Title: Conroy v. Regents Univ. of Cal.
Citation: 45 Cal. 4th 1244
Docket Number: S153002
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: April 6, 2009

Filed 4/6/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
EVELYN CONROY, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S153002 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/3 G035537 
THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY 
) 
OF CALIFORNIA, 
) 
 
) 
Orange County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 00CC01942 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
The Willed Body Program at the University of California at Irvine accepts 
human cadavers for scientific and anatomical studies.  A donation agreement is the 
document by which an individual wills his or her own body, or the body of a 
deceased loved one, to the Willed Body Program.  Prior to his death, plaintiff’s 
husband, James Conroy, executed a donation agreement with the Willed Body 
Program for the donation of his body.  Following his death on January 25, 1999, 
plaintiff Evelyn Conroy, his wife of more than 40 years, arranged for delivery of 
his body to the University of California at Irvine (UCI) in an unembalmed and 
unautopsied state, as specified in the donation agreement.   
Some months later, plaintiff read newspaper reports of irregularities in the 
UCI Willed Body Program.  These reports alleged that the program had failed to 
maintain adequate records of the human cadavers donated for teaching and 
research and that donated bodies could not be located.  Plaintiff contacted UCI to 
inquire about her husband’s body.  She was informed that there were no records of 
1 
what had happened to her husband’s body after it was brought to the UCI medical 
school and that the body’s whereabouts were unknown.  Plaintiff suffered 
emotional distress over these revelations and over UCI’s failure to notify her, as 
had been promised by Chris Brown, the director of the Willed Body Program at 
the time her husband executed the donation agreement, about a ceremony at sea to 
scatter her husband’s ashes. 
In 2000, plaintiff instituted this action against defendant Regents of the 
University of California (the Regents) and others.  The complaint alleged, inter 
alia, causes of action for negligence, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation.  The 
trial court granted the Regents’ motion for summary judgment on these claims, 
and the Court of Appeal affirmed.  We affirm.     
BACKGROUND 
On June 30, 1996, plaintiff Evelyn Conroy and her husband, James Conroy, 
each executed separate agreements to donate their bodies to the UCI Willed Body 
Program.  James Conroy’s agreement provided:  “I here state that it is my wish to 
donate my body to the Department of Anatomy and Neurobiology, College of 
Medicine, University of California, Irvine (UCI), immediately following my 
death, for teaching purposes, scientific research, or such purposes as the said 
University or its authorized representative shall in their sole discretion deem 
advisable.  My body, when delivered to UCI, will be unembalmed and in good 
condition.  It is further understood and agreed that final disposition of my body by 
UCI shall be in accordance with the State Code.”     
James Conroy died on January 25, 1999.  After plaintiff notified their 
children of his passing, someone called UCI to arrange for delivery of the body.  
Sometime in September 1999, plaintiff read an article in the Orange County 
Register describing misconduct at the UCI Willed Body Program and telephoned 
UCI to inquire about her husband’s body.  About a month later, Dr. Peter 
2 
Lawrence, the interim director of the Willed Body Program, returned her call.  Dr. 
Lawrence stated that Chris Brown, the prior director, had failed to keep proper 
records and that UCI did not know what happened to her husband’s body after it 
was picked up.  Dr. Lawrence subsequently sent a letter confirming that her 
husband’s body had been delivered to UCI but added that there was no further 
record of what happened to it.     
Plaintiff then instituted this action against various parties, including the 
Regents, which administer the 10-campus University of California system, and 
asserted claims for breach of implied contract, negligence, negligent 
misrepresentation, breach of special duty, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and fraud and intentional deceit.  In the complaint, plaintiff alleged that 
she, as the holder of the statutory right to control the disposition of her husband’s 
body, had entrusted her husband’s body to defendant under the Willed Body 
Program for purposes of teaching and research; that she was to receive her 
husband’s remains “upon completion of the educational and research purposes” 
for which the donation was made; that plaintiff discovered in the fall of 1999 that 
defendant was using cadavers donated under the Willed Body Program for 
unauthorized purposes, including private for-profit tutoring classes and the 
transport and dismembering of bodies for profit; that defendant had failed to 
maintain records to ensure that the cadavers were used only for authorized 
purposes and to enable return of the remains to the appropriate family members; 
and that her husband’s body “was misused in that the body was not used for 
medical research by the university.”  Plaintiff further alleged that she had suffered 
injuries to her health as well as emotional distress as a result of defendant’s 
misconduct and sought compensatory and punitive damages.     
