Title: Ex parte Auburn University, Dr. Jay Gogue and Dr. Gaines Smith. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Brenda M. Allen et al. v. Auburn University et al.)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1070174
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 3, 2008

rel: 10/03/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2008
_________________________
1070174
_________________________
Ex parte Auburn University, Dr. Jay Gogue, and Dr. Gaines
Smith 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Brenda M. Allen et al.
v.
Auburn University et al.)
(Lee Circuit Court, CV-06-69)
BOLIN, Justice.
1070174
While this case was pending below, Dr. Gogue was
1
substituted for Dr. Ed Richardson, the former president of
Auburn University.  See Rule 25(d)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P.
2
Auburn University, its president Dr. Jay Gogue,  and Dr.
1
Gaines Smith (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the
petitioners"), petition this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the Lee Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in
their favor based on sovereign immunity and State-agent
immunity as to the claims asserted against them by Brenda M.
Allen, Austin K. Hagan, Charles C. Mitchell, Jr., James L.
Novak, J. Walter Prevatt, Eugene H. Simpson III, and James O.
Donald 
(hereinafter 
collectively 
referred 
to 
as 
"the
plaintiffs"), all tenured professors employed by Auburn
University ("the University").
Facts and Procedural History
The plaintiffs are faculty members in both the College of
Agriculture and the School of Forestry and Wildlife Sciences.
Before the 1987-1988 academic year, the plaintiffs were
designated as federal Schedule A appointees employed by the
University-affiliated Alabama Cooperative Extension Systems
("ACES") as extension specialists.  ACES delivers research
findings/information 
of 
the 
various 
land-grant 
universities 
to
1070174
3
Alabama's farmers.  As Schedule A appointees, the plaintiffs
were 
eligible 
for 
certain federal benefits, including
participation in the Federal Civil Service Retirement System.
During the 1987-1988 academic year, the University's Board of
Trustees approved a reorganization of the University's
administrative structure.  As part of this reorganization, the
plaintiffs were merged into the College of Agriculture and the
School of Forestry and Wildlife Sciences as faculty members
and were given rank and tenure.  Each plaintiff was given the
title "Extension Specialist & Professor" and was no longer
considered an ACES employee.  However, the plaintiffs, as
Schedule A appointees, remained eligible for federal benefits,
including the participation in the Federal Civil Service
Retirement System.
Before 1997, faculty in the University's College of
Agriculture and School of Forestry and Wildlife Sciences were
hired 
on 
12-month 
appointments. 
 
Under 
the 
12-month
appointments, the faculty members worked for the University
year-round.  Beginning in 1997, the University began hiring
faculty in the University's College of Agriculture and School
of Forestry and Wildlife Sciences on nine-month appointments.
1070174
4
The University also allowed faculty members who had been hired
before 1997 to convert from 12-month appointments to 9-month
appointments.  Chapter 7, § B. 1., of the University's Faculty
Handbook provides: 
"Faculty participation in programs and projects
administered or conducted by the University and
supported by extramural contracts, grants, or other
types of agreements shall be considered a part of
the 
faculty 
member's 
responsibilities 
to 
the
University.  During the time that a faculty member
is under contract to the University, be it on a
nine-month or a 12-month appointment, the individual
is 
expected 
to 
fulfill 
his 
or 
her 
total
responsibilities.  Therefore, if a faculty member is
participating in an extramural program or project
within the University, whether it is in his or her
own or a different department or division of the
University, an appropriate part of the faculty
member's salary shall be provided by the program or
project budget.  Under these circumstances, no
increase in the faculty member's base compensation
shall be permitted."  
The import of this policy is that a faculty member on a nine-
month appointment is free to supplement his or her salary by
pursuing other opportunities, such as research grants through
extramural funding, during the three months of the year that
he or she is not obligated to the University.  A faculty
member on a 12-month appointment is obligated to the
University on a year-round basis and is unable to supplement
his or her base salaries through extramural funding because
1070174
5
participation in externally funded programs during the period
of the faculty member's appointment, whether it be 9 months or
12 months, is considered part of the faculty member's
responsibility to the University and a portion of that faculty
member's salary is already provided for by the externally
funded program.  
When 
a 
faculty 
member 
converts 
from 
a 
12-month
appointment to a 9-month appointment, that faculty member
agrees to a permanent reduction in his or her base salary to
approximately 91% of his or her 12-month salary.  Faculty
members who were converting from 12-month appointments to 9-
month appointments were guaranteed by the University two
summer salaries at 25% of the 9-month base salary until
extramural funding could be obtained.  Once the University had
met its commitment as to the summer salaries, it was the
faculty member's responsibility to obtain extramural funding
to supplement his or her nine-month base salary, and there was
no guarantee that the faculty member could obtain the
extramural funding.
Dr. Smith, the interim director of ACES during the
conversion, contacted 
the United States Department 
of
1070174
6
Agriculture ("the USDA") in June 2002, to inquire as to the
possibility of Schedule A appointees converting from 12-month
appointments to 9-month appointments.  The USDA responded that
Schedule A appointees were not eligible for nine-month
appointments, stating that Schedule A appointees must be
"employed [by the University] under a permanent year round
arrangement with Extension functions being performed at least
50% of the time throughout the entire year."
Section 7220 of the Farm Security and Rural Investment
Act of 2002 terminated all Schedule A appointments on January
31, 2003.  However, the plaintiffs, as former Schedule A
appointees, remained eligible for participation in the Federal
Civil Service Retirement System under the Farm Security and
Rural Investment Act if the plaintiffs remained employed by
the University on a permanent year-round basis with at least
50% of their employment time being devoted to extension
functions.  ACES is required to certify annually to the USDA
that the former Schedule A appointees are meeting the USDA's
requirements in order to maintain their eligibility for the
Federal Civil Service Retirement.  These former Schedule A
appointees were also permitted to begin participating in the
1070174
7
State of Alabama Retirement Systems at a rate of 50% of their
annual salaries.  The vast majority of the University's
faculty, who are not former Schedule A appointees, are not
eligible to participate in the Federal Civil Service
Retirement System.
In April 2005, the plaintiffs expressed to Dr. Smith
their discontent with being denied the opportunity to
participate in the nine-month conversion process afforded the
other faculty members in their departments.  The plaintiffs
had determined that their being denied the opportunity to
participate in the nine-month conversion process had resulted
in their annual compensation levels falling below those of
their colleagues who were not former Schedule A appointees,
who had been allowed to convert to nine-month appointments.
The plaintiffs requested an increase of 13.75% to 21.13% in
their base salary in order, they said, to create equity with
the 
salaries 
of 
their 
colleagues 
who, 
as 
nine-month
appointees, were allowed to enhance their salaries through
extramural sources during the summer months.
Dr. Smith responded to the plaintiffs by letter in June
2005, expressly informing the plaintiffs that conversion from
1070174
8
12-month 
appointments 
to 
nine-month 
appointments 
was
prohibited by the federal regulations of the USDA.  Dr. Smith
also denied the plaintiffs' requested salary increases as
unjustified, explaining:
"There are two additional points to consider.
First, all faculty who have elected to convert their
salaries at 91% or less have opted to have their
base salary reduced permanently.  While summer
salary, whether guaranteed or funded from funds
raised 
by 
the 
faculty 
member, 
increases
compensation, it does not increase the base salary
for these individuals.
"Secondly, after summer funding commitments are
met, then the faculty member is responsible for
raising funds for additional compensation.  There is
a risk for the individual that the funds will not be
available.  By electing to shift to a nine-month
appointment, the individual has assumed the risk.
"Therefore, based on these points relating to
the conversions, the requested increase in base
salary for a continuing 12-month appointment would
place your benefits substantially above others in
the College.  Further, the average salary of your
group making this request is 120% of the southern
region average for Extension specialists.  Hence,
your requested salary adjustments are not approved."
      
Although Dr. Smith denied the plaintiffs' request to increase
their salaries, he did offer the plaintiffs the following
option:
"There is, however, another straightforward
process 
for 
removing 
the 
circumstances 
that
disallows you to be on a nine-month appointment;
1070174
9
that is, your former Schedule A federal appointment
that requires a 12-month appointment can be ended
through retirement or job abolishment.  As the
designated 
administrator 
responsible 
for 
the
management of federal Schedule A appointees, I have
the authority to abolish your current position
making you eligible to receive an immediate federal
retirement annuity and free to negotiate a nine-
month appointment as others in the College of
Agriculture have done.
"For 
those 
eligible, 
the 
same 
can 
be
accomplished through regular retirement.
"Let me know if there is any interest in either
of these options.  We can initiate the process
immediately."
The plaintiffs rejected this option, apparently because they
did not want to forgo their federal benefits. 
In sum, the plaintiffs, as former Schedule A appointees,
are prohibited by federal regulations from converting from 12-
month appointments to 9-month appointments; if they converted
to 9-month appointments, they would lose their eligibility to
participate in the Federal Civil Service Retirement System.
