Title: State v. Nelson
Citation: 2014 WI 70
Docket Number: 2012AP002140-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 16, 2014

2014 WI 70 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP2140-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Angelica C. Nelson, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 351 Wis. 2d 224, 838 N.W.2d 865 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Unpublished)  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 16, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 18, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire 
 
JUDGE: 
William M. Gabler Sr. 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Michelle L. Velasquez, assistant state public defender, and 
oral argument by Michelle L. Velasquez. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Aaron 
O’Neil, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 70
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP2140-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2011CF523) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Angelica C. Nelson, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J.   We 
review 
an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 that affirmed a 
judgment the Eau Claire County Circuit Court2 entered on a jury 
verdict convicting defendant Angelica Nelson of three counts of 
sexual assault of a child, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) 
(2011-12).3   
                                                 
1 State v. Nelson, No. 2012AP2140-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2013). 
2 The Honorable William M. Gabler, Sr. presided. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Our review concerns the circuit court's refusal to 
allow Nelson to testify at trial based on a finding that she was 
not validly waiving her right against self-incrimination.  While 
Nelson did not intend to dispute that she engaged in conduct 
that met the elements of the crimes charged, she wanted to 
testify at trial because she "want[ed] [her] side to be heard."   
¶3 
Nelson argues that the circuit court's decision 
deprived her of her rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and 
that she is automatically entitled to a new trial because the 
denial of a defendant's right to testify is not amenable to 
harmless error review.   
¶4 
The State does not dispute that the circuit court 
erred in refusing to allow Nelson to testify.  Instead, it 
argues that harmless error review applies to that error under 
the governing framework of structural and trial errors.  It 
further argues that the error was harmless because evidence 
showed that Nelson admitted to having sexual intercourse with a 
14-year-old victim on three occasions, and she did not intend to 
dispute that assertion if she testified.  
¶5 
We conclude that harmless error review applies to the 
circuit court's alleged denial of Nelson's right to testify 
because its effect on the outcome of the trial is capable of 
assessment.  See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08 
(1991).  We further conclude that, given the nature of Nelson's 
defense and the overwhelming evidence of her guilt, the alleged 
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
3 
 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  
I.  BACKGROUND4 
¶6 
Nelson was a friend of the family of the victim, D.M.  
She frequented D.M's neighborhood and walked D.M.'s younger 
siblings home from school on a regular basis.  She saw D.M.'s 
mother, Tamyra, nearly every day.  When she was 18 years old, 
Nelson met D.M., who was 14 years old at that time.  
¶7 
After she became acquainted with Nelson, Tamyra heard 
rumors that Nelson "thought [D.M.] was hot and that [Nelson] 
wouldn't mind dating him."  Tamyra told Nelson that under no 
circumstances was Nelson to be involved with D.M.   
¶8 
Shortly after having this conversation with Nelson, 
Tamyra heard that Nelson had not heeded her warning.  Tamyra 
sent a text message to Nelson and asked her if she had "sex" 
with D.M.  Nelson responded, "You're going to be mad at me; but, 
yes, I did."  After Tamyra reminded Nelson that D.M. was a 
child, Nelson texted back, "I know there[] [are] laws, but he's 
hot and I'm sorry."   
¶9 
Tamyra called the police, and Officer Dana Brown 
responded to Tamyra's home.  When Officer Brown arrived, Tamyra 
was on the phone with Nelson.  Tamyra placed the call on 
speakerphone, and Officer Brown overheard Nelson admit to having 
sexual intercourse with D.M. at least three times.  He also 
                                                 
4 The following facts are taken from witness testimony at 
trial unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
4 
 
viewed the text messages between Tamyra and Nelson on Tamyra's 
phone.   
¶10 Officer Brown subsequently interviewed D.M. in his 
squad car.  D.M. said that he had "sex" with Nelson on three 
consecutive days behind the Altoona elementary school and that 
it was Nelson's idea.  While D.M. could not remember a specific 
date that the assaults occurred, he recalled that he received a 
citation for violating curfew just after the third assault.  
Officer Brown testified that D.M. received that citation on 
May 11. 
¶11 Officer Scott Kelley followed up on Tamyra's complaint 
by interviewing Nelson at the police station.  During that 
interview, Nelson told Officer Kelley that she had sexual 
intercourse with D.M., whom she knew to be 14 years old at that 
time, on three occasions behind the elementary school and that 
it was D.M.'s idea.  
¶12 The State charged Nelson with three counts of sexual 
assault of a child, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).5  The 
amended complaint stated that the assaults occurred on May 8, 9, 
and 10 of 2011.  The State came up with these dates using the 
curfew citation D.M. received on the night of the third assault, 
and working backwards according to D.M.'s statement that the 
assaults occurred on three consecutive nights.   
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(2) provides that "[w]hoever has 
sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not 
attained the age of 16 years is guilty of a Class C felony." 
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
5 
 
¶13 Nelson initially pleaded not guilty by reason of 
mental disease or defect.  After the circuit court found that, 
despite some mental limitations, Nelson could appreciate the 
wrongfulness of her conduct and conform it to the requirements 
of the law, Nelson changed her plea to not guilty.   
¶14 At trial, the State presented testimony from Tamyra, 
D.M., and the two police officers.  When the State rested, Judge 
Gabler asked Nelson's attorney if Nelson wanted to testify.  
Nelson said that she did.  Judge Gabler proceeded to engage 
Nelson in a colloquy about waiving her right against self-
incrimination, which Nelson said she understood. 
¶15 Judge Gabler also asked Nelson about the substance of 
her testimony.  Nelson said that she "want[ed] to tell what 
actually happened."  She also wanted to testify that she did not 
unbuckle D.M.'s pants and that the assaults did not happen three 
days in a row.  Judge Gabler explained that this testimony had 
no bearing on the elements of the offense, and made sure that 
Nelson's attorney had expressed to Nelson that "it wouldn't be a 
good idea" for Nelson to testify.   
¶16 The circuit court then found that Nelson was not 
"intelligently and knowingly waiving her right against self-
incrimination because she wants to testify to things that are 
completely irrelevant to the two things that the [S]tate has to 
prove."   
¶17 The jury convicted Nelson on all three counts, and the 
court withheld a sentence and placed her on probation for five 
years. Nelson filed a motion for post-conviction relief, 
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
6 
 
