Title: Peterson v. Delaware
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 222, 2013
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 13, 2013

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KALVIN PETERSON,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 222, 2013 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Cr. A. No. 12030234168C 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  November 6, 2013 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  November 13, 2013 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
Nicole M. Walker, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
John Williams, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for 
appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
The defendant-appellant, Kalvin Peterson (“Peterson”), appeals from 
a Superior Court judgment, following a bench trial, convicting him of one 
count of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”).  
Peterson’s sole claim of error is that collateral estoppel and double jeopardy 
bar his conviction.  Peterson argues that the bench trial conviction was 
precluded because at a concurrent trial, a jury acquitted him of both 
Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”), 
and the underlying felony of Assault in the First Degree.   
We have concluded that Peterson’s arguments are without merit.  
Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. 
Facts 
On February 21, 2012, David Brown was walking toward the 
intersection of Bennett and Taylor Streets in Wilmington, Delaware.  
According to his testimony, Brown was planning to buy crack cocaine.  
Brown had been using crack cocaine earlier that day, and for “maybe two 
days” leading up to February 21st.   
While speaking to some acquaintances inside a car in the middle of 
Bennett Street, Brown saw a person turn the corner onto Bennett Street and 
walk toward him.  Brown turned and began walking away because he saw 
3 
 
that that person had a gun.  A moment later, Brown saw “fire” in his 
peripheral vision and realized he had been shot in the back.   
On February 21, 2012 at 8:05 p.m., the Wilmington Police 
Department received a report of a shooting on the 800 block of Bennett 
Street near the Taylor Street intersection.  Officer Witte (“Witte”) responded 
and found Brown lying on the curb with two gunshot wounds to his right 
backside.  Brown initially told Witte that he did not see who shot him.  Witte 
then told Brown that he (Witte) was there to help.1  Brown responded that he 
could identify the shooter but didn’t know his name.  Brown also told Witte 
that the shooter fled the scene in “a burgundy-colored vehicle.”2  
Two weeks after the shooting, Detective Lenhardt (“Lenhardt”) 
interviewed Brown.  During that interview, Brown was unable to give 
Lenhardt the name of the shooter.  Later that day, however, Brown sent 
Lenhardt a text message saying “Kal” was the shooter.  On March 27, 2012, 
Lenhardt presented Brown with a six-photo array, from which Brown 
identified Peterson as the shooter.3   
                                          
 
1 Brown was speaking with his cousin when Witte reassured Brown of his desire to help.  
2 While being treated at the Christiana Hospital Emergency Department, Brown also told 
Jennifer Oldham, a forensic nurse: “This guy ran from Taylor Street and shot me.  I don’t 
know his name.  If I could see his face, I could tell you.  I know he drives a burgundy 
car.”  
3 The shooter’s identity is in dispute. Peterson argued that he was not present when and 
where Brown was shot. 
4 
 
On March 29, 2012, Peterson was arrested.  Police searched 
Peterson’s residence and located a burgundy Mazda in the driveway.  After 
his arrest, Peterson was indicted for Assault in the First Degree,4 PFDCF,5 
and PFBPP.6  On April 9, 2013, Peterson waived his right to a jury trial on 
the PFBPP charge, which was then severed for a separate bench trial.  
A jury trial on the assault and PFDCF charges began on April 10, 
2013, and lasted four days.  Brown testified that Peterson had confronted 
him twice on February 21, 2012 before the shooting—once when Brown 
was leaving his (Brown’s) residence and again when Brown was leaving his 
cousin’s home on Bennett Street.7  Brown also identified Peterson as the 
person who shot him.   
Peterson presented an alibi defense—through a supervisor’s 
testimony—that at the time of the shooting he was scheduled to work at 
Capriotti’s sandwich shop.8  The State rebutted that alibi defense with 
testimony from a Capriotti's manager that Peterson did not clock in to work 
                                          
 
4 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 613. 
5 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1447A. 
6 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1448.  Additional indicted charges irrelevant to this appeal are 
omitted.  
7 Brown testified that one confrontation occurred before noon and one occurred after 
noon, and at both times Peterson was a passenger in a car.   
8 Peterson elected not to testify. 
5 
 
on February 21, 2012.9  The manager’s testimony was corroborated by a 
printout from Capriotti’s time-clock machine.   
On April 15, 2013, the jury acquitted Peterson of the PFDCF and 
assault charges.10  On April 17, 2013, the trial judge issued a bench ruling 
finding Peterson guilty of PFBPP. 
The Parties’ Contentions 
Peterson advances a single claim of error on appeal.  He argues that 
both collateral estoppel under 11 Del. C. § 208, and the prohibitions against 
double jeopardy in the United States and Delaware Constitutions,11 
precluded a conviction for PFBPP after a jury had acquitted him of PFDCF 
and the underlying felony of first degree assault.  Peterson contends that the 
jury must have found he was not the shooter—and possibly not even at the 
scene at the time of the shooting.  Therefore, Peterson submits, the State was 
collaterally estopped from seeking to convict him for PFBPP.  The State 
argues that the general jury verdict—which did not make any specific factual 
findings for the acquittal—did not preclude the PFBPP conviction.  
                                          
 
9 The State’s witness was not a manager at Capriotti’s during the time period in question.   
10 Also on April 15, 2013, after the State closed the jury portion of the trial, Peterson filed 
a Motion to Dismiss the PFBPP charge, which was denied and is not contested in this 
appeal.  Prior to resting, the State introduced evidence to the judge that Peterson was a 
person prohibited under the statute.   
11 The United States Constitution states that no “person [shall] be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. V.  The 
Delaware Constitution states that “no person shall be for the same offense twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”  Del. Const. Art. 1 § 8.   
6 
 
Standard of Review 
This Court reviews claims of constitutional violations de novo.12  
Questions of law are likewise reviewed de novo.13  In this appeal, our 
analysis of Peterson’s collateral estoppel claim is dispositive. 
Collateral Estoppel 
In Delaware, the collateral estoppel doctrine precludes a criminal 
conviction where a previous prosecution was “terminated by an acquittal . . . 
[that] necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which 
must be established for conviction of the second offense.”14  When 
reviewing a collateral estoppel claim, the court’s inquiry is whether, based 
on the pleadings, defense, evidence, and jury charge, “a rational jury could 
have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant 
seeks to foreclose from consideration.”15  Accordingly, the issue before this 
                                          
 
12 Tucker v. State, 2012 WL 4512900, at *1 (Del. Sept. 19, 2012) (TABLE); Wescott v. 
State, 2009 WL 3282707, at * 2 (Del. Oct. 13, 2009) (citing Norman v. State, 976 A.2d 
843, 857 (Del. 2009)). 
13 Sierra v. State, 958 A.2d 825, 828 (Del. 2008) (citing Donald v. State, 903 A.2d 315, 
318 (Del. 2006)). 
14 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 208.  See also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 442 (1970) 
(“[W]hen an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final 
judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future 
lawsuit.”); Wescott v. State, 2009 WL 3282707, at *4 (citing Banther v. State, 884 A.2d 
487, 492 (Del. 2005)).   
15 Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 350 (1990) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 
U.S. at 444 (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Westcott v. State, 2009 WL 
3282707, at * 4 (citing Banther v. State, 884 A.2d at 492 (Del. 2005)).  The party 
asserting collateral estoppel has the burden to show that “the issue whose relitgation he 
7 
 
