Title: Ex parte Fairfield Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1140454
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 29, 2015

Rel: 05/29/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
_________________________
1140454
_________________________
Ex parte Fairfield Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC,
et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Myrtis Hill
v.
Fairfield Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC, et al.)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division, CV-06-1266)
MAIN, Justice.
1140454
Fairfield 
Nursing 
and 
Rehabilitation 
Center, 
LLC
("Fairfield"); D&N, LLC ("D&N"); DTD HC, LLC ("DTD"); Aurora
Cares, LLC (alleged to be doing business, and herein sometimes
referred to, as "Tara Cares"); and Aurora Healthcare, LLC
("Aurora") (hereinafter sometimes referred to collectively as
"the defendants"), petition this Court for a writ of mandamus,
directing the trial court to vacate its February 6, 2015,
order denying their "Motion to Quash Depositions and Motion
for Protective Order, and Motion to Reconsider January 30,
2015[,] Order."   The defendants also request that we direct
1
the trial court to grant their motion.  We grant the petition
and issue the writ.
I. Facts and Procedural History2
The trial court's January 30, 2015, order granted the
1
"Motion to Compel the Deposition of All Corporate Defendant
Representatives, or In the Alternative to Strike the Newly
Named Experts [for the Defendants]" filed by the original
plaintiff below, Myrtis Hill.   
These parties have been before this Court on several
2
occasions.  See Ex parte Fairfield Nursing & Rehab. Ctr.,
L.L.C., 22 So. 3d 445 (Ala. 2009); Hill v. Fairfield Nursing
& Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 134 So. 3d 396 (Ala. 2013) (opinion on
application for rehearing); and Ex parte Fairfield Nursing &
Rehab. Ctr., LLC (No. 1130955, June 6, 2014) (denial of
petition for the writ of mandamus). 
2
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On September 25, 2006, Myrtis Hill ("Hill")  filed an
3
action in the Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division,
against Fairfield; D&N; DTD; Donald T. Denz ("Denz"); Norbert
A. Bennett ("Bennett"); Tara Cares; and Aurora.   In the
4
complaint, Hill asserted:
"4. In May 2006 ... Hill ... was a patient at
[Fairfield]. 
At 
the 
time 
of 
admittance[,]
[Fairfield] undertook and agreed to provide [Hill]
with all necessary and proper care for [Hill's]
physical health, and medical needs.
"5. On [Hill's] admittance to [Fairfield],
[Hill] had no broken bones.
"The complaint also listed Hill's son, Fred Hill, as a
3
plaintiff in the capacity of 'next of friend' of Myrtis Hill,
but Fred Hill later was dismissed as a plaintiff after the
parties stipulated that Myrtis Hill was competent."  Hill v.
Fairfield Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 134 So. 3d 396, 399 n.
1 (Ala. 2013).  Hill died on January 26, 2015.  Respondent's
brief, at 7.  Although the attachments to the petition and the
respondent's brief do not include a "Suggestion of Death" or
any filing showing that Hill's son, Fred, was substituted for
Hill as the plaintiff in this case, some of the documents
attached to the petition and the respondent's brief that were
filed after Hill's death show the named plaintiff as "Fred
Hill, as next friend of [Myrtis] Hill."  For the sake of
continuity, in this opinion we continue to refer to the
plaintiff as "Hill." 
Denz and Bennett are no longer parties in this matter. 
4
See Hill v. Fairfield Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 134 So. 3d
396, 399 n. 2 (Ala. 2013)("In addition to the defendants
listed, Hill at one point asserted claims against several
other individuals and 
one 
limited liability company, LKC, LLC,
not listed. At a hearing on a summary-judgment motion before
trial, Hill voluntarily dismissed those other defendants.").
3
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"6. On May 10, 2006, ... Hill ... suffered a
broken leg while under the care of [a Fairfield]
employee, [who,] while attempting to transfer [Hill
to a bedside commode], negligently dropped her to
the floor thereby breaking [Hill's] right leg and
causing severe injury to both of her legs.
"7. Upon information and belief, Defendants,
their employees, and assigns negligently used said
lift in attempting to lower [Hill,] thereby
deviating from their own safety rules as well as
those imposed by state and federal regulations."
In addition to the medical-negligence claim, Hill also stated
a claim of "breach of contract/piercing the corporate veil."5
Between August 2009 and October 2009, Hill deposed, among
other persons, Chance Becnel, the corporate representative of
Tara Cares; Denz, the corporate representative of both DTD and
Aurora; and Bennett, the corporate representative of D&N.  
6
Hill also deposed Denz and Bennett in their individual
The piercing-the-corporate-veil claim will be litigated,
5
if at all, in a separate bench trial after the medical-
negligence claim, which will be tried before a jury, has been
fully litigated.   
