Title: State v. Marks
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 123034
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 2021

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 123,034 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
RICKEY MARKS, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
Neither K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3212 nor K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3213 permit 
postconviction discovery in a criminal case. 
 
 
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; WESLEY K. GRIFFIN, judge. Opinion filed July 2, 2021. 
Affirmed. 
 
Joseph A. Desch, of Law Office of Joseph Desch, of Topeka, was on the brief for appellant.  
 
Daniel G. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, Mark A. Dupree Sr., district attorney, and Derek 
Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
LUCKERT, C.J.:  Rickey Marks seeks personal copies of records the State made 
available to his attorney more than a decade ago during criminal proceedings that led to 
his conviction of first-degree premeditated murder. The district court denied Marks' pro 
se and barebones postconviction motion to compel the production of those records, and 
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he brought this appeal. Before us, now represented by counsel, Marks cites K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 22-3212 and K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3213 as authority for his motion to compel. But 
neither K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3212 nor K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3213 permit 
postconviction discovery in a criminal case. We thus reject his arguments and affirm the 
district court's denial of Marks' motion to compel discovery.  
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Marks has litigated the question of whether he is entitled to a copy of the 
discovery materials throughout this case. Before his trial on the first-degree premeditated 
murder conviction, he asked the trial court judge to require the State give him his own 
copy of discovery materials and witness statements. The State objected, noting it had an 
open-file discovery policy and was giving Marks' trial counsel full access to its records. 
The trial judge denied Marks' request for a personal copy of the discovery. On the record, 
Marks' counsel told the judge the defense team would review and discuss all the 
discovery material with Marks.  
 
A trial followed, and a jury convicted Marks of first-degree premeditated murder. 
A judge sentenced Marks to a hard 25 life sentence, and Marks appealed to this court. In 
that appeal, he argued, among other issues, that the trial judge erred when the judge ruled 
that Marks was not entitled to a personal copy of the discovery. He based this allegation 
on both statutory and constitutional grounds.  
 
We agreed with his argument in part. We found merit in his statutory argument:  
"Under the plain language of K.S.A. 22-3212 and K.S.A. 22-3213, the defendant is 
entitled to personal copies of certain discovery upon request." State v. Marks, 297 Kan. 
131, Syl. ¶ 7, 298 P.3d 1102 (2013). But we rejected Marks' argument that he had a 
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constitutional right to personal copies. We noted "'[t]here is no general constitutional 
right to discovery in a criminal case.'" 297 Kan. at 149 (quoting Weatherford v. Bursey, 
429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S. Ct. 837, 51 L. Ed. 2d 30 [1977]). As to Marks' argument that the 
judge's ruling infringed on his constitutional right to meaningfully participate in his own 
defense, we held that he failed to support that argument. First, he did "not articulate how 
his participation was actually impeded when he otherwise had the opportunity to review 
the information with his attorney." 297 Kan. at 148. Second, he failed to "cite any 
authority which would support his theory of constitutional infringement." 297 Kan. at 
148. After discussion of relevant caselaw, we held that "[a] defendant's right to assistance 
in his or her defense does not translate to a constitutional right to personal copies of 
discovery, particularly when that discovery was already provided to his or her attorney." 
297 Kan. at 149 (citing United States v. Shrake, 515 F.3d 743, 745 [7th Cir. 2008]; State 
v. Deavers, 252 Kan. 149, 158, 843 P.2d 695 [1992], cert. denied 508 U.S. 978 [1993]; 
People v. Davison, 292 Ill. App. 3d 981, 988, 686 N.E.2d 1231 [1997]).   
 
We then turned to the question of whether the violation of Marks' statutory right to 
have a copy of the discovery was harmless. We noted that the State's open file policy 
allowed Marks' attorneys access to discovery that met or exceeded the requirements of 
the criminal discovery statutes. And Marks did not allege his defense was compromised 
by any failure to obtain copies or that his counsel failed to review discovery with him. 
We thus held there was no reasonable probability the district court's erroneous 
interpretation of K.S.A. 22-3212 and K.S.A. 22-3213 affected the trial's outcome. In 
other words, the statutory error was harmless. Marks, 297 Kan. at 150.  
 
About five years later, Marks renewed his effort to get personal copies of the 
discovery—this time through a postconviction motion filed under K.S.A. 60-1507. The 
district court held a full evidentiary hearing before denying relief. The Court of Appeals 
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affirmed. Marks v. State, No. 115,444, 2017 WL 2494990 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished 
opinion).  
 
Marks also pursued habeas relief in federal court. The federal district court 
dismissed Marks' petition in part and denied it in part. See Marks v. Cline, No. 5:18-CV-
03065-HLT, 2020 WL 1812267 (D. Kan. 2020) (unpublished opinion). Marks appealed 
to the Tenth Circuit, which recently denied his request for a certificate of appealability. 
Marks v. Cline, No. 20-3071, __ Fed. Appx. __, 2021 WL 1343673 (10th Cir. 2021) 
(unpublished opinion).  
 
While the federal action was pending, Marks also persisted with repeated attempts 
to obtain postconviction discovery through motions filed in his state criminal case. His 
three most recent attempts were filed on June 8, June 30, and July 2, 2020. The district 
court denied all three. 
 
The first request filed June 8 cited no authority for requesting the discovery. The 
sole basis for the request appears to be:  "Without this discovery plaintiff will not be able 
to present me[ritor]ious issues to the US District Court 10th Circuit." The district court 
denied the motion on June 16, 2020; the order did not address the June 30 or July 2, 
2020, motions. Marks filed a notice of appeal relating to "all issue[s] that were ruled on 
the motion to produce discovery filed June 8, 2020." (Emphasis added.) The Docketing 
Statement identified the subject of the appeal as the district court's ruling dated June 16, 
2020. And Marks' brief confirms his appeal is limited to the June 16, 2020, district court 
order. Thus, although the history of the case involves several district court rulings, we 
restrict our consideration to Marks' June 8, 2020, motion that the district court denied on 
June 16, 2020. 
 
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As noted, Marks' pro se filing offered no authority for his request. But, through 
counsel, Marks' appellate brief argues K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3212 and K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 22-3213 authorized the district court to grant his discovery request. Marks argues 
liberal construction of his pro se pleadings permits the court to consider this argument. 
We agree. See State v. Kelly, 291 Kan. 563, 565, 244 P.3d 639 (2010). 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Marks' appeal, as argued before us, thus hinges on whether K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-
3212 and K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3213 authorize a district court to order postconviction 
discovery. He recognizes that we have rejected arguments that authority for 
postconviction discovery arises from other statutes. For example, he cites to our holding 
in State v. Robinson, 309 Kan. 159, 161, 432 P.3d 75 (2019), that "'[n]othing in [K.S.A. 
2015 Supp. 60-237] permits a postconviction motion to compel discovery in a criminal 
case.'"  
 
In placing all his discovery eggs in the K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3212 and K.S.A. 
2020 Supp. 22-3213 basket, he notes that "'K.S.A. 22-3212 . . . sets out comprehensive 
notice and discovery requirements for the parties in criminal trials.' State v. Edwards, 299 
Kan. 1008, 1015, 327 P.3d 469 (2014)." And "'[a] defendant may request discovery 
pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3212 and 22-3213.' State v. Sherry, 233 Kan. 920, 929, 667 P.2d 
367 (1983)." Marks suggests these holdings mean that postconviction discovery is 
allowed by these statutes.  
 
Marks' arguments ignore the plain language of these statutes. Yet the outcome of 
this appeal depends on whether, through the language in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3212 and 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3213, the Legislature expressed an intent to allow postconviction 
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discovery. "To divine that intent, courts examine the language of the provision and apply 
plain and unambiguous language as written. If the Legislature's intent is not clear from 
the language, a court may look to legislative history, background considerations, and 
canons of construction to help determine legislative intent." Jarvis v. Dept. of Revenue, 
312 Kan. 156, 159, 473 P.3d 869 (2020). This question of statutory interpretation 
presents an issue of law subject to our unlimited review. 312 Kan. at 159. 
 
Both K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3212 and K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3213 are plain and 
unambiguous, at least as to the question of whether they authorize postconviction 
discovery. No provision explicitly allows a district court to order postconviction 
discovery. And both statutes include temporal limitations relating to the pretrial and trial 
phases of criminal proceedings. These temporal limitations exclude postconviction 
discovery.  
 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3213, the narrowest of the two statutes, relates to the 
discovery of witness statements. Its provisions are not triggered until the defense makes a 
request after a "witness has testified on direct examination at the preliminary hearing or 
in the trial of the case." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3213(a). Once the witness testifies and a 
discovery request is made, the statute makes clear the State must deliver the requested 
materials "directly to the defense for examination and use by the defense." K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 22-3213(b). The Legislature accommodated the potential disruption this 
sequencing and timing might cause by stating that the court could "recess proceedings in 
the trial for such time as it may determine to be reasonably required for the examination 
of such statement by the defense and preparation for its use in the trial." K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 22-3213(c). These provisions reveal a legislative intent that the provisions be 
applied promptly and during the preliminary hearing or the trial.  
 
