Title: State v. Nelson
Citation: 362 P.2d 224
Docket Number: 10133
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: May 19, 1961

362 P.2d 224 (1961) STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Larry LaVerne NELSON, Defendant and Appellant. No. 10133. Supreme Court of Montana. Submitted March 7, 1961. Decided May 19, 1961. *225 Arnold H. Olsen, Leif Erickson, Jerrold R. Richards, Helena, for appellant. Jerrold R. Richards, Helena, argued orally. Forrest H. Anderson, Atty. Gen., Alfred B. Coate, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gene B. Daly, County Atty., Paul Hatfield, Deputy County Atty., Great Falls, for respondent. Gene B. Daly, Great Falls, and Alfred B. Coate, Helena, argued orally. JOHN C. HARRISON, Justice Court. The defendant was convicted of first degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals from the judgment of conviction and in his specifications of error raises the following questions: 1. Did the district court err in refusing the defendant's motion to strike certain testimony? 2. Were the defendant's admissions and confessions properly admitted into evidence? The defendant, Larry LaVerne Nelson, nineteen years of age, left his home in Great Falls, Montana, to seek employment in another area and located a job as a gas station attendant in Monte Vista, Colorado. While employed there he became acquainted with Steven Horn, who was seventeen years of age. The defendant worked in Monte Vista for three weeks and then decided to return in his car to Great Falls. *226 Horn decided to accompany the defendant on this trip and they were joined by two other youths, Butch Vares and David Van Ausdale. A.38 calibre revolver owned by Horn was taken on the trip. After the four had reached Cheyenne, Wyoming, Vares and Van Ausdale decided to return to Monte Vista and the defendant and Horn continued the trip by themselves. On the evening of October 19, 1958, they stopped in Lewistown, Montana, to eat and then continued on toward Great Falls. They drove down a country road in search of deer, after having seen two go across the highway. After locating a doe Horn fired the revolver, but missed the doe. Shortly thereafter the defendant became dissatisfied with the driving of Horn and an argument ensued. The defendant grabbed the steering wheel and the car was brought to a stop about four miles from Great Falls. While the two were wrestling for control of the car the defendant felt the revolver underneath his leg. He picked up the revolver and was threatening Horn with it when it discharged and struck Horn. The defendant then placed Horn in the back seat of the car, after which he shot Horn a second time, drove through Great Falls to a spot on the River Road, and rolled Horn's body down a bank. The body was discovered by deer hunters on October 21, 1958, but no identification was made. On November 7, Horn's father contacted the sheriff of Cascade County to obtain information concerning his son's whereabouts. Since the defendant had been with Horn when Horn was last seen the defendant was sought, located, brought in for questioning, and later arrested for the homicide of Horn. The first specification of error involves the question of whether the court erred in refusing the defendant's motion to strike an answer given by the prosecution's witness David Van Ausdale during his testimony. In considering this alleged error the testimony leading up to the last answer of Van Ausdale and the defendant's motion to strike should be examined. On direct examination of Van Ausdale by counsel for the prosecution concerning the defendant's actions with the homicide weapon in Colorado there were the following questions and answers, which were not objected to by defense counsel: On cross-examination of Van Ausdale by defense counsel there were the following questions and answers concerning the defendant's actions with the homicide weapon: The following was on re-direct examination of Van Ausdale by counsel for the prosecution: The defendant's motion to strike the answer of Van Ausdale raised the question of remoteness in time and place of the incident. This court in State v. Satterfield, 114 Mont. 122, 127, 132 P.2d 372, 373, 374, stated: "The objection that evidence is too remote is directed to the discretion of the court and is a matter that goes to the credibility of the evidence rather than to its admissibility * * * unless the remoteness is so great that the proffered evidence has no evidentiary value." In 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 638, p. 977, it is stated: "Whether evidence is inadmissible because of remoteness rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial court, the objection going to the weight of the evidence, rather than to admissibility. In this connection, remoteness has regard to factors other than mere lapse of time, and is to be determined by the circumstances of the case." Wharton's Criminal Evidence (12th ed.), § 149, p. 291, states: "There is no fixed standard for determining remoteness. It is therefore necessary to consider all the circumstances of the case, the nature of the act indicated or shown by the evidence offered, and the nature of the crime. In any case, the determination of whether evidence is too remote to be relevant is left to the discretion of the trial judge, and his decision will not be reversed in the absence of clear proof of an abuse of that discretion." We find no error in the court's ruling in regard to alleged remoteness. The defendant's motion to strike the answer of Van Ausdale also raised the question of relevancy of the incident. In 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 611, p. 931, the rule is stated: "Evidence is relevant to show that accused owned, possessed, or had access to, tools, implements, or any