"A party may ... name as the deponent a public or private
6
corporation 
... 
and 
describe 
with 
reasonable 
particularity 
the
matters on which examination is requested. In that event, the
organization so named shall designate one or more officers,
directors, or managing agents, or other persons who consent to
testify on its behalf ...."  Rule 30(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P.
4
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capacities in 2009; additionally, Hill deposed 14 Fairfield
employees and 2 other Tara Cares employees.  
The defendants moved the trial court for a summary
judgment; after holding a hearing, the trial court denied the
motion.  Subsequently, the defendants moved the trial court to
"reconsider" its denial of their summary-judgment motion.  On
November 
13, 
2009, 
the 
trial 
court 
granted 
the
summary-judgment motion in part, entering a summary judgment
in favor of all the defendants except Fairfield.  The case
against Fairfield proceeded to a jury trial.  After Hill
concluded her case, Fairfield moved for a judgment as a matter
of law; the trial court granted Fairfield's motion on November
24, 2009.  Hill subsequently moved the trial court to alter,
amend, or vacate its judgment; the trial court denied Hill's
motion on January 5, 2010.  Hill timely appealed to this
Court.  We reversed both the summary judgment in favor of all
the defendants except Fairfield and the judgment as a matter
of law in favor of Fairfield, and we remanded the cause to the
trial court for further proceedings, i.e., a new jury trial on
Hill's medical-negligence claim and, if necessary, and only
after the completion of the medical-negligence action, 
a 
bench
5
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trial on Hill's piercing-the-corporate-veil claim.   Hill v.
7
Fairfield Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 134 So. 3d 396, 411
(Ala. 2013).
On January 27, 2015, Hill filed a document entitled
"Motion to Compel the Deposition of all Corporate Defendant
Representatives, or in the Alternative to Strike the Newly
Named [Defendants'] Experts."  In that filing, Hill argued
that Hill should be permitted to redepose all the defendants'
corporate representatives because, Hill said, "facts may have
changed that [Hill] would need to know about prior to trial." 
Alternatively, Hill argued that the trial court should strike
the "newly named experts" the defendants had disclosed as
persons who would be testifying at trial.  On January 30,
2015, Hill filed a document entitled "Second Motion to Compel
the Deposition of all Corporate Defendant Representatives,"
essentially restating the same arguments presented in the
first motion to compel.  
In Hill v. Fairfield Nursing & Rehabilitation Center,
7
LLC, 134 So. 3d 396, 411 (Ala. 2013), this Court noted that
"'[w]hether the corporate veil of a business entity should be
pierced is a matter of equity, properly decided by a judge
after a jury has resolved the accompanying legal issues.'"
(Quoting Heisz v. Galt Indus., Inc., 93 So. 3d 918, 929 (Ala.
2012) (emphasis added).)    
6
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Also on January 30, 2015, the defendants filed a document
entitled "Response to [Hill's] Motion to Compel and Motion to
Strike, and Defendants' Motion for Protective Order."  In that
filing, the defendants argued, in sum: (1) that "[Hill]
already took the Rule 30(b)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] depositions of
the corporate defendants in August 2009 and October 2009" and
"has provided no justifiable reason, nor does one exist, that
entitles [Hill] to take any of these depositions again"; (2)
that "[Hill's] informal request for additional corporate
representative depositions amount[s] to nothing more than an
attempt to annoy and harass the Defendants that would be
unduly burdensome, and lead to unnecessary time and expense,"
in contravention of Rule 26(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; and (3) that
the defendants had designated only one new expert, namely, Dr.
Lars Reinhart, to testify at trial and had "offered the
deposition of Dr. Reinhart on January 29, 2015," but that
"[Hill's] counsel advised that they did not need to depose Dr.
Reinhart and that they would just 'see him at trial.'"  On the
same day, the trial court entered an order stating: "[Hill's]
Motion To Compel the [Rule] 30(b)(5) & (6) depositions of the
7
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Defendant[] LLCs is granted and [the defendants are] ordered
to comply or suffer imposition of sanctions."
On February 4, 2015, the defendants filed a document
entitled "Defendants' Motion to Quash Depositions and Motion
for Protective Order, and Motion to Reconsider January 30,
2015[,] Order" ("motion for a protective order").  The
defendants presented four arguments in support of the motion
for a protective order.  First, the defendants argued:
"[Hill] first issued [the] Deposition Notices
seven (7) days before the discovery cutoff mandated
by this Court's Scheduling Order. Because [Hill]
failed to initiate the discovery in such a time that
the depositions could be completed before the
discovery cutoff date, the requested depositions
should be quashed and a protective order in favor of
Defendants is warranted."
Second, the defendants argued that "[t]he Depositions should
be quashed because they are duplicative of depositions
previously taken by [Hill]."  Third, the defendants argued
that "[t]he depositions should also not proceed because the
topics for which the depositions are sought pertain solely to
[Hill's] piercing the corporate veil claim that both this
Court and the Alabama Supreme Court have held must be tried
separately in equity."  Fourth, the defendants argued that
"[they] are entitled to a protective order regarding the
8
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depositions because 
they 
subject 
[the] defendants 
to
'annoyance, ... undue burden and expense,'" in contravention
of Rule 26(c).  Also, the defendants moved the  trial court to
vacate its order compelling the depositions of 
the 
defendants'
corporate representatives for the same four reasons.  On
February 6, 2015, the trial court denied the motion for a
protective order without explaining its reasoning for doing
so.  The defendants now seek mandamus review.
II. Standard of Review
"A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy,
and is appropriate when the petitioner can show (1)
a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court." 
Ex parte BOC Grp., Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001).
"'"Discovery 
matters 
are
within the trial court's sound
discretion, and this Court will
not 
reverse 
a trial court's
ruling on 
a 
discovery 
issue
unless 
the 
trial 
court 
has
clearly exceeded its discretion.
Home Ins. Co. v. Rice, 585 So. 2d
859, 
862 
(Ala. 
1991).
Accordingly, mandamus will issue
to reverse a trial court's ruling
on a discovery issue only (1)
where there is a showing that the
trial court clearly exceeded its
9
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discretion, and (2) where the
aggrieved party does not have an
adequate 
remedy 
by 
ordinary
appeal. The petitioner has an
affirmative burden to prove the
existence 
of 
each 
of 
these
conditions."
"'Ex parte Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 872 So. 2d
810, 813 (Ala. 2003).
"'Moreover, this Court will review by
mandamus only those discovery matters
involving (a) the disregard of a privilege,
(b) the ordered production of "patently
irrelevant or duplicative documents," (c)
orders effectively eviscerating "a party's
entire action or defense," and (d) orders
denying a party the opportunity to make a
record sufficient for appellate review of
the discovery issue. 872 So. 2d at
813–14.'"
Ex parte Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 123 So. 3d 499, 504 (Ala.
2013) (quoting Ex parte Meadowbrook Ins. Grp., Inc., 987 So.
2d 540, 547 (Ala. 2007)).  Mandamus review is the appropriate
manner by which to challenge the denial of a motion for a
protective order after a trial court has compelled discovery. 
See Ex parte Community Health Sys. Prof'l Servs. Corp., 72 So.
3d 595 (Ala. 2011); Ex parte Aramark Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. P'ship,
156 So. 3d 407 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014).   
III. Analysis
A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
10
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As an initial matter, we must address the defendants'
rather confusing and misguided argument regarding the trial
court's exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction in this case. 
The defendants' argument is unclear.  As best we understand,
the defendants argue that, because the information Hill seeks
from the requested depositions pertains only to the piercing-
the-corporate-veil claim that is not yet being adjudicated in
the trial court, "[that] court is adjudicating claims for
which it has no subject matter jurisdiction."  This argument
is faulty for a number of reasons; among others, this argument
is erroneously premised on the defendants' apparent belief
that taking of depositions is the functional equivalent of
"adjudicating claims."  That analogy is simply incorrect. 
Also, taking depositions –- potentially -– with regard to the
yet-to-be-litigated piercing-the-corporate-veil claim in no
way disturbs the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction
over the pending medical-negligence claim.  Furthermore, the
defendants have effectively conceded that the trial court has
subject-matter jurisdiction in this action; notably, the
defendants in their mandamus petition do not seek the
dismissal of Hill's action for lack of subject-matter
11
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jurisdiction but seek the issuance of a protective order,
which the trial court could not do if it lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Redtop Market, Inc. v. State, 66 So.
3d 204, 206 (Ala. 2010) (noting that, when a circuit court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, all orders and judgments
entered in the case, except an order of dismissal, are void ab
initio).  The defendants' argument regarding the 
trial 
court's
subject-matter jurisdiction in this case is meritless.
B. Merits
The defendants' arguments on the merits of the petition
are more straightforward.  The defendants argue, in pertinent
part, that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying
the motion for a protective order because, they claim, Hill
has offered no compelling reason to support her request to
redepose the defendants' corporate representatives; that the
taking of those depositions would provide Hill information
that is merely duplicative of the information provided by the
corporate representatives during prior depositions; and that
the taking of those new depositions would cause the defendants
unnecessary "annoyance" and "expense" and would constitute an 
"undue burden."  We agree.  
12
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Rule 26(b)(2)(B), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that a trial
court "shall" limit or prohibit discovery if it determines (1)
that the discovery sought is "unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative"; (2) "that the party seeking discovery has had
ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the
information sought"; or (3) that the discovery sought is
"unduly burdensome."  (Emphasis added.)  The party contesting
the discovery request must demonstrate the existence of only
one of the three reasons for limiting or prohibiting discovery
quoted above; in this case, the defendants have demonstrated
the existence of all three reasons for prohibiting the
requested depositions.  
First, the defendants have demonstrated that the
requested 
depositions 
would 
be 
unreasonably 
duplicative 
of 
the
depositions already provided by the defendants' corporate
representatives.  In their mandamus petition, the defendants
set forth nine examples of information Hill is seeking in the
requested depositions and demonstrate how the defendants'
corporate representatives have already provided substantial
testimony as to all nine of those issues.  See Petition, at 6-
13.  The defendants state that they have provided "only
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representative examples" of the duplicative nature of
requested deposition testimony because, they say, "there are
nearly five hundred (500) pages of testimony responsive to the
topics" set forth in the petition.  Id. at 6.  Hill neither
provides 
meaningful 
response 
to 
nor 
contradicts 
the
defendants' argument.  Instead, Hill merely posits 
that "[t]he
simple truth is that whenever this case gets close to trial,
the 
Petitioners/Defendants 
improvidently 
file 
baseless 
motions
seeking only to delay and deny both the trial and justice." 
Respondent's brief, at 14.  See also respondent's brief, at 17
("The simple truth is that the Defendants have purposely
attempted to derail the trial of this case on two different
occasions ... to delay justice and distract the Respondent
from trial preparation.").  In fact, Hill goes so far as to
allege that "[the defendants'] 'delays,' in their eyes, have
brought about the intended outcome, i.e.[,] the death of
[Myrtis] Hill...."  Id. at 14.  Hill's response to the
defendants' argument is baseless; it does nothing to defeat
the defendants' showing that the requested depositions are
unreasonably duplicative of the depositions previously given
by the defendants' corporate representatives.  
14
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Second, the defendants have demonstrated that Hill has
had "ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain
the information sought."  As noted, Hill filed the original
complaint against the defendants on September 25, 2006.  Hill
deposed the defendants' corporate representatives between
August 2009 and October 2009.  On January 27, 2015, Hill moved
the trial court to redepose the defendants' corporate
representatives.  This action had been pending for almost 9
years when Hill moved to redepose the defendants' corporate
representatives, and this action is before the trial court
after having been addressed by this Court on three occasions. 
Furthermore, as previously stated, Hill has already obtained
the information she seeks from the corporate representatives. 
We are clear to the conclusion that Hill has had ample
opportunity to obtain, and, in fact, has already obtained, the
information sought in the requested depositions.
Third, the defendants have demonstrated that the
discovery would be "unduly burdensome."  Suffice it to say,
the time, effort, and financial costs that would be required
of the defendants if Hill were allowed to redepose the
15
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defendants' corporate representatives for information already
obtained by Hill would be unduly burdensome.  
Lastly, we note that Rule 26(c) provides that a trial
court may issue a protective order refusing to compel
discovery in order to protect a party from, among other
things, "annoyance" and "undue burden and expense."  As
stated, allowing Hill to redepose the defendants' corporate
representatives would clearly impose on the defendants an
undue burden and expense.  Thus, based on the foregoing, we
hold that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying
the motion for a protective order.  See Rule 26(b)(2)(B), Ala.
R. Civ. P.; Rule 26(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; and Ex parte
Industrial Dev. Bd. of City of Montgomery, 42 So. 3d 699, 718
(Ala. 2010) ("Because the [petitioner] has shown that [the
proposed deponent] is not the only source of information about
each of the topics on which the plaintiffs sought to depose
him and because the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that
deposing [the proposed deponent] is crucial to 
preparing their
cases, the [petitioner] is entitled to a protective order
preventing the plaintiffs from deposing [the proposed
deponent].").
16
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IV. Conclusion
The defendants have demonstrated "a clear legal right ...
to the order sought" and that the trial court clearly exceeded
its discretion in denying the defendants' motion for a
protective order.   See Ex parte Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 123
So 3d at 427.  Therefore, we direct the trial court to vacate
its February 6, 2015, order denying the motion for a
protective order and to enter an order granting the same
motion.  Hill's "Motion for Award of Damages based on [the
defendants'] 
pattern 
and 
practice 
of 
filing 
frivolous 
appeals"
is denied.  We pretermit as unnecessary any discussion of the
defendants' remaining arguments.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED; RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
DAMAGES DENIED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur. 
Moore, C.J., and Murdock and Shaw, JJ., dissent.
17