Title: Madigan v. Stateline Recycling, LLC
Citation: 2020 IL 124417
Docket Number: 124417
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 3, 2020

2020 IL 124417 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
(Docket No. 124417) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. LISA MADIGAN, Attorney General, 
Appellant, v. STATELINE RECYCLING, LLC, et al. (Elizabeth Reents, Appellee). 
Opinion filed December 3, 2020. 
JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
Chief Justice Anne M. Burke and Justices Kilbride, Garman, Karmeier, and 
Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
Justice Michael J. Burke took no part in the decision. 
OPINION 
¶ 1 
The Illinois Attorney General and the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency 
(IEPA) initiated this civil enforcement action, alleging several violations of the 
Environmental Protection Act (Act) (415 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2016)) with regard 
to a parcel of property located in Rockford, Illinois. The complaint was brought 
against defendants Elizabeth Reents, as the owner of the subject property, and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stateline Recycling, LLC, a limited liability company that allegedly conducted an 
operation involving the dumping of construction and demolition debris on the 
property. Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 214(a) (eff. July 1, 2014), the 
Attorney General initiated pretrial discovery seeking to inspect the subject 
property. Reents refused to permit the inspection, and the circuit court of 
Winnebago County granted the Attorney General’s motion to compel her to comply 
with the Rule 214(a) inspection request. After Reents asserted a good-faith 
objection and respectfully refused to comply with the discovery order, the circuit 
court held her in contempt so that she could file an appeal. 
¶ 2 
The appellate court reversed, holding that fourth amendment principles must be 
considered because the party requesting the inspection in this case was the 
government. 2018 IL App (2d) 170860, ¶¶ 39-40. The appellate court vacated the 
discovery order and remanded the case to the circuit court for application of fourth 
amendment principles in ruling on the Attorney General’s motion to compel. Id. 
¶¶ 69-70. We allowed the Attorney General’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. 
R. 315(a) (eff. July 1, 2018). For the reasons that follow, we vacate the judgment 
of the appellate court and remand to that court for further proceedings. 
¶ 3 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶ 4 
The subject matter of this environmental enforcement action is a parcel of 
property consisting of approximately 10 acres, which is locked and gated and 
located at 2317 Seminary Street in Rockford, Illinois. Reents became the owner of 
the site when she obtained a tax deed to the property on April 8, 2015. 
¶ 5 
In January 2017, the Attorney General, on her own motion and at the request of 
the IEPA, on the behalf of the People of the State of Illinois, filed this civil 
enforcement action against defendants for violations of the Act (415 ILCS 5/1 et 
seq. (West 2016)).1 The complaint, as finally amended, asserted several counts 
against both Reents and Stateline Recycling, LLC, including allegations of open 
dumping of waste without a permit; disposal, storage, and abandonment of waste 
at an unpermitted facility; open dumping of waste resulting in litter and the 
1Attorney General Kwame Raoul succeeded Attorney General Lisa Madigan in January 2019 
and pursues the appeal before this court. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1008(d) (West 2018). 
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deposition of construction and demolition debris; and failure to pay clean 
construction and demolition debris fill operation fees. Id. §§ 21(a), (e), (p), 
22.51(a). The Attorney General sought injunctive relief as well as a civil penalty of 
$50,000 for the violation of the Act, an additional $10,000 for each day the violation 
continues, and costs pursuant to the Act. Id. §§ 42, 43. 
¶ 6 
The complaint alleged that Stateline Recycling, LLC, and/or its corporate 
predecessor, Busse Development & Recycling, Inc., conducted an operation for the 
dumping of construction and demolition debris at the site. According to the 
complaint, an inspection of the site by an IEPA inspector on July 29, 2015, showed 
mixed piles consisting of concrete, brick, painted cinder blocks, asphalt, and soil. 
Some of the mixed materials were placed above the ground. The inspection also 
revealed that there was no indication of recycling the material, although a Stateline 
Recycling, LLC, representative indicated an intention to recycle it. The complaint 
further alleged that at a follow-up inspection on July 14, 2016, the IEPA inspector 
found the gate to the site unlocked and open, although no personnel were present. 
From his vantage point by the front gate, the inspector observed the continued 
presence of the same materials that were noted in the July 2015 inspection. 
¶ 7 
In April 2017, the Attorney General issued Reents a discovery request pursuant 
to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 214(a) (eff. July 1, 2014), seeking access to the site 
to perform an inspection. In particular, the Rule 214(a) discovery notice requested 
that Reents permit the following: 
“[a]llow representatives of the Illinois Attorney General access to the real 
property controlled and/or owned by Reents located at 2317 Seminary Street, 
Rockford, Winnebago County, Illinois, including any buildings, trailers, or 
fixtures thereupon. Plaintiff requests access on May 5, 2017 at 11 a.m., or at 
such other time as may be agreed between the parties. At this inspection, 
representatives of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency may also 
accompany Attorney General representatives and conduct an inspection 
pursuant to their authority under 415 ILCS 5/4 (2014).” 
¶ 8 
In response, Reents objected to the site inspection, claiming that it improperly 
sought to circumvent the constitutional requirement for a warrant and violated the 
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV) and 
article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6). 
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¶ 9 
The Attorney General attempted to resolve the discovery dispute during the 
spring and summer of 2017 pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(k) (eff. 
July 1, 2014), but Reents refused to permit access to the site. In July 2017, the 
Attorney General filed a motion to compel Reents to allow her representatives 
access to the site. In support, the Attorney General explained that, because the site 
was the subject matter of the action, the nature and condition of the site were 
relevant to the alleged violations of the Act and the site was subject to inspection 
under this court’s rules. The Attorney General argued that her representatives 
should be allowed access to the site, including any buildings, trailers, or fixtures for 
inspection under Rule 214(a). The Attorney General also argued that IEPA 
representatives should be allowed to accompany her representatives during the 
inspection because of its own independent statutory authority to conduct 
inspections of the site (415 ILCS 5/4(c) (West 2016)) and to monitor compliance 
with the Act (id. § 4(d)). The Attorney General further noted that certain industries 
have a history of government oversight and that no reasonable expectation of 
privacy could exist for an owner of property used in such industries. According to 
the Attorney General, landfills are a highly regulated commercial activity, and 
inspections by the IEPA can be expected. 
¶ 10 
Reents opposed the motion to compel and again contended that the inspection 
request constituted an attempt to use Rule 214(a) to circumvent the probable cause 
and warrant requirements of the fourth amendment. Reents also disputed that she 
was engaged in a highly regulated commercial activity because she had recently 
obtained title to the property through a tax purchase and there was no evidence that 
she had conducted or permitted the conduct of regulated activities upon her 
property. 
¶ 11 
In reply, the Attorney General reasoned that Rule 214(a)’s plain language 
applies to all parties in civil litigation, without excepting a government litigant. The 
Attorney General maintained that the civil discovery rules, including their 
relevance, 
reasonableness, 
and 
judicial 
oversight 
requirements, 
satisfy 
constitutional concerns. 
¶ 12 
Following a hearing at which Reents acknowledged that the site had been a 
landfill in the past, the circuit court granted the Attorney General’s motion to 
compel her compliance with the 214(a) request to inspect the site. The circuit court 
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reasoned that Rule 214 applies to all civil cases and permits any party to request 
access to real estate for inspection when it is relevant to the subject matter of the 
litigation. The circuit court determined that the subject matter of the litigation is the 
property currently owned by Reents and that the alleged violations of the Act 
pertained to the property. The court further explained that, because this was a civil 
case and not a criminal case, the fourth amendment posed no impediment to the 
Attorney General’s right to inspect the site pursuant to Rule 214(a). 
¶ 13 
Based on Reents’s good-faith objection to the order compelling her to comply 
with the inspection notice, the circuit court subsequently held her in contempt and 
imposed a monetary sanction of $100 so that she could appeal the issue. The circuit 
court stayed the discovery order pending appeal. 
¶ 14 
The appellate court reversed the circuit court’s discovery order, vacated the 
contempt order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. 2018 IL App (2d) 
170860, ¶ 73. 
¶ 15 
Initially, the appellate court took judicial notice of the fact that the Attorney 
General successfully obtained an administrative warrant pursuant to section 4 of 
the Act, authorizing IEPA representatives to enter the site to “ ‘observe, inspect, 
and photograph the Site, and all operations, processes, structures and materials 
upon said Site.’ ” Id. ¶ 19. The appellate court also acknowledged that the Attorney 
General was not relying on that portion of the civil discovery order. Id. 
¶ 16 
The appellate court explained that, although Rule 214(a) allows the inspection 
of property relevant to the subject matter and the site is relevant to this action, 
relevance did not set the bar here. Id. ¶¶ 42-43. The appellate court reasoned that, 
though civil in form, this action amounted to a quasi-criminal proceeding since the 
statutory scheme allows for substantial civil penalties, injunctive relief, and, 
although not currently sought in this case, criminal penalties and forfeiture. Id. ¶ 43. 
¶ 17 
The appellate court held that the civil discovery rules do not satisfy the core 
protection of the fourth amendment. Id. ¶ 54. The court further held that fourth 
amendment protection applies to Reents’s privacy interest in the property and to 
the government’s request for access to the site. Id. 
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¶ 18 
Relying on New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987), the appellate 
court determined that a warrantless administrative inspection of a closely regulated 
business is reasonable only if (1) there is a substantial government interest 
underlying the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made, (2) the 
inspection is necessary to further the regulatory scheme, and (3) the regulatory 
scheme sets forth sufficient “ ‘certainty and regularity’ ” to provide the business 
owner with a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. 2018 IL App (2d) 
170860, ¶ 64. The appellate court concluded that the circuit court erred in failing to 
consider fourth amendment principles and Burger’s framework in crafting the 
discovery order. Id. 
¶ 19 
Lastly, the court explained that Reents had forfeited any constitutional 
challenge to section 4(d)(1) of the Act because she had not raised the challenge in 
the circuit court. Id. ¶ 68. 
¶ 20 
This court granted the Attorney General’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. 
R. 315(a) (eff. July 1, 2018). 
¶ 21 
II. ANALYSIS 
¶ 22 
A. Statutory Overview 
¶ 23 
The purpose of the Act is to establish a unified, statewide program, 
supplemented by private remedies, to restore, protect, and enhance the quality of 
the environment and to assure that adverse effects upon the environment are fully 
considered and borne by those who cause them. The terms and provisions of this 
Act are liberally construed so as to effectuate the purposes of the Act, and to the 
extent that the Act prescribes criminal penalties, it is construed in accordance with 
the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 2016)). 415 ILCS 5/2 
(West 2016). 
¶ 24 
The IEPA has authority to conduct a program of continuing surveillance and of 
regular or periodic inspection of actual or potential refuse disposal sites. 415 ILCS 
5/4(c) (West 2016). In accordance with constitutional limitations, the Agency has 
authority to enter at all reasonable times upon any private or public property for the 
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purpose of inspecting and investigating to ascertain possible violations of this Act. 
Id. § 4(d)(1). 
¶ 25 
The Act also provides that any person that violates any provision of the Act 
shall be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed $50,000 for the violation and an 
additional civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 for each day during which the 
violation continues. Id. § 42(a). In addition, although not sought in this case, the 
criminal penalty for violation of this Act is a Class A misdemeanor (id. § 44), and 
the Act provides for forfeiture of profits, benefits, or other property (id. § 44.1(a)). 
¶ 26 
B. Governing Civil Discovery Rules 
¶ 27 
In Illinois, discovery in civil actions is governed by Illinois Supreme Court 
Rules 201 through 224. Ill. S. Ct. Rs. Art. II, part E. Rule 201 and related rules, 
which control the specific discovery methods, form a comprehensive scheme for 
fair and efficient discovery, with judicial oversight to protect litigants from 
harassment. Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 531 (1997). 
¶ 28 
Relevant here, the plain language of Rule 214(a) includes four distinct and 
critical aspects: 
(1) the rule applies to any party and makes no distinction for government 
litigants; 
(2) it specifically allows for the inspection of real estate; 
(3) it permits such inspection whenever the nature, contents, or condition of 
the real estate is relevant to the subject matter of the action; and 
(4) it requires that the request specify a reasonable time (with at least 28 
days’ notice), along with the place and manner of the inspection. Ill. S. Ct. R. 
214(a) (eff. July 1, 2014). 
¶ 29 
Rule 201 sets out several of the general principles regarding civil discovery. Ill. 
S. Ct. R. 201 (eff. July 1, 2014). It addresses the scope for pretrial discovery and 
provides that a party may obtain, by discovery, full disclosure regarding any matter 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. Id. 
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¶ 30 
Further, Rule 201 contains several provisions to prevent discovery abuse. Rule 
201(c)(1) allows the entry of a protective order to deny, limit, condition, or regulate 
discovery, as justice requires, to prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense, 
embarrassment, disadvantage, or oppression. Ill. S. Ct. R. 201(c)(1) (eff. July 1, 
2014). In addition, Rule 201(c)(2) provides that the circuit court, on its own 
initiative, may supervise all or any part of any discovery procedure. Ill. S. Ct. R. 