articles with which the particular crime was * * * committed, and that he owned or had in his possession weapons with which the crime was * * * committed prior to * * * the commission of the crime." State v. Francis, 330 Mo. 1205, 1210, 52 S.W.2d 552, 554; State v. Nichols, 179 Minn. 301, 302, 303, 229 N.W. 99. In Quinn v. State, 55 Okl.Cr. 116, 126, 25 P.2d 711, 715, the court stated: "Upon a trial for murder, where it appears the injuries were inflicted by a certain kind of instrument or weapon, evidence that defendant had such a weapon in his possession before the murder is admissible." In Morton v. United States, 87 U.S.App. D.C. 135, 183 F.2d 844, 845, the court adopted the following rules: "As indicating the likelihood of a person doing * * * an act in question * * * his possession of the appropriate means or tools, are usually of sufficient probative value to be admissible." Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.), § 83, p. 512. "The previous possession * * * of special means, tools, apparatus, and the like, may be of probative value to show the doing * * * of an act requiring such means." Id., § 88, p. 516. The court in Stapp v. State, 140 Tex.Cr. 669, 673, 147 S.W.2d 256, 258, an appeal from a conviction for murder with malice, held that the statements and conduct of the defendant in exhibiting a pistol, announcing *229 he was "a tough guy", offering to do some fancy shooting with such pistol, and announcing that he wanted no one to give him "any static", occurring some time prior to the shooting of the deceased, were admissible to show the defendant's motive and malice, and general and reckless disregard of the rights of others. We find no error in the court's ruling in regard to alleged irrelevancy. The second specification of error raises questions as to whether the defendant's admissions and confessions were properly admitted into evidence and whether the defendant was availed of his constitutional rights. The defendant states that he was arrested without a warrant. However, section 94-6003, R.C.M. 1947, states: "A peace officer may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered to him, or may, without a warrant, arrest a person "2. When a person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence; "3. When a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it; * * *" The defendant was requested to go to the sheriff's office for questioning and was not arrested until after his confession was given. The arrest without a warrant subsequent to the confession was a proper one within the statute. The defendant cites section 94-6016, R.C.M. 1947: "When an arrest is made without a warrant by a peace officer or private person, the person arrested must, without unnecessary delay, be taken before the nearest or most accessible magistrate in the county in which the arrest is made, and a complaint, stating the charge against the person, must be made before such magistrate." The purpose of this statute is to insure that the person arrested is advised of the charge made against him in order to enable him to prepare a defense, and to protect him from being held incommunicado for protracted periods of time. The court in State v. Pierce, 4 N.J. 252, 263, 265, 72 A.2d 305, 311, 312, an appeal from a first degree murder conviction, stated: "It is urged that the failure to take Pierce before the nearest available magistrate without unnecessary delay constitutes part of a `complex of circumstances' showing the subsequent statement was coerced and involuntary. We think the surrounding circumstances already discussed in this opinion demonstrate the lack of merit in this contention. But assuming an unnecessary delay, we find no justification for the rejection of a statement otherwise voluntarily and freely made as here evidenced." Taking cognizance of the statute providing for a hearing before a magistrate without unnecessary delay after the arrest of an accused, the Supreme Court of New Jersey said: "A confession is not rendered inadmissible solely by reason of a delay in taking the arrested person before a magistrate but that circumstance becomes an important factor to be given serious consideration in determining whether or not the confession was voluntarily made. The mere failure to follow the procedural rule, however, does not of itself destroy the voluntariness of the confession if the abuses the rule seeks to prevent did not in fact take place." 19 A.L.R.2d 1331, Admissibility of confession as affected by delay in arraignment of prisoner; 1 L. Ed. 2d 1747. he defendant was contacted at about 8:55 p.m., Friday, November 7, 1958, at his place of employment and was requested to come voluntarily to the jail for questioning. The sheriff arrived at about 10:00 p.m. and questioned the defendant. Shortly thereafter the defendant made an oral statement and then wrote and signed a confession which was witnessed by the sheriff and one of his deputies at 11:50 p.m. The defendant was booked at 12:07 a.m., Saturday, November 8. At 10:40 a.m. on Saturday *230 a statement in the form of questions and answers was taken from the defendant by a stenographer in the county attorney's office in the presence of the sheriff and deputy county attorney. At 11:45 a.m. the same day, Saturday, November 8, the appellant was brought before the magistrate in the courthouse. In Cline v. Tait, 113 Mont. 475, 484, 129 P.2d 89, 93, where an arrest was made in the nighttime without a warrant, the court, in considering whether there was unnecessary delay in taking the arrested person before a magistrate, stated: "However, it cannot be said unreasonable as a matter of law to wait until ordinary office hours (see discussion and citations, 25 C.J. 493, § 62)." See section 25-306, R.C.M. 1947, fixing the hours for certain justices of the peace. In Rounds v. Bucher, 137 Mont. 39, 349 P.2d 1026, 1028, where the plaintiff in a false imprisonment action had been picked up by the sheriff pursuant to a warrant of arrest at 4:00 p.m. on Saturday and had not been taken before a justice of the peace until 11:00 a.m. the following Monday, the court stated: "* * * we are not prepared to say, as a matter of law, that a delay from Saturday night until ordinary office hours Monday morning is an unnecessary delay." The defendant states that he was not taken before a magistrate until after the confessions had been extracted. However, he does not show how this would constitute unnecessary delay, and we are unable to come to the conclusion that it did. The defendant contends that the court erred in permitting the State to introduce the defendant's confessions without having laid a proper foundation, namely, by proving that the confessions were voluntary. In State v. Robuck, 126 Mont. 302, 308, 309, 248 P.2d 817, 820, the court stated: "The test applied in determining whether a confession is voluntary and hence admissible is, `Was the inducement held out to the accused such as that there is any fair risk of a false confession?'" State v. Sherman, 35 Mont. 512, 90 P. 981; State v. Walsh, 72 Mont. 110, 119, 232 P. 194, 197; State v. Dixson, 80 Mont. 181, 196, 260 P. 138, 144; State v. Rossell, 113 Mont. 457, 465, 127 P.2d 379, 382. The confessions were not extracted by threat, promise or inducement and the circumstances surrounding the confessions as to time, place and persons present were established. The trial court had sufficient information before it to determine whether a proper foundation was laid for the admission of the confessions. Upon that information the trial court properly admitted the confessions into evidence. The defendant contends that one of the elements the state relied upon to prove the specific intent necessary in first degree murder was the language in the confessions relating to the second shot. The defendant claims that some of the words in the confessions were suggested very forcefully by the sheriff, thus rendering the confessions involuntary and inadmissible. On direct examination of the defendant by defense counsel there were the following questions and answers concerning the original questioning of the defendant by the sheriff: The defendant insists throughout the trial that he did not have any knowledge of a second shot and that the words in the written confession, "He started coughing and spitting blood, I rolled him into the back *231 seat and shot him again", were demanded of him by the sheriff and that only after extensive insistence on the part of the sheriff did he give in and agree with the sheriff to that effect. On direct examination of the sheriff by the county attorney there was the following question and answer concerning the original questioning of the defendant by the sheriff: The defendant claims that at the time he made his statement, which was transcribed in the county attorney's office on the morning of Saturday, November 8, the sheriff's presence so dominated him that he made statements which he otherwise would not have made, and also that at least one of his answers was induced by the leading form of the questions. The transcribed questions of the deputy county attorney, Mr. Gabriel, and answers of the defendant are as follows: On cross-examination of the defendant by the county attorney there were the following questions and answers concerning the defendant's transcribed statement: From the previous testimony we do not find that the questioning of the sheriff relating to the firing of the second shot was such that it suggested unfairly the answers of the defendant or amounted to coercion so as to render the confession involuntary and inadmissible. Nor do we find that at the taking of the transcribed statement the sheriff's presence, which the defendant claims dominated him, was prejudicial to the defendant's rights. Likewise we do not find that the leading form of the question of the deputy county attorney was prejudicial to the defendant's rights. The defendant contends that the confessions were extracted from him by "third degree" methods. However, no more than three hours passed from the time the defendant was first contacted for questioning until he signed his written confession. And from the defendant's own testimony we find that he "was never abused in any manner". Since the defendant was not questioned for an excessive length of time, nor was he otherwise mistreated, elements which would constitute "third degree" methods are lacking. The defendant claims that the confessions and statements were taken from him at a time when he was denied the counsel of friends and family, particularly his mother, thus rendering them involuntary and inadmissible. On direct examination of the defendant by defense counsel there were the following questions and answers concerning the defendant's requests to see his mother: On direct examination of the sheriff by the county attorney there were the following questions and answers concerning the defendant's requests to see his mother: On cross-examination of the sheriff by defense counsel there were the following questions and answers concerning the defendant's requests to see his mother: Again on cross-examination of the sheriff by defense counsel there were the following questions and answers concerning the defendant's requests to see his mother: From the previous testimony we do not find that the defendant was denied the *234 counsel of friends or family so as to render his confessions and statements involuntary and inadmissible. Therefore, nothing alleged in the second specification of error constitutes error. The judgment is affirmed. JAMES T. HARRISON, C. J., and ADAIR and CASTLES., concur.