Title: Commonwealth v. Montague
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 000130
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 2000

PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
OPINION BY  
v.  Record No. 000130 
SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
 
 
 
November 3, 2000 
HOMER D. MONTAGUE 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the felony-murder 
statute applies to the facts of this case. 
I 
 
Tried by a jury in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Richmond, Homer D. Montague was convicted of felony murder in 
violation of Code § 18.2-33.∗  The trial court sentenced Montague 
to imprisonment for 15 years, with seven years suspended.  
Montague appealed his felony-murder conviction to the Court of 
Appeals, which reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded 
the case.  Montague v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 187, 522 S.E.2d 
379 (1999).  We awarded the Commonwealth this appeal. 
II 
 
The facts are undisputed.  On August 23, 1997, between 
11:00 a.m. and noon, Leslie Louick parked her red 1991 Dodge 
Shadow automobile in the City of Richmond, on Grayland Avenue, 
                     
 
∗ Montague also was convicted of grand larceny and of 
eluding the police for which he received sentences of three 
years' imprisonment, with two years suspended, and 12 months in 
jail, with six months suspended, respectively. 
near Boulevard.  The following day, around noon, Louick 
discovered that her car had been stolen.  During the daytime on 
August 24, a witness saw Montague driving Louick's car in the 
Jackson Ward area of the City. 
 
On the evening of August 24, Richmond City police officers 
set up a routine traffic checkpoint on the Fourth Street Bridge.  
Officer Chester Roberts, Jr., was authorized to operate the 
southbound chase car and to pursue any vehicles that attempted 
to evade the checkpoint. 
 
Between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., Officer Roberts saw two 
automobiles approach the bridge from the south.  One car was a 
large sedan.  The other car was Louick's, driven by Montague.  
The two cars had traveled approximately 100 feet onto the bridge 
when each made an illegal U-turn across double yellow lines and 
headed south. 
 
Officer Roberts immediately activated his vehicle's 
emergency lights and siren and pursued the fleeing cars.  At an 
intersection, the sedan turned left, and the car driven by 
Montague continued forward.  The officer pursued Montague into 
the Gilpin Court neighborhood. 
 
After Montague entered Gilpin Court, Roberts saw the car's 
illuminated brake lights.  Roberts also could see and hear that 
the car was skidding as Montague was attempting to negotiate a 
left turn onto St. Paul Street.  Montague failed to make the 
 
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turn, and the car traveled over the curb and struck ten-year-old 
Antoine Lamont Lewis, who was riding his bicycle on the 
sidewalk. 
 
Montague exited the car and ran, and another police officer 
apprehended him less than a block away.  Montague later gave a 
statement to Officer Roberts in which he admitted that he was 
the driver of Louick's car and that he had stolen it. 
 
Antoine Lewis died at the Medical College of Virginia 
Hospitals.  His death was the result of trauma to his brain 
caused by the collision. 
III 
 
Code § 18.2-33 provides that "[t]he killing of one 
accidentally, contrary to the intention of the parties, while in 
the prosecution of some felonious act other than those specified 
in §§ 18.2-31 and 18.2-32, is murder of the second degree."  The 
felony-murder doctrine originated at common law and, when 
supported by the evidence, operates to elevate to second-degree 
murder a homicide committed during the commission of a felony by 
imputing malice to the killing.  F.P. Heacock v. Commonwealth, 
228 Va. 397, 403, 323 S.E.2d 90, 93 (1984); Wooden v. 
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 762, 284 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1981). 
 
Although the homicide in the present case did not occur 
until at least eleven hours after the grand larceny was 
completed, the Commonwealth contends that the felony-murder 
 
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statute applies.  The Commonwealth asserts that Montague's 
flight from police in an effort to avoid detection of his crime 
established a causal connection between the larceny and the 
homicide. 
 
Montague contends, on the other hand, that the felony-
murder statute does not apply because the homicide and the 
underlying felony "were widely and distinctly separated in time, 
distance and continuity of action, and were not parts of the 
same criminal enterprise."  Montague relies mainly on our 
decisions in Doane v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 500, 237 S.E.2d 797 
(1977), and Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1033, 243 S.E.2d 
477 (1978). 
 
In Doane, the defendant, who was charged with felony 
murder, had stolen an automobile in the City of Richmond around 
noon on July 7, 1976.  The following day, around 6:15 p.m., the 
defendant, while operating the stolen car, ran a stop sign and 
killed a passenger in another vehicle.  The accident occurred in 
Smyth County, approximately 280 miles from the City of Richmond.  
218 Va. at 501, 237 S.E.2d at 798.  The Commonwealth contended 
that larceny is a continuing offense, and, therefore, the 
homicide occurred during the commission of a felony.  The trial 
court agreed and convicted the defendant of second-degree 
murder.  Id. at 501-02, 237 S.E.2d at 798.  We, however, 
 
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reversed the judgment of the trial court.  Id. at 503, 237 
S.E.2d at 799. 
 
We noted, in Doane, that "[t]he concept of larceny as a 
continuing offense is a fiction of the common law, . . . which 
allows a thief who steals within a jurisdiction to be tried for 
the offense in any venue of that jurisdiction to which he 
transports, or wherein he possesses, the fruits of the larceny."  
Id. at 502, 237 S.E.2d at 798.  Although we recognize this legal 
fiction in support of venue considerations, we declined, in 
Doane, to extend the fiction to satisfy the requirements of the 
felony-murder statute.  Id. 
 
We also said, in Doane, that, without the benefit of the 
fiction, there was "neither a showing of causal relationship nor 
a showing of nexus between the larceny . . . and the accidental 
killing."  Id.  We further stated, however, that we would defer 
to another day the issue "[w]hether that showing must be one of 
causal relationship, or whether a showing of mere nexus will 
suffice."  Id. at 502-03, 237 S.E.2d at 798-99. 
 
Approximately six months after the Doane decision, we 
decided Haskell, another felony-murder case.  In Haskell, the 
three defendants and their companion attacked, beat, and 
searched an intoxicated sailor in an attempt to rob him.  When 
the defendants and their companion discovered that the sailor 
had no money, they tried to leave in their automobile.  The 
 
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beaten sailor, however, sought to prevent his assailants' 
escape, and, during a scuffle, the defendants' companion shot 
and killed the sailor.  218 Va. at 1036-37, 243 S.E.2d at 478-
79.  The defendants contended that, as a matter of law, the 
homicide did not occur during the commission of a felony because 
the attempt to rob had been abandoned by them before the 
altercation between their companion and the sailor ended in the 
fatal shooting.  Id. at 1039, 243 S.E.2d at 480. 
 
In Haskell, we affirmed the three defendants' convictions 
for felony murder.  In doing so, we adopted the so-called res 
gestae rule, which represents the prevailing view among other 
jurisdictions.  The rule provides that "the felony-murder 
statute applies where the killing is so closely related to the 
felony in time, place, and causal connection as to make it a 
part of the same criminal enterprise."  Id. at 1043-44, 243 
S.E.2d at 483.  We found, in Haskell, that the killing of the 
sailor was closely related in time, place, and causal connection 
to the attempted robbery of him, and, therefore, the underlying 
felony and the homicide were parts of the same criminal 
enterprise.  Id. at 1043, 243 S.E.2d at 483. 
 
It is important to note that the required elements of the 
rule, i.e., time, place, and causal connection, are stated in 
the conjunctive.  Therefore, all three elements must be 
established for the felony-murder statute to apply. 
 
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In the present case, the grand larceny occurred at least 
eleven hours before the homicide.  Thus, we agree with the Court 
of Appeals' conclusion that "the accidental killing of the 
victim was not related in time to the larceny."  31 Va. App. at 
192, 522 S.E.2d at 381-82.  We also conclude that the place 
element has not been established as the larceny and the homicide 
transpired in different parts of the City, and Montague had been 
seen driving Louick's car in still another part of the City in 
the interim.  We hold, therefore, that the grand larceny and the 
homicide were not parts of the same criminal enterprise as 
required by the res gestae rule and that the felony-murder 
statute does not apply to the facts of this case. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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