Title: Hoeber v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC95079
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: May 3, 2016

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
EDWARD L. HOEBER, 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
  
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
No.  SC95079 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
STATE OF MISSOURI,   
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Respondent.    
  ) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BUCHANAN COUNTY 
The Honorable Daniel F. Kellogg, Judge  
 
Opinion issued May 3, 2016 
 
Edward L. Hoeber was convicted of two counts of statutory sodomy in the first 
degree, section 566.062.1  Mr. Hoeber subsequently filed a Rule 29.15 motion for post-
conviction relief alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
verdict directors that violated his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict and for 
failing to hire an expert to testify at the sentencing hearing.  The motion court concluded 
that trial counsel’s failure to object to the verdict directors did not prejudice Mr. Hoeber 
because no risk existed that the jurors were misled about which incident of abuse applied 
to each particular count of statutory sodomy.  The motion court further concluded that 
trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to hire an expert to testify at Mr. Hoeber’s 
                                              
1 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory citations are to RSMo Supp. 2007.  
sentencing hearing.  The motion court overruled Mr. Hoeber’s motion for post-conviction 
relief. 
The two verdict directors submitted in Mr. Hoeber’s case both failed to identify a 
specific act or incident of abuse despite testimony at trial regarding multiple incidents of 
Mr. Hoeber inappropriately touching S.M., the victim.  Given the evidence of multiple 
acts or incidents of abuse introduced at trial and the state’s emphasis on such evidence in 
its closing argument, the non-specific verdict directors created a risk that the jurors did 
not unanimously agree as to the acts for which they were finding Mr. Hoeber guilty.  A 
reasonable probability exists, therefore, that both verdict directors in this case misled or 
misdirected the jury in such a way that affected the verdicts.  Accordingly, trial counsel’s 
failure to object to the erroneous verdict directors prejudiced Mr. Hoeber. 
Moreover, a reasonably competent attorney would have objected to, or requested 
the modification of, the two insufficiently specific verdict directors to protect               
Mr. Hoeber’s right to a unanimous jury verdict.  At the time of Mr. Hoeber’s trial, the 
MAI notes on use addressed the significance of modifying verdict directors in multiple 
acts cases, and it was well-established Missouri law that the verdict must be definite and 
certain as to the crime of which the accused is found guilty.  The fact that State v. Celis-
Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150 (Mo. banc 2011), had yet to be decided at the time of              
Mr. Hoeber’s trial does not excuse trial counsel’s failure to object to the two erroneous 
verdict directors.  Consequently, because no reasonable trial strategy existed for trial 
counsel’s failure to object to the non-specific verdict directors, trial counsel’s 
performance fell outside the wide range of professional, competent assistance.   
3 
 
Accordingly, Mr. Hoeber established that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to two insufficiently specific verdict directors, and the motion court 
clearly erred in overruling Mr. Hoeber’s Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief.  
This Court reverses the motion court’s judgment and remands this case.  
Factual and Procedural Background 
S.M. was born in 2003.  In 2004, S.M.’s mother began dating Mr. Hoeber, who 
moved in with the family soon thereafter.  Mr. Hoeber and S.M’s mother ended their 
romantic relationship in 2005.  Nevertheless, Mr. Hoeber continued to live with the 
family intermittently through 2007.     
In July 2007, S.M., her mother, and Mr. Hoeber were living in a one-bedroom 
apartment in St. Joseph.  S.M.’s mother had increasing health problems that caused her to 
spend the majority of the day sitting in a recliner in the living room.  Because of her 
health problems, she was unable to care for S.M.  As a result, Mr. Hoeber prepared 
S.M.’s meals, bathed and dressed S.M., and helped S.M. use the bathroom.  While        
Mr. Hoeber was taking care of S.M., she was diagnosed with a vaginal infection.  
Because S.M.’s mother was unable to apply the medication, Mr. Hoeber applied it to 
S.M.’s genitals using his finger.   
 
By September 2007, Mr. Hoeber was no longer living at the apartment, and S.M. 
was placed in foster care.  While in foster care, S.M. told her foster mother that            
Mr. Hoeber had touched her.  After the disclosure, S.M. began seeing a child therapist.  
S.M. told the therapist that Mr. Hoeber had touched her “private area.”    
4 
 
 
By January 2008, S.M. had returned to living with her mother.  One night, S.M. 
began talking in her sleep saying “Stop it! Stop it!”  When S.M.’s mother woke her, S.M. 
said “Eddie hurt me.”  When questioned further, S.M. said that Mr. Hoeber had touched 
her “pee-pee” and demonstrated to her mother how he had touched her genitals.  S.M.’s 
mother called the police.   
Mr. Hoeber was charged with two counts of first degree statutory sodomy.2  When 
questioned, Mr. Hoeber originally denied touching S.M. inappropriately and requested 
that a lie detector test be administered.  Detective Scott Coates of the Buchanan County 
sheriff’s office prepared Mr. Hoeber for the lie detector test.  While doing so, Detective 
Coates asked Mr. Hoeber if there was anything Mr. Hoeber was not telling him and that, 
if there were, Mr. Hoeber should tell him before the test.  Mr. Hoeber eventually admitted 
to touching S.M. in the bathroom on two separate occasions.  Detective Coates 
transcribed Mr. Hoeber’s admission in a statement that Mr. Hoeber then signed.  
In 2009, the case proceeded to trial.  S.M. testified that Mr. Hoeber touched her 
private area and her butt with his hand more than one time.  When asked what room she 
was in when the touching occurred, S.M. stated it was in the kitchen.  S.M. went on to 
testify that no touching occurred in the bedroom, the bathroom, or the living room.   
S.M.’s mother also testified at trial.  She explained that S.M. had told her that the 
touching occurred more than one time.  She further testified that S.M. told her the 
touching occurred in the kitchen and the bedroom.   
                                              
2 Mr. Hoeber was also charged with two counts of first degree child molestation, section 
566.067.  These charges, however, were dismissed at trial.  
5 
 
The state offered additional testimony from S.M.’s therapist.  The therapist 
testified that she first saw S.M. in September 2007.  During that visit, S.M. told the 
therapist that Mr. Hoeber had touched her, then immediately stated “No, he doesn’t.”  At 
a later visit, S.M. told the therapist that she “needed to tell [the therapist] a secret.”  S.M. 
then disclosed that Mr. Hoeber had touched her private area with his hand while she was 
in the bedroom.  In subsequent visits, S.M. disclosed that Mr. Hoeber had touched her 
private area with his hand on more than one occasion.  In describing the touchings, S.M. 
told the therapist they had occurred in the bedroom, the kitchen, the bathroom, and the 
living room.   
 
