Title: State v. Daniel G. Scheidell
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP001426-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-1426-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Daniel G. Scheidell  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  220 Wis. 2d 753, 584 N.W.2d 897 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 30, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
March 3, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Emmanuel Vuvunas 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Abrahamson, C.J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Bablitch and Bradley, J.J., join 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by James M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and 
oral argument by Mitchell E. Cooper, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-1426-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Daniel G. Scheidell  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.  This is a review of a published 
opinion of the court of appeals, State v. Scheidell, 220 Wis. 2d 
753, 755, 584 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1998), which reversed and 
remanded a judgment and order of the circuit court for Racine 
County, Honorable Emmanuel J. Vuvunas.  The defendant, Daniel G. 
Scheidell, was found guilty by a jury of one count of attempted 
first-degree sexual assault while masked and one count of armed 
burglary while masked.  The State seeks reversal of the court of 
appeals’ newly-established test to determine the admissibility 
of other acts evidence committed by an unknown third party which 
is proffered by the accused on the issue of identity.  Instead, 
the State urges us to apply State v. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 357 
N.W.2d 12 (Ct. App. 1984) when an accused seeks to use such 
other acts evidence. 
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
2 
¶2 
We do not agree that Denny can be molded to fit the 
facts of this case.  We also decline to adopt the court of 
appeals’ newly-established test.  Rather, we conclude that our 
recent decision in State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 576 
N.W.2d 30 (1998), provides the proper framework when a defendant 
seeks to introduce other acts evidence that was perpetrated by 
an unknown third party.  Even though the circuit court failed to 
apply the proper test in its denial of Scheidell’s offer of 
proof, we conclude that its determination to exclude the other 
acts evidence was proper.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals.1   
I. 
¶3 
The facts are not in dispute.  In 
August 
1994, 
Jennifer D. began working at the Chancery Restaurant where she 
met Scheidell.  When Jennifer and her two roommates were 
searching for a new apartment in May 1995, Scheidell remarked 
that two apartments in his building were unoccupied.  Only one 
of the apartments was available, and Jennifer moved into the 
                     
1 In his brief, Scheidell asks this court to review the 
circuit court’s ruling, which was affirmed by the court of 
appeals, that Scheidell’s comparative handprint evidence was 
inadmissible.  Scheidell did not, however, challenge this 
decision by way of cross petition, and this court granted the 
State’s petition for review as to the first issue only—the test 
for admissibility of other acts evidence proffered by the 
defendant.  Accordingly, we will not review the issue regarding 
the relevance of the comparative handprint.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.62(6); State v. Weber, 164 Wis. 2d 788, 789-91, 476 N.W.2d 
867 (1991); and Betchkal v. Willis, 127 Wis. 2d 177, 183 n.4, 
378 N.W.2d 684 (1985)(if an issue is not raised in the petition 
for review or in a cross-petition, the issue is not before us). 
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
3 
one-bedroom, studio apartment on the ground floor of the 
building.2   
¶4 
Scheidell was friendly with Jennifer, and stopped by 
to chat on occasion.  Scheidell, who did work around the 
building, had obtained a key to Jennifer’s apartment from the 
owner of the building.  He had asked to keep the key to help 
paint her bathroom, and allowed a cable company employee into 
Jennifer’s apartment while she was at work.  
¶5 
At 4:45 a.m., on May 20, 1995, Jennifer awoke to the 
sound of the window blind falling onto her bathroom floor.  She 
walked into the bathroom and noted that the casement window 
which she had left ajar for air was now open approximately one 
foot.  
¶6 
Jennifer shut the window and attempted to go back to 
sleep.  Approximately 30 minutes later, Jennifer awoke with a 
man straddling her waist.  The assailant was wearing a black, 
knit ski mask with holes for the eyes and mouth, and a nylon 
jacket draped around his head.   
¶7 
The assailant had pulled up her shirt, exposing her 
chest, he had his hand over her mouth, and she felt an object at 
her throat.  When Jennifer struggled to break free, he began 
hitting her in the face with an open hand and tried to pull off 
her underpants.  She was able to get one hand free and began 
hitting her assailant.  
                     
2 Jennifer described the apartment as one big room divided 
by archways into a kitchen, living room and bedroom with a small 
bathroom off of the bedroom.  
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
4 
¶8 
Jennifer testified that she could see his eyes and 
believed she recognized the assailant as Scheidell.  She said 
his name and asked him what he was doing.  The assailant 
hesitated for a few seconds, pulled back, and then started 
hitting her again.  Jennifer managed to push the assailant off 
her bed, but he shoved her back down to the bed at which point 
she noticed that he had a knife with a serrated edge.3  During 
the struggle, Jennifer called out “Danno,” Scheidell’s nickname, 
at least six times; each time the assailant hesitated and then 
resumed hitting her harder.  She also managed to expose the left 
side of the man’s face from the bottom of the eye to the top of 
the lip.  Based on the assailant’s distinctive body and walk, 
Jennifer was certain her attacker was Scheidell. 
¶9 
Jennifer was again able to kick the assailant away 
from the bed, allowing her to retrieve a pistol from her 
dresser.  She pointed the pistol at the intruder and he lunged 
at her.  She cocked the trigger, and she told the assailant that 
if he did not leave, she would shoot him.  The assailant left 
her apartment having never uttered a word.  
¶10 Jennifer called the Racine police department to report 
the incident.  When the police arrived, Scheidell was coming 
down the stairs and appeared to have just woken up.  Jennifer 
was brought into the hallway where she accused Scheidell of 
                     
3 In her attempt to fight off her attacker, Jennifer 
sustained cuts from the knife on her hand and back.   
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
5 
assaulting her.4  An officer took Scheidell up to his apartment 
where Scheidell voluntarily gave a statement.  After a limited 
search of Scheidell’s apartment and the outside alley, the 
police arrested him.  
¶11 Scheidell was charged with one count of first-degree 
sexual assault while masked, Wis. 
Stat. §§ 940.225(1)(b), 
939.32, 939.641 (1993-94),5 and one count of armed burglary while 
masked, Wis. Stat. §§ 943.10(2)(b) and 939.641.  On the first 
morning of the jury trial, the circuit court heard arguments on 
Scheidell’s intent to present evidence of a similar crime 
committed by an unknown third party while he was in jail.  
According to the offer of proof, a police report, Kim C. was 
attacked in her second floor apartment approximately five weeks 
after the attack on Jennifer and approximately four blocks away. 
 The offender, reportedly, a white male, age 35 to 40, with a 
thin build, entered through a previously damaged window, he was 
wearing some type of hood and possibly a white mask, and he used 
a butcher knife with a dull, rusty blade.   
¶12 According to the proffer, at approximately 5:00 a.m., 
Kim C. awoke with a hand on the bare skin of her back just above 
                     
4 According to the testimony of Officer Stephen Hansen, 
Jennifer accused Scheidell of assaulting her and she confronted 
him about having a key to her apartment.  Scheidell responded, 
“How do you know they didn’t come through the bathroom window.  
It’s not locked.”  When asked by the police, Scheidell provided 
the key to Jennifer’s apartment. 
5 All statutory references are to the 1993-94 version of the 
statutes unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
6 
her buttocks.  When she attempted to get up and turn around, the 
offender forced her back down by applying pressure to her back 
with his hand.  The offender said, “Get down!” or “Stay down!”  
The voice sounded familiar, but Kim could not identify her 
attacker.  He then laid on top of Kim’s back, and placed the 
knife on her neck.  Kim stated that she grabbed the knife and 
pushed it away without cutting herself, but the offender 
retained control of the knife and stayed on top of her.   
¶13 Kim begged the offender not to hurt her baby, he 
ordered her to “Stay down!”  Kim then told the offender to “Do 
whatever it is you’ve got to do.  Please don’t put it into my 
butt,” to which he responded, “Okay.”  The offender completed 
the attack without vaginal or anal entry, and then got up and 
put his pants on.  The offender asked Kim her name, and then 
told her to “Put your head down.  Keep your face down.  Keep it 
down!”  Kim covered her head, and the offender covered her 
buttocks and legs with a blanket.  He then fled through the 
broken window.  
¶14 The circuit court excluded the evidence based on 
Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614.  Applying Denny, the circuit court 
concluded that while the crimes were strikingly similar, there 
was no showing of any direct connection between the crimes; 
therefore, the evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible.6  The 
jury found Scheidell guilty on both counts and Scheidell was 
                     
6 If the proffered evidence was allowed, the prosecutor was 
prepared to submit evidence of Kim C.’s seven prior convictions 
as well as two possibly false reports she made to the police. 
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
7 
sentenced to 25 years in prison on each count to run 
concurrently.    
¶15 Scheidell filed a motion for post-conviction relief, 
arguing that the circuit court erred by excluding the evidence 
of the third-party similar crime evidence and his comparative 
handprint evidence.  The circuit court denied Scheidell’s post-
conviction motion.  Scheidell appealed.   
¶16 The court of appeals reversed.7  The court first held 
that Denny was inapplicable because Scheidell sought admission 
of the third-party similar crime evidence to raise a doubt that 
he was the person who assaulted Jennifer; thus, the protections 
of Denny’s “legitimate tendency” test were not necessary.  
Scheidell, 220 Wis. 2d at 762-63.  The court next held that the 
modus operandi test, adopted in State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 
247, 378 N.W.2d 272 (1985), where the state seeks to introduce 
other acts evidence for purposes of “identity” pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 904.04(2), should not be applied to a defendant seeking 
to present such evidence.  Scheidell, 220 Wis. 2d at 765-66.   
¶17 Instead, the court of appeals modified State v. 
Garfole, 388 A.2d 587 (N.J. 1978), and adopted a new standard of 
admissibility:  “when a defendant seeks to offer ‘other acts’ 
evidence regarding identification, prejudice is no longer a 
                     
7 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s 
discretionary determination to not admit Scheidell’s comparative 
handprint exhibit into evidence.  State v. Scheidell, 220 Wis. 
2d 753, 774, 584 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1998).  Again, we will not 
review the admissibility of the handprint exhibit.  See n.1, 
supra.   
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
8 
factor and the trial court should use an admissibility standard 
that concentrates on the simple relevancy as to guilt and 
innocence.”  Scheidell, 220 Wis. 2d at 766.  Under this test, 
similarities between the other acts and the charged crime are 
not essential; rather, the relevancy of the other acts evidence 
should be balanced against considerations of confusion of the 
issues or misleading the jury.  Id. at 763-64, 766, 771.  The 
court of appeals then concluded that the circuit court’s 
decision to exclude the evidence constituted reversible error.  
Id. at 773.   
¶18 In our order granting the State’s petition for review, 
we limited the issue on review to what the appropriate test for 
admissibility of other acts evidence committed by an unknown 
third party should be when the evidence is proffered by the 
defendant to prove identity. 
II. 
¶19 The 
constitutional 
right 
to 
present 
evidence is 
grounded in the confrontation and compulsory process clauses of 
Art. I, § 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973); State v. Pulizzano, 155 
Wis. 2d 633, 645, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990).  An accused’s right to 
cross-examine witnesses and to present witnesses in his or her 
own defense have long been recognized as fundamental and 
essential to a fair trial.  Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03; 
Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 645.  The right to present evidence is 
not absolute, however.  Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 646.  Much 
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
9 
like the state, an accused “must comply with established rules 
of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and 
reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.”   
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.  Simply put, an accused has no right, 
constitutional or otherwise, to present irrelevant evidence.  
State v. Robinson, 146 Wis. 2d 315, 332, 431 N.W.2d 165 (1988). 
    
¶20 In this case, Scheidell attempted to admit evidence of 
a similar crime that was committed by an unknown third party 
while he was in jail awaiting trial on the pending matter to 
prove mistaken identity.  Wisconsin Stat. 904.04(2), which 
governs the use of other acts evidence provides: 
OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS.  Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that the person 
acted in conformity therewith.  This subsection does 
not exclude the evidence when offered for other 
purposes, such as . . . identity. 
¶21 The general rule is one of exclusion.  State v. 
Rutchik, 116 Wis. 2d 61, 67, 341 N.W.2d 639 (1984).  However, 
other crimes evidence may be admissible if it is probative of 
intent, identity, or an element of the specific crime charged 
and this probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.  
Barrera v. State, 99 Wis. 2d 269, 278, 298 N.W.2d 820 (1980).  
It is well established that either the state or a defendant may 
introduce other acts evidence for support.  See e.g., Whitty v. 
State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 293-94, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967)(state 
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
10
proffers evidence) and Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 622-24 (defendant 
proffers evidence).8  
III. 
¶22 The question before the court in this case is which 
test of admissibility of other acts evidence is most appropriate 
when the evidence of a similar crime committed by an unknown 
third party is proffered by the defendant on the issue of 
identity: 
 
the 
Denny 
“legitimate 
tendency” 
test, 
the 
Whitty/Sullivan 
other 
acts 
evidence 
test 
or 
the 
newly-
established Garfole test.    
¶23 The State contends that the “legitimate tendency” test 
of Denny governs the admissibility of a defendant’s proffered 
evidence of a similar crime committed by an unknown third party. 
 In Denny, the defendant, who was convicted by a jury of first-
degree murder, sought to introduce evidence suggesting that any 
one of a number of named third parties had a motive and the 
opportunity to murder the victim.  Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 617.  
The circuit court ruled that the evidence was irrelevant. 
                     
8 See also State v. Oberlander, 149 Wis. 2d 132, 141, 438 
N.W.2d 580 (1989)(defendant proffers evidence); Boyer v. State, 
91 Wis. 2d 647, 660-61, 284 N.W.2d 30 (1979)(defendant proffers 
evidence); 1 Mueller and Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence 2nd Ed. 
§ 115(f), at 684-87 (1994)(reverse 404(b) evidence); and 2 
Weinstein and Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence § 404(15), at 404-94, 
and n.11 (1992)(to prove mistaken identity, defendant may show 
that other crimes similar in detail have been committed at or 
about the same time by some person other than him/herself); 2 
Wigmore, Evidence § 304, at 252 (Chadbourn rev. 1979) (other 
acts evidence may also be available to “negative the accused’s 
guilt”). 
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
11
¶24 The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the 
circuit court, but it established a bright line standard, coined 
the “legitimate tendency” test, to be used when a defendant 
seeks to introduce third-party defense evidence.  Id. at 625.  
Third-party defense evidence may be admissible under the 
legitimate tendency test if the defendant can show that the 
third party had (1) the motive and (2) the opportunity to commit 
the charged crime, and (3) can provide some evidence to directly 
connect the third person to the crime charged which is not 
remote in time, place or circumstance.  Id. at 623-24.     
¶25 The State urges this court to employ this legitimate 
tendency test to determine the admissibility of evidence of 
third-party culpability where the defendant seeks to present 
evidence that an unknown third party committed a crime similar 
to the charged crime.  The State insists that the focus in cases 
where the alleged third party goes unnamed would simply be on 
whether the defendant’s evidence of the third party’s other acts 
satisfies the direct connection component of the legitimate 
tendency test.   
¶26 We are not persuaded that the legitimate tendency test 
of Denny can or should be molded to fit a situation where the 
defendant seeks to show that some unknown third party committed 
the charged crime based on evidence of another allegedly similar 
crime. In a situation where the perpetrator of the allegedly 
similar crime is unknown, it would be virtually impossible for 
the defendant to satisfy the motive or the opportunity prongs of 
the legitimate tendency test of Denny.  A defendant simply could 
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
12
not show that an unknown third party had the opportunity to 
commit the charged crime.  Nor could the defendant establish a 
plausible motive for the unknown individual to complete the 
charged crime.  Under the legitimate tendency test, “evidence 
that simply affords a possible ground of suspicion against 
another person should not be admissible.”  Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 
623.  Thus, a defendant simply could not meet his or her burden 
under the legitimate tendency test when the alleged third party 
is unknown. 
¶27 If we were to apply Denny’s legitimate tendency test 
to 
unknown, 
third-party 
evidence, 
the 
bright 
line 
test 
established in Denny would be rendered meaningless or a 
defendant would face an insurmountable barrier to admissibility. 
 Because there is neither a legal basis nor a compelling reason 
to apply the legitimate tendency test in this case, we hold that 
the test is not applicable to the introduction of allegedly 
similar crime evidence that is committed by an unknown third 
party.9  Denny simply does not apply to this type of other acts 
evidence.   
 
 
IV. 
                     
9 We do not consider whether the legitimate tendency test is 
an appropriate standard for the introduction of third-party 
defense evidence offered to prove something other than motive.  
Cf. State v. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 357 N.W.2d 12 (Ct. App. 
1984).   
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
13
¶28 Wisconsin’s seminal case dealing with other acts 
evidence is Whitty, 34 Wis. 2d 278.  In Whitty, the defendant 
challenged the admission of evidence for identity purposes 
regarding a prior attempted assault.  Id. at 291.  The Whitty 
court set forth the analytical framework for determining the 
admissibility of other acts evidence.  Id. at 294.  The three-
step analytical framework is as follows: 
(1) Is the other acts evidence offered for an 
acceptable 
purpose 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 
904.04(2), such as establishing identity? 
(2)  Is the other acts evidence relevant, considering 
the two facets of relevance set forth in Wis. Stat. § 
(Rule) 904.01:  (a) does the other acts evidence 
relate to a fact or proposition that is of consequence 
to a determination of the action; and (b) does the 
other acts evidence have a tendency to make the 
consequential fact or proposition more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
(3)  Is the probative value of the other acts evidence 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or other considerations contained in Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 904.03.   
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772-73 (reaffirming vitality of 
§ 904.04(2) and Whitty).   
¶29 In this case, it was Scheidell, not the State, who 
sought to introduce the other acts evidence to raise doubt as to 
the identity of the attacker in the charged crime.  The court of 
appeals adopted, and Scheidell urges this court to accept, a 
less stringent standard for other acts evidence which is 
proffered by the defense to show mistaken identity.   
¶30 The court of appeals slightly modified the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s decision in Garfole, 388 A.2d 587.  The majority 
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
14
in Garfole adopted a lower standard of degree of similarity of 
offenses when the defendant seeks to use exculpatory, other 
crimes evidence.  Id. at 591.  Because prejudice to the 
defendant is no longer a factor, the court held that simple 
relevance to guilt or innocence should suffice as the standard 
of admissibility.  Id.  The Garfole court further required the 
circuit court to “weigh in the balance the concern of the law 
for orderly and efficient administration of the jury process.”  
Id. at 593.  Thus, under the Garfole test the trial judge acts 
as the gatekeeper, weighing the “relevance of the disputed 
evidence as against Rule 4 considerations [the equivalent to 
Wis. Stat. § 904.03 considerations] which militate for rejection 
of it.”  Garfole, 388 A.2d at 593.   
¶31 One dissenting justice in the Garfole case criticized 
the majority’s formulation, instead suggesting a two-tier test 
admitting 
relevant 
evidence 
unless 
the 
danger 
of 
great 
consumption of time or jury confusion is acute.  Id. at 594-95 
(Pashman, J., dissenting).  Under the two-tier test, the circuit 
court would make a preliminary determination as to whether 
defendant’s proofs are so highly relevant that they should be 
admitted without regard to Rule 4 (Wis. Stat. § 904.03) 
considerations.  Garfole, 388 A.2d at 594 (Pashman, J., 
dissenting).  If the relevance is not strong enough to meet that 
standard, then a balancing test is in order.  Id.   
¶32 The court of appeals test in this case, a modified 
Garfole test, is more similar to the dissent’s first tier (jury 
is final arbiter) than it is to the majority’s formulation 
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
15
(judge is gatekeeper).  The test adopted by the court of appeals 
first requires the circuit court to “use an admissibility 
standard that concentrates on the simple relevancy as to guilt 
and innocence [because prejudice is no longer a factor].  The 
court must balance against relevancy the considerations of 
§ 904.03, STATS.”  Scheidell, 220 Wis. 2d at 766.  Thus far, the 
test is much like the majority in Garfole.  The court of appeals 
test, however, further limits the circuit court’s admissibility 
determination: 
  In determining whether to admit the “other acts” 
evidence offered by the defendant, the trial court is 
not to make a preliminary finding that the other crime 
occurred.  When considering the defendant’s proffer, 
the trial court neither weighs credibility nor makes 
findings that the defendant has proven the occurrence 
of the other crime.  The court simply examines the 
defendant’s entire proffer and decides whether the 
jury could reasonably find that the crime occurred. 
  The similarities and differences between the crimes 
are for the jury to weigh and do not serve as a 
barrier to admissibility.  Likewise, the assertion by 
the State that the second victim is less than credible 
is not a barrier to admissibility; the opinion of the 
truthfulness of a witness is not admissible into 
evidence.  The jury is the arbiter of the weight and 
credibility of that witness’s testimony.  
Scheidell, 220 Wis. 2d at 770-71 (citations omitted; emphasis 
added).  Under this test, the circuit court does not exercise 
discretion 
or 
act 
as 
a 
gatekeeper 
when 
evaluating 
the 
admissibility of evidence of other acts by an unknown third 
party proferred by the defendant.  Rather, the court simply 
decides, based on the proffer, whether the jury could reasonably 
find that the other crime occurred.  This is contrary to the 
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
16
discretion afforded circuit courts to rule on evidentiary 
matters.  Michael R.B. v. State, 175 Wis. 2d 713, 723-25, 499 
N.W.2d 641 (1993). 
 
¶33 Admissibility of evidence is determined by the circuit 
court subject to the limitations of relevancy and adequacy of 
proof.  Wis. Stat. § 901.04; Michael R.B., 175 Wis. 2d at 723.  
Circuit courts exercise broad discretion with regard to the 
admissibility of evidence as long as the evidence tends to prove 
a material fact.  Wis. Stat. §§ 904.01 and 904.02; Michael R.B., 
175 Wis. 2d at 723; Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 623.  “Material facts 
are those that are of consequence to the merits of the 
litigation.”  Michael R.B., 175 Wis. 2d at 724.  “Relevancy, in 
turn, is a function of whether the evidence tends ‘to make the 
existence of [a material fact] more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence.’”  Id. (quoting Denny, 
120 Wis. 2d at 623).  The proffered evidence must do more than 
“simply afford[] a possible ground of suspicion against another 
person,” Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 623, it must connect that person 
to the crime—either directly or inferentially, Michael R.B., 175 
Wis. 2d at 724-25.   
¶34 The identity exception to other acts evidence, Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2), requires that “similarities [] exist 
between the ‘other act’ and the offense for which the defendant 
is being tried.”  Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 263 (citation 
omitted).  The threshold measure for similarity in the admission 
of other acts evidence with regard to identity is nearness of 
time, place, and circumstance of the other act to the crime 
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
17
alleged.  Id. at 264 n.7 (quoting Whitty, 34 Wis. 2d at 294).  
Similarities which tend to identify a third party rather than 
the defendant as the proponent of an act also tend to ensure the 
probity of the other acts evidence.  See Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 
at 263; Boyer v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 647, 660, 284 N.W.2d 30 
(1979); Sanford v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 72, 79, 250 N.W.2d 348 
(1977); Whitty, 34 Wis. 2d at 294. 
¶35 These standards have been applied even when the 
defendant is the proponent of the evidence.  In State v. 
Oberlander, 149 Wis. 2d 132, 136-38, 438 N.W.2d 580 (1989), the 
defendant sought to admit evidence that a named third-party had 
committed a similar act of arson and that the charged crime bore 
this other person’s imprint.  The circuit court excluded the 
other acts evidence holding that the evidence was irrelevant 
under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) and Whitty because it was too 
remote and had no connection with the arson in the charged case. 
 Oberlander, 149 Wis. 2d at 136-37, 144.  This court affirmed 
the circuit court’s decision, concluding that the circuit court 
based its decision on the proper facts and law governing the 
issue.  Id. at 144.  
¶36 In State v. Walker, 154 Wis. 2d 158, 164-65, 453 
N.W.2d 127 (1990), the defendant attempted to admit evidence of 
an allegedly similar robbery committed by an unnamed third party 
while he was incarcerated pending his trial on the charged 
crimes.  The circuit court excluded the evidence because of the 
dissimilarity in appearance between the perpetrator of that 
crime and the perpetrator of the crimes for which Walker was 
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
18
charged.  Id. at 191-92.  This court again affirmed the circuit 
court’s  determination based on the facts of the case and the 
relevant law.  Id. at 192.  The court of appeals’ adoption of a 
modified Garfole test in this case does not account for the 
admissibility determination of the circuit court, or the court’s 
application of the identity exception to evidence of third party 
other crimes introduced by the defendant which was approved in 
these decisions. 
¶37 Even in Denny, where the defendant sought to introduce 
evidence establishing several other individuals’ motives to 
commit the charged crime, he was required to show a direct 
connection between the charged crime and the other crime.  Here, 
the defendant is seeking to introduce evidence of an allegedly 
similar crime committed by an unknown individual.  Yet, the 
modified Garfole test apparently would not require the defendant 
to show any connection or similarity between the two crimes.  
See Scheidell, 220 Wis. 2d at 770-71.  We decline to adopt this 
seemingly inconsistent result. 
¶38 Moreover, the court of appeals’ newly-established 
standard ignores the fact that nearly all evidence operates to 
the prejudice of the party against whom it is offered.  
Christensen v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 77 Wis. 2d 50, 61-62, 
252 N.W.2d 81 (1977); State v. Johnson, 184 Wis. 2d 324, 340, 
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
19
516 N.W.2d 463 (Ct. App. 1994).10  This includes prejudice to the 
state when evidence is offered by the defendant.  The state has 
a 
significant 
interest 
in 
preserving 
orderly 
trials, 
in 
preventing 
undue 
diversion 
of 
the 
trial 
by 
injecting 
a 
collateral issue, and in avoiding unsupported jury speculation 
regarding the guilt of other suspects.  See Younger v. Harris, 
401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1453 
(9th Cir. 1983).  An additional concern is erroneous acquittals; 
a judge has no power “to assure that an acquittal is based on 
the proper legal standard:  a reasonable doubt rather than a 
speculative one.”  David McCord, The Admissibility of Evidence 
Offered by a Criminal Defendant to Suggest that Someone Else is 
Guilty., 63 Tenn. L. Rev. 917, 976 (1996).  These state 
interests are not erased simply because the defendant proffers 
the evidence of other acts by an unknown third party. 
                     
10 We do not dispute that when the defendant uses other acts 
evidence to create a doubt as to identity, prejudice to the 
defendant may not be as important of a consideration.  See 
Scheidell, 220 Wis. 2d at 765.  Clearly, the defendant is 
assuming the risk that the evidence will convince the jury that 
he or she is innocent of both the other act and of the charged 
crime.  Nevertheless, we agree with the Johnson court, the 
standard for unfair prejudice is not whether the evidence harms 
the opposing party’s case, but rather whether the evidence tends 
to influence the outcome of the case on an improper basis.  
State v. Johnson, 184 Wis. 2d 324, 340, 516 N.W.2d 463 (Ct. App. 
1994); see also Christensen v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 77 Wis. 
2d 50, 61, n.11., 252 N.W.2d 81 (1977).   
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
20
¶39 For these reasons, we decline to adopt the court of 
appeals’ modified Garfole test.11  We recognize that the 
standards of relevancy are stricter when the state seeks to 
introduce other crimes evidence to prove identity because “the 
prejudice [resulting from such evidence] is apt to be relatively 
greater than the probative value.”  Whitty, 34 Wis. 2d at 294.  
When the state seeks to admit identity evidence of other crimes, 
it must show “such a concurrence of common features and so many 
points of similarity between the other acts and the crime 
charged that it can reasonably be said that the other acts and 
the present act constitute the imprint of the defendant.”  
Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 263-64. 
¶40 While we do not believe that the defendant must 
establish that the two crimes are the “imprint” or “signature” 
of the third party, we nevertheless conclude that similarities 
between the other act evidence and the charged crime must be 
                     
11 Some courts have chosen to follow State v. Garfole, 388 
A.2d 587 (N.J. 1978).  See e.g., United States v. Stevens, 935 
F.2d 1380, 1404-05 (3rd Cir. 1991), People v. Bueno, 626 P.2d 
1167, 1169-70 (Colo. App. 1981), Brown v. State, 416 N.E.2d 828, 
830 (Ind. 1981), Commonwealth v. Jewett, 467 N.E.2d 155, 158 
(Mass. 1984).  While others have not.  See e.g., United States 
v. Perkins, 937 F.2d 1397, 1400-01 (9th Cir. 1991), Perry v. 
Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1983), Hinds v. State, 469 
N.E.2d 31, 38 (Ind. App. 1984), People v. Logan, 408 N.E.2d 
1086, 1090 (Ill. App. 1980), State v. Mosby, 595 So.2d 1135, 
1138-39 (La. 1992), Commonwealth v. Harris, 479 N.E.2d 690, 693 
(Mass. 1985), State v. Jones, 656 P.2d 1012, 1014 (Utah 1982). 
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
21
shown.12  This is particularly true in a case such as this where 
the allegedly similar crime was committed by an unknown 
individual.  We agree with the court in North Carolina that to 
be admissible, such other acts evidence must do more than raise 
conjecture or speculation.  State v. Richardson, 402 S.E.2d 401, 
404 (N.C. 1991); State v. Cotton, 351 S.E.2d 277, 279 (N.C. 
1987). 
¶41 In Wisconsin, the threshold measure for similarity in 
the admission of other acts evidence with regard to identity is 
nearness of time, place, and circumstance of the other act to 
the crime alleged.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 786; Fishnick, 127 
Wis. 2d at 264 n.7 (quoting Whitty, 34 Wis. 2d at 294).  “The 
required degree of similarity between the other act and the 
charged offense and the required number of similar other acts 
cannot be formulated as a general rule.”  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 
at 787.  However, the greater the similarity, complexity and 
distinctiveness of the events, as well as the relative frequency 
of the event, the stronger the case for admission of the other 
acts evidence.  Id.     
¶42 Similarities which tend to identify a third party 
rather than the defendant as the perpetrator of an act also tend 
                     
12 Even courts that have adopted the Garfole test have 
compared the similarities and/or distinctiveness of the other 
crimes by a third party and the charged crime.  See People v. 
Flowers, 644 P.2d 916, 920 (Colo. 1982)(concluding that the 
similar acts and circumstances taken together do not support a 
finding that the same person was probably involved in all the 
cases).   
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
22
to ensure the probity of the other acts evidence.  See Fishnick, 
127 Wis. 2d at 263.  We therefore conclude that when a defendant 
proffers other acts evidence committed by an unknown party on 
the issue of identity, the court must balance the probity of the 
evidence, considering the similarities between the other act and 
the crime alleged, against the considerations contained in Wis. 
Stat. § 904.03, utilizing the Whitty/Sullivan framework.  See 
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772-73; Whitty, 34 Wis. 2d at 294-95. 
V. 
¶43 Here, 
the 
circuit 
court 
applied 
the 
legitimate 
tendency test of Denny, concluding that there was no showing of 
opportunity or direct connection between the two crimes.  Yet 
the evidence was proffered as other acts evidence for the 
purposes of identity under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).  Generally, 
the decision to admit or exclude relevant other crimes evidence 
is a discretionary function of the circuit court which this 
court will sustain if we find that the court exercised its 
discretion in accordance with accepted legal standards and in 
accordance with the facts of record.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 
780-81; Barrera, 99 Wis. 2d at 279.  However, the circuit court 
did not perform the balancing test for other acts evidence; 
thus, we independently review the evidence to determine whether 
it supports the circuit court’s ruling to exclude it.  Johnson, 
184 Wis. 2d at 337.  See also Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 781.   
¶44 We have determined that when the defendant proffers 
other acts evidence committed by an unknown party, courts should 
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
23
engage in the three-step analytical framework outlined in Whitty 
and Sullivan. 
¶45 The first step in the analysis is to determine whether 
the other acts evidence is offered for a permissible purpose 
under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2), such as to establish motive, 
opportunity, plan, knowledge, or identity.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 
2d at 783.  In his offer of proof, Scheidell argued that the 
other acts evidence was related to identity, a permissible use 
of other acts evidence.  We conclude that Scheidell met his 
burden to show that the other acts evidence was offered for a 
permissible purpose under step one of the three-step analysis.   
¶46 We next consider the second step of the analysis:  Is 
the other acts evidence relevant?  In assessing relevance, the 
court must first determine whether the evidence relates to a 
fact or proposition that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 785.  The proponent of 
the evidence, here Scheidell, must articulate the fact or 
proposition that the evidence is offered to prove.  Id. at 786. 
 In this case, Jennifer immediately identified Scheidell as her 
attacker, and Scheidell denied the accusation.  We conclude, and 
the parties do not dispute, that the identity of the attacker 
was of consequence to the case and that the other acts evidence 
was offered to prove Scheidell was mistakenly identified.   
¶47 The second inquiry in assessing relevancy is the 
probative value of the evidence.  Whether the evidence has a 
tendency to make a consequential fact more or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence determines the probative value 
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
24
of that evidence.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 786; Richardson, 210 
Wis. 2d at 706-07.   
¶48 The probative value of other acts evidence intended to 
prove identity depends upon its nearness in time, place, and 
circumstances to the alleged crime or to the fact or proposition 
sought to be proved.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 786; Oberlander, 
149 Wis. 2d at 142-43.  “[T]he probative value lies in the 
similarity between the other act and the charged offense.”  
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 786.  The greater the similarity, 
complexity and distinctiveness of the events, as well as the 
relative frequency of the event, the stronger is the case for 
admission of the other acts evidence.  Id. at 787-88.   
¶49 Scheidell argues that there were many points of 
similarity between the other incident involving Kim C. and the 
charged crime involving Jennifer.  Scheidell insists that the 
“accretion [of] the similarities add up to an odds-defying modus 
operandi,” such that evidence of the later offense should have 
been admitted.  Scheidell points to the following similarities: 
 both crimes took place within four blocks of each other; both 
were committed only five weeks apart; both occurred between 
5:00-5:30 a.m.; in both cases a lower-story apartment window was 
a suspected point of entry; each victim was awakened in her bed 
to find a man armed with a knife straddling her; the assailant 
wore a mask and covered his head with a jacket or part of a 
jacket; the assailant was about 5’10”, white, and slender; the 
assailant either attempted or completed the same crime: first-
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
25
degree sexual assault; and the assailant chose similar victims: 
a single, young, white woman.   
¶50 We agree that there are some similarities between the 
later offense and the charged crime—the location, the nearness 
in time between events, and the early-hour of the assaults.  
Even so, we do not agree that the two incidents are so 
distinctively similar as to support the inference that some 
unknown third party, and not Scheidell, committed the charged 
crime. 
¶51 We 
note 
several 
significant 
deficiencies 
with 
Scheidell’s comparison of the other acts evidence.  Scheidell’s 
evidence involves only one incident, not a series of incidents 
which increases the probability that the two incidents occurred 
by mere chance or coincidence.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 786-87. 
 Also, the factual details of the two incidents were not 
particularly 
complex 
or 
unusual—residential 
sexual 
assault 
committed at knife point in predawn hours by white man who 
concealed his identity.  See e.g., Commonwealth v. Harris, 479 
N.E.2d 690, 693 (Mass. 1985) (despite similar description of 
attackers, weapon, and threat to kill victim, the points of 
similarity were not particularly distinguishing or unique); 
People v. Flowers, 644 P.2d 916, 919-20 (Colo. 1982)(entry 
through back window, threat of knife, tying of victim’s hands, 
sexual assault, and theft were common to most sexual assaults 
and not distinctive or unusual enough to represent signature of 
individual); and People v. Johnson, 405 N.Y.S.2d 538, 540-41 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978)(similar description from victims, use of 
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
26
gun, 
and 
occurrence 
of 
both 
sexual 
assaults 
in 
parking 
facilities were not sufficiently unique to provide a basis for 
admitting collateral testimony concerning prior rape).   
¶52 Equally significant is the difference between the two 
assaults.  In the charged crime, it is unclear whether the 
assailant entered through an open window or through the front 
door; however, Jennifer awoke with a man, who was fully clothed, 
straddling her.  In the other crime, the unknown assailant 
entered and exited through a broken window; and the assailant, 
who had taken off his pants, placed his hand on Kim’s buttocks, 
laid on top of her back and legs, and assaulted her from behind. 
  
