Title: Angel v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 092341
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 13, 2011

Present:  Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons, JJ., and Carrico, 
Russell and Lacy, S.JJ. 
 
RUBIO ARGELIO ANGEL 
 
v.  Record No. 092341 
 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ELIZABETH B. LACY 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA  
 
    JANUARY 13, 2011 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Rubio Argelio Angel was convicted by an Arlington County 
jury of malicious wounding, Code § 18.2-51, abduction with 
intent to defile, Code § 18.2-48, two counts of object sexual 
penetration, Code § 18.2-67.2, and misdemeanor sexual battery, 
Code § 18.2-67.4, arising out of attacks on two women, S.P. 
and V.L., on two different dates.  He was sentenced to three 
consecutive life terms and a twenty-year term of imprisonment, 
plus twelve months in jail.  His convictions were affirmed by 
the Court of Appeals in an unpublished memorandum opinion.  
Angel v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2044-07-4 (Mar. 24, 2009).  
For the reasons stated below, we will affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals.  
FACTS 
 
The facts relating to the attacks at issue are as 
follows.  Facts relevant only to specific assignments of error 
will be addressed in the discussion of those assignments of 
error. 
 
On Sunday, July 9, 2006, at approximately 6:30 p.m., V.L. 
was attacked from behind while walking on a bike path in 
western Arlington County.  V.L. testified that her assailant 
was a male of average build with dark hair who appeared to be 
Hispanic.  The man knocked V.L. to the ground and continued to 
“punch [her] in the head and kick [her] all over.”  After 
several blows to her head, V.L. lost consciousness.  The man 
then dragged V.L. away from the bike path and into the woods.  
V.L. testified that the next thing she remembered was being 
unable to open her eyes because they were swollen shut but 
that she heard a motorbike, and then voices of the people who 
found her and called for an ambulance.  
 
Adam Radicic and Christina Bishop were walking on the 
bike path at the time of the attack on V.L.  Radicic testified 
that he and Bishop saw a small, green motorbike “idling” on 
the right side of the path, which was bordered by a wooded 
area.  Radicic recognized the green motorbike as one he and 
Bishop had seen a young man pushing across a creek just a few 
minutes earlier.  Radicic testified that he and Bishop 
continued on their walk past the motorbike and then heard 
“moans coming from the woods” and “all of a sudden, this guy 
jets out of the woods, running within an arm’s distance of me 
and does a 90-degree turn” to run back in the direction of the 
motorbike.  Radicic testified that the man was approximately 
2 
 
 
 
five feet, eight inches tall, slender, “really . . . very, 
very thin” and was the same man he had seen earlier on the 
green motorbike.  Radicic identified Angel at trial stating 
that Angel “match[ed] a lot of the key features” of the man he 
saw running from the woods. 
Radicic also testified that he found V.L. lying on her 
back in the woods, “completely covered in blood” with a black 
tank top pushed up around her neck and her shorts and 
undergarments had been ripped off.  Her legs were positioned 
apart and Radicic testified that her head was “entirely 
swollen up” and her “hair was caked with blood.”  Once the 
paramedics arrived, V.L. was transported to Inova Fairfax 
Hospital. 
 
Nancy Susco, a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner at Inova 
Fairfax Hospital, examined V.L. and testified that her hair 
was “matted with blood, dried blood,” and that she “had 
leaves, dirt [and] twigs all over her.”  Susco testified that 
V.L. had a bloody nose, a laceration to her forehead, her 
hands were covered in blood, and she had numerous scratches 
and bruises all over her body.  Susco also testified that V.L. 
had a tear to the vaginal wall with “a lot of swelling to that 
area and there was a lot of bleeding” and that “[V.L.] ended 
up going to the operating room.”  Susco also removed a wooden 
stick, approximately five inches long, from V.L.’s anus.  
3 
 
 
 
Susco opined that the stick found in V.L.’s anus and the 
injuries to her vagina were “consistent with forceful 
penetration.” 
Detective Sean Carrig, a member of the Special Victim’s 
Unit of the Arlington County Police Department, interviewed 
V.L. at the hospital.  He testified that based upon the 
information provided to the police by the victim and 
witnesses, Arlington Police issued a regional broadcast to 
other jurisdictions regarding details about the crime against 
V.L. including that the suspect was a young Hispanic male 
traveling on a green dirt bike. 
As a result of the broadcast, Arlington police learned of 
an attack on S.P. that occurred on June 18, 2006, in South 
Arlington, within approximately one mile from where V.L. was 
attacked.  The evidence showed that the attack on S.P. was not 
as severe as the attack on V.L., but the police noted the two 
cases were related because both attacks occurred on a Sunday 
evening at approximately 6:30 p.m. and the suspect was a young 
Hispanic male of medium build who attacked the women from 
behind as they were walking on paths. 
At trial, S.P. testified that on Sunday, June 18, 2006, 
she was walking her dogs on a path near Thomas Jefferson 
Middle School in Arlington, and that at approximately 6:00 
p.m. she passed a man who appeared to be adjusting his shoe.  
4 
 
 
 
She testified that a few moments later “someone came up from 
behind and tried to pull [her] athletic shorts down.”  S.P. 
turned, looked at the man and “started swearing” at him and he 
ran away.  She testified that her attacker was a normal height 
and build, had dark hair, he had dark, “kind of angled 
eyebrows” and was wearing black shoes and a yellow striped 
“polo shirt” with a “thin line of navy blue.”  S.P. testified 
that she thought the man was of Latin ethnicity. 
Detective Carrig testified that he also learned of three 
other attacks similar to the attacks on V.L. and S.P. from 
Detective Victor Ignacio of the Alexandria Police Department.  
Detective Ignacio testified that he had been investigating 
assaults that occurred in Alexandria on Sunday, July 9, 2006, 
against K.G. who was attacked at approximately 5:30 p.m. and 
two other women within the hour.  Detective Carrig testified 
that the attacks on the three women involved a young Hispanic 
male of medium build who “grabbed” or “slapped” the victims’ 
“butt[s]” from behind and who fled on a lime green motorbike 
and the attacks occurred within “1.6 miles” of each other. 
K.G. testified that she was assaulted just after getting 
out of her car at her apartment complex in western Alexandria 
at approximately 5:30 p.m. on Sunday, July 9, 2006.  She 
noticed a green motorbike drive past the back of her car and 
stop about two spaces down from where she was parked.  As K.G. 
5 
 
 
 
was walking through the parking lot, she saw a person kneeling 
behind the green motorbike “tinkering with something” and she 
purposefully “made eye contact with the person.”  As she 
started up the steps to her apartment, K.G. felt a two-handed 
grab from behind that reached “kind of in between [her] legs 
and up around [her] butt” at which point she turned around to 
see who it was.  K.G. started yelling at the man who ran back 
to the green motorbike and fled. 
Neither the Alexandria Police nor the Arlington Police 
had a suspect for these attacks until July 26, 2006, when 
Arlington County Police Detective Rick Rodriguez was in the 
800 block of South Glebe Road responding to a call regarding 
an assault on a female in that area.  Detective Rodriguez 
testified that he was aware of the regional broadcast about 
the other assaults on women in the vicinity and was “looking 
for a lime green motorbike.”  He also testified that he saw 
Angel working on a lime green motorbike located at 833 South 
Glebe Road in Arlington County.  Detective Rodriguez 
identified himself to Angel as a police officer and that he 
was interested in talking with Angel about reports of 
“something [that] had happened further down the street and 
[that the police] were looking for some individuals.”  Angel 
identified himself to Detective Rodriguez as “Carlos Alberto 
Zepeda” and provided identification with that name and a birth 
6 
 
 
 
date of January 2, 1985.  Angel allowed Detective Rodriguez to 
photograph him and the motorbike.  
Detective Rodriguez circulated the information and 
photographs of Angel and the lime green motorbike to the 
police departments of Arlington County and the City of 
Alexandria.  Detective Ignacio, of the Alexandria Police 
Department, received the photographs and compiled a “photo 
spread,” including the photograph of Angel, and showed it to 
K.G. who identified Angel as the man who assaulted her on July 
9, 2006.  Angel was arrested on July 28, 2006, for the offense 
of sexual battery against K.G.  At the time of his arrest, 
Angel again identified himself to police as Carlos Zepeda, a 
21-year-old male and he presented corresponding 
identification.  
DISCUSSION 
In this appeal, Angel raises five assignments of error 
relating to the denial of his motion to suppress his 
statements to police, failure to comply with parental 
notification requirements, the joinder of trials for two 
separate offenses and admission of certain evidence of other 
crimes, the denial of a DNA expert, and the denial of his 
motion for mistrial.  In another assignment of error, Angel 
also asserts, relying on the recent ruling in Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010), that his three 
7 
 
 
 
consecutive life sentences for nonhomicide crimes, without 
parole, should be vacated because it is cruel and unusual 
punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  We consider these issues in order. 
I.  Motion to Suppress Statements to Police 
In his first assignment of error, Angel argues that the 
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s denial 
of his motion to suppress his custodial interrogation because 
it violated his constitutional rights against self-
incrimination and to the assistance of legal counsel under 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966). 
 
The well-settled principles of federal constitutional law 
require that a suspect be informed of his constitutional 
rights to the assistance of counsel and against self-
incrimination. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471.  These Miranda rights 
may be waived by the suspect if the waiver is made knowingly 
and intelligently.  Id. at 475.  The Commonwealth bears the 
burden of showing a knowing and intelligent waiver.  Id.  The 
determination of whether the waiver was made knowingly and 
intelligently is a question of fact that will not be set aside 
on appeal unless plainly wrong.  Jackson v. Commonwealth, 266 
Va. 423, 432, 587 S.E.2d 532, 540 (2003). 
 
The evidence in this case shows that Detectives Victor 
Ignacio and Rosa Ortiz interviewed Angel entirely in Spanish, 
8 
 
 
 
Angel’s native language.  The detectives wore plain clothes 
and carried no weapons during the interview and they did not 
raise their voices or resort to any physical violence at any 
time during the interview.  
Throughout the interview, Angel identified himself as 
Carlos Zepeda, a 21-year-old male.  Angel also provided the 
police with corresponding identification, which the police 
later discovered to be false. 
The detectives began the interview by obtaining general 
information from Angel including that he had completed the 
ninth grade in El Salvador, that he had moved to the United 
States in February 2006, and that he had full-time employment 
in construction work.  The detectives ensured that Angel was 
not hungry or thirsty and that he had not consumed any 
medications, drugs, or alcohol that day. 
After obtaining this background information and observing 
that Angel’s “Spanish was fairly good” and that he had a “good 
background in terms of his verbal expressions, how he spoke” 
the detectives advised Angel of his rights.  Detective Ignacio 
read Angel his Miranda rights in Spanish and also provided 
Angel with a waiver of rights form written in Spanish.  When 
asked if he understood his rights as read to him, Angel 
responded affirmatively.  Angel, at Detective Ignacio’s 
request, read the waiver portion of the form aloud, which 
9 
 
 
 
provides, as translated in English, “I have read this 
declaration of my rights and I understand my rights.  I am 
willing to testify and answer the questions.  I have not been 
threatened or made any promises or offers of compensation.”  
Angel stated that he understood what he had read, and before 
signing the form, said he did not have any questions regarding 
the form or its contents. 
 
Angel argues that an understanding of rights is not the 
same as a waiver of those rights.  Here, Angel argues that he 
did not expressly waive his rights and such waiver cannot be 
inferred either from his signature and statements indicating 
he understood his rights nor his silence as to waiver.  He 
contends there is a presumption against waiver and, here, the 
totality of the circumstances – that he was seventeen years 
old with only a ninth grade education from El Salvador, a 
foreigner who had been present in this country for only six 
months, and the absence of a parent, guardian or other 
interested adult at the interview – does not rebut that 
presumption.  Angel argues that his conduct here was “mere 
silence” with respect to his rights and it does not constitute 
a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. 
 
