Title: Bell v. Driskill
Citation: 213 So. 2d 806
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: August 22, 1968

213 So. 2d 806 (1968)
N. J. BELL, III, et al., d/b/a Whitley Hotel
v.
Charlie DRISKILL.
3 Div. 185.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 22, 1968.
Rehearing Denied September 19, 1968.
*807 Rushton, Stakely &amp; Johnston, Montgomery, for appellants.
Walter J. Knabe, of Capell, Howard, Knabe &amp; Cobbs, Montgomery, for appellee.
SIMPSON, Justice.
This case was initially assigned to the late lamented Justice Goodwyn and, after *808 his untimely death, was assigned to the writer.
The proceeding was commenced in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County on December 18, 1963, for the recovery of benefits under the Alabama Workmen's Compensation Law, Code 1940, Tit. 26, § 253 et seq., as amended by Charlie Driskill, appellee, for disability allegedly resulting from an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment by N. J. Bell, et al., d/b/a The Whitley Hotel, defendants below and petitioners here. The trial court awarded compensation to the plaintiff and the case is here on certiorari brought by defendants.
The defendants admitted in their answer to the complaint that the parties were subject to the Workmen's Compensation Laws of Alabama, that the plaintiff suffered an injury from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the defendants on the date complained of, that defendants received prompt and immediate notice thereof, and that plaintiff had a dependant wife at the time of the accident.
As to the accident causing the injury, the complaint alleged:
Plaintiff alleged that at the time of the injury he was receiving a salary of $40.00 per week.
Evidence was taken orally before the trial court from which the court found, as a part of its findings of facts, that plaintiff had suffered a temporary total disability and a permanent partial disability, that his earning capacity has been decreased 90%, that the proximate results of the accident included more than an injury to his leg, and that compensation is payable under § 279 (C)6 of Tit. 26, Code 1940, as amended. It was found that plaintiff had been totally disabled for a period of 80 weeks and that he had already received compensation for 78¾ weeks. The court also found that plaintiff is entitled to compensation for a period of 300 weeks for permanent partial *809 disability, less 80 weeks for temporary total disability, or a total of 220 weeks.
The trial court's decree was, in part, as follows:
The facts in this case show that, on or about December 14, 1960, plaintiff was employed by the Whitley Hotel in Montgomery. He had been employed at the hotel since 1932 in various capacities but since 1955 his work had been confined entirely to a garage operated by the hotel. His job consisted of parking cars and working as cashier to collect money from garage patrons. His salary was $150.00 per month plus occasional payments for overtime.
Plaintiff sustained the injury when he turned his foot or ankle while walking down the ramp in defendants' parking garage. Following his injury in December, 1960, plaintiff continued to work until August 25, 1961. Thereafter, he had two operations on his knee. He did not return to work at the garage until January 15, 1964, and then only to temporarily replace a man who had had a heart attack. At that time, he acted as cashier and directed the parking of cars. He did not park the cars himself. When the man he replaced returned to work, plaintiff was without a job.
He then acquired a job with the State of Alabama as a mailman but quit after four days due to his inability to do the extensive walking the job required.
Through the efforts of one of the defendants, plaintiff was given a job at the First Baptist Church parking lot, acting as cashier and directing the parking of cars. His salary was $32.00 per week and this was the job he held at the time of the trial.
Plaintiff's injuries were as follows, quoting from the trial court's findings:
The evidence showed that plaintiff had a sixth-grade education. He had performed *810 manual labor all his life and was not trained or qualified for any other type of work. His physician stated that plaintiff was unable to perform manual labor in his present condition, unless that could be accomplished by a sedentary occupation. The doctor stated that, in his opinion, the plaintiff has a permanent disability of 45% to the right leg.
The basic point of dispute in this case seems to be whether plaintiff's injury should be compensated under the provisions of § 279(C)1 of Tit. 26, or under the more remunerative (for plaintiff) provisions of § 279(C)6. Defendants argue in support of the application of the former, plaintiff for the latter.
Section 279(C)1 provides, in part:
Defendants' argument in support of reversal of the trial court's decree is divided into four parts. We will answer these arguments in the order in which presented by defendants' brief.
Defendants contend it was error for the trial court to award compensation to plaintiff under § 279(C)6 of Tit. 26 rather than under § 279(C)1, since plaintiff's only injury was to his right knee.
We should first reiterate the long standing rule in this court that on certiorari to review judgments in compensation cases, this court does not look to the weight of the evidence as to any fact found by the trial court, but looks to see if there is any evidence to support the facts found by the trial court. Tiger Motor Co. v. Winslett, 278 Ala. 108, 176 So. 2d 39; Head v. Triangle Construction Co., 274 Ala. 519, 150 So. 2d 389.
In its final determination and judgment, the trial court set forth the evidence which convinced it that the injury to plaintiff extended beyond a mere leg injury. A paragraph from the court's opinion is set forth above. The court concluded:
The question of the exclusiveness of schedule allowances in Workmen's Compensation Laws is discussed in 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 58.20, pp. 44-45, where it is stated:
This same problem is treated in an annotation in 156 A.L.R. 1344, where the rule is said to be as follows:
Numerous cases are cited in the annotation as authority for this statement. (See also the recent cases cited in 1967 Supplement to Larson's, Vol. 2, beginning at page 49 of the supplement.)
In Warrior Stone &amp; Contracting Co. v. De Foor, 241 Ala. 227, 2 So. 2d 430, the employee sustained an injury to his leg, the effects of which extended beyond a mere injury to the leg and affected his whole body. The case is similar to the one at bar in that the trial judge there found that as a result of the injury, the employee
In that case, the trial court found that the employee sustained a permanent partial disability of 80%.
We conclude that although the injury itself is to only one part or member of the body, if the effect of such injury extends to other parts of the body, and produces a greater or more prolonged incapacity than that which naturally results from the specific injury, or the injury causes an abnormal and unusual incapacity with respect to the member, then the employee is not limited in his recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Law to the amount allowed under the schedule for injury to the one member.
Defendants argue that where an injured employee returns to gainful employment making substantially the wages he was making at the time of the injury, it is error to award him compensation based upon a 90% decrease in earning capacity.
An identical argument was rejected by this court in Goodyear Tire &amp; Rubber Co. of Alabama v. Downey, 266 Ala. 344, 96 So. 2d 278, where we stated:
For other authority, see Birmingham Post Co. v. McGinnis, 256 Ala. 473, 55 So. 2d 507; Alabama By-Products Co. v. Landgraff, 248 Ala. 253, 27 So. 2d 215; Nashville Bridge Co. v. Honeycutt, 246 Ala. 319, 20 So. 2d 591; Agricola Furnace Co. v. Smith, 239 Ala. 488, 195 So. 743; and 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 57.21, pp. 4-6.
Defendants contend that the finding that plaintiff suffered a 90% loss of earning capacity is not supported by the evidence.
We again avert to the long standing rule that, on certiorari in workmen's compensation cases, where there is any legal evidence, or reasonable inference therefrom, to support the finding of facts of the trial court, such finding is conclusive, and the judgment thereon will not be disturbed. 19A Ala.Digest, Workmen's Compensation.
It is also well established that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be given a liberal construction to accomplish its beneficent purposes. City of Foley v. Terry, 278 Ala. 30, 175 So. 2d 461.
There is considerable evidence that plaintiff is almost totally disabled, or at least disabled to the extent that he has practically lost all earning capacity. He has only a sixth grade education and is unqualified for any work other than manual labor. At the time of the trial, plaintiff was 60 years old. His physician stated that he was unable to perform manual labor other than the type that could be performed in a sedentary occupation. His injury is such that he is unable to remain on his feet for any extended length of time, and when he does, the knee swells and causes him considerable pain. His employment at the time of the trial was secured only through the efforts and influence of a man for whom the plaintiff had worked for thirty years.
While it is true no one at the trial used the figure of 90% in describing plaintiff's decrease in earning capacity, we believe, under the evidence presented, the trial judge was warranted in so finding. This conclusion is supported by the holding in the recent case of Semmes Nurseries, Inc. v. McVay, 279 Ala. 42, 181 So. 2d 331, where we stated:
See also the recent case of Kroger Co. v. Millsap, 280 Ala. 531, 196 So. 2d 380.
In Brunson Milling Co. v. Grimes, 267 Ala. 395, 103 So. 2d 315, this court stated that "total disability within the Workmen's Compensation Act does not mean absolute helplessness or entire physical disability, but means inability to perform the work of one's trade or inability to obtain reasonably gainful employment." (Emphasis added.)
We cannot say that a finding that plaintiff suffered a 90% loss of earning capacity is unsupported by evidence.
Defendants' fourth argument in support of reversal of the trial court's *813 judgment alleges that the court erred in that compensation should have been based on "average weekly earnings" instead of "weekly pay" and that § 279(G) defines the method of computing "average weekly earnings"; that no "average weekly earnings" were proved or found by the court, nor were they alleged in the complaint, rather the award was based on "weekly pay" and pay "per week"; and that even if the allegation of weekly pay could suffice for a determination of "average weekly earnings", the findings are totally inconsistent with the proof because $40.00 per week was alleged and $150.00 per month proved.
From the following language contained in the court's finding, it appears that the trial court was fully aware of the concept of "average weekly earnings" and the method by which it is computed:
In arriving at the amount of compensation due plaintiff, the court made the following computations:
Defendants' chief concern seems to be whether the amount of $40.00 is an accurate appraisal of plaintiff's "average weekly earnings". Defendants alleged in their answer that plaintiff's average weekly earnings were $37.50, but they also alleged: "2. Plaintiff has been paid Workmen's Compensation benefits for 78¾ weeks at the rate of $24.00 per week * * *" ($24.00 is 60% of $40.00). Further, during the hearing the plaintiff's attorney stated that he would like the record to show by agreement of counsel that plaintiff had received checks for 78¾ weeks' compensation, to which the defendants, through counsel, added, "at the lawful rate". Attorney for plaintiff then stated that, by agreement of counsel, the plaintiff "has been paid at the rate prescribed by law insofar as his weekly compensation is paid, that is, at the rate which he is being paid is correct". Defendants made no objection to this statement.
In answer to defendants' contention that there is a variance between the pleading and the proof as to how much the plaintiff was paid, the following testimony of plaintiff is taken from the record:
It is thus clear that plaintiff was paid in excess of $150.00 per month and, according to his statement, the $40.00 figure is correct as a statement of his weekly pay.
We believe that by answer and by admission in open court, defendants agreed that $24.00 weekly was the proper amount of compensation payable to plaintiff, and that *814 this amount was based on the proper computation of plaintiff's "average weekly wage".
Affirmed.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and COLEMAN and KOHN, JJ., concur.