Title: Michael Dean Overstreet v. State of Indiana
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 41S00-0306-PD-249
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: November 27, 2007

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Susan K. Carpenter 
 
 
 
 
 
Steve Carter 
Public Defender of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Steven H. Schutte 
 
 
 
 
 
James B. Martin 
Deputy Public Defender  
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Thomas C. Hinesley 
Deputy Public Defender 
 
Kathleen Cleary 
Deputy Public Defender 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No.  41S00-0306-PD-249 
 
MICHAEL DEAN OVERSTREET, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Petitioner below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Respondent below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Johnson Superior Court 2, No. 41D02-0401-PC-00001 
The Honorable Cynthia S. Emkes, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Appeal From The Denial Of Post-Conviction Relief 
_________________________________ 
 
November 27, 2007 
 
Rucker, J. 
 
Summary 
 
A jury convicted Michael Dean Overstreet of murder, rape, and criminal confinement in 
connection with the 1997 strangulation death of 18-year-old Kelly Eckart.  The jury 
recommended a sentence of death, and the trial court accepted the recommendation.  On direct 
appeal we affirmed Overstreet’s conviction and sentence of death.  Overstreet v. State, 783 
N.E.2d 1140 (Ind. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004).  Thereafter, Overstreet filed a 
petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing.  He 
now appeals that denial raising several issues for our review, at least two of which are waived 
because they were known and available at the time of Overstreet’s direct appeal,1 and another 
three are barred because of the doctrine of res judicata.2  We address the remaining issues, which 
we rephrase as follows: (a) was Overstreet denied the effective assistance of trial counsel; (b) 
was Overstreet denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel; (c) did Overstreet receive a 
fair post-conviction proceeding; and (d) is Overstreet incompetent to be executed because of his 
mental illness.   
                                                 
1 As framed by Overstreet the two issues are: (a) “Overstreet’s pretrial incompetence to assess the plea 
offer renders his death sentence unfair and unreliable” and (b) “The State’s use of false evidence 
regarding Overstreet’s post-crime conduct and the cause of Ms. Eckart’s head wound violated due 
process.”  Br. of Appellant at 78, 80.  If an issue was known on direct appeal but not raised, it is waived.  
Williams v. State, 808 N.E.2d 652, 659 (Ind. 2004).  
 
2 On direct appeal, citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584 (2002), Overstreet challenged the trial court’s refusal to give certain jury instructions.  We rejected 
the challenge, determining that “the jury was instructed consistent with Apprendi and Ring.”  Overstreet, 
783 N.E.2d at 1165.  Wording his claim slightly differently Overstreet now attempts to revisit this issue 
contending his lawyers rendered ineffective assistance for their “failure to ensure the jury was properly 
instructed as to weighing,” Br. of Appellant at 60, and “Overstreet’s death sentence is unconstitutional 
under Ring v. Arizona and warrants reconsideration.”  Id. at 72.  Also on direct appeal, Overstreet 
complained that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in failing to disclose that Overstreet’s wife 
had changed her testimony prior to trial.  Thus, according to Overstreet, the trial court erred in not 
granting a mistrial.  We disagreed, concluding that the prosecutorial misconduct did not require declaring 
a mistrial.  Overstreet, 783 N.E.2d at 1155.  Overstreet attempts to revisit this issue by now claiming that 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance for “Failure To Seek Dismissal Of Death Request As Remedy For 
Discovery Violation.”  Br. of Appellant at 51.  A petitioner for post-conviction relief cannot escape the 
effect of claim preclusion merely by using different language to phrase an issue and define an alleged 
error.  Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1194 (Ind. 2006).  Although differently designated, an issue 
previously considered and determined in a defendant’s direct appeal is barred for post-conviction review 
on grounds of prior adjudication – res judicata.  Id.   
 
2
Facts3 
 
A detailed recitation of the facts is set forth in our opinion on direct appeal. See 
Overstreet, supra.  We summarize them here as follows.  On September 30, 1997, the partially 
clothed body of Kelly Eckart was discovered in a ravine near Camp Atterbury in Brown County.  
She had been strangled to death with a strap from her bib overalls and a shoestring from her 
shoes.  Three days before, in the early morning hours of September 27, 1997, Overstreet 
telephoned his brother Scott Overstreet and asked Scott to meet him at a motel in Franklin.  Scott 
complied and met Overstreet in the motel parking lot.  Overstreet informed Scott that he needed 
Scott to drive him in his van to Edinburgh.  About fifteen minutes into the ride, Overstreet told 
Scott that he had changed his mind and now wanted to go to Camp Atterbury.  When questioned 
why he wanted to go to Camp Atterbury, Overstreet replied, “I took a girl.”  Tr. at 3226.  Scott 
drove to a gravel turnaround in a remote area of Camp Atterbury where he left the girl and 
Overstreet.  Before doing so Overstreet asked Scott to return in a couple of hours and pick him 
up.  Scott refused, and Overstreet instructed him to contact Overstreet’s wife Melissa and tell her 
to drive the van and pick him up in a couple of hours at a nearby rifle range.  
 
Melissa arrived at the rifle range around 3:30 a.m.  As Overstreet approached the van, he 
was sweating, his shirt was unbuttoned, and he was carrying a blanket and a rifle.  When Melissa 
asked why he was out so late at the rifle range, Overstreet responded that if anyone asked 
concerning his whereabouts she should tell them that he was out drinking with friends.  Melissa 
drove Overstreet home, and he went to bed. 
 
The following day, Melissa accompanied Overstreet to a car wash where he cleaned the 
back of his van.  Despite the fact that the front part of the van was described by Melissa as 
“trashy,” Overstreet spent over an hour cleaning only the back of the van.  Tr. at 3883. 
 
About a month after Eckart’s body was discovered, police received a tip that led to the 
questioning of Scott about Kelly Eckart’s disappearance.  Scott led police to the gravel 
turnaround at Camp Atterbury, where police found several of Eckart’s personal items.  
                                                 
3 “Tr.” refers to the trial transcript.  “P-Cr.” refers to the transcript of the post-conviction proceedings.    
 
3
As a result of a search warrant, investigators recovered evidence from Overstreet’s home, 
including the blanket Overstreet was carrying the night Melissa picked him up at the rifle range.  
They also recovered a hand drawn map of an area of Brown County near Camp Atterbury 
depicting the same area where Eckart’s body was discovered.  Fibers recovered from Eckart’s 
shirt were consistent with fibers taken from the blanket.  And fibers found on Eckart’s overalls 
were consistent with fibers recovered from inside Overstreet’s van.  DNA testing revealed that 
sperm found inside Eckart’s body and on her underwear was consistent with that of Overstreet. 
 
Procedural History 
 
The State charged Overstreet with murder, felony murder, rape as a Class B felony, and 
confinement as a Class B felony.  Tr. at 923.  The State sought the death penalty based on three 
aggravating circumstances: (a) Overstreet committed the murder by intentionally killing Kelly 
Eckart while committing or attempting to commit rape; (b) Kelly Eckart was the victim of rape 
for which Overstreet has been convicted; and (c) Kelly Eckart was the victim of confinement for 
which Overstreet has been convicted.  Id. at 962.  
 
The trial was held from April 24 through May 18, 2000.  The jury convicted Overstreet as 
charged and recommended the death penalty.  After conducting an independent evaluation the 
trial court accepted the jury’s recommendation.  Among other things the trial court determined 
that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the charged aggravators, the 
intentional killing while committing rape, outweighed Overstreet’s mitigating evidence, and that 
death was the appropriate sentence.  The trial court then entered judgment for the murder, rape, 
and Class B felony confinement convictions and sentenced Overstreet to death.  The trial court 
also imposed consecutive sentences of twenty years for each of the rape and criminal 
confinement convictions. 
 
On direct appeal we affirmed Overstreet’s convictions and death sentence.  On Indiana 
double jeopardy grounds we reduced Overstreet’s conviction for criminal confinement as a Class 
B felony to a Class D felony, vacated his sentence of twenty years for that offense, and remanded 
the cause to the trial court for resentencing.  Thereafter, Overstreet filed a petition for post-
 
4
conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing.  This appeal followed. 
Additional facts are discussed below as necessary.  
 
Standard of Review for Post-Conviction Proceedings 
 
The petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding bears the burden of establishing grounds 
for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.  Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004).  
When appealing the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner stands in the position of one 
appealing from a negative judgment.  Id.  To prevail from the denial of post-conviction relief, a 
petitioner must show that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a 
conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court.  Weatherford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 
915, 917 (Ind. 1993).  Further, the post-conviction court in this case made findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6).  Although we do not 
defer to the post-conviction court’s legal conclusions, “[a] post-conviction court’s findings and 
judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error – that which leaves us with a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”  Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 
102, 106 (Ind. 2000) (citation omitted).  
 
Standard of Review for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
 
Most of Overstreet’s complaints center on the alleged shortcomings of both his trial and 
appellate lawyers.  To establish a post-conviction claim alleging a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish before the post-
conviction court the two components set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000).  First, a defendant must show that counsel’s 
performance was deficient.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  This requires a showing that counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as “counsel” guaranteed to the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment.  Id.  Second, a defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense.  Id.  This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the 
 
5
defendant of a fair trial, meaning a trial whose result is reliable.  Id.  To establish prejudice, a 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  Id. at 694.  A reasonable 
probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  Id.  Further, 
counsel’s performance is presumed effective, and a defendant must offer strong and convincing 
evidence to overcome this presumption.  Ben-Yisrayl, 729 N.E.2d at 106.   
 
I. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Pre-Trial 
 
 
Overstreet contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to perfect 
a timely interlocutory appeal.  The essential facts are these.  Prior to trial, counsel filed a motion 
requesting the transcript and exhibits presented to the grand jury that was impaneled to 
investigate Scott’s involvement in the death of Kelly Eckart.  The trial court granted the motion.  
Thereafter counsel filed a motion specifically requesting the following additional grand jury 
information: comments made by the prosecutor when presenting the case to the grand jury, the 
instructions, and the charges or any information regarding the charges which the grand jury was 
considering.  The trial court initially entered an order granting the motion.  But upon the State’s 
motion, the trial court reconsidered its order and, after conducting an in camera review of the 
requested information, denied counsel’s motion.  Counsel intended to pursue an interlocutory 
appeal from the trial court’s order.  But after missing the filing deadline, he tendered an 
appellant’s brief to the Court of Appeals along with a motion for leave to file a belated appeal.  
The Court of Appeals denied the motion and dismissed the appeal.  At the post-conviction 
proceedings, trial counsel testified that he sought the materials in order to challenge the manner 
in which the State presented to the grand jury Scott’s involvement in Kelly Eckart’s abduction 
and murder.  
 
 
The post-conviction court determined that trial counsel rendered deficient performance 
by missing the deadline for filing an appellate brief.  However, the court found that Overstreet 
failed to establish he was prejudiced as a result of the failure.  See Kitchen v. United States, 227 
F.3d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that counsel was deficient in failing to pursue an appeal, 
 
6
but the deficiency was not prejudicial).  We agree with the post-conviction court.  At trial the 
State elicited testimony from Scott that he was a target of the grand jury investigation.  Trial 
counsel aggressively cross-examined Scott, challenging his credibility, discussing his conduct on 
the night of the murder, and exploring his testimony before the grand jury.  During closing 
remarks trial counsel argued that Scott’s testimony was not worthy of belief.  Overstreet has 
made no showing that the post-conviction court’s finding is clearly erroneous. 
 
II. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Guilt Phase4 
 
Overstreet sets forth a number of assertions that he contends demonstrate counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance during the guilt phase of trial.  Consolidated, rephrased, and 
reordered, those claims are as follows: (a) counsel failed to present evidence of Overstreet’s 
mental illness; (b) counsel failed to impeach adequately the testimony of Overstreet’s wife; and 
(c) counsel failed to object to an alleged evidentiary harpoon.  We address each assertion in turn.  
 
A. Evidence of Mental Illness 
 
The record shows that by the time of trial Overstreet had been diagnosed by at least four 
mental health professionals.  Three mental health professionals diagnosed Overstreet as suffering 
from “schizotypal personality disorder” and found that he had a “severely disturbed personality 
structure.”  Tr. at 5078-79; Tr. at 5092 (Pre-trial reports from both psychiatrist Dr. Fitzgerald and 
Navy clinical psychologist A.S. Hughes were submitted as part of Defendant’s Exhibit CC.).  
Another diagnosed Overstreet with Schizoaffective Disorder, which is a combination of 
schizophrenia and major depression.  App. at 680.  No evidence of Overstreet’s mental illness 
was presented during the guilt phase of trial.  Overstreet concedes, “Insanity was not a viable 
theory, as no expert was prepared to testify that [he] was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness 
                                                 
4 Under the heading “Omitted Evidence Consistent With Defense Presented” Overstreet sets forth a 
laundry list of  “Other Evidence Implicating Scott Overstreet.”  Br. of Appellant at 53.  He cites to no 
authority and makes no cogent argument supporting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Any 
such claim under this heading is waived.  See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a); Harrison v. State, 707 
N.E.2d 767, 777 (Ind. 1999).  
 
7
of his actions.”  Br. of Appellant at 35.  But Overstreet complains that trial counsel nonetheless 
should have presented evidence of his mental illness.  According to Overstreet, “If trial counsel 
had contested Overstreet’s mens rea due to mental illness, the jury could have had the option of 
returning a verdict of Guilty but Mentally Ill (GBMI).”  Id.   
 
The flaw in this contention is that Overstreet’s defense theory centered on attempting to 
prove that someone other than Overstreet committed the offenses, namely, Overstreet’s brother 
Scott.  Trial counsel had no reason therefore to raise the issue of mental capacity.  Arguing that 
Overstreet lacked the mental capacity to form the necessary intent would have been contrary to 
his claim.  Overstreet contended that he did not commit the crime, not that he did not intend to 
commit the crime.5  See Meredith v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1309, 1312 (Ind. 1997) (rejecting the 
claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to raise diminished capacity during 
the guilt phase of trial where the defense theory was that someone other than the defendant 
committed the murder).  The choice of defenses for trial is a matter of trial strategy.  Van Evey v. 
State, 499 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ind. 1986).  Overstreet has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s 
strategic decisions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  
 
 
B. Inadequate Impeachment 
 
 
Overstreet complains that counsel rendered ineffective assistance for their “Failure to 
Impeach Melissa Overstreet with Lead Investigator’s Report.”  Br. of Appellant at 50.  As 
recounted in the facts section of this opinion, Overstreet’s wife testified about a van-cleaning 
incident occurring the day after she picked up Overstreet from the rifle range near Camp 
Atterbury.  According to Overstreet, the lead investigator for the defense had questioned 
Overstreet’s employer who allegedly reported that Overstreet was at work during the time 
Melissa testified he was cleaning the van.  Overstreet argues that trial counsel should have used 
this information to impeach Melissa on this “critical” point.  Id. at 51. 
 
                                                 
5 Indeed, discussing his case with his mental health professionals, Overstreet not only insisted that he did 
not commit the crimes for which he was charged, he also insisted that he had no memory of much of the 
events occurring on the evening Kelly Eckart was abducted.  App. at 687, 733, 736. 
 
8
We first observe that the critical point was the cleaning of the van itself.  And trial 
counsel exhaustively cross-examined Melissa on this issue asking a wide range of questions 
including her failure to disclose this information during either her grand jury testimony, her 
pretrial deposition, or in various statements given to different law enforcement agencies.  Tr. at 
4070-71.  Second, during questioning outside the presence of the jury, Melissa testified that she 
knew that “[Overstreet] cleaned the van, but [she] ha[d] to sort out the time lines.”  Id. at 3959.  
As the post-conviction court observed, the impeachment value of information that Overstreet 
was at work at the time Melissa testified that he was cleaning the van was minimal in that she 
would merely have testified that her dates were wrong and that the cleaning of the van occurred 
on another day.  We agree with the post-conviction court. 
 
C. Evidentiary Harpoon 
 
 
The record shows that prior to trial the trial court ordered certain evidence held in the 
custody of the Indiana State Police laboratory released to a DNA laboratory designated by the 
defense team.  At trial the State sought to introduce several items of evidence including blood 
and hair samples held in the State Police laboratory.  In establishing a chain of custody, and in 
response to questioning by the State, the State’s witness twice testified that the items had been 
sent off for some additional testing at the request of the defense attorney.  Tr. at 4328, 4336.  
Later, the State inquired, “Sir, you’ve indicated that several of the items that we’ve talked about 
here and that we’ve admitted were sent to the Defense’s laboratory for testing; correct?”  Id. at 
4368.  Trial counsel objected and at a side bar noted that he had allowed the answers to those 
questions to show chain of custody, but argued “if he goes any farther with it, he’s infringing on 
the Defendant’s right not to present any evidence and shifting the burden, and we’ll ask for [an] 
immediate mistrial if he goes one step farther with it.”  Id.  The State then withdrew the question.   
 
 
Characterizing the two earlier responses as “evidentiary harpoons,” Overstreet complains 
that counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to object in the first instance.  Br. of 
Appellant at 52.  First, an evidentiary harpoon occurs when the prosecution places inadmissible 
evidence before the jury for the deliberate purpose of prejudicing the jury against the defendant 
and his defense.  Evans v. State, 643 N.E.2d 877, 879 (Ind. 1994).  Even assuming the 
 
9
challenged testimony was inadmissible, we are not persuaded it was introduced for the deliberate 
purpose of prejudicing the jury.  Rather, it is apparent that the references were made in the 
context of the State establishing a chain of custody – a point on which the State bears a higher 
burden for “fungible” evidence, such as blood and hair samples.  Troxell v. State, 778 N.E.2d 
811, 814 (Ind. 2002).  In short, absent a stipulation by the defense, the State had to account for 
the whereabouts of the evidence that was not in its possession and control for a period of time.  
Second, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance due to the failure to object, the 
defendant must show an objection would have been sustained if made.  Wrinkles v. State, 749 
N.E.2d 1179, 1192 (Ind. 2001) (citing Timberlake v. State, 690 N.E.2d 243, 259 (Ind. 1997)).  
We agree that the responses at the “request of the defense attorney” were objectionable.  An 
objection to this reference and a motion to strike likely would have been sustained.  But trial 
counsel cannot be faulted for his strategy of declining to object.  There was no need to bring 
unnecessary attention to this matter arising as it did in the context of the State establishing a 
chain of custody.  In sum, Overstreet has not shown that counsel’s conduct was objectively 
unreasonable.  
 
III. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Penalty Phase 
 
Overstreet argues that his trial lawyers were ineffective at the penalty phase of trial 
because they: (a) misled the jury with an inaccurate stipulation; (b) failed to present additional 
mitigation evidence; (c) allowed spectators in the courtroom to wear buttons with a picture of the 
victim; (d) did not object to Overstreet wearing handcuffs; (e) failed to contest adequately the 
State’s DNA evidence; and (f) failed to present evidence negating aggravation.  We address each 
contention in turn.  
 
 
A. Inaccurate Stipulation  
 
Overstreet complains about his lawyers’ conduct of introducing into evidence a 
stipulation informing the jury that Overstreet’s mental health experts rendered identical opinions 
and diagnoses.  This allegation is based on the following facts.  Trial counsel retained the 
 
10
services of three mental health professionals: Dr. Eric Engum, a neuropsychologist, Dr. Robert 
Smith, a clinical psychologist, and Dr. Philip Coons, a forensic psychiatrist.  The only mental 
health expert that testified at the penalty phase of trial was Dr. Engum.  He had conducted a 
broad-ranging psychological evaluation of Overstreet consisting of a clinical interview and an 
extended mental status examination, including psychological history and testing.  Among other 
things, Dr. Engum testified that Overstreet had a “severely disturbed personality structure.”  Tr. 
at 5078.  Dr. Engum concluded that Overstreet had a “schizotypal personality disorder,” which 
he described as “among the most severe of the personality disorders.”  Id. at 5122.  According to 
Dr. Engum, Overstreet was severely mentally ill, although he was not psychotic at the time of the 
offense.  Noting that he also holds a law degree, Dr. Engum testified that Overstreet’s mental 
illness satisfied a statutory mitigating factor in that it was an extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance that substantially impaired Overstreet’s ability to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law.  Id. at 5135-36.  See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(c). 
 
Counsel was in possession of a report from Dr. Smith that showed he had diagnosed 
Overstreet with a schizoaffective disorder.  He would later testify at the post-conviction hearing 
that Overstreet’s schizoaffective disorder is a combination of schizophrenia and depression.  Dr. 
Smith’s pre-trial report concluded that Overstreet’s mental illness “played a significant role in 
his involvement in the instant offense.”  App. at 681.  
 
Dr. Smith was not called to testify at the penalty phase of trial.  Instead, counsel read into 
evidence a stipulation that provided in pertinent part that Dr. Smith examined Overstreet, that he 
rendered an opinion, and that “Dr. Smith’s opinion and diagnosis [are] identical to that of Dr. 
Eric Engum.”  Tr. at 5190.  Complaining that Dr. Smith’s diagnosis is not identical to that of Dr. 
Engum,6 Overstreet maintains that the stipulation was “false,” misled the jury, and that counsel’s 
conduct in presenting the stipulation to the jury amounts to ineffective assistance.  
 
                                                 
6 At the post-conviction hearing, Dr. Smith confirmed that his diagnosis was not the same as Dr. Engum, 
P-Cr. at 517, and testified that he had in fact diagnosed Overstreet as suffering from schizophrenia and 
major depression, i.e. schizoaffective disorder.  Id. at 522-23. 
 
 
11
The crux of Overstreet’s argument is the assertion that a schizoaffective disorder is a 
more severe mental illness than a schizotypal personality disorder.  Thus, the argument 
continues, “[Dr.] Smith’s testimony would have been significantly more helpful to Overstreet’s 
mitigation case than [Dr.] Engum’s.”  Br. of Appellant at 38.  
 
Assuming the accuracy of Overstreet’s assertion, he has failed to show that the outcome 
of the penalty phase of trial would have been any different.  First, it is not at all clear that a lay 
jury would necessarily appreciate the subtle and nuanced distinction between a schizoaffective 
disorder and a schizotypal personality disorder.  In any event, the jury heard extensive testimony 
from Dr. Engum about the seriousness of Overstreet’s mental illness.  As recited above Dr. 
Engum testified, among other things, that Overstreet was severely mentally ill, that Overstreet’s 
mental illness was an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and that Overstreet’s schizotypal 
personality disorder substantially impaired his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of the law.  At sentencing the trial court considered the reports of both Dr. Smith and Dr. 
Engum.7  We conclude not only has Overstreet failed to show that the conduct of counsel in 
entering into what may have been an inaccurate stipulation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, but also he has failed to show any prejudice resulted from counsel’s conduct.  
 
B. Additional Evidence of Mitigation 
 
Overstreet contends that counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to present 
additional mitigation evidence to the jury.  More specifically he faults counsel for not calling to 
testify his two additional mental health experts, Dr. Smith and Dr. Coons, and failing “to present 
Overstreet’s traumatic family background.”  Br. of Appellant at 39.  
 
                                                 
7 Acknowledging the stipulation “eliminat[ed] the need for Dr. Smith to testify,” the court noted that 
“[b]oth doctors submitted reports that were attached to the Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum” and 
that “[b]oth Dr. Smith and Dr. Engum urge[d] the Court to find the two defense mitigators present in this 
case, namely, that the Defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance 
when the murder was committed and that the Defendant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of the 
Defendant’s conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired 
as a result of mental disease.”  Tr. at 1300–01.  
 
12
As for claim number one, Overstreet recasts much of the same argument that we disposed 
of under section A.  That is, he complains that the jury did not hear the testimony of mental 
health professionals that diagnosed Overstreet with a more serious form of mental illness.  We 
decline to address this point any further.  Concerning claim number two, Overstreet is mistaken.  
The record shows that at the penalty phase of trial, among other witnesses, counsel presented the 
testimony of Overstreet’s mother.  She testified about the substance abuse of Overstreet’s father, 
domestic violence and alcoholism, and gave a detailed picture of Overstreet’s childhood as well 
as his adult life.  Tr. at 4993-94; 5005-06.  In addition, Overstreet’s school and childhood mental 
health records were introduced into evidence detailing Overstreet’s social and mental health 
history.  Id. at 5066, 5092.   
 
This Court acknowledges the importance of presenting mitigating evidence, particularly 
in capital cases.  Harrison, 707 N.E.2d at 783.  We have held that the failure to present mitigating 
evidence constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, warranting the vacation of a death 
sentence.  Id. (citing Burris v. State, 558 N.E.2d 1067, 1076 (Ind. 1990) and Smith v. State, 547 
N.E.2d 817, 822 (Ind. 1989)); see also Prowell v. State, 741 N.E.2d 704, 717 (Ind. 2001).  But 
that is not to say that counsel is required to present all available mitigation evidence.  Indeed 
after some investigation of a defendant’s background, even a reasonable decision to present no 
evidence of a defendant’s unstable childhood “complies with the dictates of Strickland.”  Burris, 
558 N.E.2d at 1075.  Thus, counsel is permitted to make strategic judgments not to present 
certain types of mitigating evidence.  Canaan v. State, 683 N.E.2d 227, 234 (Ind. 1997); see also 
Timberlake, 690 N.E.2d at 261 (“As a matter of trial strategy, a defense counsel in a capital case 
may decide what is the best argument to present during the penalty phase.”).  
 
In this case counsel did not fail to present mitigating evidence.  In fact, the trial court 
recognized that “without a doubt, he had an abnormal childhood,” and he “was raised in a very 
dysfunctional family and he does come from a broken home.”  Tr. at 5460.  After employing a 
mitigation specialist and conducting an investigation into Overstreet’s background, counsel made 
a strategic decision concerning the type and extent of mitigating evidence to present to the jury.  
This conduct does not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.  
 
 
13
C. Spectators Wearing Buttons   
 
Overstreet complains that counsel failed “To Object To Prejudicial Symbols Of 
Mourning In The Gallery.”  Br. of Appellant at 46.  He implies that the wearing of buttons by 
spectators was an attempt to influence the jury and argues it was inherently prejudicial to his 
right to a fair trial.  
 
The record establishes the following facts.  At the post-conviction hearing Overstreet’s 
trial counsel testified that at some point during trial they observed some spectators in the gallery 
wearing buttons with the picture of Kelly Eckart.  P-Cr. at 25-26, 69.  Affidavits from four jurors 
were also introduced.  Although worded slightly differently they provided in relevant part, “I was 
able to observe spectators in the courtroom.  Some of these people wore ribbons and button[s] 
with pictures of Kelly Eckart.”  App. at 793, 797, 799, 801.  No other evidence was presented 
concerning the buttons.  
 
This issue appears to be one of first impression in Indiana.  There are several cases from 
other jurisdictions in which the wearing of certain items of clothing or accessories led to a 
determination that the defendant was denied a fair trial.  See, e.g., Woods v. Dugger, 923 F.2d 
1454, 1460 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding the presence of numerous uniformed prison guards in the 
audience of a trial for the murder of a prison guard deprived defendant of a fair trial), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 953 (1991); Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding the 
presence of spectators wearing large buttons with the slogan “Women Against Rape” in the 
audience of a trial for kidnapping and sexual intercourse without consent deprived defendant of a 
fair trial); State v. Franklin, 327 S.E.2d 449, 455 (W. Va. 1985) (finding the defendant was 
deprived of a fair trial when several spectators, including the sheriff, wore MADD lapel buttons 
during a trial for driving under the influence which resulted in death). 
 
But jurisdictions have diverged widely in their treatment of what has been characterized 
as defendants’ spectator-conduct claims.  Several courts have rejected claims that defendants 
have been prejudiced by display of items worn by spectators.  See, e.g., Billings v. Polk, 441 
F.3d 238, 247 (4th Cir. 2006) (declaring that existing precedent “do[es] not clearly establish that 
 
14
a defendant’s right to a fair jury trial is violated whenever an article of clothing worn at trial 
arguably conveys a message about the matter before the jury”), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 932 
(2007); State v. Lord, 165 P.3d 1251, 1258-59 (Wash. 2007) (finding no constitutional 
infringement on the right to a fair trial when buttons bear the victim’s picture but contain no 
message); Davis v. State, 223 S.W.3d 466, 474-75 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (“Appellant does not 
cite any authority holding the display of [medallions bearing the victim’s picture] by spectators 
creates inherent prejudice.”); In re Woods, 114 P.3d 607, 617 (Wash. 2005) (concluding that 
ribbons worn by spectators did not prejudice the defendant); State v. Speed, 961 P.2d 13, 30 
(Kan. 1998) (finding no error in trial court’s refusal to direct spectators to remove buttons and t-
shirts); State v. Braxton, 477 S.E.2d 172, 177 (N.C. 1996) (finding no error in the trial court 
refusing to declare a mistrial because spectators were wearing badges with pictures of one of the 
victims).   
 
We are guided by the United States Supreme Court’s recognition that certain courtroom 
practices are inherently prejudicial because they deprive the defendant of a fair trial by creating 
an unacceptable risk of impermissible factors coming into play.  Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 
560, 570 (1986) (The seating of four uniformed state troopers in seats immediately behind the 
defendant at trial was not so inherently prejudicial that it denied the defendant a fair trial.  Rather 
“the question must be . . . whether an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors 
coming into play.”) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). 
  
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court determined it was not contrary to or an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law for a state court to hold that buttons 
displaying the victim’s image and worn by the victim’s family did not deny the defendant his 
right to a fair trial.  Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 654 (2006).  In that case, in which the 
defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and three related offenses.  On at least some of 
the fourteen days of trial, some members of the victim’s family wore buttons with a picture of 
the victim.  Prior to opening statements counsel moved the trial court to order the victim’s family 
not to wear the buttons during trial.  The trial court denied the motion stating that it saw “no 
possible prejudice to the defendant.”  Id. at 652.  On direct review the California Court of 
Appeals affirmed the conviction.  On subsequent habeas review the Ninth Circuit Court of 
 
15
Appeals reversed, finding that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme 
Court.8  Granting certiorari the Supreme Court disagreed, vacated the Court of Appeals’ 
judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.  In a concurring opinion, Justice 
Souter observed:  
 
[O]ne could not seriously deny that allowing spectators at a 
criminal trial to wear visible buttons with the victim’s photo can 
raise a risk of improper considerations.  The display is no part of 
the evidence going to guilt or innocence, and the buttons are at 
once an appeal for sympathy for the victim (and perhaps for those 
who wear the buttons) and a call for some response from those 
who see them.  On the jurors’ part, that expected response could 
well seem to be a verdict of guilty, and a sympathetic urge to 
assuage the grief or rage of survivors with a conviction would be 
the paradigm of improper consideration.  The only debatable 
question is whether the risk in a given case reaches the 
‘unacceptable’ level. 
 
Id. at 657-58 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).  We agree with these observations.  
 
In this case Overstreet has not shown that counsel rendered deficient performance for 
failing to object or otherwise move the trial court for an order directing spectators not to wear 
buttons.  For example, there is nothing in this record that tells us the size of the buttons, how 
easy it was for the jurors to see the picture on the buttons, the number of spectators wearing the 
buttons, how many days of trial the buttons were worn or, more importantly, whether any juror 
was in any way affected by the buttons.  On this record it is simply impossible to determine 
whether the risk of any improper considerations rose to an unacceptable level.  It is only at the 
                                                 
8 Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) a federal court cannot grant 
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a person in state custody with regard to any claim that was 
rejected on the merits by the state court unless the adjudication of the claim in state court either:  
 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 
 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
 
16
unacceptable level of risk that any plausible argument can be made that counsel’s inaction fell 
below the objective standard of reasonableness.   
 
D. 
Use of Restraints     
 
Overstreet next complains of “Counsel’s Failure To Object To The Use Of Restraints In 
The Courtroom.”  Br. of Appellant at 48.  The facts are these.  The trial record is silent regarding 
Overstreet’s appearance before the jury in restraints.  At the post-conviction hearing one of 
Overstreet’s lawyers testified “yes” to the question of whether he recalled seeing Overstreet in 
handcuffs in the courtroom and elaborated that he thought there was no need for handcuffs, 
because counsel “never saw anything that would indicate [Overstreet] was going to do anything.” 
P-Cr. at 68.  Counsel was not questioned further on this issue. 
 
Overstreet also introduced into evidence at the post-conviction hearing the affidavits of 
two jurors.  In relevant part they provided, “[o]n one occasion, I recall that the jury was already 
present in the jury box when the defendant was brought into the courtroom wearing handcuffs.”  
App. at 795, 797.  The State introduced into evidence affidavits from both jurors who clarified 
that the foregoing incident “happened only once” and that “when deputies brought Mr. 
Overstreet into the courtroom after the jury had been seated in the jury box, Mr. Overstreet’s 
handcuffs were immediately removed and he sat down at counsel’s table unrestrained.”  Id. at 
803, 805.  
 
There was extended colloquy between defense counsel and the post-conviction court 
judge (who also served as the trial judge in this case) about whether Overstreet was alleging 
being handcuffed during the guilt or penalty phase of trial.  When specifically asked which phase 
of trial to which Overstreet was referring, counsel responded, “We can’t be that specific, we 
don’t know whether it was guilt phase or penalty phase, in front of a jury, yes.  I don’t believe 
we know.”  P-Cr. at 111.  The court responded, “I have absolutely no doubt in my mind that 
before that jury was brought in every day during jury selection and during the guilt phase, that he 
was not handcuffed and he was not shackled and I know the officers were under strict orders in 
 
17
that regard . . . .  The penalty phase is another issue.  I, I do not have a recollection in regard to 
the penalty phase.”  Id. at 111-12.  
 
In its findings of fact the post-conviction court did not specifically resolve the question of 
what phase of trial some jurors might have seen Overstreet in handcuffs.  However, in rejecting 
Overstreet’s ineffective assistance claim, the post-conviction court concluded, “Petitioner has 
failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that jurors who saw Petitioner in handcuffs 
did so during the guilt phase of the trial . . . .”  App. at 486.  Overstreet does not contest this 
conclusion but asserts that he “presumes this incident occurred during [the] penalty phase.”  Br. 
of Appellant at 48.  
 
As a general proposition a defendant has the right to appear before a jury without 
physical restraints, unless such restraints are necessary to prevent the defendant’s escape, to 
protect those present in the courtroom, or to maintain order during trial.  Bivins v. State, 642 
N.E.2d 928, 936 (Ind. 1994).  This right arises from the basic principle of American 
jurisprudence that a person accused of a crime is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Wrinkles, 749 N.E.2d at 1193.  For this presumption to be effective, courts 
must guard against practices that unnecessarily mark the defendant as a dangerous character or 
suggest that his guilt is a foregone conclusion.  Id. (citing Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 567-68; Estelle 
v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976)).  
 
In arguing that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to object to his 
being handcuffed in front of the jury, Overstreet relies in part on Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 
(2005).  In that case the United States Supreme Court declared that routine shackling during the 
penalty phase of a capital trial, without a case-specific finding that security needs justify the 
shackling, violates a defendant’s due process rights unless the state shows beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the shackling did not contribute to the verdict.  Id. at 633, 635.  
 
 
18
There are at least two problems with Overstreet’s claim.  First, Deck established a new 
rule that does not apply retroactively here.9  Prior to Deck, Supreme Court precedent concerning 
shackling in the presence of the jury did not involve the penalty phase of a capital trial.  Rather, 
prior precedent involved shackling only before a determination of guilt.  See Illinois v. Allen, 
397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970) (holding that “no person should be tried while shackled and gagged 
except as a last resort”) (emphasis added).  In fact, until Deck, the Supreme Court had not at all 
addressed what one court has characterized as the “very different issue of shackling during the 
penalty phase of a capital trial where the defendant has already been convicted of a serious, 
violent crime by the jury.”  Marquard v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 429 F.3d 1278, 1311 (11th Cir. 
2005) (rejecting a capital defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to 
object to defendant appearing before the jury in shackles during the penalty phase of trial), cert. 
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2356 (2006).  Indeed the reasoning supporting the pre-conviction precedent 
did not dictate its applicability to the penalty phase of a capital trial.  Where a defendant is 
handcuffed before the jury, the paramount constitutional concern expressed by prior Supreme 
Court precedent is that the sight of a shackled defendant could suggest that the defendant is 
guilty.  Allen, 397 U.S. at 344.  In the penalty phase of a capital case, the defendant’s guilt has 
already been established.  
 
Therefore, the underlying rationale of the Supreme Court’s pre-conviction precedent did 
not dictate the penalty-phase rule established by Deck.  We have previously observed the 
distinction between the guilt and penalty phases of trial.  See French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 
821 (Ind. 2002) (After recognizing that the presumption of innocence no longer applies to the 
sentencing proceedings or the habitual offender phase, the Court found it was not a fundamental 
error to require the defendant to wear jail clothing, handcuffs, and shackles in front of a new jury 
for the habitual offender phase of trial.).  This distinction also has been echoed in other 
jurisdictions as well.  See, e.g., Hall v. Luebbers, 296 F.3d 685, 699 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding the 
use of shackles during the penalty phase would not necessarily lead jurors to conclude they must 
                                                 
9 Under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (plurality opinion), “a case announces a new rule when 
it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government [or] . . . if the 
result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”  In 
Daniels v. State, 561 N.E.2d 487, 489 (Ind. 1990), this Court adopted for Indiana the same principles of 
retroactivity as those announced in Teague.  
 
19
impose a death sentence); Marquez v. Collins, 11 F.3d 1241, 1244 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that 
the risk of prejudice is lessened when the complained of restraint comes only in the sentencing 
phase of a capital charge because the jury has just convicted the defendant for a violent crime); 
Bowers v. State, 507 A.2d 1072, 1078 (Md. 1986) (recognizing that being in the position of a 
convicted felon is unlike the ordinary defendant who at trial stands clothed in the presumption of 
innocence). 
 
We emphasize that at the time of Overstreet’s trial there was no clear constitutional, 
statutory, or common-law prohibition to a defendant appearing in handcuffs before a jury during 
the penalty phase of a capital trial.  Thus, even if counsel had objected to the handcuffs, the trial 
court would not have erred in overruling the objection.  And counsel’s representation cannot be 
deemed to have fallen below an objective standard of reasonableness for failing to anticipate a 
change in the law.  Harrison, 707 N.E.2d at 776 (stating the failure to anticipate or effectuate a 
change in the existing law does not constitute ineffective assistance under Strickland). 
 
Overstreet’s claim fails for another reason as well.  The post-conviction court found, 
among other things, “It is obvious from the totality of the evidence in favor of the Petitioner on 
this issue that any observation of the Petitioner in handcuffs was brief and inadvertent and not 
something the court allowed to happen on a regular basis during the trial.”  App. at 486.  
Overstreet does not challenge this finding. 
 
Deck forbids the use of visible restraints only during the guilt and penalty phases of 
courtroom proceedings.  The Supreme Court has not addressed the use of restraints when a 
criminal defendant in police custody is being moved about the courthouse.  Indeed throughout 
both the majority and dissenting opinions in Deck there is consistent use of language clearly 
indicating that being shackled during the entire proceeding, as opposed to being briefly and 
inadvertently seen entering the courtroom in shackles, is what the Constitution forbids.  This 
Court has long determined that a defendant is not automatically entitled to relief based on jurors 
momentarily seeing a defendant in restraints while being transported about the courthouse.  See, 
e.g., Underwood v. State, 535 N.E.2d 507, 518 (Ind. 1989) (finding that absent a showing of 
actual harm, the defendant was not entitled to mistrial on grounds that jurors saw him in 
 
20
handcuffs while in transit to jail); Smith v. State, 475 N.E.2d 1139, 1144 (Ind. 1985) (finding no 
abuse of discretion in allowing jury to see defendant wearing handcuffs and shackles while being 
transported to courthouse).  A number of jurisdictions have embraced this view as well.10 
 
We acknowledge that the foregoing authority pre-dates Deck.  But for reasons already 
expressed we believe it survives Deck and is still good law.  We conclude therefore that, 
assuming for the sake of argument counsel’s conduct in failing to object to a “brief and 
inadvertent” jury observation of Overstreet in handcuffs fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, Overstreet still has failed to show that but for counsel’s error the outcome of the 
penalty phase of trial would have been different.  That is to say, Overstreet has failed to show 
that but for the inadvertent and brief glimpse of Overstreet in restraints the jury would have 
returned a verdict recommending a sentence of a term of years rather than a death sentence.  See 
Fountain v. United States, 211 F.3d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding petitioner failed to 
establish prejudice because an objection to the shackling would not have likely altered the 
result). 
 
E. Failure to Contest Adequately the State’s DNA Evidence 
 
Overstreet complains that counsel rendered ineffective assistance because they “did not 
consult with an expert in population genetics” to refute the State’s DNA evidence.  Br. of 
Appellant at 56.  Here are the essential facts.  The State’s DNA evidence consisted primarily of 
swabs and slides from Eckart’s sexual assault kit.  At trial, State Police DNA analyst Jennie 
Wood testified that, using short tandem repeat (“STR”) testing, the sperm found in Eckart’s 
                                                 
10 “Most courts now agree . . . that a defendant is not denied a fair trial and is not entitled to a mistrial 
solely because he was momentarily and inadvertently seen in handcuffs by jury members.”  State v. 
Jones, 328 A.2d 41, 44 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974) (collecting cases); see also United States v. 
Lattner, 385 F.3d 947, 959 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1095 (2005) (holding that the defendant 
was “not entitled to a new trial simply because several jurors briefly observed him in handcuffs while he 
was being escorted onto an elevator”); United States v. Olano, 62 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] 
jury’s brief or inadvertent glimpse of a defendant in physical restraints is not inherently or presumptively 
prejudicial to a defendant.”); Allen v. Montgomery, 728 F.2d 1409, 1413 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that a 
defendant’s rights were not violated where jurors saw a brief glimpse of the defendant in handcuffs which 
“were removed as soon as he was brought into the courtroom”); Wright v. Texas, 533 F.2d 185, 187 (5th 
Cir. 1976) (“We have consistently held that a brief and fortuitous encounter of the defendant in handcuffs 
by jurors is not prejudicial and requires an affirmative showing of prejudice by the defendant.”). 
 
21
underwear was consistent with Overstreet’s DNA profile with a statistical significance of 1 in 12 
billion.  Another analyst called by the State, Dr. Michael Conneally, reached the same 
conclusion.  Dr. Conneally also examined a vaginal slide that showed a mixture to which 
Overstreet and Eckart could be contributors.  Using both STR and polymerase chain reaction 
(“PCR”) testing, Dr. Conneally concluded that the sperm found was consistent with Overstreet’s 
profile with a statistical significance of 1 in 4 trillion.   
 
Overstreet’s defense team had hired an independent laboratory to analyze the State’s 
DNA evidence.  Although trial counsel vigorously cross-examined the State’s witnesses, for 
reasons neither the trial record nor the post-conviction record reveals the results of the 
independent laboratory were not introduced into evidence.  Also, defense counsel did not call an 
expert witness to rebut the State’s DNA evidence.  
 
At the post-conviction hearing defense DNA analyst Dr. Laurence Mueller, a population 
geneticist, disagreed with the methodology Dr. Conneally used to reach the 1 in 4 trillion 
conclusion.  Dr. Mueller did not indicate what his conclusion would have been using a different 
methodology.  With regard to the sample taken from the victim’s body, he also testified that data 
from the Indiana Police laboratory suggested that although Overstreet could not be excluded as a 
possible contributor, another unknown person could have contributed the DNA found on the 
vaginal slides.  In rebuttal, Dr. Conneally disagreed. 
 
Overstreet argues that Dr. Mueller’s testimony of the possibility of another sperm donor 
on the vaginal swabs should have been presented to the fact-finders.  According to Overstreet, he 
“was prejudiced at penalty and sentencing phase, because this evidence would, when combined 
with other evidence presented at PCR, diminish his culpability.”  Br. of Appellant at 56.  
 
Major participation in the killing coupled with a culpable mental state is needed to satisfy 
constitutional requirements in finding the intentional killing while committing a rape aggravator.  
See Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921, 937 (Ind. 1998).  This issue often surfaces when 
determining who, among two or more actors accused of committing a crime, acted as principals 
and accomplices.  This is because although “an accomplice may be found guilty of the crime 
 
22
largely executed by his principal, it does not follow that the same penalty is appropriate.”  
Martinez Chavez v. State, 534 N.E.2d 731, 735 (Ind. 1989).  
 
Here, the evidence Overstreet presented goes to the possibility that a third party, 
presumably Overstreet’s brother Scott, may have participated in Eckart’s rape and murder.  It 
does not, as Overstreet argues, address his own culpability.  Further, although the evidence might 
implicate a third party, it does not disprove Overstreet’s major participation in these crimes.  See 
Saylor v. State, 765 N.E.2d 535, 556 (Ind. 2002) (rejecting the claim that counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance for failing to introduce additional evidence of mitigation implicating a third 
party in the murder of the victim), rev’d on other grounds.  In sum, Overstreet has failed to 
demonstrate that had this additional evidence been introduced, the outcome of the penalty phase 
of trial would have been any different.  
 
F. Evidence Negating Aggravation 
 
Overstreet complains that counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to secure an 
expert on eyewitness identification to challenge the testimony of one of the State’s witnesses.11  
The record shows that at trial the State called Amanda Chittum who testified that she saw 
Overstreet around noon on September 30, 1997, when her vehicle nearly collided with 
Overstreet’s van at a location close to the site where Eckart’s body was discovered.  According 
to Chittum, Overstreet’s van almost came to a complete stop, the vehicles were within 10 to 15 
feet of each other, and she got a good look at Overstreet’s face.  At the post-conviction hearing 
Dr. Roger Terry, an eyewitness identification expert, testified and noted probable problems with 
the accuracy of Chittum’s memory.  Overstreet asserts, “If the judge and jury had heard from an 
expert like Terry, and become fully educated in the weaknesses in Chittum’s testimony, there 
would have been a reasonable probability of a different sentencing result.”  Br. of Appellant at 
                                                 
11 In addition to this assertion, under the heading “Failure To Present Evidence Negating Aggravation,” 
Br. of Appellant at 57, Overstreet makes two additional claims: (1) counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance for their “Failure To Challenge (b)(1) Intent With Mental Health” and (2) counsel “Fail[ed] To 
Ensure The Jury Was Properly Instructed As To Weighing.”  Id. at 60.  Using slightly different language, 
both claims, which incidentally appear in four and three sentence paragraphs respectively, are a rehash of 
issues we have already addressed in Part III. A (discussing evidence of mental illness presented to the 
jury) and footnote 2 (discussing res judicata bar related to Apprendi and Ring).  We decline to discuss 
these issues further. 
 
23
59.  To support this assertion Overstreet contends, “In sentencing Overstreet to death the trial 
court relied in part on Chittum’s testimony in finding that Overstreet had a ‘lurid mind.’”  Id. 
(quoting Tr. at 1294).   
 
Both the assertion and the contention border on the frivolous.  First, the State alleged 
three aggravating circumstances: Overstreet committed the murder by intentionally killing Kelly 
Eckart while committing or attempting to commit rape; Kelly Eckart was the victim of rape for 
which Overstreet has been convicted; and Kelly Eckart was the victim of confinement for which 
Overstreet has been convicted.  Tr. at 962.  Overstreet does not explain, and we cannot discern, 
how a challenge to Chittum’s eyewitness identification could have any bearing on negating the 
State’s alleged aggravators.  
 
As for the trial court’s reference to Overstreet’s “lurid mind,” the record shows that in 
conducting an independent review of the jury’s death sentence recommendation the trial court 
entered a twenty-seven-page sentencing order that included the following:   
 
The Court finds that the aggravating factor found herein that the 
Defendant intentionally killed Kelly Eckart while committing rape 
should be given substantial weight and great consideration.  All of 
the factors as cited herein in paragraphs 15(b)(1) through 15(b)(9) 
point to the unmistakable conclusion that the defendant planned to 
abduct an unwitting and unsuspecting person on the evening of 
September 26, 1997.  The Defendant had a weapon and a plan he 
intended to follow through with.  The Defendant acted on his 
sinister plan by disabling his victim, raping her, killing her by 
strangling her with her own clothing, and dumping her partially 
clothed body in an area he had mapped out in advance to end his 
plan.  The acts of the defendant were calculated, cold-blooded, 
merciless, and sinister from beginning to end.  As further 
testimony to the Defendant’s lurid mind, the Defendant destroyed 
evidence in his van, tried to hide the victim’s shoes and socks, 
involved and threatened his brother, and approximately four (4) 
days after he threw the victim’s body into a ravine, he visited the 
site again for no apparent reason.  The manner in which the crime 
was committed, the motivation, the Defendant’s actions to conceal 
the body and other evidence of the crimes, as well as other 
attendant circumstances of the crime, are the type of considerations 
which augment the value of this aggravator.  
 
 
24
Tr. at 1294.  From the foregoing recitation, it is readily apparent that evidence Overstreet re-
visited the location where Eckart’s body was found – presumably corroborated by the testimony 
of Chittum – played a rather insignificant role in the trial court’s determination of the substantial 
weight given to the intentional killing while committing rape aggravator.  There is simply 
nothing in the record to support the notion that the trial court would have imposed, or the jury 
would have recommended, a sentence other than death had there been a more thorough challenge 
to Chittum’s testimony.  There was no ineffective assistance of counsel associated with this 
claim.  
 
IV. 
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
 
The standard of review for a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the 
same as for trial counsel in that the petitioner must show appellate counsel was deficient in her 
performance and that the deficiency resulted in prejudice.  Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 
193 (Ind. 1997).  To satisfy the first prong, the petitioner must show that counsel’s performance 
was deficient in that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
and that counsel committed errors so serious that petitioner did not have the “counsel” 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. 2002).  To 
show prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.  Id. 
 
 
When raised on collateral review, ineffective assistance claims generally fall into three 
basic categories: (1) denial of access to an appeal; (2) waiver of issues; and (3) failure to present 
issues well.  Id. at 193-95.  In alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Overstreet 
makes two claims: (a) counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to raise a claim of error 
based upon the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 
(1992) and (b) appellate counsel failed to challenge trial court error in using Overstreet’s mental 
illness as an aggravating factor rather than a mitigating factor.  His first claim falls under the 
category of failure to present issues well, and his second claim is based upon the waiver of issues 
category. 
 
25
A. The Espinosa Claim 
 
On direct appeal, appellate counsel argued that the jury was allowed to find two 
overlapping, impermissibly duplicative aggravating circumstances, and therefore the jury 
considered an inappropriate aggravating circumstance in its weighing process.  We disagreed and 
found that the (b)(1) aggravator (intentional killing during commission of rape) and the 
(b)(13)(D) aggravator (Eckart was a victim of rape) were not impermissibly duplicative because 
they were based on different underlying policy considerations.  Overstreet, 783 N.E.2d at 1162.  
We also determined that in its independent evaluation, the trial court correctly refused to weigh 
either the (b)(13)(D) aggravator or the (b)(13)(C) aggravator (Eckart was a victim of 
confinement) because the facts supporting them overlapped with the (b)(1) aggravator.  Id. at 
1167.  Overstreet now complains that our determination contravenes the United State Supreme 
Court’s holding in Espinosa and that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing 
to cite or discuss this case on direct appeal.  
 
In Espinosa, the jury was instructed that if the murder in that case was “especially 
wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel,” the jury could consider that fact as an aggravating circumstance 
in recommending a sentence of death.  Espinosa, 505 U.S. at 1080.  The jury returned a death 
sentence recommendation and upon independent evaluation the trial court entered judgment 
accordingly.  Accepting certiorari, the Supreme Court declared that the “wicked, evil, atrocious 
or cruel” instruction was unconstitutionally vague, and therefore held that the trial court violated 
the federal Constitution’s Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment in imposing 
a death sentence.  Id. at 1081.   
 
Claims of inadequate presentation of certain issues, as contrasted with denial of access to 
an appeal or waiver of issues, are the most difficult for defendants to advance and reviewing 
tribunals to support.  Bieghler, 690 N.E.2d at 195.  And this is so because such claims essentially 
require the reviewing court to reexamine and take another look at specific issues it has already 
adjudicated to determine “whether the new record citations, case references, or arguments would 
have had any marginal effect on their previous decision.”  Id.  
 
 
26
Here, as best as we can discern, Overstreet seems to argue that because the (b)(13)(C) 
and (D) aggravators merged into the (b)(1) aggravator the jury weighed improper aggravators.  
Thus, the argument continues, “[s]uch weighing contravened the Fifth Amendment protection 
against double jeopardy, the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee of reliability, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process protections.”  Br. of Appellant at 67.   
 
We fail to see how Espinosa helps Overstreet’s argument.  There, the aggravators were 
held to be improper because they were unconstitutionally vague.  No such claim is made here.  
Had appellate counsel cited or discussed this case on direct review, it would have made no 
difference in our disposition of Overstreet’s appeal.    
 
B. Mental Illness as an Aggravating Factor 
 
Overstreet contends that the trial court relied on his mental illness as an aggravating 
factor rather than a mitigating factor.  According to Overstreet, counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal.  
 
To show that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an issue on appeal thus resulting 
in waiver for collateral review, the defendant must overcome the strongest presumption of 
adequate assistance, and judicial review is highly deferential.  Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 
253, 260-61 (Ind. 2000).  Ineffective assistance is very rarely found in cases where a defendant 
asserts that appellate counsel failed to raise an issue on appeal.  Bieghler, 690 N.E.2d at 193.  
One reason for this is that the decision of what issues to raise is one of the most important 
decisions to be made by appellate counsel.  Id. 
 
To support his contention that the trial court relied on his mental illness as an aggravating 
factor, Overstreet directs our attention to the following excerpt from the trial court’s sentencing 
order:  
 
Defendant did little, if anything, to treat his condition as a young 
adult and his mother was quite the enabler for his recalcitrant 
behavior.  As an adult, the Defendant did not seek any treatment 
 
27
until approximately six months before the crimes herein occurred, 
despite the evaluations and facts which supported the need for 
therapy and medication. 
 
[T]he evidence also establishes that as Defendant became an adult, 
he continued to rebuke suggestions for on-going mental health 
treatment until 1997.  In any civilized society there comes a time 
when adults can no longer blame their actions as adults on what 
happened to them as children. 
 
Br. of Appellant at 69-70 (quoting Tr. at 1302, 1304).  
 
We first observe, “[M]ental illness at the time of the crime may be considered a 
significant mitigating factor.”  Castor v. State, 754 N.E.2d 506, 509 (Ind. 2001) (emphasis 
added) (citing Mayberry v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1262, 1271 (Ind. 1996)).  In any event Overstreet’s 
claim lacks merit.  The record shows that in its sentencing order the trial court expressly 
acknowledged, “The defense presented evidence of mitigating circumstances, and the Court has 
fully and carefully considered the same in determining whether a sentence less than death is 
more appropriate herein.”  Tr. at 1294.  In a lengthy and detailed recitation, the trial court then 
chronicled the evidence presented at trial supporting Overstreet’s claim of mental illness.  Id. at 
1297-1302.  The trial court acknowledged that “the Court finds the Defendant has shown the 
Court that he did suffer from an extreme mental disorder,” id. at 1301, but concluded that 
“[d]espite the Defendant’s mental condition, the evidence is too extensive for the Court to give a 
great amount of weight to this as a mitigating factor, but the Court does give low to moderate 
weight to it as a mitigating factor.”  Id. at 1303.    
 
Far from considering Overstreet’s mental illness as an aggravating factor, as Overstreet 
erroneously contends, the trial court specifically found Overstreet’s mental illness as a mitigating 
factor.  The portion of the sentencing order to which Overstreet directs our attention merely 
serves as a partial explanation of the trial court’s reasoning for assigning it low to moderate 
weight.  Appellate counsel cannot be faulted for failing to raise what would have been a 
meritless claim. 
 
 
28
V. 
Denial of a Fair Post-Conviction Hearing 
 
 
Overstreet complains that he was denied a fair post-conviction hearing.  He alleges: (a) 
the post-conviction court erred in the admission and exclusion of evidence; (b) the post-
conviction court erred in quashing a subpoena to the Johnson County Prosecutor; and (c) an 
inaccurate post-conviction hearing transcript denies him a fair appellate review of the post-
conviction proceedings.  
 
A. 
The Admission and Exclusion of Evidence 
 
Under this general heading, Overstreet makes three claims: (1) the post-conviction court 
erred in sustaining the State’s objection to the admission of demonstrative evidence; (2) the post-
conviction court erred in sustaining the State’s objection to the admission into evidence an 
affidavit of a defense witness; and (3) the post-conviction court erred in allowing a State’s 
rebuttal witness.   
 
(1)  
Demonstrative Evidence 
 
At the post-conviction hearing Overstreet presented four mental health experts that 
testified about various aspects of his mental illness.  During the testimony of one of the experts, 
Overstreet sought to introduce as a demonstrative exhibit excerpts from a motion picture about 
the life of a person diagnosed with schizophrenia.  Overstreet argued that the excerpts would be 
“of assistance to the Court in terms of showing how the . . . hallucinations and delusion 
symptoms work on a schizophrenic.”  P-Cr. at 532.  The post-conviction court sustained the 
State’s objection to the introduction of the exhibit.  “Demonstrative evidence is evidence offered 
for purposes of illustration and clarification.”  Wise v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1192, 1196 (Ind. 1999).  
To be admissible, the evidence must be sufficiently explanatory or illustrative of relevant 
testimony to be of potential help to the trier of fact.  Id.  By granting the State’s motion the post-
conviction court apparently concluded that excerpts from the motion picture would be of no help 
in illustrating or clarifying the witness’ testimony.  The record shows that the post-conviction 
 
29
court listened to hours of testimony and reviewed several documents detailing Overstreet’s 
mental illness.  We find no abuse of discretion in the court declining to allow into evidence a 
fictional story, albeit based on a true-life event that at most would have amounted to cumulative 
evidence. 
 
(2) 
Admission of Affidavit 
 
 
During hearings on August 16 and August 20, 2004, Overstreet sought to introduce into 
evidence the affidavits of three expert witnesses, one of which was Dr. Eric Engum’s.  The post-
conviction court sustained the State’s objection to the admission of these affidavits, but “allowed 
the Petitioner one additional day of trial on September 13, 2004, in which to present these 
experts for testimony and cross-examination.”  App. at 301.  At the September 13 hearing 
defense counsel informed the court that Dr. Engum was not available, would not be available 
until October, and requested the court to “give us another day in October and try and get Dr. 
Engum here to testify.”  P-Cr. at 839-40.  The post-conviction court declined to delay the 
proceedings any further and also declined to reconsider its ruling on the affidavit.  Id. at 840.  
 
Complaining that despite their best efforts counsel could not secure Dr. Engum by the 
date of the continued hearing, Overstreet argues that, “[g]iven the relevance” of the information 
contained in the affidavit, “the PCR judge abused its discretion in rejecting the affidavit.”  Br. of 
Appellant at 89.12  First, the problem with the affidavit is not one of relevance, but the ability of 
the State to question and cross-examine the affiant.  See Shumaker v. State, 523 N.E.2d 1381, 
1382 (Ind. 1988) (noting that the proffered affidavit was hearsay and improperly admitted 
because it was an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein 
and not susceptible to cross-examination).  Indeed, affording the State an opportunity to cross-
examine Dr. Engum, as well as other witnesses whose testimony Overstreet sought to present by 
way of affidavit, prompted the post-conviction court to sustain the State’s objection in the first 
place.  Second, Overstreet had nearly a month to make alternative arrangements to secure the 
testimony of Dr. Engum and apparently failed to do so.  Third, and perhaps most important, the 
                                                 
12 Dr. Engum’s affidavit provided in pertinent part that if he had been provided with certain information, 
he would have diagnosed Overstreet with schizophrenia as well as schizotypal personality disorder.  App. 
at 730. 
 
30
critical point of Dr. Engum’s affidavit – that he also would have diagnosed Overstreet as 
schizophrenic – was not only cumulative, but would have made no difference in the penalty 
phase of trial.  As we discussed earlier in Part III. A, Dr. Smith testified at the post-conviction 
hearing that he diagnosed Overstreet as suffering from schizophrenia.  And the jury heard 
extensive testimony from Dr. Engum about the seriousness of Overstreet’s mental illness.  In 
sum, the post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion in failing to allow Engum’s affidavit 
into evidence.  
 
(3) 
State’s Rebuttal Witness 
 
Overstreet also complains about the post-conviction court’s decision to allow the State to 
call a rebuttal witness.  The scope of rebuttal evidence lies within the post-conviction court’s 
discretion.  Brown v. State, 577 N.E.2d 221, 232 (Ind. 1991).  As we mentioned earlier, during 
the post-conviction hearing Overstreet presented four mental health experts that testified about 
various aspects of his mental illness.  After Overstreet had concluded his presentation, the State 
called Dr. Ned Masbaum, a forensic psychiatrist, to give “his opinions regarding the reports that 
have been offered by these experts.”  P-Cr. at 840.  Overstreet objected and complained that 
allowing Dr. Masbaum to testify was not consistent with the court’s case management schedule 
and Dr. Masbaum’s testimony was unnecessary because he could only rebut the testimony of Dr. 
Engum who did not testify.  After a lengthy discussion and argument by both sides, the post-
conviction court overruled Overstreet’s objection.  
 
Among other things, Dr. Masbaum testified that the trial court appointed him in 1998 to 
evaluate Overstreet for an opinion regarding his competence to stand trial and his sanity at the 
time of the offense.  Dr. Masbaum’s clinical diagnosis at that time was that Overstreet had a 
history of alcohol dependence.  He concluded that Overstreet had sufficient comprehension to 
understand the proceedings and to assist his attorneys in his defense.  Dr. Masbaum also opined 
that Overstreet was of sound mind at the time of the offenses and that he was able to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of his conduct.  Noting that he had reviewed the reports of various defense 
experts, including reports making the diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, Dr. Masbaum 
testified that “[Overstreet] had no schizophrenia when I examined him.”  Id. at 896.  He also 
 
31
testified that he stood by that conclusion despite the additional records he had reviewed in 
preparation for the hearing.  Id.  Overstreet vigorously cross-examined Dr. Masbaum, 
challenging his assumptions and pointing out that Dr. Masbaum did not review the post-
conviction testimony of Overstreet’s experts.  Id. at 905-13.   
 
On appeal Overstreet has not explained how he was harmed by the post-conviction 
court’s decision to allow Dr. Masbaum to testify.  Overstreet complains that he was “caught by 
surprise.”  Br. of Appellant at 90.  But the thoroughness of Overstreet’s cross-examination 
reveals that he was well prepared to meet any challenge posed by the testimony of this witness.  
We find no abuse of discretion here.  
 
B. 
Sustaining Motion to Quash Subpoena 
 
During the post-conviction proceedings Overstreet served a subpoena on the prosecutor 
of Johnson County directing him to appear in court for questioning.  Overstreet sought to explore 
a broad range of topics, including decisions the prosecutor made during trial as well as the 
prosecutor’s investigation of Scott Overstreet’s involvement in the death of Kelly Eckart.13  On 
motion by the Attorney General, the post-conviction court entered an order quashing the 
subpoena.  Overstreet complains the court erred.  
 
This Court has held: 
 
As a general rule, a prosecuting attorney cannot be called as a 
defense witness unless the testimony sought is required by 
compelling and legitimate need.  The trial court in its discretion 
may deny the request if the prosecutor does not have information 
vital to the case.  Where the evidence is easily available from other 
                                                 
13 More specifically Overstreet sought to pursue the following: “[k]nowing presentation of false 
testimony, [a]buse of the grand jury process, [i]nterference with the defense investigation, [i]mproper 
focus on Overstreet as a suspect, [s]uppression of material evidence, [i]njection of inadmissible victim 
impact evidence, [f]ailure to pursue other suspects, [e]ngagement in a pattern of misconduct, [p]ossible 
participation in causing Overstreet to appear before the jury in shackles, [w]ithholding information about 
benefits extended to a key witness, and [e]liciting prejudicial, inadmissible, and misleading evidence.”  
App. at 155.  According to Overstreet, “As to these areas, Hamner [the Johnson County Prosecutor] is the 
appropriate witness.  As trial prosecutor, he presumably has first-hand knowledge of these matters.”  Id.  
 
32
sources and absent “extraordinary circumstances” or “compelling 
reasons,” an attorney who participates in a case should not be 
called as a witness. 
 
Ingle v. State, 746 N.E.2d 927, 933 (Ind. 2001) (quotation omitted) (finding there was no basis to 
conclude that prosecutor had any information that was not easily available from other sources); 
see also Badelle v. State, 754 N.E.2d 510, 536 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (finding the defendant 
established a compelling and legitimate need for some of the information requested from former 
prosecutor, but the need was met by former prosecutor’s affidavit and the testimony of a deputy 
prosecutor), trans. denied, 761 N.E.2d 423 (Ind. 2001).   
 
Citing Ingle and Badelle, the post-conviction court determined that although Overstreet 
“may have a compelling need for the information sought, [he] has failed to show that the 
information is not available from other sources or by other means.”  App. at 167.  In this appeal 
Overstreet still makes no attempt to demonstrate that the information he sought is not easily 
available from other sources.  Instead he contends Ingle is not relevant and that Badelle is 
distinguishable on its facts.  Br. of Appellant at 91-92.  We agree with the post-conviction court.  
Overstreet’s failure to show that the information he requested is not easily available from other 
sources is fatal to his claim.  
 
C. 
Inaccurate Post-Conviction Transcript 
 
After the post-conviction court entered its order denying Overstreet relief, he thereafter 
filed a motion to correct and supplement the transcript of the post-conviction proceedings.  
Attached to his motion was an eighteen-page errata sheet, based on Overstreet’s review of audio 
discs, listing suggested corrections of misspelled words and transcriptions of testimony the court 
reporter found inaudible.  App. at 585-605.  Overstreet requested that the transcript be corrected 
consistent with his errata sheet and that a corrected transcript be submitted as a supplemental 
transcript in accordance with the Indiana Appellate Rules.14  The State responded arguing that 
although Overstreet for the most part correctly identified typographical, grammatical, or spelling 
                                                 
14 Indiana Appellate Rule 31(A) provides in pertinent part: “If no Transcript of all or part of the evidence 
is available, a party or the party’s attorney may prepare a verified statement of the evidence from the best 
available sources, which may include the party’s or the attorney’s recollection.” 
 
33
errors, Overstreet failed to show that these inaccuracies were material.  The post-conviction court 
denied Overstreet’s motion.   
 
Overstreet complains that the post-conviction court’s ruling violated his right to a fair 
opportunity to pursue his claims.15  Br. of Appellant at 94.  In support Overstreet relies in part on 
Ben-Yisrayl v. Davis, 277 F.Supp. 2d 898, 905 (N.D. Ind. 2003), where the district court granted 
habeas corpus relief to a petitioner in part because of inaccuracies in the transcript of petitioner’s 
capital trial.  On appeal to the circuit court, Judge Manion observed, “[T]his faulty record does 
not provide the foundation necessary to render due process to the defendant in this appeal.”  Ben-
Yisrayl v. Davis, 431 F.3d 1043, 1054 (7th Cir. 2005) (Manion, J., concurring). 
 
Ben-Yisrayl provides Overstreet no relief.  At stake in that case was the accuracy and 
reliability of the trial record.16  See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 361 (1977) (“[I]t is 
important that the record on appeal disclose to the reviewing court the considerations which 
motivated the death sentence in every case in which it is imposed.”); see also Dobbs v. Zant, 506 
U.S. 357, 358 (1993) (per curiam) (“We have emphasized before the importance of reviewing 
capital sentences on a complete record.”).  Importantly, the district court in Ben-Yisrayl 
determined that the record, in particular a transcript of comments the State made during closing 
argument, contained too many errors and uncertainties to enable the court to explore fully the 
existence and extent of any constitutional error.  Ben-Yisrayl, 277 F.Supp. 2d at 906.  
 
In this case the errors in the transcript are inconsequential.17  Significantly, our review of 
Overstreet’s post-conviction claims has not been impeded by inaccuracies in the transcript.  
                                                 
15 We note that Overstreet has not provided this Court with the audio discs that he contends are an 
accurate reflection of the post-conviction hearing.  Rather he invites us to “if necessary, order the audio 
version submitted to resolve any disputes about what was said.”  Br. of Appellant at 94.  As explained 
more fully we do not find it necessary to order the audio discs and thus decline Overstreet’s invitation. 
 
16 Indeed Ben-Yisrayl “argue[d] vigorously that errors and omissions in the record entitle[d] him to a new 
trial.”  Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 753 N.E.2d 649, 658 (Ind. 2001).   
 
17 For example, the transcript records some words as  “INAUDIBLE,” but apparently the actual words can 
be discerned from the audio discs.  In other instances witness responses are, according to Overstreet, 
inaccurately transcribed, for example, “it’s a form, a line” instead of “It’s a form of lying.”  App. at 596.  
 
34
Many errors listed are in portions of the proceedings that are not germane to the issues Overstreet 
has raised for review.  And just as important, Overstreet makes no claim that he has been harmed 
in any way by the inaccuracies.  For example, Overstreet does not contend that his presentation 
of the issues in this appeal have been in any way affected by the post-conviction transcript’s 
deficiencies, and Overstreet does not contend that his ability to advance a claim has in any way 
been adversely affected by the transcript’s deficiencies.  We find no error.   
 
VI. 
Mental Illness and Competency to be Executed 
 
Overstreet contends that his death sentence “should be prohibited under the United States 
and Indiana Constitutions” because he is “a severely mentally ill man.”  Br. of Appellant at 73.   
 
A. 
Federal Constitutional Claim 
 
The Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]he Eighth Amendment prohibits the State 
from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”  Ford v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 399, 410 (1986).  What is less clear however is who falls within the Eighth Amendment’s 
embrace.  The Court did not define insanity, instead leaving to the states “the task of developing 
appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon its execution of sentences.”  Id. at 
416-17 (plurality opinion).  In a concurring opinion Justice Powell declared that the Eighth 
Amendment “forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are 
about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.”  Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring).  More recently, 
in Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007) the Supreme Court again declined to “attempt 
to set down a rule governing all competency determinations.”  Id. at 2862.  However, the Court 
departed from the Justice Powell formulation and expanded upon the Eighth Amendment’s reach 
                                                                                                                                                             
And there are a number of spelling and punctuation errors.  See, e.g., id. at 590 (“Borgess” instead of 
“Borges”); id. at 605 (“Hailes’” instead of “Haile’s”). 
 
 
35
for persons with mental illness.18  It held that the lower court should have considered Panetti’s 
submission that he “suffers from a severe, documented mental illness that is the source of gross 
delusions preventing him from comprehending the meaning and purpose of the punishment to 
which he has been sentenced.”  Id. (rejecting the argument that a prisoner’s awareness of the 
State’s rationale for an execution is the same as a rational understanding of it).  The Court noted 
that the goal of retribution is served only when the prisoner can recognize “the severity of the 
offense and the objective of community vindication.”  Id. at 2861.  This goal is called into 
question when the prisoner suffers from a form of mental illness that distorts his or her mental 
state to the point that the prisoner’s “awareness of the crime and punishment has little or no 
relation to the understanding of those concepts shared by the community as a whole.”  Id.   
 
As we read Panetti, a prisoner is not competent to be executed within the meaning of the 
Eighth Amendment if (1) he or she suffers from a severe, documented mental illness; (2) the 
mental illness is the source of gross delusions; and (3) those gross delusions place the “link 
between a crime and its punishment in a context so far removed from reality” that it prevents the 
prisoner from “comprehending the meaning and purpose of the punishment to which he [or she] 
has been sentenced.”  Id. at 2862.   
 
In this case, there is no doubt that Overstreet suffers from severe, documented mental 
illness.  The record shows that three mental health professionals examined Overstreet shortly 
before his trial in 2000.  Dr. Eric Engum diagnosed Overstreet with schizotypal personality 
disorder, Tr. at 5078-79, Dr. Robert Smith diagnosed Overstreet with alcohol dependence and 
schizoaffective disorder, P-Cr. at 510, and Dr. Philip Coons diagnosed alcohol abuse, schizotypal 
personality disorder and dissociative disorder not otherwise specified.  Id. at 442.  In 2004, in 
preparation for the post-conviction hearing, both Dr. Smith and Dr. Coons re-evaluated 
Overstreet.  Dr. Smith concluded that Overstreet was now schizophrenic, stating, “It’s been 
documented for basically now over twenty years that [Overstreet] has a severe psychiatric illness 
that has grown progressively worse over time.”  Id. at 524.  Dr. Coons diagnosed Overstreet with 
schizophrenia – paranoid type – as a principal diagnosis, along with dissociative disorder not 
                                                 
18 Prior to Panetti, “Federal and state courts generally agree[d] that Justice Powell’s concurring opinion 
[set] forth the applicable constitutional standard.”  Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 136 F.Supp. 2d 1014, 1021 
(D. Ariz. 2001) (citing cases). 
 
36
otherwise specified, and a history of alcohol abuse.  App. at 703.  Also in advance of the post-
conviction hearing, Dr. Edmond Charles Haskins, a clinical neuropsychologist, diagnosed 
Overstreet with paranoid schizophrenia, which the doctor agreed, “reflects an extreme mental 
and emotional disturbance.”  P-Cr. at 612.  Further, Dr. Smith, Dr. Haskins, and Dr. Coons all 
testified that Overstreet was not malingering.  Id. at 453, 523, 603.   
 
The evidence presented to the post-conviction court demonstrates that Overstreet’s 
mental illness manifests itself in a variety of ways including “hallucinations and delusions” 
which are associated with believing that demons and angels talk to him and tell him what to do.  
P-Cr. at 519, 599-600.  “He again acknowledged that his doctors have tried to tell him that the 
devils and demons are not real but he maintained that ‘they do not know the truth.’  He explained 
that devils and demons have special powers and that they can disguise themselves as corrections 
officers, visitors, etc.”  App. at 686.  Overstreet described several incidents of these paranoid 
delusions where he believed that the demons imitated his sister, his mother, his ex-wife, and 
prison guards.  Id. at 673.  Additionally he believes that bad things reported on television, his 
wife’s asthma, and other accidents and injuries to his family members are caused by him slipping 
into negative thoughts.  Id. at 672, 687.  He discussed with Dr. Smith several experiences where 
he is uncertain if they were real or not.  For example, “[a]t one time, Mr. Overstreet believed that 
his ex-wife was hired at the Pendleton Correctional Facility and was harassing him by calling his 
name at night and during the day.”  Id. at 673.  Overstreet has a long history of dissociative 
disorders including: depersonalization (out-of-body experiences), derealization (feelings of 
unreality), amnesia, fugue (amnesia plus wandering), and feeling split into different personality 
states.  Id. at 706.  
 
It is clear that Overstreet suffers from a severe, documented mental illness and that the 
mental illness is a psychotic disorder that is the source of gross delusions.  However, fatal to 
Overstreet’s federal constitutional claim is that there was no evidence presented to the post-
conviction court one way or the other on whether Overstreet is aware of the punishment he is 
about to suffer and why he is to suffer it – the Ford standard as articulated by Justice Powell.  
Nor was there any evidence presented to the post-conviction court one way or the other on 
whether Overstreet’s psychotic delusions “prevent[ ] him from comprehending the meaning and 
 
37
purpose of the punishment to which he has been sentenced.”  Panetti, 128 S. Ct. at 2862.  Indeed 
the scant evidence bearing on this question includes Overstreet’s statement that “[E]veryone tells 
me that I did it, but I cannot believe them.”  App. at 687.  There was also evidence that 
Overstreet related that he sometimes has bad thoughts that his brother committed the offense, but 
his communication becomes vague and circular in reasoning, repeating over and over that he 
needs to have positive thoughts because his negative thoughts would otherwise result in harm to 
his family.  Id.  The record shows that although Overstreet continues to struggle with discerning 
“what is ‘real,’” there is no evidence that indicates he questions the reality of the crime occurring 
or the reality of his punishment by the State for the crime committed.  Id. at 689.  Thus, even 
under Panetti’s more nuanced articulation of the Ford insanity test, Overstreet does not qualify as 
insane under current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  In sum, Overstreet is entitled to no relief 
on his federal constitutional claim.  
 
B. 
State Constitutional Claim 
 
According to the majority Overstreet also is entitled to no relief on his state constitutional 
claim.  This view is expressed in the separate opinions of Chief Justice Shepard (joined by 
Sullivan), Justice Dickson, and Justice Boehm.  I respectfully disagree.   
 
 
Article I, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution provides, “Excessive bail shall not be 
required.  Excessive fines shall not be imposed.  Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be 
inflicted.  All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.”  
 
