Title: Ex parte Sherman Collins
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1200443
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 5, 2021

REL: November 5, 2021
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2021-2022
____________________
1200443
____________________
Ex parte Sherman Collins
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  Sherman Collins
v.
State of Alabama)
(Sumter Circuit Court, CC-12-109;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-14-0753)
1200443
MENDHEIM, Justice.
Sherman Collins petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to
review the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in Collins v. State, [Ms.
CR-14-0753, Oct. 13, 2017] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2017) (opinion
on original submission); [Ms. CR-14-0753, July 13, 2018] ___ So. 3d at ___
(opinion on return to remand); [Ms. CR-14-0753, Oct. 25, 2019] ___ So. 3d
at ___ (opinion on return to second remand); and [Ms. CR-14-0753,
Mar. 12, 2021] ___ So. 3d at ___ (on application for rehearing), affirming
Collins's convictions in the Sumter Circuit Court for capital murder for the
intentional killing of Detrick Bell for pecuniary gain, a violation of
§ 13A-5-40(a)(7), Ala. Code 1975, and for criminal conspiracy, a violation
of § 13A-4-3, Ala. Code 1975, and affirming his resulting sentences of
death for his capital-murder conviction and of 120 months' imprisonment
for his criminal-conspiracy conviction.  We granted certiorari review to
consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision is in conflict
with Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); we conclude that
it is.  As a result, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision
insofar as it affirms Collins's capital-murder conviction and his resulting
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sentence to death and we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision
insofar as it affirms Collins's criminal-conspiracy conviction and his
resulting sentence to 120 months' imprisonment.  We also remand this
cause to the Court of Criminal Appeals to remand the cause to the trial
court to set aside Collins's criminal-conspiracy conviction and resulting
sentence.
Facts and Procedural History
An extensive recitation of the facts, which is not necessary for our
purposes in this case, is set forth in Collins.  In short, on June 17, 2012,
Collins entered into an agreement with Kelvin Wrenn to kill Detrick
"Speedy" Bell in exchange for $2,000, and, in accordance with the
agreement, Collins shot and killed Bell.  Collins confessed to entering into
an agreement with Wrenn to kill Bell and to killing Bell.  Collins was
charged and, following a jury trial, convicted of capital murder for the
intentional killing of Bell for pecuniary gain, a violation of
§ 13A-5-40(a)(7), and of criminal conspiracy, a violation of § 13A-4-3. 
Collins was sentenced to death for his capital-murder conviction and to
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120 months' imprisonment for his criminal-conspiracy conviction.  Collins
appealed.
In affirming Collins's convictions on appeal, the Court of Criminal
Appeals noted the following:
"Collins's convictions for capital murder and conspiracy
to commit murder do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
As this Court stated in Williams v. State, 830 So. 2d 45 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2001), when considering whether Williams's
convictions for robbery/murder and conspiracy to commit first-
degree robbery constituted a double-jeopardy violation:
" 'Under § 13A-4-3, [Ala. Code 1975,] "[a]
person is guilty of criminal conspiracy if, with the
intent that conduct constituting an offense be
performed, he agrees with one or more persons to
engage in or cause the performance of such
conduct, and any one or more of such persons does
an overt act to effect an objective of the
agreement."  On the other hand, an objective of
murder made capital pursuant to § 13A-5-40(a)(2),
[Ala. Code 1975,] requires no agreement to effect
that offense.  See §§ 13A-6-2(A)(1); 13A-8-41; and
13A-8-43, Ala. Code 1975.  Likewise, the offense of
murder made capital pursuant to § 13A-5-40(a)(2)
requires proof of an intentional killing; § 13A-4-3
requires no such proof.  Clearly, the two offenses
for which the appellant was convicted and
sentenced are not the same under the Blockburger
[v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932),] test. 
Therefore, we find no merit in the appellant's
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argument that his rights under the Double
Jeopardy Clause were violated.'
"Williams, 830 So. 2d at 48."
Collins, ___ So. 3d at ___ n.6 (opinion on original submission).
Standard of Review
" ' "This Court reviews pure questions of law in criminal cases
de novo." ' " Ex parte Knox, 201 So. 3d 1213, 1216 (Ala. 2015) (quoting
Ex parte Morrow, 915 So. 2d 539, 541 (Ala. 2004), quoting in turn
Ex parte Key, 890 So. 2d 1056, 1059 (Ala. 2003)).
Discussion
As noted above, this Court granted certiorari review to consider
whether the above-quoted portion of the Court of Criminal Appeals'
decision is in conflict with Blockburger, supra.  In his brief before this
Court, Collins argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision is in
conflict with Blockburger because, he argues, "[t]he offense of capital
murder for hire, as charged in this case under Ala. Code [1975,]
§ 13A-5-40(a)(7), encapsulates the offense of conspiracy to commit
murder."  Collins's brief at p. 12.  Collins argues that the crime of criminal
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conspiracy defined in § 13A-4-3(a) is a lesser-included offense of murder
for hire as defined in § 13A-5-40(a)(7).  Collins argues that his convictions
and sentences for murder for hire and for criminal conspiracy violate
double-jeopardy principles.  Collins is correct.
In Williams v. State, 830 So. 2d 45 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001), the case
relied upon by the Court of Criminal Appeals below, the Court of Criminal
Appeals provided the following explanation of the Blockburger test:
"The established test for determining whether two
offenses are sufficiently distinguishable to permit the
imposition of cumulative punishment was stated in
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76
L. Ed. 306 (1932). Where the same act or transaction
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the
test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses
or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an
additional fact that the other does not. The test emphasizes
the elements of the two offenses. If each offense requires proof
of a fact that the other does not, then the Blockburger test is
satisfied, notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof
offered to establish the offenses. In essence, the Blockburger
rule is one of statutory construction. The assumption
underlying the rule is that the legislative branch of
government ordinarily does not intend to punish for the same
offense under two different statutes. Therefore, where two
statutory provisions proscribe the 'same offense,' they are
construed not to authorize cumulative punishments, at least
in the absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative
intent. See Ex parte Rice, 766 So. 2d 143 (Ala. 1999)."
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830 So. 2d at 47-48.
Under § 13A-4-3(a), 
"[a] person is guilty of criminal conspiracy if, with the intent
that conduct constituting an offense be performed, he agrees
with one or more persons to engage in or cause the
performance of such conduct, and any one or more of such
persons does an overt act to effect an objective of the
agreement."
Section 13A-5-40(a)(7) makes a capital offense "[m]urder done for a
pecuniary or other valuable consideration or pursuant to a contract or for
hire."  In the present case, the State charged Collins with violating
§ 13A-5-40(a)(7), alleging that he had entered into an agreement with
Wrenn, whereby Collins agreed to murder Bell in exchange for Wrenn's
paying Collins $2,000, and that Collins did, in fact, murder Bell.  The
State also charged Collins with violating § 13A-4-3(a), alleging that
Collins had entered into an agreement with Wrenn, whereby Collins
agreed to murder Bell in exchange for Wrenn's paying Collins $2,000, and
that Collins took some overt act to effect an objective of the agreement. 
Obviously, murder made capital pursuant to § 13A-5-40(a)(7) requires
proof of an intentional killing; § 13A-4-3(a) requires no such proof.  This
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is something that distinguishes the crimes.  However, in this case, the
State relied upon the same facts to prove that Collins violated § 13A-4-3(a)
in proving that Collins violated § 13A-5-40(a)(7).  Stated differently, once
the State proved that Collins had violated §13-5-40(a)(7), it did not need
to prove any additional fact to prove that Collins had also violated
§ 13A-4-3(a).  We conclude that, as charged in this case, criminal
conspiracy is a lesser-included offense of murder made capital pursuant
to § 13A-5-40(a)(7).  See § 13A-1-9(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975 ("A defendant may
be convicted of an offense included in an offense charged. An offense is an
included one if ... [i]t is established by proof of the same or fewer than all
the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged.").
Although we have not heretofore made such a conclusion,
Mississippi, which has laws similar to our own concerning murder for hire
and criminal conspiracy, has determined that criminal conspiracy is a
lesser-included offense of murder for hire.  In Stewart v. State, 662 So. 2d
552, 561 (Miss. 1995), the Mississippi Supreme Court stated:
"Conspiracy and the underlying substantive offense are
normally distinct and separate offenses. Pinkerton v. United
States, 328 U.S. 640, 643, 66 S. Ct. 1180, 1181, 90 L. Ed. 1489
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(1946); Griffin v. State, 545 So. 2d 729, 730 (Miss. 1989).
