Title: United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Hormel Foods Corp.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2014AP001880
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: March 1, 2016

2016 WI 13 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP1880 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 
1473, Dennis  
A. Warne, Charles R. Seeley and Pamela Collins, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Hormel Foods Corporation, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 1, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 5, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Rock 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael R. Fitzpatrick 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCUR & DISSENT: 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., PROSSER, J., concur and 
dissent. (Opinion Filed) 
 
DISSENTED: 
Gableman, Ziegler, J.J., dissent. (Opinion 
Filed) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: R.G. Bradley, J., did not participate.     
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs by Thomas P. 
Krukowski and Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Thomas P. Krukowski. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents, there was a brief by Mark 
A. Sweet and Sweet and Associates, LLC, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Mark A. Sweet. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 13
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP1880 
(L.C. No. 
2010CV2595) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 
1473, Dennis A. Warne, Charles R. Seeley and 
Pamela Collins, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Hormel Foods Corporation, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 1, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Circuit Court for 
Rock County, Michael R. Fitzpatrick, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   This is an appeal from a 
judgment and order of the circuit court for Rock County, Michael 
R. Fitzpatrick, Judge, in favor of United Food & Commercial 
Workers Union, Local 1473 (and various individuals1), the 
                                                 
1 Dennis A. Warne, Charles R. Seeley, and Pamela Collins 
join as plaintiffs.  We refer only to the Union as the plaintiff 
for simplicity. 
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
2 
 
plaintiffs, against Hormel Foods Corporation, the defendant.  
The court of appeals certified the appeal to this court pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2013-14).2   
¶2 
This is a "donning and doffing" wage and hour case.  
Employees 
seek 
compensation 
for 
time 
spent 
putting 
on 
("donning") and taking off ("doffing") company-required clothing 
and equipment before and after shifts at Hormel's canning plant 
located in Beloit, Wisconsin.     
¶3 
The Union filed a class action on behalf of a class of 
current and former employees in Hormel's plant, alleging that 
Hormel violated Wisconsin wage and hour laws by failing to pay 
the employees for time spent at the plant putting on and taking 
off the required clothing and equipment.  Because the time spent 
putting on and taking off the required clothing and equipment is 
not included in the employees' compensation, the Union asserts 
that the employees are working more than 40 hours per week 
without being paid overtime.    
¶4 
The certification presents two questions: 
(1) Is the donning and doffing of the company-
required clothing and equipment compensable work 
time 
or 
non-compensable 
preliminary 
and 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
3 
 
postliminary activities under Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 272.12(2)(e) (Feb. 2009)3; and  
(2) Even if the time spent donning and doffing is 
otherwise compensable work time, is this time 
non-compensable under the doctrine of de minimis 
non curat lex?  
¶5 
After a bench trial, the circuit court issued a 
comprehensive decision holding in favor of the Union and 
requiring Hormel to compensate its employees for time spent 
donning and doffing the required clothing and equipment at the 
plant at the beginning and end of the day and during unpaid meal 
periods (for the one percent of employees who left the plant 
during their meal periods).  The circuit court further held, 
"Hormel has failed to carry its burden to show the applicability 
of the de minimis doctrine, and, therefore, that doctrine is not 
controlling (assuming it exists at all in Wisconsin law)."   
¶6 
Based on these conclusions, the circuit court awarded 
the class monetary damages of $195,087.30 broken down as 
follows:  (1) $180,087.30 in unpaid wages for 5.7 minutes per 
day spent donning and doffing the required clothing and 
equipment; and (2) pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, 
$15,000 in damages for unpaid meal periods.  
¶7 
We conclude:  
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code are to the February 2009 register date unless otherwise 
noted. 
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
4 
 
(1) Wisconsin Admin. Code § DWD 272.12 requires Hormel 
to compensate its employees for the 5.7 minutes 
per day spent donning and doffing the clothing and 
equipment at the beginning and end of the day. 
Relying on the Tyson Foods case, Weissman v. Tyson 
Prepared Foods, Inc., 2013 WI App 109, 350 
Wis. 2d 380, 838 N.W.2d 502, as did the circuit 
court, we conclude, as did the circuit court, that 
the employees' donning and doffing clothing and 
equipment at the beginning and end of the day 
brought Hormel into compliance with federal food 
and safety regulations and was integral and 
indispensable to sanitation and safety in the 
employees' principal work activities, namely food 
production.4 
(2) The donning and doffing of clothing and equipment 
at the beginning and end of the day does not fall 
within the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex.  
The wages involved are not a "trifle" either for 
the employees or for Hormel. 
                                                 
4 The court granted review in the Tyson Foods case.  See 
Weissman v. Tyson Prepared Foods, Inc., 2013 WI App 109, 350 
Wis. 2d 380, 838 N.W.2d 502, review granted, 2014 WI 3, 352 
Wis. 2d 351, 842 N.W.2d 359.  The review was dismissed prior to 
argument or a decision by this court, however, when the parties 
settled the litigation.   
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
5 
 
¶8 
We also briefly address whether the time spent donning 
and doffing Hormel's required clothing and equipment during meal 
periods is considered compensable work time. 
¶9 
On appeal Hormel argues that the Tyson Foods case was 
wrongly decided and "puts state law at odds with federal 
authority, namely, with the U.S. Supreme Court's holding" in a 
recent decision, Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 135 
S. Ct. 513 (2014).  As a result, Hormel asks us to overturn 
Tyson Foods.  We conclude that the discussion in Tyson Foods 
relating to compensating its employees for time spent donning 
and doffing the required clothing and equipment at the plant at 
the beginning and end of the day does not contravene Integrity 
Staffing. 
I 
¶10 The parties stipulated to many facts, and the circuit 
court also made numerous findings of fact following a bench 
trial.  None of the circuit court's findings of fact are clearly 
erroneous.  Here are the relevant facts.  
¶11 The class consists of approximately 330 persons who 
are or were hourly employees of Hormel at the Beloit canning 
facility.  We will refer to the class members as "the 
employees." 
¶12 Hormel is a multi-national food company incorporated 
in Delaware and headquartered in Austin, Minnesota.  The Union 
agreed that Hormel is a fine employer with a quality record and 
a history of producing good, safe food for customers around the 
world. 
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
6 
 
¶13 Hormel's Beloit canning facility prepares, cooks, 
cans, and ships a variety of "shelf stable" products including 
Hormel Chili, Mary Kitchen Hash, and Chi-Chi's Salsa, primarily 
for sale to consumers in retail stores.  A "shelf stable" 
product 
can 
be 
stored 
almost 
indefinitely 
and 
without 
refrigeration.  
¶14 The Beloit canning facility operates like an assembly 
line.  Raw ingredients enter at one end of the facility and are 
stored in a cooler or dry storage.  Products (which may consist 
of meat and seasoning ingredients) are out in the open in about 
one-half of the plant.    
¶15 Employees grind and blanch the meat, and cook and can 
the product.  A sophisticated, high-temperature, heavy-pressure 
process is used to make the product shelf stable.  The product 
is moved to areas designated for pickup to ship to distribution 
centers or retailers. 
¶16 Regulations 
promulgated 
by 
the 
United 
States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), the United States Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), and the federal Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) govern Hormel's production 
facilities.  Products containing meat are regulated by the 
United States Department of Agriculture Food Safety Inspection 
Service.  Products not containing meat are regulated by the 
United States Food and Drug Administration.  The federal 
Occupational 
Safety 
and 
Health 
Administration 
regulates 
workplace safety.   
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
7 
 
¶17 Federal regulations require Hormel to meet standards 
of cleanliness, quality, and safety in its plant and products.  
For example, the federal regulations require that persons 
working with food protect against contamination of food by 
maintaining hygienic practices like washing hands and wearing 
clean outer garments.  While the federal regulations set forth 
performance standards, they generally do not require these 
standards be satisfied in any particular manner.  
¶18 Hormel has adopted Work Rules in an effort to meet 
performance 
standards, 
maintain 
sanitation, 
and 
protect 
employees and consumers.  The Work Rules require that employees 
wear certain clothing and equipment.  If employees do not wear 
the required clothing and equipment, the employees are subject 
to discipline, up to discharge.  
¶19 Specifically, Hormel's Work Rules require employees  
wear Hormel-provided hard hats, hearing protection, and eye 
protection.  All exposed head and facial hair must be covered by 
a hair net.  Employees are to wear clean and sanitary footwear 
at all times.5  Clothing is provided by Hormel and must be 
changed daily or more often (as good sanitation practices 
dictate) and shall not be worn outside the plant.  Hormel leases 
the clothes from Aramark, which picks up worn clothes, launders 
them, and drops off clean clothes. 
                                                 
5 The shoes must be kept at the facility and are called 
"captive shoes." 
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
8 
 
¶20 Hormel does not compensate employees for time spent 
putting on or taking off (donning and doffing) the required 
clothing and equipment at the beginning and end of the day.  
¶21 The parties stipulated that the median time for 
donning and doffing the required clothing and equipment at the 
beginning and end of the day, washing hands, and walking to and 
from the assigned work stations was 5.7 minutes per day, 28.5 
minutes per week, or approximately 24 hours per year.6  
¶22 The employees must "swipe in" between 1 and 29 minutes 
before the scheduled start of their shift.  The employees must 
have their clothes changed, be swiped in, and be at their 
                                                 
6 This stipulation includes not just the time spent donning 
and doffing the required clothing and equipment, but also time 
spent washing hands and walking to and from workstations.  
Nonetheless, under Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(1)(a)2., the 
"workday" is defined as "the period between 'the time on any 
particular workday at which such employee commences their 
principal 
activity 
or 
activities' 
and 
'the 
time 
on 
any 
particular workday at which they cease such principal activity 
or activities.'"   
Because we hold that donning and doffing the required 
clothing and equipment at the beginning and end of the day is 
integral and indispensable to the employees' principal work 
activity of food preparation, the donning and doffing is itself 
a principal work activity.  See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 
21, 37 (2005) ("[W]e hold that any activity that is 'integral 
and indispensable' to a 'principal activity' is itself a 
'principal activity . . . .'").  As a result, the time spent 
walking to or from workstations or washing hands occurs after 
the employees' "workday" begins and is thus compensable.  See 
IBP, 546 U.S. at 37 ("Moreover, during a continuous workday, any 
walking time that occurs after the beginning of the employee's 
first principal activity and before the end of the employee's 
last principal activity is . . . covered by the FLSA.").   
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
9 
 
workstations at their assigned start times or they will be 
considered tardy.  The employees are paid by Hormel beginning at 
the scheduled start of their shift, not at the time of swiping 
in.  
 
¶23 As a result, the employees are not paid for the time 
spent putting on their clothing and equipment before the 
scheduled start of their shift.  The employees are also not paid 
for a 30-minute meal period.  To leave the facility during the 
30-minute meal period, the employees must doff their clothing 
and equipment before leaving the facility and don their clothing 
and equipment before returning to work.   
¶24 Upon completion of the assigned duties for the day and 
after being released from work, the employees must "swipe out" 
and change back into their street clothes.  
¶25 The employees are paid until they officially "swipe 
out."  Thereafter, the employees must change from their required 
clothing and equipment into their street clothes.  As a result, 
the employees are not paid for the time spent taking off their 
clothing and equipment after they swipe out. 
¶26 In sum, the paid "workday" for employees at Hormel is 
measured from the scheduled commencement of the shift to the 
swipe out at the electronic clock after release by the 
supervisor less 30 minutes for the employees' meal period. 
¶27 The circuit court found, on the great weight of the 
credible evidence, that putting on and taking off the clothing 
and equipment required by Hormel at the beginning and end of the 
day is integral and indispensable to the performance of the 
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
10 
 
employees' principal activities.  According to the circuit 
court, a close connection exists between the donning and 
doffing; compliance with the federal regulations of the United 
States 
Department 
of 
Agriculture, 
the 
Food 
and 
Drug 
Administration, 
and 
Occupational 
Safety 
and 
Health 
Administration; 
and 
the 
employees' 
principal 
activities, 
producing canned food.    
II 
¶28 The standard of review applicable to the instant case 
is oft stated and is as follows:  
¶29 This court will not overturn factual findings of the 
circuit court unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  
Royster-Clark, Inc. v. Olsen's Mill, Inc., 2006 WI 46, ¶11, 290 
Wis. 2d 264, 714 N.W.2d 530.  
¶30 The appeal revolves around the interpretation and 
application of Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12.  When interpreting 
administrative regulations the court uses the same rules of 
interpretation as it applies to statutes.  Wis. DOR v. Menasha 
Corp., 2008 WI 88, ¶45, 311 Wis. 2d 579, 754 N.W.2d 95.  
Interpretation and application of a regulation is ordinarily a 
question of law that this court determines independently of the 
circuit court or court of appeals, but benefiting from the 
analysis of the other courts.  State v. Brown, 2006 WI 131, ¶18, 
298 Wis. 2d 37, 725 N.W.2d 262.  
¶31 To determine the meaning of a regulation, we turn 
first to the text.  Each word shall be interpreted so as to give 
it meaning, and none shall be treated as superfluous.  See In re 
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
11 
 
Guardianship of James D.K., 2006 WI 68, ¶16, 291 Wis. 2d 333, 
718 N.W.2d 38.  The context of the regulation and case law 
interpreting the regulation are also considered.   
¶32 The parties dispute whether a circuit court's findings 
that an activity is integral and indispensable to the employees' 
principal activities is a question of fact or a question of law.  
If the question is one of fact, this court will not overturn the 
factual findings of the circuit court unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous.  Wis. DOR, 311 Wis. 2d 579, ¶45.  If the 
question is one of law, this court decides the question 
independently while benefiting from the analyses of the circuit 
court and court of appeals.  Wis. DOR, 311 Wis. 2d 579, ¶44; 
Brown, 298 Wis. 2d 37, ¶18.  
¶33 The Union raised the issue of the standard of review 
in its response brief, relying on a treatise that states, 
without citation, that "[w]hether an activity is characterized 
as . . . 'an integral and indispensable part' of the employee's 
principal activities (as distinguished from preliminary or 
postliminary to those activities), is a question of fact to be 
determined from all the circumstances."7 
¶34 In reply, Hormel argued that the facts are undisputed 
and the interpretation and application of the regulations to 
undisputed facts is a question of law that the court decides 
independently of the circuit court or court of appeals.   
                                                 
7 See Laurie E. Leader, Wages and Hours: Law & Practice 
§ 6.03[7], at 6-30 (2015).   
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
12 
 
¶35 We need not decide this issue.  Whether we examine the 
questions certified as ones of fact or law, we conclude the 
circuit court reached the correct decision.8 
III 
¶36 We examine first whether the time spent donning and 
doffing 
Hormel's 
required 
clothing 
and 
equipment 
at 
the 
beginning and end of the day is considered compensable work time 
or non-compensable preliminary and postliminary activities under 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(2)(e).    
¶37 The Department of Workforce Development regulations 
determining an employee's work hours are found in Wis. Admin. 
Code § DWD 272.12.   
                                                 
8 In the circuit court, the parties also disagreed about the 
burden of proof.  The Union argued that it would have the burden 
of proof to demonstrate that the acts at issue are "work," and 
the burden would then shift to Hormel to demonstrate that the 
acts are noncompensable.  Hormel disagreed with the Union's 
description of the burden of proof, although Hormel agreed that 
it had the burden of proof on the application of the de minimis 
doctrine.      
The circuit court stated that the (undefined) burdens of 
proof were on the respective parties by the greater weight of 
the credible evidence.  The circuit court viewed Hormel as 
having the burden of proof on the application of the de minimis 
doctrine.   
In this court, neither party raises the issue of the 
allocation of the burdens of proof.  As a result, we do not 
address the issue.  See State v. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶28 n.13, 
345 Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87 (stating "we do not usually 
address undeveloped arguments").  Regardless of the allocation 
of the burdens of proof, we conclude the circuit court's 
decision was correct.       
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
13 
 
¶38 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(1)(a)1. provides 
that an employee must be paid "for all time spent 'in physical 
or mental exertion . . . controlled or required by the employer 
and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the 
employer's business.'"9   
¶39 The parties agree that the donning and doffing are 
physical or mental exertion; are required by Hormel; and are 
pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of Hormel's 
business.  
¶40 Compensable time is defined in the regulations in 
terms of a "workday."  See Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(1)(a)2.  
Workday is defined as the "period between 'the time on any 
particular workday at which such employee commences their 
principal 
activity 
or 
activities' 
and 
'the 
time 
on 
any 
particular workday at which they cease such principal activity 
or activities.'"10 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DWD 272.12, titled "Interpretation 
of hours worked," states in (1)(a)1.:   
(1) Principles for determination of hours worked. (a) 
General requirements of sections. 1. Employees subject 
to the statutes must be paid for all time spent in 
"physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or 
not) controlled or required by the employer and 
pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of 
the employer's business." The workweek ordinarily 
includes "all time during which an employee is 
necessarily required to be on the employer's premises, 
on duty or at a prescribed work place." 
10 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(1)(a)2. states:  
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
14 
 
