Title: Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. New Jersey Civil Service Commission
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 8, 2018

Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. New Jersey Civil Service Commission Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In March 2013, the Civil Service Commission (the Commission) published amendments to the New Jersey Administrative Code (the Proposed Rule). The Proposed Rule introduced the concept of a “job band,” defined as “a grouping of titles or title series into a single broad band consisting of title levels with similar duties, responsibilities, and qualifications.” Under the Proposed Rule, employees could advance between banded titles without competitive examinations, and the appointing authority would have the discretion to choose among all of the candidates who demonstrated the required competencies, rather than choosing among the three highest-ranking eligibles. In the Commission’s view, there was “no Constitutional or statutory impediment to the advancement of employees to different levels within a single title without a formal, competitive examination.” On June 27, 2013, the Legislature passed a concurrent resolution declaring the Proposed Rule inconsistent with the legislative intent of the Civil Service Act. On December 4, 2013, the Legislature transmitted the concurrent resolution, commencing the thirty-day period for the Commission to amend or withdraw the rule. The next day, however, the Senate commenced the second phase of the Legislative Review Clause by introducing a concurrent resolution invalidating the Proposed Rule. At issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court was the Legislature’s first exercise of its constitutional authority under the Legislative Review Clause and the threshold question of whether and under what standard a court could review concurrent resolutions as to agency rules and regulations. The Court determined a court could reverse the Legislature’s invalidation of an agency rule or regulation pursuant to the Legislative Review Clause if: (1) the Legislature has not complied with the procedural requirements of the Clause; (2) the Legislature has incorrectly asserted that the challenged rule or regulation was inconsistent with “the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the language of the statute which the rule or regulation is intended to implement,” N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6; or (3) the Legislature’s action violates a protection afforded by any other provision of the New Jersey Constitution, or a provision of the United States Constitution. To determine legislative intent, a court should rely exclusively on statutory language and not apply a presumption in favor of either the Legislature’s findings or the agency’s exercise of its rulemaking authority. In this case, the Supreme Court found no procedural defect or constitutional infirmity in the Legislature’s actions. The Legislature correctly determined that N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A conflicted with two provisions of the Civil Service Act. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. New Jersey Civil Service Commission (A-47-16) (078742)Argued September 12, 2017 -- Decided August 8, 2018PATTERSON, J., writing for the Court. The Court considers the Legislature’s first exercise of its constitutional authority under the Legislative Review Clause and the threshold question of whether and under what standard a court can review concurrent resolutions as to agency rules and regulations. The Legislative Review Clause, adopted as an amendment to the New Jersey Constitution in 1992, authorizes the Legislature to determine whether an administrative rule or regulation promulgated by an executive agency “is consistent with the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the language of the statute which the rule or regulation is intended to implement.” N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6. The Clause prescribes a procedure through which the Legislature, by concurrent resolution, notifies the Governor and executive agency that the challenged rule or regulation contravenes legislative intent as stated in an enabling act’s statutory terms. Following delivery of that resolution to the Governor and the head of the agency, the agency is afforded thirty days to reconcile the disputed rule or regulation with legislative intent by amending or withdrawing it. Ibid. If the agency does not amend or withdraw the rule or regulation, the Legislature may commence the second phase of the process. Ibid. In that phase, a second concurrent resolution invalidating the rule or regulation is introduced in the Senate and General Assembly. Either house then holds a public hearing regarding the invalidation of the rule or regulation and delivers a transcript of the hearing to the desk of each legislator. Ibid. Twenty days after the transcripts are delivered, the Senate and General Assembly may vote to pass the resolution invalidating the rule or regulation. Ibid. In March 2013, the Civil Service Commission (the Commission) published amendments to the New Jersey Administrative Code (the Proposed Rule). The Proposed Rule introduced the concept of a “job band,” defined as “a grouping of titles or title series into a single broad band consisting of title levels with similar duties, responsibilities, and qualifications.” Under the Proposed Rule, employees could advance between banded titles without competitive examinations, and the appointing authority would have the discretion to choose among all of the candidates who demonstrated the required competencies, rather than choosing among the three highest-ranking eligibles. In the Commission’s view, there was “no Constitutional or statutory impediment to the advancement of employees to different levels within a single title without a formal, competitive examination.” 1 On June 27, 2013, the Legislature passed a concurrent resolution declaring the Proposed Rule inconsistent with the legislative intent of the Civil Service Act, N.J.S.A. 11A:1-1 to -12.6. On December 4, 2013, the Legislature transmitted the concurrent resolution, commencing the thirty-day period for the Commission to amend or withdraw the rule. The next day, however, the Senate commenced the second phase of the Legislative Review Clause by introducing a concurrent resolution invalidating the Proposed Rule. On December 23, 2013, the Commission announced amendments to the Proposed Rule (the First Amended Proposed Rule). On May 7, 2014, the Commission adopted the First Amended Proposed Rule as N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A. In the wake of the Commission’s adoption of the First Amended Proposed Rule, the Legislature recommenced the Legislative Review Clause procedure. On June 16, 2014, the Legislature passed a concurrent resolution declaring the First Amended Proposed Rule contrary to Article VII, Section 1, Paragraph 2 of the New Jersey Constitution, and the legislative intent of the Civil Service Act. The concurrent resolution stated that “[a]ny amended rule that contains a job banding provision or elimination of competitive promotional examinations” would be deemed to violate Article VII, Section 1, Paragraph 2 and “the Civil Service Act, including the spirit, intent, or plain meaning of N.J.S.A. 11A:3-1, N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1, or N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8.” The Legislature transmitted the concurrent resolution on June 17, 2014, thus commencing the thirty-day period for the Commission to amend or withdraw N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A. On July 16, 2014, the Commission proposed a third iteration of the job banding rule (the Second Amended Proposed Rule). The Legislature did not recommence the two-phase process. Instead, on September 29, 2014, a new concurrent resolution was introduced in the General Assembly that addressed both the First and the Second Amended Proposed Rules. The Legislature stated that the amendments were “not responsive to the . . . finding . . . that job banding is not consistent with legislative intent as expressed in the language of the Civil Service Act” and thus “do not in any way limit [its] ability to proceed with invalidating the job banding rule.” The Legislature thus resolved to invalidate N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A “in its entirety” and declared that “any subsequent amendments to said regulation shall be deemed null and void.” On October 22, 2014, the Commission adopted the Second Amended Proposed Rule as N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A. On December 18, 2014, the Legislature passed the final concurrent resolution at issue in this appeal, to invalidate the job banding rule. On February 9, 2015, the Chairman of the Commission issued a statement declaring job banding to be consistent with the Constitution and the Civil Service Act. The Chairman further asserted that the Legislature failed to properly invalidate N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A in light of the Second Amended Proposed Rule. The Commission subsequently approved two requests by appointing authorities to implement job banding pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A. The Commission’s approval of the positions constituted final administrative determinations, subject to appeal. See R. 2:2-3(a)(2). The Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO (CWA), the International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, AFL-CIO (IFPTE), and the Senate President and the Speaker of the General Assembly challenged the adoption and 2 implementation of the job banding rule. The Appellate Division granted the Senate and the General Assembly leave to intervene in two appeals. In an opinion by Judge Fasciale, an Appellate Division panel held that the Legislature properly invoked the Legislative Review Clause to invalidate N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2 A. 447 N.J. Super. 584, 606 (App. Div. 2016). The panel concluded that the deferential standard that ordinarily applies in appellate review of agency determinations should not govern an invocation of the Legislative Review Clause. Id. at 600. The panel prescribed a three- pronged standard to govern appellate review. Applying that standard to the dispute before it, the panel concluded that the Legislature had complied with the Legislative Review Clause’s procedural requirements. Id. at 602-03. The panel found no violation of federal or state constitutional norms in the Legislature’s action. Id. at 606. Finally, the panel concluded that the Legislature’s determination that there was a conflict between the job banding rule and the Civil Service Act “does not amount to a patently erroneous interpretation of the language of the [statute].” Id. at 603. It reversed the Commissioner’s final agency determinations, and vacated the implementation of N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A. Id. at 606. The Court granted the Commission’s petition for certification. 229 N.J. 590 (2017).HELD: A court may reverse the Legislature’s invalidation of an agency rule or regulation pursuant to the Legislative Review Clause if (1) the Legislature has not complied with the procedural requirements of the Clause; (2) the Legislature has incorrectly asserted that the challenged rule or regulation is inconsistent with “the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the language of the statute which the rule or regulation is intended to implement,” N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6; or (3) the Legislature’s action violates a protection afforded by any other provision of the New Jersey Constitution, or a provision of the United States Constitution. To determine legislative intent, the court should rely exclusively on statutory language. It should not apply a presumption in favor of either the Legislature’s findings or the agency’s exercise of its rulemaking authority. Here, the Court finds no procedural defect or constitutional infirmity in the Legislature’s actions. The Legislature correctly determined that N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A conflicts with two provisions of the Civil Service Act.1. The Legislative Review Clause imposes a series of procedural requirements for an exercise of a legislative veto. If the Legislature has not complied with those requirements, its attempt to invalidate the agency’s action is a nullity, and the reviewing court’s inquiry ends. (pp. 24-25)2. The separation of powers provision, N.J. Const. art. III, ¶ 1, was designed to maintain the balance between the three branches of government, preserve their respective independence and integrity, and prevent the concentration of unchecked power in the hands of any one branch. The doctrine requires not an absolute division of power but a cooperative accommodation among the three branches of government. Closely aligned with the separation of powers provision is the Presentment Clause, N.J. Const. art. V, § 1, ¶ 14, which bars the exercise of law-making power without the concurrence of both houses of the Legislature and approval by the Executive, unless the Legislature can muster a two-thirds majority vote of both houses to override the executive veto. Like the separation of powers 3 provision, the Presentment Clause was enacted to prevent unwarranted legislative interference with the executive branch and excessive legislative law-making power. (pp. 25-29)3. In 1981, the Legislature unanimously overrode a veto by Governor Byrne to enact the Legislative Oversight Act, which required that all new and amended regulations, except those mandated by federal law or related to an emergency affecting the public health, safety, or welfare, be submitted to the Legislature for review and approval. In General Assembly v. Byrne, the Court rejected an application for a declaratory judgment stating that the Legislative Oversight Act was constitutional. 90 N.J. 376, 385-95 (1982). It acknowledged the nexus between the separation of powers doctrine and the Presentment Clause, noting that “[a]ny legislative action that so removes the Governor from law making as to violate the Presentment Clause, Art. V, § 1, ¶ 14, threatens the separation of powers.” Id. at 385. The Court also held that the Act violated the separation of powers doctrine and the Presentment Clause “by giving the Legislature excessive power.” Id. at 395-96. The Court noted that “the Legislature cannot circumvent the constitutional requirement of presentment to the Governor merely by passing a statute which allows such a procedure.” Id. at 391. On the very day that General Assembly was decided, the Legislature passed a concurrent resolution proposing a constitutional amendment. In the 1985 general election, however, the voters rejected the proposed constitutional amendment. The Legislative Review Clause approved by the voters in 1992 is a grant of a far more limited power. By virtue of its limiting language, the Clause follows the constitutional principles of General Assembly. (pp. 29-34)4. When the Legislature exercises its constitutional authority to make laws, its actions are afforded highly deferential judicial review. In its rulemaking function, an executive agency is similarly afforded substantial deference. When the Legislature and Executive dispute the parameters of their constitutional powers, the separation of powers doctrine mandates vigilant judicial review. When a court reviews the Legislature’s finding that there is a conflict between the enabling statute and the rule or regulation, no presumption should operate in favor of the position taken by either branch. Instead, the court should simply determine whether the Legislature’s finding that the rule or regulation conflicts with statutory language is correct. The court should be guided exclusively by the statutory text, not by extrinsic evidence of legislative intent. That limitation effectuates the language ratified by the voters and serves the objectives of the separation of powers provision and the Presentment Clause because it tethers the veto power to the language of a statute passed by the Legislature and signed by the Governor. A reviewing court should also determine whether invocation of the Legislative Review Clause contravenes any other constitutional provision. In sum, a court should review the Legislature’s invalidation of an administrative rule or regulation under a three-part inquiry. (pp. 34-42)5. First, the Court addresses the Legislature’s compliance with the Legislative Review Clause’s procedural requirements. The Legislature prematurely commenced the Legislative Review Clause’s second phase in its challenge to the original Proposed Rule. That does not affect its second invalidation of N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A, which is the operative legislative action for purposes of these appeals, however. In that second invocation of its legislative veto 4 power, the Legislature took no action during the thirty-day period for the Commission to amend or withdraw the published rule. As to the assertion that there was a procedural defect in the Legislature’s subsequent challenge to N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A, the Clause does not specifically address a setting in which the agency amends the rule or regulation but the Legislature finds that amendment inadequate. The provision’s objective of ensuring that rules and regulations comport with their enabling statutes, however, would be undermined if an agency could indefinitely forestall a legislative veto by a succession of minor amendments that do not resolve the Legislature’s concern. Here, the Legislature correctly determined that the amendments did not address its objections, and properly proceeded to invalidate that regulation. There was no procedural defect in the Legislature’s exercise of the Legislative Review Clause. (pp. 43-46)6. The Court next considers whether N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A is consistent with the language of the Civil Service Act’s relevant provisions. (pp. 46-60) The Civil Service Act was enacted to secure the appointment and advancement of civil service employees based on their merit and abilities, and it emphasizes the role of competitive examinations in appointment and promotion. The Act’s legislative findings expressly acknowledge and reinforce Article VII, Section I, Paragraph 2 of the New Jersey Constitution. That provision does not require that merit and fitness be determined by competitive examination in every case, but only as far as practicable. In addition to stating the competitive examination requirement, the Civil Service Act addresses the procedure for those examinations and the appointments and promotions that derive from them. The Act charges the Commission to “provide for . . . [t]he announcement and administration of examinations which shall test fairly the knowledge, skills and abilities required to satisfactorily perform the duties of a title or group of titles.” N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1(a). Such “examinations may include, but are not limited to, written, oral, performance and evaluation of education and experience.” Ibid. Vacancies “shall be filled by a promotional examination when considered by the commission to be in the best interest of the career service.” N.J.S.A. 11A:4-2. Following a competitive examination, the Commission is charged to “certify the three eligibles who have received the highest ranking on an open competitive or promotional list.” N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8. The appointing authority is then permitted to select one of the three highest scoring candidates from an open competitive examination. (pp. 46-51) The Court concludes that N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A directly contradicts legislative intent as expressed in two provisions of the Civil Service Act, N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1 and N.J.S.A. 11A:4- 8. First, contrary to one of the chief policy goals identified by the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 11A:3-2.1, the Commission’s job banding rule authorizes promotions between banded titles in the competitive division without the competitive examinations addressed in N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1. The Commission argues that for employees in job banded titles, competency evaluations should be deemed to constitute the competitive examinations envisioned by Article VII, Section 1, Paragraph 2 and N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1. That assertion, however, is belied by the terms of the regulation itself, which makes clear its purpose to eliminate competitive examinations in advancement between positions within a job band. In short, by the very terms of the job banding regulation, competency evaluations are distinct from competitive 5 examinations, not their functional equivalent. Second, N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A directly contravenes N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8, the Civil Service Act provision codifying the “Rule of Three.” Under the job banding regulation, the Commission does not certify three eligible candidates based on their ranking in a competitive examination. Applying no presumption in favor of either the Legislature’s contentions or the validity of the Commission’s regulation, the Court concludes that the Legislature properly invoked the Legislative Review Clause. (pp. 51-60)7. Finally, the Court does not find any violation of a protection afforded by any other provision of the New Jersey Constitution, or by the United States Constitution, in the legislative veto at issue in these appeals. (p. 60) AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part, agrees that the Appellate Division rightly rejected the Commission’s challenge but dissents from the adopted standard for judicial review in Justice Patterson’s opinion, suggesting that a substantial deference standard is more consistent with constitutional text that explicitly provides the Legislature with veto power. Justice LaVecchia notes that the agency’s rulemaking power is merely derived from the Legislature’s enabling act and that, under the Constitution as now amended, the Legislature is authorized to explain its intent, using its language, and thereby explicate the legislative policy and principle of an enabling act for the benefit of the implementing agency. According to Justice LaVecchia, the Judiciary’s view of legislative intent, culled from statutory language using the usual tools of statutory construction, is as subordinate as that of the Executive’s in this setting. JUSTICE SOLOMON, concurring in part and dissenting in part, concurs in the majority’s stated standard of review but dissents because, here, the majority improperly applies that standard. In Justice Solomon’s view, the job banding regulation is consistent with the Constitution and the “intent” of the Civil Service Act (CSA) “as expressed in [its] language,” N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6, both in a general sense and in its particulars. Given the absence of conflict between the language of the statute and the stricken regulation, it appears to Justice Solomon that the Legislature relied on its view of the “spirit” of the CSA -- not the Act’s intent as expressed in its plain language -- to strike down the Job Banding Rule and that, by allowing it to do so, the majority expands legislative authority and reduces executive authority in a manner that threatens to undo the balance of powers established by Article III, ¶ 1, and Article V, § 1, ¶ 14 of the New Jersey Constitution.JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court as to both the applicable standard of review and the outcome in this appeal. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA filed a separate opinion -- concurring in the outcome in this appeal but dissenting as to the applicable standard of review -- in which JUSTICES ALBIN and TIMPONE join. JUSTICE SOLOMON filed a separate opinion -- concurring as to the applicable standard of review but dissenting as to the outcome in this appeal -- in which CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA join. 6 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 47 September Term 2016 078742COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Appellant-Respondent, v.NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellant.COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Appellant-Respondent, v.NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellant.IN THE MATTER OF JOB BANDING FOR SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT SPECIALIST 1 AND 2, AND NETWORK ADMINISTRATOR 1 AND 2, OFFICE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY.IN THE MATTER OF CHANGES IN THE STATE CLASSIFICATION PLAN AND JOB BANDING REQUEST, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION. 1 IN THE MATTER OF CHANGES IN THE STATE CLASSIFICATION PLAN AND JOB BANDING REQUEST, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION.IN THE MATTER OF JOB BANDING FOR SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT SPECIALIST 1 AND 2, AND NETWORK ADMINISTRATOR 1 AND 2, OFFICE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY. Argued September 12, 2017 – Decided August 8, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 447 N.J. Super. 584 (App. Div. 2016). Peter Slocum argued the cause for appellant New Jersey Civil Service Commission (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, of counsel; and Peter Slocum, on the brief). Leon J. Sokol argued the cause for respondents Stephen M. Sweeney, President of the New Jersey State Senate, Vincent Prieto, Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly, the Senate, and the General Assembly (Cullen and Dykman, attorneys; Leon J. Sokol and Herbert B. Bennett, on the briefs). Annmarie Pinarski argued the cause for respondent Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO (Weissman & Mintz, attorneys; Annmarie Pinarski and Steven P. Weissman, on the brief). 2 Arnold Shep Cohen argued the cause for respondent International Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers Local 195 (Oxfeld Cohen, attorneys; Arnold Shep Cohen, of counsel and on the brief). JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court. The Legislative Review Clause authorizes the Legislature todetermine whether an administrative rule or regulationpromulgated by an executive agency “is consistent with theintent of the Legislature as expressed in the language of thestatute which the rule or regulation is intended to implement.”N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6. The Clause prescribes a procedurethrough which the Legislature, by concurrent resolution,notifies the Governor and executive agency that the challengedrule or regulation contravenes legislative intent as stated inan enabling act’s statutory terms, and gives the agency anopportunity to amend or withdraw the rule or regulation. In asecond concurrent resolution, the Legislature invalidates therule or regulation. Ibid. In the five appeals before the Court, we consider theLegislature’s first exercise of its constitutional authorityunder the Legislative Review Clause. The appeals arose from theCivil Service Commission’s (the Commission) introduction of arule allowing “job banding,” the aggregation of certain publicemployment job titles in a “band” that permits employees toadvance to higher titles within a band without competitive 3 examinations. N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A. The Legislature contendedthat the Commission’s job banding rule contravened Article VII,Section 1, Paragraph 2 of the New Jersey Constitution, aprovision addressing competitive examinations in publicemployment, and the New Jersey Civil Service Act, N.J.S.A.11A:1-1 to -12.6. It first objected to, and then invalidated,the rule by concurrent resolution. Asserting that its jobbanding rule was consonant with the New Jersey Constitution andthe Civil Service Act, the Commission nevertheless adopted andimplemented that rule. The Commission’s actions were challenged in appeals filedby Stephen M. Sweeney, President of the Senate; Vincent Prieto,Speaker of the General Assembly; the Senate; the GeneralAssembly; and two unions representing public employees affectedby the job banding rule. A threshold question arose as towhether and under what standard a court can review concurrentresolutions as to agency rules and regulations. An AppellateDivision panel held that a court may reverse the Legislature’sinvalidation of a rule or regulation if the Legislature’s actionis procedurally deficient, if it violates federal or stateconstitutional protections, or if it constitutes a patentlyerroneous interpretation of the statutory language of theenabling act. Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n,447 N.J. Super. 584, 601 (App. Div. 2016). Under that standard, 4 the panel found no defect in the Legislature’s invalidation ofthe job banding rule. The panel therefore reversed theCommission’s decisions, and invalidated N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A. Id.at 606. We now modify the standard of review articulated by theAppellate Division panel to harmonize the Legislative ReviewClause with our Constitution’s separation of powers provision,N.J. Const. art. III, ¶ 1, and Presentment Clause, N.J. Const.art. V, § 1, ¶ 14. We hold that a court may reverse theLegislature’s invalidation of an agency rule or regulationpursuant to the Legislative Review Clause if (1) the Legislaturehas not complied with the procedural requirements of the Clause;(2) the Legislature has incorrectly asserted that the challengedrule or regulation is inconsistent with “the intent of theLegislature as expressed in the language of the statute whichthe rule or regulation is intended to implement,” N.J. Const.art. V, § 4, ¶ 6; or (3) the Legislature’s action violates aprotection afforded by any other provision of the New JerseyConstitution, or a provision of the United States Constitution.To determine legislative intent, the court should relyexclusively on statutory language. It should not apply apresumption in favor of either the Legislature’s findings or theagency’s exercise of its rulemaking authority. 5 Applying that standard of review to the legislative veto atissue in these appeals, we find no procedural defect orconstitutional infirmity in the Legislature’s actions. Weconclude that the Legislature correctly determined that N.J.A.C.4A:3-3.2A conflicts with two provisions of the Civil ServiceAct, N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1 and N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8. Accordingly, weconcur with the Appellate Division panel that the Legislatureproperly invoked the Legislative Review Clause, and we affirm asmodified its judgment. I. A. The Legislative Review Clause, adopted as an amendment tothe New Jersey Constitution in 1992, provides in relevant part: The Legislature may review any rule or regulation to determine if the rule or regulation is consistent with the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the language of the statute which the rule or regulation is intended to implement. Upon a finding that an existing or proposed rule or regulation is not consistent with legislative intent, the Legislature shall transmit this finding in the form of a concurrent resolution to the Governor and the head of the Executive Branch agency which promulgated, or plans to promulgate, the rule or regulation. The agency shall have 30 days to amend or withdraw the existing or proposed rule or regulation. If the agency does not amend or withdraw the existing or proposed rule or regulation, the Legislature may invalidate that rule or regulation, in whole or in part, or may prohibit that proposed rule or regulation, in whole or in part, from taking effect by a vote 6 of a majority of the authorized membership of each House in favor of a concurrent resolution providing for invalidation or prohibition, as the case may be, of the rule or regulation. This vote shall not take place until at least 20 calendar days after the placing on the desks of the members of each House of the Legislature in open meeting of the transcript of a public hearing held by either House on the invalidation or prohibition of the rule or regulation. [N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6.] The Legislative Review Clause thus prescribes a two-phaseprocedure. In the first phase, the Legislature passes aconcurrent resolution asserting an inconsistency between thedisputed agency rule or regulation and the Legislature’s intent,as expressed in the language of the enabling statute. Ibid.Following delivery of that resolution to the Governor and thehead of the agency, the agency is afforded thirty days toreconcile the disputed rule or regulation with legislativeintent by amending or withdrawing it. Ibid. If the agency does not amend or withdraw the rule orregulation, the Legislature may commence the second phase of theprocess. Ibid. In that phase, a second concurrent resolutioninvalidating the rule or regulation is introduced in the Senateand General Assembly. Either house then holds a public hearingregarding the invalidation of the rule or regulation anddelivers a transcript of the hearing to the desk of eachlegislator. Ibid. Twenty days after the transcripts are 7 delivered, the Senate and General Assembly may vote to pass theresolution invalidating the rule or regulation. Ibid. Prior to the legislative veto that gave rise to theseappeals, the Legislature had never invalidated a rule orregulation pursuant to the Legislative Review Clause. B. In March 2013, the Commission published amendments to Title4A of the New Jersey Administrative Code (the Proposed Rule).45 N.J.R. 500(a) (Mar. 18, 2013). The Commission stated thatthe Proposed Rule was intended “to codify a new job bandingprogram that would apply to positions in both State and localservice.” 45 N.J.R. at 501. The Commission acknowledged that it had been itsestablished practice to administer competitive examinations forpromotions in every job title in State service. Ibid. TheCommission deemed that process -- which required theannouncement of an opening, a determination of who is eligibleto take the examination, the administration of the examination,and the certification of the highest ranking scores to theappointing authority -- to be inefficient. 45 N.J.R. at 505. The Proposed Rule incorporated several significantamendments to that regulatory scheme. It introduced the conceptof a “job band,” defined as “a grouping of titles or titleseries into a single broad band consisting of title levels with 8 similar duties, responsibilities, and qualifications.” 45 N.J.R. at 507. It used the term “competency” to describe “theminimum level of training and orientation needed to successfullyperform at a particular title level within a job band.” Ibid.The Proposed Rule defined an “advancement appointment” as “amovement within a job band, upon achievement of a specificnumber of predetermined competencies, to a higher title leveland, where applicable, associated higher class code, which doesnot require competitive examination.” Ibid. The Proposed Rule also amended existing regulatorydefinitions. The term “promotion” was limited, in relation toState service positions, to “a movement to a title with a higherclass code not in the employee’s current job band.” Ibid. Theterm “title,” as applied to “titles approved for inclusion injob bands,” was defined to “mean the title level within the jobband, and, where applicable, the level’s associated class code,unless otherwise stated, or the context clearly suggestsotherwise.” 45 N.J.R. at 508. The Commission explained that under the Proposed Rule,employees could advance between banded titles withoutcompetitive examinations, and that the appointing authoritywould have the discretion to choose among all of the candidateswho demonstrated the required competencies, rather than choosing 9 among the three highest-ranking eligibles pursuant to N.J.S.A.11A:4-8. 45 N.J.R. at 505. In the Commission’s view, the constitutional and statutorymandate to conduct competitive examinations does not require the application of the formal examination process in every instance in which an employee demonstrates (and the needs of the appointing authority require) that he or she has progressed from being able to perform “routine” level work to being able to perform “complex” level work associated with the title. [ 45 N.J.R. at 502.]It explained that an employee’s progression -- treated inexisting regulations “as a 'promotion’ to the next higher, non-supervisory title in a title series” -- is more accuratelyviewed as the employee’s advancement “to the point where he orshe can be entrusted with higher level, non-supervisory duties.”Ibid. The Commission concluded that there was “noConstitutional or statutory impediment to the advancement ofemployees to different levels within a single title without aformal, competitive examination.” Ibid. The Commission predicted that job banding would “streamlinethe selection process by eliminating duplicative promotionalprocedures, while preserving the underlying principles of meritand fitness.” Ibid. 10 On June 27, 2013, the Legislature passed a concurrentresolution declaring the Proposed Rule to be inconsistent withthe legislative intent of the Civil Service Act. 1 A. Con. Res. 199 (2013) (enacted). In the concurrent resolution, theLegislature made the following findings: The proposed new Job Banding Rule, N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A, is contrary to the spirit, intent, and plain meaning of the provision in the New Jersey Constitution that requires that promotions be based on merit and fitness to be ascertained, as far as practicable, by examination, which, as far as practicable, shall be competitive. The fact that the proposed new rule would eliminate competitive promotional examinations for tens of thousands of positions for which such exams have been administered for decades is compelling evidence that it is practicable to continue to determine the merit and fitness of candidates for such promotional positions by competitive examination in accordance with the New Jersey Constitution. The proposed new rule is not consistent with the legislative intent that the public policy of this State is to select and advance employees on the basis of their relative knowledge, skills and abilities, ensure equal employment opportunity at all levels of public service, and protect career public employees from political coercion. The proposed new rule is not consistent with the legislative intent that a competitive promotional examination process be1 On June 20, 2013, the concurrent resolution was introduced in the General Assembly as ACR-199. On June 24, 2013, the Senate passed an identical resolution, SCR-158. On June 27, 2013, the Senate substituted ACR-199 for SCR-158. 11 established, maintained, and administered by the Civil Service Commission to ensure that promotions are based on merit and fitness and are not based on patronage or discriminatory reasons. The proposed new rule is not consistent with the legislative intent that whenever a veteran ranks highest on a promotional certification, a nonveteran shall not be appointed unless the appointing authority shall show cause before the commission why a veteran should not receive such promotion. The proposed new rule is not consistent with the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the language of the Civil Service Act, including the spirit, intent, or plain meaning of N.J.S.A. 11A:3-1, N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1,N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8 or N.J.S.A. 11A:5-7. [Ibid.] On December 4, 2013, the Legislature transmitted theconcurrent resolution to the Commission and the Governor, thuscommencing the thirty-day period for the Commission to amend orwithdraw the disputed rule under the Legislative Review Clause.The next day, however, the Senate commenced the second phase ofthe Legislative Review Clause by introducing a concurrentresolution invalidating the Proposed Rule. S. Con. Res. 166(2013). The Senate held a public hearing regarding theconcurrent resolution on December 12, 2013, thereby commencingthe twenty-day period that the Legislature was required to waitbefore voting to invalidate the Proposed Rule. See N.J. Const.art. V, § 4, ¶ 6. 12 On December 23, 2013, the Commission announced amendmentsto the Proposed Rule (the First Amended Proposed Rule). See 46 N.J.R. 260(a) (Feb. 3, 2014). In the First Amended ProposedRule, the Commission limited job banding to civilian, non-publicsafety job titles in State service. Ibid. It also confirmedthe applicability of the Title 11A veterans’ preference2 toadvancement appointments, and clarified remedies for allegeddiscrimination in job banding determinations. Ibid. On January9, 2014, the Legislature passed a concurrent resolution toprohibit the adoption of the Proposed Rule. 3 A. Con. Res. 215(2013) (enacted). On May 7, 2014, the Commission adopted the First AmendedProposed Rule as N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A, with an effective date ofJune 2, 2014. See 46 N.J.R. 1331(c) (June 2, 2014). In the wake of the Commission’s adoption of the FirstAmended Proposed Rule as N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A, the Legislature2 The veterans’ preference is a statutory requirement that “disabled veterans who receive passing scores on open competitive examinations shall be placed at the top of the employment list in the order of their respective final scores,”N.J.S.A. 11A:5-4, and that non-disabled veterans with passing scores “be placed . . . immediately after disabled veterans,”N.J.S.A. 11A:5-5.3 On December 12, 2013, the concurrent resolution, ACR-215, was introduced in the General Assembly. The General Assembly passed that resolution on January 6, 2014. On January 9, 2014, the Senate substituted ACR-215 for SCR-166. 13 recommenced the Legislative Review Clause procedure. On June16, 2014, the Legislature passed a concurrent resolutiondeclaring the First Amended Proposed Rule to be contrary toArticle VII, Section 1, Paragraph 2 of the New JerseyConstitution, and the legislative intent of the Civil ServiceAct. 4 S. Con. Res. 116 (2014) (enacted). In that concurrentresolution, the Legislature restated the findings set forth inits prior concurrent resolutions, except to delete the findingthat the Rule disregarded the veterans’ preference, and thecitation to N.J.S.A. 11A:5-7, which addresses the veterans’preference in promotion. Ibid. The concurrent resolutionstated that “[a]ny amended rule that contains a job bandingprovision or elimination of competitive promotionalexaminations” would be deemed by the Legislature to violateArticle VII, Section 1, Paragraph 2 and “the Civil Service Act,including the spirit, intent, or plain meaning of N.J.S.A.11A:3-1, N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1, or N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8.” Ibid. The Legislature transmitted the concurrent resolution tothe Commission and the Governor on June 17, 2014, thus4 On May 12, 2014, that concurrent resolution, SCR-116, was introduced in the Senate. On May 22, 2014, an identical resolution, ACR-155, was introduced in the General Assembly. On June 12, 2014, the Senate passed SCR-116. On June 16, 2014, the General Assembly substituted SCR-116 for ACR-155. 14 commencing the thirty-day period for the Commission to amend orwithdraw N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A. On July 16, 2014, the Commission proposed a third iterationof the job banding rule (the Second Amended Proposed Rule). 46 N.J.R. 1765(a) (Aug. 18, 2014). The Commission stated that inorder to avoid “the potential abuses alleged” in theLegislature’s latest concurrent resolution, it had amended thejob banding rule in two respects. Ibid. First, the SecondAmended Proposed Rule required an appointing authority to“obtain approval of the advancement appointment selectionprocess from the Chairperson of the Commission or designeebefore administering such process.” Ibid. Second, the SecondAmended Proposed Rule required the appointing authority, afterdetermining an advancement appointment, to “rank the candidatesfor the announced advancement appointment, taking into accountveterans’ preference, if applicable, . . . and to documentaccordingly.” Ibid. In the wake of the Commission’s publication of its SecondAmended Proposed Rule, the Legislature did not recommence thetwo-phase Legislative Review Clause process. Instead, onSeptember 29, 2014, a new concurrent resolution was introducedin the General Assembly. See A. Con. Res. 192 (2014). Thatconcurrent resolution addressed both the First Amended ProposedRule, already adopted as N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A, and the Second 15 Amended Proposed Rule. Ibid. The Legislature acknowledged theCommission’s amendments but stated that those amendments “wouldmake only minor changes and are not responsive to theLegislature’s finding . . . that job banding is not consistentwith legislative intent as expressed in the language of theCivil Service Act.” Ibid. Accordingly, the Legislaturedeclared that those amendments “do not in any way limit [its]ability to proceed with invalidating the job banding rulepursuant to [the Legislative Review Clause].” Ibid. The Legislature thus resolved to invalidate N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A “in its entirety” and declared that “any subsequentamendments to said regulation shall be deemed null and void.”Ibid. On October 22, 2014, the Commission adopted the SecondAmended Proposed Rule as N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2 A. 46 N.J.R. 2277(b)(Nov. 17, 2014). On December 18, 2014, the Legislature passedACR-192, the final concurrent resolution at issue in thisappeal, to invalidate the job banding rule.5 On February 9, 2015, the Chairman of the Commission issueda statement declaring job banding to be consistent with the5 On October 9, 2014, the General Assembly held a public hearing on ACR-192. On the same day, the Senate introduced its identical resolution, SCR-147. One week later, the transcripts of the public hearing were delivered to legislators’ desks. ACR-192 was passed by the General Assembly on November 13, 2014. The Senate substituted ACR-192 for SCR-147 on December 18, 2014. 16 Constitution and the Civil Service Act. The Chairman furtherasserted that the Legislature failed to properly invalidateN.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A in light of the Commission’s proposal of theSecond Amended Proposed Rule. The Commission subsequently approved two requests byappointing authorities to implement job banding pursuant toN.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A. In July 2015, the Commission authorized theOffice of Information Technology to band four job titles “inorder to streamline the appointment process with a more finelycalibrated system which considers competencies and jobperformance.” In re Job Banding for Software Dev. Specialist 1& 2, & Network Adm’r 1 & 2, Office of Info. Tech., CSC No. 2016-651, at 2 (July 31, 2015). The Commission found that the keydistinctions among the titles related to “the complexity of workperformed and the level of supervision received” in theposition, factors that could not accurately be tested by writtenexaminations. Id. at 6. The following month, the Commission authorized theDepartment of Transportation to band three Highway OperationsTechnician titles. In re Changes in the State ClassificationPlan & Job Banding Request, Dep’t of Transp., CSC Nos. 2016-778,-779, at 4 (Aug. 21, 2015). The Commission again found that thetitles differed from one another primarily with respect to “thecomplexity of work performed and the level of supervision 17 received” in the position, and that an employee’s ability toperform more complex work with less supervision could notaccurately be measured by competitive examinations. Id. at 3. The Commission’s approval of the Office of InformationTechnology and Department of Transportation positionsconstituted final administrative determinations by theCommission, subject to appeal. See R. 2:2-3(a)(2). C. The Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO (CWA), theInternational Federation of Professional and TechnicalEngineers, AFL-CIO (IFPTE), and the Senate President and theSpeaker of the General Assembly challenged the Commission’sadoption and implementation of the job banding rule in sixappeals, five of which are now before the Court. 6 The Appellate 6 The CWA filed three appeals. See Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, No. A-4912-13T3 (challenging Commission’s adoption of First Amended Proposed Rule as N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A); Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, No. A-3041-14T3 (challenging Commission’s February 9, 2015 determination that N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A conformed to Article VII, Section 1, Paragraph 2, and Civil Service Act); In re Job Banding for Software Dev. Specialist 1 and 2, and Network Adm’r 1 and 2, Office of Info. Tech., No. A-230-15T3 (challenging Commission’s final agency decision approving Office of Information Technology’s request to band titles pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:3- 3.2A). The CWA later withdrew its first appeal as moot. The IFTPE challenged the Commission’s final agency decision approving the Department of Transportation’s request to band titles pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A. In re Changes in the State Classification Plan and Job Banding Request, Dept. of Transp., No. A-232-15T3. The Senate President and the Speaker of the General Assembly filed the final two appeals. See In re 18 Division granted the Senate and the General Assembly leave tointervene in the two appeals filed by the Senate President andthe Speaker of the General Assembly. The Appellate Division denied stay applications filed bythe CWA and the IFPTE. It consolidated CWA’s three appeals, butdeclined to consolidate the remaining three appeals. In an opinion by Judge Fasciale, an Appellate Divisionpanel held that the Legislature properly invoked the LegislativeReview Clause to invalidate N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A. Commc’nsWorkers, 447 N.J. Super. at 606. The panel concluded that thedeferential standard that ordinarily applies in appellate reviewof agency determinations should not govern an invocation of theLegislative Review Clause. Id. at 600. Although it affordedthe Legislature “substantial deference” in exercising itslegislative veto, the panel reasoned that the Legislative ReviewClause neither limits appellate courts’ “traditional role ofinterpreting the law,” nor “preclude[s] the judicial branch fromexercising its role to enforce the checks and balances embodiedChanges of State Classification Plan and Job Banding Request, Dep’t of Transp., No. A-274-15T3 (challenging Commission’s final agency decision approving Department of Transportation’s request to band titles pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A); In re Job Banding for Software Dev. Specialist 1 and 2, and Network Adm’r 1 and 2, Office of Info. Tech., No. A-275-15T3 (challenging Commission’s final agency decision approving Office of Information Technology’s request to band titles pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A). 19 in the State Constitution.” Id. at 600-01. The panel declaredthat it retained its authority to review the Legislature’sfindings and conclusions to ensure that the Legislature hasproperly invalidated a rule or regulation rather than “passingnew legislation, subject to the presentment clause.” Id. at601. The panel prescribed a three-pronged standard to governappellate review: We therefore hold that we may reverse the Legislature’s invalidation of an administrative executive rule or regulation if (1) the Legislature has not complied with the procedural requirements of the Legislative Review Clause; (2) its action violates the protections afforded by the Federal or New Jersey Constitution; or (3) the Legislature’s concurrent resolution amounts to a patently erroneous interpretation of “the language of the statute which the rule or regulation is intended to implement.” [Ibid. (quoting N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6).] Applying that standard to the dispute before it, the panelconcluded that the Legislature had complied with the LegislativeReview Clause’s procedural requirements. Id. at 602-03. Thepanel found no violation of federal or state constitutionalnorms in the Legislature’s action. Id. at 606. Finally, thepanel concluded that the Legislature’s determination that therewas a conflict between the job banding rule and the CivilService Act “does not amount to a patently erroneous 20 interpretation of the language of the [statute].” Id. at 603.It reversed the Commissioner’s final agency determinations, andvacated the implementation of N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A. Id. at 606. We granted the Commission’s petition for certification.229 N.J. 590 (2017).7 II. The Commission argues that the Legislature failed to complywith the Legislative Review Clause’s procedural requirementswhen it exercised its legislative veto. It asserts that theCivil Service Act authorizes it to institute the practice of jobbanding and that job banding is not inconsistent with the Act’sprovisions regarding competitive examinations. The Commissioncontends that the Legislature improperly invoked the LegislativeReview Clause to divest the Commission of its statutoryauthority and to manage an executive agency, thereby violatingthe New Jersey Constitution’s separation of powers provision,N.J. Const. art. III, ¶ 1, and its Presentment Clause, N.J.7 After the Commission moved before the Appellate Division panel for a stay of the Appellate Division’s judgment pending this Court’s determination, the Commission, the CWA, and the Legislature consented to a stay of the Appellate Division’s judgment as applied to the 105 employees represented by the CWA who had received “advancement appointments” under N.J.A.C. 4A:3- 3.2A. The Appellate Division panel denied the Commission’s motion for a stay of the panel’s judgment. This Court denied the Commission’s motion for a stay of that judgment beyond the parameters of the consent stay and denied the Commission’s motion to accelerate the appeals. 21 Const. art. V, § 1, ¶ 14. The Commission urges the Court not todefer to the Legislature’s veto of N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A becausethat veto unconstitutionally abrogates executive authority. The Senate President, the Speaker of the General Assembly,the Senate, and the General Assembly argue that the AppellateDivision panel conducted appropriate judicial review in theseappeals and urge the Court to affirm the panel’s judgment. Theycontend that the Legislature complied with the procedural andsubstantive requirements of the Legislative Review Clause, thatit properly identified a conflict between the Civil ServiceAct’s competitive examination provisions and the Commission’sjob banding rule, and that it acted within the authorityconferred on it by the Legislative Review Clause when itinvalidated that regulation. The CWA agrees that the Legislature complied with theLegislative Review Clause’s procedural provisions and urges theCourt to defer to the Legislature’s finding of a conflictbetween the Civil Service Act and N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A. The CWAcharacterizes the passage of a concurrent resolution as “anaction squarely within the wheelhouse of the legislative branchof government” that is entitled to the same deference as thatafforded to a statute. It contends that the Legislatureproperly concluded that N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A contravened 22 legislative intent, as expressed in N.J.S.A. 11A:3-1, N.J.S.A.11A:4-1, and N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8. The IFPTE recognizes “no role for strict judicial review ofthe Legislature’s findings that a regulation is contrary tolegislative intent.” It contends that if the Legislaturefollows the procedures prescribed by the Legislative ReviewClause, judicial scrutiny of a veto should be limited to whetherthe Legislature has acted in a manner “repugnant to theConstitution.” The IFPTE urges the Court to apply that proposedstandard of review to uphold the legislative veto at issue inthese appeals. III. We first determine the standard by which a court reviews alegislative veto under the Legislative Review Clause. That determination begins with the language of theprovision itself. See State v. Buckner, 223 N.J. 1, 15 (2015)(“To understand the meaning and intent of a constitutionalprovision, courts look first to the plain language the framersused.”); Comm. to Recall Robert Menendez from the Office of U.S.Senator v. Wells, 204 N.J. 79, 105 (2010) (same). “If thelanguage is straightforward, 'the words used must be given theirplain meaning.’” Buckner, 223 N.J. at 15 (quoting State v.Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, 160 N.J. 505, 527 (1999)). Aconstitutional provision “must be interpreted and applied in a 23 manner 'that serves to effectuate fully and fairly itsoverriding purpose.’” Trump Hotels, 160 N.J. at 527 (quotingDickinson v. Fund for Support of Free Pub. Schs., 95 N.J. 65, 95(1983) (Handler, J., dissenting in part)). In our analysis, we strive to harmonize competingconstitutional provisions. State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 44(1996). We “consider[] all the parts [of the Constitution] as awhole, and not one part as a separate and independent provisionbearing no relation to the remainder.” Behnke v. Highway Auth.,13 N.J. 14, 24 (1953). A. The Legislative Review Clause imposes a series ofprocedural requirements for an exercise of a legislative veto.The Legislature must state, in a concurrent resolution passed byboth houses, its findings that an agency rule or regulationcontravenes the legislative intent of the enabling statute.N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6. It must then “transmit [that]finding . . . to the Governor and the head of the ExecutiveBranch Agency” responsible for the rule’s proposal. Ibid. Ifthe agency does not withdraw or amend the rule during thethirty-day window that the Clause prescribes, either the GeneralAssembly or the Senate holds a public hearing regarding therule’s invalidation, the transcript of which must be “plac[ed]on the desks of the members of each House.” Ibid. When twenty 24 days have elapsed after the delivery of the transcripts, theLegislature may vote to invalidate the rule. Ibid. Those procedural requirements serve fundamental goals: toensure that the executive agency and the public are on notice ofthe Legislature’s objection to the rule or regulation and togrant the agency the opportunity to address that objection byamending or withdrawing the rule or regulation. If theLegislature has not complied with those requirements, itsattempt to invalidate the agency’s action is a nullity, and thereviewing court’s inquiry ends. B. We next determine the scope of judicial review of theLegislature’s finding that a rule or regulation is inconsistent“with the intent of the Legislature as expressed in thelanguage” of the enabling act. N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6. 1. In our inquiry, we harmonize the Legislative Review Clausewith two other constitutional provisions, the separation ofpowers provision, N.J. Const. art III, ¶ 1, and the PresentmentClause, N.J. Const. art. V, § 1, ¶ 14. “[S]eparation of powers is a fundamental principle ofAmerican government, expressly provided for in the constitutionsof many states, and implied in almost all the others and in thefederal government from the creation of the three separate 25 branches of government.” David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 323(1965); accord Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Florio, 130 N.J. 439,449 (1992). The New Jersey Constitution codifies the doctrine: The powers of the government shall be divided among three distinct branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or constituting one branch shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as expressly provided in this Constitution. [N.J. Const. art. III, ¶ 1.] Our Constitution vests “[t]he legislative power . . . in aSenate and General Assembly.” N.J. Const. art. IV, § 1, ¶ 1.It grants “[t]he executive power . . . [to] a Governor.” N.J.Const. art. V, § 1, ¶ 1. Finally, the Constitution vests “[t]hejudicial power . . . in a Supreme Court, a Superior Court, andother courts of limited jurisdiction.” N.J. Const. art. VI,§ 1, ¶ 1. The separation of powers provision “was designed to'maintain the balance between the three branches of government,preserve their respective independence and integrity, andprevent the concentration of unchecked power in the hands of anyone branch.’” Florio, 130 N.J. at 449 (quoting David, 45 N.J.at 326). The provision recognizes “that each branch ofgovernment is distinct and is the repository of the powers whichare unique to it; the members or representatives of one branch 26 cannot arrogate powers of another branch.” Knight v. Margate,86 N.J. 374, 388 (1981). Separation of powers “is premised onthe theory that government works best when each branch ofgovernment acts independently and within its designated sphere,and does not attempt to gain dominance over another branch.” Inre P.L. 2001, Chapter 362, 186 N.J. 368, 378 (2006). Nonetheless, “we have always recognized that the doctrinerequires not an absolute division of power but a cooperativeaccommodation among the three branches of government.” Florio,130 N.J. at 449; accord Gen. Assembly v. Byrne, 90 N.J. 376, 382(1982); Knight, 86 N.J. at 388. “[T]he doctrine necessarilyassumes the branches will coordinate to the end that governmentwill fulfill its mission.” Brown v. Heymann, 62 N.J. 1, 11(1972). The purpose of the separation of powers doctrine “isnot to create three 'watertight’ governmental compartments,stifling cooperative action among the executive, legislative andjudicial branches,” but to “guarantee a system in which onebranch cannot claim or receive an inordinate power.” In re P.L.2001, 186 N.J. at 379 (quoting Florio, 130 N.J. at 450 (bracketsremoved)). Closely aligned with the separation of powers provision isour Constitution’s Presentment Clause, N.J. Const. art. V, § 1,¶ 14. That Clause provides in part: 27 When a bill has finally passed both houses, the house in which final action was taken to complete its passage shall cause it to be presented to the Governor before the close of the calendar day next following the date of the session at which such final action was taken. [N.J. Const. art. V, § 1, ¶ 14.] A bill presented to the Governor becomes law: (1) if the Governor approves and signs it within the period allowed for his consideration; or, (2) if the Governor does not return it to the house of origin, with a statement of his objections, before the expiration of the period allowed for his consideration; or, (3) if, upon reconsideration of a bill objected to by the Governor, two-thirds of all the members of each house agree to pass the bill. [Ibid.] The Presentment Clause bars “the exercise of law-makingpower without the concurrence of both houses of the Legislatureand approval by the Executive, unless the Legislature can mustera two-thirds majority vote of both houses to override theexecutive veto.” Gen. Assembly, 90 N.J. at 384; cf. INS v.Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 , 946 (1983) (“[T]he requirement that alllegislation be presented to the President before becoming lawwas uniformly accepted by the Framers.”). It confirms that allstatutes, unless passed by two-thirds of both houses of theLegislature after a veto, will be enacted with “the concurrence 28 of both houses . . . and approval by the Executive.” Gen.Assembly, 90 N.J. at 384. Like the separation of powers provision, the PresentmentClause was enacted to prevent “unwarranted legislativeinterference with the executive branch and excessive legislativelaw-making power.” Id. at 385. The Framers sought to ensurethat “no legislative action may have substantial policy-makingeffects without the approval of the Governor or a two-thirdsvote of both houses of the Legislature.” Id. at 389. The Presentment Clause, however, does not mandate that“every legislative action require[] the approval of both housesand presentment to the Governor.” Enourato v. Bldg. Auth., 90 N.J. 396, 408 (1982). To assess a legislative action’sconformity with the Presentment Clause, a reviewing courtdetermines whether the challenged action effects “a subsequentlegislative nullification of a policy that a former Legislatureenacted into law.” Id. at 407. Before our Constitution was amended to adopt theLegislative Review Clause, this Court invoked the separation ofpowers doctrine and the Presentment Clause to strike down anunrestricted legislative veto provision enacted by statute inGeneral Assembly, 90 N.J. at 385-95. The Court articulatedprinciples in General Assembly that guide our determination ofthese appeals. 29 In 1981, the Legislature unanimously overrode a veto byGovernor Byrne to enact the Legislative Oversight Act, L. 1981,c. 27. See id. at 379. That Act required that all new andamended regulations, except those mandated by federal law orrelated to an emergency affecting the public health, safety, orwelfare, be submitted to the Legislature for review andapproval. L. 1981, c. 27, §§ 1, 4. Pursuant to the LegislativeOversight Act, if the Legislature disapproved of the rule, itwas authorized to adopt a concurrent resolution invalidating therule within sixty days of its receipt of that rule. L. 1981, c.27, § 3. In General Assembly, this Court rejected an application fora declaratory judgment stating that the Legislative OversightAct was constitutional. 90 N.J. at 385-95. It acknowledged thenexus between the separation of powers doctrine and thePresentment Clause, noting that “[a]ny legislative action thatso removes the Governor from law making as to violate thePresentment Clause, Art. V, § 1, ¶ 14, threatens the separationof powers.” Id. at 385. The Court identified theconstitutional provisions’ dual objectives: To determine whether legislative action violates either clause, the Court must bear in mind the two purposes of both provisions: preventing unwarranted legislative interference with the executive branch and excessive legislative law-making power. In a scheme of government that frequently requires 30 cooperation between the branches of government, we cannot decide what constitutes excessive legislative power merely by intoning the abstract principles of separation of powers. To judge the constitutionality of the legislative veto provision in [the Legislative Oversight Act], the Court must determine its practical effects upon law making and law enforcement. [Ibid. (citation omitted).] The Court deemed the “extremely broad legislative veto”authorized by the Legislative Oversight Act to “frustrate[] theExecutive’s constitutional mandate to faithfully execute thelaw.” Ibid. “Even where the Legislature is not using its vetopower to effectively change the law,” the Court noted, “the vetocan illegitimately interfere with executive attempts to enforcethe law.” Id. at 386. The Court also held that the Act violated the separation ofpowers doctrine and the Presentment Clause “by giving theLegislature excessive power.” Id. at 395-96. It observed that [t]he legislative veto gives the Legislature unlimited potential to block any rules promulgated pursuant to a particular statute. The Legislature can use this power to exert a policy-making effect equivalent to amending or repealing existing legislation. A veto which effectively amends or repeals existing law offends the Constitution because it is tantamount to passage of a new law without the approval of the Governor. This violates the separation of powers, N.J. Const. (1947), Art. III, ¶ 1, and the Presentment Clause, Art. V, § 1, ¶ 14. [Id. at 388.] 31 The Court noted that “the Legislature cannot circumvent theconstitutional requirement of presentment to the Governor merelyby passing a statute which allows such a procedure.” Id. at391. The Court prescribed the following standard to determinewhether a legislative veto provision violates separation ofpowers principles and the Presentment Clause: “Wherelegislative action is necessary to further a statutory schemerequiring cooperation between the two branches, and such actionoffers no substantial potential to interfere with exclusiveexecutive functions or alter the statute’s purposes, legislativeveto power can pass constitutional muster.” Id. at 395; seealso Enourato, 90 N.J. at 401.8 The Court’s decision in General Assembly provoked “alegislative response . . . that was extraordinarily prompt by8 In Enourato, decided the same day as General Assembly, the Court identified a legislative veto provision that did not run afoul of the Constitution. 90 N.J. at 407. The statutory provision in dispute in Enourato permitted either house of the Legislature to veto building projects and lease agreements proposed by the New Jersey Building Authority. Id. at 399. The Court acknowledged that, taken to the extreme, “repeated legislative vetoes” could “effectively repeal” the enabling statute without presentment to the Governor. Id. at 407. However, it deemed that “[t]he potential . . . to effectively alter the policy of existing laws without presentment” to be “negligible under the limited veto power in the Building Authority Act.” Ibid. 32 any standard.” Kimmelman v. Burgio, 204 N.J. Super. 44, 48(App. Div. 1985). On the very day that General Assembly wasdecided, the Legislature passed a concurrent resolutionproposing a constitutional amendment. Under that proposal,Article V, Section 4, Paragraph 6 would have been amended toauthorize the Legislature, by a majority of the authorizedmembership of each House, to “invalidate any rule or regulation,in whole or in part,” and to “prohibit any proposed rule orregulation, in whole or in part.” S. Con. Res. 133 (1982). 9 Inthe 1985 general election, however, the voters rejected theproposed constitutional amendment. See Public Question No. 7(1985), http://www.njelections.org/election-results/1985-public-questions.pdf. The Legislative Review Clause approved by the voters in1992 is a grant of a far more limited power. See PublicQuestion No. 4 (1992), http://www.njelections.org/election-results/1992-public-questions.pdf. The Clause does not purportto confer on the Legislature the unfettered authority to vetoexecutive agency rules and regulations envisioned by the9 In accordance with an Appellate Division panel’s suggestion, Kimmelman, 204 N.J. Super. at 55, the proposed amendment’s interpretive statement cautioned voters that the amendment “would constitute a fundamental change in the relationship between the co-equal branches of government.” Public Question No. 7 (1985), http://www.njelections.org/election-results/1985- public-questions.pdf. 33 Legislative Oversight Act and the rejected amendment of 1985.N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6. Nor does it authorize theLegislature to use the veto power to amend the enabling statute,thus circumventing the Presentment Clause. See Gen. Assembly,90 N.J. at 391. By virtue of its limiting language, the Clausefollows the constitutional principles of General Assembly. 2. Against that backdrop, we consider the scope of judicialreview.10 As this Court has long recognized, when theLegislature exercises its constitutional authority to make laws,its actions are afforded highly deferential judicial review.Courts “can and should exercise caution and defer to[legislative] solutions when appropriately drafted by theLegislature.” In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96, 215 N.J. 578,616 (2013); see also Gangemi v. Berry, 25 N.J. 1, 9 (1957)10 Four of our sister states have constitutional provisions providing for legislative oversight of administrative regulations. Conn. Const., Amends. art. XVIII; Idaho Const. art. III, § 29; Iowa Const. art. III, § 40; Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1. No appellate court in any of those jurisdictions, however, has addressed the standard of review that governs a legislative veto of a rule or regulation. In a decision applying the Iowa constitutional provision, the Iowa Supreme Court addressed a different separation-of-powers question. It rejected the executive agency’s contention that only the Legislature, not the court, could review agency regulations; because the Legislature had not invoked its power to invalidate the regulation, the court reviewed that regulation with deference to the agency. Iowa Fed’n of Labor v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 427 N.W.2d 443 , 445-49 (Iowa 1988). 34 (stating that Legislature is entrusted “with the generalauthority to make laws at discretion” (internal quotation marksomitted)). A party seeking a ruling that a statute isunconstitutional “must hurdle '[t]he strong presumption ofconstitutionality that attaches’” to a statute. Buckner, 223 N.J. at 14 (alteration in original) (quoting Hamilton AmusementCtr. v. Verniero, 156 N.J. 254, 285 (1998)). When a statute ischallenged on constitutional grounds, it will be upheld unlessits “repugnancy to the constitution is clear beyond a reasonabledoubt.” Ibid. (emphasis removed) (quoting Gangemi, 25 N.J. at 10); accord Trump Hotels, 160 N.J. at 527. “When reasonablepeople 'might differ’ about the constitutionality of a law,courts 'must defer[] to the will of the lawmakers.’” Buckner,223 N.J. at 15 (alteration in original) (quoting N.J. Ass’n onCorr. v. Lan, 80 N.J. 199, 220 (1979)). In its rulemaking function, an executive agency issimilarly afforded substantial deference. When it establishesan administrative agency, the Legislature “delegate[s] theprimary authority of implementing policy in a specialized areato governmental bodies with the staff, resources, and expertiseto understand and solve those specialized problems.” BergenCty. Pines Hosp. v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 96 N.J. 456, 474(1984). We “defer to an agency’s interpretation of both astatute and implementing regulation, within the sphere of the 35 agency’s authority, unless the interpretation is 'plainlyunreasonable.’” In re Election Law Enforcement Comm’n AdvisoryOp. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010) (quoting Reilly v. AAAMid-Atl. Ins. Co. of N.J., 194 N.J. 474, 485 (2008)). An appellate court may reverse an agency decision only ifit is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. In re ProposedQuest Acad. Charter Sch., 216 N.J. 370, 385 (2013). Judicialreview is limited to three inquiries: (1) whether the agency’s action violates the enabling act’s express or implied legislative policies; (2) whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts the agency clearly erred by reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors. [In re Petitions for Rulemaking, 117 N.J. 311, 325 (1989).] In these appeals, however, we review neither a challenge toa statute’s constitutionality nor an agency’s routine exerciseof its rulemaking authority. Instead, we confront a discreteissue: whether the Legislature properly invoked its authorityunder the Legislative Review Clause. It is clear that the Clause expanded legislative oversightof agency rules and regulations. See Hunterdon Med. Ctr. v.Township of Readington, 195 N.J. 549, 571 n.15 (2008) (observingthat “the Legislature’s authority to challenge regulations with 36 which it disagrees has only increased” with amendment of ArticleV, Section 4, Paragraph 6); In re Adoption of RegulationsGoverning the State Health Plan, 135 N.J. 24, 28 (1994)(characterizing Legislative Review Clause as “a strong statementof the allocation of power between the state department and theLegislature”). The voters, however, granted that expandedauthority in only one setting: the Legislature may exercise itspower to veto a rule or regulation promulgated by the Executivein the event of an actual conflict between the rule orregulation and the intent of the Legislature as reflected in thelanguage of the enabling statute. N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6. Were we to presume that any legislative invocation of theLegislative Review Clause is correct, we would risk abrogatingexecutive rulemaking authority in violation of the PresentmentClause and separation of powers. As the Court has noted, “nodeviation from the . . . separation of powers [doctrine] will betolerated which impairs the essential integrity of one of the[three] branches of government.” In re P.L. 2001, 186 N.J. at 379 (alterations in original) (quoting Massett Bldg. Co. v.Bennett, 4 N.J. 53, 57 (1950)). When the Legislature andExecutive dispute the parameters of their constitutional powers,the separation of powers doctrine mandates vigilant judicialreview: 37 Although both the giving and taking of power can be constitutional if not excessive, the taking of power is more prone to abuse and therefore warrants an especially careful scrutiny. The case before us is one in which the Legislature has taken for itself a power normally lodged in the executive branch. Therefore, our deference to the Legislature must be accompanied by the most thorough and careful review to guard against the encroachment of one co-equal branch of government on another. [Florio, 130 N.J. at 457.] Consistent with that principle, we do not review either theLegislature’s construction of the enabling statute, or theagency’s position that its regulation conformed with thatstatute, with the broad deference that typically governsjudicial review. When a court reviews the Legislature’s findingthat there is a conflict between the enabling statute and therule or regulation, no presumption should operate in favor ofthe position taken by either branch. Instead, the court shouldsimply determine whether the Legislature’s finding that the ruleor regulation conflicts with statutory language is correct. The court should be guided in that inquiry exclusively bythe statutory text, not by extrinsic evidence of legislativeintent. That limitation effectuates the language ratified bythe voters. See N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6 (authorizingLegislature to determine whether administrative rule orregulation promulgated by executive agency “is consistent with 38 the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the language ofthe statute which the rule or regulation is intended toimplement”). It also serves the objectives of the separation ofpowers provision and the Presentment Clause because it tethersthe veto power to the language of a statute passed by theLegislature and signed by the Governor. See Gen. Assembly, 90 N.J. at 388 (noting need to ensure that veto is not exercised inmanner that “effectively amends or repeals existing law” withoutGovernor’s approval). C. We concur with the Appellate Division that a reviewingcourt should also determine whether the Legislature’s invocationof the Legislative Review Clause contravenes any other provisionof the New Jersey Constitution, or any provision of the UnitedStates Constitution. Commc’ns Workers, 447 N.J. Super. at 601. D. In sum, an appellate court should reverse the Legislature’sinvalidation of an administrative rule or regulation pursuant tothe Legislative Review Clause if (1) the Legislature has notcomplied with the procedural requirements of the Clause; (2) theLegislature has incorrectly asserted that the challenged rule orregulation is inconsistent with “the intent of the Legislatureas expressed in the language of the statute which the rule orregulation is intended to implement,” N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 39 6; or (3) the Legislature’s action violates a protectionafforded by any other provision of the New Jersey Constitution,or a provision of the United States Constitution. If the courtfinds that none of those standards have been contravened, itshould affirm the Legislature’s action. E. In Justice LaVecchia’s opinion, our concurring anddissenting colleagues refute arguments that are not asserted inthis opinion. See post at ___ (slip op. at 16-21). It isbeyond dispute that when the voters approved the LegislativeReview Clause, they expanded the Legislature’s authority tonullify executive agency rules, if those rules contravenelegislative intent as expressed in an enabling statute’slanguage. Supra at ___ (slip op. at 36-37); see also N.J.Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6. It is equally clear that when theLegislature exercises its authority to make laws, it is entitledto substantial deference in judicial review. Supra at ___ (slipop. at 34-35). Notwithstanding the contentions set forth in theconcurring and dissenting opinion, the standard adopted in thisappeal is not premised on the notion that the Clause grants tothe Executive a corollary power to interpret the enablingstatute, or that judicial review turns on the agency’s view ofwhat constitutes valid execution of the law. To the contrary, 40 that standard affords no deference to the views of the executiveagency. See supra at ___ (slip op. at 36-38). There is only one point of dispute between this opinion andthat of our concurring and dissenting colleagues: the secondcomponent of the three-pronged standard governing judicialreview of the Legislature’s invocation of the Legislative ReviewClause. Applying that aspect of the test, a reviewing courtdetermines whether the Legislature has incorrectly asserted thatthe challenged rule or regulation is inconsistent with theintent of the Legislature as expressed in the language of thestatute which the rule or regulation is intended to implement.That language is not a judicial invention; it is deriveddirectly from the text of the Clause itself. See N.J. Const.art. V, § 4, ¶ 6. Criticizing that test as conclusory and incongruent withthe Legislative Review Clause, post at ___ (slip op. at 16-17,20), our concurring and dissenting colleagues offer as analternative a standard premised on the Legislature’s “reasonableinterpretation” of its statute, post at ___ (slip op. at 23).The only three cases cited by our concurring and dissentingcolleagues in support of that standard do not address thesetting of this case. See White v. Wheeler, 577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 456, 460-62 (2015) (holding that federal court reviewingstate court’s excusal of juror under Antiterrorism and Effective 41 Death Penalty Act must be “doubly deferential” (internalquotation marks omitted)); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 , 195-96 (1997) (according “substantial deference to thepredictive judgments of Congress” when Congress creates nationalpolicy and “out of respect for its authority to exercise thelegislative power”); Roe v. Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 229 (1964)(acknowledging principle of “judicial deference to the will ofthe lawmakers” in challenge to constitutionality ofappropriations under redevelopment law). More importantly, that“reasonable interpretation” language is found nowhere in theLegislative Review Clause. Under the standard stated in this opinion, if theLegislature has correctly identified a conflict betweenstatutory language and the disputed rule or regulation, then ithas properly invoked the Clause, and its action is upheld. Ifnot, then the limiting language that the voters adopted in theLegislative Review Clause -- language that harmonizes the Clausewith the separation of powers doctrine and the PresentmentClause -- constrains the legislative veto. That judicialdetermination, grounded in the constitutional text, accuratelyreflects the Legislature’s intent when it proposed theLegislative Review Clause, and the voters’ intent when theyapproved it. IV. 42 In accordance with that standard, we review the legislativeveto invalidating N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A. A. We first address the Legislature’s compliance with theLegislative Review Clause’s procedural requirements. The Commission contends that after the Legislaturechallenged the Proposed Rule by concurrent resolution, itaccelerated the schedule for the second phase of the LegislativeReview Clause procedure by holding a public hearing and passinga concurrent resolution on the first day of the thirty-dayperiod in which the agency may amend or withdraw the rule. Weagree. The Clause provides that after the transmittal of theresolution to the Executive Branch, the agency “shall have 30days to amend or withdraw the existing or proposed rule orregulation.” N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6. It furtherprescribes that the Legislature may invalidate a rule orregulation “[i]f the agency does not amend or withdraw theexisting or proposed rule or regulation.” Ibid. Accordingly, the Legislative Review Clause does notauthorize the Legislature to take further action against anagency for thirty days after it delivers its findings in aconcurrent resolution to the Governor and the head of theagency. See Office of Legislative Servs., New JerseyLegislature Legislator’s Handbook 26 (2016-2017 ed.) (stating 43 that after Legislature transmits its concurrent resolutionstating its findings to Governor and executive agency, it “waits30 days for the executive agency to withdraw or amend the ruleor regulation”). Thus, the Legislature prematurely commencedthe Legislative Review Clause’s second phase in its challenge tothe original Proposed Rule. That does not affect its second invalidation of N.J.A.C.4A:3-3.2A, which is the operative legislative action forpurposes of these appeals, however. In that second invocationof its legislative veto power, the Legislature took no actionduring the thirty-day period for the Commission to amend orwithdraw the published rule. Accordingly, the timing of theLegislature’s first exercise of the Clause has no impact on ourdetermination. The Commission also asserts that there was a proceduraldefect in the Legislature’s subsequent challenge to N.J.A.C.4A:3-3.2A. It contends that when it proposed the Second AmendedProposed Rule within the thirty-day window, the Legislature wasrequired to restart the Legislative Review Clause process anewand to make findings specific to the Second Amended ProposedRule in a revised concurrent resolution. Instead, theLegislature declined to address the Second Amended Proposed Ruleand prospectively invalidated any future amendments. 44 The Clause does not specifically address a setting in whichthe agency amends the rule or regulation but the Legislaturefinds that amendment to be inadequate to address its concerns.The provision’s objective of ensuring that rules and regulationscomport with their enabling statutes, however, would beundermined if an agency could indefinitely forestall alegislative veto by a succession of minor amendments that do notresolve the Legislature’s concern. After the Commission’s second set of amendments to itsproposed rule and its adoption of N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A, theCommission amended the Rule only to provide for additionaladministrative oversight of the advancement appointmentselection process and to require the appointing authority torank candidates and document that ranking. The Legislaturecorrectly determined that the amendments did not address itsobjections, and properly proceeded to invalidate thatregulation.1111 Nothing in the Legislative Review Clause authorizes the Legislature to prospectively invalidate all future amendments to N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A; indeed, the Clause envisions that an agency may amend a rule or regulation in order to align it with the enabling statute. N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6. Although the Legislature resolved that any future amendments to N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A would be declared null and void in ACR-192, there were no such amendments, and that declaration had no impact on the outcome of these appeals. 45 We therefore concur with the Appellate Division’sconclusion that there was no procedural defect in theLegislature’s exercise of its authority under the LegislativeReview Clause. B. 1. We next consider whether N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A is consistentwith the language of the Civil Service Act’s relevantprovisions. The Civil Service Act governs civil service employment inNew Jersey, which includes all positions within state governmentand those within the political subdivisions that choose to adoptit and be governed by its terms. See N.J.S.A. 11A:2-11(e). Thestatute was enacted “to secure the appointment and advancementof civil service employees based on their merit and abilities.”Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Dep’t of Pers., 154 N.J. 121, 126(1998). “[T]he Act seeks to put civil service positions beyondpolitical control, partisanship, and personal favoritism.”Ibid. The Civil Service Act grants to the Commission theauthority to: a. Establish, administer, amend and continuously review a State classification plan governing all positions in State service and similar plans for political subdivisions; 46 b. Establish, consolidate and abolish titles; c. Ensure the grouping in a single title of positions with similar qualifications, authority and responsibility; d. Assign and reassign titles to appropriate positions; and e. Provide a specification for each title. [N.J.S.A. 11A:3-1.] It directs the Commission to “promulgate, pursuant to the'Administrative Procedure Act,’ [ N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -31],rules and regulations to effectuate the purposes of” the CivilService Act. N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1.2. Those “purposes” are definedby the statute to include the selection and advancement ofemployees “on the basis of their relative knowledge, skills andabilities”; the encouragement and rewarding of “meritoriousperformance”; and the retention and separation of employees “onthe basis of the adequacy of their performance.” N.J.S.A.11A:1-2. The Act’s provisions addressing the manner in whichemployees are appointed to particular titles and promoted fromone title to another are at the center of these appeals. The Civil Service Act emphasizes the role of competitiveexaminations in appointment and promotion. The Act’slegislative findings expressly acknowledge and reinforce ArticleVII, Section I, Paragraph 2 of the New Jersey Constitution. SeeN.J.S.A. 11A:3-2.1. That constitutional provision states: 47 Appointments and promotions in the civil service of the State, and of such political subdivisions as may be provided by law, shall be made according to merit and fitness to be ascertained, as far as practicable, by examination, which, as far as practicable, shall be competitive; except that preference in appointments by reasons of active service in any branch of the military or naval forces of the United States in time of war may be provided by law. [N.J. Const. art. VII, § 1, ¶ 2.] That provision “does not require that merit and fitness bedetermined by competitive examination in every case, but only'as far as practicable.’” Newark Superior Officers Ass’n v.City of Newark, 98 N.J. 212, 232 (1985) (quoting N.J. Const.art. VII, § 1, ¶ 2). As this Court observed, “[t]he framers ofthe Constitution recognized that although competitiveexaminations would be the general rule in Civil Serviceappointments and promotions, there would be situations wheresuch examination would not be practicable, and they madeexplicit provision therefor.” Falcey v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 16 N.J. 117, 122-23 (1954). Acknowledging that “appointments to certain types ofemployment are not readily made through a competitiveexamination process,” N.J.S.A. 11A:3-2.1, the Civil Service Actdivides the career service into a competitive division and anoncompetitive division. N.J.S.A. 11A:3-2. In contrast to the“examination and certification” process governing advancement in 48 the competitive division, the Act provides for “appointment” totitles in the noncompetitive division. N.J.S.A. 11A:4-13. TheCommission has the authority to “assign and reassign such titlesto each division and may provide for movement, includingpromotion, of employees from one division to the other.”N.J.S.A. 11A:3-2.12 Like the noncompetitive division of the career service, thesenior executive service, the State unclassified service, andthe political subdivision unclassified service are exempt fromthe competitive examination provisions of the Civil Service Act.See N.J.S.A. 11A:3-3 to -5. The Act also permits the Commissionto “waive an examination for an applicant who has a physical,mental, or emotional injury, impairment, or disability” thatmeets statutory criteria. N.J.S.A. 11A:7-13.1312 In 1993, the Legislature amended the Civil Service Act to bar the transfer of any title “from the State unclassified service or the senior executive service” to the noncompetitive division of the career service, and to bar the transfer or appointment of any “individual serving in a title of the State unclassified service or the senior executive service” to the noncompetitive division of the career service,” in the last six months of a governor’s term. N.J.S.A. 11A:3-2.2.13 Regulations other than N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A also authorize waivers of competitive examinations. See N.J.A.C. 4A:4-2.14 (authorizing waiver of examination for persons with disabilities); N.J.A.C. 4A:4-2.7 (authorizing Commission to waive examination for promotion if “[t]he employee has been successfully tested in the basic skills required for the promotional title”; [t]he employee has not failed, within one year prior to the announced closing date, a promotional examination for that title”; “[t]he number of interested 49 In addition to stating the competitive examinationrequirement, the Civil Service Act addresses the procedure forthose examinations and the appointments and promotions thatderive from them. The Act charges the Commission to “providefor . . . [t]he announcement and administration of examinationswhich shall test fairly the knowledge, skills and abilitiesrequired to satisfactorily perform the duties of a title orgroup of titles.” N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1(a). Such “examinations mayinclude, but are not limited to, written, oral, performance andevaluation of education and experience.” Ibid. Vacancies“shall be filled by a promotional examination when considered bythe commission to be in the best interest of the careerservice.” N.J.S.A. 11A:4-2. Following a competitive examination, the Commission ischarged to “certify the three eligibles who have received thehighest ranking on an open competitive or promotional list.”N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8. The appointing authority is then permitted to“select one of the three highest scoring candidates from an opencompetitive examination.” In re Foglio, 207 N.J. 38, 45 (2011)(quoting Local 518, State Motor Vehicle Emps. Union v. DMV, 262 N.J. Super. 598, 603 (App. Div. 1993)). That practice, known aseligibles for the promotional examination does not exceed the number of promotional appointments by more than two”; and “[v]eterans preference rights are not a factor”). 50 the “Rule of Three,” has “governed the certification ofcandidates to the appointing body as well as the appointingbody’s hiring discretion for over a century.” Ibid. (citing L.1908, c. 156, § 21). We conclude that N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A directly contradictslegislative intent as expressed in two provisions of the CivilService Act, N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1 and N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8. First, contrary to one of the chief policy goals identifiedby the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 11A:3-2.1, the Commission’s jobbanding rule authorizes promotions between banded titles in thecompetitive division without the competitive examinationsaddressed in N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1. The Commission has broad authority to “[e]stablish . . .and abolish titles”; “[a]ssign and reassign titles toappropriate positions”; and “[e]nsure the grouping in a singletitle of positions with similar qualifications, authority andresponsibility.” N.J.S.A. 11A:3-1. It is authorized toreallocate titles from the competitive division to thenoncompetitive division, thereby obviating the need toadminister competitive examinations in titles as to which theyare impracticable. N.J.S.A. 11A:3-2. In N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A, however, the Commission seeks to domuch more. For titles covered by the job banding rule, anemployment action that would otherwise be considered a promotion 51 requiring a competitive examination is renamed an “advancementappointment” exempt from the constitutional and statutorymandate. N.J.A.C. 4A:1-1.3. For job banded titles, N.J.A.C.4A:3-3.2A does not require the Commission to find competitiveexaminations impracticable in order to dispense with thoseexaminations. In short, N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A obviates the needfor the Commission to administer competitive examinations thatN.J.S.A. 11A:4-1 would otherwise require. The Commission notes that in accordance with N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A(d), an employee’s competencies are regularly assessed, andadvancement appointments are based on those competencies. Itargues that for employees in job banded titles, these competencyevaluations should be deemed to constitute the competitiveexaminations envisioned by Article VII, Section 1, Paragraph 2and N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1. That assertion, however, is belied by the terms of theregulation itself, which makes clear its purpose to eliminatecompetitive examinations in advancement between positions withina job band: (b) The Civil Service Commission shall review titles and title series in State service to determine whether they are appropriate for job banding. 1. This determination shall be guided by whether a movement from one position to a higher level position may be achieved based on an evaluation of relative 52 knowledge, skills, and abilities without resorting to competitive examination procedures, while still satisfying the State constitutional and statutory mandate for merit and fitness in selections and appointments. [N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A(b)(1).] Distinguishing the advancement procedures prescribed forjob banded titles from those governing titles outside of theband, the job banding regulation provided that “[t]he movementto a supervisory title outside of the band shall be effectedthrough promotional examination procedures.” N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A(i). In short, by the very terms of the job bandingregulation, competency evaluations are distinct from competitiveexaminations, not their functional equivalent. In the Social Impact statement of the Proposed Rule, theCommission underscored its position that its job banding rulewould dispense with competitive examinations for job bandedtitles. 45 N.J.R. at 505. Describing the complex and time-consuming process of promotion by competitive examination, theCommission stated that “[i]t is the intention of the proposednew job banding program to streamline the selection process byeliminating duplicative promotional procedures, while preservingthe underlying principles of merit and fitness.” Ibid. Accordingly, when it introduced the Proposed Rule, theCommission did not assert that the competency evaluations 53 envisioned by N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A(d) satisfied the statutoryrequirement of competitive examinations. To the contrary, itargued that it could achieve the Civil Service Act’s overridingobjectives of merit and fitness in appointments in banded titlesmore efficiently without the cumbersome competitive-examinationprocess. Ibid. As the Commission candidly stated when it published theProposed Rule, the evaluations used to determine advancementappointments between banded titles are distinct from thecompetitive examinations envisioned by Article VII, Section 1,Paragraph 2 and N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1. To the extent that suchevaluations are substituted for competitive examinations in thecompetitive division, they are inconsistent with legislativeintent, as expressed in the language of N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1.1414 The Commission’s reliance on its promulgation and enforcement of N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.7 to implement job banding in trainee positions, which prompted no legislative veto pursuant to N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6, is misplaced. That regulation, governing only “entry level employment,” requires a trainee to complete a training period before appointment to a “primary title,” N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.7(a), (c), (j). As the Commission stated in a final administrative action reallocating various trainee titles to the noncompetitive division of the career service, “competitive testing [for those trainee titles] is not practicable since the knowledge, skills, and abilities associated with a trainee title are evaluated during the mandatory training period.” In the Matter of Reallocation of Local Trainee Titles from the Competitive to the Non-Competitive Division of the Career Service, CSC Docket No. 2015-2987, final administrative action, (May 8, 2015), 2 http://www.state.nj.us/ csc/about/meetings/decisions/pdf/2015/5-6-15/B-74.PDF. The “trainee” titles are clearly within the category of positions 54 Second, N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A directly contravenes N.J.S.A.11A:4-8, the Civil Service Act provision codifying the “Rule ofThree.” Under the job banding regulation, the Commission doesnot certify three eligible candidates based on their ranking ina competitive examination, so that the appointing authority canselect one of the three for the position, as N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8provides. Instead, when an appointing authority identifies avacancy at a particular level within a job band, “it mayconsider all employees who have attained the predeterminedcompetencies.” N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A(d)(1). The appointingauthority then conducts “an advancement appointment selectionprocess approved by the Chairperson or designee” and determines“which employee or employees may receive an advancementappointment,” taking into account the veterans’ preference setforth in the regulation. N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A(d)(3). The“appointing authority” ranks the candidates and documents thatranking. Ibid. In short, for job banded titles, N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A eliminates the statutory certification and appointmentprocedure prescribed by the Civil Service Act, directlycontradicting the language of N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8.that “cannot be properly tested for, such as lower-level jobs which do not require significant education or experience,” for which the noncompetitive division exists. N.J.S.A. 11A:3- 2.1(d). 55 Applying no presumption in favor of either theLegislature’s contentions or the validity of the Commission’sregulation, we conclude that the Legislature properly invokedthe Legislative Review Clause, N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6.The Legislature correctly found the job banding practiceprescribed by N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A to be inconsistent withlegislative intent, as expressed in the language of two CivilService Act provisions, N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1 and N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8. 2. In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Solomonasserts that this opinion authorizes the Legislature toinvalidate executive action based on what he terms the“legislative spirit” of the Civil Service Act, therebycontravening separation of powers principles. Post at ___ (slipop. at 19-21). The Legislature’s concurrent resolutionsinvalidating N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A cited the “spirit” of variousprovisions of the Civil Service Act as well as its “intent” and“plain meaning.” S. Con. Res. 116; A. Con. Res. 192. To theextent that the Legislature intended to rely on the “spirit” ofthe Civil Service Act as distinct from its express language, itsinvocation of the statute’s “spirit” is immaterial to ouranalysis. In accordance with the express language of theLegislative Review Clause, we consider only whether N.J.A.C.4A:3-3.2A is “consistent with the intent of the Legislature as 56 expressed in the language” of the Civil Service Act. N.J.Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6. Notwithstanding the view expressed by our concurring anddissenting colleagues, that inquiry reveals a significantdisparity between statute and rule. The concurring anddissenting opinion stresses that N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A’sadvancement appointment selection process fairly assessescompeting candidates’ skills and experience, and that theprocess constitutes, in effect, the “competitive examinations”envisioned by N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1 and 11A:4-8. Post at ___ (slipop. at 10, 14-15). Not even the Commission, however, suggests that advancementappointments are competitive examinations within the meaning ofeither Article VII, Section I, Paragraph 2 of the New JerseyConstitution or N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1 and 11A:4-8.15 To the contrary,the Commission maintains that the grouping of multiple titleswithin a single band would further constitutional and statutoryobjectives to promote merit and fitness in public employment asit obviates the need for competitive examinations in the15 In light of the Commission’s amendments to the job banding proposal, the Legislature did not rely on N.J.S.A. 11A:5-7, the provision addressing the veteran’s preference in promotions, in the concurrent resolutions under review. See S. Con. Res. 116; A. Con. Res. 192. That statute is thus not relevant to our analysis. 57 advancement of employees within a given band. N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A(b)(1). In short, the Commission’s stated intent was not simply toredesign competitive examinations in the advancement ofemployees within a job band, as our colleagues suggest, but toeliminate competitive examinations in that setting. Ibid.; seealso N.J.A.C. 4A:3-1.2(b) (“A career service job title in thecompetitive division is subject to the competitive examinationprocedures of N.J.A.C. 4A:4-2, except as provided in N.J.A.C.4A:3-3.2A.”). Moreover, our concurring and dissenting colleagues cannotreconcile N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A with N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8, the CivilService Act provision that codifies the “Rule of Three.” Thejob banding rule abandons the statutory practice by which theCommission certifies three qualified candidates and theappointing authority selects one of those three candidates forthe position; it instead authorizes the appointing authority toselect from all employees with predetermined competencies forthe position. Compare N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A(d)(1) (“When anappointing authority determines a need to fill a position at aparticular level within a band, it may consider for advancementappointment all employees who have attained the predeterminedcompetencies.”), with N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8 (prescribing thatCommission “shall certify the three eligible who have received 58 the highest ranking on an open competitive or promotional list”and that appointment “shall be made from among those eligible”). The statutory language belies the notion, suggested in theconcurring and dissenting opinion, that the Rule of Three hasonly a limited application to the civil service appointment andpromotion process, and that it does not conflict with the jobbanding rule. Post at ___ (slip op. at 16). See In re Foglio,207 N.J. at 45-46 (discussing respective roles of Commission andappointing authority under N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8 “Rule of Three”procedure). Our concurring and dissenting colleagues suggest that the“Rule of Three” could be incorporated into a job bandingprocess. Post at ___ (slip op. at 16-17). Whether or not thatis so, the regulation before the Court does not attempt -- letalone accomplish -- such integration. See N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A(d)(1); 46 N.J.R. at 1339 (“The Rule of Three is notapplicable to advancements under job banding, since these arenot open or promotional appointments under N.J.S.A. 11A:4-18.”).By its own terms, N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A is simply incompatible withthe “Rule of Three” provision set forth in N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8. Our concurring and dissenting colleagues argue that theLegislature’s exercise of its veto authority under theLegislative Review Clause violates constitutional principles.Post at ___ (slip op. at 7-8, 19-20). We disagree. As the 59 voters authorized it to do, the Legislature invalidated N.J.A.C.4A:3-3.2A because it is inconsistent “with the intent of theLegislature as expressed in the language” of the Civil ServiceAct. N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6. C. Finally, we do not find any violation of a protectionafforded by any other provision of the New Jersey Constitution,or by the United States Constitution, in the legislative veto atissue in these appeals. Because the Legislature exercised itsveto power based on a proper finding that N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2Acontravened the language of provisions of the Civil Service Act,that veto comports with the separation of powers doctrine, N.J.Const. art. III, ¶ 1, and the Presentment Clause, N.J. Const.art. V, § 1, ¶ 14. The Legislature’s action implicates no otherprovision of the State Constitution, or any provision of theUnited States Constitution. V. We affirm as modified the judgment of the AppellateDivision. JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court as to both the applicable standard of review and the outcome in this appeal. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA filed a separate opinion -- concurring in the outcome in this appeal but dissenting as to the applicable standard of review -- in which JUSTICES ALBIN and TIMPONE join. JUSTICE SOLOMON filed a separate opinion -- concurring as to the applicable standard of review but dissenting as to the outcome in this appeal -- in which CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA join. 60 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 47 September Term 2016 078742COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Appellant-Respondent, v. NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellant.COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Appellant-Respondent, v. NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellant.IN THE MATTER OF JOB BANDING FOR SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT SPECIALIST 1 AND 2, AND NETWORK ADMINISTRATOR 1 AND 2, OFFICE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY.IN THE MATTER OF CHANGES IN THE STATE CLASSIFICATION PLAN AND JOB BANDING REQUEST, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION.IN THE MATTER OF CHANGES IN THE STATE CLASSIFICATION PLAN 1 AND JOB BANDING REQUEST, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION.IN THE MATTER OF JOB BANDING FOR SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT SPECIALIST 1 AND 2, AND NETWORK ADMINISTRATOR 1 AND 2, OFFICE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, concurring in the judgment anddissenting in part. In 1992, New Jersey voters approved a state constitutionalamendment that worked a substantial change in the framework ofState government. That constitutional amendment -- known as theLegislative Review Clause -- gave the Legislature the power toveto an administrative agency’s rule or regulation. N.J. Const.art. V, § 4, ¶ 6. Now, more than two decades later, this appeal arises in thecontext of the Legislature’s first and only use of that vetoauthority. Employing the Constitution’s procedural steps, theLegislature utilized its veto power to invalidate N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A, the “Job Banding Rule” promulgated by the Civil ServiceCommission (Commission). The Commission challenges theLegislature’s veto of the Job Banding Rule as not lawful. The appeal presents two questions. First, by what standardmay a court review the Legislature’s use of its constitutional 2 veto power. Second, does the legislative veto at issuewithstand challenge. Because I agree that the Appellate Division rightlyrejected the Commission’s challenge, I and three other membersof the Court comprise a majority to affirm the judgment of theAppellate Division. However, I disagree with the standard of review in JusticePatterson’s opinion, which is joined by three members of theCourt. In my view, that Court-adopted standard for judicialreview of the Legislature’s use of its constitutional veto powerfails to give due deference to the Legislature. For the reasonsmore fully set forth hereinafter, I respectfully dissent fromthe Court-adopted standard. When the Legislature exercises itsconstitutional veto power in a procedurally sound manner andinvalidates an administrative agency’s rule because theLegislature has determined that the rule contravenes legislativeintent as expressed in the statutory authority for the rule, theJudiciary should afford that legislative determinationsubstantial deference. I. A. The voters of New Jersey amended the State Constitution in1992 to add Article V, Section 4, Paragraph 6 to the powersentrusted to the Legislature. The Legislative Review Clause 3 permits the Legislature to review and invalidate ExecutiveBranch administrative rules and regulations. N.J. Const. art.V, § 4, ¶ 6. The amendment has a past, and that past is prologue to thequestion before us. To that history, I turn. B. The Legislature has long sought an oversight roleconcerning Executive Branch administrative rules andregulations. Undoubtedly, that is because of the sharedresponsibility between the two Branches for promulgatedadministrative rules and regulations, which carry the force andeffect of law. As this Court well recognizes, [m]any agency regulations differ little in their scope and effect from legislative commands. Yet, in our system of government, the Legislature and not the Executive must make the law. Administrative agency power derives solely from a grant of authority by the Legislature. The Legislature has the power to limit that scope of authority or even abolish it. [Gen. Assembly v. Byrne, 90 N.J. 376, 393 (1982).] Certain bedrock principles of administrative law and agencyrulemaking authority place into proper context the appropriateanalysis for the question the proper amount of judicialdeference due to the Legislature in its exercise of itsconstitutional veto power. Administrative agencies are 4 creatures of statute. In re Appeal of Certain Sections of Unif.Admin. Procedure Rules, 90 N.J. 85, 93 (1982) (“Agencies arespecially created by the Legislature to administer laws inaccordance with the statutory duties that have been selectivelydelegated to them.”). Each state agency operates pursuant to anenabling act that specifies the agency’s mission and powers.See generally 37 Steven L. Lefelt, et al., New Jersey Practice:Administrative Law and Practice § 1.6 (2d ed. 2000). Sometimesthe agency’s enabling act includes a grant of specific means bywhich the Legislature expects the agency to fulfill statutorypolicy, such as the grant of rulemaking authority oradjudicative authority. See Abelson’s, Inc. v. State Bd. ofOptometrists, 5 N.J. 412, 423 (1950). Such grants of authorityare recognized as “grant[s] of administrative power for theexecution of the statutory policy; and its exercise is ofnecessity restrained by the declared policy and spirit of thestatute and the criteria and standards therein laid down.”Ibid.; see also State Chamber of Commerce v. Election Law Enf’tComm’n, 82 N.J. 57, 82-83 (1980) (noting that even when broadrulemaking authority is granted, agency may not promulgateregulations that alter or frustrate terms or policy embodied instatute). Thus, when an enabling statute delegates rulemaking powerto an agency, as has been done in the present instance for the 5 Commission, see N.J.S.A. 11A:2-6(d) (conferring broad rulemakingauthority), the administrative agency has quasi-legislativepower to promulgate rules that carry the force and effect of lawbecause the Legislative Branch has authorized the rulemakingpower, Abelson’s, 5 N.J. at 423-24. And, rulemaking is not animpermissible delegation of “essential legislative power incontravention of constitutional limitations” when it is subjectto proper legislative limits guiding the discretionary actionsof the agency. Ibid. (“[R]ules and regulations . . . cannotsubvert or enlarge upon the statutory policy . . . [and] cannotdeviate from the principle and policy of the statute.”).Tethering rulemaking authority to its delegation and tolimitations expressed and implied by the principles and policyof the legislative grant of authority is essential. As thisCourt has explained, “[t]he distinction is between the makingand the execution of the law.” Id. at 423. In sum, an agencymay promulgate regulations as valid administrative action, andnot as impermissible legislative action, when authorized andsubject to the limits of its authority delegated by theLegislature. Id. at 424. Thus, there is an inherent tension in legislative grants ofrulemaking authority, as the agency must implement therulemaking responsibility entrusted to it without transgressingthe limits of the delegated power received from the Legislature. 6 To the extent there is ambiguity in an enabling statute,administrative agencies have received, in challenges to theauthority of a rule brought by a third party member of thepublic, the benefit of a liberal construction, particularly whenpublic health or welfare are involved. N.J. Guild of HearingAid Dispensers v. Long, 75 N.J. 544, 562 (1978) (“[T]he grant ofauthority to an administrative agency is to be liberallyconstrued in order to enable the agency to accomplish itsstatutory responsibilities and . . . courts should readily implysuch incidental powers as are necessary to effectuate fully thelegislative intent.”). However, legislative intent is thetouchstone. And now, through the Legislative Review Clause, theLegislature gets its say about what its words in an enablingstatute were intended to authorize an administrative agency todo when the agency exercises its delegated rulemaking authority.But that took a while for the Legislature to accomplish. The 1980s marked the beginning of the Legislature’spersistent endeavors to establish a legislative review overagency rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to legislativedelegations of authority. The Legislature consistently madeefforts to have a substantive say in whether an agency’sregulations exceeded the legislative intent for the regulatoryscheme entrusted to an agency for implementation. 7 The Legislature’s first effort to accomplish that goaloccurred when the Legislature overrode a gubernatorial veto topass the Legislative Oversight Act (or “the Act”), L. 1981, c.27 (codified at N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4.1 to -4.9). The Act requiredall new and amendatory regulations to be submitted to theLegislature for review and approval. L. 1981, c. 27, §§ 1, 2.Under the Act’s new scheme for review of promulgatedregulations, the Legislature had sixty days from receipt of asubmitted rule to disapprove it through the adoption of aconcurrent resolution. L. 1981, c. 27, § 3. The legislationcontained no standard for the Legislature’s exercise of itspower to invalidate a rule. Ibid. The Act also gavedisapproval authority to a newly created joint LegislativeOversight Committee, to which the Legislature also entrusted thereview of rules to ensure that the rules were “consistent withlegislative intent, in accord with judicial findings, and withinthe scope of the promulgating agency’s authority.” L. 1981, c.27, §§ 5, 6, 7. The Act stated that it applied to all rules,subject to an exception not relevant here. See L. 1981, c. 27,§ 4. The shift in power between the Branches of governmentwrought by the Legislative Oversight Act generated inter-Branch 8 conflict.1 That led the Legislature, in 1982, to file an actionseeking a declaration that the Legislative Oversight Act wasconstitutional. Gen. Assembly, 90 N.J. at 378. The suit provedultimately unsuccessful. On July 22, 1982, this Court declaredthe legislation unconstitutional under the State Constitution’sSeparation of Powers and Presentment Clauses. Id. at 395-96. With respect to separation of powers, the Court held thatthe legislative veto “excessively” interfered with thefunctioning of the Executive Branch in two ways. Id. at 378.The Court determined that the statutorily created legislative“power to revoke at will portions of coherent regulatoryschemes” was unconstitutional because it would “imped[e] theExecutive in its constitutional mandate to faithfully executethe law.” Ibid. The Court determined that the “legislativeveto further offend[ed] the separation of powers [doctrine] byallowing the Legislature to effectively amend or repeal existing1 On March 10, 1981, the Attorney General issued a Formal Opinion to Counsel to the Governor, Daniel O’Hern, opining that the Legislative Oversight Act was unconstitutional. Specifically, the Opinion advised that the Act’s provisions concerning the means for effectuating the new legislative veto power constituted acts that were equivalent to legislation. From that determination, the Opinion reasoned that the Act’s provisions were inconsistent with state constitutional requirements for the passage of legislation and for the presentment of the same to the governor for his review and approval. The Attorney General advised the Governor’s Counsel that the administrative agencies of state government should be directed not to conform their rulemaking activities to the law’s requirements on its effective date. 9 laws without participation by the Governor.” Id. at 378-79.With respect to the Presentment Clause, the legislative vetoprocess enacted through the Act also was determined tocontravene that Clause’s procedural requirements, by whichchanges to legislative policy must occur “by a majority vote ofboth houses of the Legislature and approval by the Governor or,after executive veto, by a two-thirds vote of both houses.” Id.at 379. The General Assembly decision left room for inter-Branchcooperation under the Constitution’s provisions at the time. Asnoted in a companion case decided the same day, the Courtunderscored that “in General Assembly[, it] made clear that theseparation of powers leaves room for some legislative oversightand participation in executive action. Not every legislativeinput into law enforcement [impermissibly] interferes with theExecutive’s law enforcement power.” Enourato v. Bldg. Auth., 90 N.J. 396, 401 (1982) (upholding against challenge legislativeveto process incorporated in review of Executive Branch leasesthat require continuing budget appropriations). That said,based on the form of legislative veto, enacted throughlegislation and examined under the then-current iteration of theConstitution, the Court determined in General Assembly that thelegislative veto aggregated excessive law-making power to the 10 Legislature and contravened the requirements of the PresentmentClause. 90 N.J. at 395-96. On the very day that this Court’s decision in GeneralAssembly issued, the Legislature acted to secure for itself aconstitutional form of the legislative veto. See Kimmelman v.Burgio, 204 N.J. Super. 44, 48 (App. Div. 1985). ThirtySenators sponsored Senate Concurrent Resolution 133 (1982),seeking to amend the New Jersey Constitution by adding a newArticle V, Section 4, Paragraph 6 to establish procedures forfiling and publication of administrative rules and regulations.Both houses of the Legislature ultimately passed a concurrentresolution that proposed as a constitutional amendment that theLegislature could “invalidate any rule or regulation, in wholeor part, and may prohibit any proposed rule or regulation, inwhole or part, by a majority of the authorized membership ofeach House.” Ibid. The resolution included the form of thequestion to be presented to voters on the ballot, as well as theinterpretive statement to accompany the question for the voters.Ibid. In Burgio, the Attorney General appealed to the AppellateDivision seeking an injunction striking from the ballot theabove-described proposed constitutional amendment. Id. at 47.The respondent, Secretary of State Jane Burgio, took theposition that, although the proposed constitutional amendment 11 had “several ambiguities and is susceptible to competinginterpretations,” the proposed amendment would be included onthe ballot unless the courts instructed otherwise. Id. at 50.The Attorney General contended that the language of theamendment, as well as its proposed placement2 within theConstitution, “is so ambiguous and subject to conflictinginterpretations” that it should not be included on the ballot.Id. at 50-51. Further, even if the amendment itself was notdetermined to be misleading, the Attorney General argued thatthe interpretive statement was misleading to the voters, takingissue with, among other things, the fact that the statement didnot refer to General Assembly and did not explain thesubstantial change that the amendment would effectuate for theworkings of State government. Ibid. In sum, the AttorneyGeneral took the position that “because the intent of theLegislature in submitting the amendment is so unclear the onlysolution” was to strike the proposed amendment from the ballot.Id. at 51. The Appellate Division rejected the latter argument by theAttorney General and, from the timing of the legislative2 The Attorney General maintained that because the amendment was not proposed to be placed either in the Separation of Powers or Presentment Clauses of the Constitution, the amendment was merely confirmatory. This argument was used to bolster the ambiguity argument advanced by the Attorney General. 12 reaction inferred that the resolutions’ drafters “had an intentto vest in the Legislature a power denied it under GeneralAssembly” and “indicat[ed] an intent to grant new powers to theLegislature.” Id. at 53. Although it declined to enjoin theproposed amendment from the ballot, the panel noted that it wasnot passing on the substantive validity of the proposedamendment. Id. at 55. With respect to the interpretative statement, however, thepanel agreed with the Attorney General that it was misleadingand thus invalid. Id. at 54. The panel explained that [t]he difficulty with the statement is that while it appears to indicate the amendment involves only a routine housekeeping matter, somehow furthering a power the Legislature already has, its real purpose is an attempt to limit the application of the separation of powers and presentment clauses of the constitution, fundamental clauses of great importance. Thus the amendment may reasonably [be] said to be intended to alter the basic relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government. While the voters may be privileged to this, the Legislature must take reasonable steps to insure that the voters recognize what they have been asked to do. [Ibid. (citation omitted).]The statement’s use was enjoined, and the matter was remanded tothe Legislature for preparation of an alternative statement.Id. at 55. The panel suggested, but did not mandate, analternative form of the statement. Id. at 54-55. 13 When finally placed before the voters in the 1985 generalelection, the proposed constitutional amendment failed toachieve a majority of the votes cast. However, anotherconstitutional amendment was proposed and placed before thevoters in 1992. The 1992 version presented a more refinedversion of the legislative veto power to be entrusted to theLegislature. That achieved passage by the voters. The successful proposal differed from the previous onepresented to the voters both in its procedural and substantiverespects. Rather than allowing the Legislature to invalidate orprohibit any rule or regulation by a simple majority vote ineach house of the Legislature, as contemplated by the 1985proposed amendment, the constitutional amendment that passed in1992 set forth a series of steps the Legislature must take priorto invalidating a rule promulgated by the Executive Branch. SeeN.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6 (permitting invalidation only ifrule is deemed inconsistent with legislative intent and onlyafter agency’s opportunity to amend or withdraw rule). The process, as described in detail in the opinion of theCourt, ante at ___ (slip op. at 6-8), requires the Legislatureto first determine whether the rule or regulation is consistentwith the legislative intent of the implementing statute asexpressed in the statute. A statement explaining theLegislature’s concern about the rule is required and a hearing 14 must be conducted. The Executive Branch then has theopportunity to review, amend, or withdraw the rule orregulation, consistent with the Legislature’s determination ofits intent as expressed in the legislative language, and only ifnot corrected or withdrawn may the Legislature invalidate therule by exercise of its veto authority. II. A. The constitutional amendment adding the Legislative ReviewClause does not specify a role for the Judiciary. Neither doesit insulate disputes over exercises of the Legislature’s vetopower from judicial review. That amendment stands in contrastto other constitutional provisions that effectively precludejudicial review. Compare N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6 (silentregarding judicial review), with N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 2(b)(providing that review of sufficiency of statement of reasonsfor recall of elected official “shall be a political rather thana judicial question”), and N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2, ¶ 5(b)(declaring determinations of Council on Local Mandates to bepolitical and not judicial determinations). As among the parties to this action, as well as the courtsto have reviewed it, there is no disagreement that theJudiciary’s authority to review legislative exercises of theconstitutional veto power includes, at minimum, the ability to 15 examine for procedural compliance. The Appellate Division heldthat the bases for judicial invalidation of a legislative vetoallow courts to reverse the Legislature’s invalidation of an administrative executive rule or regulation if (1) the Legislature has not complied with the procedural requirements of the Legislative Review Clause; (2) its action violates the protections afforded by the Federal or New Jersey Constitution; or (3) the Legislature’s concurrent resolution amounts to a patently erroneous interpretation of the language of the statute which the rule or regulation is intended to implement. [Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 447 N.J. Super. 584, 601 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).] The majority who agree on the standard set forth in theCourt’s opinion primarily accept the Appellate Division’srecitation of the standard, ante at ___ (slip op. at 5), butdisagree with the level of deference accorded the Legislaturewhen implementing the last prong of the standard. They statethe test differently, asking whether “the Legislature hasincorrectly asserted that the challenged rule or regulation isinconsistent with 'the intent of the Legislature as expressed inthe language of the statute which the rule or regulation isintended to implement.’” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 39-40)(quoting N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6). In my view, besides finding the Court-adopted standard tostate a mere conclusion rather than a test to administer, I also 16 believe that the Court-adopted standard fails to accord to theLegislature proper deference in the exercise of its newconstitutional authority. That the Court does so out ofseparation of powers concerns is, to me, misplaced. B. 1. Separation of powers concerns -- as between the Legislatureand the Executive -- are absent here. “The constitutionalspirit inherent in the separation of governmental powerscontemplates that each branch of government will exercise fullyits own powers without transgressing upon powers rightfullybelonging to a cognate branch.” Knight v. Margate, 86 N.J. 374,388 (1981). The exercise of the Constitution’s LegislativeReview Clause does not usurp executive authority because theClause has become a part of the organic document governing thefunctioning of our government. It changed the framework inwhich the two Branches operate with respect to delegatedrulemaking authority. The people, in unambiguous language, have granted to theLegislature a new and augmented constitutional power toinvalidate administrative rules and regulations when determined,by the Legislature, to contravene legislative intent asexpressed in the language of an enabling statute. We must takethe language of the Constitution “as we find it,” and the job of 17 the Judiciary is to enforce it. Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 244 (1950). Under the Constitution as now amended, the Legislature isauthorized to explain its intent, using its language, andthereby explicate the legislative policy and principle of anenabling act for the benefit of the implementing agency. When aBranch of government exercises a power granted to it under theConstitution, substantial deference is generally given to thatBranch in its exercise of that conferred power. In this disputebetween an Executive Branch agency and the Legislature’s use ofits veto power to invalidate the agency’s rule, the agencycertainly does not enjoy the liberal construction of theunderlying statute that it enjoys when a third party challengesan administrative rule as unauthorized by statute. Cf. N.J.Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers, 75 N.J. at 562. Yet, here, the agency is insisting on its own view of itsauthority to promulgate an implementing rule. But, theconstitutional amendment did not grant a corollary power to theExecutive Branch to interpret its enabling statute in contraryfashion to that of the Legislature. The Legislature is theBranch responsible for the delegation of rulemaking authority tothe administrative agency in the first instance, and anadministrative agency, as a creature of statute, has rulemakingpower when the Legislature delegates it. See, e.g., Worthington 18 v. Fauver, 88 N.J. 183, 208 (1982). In this clash overlegislative intent, when viewed through the prism of theconstitutional amendment, the Executive Branch agency is not onequal footing. The agency’s rulemaking power, and anyincidental ability to fill in details on policy throughrulemaking, is merely derived from the Legislature’s enablingact. This challenge by an Executive Branch agency to theLegislature’s use of its veto power should not rise and fall onthe legitimacy of the agency’s view of what constitutes a validexecution of the law. This appeal concerns whether theLegislature properly exercised its constitutional veto authorityto redirect the Executive Branch concerning the import of itsstatutory language and what that language indicates about theLegislature’s intent for the statute’s policy. Although theconstitutional amendment does not empower the Legislature tomake new positive law, the Legislature has had its poweraugmented. It has now new means to redirect an Executive Branchagency about the meaning of its statutory language, and whatthat language intended to authorize the agency to do when,through the promulgation of rules, the agency purports toimplement the intended policy of the statute. In sum, separation of powers concerns fall away here and donot provide a sound basis to impose a judicial review standard 19 that is not deferential to a determination of the Legislatureabout its intent expressed through its own statutory language.The legislative veto is a means of communication between theExecutive and Legislative Branches and not an incursion onexclusive powers reposed in the Executive Branch. PresentmentClause concerns are also utterly absent. This appeal does notrequire the harmonizing of competing constitutional provisions. 2. The constitutional amendment says nothing about anystandard by which the Judiciary should review and determinewhether the Legislature’s statement about its intent, asexpressed in legislative language, is “correct.” Ante at ___(slip op. at 38). I find it difficult to believe that theeffort that the Legislature went through to achieve thisaugmented constitutional power was to culminate in having onlythe ability to make a declaration, which the Judiciary mustdetermine to be worthy of affirmance as a “correct”interpretation of the Legislature’s own language, using thecourts’ usual tools of statutory construction. Indeed, in Burgio, the Appellate Division invalidated aninterpretative statement from appearing on the ballotspecifically because the proposed explanation of the amendmentdid not adequately inform voters of the significant alterationthat inclusion of a legislative veto would have in the interplay 20 between the Legislature and the Executive concerning regulationsthat transgressed statutory intent. 204 N.J. Super. at 54. Nowthat the amendment has passed, the Judiciary’s duty is toenforce the provision as we find it. Winberry, 5 N.J. at 244.The amendment changed the interaction between the Legislatureand the Executive. It empowers the Legislature to tell anExecutive Branch agency that a rule is inconsistent withlegislative intent as expressed through an enabling act andauthorizes the Legislature to invalidate the rule if the agencydoes not withdraw or correct it. Also, as noted previously, the amendment does not signalthat the Executive Branch’s view would be entitled to equalweight when the Judiciary is called on to umpire a statutoryintent battle between the Executive and the LegislativeBranches. As between a constitutional power granted by thepeople, through our State government’s organic document, to theLegislature, and an executive rulemaking power granted, if atall, by virtue of legislative action, there can be no equipoise. The Court adopts a standard of review that, in my view,aggregates to the Judiciary more power than should be authorizedby the intent and spirit of the constitutional amendment. Weare not being called on to adjudicate a third party’s challengeto an agency rule. We are passing on the Legislature’s use ofits constitutional power to invalidate a rule. The Judiciary’s 21 view of legislative intent, culled from statutory language usingthe usual tools of statutory construction, is as subordinate asthat of the Executive’s in this setting. I respectfully suggest that a substantial deferencestandard of review is more consistent with constitutional textthat explicitly provides the Legislature with veto power. Ourjob is not to determine whether the constitutional amendment isa wise or welcome addition to the interplay between Branches ofGovernment. Our job is to enforce it. The application ofsubstantial deference to a determination is a well-known andeasily replicable standard that allows for the possibility thatreasonable minds may differ, but that is not enough toinvalidate a decision to which deference is owed. Severalcourts have explained the concept of substantial deference inother contexts. See, e.g., White v. Wheeler, 577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 456, 462 (2015) (discussing “substantial deference” andnoting that “simple disagreement does not overcome” whendeference is due); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 , 195-96 (1997) (applying “substantial deference” standard); Roe v.Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 229 (1964) (discussing cases that apply“principle of judicial deference” and recognizing that deferenceis not overcome when reasonable minds might differ). The test that I would apply in a challenge to theLegislature’s use of the legislative veto power to invalidate an 22 agency rule can be summarized as follows. When (1) theLegislature’s veto process complies with the Legislative ReviewClause’s procedural requirements; (2) the Legislature provides areasonable interpretation of statutory language to support itsdetermination that an administrative agency’s rule isinconsistent with the legislative intent expressed through thatlanguage; and (3) the veto does not work a violation of anotherprovision of the State Constitution or one of the FederalConstitution, the legislative veto should be upheld. Even ifreasonable people could differ, the Legislature’s explanation ofits intent, rooted in the statutory language, must prevail undera substantial deference standard. Under that approach, which Ifavor, the Legislature’s explanation of its statutory intent,using the language of the statute, will survive challenge in thecourts, even if the Executive Branch agency provides an equallyreasonable interpretation. III. To conclude, I find the standard adopted by the Court notsuitable for the Judiciary to employ in the setting of achallenge to the Legislature’s exercise of its constitutionalveto power. To the extent that standard is now adopted forapplication in this and future appeals of this nature, I dissentfrom the holding of the Court on that issue. 23 Applying the deferential standard that I believeappropriate, the legislative veto at issue must be sustained.The Appellate Division judgment, which I would affirm, reachedthe same conclusion applying a deferential standard. To theextent that the Court’s opinion upholds the veto action of theLegislature, I concur in the judgment. 24 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 47 September Term 2016 078742COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Appellant-Respondent, v. NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellant.COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Appellant-Respondent, v. NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellant.IN THE MATTER OF JOB BANDING FOR SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT SPECIALIST 1 AND 2, AND NETWORK ADMINISTRATOR 1 AND 2, OFFICE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY.IN THE MATTER OF CHANGES IN THE STATE CLASSIFICATION PLAN AND JOB BANDING REQUEST, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION.IN THE MATTER OF CHANGES IN THE STATE CLASSIFICATION PLAN AND JOB BANDING REQUEST, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION. 1 IN THE MATTER OF JOB BANDING FOR SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT SPECIALIST 1 AND 2, AND NETWORK ADMINISTRATOR 1 AND 2, OFFICE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY. JUSTICE SOLOMON, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I join the majority and agree that a court may reverse theLegislature’s invalidation of an agency rule or regulationpursuant to the Legislative Review Clause (the Clause). Idissent because the Constitution gives the Legislature the powerto invalidate such rules or regulations under limitedcircumstances: when the challenged rule or regulation isinconsistent with the “intent of the legislation as expressed inthe language of the statute which the rule or regulation isintended to implement.” N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6. Themajority’s analysis has broadened those limited circumstancesand allowed the Legislature to invalidate executive action basedon the “legislative spirit” of the Civil Service Act, N.J.S.A.11A:1-1 to 12-6 (CSA or the Act), and not the legislative intent“as expressed in the language of” that Act. The majority’sanalysis thus threatens the constitutional balance of poweramong New Jersey’s co-equal branches of government andimpermissibly expands the power granted to the Legislature bythe voters when they approved the Clause. 2 I. A. The Clause allows “the Legislature [to] review any rule orregulation to determine if the rule or regulation is consistentwith the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the languageof the statute which the rule or regulation is intended toimplement.” N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6. It is important tounderstand the Clause’s evolution and the reasoning behind itscareful wording. In January 1977, the General Assembly Speaker recommendedthe establishment of the Assembly Legislative OversightCommittee (the Committee) in part “to review administrativerules and regulations to ascertain whether the executivedepartment, agency or authority promulgating the rules orregulations is faithfully executing the intent of theLegislature in its grant of statutory authority to issue suchrules or regulations.” Legislative Oversight Comm., Gen.Assembly, Eye on the Executive 1 (Dec. 1977), http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/reports/executive.pdf (citationomitted). Later that year, the Committee issued its reportentitled, Eye on the Executive (the report), which recommendedthat “the legislature should be empowered to permanently vetosuch rules if they are found to be unreasonable, arbitrary,capricious, inconsistent with legislative intent, or beyond the 3 scope of the agency’s authority.” Id. at 34 (emphasis omitted).The report recognized “legislative intent” as the threshold toreview rules promulgated and implemented by executive agencies.See id. at 16 (prescribing post-auditing and review ofexpenditures to determine if rules are in accord withlegislative intent); id. at 19 (requiring that committees“devote greater attention to an explanation of their intent whenapproving legislation” as means of “pre-oversight” and notingthat “[t]he lack of clear intent (and confusion as to language)in many pieces of legislation stands as the most commoncriticism of the Legislature from Executive agencies”). Thereafter, the Legislature drafted legislation consistentwith the recommendations of the Committee. A. 2323 (1978)required agencies to submit “a statement of either the terms orsubstance of the intended action or a description of thesubjects and issues involved” to the Legislature and providedthat they could proceed with the action unless that actionshould be disapproved by a majority vote of each House withinsixty days of submission. And S. 1026 (1978) provided for asimilar ability to disapprove agency action by concurrentresolution of both Houses within ninety days of submission.Governor Byrne pocket vetoed both A. 2323, see Governor’sStatement on Filing A. 2323 Unsigned (Mar. 3, 1978), and S. 4 1026, see Governor’s Statement on Filing S. 1026 Unsigned (Feb.26, 1980). Iterations proposed in 1980 and 1981 would have providedthe Legislature with wide latitude to review whether anadministrative “rule is adequate, proper, timely, appropriate,necessary, reasonable, equitable, understandable, consistentwith legislative intent, in accord with judicial findings, andwithin the scope of the promulgating agency’s authority.” S.1560 (L. 1981, c. 27); S. 1203 (1980). Governor Byrne, whofound those proposals to be an unconstitutional encroachment bythe Legislative Branch upon the Executive, vetoed both bills.Governor’s Veto Statement to S. 1560 (Jan. 13, 1981); Governor’sVeto Statement to S. 1203 (Sept. 22, 1980). The General Assembly unanimously overrode the Governor’sveto of S. 1560 (L. 1981, c. 27), and we were asked to decidethe law’s constitutionality. In General Assembly v. Byrne, wefound that it was overly broad and “[gave] the legislatureunlimited potential to block any rules,” without the Governor’ssignature, 90 N.J. 376, 388 (1982), thereby violating theSeparation of Powers and Presentment Clauses of ourConstitution, id. at 396. Next, the Legislature moved for “Legislative Disapproval ofRules and Regulations” to be added to the New JerseyConstitution through two proposed ballot questions that each 5 would have “authoriz[ed] the Legislature to prohibit proposedadministrative rules and regulations from taking effect and toinvalidate existing rules and regulations.” Sen. Con. Res. 1072 (May 14, 1984); S. Con. Res. 133 2 (July 22, 1982). Theinterpretive statement that was to appear before the votersposited that “[t]he Legislature has the duty to review [agency-issued] rules and regulations to see if they carry out theintention of the Legislature as contained in law and if they areefficient and effective.” Ibid. Again the courts intervened, finding the statement “highlymisleading” to the voters. Kimmelman v. Burgio, 204 N.J. Super. 44, 54 (App. Div. 1985). The Appellate Division explained that [t]he difficulty with the statement is that while it appears to indicate the amendment involves only a routine housekeeping matter, somehow furthering a power the Legislature already has, its real purpose is an attempt to limit the application of the separation of powers and presentment clauses of the constitution, fundamental clauses of great importance. Thus the amendment may reasonably [be] said to be intended to alter the basic relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government. [Ibid.]Emphasizing that voters must recognize what they have been askedto do, the Appellate Division suggested a rewrite of theinterpretive statement and allowed the measure to appear on theballot in the 1985 General Election. Id. at 54-55. The voters 6 overwhelmingly rejected the amendment by a twenty-five percentmargin. See Public Question No. 7 (1985), http://www.njelections.org/election-results/1985-public-questions.pdf. Seven years later, in 1992, as the culmination of afifteen-year effort by the Legislature to acquire the right oflegislative review of executive action, the voters approved themeasure currently before this Court. A. Con. Res. 199 (2013)(enacted). The language of the successful amendment contains anarrow veto power permitting only the invalidation of a ruledeemed inconsistent with legislative intent “as expressed in thelanguage of the statute.” N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6. The history of the substantial contraction of the Clausebefore it was finally passed reinforces the limited review powerprovided for in the plain language of the Clause and underscoresthat the standard against which the Legislature may measureadministrative action is the legislative intent “as expressed inthe language of the statute,” and not the more nebulous“legislative spirit” of an enactment. Looking beyond the textof a statute -- for example, looking to its “legislative spirit”-- would exceed the constitutional authority granted to theLegislature by the amendment and would grant the Legislature apower that was rejected by Governor Byrne, our courts, and ourvoters. 7 Nevertheless, the resolution currently before us presentsthe Legislature’s findings as to the Job Banding Rule in thefollowing terms: The proposed new Job Banding Rule, N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A, is contrary to the spirit, intent, and plain meaning of the provision in the New Jersey Constitution that requires that promotions be based on merit and fitness to be ascertained, as far as practicable, by examination, which, as far as practicable, shall be competitive. . . . . The proposed new rule is not consistent with the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the language of the Civil Service Act, including the spirit, intent, or plain meaning of N.J.S.A. 11A:3-1, N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1, N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8 or N.J.S.A. 11A:5-7. [A. Con. Res. 199 (2013) (enacted) (emphases added).] To the extent that the Legislature relied on the purported“spirit” of the CSA, and not exclusively on the legislativeintent “as expressed in the language of the statute,” indetermining to strike down the Job Banding Rule, the Legislatureexceeded its authority under Article V, Section 4, Paragraph 6of the New Jersey Constitution. We therefore turn to thelanguage of the CSA to properly determine whether theregulations proposed by the Commission are inconsistent with 8 “the language of the statute” on its own, absent impermissibleextraneous considerations. II. Under the Legislative Review Clause, the Legislature wasentitled to consider whether the Civil Service Commission’s JobBanding Rule was inconsistent with the legislative intent of theCSA “as expressed in the language of the statute.” A. The Job Banding Rule “facilitates advancement appointmentsof qualified employees to the next higher title level within ajob band when a vacancy exists.” N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A(a). A jobband is “a grouping of titles or title series into a singlebroad band consisting of title levels with similar duties,responsibilities, and qualifications,” 45 N.J.R. at 507, andmovement from a lower to a higher title within a job band isconsidered an “advancement appointment,” N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A(c).The question is whether such intra-band advancement proceduresconflict with the legislative intent as expressed in language ofthe CSA. Under the regulations, job bands have multiple title levelswithin which movement to a higher level is considered anadvancement. N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A(c). In choosing whether titlesare appropriate for job banding, and consistent with theCommissioner’s authority “to establish the procedures by which 9 merit-based appointments are to be made,” In re Foglio, 207 N.J. 38, 44 (2011), the Commissioner determines “whether a movementfrom one position to a higher level position may be achievedbased on an evaluation of relative knowledge, skills, andabilities without resorting to competitive examinationprocedures, while still satisfying the State Constitutional andstatutory mandate for merit and fitness in selections andappointments,” N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A(b)(1). In practice, eligible employees being considered foradvancement endure a multifaceted and competitive examination oftheir skills and attributes. Although the regulation indicatesthat advancement is possible “without resorting to competitiveexamination procedures,” it is clear in context that theregulation proposes to bypass only competitive writtenexaminations, not all competitive examinations. First, the job banding regulation establishes predeterminedcompetencies for a position and notifies all of those in thenext lower level of the opportunity to apply. N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A. The job banding regulation further provides that theappointing authority “shall conduct an advancement appointmentselection process” -- a competitive examination process.1 Ibid.1 For example, when the Office of Information Technology (OIT) implemented job banding, it established the following competency standards to be considered: (1) Performance Assessment Review 10 The appointing authority then decides which candidates “may”receive an advanced appointment, and, finally, the candidatesare ranked and the appointments are announced. Ibid. (emphasisadded). Nothing in the Job Banding Rule conflicts with thelegislative intent of the CSA as expressed in its language. TheCSA governs civil service employment in New Jersey, includingall positions within state government and those within thepolitical subdivisions that choose to adopt and be governed bythe CSA. See N.J.S.A. 11A:2-11(e). It was enacted toeffectuate the mandate of Article VII, Section 1, Paragraph 2 ofthe New Jersey Constitution that “[a]ppointments and promotionsin the civil service of the State, . . . be made according tomerit and fitness to be ascertained, as far as practicable, byexamination, which, as far as practicable, shall becompetitive.” See Foglio, 207 N.J. at 52. Our courts haveexplained the requirements for advancement of state employeesclassified by title; as the Appellate Division noted in this(PAR) -- twenty percent; (2) structured interview during which a panel no fewer than three interviewers will rate all candidates based on their responses to a set of predetermined questions designed to illicit responses that demonstrate each employee’s competencies in areas relevant to the position -- forty percent; (3) written exercise (where practicable) to include preparing a sample program, solving a scenario-driven network problem, etc., with each question to be graded anonymously using rubric -- twenty percent; and (4) a work history review -- twenty percent. 11 case, “the appointment and promotions of the civil service ofNew Jersey must be made based on merit and fitness except ifimpracticable.” Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n,447 N.J. Super. 584, 605 (App. Div. 2016). The CSA likewise affirms that “[i]t is the public policy ofthis State to select and advance employees on the basis of theirrelative knowledge, skills and abilities” and the “adequacy oftheir performance.” N.J.S.A. 11A:1-2(a), (c). And, in keepingwith the constitution’s preference for competitive examinations,the CSA calls for competitive examinations to be used whenhiring and promoting civil service employees. N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1. The Job Banding Rule provides for “promotions” “based onmerit and fitness,” and is therefore in harmony with thelegislative intent of the CSA “as expressed” in its “language”as a general matter. It is therefore appropriate to considerwhether any particular aspect of the job banding regulationsconflicts with the legislative intent of the CSA as expressed inany of its component provisions. B. The Legislature struck down the Commission’s Job BandingRule as inconsistent with the CSA, “including N.J.S.A. 11A:3-1,N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1, N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8 or N.J.S.A. 11A:5-7.” A.Con. Res. 199 (2013) (enacted). I consider each point ofpurported conflict in turn. 12 1. To implement the hiring and advancement policies thatundergird the CSA, the Act explicitly delegates certain powersto the New Jersey Civil Service Commission (the Commission).The CSA confers upon the Commission the authority to “assign andreassign” and to “consolidate and abolish titles.” N.J.S.A.11A:3-1. In particular, the CSA states that the Commissionshall: a. Establish, administer, amend and continuously review a State classification plan governing all positions in State service and similar plans for political subdivisions; b. Establish, consolidate and abolish titles; c. Ensure the grouping in a single title of positions with similar qualifications, authority and responsibility; d. Assign and reassign titles to appropriate positions; and e. Provide a specification for each title. [Ibid. (emphasis added).] Therefore, the authority to classify or abolish positionsand the metrics by which they are filled are expressly delegatedto the Commission. Furthermore, Title 11 of the CSA gives theCommissioner the authority to “adopt and enforce rules to carryout this title and to effectively implement a comprehensivepersonnel management system.” N.J.S.A. 11A:2-6. Accordingly, 13 the Commissioner is authorized “to establish the procedures bywhich merit-based appointments are to be made.” Foglio, 207 N.J. at 44. Nothing “expressed in the language of [N.J.S.A. 11A:3-1]”bars job banding; indeed, the Job Banding Rule would seem tofall within the Commission’s delegated ability to consolidatetitles and to group positions within a title. 2.N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1, in relevant part, instructs theCommission to provide for: a. The announcement and administration of examinations which shall test fairly the knowledge, skills and abilities required to satisfactorily perform the duties of a title or group of titles. The examinations may include, but are not limited to, written, oral, performance and evaluation of education and experience; b. The rating of examinations; c. The security of the examination process and appropriate sanctions for a breach of security; d. The selection of special examiners to act as subject matter specialists or to provide other assistance.Under the statute, competitive examinations may range fromwritten and oral tests to performance or education andexperience evaluations provided that they “fairly test” the 14 preparedness of applicants to fulfill the functions of aparticular job “title or group of titles.” Ibid. Indeed, under subsection (a) of N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1, the CSAgrants the Commission wide latitude in determining the nature ofcompetitive examination it will use to assess qualifications forappointment and advancement, and nowhere does it prohibit thenon-written yet still rigorous “evaluation of relativeknowledge, skills, and abilities” provided for in Section 4A:3-3.2A(b)(1) of the job banding regulations. In short, nothing“expressed in the language of [N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1]” prohibits jobbanding. 3. The Legislature claims and the majority agrees that the jobbanding regulation “eliminates the statutory certification andappointment procedure prescribed by the [CSA], directlycontradicting [its] language.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 55).N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8 provides that [t]he commission shall certify the three eligibles who have received the highest ranking on an open competitive or promotional list against the first provisional or vacancy. For each additional provisional or vacancy against whom a certification is issued at that time, the commission shall certify the next ranked eligible. If more than one eligible has the same score, the tie shall not be broken and they shall have the same rank. If three or more eligibles can be certified as the result of the ranking without resorting to all 15 three highest scores, only those eligibles shall be so certified. A certification that contains the names of at least three interested eligibles shall be complete and a regular appointment shall be made from among those eligibles. An eligible on an incomplete list shall be entitled to a provisional appointment if a permanent appointment is not made. Eligibles on any type of reemployment list shall be certified and appointed in the order of their ranking and the certification shall not be considered incomplete. Nowhere in the job banding regulation is N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8’s“Rule of Three” process countermanded -- or even mentioned.Applicants are notified of an advancement opportunity, examined,selected, and ranked. N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A. That does notprevent application of the “Rule of Three” process. It does notalter or supersede the statute. See Morton v. 4 Orchard LandTr., 362 N.J. Super. 190, 198 (App. Div. 2003) (“We are mindfulthat when a regulation conflicts with a statute, the regulationis void as a matter of law.”); In re Terebetski, 338 N.J. Super. 564, 571 (App. Div. 2001) (“[A] regulation cannot supersede oralter a statute.”). Further, the “Rule of Three” is self-contained and does notpurport to occupy the entire field of appointment and promotiondeterminations. Although the rule must be followed, nothing inthe statute precludes the adoption of additional, supplementaryprocedures. And “nothing expressed in the language of [N.J.S.A. 16 11A:4-8]” would prohibit the supplementary procedures set forthin the Job Banding Rule. 4. The final section of the CSA with which the Legislature hasfound the job banding regulations to conflict is N.J.S.A. 11A:5-7, which provides that “whenever a veteran ranks highest on apromotional certification, a nonveteran shall not be appointedunless the appointing authority shall show cause before theboard why a veteran should not receive such promotion.” The Job Banding Rule also contains a veterans’ preference: Once an appointing authority determines which eligible employees are interested, it shall conduct an advancement appointment selection process approved by the Chairperson or designee and make a determination as to which employee or employees may receive an advancement appointment. The appointing authority shall then rank the candidates for the announced advancement appointment and document same, taking into account the veterans’ preference described in (d)3i and ii below, where applicable. i. Whenever a veteran ranks highest in the advancement appointment selection process, a nonveteran shall not be appointed unless the appointing authority shows cause before the Civil Service Commission why the veteran shall not receive the advancement appointment. ii. When the advancement appointment selection process results in a tie between a veteran and a nonveteran, the veteran shall be offered the advancement appointment. [N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2A(d)(3)(i) to (ii).] 17 Not only does the regulation not conflict with the statutoryveterans’ preference, but it uses the statutory languageverbatim and adds a non-conflicting provision for ties. Inshort, nothing “expressed in the language of [N.J.S.A. 11A:5-7]”prohibits the veterans’ preference established in the jobbanding regulations. C. In sum, the job banding regulation is consistent with theConstitution and the “intent” of the CSA “as expressed in [its]language,” N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6, both in a general senseand in its particulars. The Job Banding Rule does not clashwith the constitutional mandate for merit- and fitness-basedhiring and promotion that undergirds the CSA. See N.J. Const.art. VII, § 1, ¶ 2; N.J.S.A. 11A:1-2(a), (c); Foglio, 207 N.J.at 52. Although job banding changes the traditional format ofcompetitive examination used to assess merit and fitness, itdoes so within statutory and constitutional bounds. Had theLegislature intended to limit competitive examinations towritten examinations, it would have said so. Instead, the CSAallows the Commissioner to devise multi-faceted competitiveexaminations so long as they “test fairly the knowledge skillsand abilities” of an applicant. N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1. Similarly,the Act does not forbid the adoption of procedures to supplementthe “Rule of Three,” N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8, or the veterans’ 18 preference, N.J.S.A. 11A:5-7. And job banding in no wayconflicts with the delegation of responsibility for jobclassification schemes to the Commission. N.J.S.A. 11A:3-1. Given the absence of conflict between the language of thestatute and the stricken regulation, it appears that theLegislature relied on its view of the “spirit” of the CSA -- andnot the Act’s intent as expressed in its plain language -- tostrike down the Job Banding Rule. In allowing it to do so, themajority has permitted the Legislature to exceed itsconstitutional authority. III. “Words make a difference.” In re Plan for the Abolition ofthe Council on Affordable Hous., 214 N.J. 444, 470-71 (2013).By allowing the Legislature to rely upon the perceived “spirit”of the CSA, the majority expands legislative authority andreduces executive authority in a manner that threatens to undothe balance of powers established by Article III, Paragraph 1,and Article V, Section 1, Paragraph 14 of the StateConstitution. The constitutional balance among branches of government isintegral to our fundamental organic law. Knight v. Margate, 86 N.J. 374, 387-88 (1981). It is a constitutional axiom that eachbranch of government is distinct and serves as the repository ofthe powers unique to it; the members or representatives of one 19 branch cannot arrogate the powers of another branch. Id. at388. Co-equal branches of government exist to safeguard fromfears “that in a representative democracy the Legislature wouldbe capable of using its plenary lawmaking power to swallow upthe other departments of the Government.” General Assembly, 90 N.J. at 383, 448 (citations omitted). “Each branch ofgovernment is counseled and restrained by the constitution notto seek dominance or hegemony over the other branches.” Knight,86 N.J. at 388. “[T]he taking of power is more prone to abuseand therefore warrants an especially careful scrutiny.”Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Florio, 130 N.J. 439, 457 (1992). When it overturned the Legislative Oversight Act in GeneralAssembly, this Court stated, “we cannot allow the Legislature tocreate oversight mechanisms that will circumvent theconstitutional procedures for making laws and interfere undulywith the Executive’s constitutional responsibility to enforcethem.” 90 N.J. at 395. By allowing the Legislature to divinethe “spirit” of legislation to invalidate job banding, thisCourt now allows that which it warned against twenty-five yearsago in General Assembly. The nearly half century of legislativeattempts to achieve the power to review administrative actionconfirms the significance of the phrase “as expressed in thelanguage of the statute.” N.J. Const. art. V, § 4, ¶ 6. By 20 improperly applying our standard of review here, the majorityalters the balance of powers upon which our government rests. IV. For the reasons set forth above, I concur in the majority’sstated standard of review but dissent because, here, themajority improperly applies that standard of review, and expandsthe Legislative Review Clause to allow the Legislature to divinethe “legislative spirit” of the CSA. 21