Title: Baker v. Elmendorf
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 051570
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 2006

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton,* S.J. 
 
CHARLES F. BAKER 
 
v.  Record No. 051570     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
April 21, 2006 
JEFFREY ELMENDORF, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Stanley P. Klein, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we decide whether a criminal conviction 
rendered in general district court but appealed pursuant to 
Code § 16.1-132 is admissible in a subsequent civil action for 
malicious prosecution. 
I. 
On May 10, 2004, Charles F. Baker filed this malicious 
prosecution action against Jeffrey and Dorothy Elmendorf.  
Baker claimed that the Elmendorfs initiated a false 
prosecution of Baker for stalking in violation of Code § 18.2-
60.3.  Baker was convicted of the charge in general district 
court but the conviction was reversed on appeal in the circuit 
court.  Baker sought damages of $33,000, the amount he 
allegedly spent to defend himself in these proceedings. 
Prior to trial, Baker submitted a motion in limine 
requesting that the trial court exclude all references to the 
general district court conviction because an appeal "annuls 
                     
* Senior Justice Compton participated in the hearing and 
decision of this case before his death on April 9, 2006. 
 
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the judgment of the inferior tribunal as completely as if 
there had been no previous trial."  Gaskill v. Commonwealth, 
206 Va. 486, 490, 144 S.E.2d 293, 296 (1965).  Based on this 
Court's holding in Ricketts v. J.G. McCrory Co. 138 Va. 548, 
554, 121 S.E. 916, 918 (1924), that a "conviction by a trial 
justice, though reversed on appeal, is conclusive evidence of 
probable cause" in an action for malicious prosecution, the 
trial court overruled the motion in limine and allowed the 
Elmendorfs to introduce into evidence the general district 
court conviction.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
Elmendorfs, and the trial court entered an order dismissing 
the case with prejudice.  Baker timely appealed to this Court 
assigning error to the trial court’s admission of the 
conviction into evidence. 
II. 
To prevail in an action for malicious prosecution a 
litigant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
"the prosecution was (1) malicious; (2) instituted by, or with 
the cooperation of, the defendant; (3) without probable cause; 
and (4) terminated in a manner not unfavorable to the 
plaintiff."  Andrews v. Ring, 266 Va. 311, 322, 585 S.E.2d 
780, 786 (2003) (quoting Stanley v. Webber, 260 Va. 90, 95-96, 
531 S.E.2d 311, 314-15 (2000)); accord Commissary Concepts 
Mgmt. v. Mziguir, 267 Va. 586, 589, 594 S.E.2d 915, 917 
 
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(2004).  The issue in this appeal involves the admissibility 
of evidence offered to establish the third element of the 
cause of action. 
In Ricketts, we held that evidence of a defendant's 
conviction in a court not of record** for petit larceny was 
admissible in a subsequent malicious prosecution suit against 
the instigator of the petit larceny charges because:  "It is 
settled law in this State that conviction by a trial justice, 
though reversed on appeal, is conclusive evidence of probable 
cause, unless such conviction was procured by the defendant 
through fraud or by means of evidence which he knew to be 
false."  Id. at 554, 121 S.E. at 918.  In making this 
statement we cited Saunders v. Baldwin, 112 Va. 431, 71 S.E. 
                     
** In 1973, the General Assembly enacted legislation 
dividing the Commonwealth into districts, consolidating 
the courts not of record, and renaming such courts 
"general district courts," with the exception of 
"juvenile and domestic relations courts."  See 1973 Acts 
ch. 546 (amending Code §§ 16.1-69.6, 16.1-69.5(d)).  
Prior to this time, courts not of record included "trial 
justices," "police justices," and "justices of the 
peace," while courts of record included "corporation 
courts," "county courts," and "hustings courts."  See 
former Code §§ 16-41 through 16-8 (1950)(trial justices); 
former Code §§ 16-124 through 16-128 (1950)(police 
justices); former Code §§ 39-1 through 39-6 (1950) 
(justices of the peace); former Code §§ 17-135 through 
17-144 (1950) (corporation courts, also known as hustings 
courts); and former Code §§ 16.1-36 through 16.1-51 
(1960) (county courts). 
 
 
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620 (1911), a case in which we explained that the policy 
behind this rule is based upon 
the principle that when the prosecuting witness 
or the person who has started the prosecution 
acts upon facts which are of such a character 
as that when they are stated to a calm and 
dispassionate person capable of judging, they 
lead him to believe that the person charged is 
guilty, they are such as make out a case of 
probable cause upon which the prosecuting 
witness or prosecutor has the right to act.  It 
is upon this principle that the doctrine 
recognized in most jurisdictions and in this 
State, that the advice of a reputable attorney 
at law, properly sought and acted on in good 
faith, constitutes probable cause as a matter 
of law, and furnishes a complete defense to an 
action of malicious prosecution. 
 
