Title: Ex parte State of Alabama. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Luvertte Williams v. State of Alabama)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1090759
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 18, 2011

rel: 03/18/2011
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
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before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
_________________________
1090759
_________________________
Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Luvertte Williams
v.
State of Alabama)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division, CC-06-1277;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-07-1439)
1090759
The 
indictment 
identified 
Williams 
as 
"Luvertte
1
Williams," alias "Antoine Luvertte Williams."  Williams is
referred to as "Antoine," "Twon," and "Luvertte" at various
places in the record.  
2
COBB, Chief Justice.
On April 10, 2008, Luvertte Williams  was convicted of
1
rape in the first degree, a violation of § 13A-6-61, Ala. Code
1975.  He was sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment and was
ordered to pay $50 to the Crime Victims Compensation Fund.
Williams appealed his conviction and sentence to the Court of
Criminal 
Appeals, 
which 
reversed 
his conviction.  See 
Williams
v. State, [Ms. CR-07-1439, Dec. 18, 2009] __ So. 3d __ (Ala.
Crim. App. 2009).  The State petitioned for the writ of
certiorari, and we granted the State's petition on June 17,
2010.  We now reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal
Appeals and remand the case.
Facts
The 
evidence 
presented 
at 
trial 
established 
the
following.  The victim's sister, J.W., was born in June 1991.
From approximately December 2003 to February 2004, when she
was 12, J.W. engaged in a sexual relationship with Williams,
who was 17 at the time.  In February 2004, she conceived a
1090759
Initials are used throughout this opinion to protect the
2
anonymity of the victim, W.M., and her sister, J.W.  See Rule
52, Ala. R. App. P.  We note that J.W. is not related to
Williams and that her surname is not the same as his.
3
child by Williams, and the baby was born in November 2004.
Williams admitted to being the baby's father, and, at some
point after he became aware that J.W. was pregnant, he moved
into the house with J.W. to assist J.W. with the baby.  Also
living in the house at that time were J.W.'s then 10-year-old
sister, W.M., and the mother of J.W. and W.M.2
W.M. testified that, before the baby was born, W.M. was
asleep on a mattress in the living room when Williams entered
the living room, sat on top of her, and attempted to remove
her clothes, waking W.M. up in the process.  W.M. testified
that she screamed and that Williams ran into the nearby
bathroom.  
W.M. further testified that, one night after the baby was
born, she was again sleeping in the living room. Williams
"came in," and W.M. ran into the bathroom and locked the door.
As W.M. braced herself against the door, she could hear
Williams picking the lock with "some kind of screwdriver."
Williams was able to pick the lock, and he forced his way into
the bathroom, causing W.M. to fall to the floor.  They
1090759
4
struggled, and Williams removed W.M.'s clothes and raped her,
then left the bathroom.  As he left, he pointed his forefinger
at her and cocked his thumb in a way that reminded W.M. of a
gun.  For some time afterward, W.M. was too afraid of Williams
to tell anyone what had happened.
W.M. testified that, in all, Williams raped her "about
three times" in her life, the last time on Christmas Eve 2005,
when she was 11 years old.  In January 2006, W.M.'s mother
learned that Williams had raped W.M., and she took W.M. to the
hospital for a physical examination. 
The physician who examined W.M., Dr. David W. Bernard,
testified at Williams's trial.  Dr. Bernard is an associate
professor at the medical school at the University of Alabama
at Birmingham ("UAB").  In his medical practice, Dr. Bernard
spends about 75 percent of his time working in the UAB
emergency room and 25 percent of his time working in a child-
abuse clinic known as the CHIPS clinic. Dr. Bernard has
training and experience in pediatric emergency medicine and
pediatric child-abuse diagnosis and treatment, including
examinations to determine whether a child has been sexually
abused.
1090759
5
During 
the 
course 
of 
Dr. 
Bernard'S 
January 
2006
examination of W.M., Dr. Bernard noted evidence of prior
blunt-force injury to the tissues of W.M.'s vagina and the
absence of hymenal tissue in an area Dr. Bernard described as
"an area where all girls should have hymenal tissue."  In
addition, W.M. had symptoms of a sexually transmitted disease,
which laboratory tests subsequently confirmed was chlamydia.
