Title: Darrick Terrell Adaway v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC04-239
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 17, 2005

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-239 
____________ 
 
DARRICK TERRELL ADAWAY, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[March 17, 2005] 
 
CANTERO, J. 
 
We review Adaway v. State, 864 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), which 
expressly declared valid a state statute mandating life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole for persons convicted of capital sexual battery.  We have 
discretionary jurisdiction and granted review.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; 
Adaway v. State, 871 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 2004) (order granting review).1  The sole 
issue is whether a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole 
                                          
 
1 The district court did not say, in so many words, that the statute at issue was 
valid.  The sole issue before the district court, however, was whether the defen-
dant’s sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment.  That sentence was 
based on the statute.  Therefore, a finding that the sentence was constitutional 
necessarily included a finding that the statute on which it was based was also 
constitutional. 
 
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for oral union with the vagina of a girl under the age of twelve constitutes either 
cruel and unusual punishment (in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution) or cruel or unusual punishment (in violation of the former 
version of article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution).2  In a case involving the 
identical crime, we held that a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of 
parole after twenty-five years complies with both constitutional provisions.  See 
Banks v. State, 342 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1976).  We reach the same conclusion now, 
notwithstanding the Legislature’s elimination of the possibility of parole.   
I. FACTS 
 
The defendant, Darrick Terrell Adaway, sexually assaulted an eleven-year-
old girl while she slept in the bedroom she shared with her siblings.  Adaway, who 
was thirty-six years old at the time, entered the bedroom, woke the victim, and told 
her to pull down her underwear.  He then touched her vagina with his tongue.  The 
State charged Adaway with sexual battery on a child under twelve in violation of 
                                          
 
2 At the time of the crime, article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution provided: 
“Excessive fines, cruel or unusual punishment, attainder, forfeiture of estate, 
indefinite imprisonment, and unreasonable detention of witnesses are forbidden.”  
In 2002, Florida voters changed the phrase “cruel or unusual punishment” to “cruel 
and unusual punishment.”  The amended version is arguably narrower.  Cf. Hale v. 
State, 630 So. 2d 521, 526 (Fla. 1993) (“The federal constitution protects against 
sentences that are both cruel and unusual.  The Florida Constitution, arguably a 
broader constitutional provision, protects against sentences that are either cruel or 
unusual.”).  Both parties acknowledge that the earlier version of article I, section 
17 applies to this case.  We agree. 
 
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section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes (1999), and with lewd or lascivious molesta-
tion of a child under twelve in violation of section 800.04(5)(b), Florida Statutes 
(1999).  A jury convicted Adaway of both charges.  The trial court sentenced him 
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on the sexual battery charge, 
which was a mandatory sentence under section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1999).  
The court also sentenced him to thirty years’ imprisonment on the lewd or lascivi-
ous molestation charge. 
On appeal, Adaway argued that a sentence of life imprisonment without pa-
role was grossly disproportionate to his crime and therefore violated both the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause of the United States Constitution and the former 
Cruel or Unusual Punishment Clause of the Florida Constitution.  See Adaway, 
864 So. 2d at 37.  The Third District disagreed and upheld Adaway’s sentence.  Id. 
at 37-38.  The court noted, however, that a concurring opinion from this Court had 
cautioned that “the constitutionality of a mandatory punishment of life imprison-
ment for the specific crime of sexual battery without penile/vaginal union is a 
significant concern.”  Id. at 38 (quoting Welsh v. State, 850 So. 2d 467, 474 n.8 
(Fla. 2003) (Pariente, J., concurring)).  We granted review to resolve the issue.  
Adaway, 871 So. 2d at 871. 
 
