Title: Rose v. Davis
Citation: 474 So. 2d 1058
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: July 19, 1985

474 So. 2d 1058 (1985)
Don ROSE and "S &amp; R Partnership"
v.
James R. DAVIS.
83-1107.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 19, 1985.
Christopher L. McIlwain of Hubbard, Waldrop, Reynolds, Davis &amp; McIlwain, Tuscaloosa, for appellants.
Ralph I. Knowles, Jr. of Drake, Knowles &amp; Pierce, Tuscaloosa, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
This appeal involves an alleged breach of a contract to construct a fish pond. Central to a determination of the questions raised on appeal is whether the contract was made with an individual in his individual capacity, or with the individual in his capacity as a partner in a partnership.
After a trial by jury, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants in the amount of $12,000, plus interest and costs.
Don Rose and "S &amp; R Partnership," defendants below, appeal from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict in favor of *1059 plaintiff Davis, and present three issues for review, as follows: (1) Whether the trial court erred by proffering verdict forms which allowed only joint liability, as opposed to individual liability; (2) Whether the plaintiff materially breached the contract, thereby excusing further performance by the defendants; and (3) Whether the jury's assessment of damages was based on speculation and conjecture. After a review of the arguments made by the parties in their briefs, we hold that the trial court did not commit error; therefore, its judgment is due to be affirmed.
Before discussing the facts and the law, we point out that defendant James Sprinkle did not appeal.
The facts of this case, briefly stated, are as follows:
In the summer of 1981, Davis, the owner, and Sprinkle, the contractor, entered into a contract whereby Sprinkle would construct a fish pond on Davis's land. Davis and Sprinkle agreed that the cost of the pond would not exceed $6,000, and that Davis would pay Sprinkle weekly according to the hourly rate for the use of certain machinery. In addition, the two agreed that the pond would meet certain height and width requirements. Rose, Sprinkle's co-defendant, was aware of the contract with Davis. In fact, Rose and Sprinkle, just prior to the execution of the Davis contract, had formed the "S &amp; R Partnership" to build ponds. Rose and Sprinkle's partnership agreement called for the splitting of all profits and losses incurred in the building of ponds and lakes.
Sprinkle commenced work on Davis's land at the end of August 1981. Sprinkle continued to work on the land for approximately one month. On August 27, Sprinkle told Davis he would not continue to work unless he was paid. On that day, Davis made a third payment to Sprinkle for $3,000. The total amount paid by Davis under the contract was $5,709.50, but Davis's payments were not made on a regular weekly basis. By the end of August, charges submitted to Davis totaled approximately $6,569.50.
The jury returned a verdict for Davis in the amount of $12,000. Rose and "S &amp; R Partnership" appeal.
Rose and the partnership contend that the trial judge erred in submitting verdict forms to the jury which failed to afford the jury an opportunity to delineate between the relative liability of the defendants. Under the facts of this case, we find no error.
It is undisputed that Rose and Sprinkle were partners in the "S &amp; R Partnership," and it is also undisputed that they entered the partnership intending to build ponds and to share profits and expenses incurred in their business.
In view of this evidence, the law relative to partnerships is applicable.
Rose testified that he was aware that Sprinkle had entered into a contract with Davis, and he also testified that he and Sprinkle planned to split any profits from the venture. The contract executed by Sprinkle was for the kind of work the partnership was created to perform; therefore, it is clear that the jury was authorized to find that Sprinkle's actions bound Rose and "S &amp; R Partnership" under Code 1975, § 10-8-49.
Furthermore, Code 1975, § 10-8-52, provides:
Appellants cite Hoffman v. Chandler, 431 So. 2d 499 (Ala.1983), in support of their argument that the trial judge should have proffered verdicts to the jury which would have allowed the jury to find individual, as opposed to joint, liability. We believe Hoffman is distinguishable from the instant case. In Hoffman, this Court reversed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against an ERISA trust and two individuals who acted as trustees of the trust. The basis of the reversal was the trial court's failure to proffer verdict forms to the jury which applied to each viable alternative verdict. Specifically, the Court found that the trial judge erred when he submitted verdict forms to the jury which "failed to afford the jury any opportunity to delineate between the relative guilt" of the two individual defendants. According to the Court,
431 So. 2d 505.
After reviewing the pleadings, the evidence, and the court's instructions to the jury, we are convinced that the principle of Hoffman should not apply here.
For example, the court in this case instructed the jury, as follows:
There was no objection made that this instruction should have been qualified, and the appellants have pointed to no requested instruction which would have clearly stated their positions regarding any individual liability of the defendants.
The defendants did object to the general verdict forms, as follows:
*1061 Assuming, without deciding, that the objection made preserved the claimed error,[1] we believe any error was at most harmless, because Rose did testify, as the trial judge noted, that he (Rose) was aware of the contract. Unquestionably, the partnership had been formed. We believe that these facts are, therefore, distinguishable from those in Hoffman.
Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct as to individual liability as opposed to joint liability.
Defendants contend that Davis materially breached the contract, thereby excusing further performance by them.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1976), circumstances significant in determining whether a breach is material include:
In the present case, Davis had tendered all but $290.50 of the contract price when Sprinkle stopped work on the site. Yet, the pond was less than half complete, according to plaintiff's theory of the case. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that Davis's breach by nonconforming payment was material.
Davis had substantially performed his contract obligations at the time of the breach; therefore, the defendants were not excused from further performance under the contract.
The defendants contend that the jury's assessment of damages was based on speculation and conjecture.
The trial judge instructed the jury on the issue of damages as follows:
The defendants interpret this instruction to mean that Davis was required to proffer evidence as to the value of the pond as completed, and as to the value of the pond had the contract been fulfilled. We disagree. We believe that the judge's charge meant that the measure of damages would be the amount required to place the plaintiff in the same position he would have been in had the contract been performed. There was expert testimony at trial that it would require approximately $15,000 to complete the pond in accordance with the contract specifications. We recognize that the evidence was conflicting on the "contract specifications," but the amount of damages to be awarded, if any, is largely left to the discretion of the jury. Feazell v. Campbell, 358 So. 2d 1017 (Ala.1978). Appellants, in their brief, argue:
In Fox v. Webb, 268 Ala. 111, 105 So. 2d 75 (1958), which is cited with approval in Lowe v. Morrison, 412 So. 2d 1212 (Ala. 1982), this Court, citing one of its prior cases, opined:
Appellants, in a reply brief, state:
We do not believe the holding in Lowe v. Morrison conflicts with the portion of Fox v. Webb which we have emphasized, because the Court in Lowe v. Morrison, cites Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 805 (1961), as its authority, and in that annotation, Fox v. Webb is included as a case which follows this proposition.
"The difference between the contract price and what it would cost to make the structure conform to the plans and specifications has sometimes been held the measure of damages where it appears the agreement was not substantially performed." Fox v. Webb, supra.
Upon a consideration of the arguments and the law, and applying that law to the evidence adduced, we cannot say that the jury verdict awarding the plaintiff $12,000 was based on speculation and conjecture.
The judgment is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and JONES, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
[1]  Rule 50, Ala.R.Civ.P., states, in part:

"Additional instructions shall be submitted in writing, except that with respect to any additional instruction taken from Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions, it shall be sufficient to identify said instruction on the record by reference to the number and title of said pattern jury instruction."