The trial court sustained demurrers to the causes of action for breach of 
implied contract, breach of special duty, and intentional infliction of emotional 
3 
distress.  The Regents then moved for summary judgment on the remaining causes 
of action.  In opposing the motion, plaintiff submitted a declaration recounting a 
telephone conversation she had had with Chris Brown, who was then the director 
of the Willed Body Program, before her husband executed the agreement to donate 
his body.  Brown had told plaintiff that her husband’s body would be cremated 
and the ashes scattered at sea after UCI had completed its research, that the family 
would be notified “so that they could take an active part in the ceremony scattering 
the ashes at sea,” and that she and her husband’s physician would be advised of 
the medical findings pertaining to her husband’s body.  But after reading about 
misconduct at the Willed Body Program in an article published in the Orange 
County Register following the donation of her husband’s body, plaintiff contacted 
Dr. Lawrence, the program’s interim director, and learned that although her 
husband’s body had been brought to the medical school, its subsequent 
whereabouts were unknown.   
Plaintiff also submitted evidence that Brown had owned or colluded with 
several companies that profited from questionable dealings involving cadavers 
donated to the Willed Body Program.  For example, Brown and Jeffrey Frazier 
were partners in a company, Replica, Inc., which offered a gross anatomy class 
called “Medbound” to students interested in attending medical school.  The class 
was held on UCI premises without authorization from UCI, using cadavers from 
the Willed Body Program, and photographs of cadavers from the program were 
placed in Replica’s storefront window.  Plaintiff contended that these facts had put 
the Regents on notice of problems with the Willed Body Program prior to her 
husband’s death that should have been, but were not, corrected.     
In addition, plaintiff submitted evidence that Brown had arranged for the 
removal of seven cervical spines from cadavers, which he and Frazier then sold 
via another company, University Health Services, to a doctor conducting research 
4 
at an Arizona hospital in June 1999.  A subsequent audit of the Willed Body 
Program ordered by the dean of the UCI medical school revealed that there were 
no records concerning the final disposition of 320 of the 441 bodies donated 
between January 1, 1995, and August 11, 1999.     
The trial court granted the Regents’ motion for summary judgment.  The 
Court of Appeal affirmed in a published opinion.   
DISCUSSION 
“Because this case comes before us after the trial court granted a motion for 
summary judgment, we take the facts from the record that was before the trial 
court when it ruled on that motion.  [Citation.]  ‘ “We review the trial court’s 
decision de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and 
opposing papers except that to which objections were made and sustained.” ’ 
[Citation.]  We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing 
summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that 
party.”  (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037.) 
“A trial court properly grants summary judgment where no triable issue of 
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”  (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.)  The materiality of a 
disputed fact is measured by the pleadings (Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 
7 Cal.4th 1238, 1252; 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Proceedings 
Without Trial, § 212, p. 650), which “set the boundaries of the issues to be 
resolved at summary judgment.”  (Oakland Raiders v. National Football League 
(2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 621, 648; see generally Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping 
Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 673 [“pleadings serve as the outer measure of 
materiality in a summary judgment proceeding”].)  We find the Court of Appeal 
did not err.     
5 
A.  The Cause of Action for Negligence 
In order to establish liability on a negligence theory, a plaintiff must prove 
duty, breach, causation, and damages.  (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 
1200, 1205.)  The complaint alleges that the Regents owed a duty of reasonable 
care with respect to the hiring, retention, training, and supervision of their agents 
and employees and the proper and respectful performance of all steps associated 
with the Willed Body Program, including the handling of James Conroy’s body in 
an individual, proper, dignified, and lawful manner.  The complaint contends that 
the Regents breached this duty by conducting or allowing to be conducted private, 
for-profit tutoring classes using donated bodies; by conducting or allowing to be 
conducted the transport of donated bodies for profit and the sale of donated body 
parts for profit; and by failing to ensure that use of the donated bodies conformed 
to the purpose of the donation.  The complaint alleges also that the Regents 
committed a breach by failing to keep records pertaining to the identification of 
bodies requested to be returned to family members and by failing to return James 
Conroy’s remains to plaintiff.  According to the complaint, these breaches caused 
plaintiff emotional distress.     
