Title: State v. Edward Bannister
Citation: 2007 WI 86
Docket Number: 2005AP000767-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 3, 2007

2007 WI 86 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP767-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Edward Bannister, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 136 
Reported at: 294 Wis. 2d 359, 720 N.W.2d 498 
(Ct. App. 2006—Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 3, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 11, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
John Siefert 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BUTLER, Jr., J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Christopher G. Wren, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney 
general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Craig S. 
Powell, Byron Lichstein, and Kohler & Hart, LLP, Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Craig S. Powell. 
 
 
2007 WI 86
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP767-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2003CF6219) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Edward Bannister, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This is a review of a published 
court of appeals decision, State v. Bannister, 2006 WI App 136, 
294 Wis. 2d 359, 720 N.W.2d 498.  The court of appeals reversed 
a judgment of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, John Siefert, 
Judge, and remanded the cause with directions.  Judge Siefert 
entered a judgment of conviction consistent with the verdict of 
guilty reached by a jury.  The jury found Edward Bannister 
(Bannister) guilty of delivery of a controlled substance 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(a)(2005-06).1    
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 961.41(1)(a) provides the following: 
No. 
2005AP767-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
This case presents two issues.   First, did the State 
satisfy the corroboration rule during the course of Bannister's 
trial?  We hold that the State satisfied the corroboration rule 
by corroborating Bannister's confession with the presence of 
morphine in Michael Wolk's body at the time of his death, which 
constitutes a significant fact.  Second, should the court grant 
Bannister a new trial in the interest of justice pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 751.06?2  We hold that the real controversy in this 
case was tried and do not grant Bannister a new trial.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Schedule I and II narcotic drugs generally. 
Except as provided in par. (d), if a person violates 
this subsection with respect to a controlled substance 
included in schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug, 
or a controlled substance analog of a controlled 
substance included in schedule I or II which is a 
narcotic drug, the person is guilty of a Class E 
felony.   
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
2005-06 version, unless otherwise stated. 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 751.06 provides the following: 
In an appeal in the supreme court, if it appears 
from the record that the real controversy has not been 
fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has 
for any reason miscarried, the court may reverse the 
judgment or order appealed from, regardless of whether 
the proper motion or objection appears in the record, 
and may direct the entry of the proper judgment or 
remit the case to the trial court for the entry of the 
proper judgment or for a new trial, and direct the 
making of such amendments in the pleadings and the 
adoption 
of 
such 
procedure 
in 
that 
court, 
not 
inconsistent with statutes or rules, as are necessary 
to accomplish the ends of justice. 
No. 
2005AP767-CR   
 
3 
 
I 
¶3 
On October 23, 2003, City of Cudahy Detective Michael 
Carchesi arrested Bannister at his home in Milwaukee County.  
Bannister had an open warrant with the Milwaukee County 
Sheriff's Department for failure to appear.  Detective Carchesi 
wanted to discuss a case he was investigating that involved the 
suspicious death of Michael Wolk.  Detective Carchesi and 
another officer transported Bannister to the police station.    
¶4 
The Cudahy Police Department's involvement in this 
case commenced when it dispatched Officer Brian Scott to the 
apartment of Michael Wolk and his wife on January 17, 2003.  
Mrs. Wolk had called 911 because her husband was unresponsive.  
She requested an ambulance. 
¶5 
Upon arrival, Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) 
attempted to revive Michael.  After approximately twenty 
minutes, the EMTs gave up their efforts.  Michael was pronounced 
dead on the scene.   
¶6 
The Milwaukee County Medical Examiner's Office was 
contacted.  It went to the scene and took custody of Michael's 
body.  The Medical Examiner also took other evidence, including 
a kitchen spoon, a white powdery substance, a couple of 
syringes, and rolling papers that were found on a table near 
Michael's body.   
¶7 
The Medical Examiner's Office examined the evidence 
collected.  Its examination included a comprehensive toxicology 
screen on the kitchen spoon and syringes.  Morphine was on both 
the spoon and the syringes.  Morphine was also found in 
No. 
2005AP767-CR   
 
4 
 
Michael's blood when a comprehensive screen on his blood was 
done.  Dr. Jeffrey Jentzen, a Milwaukee County Medical Examiner, 
concluded that Michael died of morphine toxicity.         
¶8 
With 
Michael's 
death, 
the 
police 
began 
an 
investigation.  At the outset of the investigation, Detective 
Carchesi interviewed Steven Wolk on two occasions.  Steven was 
Michael's brother.  Steven identified Bannister as their source 
for morphine.       
¶9 
Detective Carchesi called Bannister and asked him to 
come to the police station the following day.  Bannister 
initially agreed to do so, but the following day he called back 
and explained he could not meet with them.  No immediate action 
was 
taken 
by 
the 
Cudahy 
Police 
Department 
to 
interview 
Bannister, but the investigation continued.     
¶10 It was eight months after requesting that Bannister 
appear at the police station that Detective Carchesi went to 
Bannister's residence and arrested him.  Once Bannister and 
Detective Carchesi arrived at the police station, Detective 
Carchesi 
advised 
Bannister 
of 
his 
constitutional 
rights.  
Detective Carchesi also told Bannister that he was investigating 
the death of Michael Wolk.   
¶11 During 
the 
interview, 
Bannister 
told 
Detective 
Carchesi that he knew Steven and Michael Wolk.  The brothers 
stopped by his residence on several occasions for morphine.  
Bannister explained that he was prescribed morphine for his 
sickle cell anemia.  Bannister told Detective Carchesi that he 
did not receive payment for the morphine.  Bannister stated that 
No. 
2005AP767-CR   
 
5 
 
he first gave the Wolks morphine in December 2002.  He continued 
giving them morphine until mid-January 2003.  Bannister told 
Detective Carchesi that he gave the Wolks morphine on eight to 
ten occasions, approximately every three days. 
¶12 After 
interviewing 
Bannister, 
Detective 
Carchesi 
booked him for delivery of a controlled substance.  The State 
subsequently charged Bannister with one count of delivery of a 
controlled substance. 
¶13 On the day Bannister's trial began, the parties 
reached an agreement.  The State agreed to not charge Bannister 
with reckless homicide.  In exchange, Bannister agreed to not 
object to evidence that an autopsy was done upon Michael Wolk 
and that morphine was found in his body at the time of his 
death. 
¶14 After the selection of the jury, the court held a 
Miranda-Goodchild hearing.3  Detective Carchesi testified about 
the 
information 
he 
provided 
Bannister 
regarding 
his 
constitutional rights and Bannister's reaction.  The circuit 
court concluded that Miranda4 was complied with and Bannister's 
statement was given voluntarily.  The circuit court denied 
Bannister's motion to suppress his statement given to Detective 
Carchesi.  
                                                 
3 State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 
N.W.2d 753 (1965). 
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
No. 
2005AP767-CR   
 
6 
 
¶15 During the State's opening statement, it summarized 
the evidence that would be presented at trial.  The summary 
included reference to testimony from Steven Wolk.  The State 
stated the following related to Steven Wolk's testimony: 
I'm 
asking, for instance, if Steven should 
testify, you listen to him and you weigh his evidence 
and you weigh his credibility.  It'll be out there for 
you.  You may find he's a distasteful individual.  
He's a drug user.  His brother was a drug user.  Drugs 
killed his brother.  You'll hear—it'll be clear that 
Steven Wolk isn't the nicest person in the world but 
he's a witness to what happened. 
     He'll tell you that over a span of time, that he 
and his brother, together with Steven, would obtain 
morphine from the defendant, Edward Bannister.  It 
went on for about a year.  They would go to Edward 
Bannister's home and obtain it.  Sometimes, Edward 
Bannister would give it to him, according to Steven.  
I don't know if that's true—but one thing, you have to 
weigh everything—would give it to him free of charge.  
Sometimes, he'd give him good faith money.  That on or 
about the 14th or 15th of January, he can't remember 
the exact day, sometime in late morning or early 
afternoon, Steven Wolk, Michael Wolk went to the 
defendant's home and the defendant gave them two 
tablets of morphine, that they in turn gave the 
defendant $20.00 in exchange for that, and that Steven 
took one pill and Michael took another one of the 
pills so that they could use it at a later date or 
later time. 
Steven Wolk never testified during the trial.  He asserted his 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
¶16 The State called four other witnesses during the 
trial.  Officer Scott testified regarding the scene at Michael 
Wolk's apartment when he responded to Mrs. Wolk's 911 call.  
Susan 
Gock, 
Technical 
Director 
of 
the 
Milwaukee 
County 
Toxicology Lab, testified about the findings of the Medical 
No. 
2005AP767-CR   
 
7 
 
Examiner's Office.  Detective Carchesi testified regarding the 
investigation into Michael's death and the statement made by 
Bannister when he interviewed him.  Finally, Dr. Jentzen 
testified about the autopsy conducted on Michael.  Dr. Jentzen 
testified that Michael died of morphine toxicity.   
¶17 Bannister 
rested 
his 
case 
without 
calling 
any 
witnesses.  The jury returned a verdict of guilty.  The circuit 
court entered a judgment of conviction consistent with the 
jury's verdict. 
¶18 Bannister appealed to the court of appeals.  He 
contended that the State's failure to corroborate his confession 
with a significant fact meant that insufficient evidence was 
presented to convict him.  He also argued that he was entitled 
to a discretionary reversal pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.35.5     
¶19 On 
the 
issue 
related 
to 
the 
corroboration 
of 
Bannister's confession, the court of appeals reversed the 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 752.35 provides the following: 
Discretionary reversal. In an appeal to the court 
of appeals, if it appears from the record that the 
real controversy has not been fully tried, or that it 
is 
probable 
that 
justice 
has 
for 
any 
reason 
miscarried, the court may reverse the judgment or 
order appealed from, regardless of whether the proper 
motion or objection appears in the record and may 
direct the entry of the proper judgment or remit the 
case to the trial court for entry of the proper 
judgment or for a new trial, and direct the making of 
such amendments in the pleadings and the adoption of 
such procedure in that court, not inconsistent with 
statutes or rules, as are necessary to accomplish the 
ends of justice.  
No. 
2005AP767-CR   
 
8 
 
judgment the circuit judge entered.  The court of appeals 
concluded that the presence of morphine in Michael's body did 
not 
constitute 
a 
corroboration 
of 
a 
significant 
fact.  
Bannister, 294 Wis. 2d 359, ¶8.  Noting that no case law 
specifically defined "significant fact," the court of appeals 
relied on the dictionary definition of "significant."  Id., ¶9.  
"Significant" means "having or likely to have influence or 
effect: important."  Id. (quoting Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary 1096 (1991)).  Based on the evidence presented at 
trial, the court of appeals concluded that the finding of 
morphine in Michael's body was "not sufficient to corroborate 
Bannister's confession claiming to have given morphine pills on 
prior uncertain dates to the deceased."  Id., ¶11.     
¶20 Pursuant to Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 
N.W. 663 (1938), which established that only dispositive issues 
need to be addressed on appeal, the court of appeals did not 
address 
Bannister's 
argument 
that 
he 
was 
entitled 
to 
a 
discretionary reversal. 
¶21 The State petitioned this court for review of the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
II 
¶22 We first address whether the State satisfied the 
corroboration rule during the course of Bannister's trial.  The 
corroboration rule is a common-law standard.  State v. Hauk, 
2002 
WI 
App 
226, 
¶20, 
257 
Wis. 2d 579, 
652 
N.W.2d 393.  
Determining if the facts fulfill a common-law standard presents 
a question of law.  Peplinski v. Fobe's Roofing, Inc., 193 
No. 
2005AP767-CR   
 
9 
 
Wis. 2d 6, 18, 531 N.W.2d 597 (1995).  We view the facts in 
evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict.  See 
State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 752 
(1990). 
¶23 The corroboration rule ensures that a conviction does 
not stand when there is an absence of any evidence independent 
of the defendant's confession that the crime in fact occurred.  
Holt v. State, 17 Wis. 2d 468, 480, 117 N.W.2d 626 (1962).  The 
corroboration rule functions as a "restriction on the power of 
the jury to convict."  Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 
(1954).  A conviction will not stand on the basis of a 
defendant's 
confession 
alone. 
 
State 
v. 
Verhasselt, 
83 
Wis. 2d 647, 661, 266 N.W.2d 342 (1978). 
¶24 The development of the corroboration rule commenced in 
1660s England.  Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back 
in: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First 
Century, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 479, 502 (2006) (discussing the roots 
of the corroboration rule).  Perry's Case, 14 Howell St. Tr. 
1312 (1660), presented a case where three people were executed 
for a suspected murder.  The convictions were based upon the 
discovery of a missing person's bloody hat and the confession of 
one of the defendants.  The confessor implicated his brother and 
mother.  Years after the defendants' executions, the missing man 
reappeared.  He was alive.  The corroboration rule addressed 
such cases by requiring evidence that the crime actually 
occurred, independent of a defendant's confession. 
No. 
2005AP767-CR   
 
10 
 
¶25 Wisconsin has been applying the corroboration rule for 
over 135 years.  See Griswold v. State, 24 Wis. 144 (1869).  
Throughout that time, the State has had to present some evidence 
that the crime charged actually occurred, independent of the 
defendant's confession.  In Griswold, the court discussed the 
threshold for satisfying the corroboration rule in terms of the 
State presenting evidence that corroborated the confession "in 
some particulars."  Id. at 147. 
¶26 The present phrasing of the corroboration rule test 
requires that the State corroborate "any significant fact."  In 
explaining the test, the court stated the following:  
All the elements of the crime do not have to be 
proved 
independently 
of 
an 
accused's 
confession; 
however, there must be some corroboration of the 
confession in order to support a conviction.  Such 
corroboration is required in order to produce a 
confidence in the truth of the confession.  The 
corroboration, however, can be far less than is 
necessary to establish the crime independently of the 
confession. 
 
If 
there 
is 
corroboration 
of 
any 
significant 
fact, 
that 
is 
sufficient 
under 
the 
Wisconsin test.   
Holt, 
17 
Wis. 2d at 480.  A significant fact has been 
corroborated when there is confidence in that the fact that the 
crime the defendant has confessed to indeed occurred. 
¶27 Prior cases applying the corroboration rule test have 
established the contours of a significant fact, even though the 
court has not explicitly defined the term "significant fact."  
For 
instance, 
a 
significant 
fact 
need 
not 
independently 
establish the specific elements of a crime.  Id.  In Holt, the 
defendant was charged with murder in the first degree.  She 
No. 
2005AP767-CR   
 
11 
 
contended that the State had failed to present sufficient 
evidence to corroborate her confession because it failed to 
prove that her baby was alive when it was placed in the furnace.  
The court concluded that the corroboration rule did not require 
that the evidence corroborate any particular aspect of her 
confession, such as her statement that the baby was alive when 
she placed it in the furnace.  "If there is corroboration of any 
significant fact, that is sufficient under the Wisconsin test."  
Id. (emphasis added).   
¶28 Jackson v. State, 29 Wis. 2d 225, 138 N.W.2d 260 
(1965), also illustrates that the significant fact need not 
independently establish a specific element of a crime.  In 
Jackson, the defendant was convicted for using heroin.  During 
her arrest, she had admitted that she used heroin.  The court 
noted that "needle marks, together with the laboratory report 
that traces of opium alkaloid were found on some of the seized 
paraphernalia, did supply sufficient corroborating evidence to 
sustain the conviction."  Id. at 231-32.  The needle marks and 
laboratory report alone would not establish that the defendant 
actually used heroin.  Nevertheless, that evidence sufficiently 
corroborated her confession. 
¶29 There may be many significant facts in a record, but 
any one of them satisfies the corroboration rule.  Holt, 17 
Wis. 2d at 480.  The Holt statement of the corroboration rule 
test itself states that the corroboration of "any significant 
fact" is sufficient.  The application of the test also supports 
that proposition.  In Triplett v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 365, 372, 
No. 
2005AP767-CR   
 
12 
 
222 N.W.2d 689 (1974), the court noted one significant fact that 
was itself sufficient, before it provided a list of other 
significant facts.  Although the record in some cases have 
presented multiple significant facts, see also, Verhasselt, 83 
Wis. 2d at 662, the test requires only one significant fact to 
be corroborated for it to be satisfied. 
¶30 It is also unnecessary that the significant fact be 
particular enough to independently link the defendant to the 
crime.  State v. DeHart, 242 Wis. 562, 566, 8 N.W.2d 360 (1943).  
In DeHart, the defendant confessed to being a party to a murder 
and robbery.  Specifically, he told authorities that he was not 
inside when the shooting occurred, but he stayed outside to keep 
watch.  The court stated that "evidence as to the location and 
condition of the body, and expert testimony that the condition 
of the bones was consistent with buckshot wounds inflicted at 
close range, sufficiently corroborated the confession."  Id.  
None of the corroborating evidence specifically related to 
DeHart's role in the crime.  Rather, the corroborating evidence 
permits confidence in that the fact that the crime DeHart 
confessed to indeed occurred.   
¶31 A significant fact is one that gives confidence that 
the crime the defendant confessed to actually occur.  A 
significant fact need not either independently establish the 
specific elements of the crime or independently link the 
defendant to the crime.  Rather, the State must present at least 
one significant fact that gives confidence that the crime the 
defendant has been convicted of actually did occur.  
No. 
2005AP767-CR   
 
13 
 
¶32 When a court addresses a defendant's claim that his or 
her confession was insufficiently corroborated, it examines the 
sufficiency of evidence presented at trial.  Schultz v. State, 
82 Wis. 2d 737, 753, 264 N.W.2d 245 (1978)(stating that "[o]ther 
evidence adduced at trial corroborated the defendant's version 
of the events"); Barth v. State, 26 Wis. 2d 466, 468, 132 
N.W.2d 578 (1965)(stating that "[w]e have carefully scrutinized 
the 
testimony 
in 
this 
case 
and 
particularly 
the 
portion . . . relied upon by the state"); DeHart, 242 Wis. at 
566 (stating that "evidence as to the location and condition of 
the body, and expert testimony that the condition of the bones 
was consistent with buckshot wounds inflicted at close range, 
sufficiently corroborated the confession"); Griswold, 24 Wis. at 
147 (stating that "[a]side from his confessions given in 
evidence against the plaintiff in error, there was other 
testimony, which was direct, going to establish his guilt").  
Because courts consider the corroboration rule after a jury 
verdict, the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the 
verdict.  See State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 
N.W.2d 752 (1990).   
¶33 The State contends that the court should classify the 
corroboration rule as a rule of admissibility, rather than as 
one of evidentiary sufficiency.  Given that the corroboration 
rule functions to ensure a jury has not convicted a defendant on 
his or her confession alone, the continued treatment of it as a 
rule of evidentiary sufficiency is warranted. 
No. 
2005AP767-CR   
 
14 
 
¶34 In this case, the evidence of morphine being present 
in Michael Wolk's body at the time of his death constitutes a 
significant fact.  The presence of morphine is evidence of the 
fact that Michael used morphine.  That fact corroborates 
Bannister's confession that he delivered morphine between 
December 2002 and mid-January 2003 to the Wolks because it gives 
confidence that he in fact gave the Wolks morphine. 
¶35 Michael's death does not make the fact significant for 
the purpose of corroboration.  Rather, the circumstances of the 
case, with Michael dying in his apartment, preserved the fact 
that he used morphine.  Had Michael lived, like his brother 
Steven, and the morphine had gone through his system, the means 
of corroboration would not have been available.  It is the fact 
that circumstances permitted the morphine to be documented as 
being in Michael's body, rather than his death itself, that 
makes the presence of the morphine a significant fact that 
corroborates Bannister's confession. 
¶36 Bannister contends that a significant fact must be a 
more meaningful and particularized fact.  In supporting his 
contention, Bannister points out that both his own confession 
and the State's corroborative evidence lacks detail.  He 
proffers that had details of the delivery of the morphine been 
part of the confession or corroborative evidence, his conviction 
might have been sustainable.   
¶37 Adopting such a definition of significant fact would 
deviate 
from 
Wisconsin's 
well-established 
test 
for 
corroboration.  Rather than permitting "any significant fact," 
No. 
2005AP767-CR   
 
15 
 
or "some particulars," Bannister's proposed definition would 
require that the right or proper fact within the confession be 
corroborated.  Requiring that specific aspects of the confession 
be corroborated, would require this court to abandon its test 
and adopt the one adopted in other jurisdictions.  This court 
has repeatedly rejected the approaches of other jurisdictions 
when it comes to the corroboration rule.  See Schultz, 82 
Wis. 2d at 752-53. 
¶38 The State presented evidence that Michael Wolk used 
morphine.  That fact was significant because it gave confidence 
that Bannister delivered morphine to the Wolks.  Accordingly, 
the State satisfied the corroboration rule.     
III 
¶39 Having 
concluded 
that 
the 
State 
satisfied 
the 
corroboration rule, we now address whether Bannister should be 
granted a new trial in the interest of justice.   
¶40 This court has both inherent and statutory power to 
review waived errors.  Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 11-12, 
456 N.W.2d 797 (1990).  Wisconsin Stat. § 751.06 provides the 
following: 
Discretionary reversal. In an appeal in the 
supreme court, if it appears from the record that the 
real controversy has not been fully tried, or that it 
is 
probable 
that 
justice 
has 
for 
any 
reason 
miscarried, the court may reverse the judgment or 
order appealed from, regardless of whether the proper 
motion or objection appears in the record, and may 
direct the entry of the proper judgment or remit the 
case to the trial court for the entry of the proper 
judgment or for a new trial, and direct the making of 
such amendments in the pleadings and the adoption of 
No. 
2005AP767-CR   
 
16 
 
such procedure in that court, not inconsistent with 
statutes or rules, as are necessary to accomplish the 
ends of justice. 
Pursuant to § 751.06, the court may exercise its discretion when 
either the real controversy has not been tried or it is probable 
that there has been a miscarriage of justice.  In this case, 
Bannister contends that the real controversy was not tried 
because of the presentation of evidence related to Michael 
Wolk's death and the prejudicial statements made by the State.  
¶41 The court has exercised its power to reverse when the 
real controversy has not been fully tried in many different 
situations.  Vollmer, 156 Wis. 2d at 19.  The court has 
exercised the power when important evidence was kept from the 
jury.  State v. Cuyler, 110 Wis. 2d 133, 142-43, 327 N.W.2d 662 
(1983).  It has also exercised the power when evidence presented 
to the jury should have been excluded.  State v. Penigar, 139 
Wis. 2d 569, 578, 408 N.W.2d 28 (1987).  The court has also 
exercised its power when it concluded there was an error in a 
jury instruction, Air Wisconsin, Inc. v. North Cent. Airlines, 
Inc., 98 Wis. 2d 301, 318, 296 N.W.2d 749 (1980), and an error 
in a verdict question, Clark v. Leisure Vehicles, Inc., 96 
Wis. 2d 607, 616, 292 N.W.2d 630 (1980).    An insufficient 
record, Bostonian Homes, Inc. v. Struck, 44 Wis. 2d 553, 559-60, 
171 N.W.2d 320 (1969), and an incomplete record, Walter v. Four 
Wheel Drive Auto Co., 213 Wis. 559, 572, 252 N.W. 346 (1934), 
also caused the court to conclude that the real controversy had 
not been tried.  The court has a broad discretion to reverse 
No. 
2005AP767-CR   
 