asserting that the court violated her constitutional right to 
testify on her own behalf and therefore, a new trial was 
required.  The circuit court denied Nelson's motion.  The court 
of appeals affirmed, and we granted Nelson's petition for 
review.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶18 This review involves 
whether the harmless error 
doctrine applies to the denial of a defendant's right to 
testify.  Whether a particular error is structural and therefore 
not subject to a harmless error review is a question of law for 
our independent review.  State v. Travis, 2013 WI 38, ¶9, 347 
Wis. 2d 142, 832 N.W.2d 491.  Because we determine that harmless 
error review applies to the denial of the right to testify, we 
must also decide whether the error in this case was harmless.  
This likewise presents a question of law for our independent 
review.  State v. Jackson, 2014 WI 4, ¶44, 352 Wis. 2d 249, 841 
N.W.2d 791. 
B.  Right to Testify 
¶19 A criminal defendant has a personal, fundamental right 
to testify and "present his own version of events in his own 
words."  Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987); State v. 
Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶39, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485.  This 
right originates from several constitutional provisions:  the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which protects a defendant's due process 
right to be heard and offer testimony; the Compulsory Process 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which protects a defendant's 
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
7 
 
right to call witnesses in her favor; and the Fifth Amendment, 
which protects a defendant's right against compelled testimony 
"unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his 
own will."  Rock, 483 U.S. at 51-53 (quoting Harris v. New York, 
401 U.S. 222, 230 (1971)) (further citation omitted).   
¶20 The fundamental nature of the right to testify means 
that it is not subject to forfeiture.  State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 
21, ¶¶30-31, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 ("[A] mere failure 
to object constitutes a forfeiture of [some] right[s] on 
appellate review. . . . [Other] rights are so important to a fair 
trial that . . . [they] may . . . be waived [only] personally 
and expressly.").  It may not be waived by a defendant's 
silence.  Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶39.  "[T]o ensure that a . . . 
defendant is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving 
his or her right to testify," the circuit court must conduct a 
limited colloquy, inquiring as to whether the defendant is aware 
of his or her right against self-incrimination and has discussed 
the right with counsel.  Id., ¶¶41, 43.   
¶21 Nelson argues that the circuit court erred in this 
case because, having engaged in the colloquy required by Weed, 
it had no basis to find that she was not validly waiving her 
right against self-incrimination.  Because the State does not 
dispute that the circuit court erred, we do not decide that 
issue.  At the outset, however, we briefly review the law on 
that point as part of a full discussion of the issue. 
¶22 We then proceed to Nelson's argument that denial of 
the right to testify is not subject to harmless error review 
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
8 
 
because it is not necessarily concerned with a defendant's 
chances of acquittal, but rather protects an individual's free 
choice and dignity.  While we acknowledge the role of a 
defendant's 
autonomy 
in 
constitutional 
jurisprudence, 
we 
conclude that the denial of a defendant's right to testify is 
subject to harmless error review under Fulminante.   
¶23 Finally, having concluded that the alleged error is 
not structural, we assess the testimony Nelson intended to 
provide in the context of the case as a whole, and conclude that 
any error was harmless.  
C.  Decision to Testify 
¶24 A defendant has the "ultimate authority to make certain 
fundamental decisions regarding the case," including whether to 
testify on his or her own behalf.  Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 
745, 751 (1983).  He or she retains this right "no matter how 
unwise such a decision."  Ortega v. O'Leary, 843 F.2d 258, 261 
(7th Cir. 1988).6  This means that a circuit court cannot refuse 
to allow a defendant to testify solely because the court wishes 
to protect the defendant from himself or herself.  Quarels v. 
Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 73, 79 (Ky. 2004); State v. Rivera, 741 
S.E.2d 694, 703 (S.C. 2013).  It also means that a circuit court 
must refrain from unduly influencing a defendant's decision.  
                                                 
6 See also Boyd v. United States, 586 A.2d 670, 673-74 (D.C. 
1991) (quoting People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 513 (Colo. 1984)) 
(further citation omitted). ("The wisdom or unwisdom of the 
defendant's choice does not diminish his right to make it."). 
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
9 
 
¶25 We have addressed this latter concern in the context 
of deciding whether to require circuit courts to engage in a 
colloquy to determine if a defendant is validly waiving the 
right to testify, or to refrain from doing so.  First, in Weed, 
we noted "valid" concerns about influencing a decision that 
rests with the defendant.  Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶41.  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit succinctly 
summarized those concerns as follows: 
To require the trial court to follow a special 
procedure, explicitly telling defendant about, and 
securing an explicit waiver of, a privilege to testify 
. . . could inappropriately influence the defendant to 
waive his constitutional right not to testify, thus 
threatening the exercise of this other, converse, 
constitutionally explicit, and more fragile right. 
Siciliano 
v. 
Vose, 
834 
F.2d 
29, 
30 
(1st 
Cir. 
1987).  
Notwithstanding 
these 
concerns, 
we 
decided 
to 
require 
a 
colloquy, as a "simple and straightforward" exchange would not 
sway a defendant.  Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶41.  In a later 
decision, however, we declined to require circuit courts to 
engage in a similar colloquy for a defendant's decision not to 
testify because "inquiry into whether the defendant is aware of 
his or her corollary right not to testify runs a real risk of 
interfering with defense strategy and inadvertently suggesting 
to the defendant that the court disapproves of his or her 
decision to testify."  State v. Denson, 2011 WI 70, ¶65, 335 
Wis. 2d 681, 799 N.W.2d 831.   
¶26 Our decision in Weed strikes a balance between 
ensuring that a defendant makes a knowing, intelligent, and 
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
10 
 
voluntary decision about whether to testify and avoiding 
inappropriately influencing that decision.  Our later decision 
in Denson illustrates that improperly influencing a decision 
that belongs to the defendant remains a source of concern.  
Therefore, we note that by going beyond the limited colloquy in 
Weed, for instance by inquiring into the "advisability and the 
risk of taking the stand," a circuit court risks going too far.  
Arthur v. United States, 986 A.2d 398, 407 (D.C. 2009).    
¶27 We do not decide, however, whether the circuit court 
erred in this case.  The State does not dispute that the circuit 
court erred.7  Therefore, we assume, without deciding, that error 
occurred, and analyze only whether that assumed error should 
result in a new trial.  
D.  Harmless Error 
¶28 Denial of a defendant's constitutional rights does not 
necessarily entitle him or her to a new trial.  Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967); State v. Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 
722, 735-38, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991).  Rather, "an otherwise valid 
conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may 
confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."  Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).  This is the doctrine of 
harmless error. 
                                                 