Plaintiff’s claim is predicated on the assumption that use of cadavers in a 
private, for-profit tutoring class and the sale of body parts for profit is inconsistent 
with the terms of the donation agreement, which granted UCI the right to use the 
donated bodies “for teaching purposes, scientific research, or such purposes as the 
said University or its authorized representative shall in their sole discretion deem 
advisable.”  Amici curiae Depuy Mitek, Inc., and Johnson & Johnson urge us to 
find otherwise, pointing out that a donee “may, if he so desires, transfer his 
ownership to another person, whether the gift be of the whole body or merely a 
part” (8A West’s U. Laws Annot. (2003) Anatomical Gift Act (1968) § 7, com., 
pp. 146-147), and arguing that the sale of donated body parts is prohibited only in 
6 
specified situations not present here.  (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 7051, 7158.3; 
Health & Saf. Code, former § 7155, subd. (a).)1  We need not decide the precise 
contours of UCI’s right to dispose of James Conroy’s body, though, because the 
summary judgment record does not support the claim that the Regents mishandled 
James Conroy’s body in the manner alleged in the complaint.   
Plaintiff attempted to establish a pattern or practice of mishandling bodies 
donated to the Willed Body Program, citing the use of cadavers in the private 
Medbound class, Replica, Inc.’s window display of photographs of cadavers as 
advertisements for the Medbound class, the harvesting of seven cervical spines for 
an Arizona hospital in 1999, and a 1998 lawsuit alleging that the Willed Body 
Program had failed to comply with a provision in the donation agreement at issue 
there to return the cremated remains of loved ones when their bodies were no 
longer needed.  However, there is no evidence in the record that James Conroy’s 
body in particular was used in a private tutoring class, transported or dismembered 
for profit, or used in a manner other than what plaintiff contends was authorized 
by the donation agreement.  This is fatal to plaintiff’s claim.  As we have 
previously explained, “reports of a general pattern of misconduct are not 
sufficient, in and of themselves, to establish that defendants’ misconduct included 
mishandling of the remains of each plaintiff’s decedent. . . .  [A]n allegation that a 
plaintiff suffered emotional distress on learning of that pattern of misconduct does 
not allege injury caused by a breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff[].”  
(Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 901 (Christensen).)  “A 
                                              
1  
In 2007, after the relevant events in this case, the Legislature repealed the 
1987 version of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (Health & Saf. Code, former 
§§ 7150-7156.5; see Stats. 1988, ch. 1095, § 1, p. 3539) and reenacted a revised 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 7150-7151.40; see Stats. 
2007, ch. 629, § 2).  Citations are to the former act, unless otherwise noted.      
7 
generalized concern that the remains of a relative may have been involved, arising 
out of a media report of a pattern of misconduct, is insufficient to satisfy the 
requirement that there be a direct connection between a defendant’s conduct and 
the injury suffered by the plaintiff.  It does not supply a necessary element—that 
the injury, here emotional distress, be caused by a breach of the defendant’s duty 
to the particular plaintiff.”  (Id. at p. 902.)  Our case law instead requires “a well-
founded substantial certainty that his or her decedent’s remains were among those 
reportedly mistreated.”  (Ibid.; see also Bennett v. Regents of University of 
California (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 347, 359.)  No such evidence appears here.   
Plaintiff contends that causation clearly exists here nonetheless, and relies 
on a passage in Christensen where we said that factors such as the source of a 
plaintiff’s knowledge of misconduct, when that conduct cannot readily be 
observed, and the time at which such knowledge was acquired “go to the 
reasonableness of a plaintiff’s claim to have suffered severe emotional distress and 
thus present issues for the trier of fact.”  (Christensen, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 902.)  
