Title: State v. Joslin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S46491
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: August 16, 2001

Filed: August 16, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
	Respondent on Review,
	v.
CHARLES GLADWIN JOSLIN,
	Petitioner on Review.
(95C22378; CA A93988; SC S46491)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted September 7, 2000.
	Dan Maloney, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, filed the
petition for review, brief on the merits, and supplemental
memorandum, and argued the cause for petitioner on review.  With
him on the petition and brief was David E. Groom, Public Defender
for Oregon. 
	Kaye E. McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed
the brief on the merits and argued the cause for respondent on
review.  With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney
General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.**
	CARSON, C.J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
    *Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Jamese L. Rhoades, Judge. 160 Or App 291, 984 P2d 957 (1999).
   **Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case; De Muniz, J., did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case.  
		CARSON, C.J.
		In this criminal case, we must decide whether defendant
validly waived his right against compelled self-incrimination
during custodial interrogation, under Article I, section 12, of
the Oregon Constitution, set out post.  At the time of his
waiver, defendant was unaware that a lawyer whom a family member
had hired to represent him had advised, through the family
member, that he not speak to police until the lawyer was present. 
The trial court nonetheless concluded that defendant's waiver was
valid and, accordingly, denied defendant's motion to suppress
certain statements and other evidence that arose from that
waiver.  A jury thereafter convicted defendant of murder and
other crimes, and the Court of Appeals affirmed from the bench. 
State v. Joslin, 160 Or App 291, 984 P2d 957 (1999).  We conclude
that defendant did not knowingly waive his right against
compelled self-incrimination and that his waiver therefore was
invalid.  We further conclude that the trial court's error in
denying defendant's motion to suppress was not harmless. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
		The following undisputed facts are taken from the trial
court's findings of fact and from the record.  On July 27, 1995,
a man with a rifle shot and killed a woman, Simonds, at the Salem
Family Worship Center in Salem.  Defendant soon became a suspect
in the shooting.  
		Later that day, Detective Quackenbush of the Salem
Police Department, together with deputies from the Marion County
Sheriff's Office, contacted defendant at the home of defendant's
sister, Martin.  Quackenbush asked defendant whether he was
willing to talk about the shooting and explained that defendant
was not under arrest and did not have to accompany Quackenbush to
any other location.  Defendant stated that he was willing to talk
to Quackenbush, and he voluntarily agreed to have the deputies
transport him to the station house for the Salem Police
Department (police station).
		Before arriving at the police station, the deputies and
Quackenbush conducted a drive-by identification of defendant by
witnesses to the shooting.  After stepping out of the deputies'
vehicle, defendant initially stated that he wanted to speak to a
lawyer; however, within a few seconds, he asked Quackenbush what
kinds of questions Quackenbush wanted to ask.  Quackenbush
responded that he could not speak to defendant because defendant
had stated that he wanted a lawyer.  Defendant responded that he
was willing to continue to talk to Quackenbush.  Quackenbush then
read defendant his Miranda rights from a prepared card, clarified
that defendant was not under arrest, and told defendant that he
could invoke his rights at any time. 
		Three witnesses, one of whom asked that defendant
remove his shirt, then were asked to identify defendant. 
Defendant removed his shirt as requested.  However, he stated at
about the same time that perhaps he should have a lawyer present. 
Quackenbush asked defendant whether he still was willing to speak
to Quackenbush, and defendant responded that he was.  Quackenbush
again explained that defendant did not have to speak and that he
was not under arrest.  Defendant responded that he still was
willing to speak and to accompany Quackenbush to the police
station for an interview.
		Meanwhile, Martin had contacted a lawyer, Lipton, who
had represented defendant in the past and who agreed to represent
defendant for the purpose of the shooting investigation.  Martin
then called the police station and spoke to Lieutenant Kohlmeyer. 
Martin told Kohlmeyer that she had hired Lipton as defendant's
lawyer and that Lipton had asked her to tell the police to tell
defendant that Lipton did not want defendant to speak to police
until Lipton was present.  Kohlmeyer replied that he would tell
defendant that Lipton had been hired, but not that defendant had
been advised not to speak, "because that was [Lipton's] job." 
Martin later called the station two more times, once speaking to
someone other than Kohlmeyer and once leaving a message with the
communications center, again passing on Lipton's instructions
that defendant not speak to police.
		After speaking with Martin, Kohlmeyer called the Marion
County District Attorney's Office for advice.  The responding
deputy district attorney, Makler, advised Kohlmeyer to tell
defendant that Lipton had been hired and was available, but not
that Lipton had advised defendant, through Martin, not to speak. 
Makler then called Dr. Suckow, a psychiatrist who worked on a
contract basis with Marion County, and asked him to meet with
defendant at the police station to determine whether defendant
was suffering from a mental disease or defect.
		When Quackenbush arrived at the police station,
Kohlmeyer told him that Martin had hired Lipton.  Quackenbush
then approached defendant, who had been placed in a small,
windowless interview room.  Quackenbush told defendant that
Martin had hired Lipton to represent him and that defendant could
invoke any of the rights that he already had been read. 
Quackenbush then asked defendant whether, despite having learned
that he now had counsel, he still was willing to talk.  Defendant
responded that he was.  
		At about the same time, Detectives Garrett and Myers of
the Marion County Sheriff's Office arrived at the police station. 
Upon their arrival, Kohlmeyer told Garrett that Martin had hired
a lawyer for defendant, and Quackenbush advised that he had told
defendant as much.  However, Garrett and Myers were not told
Lipton's name or the substance of his advice to defendant.
		Garrett and Myers then began interviewing defendant. 
At the outset, Garrett again advised defendant of his Miranda
rights, and defendant signed a card that acknowledged that he
understood his rights and had no questions in that regard.  A
short time later, Suckow arrived and joined the interview. 
Garrett and Myers then questioned defendant, for about an hour,
concerning his physical fitness, his work status, any medication
that he might have been taking, and whether he recently had
consumed alcohol.  Garrett and Myers also questioned defendant
concerning a rifle that he owned, and defendant discussed his
intent to sell the rifle, due to recent delusions that he had
been suffering, as well as a fear that he might harm himself or
others.  At one point, Garrett and Myers also asked defendant if
he would be willing to take a polygraph examination.  Defendant
responded that that sounded like a good idea, but that he would
need to speak to his lawyer first.
		Garrett and Myers eventually left the interview room,
and defendant spoke to Suckow alone for about 10 to 15 minutes. 
At that time, defendant made statements about his mental health. 
Garrett and Myers then returned to the interview room and told
defendant that he had been identified as the person who had shot
Simonds.  Defendant responded that he wanted to talk to his
lawyer before speaking any further.  Garrett and Myers stopped
their questioning and arrested defendant.
		Defendant later was indicted for murder and other
crimes.  He moved to suppress, among other things, statements
that he had made to Quackenbush, Garrett, Myers, and Suckow, as
well as any of Suckow's reports or testimony concerning his
observations of defendant, upon the grounds that that evidence
was obtained in violation of his state and federal constitutional
rights against compelled self-incrimination and rights to
counsel.  After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found
that defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation until
being interviewed by Garrett, Myers, and Suckow, and,
consequently, that his constitutional rights against compelled
self-incrimination were not implicated until that time.  The
trial court further found that defendant knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily had waived all his rights,
including his right against compelled self-incrimination, while
speaking to Quackenbush.  Therefore, in the trial court's view,
defendant already had waived his rights when he subjected himself
to custodial interrogation by Garrett, Myers, and Suckow. 
Finally, the trial court concluded that defendant's waiver was
not vitiated by Martin's attempt to inform defendant that Lipton
had advised that he not speak to police.  In the trial court's
view, Martin could not invoke defendant's constitutional rights
in his behalf, against defendant's own waiver of those rights and
his decision to speak to Garrett, Myers, and Suckow after being
told that Lipton had been hired.  Accordingly, the trial court
denied defendant's motion to suppress.
		At trial, defendant raised the defense of insanity due
to mental disease or defect.  In relation to that defense, Suckow
testified in the state's behalf that, in his opinion, defendant
had not been suffering from delusions at the time of his crimes
and had been capable of forming intent.  The jury rejected
defendant's insanity defense and found him guilty of murder,
among other crimes.  Defendant appealed his conviction to the
Court of Appeals, which, as noted, affirmed from the bench.  We
allowed defendant's petition for review.
		On review, defendant challenges the statements that he
made to Garrett, Myers, and Suckow during the interview at the
police station, as well as subsequent reports and testimony based
upon that interview.  Among other things, defendant contends
that, in withholding the fact that Lipton had attempted, through
Martin, to advise defendant not to speak to police until Lipton
was present, the police prevented defendant from making an
informed or knowing waiver of his right against compelled self-incrimination under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon
Constitution.  That section provides, in part:
"No person shall * * * be compelled in any
criminal prosecution to testify against himself."
In support of his position, defendant primarily relies upon this
court's decisions in State v. Haynes, 288 Or 59, 602 P2d 272
(1979), and State v. Simonsen, 319 Or 510, 878 P2d 409 (1994). 
Defendant further contends that the police violated his right
against compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. (1)
		The state responds that the police were not obligated,
under any constitutional provision, to convey a message to
defendant from Martin and, indeed, that the police were not even
obligated to tell defendant that Martin had hired Lipton to
represent defendant.  The state adds that defendant knowingly
waived his right against compelled self-incrimination because he
was aware of the existence of that right, as well as Lipton's
hiring and availability, and, nonetheless, he voluntarily agreed
to speak to Garrett, Myers, and Suckow.
		We begin with defendant's state constitutional
argument.  See State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 262, 666 P2d 1316
(1983) (court decides state constitutional issues before deciding
federal issues).  As noted, Article I, section 12, protects
against compelled self-incrimination in criminal prosecutions. 
That protection extends to custodial interrogations, because of
the inherent level of coercion that exists in such
interrogations.  State v. Meade, 327 Or 335, 339, 963 P2d 656
(1998).  Further, Article I, section 12, provides a derivative
right to the assistance of counsel during custodial
interrogation, because "a lawyer's presence at a custodial
interrogation is one way to ensure the right to be free from
compelled self-incrimination."  Id.; see also Haynes, 288 Or at
71 (explaining derivative right).
		Here, the trial court determined that defendant was
subjected to custodial interrogation when Garrett, Myers, and
Suckow interviewed him at the police station.  Neither party
disagrees with that determination.  Rather, the parties dispute
whether the police were obligated to tell defendant that Lipton
had advised defendant, through Martin, not to speak to the police
until Lipton was present.  As noted, defendant relies upon this
court's decisions in Haynes and Simonsen, while the state argues
that those cases are distinguishable from the facts at hand.  We
turn to a discussion of those cases, which, as explained below,
provide the starting point for our analysis in this case.
		In Haynes, the police arrested the defendant during a
murder investigation and advised him of his Miranda rights.  The
defendant's wife hired a lawyer, who called the police station
the morning after the defendant's arrest to arrange a visit with
the defendant.  The lawyer initially received inaccurate
information regarding the defendant's whereabouts and was unable
to speak to an on-duty police sergeant until about an hour had
passed.  At that point, the lawyer told the sergeant that he was
coming to see the defendant.  About a half-hour later, just as
the lawyer was arriving at the police station, and with knowledge
that the lawyer was on his way, a different sergeant removed the
defendant from the police station and obtained incriminating
statements from him.  That sergeant did not return the defendant
to the police station for several hours.  288 Or at 61-63.
		The trial court in Haynes denied the defendant's
motion, based upon Article I, section 12, to suppress his
incriminating statements.  This court reversed, stating:
"We hold that a suspect who has previously been told in
general terms of his right to counsel and has waived
this right must be informed when counsel actually seeks
to consult with him and must voluntarily and
intelligently have rejected that opportunity, before
further statements may thereafter be taken from him and
used against him."
Id. at 61 (emphasis added).  In so holding, the court
acknowledged that a suspect who already is represented by counsel
validly may waive the presence of counsel during custodial
interrogation, if that waiver occurs "with knowledge that [the
suspect] may remain silent or may end the dialogue and ask to
consult counsel at any time."  Id. at 69.  However, the court
distinguished that situation from one in which, unknown to the
suspect, an identified lawyer was seeking to consult with the
suspect as a client:
"We hold only that when unknown to the person in this
situation an identified attorney is actually available
and seeking an opportunity to consult with him, and the
police do not inform him of that fact, any statement or
the fruits of any statement obtained after the police
themselves know of the attorney's efforts to reach the
arrested person cannot be rendered admissible on the
theory that the person knowingly and intelligently
waived counsel."
Id. at 70 (emphasis added).  The court emphasized that its
holding was based upon the derivative right to assistance of
counsel at custodial interrogation, under Article I, section 12,
to protect against compelled self-incrimination.  Id. at 71.  The
court reiterated that such a right may be waived; "[t]he crucial
point is that it must be a knowing choice as well as voluntary in
the sense of not being coerced."  Id. at 72.
		Finally, the court noted that it was immaterial that
the defendant's wife, rather than the defendant, had hired the
lawyer, or that the lawyer, in fact, ultimately had declined to
represent the defendant.  Rather, it was sufficient that the
lawyer had come to the police station "prepared at least to
assume the initial responsibility of an attorney, and [the]
defendant was denied the opportunity to decide whether he would
retain [the lawyer] in that role or proceed without him."  Id. at
72 n 5.
		In Simonsen, the defendant was arrested for aggravated
murder, advised of his Miranda rights, transported to jail, and,
the following morning, removed from jail by a detective.  Shortly
thereafter, the defendant's court-appointed lawyer arrived at the
jail, only to find the defendant gone.  The lawyer then demanded
that all questioning cease until he was able to consult with the
defendant.  Meanwhile, the detective and a deputy sheriff had
transported the defendant to a location near the crime scene,
where they and other deputies at the scene turned off their two-way radios.  The defendant then made incriminating statements, at
the same time that his lawyer was trying to contact him through
the police dispatcher.  319 Or at 512-13, 512 n 2.
		The defendant later pleaded guilty to aggravated
murder, but moved to suppress his incriminating statements in the
penalty phase of his capital trial.  The trial court denied that
motion, reasoning that the interrogating detective personally had
not been told about the existence of the defendant's lawyer or
the lawyer's specific requests.  This court reversed, stating:
"Defendant had a right to have th[e] invocation by his
lawyer of his right to remain silent honored, at least
until he was able to consult with the lawyer or, in the
alternative, he waived his right to such a consultation
after being fully apprised of the situation that
actually existed."
Id. at 514 (emphasis added).  In the court's view, in light of
police knowledge of the lawyer's appointment and his demand that
all interrogation cease, and the failure of the police to impart
that knowledge to the defendant, the state failed to demonstrate
that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily had
waived his right against compelled self-incrimination during
custodial interrogation.  Id.  
		The court in Simonsen further held that the fact that
the interrogating detective was unaware of the lawyer's
invocation of the defendant's right to remain silent was not
dispositive:
	"* * * We hold that a lawyer's request to a
responsible officer of a police organization that any
questioning of the lawyer's client cease must be
honored promptly by that organization, whether or not
one or more members of the organization individually
are ignorant of the fact or nature of the request. 
	"* * * [Here,] a particular lawyer actually was
available and had asked that any questioning of [the]
defendant cease.  It also is clear that [the] defendant
was not informed of those facts before he gave his
videotaped confession.  In that state of ignorance,
[the] defendant was prevented from making an informed
or knowing choice in the matter of waiver of his right
to have counsel's assistance in determining whether to
incriminate himself."
Id. at 517-18 (emphasis added).  
		Taken together, Haynes and Simonsen stand for the
following propositions.  First, when an identified lawyer has
been hired or appointed and is seeking to consult with a suspect
who is subject to custodial interrogation, the suspect must be
informed of both those facts before the suspect may be said
knowingly to have waived his or her right against compelled self-incrimination under Article I, section 12.  Haynes, 288 Or at 70;
see also Simonsen, 319 Or at 514-17 (discussing Haynes in court-appointment context); (2) State v. Isom, 306 Or 587, 593, 761 P2d
524 (1988) (noting that, in Haynes, this court suppressed
statements "even though the defendant himself had not sought to
stop questioning to consult with a lawyer"); State v. Sparklin,
296 Or 85, 90, 672 P2d 1182 (1983) (summarizing Haynes as holding
that "no waiver could be adequate unless [the] defendant knew his
attorney wanted to see him").  Second, such a lawyer may invoke a
suspect's right against compelled self-incrimination in the
suspect's behalf; if the lawyer does so, then the police either
must stop questioning the suspect or must inform the suspect that
his or her lawyer has invoked the right and provide the suspect
with the opportunity to accept or reject that invocation. 
Simonsen, 319 Or at 514; see also State v. Wilson, 323 Or 498,
511 n 8, 918 P2d 826 (1996) (suspect may invoke right to be free
from compelled self-incrimination through lawyer, citing
Simonsen).  
		Third, the suspect personally need not hire the lawyer,
and either the suspect or the lawyer ultimately need not agree to
the representation.  Rather, so long as, at the time of the
custodial interrogation, the lawyer at least had been hired in
the suspect's behalf and was prepared to assume the initial
responsibility of representing the suspect, the police must
inform the suspect of both the lawyer's availability and, where
it exists, of the lawyer's desire to consult with the suspect and
any invocation of the suspect's right against compelled self-incrimination.  Haynes, 288 Or at 72 n 5; see also Simonsen, 319
Or at 517-18 (respecting invocation); Isom, 306 Or at 593 (noting
that, in Haynes, lawyer sought to consult at wife's instigation). 
Finally, when a lawyer directs his or her request that all
questioning of a suspect cease to a responsible officer of a
police organization, then that organization promptly must honor
that request, regardless of the ignorance of some of its members
concerning the request.  Simonsen, 319 Or at 517.
		This case resembles both Haynes and Simonsen in that a
family member had hired a particular, identified lawyer -- Lipton
-- who was planning to consult with defendant.  Nonetheless, the
state emphasizes two distinguishing facts that, on the surface,
appear to set this case apart from Haynes and Simonsen:  (1)
unlike in Haynes, it is unclear from the record here if Lipton
was seeking to consult with defendant immediately or whether he
was on his way to the police station; and (2) unlike in Simonsen,
Lipton did not invoke explicitly defendant's right against
compelled self-incrimination; rather, Lipton sought to advise
defendant, through Martin, that defendant should invoke that
right until Lipton was present.  However, the practical effect of
Lipton's position and actions vis-a-vis defendant is
indistinguishable in those respects from the lawyers' actions in
both Haynes and Simonsen:  Lipton had been hired in defendant's
behalf, was planning to consult with defendant, and took steps to
ensure that defendant did not speak to police, at least until
Lipton was present.  To the extent of those facts, then, the
foregoing principles set out in Haynes and Simonsen apply equally
to this case.  
		The more obvious -- and most significant --
distinguishing fact here is that it was not Lipton, but Martin,
who called the police and asked that defendant be told that
Lipton had advised that defendant not speak to police until
Lipton was present.  The question is whether that is a
distinction with a difference, respecting application of the
principles set out in Haynes and Simonsen.  As explained below,
we conclude that it is not.
		As this court held in Simonsen, a suspect must be
"fully apprised of the situation that actually existed," 319 Or
at 514 (emphasis added), including the availability of a hired
lawyer and related information respecting invocation of the right
against compelled self-incrimination, to provide a fully informed
and knowing waiver of that right.  Such a requirement cannot turn
on the identity of a person who contacts the police to assist the
suspect, provided that that person accurately conveys the
information in question at the direction of a lawyer hired in the
suspect's behalf (who, as discussed above, ultimately is entitled
to invoke Article I, section 12, in the suspect's behalf).
		We now hold that, when police receive from a third
party an invocation or legal advice respecting Article I, section
12, in behalf of a suspect in custody, in which the third party
purports to be speaking for a lawyer hired in the suspect's
behalf, the police are bound to honor that invocation (3) or convey
that legal advice, unless:  (1) the police in fact do not believe
that the third party is speaking for such a lawyer; and (2) the
police have an objectively reasonable basis in fact for
disbelieving the third party.
		Here, it is undisputed that Martin had hired Lipton in
defendant's behalf and that Lipton had told Martin to tell
defendant not to speak to police until Lipton was present.  There
also is no question that Martin had called the police station at
Lipton's direction.  Further, the police knew that Martin was
defendant's sister (4) and never questioned seriously either the
fact that she had hired Lipton or the substance of Lipton's
advice to defendant. (5)  Those facts demonstrate that the police in
fact did not disbelieve that Martin had called in Lipton's behalf
to convey legal advice to defendant, respecting defendant's
rights under Article I, section 12. 
		It follows that, upon learning from Martin that Lipton
had been hired and had advised that defendant not speak to police
until Lipton was present, the police were obligated to convey
that information to defendant or to refrain from questioning him
altogether.  Although Quackenbush told defendant that Martin had
hired Lipton, he did not convey Lipton's advice that defendant
invoke his right against compelled self-incrimination.  As a
result, defendant's waiver of that right under Article I, section
12, although voluntary, was not knowingly made and, therefore,
was invalid.  Accordingly, the trial court should have suppressed
the evidence that resulted from that waiver -- specifically,
defendant's statements during his interview with Garrett, Myers,
and Suckow, as well as subsequent reports and testimony relating
to that interview.  See Haynes, 288 Or at 73-74 ("[W]hen law
enforcement officers have failed to admit counsel to a person in
custody or to inform the person of the attorney's efforts to
reach him, they cannot thereafter rely on defendant's 'waiver'
for the use of his subsequent uncounseled statements or resulting
evidence against him."). (6)
		The state next argues that, even if the evidence at
issue were admitted in error in violation of Article I, section
12, that error was harmless to the ultimate outcome of
defendant's trial.  In criminal cases, this court will affirm a
conviction, notwithstanding legal error under the Oregon
Constitution, "if the error did not affect a 'substantial right'
of the defendant."  State v. Walton, 311 Or 223, 230, 809 P2d 81
(1991) (quoting OEC 103(1); other internal quotation marks
omitted).  This court has interpreted that standard to require
affirmance if there is "(1) substantial and convincing evidence
of guilt * * *, and (2) little, if any, likelihood that the error
affected the verdict."  Id. (quoting State v. Miller, 300 Or 203,
220-21, 709 P2d 225 (1985)).
		The record here discloses substantial and convincing
evidence that defendant shot and killed Simonds.  Defendant does
not dispute that evidence; rather, he focuses upon the evidence
relating to his insanity defense under ORS 161.295(1). (7) 
Defendant specifically contends that Suckow's testimony about his
interview with defendant, which the state offered in its case-in-chief, was "the center piece [sic] of the state's case that
defendant did not suffer from mental disease or defect" at the
time of his crimes.  It follows, defendant continues, that the
erroneous admission of Suckow's testimony likely affected the
verdict because, without that testimony, the state would have
been unable to rebut sufficiently defendant's insanity defense. 
The state responds that, even without Suckow's testimony in its
behalf, defendant did not prove his defense. (8)  
		After reviewing the record, we agree with defendant
that the error here was not harmless.  Unlike the two other
expert witnesses in the case -- one who testified in defendant's
behalf (supporting his insanity defense) and one who testified in
the state's behalf on rebuttal (refuting that defense) -- Suckow
had evaluated defendant on the day of the shooting, which added a
dimension of credibility to his evaluation that was absent from
the other expert witnesses' evaluations.  Indeed, Suckow
specifically testified as to defendant's ability to form intent
on that day, in addition to reporting the lack of any delusional
behavior on defendant's part.  Further, both the other expert
witnesses had reviewed Suckow's written report before evaluating
defendant, and the state's other expert witness even referred to
that report twice during his testimony.  In sum, without Suckow's
testimony and written report -- as well as the testimony of
Garrett and Myers regarding their interview with and observations
of defendant -- the quality of the state's evidence refuting
defendant's insanity defense would have been weakened to a
significant degree.  In light of that determination, even if
there were substantial and convincing evidence of defendant's
guilt, we cannot say that there was little, if any, likelihood
that the error in denying defendant's motion to suppress affected
the verdict.  Accordingly, we reverse defendant's conviction.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.



1. 	The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in part:
	"No person * * * shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]"
		Defendant also contends that the police violated his
rights to counsel under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution, and the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.  We need not address defendant's right-to-counsel
arguments, or his Fifth Amendment argument, in light of our
disposition of defendant's Article I, section 12, argument.

2. 	As this case involves a lawyer hired in defendant's
behalf, rather than a court-appointed lawyer, the discussion that
follows refers only to hired counsel.  We note, however, that the
principles set out below apply equally when court-appointed
counsel is involved.  See generally Simonsen, 319 Or at 514-17
(so demonstrating in similar context).

3. 	More specifically, as explained in Simonsen, 319 Or at
514, the suspect has a right to have that invocation honored, "at
least until [the suspect is] able to consult with the lawyer or,
in the alternative, [the suspect] waive[s] his [or her] right to
such a consultation after being fully apprised of the situation
that actually existed."

4. 	The police had been dealing with Martin throughout the
day -- as noted, the police initially contacted defendant at
Martin's home, and Martin spoke generally at that time about
hiring a lawyer for defendant.

5. 	At the suppression hearing, Kohlmeyer testified that he
had no reason either to believe or to disbelieve Martin, and that
he viewed her statements as third-hand information.  However,
Kohlmeyer nonetheless advised Quackenbush to pass on part of
Martin's message to defendant -- that Lipton had been hired and
was available -- while withholding the rest of Martin's message
concerning Lipton's advice.  Under those facts, and in light of
the additional fact that the state never has suggested that the
police doubted Martin's veracity, it is apparent from the record
as a whole that the police treated Martin's statements as true.

6. 	The state contends, nonetheless, that Haynes and
Simonsen are distinguishable because the defendants in those
cases had been arrested on particular charges before being
subjected to custodial interrogation.  That distinction is
immaterial, because defendant's rights under Article I, section
12, attach at custodial interrogation regardless of whether an
arrest has occurred.  See, e.g., Meade, 327 Or at 339 (discussing
rights afforded under Article I, section 12, including derivative
right to assistance of counsel, in context of pre-arrest
custodial interrogation); State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 7-8, 791 P2d
836 (1990) (discussing requirement of Miranda-like warnings under
Article I, section 12, in context of pre-arrest custodial
setting).
		We also note that the state never has argued that,
because Kohlmeyer and Quackenbush worked for a different police
agency than Garrett and Myers, the discussion in Simonsen, 319 Or
at 517, imputing information known to a responsible police
officer to all members of the same police organization, is
inapplicable here.  Even so, under the unique facts of this case
-- where Garrett and Myers interviewed defendant at the police
station for the Salem Police Department after specifically
consulting with Kohlmeyer and Quackenbush -- that rule from
Simonsen is applicable here.

7. 	ORS 161.295(1) provides:
	"A person is guilty except for insanity if, as a
result of mental disease or defect at the time of
engaging in criminal conduct, the person lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality of the conduct or to conform the conduct to
the requirements of law."

8. 	Defendant was required to prove his insanity defense by
a preponderance of the evidence.  See ORS 161.305 (characterizing
insanity defense under ORS 161.295 as affirmative defense); ORS
161.055(2) (setting out preponderance-of-the-evidence standard
for affirmative defenses).