Title: Rochelle Hodges, et. al. v. Feinstein, Raiss, Kelin & Booker, L.L.C.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-113-05
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: January 31, 2007

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 113 September Term 2005 ROCHELLE HODGES and RENITA HODGES, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. SASIL CORPORATION, SOTNAS GARDEN APARTMENTS CORPORATION, ROSALIE C. SCHECKEL, ESQ., 100 CHADWICK AVENUE, L.L.C. and ALFONSO SANTOS, Defendants, and FEINSTEIN, RAISS, KELIN &amp; BOOKER, L.L.C., Defendant-Appellant. Argued September 25, 2006 Decided January 31, 2007 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 383 N.J. Super. 596 (2006). Gary D. Gordon argued the cause for appellant (Feinstein, Raiss, Kelin &amp; Booker, attorneys; Mr. Gordon and Tracey Goldstein, on the briefs). C sar E. Torres argued the cause for respondents (Edna Y. Baugh, President, Essex-Newark Legal Services, attorney). Charles X. Gormally argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Apartment Association (Wolf, Block, Schorr &amp; Solis-Cohen, attorneys; Mr. Gormally and Sean A. Smith, on the brief). David G. McMillin argued the cause for amicus curiae Legal Services of New Jersey (Melville D. Miller, Jr., President, attorney; Mr. McMillin, Mr. Miller and Joseph Harris David, on the brief). Jenny-Brooke Condon submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey HUD Tenant's Coalition (Ms. Condon and Linda E. Fisher, attorneys). Wayne J. Positan, President, submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association. Justice ZAZZALI delivered the opinion of the Court. Plaintiffs, two sisters living in separate, federally-subsidized apartments, were regularly behind on their rent. Their missed rental payments prompted the filing of several summary dispossess actions seeking eviction. The summonses and complaints, prepared by the landlord s attorneys, labeled the total amount due and owing -- the actual monthly rental obligation, late charges, attorneys fees, and miscellaneous fees -- as rent. The complaints did not advise plaintiffs that in order for them to avoid eviction, they were required to pay only the statutorily-defined rent rather than all amounts itemized in the pleadings. Therefore, under a mistaken belief concerning their obligations, plaintiffs regularly remitted amounts substantially exceeding the minimum needed to prevent eviction. They then filed suit, claiming that the law firm s conduct violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA, the Act), 15 U.S.C.A. 1692e &amp; f. The trial court dismissed that claim against the law firm. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that law firms regularly engaged in summary dispossess proceedings are subject to the FDCPA s strictures. In this appeal, we must determine whether a law firm that regularly files summary dispossess actions for nonpayment of rent may be considered a debt collector under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C.A. 1692 to 1692o. Based on the Act s broad statutory language, we hold that a law firm that regularly files summary dispossess actions for nonpayment of rent is a debt collector under the FDCPA. Our holding furthers the congressional intent of eliminating abusive debt collection practices and provides low-income tenants with the essential protections to which they are entitled. When interpreting a statute, the Legislature s intent is paramount and, generally, the statutory language is the best indicator of that intent. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005). Statutory words are ascribed their ordinary meaning and are read in context with related provisions, giving sense to the legislation as a whole. Ibid. This Court s duty is clear: construe and apply the statute as enacted. Ibid. (quoting In re Closing of Jamesburg High Sch., 83 N.J. 540, 548 (1980)). We begin with the Act s plain and expansive language. See Wright v. Fin. Serv. of Norwalk, Inc., 22 F.3d 647, 650 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting FDCPA s broad language). The FDCPA defines debt as any obligation . . . to pay money arising out of a transaction . . . primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 15 U.S.C.A. 1692a(5). That definition is not beset with internal inconsistencies [or] burdened with vocabulary that escapes common understanding. Hamilton, supra, 310 F.3d at 391 (quotations omitted). Rent, generally defined as [c]onsideration paid, usu[ally] periodically, for the use or occupancy of property, Black s Law Dictionary 1322 (8th ed. 2004), squarely comports with the FDCPA s definition of debt when it is paid for residential purposes, as here. That finding is consistent with federal precedent. Courts have observed that rent clearly fits the definition of debt embodied in the FDCPA. Travieso v. Gutman, Mintz, Baker &amp; Sonnenfeldt, P.C., No. 94-5756, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17804, *9 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1995) (citing Emanuel v. Am. Credit Exch., 870 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also Romea v. Heiberger &amp; Assocs., 163 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that back rent is debt under the FDCPA). Other courts assume that the FDCPA encompasses rent without directly addressing whether overdue rent on a residential lease is a debt. See, e.g., Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 559-60 (7th Cir. 1999) (allowing evicted tenant s FDCPA claims against attorney to proceed); Brady v. Credit Recovery Co., 160 F.3d 64, 65 (1st Cir. 1998) (reversing summary judgment of FDCPA claims against landlord s collection agent); Poirier v. Alco Collections, Inc., 107 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 1997) (landlord s collection agent violated FDCPA by attempting to collect unpaid rent); Daniels v. Baritz, No. 02-7929, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7707, *28-29 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2003) (denying motion to dismiss tenant s FDCPA claim against attorneys). But see Barstow Rd. Owners, Inc. v. Billing, 687 N.Y.S.2d 845, 852 (Dist. Ct. 1998) (declining to apply FDCPA to nonpayment summary proceeding). Because of the FDCPA s broad definitional language, we agree with the overwhelming majority of federal courts that apply the FDCPA to situations concerning the collection of rent. We add only that there is support for the federal position at the state level as well. See, e.g., Eina Realty v. Calixte, 679 N.Y.S.2d 796, 798 (Civ. Ct. 1998) (noting that unpaid rent is a debt , as the term is defined in 15 U.S.C.[A]. 1692a(5) of the FDCPA ); Pache Mgmt. Co. v. Lusk, No. 96APE10-1302, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2104, *9-15 (Ct. App. May 15, 1997) (concerning deceptive debt collection practices regarding unpaid rent under FDCPA); cf. Reid v. Ayers, 531 S.E.2d 231, 234 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (addressing whether homeowners association dues are rent and noting that nearly every court, state or federal, that has considered the issue has concluded that association dues, assessments, and rent are properly classified as debt ). Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. SASIL CORPORATION, SOTNAS GARDEN APARTMENTS CORPORATION, ROSALIE C. SCHECKEL, ESQ., 100 CHADWICK AVENUE, L.L.C. and ALFONSO SANTOS, Defendants, and FEINSTEIN, RAISS, KELIN &amp; BOOKER, L.L.C., Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I disagree with the majority s conclusion that attorneys subject themselves to the requirements of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 1692 to 1692o (FDCPA), on the filing of a complaint in a summary dispossess action. Because our summary dispossess action is not and never was an action to collect a debt, attorneys do not become debt collectors by filing summary dispossess actions, no matter how regularly they engage in such practice. New Jersey s summary dispossess statute originated in 1847 . . . to give the landlord a quick remedy for possession. Vineland Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. De Marco, 35 N.J. 459, 462 (1961). This Court previously has stated that [t]he only remedy that can be granted in a summary-dispossess proceeding is possession; no money damages may be awarded. Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 280 (1994). The judgment of possession is nothing more than a legal sanction for the issuance of a warrant which acts as a legal justification for . . . removing the tenant from and putting the landlord into possession of the premises. Galka v. Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co., 133 N.J. Eq. 137, 140 (Ch. 1943). The current court rules reflect the limited remedy available in a summary-dispossess action and bar litigants from joining any additional claims. R. 6:3-4. Thus, if a lawyer properly pleads a summary dispossess action, that lawyer is not engaged in the collection of a debt because the only remedy available is possession, not money damages. Although I reject the majority s premise that New Jersey attorneys who regularly file summary dispossess actions are debt collectors subject to FDCPA penalties and conditions, I applaud the Court s determination henceforth to require that the verified complaint in a summary dispossess action shall expressly and conspicuously identify precisely the amount [of rent] the tenant is required to remit to avoid eviction. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 28). That added protection improves summary dispossess practice and procedure. It will curb overreaching by landlords and lawyers who take advantage of uninformed tenants facing ejectment by alleging in the summary dispossess complaint an amount due that is in excess of what is allowed by law to be charged as rent and, therefore, is more than must be paid by the tenant to avoid eviction. I, however, would impose that improvement to our summary dispossess process pursuant to this Court s general supervisory interest and constitutional responsibility for fairness in the practice and procedure in our courts, see N.J. Const. art. VI, 2, 3, rather than basing it on some perceived impetus from the FDCPA. Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part from the judgment of the majority in this matter. Justice Rivera-Soto joins in this opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-113 SEPTEMBER TERM 2005 ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court ROCHELLE HODGES and RENITA HODGES, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. SASIL CORPORATION, SOTNAS GARDEN APARTMENTS CORPORATION, ROSALIE C. SCHECKEL, ESQ., 100 CHADWICK AVENUE, L.L.C. and ALFONSO SANTOS, Defendants, and FEINSTEIN, RAISS, KELIN &amp; BOOKER, L.L.C., Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED January 31, 2007 Justice Long PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Zazzali CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia DISSENTING OPINION BY