Title: Overton v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 000552
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 2000

Present:  All the Justices 
 
DAVID LESTON OVERTON, JR. 
 
v. Record No. 000552  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  November 3, 2000 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
From the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County 
John F. Daffron, Jr., Judge 
 
 
 
In this capital murder case, the defendant asks this 
Court to commute his sentence of death to life 
imprisonment.  He contends that the circuit court imposed 
the death penalty under the influence of passion or 
prejudice, and that his sentence of death is 
disproportionate to sentences imposed in factually 
comparable cases.  Finding no merit in the defendant's 
arguments and after reviewing his sentence of death 
pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(C), we will affirm the judgment 
of the circuit court. 
MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
 
David Leston Overton, Jr., pled guilty to the capital 
murder of Edgar Allen Williams, a 63-year-old quadriplegic.  
After accepting Overton’s guilty plea and finding him 
guilty of capital murder, the circuit court heard evidence 
in aggravation and mitigation of the offense.1  At the 
                     
1 Overton also pled guilty to robbery and statutory 
burglary while armed with a deadly weapon.  After finding 
conclusion of the penalty-phase hearing, the court 
sentenced Overton to death on the capital murder 
conviction, finding that Overton’s conduct in committing 
the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile in that it 
involved an aggravated battery to the victim.2
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(C), we now undertake the 
mandatory review of Overton’s sentence of death to 
determine whether it was imposed “under the influence of 
passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor,” and 
whether his sentence is excessive or disproportionate to 
penalties imposed in this Commonwealth in similar cases, 
“considering both the crime and the defendant.” 
FACTS 
On the morning of February 26, 1999, a detective with 
the Chesterfield County Police Department responded to a 
call concerning a dead individual at Williams' residence.  
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Overton guilty of these charges, the circuit court 
sentenced Overton to life imprisonment on the robbery 
conviction, and to 20 years on the statutory burglary 
conviction.  Overton did not appeal those convictions. 
 
2 The circuit court did not include its finding of the 
“vileness” predicate in its sentencing order dated December 
14, 1999.  Consequently, this Court remanded the case to 
the circuit court for clarification of its sentencing 
order.  In a subsequent order, the court found “beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant’s conduct in committing 
the offense . . . was outrageously or wantonly vile, 
horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity 
 
2
Upon arriving at the scene and entering the house, the 
detective found Williams lying on his back in his bed.  
Williams appeared to be deceased.  The shirt that Williams 
was wearing was marked with numerous holes and red stains.  
The telephone in the bedroom had been pulled from the wall.  
During a search of Williams’ house, the police discovered 
over $40,000 in cash and 11.88 grams of cocaine. 
A subsequent autopsy of Williams’ body revealed that 
he had sustained 21 stab wounds and one incised wound.  
Three of the numerous stab wounds to Williams’ chest were 
each lethal wounds.  Although approximately 90 percent of 
the wounds were located in the chest region, four stab 
wounds were inflicted in the neck area.  However, there 
were no defensive injuries on Williams’ body nor any other 
bruising that would indicate his assailant had hit or 
punched Williams.  On the autopsy report, the cause of 
death was listed as “[e]xsanguination due to stab wounds of 
[the] chest.” 
Overton confessed to the murder of Williams.  That 
confession, along with testimony from Overton’s girlfriend, 
Tina Marie Middlebrook, establishes the following pertinent 
facts.  On the evening of Williams’ murder, Overton, 
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of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim.”  The case 
was then returned to this Court. 
 
3
Middlebrook, and Eric Brown, a friend of Overton, were 
“doing drugs” in a motel room.  Overton and Brown left the 
motel and traveled by car to Williams’ house.  On the way 
to Williams’ home, they stopped at a convenience store and 
purchased a flashlight so Overton could see what he was 
doing without having to turn on the lights in Williams’ 
house.  After they arrived at Williams’ home, Brown stayed 
in the car, and Overton entered the house, apparently the 
door was not locked, and walked into Williams’ bedroom.  
Williams then turned on the light beside his bed and 
started demanding to know why Overton was there so late at 
night.  At that point, Overton, in his words, “blacked out 
and did it[,] . . . stabbed [Williams] with a knife 
somewhere in his upper chest.”  Overton described the knife 
he used as a “skinning knife.”  Overton then grabbed what 
money he could see and a gun lying in a drawer of a 
nightstand, and left Williams’ house.3
                     
3 Overton had been to Williams’ house with Middlebrook 
on many occasions to buy drugs from Williams.  In fact, 
Overton admitted that he had gone to Williams’ house a 
couple of days before the murder “to do it” but got scared 
because he was not “high.” 
 
 
4
On their way back to the motel, Overton threw the 
knife out the car window.4  After he and Brown returned to 
the motel, Middlebrook observed a gun and rolls of money in 
Overton’s coat pocket, and blood on his sleeve.  She asked 
Overton what he had done, and Overton admitted that he had 
killed Williams.  The three individuals then went to 
Richmond to buy more drugs.  Overton was arrested 
approximately two weeks later. 
At Overton’s sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth 
introduced evidence with regard to the “vileness” 
predicate.  The court heard victim impact testimony from 
Williams’ two daughters, his ex-wife, a friend, and 
caretakers.  The forensic pathologist who performed the 
autopsy on Williams’ body described the numerous stab 
wounds as the Commonwealth introduced into evidence 
pictures of the victim and the wounds.  The pathologist 
opined that Williams may have been aware of what was 
happening but that he would have become unconscious within 
minutes. 
Finally, the Commonwealth presented testimony from a 
doctor who had treated Williams.  Although Williams was a 
quadriplegic, the doctor testified that Williams was able 
                     
4 After Overton was arrested, he took two police 
officers to the location where he had thrown the knife.  
 
5
to move his shoulders and arms, though the muscle function 
in his hands was severely limited.  Williams had normal 
sensation throughout both arms and down to a “dermatoma 
level in the skin” halfway between his collar bone and 
nipple.  Thus, the doctor opined that the majority of the 
stab wounds inflicted on Williams were at or above the 
point where Williams’ sensation was intact. 
Overton then presented evidence in mitigation of the 
offense.  Members of his family testified that Overton was 
“remorseful” and accepted responsibility for his crimes.  A 
licensed clinical psychologist stated that, when he treated 
Overton on eight occasions approximately four years before 
Overton committed the present crimes, Overton was “upset” 
and “sad” about the “fights” and “conflict” in his home.  
Finally, Overton submitted a letter to the circuit court in 
which he stated, “I do not wish to fight this.  I humbly 
request that you respect the family’s [Williams’ family] 
wishes in sentencing me to death.” 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
Overton does not assign any errors on appeal except 
with respect to the two questions that this Court must 
address in our statutorily mandated review.  See Code 
§ 17.1-313(C).  In his first assignment of error, Overton 
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The officers recovered the knife at that spot.  
 
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asserts that his sentence of death was imposed under the 
influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors 
for three reasons:  (1) that the circuit court was 
improperly swayed by the emotional testimony of Williams’ 
family and friends; (2) that the “graphic pictures” of the 
victim improperly influenced the court; and (3) that 
Overton’s letter to the circuit court requesting that the 
death sentence be imposed impacted the court’s sentencing 
decision.  In his second assignment of error, Overton 
contends that his sentence of death is disproportionate 
because defendants in factually comparable cases have 
received only life sentences.  We do not agree with 
Overton’s arguments. 
With regard to Overton’s assertion that the circuit 
court was improperly influenced by the victim impact 
testimony from Williams’ family and friends, and by the 
photographs of the victim and the stab wounds, we find that 
Overton failed to object at the sentencing hearing either 
to the victim impact testimony or to the introduction of 
the photographs.  His failure to make contemporaneous 
objections at trial precludes consideration of those issues 
on appeal.  Rule 5:25; see also Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 
257 Va. 292, 310, 513 S.E.2d 642, 654, cert. denied, ___ 
 
7
U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 177 (1999) (defendant waived argument 
for failure to object in trial court). 
Turning to Overton’s letter addressed to the circuit 
court, we note that the court stated at the sentencing 
hearing that it had “not considered the defendant’s request 
to die as an aspect or component of the sentencing 
decision.”  Nevertheless, Overton insists that his request 
to die had to influence the court’s sentencing 
determination.  However, we are unwilling to disregard the 
court’s unequivocal statement that it did not consider 
Overton’s request.  “ ‘A judge, unlike a juror, is uniquely 
suited by training, experience and judicial discipline to 
disregard potentially prejudicial comments . . . .’ ”  
Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243, 268, 389 S.E.2d 871, 
885, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990) (quoting Eckhart v. 
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 213, 216, 279 S.E.2d 155, 157 
(1981)).  Thus, we conclude that Overton’s sentence of 
death was not imposed under the influence of passion, 
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. 
The second part of our review, as well as Overton’s 
second assignment of error, addresses the question whether 
his “sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to 
the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the 
crime and the defendant.”  Code § 17.1-313(C)(2).  Relying 
 
8
on several cases in which defendants convicted of capital 
murder received life sentences rather than the death 
penalty, such as Robinson v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 
143, 341 S.E.2d 159, 160 (1986), and Simpson v. 
Commonwealth, 227 Va. 557, 560, 318 S.E.2d 386, 388 (1984), 
Overton argues that the facts of the present case 
demonstrate that his sentence of death is disproportionate 
to sentences generally imposed in this Commonwealth for 
similar crimes.  Those facts, according to Overton, include 
his age of 19 at the time of the offenses; his 
dysfunctional family; his drug use, especially on the day 
of the offenses as opposed to a few days earlier when he 
was not “high” enough to commit the crimes; Williams’ sale 
of drugs to Overton and his girlfriend; the absence of 
defensive wounds on Williams’ body, which, according to 
Overton, indicates that he did not beat Williams; his 
confession and cooperation in helping the police recover 
the murder weapon; and his criminal record that consists of 
only three prior convictions: possession of a concealed 
weapon, petty larceny, and possession of stolen property. 
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(E), we have accumulated 
the records of all capital murder cases reviewed by this 
Court.  Those records include not only those cases in which 
the death penalty was imposed, but also those cases in 
 
9
which either the trial court or jury imposed a life 
sentence instead of the death penalty and the defendant 
filed a petition for appeal with this Court.  Orbe v. 
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 390, 404, 519 S.E. 2d 808, 816  
(1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1970 (2000);  
Whitley v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66, 81, 286 S.E.2d 162, 
171, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).  In complying with 
the directive in Code § 17.1-313(C)(2) to compare “similar” 
cases, we have given particular attention, in conducting 
the review of Overton’s sentence of death, to those cases 
in which the underlying felony predicate, and the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crimes were 
similar to those in this case.  We have also focused on 
cases in which the death penalty was imposed solely on the 
basis of the “vileness” factor. 
If we conduct, as Overton did, a selective review of 
those records, it is possible to find comparable cases in 
which defendants received death sentences as well as 
comparable cases in which defendants received life 
sentences.  For example in Robinson, discussed by Overton 
on brief, the defendant used a pair of scissors to inflict 
lethal stab wounds to two individuals during the course of 
a robbery in one of the victim’s townhouse.  231 Va. at 
146, 341 S.E.2d at 161.  The defendant had gone to the 
 
10
townhouse twice on the day of the murder, first because his 
car had been towed and second ostensibly to pay his rent.  
Id. at 145, 341 S.E.2d at 161.  However, the defendant 
received a life sentence instead of the death penalty on 
each of two convictions of capital murder.  Id. at 143, 341 
S.E.2d at 160. 
In contrast, the 21-year-old defendant in Boggs v. 
Commonwealth, 229 Va. 501, 505-06, 331 S.E.2d 407, 411 
(1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986), received the 
death penalty for the capital murder of his neighbor, who 
was an 87-year-old widow.  The defendant planned the murder 
and went to the victim’s home for a friendly visit.  Id. at 
507, 331 S.E.2d at 413.  He then inflicted multiple blunt-
force blows with a metal rod to the victim's head and neck, 
and stabbed her in the shoulder and chest.  Id. at 507, 331 
S.E.2d at 413. 
However, our proportionality analysis encompasses all 
capital murder cases presented to this Court for review and 
is not limited to cases selectively chosen.  Id. at 522, 
331 S.E.2d at 422.  Additionally, the question of 
proportionality does not turn on whether a given capital 
murder case “equal[s] in horror the worst possible scenario 
yet encountered.”  Turner v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 543, 
 
11
556, 364 S.E.2d 483, 490, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 
(1988). 
 
Thus, upon reviewing the records of all capital murder 
cases presented to this Court, including those cases cited 
by Overton, and giving particular attention to cases 
involving the predicate offense of robbery and the 
“vileness” factor, we conclude that Overton’s sentence of 
death is not excessive or disproportionate to sentences 
generally imposed in this Commonwealth for capital murders 
comparable to Overton’s murder of Edgar Allen Williams.  
See, e.g., Fry v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 413, 416-17, 463 
S.E.2d 433, 435 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110 (1996) 
(11 gunshot wounds to victim’s head, chest, and abdomen; 
victim dragged down dirt road while alive); Barnes v. 
Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130, 133, 360 S.E.2d 196, 199 (1987), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036 (1988) (victim sustained 
multiple gunshot wounds); LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 
Va. 564, 571, 304 S.E.2d 644, 647 (1983), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 1063 (1984)(three stab wounds, 40 other wounds 
inflicted on victim; carving fork and ice pick left in 
victim); Quintana v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 127, 134, 295 
S.E.2d 643, 645 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1029 (1983) 
(victim died from multiple hammer blows to head, neck, and 
back); Bennett v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 448, 452, 374 
 
12
S.E.2d 303, 306 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989) 
(victim died from multiple blunt impact injuries to head, 
face, and right hand; stabbed three times in neck, once in 
abdomen; and strangled).5  Overton did, after all, inflict 
21 stab wounds on a 63-year-old quadriplegic. 
 
“The purpose of our comparative review is to reach a 
reasoned judgment regarding what cases justify the 
imposition of the death penalty.”  Orbe, 258 Va. at 390, 
519 S.E.2d at 817.  Although we cannot insure that 
“complete symmetry” exists among all death penalty cases, 
“our review does enable us to identify and invalidate a 
death sentence that is ‘excessive or disproportionate to 
the penalty imposed in similar cases.’ ”  Id. (quoting Code 
§ 17.1-313(C)(2)); see also Tennessee v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 
651, 665 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1083 (1998) 
(court’s “function in performing comparative review is not 
to search for proof that a defendant’s death sentence is 
                     
5 We cite these cases to show that the death penalty is 
generally imposed in this Commonwealth for capital murders 
similar to the one in this case.  See Payne v. 
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 216, 223, 509 S.E.2d 293, 298 (1999) 
(from our accumulated records, we determine whether juries 
in this Commonwealth generally approve the death penalty 
for comparable crimes).  “The test is not whether a jury 
may have declined to recommend the death penalty in a 
particular case but whether generally juries in this 
jurisdiction impose the death sentence for conduct similar 
to that of the defendant.”  Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 
 
13
perfectly symmetrical, but to identify and invalidate the 
aberrant death sentence”). 
For these reasons, we find no error in the imposition 
of the death penalty in this case, nor do we perceive any 
reason to commute Overton’s sentence of death to life 
imprisonment.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of 
the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
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Va. 260, 283-84, 257 S.E.2d 808, 824 (1979), cert. denied, 
445 U.S. 972 (1980). 
 
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