Title: Matter of Romano
Citation: 104 N.J. 306, 516 A.2d 1109
Docket Number: N/A
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: November 12, 1986

104 N.J. 306 (1986) 516 A.2d 1109 IN THE MATTER OF JOSEPH T. ROMANO, AN ATTORNEY-AT-LAW. The Supreme Court of New Jersey. Argued June 5, 1986. Decided November 12, 1986. William R. Wood, Deputy Ethics Counsel, argued the cause on behalf of the Office of Attorney Ethics. Gerald H. Baker argued the cause on behalf of respondent (Baker, Garber, Duffy, &amp; Baker, attorneys). PER CURIAM. This matter arises from a report of the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) recommending that respondent, Joseph T. Romano, be disbarred. The matter came before the Board upon a presentment filed by the District VI Ethics Committee, as a result of complaints filed by four former clients charging respondent with misappropriation of clients' funds. Respondent *307 admitted the misappropriations and recognizes that the normal consequence of such conduct is disbarment. In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451 (1979). He offers as mitigating circumstances, however, that he was a cocaine addict and that his addiction was a mental or physical disability that caused him to engage in inappropriate behavior. The DRB summarized the relevant facts as follows: Upon a review of the full record, the DRB concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence of respondent's unethical conduct. We have independently reviewed the record and reached the same conclusion. As the DRB stated in its Decision and Recommendation: In its presentment, the Ethics Committee made no recommendation as to the appropriate penalty. Although a majority of the DRB voted in favor of disbarment, one member favored a lengthy suspension. In some respects, this case, like those involving alcoholism or gambling, is a modern American tragedy. Respondent was once a promising young trial attorney. He is now a recovering drug addict. His testimony recites his gradual surrender to the use of cocaine. According to respondent, sometime in 1978 he was introduced by friends to cocaine at a bar in New York. Six to eight months later, he began buying a grain of cocaine each weekend. His drug use increased to an eighth of an ounce a weekend, then in 1979-80 to a quarter of an ounce a week. By 1980-81, he was using as much as a half an ounce a week. After 1981, he started "freebasing" (smoking cocaine), which led to his using an ounce a week, at a weekly cost of $1,800 to $2,100. He developed a line of credit of $10,000 with each of three drug dealers, and in 1982 he was indebted to them for over $30,000. Although his increased drug use and related lifestyle frequently left him exhausted, at all times he was able to function successfully as a trial lawyer. He settled some cases and tried others. According to respondent, no client was ever dissatisfied or complained about his services. No client, lawyer, or judge suspected respondent's drug addiction. On July 30, 1984, however, Mrs. Moriggia complained to the District VI Ethics Committee because respondent had not paid *310 certain of her medical bills, as he had promised to do, from the proceeds of the settlement of her personal injuries action. That complaint led to an audit of the trust account of Jesse Moskowitz, the attorney with whom respondent was associated, and ultimately to the issuance on February 12, 1985, of the complaint by the Ethics Committee. Respondent accomplished the diversion of client funds through three methods: (1) On respondent's instructions, trust checks totaling $6,665.85 in the Moriggia and McGill matters were drawn by Mr. Moskowitz or his secretary to legitimate payees; respondent, however, delivered the checks to a drug dealer in part-payment for cocaine purchases. (2) On respondent's instructions, trust checks totaling $5,334.85 drawn by Mr. Moskowitz or his secretary were made payable to respondent as payee. Those checks, however, were duplicates of payments previously made to respondent, who used the funds to purchase cocaine or to pay drug dealers on account of prior purchases. (3) Respondent forged Mr. Moskowitz's name as maker to checks made payable either to respondent or to Mr. Moskowitz, whose endorsement respondent also forged. Respondent then used these checks to pay drug dealers for cocaine purchases. The Ethics Committee accepted the testimony of one of respondent's witnesses, Dr. George T. Pierson, who testified that respondent's diversion of client funds was the result of physical or mental disability caused by his drug addiction. He described respondent's behavior as "inappropriate" and stated that "the diversion of funds was the direct result of his disease." Nothing in the record indicates, however, that respondent did not comprehend that he was misappropriating clients' funds or that he did not know or appreciate that the misappropriations were wrongful. Indeed, the evidence is clear and convincing that respondent knew that he was diverting client funds and that it was wrong. For example, when a drug dealer to whom he was indebted came to respondent's home and saw clients' checks, respondent explained that he could not give the *311 dealer the clients' money. Nonetheless, respondent gave the dealer the checks to pay for his drug debts. We have no doubt that respondent knew exactly what he was doing when he forged his employer's signature on two checks and when he delivered other checks to a drug dealer for credit against his outstanding bill. We conclude that respondent has failed to demonstrate that a disease of the mind rendered him unable to tell right from wrong or to understand the nature and quality of his acts. The picture that emerges is one of a lawyer who could function successfully as a practitioner, who knew that it was wrong to misappropriate clients' funds to pay for his own drug debts, but who proceeded to use clients' funds to pay for his own drug addiction. To respondent's credit, he is participating in a drug rehabilitation program and appears to be a recovering drug addict. The tragic fact remains, as the DRB found, that respondent is "an admitted thief." We conclude that the only appropriate sanction is disbarment. See In re Hein, 104 N.J. 297 (1986). Respondent shall reimburse the Ethics Financial Committee for appropriate administrative costs. For disbarment Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN 7. Opposed None. It is ORDERED that JOSEPH T. ROMANO of JERSEY CITY, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1975, be disbarred and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys of this State, effective immediately; and it is further ORDERED that JOSEPH T. ROMANO be and hereby is permanently restrained and enjoined from practicing law; and it is further *312 ORDERED that respondent comply with Administrative Guideline No. 23 of the Office of Attorney Ethics dealing with disbarred attorneys; and it is further ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Ethics Financial Committee for appropriate administrative costs.