Title: State v. Ben R. Oldakowski
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1994AP002357
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 8, 1995

NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
Nos.  94-2356, 94-2357 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Samuel E. Post, 
 
 
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 DEC 8, 1995 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                
   
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Ben R. Oldakowski, 
 
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
                                                                
   
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County, 
Stuart A. Schwartz, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded. 
 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.   These cases are before the court upon 
certification by the court of appeals pursuant to Rule 809.61 of 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
2 
the Wisconsin Statutes.1  The State appeals from an order of the 
Circuit Court for Dane County, Stuart A. Schwartz, Circuit Judge, 
dismissing petitions filed in both cases under Wis. Stat. Chapter 
980, the Sexually Violent Person Commitments statute, on the 
grounds that it is unconstitutional.  The circuit court found that 
chapter 980 violated constitutional protections against double 
jeopardy and ex post facto laws, as well as the guarantees of 
substantive due process and equal protection under the law. 
 
The issues certified on appeal to this court are whether 
chapter 980 violates constitutional guarantees: (1) against double 
jeopardy; (2) against ex post facto laws; (3) of substantive due 
process; (4) of equal protection under the law; and (5) whether 
the governor's partial veto created a law which is incomplete and 
unworkable as applied to persons committed under chapter 975 (the 
Sex Crimes Act).  We reverse the circuit court on all 
constitutional issues.  We hold that chapter 980 does not violate 
the constitution on either double jeopardy or ex post facto 
grounds.  Our decision on these two challenges is controlled by 
the opinion issued today in the companion case, State v. 
Carpenter, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (199_).  This opinion 
addresses the remaining three issues. 
                     
    1 
 
Textual 
references 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Statutes 
are 
hereinafter indicated as "chapter xxx" or "section xxx.xx," 
without the designation "of the Wisconsin Statutes."  Unless 
otherwise indicated, all references in this opinion are to the 
1993-1994 Wisconsin Statutes. 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
3 
 
We hold that chapter 980 withstands constitutional challenge 
in that it violates neither the substantive due process nor the 
equal protection guarantees of the United States and Wisconsin 
constitutions.  Chapter 980 authorizes the civil commitment of 
persons, previously convicted of a sexually violent offense, who 
currently suffer from a mental disorder that predisposes them to 
repeat such acts.  We recognize the state's compelling interest in 
protecting society by preventing future acts of sexual violence 
through the commitment and treatment of those identified as most 
likely to commit such acts.  We conclude that substantive due 
process is not offended by commitments, such as those under 
chapter 980, whose nature and duration are reasonably related to 
such compelling state purposes.  Similarly, we hold that the equal 
protection challenge does not affect the constitutionality of 
chapter 980 as a whole.  However, this court requires that the 
right to a jury determination be extended to persons committed 
under chapter 980 at all discharge hearings.  Additionally, we 
conclude that chapter 980 is a complete and workable law in 
respect to chapter 975 committed persons.2 
 
                     
    2  For purposes of brevity, the term "committed person[s]" 
will be used in reference to those committed under chapter 980 as 
sexually violent persons as well as to individuals originally 
committed under chapter 975. 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
4 
   
FACTS 
 
 
For purposes of this appeal, the parties do not dispute the 
following facts and procedural history.  In 1976 Samuel E. Post 
(Post) was convicted of two counts each of first degree sexual 
assault, armed robbery and false imprisonment stemming from 
incidents in which he abducted women from shopping mall parking 
lots and drove them to remote locations where he forced them to 
engage in oral sex acts.  The circuit court committed him to the 
custody of the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services 
(DHSS) under chapter 975 and confined him at Mendota Mental Health 
Institute (Mendota).  Following his mandatory release on parole in 
1990, Post was again confined at Mendota after revocation for 
violation of several parole conditions, including allegations that 
he repeatedly fondled his minor stepdaughter.  Post was scheduled 
for release on July 15, 1994. 
 
In 1972 the State charged Ben R. Oldakowski (Oldakowski) with 
numerous counts of kidnapping and sexual assault involving the 
abductions of five women and the attempted abduction of a sixth.  
He ultimately pled guilty and was convicted of one count of rape 
in 1972.  Pursuant to § 975.06, the court committed him to the 
custody of DHSS which subsequently transferred him to Mendota.  
Six months after his release in April of 1979, the State revoked 
Oldakowski's initial parole following charges that he sexually 
assaulted a 17-year-old girl.  In 1985, he was again paroled and, 
in 1986, revoked for exposing himself to a teenage girl.  
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
5 
Revocation proceedings were initiated only two months after his 
third parole, in February of 1991, following a conviction, as a 
repeat offender, for lewd and lascivious behavior.  Oldakowski was 
returned to Mendota and scheduled to be released on July 15, 1994. 
 
On July 12, 1994, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed 
petitions pursuant to chapter 980 seeking to commit Post and 
Oldakowski as sexually violent persons.  At the probable cause 
hearings, the State relied upon the diagnoses of Post and 
Oldakowski provided by Dr. Dennis Doren, the Forensic Clinical 
Director of Mendota.  Dr. Doren testified that his primary 
diagnosis of Post is antisocial personality disorder3 with 
secondary atypical paraphilia.4  He diagnosed Oldakowski as 
primarily suffering from paraphilia, including sexual sadism 
(inflicting humiliation or suffering) and exhibitionism (exposure 
of genitals),5 and secondarily from a personality disorder, not 
otherwise specified.  Dr. Doren testified that, in his medical 
opinion, the above disorders are mental disorders within the 
                     
    3  
According 
to the 
American 
Psychiatric 
Association, 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 
1994) (hereinafter DSM-IV), "the essential feature of Antisocial 
Personality Disorders is a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and 
violation of, the rights of others . . . ."  DSM-IV, at 645. 
    4  "The essential features of a Paraphilia are recurrent, 
intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors 
generally involving ... children or other nonconsenting persons 
and that occur over a period of at least 6 months."  DSM-IV, at 
522-23. 
    5  DSM-IV, at 523.  
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
6 
definition of § 980.01(2), and that both Post and Oldakowski are 
dangerous to others because their mental disorders create a 
substantial probability that they will engage in acts of sexual 
violence6--in other words, that both men fit the statutory 
definition of sexually violent persons.  The circuit court found 
probable cause to believe that both Post and Oldakowski were 
sexually violent persons and ordered them held at Mendota pending 
trial.   
 
On the day the probable cause hearings were held, Post and 
Oldakowski each filed motions to dismiss the commitment petitions 
on the grounds that chapter 980 violates various constitutional 
protections and guarantees.7  The circuit court granted those 
motions, 
finding 
that 
chapter 
980 
violated 
constitutional 
protections against double jeopardy and ex post facto laws, as 
well as the guarantees of substantive due process and equal 
protection under the law.  The circuit court therefore ordered 
Post and Oldakowski released.  The court of appeals ordered the 
matters consolidated and stayed Post and Oldakowski's release 
pending appellate review of the constitutionality of the statute. 
                     
    6  Polysubstance abuse and alcohol abuse, in Post's case, and 
Oldakowski's alcohol abuse (all in forced remission) were cited as 
additional 
risk 
factors 
which 
contributed 
to 
Dr. 
Doren's 
assessment that both men posed a substantial risk of reoffense. 
    7  Upon stipulation by counsel that the same arguments were to 
be raised in support of dismissing both petitions, Post and 
Oldakowski filed joint briefs and the circuit court entered one 
decision addressing both motions. 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
7 
 This court subsequently accepted certification from the court of 
appeals.   
 
 
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY 
 
Post and Oldakowski challenge virtually the entirety of 
chapter 
980 
on 
various 
substantive 
and 
procedural 
bases.  
Therefore, chapter 980's statutory scheme will be summarized at 
this point to provide a framework for the remainder of this 
opinion.  Chapter 980 requires an agency with authority to 
discharge or release a person who may fit the criteria for 
commitment as a sexually violent person to notify the DOJ or 
appropriate district attorney of pending release and to provide 
treatment records and other relevant documentation concerning that 
individual.  Wis. Stat. § 980.015.  A petition seeking commitment 
under chapter 980 must allege that the person: (1) was convicted, 
found delinquent, or found not guilty by reason of mental disease 
or defect of a sexually violent offense;8 (2) is within 90 days of 
release from a sentence, commitment, or secured correctional 
                     
    8  980.01  Definitions.  In this chapter: 
 
(5)  "Sexually motivated" means that one of the purposes for 
an act is for the actor's sexual arousal or gratification. 
 
(6)  "Sexually violent offense" means any of the following: 
 
(a) Any crime specified in s. 940.225(1) or (2), 948.02(1) 
or (2), 948.025, 948.06 or 948.07. 
 
(b) Any crime specified in s. 940.01, 940.02, 940.05, 
940.06, 940.19(4) or (5), 940.30, 940.305, 940.31 or 943.10 that 
is determined, in a proceeding under s. 980.05(3)(b), to have been 
sexually motivated. 
 
(c) Any solicitation, conspiracy or attempt to commit a 
crime under par. (a) or (b). 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
8 
facility arising from a sexually violent offense; (3) has a mental 
disorder; and (4) is dangerous because that mental disorder 
creates a substantial probability that he or she will engage in 
acts of sexual violence.9  Mental disorder is statutorily defined 
as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or 
volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of 
sexual violence."  Wis. Stat. § 980.01(2).   
 
The court shall review a chapter 980 petition filed by the 
state and order detention only if it finds cause to believe that 
the person named in the petition is eligible for commitment under 
the statute.  Within 72 hours of filing, there shall be a hearing 
in which the court determines whether there is probable cause to 
believe that the subject of the petition is a sexually violent 
                     
    9  980.02  Sexually violent person petition; contents; filing. 
  (2) A petition filed under this section shall allege that all of 
the following apply to the person alleged to be a sexually violent 
person:  
  (a) The person satisfies any of the following criteria:  
   1. The person has been convicted of a sexually violent offense. 
    2. The person has been found delinquent for a sexually violent 
offense.  
   3. The person has been found not guilty of a sexually violent 
offense by reason of mental disease or defect. 
   (ag) The person is within 90 days of discharge or release, on 
parole or otherwise, from a sentence that was imposed for a 
conviction for a sexually violent offense[,] from a secured 
correctional facility, as defined in s. 48.02(15m), if the person 
was placed in the facility for being adjudicated delinquent under 
s. 48.34 on the basis of a sexually violent offense or from a 
commitment order that was entered as a result of a sexually 
violent offense. 
   (b) The person has a mental disorder. 
   (c) The person is dangerous to others because the person's 
mental disorder creates a substantial probability that he or she 
will engage in acts of sexual violence.  
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
9 
person.  The court shall dismiss the petition if it fails to 
establish probable cause.  However, upon a finding of probable 
cause, the court shall order the individual to be transferred to 
an appropriate facility for evaluation.  Wis. Stat. §§ 980.04(1)-
(3).  When required to submit to an examination, a person may 
retain his or her own examiner (or one will be appointed upon 
proof of indigency) who will have reasonable access to the subject 
of the petition and to past and present treatment records.  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.03(4). 
 
The person is entitled to a full adversarial trial on the 
allegations in the petition.  During the trial, all criminal rules 
of evidence apply and the state carries the burden of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  Wis. Stat. §§ 980.05(1m) and (3).  The person 
who is the subject of the petition has the following rights:  to 
counsel (which will be appointed if indigency is established); to 
remain silent; to present and cross-examine witnesses; and to have 
the hearing recorded.  A jury of 12 may be requested and must 
arrive at a unanimous verdict.  Wis. Stat. §§ 980.03(2)-(3).  
 
Once a person is found to be sexually violent under this 
chapter, the circuit court must commit the person to DHSS for 
control, care and treatment until it is determined that he or she 
is no longer a sexually violent person.  Wis. Stat. § 980.06(1).  
The court must initially determine whether the individual requires 
secure institutional care or is appropriate for supervised 
release.  Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(b).  If committed to a secure 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
10 
treatment facility, a person may petition for supervised release 
every six months.  The court shall grant this petition unless the 
state proves by clear and convincing evidence that the person is 
still sexually violent and substantially likely to commit acts of 
sexual violence unless confined.  Wis. Stat. §§ 980.08(1) and (4). 
 At any time, the secretary of DHSS may authorize the filing of a 
petition for discharge.  This petition will be granted unless the 
state presents clear and convincing proof at a trial to the court 
that the petitioner is still a sexually violent person.  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.09(1). 
 
Mental reexaminations are conducted six months after the 
initial commitment and every year thereafter "for the purpose of 
determining whether the person has made sufficient progress to be 
entitled to transfer to a less restrictive facility, to supervised 
release or to discharge."  Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1).  As with the 
original examination, the committed person may hire an additional 
examiner of his or her own choosing or, upon request by an 
indigent, one may be appointed by the court.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.07(1).   
 
At the time of each examination under § 980.07, the committed 
person shall receive written notice of his or her right to 
petition the court for discharge.  If this right is not 
affirmatively waived by the committed person, the court shall hold 
a probable cause hearing at which the committed person is not 
entitled to appear but does have the right to be represented by 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
11 
counsel.  Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2)(a).  Upon a finding that probable 
cause exists to believe that the committed person is no longer a 
sexually violent person, a hearing on this issue is held before 
the court.  At this hearing, the person has the right to be 
present, be represented by counsel, remain silent, present and 
cross-examine witnesses, and have the hearing recorded.  If the 
state cannot prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
committed person is still a sexually violent person, he or she 
shall be discharged from the custody of DHSS.  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 980.09(2)(b) and (c). 
 
Additionally, the committed person may file a petition for 
discharge at any time under § 980.10.  However, following an 
unsuccessful petition, the court shall deny any subsequent 
petitions filed under that section without a hearing unless the 
petition contains facts sufficient for a court to find that the 
individual's condition has so changed as to warrant a hearing.  
Wis. Stat. § 980.10.   
 
 
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
 
 
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law which 
this court approaches de novo without deference to the courts 
below.  State v. Migliorino, 150 Wis. 2d 513, 524, 442 N.W.2d 36 
(1989).  There is a presumption of constitutionality for 
legislative enactments and every presumption favoring validity of 
the law must be indulged.  State v. Randall, 192 Wis. 2d 800, 824, 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
12 
532 N.W.2d 94 (1995).  Further, the challenger bears the burden to 
prove a statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  State 
v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 129, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989). 
 
 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
 
 
Post 
and 
Oldakowski 
argue 
that 
chapter 
980 
is 
unconstitutional because it interferes with their fundamental 
right to liberty without providing the protection guaranteed under 
the Due 
Process Clause.10 
 
Specifically, they 
argue 
that 
substantive due process is violated because chapter 980 allows 
commitment: (1) without a showing of mental illness; (2) without 
an individualized showing of amenability to treatment; and (3) 
with an insufficient showing of dangerousness. 
                     
    10  The United States and Wisconsin constitutions provide 
similar guarantees of due process.  See U.S. Const. amend. V and 
XIV § 1 and Wis. Const. art. 1, § 8. 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
13 
 
In addition to the procedural protections provided by the Due 
Process Clause, the United States Supreme Court has recognized "a 
substantive component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful 
government actions."  Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) 
(quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)).  Freedom 
from physical restraint is a fundamental right that "has always 
been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause from arbitrary governmental action."  Foucha, 504 U.S. at 
80 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982)).  The 
Supreme Court found that, "[c]ivil commitment for any purpose 
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due 
process protection."  Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 
(1979).     
 
Review 
of 
legislation 
that 
restricts 
a 
fundamental liberty requires this court to apply strict scrutiny 
to its due process analysis.  In order to pass strict scrutiny, 
the challenged statute must further a compelling state interest 
and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest.  Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 155 (1973).  In this instance, the state has dual 
interests--to protect the community from the dangerously mentally 
disordered and to provide care and treatment to those with mental 
disorders that predispose them to sexual violence.  The Supreme 
Court has recognized both of these interests as legitimate, the 
first under a state's police powers and the latter under its 
parens patriae powers.  Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.  The Court has 
also found that the government's interest in detaining mentally 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
14 
unstable persons who pose a threat to the safety of the community 
is compelling.  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 
(1987).  We find the state's dual interests represented by chapter 
980 to be both legitimate and compelling. 
 
1.  Mental Disorder v. Mental Illness  
 
Post and Oldakowski assert that involuntary commitments 
require a finding of "mental illness" and that the "mental 
disorder" required under chapter 980 is not sufficiently narrowly 
tailored to survive strict scrutiny.  Chapter 980 defines mental 
disorder as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the 
emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to 
engage in acts of sexual violence."  Wis. Stat. § 980.01(2).  Post 
and Oldakowski claim that the term "disorder" sweeps too broadly 
and does not adequately define those who fall within its reach.  
The State counters that the definition of disorder in chapter 980 
is sufficiently narrow in that it only applies to a small group of 
mentally disordered persons whose disorders have the specific 
effect of predisposing them to commit sexually violent acts.  We 
agree with the State and hold that the term "mental disorder" as 
defined in chapter 980 satisfies the mental condition component 
required by substantive due process for involuntary mental 
commitment. 
 
A statute must be narrowly enough drawn that its terms can be 
given 
a 
reasonably 
precise 
content 
and 
those 
persons 
it 
encompasses can be identified with reasonable accuracy.  O'Connor 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
15 
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).  In chapter 980, the use 
of the term "mental disorder" and its definition fulfill these 
requirements.  Despite Post and Oldakowski's protestations, there 
is no talismanic significance that should be given to the term 
"mental illness."  Contrary to the position advanced by the 
dissent, "mental illness" is not required by either the federal or 
state constitution and the Supreme Court has declined to enunciate 
a single definition that must be used as the mental condition 
sufficient for involuntary mental commitments.  The Court has 
wisely left the job of creating statutory definitions to the 
legislators who draft state laws.  Noting that the substantive as 
well as procedural mechanisms for civil commitment vary from state 
to state, the Court declared that "[t]he essence of federalism is 
that states must be free to develop a variety of solutions to 
problems and not be forced into a common, uniform mold."  
Addington, 441 U.S. at 431.  Particularly when a legislature 
"undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific 
uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad and 
courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation." Jones v. 
United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983) (quoting Marshall v. 
United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974)).   
 
The Supreme Court itself has used numerous terms to describe 
the 
mental 
condition 
of 
those 
properly 
subject 
to 
civil 
commitment, including emotional and mental "disorders."11  State 
                     
    11  See Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-26 (discussing the "state's 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
16 
legislatures have also relied on a variety of terms and 
definitions.12  Even Wisconsin law relies on varied terminology.  
Chapter 51 (the Mental Health Act) defines "mental illness" in the 
context of involuntary commitment as "a substantial disorder of 
thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory which grossly 
impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or 
ability to meet the ordinary demands of life."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.01(13)(b) (emphasis added). 
 
It is important to stress that the above definitions serve a 
legal, not medical, function.  Even the primary tool of clinical 
diagnosis in the psychiatric field, the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), warns of a significant risk 
of misunderstanding when descriptions designed for clinical use 
are transplanted into the forensic setting.13  An apt analogy 
(..continued) 
interest in committing the emotionally disturbed" and the 
"expanding concern of society with problems of mental disorders"); 
see also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972) (recognizing 
there are a number of bases for involuntary civil commitment 
including "defective delinquency laws, sexual psychopath laws, 
[and] commitment of persons acquitted by reason of insanity").   
    12  Washington state allows involuntary civil commitment for 
treatment of those with "mental disorders," Wash. Rev. Code § 
71.05; Illinois' Sexually Dangerous Persons Act provides for 
commitment of those "suffering from a mental disorder," Ill. Rev. 
Stat., ch. 725 § 205/1.01; and Indiana's civil commitment scheme 
defines "mental illness" as a "psychiatric disorder" which is in 
turn defined as a mental illness or disease.  Ind. Code 12-7-2-130 
and 12-7-2-150. 
    13  This risk is due to the "imperfect fit" between the law and 
clinical diagnosis which is exacerbated by the legal necessity for 
information that falls outside of that relevant to psychiatric 
categorical designations.  However, DSM-IV notes that when 
properly used, diagnostic information can increase reliability and 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
17 
illustrating the need for separation between legal and medical 
definitions can be found in the Wisconsin jury instructions on 
criminal responsibility.  In that context, mental disease is 
statutorily defined as "an abnormal condition of the mind which 
substantially affects mental or emotional processes," but the jury 
is cautioned that it is "not bound by medical labels, definitions, 
or conclusions as to what is or is not a mental disease."  Wis. 
JI-Criminal 605.    
 
In support of its argument that a "mental disorder" cannot be 
a sufficient condition for commitment, the dissent cites testimony 
that "mental disorders are the broad big umbrella that all of us 
could fall under."  Dissent at 21.  On the contrary, the DSM-IV 
states that a diagnosis of "disorder" is only appropriate when a 
manifestation of 
dysfunction 
crosses 
the 
"boundary 
between 
normality 
and pathology."  
DSM-IV, 
at 
xxi. 
 
The 
DSM-IV 
acknowledges that "no definition adequately specifies precise 
boundaries for the concept of 'mental disorder.'"  However, a 
mental disorder is "conceptualized as a clinically significant 
behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an 
individual" and must reflect a current state of distress, impaired 
functioning or significant risk of pain, death or loss of freedom. 
(..continued) 
facilitate understanding of complex matters in the decision-making 
process "when the presence of a mental disorder is the predicate 
for a subsequent legal determination (e.g., involuntary civil 
commitment)." DSM-IV, at xxiii-xxiv. 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
18 
 Disorders do not include merely deviant behaviors that conflict 
with prevailing societal mores.  DSM-IV, at xxi-xxii. 
 
The key to the constitutionality of the definition of mental 
disorder in chapter 980 is that it requires a nexus--persons will 
not fall within chapter 980's reach unless they are diagnosed with 
a disorder that has the specific effect of predisposing them to 
engage in acts of sexual violence.  Not all persons who commit 
sexually violent crimes can be diagnosed as suffering from mental 
disorders, nor are all persons with a mental disorder predisposed 
to commit sexually violent offenses. 
 
The dissent asserts that the definition of "mental disorder" 
is circular and "authoriz[es] lifetime commitment based not on 
mental illness but on past crimes."14  Dissent at 22.  This 
characterization fails to acknowledge that the focal point of 
commitment is not on past acts but on current diagnosis of a 
present disorder suffered by an individual that specifically 
causes that person to be prone to commit sexually violent acts in 
the future.  The statute, as drafted, does not sweep too broadly; 
rather, it is narrowly tailored to allow commitment only of the 
                     
    14  A finding that a person does fit the chapter 980 criteria 
of a sexually violent person in no sense equates to automatic 
"lifetime commitment."  Commitment to the custody of the DHSS does 
not necessarily result in immediate secure institutionalization, 
rather it can mean supervised release into the community.  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.06(2)(b).  Further, there are numerous procedural 
safeguards for those for whom institutionalization is deemed 
appropriate, 
including 
periodic 
reexamination, 
review, 
and 
supervised release or discharge.  See Majority opinion at 9-11, 
39-41. 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
19 
most dangerous of sexual offenders--those whose mental condition 
predisposes them to reoffend. 
 
2.  Treatment  
 
Additionally, Post and Oldakowski argue that their right to 
due process is violated because treatment is not "a serious 
objective" of chapter 980.  They assert that support for this 
claim is found in: (1) the lack of a requirement for an 
individualized showing of amenability to treatment; (2) the 
failure to seek commitment until completion of a sentence; and (3) 
the "recognition" in the psychiatric-medical community that 
treatment for sex offenders is "largely ineffective."  As with all 
enactments, we presume good faith on the part of the legislature. 
 State ex rel. Thomson v. Zimmerman, 264 Wis. 644, 652, 60 N.W.2d 
416 (1953).  We conclude that treatment is a bona fide goal of 
this statute and we presume the legislature will proceed in good 
faith and fund the treatment programs necessary for those 
committed under chapter 980.   
We recognize, as has the Supreme 
Court, that the purpose of civil commitment "is to treat the 
individual's mental illness and protect him and society from his 
potential dangerousness."  Jones, 463 U.S. at 368.  However, the 
State correctly points out that this does not necessarily equate 
with a constitutional requirement that commitment be based on 
amenability to treatment nor even on a constitutional right to 
treatment.  These issues were addressed by Chief Justice Burger 
who found: 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
20 
. . . no basis for equating an involuntarily committed mental 
patient's unquestioned constitutional right not to be 
confined 
without 
due 
process 
of 
law 
with 
a 
constitutional right to treatment.  Given the present 
state of medical knowledge regarding abnormal human 
behavior and its treatment, few things would be more 
fraught with peril than to irrevocably condition a 
State's power to protect the mentally ill upon the 
providing of "such treatment as will give [them] a 
realistic opportunity to be cured."  
 
O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 587-89 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (footnote 
omitted).   
 
Post and Oldakowski did not rely on any precedent in which 
"treatability" was held to be a constitutional prerequisite to 
commitment nor were they able to present any evidence that the 
state will not treat persons committed under chapter 980.  On the 
contrary, 
the 
state 
is 
clearly 
statutorily 
obliged 
under 
§ 980.06(1) to provide "control, care and treatment" to those 
determined to be sexually violent persons.  In addition, chapter 
980 committed persons are entitled to the patient's rights 
conferred under chapter 51, which include the "right to receive 
prompt and adequate treatment."  Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(f).  We 
find these statutory obligations to treat to be consistent with 
the nature and duration of commitments pursuant to chapter 980 and 
conclude that the lack of a precommitment finding of treatability 
is not offensive to the constitution under substantive due 
process. 
 
In response to Post and Oldakowski's argument about the 
timing of chapter 980 commitments, we note that treatment, even 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
21 
specialized 
treatment directed 
toward 
sexual 
offenders, 
is 
currently available in the regular prison setting.  For those who 
have fully availed themselves of treatment opportunities, a 
chapter 980 petition may be unnecessary.  It is only those for 
whom previous treatment has proved ineffective, as demonstrated by 
their current diagnosis of a mental disorder that predisposes them 
to commit violent acts, that chapter 980 commitment will be 
appropriate.  The focus on current mental condition is designed to 
afford persons with the most persistent problems the greatest help 
available.  This court fails to see how a statute structured to 
cover only those demonstrated to be most in need of treatment can 
be characterized as "not serious" in its pursuit of the objective 
of providing treatment. 
 
Further, the particularized treatment that will be provided 
to those committed under chapter 980 cannot, as the dissent 
infers, be as easily provided under chapter 51.  Dr. Wood, acting 
unit manager for the sexually violent person unit of the Wisconsin 
Resource Center, testified that plans pursuant to the new law call 
for a dedicated wing which will solely house those committed as 
sexually violent persons.  This unique unit will be staffed by 
psychologists, clinical nurses and psychiatric care technicians 
who will facilitate a treatment regimen focused on the needs of 
the sexually violent person by offering "a multi-component 
concomitant behavioral program that will address issues at the 
level of arousal and fantasy as well as behavioral controls, 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
22 
relapse prevention and the attempt to work on both the underlying 
disorder as well as the potential dangerousness."  
 
Although Post and Oldakowski refer to studies by several 
behavioral scientists in which treatment for sexual offenders was 
deemed to be ineffective, there is by no means consensus within 
the behavioral sciences community on this issue.  The State, in 
turn, cited numerous studies reporting positive results in 
reducing rates of recidivism through treatment.15  There are many 
new techniques and treatment methods, such as "cognitive-
behavioral" programs and "relapse prevention" that are aimed at 
teaching sexual offenders skills to recognize and cope with 
situations such as anger and substance abuse that create high risk 
for relapse.16  The fact that studies reaching opposite conclusions 
can be cited on both sides of this issue does not preclude the 
legislature from acting, nor does it compel a finding of 
unconstitutionality.  The Supreme Court has addressed the lack of 
certainty in this area: 
                     
    15  See, e.g., Janice K. Marques, David M. Day, Craig Nelson, 
Mary Ann West, Effects of Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment on Sex 
Offender Recidivism, 21 Criminal Justice and Behavior 28, 28-52 
(1994); W.L. Marshall and W.D. Pithers, A Reconsideration of 
Treatment Outcome with Sex Offenders, 21 Criminal Justice and 
Behavior 10, 10-27 (1994); W.L. Marshall and H.E. Barbaree, 
Outcome of Comprehensive Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment Programs 
in Handbook of Sexual Assault, 363-85 (W.L.  Marshall, D.R. Laws, 
H.E. Barbaree eds., 1990); William D. Pithers, Relapse Prevention 
with Sexual Aggressors in Handbook of Sexual Assault, 343-61 (W.L. 
Marshall, D.R. Laws, H.E. Barbaree eds. 1990). 
    16  Pithers, at 13. 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
23 
We do not agree with the suggestion that Congress' power to 
legislate in this area depends on the research conducted 
by the psychiatric community.  We have recognized 
repeatedly the "uncertainty of diagnosis in this field 
and the tentativeness of professional judgment.  The 
only certain thing that can be said about the present 
state of knowledge and therapy regarding mental disease 
is 
that 
science 
has 
not 
reached 
finality 
of 
judgment . . . ."  The lesson we have drawn is not that 
government may not act in the face of this uncertainty, 
but rather that courts should pay particular deference 
to reasonable legislative judgments. 
 
Jones, 463 U.S. at 364 n.13 (citations omitted).  The Wisconsin 
Legislature has chosen to commit those found to be sexually 
violent persons for treatment and, heeding the above language, we 
do not question the relative merits of this treatment. 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
24 
 
3.  Dangerousness 
 
We also reject Post and Oldakowski's claim that chapter 980's 
statutory definition of dangerousness17 sets an impermissibly low 
standard of "substantial risk" and is therefore unconstitutional. 
 The Supreme Court has refused to proscribe strict boundaries for 
legislative determinations of what degree of dangerousness is 
necessary for involuntary commitment.18  Substantive as well as 
procedural limitations on a state's traditional power to commit 
the dangerously mentally ill vary widely from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.  Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 736-37 (1972).  
The Supreme Court has noted the uncertainty endemic to the field 
of psychiatry and held that particular deference must be shown to 
legislative decisions in that arena.  Jones, 463 U.S. at 364 n.13. 
 The Court recognized that although predictions of future 
dangerousness may be difficult, they are still an attainable, in 
fact essential, part of our judicial process.  Barefoot v. 
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 897 (1983).  Here, the Wisconsin 
Legislature has devised a statutory method for assessing the 
future danger posed by persons predisposed to sexual violence and 
we find it constitutionally sound.  
                     
    17  A sexually violent person is deemed dangerous if "he or she 
suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially 
probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence." 
 Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7). 
    18  For example, Minnesota law provides for involuntary 
commitment 
of 
a 
"psychopathic 
personality" 
who 
exhibits 
"conditions 
of 
emotional 
instability, 
or 
impulsiveness 
of 
behavior" which "render such person irresponsible for personal 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
25 
Nature and Duration of Commitment 
 
Further, Post and Oldakowski contend that the nature of 
chapter 980 commitments bears no reasonable relationship to the 
purposes of commitment and is specifically contrary to the Supreme 
Court's holding in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).  At a 
minimum, the Supreme Court has stated that "due process requires 
that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable 
relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed."  
Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.  The purposes of commitment under 
chapter 980 have already been identified as the protection of the 
community and the treatment of persons suffering from disorders 
that predispose them to commit sexually violent acts.  The nature 
of the commitment (to the custody of DHSS with potential 
confinement in a secure mental health facility) is consistent with 
both purposes.  Wis. Stat. §§ 980.06(1) and 980.065. 
 
The language of the statute provides the best evidence of 
this reasonable relationship.  Individuals found to be sexually 
violent persons are committed to the custody of DHSS "for control, 
(..continued) 
conduct with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to 
other persons." Commitment hinges on showing that persons "by a 
habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, have evidenced an 
utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses and who, as a 
result, are likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, 
pain or other evil on the objects of their uncontrolled and 
uncontrollable desire."  In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 912-13, 
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 146 (1994).  The United States Supreme 
Court upheld this scheme against a vagueness challenge in 
Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 
Minn., 309 U.S. 270, 274 (1940), aff'g 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297 
(1939). 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
26 
care and treatment" in "the least restrictive manner consistent 
with the requirements of the person and in accordance with the 
court's commitment order."  Wis. Stat. §§ 980.06(1) and (2)(b).  
Chapter 980 committed persons are defined as "patients" under 
chapter 51, the Mental Health Act, and are entitled to the same 
rights as other patients, including the right to "receive prompt 
and adequate treatment, rehabilitation and educational services 
appropriate for his or her condition."  Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(f). 
 An additional right afforded to those defined as "patients" under 
chapter 51 is the requirement that facilities "be designed to make 
a positive contribution to the effective attainment of the 
treatment goals of the hospital."  Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(m).  
Commitment in a secure setting that provides specialized treatment 
for sexual offenders serves both to protect society and to treat 
the individual. 
 
Again, the statutory language itself illustrates that the 
duration of the commitment, although potentially indefinite, is 
reasonably related to the purposes of the commitment.  Periodic 
mental examinations are conducted "for the purpose of determining 
whether the person has made sufficient progress to be entitled to 
transfer to a less restrictive facility, to supervised release or 
to discharge."  Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1).  Thus, the duration of an 
individual's commitment is intimately linked to treatment of his 
mental condition.  Commitment ends when the committed person no 
longer suffers from a mental disorder or when that condition no 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
27 
longer predisposes him to commit acts of sexual violence.  
Protection of the community is also well-served by this statutory 
scheme because the danger to the public has necessarily dissipated 
when 
treatment 
has 
progressed 
sufficiently 
to 
warrant 
an 
individual's release.   
 
Post and Oldakowski argue that Wisconsin's Sexually Violent 
Person Commitment statute is in direct conflict with Foucha, based 
on the contention that chapter 980 allows an indefinite commitment 
on the basis of a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. 
However, we see our ruling today as consistent with both the 
conceptual framework and the specific findings expressed in 
Foucha.  There, Louisiana's statutory scheme for continuing 
confinement of insanity acquittees was found to be violative of 
both substantive due process and equal protection guarantees.19  
Although it sought to extend his commitment to a mental 
institution, the state conceded that Foucha was neither mentally 
ill nor was his condition treatable.  Here, the State makes 
neither of the above concessions; in fact, commitment under 
chapter 980 is based on the presence of a mental disorder that the 
state intends to treat.20   
                     
    19  A majority of justices (Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and 
Souter) joined in the portion of Justice White's opinion 
discussing substantive due process.  However, Part III, concerning 
equal protection, garnered only a plurality as Justice O'Connor 
declined to join stating that she felt it "unnecessary to reach 
equal protection issues" on the facts before the Court.  Foucha, 
504 U.S. at 88 (J. O'Connor, concurring).  
    20 
 
Further, 
the 
Louisiana 
statute 
allowed 
indefinite 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
28 
 
The Court reiterated that the nature of commitment must 
relate to its purpose and found that because the state no longer 
considered Foucha mentally ill, its basis for committing him to a 
psychiatric facility had disappeared.  Foucha, 504 U.S. at 78-79. 
 In her concurrence in Foucha, Justice O'Connor stressed that the 
opinion addressed only Louisiana's specific statutory scheme and 
did not rule out more narrowly devised schemes.  She further 
opined that it might even "be permissible for Louisiana to confine 
an insanity acquittee who has regained sanity if, unlike the 
situation in this case, the nature and duration of detention were 
tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns related to the 
acquittee's continuing dangerousness."  Id. at 87-88.  Justice 
O'Connor 
reasoned 
that 
the 
state 
cannot 
confine 
insanity 
acquittees as mental patients without medical justification.  Id. 
at 88.  As discussed earlier, Wisconsin's statutory scheme is 
sufficiently 
narrowly 
tailored 
to 
withstand 
constitutional 
challenge because the nature and duration of chapter 980 
confinements are reasonably related to the purposes for those 
commitments.  We do not read Foucha to prohibit the commitment of 
dangerous mentally disordered persons.   
(..continued) 
commitment with release only if the insanity acquittee could prove 
that he or she was no longer dangerous.  Under chapter 980, at 
court hearings on petitions for supervised release or discharge, 
the state bears the burden of proving that the petitioner is still 
a sexually violent person.  See, Wis. Stat. §§ 980.08(4) and 
980.09(1)(b) and (2)(b). 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
29 
 
In State v. Randall, 192 Wis. 2d 800, 532 N.W.2d 94 (1995), 
this court recently upheld the constitutionality of Wisconsin's 
scheme for the commitment of insanity acquittees against a 
challenge based on Foucha.  We held that Foucha did not prohibit 
the continued commitment of sane but dangerous insanity acquittees 
"so long as they are treated in a manner consistent with the 
purposes of their commitment, e.g., there must be a medical 
justification . . . ."  Randall, 192 Wis. 2d at 807.  We noted 
that the treatment programs in Wisconsin's secure mental health 
facilities are designed to treat both mental and behavioral 
disorders and that the goal of safely returning an acquittee to 
the community can be well-served by continuing treatment aimed at 
reduction of danger arising from behavioral disorders even after 
an acquittee was deemed to no longer suffer from a condition that 
could be defined under the traditional rubric of mental illness.  
Id.     
 
 
Under the statutory scheme of chapter 980, there is medical 
justification for the commitment of persons whose mental disorders 
predispose them to engage in sexually violent acts.  Disorders 
such as paraphilias, which often form the diagnostic basis for 
chapter 980 commitments, are characterized by recurrent urges and 
behaviors.  Treatment that is specifically geared toward helping a 
committed person recognize and control these patterns of behavior 
certainly serves the goals of individualized treatment and 
community protection. 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
30 
 
Finally, we point out that substantive due process analysis 
necessarily involves the balancing of individual liberties against 
the "demands of an organized society."  Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 
320.  The balance can favor danger-preempting confinement under 
proper 
circumstances, including 
the 
necessity 
of 
detaining 
"mentally unstable individuals who present a danger to the 
public."  Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748-49.  We find that chapter 980 
permissibly balances the individual's liberty interest with the 
public's right to be protected from the dangers posed by persons 
who have already demonstrated their propensity and willingness to 
commit sexually violent acts. 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
31 
 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
 
Post and Oldakowski also challenge chapter 980 on the basis 
that it denies them equal protection under the laws.21  They 
specifically claim the following substantive differences between 
the statutory schemes for initial commitment under chapter 51 and 
chapter 980 are violative of equal protection: (1) § 51.20(1)(a)1 
requires a showing of "mental illness" while § 980.02(b) requires 
only "mental disorder"; (2) chapter 980 contains no requirement 
for an individualized finding of suitability for treatment as does 
§ 51.20(1); 
and 
(3) 
the 
standard 
for 
dangerousness 
in 
§ 980.02(2)(c) is insufficient because there is no recent overt 
act requirement as in § 51.20(1)(a)2.  Post and Oldakowski also 
argue that there are numerous procedural infirmities in chapter 
980 that impermissibly impose more stringent requirements for 
release.22   
                     
    21  This court applies the same interpretation to the state 
Equal Protection Clause found in Wis. Const. art. I § 1, as that 
given to the federal provision, U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.  State 
v. Heft, 185 Wis. 2d 288, 293 n.3, 517 N.W.2d 494 (1994). 
    22  They claim there are the following procedural differences 
between the two chapters which are unconstitutional under the 
Equal 
Protection 
Clause: 
(1) 
chapter 
980 
commitments 
are 
indefinite; (2) a chapter 980 committed person must affirmatively 
petition for discharge in order to be entitled to a judicial 
review; (3) the petitioner carries the burden of proof at a 
probable cause hearing on discharge; (4) discharge trials are to 
the court without a jury; and (5) finally, if a petition filed 
without the department's approval is denied, the court must deny 
subsequent petitions unless they contain "new factors."  This 
characterization of the procedure under chapter 980 is contrasted 
with the mechanisms employed under chapter 51: (1) chapter 51 
involuntary commitments automatically expire; (2) on expiration, 
the state has the burden to file for recommitment; (3) the state 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
32 
 
When a party attacks a statute on the grounds that it denies 
equal protection under the law, the party must demonstrate that 
the state unconstitutionally treats members of similarly situated 
classes differently.  Here, the parties agree, and we are also 
satisfied, that persons committed under chapters 51 and 980 are 
similarly 
situated 
for 
purposes 
of 
an 
equal 
protection 
comparison.23 
 
Although they agree that the classes to be compared in the 
equal protection analysis are similarly situated, Post and 
Oldakowski and the State strongly disagree on the level of 
judicial scrutiny that is to be applied to that comparison.  Post 
and Oldakowski urge this court to employ strict scrutiny while the 
State argues that a rational basis test should be applied.  Under 
a rational basis test, a classification "cannot run afoul of the 
Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship 
between 
the 
disparity 
of 
treatment 
and 
some 
legitimate 
governmental purpose."  Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642 
(1993).  Classifications based on a suspect class, such as 
alienage or race, are traditionally subjected to strict scrutiny 
(..continued) 
carries the burden of proof at all hearings; (4) the chapter 51 
committed person is entitled to a trial by jury at all commitment 
and recommitment hearings; and (5) the chapter 51 committed person 
need never show new factors or changed circumstances.  See Wis. 
Stat. §§ 51.20(13) and (16), and §§ 980.08-980.10. 
    23  In a previous equal protection analysis, this court found 
that chapter 51, the Mental Health Act, and chapter 975, the Sex 
Crimes Act, deal with similarly situated classes.  State ex rel. 
Farrell v. Stovall, 59 Wis. 2d 148, 159, 207 N.W.2d 809 (1973). 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
33 
and must be shown to be necessary to promote a compelling 
governmental interest in order to be found constitutional.  Graham 
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971).  Strict scrutiny has also 
been applied to invidious classifications that arbitrarily deprive 
one class of persons, but not another similarly situated, of a 
fundamental right.  See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 
316 
U.S. 
535 
(1942) 
(statute 
unconstitutionally 
authorized 
sterilization of persons convicted of some larcenies but not 
others); Police Department of the City of Chicago et al. v. 
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (distinction between peaceful labor 
picketing and other peaceful picketing impermissibly impinged on 
First Amendment rights).   
 