The United States Constitution establishes a minimum level of protection to citizens of 
all states.  See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).  But a state is free as a matter of its 
own constitutional law to confer rights above the floor of constitutional safeguards found in the 
United States Constitution.  See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 
(1980); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).  As Justice Brennan wrote: 
 
[T]he decisions of the [United States Supreme] Court are not, and 
should not be, dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed 
by counterpart provisions of state law.  Accordingly, such 
 
38
decisions are not mechanically applicable to state law issues, and 
state court judges and the members of the bar seriously err if they 
so treat them.  Rather, state court judges, and also practitioners, do 
well to scrutinize constitutional decisions by federal courts, for 
only if they are found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned, 
paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific 
constitutional guarantees, may they properly claim persuasive 
weight as guideposts when interpreting counterpart state 
guarantees. 
 
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv.  L. 
Rev. 489, 502 (1977) (footnote omitted).  This Court has explained on more than one occasion 
that when examining constitutional issues, claims based upon the Indiana Constitution should be 
analyzed separately from claims based upon its federal constitutional counterparts.  See Boehm 
v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ind. 1996); Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ind. 
1994); see also Randall T. Shepard, Second Wind for the Indiana Bill of Rights, 22 Ind. L. Rev. 
575 (1989).  I agree with this proposition.  And in this area of jurisprudence in particular, I 
continue to believe that “Indiana’s constitution affords even greater protection than its federal 
counterpart.”  Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 503 (Ind. 2002) (Rucker, J., dissenting) 
(expressing the belief that a sentence of death for a person suffering from severe mental illness 
violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment provision of the Indiana Constitution).  
 
 
In this case, precedent from the United States Supreme Court, albeit in a slightly different 
context, informs my view on the question of whether certain mentally ill prisoners should be 
excluded from execution.  In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Court held that 
executions of the mentally retarded violated the Eighth Amendment.  Importantly the Court 
declared that the basis for this prohibition is the mentally retarded person’s “diminished 
capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and 
learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the 
reactions of others.”  Id. at 318.  Of course, Indiana’s statutory prohibition on executing the 
mentally retarded predates Atkins by eight years.  I.C. § 35-36-2-5(e) (1997 Supp.).19  And there 
                                                 
19 Indiana Code section 35-36-2-5(e) (1997 Supp.) provides in relevant part: “If a court determines under 
IC 35-36-9 that a defendant who is charged with a murder for which the state seeks a death sentence is a 
mentally retarded individual, the court shall sentence the defendant under IC § 35-50-2-3(a),” which 
provides for a term of years.  
 
39
is no claim in this case that Overstreet is mentally retarded.  But the logic and underlying 
rationale of Atkins applies with equal force here.  See Corcoran, 774 N.E.2d at 502 (The 
“underlying rationale for prohibiting executions of the mentally retarded is just as compelling for 
prohibiting executions of the seriously mentally ill.”) (Rucker, J., dissenting).  That is to say, if a 
person who is mentally ill suffers from the same “diminished capacities” as a person who is 
mentally retarded, then logic dictates it would be equally offensive to the prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment to execute that mentally ill person.   
 
 
As recounted in detail above, Overstreet suffers from “a severe psychiatric illness that has 
grown progressively worse over time.”  P-Cr. at 524.  He exhibits diminished capacities to 
understand and process information.  Overstreet’s mental illness is also reflected in his “confused 
and disorganized thinking.”  Id. at 523.  His communication often becomes vague and circular in 
reasoning.  App. at 687.  He does not understand the reaction of others who try to tell him his 
hallucinations are not real.  Id. at 686 (“He again acknowledged that his doctors have tried to tell 
him that the devils and demons are not real but he maintained that ‘they do not know the 
truth.’”).   
 
 
Punishment is cruel and unusual under Article I, Section 16 if it “makes no measurable 
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment, but rather constitutes only purposeless and 
needless imposition of pain and suffering.”  Dunlop v. State, 724 N.E.2d 592, 597 (Ind. 2000) 
(quotation omitted).  Because I see no principled distinction between the diminished capacities 
exhibited by Overstreet and the diminished capacities that exempt the mentally retarded from 
execution, I would declare that executing Overstreet constitutes purposeless and needless 
imposition of pain and suffering thereby violating the Cruel and Unusual Punishment provision 
of the Indiana Constitution.  Therefore, I would remand this cause to the post-conviction court 
with instructions to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.  In all other respects, 
I would affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. 
 
40
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan, and Boehm, JJ., concur except as to part VI. B, and vote to 
affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.  
 
As to part VI. B, Shepard, C.J. delivers an opinion in which Sullivan, J. concurs and Dickson, J., 
and Boehm, J., deliver separate opinions. 
 
 
41
Shepard, C.J., as to the State Constitutional Claim. 
 
 
All five Justices join Justice Rucker’s opinion as to the resolution of Overstreet’s various 
claims, except as to Part VI. B. 
 
Part VI. B covers Overstreet’s contention that his mental illness renders him ineligible for 
the death penalty, citing Article I, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution.  This claim under 
Section 16 has already been decided adversely to his position.  Matheney v. State, 833 N.E.2d 
454, 457 (Ind. 2005); Baird v. State, 831 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. 2005).  Thus, the post-conviction 
court is being affirmed in all respects. 
 
Sullivan, J., concurs. 
Dickson, Justice. 
 
 
I concur with Justice Rucker's opinion with the exception of Part VI. B, which addresses 
Overstreet's state constitutional claim.  As to this issue, I agree with Justice Boehm that 
Matheney v. State, 833 N.E.2d 454, 456 (Ind. 2005), and Baird v. State, 831 N.E.2d 109, 115 
(Ind. 2005), both focused on a claim of mental illness at the time of the crime, rather than a claim 
of subsequent or enhanced mental illness.  But, although Overstreet may claim that the severity 
of his mental illness has increased over time, this assertion does not result in a violation of the 
Indiana Constitution.   
 
 
While both the federal Constitution's Eighth Amendment and Article 1, Section 16 of our 
1851 Indiana Constitution prohibit the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments," I cannot 
agree that the subsequent interpretation and application of Indiana's Section 16 necessarily 
follow in precise lock step with the ascendant federal formulation of Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  In this, I agree with Justice Rucker that claims based upon the Indiana 
Constitution should be analyzed separately from those based upon its federal constitutional 
counterparts.  But in contrast to Justice Rucker's conclusion, I consider the Indiana Constitution 
to provide different, rather than necessarily more, protection than the federal Eighth Amendment 
for persons with mental illness facing the death penalty.   
 
Justice Boehm notes federal decisions that, in the past fifty years, have interpreted the 
prohibition of cruel and inhuman punishment, calling for consideration of "evolving standards of 
decency."  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560-561, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1190, 161 L.Ed.2d 1, 16 
(2005); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01, 78 S. Ct. 590, 598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630, 642, (1958); cf. 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-13, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2246-48, 153 L.Ed.2d 335, 343-46, 
(2002) (considering a national consensus of the standards of decency); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 399, 406, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2600, 91 L.Ed.2d 335, 344 (1986) (taking into account 
"contemporary values").  Consideration of factors such as "national consensus" and "standards of 
decency," however, are not necessarily required when construing Indiana's Section 16.   
 
The text "cruel and unusual punishment" in Section 16, like the phrase "unreasonable 
search and seizure" in Section 11 of Article 1, strongly suggests that our framers and ratifiers 
intended and foresaw that these provisions would be understood and applied in light of the 
circumstances existing and values prevailing in Indiana at relevant future times.  When 
considering that the Indiana General Assembly has relatively recently spoken with legislative 
enactments defining the limited class of defendants eligible for the death penalty,1 prohibiting 
the death penalty for mentally retarded individuals but not for persons with mental illness,2 a
defining "mentally ill" and "mentally retarded" for purposes of criminal procedure and 
sentencing,
nd 
                                                
3 a sentence of death for a person not mentally retarded but suffering mental illness 
cannot be considered "cruel" or "unusual" under Section 16 in light of the clearly prevailing 
values in our state.  For these reasons, Overstreet does not prevail in the claim that his death 
sentence violates the Indiana Constitution.  
 
 
1 Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9 (last amended in 2007). 
 
2 Ind Code § 35-36-2-5 (last amended in 2007), and Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(a) (last amended in 
2007). 
 
3 Ind. Code § 35-36-1-1 (1981) (definitions of "insanity" and "mentally ill"), Ind. Code §35-36-9-
2 (last amended in 2007) (definition of "mentally retarded individual"). 
 
 
2
 
Boehm, Justice, concurring, and concurring in result as to Part VI. B 
 
I concur in all parts of Justice Rucker’s opinion except for Part VI. B.  For the reasons 
explained below, I concur in the result reached in the separate opinions of Chief Justice Shepard 
and Justice Dickson. 
I do not agree with the Chief Justice that prior decisions of this court have foreclosed 
Overstreet’s current claim that his execution would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of Article I, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution.  Specifically, neither of the cases 
cited by Chief Justice Shepard’s separate opinion as to Part VI.B of the majority opinion 
addressed a claim that the current mental state of the petitioner rendered the petitioner ineligible 
for execution.  Rather, Matheney v. State stated Matheney’s claim under the Indiana Constitution 
as that he “should be exempt from the death penalty because he was mentally ill when he 
committed the murder.”  833 N.E.2d 454, 456 (Ind. 2005).  Baird v. State was explicit in 
declining to rule on the issue Overstreet seeks to raise: “we do not discern a claim that Baird is 
presently not competent to be executed . . . .”  831 N.E.2d 109, 115 (Ind. 2005).  Moreover, 
neither case addressed anything more than the specific record proof, or lack thereof, of the 
petitioner’s mental state.  
 
I agree, however, that the Indiana Constitution affords no greater protection than the 
Eighth Amendment provides on this issue.  The text of the Indiana Constitution on this point is 
identical to the Eighth Amendment, and there is nothing in the history or judicial precedents of 
this state, or our constitutional debates, that leads me to conclude that the texts should be 
interpreted differently.  The Eighth Amendment prohibition against the execution of the insane 
rests significantly on evolving national standards of decency.1  I cannot conclude that the culture 
                                                 
1 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (“In addition to considering the barbarous 
methods generally outlawed in the 18th century, therefore, this Court takes into account objective 
evidence of contemporary values before determining whether a particular punishment comports 
with the fundamental human dignity that the [Eighth] Amendment protects.”); cf. Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560-61 (2005) (holding that the Court must refer to “‘the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’ to determine which 
punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion))); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-13 (2002) 
(holding that the determination of constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment includes both a 
of Indiana is materially different in this respect from the national consensus the Supreme Court 
of the United States has found.   
 
In the past few years, the Supreme Court has held that the federal Constitution prohibits 
the execution of both juveniles and the mentally retarded.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
567-68 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).  No such categorical prohibition 
has been placed on the execution of the mentally ill, even those whose disease is severe.  Rather, 
the Constitution has been held to prohibit only the execution of those who meet the standards set 
by Ford and Panetti.  Although I can certainly understand why the legislature might choose to 
prohibit the execution of all persons suffering from severe mental illness, that has not occurred in 
this state, and I cannot read Article I, Section 16 more expansively than the Eighth Amendment.  
Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by Chief Justice Shepard as to Part VI.B. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
national consensus of the standards of decency as well as the Court’s judgment of that 
consensus). 
 
2