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II. ANALYSIS 
 
The statute defines sexual battery as “oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or 
union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of an-
other by any other object.”  § 794.011(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (1999).  When a person at 
least eighteen years old commits sexual battery on a person under twelve, the 
statute deems it “a capital felony, punishable as provided in ss. 775.082 and 
921.141.”  § 794.011(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999).  As written, the cross-referenced 
section provides that capital sexual battery is punishable by death.  § 775.082(1), 
Fla. Stat. (1999).  In Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981), however, we held 
that a sentence of death for capital sexual battery violates the Eighth Amendment. 
Following Buford, the maximum sentence for capital sexual battery became 
life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years.  See Rusaw 
v. State, 451 So. 2d 469, 470 (Fla. 1984) (“Death is no longer permissible for the 
sexual battery described in subsection 794.011(2), but life imprisonment with a 
twenty-five-year minimum is.”).  We have upheld such a sentence as applied to the 
crime of oral union with the genitals of a child under twelve.  See Banks, 342 So. 
2d at 470. 
In 1995, the Legislature eliminated the possibility of parole for convictions  
of capital sexual battery.  See Ch. 95-294, § 4, at 2718, Laws of Fla.  Thus, section 
775.082 now provides that a person convicted of capital sexual battery “shall be 
 
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punished by life imprisonment and shall be ineligible for parole.”  § 775.082(1), 
Fla. Stat. (1999).  Adaway, who received such a sentence, contends it is grossly 
disproportionate to his crime and therefore violates both the United States and the 
Florida Constitutions. 
Like the United States Supreme Court, we have been reluctant to declare a 
sentence cruel or unusual simply because of its length.  See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 
U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (expressing a “reluctance to review legislatively mandated 
terms of imprisonment”).  As we have stated more than once, “the length of the 
sentence actually imposed is generally said to be a matter of legislative preroga-
tive.”  Hall v. State, 823 So. 2d 757, 760 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Hale v. State, 630 
So. 2d 521, 526 (Fla. 1993)).  We noted in Hall that both “[t]he Eighth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and [the former] article I, section 17 of the Flor-
ida Constitution have historically provided protection relative to the mode and 
method of punishment, not the length of incarceration.”  823 So. 2d at 760; see 
also id. (“Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the 
proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.”) (quoting 
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272).  We reiterate the soundness of this approach.  Accord-
ingly, we analyze Adaway’s claims with “substantial deference to the broad au-
thority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of 
punishments for crimes.”  Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983). 
 
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We first discuss Adaway’s challenge to his sentence under the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution.  We then address his claim that the sentence violates the former version 
of article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution. 
A.  Eighth Amendment 
The United States Supreme Court has not reached a majority consensus on 
the standard for determining the constitutionality of long prison sentences.  See 
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (plurality opinion); Harmelin v. Michigan, 
501 U.S. 957 (1990) (plurality opinion).  The Court has acknowledged that “in 
determining whether a particular sentence for a term of years can violate the Eighth 
Amendment, we have not established a clear or consistent path for courts to fol-
low.”  Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003).  A majority of the Court re-
cently agreed, however, that “[t]hrough this thicket of Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence, one governing legal principle emerges as ‘clearly established’”––
namely, that a “gross disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences for 
terms of years.”  Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).  In other words, to violate 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a prison sentence must, at least, be 
grossly disproportionate to the crime. 
 
The first and only case in which the Supreme Court has invalidated a prison 
sentence because of its length was Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. at 290.  See Erwin 
 
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Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1049, 1058 
(2004) (noting that “Solem v. Helm remains the only case in which the Supreme 
Court has found a prison sentence to be grossly disproportionate”).  The defendant 
in Solem had been sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for writing a “no 
account” check for $100.  436 U.S. at 281.  The defendant previously had been 
convicted of six nonviolent felonies, including third-degree burglary (three times), 
obtaining money under false pretenses, grand larceny, and third-offense driving 
while intoxicated.  Id. at 279-80.  The Court concluded that the sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole was “significantly disproportionate to [the] crime, 
and . . . therefore prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.”  Id. at 303. 
 
In Solem, the Court’s proportionality analysis was “guided by objective 
criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) 
the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the 
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.”  Id. at 
292.  While characterizing the first of the three factors as one that “a court must 
consider,” in discussing the other factors the Court stated only that “it may be 
helpful” to apply the second and that “courts may find it useful” to apply the third.  
Id. at 291.   
 
Solem remains the only case in which the United States Supreme Court 
declared a sentence unconstitutional based on its length.  Since then, it has twice 
 
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upheld such sentences, but without agreement on a rationale.  Eight years after 
Solem, the Supreme Court decided Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).  In 
Harmelin, the defendant was convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine.  He 
received life imprisonment without parole.  Id. at 961.  The Court upheld the 
sentence.  Justice Scalia, in a plurality opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
argued that “Solem was simply wrong” and that proportionality review should 
apply only in death penalty cases.  Id. at 965, 994.  Justice Kennedy wrote a con-
curring opinion, joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter, which interpreted Solem 
as adopting a “narrow proportionality principle.”  Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment).  According to Justice Kennedy, “[t]he 
Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and 
sentence.  Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportion-
ate’ to the crime.”  Id. at 1001 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 288).  Justice Kennedy 
rejected the idea that Solem had “announce[d] a rigid three-part test” for propor-
tionality.  Id. at 1004.  Instead, he concluded that the second and third factors from 
Solem, which involve comparative analysis, “are appropriate only in the rare case 
in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed 
leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.”  Id. at 1005.  Finding no such 
inference in Harmelin, Justice Kennedy began and ended his analysis with the first 
factor from Solem.  See id. at 1004.  The four dissenters criticized Justice Ken-
 
- 9 -
nedy’s concurrence for “abandon[ing] the second and third factors set forth in 
Solem” and thereby “mak[ing] any attempt at an objective proportionality analysis 
futile.”  Id. at 1020 (White, J., dissenting). 
 
These divisions persisted in Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), the 
Court’s most recent decision on the issue.  In Ewing, the defendant shoplifted three 
golf clubs, each valued at $399.  Id. at 18.  Because of his prior convictions of 
three burglaries and a robbery, he was sentenced to prison for twenty-five years to 
life under California’s three strikes law.  Id. at 20.  The Court upheld the sentence, 
again without a majority rationale.  Justice O’Connor, writing for a plurality of 
three (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy), applied Justice 
Kennedy’s analysis from Harmelin and concluded the sentence was not “grossly 
disproportionate” to the crime.  Id. at 30.  Concurring separately in the judgment, 
Justices Scalia and Thomas argued that prison sentences should never be invali-
dated because of their length.  Id. at 31-32 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); 
id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).  The four dissenters protested 
that, even applying Justice Kennedy’s framework, Ewing “is a ‘rare’ case––one in 
which a court can say with reasonable confidence that the punishment is ‘grossly 
disproportionate’ to the crime.”  Id. at 37 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 
We read the decisions in Solem, Harmelin, and Ewing as requiring, for a 
prison sentence to constitute cruel and unusual punishment solely because of its 
 
- 10 -
length, that at a minimum the sentence be grossly disproportionate to the crime.  
The Court itself has announced that it is “clearly established” that “[a] gross dis-
proportionality principle is applicable to sentences for terms of years.”  Lockyer, 
538 U.S. at 72.  In this case, we need not speculate about other requirements be-
cause Adaway has failed to demonstrate gross disproportionality. 
 
We conclude that Adaway’s sentence of life imprisonment without parole is 
not grossly disproportionate to his crime of oral union with the vagina of a girl 
under the age of twelve.  We reiterate that “the length of the sentence actually 
imposed is generally said to be a matter of legislative prerogative.”  Hall, 823 So. 
at 760 (quoting Hale, 630 So. 2d at 526).  Although the penalty is harsh, we accept 
the Legislature’s judgment about the gravity of the crime.  See Kendry v. State, 
517 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (stating that sexual battery upon a child is 
“one of the most heinous and despicable offenses imaginable”).  As one court has 
remarked: 
Child sexual predation is a serious concern.  Even when it leaves no 
physical scars, it can create emotional damage that lasts a lifetime.  
There is evidence that victims of abuse can become abusers and that 
this crime can transmit its injuries across generations.  Because vic-
tims hesitate to report this crime and proof of the offense is often dif-
ficult to obtain, there is a risk that perpetrators will believe they can 
escape detection and punishment.  As a result, there is a need for a 
harsh penalty to act as a sufficient deterrent. 
 
- 11 -
Gibson v. State, 721 So. 2d 363, 368-69 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (citing Charles A. 
Phipps, Children, Adults, Sex and the Criminal Law: In Search of Reason, 22 
Seton Hall Legis. J. 1, 107 (1997)). 
We have recognized that “[n]early all sexual battery cases inflict emotional 
hardship on the victim.”  Lerma v. State, 497 So. 2d 736, 739 (Fla. 1986).  The 
crime of sexual battery is especially harmful to young victims.  Researchers have 
identified a long list of harms caused by child sexual abuse, including “fears, 
anxiety, phobias, sleep and eating disturbances, poor self-esteem, depression, self-
mutilation, suicide, anger, hostility, aggression, violence, running away, truancy, 
delinquency, increased vulnerability to revictimization, substance abuse, teenage 
prostitution, and early pregnancy.”  Frank W. Putnam & Penelope K. Trickett, 
Child Sexual Abuse: A Model of Chronic Trauma, 56 Psychiatry 82, 84 (1993); 
see also Kathleen A. Kendall-Tackett et al., Impact of Sexual Abuse on Children: 
A Review and Synthesis of Recent Empirical Studies, 113 Psychol. Bulletin 164, 
165 (1993) (finding that seven factors stand out in sexually abused children as 
compared with non-abused children: aggression, anxiety, depression, externalizing, 
internalizing, sexualized behavior, and withdrawal).  Research has further shown 
that certain adult psychiatric problems, including eating disorders, personality 
disorders, and somatization disorder (physical symptoms without medical explana-
tion), can be directly related to child sexual abuse.  See Putnam & Trickett, 56 
 
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Psychiatry at 83.  Given this array of potentially lifelong harms associated with 
sexual abuse of children, we will not second-guess the Legislature’s judgment that 
such a crime warrants a lifelong penalty. 
A comparison of the crime in this case to those involved in the relevant 
United States Supreme Court decisions strengthens our conclusion.  The Court has 
upheld a life sentence without the possibility of parole for the possession of 672 
grams (about 1.5 pounds) of cocaine, Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 979, and a sentence of 
twenty-five years to life for shoplifting three golf clubs after previous convictions 
of three burglaries and a robbery, Ewing, 538 U.S. at 11.  The Court concluded that 
neither sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime.  To classify Adaway’s 
life sentence without parole as grossly disproportionate, we would have to con-
clude that an adult’s oral union with the vagina of an eleven-year-old girl is an 
objectively lesser offense than possessing one and a half pounds of cocaine or 
shoplifting three golf clubs after previous convictions of three burglaries and a 
robbery.  We are unable to do so.  Indeed, Adaway’s sexual abuse arguably consti-
tutes a substantially greater offense. 
This case is drastically different from Solem, the lone case in which the Su-
preme Court has invalidated a prison sentence because of its length.  463 U.S. at 
303.  In Solem, the defendant received a life sentence without the possibility of 
parole for fraudulently writing a $100 check, which the Court described as “one of 
 
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the most passive felonies a person could commit.”  Id. at 296 (quoting State v. 
Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 501 (S.D. 1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting)).  The Court 
emphasized that the crime in Solem “involved neither violence nor threat of vio-
lence to any person.”  Id.   In contrast, there was nothing passive or nonviolent 
about Adaway’s crime.  He approached his eleven-year-old victim in her bedroom 
while she was sleeping, ordered her to remove her clothing, and touched her geni-
tals without her consent.  This is one of the more active and physically threatening 
felonies a person can commit on a child. 
We reach the same conclusion in this case as we did in Banks, 342 So. 2d at 
469.  In Banks, which involved the same crime, we upheld a sentence of life im-
prisonment with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years.  Id. at 470.  The 
only difference in this case is that the Legislature has since removed the possibility 
of parole.  Adaway has not urged us to recede from Banks.  Rather, he argues that 
the absence of parole eligibility distinguishes his case from Banks and mandates 
the opposite result. 
It is true that the Supreme Court has considered parole eligibility relevant 
under the Eighth Amendment, at least in close cases.  See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 
280-81.  In Rummel, the defendant received a life sentence for obtaining $120.75 
by false pretenses, after having been previously convicted of two monetary frauds 
totaling $108.36.  Id. at 265-66.  In upholding the defendant’s life sentence, the 
 
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Court emphasized that Texas had a “relatively liberal policy” that “historically has 
allowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for parole in as little 
as 12 years.”  Id. at 280. 
Florida has a more stringent parole policy, however, making parole eligibil-
ity less relevant to our analysis.  “In Florida, parole-eligible inmates do not have a 
legitimate expectation of liberty or right to expect release on a certain date even 
after they have been given a specific Presumptive Parole Release Date”––much 
less when they are given a life sentence that allows for the possibility of parole.  
Meola v. Dep’t of Corrections, 732 So. 2d 1029, 1034 (Fla. 1999).  In fact, as one 
court has noted, “[f]or many prisoners, the sentence imposed for capital sexual 
battery prior to [the Legislature’s elimination of parole eligibility in] 1995 may 
result in a sentence just as long as a sentence imposed after 1995.”  Gibson, 721 
So. 2d at 369.   
We disagree with Adaway’s argument that the absence of parole eligibility 
in this case mandates a different result.  Our affirmance of the sentence in Banks 
did not depend on the existence of parole eligibility.  While the Legislature’s 
elimination of parole eligibility after twenty-five years has increased the overall 
harshness of the punishment for capital sexual battery, the difference is not severe 
enough to render Adaway’s life sentence grossly disproportionate.  We therefore 
 
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hold that Adaway’s sentence satisfies the requirements of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause.  
B.  The Former Article I, Section 17 
We next consider whether Adaway’s sentence violates the former article I, 
section 17 of the Florida Constitution.  Because this provision forbade “cruel or 
unusual punishment” as opposed to the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel 
and unusual punishment,” the Florida provision arguably was broader.  See Hale, 
630 So. 2d at 526.  We have never concluded, however, that the difference be-
tween the federal “and” and the Florida “or” was constitutionally decisive.  For this 
reason, we have never precisely identified the parameters of the former Cruel or 
Unusual Punishment Clause.  In Hale, for example, we concluded: “It is not neces-
sary to delineate the precise contours of the Florida guarantee against cruel or 
unusual punishment . . . because Hale’s sentence is clearly not disproportionate.”  
Id. at 526.  We reach the same conclusion here.  We therefore hold that Adaway’s 
sentence does not violate article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, we hold that Adaway’s sentence of life imprisonment 
without parole for the crime of oral union with the genitals of a child under the age 
of twelve does not violate either the Eighth Amendment to the United States Con-
 
- 16 -
stitution or article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution.  We approve the district 
court’s decision upholding Adaway’s sentence. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
PARIENTE, C.J., concurs with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
PARIENTE, C.J., concurring. 
 
I have previously expressed reservations about the constitutionality of a 
mandatory life sentence for sexual battery in which the defendant’s penis does not 
come into contact with the victim’s vagina.  See Welsh v. State, 850 So. 2d 467, 
474 n.8 (Fla. 2003) (Pariente, J., concurring).  Although this case, like Welsh, 
involves a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for the crime of capital 
sexual battery involving contact between the defendant’s mouth and the victim’s 
vagina, I concur in the Court’s decision because I agree that relief is foreclosed 
under the applicable precedent.3  
                                          
 
 
3.  I also note that the trial court would have been compelled to sentence 
Adaway to life imprisonment for this crime even if it were classified as a life 
felony.   Adaway was separately sentenced to thirty years’ incarceration as a prison 
releasee reoffender for lewd and lascivious molestation on the same victim.  Under 
section 775.082(9)(a)(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), the trial court is required to 
impose a life sentence upon a prison releasee reoffender who commits a life fel-
ony. 
 
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Although I would not hold the sentence in this case unconstitutional, I would 
request that the Legislature consider addressing whether all conduct now labeled 
capital sexual battery should in all circumstances yield a mandatory term of life 
imprisonment.  Without question, the crime, however committed, is an appalling 
violation that cannot be tolerated by a society that values its children.  And the 
conduct of the defendant in this case is justifiably punished by a lengthy sentence, 
particularly in light of a prior record that includes a previous conviction of sexual 
battery.  Yet the question remains whether, under every possible scenario in which 
the crime of capital sexual battery may be committed, society is well served by 
warehousing the offender in prison for the remainder of his or her life.  
 
Initially, Florida is in a small minority of states that requires a life sentence 
for a perpetrator’s first sexual assault of a child.  The others are Illinois, Louisiana, 
Ohio, and North Carolina.  See People v. Huddleston, 816 N.E.2d 322, 341-42 (Ill. 
2004).  Moreover, the definition of “sexual battery” applicable to prosecutions of 
capital sexual battery in Florida is broad.  The Second District has explained how 
this occurred:   
Through the 1960s, capital sexual battery was punishable by death. 
During that period, capital sexual battery required proof that a defen-
dant “carnally know and abuse a female child.”  See  § 794.01, Fla. 
Stat. (1969). That statute, based on the common law, required proof of 
penetration. See Askew v. State, 118 So.2d 219, 221 (Fla. 1960). Un-
der that statute, Mr. Gibson could have been convicted of a lesser of-
 
- 18 -
fense, but probably would not have been convicted of capital sexual 
battery.[4] 
 
Florida’s rape statute was amended in 1974. See ch. 74-121, 
Laws of Fla. The amendment changed the definition of sexual battery 
to “oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual or-
gan of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of another by any 
other object.”  § 794.011(f), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1974). This is the same 
definition of sexual battery that is used in the current statute.  See § 
794.011(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (1997). This anatomically correct, but more 
antiseptic, definition of capital sexual battery transformed acts that 
were previously lesser offenses into capital sexual battery. This 
amendment also results in the more frequent prosecution of capital 
sexual battery cases in which there is little, if any, physical evidence 
of rape. Often a defendant is convicted of this crime based primarily, 
if not exclusively, on the testimony of a young child. 
 
Gibson v. State, 721 So. 2d 363, 367 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). 
 
 
I agree with the warning by Judge Altenbernd in Gibson that the mandatory 
life penalty for capital sexual battery may discourage both reporting of the crime 
and guilty verdicts for those apprehended and tried: 
There is reason to be concerned that family members who know about 
the severity of this penalty will hesitate or even refuse to report in-
trafamily sexual battery, or choose not to cooperate with its prosecu-
tion. The eloquent juror in this case demonstrates that jurors who un-
derstand the law may choose to exercise their options of jury pardon 
in some cases. Thus, there is a possibility this inflexible mandatory 
penalty of life imprisonment may result in fewer convictions for this 
type of sexual predation than a more flexible penalty. As a result, this 
more severe punishment may ultimately prove to be a lesser deterrent 
than a more flexible penalty. These concerns . . . are matters for con-
sideration by the legislature . . . . 
                                          
 
 
4.  Gibson engaged in penile-vaginal union with his female victim.  
Adaway’s conduct, oral-vaginal union, would not have constituted capital sexual 
battery before the 1974 amendment to section 794.011. 
 
- 19 -
Id. at 370.   
 
Another consideration weighing in favor of determinate sentences is that 
mandatory life sentences for capital sexual battery offenders contribute to the aging 
of Florida’s prison population.  Figures supplied by the Department of Corrections 
show that from January 2000 to December 2004, the percentage of state prison 
inmates fifty years of age or older increased from 7.7 percent to 11.2 percent, an 
increase of 3,938 prisoners.  It is well known that older prisoners have higher 
health care costs than both younger prisoners and older persons who are not incar-
cerated, and these costs are almost always borne by the taxpayers.  Moreover, 
when they are released after serving lengthy sentences, older prisoners recidivate at 
lower rates than their younger counterparts.  See generally Florida Department of 
Corrections, Recidivism Report:  Inmates Released from Florida Prisons July 1995 
to June 2001, at http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/recidivism/2003/full.pdf (visited 
March 11, 2005). 
 
Further, for those older prisoners who continue to pose a substantial risk of 
reoffending after serving their sentences, in enacting the Jimmy Ryce Act the 
Legislature has created a powerful tool for keeping dangerous sexual offenders 
away from the public long after their sentences have ended.  See  §§ 394.912-
394.931, Fla. Stat. (2004).  A person who has completed a sentence for sexual 
battery may be civilly committed under the Ryce Act if the person is determined 
 
- 20 -
by a judge or jury to be suffering from “a mental abnormality or personality disor-
der that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined 
in a secure facility.”  § 394.912(10)(b), 394.917(1), Fla. Stat. (2004).  Thereafter, 
the person is released only if he or she is found to be “not likely to commit acts of 
sexual violence if discharged.”  § 394.919(1), Fla. Stat. (2004).   
 
The Ryce Act serves at least one of the purposes of a mandatory life sen-
tence for capital sexual battery––to prevent further victimization of children.  Its 
availability supports re-examination of whether conduct that does not include 
sexual penetration or grave injury should be defined as capital sexual battery, or 
whether the crime of capital sexual battery should be redesignated a life felony, 
which would restore some degree of sentence discretion.5 
 
Finally, if capital sexual battery remains a capital felony, I urge this Court to 
consider amending Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.270 to require a jury of 
twelve in these cases.  As noted in Palazzolo v. State, 754 So. 2d 731, 737 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2000), the evidence in a capital sexual battery trial can be much more tenu-
ous than in a murder trial, and often rests largely on the victim’s testimony and 
hearsay statements.  Unless the defense agrees to a jury of six, a twelve-person jury 
is required in first-degree murder cases in which the maximum penalty is life 
                                          
 
 
5.  For a life felony committed after July 1, 1995, the trial court may impose 
a term of imprisonment of life or a term of years not exceeding life. See  § 
775.082(3)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (2004). 
 
- 21 -
imprisonment because the State is not seeking the death penalty.  See State v. 
Griffith, 561 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1990).   
 
There may be merit to the notion that a unanimous guilty verdict by a jury of 
twelve should also be required for capital sexual battery cases, unless waived by 
the defendant.  Amendment of rule 3.270 would be necessary because this Court 
has previously held that a twelve-person jury is not required under the rule for a 
capital sexual battery trial.  See State v. Hogan, 451 So. 2d 844, 845-846 (Fla. 
1984).  The matter should be referred to the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee 
for study and a possible recommendation. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs. 
 
 
 
An Appeal from the District Court of Appeal - Statutory Validity 
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D02-1907 
 
 
(Dade County) 
 
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and Roy A. Heimlich, Assistant Public 
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Richard Polin, Bureau 
Chief, Criminal Appeals and Paulette R. Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, 
Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee