Title: Mahan v. Boston Retirement Bd.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13208
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 6, 2022

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-13208 
 
PAUL MAHAN  vs.  BOSTON RETIREMENT BOARD & another.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 7, 2022. - September 6, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Retirement.  Public Employment, Retirement, Forfeiture of 
retirement benefits.  Municipal Corporations, Retirement 
board.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on March 7, 2019. 
 
Following transfer to the Superior Court Department, the 
case was heard by Sharon E. Donatelle, J., on motions for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Nicholas Poser for the plaintiff. 
Natacha Thomas for Boston Retirement Board. 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  In this case, we are asked to decide whether 
the pension forfeiture provisions set forth in G. L. c. 32, 
 
 
1 Boston Municipal Court. 
2 
 
§ 15 (3) and (4), are applicable to an individual who, after 
having retired from public service, misappropriates government 
funds or engages in criminal activity tied to his or her former 
public employment.  The plaintiff is a former correction officer 
for the Suffolk County sheriff's department who was found to be 
permanently disabled after suffering a work-related injury.  He 
began receiving workers' compensation benefits soon after the 
injury and eventually was approved for accidental disability 
retirement.  Two years after his retirement, while continuing to 
receive workers' compensation and other benefits from the 
Suffolk County sheriff's department, the plaintiff started 
working at a used car dealership owned by his wife.  He 
ultimately was convicted of workers' compensation fraud and 
larceny for falsely certifying, regularly, over a period of 
seven years, that he was not working or able to work. 
 
Following the plaintiff's convictions, the Boston 
retirement board (board) revoked his retirement allowance 
pursuant to G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3) and (4).  The plaintiff sought 
review of the board's decision on the ground that he had been 
retired from public service for more than two years before his 
criminal conduct commenced and, therefore, that the forfeiture 
provisions were inapplicable to him.  A judge of the Boston 
Municipal Court disagreed and found that the board did not err 
in applying both G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3) and (4), to the 
3 
 
plaintiff.  The plaintiff then filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari in the county court.  A single justice transferred 
the matter to the Superior Court, and a Superior Court judge 
denied the petition.  After the plaintiff appealed to the 
Appeals Court, we transferred the matter to this court on our 
own motion. 
 
We discern no error in the board's conclusion that G. L. 
c. 32, § 15 (3) and (4), may be applicable to an individual 
whose criminal activity occurs after the individual has retired 
from public service, because both provisions apply to a "member" 
of a retirement system, irrespective of whether that member is a 
public employee at the time that the member commits the relevant 
offense.  We also discern no error in the board's determination 
that the requirements of G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3) and (4), were 
satisfied here.  Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion 
in the Superior Court judge's denial of the plaintiff's petition 
for a writ of certiorari. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Workplace injury.  The relevant facts 
are taken from the transcript of the plaintiff's plea hearing in 
the underlying criminal case, the recommended decision by the 
hearing officer of the board, and the Superior Court judge's 
decision on the petition for a writ in the nature of certiorari. 
 
The plaintiff was hired as a correction officer for the 
Suffolk County sheriff's department in 1997.  His duties 
4 
 
included providing general security by searching inmate cells 
for weapons and other contraband and by intervening in physical 
altercations between inmates.  On August 15, 2000, while 
attempting to restrain an inmate who was involved in a fight, 
the plaintiff severely injured his knee.  Following the 
incident, the plaintiff attempted to return to work with a knee 
brace, but his doctors subsequently advised him, after reviewing 
several magnetic resonance imaging scans, to stop working. 
 
The plaintiff then applied for workers' compensation 
benefits; from August of 2000 until August of 2003, he received 
temporary total incapacity workers' compensation benefits, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 34, which limits receipt of such 
benefits to a period of 156 weeks.  Starting in August of 2003, 
he began receiving partial incapacity benefits, pursuant to 
G. L. c. 152, § 35, which allows an individual to receive such 
benefits for up to 260 weeks.  As a former employee of the city 
of Boston, the plaintiff also was eligible for a retirement 
allowance.  In May of 2004, he filed an application for 
accidental disability retirement with the Boston retirement 
system; the board approved the application in September of 2005, 
after a panel of doctors unanimously determined that the 
plaintiff was physically incapable of performing the essential 
duties of his job as a correction officer and that his 
incapacity was likely to be permanent.  In August of 2006, the 
5 
 
Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission (PERAC) 
sent a letter to the board stating that it had approved payment 
of the plaintiff's accidental disability retirement allowance 
effective November 4, 2003. 
 
At some point, the plaintiff filed a claim with the 
Department of Industrial Accidents for "permanent and total" 
workers' compensation benefits under G. L. c. 152, § 34A, which 
allows an individual to receive benefits for as long as he or 
she is disabled.  An administrative judge allowed the claim and 
ordered that the plaintiff be paid such benefits effective May 
23, 2006.  The plaintiff also was eligible for, and began 
receiving, assault pay pursuant to G. L. c. 30, § 58, as "an 
employee who, while in the performance of duty, receive[d] 
bodily injuries resulting from acts of violence of patients or 
prisoners in the employee's custody."  Thus, between January 1, 
2006, and January 1, 2013, the plaintiff received a combination 
of workers' compensation benefits, assault pay, and a disability 
retirement allowance.2  To demonstrate his ongoing eligibility 
for workers' compensation benefits during that period, the 
plaintiff certified, every six months, under the pains and 
 
 
2 Pursuant to G. L. c. 32, § 14 (2), the plaintiff's 
disability retirement allowance was offset by the workers' 
compensation payments he was receiving, meaning that the 
allowance was decreased by the dollar amount he received in 
workers' compensation benefits. 
6 
 
penalties of perjury, that he was not working or deriving any 
income from work. 
 
b.  Criminal conviction.  In 2005, the plaintiff's wife 
opened a used car dealership in Winchendon.  Between January 1, 
2006, and January 1, 2013, the plaintiff worked at the 
dealership; he generally was present during business hours, sold 
cars at the dealership, was involved in the hiring of employees, 
and bid on cars for resale at used car auctions.  In addition, 
although his wife was the listed owner of the dealership, he 
represented himself to the general public as the business owner. 
 
Following a joint investigation by the Suffolk County 
sheriff's department and the Attorney General's office, the 
plaintiff was indicted by a grand jury, in February of 2013, on 
one count of workers' compensation fraud, in violation of G. L. 
c. 152, § 14 (3), and one count of larceny over $250, in 
violation of G. L. c. 266, § 30.  He was arraigned in the 
Superior Court and subsequently pleaded guilty to both offenses.  
In so doing, the plaintiff agreed that he was capable of working 
and, in fact, had worked while receiving workers' compensation 
benefits.  The plaintiff, however, denied that he had earned any 
wages for his work at the dealership, and instead said that 
payments for all of the income that he earned were issued to his 
wife. 
7 
 
 
As a result of his fraud, the plaintiff received 
overpayments of $205,618.25 in workers' compensation benefits, 
$181,825.59 in assault pay benefits, and $49,841.18 in 
retirement benefits.  As the Suffolk County sheriff's department 
is self-insured, all of the workers' compensation and assault 
pay benefits come directly from its budget, rather than through 
an insurance fund or private insurer.  After pleading guilty, 
the plaintiff was sentenced to five years of probation and 
ordered to pay restitution to the Suffolk County sheriff's 
department in the amount of $205,618 for workers' compensation 
overpayments and $100,000 for assault pay overpayments.  As of 
March of 2017, the plaintiff had repaid $1,280 in restitution. 
 
c.  Pension forfeiture proceedings.  In June of 2015, the 
office of the Attorney General sent a letter to PERAC notifying 
the agency of the plaintiff's criminal convictions.  The Boston 
retirement system subsequently initiated proceedings to consider 
the application of G. L. c. 32, § 15, to the plaintiff.  
Following a hearing in May of 2017, at which both the plaintiff 
and his wife testified, a hearing officer for the board issued a 
decision recommending that the board revoke the plaintiff's 
retirement benefits through application of either G. L. c. 32, 
§ 15 (3) or (4).  The board unanimously voted to "forfeit [the 
plaintiff's] retirement benefits pursuant to G. L. c. 32, 
§ 15 (4)," and to "adopt the recommended decision of the hearing 
8 
 
officer," thus determining that G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3), also 
applied to the plaintiff's case. 
 
On April 6, 2018, the plaintiff filed a petition in the 
Boston Municipal Court for review of the board's decision.  The 
plaintiff asserted that neither G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3) nor (4), 
was applicable to him because he was already retired at the time 
of the commission of his crimes, and that the forfeiture of his 
pension constituted an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Once the board 
filed its answer, the plaintiff moved for judgment on the 
pleadings, and the board filed a cross motion for judgment on 
the pleadings.  Following a hearing on October 4, 2018, a Boston 
Municipal Court judge concluded that the board did not err in 
deciding that the plaintiff's pension should be forfeited.  The 
judge denied the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings and allowed the board's cross motion. 
 
The plaintiff then filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari in the county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4.  
A single justice transferred the matter to the Superior Court, 
where a Superior Court judge declined to issue the requested 
writ of certiorari.3  The plaintiff appealed from the denial of 
 
3 The Superior Court judge initially remanded the matter to 
the Boston Municipal Court so that the motion judge could decide 
whether forfeiture of the plaintiff's pension constituted an 
excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the 
9 
 
his petition for a writ of certiorari to the Appeals Court, and 
we transferred the matter to this court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standards of review.  "The purpose 
[of] certiorari is to correct errors that 'are not otherwise 
reviewable by motion or by appeal.'"  Picciotto v. Superior 
Court Dep't of the Trial Court, 437 Mass. 1019, 1020 (2002), 
quoting G. L. c. 249, § 4.  The scope of judicial review of an 
action in the nature of certiorari under G. L. c. 249, § 4, is 
limited.  See State Bd. of Retirement v. Bulger, 446 Mass. 169, 
173 (2006).  "Certiorari allows a court to 'correct only a 
substantial error of law, evidenced by the record, which 
adversely affects a material right of the plaintiff. . . .  In 
its review, the court may rectify only those errors of law which 
have resulted in manifest injustice to the plaintiff or which 
have adversely affected the real interests of the general 
public.'"  Id., quoting Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. 
Auditor of the Commonwealth, 430 Mass. 783, 790 (2000).  A 
decision to allow this extraordinary form of relief is 
 
United States Constitution.  The plaintiff then filed a motion 
for relief from judgment, to which the board assented; the 
plaintiff requested that the Superior Court judge stay the 
remand and allow the plaintiff to appeal from the decision on 
the merits.  Because the motion for a stay was allowed, the 
question whether forfeiture of the plaintiff's pension 
constituted an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment is not 
before us. 
10 
 
discretionary.  See O'Donnell v. Board of Appeals of Billerica, 
349 Mass. 324, 328 (1965). 
 
b.  Statutory provisions.  By its plain language, G. L. 
c. 32, § 15, entitled "Dereliction of duty by members," applies 
to "members" of a retirement system.  Pursuant to G. L. c. 32, 
§ 3, there are two types of "members":  a "member in service" is 
defined as "[a]ny member who is regularly employed in the 
performance of his [or her] duties," while a "member inactive" 
includes "[a]ny member in service who has been retired and who 
is receiving a retirement allowance."  General Laws c. 32, § 15, 
mandates the forfeiture of a retirement allowance earned by a 
"member" of a public retirement system in a number of 
circumstances where the member is convicted of certain criminal 
offenses. 
 
Under G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3), which pertains to 
misappropriation of public funds, "[i]n no event shall any 
member" after conviction of an offense involving the funds or 
property of his or her current or former government employer, or 
of a retirement system to which the member belongs, "be entitled 
to receive a retirement allowance or a return of his accumulated 
total deductions . . . unless and until full restitution for any 
such misappropriation has been made."  See G. L. c. 32, 
§ 15 (1), (3).  Likewise, under G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3A), a 
"member" is prohibited from receiving a retirement allowance or 
11 
 
a return of his or her accumulated total deductions if the 
member is convicted of one of two highly specialized crimes 
involving "police or licensing duties."  Finally, under G. L. 
c. 32, § 15 (4), which pertains to criminal conduct related to 
an individual's public employment, "[i]n no event shall any 
member after final conviction of a criminal offense involving 
violation of the laws applicable to his office or position, be 
entitled to receive a retirement allowance."  Unlike a member 
whose pension is forfeited under G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3), a member 
whose pension benefits are subject to forfeiture under either 
G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3A) or (4), may not regain such benefits 
through payment of restitution; a member whose pension is 
forfeited under G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), however, is entitled to 
receive "a return of his [or her] accumulated total deductions." 
 
Additional provisions in G. L. c. 32, § 15, set forth the 
procedure to be followed for forfeiture of a public pension.  As 
part of this procedure, "[i]f the attorney general or district 
attorney becomes aware of a final conviction of a member of a 
retirement system under circumstances which may require 
forfeiture of the member's rights to a pension . . . [or] 
retirement allowance . . . , he [or she] shall immediately 
notify [PERAC] of such conviction."  G. L. c. 32, § 15 (5).  The 
retirement board with jurisdiction over the retirement system to 
which the member belongs is authorized, along with other 
12 
 
entities and individuals, to initiate forfeiture proceedings.  
See G. L. c. 32, §§ 1, 15 (2).  Should the board or another 
authorized entity find that forfeiture is required under G. L. 
c. 32, § 15, the member subject to forfeiture has a right to 
judicial review.  Pursuant to G. L. c. 32, § 16 (3), any member 
"aggrieved by any action taken or decision of a [retirement] 
board or the public employee retirement administration 
commission rendered with reference to his dereliction of duty as 
set forth in [§ 15]" may "bring a petition in the district 
court" for review of such decision.  In conducting the review, a 
District Court judge shall "hear any and all evidence and 
determine whether such action was justified."  See id.  A 
decision of the District Court pursuant to G. L. c. 32, 
§ 16 (3), "shall be final." 
 
The relationship between G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3) and (4), is 
complex and intertwined.  This court first examined the 
relationship between those two provisions in Gaffney v. 
Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 423 Mass. 1, 3-5 (1996).  
There, the former superintendent of the Shrewsbury water and 
sewer department was convicted of larceny after he stole money 
from the town and the town's retirement board subsequently 
revoked his pension benefits under G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4).  See 
Gaffney, supra at 2-3.  In his appeal from the board's decision, 
the superintendent argued that G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3), rather 
13 
 
than G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), should apply to him, as application 
of the former provision would allow for recovery of his pension 
benefits upon payment of restitution.  See Gaffney, supra.  We 
rejected the superintendent's argument on the ground that G. L. 
c. 32, § 15 (3) and (4), are not "mutually exclusive 
alternatives," but, rather, provide "complementary remedies."  
See Gaffney, supra at 5.  General Laws c. 32, § 15 (3), which 
prohibits "any payout of remaining benefits unless restitution 
is first made, whenever the member has been convicted of crimes 
relating to public funds or property," is temporary and remedial 
in nature.  See Gaffney, supra at 4-5.  General Laws c. 32, 
§ 15 (4), on the other hand, requires permanent forfeiture of a 
retirement allowance where a member engages in misconduct that 
is "applicable to his [or her] office or position," and thus is 
considered penal in nature.  See Bulger, 446 Mass. at 174.  A 
member whose pension is forfeited under G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), 
however, recovers the contributions that that the member 
actually made while the member was working.  As we observed in 
Gaffney, supra at 5, in certain circumstances, "the 
restitutionary scheme of [G. L. c. 32, § 15 (1)-(3),] might 
still be needed to recover any misappropriated funds or property 
out of the pension assets not forfeited."4 
 
 
4 Although the question was not addressed directly in 
Gaffney, it is not evident that a member ever could engage in 
14 
 
 
The Gaffney decision also was our first opportunity to 
interpret the language of G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4).  Recognizing 
that § 15 (4) was added by the Legislature in an effort to 
"broaden the range of crimes that would lead to pension 
forfeiture," we stated that the "substantive touchstone intended 
by the [Legislature] is criminal activity connected with the 
office or position."  See Gaffney, 423 Mass. at 3, 4.  We 
understood, however, that the Legislature "did not intend 
pension forfeiture to follow as a sequelae of any and all 
criminal convictions."  Id. at 5.  We therefore concluded that, 
to "best effectuate[] the legislative intent of [G. L. c. 32, 
§ 15 (4),]" courts should look "to the facts of each case for a 
direct link between the criminal offense and the member's office 
or position."  Id. 
 
In subsequent cases, we clarified that "[t]his 'direct 
link' requirement 'does not mean that the crime itself must 
reference public employment or the employee's particular 
position or responsibility, . . . or that the crime necessarily 
 
misappropriation of government funds, within the meaning of 
G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3), without also violating the provisions 
applicable to the member's office or position, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 32, § 15 (4).  In other words, it appears that whenever a 
member's pension could be forfeited under G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3), 
it also would be forfeitable under G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4).  The 
reverse is not the case, as a member could commit a criminal 
offense other than misappropriation that would trigger the 
application of G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4). 
15 
 
must have been committed at or during work."  See Garney v. 
Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System., 469 Mass. 384, 389 
(2014), quoting Maher v. Justices of the Quincy Div. of the 
Dist. Court Dep't, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 612, 616 (2006).  Rather, a 
"direct link" may be either legal or factual; while a legal link 
exists "when a public employee commits a crime directly 
implicating a statute that is specifically applicable to the 
employee's position," a factual link exists "where there is a 
direct factual connection between the public employee's crime 
and position."  See State Bd. of Retirement v. Finneran, 476 
Mass. 714, 720-721 (2017). 
 
Direct factual links have been found to exist where a 
member's public job somehow facilitated the crime, by allowing 
either access to or the use of resources, see Dell'Isola v. 
State Bd. of Retirement, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 547, 547-548 (2017) 
(correction officer who possessed cocaine as result of 
arrangement with inmate who had been in his custody was subject 
to forfeiture of pension); Durkin v. Boston Retirement Bd., 83 
Mass. App. Ct. 116, 116-117 (2013) (Boston police officer who 
shot fellow officer while off duty, using department-issued 
firearm, was subject to forfeiture of pension), or by putting 
the member in a position to commit the crime, see Finneran, 476 
Mass. at 715 (Speaker of House who falsely testified regarding 
his role in and knowledge of State redistricting process was 
16 
 
subject to pension forfeiture).  Compare Garney, 469 Mass. 
at 389 (no forfeiture where teacher who was convicted of 
possessing child pornography "committed his crimes outside of 
school, without using school resources or otherwise using his 
position to facilitate his crimes, and without involving 
students in his illicit activities").  Direct factual 
connections also have been identified where a government 
employer was the victim of the criminal offense.  See, e.g., 
Maher, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 613, 616-617 (Quincy chief plumbing 
and gas inspector who broke into city hall, reviewed personnel 
files, and stole documents was subject to forfeiture).  In cases 
where no direct factual link has been found, the crimes at issue 
were "personal in nature," rather than work-related.  See 
Garney, 469 Mass. at 385-386 (no forfeiture where teacher 
purchased and stored child pornography on home computer); 
Retirement Bd. of Maynard v. Tyler, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 109, 112 
(2013) (no forfeiture where firefighter sexually abused fellow 
firefighter's child); Herrick v. Essex Regional Retirement Bd., 
77 Mass. App. Ct. 645, 646-647 (2010), S.C., 465 Mass. 801 
(2013) (no forfeiture where custodian at housing authority 
committed assault and battery on daughter). 
 
c.  Applicability of G. L. c. 32, § 15, to criminal conduct 
that occurs after retirement from public service.  The parties 
agree that the plaintiff was "retired" from his job as a 
17 
 
correction officer as of November 4, 2003, the date his 
disability retirement allowance was effective; the plaintiff's 
criminal activity commenced more than two years after that date.  
In his motion for judgment on the pleadings, the plaintiff 
argued that G. L. c. 32, § 15, could not apply in his case 
because its provisions were "not designed to follow a retiree 
into retirement."  A Boston Municipal Court judge rejected this 
argument, based on the plain language of G. L. c. 32; the judge 
concluded that the plaintiff was an inactive member of a 
retirement system at the time he committed his crimes, and 
therefore "would fall within the parameters of 'any member' who 
would be precluded from receiving a retirement allowance."  In 
denying the plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari, the 
Superior Court judge also relied upon this reasoning.  Before 
us, the plaintiff continues to argue that G. L. c. 32, § 15, 
cannot apply to an individual who is no longer a public employee 
when he or she engages in the relevant criminal conduct.5 
 
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.  
See Commonwealth v. Perella, 464 Mass. 274, 276 (2013).  "A 
fundamental principle of statutory interpretation 'is that a 
 
 
5 The plaintiff does not address the requirement of G. L. 
c. 152, § 11D, that "[a]ny employee entitled to receive weekly 
compensation under [the workers' compensation statute] shall 
have an affirmative duty to report to the insurer [(here, the 
Suffolk County sheriff's department)] all earnings, including 
wages or salary earned from self-employment." 
18 
 
statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the 
Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the 
ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in 
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be 
effectuated.'"  Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of 
Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006), quoting Hanlon v. 
Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934).  "Courts must follow the 
plain language of a statute when it is unambiguous and when its 
application would not lead to an absurd result, or contravene 
the Legislature's clear intent."  Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 
478 Mass. 786, 787 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 
Mass. 682, 689 (2015). 
 
The plain language of G. L. c. 32, § 15, indicates that its 
application is not limited to individuals who commit the 
criminal offense at issue while they are serving as public 
employees.  Nowhere in that section does the statutory language 
state that a "member" must be a "member in service," and thus an 
active employee, at the time that he or she misappropriates 
government funds, violates laws applicable to his or her office 
or position, or commits any of the offenses specified in G. L. 
c. 32, § 15 (3A).  "We will not add words to a statute that the 
Legislature did not put there, either by inadvertent omission or 
19 
 
by design."  Retirement Bd. of Somerville v. Buonomo, 467 Mass. 
662, 672 (2014).  Notably, elsewhere in G. L. c. 32, governing 
retirement systems and pensions, the Legislature did distinguish 
between members in service and members inactive.  See G. L. 
c. 32, § 6 ("Any member in service who is unable to perform the 
essential duties of his job and that such inability is likely to 
be permanent . . . shall be retired for ordinary disability as 
of a date which shall be specified . . ." [emphasis added]).  
That the Legislature did not make such a distinction in G. L. 
c. 32, § 15, is instructive.  See DiFiore v. American Airlines, 
Inc., 454 Mass. 486, 491 (2009) ("Where possible, we construe 
the various provisions of a statute in harmony with one another, 
recognizing that the Legislature did not intend internal 
contradiction"). 
 
In Buonomo, 467 Mass. at 671 n.12, we explicitly noted that 
the fact that G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), pertained to "any member" 
meant that it applied to the plaintiff in that case, who was an 
inactive member of one government retirement system when he 
committed crimes against a different government employer where 
he was then working.  The plaintiff in that case was a former 
member of the board of aldermen of Somerville who, after 
retiring, became register of probate of Middlesex County.  See 
Buonomo, supra at 664.  While employed as a register of probate, 
he stole from cash vending machines attached to photocopiers 
20 
 
located in a building that housed the registry of probate, among 
other entities.  See id. at 664-665.  As the plaintiff had opted 
to receive a retirement allowance from the city of Somerville 
upon retiring from his position as alderman, and therefore was a 
"member" within the meaning of G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), we 
concluded that his crimes required forfeiture of that retirement 
allowance, even though he was no longer employed by the city of 
Somerville at the time of their commission.  See id. at 671-672 
& n.12.  We observed that "[i]f the Legislature had wanted to 
limit the applicability of this forfeiture provision to active 
members, it would have used the words 'any member in service,' 
instead of 'any member.'"  Id. at 671 n.12.  We draw the same 
conclusion here with regard to the entirety of G. L. c. 32, 
§ 15. 
 
