Title: Brown v. Brown
Citation: 105 Ariz. 273, 463 P.2d 71
Docket Number: 9837
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: December 26, 1969

105 Ariz. 273 (1969) 463 P.2d 71 Michael J. BROWN, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. Joan M. BROWN, Appellee and Cross-Appellant. No. 9837. Supreme Court of Arizona. In Banc. December 26, 1969. Rehearing Denied February 10, 1970. Rees, Estes &amp; Browning, Chandler, Tullar, Udall &amp; Richmond, by Donald Estes, Tucson, for appellant and cross-appellee. John William Johnson, Tucson, for appellee and cross-appellant. McFARLAND, Justice: On November 25, 1964, after a trial on the issues, the parties were divorced, and custody of the minor child of the marriage, Kevin Sean Brown (Kevin), was awarded to Joan M. Brown (Mrs. Brown). Mrs. Brown continued to reside in Tucson with Kevin where visitation rights were exercised by the appellant, Michael J. Brown (Mr. Brown). However, on August 6, 1965, Mrs. Brown and Kevin left the State of Arizona, and moved to Des Plaines, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago. She gave no prior notice of this move to Mr. Brown, but left a note to him on the door of her prior residence advising him of her new address. There is no question but that she became legally domiciled in Illinois, and has resided there ever since. In the original decree of divorce containing the grant of custody to Mrs. Brown, no mention was made that she must continue to reside in Arizona, nor was there any provision that she could not change her domicile and that of Kevin without prior permission of the court. Therefore, when she departed for Illinois she was within her legal rights. However, the parties got into difficulties over visitation rights. Mr. Brown filed an Order to Show Cause with the Pima County Superior Court, and on June 17, 1966, a stipulation of the parties and an Order of the Court was filed, reaffirming Mr. Brown's visitation rights. This action was taken with full knowledge of all concerned that Mrs. Brown and Kevin were then lawfully domiciled in Illinois. The next day Mrs. Brown sent Kevin, alone, to Tucson by airplane. After the child's return to Illinois, Mrs. Brown failed to return Kevin during other visitation periods outlined in the order of the court. After this trip Mrs. Brown said that she was fearful for the welfare of Kevin in traveling alone across the country, and so informed Mr. Brown in a telephone conversation with him on November 22, 1966, which he had taped. She told him that she would be most happy to allow Kevin to come to Arizona for a visit if he would *274 come and get him, or would arrange to have some competent adult travel with him on the trip. Thereafter on the 19th day of December 1966 Mr. Brown had his mother and sister, without the knowledge or the consent of Mrs. Brown, take Kevin from school and put him on a plane, alone, for the trip to Phoenix, Arizona, and, on the same day, he had a temporary restraining order and an Order to Show Cause issued and served upon Mrs. Brown's attorney of record in the original case, together with a copy of a petition for a change in custody. A hearing was held on the Order to Show Cause, and, as a result, the court amended the original decree, and awarded custody of Kevin to Mr. Brown. It also sentenced Mr. Brown to two days in jail for contumaciously removing Kevin from his school in Illinois prior to vacation time. Mrs. Brown personally appeared in response to the Order to Show Cause, and was represented by counsel. The trial court entered a minute entry on January 16, 1967, but, because of extensive interim procedures, the formal, final judgment was not entered until November 6, 1967. The Court of Appeals, Div. 2, affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and both parties petitioned for review by this Court. 10 Ariz. App. 388, 459 P.2d 115. Both appellant and appellee question the trial court's jurisdiction to enter a final judgment more than sixty days after submission of the matter. Appellee Mrs. Brown claims the court should have dismissed the case when it became clear that the child was abducted from Illinois to Arizona in violation of the court's order. She also contends that there was insufficient proof of change in circumstances to justify a change in custody, and objects to the admission into evidence of events and conditions prior to the order of June 17, 1966. However, it is not necessary to consider these questions since our recent decision in Johnson v. Johnson, 105 Ariz. 233, 462 P.2d 782, disposes of this matter. We there reaffirmed our holding in In re Hughes, 73 Ariz. 97, 237 P.2d 1009, where we said: But, in Johnson v. Johnson, supra, we also said: Professor Ehrenzweig refers to this doctrine as the "Washington rule" of "clean hands," and he claims that "* * * There are thirty-one states whose case law, in the virtual absence of authority to the contrary, may well be held to represent prevailing authority." Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws, § 88 (West Pub. Co. 1962). There is one difference between the instant case and the usual "clean hands" case. Here there was no order by the courts of Illinois the only decree being the Arizona one rendered in the original action. But this does not alter the underlying principle of the "clean hands" rule that courts should not "* * * be accessories after the fact to disorderly practices of individual parents or others who thus seek to avoid the normal processes of justice * * *." Wicks v. Cox, 146 Tex. 489, 208 S.W.2d 876. This case is analogous to Shippen v. Bailey, 303 Ky. 10, 196 S.W.2d 425, where the Ohio court, as part of its original decree of divorce, awarded custody of the children to the mother, who was domiciled in Ohio. However, prior to these proceedings, the mother, due to economic conditions, turned the care and control of the children over to their maternal grandmother, who was domiciled in Pennsylvania. Some ten years later, the father without consent took the children from the home of their grandmother to his home in Kentucky. In so taking them the father did not violate any order of a Pennsylvania court, nor did he remove them from the direct control of the mother, but the Kentucky court held, in part: In the early case of Taylor v. Jeter, 33 Ga. 195, 81 Am.Dec. 202, an uncle wrongfully took a child from his domicile in Alabama into the State of Georgia. The Georgia court there said: Therefore, under the rule of "clean hands" a court of this state should not, even where its own order is involved, put its stamp of approval on a wrongful abduction from a sister state. Abductions should not be recognized as giving courts jurisdiction. To do so would encourage actions which could result in sorrow and anguish to the parent who would not know the whereabouts of a child which had been abducted, and which could be detrimental to the child's physical and mental well-being. It would permit and encourage parents, dissatisfied with one court, to take a child unlawfully to another state and conceal its whereabouts until they were ready to apply for custody in a state in which it was believed the court would be more favorable. Mr. Brown has his recourse by availing himself of the normal processes of justice in the courts of the state of domicile. The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated. The judgment of the Superior Court is vacated, and custody of child, Kevin, is ordered returned to the mother. UDALL, C.J., LOCKWOOD, V.C.J., and STRUCKMEYER and HAYS, JJ., concur.