201(c)(2) (eff. July 1, 2014). 
¶ 31 
Rule 219(a) provides that, if a party refuses to comply with an inspection of real 
property, the party serving the request may on like notice move for an order 
compelling compliance with the request. Ill. S. Ct. R. 219(a) (eff. July 1, 2002). If 
the court finds that the refusal or failure was without substantial justification, the 
court shall require the offending party or deponent, or the party whose attorney 
advised the conduct complained of, or either of them, to pay to the aggrieved party 
the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including 
reasonable attorney fees. Id. When appropriate, the court may, by contempt 
proceedings, compel obedience by any party to any order entered under these rules. 
Ill. S. Ct. R. 219(c) (eff. July 1, 2002). 
¶ 32 
In the context of civil discovery, our rules provide certain safeguards by limiting 
discovery to information that is relevant to the issues in the lawsuit. Ill. S. Ct. R. 
201(b)(1) (eff. July 1, 2014). This court has recognized that the scope of 
information considered relevant can be broad, including both evidence that would 
be admissible at trial and information leading to discovery of admissible evidence. 
Monier v. Chamberlain, 31 Ill. 2d 400, 403 (1964). In addition, the relevance 
requirement safeguards against “improper and abusive” discovery and acts as an 
“independent constraint on discovery.” Kunkel, 179 Ill. 2d at 533. Further, the 
discovery rules’ relevance and proportionality requirements ensure the 
constitutional reasonableness of discovery orders. Id. at 538 (observing that, in the 
context of civil discovery, reasonableness is a function of relevance). 
¶ 33 
Civil discovery proceedings compel discovery within the judicial process under 
the direction of the neutral circuit court judge, who ensures that a discovery request 
and ensuing order comply with this court’s rules’ reasonable protections, after the 
responding party has notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Illinois v. Krull, 
480 U.S. 340, 348 (1987). Whether the discovery order is too broad in scope is a 
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matter of discretion committed to the circuit court. People ex rel. General Motors 
Corp. v. Bua, 37 Ill. 2d 180, 191 (1967). Pursuant to our rules, the circuit court has 
authority and responsibility to issue orders that will discourage abuse of the 
discovery process. Ill. S. Ct. R. 201 (eff. July 1, 2014); see also Zagorski v. Allstate 
Insurance Co., 2016 IL App (5th) 140056, ¶ 36. 
¶ 34 
C. Consideration of the Appellate Court’s Judgment 
¶ 35 
Initially, we observe that the only issue that was properly before the appellate 
court was whether the circuit court’s discovery order constituted an abuse of 
discretion. Yet, the appellate court did not resolve that question and, instead, held 
that fourth amendment principles must be applied to its review of the discovery 
order. Given the nature of the appellate court’s disposition and Reents’s arguments 
before this court, we deem it necessary to clarify that the following questions are 
not at issue in this case: (1) the constitutionality of section 4(d) of the Act (415 
ILCS 5/4(d) (West 2016)), permitting warrantless inspections; (2) the propriety of 
the administrative warrant issued to the IEPA, allowing inspection of the site; 
(3) any inquiry as to the constitutionality of discovery pursuant to statute or an 
administrative warrant that is issued outside of litigation; (4) any criminal liability 
or penalties that could be available under the Act in a different case; and (5) the 
constitutionality of our Rule 214(a) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 214(a) (eff. July 1, 2014)). 
¶ 36 
Although discovery orders are not final and, therefore, ordinarily are not 
appealable, the correctness of a discovery order may be tested through contempt 
proceedings where, as here, a party is found in contempt for refusing to comply. 
Harris v. One Hope United, Inc., 2015 IL 117200, ¶ 6; Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d 
60, 69 (2001); see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b)(5) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). Review of a 
circuit court’s contempt finding requires review of the order upon which it was 
based. Norskog, 197 Ill. 2d at 69. Discovery orders are typically reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. Id. at 70. 
¶ 37 
The Attorney General argues, inter alia, that the appellate court erred in 
deciding the appeal on constitutional grounds. In particular, the Attorney General 
contends that, because the issue presented involves a civil discovery order that was 
entered pursuant to our rules, the appellate court should have reviewed the order 
for an abuse of discretion. We agree. 
