Title: State of Alabama ex rel. Michael O'dell, District Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Alabama v. Gary Michael Coker
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1091068
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 15, 2010

REL:10/15/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
_________________________
1091068
_________________________
State of Alabama ex rel. Michael O'Dell, District Attorney
for the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Alabama
v.
Gary Michael Coker
 Appeal from Cherokee Circuit Court
(DC-08-746)
BOLIN, Justice.
The State of Alabama on behalf of Michael O'Dell,
District Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Alabama,
appeals from the trial court's order, quashing a writ of
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execution on the real property owned by Gary Michael Coker.
We reverse and remand.
Facts
The record reflects that Coker was arrested for and
charged with trafficking in methamphetamine.  In addition to
filing criminal charges, the State also filed a civil
condemnation action against Coker, seeking forfeiture of:
(1)cash in the amount of $98,273 and (2) title to real
property consisting of a house and two acres of land owned by
Coker (hereinafter referred to as "the subject property").  On
August 25, 2008, Coker entered into a plea agreement.
According to the trial court, the plea-agreement form
indicated that the plea was an "open plea" insofar as the
sentencing was concerned; other aspects of the agreement,
however, including a mandatory fine of $50,000 (hereinafter
referred to as "the criminal fine"), were agreed upon by
Coker, Coker's attorney, and the district attorney.  The trial
court held a sentencing hearing on September 29, 2008.  At the
conclusion of the guilty-plea colloquy, the trial court signed
a proposed consent order signed by Coker, his attorney, and
the deputy district attorney, in which the parties agreed that
the cash would be deemed contraband and forfeited to the State
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but that the State's request for forfeiture of the subject
property as contraband would be denied.  The consent order
reads as follows:
  
"By agreement of the parties, the Court orders as
follows:
"1. The State's request to have the real property
identified in this action as 'One (1) Parcel of Land
with Structures and Fixtures' and as 'the premises
of Coker,' which is located at ... declared
contraband and to further constitute fruits or
instrumentalities of the drug trade subject to
forfeiture ... is DENIED.  Coker shall retain full
title, use, possession and enjoyment of said
property.  The State relinquishes all claim to said
property.
"2.  Defendant Coker shall be responsible for
preparing 
and 
filing 
any 
documents 
that 
are
necessary to clear the notice of lis pendens which
the State has recorded against the real estate which
is subject-matter of this action and shall bear any
costs associated with filing same.
"3.  NINETY-EIGHT THOUSAND, TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-
THREE DOLLARS ($98,273.00) Lawful Cash, Coin, or
Currency of the United States of America which is
subject-matter of this action is declared to
constitute fruits and instrumentalities of the
illicit 
drug 
trade 
and 
therefore 
to 
further
constitute contraband.  Said currency is forfeited
pursuant to Ala. Code § 20-2-93 to the CHEROKEE
COUNTY NARCOTICS UNIT for official use as provided
by law. ..."
(Capitalization in original; emphasis added.)  Accordingly,
the trial court sentenced Coker and ordered him to pay the
criminal fine and any additional assessments due.
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On December 30, 2008, the State obtained a judgment
against Coker in the amount of $67,704.65, an amount
representing the unpaid criminal fine and assessments.  The
State thereafter filed a writ of execution seeking to seize
the subject property in order to collect the criminal fine.
Coker responded by filing (1) a motion to remit the fine,
arguing that he has no means of support with which to
contribute toward the criminal fine until he is no longer
incarcerated; (2) a claim for exemptions, arguing that the
property sought to be seized was his homestead and was
therefore exempt from execution; and (3) a motion seeking
relief from the writ of execution by virtue of the language in
the consent order in which the State relinquished any claim it
might have to execute on the subject property.  The trial
court conducted a hearing on the foregoing matters and
thereafter entered an order quashing the writ of execution on
the subject property.  In interpreting the consent order, the
trial court ultimately concluded that the State's claim
against the subject property in the consent order was broad
enough to extend to its subsequent effort to collect the fine
in the criminal case, thereby pretermitting any ruling on
Coker's homestead-exemption claim or his motion for relief
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from the writ of execution.  The State filed a motion to
alter, amend, or vacate the order quashing the writ of
execution.  The trial court denied the motion, and the State
appealed.  
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
"For purposes of construction, a consent order
is to be construed like a contract. Hanson v. Hearn,
521 So. 2d 953 (Ala. 1988). The legal effect of
judgments or orders should be determined in the
light of the literal meaning of the language used.
Where that language is not ambiguous, it must be
given its usual and ordinary meaning. Moore v.
Graham, 590 So. 2d 293 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991)."
Dewitt Apparel, Inc. v. Four Seasons of Romar Beach
Condominium Owners' Ass'n, Inc., 678 So. 2d 740, 744 (Ala.
1996).
"The question whether a contract is ambiguous is
for a court to decide. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Slade, 747 So. 2d 293 (Ala. 1999). As long as the
contractual 
terms 
are 
clear 
and 
unambiguous,
questions of their legal effect are questions of
law. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Leggett, 744 So. 2d
890 (Ala. 1999). Thus, we apply a de novo review to
a trial court's determination of whether a contract
is ambiguous and to a trial court's determination of
the legal effect of an unambiguous contract term."
Winkleblack v. Murphy, 811 So. 2d 521, 525-26 (Ala. 2001).
Furthermore, "[w]here no ambiguity exists, the court's
only function is to interpret the lawful meaning and
intentions of the parties as found within the agreement and to
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give effect to them."  Johnson v. Asphalt Hot Mix, 565 So. 2d
219, 221 (Ala. 1990).
Discussion
In its brief before this Court, the State argues that the
phrase in the consent order, "[t]he State relinquishes all
claim to [the subject] property," was intended by the parties
to mean that the State merely relinquished the specific claim
over the subject property that it had in the forfeiture case
at the time the consent order was signed and that the phrase
does not operate to bar future claims that might arise against
the subject property.  The State asserts that it took great
effort in explaining to Coker's counsel that the disposition
of Coker's criminal case by a plea agreement and the consent
order in his civil forfeiture case would remain completely
separate and that the terms of one could not be dependent on
the terms of the other.  In construing the consent order in
its entirety, we conclude that there is nothing ambiguous
about the consent order or about the parties' intent, which is
clearly expressed in the consent order. The language in the
consent order recites (1) that "Coker shall retain full title,
use, possession and enjoyment of [the subject] property," (2)
that "[t]he State relinquishes all claim to [the subject]
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property," and (3) that "Coker shall be responsible for
preparing and filing any documents that are necessary to clear
the notice of lis pendens which the State has recorded against
the real estate which is the subject-matter of this action
...."  (Emphasis added.) The use of the phrase "this action"
refers specifically to the forfeiture action in which the
State "[had] recorded" a lis pendens against the subject
property at the time the consent order was signed.  Once Coker
filed the necessary documents clearing the notice of lis
pendens the State had recorded against the subject property in
the forfeiture action, the consent order no longer had any
bearing on any future claims that might accrue on behalf of
the State against the subject property.  The consent order in
this case "must be 
construed in its entirety--single
provisions or sentences are not to be disassociated from
others referring to the same subject matter."  Wayne J.
Griffin Elec., Inc. v. Dunn Constr. Co., 622 So. 2d 314, 317
(Ala. 1993). 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's order quashing
the writ of execution on the subject property is reversed, and
the cause is remanded for the trial court to determine whether
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Coker is entitled to relief under the alternative theories
argued before the trial court.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Stuart, and Murdock, JJ., concur.