Title: State v. Deryl B. Beyer
Citation: 2006 WI 2
Docket Number: 2004AP001208
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 10, 2006

2006 WI 2 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP1208 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Deryl B. Beyer: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Deryl B. Beyer, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 10, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 11, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Green   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel L. LaRocque 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
WILCOX, J., joins the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs and oral 
argument by Donald T. Lang, assistant state public defender. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by 
Eileen Pray, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2006 WI 2
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
  
No.  2004AP1208  
(L.C. No. 
1998CV137) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Deryl B. Beyer: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Deryl B. Beyer,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 10, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Green County, 
Daniel L. LaRocque, Reserve Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is an appeal from 
an order of the circuit court for Green County, Daniel L. 
LaRocque, Reserve Judge, denying Deryl B. Beyer's pro se motion 
for release from commitment as a sexually violent person under 
chapter 980 of the statutes.1  The court of appeals certified the 
                                                 
1 The State, Beyer, and the circuit court characterized 
Beyer's pro se motion as a motion to dismiss the ch. 980 
proceedings.  The effect of a motion to dismiss the ch. 980 
proceedings would be to release Beyer, and we therefore view the 
motion as a motion for release from commitment.  
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
2 
 
case to this court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2003-
04).2  We accepted the certification and affirm the order of the 
circuit court. 
¶2 
Two issues are presented:  First, whether the due 
process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution3 has been violated by a delay of over 22 
months in the present case between the time the first annual 
periodic examination report on Beyer was submitted to the 
circuit court under Wis. Stat. § 980.07 and the circuit court's 
probable 
cause 
hearing 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2)(a) 
to 
determine whether facts exist that warrant a hearing on whether 
Beyer is still a sexually violent person.   We conclude that the 
delay in the present case violated due process. 
¶3 
Second, whether the remedy for this violation of due 
process is, under the circumstances of the present case, the 
release of Beyer from commitment as a sexually violent person.  
We conclude that the circuit court did not err in refusing to 
release Beyer from commitment as a sexually violent person.   
¶4 
Beyer argues before this court that the circuit court 
unreasonably delayed in appointing counsel to represent him at 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law . . . ." 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
3 
 
the probable cause hearing4 and that this delay rendered it 
impossible for him to secure an independent evaluation promptly 
and to have prompt judicial review of his continued detention by 
means of a probable cause hearing.  Beyer contends that the 
delay effectively nullified his due process right to periodic 
judicial review of his civil commitment.  The remedy he proposes 
for the alleged denial of due process is release from commitment 
as a sexually violent person.5 
¶5 
The 
State 
contends 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2)(a) 
governing the probable cause hearing does not provide a time for 
holding the hearing, that this court should not read a time 
limit into the statute, and that the delay in holding the 
probable cause hearing in the present case does not constitute a 
due process violation.    
¶6 
After careful consideration of Wis. Stat. §§ 980.07(1) 
and 980.09(2)(a) and of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, we hold that due process requires that a ch. 980 
committee 
be 
granted 
a 
probable 
cause 
hearing 
within 
a 
meaningful time period after the Department of Health and Family 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 980.09(2)(a) 
provides 
that 
"[t]he 
committed person has a right to have an attorney represent him 
or her at the probable cause hearing, but the person is not 
entitled to be present at the probable cause hearing." 
5 Beyer further argues that the delay deprived him of equal 
protection of the law.  Because we hold that the delay in this 
case violated Beyer's rights under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, we need not reach the question of whether 
Beyer's rights under the Equal Protection Clause were also 
violated. 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
4 
 
