Title: In Re Tarr
Citation: 109 Ariz. 264, 508 P.2d 728
Docket Number: N/A
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 1973

109 Ariz. 264 (1973) 508 P.2d 728 In re Seth Ulysses TARR. No. H-640. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. April 20, 1973. Flynn, Kimerer, Thinnes &amp; Galbraith by Clark L. Derrick, Phoenix, for petitioner. Leonard C. Langford, Mohave County Atty. by Warner B. Bair, II, Deputy County Atty., Kingman, for respondent. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus in which the petitioner asked that he be admitted to bail pending trial. We are called upon to answer only one question and that is: Where the Arizona statute imposing the death penalty has been stricken by the United States Supreme Court, may a person charged with first degree murder, a crime previously punishable by death, be denied admission to bail pending trial on that charge? The facts necessary for a determination of this matter are as follows. An indictment was returned against the petitioner, Seth Ulysses Tarr, 27 February 1973, by the Mohave County Grand Jury charging the defendant-petitioner with the crime of first degree murder. An application for admission to bail was filed by the petitioner and following a hearing on the application the motion was denied by the trial judge on 28 February 1973. Petitioner is presently incarcerated in the Mohave County Jail in Kingman, Arizona. The offense for which petitioner was charged, murder in the first degree, is by statute in Arizona punishable by death. §§ 13-451, 452, 453. The Arizona Constitution, Art. 2, § 22, A.R.S., reads as follows: The bail provisions of the Arizona Revised Statutes, § 13-1571 et seq., echo the constitutional provision against denying a person bail except in capital criminal cases where the "proof is evident or the presumption great" that he is guilty of the offense. It is universally held that a "capital offense" is an offense for which a sentence of death may be imposed. Ex parte Berry, 198 Wash. 317, 88 P.2d 427 (1939); 8 C.J.S. Bail § 34(1) (1962). Our Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., also define a capital offense as follows: The United States Supreme Court has abolished the death penalty in statutes like Arizona's, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972) and Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845, 92 S. Ct. 2845, 33 L. Ed. 2d 744 (1972), and has therefore abolished "capital offenses" in Arizona. Other courts have considered this matter in detail and have reached the conclusion that with the abolishment of the death sentence, a person may not be denied admission to bail: And: Actually, this court has previously expressed itself in this matter as follows: Nothing we say in this opinion should in any way limit the trial court in setting an appropriate bond commensurate with the crime and the propensity, if any, of the defendant to leave the jurisdiction pending trial. Neither does this opinion in any way limit recent enactments of our legislature concerning revocation of bond, § 13-1578 A.R.S., nor the recent amendment to Art. 2, § 22, Arizona Constitution, regarding felony offenses committed when a person charged is already admitted to bail on a separate felony charge. Art. 2, § 22, as amended, 3 November 1970. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is hereby granted and the matter remanded to the Superior Court of Mohave County for the setting of an appropriate bail after such hearing and proceeding consistent with this opinion and as the trial court deems proper. HAYS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, LOCKWOOD and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.