Title: Kafka v. Edwards
Citation: 182 Kan. 568, 322 P.2d 785
Docket Number: 40,810
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: March 8, 1958

182 Kan. 568 (1958)
322 P.2d 785
FLORENCE KAFKA, Widow, and FLORENCE KAFKA, Guardian of DWIGHT MARTIN KAFKA and DONNA LEE KAFKA, Minors, Appellants,
v.
D.I. EDWARDS, d/b/a EDWARDS TRUCKING SERVICE, Respondent, FIREMEN'S FUND INDEMNITY COMPANY, Insurance Carrier, Appellees.
No. 40,810

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 8, 1958.
George R. Lehmberg, of McPherson, argued the cause, and J. R. Rhoades, of McPherson, was with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Donald R. Newkirk, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Homer V. Gooing, Wayne Coulson, Paul R. Kitch, Dale M. Stucky, Robert J. Hill, Gerrit H. Wormhoudt, Theodore C. Geisert, Philip Kassebaum, and Hugo T. Wedell, of Counsel, all of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This is a workmen's compensation case arising from the death of Martin W. Kafka, a cattle truck driver, whose death occurred from coronary thrombosis or coronary occlusion on December 5, 1955, within a few minutes from the time he had loaded his truck with cattle, driven it some three hundred feet away from the loading chutes, left the truck, and then walked back, approximately one hundred fifty feet, toward such chute.
*569 The proceeding was instituted by Florence Kafka, hereinafter referred to as the claimant or appellant, as widow and guardian of the decedent's two minor children, against D.I. Edwards, d/b/a Edwards Trucking Service, the employer, and Firemen's Fund Indemnity Company, the insurance carrier.
In submitting the cause to the commissioner, the parties stipulated the only questions in issue were (1) whether decedent met with personal injury by accident on the date in question, (2) whether his accidental injury arose out of and in the course of his employment, and (3) the amount of compensation due if any. A hearing on these controverted issues resulted in an award to claimant, and the respondent and its insurance carrier appealed to the district court.
After a hearing in district court in conformity with the provisions of Laws of 1955, Chapter 250, Section 10, now G.S. 1957 Supp., 44-556, the district court found:
and rendered judgment accordingly. Thereupon the claimant perfected this appeal.
Because it has a direct bearing on other contentions advanced by appellant we are forced at the outset to dispose of one contention made by her in advance of the order in which it was presented.
Conceding the last portion of the findings above quoted is a finding of fact, appellant strenuously argues that the language "That the deceased workman, Martin W. Kafka did not suffer any accident or injury while in the course of his employment," appearing in such findings is a conclusion of law, hence it is the function and obligation of this court to pass upon that finding as a legal conclusion instead of determining its sufficiency as a finding of fact under well-established rules of this court to which we shall presently refer. The question thus raised lacks merit and cannot be upheld. Indeed it has been disposed of contrary to appellant's position by numerous decisions of this court.
See, e.g., Gregg v. American Walnut Lbr. Co., 137 Kan. 201, 19 P.2d 463, where it is held:
A more recent decision, wherein like contentions were made with respect to similar findings, is Aguilera v. C. &amp; S. Well Service, 178 Kan. 545, 289 P.2d 1062, where it is said:
For other decisions of like import see Miller v. K.S. Flint Rig Co., 155 Kan. 66, 122 P.2d 734; Meredith v. Seymour Packing Co., 141 Kan. 244, 40 P.2d 325.
Having established that we are here concerned with an appeal from findings of fact made by a district court in a workmen's compensation proceeding the next step is to determine the jurisdiction and function of this court upon appellate review of those decisions.
For our latest reported decision, dealing with the subject just mentioned, see Madison v. Key Work Clothes, 182 Kan. 186, 318 P.2d 991, where it is said:
See, also, McDonald v. Rader, 177 Kan. 249, 277 P.2d 652, which holds:
And where, in elaboration of the same subject, it is said:
And see Angleton v. Foster Wheeler Construction Co., 177 Kan. 134, 276 P.2d 325, which holds:
Many other decisions, where like rules are announced, discussed and applied, are to be found in our reports. For just a few of them see Snedden v. Nichols, 181 Kan. 1052, 1054, 317 P.2d 448; Wilbeck v. Grain Belt Transportation Co., 181 Kan. 512, 514, 313 P.2d 725; Beaver v. Tammany Industries, 180 Kan. 440, 304 P.2d 501; Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 Kan. 295, 299, 303 P.2d 197; Silvers v. Wakefield, 176 Kan. 259, 270 P.2d 259, and the decisions there cited.
From what has been heretofore related it becomes obvious the all decisive question involved in this appeal is whether the record *572 discloses substantial evidence to sustain the previously quoted factual findings made by the trial court. We are not disposed to prolong this opinion by laboring the evidence adduced by the parties. It suffices to say that after a careful and extended examination of the entire record we are convinced it discloses sufficient competent evidence on which that tribunal, as was its province, could make such findings. That, under the decisions to which we have heretofore referred, means such findings cannot be disturbed and compels an affirmance of the judgment. This, we may add, must be our conclusion under the established law of this jurisdiction even though, as appellant contends and as we frankly concede, there is evidence of record which, if the trial court had seen fit to give it credence, would have supported contrary findings.
The judgment is affirmed.