But the quoted excerpt from Christensen was premised on the inclusion of an 
allegation in the complaint there that the plaintiffs had “learned from the media 
reports that the remains of ‘their’ decedents had been improperly treated,” which 
was sufficient to resist a demurrer.  (Id. at p. 901, italics added.)  In light of that 
allegation, we did not question in Christensen “[t]he ability of each plaintiff to 
prove either that at the time the plaintiff learned of the misconduct he or she knew 
or had substantial reason to believe that the decedent was a victim of defendant’s 
misconduct, or that the alleged continuing emotional distress each plaintiff suffers 
is based on knowledge that the decedent’s remains have been mishandled.”  (Ibid., 
italics added, fn. omitted.)  Here, by contrast, we are reviewing a grant of 
summary judgment, and the record contains no evidence to support “a well-
8 
founded substantial certainty” that James Conroy’s remains were among those 
reportedly mishandled.  (Id. at p. 902.) 
Indeed, as the Court of Appeal pointed out, the record refutes plaintiff’s 
claim of mistreatment.  “Because James Conroy did not pass away until January 
1999, his body could not have been involved in the 1998 Medbound class, nor 
could it have been one of the bodies in the photographs taken down from Replica’s 
storefront in July 1998.  Similarly, the unspecified misconduct alleged in the June 
1998 lawsuit necessarily predated its filing and therefore could not have involved 
James Conroy’s body.  [Plaintiff’s] only specific allegation of mistreatment 
occurring when UCI had possession of her husband’s body was the claim that in 
June 1999 Brown harvested seven spines from [Willed Body Program] cadavers 
for a doctor in Arizona.  Nonetheless, she did not dispute the Regents’ evidence 
that the spines were ‘fresh tissue specimens from bodies that would have entered 
the [Willed Body Program] within a few weeks of the Arizona trip,’ and hence 
none of the spines could have been from her husband because he died months 
earlier in January.”     
Plaintiff relies also on Saari v. Jongordon Corp. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 797, 
which she claims is “directly on point.”  Plaintiff has misread Saari.  In that case, 
the plaintiffs had arranged for the defendant corporation to cremate the decedent’s 
body and return the ashes without performing any religious service.  In violation 
of the terms of the contract, the defendant scattered the decedent’s ashes at sea, 
performed a Christian religious service on his remains, and failed to release the 
ashes to the decedent’s longtime companion.  Then, in violation of a subsequent 
agreement with the decedent’s longtime companion, the president of the defendant 
corporation, Richard Jongordon, contacted the decedent’s mother and sister and 
informed them that the decedent’s ashes had been scattered at sea following a 
religious service.  (Saari, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 801.)  The decedent’s mother 
9 
testified that she suffered emotional distress because of the defendant’s 
mishandling of her son’s remains and because of her distrust of what Jongordon 
himself had said “about the actual disposition of her son’s ashes,” and that, among 
other emotional distress damages, she lay awake at night “wondering what had 
happened to her son’s remains.”  (Id. at p. 806.)  Relying on Christensen’s 
requirement that a plaintiff establish a well-founded substantial certainty of 
mistreatment, the defendant corporation argued that the mother’s uncertainty—i.e., 
her distrust of Jongordon’s account of what had happened to her son’s body and 
her corresponding uncertainty as to the actual disposition of her son’s remains—
could not form the basis for recovery of damages for emotional distress.  (Saari, 
supra, at p. 806.)  The Saari court disagreed:  “This speaks to a different matter 
than that raised in our case.  The issue in Christensen was whether persons who 
were uncertain if their decedent’s remains were actually mishandled could recover 
for emotional distress arising from this uncertainty.  Saari’s claim is not that she 
does not know if Robert’s remains were mishandled, but that she is not certain 
what actual disposition was made of his ashes.  As Saari’s uncertainty does not 
raise any doubt about whether there was a breach of duty, Christensen does not 
preclude this basis of recovery for emotional distress.”  (Saari, supra, at p. 806.)  
