Title: State v. Victor Naydihor
Citation: 2004 WI 43
Docket Number: 2001AP003094-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 15, 2004

2004 WI 43 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Victor Naydihor,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 272 
Reported at: 258 Wis. 2d 746, 654 N.W.2d 479 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 15, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 17, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Bruce E. Schroeder   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Philip J. Brehm, Janesville, and oral argument by Philip J. 
Brehm. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Warren 
D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
2004 WI 43 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR 
(L.C. No. 
00 CF 212 & 00 CF 471) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Victor Naydihor,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 15, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
 
JON 
P. 
WILCOX, 
J.   The 
defendant, 
Victor 
Naydihor (Naydihor), seeks review of a published decision of the 
court of appeals, State v. Naydihor, 2002 WI App 272, 258 
Wis. 2d 746, 654 N.W.2d 479, that affirmed an order of the 
Kenosha County Circuit Court, Bruce E. Schroeder, Judge, denying 
his motion for postconviction relief. 
I 
¶2 
On February 25, 2000, Naydihor was involved in an 
automobile collision in Kenosha County.  The law enforcement 
personnel that responded noticed several bottles of whiskey in 
Naydihor's vehicle and numerous empty beer bottles.  Naydihor 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
2 
 
was unconscious and the deputies noticed a strong odor of 
alcohol emanating from him.  Witnesses observed that Naydihor 
had run a red light and collided with the victim's vehicle.  The 
investigation also revealed that Naydihor had a blood alcohol 
content of .265.  On March 7, 2000, the State filed a criminal 
complaint against Naydihor charging him with three counts of 
criminal conduct arising from the collision:  1) injury by 
intoxicated 
use 
of 
a 
vehicle, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1)(a)(1999-2000);1 
2) 
operating 
while 
intoxicated 
causing 
injury, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63(2)(a)(1) and 346.65(3m); and 3) operating 
with a prohibited alcohol concentration causing injury, contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63(1)(b), 
346.65(3m), 
and 
340.01(46m).  
Naydihor also received several ordinance violations stemming 
from the incident, including mandatory seat belt violation, open 
intoxicant in the vehicle, operating without a valid driver's 
license, and violation of traffic control.  
¶3 
The second count in the complaint was dismissed at 
Naydihor's initial appearance on March 7, 2000.  The State filed 
an information on March 15, 2000, alleging the same counts as 
did the criminal complaint.  On April 7, 2000, as part of a plea 
agreement with the State, Naydihor pled guilty to the first 
count in the information and the other counts were dismissed.  
The State agreed to recommend probation but "retained a free 
                                                 
1 All statutory references are to the 1999-2000 version 
unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
3 
 
hand on the conditions of that probation."  Sentencing was 
scheduled for May 18, 2000; however, at that time the State 
informed the court that Naydihor would be charged with felony 
bail jumping as a result of his failure to comply with the terms 
of his bond.  While on bond, Naydihor failed to appear for the 
presentence 
investigation 
and 
tested 
positive 
for 
tetrahydrocannabinol.   
¶4 
On July 6, 2000, Naydihor appeared for sentencing in 
both matters.  He pled no contest to the bail jumping charge.  
The Kenosha County Circuit Court, Barbara A. Kluka, Judge, 
sentenced Naydihor to three years in prison and five years 
extended supervision on his driving offense.  The court also 
sentenced Naydihor to ten years of consecutive probation on the 
bail jumping offense.  On December 4, 2000, Naydihor filed a 
motion seeking postconviction relief, alleging that under State 
v. Poole, 131 Wis. 2d 359, 389 N.W.2d 40 (Ct. App. 1986), the 
prosecutor breached the plea agreement by repeatedly stating to 
the court that he had made the plea agreement before reading the 
presentence report, which indicated that Naydihor had previous 
convictions for alcohol-related offenses.  The State did not 
oppose the postconviction motion, and on January 13, 2001, the 
circuit court granted Naydihor's motion and ordered resentencing 
before a different judge.  
¶5 
On March 5, 2001, Naydihor was resentenced by Judge 
Schroeder.  Regarding the injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle 
charge, the prosecutor recommended ten years probation with 
several conditions.  The prosecutor recommended that Naydihor be 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
4 
 
required to:  1) obey all rules of supervision; 2) have no 
association with any known felons, drug dealers or drug users; 
3) refrain from alcohol or nonprescribed controlled substances 
and then only controlled substances in strict accordance with 
the prescription order; 4) submit to chemical dependency 
assessments and complete all treatment; 5) submit to random 
weekly urinalyses; 6) attend counseling; 7) have no contact with 
the victim; 8) pay restitution; 9) not be present in any 
taverns; 10) not possess any alcohol containers; 11) not operate 
a motor vehicle; 12) not be present in any liquor store, 
including any grocery store that sells liquor; and 13) not be 
present in any restaurant that serves alcohol.  In addition, the 
prosecutor recommended that Naydihor serve one year in the 
Kenosha County jail and perform 2000 hours community service.  
To support these conditions, the prosecutor detailed Naydihor's 
history of substance abuse, the effect of the crime on the 
victim, and the need for deterrence.  The circuit court 
sentenced Naydihor to five years initial confinement and five 
years extended supervision on the driving offense and ten years 
consecutive probation on the bail jumping offense.  The circuit 
court justified the increased sentence on the grounds that the 
condition of the victim had deteriorated since the initial 
sentencing and her medical bills had substantially increased.   
II 
¶6 
On September 14, 2001, Naydihor again moved the court 
for postconviction relief.  In his motion he requested the 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
5 
 
following:  1) a Machner2 hearing to determine whether trial 
counsel was ineffective during resentencing; 2) a vacation of 
the sentence imposed by Judge Schroeder and resentencing in 
front of another judge; 3) that the State advocate for the terms 
of 
the 
plea 
agreement 
at 
resentencing; 
and 
4) 
in 
the 
alternative, a reinstatement of the original sentence pronounced 
by Judge Kluka.  On October 22, 2001, Judge Schroeder heard the 
motion and thereafter issued an order on November 13, 2001, 
denying Naydihor's motion for postconviction relief on all 
grounds.   
¶7 
On appeal, Naydihor argued that his trial counsel was 
ineffective at resentencing because he failed to object to 
comments made by the prosecutor that allegedly breached the plea 
agreement governing the injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle 
charge.  Naydihor, 258 Wis. 2d 746, ¶1.3  Naydihor also alleged 
that his increased sentence violated due process because it was 
the product of judicial vindictiveness.  Id.  The court of 
appeals held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying the Machner hearing because the prosecutor had not 
violated the terms of the plea agreement at resentencing and 
thus Naydihor's counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
                                                 
2 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979).  
3 Apparently, Naydihor also alleged a breach of the plea 
agreement with respect to his bail jumping offense in the 
circuit court.  However, he has not preserved this issue on 
appeal.  The issue before us concerns the plea agreement 
governing the injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle charge.  
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
6 
 
object.  Id., ¶2.  The court of appeals also held that the 
resentencing court was entitled to consider the deteriorated 
condition of the victim in resentencing Naydihor and therefore 
the 
increased 
sentence 
was 
not 
a 
product 
of 
judicial 
vindictiveness.  Id.   
¶8 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals and 
hold that the prosecutor did not breach the plea agreement at 
resentencing and thus Naydihor was not entitled to a Machner 
hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  We also 
affirm the court of appeals' determination that Naydihor's 
increased 
sentence 
was 
not 
the 
product 
of 
judicial 
vindictiveness.  We hold that no presumption of vindictiveness 
arose on the facts of this case.  We further hold that even if 
there were a presumption of vindictiveness, it was overcome 
because the victim's testimony concerning her deteriorated 
condition constituted a legitimate nonvindictive reason for 
increasing Naydihor's sentence.   
III 
¶9 
Naydihor's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is 
premised on defense counsel's failure to object to an alleged 
breach of a plea agreement.  Under the familiar standard of 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the defendant 
must establish both that counsel's performance was deficient and 
that 
he 
was 
prejudiced 
as 
a 
result 
of 
that 
deficient 
performance.  State v. Gordon, 2003 WI 69, ¶22, 262 Wis. 2d 380, 
663 
N.W.2d 765. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
threshold 
inquiry 
on 
Naydihor's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is whether 
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01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
7 
 
the State's actions constituted a breach of the plea agreement.  
If the State did not breach the plea agreement, then the failure 
of Naydihor's counsel to object did not constitute deficient 
performance, and the circuit court correctly ruled that Naydihor 
was not entitled to a Machner hearing. 
¶10 This court set forth the standards for reviewing an 
alleged breach of a plea agreement in State v. Williams, 2002 WI 
1, 249 Wis. 2d 492, 637 N.W.2d 733:   
[A]n accused has a constitutional right to the 
enforcement of a negotiated plea agreement. . . .  
 
A prosecutor who does not present the negotiated 
sentencing 
recommendation 
to 
the 
circuit 
court 
breaches the plea agreement.  An actionable breach 
must not be merely a technical breach; it must be a 
material and substantial breach.  When the breach is 
material and substantial, a plea agreement may be 
vacated or an accused may be entitled to resentencing. 
Id., ¶¶37-38. 
¶11 Whether the State breached a plea agreement is a mixed 
question of fact and law.  The precise terms of a plea agreement 
between the State and a defendant and the historical facts 
surrounding the State's alleged breach of that agreement are 
questions of fact.  Id., ¶2.  On appeal, the circuit court's 
determinations as to these facts are reviewed under the clearly 
erroneous standard.  Id., ¶20.  Whether the State's conduct 
constitutes a material and substantial breach of the plea 
agreement is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.  
Id.  A breach is material and substantial when it "defeats the 
benefit for which the accused bargained."  Id., ¶38.   
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
8 
 
¶12 While the parties offer differing characterizations of 
the plea agreement, they both agree as to where the plea 
agreement is found in the record.4  Essentially, Naydihor agreed 
to plead guilty to the first count in the information; in 
exchange, the State agreed to drop the third count and recommend 
probation on the first count.  The State, however, remained free 
                                                 
4 Naydihor's pleas were both entered in the record during 
the proceedings on April 7, 2000.  It is during this proceeding 
that the terms of the plea bargain appear on the record: 
THE COURT:  This is on the calendar this morning for a 
plea hearing. . . .  
[PROSECUTOR]:  Judge, the agreement is that the 
defendant would be entering a plea to Count 1, which 
is injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle.  Count 3, 
which is the prohibited alcohol concentration, would 
be dismissed. 
 
In regards to the TR files, judge, the defendant 
is going to be entering a plea to 1518, which is open 
intoxicants in a vehicle.  The remaining citations 
will be dismissed.   
 
The State is agreeing to recommend probation, but 
retains a free hand on the conditions of that 
probation. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  You're also dismissing Count 2. 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Count 2 has already been dismissed, 
judge.   
THE COURT:  Thank you.  Correct, [DEFENSE COUNSEL]? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  That is correct.  Count 2 was 
dismissed at the initial appearance, but I see it was 
carried over in the information.  
At Naydihor's initial appearance, his attorney recited the 
terms of the plea agreement in the same manner. 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
9 
 
to recommend the conditions and length of probation.  At the 
hearing on Naydihor's motion for postconviction relief, Judge 
Schroeder indicated that he was familiar with the terms of the 
plea agreement as set forth in the record of the original 
sentencing proceedings before Judge Kluka.  Defense counsel 
indicated that there had been no change in the agreement since 
the original sentencing.  
¶13 Therefore, as there is no dispute over the terms of 
the plea agreement, we are left to determine whether the 
comments made by the State at resentencing breached the terms of 
that agreement.  The comments of the prosecutor at resentencing 
are set forth in full below:   
Thank you, your Honor.  I embrace most of the 
concerns expressed by the victim who spoke to the 
Court, except one, where she is critically wrong.  
This is a collision.  It's not an accident when there 
is alcohol-impaired driving involved.  We use that 
term sometimes lightly when we say it's an accident.  
Maybe we do it because, as is stated to the Court, the 
defendant didn't mean to do it.  But this is not the 
type of offense where what the defendant means to do 
has 
any 
relevance 
whatsoever. 
 
Alcohol-impaired 
driving that leads to injury of any sort is a danger, 
an equal opportunity danger committed by the rich and 
the poor, persons who have lengthy criminal histories 
behind them and individuals who, except for their 
alcohol problem, have never seen the inside of a 
courtroom as a defendant in a criminal case.  The 
respectable and the less than respectable.  But the 
common denominator is that the threat to the community 
is just as great regardless of who the defendant is 
and regardless of the circumstances. 
 
And that's one of the things that I point out to 
the Court because sometimes we look at these things a 
little too lightly and we fail to recognize the fact 
that a person who is out of control sometimes is more 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
10 
 
a danger to the community at large and to themselves 
than someone who commits an act intentionally and who 
has a focus and a target and knows exactly what they 
are going to do and limits the scope of what they do.  
The drunken driver behind the wheel of a fast-moving 
two-ton piece of machinery, who is out of control is 
indiscriminate and substantially more dangerous.   
 
The victim impact statement makes a couple of 
interesting points that were not covered in the oral 
comments to the Court.  Yes, I'm now in a wheelchair 
and unable to earn a living.  I had to get help to do 
house-work and also to help my husband, who is totally 
blind.  I'm behind in all my bills because I have no 
income.  I'm absolutely terrified of drunk drivers.  
The fear and anxiety of my family when I was injured 
so badly was terrible.  My 5 year-old granddaughter is 
still having bad dreams.  She asks me, grandma, is the 
man who hurt you going to stop drinking now.  I told 
her I hope so.  And there is a request for a no 
contact order.  
 
What you heard and what you saw is the real face 
of the consequences of alcohol-impaired driving.  It 
doesn't matter what this defendant or any other 
defendant intended to do.  It's what they did.  The 
crime began by getting behind the wheel of a motor 
vehicle when the defendant was impaired to the point 
that he could not safely control his driving or his 
other behavior.  Now, that's just talking about the 
offense and the offender generically because there 
are, as I said, these common threads in these cases.  
This is one of those crimes where the respectable and 
the less than respectable are equally as dangerous.   
 
In 
this 
case 
this 
is 
exacerbated 
by 
the 
defendant's lack of insight into what has been 
demonstrated throughout the presentence investigation 
report as a lengthy history of polysubstance abuse.  
The fact that while he was out on bond in this case he 
had a dirty UA as referenced in the report from 
Wisconsin Correctional Services on April 19, 2000 to 
this Court.  While he was out on bond, he had a dirty 
UA for marijuana.  And also the defendant failed to 
report to WCS faithfully when he was out on bond when 
he was given a chance in the community.  The defendant 
with regard to the WCS dirty UA responded, I only 
smoked the residue in the pipe. 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
11 
 
 
The defendant believes he has a drinking problem 
because he does not know why he drinks, but then he 
says I don't think I'm addicted to anything. 
 
This defendant is an individual who needs to be 
controlled for a lengthy period of supervision because 
he presents a significant danger to the community and 
to himself.  There is no excuse whatsoever for what 
happened on February 25th last year.  There is no 
excuse for an otherwise productive citizen of this 
community to now be confined to a wheelchair, to have 
bills racking up because of her inability to work and 
to have her young grandchild in fear when they did 
nothing wrong and the defendant did everything wrong.  
¶14 The prosecutor then made his sentence recommendation, 
as noted supra.  He concluded:   
It is very, very necessary that a message be sent 
this type of behavior will not be tolerated in this 
community or in any other community in this state; and 
that individuals who perpetrate these crimes will be 
held 
accountable, 
will 
be 
monitored 
and 
will 
understand the reason why.   
And, unfortunately, all the restitution in the 
world is not going to give [the victim] the ability to 
walk that she had before February 25, 2000.   
¶15 Naydihor argues that this case is controlled by 
Williams and that the above comments constituted a material and 
substantial breach of the plea agreement because the prosecutor 
implied to the court that a harsher sentence was needed than 
that recommended.  Naydihor repeatedly takes issue with the fact 
that the State did not say one thing positive about him.  In 
addition, Naydihor faults the prosecutor for highlighting his 
history of substance abuse, the victim's substantial injuries, 
and calling him a danger to the community.  As such, Naydihor 
asserts that these actions constituted an "end-run" around the 
plea agreement. 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
12 
 
¶16 The State responds that the prosecutor's comments must 
be read in light of the actual sentence recommendation.  The 
State notes that as part of the plea bargain, it remained free 
to argue the length of probation and the terms of that 
probation.  Essentially, the State argues that the prosecutor's 
comments were necessary to justify the recommended ten years 
probation and what it characterizes as "rather restrictive 
conditions of probation."  In addition, the State argues that 
the prosecutor did not adopt the victim impact statement as his 
own but merely reiterated what the victim had already told the 
court.  Also, the State finds it significant that the prosecutor 
never referred to a term of imprisonment (as opposed to the one 
year of jail time he recommended as a condition of probation).   
¶17 In 
order 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
prosecutor's 
comments constituted a substantial and material breach of the 
plea agreement in this case, we look to other cases that have 
addressed this issue.  In Williams, this court held that the 
State breached the plea agreement because the prosecutor's 
comments at sentencing "undercut the essence of the plea 
agreement."  Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 492, ¶46.  The prosecutor in 
Williams stated that since entering into the plea bargain, her 
impression 
of 
the 
defendant 
changed 
after 
she 
read 
the 
presentence investigation report and spoke with the defendant's 
ex-wife.  Id., ¶47.   
¶18 We stated that the result of this was that the 
prosecutor "implied that had the State known more about the 
defendant, it would not have entered into the plea agreement."  
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
13 
 
Id.  We reasoned that by adopting the information contained in 
the 
presentence 
investigation 
report 
as 
her 
own, 
"[t]he 
prosecutor's declaration of her personal opinion created the 
impression 
that 
the 
prosecutor 
was 
arguing 
against 
the 
negotiated terms of the plea agreement."  Id., ¶48.   
The State did not merely recite the unfavorable 
facts about the defendant to inform the circuit court 
fully.  Rather, the State covertly implied to the 
sentencing 
court 
that 
the 
additional 
information 
available from the presentence investigation report 
and from a conversation with the defendant's ex-wife 
raised doubts regarding the wisdom of the terms of the 
plea agreement.  The State cannot cast doubt on or 
distance itself from its own sentence recommendation.  
Although the State is not barred from using negative 
information about the defendant that has come to light 
after the plea agreement and before the sentencing, 
the State may not imply that if the State had known 
more about the defendant, the State would not have 
entered into the plea agreement.  
Id., ¶50.  Finally, we stated that "[t]his information was 
unnecessary to explain or support the agreement that the State 
would 
recommend 
the 
minimum 
sentence 
of 
probation; 
the 
information supports a more severe sentence of a prison term."  
Id., ¶51 (emphasis added).   
¶19 In State v. Hanson, 2000 WI App 10, ¶14, 232 
Wis. 2d 291, 606 N.W.2d 278, the defendant argued that the 
prosecutor had breached the plea agreement by "rendering a less 
than neutral recital of the agreement."  Specifically, the 
defendant argued that the prosecutor breached the agreement by 
noting that the case was "extremely violent" and describing the 
violence and other aggravating factors associated with the 
crime.  Id., ¶25.  In rejecting the defendant's claim, the court 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
14 
 
of appeals noted, "[a] prosecutor may not render a less than 
neutral recitation of the plea agreement."  Id., ¶24.  However, 
while "the State must obviously abide by its agreement to cap 
its sentencing recommendation . . . .[it] is free to argue for 
an appropriate sentence within the limits of the cap."  Id., 
¶27.  The court of appeals concluded that "the prosecutor was 
entitled under the plea agreement to speak to the aggravating 
factors relevant to the sentencing and to seek a sentence at the 
high end of the cap."  Id., ¶28.   
¶20 In State v. Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d 317, 321, 479 
N.W.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1991), the defendant argued that while the 
prosecutor accurately recited the terms of the plea agreement, 
the 
prosecutor's 
derogatory 
comments 
about 
the 
defendant 
violated the agreement.  Under the plea bargain, the prosecutor 
agreed to recommend probation but did not agree to any 
particular length and was free to argue for the maximum.  Id. at 
319.  After recommending the maximum sentence, the prosecutor 
discussed the severity of the offense, stating, "these were the 
most perverted of all perverted sex acts."  Id.  The prosecutor 
concluded, "this is the sickest case that I have seen or read 
about.  If I refer to this defendant as 'sleaze,' I think that 
would be giving him a compliment."  Id. at 319-20.  
 
¶21 In 
rejecting 
the 
defendant's 
claim, 
the 
court 
reasoned: 
The plea agreement in this case did not prohibit 
the 
state 
from 
informing 
the 
trial 
court 
of 
aggravating sentencing factors.  Nor could it.  At 
sentencing, 
pertinent 
factors 
relating 
to 
the 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
15 
 
defendant's character and behavioral pattern cannot 
"be 
immunized 
by 
a 
plea 
agreement 
between 
the 
defendant and the state."  A plea agreement which does 
not allow the sentencing court to be appraised of 
relevant information is void against public policy.  
Id. at 324 (quoting Elias v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 278, 285, 286 
N.W.2d 559 (1980)).   
 
¶22 After noting that all of the prosecutor's comments 
related to the three primary sentencing factors, the court of 
appeals ruled:  
 
In order to convince the trial court to impose 
the maximum allowable sentence, the prosecutor was 
free to list the applicable aggravating factors.  In a 
sense, he had to do so, since he was asking for the 
maximum.  The prosecutor highlighted the special 
vulnerability of the victim, the extreme cruelty of 
the acts against the victim, the fact that the 
offenses involved multiple victims. . . .  
Nor 
are 
we persuaded that 
the prosecutor's 
denigrating remarks about the defendant's character 
were 
inappropriate, 
in 
light 
of 
the 
plea 
agreement. . . .  
 
The prosecutor in this case faced the unenviable 
task of convincing the sentencing court that [the 
defendant's] actions were such that he deserved the 
maximum 
allowable 
sentence, 
but 
should 
only 
be 
required to actually serve one year of county jail 
time.  While his comments regarding [the defendant] 
displayed 
more 
vitriol 
than 
those 
typically 
accompanying a one-year jail term recommendation, we 
believe they were appropriate in light of the rather 
unusual terms of the plea agreement.  We conclude the 
prosecutor's remarks did not amount to a breach of the 
plea agreement.  
Id. at 324-25 (emphasis added).  
¶23 In State v. Jorgensen, 137 Wis. 2d 163, 165, 404 
N.W.2d 66 (Ct. App. 1987), the issue on appeal was whether the 
State violated the terms of a plea agreement under which the 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
16 
 
State agreed to remain silent at sentencing.  The prosecutor, 
however, did not remain silent at sentencing after defense 
counsel incorrectly relayed the facts of the underlying crime.  
Id. at 166-67.  The court of appeals ultimately rejected the 
defendant's allegations, noting that the prosecutor, even under 
an agreement to remain silent at sentencing, is not required to 
remain silent when inaccurate information is conveyed to the 
sentencing court.  Id. at 169-70.  Finally, in Poole, 131 
Wis. 2d at 364, the court of appeals ruled that the prosecutor's 
comments at sentencing breached the plea agreement because they 
"implied that circumstances had changed since the plea bargain, 
and that had the state known of the other instances of 
defendant's misconduct, they would not have made the agreement 
they did."   
¶24 While 
the 
prosecutor's 
conduct 
at 
the 
original 
sentence hearing clearly constituted a breach of the plea 
agreement under Poole,5 we believe this case is factually similar 
                                                 
5 At Naydihor's original sentence hearing, the prosecutor 
noted that while his recommendation remained the same, the 
presentence investigation report contained information relating 
to Naydihor's prior offenses of which the prosecutor was unaware 
at the time the State entered into the plea agreement.   
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
17 
 
to both Hanson and Ferguson.6  Hanson stands for the proposition 
that the State may discuss negative facts about the defendant in 
order to justify a recommended sentence within the parameters of 
the plea agreement.  Hanson, 232 Wis. 2d 291, ¶¶27-28.   
¶25 Likewise, 
Ferguson 
permits 
the State 
to discuss 
aggravating 
sentencing 
factors 
and 
relevant 
behavioral 
characteristics of the defendant in order to justify an unusual 
sentence recommendation within the constraints of the plea 
agreement. 
 
Ferguson, 
166 
Wis. 2d at 
324-25. 
 
Ferguson 
specifically 
concluded 
that 
a 
prosecutor 
could 
discuss 
"pertinent factors relating to the defendant's character and 
behavioral pattern."  Id. at 324.  Indeed, the court in Ferguson 
stated that a prosecutor 
has the 
duty to 
discuss 
such 
information in order to justify a harsh and unusual sentence 
recommendation.  Id. at 325.  Further, no plea bargain can 
prevent a prosecutor from bringing to the court's attention 
relevant sentencing information.  Id. at 234.  See also 
                                                 
6 Naydihor also argues that under State v. Poole, 131 
Wis. 2d 359, 364, 389 N.W.2d 40 (Ct. App. 1986), the State 
breached the plea agreement by bringing to the court's attention 
new information, namely, the fact the condition of the victim 
deteriorated.  We reject this argument.  Unlike Poole, the 
prosecutor did not intimate that he would not have entered into 
the plea bargain had he known of this information.  Quite the 
contrary, in the present case the prosecutor used this new 
information to justify the recommended conditions of probation.  
This is clearly allowed under State v. Williams, 2002 WI 1, ¶50, 
249 Wis. 2d 492, 637 N.W.2d 733 (noting that "the State is not 
barred from using negative information about the defendant that 
has come to light after the plea agreement and before the 
sentencing").   
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
18 
 
Jorgensen, 
137 
Wis. 2d 169-70 
(accord). 
 
Finally, 
under 
Williams, the State may "recite the unfavorable facts about the 
defendant to inform the circuit court fully."  Williams, 249 
Wis. 2d 492, ¶50. 
¶26 Here, all of the prosecutor's comments were related to 
the three primary sentencing factors:  "'the nature of the 
crime, the character of the defendant, and the rights of the 
public.'"  Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d at 325 (quoting State v. 
McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d 116, 126, 452 N.W.2d 377 (1990)).  The 
State's recitation of Naydihor's history of substance abuse 
related to the "character of the defendant" and was necessary to 
justify its recommendation that Naydihor be prohibited from 
entering businesses, even restaurants, that sold alcohol.  The 
fact that Naydihor had failed to comply with the terms of his 
bond, had a dirty urinalysis, and displayed a cavalier attitude 
towards substance abuse was also related to the "character of 
the defendant" and was necessary to support the State's 
recommendation that Naydihor submit to weekly random drug 
testing, chemical dependency assessments, and counseling.   
¶27 By noting the need for deterrence and characterizing 
the defendant as a "danger to the community," the prosecutor was 
justifying the ten years of highly monitored probation and one 
year of jail time it recommended as a condition of probation.  
These comments and the prosecutor's statement that no amount of 
restitution was sufficient were relevant to the rights of the 
public.  The prosecutor's discussion of information contained in 
the victim impact statement, namely, how the crime had affected 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
19 
 
the victim, is relevant to the nature of the crime.  See Hanson, 
232 Wis. 2d 291, ¶28.  Thus, in contrast to Williams, the 
prosecutor's comments in the present case were necessary to 
support the precise sentence it recommended.  The information 
the prosecutor discussed constituted no more than pertinent 
behavioral characteristics and aggravating factors relevant to 
sentencing 
and 
was 
necessary 
to 
justify 
the 
recommended 
sentence.  See Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d at 324. 
¶28 Also, the State here, unlike Williams, did not agree 
to recommend the minimum sentence; it agreed only to recommend 
some type of probation and dismiss one of the charges.  Further, 
the negative information about Naydihor that the prosecutor 
conveyed to the court in no way insinuated that the prosecutor 
was distancing itself from its recommendation.  Quite the 
contrary, the prosecutor's comments can be characterized as an 
enthusiastic 
argument 
supporting 
the 
"rather 
unusual" 
recommended sentence.  See Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d at 325. 
¶29 While the prosecutor did direct the court to certain 
facts contained in the victim impact statement, this is not 
prohibited under Williams.  In Williams, the prosecutor's 
comments implied that the additional information it received 
from the presentence investigation report and the defendant's 
ex-wife justified a harsher sentence than that recommended.  
Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 492, ¶50.  We noted that the prosecutor 
may convey negative information about the defendant to fully 
inform the court, id., ¶49, but "'what the prosecutor may not do 
is 
personalize 
the 
information, 
adopt 
the 
same 
negative 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
20 
 
impression as [the author of the presentence investigation 
report] and then remind the court that the [author] had 
recommended a harsher sentence than recommended.'"  Id., ¶48 
(quoting State v. Williams, 2001 WI App 7, ¶12, 241 Wis. 2d 1, 
624 N.W.2d 164).  Here, the prosecutor made no mention of the 
recommendation 
of 
the 
presentence 
investigation 
report or 
otherwise "intimated to the court that it no longer supported 
the plea agreement."  Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 492, ¶45.   
¶30 Thus, while a defendant is entitled to a neutral 
recitation of the terms of the plea agreement, Poole, 131 
Wis. 2d at 364, and the prosecutor may not overtly or covertly 
convey to 
the court that 
a sentence 
harsher 
than 
that 
recommended is warranted, Hanson, 232 Wis. 2d 291, ¶24, we have 
found no case that holds that the State is obligated to say 
something nice or positive about the defendant in order to avoid 
breaching a plea agreement.  Naydihor bargained only for the 
State to drop one of the counts in the information and to 
recommend 
probation. 
 
Naydihor 
did 
not 
bargain 
for 
the 
prosecutor to extol his virtues at sentencing.  The State 
remained free to recommend whatever length and terms of 
probation it felt appropriate.  The State chose to recommend a 
lengthy period of probation with very extensive conditions.  The 
prosecutor's comments did not imply to the court that the State 
believed a more severe sentence than that recommended was 
appropriate.  Rather, the prosecutor's comments supported the 
recommended 
sentence 
and 
were 
relevant 
to 
the 
pertinent 
sentencing factors the court was required to consider.   
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
21 
 
¶31 Having reviewed the prosecutor's statements in their 
entirety, we believe that "the prosecutor strongly affirmed the 
plea agreement and did not make any statements that expressly, 
covertly or otherwise suggested that the State no longer adhered 
to the agreement."  Hanson, 232 Wis. 2d 291, ¶29.  We hold that 
the State did not breach the plea agreement and therefore, 
Naydihor's counsel was not deficient for failing to object.  As 
such, Naydihor's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.  
IV 
A 
¶32 Naydihor was originally sentenced to three years of 
initial confinement and five years of extended supervision.  At 
resentencing, the circuit court sentenced Naydihor to five years 
of initial confinement followed by five years of extended 
supervision.  Judge Schroeder justified the increased sentence 
on the following basis: 
And you have ruined this lady's life.  And this 
case, by the way, is significantly different than what 
it was when it was before Judge Kluka because Judge 
Kluka was working off this presentence, which stated 
that [the victim] suffered extensive injuries to her 
leg as a result of this accident, etc.  [The victim] 
indicated that as a result of the injuries suffered to 
her left leg, she may have some permanent disability.  
Well, now we know that she will.  And, in fact, she 
says she'll never walk again.  That's a monstrous 
increase in the enormity of this crime from how it 
appeared before Judge Kluka.  When Judge Kluka heard 
this case, it says [the victim] believes her medical 
expenses total at least $30,000.00.  Now she says it's 
$75,000.00.  And she hasn't seen anywhere near the end 
of it yet.  This is a serious, violent crime.  Much 
more serious than most of the things we see passing 
through the courts. 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
22 
 
¶33 Naydihor argues that this increased sentence violated 
his constitutional right to due process because it was the 
product of judicial vindictiveness.  Naydihor does not assert 
that 
his 
increased 
sentence 
was 
the 
result 
of 
actual 
vindictiveness; rather, he argues that under North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), his increased sentence created a 
presumption of vindictiveness that was never rebutted.  In 
Pearce, the United States Supreme Court concluded that due 
process prohibited a defendant from being given a harsher 
sentence at resentencing because of vindictiveness for having 
successfully attacked his first conviction.  The Court stated:   
Due 
process 
of 
law, 
then, 
requires 
that 
vindictiveness 
against 
a 
defendant 
for 
having 
successfully attacked his first conviction must play 
no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.  
And 
since 
the 
fear 
of 
such 
vindictiveness 
may 
unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the 
right to appeal or collaterally attack his first 
conviction, due process also requires that a defendant 
be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory 
motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.  
 
In order to assure the absence of such a 
motivation, we have concluded that whenever a judge 
imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after 
a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must 
affirmatively appear.   
Id. at 725-26.  Subsequent cases have interpreted Pearce as 
applying "a presumption of vindictiveness, which may be overcome 
only by objective information in the record justifying the 
increased sentence."  United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 
374 (1982).  The Court has recognized that where the presumption 
is inapplicable, a defendant is required to demonstrate actual 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
23 
 
vindictiveness in order to prevail.  Wasman v. United States, 
468 U.S. 559, 568-69 (1984).  This court has expressly adopted 
the 
approach 
of 
Pearce 
and 
its 
progeny, 
noting 
"[t]he 
constitutionality of an increased sentence upon resentencing is 
determined by reference to Pearce and the Supreme Court cases 
elaborating on the Pearce presumption."  State v. Church, 2003 
WI 74, ¶52, 262 Wis. 2d 678, 665 N.W.2d 141. 
¶34 The parties dispute whether the Pearce presumption 
applies in this case and if so, whether the new information 
concerning the victim's deteriorated condition at the time of 
resentencing constitutes a justifiable basis for increasing the 
sentence.  The State argues that the Pearce presumption applies 
only 
in 
circumstances 
where 
a 
reasonable 
likelihood 
of 
vindictiveness exists.  It asserts that no reasonable likelihood 
of vindictiveness exists under these facts because:  1) a 
different judge resentenced Naydihor; 2) the court that imposed 
the 
original 
sentence 
granted 
Naydihor's 
motion 
for 
resentencing, and the case was not reversed by an appellate 
court; 3) Naydihor was resentenced due to an error by the 
prosecutor, not the original sentencing court; and 4) the case 
was set for resentencing, not a retrial.  Naydihor counters that 
there is a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness, such that 
the 
Pearce 
presumption 
should 
apply, 
because: 
 
1) 
the 
resentencing court was aware of the first sentence and used the 
first sentence as a "baseline"; 2) the judge that resentenced 
him may have felt that there was no error to correct because 
that judge was not the same judge that ordered resentencing; and 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
24 
 
3) both judges are equals, and this court can assume that judges 
who work at the same level have a stake in discouraging 
defendants from seeking review of their sentences.   
¶35 We agree with the State that the Pearce presumption of 
vindictiveness does not apply to the facts of this case.   
¶36 While 
Pearce created 
a 
rebutable 
presumption of 
vindictiveness, 
its 
prophylactic 
rule 
has, 
as 
the 
State 
correctly notes and Naydihor freely admits, been limited by 
subsequent cases.  The United States Supreme Court has since 
explained that it has "restricted application of Pearce to areas 
where its 'objectives are thought most efficaciously served.'"  
Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 138 (1986)(quoting Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 487 (1976)).  "Such circumstances are 
those in which there is a 'reasonable likelihood' that the 
increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on 
the part of the sentencing authority."  Alabama v. Smith, 490 
U.S. 794, 799 (1989) (quoting Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373).  We 
have 
recognized 
that 
the 
Court 
has 
limited 
the 
Pearce 
presumption to those contexts where "[i]nherent in the[] 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
25 
 
circumstances is the 'reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.'"  
Church, 262 Wis. 2d 678, ¶54 (quoting Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373).7   
¶37 The Court has also explained that a reasonable 
likelihood of vindictiveness exists only if there is a realistic 
possibility that the sentencing court, after being reversed, may 
engage in self-vindication and retaliate against the defendant 
for having successfully pursued appellate relief.  See Smith, 
490 U.S. at 799-800; McCullough, 475 U.S. at 138-39; Goodwin, 
457 U.S. at 376-77; Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974); 
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 27 (1973); Pearce, 395 U.S. 
at 725.  The concern over actual vindictiveness and self-
vindication is premised on the notion that "the institutional 
bias inherent in the judicial system against the retrial of 
issues 
that 
have 
already 
been 
decided . . . might 
also 
subconsciously motivate a vindictive prosecutorial or judicial 
                                                 
7 The United States Supreme Court has utilized varying 
terminology to describe when the presumption in North Carolina 
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), is applicable.  Thus, the Court 
has stated that the Pearce presumption applies only where there 
is a "realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness,'" Blackledge v. 
Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974), and not where there is "no 
realistic motive for vindictive sentencing[.]"  Texas v. 
McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 139 (1986).  See also, United States 
v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373 (1982)(noting that "[g]iven the 
severity of the presumption . . . the Court has [applied it] 
only in cases in which a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness 
exists"); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 26 (1973)(stating 
that the Pearce presumption is not applicable if there is no 
"'possibility of vindictiveness'"); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 
104, 116 (1972)(explaining that the Pearce presumption does not 
apply where there is no "hazard of being penalized for seeking a 
new trial"). 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
26 
 
response to a defendant's exercise of his right to obtain a 
retrial of a decided question."  Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 376-77.   
¶38 As the Court has subsequently clarified: 
While the Pearce opinion appeared on its face to 
announce a rule of sweeping dimension, our subsequent 
cases 
have 
made 
clear 
that 
its 
presumption 
of 
vindictiveness "do[es] not apply in every case where a 
convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on 
retrial."  As we explained in Texas v. McCullough, 
"the evil the [Pearce] Court sought to prevent" was 
not the imposition of "enlarged sentences after a new 
trial" but "vindictiveness of a sentencing judge." 
Smith, 490 U.S. at 799 (quoting McCullough, 475 U.S. at 138).  
As discussed infra, the common thread in all of the Court's 
cases in which the Pearce presumption was not applied was that 
it was unlikely that this institutional bias, motive for self-
vindication, or actual vindictiveness existed in the context in 
which the defendant was resentenced.   
¶39 In Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 114 (1972), the 
defendant 
argued 
that 
Kentucky's 
two–tier 
system 
for 
adjudicating less serious offenses violated the Due Process 
Clause under Pearce because he was subject to a higher sentence 
at his trial de novo.  In analyzing the defendant's claim, the 
Court noted, "Pearce did not turn simply on the fact of 
conviction, appeal, 
reversal, 
reconviction, 
and 
a greater 
sentence."  Id. at 116.  The Court stated that the holding in 
Pearce was premised on "the hazard of being penalized for 
seeking a new trial."  Id.  The Court concluded that this hazard 
was not inherent in Kentucky's two-tier system such that unlike 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
27 
 
