Title: In re Tichenor
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S52239
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: February 16, 2006

FILED:  February 16, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
CARROLL J. TICHENOR,
Accused.
(OSB 03-33; SC S52239)
On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
Argued and submitted September 7, 2005.
Marc D. Blackman, Ranson Blackman, LLP, Portland, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for the accused.  With him on the
briefs was Kendra M. Matthews.
Mary Anne Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake
Oswego, argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State
Bar. 
Robert W. Hermann, Hillsboro, filed the brief for amicus
curiae Oregon District Attorneys' Association.
Before Gillette, P.J., and Durham, Riggs, De Muniz,* Balmer,
and Kistler, JJ.**
PER CURIAM
Complaint dismissed.
* Chief Justice when decision was rendered.
**Carson, J., Chief Justice when case was argued, did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
PER CURIAM
In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar alleged that the accused violated Code of Professional
Responsibility Disciplinary Rule (DR) 7-106(C)(1) (prohibiting
lawyers from referring to matters that will not be supported by
admissible evidence). (1)  A trial panel of the Disciplinary
Board determined that the accused had violated that rule and
reprimanded him.  Because we find that the accused's conduct did
not violate DR 7-106(C)(1), we dismiss the Bar's complaint.
The events that gave rise to this disciplinary
proceeding are not disputed.  The state charged Holbrook with
sexually abusing a young girl, and the accused served as the
prosecutor in Holbrook's two criminal trials.  Holbrook's first
trial resulted in a hung jury.  During his second trial, Holbrook
called two witnesses, who offered their opinions regarding his
character for sexual propriety. (2)  Each witness testified
that, in her opinion, Holbrook's character for sexual propriety
was "appropriate."
The accused cross-examined Holbrook's first character
witness by asking if the witness knew (1) "anything about
[Holbrook] having a secret correspondence with a 14-year-old
girl," (2) that Holbrook had come home with "hickeys" on his
stomach, (3) that Holbrook "would often be out away from his wife
until 3:00, 4 o'clock in the morning," and (4) that Holbrook had
been involved in an adulterous relationship.
Holbrook's counsel objected to the third question on
the ground that the accused was "making a statement of fact when
there's no evidence to support it."  The trial court ruled that
the question was permissible if the accused had "a factual basis"
for asking it.  The accused stated, "I have a basis," the trial
court overruled the objection, and the witness answered that she
was not aware that Holbrook had engaged in that conduct.  The
accused pursued a similar line of cross-examination with the
second character witness, who gave similar answers.  After
considering the evidence, the jury convicted Holbrook of sexual
abuse, the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion, and this
court denied review.  State v. Holbrook, 196 Or App 353, 103 P3d
1211 (2004), rev den, 338 Or 681 (2005).
After Holbrook's criminal trial ended, the Bar filed a
complaint against the accused charging him with violating DR 7-106(C)(1).  The Bar alleged that the questions that the accused
had asked the two witnesses violated that disciplinary rule
because the questions referred to matters that "were not
supported by admissible evidence." (3)  In support of that
allegation, the Bar offered evidence at the disciplinary hearing
showing that the accused had based his questions on statements
that Holbrook's wife allegedly had made to her sister, who in
turn had reported those statements to the accused.  After the
sister had reported the statements but before the second trial
began, the accused learned that Holbrook's wife denied accusing
Holbrook of having been involved in an adulterous relationship
and of having acted inappropriately with any child.
In deciding whether the accused had violated DR 7-106(C)(1), the trial panel considered two issues.  It began by
considering whether the accused had violated OEC 405(1) in cross-examining the two character witnesses.  The trial panel reasoned
that, under OEC 405(1), a lawyer cannot cross-examine a character
witness "regarding prior instances of conduct when the [lawyer]
does not have a reasonable basis for believing such conduct
actually occurred."  The trial panel found that the accused did
not have "a good faith belief that Holbrook had actually engaged
in the conduct in question" and concluded that the accused had
violated OEC 405(1) and consequently DR 7-106(C)(1).  The trial
panel did not explain why the perceived violation of OEC 405(1)
gave rise to a violation of DR 7-106(C)(1).  Rather, it appeared
to assume that the disciplinary violation followed automatically
from the evidentiary violation.  The trial panel reprimanded the
accused, who has petitioned for review.
As the parties frame the issues in this case, they
involve the relationship between two sets of rules -- the rules
of evidence governing the conduct of trials and the disciplinary
rules governing the conduct of lawyers.  We first set out the
texts of the two rules at issue here and describe their operation
briefly.  We then examine the relationship between those rules. 
Finally, we turn to the Bar's argument that, because the accused
violated OEC 405(1), he also violated DR 7-106(C)(1).  As
explained below, we hold that a violation of OEC 405(1) or, more
precisely, a violation of a judicial rule related to OEC 405(1)
does not give rise to a violation of DR 7-106(C)(1).
OEC 405(1) provides:
"In all cases in which evidence of character or a
trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may
be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony
in the form of an opinion.  On cross-examination,
inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances
of conduct."
Consistently with that rule, this court has held that, when a
party calls a witness to offer reputation or opinion evidence
concerning that party's good character, the opposing party may
impeach the witness's testimony by asking whether the witness has
heard or is aware of specific instances of conduct that
contradict either the reported reputation or the witness's
opinion.  See, e.g., State v. Shull, 131 Or 224, 282 P 237 (1929)
(so holding).
Because of the significant potential for prejudice
posed by that type of cross-examination, the courts have ruled
that "[i]t is improper for [a lawyer] to cross-examine a
character witness regarding prior instances of conduct when the
[lawyer] does not have a reasonable basis for believing such
conduct actually occurred."  Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon
Evidence § 405.04, Art IV-104 (4th ed 2002); see Troutman v.
Erlandson, 279 Or 595, 602-03, 569 P2d 575 (1977) (recognizing
majority rule that lawyer must have "good faith" belief that
conduct occurred).  Kirkpatrick regards this judge-made rule as a
corollary of the right to cross-examine on specific instances of
conduct under OEC 405(1).  Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence § 405.04
at Art IV-104.  As we understand the Bar's argument in this case,
it contends that the accused's questions violated the judge-made
corollary to OEC 405(1) rather than the terms of OEC 405(1)
itself, which merely authorizes an inquiry into "relevant
specific instances of conduct" on cross-examination.
DR 7-106(C)(1), the disciplinary rule at issue in this
case, is one of seven rules directed at a lawyer's conduct before
tribunals. (4)  That rule provides that, "[i]n appearing in the
lawyer’s professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall
not [s]tate or allude to any matter * * * that will not be
supported by admissible evidence."  As worded, the rule appears
to assume that lawyers should be able to offer admissible
evidence at trial to support the statements that they make in
voir dire, opening statement, and the like.  See In re Eadie, 333
Or 42, 62, 36 P3d 468 (2001) (lawyer violated DR 7-106(C)(1) when
he referred to insurance during voir dire knowing that evidence
of insurance would not be admissible at trial).
Regarding the relationship between those two rules, the
accused argues (and the Bar does not dispute) that DR 7-106(C)(1)
does not prohibit anything that OEC 405(1) or its judge-made
corollary permits; that is, if the accused's questions complied
with OEC 405(1) and the corollary to that rule, DR 7-106(C)(1)
did not authorize the Bar to discipline the accused for asking
those questions.  We agree with that proposition; however, the
converse of that proposition is not true.  Every departure from
the rules of evidence or trial practice does not become an
ethical violation punishable under either 7-106(C) generally or
DR 7-106(C)(1) specifically.  Rather, DR 7-106(C) authorizes the
Bar to discipline lawyers for a narrower class of conduct.  See,
e.g., DR 7-106(C)(7) (only intentional or habitual violations of
established rules of evidence violate that disciplinary rule). 
That narrower focus is of particular importance in this case.
Accordingly, to prove its allegations that the accused
violated DR 7-106(C)(1), the Bar must establish two propositions: 
first, that the accused violated the corollary to OEC 405(1) and,
second, that his violation of that evidence rule also constituted
a violation of DR 7-106(C)(1).  As we understand the Bar's
argument on those propositions, it runs as follows: (1) Under the
corollary to OEC 405(1), a lawyer lacks a reasonable or good-faith basis to believe that specific instances of conduct
occurred unless the lawyer can offer admissible evidence to prove
that the conduct actually occurred; (2) the question whether a
lawyer violated DR 7-106(C)(1) also turns on the same issue
because that rule prohibits lawyers from referring to matters
that they cannot offer admissible evidence to prove; and (3) it
follows from the foregoing, the Bar argues, that a violation of
the corollary to OEC 405(1) necessarily gives rise to a violation
of DR 7-106(C)(1).
The initial difficulty with the Bar's argument lies in
its understanding of the corollary to OEC 405(1).  That rule
requires that lawyers have a reasonable or good-faith basis to
believe that the mentioned conduct occurred.  It does not require
that they be able to offer admissible evidence to prove that the
conduct occurred.  See, e.g., Troutman, 279 Or at 604 (requiring
only good-faith basis); State v. Bateham, 94 Or 524, 531, 186 P 5
(1919) (requiring "foundation within [lawyer's] knowledge or
information"); cf. State v. Doris, 51 Or 136, 159, 94 P 44 (1908)
(cross-examination regarding community rumors permissible to
impeach reputation testimony on defendant's good character).  As
one treatise has explained, the good-faith basis test
"does not require that proof of the specific act be
admissible under the rules of evidence, for the obvious
reason that the act is not being admitted as a fact. 
Consequently, the good faith basis test has often been
met through hearsay statements of law enforcement
officers implicating the defendant in criminal
activity."
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Daniel J. Capra, and Michael M. Martin,
2 Federal Rules of Evidence Manual § 405.02[5] at 405-8 (8th Ed
2002). (5)  The Bar offers no persuasive authority to support
its contrary understanding of the rule. (6)
The link that the Bar perceives between the corollary
to OEC 405(1) and DR 7-106(C)(1) is absent.  The former requires
a reasonable or good-faith basis to believe that conduct occurred
as a predicate to mentioning that conduct during cross-examination.  The latter authorizes the Bar to discipline lawyers
who refer to matters during voir dire, opening statement, and the
like that they will not be able to offer admissible evidence at
trial to prove.  The two rules address different concerns.  Proof of a violation of the corollary to OEC 405(1) does not give rise
to a violation of DR 7-106(C)(1). (7) 
It follows from the foregoing discussion that we need
not decide whether the accused had a reasonable basis to believe
that Holbrook had engaged in the conduct that the accused
mentioned during cross-examination.  Even if the accused lacked a
reasonable basis for drawing that conclusion and violated the
corollary to OEC 405(1), a violation of that judge-made rule does
not give rise to a violation of DR 7-106(C)(1).  The Bar alleged
only that the accused violated DR 7-106(C)(1), and it is
sufficient in this case to hold only that the evidence failed to
establish a violation of that disciplinary rule.
Complaint dismissed.
1. 
The Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct became
effective January 1, 2005.  Because the conduct at issue here
occurred before that date, the Code of Professional
Responsibility applies.
2. 
The Court of Appeals has held that OEC 405(1) permits a
witness to testify about a defendant's character for sexual
propriety.  State v. Enakiev, 175 Or App 589, 29 P3d 1160 (2001). 
This court has not addressed that issue and, in describing what
occurred at Holbrook's criminal trial, we express no opinion on
whether OEC 405(1) permitted that question.  Cf. State v.
Marshall, 312 Or 367, 373, 823 P2d 961 (1991) (holding that OEC
405(1) does not permit asking witness whether defendant had
reputation for telling particular kind of lie).
3. 
The Bar also alleged that "the [a]ccused had no
reasonable belief that the matters upon which these questions
were based were relevant to the case."  The Bar conceded at oral
argument, however, that the matters that the accused mentioned
were relevant because they went to the credibility of the two
character witnesses.  See State v. Bateham, 94 Or 524, 531, 186 P
5 (1919) (recognizing principle).  We accept that concession.
4. 
DR 7-106(C) provides:
"In appearing in the lawyer’s professional
capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not:
"(1) State or allude to any matter that the lawyer
has no reasonable basis to believe is relevant to the
case or that will not be supported by admissible
evidence.
"(2) Ask any question that the lawyer has no
reasonable basis to believe is relevant to the case and
that is intended to degrade a witness or other person.
"(3) Assert the lawyer’s personal knowledge of the
facts in issue except when testifying as a witness.
"(4) Assert the lawyer’s personal opinion as to
the justness of a cause, as to the credibility of a
witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant or
as to the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant
but the lawyer may argue, on the lawyer’s analysis of
the evidence, for any position or conclusion with
respect to the matters stated herein.
"(5) Fail to comply with known local customs of
courtesy or practice of the bar or a particular
tribunal without giving to opposing counsel timely
notice of the lawyer’s intent not to comply.
"(6) Engage in undignified or discourteous conduct
which is degrading to a tribunal.
"(7) Intentionally or habitually violate any
established rule of procedure or of evidence."
5. 
Put another way, the question under the corollary to
OEC 405(1) is whether the evidence is reliable, not whether it is
admissible.  Although admissible evidence usually will be
reliable, the fact that the evidence is not admissible does not
preclude it from being reliable, for purposes of the corollary to
OEC 405(1).
6. 
In arguing for a different understanding of the
corollary to OEC 405(1), the Bar quotes a passage from United
States v. Silverstein, 737 F2d 864, 868 (10th Cir 1984).  The
decision in Silverstein, however, addressed a different rule of
evidence.  The Bar does not seem to recognize that distinction,
much less explain why the reasoning in Silverstein should apply
to the corollary to OEC 405(1).
7. 
We note that DR 7-106(C)(7) prohibits lawyers from
intentionally or habitually violating established rules of
evidence; however, the Bar has not charged the accused with
violating that disciplinary rule or any disciplinary rule other
than DR 7-106(C)(1).