Nevertheless, there are times when a defendant may not be
charged with both conspiracy and the substantive offense.
Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 643, 66 S. Ct. at 1181. 'One is where the
agreement of two persons is necessary for the completion of
the substantive crime and there is no ingredient in the
conspiracy which is not present in the completed crime.' Id.
"Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(d) (1972) capital murder
provision reads as follows:
" '(2) The killing of a human being without the
authority of law by any means or in any manner
shall be capital murder in the following cases:
" '(d) Murder which is perpetrated
by any person who has been offered or
has received anything of value for
committing the murder, and all parties
to such a murder, are guilty as
principals.'
"We find that once the State has proven murder under this
definition, no other evidence must be produced in order to
establish the crime of conspiracy. Conspiracy to commit
murder-for-hire is completely enveloped by our definition of
murder-for-hire found in § 97-3-19(2)(d) of the capital murder
statute."
We find convincing the reasoning set forth in Stewart by the Mississippi
Supreme Court and conclude that criminal conspiracy is a lesser-included
offense of murder for hire.
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It is significant to note Stewart's reliance upon Pinkerton v. United
States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).  Pinkerton is a significant case in double-
jeopardy precedent -- relied upon by many other federal cases (some of
which the State relies upon in its brief before this Court) -- that sets forth
well-established principles concerning a criminal defendant's convictions
for both a substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit that substantive
offense.  Pinkerton states, in pertinent part:
"It has been long and consistently recognized by the Court that
the commission of the substantive offense and a conspiracy to
commit it are separate and distinct offenses. The power of
Congress to separate the two and to affix to each a different
penalty is well established. Clune v. United States, 159 U.S.
590, 594, 595 [(1895)]. A conviction for the conspiracy may be
had though the substantive offense was completed. See Heike
v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 144 [(1913)]. And the plea of
double jeopardy is no defense to a conviction for both offenses.
Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 395 [(1902)]. It is only an
identity of offenses which is fatal. See Gavieres v. United
States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 [(1911)]. Cf. Freeman v. United
States, 6 Cir., 146 F.2d 978 [(1945)]. A conspiracy is a
partnership in crime. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 253 [(1940)]. It has ingredients, as well as
implications, distinct from the completion of the unlawful
project. As stated in United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78,
88 [(1915)]:
" 'For two or more to confederate and combine
together to commit or cause to be committed a
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breach of the criminal laws is an offense of the
gravest character, sometimes quite outweighing, in
injury to the public, the mere commission of the
contemplated crime. It involves deliberate plotting
to subvert the laws, educating and preparing the
conspirators for further and habitual criminal
practices. And it is characterized by secrecy,
rendering it difficult of detection, requiring more
time for its discovery, and adding to the importance
of punishing it when discovered.'
"And see Sneed v. United States, 5 Cir., 298 F. 911, 912, 913
[(1924)]; Banghart v. United States, 4 Cir., 148 F.2d 521
[(1945)].
"Moreover, it is not material that overt acts charged in
the conspiracy counts were also charged and proved as
substantive offenses. As stated in Sneed v. United States,
supra, 298 F. at page 913, 'If the overt act be the offense which
was the object of the conspiracy, and is also punished, there is
not a double punishment of it.' The agreement to do an
unlawful act is even then distinct from the doing of the act."
Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 643-44.  Therefore, under federal law, it is well
established that a substantive crime and a conspiracy to commit that
substantive crime are generally separate and distinct offenses.  However,
the Pinkerton Court expressly recognized an exception to the above-
quoted general principles:
"There are, of course, instances where a conspiracy charge may
not be added to the substantive charge. One is where the
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agreement of two persons is necessary for the completion of
the substantive crime and there is no ingredient in the
conspiracy which is not present in the completed crime. See
United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 355, 356 [(1926)]; Gebardi
v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 121, 122 [(1932)]."
Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 643 (emphasis added).  This makes clear that,
under federal law, if the conspiracy to commit a substantive crime is a
lesser-included offense of the substantive crime, then the "conspiracy
charge may not be added to the substantive charge."  Id.  This is exactly
what the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized in Stewart, and that
exception applies to the facts of the present case.
Despite the exception stated in Pinkerton, the State notes that some
federal cases involving the federal murder-for-hire statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1958, have concluded that a federal criminal defendant charged with
violating § 1958 may be convicted of and sentenced for both the
substantive offense of murder for hire and conspiring to commit the
substantive offense of murder for hire.  See, e.g., United States v.
Lingenfelter, 473 F. App'x 303 (4th Cir. 2012), United States v. Bicaksiz,
194 F.3d 390 (2d Cir. 1999), Plunkett v. United States, Criminal Action
No. 4:04-cr-70083, June 6, 2011 (W.D. Va. 2011) (not reported in Federal
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Supplement), and United States v. Gomez, 644 F. Supp. 2d 362 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).  The State urges this Court to adopt the approach taken by these
federal cases rather than that taken by the Mississippi Supreme Court in
Stewart.  The federal cases relied upon by the State, however, are
inapposite to the present case and Alabama law.
The United States Supreme Court has explained that
"Blockburger [v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932),]
established a rule of statutory construction in these terms:
" 'The assumption underlying the rule is that
Congress ordinarily does not intend to punish the
same offense under two different statutes.
Accordingly, where two statutory provisions
proscribe the "same offense," they are construed
not to authorize cumulative punishments in the
absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative
intent.'  [Whalen v. United States,] 445 U.S. [684,]
691-692 [(1980)] (emphasis added).
"We went on to emphasize the qualification on that rule:
" '[W]here the offenses are the same ... cumulative
sentences are not permitted, unless elsewhere
specially authorized by Congress.' Id., at 693
(emphasis added)."
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983).  In short, the United States
Supreme Court has stated that the Blockburger test is a rule of statutory
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construction that, if met, indicates that Congress did not intend to
authorize cumulative punishments for the same offense, but such
intention derived from applying the Blockburger test may be controverted
by a special authorization of Congress indicating its intention otherwise. 
Congress's intent is the significant factor.
Collins notes that, in Alabama, the legislature has passed a law
expressly stating its intent in situations such as the one presented in this
case where a criminal defendant is charged with a substantive offense and
a lesser-included offense.  Collins directs this Court's attention to § 13A-1-
8(b)(1), Ala. Code 1975, which states, in pertinent part:  "When the same
conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one
offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense. He may
not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if ... [o]ne offense is
included in the other, as defined in Section 13A-1-9[, Ala. Code 1975]." 
(Emphasis added.)  As set forth above, criminal conspiracy is a lesser-
included offense of murder for hire.  In § 13A-1-8(b)(1), the legislature
makes clear that a criminal defendant may not be convicted of both of
those crimes based on the same conduct.  See also § 13A-4-5(b)(3), Ala.
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Code 1975 ("A person may not be convicted on the basis of the same course
of conduct of both the actual commission of an offense and ... [c]riminal
conspiracy of the offense.")  Accordingly, unlike federal law, Alabama law
makes abundantly clear that the legislature does not intend for a criminal
defendant to be convicted of both murder for hire and the lesser-included
offense of criminal conspiracy; the federal cases concerning § 1958 have
no application in the present case and are not persuasive.
Lastly, we note that, in the present case, the Court of Criminal
Appeals relied upon Williams, supra, in concluding that Collins's double-
jeopardy rights were not violated.  Williams, however, is a distinguishable
case.  In Williams, the criminal defendant was convicted of criminal
conspiracy and murder made capital because it was committed during the
course of a robbery, see § 13A-5-40(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975.  The Court of
Criminal Appeals stated in Williams that "the offense of murder made
capital pursuant to § 13A-5-40(a)(2)[] requires no agreement to effect that
offense."  Williams, 830 So. 2d at 48.  Accordingly, the Court of Criminal
Appeals concluded that "the two offenses for which [Williams] was
convicted and sentenced are not the same under the Blockburger test. 
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Therefore, we find no merit in [Williams]'s argument that his rights under
the Double Jeopardy Clause were violated."  Id.  As explained above,
however, the two offenses for which Collins was convicted and sentenced
are the same under the Blockburger test; the crime of criminal conspiracy
does not require proof of a fact that the crime of murder for hire does not.1
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Collins has established a conflict between
the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision and Blockburger; the Court of
Criminal Appeals erred in concluding that Collins's convictions and
sentences for murder for hire and criminal conspiracy do not violate the
1As he did before the Court of Criminal Appeals, Collins also argues
before this Court that the trial court's admission of a confession made by
Wrenn, Collins's codefendant, allegedly violated Collins's right of cross-
examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.  We need not address this argument,
however, because we specifically denied certiorari review of this issue.  In
his petition for certiorari review, Collins, citing Rule 39(a)(1)(D), Ala. R.
App. P., alleged that the Court of Criminal Appeals' determination of this
Confrontation Clause issue conflicted with prior decisions of the United
States Supreme Court.  We did not find Collins's allegation of conflict
convincing and denied certiorari review of that particular issue. 
Accordingly, that issue is not properly before us, and, thus, we need not
consider Collins's argument.
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Double Jeopardy Clause.  As a result, we affirm the Court of Criminal
Appeals' decision insofar as it affirms Collins's capital-murder conviction
and his resulting sentence to death and reverse the Court of Criminal
Appeals' decision insofar as it affirms Collins's criminal-conspiracy
conviction and his resulting sentence to 120 months' imprisonment.  See
Heard v. State, 999 So. 2d 992, 1009 (Ala. 2007) ("[W]hen a jury returns
a verdict finding a defendant guilty of capital murder on one count and
guilty of a lesser-included offense of another count, if that lesser-included
offense is also a lesser-included offense of the offense resulting in the
capital-murder conviction, under § 13A-1-8(b) and § 13A-1-9, Ala. Code
1975, the conviction for the lesser-included [offense] cannot stand.").  We
also remand this cause to the Court of Criminal Appeals with instructions
for it to remand this cause to the circuit court for it to set aside Collins's
conviction for criminal conspiracy and his resulting sentence therefrom. 
No return to remand need be filed.
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AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, and Stewart,
JJ., concur.
Mitchell, J., concurs specially.
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MITCHELL, Justice (concurring specially).
Often overlooked is the fact that state law can provide greater
protections of individual rights than protections under federal law.2  This
case offers an example.
Here, Sherman Collins cited three provisions in support of his
argument that the two offenses for which he was convicted constitute the
"same offense": (1) the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, as analyzed under the test set out in Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); (2) § 13A-1-8(b), Ala. Code 1975; and (3)
§ 13A-4-5(b), Ala. Code 1975.  The majority opinion primarily rules in
2In this case, we have an Alabama statute that provides superior
protection.  But we are beginning to see the emergence of cases across the
country where litigants correctly recognize that state constitutions may
better protect individual rights than the United States Constitution.  See,
e.g., Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 806 S.E.2d 505 (2017) (holding that the
Georgia 
state 
constitution's 
protection 
against compelled 
self-
incrimination extends beyond testimony -- as the federal right has been
interpreted -- to incriminating acts, such as breath tests);  see also Jeffrey
S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American
Constitutional Law 16-20, 76 (Oxford Univ. Press 2018).  The Alabama
Constitution, like other state constitutions, is a relatively untapped source
of law for the protection of individual rights, and it may hold promise for
future litigants in a variety of contexts.
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favor of Collins based on Blockburger and § 13A-1-8(b)(1), and I fully
concur in the opinion.
I write separately to point out that in enacting § 13A-4-5(b)(3), Ala.
Code 1975, which provides that "[a] person may not be convicted on the
basis of the same course of conduct of both the actual commission of an
offense and ... [c]riminal conspiracy of the offense,"3 the Legislature has
provided even greater protections for criminal defendants than under
federal law.  Whereas federal law recognizes that "the commission of [a]
substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and
distinct offenses," Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946),
and that convictions for both may stand so long as the Blockburger "same
elements" test is satisfied, the Alabama statute sweeps more broadly and
definitively, protecting a criminal defendant from being convicted based
on the same course of conduct of both "criminal conspiracy of the offense"
3The Commentary to § 13A-4-5 explains that subsection (b) "deal[s]
only with convictions, not with multiple charges or counts in an
indictment or complaint."  That is, a defendant may be charged with both
criminal conspiracy of an offense and the actual commission of the offense,
but not convicted of both.
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(an inchoate crime) and "the actual commission of an offense" (a
substantive crime). 
To some, it may seem counterintuitive that state law can contain
greater rights protections than federal law -- causing some litigants to cite
state-law provisions but not develop any arguments around them or,
worse, to bypass state law entirely.  That is a mistake.  I encourage
parties in future cases involving counterpart rights under state and
federal law not to assume either that the state-law right is inferior and
unworthy of attention or that the state-law right is simply a carbon copy
of the federal right.  Making those assumptions could cause a litigant to
lose his or her case or to obtain less relief than he or she is due.
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