Title: In re Marriage of Rogers
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 97833
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: November 18, 2004

Docket No. 97833-Agenda 33-September 2004.
In re MARRIAGE OF JOAN ROGERS, Appellee, and MARK 							ROGERS, Appellant.
Opinion filed November 18, 2004.
	JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:
	The issue in this case is whether cash gifts and "loans" received
by a father from his family qualify as income under section 505 of the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (750
ILCS 5/505 (West 2002)) for purposes of calculating the father's
statutory child support obligations. The circuit court held that they do.
It therefore took those gifts and "loans" into account when it granted
the mother's request for modification of the court's judgment
regarding child support. The appellate court affirmed. 345 Ill. App. 3d
77. We granted the father's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.
315. For the reasons that follow, we now affirm.
	Mark Rogers, the father, married Joan Rogers, the mother, on
August 11, 1984. The couple had one child, named Dylan, born
October 2, 1985. Shortly after Dylan's third birthday, the mother
petitioned to have the marriage dissolved. Judgment granting
dissolution was eventually entered February 21, 1991. The judgment
incorporated a marital settlement agreement under which Dylan was
to reside with his mother, and the father was obligated to pay $250
per month in child support.
	According to the record before us, nothing of consequence
occurred in the case for the next 5½ years. Beginning in December of
1996, however, the parties began to battle over various issues related
to Dylan's custody and care. The parties' disagreements culminated
in a new custody and visitation order filed February 23, 2001. That
order provided, among other things, that the father and mother were
to have joint physical and legal custody of Dylan and that the father
was no longer responsible for paying child support to the mother.
	Less than six months later, the father filed an emergency petition
to terminate that order. A few months after that, an emergency
petition to terminate the order was also filed by the mother. While
those matters were pending, the court granted the mother temporary
custody of Dylan and ordered the father to resume paying her $250
per month in child support, effective November 13, 2001. When the
father failed to comply, the mother moved for a rule to show cause
why he should not be held in contempt of court. The court
subsequently issued an order granting sole custody of Dylan to the
mother and again ordering the father to pay her $250 per month in
child support. The court also ordered the father to pay the mother
$375 in child support he still owed under the court's previous order. 	Within months of the foregoing order, the mother was forced to
return to court to compel the father to comply with the order's
provisions. She also filed an emergency petition for immediate
modification of the order's support provisions. The modification
request was brought pursuant to section 510 of the Act (750 ILCS
5/510 (West 2002)). It alleged that ongoing misdeeds by the father,
including neglect and abuse of Dylan and the father's persistent failure
to meet his financial obligations toward the child, had imperiled the
ability of the mother to meet Dylan's basic needs and had required her
to incur additional medical, educational and therapeutic expenses for
the child's treatment and care.
	The father moved to dismiss the petition for modification.
Following an evidentiary hearing at which the mother and father both
testified, the circuit court denied the father's motion to dismiss and
granted the mother's petition for modification. The circuit court's
modification order, filed July 29, 2002, held that the mother's
testimony was credible and the father's was not. Based on the
evidence before it, the court determined that the father should pay
75% of Dylan's school tuition, books, fees and related expenses and
100% of the therapy costs sustained by Dylan that were not covered
by insurance. The court further held that the father's child support
payments should increase. The increase was based on section 505 of
the Act (750 ILCS 5/505 (West 2002)). Section 505 sets forth
guidelines courts are to use in determining the minimum amount of
child support a parent is required to pay. Where one child is involved,
as is the case here, the guidelines set the amount of support at 20% of
the supporting party's "net income." 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(1) (West
2002).
	"Net income" is defined by the Act as "the total of all income
from all sources," minus deductions for state and federal income tax,
social security (FICA payments), mandatory retirement contributions,
union dues, dependent and individual health/hospitalization insurance
premiums, prior obligations of support or maintenance actually paid
pursuant to court order, and expenditures for repayment of debts
incurred for certain purposes. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3) (West 2002). In
computing the father's "net income" here, the circuit court determined
that the father earns $15,000 per year from a teaching job at the
Chicago School of Professional Psychology and receives an additional
$46,000 per year in gifts and loans from his parents. The court further
concluded that the father has little if any tax liability on his income.
Based on these factors, the court held that the father's child support
obligations should be increased from $250 per month to $1,000 per
month effective August 1, 2002, and continuing until June of 2004.
	The father did not comply with the circuit court's order. Instead,
he moved for reconsideration. As grounds for his motion, the father
argued that the increase in child support was erroneous because it did
not comport with the provisions of section 505 of the Act. According
to the father, the circuit court improperly deviated from the provisions
of the statute by considering the $46,000 in gifts and loans paid to the
father each year by his family. In the father's view, those annual gifts
and loans do not qualify as "net income" and therefore should not
have been taken into account by the circuit court in making its
calculations under the statute. The father contended that the only
income of his that should have been considered by the court was the
$15,000 he earned from his teaching job. Even with respect to that,
however, the father argued that the court's computation was
erroneous because it did not credit him for payments he will be
required to make for state and federal income tax and for FICA
payments.(1)
	In response to the father's arguments, the mother noted that by
the father's own testimony, the gifts and loans from his family
"represent a steady source of dependable annual income *** he has
received each year over the course of his adult life." He has never had
to repay any portion of those sums, nor has he been required to pay
tax on them. The father likewise has little, if any, tax liability on the
sums he earns from teaching. Accordingly, the mother argued, all of
the $61,000 the father receives each year was properly considered by
the court in applying the guidelines set forth in section 505 of the Act.
The father therefore cannot complain that the trial court did not
correctly follow the applicable law.
	By order filed November 27, 2002, the circuit court denied the
father's motion to reconsider, noting that it "agree[d] with the
statements made in Mrs. Rogers' response." The father appealed. As
grounds for his appeal, the father argued, as he had in the circuit
court, that the $46,000 in gifts and loans he received each year from
his family should not have been included as part of his "net income"
for purposes of calculating his child support obligations under section
505 of the Act. No other issues were raised. As noted at the outset of
this opinion, the appellate court rejected the father's argument. It
therefore affirmed.
	We allowed the father's petition for leave to appeal. The father
elected to have his petition for leave to appeal stand as his brief. 177
Ill. 2d R. 315(g). Although no appellee's brief has been filed by the
mother, the record is simple and the issue raised is such that we can
easily decide it without the aid of an appellee's brief. People v.
Johnson, 197 Ill. 2d 478, 481 (2001). In addition, our understanding
of the dispute has been assisted by the Illinois Department of Public
Aid, which was granted leave to submit an amicus curiae brief in
support of the wife's position. We shall therefore proceed to decide
the case on its merits.
	The appeal before us arises from an order of the circuit court
granting the wife's motion to modify child support payments.
Generally speaking, the modification of child support payments lies
within the sound discretion of the trial court, and a trial court's
modification order will not be disturbed on appeal, absent an abuse of
discretion. In re Marriage of Bussey, 108 Ill. 2d 286, 296 (1985). In
this case, however, the only aspect of the circuit court's decision
challenged by the father is its interpretation of "net income" under
section 505 of the Act to include gifts and loans received by the father
from his family. How a statute is interpreted is not a matter left to the
trial court's discretion. It presents a question of law, which we review
de novo. Lee v. John Deere Insurance Co., 208 Ill. 2d 38, 43 (2003).
	The principles governing our review are well established. The
fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the
intention of the legislature. The best indicator of the legislature's
intent is the plain language of the statute. When the statutory language
is clear, it must be given effect without resort to other tools of
interpretation. Metzger v. DaRosa, 209 Ill. 2d 30, 35 (2004).
	For purposes of determining statutory child support obligations,
the General Assembly has adopted an expansive definition what
constitutes "net income." "Net income" is defined broadly to
encompass "the total of all income from all sources," minus
deductions for state and federal income tax, social security (FICA
payments), mandatory retirement contributions, union dues, dependent
and individual health/hospitalization insurance premiums, prior
obligations of support or maintenance actually paid pursuant to court
order, and expenditures for repayment of debts incurred for certain
purposes. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3) (West 2002).
	Under the foregoing definition, the first step in calculating a
parent's "net income" is ascertaining "the total of all income from all
sources" received by that parent. That determination, in turn, depends
on what items may properly be considered "income." "Income" is not
separately defined in section 505 of the Act. We will therefore give it
its plain and ordinary meaning. In re Estate of Poole, 207 Ill. 2d 393,
406 (2003).
	As the word itself suggests, "income" is simply "something that
comes in as an increment or addition ***: a gain or recurrent benefit
that is usu[ually] measured in money ***: the value of goods and
services received by an individual in a given period of time."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1143 (1986). It has
likewise been defined as "[t]he money or other form of payment that
one receives, usu[ually] periodically, from employment, business,
investments, royalties, gifts and the like." Black's Law Dictionary 778
(8th ed. 2004).
	Under these definitions, a variety of payments will qualify as
"income" for purposes of section 505(a)(3) of the Act that would not
be taxable as income under the Internal Revenue Code. As our
appellate court has recognized, however, the Internal Revenue Code
is designed to achieve different purposes than our state's child support
provisions. See In re Marriage of McGowan, 265 Ill. App. 3d 976,
979 (1994). Accordingly, it does not govern the determination of what
constitutes "income" under the statutory child support guidelines
enacted by the General Assembly. In re Marriage of Sweet, 316 Ill.
App. 3d 101, 109 (2000); In re Marriage of Boland, 308 Ill. App. 3d
1063, 1067 (1999); In re Marriage of Pylawka, 277 Ill. App. 3d 728,
732 (1996).
	Based on the foregoing principles, we conclude, as the appellate
court did, that the circuit court was correct to include as part of the
father's "income" the annual gifts he received from his parents. That
the gifts may not have been subject to taxation by the federal
government is of no consequence. They represented a valuable benefit
to the father that enhanced his wealth and facilitated his ability to
support Dylan. They therefore qualify as "income" and were properly
considered by the circuit court in computing the father's "net income"
under section 505(a)(3) of the Act.
	In urging us to reach a contrary conclusion, the father cites two
appellate court opinions, In re Marriage of Bowlby, 338 Ill. App. 3d
720, 729-30 (2003), and In re Marriage of Harmon, 210 Ill. App. 3d
92, 95 (1991). Those cases did both hold that money received as gifts
was properly excluded from consideration as income for purposes of
calculating child support. In our view, however, the rationale
underlying those decisions is unpersuasive. The court in In re
Marriage of Harmon refused to consider gifts when determining "net
income" on the grounds that the petitioner had not cited authority that
would permit it to do so. In re Marriage of Harmon, 210 Ill. App. 3d
at 95. As we have just discussed, however, inclusion of gifts as
"income" is proper under the plain and ordinary language of section
505(a)(3) itself. No further authority is necessary. Where, as here, the
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the circuit courts need
not await interpretation by a court of review before giving the statute
effect.
	Later in its opinion, the court in In re Marriage of Harmon
attempted to buttress its position using the theory that there was no
guarantee that the respondent, who received $10,000 per year from
her mother, would continue to receive such gifts in the future.
Although it was possible that the payments would go on, the court
reasoned that "[t]he possibility of future financial resources ***
should not be considered when setting an award of child support."
	This rationale is also untenable. Few, if any, sources of income
are certain to continue unchanged year in and year out. People can
lose their jobs, interest rates can fall, business conditions can wipe out
profits and dividends. Accordingly, the relevant focus under section
505 is the parent's economic situation at the time the child support
calculations are made by the court. If a parent has received payments
that would otherwise qualify as "income" under the statute, nothing
in the law permits those payments to be excluded from consideration
merely because like payments might not be forthcoming in the future.
As our appellate court has held, "the Act does not provide for a
deduction of nonrecurring income in calculating net income for
purposes of child support." In re Marriage of Hart, 194 Ill. App. 3d
839, 850 (1990).
	Having said that, we hasten to add that the nonrecurring nature
of an income stream is not irrelevant. Recurring or not, the income
must be included by the circuit court in the first instance when it
computes a parent's "net income" and applies the statutory guidelines
for determining the minimum amount of support due under section
505(a)(1) of the Act. If, however, the evidence shows that a parent is
unlikely to continue receiving certain payments in the future, the
circuit court may consider that fact when determining, under section
505(a)(2) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/505(a)(2) (West 2002)), whether,
and to what extent, deviation from the statutory support guidelines is
warranted. Moreover, if the payments should stop earlier than
anticipated by the court, the parent obligated to provide support based
on those payments may seek modification of the support order
pursuant to section 510 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/510 (West 2002)).
	In re Marriage of Bowlby, the other case upon which the father
relies, offers no additional justification for excluding gifts from
"income" when calculating child support under section 505(a) of the
Act. It merely cites In re Marriage of Harmon. We therefore reject it
as well. To the extent that In re Marriage of Bowlby and In re
Marriage of Harmon are inconsistent with the views expressed in this
opinion, they are both hereby overruled.
	This leaves only the matter of the annual "loans" given to the
father by his parents. For purposes of determining a parent's net
income, section 505 of the Act authorizes the deduction of amounts
expended in repayment of certain types of debts. There is no
corresponding provision authorizing the exclusion of loan proceeds.
Accordingly, the appellate court reasoned that under the language of
the Act, the circuit court acted correctly when it included the money
the father's parents loaned him when it calculated his support
obligations. 345 Ill. App. 3d at 80-81.
	Although the father challenges the appellate court's construction
of the statute, we have no occasion in this case to address whether and
under what circumstances loan proceeds are properly regarded as an
element of income for child support purposes. The reason for that is
that the sums at issue here are loans in name only. According to the
mother, whose testimony was found to be more credible by the circuit
court, the father had never been required to repay any part of the
substantial "loans" given to him each year by his parents. She stated
that by the father's own testimony, those sums "represent a steady
source of dependable annual income *** he has received each year
over the course of his adult life."(2) That being so, the money the father
received from his parents was no less "income" than the gifts they
gave him or the salary he received from his teaching job. The appellate
court therefore acted properly when it upheld the circuit court's
determination that the proceeds should be considered in determining
the father's "net income" under section 505(a)(3) of the Act.
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
1.The 
father also asserted that requiring him to pay 75% of Dylan=s 
educational expenses and 100% of the cost of therapy not covered by insurance in 
addition to the increased child support placed more of a burden on him than was 
fair. This argument was vigorously challenged by the mother in the trial court 
and has not been pursued by the father on appeal.
2.                  
           
Although no report 
of proceedings was prepared or filed in this case, the father does not contest 
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court=s 
judgment. We note, moreover, that if additional facts existed to support the 
father=s 
position, it was his obligation, as the appellant, to make them known to the 
reviewing courts. Any doubts arising from the incompleteness of the record must 
be resolved against him. Foutch v. O=Bryant, 
99 Ill. 2d 389, 392 (1984).