Title: Ex parte Bessemer Board of Education et al. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: Bessemer Board of Education et al. v. Jean Minor)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1041932
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 4, 2011

Rel: 02/04/2011
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
____________________
1041932
____________________
Ex parte Bessemer Board of Education et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Bessemer Board of Education et al.
v.
Jean Minor)
____________________
1050037
____________________
Ex parte Ed Richardson, as superintendent of the Alabama
Department of Education, et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Ed Richardson, individually and as superintendent of
the Alabama Department of Education, et al.
v.
Jean Minor)
Dr. Joseph B. Morton succeeded Ed Richardson as
1
superintendent of the Department in 2004; it is unclear
whether the named officials of the Bessemer School System
still occupy those positions.  However, Rule 25(d), Ala. R.
Civ. P., and Rule 43(b), Ala. R. App. P., provide that if a
public officer is a party to an action or an appeal in an
official capacity and the officer ceases to hold office during
the pendency of the action or the appeal, the officer's
successor is automatically substituted as a party.
2
(Proceedings from Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer
Division, CV-01-792)
PARKER, Justice.
The Alabama Department of Education ("the Department");
Ed Richardson, as superintendent of the Department; Wayland
Blake, as the appointed chief financial officer of the
Bessemer School System; Marvin Taylor, Sr., Marvin Taylor,
Jr., and Michael Taylor, as appointed financial officers of
the Bessemer School System; and Alan Stevens, as the appointed
chief administrative officer of the Bessemer School System
(hereinafter 
collectively 
referred 
to 
as 
"the 
State
defendants") (case no. 1050037),  and the Bessemer Board of
1
Education ("the Bessemer Board") and its members in their
official capacities (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"the Bessemer Board defendants") (case no. 1041932) separately
appealed the trial court's order in favor of Jean Minor, a
1041932; 1050037
3
teacher in the Bessemer School System.  Because the trial
court's order is not final and the Bessemer Board defendants
and the State defendants are seeking review of an order
denying their claims of immunity, we treat the appeals as
petitions for a writ of mandamus.  In case no. 1041932, we
deny the Bessemer Board defendants' petition in part and grant
it in part, and, in case no. 1050037, we deny the State
defendants' petition in part and grant it in part.
Facts and Procedural History
In March 2000, the Alabama State Board of Education
assumed control over the finances of the Bessemer School
System.  The State Board of Education authorized Richardson,
as superintendent of the Department, to appoint a chief
financial officer for the Bessemer School System under §
16-6B-4, Ala. Code 1975.  Richardson appointed Blake to that
position.  In May 2000, the Alabama Legislature enacted § 16-
22-13.1, Ala. Code 1975, which provided percentage pay
increases 
for 
public-education employees 
based on the
employee's number of years of experience.  The pay increases
were effective for the fiscal year beginning October 1, 2000.
At that time, Minor was employed as a teacher by the Bessemer
1041932; 1050037
Originally, this lawsuit involved other plaintiffs and
2
raised issues concerning transfer, termination, and tenure of
teachers in the Bessemer School System.  This Court decided
those issues in Richardson v. Terry, 893 So.  2d 277 (Ala.
2004).  The claim involving the calculation of the pay
increase is the only claim that remains to be resolved.
4
Board.  Under the statute, Minor's years of experience
entitled her to a 5.5% pay increase.  Marvin Taylor, Sr., an
appointed financial officer of the Bessemer School System,
determined the method to be used in calculating the salary
increases for the teachers employed by the Bessemer Board, and
the teachers were paid accordingly.  On March 11, 2004, the
State Board of Education returned all financial control of the
Bessemer School System to the Bessemer Board.
In 2001, Minor, individually and on behalf of other
similarly situated employees, sued the State defendants and
the Bessemer Board defendants, claiming that her statutory pay
raise had been miscalculated.   Minor sought backpay for the
2
2000-2001 fiscal year and sought to have the amount of her pay
recalculated for ensuing years.  Minor also made a general
allegation that she had been denied "due process of law" and
requested "relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including
attorneys' fees per 42 U.S.C. § 1988."
1041932; 1050037
5
The Bessemer Board defendants and the State defendants
moved to dismiss the complaint or for a summary judgment.
They contended that they are entitled to immunity from Minor's
action and that the teachers' pay increase was computed
correctly.  Minor also moved for a summary judgment.
