Title: Dusty Ray Spencer V. State of Florida - New
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC00-1051
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 9, 2003

Supreme Court of Florida
________________________
Nos. SC00-1051; SC00-2588
________________________
DUSTY RAY SPENCER,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
DUSTY RAY SPENCER,
Petitioner,
vs.
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR.,
Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections,
Respondent.
[January 9, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
Dusty Ray Spencer appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion
for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  Spencer
also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art.
V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial
-2-
court's denial of postconviction relief and we deny relief under the habeas petition.
Spencer was convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated assault,
aggravated battery, and attempted second-degree murder involving two attacks
upon his wife Karen Spencer and his stepson Timothy Johnson.  Karen was killed
during the second attack.  The facts surrounding these crimes are discussed in
Spencer v. State, 645 So. 2d 377, 379-80 (Fla. 1994).  The jury recommended a
death sentence by a seven-to-five vote.  The trial judge found three aggravating
circumstances (a previous violent felony conviction based on the contemporaneous
convictions; the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and the murder
was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP)), no statutory mitigating
circumstances, and one nonstatutory mitigating circumstance (Spencer’s history
and background).  The trial judge followed the jury's recommendation and imposed
death.  Spencer was also sentenced to five years for aggravated assault, fifteen
years for attempted second-degree murder, and fifteen years for aggravated battery,
with the sentences to run consecutively for a total of thirty-five years.
On direct appeal, Spencer raised seven issues.  He argued that:  the trial
court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence
was insufficient to establish premeditation; his motion to sever charges relating to
the previous “iron incident” was improperly denied; his objections to the standard
-3-
jury instructions on premeditation and reasonable doubt were improperly denied;
the trial court should have granted his motion for mistrial based upon the
prosecutor’s improper argument regarding matters not in evidence; the State’s use
of hearsay testimony violated his rights to due process and to confront and cross
examine witnesses; his death sentence had been impermissibly imposed because the
trial court considered improper aggravating circumstances, excluded existing
mitigating circumstances, and did not properly weigh the circumstances; and
Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional.  This Court affirmed Spencer’s
convictions, but vacated his death sentence because the trial court improperly
found the CCP aggravating circumstance and improperly rejected the statutory
mitigating circumstances of "committed while the defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance" and "substantial impairment of the
defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law."  Id. at 384-85.  Consequently, we remanded
the case for reconsideration of the death sentence by the judge.  See id. at 385.
On remand, the trial court heard argument from both parties and once again
imposed the death sentence.  The trial judge found two aggravating circumstances
(prior violent felony and HAC), the two statutory mental mitigating circumstances,
and a number of nonstatutory mitigating factors in Spencer’s background.  The
1. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993); see also Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.851(c).
-4-
judge gave some weight to the statutory mental mitigators, very little weight to the
nonstatutory mitigators, and concluded that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed all of the mitigating circumstances.  See Spencer v. State, 691 So. 2d
1062 (Fla. 1996).
On appeal after resentencing, Spencer raised two issues.  He argued that:  the
death sentence was improperly imposed because the sentencing order was
insufficient in its factual basis and rationale, the judge considered inappropriate
aggravating factors, the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating, and the death
sentence was not proportionately warranted; and the introduction of hearsay
testimony during the penalty phase violated his constitutional rights to due process,
confrontation, and cross-examination.  This Court found no merit to Spencer’s
claims and affirmed his death sentence.  See id.  The United States Supreme Court
denied Spencer’s petition for certiorari.  See Spencer v. Florida, 522 U.S. 884
(1997).
In September 1999, Spencer filed an amended motion to vacate his
convictions and sentences.  The lower court conducted a Huff1 hearing in
December 1999 and subsequently conducted a limited evidentiary hearing in March
2. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
3. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
-5-
2000.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the court entered a comprehensive fifty-
nine page order denying all relief.  Spencer appeals that denial to this Court and
raises ten issues.  Spencer claims that:  (1) he was denied a fair trial by various
instances of prosecutorial misconduct; (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance during the guilt phase of the trial; (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance during the penalty phase of the trial; (4) the State committed a Brady2
violation by failing to disclose that a reserve deputy sheriff assisted in the
investigation of Spencer’s first attack on the victim; (5) pretrial publicity and
improper contact between protesters and the jurors resulted in juror bias; (6) trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance during voir dire questioning of the
prospective jurors; (7) the postconviction court should have granted an evidentiary
hearing on several other claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the
penalty phase; (8) the State committed several Giglio3 violations by either
presenting false evidence or by misrepresenting the evidence during argument to the
jury; (9) Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.5(d)(4), which prohibits trial counsel
from interviewing jurors, denied him adequate assistance of counsel in pursuing
-6-
postconviction relief; and (10) cumulative errors resulted in an unfair proceeding.
Spencer has also filed a habeas corpus petition with this Court, raising two
issues.  Spencer claims that Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional on its
face and as applied and that his conviction and sentence violate the constitutional
guarantees to due process, effective assistance of counsel, equal protection, and
right to jury trial.  Spencer also asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective in
failing to raise claims of fundamental error on direct appeal.
Denial of Rule 3.850 Motion
In issue one, Spencer claims that the prosecutor engaged in various
misconduct during both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, including improper
Golden Rule arguments, improper appeals to the jury’s emotions, eliciting
prohibited testimony, making false statements, and improperly commenting on
Spencer’s right not to testify.  The lower court found that all of Spencer’s claims
of prosecutorial misconduct were  procedurally barred from consideration in the
postconviction proceedings as they should have been raised on direct appeal. 
However, “in an abundance of caution” the lower court granted a hearing as to
these claims and addressed each on the merits.
We conclude that Spencer’s substantive claims of prosecutorial misconduct
could and should have been raised on direct appeal and thus are procedurally
-7-
barred from consideration in a postconviction motion.  See Smith v. State, 445 So.
2d 323, 325 (Fla. 1983) ("Issues which either were or could have been litigated at
trial and upon direct appeal are not cognizable through collateral attack.").  Each of
the alleged violations appears on the trial record and could have been raised on
direct appeal.  Thus, the postconviction court properly concluded that the claims
were procedurally barred and we affirm the denial of relief on this claim.
In issue two, Spencer asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance during the guilt phase of the trial and cites the following specific
examples as evidence of this failure:  counsel did not present evidence to rebut the
State’s claim of premeditation; counsel did not present expert testimony regarding
Spencer’s “dissociative state” during the murder; counsel did not impeach the
testimony of the physician who treated the victim after the first attack; counsel did
not test the brick used to strike the victim for evidence of Spencer’s blood; counsel
failed to impeach the testimony of the victim’s son regarding Spencer’s use of latex
gloves; counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s “emotional display” during
closing argument; counsel conceded that Spencer struck the victim with an iron in
the first attack and admitted that Spencer intended to kill the victim; and counsel
failed to elicit evidence that Spencer regularly carried a knife.
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a
-8-
defendant must demonstrate that (1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2)
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984).  A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.  See id. at 694.  In reviewing counsel's performance, the court must be
highly deferential to counsel, and in assessing the performance, every effort must
"be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel's perspective at the time."  Id. at 689; see also Rivera v. Dugger, 629 So.
2d 105, 107 (Fla. 1993).  As to the first prong, the defendant must establish that
"counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687;
see also Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Fla. 1995).  For the prejudice
prong, the reviewing court must determine whether there is a reasonable probability
that, but for the deficiency, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695; see also Valle v. State, 705 So. 2d 1331, 1333
(Fla. 1997).  "Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the
conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process
that renders the result unreliable."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  This is the standard
-9-
that the postconviction court used in assessing Spencer’s claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel and in denying relief on the claims.  The postconviction court
concluded that Spencer “received competent, effective assistance of counsel in the
presentation of his defense” and, to the extent that counsel’s performance was
“less than perfect,” Spencer was not prejudiced by it.  For the reasons expressed
below, we agree with the postconviction court’s denial of relief on each of these
subclaims.
Spencer contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present
witnesses who could testify as to the stormy and antagonistic relationship that he
had with his wife.  Spencer argues that this evidence would have rebutted the
conclusion that the murder was premeditated.  At the evidentiary hearing, Spencer
presented the testimony of several friends who had witnessed the couple’s
relationship.  Trial counsel testified that the defense investigator spoke to these
individuals during the pre-trial investigation, but that counsel chose not to focus on
the relationship for fear of being perceived as blaming the victim for Spencer’s
actions.  Counsel was also concerned with opening the door to damaging and
prejudicial evidence relating to Spencer’s first marriage and his background. 
Ultimately, counsel testified, he decided not to present witnesses during the guilt
phase as they would not substantially help Spencer’s defense of lack of
-10-
premeditation.  Instead, counsel testified, he chose to cast doubt on the State’s
case through cross-examination of the State witnesses.  Thus, this was not a case
of failure to adequately investigate and prepare for trial.  Counsel made a strategic
decision not to call these witnesses.  Further, the stormy nature of the Spencers’
relationship was presented at trial through the direct and cross-examination of the
State witnesses.
This Court has held that defense counsel's strategic choices do not
constitute deficient conduct if alternative courses of action have been considered
and rejected.  See Valle, 778 So. 2d at 965; Shere v. State, 742 So. 2d 215, 220
(Fla. 1999).  Thus, we affirm the lower court’s denial of relief on this claim.
Spencer claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to present expert
testimony in the guilt phase regarding his “dissociative state” that occurred during
the murder.  Spencer asserts that this evidence of his amnesia or altered
consciousness would have shown that the murder was not premeditated.  At the
evidentiary hearing, clinical psychologist Dr. Kathleen Burch and
neuropharmacologist Dr. Jonathan Lipman stated that they could have testified
during the guilt phase about Spencer’s dissociative state during the murder, but
were not asked to do so by trial counsel.  Both experts opined that it was likely that
Spencer suffered such a dissociative state during the murder based upon his self-
-11-
report of not remembering the stabbing and of experiencing a blackout during the
attack, his long history of alcohol abuse, and his personality disorder.  However,
Dr. Burch did admit that at the time of trial she was skeptical of Spencer’s claimed
amnesia and still could not state with certainty that he was definitely in a
dissociative state.  Dr. Lipman stated that he could also have testified that
Spencer’s mind was impaired at the time of the offense based upon the residual
effects of a two-week alcoholic binge even though Spencer’s blood alcohol level
was zero at the time of the murder.
Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that the defense team had
discussed whether to call the experts as guilt phase witnesses, but ultimately
decided against this for two reasons.  First, counsel feared that the experts’
testimony might reveal other statements by Spencer that would be more harmful
than helpful to his defense.  Second, counsel felt that the experts’ effectiveness as
penalty phase witnesses might be compromised if they testified in the guilt phase
and Spencer was found guilty.
The lower court concluded that trial counsel made a strategic decision not to 
present this testimony during the guilt phase of the trial and that the evidence had no
reasonable probability of being an effective defense to premeditation as the
dissociative state was only supported by Spencer’s self-report and could not be
-12-
confirmed otherwise.  Further, the lower court noted that Spencer remembered all
of the events of the murder up to the point where he repeatedly struck the victim
with a brick and reported these events to Dr. Lipman.  The lower court also noted
that Dr. Lipman’s testimony regarding Spencer’s alcohol binge would not have
demonstrated a defense of voluntary intoxication because Spencer was not
intoxicated at time of the offense.  Thus, the lower court denied relief on this claim.
While not specifically addressed by the lower court, we conclude that the
evidence of Spencer’s “dissociative state” would not have been admissible during
the guilt phase of the trial.  “[E]vidence of most mental conditions is simply too
misleading to be allowed in the guilt phase.”  Dillbeck v. State, 643 So. 2d 1027,
1029 (Fla. 1994).  While evidence of voluntary intoxication and of other commonly
understood conditions that are beyond one's control, such as epilepsy, are
admissible in cases involving specific intent, see id.; see also Bunney v. State, 603
So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 1992); Gurganus v. State, 451 So. 2d 817, 822-23 (Fla. 1984)
("When specific intent is an element of the crime charged, evidence of voluntary
intoxication . . . is relevant."), there are limitations regarding the admissibility of
evidence of mental disease or defect within the defense of voluntary intoxication. 
See State v. Bias, 653 So. 2d 380, 382-83 (Fla. 1995).  As this Court explained in
Bias, such limitations are required “to ensure that the defense of voluntary
-13-
intoxication is not utilized as a label for what in reality is a defense based upon the
doctrine of diminished capacity.”  Id.  Further, “[w]e continue to adhere to the rule
that expert evidence of diminished capacity is inadmissible on the issue of mens
rea.”  Id.  Thus, we agree with the lower court that counsel’s failure to present this
evidence did not constitute deficient performance and we affirm the lower court’s
denial of this claim.
Spencer also claims that counsel was ineffective in failing to impeach the
testimony of the physician who treated the victim after the first attack.  The treating
physician testified at trial that the victim reported that “she was beaten with an iron”
and that her facial injuries were consistent with being hit with an iron.  Spencer
contends that counsel should have introduced testimony from the triage physician
who also saw the victim at the hospital.  At the evidentiary hearing, Spencer
proffered the triage physician’s report, which does not mention an iron.  However,
Spencer did not offer testimony or an affidavit from the triage physician to directly
contradict the testimony of the treating physician on the nature of the weapon used. 
Reversible error cannot be predicated on such conjecture.  See Sullivan v. State,
303 So. 2d 632, 635 (Fla. 1974).  Thus, this claim of ineffective assistance does not
meet either prong of the Strickland standard and no relief is warranted on this basis.
Spencer further asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to test the
-14-
brick, which was introduced into evidence as a weapon in the fatal attack, for
indications of his blood.  The test results introduced at the evidentiary hearing were
inconclusive.  No relief is warranted on Spencer’s speculative assertion that had the
brick been tested for Spencer’s blood at the time of trial it might have revealed his
blood and that this would have supported his claim of a domestic dispute that got
out of hand and he would not have been convicted of first-degree murder.  See
Sullivan.
Spencer also claims that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to impeach the
testimony of Timothy Johnson, the victim’s son, regarding Spencer’s use of latex
gloves.  On direct examination at trial, Johnson testified that Spencer was wearing
clear plastic “surgical gloves” on the day of his mother’s murder.  Johnson also
testified that these were the type of gloves used by Spencer and his mother in their
painting business.  During cross-examination by trial counsel, Johnson stated that
he had never seen Spencer wear these gloves during the three years he had known
Spencer and that only his mother wore the gloves while painting.  In his pre-trial
deposition Johnson stated that he had seen Spencer wear similar gloves while
painting.  Spencer claims that the gloves were crucial to the State’s theory of
premeditation and thus counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Johnson on
this point.  At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel conceded that he missed this
-15-
point on cross-examination.  The lower court concluded that counsel’s failure to
impeach Johnson about the gloves did not constitute ineffective assistance as there
was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been
different had counsel done so.
Whether or not Spencer had previously worn gloves when he was painting
had no bearing on the issue of premeditation.  There was never any allegation that
Spencer had gone to his wife’s house to paint on the day of the murder.  In fact,
Spencer stated that he went to the house to steal his car title and did not want to
leave his fingerprints.  Thus, Spencer did wear gloves to conceal his identity on the
day of the murder.  Counsel’s failure to impeach on this point does not meet the
Strickland standard and we affirm the lower court’s denial of relief on this claim.
Spencer also cites trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s
“emotional display” during closing argument as evidence of ineffective assistance. 
At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor testified that she did not cry during
closing argument as Spencer contends.  Based upon the prosecutor’s testimony
and a videotape of the prosecutor’s closing argument, the lower court found that 
the prosecutor’s voice “quavered” for a few seconds, but that she did not cry
during closing argument.  The court also noted that the prosecutor turned away
from the jury when this occurred and composed herself before proceeding with her
-16-
closing argument.  Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that the
prosecutor had her back to the defense team during closing argument and they
could not tell whether she was crying, that her emotional tone lasted for only a few
seconds, and that she had regained her composure by the time they even realized
that something might be happening to which they should object.  Thus, we
conclude that even if counsel was deficient in failing to object to this incident there
is no reasonable probability that an objection would have resulted in a different
outcome.
We conclude that the other incidents of alleged ineffective assistance for
failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct during the guilt phase do not meet the
Strickland standard either because the substantive claim was raised and rejected on
direct appeal (the prosecutor’s comments relating to the victim carrying a rifle) or
the prejudice prong was not proven (the prosecutor’s opening comments that
Johnson witnessed Spencer hitting the victim with an iron were corrected later in the
trial and there was independent evidence that victim was hit with an iron).
Spencer also claims that trial counsel improperly conceded that Spencer hit
the victim with an iron during the first attack and improperly admitted during
closing argument that Spencer killed his wife.  At the evidentiary hearing, trial
counsel explained that he could not argue to the jury that the acts in question had
-17-
not occurred or that Spencer had not committed the acts as the victim’s son was
an  eyewitness to the acts.  Nor could he deny that the victim died as a result of
these actions.  Counsel explained that he instead argued that the acts did not result
from a premeditated design.  Counsel explained that he was drawing a distinction
between Spencer’s intent to do the acts at the moment and a premeditated design
to kill the victim.  In fact, trial counsel repeatedly asked, “Where’s the intent [to
commit murder]?” during his argument to the jury.  The lower court concluded that
trial counsel’s argument did not constitute deficient performance and there was no
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had
counsel not made this argument.  We agree with this conclusion.
Spencer also asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present
witnesses who could have testified that he commonly carried a hunting knife on his
person.  Spencer contends that such evidence would have refuted the inference that
he carried a knife on the day of the murder for the purpose of killing his wife.  At
the evidentiary hearing, Spencer presented testimony from two witnesses who
verified that Spencer did carry a hunting knife at times.  However, at trial Johnson
testified that the knife Spencer used to stab the victim was a serrated “steak knife”
and that it was not taken from his mother’s kitchen as those knives were all
accounted for after the murder.  At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel stated that
-18-
it would not have helped his client if he had introduced evidence of the hunting
knife when the weapon in question was identified by an eyewitness as a serrated
steak knife.  Counsel also stated that his strategy regarding the knife was to put the
burden on the State to show where the knife came from and that the knife Johnson
saw was actually used to stab the victim.
Regardless of the efficacy of counsel’s strategy, we agree with the lower
court that the hunting knife testimony would have been of little assistance in proving
lack of premeditation where the knife in question was clearly identified as a serrated
steak knife.  Thus, there is no reasonable probability that the result of the
proceeding would have been different had this evidence been presented at trial and
thus no relief is warranted.  See Strickland.
Finally, Spencer claims that trial counsel was ineffective in his voir dire
questioning of three jurors regarding bias and in failing to question jurors who had
contact with the prosecutors and the victim’s advocate during trial.  As noted in the
lower court’s order, trial counsel filed a Motion for Juror Questionnaire and to
Supplement Voir Dire.  Based upon this motion, each potential juror filled out a
fairly extensive questionnaire consisting of forty-one questions.  The questionnaire
was designed to seek out biases, including whether the juror or someone close to
the juror had been the victim of a violent crime or domestic violence and to elicit
4.  In one instance, several jurors said good morning to the prosecutor, who 
did not respond to them.  On another occasion, one of the jurors spoke to the
victim’s advocate from the Orange County Sheriff’s Department who was sitting
on a bench outside the courtroom.  The juror told the advocate that he had brought
a sweater with him to court instead of a jacket and the advocate responded that was
nice.  During trial, one of the jurors approached the prosecutor in the hall and stated
that all of the jurors had taken a vote and they liked her jacket.  She responded with
a thank you and left.  Also during trial, a juror walked into the State’s witness room
and spoke to the prosecutor while she was looking out a window.  When the
prosecutor turned around and informed the juror that he was not supposed to be
talking to her, the juror stated that he thought she was one of the jurors and left the
room.
-19-
what newspapers, periodicals, and media the juror regularly read or viewed.
The test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside
any bias or prejudice and render a verdict solely on the evidence presented and the
instructions on the law given by the court.  See Lusk v. State, 446 So. 2d 1038,
1041 (Fla. 1984).  Our review of the record indicates that each of the jurors in
question met this standard.  Further, the record shows that either counsel or the
court adequately questioned the jurors regarding any possible bias.  Thus, we agree
with the lower court that there is no merit to this claim and relief was not warranted
on this basis.
The second part of this claim questions the adequacy of counsel’s inquiry
about improper contact between the jurors and the prosecutors and the victims’
advocate.  The improper contact involved innocuous comments by several jurors4
-20-
which were immediately brought to the court’s attention.  After inquiry by the
judge, the jurors were reminded not to say anything to the lawyers or any of the
witnesses until the trial was over.
The lower court concluded that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient
for failing to voir dire the jurors about these incidents and that there was no
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had
counsel done so.  As noted above and in the lower court’s order, the record
supports this conclusion and we affirm the denial of relief on this claim.
In issue three, Spencer claims that trial counsel was ineffective during the
penalty phase proceedings by failing to properly present evidence of his
dissociative state during the stabbing and by failing to object to the prosecutor’s
mischaracterization of Dr. Lipman’s testimony during closing argument.  Spencer
claims that the dissociative state evidence would have negated the HAC aggravator
as the actions that supported HAC occurred during his dissociative state.
As noted in issue two above, Drs. Lipman and Burch testified at the
evidentiary hearing about the testimony and opinions that they could have offered
as to a dissociative state.  Dr. Lipman’s assessment of a dissociative state was
based on Spencer’s self-reported lack of memory and was not otherwise subject to
confirmation.  Dr. Burch testified that she could not state with certainty that
-21-
Spencer was in a dissociative state at the time of the murder.  Furthermore, Dr.
Burch’s final report to the defense team prior to trial questioned Spencer’s claim of
amnesia.
The record of the penalty phase shows that both Drs. Lipman and Burch did
testify as to Spencer’s “dissociative state” or lack of memory of the stabbing. 
Both experts also testified about Spencer’s alcohol and drug use, his inability to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, and his mental impairments
which resulted in a loss of control in stressful situations.  Dr. Lipman also opined
that Spencer was impaired at the time of the offense based upon the residual effects
of a two-week alcoholic binge.
Based upon this evidence from the penalty phase and that presented at the
evidentiary hearing, the lower court concluded that Spencer’s trial counsel utilized
the experts effectively.  As the lower court noted, Spencer’s trial counsel employed
both a clinical psychologist who conducted testing on Spencer and a
neuropharmacologist to explain the effects of his alcohol and drug use on his
mental state.  These experts even testified as to Spencer’s “dissociative state”
during the murder.  Thus, we agree with the lower court that Spencer is not entitled
to relief on this claim.
Spencer also contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to
-22-
the prosecutor’s characterization of Dr. Lipman’s testimony during closing
argument.  Spencer claims that the prosecutor misstated Dr. Lipman’s testimony
and gave the jurors the impression that Spencer remembered stabbing the victim by
arguing that “Dusty Spencer gave statements to Dr. Lipman that he had stabbed
Karen [Spencer] before Tim [Johnson] left.”  The lower court found the claim to be
without merit and that counsel was not deficient for failing to object to this
statement.
Our review of the trial record shows that the prosecutor made this statement
in the context of arguing that the victim received all of her injuries while she was
alive and that Johnson was confused about whether his mother had been stabbed
before he left the scene.  While Dr. Lipman testified on direct examination that
Spencer did not actually remember using the knife, he also testified that, in
Spencer’s “own words,” when Spencer “came out of a blackout” he had a knife in
his hand, Johnson was pulling his mother away and stating that Spencer had killed
her, the victim had blood coming out of her mouth, and Johnson then ran off down
the road.  When Dr. Lipman was asked on cross-examination whether Spencer told
him “that he remembered that [the victim] was stabbed before Tim left,” Dr.
Lipman replied “right.”
As the lower court noted, a fair reading of the transcript and Spencer’s
-23-
statement to Dr. Lipman indicates that Spencer stabbed the victim before the son
left, which was the point of the prosecutor’s argument.  We conclude that the
prosecutor did not intend this statement as an indication that Spencer actually
remembered the stabbing.  Thus, Spencer is not entitled to relief on this claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
In issue four, Spencer asserts that the State committed a Brady violation by
failing to disclose that a reserve deputy sheriff assisted in the investigation of
Spencer’s first attack on the victim.  At the evidentiary hearing, reserve Orange
County Sheriff’s Deputy Bill Anthony testified that he was present and assisted
Deputy Ronald Weyland, who testified at trial, in responding and investigating the
“iron incident.”  Anthony testified that Karen Spencer made a statement to the
deputies after being treated by the doctors at the hospital.  According to Anthony,
Karen stated that Spencer had hit her with something, but she did not know what
the object was.  Anthony also testified that no one from Spencer’s defense team
spoke to him before trial.  On cross examination, Anthony testified that Deputy
Weyland actually wrote the police report, that Weyland was present during the time
that Anthony was with Karen, and that Anthony’s name appeared in the report as
one of the responding officers.  Anthony further testified that he could not have
offered any testimony different from that given by Deputy Weyland at trial.
-24-
A defendant must demonstrate the following elements before a violation of
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), has been proven:  (1) the evidence at issue
is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is
impeaching; (2) the evidence has been suppressed by the State, either wilfully or
inadvertently; and (3) the defendant has been prejudiced by the suppression of this
evidence.  See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); Way v. State, 760
So. 2d 903, 910 (Fla. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1155 (2001); Thompson v.
State, 759 So. 2d 650, 662 (Fla. 2000).  A defendant is prejudiced by the
suppression of exculpatory evidence if it is material, in other words if "there is a
‘reasonable probability’ that the result of the trial would have been different if the
suppressed documents had been disclosed to the defense."  Strickler, 527 U.S. at
289.
The lower court concluded that no Brady violation occurred in Spencer’s
case because (1) Anthony was identified in Weyland’s police report, which was
given to trial counsel in discovery; (2) Weyland mentioned Anthony’s name in his
pretrial deposition; and (3) Anthony was listed as a State witness for the penalty
phase.  Based upon the record evidence, we conclude that Anthony’s identity was
not suppressed by the State, and that Anthony did not possess any evidence that
was favorable to Spencer.  Thus, we agree with the lower court that there was no
-25-
Brady violation and we affirm the  denial of relief on this claim.
