Title: Danielle Davidson v. Raymond A.Slater , et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-84-05
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: January 30, 2007

Plaintiff Danielle Davidson was involved in an automobile accident on August 2, 2001, when the vehicle in which she was a passenger was rear-ended by a car driven by Raymond Slater and owned by his wife, Deanna. The following day, Davidson went to the hospital emergency room where she was x-rayed, treated, and released. Two weeks after the accident, she was examined by her internist, Dr. Scott Dorfner, who treated her with anti-inflammatory medication, physical therapy, and medication for depression, explained to be caused by her ongoing disabilities. Dr. Dorfner diagnosed lumbar disc protrusion at L5-S1, post-traumatic myofascitis and headache, lumbar radiculitis bilaterally, and post-traumatic cervical, dorsal (thoracic), and lumbar strain and sprain. He further concluded that the injuries were directly related to the August 2, 2001 accident and were permanent. Davidson was also examined by Dr. Nathan Zemel, an independent physician assigned by the no-fault carrier, and by defendant s physician, Dr. Gregory Maslow. On July 18, 2003, Davidson filed a complaint against defendants, Raymond and Deanna Slater. Davidson sought damages for emotional, mental, and physical pain and suffering, and asserted compliance with the N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) prerequisites for such non-economic damages. Defendants filed an answer denying the claims and asserting numerous affirmative defenses, including the verbal threshold defense. Defendants then filed two summary judgment motions. The first motion, filed on behalf of Deanna Slater, the vehicle owner, and unopposed by Davidson, was granted by the trial court, and left Raymond Slater as the sole defendant. We are here concerned with the second motion, which sought judgment based, in part, on Davidson s failure to show proximate causation by offering, as required by Polk v. Daconceicao, 268 N.J. Super. 568 (App. Div. 1993), a comparative analysis of plaintiff s injuries to the same body parts involved in three separate accidents, one in 1997 and another in 2003, notwithstanding that Davidson was not alleging an aggravation to a pre-existing injury. On the merits, the trial court granted summary judgment to defendant because Davidson had been injured in other accidents and did not provide a comparative-medical analysis distinguishing the alleged accident injuries from all other injuries to the same body parts. Moreover, the court observed that the only injury that might be attributed solely to the August 2001 accident was Davidson s disc protrusion and that a physician s report addressing her 2003 accident injuries did not mention any extant disc protrusion, yielding to the conclusion that there was no credible evidence of permanent injury. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that such an analysis was not required for Davidson s non-aggravation claim to vault the verbal threshold. Davidson v. Slater, 381 N.J. Super 22 (2005). The panel pointedly disagreed with other appellate decisions that had required a plaintiff to produce a Polk comparative analysis as part of an AICRA verbal threshold presentation and, further, that had required a comparative analysis in the context of a non-aggravation claim seeking damages for injury to a body part that previously had been injured. The Supreme Court granted defendant s petition for certification. The Court also granted multiple amici applications. HELD: Plaintiff was under no obligation under the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA) to produce, as part of her prima facie presentation in this non-aggravation cause of action, a comparative analysis in order to satisfy the verbal threshold proof requirements. As between defendant s medical proofs and those presented by plaintiff, the trial court was obliged to determine whether a genuine issue of proximate cause had been presented. As to the issue of permanency, the matter is remanded for further explication of this record by the Appellate Division in light of the proof requirements for objective medical evidence of permanency. 1. Before AICRA and its current iteration of the verbal threshold was enacted, an automobile-accident victim seeking to sue for bodily injury non-economic damages had to vault an earlier version of the threshold. Suit was permitted for nine enumerated categories of injuries. In Oswin v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290 (1992) we held that a plaintiff had to demonstrate one of the statute s nine categories of injury and also prove that the injury had a serious impact on the plaintiff and her life Oswin s so-called subjective prong. Oswin further required that verbal threshold cases follow a summary judgment model. The role of comparative-analysis evidence in a verbal threshold summary judgment motion was discussed in Polk, in which the Appellate Division found that Polk s physician offered no objective medical basis whatsoever to substantiate plaintiff s complaints [or] to causally connect these complaints to the accident rather than to plaintiff s serious pre-existing prior medical condition. Polk, supra, 268 N.J. Super. at 576. Following Polk, courts have dismissed automobile accident actions alleging aggravation of pre-existing injuries when plaintiff failed to produce a comparative analysis. (Pp. 15-19) 2. AICRA revised the proof requirements for the verbal threshold and incorporated Oswin s objective prong. On the other hand, Oswin s subjective, serious life impact requirement was found by this Court to be incompatible with the plain language of AICRA s revised limitation-on-lawsuit standard and inconsistent with the Legislature s expressed intention to create a substantially new verbal threshold. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 (2005). To vault AICRA s verbal threshold an accident victim need only prove an injury as defined in the statute. Serrano v. Serrano, 183 N.J. 508 (2005). The question of the continuing relevance of a Polk comparative analysis in connection with a plaintiff s verbal threshold demonstration has been the subject of much debate. Several appellate panels have affirmed the continuing vitality of Oswin s serious life impact requirement and one panel has expanded the Polk holding to require a comparative-analysis in non-aggravation claims. The Davidson panel found that Polk s comparative analysis requirement likely was no longer viable in the context of verbal-threshold motions in light of DiProspero and Serrano, whether aggravation of a prior injury is alleged or not. Davidson, supra, 381 N.J. Super. at 29. (Pp. 19-23) 3. There presently is no longer any need for a plaintiff to make a life-impact showing. That said, to the extent the parties have focused their attention on a pre- versus post-AICRA substantive requirement for comparative medical evidence, their arguments are wide of the mark. The need for a plaintiff to produce a comparative medical analysis remains dependent on traditional principles of causation and burden allocation applicable to tort cases generally. Those principles are what determine the need for comparative evidence. The question that we now answer is one that transcends the AICRA verbal threshold setting in which it has arisen. (Pp. 24-25) 4. When aggravation of a pre-existing injury is pled by a plaintiff, comparative medical evidence is necessary as part of a plaintiff s prima facie and concomitant verbal threshold demonstration in order to isolate the physician s diagnosis of the injury or injuries that are allegedly permanent as a result of the subject accident. The rub comes when a plaintiff does not plead aggravation of pre-existing injuries, but there have been other injuries to the body part. Defendant seeks to burden Davidson with an initial obligation to produce comparative-analysis evidence excluding all other injuries from being the cause of the permanent injury on which the verbal threshold action is based. We reject the invitation to place such a burden of production on plaintiff in her AICRA non-aggravation-pled case. There is no such requirement to be found in AICRA. In Oswin, supra, the Court established that verbal threshold cases should follow the summary judgment model. That summary judgment framework still applies to AICRA s refined standard for vaulting the verbal threshold. (Pp. 25-30) 5. Davidson was under no obligation under the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA) to produce, as part of her prima facie presentation in this non-aggravation cause of action, a comparative analysis in order to satisfy the verbal threshold proof requirements. Moreover, as between defendant s medical proofs and those presented by plaintiff, the trial court was obliged to determine whether a genuine issue of proximate cause had been presented. In that respect, we affirm the Appellate Division judgment. As to the issue of permanency, however, defendant asserts that the Appellate Division improperly relied on Dr. Dorfner s certification of permanency exclusively when reversing the trial court s grant of summary judgment. As defendant notes, a court is not bound to rely solely on a physician s certification to vault a plaintiff over the verbal threshold. However, that does not appear to be what happened here. The record before us is unclear on the question of permanency. We remand for further explication of this record by the Appellate Division in light of the proof requirements for objective medical evidence of permanency. (Pp. 30-34) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED with modification and the matter is REMANDED to the Appellate Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUSTICES LONG, ZAZZALI, ALBIN, WALLACE, and RIVERA-SOTO join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA s opinion. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RAYMOND A. SLATER, Defendant-Appellant, and DEANNA L. SLATER and JOHN DOE(s), 1-5, ABC CORPORATION(s), 1-5, Defendants. Argued September 12, 2006 Decided January 30, 2007 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 381 N.J. Super. 22 (2005). William J. Markwardt argued the cause for appellant (Kent &amp; McBride, attorneys). Michael A. Ferrara, Jr. argued the cause for respondent (Steven J. Jozwiak, attorney). Susan Stryker argued the cause for amici curiae Insurance Council of New Jersey, American Insurance Association, Property Casualty Insurers Association of America and National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (Sterns &amp; Weinroth, attorneys; Ms. Stryker and Mitchell A. Livingston, on the brief). Daniel E. Rosner argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Trial Lawyers of America-New Jersey. R. Peter Connell submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Independent Insurance Agents &amp; Brokers of New Jersey (Connell, Connell &amp; Camassa, attorneys; Mr. Connell and Jessica Ann Schlee, on the brief). Cynthia M. Craig submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Trial Attorneys of New Jersey (Blume, Goldfaden, Berkowitz, Donnelly, Fried &amp; Forte, attorneys). Wayne J. Positan and Gerald H. Baker submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association (Mr. Positan, President, attorney; Mr. Baker and Amirali Y. Haidri, of counsel). JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court. This personal injury action involves the limitation-on-lawsuit or verbal threshold of the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1 to -35. We have been asked whether, in order to vault the verbal threshold, a plaintiff must produce a comparative analysis segregating injuries suffered in the subject automobile accident from all previous injuries to the same body part, regardless of whether the plaintiff has pled a cause of action premised on the aggravation of pre-existing injuries. See Polk v. Daconceicao, 268 N.J. Super. 