The Supreme Court has not clearly articulated which of the 
two standards is to be applied to equal protection challenges of 
involuntary commitment statutes, nor has this court previously 
resolved the issue.  The Court explicitly declined to determine 
whether the heightened level of scrutiny was applicable in a 
recent challenge because the issue had not been properly presented 
in the courts below.  Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2642.  There, the case 
had been argued in lower courts solely on the theory of rational 
basis, and the Court maintained that level of review in finding 
that equal protection was not violated by differences in 
Kentucky's statutory procedures for involuntary commitment of the 
mentally ill and mentally retarded.  Id. 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
34 
 
In our decisions involving equal protection challenges to 
involuntary commitments under chapter 975 (the Sex Crimes Act), 
this court has consistently applied a rational basis test.  See, 
e.g., State ex rel. Farrell v. Stovall, 59 Wis. 2d 148, 159, 207 
N.W.2d 809 (1973); State ex rel. Terry v. Schubert, 74 Wis. 2d 
487, 499, 247 N.W.2d 109 (1976); State v. Hungerford, 84 Wis. 2d 
236, 256, 267 N.W.2d 258 (1978).  The issue of whether a 
heightened level of scrutiny should be applied to classifications 
involving the mentally ill was discussed by this court in State ex 
rel. Watts v. Combined Community Services, 122 Wis. 2d 65, 81-83 
n.8, 362 N.W.2d 104 (1985).  In that instance, we found it 
unnecessary to resolve the issue as we concluded that the 
challenged disparities between chapter 51 and chapter 55 (which 
covers involuntary placements under the Protective Service System) 
did not survive even rational basis scrutiny.  Id. 
 
The question of which level of scrutiny is to be applied has 
been complicated by the Supreme Court's introduction of a third 
"intermediate" level of scrutiny wherein a classification need 
only further a "substantial interest of the State."  Plyer v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202, 217-8 (1982).  This level of review is to be 
employed only in limited circumstances when the legislation is not 
facially invidious but "nonetheless give[s] rise to recurring 
constitutional difficulties."  Id. at 217.  The plurality portion 
of the Foucha opinion added to the confusion on this issue with 
the following language which does not use recognized terms of art 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
35 
for either of the two traditional levels of scrutiny: "[f]reedom 
from physical restraint being a fundamental right, the State must 
have a particularly convincing reason, which it has not put 
forward, for such discrimination against insanity acquittees who 
are no longer mentally ill."  Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86 (emphasis 
added).  It is this language that Post and Oldakowski primarily 
rely on in urging this court to utilize strict scrutiny in its 
review of chapter 980.   We conclude that, in this case, we need 
not resolve the appropriate level of scrutiny, as we find that all 
but one of the disparities challenged in chapter 980 pass even the 
highest level of scrutiny.  The state's compelling interest in 
protecting the public provides the necessary justification for the 
differential treatment of the class of sexually violent persons 
whose mental disorders make them distinctively dangerous because 
of the substantial probability that they will commit future crimes 
of sexual violence.    
 
 
"Equal protection does not require that all persons be dealt 
with identically, but it does require that a distinction made have 
some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is 
made."  Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966).  Differences 
in 
difficulty 
of 
diagnosis, 
degree 
of 
dangerousness, 
and 
intrusiveness of treatment were found by the Supreme Court to be 
sufficient justifications for differential treatment of the 
mentally retarded and the mentally ill.  See Heller, 113 S. Ct. 
2637.  The Supreme Court has also recognized that distinctions 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
36 
between the dangerous and non-dangerous mentally ill may be 
reasonable for purposes of "determining the type of custodial or 
medical care to be given."  Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 111.  As long as 
the mechanism adopted by a legislature is constitutional, as we 
have found chapter 980 to be, the people can choose, through their 
duly elected representatives, to address complex social problems 
in more than one way.  There is no constitutional mandate that one 
alternative must be chosen over another and neither the federal 
nor the state constitution bars the state from creating and 
implementing a variety of solutions aimed at controlling a variety 
of ills.  See Matter of Guardianship of K.N.K., 139 Wis. 2d 190, 
209-10, 407 N.W.2d 281 (Ct. App. 1987), Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 
2643-47.   
 
As the Supreme Court noted, "the crucial question [in all 
equal protection cases] is whether there is an appropriate 
governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential 
treatment."  Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95.  The legislature has 
determined that, as a class, persons predisposed to sexual 
violence are more likely to pose a higher level of danger to the 
community than do other classes of mentally ill or mentally 
disabled persons.  This heightened level of dangerousness and the 
unique treatment needs of sexually violent persons justify 
distinct 
legislative 
approaches 
to 
further 
the 
compelling 
governmental purpose of protection of the public. 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
37 
 
1.Equal Protection Challenges to Substantive Standards for 
Commitment 
 
 
According to Post and Oldakowski, the differences in 
substantive standards for commitment between chapter 51 and 
chapter 980 (the use of the term "mental disorder," lack of 
"treatability" and recent overt act requirements) are violative of 
equal protection.  We conclude that none of these claimed 
deficiencies is fatal to chapter 980.  The distinctions between 
the terms "mental illness" and "mental disorder" were discussed 
earlier in this opinion and we find the difference in nomenclature 
to form no more of a constitutional impediment under equal 
protection than it did under substantive due process.  
 
Nor do we find the lack of a "suitability for treatment" 
requirement violative of equal protection.  The requirement that 
persons committed under chapter 51 must be "proper subject[s] for 
treatment" has been interpreted by the court of appeals of this 
state to encompass treatment that is aimed at reducing aggressive 
behaviors and controlling symptomatic conduct even when there is a 
determination that the underlying mental condition cannot be 
"cured."  See In re Mental Condition of C.J., 120 Wis. 2d 355, 354 
N.W.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1984).  This court has previously recognized 
that "Wisconsin's mental health facilities offer comprehensive 
treatment programs designed to reduce the patient's propensity for 
dangerousness."  Randall, 192 Wis. 2d at 834.  Broad leeway is 
particularly appropriate in the treatment of those prone to sexual 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
38 
violence whose lack of control over their violent behavior is 
exactly what makes them so dangerous and requires their commitment 
for treatment.  Because sexually violent persons pose specialized 
treatment problems and may require nontraditional therapies that 
cannot be assessed in the same manner as for other civilly 
committed persons, we find that the legislature is justified in 
not requiring a showing of amenability to treatment.  
 
We further conclude that the lack of a recent overt act 
requirement in chapter 980's definition of dangerousness does not 
render this standard unconstitutional under equal protection.  
Various 
mental 
conditions 
may 
receive 
different 
statutory 
treatment depending on the state's underlying interest in the 
commitment.  The statutory criteria of dangerousness sufficient to 
support involuntary commitments already varies widely.  For 
example, a protective placement under chapter 55 does not require 
a recent overt act but merely that the person's condition "create 
a substantial risk of serious harm to oneself or others."  Wis. 
Stat. § 51.06(2)(c).  Even under chapter 51, if the subject of a 
petition for commitment is an inmate of a state prison or the 
subject of inpatient treatment in a mental hospital, a recent 
overt act is not necessary.  Wis. Stat. §§ 51.20(1)(am) and (ar). 
 The legislature defines dangerousness in chapter 980 on the basis 
of a current diagnosis of a mental disorder that has the effect of 
creating a substantial probability that the subject of the 
petition will engage in acts of sexual violence.  We find the lack 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
39 
of a recent overt act under chapter 980 in no way violates equal 
protection. 
 
Only persons who fit the following substantive criteria are 
subject to chapter 980 commitments--those who have been convicted 
of specific sexually violent acts in the past and who are 
substantially probable to engage in sexually violent acts in the 
future because their current mental disorder predisposes them to 
engage in such conduct.  The compelling state interest in 
protecting the public from such dangerously disordered persons 
justifies the differentiations the legislature has created in 
substantive threshold criteria.  
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
40 
2.Equal Protection Challenges to Procedures of Commitment  
 
 
Post and Oldakowski argue that equal protection is violated 
by the chapter 980 procedures that make release more difficult 
than the parallel provisions in chapter 51.  The State counters 
that procedures need not be identical and that the procedural 
safeguards applied at the stage of initial commitment are actually 
much more stringent than those in chapter 51, thereby reducing the 
risk of erroneous commitment and lessening the need for the type 
of release procedures that the legislature chose to employ for 
chapter 51 committed persons.  We find the State's arguments 
persuasive and agree that most of the differences between the two 
statutory schemes are justified by the state's compelling interest 
in the protection of the public from those who are dangerous due 
to a mental disorder which creates a substantial probability of 
future acts of sexual violence.   
 
The Supreme Court has recognized that a proper "function of 
[the] legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous 
decisions" and cautioned that, "[t]he individual should not be 
asked to share equally with society the risk of error when the 
possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than 
any possible harm to the state."  Addington, 441 U.S. at 425, 427. 
 Loss of liberty through involuntary commitment imposes just such 
a heavy duty upon the state.  Chapter 980 properly balances the 
risks by providing stringent procedural safeguards on the initial 
commitment process.  At the commitment trial, the subject of the 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
41 
petition is afforded all of the rights available to a defendant in 
a criminal trial. Wis. Stat. § 980.05(1m).  A person can be 
committed under chapter 980 only if a jury unanimously finds that 
all of the criteria in the petition are met beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Wis. Stat. § 980.03(3).  This is contrasted with chapter 
51, under which the state need only prove the substantive criteria 
by clear and convincing evidence and which allows commitment on a 
5/6ths jury verdict.  Wis. Stat. §§ 51.20(11) and (13)(e).  The 
increased likelihood of accurate initial 980 commitment decisions 
reduces the need for some of the recommitment procedures that act 
as a safety net in chapter 51. 
 
Specifically, we find that the automatic expiration of 
chapter 51 commitments is not a universally required mechanism.  
Chapter 980 offers ample and fair opportunity for review and 
petition for release.  An institutionalized committed person can 
petition for supervised release every six months and must be 
released unless the state can show clear and convincing evidence 
that continued secure confinement is necessary.  Annual mental 
reexaminations are conducted and a probable cause hearing for 
discharge will be held unless the committed person affirmatively 
waives this right.  Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2).  Thus, a person under 
a chapter 980 commitment is entitled to an annual review that will 
be held unless an affirmative waiver is submitted.   
 
Post and Oldakowski argue that the procedure outlined in 
§ 980.10 places an impermissibly onerous requirement on petitions 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
42 
for discharge.  Following rejection of a petition filed without 
the approval of the secretary of DHSS, subsequent petitions filed 
without approval will be denied without a hearing unless the 
petition contains facts indicating the person's condition has so 
changed as to warrant a hearing.  Wis. Stat. § 980.10.  This 
procedure however, is clearly limited to "subsequent petition[s] 
under this section."  Wis. Stat. § 980.10 (emphasis added).  In 
other words, this limitation does not apply to petitions for 
supervised release, petitions for discharge filed with the 
secretary's approval, or those filed without approval following 
the yearly examination.  Nor does this section in any way affect a 
committed person's right to an annual hearing for discharge under 
§ 980.09(2).  We hold that the opportunities to seek release every 
six months and discharge annually are sufficient to meet 
constitutional demands and the state is not required to provide 
access to unlimited additional hearings unless adequate cause is 
shown. 
 
Post and Oldakowski also claim that chapter 980 fails under 
an equal protection analysis because sexually violent person 
commitments 
are 
indefinite 
while 
chapter 
51 
commitments 
automatically expire.  In Jones v. United States, the Supreme 
Court upheld an indefinite commitment scheme for insanity 
acquittees, citing with approval the reasoning that "because it is 
impossible to predict how long it will take for any given 
individual to recover -- or indeed whether he ever will recover --
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
43 
 Congress has chosen, as it has with respect to civil commitment, 
to leave the length of commitment indeterminate, subject to 
periodic review of the patient's suitability for release."  Jones, 
463 U.S. at 368.  Where, as here, one of the purposes of the 
commitment is to protect the public through incapacitation and 
treatment of dangerous mentally disturbed individuals who are 
substantially likely to engage in future acts of sexual violence, 
release properly hinges on the progress of treatment rather than 
any arbitrary date in time.  The commitment ends when this purpose 
is satisfied--when the committed person no longer poses a danger 
to the community as a sexually violent person. 
 
 
Chapter 980 must fail, argue Post and Oldakowski, because it 
does not provide for jury trials at discharge hearings, as does 
chapter 51.  In its review of chapter 975, Wisconsin's Sex Crimes 
Act, the United States Supreme Court commented that because 
commitments are based on social and legal as well as medical 
judgments, "the jury serves the critical function of introducing 
into the process a lay judgment, reflecting values generally held 
in the community, concerning the kinds of potential harm that 
justify the State in confining a person for compulsory treatment." 
 Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).  This court 
previously found, in a comparison of chapters 51 and 975, that 
denial of a jury trial only to the latter in recommitment 
proceedings violated equal protection.  Farrell, 59 Wis. 2d at 
168.  Similarly, we find in this instance that there is no 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
44 
justification for this distinction between chapter 51 and chapter 
980 and that equal protection demands that a right to a jury trial 
be made available at this important stage.  However, we stress 
that this conclusion is not fatal to the statute itself.   
 
This court has previously construed deficient statutes to 
include constitutionally required procedures.  State ex rel. Terry 
v. Schubert, 74 Wis. 2d 487, 498, 247 N.W.2d 109 (1976).  We do so 
again by holding that persons committed under chapter 980 must be 
afforded the right to request a jury for discharge hearings under 
§§ 980.09 and 980.10.  Because chapter 51 requires only a jury of 
six, the same will be made available upon request to chapter 980 
committed persons.  We note that the burden of proof for the state 
in such discharge hearings will remain clear and convincing, which 
comports with the level required in chapter 51 recommitment 
hearings.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 980.09(1)(b), 980.09(2)(b) and 
§ 51.20(13)(e).   
 
Finally, Post and Oldakowski argue that their right to equal 
protection under the law is violated because persons who may be 
equally dangerous (because they have the same mental disorders, 
the same proclivities and have committed the same crimes), but who 
are not currently incarcerated, are not affected by chapter 980.  
Both the Supreme Court and this court have rejected this "all or 
nothing" approach.  The Supreme Court has stated that the question 
is not whether state laws can go farther, indeed that "the 
legislature is free to recognize degrees of harm, and it may 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
45 
confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need 
is deemed to be clearest."  Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate 
Court of Ramsey County, Minn., 309 U.S. 270, 274-75 (1940), aff'g 
205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297 (1939).  In the same vein, this court 
has held that if "the law presumably hits the evil where it is 
most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other 
instances to which it might have been applied."  State v. Hart, 89 
Wis. 2d 58, 68-69, 277 N.W.2d 843 (1979) (quoting State ex rel. 
Baer v. Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 624, 634, 148 N.W.2d 21 (1967)).  We 
agree with the State that it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to "draw the line" if the legislature had attempted to 
craft a statute encompassing persons in the general community.  
The Supreme Court has recognized that "[a] statute does not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because it is not all-
embracing,"  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 370 (1927), and 
we find that the claim of underinclusiveness here is insufficient 
to sustain an equal protection challenge.   
 
In summary, the state has a compelling interest in protecting 
the public from dangerous mentally disordered persons and we find 
that its statutorily distinctive mechanisms, as found in chapter 
980, do not violate equal protection.  Also, we note the words of 
the Supreme Court regarding differential treatment of non-suspect 
classes: 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
46 
. . . where individuals in the group affected by a law have 
distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the 
State has the authority to implement, the courts have 
been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal 
system and with our respect for the separation of 
powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to 
whether, how, and to what extent those interests should 
be pursued.   
 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 441 
(1985).24  The legislature has chosen to provide a mechanism for 
the civil commitment of a narrowly defined group of persons who 
have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, are within 90 
days of release, and currently have a mental disorder that 
predisposes them to repeat that violent conduct.  We reiterate--
legislative enactments are presumed constitutional.  We find no 
infirmities in this scheme that adequately rebut that presumption. 
 
                     
    24  In this case, the Court utilized a rational basis standard 
in finding that a zoning ordinance prohibiting group homes for the 
mentally retarded violated the Equal Protection Clause. 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
47 
 
II.  CHAPTER 975 COMMITTED PERSONS 
 
 
Finally, Post and Oldakowski argue that the governor's 
partial veto of Special Session Assembly Bill 3 resulted in a gap 
in the newly created chapter 980 which makes it inapplicable to 
those committed pursuant to chapter 975, the Sex Crimes Act.25  An 
objective test is applied following a partial veto requiring what 
remains to be a "complete, entire, and workable law."  State ex 
rel. Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 706, 264 N.W.2d 539 (1978). 
  
Post and Oldakowski assert that the law following the veto is 
unworkable in that it: (1) did not repeal § 975.12 that specifies 
chapter 51 civil commitments as the exclusive means of extending a 
chapter 975 commitment; (2) does not abrogate the privileged 
nature of treatment records; and (3) provides no mechanism for 
notification of pending release of chapter 975 committed persons 
nor for transmission of otherwise confidential information to the 
appropriate authorities.     
 
 
We find Post and Oldakowski's claim that chapter 51 
proceedings provide the exclusive method to "extend" civil 
                     
    25  In his veto message dated May 26, 1994, the governor 
explained that, as drafted, the bill did not cover persons who had 
been committed under chapter 975.  His partial veto was 
specifically intended to bring those persons within the ambit of 
chapter 980.  This was accomplished by striking references to 
commitments ordered "under section 971.17" which covers insanity 
acquittees.  The remaining language merely refers to those within 
90 days of release from "a commitment order," (See Wis. Stat. §§  
980.02(1)(b)(2), 
980.02(4)(am), 
and 
980.02(4)(b)) 
"that 
was 
entered as a result of a sexually violent offense." (See Wis. 
Stat. § 980.02(2)(ag).) 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
48 
commitment of chapter 975 committed persons unpersuasive.  This 
argument centers on the language of § 975.12(1) which states that 
persons shall be discharged at the end of one year or the maximum 
term for the underlying offense for which they were convicted 
unless DHSS has petitioned for civil commitment under § 51.20.  We 
acknowledge that the veto did not repeal this section, but we find 
that point irrelevant.  A chapter 980 commitment is not an 
"extension" of any other type of commitment and § 975.12 does not 
limit the state's ability to seek a separate civil commitment 
under chapter 980. 
 
Post and Oldakowski originally argued that the veto failed to 
abrogate the physician-patient privilege of § 905.04(2) which 
prevents the use in court of confidential communications by a 
patient to any treatment provider.  At oral argument, Post and 
Oldakowski conceded that the general rule of physician-patient 
privilege is subject to exception once the mental state of the 
committed person becomes an issue at a hearing.  This concession 
was appropriate as this court has previously ruled that chapter 
975 continuation of control hearings fall within the statutory 
exception to privilege as "proceedings for hospitalization."  Wis. 
Stat. § 905.04(4)(a).  See State v. Cramer, 98 Wis. 2d 416, 425, 
296 N.W.2d 921 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 924 (1981) .  We 
conclude that both initial commitment and discharge hearings under 
chapter 980 are similarly "proceedings for hospitalization" which 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
49 
fall within the established exception to the privilege found in 
§ 905.04(4)(a).  
 
Post and Oldakowski's final claim, that the post-veto law 
does not provide mechanisms for notice or release of confidential 
information, rests on the following language in § 980.015: 
(2) If an agency with jurisdiction has control or custody 
over a person who may meet the criteria for commitment 
as 
a 
sexually 
violent 
person, 
the 
agency 
with 
jurisdiction shall inform each appropriate district 
attorney and the department of justice regarding the 
person as soon as possible beginning 3 months prior to 
the applicable date of the following: 
 
(a) 
The 
anticipated 
discharge 
from 
a 
sentence, 
anticipated release on parole or anticipated release 
from imprisonment of a person who has been convicted of 
a sexually violent offense. 
 
(b) The anticipated release from a secured correctional 
facility, as defined in s. 48.02(15m), of a person 
adjudicated delinquent under s. 48.34 on the basis of a 
sexually violent offense. 
 
(c) The termination or discharge of a person who has 
been found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by 
reason of mental disease or defect under s. 971.17. 
 
 
Post and Oldakowski read this to cover only persons 
imprisoned, adjudicated delinquent and placed in a secure 
correctional facility, or found not guilty by reason of mental 
disease or defect.  They reason that persons under chapter 975, 
committed in lieu of imprisonment, do not "fit" into any of the 
categories and therefore DHSS can neither supply notification of 
their pending release nor transmit their records.  Post and 
Oldakowski acknowledge that the legislature created a new 
exception to the confidentiality of treatment records that 
specifically allows access: 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
50 
To the department of justice or a district attorney under s. 
980.015(3)(b), 
if 
the 
treatment 
records 
are 
maintained by an agency with jurisdiction, as 
defined in s. 980.015(1), that has control or 
custody over a person who may meet the criteria for 
commitment as a sexually violent person under ch. 
980. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 51.30(4)(b)10m.  However, they assert that because 
persons committed under chapter 975 do not "fit" into the 
challenged language in § 980.015, the exception to confidentiality 
cannot be triggered. 
 
If an "agency with jurisdiction" (defined as the agency with 
the "authority or duty to release or discharge") has "control or 
custody over a person who may meet the criteria for commitment as 
a sexually violent person" it shall inform the DOJ or district 
attorney within 90 days of the anticipated discharge from sentence 
or release on parole of the status of such person.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.015.  
 
Under chapter 975, a person convicted of certain sexual 
offenses and found to be in need of specialized treatment could be 
committed to the custody of DHSS rather than sentenced to prison. 
Wis. Stat. §§ 975.001, and 975.06(2).  DHSS remains the agency 
with the authority to release on parole persons committed under 
chapter 975.  Wis. Stat. § 975.10.  Thus, chapter 975 committed 
persons clearly do "fit" within the category of persons described 
in § 980.015(2)(a) in that they may be released on parole 
following a conviction for a sexually violent offense.    
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357 
 
 
 
51 
 
We hold that the above language does not preclude but rather 
requires DHSS to provide notification of pending release and to 
transmit relevant treatment records concerning persons committed 
under chapter 975 whom DHSS deems may be candidates for commitment 
as sexually violent persons.  Wis. Stat. § 980.015(3)(b).  DHSS, 
as the agency with jurisdiction, has the obligation to provide DOJ 
or the district attorney with such information concerning all 
persons who might meet the statutory commitment criteria, i.e., 
those who: (1) have been convicted of a sexually violent offense 
(§ 980.02(2)(a)); (2) are within 90 days of discharge or release 
from a commitment order entered as a result of a sexually violent 
offense 
(§ 980.02(2)(ag)); 
(3) 
have 
a 
mental 
disorder 
(§ 980.02(2)(b)); and (4) are dangerous because that disorder 
creates a substantial probability that he or she will engage in 
acts of sexual violence (§ 980.02(2)(e)).  This description 
potentially encompasses persons committed under chapter 975 and 
the post-veto law in no way excludes them from coverage.   
 
We conclude that the governor's veto resulted in a complete 
and workable law that properly encompasses persons originally 
committed under chapter 975. 
 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed and 
the cause is remanded. 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.  (dissenting).   No one denies that 
the crimes precipitating the passage of chapter 980 are among the 
most heinous afflicting our society.  One can readily understand 
why the legislature, faced with such wrongs, sought redress 
through the enactment of chapter 980.  But much as I might 
empathize with the legislature and much as I might share the 
concerns which led to the passage of chapter 980, it is beyond 
reasonable doubt that chapter 980 is unconstitutional.  I join the 
many judges from Wisconsin26 and other jurisdictions27 who have 
found that similar statutes create unconstitutional preventive 
detention based primarily on predictions of dangerousness. 
 
In authorizing the incarceration of individuals on the basis 
of past crimes for which they have already served their sentences, 
chapter 980 violates constitutional provisions against double 
jeopardy and ex post facto laws.  In creating a circularly defined 
class of "sexually violent persons" who can be committed without 
evidence of mental illness and who could not be committed under 
                     
     26  Approximately one-half of the Wisconsin circuit court 
judges who have been faced with constitutional challenges to 
chapter 980 have found the statute unconstitutional. 
     27  See, e.g., Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (D. Wash. 
1995); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1994) cert. denied, 
115 S. Ct. 146 (1994) (three dissenting justices); In re Young, 
857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993), rev'd, Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 
744 (D. Wash. 1995) (three dissenting justices). 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
2 
Wisconsin's 
civil 
commitment 
law, 
chapter 
980 
violates 
constitutional guarantees of substantive due process and equal 
protection.  
 
The state cannot violate individual rights inscribed in the 
constitutions by creating special classes of individuals whose 
constitutional rights are diminished.  Although the end result may 
seem attractive, under our constitutions the state cannot simply 
lock people up on the supposition that they will be dangerous in 
the future when they have already served their sentences for 
crimes committed in the past.   
 
The 
legislative, executive 
and judicial branches have 
available other, constitutionally valid methods of addressing the 
dangers posed by violent criminals.  These methods include tougher 
and more stringent supervision of those on parole or conditional 
release, chapter 51 commitment, more intensive prison treatment 
programs, longer legislatively enacted sentences for crimes of 
sexual violence, and prosecutors' advocacy for and judges' 
imposition of lengthier or consecutive sentences at the time of 
sentencing.  Such responses to the dangers posed by sex offenders 
can protect the community without eroding the constitutional 
guarantees that protect all of us.  For the reasons set forth, I 
dissent.28   
                     
     28  I dissent from both majority opinions.  While State v. 
Carpenter is primarily addressed to the issues of double jeopardy 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
3 
 
I. 
 
The issue presented is whether chapter 980's restriction on 
liberty principally constitutes permissible civil commitment or 
impermissible punishment.  If chapter 980 is principally punitive, 
it violates the ex post facto and double jeopardy clauses of the 
Wisconsin and federal constitutions.29 
 
This court has explained that "[g]overnmental action is 
punishment under the double jeopardy clause if its principal 
purpose is punishment, retribution or deterrence.  When the 
principal purpose is nonpunitive, the fact that a punitive motive 
may also be present does not make the action punishment."  State 
v. Killebrew, 115 Wis. 2d 243, 251 (1983) (emphasis added).   
 
The language of chapter 980 provides insufficient evidence of 
remedial intent while its legislative history, purpose and effect 
(..continued) 
and the ex post facto clause and State v. Post is primarily 
addressed to the issues of substantive due process and equal 
protection, the four respondents do not divide their arguments in 
this manner.  Moreover, the consideration of these four issues 
together highlights tensions in the respective majority analyses 
that would not otherwise be apparent.  I address these tensions in 
Part III.  This dissent, then, responds to both majority opinions 
and addresses all four of the constitutional issues which they 
discuss.  
     29  To violate either the double jeopardy or ex post facto 
clauses, the government action under the statute must constitute 
punishment or create a criminal proceeding within the meaning of 
those clauses.  Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 46-52 (1990); 
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-51 (1989); State v. 
Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 695, 702-03, 524 N.W.2d 641 (1994); State v. 
Killebrew, 115 Wis. 2d 243, 246-51, 340 N.W.2d 470 (1983). 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
4 
provide overwhelming evidence of its principally punitive purpose. 
 In determining that chapter 980 passes constitutional muster, 
however, the majority opinion in State v. Carpenter relies on 
chapter 
980's 
language 
and 
structure 
while 
ignoring 
its 
legislative 
history, 
purpose 
and 
effect. 
 
This 
approach 
misconstrues the very U.S. Supreme Court precedent which, as the 
majority correctly observes, this court has consistently followed 
in interpreting the double jeopardy and ex post facto clauses of 
the Wisconsin and federal constitutions.  When correctly applied, 
the Supreme Court's test clearly reveals that chapter 980 violates 
the 
double 
jeopardy 
and 
ex 
post 
facto 
clauses 
in 
both 
constitutions.  
 
According to the majority opinion, "we look to the plain 
language of the statute as evidence of the legislature's intent," 
 State v. Carpenter, Majority op. at 14 (discussing possible 
double jeopardy violations), and "we must consider the language 
and structure of the statute to determine whether it serves a 
legitimate regulatory public purpose," Id. at 18 (discussing 
possible ex post facto violations).  The majority opinion points 
repeatedly to chapter 980's treatment provisions to conclude that 
the chapter is remedial rather than punitive.  For example, the 
majority opinion notes that "a person found to be sexually violent 
is committed to the custody of DHSS for control, care, and 
treatment, as opposed to the DOC for imprisonment."  Id. at 10.  
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
5 
The majority opinion thereby concludes that "[t]he emphasis on 
treatment in ch. 980 is evident from its plain language."  Id. 
 