Pearce, the possibility of vindictiveness did not exist.  Id.  
The Court reasoned: 
[T]he court which conducted [the defendant's] trial 
and imposed the final sentence was not the court with 
whose 
work 
[the 
defendant] 
was 
sufficiently 
dissatisfied to seek a different result on appeal; and 
it is not the court that is asked to do over what it 
thought it had already done correctly.  Nor is the de 
novo court even asked to find error in another court's 
work. . . . We see no reason, and none is offered, to 
assume that the de novo court will deal any more 
strictly 
with 
those 
who 
insist 
on 
a 
[new] 
trial . . . than it would with those defendants whose 
cases are filed originally in [that court] . . . . 
Id. at 116-17.  Thus, the Court concluded that the Pearce 
presumption did not apply to defendants sentenced to harsher 
sentences under Kentucky's two-tier system.  Id. at 118.8 
¶40 Likewise, in Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 26, the Court 
reaffirmed that the Pearce presumption applies only when there 
is a "possibility of vindictiveness."   The Court explained: 
Pearce was not written with a view to protecting 
against the mere possibility that, once the slate is 
wiped clean and the prosecution begins anew, a fresh 
sentence 
may 
be 
higher 
for 
some 
valid 
reason 
associated 
with 
the 
need 
for 
flexibility 
and 
discretion in the sentencing process.  The possibility 
of a higher sentence was recognized and accepted as a 
legitimate concomitant of the retrial process.   
                                                 
8 While the United States Supreme Court in Colten, 407 U.S. 
at 117-18, also emphasized that the record from the lower court 
was not before the superior court, the Court, as discussed 
infra, has subsequently ruled that the Pearce presumption is 
inapplicable under circumstances where the second court was 
aware of the first sentence and relied upon that first sentence 
as part of its sentencing determination. 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
28 
 
Id. at 25.  The Court concluded that the Pearce presumption was 
inapplicable when a jury rendered a sentence to the defendant on 
retrial that was harsher than the original jury's sentence 
because the second jury was not aware of the sentence of the 
first jury, id. at 26, and the second sentence was "not meted 
out by the same judicial authority whose handling of the prior 
trial was sufficiently unacceptable to have required a reversal 
of the conviction."  Id. at 27.  
¶41 In Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 27, the Court extended the 
Pearce presumption to cover prosecutorial vindictiveness when a 
prosecutor brought a more serious charge against the defendant 
prior to his trial de novo after the defendant invoked his right 
to an appeal under North Carolina's two-tier appellate process.  
However, the Court stated that "[t]he lesson that emerges from 
Pearce, Colten, and Chaffin is that the Due Process Clause is 
not offended by all possibilities of increased punishment upon 
retrial after appeal, but only by those that pose a realistic 
likelihood of 'vindictiveness.'"  Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 27.  
The Court reasoned that the Pearce rule should be extended in 
that case because the prosecutor had a personal stake in the 
permanency of the defendant's original conviction, an interest 
in discouraging defendants from appealing and obtaining a trial 
de novo, and the means to so discourage defendants.  Id. at 27-
28. 
¶42 In McCullough, 475 U.S. at 135, the defendant was 
convicted of murder and tried before a jury.  After the jury 
imposed a 20-year sentence, the trial court granted the 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
29 
 
defendant's motion for a new trial on the basis of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  Id. at 136.  The case was retried before a jury in 
front of the same judge.  Id.  After the jury again convicted 
the defendant, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to 50 
years in prison.  Id.  The trial judge justified the increased 
sentence on the basis that testimony from two new witnesses who 
had 
not 
testified 
at 
the 
first 
trial 
strengthened 
the 
government's case regarding both guilt and punishment.  Id.  
Also, the judge learned for the first time that the defendant 
had committed the crime only four months after being released 
from prison.  Id.   
¶43 The Court held that no presumption of vindictiveness 
arose in the case because:  
In contrast to Pearce, McCullough's second trial came 
about because the trial judge herself concluded that 
the prosecutor's misconduct required it.  Granting 
McCullough's motion for a new trial hardly suggests 
any vindictiveness on the part of the judge towards 
him.  "[U]nlike the judge who has been reversed," the 
trial judge here had "no motivation to engage in self-
vindication."  In such circumstances, there is also no 
justifiable concern about "institutional interests 
that might occasion higher sentences by a judge 
desirous of discouraging what he regards as meritless 
appeals." . . . Presuming vindictiveness on this basis 
alone would be tantamount to presuming that a judge 
will be vindictive towards a defendant merely because 
he seeks an acquittal. . . . We decline to adopt the 
view that the judicial temperament of our Nation's 
trial judges will suddenly change upon the filing of a 
successful post-trial motion.  The presumption of 
Pearce 
does 
not 
apply 
in 
situations 
where 
the 
possibility 
of 
vindictiveness 
is 
this 
speculative. . . . Because 
there 
was 
no 
realistic 
motive 
for 
vindictive 
sentencing, 
the 
Pearce 
presumption was inappropriate.  
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
30 
 
Id. at 138-39 (quoting Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 27).  In addition, 
the Court noted that the Pearce presumption was inapplicable 
because "different sentencers assessed the varying sentences 
that McCullough received," noting that "[i]n such circumstances, 
a sentence 'increase' cannot truly be said to have taken place."  
Id. at 140.9   
¶44  In Smith, the defendant originally was sentenced 
pursuant to a plea bargain, but his sentence was subsequently 
vacated on the ground that the defendant had not knowingly and 
voluntarily entered into the plea.  Smith, 490 U.S. at 795-96.  
The case was then tried before a jury with the judge from the 
initial sentencing presiding.  Id. at 796-97.  After the jury 
returned a verdict of guilty, the judge imposed a harsher 
sentence because the information developed at trial, relating to 
the nature of the crime and its impact on the victim, convinced 
the judge that the initial sentence was too lenient and an 
increase was justified.  Id. at 797. 
                                                 
9 The Court in McCullough also stated that "[h]ere, the 
second sentencer provides an on-the-record, wholly logical, 
nonvindictive reason for the sentence.  We read Pearce to 
require no more particularly since trial judges must be accorded 
broad discretion in sentencing."  McCullough, 475 U.S. at 140.  
While this statement appears in the section of the opinion 
discussing why the Pearce presumption was inapplicable, it is 
unclear whether the Court intended this to be a separate basis 
for not applying the presumption in the first instance, a factor 
to be taken into consideration in determining whether the 
presumption applies, or whether this fact merely supports the 
Court's subsequent conclusion in McCullough that even if the 
presumption applied, it was rebutted.   
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
31 
 
¶45 The Court held that the Pearce presumption does not 
apply when the second sentence follows a trial and the first was 
based on a guilty plea, overruling Simpson v. Rice, 395 U.S. 711 
(1969), the Pearce companion case.  Smith, 490 U.S. at 795, 803.  
In doing so, the Court noted that "the Pearce presumption was 
not designed to prevent the imposition of an increased sentence 
on retrial 'for some valid reason associated with the need for 
flexibility and discretion in the sentencing process,' but was 
'premised on the apparent need to guard against vindictiveness 
in the resentencing process.'"  Id. at 799 (quoting Chaffin, 412 
U.S. at 25) (first emphasis added).  The Court reasoned that 
"the relevant sentencing information available to the judge 
after the plea will usually be considerably less than that 
available after a trial."  Id. at 801.  The Court noted that a 
judge who sentences after a full trial will usually be aware of 
more facts that bear on the "nature and extent of the crimes 
charged," id. at 801, and will therefore possess a "greater 
amount of sentencing information" than the judge would at the 
time of the guilty plea.  Id. at 803.   
¶46 Moreover, the Court emphasized the fact that even if 
the same judge imposes both sentences in this context, the court 
is not being forced to do over what it thought it had previously 
done properly.  Id. at 801-02.  The Court distinguished Pearce, 
by noting that "[t]here, the sentencing judge who presides at 
both trials can be expected to operate in the context of roughly 
the same sentencing considerations after the second trial as he 
does after the first; any unexplained change in the sentence is 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
32 
 
therefore subject to a presumption of vindictiveness."  Id. at 
802.  The Court concluded that when the first sentence follows a 
plea and the second follows a full trial, "there are enough 
justifications for a heavier second sentence that it cannot be 
said to be more likely than not that a judge who imposes one is 
motivated by vindictiveness."  Id. at 802.   
¶47 Applying these principles in Church, 262 Wis. 2d 678, 
¶54, we held that the Pearce presumption applied when the 
defendant received a longer sentence from the same court after 
successfully challenging the validity of multiple convictions.  
We reasoned:  "The appeal in this case posed a direct challenge 
to a decision of the circuit court.  The circuit court's 
decision on multiplicity was reversed, the entire case was 
remanded, and the circuit court was essentially '"do[ing] over 
what it thought it had already done correctly."'"  Id. (quoting 
Smith, 490 U.S. at 801 (quoting Colten, 407 U.S. at 117)). 
¶48 However, the facts of the present case stand in stark 
contrast to those in Church and Pearce.  Here, Naydihor moved 
for resentencing due to prosecutorial error.  The court before 
which he was sentenced granted his postconviction motion and 
ordered resentencing before a new judge.  The State did not 
oppose the motion.  Naydihor's conviction was not reversed 
because of an error by the court.  In addition, it was the court 
itself that granted his motion.  In other words, this is not a 
case where an appellate court reversed a conviction due to a 
circuit court error and the same circuit court that erred 
resentenced the defendant.  The judge that resentenced Naydihor 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
33 
 
was not the same judge that originally sentenced him; nor was 
the resentencing court the court in which the error that led to 
resentencing took place.  We conclude that under the facts of 
this case, consistent with Chaffin, Colten, McCullough, and 
Smith, no presumption of vindictiveness is warranted because the 
reasons justifying the prophylactic Pearce presumption are not 
present.   
¶49 The defendant argues that unlike the scenario in 
Chaffin, the second sentencer here was aware of the previous 
sentence.  However, Chaffin was not based solely on the fact 
that the second sentencer was unaware of the previous sentence.  
The Chaffin Court also reasoned that the Pearce presumption was 
inapplicable because "the second sentence [was] not meted out by 
the same judicial authority whose handling of the prior trial 
was sufficiently unacceptable to have required a reversal of the 
conviction."  Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 27.  See also Colten, 407 
U.S. at 116 (explaining the fact that the second sentencer was 
not the court whose judgment was reversed was a significant 
factor justifying the nonapplication of the Pearce presumption). 
¶50 More significantly, the Court in McCullough refused to 
apply the presumption even though the resentencing judge was 
aware of the initial sentence and arguably used the original 
sentence as a "baseline."  McCullough, 475 U.S. at 140 (noting 
the judge's appraisal of the first sentence as "unduly lenient" 
in light of new information "cannot be faulted").  See also 
Smith, 490 U.S. at 795, 797, 801-02 (explaining that the 
presumption of vindictiveness does not apply when a defendant is 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
34 
 
originally sentenced after pleading guilty and then resentenced 
after a subsequent trial, even when the same judge imposes both 
sentences).10   
¶51 The Court in McCullough, 475 U.S. at 140, thus found 
the fact that there were two different sentencing authorities to 
be dispositive, even though the second authority was aware of 
the 
prior 
sentence. 
 
The 
McCullough 
Court 
specifically 
repudiated the argument that the Pearce presumption should be 
applied where there are two different sentencers: 
Pearce 
itself 
apparently 
involved 
different 
judges presiding over the two trials, a fact that has 
led some courts to conclude by implication that the 
presumption 
of 
vindictiveness 
applies 
even 
where 
different sentencing judges are involved.  That fact 
however, may not have been drawn to the Court's 
attention and does not appear anywhere in the Court's 
opinion in Pearce.  Clearly the Court did not focus on 
it as a consideration for its holding.  Subsequent 
opinions have also elucidated  . . . [that the basis 
for the Pearce presumption] derives from the judge's 
"personal stake in the prior conviction," a statement 
clearly at odds with reading Pearce to answer the two-
sentencer issue. 
McCullough, 475 U.S. at 140 n.3 (quoting Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 
27) (citations omitted).  The McCullough Court stated that where 
there are two different sentencers, "a sentence 'increase' 
cannot truly be said to have taken place."  Id. at 140. 
                                                 
10 Thus, while the Court in Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 26, stated 
that 
"[t]he 
first 
prerequisite 
for 
the 
imposition 
of 
a 
retaliatory penalty is knowledge of the prior sentence," the 
Court has distanced itself from this statement in Alabama v. 
Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989) and McCullough by holding that the 
Pearce presumption was inapplicable in contexts where the 
resentencing judge had knowledge of the prior sentence. 
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35 
 
¶52 Similar to the Court in McCullough, we find it 
significant that Naydihor's two sentences were rendered by 
differing sentencing authorities and the resentencing "came 
about because the trial judge herself concluded that the 
prosecutor's misconduct required it."  Id. at 138.  Thus, "[the 
resentencing court] is not the court that is asked to do over 
what it thought it had already done correctly."  Colten, 407 
U.S. at 117.  "'[U]nlike the judge who has been reversed,' the 
trial judge here had 'no motivation to engage in self-
vindication.'"  McCullough, 475 U.S. at 139 (quoting Chaffin, 
412 U.S. at 27).  As the McCullough court noted, it had 
previously clarified in Chaffin that the basis for the Pearce 
presumption originates from the judge's "personal stake in the 
prior conviction."  McCullough, 475 U.S. at 140 n.3 (quoting 
Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 27).  See also Smith, 490 U.S. at 800-02; 
Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 383.  Here, it cannot be said that Judge 
Schroeder had a "personal stake" in the legitimacy of Judge 
Kluka's previous sentence.  Therefore, "there was no realistic 
motive for vindictive sentencing."  McCullough, 475 U.S. at 139. 
¶53 However, Naydihor argues that there is a possibility 
for vindictiveness here because both sentencing judges were from 
the same county and it is reasonable to infer that the second 
court would be perturbed at having to repeat the sentencing 
process after a successful postconviction motion.  As the Court 
stated in McCullough, "[w]e decline to adopt the view that the 
judicial temperament of our [state's] trial judges will suddenly 
change upon the filing of a successful post-trial motion."  
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36 
 
McCullough, 475 U.S. at 139.  To presume "vindictiveness on this 
basis alone would be tantamount to presuming that a judge will 
be vindictive towards a defendant merely because he seeks an 
acquittal."  Id.  Under Goodwin, "a mere opportunity for 
vindictiveness is insufficient to justify the imposition of a 
prophylactic rule."  Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384.  
¶54 To paraphrase Colten, 407 U.S. at 117, there is no 
reasonable basis here to conclude that the court in which 
Naydihor was resentenced would deal any more strictly with him 
than it would if he were being sentenced before the court for 
the first 
time.  
Moreover, 
the 
fact 
that 
Naydihor was 
resentenced by a different judicial authority upon his request 
belies any assertion of the presence of "even 'apprehension of 
such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing 
judge.'"  McCullough, 475 U.S. at 139 (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. 
at 725).  We agree with the State that it is significant that 
there was simply a resentencing here, not a complete retrial.  
Thus, "the institutional bias against the retrial of a decided 
question that supported the decisions in Pearce and Blackledge 
simply has no counterpart in this case."  Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 
383. 
¶55 Finally, Naydihor argues that the Pearce presumption 
should apply because Judge Schroeder denied his motion for 
judicial substitution.  However, we have found no case that even 
suggests the Pearce presumption may arise out of a failed motion 
for substitution.  As noted supra, the Pearce presumption 
applies only where there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
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37 
 
second sentencer will have a motive to retaliate against the 
defendant for successfully challenging his previous sentence.  A 
failed substitution motion has no relevance in this analysis.11   
¶56 Consistent with the approach taken by the United 
States Supreme Court, we hold that the Pearce presumption of 
vindictiveness does not apply here because the defendant was 
resentenced by a different judicial authority at his request due 
to a non-judicial defect at the original sentence hearing, and 
the resentencing was granted by the original court in which the 
defect occurred.  In such circumstances there is "no realistic 
motive for vindictive sentencing," McCullough, 475 U.S. at 139, 
such that it can be said there was a "reasonable likelihood of 
vindictiveness," 
Goodwin, 
457 
U.S. 
at 
373, 
much 
less 
a 
"possibility of vindictiveness."  Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 26.  As 
there was no hazard that Naydihor was being penalized for 
seeking enforcement of the terms of his plea bargain, the Pearce 
presumption does not apply to this case.  
B 
¶57 Even if the Pearce presumption were to apply to this 
case, we conclude that the presumption was overcome because new 
information regarding the deteriorated condition of the crime 
victim constituted objective evidence of an event occurring 
after the initial sentence that provided a nonvindictive 
                                                 
11 Also, we note that Naydihor merely attempted to exercise 
his statutory right to automatic substitution, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 971.20(5).  The motion was denied because it was 
untimely. 
 
Naydihor 
did 
not 
argue 
for 
common 
law 
disqualification on the grounds of bias.  
No. 
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38 
 
justification for the circuit court's imposition of a more 
severe sentence.  This court has stated that "[t]he Pearce 
presumption of vindictiveness can be overcome if 'affirmative 
reasons' justifying the longer sentence appear in the record and 
if 
those 
reasons 
are 
'based 
upon 
objective 
information' 
regarding events or 'identifiable conduct on the part of the 
defendant' subsequent to the original sentencing proceeding."  
Church, 262 Wis. 2d 678, ¶55 (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726) 
(emphasis added).   
¶58 The State argues that cases subsequent to Pearce have 
held that the Pearce presumption is overcome anytime a judge 
renders a harsher sentence based on an event or conduct of the 
defendant that occurs after the original sentencing and relates 
to legitimate sentencing factors.  The State posits that the 
deteriorated condition of the victim qualifies as a legitimate 
"event" upon which a sentence increase may be justified.  As the 
effect of the crime on the victim is a legitimate sentencing 
factor, the State concludes that a court may increase a sentence 
when the condition of the victim deteriorates between the 
original and subsequent sentence hearings.    
¶59 Naydihor retorts that no case has held that the Pearce 
presumption 
is 
overcome 
when 
the 
victim's 
condition 
deteriorates, and that in any event, the victim's condition here 
was substantially the same as it was at the original sentencing.  
Naydihor argues that the condition of the victim does not 
constitute objective information of identifiable conduct on the 
part of the defendant that justifies a sentence increase.  
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39 
 
Naydihor further asserts that while a defendant may anticipate 
being given a harsher sentence because of some conduct on his 
part or an existing fact about him that has recently come to 
light, he has no way of anticipating that the condition of the 
crime victim may deteriorate after his original sentence.  
Therefore, according to Naydihor, allowing an increased sentence 
based on this information would discourage defendants from 
challenging their pleas.    
¶60 We begin by addressing Naydihor's contention that 
there was no appreciable change in the victim's condition.  
Naydihor argues that no change actually occurred because it was 
understood at the initial sentencing hearing that the effects of 
the crime on the victim would be ongoing, that she would require 
continued medical treatment, and that her medical bills would 
probably increase.  However, the record contradicts this 
argument.  At the initial sentencing hearing, the presentence 
report indicated that the victim sustained substantial leg 
injuries that could result in permanent disability and that she 
had incurred medical bills totaling $30,000.   
¶61 At the second sentencing hearing the victim indicated 
that she was confined to a wheelchair and that she would 
"probably be in it forever."  She also stated:  "They are 
attempting to build a brace for my leg, but so far they haven't 
found anything that's going to help me walk."  While the 
presentence report had previously indicated that the victim was 
unable to earn any income as a result of the accident, the 
victim now indicated that her medial bills had doubled and her 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
40 
 
insurance money from the accident had been depleted.  The victim 
stated that she had undergone three major surgeries and was 
expecting more.  Her medical bills at the time of the second 
hearing totaled over $70,000.  We agree with Judge Schroeder 
that these facts represent a "monstrous increase in the enormity 
of the crime."  Having determined that the victim's condition 
did significantly deteriorate since the original sentencing 
proceeding, 
we 
now 
examine 
whether 
this 
constituted 
a 
justifiable basis to increase Naydihor's sentence. 
¶62 This court in Church held that the mere fact that the 
defendant had not sought treatment or expressed remorse for his 
crime after a length of time had passed between his original 
sentence 
and 
resentencing 
did 
not 
surmount 
the 
Pearce 
presumption 
because 
it 
did 
not 
constitute 
"'objective 
information' of 'identifiable conduct on the part of the 
defendant' subsequent to the original sentencing."  Church, 262 
Wis. 2d 678, ¶56.  However, this court did not address the issue 
presented in this case, namely, what qualifies as "objective 
information" of an "event" subsequent to the original sentence 
that would justify a sentence increase.   
¶63 Admittedly, no United States Supreme Court decision 
has explicitly held that the deteriorated condition of a crime 
victim constitutes objective information of an event that would 
overcome the Pearce presumption.  However, a close reading of 
the Court's decisions applying Pearce reveals that allowing a 
sentence to be increased on this basis would not violate due 
process.  These decisions reveal that the focus of Pearce was 
No. 
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41 
 
not on the underlying behavior of the defendant; rather, the 
Pearce presumption was created to remedy the situation where a 
sentencing 
court 
did 
not 
explicitly 
set 
forth 
objective 
information justifying a sentence increase on the record.  Thus, 
the Pearce presumption exists to force courts to provide on-the-
record justification for sentence increases, so as to remove 
fear that courts will, out of vindictiveness, punish defendants 
for exercising their appellate rights.   
¶64 The Court in Wasman, 468 U.S. at 572, clarified that 
information used to rebut the Pearce presumption is not limited 
to "conduct" of the defendant.  The defendant in Wasman argued 
that his sentence was impermissibly enhanced because he was 
convicted of an additional offense after his initial sentence, 
which was based upon conduct predating his first sentence.  
Wasman, 468 U.S. at 570.  The trial judge did not consider the 
pending charge at the first sentence hearing, but did consider 
the subsequent conviction at the second hearing.  Id.  The 
defendant argued that under Pearce, his conviction was not 
"conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time 
of the original conviction."  Id. (emphasis in original). 
¶65 After noting that Pearce itself is unclear as to what 
may justify an increased sentence, the Court rejected the notion 
that "events" and "conduct" should be treated differently for 
the purposes of the Pearce analysis.  Id. at 571-72 (noting that 
"[t]here is no logical support for a distinction between 
'events' and 'conduct' of the defendant occurring after the 
initial sentencing insofar as the kind of information that may 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
42 
 
be relied upon to show a nonvindictive motive is concerned").  
The Court concluded that "after retrial and conviction following 
a defendant's successful appeal, a sentencing authority may 
justify an increased sentence by affirmatively identifying 
relevant conduct or events that occurred subsequent to the 
original sentencing proceeding."  Wasman, 468 U.S. at 572 
(emphasis added).  
¶66 Wasman further explained that "relevant conduct or 
events" are those related to sentencing discretion:   
Even without a limitation on the type of factual 
information that may be considered, the requirement 
that the sentencing authority or prosecutor detail the 
reasons for an increased sentence or charge enables 
appellate 
courts to 
ensure that 
a nonvindictive 
rationale 
supports 
the 
increase. 
 
A 
contrary 
conclusion would result in the needless exclusion of 
relevant 
sentencing 
information 
from 
the 
very 
authority in whom the sentencing power is vested.   
Wasman, 468 U.S. at 572 (emphasis added).   
¶67 In addition, the Court explained:  "If it was not 
clear from the Court's holding in Pearce, it is clear from our 
subsequent cases applying Pearce that due process does not in 
any sense forbid enhanced sentences or charges, but only 
enhancement motivated by 
actual vindictiveness 
toward the 
defendant for having exercised guaranteed rights."  Id. at 568 
(emphasis in original).  Wasman emphasized that the Pearce 
presumption must be applied in light of the "underlying 
philosophy of modern sentencing" which is "to take into account 
the person as well as the crime."  Id. at 572 (emphasis added).  
The Court also noted that "[t]he sentencing court or jury must 
No. 
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43 
 
be permitted to consider any and all information that reasonably 
might bear on the proper sentence for the particular defendant, 
given the crime committed."  Id. at 563.   
¶68 Wasman further elaborated that Pearce was chiefly 
concerned with unexplained sentence increases.  Wasman noted 
that in Pearce the prosecutor did not attempt to justify the 
court's higher sentence on anything contained in the record; it 
merely asserted the court's "'naked power to impose it.'"  Id. 
at 565 (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726).  Thus, in ruling that 
the Pearce presumption was rebutted in the case before it, the 
Court explained:  "In sharp contrast to Pearce and Blackledge, 
however, the trial judge here carefully explained his reasons 
for imposing the greater sentence."  Wasman, 468 U.S. at 569.   
¶69 Like 
Wasman, 
McCullough 
indicated 
that 
Pearce 
primarily sought to remove the evil of unexplained increased 
sentences, noting, "[h]ere, the second sentencer provides an on-
the-record, 
wholly 
logical, 
nonvindictive 
reason 
for 
the 
sentence.  We read Pearce to require no more, particularly since 
trial judges must be accorded broad discretion in sentencing."  
McCullough, 475 U.S. at 140 (emphasis added).  McCullough also 
reaffirmed the holding in Wasman that a sentence increase may be 
based upon the defendant's conduct or events.  Id. at 141.  
McCullough went even further than Wasman and stated, "[t]his 
language, however, was never intended to describe exhaustively 
all of the possible circumstances in which a sentence increase 
could be justified."  Id.  The Court then stated that 
"[r]estricting justifications for a sentence increase to only 
No. 
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44 
 
'events that occurred subsequent to the original sentencing 
proceedings' 
could 
in 
some 
circumstances 
lead 
to 
absurd 
results."  Id. (emphasis in original)(quoting Wasman, 468 U.S at 
572).   
¶70 Thus, McCullough held that the Pearce presumption 
could be rebutted by "'objective information . . . justifying 
the increased sentence.'"  McCullough, 475 U.S. at 142 (quoting 
Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 374).12  The Court went on to state that 
"[n]othing in the Constitution requires a judge to ignore 
'objective 
information . . . justifying 
the 
increased 
sentence.' . . . Realistically, if anything this focus would 
require rather than forbid the consideration of the relevant 
evidence bearing on sentence[.]"  McCullough, 475 U.S. at 142 
(quoting Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 374).  The Court concluded that 
applying Pearce to prevent consideration of new pertinent 
sentencing information "would be wholly incompatible with modern 
sentencing 
standards." 
 
McCullough, 
475 
U.S. 
at 
144.13  
Therefore, the Court concluded that new information concerning 
the nature and extent of the crime and the defendant's 
involvement 
therein 
constituted 
"'objective 
                                                 
12 The Court has subsequently reiterated this formulation of 
how the Pearce presumption may be rebutted.  See Smith, 490 U.S. 
at 799. 
13 Therefore, both Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 
(1984) and McCullough represent a dramatic shift away from the 
original restriction in Pearce that the reasons for increasing a 
sentence must "be based upon objective information concerning 
identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant."  Pearce, 395 
U.S. at 726. 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
45 
 
information . . . justifying the increased sentence.'"  Id. at 
143. 
¶71 We also note that the Court has squarely rejected 
Naydihor's "chilling effect" argument.    
Petitioner's 
final 
argument 
is 
that 
harsher 
sentences 
on 
retrial 
are 
impermissible 
because, 
irrespective of their causes and even conceding that 
vindictiveness plays no discernible role, they have a 
'chilling 
effect' 
on 
the 
convicted 
defendant's 
exercise 
of 
his 
right 
to 
challenge 
his 
first 
conviction either by direct appeal or collateral 
attack. . . . Pearce . . . provides no foundation for 
this claim.  To the contrary, the Court there 
intimated no doubt about the constitutional validity 
of higher sentences in the absence of vindictiveness 
despite whatever incidental deterrent effect they 
might have on the right to appeal.   
Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 29.   
¶72 Over ten years later, the Court again rejected this 
argument in McCullough.   
To be sure, a defendant may be more reluctant to 
appeal if there is a risk that new, probative evidence 
supporting a longer sentence may be revealed on 
retrial.  But this Court has never recognized this 
"chilling effect" as sufficient reason to create a 
constitutional 
prohibition 
against 
considering 
relevant information in assessing sentences. 
McCullough, 475 U.S. at 143.  
¶73 As these cases illustrate, the Pearce presumption was 
designed to prevent judges from increasing a defendant's 
sentence following a successful appeal based on judicial 
vindictiveness.  It was not designed, as Naydihor implies, to 
reward defendants for good behavior between the original 
sentence and resentencing.  To that extent, Pearce and its 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
46 
 
progeny clearly require that any sentence increase must be based 
on objective information not known to the court at the initial 
sentencing that relates to legitimate sentencing factors and is 
explained on the record.   
¶74 The Court has repeatedly stated that the Pearce 
presumption 
may 
be 
rebutted 
by 
"'"objective 
information . . . justifying the increased sentence."'"  Smith, 
490 U.S. at 799 (quoting McCullough, 475 U.S. at 142 (quoting 
Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 374)).  This may be an actual intervening 
event set in motion by prior conduct on the part of the 
defendant, as in Wasman, 468 U.S. at 569-70, or new information 
concerning prior conduct of the defendant that relates to the 
nature and extent of the defendant's crime, as in McCullough, 
475 U.S. at 143-44.  While McCullough opened the door for 
increased sentences based on "new information" concerning the 
crime, it is clear under Church, 262 Wis. 2d 678, ¶¶56-57, that 
when the Pearce presumption applies, a resentencing court cannot 
use "old facts"——information that was available to the original 
sentencing authority——to justify an increase because presumably 
the first sentencer was aware of this information and took it 
into consideration in rendering the initial sentence.   
¶75 In Church this court held that when the Pearce 
presumption is operative, a defendant's sentence could not be 
increased because he continued to deny responsibility for the 
crime.  Church, 262 Wis. 2d 678, ¶¶56-57.  We reasoned: 
This does not constitute "objective information" of 
"identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant" 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
47 
 
subsequent to the original sentencing.  It constitutes 
a subjective evaluation of the status of Church's 
rehabilitation at the time of resentencing, based not 
on any new facts but on the mere continued existence 
of the original facts. 
 . . . To premise an increased sentence [on this 
basis] comes far too close to punishing the defendant 
for exercising his right to appeal. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶76 However, we recognized the possibility in Church that 
a court operating under the Pearce presumption could increase a 
sentence based on new facts or objective information "regarding 
events . . . subsequent to the original sentencing proceeding."  
Id., ¶55 (citing Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726).  As the facts in 
Church related to the defendant's conduct, we did not elaborate 
as to when a sentence could be increased based on objective 
facts concerning an "event" that occurs subsequent to the 
original sentencing.  However, nothing in Church precludes a 
court from increasing a sentence based on new objective 
information of an event such as the victim's deteriorated 
condition, which occurs subsequent to the original sentencing.   
¶77 We again reiterate that the United States Supreme 
Court in McCullough stated that Pearce "was never intended to 
describe exhaustively all of the possible circumstances in which 
a sentence increase could be justified."  McCullough, 475 U.S. 
at 141.  None of the Court's decisions subsequent to Pearce have 
construed the phrase "objective information . . . justifying a 
sentence increase" to refer only to new conduct on the part of 
the defendant.  Indeed, the Court in McCullough stated that a 
No. 
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48 
 
sentence increase could be justified based on "pertinent new 
information" that "bore legitimately on the appropriate sentence 
to impose."  McCullough, 475 U.S. at 144.  To summarize Wasman, 
McCullough, and Church, without using artificial labels or 
engaging in semantics, a sentence may be legitimately increased 
as a result of "any objective, identifiable factual data not 
known to the trial judge at the time of the original sentencing 
proceeding," Pearce, 395 U.S. at 751 (White, J., concurring in 
part), so long as that data relates to legitimate sentencing 
factors and is set forth clearly in the record.  See McCullough, 
475 U.S. at 153-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(noting that the 
majority opinion permits a sentence increase to be based on new 
information about the crime charged and removes the restriction 
that led to Justice White's concurrence in Pearce).  Whether the 
basis for the sentence increase here is characterized as an 
event under Wasman14 or new information about the nature and 
                                                 
14 Arguably, the fact situation presented here is within the 
array of justifiable sentence increases described in Pearce 
itself.  In Pearce, the Court stated:  
A trial judge is not constitutionally precluded, in 
other words, from imposing a new sentence, whether 
greater or less than the original sentence, in the 
light of events subsequent to the first trial that may 
have 
thrown 
new 
light 
upon 
the 
defendant's . . . conduct . . . . Such information may 
come to the judge's attention from evidence adduced at 
the second trial itself, from a new presentence 
investigation, from the defendant's prison record, or 
possibly from other sources.   
No. 
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49 
 
extent of the crime under McCullough, the fact that the 
condition of the victim deteriorated since the original sentence 
proceeding clearly constitutes a change in the status quo, 
something that was not present in Church.  As discussed below, 
this change was clearly relevant to the sentencing factors Judge 
Schroeder was required to consider at resentencing.   
¶78 As noted supra, the three primary sentencing factors 
that the court must consider are "'(1) the gravity and nature of 
the offense, including the effect on the victim, (2) the 
character and rehabilitative needs of the offender, and (3) the 
need to protect the public.'"  State v. Hall, 2002 WI App 108, 
¶7, 255 Wis. 2d 662, 648 N.W.2d 41 (quoting State v. Spears, 227 
Wis. 2d 495, 507, 596 N.W.2d 375 (1999)) (emphasis added).  
Further, a court may consider the "'vicious or aggravated nature 
of the crime.'"  Spears, 227 Wis. 2d at 507 (quoting State v. 
Harris, 119 Wis. 2d 612, 623, 350 N.W.2d 633 (1984)).  Also, the 
preamble to Wis. Stat. ch. 950, the victims' bill of rights, 
states:  "the legislature declares its intent . . . that the 
rights extended in this chapter to victims . . . are honored and 
protected by . . . judges in a manner no less vigorous than the 
protections 
afforded 
to 
criminal 
defendants."  
Wis. Stat. § 950.01.  Wisconsin  Stat. § 950.04(1v)(m) provides 
crime victims the right to "provide statements concerning 
                                                                                                                                                             
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723.  When the condition of the crime victim 
has deteriorated between the first and second sentencing as a 
result of the initial criminal act, this qualifies as an 
"event[] subsequent to the first trial that . . . throw[s] new 
light upon the defendant's . . . conduct."  Id.   
No. 
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50 
 
sentencing." 
 
More 
importantly, 
Wis. Stat. § 950.04(1v)(pm) 
provides crime victims the right to "have the court provided 
with information pertaining to the economic, physical and 
psychological effect of the crime upon the victim and have the 
information considered by the court." (Emphasis added.)  See 
also Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m.   
¶79 These rights would be rendered meaningless if a court 
at resentencing was prohibited from considering the deteriorated 
condition of the crime victim in rendering its sentence.  
Otherwise, § 950.04(1v)(pm) might as well read that the victim 
of the crime has the right to have the information considered by 
the court, unless the accused is being resentenced.  Holding 
that a circuit court could not render a harsher sentence based 
on the deteriorated condition of the crime victim "would result 
in the needless exclusion of relevant sentencing information 
from the very authority in whom the sentencing power is vested."  
Wasman, 468 U.S. at 572.  We also observe that the United States 
Supreme Court has specifically concluded, in the death penalty 
context, that victim impact evidence is "relevant sentencing 
information." 
Victim impact evidence is simply another form or 
method of informing the sentencing authority about the 
specific harm caused by the crime in question, 
evidence 
of 
a 
general 
type 
long 
considered 
by 
sentencing authorities. . . .  
 
We are now of the view that a State may properly 
conclude that for the jury to assess meaningfully the 
defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness, it 
should have before it at the sentencing phase evidence 
of the specific harm caused by the defendant. 
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51 
 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991). 
¶80 We hold that when a victim testifies at resentencing 
that 
her 
condition 
has 
deteriorated 
since 
the 
original 
sentencing proceeding as a result of the defendant's underlying 
criminal 
act, 
this 
constitutes 
"'objective 
information . . . justifying 
the 
increased 
sentence.'"  
McCullough, 475 U.S. at 143.  As Judge Schroeder specifically 
stated that this was the basis for increasing Naydihor's 
sentence, 
he 
provided 
"an 
on-the-record, 
wholly 
logical, 
nonvindictive reason for the sentence.  We read Pearce to 
require no more, particularity since trial judges must be 
accorded broad discretion in sentencing."  Id. at 140.   
V 
¶81 To summarize, we hold that the prosecutor did not 
breach the plea agreement at resentencing and thus Naydihor was 
not entitled to a Machner hearing on his ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim.  We also hold that the Pearce presumption of 
vindictiveness did not arise in this case.  We further hold that 
even if the Pearce presumption did apply it was overcome because 
the victim's testimony concerning her deteriorated condition 
constituted 
"'objective 
information . . . justifying 
the 
increased sentence.'"  Id. at 143.  As such, Naydihor's due 
process rights were not violated by the imposition of the second 
sentence. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
No. 
01-3093-CR & 01-3094-CR   
 
 
 
1