Title: Ex Parte Bufkin
Citation: 936 So. 2d 1042
Docket Number: 1041890
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 10, 2006

936 So. 2d 1042 (2006)
Ex parte John BUFKIN.
(In re George Roberts
v.
John Bufkin and Byron Williamson).
1041890.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 10, 2006.
*1044 Rick A. Howard and Jason D. Darneille of Nix Holtsford Gilliland Higgins &amp; Hitson, P.C., Montgomery, for petitioner.
Robert G. Wilson of Wilson &amp; Scott, LLC, Fort Payne, for respondent.
LYONS, Justice.
George Roberts sued John Bufkin and Byron Williamson in the Sumter Circuit Court. Bufkin filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The trial court denied that motion, and Bufkin filed this petition for a writ of mandamus. We deny the petition.
According to Roberts's complaint, on September 12, 2003, he was permanently injured and his property damaged when Bufkin backed a truck over the motorcycle Roberts was riding. The accident occurred in Fayetteville, Tennessee. Bufkin is a resident of Mississippi. Williamson, who owns the truck Bufkin was driving at the time of the accident and who is also a defendant in the case, is a resident of Alabama, as is Roberts, the plaintiff. Williamson was not present at the time of the accident. Roberts alleged negligence and wantonness on the part of Bufkin and negligent entrustment on the part of Williamson.
Bufkin filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Williamson filed a motion for a summary judgment, setting forth defenses to Roberts's negligent-entrustment claim. The trial court denied Bufkin's motion to dismiss and reserved judgment on Williamson's summary-judgment motion until discovery was completed. Bufkin then filed this petition for the writ of mandamus in which he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Ex parte McWilliams, 812 So. 2d 318, 321 (Ala.2001). "An appellate court considers de novo a trial court's judgment on a party's motion to dismiss for lack of personal *1045 jurisdiction." Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 729 (Ala.2002).
Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d 226, 229-30 (Ala.2004).
"A state has jurisdiction over a person or corporation so long as its `long-arm statute' reaches the person or corporation and the state's jurisdiction comports with the requirements of due process." Leithead v. Banyan Corp., 926 So. 2d 1025, 1029-30 (Ala.2005). Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Civ. P., Alabama's long-arm rule, provides:
Therefore, Alabama's long-arm rule extends the personal jurisdiction of Alabama courts to the limits of due process permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 13, Constitution of Alabama of 1901. See Ex parte Alloy Wheels Int'l, 882 So. 2d 819, 822 (Ala.2003).
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits a forum state to subject a nonresident defendant to jurisdiction in its courts only when that defendant has had `minimum contacts' with the forum state." Ex parte Full Circle Distrib., L.L.C., 883 So. 2d 638, 644 (Ala. 2003) (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945)).
Elliott, 830 So. 2d  at 730-31.
Roberts argues that the trial court has specific personal jurisdiction over Bufkin, focusing on Bufkin's contacts with Alabama that are related to the underlying cause of action. According to Roberts's complaint, "[a]t the time of the accident complained of, [Bufkin] was the agent, servant or employee of [Williamson] and/or was involved in a joint venture with [Williamson]." According to Williamson's summary-judgment motion, Williamson's truck, being driven by Bufkin at the time of the accident involving Roberts, had a horse trailer attached to it when Bufkin backed over Roberts's motorcycle, a fact Bufkin admits in his reply brief. In an affidavit submitted to the trial court, Bufkin concedes that, at some point in September 2003, the month in which the accident occurred in Tennessee, Bufkin was present in Alabama.
We have recently reiterated the principle that "`"[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving the court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson &amp; Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir.2002).'" Ex parte Troncalli Chrysler Plymouth Dodge, Inc., 876 So. 2d 459, 463 (Ala.2003) (quoting Ex parte Dill, Dill, Carr, Stonbraker &amp; Hutchings, P.C., 866 So. 2d 519, 525 (Ala. 2003)). While affidavits filed by Bufkin and Williamson do not contradict the allegations of agency contained in Roberts's complaint, based on the limited facts before us on this petition for the writ of mandamus, we cannot determine the nature of the alleged business relationship between Bufkin and Williamson; therefore, we cannot conclude that Bufkin's contacts with Alabama are such that the trial court could have found, at this stage of the proceeding, that Roberts had established that that court had personal jurisdiction over Bufkin. However, if Roberts is entitled to conduct further discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction, our inability to find personal jurisdiction based on the facts presently before us does not warrant our issuing the writ of mandamus and instructing the trial court to dismiss all claims against Bufkin.
Roberts contends that before a final determination is made regarding personal *1047 jurisdiction as to Bufkin, Roberts is entitled to limited discovery to investigate facts relevant to that issue. Roberts points out that Bufkin has refused to respond to discovery requests, causing Roberts to file a motion to compel discovery. There is no indication that the trial court has ruled on Roberts's motion to compel. Roberts contends that, while he believes that Bufkin and Williamson were involved in some sort of business relationship at the time of the accident, which is the reason Bufkin was driving Williamson's truck, he is unable to confirm that belief because Bufkin has refused to respond to Roberts's discovery requests.
In Ex parte Troncalli Chrysler Plymouth Dodge, Inc., a case involving discovery on the question of jurisdiction, this Court said:
876 So. 2d  at 467-68.
In Troncalli, we held that the plaintiff's discovery request presented "nothing but `conjecture and surmise' regarding the existence of general jurisdiction," 876 So. 2d  at 468, and was therefore due to be denied. Unlike the complaint in Troncalli, which was devoid of allegations necessary to sustain personal jurisdiction, the complaint in this proceeding alleges that "[Bufkin] was the agent, servant or employee of [Williamson] and/or was involved in a joint venture with [Williamson]." Williamson, of course, is a resident of Alabama. Bufkin admits in his affidavit that he visited Alabama during the month in which the accident occurred, and it is undisputed that Bufkin was driving Williamson's truck at the time of the accident. Therefore, in contrast to the situation presented this Court in Troncalli, Roberts has "at least alleg[ed] facts that would support a colorable claim of jurisdiction." 876 So. 2d  at 468. Limited discovery could flesh out Roberts's allegations and could lead to a conclusion that the trial court can exercise personal jurisdiction over Bufkin.
The allegations before us in this proceeding are distinguishable from those in *1048 Troncalli, and they justify a less restrictive approach to allowing jurisdictional discovery. We embrace the rule applicable in such circumstance as expressed in Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 456 (3d Cir.2003):
Without affording Roberts the opportunity for limited discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction, we will not at this stage of the proceeding grant the writ of mandamus and order Bufkin's dismissal from the action. The petition for mandamus is therefore premature and is due to be denied.
The answer to the question whether Bufkin is subject to the jurisdiction of the trial court must await further discovery. We note that there is no ruling for us to review on Roberts's pending motion to compel discovery. Nonetheless, we assume that further proceedings with respect to discovery from Bufkin will be limited to the issue of personal jurisdiction until that issue is resolved.
PETITION DENIED.
WOODALL, STUART, SMITH, and PARKER, JJ., concur.