Id. at 437-38, 71 S.E. at 622. 
Baker argues that despite the policy stated in Saunders 
and Ricketts, ensuing statutory amendments and other decisions 
of this Court, specifically Santen v. Tuthill, 265 Va. 492, 
578 S.E.2d 788 (2003), have rendered the prior cases no longer 
binding precedent.  In contrast, the Elmendorfs argue that 
Ricketts is still controlling law, Santen is distinguishable, 
and the probable cause element of the tort requires the 
admission of the judicial history of the criminal charge. 
At this point, a review of the statutes and case law 
regarding appeals from courts not of record and the 
admissibility of judgments rendered in such courts is in 
order.  In 1924, when Ricketts was decided, a criminal 
 
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defendant convicted of a non-felonious offense in a court not 
of record was entitled to an appeal of right to a court of 
record and a "trial by jury in the same manner as if he had 
been indicted for the offense in said court," Code §§ 4989, 
4990 (1919).  Neither the statutory language nor our 
decisions, however, established the manner in which that 
appeal was to be heard; in other words, whether it was to be 
heard de novo. 
In 1926, in Cooper v. Town of Appalachia, 145 Va. 861, 
864, 134 S.E. 591, 592 (1926), this Court appeared to answer 
that question in the negative, holding that by entering a 
guilty plea in a court not of record, a defendant waived his 
right to an appeal.  However, we reconsidered and overruled 
our decision in Cooper in 1934 when we decided Dickerson v. 
Commonwealth, 162 Va. 787, 173 S.E. 543 (1934).  Though the 
language of the statutes governing appeals from courts not of 
record had not changed significantly at that point, we held: 
Under these statutory provisions upon an appeal 
from the judgment of a justice or trial justice 
the case is to be tried de novo as if it were 
being tried upon an information or indictment 
brought before the circuit court in the first 
instance; that is, the appeal is in effect a 
statutory grant of a new trial to the accused 
to be had before the circuit court. . . . 
 
[U]nder statutes such as the Virginia statutes 
a plea of guilty entered before a justice of 
the peace does not operate to waive or bar the 
right of the accused to an appeal. 
 
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Id. at 793-94, 173 S.E. at 546.  Four years later, in 1938, 
the General Assembly amended Code § 4989 specifically to 
provide for an appeal "de novo" from courts not of record.  
See 1938 Acts ch. 53.  It then added to former Section 4989 in 
the 1950 recodification the principle that a guilty plea in a 
court not of record did not waive the right to a de novo 
appeal.  See Former Code § 16-6 (1950) (granting right to 
appeal irrespective of guilty plea); former Code § 16-10 
(1950) (prescribing trial de novo on appeal). 
Since the 1950 recodification, the language of the Code 
provisions has remained virtually the same, see Code §§ 16.1-
132, -136 (2003), but as we have been presented with new 
circumstances involving appeals from courts not of record to 
circuit courts, we have continued to develop the implications 
of a de novo appeal, specifically that an appeal of a general 
district court decision negates any judgment entered in that 
prior proceeding. 
For example, Gaskill involved the nature of a conviction 
that had been appealed de novo to a court of record.  206 Va. 
at 487, 144 S.E.2d at 294.  The defendant sought to overturn 
her criminal jury conviction in a court of record on the 
grounds that her conviction by the judge in the court not of 
record was unconstitutional because she had a right to trial 
 
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by jury for the offense charged.  Id.  We rejected this 
argument, explaining that an appeal from the court not of 
record to the court of record "annuls the judgment of the 
inferior tribunal as completely as if there had been no 
previous trial [and] it is reversible error to permit such 
judgment to be introduced in evidence before the jury on a 
trial of the case on appeal."  Id. at 490, 144 S.E.2d at 296.  
Therefore, the defendant was not denied a right to a jury 
trial. 
The principle that the appeal de novo negates the prior 
proceeding has not been limited to circumstances involving the 
appeal of a criminal conviction.  In Santen, we considered 
whether a guilty plea in the general district court that was 
appealed and reversed on appeal was properly excluded from 
evidence in a subsequent civil action.  265 Va. at 496, 578 
S.E.2d at 790.  We concluded that under these circumstances 
the guilty plea was not admissible "[s]ince an appeal under 
Code § 16.1-132 'annuls or wipes out' a guilty plea entered in 
district court, [thus] there no longer exists a guilty plea 
that, otherwise, would be admissible in a subsequent civil 
proceeding under the provisions of Code § 8.01-418."  Id. at 
497, 578 S.E.2d at 791.  For the same reason, the guilty plea 
was also inadmissible as a party admission or prior 
inconsistent statement, although testimony in the general 
 
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district court was not "wiped out" and would be admissible in 
the civil case.  Id. 
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that since 
Ricketts, the General Assembly has amended the Code of 
Virginia and we have issued opinions examining the nature of 
the de novo appeal and more clearly defining its scope.  The 
General Assembly's codification of trials "de novo" in 1938 
and its inclusion of guilty pleas as appealable judgments in 
1950, and our explanation that de novo appeals "annul[] the 
judgment of the inferior tribunal as completely as if there 
had been no previous trial," Gaskill, 206 Va. at 490, 144 
S.E.2d at 296, and "wipe[] out" guilty pleas, Santen, 265 Va. 
at 497, 578 S.E.2d at 791, compel us to conclude that Baker's 
conviction in the general district court which was appealed 
and reversed on appeal should not have been admitted in 
evidence. 
Finally we reject the Elmendorfs' remaining argument 
that, regardless of these cases and statutory changes, 
Ricketts should still control this case because an action for 
malicious prosecution requires an examination of the judicial 
history of the criminal charge.  The case law and statutes 
establishing the principles of de novo review do not 
distinguish among the bases for the judgment in general 
district court from which the appeal is taken, for example, 
 
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whether the defendant entered a guilty plea or was convicted; 
nor do they consider the nature of the subsequent proceeding, 
for example whether the case involved the de novo appeal of 
the criminal case or a subsequent civil case.  Whenever a 
defendant exercises his rights under Code § 16.1-132 and a 
conviction in general district court is appealed, the fact of 
that conviction is not admissible in the appeal or in a 
subsequent civil proceeding. 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
trial court and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded.