Title: State v. Massey
Citation: 411 P.2d 422, 68 Wash. 2d 88
Docket Number: 38161
State: Washington
Issuer: Washington Supreme Court
Date: February 24, 1966

68 Wn.2d 88 (1966) 411 P.2d 422 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. WINFORD MASSEY, Appellant.[*] No. 38161. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department One. February 24, 1966. David R. LaRose, for appellant (Appointed counsel for appeal). Charles O. Carroll and Thomas A. Stang, for respondent. OTT, J. Winford Massey was arrested September 2, 1964, and charged with the crime of unlawful possession of narcotics, namely, heroin. The cause was tried to the court. From the judgment and sentence entered upon the finding of guilty, Winford Massey has appealed. The court-appointed *89 counsel representing the appellant on this appeal did not represent him at the trial. The appellant assigns error to the court's failure to suppress the evidence. His sole contention in this regard is that the arrest was illegal because the officers, at the time of the arrest without a warrant, did not have probable cause to believe a felony had been or was being committed in their presence. [1] An officer who effects an arrest without a warrant is governed by general rules stated variously as follows: (1) An officer has cause for an arrest if he has reasonable grounds for suspicion, together with evidence of circumstances to warrant a cautious man in believing the accused to be guilty. State v. Hughlett, 124 Wash. 366, 214 Pac. 841 (1923). (2) An officer has probable cause to arrest without a warrant if he has knowledge which would convince a cautious but disinterested person that the accused is guilty of a felonious offense. State v. Darst, 65 Wn.2d 808, 399 P.2d 618 (1965); State v. Smith, 56 Wn.2d 368, 353 P.2d 155 (1960); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 85 Sup. Ct. 223 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 Sup. Ct. 407 (1963). (3) An officer is not required to have knowledge of evidence sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327, 79 Sup. Ct. 329 (1959). In the instant case, the appellant offered no evidence to rebut that offered by the state. The state's evidence established, inter alia, that appellant had previously been convicted of violation of the narcotics act; that, prior to September 2, 1964, the arresting officers had information from a reliable informant that appellant was selling heroin, and that he had narcotics in his room, No. 401 at the New Richmond Hotel. For several days, the officers had his room under surveillance from an adjoining room, No. 403. During this observation, they had seen appellant associating with known and suspected traffickers in narcotics. The officers obtained a search warrant for room No. 401. When they *90 went to the hotel to search the room, the following transpired, according to the testimony of Officer Karl Meyer: Officer Meyer's testimony was corroborated by Officer Chester Sprinkle. The search revealed 10 capsules of heroin in the lining of appellant's raincoat. While searching the raincoat, the officers found a key with the number 524. Appellant voluntarily told the officers that additional capsules could be found in his overcoat in room No. 524 at the Frye Hotel. A search warrant was obtained, and an additional 84 capsules of heroin were found, together with a paper parcel containing marijuana. The trial court believed the state's evidence, and applying the law to the facts, found that the officers had probable cause to arrest the appellant without a warrant. The record sustains the trial court in this regard. Appellant asserts that the court erred in refusing to disclose the name of the informer upon whose information the officers relied. The trial court, in ruling upon the motion to disclose, held that the appellant had not presented sufficient facts to require that such disclosure be made. [2] The privilege of nondisclosure of the name of an informant in criminal cases is predicated upon the protection of the public interest. It is the obligation of citizens *92 to communicate knowledge of crimes to officers charged with the enforcement of the law. The privilege of nondisclosure is granted to preserve their anonymity and encourage them to disclose such knowledge to the officers. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639, 77 Sup. Ct. 623 (1957). In discussing the constitutional problem presented, the United States Supreme Court, in the cited case at 62, said: This balancing of public interest against the individual's constitutional guarantees was adopted by this court in State v. Driscoll, 61 Wn.2d 533, 379 P.2d 206 (1963). We further held in the Driscoll case that one who seeks disclosure of the identity of an informant has the burden of showing justification for an exception to the rule of nondisclosure. We adhere to the rule announced in the Driscoll case, and hold that the appellant, by offering no evidence in this regard, failed to justify an exception to the exercise of the privilege of nondisclosure. One of the arresting officers testified that their informant was reliable. Whether the informant was reliable is predicated upon the officers' prior experience with the informer. The appellant, on cross-examination of the officer relative to the basis for his conclusion that the informer was reliable, did not inquire into the officer's reason for believing the informant to be reliable. He merely asked the name of the informer and, in argument to the court, asserted that if he knew the informant's name he might be able to prove him unreliable. Since reliability alone was challenged for the purpose of requesting disclosure of the informant's *93 identity, the appellant did not meet the required burden of proof. Further, the trial judge, in finding probable cause, held that the facts known by the officers, exclusive of the information furnished by the informant, were sufficient to establish probable cause for the arrest without a warrant. The trial court did not err in denying the motion to disclose. We have considered appellant's pro se brief of additional authorities and the issues raised therein, and find them to be without merit. The judgment and sentence is affirmed. ROSELLINI, C.J., HILL, HUNTER, and HALE, JJ., concur. April 1, 1966. Petition for rehearing denied. [*] Reported in 411 P.2d 422.