Title: Harnage v. State
Citation: 274 So. 2d 352
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 28, 1972

274 So. 2d 352 (1972)
In re Floyd E. HARNAGE, Jr.
v.
STATE of Alabama.
Ex parte STATE of Alabama ex rel. ATTORNEY GENERAL.
7 Div. 934.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 28, 1972.
*353 William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., and Richard F. Calhoun, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
No appearance for respondent.
MERRILL, Justice.
Defendant Harnage was convicted of the offense of murder in the first degree and was sentenced to life imprisonment in the penitentiary. He was charged with strangling Linda Croft and killing her.
Several points are treated in the opinion of the Criminal Court of Appeals, 49 Ala. App. 563, 274 So. 333, but the only point on which the judgment was reversed, and the only point before us is stated in the following from the opinion of that court:
In the first place, the motion for a mistrial was "because of the misconduct of the juror," and not because of any ruling of the court. There was no misconduct on the part of the juror in asking if it was permissible for the jury to see the defendant's hands. Of course, the request came too late, because the case had already been presented to the jury and any member of the jury had had the opportunity to observe the hands of the defendant during the five days consumed in the trial and, more particularly, while the defendant was testifying in his own behalf.
Here, no objection was made to any ruling of the court, and even though appellate courts must consider all questions apparent on the record, Tit. 15, § 389, Code 1940, we have held that such language in § 389 "does not mean that in a non-capital case a review will be made of questions which are not properly raised." Segers v. State, 283 Ala. 682, 220 So. 2d 848; Cauley v. State, 33 Ala.App. 557, 36 So. 2d 347.
However, the Court of Criminal Appeals has treated this question as if an objection was made to a remark of the judge even though it definitely was not a ruling. There is a principle, and it has been applied, that if the court's ruling was correct for any reason, it will not be reversed because the court assigned the wrong reason therefor. Stevenson v. State, 18 Ala.App. 174, 90 So. 140, cert. den. 206 Ala. 701, 90 So. 926; Nichols v. State, 276 Ala. 209, 160 So. 2d 619; 7 Ala. Dig., Criminal Law, No question is raised as to the validity of the ruling of the court when the jury returned and the court gave a proper reason for denying the request of the juror.
But, laying aside the question of whether the point was properly raised, the only matter considered, and the sole cause of the reversal, by the Court of Criminal Appeals was the judge's statement, "Not unless he wants you to, or his lawyers say that you can." It would have been better to let the jury retire but what the judge told them was a correct statement of the law.
In Smith v. State, 247 Ala. 354, 24 So. 2d 546, this court said:
This defendant had denied all connection with the crime and it is obvious that he could not have been required to "stand up for inspection" against his will. So the trial court could only allow the defendant's hands to be inspected by the jury if done with the defendant's consent.
No consent or refusal on the part of the defendant was asked for or made, and the jury was sent out with no answer to the juror's question, and no one at that time being in "an untenable position" because no action had been taken or even attempted on the first sentence of the trial court's statement.
Then when the jury was recalled, the judge explained that he had considered the matter and the request came too late and was not proper and that he was taking the responsibility for denying the request. If any conceivable error occurred, it was cured by the judge's explanation, and that was his only and final ruling. In Shadle v. State, 280 Ala. 379, 194 So. 2d 538, the court said that the granting of a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court, for he, being present, is in a much better position to determine what effect, if any, some occurrence may have had upon the jury's ability to decide the defendant's fate fairly and justly. And we will not interfere with the actions of the trial judge unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.
A reading of that portion of the record quoted in the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals does not convince us that the defendant's rights were prejudiced under the circumstances; therefore, we will not disturb the trial court's ruling in this regard. Shadle v. State, supra; Andrews v. State, 174 Ala. 11, 56 So. 998; Hallman v. State, 36 Ala.App. 592, 61 So. 2d 857; Tit. 30, § 100, Code 1940.
We conclude by quoting two paragraphs from Thomas v. Ware, 44 Ala.App. 157, 204 So.2d 501:
In our opinion, the statement of the trial court in the instant case does not present ineradicable prejudice against the defendant.
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
HARWOOD, BLOODWORTH, MADDOX, McCALL and SOMERVILLE, JJ., concur.
HEFLIN, C. J., and COLEMAN, J., dissent.
HEFLIN, Chief Justice (dissenting):
I feel the exception by defendant-appellant-respondent to the remarks of the trial judge properly establishes a right of review. I agree with the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals and, therefore, respectfully dissent.