7 This court is not bound by a party's concessions of law. 
State v. St. Martin, 2011 WI 44, ¶14 n.6, 334 Wis. 2d 290, 800 
N.W.2d 858.   
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
11 
 
¶29 Wisconsin's harmless error rule appears in Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.18.  It is made applicable to criminal proceedings by Wis. 
Stat. § 972.11(1), and prohibits reversal in those cases for 
errors that do not affect the substantial rights of a defendant.  
State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 368 & n.36, 588 N.W.2d 606 
(1999).  As with its federal counterpart,8 the Wisconsin rule 
accords a "strong presumption" that an error is subject to a 
harmless-error review.  See State v. Hansbrough, 2011 WI App 79, 
¶11, 334 Wis. 2d 237, 799 N.W.2d 887 (quoting Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999)) (further citation omitted).  
Accordingly, "most constitutional errors can be harmless," and 
only a "very limited class of cases" require automatic reversal.  
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306; Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 
461, 468 (1997).   
¶30 For the purposes of determining when to apply harmless 
error review, the United States Supreme Court has set forth a 
dichotomy of error types.  Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-10.  
First, 
there 
are 
trial 
errors, 
which 
"occur[] 
during 
presentation of the case to the jury and their effect may be 
quantitatively 
assessed 
in 
the 
context 
of 
other 
evidence presented in order to determine whether [they were] 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."  United States v. Gonzalez-
Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006) (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin's harmless error rule is nearly "identical to 
the federal rule," which provides that "[a]ny error, defect, 
irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial 
rights must be disregarded."  State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶39, 
254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189; Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a).   
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
12 
 
307-08) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The second type of 
error is structural.  These "defy analysis by harmless-error 
standards because they affec[t] the framework within which the 
trial proceeds, and are not simply . . . error[s] in the trial 
process itself."  Id. (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  This latter type of error 
is "so intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal."  
Neder, 527 U.S. at 7.   
¶31 We have embraced this framework in our previous 
decisions.  Travis, 347 Wis. 2d 142, ¶54; State v. Harvey, 2002 
WI 93, ¶¶36-39, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.  In keeping 
with our tradition of interpreting Wisconsin's harmless error 
rule in a similar manner to its federal counterpart, we apply 
that test again today, and conclude that denial of the right to 
testify is subject to harmless error review. 
¶32 An error denying the defendant of the right to testify 
on his or her own behalf bears the hallmark of a trial error.  
That is, its affect on the jury's verdict can be "quantitatively 
assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to 
determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308.   
¶33 We recognize that a defendant's testimony may be, on 
the whole, of particular importance to the issues in the case.  
See Rivera, 741 S.E.2d at 704 ("it is difficult to fathom 
anything more logically connected to the fundamental issue" in a 
case "than a defendant's own testimony about the [crime]").  
However, this does not make its absence incapable of assessment.  
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
13 
 
We agree with the following position of the Tennessee Supreme 
Court: 
In some cases, the defendant's testimony would have no 
impact, or even a negative impact, on the result of 
trial. 
 
Likewise, 
in 
some 
cases, 
denial 
of 
a 
defendant's right to testify may be devastating to the 
defense. 
 
However, 
under 
such 
circumstances, 
a 
reviewing court will simply conclude that the error 
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The fact 
that reversal may be required in some cases is no 
reason to eschew the harmless error doctrine entirely 
when the error involved is clearly of a trial, rather 
than a structural nature.  
Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 166 (Tenn. 1999) (internal 
citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  Stated 
otherwise, denying a defendant the right to testify is not the 
type of error, "the effect[] of which [is] inherently elusive, 
intangible, and [therefore] not susceptible to harmless error 
review."  Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 399 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Accordingly, harmless error review applies. 
¶34 We also observe that, as with other errors in the 
"trial error" category, the denial of a defendant's right to 
testify occurs at a discrete point in the trial.  By contrast, 
errors that are structural permeate the entire process.  These 
include a complete denial of counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335, 344 (1963); a denial of counsel of defendant's choice, 
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150; a biased judge, Tumey v. Ohio, 
273 U.S. 510, 534 (1927); racial discrimination during jury 
selection, Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986); and 
denial of self-representation, McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 
168, 177-78 n.8 (1984).   Neder, 527 U.S. at 8.  A defective 
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
14 
 
reasonable doubt instruction is also structural because it 
"vitiates all the jury's findings" by "erecting a presumption 
regarding an element of the offense."  Sullivan v. Louisiana, 
508 U.S. 275, 280-81 (1993). 
¶35 Our conclusion is consistent with the majority of 
other jurisdictions that on direct appeal have applied harmless 
error review to a circuit court's denial of a defendant's right 
to testify.  Quarels, 142 S.W.3d at 82; Momon, 18 S.W.3d at 166; 
People v. Solomon, 560 N.W.2d 651, 655 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).9  
Federal courts that have considered the issue in the context of 
habeas petitions have reached a similar result.  Gill v. Ayers, 
342 F.3d 911, 921-22 (9th Cir. 2003); Ortega, 843 F.2d at 262; 
Wright v. Estelle, 549 F.2d 971, 972, 974 (5th Cir. 1977).  And, 
in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we 
note that a defendant does not automatically receive a new trial 
when deprived of the right to testify; rather, a defendant must 
proceed under the framework of Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984).  State v. Flynn, 190 Wis. 2d 31, 56, 527 N.W.2d 
343 (Ct. App. 1994).  That a defendant must show that the denial 
of his or her right to testify was prejudicial, then, is not a 
new concept. 
                                                 
9 We note that in Arthur v. United States, 986 A.2d 398 
(D.C. 2009), which held that the denial of a defendant's right 
to testify is not amendable to harmless error, the court seemed 
capable of assessing the effect of such an error in the context 
of other evidence.  Id. at 416 (there was "a reasonable 
probability that but for the violation of appellant's right to 
testify, the jury would have had a reasonable doubt of his 
guilt").   
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
15 
 