The present case is unlike Saari in that plaintiff has not presented evidence that the 
Regents actually mishandled her husband’s remains.  Consequently, Saari is 
inapplicable.   
Plaintiff would appear at first glance to be on firmer ground as to the 
allegation in her complaint that the Regents failed in their duty to return her 
husband’s ashes to her, in that the record does indisputably show that his remains 
were not returned.  However, the donation agreement did not specify that the 
remains were to be returned to plaintiff; rather, the agreement provided simply that 
UCI had a duty to dispose of the body “in accordance with the State Code.”  Other 
10 
parts of the record confirm that plaintiff did not request or expect that the remains 
would be returned to her.  Indeed, plaintiff’s declaration in opposition to the 
motion for summary judgment admits that she expected instead to be notified of 
the scattering of ashes at sea so that she could participate in some way in the 
service.  Defendant was therefore under no duty to return the remains.   
Plaintiff’s belated assertion in her declaration in opposition to the motion 
for summary judgment that the Regents failed to notify her of the scattering of her 
husband’s ashes does not establish error, either.  As stated above, the materiality 
of a disputed fact is measured by the pleadings.  The complaint, which is the 
operative pleading here, alleged that the Regents had a duty to return her 
husband’s remains, not that the Regents had a duty to notify her of the scattering 
of her husband’s ashes so as to enable her to participate in some way in a service.  
The Regents, accordingly, had the burden on summary judgment of negating only 
those “ ‘theories of liability as alleged in the complaint’ ” and were not obliged to 
“ ‘ “ ‘refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the 
pleadings,’ ” ’ ” simply because such a claim was raised in plaintiff’s declaration 
in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.  (County of Santa Clara v. 
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 332.)  “ ‘Declarations in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment “are no substitute for amended 
pleadings.” . . .  If the motion for summary judgment presents evidence sufficient 
to disprove the plaintiff’s claims, as opposed to merely attacking the sufficiency of 
the complaint, the plaintiff forfeits an opportunity to amend to state new claims by 
failing to request it.’ ”  (Id. at p. 333; see also Melican v. Regents of the University 
of California (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 182 [“We do not require the Regents to 
negate elements of causes of action plaintiffs never pleaded”].)   
Nor did the trial court err in granting summary judgment as to plaintiff’s 
claim that the Regents breached their duty to her to maintain adequate records to 
11 
ensure that the donated bodies were used in accordance with the purpose for which 
the donation was made.  To the extent plaintiff premised such a duty on the 
Regents’ concomitant duty to return her husband’s remains, the claim fails, given 
that plaintiff now concedes that the Regents had no duty to return her husband’s 
remains.  To the extent plaintiff contends that the Regents owed her a duty to 
maintain records of her husband’s body even in the absence of any duty to return 
his remains, we again disagree.  Such a duty appears inconsistent with the 
donation agreement itself, which allows UCI to use the body “for teaching 
purposes, scientific research, or such purposes as the said University or its 
authorized representative shall in their sole discretion deem advisable” and which 
imposes no duty on UCI at the completion of its research except to dispose of the 
body “in accordance with the State Code.”  The Legislature does now require the 
donee to return the decedent’s cremated remains, “unless the donor has previously 
designated otherwise in the document of gift” (Health & Saf. Code, § 7151.40, 
subd. (b)), but this provision applies only to donations made pursuant to a 
donation agreement executed after January 1, 2001 (see id., former § 7154, subd. 
(d)), and we are loath to expand a donee’s duties in this area beyond those the 
Legislature has provided. We note as well that plaintiff cites no authority for her 
assertion that the Regents, even in the absence of a duty to return her husband’s 
remains, owed her a continuing duty to comply with the Willed Body Program’s 
own internal procedures concerning the tracking of cadavers.   
