Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Daniel W. Johns, Jr.
Citation: 2014 WI 32
Docket Number: 2011AP002760-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 2014

2014 WI 32 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP2760-D   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Daniel W. Johns, Jr., Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Appellant, 
     v. 
Daniel W. Johns, Jr., 
          Respondent-Respondent.   
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST JOHNS  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 6, 2014   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 23, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents. (Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: BRADLEY, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the Office of Lawyer Regulation there were briefs by 
Thomas J. Basting Sr., Madison, and oral argument by Thomas J. 
Basting Sr.  
 
 
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief by Dean R. 
Dietrich, and Ruder Ware L.L.S.C., Wausau, and oral argument by 
Dean R. Dietrich. 
  
 
 
2014 WI 32
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP2760-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Daniel W. Johns, Jr., Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Daniel W. Johns, Jr., 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 6, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.  Complaint dismissed. 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   In this disciplinary proceeding, the 
referee concluded that the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) had 
proven violations on one of two counts contained in the 
complaint filed by the OLR.  Based on that violation, the 
referee recommended that Attorney Daniel W. Johns, Jr., be 
either privately or publicly reprimanded.  The OLR appeals from 
the referee's report and recommendation, arguing that the court 
should determine that Attorney Johns committed both counts of 
misconduct and should be suspended for 60 days. 
No. 
2011AP2760-D   
 
2 
 
¶2 
After independently reviewing the record, we accept 
the facts as found by the referee.  We agree with the referee's 
conclusion that Attorney Johns' conduct resulting in a 2004 
felony conviction does not reflect adversely on his honesty, 
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects so as 
to violate SCR 20:8.4(b).1  We disagree with the referee's 
conclusion that Attorney Johns violated SCR 21.15(5),2 as 
enforced via SCR 20:8.4(f),3 by failing to notify the clerk of 
the supreme court and the OLR, in writing, of his conviction.  
We conclude that Attorney Johns' violation of SCR 21.15(5) was 
too technical to justify the imposition of legal consequences.  
Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed. 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:8.4(b) states that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "commit a criminal act that reflects adversely 
on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer 
in other respects." 
2 SCR 21.15(5) provides: 
 
An attorney found guilty or convicted of any 
crime on or after July 1, 2002, shall notify in 
writing the office of lawyer regulation and the clerk 
of the [s]upreme [c]ourt within 5 days after the 
finding or conviction, whichever first occurs.  The 
notice shall include the identity of the attorney, the 
date of finding or conviction, the offenses, and the 
jurisdiction.  An attorney's failure to notify the 
office of lawyer regulation and clerk of the supreme 
court of being found guilty or his or her conviction 
is misconduct. 
3 SCR 20:8.4(f) states that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme 
court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers." 
No. 
2011AP2760-D   
 
3 
 
¶3 
Attorney Johns was admitted to the practice of law in 
Wisconsin in 1999.  He has no disciplinary history. 
¶4 
On November 30, 2011, the OLR filed a two-count 
complaint against Attorney Johns. This court appointed the 
Honorable James R. Erickson as referee.  The referee held an 
evidentiary hearing on June 28, 2012.  Both parties submitted 
post-hearing briefs. 
¶5 
The referee submitted a report containing his findings 
of 
fact, 
conclusions 
of 
law, 
and 
a 
recommendation 
for 
discipline.  The findings of fact incorporated a stipulation 
between the parties and a series of exhibits attached to that 
stipulation.  The findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
summarized below. 
¶6 
When reviewing the referee's report, we will affirm 
the referee's findings of fact unless they are found to be 
clearly erroneous, but we will review the referee's conclusions 
of law on a de novo basis.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against 
Inglimo, 
2007 
WI 
126, 
¶5, 
305 
Wis. 2d 71, 
740 
N.W.2d 125. 
¶7 
Shortly before 1:00 a.m. on December 28, 2002, when he 
was 29 years old, Attorney Johns was the driver in a deadly one-
vehicle 
drunk 
driving 
accident. 
 
Earlier 
that 
evening, 
Attorney Johns had met his father, stepmother, brother, and 
other family members at a restaurant in northern Wisconsin to 
celebrate the holidays.  After dinner, Attorney Johns and his 
brother stayed at the restaurant bar with friends.  When the 
restaurant closed, Attorney Johns and his brother left in 
No. 
2011AP2760-D   
 