In issue five, Spencer asserts that he was unable to receive a fair trial because
of pretrial publicity and local protests against domestic violence.  He further claims
that trial counsel failed to adequately argue for a change of venue and that the trial
court conducted inadequate voir dire regarding pretrial publicity and bias.
In his postconviction motion to the lower court, Spencer cited a number of
newspaper articles reporting the victim’s death and the ensuing judicial proceedings
and several newspaper editorials which criticized the legal system for its handling of
domestic violence cases.  Spencer also noted that the National Organization for
Women organized a candlelight vigil for Karen Spencer at the Orange County
Courthouse the day after her murder.  Spencer also made general allegations that
the protestors exerted political pressure for his conviction and created a public bias
against him, that reporters and protestors spoke to jurors, and that jurors, reporters,
and protestors mingled in the halls of the courtroom.  Spencer did not offer details
or specifics to support these claims.
The lower court concluded that Spencer’s claims of pretrial publicity and
juror bias were procedurally barred because not raised on direct appeal.  However,
even though the lower court found these claims barred, the court did address the
merits of the claims.  As the lower court noted, of the twenty potential jurors who
-26-
had any prior knowledge of the case, only three were actually seated on the jury. 
These three jurors stated that they had no fixed opinion as to Spencer’s guilt or
innocence and would consider the case based only on the evidence presented in
court.
We agree with the lower court that any claims relating to pretrial publicity or
juror bias are procedurally barred because not raised on direct appeal.  See Smith
v. State, 445 So. 2d 323, 325 (Fla. 1983) ("Issues which either were or could have
been litigated at trial and upon direct appeal are not cognizable through collateral
attack.").  Further, even if the issues were not procedurally barred, relief still would
not be warranted.  The mere fact that jurors were exposed to pretrial publicity is not
enough to raise the presumption of unfairness.  See Castro v. State, 644 So. 2d
987, 990 (Fla. 1994).  It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his or her  opinion or
impression and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.  See id.;
Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9, 19 (Fla. 1985).  The jurors in question here met that
standard.
As to Spencer’s claims that the trial court conducted inadequate voir dire
and that the jurors had improper contact with protestors and reporters during the
trial, we agree with the lower court that these claims are procedurally barred
because not raised on direct appeal.  See Smith.  Further, as the lower court noted,
-27-
Spencer does not allege specific details to support these claims.
Finally, Spencer claims that trial counsel was ineffective in not presenting a
better motion for a change of venue.  We find no merit to this claim.  As the lower
court noted, Spencer’s trial counsel did file a motion for a change of venue based
upon pretrial publicity.  Attached to the motion was a memorandum of law and
copies of newspaper articles related to the case.  Trial counsel brought the motion
before the court at a pretrial hearing, but the court reserved ruling on the motion
until it attempted to seat a jury.  See Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239, 245 (Fla.
1996) (stating that  trial courts are ordinarily permitted to attempt to empanel a jury
before ruling on a motion for change of venue).  The court stated that if a fair and
impartial jury could not be seated, then it would hear the motion for a change of
venue.  Spencer's real claim appears to be that counsel did not prevail on the
motion for a change of venue.  Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to
prevail on an issue raised and properly rejected by the trial court.  See Teffeteller v.
Dugger, 734 So. 2d 1009, 1020 (Fla. 1999).
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the lower court’s denial of relief
on all of Spencer’s claims relating to pretrial publicity and juror bias.
In issue six, Spencer argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
in failing to adequately voir dire the jurors about bias against him.  He asserts that
-28-
counsel should have challenged or excused three jurors and did not voir dire other
jurors who had contact with state actors during the trial.  Based upon the record of
voir dire, the lower court concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective in his
questioning of the three jurors regarding possible bias.  The lower court also
concluded that even though trial counsel did not question jurors about their contact
with state actors, counsel was not deficient in this regard as the trial court fully
explored the reported contact, determined that the contact involved innocuous
passing comments, and admonished the jurors not to say anything to the lawyers or
witnesses involved in the case.  As discussed more fully in issue two above, our
review of the record supports the lower court’s conclusion that trial counsel did
not render ineffective assistance in this regard and no relief is warranted on this
basis.
In issue seven, Spencer alleges that the lower court should have conducted
an evidentiary hearing on his other claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
during the penalty phase proceeding.  Specifically, Spencer claims that counsel was
ineffective in failing to object to the prosecutor’s cross-examination questions to
several lay witnesses about Spencer’s mental state and for failing to seek a new
penalty phase before a new jury on remand by this Court for resentencing.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(d) provides that a claim can be
-29-
denied without a hearing where “the motion, files, and records in the case
conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.”  See also Anderson v.
State, 627 So. 2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. 1993); Provenzano v. Dugger, 561 So. 2d 541,
543 (Fla. 1990).  To support summary denial without a hearing, a trial court must
either state its rationale in its decision or attach those specific parts of the record
that refute each claim presented in the motion.  See Anderson, 627 So. 2d at 1170.
During the penalty phase proceedings of Spencer’s trial three lay witnesses,
including Spencer’s father, a childhood friend, and a childhood and military friend,
testified on Spencer’s behalf.  On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked each of
the witnesses if they had observed anything that led them to believe that Spencer
was mentally or emotionally ill.  Trial counsel entered no objection to this
questioning.  However, even if counsel had objected it would have had no effect on
the testimony elicited as this line of questioning was entirely proper.  "It is a well
established principle of law in this state that an otherwise qualified witness who is
not a medical expert can testify about a person's mental condition, provided the
testimony is based on personal knowledge or observation."  Rivers v. State, 458
So. 2d 762, 765 (Fla. 1984); see also Strausser v. State, 682 So. 2d 539, 541 (Fla.
1996) (finding no error in permitting lay witness who knew the defendant to express
an opinion as to the defendant’s mental condition when it was based entirely on his
-30-
personal observations).  Thus, the lower court’s summary denial of this claim was
proper.