¶41 This regulation leads us to the meaning of the phrase 
"principal activity or activities" of the employee.  
¶42 "[P]rincipal activities" is defined in Wis. Admin. 
Code § DWD 272.12(2)(e) to include all activities that are "an 
integral part of a principal activity."  (Emphasis added.)  
"Among the activities included as an integral part of the 
principal activity are those closely related activities which 
are indispensable to its performance."11  In other words, an 
integral part of a principal activity includes activities that 
are closely related to the principal activity and indispensable 
to its performance.12      
¶43 The regulation gives three examples of "what is meant 
by an integral part of a principal activity" justifying 
compensation for an employee.  The third example relates to a 
chemical plant worker who dons and doffs clothing and equipment.  
This example seems closest to the facts of the instant case, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
'Workday,' in general, means the period between 'the 
time on any particular workday at which such employee 
commences their principal activity or activities' and 
'the time on any particular workday at which they 
cease such principal activity or activities.'   The 
'workday' may thus be longer than the employee's 
scheduled shift, hours, tour of duty, or time on the 
production line.  Also, its duration may vary from day 
to day depending upon when the employee commences or 
ceases their 'principal' activities (emphasis added).   
11 See Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(2)(e)c. (emphasis 
added).  
12 See Tyson Foods, 350 Wis. 2d 380, ¶26. 
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
15 
 
is therefore most helpful in deciding the instant case.  Here 
are the three examples in the regulations: 
a. In connection with the operation of a lathe, an 
employee will frequently, at the commencement of their 
workday, oil, grease, or clean their machine, or 
install a new cutting tool.  Such activities are an 
integral part of the principal activity, and are 
included within such term. 
b. In the case of a garment worker in a textile mill, 
who is required to report 30 minutes before other 
employees 
report 
to 
commence 
their 
principal 
activities, and who during such 30 minutes distributes 
clothing or parts of clothing at the workbenches of 
other employees and gets machines in readiness for 
operation by other employees, such activities are 
among the principal activities of such employee.  Such 
preparatory activities are compensable under this 
chapter. 
c. Among the activities included as an integral part 
of the principal activity are those closely related 
activities which are indispensable to its performance.  
If an employee in a chemical plant, for example, 
cannot perform their principal activities without 
putting on certain clothes, changing clothes on the 
employer's premises at the beginning and end of the 
workday would be an integral part of the employee's 
principal activity.  On the other hand, if changing 
clothes is merely a convenience to the employee and 
not directly related to their principal activities, it 
would 
be 
considered 
as 
a 
"preliminary" 
or 
"postliminary" activity rather than a principal part 
of the activity.  However, activities such as checking 
in and out and waiting in line to do so would not 
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
16 
 
ordinarily be regarded as integral parts of the 
principal activity or activities.13   
¶44 To determine whether the Hormel-required donning and 
doffing 
are 
merely 
incidental 
preparatory 
and 
concluding 
activities or are integral and indispensable to the employees' 
primary activities, we examine the third example, which we shall 
refer to as "the chemical plant example," and its interpretation 
and application by the court of appeals in Weissman v. Tyson 
Prepared Foods, Inc., 2013 WI App 109, 350 Wis. 2d 380, 838 
N.W.2d 502.  We shall refer to this case as the Tyson Foods 
case.  
¶45 The plaintiffs in Tyson Foods were employees of a meat 
processing plant in Jefferson County, Wisconsin, operated by 
Tyson Prepared Foods, Inc.  Tyson Foods required its employees 
to put on sanitary clothing and equipment before they began 
                                                 
13 This Wisconsin regulation is substantially similar to 
federal regulations addressing the phrase "principal activity or 
activities."  Compare Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(2)(e) with 
29 C.F.R. § 785.24 and 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(b)-(c).  Specifically, 
the federal regulations provide the exact same three examples 
that § DWD 272.12(2)(e) provides to clarify when an activity is 
an "integral part of a principal activity" for which employees 
must receive compensation.   
The history and purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
federal regulations, Wisconsin law and regulations, and case law 
interpreting the statutes and regulations are set forth at 
length in prior cases and need not be repeated here.  See, e.g., 
Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513, 516-
18 (2014); Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 875-76 
(2014); Tyson Foods, 350 Wis. 2d 380, passim.   
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
17 
 
their duties for each shift and to take off these items at the 
end of their shifts.14  
¶46 The clothing and equipment involved in Tyson Foods are 
very similar to those in the instant case: hair nets; beard 
nets; frocks (a coat with snaps in front); vinyl gloves; vinyl 
sleeves; lightweight hard hats; safety glasses; ear plugs; and 
"captive shoes."15 
¶47 In Tyson Foods, the court of appeals began its 
analysis 
with 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ DWD 
272.12(1)(a)1. 
and 
determined that Tyson Foods controlled the employees' clothing 
and equipment and that requiring employees to put on and take 
off the required clothing and equipment primarily benefited the 
employer.16  Although the court of appeals viewed this initial 
inquiry as necessary, the court of appeals did not consider it 
dispositive.17   
¶48 The Tyson Foods court of appeals then turned its 
inquiry to whether the period of contested compensation is 
included as a "principal activity," as distinguished from 
                                                 
14 Tyson Foods, 350 Wis. 2d 380, ¶4.  
15 Tyson Foods, 350 Wis. 2d 380, ¶4. 
16 The court of appeals concluded that the donning and 
doffing activities were required and controlled by Tyson Foods 
and primarily benefited the employer, satisfying the initial 
inquiry.  Tyson Foods, 350 Wis. 2d 380, ¶¶17, 22. 
17 Tyson Foods, 350 Wis. 2d 380, ¶¶17, 23. 
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
18 
 
"preparatory and concluding activities," under Wis. Admin. Code. 
§ DWD 272.12(2)(e).18  
¶49 The court of appeals concluded in Tyson Foods that the 
donning and doffing are compensable because they are integral 
and indispensable to the principal work activities of the 
employees in manufacturing food.     
¶50 The court of appeals in Tyson Foods relied primarily 
on the chemical plant example set forth in Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 272.12(2)(e)(1)c. to analyze the issue.  In this example, 
as set forth in full above, a chemical plant employee is 
entitled to compensation for time spent to don and doff 
protective clothing and equipment at the employer's premises.  
¶51 Comparing the chemical plant employees and the Tyson 
Foods employees, the court of appeals determined that the 
chemical plant example in the regulations is analogous to the 
donning and doffing of the Tyson Foods clothing and equipment.19 
¶52 In both the chemical plant example and Tyson Foods, 
safety laws, rules of the employer, and the nature of the work 
all require the employees to change clothes to do their 
respective jobs in the chemical plant and at the Tyson Foods 
processing plant.20  In the Tyson Foods case, there was no 
serious dispute that Tyson Foods required employees to don most 
                                                 
18 Tyson Foods, 350 Wis. 2d 380, ¶23. 
19 Tyson Foods, 350 Wis. 2d 380, ¶¶26, 28-29, 32, 37.     
20 Tyson Foods, 350 Wis. 2d 380, ¶32.   
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
19 
 
if not all items to keep food from being contaminated, to 
operate more efficiently, and to limit Tyson Foods' liability 
for and costs associated with employees' injuries.21      
¶53 Although 
Tyson 
Foods 
gave 
short 
shrift 
to 
the 
undisputed fact that its employees were required to don most of 
the clothing and equipment to protect the meat-consuming public 
from unappealing or even health-threatening food, the court of 
appeals did not.  Certain of these items were worn at least in 
part to prevent contamination of food.22  To the court of 
appeals, "needing to avoid food contamination plainly adds to 
the indispensability of the donning and doffing."23  
¶54 The court of appeals concluded that donning and 
doffing clothes and equipment in the Tyson Foods case was 
indispensable for the safety of the employees and the safety of 
the food they help produce.24  Thus, the time for donning and 
doffing was compensable. 
¶55 The Tyson Foods case presents essentially the same 
fact situation as presented in the instant case.   
¶56 Both Tyson Foods and Hormel operate food processing 
plants in Wisconsin subject to the same Wisconsin laws.  The 
clothing and equipment requirements for employees of each 
                                                 
21 Tyson Foods, 350 Wis. 2d 380, ¶28.   
22 Tyson Foods, 350 Wis. 2d 380, ¶4. 
23 Tyson Foods, 350 Wis. 2d 380, ¶36. 
24 Tyson Foods, 350 Wis. 2d 380, ¶31.  
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
20 
 
company are essentially the same.  Likewise, the clothing and 
equipment requirements for employees of each company serve 
essentially the same purposes: the safety of the employees and 
the safety of the food they help produce.   
¶57 The testimony with regard to the purposes of Hormel's 
Work Rules is similar to the undisputed facts in Tyson Foods.  
¶58 The Corporate Manager of Regulatory Compliance at 
Hormel testified that because Hormel's process is regulated both 
by the Food and Drug Administration and United States Department 
of Agriculture, Hormel employees are required "to be clean in a 
manner to prevent product alteration or the general creation of 
unsanitary type conditions."   
¶59 When asked whether Hormel's clothing and equipment 
requirements were to comply with federal regulations, the 
Corporate Manager replied, "They are. . . .  The government just 
kind of gives us what they call performance standards you know, 
hey, look, we know there's various means to the ends."  The 
required donning and doffing of the sanitary company clothing 
and equipment at the Beloit facility is a "means to an end," 
complying with the federal regulations regarding food sanitation 
and workplace safety.   
¶60 Although several Hormel employees testified that they 
could do their assigned job function at Hormel without the aid 
of the donned and doffed items, Hormel's plant operation 
required proper sanitation standards and protective equipment to  
meet the federal regulations.  Cleanliness and food safety are 
"intrinsic element[s]" of preparing and canning food at the 
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
21 
 
Hormel canning facility.  The clothing and equipment is integral 
and indispensable to the performance to the employees' job 
function (principal work activity) of preparing canned food.  
See Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(e)1.c.  
¶61 Hypothetically the Hormel employees may be able to do 
their jobs in street clothes, however Hormel's Work Rules and 
Hormel's need to comply with federal regulations have created a 
tight connection between the donning and doffing and the 
principal activities of the employees.  
¶62 In Tyson Foods and in the instant case, the clothing 
and equipment requirements at the beginning and end of the day 
are integral and indispensable to the employees' principal work 
activities.  Putting on and taking off the required clothing and 
equipment at the beginning and end of the day is tied directly 
to 
the 
work 
the 
employees 
were 
hired 
to 
perform——food 
production——and 
cannot 
be 
eliminated 
altogether 
without 
degrading the sanitation of the food or the safety of the 
employees. 
¶63 The employees in Tyson Foods and in the instant case 
were compelled by the nature of their jobs in food production to 
change clothing and wear equipment to ensure food and employee 
safety.  The nature of the employees' work makes the employer's 
requirement of putting on and taking off clothing and equipment 
at the beginning and end of the day an integral part of the 
employees' principal activity.   
¶64 Hormel dismisses Tyson Foods, contending that the 
Tyson Foods case "puts state law at odds with federal authority, 
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
22 
 
namely, with the United States Supreme Court holding" in a 
recent decision, Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 135 
S. Ct. 513 (2014).  As a result, Hormel urges us to overturn 
Tyson Foods.   
¶65 Integrity Staffing does not conflict with Tyson Foods.  
Because the Wisconsin administrative regulations at issue here 
are substantially similar to federal regulations, federal cases 
may assist in our analysis.  See Tyson Foods, 350 Wis. 2d 380, 
¶44; see also State v. Gudenschwager, 191 Wis. 2d 431, 439, 529 
N.W.2d 225 (1995).    
¶66 In Integrity Staffing, one of the federal regulations 
involved was substantially similar to Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
272.12(e); indeed the federal regulations use an illustration 
substantially similar to the chemical plant example in the 
Wisconsin regulations.25 
¶67 The employees in Integrity Staffing worked in a 
warehouse retrieving products from shelves and packaging the 
products for delivery to Amazon.com customers.26  Integrity 
Staffing's employees were required to undergo antitheft security 
screening before leaving the warehouse each day.27  The question 
presented to the United States Supreme Court was whether the 
employees' time spent waiting to undergo and then undergoing the 
                                                 
25 See 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c).   
26 Integrity Staffing, 135 S. Ct. at 515.   
27 Integrity Staffing, 135 S. Ct. at 515.   
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
23 
 
security screenings was compensable under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.  
¶68 The federal court of appeals upheld the employees' 
claim for compensation viewing the screenings as an integral and 
indispensable part of the principal activity the employees were 
employed to perform; the court viewed the screenings as 
necessary to the employees' primary work as warehouse employees 
and for Integrity Staffing's benefit.28  The United States 
Supreme Court reversed the federal court of appeals. 
¶69 Applying federal regulations substantially similar to 
those at issue here, the United States Supreme Court held that 
"an activity is integral and indispensable to the principal 
activities that an employee is employed to perform——and thus 
compensable under the [Fair Labor Standards Act]——if it is an 
intrinsic element of those activities and one with which the 
employee cannot dispense if he is to perform his principal 
activities."29  According to the Integrity Staffing Court, 
because the employer-required screenings were not tied to the 
productive work the employees were employed to perform——
retrieving and packing products——and the screenings could have 
been eliminated without affecting the employees' ability to 
perform their principal activity of retrieving and packaging 
                                                 
28 Integrity Staffing, 135 S. Ct. at 516.   
29 Integrity Staffing, 135 S. Ct. at 519.   
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
24 
 
products,30 the time spent waiting to undergo and undergoing 
security screening was noncompensable.31   
¶70 The reasoning in Integrity Staffing is not, as Hormel 
argues, "squarely the opposite of the Court of Appeals' 
reasoning in [Tyson Foods]."  Rather, the reasoning in Integrity 
Staffing is consistent with Tyson Foods.  Nor is Integrity 
Staffing inconsistent with prior federal precedent.32  Instead, 
Integrity Staffing once again clarified that whether an activity 
is integral and indispensable to an employee's principal 
activities is answered by reference to the nature of the 
employees' job duties.  Simply put, the donning and doffing 
cases are fact dependent.    
¶71 Both Integrity Staffing and Tyson Foods support the 
proposition that just because the employer requires employees to 
perform an activity that benefits the employer does not 
                                                 
30 Integrity Staffing, 135 S. Ct. at 518.   
31 Integrity Staffing, 135 S. Ct. at 519.   
32 In Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247 (1956), the Court 
held battery plant employees were entitled to compensation for 
time spent showering and changing clothes because of the toxic 
chemicals in the plant were "indispensable to the performance of 
their productive work and integrally related thereto."  Steiner, 
350 U.S. at 249, 251.  In a different case, the Court held that 
meatpacker employees were entitled to compensation for time 
spent sharpening their knives.  See Mitchell v. King Packing 
Co., 350 U.S. 260, 262-63 (1956).  Conversely, in a third case, 
the Supreme Court held the time spent waiting by poultry plant 
employees to don protective equipment was noncompensable because 
"such waiting . . . was two steps removed from the productive 
activity on the assembly line . . . .'"  IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 
546 U.S. 21, 42 (2005) (emphasis added).   
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
25 
 
automatically render that activity integral and indispensable to 
an employee's principal work activities, and thus compensable.  
See Integrity Staffing, 135 S. Ct. at 519; Tyson Foods, 350 
Wis. 2d 380, ¶26.  Both cases declare that an activity is 
integral and indispensable to the principal activities if it is 
an intrinsic element with which the employee cannot dispense if 
he or she is to perform the employee's principal activities.33  
Integrity Staffing does not contradict Tyson Foods; Tyson Foods 
remains good law.   
¶72 Another recent United States Supreme Court decision, 
Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014), 
discusses the issue of compensation for donning and doffing.   
¶73 In Sandifer, employees were required to wear special 
clothing and protective equipment and devices because of the 
hazards at steel plants.34  The statutory provision interpreted 
in Sandifer was 29 U.S.C. § 203(o).35  Section 203(o) provides 
that the compensability of time spent "changing clothes or 
washing at the beginning or end of each workday" is a subject 
                                                 