¶36 Nelson 
attempts 
to 
avoid 
the 
result 
Fulminante 
dictates by employing a somewhat different test.  She contends 
that the harmless error rule should not apply because the right 
to testify "is a right that when exercised usually increases the 
likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant, [and 
therefore] its denial is not amenable to 'harmless error' 
analysis."  McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177 n.8.  Drawing on McKaskle, 
which held that the right to self-representation is not subject 
to harmless error review, she argues as follows: 
Like self-representation, the right to testify 
cannot be harmless because it is a right to make a 
personal decision that is founded on the respect for 
free choice and the human dignity of the individual 
citizen.  (Citation omitted.)  The denial of that 
right is structural, not because it is born from the 
belief that by doing so the defendant will have a 
better chance of acquittal, but because it is born 
from "the axiomatic notion that each person is 
ultimately responsible for choosing his own fate 
. . ."  Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 891 
(5th Cir. 1977).  
¶37 We agree with Nelson that certain rights serve 
purposes other than to determine the guilt or innocence of a 
defendant.  For instance, Nelson correctly notes that the right 
of 
self-representation 
is 
grounded 
in 
"respect 
for 
the 
individual," and that it "exists to affirm the accused's 
individual dignity and autonomy."  Faretta v. California, 422 
U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 
350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)); State v. Klessig, 211 
Wis. 2d 194, 215-16, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997) (quoting McKaskle, 
465 U.S. at 178 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring)).    
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
16 
 
¶38 Principles of self-determination also underlie the 
requirement that a defendant make certain decisions, such as 
whether to accept a plea, whether to try the case to a jury, and 
whether he or she will be present at trial.10  Richard J. Bonnie, 
The Competence of Criminal Defendants:  Beyond Dusky and Drope, 
47 U. Miami L. Rev. 539, 553 (1993).    
¶39 Additionally, 
autonomy 
has 
proven 
an 
important 
consideration in certain areas of constitutional jurisprudence, 
including reproductive rights,11 search and seizure,12 and self-
incrimination.13   Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity 
and Constitutional Theory:  Preliminary Thoughts on the Role of 
School Choice and the Autonomy Principle, 14 J.L. & Pol. 411, 
452 (1998).  We cannot conclude, however, that any of this means 
                                                 
10 See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). 
11 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 
(1977) (discussing the "constitutional protection of individual 
autonomy in matters of childbearing"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (referencing "penumbral rights of 
'privacy and repose'"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) 
("right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or 
zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution"). 
12 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. 
R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No right is held 
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, 
than the right of every individual to the possession and control 
of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of 
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."). 
13 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) ("the 
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege [against 
self-incrimination] is the respect a government——state or 
federal——must accord to the dignity and integrity of its 
citizens . . . to respect the inviolability of the human 
personality"). 
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
17 
 
that Nelson is automatically entitled to a new trial, for the 
reasons we now explain. 
¶40 First, while autonomy is an important constitutional 
value, the test of Fulminante makes no mention of the purpose of 
the right or the interests it serves.  Rather, it defines 
structural error by only two characteristics, the timing of the 
error and its capacity for assessment.  See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 
U.S. at 149 n.4 ("it is hard to read [Fulminante] as doing 
anything other than dividing constitutional error into two 
comprehensive categories").   
¶41 Second, although McKaskle, which was decided before 
Fulminante, relied on the "irrelevance of harmlessness" in 
concluding that a defendant's right to self-representation is 
structural, McKaskle is distinguishable.  Unlike denial of a 
defendant's right to testify, denial of the right to self-
representation permeates the entire trial.  Therefore, McKaskle 
comes squarely within Fulminante's description of a structural 
error.  As such, we see no reason to depart from the Fulminante 
framework.  
¶42 Finally, accepting Nelson's test would divorce the 
doctrine of harmless error from its purpose.  Harmless error 
developed from the criticism that "[r]eversal for error, 
regardless of its effect on the judgment, encourages litigants 
to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public to ridicule 
it."  Neder, 527 U.S. at 18 (quoting R. Traynor, The Riddle of 
Harmless Error 50 (1970)).  Its application does not "reflect[] 
a denigration of the constitutional rights involved."  Rose v. 
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
18 
 
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986).  Rather, it "strikes the 
appropriate balance between the judicial system's interest in 
obtaining reliable results and the system's competing interest 
in having litigation end at some point."  Momon, 18 S.W.3d at 
167.  In other words, it furthers "the principle that the 
central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual 
question of the defendant's guilt or innocence."  Id. at 165 
(quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681).  As such, it makes sense 
to define the structural/trial error dichotomy by an error's 
capacity for assessment, rather than the nature or importance of 
the right the error affected. 
¶43 For these reasons, we conclude that the denial of a 
defendant's right to testify is subject to harmless error 
review.  We now apply that rule to the alleged error in the 
present case.  
E.  Application 
¶44 In order for an error to be harmless, the State, as 
the party benefitting from the error, must prove that it is 
"clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have 
found the defendant guilty absent the error."  Harvey, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, ¶46 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 18); State v. 
LaCount, 2008 WI 59, ¶85, 310 Wis. 2d 85, 750 N.W.2d 780 
(further citations omitted).  Stated otherwise, we must be 
satisfied "not that the jury could have convicted the defendant 
(i.e., sufficient evidence existed to convict the defendant), 
but rather that the jury would have arrived at the same verdict 
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
19 
 
had the error not occurred."  State v. Martin, 2012 WI 96, ¶45, 
343 Wis. 2d 278, 816 N.W.2d 270 (internal citation omitted).  
¶45 In Martin, we recently articulated a non-exhaustive 
list of factors that aid in evaluating whether the State has met 
its 
burden. 
 
Id., 
¶46. 
 
These 
included 
the 
following 
considerations: 
the frequency of the error; the importance of the 
erroneously admitted evidence; the presence or absence 
of 
evidence 
corroborating 
or 
contradicting 
the 
erroneously admitted evidence; whether the erroneously 
admitted evidence duplicates untainted evidence; the 
nature of the defense; the nature of the State's case; 
and the overall strength of the State's case.   
Id.  Because that case involved an erroneous decision to admit 
evidence, and in the present case we assume error because of a 
decision to exclude evidence, Martin's terminology does not 
correspond perfectly to this case.  Those factors do, however, 
provide useful ways to look at the effect of an error on the 
trial as a whole.   
¶46 As was the court in Momon, we are persuaded that 
"[d]enial of a defendant's right to testify is analogous to 
denial of a defendant's right to effective cross-examination."  
Momon, 18 S.W.3d at 167.  "In both instances, the defendant is 
being deprived of the right to present evidence to the jury."  
Id.  Accordingly, we conclude that the following formulation 
from Momon, which is based on the language of Van Arsdall, 
correlates well to our pronouncement in Martin: 
[C]ourts should consider the following factors when 
determining whether the denial of the right to testify 
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt:  (1) the 
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
20 
 
importance of the defendant's testimony to the defense 
case; (2) the cumulative nature of the testimony; (3) 
the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or 
contradicting the defendant on material points; (4) 
the overall strength of the prosecution's case. 
Id. at 168; see Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684; State v. Norman, 
2003 WI 72, ¶48, 262 Wis. 2d 506, 664 N.W.2d 97.  We now apply 
those factors to the alleged error in the present case. 
¶47 There is no denying that testifying at her own trial 
was important to Nelson.  She wanted to recount the events from 
her own perspective, and thought that telling her side of the 
story would make her "feel better."  These are not trivial 
concerns.  Having one's voice heard is a key element of 
"procedural justice," which is grounded in the concept that if 
people perceive legal process as fair, they are more willing to 
accept legal rules and outcomes with which they do not agree.  
Tom R. Tyler & E. Allen Lind, Handbook of Justice Research in 
Law, 65 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001).  However, 
we cannot say that it was important for the purpose of harmless 
error review, which is concerned with the accuracy of the 
verdict.  Therefore, to the extent that Nelson would have taken 
the stand and admitted that she engaged in the conduct she was 
accused of, we conclude that the exclusion of that testimony was 
harmless.   
¶48 Nelson also wished to offer a different account of the 
timing of the events and testify that she did not unbuckle 
D.M.'s pants.  She did not intend to deny, however, that she had 
sexual intercourse with D.M. on three separate occasions and 
that she knew he was under the age of 16.  Considering the trial 
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
21 
 
as a whole, we conclude that the exclusion of this testimony was 
likewise harmless. 
¶49 The sole theory of Nelson's defense was to put the 
State to its burden of proving her guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.14  Interjecting an alternative version of events may have 
made it more difficult for a jury to find Nelson guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  For instance, it could have cast doubt on 
D.M.'s ability to accurately recall the assaults.  This does not 
mean, however, that the result would have changed had Nelson 
testified on her own behalf.   
¶50 This is so because the jury could have convicted 
Nelson even if its members did not agree on the timing of the 
events or who unbuckled D.M.'s pants.  See State v. Badzinski, 
2014 WI 6, ¶28, 352 Wis. 2d 329, 843 N.W.2d 29 (quoting State v. 
Holland, 91 Wis. 2d 134, 143, 280 N.W.2d 288 (1979)) ("Unanimity 
                                                 
14 Nelson's post-conviction counsel argued that testimony 
disputing that Nelson unbuckled D.M.'s pants and the timing of 
the events could have helped her defense because "if she had 
said that it only happened one time, that's it, and he forced 
himself on me, then she would, if the jury accepted such 
testimony, she clearly would be found not guilty of two of the 
three counts, perhaps found not guilty of the remaining count."  
It is certainly true that "where we have an assertion that it 
was the defendant who did not consent to the intercourse, that 
it was she who was raped by the child, then the issue of her 
consent becomes paramount."  State v. Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, 
¶29, 301 Wis. 2d 418, 734 N.W.2d 23.  The problem with this 
argument is that Nelson has never claimed that D.M. raped her. 
By considering it, we would be assessing the error not in the 
context of the case as a whole, but in the abstract.  
Additionally, because she does not make this argument on review, 
we need not consider it. Gister v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 
2012 WI 86, ¶37 n.19, 342 Wis. 2d 496, 818 N.W.2d 880. 
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
22 
 
is required only with respect to the ultimate issue of the 
defendant's guilt or innocence of the crime charged, [it] is not 
required with respect to the alternative means or ways in which 
the crime can be committed.") (alteration in Badzinski).  The 
only facts the jury needed to find were that Nelson had sexual 
intercourse with a person who had not attained the age of 16 on 
three occasions.  Even if the jury believed Nelson's version of 
the events, or could not decide whether to believe Nelson or 
D.M., Nelson's testimony still would have made it more likely 
that those facts were true.15  In that sense, her testimony was 
cumulative of the evidence the State presented, and bolstered 
its case against her.  Because her testimony would have differed 
from the State's evidence only on immaterial points, it would 
not have aided in her defense.  
¶51 Finally, we note the overwhelming strength of the 
prosecution's case.  The State presented the testimony from the 
victim's mother and two law enforcement officers, all of whom 
said that Nelson admitted engaging in conduct that was contrary 
to the laws she was charged with violating.  The victim himself 
corroborated this testimony.  There was not a shred of evidence 
controverting the State's assertion that Nelson had sexual 
intercourse with D.M., who was under the age of 16 at the time.  
Therefore, we have no trouble concluding that the jury would 
                                                 
15 See generally Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139-
140 (1968) (White, J., dissenting) ("the defendant's own 
confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence 
that can be admitted against him"). 
No. 
2012AP2140-CR   
 
23 
 
have convicted Nelson even if she took the stand, and that any 
error in preventing her from testifying was harmless. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶52 We conclude that harmless error review applies to the 
circuit court's alleged denial of Nelson's right to testify 
because its effect on the outcome of the trial is capable of 
assessment.  See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08.  We further 
conclude that, given the nature of Nelson's defense and the 
overwhelming evidence of her guilt, the alleged error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2012AP2140-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶53 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion which affirms the decision of the court of 
appeals.  I write separately and concur, however, because I 
would not assume that the circuit court erred. On this record, 
it is less than clear that the circuit court should have 
concluded that Nelson knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
decided to testify.  See State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶40, 263 
Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485.  Nelson's right to testify is 
unquestionably an important right.  See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 
U.S. 44, 53 n.10 (1987).  Typically, a circuit court would be 
incorrect to deny a defendant that important right.  On the 
record in the case at issue, however, given the nature of 
Nelson's defense, the fact that Nelson's testimony would only 
serve to incriminate her, and could, at best, lead to jury 
nullification, and considering Nelson and her counsel's own 
words, the circuit court was not necessarily incorrect.  In 
fact, had Nelson taken the stand it would have been well within 
the circuit court's discretion to have precluded the only 
testimony that Nelson wished to offer.  See State v. Bjerkaas, 
163 Wis. 2d 949, 960, 472 N.W.2d 615 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding 
that a defendant has no right to urge a jury to nullify 
applicable laws).  The circuit court was hard pressed to 
conclude that Nelson indeed knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily reached the conclusion that she wished to testify. 
¶54 A defendant's right to testify is not synonymous with 
a defendant's right to say anything he or she would like.  Had 
Nelson been allowed to testify she would have been relegated to 
No.  2012AP2140-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
incriminating 
herself, 
thus 
undercutting 
her 
defense——that 
being, that the State has not met its burden of proof.  Majority 
op., ¶49.  The record reflects that the circuit court was not 
convinced that Nelson was making her decision knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily. 
¶55 Simply stated, it is not completely clear that Nelson 
did in fact knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily make a 
decision 
to 
testify 
and 
incriminate 
herself 
given 
the 
circumstances.  Confronted with a less than satisfying exchange 
regarding Nelson's decision about testifying, the court stated:   
As Ms. Larson observed, she's never seen or heard of 
this in 21 years of being a prosecutor.  I've never 
run across this kind of a situation either.   
 
