Title: Case v. Ward
Citation: 160 So. 2d 859
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: February 13, 1964

160 So. 2d 859 (1964)
A. B. CASE and Willella S. Case
v.
George W. WARD.
1 Div. 999.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 13, 1964.
W. Dewitt Reams and Hubert P. Robertson for Pillans, Reams, Tappan, Wood &amp; Roberts, Mobile, for appellants.
Caffey, Gallalee &amp; Caffey and Robt. S. Edington, Mobile, for appellee.
COLEMAN, Justice.
This is an appeal by respondents from a decree quieting title in complainant to certain lots in the City of Mobile.
Complainant filed his bill which recites that:
Complainant avers also that respondents claim some interest in the land and calls on them to set forth their title and how it was created.
Respondents filed answer which was made a cross bill. They deny that complainant is in peaceable possession of or owns the land, and also aver that:
Complainant answered the cross bill, denying that respondents, or either of them, have any interest in the land, and averring that complainant:
In the answer, complainant further averred in detail that he took possession in February, 1944, and that since that time he has been in "the open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted and peaceable possession and use of the property described in the complaint," etc.
At the outset, appellee, the complainant, asserts that appellants have failed to comply with Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of this court, which recites in pertinent part as follows:
Appellants' "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" commences:
and then proceeds to hypothesize certain facts and asks: A. Whether respondents' title is defeated; B. Could title be decreed to be in complainant without requiring complainant to reimburse respondents for the money they paid to the city; and, C. Was the decree correct in decreeing that complainant was the owner in fee simple.
We are of opinion that these questions fall short of being "a concise statement of so much of the record as fully presents every error and exception relied upon."
The substantial deficiency in appellants' brief is the failure to set out "a condensed recital of the evidence given by each witness in narrative form," etc., as required by Rule 9 where the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict or finding, in fact or law, is assigned. Appellee states in brief:
In reply, appellants say:
The decree did quiet the title in complainant. Assignment 1 recites:
The decree can be sustained only by a finding that complainant was in peaceable possession and that respondents have failed to prove that they have a title better than the title of complainant. Assignment 1 asserts that the court erred in rendering the final decree and, therefore, necessarily asserts that the finding on which the decree must be based is not supported by the evidence. We are of opinion that Assignment 1 is an assignment to the effect that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict or finding, in fact or law, and requires appellants to set out a condensed recital of the testimony of each witness as required by Rule 9.
In further reply, appellants say that any violation of the rule on their part was unintentional and ask that we consider the case under the liberal rule which has been stated as follows:
It has never been the inclination of this court to deny consideration of an appeal on the merits where appellant has substantially complied with the rules and "appellant's brief, even though not in compliance with the rule, fairly and helpfully makes the points upon which appellant relies." Bolton v. Barnett Lumber &amp; Supply Co., 267 Ala. 74, 100 So. 2d 9. In Quinn v. Hannon, supra, the evidence had been "reduced to writing by agreement of the parties and presented to the trial court without an oral hearing." In other cases, where non-compliance with Rule 9 has been condoned, the record was short and easily understood. That is not the situation here. The instant court reporter's transcript of the evidence contains the testimony of about twelve witnesses and covers three hundred and thirty-seven pages.
The brief of appellants fails to persuade us that the court was plainly wrong in reaching either of the two conclusions which appellee asserts will sustain the decree.
Appellee says: first, that appellants failed to prove title in themselves; and, second, even if appellants did prove such title, they are estopped by the conduct of their predecessor in title, the City of Mobile, from prevailing against appellee under the rule applied in Powell v. City of Birmingham, 258 Ala. 159, 61 So. 2d 11.
In the case at bar, we are of opinion that the rule to be applied here is the rule which has been stated as follows:
The second question posed in appellants' statement of the case is whether the court erred in failing to require appellee to reimburse appellants for the money they paid to the city to discharge the alleged improvement lien on the property in suit. We are of opinion that the court was not in error in this respect because the court could find from the evidence, as we understand it, that appellants paid for an improvement lien on property which was not shown to be the same property described in the bill of complaint. Flowers v. Tillery, 272 Ala. 9, 127 So. 2d 595.
We are somewhat at a loss to understand the significance of the third question posed by appellants. This question is presented by argument in support of Assignment 5 which recites as follows:
Appellants' argument seems to be that appellee did not hold in fee simple because the property had been leased to one who is not a party to this suit. Appellants may be correct in this contention, but we fail to see how this injures appellants. The issue between them and appellee is who has the better title. It matters not to the loser whether the court merely declares that appellee has the superior title or a title in fee simple. We are not persuaded that we should reverse for the error asserted in Assignment 5.
We do not see clearly that the conclusions of the trial court are wrong. Marlowe v. Benagh, 52 Ala. 112.
Affirmed.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.