33 Integrity Staffing, 135 S. Ct. at 519 ("[A]n activity is 
integral and indispensable to the principal activities . . . if 
it is an intrinsic element . . . with which the employee cannot 
dispense if he is to perform his principal activities."); Tyson 
Foods, 350 Wis. 2d 380, ¶26 ("An integral part of a principal 
activity includes . . . an activity that is . . . indispensable 
to its performance.").  
34 Sandifer, 134 S. Ct. at 874.   
35 Sandifer, 134 S. Ct. at 874.   
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
26 
 
appropriately committed to collective bargaining.36  U.S. Steel, 
the defendant, contended that the provision in the collective 
bargaining agreement rendering noncompensable the time spent 
donning 
and 
doffing 
the 
special 
clothing 
and 
protective 
equipment and devices was a valid provision under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 203(o).37   
¶74 According to the Sandifer Court, the exception for 
collective bargaining agreements in 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) applies 
only when "changing clothes" is "'an integral and indispensable 
part of the principal activities for which covered workmen are 
employed.'"38  U.S. Steel did not dispute the Seventh Circuit's 
conclusion that were it not for 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) and the 
collective bargaining agreement, the time spent donning and 
doffing the special clothing and protective equipment and 
devices would have been integral and indispensable to the 
principal activities for which the employees were employed.39  
Thus, the time would have been compensable.   
¶75 Analyzing dictionary definitions of the statutory 
terms "change" and "clothes," the Sandifer Court concluded the 
time spent putting on and taking off the special clothing and 
                                                 
36 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (emphasis added).   
37 Sandifer, 134 S. Ct. at 874.   
38 Sandifer, 134 S. Ct. at 877 (quoting Steiner v. Mitchell, 
350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956)).   
39 Sandifer, 134 S. Ct. at 876 (quoting Sandifer v. U.S. 
Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 596 (7th Cir. 2012)).   
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
27 
 
protective equipment and devices was, on the whole, time spent 
"changing clothes" under 29 U.S.C. § 203(o).40  As a result, the 
time spent donning and doffing was not compensable under 29 
U.S.C. § 203(o) and the collective bargaining agreement.41   
¶76 No counterpart to 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) exists in 
Wisconsin law.  Although the clothing and protective equipment 
and devices at issue in Sandifer were more specialized than 
those at issue in the instant case, the Sandifer case supports 
the conclusion that the clothing and equipment at issue in the 
instant case is integral and indispensable to the employees' 
principal work activities.   
¶77 Moreover, although Hormel and the Union have entered 
into a collective bargaining agreement, the agreement does not 
speak to the compensability of time spent donning and doffing 
the required clothing and equipment.   
¶78 Applying 
Tyson 
Foods, 
Integrity 
Staffing, 
and 
Sandifer, we conclude that donning and doffing the clothing and 
equipment at the beginning and end of the day in the instant 
case is "integral and indispensable" to the employees' principal 
activities of producing food products.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the circuit court's judgment and order that the employees should 
be compensated for the 5.7 minutes per day spent donning and 
                                                 
40 Sandifer, 134 S. Ct. at 876-79.   
41 Sandifer, 134 S. Ct. at 879.   
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
28 
 
doffing the required clothing and equipment at the beginning and 
end of the day under Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12.         
 
IV 
¶79 We next examine whether the time spent donning and 
doffing Hormel's required clothing and equipment during meal 
periods is considered compensable work time.  
¶80 Hormel does not pay the employees for their 30-minute 
meal period.   
¶81 In the circuit court, the Union argued that the unpaid 
meal periods were compensable under two regulations.  First, 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(2)(c), which applies to "[r]est 
and meal periods."  Second, Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.02(3), 
which provides the test for when a meal period is "on-duty," and 
thus counted as compensable work time.42     
¶82 We will address the applicable regulations, Wis. 
Admin. Code §§ DWD 272.12(2)(c) and 274.02(3), in turn.     
¶83 First, Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(2)(c)2. provides 
that "[b]ona fide meal periods of 30 minutes or more are not 
                                                 
42 Although the concurrence/dissent concludes that the 
unpaid meal periods are not compensable, the concurrence/dissent 
cites only one of these regulations, Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
274.02(3).  See concurrence/dissent, ¶119 n.8.  Instead, the 
concurrence/dissent analyzes whether leaving the facility during 
a meal period is a "principal activity" under Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 272.12(2)(e).  See concurrence/dissent, ¶¶122-124.   
The "principal activity" analysis under Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 272.12(2)(e) applies to "[p]reparatory and concluding 
activities." 
 
Meal 
periods 
are 
not 
generally 
viewed 
as 
"[p]reparatory and concluding activities."   
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
29 
 
work time. . . .  The employee must be completely relieved from 
duty for the purposes of eating regular meals. . . .  The 
employee is not relieved if they are required to perform any 
duties, whether active or inactive, while eating."   
¶84 Second, Wis. Admin Code § DWD 274.02(3) states that 
"[t]he employer shall pay all employees for on-duty meal 
periods, which are to be counted as work time.  An on-duty meal 
period is a meal period where the employer does not provide at 
least 30 minutes free from work.  Any meal period where the 
employee is not free to leave the premises of the employer will 
also be considered an on-duty meal period." 
¶85 The circuit court declared that the required donning 
and doffing of clothing and equipment to leave the Hormel plant 
during the 30-minute meal periods denied employees a bona fide 
30-minute 
meal 
period 
in 
violation 
of 
Wisconsin 
law. 
Nevertheless, the circuit court refused to award damages for 
employees who remained on site during the meal period.  The 
circuit court did not adopt the Union's position that the 
employees were to be reimbursed for the alleged lost 30-minute 
meal break when the employees did not leave the premises but 
simply sat in the lunch room for 30 minutes and ate their meal.  
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
30 
 
The circuit court labeled the Union's contention far too broad 
in its scope and found it was unsupported by credible evidence.43  
¶86 As the circuit court acknowledged, "evidence about the 
lunch period was sparse."  The circuit court apparently agreed 
with Hormel's position that even if liability were found for the 
unpaid meal period, damages could be awarded only to the 
employees who left the premises during the meals period.  The 
circuit court accepted the evidence that 1% of the employees 
donned and doffed the clothing and equipment and left the 
premises for meals.  The parties stipulated that if the circuit 
court accepted the 1% evidence, the damages on the unpaid meal 
period claim would be $15,000.      
¶87 The parties explained in the stipulation that the 
stipulation was entered to limit the issues and expedite the 
trial.  Neither party took any opportunity at the circuit court 
or thereafter to challenge the circuit court's $15,000 damage 
award. 
¶88 In this court, neither Hormel nor the Union made any 
arguments specifically regarding the compensability of the 
                                                 
43 The Union argued that because Hormel's work rules 
required the employees to don and doff their clothing and 
equipment to leave the facility during their meal periods, the 
vast majority of employees chose to remain on site during their 
meal periods.  The circuit court referred to this as the Union's 
"chilling effect" argument, and concluded it was unsupported by 
any credible evidence.  If the circuit court had accepted the 
Union's "chilling effect" argument, damages would have been 
about $1.5 million.   
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
31 
 
unpaid meal periods.  They merely discussed the meal periods in 
stating the background of the dispute.   
¶89 Hormel's counsel never discussed the compensability of 
the unpaid meal periods in his briefs to the court of appeals or 
this court or in oral argument.   
¶90 As the concurrence/dissent points out, the Union's 
counsel did responded to several questions from the court at 
oral argument regarding the compensability of unpaid meal 
periods.  However, the Union's counsel did not, as the 
concurrence/dissent contends, "renew" any claim for compensation 
for unpaid meal periods aside from defending the circuit court's 
$15,000 damage award for the 1% of the employees who left the 
premises for meals.44  As the excerpts of oral argument quoted in 
the concurrence/dissent show, the Union's counsel was "not 
asking for pay for the other 99%" of the employees.45   
¶91 Instead, Hormel's and the Union's arguments to both 
this court and the court of appeals addressed only the circuit 
court's  determination that 5.7 minutes spent per day donning 
and doffing the required clothing and equipment is "integral and 
indispensable" to the employees' principal work activities of 
food production.  
¶92 As explained previously, we affirm the circuit court's 
conclusion that the 5.7 minutes spent per day donning and 
                                                 
44 See concurrence/dissent, ¶119. 
45 Concurrence/dissent, ¶120.   
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
32 
 
doffing the required clothing and equipment is integral and 
indispensable to the employees' principal work activities.       
¶93 We do not affirm the circuit court's declaration that 
the required donning and doffing of clothing and equipment to 
leave the Hormel plant during the 30-minute meal periods denied 
employees a bona fide 30-minute meal period in violation of 
Wisconsin law.  We accept the $15,000 damage award because the 
parties accepted it and have not disputed it in this court.46   
¶94 The circuit court's awarding $15,000 based on the 
parties' stipulation appears to be an attempt by the circuit 
court and the parties to efficiently resolve this dispute 
without a definitive ruling on the meal period.  The parties 
were trying to limit the issues and expedite the trial on the 
issue of donning and doffing the Hormel-required clothing and 
equipment at the beginning and end of the day.  In the absence 
of evidence and argument, we, like the circuit court, will not 
disturb the $15,000 accommodation between the parties.   
V 
¶95 Having determined that the donning and doffing at the 
beginning and end of the day is integral and indispensable to 
the employees' principal activities in producing food products, 
we next address whether this time is non-compensable under the 
                                                 
46 See Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, ¶120, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 
682 N.W.2d 866 (Abrahamson, C.J., & Crooks, J., concurring) 
("The rule of law is generally best developed when matters are 
tested by the fire of adversarial briefs and oral argument), 
overruled on other grounds by Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. 
Fund, 2006 WI 91, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216 
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
33 
 
doctrine of de minimis non curat lex (the law does not concern 
itself with trifles).   
¶96 The circuit court and Hormel viewed Hormel as having 
the burden of proof on the issue of the de minimis non curat lex 
doctrine.  The circuit court determined that "Hormel has failed 
to carry its burden to show the applicability of the de minimis 
doctrine, and, therefore, that doctrine is not controlling 
(assuming it exists at all in Wisconsin law)."   
¶97  The de minimis non curat lex doctrine "permits 
employers to disregard . . . otherwise compensable work '[w]hen 
the matter in issue concerns only a few seconds or minutes of 
work beyond the scheduled working hours.'"  Singh v. City of New 
York, 524 F.3d 361, 370 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Mt. 
Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946)).47  
¶98 Assuming, without deciding, that the 
de minimis 
doctrine is applicable to claims under Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
272.12, we conclude that in the instant case, the de minimis 
doctrine does not bar compensation for the time spent donning 
and doffing the required clothing and equipment because the time 
spent donning and doffing is not a "trifle." 
                                                 
47 The Sandifer court remarked (in the context of 29 U.S.C. 
§ 209(o)) that "[a] de minimis doctrine does not fit comfortably 
within the statute at issue here, which, it can fairly be said, 
is all about trifles——the relatively insignificant periods of 
time in which employees wash up and put on various items of 
clothing needed for their jobs."  Sandifer, 134 S. Ct. at 880. 
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
34 
 
¶99 Although the de minimis non curat lex doctrine is an 
established feature of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act,48 no 
Wisconsin cases, statutes, or regulations state that the de 
minimis doctrine applies to Wisconsin DWD regulations or in 
employment disputes.  Wisconsin courts have, however, applied 
the doctrine in other unrelated contexts.  See, e.g., Town of 
Delevan v. City of Delevan, 176 Wis. 2d 516, 532, 500 N.W.2d 268 
(1993) (annexation); Waupaca Cnty. v. Bax, No. 2009AP1406, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2010) (zoning).  
¶100 Despite the lack of Wisconsin case law or state 
statutory guidance with regard to the de minimis doctrine in the 
instant case, a review of federal case law assists in reaching 
our conclusions.  
¶101 As Hormel noted, the United States Supreme Court first 
applied the maxim of de minimis non curat lex as a possible 
defense 
to 
disputes 
originating 
under 
the 
Federal 
Labor 
Standards Act in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 
680 (1946).  The United States Supreme Court stated that 
overtime compensation that concerns "only a few seconds or 
minutes of work" may be disregarded as de minimis, reasoning 
that "[s]plit-second absurdities are not justified by the 
actualities of working conditions or by the policy of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act."  Anderson, 328 U.S. at 692.  The de 
minimis doctrine appears in the federal regulations.  See 29 
                                                 
48 Tyson Foods, 350 Wis. 2d 380, ¶51.    
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
35 
 
C.F.R. § 785.47.  In contrast to federal law, the de minimis 
doctrine has no explicit basis in the Wisconsin statutes or 
Wisconsin regulations in the instant case. 
¶102 In the instant case, employees spend approximately 24 
hours per year donning and doffing.  Viewed in light of the 
employees' hourly rate of $22 per hour, the unpaid period in 
question may amount to over $500 per year for each employee and 
substantial sums for Hormel.  We agree with the circuit court 
that in the instant case this time is not a "trifle."  
¶103 Hormel's 
primary 
reliance 
on 
Mitchell 
v. 
JCG 
Industries, Inc., 745 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2014), is misplaced.  
In Mitchell, the Seventh Circuit held the de minimis doctrine 
applicable 
to 
donning 
and 
doffing 
during 
a 
meal 
break.  
Mitchell, 745 F.3d at 841-42.  After discussing the parties' 
disagreement regarding the amount of time spent donning and 
doffing equipment, the federal court of appeals quoted the 
Supreme Court in Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 
881 (2014), that "it is most unlikely Congress meant § 203(o) to 
convert 
federal 
judges 
into 
time-study 
professionals."  
Mitchell, 745 F.3d at 843 (quoting Sandifer, 134 S. Ct. at 881). 
Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that under the de minimis 
doctrine, it was better to leave to collective bargaining, 
rather than judicial determination, the issue of how much time 
was spent donning and doffing equipment on different days.  
Mitchell, 745 F.3d at 843.  
¶104 Here, Hormel and the Union stipulated to the donning 
and doffing period in question at the beginning and end of the 
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
36 
 
day:  5.7 minutes per day, 28.5 minutes per week, approximately 
24 hours per year.  As a result, in the instant case the court 
need not be a "time-study professional" to determine the time 
spent donning and doffing the clothing and equipment.     
¶105 Assuming, without deciding, that the 
de minimis 
doctrine applies to claims arising under Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 
272.12, the de minimis doctrine does not bar compensation for 
the time spent donning and doffing the required clothing and 
equipment at the beginning and end of the day because the time 
spent donning and doffing is not a "trifle."  The donning and 
doffing of the clothing and equipment at the beginning and end 
of the day is integral and indispensable to the employees' 
principal 
activity——to 
successfully 
and 
sanitarily 
produce 
Hormel's products.  Viewed in the aggregate, this time amounts 
to over $500 per year for each employee, a figure that is 
certainly 
significant 
to 
an 
employee 
and 
to 
Hormel.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the period spent donning and 
doffing at the beginning and end of the day is compensable under 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12 and affirm the judgment and order 
of the circuit court. 
¶106 For the reasons set forth, we conclude:  
(1) Wisconsin Admin. Code § DWD 272.12 requires 
Hormel to compensate its employees for the 5.7 
minutes per day spent donning and doffing the 
clothing and equipment at the beginning and end 
of the day.  Relying on Tyson Foods, 350 Wis. 2d 
380, as did the circuit court, we conclude, as 
No. 
2014AP1880   
 
37 
 
did the circuit court, that the employees' 
donning and doffing clothing and equipment at the 
beginning and end of the day brought Hormel into 
compliance 
with 
federal 
food 
and 
safety 
regulations and was integral to sanitation and 
safety in the employees' principal activities, 
namely food production. 
(2) The required donning and doffing of clothing and 
equipment at the beginning and end of the day 
does not fall within the doctrine of de minimis 
non curat lex.  The wages involved are not a 
"trifle" either for the employees or Hormel. 
By the Court.-The judgment and order of the circuit court 
is affirmed. 
¶107 REBECCA G. BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  2014AP1880.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶108 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J. (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).   While I do not join the lead opinion,1 I 
agree with its conclusion that donning and doffing of company-
required clothing and gear at the beginning and end of the 
workday is "an integral part of a principal activity" of Hormel 
Foods Corporation for which compensation is required.2  I also 
agree that under the facts of this case Hormel is not relieved 
of its obligation to compensate for 5.7 minutes per day for 
those tasks by the de minimis rule.3   
¶109 I dissent from the lead opinion because I conclude 
that Hormel is not required to further compensate its employees 
due to doffing and donning by employees who choose to leave the 
workplace for lunch.  Leaving during the lunch break serves no 
interest of Hormel, is not "an integral part of a principal 
activity" of the employer within the meaning of Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 
272.12(2)(e)1. 
(2009), 
and 
serves 
only 
employees' 
interests.  I also dissent because I would cabin the time for 
which compensation is due each employee at 5.7 minutes per 
workday.  That is the total time presented to us as a 
stipulation by the parties for an employee to accomplish donning 
and doffing at the beginning and end of a workday.  If the time 
allocated for donning and doffing were not cabined at a 
                                                 
1 The lead opinion represents the decision of two justices:  
Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley.  
2 Lead op., ¶7. 
3 Id. at ¶8. 
No.  2014AP1880.pdr 
 
2 
 
specified number of minutes per employee per workday, the de 
minimis 
rule 
would 
preclude 
compensation 
because 
keeping 
accurate payroll records of the varying time that each employee 
spends donning and doffing on each workday would appear to be a 
nearly impossible administrative task for Hormel.  Cabining the 
time at a specified number of minutes per employee per workday 
for which compensation is due was the mode employed in prior 
contracts between Hormel and the Union for those tasks.  
Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part 
from the lead opinion. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶110 The lead opinion ably sets out facts as presented by 
the parties, who do not dispute what occurred on a factual 
basis.  I repeat only a few facts here to draw the reader into 
the discussion that follows.   
¶111 This is a wage and hour claim against Hormel, whose 
business is food production.  Hormel's Beloit plant has 
assembly-line food preparation where raw materials enter the 
facility and move through a production-line process where meat, 
seasonings and other ingredients are ground, chopped and 
prepared for cooking and canning.  During part of the food 
preparation, product ingredients are in open containers as 
employees work to prepare and cook various raw materials.  The 
production process of food products ends when high temperature, 
heavy pressure canning occurs.   
¶112 The 
claim 
here 
arises 
because 
Hormel 
requires 
employees to wear Hormel-provided clothing, "whites," and 
No.  2014AP1880.pdr 
 
3 
 
protective gear, such as glasses, hair and beard nets, and hard 
hats, while working and to remove the whites and gear before 
they leave Hormel's facility.4  When employees choose to leave 
Hormel's facility during the 30-minute lunch break, they are 
required to doff their whites and gear and to don them again 
before they return to food preparation.   
¶113 Hormel is not currently compensating employees for 
donning and doffing.  However, in an earlier union contract, 
Hormel compensated employees 12 minutes per day for these tasks.5  
During subsequent contract negotiations, the Union bargained 
away this compensation provision.6 
¶114 The parties stipulated that 5.7 minutes is the total 
average time per day an employee requires to don and doff whites 
and gear at the beginning and end of the workday.  The questions 
presented to us are four-fold:  (1) whether donning and doffing 
of clothing and gear that Hormel requires employees to put on at 
the start of the workday and remove before they leave the 
workplace is time worked for which compensation is due under 
                                                 
4 For convenience, I refer to the clothing provided by 
Hormel as "whites," even though some employees are required to 
wear clothing that is blue in color.   
5 The record reflects that in the 1980s employees were 
compensated 12 minutes per day for donning and doffing under the 
then union contract. 
6 Hormel does not argue that no compensation is due because 
such compensation was bargained away in a collective bargaining 
agreement, which is permitted under state and federal law.  See 
Aguilar v. Husco Int'l, Inc., 2015 WI 36, ¶24, 361 Wis. 2d 597, 
863 N.W.2d 556; Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.05; see also Sandifer 
v. United States Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 878-79 (2014). 
No.  2014AP1880.pdr 
 
4 
 
Wisconsin law; (2)  whether doffing and donning of clothing and 
equipment that occurs when employees choose to leave during the 
30-minute lunch break is time worked for which compensation is 
due under Wisconsin law; (3) whether Hormel is relieved from 
compensating its employees for donning and doffing by the de 
minimis rule; and (4) if the de minimis rule does not apply, 
what is the amount of time for which compensation is due for 
past, and will be due for future, donning and doffing.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶115 To decide the questions presented, we must interpret 
Wisconsin Administrative Code provisions, most specifically, 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(2)(e)1., as it drives the 
determination of "hours worked" by Hormel employees.  In that 
regard, whether donning and doffing are "an integral part of a 
principal activity" of the employer within the meaning of § DWD 
272.12(2)(e)1. 
is 
a 
question 
of 
law 
that 
we 
review 
independently.  DaimlerChrysler v. LIRC, 2007 WI 15, ¶10, 299 
Wis. 2d 1, 727 N.W.2d 311.   
¶116 If Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(2)(e)1. applies to 
donning and doffing, whether the de minimis rule nevertheless 
precludes Hormel employees' recovery for otherwise compensable 
time is also a question of law for our independent review.  
Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 1984). 
No.  2014AP1880.pdr 
 
5 
 
B.  Section DWD 272.12(2)(e)1. 
1.  Beginning and end of workday 
¶117 If donning and doffing come within Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 272.12(2)(e)1., those tasks are part of the hours worked 
for which compensation is due because they are part of the 
"Workday."  § DWD 272.12(1)(a)2.  I agree with the lead 
opinion's conclusion that § DWD 272.12(2)(e)1. requires Hormel 
to compensate its employees for 5.7 minutes per day that have 
been cabined for donning and doffing clothing and equipment at 
the beginning and end of the workday.7  I agree because a 
principal activity of Hormel is sanitary food production and 
Hormel's requirement that employees wear clean whites, hair 
nets, beard nets and other equipment designed to keep foreign 
objects out of the food is an integral part of the production of 
sanitary food.  See § DWD 272.12(2)(e)1.c.  As the court of 
appeals correctly reasoned in regard to Weissman's claim for 
donning required clothing and gear at the start of the workday 
and doffing at day's conclusion, "donning and doffing here 
constitute 'preparatory and concluding' activities that are 'an 
integral part of a principal activity'" of the employer, again 
sanitary food production.  Weissman v. Tyson Prepared Foods, 
Inc., 2013 WI App 109, ¶2, 350 Wis. 2d 380, 838 N.W.2d 502.   
2.  Lunch break 
¶118 The circuit court granted compensation for doffing and 
donning clothing and gear for those employees who chose to leave 
                                                 
7 See lead op., ¶7. 
No.  2014AP1880.pdr 
 
6 
 
Hormel's facility during their lunch break.  The Union had asked 
for 30 minutes of additional compensation because it claimed 
that doffing and donning in order to leave the workplace during 
lunch break caused the break to be less than 30 minutes long and 
therefore compensation for the full 30 minutes was due.   
¶119 Before 
us, 
the 
Union 
renews 
its 
claim 
that 
compensation is due for an additional 30 minutes because the 
time required for doffing and donning that occurs when employees 
choose to leave the workplace reduces the lunch break to less 
than 30 minutes, the minimum time required for an unpaid break.8  
The lead opinion affirms the circuit court, and ducks the 
question presented about the compensability of the doffing and 
donning during the lunch break by asserting, "neither Hormel nor 
the 
Union 
made 
any 
arguments 
specifically 
regarding 
the 
compensability of the unpaid meal periods."9 
¶120 The lead opinion minimizes what occurred at oral 
argument before us.  For example, the following questions were 
asked and answered: 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROGGENSACK:  Part of your brief was 
people wanting to leave the workplace for 30 minutes, 
and in order to do so they have to take off the 
clothes that they're required to put on when they go 
out to lunch and put them back on again when they come 
in from lunch, correct? 
UNION COUNSEL:  Yes.  
                                                 
8 See Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 274.02(3) (2013).   
9 Lead op., ¶88.   
No.  2014AP1880.pdr 
 
7 
 
CHIEF 
JUSTICE 
ROGGENSACK: 
 
Are 
you 
asking 
for 
compensation for that in addition to the beginning of 
the workday and the end of the workday for anybody who 
leaves the place of employment? 
UNION COUNSEL:  Well the trial court looked at that 
and the regulations again are clear.  That if there is 
not a 30 minute uninterrupted break, it has to be paid 
for. So the issue is, since people are required to don 
before they leave the plant and doff before they, when 
they come back, they are actually getting less than a 
30-minute lunch.  
CHIEF JUSTICE ROGGENSACK:  Okay so the answer to my 
question is "yes?"   
UNION COUNSEL:  They should be paid for the lunchtime.  
And the court found that approximately 1% of the 
workers do that. So we're not asking for pay for the 
other 99%.  
. . . .  
JUSTICE A.W. BRADLEY:  I'm focusing on the lunch hour, 
the 30 minutes.  Our opinions have to make sense 
. . . .  This doesn't make sense to me.  If we would 
agree with the trial court that the donning and 
doffing for some employees who do this over the 30-
minute lunch hour should be compensable, what, doesn't 
that provide an incentive for . . . more, maybe all of 
the employees to say "oh let's get time and a half, 
let's put on and take off over the 30-minute lunch 
hour?"  That doesn't make sense to me.  It sounds like 
it will be giving a rather perverse incentive.  Now, 
so tell me why it does make sense.  Tell me why, since 
it only affects a few, according to the record, a few 
employees, that shouldn't be considered de minimis. So 
you've got two questions there.  
UNION COUNSEL:  Well, again, it's only if, just 
factually, if you're leaving the plant that you're 
entitled 
to 
that 
pay. 
[Justice 
A.W. 
Bradley 
interjects].  I think the exact same test is being 
applied.  So, if you find that donning and doffing the 
clothes is compensable in the morning and in the 
afternoon where employers are required because it is 
integral and indispensable, the exact same argument 
makes exact same sense because of the regulation that 
requires a bona fide meal period of 30 minutes. So 
No.  2014AP1880.pdr 
 
8 
 
Hormel would be required to allow employees to take a 
full 30-minute lunch, which includes being able to don 
first, then leave the plant, then come back 30 minutes 
later, and then——or doff first——and then don on the 
way back in. 
JUSTICE A.W. BRADLEY:  So you're not really responding 
to my concern about the potential for gaming the law?  
UNION COUNSEL:  I don't see how it's gaming because 
the legislature has said that the Department of 
Workforce Development has to pass these regulations, 
and they have.  They've said that everyone is entitled 
to a 30-minute bona fide meal period.   
. . . . 
JUSTICE ABRAHAMSON:  Does the 5.7 minutes include the 
initial putting them on and the final taking them off 
and the lunch hour donning and doffing? 
UNION COUNSEL:  No.  
JUSTICE ABRAHAMSON:  So it only deals with putting 
them on to begin with and taking them off, right? 
UNION COUNSEL:  Right.  
JUSTICE ABRAHAMSON:  But the trial court order says 
. . . that the class members have been denied the 
right to 30 minutes off duty to leave the premises and 
the doffing and donning clothes and gear during such 
30 minutes violates the class members.  So the 
declaratory judgment is that's a violation.   
UNION COUNSEL:  Right . . . yes.  
¶121 I conclude the reasoning that supports the conclusion 
that donning and doffing at the beginning and end of the workday 
are "an integral part of a principal activity" of Hormel and 
therefore require compensation does not support compensation for 
doffing and donning when employees choose to leave Hormel's 
facility during their lunch break, nor does it support 30 
minutes more pay because time required to doff and don reduces 
the lunch break below 30 minutes.   
No.  2014AP1880.pdr 
 
9 
 
¶122 First, no interest or activity of Hormel is served by 
employees leaving its facility during lunch break.  Stated 
otherwise, leaving Hormel's facility at lunch does not aid in 
sanitary food production, which is a principal activity of 
Hormel.  Second, the choice to leave Hormel's facility at lunch 
is totally each individual employee's choice, not Hormel's.   
¶123 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(2)(e)1. is directed 
at "a principal activity" of the employer, Hormel.  It is § DWD 
272.12(2)(e)1. 
that 
drives 
the 
obligation 
to 
compensate 
employees for the initial donning and final doffing of whites 
and gear.  Section DWD 272.12(2)(e)1. is not directed at 
principal activities of employees.  However, leaving the 
workplace during lunch break is driven by principal activities 
of employees, i.e., employees choose to leave to further their 
own interests.  Furthermore, approximately 1% of employees 
choose to leave during lunch break.  With 99% of employees not 
undertaking an activity, that activity cannot reasonably be 
contended to constitute a "principal activity" of the employer.  
Instead, the 1% of employees is furthering their own principal 
activity, i.e., their choice to leave for lunch.  Section DWD 
272.12(2)(e)1. does not require compensation for principal 
activities of employees. 
¶124 And finally, while employees are free to leave the 
workplace during lunch break, it is their personal and voluntary 
choice that causes them to leave Hormel's facility.  Their 
leaving serves no interest of Hormel.  Accordingly, I conclude 
that Hormel is not required to compensate employees who leave 
No.  2014AP1880.pdr 
 
10 
 
the workplace for their entire lunch break, as the Union 
requests, or for a portion thereof, as the circuit court 
ordered.  Therefore, I would reverse the order of the circuit 
court in regard to payment for lunchtime doffing and donning, 
which order the lead opinion does not overturn.10 
C.  De Minimis Rule 
¶125 Hormel contends that all donning and doffing should 
fall outside of its obligation to provide compensation because 
of the de minimis rule.  The lead opinion concludes that donning 
and doffing at the beginning and end of the workday are not de 
minimis, assuming that the de minimis rule may be applied to the 
Union's claims.11  The lead opinion does not discuss whether the 
de minimis rule may be applied to doffing and donning by those 
employees who choose to leave during their lunch break. 
¶126 The United States Supreme Court discussed application 
of the de minimis rule in regard to a federal wage and hour 
claim in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 
(1946).  There, the Court said that work "pursued necessarily 
and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business" 
and 
rightly 
included 
in 
"the 
statutory 
workweek" 
may 
nevertheless go without payment if it is de minimis.  Id. at 
691-92 (citation omitted).   
                                                 
10 Because four justices, Chief Justice Roggensack, Justice 
Prosser, Justice Ziegler and Justice Gableman, conclude that no 
compensation is due for doffing and donning during lunch break, 
the order of the circuit court is reversed in regard to the 
$15,000 payment that the circuit court ordered. 
11 Id., ¶¶8, 98.   
No.  2014AP1880.pdr 
 
11 
 
¶127 To determine whether the de minimis rule applies in a 
particular context, one must consider whether the factual 
predicates for the rule's application are met.  In Lindow, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals carefully explained a test that 
it applied when considering whether compensation is excused that 
otherwise would be due because the work is de minimis.  There, 
employees of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) sought overtime 
compensation for the Corps' requirement that they report to work 
15 minutes before the start of their scheduled shifts to perform 
certain tasks that took part of the required 15 minutes.  
Lindow, 738 F.2d at 1059.   
¶128 Lindow 
explained 
that 
the 
"de 
minimis 
rule 
is 
concerned with the practical administrative difficulty of 
recording small amounts of time for payroll purposes."  Id. at 
1062.  The court reasoned that keeping accurate track of 
varying, small amounts of time for many employees could be an 
overwhelming task for employers.  Id. at 1063 (citing Veech & 
Moon, De Minimis Non Curat Lex, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 537, 551 (1947) 
and its conclusion that Anderson was concerned with "just plain 
everyday practicality").   
¶129 Lindow also explained that an "important factor in 
determining whether a claim is de minimis is the amount of daily 
time spent on the additional work[,] . . . [although n]o rigid 
rule can be applied with mathematical certainty."  Id. at 1062 
(citing Frank v. Wilson & Co., 172 F.2d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 1949) 
and Nardone v. Gen. Motors, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 336, 341 (D.N.J. 
1962)).  Further, the court considered the "size of the 
No.  2014AP1880.pdr 
 
12 
 
aggregate claim" for those claims where time expended may have 
been minimal on a daily basis.  Id. at 1063.  And finally, 
Lindow noted that "in applying the de minimis rule, we will 
consider whether the claimants performed the work on a regular 
basis."  Id. (citing Smith v. Cleveland Pneumatic Tool, Co., 173 
F.2d 775, 776 (6th Cir. 1949), as applying de minimis rule where 
unpaid work did not occur on a daily basis). 
¶130 I adopt and apply the Lindow test, summarizing it as 
follows:  (1) the time at issue must be otherwise compensable by 
the employer and (2) consideration must be given to (a) the 
practical, administrative difficulty of accurately recording 
small amounts of additional time that may vary from employee to 
employee, (b) the regularity on which additional work is 
performed, (c) the time spent each day on additional work, and 
(d) the size of the aggregate claim for additional compensation.  
Id. at 1062-63.  
¶131 In the case now before us, unless the de minimis rule 
applies, the cabined 5.7 minutes per day for donning whites and 
required gear at the beginning of the workday and doffing at the 
end of the workday is compensable because it is integral to a 
principal activity of Hormel.  Weissman, 350 Wis. 2d 380, ¶2.  
However, because doffing and donning by those employees who 
choose to leave during lunch break is not compensable, the de 
minimis rule has no application there.  Anderson, 328 U.S. at 
691-92; Lindow, 738 F.2d at 1063.   
¶132 As I apply the Lindow test to determine whether the de 
minimis rule eliminates Hormel's obligation for compensation of 
No.  2014AP1880.pdr 
 
13 
 
the stipulated total time of 5.7 minutes per day for donning at 
the beginning of the workday and doffing at the end of the 
workday, I note that if Hormel were required to record for 
payroll 
purposes 
the 
varying 
amounts 
of 
time 
that 
each 
individual employee expends to don and doff at the beginning and 
end of each workday, it would appear to be almost an 
administrative impossibility to do so accurately.  Furthermore, 
imposing such an obligation on Hormel could lead to an unending 
series of wage and hour claims by employees who contend that 
Hormel did not record the correct amount of time on particular 
days for particular employees.  Stated otherwise, if the total 
time per day that is due for donning and doffing were not 
cabined at a stipulated amount, all donning and doffing would be 
precluded by the de minimis rule.   
¶133 Other courts have used the de minimis rule to 
eliminate otherwise compensable time that was too burdensome to 
record accurately.  See Mitchell v. JCG Indus., Inc., 745 F.3d 
837, 843 (7th Cir. 2014) (precluding an obligation to record 
small, varying amounts of time for payroll purposes in part 
because it would turn judges into "time-study professionals" 
when complaints about accuracy of recording were made).   
¶134 However, as the claim is presented to us, the Union 
and Hormel have cabined the total time taken to don and doff at 
the beginning and end of a workday at 5.7 minutes per employee.  
In addition, the Union has not requested that we impose an 
obligation on Hormel to record for payroll purposes the actual 
time spent by each employee on each day.   
No.  2014AP1880.pdr 
 
14 
 
¶135 The Union's approach of seeking recovery for an agreed 
amount of compensable time on a daily basis is consistent with 
the approach the Union took when donning and doffing were 
accorded in collective bargaining.12  It also frees Hormel from 
what would be a near administrative impossibility to do 
accurately.   
¶136 I note that the tasks for which compensation is 
required occur on a daily basis for each employee engaged in 
food preparation.  In addition, although 5.7 minutes per day is 
a small amount of time, because it is expended every day, the 
aggregate amount of each employee's claim per year is $500, 
which is significant.  It is also significant to Hormel as an 
aggregate amount for all food preparation employees.   
¶137 Accordingly, I conclude that in the context presented 
by the case at hand, the de minimis rule does not apply to 
preclude compensation for 5.7 minutes per day for each food 
preparation employee who dons whites and required gear at the 
start of the workday and doffs them at the day's conclusion.   
D.  Cabining Time Allotted 
¶138 If the lead opinion were construed as leaving the 
amount of donning and doffing time open to adjustment for future 
work days, I could not concur with the lead opinion in any 
respect.  This is so because without cabining the time at a 
specified number of minutes per employee per day for which 
compensation is due, the entire claim would be precluded by the 
                                                 
12 See note 5, supra.   
No.  2014AP1880.pdr 
 
15 
 
near impossibility of Hormel's accurately recording small, 
varying amounts of time for payroll purposes for each employee.  
However, with compensable time cabined at a stipulated amount, 
Hormel knows what compensation is due for past work.  Hormel 
also can choose to compensate through shortening future workdays 
by 5.7 minutes so that it is not put in the position of 
exceeding a 40-hour work week in the future.  Accordingly, 
cabining the time allotted for which compensation is due is 
necessary to my decision to agree with the lead opinion in part.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶139 While I do not join the lead opinion, I agree with its 
conclusion that donning and doffing of company-required clothing 
and gear at the beginning and end of the workday is "an integral 
part of a principal activity" of Hormel for which compensation 
is required.  I also agree that under the facts of this case 
Hormel is not relieved of its obligation to compensate for 5.7 
minutes per day for those tasks by the de minimis rule.   
¶140 I dissent from the lead opinion because I conclude 
that Hormel is not required to further compensate its employees 
due to doffing and donning by employees who choose to leave the 
workplace for lunch.  Leaving during the lunch break serves no 
interest of Hormel, is not "an integral part of a principal 
activity" of the employer within the meaning of Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 272.12(2)(e)1 and serves only employees' interests.  I 
also dissent because I would cabin the time for which 
compensation is due each employee at 5.7 minutes per workday.  
That is the total time presented to us as a stipulation by the 
No.  2014AP1880.pdr 
 
16 
 
parties for an employee to accomplish donning and doffing at the 
beginning and end of a workday.  If the time allocated for 
donning and doffing were not cabined at a specified number of 
minutes per employee per workday, the de minimis rule would 
preclude compensation because keeping accurate records of the 
varying time that each employee spends donning and doffing on 
each workday would be a nearly impossible administrative task 
for Hormel.  Cabining the time at a specified number of minutes 
per employee per workday for which compensation is due was the 
mode employed in prior contracts between Hormel and the Union 
for those tasks.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and 
dissent in part from the lead opinion. 
¶141 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. 
PROSSER, JR. joins this opinion. 
 
 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
1 
 
¶142 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   (dissenting).  I agree with 
the lead opinion's and the concurring/dissenting opinion's 
conclusion that Weissman v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2013 WI App 109, 
350 Wis. 2d 380, 838 N.W.2d 502, review granted, 2014 WI 3, 352 
Wis. 2d 351, 842 N.W.2d 359, need not be overruled. However, I 
do 
not 
agree 
with 
the 
lead 
opinion's 
and 
the 
concurring/dissenting opinion's conclusion that Hormel must 
compensate its employees for the time they spend "donning and 
doffing" company-required "whites" at the Beloit cannery. Unlike 
a majority of this court, I conclude that the "donning and 
doffing" of the "whites" in this case is not "integral and 
indispensable" to the employees' principal work activity of 
canning food. 
¶143 Because an "integral and indispensable" analysis is 
context-specific, I begin by laying out the facts of the present 
case.1 I then take up the two issues before this court: (1) is 
                                                 
1 This dissent often quotes information contained in the 
record. The information quoted is largely derived from trial 
testimony and the circuit court's opinion and order. Below is a 
list of individuals who testified at trial: 
Scott A. Ramlo: Plant Manager at the Beloit cannery. 
Pamela Collins: Quality Control, Weight, and Seam 
Technician at the Beloit cannery. 
Charles Seeley: Production Specialist at the Beloit 
cannery. 
Dennis Warne: Stork Operator at the Beloit cannery. 
Resha 
Hovde: 
Corporate 
Manager 
of 
Regulatory 
Compliance 
and 
HAACP. 
HAACP 
stands 
for 
"hazard 
analysis critical control point." 
(continued) 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
2 
 
the 
"donning 
and 
doffing" 
of 
company-required 
"whites" 
compensable 
work 
time 
or 
non-compensable 
preliminary 
and 
postliminary 
activities 
under 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code. 
§ DWD 
272.12(2)(e); and (2) if the time spent "donning and doffing" is 
otherwise compensable work time, is this time non-compensable 
under the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex? 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶144 Hormel Foods Corporation ("Hormel") is a multi-
national company specializing in food production. All the 
parties and the lead opinion agree that "Hormel is a fine 
employer with a quality record and a history of producing good, 
safe food for customers around the world." Lead op., ¶12. 
¶145 Hormel has a variety of food producing plants located 
in different states. At every one of these plants, and without 
regard to what is being produced, Hormel requires its employees 
to "don and doff" either "whites" or "blues." Most employees 
wear "whites," but the maintenance department wears "blues." 
Every day Hormel employees "don and doff" hardhats, hearing 
protection, eye protection, hair nets, shoes,2 and clean clothes. 
I use the term "whites" to refer to all of the above described 
items. Depending on the nature of the job, some employees "don 
and doff" additional clothing and gear on top of their "whites." 
Currently, Hormel's employees are not paid for the time it takes 
                                                                                                                                                             
Francisco Velaquez: Human Resource and Safety Manager 
at the Beloit cannery. 
2 Employees wear "captive" or "dedicated" shoes. Captive 
shoes are shoes that are left at the facility overnight. 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
3 
 
to "don and doff" the "whites."3 "Donning and doffing" the 
"whites" takes, at the median, 2.903 minutes per day. More 
specifically, "donning" the "whites" takes, at the median, 2 
minutes, 3.84 seconds (or 2.064 minutes),4 and "doffing" the  
                                                 
3 The concurring/dissenting opinion correctly notes that in 
the 1980's Hormel compensated its employees 12 minutes per day 
for "donning and doffing" under a then-existing collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
("CBA"). 
Concurrence/Dissent, 
¶113. 
Eventually the compensation Hormel's employees received for 
"donning and doffing" was "bargained away." Id., ¶113 n.6. 
The Wisconsin Administrative Code allows employees to 
bargain away rights they would otherwise have under the Code as 
long as the parties enter into a CBA agreement and apply for a 
waiver or otherwise meet the factors required for a waiver. See 
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 247.05; Aguilar v. Husco Int'l, Inc., 
2015 WI 36, ¶11, 361 Wis. 2d 597, 863 N.W.2d 556 ("[E]ven though 
the 20-minute unpaid breaks were technically violations of the 
code, it would be unreasonable to grant back pay because the 
breaks had posed no health or safety concerns, the statute 
permits waivers in circumstances such as these, and the 
employees had enjoyed other benefits in exchange for . . . the 
short unpaid meal periods.") 
But, as the concurring/dissenting opinion points out, 
"Hormel does not argue that no compensation is due because such 
compensation was bargained away in a collective bargaining 
agreement, which is permitted under state and federal law." 
Concurrence/Dissent, ¶113 n.6. 
4 "Donning" a belt takes 16.740 seconds, "donning" ear plugs 
takes 6.960 seconds, "donning" a hair net takes 9.780 seconds, 
"donning" a hard hat takes 5.940 seconds, "donning" captive 
shoes takes 26.280 seconds, "donning" safety glasses takes 5.400 
seconds, "donning" uniform pants takes 19.320 seconds, and 
"donning" a uniform shirt takes 18.780 seconds.  
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
4 
 
"whites" takes, at the median, 50.34 seconds (or .839 minutes).5 
"Donning and doffing" the "whites," washing hands,6 and walking 
to an assigned work station takes,7 at the median, 5.7 minutes 
per day.8 
¶146 This case concerns only Hormel's Beloit cannery. The 
Beloit cannery employs approximately 290 people for various 
types of work ranging from quality control technician to 
forklift driver to sanitation crew member. The record reflects 
that only half of Hormel's employees at the Beloit cannery work 
near open product. Additionally, only half of the Beloit cannery 
has open product in it. 
¶147 As a cannery, the Beloit facility is mainly tasked 
with preparing, canning, and shipping "shelf-stable" canned 
                                                 
5 "Doffing" a belt takes 3.720 seconds, "doffing" ear plugs 
takes 1.980 seconds, "doffing" a hair net takes 4.860 seconds, 
"doffing" a hard hat takes 4.440 seconds, "doffing" captive 
shoes takes 14.640 seconds, "doffing" safety glasses takes 3.480 
seconds, "doffing" uniform pants takes 10.800 seconds, and 
"doffing" a uniform shirt takes 6.420 seconds.  
6 Washing hands takes 14.640 seconds. 
7 The time it takes to walk to and from an employee's 
workstation varies depending on the location of the workstation. 
The shortest walk time to a workstation takes 27.66 seconds, and 
the shortest walk time from a workstation takes 26.16 seconds 
(for a total of 53.82 seconds per day). The longest walk time to 
a workstation takes 2 minutes, 19.56 seconds, and the longest 
walk time from a workstation takes 1 minute, 31.74 seconds (for 
a total of 3 minutes, 51.3 seconds per day). 
8 Attached to this dissent are time tables contained in the 
record. The tables show how long it takes to "don" and "doff" 
various items, to wash hands, and to walk to assigned 
workstations. 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
5 
 
goods, including items such as Hormel Chili, Mary Kitchen Hash, 
and Chi-Chi's Salsa. This process is largely assembly like: 
outside suppliers deliver raw product in a receiving area; the 
product is cooked; the cooked product is placed into a can or 
glass container; and the canned product is sent through a final 
heating process. It is this final heating process, called "12-D 
cook" for canned products or "acidification" for glass products, 
that renders the product shelf-stable. 
¶148 The 12-D cook and acidification processes are quite 
technical. For example, Resha Hovde, Hormel's corporate manager 
of regulatory compliance and HACCP, testified that Hormel's 12-D 
cook process 
provides a thermal destruction of organisms, of a 
trillion organisms. It's 12 to the 10th power. So if 
you could imagine a trillion organisms, and whatever 
product it is, it would destroy all the vegetative 
organisms . . . . So through time, an extensive amount 
of time at a high temperature, we're able to eliminate 
those organisms of concern. 
In short, the 12-D cook and acidification processes "destroy any 
organisms of concern" such that any organism in the can or glass 
container "certainly wouldn't be a food safety issue."9 No 
                                                 
9 The following trial testimony emphasizes just how powerful 
the 12-D cook and acidification processes are: 
Q. Ms. Hovde, yesterday there was a hypothetical 
example that was posed to Mr. Ramlo, the plant manager 
at the Beloit facility, and it was regarding a world 
in which Hormel allows street clothes in the Beloit 
facility and doesn't require whites. Now in that 
world, 
according 
to 
the 
hypothetical, 
an 
avid 
fisherman who works at the Beloit facility would 
report to work with fish scales on his clothing and 
worms in his pockets. Based on the 12-D cook process 
(continued) 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
6 
 
employees come into contact with open product after the 12-D 
cook or acidification processes. The next time the product would 
come into contact with someone would be when a consumer opens 
the can. 
¶149 As noted by the lead opinion, Hormel is subject to 
federal 
regulation 
by 
the 
United 
States 
Department 
of 
Agriculture 
(USDA), 
the 
United 
States 
Food 
and 
Drug 
Administration (FDA), and the federal Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA). These regulations ensure that 
Hormel satisfies cleanliness, quality, and safety standards; 
however, these regulations "do not require these standards be 
satisfied in any particular manner." Lead op., ¶17. Instead, the 
regulations "generally speak to the point that [Hormel] need[s] 
[its] employees to be clean in a manner to prevent product 
adulteration 
or 
the 
general 
creation 
of 
unsanitary 
type 
conditions." Notably, the circuit court found, 
                                                                                                                                                             
you just described, what if those fish scales or those 
worms made their way into a can of Hormel product? 
Would they pose a threat to human safety? 
A. I would argue that the heat process would destroy 
any organisms of concern. 
Q. It might not be desirable to have those items in 
the can –- 
A. Correct. 
Q. –- but it certainly wouldn't be a food safety 
issue? 
A. Correct. 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
7 
 
The USDA and FDA regulations do not require 
employees at the Beloit facility to wear whites. The 
USDA and FDA regulations do not specify who has to own 
or launder the clothing worn by the employees at the 
Beloit facility. Those regulations do not specify 
where the items have to be donned, doffed, and stored. 
 . . .  
 
Hormel employees could wear street clothes at the 
Beloit facility and still comply with USDA and FDA 
regulations. USDA and FDA regulations do not require 
employees at the Beloit facility to keep their shoes 
within the facility. The use of captive or dedicated 
shoes is not the only method to avoid contamination at 
the Beloit plant. Hair covering is left to the 
company's 
discretion 
under 
the 
USDA 
and 
FDA 
regulations but the hair needs to be secured in a 
manner to prevent potential for product adulteration. 
Thus, one way Hormel promotes cleanliness, quality, and safety 
is by having its employees "don and doff" the "whites." But this 
"donning and doffing" is not mandated by any regulation. 
 