If reference to treatment were sufficient to render a statute 
civil, however, chapter 302, governing state prisons and jails, 
would be transmogrified into a civil statute.  Arguably the most 
punitive of all the Wisconsin statutes, chapter 302 nevertheless 
refers to treatment 30 times; chapter 980 mentions treatment 9 
times.  Chapter 302 provides for "confinement, treatment, and 
rehabilitation" in Wisconsin's prisons;30 chapter 980 provides for 
"control, care, and treatment" of chapter 980 committees.31  One of 
the purposes of chapter 302 is "to provide a just, humane and 
efficient program of rehabilitation of offenders."32  Chapter 980 
contains no comparable statement evincing a purpose to provide 
treatment.  
 
Looking solely to the plain language of chapter 302, as the 
majority would have a court do, the court would conclude that 
chapter 302 manifests great concern with treatment and, applying 
                     
     30  Wis. Stat. § 302.25(1) (1993-94). 
     31  Wis. Stat. § 980.06(1) (1993-94). 
     32  Wis. Stat. § 301.001 (1993-94).  Chapter 51 (the Mental 
Health Act), which governs civil commitments, mentions treatment 
363 times.  The legislative policy in the Mental Health Act is "to 
assure 
the 
provision 
of 
a 
full 
range 
of 
treatment 
and 
rehabilitation services in the state for all mental disorders and 
developmental disabilities and for mental illness, alcoholism and 
other drug abuse." 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
6 
the majority opinion's reasoning, would conclude that the purpose 
and effect of the statute governing prisons is remedial.  But 
while both rehabilitation and treatment have long been among the 
justifications for imprisonment,33 their inclusion in the stated 
purpose and statutory language of chapter 302 does not alter the 
fact that the principal purpose of the statute governing prisons 
and jails is punishment.  Statutory language alone, then, cannot 
resolve the question of whether a statute containing remedial 
aspects is principally punitive in purpose.   
 
Nothing in the language of chapter 980 refers to the 
commitment it prescribes as a civil commitment.34  Even if chapter 
980 had expressly referred to its commitment procedures as civil, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly warned that a legislature's 
designation of a statute as "civil" or "remedial" rather than 
"punitive," "retributive" or "deterrent" is not determinative in 
gauging the principal purpose that statute actually serves.  
                     
     33  See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4 Encyclopedia 
of Crime and Justice 1336-45 (Sanford H. Kadish, ed. 1983); 1 
Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law 
§ 1.5, 32-33 (1986). 
     34  The word "civil" appears once in the title and relating 
clause of the Act creating chapter 980, stating that it is 
"relating to civil commitment of sexually violent persons."  LRB 
Drafting File for 1993 Act 479 (emphasis added).  The word "civil" 
also appears once in chapter 980 itself, but only with reference 
to the immunity from civil liability extended to state agency 
officials under the statute's victim notification provisions.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 980.015(4) (1993-94). 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
7 
Notwithstanding how a statute is labeled or characterized by the 
legislature, "a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes 
punishment when the sanction as applied in the individual case 
serves the goals of punishment . . . [A] civil sanction that 
cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but 
rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or 
deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand 
the term."35  Therefore, a court must look beyond a statute's 
                     
     35  Halper, 490 U.S. at 448 (emphasis added).   
 
 
In assessing a challenge to the double jeopardy clause, the 
Halper Court discounted the value of labels, stating as follows:   
 
[T]he labels "criminal" and "civil" are not of paramount 
importance.  It is commonly understood that civil 
proceedings may advance punitive as well as remedial 
goals, and, conversely, that both punitive and remedial 
goals may be served by criminal penalties . . . .  The 
notion of punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts 
across the division between the civil and the criminal 
law, and for the purposes of assessing whether a given 
sanction constitutes multiple punishment barred by the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, we must follow the notion where 
it leads . . . .  ("[T]he labels affixed either to the 
proceeding or to the relief imposed are not controlling 
and will not be allowed to defeat the applicable 
protections of federal constitutional law").   
 
Halper, 490 U.S. at 447-48 (citations omitted). 
 
 
See also Collins, 497 U.S. at 46 (how a statute is labeled is 
not controlling and should not "immunize it from scrutiny" in 
determining whether the constitutional prohibition against ex post 
facto laws has been violated, because "[s]ubtle ex post facto 
violations are no more permissible than overt ones," and the 
"constitutional prohibition is addressed to laws, 'whatever their 
form'"). 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
8 
language and structure and inquire further whether the statutory 
scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate 
the remedial aspects of the statute.  United States v. One 
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362-63 (1984) (citing 
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)).   
 
Not surprisingly, in exploring a statute's principal purpose, 
the Supreme Court has examined legislative history.  See, e.g.,  
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169-184 (1963); 
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 618-619 (1960).  Quoting 
Flemming, the majority opinion in State v. Carpenter asserts that 
courts should not look beyond the language of a statute in 
determining legislative intent.  State v. Carpenter, Majority op. 
at 13-14.  The Flemming Court did, however, look at legislative 
history in determining Congressional intent.  Flemming, 363 U.S. 
at 619.  The Flemming Court refers at length to previous Supreme 
Court cases in which the Court had relied upon such "Congressional 
history" or the "Court's first-hand acquaintance with the events 
and the mood" surrounding passage of a statute in determining that 
a nominally civil statute was actually punitive.  See, e.g., 
Flemming, 363 U.S. at 615.   
 
Noting that "only the clearest proof could suffice to 
establish the unconstitutionality of a statute" on the basis of 
legislative history, Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617, the Flemming Court 
concluded that the "meagre [legislative] history" available in 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
9 
relation to the statute at issue in that case was insufficient to 
prove Congress' punitive intent.  Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617-619.  
In contrast, as I explain below, all the legislative history of 
chapter 980 provides clear proof of its punitive purpose:  to 
reduce the likelihood that sexual predators might reoffend by 
prolonging their detention past the completion of their prison 
terms. 
 
The context in which a statute is passed assists in 
determining legislative intent.   
It is established practice in American legal processes to 
consider relevant information concerning the historical 
background of enactment in making decisions about how a 
statute is to be construed and applied . . . .  These 
extrinsic aids may show the circumstances under which 
the statute was passed, the mischief at which it was 
aimed and the object it was supposed to achieve. 
Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 48.03 at 
315 (1992) (note omitted).36  
 
The enactment of chapter 980 was preceded by a widely 
publicized, highly politicized and extremely emotional public 
debate following the release of the notorious sex offender Gerald 
Turner.37  In calling a special legislative session to enact 
                     
     36  See also Erdman v. Jovoco Inc., 181 Wis. 2d 736, 751, 512 
N.W.2d 487 (1994) (relying on fact that statute was passed during 
the Great Depression in adopting remedial construction). 
     37  Greg Rosenberg, The Legislative History and Implementation 
of Chapter 980, Wisconsin Defender, June-August 1995, at 4; Erich 
C. Straub & James E. Kachelski, The Constitutionality of 
Wisconsin's Sexual Predator Law, Wisconsin Lawyer, July 1995, 
at 15. 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
10 
chapter 980, Governor Tommy Thompson expressed the hope that "[w]e 
might be able to use this civil commitment procedure to keep them 
[i.e., convicted sex offenders] in jail."38  In equating civil 
commitment with jail, the Governor speaks volumes concerning the 
primarily punitive nature and purpose of chapter 980's allegedly 
civil commitment proceedings. 
 
Drafting requests and statements made by sponsors of 
legislation 
prior 
to 
enactment 
have 
long 
been 
considered 
authoritative in construing legislative intent.39  The stated views 
of Representative Lolita Schneiders, a legislator who sponsored 
chapter 980, make clear that its primary purpose is deterrence, 
one of "the traditional aims of punishment."  Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168.   
 
In her drafting request to the Legislative Reference Bureau 
for the first version of chapter 980, Representative Schneiders 
stated that the bill "seeks to place further restrictions on the 
                     
     38  Sexual predator bill sparks session call:  Offenders would 
be kept in jail, Milwaukee Sentinel, May 18, 1994, at A-11.  
     39  Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction 
§ 48.15 at 364 (1992); Bartus v. DHSS, 176 Wis. 2d 1063, 1075-76, 
501 N.W.2d 419 (1993) (drafting request of legislative sponsor 
indicative of legislative intent); Kelley Co., Inc. v. Marquardt, 
172 Wis. 2d 234, 248-49, 493 N.W.2d 68 (1992) (statements by 
bill's sponsor comprise "legislative history" revealing purpose of 
statute); Foerster, Inc. v. Atlas Metal Parts Co., 105 Wis. 2d 17, 
24, 313 N.W.2d 60 (1981) (statements by bill's sponsor, including 
a 
press 
release 
regarding 
the 
bill, 
provide 
evidence 
of 
legislative intent). 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
11 
most heinous of repeat sexual offenders" by insuring that "the 
prison stay [would] be lengthened" for any "predator" who remained 
"a significant threat to society."40  Representative Schneiders 
acknowledged in her request that "[t]hese predators are sane, not 
mentally ill" and opined that they are "highly resistant to 
change."  She sought legislation which would "mak[e] the offender 
face a lifetime of accountability and loss of liberty for engaging 
in [past] sexually assaultive acts."41 
 
Both the drafting file and the written views of those 
associated with the drafting process have also long been 
considered reliable indicia of legislative intent.42  The comments 
of the principal draftsman of chapter 980, Legislative Reference 
Bureau attorney Jeffrey Olsen, provide further evidence of the 
                     
     40 
 
Drafting 
Request 
Memo 
from 
Representative 
Lolita 
Schneiders to Bruce Feustel, Assistant Chief Counsel, Legislative 
Reference Bureau, LRB Drafting File for 1993 AB 955 (March 15, 
1993). 
     41  Id.  See also Lolita Schneiders, Putting a Stop to Sex 
Offenders, Milwaukee Journal, November 16, 1993, at A-15. 
     42  Bartus, 167 Wis. 2d at 1075-76; Robert Hansen Trucking, 
Inc. v. LIRC, 126 Wis. 2d 323, 336, 377 N.W.2d 151 (1985) ("this 
court has given weight to the written comments of those involved 
in drafting the legislation"); State v. Barkdoll, 99 Wis. 2d 163, 
176, 298 N.W.2d 539 (1980) (citations omitted) (written views of 
those involved with the drafting process "can properly be 
considered 
as 
an 
authoritative 
statement 
of 
legislative 
intention"); Bendorf v. City of Darlington, 31 Wis. 2d 570, 579, 
143 N.W.2d 449 (1966) (memo in drafting file by drafter of bill 
represents 
appropriate 
source 
of 
legislative 
history 
in 
determining meaning of bill). 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
12 
statute's punitive intent.  According to the draftsman, he 
understood that the legislative intent was "to make continued 
commitment of the person as secure as possible . . . ."43 
 
The events leading up to the passage of chapter 980 therefore 
confirm the statement of one circuit court judge who held chapter 
980 unconstitutional:  "[t]o suggest that this law is merely a 
benign exercise of the State's parens patriae authority without a 
significant punitive content is to ignore the reality of the 
political context in which this law was passed and the manner in 
which it was drafted."44   
 
The placement of chapter 980 within the Wisconsin statutes 
also lends support to the conclusion that its principal purpose is 
punitive rather than remedial.  Chapter 980 is placed squarely 
within the criminal portion of the Wisconsin statutes.  Although 
the state claims that this placement is not "significant to show 
the legislature intended to create a criminal statute,"45 Wisconsin 
case law suggests otherwise.  The "position of [a] section [of the 
statutes] in controversy is very persuasive as to its intent."  
Montreal Mining Co. v. State, 155 Wis. 245, 248, 144 N.W. 195 
(1913).  Although not itself dispositive, the fact that the 
                     
     43  Drafter's note to 2975/1 at 1 (October 25, 1993). 
     44  State v. Carpenter, No. 94-CF-1216 (Dane Co. July 22, 
1994). 
     45  State's Brief in State v. Carpenter at 16.   
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
13 
legislature placed an act in a particular section of the statutes 
can, when supplemented by other evidence, corroborate the 
impression that placement conveys.  State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 
73-74, 291 N.W.2d 809 (1980).   
 
Thus 
the 
legislative 
history 
of 
chapter 
980 
clearly 
demonstrates the extent to which this nominally remedial statute 
principally evinces a punitive purpose, namely the ongoing 
incarceration of convicted sex offenders who might otherwise be 
released. 
 
Furthermore, because chapter 980 requires that convicted sex 
offenders serve their criminal sentences before being committed 
under its auspices, the statute is inextricably linked to a 
punitive 
purpose 
and 
effect, 
notwithstanding 
its 
remedial 
features.46  Why would a legislature with a principal interest in 
treatment create a statute deliberately delaying the promised 
treatment and thereby exacerbating the alleged ills which it is 
designed to cure?  An individual's need for diagnosis and 
treatment does not surface only at the end of a prison term.  The 
                     
     46  Although the majority opinion in State v. Carpenter claims 
that "the mere fact that a prior conviction is a predicate of the 
current sanction does not render the current sanction punishment 
for the past offense," State v. Carpenter, Majority op. at 19, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has explained that conditioning the restraint 
of liberty on the commission of a crime is "significant of penal 
and prohibitory intent."  Dep't of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth 
Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1947 (1994) (quoting United States v. 
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935)). 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
14 
state's failure to mandate treatment prior to the completion of 
the punishment phase "strongly suggests that treatment is of 
secondary, rather than primary, concern."  Young v. Weston, 898 F. 
Supp 744, 753 (D. Wash. 1995).47 
 
The majority observes that treatment is already available to 
sex offenders within the prison setting and that chapter 980 is 
therefore reserved for those who have not fully availed themselves 
of previous treatment opportunities or for whom previous treatment 
has proven ineffective.  State v. Post, Majority op. at 20.  The 
statute, the majority continues, is structured "to cover only 
those demonstrated to be most in need of treatment" and is 
                     
     47  See also In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1024 (Johnson, J. 
dissenting) (when treatment for sex offenders follows rather than 
substitutes for prison sentences, this "timing alone is a strong 
indication that the legislature was less interested in treatment 
than in confinement" and demonstrates that while "the Statute 
provides for treatment, this goal is completely subordinated to 
punishment"); State v. Carpenter, No. 94-CF-1216 (Dane Co. July 
22, 1994) ("The fact that treatment is not offered until the end 
of an underlying prison sentence which may be many years after the 
last sexual offense strongly suggests that treatment is virtually 
an afterthought in this legislative scheme. Further, the fact that 
there is no requirement for a finding of amenability to treatment 
as required in Chapter 51 commitments bolsters this conclusion"); 
State v. Oldakowski and Post, Nos. 94-CF-1200-01, slip op. at 14, 
18 (Dane Co. Sept. 2, 1994) (suggesting that treatment is "an 
afterthought masking the real concern for keeping predators out of 
the community," since medical treatment models suggest that 
treatment is more effective when provided earlier); State v. 
Watson, No. 94-CF-2377 (Dane Co. April 7, 1995) (chapter 980's 
definition 
of 
"mental 
disorder" 
is 
a 
"characterological" 
description of persons whose potential to commit future sexually 
violent acts is based on past crimes rather than mental illness). 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
15 
therefore 
serious 
in 
pursuing 
the 
objective 
of 
providing 
treatment.  Id.  
 