We agree that a valid waiver will not be presumed simply 
from the silence of the accused after the warnings are given.  
Harrison v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 576, 582, 423 S.E.2d 160, 
10
 
 
 
163-4 (1992) (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 
373 (1979) for the conclusion that, under Miranda, “mere 
silence is not enough”).  However, Miranda neither requires a 
waiver to be in writing or verbally expressed, nor does it 
preclude the conclusion that a waiver occurred based on the 
suspect’s course of conduct.  Harrison, 244 Va. at 582, 423 
S.E.2d at 163 (quoting Butler, 441 U.S. at 373).  
The evidence in this case demonstrates that Angel was not 
silent as to his rights and that he understood and waived 
those rights.  The interview and discussion of rights were 
conducted in Angel’s native language.  He indicated verbally 
that he understood each of his rights when they were read to 
him and when he read them aloud and affirmatively checked each 
statement on the form indicating his understanding and signed 
the form.  The form specified that Angel had a right to not 
talk with the officers or to stop talking with them at any 
time.  Nevertheless, Angel proceeded to talk with the officers 
about the attacks after he was informed of these rights.  The 
explanation of his rights also included the statements that “I 
understand my rights” and that “I am willing to testify and 
answer the questions.”  Angel’s express written and verbal 
statements of waiver of his rights are strong proof of the 
validity of his waiver.  Id. at 582, 423 S.E.2d at 163.  
11
 
 
 
While the officers conducting the interrogation did not 
know at that time that Angel was a juvenile, the information 
gathered from him reflected Angel’s experience, education, and 
background for consideration by the trial court in determining 
whether Angel knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived 
his rights.  Moreover, there is no evidence that Detectives 
Ignacio and Ortiz obtained Angel’s acknowledgement of 
understanding regarding his rights or signature on the waiver 
of rights form by duress or coercion. 
 
Based on our review of this evidence, we find that the 
record supports the trial court’s factual finding that Angel 
waived his Miranda rights and that the waiver was knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent.  Accordingly, we will affirm that 
part of the Court of Appeals’ judgment sustaining the trial 
court’s denial of Angel’s motion to suppress his statements to 
Detectives Ignacio and Ortiz.  
II. Parental Notification 
 
 
In his second assignment of error, Angel asserts that the 
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the circuit court’s 
actions dismissing his appeal of the certification order and 
denying his motion to dismiss the indictments.  Angel’s appeal 
and motion to dismiss were based on his contention that he has 
a due process right guaranteed under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution to have his 
12
 
 
 
parents notified of juvenile court proceedings affecting him.  
Because such notification was not given in either his initial 
advisement hearing or in the transfer hearing, Angel asserts 
that his constitutional right to due process was violated and 
the dismissal of his appeal and denial of the motion to 
dismiss the indictments were error. 
 
The facts relevant to this assignment of error follow.  
When arrested on July 28, 2006, Angel stated he was 21 years 
old, but later admitted he was only 17 years of age.  He also 
told the police that his mother was in El Salvador and that 
she did not have a telephone and that he could not call her.  
Angel did not know his father or where his father resided.  He 
said he had other relatives but he did not “associate with 
them” and that “[t]hey didn’t know anything about him.” 
 
Six petitions were presented to the Arlington County 
Juvenile and Domestic Relations (“JDR”) court at an advisory 
hearing held on July 31, 2006.  Each petition named Angel’s 
mother as Maria E. Angel, and her address as unknown, but in 
El Salvador.  Angel’s father and father’s address were listed 
as unknown.  In its July 31 order, the JDR court noted that 
“[N]o parent is available.”  The JDR court also appointed an 
attorney and guardian ad litem and ordered that Angel be held 
in detention pending the transfer hearing which was set for 
September 6, 2006. 
13
 
 
14
 
 
 
 
Angel, his attorney and his guardian ad litem received 
written notice and all were present at the transfer hearing on 
September 6, 2006.  At the hearing, the JDR court found 
probable cause existed to believe Angel committed the 
aggravated malicious wounding against V.L. and certified that 
charge along with the five other charges to the grand jury 
pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.1(B).1  Angel filed a motion 
opposing the transfer and certification of the charges and 
filed a notice of appeal to the Circuit Court of Arlington 
County citing failure to comply with the notice provisions of 
Code §§ 16.1-263 and 16.1-269.1 and “the dictates of due 
process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”2 
 
On September 12, 2006, the Commonwealth filed a motion in 
the JDR court seeking a clarification of that court’s July 31 
order.  The motion was granted and the JDR court entered an 
order reciting the elements of the July 31 hearing, 
specifically, that the Commonwealth proffered that the 
whereabouts of Angel’s father was unknown and his mother lived 
at an unknown address in El Salvador and that Angel did not 
object to this proffer.  The JDR court then certified that 
                                                 
1 The Commonwealth originally sought certification 
pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.1(C).  
2 Angel also filed a petition for a Writ of Prohibition 
with this Court on September 14, 2006, seeking an order 
preventing the issuance of the indictments.  That petition was 
denied by Order dated September 20, 2006. 
 
“the identity of the defendant’s father was not reasonably 
ascertainable and that the location or mailing address of the 
defendant’s mother was not reasonably ascertainable.”  The 
guardian ad litem noted on the order that she could neither 
object nor agree to the order because she was not present at 
the July 31 advisory hearing.  She also noted that since the 
advisory hearing she had obtained a telephone number for 
Angel’s mother.  There was no indication of an address for the 
mother. 
 
At a hearing on September 27, 2006, the circuit court 
denied Angel’s appeal finding that Code § 16.1–269.4 precludes 
an appeal from certifications made pursuant to subsection B of 
Code § 16.1-269.1, that because an appeal is an appeal de 
novo, reconsideration of a transfer was not “appropriate,” and 
pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.1(E), an indictment “cures any 
error or defect in any proceeding held in the juvenile court 
except with respect to the juvenile’s age.” 
 
On November 30, 2006, Angel filed a motion to dismiss the 
indictments issued on September 18, reiterating his due 
process contention regarding the failure to provide notice to 
his parents.  The circuit court denied Angel’s motion to 
dismiss the indictments at a hearing on December 7, 2006. 
 
We have said, and Angel does not dispute, that the 
failure to comply with statutory requirements relating to 
15
 
 
16
 
 
 
juvenile proceedings including parental notice requirements 
constitutes procedural error that renders the proceeding 
voidable.  Nelson v. Warden, 262 Va. 276, 285, 552 S.E.2d 73, 
78 (2001).  Angel also agrees that any procedural error is 
deemed cured by the issuance of an indictment pursuant to Code 
§ 16.1-269.1(E).  Shackleford v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 196, 
205-06, 547 S.E.2d 899, 904-05 (2001).  Angel correctly 
asserts, however, that this Court has never addressed whether 
the failure to comply with the statutory parental notification 
requirement constitutes a denial of due process guaranteed by 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Thus, the threshold 
issue in Angel’s assignment of error is whether the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution confer 
on him a due process right to parental notification for his 
initial advisement hearing and his transfer hearing.3 
 
In 1967, this Court considered whether the recently 
decided United States Supreme Court case of In re Gault, 387 
U.S. 1 (1967), required, as a matter of constitutional due 
process, the provision of an attorney for a juvenile in a 
transfer hearing. Cradle v. Peyton, 208 Va. 243, 156 S.E.2d 
874 (1967).  We concluded that the constitutional safeguards 
afforded juveniles in Gault were limited by Gault to 
                                                 
3 Angel’s assignment of error does not encompass any 
challenge asserting a constitutional defect in the statutory 
processes relevant here. 
 
proceedings “by which a determination is made as to whether a 
juvenile is a ‘delinquent’ as a result of alleged misconduct 
on his part, with the consequence that he may be committed to 
a state institution.”  387 U.S. at 13.  A transfer hearing, 
which was the proceeding at issue in Cradle, was not the type 
of hearing that resulted in commitment to a state institution 
and, accordingly, we concluded that the constitutional 
protections imposed in Gault did not apply.  Cradle, 208 Va. 
at 246, 156 S.E.2d at 877. 
 
Angel asserts that “Cradle’s distinction between 
adjudicatory and transfer hearings has been undermined since 
1967.”  In support of this statement, Angel refers to the 
statutory changes in the Code of Virginia relating to juvenile 
proceedings which now afford a juvenile a right to counsel 
“prior to the adjudicatory or transfer hearing.”  Code § 16.1-
266(C).  There is no question that since Cradle the General 
Assembly has specifically provided juveniles certain 
procedural rights.  However, those are rights provided by 
statute, not conferred by the constitution. 
 
Angel does not cite and we find no case in which the 
United States Supreme Court has established that juveniles 
have a constitutionally protected due process right of 
parental notice for non-adjudicatory proceedings.  The 
statements of the Supreme Court relied upon by Angel, that 
17
 
 
18
 
 
 
transfer hearings are critically important and that juvenile 
proceedings must satisfy "the basic requirements of due 
process and fairness," were made in Kent v. United States, 383 
U.S. 541, 553 (1966) and cited in Gault, 387 U.S. at 12.  
These statements do not make parental notification of an 
initial advisement hearing or a transfer hearing a due process 
right.  Nevertheless, as indicated above, in this case Angel 
was represented by counsel at both hearings.  A guardian ad 
litem was appointed in the initial hearing at the request of 
Angel’s attorney because, as proffered by the Commonwealth, 
Angel’s father was unknown and the location information 
regarding Angel’s mother was limited to somewhere in El 
Salvador.  Angel did not dispute the information contained in 
the Commonwealth’s proffer.4  The guardian ad litem received 
notice and participated in the transfer hearing.  These facts 
show that the process Angel received is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s admonition that a juvenile be treated with the 
“basic requirements of due process and fairness.”  Kent, 383 
U.S. at 553. 
 
For these reasons, Angel’s claim that his constitutional 
due process rights were violated must fail because no such 
right exists with regard to non-adjudicatory proceedings.       
                                                 
4 These facts were also recited in Angel’s Writ of 
Prohibition filed in this Court.  
 
III.  Motion for Appointment of DNA Expert 
and for a Continuance 
 
Prior to trial, Angel filed a motion seeking funds to 
employ a DNA expert to review the DNA evidence that the 
Commonwealth intended to introduce at trial.  That evidence 
consisted of a DNA analysis from blood stains on a shoe 
recovered from Angel’s residence.  The analysis showed that 
the DNA matched the DNA profile of victim V.L.  The trial 
court denied Angel’s motion.  The trial court also denied 
Angel’s renewed motion to employ a DNA expert as well as his 
motion, made eleven days before trial, for a continuance to 
allow Angel to prepare his defense with regard to the DNA 
evidence. 
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals assumed without deciding 
that the failure to grant these motions was error but held 
that any such error was harmless.  Angel, slip op. at 16-18.  
Angel’s third assignment of error asserts that the Court of 
Appeals’ holding was error. 
 
On brief, Angel presents various reasons why the trial 
court’s refusal to grant Angel’s motions for a DNA expert and 
continuance were error.  Because the Court of Appeals assumed 
without deciding that the trial court’s action in this regard 
was error, we need not address these arguments.  The issue 
before this Court is whether the error, if any, was harmless. 
19
 
 
 
We have previously held that the Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses of the United States Constitution, as 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Ake v. 
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) and Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 
U.S. 320 (1985), require that “the Commonwealth of Virginia, 
upon request, provide indigent defendants with ‘the basic 
tools of an adequate defense,’ and, that in certain instances, 
these basic tools may include the appointment of non-
psychiatric experts.”  Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 
211, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996) (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 77).  
We have also held that errors, arising from the denial of a 
constitutional right are subject to a harmless error analysis.  
Lilly v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 548, 551, 523 S.E.2d 208, 209 
(1999).  When considering whether an error involving a 
constitutional right can be held harmless, “ ‘the court must 
be able to declare a belief that [the error] was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt;’ otherwise the conviction under 
review must be set aside.”  Id. (quoting Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). 
 
Application of this standard requires us to determine 
whether there is a “reasonable possibility” that the evidence 
complained of by the defendant “might have contributed to the 
conviction.”  Id. (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23).  In 
reaching such a determination, the Court must consider whether 
20
 
 
 
several factors, including (1) the importance of the tainted 
evidence in the prosecutor’s case, (2) whether that evidence 
was cumulative, (3) whether there is evidence that 
corroborates or contradicts the tainted evidence on material 
points, and (4) the strength of the prosecution’s case as a 
whole.  Id. 
 
Angel argues that the probative value of the DNA evidence 
presented by the Commonwealth as purportedly linking Angel to 
V.L. was “very high.”  Angel argues that the identifying 
evidence was “ambiguous and greatly strengthened by the DNA 
evidence.”  The only physical evidence linking Angel to the 
crime against V.L. was the DNA evidence.  Finally, Angel 
argues that the evidence of his confession was weak, as it 
constituted no more than “a serial assent to statements made 
by the police, concerning events he said took place when he 
had been drinking heavily.”  According to Angel, “[I]t is 
reasonably possible that the verdict would not have been the 
same” if a DNA expert had challenged the conclusions regarding 
the DNA evidence offered by the Commonwealth’s witness or the 
procedures used to analyze the DNA evidence.  Thus, Angel 
argues if he had been given an expert or the time to prepare 
even without the expert, some or all of the convictions “could 
certainly” have been affected.  Therefore, according to Angel, 
the Commonwealth did not meet its burden in demonstrating that 
21
 
 
 
the asserted errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
We disagree.  
 
While the DNA evidence is the only physical evidence that 
links Angel to V.L., the remaining evidence shows beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the lack of the DNA evidence would not 
have altered the verdict.  Circumstantial evidence including 
description of a person fleeing the crime scene using a green 
motorbike matched the description of the perpetrator of an 
attack shortly before the attack on V.L. and his mode of 
escape. The victim of the earlier attack positively identified 
Angel as the attacker.  Furthermore, Angel confessed to the 
attack on V.L. in a recorded statement, which he signed and he 
wrote a letter of apology to the victim V.L., which was 
admitted into evidence.  The DNA evidence at issue related 
only to the question of the perpetrator’s identity.  
Considering the remaining evidence of identity of the 
perpetrator of the attack on V.L. in light of the factors 
outlined, we conclude that any error in denying Angel’s motion 
for appointment and compensation of an expert was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  We reach the same conclusion with 
regard to the denial of Angel’s motion for continuance.  That 
request was based solely on a stated need for additional time 
to review the DNA evidence.  The denial of this motion, if 
22
 
 
 
error, was harmless error based on the remaining evidence of 
identity recited above. 
IV. Joinder and Admissibility 
of Other Crimes Evidence 
 
In his fourth assignment of error, Angel contends that 
the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court’s 
joinder of the offenses against V.L. and S.P. for trial and 
the admission of other crimes evidence were harmless error.  
While Angel spends considerable time discussing why joinder 
was error, we need not address that issue because the Court of 
Appeals, as reflected in Angel’s assignment of error, assumed 
without deciding that the joinder was error.  See also Angel, 
slip op. at 8.  The issue before us with regard to joinder is 
directed to the Court of Appeals’ holding that such joinder, 
if error, was nevertheless harmless error. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the joinder of 
separate offenses was harmless error because (1) the evidence 
of other crimes admitted in the joint trial would have been 
admissible in each trial had the offenses been tried 
separately, and (2) assuming without deciding that the 
evidence relating to the attack on V.L. would not be 
admissible in a trial of charges relating to the assault of 
S.P., and that the evidence relating to the assault of S.P. 
would not be admissible in the trial of charges relating to 
23
 
 
 
the attack on V.L., the impact of that evidence in the joint 
trial was harmless error because the other evidence of Angel’s 
guilt relating to the respective attacks was overwhelming.  
Id., slip op. at 13-15.  We agree. 
A. Admissibility of Other Crimes Evidence 
The evidence of other crimes at issue in this case 
involves sexual assaults against three other women.  These 
three assaults took place on Sunday, July 9, 2006, within one 
hour of the same time of day as the assault on V.L.  The first 
crime involved an assault on K.G. who testified that a man 
wearing a bike helmet approached her from behind and touched 
her between her legs and around her buttocks as she started up 
the steps to her apartment in western Alexandria.  She had 
observed the man kneeling behind a motorbike with green and 
red swirls “tinkering with something” just before the attack.  
The man fled on the motorbike after the assault.  K.G. 
identified Angel as her attacker.  
At trial, Detective Ignacio testified as to the two other 
assaults that also occurred in western Alexandria on July 9 
just prior to the assault on V.L.  In those instances, the 
attacker “grabbed” or “slapped” the buttocks of two women.  By 
the time of trial, Angel had pled guilty to sexual battery in 
all three incidents. 
24
 
 
 
Angel argues that the admission of proof relating to 
these crimes was improper because the facts of the incidents 
were not nearly identical to the crimes for which he was on 
trial in any distinctive aspect, particularly with regard to 
the attack on V.L., and the admission of these crimes was more 
prejudicial than probative. 
Evidence of other crimes generally is not admissible to 
show a defendant’s propensity to engage in bad acts or crimes.  
Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 176 S.E.2d 802, 
805 (1970).  However, there are exceptions to this general 
rule.  Evidence of other crimes is admissible in cases of 
disputed identity to prove the probability of a common 
perpetrator if the other crimes bear “sufficient marks of 
similarity to the crime charged.”  Turner v. Commonwealth, 259 
Va. 645, 651, 529 S.E.2d 787, 791 (2000) (quoting Chichester 
v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 311, 327, 448 S.E.2d 638, 649 
(1994)).  To be admissible, other crimes need not be “virtual 
carbon copies” of the crime on trial.  Spencer v. 
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 90, 393 S.E.2d 609, 616 (1990).  The 
similarity must be such that the probative value outweighs any 
prejudicial effect.  Id. at 90, 393 S.E.2d at 617. 
Applying these principles, we consider whether the other 
crimes evidence would have been admissible in a separate trial 
of the charges based on the July 9 attack of V.L. as well as 
25
 
 
 
in a separate trial of the charges based on the June 18 attack 
on S.P.  The other crimes evidence involved three sexual 
assaults, each of which occurred on July 9 within one hour’s 
time and within one and one-half to three miles of each other.  
As noted by the Court of Appeals, the attacks involved a 
sexual touching of the victims just below the waist from the 
rear.  The attacker was a male, identified by two victims as 
young and Hispanic, who fled on a motorbike with green 
coloring.  The evidence indicated that the attacker traveled 
by motorbike “in a northeasterly path from Alexandria into 
Arlington as he committed the series of offenses leading up to 
his attack on V.L.”  Angel, slip op. at 11.  The attack on 
V.L., although significantly more violent, shared 
idiosyncratic features with the attacks committed in the other 
crimes - a sexual attack initiated from the rear; use of a 
green motorbike by the attacker; and Hispanic appearance.  
Additionally, the attacks in the other crimes occurred just 
prior to the attack on V.L. and all of the attacks, including 
the attack against V.L., occurred within three miles of each 
other.  
In the trial court Angel contested his identity as the 
perpetrator of the July 9 attack on V.L.  K.G. positively 
identified Angel as her attacker and Angel pled guilty to the 
other two attacks.  Consequently, the other crimes evidence 
26
 
 
 
met the criteria of relevance on the issue of identity.  Based 
on this record, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the 
other crimes evidence would have been admissible in a trial of 
the charges against Angel based on the July 9 attack against 
V.L.  Angel, slip op. at 10-11.  
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the other 
crimes evidence would have been admissible in a trial on the 
charges based on the June 18 attack on S.P.  Id., slip op. at 
11-12.  We have already discussed the similarities between the 
other crimes evidence.  Like those attacks, the June 18 attack 
on S.P. occurred on a Sunday in the early evening within three 
miles of the places where the July 9 attacks occurred and the 
attack against S.P. was executed in the same manner as the 
attacks described in the other crimes evidence.  As the Court 
of Appeals stated, in these attacks, “the perpetrator said 
nothing, used his hands to make brief contact with the woman’s 
buttocks or the clothing covering her buttocks, and fled 
quickly after making the contact that constituted sexual 
battery.”  Id., slip op. at 12.  Angel, slip op. at 12.  
Because the evidence of other crimes would have been 
admissible had the charges against Angel for the attacks on 
V.L. and S.P. been tried separately, Angel suffered no 
prejudice from their admission in the single trial of those 
charges in this case. 
27
 
 
 
B. Joinder as Harmless Error 
The joinder of the two trials also allowed the jury to 
hear evidence of both the July 9 attack on V.L. and the June 
18 attack on S.P.  Angel argues that if the cases had not been 
joined “it is less likely that the subsequent July 9 acts 
would have been permitted to be heard by the [S.P.] jury.”  
With regard to the impact on the offenses against V.L., Angel 
asserts that if the jury did not hear the evidence relating to 
the June 18 attack, it would “think differently” about the 
issue of intent in connection with the July 9 attack because 
the only criminal history revealed would be a series of 
assaults in a short time frame on a single afternoon, rather 
than a man who also had performed the same act a month 
earlier.  For these reasons, Angel says the joinder of the two 
trials was not harmless error.  
A non-constitutional error is harmless if it plainly 
appears from the record that the parties had “a fair trial on 
the merits and substantial justice has been reached.”  Code 
§ 8.01-678.  If other evidence of guilt is so overwhelming and 
the error insignificant, by comparison, supporting a 
conclusion that the error did not have a substantial effect on 
the verdict, the error is harmless.  United States v. Lane, 
474 U.S. 438, 450 (1986). 
28
 
 
 
In concluding that the joinder was harmless error, the 
Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that the evidence of 
crimes against V.L. would not have been admitted in a separate 
trial involving the offense against S.P.  Angel, slip op. at 
15. With regard to the offense against S.P., Angel challenged 
only the evidence identifying him as the perpetrator.  The 
admissible evidence included Angel’s admission that he 
committed misdemeanor sexual batteries against other women on 
July 9 using methods similar to those utilized in the June 18 
attack as discussed above.  Additional admissible evidence 
included Angel’s admission that he previously had committed 
another offense near “T.J. School”  similar to the July 9 
misdemeanor sexual batteries.  S.P. was attacked near Thomas 
Jefferson Middle School in Alexandria.  S.P.’s description of 
her attacker was consistent with Angel’s appearance and her 
description of the shirt worn by her attacker matched a shirt 
that was found in Angel’s clothes hamper at his residence. 
Based on this record, we agree with the Court of Appeals’ 
conclusion that the admissible evidence constitutes 
“overwhelming evidence that [Angel] was the perpetrator of the 
June 18 misdemeanor sexual battery against S.P., and thus, any 
error in joining for trial that offense with the offenses 
against V.L. was harmless on the issue of guilt or innocence.” 
Id., slip op. at 16. 
29
 
 
 
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that joinder, if 
error, was harmless error with regard to Angel’s sentence for 
the June 18 misdemeanor offense.  The trial court, not the 
jury, sentenced Angel, pursuant to Code § 16.1-272.  The 
nature and severity of Angel’s crimes against V.L. were 
admitted for purposes relating to those crimes and, absent 
evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court did 
not consider this evidence in determining Angel’s sentence for 
the misdemeanor sexual battery offense against S.P.  
Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978, 234 S.E.2d 286, 
291 (1977). 
Finally, we address Angel’s contention that evidence of 
the June 18 offense heard by the jury in relation to the July 
9 offenses was not harmless error because it would impact the 
issue of intent with regard to the July 9 offenses.  It is not 
clear whether Angel is contending that, without evidence of 
the June 18 offense, the evidence would not support the 
element of intent or that the sentence would be different.  
Either contention is without merit.  At trial, and in the 
Court of Appeals, Angel conceded that there was no issue as to 
motive or intent with respect to either the July 9 or June 18 
offenses. Thus, the June 18 offense evidence would not cause a 
different result with respect to guilt based on the issue of 
intent.  With respect to an impact on sentencing, as discussed 
30
 
 
 
above, the sentence was imposed by the court, not the jury, 
and we presume the court considered only relevant admissible 
evidence in sentencing Angel for the July 9 offenses.  Id. 
In summary, there was no error in the admission of 
evidence of other crimes because such evidence would be 
admissible in each trial had the charges based on the attacks 
on S.P. and V.L. been tried separately.  Furthermore, in 
assuming without deciding that the joinder of the trials was 
error, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that any 
such error was harmless.  
V.  Motion for Mistrial 
In his fifth assignment of error, Angel asserts that the 
Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Angel’s request for 
a mistrial made after the jury retired was untimely and that 
the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the denial of the 
mistrial was harmless error. 
The following exchange occurred at the conclusion of the 
Commonwealth’s rebuttal argument to the jury: 
[COMMONWEALTH]: But while you are deliberating, 
please keep her in your thoughts and think about 
what happened to her.  6:00, Sunday, July 9th.  
Leaves her house [at] 6:02.  I think she 
remembered.  She leaves her house, takes a walk 
just like she does every other day. 
6:15, loving life, she’s walking along, she’s 
been watching the World Cup soccer.  6:20. 
 
31
 
 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I’m going to have 
to object. This is not rebuttal.  It’s not 
answering any of the facts I raised. 
 
THE COURT:  It’s legitimate summation.  Go ahead. 
 
The Commonwealth continued, reciting the events of the 
attack and the injuries inflicted, concluding 
[COMMONWEALTH]: While it doesn’t have to define her, 
it certainly will be a part of her for the rest of 
her life, and it serves really as a reminder as to 
just how fragile life is and how everything can 
change in an instant, suddenly, without any warning. 
 
While we can’t feel her pain, there is no way 
any of us can feel her pain, we can take a moment 
before you go back into the jury room and we can try 
to imagine it. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I have a continuing 
objection. 
 
[COMMONWEALTH]: Thank you. 
 
THE COURT: Are you through? 
 
[COMMONWEALTH]: Yes. 
 
The trial court then noted the time as 5:15 p.m. and 
asked the jury whether they wanted to begin deliberation or 
return in the morning.  The jury retired from the courtroom to 
decide when to begin deliberations.  At this point, Angel’s 
counsel moved for a mistrial stating  
I am respectfully moving for a mistrial because the 
last portion of [the Commonwealth’s] rebuttal, 
closing was, ‘Having said I’m not going to appeal to 
your sympathy, I want you to decide this on the 
facts.’ Goes on to discuss the events of that day 
that were not contested on during my closing 
argument. 
32
 
 
 
So it was clearly to inflame the passion of the 
jury and to seek sympathy and I move for mistrial. 
 
The trial court denied this motion.  The jury then returned and 
told the court that it wished to begin deliberations the 
following morning. 
 
Referring to cases of this Court regarding the timeliness 
of motions for mistrial, the Court of Appeals held that 
because Angel did not move for a mistrial at the time the 
complained of words were spoken, he waived his objection.  
Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 278-79, 427 S.E.2d 411, 
419 (1993); Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 137, 410 
S.E.2d 254, 264 (1991).  The rule cited by the Court of 
Appeals and recited in our cases is based on the principle 
that, in the absence of a contemporaneous objection and 
request for a curative instruction or mistrial, the trial 
court’s ability to take effective corrective action is 
significantly, if not totally, impaired. While we have 
repeatedly required a contemporaneous objection to counsel’s 
offending jury argument and request for a curative instruction 
or mistrial to preserve the issue for appeal, in considering 
whether the issue was preserved or waived, we have also 
examined the circumstances of each case to determine the facts 
surrounding the objection and motions.  Burns v. Commonwealth, 
261 Va. 307, 341-42, 541 S.E.2d 872, 894-95 (2001); Reid v. 
33
 
 
 
Baumgardner, 217 Va. 769, 772-74, 232 S.E.2d 778, 780-81 
(1977).  
 
In this case, no motion for a mistrial or curative 
instruction accompanied Angel’s first objection to the 
Commonwealth’s argument and Angel’s assertions of error based 
on those statements are waived.  Beavers, 245 Va. at 279, 427 
S.E.2d at 419.  However, after Angel’s second objection, the 
Commonwealth rested and the trial court directed the jury to 
determine when to begin deliberation.  As soon as the jury 
left the courtroom to decide when to begin deliberations, 
Angel’s counsel addressed his concerns about the 
Commonwealth’s argument and moved for a mistrial.  No further 
argument or substantive proceeding occurred between the 
objection and the motion.  Under these circumstances, we 
cannot say that the trial court’s ability to take corrective 
action, if the objection was meritorious, was impaired; nor 
can we say that the time between the objection and asserting 
the motion for mistrial made the motion untimely.  But see 
Beavers, 245 Va. at 279, 427 S.E.2d at 419 (objection and 
motion for mistrial untimely when made after allegedly 
prejudicial statements were uttered); Yeatts, 242 Va. at 137, 
410 S.E.2d at 264 (motion for mistrial untimely when made the 
day after the alleged objectionable incident occurred); Cheng 
v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 40, 393 S.E.2d 599, 606-07 (1990) 
34
 
 
35
 
 
 
(trial court not required to issue cautionary instruction or 
mistrial sua sponte when defendant failed to seek corrective 
action for prosecutor’s alleged improper statements).  
Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in 
holding that Angel waived his claim regarding his mistrial 
motion as to that part of the Commonwealth’s argument 
addressed in Angel’s second objection.  Nevertheless, 
considering this issue on the merits, we conclude that denial 
of the mistrial motion was not error.5 
 
Angel asserts that “[m]aterial which directly solicits 
the jurors to imagine themselves in the position of the victim 
of a brutal assault” is inadmissible.  However, as recited 
above, statements of this nature were not the basis of Angel’s 
                                                 
5 In this assignment of error Angel also avers that the 
Court of Appeals erred in holding that “the denial of a 
mistrial was harmless error.”  However, it is not clear the 
Court of Appeals made such a holding.  In that court, Angel 
asserted that if his request for a mistrial was untimely, the 
Court of Appeals should nevertheless address the issue under 
the “good cause” or “ends of justice exception” to that 
court’s Rule 5A:18.  In declining to apply the exception, the 
Court of Appeals held that “it is not apparent from the face 
of the record that an error occurred that was ‘clear, 
substantial and material.’  Because the statements complained 
of “did not compel the conclusion that the statement[s were] 
improper or, even if [they were,] that a mistrial was required 
to cure any prejudice.”  Angel, slip op. at 20.  There was no 
specific holding of error.  However at the end of its opinion 
the Court of Appeals recited that there was no error in 
denying the motion to suppress and dismissing the appeal of 
the certification determination and “as to the remaining 
assignments of error, we hold any error was harmless.”  Id., 
slip op. at 21. 
 
motion for mistrial.  The motion only referred to the 
Commonwealth’s recitation of the uncontested events of the 
attack as appealing to the sympathy of the jury.  The 
recitation of facts, including these facts, is not improper 
argument.  Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial and we 
reject this assignment of error.  Blanton v. Commonwealth, 280 
Va. 447, 455, 699 S.E.2d 279, 284 (2010) (motion for mistrial 
is reviewed for abuse of discretion). 
VI.  Application of Graham v. Florida 
On July 27, 2007, the trial judge sentenced Angel to 
three life sentences, plus sentences of twenty years and 
twelve months, all of which were to run consecutively.  
Virginia has abolished parole and, therefore, the effect of 
these sentences is that Angel will spend the rest of his life 
confined in the penitentiary.  Angel did not appeal these 
sentences to the Court of Appeals.  However his petition for 
appeal and brief on the merits before this Court contained an 
assignment of error claiming that the sentences constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  He raises this 
issue because following the entry of judgment by the Court of 
Appeals, the Supreme Court of the United States granted 
certiorari in the case of Graham, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2011 
36
 
 
37
 
 
 
and, on July 6, 2010, rendered its modified decision.  In that 
decision, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution prohibited sentencing persons 
to life without parole for nonhomicidal crimes if they were 
less than 18 years of age when they committed the crime.  Id. 
at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2030.  We included this assignment of 
error when we awarded Angel an appeal.6  
The petitioner in Graham was 16 years old when he was 
originally charged as an adult for first and second degree 
felony charges, carrying maximum penalties of life 
imprisonment without parole and 15 years’ imprisonment, 
respectively.  Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court 
withheld adjudication as to the charges and sentenced Graham 
to concurrent three-year terms of probation.  Id. at ___, 130 
S.Ct. at 2018.  While on probation, Graham was arrested in 
connection with a home invasion robbery and another robbery, 
committed just before his eighteenth birthday.  Following a 
hearing, the trial court concluded that Graham had violated 
the terms of his probation, found Graham guilty of the earlier 
felony charges and sentenced him to the maximum sentence 
                                                 
6 Both Angel and the Commonwealth acknowledge that this 
issue was not raised in the courts below, but both suggest 
that we address this issue in light of its significance in 
this case and, as the Commonwealth notes, “to provide guidance 
to trial courts in Virginia.” 
 
authorized for each offense.  Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2019-
20. 
The Supreme Court considered Graham’s argument that his 
life sentence without parole violated the Eighth Amendment as 
a “categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence,” rather 
than whether the sentence was disproportionate for Graham’s 
crime.  Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2022-23.  After determining 
that “a national consensus has developed against” sentencing 
juveniles who commit nonhomicidal crimes to life imprisonment 
without parole, that such a sentencing practice does not serve 
legitimate penological goals, particularly rehabilitation, and 
does not recognize the limited moral culpability of juvenile 
offenders, the Supreme Court concluded that the Eighth 
Amendment: 
Prohibits the imposition of a life without parole 
sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit 
homicide . . . . if it imposes a sentence of life 
it must provide him or her with some realistic 
opportunity to obtain release before the end of 
that term. 
 
560 U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2034. 
 
Angel argues that Virginia, like Florida, has eliminated 
parole, and therefore Graham requires vacation of his life 
sentences.  The Commonwealth replies that Graham does not 
require the result advanced by Angel because Code § 53.1-40.01 
provides for the conditional release of prisoners who have 
38
 
 
 
reached a certain age and served a certain length of 
imprisonment, thus complying with the Supreme Court’s 
decision. We agree with the Commonwealth.  
In its opinion the Supreme Court stated: 
A State is not required to guarantee eventual 
freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a 
nonhomicide crime.  What the State must do, however, 
is give defendants like Graham some meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation.  It is for the State, 
in the first instance, to explore the means and 
mechanisms for compliance. . . . [The Eighth 
Amendment] does not require the State to release 
that offender during his natural life.  
 
560 U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2030. 
The Supreme Court has left it up to the states to devise 
methods of allowing juvenile offenders an opportunity for 
release based on maturity and rehabilitation.  While the 
Supreme Court did not identify a specific method or methods 
that would provide “meaningful opportunity” for release, the 
Court clearly stated that states did not have to guarantee 
that the offender would be released.  Furthermore the Supreme 
Court did not require that states provide the opportunity for 
release at any particular time related to either the 
offender’s age or length of incarceration.  
Code § 53.1-40.01 provides: 
Any person serving a sentence imposed upon a 
conviction for a felony offense, other than a Class 
1 felony, (i) who has reached the age of sixty-five 
or older and who has served at least five years of 
39
 
 
 
the sentence imposed or (ii) who has reached the age 
of sixty or older and who has served at least ten 
years of the sentence imposed may petition the 
Parole Board for conditional release.  The Parole 
Board shall promulgate regulations to implement the 
provisions of this section. 
 
The regulations for conditional release under this statute 
provide that if the prisoner meets the qualifications for 
consideration contained in the statute, the factors used in 
the normal parole consideration process apply to conditional 
release decisions under this statute.  While this statute has 
an age qualifier, it provides, as the Commonwealth argues, the 
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” required by the 
Eighth Amendment.  Accordingly, we reject this assignment of 
error. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, for the reasons stated, we hold that there 
was no reversible error in denying Angel’s motion to suppress 
his custodial interrogation, in denying Angel’s appeal of the 
order of the JDR court certifying the charges against him to 
the grand jury pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.1(B), in denying 
his motion to dismiss the indictments, in denying his motion 
for appointment and compensation for a DNA expert and denying 
his motion for a continuance, in joining the trials of 
separate offenses and admitting evidence of other crimes, and 
40
 
 
 
in denying Angel’s motion for mistrial.  We also hold that the 
imposition of life sentences without parole in this case is 
not cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution pursuant to 
Graham.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
41