II. THE "DONNING AND DOFFING" OF THE "WHITES" IS NOT COMPENSABLE 
WORK TIME UNDER THE CODE OR PRECEDENT. 
 
A. WISCONSIN ADMIN. CODE § DWD 272.12 
¶150 To resolve this case, I must interpret and apply Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ DWD 
272.12. 
Under 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ DWD 
272.12(1)(a)1., employees "must be paid for all time spent in 
'physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) 
controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily 
and primarily for the benefit of the employer's business.'" An 
employee's workweek "ordinarily includes 'all time during which 
an employee is necessarily required to be on the employer's 
premises, on duty or at a prescribed workplace.'" Wis. Admin. 
Code § DWD 272.12(1)(a)1. 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
8 
 
¶151 Compensable time is measured in terms of a "workday." 
According 
to 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ DWD 
272.12(1)(a)2., 
the 
"'[w]orkday,' in general, means the period between 'the time on 
any particular workday at which such employee commences their 
principal 
activity 
or 
activities' 
and 
'the 
time 
on 
any 
particular workday at which they cease such principal activity 
or activities.'" Activities that fall outside the workday are 
called "preliminary" or "postliminary" activities. See Wis. 
Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(2)(e)1.c. Pursuant to Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DWD 272.12(2)(e), the "term 'principal activities' includes 
all activities which are an integral part of a principal 
activity." Moreover, 
[a]mong the activities included as an integral part of 
the principal activity are those closely related 
activities which are indispensable to its performance. 
If an employee in a chemical plant, for example, 
cannot perform their principal activities without 
putting on certain clothes, changing clothes on the 
employer's premises at the beginning and end of the 
workday would be an integral part of the employee's 
principal activity. . . .  
Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12(2)(e)1.c. (emphasis added). 
¶152 To summarize, if the "donning and doffing" is a 
preliminary or postliminary activity, then it falls outside the 
workday and does not qualify as compensable work time. In 
contrast, if the "donning and doffing" is a principal activity, 
then it falls within the workday and qualifies as compensable 
work time. Principal activities include those activities that 
are an "integral and indispensable" part of a principal 
activity. 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
9 
 
B. PRECEDENT: WEISSMAN v. TYSON FOODS, INTEGRITY STAFFING 
SOLUTIONS, INC. v. BUSK, STEINER v. MITCHELL, AND MITCHELL v. 
KING PACKING CO. 
¶153 In addition to interpreting and applying the pertinent 
portions of Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.12, I also look to 
applicable case law as a guide for determining when an activity 
is "integral and indispensable." Four cases, one from the court 
of appeals and three from the Supreme Court of the United States 
are particularly relevant; thus, a brief recitation of the facts 
and holdings of each case is appropriate. 
¶154 In Weissman v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2013 WI App 109, 350 
Wis. 2d 380, 838 N.W.2d 502, review granted, 2014 WI 3, 352 
Wis. 2d 351, 842 N.W.2d 359,10 the court of appeals considered 
whether the "donning and doffing" of sanitary and protective 
gear was compensable work time. 350 Wis. 2d 380, ¶1. There, the 
Tyson employees at the Jefferson plant primarily produced 
pepperonis, a ready-to-eat meat product. Id., ¶4. To answer the 
question 
of 
whether 
the 
employees 
"donning 
and 
doffing" 
qualified as compensable worktime, the court conducted a two-
step analysis. 
¶155 First, it began with the statutory language of Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ DWD 
272.12(1)(a)1., 
which 
contains 
two 
requirements: the activity (1) must be "controlled or required 
by the employer" and (2) must be done "necessarily and primarily 
for the benefit of the employer's business." Id., ¶¶17-21. 
Second, the court went on to discuss whether the activity was an 
                                                 
10 Similar to the lead opinion, I will also refer to 
Weissman v. Tyson Foods, Inc., as "Tyson Foods." 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
10 
 
"integral part" of a "principal activity." Id., ¶¶22-26. It 
concluded that an "integral part" meant an activity that is (1) 
closely related to the principal activity and (2) indispensable 
to its performance. Id., ¶¶26, 28-31. Using this two-step 
approach, the court concluded that the "donning and doffing" was 
compensable under the circumstances. Id., ¶37; but see Mitchell 
v. JCG Industries, Inc., 745 F.3d 837 (2014) (holding that the 
minimal time employees spent "donning and doffing" sanitary gear 
during bona fide meal breaks and at the beginning and end of 
each day was not work time that had to be compensated). 
¶156 A few months after the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
decided Tyson Foods, the Supreme Court of the United States 
decided Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, __ U.S. __, 
135 S. Ct. 513 (2014).11 In Integrity Staffing, the Court 
addressed the issue of "whether the employees' time spent 
waiting to undergo and undergoing [a] security screening[] [was] 
compensable under the [Fair Labor Standards Act]." 135 S. Ct. at 
515. The Court concluded that the "roughly 25 minutes" employees 
spent each day was not compensable work time. Id. 
¶157 In reaching that conclusion, the Court reiterated that 
it "has consistently interpreted 'the term "principal activity 
or activities" [to] embrac[e] all activities which are an 
integral and indispensable part of the principal activities.'" 
Id. at 517 (emphasis added) (quoting IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 
                                                 
11 Similar to the lead opinion, I will also refer to 
Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, as "Integrity 
Staffing." 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
11 
 
U.S. 21, 29-30 (2005)). Moreover, the Court clarified that "an 
activity is . . . integral and indispensable to the principal 
activities that an employee is employed to perform if it is an 
intrinsic element of those activities and one with which the 
employee cannot dispense if he is to perform his principal 
activities." 
Id. 
(emphasis 
added). 
Finally, 
the 
court 
unequivocally rejected other courts' reliance on a required-
benefit analysis: "The [Ninth Circuit] erred by focusing on 
whether the employer required a particular activity. The 
integral and indispensable test is tied to the productive work 
that the employee is employed to perform." Id. at 519 (emphasis 
omitted). Additionally, the Court noted, "A test that turns on 
whether the activity is for the benefit of the employer is 
similarly overbroad."12 Id. The Court rejected the required-
benefit approach because "[i]f the test could be satisfied 
merely by the fact that an employer required an activity, it 
would sweep into 'principal activities'" the type of preliminary 
and postliminary activities that Congress worried would "bring 
about the financial ruin of many employers," would result in 
"windfall payments" to employees, and attempted to remedy when 
                                                 
12 I 
agree 
with 
the 
lead 
opinion's 
and 
the 
concurring/dissenting opinion's conclusion that Tyson Foods need 
not be overruled because although the court of appeals applied a 
required-benefit test, it went on to discuss whether the 
"donning and doffing" under the circumstances present in that 
case were "integral and indispensable" to a principal activity. 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
12 
 
it enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act.13 Id. at 517, 519 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 251(a)-(b)). 
¶158 The "integral and indispensable" test is no cake walk 
for the party who seeks to establish its requisite elements; it 
imposes a tough standard. For example, in Steiner v. Mitchell, 
350 U.S. 247 (1956), the Court addressed  
whether workers in a battery plant must be paid as 
part of their "principal" activities for the time 
incident to changing clothes at the beginning of the 
shift and showering at the end, where they must make 
extensive 
use 
of 
dangerously 
caustic 
and 
toxic 
materials, 
and 
are 
compelled 
by 
circumstances, 
including vital consideration of health and hygiene, 
to change clothes and to shower in facilities in which 
the state law required their employer to provide, or 
whether 
these 
activities 
are 
"preliminary" 
or 
"postliminary" . . . . 
350 U.S. at 248 (emphasis added). In answering that question, 
the Court looked to the particular circumstances of the battery 
                                                 
13 Congress enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act in an effort to 
remedy a judicial interpretation of the Fair Labor Standard Act 
that if permitted to stand would have "br[ought] about the 
financial ruin of many employers" and would have resulted in a 
windfall of payments to employees "for activities performed by 
them without any expectation of reward beyond that included in 
their agreed rates of pay." Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. 
v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513, 517 (2014) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 251(a)-(b)). The Portal-to-Portal 
Act exempted employers from liability for claims based on 
"activities which are preliminary to or postlimiary to said 
principal activity or activities." Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. 
§ 254(a)). These preliminary or postliminary activities "occur 
either prior to the time on any particular workday at which such 
employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular 
workday 
at 
which 
he 
ceases, 
such 
principal 
activity 
or 
activities." Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)). 
 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
13 
 
plant, which included the fact that employees "customarily work 
with or near the various chemicals in the plant[, including] 
lead metal, lead oxide, lead sulphate, lead peroxide, and 
sulphuric acid." Id. at 249. There, the "very great" risks 
associated with the plant's conditions mandated "the removal of 
clothing and showering at the end of the work period." Id. at 
250. In fact, the practice of clothing removal and showering 
"[had] become [such] a recognized part of industrial hygiene 
programs in the industry [that] the state law of Tennessee 
[required] facilities for th[at] purpose." Id. 
¶159 Under those circumstances, the trial court found, and 
the Court agreed, that the employees' activities (changing 
clothes and showering) "[were] made necessary by the nature of 
the work performed; . . . and that they [were] so closely 
related to other duties performed by (petitioners') employees as 
to be an integral part thereof, and [were], therefore, included 
among the principal activities of said employees." Id. at 252 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). In short, 
changing 
clothes 
and 
showering 
was 
an 
"integral 
and 
indispensable" part of the production of batteries because 
without it, employees would be exposed to chemicals and 
potentially poisoned. Id. at 249. To emphasize just how integral 
the 
changing 
and 
showering 
was 
under 
those 
particular 
circumstances, the Court concluded by saying, "[I]t would be 
difficult to conjure up an instance where changing clothes and 
showering are more clearly an integral and indispensable part of 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
14 
 
the principal activity of the employment than in the case of 
these employees." Id. at 256. 
¶160 Mitchell v. King Packing Co., 350 U.S. 260 (1956), 
serves as another example of just how tough the "integral and 
indispensable" test is. In Mitchell, the Court considered 
"whether the knife-sharpening activities of the employees of 
respondent 
King 
Packing 
Co." 
were 
an 
"integral 
and 
indispensable" part of the principal activity of meatpacking. 
350 U.S. at 261. Meatpacking includes the "slaughtering, 
butchering, dressing, and distributing" of meat. Id. 
¶161 There, the Court noted that "[v]arious knives and 
electric saws [were] used on the butchering operation" and that 
"all of the knives as well as the saws must be 'razor sharp' for 
the proper performance of the work." Id. at 262 (emphasis 
added). The knives needed to be "razor sharp" because "a dull 
knife would slow down production which is conducted on an 
assembly line basis, affect the appearance of the meat as well 
as the quality of the hides, cause waste and make for 
accidents." Id. The Court added, "[for] a knife to be of any 
practical value in a knife job[, it] has to be . . . sharp." Id. 
(emphasis added). Consequently, the Court held that the knife-
sharpening 
activities 
were 
"an 
integral 
part 
of 
and 
indispensable to the various butchering activities for which 
[the employees] were principally employed." It did so because 
the knives needed to be "razor sharp" to perform the principal 
activity of slaughtering, butchering, dressing, and distributing 
the meat. Id. at 261, 262. 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
15 
 
C. THE OUTCOME OF THE LEAD OPINION AND THE CONCURRING/DISSENTING 
OPINION CANNOT SURVIVE APPLICATION OF THE "INTEGRAL AND 
INDISPENSABLE" TEST. 
¶162 Turning to the employees at the Beloit cannery, I 
conclude that the "donning and doffing" of the "whites" is not 
"integral and indispensable" to performance of a principal 
activity; therefore, it is not compensable. In this case, the 
"donning and doffing" of the "whites" by Hormel's employees is 
not an "intrinsic element" of canning food; moreover, an 
employee could easily dispense with the "donning and doffing" of 
the "whites" and still complete his or her principal activity of 
safely canning clean food.  
¶163 As 
a 
result, 
the 
lead 
opinion's 
and 
the 
concurring/dissenting opinion's conclusion that the "donning and 
doffing" of the "whites" is "integral and indispensable" to a 
principal activity is incorrect. It is incorrect for two main 
reasons: (1) the lead opinion says that the applicable federal 
food, health, and safety regulations require Hormel to have its 
employees "don and doff" the "whites", but the regulations do 
not contain such a requirement; and (2) the lead opinion relies 
on and affirms the circuit court's analysis, but the circuit 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
16 
 
court applied the wrong test.14 I will discuss these two reasons 
in detail, and then I will provide two examples of when "donning 
and doffing" would be compensable. 
 
1. The FDA and USDA Regulations Do Not Support The Lead 
Opinion's Conclusion. 
¶164 To begin, the "donning and doffing" of the "whites" is 
not required by the applicable federal food, health, and safety 
regulations. There was abundant testimony regarding this point 
at trial: 
Q. Are the whites necessary to avoid contamination at 
the Beloit facility? 
A. No, they're not. 
Q. Can you explain to me why that is? 
A. Again, back to the regulation, there's various 
means to an end. And in that type of environment, in 
the food safety realm, we kind of categorize our 
plants into, you know, maybe high-risk operations. In 
our meat and poultry establishments that produce 
ready, or what we determine to be ready-to-eat exposed 
meat products, those are determined to be high-risk 
operations. Canning operations such as the Beloit 
                                                 
14 Although this dissent refers most often to the lead 
opinion, the concurring/dissenting opinion suffers from the same 
shortfalls because it agrees with the lead opinion's point of 
view: "While I do not join the lead opinion, I agree with its 
conclusion that donning and doffing of company-required clothing 
and gear at the beginning and end of the workday is 'an integral 
part of a principal activity' of Hormel Foods Corporation for 
which 
compensation 
is 
required," 
concurrence/dissent, 
¶108 
(footnote omitted) (citing Lead op., ¶7), and "I agree with the 
lead opinion's conclusion that § DWD 272.12(2)(e)1. requires 
Hormel to compensate its employees for 5.7 minutes per day that 
have been cabined for donning and doffing clothing and equipment 
at the beginning and end of the workday," id., ¶117 (citing Lead 
op., ¶7). 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
17 
 
facility are deemed lower risk due to that 12-D type 
cook process, the canning process in general. 
Q. Could Hormel allow employees to wear street clothes 
at the Beloit facility and still comply with the FDA 
regulations?  
A. Yes, they could. 
Q. And could Hormel allow employees to bring whites 
home with them and bring them back to the facility and 
still comply with the FDA regulations?  
A. Yes, they could. The clothes just need to be clean. 
Q. So long as the clothing is clean? 
A. That's correct.  
Q. Do the FDA regulations require employees at the 
Beloit facility to keep their shoes within the 
facility? 
A. No, they do not. 
Q. What, if anything, do the regulations require in 
terms of the shoes people wear at the Beloit facility? 
A. Again, it's just clean and what we need to prevent 
adulteration of the product. 
Q. Are captive, or as you've termed it, dedicated 
shoe, is that necessary to avoid contamination at the 
Beloit facility? 
A. No, it's not. 
 . . .  
Q. Do the FDA regulations require employees at the 
Beloit facility to wear the hardhats that you see on 
Holly Hormel? 
A. No, the FDA regulations do not.  
Q. What, if anything, do the FDA regulations require 
in terms of hardhats? 
A. In terms of hardhats, nothing. As far as hair 
covering, they leave it to our discretion. The hair 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
18 
 
should be secured, a manner secured to prevent the 
potential for product adulteration. 
 . . .  
Q. Okay. Do the FDA regulations require employees at 
the Beloit facility to wear safety glasses? 
A. No.  
Q. Do the FDA regulations require employees at the 
Beloit facility to wash their hands? 
A. Again, the regulations are not very specific. It's 
somewhat of a means to an end, and it does describe 
where necessary they should be washing their hands. So 
if they're in direct product contact, they should be 
washing their hands per the FDA regulations. 
(Emphasis added.) Similarly, the USDA regulations do not require 
"donning and doffing": 
Q. Do the USDA regulations require employees at the 
Beloit facility to wear whites? 
A. No, they do not. 
Q. What, if anything, do the USDA regulations require 
in terms of clothing at the Beloit facility? 
A. Again, it's very open-ended in terms of, you know, 
there's various means to an end. We just have to 
prevent adulteration and the creation of insanitary 
conditions. So essentially clean clothes. 
Q. Do the USDA regulations specify who has to own or 
launder the clothing worn at the Beloit facility? 
A. They do not. 
Q. Do the regulations specify where those items are 
donned and doffed and stored? 
A. No. 
Q. Does wearing the whites at the Beloit facility 
comply with the USDA regulations? 
A. Yes, it does. 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
19 
 
Q. Are whites necessary to prevent the adulteration of 
product or the creation of insanitary conditions at 
the Beloit facility? 
A. No, they're not. 
(Emphasis added.) After hearing all the testimony regarding the 
federal regulations, the circuit court even concluded that the 
federal regulations do not require employees to wear the 
"whites," do not specify where the "whites" have to be "donned," 
"doffed," or stored, and do not require captive shoes. Indeed, 
the circuit court concluded that "Hormel employees could wear 
street clothes at the Beloit facility and still comply with the 
USDA and FDA regulations." (Emphasis added.) In sum, compliance 
with the federal regulations under these circumstances is not——
and cannot be——what makes the "donning and doffing" of the 
"whites" 
"integral 
and 
indispensable" 
to 
the 
employees' 
principal activity of canning food. The lead opinion nonetheless 
contorts these federal regulations into just such a conclusion. 
 
2. The Lead Opinion Conflates The Required-Benefit Test With The 
"Integral and Indispensable" Test. 
¶165 The lead opinion's reliance on the circuit court's 
"comprehensive decision holding in favor of the Union" is 
mistaken because the circuit court incorrectly applied the 
"integral and indispensable" test by repeatedly focusing on 
whether the "donning and doffing" was required by and benefitted 
Hormel. Lead op., ¶5. In other words, the lead opinion conflates 
the required-benefit test with the "integral and indispensable" 
test. 
¶166 After discussing whether the "donning and doffing" of 
the "whites" was required by and benefitted the employer, the 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
20 
 
circuit court appeared to transition to analyzing and applying 
the "integral and indispensable" test. In fact, the heading of 
this section in the circuit court's opinion and order reads, 
"ARE THE ACTIVITIES CLOSELY RELATED TO AND INDISPENSABLE TO 
PERFORMANCE OF A PRINCIPAL ACTIVITY?" Moreover, the circuit 
court acknowledged that "[e]ach of the class members agreed that 
there was nothing essential about the clothes Hormel required 
them to wear in order to get their job done. Each of them agreed 
that they could probably perform each of the movements required 
by their job even if wearing street clothes." The circuit court 
went on to quote plant manager Scott Ramlo: 
A. The clothes that they put on are there for their 
benefit and they're a good manufacturing practice and 
we require it, that's not disputed. But it, it doesn't 
have anything to do with the production of the 
product, 
I 
guess, 
for 
lack 
of 
-- 
maybe 
I'm 
oversimplifying it, but its not required, it -- I'm 
sorry, it's not essential as they make the product, it 
adds nothing to it. Now there are certain food 
manufacturing processes that, you know, perfectly 
clean clothes and, and like a ready-to-eat atmosphere, 
say something like that, we don't have any of those in 
the Beloit plant that it might add some value to it. 
But I can go there today and produce the products and 
do everything that everybody had on that screen other 
than the sanitation job, I can make that product the 
same quality. It's no different. And the key to the 
whole process in the Beloit plant being a cannery is 
that the product is pressure cooked and it's shelf-
stable. So any microorganisms, that type of thing that 
might be inferred by having perfectly clean clothing 
each 
day 
really 
is 
negated 
by 
the 
thermal 
process. . . .  
(Emphasis added.) Rather than applying the "integral and 
indispensable" test, however, the circuit court's analysis 
transformed into an analysis of the required-benefit test: 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
21 
 
"[t]he most important part of [Scott Ramlo's] answer was at the 
start when he admitted that wearing the whites and gear was 
required by Hormel." (Emphasis added.) 
¶167 The circuit court's emphasis ("the most important 
part") on the fact that "donning and doffing" the "whites" was 
required by the employer shows that the circuit court mixed a 
required-benefit analysis into what was supposed to be an 
"integral and indispensable" analysis. In fact, the circuit 
court's analysis is littered with references to the fact that 
"donning and doffing" was required by and benefitted Hormel: 
Ms. Collins agreed that she could physically perform 
the tasks she is required to perform at work in 
clothes 
she 
wore 
from 
home 
but 
Ms. 
Collins 
continually, and correctly, pointed out that she is 
required to wear those clothes and equipment in order 
to get into the canning part of the plant pursuant to 
Hormel's rules. 
The overwhelming evidence is that Hormel requires the 
class member to don and doff those materials to 
operate the Beloit facility in compliance with the 
federal regulations of USDA, FDA, and OSHA. There are 
also efficiencies already noted, an avoidance of 
recalls, and customer satisfaction benefits. All of 
these benefits are in place for Hormel because it 
requires the Class members to don and doff the 
clothing and equipment on the premises. 
I further find that the donning and doffing of the 
whites and related gear is indispensable to the 
performance 
of 
the 
class 
members' 
principal 
activities. This is so because Hormel has made it so. 
The only credible evidence is that Class members are 
required to wear these materials . . . ." 
These acts are obligatory, essential, and absolutely 
necessary because Hormel controls the process and has 
required these acts. 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
22 
 
The focus is not on what the United States government 
may require but, instead, what Hormel requires of its 
own employees. 
These activities are controlled by the employer for 
the employer's benefit and are integral to the Class 
members' work. 
(Emphasis added.) These are just a handful of times the circuit 
court looked at what Hormel required and whether Hormel 
benefited rather than looking to whether the "donning and 
doffing" of the "whites" was "integral and indispensable" to the 
principal activity of canning food.15 The circuit court did not 
have the benefit of the Supreme Court of the United State's 
decision in Integrity Staffing as the circuit court's decision 
was issued prior to Integrity Staffing. However, this court did 
have such guidance. The lead opinion's choice to rely on the 
circuit court's "comprehensive decision holding in favor of the 
Union" rather than the Supreme Court's instruction in Integrity 
Staffing is curious. 
 
D. ADDITIONALLY, THE TIME SPENT "DONNING AND DOFFING" THE 
"WHITES" DURING MEAL PERIODS IS NOT COMPENSABLE WORK TIME. 
¶168 Related to the question of whether "donning and 
doffing" of the "whites" at the beginning and end of each work 
day is compensable, is the question of whether "donning and 
doffing" 
during 
the 
employees' 
30-minute 
meal 
period 
is 
compensable. I have already concluded that the "donning and 
doffing" of the "whites" is not compensable because it fails the 
                                                 
15 Indeed, the circuit court seems to have concluded that 
the "donning and doffing" of the "whites" is indispensable 
because it is required. This is a conflation of the required-
benefit analysis and the "integral and indispensable" analysis.  
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
23 
 
"integral and indispensable" test. However, I briefly comment on 
the lead opinion's and the concurring/dissenting opinion's 
analyses of this issue because I believe that neither can square 
their determinations that the "donning and doffing" of the 
"whites" at the beginning and end of the workday is compensable 
with their determinations that the exact same "donning and 
doffing" is not compensable when done over the lunch hour. 
¶169 Most Hormel employees have a 30-minute unpaid lunch 
break. An employee may choose to go off his or her work premises 
to eat a meal. If an employee leaves, he or she is required to 
change out of his or her "whites" and then change back into the 
"whites" when he or she returns. Regardless of whether the 
employee leaves (and accordingly "dons and doffs") or stays on 
site, the employee is entitled only to 30 minutes. 
¶170 Hormel's employees argue that they have been denied 
the "right under Wisconsin law to have a 30-minute lunch period 
free from duty in which the employee is free to leave the 
premises." The test for whether meal time "donning and doffing" 
is compensable is simple and familiar: meal time "donning and 
doffing" is compensable if it is "integral and indispensable" to 
an employee's principal activity.16 
                                                 
16 In an attempt to reach its current outcome, the 
concurring/dissenting 
opinion 
distorts 
the 
analysis 
for 
lunchtime 
"donning 
and 
doffing." 
Although 
the 
concurring/dissenting opinion believes the "donning and doffing" 
of the whites is "integral and indispensable" to "sanitary food 
production" at the beginning and end of the day, it concludes 
that the same "donning and doffing" of the same "whites" is no 
longer 
"integral 
and 
indispensable" 
to 
"sanitary 
food 
production" when done over the lunch hour. Concurrence/Dissent, 
¶121. The concurring/dissenting opinion states, 
(continued) 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
24 
 
¶171 The lead opinion and the concurring/dissenting opinion 
believe that the "donning and doffing" of the "whites" is 
"integral and indispensable" to canning food and, therefore, 
compensable. Except, that is, when the "donning and doffing" 
occurs during the lunch hour instead of at the beginning and end 
of the work day. But the employees' principal activity has not 
changed; it is still canning food. And what is required to be 
"donned and doffed" has not changed; it is still the "whites." 
                                                                                                                                                             
First, no interest of Hormel is served by employees 
leaving its facility during lunch break. Stated 
otherwise, leaving Hormel's facility at lunch does not 
aid in sanitary food production, which is a principal 
activity of Hormel. Second, the choice to leave 
Hormel's facility at lunch is totally each individual 
employee's choice, not Hormel's. 
Id., ¶122 (emphasis added). There are two problems with this 
conclusion. 
First, the concurring/dissenting opinion focuses on what 
Hormel requires and whether Hormel benefits. As laid out in full 
earlier, conflating the required-benefit test with the "integral 
and indispensable" test goes against the law as clarified by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Integrity Staffing.  
Second, the concurring/dissenting opinion applies the wrong 
test by focusing on the employees' choice to leave. The test is 
whether the "donning and doffing" of the "whites" when entering 
and exiting the Beloit cannery (whether at the beginning and end 
of the day or at lunch) is "integral and indispensable" to 
canning food. The lead opinion and concurring/dissenting opinion 
say it is at the beginning and end of the day. Common sense 
would dictate that if "donning and doffing" the "whites" is 
"integral and indispensable" to canning food at the beginning 
and end of the day, then it must also be "integral and 
indispensable" to canning food at the middle of the day after 
lunch. 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
25 
 
The only change is the time at which the employee "dons and 
doffs."  
¶172 To say that "donning and doffing" of the "whites" is 
"integral and indispensable" when an employee arrives and leaves 
at the end of the day but is not "integral and indispensable" 
when an employee leaves and arrives at lunch is unsupported by 
the law. If the lead opinion and the concurring/dissenting 
opinion conclude (as they do) that the "donning and doffing" of 
the "whites" is so "integral and indispensable" to canning food 
at the start of the shift at the beginning of the day that it 
must be compensable, then they must also conclude that the 
"donning 
and 
doffing" 
of 
the 
"whites" 
is 
"integral 
and 
indispensable" to canning food at the start of the shift after 
the lunch period. The lead opinion and the concurring/dissenting 
opinion somehow do not. In doing so, the lead opinion and the 
concurring/dissenting opinion admit that the "donning and 
doffing" 
of 
the 
"whites" 
is 
not 
truly 
"integral 
and 
indispensable" to the employees' principal activity of canning 
food. 
E. "DONNING AND DOFFING" IS SOMETIMES COMPENSABLE. 
¶173 That the "donning and doffing" of the "whites" is not 
compensable under our specific factual circumstances becomes 
abundantly clear when compared to "donning and doffing" that is 
compensable under other circumstances. 
¶174 For instance, some of Hormel's employees are part of a 
sanitation crew; these sanitation crew members "play a real 
critical part in cleaning the entire plant up top to bottom 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
26 
 
every night . . . ." Employees who work in sanitation wear 
different and additional clothing and equipment: 
They will wear--the eyewear is more of a goggles and, 
in addition to a face shield. They also wear--the 
footwear would be different. They're standing in water 
the entire time. So tennis shoes, something like that, 
wouldn't be appropriate. And then they have--we call 
it a rain suit, but it's just a big yellow pants with 
suspenders and a coat that's yellow, too. So it 
protects them. And then they also, I think all of them 
wear 
arm 
guards. 
So 
you're 
sealed 
against 
the 
chemicals that you work with. Pretty much every job in 
our wet area, you're dealing with chemicals every 
night. 
Hormel pays its sanitation workers to "don and doff" this 
additional clothing and equipment because "[the sanitation 
workers] really couldn't do their job without [it]. I mean 
safety and commonsense, everything says that they wouldn't be 
able to safely work out there with all those chemicals without 
this equipment." (Emphasis added.) Simply put, the sanitation 
crew's 
principal 
activity 
is 
sanitizing 
the 
plant, 
and 
sanitizing the plant necessitates contact with "very caustic or 
acidic" chemicals; therefore, the sanitation crew must wear 
protective gear in order to sanitize the plant with chemicals.17 
                                                 
17 Scott A. Ramlo, plant manager at the Beloit cannery, 
testified that some of the chemicals the sanitation crew works 
with are "very caustic or acidic and will cause skin damage, 
irritation." He went on to say the following: 
Q. I'm sorry? Now, what, what are the cleaning 
materials please? 
A. It can be any number of chemicals, but it's a foam 
that comes from a central foaming station that will 
break the surface tension of the product on to the 
stainless steel.  . . . So the foam that he's using 
and applying there is corrosive materials that you 
(continued) 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
27 
 
¶175 Here is a second example. In addition to running a 
cannery, Hormel runs other types of food-related operations. In 
Algona, Iowa, Hormel runs a dry sausage operation, which 
primarily makes pepperonis.18 At trial, Francisco Velaquez, a 
resource and safety manager at Hormel, testified that pepperoni 
is a ready-to-eat meat product that must be produced in a ready-
to-eat facility. For comparison, plants that produce ready-to-
eat meat products are considered "high-risk operations" whereas 
canneries are considered "lower risk" because food product at a 
cannery goes through the 12-D cook or acidification processes. 
Because pepperonis are a high-risk, ready-to-eat meat product, 
employees at this type of facility must "don and doff" 
additional items on top of their "whites" to prevent different 
types of contamination (contamination that is not annihilated 
with a 12-D cook or acidification process).19 
                                                                                                                                                             
have to be protected from. And he'll spray that. After 
he's done, a quick rinse of the equipment when he 
first got to it, then he'll come and put that foam 
over the entire, all that equipment. You can see it's 
foam because it clings. 
(Emphasis added.) 
18 Interestingly, the employees in Tyson Foods primarily 
made pepperonis. 
19 Scott Ramlo, plant manager at the Beloit facility, 
testified, "There are certain things that you should probably do 
if you're making bacon or pepperoni or something that somebody's 
going to eat right out of the package versus what we do, which 
is a thermos-processed product that's fully processed in a can, 
very different than some other products." 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
28 
 
¶176 For instance, a high-risk, ready-to-eat meat facility 
is especially concerned with Listeria or Salmonella, which is 
often tracked into a plant by street shoes. To combat those 
risks, "[Hormel] ha[s] [its employees] change into these rubber 
boots. Then [the employees] have to go through something called 
a boot scrubber, and there [Hormel] appl[ies] quaternary 
ammonium" 
to 
reduce 
contamination. 
Additionally, 
employees 
"typically have plastic aprons that they put over their 
whites. . . . And then they have these things called sleeve 
guards that are plastic that go up to their elbows, and then 
they have rubber gloves that they wear that they tuck under 
their sleeve guards." 
¶177 Employees 
at 
these 
high-risk, 
ready-to-eat 
meat 
facilities are paid for the time they spend "donning and 
doffing" their additional gear; that is, they are paid for the 
time it takes to put on, wash, and take off their boots as well 
as the time it takes to put on and take off their aprons, sleeve 
guards, and rubber gloves. The "donning and doffing" of this 
extra 
gear 
is 
compensable 
because 
it 
is 
"integral 
and 
indispensable" 
to 
producing 
high-risk, 
ready-to-eat 
meat 
products. 
¶178 The above two examples help to illustrate exactly what 
the "integral and indispensable" test calls for. Namely, for the 
employer-required activity to be compensable, it must be an 
"intrinsic element" of the activity performed and "one with 
which the employee cannot dispense if he is to perform those 
activities." Integrity Staffing, 135 S. Ct. at 517. A sanitation 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
29 
 
crew member cannot dispense with his or her extra clothing and 
equipment due to the "very caustic or acidic" chemicals he or 
she is exposed to while performing his or her principal 
activities of cleaning and sanitizing. A ready-to-eat meat 
facility employee cannot dispense with his or her extra clothing 
and equipment due to the high-risk nature of certain types of 
contamination at a ready-to-eat meat facility. But a cannery 
employee at a "lower risk" facility can dispense with wearing 
"whites" and still safely produce clean food. 
¶179 In sum, Hormel's own employees put it best when they 
testified, and the circuit court found that "there is nothing 
essential about the clothes Hormel required them to wear in 
order to get their job done." (Emphasis added.) I agree with 
Hormel's employees. The "donning and doffing" of the "whites" is 
not "integral and indispensable" to the Beloit employees' 
principal activity of canning food; therefore, the time spent 
"donning and doffing" the "whites" is not compensable. 
 
III. WHAT THE LEAD OPINION DOES NOT DECIDE: THE DE MINIMIS NON 
CURAT LEX DOCTRINE. 
¶180 I 
now 
turn 
to 
the 
second 
issue: 
whether 
the 
requirement for compensation for time spent "donning and 
doffing" would be obviated by the doctrine of de minimis non 
curat lex ("the law doesn't care about trifles"). Because I have 
concluded that the employees "donning and doffing" of the 
"whites" is not compensable, I need not consider whether the 
time spent "donning and doffing" is de minimis.  
¶181 However, I write to point out that the lead opinion, 
while pretending to engage in a de minimis-like discussion, does 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
30 
 
not actually answer the question before us. Specifically, the 
lead opinion does not determine whether the de minimis doctrine 
applies in Wisconsin, does not explain what test or approach it 
used to reach its conclusion, and thus, does not provide any 
guidance for courts and parties moving forward. We grant review 
of cases only when "special and important reasons are presented" 
and when a decision will help "develop, clarify or harmonize the 
law." Wis. Stat. § 809.62(1r),(1r)(c). In choosing not to answer 
the question before this court, the lead opinion fails to help 
"develop, clarify or harmonize the law." As a result, while this 
case is decided by the lead opinion for these employees at this 
facility, the issue of whether the de minimis doctrine applies 
in Wisconsin and how a de minimis determination would be 
conducted lives on.20 
¶182 The de minimis doctrine simply asks the following: 
should all "integral and indispensable" activities, including 
those that last a single second or a handful of seconds or 
minutes be recorded by and paid for by an employer? See Anderson 
                                                 
20 As stated previously, we were called upon to determine 
whether the de minimis doctrine applies in Wisconsin. This was a 
question 
of 
first 
impression 
for 
this 
court. 
The 
concurring/dissenting opinion appears to adopt the de minimis 
doctrine in Wisconsin. It states, "I adopt and apply the Lindow 
test . . . .," concurrence/dissent, ¶130, and "If the time 
allocated for donning and doffing were not cabined at a 
specified number of minutes per employee per workday, the de 
minimis rule would preclude compensation . . . .," id., ¶109. 
But the concurring/dissenting opinion fails to explain why it 
chooses to adopt the de minimis doctrine in Wisconsin. Similar 
to choosing not to answer the question at all, blind adoption of 
the doctrine without any explanation fails to help "develop, 
clarify or harmonize the law." Wis. Stat. § 809.62(1r),(1r)(c). 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
31 
 
v. Mt. Clements Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946) ("Split-
second absurdities are not justified by the actualities of 
working conditions . . . ."). Or are there ever activities that 
take such a small, trivial amount of time that a court should 
not expect an employer to keep track of and compensate for this 
time? See JCG Industries, 745 F.3d at 842, 841 (noting that 
"[c]ommon sense has a place in adjudication" and commenting that 
"[o]ne reason to withhold a remedy is that the harm is small but 
measuring it for purposes of calculating a remedy would be 
difficult, time-consuming, and uncertain, hence not worthwhile 
given that smallness"); Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057, 
1062 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[C]ommon sense must be applied to the 
facts of each case."). The Supreme Court of the United States 
answered the de minimis question by holding that "[w]hen the 
matter in issue concerns only a few seconds or minutes of work 
beyond the scheduled working hours, such trifles may be 
disregarded." Anderson, 328 U.S. at 692.  
¶183 As a result, when a federal court determines that the 
time spent on an activity is compensable because it is "integral 
and indispensable," the court next determines whether that 
compensable time is rendered non-compensable by the de minimis 
doctrine. See id. at 693; Lindow, 738 F.2d at 1062 ("As a 
general rule, employees cannot recover for otherwise compensable 
time if it is de minimis."). In contrast, when a federal court 
determines that the time spent on the activity is not "integral 
and 
indispensable," 
the 
court's 
analysis 
ends 
and 
no 
compensation is due. See Integrity Staffing, 135 S. Ct. at 515 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
32 
 
(concluding 
that 
the 
activity 
was 
not 
"integral 
and 
indispensable" and, therefore, not proceeding to a de minimis 
analysis). We have never before determined whether we should 
take this same approach in Wisconsin.21 We were called upon to 
make that determination in this case. 
¶184 Because the lead opinion concludes that the employees 
"donning and doffing" of the "whites" is compensable, it could 
have engaged in a full discussion of whether the de minimis 
doctrine applies in Wisconsin.22 But it did not. To quote the 
lead opinion, 
                                                 
21 If we adopt this approach, then one possible way of 
resolving this issue would be as follows: (1) if a court 
concludes that an activity is not "integral and indispensable," 
then the analysis ends and no compensation is owed; but (2) if a 
court 
concludes 
that 
an 
activity 
is 
"integral 
and 
indispensable," then it must next consider whether the time 
spent on that activity is so short in duration that it qualifies 
as de minimis, in which case the time is not compensable. Under 
this 
approach, 
because 
the 
lead 
opinion 
and 
the 
concurring/dissenting opinion concluded that the time spent 
"donning and doffing" is "integral and indispensable," they 
would need to then consider whether that time is so short in 
duration that it qualifies as de minimis. If it qualifies as de 
minimis, then no compensation is due. 
22 Simply put, the lead opinion had an abundance of options 
in this case, but it chose none. The lead opinion could have 
concluded that the de minimis doctrine does not apply in 
Wisconsin. The lead opinion could have concluded that the de 
minimis doctrine applies in Wisconsin and then provided a 
practical framework for how to conduct a de minimis analysis. 
The lead opinion could have concluded that the de minimis 
doctrine applies and then held that the 2.903 minutes spent 
donning and doffing each day was too long in duration to qualify 
as de minimis. Rather than choose any of the above options, the 
lead opinion picked an outcome and reached a conclusion for 
these litigants on this day. 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
33 
 
Assuming, without deciding, that the 
de minimis 
doctrine is applicable to claims under Wis. Admin. 
Code § 272.12, we conclude that in the instant case, 
the de minimis doctrine does not bar compensation for 
the time spent donning and doffing the required 
clothing and equipment because the time spent donning 
and doffing is not a "trifle." 
Lead op., ¶98 (emphasis added).23 Why assume without deciding? 
The question was certified by the court of appeals, the parties 
spent roughly 17 pages of their respective briefs on the issue, 
and the parties addressed this issue during oral argument before 
this court. Perhaps the lead opinion chooses not to answer the 
question because it cannot reach its present outcome given what 
the law is. 
¶185 The law is this. The Supreme Court of the United 
States first applied the de minimis doctrine in Anderson v. Mt. 
Clements Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946). There, the employees 
alleged that their employers' method of calculating hours did 
not "accurately reflect all the time actually worked and that 
they were thereby deprived of" proper overtime compensation. 
Anderson, 328 U.S. at 684. The employees wanted their walk time 
to and from their workstations as well as their "donning and 
doffing" of work clothing included in their work hours. Id. at 
682-83. 
¶186 In resolving that question, the Court noted, 
                                                 
23 The concurring/dissenting opinion also notes that the 
lead opinion dodges the question of whether the de minimis 
doctrine applies in Wisconsin: "The lead opinion concludes that 
donning and doffing at the beginning and end of the workday are 
not de minimis, assuming that the de minimis rule may be applied 
to the Union's claims." Concurrence/Dissent, ¶1125 (emphasis 
added). 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
34 
 
When the matter in issue concerns only a few seconds 
or minutes of work beyond the scheduled working hours, 
such 
trifles 
may 
be 
disregarded. 
Split-second 
absurdities are not justified by the actualities of 
working conditions or by the policy of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. It is only when the employee is 
required to give up a substantial measure of his time 
and effort that compensable working time is involved. 
Id. at 692 (emphasis added). Later in the opinion, the Court 
reiterated, "it is appropriate to apply a de minimis doctrine so 
that insubstantial and insignificant periods of time spent in 
preliminary activities need not be included in the statutory 
workweek. Id. at 693 (emphasis added). The Anderson Court's 
focus was on time, specifically whether the activity took just 
"a few seconds or minutes." See also Lindow, 738 F.2d at 1062 
("An important factor in determining whether a claim is de 
minimis is the amount of daily time spent on the additional 
work."). 
¶187 While making sure to explain that it is not deciding 
whether the de minimis doctrine applies in Wisconsin, the lead 
opinion nevertheless discusses the doctrine and pays lip service 
to Anderson by quoting its use of the word "trifle." But 
unsurprisingly the lead opinion chooses not to apply Anderson's 
test.24 Instead, the lead opinion cherry-picks one factor (not 
                                                 
24 Again unsurprisingly, the concurring/dissenting opinion 
also gives Anderson, the Supreme Court of the United States 
decision that created the de minimis doctrine, a fleeting 
glance. The concurring/dissenting opinion mentions Anderson a 
meager three times in its entire de minimis discussion, which 
spans approximately five pages. See Concurrence/Dissent, ¶¶126, 
128, 131. Rather than rely on a Supreme Court decision, the 
concurring/dissenting opinion roots its analysis in a Ninth 
Circuit opinion, Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057 (9th 
Cir. 1984). In fact, the concurring/dissenting opinion formally 
(continued) 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
35 
 
found in Anderson) in which to ground its conclusion.25 The lead 
opinion states, 
[i]n the instant case, employees spend approximately 
24 hours per year donning and doffing. Viewed in light 
of the employees' hourly rate of $22 per hour, the 
unpaid period in question may amount to over $500 per 
year for each employee and substantial sums for 
Hormel. We agree with the circuit court that in the 
instant case this time is not a "trifle." 
Lead op., ¶102 (emphasis added).26 
                                                                                                                                                             
"adopt[s] and appl[ies] the Lindow test." Concurrence/Dissent, 
¶130.  
Lindow is cited by federal courts for its four-factor de 
minimis approach. Under Lindow, a de minimis determination looks 
at (1) the amount of daily time spent on the additional work, 
(2) the administrative difficulty in recording that additional 
time, (3) the aggregate amount of compensable time, and (4) the 
regularity of the additional work. 738 F.2d at 1062-63. Missing 
from the concurring/dissenting opinion's discussion of Lindow is 
a critical quote from Lindow: "Most courts have found daily 
periods of approximately 10 minutes de minimis even though 
otherwise compensable." Id. at 1062. Lindow itself stands for 
the proposition that the 7 to 8 minutes employees spent on 
activities qualified as de minimis. Id. at 1063-64. 
25 The lead opinion does not cite Lindow, but it arguably is 
where the lead opinion hand-picked the aggregate sum factor. If 
so, the lead opinion conveniently forgot to look at the first 
factor: "the amount of daily time spent on the additional work." 
Lindow, 738 F.2d at 1062 (emphasis added). 
26 The 
concurring/dissenting 
opinion 
also 
utilizes 
an 
aggregate sum factor: "In addition, although 5.7 minutes per day 
is a small amount of time, because it is expended every day, the 
aggregate amount of each employee's claim per year is $500, 
which is significant. It is also significant to Hormel as an 
aggregate 
amount 
for 
all 
food 
preparation 
employees." 
Concurrence/Dissent, ¶136 (emphasis added). Not only is the lead 
opinion's and the concurring/dissenting opinion's seemingly 
outcome oriented choice to ground their analyses in an aggregate 
sum factor not supported by the law (namely, Anderson), but also 
their outcome leads to disparate treatment under the law. A de 
minimis analysis that is focused on a dollar figure will favor 
(continued) 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
36 
 
¶188 Hidden in the lead opinion's language is a conclusion 
that is at odds with the law: that 2.903 minutes is not de 
minimis. The lead opinion cannot state outright that 2.903 
minutes is not de minimis because it would be hard-pressed to 
reconcile that determination with the fact that Anderson 
designed the de minimis doctrine to preclude compensation when 
"the matter in issue concerne[d] only a few seconds or minutes 
of work." 328 U.S. at 692 (emphasis added). Moreover, it cannot 
state outright that 2.903 minutes is not de minimis because it 
would have to face the fact that "[m]ost courts have found daily 
periods of approximately 10 minutes de minimis even though 
otherwise compensable." Lindow, 738 F.2d at 1062 (emphasis 
added) (holding that the 7 to 8 minutes the employees spent on a 
pre-shift activity in that case was de minimis and citing a 
litany of cases for the proposition that daily periods of 10 
minutes or less are de minimis). 
                                                                                                                                                             
those employees who are paid a higher wage. Employees who make 
only $5 per hour and file a wage and hour claim will have their 
aggregate sum declared de minimis, but employees who make $22 
per hour will have their aggregate sum declared not de minimis. 
Perhaps this is why Anderson's focus was on time, and whether 
the activity concerned just a few "minutes or seconds." 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
37 
 
 
 
¶189 If the lead opinion were to actually answer the 
question of whether the de minimis doctrine is a part of 
Wisconsin law, then it would have to focus on——or at the very 
least discuss——the amount of daily time spent on "donning and 
doffing" (here, 2.903 minutes) and whether that time qualifies 
as just a few "seconds or minutes." The lead opinion tiptoes 
past this quagmire by sidestepping the question entirely.27 
                                                 
27 The concurring/dissenting opinion also creeps past the 
time 
predicament 
but 
does 
so 
in 
a 
different 
way. 
The 
concurring/dissenting opinion concludes,  
If the time allocated for donning and doffing were not 
cabined at a specified number of minutes per employee 
per workday, the de minimis rule would preclude 
compensation because keeping accurate payroll records 
of the varying time that each employee spends donning 
and doffing would appear to be a nearly impossible 
administrative task for Hormel. 
Concurrence/Dissent, 
¶109. 
In 
sum, 
because 
the 
parties 
stipulated to 5.7 minutes, 5.7 minutes is not de minimis. 
Otherwise, 5.7 minutes would be de minimis. According to the 
concurring/dissenting opinion, this time becomes de minimis if 
it is not cabined because "if Hormel were required to record for 
payroll purposes the varying amounts of the time that each 
individual employee expends to don and doff at the beginning and 
end of each workday, it would appear to be almost an 
administrative impossibility to do so accurately." Id., ¶132; 
see also id., ¶¶ 109, 135, 138, 140. 
The 
problem 
with 
the 
concurring/dissenting 
opinion's 
conclusion that it "would appear to be" an administrative 
impossibility to accurately record the time is that the circuit 
court made the exact opposite finding of fact in its opinion and 
order. The circuit court spent nearly two and a half pages in 
its order and opinion specifically addressing whether it would 
be administratively difficult for Hormel to accurately record 
"donning and doffing" time. Indeed, the section of the circuit 
(continued) 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
38 
 
Consequently, the question is left unanswered and Wisconsinites 
are left wondering. 
¶190 In sum, the lead opinion could have resolved the issue 
of whether the de minimis doctrine applies in Wisconsin, and it 
could have provided a workable test or approach for how to 
conduct a de minimis analysis. It chose not to. When we accept a 
case, we do so to help "develop, clarify, or harmonize the law." 
As such, the lead opinion owed the people of Wisconsin and the 
parties a full and thorough discussion on whether the de minimis 
doctrine applies in Wisconsin as well as a discussion on the 
proper method or approach for conducting a de minimis analysis. 
                                                                                                                                                             
court's opinion and order is titled "Practical Administrative 
Difficulties." There, the court stated,  
Despite carrying the burden of proof on the de minimis 
issue, I find that Hormel has not provided credible 
evidence of administrative difficulties which may be 
encountered if it is required to record the additional 
donning and doffing time. As a result, factor two [of 
the Lindow test] also falls in favor of the Class. 
(Emphasis added.) Later, the circuit court again emphasized that 
"the vague and unsubstantiated opinions of Hormel employees 
about the administrative difficulties of reimbursing the Class 
members for donning and doffing are belied by the daily 
activities at the Beloit Hormel plant. . . . Hormel's processes 
show that it is able to monitor [employees] adequately." 
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the concurring/dissenting opinion's 
conclusion that it "would appear to be" an administrative 
impossibility to record the time spent "donning and doffing" is 
directly contrary to the circuit court's explicit finding of 
fact on that point. The concurring/dissenting opinion "appears" 
to ignore the circuit court's opposite finding of fact, as it 
fails to acknowledge the circuit court's factual finding and 
fails to provide any discussion of whether the circuit court's 
finding would be clearly erroneous. 
No. 2014AP1880.mjg 
 
39 
 
Because the lead opinion elects to leave today's question 
unanswered, it short-changes the people of Wisconsin. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶191 I cannot join the lead opinion because I believe it 
reaches the wrong conclusion as to whether the "donning and 
doffing" of the "whites" is "integral and indispensable" and 
reaches no determination as to whether the de minimis doctrine 
is a part of Wisconsin law or how a de minimis analysis is to be 
conducted in future cases. 
¶192 For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. 
¶193 I 
am 
authorized 
to 
state 
that 
Justice 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this dissent. 
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