¶53 The most distinguishing factor between the other crime 
and the charged crime, completely overlooked by Scheidell, was 
the significantly different behavior displayed by the two 
assailants toward their victims.  In the other crime, the 
assailant never struck Kim, but he spoke directly to her, 
ordering her to stay down, verbally agreeing not to assault her 
anally, and asking her name.  In the charged crime, the 
assailant did not utter a word; however, he immediately and 
persistently struck Jennifer in the head and the face.   
¶54 Based on the distinguishing circumstances of the two 
incidents, we conclude that the other acts evidence was not 
probative of (i.e., relevant to) Scheidell being identified as 
the assailant in the charged crime, and was therefore properly 
excluded by the circuit court.  Because we conclude that the 
other acts evidence proffered by Scheidell is not probative of a 
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
27
permissible purpose under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2), we need not 
address 
the 
third 
step—the 
prejudice 
prong—of 
the 
Whitty/Sullivan analysis.13  See Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 789.  
VI. 
¶55 Having 
concluded 
that 
the 
other 
acts 
evidence 
Scheidell sought to admit was properly excluded by the circuit 
court because it was irrelevant, we will now summarize our 
holdings in this case.  First, the circuit court determined that 
the 
third 
party 
other 
acts 
evidence 
was 
irrelevant 
and 
inadmissible under Denny.  We do not agree that Denny applies to 
other acts evidence committed by an unknown third party.  
However, we also decline to adopt the modified Garfole test 
adopted and applied by the court of appeals in its decision.  
Instead, we conclude that when a defendant proffers other acts 
evidence committed by an unknown third party, the court, 
following Whitty and Sullivan, must balance the probity of the 
evidence, considering the similarities between the other act and 
the crime alleged, against the considerations contained in Wis. 
Stat. § 904.03.  Based on our independent review of the evidence 
                     
13 
Even 
if 
the 
evidence 
were 
relevant 
under 
the 
Whitty/Sullivan standard, a circuit court may exclude relevant 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay.  Wis. 
Stat. § 904.03.  Although the circuit court did not reach the 
question of potential confusion or undue delay caused by the 
introduction of testimony concerning identification in the other 
assault, we conclude that such testimony coupled with the 
State’s rebuttal evidence would tend to confuse the issues in 
the single case before the jury and unduly delay the trial.     
No. 
97-1426-CR 
 
28
under Whitty and Sullivan, we also conclude that the evidence 
was not relevant to the charged crime and was properly excluded 
by the circuit court.14  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals.     
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
                     
14 We may affirm a lower court’s decision on different 
grounds than those relied upon by the lower court.  Koestler v. 
Pollard, 162 Wis. 2d 797, 809 n.8, 471 N.W.2d 7 (1991), citing 
Saenz v. Murphy, 162 Wis. 2d 54, 57 n.2, 469 N.W.2d 611 (1991); 
Liberty Trucking Co. v. DILHR, 57 Wis. 2d 331, 342, 204 N.W.2d 
217 (1973).   
No. 97-1426-CR.ssa 
 
1 
¶56 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).   
The defendant in the case at bar sought to introduce evidence to 
show that other crimes of a similar nature have been committed 
by some other person to cast doubt upon the identification of 
the defendant as the person who committed the crime charged.  
The defendant was attempting to use "other act" evidence to 
exonerate himself. 
¶57 I 
agree 
with 
the 
majority 
opinion 
that 
the 
admissibility  of this defensive use of other acts evidence is 
assessed using the three-step analytical framework set forth in 
State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 771-72, 576 N.W.2d 30 
(1998); 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Evidence, 
§ 404.5, at 41 (Supp. 1999).  Again, the Sullivan framework for 
assessing the admissibility of other-acts evidence is the 
following: 
 
 
(1)  Is the other acts evidence offered for an 
acceptable 
purpose 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 904.04(2), 
such 
as 
establishing 
motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident? 
 