Dr. Bernard testified that chlamydia could not have been
transmitted to W.M. by simply living in the same house with a
person who had the disease.  According to Dr. Bernard, the
only way for chlamydia to be transferred to the genitals of a
child would be through direct contact with another person's
bodily secretions that contained the chlamydia organism.
Based on his observations, Dr. Bernard concluded that W.M. had
been the victim of sexual abuse.
Before the trial in this case, while Williams was in
jail, the parties consented to a court order requiring
Williams to submit to a chlamydia test to be administered by
the doctor at the jail.  Williams submitted to the test, and
the results were positive for chlamydia.  At trial, during the
cross-examination of the jail nurse-technician, Williams's
1090759
6
counsel sought to discredit the results of the chlamydia test
by pointing out that the laboratory records reflected an
incorrect date of birth for Williams and by questioning
whether the test sample could have belonged to another person
named Luvertte Williams.  Under cross-examination, the nurse-
technician admitted that "it could be a possibility" that more
than one inmate in the jail while Williams was there was named
Luvertte Williams.
At trial, J.W. testified that she was tested for
chlamydia after she learned that W.M. had tested positive for
the disease.  J.W.'s test results were also positive for
chlamydia.
Counsel for the State asked Dr. Bernard the following
question during his testimony at trial:
"If you were -- would you find it significant that
[W.M.], who has chlamydia, that her sister [J.W.]
also has chlamydia, and that ... Williams .. also
has 
chlamydia. 
 
Would 
you 
find 
that 
to 
be
significant with them living all in the same house?"
Dr. Bernard responded:
"Chlamydia is a very rare disease in children.  And
we know that [it] is only passed by sexual contact
in that age child.  So to have two children in the
same house with it, and to have an older person with
chlamydia in the same home, you wonder about the
1090759
7
fact that chlamydia could have been transmitted
within the home via sexual contact."
Williams did not contend during his trial that W.M. had
not been raped.  Rather, he presented the defense that the
State had not proven that he was  the person who had raped
W.M. 
Procedural History
On August 25, 2006, Williams was indicted on two counts
of first-degree rape.  Before trial, Williams filed a motion
in limine requesting an order prohibiting the State from
entering into evidence certain prior wrongful acts of
Williams, specifically that he had had a sexual relationship
with J.W. when she was 12 and had fathered a child by her and
that he had been placed in a psychiatric facility for 2 years
for molesting his 7-year-old cousin when he was 15 years of
age.  The State stipulated that it would not introduce
evidence as to the time Williams spent in the psychiatric
facility for molesting his seven-year-old cousin.  The trial
court then overruled the motion as to Williams's sexual
relationship with J.W. and as to the fact that he had fathered
a child with her.
1090759
8
At trial, Williams again moved for an order prohibiting
the State from introducing evidence of Williams's sexual
relationship with J.W., including evidence indicating that
Williams had fathered a child by J.W.  The trial court again
denied the motion.
On April 10, 2008, the jury convicted Williams of first-
degree rape.  Williams appealed.  On appeal, Williams argued
that the trial court committed reversible error when it
allowed the State to introduce at trial evidence showing that
Williams had fathered a child by the victim's sister.  The
Court of Criminal Appeals held that, under Lee v. State,  246
Ala. 69, 18 So. 2d 706 (1944), "evidence showing the defendant
impregnated the sister of the victim is inadmissible in
Alabama."  __ So. 3d at __. The Court of Criminal Appeals
concluded 
that 
evidence 
of 
Williams's 
sexual 
relationship 
with
J.W. and the fact that he had fathered a child with her fit
none of the exceptions found in Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid.,
regarding  the introduction of a defendant's prior "crimes,
wrongs, or acts."  Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals
reversed Williams's conviction and his sentence.  
1090759
9
Standard of Review
"The question of admissibility of evidence is generally
left to the discretion of the trial court, and the trial
court's determination on that question will not be reversed
except upon a clear showing" that the trial court exceeded its
discretion.  Ex parte Loggins, 771 So. 2d 1093, 1103 (Ala.
2000).
Analysis
I.