Detective Coates then read Mr. Hoeber’s statement into evidence.  The statement 
provided:  
I, Edward Hoeber, state that I dated [S.M.’s mother] for about one 
year.  I lived with [S.M.’s mother] in 2004, this is December, to September 
2005.  Then I would say I have lived with [S.M.’s mother] off and on since 
December of 2004.  I came to jail in August of 2007.3   
 
During the time I lived with [S.M’s mother], she would have me 
take care of her daughter, [S.M.].  I would give her a bath and sometimes 
wipe after she got done in the bathroom.  [S.M.] was 4.  She will be 5 next 
month.  
 
About a month before I got arrested, we were living at 619 North 
9th.  Around that time, there were two times I touched [S.M.] 
inappropriately.  There were two times where [S.M.] was in the bathroom 
and had gotten off the toilet with her pants down. 
 
Before she would pull her pants up, I would rub her clitoris with my 
fingers.  She would kind of laugh.  I would rub her for about two minutes or 
so.  [S.M.’s mother] would be sitting in the front room.  I never told her 
anything about this.  As far as I know, [S.M.’s mother] never knew.  I only 
did it the two times.  I am sorry for what I did.  I really need help.  
 
                                              
3 Mr. Hoeber’s arrest and jail time in August 2007 were unrelated to the present case.    
6 
 
Testifying on his own behalf, Mr. Hoeber denied touching S.M. inappropriately and 
explained that his confession was coerced by Detective Coates.    
 
At the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on two counts of first 
degree statutory sodomy.  Mr. Hoeber’s trial counsel did not object to either verdict 
director submitted to the jury.  The jury found Mr. Hoeber guilty on both counts, and the 
trial court sentenced Mr. Hoeber, as a prior offender, to 40 years on each count to run 
consecutively.  Trial counsel presented no witnesses on Mr. Hoeber’s behalf at the 
sentencing hearing.  Mr. Hoeber’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.  State v. 
Hoeber, 341 S.W.3d 195 (Mo. App. 2011). 
 
On March 24, 2010, Mr. Hoeber filed his pro se motion for post-conviction relief 
pursuant to Rule 29.15.  In his amended Rule 29.15 motion, Mr. Hoeber claimed that his 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the verdict directors, which he alleged 
violated his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict.  Mr. Hoeber further claimed 
that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing by failing 
to hire an expert to present evidence regarding the mitigating effect of Mr. Hoeber’s 
mental conditions.   
 
On May 3, 2013, the motion court conducted an evidentiary hearing.  Trial counsel 
testified that he did not consider objecting on the basis that the verdict directors failed to 
specify a particular incident or place in which the touchings occurred.  He further 
testified that he had no trial strategy for failing to object to the verdict directors.            
Dr. William Geis also testified at the evidentiary hearing regarding Mr. Hoeber’s mental 
condition and whether Mr. Hoeber was likely to be a repeat offender.  
7 
 
 
On September 25, 2013, the motion court entered its findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, and judgment in which it overruled Mr. Hoeber’s motion for post-conviction 
relief.  In doing so, the motion court concluded that Mr. Hoeber did not establish that he 
was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to object to the verdict directors because 
there was no risk that the jurors would be misled about which incidents of abuse applied 
to a particular count.  The motion court also concluded that Mr. Hoeber failed to establish 
that the outcome of the sentencing would have been different had Mr. Hoeber’s trial 
counsel hired Dr. Geis to testify.  
 
Mr. Hoeber appealed.  After a decision by the court of appeals, this Court granted 
transfer.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.    
Standard of Review 
 
This Court’s review of a motion court’s overruling of a motion for post-conviction 
relief is limited to a determination of whether the motion court’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are clearly erroneous.  Rule 29.15(k).   A motion court’s findings and 
conclusions are “clearly erroneous only if this Court is left with a definite and firm 
impression that a mistake has been made.”  Mallow v. State, 439 S.W.3d 764, 768 (Mo. 
banc 2014). 
The Verdict Directors Failed to Ensure Unanimous Jury Verdicts 
In his first point, Mr. Hoeber claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to the verdict directors submitted on the two counts of statutory sodomy in the first 
degree.  Mr. Hoeber asserts that the verdict directors in this case violated his 
constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict in that the verdict directors failed to 
8 
 
specify a particular incident or act of hand-to-genital contact despite evidence of multiple 
acts of hand-to-genital contact being introduced at trial.   
The Missouri Constitution provides “[t]hat the right of trial by jury as heretofore 
enjoyed shall remain inviolate[.]”  Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 22(a).  This Court has held that 
article I, section 22(a) protects a defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict.  State v. 
Hadley, 815 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo. banc 1991).  “For a jury verdict to be unanimous, the 
jurors must be in substantial agreement as to the defendant’s acts, as a preliminary step to 
determining guilt.”  Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d at 155 (internal quotation omitted). 
In Celis-Garcia, this Court addressed the right to a unanimous verdict in the 
context of a multiple acts case.4  Id. at 155-58.  The defendant in Celis-Garcia was 
charged with two counts of statutory sodomy.  Id. at 152.  At trial, the two victims 
testified about multiple incidents of abuse occurring in different locations.  Id. at 153.  
Two verdict directors – one for each victim – instructed the jury that if it believed the 
defendant had committed the act constituting statutory sodomy between the charged 
dates, it must find the defendant guilty of statutory sodomy.  Id. at 154-55.  Besides the 
charged dates, the verdict directors did not specify a particular location or otherwise 
identify the incident of statutory sodomy the defendant had allegedly committed.  Id. at 
154. 
In vacating the defendant’s convictions, this Court explained:  
                                              
4 “A multiple acts case arises when there is evidence of multiple, distinct criminal acts, 
each of which could serve as the basis for a criminal charge, but the defendant is charged 
with those acts in a single count.”  Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d at 155-56. 
9 
 
Despite evidence of multiple, separate incidents of statutory sodomy, the 
verdict directors failed to differentiate between the various acts in a way 
that ensured the jury unanimously convicted [the defendant] of the same act 
or acts. . . . This broad language allowed each individual juror to determine 
which incident he or she would consider in finding [the defendant] guilty of 
statutory sodomy. Under the instructions, the jurors could convict [the 
defendant] if they found that she engaged or assisted in hand-to-genital 
contact with the children during an incident in her bedroom, or on the 
enclosed porch, or in the shed, or in the bathroom. 
 
Id. at 156 (emphasis in original).  This Court then found that, because there was evidence 
of multiple, separate incidents of statutory sodomy committed against both victims and 
any of them would have supported the charged offenses, it was “impossible to determine 
whether the jury unanimously agreed on any one of these separate incidents.”  Id. at 158.  
Accordingly, this Court concluded that “the verdict directors violated [the defendant’s] 
constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict[.]”  Id.  This Court then determined that 
the trial court plainly erred in failing to properly instruct the jury because the “verdict 
directors misdirected the jury in a way the affected that verdict, thereby resulting in 
manifest injustice.”  Id. at 159.   
Similar to the situation in Celis-Garcia, evidence of multiple acts of hand-to-
genital contact, each of which would constitute the commission of the offense of statutory 
sodomy, was presented at Mr. Hoeber’s trial.  S.M. testified that Mr. Hoeber touched her 
private area and butt with his hand more than one time in the kitchen.  She further 
testified that Mr. Hoeber did not touch her inappropriately in the bedroom, bathroom, or 
living room.  S.M.’s mother, however, testified that S.M. told her the touching occurred 
in the bedroom and the kitchen more than one time.  The therapist offered additional 
testimony regarding the incidents of hand-to-genital contact S.M. disclosed during their 
10 
 
therapy sessions.  The therapist testified that S.M. had reported being touched in the 
bedroom, kitchen, living room, and bathroom on more than one occasion.  Mr. Hoeber’s 
statement in which he admitted to touching S.M.’s genitals twice in the bathroom was 
also read into evidence.  Mr. Hoeber then testified that he had not touched S.M. and that 
his statement was coerced.         
Despite the conflicting evidence presented at trial of multiple acts of hand-to-
genital contact, neither verdict director specified a particular room or incident.  Instead, 
two counts of statutory sodomy were submitted to the jury – Instruction No. 8 and 
Instruction No. 10.  Instruction No. 8 reads:  
As to Count I, if you find and believe from the evidence  
 
First, that between July 1, 2007 and August 29, 2007, in the County of 
Buchanan, State of Missouri, [Mr. Hoeber] knowingly touched the genitals 
of S.M. with his hands, 
 
and 
 
Second, that such conduct constituted deviate sexual intercourse,  
 
and 
 
Third, that at the time S.M. was a child less than twelve years old, then you 
will find [Mr. Hoeber] guilty under Count I of statutory sodomy in the first 
degree.  
 
. . . .  
     
Instruction No. 10 contained the identical language except for references to Count II.   
Because the verdict directors failed to identify any specific incident or room in 
which the conduct occurred, the verdict directors allowed each individual juror to 
determine which incident he or she would consider in finding Mr. Hoeber guilty on each 
11 
 
count of statutory sodomy.  Under each verdict director, each juror could have found    
Mr. Hoeber guilty of engaging in hand-to-genital contact with S.M. during an incident in 
the kitchen or in the bathroom or in the living room or in the bedroom.  The verdict 
directors, therefore, created a real risk that the jurors did not unanimously agree on the 
specific acts of statutory sodomy for which they found Mr. Hoeber guilty.  Accordingly, 
the verdict directors failed to ensure a unanimous jury verdict.   
Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for Failing to Object to the Verdict Directors 
This Court must now determine whether trial counsel’s failure to object to the 
erroneous verdict directors constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.  To establish 
ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must prove “by a preponderance of the 
evidence that (1) trial counsel failed to exercise the level of skill and diligence that 
reasonably competent counsel would exercise in a similar situation and (2) the movant 
was prejudiced by that failure.”  Dorsey v. State, 448 S.W.3d 276, 286-87 (Mo. banc 
2014) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).  If a movant fails to 
satisfy either prong of the Strickland test, he or she is not entitled to post-conviction 
relief.  State v. Simmons, 955 S.W.2d 729, 746 (Mo. banc 1997). 
To satisfy the performance prong, movants “must overcome the strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct was reasonable and effective.”  Johnson v. State, 406 
S.W.3d 892, 899 (Mo. banc 2013).  This presumption is overcome when a movant 
identifies “specific acts or omissions of counsel that, in light of all the circumstances, fell 
outside the wide range of professional competent assistance.”  Id. (internal quotation 
omitted).  
12 
 
 
To establish Strickland prejudice, “a movant must show a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome would have been different.”  Dorsey, 448 
S.W.3d at 287.  “A reasonable probability exists when there is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id. (internal quotation omitted).  
The motion court concluded that trial counsel’s failure to object to the verdict 
directors did not prejudice Mr. Hoeber.  In doing so, the motion court reasoned that, in 
Celis-Garcia, the risk that the verdict directors misdirected the jury occurred because the 
state emphasized multiple uncharged bad acts.  The motion court found that there was no 
risk that the jurors were misled about which incident of abuse applied to a particular 
count in Mr. Hoeber’s case because S.M. testified about two particular incidents5 and any 
uncharged acts committed by Mr. Hoeber were not the emphasis or focus of the state’s 
case.     
As previously explained, however, the state presented conflicting evidence at trial 
that S.M. had disclosed incidents of hand-to-genital contact occurring in the kitchen, the 
bedroom, the living room, and the bathroom.  In its closing argument, the state addressed 
S.M’s conflicting statements:  
When you’re talking to a child, when you ask them a question, 
they’re going to answer whatever memory that jogs.  And if something 
happens to them multiple times, one time they might remember the kitchen.  
The next time they might remember the bedroom.  The next time they 
might remember the living room.    
                                              
5 In its findings and conclusions, the motion court incorrectly states that S.M. “testified as 
to two particular incidents: one in the bedroom and one in the kitchen.”  S.M. testified at 
trial that Mr. Hoeber had touched her more than one time in the kitchen.  When 
questioned about other rooms in which the abuse occurred, S.M. testified that no abuse 
occurred in the bathroom, the living room, or the bedroom.    
13 
 
They’re going to spit out whatever what you said to them makes 
them think about.  And that’s what’s happened to this child.  And this 
happened more than one time.  Even the defendant said it happened twice.  
[S.M.] said it happened more than one time and a lot. 
 
As reflected by this closing argument, the state’s case was not limited to or focused on 
any two particular incidents of abuse.  Instead, the state argued that multiple acts of abuse 
had occurred in justifying S.M.’s conflicting statements.  In fact, the state concluded its 
closing argument by stating: “[Mr. Hoeber] touched [S.M.] on at least two occasions in 
2007 between July 1st and the end of August . . . .” (Emphasis added).  Given the 
evidence of multiple acts of abuse introduced at trial and the state’s emphasis on such 
evidence in its closing argument, the non-specific verdict directors created a real risk that 
the jurors did not unanimously agree as to the acts for which they were finding             
Mr. Hoeber guilty.  Therefore, a reasonable probability exists in this case that the verdict 
directors misled or misdirected the jury in such a way that undermines this Court’s 
confidence in the verdicts.  
The state asserts that, even though multiple acts of statutory sodomy were 
introduced into evidence, no prejudice resulted from trial counsel’s failure to object to the 
non-specific verdict directors because Mr. Hoeber employed a “unitary defense” at trial.  
In support of its argument, the state relies on State v. LeSieur, 361 S.W.3d 458 (Mo. App. 
2012), for the proposition that the type of defense a defendant employs determines 
whether a risk exists that the jurors did not unanimously agree on the act they found the 
defendant guilty of committing.  
14 
 
 
In LeSieur, the defendant was convicted of two counts of second-degree statutory 
rape.  Id. at 460.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court violated his 
constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict because the verdict directors failed to 
require the jury to agree on the specific act he committed to find him guilty on each rape 
count.  Id.  The court of appeals found that the trial court erred in failing to properly 
instruct the jury because the victim testified to multiple acts of statutory rape but the 
verdict directors did not include any distinguishing characteristics.  Id. at 463.  
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the erroneous verdict directors did not result in 
plain error.  Id. at 465.  The court reasoned: 
Celis-Garcia makes clear that, to establish manifest injustice based on an 
insufficiently specific verdict director in a multiple acts case, the defendant 
must have mounted an incident-specific defense, which would have given 
the jury a basis to distinguish among the various incidents mentioned in the 
evidence.  Celis-Garcia suggests that, where the defendant instead mounts 
a unitary defense to all alleged actions, attacking the victim’s credibility 
generally, manifest injustice does not exist.  
 
Id. (internal quotation omitted).  Since LeSieur, multiple cases have, likewise, held that 
the failure to mount an incident-specific defense precludes a finding that non-specific 
verdict directors resulted in manifest injustice.  See State v. King, 453 S.W.3d 363, 376-
77 (Mo. App. 2015); State v. Payne, 414 S.W.3d 52, 56-57 (Mo. App. 2013); State v. 
Rose, 421 S.W.3d 522, 529 (Mo. App. 2013). 
 
At no point in Celis-Garcia, however, did this Court conclude that a defendant 
asserting a general defense could never be prejudiced by non-specific verdict directors.  
Instead, this Court found that the fact that the defendant in Celis-Garcia “relied on 
evidentiary inconsistencies and factual improbabilities respecting each allegation of 
15 
 
hand-to-genital contact makes it more likely that individual jurors convicted her on the 
basis of different acts.”  Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d at 159 (emphasis added).  In other 
words, while the act-specific defense in Celis-Garcia helped this Court find that the 
insufficiently specific verdict directors were prejudicial to the defendant, the Court was 
not required to find prejudice based on her defense.  This Court’s analysis and holding in 
Celis-Garcia was not that a defendant like Mr. Hoeber could not suffer prejudice from 
insufficiently specific verdict directors just because he employed a general or unitary 
defense.  To the extent LeSieur and its progeny suggest otherwise, they should no longer 
be followed.  
 
Rather, as previously explained, to establish prejudice, “a movant must show a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome would have been 
different.”  Dorsey, 448 S.W.3d at 287.  Moreover, in reviewing a post-conviction relief 
case, “the appropriate standard of prejudice should be somewhat lower” than that needed 
to establish plain error.  Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 427-28 (Mo. banc 2002) (internal 
quotation omitted).  The ultimate determination in a post-conviction relief case is 
“whether defendant has suffered a genuine deprivation of his right to effective assistance 
of counsel, such that this Court’s confidence in the fairness of the proceeding is 
undermined.”  Id. at 428. 
 
Trial counsel’s failure to object to the insufficiently specific verdict directors 
submitted to the jury undermines this Court’s confidence in the reliability of the verdicts.  
At trial, the jury heard conflicting statements about multiple incidents of hand-to-genital 
contact.  The state’s case was not focused on or limited to any specific acts or incidents of 
16 
 
sexual abuse.  Rather, the state argued that Mr. Hoeber had abused S.M. multiple times 
and at least on two occasions.  Because there was evidence of multiple, separate incidents 
of statutory sodomy, any of which would have supported the charged offenses, and 
neither verdict director specified a particular act or incident, there was no requirement 
that jurors agree on the same act to find Mr. Hoeber guilty on either count of statutory 
sodomy.  The verdict directors, therefore, created a real risk that the jury verdicts were 
not unanimous.  Despite this substantial threat to the unanimity of the jury verdicts,     
Mr. Hoeber’s trial counsel failed to object to the insufficiently specific verdict directors.  
Accordingly, trial counsel’s failure to object to the erroneous verdict directors prejudiced 
Mr. Hoeber.     
Because the motion court concluded that Mr. Hoeber was not prejudiced by trial 
counsel’s failure to object, it did not determine whether trial counsel’s performance fell 
outside the range of professional, competent assistance.  Mr. Hoeber argues that trial 
counsel’s failure to object was unreasonable in that, at the time of trial, the notes on use 
to MAI-CR3d 304.02 warned of the need to modify verdict directors to avoid the risk of a 
non-unanimous jury verdict in a multiple acts case.  The notes on use provided that the 
“place of the offense may become of ‘decisive importance’ . . . where the defendant may 
have committed several separate offenses against the same victim at the same general 
location within a short space of time.”  MAI-CR3d 304.02, Notes on Use 6.  “In such a 
situation, upon request of the defendant or on the Court’s own motion, the place should 
be more definitely identified, such as ‘the front bedroom on the second floor,’ ‘the 
southeast corner of the basement,’ etc.”  Id.   
17 
 
In Celis-Garcia, this Court determined that the modification suggested by the 
notes on use was “insufficient to protect a defendant’s constitutional right to a unanimous 
jury verdict in a multiple acts case.”  344 S.W.3d at 158.  In doing so, this Court found 
that the modification should have been mandatory in multiple acts cases and that the 
separate offenses could be distinguished on the basis of time or other characteristics 
besides the place in which the offense occurred.  Id.  Nevertheless, at the time of          
Mr. Hoeber’s trial, the notes on use contained an express warning that, in cases in which 
the defendant has committed multiple separate acts, distinguishing between the offenses 
is of crucial importance and that the verdict directors should be modified accordingly.  
Given this express warning, a reasonably competent attorney would have objected to, or 
requested the modification of, the verdict directors to protect a defendant’s right to a 
unanimous jury verdict in a multiple acts case.   
The state acknowledges that the notes on use at the time of trial addressed 
modification of verdict directors in multiple acts cases.  Nevertheless, it asserts that the 
prevailing professional norms at the time of Mr. Hoeber’s trial did not require trial 
counsel to object because Celis-Garcia had not yet been decided.  The state contends that 
trial counsel should not be found incompetent for failing to predict the change in the law 
that resulted from this Court’s opinion in Celis-Garcia.    
In evaluating trial counsel’s performance, “counsel’s conduct is measured by what 
the law is at the time of trial.”  Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 190 (Mo. banc 2009).  It 
follows that trial counsel typically will “not be held ineffective for failing to anticipate a 
18 
 
change in the law.”  Id. (internal quotation omitted).  This Court’s opinion in Celis-
Garcia, however, did not constitute a substantive change in the law.    
As explained in Barmettler v. State, 399 S.W.3d 523, 529 (Mo. App. 2013), 
“Celis-Garcia did not establish the right of criminal defendants to a unanimous jury 
verdict, and was not the first judicial decision to recognize that imprecisely drafted 
verdict directors could violate this constitutional right.”  At the time of Mr. Hoeber’s 
trial, it was well-established law in the Missouri that “the verdict must be definite and 
certain as to the crime of which the accused is found guilty.”6  State v. Washington, 146 
S.W. 1164, 1166 (Mo. 1912); see also State v. Jackson, 146 S.W. 1166, 1169 (Mo. 
1912); State v. Pruitt, 100 S.W. 431, 432 (Mo. 1907); State v. Mitchell, 704 S.W.2d 280, 
287 (Mo. App. 1986); State v. Pope, 733 S.W.2d 811, 813 (Mo. App. 1987).  This 
Court’s opinion in Celis-Garcia merely reiterated this principle in the context of a 
statutory sodomy case.  Celis-Garcia, therefore, did not constitute a substantive change in 
the law and cannot excuse trial counsel’s failure to object to the verdict directors.  
The state further claims that trial counsel’s performance cannot be deemed 
incompetent because trial counsel’s failure to object could be viewed as reasonable trial 
                                              
6 In its brief, the state relies on several cases for the proposition that, at the time of       
Mr. Hoeber’s trial, the prevailing norms did not require him to object to the verdict 
directors.  The cases relied on by the state, however, did not approvingly uphold the use 
of non-specific verdict directors; rather, the courts found that, under the circumstances of 
each case, the insufficiently specific verdict directors did not prejudice the defendant.  
See State v. Smith, 32 S.W.3d 134, 136 (Mo. App. 2000); State v. Staples, 908 S.W.2d 
189, 190-91 (Mo. App. 1995); State v. Burch, 740 S.W.2d 293, 295-96 (Mo. App. 1987) 
abrogation recognized by Mallow, 439 S.W.3d at 771 n.5.  Simply because these courts 
found no prejudice resulted from the non-specific verdict directors does not mean that 
insufficiently specific verdict directors were an acceptable practice at the time of         
Mr. Hoeber’s trial.      
19 
 
strategy under the circumstances of Mr. Hoeber’s case.  In particular, the state relies on 
the fact that Mr. Hoeber’s defense at trial was that he did not commit any acts of statutory 
sodomy; thus, trial counsel would have had no reason to focus the jury’s attention on the 
multiple acts evidenced at trial by including specific references to those acts in alternative 
verdict directors.  The state asserts that, had trial counsel objected, it would have resulted 
in eight possible alternative verdict directors, making it more likely that Mr. Hoeber 
would have been convicted.7  
There is “a presumption that counsel’s alleged omissions were sound trial 
strategy.”  Storey v. State, 175 S.W.3d 116, 125 (Mo. banc 2005) (internal quotation 
omitted).  At the evidentiary hearing, however, trial counsel testified that he did not fail 
to object to the verdict directors on the basis of trial strategy.8  Moreover, the state’s trial 
strategy argument is premised on the assumption that modifying the verdict directors 
would have made it more likely that Mr. Hoeber was convicted.  This argument is 
contrary to the purpose of requiring juror unanimity in multiple acts cases.   
Again, the lack of specificity in the verdict directors made it possible for each 
individual juror to determine which incident he or she would consider in finding          
Mr. Hoeber guilty on each count of statutory sodomy.  Therefore, one juror could have 
found Mr. Hoeber guilty of an act that occurred in the kitchen, while another juror could 
                                              
7 Although the state argues that any objection by trial counsel would have resulted in 
multiple alternative verdict directors, the state also could have elected to submit one 
specific incident or act of statutory sodomy for each count.   
8 The motion court made no credibility findings regarding trial counsel’s testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing that he had no trial strategy in failing to object to the verdict 
directors.   
20 
 
have found him guilty of an act that occurred in the bathroom.  The verdict directors 
allowed the jury to convict Mr. Hoeber of two counts of statutory sodomy without 
requiring all 12 jurors to agree on the specific conduct that constituted each offense.  
Because the jurors did not have to agree on which of S.M.’s conflicting disclosures of 
abuse constituted each offense, the insufficiently specific verdict directors made it easier 
for the jury to convict Mr. Hoeber of two counts of statutory sodomy.  It follows that no 
reasonable trial strategy existed for failing to object to the non-specific verdict directors.   
In the absence of reasonable trial strategy, trial counsel’s failure to object to the 
insufficiently specific verdict directors did not conform to the degree of skill, care, and 
diligence of a reasonably competent attorney.  Mr. Hoeber, therefore, has shown that, 
under the circumstances of this case, trial counsel’s performance fell outside the wide 
range of professional, competent assistance. 
 
Accordingly, Mr. Hoeber has established that, by failing to object to the 
insufficiently specific verdict directors, trial counsel’s performance was deficient and   
Mr. Hoeber was thereby prejudiced.  Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when 
he failed to object to the erroneous verdict directors, and the motion court clearly erred in 
overruling Mr. Hoeber’s motion for post-conviction relief.    
Conclusion 
 
Mr. Hoeber was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel 
failed to object to the use of non-specific verdict directors in a multiple acts case.  
21 
 
Consequently, the motion court clearly erred in overruling Mr. Hoeber’s motion for post-
conviction relief.  The motion court’s judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded.9   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
 
Stith, Draper, Teitelman and 
Russell, JJ., concur; Fischer, J. 
dissents in separate opinion filed; 
Wilson, J., concurs in opinion of 
Fischer, J. 
 
                                              
9 In his second point, Mr. Hoeber asserts that the motion court clearly erred in overruling 
his motion for post-conviction relief because trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 
at his sentencing hearing by failing to present mitigating evidence from a mental health 
expert.  Because Mr. Hoeber’s first point is dispositive of this appeal, this Court need not 
decide Mr. Hoeber’s second point.  
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
EDWARD L. HOEBER, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
  
Appellant, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC95079 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
 
) 
   
 
 
) 
Respondent.  
 
) 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
I respectfully dissent.  The principal opinion, in holding that the motion court was 
clearly erroneous in concluding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object 
to the non-specific verdict directors, fails to give due consideration to the circumstances 
then before the defense and fails to apply a presumption of reasonableness to counsel's 
conduct.  Because the defense's overall trial strategy was furthered by the non-specific 
verdict directors, and because the risk of non-unanimous verdicts was low from the 
defense's perspective, trial counsel's failure to object to the non-specific verdict directors 
was a reasonable trial strategy.1 
                                              
1  As recognized by the principal opinion, even though the motion court expressly addressed only 
the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, "[a]ll fact issues upon which 
no specific findings are made shall be considered as having been found in accordance with the 
result reached."  Rule 73.01(c); see also Johnson v. State, 388 S.W.3d 159, 168 (Mo. banc 2012) 
(applying Rule 78.07(c) to a Rule 29.15 motion, requiring movant to raise the omission of 
required findings in a motion to amend the judgment).  
2 
 
 
"To be entitled to post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
movant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her trial counsel failed 
to meet the Strickland test in order to prove his or her claims."  Johnson v. State, 406 
S.W.3d 892, 898 (Mo. banc 2013).  Under the first prong of the Strickland test, the 
movant must show "his or her counsel failed to exercise the level of skill and diligence 
that a reasonably competent counsel would in a similar situation."  Id. at 898–99 
(emphasis added).  That is, "a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge 
the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, 
viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct."  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
690 (1984) (emphasis added).  As further explained by the United States Supreme Court: 
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential.  
It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance 
after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, 
examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude 
that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.  A fair 
assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to 
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct 
from counsel's perspective at the time.  Because of the difficulties inherent 
in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, 
under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be considered 
sound trial strategy."  There are countless ways to provide effective 
assistance in any given case.  Even the best criminal defense attorneys 
would not defend a particular client in the same way. 
 
Id. at 689 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).  Accordingly, it is the rare case 
that a reviewing court should find the presumption of reasonableness has been overcome.  
This is not one of those cases. 
3 
 
 
Here, there were two categories of evidence against Hoeber: (1) S.M's statements, 
which consisted of her testimony at trial, a video interview with police, and out-of-court 
statements purportedly made to her mother and a child therapist, and (2) Hoeber's 
confession to police.  Not surprisingly, S.M., who was only four years old at the time of 
the out-of-court statements and only six years old at the time of trial, gave statements that 
were contradictory as to the room in which the inappropriate touching took place,2 that 
failed to provide a logical timeframe as to when the touching took place, that failed to 
establish on how many occasions the touching took place, and that were even 
contradictory as to whether Hoeber touched her.  In contrast, Hoeber's confession to 
police, the very words of the adult defendant, was quite clear in detail.  Hoeber admitted 
to touching S.M. inappropriately on two occasions, he identified the room where the 
touching took place (the bathroom), and he identified the general timeframe (about a 
month before he was arrested in August 2007). 
 
Given the nature of this evidence, Hoeber's confession was undoubtedly the State's 
strongest evidence and the primary basis for charging Hoeber with two counts of first-
degree statutory sodomy.  And, given this dichotomy of the evidence, Hoeber's counsel 
employed a reasonable strategy at trial.  While counsel did perhaps the best he could with 
Hoeber's confession (attempting to show it was coerced by police), he of course wanted 
the jury's primary focus to be on the weaker evidence, S.M.'s statements, which were ripe 
                                              
2 At trial, S.M. testified that the touching occurred only in the kitchen, and not in the bedroom, 
living room, or bathroom.  In out-of-court statements made to her mother, S.M. said the touching 
occurred in the kitchen and bedroom.  In out-of-court statements made to a child therapist, S.M. 
identified, at varying times, the kitchen, bedroom, living room, and bathroom as rooms where the 
touching occurred.  
4 
 
to be picked apart based on credibility concerns.  The infirmities in S.M.'s statements 
were the best vehicle to sow reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors.  That is, if the 
jury focused on this weaker evidence, there was not only a possibility that the jury would 
disbelieve S.M.'s testimony and purported out-of-court statements but also a possibility 
that—because this evidence did not add up—the jury would consequently conclude there 
was reasonable doubt regarding the veracity of Hoeber's confession.  That this was 
clearly counsel's overall trial strategy, as reflected in the trial transcript, was further 
confirmed by trial counsel's testimony at Hoeber's postconviction hearing.   
 
Because counsel wanted the jury to focus on S.M.'s statements, it was perfectly 
reasonable and consistent with the overall trial strategy not to insist that the verdict 
directors specify a room where the touching took place.3  As discussed, Hoeber's 
confession identified only one room, the bathroom.  With S.M.'s statements, the 
bathroom was referenced only once, and that was through the testimony of the child 
therapist.  It was the other rooms, particularly the kitchen and bedroom, that were at the 
center of S.M.'s statements.  The kitchen was identified in S.M.'s testimony, the mother's 
testimony, and the child therapist's testimony, while the bedroom was identified in S.M.'s 
                                              
3  It is immaterial that, at Hoeber's postconviction hearing, counsel testified that his failure to 
object to the verdict directors was not based on trial strategy.  Criminal defendants are 
guaranteed objectively effective assistance of counsel, not subjectively effective assistance of 
counsel; the question is whether counsel's conduct was objectively reasonable, not whether 
counsel subjectively believed his conduct was reasonable.  See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; 
Love v. State, 670 S.W.2d 499, 502 (Mo. banc 1984).  Additionally, despite an ethical obligation 
to testify truthfully to the motion court, see Rule 4-3.3(a)(1), a defendant's trial counsel 
occasionally provides testimony that facilitates a finding that he or she provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  This Court has previously directed the Office of Chief Disciplinary 
Counsel to investigate counsel's competency when there is a published opinion finding 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
5 
 
video interview with police, the mother's testimony, and the child therapist's testimony.  
Consequently, the identity of the room was tied up with the category of evidence.  The 
bathroom was associated with Hoeber's confession; the other rooms were associated with 
S.M.'s statements.  Without specifying a room, the verdict directors did not focus the 
jury's attention on an associated category of evidence either way, i.e., the verdict directors 
did not prompt the jury toward either Hoeber's confession or S.M.'s statements.  The non-
specific verdict directors, therefore, left open the possibility that jury deliberations would 
center around S.M.'s statements, exactly what the defense wanted.  
However, this possibility would have been effectively foreclosed by specific 
verdict directors.  If counsel had insisted on specifying a room in the verdict directors, 
there were two scenarios: (1) as the principal opinion points out, the State could have 
elected to specify one room for each of the verdict directors, or (2) as the State argues, 
there could have been eight possible alternative verdict directors—four for each count, 
with a different verdict director for each possible room (bathroom, kitchen, bedroom, and 
living room).  Of course, under the first scenario, the State would have elected to specify 
the bathroom in the verdict directors, because the backbone of the State's evidence, 
Hoeber's confession, identified that Hoeber touched S.M. twice (once for each count), 
specifically in the bathroom, and specifically within the timeframe given in the verdict 
directors, between July 1, 2007, and August 29, 2007.  Choosing to specify any room 
over the bathroom would have been illogical for the State, as the State then would have 
been relying on its weaker evidence.  Under the first scenario, the jury's focus would have 
6 
 
certainly been shifted to Hoeber's confession—exactly what reasonable defense counsel 
would not have wanted under the circumstances. 
 
The second scenario would not have been any better for Hoeber.  The principal 
opinion dismisses the argument that having four alternative verdict directors for each 
count would have necessarily been bad for the defense because it would have reminded 
the jury of just how many bad acts were alleged.  While that would have been a 
reasonable consideration for the defense, it is not the only one.  With alternative verdict 
directors, there would have been one verdict director for each count that specified the 
bathroom and necessarily focused the jury's attention on Hoeber's confession.  Moreover, 
acting reasonably and relying on its strongest evidence, the State would have insisted that 
the verdict director specifying the bathroom be the first verdict director for each count, 
prompting the jury to Hoeber's confession right out of the gate.  Again, this is exactly 
what reasonable defense counsel would not have wanted under the circumstances. 
 
Although specific verdict directors, under both scenarios, would have better 
ensured unanimous verdicts, this would have come at the price of undermining the 
defense's overall trial strategy by unduly shifting the jury's focus to the State's strongest 
evidence—Hoeber's confession.  Moreover, evaluated "from counsel's perspective at the 
time" and "considering all the circumstances," see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89, any 
risk of non-unanimous verdicts likely, and reasonably, appeared remote to the defense.  
Such a conclusion flows from the dichotomy of the evidence—the defendant's own 
detailed confession versus the contradictory, and at times nonsensical, statements of a 
very young child.  Assuming a conviction by reasonable jurors, if a particular juror did 
7 
 
not believe S.M.'s statements, his or her guilty vote would have been based solely on 
Hoeber's confession.  But the opposite does not follow.  If a different juror did believe 
S.M.'s statements, it seems rather unlikely that his or her guilty vote would have been 
based solely on S.M.'s statements—that is, if the juror believed S.M.'s statements, he or 
she would have little reason to doubt the veracity of Hoeber's confession.  Accordingly, it 
was reasonable under the circumstances to conclude that if Hoeber were to be convicted, 
it was almost certainly going to be because all jurors believed Hoeber's confession.4  In 
this way, it was objectively reasonable for counsel to act in furtherance of the defense's 
overall trial strategy, rather than act out of concern for possible non-unanimous verdicts.     
Therefore, contrary to the principal opinion's assumption, it does not follow "that 
no reasonable trial strategy existed for failing to object to the non-specific verdict 
directors."  Any importance placed on unanimous verdicts in general is not dispositive of 
whether counsel provided reasonably effective assistance in this particular case, under 
these particular circumstances.  See, e.g., Love, 670 S.W.2d at 503 (rejecting the 
argument that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the omission of an instruction in 
a motion for a new trial simply because the "instruction was required by the then 
applicable law" and, instead, concluding "that a reasonable attorney could have decided 
[the] instruction would have been detrimental to his client").  The principal opinion fails 
                                              
4  Given these circumstances, it is also understandable that the motion court chose to skip to the 
second prong of the Strickland test and specifically address prejudice.  See Taylor v. State, 382 
S.W.3d 78, 81 (Mo. banc 2012) ("The court may not need to address both prongs if the movant 
has failed to make a sufficient showing on one.  If the ineffectiveness claim can be disposed of 
because of lack of sufficient prejudice, that course should be followed.") (internal citation 
omitted). 
8 
 
to adhere to basic tenets of ineffectiveness analysis, that there is a presumption of 
reasonableness and that "[t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any 
given case."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  Although one way to provide effective 
assistance in this case may have been to eliminate any risk of non-unanimous verdicts, 
another—and in my view better—way to provide effective assistance under the 
circumstances was to not insist on specific verdict directors, so as to not focus jury 
deliberations on Hoeber's own damning confession.  While the principal opinion may 
endorse a strategy that puts the protection of unanimous verdicts first and foremost, it 
unduly narrows consideration of the likely original trial outcome and outcome on 
remand.   
It is also worth noting that the principal opinion's shoehorning of Celis-Garcia's 
principles into the postconviction relief context opens the door even further for prisoners 
to make matters considerably worse for themselves in the pursuit of postconviction relief, 
a result entirely foreseeable based on the ultimate resolution of Celis-Garcia itself.  See 
State v. Ess, 453 S.W.3d 196, 214 n.6 (Mo. banc 2015) (Wilson, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) ("[I]t will never be known whether the decision not to object to the 
state's instructions in Celis-Garcia was a matter of trial strategy even though the 
subsequent history of that case shows such a strategy would not have been 
unreasonable.").  In State v. Celis-Garcia, a direct appeal case, this Court reversed and 
remanded for a new trial on plain error review after the State broadly charged the 
defendant with only two counts of first-degree statutory sodomy but presented evidence 
of numerous acts that could have served as the basis for each criminal charge.  344 
9 
 
S.W.3d 150, 154–56 (Mo. banc 2011).  The defendant was originally convicted of both 
counts of first-degree statutory sodomy and sentenced to two concurrent 25-year 
sentences.  Id. at 154.  On remand, however, the State added new charges to match the 
numerous acts that had been alleged at trial but not specifically instructed on, and the 
defendant was subsequently convicted of 10 counts of first-degree statutory sodomy 
(each carrying a life sentence), six counts of first-degree child molestation (each carrying 
a 15-year sentence), and one count of first-degree statutory rape (also carrying a life 
sentence).  State v. Celis-Garcia, 420 S.W.3d 723, 725 (Mo. App. 2014).  These 
convictions, after taking into account the concurrent or consecutive nature of the 
individual sentences, resulted in three consecutive life sentences plus 30 years.  Id.  
Likewise, the State here is not precluded from adding charges after remand.  Under the 
principal opinion's analysis and result, the State is incentivized to amend the charges on 
remand to include all versions of facts contained in the record, which trial counsel 
undoubtedly knew, and knows, is not in Hoeber's best interest. 
These repercussions aside, this Court should not merely acknowledge the Supreme 
Court's directives in ineffectiveness analysis but actually follow them and find counsel to 
have been effective in all but the rarest of cases.  A reviewing court's mere disagreement 
with counsel's trial strategy does not render counsel's assistance ineffective; not only is 
there a presumption of reasonableness, but due deference and due consideration of the 
circumstances of the case also should be given, and a wide latitude of what constitutes 
"reasonable" should be applied.  In my view, after reviewing the trial transcript and 
motion hearing transcript, Hoeber has not overcome the presumption that trial counsel 
10 
 
acted reasonably because counsel's conduct "falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance; that is . . . the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial 
strategy.'"  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (emphasis added).  I, therefore, dissent, and I 
would not subject Hoeber to the risk of additional charges. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Zel M. Fischer, Judge