Finally, we reject plaintiff’s contention that her husband’s donation of his 
body created “a duty to dispose of the remains in a manner that would not shock 
the sensibility to family members who enabled [UCI] to take possession of the 
[body] in the first place.”  Upon execution of the donation agreement and James 
Conroy’s death, the statutory right to control the disposition of James Conroy’s 
body passed to UCI.  (Health & Saf. Code, former §§ 7150.5, subd. (h),  7154, 
12 
subd. (a).)  As the statutory right holder, UCI had “the exclusive right to control 
the disposition of the remains, and may do so in a manner offensive to other 
family members.”  (Christensen, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 891, fn. 19.)  The only 
limitation was that imposed by the donation agreement itself, which provided that 
“final disposition of [the] body by UCI shall be in accordance with the State 
Code.”  State law, which specifically exempts UCI and other medical schools, 
hospitals, and public institutions from the Funeral Directors and Embalmers Law 
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7609), does not impose a duty on UCI to conduct its 
teaching and research in such a way as to safeguard the sensibilities of the 
surviving family members.  “Even where not mishandled, bodies donated to the 
[Willed Body Program] are routinely subjected to treatment that could foreseeably 
cause emotional distress to family members. . . .  But the Legislature has made a 
policy decision based on the importance of medical education and research that 
universities may act in the manner described above, and [has] expressly exempted 
them from the myriad of laws governing funeral directors.”  (Melican v. Regents 
of University of California, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 181.)   
For these reasons, the order granting summary judgment was not erroneous 
as to plaintiff’s negligence cause of action. 
B.  The Causes of Action for Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation  
The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (1) a 
misrepresentation, (2) with knowledge of its falsity, (3) with the intent to induce 
another’s reliance on the misrepresentation, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) 
resulting damage.  (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 173.)  
The tort of negligent misrepresentation, a species of the tort of deceit (Bily v. 
Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 407), does not require intent to defraud 
but only the assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no 
13 
reasonable ground for believing it to be true.  (Small, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 173-
174.)   
The complaint alleges that the Willed Body Program, through its agents, 
represented that James Conroy’s body would be used for research and teaching 
purposes (and not for gain or profit) and that the body would at all times be 
handled in a respectful and dignified manner.  The complaint alleges further that 
these representations were false, in that defendant conducted or allowed to be 
conducted private, for-profit tutoring classes using donated bodies; conducted or 
allowed to be conducted the transport of bodies for profit and the sale of body 
parts for profit; failed to ensure that use of the bodies conformed to the purpose of 
the donation; failed to keep records pertaining to the identification of bodies 
requested to be returned to family members; and failed to return James Conroy’s 
remains to plaintiff.  Finally, the complaint alleges that defendant made these 
representations to induce plaintiff to participate in the Willed Body Program; that 
plaintiff, who was ignorant of the falsity of these representations, relied on them in 
electing to participate in the Willed Body Program; and that plaintiff suffered 
emotional distress as a consequence.     
Once again, though, the summary judgment record does not support the 
allegations of the complaint.  As discussed in the preceding section, there is no 
evidence in the record that James Conroy’s body was used in a clandestine private 
tutoring class, transported or dismembered for profit, or used in any manner other 
than that specified in the donation agreement.  Moreover, the record also reveals 
that plaintiff did not request or expect that her husband’s remains would be 
returned to her.  Because plaintiff failed to identify any false representations, the 
trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on the claims of fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation. 
14 
Plaintiff’s claims fail for an additional reason:  she has not shown that she 
actually relied on the alleged misrepresentations, which is an essential element of 
both claims of deceit.  (Mirkin v. Wasserman (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1082, 1088-1089.)  
“Actual reliance occurs when a misrepresentation is ‘ “an immediate cause of [a 
plaintiff’s] conduct, which alters his legal relations,” ’ and when, absent such 
representation, ‘ “he would not, in all reasonable probability, have entered into the 
contract or other transaction.” ’  [Citations.]  ‘It is not . . . necessary that [a 
plaintiff’s] reliance upon the truth of the fraudulent misrepresentations be the sole 
or even the predominant or decisive factor in influencing his conduct. . . .  It is 
enough that the representation has played a substantial part, and so has been a 
substantial factor, in influencing his decision.’ ”  (Engalla v. Permanente Medical 
Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 976-977.)   
The actual donor in this case was the decedent, James Conroy, and it was 
he who executed the donation agreement.  Plaintiff attempted to demonstrate that 
her husband detrimentally relied on defendant’s representations by reciting in her 
declaration that “[i]n reliance on Chris Brown’s statements to me, my husband and 
I agreed to donate our bodies to UCI and to participate in the Willed Body 
Program.”  The trial court sustained the Regents’ objection to this statement as 
speculative to the extent it purported to describe James Conroy’s motivation and 
ordered the words “my husband” stricken from the declaration.  Plaintiff did not 
challenge that ruling in the Court of Appeal or in this court.   
In other words, the declaration now purports to say only that plaintiff relied 
on Brown’s statements.  (See Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., supra, 36 Cal.4th at 
p. 1037.)  It is true, as plaintiff points out, that she delivered her husband’s body 
“in a particular manner, i.e., unembalmed and unautopsied,” and she claims she 
was “induced to do so in reliance upon the promises made by Chris Brown.”  But 
as the Court of Appeal observed, plaintiff “did not execute her husband’s donation 
15 
agreement, or make any decision regarding disposition of his body” and thus “had 
no legal right to control the disposition of her husband’s body.”  The right of 
plaintiff, as the surviving spouse, to control the disposition of her husband’s body 
was superseded by the terms of the written donation agreement executed by her 
husband.  (Health & Saf. Code, former § 7154, subd. (a) [“Rights of a donee 
created by an anatomical gift are superior to rights of others”]; see also id., 
§ 7100.1, subd. (a); see generally 8A West’s U. Laws Annot., supra, Anatomical 
Gift Act (1987) prefatory note, p. 6 [“consent of next of kin after death is not 
required if the donor has made an anatomical gift”].)  That agreement recited that 
James Conroy’s body was to be donated to UCI “immediately” following his death 
and that the body, when delivered, was to be “unembalmed and in good 
condition.”  Those instructions were to be “faithfully carried out upon his .  . . 
death” and could not be “altered, changed, or otherwise amended in any material 
way, except as may be required by law.”  (Health & Saf. Code, § 7100.1, subd. 
(a).)  Plaintiff has not identified any legal basis for altering her husband’s 
instructions.     
Accordingly, although plaintiff did deliver her husband’s body to UCI, her 
actions are not cognizable as reliance for purposes of a claim of deceit, inasmuch 
as her husband’s gift was already “irrevocable” upon his death.  (Health & Saf. 
Code, former § 7150.5, subd. (h).)  Plaintiff did not enter into an agreement with 
UCI regarding her husband’s body, nor did Brown’s representations cause her to 
alter her legal relations with UCI.  James Conroy’s gift of his body in an 
unembalmed and unautopsied condition, as specified in the donation agreement, 
did not require her “consent,” “concurrence,” or “approval.”  (Id., former 
§ 7150.5, subds. (h), (l); see 8A West’s U. Laws Ann., supra, Anatomical Gift Act 
(1987) § 2, com., pp. 26-27 [the Uniform Act “ ‘recognizes and gives legal effect 
16 
17 
to the right of the individual to dispose of his own body without subsequent veto 
by others’ ”].) 
For these reasons, the order granting summary judgment was not erroneous 
as to plaintiff’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation causes of action.  
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Conroy v. Regents of University of California 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 151 Cal.App.4th 132 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S153002 
Date Filed: April 6, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Orange 
Judge: William F. McDonald and David C. Velasquez 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Mahoney & Soll, Paul M. Mahoney and Richard A. Soll for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Marlin & Saltzman, Louis M. Marlin, Dale A. Anderson, Alan S. Lazar and Lynn P. Whitlock for 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
O’Melveny & Myers, Richard B. Goetz, Sabrina H. Strong and Carlos M. Lazatin for DePuy Mitek, Inc., 
and Johnson & Johnson as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Paul M. Mahoney 
Mahoney & Soll 
150 W. First Street, #280 
Claremont, CA  91711 
(909) 399-9987 
 
Louis M. Marlin 
Marlin & Saltzman 
3200 El Camino Real, Suite 100 
Irvine, CA  92602 
(714) 669-4900