The Holding of Lee v. State
In reversing Williams's conviction and sentence, the
Court of Criminal Appeals relied heavily on Lee v. State, 246
Ala. 69, 18 So. 2d 706 (1944).  In that 1944 case, Virgil Lee
was indicted, tried, and convicted of the charge that he "'did
carnally know, or abuse in the attempt to carnally know [his
daughter] Elese Lee, a girl under the age of twelve years,'"
in violation of Title 14, § 398, Ala. Code 1940. 246 Ala. at
71, 18 So. 2d at 707.  The prosecution introduced testimony
evidence indicating that Lee had previously made sexual
advances on two of his other daughters, Mary Ruth and Jewel,
and that he had placed his hands on their breasts and
genitals.  Id. In addition, the prosecution presented
1090759
10
evidence indicating that Virgil Lee had raped Ruby, another of
his daughters, who testified that she had become pregnant by
her father.  246 Ala. at 71-72, 18 So. 2d at 707-08.  Ruby
also testified that she had been married and that her father
first raped her shortly after she had left her husband and
returned home.  246 Ala. at 72, 18 So. 2d at 708.  This Court
noted that Ruby's testimony was "not at all clear or
satisfactory as to whether she became pregnant at a time which
necessarily would exclude the possibility" that she conceived
the child by her husband, not her father.  246 Ala. at 72, 18
So. 2d at 708.
With little discussion, the Court held that the trial
court properly admitted testimony of Virgil Lee's sexual abuse
of Mary Ruth, Jewel, and Ruby.  246 Ala. at 71, 18 So. 2d at
707.  However, the Court went on to consider whether the trial
court properly admitted evidence of the fact of Ruby's
pregnancy.  246 Ala. at 71-72, 18 So. 2d at 707-08.  In
analyzing the admissibility of evidence pertaining to Ruby's
pregnancy, the Court stated the following general rule:
"'In 
inquiries 
of 
fact, 
dependent 
on
circumstantial evidence for their solution, no
certain rule can be laid down, which will define,
with unerring accuracy, what collateral facts and
1090759
11
circumstances are sufficiently proximate to justify
their admission in evidence. Human transactions are
too varied to admit of such clear declaration of the
rule. Whatever tends to shed light on the main
inquiry, and does not withdraw attention from such
main inquiry, by obtruding upon the minds of the
jury matters which are foreign, or of questionable
pertinency, is, as a general rule, admissible
evidence. On the other hand, undue multiplication of
the issues is to be steadily guarded against, as
tending to divert the minds of jurors from the main
issue.'"
246 Ala. at 72, 18 So. 2d at 708 (quoting Mattison v. State,
55 Ala. 224, 232 (1876) (emphasis added)).  Cf. Rule 403, Ala.
R. Evid. ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.").
After considering the facts of the case in light of the
general rule against the admission of evidence that unduly
confuses and multiplies the issues before the jury, the Court
in Lee held that the evidence pertaining to Ruby's pregnancy
was not admissible.  Specifically, the Court held: 
"The fact of Ruby's pregnancy, through the agency of
her father, does tend to shed light on the main
inquiry, but unlike the fact of sexual intercourse
with her father, it also tends to unduly multiply
1090759
In 1944, when Lee was decided, scientific methods for
3
determining paternity, such as DNA testing, were not
available, and it was usually difficult, if not impossible, to
accurately determine the paternity of a child born of an
unmarried mother who had sexual relations with more than one
man around the time that the child was conceived.
12
the issues and to divert the minds of the jury from
the main issue."