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K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3212 relates to other materials—a defendant's statements, 
reports, test results, and other matters—that the defense and prosecution may discover 
and inspect on request of the other party. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3212(a)-(d). K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 22-3212 limits the statute's applicability to requests made before trial or, at the 
latest, during trial. For example, some provisions require expert reports or summaries of 
such reports be provided before trial. E.g., K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3212(b)(2) (prosecuting 
attorney); K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3212(c)(2) (defense attorney). And in subsection (h), the 
Legislature directed that the discovery "must be completed no later than 21 days after 
arraignment or at such reasonable later time as the court may permit." But the Legislature 
included an exception in subsection (i) if, "prior to or during trial, a party discovers 
additional material previously requested or ordered which is subject to discovery or 
inspection under this section." In that circumstance, "the court may order such party to 
permit the discovery or inspection of materials not previously disclosed, grant a 
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, 
or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances." K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 22-3212(i). Each of these remedies relates to pretrial or trial proceedings. 
 
Also, the word "discovery" is used throughout the provisions. See K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 22-3212(c), (d), (f), (g), (h), (i); K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3213(a). Discovery is 
understood to relate to pretrial proceedings. See Black's Law Dictionary 584 (11th ed. 
2019) ("The pretrial phase of a lawsuit during which depositions, interrogatories, and 
other forms of discovery are conducted." [Emphasis added.]). Consistent with this 
definition, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3212 and 22-3213 are aimed at discovery before or, at 
the latest, during a criminal trial for use during trial. Neither addresses postconviction 
discovery such as that sought here.  
 
 
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The caselaw cited by Marks further supports reading the statutes as applying to 
only pretrial and trial proceedings. He primarily relies on State v. Mundo-Parra, 58 Kan. 
App. 2d 17, 462 P.3d 1211, rev. denied 312 Kan. 899 (2020). Mundo-Parra is an apt case 
because Jose Mundo-Parra also sought postconviction discovery through motions in his 
criminal case. But Marks overlooks a sentence in Mundo-Parra that cuts against his 
attempt to seek discovery. In the overlooked passage, the Court of Appeals panel 
interpreted K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3212 and K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3213 "to apply only 
before trial . . . ." 58 Kan. App. 2d at 20-21.  
 
Marks' trial concluded years ago. If K.S.A. 22-3212 and 22-3213 are limited to 
pretrial discovery, as the Mundo-Parra panel interpreted them to be, they do not support 
Marks' request for postconviction discovery. And we agree with the Mundo-Parra panel's 
conclusion that these statutes are limited to pretrial proceedings, or at the very latest 
production of discovery materials during trial.  
 
Another case cited by Marks, State v. Edwards, 299 Kan. 1008, 327 P.3d 469 
(2014), suggests a different reason for us to hold that K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3212 and 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3213 do not extend to postconviction discovery. Marks cites 
Edwards for the proposition that K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3212 and K.S.A. 2020 Supp 22-
3213 set out comprehensive notice and discovery requirements. But Edwards referenced 
this comprehensive scheme as applying to "the parties in criminal trials." (Emphasis 
added.) 299 Kan. at 1016. It did not recognize another context in which the scheme 
would apply.  
 
Further, the holding, while not on point, suggests the Legislature did not intend the 
language of these statutes to be extended. In that holding, we rejected the defendant's 
argument that the State must comply with K.S.A. 60-226, which requires parties in civil 
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proceedings to provide notice of expert witnesses. In reaching this holding, we 
recognized that the code of civil procedure could apply in criminal proceedings if the 
code of criminal procedure includes no contrary provisions. But because the criminal 
code "sets out comprehensive notice and discovery requirements for the parties in 
criminal trials" we concluded that, "[i]f the legislature intended to require special expert 
witness requirements, it could have placed those requirements in K.S.A. 22-3212." 
299 Kan. at 1016.  
 
Likewise, because K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3212 and K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3213 set 
out comprehensive pretrial and trial discovery requirements but no postconviction 
discovery requirements we infer the Legislature intended no such discovery be allowed 
under the authority of these statutes.  
 
In short, Marks cites no support for his theory that K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3212 and 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3213 apply to his motion for postconviction discovery. Before us, 
he cites no other basis for the discovery he now requests. We therefore affirm the district 
court's denial of Marks' motion to compel discovery.  
 
Affirmed.