Services 
(DHFS) 
provides 
a 
copy 
of 
the 
annual 
periodic 
examination report to the circuit court pursuant to § 980.07(2).  
We hold that, in this case, the delay in holding the probable 
cause hearing was unreasonably long and violated Beyer's due 
process right to periodic judicial review of his ch. 980 civil 
commitment within a meaningful time period. 
¶7 
Nevertheless, we disagree with Beyer's contention that 
he must be released from commitment as a sexually violent 
person.  Beyer presently remains a sexually violent person.  
Release of a person who continues to be sexually violent under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) contravenes the purposes of ch. 980——
treatment of the committee's mental disorder and protection of 
the public——and is not required by the due process clause.  The 
appropriate remedy for a ch. 980 committee when a circuit court 
fails to take prompt action to appoint counsel or an independent 
examiner and hold a probable cause hearing under Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.09(2) is to move for a writ of mandamus or a supervisory 
writ to compel the circuit court to take immediate action.  If 
counsel or an independent examiner delays the proceedings, a ch. 
980 committee could move the circuit court for just and 
equitable relief such as an order to show cause why counsel or 
the independent examiner should not be discharged or why the 
independent examiner should not be ordered to conduct the 
examination promptly or provide the examination report to the 
circuit court immediately. 
¶8 
However, because a ch. 980 committee may encounter 
considerable obstacles to pursuing these remedies, the DHFS, the 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
5 
 
Department of Justice, the bar, and the circuit courts must bear 
substantial responsibility for ensuring prompt judicial review 
of ch. 980 annual periodic examination reports.  We therefore 
recommend appropriate precautionary measures to ensure that the 
due process violation that occurred in the present case does not 
occur in the future. 
I 
¶9 
We begin our analysis by discussing the statutory 
framework 
of 
the 
commitment 
of 
certain 
sexually 
violent 
offenders and the periodic annual examination of ch. 980 
committees.   
¶10 Chapter 
980 
provides 
procedures 
for 
involuntary 
commitment of individuals determined to be "sexually violent 
persons."6  When a felon convicted of certain sexually violent 
offenses7 is to be released from prison, the Department of 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.01(7) defines a sexually violent 
person as  
a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent 
offense, 
has 
been 
adjudicated 
delinquent 
for 
a 
sexually violent offense, or has been found not guilty 
of or not responsible for a sexually violent offense 
by reason of insanity or mental disease, defect, or 
illness, and who is dangerous because he or she 
suffers from a mental disorder that makes it likely 
that the person will engage in acts of sexual 
violence. 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.01(6) defines a sexually violent 
offense as follows: 
(a) Any crime specified in s. 940.225 (1) or (2), 
948.02 (1) or (2), 948.025, 948.06 or 948.07. 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
6 
 
Justice or a local district attorney may petition the circuit 
court to commit that individual to a state institution.8  Once a 
person is determined at trial to be a sexually violent person, 
the circuit court must commit the person to the custody of the 
DHFS for control, care, and treatment until it is determined 
that the person is no longer sexually violent.9   
¶11 Once committed, an individual's primary procedural 
protections are established by Wis. Stat. §§ 980.07 and 980.09.  
Although these statutes do not explicitly set forth a step-by-
step procedure for the annual periodic examination and judicial 
review, they provide a broad outline of the process.10     
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) Any crime specified in s. 940.01, 940.02, 940.05, 
940.06, 940.19 (4) or (5), 940.195 (4) or (5), 940.30, 
940.305, 940.31 or 943.10 that is determined, in a 
proceeding under s. 980.05 (3) (b), to have been 
sexually motivated. 
(c) Any solicitation, conspiracy or attempt to commit 
a crime under par. (a) or (b). 
8 Wis. Stat. § 980.02. 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.06 states: 
If a court or jury determines that the person who is 
the subject of a petition under s. 980.02 is a 
sexually violent person, the court shall order the 
person 
to 
be 
committed 
to 
the 
custody 
of 
the 
department for control, care and treatment until such 
time as the person is no longer a sexually violent 
person. A commitment order under this section shall 
specify that the person be placed in institutional 
care. 
10 State v. Thayer, 2001 WI App 51, ¶12, 241 Wis. 2d 417, 
626 N.W.2d 811. 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
7 
 
