Title: Bekins Van & Storage Co. v. STATE CORPORATION COM'N
Citation: 338 P.2d 1055, 65 N.M. 423
Docket Number: 6509
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: April 14, 1959

338 P.2d 1055 (1959) 65 N.M. 423 BEKINS VAN &amp; STORAGE CO., INC., a Corporation, and Alfredo Gonzales, an Individual, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION OF NEW MEXICO, and John Block, Jr., James F. Lamb and Ingram B. Pickett, Members of said Commission, Defendants-Appellants, Charles R. Wilson and John R. Wilson, partners, d/b/a Wilson Transfer &amp; Storage Company; C. J. Hogue and Earnest K. Lacy, partners, d/b/a Albuquerque Moving and Storage Co.; Dalton Transfer and Storage Co., Inc., a Corporation; Robert E. Waterman and E. E. Higginbotham, partners, d/b/a Los Alamos Transfer; Southwest Moving and Storage Company, a Corporation; M. B. Bennett, d/b/a Bennett's Transportation Company; J. Clell Miller, d/b/a Miller Van Lines and Santa Fe Storage and Transfer Co., a Corporation, Intervenors-Appellants. No. 6509. Supreme Court of New Mexico. April 14, 1959. Rehearing Denied May 25, 1959. *1056 Fred M. Standley, Atty. Gen., Joel B. Burr, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants. O. Russell Jones, Jack Smith, Santa Fe, for intervenors. Modrall, Seymour, Sperling, Roehl &amp; Harriss, Leland S. Sedberry, Jr., Albuquerque, Donovan N. Hoover, Santa Fe, for appellees. SADLER, Justice. The appellants, being the defendants and intervenors below, complain of the action of the district court of Santa Fe County, in deciding to vacate an order of State Corporation Commission, made October 3, 1957, withholding approval of an application to transfer to Bekins Van &amp; Storage Co., Inc. that portion of the operations described in Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity No. 739 in the name of Alfredo Gonzales, authorizing "the transportation of household goods between points and places in Harding, Colfax, Union, Taos, Mora, San Miguel, Santa Fe, Sandoval and Bernalillo Counties," theretofore issued by said Corporation Commission to Alfredo Gonzales, an individual. The two parties mentioned filed their complaint in the district court of Santa Fe County on December 23, 1957, pursuant to the provisions of 1953 Comp. § 64-27-11 and the Commission's Rule No. 21. At a hearing held in the offices of the Commission in Santa Fe, New Mexico, on April 17, 1957, the Commission had taken the position that the transfer in question would result in the creation of a new, or substantially different, service from that previously rendered under the certificate and, accordingly, that proof of public convenience and necessity would have to be shown. The plaintiffs herein having declined to offer such proof, the order of the Commission made on October 3, 1957, followed, becoming the basis for this proceeding in the district court. Under court order, dated February 18, 1958, certain interested carriers, who had been parties to the proceeding before the Commission, were allowed to intervene. The district court, after hearing, entered judgment for the plaintiffs setting aside the order of the Commission on September 14, 1958. The court, on the same day, upon motion of the defendants and intervenors, allowed an appeal to the Supreme Court with stay of said judgment pending appeal. The facts out of which the present controversy arose appear from what has been said. Only a few further facts need be set forth. Gonzales was the holder of Certificate No. 739 issued by the Commission. It authorized operations thereunder, as follows: Gonzales resided and operated out of Roy, New Mexico. He entered into a contract with Bekins Van &amp; Storage Company, Inc., a corporation domiciled in Albuquerque, New Mexico, whereby he proposed, subject to approval of the Commission, to sell the Bekins Van &amp; Storage Company, Inc., that portion of Certificate No. 739, as follows: It was the refusal of the trial court to approve, and its action in setting aside, the Commission's order that caused this appeal. In other words, the trial court held no showing of public convenience was required on the transfer presented to the Commission for approval. We are compelled to agree with the trial court's ruling. In so doing we have the support of decisions from some thirteen or more states which possess statutes of similar import to our own on this subject holding an inquiry is unnecessary upon a transfer such as we have before us here. See decisions from other states, as follows: Sale v. Railroad Comm., 15 Cal. 2d 612, 104 P.2d 38; University City Transfer Co. v. Florida Railroad Comm., 124 Fla. 308, 168 So. 413; Woodside Transfer &amp; Storage Co. v. Georgia Public Service Comm., 212 Ga. 625, 94 S.E.2d 706; Indianapolis &amp; Southern Motor Express, Inc. v. Public Service Comm., 232 Ind. 377, 112 N.E.2d 864; McGehee v. Wolchansky, 217 Miss. 88, 63 So. 2d 549; Caudill v. Lysinger, 161 Neb. 235, 72 N.W.2d 684; Ramsey v. Public Utilities Comm., 115 Ohio St. 394, 154 N.E. 730; Paradise v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm., 184 Pa.Super. 8, 132 A.2d 754; Application of Transport, Inc. of South Dakota, 75 S.D. 340, 64 N.W.2d 313; Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Jackson, Tex., 299 S.W.2d 266; Frank L. Cook Transfer v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 384, 83 S.E.2d 733; West Shore Express, Inc. v. Public Service Comm., 264 Wis. 65, 58 N.W.2d 407. See, also, subject annotation, 15 A.L.R.2d 883. In McGehee v. Wolchansky, supra [217 Miss. 88, 63 So. 2d 551], the latter applied to the Public Service Company of Mississippi for approval of his offer to purchase the certificate held by Young and Chamberlain for intrastate transportation between all points in Mississippi of household goods, furniture and fixtures. There, as here, it was claimed the transferor had not operated for several years and that other carriers were furnishing adequate service. The court pointed out, as is the case here, that the certificate involved had never been revoked and was still valid and outstanding and that no proceedings had ever been instituted to revoke same. The Commission held against all these arguments and affirmed its action with this language, to-wit: In Hostetter v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm., 160 Pa.Super. 94, 49 A.2d 862, 864, the rule as it exists in Pennsylvania was stated, as follows: In Application of Transport, Inc. of South Dakota, supra [75 S.D. 340, 64 N.W.2d 315], the court said: In L.A. Norris Truck Line v. Railroad Commission, 245 S.W.2d 746, 748, the rule applied in Texas is well stated by the court of civil appeals in Austin, as follows: What the court of civil appeals of Texas said in above mentioned case is peculiarly applicable here where substantially the same statutory provisions as respect dormancy of a certificate and its revocation exist, as shown by the opinion obtain in Texas. In a later Texas case, Railroad Commission of Texas v. Jackson, supra [299 S.W.2d 269], while the Supreme Court of Texas declined approval of the transfer in the particular instance, it sets out so clearly when it will and when it will not insist upon new proof of public convenience and necessity that we quote from its opinion, as follows: It is the aim of counsel for the defendants and intervenors to bring themselves within the exception pointed out in the quotation last above. Unfortunately for them the proof does not place them there. The plaintiffs, under the conditions imposed for approving a transfer have met every requirement, under the findings made by the trail court. As in many of the states from which cases are cited, New Mexico has a statutory provision governing the transfer of a certificate. 1953 Comp., § 64-27-11, provides: Only one express condition to the approval sought appears in the statute authorizing approval of transfers, namely, that the holder shall satisfy the commission that all indebtedness pertaining to the certificate has been paid. The indebtedness referred to has been held in an attorney general's opinion to be only such as is directly attributable to the certificate, such as mileage taxes and funds due the state. It is not contended any such debts were due and unpaid in this instance. Indeed, the trial court expressly found that all such debts mentioned in the statute had been paid. The court below further found that the certificate in question contains no restrictions of any character, either as to the domicile and location of the equipment to be used by the certificate holder, or as to the quantity, quality or type of service to be performed other than to conduct an irregular route service between all points and places within counties therein named. It concluded that public convenience and necessity were not germane to the hearing on an application to approve the transfer. And, finally, there was the decisive conclusion that the order of the State Corporation Commission in declining to approve the transfer was "unlawful, unreasonable, artbitrary, capricious, confiscatory, and void." It is our settled conviction that the trial court was correct in setting aside and vacating the order of the State Corporation Commission in declining approval of the transfer of the portion of the certificate in question upon the ground a new showing of public convenience and necessity was required. The transferee proposed to conduct its operations strictly in conformity within the limits of the authority conferred by the certificate in question as to the portion thereof being transferred. Indeed, nothing said in our somewhat recent decision in Musslewhite v. State Corporation Commission, 61 N.M. 97, 295 P.2d 216, conflicts in any way with the holding we announce today. In so far as it has any bearing at all, it may be said to have forecast the result we announce. Finding no error the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. It is so ordered. *1060 LUJAN, C.J., and McGHEE and COMPTON, JJ., concur. CARMODY, J., having tried the cause below, not participating.