Title: Strack v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 22S-CR-00137
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: May 2, 2022

I N  T H E
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 22S-CR-137 
Cole G. Strack 
Appellant-Defendant 
–v–
State of Indiana 
Appellee-Plaintiff 
Decided: May 2, 2022 
Appeal from the Wells Superior Court 
No. 90D01-2003-F6-51 
The Honorable Max C. Ludy, Jr., Senior Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 21A-CR-922 
Per Curiam Opinion 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur. 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
May 02 2022, 11:58 am
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Per curiam. 
At sentencing, a criminal defendant who enters an open guilty plea has 
a right to allocution distinct from the right to present evidence on his or 
her behalf. We grant transfer to clarify this distinction. But finding the trial 
court’s error was not reversible, we ultimately affirm Strack’s sentence.  
Facts and Procedural History 
Without a plea agreement, Cole G. Strack pleaded guilty to four 
charges, including operating a vehicle while intoxicated and possession of 
marijuana, and admitted to being a habitual vehicular substance offender. 
The State questioned Strack at his plea hearing to establish a factual basis 
for the guilty plea.  The trial court accepted Strack’s guilty plea and 
ordered a presentence investigation report. 
At the sentencing hearing, Strack’s mother and father testified. 
Thereafter, the trial court had this exchange with the parties: 
THE COURT: […] Any additional witnesses? 
[STRACK’S COUNSEL]: Would you permit me to present 
Cole’s facts in summation, Your Honor? 
THE STATE: What do you mean Cole’s facts in summation? 
THE COURT: His facts? 
[STRACK’S COUNSEL]: The facts I, I was going to ask him 
about and have, he’s, he’s nervous today as can be… 
THE STATE: Judge, the State would, the State wants to be able 
to cross exam[ine], if he’s going to testify and present evidence, 
the State’s going to cross it. 
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[STRACK’S COUNSEL]: Why, I understand that they wouldn’t 
lose their right to cross examine him. 
THE STATE: Judge, he can testify. He’s got to establish the 
evidence. 
THE COURT: Yeah, if your client has anything to say he needs 
to testify. 
[STRACK’S COUNSEL]: Certainly, Your Honor. I’d like to call 
Cole, Cole Strack. 
Tr. Vol. 2, p. 40.  
Strack testified and was cross-examined, over objection, about his 
continued alcohol use, both related to domestic battery charges pending 
separately and the present case, in which he endanged his young 
daughter by driving intoxicated with her in the vehicle. After Strack’s 
testimony, both sides presented closing arguments.  The trial court then 
allowed Strack to speak, stating:  
THE COURT: Mr. Strack, you’re not required to say anything 
at the time of sentencing, but you have that right. Is there 
anything additional you’d like to say, sir? 
THE DEFENDANT: I’d just like to say that most of my criminal 
history was before I had a child. And, this was a real eye-
opener for me. Being in jail for three months is, is for lack of a 
better word, very sobering. And I, I think I’ve learned my 
lesson and I’d like to move on with, with my life, with my 
daughter and I. 
Tr. Vol. 2, p. 58.  
The trial court dismissed two of the counts on double jeopardy grounds 
and sentenced Strack to a total of six years, with two suspended to 
probation. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Strack v. State, 178 N.E.3d 1253 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CR-137 | May 2, 2022 
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(Ind. Ct. App. 2021). We now grant transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals 
opinion. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 
Discussion and Decision 
For an individual who enters an open guilty plea, the right to present 
evidence at sentencing and the right of allocution are distinct, as we clarify 
below. But we conclude Strack is not entitled to relief because he exercised 
both rights and any error by the trial court was harmless.  
Before being sentenced for a felony, a criminal defendant is “entitled to 
subpoena and call witnesses and to present information in his own 
behalf.” Ind. Code § 35-38-1-3. A defendant is not required to testify at 
sentencing, but when a defendant chooses to testify for evidentiary 
purposes, he or she must be placed under oath and subject to cross-
examination. Biddinger v. State, 868 N.E.2d 407, 413 (Ind. 2007).  
“But a statement in allocution is not evidence. Rather it is more in the 
nature of closing argument where the defendant is given the opportunity 
to speak for himself or herself” to the trial court before the court 
pronounces the sentence. Id. Through allocution, the defendant may 
explain his or her views of the facts and circumstances without being “put 
to the rigors of cross-examination.” Id. 
Though long recognized as a principle in common law, Indiana first 
codified the right of allocution in 1905. Today, the statutory right of 
allocution is found in Indiana Code section 35-38-1-5: 
When the defendant appears for sentencing, the court shall 
inform the defendant of the verdict of the jury or the finding of 
the court. The court shall afford counsel for the defendant an 
opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant. The defendant 
may also make a statement personally in the defendant's own 
behalf and, before pronouncing sentence, the court shall ask the 
defendant whether the defendant wishes to make such a 
statement. Sentence shall then be pronounced, unless a 
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sufficient cause is alleged or appears to the court for delay in 
sentencing. 
Because this statutory right is based on “the verdict of the jury or the 
finding of the court[,]” it does not extend to sentencing on a guilty plea or 
probation revocation. See Biddinger, 868 N.E.2d at 412; Vicory v. State, 802 
N.E.2d 426, 429 (Ind. 2004). 
But the “Indiana Constitution places a unique value upon the desire of 
an individual accused of a crime to speak out personally in the courtroom 
and state what in his mind constitutes a predicate for his innocence of the 
charges.” Biddinger, 868 N.E.2d at 412 (quoting Vicory, 802 N.E.2d at 429). 
Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution provides, “In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right…to be heard by himself and 
counsel[.]” Informed by these principles, we have found that defendants 
who ask to give allocution in guilty plea and probation revocation cases 
also have the right to do so. Biddinger, 868 N.E.2d at 412; Vicory, 802 
N.E.2d at 429. And where the defendant has pleaded guilty without a plea 
agreement, as here, this right to allocution is separate and distinct from 
the right to present sentencing testimony. 
Here, though, Strack ultimately exercised both these discrete rights—
first testifying for evidentiary purposes, then after closing arguments, 
accepting the trial court’s invitation to give allocution. Although Strack 
was not denied either right, he claims that the trial court committed 
fundamental error by incorrectly advising, before he testified, that if he 
had “anything to say he need[ed] to testify.” Strack argues that, instead of 
informing him of his right to allocution, the trial court essentially forced 
him to testify and submit to cross-examination or lose the ability to speak 
on his own behalf. 
Because Strack’s counsel did not object to the trial court’s advisement 
or process, we review only for fundamental error. “Fundamental error is 
an exception to the general rule that a party’s failure to object at trial 
results in a waiver of the issue on appeal.” Kelly v. State, 122 N.E.3d 803, 
805 (Ind. 2019). But fundamental error occurs only when the error “makes 
a fair trial impossible or constitutes clearly blatant violations of basic and 
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elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and 
substantial potential for harm.” Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. 
2009). Strack bears the heavy burden of showing fundamental error on 
appeal. See Isom v. State, 170 N.E.3d 623, 651 (Ind. 2021). Likewise, “a 
defendant claiming that he was denied his right to allocution carries a 
strong burden in establishing his claim.” Vicory, 802 N.E.2d at 429. 
In both Biddinger and Vicory, denying allocution was error, but not 
reversible. In Biddinger, after a jury trial had already begun, the defendant 
pleaded guilty to felony aggravated battery. 868 N.E.2d at 409. At 
sentencing, the trial court denied the defendant’s allocution request, but 
the defendant filed a written copy of his statement under seal as an offer 
of proof. Id. at 409–10. Although the trial court erroneously denied 
allocution, we found the error harmless because much of Biddinger’s 
statement had already been introduced at trial and he “fail[ed] to establish 
how the excluded portion of his statement would have made a difference 
in the sentence the trial court imposed.” Id. at 412–13. 
Similarly, in Vicory, we found the trial court erred by not granting a 
defendant’s allocution request at his probation revocation hearing. 802 
N.E.2d at 430. But we also found reversal unnecessary because “Vicory 
testified at his hearing and because he has not identified any statement or 
argument he would have made had the court permitted him to read his 
statement[.]” Id.1 
Strack complains that cross-examination elicited evidence that he 
endangered his young daughter riding with him when he operated a 
vehicle while intoxicated and that he continued using alcohol after the 
incident. But other sentencing testimony had already introduced that 
information. Likewise, the presentence investigation report disclosed 
Strack’s pending domestic battery charges, and the trial court took care 
not to allow testimony about the elements of that charged offense. 
 
1 A defendant who chooses to testify for evidentiary purposes does not thereby negate his or 
her right of allocution. To the extent Vicory can be read to suggest otherwise, see 802 N.E.2d at 
430, we hereby disapprove of that suggestion. 
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Excluding the charges dismissed on double jeopardy grounds, Strack 
faced a maximum of 11 years of incarceration. See I.C. § 35-50-2-7; 
I.C. § 35-50-3-3; I.C. § 9-30-15.5-2. Strack was sentenced to an aggregate of 
six years, only four of which were to be executed. 
We find that Strack has not proved his sentence would have been 
different had he not testified and been subject to cross-examination. As we 
did in Williams v. State, 164 N.E.3d 724, 725 (Ind. 2021), we remind trial 
courts to be clear and accurate in their sentencing hearing colloquies. But 
here, Strack was able to exercise both his right to present evidence and his 
right to allocution. We therefore find any error was harmless and did not 
affect his substantive rights such that reversal is warranted.2 Having 
granted transfer, we affirm Strack’s sentence. 
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLA N T  
Stacy R. Uliana 
Bargersville, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Theodore E. Rokita 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Megan M. Smith 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
2 In the Court of Appeals, Strack argued that the trial court erred by failing to consider the 
negative impact of his incarceration on his daughter and his open guilty plea as mitigating 
factors. We summarily affirm the Court of Appeals resolution of these issues in Section II of its 
opinion. See Ind. App. R. 58(A)(2). On Strack’s assertion of cumulative error, we find any errors 
here in sentencing taken together do not justify reversal. Strack has a substantial history of 
alcohol-related crimes, including three other convictions for operating while intoxicated. 
Almost all of his previous sentences were suspended, which the trial court found relevant 
when imposing a partially executed sentence.