Title: People v. Peeples
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 83783
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 2002

Docket No. 83783-Agenda 1-September 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								WILLIAM PEEPLES, Appellant.
Opinion filed June 20, 2002.
	 
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:	Pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS
5/122-1 et seq. (West 1994)), defendant, William Peeples,
petitioned the circuit court of Cook County for post-conviction
relief. The circuit court dismissed defendant's amended post-conviction petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Because defendant was sentenced to death for the underlying
murder conviction, he appeals directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R.
651(a). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the
circuit court.

BACKGROUND
	This court has previously detailed the evidence presented at
defendant's trial in our opinion on direct appeal. People v.
Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422 (1993). Therefore, we state here only
those facts which are necessary to the disposition of this appeal.
	On May 18, 1988, defendant was arrested for the murder of
Dawn Dudovic, who was discovered stabbed to death in her
Schaumburg apartment earlier that day. Defendant and his fiancée,
Vanessa Allen, lived in an apartment next door to the victim's
apartment.
	During the early evening hours of May 18, Pamela Killeen,
the victim's roommate, returned home and observed the victim's
car in the parking lot. Upon arriving at the front door of unit 102,
the apartment she shared with the victim, Killeen discovered a red-stained piece of paper towel wedged in the door which prevented
the door from locking. Killeen removed the paper towel and
entered the apartment. She then noticed red stains on the walls and
carpeting leading to the kitchen, and discovered the victim lying
on her back on the kitchen floor. In an immediate attempt to seek
help, Killeen pounded on the front door of unit 101, defendant's
apartment. Killeen testified that she continued to knock and
scream at the door of unit 101 for about a minute because she had
heard sounds inside that apartment. However, when there was no
response, she sought and received help from another neighbor,
Kenneth Evensen. Evensen accompanied Killeen to her apartment,
observed the victim lying in a pool of blood on the kitchen floor,
and returned to his apartment to call the paramedics. Shortly
thereafter, the paramedics arrived and pronounced the victim dead.
	At approximately 6 p.m., members of the Schaumburg police
department began arriving at the apartment complex and initiated
a canvas of the building. When the officers knocked on the door
of unit 101, they received no response. However, the officers
noticed that shadows appeared and disappeared through the
apartment's peephole, indicating that an individual was present
inside. The officers contacted the building's manager and were
told that Vanessa Allen was the tenant of record for unit 101.
When the officers telephoned Allen at work, she informed police
that she lived in the apartment alone. Based on this information,
the officers concluded that no one should have been in the
apartment.
	At approximately 7:40 p.m., the police had not yet gained
entry into unit 101. At that time, the officers observed smoke
coming from underneath unit 101's front door. When an officer
went to the rear of the apartment and tried to look into the
bedroom through a separation in the window curtains, the curtains
suddenly went up in flames. The officer, who then had an
unobstructed view of the bedroom, observed two fires burning in
that room. In addition, it appeared that at least three other fires
were burning in the living room. Shortly thereafter, Schaumburg
firefighters arrived at the scene and broke out the bedroom
window of unit 101. The firefighters then extended a fire hose into
the apartment and attempted to extinguish the blaze. At that point,
defendant appeared inside the apartment and exited through the
shattered bedroom window. Defendant was arrested and
transported by police to a local hospital, where medical personnel
tended to a deep laceration on his left hand that had cut through
the tendons of three fingers and which was bleeding profusely.
Defendant also had a second cut at the web part of his left hand.
	Pursuant to a search warrant, police officers searched
defendant's apartment and discovered evidence of six separate
fires in the living room and six separate fires in the bedroom. Each
fire had been started by igniting small piles of items. Recovered
from one of these piles was a wallet that contained defendant's
driver's license, as well as a large kitchen knife with a
bloodstained wooden handle. Investigators also discovered a
satchel in the living room, which contained a coffee cup.
Examination of this cup revealed that it contained sugar and was
spattered with blood.
	During this time, the police also continued their investigation
at the victim's apartment. An evidence technician collected blood
samples from the kitchen and other areas of the victim's
apartment. At trial, an expert in serology testified that the blood
samples taken from several locations in the victim's apartment
were of type A, which was defendant's blood type. The serologist
further testified at trial that blood discovered on defendant's
wristwatch and on the knife recovered from his apartment was
determined to be type AB, the blood type of the victim. Testimony
was also adduced that two piles of a white substance were
discovered on the floor of the victim's apartment, one near the
front door and one near the kitchen doorway. This substance was
later confirmed to be sugar.
	An autopsy performed on the victim revealed that she had
suffered 23 stab wounds and 16 incised wounds. The victim also
exhibited several defense wounds to her hands and arms.
According to the medical examiner, the victim died as a result of
multiple stab wounds, three of which pierced her lung, liver and
heart. The medical examiner further testified that the wounds
inflicted upon the victim could have been made by the knife
recovered from defendant's apartment, although they could not be
tied with certainty to any particular weapon.
	Defendant testified on his own behalf. According to
defendant, on the morning of May 18, 1988, he did not go to work
because he was ill, took over-the-counter medication, and slept
most of the day. Defendant stated that at approximately 4 p.m. he
removed a package of frozen pork chops from the freezer and
attempted to pry the pork chops apart with a sharp kitchen knife.
Defendant, who is left handed, held the package of pork chops in
his left hand and held the knife in his right hand as he tried to pry
the meat apart. Defendant stated that the knife slipped, and he
suffered a minor cut to his left hand. Defendant testified that when
he made a second attempt to separate the pork chops, the knife
slipped again and caused a deep bloody wound to his left hand.
According to defendant, he wrapped his hand to control the
bleeding, took pain relievers, lay down, and fell asleep.
	Defendant testified that he was awakened from his sleep by
his telephone ringing and by pounding on his front door.
Defendant stated that he looked through the peephole, saw police,
and did not respond because he did not want the building
management to discover that he had been living in the apartment,
which was registered only in Allen's name. Defendant denied that
he had set the fires in his apartment, and asserted that the police
broke into his apartment and set the fires in an effort to force him
out. Defendant also denied placing the knife in one of the piles of
burning clothes, and contended that police placed the knife and
wallet in the pile because he was the most convenient suspect and
also because of "the prejudice in the northwest suburbs."
	During cross-examination, the State confronted defendant
with a photograph of an unopened package of pork chops lying on
the kitchen counter in defendant's apartment. The State then
introduced the unopened package into evidence. In addition,
defendant had no explanation for the fact that the kitchen knife
handle appeared to be covered with blood when, according to his
testimony, only the blade of the knife had cut his hand.
	On March 7, 1990, at the close of evidence and after
argument, the jury returned verdicts finding defendant guilty of
first degree murder, aggravated arson, home invasion and armed
violence. On April 9, 1990, pursuant to defendant's pre-trial
waiver of a sentencing jury, the first phase of defendant's
sentencing hearing was conducted. The trial judge found that
defendant was eligible for the death penalty under section 9-1 of
the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994))
in that he was over 18 years of age at the time of the offenses and
that he had committed first degree murder in the course of a home
invasion.
	Immediately following the circuit court's finding of eligibility,
the State indicated that it was prepared to proceed to the second
phase of the death penalty hearing. Defense counsel requested a
continuance, stating that "there are certain aspects of the
mitigation we were [sic] still working on," and that there were
some mitigation witnesses that their "investigator was trying to
locate." Defense counsel's request for a continuance, however,
was principally based upon their discovery that defendant had
suffered from spinal meningitis as a youth, which "may have
affected his brain," and that shortly before the offenses defendant
was in a car accident where he lost consciousness. Counsel
therefore requested additional time to "do a complete neurological
workup on [defendant] for the brain to see if, just how his brain
is." Counsel stated that they had engaged in discussions with Dr.
Rosenwald, a psychologist, who believed that "it might be
appropriate to do the testing."
	When the court commented that defense counsel had four
weeks since the time of defendant's conviction to prepare a
mitigation case, counsel responded that they had been diligent and
that they "resist[ed] any suggestion that we have not been
preparing for this." Counsel stated that they had engaged in
conversations with defendant, and that they had interviewed
several mitigation witnesses, and that these interviews had
provided additional names of potential witnesses with whom they
had been in contact. Counsel stated that they had "already talked
to and interviewed" several witnesses who were present in court.
However, although they had been "working very hard at this,"
counsel stated that "there are some matters that inevitably arise in
the last few days before such a hearing, and those are what you are
hearing about now." The court denied defense counsel's motion
for a continuance, and the second phase of defendant's sentencing
hearing began.
	In aggravation, the State presented evidence of three prior
convictions of defendant. First, the State introduced a certified
statement of conviction showing that on July 12, 1983, defendant
had entered a guilty plea to attempted rape and residential burglary
and had been sentenced to four years' imprisonment. In connection
with this conviction, the State presented the testimony of the
victim, Lisa Mowery, who was 13 years old and had been baby-sitting for her three-year-old sister at the time of the offenses.
Mowery testified that defendant had knocked at the front door of
their home in Schaumburg, stated that his car had broken down,
and asked if he could use the telephone to summon help. Mowery
let defendant into the house, defendant made a telephone call, and
asked Mowery if he could wait in the house until his ride arrived.
Mowery testified that defendant then grabbed her around the neck,
held a knife to her ribs, forced her upstairs to the bedroom, and
instructed her to remove her clothing. When Mowery refused,
defendant threatened to kill her and began to cut off articles of her
clothing with his knife. Defendant became angry, started hitting
her with his fists, and broke her nose. Defendant then ran out of
the house.
	Second, the State introduced a certified copy of conviction
showing that in February 1985, defendant pled guilty to the charge
of misdemeanor battery and was sentenced to 90 days'
incarceration. Des Plaines police officer Carol Daugherty testified
that on November 13, 1984, she observed defendant running down
the street carrying a knife while an unarmed man was chasing him.
Officer Daugherty stated that the unarmed man had sustained a
deep laceration to his back. The State also presented evidence that,
at the time of this incident, defendant was on mandatory
supervised release. As a result of this incident, defendant's release
was revoked, and he was returned to the penitentiary.
	Finally, the State introduced a certified copy of conviction
showing that defendant had been convicted of misdemeanor theft
in March 1988.
	Counsel for defendant presented an opening statement in
which counsel requested that the court "exercise mercy," and that
"defendant's love of family, his caring for his family" and his
"good character" would be presented in mitigation. Counsel
explained that the evidence in mitigation would show that while
defendant was growing up, he "had no father figure, no role model
to look up to, but despite that fact, despite the fact that he had no
role model, he had the strength and inner goodness to become
what we consider a good son, a good brother, a good uncle, and a
father figure to his sister."
	Defendant's case in mitigation consisted of the testimony of
six witnesses on his behalf. In addition, two letters in support of
defendant were admitted into evidence. The first witness to testify
for defendant was Rev. William Frestoe, the pastor of a Chicago
church, a former police officer, and the chaplin at the Cook
County Department of Corrections. Rev. Frestoe testified that
defendant and his family had been long-time members of his
church and that he had known defendant since defendant was a
very small child. According to Rev. Frestoe, defendant regularly
attended church services and Sunday school and was active in the
youth work of the church. Rev. Frestoe stated that, in his view,
defendant was a "young man that seem[ed] to be very concerned
about his education." Rev. Frestoe also related that defendant
provided a great amount of help and support to defendant's ill
mother, with whom defendant was very close. Defendant cooked
and cleaned for his mother and cared for her needs. Rev. Frestoe
testified that defendant was very concerned about his mother's
well-being.
	Defendant's grandmother, Helen Shannon, was the next
witness to testify on defendant's behalf. Shannon stated that
because defendant's mother worked, defendant had lived with
Shannon on and off from 1964 until 1978. According to Shannon,
defendant "was a very obedient child," and he "never got in any
trouble in school *** [or] around the neighborhood." When
Shannon became ill, defendant helped her by preparing her meals,
going to the store for her medicine, cleaning her house, and staying
overnight to assure her well-being. Shannon testified that
defendant never complained about doing these things for her.
When asked on cross-examination whether she was aware that
defendant had been expelled from high school for being in trouble,
she replied in the negative.
	The next witness to testify in mitigation for defendant was
Robin McMath. McMath stated that she met defendant in 1984 at
the National Education Center for Paramedics and that she and
defendant had become good friends. McMath testified that when
both of her parents were diagnosed with severe and disabling
health problems, defendant gave her support and counseled her in
an effort to help her handle the stress. McMath also stated that
when she informed defendant that she missed her brother who was
away in the Air Force, defendant told her not to worry because
defendant would act as her "big brother." McMath stated that she
would talk with defendant every day about "everything" and that
they were very close. According to McMath, she conferred with
defendant before she got married, and after she was married
defendant baby-sat for her child and was always there for her when
she needed help.
	Defendant's cousin, Wayne Greer, was the next witness called
to testify on defendant's behalf. Greer stated that defendant was
like a "brother" to him, and described defendant as an "all-around
good person." When asked what defendant's life meant to him,
Greer responded "pretty much everything." Greer recounted
incidents from his childhood when he and defendant would do
things together and when defendant would break up fights. Greer
also stated that defendant counseled him on handling a situation
with Greer's brother, even though defendant was in jail at the time.
Greer testified that he did not want defendant to die and that
defendant was "not worthy of death."
