Title: State v. Tedesco
Citation: 286 P.2d 785, 4 Utah 2d 31
Docket Number: 8270
State: Utah
Issuer: Utah Supreme Court
Date: August 5, 1955

4 Utah 2d 31 (1955) 286 P.2d 785 STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH ITS ENGINEERING COMMISSION, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, v. FRED TEDESCO ET AL., DEFENDANTS, AND BIRD &amp; EVANS, INC., COUNTER-CLAIMANTS AND APPELLANTS. No. 8270. Supreme Court of Utah. August 5, 1955. Pugsley, Hayes &amp; Rampton, Salt Lake City, for appellant. Robert B. Porter, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondent. HENRIOD, Justice. This is an appeal from a judgment notwithstanding a verdict for plaintiff, in a condemnation suit in which defendant's adjoining land allegedly was injured thereby. Affirmed, with costs to plaintiff. Defendant, Bird &amp; Evans, Inc., is the owner of land adjoining that of the Wagener Improvement Co., whose land was the subject of condemnation. In the role of party defendant, Bird &amp; Evans filed a claim in the condemnation proceedings, describing its land which adjoined that sought to be condemned, alleging that its land would suffer damage if the Wagener land was condemned. We have doubts as to whether such pleading can be interpreted to constitute a claim of interest in the land sought to be condemned, as is required before one may intervene in a condemnation action such as this and under the facts of this case,[1] but for the purpose of this decision it will be treated as such a pleaded claim. So far as is important to the decision of this case, the State claims sovereign immunity from defendant's alleged claim, and asserts that the facts do not justify any conclusion to the effect that defendant, Bird &amp; Evans had any compensable interest in the Wagener land. We shall treat these contentions in reverse order. The defendant can prevail here only if the facts clearly establish that it has a present, direct and real interest in the land sought to be condemned by the State, and the defendant concedes that this is so. The only evidence in the record that might reflect such an interest, is the testimony of one witness, Mr. Brayton, a lawyer and the vice-president of the Wagener company. It may be abstracted as follows: On this evidence, defendant wishes this court to decide that there were restrictive covenants created which were charges against all of the land of the Wagener company and all of the land of Bird &amp; Evans, giving the latter company a vested interest in the Wagener property, requiring that the State, in condemnation proceedings against the Wagener land must recognize such an interest in the Wagener land for which compensation must be paid to Bird &amp; Evans. We are convinced that the evidence in this case falls far short of creating a vested interest in the Wagener fee in favor of Bird &amp; Evans or vice versa. At best, the only effective charge against any of the land was created by the filing of written restrictive covenants pertaining only to a small area belonging to Wagener company, not to Bird &amp; Evans, and such restrictive covenants were binding only as to their signatories, i.e., as to Wagener and the purchasers from Wagener. There is nothing in the restrictive covenants mentioned, which were introduced as an exhibit, that has any reference to Bird &amp; Evans or its property, nor were such restrictive covenants signed by Bird &amp; Evans. Admittedly, Plat A, a small area in the whole tract, and upon which restrictive covenants were placed, was the only plat that had been approved and filed for record. No other plats, including any drawn by Bird &amp; Evans, had been approved and recorded, nor is there any evidence to indicate that any of those proposed would or could comply with statutory requirements,[2] and there is no indication that the authorities having power so to do, would approve such subdivisions if and when they were presented for that purpose. How there could be created a binding charge against Wagener's land in favor of Bird &amp; Evans, or vice versa, without any binding writing signed by either party, without written restrictive covenants having been signed by either party, without any official approval of proposed plats which are required to be approved by statute, and without even any substantial oral manifestations of mutual assent that would justify the conclusion that an estate in real property had been created, is difficult to determine. We believe and hold that to graft charges onto and create interests in real property, which is the subject of condemnation, there must be clear and convincing evidence establishing such charge or interest, and that the evidence in this case falls far short of that quality of proof, as the trial court concluded. Although we need not pass upon the matter, assuming, for the sake of argument, that there may have been a binding parol contract of some sort, at best it would have been a contract for the development of the area and by no means one creating restrictive covenants. Such conclusion is made obvious when it is pointed out that any purchaser from Bird &amp; Evans could not enforce the restrictive covenants filed in connection with Oak Hills Plat A, because Bird &amp; Evans was not a party to those covenants and those covenants did not mention Bird &amp; Evans or its property. To say that a purchaser from Bird &amp; Evans could enforce the Oak Hills Plat A restrictive covenants against a Wagener purchaser because Wagener and Bird &amp; Evans had a parol agreement to put restrictive covenants on lands other than that in Oak Hills Plat, when and if more land might be subdivided and platted, which parol agreement, so far as this record is concerned, may or may not have been known to the residents of Oak Hills Plat A, is to indulge in impractical and unreasonable circuity of reasoning. The contract here, if it could be said there was one, is one looking to the appreciation of land values by mutual carrying out the terms of the contract, if and when those terms were carried out. The power of eminent domain is not exercisable only on condition that values beyond those of the land and any vested interests therein must be paid. The land itself is compensable, as are vested interests such as leaseholds having a fair rental value, life estates and the like, and we choose to adhere to the sensible doctrine, best expressed in 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain, 3rd Ed., Sec. 5.76(2), p. 115, where it is said: Since we hold that at best the defendant may have had a contract right in the development of prospective residential land, which, if carried out, would have enhanced the value of its land, such a claim cannot be made the basis for intervention in a condemnation suit brought by the state against property in which defendant has no vested interest. This being so, the defendant could not sue the sovereign for the damages claimed here, and the State's defense of sovereign immunity is well taken in this case. Any claim defendant may deem it has because of damage growing out of the condemnation which is not assertable because of such sovereign immunity, more properly may be asserted by application to the Board of Examiners under the provisions of Titles 63-6-11 and 63-6-13, U.C.A. 1953, for hearing and decision as to the merit of such claim. McDONOUGH, C.J., and CROCKETT, J., concur. WADE, Justice (concurring in the result). I concur in the result on the ground that appellants failed to show that they have suffered any compensable damages to their property. However, I do not agree that if such damages had been shown the defense of sovereign immunity is applicable to this case. WORTHEN, Justice, concurs in the opinion of WADE, J. [1] Title 78-34-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953. [2] Title 57-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953.