Title: Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC v. Department of Criminal Justice Information Services
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12690
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 12, 2020

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12690 
 
BOSTON GLOBE MEDIA PARTNERS, LLC  vs.  DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 5, 2019. - March 12, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Public Records.  Criminal Offender Record Information.  State 
Police.  Police, Records.  Municipal Corporations, Police, 
Public record.  Privacy. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
May 12, 2015. 
 
 
The case was heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J., on motions 
for summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Elizabeth N. Dewar, State Solicitor (Daniel J. Hammond, 
Assistant Attorney General, also present) for Department of 
Criminal Justice Information Services & another. 
 
Jason M. Lederman, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for 
Boston Police Department. 
 
Jonathan M. Albano for the plaintiff. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
                     
1 Massachusetts State Police, Department of Correction, 
North Andover Police Department, and the Boston Police 
Department. 
2 
 
 
 
Ruth A. Bourquin & Matthew R. Segal for American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts. 
 
Robert J. Ambrogi for Massachusetts Newspaper Publishers 
Association. 
 
Pauline Quirion for Greater Boston Legal Services & 
another. 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  In the summer of 2012, the State police 
arrested a Barnstable law enforcement officer for operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence.  The State police 
arrested a Tewksbury police officer for the same offense in 
August 2014.  Following this second incident, a reporter for 
Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC (Globe), made public records 
requests to the State police, seeking booking photographs and 
police incident reports related to the arrests.  The State 
police refused to comply with the requests, claiming that the 
records were "criminal offender record information" (CORI), as 
defined in G. L. c. 6, § 167, and therefore were not "public 
records," as defined in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, because 
they were "specifically or by necessary implication exempted 
from disclosure by statute."  The Globe also requested a police 
incident report involving an investigation into whether a 
District Court judge had taken another passenger's watch from a 
bin at a security checkpoint at Logan International Airport.  
The State police denied that request on the same basis. 
In addition, the Globe made a public records request to the 
Boston police department for, among other things, the names of 
3 
 
 
officers charged with driving under the influence, as well as 
the related booking photographs and incident reports.  The 
Boston police department withheld the records on the same 
grounds as the State police had.  The Globe appealed all of 
these denials to the supervisor of records (supervisor) in the 
office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, who upheld the law 
enforcement agencies' decisions in each case. 
In May 2015, the Globe brought suit against the State 
police, the Boston police department, and the Department of 
Criminal Justice Information Services (DCJIS), among others 
(collectively, law enforcement agencies), seeking a judgment 
declaring that the requested records must be disclosed under the 
public records law.  On cross motions for summary judgment, a 
Superior Court judge ruled in favor of the Globe and declared 
that booking photographs of police officers arrested for alleged 
crimes and police incident reports involving public officials 
were not exempt from disclosure under the public records law.  
The law enforcement agencies appealed, and a single justice of 
the Appeals Court stayed the judgment "insomuch as the judgment 
requires the named defendants to provide access to the records 
that are the subject of this action CORI."  We transferred the 
appeal to this court on our own motion.  For the reasons that 
4 
 
 
follow, we affirm the judge's decision, albeit on different 
grounds.2 
Statutory background.  This case requires us to attempt to 
harmonize the language and legislative purpose of two statutes:  
the public records law, G. L. c. 66, § 10, and the CORI act, 
G. L. c. 6, §§ 167-178B. 
1.  The public records law.  The public records law, G. L. 
c. 66, § 10, governs the public's right to access records and 
information held by State governmental entities.  Under the 
public records law, anyone has the right to access or inspect 
"public records" upon request.  G. L. c. 66, § 10 (a).  "The 
primary purpose of the [public records law] is to give the 
public broad access to governmental records."  Worcester Tel. & 
Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 436 Mass. 378, 
382-383 (2002).  In enacting the public records law, the 
Legislature recognized that "[t]he public has an interest in 
knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in 
an efficient and law-abiding manner," Attorney Gen. v. Collector 
of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 158 (1979) (Collector of Lynn), and that 
"greater access to information about the actions of public 
officers and institutions is increasingly . . . an essential 
                     
