Title: Ex parte Manu C. Patel. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Manu C. Patel v. Management Enterprise Development and Services, Inc., et al.)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1060897
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 5, 2007

REL: 10/05/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1060897
_________________________
Ex parte Manu C. Patel
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re:  Manu C. Patel
v.
Management Enterprise Development and Services, Inc., et
al.)
(Madison Circuit Court, CV-04-1776;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2050839)
LYONS, Justice.
1060897
2
Manu C. Patel sued Management Enterprise Development and
Services, Inc. (hereinafter "MEDS"); Stanley McCall, the chief
executive officer of MEDS; and Willow Run Nursing Center, Inc.
(hereinafter "Willow Run"), a facility developed by MEDS
(hereinafter 
collectively 
"the 
MEDS 
parties"), 
alleging 
breach
of contract.  The trial court entered a summary judgment in
favor of the MEDS parties.  Patel then appealed to the Court
of Civil Appeals.  The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the
summary judgment, without an opinion.  Patel v. Management
Enter. Dev. & Servs., Inc. (No. 2050839, January 12, 2007), __
So. 2d __ (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (table).  Patel then
petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, and we granted
certiorari to consider only whether the Court of Civil
Appeals' affirmance of the trial court's judgment is in
conflict with our settled authority requiring that, on a
motion for summary judgment, the evidence is to be viewed most
favorably to the nonmovant.  We reverse and remand.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Patel alleged that the MEDS parties breached a contract
to compensate him for his work in assisting MEDS in obtaining
a loan from Colonial Bank.  Patel, who describes himself as a
1060897
3
financial consultant, had previously assisted Willow Run in
obtaining financing.  Patel contends that after McCall told
him that he was experiencing difficulty obtaining financing
from Colonial Bank for the development of Willow Run, Patel
told McCall that he could help MEDS obtain the financing.
According to Patel, "[w]ithin a month or so" of this
conversation, Patel and McCall entered into an oral contract
pursuant to which MEDS would pay Patel a fee of 1% of the
financed amount in exchange for Patel's assistance in
obtaining a loan from Colonial Bank.  The agreement, according
to Patel, called for MEDS to pay the fee in monthly
installments of $10,000, to begin once the financing had been
obtained and to continue until the fee was paid in full.
Patel also alleges that after the loan was obtained in the
amount of $4,700,000, he and McCall entered into an oral
agreement specifying that the fee was $47,000 or 1% of the
amount of the loan.  
After the loan had been finalized, Patel sent McCall an
e-mail referring to "your commitment" to pay Patel $10,000 per
month until the fee of $47,000 was paid.  MEDS then made two
$10,000 payments in consecutive months.  After a hiatus of two
1060897
4
months, during which MEDS made no payment to Patel, MEDS e-
mailed Patel stating, "WE DO NOT HAVE THE MONEY YET .... WE
HAVE NOT IDENTIFIED THE MONEY TO PAY YOU AS OF YET."  A month
later, McCall sent Patel an e-mail stating, in pertinent part:
"Whatever I do for Willow Run Nursing Center will be because
I personally choose and not because of any legal obligations."
MEDS made no further payments to Patel.  MEDS denies that it
entered into any contract with Patel, and it disputes Patel's
involvement in procuring the loan from Colonial Bank.
II. Standard of Review
Because we are reviewing the Court of Civil Appeals'
affirmance of a summary judgment, our review is de novo.  "On
certiorari review, this Court accords no presumption of
correctness to the legal conclusions of the intermediate
appellate court.  Therefore, we must apply de novo the
standard of review that was applicable in the Court of Civil
Appeals."  Ex parte Toyota Motor Corp., 684 So. 2d 132, 135
(Ala. 1996).  The law is well established that a de novo
standard applies to appellate review of a trial court's
summary judgment.  Ex parte Fort James Operating Co., 895 So.
2d 294 (Ala. 2004).
1060897
5
III. Analysis
Patel argues that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in
affirming the summary judgment in favor of the MEDS parties
because, he argues, the Court of Civil Appeals (1) did not
review the evidence in the light most favorable to him as the
nonmovant, and (2) did not resolve all reasonable doubts
regarding the evidence in his favor.  The MEDS parties argue
that the Court of Civil Appeals properly affirmed the summary
judgment because, they argue, there is no basis from which to
reasonably infer the existence of a valid contract between
Patel and the MEDS parties.  The MEDS parties specifically
argue that without making impermissible inferences in favor of
Patel, 
the 
fact-finder 
could 
not 
conclude 
that 
the
consideration required for a valid contract existed because,
they argue, the alleged promise to pay Patel occurred after
Patel contends that he performed the alleged contract.
A summary judgment is properly granted when there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.  See Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R.
Civ. P.  To determine whether the evidence creates a genuine
issue of material fact, "[the appellate court] must review the
1060897
6
record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant."  Ex
parte Steadman, 812 So. 2d 290, 293 (Ala. 2001) (citing Pryor
v. Brown & Root USA, Inc., 674 So. 2d 45, 47 (Ala. 1995)).  In
a breach-of-contract action, no genuine issue of material
facts exists "where the contract is unambiguous and the facts
undisputed."  P & S Bus., Inc. v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co.,
466 So. 2d 928, 931-32 (Ala. 1985).
The 
MEDS 
parties 
contend 
that 
Patel's 
deposition
testimony, to the effect that "once the loan was confirmed,
Mr. McCall agreed to pay me $47,000," establishes that, as a
matter of law, the promise by McCall took place after the loan
had been obtained and that, therefore, no consideration for
payment for the rendition of previous services existed.  The
MEDS parties, as did the Court of Civil Appeals, rely upon
Gregory v. Hardy, 53 Ala. App. 705, 304 So. 2d 209 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1974), which provides that for mutual promises to be
enforceable the promises "'must be concurrent, that is, they
must become obligatiory [sic] at the same time; otherwise each
is a nudum pactum at the time it is made, and neither will
support the other. Promises made at different times on the
1060897
The briefs and record appear to be silent as to the date
1
Colonial Bank committed to loan MEDS $4,700,000.  However, the
MEDS parties have not submitted any evidence in support of
their motion for a summary judgment establishing that the loan
had already been obtained at the time of any alleged agreement
between Patel and McCall.   
7
same day are not sufficient.'"  53 Ala. App. at 712, 304 So.
2d at 215 (quoting 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 98).
Only by construing Patel's testimony most favorably to
the MEDS parties can we conclude that the MEDS parties'
agreement to pay Patel $47,000 (1% of the $4,700,000 loan
obtained from Colonial Bank) constituted the entire agreement
concerning his compensation for his services.  Such a
construction totally overlooks Patel's testimony to the effect
that an agreement was reached "within a month or so" of the
original conversation between Patel and McCall concerning
MEDS's difficulty in obtaining a loan.   Obviously, until the
1
amount of the loan was fixed, there could be no agreement as
to the exact dollar amount of any fee.
When all the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable
to Patel and all reasonable inferences are made in his favor,
a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether
there was a valid contract between Patel and the MEDS parties.
Specifically, an inference that Patel and the MEDS parties
1060897
8
entered into a valid oral contract before Colonial Bank
provided financing is reasonable from Patel's testimony that
MEDS agreed to pay him a fee of 1% of the amount of the loan
ultimately obtained.  A jury question therefore exists as to
whether a valid contract existed between the parties.
Therefore, we must reverse the Court of Civil Appeals'
judgment affirming the summary judgment in favor of the MEDS
parties.
IV. Conclusion
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and
remand the cause to that court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and
Parker, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., recuses himself.