I've tried to do some quick legal research.  I 
can't find anything about what a judicial officer is 
to do under these types of circumstances. 
 
But I do know this, that in order for me to 
permit 
the 
defendant, 
any 
defendant, 
including 
Ms. Nelson, to testify, I have to make a finding that 
she's waiving her right against self-incrimination 
freely, voluntarily and intelligently and knowingly 
and that she understands her right to either testify 
or not testify. 
The court further acknowledged: 
 
And it seems to me that based upon this limited 
colloquy that I've had with Ms. Nelson, I, and when I 
say limited, I think I've thoroughly explored the ins 
and outs of what she wants to testify to, but I can't 
find that Ms. Nelson is intelligently and knowingly 
waiving her right against self-incrimination because 
she wants to testify to things that are completely 
irrelevant to the two things that the state has to 
prove. 
Considering the duty to make certain findings regarding her 
decision to testify, the court stated: 
No.  2012AP2140-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
 
I'm also finding that she's -- that she's not 
intelligently and knowingly waiving her right against 
self-incrimination, because based upon the colloquy 
that I've had here with Ms. Bahnson, Angelica Nelson 
is doing this against the advice of her lawyer, at 
least with her lawyer telling her that it's not a good 
idea. 
The court understood that "there are some instances in which a 
defendant could be inadvisably taking the witness stand.  But it 
would be on elements, issues that are central to the case, that 
is, elements the state has to prove."  Specific to this case, 
the court found: 
Nelson wants to talk about all sorts of things that 
don't matter.  And if she took the witness stand, 
under the circumstances, Ms. Larson could extract from 
Ms. Nelson the admissions that this occurred.  So I 
just don't think I can make that finding.  So I'm not 
going to let her testify. 
Ultimately, the court concluded: 
I'm reaffirming my decision and belief that Ms. Nelson 
is 
not 
freely 
-- 
she's 
not 
voluntarily 
and 
intelligently and knowingly waiving her right against 
self-incrimination, so I'm not going to permit her to 
testify. 
¶56 The record reflects that the circuit court did not 
necessarily err in determining that Nelson was not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily making a decision to testify.  
See Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶¶44-46.  As such, it is far from 
certain that the circuit court erred when it precluded Nelson 
from offering irrelevant, excludable testimony. 
¶57 At most, Nelson's testimony would have invited jury 
nullification.  She "'want[ed] to tell what actually happened,'" 
that is, Nelson would testify that she did have intercourse with 
D.M., but she wanted to add that "she did not unbuckle D.M.'s 
No.  2012AP2140-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
pants and that the assaults did not happen three days in a row."  
Majority op., ¶15.  However, whether she unbuckled his pants or 
he unbuckled his own pants is of no help to Nelson, since 
consent was not an issue in this case.  Similarly, whether the 
assaults occurred "three days in a row" is of no assistance to 
Nelson, since the State did not have to prove the exact date or 
time of the assaults in order to secure a conviction.  Majority 
op., ¶50 (citing State v. Badzinski, 2014 WI 6, ¶28, 352 Wis. 2d 
329, 843 N.W.2d 29); see also Wis. Stat. § 948.02; State v. 
Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d 244, 250, 426 N.W.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1988).  
Nelson acknowledged that if she were to testify, she would have 
indeed admitted the sexual assaults charged.  Id.  Her only 
defense was to argue that the State failed to meet its burden of 
proof. Her testimony would have completely unraveled her only 
defense.  Additionally, the circuit court would have been within 
its discretion to preclude the only testimony that Nelson wanted 
to offer, see Bjerkaas, 163 Wis. 2d at 960, and Nelson would 
have been left with only inculpatory testimony.  On this record, 
the circuit court was hard pressed to conclude that Nelson was 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily making the decision to 
testify. 
¶58 The circuit court judge was between a rock and a hard 
place.  If Nelson was allowed to testify, the court could be 
criticized 
for 
not 
insuring 
that 
she 
was 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily deciding to testify, see Weed, 
263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶40, and Nelson's counsel could be challenged 
as ineffective.  See State v. Arredondo, 2004 WI App 7, ¶¶27-29, 
No.  2012AP2140-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
269 Wis. 2d 369, 674 N.W.2d 647.  If Nelson was not allowed to 
testify, the court could be viewed as depriving Nelson of her 
fundamental right to testify.  See Harris v. New York, 401 
U.S. 222, 225 (1971).  In this case, there was no easy answer.  
I am duly concerned that on this record, had Nelson been allowed 
to testify we would be left to second-guess the circuit court's 
decision in that regard and likely reviewing a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Here, the circuit court 
seems to have done the best it could given the circumstances, 
and did not err in protecting Nelson from her own incriminating 
testimony.  
¶59 As a result, while I conclude that it is indeed a rare 
circumstance that the circuit court should be allowed to 
preclude a defendant from testifying, the facts here indicate 
that the circuit court did not err in so concluding that Nelson 
was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily making her 
decision to testify. 
¶60 For the foregoing reasons, I concur. 
 
No.  2012AP2140-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶61 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
record is clear in the instant case that the defendant wanted to 
testify.  Although the right to testify is personal to the 
defendant 
and 
belongs 
exclusively 
to 
the 
defendant, 
the 
defendant both personally and through counsel (who advised the 
defendant against testifying) unequivocally asserted that she 
wanted to testify.   
¶62 By prohibiting the defendant from getting on the stand 
and testifying on her own behalf, the circuit court denied the 
defendant the right to decide whether to testify, a decision 
that was hers alone to make.  Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 
(1983).       
¶63 The majority opinion assumes that the circuit court 
erred when it refused to allow the defendant to tell her side of 
the story.1  The concurrence concludes that the circuit court did 
not err in precluding the defendant from testifying.2 
¶64 I would hold that the circuit court erred.    
¶65 The majority opinion asserts the assumed error is 
subject to harmless-error analysis.3  Many courts have held that 
the denial of a criminal defendant's right to testify is subject 
to harmless-error analysis.4  Other courts, however, refuse to 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶27. 
2 Concurrence, ¶55-56. 
3 Majority op., ¶5. 
4 Majority op., ¶35. 
No.  2012AP2140-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
follow this principle and instead hold that the denial of the 
right to testify is not subject to harmless-error analysis.5  
¶66 Whether an error is subject to harmless-error analysis 
is a question of law this court decides independently of the 
circuit court or court of appeals, benefiting from their 
analyses.6   
¶67 I would hold that the error is not subject to 
harmless-error analysis.   
¶68 A defendant has a fundamental right to testify.  The 
United States Supreme Court has declared that the United States 
Constitution 
guarantees 
criminal 
defendants 
the 
right 
to 
testify, locating the right in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the Constitution.7  The right to testify is 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., State v. Rivera, 741 S.E.2d 694, 706 (S.C. 
2013) ("[A] trial court's improper refusal to permit a defendant 
to testify . . . is not amenable to harmless-error analysis."); 
State v. Dauzart, 769 So. 2d 1206, 1210 (La. 2000) ("[D]enial of 
the accused's right to testify is not amenable to harmless-error 
analysis."); State v. Rosillo, 281 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn. 1979) 
("[T]he right to testify is such a basic and personal right that 
its infraction should not be treated as harmless error."). 
6 State v. Travis, 2013 WI 38, ¶9 & n.9, 347 Wis. 2d 142, 
832 N.W.2d 491. 
7 "The opportunity to testify is . . . a necessary corollary 
to the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony."  
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987).  The Sixth Amendment's 
Compulsory Process Clause guarantees a criminal defendant "the 
right to call witnesses in his [or her] favor."  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   The Fourteenth Amendment assures 
defendants the "right to be heard and to offer testimony" as a 
part of due process.  Id. at 51. 
See also State v. Albright, 96 Wis. 2d 122, 128, 291 
N.W.2d 487 (1980). 
No.  2012AP2140-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
embedded in the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense and 
to self-representation.8  The right to testify is one of the 
rights that "are essential to due process of law in a fair 
adversary process."9   
¶69 The Wisconsin Constitution explicitly states that 
criminal defendants "shall enjoy the right to be heard."10   
¶70 The question before the court in the instant case is 
whether a defendant's fundamental constitutional right to 
testify is so fundamental to a fair trial that its infraction 
cannot be treated as harmless error.  A limited class of 
fundamental constitutional errors exists that defies harmless-
error analysis.  The labels "structural error" and "non-
structural error" have been assigned to constitutional errors.  
If the error is labeled "structural," then the harmless error 
analysis is not applied; reversal is automatic.  These errors 
are 
"so 
intrinsically 
harmful 
as 
to 
require 
automatic 
reversal . . . without regard to their effect on [a trial's] 
outcome."11  If the error is labeled "non-structural," then the 
harmless-error analysis is applied.   
                                                 
8 Rock, 483 U.S. at 51. 
9 Id. 
10 Wis. Const. art. I, § 7.  See State v. Denson, 2011 WI 
70, ¶¶49-56, 335 Wis. 2d 681, 799 N.W.2d 831 (noting the 
protections 
provided 
by 
both 
the 
Wisconsin 
and 
federal 
constitutions for the right to testify and its corollary, the 
right not to testify). 
11 See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999). 
No.  2012AP2140-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶71 Most constitutional errors are labeled non-structural.  
The United States Supreme Court has, however, enumerated several 
fundamental rights the denial of which is prejudicial per se and 
not subject to harmless-error analysis, including the right of 
self-representation,12 the right to counsel,13 and the right to an 
impartial judge.14  The United States Supreme Court has not ruled 
on whether harmless-error analysis applies to denial of a 
defendant's right to testify.15  
¶72 I conclude that the defendant's right to testify falls 
within this category of fundamental rights not subject to 
harmless-error analysis.  I reach this conclusion for several 
reasons. 
                                                 
12 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177-78 & n.8 (1984). 
13 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963). 
14 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927). 
15 Although one Wisconsin court of appeals case asserts that 
the United States Supreme Court has determined that harmless-
error analysis applies to the deprivation of the right to 
testify, see State v. Flynn, 190 Wis. 2d 31, 56, 527 N.W.2d 343 
(Ct. App. 1994), the Flynn case cited Crane v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 683 (1986), for this proposition.  Crane did not assert 
that harmless-error analysis applied.  Rather, in Crane, the 
parties agreed that harmless-error analysis applied and the 
Court did not reach the issue.  Also, the case involved the 
prosecutor's foreclosing the defendant's efforts to admit 
testimony on the environment in which police secured his 
confession, rather than foreclosing the defendant's testimony in 
its entirety. 
In addition, the Flynn case itself can be distinguished 
because Flynn concerned an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, which has a different standard for determining prejudice 
than a harmless-error analysis. 
No.  2012AP2140-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶73 First, the right to testify is meaningless if the 
defendant is not allowed to actually testify.  Taking the stand 
is a defendant's opportunity to face his or her accusers, to 
tell his or her story, and to attempt to persuade those who will 
make a decision that will have a profound effect on his or her 
life and liberty.  A defendant's opportunity to conduct his or 
her own defense by calling witnesses is incomplete if the 
defendant may not present himself or herself as a witness.16 
¶74 "[T]he most important witness for the defense in many 
criminal cases is the defendant."17  "[T]he right to speak for 
oneself entails more than the opportunity to add one's voice to 
a cacophony of others."18  Barring a criminal defendant from 
testifying is not comparable to excluding a witness's testimony 
or particular evidence to which harmless-error analysis applies.  
The defendant is a very special witness.  "[T]here [i]s no 
rational justification for prohibiting the sworn testimony of 
the accused, who above all others may be in a position to meet 
the prosecution's case."19        
¶75 Second, the right to testify is intertwined and 
connected with the right of self-representation.  Denial of the 
right of self-representation is not subject to harmless-error 
analysis.  In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), the 
                                                 
16 Rock, 483 U.S. at 52. 
17 Id. 
18 McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177. 
19 Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 582 (1961) (emphasis 
added).  See also Rock, 483 U.S. at 50 (quoting Ferguson). 
No.  2012AP2140-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
United States Supreme Court vacated the conviction of a 
defendant who was not permitted to appear pro se.  The Court did 
not analyze whether the defendant would have fared better with 
or without appointed counsel.    
¶76 The right of a defendant to testify, according to Rock 
v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987), is "[e]ven more fundamental 
to a personal defense than the right of self-representation."      
¶77 If a defendant's right to testify is even more 
fundamental than the defendant's right of self-representation 
and the right of self-representation is not subject to harmless-
error analysis, it seems to follow that denial of the right to 
testify is not subject to harmless-error analysis. 
¶78 Third, the error in the present case of barring the 
defendant from testifying falls within the various formulations 
of an error not subject to harmless-error analysis.  The test 
for determining whether a fundamental error is subject to 
harmless-error analysis is expressed in the case law in the 
following variety of ways.  An error is not subject to harmless-
error analysis if: 
• 
The error is a "defect affecting the framework within 
which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error 
in the trial process itself."20      
• 
The error "infect[s] the entire trial process,"21 and 
renders the entire trial "fundamentally unfair."22  
                                                 
20 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). 
21 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630 (1993). 
No.  2012AP2140-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
• 
The error deprives a defendant of "basic protections" 
without which "a criminal trial cannot reliably serve 
its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt 
or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be 
regarded as fundamentally fair."23  
• 
The error seriously affects "the fairness, integrity 
or public reputation of judicial proceedings and [is] 
so 
fundamental 
that 
[it 
is] 
considered 
per 
se 
prejudicial."24  
• 
The error is "so basic to a fair trial" that it "can 
never be treated as harmless error."25  
• 
The error undermines a right founded on the respect 
for 
free 
choice 
and 
the 
human 
dignity 
of 
the 
individual.26   
                                                                                                                                                             
22 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (citing Rose 
v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted); Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-310.  See also 
State v. Ford, 2007 WI 138, ¶42, 306 Wis. 2d 1, 742 N.W.2d 61 
(citing Neder). 
23 Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986) (citation 
omitted). 
24 State v. Ford, 2007 WI 138, ¶42, 306 Wis. 2d 1, 742 
N.W.2d 61 (quoting Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, ¶62, 298 Wis. 2d 1, 
724 N.W.2d 623). 
25 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967). 
26 The decision "must be honored out of . . . respect for 
the individual which is the lifeblood of the law."  Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 
397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  See also Chapman v. United States, 
553 F.2d 886, 891 (5th Cir. 1977). 
No.  2012AP2140-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
• 
The error undermines the concept of each person being 
ultimately responsible for choosing his or her own 
fate.27  
• 
The 
error 
produces 
consequences 
that 
are 
unquantifiable, indeterminate, and unmeasurable.28   
¶79 The denial of the right to testify fits within each of 
these descriptions of an error to which harmless-error analysis 
does not apply.  The error in the present case defies harmless-
error review.  It is too difficult to determine the effect of a 
defendant's taking or not taking the stand on the trial's 
outcome.     
¶80 Before I conclude, let me address two additional 
points raised in the majority opinion and concurrence. 
¶81 First, I agree with the concurrence that the circuit 
court was in a difficult position, caught between protecting the 
defendant's two rights——the right to testify and the right not 
to testify.29   
¶82 The circuit court obviously thought it ill-advised for 
the defendant to testify.  The concurrence agrees.  That the 
defendant may be ill-advised or unwise to testify is not the 
legal standard for determining whether the circuit court erred 
in barring the defendant from testifying.  A court cannot 
                                                 
27 See Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 891 (5th Cir. 
1977). 
28 Neder, 527 U.S. at 11; Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 
275, 281-82 (1993). 
29 A limited colloquy is advised when a defendant elects to 
testify.  Denson, 335 Wis. 2d 681, ¶63.   
No.  2012AP2140-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
substitute its judgment for the defendant's.30  The defendant 
must have the right  
as he suffers whatever consequences there may be——to 
the knowledge that it was the claim that he put 
forward that was considered and rejected, and to the 
knowledge that in our free society, devoted to the 
ideal of individual worth, he was not deprived of his 
free will to make his own choice, in his hour of 
trial, to handle his own case. 
United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 
1972). 
¶83 Second, the relevance of the defendant's testimony 
does not dictate a court's decision to bar the defendant from 
taking the stand to testify.  The majority opinion speculates 
that the information the defendant desired to present in her 
testimony was irrelevant.31  The circuit court concluded that the 
defendant's testimony was irrelevant to the issue of guilt or 
innocence.  The concurrence agrees.32  
¶84 Relevance, or lack thereof, may be the basis for 
objecting 
to 
a 
defendant's 
testimony 
and 
for 
sustaining 
objections to the defendant's testimony once the defendant takes 
the stand.  The accused's right to testify is not unqualified 
and "'may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other 
legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. . . .'"  
Rock, 483 U.S. at 55 (quoted source omitted).  But a court 
                                                 
30 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835-36 (asserting that a court's 
assessment of a defendant's legal acumen is irrelevant to its 
evaluation of a defendant's decision to self-represent). 
31 Majority op., ¶50. 
32 Concurrence, ¶¶55-56. 
No.  2012AP2140-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
should not use the relevance of a defendant's testimony to 
justify barring the defendant from taking the stand at all.  We 
cannot know whether her testimony is relevant before she 
testifies. 
¶85 In the instant case, the defendant's testimony may 
well have been relevant.  As the majority opinion acknowledges, 
if the defendant's testimony asserts that "it was the defendant 
who did not consent to the intercourse, that it was she who was 
raped by the child, then the issue of her consent becomes 
paramount." 
 
Majority 
op., 
¶49 
n.14 
(quoting 
State 
v. 
Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, ¶29, 301 Wis. 2d 418, 734 N.W.2d 23).  
Because the defendant was prohibited from testifying, the jury 
was prevented from evaluating her version of the events and 
whether her cognitive and intellectual limitations played a role 
in her ability to consent.   
¶86 For the reasons set forth, I conclude that the circuit 
court erred in depriving the defendant of the right to testify 
under the circumstances of the present case and the error cannot 
be subject to harmless-error analysis. The defendant in the 
instant case is entitled to reversal of the conviction.   
¶87 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
¶88 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2012AP2140-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
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