University policy prohibits the plaintiffs, as 12-month
appointees, from supplementing their base salaries through
participation in externally funded programs.    
1070174
See note 1.
2
10
On January 31, 2006, the plaintiffs sued the University;
its president, Dr. Ed Richardson,  in his official capacity;
2
and Dr. Smith, in both his official and individual capacities,
alleging against all the defendants a denial of their equal
protection as established by the Constitution of Alabama of
1901 
and 
age 
discrimination 
under 
the 
Alabama 
Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, § 25-1-20 et seq., Ala. Code
1975.  The petitioners answered the complaint on March 13,
2006, asserting, among other things, that they were immune
from suit based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity and
State-agent immunity and that the complaint failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.
The plaintiffs amended their complaint on August 22,
2006, to assert a fraud claim against the University, the
president of the University (now Dr. Gogue), in his official
capacity, and Dr. Smith, in his official and individual
capacities.  The plaintiffs also alleged that Dr. Smith had
acted beyond the scope of his authority in denying the
plaintiffs' request for increases in their base salaries.  The
petitioners answered the amended complaint on November 8,
1070174
The plaintiffs' motion for a summary judgment and
3
supportive briefs have not been included in the materials
filed in opposition to the petitioner's petition for a writ of
mandamus.
11
2006, again asserting the doctrines of sovereign immunity and
State-agent immunity.  The petitioners also asserted that the
amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.
Both sides moved the trial court for summary judgments
and filed briefs in support of their respective motions.   On
3
September 14, 2007, the trial court entered an order denying
the summary-judgment motions and expressly determining: (1)
that the "issues involving sovereign immunity" would be
decided during the course of the trial and (2) that an issue
of fact existed as to whether Dr. Smith had acted beyond his
authority, which would have removed him from the protection of
State-agent immunity as to the plaintiffs' claims asserted
against him in his individual capacity.  This petition
followed.
Standard of Review
This Court has stated:
"'While the general rule is that the denial of
a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable, the
exception is that the denial of a motion grounded on
1070174
12
a claim of immunity is reviewable by petition for
writ of mandamus.  Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d 794
(Ala. 1996)....
"'Summary judgment is appropriate only when
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
Young v. La Quinta Inns, Inc., 682 So. 2d 402 (Ala.
1996).  A court considering a motion for summary
judgment will view the record in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, Hurst v. Alabama
Power Co., 675 So. 2d 397 (Ala. 1996), Fuqua v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 591 So. 2d 486 (Ala. 1991); will
accord the nonmoving party all reasonable favorable
inferences from the evidence, Fuqua, supra, Aldridge
v. Valley Steel Constr., Inc., 603 So. 2d 981 (Ala.
1992); and will resolve all reasonable doubts
against the moving party, Hurst, supra, Ex parte
Brislin, 719 So. 2d 185 (Ala. 1998).
"'An appellate court reviewing a ruling on a
motion for summary judgment will, de novo, apply
these same standards applicable in the trial court.
Fuqua, supra, Brislin, supra.  Likewise, the
appellate court will consider only that factual
material available of record to the trial court for
its consideration in deciding the motion.  Dynasty
Corp. v. Alpha Resins Corp., 577 So. 2d 1278 (Ala.
1991), Boland v. Fort Rucker Nat'l Bank, 599 So. 2d
595 (Ala. 1992), Rowe v. Isbell, 599 So. 2d 35
(Ala.1992).'"
Ex parte Turner, 840 So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Ex
parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912-13 (Ala. 2000)).  A writ of
mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only when the
petitioner demonstrates: "'(1) a clear legal right to the
order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to
1070174
13
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court.'"  Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541,
543 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d
1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001)).
Discussion
The petitioners argue that the trial court erred in
choosing to address their sovereign-immunity defenses at trial
rather than addressing at the summary-judgment stage of the
litigation. "'One of the purposes of immunity, absolute or
qualified, is to spare a defendant not only unwarranted
liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon
those defending a long drawn out lawsuit.'" Ryan v. Hayes, 831
So. 2d 21, 31 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S.
226, 232 (1991)).  Additionally, this Court has stated: 
"'Where the defendant seeks qualified immunity, a
ruling on that issue should be made early in the
proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial
are avoided where the defense is dispositive.
Qualified immunity is "an entitlement not to stand
trial or face the other burdens of litigation."
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S. Ct.
2806, 86 L. Ed.2d 411 (1985).  The privilege is "an
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to
liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is
effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted
to go to trial."  Ibid.  As a result, "we repeatedly
1070174
14
have stressed the importance of resolving immunity
questions 
at 
the 
earliest 
possible 
stage 
in
litigation." Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227,
112 S. Ct. 534, 116 L. Ed.2d 589 (1991) (per
curiam).'"
Ryan, 831 So. 2d at 31-32 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 199-202 (2001)).
The trial court reasoned that because the parties had
waived the right to a jury trial in this case, in favor of a
bench trial, that a "great deal of costs and expense"
associated with a jury trial would be alleviated.  However, by
delaying until trial its determination of the sovereign-
immunity defenses asserted by the petitioners, the trial court
has effectively denied the petitioners their privilege of not
being subjected to suit and their right to not stand trial and
face the burdens of litigation should their immunity defenses
prove dispositive.  Ryan, supra.  Accordingly, we conclude
that the trial court erred in failing to address the
sovereign-immunity defenses at the summary-judgment stage of
the litigation.
The petitioners next argue that the trial court erred in
finding that a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether Dr.
Smith had acted fraudulently or beyond his authority thereby
1070174
The plaintiffs do not include in the argument section of
4
their brief a description of how Dr. Smith acted fraudulently
or beyond the scope of his authority so as to remove him from
the protection afforded him by State-agent immunity.  Instead,
they simply refer to Dr. Smith's conduct as "acting under a
mistaken interpretation of the law" with almost no development
of this argument.  Therefore, it could be assumed that the
plaintiffs have abandoned their contentions on appeal as they
relate to Dr. Smith's claim of State-agent immunity. However,
because the trial court found that a genuine issue of material
fact existed as to whether Dr. Smith had acted fraudulently
and/or beyond his authority and, therefore, whether he was
entitled to State-agent immunity, we will address the issue
whether Dr. Smith was entitled to State-agent immunity. 
15
removing him from the protection of State-agent immunity.  
4
In Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000), a
plurality of this Court restated the test for determining when
a State employee is entitled to State-agent immunity:
"A State agent shall be immune from civil
liability in his or her personal capacity when the
conduct made the basis of the claim against the
agent is based upon the agent's
"(1) formulating 
plans, 
policies, 
or 
designs; 
or
"(2) exercising his or her judgment in the
administration 
of 
a 
department 
or 
agency 
of
government, including, but not limited to, examples
such as:
"(a) 
making 
administrative
adjudications;
"(b) allocating resources;
"(c) negotiating contracts;
1070174
16
"(d) hiring, firing, transferring,
assigning, or supervising personnel; or
"(3) discharging duties imposed on a department
or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar
as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the
manner for performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner; or
"(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of
the criminal laws of the State, including, but not
limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons; or
"(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of
duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in
releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons
of unsound mind, or educating students.
"Notwithstanding 
anything 
to 
the 
contrary 
in 
the
foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall
not be immune from civil liability in his or her
personal capacity
"(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws,
rules, or regulations of this State enacted or
promulgated for the purpose of regulating the
activities 
of 
a 
governmental 
agency 
require
otherwise; or
"(2) when the State agent acts willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his
or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation
of the law."
792 So. 2d at 405.  Although Cranman was a plurality decision,
the restatement of law as it pertains to State-agent immunity
set forth in Cranman was subsequently adopted by this Court's
1070174
17
decisions in Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911 (Ala. 2000), and Ex
parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173 (Ala. 2000).
Additionally, this Court has stated:
"This Court has established a 'burden-shifting'
process 
when 
a 
party 
raises 
the 
defense 
of
State-agent immunity.  Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So.
2d 1046, 1052 (Ala. 2003).  In order to claim
State-agent immunity, a State agent bears the burden
of demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims arise
from a function that would entitle the State agent
to immunity.  Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at 1052; Ex
parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 709 (Ala. 2002).  If the
State agent makes such a showing, the burden then
shifts to the plaintiff to show that the State agent
acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad
faith, or beyond his or her authority.  Giambrone,
874 So. 2d at 1052; Wood, 852 So. 2d at 709; Ex
parte Davis, 721 So. 2d 685, 689 (Ala. 1998). 'A
State agent acts beyond authority and is therefore
not immune when he or she "fail[s] to discharge
duties pursuant to detailed rules or regulations,
such as those stated on a checklist."'  Giambrone,
874 So. 2d at 1052 (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So.
2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000))."
Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006).
Dr. Smith, as the interim director of ACES during the
period 
faculty 
members 
were 
converting 
from 
12-month
appointments to 9-month appointments, exercised his judgment
in the administration of that agency, thereby establishing
that he was engaged in a function that would entitle him to
State-agent immunity.  Ex parte Cranman, supra.  Therefore,
1070174
In June 2005, Dr. Smith responded by letter to the
5
plaintiffs' request for an increase in their base salaries
allegedly to create equity with the nine-month appointees.  In
that letter Dr. Smith simply stated that federal policy
prohibited the plaintiffs from converting from 12-month
appointments to 9-month appointments and still remain eligible
for their Federal Civil Service Retirement.  He did not state
that 
federal 
policy 
prohibited 
the 
plaintiffs 
from
18
the burden then shifted to the plaintiffs to show that  that
Dr. Smith acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad
faith, or beyond his authority in order to remove Dr. Smith
from the protection of State-agent immunity.  Ex parte Estate
of Reynolds, supra.
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that Dr. Smith
fraudulently represented to them that federal regulations
prohibited the plaintiffs, as former Schedule A appointees,
from supplementing their base salaries with externally funded
programs when, in fact, it was University policy, not federal
regulations, 
that 
prohibited 
the 
plaintiffs 
from 
supplementing
their salaries as 12-month appointees.  Assuming that Dr.
Smith did misrepresent to the plaintiffs that federal policy
prevented 
them 
from 
supplementing 
their 
salaries, 
we
nevertheless conclude that Dr. Smith's conduct did not fall
within the willful, malicious, and fraudulent exception to
State-agent 
immunity.  
 
 
The 
plaintiff in Segrest v. Lewis,
5
1070174
supplementing their 12-month salaries through externally
funded programs.  Dr. Smith later testified in his deposition
and affidavit that it was the University's policy that
prohibited the plaintiffs from enhancing their 12-month
salaries with externally funded programs.
19
907 So. 2d 452 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005), was employed with the
Retirement Systems of Alabama ("the RSA") as an administrative
support assistant I.  During her probationary period, the
plaintiff interviewed for a similar position with the State
Board of Pardons and Paroles ("the Parole Board").  On March
18, 2002, the Parole Board decided to employ the plaintiff.
On March 20, 2002, William Segrest, then the executive
director of the Parole Board, sent the plaintiff a letter
informing her that she had been approved for employment with
the Parole Board and that she was to report to work on April
8, 2002, to begin her employment.  However, the State
Personnel Department did not approve the plaintiff's transfer
from the RSA to the Parole Board.
In reliance upon the letter from Segrest, the plaintiff,
on March 22, 2002, sent a letter to the RSA stating that she
would be leaving the RSA on April 5, 2002, to assume a
position with the the Parole Board.  However, because the
State Personnel Department had not approved the plaintiff's
1070174
20
transfer to the Parole Board, she  requested that she be
allowed to retract her resignation from her employment with
the RSA.  The RSA informed the plaintiff on April 2, 2002,
that her request to retract her resignation could not be
approved because her resignation had been accepted and a
"Certification of Candidates" had been issued to fill her
position.  Segrest, supra.  
On May 3, 2002, the plaintiff sued Segrest, among others,
seeking to enforce Segrest's "commitment to employ" her.  She
also alleged fraudulent misrepresentation and sought backpay
and benefits.  On December 5, 2003, the trial court entered a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and Segrest appealed.
Segrest, supra.
The plaintiff argued on appeal that Segrest's conduct in
communicating the decision to employ her fell within the
exception to State-agent immunity that applies when a State
agent "acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad
faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken
interpretation of the law."  Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d at
405.  In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court
of Civil Appeals determined that the facts of the case were
1070174
21
such that Segrest was protected from liability by the doctrine
of State-agent immunity.  The court stated:
"We do not read this provision from Ex parte
Cranman[, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000),] and Ex parte
Butts[, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000)], nor do we
read any of the progeny of those cases, as holding
that an innocent misrepresentation by a state agent
falls outside the protection that for so long has
been provided by our law to state officials and
employees while acting within reason and in good
faith in the discharge of their responsibilities to
the public. If something more were not required in
order for conduct to fall within the exception
relied upon by [the plaintiff], that exception would
'swallow' the whole of the general rule of immunity
itself.  Any misrepresentation is beyond the
authority of a state agent.  Indeed, any misstep by
any state employee or other state agent that wrongs
another can be said to be beyond his or her
authority 
and/or 
committed 
under 
a 
mistaken
interpretation of the law. Construing the exception
at issue in the manner urged by [the plaintiff]
would mean that missteps by a state agent, no matter
how innocently or reasonably taken, would in every
case pull the agent out from under the umbrella of
state-agent immunity provided by Ex parte Cranman
and Ex parte Butts and supported by the results
reached in decades of decisions that preceded those
cases.  See Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d
201, 206 (Ala. 2003) (Cranman is a 'restatement of
the law of immunity, not a statute'). Our conclusion
in this regard is supported by the fact that the
word 
'fraudulently' 
appears 
in 
the 
exception
articulated in Ex parte Cranman and Ex parte Butts
sandwiched 
between 
the 
terms 
'willfully,
maliciously,' and 'in bad faith. Cf. King v. St.
Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221, 112 S. Ct. 570,
116 L. Ed.2d 578 (1991) (quoting NLRB v. Federbush
Co., 121 F. 2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941)) ('"Words are
not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only
1070174
22
a communal existence; and not only does the meaning
of each interpenetrate the other, but all in their
aggregate take their purport from the setting in
which they are used...."').
"Our 
conclusion 
in 
this 
regard 
also 
is
consistent with the manner in which our appellate
courts have applied the principles of immunity to
state agents both before and after Ex parte Cranman
and Ex parte Butts.  Compare, e.g., Byrd v. Lamar,
846 So. 2d 334 (Ala. 2002) (holding that acts of
promissory fraud--which require proof that the
defendants intended not to perform promised acts--
were 
not 
protected 
by 
state-agent 
immunity);
Tuscaloosa County v. Henderson, 699 So. 2d 1274,
1277 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (holding that state-agent
immunity was not available to a county employee who
sued the plaintiff and had him arrested for
operating without a business license because the
evidence showed that, in so doing, the defendant
acted with 'malice, willfullness, or ... so beyond
his authority that sovereign immunity would not
apply' (footnote omitted)); Ex parte Tuscaloosa
County, 796 So. 2d 1100, 1106-07 (Ala. 2000)
(holding that a state agent was entitled to immunity
notwithstanding the fact that there was sufficient
evidence for a jury to return a verdict for
malicious prosecution, because malice for purposes
of malicious prosecution can be based upon a lack of
probable cause but such 'malice in law' is not
enough to satisfy the Ex parte Cranman exception for
acts 
committed 
'willfully, 
maliciously,
fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her
authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the
law'); Bayles v. Marriott, 816 So. 2d 38 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2001)."
Segrest, 907 So. 2d at 456-57.
In this case, Dr. Smith allegedly represented to the
plaintiffs that federal regulations prohibited the plaintiffs
1070174
23
from supplementing their 12-month salaries with externally
funded programs, when in fact it was actually University
policy that prohibited the plaintiffs from supplementing their
salaries.  Like the State agent in Segrest, Dr. Smith did no
more than misspeak when he allegedly communicated to the
plaintiffs that federal regulations prohibited them from
supplementing their 12-month salaries.  In fact, both the
federal regulations and University policy acted together to
prevent the plaintiffs from supplementing their salaries with
externally funded programs.  University policy prohibits 12-
month appointees from supplementing their salaries, while the
federal regulations prohibit the plaintiffs, as Schedule A
appointees, from converting to nine-month appointments so as
to be allowed to supplement their salaries.  Dr. Smith simply
miscommunicated 
to 
the 
plaintiffs 
the 
source 
of 
the
prohibition against their supplementing their salaries.  He
did not miscommunicate to the plaintiffs that they were
prohibited from supplementing their salaries.  Nothing in the
record before this Court indicates that Dr. Smith acted
"willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, or in bad faith" so as
1070174
24
to remove him from the umbrella of protection afforded him by
State-agent immunity.
Although not entirely clear, it appears that the
plaintiffs argued that Dr. Smith had acted beyond his
authority in his June 2005 letter by offering, even though he
allegedly lacked the authority to do so, to abolish "[their]
current position making [the plaintiffs] eligible to receive
an immediate federal retirement annuity and free to negotiate
a nine-month appointment."  The plaintiffs submitted the
affidavit of Dr. James L. Smith, the former associate director
for human resources for ACES, who testified that the
plaintiffs were not ACES employees and that ACES had no
authority over them.  
The plaintiffs' contention that Dr. Smith acted beyond
his authority in stating that he had the authority to abolish
their positions fails for the same reasons that their
contention that he acted fraudulently in communicating to them
that 
federal 
regulations, 
and 
not 
University 
policy,
prohibited them from supplementing their salaries.  Assuming
Dr. Smith did not have the actual authority to abolish the
plaintiffs' positions, thus making them eligible to negotiate
1070174
25
nine-month appointments, nothing in the record indicates that
the plaintiffs' positions could not in fact be abolished by
the person with the actual authority to do so, thereby making
the plaintiffs eligible to negotiate nine-month appointments.
In other words, Dr. Smith may have miscommunicated to the
plaintiffs as to who actually had the authority to abolish
their positions, but he did not miscommunicate when he stated
that their positions could be abolished, thus making them
eligible for nine-month appointments.  Further, Dr. Smith also
correctly informed the plaintiffs that they could become
eligible for 9-month appointments if they simply resigned
their 12-month positions.  The plaintiffs offer nothing in
contradiction to this representation by Dr. Smith.  Nothing in
the record indicates that Dr. Smith was acting in bad faith
when he miscommunicated to the plaintiffs that he had the
authority to abolish their positions in order to make them
eligible to negotiate nine-month appointments.
Accordingly, we conclude that Dr. Smith is entitled to
State-agent immunity as to the claims asserted against him in
his individual capacity by the plaintiffs in their amended
complaint.
1070174
26
We grant the petition for a writ of mandamus and direct
the trial court to address the petitioners' sovereign-immunity
claims and to enter a summary judgment in favor of Dr. Smith
as to the claims asserted against him in his individual
capacity in the plaintiffs' amended complaint.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED. 
Cobb, C.J., and See, Stuart, Smith, Parker, and Murdock,
JJ., concur.
Lyons, J., concurs in the result.
1070174
27
LYONS, Justice (concurring in the result).  
The complaint, as initially filed, contained two counts.
Count one sought to enjoin the defendants from discriminating
against the plaintiffs on the basis of age, as well as
backpay, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees, pursuant to
§ 25-1-22, Ala. Code 1975.  Count two sought damages for a
denial of equal protection under the Alabama Constitution of
1901.  An amended complaint added count three, seeking damages
for intentional and willful misrepresentation of material
facts and bad faith, and count four, seeking damages for
action by Dr. Gaines Smith allegedly in excess of his
authority.  
The defendants moved for a summary judgment based upon 1)
sovereign immunity, 2) the unavailability of relief against
the State officials in their individual capacities on the age-
discrimination claim because neither individual is the
employer of the plaintiffs, 3) the absence of any provision
for equal protection of the laws under the Alabama
Constitution of 1901, and 4) failure of the fraud and bad-
faith count (count three) to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.  After receiving briefs and hearing arguments,
1070174
28
the trial court entered what is best described as an oblique
order that, among other things, stated:  "[T]he remaining
issue before the Court was whether or not Dr. Gaines Smith
should be granted immunity."   The trial court concluded that
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dr.
Smith had acted beyond his authority, justifying imposing
individual liability under the exception recognized in Ex
parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000), for conduct beyond
a State agent's authority.  Specifically, the trial court
concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether Dr. Smith "exceeded his authority by misstating his
actual authority."  The trial court found that "the
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is due to be denied on
this ground."  (Emphasis added.)  The trial court then
concluded:  "In our case at bar, the issue of sovereign
immunity does not need to be addressed prior to further
litigation, and the case may go forward with a discussion of
the issue of immunity during the course of the bench trial."
In conclusion, the trial court stated:  "[S]ince all issues
will be heard in a bench trial, making a determination as to
sovereign immunity can best be decided by hearing all of the
1070174
29
testimony regarding the subject instead of bifurcating the
issues."  (Emphasis added.)  
The trial court did not specifically refer to the
necessity of further proceedings with respect to the merits of
the age-discrimination claim, the equal-protection claim, or
the fraud and bad-faith count.  The propriety of summary
judgment as to the merits of those claims or, indeed, whether
the trial court indirectly disposed of them by failing to
refer to them, is not before us on this proceeding, which is
limited solely to the availability of the defense of immunity.
Evidence as to the personal liability of Dr. Smith by
reason of his action in excess of his authority is the sole
basis for the trial court's recognition of the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact as to the availability to Dr.
Smith of the defense of State-agent immunity.  Only count four
of the amended complaint refers to action in excess of
authority.  However, the trial court's reference to Dr.
Smith's "misstating his actual authority" could also be
relevant to count three of the complaint, charging fraud and
bad faith.  Thus, the trial court's order can be said to sweep
in favor of triable issues as to the availability of State-
1070174
30
agent immunity as to both counts three and four.  Whether the
trial court's order should also be correctly interpreted as
recognizing or rejecting triable issues as to immunity with
respect to counts one (age discrimination) and two (equal
protection) simply cannot be determined at this juncture.  I
am not willing to address an issue that mere speculation might
suggest is properly before us.  Thus, the sole issue before
this Court at this stage of the proceeding coming to us by a
petition for a writ of mandamus seeking enforcement of the
defense of immunity is whether the trial court erred in not
entering a summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to
counts three and four of the amended complaint.
The controversy centers around Dr. Smith's having
described his authority in a letter to the plaintiffs in terms
that erroneously attributed to him greater authority than he
in fact possessed.  We recognize an exception to State-agent
immunity "when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously,
fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or
under a mistaken interpretation of the law."  See Ex parte
Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405.  The plaintiffs argue before us
that they are entitled to the exception from immunity
1070174
31
described as "a mistaken interpretation of the law."
Respondents' brief, p. 14.  However, count four of the
complaint does not allege a mistaken interpretation of the
law; instead, as previously noted, it charges that Dr. Smith
acted beyond his authority.  Confining review to that issue,
in Finnell v. Pitts, 222 Ala. 290, 293, 132 So. 2, 4 (1930),
this Court stated:  "If in the promotion of the state's
business its officers without authority of law apply private
property to the state's enterprises, they are guilty of the
same nature of wrong, as if they were acting as agents of a
private corporation."  We lose the sense of the exception if
we take it beyond the context of intentional conduct, such as
the taking of property as was the case in Pitts, one of the
early cases in which it was recognized.  See also Elmore v.
Fields, 153 Ala. 345, 351, 45 So. 66, 67 (1907) ("Here, we
have an agent charged with a tort [trespass], setting up by
plea that he was acting for and in behalf of the state, and
the authorities hold that he has no authority to act for the
state in the commission of a tort.").  The foundation of the
trial court's denial of immunity--the inaccurate description
of Dr. Smith's authority--does not in and of itself constitute
1070174
32
a freestanding intentional tort to which the exception from
immunity based on action beyond a State agent's authority can
apply.  
With respect to the allegation of fraud in count three of
the amended complaint, I agree with the conclusion in the main
opinion that an innocent misrepresentation does not fall
within an exception to State-agent immunity.  Therefore, the
petition for a writ of mandamus can be denied if a question of
fact exists as to whether Dr. Smith acted willfully in
misstating his authority.  The petitioners (the defendants in
the trial court) did not provide a complete record of the
responses filed by the plaintiffs in opposition to their
summary-judgment motion.  In Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge,
Inc., 904 So. 2d 226, 232 n.2 (Ala. 2004), this Court
explained the role of the parties in assembling a record in a
mandamus proceeding:
"The materials reviewed by this Court in
considering a petition for writ of mandamus consist
of exhibits provided by the parties: 
"'[A] petitioner for a writ of mandamus is
obliged to provide with the petition
"copies of any order or opinion or parts of
the record that would be essential to an
understanding of the matters set forth in
the petition."  Rule 21(a), Ala. R. App. P.
1070174
33
In the event the petition is not denied,
the respondent is directed to file an
answer to the petition, which provides the
respondent 
with 
an 
"opportunity 
to
supplement 
the 
'record' 
by 
attaching
exhibits of its own...."'
"Ex parte Fontaine Trailer Co., 854 So. 2d 71, 74
(Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte Miltope Corp., 522 So.
2d 272, 273 (Ala. 1988))."
In their answer to the petition the plaintiffs attach numerous
affidavits and documents as exhibits, but they fail to attach
any responses to the summary-judgment motion.  Of course, such
responses do exist, as some of the materials attached to the
petition respond to them.  The plaintiffs do not argue in
their brief in opposition to the petition that there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to a state of mind
consistent with intentional misrepresentations on the part of
Dr. Smith.  Nothing in the trial court's order suggests the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to Dr.
Smith's state of mind.  
I would grant the petition and order the trial court to
hold 
further 
proceedings, 
before 
holding 
any 
bench 
trial, 
with
respect to the defendants' motion for a summary judgment, with
such proceedings to culminate in an order either entering or
denying a summary judgment as to each count of the complaint
1070174
34
and with such further proceedings to be governed by the
conclusions expressed herein with respect to the absence of
any impediment to State-agent immunity arising from Dr.
Smith's having exceeded his authority or misstated his
authority.