Title: Charles Terry Tyson v. The Florida Bar
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC01-2179
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 5, 2002

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC01-2179
____________
CHARLES TERRY TYSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Respondent.
[September 5, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Charles Terry Tyson petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus
commanding The Florida Bar to reopen its investigation into alleged prosecutorial
misconduct by an assistant state attorney for the Fourth Judicial Circuit of Florida. 
Because petitioner cannot demonstrate that the Bar has failed to perform some duty
which he has a clear legal right to have performed, this Court has no jurisdiction to
issue the writ and we therefore dismiss the petition.  See Kobayashi v. Kobayashi,
777 So. 2d 951, 951 (Fla. 2000) (dismissing petition for writ of mandamus based
on the conclusion that “this Court has no jurisdiction to issue the writ” where the
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petition does not demonstrate the requisite failure by a state officer or agent to
perform a particular duty imposed upon it by law that the petitioner has a clear legal
right to have performed).   
Petitioner alleges that he filed a letter complaint with the Bar asserting that the
assistant state attorney engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, in the context of the
criminal prosecution that resulted in petitioner’s current incarceration in the state
prison system, by withholding relevant police reports from the defense, despite
defense requests for these materials during discovery, and by presenting perjured
testimony by a law enforcement witness for the State.  Petitioner indicates that the
Bar opened a disciplinary file following its preliminary review of his complaint.  See
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.3(a) (“Prior to opening a disciplinary file, bar counsel
shall review the inquiry made and determine whether the alleged conduct, if proven,
would constitute a violation of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar warranting the
imposition of discipline.”); R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.3(b) (“If bar counsel decides
to pursue an inquiry, a disciplinary file shall be opened and the inquiry shall be
considered as a complaint, if the form requirement of subdivision (c) is met.”).
Petitioner alleges that, after opening the disciplinary file, the Bar conducted
an independent investigation during which it both interviewed the attorney
appointed by the court to represent petitioner in the context of his criminal
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proceedings, and obtained a response from the assistant state attorney wherein he
denied the allegations made by petitioner.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.3(b)
(“Bar counsel shall investigate the allegations contained in the complaint.”). 
Petitioner asserts that he subsequently received correspondence from bar counsel
indicating that, after having reviewed all of petitioner’s submissions, there appeared
to be no basis for further action on petitioner’s complaint by the Bar and advising
petitioner that the file would therefore be closed.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-
7.3(d) (“Bar counsel may dismiss disciplinary cases if, after complete investigation,
bar counsel determines that the facts show that the respondent did not violate the
Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.”).  This letter from bar counsel, which petitioner
attached as an exhibit to his petition in this Court, sets forth at length the reasons
supporting bar counsel’s determination that no further action was warranted.  See
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.3(d) (“If a disciplinary case is dismissed, the
complainant shall be notified of the dismissal and shall be given the reasons
therefor.”).
Petitioner alleges that he thereafter unsuccessfully sought informal review of
bar counsel’s decision to close the disciplinary file within the hierarchical personnel
1.  Although petitioner initiated this informal review process by filing with the
Bar a document entitled “Board of Govenor [sic] - Notice of Appeal,” he was only
entitled to the informal review procedure employed by the Bar in this case because
he was never a party to the disciplinary proceeding he initiated with his letter
complaint.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.4(i); R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.6(j).
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structure of the Bar.1  Petitioner alleges in his petition that he received
correspondence from bar counsel’s superiors at the Bar, which he attached as
exhibits to his petition in this Court, informing him that the disciplinary file had been
independently reviewed by these individuals and that they concurred with the
decision by bar counsel to close the file and pursue no further action.  At that
point, petitioner initiated these proceedings requesting this Court to independently
review his complaint against the assistant state attorney and issue a writ of
mandamus commanding The Florida Bar to reopen its investigation into the
allegations that this attorney engaged in unethical conduct during the course of
petitioner’s criminal trial.  
“This Court routinely receives inquiries from individuals who are unhappy
with the Bar’s handling of their complaint against an attorney.”  Amendments to the
Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 763 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 2000).  The role of
the complaining witness in a bar disciplinary proceeding, however, is somewhat
analogous to that of the victim in a criminal proceeding and, like crime victims,
complaining witnesses cannot demand that the prosecuting authority file criminal
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charges against a particular individual based on alleged criminal behavior.  See State
v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345, 350 (Fla. 2000) (“[A]bsent a compelling equal
protection argument, the exercise of such prosecutorial discretion is not generally
subject to judicial review.”); see also Bd. of Regents v. Taborsky, 648 So. 2d 748,
754 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (reiterating the well-established principle that crime victims
are not parties to criminal actions and “must channel any requests as victim[s]
through the state attorney's office”).  
As we explained over forty years ago in In re Harper, 84 So. 2d 700, 702
(Fla. 1956), the purpose of an attorney disciplinary proceeding is the protection of
the public, not the vindication of private rights:  “Disciplinary proceedings against
attorneys are instituted in the public interest and to preserve the purity of the courts. 
No private rights except those of the accused attorney are involved.”
Accordingly, petitioner had no clear legal right to have the Bar proceed with
disciplinary charges against the assistant state attorney and therefore is not entitled
to the mandamus relief he seeks.  See Huffman v. State, 813 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla.
2000) (“In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus the petitioner must have a
clear legal right to the requested relief, the respondent must have an indisputable
legal duty to perform the requested action, and the petitioner must have no other
adequate remedy available.”); see also Migliore v. City of Lauderhill, 415 So. 2d 62,
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63 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (“It has long been established that mandamus lies to
compel the performance of a specific imperative ministerial duty.  It is not an
appropriate vehicle for review of a merely erroneous decision nor is it proper to
mandate the doing (or undoing) of a discretionary act.”), approved, 431 So. 2d 986
(Fla. 1983).  Petitioner’s petition for writ of mandamus is therefore dismissed. 
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ.,
and HARDING, Senior Justice, concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding - Mandamus
Charles T. Tyson, pro se, Sanderson, Florida,
for Petitioner
No Appearance,
for Respondent