246 Ala. at 72, 18 So. 2d at 708.
As this Court noted in Lee, the paternity of Ruby's
unborn child was not satisfactorily established by her
testimony.  Thus, evidence of Ruby's pregnancy introduced a
side issue -- the question of the child's paternity.  See 246
Ala. at 72, 18 So. 2d at 708 ("[Ruby's] testimony is not at
all clear or satisfactory as to whether she became pregnant at
a time which would necessarily exclude the possibility of her
husband's agency.").   Any potential relevance of Ruby's
3
pregnancy to the rape of Elese was far outweighed by the
potential for the question of the child's paternity to
multiply and confuse the issues before the jury.  See Lee, 246
Ala. at 72, 18 So. 2d at 708 ("'[U]ndue multiplication of the
issues is to be steadily guarded against, as tending to divert
the minds of jurors from the main issue.'"(quoting Mattison,
55 Ala. at 232)); cf. Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid.
1090759
13
Thus, contrary to the holding of the Court of Criminal
Appeals in this case, Lee did not lay down a blanket rule that
"evidence showing the defendant impregnated the sister of the
victim is inadmissible in Alabama."  Williams v. State,  __
So. 3d at __. Rather, this Court in Lee held that, under the
facts and circumstances of that case, the potential for
prejudice and confusion outweighed any probative value that
evidence of Ruby's pregnancy might have had.  In fact, this
Court's opinion in Lee strongly cautions that "no certain rule
can be laid down, which will define, with unerring accuracy,
what collateral facts and circumstances are sufficiently
proximate to justify their admission in evidence. Human
transactions are too varied to admit of such clear declaration
of the rule."  Lee, 246 Ala. at 72, 18 So. 2d at 708.
II.  Progeny of Lee v. State
In 
holding 
that 
"evidence 
showing 
the 
defendant
impregnated the sister of the victim is inadmissible in
Alabama,"  Williams v. State,  __ So. 3d at __,  the Court of
Criminal Appeals also relied on Bowden v. State, 538 So. 2d
1226 (Ala. 1988), Watson v. State, 538 So. 2d 1216 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1987), Grizzell v. State, 507 So. 2d 969 (Ala. Crim. App.
1090759
In Bowden, this Court consolidated the appeals from two
4
cases, Watson v. State, supra, and Bowden v. State, 538 So. 2d
1216 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987).  Bowden, 538 So. 2d at 1227.
"In its opinion on certiorari review, the Supreme Court
5
dropped Grizzell's name from the style of the case and
restyled the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion 'Anonymous v.
State.' The Court of Criminal Appeals declined to do
likewise."  Anonymous v. State, 507 So. 2d at 972, Reporter's
Note.
14
1986), and Sellers v. State, 41 Ala. App. 612, 145 So. 2d 853
(1962).  In reviewing the holding of the Court of Criminal
Appeals, we consider these cases as well as related cases
decided by this Court.
In Bowden v. State, supra, this Court affirmed the Court
of Criminal Appeals' decision in Watson v. State, supra.   In
4
Anonymous v. State, 507 So. 2d 972 (Ala. 1987), this Court
affirmed that court's judgment in Grizzell v. State, supra.5
A plain reading of these cases reveals that they do not
support the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals in this
case that "evidence showing the defendant impregnated the
sister of the victim is inadmissible in Alabama."  __ So. 3d
at __. In both Bowden and Anonymous, this Court considered,
among other issues, the admissibility of evidence indicating
that the defendant in each of those cases had committed
1090759
15
wrongful sexual acts with the victim's sister and the
admissibility of evidence indicating that the defendant had
impregnated the victim's sister.  In both cases, this Court
held that those issues were to be determined by applying
certain general rules of evidence to the facts of each case.
See Bowden, 538 So. 2d at 1233 ("The same factors for
determining 
the 
admissibility 
of 
collateral 
acts 
of 
misconduct
by the accused in other types of prosecutions are to be
applied 
in 
determining 
the 
admissibility 
of 
collateral 
acts 
of
sexual misconduct in the prosecution of sex crimes. Which is
to say that, provided the test for materiality is met,
evidence of collateral crimes or misconduct may be admitted.
Of necessity, this analysis is case by case." (final emphasis
added)); Bowden, 538 So. 2d at 1227 ("Applying the [general
exclusionary] rule [of evidence] and its exceptions to the
facts in Anonymous, we concluded that the Court of Criminal
Appeals correctly determined that the evidence of ... the
[victim's] sister's pregnancy and resulting child was
inadmissible.");  Anonymous, 507 So. 2d at 973 ("In order to
reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, a
determination 
must 
necessarily 
be 
made 
that 
the 
evidence 
which
1090759
16
that court held to be inadmissible was, indeed, admissible. To
make that determination, the applicable laws of evidence must
be applied to the unique facts of this case." (emphasis
added)).
In Sellers v. State, 41 Ala. App. 612, 145 So. 2d 853
(1962), the victim's sister testified at trial that the
defendant had raped and impregnated her.  Unlike Lee, however,
there was no suggestion in Sellers that someone other than the
defendant could have been the father of the victim's sister's
child.  The Court of Appeals provided no analysis of the
application of general rules of evidence to the specific facts
of the case.  Rather, citing the result in Lee, the Court of
Appeals held that testimony that the defendant had raped the
victim's sister was admissible but that evidence of the
resulting pregnancy "multiplied the issues and tended to
divert the minds of the jury from the main issue."  Sellers,
41 Ala. App. at 615, 145 So. 2d at 856.   
It appears that, in Sellers, the Court of Appeals
interpreted the result Lee as a blanket rule that, in a
prosecution for rape of a child, evidence showing that the
defendant raped another child is always admissible, while
1090759
17
evidence of the resulting pregnancy of the other child is
never admissible.  See Sellers, 41 Ala. App. at 615, 145 So.
2d at 856 ("We cannot circumvent the holding of the Lee case
and are, therefore, compelled on the authority thereof to
order a reversal of this case.").  Lee, of course, did not lay
down such a blanket rule.  See Lee, 246 Ala. at 72, 18 So. 2d
at 708.  Because Sellers misapplies Lee in this regard and
also conflicts with Bowden and Anonymous, we hereby overrule
Sellers.  
Alabama has no general rule that  "evidence showing the
defendant 
impregnated 
the 
sister 
of 
the 
victim 
is
inadmissible."  Williams, ___ So. 3d at ___.  Rather, the
admissibility of such evidence is to be determined according
to the rules of evidence on "a case by case" basis.  Bowden,
538 So. 2d at 1234.
III.
The Admissibility of Evidence of J.W.'s Pregnancy
In Lee, Bowden, and Anonymous, supra, this Court
considered the admissibility of evidence showing that the
defendant had raped the victim's sister and that the victim's
sister had become pregnant as a result.  In each case, the
Court held that these issues were to be determined by applying
1090759
18
certain general rules of evidence to the unique facts of each
case.  We reiterate those rules of evidence before applying
them to the particular facts of this case.
"All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States or that of
the State of Alabama, by statute, by these rules, or by other
rules applicable in the courts of this State."  Rule 402, Ala.
R. Evid.  "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."  Rule 403, Ala.
R. Evid.  See Lee, 246 Ala. at 72, 18 So. 2d at 708.
Further, 
"[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as 
proof 
of 
motive, 
opportunity, 
intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident ...."
Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid. See Anonymous, 507 So. 2d at 973
("In a prosecution for one offense, evidence of collateral
crimes or acts is generally inadmissible to prove the guilt of
1090759
19
the accused."(footnote omitted)); id. at 974 ("Although
evidence of collateral crimes and acts may not be admitted to
prove the accused's bad character, it has been held admissible
to prove such things as the accused's criminal intent, his
motive, or his identity, or to prove that the now-charged
crime and another crime were committed pursuant to a single
plan, design, scheme, or system."); see also Bowden, 538 So.
2d 
at 
1233 
("The 
same 
factors 
for 
determining 
the
admissibility of collateral acts of misconduct by the accused
in other types of prosecutions are to be applied in
determining the admissibility of collateral acts of sexual
misconduct in the prosecution of sex crimes.").
To be admissible for a purpose other than to prove that
the accused acted in conformity with bad character traits,
evidence of other crimes or wrongs "must be relevant to some
issue that is material to the case."  Anonymous, 507 So. 2d at
974; See also Bowden, 538 So. 2d at 1233 ("[P]rovided the test
for materiality is met, evidence of collateral crimes or
misconduct may be admitted.").  In this case, in addition to
W.M.'s testimony, Dr. Bernard's testimony regarding W.M.'s
injuries and the fact that she suffered from a sexually
1090759
20
transmitted disease establishes that someone raped W.M.
Williams does not dispute that W.M. was raped or sexually
abused; rather, he contends that he was not the person who
raped W.M.  Thus, contrary to the holding of the Court of
Criminal Appeals, the identity of W.M.'s rapist is a material
issue in this case.  Cf. Bowden, 538 So. 2d at 1234 (holding
that "there was a real and open issue as to the rapist's
identity" because the defendant contended that the victim was
raped by someone other than himself).
The State argues that, under the facts of this case,
evidence indicating that Williams had a sexual relationship
with J.W. and that he fathered a child by her is relevant to
prove the identity of W.M.'s rapist.  According to Dr.
Bernard, W.M. contracted chlamydia through sexual contact.
Evidence was presented at trial indicating that Williams
tested positive for chlamydia, although Williams elicited
testimony to suggest that another inmate could have been the
source of the positive chlamydia test administered by the jail
staff.  However, J.W. also tested positive for chlamydia.  The
fact that J.W. had a sexual relationship with Williams is
1090759
J.W. testified at trial that she had had a sexual
6
relationship with Williams nine months before the birth of her
baby.  J.W. also testified that Williams admitted to her that
he was the father of her child.  In addition, the prosecution
entered into evidence a letter to the baby that was in
Williams's handwriting.  In the letter, Williams wrote, "Happy
Birthday [baby's name], by [Williams], your daddy."
21
established by her testimony and by Williams's admissions that
he fathered J.W.'s baby.  
6
Dr. Bernard testified:
"Chlamydia is a very rare disease in children.  And
we know that [it] is only passed by sexual contact
in that age child.  So to have two children in the
same house with it, and to have an older person with
chlamydia in the same home, you wonder about the
fact that chlamydia could have been transmitted
within the home via sexual contact."
As Dr. Bernard suggested in his testimony, the fact of
J.W.'s sexual relationship with Williams and her positive
chlamydia test are relevant to show Williams's identity as the
rapist who gave W.M. chlamydia.  Therefore, the Court of
Criminal Appeals erred in holding that evidence of Williams's
wrongful acts with J.W. was immaterial to the issue of the
identity of W.M.'s rapist.  See Bowden, 538 So. 2d at 1233
("[P]rovided the test for materiality is met, evidence of
collateral crimes or misconduct may be admitted."). 
1090759
22
Williams concedes that he is in fact the father of J.W.'s
baby, and there is no question as to the baby's paternity.
Even if J.W.'s testimony regarding the fact of Williams's
sexual relationship with her would have alone been sufficient
to establish the identity of the person who raped W.M., the
fact that a pregnancy was the natural result of Williams's
sexual relationship with J.W. tends to confirm the existence
of that sexual relationship and sheds light on a material
issue.  See Bowden, 538 So. 2d at 1230 ("'"We know as a
scientific fact that when a child has been born there has been
an act of sexual intercourse ...."'" (quoting  Watson, 538 So.
2d at 1220)); Rule 404,  Ala. R. Evid. ("Evidence of other ...
acts" is admissible for purposes other than to prove "the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.").  Under the unique facts of this case, although
relevant to Williams's identity as W.M.'s chlamydia-positive
rapist, the fact that Williams fathered a child by J.W. does
not unduly confuse or compound the issues.  Cf. Rule 403, Ala.
R. Evid ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
... confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury ....");
1090759
23
Lee, 
246 
Ala. 
at 
72, 
18 
So. 
2d 
at 
708 
("'[U]ndue
multiplication of the issues is to be steadily guarded
against, as tending to divert the minds of jurors from the
main issue.'"(quoting Mattison, 55 Ala. at 232)).
Moreover, fathering a child, in and of itself, is not a
wrongful act.  The circumstances surrounding the conception of
the baby in this case -- i.e., Williams's sexual relationship
with J.W. when she was 12 years old -- constitute the
"wrongful act" in question.  Under the circumstances of this
case, evidence that a baby resulted from Williams's sexual
activities with J.W. does not significantly add to the
prejudice Williams would have suffered if the trial court had
merely allowed J.W. to testify that Williams had sex with her
when she was 12. See Lee, 246 Ala. at 72, 18 So. 2d at 708
("'Whatever tends to shed light on the main inquiry, and does
not withdraw attention from such main inquiry, ... is, as a
general 
rule, 
admissible 
evidence.'"(quoting 
Mattison, 
55 
Ala.
at 232)).  Cf. Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid.("Although relevant,
evidence 
may 
be 
excluded 
if 
its 
probative 
value 
is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
....").
1090759
24
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not exceed
its discretion by admitting evidence that Williams was the
father of J.W.'s baby.  The Court of Criminal Appeals erred in
reversing Williams's conviction and sentence. We now reverse
its judgment and remand this case to that court for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Woodall, Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Murdock, and Shaw, JJ.,
concur.
Main and Wise, JJ., recuse themselves.*
*Justice Main and Justice Wise were members of the Court
of Criminal Appeals when that court considered this case.