568, 575 (App. Div. 1993) (requiring plaintiff to produce comparative-medical analysis for pre-AICRA verbal threshold claim based on aggravation of pre-existing injury or condition). In this matter, plaintiff does not allege aggravation of pre-existing injuries. However, because she had been injured in other accidents and did not provide a comparative-medical analysis distinguishing the alleged accident injuries from all other injuries to the same body parts, the trial court dismissed her complaint on a motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that such an analysis was not required for plaintiff s non-aggravation claim to vault the verbal threshold. Davidson v. Slater, 381 N.J. Super. 22, 29 (2005). We granted defendant s petition for certification. 186 N.J. 243 (2006). We agree with the Appellate Division s conclusion that plaintiff s non-aggravation cause of action should not have been dismissed based on the failure to provide a comparative-medical analysis. Although the parties present their dispute as one focused on the current verbal threshold standard, our determination in this matter turns ultimately on the application of basic tort principles of causation and burden allocation as between plaintiffs and defendants. When a plaintiff alleges aggravation of pre-existing injuries as the animating theory for the claim, then plaintiff must produce comparative evidence to move forward with the causation element of that tort action. When a plaintiff does not plead aggravation of pre-existing injuries, a comparative analysis is not required to make that demonstration. AICRA does not impose on plaintiff any special requirement for a comparative medical analysis in respect of causation in order to vault the verbal threshold. In this matter, plaintiff can carry her burden of moving forward in her non-aggravation case by demonstrating the existence of a permanent injury resulting from the automobile accident without having to exclude all prior injuries to the same body part. If defendant raises a genuine factual issue about the causation of plaintiff s claimed injuries by pointing to other injuries the plaintiff may have experienced, that disputed issue of causation is for the fact-finder to decide, except in those unusual instances when no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the permanent injury was caused by the subject accident. The role of comparative-analysis evidence in a verbal threshold summary judgment motion was discussed in Polk, supra, 268 N.J. Super. at 575. In Polk the plaintiff claimed that his pre-existing hip injury and arthritic condition were aggravated in an automobile accident. Id. at 570-72. The trial court granted the defendant s motion for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff had not cleared the No-Fault Act s verbal threshold, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Id. at 570. It is sufficient for present purposes to note that the courts that heard Polk s claim concluded that the results of the subjective limitation-of-motion tests that were performed on him failed to satisfy Oswin s objective prong, id. at 573, and he was unable to undergo an MRI examination, id. at 574, 576. Polk s physician also had submitted a list of his patient s complaints to address the serious impact that his injuries had on his daily life. Id. at 574. The Polk panel found that the list failed to link the complaints through objective medical evidence to the injuries suffered in the accident, and added: A diagnosis of aggravation of a pre-existing injury or condition must be based upon a comparative analysis of the plaintiff s residuals prior to the accident with the injuries suffered in the automobile accident at issue. This must encompass an evaluation of the medical records of the patient prior to the trauma with the objective medical evidence existent post trauma. Without a comparative analysis, the conclusion that the pre-accident condition has been aggravated must be deemed insufficient to overcome the threshold of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8a. [Id. at 575.] Thus, because Polk failed to relate through objective medical evidence his injury to his life-impact complaints, the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, stating that it did not need to reach the merits of the serious life impact issue itself. Id. at 576. The court found that Polk s physician offered no objective medical basis whatsoever to substantiate plaintiff s complaints [or] to causally connect these complaints to the accident rather than to plaintiff s serious pre-existing prior medical condition. Ibid. The physician s assertion that Polk s condition was permanent provided no assistance in that regard because the doctor s opinion failed to delineate between the plaintiff s pre-existing conditions and the effect of the accident on those medical conditions. Ibid. Following Polk, courts have dismissed automobile accident actions alleging aggravation of pre-existing injuries when a plaintiff failed to produce a comparative analysis. See, e.g., Sherry v. Buonansonti, 287 N.J. Super. 518, 521 (App. Div. 1996) (holding that physician s statement that CAT scan was suggestive of degeneration did not satisfy objective prong of Oswin, and further that plaintiff, who was injured in multiple accidents, failed to produce comparative analysis); Loftus-Smith v. Henry, 286 N.J. Super. 477, 491 (App. Div. 1996) (affirming summary dismissal because plaintiff, who claimed aggravation of pre-existing condition, failed to produce comparative analysis). Similarly, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts states that [t]he plaintiff must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result. A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant. [W. Page Keeton et. al., Prosser &amp; Keeton on the Law of Torts, 41, at 269 (5th ed. 1984) (Prosser &amp; Keeton).] [Id. at 284.] When aggravation of a pre-existing injury is pled by a plaintiff, comparative medical evidence is necessary as part of a plaintiff s prima facie and concomitant verbal threshold demonstration in order to isolate the physician s diagnosis of the injury or injuries that are allegedly permanent as a result of the subject accident. Causation is germane to the plaintiff s theory of aggravation of a pre-existing injury or new independent injury to an already injured body part. In such matters, a plaintiff generally bears the burden of production in respect of demonstrating that the accident was the proximate cause of the injury aggravation or new permanent injury to the previously injured body part. See O Brien (Newark) Cogeneration, Inc. v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am., 361 N.J. Super. 264, 274-75 (App. Div. 2003) (explaining that in routine personal injury aggravation claims plaintiff must bear burden of production that defendant s negligence was proximate cause of injuries and damages suffered). Such evidence provides essential support for the pled theory of a plaintiff s cause of action and a plaintiff s failure to produce such evidence can result in a directed verdict for defendant. See Reichert v. Vegholm, 366 N.J. Super. 209, 213-14 (App. Div. 2004). The parties in this action concede that a plaintiff will have to produce comparative-analysis evidence to establish a prima facie aggravation of pre-existing injuries cause of action, although plaintiff need only raise a genuine issue of material fact in respect of causation sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the alleged dispute in her favor. See Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995) ( [W]hen deciding a motion for summary judgment under Rule 4:46-2, the determination whether there exists a genuine issue with respect to a material fact challenged requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. ). The rub comes when a plaintiff does not plead aggravation of pre-existing injuries, but there have been other injuries to the body part. Defendant seeks to burden Davidson with an initial obligation to produce comparative-analysis evidence excluding all other injuries from being the cause of the permanent injury on which the verbal threshold action is based. We reject the invitation to place such a burden of production on plaintiff in her AICRA non-aggravation-pled case. There is no such requirement to be found in AICRA. Under AICRA, to vault the verbal threshold s limitation on the right to claim non-economic damages, a plaintiff must establish that as a result of bodily injury, arising out of the . . . operation . . . or use of an automobile, she has sustained a bodily injury which results in one of the enumerated categories of serious injury, including a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a). Aside from the circumstance of medically segregating a claimed aggravation of a pre-existing injury from the fresh injury to a body part, a plaintiff need not produce affirmative medical evidence segregating what plaintiff considers to be non-causes of the alleged injury in order to avoid a directed verdict under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) s express standards. In this case, the issue of aggravation was raised not by plaintiff but by defendant. That was his prerogative. Indeed, this Court has long recognized that every defendant, in response to an allegation that his negligence has caused injury, possesses the right of demonstrating by competent evidence that that injury could have been caused, wholly or partly, by an earlier accident or by a pre-existing condition. Paxton v. Misiuk, 34 N.J. 453, 460-61 (1961); see also McCray v. Chrucky, 66 N.J. Super. 124, 128-29 (App. Div. 1961) (noting that defendant must persuade jury that damages were due to pre-existing condition). In Oswin, supra, the Court established that verbal threshold cases should follow the summary judgment model -- i.e., the court should decide whether the injury alleged would, if proven, meet the requirements of one of the verbal-threshold categories, and the jury should decide factual disputes. See footnote 9 129 N.J. at 294. That summary judgment framework still applies to AICRA s refined standard for vaulting the verbal threshold. If plaintiff produces evidence on all basic elements of her pled tort action, then her case can proceed to trial except when the defendant can show that there is no genuine factual issue as to an element of the plaintiff s tort claim. We presume that defendants routinely will inquire during discovery about a plaintiff s prior injuries. In respect of the element of causation specifically, a plaintiff will risk dismissal on summary judgment if the defendant can show that no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the defendant s negligence caused plaintiff s alleged permanent injury. Thus, the plaintiff who does not prepare for comparative medical evidence is at risk of failing to raise a jury-worthy factual issue about whether the subject accident caused the injuries. See Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540; Hardison, supra, 381 N.J. Super. at 137. At the very least, plaintiff will be forced to address causation before the fact-finder and properly may be held to the theory of the case as pled. Jardine Estates, Inc. v. Koppel, 24 N.J. 536, 542 (1957) (noting that parties are ordinarily limited in their proofs at trial to issues as set forth in pleadings and pre-trial order); see also Rothman Realty Corp. v. Bereck, 73 N.J. 590, 598 (1977) (stating same and expressing courts general disfavor of plaintiff s late attempt to change cause of action s theory). SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-84 SEPTEMBER TERM 2005 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court DANIELLE DAVIDSON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RAYMOND A. SLATER, Defendant-Appellant, and DEANNA L. SLATER and JOHN DOE(s), 105, ABC CORPORATION(s), 1-5, Defendants. DECIDED January 30, 2007 Justice Long PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY