Title: In re A.R.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S260928
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: April 5, 2021

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re A.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. 
__________________________________________________ 
 
ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
M.B.,  
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S260928 
 
First Appellate District, Division One 
A158143 
 
Alameda County Superior Court 
JD02839802 
 
 
April 5, 2021 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, Groban, and Jenkins concurred. 
 
1 
In re A.R. 
S260928 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
When the juvenile court terminated M.B.’s parental rights 
to her minor child, M.B. promptly directed her court-appointed 
attorney to appeal.  The attorney mistakenly filed the notice of 
appeal four days late, however, and the Court of Appeal 
dismissed M.B.’s appeal as untimely.  The question presented is 
whether, as a result of her attorney’s mistake, M.B. has 
irrevocably lost her right to appeal the termination of her 
parental rights.  We conclude the answer is no.  By statute, every 
parent facing the termination of parental rights is entitled to the 
assistance of competent counsel (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 317, 
317.5, 366.26, subd. (f)(2)), as well as the right to appeal an 
adverse ruling (id., § 366.26, subd. (i)(1)).  When an attorney 
fails to file a timely appeal in accordance with a client’s 
instructions, the parent may seek relief based on the attorney’s 
failure to provide competent representation.  Because time is of 
the essence in matters affecting children’s long-term placement, 
whether relief is granted will depend on the parent’s promptness 
and diligence in pursuing the appeal. 
I. 
M.B. gave birth to A.R. in 2016.  At the time, M.B. herself 
was still a minor.  Less than a year later, the Alameda County 
Social Services Agency (Agency) filed a petition under Welfare 
and Institutions Code section 300 to have A.R. declared a 
dependent of the court.  The operative petition alleged that M.B. 
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
2 
had mental health concerns, such as depression, that impeded 
her ability to care for her child.  The juvenile court sustained the 
petition.  Although the court attempted to place A.R. with M.B., 
M.B. later raised concerns about her ability to care for A.R. 
while she finished high school.  The court ordered A.R. placed in 
a foster home while M.B. participated in family reunification 
services.  
Several months later, the court entered an order 
terminating reunification services.  The court noted that it was 
encouraged by the mother’s recent progress, however, and 
expressed openness to M.B. bringing a future petition under 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 (section 388) to 
modify the order.  M.B.’s court-appointed attorney prepared a 
record documenting M.B.’s progress as a parent and her bond 
with A.R.  The court later found M.B. had made a prima facie 
case that circumstances had changed so as to warrant 
modification and accordingly granted her an evidentiary 
hearing.   
Two years after A.R. was first declared a dependent, the 
juvenile court scheduled a hearing to determine whether to 
grant M.B.’s section 388 modification petition or, in the 
alternative, whether to terminate M.B.’s parental rights.  (See 
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26 (section 366.26).)  Although M.B. 
had planned to testify in support of her section 388 petition, on 
the day of the hearing she had a health emergency that landed 
her in the emergency room and was unable to attend.  Because 
her original court-appointed attorney was in the process of 
quitting her job at the time, a new attorney participated in the 
hearing on M.B.’s behalf.  
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
3 
At the hearing, the court rejected M.B.’s section 388 
modification petition, having excluded M.B.’s supporting 
evidence on technical grounds.  The court then turned to the 
question of whether to permanently sever M.B.’s parental 
rights.  M.B.’s attorney urged the court instead to apply the 
beneficial parental relationship exception to the termination of 
parental rights.  (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)  The court rejected 
that argument and entered an order terminating M.B.’s 
parental rights.   
Five days after the juvenile court ruled against her, M.B. 
asked her new court-appointed counsel to file an appeal.  Her 
attorney, however, forgot about the request until it was too late:  
The attorney did not file a notice of appeal on her client’s behalf 
until four days after the 60-day filing deadline had passed.  
The Court of Appeal initially docketed M.B.’s untimely 
appeal.  Some months later, M.B. timely filed her opening brief 
on the merits along with an application for relief from default.  
In the application, M.B. acknowledged her counsel’s error in 
filing the notice of appeal and asked the court to consider the 
notice of appeal to have been timely filed.  The Court of Appeal 
denied the application and dismissed M.B.’s appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction.  M.B. then filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in the Court of Appeal, alleging that her attorney’s 
substandard performance had denied her the right to pursue an 
appeal.  The court also denied M.B.’s habeas corpus petition, 
albeit without prejudice to refiling it in the trial court.   
We granted review, directing the parties to address two 
issues:  (1) whether a parent has the right to challenge her 
counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal from an order 
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
terminating her parental rights, and (2) if she has such a right, 
the proper procedures for raising such a claim. 
II. 
A. 
The juvenile dependency law is designed “to provide 
maximum safety and protection for children who are currently 
being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being 
neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, 
protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children 
who are at risk of that harm.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300.2.)  The 
law authorizes a court to declare a child facing abuse or neglect 
to be a dependent of the court.  (Id., § 300.)  Once the child has 
been declared a dependent, “the statutory scheme is designed to 
allow retention of parental rights to the greatest degree 
consistent with the child’s safety and welfare, and to return full 
custody and control to the parents or guardians if, and as soon 
as, the circumstances warrant.”  (In re Ethan C. (2012) 54 
Cal.4th 610, 625.)  “[T]he general rule is that when a dependent 
child is removed from the parent’s or guardian’s physical 
custody, child welfare services, including family reunification 
services, must be offered.”  (Id. at p. 626.)  The court then 
conducts periodic check-ins to determine whether the child may 
safely be returned to the parent or guardian.  (Ibid.)  If the 
answer is no, the court may decide to terminate parental rights 
and order that the child be placed for adoption.  (Ibid.; see 
§ 366.26, subds. (b)(1), (c)(1); see generally Ethan C., at pp. 623–
626; Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 247–
249.) 
While terminating parental rights is sometimes necessary 
to secure the child’s long-term welfare, it is a uniquely serious 
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
5 
step — one widely recognized as ranking “among the most 
severe forms of state action.”  (M. L. B. v. S. L. J. (1996) 519 U.S. 
102, 128.)  To guard against the risk that parental rights will be 
terminated in error, the Legislature has enacted several 
significant procedural protections.  (In re James F. (2008) 42 
Cal.4th 901, 904.)  Two of those protections are central to the 
issue we confront in this case. 
The first protection is the right to counsel.  Depending on 
the circumstances of the case, constitutional due process 
sometimes demands the appointment of counsel for a parent 
facing the termination of rights.  (Lassiter v. Department of 
Social Services (1981) 452 U.S. 18, 32; In re Sade C. (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 952, 984.)  But even when court-appointed counsel may 
not be constitutionally required, California statutory law has 
long required the appointment of counsel in connection with 
parental rights termination proceedings.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§§ 317 (section 317), 317.5 (section 317.5), 366.26, subd. (f)(2).)  
The right dates back to 1965, when the Legislature granted 
indigent parents the right to court-appointed counsel in 
termination hearings.  (Civ. Code, former § 237.5, added by 
Stats. 1965, ch. 1530, § 3, p. 3624, repealed by Stats. 1992, 
ch. 162, § 2, p. 464.)  Two decades later, the Legislature 
expanded that guarantee to any dependency proceeding in 
which out-of-home placement is at stake.  (§ 317, subd. (b), 
added by Stats. 1987, ch. 1485, § 21, p. 5613.)  Finally, in 1994, 
the Legislature added a provision specifying, in unusually 
explicit terms, that “[a]ll parties who are represented by counsel 
at dependency proceedings” are “entitled to competent counsel.”  
(§ 317.5, subd. (a), added by Stats. 1994, ch. 1073, § 1, p. 6425, 
italics added.)  The amendment makes clear that under 
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
6 
California law, every parent facing termination of parental 
rights is entitled to competent representation. 
The second procedural protection is the right of appeal.  
Parents whose parental rights have been terminated are 
entitled to appeal the order (§ 366.26, subd. (i)(1); see In re 
Matthew C. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 386, 393), and no posttermination 
petition for adoption may be granted before “the appellate rights 
of the natural parents have been exhausted” (§ 366.26, subd. (j)).  
After the parent’s appellate rights have been exhausted, 
however, the juvenile court’s termination order becomes 
“conclusive and binding,” and may not be set aside, changed, or 
modified.  (Id., subd. (i)(1).) 
The issue in this case concerns what happens when denial 
of the first protection — the right to competent counsel — 
threatens the second protection, the right of appeal.  Ordinarily, 
the first step in pursuing an appeal is to file a timely notice of 
appeal — which, under current rules of court, means filing 
within 60 days of the challenged order.  (Cal. Rules of Court, 
rule 8.406(a)(1).)  This is a jurisdictional deadline, meaning that 
courts lack the power to extend it, regardless of whether failure 
to meet the deadline was “wilful [sic] or inadvertent,” 
“reasonable or unreasonable,” or rooted in “good faith or not.”  
(Estate of Hanley (1943) 23 Cal.2d 120, 122 (Hanley); see Cal. 
Rules of Court, rules 8.60(d), 8.104(b).)  Here, M.B. and her 
appointed attorney both attest that M.B. failed to file a timely 
notice of appeal solely because her attorney failed to 
competently discharge that responsibility.  M.B. argues that the 
appropriate remedy for the denial of her statutory entitlement 
to competent representation is relief from default, which would 
allow her to pursue her appeal notwithstanding her attorney’s 
error.  With certain caveats described below, we agree. 
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
7 
B. 
As a general rule, a parent who has not received 
competent representation in juvenile dependency proceedings is 
entitled to seek relief based on denial of the statutory right.  A 
long line of appellate authority, beginning with In re Kristin H. 
(1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635 (Kristin H.), so holds; we now affirm 
the correctness of these decisions.   
In Kristin H., the Court of Appeal considered a habeas 
corpus petition filed by mother who claimed her attorney 
performed incompetently by failing to investigate and introduce 
favorable evidence at the dispositional stage of juvenile 
dependency proceedings.  (Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1658.)1  Before Kristin H., appellate courts had agreed that 
the right to counsel rooted in constitutional due process carried 
with it a right to the effective assistance of counsel.  (Kristin H. 
 
1 
Despite its familiar application in cases concerning official 
confinement, California has long recognized habeas as a vehicle 
for challenging child custody decisions.  As early as 1892, this 
court entertained a habeas petition by a mother seeking custody 
of her child from the child’s uncle, on the ground that the 
superior court order appointing the uncle guardian was void for 
lack of jurisdiction.  (In re Gates (1892) 95 Cal. 461–462.)  The 
logic underlying the habeas petition was that the child had been 
“unlawfully restrained of her liberty” (id. at p. 461) by the 
guardian; we ruled that since the superior court had lacked 
jurisdiction, the child was to be “freed from all illegal restraint” 
(id. at p. 462) and allowed to choose where to live.  Since then, 
this court has recognized that habeas corpus may be used to 
“assert custody rights” as well as to “secure relief from 
confinement resulting from criminal prosecution.”  (In re 
Richard M. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 783, 790; see id. at pp. 789–791; 
accord, Adoption of Alexander S. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 857, 866–867; 
In re Cody R. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 381, 392–393 [discussing 
the availability of habeas corpus in the dependency context].)  
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
at p. 1659, citing, inter alia, In re Christina P. (1985) 175 
Cal.App.3d 115, 129.)  But courts disagreed about whether the 
same was true of the statutory right to counsel secured by 
section 317.  (Kristin H., at p. 1660.)  Even before the 
Legislature amended the statute to provide an explicit 
guarantee of competent counsel, some courts analogized to 
ineffective assistance of counsel in the criminal context and 
“recognized claims based on violations of a statutory right to 
counsel.”  (Ibid.)  Some courts, however, refused to recognize 
claims based on violations of the statutory right to competent 
counsel, reasoning that dependency cases are civil proceedings 
in which “the paramount concern is the child’s welfare, and in 
particular the child’s interest in the finality of the proceedings.”  
(Id. at p. 1664; see also id. at p. 1660, citing, inter alia, In re 
Michael S. (1981) 127 Cal.App.3d 348, 363–364.)  In these 
courts’ view, “allowing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
will cause delay and consequently does not serve the best 
interests of the child.”  (Kristin H., at p. 1660; see also id. at 
pp. 1665–1667 [cataloguing additional cases].) 
Kristin H. concluded the Legislature effectively rejected 
the latter approach in 1994 when it added the provision 
guaranteeing representation by “competent counsel.”  (§ 317.5, 
subd. (a), italics added.)  The court considered the wording 
choice “particularly meaningful, as California case law defining 
the right to effective assistance of counsel uses this word in the 
test for determining adequacy of counsel” in adjudicating claims 
of ineffective assistance.  (Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1662.)  It then noted that the legislative history of the 
provision, too, supported the conclusion that “the statutory right 
to competent counsel carries with it the right to judicial review.”  
(Id. at p. 1663.)  In particular, the court highlighted portions of 
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
9 
the legislative history indicating that the 1994 revisions were 
intended to address the “ ‘problem of a lack of any meaningful 
process’ ” whereby parties in dependency proceedings could 
“ ‘complain about their appointed counsel,’ ” and analogizing the 
statutory right to counsel to the guarantees that would be 
afforded a criminal defendant.  (Ibid., quoting Assem. Com. on 
Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 783 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended Apr. 13, 1994, p. 2.)  In sum, the Kristin H. court saw 
“nothing vague or ambiguous about th[e] directive” to provide 
competent representation:  Because the Legislature could not 
have intended to create a “ ‘hollow right,’ ” the statutory right to 
competent representation “must include the right to seek review 
of claims of incompetence of counsel.”  (Kristin H., at pp. 1660, 
1662.)   
The Kristin H. court acknowledged prior courts’ concerns 
that claims of incompetent representation would delay the 
finality of dependency proceedings.  The court observed, 
however, that the child’s interest in finality is not the only value 
to consider; the child also has an important interest in ensuring 
that her relationship with a parent is not erroneously severed 
because of the incompetence of the parent’s lawyer.  (Kristin H., 
supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1664.)  The court also explained that 
even if finality interests do not foreclose relief entirely, they do 
require that parents act promptly in raising their claims.  The 
court cautioned that “untimeliness may in many cases preclude 
review of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,” since 
“[n]owhere is timeliness more important than in a dependency 
proceeding where a delay of months may seem like ‘forever’ to a 
young child.”  (Id. at p. 1667.)  Applying these principles to the 
case before it, the Kristin H. court permitted the mother to 
proceed with her habeas petition challenging her attorney’s 
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
10 
juvenile court performance.  (Id. at p. 1642.)  Since Kristin H., 
the Courts of Appeal have uniformly agreed that parents may 
seek relief for incompetent representation in juvenile court 
proceedings.  (See, e.g., In re Paul W. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 37, 
52–54; In re Darlice C. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 459, 465–466; In 
re O. S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1406 & fn. 2; In re Carrie 
M. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 530, 533–534.)  Neither the Agency 
nor A.R. disputes the point.  We, too, agree that a parent may 
seek relief for deprivation of the statutory right to competent 
representation secured by sections 317 and 317.5. 
C. 
The central point of dispute between the parties concerns 
whether the right to seek relief for incompetent representation 
lapses with the jurisdictional deadline for filing a notice of 
appeal from the parental rights termination order — even when 
counsel’s incompetence is the very reason no filing has been 
made by that deadline.  The Agency and A.R. contend that, no 
matter the reasons for the delayed filing, the passage of the 
deadline marks the point at which the child’s interest in 
avoiding 
unnecessary 
delay 
definitively 
overcomes 
any 
countervailing interests the parent may have. 
We emphatically agree that dependent children have a 
critical interest in avoiding unnecessary delays to their long-
term placement.  (See, e.g., In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at 
p. 993 [describing the “pointed and concrete harm” a child may 
suffer from protracted custody proceedings]; Lehman v. 
Lycoming County Children’s Services (1982) 458 U.S. 502, 512 
(Lehman) [referencing the “exceptional need for finality in child-
custody disputes”].)  But it does not follow that parents must 
automatically lose the ability to seek redress for incompetent 
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
representation as soon as the time for filing the notice of appeal 
has passed.  Certainly nothing in the statute says so.  While the 
statute makes an order terminating parental rights “conclusive 
and binding,” it does so expressly subject to the parent’s right of 
appeal.  (§ 366.26, subd. (i)(1) [“nothing in this section shall be 
construed to limit the right to appeal the [termination] order”].)  
And to underscore the point, the statute further provides that 
the child may not be adopted until “the appellate rights of the 
natural parents have been exhausted.”  (Id., subd. (j).)  The 
statute does not purport to deny appellate rights to a parent 
whose appeal has been untimely filed because of counsel’s 
mistakes. 
And while finality is a critically important interest in 
termination proceedings, it is not the only interest at stake.  
Children and parents alike also have an interest in ensuring 
that the parent-child relationship is not erroneously abridged.  
(Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1664.)  The Legislature 
sought to protect this interest in accuracy by affording parents 
a right to competent counsel, as well as a right of appellate 
review.  (§§ 317, 317.5, 366.26, subd. (i).)  When parents raise a 
timely claim that the deprivation of the first right has worked 
to undermine the other, the logical remedy is to afford them the 
appeal to which they are statutorily entitled, and thus to ensure 
the decision to terminate parental rights has been made 
accurately before it is made final. 
The Agency and A.R. contend that any effort to revive an 
appeal that occurs in the absence of a timely notice is prohibited 
as a collateral attack on the juvenile court’s termination order.  
They rely for this argument primarily on Adoption of Alexander 
S., supra, 44 Cal.3d 857 (Alexander S.).  In Alexander S., a birth 
mother initially consented to adoption, but later changed her 
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
mind and petitioned to withdraw the consent.  The petition was 
denied, and she did not appeal.  Some months later, the birth 
mother appealed a different order and sought in her appellate 
brief to challenge the denial of her petition to withdraw consent 
as well.  The Court of Appeal acknowledged the time for 
appealing the latter order had already lapsed, but attempted to 
resuscitate the claim by treating the appeal as a petition for writ 
of habeas corpus based on the incompetent performance of the 
counsel who advised her to sign the consent to adoption.  We 
reversed, explaining:  “Out of concern for the welfare of children 
in adoption actions, we hold that habeas corpus may not be used 
to collaterally attack a final nonmodifiable judgment in an 
adoption-related action where the trial court had jurisdiction to 
render the final judgment.”  (Alexander S., at pp. 867–868.) 
Alexander S. relied in turn on Ex parte Miller (1895) 109 
Cal. 643.  In that case, parents who had failed to file a timely 
appeal of an order appointing a third party as the guardian of 
their child later filed a habeas petition seeking to collaterally 
attack the final appointment order on its merits.  This court 
rejected the petition, explaining that habeas corpus would lie 
only to attack the jurisdiction of the court that entered the 
guardianship order, not to establish a right to the custody of the 
child as against her appointed guardian.  (Miller, at pp. 646–
647.)  Alexander S. affirmed Miller’s holding, concluding that 
“sound public policy offers continued justification” for a rule that 
avoids “[p]rotracted litigation over the custody of a child.”  
(Alexander S., supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 868.) 
Neither Alexander S. nor Miller speaks to the situation we 
confront here.  Each of those cases concerned efforts to 
repackage untimely appeals from certain final custody-related 
orders as requests for habeas relief, based on alleged defects 
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
13 
that could have been fully addressed on appeal.  In both cases, 
those efforts were barred by the settled rule that “ ‘habeas 
corpus cannot serve as a substitute for an appeal . . . .’ ”  
(Alexander S., supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 865, quoting In re Dixon 
(1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759.)  In neither case did the court consider 
a habeas petition raising a claim of incompetent representation 
that resulted in the loss of any opportunity to appeal.  Indeed, 
Alexander S. made this point explicitly, noting that the birth 
mother in that case did not “assert any excuse for her failure to 
file a timely notice of appeal” from the order denying her 
withdrawal of consent.  (Alexander S., at p. 865; accord, id. at 
p. 863.)  The rule that habeas cannot substitute for an appeal 
has limited relevance where, as here, the only issue is whether 
the litigant will be permitted the opportunity to pursue her 
appeal in the first place. 
Notwithstanding the differences between Alexander S., 
Miller, and this case, we reaffirm those cases’ emphasis on the 
importance of avoiding protracted litigation over matters 
concerning a child’s long-term placement.  (Alexander S., supra, 
44 Cal.3d at p. 868.)  As we will explain further below, this policy 
requires courts to consider whether parents have acted 
promptly and diligently in pursuing their rights before granting 
relief.  But the policy does not erect an absolute bar to relief for 
the parent whose attorney mistakenly files the notice of appeal 
after the deadline or fails to file it entirely despite a request from 
the parent to do so, thereby denying the parent the benefit of 
important statutory protections against erroneous decisions.  In 
many cases the risk of delay is minimal when compared to the 
ordinary timing of an appeal:  Here, for example, M.B.’s notice 
of appeal was filed just four days late; M.B. promptly attempted 
to remedy the error, and filed her appellate brief on time.  To 
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
14 
categorically cut off any possibility of appeal in such case would 
not serve any meaningful interest in avoiding unnecessary 
delay.  It would instead serve only to penalize the parent for 
relying on the putatively “competent counsel” to which she is 
statutorily entitled.  (§ 317.5, subd. (a).)2 
D. 
Having concluded that parents may raise an incompetent 
representation claim based on the untimely filing of a notice of 
appeal, we now address several questions about the contours of 
such claims and the procedures for raising them. 
The first question concerns the substantive showing 
necessary to establish a prima facie case for relief.  In general, 
“[a] parent seeking review of a claimed violation of  section 317.5 
must show a violation of the statute, i.e., that counsel failed to 
act in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent 
attorneys practicing in the field of juvenile dependency law.”  
(Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1667–1668.)  As the 
high court has observed, “a lawyer who disregards specific 
instructions from [his or her client] to file a notice of appeal acts 
in a manner that is professionally unreasonable.”  (Roe v. Flores-
Ortega (2000) 528 U.S. 470, 477 (Flores-Ortega).)  A parent 
therefore generally will satisfy this requirement by showing 
 
2 
We disapprove the following cases to the extent they are 
inconsistent with the conclusion that parents in M.B.’s situation 
may be entitled to relief from default:  In re J.A. (2019) 43 
Cal.App.5th 49, 56; In re Z.S. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 754, 769–
770; In re Ryan R. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 595, 598; In re Alyssa 
H. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1254; In re Ricky H. (1992) 10 
Cal.App.4th 552, 560; In re Issac J. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 525, 
533; In re A.M. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 319, 322.   
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
15 
that counsel was directed to file an appeal on behalf of a parent 
but failed to do so in a timely manner.3 
But a showing of incompetence is usually only the first 
step in making out a claim of error based on the ineffective 
assistance of counsel; the represented party ordinarily must also 
establish that the attorney’s unprofessional performance was 
prejudicial.  (Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1668.)  
Where, as here, the claim of error is based on violation of a state 
statute, the test for prejudice is generally whether “it is 
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [her] would 
have been reached in the absence of the error.”  (People v. 
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)   
The parties disagree about the showing necessary to 
satisfy this prong of the analysis.  The Agency contends that in 
a case concerning a late-filed notice of appeal, a parent must 
demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability she would 
have prevailed on appeal if the notice of appeal had been timely 
filed.  M.B. counters that no such showing should be required; it 
is enough for the parent to show that she directed her attorney 
to appeal and the attorney failed to file a timely notice.  
We reject the Agency’s contention that Watson imposes a 
likelihood-of-success condition on the right to pursue an appeal 
in these circumstances.  For a parent whose attorney has 
incompetently failed to file a timely appeal, the relevant injury 
is not denial of any specific substantive appellate victory; it is 
the opportunity to appeal at all.  Confronting a similar question 
in the context of criminal appeals, the United States Supreme 
 
3  
We do not here address a situation in which the lawyer 
concludes that there are no arguable grounds for appeal.  (See 
In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 982.) 
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
16 
Court has held that when attorney incompetence deprives a 
criminal defendant of the right to pursue an appeal, the 
defendant need not show “some likelihood of success on appeal” 
in order to secure relief.  (Rodriquez v. United States (1969) 395 
U.S. 327, 330.)  So long as there are “substantial reasons to 
believe [a losing party] would have appealed” were it not for 
attorney incompetence, a party seeking to revive the appeal can 
demonstrate prejudice.  (Flores-Ortega, supra, 528 U.S. at 
p. 486; see also Garza v. Idaho (2019) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [139 S.Ct. 
738, 742] [“[W]hen an attorney’s deficient performance costs a 
defendant an appeal that the defendant would have otherwise 
pursued, prejudice to the defendant should be presumed.”].)  We 
take a similar approach here:  To ascertain prejudice, we focus 
on whether the parent would have taken a timely appeal, 
without requiring the parent to shoulder the further burden of 
demonstrating the appeal was likely to be successful. 
The final, and crucial, element of any successful claim to 
relief based on incompetent representation is the claimant’s 
promptness and diligence in pursuing an appeal.  These 
requirements are not unique to dependency proceedings.  In In 
re Benoit (1973) 10 Cal.3d 72 (Benoit), for example, this court 
held the so-called constructive filing doctrine offered a form of 
relief from default to prisoners whose attorneys failed to file 
timely notices of appeal from their criminal convictions.  We 
advised, however, that the availability of this relief would 
depend on the prisoner’s diligence in pursuing the appeal.  We 
cautioned that courts should not “indiscriminately permit” relief 
from default for a defendant who “has displayed no diligence in 
seeing that his attorney has discharged [his] responsibility.”  
(Id. at p. 89; see also In re Jordan (1992) 4 Cal.4th 116, 122 
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
17 
[discussing the appropriate test for assessing a prisoner’s 
diligence].)  
What we said in Benoit and Jordan applies with even 
greater force in the dependency context, where the costs of delay 
are particularly acute.  The purpose of the dependency law is to 
promote the well-being of children, ultimately by ensuring a safe 
and stable permanent home.  A parent who seeks to challenge a 
termination order therefore must act promptly to avoid 
jeopardizing the child’s long-term placement.  Here, the notice 
of appeal was filed just four days late, and M.B. promptly sought 
relief from default along with her timely filed brief on the merits, 
thus minimizing the risks of delay.  This is not to suggest that a 
four-day delay is the outer limit for promptness.  But, as the 
court advised in Kristin H., in many other cases the failure to 
promptly seek relief “may . . . preclude review of claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel,” since “[n]owhere is timeliness 
more important than in a dependency proceeding where a delay 
of months may seem like ‘forever’ to a young child.”  (Kristin H., 
supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1667.)     
We next address the proper procedures for raising a claim 
of incompetent representation based on counsel’s late filing of a 
notice of appeal.  We address two primary issues.  First, M.B. 
invites us to extend the constructive filing doctrine as 
announced and applied in Benoit, to the juvenile dependency 
context.  Second, M.B. asks us to hold, as some courts have done, 
that a constructive filing claim may be made by means of a 
streamlined motion procedure.  (See, e.g., People v. Zarazua 
(2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1054, 1062 (Zarazua).) 
As to M.B.’s first point, we see no reason to extend the 
constructive filing doctrine to this context.  That doctrine 
developed in the context of prison filings and has, historically, 
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
18 
been limited to cases involving incarcerated appellants who are 
unable to personally ensure the timely filing of court documents, 
and thus must rely on others, including prison officials and 
counsel.  (See Hollister Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. Rico (1975) 
15 Cal.3d 660, 669 (Hollister); see also Silverbrand v. County of 
Los Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106, 129 [describing the doctrine 
as a means of “ensur[ing]” that prisoners “are not denied access 
to the appellate courts by obstacles . . . other litigants readily 
could overcome”].)  For such litigants, we have explained, 
“diligent but futile efforts” to file a timely appeal may be treated 
as “in themselves tantamount to actual filing of a timely appeal” 
— letting a court construe the filing as timely, and in that way 
overcoming any jurisdictional barrier to appellate review.  
(Hollister, at p. 669.) 
Parents in M.B.’s position are entitled to seek relief on a 
different and independently sufficient basis:  Like other parents 
whose 
lawyers 
have 
made 
serious 
mistakes 
in 
the 
representation, they are entitled to seek a remedy for the 
violation of their statutory right to competent representation.  
(See, e.g., In re Jackson W. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 247, 261; In 
re Dennis H. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 94, 98; In re O. S., supra, 
102 Cal.App.4th at p. 1406 & fn. 2; In re Eileen A. (2000) 84 
Cal.App.4th 1248, 1259–1261, disapproved on another ground 
in In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413–414.)  Where, as here, 
a parent’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal is the result of 
counsel’s error, reinstating an otherwise-defaulted appeal is 
generally the only meaningful way to safeguard the statutory 
right to competent representation.   
Incompetent representation claims in dependency cases 
generally have been raised by means of a petition for habeas 
corpus, like the one filed in Kristin H.  (See, e.g., In re Carrie M., 
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
19 
supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 533–534; cf. In re Jackson W., 
supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 258 [observing that the “customary 
way” to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is 
through habeas corpus].)4  This is partly because habeas allows 
for consideration of matters outside the appellate record, 
including evaluation of counsel’s decisions and tactics, which is 
a necessary focus of many ineffective assistance claims.  (E.g., 
In re Darlice C., supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 463.)  But it is also 
because habeas carries with it broad authority to fashion 
appropriate relief for the claimed violation.  (E.g., People v. 
Booth (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1284, 1312.)  This authority includes 
the power to conduct such additional proceedings as may be 
appropriate 
to 
remedy 
the 
statutory 
or 
constitutional 
deprivations alleged, even where those proceedings would 
normally be barred by jurisdictional filing deadlines.  (In re 
Byrnes (1945) 26 Cal.2d 824, 827–828; see also, e.g., Flores-
Ortega, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 485 [addressing the circumstances 
under which a criminal defendant’s appellate rights can be 
reinstated on account of his or her attorney’s negligent failure 
to file a timely notice of appeal].)  Where the deprivation in 
question stems from a defaulted appeal, habeas offers an avenue 
for relief from default.5   
 
4  
Insofar as this opinion describes the practice for raising 
incompetent representation claims in dependency cases, it 
should not be read to cast any doubt on the practices courts have 
developed for handling constructive filing claims.  (See, e.g., 
Zarazua, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 1062.) 
5  
This remedy follows from the nature of the claim.  As noted 
above, we have long held that the time for filing a notice of 
appeal cannot be extended, even for reasons of equity.  “ ‘In the 
absence of statutory authorization, neither the trial nor 
 
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
20 
This brings us to M.B.’s second point.  Although M.B. 
acknowledges that habeas is the usual path for relief based on 
claims of incompetent representation in dependency cases, she 
raises practical concerns about following the same course in 
cases seeking to reinstate late-filed appeals.  As M.B. 
emphasizes, habeas typically requires compliance with the 
formal procedures set out in Penal Code sections 1473 through 
1508 (see Alexander S., supra, 44 Cal.3d 865), beginning with 
the filing of a verified petition for habeas corpus and including, 
as appropriate, formal responses and the holding of an 
evidentiary hearing (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 
744).  M.B. contends that use of these formal procedures will 
cause needless delay, a result all parties wish to avoid. 
As an initial matter, we do not agree that obtaining relief 
through formal habeas procedures necessarily “must be slow or 
 
appellate courts may extend or shorten the time for appeal 
[citation], even to relieve against mistake, inadvertence, 
accident, or misfortune [citations]. . . .  If it appears that the 
appeal was not taken within the 60-day period, the court has no 
discretion but must dismiss the appeal of its own motion even if 
no objection is made.’ ”  (Hollister, supra, 15 Cal.3d at pp. 666–
667, quoting Hanley, supra, 23 Cal.2d at p. 123; see also 
Maynard v. Brandon (2005) 36 Cal.4th 364, 372–373.)  But we 
have also made clear this jurisdictional bar is absolute only 
“ ‘[i]n the absence of statutory authorization’ ” to extend the time 
for filing.  (Id. at p. 373.)  In the case of a claim concerning 
deprivation of the statutory right to competent representation 
— collateral relief our courts have previously recognized is 
available to parents in the dependency context (see ante, pp. 7–
10 & fn. 1) — section 317.5 and the habeas corpus law provide 
the necessary authorization to override the interests in finality 
reflected by the jurisdictional rule, at least so long as the 
extension is of sufficiently short duration that it will not 
prejudice the interests of others with a stake in the dependency 
proceedings (see pp. 16–17, ante). 
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
21 
cumbersome.”  (People v. Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 744.)  In 
criminal-related habeas matters, we have noted that while 
courts must give the opposing party the opportunity to file a 
return following the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus or order 
to show cause, the opportunity may be waived, or, depending on 
the exigencies of the situation, may be required within “as little 
as 24 hours.”  (Ibid.)  Indeed, the Rules of Court vest courts with 
significant discretion to expedite and simplify proceedings.  
(See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.386(d)(1) [“Unless the court 
orders otherwise, within 30 days after the respondent files a 
return, the petitioner may serve and file a traverse.”].)   
That said, we agree with M.B. that strict adherence to the 
full Penal Code habeas procedures is neither necessary nor 
practical in the context of an application for relief from default 
based 
on 
an 
attorney’s 
late 
filing 
in 
a 
dependency 
case.6  Although the Legislature has recognized that the Penal 
Code provisions may apply outside the criminal context, those 
provisions were, for the most part, developed in — and in some 
cases are explicitly aimed at — the penal context and other cases 
involving official custody or restraint.  (See, e.g., Pen. Code, 
§ 1473, subd. (a) [authorizing habeas corpus relief for “[a] person 
unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty”]; id., § 1487 
[governing discharge of prisoners]; but see id., § 1507 
[describing procedures for a petition made “by or on behalf of 
any person other than a defendant in a criminal case”].)  Courts 
have appropriately found the Penal Code provisions controlling 
in their handling of habeas corpus petitions seeking relief based 
 
6  
We emphasize that we do not here address the procedures 
required to obtain habeas corpus relief in criminal matters or 
other contexts; our opinion is strictly limited to the dependency 
context.  
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
22 
on incompetent representation in dependency proceedings.  
(See, e.g., Alexander S., supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 865.)  But they 
have also recognized that the rules must in some instances be 
adapted to fit the dependency context.  (In re Paul W., supra, 
151 Cal.App.4th at p. 53 [“ ‘Because the rules on habeas corpus 
petitions evolved in the context of prisoners asserting unlawful 
confinement or conditions of confinement, they do not fit the 
dependency context well.’ ”]; accord, id. at p. 67 (conc. opn. of 
Bamattre-Manoukian, 
Acting P. J.) [observing that the 
standard framework for habeas does not “provide an ideal model 
for a habeas proceeding raising ineffective assistance of counsel 
in a dependency setting”].) 
It follows that courts can and should handle claims 
seeking to revive appeals from the termination of parental 
rights in a manner that is sensitive to both the importance of 
speed and finality in this context and the precise nature of the 
claim at hand.  As with all dependency-related proceedings, the 
court has an obligation to ensure the matter is resolved as 
expediently as possible, to avoid delays that may destabilize a 
child’s long-term placement.  (Cf. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395, 
subd. 
(a)(1) 
[entitling 
dependency 
appeals 
to 
priority 
consideration].)  Courts should also recognize that this type of 
claim is in many ways unique, even among incompetent 
representation claims raised in dependency cases.  To evaluate 
claims like M.B.’s does not demand any significant evidentiary 
inquiry into counsel’s strategic judgment or litigation tactics; it 
instead requires a more straightforward inquiry into the nature 
of the parent’s instructions to her attorney and her promptness 
and diligence in pursuing her appellate rights.    
In determining the appropriate procedures, the court must 
give all parties notice and an opportunity to be heard, ensuring 
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
23 
adequate exploration of the issues relevant to the granting of 
relief.  (Alexander S., supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 865.)  But in the 
absence of contrary directives, a court has substantial discretion 
to determine the specific procedures to be employed in handling 
applications for relief from default based on an attorney’s late 
filing.  (See Weiss v. People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (2020) 
9 Cal.5th 840, 857 [“[W]hen no procedure is specified by statute 
or rule, judges may fashion nonstatutory procedures suitable to 
the specific cases before them,” though they “do not have the 
authority to adopt procedures or policies that conflict with 
statutory law or the Rules of Court.”].)  We hasten to add, 
however, that the Legislature may always choose to provide 
more specific guidance about the procedures to be followed, and 
the Judicial Council is likewise empowered to adopt statewide 
rules consistent with statutory procedures.  (In re Cook (2019) 
7 Cal.5th 439, 459; Weiss, at p. 857.) 
There remains a final procedural question:  To which court 
should the application for relief be addressed?  We conclude that 
as a general matter, an application seeking to pursue or perfect 
an appeal is properly directed to the Court of Appeal rather than 
the superior court, since, after all, “the court in which the appeal 
is pending is the court which can relieve from default.”  (In re 
Gonsalves (1957) 48 Cal.2d 638, 646; see id. at pp. 641–642 
[directing the Court of Appeal to entertain the defendant’s 
petition for habeas corpus seeking relief from default on his 
appeal]; accord, Benoit, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 75, 89; People v. 
Lyons (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1363 [observing that “since 
1972, only the appellate court can grant ‘Benoit’ relief”].)  We see 
no reason why relief from default in a juvenile dependency 
appeal should operate differently. 
In re A.R. 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
24 
III. 
In this case, the Court of Appeal dismissed M.B.’s appeal 
as untimely, notwithstanding her efforts to demonstrate that 
the untimeliness of her notice of appeal was the result of 
incompetent performance by her attorney.  We today hold that 
when their court-appointed attorneys have failed to timely file a 
notice of appeal of an order terminating parental rights, parents 
whose rights have been terminated may seek relief based on the 
denial of the statutory right to the assistance of competent 
counsel.  (§§ 317, 317.5.)  To succeed in such a claim, parents 
must show that they would have filed a timely appeal absent 
attorney error and that they diligently sought relief from default 
within a reasonable time frame, considering the child’s 
“ ‘unusually strong’ ” interest in finality.  (Alexander S., supra, 
44 Cal.3d at p. 868, quoting Lehman, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 513.)   
Whether M.B. has made the required showing is a matter 
for the Court of Appeal to determine in the first instance.  We  
thus reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand 
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J.  
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  In re A.R.   
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP order filed 1/21/20 – 1st 
Dist., Div. 1 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S260928 
Date Filed:  April 5, 2021 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Alameda  
Judge:  Charles A. Smiley III    
 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Louise E. Collari, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Michael J. Levy and Catherine Blakemore for California Commission 
on Access to Justice as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Raymond A. Cardozo, Dennis A. Fischer, Scott M. Reddie, Robin 
Meadow, Robert Gerstein, Rex S.  Heinke, Kirk Jenkins, R. Rothschild, 
Robin B. Johansen; Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, Michael G. 
Colantuono, Pamela Graham; Law Offices of Robert S. Gerstein and 
Robert S. Gerstein for Academy of Appellate Lawyers as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
Stephanie G. Miller; Deanna F. Lamb; and Linda M Fabian for 
California Appellate Projects Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant 
and Appellant. 
 
Donna Ziegler, County Counsel, and Samantha N. Stonework-Hand, 
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.  
 
Anna L. Stuart, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Minor 
A.R.   
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Louise E. Collari 
First District Appellate Project 
475 14th St., Suite 650 
Oakland, CA 94612 
(415) 495-3119 
 
Samantha N. Stonework-Hand 
Deputy County Counsel 
1221 Oak St., Suite 450 
Oakland, CA 94612 
(510) 272-6718 
 
Anna L. Stuart 
Sixth District Appellate Program 
95 S. Market St., Suite 570 
San Jose, CA 95113 
(408) 241-6171