	The next witness to testify on defendant's behalf was
defendant's mother, Charlyne McCallister. She testified that she
was 16 years old at the time of defendant's birth and that
defendant's father, her first husband, was "very immature" and
"wasn't ready to be a husband, let alone a father." McCallister
stated that, over time, her relationship with defendant's father
changed for the worse, as "he became involved with smoking
marijuana, drinking, just running the streets *** he was in all
kinds of trouble." She left defendant's father when defendant was
six months old, and she was forced to go to work. However, she
had difficulty remaining employed because she had severe asthma
and other health problems. When defendant was three years old,
she married Thomas McCallister, who was a recovering alcoholic.
However, when she became pregnant with defendant's half-sister
Kimberly, her health problems worsened and her husband began
drinking.
	McCallister testified that when defendant was four years of
age, he contracted spinal meningitis and was hospitalized for about
six months. She visited him every day in the hospital, and when he
was released from the hospital they became "much closer." As a
child, defendant was "very small for his age," and he was "picked
on because he was so small." McCallister recalled one incident
when she was telephoned by defendant's school because defendant
was "clowning around" in his class. Her husband went to the
school and beat defendant in front of his classmates as punishment
for his misbehavior.
	When defendant was six or seven years old, defendant's father
came back into his life, and defendant stayed with him on
weekends, during spring break, and for a few weeks in the
summer. McCallister testified that during these stays defendant
would call her, crying, stating that his father had left him with
whichever lady friend his father was seeing at the time and that
defendant did not know where his father was. McCallister stated
that defendant's father physically abused women in defendant's
presence, and that defendant's father drank heavily. McCallister
also testified that on one occasion defendant was in a hit-and-run
accident with his father and defendant hit his head on the car's
dashboard.
	McCallister stated that when defendant was 11, she married
her third husband, James Green. According to McCallister, Green
physically abused her and sexually abused her daughter Kimberly
when Kimberly was four. Kimberly confided to defendant that she
had been molested, and defendant made Kimberly sleep in his
room, barricading the door so that no one could gain entry.
McCallister stated that her marriage to Green was annulled
because he was still married to his previous wife.
	In 1980, McCallister moved her family into a Chicago
housing project, where the conditions were "horrendous."
McCallister explained that the "gang and violence situation was
just horrible." The family lived there about eight months before
moving to Schaumburg. At the time the family moved,
McCallister was confined to a wheelchair and suffered from
numerous serious health problems, including multiple sclerosis.
Defendant, who was then 17 years old, took care of McCallister
and the family by cleaning the house, washing clothes, preparing
meals, and taking her to the hospital when she was ill. McCallister
stated that defendant went to a part-time job every day, contributed
his paycheck to the household expenses, and spent all of his time
with the family. According to McCallister, defendant also acted as
a father figure to his sister Kimberly, in that he watched over her,
took her to different places, and spent time helping her with her
homework and cleaning her room. McCallister further stated that
in December 1987, defendant was hit by a car in front of her house
and was knocked into the air. As a result, defendant suffered a
broken leg and was rendered unconscious. McCallister concluded
her testimony by relating that even though defendant was in jail,
he called her every day, and has helped to mediate arguments
between herself and Kimberly.
	Defendant's sister, Kimberly McCallister, was the final
witness to testify on defendant's behalf. Kimberly stated that when
the family moved to Schaumburg, she had great difficulty with her
schoolwork, and that defendant spent several hours with her every
day to help her understand her studies and to inspire her when she
became frustrated. Kimberly stated that defendant taught her how
to swim, that they listened to music together, and that he often
took her and her friends to the movies. Kimberly testified that
defendant took care of their mother when she became severely ill,
and that defendant "basically finished raising me." Defendant took
care of the family by going grocery shopping, paying the bills,
doing the laundry, and cooking the meals. According to Kimberly,
defendant taught her to "love everybody and everything."
	Kimberly further testified that when she was a teenager, she
became pregnant and was frightened to tell her mother. Kimberly
confided in defendant, who gave her comfort and support.
Defendant advised Kimberly both against obtaining an abortion
and giving the child away for adoption, and told her that he would
take the baby if she did not want it. When Kimberly's daughter
was born, defendant loved the baby and bought her clothes, toys,
and candy. As the child grew older, defendant took the child to
different places and baby-sat for her while Kimberly went to
college.
	According to Kimberly, even after defendant moved out of the
family home, he visited her and her mother every day and spent
time with Kimberly's daughter. Kimberly recounted that on one
occasion when her daughter became very sick, defendant
immediately drove them to the hospital. Kimberly stated that
defendant is her daughter's "world" and that "[h]e's everything to
her." Kimberly testified that defendant is "everything to me" and
that "[w]hen I needed him, he was always there, no matter what."
	Also received in evidence during the mitigation portion of the
hearing was a letter written by defendant's fiancée, Vanessa Allen.
Allen stated that she had known defendant for 20 months and that
he was "kind, loving, generous, and would go out of his way to
help people." A second letter received in evidence was submitted
by Vanessa's mother, Bernice Allen, who stated that defendant
was a respectable young man.
	After the evidence in aggravation and mitigation was
presented, both sides gave closing arguments. In their closing
argument, defense counsel again asked that the court show mercy
to defendant. Counsel suggested that defendant's criminal history
was "not significant" and "borderline at best." Counsel argued that
the evidence showed that "[t]here are forces that helped shape
[defendant], slow, persistent, continuous powerful forces."
Counsel noted that the evidence established that defendant "had no
father figure" and that the men in his life "were alcoholics."
Counsel argued that although "[e]very child, everyone needs a role
model," defendant felt "abandoned" and that this "sense of
abandonment" was a "force creating and controlling [defendant]."
	Counsel argued that "another force" forming defendant was
the sexual abuse suffered by his sister Kimberly. Counsel noted
that defendant was still a child himself when he tried to protect his
sister, and that he resorted to "building up a barricade." Counsel
also noted that due to defendant's small stature when he was
young, he was constantly picked on, and this was "another force
working on him." Counsel also noted that defendant was
demeaned in school and that his stepfather had once beat him in
front of the whole class. Counsel described these incidents as more
"slow, persistent powerful forces that are forming him."
	Defense counsel argued that they brought these "forces" to the
attention of the court to show that "there are two William
Peeples," the "William Peeples that family and friends knew and
the William Peeples that the jury convicted him of," and "maybe
these forces had something to do with it, *** can explain the
differences." Defense counsel then stated: "Because what you
heard in mitigation, this is not the person who would do something
like this, your Honor. The jury found him guilty, but there's no
question of that, but that's not the same person you heard his
mother testify about, that's not the same person his sister testified
about or his friends. It's a different person. He was convicted of a
terrible crime, but he is not an evil person deserving to die."
Counsel then asked the court "to consider the totality of William
Peeples, not just the crime that he was convicted of." After
recounting the testimony in mitigation, counsel asked, "Are these
the actions of an evil man needing to be put to death? No, your
honor, I suggest these are mitigating factors, not reasons to put
him to death."
	Defendant then spoke in allocution. Defendant informed the
court that "I will not beg you for mercy for a crime that I did not
commit," and stated that "I have nothing to feel remorseful about."
Defendant also stated that "I love my family and my friends and I
tried to love my fellow human beings."
	At the conclusion of evidence and argument, the trial court
sentenced defendant. With respect to defendant's three prior
convictions, two of which involved the use of a knife, the court
concluded that "[c]ontrary to what the defense says, I believe that
these crimes are significant, and it is a significant history of prior
criminal activity." The trial court judge then noted the evidence
presented in mitigation, including "the good that defendant did in
his lifetime," the "charitable acts that he performed," and the "love
that was exhibited between him and his family members to each
other." The trial court judge stated that although he had no doubt
that defendant had committed the crimes of which he was
convicted, "the doubt that exists in my mind right now is whether
the William Peeples that we heard about from the testimony of the
witnesses today ever existed. The doubt that I have in my mind
today is not whether William Peeples was a good boy while he
attended church *** but what became of him in the meantime,
because the William Peeples who committed the crime that I heard
testimony to throughout three weeks of trial is not the William
Peeples that was testified about today." The trial court judge
concluded that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to
preclude the imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, the
circuit court sentenced defendant to death on the first degree
murder conviction. The court also sentenced defendant to
concurrent 30-year prison terms on the aggravated arson and home
invasion convictions. Defendant's convictions and sentences were
affirmed on direct appeal by this court. People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422 (1993).
	On July 18, 1994, defendant, through post-conviction counsel,
filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that defendant's
constitutional rights were violated during his trial and on direct
appeal. On August 24, 1994, the State filed a motion to dismiss
defendant's post-conviction petition. Thereafter, post-conviction
counsel was granted leave to file an amended petition for post-conviction relief. The amended post-conviction petition, which
was filed on October 31, 1994, raised eight claims for post-conviction relief. We set forth only those claims which are raised
by defendant in this appeal.
	First, the amended post-conviction petition alleged that
defendant's due process right to be present at all critical stages of
trial under the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) was violated when, during
the selection of his jury, defendant was excluded from the in-chambers voir dire of 15 prospective jurors, three of whom
ultimately served on the jury which convicted him. Within the
context of this claim, the amended petition further alleged a
subclaim that defendant's right to effective assistance of appellate
counsel under the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV) was violated
when his appellate counsel failed to raise on direct appeal the issue
of defendant's absence from the in-chambers questioning of
prospective jurors.
	Second, the amended post-conviction petition alleged that
defendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by the
sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution
(U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV) was violated as a result of the
"extraordinary security measures" employed during those portions
of defendant's trial when the jury was present. According to the
amended petition, throughout defendant's trial, two uniformed
deputy sheriffs were stationed behind him. In addition, the
amended petition alleged that when defendant testified in his own
behalf, another uniformed deputy sheriff escorted defendant to the
witness stand, stood behind defendant as he testified, and then
escorted him back to the defense table in the presence of the jury.
The amended petition further alleged that trial counsel's failure to
object to these "prejudicial security measures" deprived defendant
of his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to effective
assistance of counsel. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV.
	In addition, the amended post-conviction petition set forth a
claim that defendant was "denied his right to effective assistance
of trial counsel" under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV) and
listed specific instances of these alleged violations in several
subparagraphs. In the first subparagraph, the amended petition
alleged that defendant's trial counsel were ineffective because they
failed to make a timely motion for the preservation and
independent testing of blood samples in the possession of the
State, and that such testing had the "potential to exonerate
[defendant] completely." Another subparagraph of this claim
alleged that trial counsel had ineffectively failed to present
evidence that latent fingerprints found at the murder scene could
not be identified as belonging to any known individual, including
defendant. According to the amended petition, had the jury been
presented with this information, the jurors "could have reasonably
concluded that the unidentified fingerprints found at the crime
scene were left there by the offender and that the offender was
therefore not [defendant]."
	Finally, another subparagraph of the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim incorporated by reference the allegations previously
made in the amended petition that the security measures employed
during the jury portion of defendant's trial violated his right to a
fundamentally fair trial under the sixth and fourteenth amendments
(U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV). The amended petition alleged that
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to having a deputy
sheriff escort defendant to and from the witness stand in the
presence of the jury and stand behind defendant during his
testimony. According to the amended petition, defendant suffered
prejudice because "[t]his unwarranted security measure conveyed
to the jury that the court believed [defendant] posed a danger,
thereby undermining his credibility before he testified and denying
him the presumption of innocence."
	The amended post-conviction petition also raised the claim
that defendant was denied his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel during the aggravation-mitigation phase of
the sentencing hearing. The petition alleged that trial counsel was
ineffective because counsel failed to investigate and present
readily available mitigating evidence with respect to defendant's
turbulent family background, his longstanding cognitive
impairments, and the possibility of neurological disturbances.
	In support of the allegations in his petition, defendant attached
his own affidavits, in which he recounted the security measures
taken during his trial, his absence from the in camera voir dire
sessions, and that he had been fingerprinted on three occasions
after his arrest. With respect to the security measures employed at
his trial, defendant stated that, during jury selection and
throughout the trial, "whenever I was seated at the defense table
there were always two uniformed deputy sheriffs behind me ***
seated in chairs about an arm's length away from me, and
sometimes they stood behind me." Defendant further stated that
when he was called as a witness on his own behalf, another deputy
sheriff "came over to the defense table and walked behind me as
I went over to the witness box." According to defendant, "this
deputy then stood behind and to the left of the witness box during
my testimony, and at the conclusion of my testimony he walked
behind me as I returned to my seat at the defense table *** while
the jury was in the courtroom." With respect to his absence from
the in-chambers voir dire, defendant recounted in his affidavit that
"[d]uring the selection of the jury, on several occasions that I was
aware of, the judge and all the attorneys left the courtroom and
went into the judge's chambers to talk to a juror." According to
defendant, "[o]n all of these occasions I remained in the
courtroom, and I was never told by the judge or my attorneys that
I could be present when a juror was being questioned in
chambers."
	Defendant's amended post-conviction petition was also
supported by several affidavits submitted by his relatives and
friends. Affidavits submitted by defendant's grandmother, sister,
uncle, two aunts, and former girlfriend related defendant's
unstable family background, which was hallmarked by a pattern of
abuse and violence. The affiants stated that during defendant's
youth, defendant's mother engaged in a series of abusive
relationships, was beset by various physical and mental-health
disorders, and had inflicted harsh punishment on defendant
bordering on abuse. The affiants revealed that due to the unstable
personal relationships of defendant's mother, defendant's family
moved often, and that defendant was routinely in trouble at school,
"missing classes frequently" and "fighting, physically and
verbally, with the teachers." Defendant was also in trouble at
home, where he set fires and cut up furniture with a knife. The
affiants further stated that defendant had contracted spinal
meningitis at age four and was hospitalized for an extended period
of time, and that shortly before the offenses in the case at bar he
had been hit by a car and suffered a head injury. The affiants also
averred that defendant had a quick and violent temper and that he
was violent in his relationships with his family and friends.
	Those affiants who testified on behalf of defendant during his
sentencing hearing stated that defendant's attorneys offered no
preparation to them before they took the witness stand, other than
instructing them to tell the judge "something that [defendant] had
done that meant a lot" to them. The remainder of the affiants
stated that they were not contacted by defense counsel and, if they
had been contacted, would have testified on defendant's behalf
during the second phase of the sentencing hearing.
	Defendant's amended post-conviction petition was also
supported by affidavits and reports submitted by professionals. Dr.
Michael Gelbort, a clinical psychologist, submitted to the circuit
court a "neuropsychological evaluation" of defendant based upon
a July 11, 1994, examination. In his report, Dr. Gelbort stated that
defendant had a full scale IQ of 88, with his reading and spelling
skills testing at the high school level, and his math skills testing at
the sixth-grade level.
	According to Dr. Gelbort's report, defendant suffers from
"cognitive dysfunction most affecting non-dominant cerebral
hemisphere functions and frontal lobe abilities." Dr. Gelbort
explained in the report that the frontal lobe is "the part of the brain
which initiates and inhibits behavior, thus allowing people to have
control over their actions." Dr. Gelbort also stated that the frontal
lobe is "the portion of the brain where complex decisions are
believed to be made." According to Dr. Gelbort, individuals with
an impairment in the frontal lobe "will often make poor decisions,
will fail to 'think ahead' or anticipate the outcome of their
behavior, will have an inability to consistently have their behavior
meet the expectations of others and society, and may be
unpredictable or odd in their behavior."
	Based upon his examination of defendant, Dr. Gelbort
concluded that defendant suffers from "minimal brain
dysfunction" which "has an effect on [defendant's] ability to think
in a logical, goal directed manner." Due to this impairment, Dr.
Gelbort opined, defendant's "[j]udgement, problem solving, and
reasoning are affected and impaired" and defendant's "everyday
activities and ability to plan ahead" is adversely affected. Dr.
Gelbort stated that this impairment "would almost certainly have
been present at the time of the offense." As a final note, Dr.
Gelbort also found that defendant's "recollection of past events
tends to 'normalize' his experience" to the extent that defendant
"minimized or denied" many of the problems he experienced
during his lifetime.
	An affidavit and report prepared by mitigation specialist
Caryn Platt Tatelli was also attached in support of defendant's
amended post-conviction petition. According to Tatelli, the
information contained within her mitigation report was gathered
by speaking with defendant on five occasions in 1994, by
interviewing approximately 20 of defendant's relatives and
friends, and by reviewing defendant's school, hospital and
employment records, as well as public records pertaining to
defendant's immediate family.
	In her report, Tatelli stated that defendant's family "has a
pervasive history of child abuse and maltreatment which can be
traced through at least three generational cycles." Tatelli wrote that
within defendant's family, there exists a "generational pattern, and
acceptance of, violence, temper expressed in rage, and
aggression." Tatelli determined that defendant's family has
"utilized violence and force as a means of solving and reconciling
their differences with others."
	Tatelli's report focused in large part on defendant's mother,
who "was abused by her own mother," and, as a victim of this
abuse, "she, in turn, was taught that abusive behavior was an
acceptable method through which to discipline children." Tatelli
stated that as a result of a series of transient and abusive
relationships entered into by defendant's mother, defendant,
during his early years, had "a turbulent life in which he lived in an
abusive setting." Defendant's family life was unstable, and
defendant's family moved often. In her mitigation report, Tatelli
concluded that defendant was raised in a "dysfunctional system"
wherein he "was exposed to a great deal of violence through his
mother and her relationships," that the discipline he received at
home was "extreme" and "could be considered child abuse," and
that defendant "did not have any man who could serve as a
positive role model."
	Tatelli's report further related that at the age of four,
defendant contracted spinal meningitis and was hospitalized for 10
days. After this illness, family members noticed a change in
defendant's behavior, cognitive abilities, and social skills. As a
result, defendant received behavioral therapy. When defendant
was eight years of age, he started a fire in the basement of the
family home. Tatelli reported that family members believed that
this was an example of defendant "constantly doing what he had
been told not to do, almost as if he did not understand the
behavioral boundaries which had been set for him."
	As defendant grew older, he began "running away, setting
fires, and having school difficulties." Tatelli stated that
defendant's school records indicated that defendant attended
school sporadically, and that he had been a student at 13 different
schools before dropping out in the tenth grade. During his school
years, defendant was diagnosed as having a learning disability, as
well as having behavioral, visual and motor problems.
	In her report, Tatelli stated that during defendant's teenage
years, he and his sister Kimberly fought "passionately" with each
other, and "[v]arious sources give clear examples of indiscriminate
violence during [their] physical fights." In addition, it was during
defendant's teenage years that defendant's family moved into a
Chicago housing project, and defendant became involved with
gangs and started experimenting with drugs. Shortly thereafter,
defendant's family moved from Chicago to the suburbs. However,
even after defendant's family moved to the suburbs, the family
remained unstable, and, according to Tatelli's report, lived in four
different residences during six years.
	After the move, Tatelli reports, defendant became involved in
a series of romantic relationships, "all of which [had]
underpinnings of violence." Tatelli stated that the "reports of inter-relationship violence corroborate other reports made of
[defendant's] temper" and that "[m]any, if not all of the sources
indicated that [defendant] has an extremely hot and volatile
temper." According to Tatelli, defendant "rapidly reached a
boiling point, or a level of explosiveness which could not be
controlled." Tatelli related that defendant's family members
"freely admit that they are a family which has trouble dealing with
its temper."
	At the age of 18, defendant was arrested for attempted rape
and pled guilty to the charges. Although defendant maintained his
innocence, he agreed to plead guilty because he would be eligible
for parole. Defendant was paroled at age 20. Shortly thereafter,
while riding a bus, defendant and another man had an argument,
which resulted in defendant and the man running down the street.
When a police officer stopped the men, defendant was found in
possession of a knife, and his parole was revoked. Defendant was
released one year later. Tatelli stated that defendant's employment
records indicated that defendant had a number of different jobs,
worked at each for only a brief period of time, and often had been
dismissed due to "excessive absenteeism or tardiness."
	In 1986, defendant was struck by a car and suffered injuries
to his knee and head. According to Tatelli, sources indicated that
defendant's temper, "which was always strong, seemed even more
easily ignited than before, with little things triggering intense
anger." When defendant had a difficult break-up with a woman he
had been dating, defendant attempted suicide by taking a number
of over-the-counter medications. According to Tatelli, defendant's
suicide attempt was consistent with his history of "reckless
driving, drug usage, and other potentially self-harming activities."
Even defendant's relationship with his fiancée, Vanessa Allen,
was marked by frequent fights, which were "usually verbal, but
sometimes accelerated to the degree that they became physical."
In her mitigation report, Tatelli concluded that "[a]s a result of the
forces acting upon [defendant], he began to turn the naturally-occurring anger, frustration and hatred for his life situation inward,
upon himself, allowing it to build into a horrible temper, as was
the method of his family. In turning the anger inward, rather than
expressing it in positive, natural ways, he began to harbor a deep-seated rage." Attached to Tatelli's report were defendant's school
and medical records.
	On December 8, 1994, the State filed an amended motion to
dismiss defendant's amended post-conviction petition. Oral
argument on the State's dismissal motion was held on April 15,
1995; on January 30, 1996, the same circuit court judge who
presided at defendant's trial granted the State's motion to dismiss
defendant's amended post-conviction petition without an
evidentiary hearing.
	The circuit court rejected the allegation in defendant's
amended post-conviction petition that his due process rights were
violated by the in-chambers voir dire of prospective jurors, finding
the issue waived because it could have been raised on direct
appeal. Similarly, the circuit court found that defendant had
waived any claim that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing
to present blood and fingerprint evidence at trial.
	The circuit court also rejected defendant's contention that the
security measures employed in the courtroom during the jury
portion of defendant's trial violated his right to a fair trial. The
court found that "no extraordinary measures were adopted by this
court," that at all times during the trial "the defendant appeared in
street clothes *** and civilian garb," and that the security
measures were "reasonable under the circumstances." The court
concluded that, under the facts presented, defendant "would not be
able to substantiate his claim that he was prejudiced and that a
different result might obtain."
	Finally, the circuit court also rejected defendant's contention
that defense counsel were ineffective at sentencing for failing to
investigate and present additional mitigating evidence. The circuit
court agreed with the State's assertion that the proffered additional
mitigation evidence regarding defendant's family background and
psychological condition "would tend to show the court that
[defendant] is, in fact, dangerous," as well as "his capacity for
future conduct." The circuit court concluded that "the argument in
and of itself is not inherently mitigating."
	On February 27, 1996, defendant filed with the circuit court
a motion to reconsider its ruling. The circuit court denied this
motion on June 25, 1997. Defendant then filed his notice of appeal
to this court on July 23, 1997. In September 1998, while the
instant appeal was pending before this court, defendant filed in the
circuit court a motion, pursuant to section 116-3 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 1998)),
requesting forensic DNA testing on blood evidence recovered
from the victim's apartment regarding his claim of actual
innocence. On October 15, 1998, both the State and defendant
entered into an agreed order for blood evidence to be subjected to
DNA analysis. On November 3, 1998, this court granted the
parties' agreed motion to stay the briefing schedule in this matter
until completion of the DNA testing. On July 18, 2000, the Illinois
State Forensic Science Center issued a report stating that a
bloodstain found in the kitchen sink of the victim's apartment
matched defendant's DNA profile and could not have come from
the victim. At defendant's request, the blood evidence was then
sent to an independent laboratory, Cellmark Diagnostics, for
further review. On May 2, 2001, Cellmark issued a letter
concluding that neither the processing of the case by the Forensic
Science Center nor the results and conclusions reached by the
Center were in error.

ANALYSIS

	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS
5/122-1 et seq. (West 1996)) provides a mechanism by which
criminal defendants can assert that their convictions and sentences
were the result of a substantial denial of their rights under the
United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, or both. See
725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1996). An action for post-conviction
relief is a collateral proceeding, and is not an appeal from the
underlying conviction and sentence. People v. Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d 154, 170 (2000); People v. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d 437, 464 (2000).
In order to be entitled to post-conviction relief, a defendant bears
the burden of establishing a substantial deprivation of federal or
state constitutional rights in the proceedings that produced the
judgment being challenged. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500,
528 (1999); People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1997).
	The purpose of a post-conviction proceeding is to permit
inquiry into constitutional issues involved in the original
conviction and sentence that were not, nor could have been,
adjudicated previously upon direct appeal. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d  at
464; Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 528. Because a proceeding brought
under the Act is a collateral attack on defendant's conviction
and/or sentence, the doctrine of res judicata bars consideration of
issues that were raised and decided on direct appeal. People v.
Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502 (1998); People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 371 (1996). Further, issues that could have been presented
on direct appeal, but were not, are waived for purposes of post-conviction review. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d  at 465; Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 
at 503. However, the doctrines of res judicata and waiver will be
relaxed in three situations: where fundamental fairness so requires;
where the alleged waiver is attributable to the incompetence of
appellate counsel; or where the facts relating to the post-conviction
claim do not appear on the face of the original record. Mahaffey,
194 Ill. 2d  at 171; Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at 371-72.
	A defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as of
right on post-conviction claims. Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d  at 171;
Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at 370-71. An evidentiary hearing is
warranted on a post-conviction claim only where the allegations
in the post-conviction petition, supported where appropriate by the
trial record or accompanying affidavits, make a substantial
showing that the constitutional rights of the defendant have been
violated. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d  at 465; Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 528.
For the purpose of determining whether to grant an evidentiary
hearing, all well-pleaded facts in the post-conviction petition and
any accompanying affidavits are taken as true. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 
at 503; People v. Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236, 244-45 (1995). A circuit
court's ruling on the sufficiency of the allegations contained in a
post-conviction petition is a legal determination. People v.
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388 (1998). Therefore, we review de
novo a post-conviction petition that has been dismissed without an
evidentiary hearing. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 528; Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 389.
	With these principles in mind, we consider whether the circuit
court erred in dismissing defendant's post-conviction petition
without an evidentiary hearing. Before this court, defendant raises
four claims for review. We address each of these claims seriatim.



I. Jury Selection

	Defendant contends that on direct appeal, appellate counsel
was deficient because counsel failed to argue that defendant's
exclusion from the in camera portion of the voir dire violated his
right to be present under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const., amend.
XIV. When determining whether a defendant has made a
substantial showing that his constitutional rights have been
violated by the incompetence of appellate counsel, we employ the
familiar standards for claims alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052
(1984). Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 397.
	In Strickland, the Court held that the "benchmark for judging
any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 686, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 692-93, 104 S. Ct.  at
2064. Pursuant to Strickland, in order to succeed on a claim
asserting that the assistance of counsel was so defective as to
require reversal of a conviction or death sentence, a defendant
must satisfy two components. First, a defendant must establish that
his defense counsel's performance was deficient. This requires a
showing that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693,
104 S. Ct.  at 2064. A defendant meets this burden by establishing
that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693,
104 S. Ct.  at 2064. In ruling on a claim that counsel was
ineffective, "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be
highly deferential." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at
694, 104 S. Ct.  at 2065. Accordingly, "a court must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant
must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.' "
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 694-95, 104 S. Ct.  at 
2065, quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 100 L. Ed. 83, 93, 76 S. Ct. 158, 164 (1955). Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 397.
	In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, Strickland requires that in addition to establishing that
counsel was deficient, a defendant must also establish that
counsel's deficiencies resulted in prejudice. The Strickland Court
explained that "any deficiencies in counsel's performance must be
prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective
assistance under the Constitution" (Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 692, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 696, 104 S. Ct. at 2067), and that "[a]n error by
counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant
setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had
no effect on the judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 691, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 696, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066. Under Strickland, a defendant
establishes prejudice by showing that "there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698,
104 S. Ct.  at 2068. When a defendant challenges a death sentence,
the specific question is "whether there is a reasonable probability
that, absent the errors, the sentencer *** would have concluded
that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did
not warrant death." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at
698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069. "In making this determination, a court
hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the
evidence before the judge or jury *** [and] must ask if the
defendant has met the burden of showing that the decision reached
would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors."
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 695-96, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698-99, 104 S. Ct. 
at 2069. The failure to satisfy either the deficiency prong or the
prejudice prong of the Strickland test precludes a finding of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 699, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069; Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 530.
	As stated, claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
are evaluated under the two-prong standard set forth in Strickland.
Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d  at 476; People v. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d 168,
175 (2000). However, to succeed on a claim that appellate counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to argue an issue on
appeal, a defendant must specifically establish that appellate
counsel's failure to raise that issue was objectively unreasonable
and that appellate counsel's decision not to raise the issue
prejudiced defendant. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d  at 476; Childress, 191 Ill. 2d  at 175. "Appellate counsel is not obligated to brief every
issue on appeal, and it is not incompetence of counsel to refrain
from raising issues which, in his or her judgment, are without
merit, unless counsel's appraisal of the merits is patently wrong."
People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 329 (2000). Thus, if the
underlying issue is not meritorious, defendant has suffered no
prejudice from counsel's failure to raise that issue on appeal.
Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 329; Childress, 191 Ill. 2d  at 175.
 	The State initially argues that defendant has failed to allege a
cognizable claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
because defendant's underlying due process claim is grounded in
facts which are outside the record on direct appeal. In its brief to
this court, the State contends that "there is nothing in the report of
proceedings from [defendant's] direct appeal that would indicate
that [defendant] was absent during the out-of-court hearings that
occurred during the selection of the jury, including the questioning
of the three potential jurors who ultimately served on the jury."
Therefore, the State concludes, "this matter concerns the total lack
of a factual basis in the record upon which the claim could have
been presented to this court on direct appeal."
	We disagree. Our thorough examination of the record reveals
that defendant was not present during the in camera questioning
of prospective jurors. This conclusion is supported by the position
taken by the State before the circuit court in the post-conviction
proceedings below. In the matter at bar, the State argued below
that because defendant failed to raise on direct appeal his
exclusion from the in camera voir dire, defendant thereby waived
his post-conviction claim that his absence from the in-chambers
questioning of several venire members violated his right to due
process. In addition, the State argued below that defendant failed
to show that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising
this issue on direct appeal. According to the State in its amended
motion to dismiss defendant's amended post-conviction petition,
defendant made "no showing that [counsel's] assessment of the
issues was deficient" or that "there is a reasonable probability that
the Illinois Supreme Court would have reversed his conviction."
Thus, the State's position before the circuit court during the post-conviction proceedings was that the appellate record presented the
due process issue, that appellate counsel could have raised this
issue on direct appeal if counsel believed it was meritorious, that
appellate counsel's failure to do so constituted waiver, and that
defendant failed to show that appellate counsel's actions were
ineffective. Indeed, it was on the basis of defendant's waiver of
this issue on direct appeal that the circuit court granted the State's
motion to dismiss this specific post-conviction claim.
	Because defendant's absence from the in camera voir dire is
apparent from the record, any constitutional issues flowing from
this absence could have been raised on direct appeal. The waiver
doctrine, however, is inapplicable where, as here, a defendant
asserts that the alleged waiver stems from the ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d  at 476. We
therefore turn to the merits of defendant's argument.
	In the matter at bar, defendant's appellate counsel filed
defendant's brief on direct appeal on December 24, 1991, over 1½
years after this court issued its opinion in People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65 (1990). Defendant contends that the performance of his
appellate counsel was objectively unreasonable because counsel
failed to argue on direct appeal that, under this court's ruling in
Bean, defendant's absence from pretrial in camera questioning of
15 venire members, including 3 who ultimately sat on his jury,
violated his fourteenth amendment due process right to be present.
Defendant further contends that appellate counsel's decision not
to raise this issue on direct appeal prejudiced defendant, as there
is a reasonable probability that had this issue been raised on direct
appeal, defendant would have prevailed. We disagree.
	In Bean, the defendant was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial
court had committed reversible error by conducting an individual
voir dire of six jury venire members in the judge's chambers,
outside the presence of the defendant. The discussions were
initiated by the trial judge when three of the venire members said
they had been exposed to publicity about the murder, when two
had difficulty expressing their views on the death penalty, and
when one stated that his previous services as a juror in a murder
trial might impair his fairness and impartiality in the defendant's
trial. On each occasion, the trial judge, in open court and in the
presence of the defendant, instructed the venire members to come
back to his chambers. These in-chambers discussions were
attended by defendant's attorneys, the prosecutors, and a court
reporter. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 79.
	The defendant in Bean argued that his absence from the in
camera voir dire sessions deprived him of his constitutional right
to be present during the entire jury selection process, under both
the Illinois and United States Constitutions. As defendant in the
case at bar premises this specific post-conviction claim solely
upon an alleged violation of his right to due process under the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, we
confine our discussion to that portion of the Bean decision which
analyzed Bean's federal claims.
	In Bean, this court's analysis proceeded from the basic
principle that under the United States Constitution, criminal
defendants are given the general right to be present at every stage
of trial, including jury selection. However, the situations in which
the denial of a defendant's right of presence actually violates the
United States Constitution are limited, as "this Federal right of
presence is not an express constitutional right but arises from the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 82. Accordingly, "the Federal right of presence is not an
absolute, inviolable right; instead, its scope is contained within the
scope of due process." Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 82. Therefore, "as long
as a defendant's absence from a portion of his trial does not
deprive him of due process, there is no violation of a defendant's
derivative due process right of presence under the United States
Constitution." Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 83.
	The Bean court held that under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, a criminal defendant's right of presence "is
violated only when a defendant's absence results in his being
denied a fair and just trial." Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 83, quoting Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08, 78 L. Ed. 674, 679, 54 S. Ct. 330, 333 (1934) ("So far as the Fourteenth Amendment is
concerned, the presence of a defendant is a condition of due
process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted
by his absence, and to that extent only"); see also Kentucky v.
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 96 L. Ed. 2d 631, 647, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (1987) ("a defendant is guaranteed the right to be
present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its
outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the
procedure"). Although jury selection is "a critical stage of trial,"
the Bean court rejected the argument advanced by the defendant
that his right to be present at this stage "encompasses every
moment of the jury selection process." Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 84. The
Bean court emphasized that, alone, a defendant's absence from
jury selection does not violate the Constitution. Rather, where a
defendant is absent from a portion of jury selection, the proper
inquiry is whether the defendant's absence results in his being
denied a fair trial, which, in turn, rests upon a determination
"concern[ing] the impartiality of defendant's jury." Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 84. Accordingly, the Bean court framed the issue as follows:
"Did defendant's absence from the in camera voir dire cause him
to be tried, convicted, and sentenced by a jury prejudiced against
him?" Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 85.
	The Bean court answered this question in the negative. The
court noted that the defendant did not dispute the impartiality of
the jury; rather, the defendant claimed that he had an absolute right
to be present at all times and that, but for his absence, the
defendant might not have allowed his attorney to use a peremptory
challenge against a certain venire member. This court held that the
defendant's claim "falls short of establishing a due process
violation, for defendant does not assert that the juror who served
in place of [the] venire member [peremptorily challenged by
defense counsel] was prejudiced." Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 85. The
Bean court then stated that "while we hold that defendant's due
process right of presence was not violated in this case, we note that
the procedure of in camera voir dire without defendant's presence
and without defendant's express waiver of this right is improper
and, in some cases, will inevitably result in the denial of a
defendant's fundamental rights to a fair trial by an impartial jury."
Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 88.
	Relying solely upon Bean, defendant at bar contends that his
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue on direct
appeal that defendant's exclusion from the in camera voir dire of
several venire members violated his right to due process under the
fourteenth amendment and entitled him to a new trial. We agree
with defendant that there are several similarities between his case
and the facts set forth in Bean. In both cases, in camera voir dire
of several venire members took place outside of the defendants'
presence after these venire members had been initially questioned
in the defendants' presence in open court. Also in both cases, the
in camera voir dire took place in the presence of defense counsel.
Although defendant at bar notes these similarities, and
acknowledges that the court in Bean denied the defendant relief on
his fourteenth amendment due process claim, defendant argues
that there exists a significant factual difference between his case
and Bean that militates in favor of an opposite result. Defendant
contends that, unlike in Bean, three venire members who were
questioned outside defendant's presence "and who could have
been removed by [defendant] with peremptory challenges"
ultimately sat on his jury. According to defendant, this distinction
between his case and Bean would have caused this court, had it
been presented with this issue by appellate counsel on direct
appeal, to apply the rules set forth in Bean and conclude that
defendant at bar, unlike the defendant in Bean, was denied a
fundamental right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. We disagree.
	In his arguments before this court, defendant argues that of the
15 prospective jurors subject to in camera voir dire outside his
presence, three ultimately sat on the jury which convicted him.
Defendant names these three venire members as Marybeth Jansen,
Bernard Crowley, and Richard Serrano, and argues that, as to each
of these three persons, defendant's presence during the in camera
proceedings would have "contributed to the fairness of the
proceedings." Specifically, defendant contends that, had he been
present during the in chambers questioning, he "could have
advised his attorneys to use peremptory challenges" to remove any
venire members he considered "potentially biased."
	We first address defendant's claim with respect to juror
Marybeth Jansen.(1) Our close examination of the record reveals that
on February 21, 1990, Jansen was called as one of the first group
of 12 prospective jurors to be examined by both the defense and
the prosecution in open court and in the presence of defendant.
Jansen, in addition to the other members of this 12-person panel,
was questioned by the trial court judge in detail concerning her
background and ability to be impartial. The record reveals that, at
the close of the questioning of the prospective jurors for that day,
an unidentified venire member informed the trial court judge in
open court that service on the jury would be a "hardship on my
business." According to defendant, based upon the context of the
statements, it appears that this comment was made by Jansen.
When court resumed the next day, Jansen was accepted by the
State and tendered to the defense. After exercising peremptory
challenges to excuse two of the four prospective jurors on the
panel, the defense accepted Jansen. Thereupon, Jansen was sworn
as a juror in defendant's case.
	It has long been recognized that once a juror has been
accepted and sworn, neither party has the right to peremptorily
challenge that juror. People v. Curran, 286 Ill. 302, 307-08 (1918);
see also People v. Brooks, 185 Ill. App. 3d 935, 939 (1989);
People v. Jarnagan, 154 Ill. App. 3d 187, 197 (1987); People v.
Castro, 146 Ill. App. 3d 629, 630 (1986); People v. Scheidt; 113
Ill. App. 3d 632, 636-37 (1983); People v. Watson, 103 Ill. App.
3d 992, 997 (1982); People v. Gamboa, 30 Ill. App. 3d 242, 252
(1975); People v. Manns, 1 Ill. App. 3d 871, 876 (1971). Although
the circuit court retains the right to dismiss a selected and sworn
juror for cause (see Jarnagan, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 197; Watson,
103 Ill. App. 3d at 997), the parties no longer possess the right to
exercise a peremptory challenge. We hold that defendant has failed
to present a cognizable post-conviction claim with respect to juror
Jansen. The record reveals that the entire questioning process of
Jansen prior to her being accepted and sworn as a juror in
defendant's case occurred in open court and in the presence of
defendant. At that time, defendant had full opportunity to witness
the questioning of Jansen, observe her demeanor, assess the import
of her answers, and advise his attorney to exercise an available
peremptory challenge against her. Defendant chose not to exercise
a peremptory challenge against Jansen, despite the fact that
defendant attributes an in-court comment to Jansen that jury duty
would serve as a "hardship" on her business, and despite the fact
that defendant exercised peremptory challenges against two other
members of Jansen's panel. Defendant cannot now claim that he
was denied his right to exercise a peremptory challenge against
Jansen as a result of an in camera conversation she had with the
trial court judge and the parties' counsel concerning her business
concerns after she was accepted and sworn as a juror.
Accordingly, the circuit court properly dismissed this post-conviction claim without an evidentiary hearing.
	We now address defendant's arguments with respect to jurors
Bernard Crowley and Richard Serrano. The record reveals that,
prior to their in camera voir dire, both Crowley and Serrano were
extensively questioned with respect to their backgrounds and their
ability to be impartial by the trial court judge in open court and in
the presence of defendant.
	As to juror Crowley, prior to the in camera questioning,
Crowley fully disclosed in open court the nature and extent of his
employment as a docket clerk with a large law firm and the fact
that his son-in-law was employed as an assistant State's Attorney.
Crowley stated that he had retired from his employment as a
docket clerk after 12 years with the firm, that he maintained the
firm's daily dockets, and that while the firm did some criminal
defense work, he had no feelings one way or the other about
criminal practice. With respect to his son-in-law who was
employed as an assistant State's Attorney, Crowley stated that
although they visited occasionally on a social basis, they never
discussed legal cases and, if he was selected as a juror, Crowley
would not discuss defendant's case with his son-in-law. Crowley
affirmed that if he was selected as a juror, he could be fair and
impartial, he would follow the law and instructions given to him,
and he had no predisposition to either the defense or the
prosecution.
	Prior to recessing court for the evening, the trial court judge
admonished the prospective jurors to avoid looking at newspapers.
In response, Crowley stated in open court that "[t]here was an
article last night" relating to defendant's trial in a newspaper and
that he had "started" to look at it. The trial court judge stated that
he would examine Crowley further on this issue when court
reconvened. The next day, the trial court judge questioned
Crowley, in chambers and in the presence of counsel for both
parties, with respect to the newspaper article. Crowley stated that
he had "glance[d]" at the first few sentences of the article and then
stopped. Crowley stated that as a result of glancing at the
newspaper article, he did not form any decisions, still had an open
mind with respect to defendant's case, and still could be fair to
both parties. The prosecution then briefly asked Crowley to again
discuss his responsibilities as a docket clerk for the law firm and
any contact Crowley may have had with criminal defense attorneys
at the firm. Crowley replied that he had limited contact with the
firm's criminal attorneys and never spoke with them concerning
criminal cases. Defense counsel then asked Crowley whether
contact with his son-in-law, employed as an assistant State's
Attorney, influenced Crowley with respect to "any presumptions
of the criminal justice system." Crowley replied in the negative.
	With respect to juror Serrano, he was initially questioned in
open court and in the presence of defendant with respect to his
background. During this questioning, Serrano stated that he was
active in his church and participated in church functions and social
groups. Although he had strong religious beliefs, Serrano stated,
he would follow the law and instructions provided to him by the
court and his religious beliefs would not conflict with this duty.
According to Serrano, he could be fair and impartial and he would
"make [his] judgment on evidence."
	During a sidebar, counsel for both the prosecution and defense
requested that the judge inquire further of Serrano's religious
beliefs and the effect these beliefs might have on his ability to be
a fair and impartial juror. The judge agreed, and Serrano was
further examined with respect to his religious beliefs in the judge's
chambers in the presence of counsel for both sides. Serrano
reiterated his statements made in open court that his religious
beliefs would not conflict with the rules of law he would be
required to apply as a juror.
	In his submission to this court, defendant contends that had he
been present during the in camera questioning of jurors Crowley
and Serrano, "he could have advised his attorneys to use
peremptory challenges to remove potentially biased jurors who
ultimately sat on his case." Specifically, with respect to Crowley,
defendant argues that, had he been present, he "would not have
been required to accept Mr. Crowley's denials at face value, could
have perceived that Mr. Crowley was not being entirely candid,
and used a peremptory challenge to remove him." With respect to
Serrano, defendant asserts that Serrano "appeared confused about
the applicable burden and standard of proof in a manner
detrimental to [defendant]," and that if he were present, defendant
"could have concluded that Mr. Serrano's confusion about legal
principles or his religious beliefs or both made him predisposed
against a defendant."
	We cannot accept defendant's argument. The record does not
indicate in any way that Crowley was "not entirely candid." To the
contrary, the record reveals that Crowley voluntarily disclosed, in
open court, that he had seen a newspaper article about the trial.
Further, the record does not support defendant's contentions that
Serrano "appeared confused" about the applicable legal principles
or that his religious beliefs interfered with his duties as a juror.
Indeed, both jurors repeatedly stated in open court, as well as
during the in camera questioning, that they would be fair and
impartial and that they would follow the law and instructions
provided to them by the court.
	As we stated in Bean, a defendant's right to be present is not
absolute; therefore, the fact that a defendant was absent during a
portion of his trial does not automatically mean that the defendant
has suffered a violation of his constitutional right to due process.
Rather, a defendant's due process right of presence under the
fourteenth amendment is violated only in the limited circumstance
when his absence results in the denial of a fair and just trial. Bean,
137 Ill. 2d  at 83; see also People v. Lofton, 194 Ill. 2d 40, 67
(2000); People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 201 (1998). Where, as here,
a defendant alleges that his absence from a portion of jury
selection violates his fourteenth amendment right to due process,
the "fairness" issue "concerns the impartiality of defendant's jury."
Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 84; see also Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 201. Therefore,
a defendant must show that his absence from the in camera voir
dire "cause[d] him to be tried, convicted, and sentenced by a jury
prejudiced against him." Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 85; see also Bull, 185 Ill. 2d  at 202. In the matter at bar, defendant has neither alleged
nor shown that Crowley and Serrano, or the jury as a whole, were
prejudiced against him. Indeed, defendant at bar, like the
defendant in Bean, does not claim that the jury which convicted
him was not impartial. As in Bean, defendant raises speculative
arguments with respect to the effect his presence might have had
on the ultimate outcome of the jury-selection process, without
asserting the jurors who actually sat on his jury were prejudiced.
As this court concluded in Bean, "[t]he United States Constitution
*** guarantees a defendant an impartial jury, not a jury of his
choice." Bean, 137 Ill. 2d  at 85.
	As previously stated, a defendant has suffered no prejudice
from appellate counsel's failure to raise an issue on direct appeal
unless that issue is meritorious. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d  at 175.
Because we find that defendant's underlying constitutional claim
based on Bean would not have been successful if raised on direct
appeal, we conclude that defendant's ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel claim lacks merit. Therefore, the circuit court
appropriately dismissed this specific post-conviction claim without
conducting an evidentiary hearing.

II. Security Measures
	Defendant next contends that the circuit court erred in
dismissing, without an evidentiary hearing, defendant's claim that
his right to a fair trial guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const.,
amends. VI, XIV) was violated by the "unwarranted" security
measures used throughout his jury trial. Defendant also asserts that
the circuit court committed error in denying him an evidentiary
hearing on the related claim that his trial counsel's failure to object
to certain security measures deprived him of his right to the
effective assistance of counsel guaranteed under the sixth and
fourteenth amendments (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV).
	As stated, for the purpose of determining whether to grant an
evidentiary hearing, all well-pleaded facts in the post-conviction
petition and any accompanying affidavits are taken as true.
Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d  at 466; Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 381.
Defendant's amended post-conviction petition relies upon
statements made by defendant in an affidavit attached to the
amended petition. The amended petition alleges that during jury
selection and throughout his trial, "two uniformed deputy sheriffs
were seated, and sometimes stood, within arms' reach behind
[defendant] as he sat at the defense table." The amended petition
further alleges that "[w]hen [defendant] was subsequently called
as a witness in the presence of the jury, the deputy sheriff in
charge of the lock-up escorted him to the witness stand, stood
behind him while he testified, and then escorted him back to the
defense table." According to the amended petition, these
"extraordinary security measures" were "highly prejudicial" to
defendant.
	The State responds that defendant's post-conviction claims
with respect to the security measures employed during the jury
portion of his trial are waived. According to the State, because
"the fact that there were deputy sheriffs near [defendant] during
the trial was of record," the "issue of the deputy sheriffs'
proximity to [defendant]" could have been raised on direct appeal.
We disagree. The specific facts contained within defendant's
amended post-conviction petition and affidavit constitute new
information which does not appear on the face of the original
appellate record. Our careful examination of the record reveals
that although the State is correct in maintaining that the record
reflects that deputy sheriffs were "near" defendant during the trial
proceedings, the record does not reveal the nature and extent of the
courtroom security measures actually employed during the
proceedings. The amended petition, supported by defendant's
affidavit, establishes the number, proximity and attire of the
deputy sheriffs involved in guarding defendant, information which
is not discernable from the record. In addition, the amended
petition and defendant's affidavit constitute the sole evidence that
defendant was escorted to and from the witness stand by a deputy
sheriff in the presence of the jury. Because the rules of procedural
default are relaxed where the facts relating to a defendant's post-conviction claim do not appear on the face of the original record
(Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at 372; People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 528 (1991)), we address the merits of defendant's claims.
	As stated, a defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing
on his post-conviction petition as a matter of right. An evidentiary
hearing is warranted only where the allegations of the post-conviction petition, supported where appropriate by the trial record
or accompanying affidavits, make a substantial showing that a
defendant's constitutional rights have been violated. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d  at 472; Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 528. After carefully reviewing
the defendant's amended petition and his affidavit, and taking all
well-pleaded facts as true, we cannot say that defendant has made
a substantial showing that there is a reasonable probability that he
would not have been convicted of first degree murder if the
challenged security measures had not been employed.
	A defendant's right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty
interest secured by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567,
89 L. Ed. 2d 525, 533, 106 S. Ct. 1340, 1345 (1986). "The
presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the
Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system
of criminal justice." Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126, 130, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 1692 (1976). To safeguard the
presumption of innocence, "courts must be alert to factors that
may undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process" and must
"carefully guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be
established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt."
Williams, 425 U.S.  at 503, 48 L. Ed. 2d  at 130, 96 S. Ct.  at 1693,
see also Holbrook, 475 U.S.  at 567, 89 L. Ed. 2d  at 533, 106 S. Ct. 
at 1345 (central to the right to a fair trial is the principle that " 'one
accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence
determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial,
and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued
custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial' "),
quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485-86, 56 L. Ed. 2d 468, 475, 98 S. Ct. 1930, 1935 (1978). Indeed, certain practices
may pose such a threat to the fairness of a trial that they must be
subjected to "close judicial scrutiny." Williams, 425 U.S.  at 504,
48 L. Ed. 2d  at 130, 96 S. Ct.  at 1693. When assessing the use of
various practices or procedures in the courtroom, "[c]ourts must
do the best they can to evaluate the likely effects of a particular
procedure, based on reason, principle, and common human
experience." Williams, 425 U.S.  at 504, 48 L. Ed. 2d  at 130, 96 S. Ct.  at 1693.
	This is not to say, however, that every courtroom practice
which tends to single out a defendant from everyone else in the
courtroom constitutes a violation of a defendant's constitutional
rights. Holbrook, 475 U.S.  at 567, 89 L. Ed. 2d  at 533, 106 S. Ct. 
at 1345. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
"jurors are quite aware that the defendant appearing before them
did not arrive there by choice or happenstance" and that "every
reminder that the State has chosen to marshal its resources against
a defendant to punish him for allegedly criminal conduct" cannot
be eliminated from court proceedings. Holbrook, 475 U.S.  at 567,
89 L. Ed. 2d  at 533-34, 106 S. Ct.  at 1345.
	In Holbrook, the Supreme Court held that the noticeable
deployment of security personnel in a courtroom during trial is not
a type of inherently prejudicial practice that should be permitted
only where justified by an essential state interest specific to each
trial. The Holbrook Court refused to find that the defendant's right
to a fair trial was violated by the presence, at his trial with five
codefendants, of four uniformed state troopers sitting in the first
row of the spectator section of the courtroom. The Court explained
that the "chief feature that distinguishes the use of identifiable
security officers from courtroom practices we might find
inherently prejudicial" is that jurors could reasonably draw a
"wide[] range of inferences *** from the officers' presence" and
that such presence "need not be interpreted as a sign that [a
defendant] is particularly dangerous or culpable." Holbrook, 475 U.S.  at 569, 89 L. Ed. 2d  at 534, 106 S. Ct.  at 1346. The Court
further stated that it could be "entirely possible that jurors will not
infer anything at all from the presence of the guards," because
"[o]ur society has become inured to the presence of armed guards
in most public places," and they are "doubtless taken for granted
so long as their numbers or weaponry do not suggest particular
official concern or alarm." Holbrook, 475 U.S. 569, 89 L. Ed. 2d 
at 535, 106 S. Ct.  at 1346. The Court therefore concluded that the
presence of the uniformed officers in the courtroom did not pose
an "unacceptable risk of prejudice" to the defendant and,
accordingly, was not inherently prejudicial. Holbrook, 475 U.S.  at
571, 89 L. Ed. 2d  at 536, 106 S. Ct.  at 1347.
	In his brief to this court, defendant first contends that the
security measures employed during the jury portion of his trial
were "inherently prejudicial" and places emphasis upon the fact
that a sheriff's deputy escorted him to and from the witness stand
and remained standing behind him during his testimony.
Defendant's argument lacks merit. As discussed above, the
Supreme Court in Holbrook rejected a presumption that "any use
of identifiable security guards in the courtroom is inherently
prejudicial" and held that "[i]n view of the variety of ways in
which such guards can be deployed, *** a case-by-case approach
is more appropriate." Holbrook, 475 U.S.  at 569, 89 L. Ed. 2d  at
535, 106 S. Ct.  at 1346.
	Defendant next contends that even if the security measures
employed during his trial were not prejudicial per se, these
measures nevertheless prejudiced defendant because they "could
raise no inference other than that [defendant] was dangerous and
guilty." We disagree. Previous decisions have found that
defendants who were subjected to in-court security measures
similar to those employed during defendant's trial did not suffer
prejudice as a result of those measures. For example, courts have
determined that no prejudice occurred when, during trial, an
officer was positioned near the defendant rather than in the
spectator section (People v. Glasco, 66 Ill. App. 2d 445, 448-49
(1966)), when two uniformed officers of the Department of
Corrections were seated behind the defendant throughout his trial
(People v. Johnson, 54 Ill. App. 3d 970, 972 (1977)), or when one
uniformed guard was stationed behind the defense table, one guard
was stationed at each entrance to the courtroom, and a group of
guards were seated in the front row of the spectators' seats (People
v. Fields, 322 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 1034-35 (2001)). Similarly, no
prejudice occurred when a prospective jury panel observed a
defendant being escorted into the courtroom by a uniformed
sheriff's deputy and later saw one deputy take the place of another
behind the defendant (People v. Shorter, 59 Ill. App. 3d 468, 478
(1978)), when a uniformed United States marshall stood near a
defendant as the latter testified (United States v. Williams, 897 F.2d 1430, 1434 (8th Cir. 1990)), or when a defendant was
escorted to and from the witness stand by a uniformed deputy
sheriff who stood behind the defendant as he testified (People v.
Hughes, 205 Ill. App. 3d 79, 83 (1990)).
	As the Court stated in Holbrook, a juror may reasonably draw
a wide range of inferences from the presence of security personnel
in the courtroom. Because "[i]t is 'a common courtroom practice'
to have uniformed guards present" during court proceedings
(People v. Fields, 322 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 1034 (2001), quoting
People v. Friesland, 130 Ill. App. 3d 595, 598 (1985)), the
"presence of guards at a defendant's trial need not be interpreted
as a sign that he is particularly dangerous or culpable" (Holbrook,
475 U.S.  at 569, 89 L. Ed. 2d  at 534, 106 S. Ct. at 1346). Our
examination of the record leads us to agree with the trial court
judge that "no extraordinary measures were adopted" with respect
to courtroom security during defendant's trial. Further, there is no
evidence of record that the number of guards or their weaponry
"suggest[ed] particular official concern or alarm" (Holbrook, 475 U.S.  at 569, 89 L. Ed. 2d  at 535, 106 S. Ct. at 1346). Therefore,
any inferences unfavorable to defendant under the circumstances
at bar would be highly speculative.
	Decisions regarding security and safety in the courtroom are
squarely within the discretion of the trial court. Fields, 322 Ill.
App. 3d at 1035; see also People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 216
(1999). Further, once the challenged security measures are found
not to be inherently prejudicial, the defendant bears the burden of
affirmatively demonstrating actual prejudice as a result of the in-court security. Holbrook, 475 U.S.  at 572, 89 L. Ed. 2d  at 537, 106
S. Ct. at 1347-48; Williams, 897 F.2d  at 1434. We conclude that
the evidence presented by defendant is inadequate to make a
substantial showing that, as a result of the security measures
employed in this case, defendant suffered prejudice and was
denied a right to a fair trial. The circuit court judge, therefore,
appropriately dismissed this post-conviction claim without an
evidentiary hearing.
	Accordingly, we also reject defendant's related post-conviction claim that he was denied effective assistance of trial
counsel as a result of counsel's failure to preserve defendant's
claim that his constitutional rights were violated when he was
escorted by a uniformed deputy to and from the witness stand by
either objecting to this practice at trial or including this specific
claim in a post-trial motion. As stated, under Strickland, defense
counsel is ineffective only if the performance of counsel falls
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and counsel's error
results in prejudice to the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687,
80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064; Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at
529-30. However, if the ineffective-assistance claim can be
disposed of on the ground that the defendant did not suffer
prejudice, a court need not determine whether counsel's
performance was constitutionally deficient. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at
530. Because we have held above that the underlying issue has no
merit, defendant has suffered no prejudice due to trial counsel's
failure to preserve this meritless issue for appeal. Therefore, the
circuit court correctly dismissed this post-conviction claim without
an evidentiary hearing.
III. Failure to Present "Exculpatory" Evidence

	In his opening brief to this court, defendant contended that the
circuit court erred in failing to grant him an evidentiary hearing on
his post-conviction claim that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to present "exculpatory" blood and fingerprint evidence
during his trial. Specifically, defendant argued that his trial
counsel ineffectively failed to make a timely motion to preserve
blood evidence obtained from the victim's apartment and, had the
evidence been so preserved, DNA testing might have established
that he was not the source of the type A blood found at the crime
scene. Defendant further alleged that his trial counsel was
ineffective by failing to present evidence at trial that the Illinois
State Police crime lab had determined that certain latent
fingerprints discovered in the victim's apartment did not belong to
any known individual, including defendant. Defendant alleged in
his post-conviction petition that had counsel presented evidence
that the fingerprints left at the crime scene were not those of
defendant, the result of the trial would have been different, as
"[t]he jury could have reasonably concluded that the unidentified
fingerprints found at the crime scene were left there by the
offender and that the offender was therefore not [defendant]."
	Defendant filed his opening brief with this court on April 27,
1998. Subsequent to this filing, both the State and defendant
entered into an agreed order that the blood evidence be subjected
to DNA testing at the Illinois State Police Forensic Science Center.
Accordingly, the briefing in this case was stayed, pending the
outcome of these tests. On July 18, 2000, a report was issued by
the Illinois State Police Forensic Science Center concluding that
a bloodstain found in the kitchen sink of the victim's apartment
"matches" defendant's DNA profile "and could not have
originated from [the vicitm]."(2) Defendant thereafter forwarded the
Forensic Science Center's laboratory case file and standard
operating procedures to an independent laboratory, Cellmark
Diagnostics, for review. On May 2, 2001, Cellmark issued a letter
concluding that it could "not identify any errors in the processing
of the case, in the results, or in the conclusions reached" by the
Illinois State Police Forensic Science Center.
	Subsequently, defendant filed a reply brief with this court, in
which he "concedes that he is unable to prevail" on the blood-evidence issue "in light of the results of recent DNA testing."
Because the result of the DNA analysis contradicts the basis of
defendant's post-conviction claim with respect to the blood
evidence, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of this
specific claim without an evidentiary hearing.
	We next turn to defendant's claim that trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to present evidence to the jury that the Illinois
State Crime Lab had concluded that 10 latent fingerprints found at
the murder scene did not belong to the victim, her roommate, their
neighbor Kenneth Evensen, or defendant. Our review of the record
of proceedings of defendant's trial discloses the following. After
comparing the latent prints recovered from the victim's apartment
with known fingerprints taken from defendant when he was
arrested for a prior, unrelated offense in 1982, a crime lab
investigator concluded that there was no match. Outside the
presence of the jury, defense counsel argued that they should be
allowed to present evidence that there was no fingerprint match
without disclosing to the jury that the fingerprint comparison was
conducted by using fingerprints obtained from defendant as the
result of a prior arrest. Defense counsel maintained that disclosure
of defendant's prior arrest to the jury would be unduly prejudicial.
The State objected, contending that a proper foundation for
defendant's 1982 fingerprints required counsel to establish when
and where the fingerprints were obtained. The trial court judge
expressed concern that the use of the 1982 fingerprints could
mislead the jury on the basis that defendant's prints could have
changed over the years as a result of trauma to his fingers, such as
cuts or scars. At the court's request, the fingerprint examiner who
excluded defendant based upon the 1982 prints was brought into
chambers and stated that any scarring or cuts on defendant's hands
after the 1982 fingerprinting would not have affected his
comparison with the latent fingerprints found at the crime scene.
After considering the arguments of the parties, the trial court judge
ruled that although the defense did not have to lay a foundation for
the 1982 fingerprints of defendant used in the comparison, the
prosecution on cross-examination would be allowed to inquire as
to the origin of defendant's fingerprints. Defense counsel then
decided not to present the fingerprint evidence at trial.
	In his post-conviction petition, defendant asserts that in light
of the adverse ruling by the trial court, defense counsel could have
"safely presented expert testimony that the unknown fingerprints
found at the scene did not belong to [defendant] based on
fingerprints taken after [defendant's arrest] for the murder." In
support of this contention, the post-conviction petition relies upon
an affidavit submitted by defendant in which defendant avers that
following his arrest for the offense at bar, he was "fingerprinted on
three separate occasions." According to defendant's affidavit, he
was first fingerprinted "immediately after my arrest *** [when]
my right hand only was fingerprinted because of the injury to my
left hand." Defendant avers in his affidavit that he was
fingerprinted a second time "six or seven months following my
arrest" when a "complete set of fingerprints, both right and left
hands, was taken at the Cook County jail." Defendant further
states in his affidavit that a third set of fingerprints was taken on
November 22, 1989, when "palm prints which included
fingerprints were taken at the request of my attorneys."
	As stated, at the motion to dismiss stage in post-conviction
proceedings, all well-pleaded facts are taken as true unless
positively rebutted by the record. People v. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d 256,
260 (2000); Childress, 191 Ill. 2d  at 174; Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at
385. After carefully examining the record in defendant's case, we
find that the statement made by defendant in his affidavit that the
first fingerprinting in connection with the offense at bar occurred
"immediately after my arrest *** [when] my right hand only was
fingerprinted because of the injury to my left hand" is contradicted
by the record. During trial, Officer James Herman of the
Schaumburg police department was called as a witness by the
defense. Officer Herman testified that as part of the investigation
of the murder, he took palm and fingerprints from the victim's
roommate, Pamela Killeen, as well as the victim's neighbor,
Kenneth Evenson. The following colloquy then occurred:
			"Q. And did you have occasion to take the fingerprints
and the fingertip prints from the defendant, William
Peeples?
			A. No, I did not.
			Q. Did you take any prints of [defendant]?
			A. Not at that time, no.
			Q. At any time subsequent to that did you take
[defendant's] fingerprints?
			A. Not subsequent to that time, no."
Shortly after this testimony, counsel for both the prosecution and
defense discussed the fingerprint evidence out of the presence of
the jury in the judge's chambers. The transcript reveals that one of
the prosecutors stated that at the time of his arrest, "defendant's
hand was injured and could not be fingerprinted." This statement
was corroborated by defense counsel, who stated that defendant's
"injury was to one hand" and that "presumably at some point the
next morning when he was in the police station they could have
fingerprinted the other hand, but they didn't." The trial court judge
then stated that "evidently there was not a current fingerprint card
taken at a [sic] close to the time of the incident because of
injuries." The judge's statement was not disputed by either party.
Therefore, we find that the specific statement in defendant's
affidavit that he was fingerprinted "immediately" after his arrest
is rebutted by the record.
	With respect to the statement made by defendant in his
affidavit that he was fingerprinted "six or seven months" after his
arrest for the offenses at bar at Cook County jail, we find that there
is no mention in the record of this occurrence. With respect to
defendant's assertion that he was fingerprinted at the request of his
attorneys on November 22, 1989, when "palm prints which
included fingerprints" were taken, although we find reference in
the record that "palm prints" were obtained from defendant at
some time between his arrest and trial, the record is silent with
respect to whether fingerprints were also taken on that occasion.
Because the facts set forth with respect to these two specific
statements do not appear on the face of the original record, they
could have not been raised on defendant's direct appeal. We
therefore address the merits of this specific post-conviction claim.
Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at 372; Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d  at 528.
	A defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his
post-conviction claim as a matter of right. An evidentiary hearing
is warranted only where the allegations of the post-conviction
petition make a substantial showing that a defendant's
constitutional rights have been violated. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 503.
After carefully reviewing defendant's post-conviction claims and
his affidavit, and taking all well-pleaded facts as true, we find that
defendant has failed to make a substantial showing that there is a
reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted of
first degree murder if fingerprint comparison evidence, using his
post-arrest fingerprints and assuming that the comparison would
again exclude defendant, had been introduced.
	Defendant contends that the fingerprint comparison evidence
is "exculpatory" and, had this evidence been disclosed to the jury,
"they would have concluded that the unidentified prints found at
the scene were left by the murderer" and not defendant. We
disagree. The absence of defendant's fingerprints from the
victim's apartment does not, as defendant contends, necessarily
constitute "exculpatory" evidence which "exonerates" him from
the crimes. Contrary to the argument advanced by defendant, the
lack of his fingerprints at the crime scene does not establish that
defendant was not in the apartment; instead, it may indicate that he
either was careful not to leave fingerprints or that any fingerprints
that were left were unsuitable for comparison. In addition, the
recovery of latent prints from the victim's apartment which did not
match the victim, Killeen, Evenson or defendant does not lead to
the conclusion advocated by defendant that the prints were those
of the "actual offender." To the contrary, the jury could have
attributed many innocent explanations to the recovery of the
fingerprints, including that they were left by visitors who had been
invited into the apartment.
	Considering the totality of circumstances presented to the
jury, we conclude that defendant has failed to make a substantial
showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's alleged error, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. The jury was presented with evidence that type A
blood, the same blood type as defendant's, was recovered from the
crime scene. The presence of a blood type other than that of the
victim indicated that during the commission of the offenses, the
perpetrator of the crime had suffered an injury. The jury was also
presented with evidence that defendant, who is left-handed,
sustained severe lacerations to his left hand, which caused
extensive bleeding. The jury was also informed that a knife
recovered from defendant's home had traces of type AB blood, the
blood type of the victim. In addition, type AB blood was
discovered on defendant's wristwatch. We conclude that defendant
has failed to make a substantial showing that a jury, presented with
the above evidence, would have arrived at a different result had
defense counsel introduced the fingerprint comparisons at trial.
Therefore, defendant cannot establish that he was prejudiced by
his attorneys' failure to present fingerprint comparison evidence.
The circuit court correctly dismissed this specific post-conviction
claim without an evidentiary hearing.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the Aggravation-Mitigation Phase at Sentencing
	Defendant next contends that he is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on his post-conviction claim that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel during the aggravation-mitigation
phase of his capital sentencing hearing. Defendant premises his
claim on the allegation made in his amended post-conviction
petition that trial counsel ineffectively failed to investigate and
present readily available mitigating evidence "which would allow
the sentencer to understand how [defendant] came to the point
where he stood convicted of a capital offense." To this end,
defendant alleges in his amended petition that trial counsel's
"failure to conduct a thorough investigation of their client's
background and to present evidence regarding his childhood,
social development, and neuropsychological impairment left the
sentencing judge with an incomplete and misleading view of how
[defendant] came to be before him." Defendant further alleges that
counsel's case in mitigation, "which consisted of kind acts
performed by [defendant] and an idealized, unrealistic view of his
childhood and family life, was completely irreconcilable with the
crime of which he had been convicted." According to defendant,
but for the alleged deficiencies in counsel's performance during
the second stage of sentencing, there is a reasonable probability
that defendant would not have been sentenced to death.
	As stated, the standard for determining whether a defendant
has received constitutionally deficient representation at a capital
sentencing hearing is governed by the two-tier test enunciated in
Strickland. The first prong of Strickland requires a defendant to
show that the performance of counsel was deficient in that
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693,
104 S. Ct.  at 2064; Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d  at 473. In assessing
whether the performance of counsel was deficient, judicial
scrutiny of a defense counsel's performance is highly deferential;
therefore, a defendant "must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
'might be considered sound trial strategy.' " Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 694-95, 104 S. Ct.  at 2065, quoting Michel,
350 U.S.  at 101, 100 L. Ed.  at 93, 76 S. Ct.  at 164; see also
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 397.
	The second Strickland prong requires defendant to show that
counsel's alleged-deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
"This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064. A defendant must show both deficiency and prejudice
in order for a reviewing court to conclude that "the conviction or
death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process
that renders the result unreliable." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.
	In his amended post-conviction petition, defendant alleges
that
the performance of his trial counsel was deficient at sentencing
because counsel had failed to conduct a thorough investigation
with respect to potential mitigation evidence. In support of this
allegation, defendant places substantial reliance upon an exchange
which occurred between the trial court and defense counsel
immediately before the start of the sentencing hearing. Our review
of the trial record reveals that on the date the sentencing hearing
was scheduled to begin, defense counsel requested that the trial
court grant a continuance. Counsel explained that there "are
certain aspects of mitigation we were still working on." Although
counsel stated that they were still trying to locate additional
potential mitigation witnesses, counsel reassured the court that
they had been "preparing for this [sentencing] hearing diligently"
and that they had "already talked to and interviewed [our]
mitigation witnesses." Indeed, counsel informed the court that they
had "four or five witnesses" at the courthouse who were ready to
testify on behalf of defendant in mitigation.
	It is apparent from the context of defense counsel's comments
that the chief reason for requesting a continuance was because
counsel, as a result of interviewing potential mitigation witnesses,
had discovered information that "[defendant] was in a car accident
a few years ago, and he also had spinal meningitis when he was
younger which *** may have affected his brain." Counsel
explained to the court that "what we are asking for is time to do a
complete neurological workup on [defendant] for the brain to see
if, just how his brain is, because there was spinal meningitis, and
there was the car accident that he was involved in, where I believe
he lost some consciousness, and we spoke with a psychologist, Dr.
Rosenwald, who thought that because of those factors that it might
be appropriate to do the testing." Counsel stated that defendant
had been examined by Dr. Rosenwald and that the doctor had
suggested that an electroencephalogram (EEG) be performed on
defendant. Counsel stated that although they had been diligently
preparing for the aggravation-mitigation portion of the sentencing
hearing, "there are some matters that inevitably arise in the last
few days before such a hearing, and those are what you are hearing
about now." The trial court judge denied defense counsel's motion
for continuance and proceeded to the aggravation-mitigation stage
of the sentencing proceedings.
	In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court held that with
respect to claims, such as that at bar, that counsel was ineffective
as a result of a failure to investigate, "counsel has a duty to make
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that
makes particular investigations unnecessary." Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 691, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066. "[S]trategic choices
made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic
choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments
support the limitations on investigation." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at
690-91, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066.
	Our review of the trial record, as well as the materials
submitted by defendant in support of his post-conviction petition,
leads us to conclude that defendant has failed to make a substantial
showing in support of his allegation that his trial counsel was
deficient in failing to reasonably investigate defendant's family
and social background. In his amended post-conviction petition,
defendant asserts that although his trial counsel "did offer
testimony of family members regarding [defendant's] redeeming
qualities," counsel was nevertheless deficient in "failing to offer
any evidence concerning [defendant's] background which shed
light on any of the criminal conduct of which he has been accused
and convicted." Defendant alleges in his amended petition that
counsel was deficient in that "the only witness counsel asked to
describe anything about [defendant's] development was
[defendant's] mother," and that the information she provided was
"incomplete, and, in many respects, inaccurate." Defendant asserts
that had counsel interviewed additional family members and
examined defendant's records, they would have learned that
defendant's mother "had mental problems, lived a chaotic
lifestyle, frequently left [defendant] to the care of others, and,
consequently, was not the best historian of [defendant's] life."
According to defendant, counsel's failure to conduct a thorough
investigation of defendant's background "left the sentencing judge
with an incomplete and misleading view of how [defendant] came
to be before him."
	 The trial record reveals that defense counsel had contacted
the two closest members of defendant's family, his mother and
sister, had traveled to their residence, and had interviewed them,
face to face, for several hours. As a result of this investigation,
counsel were provided with information with respect to
defendant's family and social history, including information that
defendant had spinal meningitis as a child and was involved in a
car accident causing him to lose consciousness. Further, the
investigation provided counsel with several additional names of
potential mitigation witnesses, and counsel stated to the trial court
judge that "we have been in contact with these witnesses," that
counsel had issued subpoenas, and that they had hired an
investigator to follow up on potential leads.
	The trial record further reveals that, during the mitigation
portion of the sentencing proceedings, counsel called six witnesses
to testify on behalf of defendant, four of whom were members of
defendant's family. In addition, counsel submitted two letters
written in support of defendant. The information elicited from the
witnesses during the mitigation portion of the hearing by defense
counsel showed that despite experiencing a very troubled
childhood, and despite facing adversity while growing up,
defendant possessed "the strength and inner goodness to become
what we consider a good son, a good brother, good uncle, and a
father figure to his sister." The record shows that defense counsel
made a strategic choice to argue that there were "two William
Peeples. The William Peeples that family and friends knew and the
William Peeples that the jury convicted of murder." In pursuing
this mitigation strategy, defense counsel focused on the redeeming
qualities possessed by defendant and asked the judge to view
defendant as a person whose life was worth saving and who was
worthy of mercy. Counsel focused upon defendant's "love of his
family, his taking care of his family," and stated this defendant's
being alive "even if it is in prison, sustains and supports his
mother and sister, and his niece." In addition, we note that
defendant in allocution repeated this theme to the extent that, after
denying he committed the crimes of which he was convicted and
that he therefore had no remorse, stated that "I love my family and
my friends and I tried to love my fellow human beings." Indeed,
"[t]he reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or
substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or
actions." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 691, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066; see also People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 409-10
(2000); People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 96 (1999). Further, the fact
that the sentencer did not accept defense counsel's position does
not mean that defense counsel was ineffective. People v. Franklin,
135 Ill. 2d 78, 119 (1990).
	In sum, affording the appropriate deference to counsel's
performance, we conclude that counsel's choice of strategy was
"well within the range of professionally reasonable judgments"
(Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 699, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 701, 104 S. Ct. at
2070), and that the decision of counsel not to seek family and
social background evidence in addition to that which was already
in hand was also reasonable.
	In his amended post-conviction petition, defendant contends
that his trial counsel were deficient during the aggravation-mitigation portion of the sentencing hearing in a second respect.
Defendant alleges that counsel failed to reasonably investigate and
present any evidence in mitigation with respect to defendant's
"longstanding cognitive deficits particularly in those portions of
the brain associated with reasoning, judgment and initiating and
inhibiting behavior." As stated, courts are highly deferential in
reviewing counsel's strategic decisions regarding the presentation
of mitigation evidence. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d 
at 694-95, 104 S. Ct.  at 2065; Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 513-14.
However, such deference is not warranted where the lack of
mitigating evidence presented is not a result of strategy, but rather
is attributable to counsel's failure to properly investigate
mitigation and prepare a defense. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 514; People
v. Howery, 178 Ill. 2d 1, 56 (1997). Accordingly, counsel's
presentation of mitigation is not deemed to be a legitimate strategy
without a reasonable investigation into mitigating circumstances.
Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 514.
	We conclude that defendant has made a substantial showing
that defense counsel's failure to present evidence with respect to
defendant's alleged cognitive deficits during the mitigation portion
of the sentencing hearing was not the result of a strategic decision
preceded by a reasonable investigation. The record before this
court indicates that immediately prior to the start of the
aggravation-mitigation stage of the sentencing hearing, counsel
requested that the trial court grant a continuance because, as a
result of the interviews with mitigation witnesses, counsel had
discovered information that defendant had suffered from spinal
meningitis as a child and had been in a car accident, two events
which "may have affected his brain." Counsel asked the court for
"time to do a complete neurological workup" on defendant,
including an EEG, which was recommended by Dr. Rosenwald.
The trial court judge denied defense counsel's motion for
continuance, and counsel did not introduce evidence concerning
defendant's alleged cognitive deficits during their mitigation case.
	It is well established that " '[m]itigating evidence is extremely
important under the Illinois capital sentencing scheme,' " because
" '[o]nce an aggravating factor is found sufficient to impose the
death penalty, there must be mitigating evidence sufficient to
preclude the imposition of the death penalty.' " Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 541, quoting People v. Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168, 194 (1992).
Given the critical importance of mitigation evidence, defense
counsel has a duty to make a reasonable investigation for potential
sources of such evidence, or must have a legitimate reason for
failing to make a particular investigation. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at
690-91, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066; People v. Enis,
194 Ill. 2d 361, 402 (2000); Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 541. Given the
record before us, we conclude that counsel's failure to introduce
this evidence is attributable to their failure to properly investigate
this potential mitigation evidence and prepare a defense.
Accordingly, we find that defense counsel's failure to investigate
and present evidence of defendant's alleged cognitive deficits was
deficient.
	However, "[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally
unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a
criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment."
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 691, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 696, 104 S. Ct.  at
2066. Under the second prong of Strickland, a defendant must
demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at
698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068. In the specific context of an allegation that
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present
mitigation evidence, defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, absent the errors committed by
counsel, the finder of fact " 'would have concluded that the
balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not
warrant death.' " People v. Henderson, 171 Ill. 2d 124, 145
(1996), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698,
104 S. Ct.  at 2069.
	Our careful examination of the record leads us to conclude
that defendant has failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of
Strickland. Under Strickland, it is "not enough for the defendant
to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the
outcome of the proceeding." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 693, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 697, 104 S. Ct.  at 2067. Defendant has failed to make a
substantial showing that the evidence that he contends trial
counsel should have offered at the sentencing hearing creates a
reasonable probability that the sentencer would have concluded
that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did
not warrant death.
	Defendant first argues that he was prejudiced by counsel's
failure to present evidence of defendant's cognitive impairments
during the mitigation stage of the sentencing proceedings.
Defendant contends that evidence of these impairments would
have assisted in explaining the aggravating evidence presented by
the State and that, under this court's decision in People v. Morgan,
187 Ill. 2d 500 (1999), the prejudice is apparent. Defendant
concludes that because the facts at bar are "remarkably similar" to
those in Morgan, this court must find that the circuit court erred in
dismissing defendant's claim without an evidentiary hearing. We
disagree and find that defendant's reliance upon Morgan is
misplaced.
	In Morgan, the circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing
on the defendant's post-conviction claim that his trial counsel was
ineffective at the sentencing phase of his trial because counsel
failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence of the
defendant's life-long organic brain damage. During the hearing, a
neurologist testified that the defendant suffered from severe
bilateral dysfunction of the frontal lobes of the brain, as well as
from more diffused damage to other portions of the brain. This
frontal lobe damage caused the defendant to be "short tempered"
and "unable to check his impulses." In addition, the defendant's
expert stated that there was a direct connection between the
organic damage to the defendant's brain and the conduct described
as part of the State's case in aggravation during the death penalty
hearing. According to the defendant's expert, the violent manner
in which the defendant carried out the two murders with which he
was charged "was characteristic of defendant's frontal lobe
damage, revealing 'stimulus-bound' behavior and 'excessive
paranoia,' " and that the "defendant would not have conducted
himself the way he did at the time of the offenses had the frontal
lobes of his brain not been damaged." Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 553-54. Significantly, the defendant's expert concluded that the
defendant's brain damage was the " 'determining factor' " in his
behavior at the time of the murders. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 553. In
addition, a clinical psychologist testified during the evidentiary
hearing that the severity of defendant's brain damage caused him
to suffer from " 'paranoid ideation' " which, at the time of the
offenses, led the defendant to " 'misconstrue' " the actions of the
victims and to react in an " 'irrational' " manner. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 554.
	This court in Morgan held that in light of the minimal amount
of evidence presented by the defendant's trial counsel during the
mitigation portion of the sentencing hearing (which comprised 10
pages of transcript), the failure of defense counsel to present
evidence of the defendant's severe organic brain damage which
was linked by two experts to the defendant's brutal actions at the
time of the murders prejudiced defendant. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at
556-57. Accordingly, this court vacated defendant's death
sentence and remanded his cause to the circuit court for a new
sentencing hearing.
	In the case at bar, the nature of the evidence presented in
support of defendant's amended petition with respect to his
"cognitive deficits" stands in sharp contrast to the evidence
adduced with respect to the defendant's life-long severe organic
brain damage in Morgan. The neuropsychological evaluation
prepared by Dr. Gelbort in support of defendant's amended
petition characterized defendant's "brain dysfunction" as
"minimal," and explained that as a result of this dysfunction,
defendant's "ability to think in a logical, goal directed manner" is
impacted. Dr. Gelbort opined that, due to defendant's brain
dysfunction, defendant's "[j]udgement, problem solving, and
reasoning are affected and impaired," that defendant's "everyday
activities and ability to plan ahead" are adversely affected, and that
defendant's brain impairment "would almost certainly have been
present at the time of the offense." The nature of the evidence
presented by defendant at bar with respect to his brain dysfunction
does not equate with the nature of the evidence adduced in
Morgan, where two medical experts "testified that there was a
definite link between the physical damage to defendant's brain and
defendant's criminal conduct," to the extent that the defendant's
brain damage was the " 'determining factor' " in his behavior at
the time of the murders. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 553-55. Therefore,
defendant's reliance upon Morgan is inapposite.
	Under Strickland, in evaluating whether a defendant has been
prejudiced by the failure of counsel to present certain evidence to
the sentencer, it is appropriate to consider the strength of the
proffered mitigating evidence and whether the "admission of the
evidence [defendant] now offers might even have been harmful to
his case." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 700, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 701, 104 S. Ct.  at 2071. Indeed, this court has repeatedly explained that "[a]t
sentencing, a judge or jury considering evidence of this nature
[mental deficits] might view the information as either mitigating
or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual
hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or
demonstrates possible future dangerousness." People v. Tenner,
175 Ill. 2d 372, 382 (1997); see also People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 102 (1999) ("Proof of defendant's mental handicaps not only
could evoke compassion from the trial judge, but also could have
demonstrated defendant's continued dangerousness"); People v.
Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d 1, 27 (1995) ("the evidence of defendant's
mental illness may also have shown that defendant was less
deterrable or that society needed to be protected from him");
People v. Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d 445, 467-68 (1995) (" 'On the one
hand, [evidence of mental impairment] shows the defendant to be
less culpable; on the other, it shows the defendant to be less
deterrable. *** Jurors who see capital punishment as the just
[dessert] of the wicked will be swayed in favor of lenience; jurors
with more instrumental views will incline toward execution as the
only way to incapacitate such a person' "), quoting Brewer v.
Aiken, 935 F.2d 850, 861 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring); People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 340 (1990).
Indeed, admission of the evidence defendant now offers contained
within Dr. Gelbort's report may have been harmful to defendant's
case. In his report, Dr. Gelbort stated that academic achievement
testing found defendant's reading and spelling to be at the high
school level. In addition, based upon his examination of defendant,
Dr. Gelbort found that defendant's "recollection of past events
tends to 'normalize' his experience" to the extent that defendant
"minimized or denied" many of the problems he experienced
during his lifetime. We find that, in the matter at bar, had the
sentencer heard the proffered evidence of defendant's cognitive
impairments, in addition to his history of violence, the sentencer
could have reasonably concluded that this evidence demonstrated
defendant's future dangerousness. Accordingly, we agree with the
ruling of the post-conviction court and conclude that defendant has
failed to make a substantial showing that there is a reasonable
probability that, had the sentencer heard the now-proffered
evidence of defendant's cognitive impairments, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.
	Defendant also asserts that he was prejudiced by counsel's
failure to present evidence of defendant's troubled family and
social background during the mitigation stage of the sentencing
proceedings. However, we have found that counsel's performance
with respect to investigating and presenting evidence of
defendant's family and social background was not deficient under
Strickland. Although that finding alone is sufficient to defeat
defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on this specific
issue (Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.
at 2064), we additionally find that counsel's failure to introduce
the evidence now cited by defendant with respect to his difficult
upbringing did not result in prejudice. This court has repeatedly
explained that although evidence with respect to a defendant's
chaotic childhood or family history of violence "could have
evoked compassion in the jurors, it could have also demonstrated
defendant's potential for future dangerousness and the basis for
defendant's past criminal acts." Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d  at 27; see
also Enis, 194 Ill. 2d  at 412; Childress, 191 Ill. 2d  at 179; People
v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 101; People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472,
491-92 (1996). This is also true with respect to evidence of
educational disabilities. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 341; People v.
Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d 176, 203-04 (1998).
	In the matter at bar, the sentencer could have reasonably
concluded that much of the evidence defendant now seeks to
introduce is, in fact, harmful to defendant's case. Many of the
documents submitted by defendant in support of his amended
petition contain highly damaging evidence. For example, the
evidence reveals that, throughout his life, defendant had a quick
and violent temper, and that this violence animated his
relationships with his family, friends, and, most especially, with
women. In her mitigation report, mitigation specialist Caryn Platt
Tatelli stated that within defendant's family there exists a
"generational pattern, and acceptance of, violence, temper
expressed in rage, and aggression," and that defendant's family
"utilized violence and force as a means of solving and reconciling
their differences with others." According to Tatelli's report,
defendant and his sister fought "passionately" with each other, and
such fights included "indiscriminate violence." Defendant also
fought with his fiancée, Vanessa Allen, and sometimes those
fights also became physical. Tatelli further stated in her report that
after the family moved to the suburbs, defendant engaged in a
series of romantic relationships, "all of which [had] underpinnings
of violence," that the "reports of inter-relationship violence
corroborate other reports made of [defendant's] temper," and that
"[m]any, if not all of the sources indicated that [defendant] has an
extremely hot and volatile temper." Tatelli described defendant as
"rapidly reach[ing] a boiling point, or a level of explosiveness
which could not be controlled." Tatelli concluded her report by
stating that "[a]s a result of the forces acting upon [defendant], he
began to turn the naturally-occurring anger, frustration and hatred
for his life situation inward, upon himself, allowing it to build into
a horrible temper, as was the method of his family *** and began
to harbor a deep-seated rage." We agree with the post-conviction
judge's conclusion that this is powerful evidence of defendant's
future dangerousness.
	In addition, the evidence submitted by defendant in support of
his amended post-conviction petition reveals that defendant has a
history of setting fires and using knives in the course of his violent
and angry outbursts. According to Tatelli's report, defendant cut
up the furniture in his home with a knife and often set fires. On
one occasion, defendant started a fire in the basement of the family
home. Tatelli stated that defendant's family members believed that
defendant's conduct in starting the fire was an example of
defendant "constantly doing what he had been told not to do." The
sentencer could have reasonably viewed this evidence as harmful
to defendant, to the extent that it shows that defendant's past
conduct is consistent with his conduct in the matter at bar: using
a knife to inflict multiple stab wounds to the victim and setting
fires to dispose of evidence.
	Other evidence contained within the documents submitted in
support of defendant's amended post-conviction petition is
cumulative or duplicative to the evidence which was already
presented by defense counsel during the mitigation phase of
sentencing. For example, a substantial amount of the proffered
evidence describes defendant's chaotic upbringing, the fact that
defendant's mother engaged in a series of relationships, and that
defendant had difficulties in school. During the mitigation portion
of the sentencing hearing, defense counsel called six witness who
testified, inter alia, that defendant's family life was very unstable,
that he was shuttled from caregiver to caregiver, that defendant's
mother had a series of unsuccessful relationships and suffered
from debilitating health problems, that he did not have a positive
male role model in his life, that he had been exposed to alcohol
and drugs at an early age, and that defendant had experienced
trouble at school and had lived in environments not conducive to
peaceful living. In addition, defense counsel presented evidence
during mitigation that defendant had been subjected to physical
and psychological abuse as a child and that defendant had
observed psychological, physical and sexual abuse within his
family. Although defendant now alleges that counsel's case in
mitigation "consisted of kind acts performed by [defendant] and
an idealized, unrealistic view of his childhood and family life," our
review of the record shows that the nature of the evidence
presented during mitigation by defense counsel belies defendant's
contention and reveals that evidence of the same nature now
proffered by defendant was already before the sentencer.
	Defendant nevertheless contends that the evidence submitted
in his post-conviction petition is at least as mitigating as the
evidence in our prior decisions found to satisfy the prejudice prong
of Strickland. Defendant's reliance on these cases, however, is
misplaced. The decisions cited by defendant are factually
distinguishable from the matter at bar, for, in those cases, defense
counsel presented very little or no evidence during the mitigation
phase of the death sentencing hearing. E.g., Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at
507 (defense counsel presented four witnesses in mitigation whose
testimony accounted for only 10 pages of trial transcript); People
v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 166 (1995) (no mitigation witnesses
were presented by trial counsel); People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148, 165 (1994) (defendant's wife was the sole mitigation
witness); People v. Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168, 176-77 (1992) (the sole
evidence presented in mitigation was a psychological report
prepared by the Department of Corrections during the defendant's
incarceration for a prior offense); People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d 1, 21-22 (1989) (the only mitigation witness called by defense counsel
was a police officer who testified that defendant expressed
remorse during questioning). In contrast, defense counsel at bar
presented the testimony of six witnesses on defendant's behalf in
mitigation, and submitted into evidence two letters written on
defendant's behalf. In addition, defendant gave his own statement
in allocution. The sentencer, therefore, was presented with
evidence and argument in several areas of mitigation absent from
the decisions relied upon by defendant.
	In sum, defendant has failed to make a substantial showing
that there is a reasonable probability that, had his trial counsel
presented the evidence now proffered in support of his amended
post-conviction petition, the sentencer would have concluded that
the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not
warrant the imposition of the death penalty. This court must
"assess prejudice in a realistic manner based on the totality of the
evidence," and therefore "it is improper to focus solely on the
potential mitigating evidence *** [as] the nature and extent of the
evidence in aggravation must also be considered." Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d  at 538.
	In this case, the aggravation evidence is plentiful and
significant. Defendant's prior criminal convictions include
offenses in which he wielded a knife against his victims.
Defendant pled guilty to the charge of misdemeanor battery when
he was apprehended during an altercation in which he was found
in the possession of a knife and the other party had been stabbed
in the back. At the time of his arrest, defendant was on mandatory
supervised release and, because he was found in possession of a
knife, he was returned to the penitentiary for violating his parole.
Defendant was on mandatory supervised release after serving a
period of incarceration as a result of his conviction of residential
burglary and the attempted rape of a 13-year-old girl, where he
used a ruse to gain entry into the victim's home and threatened to
kill the victim with a knife if she did not acquiesce to his demands.
Defendant's conduct in that case is strikingly similar to his
conduct in the case at bar, where defendant apparently gained
entry into the apartment of Dawn Dudovic by asking her for a cup
of sugar and then stabbing her to death with a knife. Moreover, the
circumstances surrounding the murder of Dawn Dudovic are
particularly violent. Defendant stabbed the victim 23 times and
inflicted 16 incise wounds. The victim exhibited numerous
defense wounds to her arms and hands, indicating that there was
a prolonged struggle. The victim died as a result of these multiple
stab wounds, three of which completely pierced her lung, liver and
heart.
	We conclude that, given all of the evidence before the
sentencer, defendant has failed to make a substantial showing that
there is a reasonable probability that the additional evidence now
offered by defendant would have changed the conclusion that the
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances and, therefore, the sentence imposed. Accordingly,
we hold that defendant has failed to make a substantial showing
that his right to effective assistance of counsel at his sentencing
hearing was violated. The circuit court correctly dismissed this
post-conviction claim without an evidentiary hearing.

CONCLUSION

	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of
Cook County dismissing defendant's amended post-conviction
petition is affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to enter an
order setting Tuesday, November 19, 2002, as the date on which
the sentence of death entered in the circuit court of Cook County
is to be carried out. Defendant shall be executed in the manner
provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 2000). The clerk of this
court shall send a certified copy of the mandate to the Director of
Corrections, to the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and to
the warden of the institution where defendant is now confined.
Affirmed.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
	The proceedings which culminated in Peeples' convictions
and sentence of death were fatally flawed because they did not
comport with the new rules enacted by our court governing the
conduct of cases in which the State is seeking the death penalty.
For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in People v.
Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 34-39 (September 27, 2001)
(Harrison, C.J., dissenting), the procedures contained in those
rules are indispensable for achieving an accurate determination of
innocence or guilt and are applicable to all capital cases now
coming before us. Because Peeples was tried, convicted and
sentenced without the benefit of the new rules, his convictions and
death sentence should be vacated, and the cause should be
remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.
	Even if Peeples were not entitled to the benefit of the new
rules, his sentence of death could not stand. For the reasons set
forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v.
Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law is void
and unenforceable because it violates the eighth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const.,
amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Absent the new rules,
there is no basis for altering that conclusion. At a minimum,
Peeples' sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and he
should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Ill. Rev. Stat.
1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(j).



	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, also dissenting:
	For the reasons set forth in my dissents in People v. Hickey,
No. 87286, slip op. at 39-43 (September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J.,
dissenting), and People v. Simpson, No. 85084, slip op. at 35-38
(September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), I believe this cause
should be remanded for a new trial conducted in compliance with
the new rules governing capital cases. As I stated in my dissents,
the procedures in capital cases prior to this court's adoption of the
new rules were inherently unreliable and did not sufficiently
protect a defendant's constitutional rights. For this reason, I
believe that the new rules should be applied retroactively. See
People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 220-21 (1997). Therefore, I 
respectfully dissent.
1.      1Defendant, in his brief to this court, inaccurately states that
Marybeth Jansen "ultimately served as the foreman of [defendant's]
jury." This statement was repeated by defense counsel during oral
argument before this court. The record reveals that juror Jansen was a
member, not the foreperson, of defendant's jury. 

2.      2The report stated that the DNA profile of the blood found in the
victim's apartment "would be expected to occur in approximately 1 in
18 quadrillion Black, 1 in 30 quadrillion White or 1 in 26 quadrillion
Hispanic unrelated individuals."