17 
 
judgments, which "enables it to achieve justice in individual 
cases."  Vollmer, 156 Wis. 2d at 21.    
¶42 Although 
the 
court 
has 
exercised 
its 
power 
of 
discretionary reversal in numerous different situations, it does 
so only in exceptional cases.  Id.  The long-established general 
rule is that an appellate court does not review an error unless 
it has been properly preserved.  Cappon v. O'Day, 165 Wis. 486, 
490, 162 N.W. 655 (1917).  We have recognized some of the many 
reasons for the general rule.  Vollmer, 156 Wis. 2d at 10-11.  
It gives attorneys an incentive to diligently try the case at 
trial because of the threat of waiver.  It emphasizes the need 
for objections, which brings an issue to the judge's attention 
and allows him or her to correct errors.  When trial judges take 
the opportunity to correct an error, the general rule functions 
to reduce the need for appeals.  The general rule also preserves 
for the court of appeals the role of corrector of errors 
actually made by trial courts, rather than addressing issues not 
even raised in the trial court. 
¶43 Bannister's case does not present an exceptional 
circumstance.  A jury returned a verdict of guilt after the real 
controversy had been tried.  The State's mention of Steven 
Wolk's testimony and evidence related to Michael Wolk did not 
cloud the real controversy to the extent that the interest of 
justice warrants a new trial.   
¶44 Bannister contends the real controversy (i.e., whether 
Bannister delivered morphine to the Wolks) was not fully tried.  
Specifically, he contends that the following items prevented the 
No. 
2005AP767-CR   
 
18 
 
jury from deciding the real controversy:  the State's reference 
to Steven Wolk's anticipated testimony during its opening 
statement, its presentation of evidence related to Michael's 
death, and its characterization of Bannister's initial failure 
to appear at the Cudahy Police Department to be interviewed.     
¶45 The State did discuss the anticipated testimony of 
Steven Wolk during its opening statement.  It stated the 
following:  
I'm 
asking, for instance, if Steven should 
testify, you listen to him and you weigh his evidence 
and you weigh his credibility.  It'll be out there for 
you.  You may find he's a distasteful individual.  
He's a drug user.  His brother was a drug user.  Drugs 
killed his brother.  You'll hear—it'll be clear that 
Steven Wolk isn't the nicest person in the world but 
he's a witness to what happened. 
     He'll tell you that over a span of time, that he 
and his brother, together with Steven, would obtain 
morphine from the defendant, Edward Bannister.  It 
went on for about a year.  They would go to Edward 
Bannister's home and obtain it.  Sometimes, Edward 
Bannister would give it to him, according to Steven.  
I don't know if that's true—but one thing, you have to 
weigh everything—would give it to him free of charge.  
Sometimes, he'd give him good faith money.  That on 
the 14th or 15th of January, he can't remember the 
exact 
day, 
sometime 
in 
late 
morning 
or 
early 
afternoon, Steven Wolk, Michael Wolk went to the 
defendant's home and the defendant gave them two 
tablets of morphine, that they in turn gave the 
defendant $20.00 in exchange for that, and that Steven 
took one pill and Michael took another one of the 
pills so that they could use it at a later date or 
later time. 
Bannister stresses the State's prefacing of its summary of 
Steven's anticipated testimony with "if Steven should testify" 
manifests its suspicion that Steven would not be testifying.  
No. 
2005AP767-CR   
 
19 
 
With such a suspicion, the argument goes, the State should not 
have summarized Steven’s anticipated testimony.  Bannister 
contends that this aspect of the State's opening statement is 
even more troubling because the circuit court denied his motion 
to point out to the jury the fact that Steven did not testify.  
¶46 The State's discussion about Steven Wolk's testimony 
did not prevent the real controversy from being tried.  The jury 
received an instruction that the statements of the attorneys 
were not evidence.  The limiting instruction means that the jury 
did not consider the State's statement about Steven Wolk's 
potential testimony.  Finding that the State's reference to 
Steven's testimony clouded the real controversy would imply that 
the limiting instruction that the trial court provided the jury 
had no effect.  That is not an implication consistent with how 
limiting instructions generally are treated.  See State v. 
Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d 244, 257, 426 N.W.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1988). 
¶47 The jury also repeatedly heard references to the death 
of Michael Wolk.  This included testimony by all of the State's 
witnesses that mentioned Michael's death in one way or another.  
In addition to the evidence presented to the jury, the State 
mentioned in its opening statement that Mrs. Wolk found her 
husband Michael dead from an overdose. 
¶48 The statements related to Michael Wolk's death did not 
cause the true controversy to not be tried.  The relevancy of 
the testimony that mentioned Michael's death was that it related 
to his use of morphine.  The Medical Examiner's Office found it 
was in Michael’s blood.  It also found morphine on the syringes 
No. 
2005AP767-CR   
 
20 
 
and kitchen spoon.  The occurrence of Michael's overdose 
captured evidence that he had used morphine.  Evidence of 
Michael's morphine use, which was established with the testimony 
about the findings of the Medical Examiner's Office, related to 
the State's theory that Bannister delivered morphine to the 
Wolks.  Bannister himself even entered into an agreement that 
permitted the admission of the evidence. 
¶49 The 
jury 
also 
heard 
testimony 
regarding 
the 
circumstances surrounding Detective Carchesi ordering Bannister 
to appear at the police department for an interview.  Bannister 
contends that the State mischaracterized his failure to appear 
at the police department.  Specifically, Bannister argues the 
State did the following inappropriate redirect examination of 
Detective Carchesi: 
Q: 
On 
February 
17, 
2003, 
you 
talked 
to 
the 
defendant, correct? 
A: 
Yes sir. 
Q: 
And you told him to come into the Cudahy Police 
Department on February 18, 2003? 
A: 
Yes sir. 
Q: 
And he never did come in, did he? 
A: 
No, he did not. 
Bannister argues that the only purpose for the redirect 
examination was to emphasize to the jury Bannister's failure to 
appear.    
¶50 The testimony regarding Bannister's failure to appear 
at the Cudahy Police Department did not keep the jury from 
No. 
2005AP767-CR   
 
21 
 
deciding the real controversy.  The matter does not rise to the 
level that we need to exercise our power of discretionary 
reversal. 
¶51 The State's reference to Steven Wolk's anticipated 
testimony, presentation of evidence related to Michael Wolk's 
death, and characterization of Bannister's failure to appear did 
not prevent the real controversy to be tried.  Accordingly, we 
decline to exercise our power to grant Bannister a new trial.   
IV 
¶52 This case presented two issues.   First, did the State 
satisfy the corroboration rule during the course of Bannister's 
trial?  We hold that the State satisfied the corroboration rule 
by corroborating Bannister's confession with the presence of 
morphine in Michael Wolk's body at the time of his death, which 
constitutes a significant fact.  Second, should the court grant 
Bannister a new trial in the interest of justice pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 751.06?  We hold that the real controversy in this 
case was tried and do not grant Bannister a new trial.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and we affirm the conviction.  
 
 
No.  2005AP767-CR.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
¶53 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
concludes that Edward Bannister should not be granted a new 
trial in the interest of justice upon his conviction for 
delivery of a controlled substance, morphine, where jurors heard 
evidence concerning Michael Wolk's death by morphine overdose, 
and where the prosecutor threatened to charge Bannister with 
reckless homicide in the death of Michael Wolk in order to 
secure Bannister's agreement not to object at trial to the 
admission of evidence relating to Michael Wolk's death.  Because 
the evidence of Michael Wolk's death was highly prejudicial in 
nature, and the means by which the prosecutor secured admission 
of this evidence were questionable at best, I conclude that 
Bannister should be granted a new trial in the interest of 
justice.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶54 On the morning of Bannister's jury trial, off-the-
record discussions between the parties and the court left the 
prosecutor with the impression that the court believed that 
evidence about the death of Michael Wolk would be unduly 
prejudicial on a delivery of controlled substance charge.  The 
prosecutor argued that he needed the evidence of Michael Wolk's 
death to corroborate Bannister's confession and prove the 
delivery charge.  The prosecution notified the court that it 
would be prepared to file an amended information charging 
Bannister 
with 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
unless 
Bannister agreed not to object to evidence of Michael Wolk's 
No.  2005AP767-CR.lbb 
 
2 
 
death during the trial on the delivery charge.  Bannister chose 
not to object to that evidence, and the charge was not amended. 
¶55 The prosecution referred to Michael Wolk's death 
during its opening statement.  "Drugs killed [Steven Wolk's] 
brother."  The State called four witnesses, each of whom 
testified to various aspects of Michael Wolk's death, including 
the autopsy results and cause of death.  Other than Bannister's 
confession, no testimony regarding any delivery was offered into 
evidence. 
¶56 Evidence of the morphine found in Michael Wolk's blood 
may 
have 
been 
relevant 
to 
establishing 
corroboration 
of 
Bannister's confession in order to prove the delivery charge.  
Majority op., ¶34.  Evidence of Michael Wolk's death, on the 
other hand, was irrelevant to the delivery charge, and was 
highly prejudicial.  Majority op., ¶35 ("Michael's death does 
not 
make 
the 
fact 
significant 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
corroboration.").  It should have been excluded pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.02 ("Evidence which is not relevant is 
not admissible."). 
¶57 The 
majority 
suggests 
that 
testimony 
regarding 
Michael's death was relevant because it related to his use of 
morphine, and that Michael's morphine use was relevant to the 
delivery charge.  Majority op., ¶48.  I do not dispute that 
Michael's morphine use may have been relevant in this case.  
Michael's death, however, was not.  Moreover, that evidence was 
entirely unnecessary and highly prejudicial.  As Judge Fine 
noted in his concurrence, "the solution was to ask for an 
No.  2005AP767-CR.lbb 
 
3 
 
agreement that Michael Wolk possessed morphine in mid-January 
2003 without telling the jury that he died as a result."  State 
v. Bannister, 2006 WI App 136, ¶16, 294 Wis. 2d 359, 720 
N.W.2d 498, (Fine, J., concurring). 
¶58 I recognize that this is a dissenting opinion.  Thus, 
while I strongly disagree that the evidence relating to 
Michael's death was relevant, for purposes of this discussion, I 
will assume its relevancy.  Nevertheless, we still have a big 
problem.  Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. 
 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
904.03. 
 
"Evidence 
is 
prejudicial if it has a tendency to influence the outcome by 
improper means or if it appeals to the jury's sympathies, 
arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish or 
otherwise causes a jury to base its decision on something other 
than the established propositions in the case."  State v. 
Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d 646, 667, 575 N.W.2d 475 (1998) (citations 
omitted).  Judge Fine correctly observes that "[w]aving the 
'bloody shirt' of Wolk's overdose death invited——in the most 
blatant way——the jury to consider the evidence as proving that, 
beyond the delivery-charge, Bannister was also guilty of 
homicide." 
 
Bannister, 
294 
Wis. 2d 359, 
¶16 
(Fine, 
J., 
concurring).  The state's case clearly appealed to the jury's 
sympathies, aroused its sense of horror, provoked its instincts 
to punish, and caused the jury to base its decision on the fact 
that Michael Wolk is dead. 
No.  2005AP767-CR.lbb 
 
4 
 
¶59 If 
it 
appears 
from 
the 
record 
that 
the 
real 
controversy has not been fully tried, we may reverse the 
judgment and order a new trial, as necessary to accomplish the 
ends 
of 
justice. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 751.06. 
 
When 
the 
real 
controversy has not been tried, we may use our power of 
discretionary reversal without first finding a probability of a 
different result on retrial.  Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 
19, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990).  We have used this power to reverse 
judgments, after concluding that the real controversy was not 
tried, because the jury had before it evidence which should have 
been excluded.  Id. at 20 (citing Logan v. State, 43 
Wis. 2d 128, 137, 168 N.W.2d 171 (1969); State v. Penigar, 139 
Wis. 2d 569, 578, 408 N.W.2d 28 (1987)).  That is precisely the 
situation we are presented with here. 
¶60 Before the trial, the prosecutor told Bannister's 
attorney that the State did not believe it had sufficient 
evidence to prove a reckless homicide charge.  Yet, the 
prosecutor was prepared to file an amended charge for first-
degree reckless homicide unless Bannister agreed to withdraw his 
objection to allowing evidence concerning Michael Wolk's death 
during the trial on the delivery of controlled substance charge.  
Judge Fine got it right when he opined: 
 
If the prosecutor believed he could prove that 
Bannister had given Michael Wolk the morphine that 
caused Michael Wolk's death, he should have stayed 
with the first-degree-reckless-homicide charge and let 
the jury decide Bannister's guilt or innocence on that 
charge.  If the prosecutor did not believe that he 
could prove that Bannister had given Michael Wolk the 
morphine that caused Michael Wolk's death, then his 
back-door use of the death-evidence was improper. 
No.  2005AP767-CR.lbb 
 
5 
 
Bannister, 294 Wis. 2d 359, ¶24 (Fine, J., concurring).  I 
wholeheartedly 
agree.  Evidence suggesting that Bannister 
provided Wolk with the drugs that killed him should not have 
been heard by the jury during a drug trial. 
¶61 In my view, Bannister has not received a fair trial.  
The real controversy, delivery of controlled substances, has not 
been fully tried.  Taking into account Bannister's confession 
that he had given Michel Wolk some morphine, the evidence 
regarding Michael Wolk's death clearly appealed to the jury's 
sympathies, aroused its sense of horror, provoked its instincts 
to punish, and caused the jury to base its decision on the fact 
that Michael Wolk is dead and the drugs Bannister gave Michael 
Wolk may have killed him.  Under these circumstances, I would 
invoke 
our 
power 
of 
discretionary 
reversal 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 751.06, and order a new trial. 
¶62 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.   
¶63 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissenting opinion. 
 
 
No.  2005AP767-CR.lbb 
 
 
 
1