Title: Cousins v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 593, 2003
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 13, 2004

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DANIEL R.  COUSINS,
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§
No.  593, 2003
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below: Superior Court of
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the State of Delaware, in and 
v.
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for Sussex County in IS00-02-
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0112R1 - 0115R1.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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Plaintiff Below,
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Appellee.
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Def.  ID No.  0002004173
Submitted: January 29, 2004
Decided:
May 13, 2004
Before BERGER, STEELE and JACOBS, Justices.
O R D E R
This 13th day of May 2004, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening
brief and appendix and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The appellant, Daniel R.  Cousins, filed this appeal from an order
of the Superior Court denying his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (Rule 61).  The appellee, State of Delaware,
has moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the basis that it is
manifest on the face of Cousins’ opening brief that the appeal is without merit.
We agree and AFFIRM.
1See Cousins v.  State, 2001 WL 1353571 (Del.  Supr.).
2Rule 61(i)(3) provides that any ground for relief that was not asserted in the
proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction is barred, unless the petitioner can
establish cause for the procedural default and prejudice from the violation of the petitioner’s
rights.
3Rule 61(i)(4) bars a  claim that is  formerly adjudicated unless reconsideration of the
claim is warranted in the interest of justice.
2
(2)
In March 2000, Cousins was indicted on two counts of Rape in the
First Degree, one count of Rape in the Fourth Degree, and one count of
Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Second Degree.  After a jury trial in the
Superior Court, Cousins was found guilty as charged.  He was sentenced in
November 2000, to a total of sixty-seven years at Level V, suspended after
serving thirty years, for one year at Level IV home confinement, followed by
probation.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Cousins’ conviction.1
(3)
In October 2002, Cousins moved pro se for a judgment of
acquittal.  The Superior Court summarily denied the motion as untimely.  In
September 2003, Cousins moved pro se for postconviction relief.  The Superior
Court denied the motion on the bases that the issues raised were procedurally
barred pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3)2 and (4)3 or were without merit.  This appeal
followed.
(4)
On appeal, Cousins raises fourteen separate claims, about half of
which concern the admissibility of a videotaped interview of the child victim.
4Title 11, section 3511 of the Delaware Code permits the use of videotaped testimony
in lieu of live testimony by an available witness under the age of twelve years.
5Superior Court Criminal Rule 15 provides for the taking of depositions in criminal
cases.
3
Cousins also raises as grounds for relief (a) the Superior Court’s voir dire of the
child victim, (b) prosecutorial misconduct, (c) double jeopardy due to
multiplicity of charges, (d) ineffective assistance of counsel, and (e) newly
discovered evidence. 
(5)
Cousins’ claims with respect to the videotaped interview may be
summarized as follows:  (a) the videotape interview did not meet the standards
of title 11, section 3511 of the Delaware Code4 and Superior Court Criminal
Rule 155; and (b) it was improper to allow the jury to replay the videotape in the
deliberation room.  Cousins also complains that the Superior Court did not
separately address each of his videotape claims when disposing of the
postconviction motion.   
(6)
The record reflects that the five-year old child victim was
interviewed at the Children’s Advocacy Center (CAC) on February 7, 2000
concerning the events of February 6, 2000, that led to the charges against
Cousins.  At trial, a videotape of the CAC interview was admitted into evidence
without objection and was played for the jury.  Moreover, the videotape of the
6See, e.g., Smith v.  State, 2000 WL 33726919 (Del.  Super.)  (denying as without
merit and as procedurally barred postconviction claim that Court erred when allowing  jury
to take videotape into deliberations), aff’d, 2000 WL 1887933 (Del.  Supr.).
7Title 11, section 3507 of the Delaware Code provides that “[i]n a criminal
prosecution, the voluntary out-of-court prior statement of a witness who is present and
subject to cross-examination may be used as affirmative evidence with substantive
independent testimonial value.”  Compare Feleke v.  State, 620 A.2d 222 (Del. 1993)
(affirming admission of child’s out-of-court taped statement pursuant to tit. 11, § 3507).
4
interview, as well as video equipment, was provided to the jury prior to its
deliberations.
(7)
We agree that Cousins’ claims with respect to the videotape
interview are properly barred pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3).  It was not error for the
Superior Court to provide the videotape of the interview to the jury during its
deliberations.  Physical evidence admitted against a defendant at trial is
appropriately submitted to the jury during its deliberations at the judge’s
discretion.6 
(8)
Moreover, notwithstanding Cousins’ contrary contentions, the
videotape of the CAC interview was not a deposition and thus was not subject
to the requirements of title 11, section 3511 of the Delaware Code and Superior
Court Criminal Rule 15.  Rather, the videotape was properly admitted into
evidence in accordance with the requirements of title 11, section 3507 of the
Delaware Code.7  
8DeShields v.  State, 2001 WL 1560689 (Del.  Supr.)
9Feleke v. State, 620 A.2d 222, 226 (Del.  1993).
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(9)
Finally, we conclude that the Superior Court properly combined
and appropriately addressed Cousins’ separate postconviction arguments that
pertained to the admissibility of the videotaped interview.  Cousins’ claim to
the contrary is without merit.   
(10)
Cousins contends that the jury was improperly excluded from
hearing the Superior Court’s voir dire of the five-year old child victim.  The
Superior Court ruled, however, and we affirm, that this claim is procedurally
barred pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3).  The Superior Court did not abuse its
discretion by conducting the voir dire outside of the presence of the jury.8
Before allowing the child to testify, the trial judge advised the jury of its
responsibility to determine the child’s credibility and the weight afforded to
her testimony.9   
(11)
Cousins claims in this Court, as he did in his postconviction
motion, that the prosecutor orchestrated the testimony given by the State’s
witnesses.  The Superior Court properly barred this claim under Rule 61(i)(3).
Cousins established no basis for the claim and thus did not demonstrate either
for failure to raise the claim or actual prejudice.
10Collingwood v.  State, 2000 WL 1177630 (Del.  Supr.).
11The multiplicity doctrine is implicated when a single criminal offense is divided
into multiple counts of an indictment, thereby violating the double jeopardy provisions of
the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Delaware.
12Feddiman v.  State, 558 A.2d 278 (Del.  1989)
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(12)
In this appeal from the denial of postconviction relief, Cousins
reiterates his claim that the prosecutor made improper statements during closing
argument.  As the Superior Court determined, however, Cousins’ contentions
were raised on direct appeal and thus are barred as formerly adjudicated
pursuant to Rule 61(i)(4).  Reconsideration of the formerly adjudicated claim
is not warranted simply because Cousins has refined or restated the claim.10 
(13)
The Superior Court properly barred, pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3),
Cousins’ claim that he was subject to double jeopardy by reason of multiplicity
of charges in the indictment.11  The evidence clearly established that separate
sexual acts and crimes took place when Cousins molested the child victim
during the evening of February 6, 2000.12
(14)
Cousins’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are fairly
summarized as follows:  (a) trial counsel failed to prepare, investigate,
interview and depose key witnesses; (b) trial counsel failed to “secure parental
DNA profiles”; (c) trial counsel allowed an “improperly produced deposition”
13Strickland v.  Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
14Flamer v.  State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990).
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to be entered into evidence; and (d) trial counsel failed to disclose to Cousins
that he had been disciplined by this Court.
(15)
To substantiate his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Cousins must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness that was prejudicial to Cousins in such a way that
the outcome of the trial would have been different.13  The review of counsel’s
representation is subject to a strong presumption that the representation was
professionally reasonable.14  
(16)
The Superior Court reviewed the allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel and properly determined that Cousins did not establish
that his counsel’s representation was unreasonable and prejudicial.
Specifically, the Superior Court determined, and we agree, that counsel was not
ineffective in securing witness testimony.  Cousins did not show what the
potential testimony would have been or how it would have been helpful to the
defense at trial.  Nor do we find that counsel was ineffective for failing to
obtain DNA testing to corroborate Cousins’ claim that he had sexual
intercourse with his girlfriend in the same bathroom in which he was found
15See McCray v.  State, 2001 WL 760845 (Del.  Supr.)  (rejecting claim of newly
discovered evidence based solely on unverified letters).
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with the child victim.  Moreover, counsel was not ineffective when he failed to
object to the admission of the CAC videotape interview that was properly
admitted pursuant to section 3507.  Finally, Cousins failed to demonstrate
actual prejudice stemming from counsel’s alleged failure to disclose to him a
prior attorney disciplinary matter in which counsel was involved.
(17)
Finally, it is clear that the Superior Court properly exercised its
discretion when denying Cousins’ request for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence.  Cousins’ newly discovered evidence consisted merely of
an unverified letter containing inadmissible hearsay.15   
(18)
The Court has carefully considered Cousin’s postconviction claims
on appeal, and we find that the judgment of the Superior Court should be
affirmed.  It is manifest on the face of Cousins’ opening brief that this appeal
is without merit.  The issues presented on appeal clearly are controlled by
settled Delaware law.  To the extent judicial discretion is implicated, there was
no abuse of discretion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s’ motion to
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.
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BY THE COURT:
/s/ Myron T. Steele
Justice