the Court of Criminal Appeals from treating Brooks's letters to the trial court as his demand and showing for an out-of-time appeal, treating his second Rule 32 petition as another such letter, and treating his appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus, much as that court did on original submission. Such a solution is the second best way, necessitated by the main opinion, to achieve the fundamental due process the courts owe Brooks and other defendants similarly situated.