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts; Greater Boston Legal 
Services and the Union of Minority Neighborhoods; and the 
Massachusetts Newspaper Publishers Association. 
5 
 
 
ingredient of public confidence in government," New Bedford 
Standard-Times Publ. Co. v. Clerk of the Third Dist. Ct. of 
Bristol, 377 Mass. 404, 417 (1979) (Abrams, J., concurring). 
"Public records" are broadly defined as "all books, papers, 
maps, photographs, recorded tapes, financial statements, 
statistical tabulations, or other documentary materials or data, 
regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received 
by any officer or employee" of any Massachusetts governmental 
entity.  G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.  But "[n]ot every record 
or document kept or made by [a] governmental agency is a 'public 
record.'"  Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Division of Capital Asset 
Mgt., 449 Mass. 444, 454 (2007).  The Legislature has identified 
twenty categories of records that fall outside the definition of 
"public records" and are consequently exempt from disclosure 
under the public records law.  G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth 
(a)-(u).  Here, only one exemption has been claimed by the law 
enforcement agencies:  G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (a) 
(exemption [a]) excludes records from disclosure where they are 
"specifically or by necessary implication exempted from 
disclosure by statute." 
A public record holder may invoke exemption (a) as the 
basis for withholding requested records where another statute -- 
the "exempting statute" -- expressly prohibits disclosure.  See, 
e.g., Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 
6 
 
 
544 n.5 (1977), citing G. L. c. 167, § 2 (copies of bank 
examination reports "shall be furnished to such bank for its use 
only and shall not be exhibited to any other person . . . 
without the prior written approval of the commissioner"); G. L. 
c. 111B, § 11 (alcohol treatment records "shall be 
confidential"); G. L. c. 41, § 97D (all reports of rape or 
sexual assault "shall not be public reports").  Alternatively, a 
record may be withheld where the exempting statute protects the 
record from disclosure by "necessary implication," such as where 
the exempting statute prohibits disclosure as a practical 
matter.  See, e.g., Champa v. Weston Pub. Schs., 473 Mass. 86, 
91 n.8 (2015) (Federal statute "does not expressly prohibit 
disclosure of 'education records,' but it does condition receipt 
of Federal funds on the nondisclosure of education records"). 
Under the public records act, "a presumption shall exist 
that each record sought is public and the burden shall be on the 
defendant agency or municipality to prove, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that such record or portion of the record may be 
withheld in accordance with state or federal law."  G. L. c. 66, 
§ 10A (d) (1) (iv).  Therefore, the burden rests with the law 
enforcement agencies to prove that the CORI act specifically or 
by necessary implication exempts the requested records from 
disclosure. 
7 
 
 
2.  The CORI act.  First enacted in 1972, the CORI act 
centralized the collection and dissemination of criminal record 
information in the Commonwealth.  St. 1972, c. 805.  See New 
Bedford Standard-Times Publ. Co., 377 Mass. at 413.  It created 
a unified management system for all criminal record information, 
allowing, for the first time, the compilation of a comprehensive 
State criminal history for each offender (CORI report).  St. 
1972, c. 805, § 1.  It also strictly limited dissemination of 
those State-compiled criminal histories to criminal justice 
agencies and other entities specifically granted access by 
statute.  Id.  By imposing these restrictions, the Legislature 
intended to address the need of criminal justice agencies to 
access criminal offender information while "embedded[ing] in the 
statutory public policy of Massachusetts" its "interest in 
promoting the rehabilitation and reintegration into society of 
former criminal defendants."  Globe Newspaper Co. v. Fenton, 819 
F. Supp. 89, 97 (D. Mass. 1993) (Fenton). 
In the following years, groups such as employers, victim 
advocates, and the press began to voice dissatisfaction with the 
inaccessibility of criminal record information and challenged 
the constitutionality of the CORI act and related provisions.  
See, e.g., New Bedford Standard-Times Publ. Co., 377 Mass. at 
405 (challenging constitutionality of CORI statute insofar as it 
limited public access to index of court records); Fenton, 819 F. 
8 
 
 
Supp. at 90 (challenging inaccessibility of newly created 
electronic indices of criminal cases); Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Pokaski, 684 F. Supp. 1132, 1132 (D. Mass. 1988), aff'd in part 
and reversed in part, 868 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1989) (challenging 
constitutionality of criminal record sealing under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100C).  After years of debate and gradual modification, see, 
e.g., St. 1990, c. 319; St. 1977, c. 691, the CORI act was 
substantially revised in 2010 by the enactment of CORI reform.  
St. 2010, c. 256.  See Massing, CORI Reform -- Providing Ex-
Offenders with Increased Opportunities without Compromising 
Employer Needs, 55 Boston Bar J. 21, 21 (2011) (discussing 
statutory history). 
CORI reform created a new agency, DCJIS, to manage "data 
processing and data communication systems . . . designed to 
ensure the prompt collection, exchange, dissemination and 
distribution of such public safety information as may be 
necessary for the efficient administration and operation of 
criminal justice agencies and to connect such systems directly 
or indirectly with similar systems in this or other [S]tates."  
G. L. c. 6, § 167A (c).  See St. 2010, c. 256, § 8 (c).  In 
turn, DCJIS developed iCORI, defined as "[t]he [I]nternet-based 
system used in the Commonwealth to access CORI and to obtain 
self-audits."  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.02 (2017). 
9 
 
 
The definition of CORI has evolved over time and was most 
recently amended as part of the 2018 criminal justice reform 
bill.  St. 2018, c. 69, §§ 3, 4.  Currently, CORI is defined 
broadly as: 
"records and data in any communicable form compiled by a 
Massachusetts criminal justice agency which concern an 
identifiable individual and relate to the nature or 
disposition of a criminal charge, an arrest, a pre-trial 
proceeding, other judicial proceedings, previous hearings 
conducted pursuant to [G. L. c. 276, § 58A,] where the 
defendant was detained prior to trial or released with 
conditions under [G. L. c. 276, § 58A (2)], sentencing, 
incarceration, rehabilitation, or release." 
 
G. L. c. 6, § 167.  However, the definition goes on to place 
certain limitations on what constitutes CORI: 
"Such information shall be restricted to information 
recorded in criminal proceedings that are not dismissed 
before arraignment. . . Criminal offender record 
information shall be limited to information concerning 
persons who have attained the age of [eighteen] and shall 
not include any information concerning criminal offenses or 
acts of delinquency committed by any person before he 
attained the age of [eighteen]; provided, however, that if 
a person under the age of [eighteen] was adjudicated as an 
adult in superior court or adjudicated as an adult after 
transfer of a case from a juvenile session to another trial 
court department, information relating to such criminal 
offense shall be criminal offender record information.  
Criminal offender record information shall not include 
information concerning any offenses which are not 
punishable by incarceration." 
 
Id.  This definition is critically important because it 
identifies which offenses in a person's criminal history 
generally may or may not be disseminated as part of the CORI 
10 
 
 
report available through iCORI.3  Based on the current definition 
of CORI, an individual's CORI report generally would not include 
juvenile offenses, unless the juvenile was adjudicated as an 
adult; offenses not punishable by incarceration; and offenses 
that were dismissed before arraignment. 
CORI reform also significantly expanded the availability of 
CORI reports.  St. 2010, c. 256, § 21.  Where before only 
criminal justice agencies and a narrow group of statutorily 
authorized employers and government agencies could access CORI 
reports, CORI reform created a tiered system of access to CORI 
based on the identity of the requestor, which DCJIS regulations 
refer to as "required access," "standard access," and "open 
access."  See id.  See also 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.05(2) 
(2017). 
                     
3 We say "generally" may not be disseminated because we 
recognize that, as noted infra at 10, some requestors are 
entitled by statute or regulation to receive criminal history 
information that falls outside the definition of CORI, 
specifically juvenile offenses adjudicated in Juvenile Court and 
sealed adjudications.  See G. L. c. 276, § 100A ("The 
commissioner [of probation], in response to inquiries by 
authorized persons other than any law enforcement agency, any 
court, or any appointing authority, shall in the case of a 
sealed record or in the case of court appearances and 
adjudications in a case of delinquency or the case of a child in 
need of services which did not result in a complaint transferred 
to the superior court for criminal prosecution, report that no 
record exists");  G. L. c. 6, § 172 (a) (1) (specifying that 
criminal justice agencies may obtain sealed records). 
11 
 
 
In the tier of "required access," criminal justice 
agencies, certain licensing authorities, and the criminal record 
review board may obtain all CORI, plus sealed records.  G. L. 
c. 6, § 172 (a) (1).4  In the tier of "standard access," 
prospective employers and landlords may obtain a limited amount 
of CORI regarding prospective employees or tenants:  their 
pending criminal charges, including cases continued without a 
finding that have yet to be dismissed, and, unless sealed, 
misdemeanor convictions from the last five years and felony 
convictions from the last ten years.  G. L. c. 6, § 172 (a) (3). 
In the tier of "open access," any member of the general public, 
upon written request, may obtain an even more limited amount of 
CORI about a person:  felony convictions from the last ten years 
that were punishable by imprisonment of five years of more, all 
felony convictions from the past two years, misdemeanor 
convictions from the past year, and information regarding 
custody status and placement if the person is incarcerated or on 
probation or parole.  G. L. c. 6, § 172 (a) (4).  The 
commissioner of DCJIS also may provide access to CORI to persons 
                     
4 There are four different levels within the "required 
access" designation, with the amount of access to CORI and other 
information dependent "on the language of the statutory, 
regulatory, or accreditation requirement that mandates obtaining 
CORI."  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.05(3)(a) (2017).  Requestors 
with "required 4 access" receive access not only to CORI, but 
also to all juvenile offenses and all sealed offenses.  803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 2.05(3)(a)(4). 
12 
 
 
other than those entitled to obtain access where he or she finds 
that such dissemination "serves the public interest."  G. L. 
c. 6, § 172 (a) (6). 
The CORI act, however, does not prohibit anyone from 
attempting to obtain more information about the criminal history 
of a particular individual from court records or from police 
daily logs or arrest registers, which are presumptively public.5  
See G. L. c. 6, § 172 (m) (declaring that "chronologically 
maintained court records of public judicial proceedings" and 
"police daily logs, arrest registers, or other similar records 
compiled chronologically" are "public records").  Those who are 
frustrated by the amount of information available to them in a 
CORI report and want to obtain a complete criminal history can 
go to the clerk's office in every court house, search for every 
                     
5 We say that these records are presumptively public because 
court records involving adults or juveniles adjudicated as 
adults may be impounded, sealed, or expunged, juvenile court 
records are closed to the public, entries regarding juvenile 
arrests must be removed from police logs, and police logs must 
be redacted where an offense is expunged.  See Republican Co. v. 
Appeals Court, 442 Mass. 218, 223 (2004) (court records can be 
impounded and made unavailable for public inspection upon 
showing of good cause); G. L. c. 276, §§ 100A, 100B, 100C 
(sealing of certain probation files and court records); G. L. 
c. 276, §§ 100F, 100G, 100H, 100J (expungement eligibility and 
procedures); G. L. c. 41, § 98F (entries regarding juvenile 
arrests); G. L. c. 276, § 100L (police logs must be redacted 
where case is expunged). 
 
13 
 
 
case under the individual's name, and review the court file.6  
They would be limited in this endeavor only by the practical 
constraints of time and expense; obtaining someone's criminal 
history in this piecemeal fashion does not violate the CORI act.  
See G. L. c. 6, § 178.7 
Discussion.  We now turn to the cross motions for summary 
judgment.  "Our review of a motion judge's decision on summary 
judgment is de novo, because we examine the same record and 
decide the same questions of law."  Kiribati Seafood Co. v. 
Dechert LLP, 478 Mass. 111, 116 (2017).  The de novo standard is 
                     
6 Under the Trial Court's Uniform Rules on Public Access to 
Court Records, criminal cases may not be searched for a 
defendant's name by members of the public through the Trial 
Court's public Internet portal.  See Rule 5(a)(2)(ii) of the 
Uniform Rules on Public Access to Court Records, Mass. Ann. Laws 
Court Rules, Trial Court Rules, at 1007 (LexisNexis 2018), and 
committee notes.  Rather, criminal cases may only be searched by 
court case docket number.  Id.  Without a docket number, one 
must go to the clerk's office of a court house and search for 
criminal cases by case name, and such a search will reveal only 
those criminal cases in that court house with that name as a 
defendant.  See Rule 2(b) of the Uniform Rules on Public Access 
to Court Records, supra at 1002. 
 
7 It would, however, be a crime for a member of the public, 
under false pretenses, to obtain from DCJIS or a law enforcement 
agency a more comprehensive criminal history regarding the 
individual than what is available under "open access."  See 
G. L. c. 6, § 178.  Moreover, CORI reform made it a crime for an 
employer to request that a prospective employee provide the 
employer with his or her CORI report.  See G. L. c. 6, § 172 
(d).  Because individuals are authorized to receive a full and 
unrestricted CORI report regarding their own criminal history, 
G. L. c. 6, § 175, this provision ensures that employers can 
access only that information to which they are statutorily 
entitled. 
14 
 
 
fortunate here, because when the Globe made its public records 
requests and when the judge was deciding the cross motions for 
summary judgment, the definition of CORI was materially 
different from the amended definition enacted in 2018 as part of 
the criminal justice reform bill.  At the time of the judge's 
decision, the definition provided that CORI "shall be restricted 
to that recorded as the result of the initiation of criminal 
proceedings or any consequent proceedings related thereto."  See 
G. L. c. 6, § 167, as amended through St. 2010, c. 256, § 4.  To 
interpret this language, DCJIS promulgated a regulation defining 
"the initiation of criminal proceedings" as "the point when a 
criminal investigation is sufficiently complete that the 
investigating officer takes actions toward bringing a specific 
suspect to court."  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.03(4) (2017).  In 
upholding the law enforcement agencies' decisions to withhold 
records from the Globe, the supervisor reached his conclusion 
that the CORI act encompassed the requested records based in 
part on this regulation.  The Superior Court judge, however, 
ruled that the DCJIS regulation was invalid because it was 
inconsistent with the statutory language, and that the documents 
at issue were not CORI because they were generated before 
criminal proceedings were "commenced" by a complaint or 
indictment.  And because the documents were not CORI, they were 
not "specifically or by necessary implication" exempted from 
15 
 
 
disclosure under the public records law by the CORI act.  He 
granted summary judgment to the Globe on that basis. 
While this appeal was pending, the Legislature amended the 
definition of CORI and removed the language on which the 
challenged DCJIS regulation and the Superior Court judgment were 
based.  Effective April 13, 2018, the sentence, "Such 
information shall be restricted to that recorded as the result 
of the initiation of criminal proceedings or any consequent 
proceedings related thereto," was struck from § 167 and replaced 
with the sentence, "Such information shall be restricted to 
information recorded in criminal proceedings that are not 
dismissed before arraignment."  G. L. c. 6, § 167, as amended by 
St. 2018, c. 69, § 3. 
We decide this case under current law for three reasons.  
First, a judgment should declare the law as of the time when a 
final judgment enters.  See Chief of the Fire Dep't of Lynn v. 
Allard, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 128, 131 (1991), quoting Hanscom v. 
Malden & Melrose Gas Light Co., 220 Mass. 1, 9 (1914) 
("equitable proceedings, looking to prospective relief, take 
note of events occurring after the commencement of the action, 
. . . and 'relief should . . . be adapted to the facts and the 
law existing at the time of the entry of the final [judgment]").  
Second, a declaration applying the current law is appropriate 
because the records at issue have not yet been produced.  See 
16 
 
 
Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Nunez, 460 Mass. 511, 519-520 
(2011) (statute granting new protections in eviction proceedings 
applied in pending case because eviction had not yet occurred).  
And, finally, the issue is recurring, and resolving the dispute 
under current law is in the public interest.  Therefore, we need 
not determine whether the DCJIS regulation interpreting the 
meaning of "the initiation of criminal proceedings" is valid 
because the statutory language it interpreted is no longer part 
of the CORI definition in the statute.  Instead, we consider 
whether the booking photographs and incident reports at issue 
are exempt from disclosure under the public records law 
specifically or by necessary implication of the CORI act in its 
current form. 
1.  Exemption (a) of the CORI act.  We begin by looking 
closely at the current definition of CORI and conclude that the 
records at issue in this case are not CORI.  As relevant here, 
records or data compiled by a Massachusetts criminal justice 
agency may be CORI where they (1) "concern an identifiable 
individual"; (2) "relate to the nature or disposition of a 
criminal charge, an arrest," a sentence, or release; (3) are 
"recorded in criminal proceedings that are not dismissed before 
arraignment" -- in other words, in a criminal proceeding where 
17 
 
 
the defendant was arraigned;8 (4) concern criminal offenses 
committed by a person who is eighteen years of age or older or 
where a juvenile was adjudicated as an adult; and (5) concern 
offenses that are punishable by incarceration.  G. L. c. 6, 
§ 167.  The booking photographs do not meet this definition 
because they say nothing as to the nature of a criminal charge 
or arrest (that is, whether it was for operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence or manslaughter) or its disposition; 
the photographs are simply the product of the booking procedure 
arising from an arrest.  Moreover, there is no suggestion in the 
record that any of the police officers or the judge was 
arraigned on charges arising from the incident reports, so both 
the incident reports and the booking photographs fail to satisfy 
the part of the CORI definition requiring that the records be 
recorded in a criminal proceeding where the defendant was 
arraigned. 
                     
8 We interpret "dismissed before arraignment" to include 
cases where the prosecutor filed a nolle prosequi before 
arraignment, thereby preventing prosecution of the case.  See 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 16 (a), 378 Mass. 885 (1979).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Miranda, 415 Mass. 1, 5-6 (1993) (entry of nolle 
prosequi dismisses charges, rather than merely making them 
dormant, such that prosecution can reinstate charges only by 
refiling them); Commonwealth v. Brandano, 359 Mass. 332, 335 
(1971) (describing entry of nolle prosequi as dismissal made 
with approval of Commonwealth); Commonwealth v. Aldrich, 21 
Mass. App. Ct. 221, 224-225 (1985) (equating nolle prosequi and 
dismissal for purposes of double jeopardy analysis). 
18 
 
 
But our conclusion that neither the booking photographs nor 
the incident reports are CORI does not by itself resolve whether 
these records are public records that must be disclosed under 
the public records law.  See Reinstein v. Police Comm'r of 
Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 294 (1979) (whether something is CORI 
"may be too fine a point" to determine whether record is 
public).  A record is not a public record and therefore is 
exempt from disclosure if it "specifically or by necessary 
implication" is exempted from disclosure by the CORI act.  See 
G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (a).  We must therefore determine 
whether the CORI act necessarily implies that the requested 
records are exempt from disclosure under the public records law. 
In determining whether the booking photographs or incident 
reports are "by necessary implication" exempted from disclosure 
by the CORI act, we must exercise considerable caution.  
"Because of the [public records act's] presumption in favor of 
disclosure, we have said that the statutory exemptions must be 
strictly and narrowly construed."  Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
District Attorney for the Middle Dist., 439 Mass. 374, 380 
(2003), quoting General Elec. Co. v. Department of Envtl. 
Protection, 429 Mass. 798, 801-802 (1999).  We have also said 
that where the exemption from disclosure derives from the CORI 
act, "it must be construed narrowly."  Globe Newspaper Co., 
supra at 383. 
19 
 
 
When the Legislature amended the CORI definition to exclude 
offenses dismissed prior to arraignment, it demonstrated a clear 
intent to protect individuals from the collateral consequences 
that might otherwise arise due to inclusion of those records in 
CORI reports.  See Statement of Sen. Will Brownsberger, Criminal 
Justice Reform at a Glance (May 6, 2018), https:// 
willbrownsberger.com/criminal-justice-package-at-a-glance/ 
[https://perma.cc/X4HE-VSWD] (2018 amendment to CORI definition 
was intended to "[m]ake criminal records more private" by 
"[a]ssur[ing] that cases dismissed before arraignment do not 
appear on criminal records").  See generally Commonwealth v. 
Pon, 469 Mass. 296, 307 (2014) (Legislature recognized "that 
gainful employment is crucial to preventing recidivism, and that 
criminal records have a deleterious effect on access to 
employment").  It did not intend to make such information easier 
for third parties to obtain through a public records request.  
The law enforcement agencies encourage us to adopt that 
legislative intent as the basis for a "necessary implication" 
that the CORI act exempts records concerning unarraigned 
offenses from disclosure under the public records law. 
However, where we must strictly and narrowly construe any 
exemption arising by "necessary implication," we are unwilling 
to declare that the CORI act absolutely protects from disclosure 
all records concerning offenses that were dismissed prior to 
20 
 
 
arraignment or never reached arraignment.  First, the goal of 
the CORI act is to limit the dissemination of someone's State-
compiled CORI report only to authorized recipients.  Certainly, 
if a member of the public or the press attempted to cobble 
together a person's criminal history through public records 
requests to various law enforcement agencies, those records 
might be exempt from disclosure "by necessary implication" 
because disclosure would subvert the CORI act's limitations on 
access to criminal history aggregated by State law enforcement 
agencies.9  But the Globe's requests in this case focus on a 
small number of specific incidents and would not permit it to 
assemble the criminal histories of the police officers or judge 
whose records are sought. 
 
Second, so broad an exemption would effectively swallow the 
investigative exemption from the public records law, G. L. c. 4, 
§ 7, Twenty-sixth (f).  The investigative exemption exempts from 
disclosure "investigative materials necessarily compiled out of 
the public view by law enforcement or other investigatory 
officials the disclosure of which materials would probably so 
prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such 
                     
9 We reach that issue in the companion case also issued 
today, Attorney Gen. v. District Attorney for the Plymouth 
Dist., 484 Mass.    ,     (2020). 
 
21 
 
 
disclosure would not be in the public interest."10  This language 
makes clear that some investigatory materials are public 
records, and we cannot read exemption (a) so broadly as to 
shield all investigatory materials created by police from 
disclosure.  We therefore conclude that the booking photographs 
and incident reports sought here are not absolutely exempt from 
disclosure as public records under exemption (a) "by necessary 
implication" of the CORI act.  See Reinstein, 378 Mass. at 289, 
quoting Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 65 
(1976) ("There is no blanket exemption provided for records kept 
by police departments").11 
2.  Exemption (c) of the CORI act.  The sole basis on which 
the law enforcement agencies claim the right to withhold the 
requested records is exemption (a).  Because we find no 
"necessary implication" that the CORI act exempts the booking 
photographs and incident reports from disclosure, we conclude 
that the law enforcement agencies have not met their burden to 
show that the requested records are exempt from disclosure under 
                     
10 The law enforcement agencies have not argued that this 
exemption applies in this case. 
11 We note that juvenile records, apart from the CORI act, 
may separately be specifically or by necessary implication 
exempt from disclosure under the public records law by G. L. 
c. 119, § 60A ("All other records of the court in cases of 
delinquency arising under [§§ 52-59], inclusive, shall be 
withheld from public inspection except with the consent of a 
justice of such court"). 
22 
 
 
the public records law.  See G. L. c. 66, § 10A (d) (1) (iv).  
However, many of the concerns raised by the law enforcement 
agencies regarding the collateral consequences of disclosure of 
these records merit attention but are more appropriately 
asserted under the personal privacy exemption, G. L. c. 4, § 7, 
Twenty-sixth (c) (exemption [c]).  We therefore take this 
opportunity to consider whether the requested records would be 
exempt from disclosure under exemption (c) were it invoked. 
Exemption (c) exempts from disclosure "any other materials 
or data relating to a specifically named individual, the 
disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy."  Id.  In contrast to exemption (a), which 
creates an absolute bar to disclosure where it applies, 
exemption (c) is not absolute.  Rather, "[a]gainst the 
prospective invasion of individual privacy is to be weighed in 
each case the public interest in disclosure:  the tilt of the 
scale will suggest whether the subdivision (c) exemption should 
be allowed."  Reinstein, 378 Mass. at 292.  "Where the public 
interest in obtaining information substantially outweighs the 
seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the private interest in 
preventing disclosure must yield to the public interest."  
Champa, 473 Mass. at 96, quoting Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. at 
156.  See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. 
23 
 
 
Department of Agric. Resources, 477 Mass. 280, 291-292 (2017) 
(PETA). 
On the privacy side of the scale, we generally "have looked 
to three factors to assess the weight of the privacy interest at 
stake:  (1) whether disclosure would result in personal 
embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; (2) 
whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a 
highly personal nature; and (3) whether the same information is 
available from other sources."  PETA, 477 Mass. at 292, citing 
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 419 Mass. 852, 
858 (1995).  "We have also said that 'other case-specific 
relevant factors' may influence the calculus."  PETA, supra, 
quoting Globe Newspaper Co., supra.  Here, those case-specific 
privacy factors include the risk of adverse collateral 
consequences to the individual that might arise from the 
disclosure of this criminal justice information.  "On the other 
side of the scale, we have said that the public has a recognized 
interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out 
their duties in a law-abiding and efficient manner."  PETA, 
supra. 
In deciding whether to invoke exemption (c) for public 
records requests such as those made here, law enforcement 
agencies "should balance the interests of transparency, 
accountability, and public confidence that might be served by 
24 
 
 
making the requested records public against the risk that 
disclosure would unfairly result in adverse collateral 
consequences to the accused."  Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC 
v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court, 483 Mass. 80, 102 (2019).  
If the request had sought records concerning the alleged 
misconduct of a private person, there might be little to offset 
the risk of adverse collateral consequences arising from such 
disclosure unless there were investigative reasons for public 
disclosure of the records.  But the records in this case concern 
alleged misconduct by public officials and, for two reasons, 
that creates a substantial public interest in disclosure that 
must be weighed against the risk of adverse collateral 
consequences. 
First, police officers and members of the judiciary occupy 
positions "of special public trust."  Police Comm'r of Boston v. 
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 372 (1986).  By 
assuming their unique position of power and authority in our 
communities, police officers "must comport themselves in 
accordance with the laws that they are sworn to enforce and 
behave in a manner that brings honor and respect for rather than 
public distrust of law enforcement personnel."  Id. at 371.  "In 
accepting employment by the public, they implicitly agree that 
they will not engage in conduct which calls into question their 
ability and fitness to perform their official responsibilities."  
25 
 
 
Id.  The same is true for judges; the extraordinary power 
invested in the judicial office demands a high standard of 
behavior to ensure public trust in the judiciary.  Accordingly, 
the public has a vital interest in ensuring transparency where 
the behavior of these public officials allegedly fails to 
comport with the heightened standards attendant to their office. 
Second, where police officers and judges allegedly engage 
in criminal conduct that does not result in an arraignment, 
either because of a nolle prosequi or a dismissal before 
arraignment, the public has a substantial interest in 
ascertaining whether the case was not prosecuted because it 
lacked merit or because these public officials received 
favorable treatment arising from their position or 
relationships.  Such matters implicate not only the integrity of 
the public officials who allegedly engaged in criminal conduct 
but also the integrity of our criminal justice system.  Cf.  
State v. Crepeault, 167 Vt. 209, 218 (1997) ("Our concern is for 
the integrity of the legal process, which suffers as much from 
the appearance as the substance of impropriety. . . .  Fair or 
not, it is not enough that our public prosecutors be ethical in 
fact.  They must be above any suspicion of wrongdoing" [citation 
omitted]). 
The public interests furthered by the public records law -- 
transparency, accountability, and public confidence -- "are at 
26 
 
 
their apex if the conduct at issue occurred in the performance 
of the official's professional duties or materially bears on the 
official's ability to perform those duties honestly or capably."  
Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC, 483 Mass. at 102.  Generally, 
and in this case, the private interests advanced by the CORI act 
-- privacy, rehabilitation, and reintegration of criminal 
offenders into society -- do not offset the public's "right to 
know 'whether public servants are carrying out their duties in 
an efficient and law-abiding manner.'"  Boston Herald, Inc. v. 
Sharpe, 432 Mass. 593, 606 (2000), quoting George W. Prescott 
Publ. Co. v. Register of Probate for Norfolk County, 395 Mass. 
274, 279 (1985).  In enacting CORI reform, the Legislature 
recognized that a public official's interest in rehabilitation 
and reintegration is limited by the public's concern with 
holding public officials accountable for misconduct when it made 
public corruption crimes committed by public officials 
ineligible for sealing.  See G. L. c. 276, § 100A; St. 2010, 
c. 256, § 128 (excluding from sealing convictions for violations 
of G. L. c. 268A).  See also Pon, 469 Mass. at 298 n.5 
("Convictions that are ineligible for sealing under [G. L. 
c. 276,] § 100A[,] include . . . crimes based on the conduct of 
public officials and employees, see G. L. c. 268A").  In 
addition, we have previously held that a "public official has a 
significantly diminished privacy interest with respect to 
27 
 
 
information relevant to the conduct of his [or her] office."  
George W. Prescott Publ. Co., supra at 278.  See also Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) ("An individual who 
decides to seek governmental office must accept certain 
necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs.  
He runs the risk of closer public scrutiny than might otherwise 
be the case").  That is not to say that public officials have no 
interest in rehabilitation and reintegration; however, the 
diminished privacy interest must be balanced against the 
public's ability to ensure that law enforcement officers and 
judges are not above the laws that they are tasked with 
upholding. 
Conclusion.  In sum, where we must narrowly construe 
exemptions from disclosure under the public records law, we 
conclude that the booking photographs and incident reports 
sought here are not absolutely exempt from disclosure as public 
records under exemption (a) "by necessary implication" of the 
CORI act.  The law enforcement agencies have therefore not met 
their burden to show that the requested records are exempt from 
disclosure under the public records law.  See G. L. c. 66, 
§ 10A (d) (1) (iv).  We also conclude that, had the law 
enforcement agencies asserted the privacy exemption, exemption 
(c), these records would not be exempt from disclosure where the 
subjects of the requested records are public officials and the 
28 
 
 
public interests in disclosure substantially outweigh the 
privacy interests in rehabilitation and reintegration furthered 
by the CORI act.  There is a substantial public interest in the 
disclosure of police incident reports regarding alleged offenses 
by police officers and public officials that do not result in 
arraignment.  And disclosure of the booking photographs will 
eliminate confusion as to the identity of those arrested where 
they may have common names that may be shared by others. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.