Title: People v. Breedlove
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 96839
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 16, 2004

Docket No. 96839-Agenda 8-May 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ALAN 							
W. BREEDLOVE, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 16, 2004.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Tazewell County in
May 2001, defendant Alan W. Breedlove was convicted of first degree
murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2000)). In August 2001, he was
sentenced to 50 years' imprisonment. Upon imposing sentence, the
trial court admonished defendant in accordance with Supreme Court
Rule 605(a) (188 Ill. 2d R. 605(a)), which required the court to
inform a defendant that, among other things, he had a right to an
appeal and that he must file a notice of appeal in the trial court within
30 days of sentencing to preserve this right.
	Under the rule in effect at the time, the trial court was not
required to admonish a defendant of either the statutory requirement
that a "challenge to the correctness of a sentence or to any aspect of
the sentencing hearing shall be made by a written motion filed within
30 days following the imposition of sentence" (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(c)
(West 2000)) or the rule that sentencing issues not preserved by the
filing of a written postsentencing motion in compliance with section
5-8-1(c) would be considered waived (People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 395 (1997)).
	This court subsequently amended Rule 605(a) to require the
additional admonishments regarding the need to file a timely
postsentencing motion and the resulting waiver for failure to do so.
The amended rule took effect on October 1, 2001, two months after
defendant was sentenced. Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 21
(October 17, 2001), R. 605(c), eff. October 1, 2001.
	Defendant did not file a postsentencing motion. On appeal, he
raised no issues with regard to his trial or sentencing. Rather,
defendant argued only that fundamental fairness required that the
cause be remanded to the trial court for further admonishments
consistent with amended Rule 605(a), thus providing him with an
additional opportunity to file a postsentencing motion. The appellate
court rejected this claim, finding that the admonishments given by the
trial court complied with the version of the rule in effect at the time
and, although he was not advised that sentencing issues not raised in
a postsentencing motion would be waived, he was not misinformed or
misled by the admonishments he was given. In addition, the appellate
court concluded that, waiver notwithstanding, defendant could still
obtain review of any plain error in sentencing. However, because
defendant did not claim any error in sentencing, plain error analysis
was not necessary. 342 Ill. App. 3d 924. This court granted
defendant's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315), and we
now affirm.
	Because the question presented is purely one of law, we review
the appellate court's decision de novo. People v. Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d 65, 87-88 (2002).
	At oral argument, defendant argued, for the first time, that the
2001 amendment to Rule 605(a), which added the requirement that
defendants be admonished of the need to file a postsentencing motion
to preserve sentencing issues, should be applied retroactively to those
defendants whose appeals were pending as of its October 1, 2001,
effective date. He offered no authority for retroactive application of
the amended rule. This retroactivity argument was neither made
before the appellate court nor raised in defendant's petition for leave
to appeal. As such, it is waived. People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159,
169 (2003).
	In making his arguments in this appeal, defendant draws an
analogy between his situation and that of a defendant who entered an
open guilty plea under former Rule 605(b) (188 Ill. 2d R. 605(b)).
Some background is in order. Prior to its amendment on November
1, 2000, Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) provided
that "[n]o appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty shall
be taken unless the defendant, within 30 days of the date on which
sentence is imposed, files in the trial court a motion to reconsider the
sentence, if only the sentence is being challenged, or, if the plea is
being challenged, a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate
the judgment." To ensure that guilty plea defendants were informed
of these requirements, the trial court was required to give the
admonishments contained in Rule 605(b) regarding the right to appeal.
Those admonishments told defendants, in relevant part, that prior to
taking an appeal, they must file within 30 days of sentencing a written
motion to reconsider the sentence or to have the judgment vacated
and for leave to withdraw the guilty plea. However, in People v.
Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 332 (1996), this court held that the motion-to-reconsider-sentence clause of Rule 605(b) applied only to open guilty
pleas. A defendant who had negotiated a plea as to charging and
sentencing with the State was required to file a motion to withdraw
his guilty plea. Subsequent cases refined this requirement. See, e.g.,
People v. Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d 182, 187 (2000) (where no agreement as
to sentencing is made, defendant not required to seek to withdraw
guilty plea as a prerequisite to challenging the sentence); People v.
Clark, 183 Ill. 2d 261, 268 (1998) (defendant who seeks to challenge
only the consecutive aspect of his sentence must file motion to
withdraw guilty plea where the plea was entered pursuant to a
negotiated plea); Linder, 186 Ill. 2d  at 74 (where defendant pleads
guilty in exchange for dismissal of certain charges and recommended
sentencing cap, he must move to withdraw his guilty plea). We also
held in Linder that where a defendant fails to comply with the motion
requirements of Rule 604(d), the appellate court must dismiss the
appeal. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d  at 74. As of November 1, 2000, Rule
605(b) was amended to provide different forms of advice for
defendants who had negotiated some aspect of their sentence and for
those who had not. Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 23
(November 15, 2000), Rs. 605(b)(2), (c)(2), eff. November 1, 2000.
However, in the interim, defendants who entered negotiated pleas as
to their sentences received incorrect advice. They were told that they
could either move to withdraw their guilty pleas or move to
reconsider their sentences. Those defendants had their cases remanded
for proper admonishments because they had been affirmatively misled
by the trial court's advice, even though the admonishments were in
accordance with the version of the rule then in effect. See People v.
Diaz, 192 Ill. 2d 211, 227 (2000); People v. Clark, 183 Ill. 2d 261,
270 (1998); People v. Leahy, 322 Ill. App. 3d 974, 975-76 (2001)
(collecting cases). Defendant believes he should receive the same
benefit. We now address his arguments.
	A conflict exists among some districts of our appellate court
regarding the question of whether a defendant who was properly
admonished under preamended Rule 605(a) is entitled on some basis
to a remand for admonishment under the amended rule. Like the
appellate court in the instant case, the court in People v. Little, 318 Ill.
App. 3d 75 (2001), declined to remand for admonishment under
amended Rule 605(a), rejecting the defendant's due process claim.
The court noted that the language of the preamended rule was plain
and unambiguous and that, in contrast to guilty plea defendants
admonished under preamended Rule 605(b), the defendant was not
misled as to what type of motion was required. The court also noted
that plain error review was always available to Rule 605(a) defendants
who failed to preserve sentencing issues for review. Little, 318 Ill.
App. 3d at 80.
	A contrary result was reached by the court in People v. Mazar,
333 Ill. App. 3d 244 (2002). There, the defendant was admonished
under preamended Rule 605(a). On appeal, although he did not claim
any error in his sentence, the defendant argued that the failure to
admonish him of the need to file a postsentencing motion deprived
him of due process, analogizing the situation to the failure to properly
admonish guilty plea defendants under preamended Rule 605(b). The
Mazar court rejected this argument, concluding that no duty existed
to admonish defendants under Rule 605(a) of the need to file a
postsentencing motion and that the rule did not misinform defendants
of their appeal rights, as it was merely silent on that issue. Mazar, 333
Ill. App. 3d at 257. Nonetheless, the court did remand the defendant's
case for admonishment under amended Rule 605(a). The court noted
the amendment of the rule and cited cases decided under preamended
Rule 605(b) holding that remand for proper admonishments was
required under principles of fundamental fairness (e.g., Leahy, 322 Ill.
App. 3d 974). The Mazar court held that a remand for admonishments
under now amended Rule 605(a) was supported by the same "general
equitable principles." The court concluded that the defendant was
"misinformed" as to all the steps necessary to preserve issues for
appeal and that fundamental fairness required a remand for
admonishment under the new rule. Mazar, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 259.
	Defendant relies heavily on Mazar in his due process argument.
However, as stated, the Mazar court found no due process violation
in failing to admonish the defendant under the preamended rule of the
need to file a postsentencing motion. Defendant argues that due
process was abridged because the rule did not accurately apprise him
of the necessary steps to perfect his appeal, citing People v. Bates,
323 Ill. App. 3d 77 (2001). That case, however, involved a defendant
who pleaded guilty and who received incorrect admonishments under
Rule 605(b). The trial court had told defendant that he would have to
move to withdraw his guilty plea and risk reinstatement of dismissed
charges when in fact he could have moved to reconsider the sentence
without that risk. Bates, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 81. In contrast, the trial
court in the instant case accurately advised defendant of the steps to
perfect his appeal. Supreme Court Rule 606 (188 Ill. 2d R. 606)
governs the perfection of appeals in criminal cases not involving guilty
pleas. That rule requires a notice of appeal to be filed with the clerk
of the circuit court within 30 days after entry of the judgment
appealed from or within 30 days after entry of an order disposing of
a timely postjudgment motion. 188 Ill. 2d R. 606(b). Defendant
appears to equate "perfection" of an appeal with advice as to every
step necessary to preserve issues for appellate review. However, it is
certainly possible to properly perfect one's appeal, yet waive every
issue claimed as error. The waiver does not affect the perfection of the
appeal.
	Due process does not require that a defendant be admonished of
the right to an appeal. People v. Cox, 53 Ill. 2d 101, 106 (1972),
overruled on other grounds, People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149 (1993).
Defendant's situation is unlike that of guilty plea defendants who were
given the wrong advice as to how to perfect their appeals. Filing of
the proper postplea motion is a condition precedent to the perfection
of their appeals. When those defendants were given wrong advice and
followed it, their appeals were dismissed. We note that not all the
steps necessary to preserve every alleged error are contained in the
supreme court rules. The requirement to file a postsentencing motion
is statutory in nature (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(c) (West 2000)). Similarly,
the requirement of filing a written posttrial motion is imposed by
statute (725 ILCS 5/116-1 (West 2000)). This court has held that
failure to object at trial and include the issue in a written posttrial
motion results in waiver of the alleged error on review. People v.
Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). At that point, the only review
available to a defendant arises from any plain error, just as it does
when a defendant fails to properly preserve sentencing errors for
review. We do not understand defendant to suggest that due process
requires that the trial court interrupt the trial at various points to
advise a defendant of the need to make objections, make offers of
proof, etc., in order to preserve issues for review. Such a scenario
would obviously be absurd. Due process does not require courts to go
to such lengths. Here, the failure to admonish defendant and others
like him as to how to preserve sentencing issues for appeal when Rule
605(a) did not include a requirement to give such an admonishment
did not deprive defendant of due process. Accordingly, we conclude
that due process does not require remand for admonishment under
amended Rule 605(a).
	Defendant also argues that application of the preamended rule in
his case violates the equal protection guarantees of the state and
federal constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. XIV, §1; Ill. Const. 1970,
art. I, §2), by treating him and others who chose to plead not guilty
and go to trial differently than those who plead guilty and spare the
State the expense of trial. Specifically, defendant and others like him,
prior to October 1, 2001, were admonished under the previous version
of Rule 605(a), which, he argues, was at that time less complete than
the admonishments given pursuant to Rule 605(b) to those who
pleaded guilty. Defendant's argument is not that he and others like
him were not advised of their right to appeal. Instead, he argues that
the Rule 605(b) admonishments are more complete than the Rule
605(a) admonishments he was given. As a result, the Rule 605(b)
defendant is fully informed of what he or she must do to preserve the
right to appeal, while the Rule 605(a) defendant, under the
preamended rule, was not fully informed. The gravamen of his equal
protection argument is that defendants in his position, who were
admonished under the previous version of the rule, were more likely
to inadvertently forfeit sentencing issues that might have been raised
on appeal than those who pleaded guilty and were admonished under
Rule 605(b).
	The constitutional guarantee of equal protection requires that the
government treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.
People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 361 (1996). Thus, the government
may not afford different treatment to persons who have been placed
by statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly
unrelated to the purpose of legislation. However, the equal protection
clause does not forbid the legislature from drawing proper distinctions
in legislation among different categories of people. In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 309 (2001). Where a statute does not affect a fundamental
right or involve a suspect class, the statute need only satisfy the
rational basis test. Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid, 171 Ill. 2d 314, 323 (1996). Under this test, the court's review is limited and
generally deferential and simply inquires whether the means employed
by the statute to achieve the stated purpose of the legislation are
rationally related to that goal. Russell v. Department of Natural
Resources, 183 Ill. 2d 434, 447 (1998). The legislation carries a
strong presumption of constitutionality and must be sustained if any
set of facts can reasonably be conceived to justify the classification.
Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 324. Applying these concepts to preamended
Rule 605(a), we find that defendant was not deprived of any equal
protection right.
	 Rule 605 recognizes that there are two classes of defendants
who appear before trial courts for sentencing-those who have been
found guilty following a trial and those who have pleaded guilty. The
rule requires both classes of defendants to be given "advice" regarding
the right to appeal. Such advice is not constitutionally required as a
matter of due process (People v. Covington, 45 Ill. 2d 105, 108
(1970) (court's adoption of Rule 605 "stems from the dictates of good
practice rather than constitutional command)), but having determined
that it is proper to advise defendants of the right to appeal, it would
likely violate equal protection to fail to require similar treatment of
both classes of defendants. See People v. Wright, 311 Ill. App. 3d
1042, 1046 (2000) (as a constitutional right to appeal exists in Illinois,
it is logical to assume that the rules governing that right should
comport with due process and equal protection). For example, if the
rule were to require that admonishments regarding the right to appeal
be given to those who plead guilty, but not those who go to trial, it
might be vulnerable to the criticism that it punishes those who elect to
utilize their constitutional right to trial. However, this is not the case.
Preamended Rule 605(a) did inform defendants of the necessary steps
to preserve their right to appeal trial errors. That it did not inform
them of the steps necessary to appeal sentencing errors does not itself
establish an equal protection violation.
	Defendant argues that defendants who enter open guilty pleas and
who are admonished under Rule 605(b) are similarly situated to
defendants, like him, who go to trial and who are admonished under
Rule 605(a). If the wrong admonishments are given under Rule
605(b), defendant notes, guilty plea defendants are entitled to a
remand for proper admonishments. Yet Rule 605(a) defendants are
not admonished of the need to file a postsentencing motion and are
not entitled to a remand for such an admonishment. Defendant asserts
that the two classes of defendants stand in the same position before
the court and, accordingly, should both be entitled to a remand for
proper admonishments. This argument fails. Guilty plea defendants
lose their appeal rights completely if they fail to file the proper
postplea motion and the reviewing court must dismiss their appeal.
See Linder, 186 Ill. 2d  at 74. In contrast, Rule 605(a) defendants
retain their right to appeal any trial errors (assuming they have filed
the necessary posttrial motion) even if they fail to preserve sentencing
errors for appeal. In addition, plain error review (134 Ill. 2d R.
615(a)) is available to such defendants. These two classes of
defendants are not, therefore, similarly situated and defendant's equal
protection argument must fail.
	Defendant argues that fundamental fairness mandates remand of
his case to the circuit court for admonishment under amended Rule
605(a). The appellate court rejected that argument, describing
fundamental fairness as a "specific exception to the waiver doctrine,
which warrants judicial review of procedurally defaulted claims only
if actual prejudice has resulted from the claimed errors." 342 Ill. App.
3d at 927. In support of this statement, the appellate court cited cases
from this court discussing the doctrine in connection with
postconviction proceedings. See, e.g., People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444 (2002); People v. Jackson, 205 Ill. 2d 247 (2001).
Fundamental fairness in that context requires a postconviction
petitioner to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test with respect to claims
that are barred by waiver because they could have been, but were not,
presented on direct appeal. Jackson, 205 Ill. 2d  at 274.
	The cause-and-prejudice test is limited to postconviction
proceedings and therefore does not apply to the instant case. Instead,
defendant analogizes his situation to that of guilty plea defendants
who were given wrong advice on what postplea motion to file under
preamended Rule 605(b). The erroneous admonishment of defendants
in these cases was particularly troublesome because compliance with
Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) is a condition
precedent to an appeal from a guilty plea. People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 105 (1988). This court has required strict compliance with the
rule. People v. Foster, 171 Ill. 2d 469, 474 (1996). Accordingly,
failure to comply with Rule 604(d) mandated dismissal of the appeal
and left postconviction proceedings as a defendant's only avenue of
review. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d  at 107. To ensure that defendants are aware
of the requirements of Rule 604(d), they must be admonished of them
pursuant to Rule 605(b). Thus, where the trial court fails to give the
admonishments required by Rule 605(b), procedural due process
prohibits the dismissal of a defendant's appeal and the case must be
remanded for proper admonishments. Foster, 171 Ill. 2d  at 473. Until
this court decided Evans, Rule 605(b) accurately stated the
procedures a defendant must follow to preserve his right to appeal
following entry of a guilty plea. However, the decision in Evans and
in subsequent cases rendered advice given in accordance with the rule
erroneous in many cases. Thus, when defendants followed such
advice, their appeals were dismissed because they had filed the wrong
motion. This court determined that in such circumstances,
fundamental fairness required remand for accurate admonishments.
	As we have stated above, defendant here and others like him have
not suffered the kind of detriment that guilty plea defendants suffered
under preamended Rule 605(b). They do not lose their appeal rights.
Their sentences may still be reviewed for plain error. They were not
misled as to how to perfect their appeals. The trial court did not give
them wrong advice that they then followed to their prejudice. We
reject defendant's argument that the amendment of Rule 605(a) was
an implicit recognition by this court that the old rule was
"constitutionally infirm." We have already demonstrated that the
preamended rule abridged no constitutional rights. The purpose of
Rule 605(a) is to inform defendants who have been convicted and
sentenced after trial as to what they must do to perfect an appeal. It
was never intended to advise defendants of every step necessary to
preserve claimed errors for review. Nonetheless, because the advice
required by Rule 605(a) was given immediately following imposition
of sentence, it may have suggested that defendants could immediately
file their notice of appeal and preserve sentencing issues by doing so.
To correct any such misunderstanding and in accordance with the
"dictates of good practice" (Covington, 45 Ill. 2d at 108), Rule 605(a)
was amended to its current form.
	For the reasons stated, we conclude that fundamental fairness
does not entitle defendant to a remand for admonishment under new
Rule 605(a). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the appellate
court.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE KARMEIER took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.