The plaintiff attempts to distinguish Buonomo, 467 Mass. 
at 664, on the ground that, despite being retired from the 
public position from which he was receiving retirement benefits, 
Buonomo was actively employed by a government agency when he 
stole public funds.  Our conclusion that Buonomo's retirement 
allowance was subject to forfeiture, however, did not rest on 
the fact that he held a public position at the time of his 
criminal conduct.  Rather, it was premised on the unequivocal 
language of G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), which provides, "In no event 
shall any member after final conviction of a criminal offense 
21 
 
involving violation of the laws applicable to his office or 
position, be entitled to receive a retirement allowance . . ." 
(emphasis added).  As we observed, "[t]he statute does not say 
that the office or position whose laws were violated be the same 
as the one from which the member is receiving a retirement 
allowance.  There simply is no such limiting language in G. L. 
c. 32, § 15 (4)."  Buonomo, supra at 672.  The same can be said 
of G. L. c. 32, § 15, as a whole; its provisions contain no 
language that limits its application to members who are publicly 
employed at the time of the commission of the relevant offense. 
 
Thus, the plaintiff's argument that "[n]o reported case has 
ever forfeited the pension of a member of the retirement system 
who has been convicted of a crime committed after he left public 
employment" is unavailing.  Certainly, in prior cases involving 
the application of G. L. c. 32, § 15, the individual was still 
actively employed when he or she engaged in the relevant 
offense.  See, e.g., Bulger, 446 Mass. at 170-171; Doherty v. 
Retirement Bd. of Medford, 425 Mass. 130, 131 (1997).  Yet, 
according to the clear and unambiguous statutory language, all 
that matters is that the individual subject to forfeiture is a 
"member" within the meaning of G. L. c. 32, § 15, at the time 
that he or she engages in the relevant criminal activity. 
 
d.  Application of G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3) and (4), to the 
plaintiff's case.  Having determined that G. L. c. 32, § 15, may 
22 
 
apply to an individual who engages in the criminal conduct at 
issue after he or she has left public service, we turn to 
consider whether the requirements of G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3) 
and (4), were satisfied here. 
 
As discussed, a member's retirement allowance is forfeited 
under G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3), upon conviction of an offense 
involving misappropriation of funds or property of the member's 
current or former government employer, or of the retirement 
system to which the member belongs.  In this case, the board 
found that the plaintiff's fraudulent receipt of workers' 
compensation benefits and assault pay fell "squarely within the 
meaning of the term 'misappropriation' as it applies to [G. L. 
c. 32, § 15]."  We agree.  In receiving benefits to which he was 
not entitled, the plaintiff clearly misappropriated funds; as 
the overpayments he received in workers' compensation and 
assault pay benefits came directly from the budget of the 
sheriff's department, he misappropriated these funds from his 
former government employer, triggering application of G. L. 
c. 32, § 15 (3). 
 
Turning to G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), this provision requires a 
direct link between the member's crime and public employment.  
The board found that a direct factual link existed here because 
"but for [the plaintiff's] work-related injury, in August 2000, 
at the Suffolk County House of Correction, [the plaintiff] would 
23 
 
not have been in a position . . . to have to complete requisite 
workers' compensation documents."  In affirming this reasoning, 
the Boston Municipal Court judge noted that, "but for his 
employment with [the Suffolk County sheriff's department], 
Plaintiff would not have been injured, would not have been 
receiving workers' compensation benefits, would not have made 
the fraudulent reports concerning other income, and thus, would 
not have been convicted of Worker's Compensation Fraud."  In 
denying the plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari, the 
Superior Court judge similarly observed that the plaintiff "was 
convicted of lying about his eligibility for workers' 
compensation, which he was receiving because he was injured 
while performing his duties as a correction[] officer" (emphasis 
added). 
 
Before us, the plaintiff maintains that there is not enough 
of a connection between his crimes and his former position as a 
correction officer to constitute a factual link.  The plaintiff 
argues that he did not use his public employment to "facilitate" 
his criminal acts, as he held no public job at the time of their 
commission.  The plaintiff also points out that G. L. c. 32, 
§ 15 (4), as a penal statute, must be narrowly construed. 
 
The plaintiff appears to have overlooked that, even though 
he was retired, his public employment can be seen as having 
"facilitate[d]" his crimes; absent that employment, he would not 
24 
 
have been eligible for workers' compensation and, therefore, 
would not have been in a position to commit the crime of 
workers' compensation fraud.  His case is factually similar to 
that of the plaintiff in Finneran, 476 Mass. at 722.  In that 
case, it was "only because [Finneran] had been Speaker of the 
House at the relevant time that he was in a position to testify 
as to the genesis of the redistricting plan and to do so 
falsely."  Id.  Although Finneran's duties as Speaker of the 
House did not involve testifying, and therefore his crime of 
obstruction of justice did not "directly implicate" his duties, 
the crime nonetheless was "inextricably intertwined" with his 
public job.  Id. 
 
Here, although the plaintiff's filing of fraudulent 
workers' compensation eligibility documents did not "directly 
implicate" his duties as a correction officer, his criminal 
offenses nonetheless were "inextricably intertwined" with his 
public employment.  See Finneran, 476 Mass. at 722.  The 
plaintiff lied about his ability to work when completing the 
eligibility documents, in order to preserve a benefit he was 
receiving as a result of having been injured in the course of 
conducting his professional duties.  See Spaniol's Case, 466 
Mass. 102, 107 (2013) (workers' compensation act was "designed 
to provide financial compensation for the impairment of an 
injured worker's earning capacity"); McDonough's Case, 440 Mass. 
25 
 
603, 604 (2003), S.C., 448 Mass. 79 (2006) ("workers' 
compensation scheme has been conceived as a mechanism by which 
workers can recover a portion of that income that they are kept 
from earning because of an injury suffered while working"); 
Ahmed's Case, 278 Mass. 180, 183 (1932) (underlying principle of 
workers' compensation act is that cost of injuries sustained by 
those employed in industry, save those due to serious and 
willful misconduct of employee, shall be treated as part of cost 
of production).  Thus, the plaintiff's crimes were not "personal 
in nature" but, rather, bore a direct connection to his former 
employer and the injury he suffered while carrying out his 
professional duties.  See Tyler, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 112-113.  
Moreover, a direct factual link exists by nature of the fact 
that the plaintiff's former employer, the Suffolk County 
sheriff's department, was the victim of his criminal offenses.  
See Gaffney, 423 Mass. at 4-5; Maher, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 613, 
616-617. 
 
As the plaintiff points out, we must construe G. L. c. 32, 
§ 15 (4), narrowly because it is a penal statute.  See Bulger, 
446 Mass. at 174-175.  "Although we have often stated that penal 
statutes should be strictly construed . . . , this maxim is a 
guide for resolving ambiguity, rather than a rigid requirement 
that we interpret each statute in the manner most favorable to 
defendants."  Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 102-103 (1982).  
26 
 
Nonetheless, the link between the plaintiff's crimes and his 
public employment is in no way as tenuous as he suggests.  There 
is a clear factual connection that renders the plaintiff's 
crimes "applicable to his office or position."  G. L. c. 32, 
§ 15 (4). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  Because there was no error in the board's 
decision to forfeit the plaintiff's retirement allowance, there 
was no abuse of discretion in the Superior Court judge's order 
denying the plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.