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¶ 38 
As this court has explained on numerous occasions, cases should be decided on 
nonconstitutional grounds whenever possible, and constitutional issues should be 
reached only as a last resort. The Carle Foundation v. Cunningham Township, 2017 
IL 120427, ¶ 34; see also People v. Melchor, 226 Ill. 2d 24, 33-36 (2007); Wade v. 
City of North Chicago Police Pension Board, 226 Ill. 2d 485, 510 (2007); Mulay v. 
Mulay, 225 Ill. 2d 601, 607 (2007). Consequently, courts must avoid reaching 
constitutional issues when a case can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds. The 
Carle Foundation, 2017 IL 120427, ¶ 34; see also People v. Hampton, 225 Ill. 2d 
238, 244 (2007). With this long-standing rule in mind, we consider whether the 
appellate court acted properly in addressing Reents’s constitutional arguments. See 
Melchor, 226 Ill. 2d at 34-36. 
¶ 39 
As noted above, the sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the circuit 
court’s discovery order compelling Reents to comply with the Attorney General’s 
Rule 214(a) request to inspect the site constituted an abuse of discretion. The 
appellate court acknowledged that such orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion 
(2018 IL App (2d) 170860, ¶ 17) but did not address that question. Rather, the 
appellate court ignored our established rule mandating avoidance of constitutional 
questions where possible and proceeded directly to an analysis of whether the 
discovery order violated Reents’s constitutional rights under the fourth amendment. 
In concluding that the protections found in our civil discovery rules do not satisfy 
the reasonableness standard when the government is the requesting party, the 
appellate court effectively held that Rule 214(a) is unconstitutional but failed to 
explain whether that rule is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to Reents. The 
appellate court further failed to recognize that Reents had not challenged the 
constitutionality of Rule 214. 
¶ 40 
Courts should not find our discovery rules unconstitutional when a particular 
case does not require it. Reents has not disputed that the circuit court applied the 
plain language of Rule 214(a) as written. Therefore, if she sought to argue that 
application of Rule 214(a) violated her constitutional rights, she was required to 
specifically challenge the rule itself—either on its face or as applied to her in this 
case. But she has not done so. She did not assert that argument in the appellate 
court, and she has not presented such a claim in this court. Indeed, she repeatedly 
assured this court at oral argument that she was not asserting a constitutional 
challenge to the rule. 
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¶ 41 
In light of our long-standing rule that cases should be decided on 
nonconstitutional grounds whenever possible, the appellate court should have 
proceeded to review the discovery order for an abuse of discretion. First, the court 
should have examined the Attorney General’s Rule 214(a) inspection notice to 
ascertain whether it satisfied the explicit requirements of the rule. Second, the court 
should have considered any specific objections asserted by Reents as to the scope, 
timing, or manner of inspection. Lastly, the court should have addressed whether 
the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to limit the request, enter a 
protective order, or supervise the discovery to ensure that the Attorney General’s 
inspection targeted only what was relevant to the subject matter of the litigation. 
¶ 42 
Given that Reents did not challenge the constitutionality of the rule, there was 
absolutely no basis for the appellate court to reach any constitutional questions in 
this case, and it was improper for the court to do so. Accordingly, we vacate the 
appellate court’s judgment and remand the cause to the appellate court with 
directions to address the nonconstitutional issue of whether the circuit court abused 
its discretion. 
¶ 43 
As a final matter, we note the Attorney General’s contention that, because 
Reents failed to assert any specific objection to the scope or timing of the Rule 
214(a) inspection request, she has forfeited all such challenges and the circuit 
court’s order can be affirmed on that ground. However, Rule 201(c) provides that 
the circuit court can, on its own initiative, issue protective orders and supervise 
discovery to prevent abuse. Ill. S. Ct. R. 201(c) (eff. July 1, 2014). Although 
Reents’s primary contentions focus on alleged violations of her fourth amendment 
rights, she argued, in the alternative, that the circuit court’s order constituted an 
abuse of discretion. The appellate court should have addressed that 
nonconstitutional issue. For this reason, we remand the case to the appellate court 
for review of the circuit court’s order under the abuse-of-discretion standard. 
¶ 44 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶ 45 
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the appellate court and 
remand the case to that court with directions that it review the circuit court’s 
discovery order for an abuse of discretion. 
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¶ 46 
Appellate court judgment vacated and remanded with directions. 
¶ 47 
JUSTICE MICHAEL J. BURKE took no part in the consideration or decision 
of this case. 
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