The limited treatment available in prison belies this 
observation.  According to Raymond Wood, acting chief of the 
sexually violent person unit at the Wisconsin Department of 
Corrections' Wisconsin Resource Center, many incarcerated sex 
offenders currently wait as long as seven years before being 
transferred to an institution where full treatment might be 
available.48  Wood's testimony indicated that prison treatment 
programs are not "nearly as intensive" or "broad based" and "don't 
have the same number of components" as those available following 
civil commitment.  Wood also acknowledged that "there are 
differences between the way seclusion is used in a mental health 
                     
     48  One commentator asserts that such delays in treatment can 
reduce the prospect that treatment will succeed, because they 
allow the offender to implement defense mechanisms and cognitive 
distortions which, in turn, make it more difficult for the 
offender to accept responsibility for what he has done.  The 
passage of time also increases the risk of memory loss of events 
which are often poorly recalled to start with because of alcohol 
or 
substance 
abuse. 
 
Robert 
M. 
Wettstein, 
A 
Psychiatric 
Perspective on Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Statute, 15 
U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 597, 617 (1992).  Finally, even when 
prisons themselves offer treatment programs, the prison milieu 
reduces an offender's ability to benefit from treatment because 
prisons socialize an inmate "to avoid disclosing personal weakness 
or vulnerability, avoid taking responsibility for his crime, or 
reveal himself to be a sex offender for fear of retaliation."  Id. 
 See also Stephen J. Morse, Mentally Disordered Offenders, in 3 
Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, supra, at 1046, 1048 (treatment 
is minimal in prisons and in hospitals that house the criminally 
insane). 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
16 
facility and the way that segregation is used in a correctional 
facility" as well as a panoply of differences regarding the rights 
of the respective populations, the care and treatment owed to the 
respective populations, and the qualifications and standards 
expected of the respective staffs. 
 
Notwithstanding these differences, the majority opinion 
relies upon Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986), in claiming 
that chapter 980's imposition of commitment subsequent to a 
criminal sentence is not "fatal."  State v. Carpenter, Majority 
op. at 14-16.  In the Illinois statute under review in Allen, 
however, commitment was in lieu of rather than in addition to a 
prison sentence.  Hence the Illinois statutory scheme "was focused 
solely 
on 
providing 
treatment 
to 
mentally 
disordered 
sex 
offenders," demonstrating that "Illinois had 'disavowed any 
interest in punishment.'"  Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 752, 
(citing Allen, 478 U.S. at 370).   
 
This difference between the Illinois and Wisconsin statutes 
underscores the remedial nature of the Illinois statute and, by 
contrast, accents the punitive nature of chapter 980.  I conclude 
that the Allen decision renders chapter 980 unconstitutional.49 
                     
     49  In response to Allen, the second draft of chapter 980 
required the state to choose, within 60 days of a conviction or a 
finding of not guilty by reason of mental insanity, whether to 
pursue sentencing through a criminal proceeding or to file a 
petition for a civil commitment.  Though the legislature was 
advised that this change had been made in an effort to insulate 
the proposed law from a possible double jeopardy challenge, the 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
17 
 
To sum up, chapter 980's nominally remedial purpose is belied 
by a revealing paper trail of legislative history demonstrating 
its principally punitive purpose and effect.  Although one might 
fairly characterize treatment as one of chapter 980's purposes, 
careful analysis of the statute establishes that its primary 
purpose is punitive and therefore unconstitutional.  Chapter 980's 
professed concern with treatment is further compromised by the 
requirement that those slated for treatment under the statute 
first serve a full criminal sentence, thereby delaying that 
treatment, possibly for decades.   
 
According chapter 980 the presumption of constitutionality 
owing to every legislative enactment, I nevertheless conclude that 
these indicia of a punitive purpose and effect establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that chapter 980 violates the protections against 
double jeopardy and ex post facto laws incorporated in the 
Wisconsin and federal constitutions. 
 
II. 
 
The right to substantive due process "bars certain arbitrary, 
wrongful actions 'regardless of the fairness of the procedures 
used to implement them.'"  Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 
(1992) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)).  
(..continued) 
legislature nevertheless instructed the draftsman to redraft the 
bill so that after a sex offender had completed his prison term, 
the state could seek a chapter 980 commitment. 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
18 
Using a substantive due process analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has carefully circumscribed those occasions when the state may, 
for nonpunitive reasons, detain individuals and thereby deprive 
them of their constitutionally protected liberty.  Youngberg v. 
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 
425 (1979). According to the cases cited by the majority opinion, 
a state may not commit any person without clear and convincing 
evidence that the person is both mentally ill and dangerous.50   
 
 Because chapter 980 allows the commitment of individuals who 
are not both mentally ill and dangerous, I conclude that it 
violates substantive due process guarantees of the Wisconsin and 
federal constitutions.  Further, because there is no rational 
basis 
for 
authorizing 
civil 
commitment 
according 
to 
the  
substantive standards for commitment under  chapter 980 rather 
than those already available under current civil commitment  
standards, I also conclude that chapter 980 violates equal 
protection guarantees inscribed in both constitutions.  
 
A. 
 
The majority opinion in State v. Post, Majority op. at 13-18, 
acknowledges that "a mental condition component" is a requirement 
of substantive due process for commitment under chapter 980.  At 
                     
     50  Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1992); Jones v. 
United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983); Addington v. Texas, 441 
U.S. 418, 426 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); 
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
19 
the same time, the majority opinion in State v. Post  observes 
that the U.S. Supreme Court has never attempted to establish one 
constitutionally required definition of "mental illness," but has 
instead allowed the states some degree of latitude in developing 
their own definitions.  Id. at 14-15.51   
 
But a recognition that mental illness or the neologism 
"mental condition component" may be defined in more than one way 
hardly suggests that mental illness can be defined howsoever the 
state pleases.  If the constitutionally prescribed threshold of 
                     
     51  The two cases cited by the majority in discussing the 
states' power to define mental illness do not support the 
majority's broad assertion concerning a state's power to define 
mental illness for purposes of commitment.  See Addington, 441 
U.S. 418 (1979); Jones, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).   
 
 
First, the committees in both cases had been diagnosed as 
paranoid and schizophrenic, conditions universally associated with 
mental illness.   
 
 
Second, the issue in Addington is the standard of proof 
required in a civil commitment by the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
decision does not discuss the definition of mental illness.   
 
 
Finally, in Jones as well, the Court does not address whether 
the committee is mentally ill.  Jones, 463 U.S. at 363 n.11.  The 
Court 
upheld 
the 
legislative 
determination 
of 
procedures 
accompanying civil commitment in a context where the committee 
"himself advances insanity as a defense and proves that his 
criminal act was a product of mental illness."  Jones, 354 U.S. at 
367.  The sentence quoted by the majority opinion, State v. Post, 
Majority op. at 15, for the proposition that courts should defer 
to legislative judgments is followed by a caveat relating such 
deference to cases involving the insanity defense.  Jones, 463 
U.S. at 370. 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
20 
mental illness has no core meaning and can mean everything, then 
it means nothing.   
 
The Foucha case teaches that states are not free to define 
any deviancy they please as a mental illness and thereby commit to 
mental hospitals anyone who might fit their definition.  Were 
there no limit on a state's substantive power to commit 
individuals, a state could civilly commit whole categories of 
criminal offenders such as intoxicated drivers merely by branding 
them deviant and designating them mentally disordered.  The Foucha 
Court underscored this point in holding that an insanity acquittee 
with a diagnosed antisocial personality disorder could not be 
confined as mentally ill.  Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77-83.  
 
For even as the Foucha Court acknowledged that "psychiatrists 
widely disagree on what constitutes a mental illness," it 
nevertheless 
insisted 
that 
there 
was 
sufficient 
consensus 
regarding 
a 
definition 
to 
make 
specific 
and 
"reliable" 
determinations about who can be considered mentally ill for 
purposes of the constitutionally required threshold for civil 
commitment.  Foucha, 504 U.S. at 76 n.3.  If, however, mental 
illness  or a "mental condition component" means whatever a state 
claims it means, a constitutionally required threshold for 
deprivation of liberty would be transformed into a meaningless 
standard signifying whatever state legislatures want it to 
signify. 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
21 
 
As both the legislative history of chapter 980 and the 
records before us reveal, those involved in drafting, enacting and 
implementing chapter 980 understood very well that the broader, 
more nebulous notion of "mental disorder" required for chapter 980 
differed greatly from the "mental illness" required by the state 
and federal constitutions.  
 
In her original drafting memorandum to the Legislative 
Reference Bureau, Representative Schneiders stated that "[t]hese 
predators are sane, not mentally ill, despite the depraved nature 
of their crimes."52  The chief draftsman for chapter 980 recognized 
the constitutional problems inherent in the drafting request. 
"[A]s I have said before," he warned in raising problems with the 
term "mental disorder," "I am not confident that the law is being 
narrowly enough drawn because it is impossible to say who should 
be committed" on the basis of a mental disorder "we are not even 
sure exists."53  
 
The two psychologists who testified at Carpenter's probable 
cause hearing for commitment under chapter 980 acknowledged a 
distinction between the concepts of generic mental disorder and 
mental illness.  Dr. Wood testified that mental illness "may be a 
                     
     52 
 
Drafting 
Request 
Memo 
from 
Representative 
Lolita 
Schneiders to Bruce Feustel, Assistant Chief Counsel, Legislative 
Reference Bureau, LRB Drafting File for 1993 AB 955 (March 15, 
1993).   
     53  Drafter's Note to 2975/1 at 1 (October 25, 1993).  
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
22 
subset of that larger group of disorder[s] known as mental 
disorder" 
and 
included 
within 
the 
American 
Psychiatric 
Association's 
Diagnostic 
and 
Statistical 
Manual 
of 
Mental 
Disorders (4th ed. 1994) (DSM-IV).54  He also explained that 
"[m]ental illness is far more incapacitating in terms of reality 
appreciation, the standard sorts of tests that we might apply to 
determine if somebody was loosely speaking crazy or not."   
 
Greg Van Rybroek, clinical director of the Mendota Mental 
Health Institute, drew a similar contrast between mental disorders 
and mental illness, noting that "there is a distinction in terms 
of definition" and that "mental disorders are the broad big 
umbrella that all of us could fall under."  Among the disorders 
comprising this broad, big umbrella of mental disorder "that all 
of us could fall under" and included within the DSM-IV Manual are 
eating disorders such as anorexia and bulimia; sleeping disorders 
such 
as 
insomnia; 
caffeine-induced 
anxiety 
disorder; 
and 
agoraphobia (anxiety about being in places or situations from 
which escape is difficult).55 
                     
     54  The disorders incorporated within DSM-IV include the 
antisocial personality disorder with which both the acquittee in 
Foucha, 563 So. 2d 1138, 1141 n.2 (La. 1990), as well as three of 
the four prospective chapter 980 committees whose cases we now 
review were diagnosed. 
     55  DSM-IV, 213, 396, 439, 539-557. 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
23 
 
Finally "mental disorder" is defined in chapter 980 not in 
terms of mental illness, mental disease or mental defect but in 
terms of a predisposition to sexual crimes.  Under chapter 980 
"mental disorder" is "a congenital or acquired condition affecting 
the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to 
engage in acts of sexual violence."  Wis. Stat. § 980.01(2).  
Since every condition is necessarily either congenital or 
acquired, and since "emotional or volitional capacity" simply 
describes the decision-making processes affecting how people act, 
mental disorder under 
chapter 980 
means no 
more than a 
predisposition to engage in acts of sexual violence.   
 
Thus chapter 980 attempts to create a mental disorder 
authorizing lifetime commitment based not on mental illness but on 
past crimes for which the prospective committee has already served 
 the prescribed sentence.  This definition is entirely circular:  
a prospective committee's "mental disorder" is derived from past 
sexual offenses which, in turn, are used to establish a 
predisposition to commit future sexual offenses.56   
                     
     56  Wettstein, supra; J. Christopher Rideout, So What's in A 
Name?  A Rhetorical Reading of Washington's Sexually Violent 
Predators Act, 15 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 781, 793 (1991-92). 
 
