Title: Marie v. State
Citation: 319 S.W.2d 86
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: December 12, 1958

319 S.W.2d 86 (1958) Murel (Merle) Mitchell MARIE and Rue Marie, v. STATE of Tennessee. Supreme Court of Tennessee. December 12, 1958. *87 Hugh C. Simpson, Knoxville, for plaintiffs in error. Thomas E. Fox, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State. NEIL, Chief Justice. This is an appeal from the criminal court of Knox County by Murel (Merle) Mitchell Marie and Rue Marie, hereinafter called the defendants, from a conviction of the crime of possessing intoxicating liquors. They were sentenced to serve 5 months and 29 days in the county workhouse and were fined $200 also. The assignments of error are, as follows: The evidence in the case is correctly stated on the brief of the Assistant Attorney General, as follows: We have carefully read the statement of facts as appears in the brief of defendants' counsel. It differs very little, if any, from that which we have quoted from the State's brief. In fact, we do not understand that any factual issue is in serious dispute. The sole question to be determined is whether or not the conviction of these defendants can be sustained upon the presumption of law that they were the owners and the possessors of the whiskey discovered in the basement of the Dunbar Hotel. Counsel for the defendants has cited the case of Tinsley v. State, unreported, as being applicable to the case at bar and justifies a reversal. It is true in the Tinsley case that the evidence failed to show that the defendant had any knowledge of whiskey being kept or sold in the hotel, and furthermore that Tinsley had the whiskey in his possession and he alone was responsible for it. The State relies upon Lampley v. State, 196 Tenn. 534, 268 S.W.2d 572, and insists that the facts in the instant case bring it within the holding of the Court in the Lampley case. But with all deference to the State's counsel, we must disagree. The legal presumption of law which is deemed sufficient to convict a defendant of possessing intoxicating liquor arises from the fact that there is no evidence on the part of the defendant to overcome or rebut this presumption. In Lampley v. State, supra, it appears that members of the Highway Patrol procured a warrant to search a building in Henry County referred to as "The Barn", which was being used as a beer tavern. The search resulted in the discovery of a considerable quantity of intoxicating liquor. The owner of the premises was not present, and according to the opinion in this case, there was a complete lack of evidence as to the ownership of the liquor so found. In discussing the presumption of law and the lack of evidence to overcome it, Mr. Justice Burnett had this to say: The foregoing is in line with the general trend of authority, thus in 31 C.J.S. Evidence § 117, p. 731, it is said: "A presumption of law is an inference which, in the absence of direct evidence on the subject, the law requires to be drawn from the existence of certain established facts." In Siler v. Siler, 152 Tenn. 379, 277 S.W. 886, 887, it is said (Mr. Justice McKinney speaking for the Court), "A presumption is a substitute for evidence"; also in H.G. Hill Co. v. Squires, 25 Tenn. App. 164, 153 S.W.2d 425, 427, it is said: "A legal presumption is a fiction of the law and is an assumption for convenience, but where proof to the contrary is introduced, the assumption is waived for it is no longer logical to assume a fact which is refuted by positive testimony." It is said in 31 C.J.S. Evidence, supra, at § 119: "* * * a presumption cannot in itself possess probative weight, but merely necessitates evidence to meet the prima facie case which it creates", citing numerous authorities in the footnotes. (Emphasis ours.) In the instant case there is evidence on the part of the defendants in contradiction of the State's proof that the whiskey in question was possessed and owned by them. The learned trial judge ruled during the trial of this case that evidence of prior convictions and proceedings to close the hotel as a nuisance was not to be considered by the jury for any purpose, the case being submitted to the jury solely on the legal presumption and the evidence in contradiction thereof. This is a circumstantial evidence case and the rule is well settled that the evidence must be consistent with the guilt of the defendants and inconsistent with their innocence, and sufficiently strong to overcome every other reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. It may be true, although we do not express an opinion at this time, that it is a question for the jury to determine whether or not the evidence offered by the defendants is sufficient to overcome the legal presumption against them. While we have the legal presumption against them, we also are mindful of the fact that in the trial court there was a presumption of innocence, and this presumption stands as a witness for them and until it is overcome by competent and credible evidence of such probative value as to establish their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Considering the probative value and effect of the legal presumptions of guilt as against the presumption of innocence, we agree with the following authoritative statement: "So, though the decisions are not harmonious, the better and more reasonable view is that the law will not countenance any presumption, which by over-coming the presumption of innocence will cast the burden of proving his innocence upon the defendant." Underhill's Criminal Evidence, Fifth Edition, Section 43, p. 66. Running through all our decisions there is a constant repetition of the generally accepted rule that proof of possessing intoxicating liquors, as in the case at bar, constitutes prima facie evidence of guilt, and is sufficient only when there is no reliable and credible evidence offered in rebuttal. Lampley v. State, supra. A vast array of decisions are cited in support of the view that a mere legal presumption "is not evidence." It cannot be doubted that under certain circumstances a legal presumption of guilt "vanishes" or "disappears", so to speak, resulting from credible proof in rebuttal of such a presumption. On the contrary it may prevail where the defendant fails to testify in rebuttal, or when his testimony is unbelievable. In no case is the jury privileged to arbitrarily disregard the testimony of any witness. Our courts have held that "a legal presumption is a fiction of the law", and "an inference arising from proven circumstances is of a higher character of evidence than a legal presumption and the inference is not destroyed by contradictive testimony." H. G. Hill Co. v. Squires, 25 Tenn. App. 164, 153 S.W.2d 425, 427. See also Frank v. Wright, 140 Tenn. 535, 205 S.W. 434. We think the learned trial judge was in error in overruling the defendants' motion for a new trial. He apparently was under the erroneous impression that the case was controlled by Lampley v. State, supra. Upon this issue we respectfully disagree. The assignments of error are sustained, and the case is reversed and remanded.