Title: Torrence v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 555, 2004
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 2, 2005

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DESMOND TORRENCE, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 555, 2004     
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 0205014445 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  October 19, 2005 
 
 
Decided:     November 2, 2005 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 2nd day of November 2005, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1. Desmond Torrence, the defendant-below, appeals his conviction of 
felony murder, first-degree robbery, two associated firearms charges, and second-
degree conspiracy.  Torrence was acquitted of intentional first-degree murder, an 
associated firearms charge, and wearing a disguise during the commission of a 
felony.  Torrence claims that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion for 
judgment of acquittal because at trial the State provided evidence only in support 
of its theory that he (Torrence) was the shooter, yet the verdict of not guilty on the 
“disguise” charge established that the jury rejected that theory and found that 
 
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Torrence was not the shooter, but the getaway driver.  As only the getaway driver 
(Torrence argues), the State presented insufficient evidence to support his 
conviction.  We find that there was sufficient evidence to support the entire jury 
verdict and, accordingly, we affirm. 
 
2. On March 20, 2002, two masked men robbed at gunpoint the clerk of 
the Travelodge in New Castle, Delaware.  As the men left the motel with the 
money, one turned and shot the clerk in the face, killing him.  The two robbers 
escaped in a getaway car driven by a third man.  The entire incident was caught on 
surveillance tape, but no physical evidence was recovered to link anyone to the 
crime. 
 
3. During a police interrogation on an unrelated matter two months later, 
Ernest Cooper revealed that he, Stephen Kattes, and Torrence had committed the 
Travelodge robbery and murder.  Torrence and Kattes were later arrested.  Kattes 
and Cooper pled guilty to first-degree robbery, to an associated firearm charge, and 
to second-degree conspiracy.  In return, they testified against Torrence, who denied 
any involvement in the crime.    
 
4. At trial, Cooper testified that he and Torrence had rented a room at the 
Travelodge for several weeks where they kept and sold drugs and stored drug 
money.  According to Cooper, they believed that cleaning personnel at the motel 
had stolen some of their drugs.  Consequently, they, along with Kattes, decided to 
 
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rob the motel in retaliation.  Cooper testified that he gave Torrence a gun on the 
day of the robbery, and that on the night of the robbery, he dropped Torrence and 
Kattes off near the Travelodge (although he did not see them enter the motel).  
Cooper remained in the car because he would be recognized because of his height.1   
 
5. Cooper then testified that he heard a gunshot, and saw Kattes and 
Torrence run down the hill and get into his car.  While in the car, Torrence told 
them that he had shot the clerk.  Cooper testified that both assailants wore 
sweatshirts (Kattes’ being black and Torrence’s being blue) and that one wore a 
bandana, which was stashed in Cooper’s car after the robbery.  At trial, Cooper 
also identified Kattes and Torrence in the surveillance video by their shoes, which 
he had seen them wear earlier that day.2    Kattes’ trial testimony generally 
corroborated the trial testimony of Cooper.   
6. 
During their deliberations, the jury asked three questions that 
suggested some doubt that Torrence was the gunman.  Specifically, the jury asked 
whether a person who did not hold the gun could be guilty of robbery in the first 
degree.  The Court responded yes, under the theory of accomplice liability.  The 
jury also asked whether, if a person was the getaway driver, that person was in 
                                                 
1 Kattes and Torrence are similar in height and build, whereas Cooper is over six feet tall.  After 
analyzing the surveillance tape, an FBI agent testified at trial that the masked robbers were of 
similar height. 
 
2 Police later recovered the bandana at Kattes’ home, and the sweatshirts and a pair of shoes 
similar to those in the surveillance tape were found in a car behind Cooper’s grandmother’s 
home. 
 
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possession of a weapon if he knew the robbery was being committed with a gun.  
Again, the Court answered yes.  Lastly, the jury asked whether, if a person was the 
getaway driver, that person was in possession of a weapon if he did not know a 
robbery was being committed with a gun.  The Court answered no.  The jury found 
Torrence not guilty of the offense of intentional first-degree murder, an associated 
firearms charge, and wearing a disguise during the commission of a felony, but 
found him guilty of felony murder, first-degree robbery, two associated firearms 
charges, and second-degree conspiracy. 
7. 
Before the penalty phase, Torrence moved for judgment of acquittal, 
arguing that given the jury’s questions to the court and the not guilty verdict on the 
disguise charge, the jury must have found that he was the getaway driver.  In his 
motion, Torrence contended that, because the State provided evidence to support 
only its theory that Torrence was the shooter, but not the getaway driver, there was 
insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict against him.   
8. 
The Superior Court denied Torrence’s motion for acquittal.  In its 
sentencing opinion, the Court found that the verdict more likely reflected the jury’s 
indecision as to precisely what role Torrence played in the robbery, but nonetheless 
demonstrated the jury’s belief that Torrence was certainly a participant.  The 
Superior Court held that “the jury must have been satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was an accomplice to the murder and robbery, but not 
 
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convinced that he was the trigger-man.”3  For that reason, the Superior Court 
declined to impose the death penalty upon Torrence.   
9. 
This Court reviews the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal to 
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt after considering all of the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution.4  In that analysis, the Court does not 
distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence.5  The jury, as the sole 
judge of the credibility of witnesses, is free to accept the testimony of some 
witnesses and reject the testimony of others.6  Thus, the determination of facts, and 
the inferences from those facts, is the province of the jury and this Court cannot set 
aside the jury’s findings unless no evidence is presented to the jury upon which the  
verdict could reasonably be based.7 
10. 
Torrence’s argument on appeal is without merit.  The jury’s acquittal 
of Torrence on the “wearing a disguise” charge appears to be an exercise of jury 
lenity.  Because there was no evidence that Torrence was the driver, it is inferable 
                                                 
3 Super. Ct. Sentencing Op., at ¶5. 
 
4 Dixon v. State, 567 A.2d 854, 857 (Del. 1989) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 
(1979)).  See also Hardin v. State, 844 A.2d 982, 989-90 (Del. 2004). 
 
5 Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1120 (Del. 1990). 
 
6 Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1363 (Del. 1992). 
 
7 Id.  See also State v. Thomas, 75 A.2d 218, 218 (Del. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1950). 
 
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that he must have worn a mask, but the jury acquitted him of that charge.  “When 
supported by sufficient evidence, arguably inconsistent jury findings will not be 
disturbed if they are the product of jury lenity.”8   
11. 
The jury was free to believe the testimony of Kattes and Cooper that 
Torrence was a participant in the robbery, but the jury was also entitled to 
reasonably doubt their testimony that Torrence was the shooter.  By doing so, the 
jury, through its verdict, influenced the Superior Court not to impose the death 
penalty.  Cooper’s and Kattes’ testimony constituted evidence that Torrence was 
involved in the planning and commission of the robbery, that Torrence knew that a 
gun was being used in furtherance thereof, and that whether directly or as an 
accomplice, Torrence recklessly caused the death of the Travelodge clerk after 
forcing him to hand over the money at gunpoint.   
12. 
Considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and 
accepting Kattes’ and Cooper’s testimony as true, that evidence established a 
reasonable basis for the jury to convict Torrence of the felony murder, robbery, 
conspiracy and the associated firearms charges under the theory of accomplice 
liability.   
                                                 
8 Garvey v. State, 873 A.2d 291, 296 (Del. 2005).   
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the Superior 
Court are AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
                      
 
        Justice