 
See also Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 750 (finding that 
the Washington State statutory definition of "mental abnormality," 
which, like the definition of "mental disorder" under chapter 980, 
requires proof of "a congenital or acquired condition affecting 
the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person 
to 
the 
commission 
of 
criminal 
sexual 
acts," 
creates 
"an 
unacceptable tautology:  a sexually violent predator suffers from 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
24 
 
The 
majority 
opinions' 
attempt 
to 
uphold 
the 
constitutionality of chapter 980 by relying on a circular 
definition of mental disorder premised on dangerousness reveals 
that the true purpose of chapter 980 is to lock up those 
considered dangerous, regardless of whether they are mentally ill. 
 But dangerousness, standing alone, is not constitutionally 
sufficient to justify a civil commitment.  Such a rationale, 
warned the U.S. Supreme Court, would allow the state to 
incarcerate any "convicted criminal, even though he has completed 
his prison term."  Foucha, 504 U.S. at 82-83.  Indeed, such a 
rationale 
would 
be 
only 
"a 
step 
away 
from 
substituting 
confinements for dangerousness for our present system which, with 
only narrow exceptions and aside from permissible confinements for 
mental illness, incarcerates only those who are proved beyond 
reasonable doubt to have violated a criminal law."  Id. at 83.57  
(..continued) 
a mental condition that predisposes him or her to commit acts of 
sexual violence;" also finding that the term "personality 
disorder" "evokes a circular definitional structure in which the 
only observed characteristic of the disorder is the predisposition 
to commit sex crimes"); In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1021 (Johnson, J. 
dissenting) (definition of mental abnormality under the Washington 
statute is "circular" because "abnormality" "will be derived from 
the person's past sexual behavior, and this in turn will be used 
to establish the person's predisposition to future dangerous 
sexual behavior"); State v. Carpenter, No. 94-CF-1216 (Dane Co.) 
(chapter 980 deploys "a watered down version of the classically 
accepted definition of mental illness, us[ing] a circular 
definition that is an invitation to arbitrary and erroneous 
interpretation"). 
     57  One of those "narrow exceptions," the pretrial detention 
of dangerous arrestees permitted by the Bail Reform Act of 1984 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
25 
 
Despite this stern admonition, the majority opinion in State 
v. Post reads Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Foucha and this 
court's decision last term in State v. Randall, 192 Wis. 2d 800, 
532 N.W.2d 94 (1995), as allowing the state to prolong the 
confinement of potentially dangerous albeit sane individuals, so 
long as some medical justification for that confinement continues 
to exist.  State v. Post, Majority op. at 27-28.  But this reading 
relying on medical justification overstates both holdings.   
 
Both Foucha and Randall involved insanity acquittees who, but 
for original diagnoses that they were mentally ill, would have 
been required to serve prison sentences for the commission of 
their respective crimes.  The relationship between Foucha's and 
Randall's respective insanity acquittals and the length of time 
(..continued) 
(Act), was upheld in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 
(1987).  But the majority's reliance on this case for the 
proposition 
that 
danger-reducing 
confinement 
can 
justify 
constitutional violations, State v. Post, Majority op. at 29, is 
misplaced.  The Salerno Court upheld the Act because its 
legislative history evinced a regulatory rather than punitive 
purpose and because "[t]he Bail Reform Act carefully limits the 
circumstances under which detention may be sought," "[t]he 
arrestee is entitled to a prompt detention hearing," and "the 
maximum length of pretrial detention is limited by the stringent 
time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act."  Id. at 747.   
 
 
Having catalogued these features of the Act, the Foucha Court 
rejected Louisiana's reliance on Salerno to justify its continued 
confinement of an individual whom doctors had assessed as still 
dangerous but who was no longer mentally ill.  Foucha, 504 U.S. at 
81-82.  Neither, then, can Salerno  rescue chapter 980 which, in 
contrast to the Act, has a legislative history evincing punitive 
intent and which allows for potential lifetime incarceration 
rather than stringently limited pretrial detention.  
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
26 
they would have served if they had been found guilty factored 
heavily in both Justice O'Connor's and this court's assessments of 
how long they might be held under the aegis of medical 
justification once they had regained their sanity.  As Justice 
O'Connor noted in her Foucha concurrence, "the permissibility of 
holding an acquittee who is not mentally ill longer than a person 
convicted of the same crimes could be imprisoned is open to 
serious question."  Foucha, 504 U.S. at 88.  Similarly, this 
court's opinion in Randall, having noted that "[i]t is the 
determination of guilt which provides the basis for the state to 
incapacitate and treat the insanity acquittee," held that 
confinement must be strictly "limited to the maximum term which 
could have been imposed for the criminal conduct."  Randall, 192 
Wis. 2d at 833, 841.   
 
A commitment extending beyond the maximum prison term which 
could have been imposed, then, must meet the constitutional 
requirement articulated in Addington, Jones, and Foucha:  the 
state must establish that the prospective committee is not only 
dangerous, but also mentally ill.  Although the Supreme Court has 
not defined mental illness for purposes of commitment, the 
circular definition of mental disorder in chapter 980 is clearly 
inadequate; it is not "reliable enough to permit the courts to 
base civil commitments on clear and convincing medical evidence 
that a person is mentally ill."  Foucha, 504 U.S. at 76 n.3.  
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
27 
Instead, chapter 980, in the words of the amicus curiae brief 
filed by the Wisconsin Psychiatric Association, invests itself in 
the aura of science and asks clinicians to "compromise their 
professional integrity so that a constitutional gloss can be 
applied to something impermissible."  Brief of the Wisconsin 
Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae at 3. 
 
This gloss cannot, in my opinion, save chapter 980.  Because 
chapter 980 allows the indefinite confinement of persons who have 
not been found to be mentally ill, it is beyond a reasonable doubt 
that chapter 980 violates  substantive  due process protections. 
 
B. 
 
I turn now to the equal protection challenge.  Both the 
majority opinion and the state observe that for purposes of equal 
protection analysis, persons committed under chapter 980 are 
similarly situated to persons committed under chapter 51, 
Wisconsin's civil commitment statute.  State v. Post, Majority op. 
at 30; State's Brief in State v. Post at 13.  Consequently, the 
requirements for chapter 51 civil commitment must be harmonized 
with those for chapter 980 commitment.58  "Equal protection does 
not require that all persons be dealt with identically, but it 
does require that a distinction made have some relevance to the 
                     
     58  See also State ex rel. Farrell v. Stovall, 59 Wis. 2d 148, 
207 N.W.2d 809 (1973) (chapter 51 civil commitments and chapter 
975 sex crime offender commitments deal with similarly situated 
classes). 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
28 
purpose for which the classification is made."  Baxstrom v. 
Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966). 
 
A state cannot seek a civil commitment under one statute 
rather than another when the two statutes apply distinct 
substantive 
standards 
for 
commitment 
and 
afford 
distinct 
procedural protections for commitment unless those distinctions 
can be justified by a rational basis and a legitimate purpose.  
Chapter 980's circular definition of mental disorder is premised 
on dangerousness rather than on evidence of mental illness.  Just 
as 
dangerousness 
alone 
cannot 
justify 
civil 
commitment, 
dangerousness alone cannot justify distinct substantive commitment 
standards.  Because the distinctions separating chapter 980 from 
chapter 51 have no rational basis, I conclude that it is beyond a 
reasonable doubt that chapter 980 violates the equal protection 
guarantees of both the Wisconsin and federal constitutions.59   
 
Chapters 51 and 980 have similarities, as the majority 
opinion in State v. Post explains.  Both statutes concern persons 
with mental disorders.  Both contemplate the treatability of the 
individual and the prospect that the individual will prove 
dangerous to the public or to himself if left untreated.  But the 
                     
     59  Because I conclude that chapter 980 does not meet a 
rational basis standard, I join the majority in reserving for 
another day the question of which standard of constitutional 
review is appropriate when applying an equal protection analysis 
to a non-suspect class.  
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
29 
"mental disorder" required for a chapter 980 commitment is not 
equivalent to the types of "mental disorders" readily subsumed 
under chapter 51.  What is the rational basis for this difference? 
 The majority opinion does not answer this fundamental question.   
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has answered it, stating that "there 
is no conceivable basis for distinguishing the commitment of a 
person who is nearing the end of a penal term from all other civil 
commitments."  Foucha, 504 U.S. at 79 (quoting Baxstrom, 383 U.S. 
107 (1966)).  In the statute under review in Baxstrom, New York 
State allowed a person to be committed at the expiration of a 
penal sentence without the jury review that was available to all 
other persons civilly committed.  The state contended that the 
statute 
created 
a 
reasonable 
classification 
differentiating 
between the "criminally and dangerously insane" and the "insane." 
 The Court held that this distinction did not survive even a 
rational basis equal protection analysis.  Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 
111.  
 
In Baxstrom the Court made clear that equal protection 
requires a state to use the same standards and procedures for 
involuntary civil commitment of incarcerated persons that it uses 
for nonimprisoned individuals.  If at the end of a prison term a 
prisoner has been freed and "the state then decides to deprive him 
of liberty and stigmatize him with involuntary hospitalization, 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
30 
the ex-prisoner should be entitled to the same protections granted 
other citizens."60  
 
The Baxstrom Court was willing to acknowledge that especially 
dangerous committees might require different treatment once they 
were committed, but emphasized that dangerousness "has no 
relevance whatever" in "show[ing] whether a person is mentally ill 
at all."  Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 111.  Hence while post-commitment 
distinctions between committees with distinct treatment needs 
might be legitimate, the Baxstrom Court left no doubt that the 
initial commitment process itself must be applied equally to the 
entire class of prospective committees unless the state could 
offer a rational basis and a legitimate purpose for any 
differences.   
 
The majority opinion in State v. Post does not provide a 
rational basis for the difference in the commitment standards.  
Instead, it elides the distinction articulated in Baxstrom between 
the initial commitment and post-commitment treatment. See State v. 
Post, Majority op. at 34.  The majority opinion tries to salvage 
the statute from an equal protection challenge by stating that the 
"heightened level of dangerousness and the unique treatment needs 
of 
sexually 
violent 
persons 
justify 
distinct 
legislative 
approaches [to chapter 51 commitment of persons with mental 
                     
     60  Stephen J. Morse, Mentally Disordered Offenders, in 3 
Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, supra, at 1049. 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
31 
illness and chapter 980 commitment of persons with mental 
disorders] to further the compelling governmental purpose of 
protection of the public."  State v. Post, Majority op. at 35.  
But neither the language and structure of chapter 980 nor the 
majority opinion reveals why the particular treatment needs of 
allegedly "mentally disordered" sexually violent persons justify 
different substantive standards for civil commitment than those 
currently available under chapter 51. 
 
Because the majority cannot present a rational basis that 
might explain why chapter 980 adopts different substantive 
commitment standards than does chapter 51, the majority opinion's 
justification for the statutory distinctions reduces to no more 
than the threat of "heightened dangerousness" which chapter 980 
sexual offenders allegedly pose--a point the majority underscores 
repeatedly in its equal protection analysis.61    
                     
     61  In responding to arguments advanced by Post and 
Oldakowski, the majority itself refutes other possible bases for 
distinguishing chapter 51 committees from chapter 980 committees. 
 As 
the 
majority 
points 
out, 
for 
example, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(ar) already waives its general requirement that those 
committed evince dangerousness through a recent overt act if the 
prospective committee, like every potential chapter 980 committee, 
is currently imprisoned.  State v. Post, Majority op. at 36-37.  
And as the majority also points out, Wisconsin case law allows the 
commitment under chapter 51 of even those who, like many potential 
committees under chapter 980, might be unamenable or hostile to 
treatment.  C.J. v. State, 120 Wis. 2d 355, 354 N.W.2d 219 (Ct. 
App. 1984); State v. Post, Majority op. at 35-37.  
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
32 
 
But 
as 
Baxstrom 
and 
Foucha 
make 
clear, 
"heightened 
dangerousness" does not pass muster under equal protection 
analysis.  "The Supreme Court has never upheld a lifetime 
preventive detention scheme for those who are feared dangerous."  
In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1023 (Wash. 1993) (Johnson, J. 
dissenting), rev'd, Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (D. Wash. 
1995).  
 
For the reasons stated, I conclude that chapter 980 violates 
the equal protection guarantees of the Wisconsin and federal 
constitutions.  
 
III. 
 
Although they address distinct constitutional issues, both 
majority opinions fail to salvage chapter 980 for the same reason: 
 they are unable to demonstrate that chapter 980 is principally 
concerned with addressing the treatment needs of persons who are 
both mentally ill and dangerous.  But the tension between the 
majority opinions' respective attempts to demonstrate that chapter 
980 meets the crucial constitutional prerequisites for civil 
commitment (mental illness and dangerousness) cannot be resolved. 
 
In order to surmount ex post facto and double jeopardy 
challenges, the majority opinion in State v. Carpenter must 
demonstrate that chapter 980's principal purpose is to provide 
treatment and that the statute is thereby civil and remedial 
rather than punitive.   
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
33 
 
In order to surmount substantive due process and equal 
protection challenges, the majority opinion in State v. Post must 
demonstrate that the prospective committees under chapter 980 are 
mentally ill.  But because chapter 980's circular definition of 
mental disorder substitutes dangerousness for evidence of mental 
illness, the majority opinion in State v. Post is compelled to 
rely heavily on the threat of heightened dangerousness which 
prospective 980 committees allegedly pose.   
 
To the extent that the majority opinion in State v. Post 
emphasizes dangerousness to society at large rather than treatment 
for the mentally ill, it undercuts the thrust of the argument 
advanced in State v. Carpenter that chapter 980 is principally a 
civil statute advancing the remedial purpose of providing 
treatment rather than principally a punitive statute advancing the 
deterrent purpose of preventing harm.   
 
Conversely, the emphasis on treatment in State v. Carpenter 
makes all the more glaring State v. Post's inability to offer a 
rational basis for separate chapter 980 and chapter 51 substantive 
commitment  standards and its consequent reliance on dangerousness 
as the primary justification for chapter 980 civil commitments.   
 
In 
dividing 
the 
task 
of 
preserving 
chapter 
980's 
constitutionality, the majority opinions have only emphasized the 
problem intrinsic to chapter 980:  Despite its attempt to recast 
punishment as "treatment for the good of the criminal," chapter 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
34 
980 punishes rather than treats; its focus is on dangerousness and 
deterrence rather than on  mental illness,  mental disorder, or a 
"mental condition component."  And most important, in their 
approach to the problem posed by violent sex offenders, chapter 
980 and the majority foster legal fictions which are in themselves 
dangerous. 
 
For the reasons set forth, I conclude that it is beyond 
reasonable doubt that in enacting chapter 980 the legislature has 
adopted 
an 
unconstitutional 
method 
to 
achieve 
its 
goals.  
Accordingly, I dissent.  
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-2356 and 94-2357 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
94-2356- 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
 
 
  
v. 
 
 
 
Samuel E. Post, 
 
 
 
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
94-2357 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Ben R. Oldakowski, 
 
 
 
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
December 8, 1995 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
September 5, 1995 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
STUART A. SCHWARTZ 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., dissents (Opinion Filed) 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the petitioner-appellant the cause was argued 
by Sally L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
Nos. 94-2356, 94-2357.ssa 
 
 
94-2356 and 94-2357 
 
 
 
For the respondents-respondents the cause was argued by 
Kenneth P. Casey, assistant state public defender, with whom on 
the brief was Keith A. Findley and Richard Martin, assistant state 
public defenders.