Title: State Ex Rel. State Highway Commission v. Bassett
Citation: 467 P.2d 11
Docket Number: 8761
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: March 30, 1970

467 P.2d 11 (1970) STATE of New Mexico ex rel. STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Carl A. BASSETT, Josephine C. Bassett and Farmers Home Administration, Defendants-Appellees. No. 8761. Supreme Court of New Mexico. March 30, 1970. Boston E. Witt, Atty. Gen., Joseph L. Droege, Richard T. Whitley, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Santa Fe, for appellant. David A. Grammer, Jr., Douglas T. Francis, Albuquerque, for appellees. PER CURIAM. Upon consideration of Motion for Rehearing the opinion heretofore filed is withdrawn and the following substituted therefor: MOISE, Chief Justice. The State Highway Commission appeals from a judgment of $5,317.20 entered in *12 favor of Carl M. Bassett and Josephine C. Bassett, after a non-jury trial of a condemnation action brought by appellant. Appellees were the owners of a tract containing 73 acres located some distance north of Highway 66 and not abutting thereon. Appellant brought action to condemn a total of 7.596 acres of the southerly portion of appellees' property for the construction of Interstate Highway 40, being a four-lane, divided highway with a service road on the north side and an overpass across the highway at the southwest corner of appellees' property. At the trial, appellant presented several witnesses who testified concerning the before and after value of appellees' land, basing their opinion of after value on prices received by appellees after the condemnation for acreage adjacent to the overpass, and sales of claimed comparable properties. The testimony was admitted over objection, but the trial judge, in finding 12, stated, "that there was no admissible evidence submitted by the State to show enhancement of the entire remainder so that the before and after value can be computed by deducting the value of the land taken from the total value before taking." Appellant's attack is on this so-called finding. Appellees call attention to other findings, not attacked, which support the conclusion reached and would have us hold as we did in State ex rel. State Highway Comm. v. Pelletier, 76 N.M. 555, 417 P.2d 46 (1966), and in Board of Trustees of Town of Farmington v. Spencer, 75 N.M. 636, 409 P.2d 269 (1965), that no proper attack being made on the findings of before and after value, those findings must be taken as correctly stating the facts, and the appellant could not prevail. We do not agree with this appraisal of the case. Although the attack is directed at what is denominated as finding No. 12, this so-called finding is not properly a finding of fact. Rather, it is a statement by the court that certain testimony received in evidence was not admissible and, accordingly, was not considered in arriving at the facts otherwise found. It follows that the issue presented is one of law concerning the admissibility and weight to be accorded the particular evidence presented. If relevant and admissible, it would be reversible error for the court to refuse to accord it any weight which, in effect, would amount to its exclusion. See Litzkuhn v. Clark, 85 Ariz. 355, 339 P.2d 389 (1959); Carroll v. Beavers, 126 Cal. App. 2d 828, 273 P.2d 56, 59 A.L.R.2d 263 (1954); compare Davey v. Davey, 77 N.M. 303, 422 P.2d 38 (1967). The particular evidence which was presented, and denied consideration although admitted, concerned actual sales by appellees of two tracts adjacent to the newly constructed highway, and one sale by a third party. Of course, these sales were subsequent to the taking and reflected increased value arising from the construction. The question here presented is a narrow one. We are called upon to determine if the evidence of sales subsequent to the taking was admissible for the purpose of determining the compensation to which appellees were entitled as of the date of taking. As already noted, the court admitted opinion evidence of the value of the land taken, based on prices received by appellees for acreage adjacent to the property taken, as well as in sales of comparable properties. However, by finding 12, quoted above, the court made it clear that it did not consider that this proof was admissible as a basis for determining benefits to the property remaining after the taking. Accordingly, we must determine whether the court was correct in its expressed view. The rules governing the question presented are set forth in an annotation appearing in 85 A.L.R.2d 110, and summarized on page 113 as follows: Transwestern Pipe Line Company v. Yandell, 69 N.M. 448, 367 P.2d 938 (1961), is cited in support of a rule thus stated: We quote from Yandell, supra: We doubt that the rule can be better stated than in the above quotation. Even conceding the admissibility of the evidence not considered by the court as argued at length by appellant, appellant cites no reason, nor do we perceive of one, whereby we could declare that in so holding, the court abused its discretion. We recognize that the cases cited above deal with sales of property other than the *14 subject of the litigation, whereas two of the sales sought to be introduced here were of the subject. We do not, however, perceive that the rule should be any different as to sales of the subject, since the same factors of comparability can also affect subject properties. Appellant would have us hold that since the evidence was received, and since if in the court's discretion the testimony was permitted, necessarily the court erred in its determination that there was no admissible evidence to establish the facts as claimed by appellant. However, we do not so view the situation. Rather, it appears to us that the court, in its discretion, determined that the proof should not have been admitted, and accordingly should not be considered. In this posture, we are not moved to hold that in this conclusion it was in error. It follows that the cause should be affirmed. It is so ordered. COMPTON and TACKETT, JJ., concur.