Title: In Re Sanborn
Citation: 208 Kan. 4, 490 P.2d 598
Docket Number: 45,703, 45,704, 45,708, 45,712, 45,713
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: November 6, 1971

208 Kan. 4 (1971)
490 P.2d 598
In re KEITH SANBORN
(STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
Vernon S. Pierce, et al., Defendants; KEITH SANBORN, Respondent in Contempt Proceedings, Appellant.)
Nos. 45,703, 45,704, 45,708, 45,712, 45,713  Consolidated

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed November 6, 1971.
R.K. Hollingsworth, deputy county attorney argued the cause, and Vern Miller, attorney general, and Keith Sanborn, county attorney, were with him on the brief for the appellant.
Everett C. Fettis, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARMAN, C.:
Appellant Keith Sanborn, county attorney of Sedgwick county, seeks annulment of seven convictions of direct contempt of court entered against him by the Sedgwick county district court upon each of which he was sentenced to pay a fine of $25.00.
*5 The conduct found contemptuous occurred while appellant was acting as attorney for the prosecution in the jury trial of nine defendants charged with varying felonies whose convictions comprise the appeal in State v. Pierce, et al., 208 Kan. 19, 490 P.2d 584.
The principal trial in district court commenced March 24, 1969. The defendants were represented by Mr. Chester I. Lewis and Mr. Charles Scott. On the morning of April 8, 1969, the following proceedings occurred in the absence of the jury:
Later on the same day, after the taking of certain testimony, the following occurred:
"THE COURT: No, I can't.
The following day, April 9, this occurred:
"THE COURT: Yes.
"THE COURT: I agree.
Later the same day the first adjudication of contempt occurred during the direct examination by appellant of a woman testifying for the prosecution. The record reflects the witness had previously given a written statement to an investigating officer concerning her knowledge of the case, to which appellant referred in the course of his examination in an effort to refresh her recollection as to the testimony desired. Counsel for defendants interposed an objection unless they were permitted to examine the document, with which position the court generally agreed. The record then reveals the following:
"THE COURT: You may read it.
"Q. Is that what you told the officer?
"A. Not really. It still doesn't cause I 
"A. Yes, I did.
"MR. LEWIS: I object.
"THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer.
"MR. LEWIS: I object.
"THE COURT: Overruled.
"MR. SANBORN: And what else did you tell him?
"A. Can I read it?
"MR. LEWIS: I object to what else.
"THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead, you may read it.
"THE COURT: All right.
"MR. LEWIS: I move to introduce it into evidence.
"THE COURT: Tab the machine, please.
"A. Now what am I supposed to do?"
Later the same day, out of the presence of the jury, as to this incident the court stated:
The second instance of contempt occurred April 10, 1969, during *9 the cross-examination by defendants' counsel of the custodian of records of Wichita State University, who had been offered as a prosecution witness and had testified concerning the attendance record of a certain person (not a defendant) at the university. This particular record had been identified and received in evidence as an exhibit. We are told the witness also had before him a folder containing other records pertaining to three of the defendants to which the witness had not testified or referred; that counsel for defendants opened the folder and removed these papers. Further events are depicted in the record as follows:
"Cross-Examination by Mr. Lewis
"MR. LEWIS: May I get these back, please?
"THE COURT: The audience is to remain quiet.
"THE COURT: No, sir, you may not...."
The following transpired later:
The third instance of contempt occurred April 16, 1969, during appellant's cross-examination of one of the defendants, John H. Manning, thus:
"Q. Well, you saw him get hit, didn't you?
"A. Mr. Sanborn, if you 
"Q. Your Honor, I request that 
"A. Now, wait a minute.
"THE COURT: I don't remember the question.
"MR. SANBORN: Yes.
"A. No.
"Q. He said that to you? Is that it?
"Q. Neither one?
"A. That wasn't said.
"A. I don't know.
"Q. Tell the jury if you said that.
"MR. LEWIS: Your Honor, I object 
"THE COURT: I want you to tab the machine."
After assessing the fine for this contempt the trial court made the following statement:
The fourth act held contemptuous took place April 18, 1969, during appellant's cross-examination of another defendant, Fred M. Johnson, as shown by the following:
"A. None presently.
"A. Can I answer the last question?
"A. Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Ask your next question, Mr. Sanborn.
Thereafter, as to this the court stated:
The fifth act of contempt occurred also April 18, 1969, during appellant's further cross-examination of defendant Johnson reflected in the following:
"A. No, that's not true.
"A. That's true.
"A. No, it was not.
*13 "A. Yes, it is.
"A. When is it dated, Mr. Sanborn?
"Q. November 21, 1967.
"A. I probably had a chance to peruse it, yes.
"A. I would say yes. Yes.
"A. Yes.
As to this act of contempt the court stated:
The sixth act occurred April 21, again during appellant's cross-examination of defendant Johnson, as follows:
The last act of contempt likewise occurred April 21 during appellant's cross-examination of defendant Johnson, as shown by the following:
"A. No, I instructed LaVert to call.
In making its rulings on the last two contempts the trial court stated:
Appellant raises no procedural challenge to his convictions but makes multiple substantive attacks upon them. He says the order he is charged with violating was not clear and unambiguous, as it must be before he can be held in contempt. He contends it was unlawful, being in derogation of his duty as an advocate prosecuting his case in compliance with K.S.A. 60-404 and 60-405. Finally, he asserts his conduct was not disrespectful or contemptuous to the court, nor such as to interrupt or interfere with its proceedings or with the administration of justice. It is upon these latter grounds we broadly rely for reversal.
By statute a direct appeal from a contempt conviction is provided wherein this court may affirm, reverse or modify the judgment as justice may require (K.S.A. 20-1205). Upon such review this court has authority to examine the language or acts found to be contemptuous and determine whether they are sufficient to constitute contempt (In re Gambrell, 160 Kan. 620, 164 P.2d 122). Appellant was adjudged guilty of that which is classified as direct criminal contempt. Generally criminal contempt is conduct directed against the dignity and authority of a court or a judge acting judicially, with punitive judgment to be imposed in vindication; *15 its essence is that the conduct obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice (17 C.J.S., Contempt, §§ 5[1], 8b.). This court defined it long ago in In re Dill, Petitioner, 32 Kan. 668, 5 Pac. 39, thus:
See, also, Smith v. Clothier, 113 Kan. 47, 213 Pac. 1071.
In making its seven findings of contempt the trial court uniformly ruled appellant had violated the April 8 order of the court. We cannot concur in this conclusion. Analyzing briefly, without detailed repetition, the events in question, we find in the first incident appellant was found guilty because he made "voluntary statements" after an objection. Here there had been considerable colloquy between the court and counsel for defendants, and the matter of the witness reading her pretrial statement had become somewhat ambiguous  did the witness intend to read the paper aloud in the presence of the jury or silently to herself? Appellant's statement appears to be no more than a request for clarification, couched in respectful terms, made at a time when there was no objection pending before the court.
In the second instance, taking records from Mr. Lewis' hands, it appears the latter had without notice to or permission from anyone removed papers from a folder brought into the courtroom by a prosecution witness. The papers referred to some of the defendants on trial and had not then been used or referred to in any way but were available for the prosecution's use in impeaching those defendants in the event they testified falsely. Once the papers had been examined by the other side, their value as impeachment tools would have been dissipated. At the same time appellant retrieved them, acting in what he considered an emergency, he explained his problem to the court, again in a respectful and factually accurate manner, and, when so directed by the court, did not persist in retention of the papers but promptly returned them to Mr. Lewis. The court conceded its lack of knowledge concerning their content despite appellant's plea to be heard prior to returning them. Patently the act of taking the papers was not in violation of the silencing order. Although discourtesy by anyone *16 should never be necessary and is not to be condoned, appellant's act seems to have been prompted by the unwarranted invasion of then private material rather than disrespect or contempt toward the court.
The third instance, occurring during appellant's cross-examination of a witness in which appellant commented that the witness was evading the question, came after a defense objection had been made upon which the court did not rule but instead addressed itself directly to appellant in a manner inviting colloquy. Appellant had made no objection but had simply repeated his question after the witness had declined to answer concerning his own purported previous statement, saying, "I don't know". There is no indication of bad faith on appellant's part. We do not pass on the propriety, from a purely legal standpoint, of the remarks made in the presence of the jury by either appellant or the court  we simply are unable to see contemptuous violation of the order here.
The fourth occurrence was appellant's restatement of his question to a defendant as to the location of a particular business enterprise. The defendant had already answered appellant's question but, as witnesses are sometimes wont to do, desired to do more. That this was the case is evidenced by the witness' further answer. Again appellant's remarks were respectful and not disruptive and we fail to see contemptuous violation of any order.
The fifth occurrence also came during cross-examination of the same defendant, who was employed as a supervisor by the Office of Economic Opportunity in its war on poverty in Wyandotte county, and had been one of the founders of the program. This defendant, along with the others, was charged with robbery and extortion of money from a representative of a private agency (JACS) whose mission was to recruit disadvantaged youth into the Job Corps program under OEO (see State v. Pierce, et al., supra). The defendant had previously testified on direct examination he had received the money as a consultant's fee and that he had no duty by reason of his job to assist in Job Corps recruitment. It was the prosecution's theory that under his employment it was his duty to do that for which he claimed the consultation fee, that is, assist in Job Corps recruitment. This point became crucial in the case as to this witness. Appellant had in his possession two OEO numbered, dated memoranda on the subject upon which he wished to test the witness' credibility on this critical issue. Upon being directed *17 to refresh the witness' recollection as to the memoranda appellant read the title of one to the witness. The witness had first indicated his familiarity with OEO policy directives but he declined to answer the question with respect to the one identified to him by title and he addressed a request directly to appellant. Appellant responded to the request by the statement, addressed to the court rather than to the witness, for which he stands convicted of contempt. It is noteworthy in passing that later cross-examination, after considerable fencing and hedging by the witness, did result in his begrudging admission that by reason of OEO policy directives with which he was familiar he did have an official duty to further Job Corps recruitment. Beyond this, however, we see no improper conduct interfering with or impeding the trial.
The last two incidents involve appellant's requests to the court for help in securing responsive answers to questions, answers which were in fact forthcoming without embellishment once the court acted as requested. Instinctively in a heated trial experienced counsel will address their problem to the court, not only to advance their cause, but also to aid the court in making proper disposition of the matter at issue. This is particularly true in cross-examination of a hostile witness where, as here, the record reveals the examiner is justified in his appeal for help. The examiner is sometimes required to make clear to the court the reason for his request for help where the situation may not be otherwise apparent. Again we see no violation of the court's order. A judge must have power to protect himself from actual obstruction in the courtroom but at the same time it is essential to a fair administration of justice that a lawyer be able to make honest good-faith efforts to present his client's case (see In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 8 L. Ed. 2d 434, 82 S.Ct. 1288).
In none of the incidents do we see hostility or defiance toward the court on appellant's part, anything abusive or insulting, undue persistence in opposing any ruling, nor do we find open or wilful misconduct which can fairly be characterized as obstructing or tending to obstruct the procedure of the trial. The brief filed on behalf of appellee virtually acknowledges this conclusion in a statement contained therein as follows:
There has been filed on behalf of appellee a lengthy counter abstract in which are included numerous excerpts from the trial transcript of events occurring prior to entry of the April 8 order. It has not been shown wherein appellant's abstract is incorrect or inadequate as to the events in question and the propriety of appellee's counter abstract may well be questioned. Nonetheless we have examined it. It does reveal appellant constantly addressed himself to the court in his comments rather than to opposing counsel  a practice not always reciprocated by the latter  and despite vigorous presentation appellant remained respectful to the court throughout. It also indicates the arduous and difficult nature of the task confronting the trial judge in the conscientious discharge of his duty  aggressive advocacy on each side appropriate to the heat of the particular skirmish; each side construing everything to its own advantage and seeking to leave nothing unanswered; frequent interruption with somewhat intemperate remarks all around; and, not the least, the presence of a volatile, partisan audience.
The judgments of conviction of contempt are reversed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.