Court is whether Peterson has shown that the jury’s acquittal on the first 
degree assault and PFDCF charges necessarily rested on a finding that 
Peterson did not possess a weapon on February 21, 2012.16   
Peterson claims that because the identity of the shooter was the “sole 
issue” before the jury, the not-guilty verdict must necessarily have 
affirmatively established Peterson was not the shooter and could not have 
possessed a gun at that time.17  This claim is unavailing.  Peterson disregards 
the general nature of the jury verdict.  Moreover, Peterson has not shown 
how the jury’s general verdict was focused solely on identity.   
Identity was not the only factual issue before that jury.  The verdict’s 
general nature does not reveal what the jury decided about the shooter’s 
identity.  Here, as in Godwin v. State,18 the jury could have rationally based 
its verdict on one or more of several alternative grounds, namely:  that 
Peterson unintentionally injured Brown, that Peterson did not cause injury to 
                                                                                                                             
 
seeks to foreclose was actually decided in the first proceeding.” Dowling v. State, 493 
U.S. at 350 (citing United States v. Citron, 853 F.2d 1055, 1058 (1988)).   
16 Peterson does not dispute that he was a “person prohibited.”  
17 Peterson relies primarily on State v. Sanchez, 2012 WL 5381405 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 
31, 2012), a non-binding Superior Court case.  In Sanchez, the judge found the defendant 
not guilty of the severed PFBPP charge where he was acquitted by a jury on reckless 
endangering and related charges.  Id. at *1.  Sanchez can be distinguished because 
Brown’s testimony places a gun in Peterson’s possession, whereas in Sanchez an 
unidentified person fired a handgun into an apartment and the State relied on means and 
motive to prove the identity of the shooter.  Id.   
18 Godwin v. State, 2006 WL 1805876, at *3-4 (Del. Jun. 6, 2006) abrogated by Lecates 
v. State, 975 A.2d 799 (Del. 2009) and abrogated by Lecates v. State 987 A.2d 413 (Del. 
2009). 
8 
 
Brown, that Peterson did not possess the firearm, or that Peterson was not 
present at the shooting.19   
This Court has consistently held that a jury acquittal of PFDCF and of 
the underlying felony does not operate as collateral estoppel to preclude a 
bench trial conviction for PFBPP.20  Those prior holdings are directly 
applicable here.  The jury’s general verdicts of acquittal did not establish 
that the jury affirmatively concluded that Peterson did not possess a 
weapon.21   
                                          
 
19 See id. (”The jury could have rationally based its verdict on the ground that Godwin 
did not possess the [weapon], or that he did not commit the felony, or that he did not 
possess the [weapon] during the commission of the felony. Thus, whether the jury 
specifically decided the possession issue in Godwin’s favor is unknown.”)(citation 
omitted).  See also Wescott v. State, 2009 WL 3282707, at *2, *5 (finding that conflicting 
testimony could have given rise to reasonable doubt regarding Westcott’s intent and this 
would not foreclose a jury from reasonably inferring that Westcott possessed a gun).   
20 See Tucker v. State, 2012 WL 4512900, at *1 (affirming a separate bench trial 
conviction of PFBPP where a jury acquitted the defendant of PFDCF); Westcott v. State, 
2009 WL 3282707, at *3-5; Godwin v. State, 2006 WL 1805876, at *3-4 (Del. June 29, 
2006) abrogated by Lecates v. State, 975 A.2d 799 (Del. 2009) and abrogated by Lecates 
v. State, 987 A.2d 413 (Del. 2009).  See also, Register v. State, 2013 WL 497991, at * 1 
(Del. Feb. 9, 2013) (TABLE) (“It is settled law in Delaware that an acquittal on related 
weapons charges does not preclude a conviction for PFBPP. A jury acquittal of PFDCF  
. . . does not preclude a trial judge from finding [the defendant] guilty of PFBPP.”).   
21Assault requires the State prove the defendant (1) intentionally caused (2) serious 
physical injury (3) with a deadly weapon. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 613.  PFDCF requires 
the State prove the defendant (1) committed an underlying felony (2) while possessing a 
firearm, and (3) acted knowingly. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1447A.  PFBPP requires the 
State prove the defendant (1) was a person prohibited and (2) that he possessed a firearm.  
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1448.  See also Lecates v. State, 987 A.2d 413, 422 (Del. 2009) 
(explaining that a conviction under Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1447A requires the State 
prove possession during the felony whereas section 1448 is broader because it prohibits 
possession at any time.). 
9 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Superior Court’s judgment, convicting Peterson of PFBPP, is 
affirmed.