On March 8, 2005, the trial court entered an order
dismissing all claims against the Bessemer Board defendants on
the basis of sovereign immunity.  On March 11, 2005, the trial
court entered a summary judgment in favor of Marvin Taylor,
Sr., Marvin Taylor, Jr., Michael Taylor, and Wayland Blake on
the bases of sovereign immunity and qualified immunity.  On
March 29, 2005, the trial court entered an order in the case-
action summary declaring that the March 8, 2005, order should
be considered a "final order" as to all claims and all
parties.
On April 6, 2005, Minor moved "to alter or amend the
judgment."  On April 23, 2005, the trial court granted Minor's
motion, entered a judgment in favor of Minor, and vacated "the
judgment(s) previously entered in this case during March
2005."
1041932; 1050037
6
In the April 23, 2005, order, the trial court recognized
that "the [Bessemer Board] as a legal entity is and always has
been the employer and the entity with the legal obligation to
pay [Minor] the correct salary."  The trial court explained
that based on Alabama Agricultural & Mechanical University v.
Jones, 895 So. 2d 867 (Ala. 2004), the Bessemer Board
defendants were not entitled to immunity because, it reasoned,
the Bessemer Board had no discretion to refuse to pay Minor
the appropriate salary increase under § 16-22-13.1, Ala. Code
1975, and because Minor was seeking "a liquidated measure of
money."  The trial court held that "the claims against the
individual defendants in their individual capacities do not
need to be addressed; those claims are moot, in that no
additional relief would be awarded against the individual-
capacity defendants that is not being awarded against the
[Bessemer Board] and the defendants in their official
capacities."  The trial court ordered
"[the Bessemer Board], and the individual defendants
in their official capacities, to pay Plaintiff Jean
Minor the correct salary (i.e., calculated in the
manner that Plaintiffs seek) for fiscal years 2000-
2001 and 2001-2002, plus interest from the date such
money was owed.  It is the Court's understanding
from the summary judgment submissions that the
principal amount for each of those years is
1041932; 1050037
Contra Rule 23(c)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. ("As soon as
3
practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is
to be so maintained.").
7
approximately $552; if the parties are unable to
agree on the calculation of the exact amount, and
the amount of interest, the Court will resolve that
dispute on appropriate motion."
The trial court also noted that 
"the issue of class certification is pending for
decision.[ ]  In expectation of a decision on that
3
issue, and in order to expedite a final judgment in
this case, the court orders the parties to promptly
engage in the necessary discovery and exchange of
information necessary to reach a stipulation, if at
all possible, on the amount of relief that would be
awarded to other class members if the class is
certified."
The order did not specifically mention the State defendants.
On May 9, 2005, the Bessemer Board defendants filed a
motion to alter, amend, or vacate the April 23, 2005, order.
On May 23, 2005, the State defendants filed a motion to alter,
amend, or vacate the April 23, 2005, order.  The trial court
did not rule on either motion.  
On September 23, 2005, the State defendants moved to
amend the trial court's April 23, 2005, order nunc pro tunc to
reflect whether the trial court's March 11, 2005, order
remained a final order as to the State defendants.  That
1041932; 1050037
Minor's Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to alter,
4
amend, or vacate the judgment was filed by "Plaintiff Jean
Minor, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,"
i.e., the purported class.  The trial court's last order
provided relief for Minor alone, while purporting to hold the
issue of class certification for further resolution.  Thus,
Minor alone, out of the named plaintiffs in the original
complaint, is the only plaintiff before this Court.
8
motion stated that the April 23, 2005, order appeared to enter
a judgment against only the Bessemer Board defendants.  The
trial court did not rule on that motion.
On September 21, 2005, the Bessemer Board defendants
filed a notice of appeal to this Court from the trial court's
April 23, 2005, order (case no. 1041932).  The State
defendants filed a notice of appeal to this Court from that
same order on September 30, 2005 (case no. 1050037).   We have
4
consolidated those appeals for the purpose of writing one
opinion, and as stated earlier we are treating the appeals,
which challenge an order denying claims of immunity, as
petitions for a writ of mandamus.
Standard of Review
The standard of review applicable to a petition for a
writ of mandamus is well settled:
"'Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and
requires a showing that there is: "(1) a clear legal
right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
1041932; 1050037
To constitute a final judgment:
5
9
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court." Ex parte Edgar, 543 So.
2d 682, 684 (Ala. 1989); Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586
So. 2d 889, 891 (Ala. 1991); Ex parte Johnson, 638
So. 2d 772, 773 (Ala. 1994).' Ex parte Gates, 675
So. 2d 371, 374 (Ala. 1996). See also Ex parte
Waites, 736 So. 2d 550, 553 (Ala. 1999)."
Ex parte Inverness Constr. Co., 775 So. 2d 153, 156 (Ala.
