Title: Commonwealth v. Johnson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12673
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 21, 2019

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SJC-12673 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DON EARL JOHNSON. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     May 9, 2019. - August 21, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Deoxyribonucleic Acid. Evidence, Scientific test.  
Estoppel.  Practice, Criminal, Postconviction relief, 
Standing, Collateral estoppel.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 8, 1994. 
 
 
A postconviction motion for deoxyribonucleic acid testing, 
filed on August 8, 2018, was considered by Janet Kenton-Walker, 
J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Edward Gauthier for the defendant. 
 
Donna-Marie Haran, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Meredith Shih, for Boston Bar Association, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
Ira L. Gant, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & Beth 
L. Eisenberg, for innocence program of Committee for Public 
Counsel Services & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  We are called upon to interpret the standing 
requirement of G. L. c. 278A (chapter 278A).  That statute 
"allows those who have been convicted but assert factual 
innocence to have access to forensic and scientific testing of 
evidence and biological material that has the potential to prove 
their innocence."  Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 Mass. 799, 799 
(2019).  "A person may file a motion for forensic or scientific 
analysis under" chapter 278A if that person is, among other 
requirements, "incarcerated in a state prison [or] house of 
correction, is on parole or probation[,] or [is one] whose 
liberty has been otherwise restrained as the result of a 
conviction."  G. L. c. 278A, § 2 (2). 
 
Don Earl Johnson is currently incarcerated in Federal 
prison for failing to register as a sex offender.  He seeks 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing of biological material 
pertaining to his only sex offense, of which he claims 
innocence.  The Commonwealth argues that Johnson does not 
satisfy the requirements of G. L. c. 278A, § 2 (2), because he 
is not incarcerated for the crime that is the subject of his 
chapter 278A motion.  Johnson argues that his current 
incarceration for failure to register is "as the result of" his 
sex offense, even though he is not incarcerated for that crime.  
3 
 
 
We agree with Johnson, and therefore conclude that he has 
satisfied the requirements of G. L. c. 278A, § 2 (2).1 
 
Background.2  Johnson was arrested in 1994 after a woman 
reported that she was beaten by two men and vaginally raped by 
one of them.  The woman thought her assailant had ejaculated, 
and a hospital nurse provided police with an evidence collection 
kit.  At the crime scene, police found spots on the ground that 
may have been semen. 
 
Johnson was indicted on two counts of aggravated rape and 
one count of assault and battery.  The aggravated rape charges 
carried maximum sentences of life in prison.  See G. L. c. 265, 
§ 22 (a).  Johnson pleaded guilty to two counts of indecent 
assault and battery and one count of assault and battery, and 
was sentenced to one year in a house of correction with a credit 
of 229 days. 
 
Two decades later, in 2014, Johnson filed pro se a chapter 
278A motion for DNA testing of semen and an evidence collection 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Boston 
Bar Association and by the innocence program of the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services and the New England Innocence 
Project. 
 
 
2 We take the following facts from the affidavits and 
exhibits included with Don Earl Johnson's motion pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278A (chapter 278A). 
 
4 
 
 
kit in the police's possession.3  The motion was denied without a 
hearing.  Johnson, now represented by counsel, filed in 2018 a 
second motion for DNA testing of the evidence collection kit. 
 
Johnson stated in an affidavit accompanying his second 
chapter 278A motion that he was "currently serving a federal 
prison sentence . . . for federal failure to register as a sex 
offender."  See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2012) (criminal penalty for 
knowing failure to "register or update a registration as 
required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act").  Johnson asserted also that he was "required to register 
as a sex offender" "[a]s a result of" his 1994 convictions of 
indecent assault and battery, and that he had "no other sex 
offense convictions."4  See Commonwealth v. Sylvester, 476 Mass. 
1, 2, 10 (2016) ("indecent assault and battery" is "a sex 
offense under G. L. c. 6, § 178C," and "the duty to register as 
a sex offender is a 'practically certain' effect of a conviction 
for a sex offense as defined in" that section).5 Finally, 
                     
 
3 Johnson had earlier moved for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
testing pursuant to the Federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254 (2012).  That motion was denied for failure to comply 
with chapter 278A. 
 
 
4 Johnson's criminal record, which was filed with his 
chapter 278A motion, confirms that he has no other convictions 
that would have required him to register as a sex offender. 
 
