Title: People v. Addison
Citation: 2023 IL 127119
Docket Number: 127119
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: April 20, 2023

2023 IL 127119 
 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 
 
(Docket No. 127119) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.  
DION ADDISON, Appellee. 
 
 
Opinion filed April 20, 2023. 
 
 
JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
 
Justices Neville, Holder White, Cunningham, and O’Brien concurred in the 
judgment and opinion. 
 
Chief Justice Theis dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Overstreet. 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
At issue is whether (1) postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable 
assistance by failing to frame the issues in defendant Dion Addison’s amended 
postconviction petition as ones of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and, if 
so, (2) the appellate court properly remanded the case for compliance with Illinois 
 
 
 
 
 
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Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017) without considering the merits of 
the petition. We answer both questions in the affirmative and therefore affirm the 
appellate court’s judgment.  
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
On February 22, 2012, defendant, Dion Addison, was charged by indictment 
with unlawful possession of a motor vehicle, unlawful possession of a converted 
motor vehicle, forgery, and two counts of theft. The charges arose out of his alleged 
use of counterfeit money to purchase a motorcycle. He was released on bond. 
Defendant failed to appear for trial and was tried in absentia.  
¶ 4 
 
The jury convicted defendant on all counts. The Kane County circuit court 
entered judgment on the guilty verdicts and scheduled the sentencing hearing for 
March 20, 2013. On March 19, 2013, new posttrial counsel filed a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. The trial court denied that 
motion and sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of 15 years’ imprisonment 
for unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle and five years’ imprisonment for 
forgery. 
¶ 5 
 
Shortly thereafter, defendant was arrested. He appeared with posttrial counsel 
for a hearing on his motion to reconsider sentence. The trial court denied that 
motion, and defendant appealed. 
¶ 6 
 
On September 24, 2014, defendant spoke on the telephone with appellate 
counsel. The next day, appellate counsel sent a letter to defendant memorializing 
their telephone conversation. Appellate counsel told defendant, “As I mentioned 
during our conversation, the only issue that I found to raise in the appeal was that 
you are entitled to credit for one more day against your sentence. I wish that I could 
have found an issue that would provide a basis for overturning your conviction or 
reducing your sentence more substantially, but unfortunately I was unable to do 
so.” Appellate counsel did not file a brief on the merits. Instead, counsel filed an 
agreed motion regarding the sentencing credit. In that motion, appellate counsel 
stated, “After reviewing the complete record on appeal in this case, undersigned 
counsel has determined that there are no meritorious issues, except for an issue 
concerning the amount of credit that should be applied toward the defendant’s 
 
 
 
 
 
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prison sentences.” On October 23, 2014, the appellate court granted that motion 
and awarded defendant two days’ credit in a minute order. 
¶ 7 
 
On March 25, 2015, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition, 
contending that “trial counsel was deficient in failing to give a good faith defense, 
failing to investigate, argue points of evidence favorable to defendant, and give 
defense theory” and that appellate counsel was deficient in failing to raise issues 
and investigate. Defendant proceeded to render his constitutional claims in more 
detail, raising 15 issues. In 14 of those, defendant alleged that appellate counsel 
failed to raise the issue. Defendant included his own affidavit as support for his 
petition.  
¶ 8 
 
The trial court advanced the petition to the second stage and appointed counsel 
on May 15, 2015. More than two years later, on July 17, 2017, postconviction 
counsel filed an amended petition. The petition asserted five claims: (1) trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress statements on 
grounds of improper Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966)); (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress 
statements on grounds that defendant’s statement was involuntary; (3) trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to object to expert testimony regarding counterfeit 
currency when no expert was disclosed; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to argue sufficiency of the evidence where there was a discrepancy in the number 
of notes recovered, inventoried, and introduced as evidence; and (5) the court erred 
in giving an accountability instruction to the jury. Counsel developed each of these 
claims over multiple pages of the amended petition. The petition did not assert any 
claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and nowhere alleged any way 
in which appellate counsel was ineffective. Postconviction counsel also filed a Rule 
651(c) certificate, stating that she had consulted with defendant to ascertain his 
constitutional claims, she had examined the court file and trial record, and she had 
made any amendments to defendant’s pro se petition necessary to adequately 
present his claims. 
¶ 9 
 
The State filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition, arguing that 
defendant’s claims were forfeited because they could have been raised on direct 
appeal. Moreover, the State pointed out that defendant had failed to challenge his 
 
 
 
 
 
- 4 - 
appellate counsel’s strategic decision not to raise these issues on appeal. The motion 
also alleged that the petition’s claims were without merit.  
¶ 10 
 
On July 10, 2018, a hearing was held on the State’s motion to dismiss. At that 
hearing, the State continued to point out that these claims could have been raised 
on direct appeal and that ineffective assistance of appellate counsel had not been 
alleged. The State made arguments such as: 
 
“Again, counsel was not ineffective. And, Judge, this claim is waived 
anyways, procedurally barred where defendant could have raised it on direct 
appeal but did not. And the strategy of appellate counsel has not been 
challenged. 
 
 
 
 
 
* * * 
 
Again, judge, this is another claim that was available on appeal and not 
raised. And, again, as the strategy of counsel has not been challenged, this 
claim, too, is procedurally barred.” (Emphasis added.) 
Postconviction counsel presented a lengthy argument in opposition to the motion 
to dismiss and never once countered the State’s assertion that she had failed to 
allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  
¶ 11 
 
After listening to the parties’ arguments, the only questions the trial court had 
for postconviction counsel concerned the State’s forfeiture argument: 
 
“[THE COURT]: One of the arguments that hasn’t been addressed in great 
detail but is addressed in the State’s motion to dismiss is the concept of waiver. 
 
And so could you address why you don’t believe that these issues that you 
have addressed would not and could not have been raised on direct appeal? 
 
[POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL]: Your Honor, on information and 
belief, having spoken to my client, his appellate counsel represented to him that 
if it wasn’t specifically argued at trial that he could not use that information. 
 
 
 
 
 
* * * 
 
[THE COURT]: *** I am just asking on the waiver argument. 
 
 
 
 
 
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Everything that has been presented by way of the amended [postconviction 
petition] are arguments that I believe could have been made on direct appeal. 
Arguments that you have brought forth are all matters that were in the record. 
 
So you don’t have to answer. I just wondered if you wished to address it. 
 
 
 
 
 
* * * 
 
[POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL]: Other than that perhaps there was the 
same oversight on the appellate level as the trial counsel had.” 
¶ 12 
 
The trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, stating that the defendant 
was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he “failed to make a substantial 
showing of any violation of a Constitutional right.” The trial court also entered a 
written order, which concluded that the defendant “failed to make a substantial 
showing of a violation of a constitutional right.” Neither in open court nor in the 
written order dismissing the petition did the trial court discuss the merits of 
defendant’s claims. The defendant appealed, arguing that postconviction counsel 
rendered unreasonable assistance in failing to file his affidavit and failing to argue 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
¶ 13 
 
The appellate court reversed and remanded. 2021 IL App (2d) 180545. The 
appellate court initially rejected the State’s argument that the defendant forfeited 
collateral review of his conviction by failing to appear at trial. Id. ¶ 20. The court 
then turned to the merits, addressing the defendant’s contention that postconviction 
counsel rendered unreasonable assistance by failing to amend his pro se petition 
with ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims. Id. ¶ 27. 
¶ 14 
 
The appellate court explained that any postconviction claims that could have 
been raised on direct appeal, but were not, are forfeited. Id. ¶ 28. However, the court 
explained that this forfeiture may be overcome by framing the issues as ones of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the issues on direct 
appeal. Id. Here, postconviction counsel failed to do so. The appellate court noted 
that postconviction counsel alleged multiple claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel but did not address the performance of appellate counsel. Id. ¶ 29. Further, 
she did not attempt to present such claims in response to the State’s motion to 
dismiss, which had raised the issue of forfeiture. Id. The appellate court concluded 
 
 
 
 
 
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that postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance by failing to frame 
defendant’s claims as ones of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing 
to raise the claims on direct appeal. Id. The court noted that in People v. Turner, 
187 Ill. 2d 406, 414 (1999), this court held that a failure of postconviction counsel 
to make a routine amendment to a petition in order to overcome a procedural bar is 
“ ‘patently unreasonable.’ ” 2021 IL App (2d) 180545, ¶ 28 (quoting People v. 
Kluppelberg, 327 Ill. App. 3d 939, 947 (2002)). Thus, the court determined that a 
remand was required. The court cited People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 47 (2007), 
for the proposition that, where appointed counsel has not complied with Rule 
651(c), a remand is required regardless of whether the petition’s claims have any 
merit. 2021 IL App (2d) 180545, ¶ 30.  
¶ 15 
 
This court allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) 
(eff. Oct. 1, 2020).  
 
¶ 16 
 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 17 
 
The State raises two issues. First, the State argues that defendant failed to rebut 
the presumption of reasonable assistance of counsel that arose from postconviction 
counsel’s filing of a Rule 651(c) certificate. According to the State, postconviction 
counsel was not required to pursue a meritless claim of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel. Second, the State contends that, even if postconviction counsel 
provided unreasonable assistance, defendant is not entitled to a remand unless she 
can show prejudice. We review a trial court’s dismissal of a postconviction petition 
at the second stage de novo. People v. Dupree, 2018 IL 122307, ¶ 29. Additionally, 
when the issue concerns the proper interpretation of a supreme court rule, our 
review is de novo. People v. Henderson, 217 Ill. 2d 449, 458 (2005). 
¶ 18 
 
Under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act), a criminal defendant may claim 
that “in the proceedings which resulted in his or her conviction there was a 
substantial denial of his or her rights under the Constitution of the United States or 
of the State of Illinois or both.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2016). The Act 
provides a three-stage mechanism for a defendant to advance such a claim. See 
People v. Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 29. At the first stage, the trial court must 
independently review the petition within 90 days of its filing and determine whether 
it is frivolous or patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2016). If 
 
 
 
 
 
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the petition is not summarily dismissed, it must be docketed for further 
consideration in the second stage. Id. § 122-2.1(b). At the second stage, the trial 
court may appoint counsel to assist an indigent defendant. Id. § 122-4.  
¶ 19 
 
In a postconviction proceeding, there is no constitutional right to the assistance 
of counsel. See Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 30. Instead, the right to counsel is a 
matter of “legislative grace.” People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 73 (1988). That is, a 
postconviction petitioner is entitled only to the level of assistance granted by the 
Act, which we have labeled a “ ‘reasonable’ level of assistance” (People v. Flores, 
153 Ill. 2d 264, 276 (1992)), which is less than that afforded by the federal and state 
constitutions (People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 472 (2006)). We have explained 
that the distinction is rational “because trial counsel plays a different role than 
counsel in post-conviction proceedings.” People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 364 
(1990). At trial, counsel “acts as a shield” to protect a defendant from being stripped 
of the presumption of innocence. Id. Postconviction petitioners, by contrast, have 
already been stripped of the presumption of innocence and have generally failed to 
obtain relief on direct review of their convictions. Id. at 365. The petitioner, rather 
than the State, initiates the proceeding by claiming that constitutional violations 
occurred at his trial. Id. Counsel is appointed not to protect postconviction 
petitioners from the prosecutorial forces of the State but to shape their complaints 
into the proper legal form and to present those complaints to the court. Id. 
¶ 20 
 
To ensure that postconviction petitioners receive that level of assistance, Rule 
651(c) provides: 
 
“The record filed in that court shall contain a showing, which may be made 
by the certificate of petitioner’s attorney, that the attorney has consulted with 
petitioner by phone, mail, electronic means or in person to ascertain his or her 
contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights, has examined the record of 
the proceedings at the trial, and has made any amendments to the petitions filed 
pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s 
contentions.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). 
¶ 21 
 
Compliance with the rule is mandatory (People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 50 
(2007)), but once postconviction counsel files a Rule 651(c) certificate, a rebuttable 
presumption of reasonable assistance arises (Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 32). The 
defendant bears the burden of overcoming that presumption by showing that 
 
 
 
 
 
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postconviction counsel did not substantially comply with the strictures of the rule. 
People v. Gallano, 2019 IL App (1st) 160570, ¶ 26. The defendant may do so by, 
inter alia, demonstrating that postconviction counsel did not make all necessary 
amendments to the pro se petition. See Turner, 187 Ill. 2d at 412 (citing People v. 
Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 238 (1993)). This includes making amendments that are 
necessary to overcome procedural bars. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d at 44. 
 