We also conclude that summary denial was also proper as to Spencer’s
claim regarding trial counsel’s failure to request that a new jury be impaneled upon
remand for resentencing.  In Spencer’s direct appeal, this Court “vacate[d] his
death sentence and remand[ed] this case for reconsideration of the death sentence
by the judge.”  Spencer v. State, 645 So. 2d 377, 385 (Fla. 1994) (emphasis
added).  After resentencing, the Court explained the procedural history of the case
by stating “we remanded the case for reconsideration of the death sentence by the
judge.”  Spencer v. State, 691 So. 2d 1062, 1063 (Fla. 1996) (emphasis added).  In
those instances where we have remanded a case for a new penalty phase
proceeding before a new jury, we have stated so in clear language.  See, e.g.,
Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 905 (Fla. 2000); Johnson v. State, 750 So. 2d 22,
28 (Fla. 1999); Donaldson v. State, 722 So. 2d 177, 189 (Fla. 1998).  Thus, trial
counsel cannot be faulted for failing to seek proceedings beyond the scope of this
Court’s remand and the lower court’s summary denial was proper.
In issue eight, Spencer argues that the State knowingly presented or failed to
correct material false statements in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150 (1972).  To establish a Giglio violation, a defendant must show:  (1) that the
-31-
testimony was false; (2) that the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3)
that the statement was material.  See id.; Routly v. State, 590 So. 2d 397 (Fla.
1991).  As the United States Supreme Court explained in Giglio, the State may
commit such a violation either by deliberately presenting false evidence or by
allowing false evidence to go uncorrected when it appears.  See Giglio, 405 U.S. at
153.  In either instance, if there is a reasonable probability that the false evidence
could have affected the jury’s judgment, then the defendant is entitled to a new trial. 
See id. at 154; Routly, 590 So. 2d at 400.
Here, Spencer alleges that the prosecutor committed a Giglio violation in two
instances.  During opening argument of the guilt phase, the prosecutor stated that
the victim’s son would testify that he saw Spencer strike his mother with an iron. 
During closing argument of the penalty phase, the prosecutor stated that Dr.
Lipman testified that Spencer told him that he remembered stabbing the victim. 
Thus, Spencer does not allege that the prosecutor actually elicited false testimony,
but intentionally misstated the nature of the evidence in the case.  The lower court
concluded that both claims were procedurally barred because they could have been
raised on direct appeal.  However, the lower court also addressed the merits of the 
claims and found no Giglio violation.  We agree with the lower court that Spencer
is not entitled to relief for the reasons discussed below.
-32-
In the guilt phase opening argument, the prosecutor stated that the victim’s
son, Timothy Johnson, would testify that he saw Spencer hit his mother with an
iron during the first incident.  At trial, Johnson did not testify that he saw Spencer
hit his mother with an iron.  Johnson testified that he saw Spencer beating his
mother with his fist, that Spencer picked up an iron and hit Johnson in the face with
the iron in Johnson’s room, and that Spencer then returned to his mother’s room. 
Dr. Bowman, the emergency room treating physician, testified that the victim stated
she had been hit with an iron and that her injuries were consistent with this
statement.  During closing argument, trial counsel reminded the jury that Johnson
had stated that he did not see Spencer hit the victim with an iron.  In her closing
argument, the prosecutor stated that while Johnson saw Spencer pick up the iron he
did not remember seeing his mother being beaten with the iron.  At the
postconviction evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor testified that she believed that
Johnson would testify as she stated in her opening argument and that she did not
intentionally misrepresent the evidence.  Additionally, there was evidence presented
at trial that supported the conclusion that Spencer did hit the victim with an iron. 
Finally, the correct version of Johnson’s testimony was brought to the jury’s
attention during closing argument by both Spencer’s trial counsel and the
prosecutor.
-33-
Regarding the second alleged Giglio violation, Spencer argues that the
prosecutor misstated Dr. Lipman’s testimony and gave the jurors the impression
that Spencer remembered stabbing the victim.  During her penalty phase closing
argument, the prosecutor stated that “Dusty Spencer gave statements to Dr.
Lipman that he had stabbed Karen before Tim[othy Johnson] left.”  Although Dr.
Lipman testified that Spencer did not actually remember using the knife, Dr. Lipman
testified that, in Spencer’s “own words,” when he “came out of a blackout” he had
a knife in his hand, Johnson was pulling his mother away and stating that Spencer
had killed her, the victim had blood coming out of her mouth, and Johnson then ran
off down the road.  The prosecutor’s statement, which was made in the context of
supporting her argument that the victim received all of her injuries while she was
alive and that Johnson was confused about whether his mother had been stabbed
before he left the scene, did not misrepresent Dr. Lipman’s testimony on this
matter.  A fair reading of the transcript and Spencer’s statement to Dr. Lipman
indicates that Spencer did stab the victim before the son left, which is the point of
the prosecutor’s argument.  Thus, we conclude that no Giglio violations occurred
and affirm the lower court’s denial of relief on this claim.
In issue nine, Spencer contends that Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-
5.  Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.5(d)(4) provides that a lawyer shall
not
after dismissal of the jury in a case with which the lawyer is connected,
initiate communication with or cause another to initiate communication
with any juror regarding the trial except to determine whether the
verdict may be subject to legal challenge; provided, a lawyer may not
interview jurors for this purpose unless the lawyer has reason to
believe that grounds for such challenge may exist; and provided
further, before conducting any such interview the lawyer must file in
the cause a notice of intention to interview setting forth the name of the
juror or jurors to be interviewed.  A copy of the notice must be
delivered to the trial judge and opposing counsel a reasonable time
before such interview.  The provisions of this rule do not prohibit a
lawyer from communicating with members of the venire or jurors in
the course of official proceedings or as authorized by court rule or
written order of the court. 
-34-
3.5(d)(4),5 which prohibits counsel from contacting the jury about the trial, is
unconstitutional as it impeded his ability to fully explore possible jury misconduct
and bias.  He further argues that the rule effectively deprived him of adequate
assistance of postconviction counsel by limiting such inquiry.  The lower court
properly concluded that the claim relating to the rule was procedurally barred
because not raised on direct appeal.  See Young v. State, 739 So. 2d 553, 555 n.5
(Fla. 1999) (concluding that postconviction claim regarding the constitutionality of
rule which limits an attorney’s right to interview jurors after the conclusion of trial
was procedurally barred because not raised on direct appeal).  Further, the lower
-35-
court also properly concluded that Spencer’s claim of ineffective assistance of
postconviction counsel was not properly cognizable in a rule 3.850 motion.  See
Lambrix v. State, 698 So. 2d 247, 248 (Fla. 1996) (holding that claims of
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel do not present a valid basis for
relief).  Accordingly, we conclude that no relief is warranted on these claims.
As his last issue on appeal, Spencer claims that he was deprived of a fair trial
by the cumulative errors that occurred during his trial proceedings.  As discussed
above, Spencer’s claims of error are either procedurally barred or without merit. 
Thus, we agree with the lower court’s denial of relief on this claim.
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Spencer is not entitled to
relief on his postconviction motion.  Accordingly, we affirm the lower court’s
denial of relief.
Habeas Petition
Spencer has also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this Court.
He raises two claims in his petition:  (1) Florida’s death penalty statute is
unconstitutional; and (2) appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise claims
of prosecutorial misconduct as fundamental error on direct appeal to this Court.
Spencer asserts that Florida’s death penalty scheme is unconstitutional under
the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
-36-
(2000).  In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Subsequently, in Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct.
2428 (2002), the Supreme Court ruled that Apprendi is applicable in the death
penalty context.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court found the Arizona capital
sentencing statute at issue in Ring to be unconstitutional “to the extent that it allows
a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance
necessary for the imposition of the death penalty.”  Id. at 2443.  Spencer argues
that Florida’s capital sentencing statute suffers the same constitutional infirmity. 
However, Spencer’s claim has already been addressed by this Court and decided
adversely to him.  See Bottoson v. Moore, 27 Fla. L. Weekly S891 (Fla. Oct. 24,
2002) (concluding that Bottoson was not entitled to relief under Ring).
Spencer also asserts that, in light of this Court’s determination that the
evidence in his case did not support the CCP aggravating circumstance but did
support the statutory mental mitigators, see Spencer v. State, 645 So. 2d 377, 384-
855 (Fla. 1994), Apprendi required that a new jury be impaneled on remand of his
case for resentencing.  He also asserts that this Court’s order on remand was
ambiguous as to whether a new jury should be impaneled to consider the mitigating
and aggravating circumstances.  However, we find no ambiguity in our specific
6.  Spencer alleges that the prosecutor:  made improper references to
inadmissible hearsay evidence that the victim carried a rifle around her house out of
fear of Spencer; elicited irrelevant testimony that the victim’s dog was removed
from the crime scene; engaged in “inflammatory histrionics”; and made improper
comment on Spencer’s right not to testify.
7.  Spencer asserts that the prosecutor intentionally misrepresented the
testimony of witnesses Timothy Johnson and Dr. Jonathan Lipman during her
argument to the jury and this amounted to Giglio violations.
-37-
remand for “reconsideration of the death sentence by the judge.”  Id. at 385
(emphasis added).  Further, after resentencing was complete we also noted that the
case had been remanded “for a reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances by the judge.”  Spencer v. State, 691 So. 2d 1062, 1064 (Fla. 1996)
(emphasis added).  Additionally, because Apprendi does not apply to Florida’s
capital sentencing scheme, there is no merit to Spencer’s claim that a new jury
should have been impaneled to determine the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances.  Thus, we conclude that Spencer is not entitled to relief on this
claim.
Spencer also contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise as fundamental error several instances of prosecutorial misconduct,6 two
alleged Giglio violations by the prosecutor,7 and the State’s introduction of
8.  Photographs taken during the investigation of the earlier “iron incident”
were redacted to remove the deputy sheriff’s identifications characterizing the
attack on the victim as a battery.
-38-
redacted photographs relating to the first attack on the victim.8  In ascertaining the
merit of a habeas petition based on a challenge of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel, it is appropriate to determine:
[F]irst, whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and,
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the
correctness of the result.
Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So. 2d 1009, 1027 (Fla. 1999); see also Wilson v.
Wainwright, 474 So. 2d 1162, 1163 (Fla. 1985).  Under this analysis, appellate
counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise issues not preserved for
appeal.  See Medina v. Dugger, 586 So. 2d 317, 318 (Fla. 1991).  However, an
exception may be made where appellate counsel fails to raise a claim which,
although not preserved at trial, presents a fundamental error.  See Roberts v. State,
568 So. 2d 1255, 1261 (Fla. 1990).  A fundamental error is defined as an error that
"reaches down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty
could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error."  Kilgore
v. State, 688 So. 2d 895, 898 (Fla. 1996).
-39-
The allegations of prosecutorial misconduct relating to evidence of the victim
carrying a rifle were raised and rejected by this Court on direct appeal.  See
Spencer, 645 So. 2d at 382-83.  Spencer claimed that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for mistrial after the prosecutor stated in closing argument that
the victim answered the door with a rifle in her hand.  The trial court had previously
sustained Spencer’s objection to this testimony as irrelevant when the prosecutor
attempted to introduce it through testimony of the victim’s friend.  When the
prosecutor made this comment in closing, defense counsel objected and the court
sustained the objection.  However, the trial court denied Spencer’s motion for a
mistrial on this basis.  On appeal, Spencer argued that he had been deprived of a
fair trial by the prosecutor’s argument on this point.  However, this Court
concluded that a mistrial was not warranted on this basis.  See id. at 383.  Thus,
appellate counsel raised this very issue on appeal and cannot be deemed ineffective
for failing to prevail on a claim raised and rejected on appeal.  See Teffeteller v.
Dugger, 734 So. 2d at 1020 (“Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to
prevail on a meritless issue.”).
During the prosecutor’s questioning of a law enforcement officer about the
crime scene, the officer stated that the victim’s “little white poodle dog” was
removed from the house before the forensic technicians arrived.  Upon objection
-40-
by defense counsel, the prosecutor rephrased the question and no further
information about the dog was introduced into evidence.  Spencer claims that
appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising the issue of this “improperly
melodramatic, irrelevant, testimony” on direct appeal.  Appellate counsel’s failure
to raise this issue did not constitute deficient performance.  As we have explained,
appellate counsel will not be considered ineffective for failing to raise issues that
have little or no chance of success.  See Engle v. Dugger, 576 So. 2d 696, 703
(Fla. 1991).  There was no allegation that Spencer harmed the dog.  The jury merely
heard that the victim had a dog which was removed in order not to contaminate the
crime scene.
Spencer also claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
several other instances of prosecutorial misconduct even though no objection was
raised at trial.  This Court has stated that appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for
failing to raise claims which were not preserved due to trial counsel's failure to
object.  See, e.g., Ferguson v. Singletary, 632 So. 2d 53, 58 (Fla. 1993) (finding
appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise allegedly improper comments
by the prosecutor which were not preserved for appeal by objection).  As a general
rule, this Court has determined that failing to raise a contemporaneous objection
when improper closing argument comments are made waives any claim concerning
-41-
such comments for appellate review.  See Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 898
(Fla. 2000).  The sole exception to this general rule is where the unobjected-to
comments rise to the level of fundamental error.  See id.; Thomas v. State, 748 So.
2d 970, 985 (Fla. 1999).  In order for an error to be fundamental and justify reversal
in the absence of a timely objection, “the error must reach down into the validity of
the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained
without the assistance of the alleged error.”  Brown v. State, 124 So. 2d 481, 484
(Fla. 1960); see also State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1991).  In order for
improper comments made in the closing arguments of a penalty phase to constitute
fundamental error, they must be so prejudicial as to taint the jury's recommended
sentence.  See Thomas, 748 So.2d at 985.  For the reasons discussed below, we
conclude that the instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct cited by Spencer
do not constitute fundamental error and thus appellate counsel did not render
ineffective assistance in failing to raise the claims on appeal.
Spencer contends that appellate counsel should have raised a claim that the
prosecutor engaged in “inflammatory histrionics” by putting on a pair of latex
gloves and displaying them to the jury and by exhibiting an emotional display in
front of the jury during closing argument of the trial.  Spencer argues that the
prosecutor’s display of latex gloves on her hands was “designed to ignite the raw
-42-
emotions of the jury.”  The gloves, which were of the same type worn by Spencer
on the day of the murder, had been admitted into evidence at trial without objection. 
At the evidentiary hearing on Spencer’s rule 3.850 motion below, the prosecutor
testified that she showed the gloves to the jury during closing argument as she
considered them strong evidence of premeditation.  Spencer offers no explanation
of why this conduct was improper, how it played to the jury’s emotions, or how it
so tainted the trial “that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained” without it. 
Thus, we conclude that this claim is legally insufficient.  Further, we conclude that
the prosecutor’s display of the evidence in this manner was not improper.
As to the prosecutor’s “emotional display” before the jury, the lower court
found that the prosecutor did not cry in front of the jury.  After viewing a videotape
of the incident in question, the lower court concluded that the prosecutor’s voice
“quavered” for a few seconds, but she turned away from the jury and composed
herself before proceeding with her closing argument.  Based upon this record, we
conclude that there is no factual basis for Spencer’s claim of “inflammatory
histrionics” by the prosecutor.  Thus, appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing
to raise this issue as fundamental error.
Spencer also asserts that the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the two
defense experts during the penalty phase included improper comment on his Fifth
-43-
Amendment right not to testify and thus constituted fundamental error that  counsel
should have raised on direct appeal.  During cross-examination in the penalty
phase, the prosecutor questioned the defense experts about their interviews of
Spencer and elicited testimony that Spencer had not been under oath when he
recounted details of the crime and his background.  The prosecutor also inquired
whether Dr. Burch would “consider the type of testimony that the jury would have
received . . . , that being sworn testimony subject to cross-examination by the state
and defense, as to be a superior form of fact finding for factual determination than
what you did, just listening to Dusty Spencer’s answers.”  Trial counsel raised no
objection to the cross-examination of the experts on this point.  Even though the
issue was not preserved for appellate review, Spencer claims that appellate counsel
should have raised this issue as fundamental error and was ineffective in failing to
do so.
A defendant has the constitutional right to decline to testify against himself in
a criminal proceeding.  See U.S. Const. amend. V; art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. 
Therefore, "[a]ny comment on, or which is fairly susceptible of being interpreted as
referring to, a defendant's failure to testify is error and is strongly discouraged."  
State v. Marshall, 476 So. 2d 150, 153 (Fla. 1985); see also, e.g., Heath v. State,
648 So. 2d 660, 663 (Fla. 1994); State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1131 (Fla.
-44-
1986).  The "fairly susceptible" test is a "very liberal rule."  DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at
1135.  This constitutional principle is also incorporated in Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.250, which prohibits a prosecuting attorney from commenting on the
defendant's failure to testify on his or her own behalf.
Comments on a defendant's failure to testify can be of an "almost unlimited
variety" and any remark which is "fairly susceptible" of being interpreted as a
comment on silence creates a "high risk" of error.  DiGuilio, 491 So.2d at 1135-36. 
The prosecutor’s questions here, which highlighted the fact that Spencer’s
accounts of the crime were not under oath, are “fairly susceptible” of being
interpreted as a comment on Spencer’s failure to testify.  However, even erroneous
comments do not require an automatic reversal, but instead “should be evaluated
according to the harmless error rule.”  Marshall, 476 So. 2d at 153; see also
Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 39 (Fla. 2000).  We conclude that any error in
the comment by the prosecutor in the instant case was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.  See DiGuilio.  Because any error in this regard was harmless,
Spencer’s claim that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the issue on
direct appeal as fundamental error cannot satisfy the Strickland prejudice prong.
Spencer also contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise the prosecutor’s misrepresentation of the testimony of two witnesses as
9.  During the trial, the State attempted to introduce evidence that the victim
was carrying a rifle around her house because she was afraid of Spencer.  The
court sustained the defendant's objection that this testimony was irrelevant to any
issue at the trial.  However, during closing argument the prosecutor stated that
"Karen answered the door with the rifle in her hand" when a friend visited her on
the night before the killing.  The trial court sustained the defendant's objection to
this comment, but denied his motion for a mistrial.  This Court concluded that a
mistrial was not warranted because the prosecutor's single comment about the rifle
did not meet the requirements for a new trial (comment must either deprive the
defendant of a fair and impartial trial, materially contribute to the conviction, be so
harmful or fundamentally tainted as to require a new trial, or be so inflammatory that
it might have influenced the jury to reach a more severe verdict than that it would
have otherwise).  See  Spencer v. State, 645 So. 2d 377, 383 (Fla. 1994).
-45-
Giglio violations.  However, as discussed in issue eight above, neither of these
incidents constituted a Giglio violation.  Thus, appellate counsel cannot be deemed
ineffective for failing to raise a meritless issue.  See Engle v. Dugger, 576 So. 2d at
703.
Finally, Spencer argues that the cumulative impact of the proven instances of
improper comment by the prosecutor deprived him of a fair trial.  On direct appeal,
this Court concluded that the prosecutor's reference to a matter outside the
evidence was improper, but did not meet the requirements for a new trial. See
Spencer v. State, 645 So. 2d 377, 382 (Fla. 1994).9  In these proceedings, we have
concluded that the prosecutor’s questions, highlighting the fact that Spencer’s
accounts of the crime to the mental health experts were not under oath, were
-46-
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Further, when we consider the combination
of both comments, we conclude that they were harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.  See DiGuilio.
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Spencer is not entitled to
relief and deny his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  We also affirm the trial
court’s denial of postconviction relief.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., and HARDING, Senior Justice, concur.
ANSTEAD, C.J., PARIENTE, J., and SHAW, Senior Justice, concur in result
only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County,
Belvin Perry, Judge - Case No. CR92-473
and An Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - Middle, and Eric C. Pinkard,
Assistant CCRC - Middle Region, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellant/Petitioner
Charlie Crist, Attorney General, and Scott A. Browne, Assistant Attorney General,
Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee/Respondent