 
5 The sex offender registration statute was not enacted 
until after Johnson's convictions.  See Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 450 Mass. 
5 
 
 
Johnson explained, "I pleaded guilty even though I was innocent 
because my attorney advised me that I already had [eight] months 
credit, that the plea would allow me to be out of jail 'right 
away,' that the risk of going to trial was a 'life sentence,' 
and that this was the case of a white woman versus a black man 
and a jury would not believe a black man.  My attorney never 
shared the police report with me and I was unaware at the time 
of the plea that there might be material available for DNA 
testing." 
 
In opposition to Johnson's second chapter 278A motion, the 
Commonwealth argued that (1) the denial of Johnson's first 
chapter 278A motion estopped Johnson from filing a new motion; 
and (2) Johnson does not have standing pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278A, § 2 (2), because he "is not currently facing 
incarceration, or any other restraint on his liberty, as a 
result of his 1994 convictions for indecent assault and 
battery."  Johnson's motion was again denied without a hearing.  
The judge wrote in the order denying the motion that "[a]fter 
review of the pleadings, exhibits and relevant law [Johnson]'s 
                     
780, 785 (2008) (describing "genesis of the duty to register").  
However, the registration requirement "applies to persons 
convicted of a designated sex offense whose 'incarceration or 
parole or probation' had been completed 'on or after August 1, 
1981.'"  Id., quoting G. L. c. 6, § 178C. 
6 
 
 
motion is denied for the reasons stated" in the Commonwealth's 
memorandum. 
 
Johnson appealed from the denial of his second chapter 278A 
motion, and we allowed his motion for direct appellate review.  
Because Johnson is in Federal prison "as the result of" his 
convictions of the crimes of which he asserts factual innocence, 
we vacate the judge's decision and remand for consideration of 
the question whether Johnson is otherwise entitled to a hearing 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 7. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Estoppel.  The Commonwealth argues, and 
the judge agreed, that Johnson is estopped from seeking forensic 
testing because his first chapter 278A motion to test the 
evidence collection kit was denied.  However, when a moving 
party fails to satisfy the threshold requirements of chapter 
278A, the moving party's motion is to be dismissed "without 
prejudice."  G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (e).6  This rule allows a moving 
                     
 
6 This requirement technically applies only to motions that 
do not satisfy G. L. c. 278A, § 3, which lists the information 
that must be provided in a chapter 278A motion.  See G. L. 
c. 278A, § 3 (e) ("The court shall . . . review all motions 
filed and shall dismiss, without prejudice, any such motion 
without a hearing if the court determines . . . that the motion 
does not meet the requirements set forth in this section" 
[emphasis added]).  However, we see no reason why motions that 
do not satisfy G. L. c. 278A, § 2, such as Johnson's first 
chapter 278A motion here, should not also be dismissed without 
prejudice.  As discussed infra, it is consistent with the 
purpose behind chapter 278A to interpret the statute in a manner 
favorable to moving parties.  See Commonwealth v. Clark, 472 
Mass. 120, 136 (2015). 
7 
 
 
party to raise in a chapter 278A motion the same issues he or 
she had raised in an earlier motion that was denied without a 
hearing.  See Commonwealth v. Wade, 467 Mass. 496, 500 n.7 
(2014), S.C., 475 Mass. 54 (2016) (chapter 278A "appears to 
contemplate any number of . . . filings").  Cf. Morgan v. Evans, 
39 Mass. App. Ct. 465, 470 (1995) (in context of dismissals 
pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 41, 365 Mass. 803 [1974], 
"dismissal without prejudice does not preclude a second action 
on the same claim and issues").7  Thus, although Johnson's first 
chapter 278A motion was "denied," it was effectively dismissed 
without prejudice. 
 
2.  Standing.  A moving party is "eligible to request" 
postconviction forensic or scientific analysis pursuant to 
chapter 278A only if he or she satisfies the standing 
requirements of G. L. c. 278A, § 2.  Williams, 481 Mass. at 800.8  
Pursuant to that section, "A person may file a motion for 
forensic or scientific analysis under this chapter if that 
                     
 
7 We previously have decided appeals from orders denying 
chapter 278A motions where earlier such motions had been denied.  
See Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 Mass. 799, 803 (2019); 
Commonwealth v. Donald, 468 Mass. 37, 40 (2014). 
 
 
8 If a moving party satisfies the requirements of G. L. 
c. 278A, §§ 2 and 3, then he or she is entitled to a hearing.  
See G. L. c. 278A, § 6 (a).  Pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b), 
a moving party is entitled to the requested forensic or 
scientific analysis if, after a hearing, a judge decides that 
the factors listed in that subsection have been proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
8 
 
 
person:  (1) has been convicted of a criminal offense in a court 
of the commonwealth; (2) is incarcerated in a state prison, 
house of correction, is on parole or probation or whose liberty 
has been otherwise restrained as the result of a conviction; and 
(3) asserts factual innocence of the crime for which the person 
has been convicted."  The Commonwealth argues, and the judge 
agreed, that Johnson does not satisfy the second factor.9 
 
With respect to G. L. c. 278A, § 2 (2), Johnson is not 
"incarcerated in a state prison" or "house of correction," nor 
is he "on parole or probation."  However, as the Commonwealth 
acknowledges, his "liberty has been otherwise restrained" 
because he is in Federal prison.  The issue is whether he is in 
prison "as the result of" his convictions of the crimes of which 
he asserts factual innocence. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the phrase "as the result of" 
requires a moving party to show that his or her liberty has been 
restrained as a "direct" consequence of his or her conviction.  
Johnson's current prison sentence, the argument goes, is an 
                     
 
9 We have yet to articulate a moving party's burden of proof 
with respect to the first two factors of G. L. c. 278A, § 2.  
Cf. Williams, 481 Mass. at 806 (with respect to third 
requirement in § 2, moving party must "assert[] in the affidavit 
accompanying his or her chapter 278A motion that he or she" was 
factually innocent); Commonwealth v. Wade, 467 Mass. 496, 501-
504 (2014), S.C., 475 Mass. 54 (2016) (establishing framework for 
deciding whether moving party has satisfied requirements of 
G. L. c. 278A, §§ 3 and 7).  We need not do so here because the 
relevant facts are uncontested. 
9 
 
 
"indirect" consequence because it was imposed for his failure to 
register as a sex offender, not for his commission of the crimes 
of which he now asserts factual innocence.  In contrast, Johnson 
contends that the second factor is satisfied where a moving 
party "is incarcerated and would not be incarcerated but for his 
[or her] conviction."10  We review de novo this issue of 
statutory interpretation, see Commonwealth v. Moffat, 478 Mass. 
292, 298-299 (2017), and conclude that Johnson is imprisoned "as 
the result of" his convictions of indecent assault and battery. 
 
"We begin with the plain language of the statute."  
Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 475 Mass. 820, 821 (2016).  On its 
face, G. L. c. 278A, § 2 (2), does not require that a moving 
party's liberty be restrained as the "direct" result of a 
conviction of the crime of which he or she asserts factual 
innocence.  The restraint on liberty must be merely "the result 
of" that conviction.  G. L. c. 278A, § 2 (2).  See Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 1937 (2002) (defining 
"result" as, in pertinent part, "something that results as a 
consequence, effect, . . . or conclusion").  "We do not read 
into [a] statute a provision which the Legislature did not see 
                     
 
10 Johnson argues in the alternative that a moving party's 
"liberty has been otherwise restrained as the result of a 
conviction," G. L. c. 278A, § 2 (2), where he or she is required 
to register as a sex offender.  We leave for another day the 
question whether the liberty interests implicated by sex 
offender registration fall within the scope of chapter 278A. 
10 
 
 
fit to put there . . . ."  Williams, 481 Mass. at 807-808, 
quoting Commissioner of Correction v. Superior Court Dep't of 
the Trial Court for the County of Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 126 
(2006).  Cf. Dartt v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. (Mass.), 427 
Mass. 1, 6, 8 (1998), quoting G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16) (statute 
prohibiting discrimination "because of" handicap "does not use 
the term 'solely.'  We discern no other similarly restrictive 
language in the statutory scheme, and we hesitate to rewrite the 
statute judicially to import such a restriction"). 
 
Additionally, "[t]he omission of particular language from a 
statute is deemed deliberate where the Legislature included 
[the] omitted language in related or similar statutes."  
Fernandes v. Attleboro Hous. Auth., 470 Mass. 117, 129 (2014).  
When chapter 278A was enacted, see St. 2012, c. 38, the 
Legislature had already required a "direct" result of criminal 
activity in other contexts.  See G. L. c. 127, § 1, as amended 
through St. 1982, c. 108, § 1 (defining "[v]ictim" as, in part, 
"any entity which has suffered property damage or property loss 
as a direct result of the crime for which the sentence referred 
to in this chapter was imposed" [emphasis added]); G. L. 
c. 258C, § 3 (b) (2) (G), as amended through St. 2010, c. 256, 
§ 113 ("Expenses incurred for professional crime scene cleanup 
services necessary as the direct result of the commission of a 
crime . . . shall be compensable . . ." [emphasis added]). 
11 
 