¶ 22 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Failure to Provide Reasonable Assistance 
¶ 23 
 
Here, we hold that postconviction counsel failed to provide defendant with the 
reasonable assistance of counsel. Defendant’s pro se petition raised 15 issues. The 
petition shows that defendant understood the need to frame his issues as ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel. When a petitioner is asserting claims that could 
have been raised on direct appeal, he can avoid the procedural bar of forfeiture by 
casting his claims as ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise 
the issues on direct appeal. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d at 413. For 14 of his claims, 
defendant specifically alleged that appellate counsel had failed to raise them on 
appeal. He further alleged that his constitutional rights were violated by appellate 
counsel’s failure to conduct a proper investigation and to raise these issues on 
appeal.  
¶ 24 
 
Postconviction counsel determined that some of defendant’s claims were worth 
pursuing and filed an amended petition raising five issues. Although these were all 
issues that could have been raised on direct appeal, the petition did not assert any 
claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and nowhere alleged any way 
in which appellate counsel was ineffective.1 Thus, we are faced with the unusual 
 
 
1In the petition’s conclusion, it stated that “Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel 
during pre-trial proceedings, during post-trial proceedings, and at the appellate level.” The State has 
never contended—nor could it—that this was a substantive claim of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel. The petition contains no explanation of how appellate counsel was ineffective. 
For instance, it is nowhere alleged that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the 
claims asserted in the petition. Moreover, even if one were to assume for the sake of argument that 
these few words in the petition’s conclusion were a “claim,” that would not end our inquiry. Rule 
651(c) requires that appointed counsel make any amendments to the pro se petition that are 
“necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s contentions.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. 
R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). Postconviction counsel’s obligation is to present the defendant’s 
postconviction claims to the court in the appropriate legal form. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d at 245. We 
could obviously not consider this an adequate presentation of an ineffective assistance of appellate 
 
 
 
 
 
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situation in which postconviction counsel, in one significant sense, made the pro se 
petition worse by amending it.  
¶ 25 
 
When the State filed its motion to dismiss, it led off by arguing that all of 
defendant’s claims were forfeited because he could have raised them on direct 
appeal. The State pointed out that defendant had failed to challenge his appellate 
counsel’s strategic decision not to raise these issues on appeal. Postconviction 
counsel did not thereafter amend the petition in response to the State’s forfeiture 
argument. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the State continued to point out 
that these claims could have been raised on direct appeal and that ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel had not been alleged. The State made arguments 
such as: 
 
“Again, counsel was not ineffective. And, Judge, this claim is waived 
anyways, procedurally barred where defendant could have raised it on direct 
appeal but did not. And the strategy of appellate counsel has not been 
challenged. 
 
 
 
 
 
* * * 
 
Again, judge, this is another claim that was available on appeal and not 
raised. And, again, as the strategy of counsel has not been challenged, this 
claim, too, is procedurally barred.” (Emphasis added.) 
Postconviction counsel presented a lengthy argument in opposition to the motion 
to dismiss and never once countered the State’s assertion that she had failed to 
allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We cannot hold that 
postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance where she identified several 
claims that she believed were worth pursuing but did not make the necessary 
 
counsel claim when (1) it is raised in such an obscure way that no one recognizes it as being in the 
petition, (2) the petition fails to set forth any way in which appellate counsel was ineffective, (3) the 
State moves to dismiss the petition on the basis that it contains no ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel claim, (4) postconviction counsel never challenges the State’s assertion that the petition 
contains no allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and (5) the trial court rules on 
the petition with the understanding that it contains no claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel. Thus, even if one were to assume for the sake of argument that postconviction counsel had 
asserted a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in the petition, she clearly did not do 
so in a way that complied with Rule 651(c).  
 
 
 
 
 
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amendments to put the claims in their proper form. Worse than that, she eliminated 
the necessary allegations that defendant had included in the pro se petition. 
¶ 26 
 
For several reasons, the State argues that postconviction counsel’s performance 
was not unreasonable. First, the State cites People v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192, 205 
(2004), for the proposition that the requirement that postconviction counsel make 
any necessary amendment to the pro se petition does not mean that counsel is 
required to advance frivolous or spurious claims. Greer explained that, “[i]f 
amendments to a pro se postconviction petition would only further a frivolous or 
patently nonmeritorious claim, they are not ‘necessary’ within the meaning of the 
rule.” Id. Greer is inapposite. In Greer, the postconviction petition was advanced 
to the second stage only because the trial court failed to rule on it within 90 days. 
Id. at 200. Thus, there had been no determination that the petition presented the gist 
of a meritorious claim. Id. at 202. The trial court appointed counsel, and counsel 
later moved to withdraw because the defendant’s issues were not meritorious and 
he could find no other meritorious issues to raise. Id. at 200. Here, by contrast, the 
trial court advanced the petition to the second stage because it determined that it 
stated the gist of a meritorious claim. Postconviction counsel reviewed the petition 
and determined that five claims were worth pursuing. However, counsel failed to 
shape the claims into the proper form. We fail to see how it can be reasonable 
assistance of counsel for an attorney to identify claims worth pursuing but then fail 
to shape them into proper form.  
¶ 27 
 
