Title: Ex parte D. P. T.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1180774
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 25, 2019

Rel: October 25, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
_________________________
1180774
_________________________
Ex parte D.P.T.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  D.P.T.
v.
United States Automobile Association, American Bankers
Insurance of Florida, Inc., and American Collectors
Insurance, LLC)
(Geneva Circuit Court, CV-17-900037)
SELLERS, Justice.
1180774
D.P.T. seeks a writ of mandamus directing the Geneva
Circuit Court to rescind a discovery order that, D.P.T.
asserts, requires him to execute written authorizations
allowing the respondents, D.P.T.'s insurers--United States
Automobile 
Association, 
American 
Bankers 
Insurance 
of 
Florida,
Inc., and American Collectors Insurance, LLC (hereinafter
collectively referred 
to 
as 
"the 
insurers")--to obtain 
records
containing 
communications that 
he 
alleges 
are 
privileged 
under
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.  See § 34-26-2, Ala.
Code 1975; Rule 503, Ala. R. Evid.  The insurers, however,
have represented to this Court that they seek only D.P.T.'s
"employment" records.  In addition, the trial court itself
filed a brief in response to the mandamus petition, which is
a somewhat rare occurrence, in which it represented to this
Court that it directed D.P.T. to execute an authorization
allowing only the release of "employment" records.  D.P.T.,
who, as the petitioner, has the burden of establishing a clear
legal right to the issuance of the writ of mandamus, has not
demonstrated that his "employment" records contain privileged
communications.  See  Ex parte BOC Grp., Inc., 823 So. 2d
1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001) (a petitioner for the writ of mandamus
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must demonstrate, among other things, "a clear legal right to
the order sought").  Thus, we deny the petition for the writ
of mandamus.
In July 2015, a vehicle occupied by D.P.T. and his minor
stepson was rear-ended by another vehicle.  On his own behalf
and as next friend of his stepson, D.P.T. sued the driver of
the other vehicle.  Later, D.P.T. amended his complaint to
state a claim against the insurers for underinsured-motorist
benefits.  D.P.T.'s and his stepson's claims against the
driver of the other vehicle involved in the car accident were
settled, and the action proceeded against the insurers.
D.P.T. has asserted that his injuries from the car
accident forced him to retire prematurely from the United
States Army, which resulted in a loss of income.  Accordingly,
the insurers sought to obtain records relating to D.P.T.'s
military service.  D.P.T., however, refused to execute an
authorization allowing the Army to produce those records.  It
is undisputed that D.P.T. has been treated at clinics operated
by the Department of Veterans Affairs for post-traumatic
stress disorder resulting from his combat experience in Iraq
and Afghanistan.  The stated basis for his refusal to sign
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authorizations for the release of his military records is a
claim that the records contain confidential communications
between him and psychotherapists.  
The insurers filed a motion to compel D.P.T. to sign an
authorization for the release of the records, which the trial
court granted within minutes of its filing.  Subsequently,
D.P.T. filed a motion asking the trial court to reconsider its
ruling and, later, a motion for a protective order.  The trial
court denied those motions, and D.P.T. initiated this mandamus
proceeding.  This Court ordered answers and briefs on the
issue whether the records sought are protected by the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.
A writ of mandamus will issue if a trial court exceeds
its discretion by ordering the production of records that are
privileged.  See Ex parte University of South Alabama, 183 So.
3d 915, 920 (Ala. 2015).  Section 34-26-2, Ala. Code 1975,
provides:
"[T]he confidential relations and communications
between 
licensed 
psychologists, 
licensed
psychiatrists, 
or 
licensed 
psychological 
technicians
and their clients are placed upon the same basis as
those provided by law between attorney and client,
and nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
require any such privileged communication to be
disclosed."
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Similarly, Rule 503(b), Ala. R. Evid., provides:
"A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and
to prevent any other person from disclosing
confidential communications, made for the purposes
of diagnosis or treatment of the patient's mental or
emotional condition, including alcohol or drug
addiction, 
among 
the 
patient, 
the 
patient's
psychotherapist, and persons who are participating
in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of
the psychotherapist, including members of the
patient's family."
Although this Court has acknowledged exceptions to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, none of those exceptions
would apply in the present case.  See Ex parte West Mental
Health Ctr., 884 So. 2d 835, 840 (Ala. 2003) (recognizing five
exceptions 
to 
the 
psychotherapist-patient 
privilege--where 
the
mental state of a parent in a child-custody matter is at
issue, where a defendant in a criminal trial raises an
insanity defense, where the communications are relevant in
proceedings seeking to hospitalize a patient for mental
illness, where the communications are made during a
court-ordered examination of the mental condition of a party
or witness, and where it is alleged that there has been a
breach of duty arising out of the psychotherapist-patient
relationship).
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In their response to D.P.T.'s mandamus petition, the
insurers assert that "[t]he trial court ordered [D.P.T.] to
execute an authorization for the release of employment
records" only and that, therefore, the trial court "did not
[exceed] its discretion by ordering discovery without an
accommodation for the psychotherapist-patient privilege."  In
its brief in response to D.P.T.'s mandamus petition,
consistent with the insurers' position, the trial court states
that its discovery order "does not provide for the discovery
of all [D.P.T.'s] military records" because "the records to be
released are exclusively [D.P.T.'s] employment records."
To be sure, as D.P.T. points out, the insurers' motion to
compel referenced more than just employment records.  It
specifically mentioned the alleged relevance of D.P.T.'s
employment, retirement, and medical records and asked for an
order directing D.P.T. to "sign all authorizations required
for the disclos[ure] of these records."  The trial court
granted 
the 
insurers' 
motion 
without 
any 
expressed
limitations.  That said, in support of the motion to compel,
the insurers submitted correspondence from their counsel to
D.P.T.'s counsel, which requested that D.P.T. execute an
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authorization 
that 
identified only 
"employment" 
records 
as 
the
"items [D.P.T. is] requesting [to be released from the Army]." 
A box that is specifically titled "medical records" on the
authorization D.P.T. was asked to sign was not checked.  As
noted, the insurers have expressly represented to this Court
that they sought only "employment" records, and the trial
court has represented that it intended only to order D.P.T. to
sign the authorization the insurers provided him and that was
submitted with the motion to compel.  Based on the materials
before us, including the insurers' and the trial court's
representations, we conclude that D.P.T. was asked to execute
only the release allowing for the production of employment
records and that the trial court compelled him to sign only
that particular release.   Because D.P.T. has not demonstrated
that 
his 
employment 
records 
contain 
privileged
psychotherapist-patient communications, we deny his petition
for the writ of mandamus.
PETITION DENIED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin and Wise, JJ., concur.
Mitchell, J., concurs in the result.
Shaw, Bryan, and Stewart, JJ., dissent.
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1180774
SHAW, Justice (dissenting).
The defendant insurers in the action below filed by the
petitioner, D.P.T., filed a motion to compel the production of
certain records, alleging that discovery was "necessary on
topics including ... [D.P.T.'s] military employment history,
factors leading to his alleged forced retirement, and medical
treatment during military service."  (Emphasis added.)  The
motion to compel stated that "discovery must be had regarding
the timing of [D.P.T.'s] retirement and his medical and
employment status" and that D.P.T. "had failed to disclose any
military employment/medical records."  (Emphasis added.)  The
defendant insurers asserted in their motion that D.P.T. "has
very clearly made his military service/medical/retirement
[sic] the paramount issue in this case" and that D.P.T.'s
"employment and medical records are objectively relevant and
material to his claim for employment and medical damages, and
he should be ordered to sign an authorization to permit [the]
Defendants to obtain those records."  (Emphasis added.)  The
defendant insurers acknowledged concerns that some records
might 
"contain 
sensitive 
and/or 
otherwise 
private 
information"
and suggested that "a carefully crafted authorization would
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1180774
alleviate the concern."  They further indicated that they were
"agreeable" to a protective order "wherein any records
received pursuant to the authorization may only be used in
this litigation, and that at the conclusion of this
litigation, the records, and all copies made, will be
destroyed."1 
The defendant insurers clearly have the right to discover
the vast bulk of the materials they sought, including
employment 
records, 
military-service 
records, 
and 
even 
medical
records.  However, it appears from the materials before us
that some of D.P.T.'s medical records would include
information that is protected by the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.  See Ex parte Western Mental Health Ctr., 884 So.
2d 835, 840 (Ala. 2003).  Although the one authorization
prepared in this case sought only "employment records," the
motion to compel suggests that much more was desired.  The
trial court granted the motion without limitation, stating
that D.P.T. had "14 days to provide the defendants with
discovery requests."  The trial court's order 
denying D.P.T.'s
motion to reconsider required D.P.T. "to execute the
1Such a protective order would still have required any
privileged materials to be produced.
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appropriate authorizations for the records the [defendant
insurers] request."  (Emphasis added.)
It is true that, at present, the only authorization
provided for D.P.T. to execute is for the production of his
employment records, and the defendant insurers are clearly
entitled to those records--as long as they do not contain
privileged materials.  However, as the present case currently
stands, the trial court has entered an order that, on its
face, grants a motion to compel that indicates that the
defendant insurers also desired what appears to be privileged
information and a follow-up order directing D.P.T. to execute
authorizations.  The fact that privileged information has not
yet been sought does not cure this fact.
Therefore, D.P.T. has shown that, in entering the order
granting the motion to compel, the trial court exceeded its
discretion and that, accordingly, D.P.T. is entitled to
mandamus relief.  All that is required in this case is an
appropriate protective order or modification of the order
compelling production 
to 
ensure 
that 
privileged information is
not produced.  I would grant the petition and issue a writ
directing the trial court either to amend its order or to
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1180774
enter an appropriate protective order.  Therefore, I
respectfully dissent.
Bryan and Stewart, JJ., concur.
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