 
 
Moreover, declining to read the word "direct" into G. L. 
c. 278A, § 2 (2), is consistent with the purpose of chapter 
278A.  "Given [the Legislature's] compelling interest in 
remedying wrongful convictions of factually innocent persons," 
"it is entirely appropriate that we construe the language of 
G. L. c. 278A, § [2 (2)], in a manner that is generous to the 
moving party."  Commonwealth v. Clark, 472 Mass. 120, 136 
(2015).  Cf. Williams, 481 Mass. at 808 ("liberal reading of 
G. L. c. 278A, § 3 [b] [4], fully comports with the purpose of 
chapter 278A"). 
 
For these reasons, we decline to adopt the Commonwealth's 
interpretation of G. L. c. 278A, § 2 (2).11  Where a moving party 
                     
 
11 Other sources of legislative intent provide little 
insight.  The Commonwealth points to statutes in other 
jurisdictions that provide for postconviction DNA testing and 
that purportedly would encompass Johnson's situation more 
clearly than does chapter 278A.  According to the Commonwealth, 
we should deem persuasive the Legislature's decision not to 
adopt these other provisions.  See Wade, 467 Mass. at 511-512 
(contrasting chapter 278A with "provisions in statutes in other 
jurisdictions providing for postconviction DNA testing").  
However, the Legislature was also presumably aware of, and 
declined to enact, a South Carolina provision that expressly 
requires a moving party to be incarcerated for the crime of 
which he or she claims innocence.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 17-28-
30(A) (person "may apply for forensic DNA testing of his DNA and 
any physical evidence or biological material related to his 
conviction or adjudication" where, among other requirements, 
person "is currently incarcerated for the offense" [emphasis 
added]). 
 
 
Likewise, the floor debates and committee hearings about 
legislative proposals containing the phrase "as the result of" 
do not provide a definitive interpretation of that phrase. 
12 
 
 
is incarcerated for failing to register as a sex offender, his 
or her liberty has been restrained "as the result of" a 
conviction but for which he or she would not be incarcerated.  
Therefore, Johnson has satisfied the requirements of G. L. 
c. 278A, § 2 (2).12 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the order denying 
Johnson's second chapter 278A motion is vacated and the case is 
                     
During the floor debate on 2011 Senate Doc. No. 1987, one 
legislator stated, "An innocent person should not be 
incarcerated because of a wrongful conviction" (emphasis added).  
State House News Service (Senate Sess.), July 28, 2011, at 5 
(statement of Sen. Cynthia Stone Creem).  However, during a 
hearing about 2011 Senate Doc. No. 753 and 2011 House Doc. No. 
2165, the Boston Bar Association provided a summary according to 
which the proposed legislation applied to "[p]ersons convicted 
of a crime in the Commonwealth . . . who are either incarcerated 
or on some form of probation or parole for this conviction" 
(emphasis added).  Testimony of the Boston Bar Association 
before the Joint Committee on the Judiciary in Support of S 753 
and H 2165 (June 8, 2011), https://www.brandeis.edu/investigate 
/innocence-project/docs/s-753-06.08.11-d-siegel-testimony-
summary-cost.pdf [https://perma.cc/ALE7-THKF]. 
 
 
12 Two convictions required Johnson to register as a sex 
offender because he pleaded guilty to two counts of indecent 
assault and battery.  Where multiple convictions require a 
moving party to register as a sex offender, each conviction 
generally will not be the but-for cause of the registration 
requirement.  See Black's Law Dictionary 273 (11th ed. 2019) 
(defining "but-for cause" as "[t]he cause without which the 
event could not have occurred").  However, where a moving party 
who is incarcerated for failing to register as a sex offender 
claims factual innocence of a single incident that led to 
multiple sex offense convictions, and where no other incident 
has led to convictions requiring that moving party to register 
as a sex offender, we will consider G. L. c. 278A, § 2 (2), to 
be satisfied. 
 
13 
 
 
remanded to the Superior Court for consideration of the question 
whether Johnson is otherwise entitled to a hearing pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278A, § 7.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
13 The chapter 278A motion at issue here might not include 
all the information required by G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b), which 
Johnson must provide to be granted a hearing and to move forward 
with his application for DNA testing.  See G. L. c. 278A, 
§§ 3 (e), 6 (a).  If that is the case, then Johnson may file an 
amended motion that addresses these other requirements.