Title: In Re Marriage of Bouska
Citation: 256 N.W.2d 196
Docket Number: 3-59709
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: July 29, 1977

256 N.W.2d 196 (1977) In re the MARRIAGE OF Sharon and Donald A. BOUSKA. Upon the Petition of Sharon BOUSKA, Appellant, and concerning Donald A. BOUSKA, Appellee. No. 3-59709. Supreme Court of Iowa. July 29, 1977. *197 William L. Wegman, New Hampton, for appellant. Kevin J. Kennedy, Kennedy &amp; Kennedy, New Hampton, for appellee. Considered en banc. RAWLINGS, Justice. Appeal by petitioner from trial court order setting aside a previously entered marriage dissolution decree for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm. November 18, 1972, petitioner, Sharon Bouska, and respondent Donald A. Bouska, were married in Iowa. They resided in this state for some time but in March 1973 moved to Colorado. In September 1975, Sharon returned to Iowa. About the same time Donald apparently moved to Wyoming. February 6, 1976, or less than a year after her return to this state, Sharon filed a petition seeking dissolution of the marriage. Petitioner concedes she had not been an Iowa resident for the statutory one year period prior thereto. February 19, Donald executed an instrument designated "Acceptance of Service of Original Notice", which provides: May 20, trial court granted a default decree purportedly dissolving the marriage and awarding custody of the one child to petitioner. Respondent thereupon moved to vacate and set aside this adjudication, alleging the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. July 16, that motion was sustained and the dissolution decree set aside. The sole issue before us is whether noncompliance with the one year residence requirement, Section 598.6, The Code 1975, deprived trial court of jurisdiction as to this dissolution proceeding. I. Our review is de novo. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 334, 344(f)(7). II. It is now well settled the Iowa statutory minimum residency requirement is not unconstitutional. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S. Ct. 553, 42 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1975). See also Annot., 57 A.L.R.3d 221. III. Furthermore, absence of such requisite residency negates trial court jurisdiction. Korsrud v. Korsrud, 242 Iowa 178, 182-183, 45 N.W.2d 848 (1951). See also J. Peters, "Iowa Reform of Marriage Termination", 20 Drake L.Rev. 211, 222-223 (1971). *198 Phrased otherwise, the power to adjudicate marriage dissolution proceedings is expressly restricted by § 598.6 and in event of noncompliance therewith a court has no jurisdiction to act upon the matrimonial matter or res. As stated by 1 Vestal &amp; Willson, Iowa Practice, § 8.04 (1974): See also 2 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment, § 21.13 (2d ed. 1945); 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 240; 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 75. IV. Like ordinary subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot be conferred by waiver, estoppel or consent. Lloyd v. State, 251 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Iowa 1977); State ex rel. Iowa St. Hwy. Com'n. v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Iowa 1975); Green v. Sherman, 173 N.W.2d 843, 846 (Iowa 1970); Bonner v. Reandrew, 203 Iowa 1355, 1358, 214 N.W. 536 (1927). See also Vestal &amp; Willson, Iowa Practice, § 8.01; Nelson, Divorce and Annulment, § 21.09. See generally 20 Am. Jur.2d, Courts, §§ 105, 139; 21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 23, 116, 118, 119. Any prior holdings by this court to the contrary are hereby overruled. Furthermore, lack of special subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Lloyd v. State, supra; Bowen v. Story County Board of Supervisors, 209 N.W.2d 567, 572 (Iowa 1973). See also Verney v. Verney, 53 A.D.2d 608, 383 N.Y.S.2d 905, 907 (1976). This means that where, as in the present case, it is in any manner brought to the court's attention a decree has been entered absent such special subject matter jurisdiction, it must be set aside or vacated and the action dismissed. Lloyd v. State, 251 N.W.2d at 558; Korsrud v. Korsrud, 242 Iowa at 183, 45 N.W.2d 848; Snyder v. Snyder, 240 Iowa 239, 242, 35 N.W.2d 32 (1948); 22 Drake L.Rev. at 222; Code § 598.9. Petitioner's assigned issue is without merit. AFFIRMED. MOORE, C. J., and MASON, LeGRAND and UHLENHOPP, JJ., concur. McCORMICK, REES, REYNOLDSON and HARRIS, JJ., dissent. McCORMICK, Justice (dissenting). I am unable to agree with the majority because I do not believe the durational residency requirement of Code § 598.6 is jurisdictional. Respondent's motion to vacate the decree and dismiss the petition was