Second, the State argues that this case differs from Turner because in that case 
the appointed counsel also provided unreasonable assistance in other ways, such as 
failing to make other necessary amendments to the petition and failing to attach an 
affidavit. Turner held that postconviction counsel’s performance was unreasonable 
given the “totality of circumstances.” Turner, 187 Ill. 2d at 414. We note that 
defendant in the present case also alleged that his counsel was unreasonable in 
failing to attach the affidavit that he had attached to his pro se petition, but the 
appellate court deemed it unnecessary to address that issue because the failure to 
allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel necessitated a remand. See 2021 
IL App (2d) 180545, ¶ 33. More importantly, however, this court was clear in 
Turner that the failure to allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when 
necessary to overcome a forfeiture was a violation of Rule 651(c). See Turner, 187 
Ill. 2d at 412-13; see also Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d at 44 (citing Turner, 187 Ill. 2d at 
 
 
 
 
 
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412-14 (Rule 651(c) requires counsel to amend the pro se petition to allege 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to avoid the procedural bar of waiver)). 
And from defendant’s standpoint, there is no difference between the two situations. 
The failure to shape defendant’s claims into their proper form violates Rule 651(c), 
and the effect of this violation is the same regardless of whether counsel’s 
performance was also deficient in other ways.  
¶ 28 
 
The State further points out that there was no Rule 651(c) certificate filed in 
Turner. The State argues that the fact that a Rule 651(c) violation occurs when 
counsel fails to make a necessary allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel does not mean that such a failure necessarily overcomes the presumption 
created by filing a certificate. This argument makes little sense. It is difficult to 
imagine what would more clearly rebut the presumption created by the certificate 
than the record demonstrating what this court has already defined to be a clear 
violation of Rule 651(c).  
¶ 29 
 
The State next contends that this court was incorrect in Turner when it stated 
that, if counsel had alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the claims 
would not have been barred by waiver. See Turner, 187 Ill. 2d at 413. The State 
claims that this court later held in People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, that only a 
meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel overcomes 
forfeiture. Once again, the State is comparing cases that were decided in different 
procedural settings. Turner involved a second-stage dismissal of a postconviction 
petition where the circuit court granted the State’s motion to dismiss because all of 
the defendant’s claims could have been raised on direct appeal. The analysis 
centered on what duties Rule 651(c) requires at the second stage. English involved 
a denial of a petition after a third-stage hearing. This court concluded that the issue 
the defendant was pursuing was forfeited because it could have been raised on 
direct appeal. Id. ¶ 31. This court then considered defendant’s argument that, if this 
court found the issue forfeited, then it should conclude that appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise it on direct appeal. Id. ¶ 32. This court then considered 
defendant’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim substantively, by 
applying the test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). English, 
2013 IL 112890, ¶ 33. The court determined that, at the time of the defendant’s 
direct appeal, precedent did not support the issue that the defendant was raising in 
his postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 35. Accordingly, it was not unreasonable for 
 
 
 
 
 
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appellate counsel to determine that the issue was unlikely to succeed on appeal and 
to pursue other issues instead. Id. This court therefore concluded that appellate 
counsel’s performance was not deficient. The court then stated that “the issue is 
forfeited, and the forfeiture is not excused based on ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel.” Id. This was a situation in which the court substantively 
considered a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel under the 
Strickland standard. The English court did not address what constitutes reasonable 
assistance of counsel at the second stage of postconviction proceedings.  
¶ 30 
 
Finally, the State argues that counsel’s determination of which pro se 
allegations should be pursued in the amended petition should be afforded deference. 
The State cites People v. Rogers, 197 Ill. 2d 216, 223 (2001), for the proposition 
that, in judging the performance of appellate counsel, a reviewing court defers to 
counsel’s determination of a potential claim’s merit. According to the State, it 
would be “strange, indeed” if a similar standard did not govern review of statutorily 
provided postconviction counsel’s performance. Again, though, postconviction 
counsel determined that there were five issues from defendant’s pro se petition that 
were worth pursuing, but she did not shape them into proper form. Indeed, she 
eliminated the necessary allegations from defendant’s pro se petition. If we defer 
to counsel’s decision to pursue these five issues, why would we then hold that it 
was reasonable for counsel to fail to shape them into a form that would allow them 
to be considered? 
 
¶ 31 
 
 
 
 
 
II. Remand 
¶ 32 
 
We next consider whether postconviction counsel’s unreasonable performance 
requires a remand for compliance with Rule 651(c).  
¶ 33 
 
Because counsel did not comply with Rule 651(c), our case law dictates that the 
cause should be remanded without a consideration of whether the petition’s claims 
have merit. In Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d at 47, this court reiterated that it has consistently 
held that, when postconviction counsel does not fulfill his or her duties under Rule 
651(c), remand is required “regardless of whether the claims raised in the petition 
had merit.” The court noted that it had held the following in People v. Brown, 52 
Ill. 2d 227, 230 (1972): 
 
 
 
 
 
- 13 - 
“ ‘[T]he purpose underlying Rule 651(c) is not merely formal. It is to ensure 
that all indigents are provided proper representation when presenting claims of 
constitutional deprivation under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. [Citation.] 
The fulfillment of this design would not be encouraged were we to ignore the 
rule’s nonobservance in those cases appealed to this court.’ ” Suarez, 224 Ill. 
2d at 51 (quoting Brown, 52 Ill. 2d at 230). 
In Suarez, the State asked this court to overrule decades of precedent and hold that 
noncompliance could be excused on the basis of harmless error when the claims in 
the petition lack merit. Id. at 49. This court declined the State’s invitation: 
 
“Our analysis, however, does not depend upon whether the pro se or 
supplemental petitions in this case did or did not contain potentially meritorious 
issues. Our Rule 651(c) analysis has been driven, not by whether a particular 
defendant’s claim is potentially meritorious, but by the conviction that where 
postconviction counsel does not adequately complete the duties mandated by 
the rule, the limited right to counsel conferred by the Act cannot be fully 
realized. [Citations.] We have consistently declined the State’s invitation to 
excuse noncompliance with the rule on the basis of harmless error. We have 
refused to address questions that are properly determined in the first instance 
by the circuit court. The State presents no new persuasive arguments that would 
justify departing from our prior case law. Accordingly, we decline to hold that 
noncompliance with Rule 651(c) may be excused on the basis of harmless 
error.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 51-52.2  
¶ 34 
 
The State argues that Suarez is limited to situations in which postconviction 
counsel did not file a certificate of compliance. We disagree. As we explained 
above, the certificate merely creates a rebuttable presumption of reasonable 
assistance of counsel. Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 32. Here, defendant clearly 
rebutted the presumption of reasonable assistance because postconviction counsel 
failed to frame his claims as ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. In fact, 
postconviction counsel eliminated the claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel that defendant had made in the pro se petition. Once a petitioner has 
 
 
2In this appeal, the State argues that, if Suarez means what it says, then this court should 
overrule it. For the reasons this court declined to overrule decades of its precedent in Suarez, we 
likewise decline to overrule Suarez.  
 