2000). In reviewing a trial court's application of the law to
undisputed facts, we apply a de novo standard of review. Ex
parte J.E., 1 So. 3d 1002, 1008 (Ala. 2008).
Discussion
The Bessemer Board defendants and the State defendants
argue that the trial court erred in refusing to grant them
immunity from liability in Minor's action against them.  Minor
responds that the appeals should be dismissed because, she
says, the trial court's April 23, 2005, order did not
constitute a final judgment and, thus, was not appealable.
We agree that the trial court's April 23, 2005, order did
not constitute a final judgment, but, because they challenge
an order denying a claim of immunity, we are treating the
appeals as petitions for a writ of mandamus.5
1041932; 1050037
"All matters should be decided; damages should be
assessed with specificity leaving the parties with
nothing to determine on their own. A judgment for
damages to be final must, therefore, be for a sum
certain determinable without resort to extraneous
facts. Gandy v. Hagler, [245 Ala. 167, 16 So. 2d 303
(1944)]; Drane v. King, 21 Ala. 556 [(1852)('Without
resort to any extraneous fact, we can ascertain the
precise amount of this recovery.  It is therefore
certain; for "id certum est quod certum reddi
potest" [that is certain which may be rendered
certain].')]."
Jewell v. Jackson & Whitsitt Cotton Co., 331 So. 2d 623, 625
(Ala. 1976); see also Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London
v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 939 So. 2d 21, 27-28 (Ala. 2006)
(holding that a judgment is not final when the amount of
damages has not been fixed). 
In the present case, the trial court's April 23, 2005,
order does not specifically establish the amount due under the
statute, and it explicitly states that "if the parties are
unable to agree on the calculation of the exact amount, and
the amount of interest, the Court will resolve that dispute on
appropriate motion"; thus, it leaves the parties with
something to determine on their own and leaves open the
possibility 
of 
further 
action 
by 
the 
trial 
court.
Furthermore, the order awarded prejudgment interest but did
not set the amount of interest or the specific date from which
the interest was awarded. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Sweet Music,
S.A., 482 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that a judgment
that determined part of the damages (the principal amount) but
did not determine the amount of prejudgment interest was not
a final judgment) (cited with approval in Precision American
Corp. v. Leasing Serv. Corp., 505 So. 2d 380, 381-82 (Ala.
1987)).  Therefore, the trial court's April 23, 2005, order
did not constitute a final judgment.
10
This Court has held that the manner in which a party
styles its request for relief is not determinative, and, when
1041932; 1050037
11
appropriate, we have treated a filing, although in the form of
an appeal, as a petition for a writ of mandamus. See, e.g.,
Morrison Rests., Inc. v. Homestead Village of Fairhope, Ltd.,
710 So. 2d 905 (Ala. 1998).  Furthermore, "a petition for a
writ of mandamus is an appropriate means for seeking review of
an order denying a claim of immunity." Ex parte Butts, 775 So.
2d 173, 176 (Ala. 2000) (citing Ex parte Alabama Dep't of
Forensic Sciences, 709 So. 2d 455 (Ala. 1997)).  Accordingly,
in the present case, we treat the appeals as petitions for a
writ of mandamus.
The Bessemer Board defendants and the State defendants
argue that under Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const. 1901, they are
entitled to immunity from Minor's state-law claim that her
statutory pay increase was miscalculated.  Article I, § 14,
Ala. Const. 1901, provides that "the State of Alabama shall
never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity."
"Under Ala. Const. of 1901, § 14, the State of Alabama has
absolute immunity from lawsuits. This absolute immunity
extends to arms or agencies of the state ...." Ex parte
Tuscaloosa County, 796 So. 2d 1100, 1103 (Ala. 2000).  Local
school boards are agencies of the State, not of the local
1041932; 1050037
12
governmental units they serve, and they are entitled to the
same absolute immunity as other agencies of the State. Ex
parte Hale County Bd. of Educ., 14 So. 3d 844, 848-49 (Ala.
2009).  
In Alabama Department of Transportation v. Harbert
International, Inc., 990 So. 2d 831 (Ala. 2008), this Court
held: "Not only is the State immune from suit under § 14, but
'[t]he State cannot be sued indirectly by suing an officer in
his or her official capacity ....'" 990 So. 2d at 839 (quoting
Lyons v. River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So. 2d 257, 261 (Ala.
2003)).  This Court further held: 
"The immunity afforded State officers sued in
their 
official 
capacities, 
however, 
is 
not
unlimited:
"'[Section 14] immunity from suit does not
extend, in all instances, to officers of
the 
State 
acting 
in 
their 
official
capacity. Unzicker v. State, 346 So. 2d 931
(Ala. 1977). In limited circumstances the
writ of mandamus will lie to require action
of state officials. This is true where
discretion is exhausted and that which
remains to be done is a ministerial act.
See Hardin v. Fullilove Excavating Co.,
Inc., 353 So. 2d 779 (Ala. 1977); Tennessee
& Coosa R.R. Co. v. Moore, 36 Ala. 371
(1860). Action may be enjoined if illegal,
fraudulent, unauthorized, done in bad faith
or under a mistaken interpretation of law.
Wallace v. Board of Education of Montgomery
1041932; 1050037
13
Co., 280 Ala. 635, 197 So. 2d 428 (1967).
If judgment or discretion is abused, and
exercised in an arbitrary or capricious
manner, mandamus will lie to compel a
proper exercise thereof. The writ will not
lie to direct the manner of exercising
discretion and neither will it lie to
compel the performance of a duty in a
certain manner where the performance of
that duty rests upon an ascertainment of
facts, or the existence of conditions, to
be determined by an officer in his judgment
or discretion. See Barnes v. State, 274
Ala. 705, 151 So. 2d 619 (1963).'
"McDowell-Purcell, Inc. v. Bass, 370 So. 2d 942, 944
(Ala. 1979).
"Moreover, certain causes of action are not
barred by § 14:
"'"There are four general categories
of actions which in Aland v. Graham, 287
Ala. 226, 250 So. 2d 677 (1971), we stated
do not come within the prohibition of § 14:
(1) 
actions 
brought 
to 
compel 
State
officials to perform their legal duties;
(2) 
actions 
brought 
to 
enjoin 
State
o f f i c i a l s  
f r o m  
e n f o r c i n g  
a n
unconstitutional law; (3) actions to compel
State officials to perform ministerial
acts; and (4) actions brought under the
Declaratory Judgments Act ... seeking
construction 
of 
a 
statute 
and 
its
application in a given situation. 287 Ala.
at 229-230, 250 So. 2d 677. Other actions
which are not prohibited by § 14 are: (5)
valid inverse condemnation actions brought
against 
State 
officials 
in 
their
representative capacity; and (6) actions
for injunction or damages brought against
State officials in their representative
1041932; 1050037
14
capacity and individually where it was
alleged that they had acted fraudulently,
in bad faith, beyond their authority or in
a mistaken interpretation of law. Wallace
v. Board of Education of Montgomery County,
... 280 Ala. [635] at 639, 197 So. 2d 428
[(1967)]; Unzicker v. State, 346 So. 2d
931, 
933 
(Ala. 
1977); 
Engelhardt 
v.
Jenkins, 273 Ala. 352, 141 So. 2d 193
(1962)."'
"Drummond Co. v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 937 So.
2d 56, 58 (Ala. 2006) (quoting [Ex parte] Carter,
395 So. 2d [65,] 68 [(Ala. 1980)]) (emphasis
omitted). These actions are sometimes referred to as
'exceptions' to § 14; however, in actuality these
actions are simply not considered to be actions
'"against the State" for § 14 purposes.' Patterson
v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d 137, 142 (Ala. 2002).
This Court has qualified those 'exceptions,' noting
that '"[a]n action is one against the [S]tate when
a favorable result for the plaintiff would directly
affect a contract or property right of the State, or
would result in the plaintiff's recovery of money
from the [S]tate."' Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ. v.
Jones, 895 So. 2d 867, 873 (Ala. 2004) (quoting
Shoals Cmty. Coll. v. Colagross, 674 So. 2d 1311,
1314 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995)) (emphasis added in
Jones)."
Alabama Dep't of Transp., 990 So. 2d at 839-40.  Furthermore,
the "exceptions" to § 14 immunity extend only to suits against
a proper State official in his or her representative capacity,
not the State agency. Id. at 840-41.
In the present case, the Bessemer Board is an agency of
the State and is entitled to absolute immunity.  No
1041932; 1050037
15
"exception" to § 14 immunity applies to the Bessemer Board
itself.  Therefore, in the present situation, the trial court
did not have jurisdiction to enter a judgment against the
Bessemer Board concerning Minor's state-law claim that her
statutory pay increase was miscalculated.  Therefore, in case
no. 1041932, we grant the petition as to the Bessemer Board
and issue the writ directing the trial court to dismiss
Minor's state-law claim against the Bessemer Board. 
However, regarding the Bessemer Board members in their
official capacities, Minor is entitled to bring an action to
compel them to perform their legal duty or to perform a
ministerial act.  In the present case, it is undisputed that
the Bessemer Board members have a statutory duty to pay Minor
the appropriate salary increase under § 16-22-13.1, Ala. Code
1975.  That statute specifically provides that a public school
teacher with Minor's years of experience being paid under the
State minimum-salary schedule shall receive a 5.5% increase in
salary beginning with the fiscal year 2000-2001.  The basis
for this calculation is at issue in this lawsuit.  The amount
of the salary increase the Bessemer Board members must pay
Minor involves obedience to the statute; it does not involve
1041932; 1050037
16
any discretion.  The Bessemer Board members have a legal duty
to pay Minor the correctly calculated salary increase under
the statute and in doing so they are performing a ministerial
act.  Therefore, Minor's action against the Bessemer Board
members in their official capacities is not an action "against
the State" for § 14 purposes; thus, the Bessemer Board members
are not entitled to § 14 immunity from Minor's action to
compel them to fulfill their statutory duty to pay her the
appropriate salary increase.  Accordingly, we deny the
petition for a writ of mandamus as to the Bessemer Board
members in their official capacities.
Regarding the State defendants, it is unclear whether the
trial court's April 23, 2005, order entered a judgment against
them.  As the trial court correctly recognized, "the [Bessemer
Board] as a legal entity is and always has been the employer
and the entity with the legal obligation to pay [Minor] the
correct salary."  Furthermore, it is undisputed that the State
Board of Education has returned all financial control of the
Bessemer School System to the Bessemer Board.  Like the
Bessemer Board, the Department, as an arm or agency of the
State, is clearly entitled to absolute immunity.  Concerning
1041932; 1050037
17
the individual State defendants, they do not have any power or
any legal duty to provide Minor with the relief she requests;
thus, they cannot be compelled to do so.  They do not fall
within any of the "exceptions" to § 14 immunity.  Minor cannot
sue the State indirectly by suing the individual State
defendants in their official capacities.  Therefore, the
individual State defendants are entitled to immunity from
Minor's state-law claim that her statutory pay increase was
miscalculated.  Accordingly, to the extent that the trial
court's order entered a judgment against the State defendants,
we grant the State defendants' petition and issue the writ
directing the trial court to dismiss Minor's state-law claim
against the State defendants. 
The Bessemer Board members also ask this Court to
determine the correct amount of the statutory pay increase if
we conclude that they are not immune from Minor's action.
However, the Bessemer Board members' petition for a writ of
mandamus is not an appropriate means for seeking such a
determination.  As noted earlier, the trial court has not
entered a final judgment regarding that issue (see supra note
5); thus, an appeal of the trial court's judgment concerning
1041932; 1050037
18
that issue cannot lie.  At this time, we decide only the
immunity issues and make no determination concerning the
proper amount of Minor's statutory pay increase.  A direct
appeal from the trial court's judgment when it becomes final
is an adequate remedy for an adverse ruling concerning that
issue.
Finally, a general, undefined 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was
included in the original complaint.  In the trial court's
April 23, 2005, order, the trial court stated that the
"defendants" are not immune from the nonspecific § 1983 claim;
however, the order only compelled the fulfillment of a
statutory duty and did not ground any relief on the § 1983
claim; thus, the trial court did not reach the § 1983 claim.
Therefore, that claim, apparently still pending, is not before
us on the State defendants' and the Bessemer Board defendants'
petitions for a writ of mandamus concerning the trial court's
April 23, 2005, order.  To the extent either set of
petitioners request relief from this Court at this time
concerning this claim, the petitions are denied.
Conclusion
1041932; 1050037
19
Based on the foregoing, in case no. 1041932, we deny the
petition as to the Bessemer Board members in their official
capacities and to the extent the Bessemer Board itself
requests relief from Minor's § 1983 claim.  However, the
Bessemer Board has established that it is entitled to immunity
on Minor's claim that her statutory pay increase was
miscalculated; therefore, we grant the petition as to the
Bessemer Board and direct the trial court to dismiss that
claim against the Bessemer Board.
In case no. 1050037, the State defendants have established
that they are entitled to immunity on Minor's claim that her
statutory pay increase was miscalculated; therefore, we grant
the petition as to the State defendants and direct the trial
court to dismiss that claim against the State defendants.
However, we deny the petition to the extent it requests relief
from Minor's § 1983 claim.
1041932 –- PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART;
WRIT ISSUED.
1050037 –- PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART;
WRIT ISSUED.
1041932; 1050037
20
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Stuart, Bolin, Murdock, and Shaw,
JJ., concur.