predicated solely on a claim the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. This claim presented an issue of statutory construction. Subject-matter jurisdiction of dissolution actions is conferred on the district court by § 598.2, The Code, which provides: This provision does not condition subject-matter jurisdiction upon the duration of residency. We have said the court has jurisdiction of the particular marital relationship if either party is a resident of the county in which the action is brought. We have held the fact of residency is jurisdictional, but until today we consistently held the duration of residency is not. Cases in which the court has held the venue requirement of § 598.2 to be jurisdictional include Larson v. District Court of Marion County, 243 N.W.2d 617, 618 (Iowa 1976) ("there is no practical distinction in Iowa between jurisdiction and venue as related to marriage dissolution actions"), and Korsrud v. Korsrud, 242 Iowa 178, 45 N.W.2d 848 (1951). *199 Even this restriction on jurisdiction will soon be eliminated. The legislature has enacted an amendment to § 598.2, effective January 1, 1978, to remove venue as a limitation on subject-matter jurisdiction. Acts 67 G.A., 1977 Regular Session, House File 281. As amended by § 1 of the act, § 598.2 will read: Under § 3 of the act, § 1 operates retroactively to validate dissolutions "entered into in good faith by the parties." The act is entitled "An act to clarify jurisdiction and venue provisions in cases of dissolution of marriage." The house judiciary committee attached the following explanation to the bill when it was filed: A cogent argument can be made that this amendment was enacted to clarify rather than change the meaning of the statute. See Barnett v. Durant Community School District, 249 N.W.2d 626, 629-630 (Iowa 1977). In any event, upon its effective date proper venue will not be essential to confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the district court. If the legislature wished to disapprove our longstanding construction of § 598.6 that the durational residency requirement is not jurisdictional, this amendment would have been the appropriate occasion for it to do so. Instead it made no change in § 598.2 or § 598.6 which would condition district court jurisdiction upon duration of residence. The durational residency requirement of § 598.6, The Code, is as follows: This court held 65 years ago that failure to allege compliance with this requirement is not jurisdictional. See Richardson v. King, 157 Iowa 287, 135 N.W. 640 (1912). In the next case in which the issue was raised the court said: The court held that proof of duration of residence under § 598.6 is not jurisdictional and that compliance with what is now § 598.2 is alone sufficient to confer subject-matter jurisdiction. This principle has been consistently recognized in subsequent cases. See Scott v. Scott, 174 Iowa 740, 746, 156 N.W. 834, 837 (1916) ("Our statute differs from those in many states in not exacting, as a prerequisite to jurisdiction, residence within the state a specified time."); Williamson v. Williamson, 179 Iowa 489, 161 N.W. 482 (1917); Newcomer v. Newcomer, 199 Iowa 290, 201 N.W. 579 (1925); Bristow v. Pagano, 238 Iowa 1075, 1078, 29 N.W.2d *200 423, 425 (1947) ("The petition states plaintiff is a resident of Polk County, which under section [598.2] confers jurisdiction over the subject matter."). In giving a similar construction to a Washington durational residency statute the Washington Supreme Court said: Other authorities on this point are collected in Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 291 et seq., 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 75, and 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 249 at 404-405 ("It is generally held that compliance with the statute prescribing a period during which the plaintiff must have resided within the state is not `jurisdictional,' and that noncompliance with the statute does not render a divorce decree void if plaintiff had a bona fide domicil in the state when suit was commenced."). The majority does not give any reason for rejecting the construction of § 598.6 which we adhered to for 65 years, in which the legislature has acquiesced, and which seems correct. I believe our previous cases accurately construe the provision and should be followed here. In the present case the § 598.2 requirements for subject-matter jurisdiction were met. Therefore the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and power to dissolve the marriage. The trial court erred in setting aside the decree and dismissing the petition on the ground of absence of subject-matter jurisdiction. REES, REYNOLDSON and HARRIS, JJ., join this dissent.