 
(2)  Is 
the 
other 
acts 
evidence 
relevant, 
considering the two facets of relevance set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.01?  The first consideration 
in assessing relevance is whether the other acts 
evidence relates to a fact or proposition that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action.  The 
second consideration in assessing relevance is whether 
the evidence has probative value, that is, whether the 
other acts evidence has a tendency to make the 
consequential fact or proposition more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
 
 
(3)  Is the probative value of the other acts 
evidence substantially outweighed by the danger of 
No. 97-1426-CR.ssa 
 
2 
unfair 
prejudice, 
confusion 
of 
the 
issues 
or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence? 
¶58 The 
defendant 
satisfies 
the 
first 
step 
of 
the 
analysis.  The defendant is seeking to introduce the other acts 
evidence for purposes of proving the identity of the perpetrator 
of the crime charged. 
¶59 As to the second step, relevance and probative value 
of the other acts evidence for purposes of proving identity 
depends on the similarities and dissimilarities between the 
other act and the charged crime.   
¶60 I agree with the majority opinion that a more 
stringent standard applies when the state seeks to introduce 
other acts evidence to prove the defendant's identity as the 
perpetrator of the crime charged15 than when an accused seeks to 
introduce other acts evidence to cast doubt on the accused's 
identity as the perpetrator of the crime with which the accused 
is charged.  In other words, a less stringent standard of 
similarity between the crime charged and the other act is 
applied when an accused proffers other acts evidence for 
purposes of exoneration.  See Majority op. at 16, 20. 
                     
15 The state should meet a high standard for probative 
value, that is, show "a concurrence of common features and so 
many points of similarity between the other acts and the crime 
charged that it can reasonably be said that the other acts and 
the present act constitute the imprint of the defendant."  State 
v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 263-64, 378 N.W.2d 272 (1985) 
No. 97-1426-CR.ssa 
 
3 
¶61 The 
majority 
opinion 
summarizes 
the 
points 
of 
similarity between the crime charged and the other act advanced 
by the defendant as the following: 
 
Both crimes took place within four blocks of each 
other; both were committed only five weeks apart; both 
occurred between 5:00-5:30 a.m.; in both cases a 
lower-story apartment window was a suspected point of 
entry; each victim was awakened in her bed to find a 
man armed with a knife straddling her; the assailant 
wore a mask and covered his head with a jacket or part 
of a jacket; the assailant was about 5'10", white, and 
slender; the assailant either attempted or completed 
the same crime; first-degree sexual assault; and the 
assailant chose similar victims:  a single young, 
white woman. 
Majority op. at 22.  The majority then states that "we do not 
agree that the two incidents are so distinctively similar as to 
support the inference that some unknown third party, and not 
Scheidell, committed the charged crime."  Majority op. at 22. 
¶62 Ironically, in prior cases involving the state's 
proffers of other acts evidence to prove the identity of an 
accused the similarities between the crime charged and the other 
acts have been fewer than the similarities the majority requires 
of the other acts evidence proffered in this case.  See, e.g., 
State v. Speer, 176 Wis. 2d 1101, 1117, 501 N.W.2d 429 (1993) 
(state's evidence that defendant previously burglarized homes 
with "For Sale" signs in front during daylight hours admitted to 
prove identity in burglary case); State v. Rutchik, 116 Wis. 2d 
61,70, 341 N.W.2d 639 (1984) (state's evidence that defendant 
previously burglarized a house while the occupants were at a 
funeral after reading of funerals in obituaries admitted to 
No. 97-1426-CR.ssa 
 
4 
prove identity in burglary case); Sanford v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 
72, 80-81, 250 N.W.2d 348 (1977) (state's evidence that 
defendant engaged in prior rape in a garage and used his jacket 
for the victim to lie on admitted to prove identity in rape 
case); Hough v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 807, 815, 235 N.W.2d 534 
(1975) (state's evidence that defendant previously stated to 15-
year-old girl his preference for virgins admitted to prove 
identity in rape case). 
¶63 I agree with the court of appeals that the other act 
evidence 
proffered 
by 
the 
defendant 
in 
this 
case 
bears 
sufficient similarity to the crime with which the defendant was 
charged to be admissible.   
¶64 As to the third step, the majority states it need not 
address the prejudice prong of the analysis because it concludes 
the other act evidence is inadmissible.  Majority op. at 26-27. 
 Nevertheless the majority concludes that the probative value of 
the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
confusion of issues and by unduly delaying the trial.  Majority 
op. at 27 n.12. 
¶65 I have considered such factors as confusion of issues, 
misleading the jury, undue delay and waste of time.  Evidence of 
one similar incident occurring while the defendant was in jail 
will not consume a great deal of time, mislead or confuse the 
jury, or cause undue delay.  I conclude that the introduction of 
the other act evidence proffered by the defendant in this case 
would have resulted in nothing more than the ordinary prejudice 
No. 97-1426-CR.ssa 
 
5 
to the state's case that will always result when a defendant 
exercises his or her constitutional right to present a defense. 
¶66 The State has failed to prove that the circuit court's 
error in refusing to admit the other act evidence was harmless 
error. 
¶67 For the reasons stated, I would affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
¶68 I am authorized to state that justices WILLIAM A. 
BABLTICH and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
No. 97-1426-CR.ssa 
 
1