Title: Serpa v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 171, 2013
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 30, 2013

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANTONIO SERPA,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
           Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 171, 2013 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 1106001209 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                      Submitted: June 26, 2013 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: July 30, 2013 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 30th day of July 2013, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Antonio Serpa, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s March 14, 2013 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior 
 
2
Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening 
brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects that, in June 2011, Antonio Serpa 
was arrested on drug charges and violations of probation (“VOPs”).  His 
brother, Miguel, was arrested at the same time.  A lawyer with the Office of 
the Public Defender was assigned to Miguel’s case and met with him on 
June 22, 2011.  On July 1, 2011, Miguel retained private counsel.  On July 
12, 2011, the same public defender who had been assigned to represent 
Miguel was assigned to Antonio’s case.  The affidavit submitted by the 
public defender in the Superior Court reflects that she only discussed court 
procedures with Miguel and no substantive legal issues, since the indictment 
was sealed and no evidentiary information was available.   
 
(3) 
On October 18, 2011, Antonio Serpa, represented by the public 
defender who had been assigned to Miguel’s case, entered a plea of guilty to 
Conspiracy in the Second Degree and two counts of Delivery of Cocaine.  
He also acknowledged three VOPs.  After being declared a habitual 
offender,2 he was sentenced to 1 year of Level V incarceration on his 
conspiracy conviction, to 20 years at Level V, to be suspended after 14 years 
for 18 months of probation on his first drug conviction and to 10 years at 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §4214(a). 
 
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Level V, to be suspended after 3 years for decreasing levels of supervision 
on his second drug conviction.  Serpa was sentenced on his first VOP to 4 
years at Level V, to be suspended for probation.  He was discharged as 
unimproved on his remaining VOPs.  Serpa did not appeal his convictions. 
 
(4) 
In his appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his motion for 
postconviction relief, Serpa claims that the public defender who represented 
him in connection with his guilty pleas had a conflict of interest because she 
also represented his brother, Miguel.  Serpa contends that the public 
defender provided ineffective assistance as a result of the conflict of interest. 
 
(5) 
When considering a motion for postconviction relief pursuant 
to Rule 61, the Superior Court must first determine whether the defendant 
has met the procedural requirements of the rule before considering the merits 
of the motion.3  In this case, Serpa’s claim is barred as untimely pursuant to 
Rule 61(i) (1) because his postconviction motion raising that claim, which 
was due to be filed on or before November 17, 2012,4 was not filed until 
December 11, 2012.   
 
(6) 
Even if Serpa’s motion had been timely filed, it is without 
merit.  An application for postconviction relief alleging a conflict of interest 
                                                 
3 Maxion v. State, 686 A.2d 148, 150 (Del. 1996). 
4 Rubino v. State, Del. Supr., No. 468, 2008, Holland, J. (Jan. 15, 2009) (the defendant’s 
conviction became final 30 days after sentencing pursuant to Rule 61(m) (1), after which 
the defendant had 1 year within which to move for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 
61(i) (1)). 
 
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must specifically identify the nature of the alleged conflict and make a 
concrete showing of actual prejudice.5  Similarly, an application for 
postconviction relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel must 
set forth and substantiate concrete allegations of actual prejudice as a result 
of counsel’s unprofessional errors.6  Serpa has failed to support his claims by 
demonstrating that any alleged error on the part of his counsel resulted in 
prejudice to him.  As such, we conclude that the Superior Court properly 
denied Serpa’s postconviction motion. 
 
(7) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented are controlled by settled 
Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, there 
was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
                                                 
5 Pettiford v. State, Del. Supr., No. 290, 2010, Berger, J. (June 13, 2011) (citing Lewis v. 
State, 757 A.2d 709, 718 (Del. 2000)). 
6 Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) and Younger v. State, 
580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990)).