Title: Commonwealth v. Jeannis
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12630
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 24, 2019

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SJC-12630 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  STANLEY JEANNIS. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 5, 2019. - May 24, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress.  
Search and Seizure, Probable cause, Bodily intrusion, Body 
examination.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, 
Probable cause.  Probable Cause. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 11, 2015. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Robert 
N. Tochka, J., and the cases were tried before Raffi N. 
Yessayan, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Ian MacLean, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Jane Larmon White for the defendant. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  During a lawful strip search of the defendant 
following his arrest, police officers observed a plastic bag 
2 
 
protruding from the cleft between his buttocks and caused him to 
remove it; it was revealed to contain individually wrapped 
plastic bags of both heroin and cocaine.  The issue presented in 
this case is whether the removal of the plastic bag was within 
the scope of the strip search, which requires only probable 
cause, or whether the officers conducted a manual body cavity 
search of the defendant's rectum, which requires the issuance by 
a judge of a search warrant based on "a strong showing of 
particularized need supported by a high degree of probable 
cause."  Rodriques v. Furtado, 410 Mass. 878, 888 (1991).  We 
conclude that, under the circumstances here, the removal of the 
plastic bag was within the scope of the strip search and that 
the actions taken by the police were reasonable within the 
bounds of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  We 
therefore affirm the denial of the defendant's motion to 
suppress the drug evidence.  We also affirm his convictions. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts as found by the judge 
who heard the defendant's motion to suppress, supplemented by 
uncontradicted witness testimony that the judge implicitly 
credited.  See Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 
(2015). 
 
On April 7, 2015, members of a Federal Bureau of 
Investigation task force arrested the defendant in a hotel room 
3 
 
in Revere on outstanding warrants.  After the defendant was 
arrested, Lieutenant David Callahan of the Revere police 
department arrived at the hotel and brought the defendant to the 
Revere police station for booking.  At the station, the 
defendant complained to Callahan that he had swallowed 
"fifties," which Callahan understood to mean small bags worth 
approximately fifty dollars of heroin or cocaine, and that he 
did not feel well.  Callahan did not believe that the defendant 
was under the influence of narcotics and thought that he was 
feigning illness, but nonetheless followed established protocol 
and requested medical assistance. 
 
Callahan observed the defendant as he sat on a bench during 
the booking procedure, and noticed that the defendant "sat 
oddly, leaning to one side."  When the defendant told Callahan 
he might vomit, Callahan, accompanied by Revere police Officer 
Joseph Singer, escorted the defendant to a nearby cell with a 
sink and toilet, which was out of sight from other prisoners and 
not clearly visible to booking officers.  As the defendant -- 
who was approximately six feet, two inches tall and weighed 
approximately 275 pounds at the time of the arrest -- walked to 
the holding cell, Callahan observed that he was not walking 
normally.  Even though the defendant was not restrained in 
shackles or handcuffs, his movement was slow, rigid, and tense.  
Callahan saw the defendant "clenching his buttocks area," and 
4 
 
believed that the defendant might have "something secreted in 
his lower half," which Callahan recognized could pose a safety 
risk to the defendant, the police officers, and other prisoners. 
 
Once inside the holding cell, Callahan ordered the 
defendant to remove his clothing.  The defendant removed his 
shirt, pants, and socks, but became argumentative when he was 
asked to remove his underwear.  While still wearing his 
underwear, he continued to clench his buttocks area and 
attempted to shield his backside from the view of Callahan and 
Singer.  Concerned that he was taking a "fighting stance" or 
possibly hiding a weapon, the officers handcuffed one of the 
defendant's arms, and Singer restrained the other arm. 
 
The defendant pulled down the waistband of his underwear 
and told the officers, in substance, "See, I don't have 
anything."  But when he did so, Singer noticed a plastic bag 
protruding from the defendant's buttocks.  He asked the 
defendant to remove the bag and the defendant stated, "I will 
get it for you if you don't charge me."  Singer then ordered the 
defendant to remove the bag, and told the defendant that he 
would remove it himself if the defendant refused to do so.  The 
defendant complied and, with Singer's hand on top of the 
defendant's hand, the defendant pulled down his underwear and 
removed the bag from his buttocks area.  It contained fifteen 
5 
 
individually wrapped bags of cocaine and thirteen individually 
wrapped bags of heroin. 
 
After a grand jury indicted the defendant on charges of 
possession of cocaine and heroin with intent to distribute, as 
subsequent offenses, the defendant moved to suppress the drugs 
that were found in the plastic bag that was removed during the 
strip search.  Following an evidentiary hearing, a Superior 
Court judge denied the motion.  The judge concluded that there 
was probable cause to believe that the defendant was attempting 
to conceal contraband "in a private area of his body," so a 
strip search was "proper."  The judge also concluded that "[t]he 
strip search did not cross over to a cavity search," noting that 
the defendant removed the bag himself after Singer ordered him 
to do so.  A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant on the 
lesser included counts of simple possession of both cocaine and 
heroin.  The defendant timely appealed, challenging the 
lawfulness of the search. 
 
The Appeals Court concluded that the defendant's motion to 
suppress should have been allowed, and vacated the defendant's 
convictions.  Commonwealth v. Jeannis, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 856, 
862-863 (2018).  The court determined that the Commonwealth 
failed to meet its "burden to provide evidence from which the 
judge could find that no portion of the bag was within the 
defendant's rectum."  Id. at 859.  Because the item was 
6 
 
presumptively "seiz[ed] from within a body cavity," id. at 861, 
the court concluded that the heightened constitutional 
requirements to perform a manual body cavity search must apply 
in these circumstances.  Although the court concluded that 
"there was heightened probable cause to believe that the bag 
protruding from the defendant's rectum contained contraband," it 
nonetheless held that the drugs found in the bag should have 
been suppressed because the bag "was seized without a judicial 
warrant in circumstances that do not justify failure to obtain 
one."  Id. at 862.  We granted the Commonwealth's application 
for further appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  We credit the motion judge's subsidiary 
findings of fact, but we review de novo his legal conclusion 
that the strip search of the defendant did not cross the line 
into a manual body cavity search.  See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 
429 Mass. 403, 405 (1999).  See also Commonwealth v. Catanzaro, 
441 Mass. 46, 50 (2004) (appellate courts "independently 
determine the correctness of the [motion] judge's application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found").  To conduct 
that analysis, we must first review the constitutional 
principles that apply to strip searches, visual body cavity 
searches, and manual body cavity searches. 
 
1.  Strip searches, visual body cavity searches, and manual 
body cavity searches.  A strip search occurs when "the last 
7 
 
layer of clothing of a detainee [is] removed," or "when a 
detainee remains partially clothed, but . . . a last layer of 
clothing is moved (and not necessarily removed) in such a manner 
whereby an intimate area of the detainee is viewed, exposed, or 
displayed."  Commonwealth v. Morales, 462 Mass. 334, 342 (2012).  
A visual body cavity search occurs when a strip search "extends 
to a visual inspection of the anal and genital areas."  Thomas, 
429 Mass. at 407 n.4. 
 
"[S]trip or visual body cavity searches, by their very 
nature, are humiliating, demeaning, and terrifying experiences 
that, without question, constitute a substantial intrusion on 
one's personal privacy rights protected under the Fourth 
Amendment and art. 14."  Commonwealth v. Prophete, 443 Mass. 
548, 553 (2005), citing Thomas, 429 Mass. at 408-409 & n.5.  Yet 
we recognize "that such searches are, in some cases, necessary 
to serve legitimate ends of law enforcement."  Prophete, supra. 
 
The same constitutional standards apply to both strip 
searches and visual body cavity searches.  Thomas, 429 Mass. at 
408.  We permit law enforcement officers to conduct such 
intrusive searches only where they have probable cause to 
believe that the defendant had concealed drugs, a weapon, 
contraband, or evidence of a crime on his or her person or 
clothing in a place where it would not be discovered by a 
traditional search of the person -- that is, in a place where 
8 
 
the police reasonably could not expect to discover it without 
exposing or inspecting an intimate area of the defendant's body.  
See Morales, 462 Mass. at 339, quoting Prophete, 443 Mass. at 
554 ("A search of a defendant 'lawfully could progressively 
extend into a strip [or a visual body cavity] search only if 
such a search was justified by probable cause to believe that 
the defendant had concealed [drugs] on his person or his 
clothing that would not otherwise be discovered by the usual 
search incident to arrest'").  See also Commonwealth v. Agogo, 
481 Mass. 633, 637 (2019). 
 
We also require that such a search be "reasonably 
conducted," considering the need for the search, the manner and 
place in which it is conducted, and the scope of the intrusion.  
Morales, 462 Mass. at 342.  See Agogo, 481 Mass. at 638.  "At 
all times the potential harm to a detainee's health and dignity 
should be taken into account in assessing the reasonableness of 
the intrusion."  Morales, supra at 343.  "To preserve the 
privacy of the person being searched to the utmost extent, 
police should conduct strip and visual body cavity searches in 
private rooms whenever possible."  Thomas, 429 Mass. at 409 n.5.  
"In addition, the searches should always be done where no one, 
other than the investigating officer or officers, can see the 
person being searched."  Id. 
9 
 
 
A manual body cavity search occurs where there is touching, 
probing, or manipulation of a body cavity, such as the anal or 
vaginal cavities.  See Commonwealth v. Vick, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 
622, 629 (2016).  See also Thomas, 429 Mass. at 408.  See 
generally Simonitsch, Visual Body Cavity Searches Incident to 
Arrest:  Validity Under the Fourth Amendment, 54 U. Miami L. 
Rev. 665, 668 (2000) ("[M]anual body cavity searches, also known 
as physical body cavity searches, include . . . those performed 
by insertion of, or manipulation with, the fingers, [and] also 
endoscopic examinations, and the use of gynecological devices" 
[footnote omitted]). 
 
Because "[i]t is difficult to imagine a more intrusive, 
humiliating, and demeaning search than the one conducted inside 
[a person's] body," Rodriques, 410 Mass. at 888, and because 
this type of search may pose an inherent threat to a person's 
health and safety, law enforcement officers may conduct such a 
search only where they first obtain a warrant "issued by the 
authority of a judge, on a strong showing of particularized need 
supported by a high degree of probable cause."  Id.  As with any 
other constitutional search, the presence of exigent 
circumstances may excuse the failure to obtain a warrant, but it 
will not excuse the need for a strong showing of particularized 
need supported by a high degree of probable cause.  See Morales, 
462 Mass. at 343-344. 
10 
 
 
2.  Bag protruding from the cleft between the buttocks.  
Where, as here, a strip search reveals that a plastic bag is 
protruding from the cleft between a defendant's buttocks, the 
police must determine whether removal of the bag is part of the 
strip search, which requires probable cause but not a search 
warrant, or constitutes a manual body cavity search, which in 
the absence of exigency requires a search warrant issued by a 
judge.  The Appeals Court concluded that the police in these 
circumstances were required to apply for a search warrant to 
remove the bag because they had failed to ascertain that "no 
portion of the bag was within the defendant's rectum."1  Jeannis, 
93 Mass. App. Ct. at 859. 
 
We agree with the Appeals Court that police officers, if 
they have probable cause, may conduct a visual body cavity 
search to learn more about the precise location of a protruding 
bag and that, if they determine through that visual search that 
the bag is solely within the intergluteal cleft of the 
                                                          
 
 
1 The "anus" is "[t]he very end -- the last inch or so -- of 
the digestive canal, more specifically of the rectum."  1 J.E. 
Schmidt, Attorneys' Dictionary of Medicine and Word Finder, at 
A-273 (1986).  The opening of the anus leads to the groove 
between the buttocks.  Id.  The "rectum" is "[t]he last five or 
six inches of the colon (large intestine, large bowel) . . . 
opening to the outside (in the groove between the buttocks) 
through the anus."  3 J.E. Schmidt, Attorneys' Dictionary of 
Medicine and Word Finder, at R-31 (1988). 
 
11 
 
defendant's buttocks2 and has not entered the anus, they may 
remove the bag based on the same probable cause that justified 
the visual body cavity search.  But we do not agree that a 
search warrant for a manual body cavity search is always 
required to remove a plastic bag where the police did not or 
could not ascertain that the bag is located completely outside 
of the rectum -- that is, where it did not to any degree 
penetrate the anus.  Rather, we conclude that a search is a 
strip or visual body cavity search, not a manual body cavity 
search, where there is "no touching or probing or otherwise 
opening or manipulating of the defendant's anal cavity, and the 
bag of drugs was easily removed without in any way endangering 
the defendant's health or safety."  Vick, 90 Mass. App. Ct. at 
629. 
 
This means that, where police officers are uncertain 
whether the bag has penetrated the defendant's anus, they have 
two alternatives.  First, where they have probable cause to do 
so, they may conduct a visual body cavity search to determine 
whether the bag has penetrated the defendant's anus.  If it has 
                                                          
 
 
2 The "buttocks" are "[t]he fleshy prominences in the back 
of the hips upon which the trunk rests when the body is in a 
sitting posture."  1 J.E. Schmidt, Attorneys' Dictionary of 
Medicine and Word Finder, supra at B-132.  The "intergluteal 
cleft" is the "split, fissure, or crack" in the area between the 
buttocks.  Id. at C-190.  2 J.E. Schmidt, Attorneys' Dictionary 
of Medicine and Word Finder, at I-80 (1988). 
12 
 
not, they may remove the bag without a search warrant.  Second, 
where the bag has penetrated the anus or where the police 
officers have not ascertained through a visual body cavity 
search whether it has, they may determine whether the bag can be 
safely removed without any touching, probing, or manipulation of 
the rectum.  See id.  If it can be safely removed and if there 
is no touching, probing, or manipulation of the rectum, the 
removal of the bag is not a manual body cavity search.  See id.  
However, if the bag cannot be safely removed without any 
touching, probing, or manipulation of the rectum or if there is 
uncertainty whether it can be, the officers must apply for a 
search warrant for a manual body cavity search, unless exigent 
circumstances justify proceeding without a warrant.  See id. at 
628-629. 
 
Pragmatically, a police officer may determine whether the 
bag can be safely removed without any touching, probing, or 
manipulation of the rectum by gently flicking the bag with his 
or her fingers, applying no significant pulling force on the 
bag.  If that suffices to remove the bag without any resistance, 
we do not consider the search to be a manual body cavity search.  
See id. at 625, 629.  A gentle flick to remove a plastic bag 
protruding from the cleft of a defendant's buttocks may in some 
circumstances be safer and less intrusive than a visual body 
cavity search intended to determine whether the bag has 
13 
 
penetrated the defendant's anus.  It is easy to envision a 
defendant resisting an intrusive and embarrassing visual body 
cavity search, risking injury to both the defendant and the 
police officers attempting to restrain the defendant.  And a 
gentle flick may be less intrusive than a visual inspection 
because a police officer attempting to conduct the inspection 
might need to place his or her fingers so close to the anus that 
he or she might come close to a touching or probing that would 
constitute a manual body cavity search. 
 
If there is any resistance to the gentle flick, indicating 
that the bag is in any way lodged or embedded within the body 
cavity, then the police must release the bag and apply for a 
search warrant for a manual body cavity search, unless there are 
exigent circumstances.  We recognize the health risk that may 
arise if a police officer were to continue to pull on the bag 
where there is any resistance.  In United States v. Fowlkes, 804 
F.3d 954, 959-960 (9th Cir. 2015), a police officer continued to 
pull on a bag protruding from the defendant's rectum after 
encountering resistance in what was described as "a difficult, 
abrasive procedure," where the plastic bag "went from a dime 
size . . . to somewhat near a golf ball size as it was taken 
out," and was "covered in blood."  The requirement of a search 
warrant for a manual body cavity search is intended not only to 
ensure that a judge determines whether there is a strong showing 
14 
 
of particularized need supported by a high degree of probable 
cause, Rodriques, 410 Mass. at 888, but also to ensure that any 
such search is conducted in a safe, reasonable manner under 
sanitary conditions by a trained medical professional.  See 
Fowlkes, supra at 967 (warrantless forcible seizure of plastic 
bag protruding from defendant's rectum was unreasonable under 
Fourth Amendment where item of unknown size was removed from 
rectum by nonmedical personnel who "did nothing to assure that 
the removal was safe and performed under sanitary conditions"). 
 
3.  Application of legal principles to removal of plastic 
bag here.  The defendant on appeal argues that the removal of 
the plastic bag that protruded from the cleft of his buttocks 
constituted a manual body cavity search, and that the officers 
failed to obtain the necessary judicial warrant before removing 
the bag.  The Commonwealth, in turn, contends that the strip 
search never became a manual body cavity search and thus did not 
require a warrant.  Because we conclude that the Commonwealth is 
correct, we do not reach the other issue the parties raise -- 
whether exigent circumstances justified an exception to the 
warrant requirement. 
 
The judge's findings indicate only that the plastic bag 
that contained the drugs protruded from the defendant's 
"buttocks"; the judge did not find whether any part of the 
plastic bag was in the defendant's rectum, and the evidence on 
15 
 
that point is not so clear that we can infer that the judge 
implicitly found that the bag did not penetrate into the rectum 
where he concluded that "[t]he strip search did not cross over 
to a cavity search."  Therefore, because the burden rests with 
the Commonwealth on a motion to suppress to justify a 
warrantless search, Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 
57 (1974), and because the Commonwealth did not prove that the 
plastic bag did not to some degree penetrate the defendant's 
anus, we must assume for the sake of this motion that the 
plastic bag did penetrate into the rectum.3  But in contrast to 
what the defendant suggests, our task does not end there.  
Instead, we must determine whether the removal of the bag was 
conducted in a manner permissible for a strip search -- that is, 
whether the removal of the bag met with any resistance that 
suggested that it was lodged or embedded in the victim's rectum. 
                                                          
 
 
3 The parties dispute the relevance of certain medical 
records that were admitted in evidence at (or following) the 
motion to suppress hearing.  These records, produced by the 
ambulatory service that brought the defendant to a hospital from 
the Revere police station, contain a note stating:  "PER REVERE 
[POLICE DEPARTMENT] [PATIENT] HAS BEEN ARRESTED, HAD BEEN FOUND 
TO HAVE BAGS OF TIGHTLY WRAPPED CRACK COCAINE AND HEROIN 
(SEPARATELY) HIDDEN IN HIS RECTUM."  The defendant argues that 
these records confirm that the police knew or believed that the 
bag was located partly within the defendant's rectum.  But as 
discussed supra, with no factual findings to the contrary, we 
must already make that assumption for the purpose of deciding 
this appeal. 
 
16 
 
 
Although the judge's findings on this factual issue are not 
as clear as we would prefer, we see no need to remand the case.  
There is nothing in the judge's findings to suggest that the bag 
required more than minimal force to remove, and we therefore 
conclude that the judge implicitly found that the bag was safely 
removed without any touching, probing, or manipulation of the 
rectum.  The judge found that Singer's hand was on top of the 
defendant's hand while the defendant pulled out the bag, and the 
defendant in his testimony said that "with my free hand I just 
retrieved it."4  The size of the 275 pound defendant compared to 
the small plastic bag at issue -- a photograph of which was 
admitted in evidence -- supported the finding that the bag, 
which was apparently visible outside the intergluteal cleft as 
soon as the defendant pulled down his waistband, did not extend 
so far down as to be lodged or embedded in his rectum.  Although 
we cannot know with certainty on this record whether any part of 
the bag was inside the rectum, the facts as found support the 
conclusion that the bag was not lodged or embedded in the 
defendant's rectum but was easily removed, and therefore the 
defendant's rectum did not need to be "manipulated" in order to 
                                                          
 
 
4 The defendant testified that Singer had put his fingers up 
the defendant's rectum and "probably pulled [the plastic bag] 
out half way" before the defendant removed it himself, but the 
judge did not credit the defendant's testimony regarding 
Singer's conduct. 
 
17 
 
retrieve the bag.  Consequently, a search warrant issued by a 
judge was not required. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, we give no weight to the fact 
that the defendant removed the bag himself, with Singer's hand 
over his.  The defendant pulled out the bag after a direct order 
from Singer to do so; he did not consent to do so voluntarily.  
See Commonwealth v. Carr, 458 Mass. 295, 302 (2010) ("The 
Commonwealth must prove consent unfettered by coercion, express 
or implied, and also something more than mere acquiescence to a 
claim of lawful authority" [quotations and citation omitted]).  
See also George v. Edholm, 752 F.3d 1206, 1215 (9th Cir. 2014) 
("Police officers may not avoid the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment by inducing, coercing, promoting, or encouraging 
private parties to perform searches they would not otherwise 
perform").  Therefore, we assess the lawfulness of the officer's 
conduct as if he alone had pulled out the plastic bag. 
 
Lastly, we recognize that the defendant has identified at 
least two States where appellate courts have ruled that the 
removal of any item protruding from a suspect's rectum was a 
manual body cavity search that required a search warrant.  In 
People v. Hall, 10 N.Y.3d 303, 311, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 938 
(2008), the Court of Appeals of New York concluded that "the 
removal of an object protruding from a body cavity, regardless 
of whether any insertion into the body cavity is necessary . . . 
18 
 
cannot be accomplished without a warrant" unless exigent 
circumstances exist.  In State v. Barnes, 215 Ariz. 279, 281 
(Ct. App. 2007), a panel of the Court of Appeals of Arizona 
declared that "an officer must secure a warrant to remove items 
partially protruding from an arrestee's rectum."  However, when 
one examines the facts of those cases, they are consistent with 
our conclusion that a warrant is required where items are lodged 
or embedded within the rectum, such that the items would require 
manipulation of the rectum to dislodge.  In Hall, supra at 306, 
the police officers "observed a string . . . hanging out of 
defendant's rectum," and, "[b]elieving that the string was 
attached to a package . . . hidden inside defendant's body," one 
officer held the defendant while the other "pulled on the string 
and removed a plastic bag that was found to contain crack 
cocaine."  Similarly, in Barnes, supra at 280-281, the officer 
"grabbed a hold" of "something protruding out of [the 
defendant's] anus," and the court declared that "the officer's 
manipulation and removal of the protruding portion of the bag 
necessarily exerted force on the portion of the bag extending 
into [the defendant's] rectum."  Here, in contrast, where the 
Commonwealth met its burden of showing that the protruding 
plastic bag was not lodged or embedded in the defendant's rectum 
and that its removal did not cause any manipulation of the 
19 
 
rectum, the same constitutional concerns do not arise.  
Accordingly, the motion to suppress was properly denied. 
 
Conclusion.  The order of the Superior Court judge denying 
the defendant's motion to suppress is affirmed.  The judgments 
of conviction are also affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.