 
 
 
 
- 14 - 
rebutted the presumption of reasonable assistance, he is in the same position as a 
petitioner in a case in which no certificate was filed and the record did not otherwise 
show compliance. Accordingly, Suarez is dispositive of this appeal, and a remand 
is required.  
¶ 35 
 
Citing People v. Landa, 2020 IL App (1st) 170851, ¶ 58, and Gallano, 2019 IL 
App (1st), 160570 ¶ 30, the State argues that, in cases in which a Rule 651(c) 
certificate has been filed, a postconviction petitioner may not obtain a remand 
without demonstrating prejudice. Those decisions held that Suarez’s statement that 
it does not matter whether a particular defendant’s postconviction claims have merit 
applies only when counsel fails to file a Rule 651(c) certificate. We note, however, 
that Landa also said that the Suarez rule “may also apply where counsel has failed 
to perform one of the three specific duties outlined in that rule.” Landa, 2020 IL 
App (1st) 170851, ¶ 58. Here, defendant is alleging that postconviction counsel 
failed to make the necessary amendments for an adequate presentation of his 
claims. Regardless, Suarez nowhere said that the rule it set forth applies only when 
postconviction counsel fails to file a certificate. Rather, we held that harmless error 
analysis does not apply where compliance with Rule 651(c) is not shown and that 
such compliance must be shown regardless of whether the claims made in the 
petition are viable. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d at 51-52. The notion that harmless error 
analysis would apply in all cases where a Rule 651(c) certificate has been filed is 
incompatible with the certificate merely creating a rebuttable presumption of 
reasonable assistance. Once the presumption has been rebutted, it would make no 
sense to treat the petitioner differently than the petitioner in any other case in which 
compliance with the rule is not shown.  
¶ 36 
 
The State further contends that Suarez is limited to situations in which there is 
a complete failure of counsel to comply with basic Rule 651(c) duties. Suarez 
contains no such limitation, and indeed, the attorney in that case had filed an 
amended petition on the defendant’s behalf that expanded on the defendant’s pro se 
claim and also raised an additional claim. Id. at 41. But this court held that 
compliance with Rule 651(c) was not shown where there was no showing in the 
record that postconviction counsel had consulted with the defendant before filing 
the petition. Id. at 42-44. And in Brown we held that a remand was required for the 
sole reason that the record did not show that postconviction counsel had examined 
the trial record. Brown, 52 Ill. 2d at 230. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 15 - 
¶ 37 
 
The State argues that remanding without a showing of prejudice is illogical 
because it makes it easier to succeed on a claim of unreasonable assistance of 
postconviction counsel than it is to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel under Strickland. The problem with trying to compare an unreasonable 
assistance claim with a Strickland claim is that, at the second stage of 
postconviction proceedings, counsel’s specific duties are prescribed by Illinois 
Supreme Court rule. As this court has explained: 
 
“Commensurate with the lower reasonable assistance standard mandated in 
postconviction proceedings, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651 (eff. July 1, 2017) 
sharply limits the requisite duties of postconviction counsel. They are required 
only to certify that they have ‘consulted with the petitioner by phone, mail, 
electronic means or in person,’ ‘examined the record’ as needed to shape the 
defendant’s pro se claims, and ‘made any amendments to the petitions filed 
pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation’ of those claims. Ill. S. 
Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017).” Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 32. 
And, as Suarez explained, when these limited duties are not carried out, “[t]his court 
has consistently held that remand is required *** regardless of whether the claims 
raised in the petition have merit.” Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d at 47. Our case law thus clearly 
establishes that all postconviction petitioners are entitled to have counsel comply 
with the limited duties of Rule 651(c) before the merits of their petitions are 
determined. We further note that there is a significant difference between what it 
means to “succeed” on a claim of unreasonable assistance of counsel at the second 
stage of postconviction proceedings and a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
under Strickland. The remedies for the two claims are vastly different. A defendant 
who succeeds on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland is 
entitled to a new trial. A defendant who successfully argues that his attorney failed 
to provide reasonable assistance at the second stage of postconviction proceedings 
is merely entitled to a remand for his attorney to comply with the limited duties 
required by Rule 651(c).  
¶ 38 
 
The State further argues that in certain contexts the appellate court has required 
a showing of prejudice when a defendant is raising a claim of unreasonable 
assistance of postconviction counsel. See People v. Pabello, 2019 IL App (2d) 
170867 (evaluating postconviction counsel’s performance at a third-stage 
 
 
 
 
 
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evidentiary hearing); People v. Hotwagner, 2015 IL App (5th) 130525 (same). A 
comparison with cases considering unreasonable assistance claims at the third stage 
is illogical, as this court has not prescribed by rule specific duties that counsel must 
perform at the third stage. In both Pabello and Hotwagner, the appellate court was 
faced with an argument that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable 
assistance at a third-stage evidentiary hearing. In Pabello, the court noted that Rule 
651(c) governs counsel’s duties at the second stage and that the third stage is simply 
governed by a general reasonableness standard. Pabello, 2019 IL App (2d) 170867, 
¶¶ 26-29. The court then analyzed the defendant’s claim of unreasonable assistance 
at the third stage by considering the defendant’s claim under Strickland. Id. at 37. 
The court reasoned that, if counsel’s performance complied with the higher 
Strickland standard, then it necessarily met the lower reasonableness standard. Id. 
at 36. The Hotwagner court used the same analysis and reasoning. See Hotwagner, 
2015 IL App (5th) 130525, ¶ 37 (“[i]t further stands to reason that if postconviction 
counsel’s performance cannot be deemed deficient under Strickland, it cannot be 
said that counsel failed to provide the reasonable level of assistance required under 
the Act”). Neither case provides any precedent for requiring a prejudice showing at 
the second stage, where counsel’s limited duties are prescribed by Illinois Supreme 
Court rule.  
¶ 39 
 
Finally, the State argues that a remand is not required here because the trial 
court dismissed the petition on the merits rather than finding that the claims were 
forfeited. In Turner, this court held that a remand was required where 
postconviction counsel had failed to make a routine amendment—alleging 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel—that was necessary to avoid forfeiture 
of the petitioner’s claims. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d at 413-14. The State argued that the 
petitioner was not prejudiced because the underlying claims were without merit. Id. 
at 415. This court disagreed, explaining that the prejudice to the petitioner was 
palpable where the failure to make the necessary amendment to avoid forfeiture led 
directly to the dismissal of the petitioner’s claims without a consideration of their 
merits. Id. In that case, the trial court found that the petitioner’s claims were waived 
because they could have been raised on direct appeal. Id. at 412-13. The State 
argues that a different result is required here because the court dismissed the 
petition on the merits rather than on the basis of forfeiture.  
 
 
 
 
 
- 17 - 
¶ 40 
 
There are two problems with the State’s argument. First, it is simply not 
possible to tell from this record that forfeiture played no part in the trial court’s 
decision. At no point, either in open court or in its written order, did the trial court 
explain why defendant’s claims lacked merit. After listening to the parties’ 
arguments, the one question that the trial court had for defense counsel was “could 
you address why you don’t believe that these issues that you have addressed would 
not and could not have been raised on direct appeal?” When defense counsel did 
not directly answer the question, the court said, “[e]verything that has been 
presented by way of the amended [postconviction petition] are arguments that I 
believe could have been made on direct appeal. Arguments that you have brought 
forth are all matters that were in the record.” When the trial judge thereafter 
dismissed the petition, he merely quoted—both in open court and in the written 
order—the statutory standard that the petition had failed to make a substantial 
showing of a violation of a constitutional right. But it is clear from the record that 
the trial court ruled on the petition under the belief that all of the claims could have 
been made on direct appeal and that there was no allegation of ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel in the petition. If the only viable claims that defendant had 
were not in the petition, then the petition necessarily did not make a substantial 
showing of a violation of a constitutional right. It is simply not possible to say from 
this record that the failure to allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
played no part in the trial court’s decision.  
¶ 41 
 
Second, the State does not sufficiently consider Turner’s principal holding. 
After noting that the petitioner did suffer prejudice, the court held that, on a more 
fundamental level, it would not be appropriate to affirm the dismissal of the petition 
when counsel had not shaped the claims into the proper form. The court cited 
Johnson for the proposition that it would not “speculate whether the trial court 
would have dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing if counsel had 
adequately performed his duties under Rule 651(c).” Id. at 416 (citing Johnson, 154 
Ill. 2d at 246). This court explained that, when counsel has not complied with Rule 
651(c), the court will not consider the merits of the petition: 
“[I]n this case it is improper to determine the merit of petitioner’s claims where 
counsel essentially did nothing to shape the petitioner’s claims into the 
appropriate legal form. To tolerate such inadequate representation would render 
the appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings nothing but ‘an 
 
 
 
 
 
- 18 - 
empty formality.’ People v. Garrison, 43 Ill. 2d 121, 123 (1969); People v. 
Wilson, 40 Ill. 2d 378, 381 (1968) (representation by appointed counsel in post-
conviction proceedings must be more than mere ‘tokenism’). Petitioner must be 
given an opportunity to replead his post-conviction petition with the benefit of 
reasonable assistance of counsel. 
 
We reiterate that we express no opinion on the merit of the claims in 
petitioner’s post-conviction petition or even whether an evidentiary hearing on 
his claims would be appropriate in this case. On remand, the trial court will 
have an opportunity to evaluate the claims in petitioner’s post-conviction 
petition once petitioner’s counsel has made any amendments to the petition 
which are necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s contentions. 
Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d at 249.” Id. at 416-17. 
¶ 42 
 
In other words, in response to the State’s argument that the petitioner suffered 
no prejudice because the underlying claims lacked any merit, this court held that 
(1) the petitioner was prejudiced because the trial court found his claims to be 
forfeited but, (2) regardless, it is inappropriate to consider the merits of the claims 
in the petition when counsel has not complied with Rule 651(c) by shaping the 
claims into the appropriate form. It was this latter part of the holding that this court 
quoted and discussed in Suarez. See Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d at 48. Suarez viewed Turner 
as one in a long line of cases holding that, when appointed counsel does not 
adequately fulfill his or her duties under Rule 651(c), a remand is required 
regardless of whether the petition’s claims have merit. Id. at 47-49. Here, where 
postconviction counsel took claims that were asserted in their proper form and 
turned them into claims that were not in the proper form, defendant is entitled to 
the same relief that the petitioner in Turner obtained. 
 
¶ 43 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 44 
 
Postconviction counsel did not comply with Rule 651(c), because she failed to 
shape defendant’s claims into proper form. Defendant had made the necessary 
claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when he filed his pro se 
petition, but postconviction counsel eliminated these claims when she filed the 
amended petition. Defendant has thus rebutted the presumption of reasonable 
assistance that arose from postconviction counsel’s Rule 651(c) certificate. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 19 - 
Pursuant to Suarez, the appellate court correctly remanded the cause for compliance 
with Rule 651(c) without considering whether the claims in the petition were 
meritorious. We therefore affirm the appellate court’s judgment, which reversed 
the judgment of the circuit court. 
 
¶ 45 
 
Appellate court judgment affirmed. 
¶ 46 
 
Circuit court judgment reversed.  
 
¶ 47 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE THEIS, dissenting: 
¶ 48 
 
The majority phrases the issue in this case as whether postconviction counsel 
rendered unreasonable assistance by failing to frame the issues in the defendant’s 
amended postconviction petition as ones of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel and, if so, whether the appellate court properly remanded the case for 
compliance with Rule 651(c) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017)) without 
considering the petition’s merits.3 Supra ¶ 1. In my view, the majority’s conclusion 
on the first part of that issue was incorrect, obviating the need to reach the second 
part. 
¶ 49 
 
The State filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition, arguing that the 
defendant’s claims were forfeited because they could have been raised on direct 
appeal and that he failed to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. 
The trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, stating that the defendant was 
not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he “failed to make a substantial 
showing of any violation of a Constitutional right.” The trial court also entered a 
written order, stating: 
 
“The Court has considered the arguments made in the written pleadings as 
well as the arguments made at the hearing today. The Petitioner has failed to 
make a substantial showing of a violation of a constitutional right.” 
 
 
3Postconviction counsel did file a Rule 651(c) certificate to accompany the amended petition. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 20 - 
¶ 50 
 
Certainly, the majority is correct that the trial court did not discuss the merits 
of the defendant’s claims in either its oral ruling or its written order. The majority, 
however, hears from that silence the reasoning behind the trial court’s decision. 
According to the majority, the trial court’s exchange with postconviction counsel 
on the subject of “waiver” during the hearing on the State’s motion means that the 
court disposed of the petition on that ground—i.e., “understanding that it 
contain[ed] no claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” Supra ¶ 24 
n.1. 
¶ 51 
 
I do not possess such clairvoyance, and I would take the trial court’s words 
literally. The trial court considered the parties’ arguments, which included 
arguments regarding the merits of the amended petition and concluded, without 
mentioning procedural default, that the petition did not meet the second-stage 
standard for legal sufficiency. See People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 35 
(stating that “the ‘substantial showing’ of a constitutional violation that must be 
made at the second stage [citation] is a measure of the legal sufficiency of the 
petition’s well-pled allegations of a constitutional violation”). As we have held, a 
defendant fails to make such a showing when the claims in the petition “lack merit.” 
People v. Pingelton, 2022 IL 127680, ¶ 66. The court should presume that the trial 
court’s decision was in conformity with the law. Cf. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 
389, 393 (1984). 
¶ 52 
 
Further, because I cannot fathom how trial counsel was ineffective and how 
appellate counsel could have asserted that he was, I cannot conclude that 
postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance by including an 
underdeveloped claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in the amended 
petition. The majority glosses over the trial proceedings, stating simply, “Defendant 
failed to appear for trial and was tried in absentia.” Supra ¶ 3. To properly 
contextualize the parties’ arguments in this appeal, a more detailed recitation of the 
factual background is necessary. 
¶ 53 
 
In mid-2011, Kevin Ziegler listed a 1995 Suzuki motorcycle for sale online. 
The defendant contacted Ziegler and asked to see the motorcycle. On June 19, 2011, 
the defendant and his friend Kenny Drake went to Ziegler’s apartment. Drake took 
the motorcycle for a test drive and told the defendant that it was in good condition. 
The defendant offered Ziegler $3000 for the motorcycle. Ziegler accepted. The 
 
 
 
 
 
- 21 - 
defendant gave Ziegler $3000 in cash, and Ziegler gave the defendant the title and 
the keys to the motorcycle. Ziegler soon realized that the currency was probably 
counterfeit, and he called the police. The defendant was ultimately arrested for an 
unrelated traffic offense and transported to the Geneva Police Department. The 
defendant was placed in a booking room, while Geneva police officer Robert Bailey 
contacted Special Agent Shannon McDowell of the United States Secret Service 
counterfeit currency unit. The next morning, McDowell arrived at the police 
station. McDowell confirmed that all of the currency was counterfeit—the bills 
lacked security features and had repeating serial numbers. 
¶ 54 
 
McDowell then spoke to the defendant. McDowell read him Miranda warnings 
from a Secret Service form. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The 
form advised the defendant: 
 
“You must understand your rights before we ask you any questions.  
 
You have the right to remain silent. 
 
Anything you say can be used against you in court, or other proceedings. 
 
You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we question you and 
to have him with you during questioning. 
 
If you cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for 
you by the court. If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer 
present, you will still have the right to stop the questioning at any time. You 
also have the right to stop the questioning at any time until you talk to a lawyer. 
 
I have read this statement of my rights and it has been read to me, and I 
understand what my rights are.” 
The defendant signed the form after those paragraphs. 
¶ 55 
 
The form continued: 
 
“I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. 
No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or force of any 
kind has been used against me. I hereby voluntarily and intentionally waive my 
 
 
 
 
 
- 22 - 
right to remain silent and my right to have an attorney at this time. I am willing 
to make a statement and answer questions.” 
The defendant again signed the form after that paragraph. At the bottom of the page, 
the defendant, Officer Bailey, and Special Agent McDowell all signed the form to 
certify that the warnings were recited to the defendant and that he read the form. 
¶ 56 
 
McDowell interviewed the defendant. The defendant admitted that he paid 
Ziegler with counterfeit currency. The defendant was not charged but released from 
custody. He cooperated with McDowell until July 2011. When the defendant was 
no longer able to help with the investigation, McDowell stated that he could be 
charged and arrested in connection with the motorcycle purchase. The defendant 
was arrested on October 28, 2011. 
¶ 57 
 
On February 22, 2012, the defendant was charged by indictment with unlawful 
possession of a motor vehicle, unlawful possession of a converted motor vehicle, 
forgery, and two counts of theft. He was released on bond. The defendant missed a 
September 2012 status hearing, but the parties agreed to schedule a pretrial hearing 
for January 10, 2013, and trial for January 14. 
¶ 58 
 
Defense counsel filed a motion in limine to bar the State from eliciting any 
mention of the defendant’s confession at trial. The defendant acknowledged that he 
purportedly made two confessions—one while in police custody and one while in 
Secret Service custody. The defendant contended that neither confession was 
voluntary. He did not specify why the first confession was involuntary, but he 
claimed that the second confession was involuntary because it “was made after the 
US Secret Service promised the Defendant that if he confessed that he knowingly 
used counterfeit bills that he would be released from custody. The promise of being 
granted his freedom was so alluring to the Defendant that his will was overborn 
[sic].” 
¶ 59 
 
When the defendant initially failed to appear in court for the pretrial hearing, 
the prosecutor asked the court to “go in absentia” on the trial date. Defense counsel 
objected and revealed his strategy for the case: 
 
“I believe that Mr. Addison is essentially my only true witness as to his 
mental state, as to whether or not he knew the bills were counterfeit, which I 
 
 
 
 
 
- 23 - 
believe is an essential element of the forgery, the fact the possession of a stolen 
motor vehicle and the converted motor vehicle. Because if he were just 
innocently passing along bills that he did not know were fake, I don’t believe 
he would have the mental state for any of those elements. 
 
And without him being present, I won’t be able to present any sort of 
defense on his behalf. So I object to *** the trial in absentia.” 
¶ 60 
 
The trial court asked defense counsel about scheduling a hearing on any pretrial 
motions. Defense counsel answered:  
 
“Your Honor, my position would be that without Mr. Addison to perfect 
some of the claims in my motions, that I don’t believe I can necessarily fully 
proceed with my motions. 
 
I can certainly cross whichever witnesses the State calls regarding the 
voluntariness and the surrounding circumstances of my client’s alleged 
statements. But he, again, would be my key witness for anything along those 
lines.” 
¶ 61 
 
Twenty minutes after the court adjourned, the defendant arrived at defense 
counsel’s office, and the parties returned to court. The trial court admonished the 
defendant that if he failed to appear for trial, he could be tried, convicted, and 
sentenced in absentia. The defendant indicated that he understood.  
¶ 62 
 
On January 14, 2013, the defendant did not appear. The State moved to strike 
the defendant’s motion in limine for want of prosecution. Defense counsel objected 
and renewed his earlier objection to proceeding without the defendant. Defense 
counsel reiterated that the defendant is “essentially my only witness” and “my best 
and really only witness” and that “any due process rights that he would have to a 
fair trial to defending himself are nonexistent if the [S]tate is allowed to proceed in 
his absence.” The trial court paused its call to give the defendant more time to 
appear. When he still had not, the court instructed defense counsel to proceed with 
the defendant’s motion in limine.  
¶ 63 
 
Defense counsel argued that the defendant’s second inculpatory statement was 
involuntary because the promise of release in exchange for such a statement 
overcame his will. The State called Special Agent McDowell as its only witness. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 24 - 
Defense counsel presented no evidence because the defendant was not present, 
though counsel suggested that the defendant’s release implied a promise in 
exchange for his inculpatory statement. The trial court denied the defendant’s 
motion in limine, and the matter immediately proceeded to a jury trial. 
¶ 64 
 
The State called Zeigler, Officer Bailey, and Special Agent McDowell as 
witnesses, then rested its case. Defense counsel moved for a directed verdict, 
arguing that “the [S]tate’s evidence is insufficient to prove the mental state and that 
no reasonable jury could find Mr. Addison guilty of these crimes.” The trial court 
denied that motion and asked defense counsel if he had any evidence. Defense 
counsel answered, “I do not,” but reserved the right to change that answer if the 
defendant appeared.  
¶ 65 
 
As the majority notes, the jury convicted the defendant on all counts. The trial 
court entered judgment on the guilty verdicts and scheduled the sentencing hearing 
for March 20, 2013. On March 19, 2013, new posttrial counsel filed a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. In that motion, counsel insisted 
that “the entire defense strategy relied on the Defendant’s presence and testimony 
and the Defendant’s testimony was necessary to prevail on Defendant’s motion to 
bar the Defendant’s statements to investigators including the U.S. Secret Service.” 
The trial court denied that motion and sentenced the defendant. Shortly thereafter, 
the defendant was arrested. He appeared with posttrial counsel for a hearing on his 
motion to reconsider sentence. The trial court denied that motion, and the defendant 
appealed. 
¶ 66 
 
Again, as the majority notes, appellate counsel communicated by telephone and 
by mail with the defendant to inform him that there were no meritorious substantive 
issues to challenge the defendant’s conviction and only a sentencing-credit issue 
that would reduce the defendant’s sentence by two days. The appellate court 
granted that relief in a minute order. 
¶ 67 
 
Seventeen months later, the defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition, 
attacking the performance of both trial and appellate counsel. The trial court 
advanced the petition to the second stage and appointed an attorney, who eventually 
filed an amended petition, asserting five claims. Among those claims, 
postconviction counsel argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 
motion to suppress the defendant’s inculpatory statement “on grounds of improper 
 
 
 
 
 
- 25 - 
Miranda warnings” and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion 
to suppress the statement as involuntary. The amended petition ended by 
summarizing that “the Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel during 
pre-trial proceedings, during post-trial proceedings, and at the appellate level.” 
¶ 68 
 
The defendant absented himself from the hearing on his motion in limine and 
his trial. Trial counsel objected to a trial in absentia because the defendant was “my 
key witness,” “essentially my only witness,” and “my best and really only witness.” 
And, even without the defendant’s testimony as support, trial counsel pressed an 
involuntariness argument. Under those challenging circumstances, trial counsel 
performed effectively. Appellate counsel had no argument to make regarding the 
core of the defendant’s case, the voluntariness of his confession, because the 
defendant intentionally sabotaged that argument by not appearing. And because 
neither trial nor appellate counsel was ineffective, postconviction counsel did not 
render unreasonable assistance by including an underdeveloped claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel in the amended petition. Accordingly, the 
presumption created by postconviction counsel’s Rule 651(c) certificate was not 
rebutted. 
¶ 69 
 
This case is not one in which the court should make grand pronouncements 
about postconviction petitions and the strictures of Rule 651(c). Under the unique 
facts of this case, the court’s narrow holding should be to affirm the trial court’s 
dismissal of the defendant’s amended petition on its merits. 
¶ 70 
 
I respectfully dissent. 
¶ 71 
 
JUSTICE OVERSTREET joins in this dissent.