4 
 
Attorney Johns' pickup truck, with Attorney Johns driving.  
According to the police report, it is unlikely that either 
Attorney 
Johns 
or 
his 
brother 
were 
wearing 
seatbelts.  
Attorney Johns drove too fast as he turned from U.S. Highway 51 
onto a county highway.  Attorney Johns lost control of the 
truck, causing it to skid off the roadway and strike a tree.  
Attorney Johns' brother was partially ejected from the truck; 
his head hit the tree, causing fatal injuries.  Medical 
personnel arrived at the scene and transported Attorney Johns' 
brother to the hospital, where he was declared dead. 
¶8 
Attorney Johns was also transported to the hospital.  
He was in great distress over his brother's death.  He had a cut 
above his eye, but did not permit medical staff to treat his 
injury.  He also had a strong odor of intoxicants and slurred 
speech. 
¶9 
Police concluded that, given Attorney Johns' head 
injury and emotional state, standard field sobriety exercises 
would be inaccurate and inappropriate.  Attorney Johns refused 
to submit to a blood draw.  A police officer directed hospital 
personnel 
to 
draw 
a 
sample 
of 
Attorney 
Johns' 
blood.  
Attorney Johns had a blood alcohol content of .257%. 
¶10 Attorney Johns was arrested and, after being read his 
warnings under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), declined 
to answer any questions and invoked his right to counsel. 
¶11 On June 10, 2004, Attorney Johns pled guilty to and 
was convicted of one count of homicide by use of a vehicle with 
No. 
2011AP2760-D   
 
5 
 
a prohibited alcohol concentration.  Attorney Johns has no other 
criminal history. 
¶12 Before the circuit court accepted Attorney Johns' 
plea, there was some confusion amongst the parties and the court 
as to whether a conviction on this count would result in an 
automatic 
revocation 
of 
Attorney 
Johns' 
law 
license.  
Attorney Johns' lawyer stated that it was his understanding that 
a felony conviction would not result in an automatic revocation 
of Attorney Johns' law license, but rather that the OLR would 
need to examine the nature of the crime and its relation to 
Attorney Johns' fitness to practice law.  The circuit court 
expressed uncertainty on this point.  The circuit court ordered 
a recess and directed the prosecutor, defense counsel, and 
Attorney Johns to telephone the OLR and resolve the issue.  They 
did so in an off-the-record telephone conversation. 
¶13 When 
the 
parties 
returned 
on 
the 
record, 
Attorney Johns' lawyer stated as follows: 
 
Judge, we were successful in getting hold of the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation.  We talked to the deputy 
director, John O'Connell is his name, and he advised 
us that my understanding of what would happen here 
with regard to OLR action was correct and I actually 
advised Mr. Johns correctly regarding all of that. 
 
To summarize, in the State of Wisconsin there is 
not 
any 
provision 
that 
calls 
for 
an 
automatic 
revocation or suspension of license based solely upon 
the felony conviction.  Mr. O'Connell referenced the 
standards that I referenced previously on the record, 
and that if there were any action taken, it would bear 
upon Mr. Johns' fitness to practice law and would not 
relate to the nature, the classification of the 
No. 
2011AP2760-D   
 
6 
 
conviction but rather the facts and circumstances of 
the conduct. 
¶14 With this explanation on the record, the circuit court 
accepted Attorney Johns' plea and entered a judgment of 
conviction.  The circuit court sentenced Attorney Johns to 120 
days in jail, with five years of probation. 
¶15 Attorney Johns served his jail time and was released 
on probation.  At the halfway point of Attorney Johns' 
probation, his probation agent recommended that he petition for 
early termination of probation.  The circuit court supported an 
early termination, noting in a letter to the district attorney 
Attorney Johns' "extraordinary record of community service" and 
his "180-degree turnabout" from the behavior that led to the 
deadly drunk driving accident.  Attorney Johns was released from 
probation two-and-a-half years early, on May 14, 2007. 
¶16 Attorney Johns began practicing law again.  He is 
currently a full-time solo practitioner. 
¶17 In December 2010 a third party——revealed at oral 
argument to be the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel——informed the OLR 
of Attorney Johns' 2004 conviction.  This proceeding followed. 
¶18 The OLR brought two counts against Attorney Johns.  
Count One alleged a violation of SCR 20:8.4(b) due to the 
conduct resulting in Attorney Johns' 2004 conviction.  Count Two 
alleged 
a 
violation 
of 
SCR 
21.15(5), 
as 
enforced 
via 
SCR 20:8.4(f), because Attorney Johns failed to notify the clerk 
of the supreme court and the OLR, in writing, of his felony 
conviction in 2004.  The OLR sought a 60-day suspension. 
No. 
2011AP2760-D   
 
7 
 
¶19 In his answer to the OLR complaint, Attorney Johns 
denied that his conduct resulting in his 2004 conviction 
reflected adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness 
as a lawyer in other respects so as to violate SCR 20:8.4(b).  
Attorney Johns also denied that he had committed misconduct 
under SCR 21.15(5); he admitted that he did not provide written 
notice of the felony conviction, but explained that he and his 
lawyer spoke with the OLR on the date of the conviction 
regarding the possible impact of the conviction on his law 
license. 
¶20 On September 21, 2012, and after a disciplinary 
hearing, the referee filed a report.  The referee concluded that 
Attorney Johns did not violate SCR 20:8.4(b).  The referee wrote 
that the "commission of a criminal act by a Wisconsin licensed 
lawyer does not, per se, constitute professional misconduct."  
Such a bright line approach, the referee wrote, "would preclude 
each 
case 
from 
being 
carefully 
considered 
based 
on 
the 
individual facts and circumstances surrounding each criminal 
offense and how those facts reflected upon the lawyer's honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects."  The 
referee 
concluded 
that 
the 
OLR 
had 
not 
proven 
that 
Attorney Johns' crime reflected adversely on his honesty, 
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.  The 
referee wrote: 
 
The evidence in this case clearly shows that the 
crime committed by [Attorney Johns] was a once in a 
lifetime aberration in his otherwise fine behavior.  
Except for this one specific and tragic event, 
No. 
2011AP2760-D   
 
8 
 
[Attorney Johns] has led an exemplary personal and 
professional life.  There is no evidence that points 
to even a hint of any other kind of personal or 
professional misconduct. There have been no prior 
reprimands.  There is no evidence of any fraud, 
deceit, 
dishonesty, 
cheating, 
client 
abuse, 
or 
malpractice in any of his behavior.  There is no other 
criminal record. 
 
[Attorney 
Johns] 
is 
a 
highly 
regarded 
and 
contributing member of his community and of the legal 
profession.  He is a credit to the legal profession.  
In my opinion, a sanction of law license suspension is 
unwarranted.  While it is true that the very long 
delay in bringing the disciplinary proceedings [has] 
given [Attorney Johns] years to accumulate his present 
fine standing, the evidence is allowed and is very 
impressive. 
¶21 Thus, the referee recommended that the court dismiss 
Count One's allegation of a violation under SCR 20:8.4(b). 
¶22 As 
to 
Count 
Two, 
the 
referee 
concluded 
that 
Attorney Johns violated SCR 21.15(5) by failing to send written 
notice of his 2004 felony conviction to the OLR and to the 
supreme court clerk.  The referee wrote that although Attorney 
Johns' and his lawyer's phone call with the OLR on the date of 
the plea hearing in the criminal case might have provided actual 
notice to the OLR, it was insufficient to comply with 
SCR 21.15(5), which requires written notice to both the OLR and 
the supreme court clerk. 
¶23 As for discipline, the referee recommended a private 
reprimand, "unless the Court should conclude that a public 
reprimand is more appropriate in order to deter other Wisconsin 
attorneys from also violating [SCR 21.15(5)]." 
No. 
2011AP2760-D   
 
9 
 
¶24 The 
OLR 
appeals 
the 
referee's 
report 
and 
recommendation.  The OLR makes five main points on appeal. 
¶25 First, 
the 
OLR 
argues 
that 
the 
referee's 
recommendation was inconsistent with Wisconsin precedent on 
attorney discipline for homicide while driving drunk.  In 
support of this proposition, the OLR cites In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Stearn, 2004 WI 73, 272 Wis. 2d 141, 682 
N.W.2d 326, in which the court granted Attorney Stearn's 
petition for consensual license revocation under SCR 22.19 after 
he was convicted of homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle and 
causing great bodily harm by intoxicated use of a vehicle.  
Attorney 
Stearn 
received 
a 
12-year 
prison 
sentence.  
Attorney Stearn conceded that he could not successfully defend 
against the OLR misconduct allegations, which included the 
assertion 
that 
his 
convictions 
established 
conduct 
that 
reflected adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness or fitness 
as a lawyer in other respects, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(b). 
¶26 Second, the OLR argues that this court has found a 
nexus between a criminal act and a lawyer's fitness in cases 
involving far less serious criminal convictions than that 
present here.  See Inglimo, 305 Wis. 2d 71, ¶¶49-55 (holding 
that attorney's marijuana usage with and delivery to clients 
reflected adversely on his fitness as a lawyer). 
¶27 Third, the OLR notes that in other jurisdictions, 
attorneys who have been convicted of vehicular homicide have 
received suspensions ranging from 18 months to disbarment.  See 
In re Janklow, 709 N.W.2d 28 (S.D. 2006) (26-month suspension 
No. 
2011AP2760-D   
 
10 
 
for a manslaughter conviction after lawyer, who was not under 
the influence of drugs or alcohol, ran a stop sign and collided 
with another vehicle); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. 
Wyatt, 32 P.3d 858 (Okla. 2001) (disbarment for a manslaughter 
conviction resulting from drunk driving accident); Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Michaels, 527 N.E.2d 299 (Ohio 1988) 
(18-month suspension following deadly drunk driving accident); 
In re Morris, 397 P.2d 475 (N.M. 1964) (indefinite suspension 
for involuntary manslaughter conviction resulting from drunk 
driving 
accident; 
lawyer 
could 
apply 
for 
termination 
of 
suspension after the later of one year following disciplinary 
order, or upon completion of sentence, or upon being restored to 
all civil rights); In re Hoare, 155 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(disbarment for an aggravated reckless homicide conviction 
resulting from drunk driving accident). 
¶28 Fourth, the OLR argues that on the facts of this case, 
a 60-day suspension is appropriate.  It points out that in In re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Brandt, 
2012 
WI 
8, 
338 
Wis. 2d 524, 808 N.W.2d 687, this court imposed a four-month 
suspension on Attorney Brandt, consistent with the parties' 
stipulation, after he received a felony conviction in Minnesota 
of first-degree driving while intoxicated within ten years of 
the first of three or more qualified prior impaired driving 
incidents.  The OLR also points out that, according to the 
Washington Supreme Court, a suspension of some length of time 
"is the appropriate sanction for every vehicular homicide."  In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Curran, 801 P.2d 962, 974 
No. 
2011AP2760-D   
 
11 
 
(Wash. 1990).  The OLR further claims that this court has 
imposed significant suspensions for crimes far less serious than 
homicide by use of a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol 
concentration.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Mross, 2003 WI 4, 259 Wis. 2d 8, 657 N.W.2d 342 (90-day 
suspension for lawyer's unlawful sale of cigarettes to jail 
inmates while visiting his clients in jail). 
¶29 Fifth, and finally, the OLR argues that the referee 
erred by admitting 21 letters from juveniles in the Lincoln 
Hills School, a juvenile correctional institution in Wisconsin.  
As a form of community service, Attorney Johns gave talks to 
classes at the Lincoln Hills School concerning his personal 
history.  In the letters at issue, the students expressed 
appreciation for Attorney Johns' time and message.  The OLR 
cites In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 117 
Wis. 2d 332, 344 N.W.2d 169 (1984), in which this court held 
that the referee erred by receiving into evidence 67 letters of 
character reference by attorneys and others who did not testify 
at 
the 
disciplinary 
hearing 
and 
whose 
statements 
as 
to 
Attorney Eisenberg's character were not made under oath.  Id. at 
338-39. 
¶30 We begin by discussing the alleged failure-to-notify 
violation under SCR 21.15(5).  The referee concluded that 
Attorney Johns committed a failure-to-notify violation under 
SCR 21.15(5).  Although Attorney Johns did actually inform the 
OLR of his conviction through his lawyer's off-the-record 
telephone conversation with an OLR official during his plea 
No. 
2011AP2760-D   
 
12 
 
hearing, SCR 21.15(5) requires notification "in writing" to the 
OLR and the clerk of the supreme court.  Attorney Johns did not 
satisfy this "in writing" requirement. 
¶31 This was a violation of the most technical variety.  
It is undisputed that, due to the telephone conversation between 
Attorney Johns' lawyer and the OLR's deputy director on the day 
of Attorney Johns' plea hearing, the OLR had actual knowledge of 
the conviction from the day it was entered.  Under the unique 
facts of this case, a completely literal enforcement of 
SCR 21.15(5) benefits no one and settles nothing.  We therefore 
dismiss this count. 
¶32 We move now to the issue of whether Attorney Johns 
violated SCR 20:8.4(b) through the misconduct leading to his 
conviction for homicide by use of a vehicle with a prohibited 
alcohol concentration.  We agree with the referee that on the 
facts of this case, the answer is no. 
¶33 In answering this question, it is helpful to bear in 
mind the purpose of disciplinary actions.  The purpose of the 
disciplinary system is not punishment or atonement, but to 
determine whether misconduct as defined by our rules has 
occurred and to what extent that misconduct indicates unfitness 
to practice law.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Crandall, 2008 WI 112, ¶23, 314 Wis. 2d 33, 754 N.W.2d 501.  No 
one 
disputes 
that 
the 
facts 
of 
this 
case 
are 
tragic:  
Attorney Johns drove drunk and killed his brother——a senseless 
loss of life.  This court will resist the impulse, however, to 
No. 
2011AP2760-D   
 
13 
 
assume that the unfortunate death of Attorney Johns' brother 
necessarily reflects upon Attorney Johns' fitness as a lawyer. 
¶34 Supreme Court Rule 20:8.4(b) requires us to answer 
whether Attorney Johns' criminal act "reflects adversely" on 
his: (1) honesty, (2) trustworthiness, or (3) "fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects."  We hold that Attorney Johns' 
criminal act does not reflect adversely on the first two 
factors, 
his 
honesty 
or 
trustworthiness. 
 
This 
was 
Attorney Johns' first drunk-driving related conviction.  He has 
no other criminal record.  He has been truthful about his 
actions.  He has never disclaimed responsibility for his 
wrongdoing.  He did not flee the scene of the accident; the 
record shows that a responding officer observed him trying to 
administer mouth-to-mouth resuscitation to his fatally wounded 
brother.  He gained nothing from his criminal action.  Thus, the 
record does not show that Attorney Johns' terrible decision to 
drive drunk on the night in question belies a deep-seated 
tendency toward dishonest or untrustworthy actions. 
¶35 The question becomes, then, whether Attorney Johns' 
criminal act reflects adversely on his "fitness as a lawyer in 
other respects"; i.e., whether the act bears on a character 
trait which, like honesty and trustworthiness, is essential to 
the practice of law. 
¶36 The ABA Comment [2] to SCR 20:8.4 provides some 
guidance as to what crimes reflect adversely on fitness as a 
lawyer.  It states: 
No. 
2011AP2760-D   
 
14 
 
Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the 
entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally 
answerable only for offenses that indicate [a] lack of 
those 
characteristics 
relevant 
to 
law 
practice.  
Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of 
trust, or serious interference with the administration 
of justice are in that category.  A pattern of 
repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance 
when considered separately, can indicate indifference 
to legal obligation. 
¶37 We also note that in interpreting subsection (6) of 
SCR 22.36 ("Reinstatement; removal of conditions"), we have 
interpreted the term "fit" with the phrase "to practice law" to 
"imply a state of preparedness to render competent legal 
services; that is, to be prepared to provide the measure of 
expertise to ensure the attorney may be safely recommended to 
the community as a person to be consulted by and to represent 
others in legal matters."  In re Medical Incapacity Proceedings 
Against Schlieve, 2010 WI 22, ¶24, 323 Wis. 2d 654, 780 
N.W.2d 516.  We believe these same concepts——preparedness, 
competence, 
expertise, 
credibility——are 
useful 
here 
in 
determining whether Attorney Johns' criminal act reflects 
adversely on his "fitness as a lawyer in other respects."  
SCR 20:8.4(b). 
¶38 We have identified certain types of criminality as 
particularly relevant to a person's fitness as a lawyer.  For 
example, we have held that a pattern of convictions "evinces a 
serious lack of respect for the law and as such relate[s] to [a 
lawyer's] 'fitness as a lawyer in other respects.'  Attorneys 
are officers of the court and should be leaders in their 
communities and should set a good example for others."  In re 
No. 
2011AP2760-D   
 
15 
 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Brandt, 2009 WI 43, ¶42, 317 
Wis. 2d 266, 766 N.W.2d 194 (discussing a lawyer's multiple OWI 
convictions).  We also have held that certain criminal conduct 
is so revealing of character defects, and so undermines public 
confidence in the legal profession, that it necessarily reflects 
adversely on an attorney's fitness as a lawyer.  See Inglimo, 
305 Wis. 2d 71, ¶¶49-55 (lawyer's marijuana usage with clients 
showed the clients that their lawyer had "a disregard for the 
law" that "reflect[ed] adversely not only on the lawyer's 
fitness, but on the profession as a whole"); see also In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Penn, 201 Wis. 2d 405, 406, 548 
N.W.2d 526 (1996) (district attorney's illegal drug usage with 
individuals subject to prosecution by his office damaged the 
"public trust in the legal system to which the people of his 
county elected him"). 
¶39 Employing the above principles here, we conclude that 
Attorney Johns' criminal act does not reflect adversely on his 
"fitness as a lawyer in other respects."  SCR 20:8.4(b).  
Attorney Johns' conviction is not part of a larger pattern of 
criminal behavior that suggests indifference toward the law.  He 
has no other criminal history.  The record does not suggest that 
Attorney 
Johns' 
conviction 
has 
adversely 
affected 
his 
professional relationships with judges, fellow lawyers, clients, 
or other members of the legal system.  Attorney Johns' 
conviction 
does 
not 
call 
into 
question 
his 
ability 
to 
competently and vigorously represent clients; we have no reason 
to doubt the referee's finding that Attorney Johns is "a highly 
No. 
2011AP2760-D   
 
16 
 
regarded and contributing member of his community and of the 
legal profession."  Nor, we believe, should Attorney Johns' 
criminal act diminish public confidence in the legal profession.  
This case is far different from those in which an attorney 
abused his or her professional status as a lawyer in committing 
a criminal act.  Attorney Johns violated no practice norms.  He 
harmed no clients.  He did not benefit from his misconduct.  He 
has been arrested, convicted, sentenced, jailed, and supervised 
on probation.  He will forever have a heavy conscience regarding 
this incident. 
¶40 Considering all of the above, we do not believe that 
Attorney Johns' isolated criminal act, even with its tragic 
consequences, denotes a deficiency in honesty, trustworthiness, 
or other character traits that are essential to the practice of 
law. 
¶41 As noted earlier, the OLR cites a variety of out-of-
state cases in an attempt to convince the court to find a 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(b).  The OLR waited until its reply 
brief to first identify the case that it maintains is most 
relevant to this case:  In re Hoare, 155 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 
1998).  The facts of Hoare are as follows.  One early morning, 
Attorney Hoare, drunk, drove his car the wrong way onto an 
interstate highway in Illinois and collided with another 
vehicle, 
causing 
that 
driver's 
death. 
 
Id. 
at 
938.  
Attorney Hoare was ultimately convicted of aggravated reckless 
homicide.  Id. at 939.  A series of professional disciplinary 
actions against Attorney Hoare followed.  In an unpublished 
No. 
2011AP2760-D   
 
17 
 
decision that is not available on Westlaw or Lexis and has not 
been provided to us by the OLR, the Missouri Supreme Court 
issued an order disbarring Attorney Hoare from the practice of 
law in Missouri.  Id. at 939, citing In re Michael Hoare, No. 
78870 (Mo. S. Ct. Jul. 16, 1996).  In an unpublished order that 
is also not available on Westlaw or Lexis and has not been 
provided to us by the OLR, the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Missouri imposed the same discipline as 
that imposed by the Missouri Supreme Court:  disbarment.  Id. at 
940, citing In the Matter of Michael J. Hoare, No. 96-MC-187 
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 11, 1997) (en banc).  The Eighth Circuit 
affirmed, noting that federal courts are "obliged to accord a 
high level of deference to state court disbarment proceedings," 
and that   "we cannot say that the district court abused its 
discretion in concluding that the reciprocal discipline of 
disbarment would not result in grave injustice."  Id. at 940-42. 
¶42 We do not find Hoare particularly enlightening.  The 
Eighth Circuit in Hoare was operating under a constrained 
standard of review of a 1996 Missouri Supreme Court order that 
is unavailable to us and that relied upon a Missouri Supreme 
Court Rule that the OLR neither quotes nor substantively 
discusses.  In the instant case, we enjoy a de novo standard of 
review over the legal issues presented, and we have the benefit 
of a fully developed record.  For the reasons set forth above, 
we hold that on the particular facts of record, Attorney Johns' 
criminal act does not reflect adversely on his honesty, 
No. 
2011AP2760-D   
 
18 
 
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, 
despite the act's tragic consequences. 
¶43 We move now to the third issue raised in the parties' 
briefs:  whether the referee erred in admitting 21 letters from 
juveniles in the Lincoln Hills School (a juvenile correctional 
institution) expressing appreciation to Attorney Johns for a 
talk he gave them about his life experiences.  Here is a 
representative example of one of the letters: 
Dear Mr. Johns, 
 
I would like to thank you for taking the time out 
of your day to come and speak to us.  I could see 
myself in you.  I did get some things out of your 
story.  One of them . . . is don't drink, and another 
is don't drink and drive under [any] circumstances.  I 
also got that change is possible and it do[es] exist.  
I admire and respect you.  Thank you again. 
¶44 In its brief-in-chief, the OLR argued that these 
letters constituted inadmissible hearsay.  Attorney Johns 
disputed this assertion in his response brief.  Attorney Johns 
further argued that, even if these letters should not have been 
admitted, their admission into evidence was harmless error 
because the record contains abundant other uncontested evidence 
of his good character. 
¶45 The OLR ignores the topic in its reply brief.  Neither 
party mentioned the issue at oral argument.  We take this lack 
of reply by the OLR as a concession that the letters were 
admissible.  See State ex rel. Blank v. Gramling, 219 Wis. 196, 
199, 262 N.W. 614 (1935). 
No. 
2011AP2760-D   
 
19 
 
¶46 For the reasons stated above, we accept the referee's 
conclusion that Attorney Johns' conduct resulting in his 2004 
conviction 
does 
not 
reflect 
adversely 
on 
his 
honesty, 
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects so as 
to violate SCR 20:8.4(b).  We depart from the referee's 
conclusion that Attorney Johns' committed a failure-to-report 
violation under SCR 21.15(5); we conclude that Attorney Johns' 
violation of SCR 21.15(5) was too technical to justify the 
imposition of legal consequences.  Accordingly, we dismiss the 
complaint. 
¶47 IT IS ORDERED that the disciplinary complaint filed 
against Daniel W. Johns, Jr., is dismissed.  No costs. 
¶48 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2011AP2760-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶49 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  The OLR 
charged Attorney Johns with two violations of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys.  I conclude that the two 
violations were proved, but I would not impose any discipline. 
¶50 Attorney Johns agrees (as he must) that he violated 
the Rules by failing to notify the clerk of the supreme court 
and OLR in writing of his felony conviction.  Attorney Johns 
disputes whether his conviction of vehicular homicide violated 
the Rules.     
¶51 The referee agreed with Attorney Johns that he 
violated only one provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
for Attorneys, namely failing to notify the clerk of the supreme 
court and the OLR in writing of his felony conviction.1 
¶52 The per curiam opinion concludes that Attorney Johns' 
conduct does not violate the Rules in either respect.   
¶53 I disagree with the court's disposition of the present 
case and address the two charges in parts A and B of this 
dissent. 
¶54 Because this case, along with two other pending cases 
and an open rules petition hearing and open rules petition 
conference, raise important concerns about the present lawyer 
regulatory system, I write stating the requests previously made 
for the court to initiate a study of the lawyer regulatory 
                                                 
1 The referee concluded that Johns did not violate the Rules 
by his felony conviction of vehicular homicide of his brother 
because the conviction does not reflect on Attorney Johns' 
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer. 
No.  2011AP2760-D.ssa 
 
2 
 
system.  The lawyer regulatory system now in effect was 
instituted about 15 years ago.  It is time to examine it to 
determine whether revisions are needed.  The director of the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation agrees.  I discuss this issue in 
Part C of this dissent.     
A 
¶55 With regard to the notification violation, Attorney 
Johns did not notify the OLR and the clerk of the Supreme Court 
of his felony conviction in writing, as SCR 21.15(5) requires.  
He did speak with a named employee at OLR.  OLR does not deny 
that this oral communication occurred.  Attorney Johns does not 
claim he spoke with or wrote the clerk of the Supreme Court 
about his conviction. 
¶56 The rule is straightforward: It requires a written 
notice to two offices.  A writing constitutes official notice to 
the OLR and the court; writing is key to the reporting 
requirement and attorney discipline.  A written communication 
avoids evidentiary proceedings to determine who said what to 
whom and when.   
¶57 Furthermore, the rule requires communication to both 
the OLR and the clerk's office.  Attorney Johns failed to notify 
the clerk's office in any way.  No one asserts he complied with 
notification to the clerk's office. 
¶58 The per curiam opinion characterizes the present case 
as a technical violation.  I do not know what a "technical 
violation" means.  Attorney Johns' notification to OLR was not 
No.  2011AP2760-D.ssa 
 
3 
 
in writing and no notification was made to the clerk of the 
supreme court.     
¶59 The court's conclusion that Attorney Johns did not 
violate SCR 21.15(5) is clearly contrary to the stipulated facts 
and the plain, unambiguous text of the Rules.  
¶60 The court has discretion whether to impose discipline.  
SCR 21.16.  In light of the circumstances of the case, including 
Attorney Johns' stellar record for the last decade, I would not 
impose any discipline for this violation.   
B 
¶61 The felony conviction presents a more difficult issue.  
The commission of a criminal act by a Wisconsin-licensed lawyer 
does not in and of itself automatically constitute professional 
misconduct.  The facts and circumstances of an offense must be 
considered to determine whether it reflects on the lawyer's 
honesty, 
trustworthiness, 
or 
fitness 
as 
a 
lawyer. 
 
SCR 
20:8.4(b). 
¶62 This felony drunk driving conviction was apparently 
Attorney Johns' only drunk driving offense before or after the 
homicide.  Nothing in the record before us indicates he has an 
alcohol-related problem.  The district attorney's office had 
discretion whether to prosecute Attorney Johns.  It prosecuted.  
The trial court had discretion in sentencing Attorney Johns for 
the homicide.  It imposed jail time and probation.            
No.  2011AP2760-D.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶63 As the per curiam opinion explains, drunk driving has 
been 
viewed 
differently 
by 
different 
courts 
in 
attorney 
discipline cases.2  
¶64 Drunk driving is a major public safety issue in 
Wisconsin and across the country.  According to the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, in 2012 an average of one 
alcohol-impaired driving fatality occurred every 51 minutes.3  In 
2012, 10,322 people were killed in alcohol-impaired driving 
crashes.4  All drivers are——or should be held to be——aware of the 
dangers of drunk driving.  That drunk driving may be prosecuted 
as a crime is also common knowledge.   
¶65 Attorney Johns was engaged in an evening of drinking 
with his family.  His blood alcohol level tested way over the 
legal limit.  He pled guilty to one count of homicide by use of 
a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration.  The one-
vehicle accident resulting in the death of Attorney Johns' 
passenger/brother was a tragedy for the entire family.  The 
tragedy did not end that night.  The tragic aftermath includes a 
                                                 
2 See also Alexandra Sorota & Shelley Lambert, Driving on 
the Wrong Side of the Road: How Lawyers are Sanctioned for 
Vehicular Homicide in New York and the District of Columbia, 15 
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 865 (2002); Rachna K. Dhanda, When 
Attorneys Become Convicted Felons: The Question of Discipline by 
the Bar, 8 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 723 (1995).  
3 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, DOT HS 811 870, Traffic Safety 
Facts: 
 
2012 
Data, 
available 
at 
http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811870.pdf (last visited March 24, 2014). 
4 Id. 
No.  2011AP2760-D.ssa 
 
5 
 
criminal prosecution, a felony conviction, jail time, probation, 
and this disciplinary action.  
¶66 This case has to be considered, however, in the 
context of the scourge of drunk driving in our society.  
Although the totality of the circumstances of the isolated 
homicide in the instant case presents a very close discipline 
case——and my sympathies are with Attorney Johns and his family——
I would hold that the felony conviction constituted a violation 
of the Rules.     
¶67 I would not, however, impose any discipline for this 
violation. 
The 
court 
has 
discretion 
whether 
to 
impose 
discipline.  SCR 21.16.  In light of the circumstances of the 
case, including Attorney Johns' stellar record for the last 
decade, discipline is not warranted.   
C 
¶68 This case, along with the two Osicka cases,5 the Kratz6 
case, and rule petitions recently filed7 and hearings on filed 
                                                 
5 OLR 
v. 
Osicka, 
2014 
WI 
33, 
___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 
___ 
N.W.2d ___, and OLR v. Osicka, 2014 WI 34, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___, mandated of even date.  Although Justice Prosser 
joined in prior cases disciplining Attorney Osicka, Justice 
Prosser dissents, asserting that OLR is "piling up legal costs 
that it expects Osicka to pay. . . . These prosecutions raise 
questions about how OLR uses its limited resources to protect 
the public interest——questions about its priorities.  Because 
the answers to questions of this sort are seldom addressed, I 
feel compelled to respectfully dissent."  Osicka, 2014 WI 33, 
¶___ (Prosser, J., dissenting).   
6 OLR v. Kratz, 2014 WI 31, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 
mandated of even date. 
No.  2011AP2760-D.ssa 
 
6 
 
rules petitions involving the OLR, raises broader issues than 
those posed by these and other individual cases.   
¶69 For example, the very prosecution of this case 10 
years after the incident seems to have troubled the referee and 
is troubling the court, as is the wisdom of OLR's appeal.  
Delays in initiating and completing discipline cases are also 
evident in Osicka and Kratz.  Other issues raised include OLR's 
discretion in charging, dismissing charges, and diversion; 
whether and what consideration is given in lawyer discipline to 
OLR's scarce resources; the extent to which the OLR should 
consider mercy, forgiveness, and the wishes of the victims; 
whether respondent lawyers should be able to appear before the 
Preliminary Review Committee; and whether the Preliminary Review 
Committee should be disbanded inasmuch as apparently over 90% of 
the OLR's recommendations are accepted.   
¶70 The Kratz case raised the issue of the role of 
partisan politics and media publicity in discipline proceedings, 
as Justice Prosser's dissent points out.  Members of the Court 
have also raised the question of the wisdom of changing the 
rules to allow plea bargaining.  These are only some of the 
significant and troubling issues illustrated in these cases and 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 See OLR's Board of Administrative Oversight and State Bar 
petition (Rule Petition 13-04) to amend the rules relating to 
referees in the lawyer regulation system; OLR's Board of 
Administrative Oversight and State Bar petition (Rule Petition 
13-06) 
relating 
to 
stipulations 
in 
lawyer 
disciplinary 
proceedings; 
and 
OLR's 
Board 
of 
Administrative 
Oversight 
petition (Rule Petition 13-12) relating to public notice of 
formal investigations. 
No.  2011AP2760-D.ssa 
 
7 
 
raised in rule petitions and the hearings on recent rule 
petitions.   
¶71 On October 25, 2013, Keith Sellen appeared advocating 
a rule petition regarding lawyer discipline.  I suggested to him 
that an impartial, objective review of OLR practices and 
procedures should be conducted.8  Fifteen years have elapsed 
since the OLR system was instituted.  Several anomalies and 
proposed amendments have been brought to the court's attention.  
I believe it is time for a review rather than piecemeal 
adjustments at this time.  Keith Sellen, director of the OLR, 
agreed with the proposal for a review.  Justices Ann Walsh 
Bradley, N. Patrick Crooks, and David T. Prosser expressed 
interest in and support for such a proposal at the October 2013 
open rules petition conference. 
¶72 Several pending rule petitions requesting changes in 
OLR's practices and procedures were the result of a review 
committee that the chair of the OLR Board of Administrative 
Oversight created at my suggestion. 
                                                 
8 For a provocative, different view of state lawyer 
discipline 
systems 
(which 
are 
now 
modeled 
on 
criminal 
prosecutions), see Jenifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The 
Paradox and Promise of Restorative Attorney Discipline, 12 
Nevada L. J. 253 (2012). The authors suggest new therapeutic 
approaches including diversionary programs, deliberation and 
decision making by a diverse group of stakeholders, increased 
victim and public participation, and discussions that focus on 
repairing the damage caused by the offending attorney to build 
trust 
between 
attorneys 
and 
their 
clients, 
to 
foster 
professional conduct, to prevent ethical misconduct, to improve 
the morale of practicing lawyers, and to protect the public.     
No.  2011AP2760-D.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶73 Instead of examining and adopting these proposals 
piecemeal, I advocated dealing with the subject matter of these 
rule petitions as well as other issues relating to OLR by an 
objective review of all OLR practices and procedures.  A review 
by persons knowledgeable in and working in other state lawyer 
discipline systems might be a good first step.  Other justices 
proposed different tacks, including appointing a committee of 
diverse stakeholders to determine the nature and course of the 
review.  I was (and am) open to taking a different or broader 
approach than I originally explored. 
¶74 The court has not resolved a proposal for such a 
review of the OLR disciplinary system.  Some members of the 
court appeared to take the view that any such proposal was not 
germane to the subject of the petitions; that any such proposal 
was not itself a rules petition; and that consequently any 
proposal could not be discussed at an open rules petition 
conference 
without 
the 
court 
first 
authorizing 
an 
open 
discussion in closed conference.   
¶75 I intend to continue to seek an open conference in 
which we can discuss instituting an impartial, objective review 
of OLR practices and procedures.  Such a review is germane to 
all the pending rules petitions.  In any event, I can and shall, 
if need be, draft a proposal in rules petition format if that's 
what it takes.   
¶76 This matter should be discussed by the court in open 
conference, not behind closed doors.  Lawyer discipline is of 
No.  2011AP2760-D.ssa 
 
9 
 
great importance to the court, the lawyers in the state, and the 
public.           
* * * * 
¶77 For the reasons set forth, I do not join the per 
curiam opinion, and I write to urge an impartial, objective 
review of our lawyer discipline system. 
No.  2011AP2760-D.ssa 
 
 
 
1