¶12 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 980.07(1) 
directs 
the DHFS to 
examine a committed person's mental condition within six months 
after the initial confinement and again thereafter at least once 
every 12 months.11  Within 30 days of the examination, the DHFS 
examiner must prepare a written report and provide a copy of the 
report to the circuit court that committed the person.12  
¶13 At the time of the annual periodic examination under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1), the ch. 980 committee must be provided 
with, pursuant to § 980.09(2)(a), "a written notice of [his or 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.07(1) provides as follows: 
980.07  Periodic examination; report.  (1) If a person 
has been committed under s. 980.06 and has not been 
discharged under s. 980.09, the department shall 
conduct an examination of his or her mental condition 
within 6 months after an initial commitment under s. 
980.06 and again thereafter at least once each 12 
months for the purpose of determining whether the 
person has made sufficient progress for the court to 
consider whether the person should be placed on 
supervised release or discharged. At the time of a 
reexamination under this section, the person who has 
been committed may retain or seek to have the court 
appoint an examiner as provided under s. 980.03 (4). 
See State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶15, 262 
Wis. 2d 720, 665 N.W.2d 155 (Sykes, J., lead opinion) (holding 
that time limits in Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1) are mandatory). 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.07(2) provides as follows:  
Any examiner conducting an examination under this 
section 
shall 
prepare 
a 
written 
report 
of 
the 
examination no later than 30 days after the date of 
the examination.  The examiner shall place a copy of 
the report in the person's medical records and shall 
provide a copy of the report to the court that 
committed the person under s. 980.06.  
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
8 
 
her] right to petition the court for discharge over the 
secretary [of the DHFS's] objection."13  This notice must also 
contain a "waiver of rights" giving the ch. 980 committee the 
option to decline to petition the circuit court for discharge.14   
¶14 The DHFS must "forward the notice and waiver form to 
the court with the report of the department's examination under 
s. 980.07."15  If the ch. 980 committee "does not affirmatively 
waive the right to petition, the court shall set a probable 
cause hearing to determine whether facts exist that warrant a 
hearing on whether the person is still a sexually violent 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09(2)(a) provides as follows: 
(2) Petition without secretary's approval. 
(a) A person may petition the committing court for 
discharge from custody or supervision without the 
secretary's approval. At the time of an examination 
under s. 980.07 (1), the secretary shall provide the 
committed person with a written notice of the person's 
right to petition the court for discharge over the 
secretary's objection. The notice shall contain a 
waiver of rights. The secretary shall forward the 
notice and waiver form to the court with the report of 
the department's examination under s. 980.07. If the 
person does not affirmatively waive the right to 
petition, the court shall set a probable cause hearing 
to determine whether facts exist that warrant a 
hearing on whether the person is still a sexually 
violent person. The committed person has a right to 
have an attorney represent him or her at the probable 
cause hearing, but the person is not entitled to be 
present at the probable cause hearing. 
14 Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2)(a). 
15 Id. 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
9 
 
person."16  The statute does not state when this probable cause 
hearing must be held.   
¶15 Although the ch. 980 committee does not have the right 
to be present at the probable cause hearing, he or she does have 
the right to have an attorney represent him or her at the 
hearing.17  The court of appeals has held that the probable cause 
hearing may be a paper review18 and that the ch. 980 committee 
may retain an independent expert to conduct an examination 
before the hearing and include the report in the record used to 
determine whether probable cause exists to hold a discharge 
hearing.19 
¶16 The 
legislature 
thus 
has 
guaranteed 
a 
ch. 
980 
committee access to periodic judicial review in Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.09(2) with counsel and an independent examiner.  A ch. 980 
committee automatically obtains a probable cause hearing after 
his or her annual periodic examination simply by not signing the 
waiver of rights form. 
 
                                                 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 State v. Paulick, 213 Wis. 2d 432, 438-39, 570 N.W.2d 626 
(Ct. App. 1997) (holding that probable cause hearing under Wis. 
Stat. § 980.09(2) was not intended to be an evidentiary hearing 
but rather a review of the paper record with argument allowed by 
counsel). 
19 Thayer, 241 Wis. 2d 417, ¶¶8-9 (holding, inter alia, that 
Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1) allows appointment of an independent 
examiner). 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
10 
 
II 
¶17 Having set forth the statutory procedure, we turn to 
the undisputed facts of this case, which are a complicated 
chronology of events relating to Beyer's first annual periodic 
examination in 2002.  We set out the relevant undisputed facts 
as follows: 
• November 18, 1999:  Beyer was involuntarily committed to 
the care of the DHFS as a sexually violent person.20 
• January 9, 2001:  The DHFS tardily conducted Beyer's 
initial six-month examination.21 
• February 20, 2002:  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1), the 
DHFS conducted the first annual periodic examination of 
Beyer.  Beyer did not waive his right to petition for 
discharge.   
• March 4, 2002:  The DHFS provided a copy of the annual 
periodic examination report and the unsigned waiver of 
rights form to the circuit court, reporting that Beyer 
continued to be a sexually violent person. 
                                                 
20 See Wis. Stat. § 980.06.  Beyer challenged the judgment 
committing him on procedural grounds.  Judge LaRocque rejected 
this challenge, as did the court of appeals, State v. Beyer, 
2001 WI App 167, 247 Wis. 2d 13, 633 N.W.2d 627, cert. denied, 
Beyer v. Wisconsin, 537 U.S. 1210 (2003).   
21 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.07(1) requires the DHFS to examine 
a ch. 980 committee within six months after an initial 
confinement.  Beyer was not examined until more than one year 
after his initial confinement.  On July 31, 2001, the circuit 
court denied Beyer's petition for discharge in connection with 
the delay in his "six-month" review.  This decision is not part 
of present appeal. 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
11 
 
• May 1, 2002:  Beyer filed a pro se petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus with the circuit court in Green County based 
on the delay in conducting his first annual periodic 
examination.22 
• June 6, 2002:  The circuit court dismissed Beyer's habeas 
corpus petition on the ground that the venue was not 
proper. 
• August 26, 2002:  Beyer wrote the circuit court, reminding 
it that he had not signed the waiver form accompanying the 
first annual periodic examination report and requesting 
counsel and an independent examiner for a probable cause 
hearing.23 
• September 9, 2002:  Ten business days after Beyer's letter, 
the circuit court's judicial assistant forwarded Beyer's 
letter to Juan Colas, the assistant attorney general for 
Beyer's case, and to Beyer's habeas counsel.24 
                                                 
22 Beyer requested appointment of counsel for the habeas 
petition.  On May 13, 2002, Judge LaRocque held a preliminary 
telephone hearing on Beyer's habeas petition, at which attorney 
R. Alan Bates, who had been appointed by the circuit court, 
represented Beyer. 
23 Beyer asked that the circuit court appoint counsel other 
than Attorney Bates, who represented him in his habeas petition, 
or Attorney Jack Hoag, another of Beyer's previous attorneys. 
24 According to the circuit court's order dismissing Beyer's 
motion for release, the circuit court's judicial assistant also 
contacted the office of the State Public Defender about 
appointing counsel for Beyer, but Beyer did not follow an 
instruction to contact that office.  Beyer disputes this 
characterization and states that he was never permitted to 
present evidence on this issue to the circuit court. 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
12 
 
o Over six months had elapsed since the DHFS provided 
the circuit court with Beyer's first annual periodic 
examination report and unsigned waiver form. 
• September 23, 2002:  Assistant Attorney General Colas 
responded to the circuit court, outlining the procedure for 
judicial review of an annual periodic examination report 
under Wis. Stat. § 980.09.  Assistant Attorney General 
Colas's letter, which was copied to the State Public 
Defender, suggested that the State Public Defender appoint 
counsel for Beyer and that the circuit court schedule a 
status conference within 30 days. 
• October 23, 2002:  With no counsel yet appointed to 
represent Beyer, the circuit court held a status conference 
with 
Assistant 
Attorney 
General 
Colas 
to 
discuss 
appointment of counsel.   
o Over seven months had elapsed since the DHFS provided 
the circuit court with Beyer's first annual periodic 
examination report and unsigned waiver form. 
• November 26, 2002:  Attorney Scott Anderson was appointed 
to represent Beyer.   
o Almost nine months had elapsed since the DHFS provided 
the circuit court with Beyer's first annual periodic 
examination report and unsigned waiver form.  
• December 19, 2002:  At a telephone status conference, it 
was decided that Dr. Lynn Maskel would be appointed to 
conduct an independent 
psychological evaluation. 
 No 
written order appointing Dr. Maskel was issued. 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
13 
 
• January 27, 2003:  Beyer wrote the circuit court, alerting 
it that Attorney Anderson had not yet communicated with 
him.   
o Almost 11 months had elapsed since the DHFS provided 
the circuit court with Beyer's first annual periodic 
examination report and unsigned waiver form.  
• February 15, 2003:  Beyer was given his second annual 
periodic examination.  Beyer again did not waive his right 
to petition for discharge. 
• March 1, 2003:  With the judicial review of Beyer's first 
annual periodic examination report still pending, the DHFS 
provided 
the 
report 
of 
the 
second 
annual 
periodic 
examination to the circuit court.   
o Almost one year had elapsed since the DHFS provided 
the circuit court with Beyer's first annual periodic 
examination report and unsigned waiver form. 
• March 28, 2003:  Beyer filed a motion to dismiss counsel 
because Attorney Anderson had not yet communicated with 
him. 
o Almost 13 months had elapsed since the DHFS provided 
the circuit court with Beyer's first annual periodic 
examination report and unsigned waiver form. 
o Almost one month had elapsed since the DHFS provided 
the circuit court with Beyer's second annual periodic 
examination report and unsigned waiver form.  
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
14 
 
• April 9, 2003:  The circuit court granted Beyer's motion 
for a new attorney at a telephone conference and appointed 
Attorney Roger Merry as successor counsel.   
o Over 13 months had elapsed since the DHFS provided the 
circuit court with Beyer's first annual periodic 
examination report and unsigned waiver form.   
o Over one month had elapsed since the DHFS provided the 
circuit court with Beyer's second annual periodic 
examination report and unsigned waiver form. 
• April 29, 2003:  The circuit court entered a written order 
appointing Dr. Maskel as the independent psychological 
evaluator, finally implementing the December 19, 2002 
appointment.   
o Almost 14 months had elapsed since the DHFS provided 
the circuit court with Beyer's first annual periodic 
examination report and unsigned waiver form.   
o Almost two months had elapsed since the DHFS provided 
the circuit court with Beyer's second annual periodic 
examination report and unsigned waiver form. 
• May 12, 2003:  Beyer filed the pro se motion that 
eventually resulted in this appeal, seeking release from 
commitment as a sexually violent person. 
• May 27, 2003:  The circuit court denied Beyer's pro se 
motion. 
• August 5, 2003:  The circuit court held another telephone 
status conference.  Attorney Merry complained on Beyer's 
behalf that Dr. Maskel had yet to file a report on Beyer's 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
15 
 
condition, despite the fact that over three months had 
passed since her appointment.  The circuit court appointed 
a replacement independent examiner, Dr. Ralph Underwager.  
Unfortunately, Dr. Underwager passed away before filing a 
report.  His colleague, Hollida Wakefield, took over 
Beyer's examination.   
o Over 18 months had elapsed since the DHFS provided the 
circuit court with Beyer's first annual periodic 
examination report and unsigned waiver form.   
o Over five months had elapsed since the DHFS provided 
the circuit court with Beyer's second annual periodic 
examination report and unsigned waiver form.   
• January 6, 2004:  Ms. Wakefield filed a report based both 
on her own and Dr. Underwager's examinations, opining that 
there was a substantial probability that Beyer would re-
offend sexually. 
• January 9, 2004:  The circuit court held a telephone 
probable cause hearing and determined that there was not 
probable cause warranting a hearing on whether Beyer was 
still a sexually violent person.   
o Twenty-two months had elapsed since the DHFS provided 
the circuit court with Beyer's first annual periodic 
examination report and unsigned waiver form.   
o Ten months had elapsed since the DHFS provided the 
circuit court with Beyer's second annual periodic 
examination report and unsigned waiver form.  
 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
16 
 
III 
¶18 The issue presented is whether the Due Process 
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution was violated in the present case by a delay of over 
22 months between the time the first annual periodic examination 
report on Beyer was provided to the circuit court under Wis. 
Stat. § 980.07 and the circuit court's probable cause hearing 
under Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2)(a) to determine whether facts exist 
that warrant a hearing on whether Beyer is still a sexually 
violent person.  We hold that the delay in the present case 
violated the due process guarantee. 
¶19 Whether the process provided by the circuit court 
satisfies due process is a question of constitutional law.  This 
court determines questions of constitutional law independently 
of the circuit court, but benefiting from its analysis.25  
 
¶20 The nature and extent of the process due depends on 
the nature of the case and is influenced by the grievousness of 
the loss that may be suffered.26  In determining the process due, 
a reviewing court balances the private interests involved, the 
                                                 
25 State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 715, 345 N.W.2d 457 
(1984). 
26 Determining what process is due in any particular case 
begins with an analysis of the government function involved and 
the private interest affected by the governmental action.  Wolff 
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560 (1974) (considering due process 
rights 
of 
prisoners 
at 
prison 
disciplinary 
proceedings); 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (requiring 
hearings prior to parole revocation). 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
17 
 
government interests involved, and the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of those interests through the procedures used.27 
¶21 Civil 
commitment 
under 
ch. 
980 
"constitutes 
a 
deprivation 
of 
liberty 
that 
is 
subject 
to 
due 
process 
protection."28 
 The private 
interests 
at stake 
in 
civil 
commitment proceedings are similar to those at stake in criminal 
proceedings.29  "Freedom from physical restraint is a fundamental 
                                                 
27 A court balances the following factors: 
[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probative value, if any, of additional 
or substituted procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government's interest, including the function involved 
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail.  
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). 
28 State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, ¶61, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 647 
N.W.2d 762. 
29 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1085 (E.D. Wis. 
1972), vacated on procedural grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974) 
(three-judge district court) (discussing the nature and history 
of 
civil 
commitment); 
see 
Rachel, 
254 
Wis. 2d 215, 
¶45 
(acknowledging that ch. 980 involves "an affirmative disability 
or restraint"). 
Indeed, the deprivation of liberty at stake may, according 
to the United States Supreme Court, be even more serious than 
criminal incarceration: 
In many respects, confinement in a mental institution 
is even more intrusive than incarceration in a prison. 
Inmates of mental institutions, like prisoners, are 
deprived of unrestricted association with friends, 
family, and community; they must contend with locks, 
guards, 
and 
detailed 
regulation 
of 
their 
daily 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
18 
 
right protected by the due process clause from wrongful, 
arbitrary governmental action."30  Commitment to an institution 
even for a short duration works a unique deprivation of liberty 
and may have "long lasting effects on the individual's ability 
to function in the outside world due to the stigma attached to 
mental illness."31 
¶22 Wisconsin has a compelling interest in protecting the 
public from dangerous, sexually violent persons.32  However, the 
State 
also 
has 
an 
interest 
in 
excluding 
from 
treatment 
individuals who are not, or are no longer, sexually violent.  
"Commitment ends when the committed person no longer suffers 
                                                                                                                                                             
activities.  In addition, a person who has been 
hospitalized involuntarily may to a significant extent 
lose the right enjoyed by others to withhold consent 
to medical treatment. . . . We should not presume that 
he lacks a compelling interest in having the decisions 
to commit him and to keep him institutionalized made 
carefully, and in a manner that preserves the maximum 
degree of personal autonomy.  Jones v. United States, 
463 U.S. 354, 384-86 (1983). 
30 Rachel, 254 Wis. 2d 215, ¶61 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 
504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). 
31 Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1091 (three-judge district 
court) (holding prior version of Wisconsin mental illness civil 
commitment statute constitutionally defective). 
32 State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 330, 541 N.W.2d 115 
(1995) ("[T]he state has a compelling interest in protecting the 
public from dangerous mentally disordered persons . . . ."); cf. 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) ("The state has a 
legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing 
care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional 
disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority 
under its police power to protect the community from the 
dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill."). 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
19 
 
from a mental disorder or when that condition no longer 
predisposes him to commit acts of sexual violence."33  Thus the 
State and the ch. 980 committee share a fundamental interest in 
fair and effective processes that allow for periodic review of a 
ch. 980 commitment to avoid the erroneous deprivation of liberty 
interests.  "Untimely periodic reexamination frustrates the 
treatment objective and may keep persons who are no longer a 
danger to the public in institutionalized care longer than 
necessary."34       
¶23 The constitutional right at stake in the instant case 
is the right to be heard for a determination of whether the ch. 
980 committee is no longer mentally disordered and dangerous and 
should be free from institutional confinement.35   
¶24 The constitutionality of Beyer's continued ch. 980 
commitment depends on sufficient judicial oversight so that if 
Beyer is no longer mentally disordered or dangerous, he can seek 
                                                 
33 Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 313-14 (holding that ch. 980 does 
not violate principles of equal protection); see State v. 
Rachel, 2002 WI 81, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762 (holding 
that limits on ch. 980 committees' right to seek supervised 
release do not render ch. 980 unconstitutional); State v. 
Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995) (holding that 
ch. 980 is not a punitive statute and violates neither the ex 
post facto nor double jeopardy clauses of the Wisconsin and 
United States constitutions); cf. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426 
("[T]he State has no interest in confining individuals if they 
are not mentally ill or if they do not pose some danger to 
themselves or others."). 
34 Marberry, 262 Wis. 2d 720, ¶19 (Sykes, J., lead opinion) 
(emphasis added). 
35 Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 328. 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
20 
 
release 
to 
the 
community 
or 
discharge 
from 
commitment.36  
Periodic review provides assurance that the nature and duration 
of commitment are, as due process demands, reasonably related to 
its purpose.  Periodic review not only prevents the unnecessary 
confinement of individuals who are no longer dangerous, it 
promotes the efficient use of treatment resources by applying 
those resources to those persons who actually continue to pose a 
risk to the public and require such treatment. 
¶25 The 
essence 
of 
due 
process 
in 
continued 
civil 
commitment is "'the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner.'"37  Due process and its promise of 
fundamental fairness require that judicial review be provided at 
                                                 
36 Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001) ("Accordingly, 
due process requires that the conditions and duration of 
confinement under the Act bear some reasonable relation to the 
purpose 
for 
which 
persons 
are 
committed."); 
O'Connor 
v. 
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) ("[E]ven if his involuntary 
confinement 
was 
initially 
permissible, 
it 
could 
not 
constitutionally continue after that basis no longer existed."); 
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (due process 
requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear a 
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is 
committed); Rachel, 254 Wis. 2d 215, ¶¶54-56 (holding that ch. 
980 does not violate due process because ch. 980 committees have 
access to adequate procedures through which to seek judicial 
review); State ex rel. Watts v. Combined Cmty. Servs. Bd., 122 
Wis. 2d 65, 362 N.W.2d 104 (1985) (concluding that periodic 
review is required in ch. 55 civil commitment proceedings).  
37 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).  See State ex 
rel. McMillian v. Dickey, 132 Wis. 2d 266, 285-86 392 N.W.2d 453 
(Ct. App. 1986) (in context of probation revocation, "[d]ue 
process is satisfied when an opportunity is accorded to be heard 
in a court at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner"). 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
21 
 
a meaningful time to avoid indefinite detention caused by delay 
of review hearings.38  By providing ch. 980 committees with 
annual periodic examinations and judicial review, ch. 980 
"offers ample and fair opportunity for review and petition for 
release."39      
¶26 In light of the fundamental nature of a ch. 980 
committee's liberty interest and the State's interest in holding 
a ch. 980 committee only for so long as he or she requires 
treatment, the due process requirement that the ch. 980 
committee be heard at a "meaningful time" demands that the 
circuit court hold the probable cause hearing promptly and 
within a reasonable time after the  DHFS provides the circuit 
court with a ch. 980 committee's annual periodic examination 
report and unsigned waiver form. 
¶27 The State concedes that delay in judicial review of a 
person's commitment may be so unreasonable as to constitute a 
due process violation.   
¶28 We must therefore address what limits due process 
places on the time for appointing counsel and appointing an 
                                                 
38 See State v. Beyer, 2001 WI App 167, 247 Wis. 2d 13, 633 
N.W.2d 627 (Beyer's appeal regarding delay in holding the 
probable cause hearing for his initial commitment); cf. State ex 
rel. Jones v. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 195 Wis. 2d 669, 674, 
536 N.W.2d 213 (Ct. App. 1995) ("Due process requires that Jones 
have 
a 
parole 
revocation 
hearing 
within 
a 
reasonable 
time . . . and prevents . . . indefinite detention . . . ."). 
39 Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 326; cf. Watts, 122 Wis. 2d at 72 
(holding that protective placement statute unconstitutionally 
deprived individuals "of an automatic periodic reexamination of 
the need for continued protective placement."). 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
22 
 
independent examiner, two steps ordinarily needed for the 
probable cause hearing under Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2)(a).     
¶29 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09(2)(a) provides no timelines 
for appointment of counsel, for appointment of an independent 
examiner, or for holding a probable cause hearing.  Section 
980.07 provides some timelines; it requires that a periodic 
examination be conducted at least once each 12 months, and that 
an examiner prepare a written report of the examination no later 
than 30 days after the date of the examination and provide it to 
the circuit court.  
¶30 In determining a reasonable time for a probable cause 
hearing in the context of Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2), we must be 
mindful of the circumstances of each case.  "'[D]ue process,' 
unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a 
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances."40   
¶31 In determining a reasonable time for a probable cause 
hearing we must read Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) in conjunction with 
the statutory requirement in § 980.07(1) of an annual review 
process.  By guaranteeing annual periodic examinations and 
judicial review absent a ch. 980 committee's affirmative waiver 
thereof, 
the 
statutes 
assure 
that 
a 
circuit 
court 
will 
expeditiously review the continued validity of a ch. 980 
commitment. 
 
As 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
observed 
in 
its 
                                                 
40 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 
123, 
162 
(1951) 
(Frankfurter, 
J., 
concurring) 
(internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 334 (1976); Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 
U.S. 886, 895 (1961). 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
23 
 
certification, "Logic therefore suggests that the [probable 
cause] proceeding must promptly follow [the annual periodic 
examination] 
to 
avoid 
defeating 
the 
purpose 
of 
the 
re-
examination process, as well as the committed person's due 
process rights."   
¶32 Twenty-two months elapsed between March 4, 2002, when 
the DHFS provided a copy of the annual periodic examination 
report and the unsigned waiver of rights form to the circuit 
court (reporting that Beyer continued to be a sexually violent 
person) and Beyer's probable cause hearing on January 9, 2004.  
It is clear that the circuit court did not act promptly to 
appoint counsel or an independent examiner, two steps ordinarily 
preceding a probable cause hearing, or to hold a probable cause 
hearing.  
¶33 We agree with the State that the circuit court and the 
DHFS were not responsible for the entire 22-month delay.  
Certainly, the State could not foresee and was largely helpless 
to prevent the inaction of Beyer's first appointed attorney and 
the first appointed independent examiner and the unexpected 
death of the second appointed independent examiner. 
¶34 However, when we review the facts, it is clear that at 
a minimum the State was responsible for almost nine months of 
delay, and likely was responsible for at least 13 months of 
delay.  The DHFS provided the circuit court with the annual 
report and Beyer's unsigned waiver on March 4, 2002.  The 
circuit court took its first action toward a probable cause 
hearing on September 9, 2002, when it forwarded Beyer's request 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
24 
 
for an attorney to Beyer's habeas attorney and to the assistant 
attorney general.  Then, the circuit court waited until November 
26, 2002, to appoint an attorney.  In other words, the circuit 
court did not begin the process by which Beyer's annual periodic 
examination report would be reviewed until over six months after 
it received the first annual periodic examination report and did 
not appoint an attorney for Beyer, an essential step in the 
process, until almost nine months had elapsed after it received 
the first annual periodic examination report.  In State v. 
Thayer, 2001 WI App 51, 241 Wis. 2d 417, 626 N.W.2d 811, the 
court of appeals declared that "counsel must simply be appointed 
[for an indigent ch. 980 committee] as soon as possible."41 
¶35 The circuit court also apparently caused delay by 
failing to appoint an independent examiner promptly.  At the 
December 19, 2002 hearing, Attorney Anderson, in the only action 
he took on behalf of Beyer, requested appointment of an 
independent examiner.  The circuit court noted at that hearing 
that Dr. Maskel would be appointed.  However, no order 
appointing Dr. Maskel issued until April 29, 2003.  Thus, four 
additional months of delay passed before Beyer obtained an 
independent examination.  No progress could be made until the 
examination occurred, because counsel must evaluate the record 
                                                 
41 Thayer, 241 Wis. 2d 417, ¶32 (ch. 980 case). 
It appears from the record that the circuit court never 
made an explicit determination regarding whether Beyer was 
eligible for court-appointed counsel.  However, both parties and 
the circuit court assume he was eligible, as do we. 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
25 
 
after an independent examiner conducts a reevaluation of the ch. 
980 committee before a probable cause hearing.42   
¶36 A delay of almost nine months before appointing 
counsel and beginning the process by which judicial review can 
be had cannot be said to be reasonable.  This delay does not 
permit the ch. 980 committee to be heard at a meaningful time 
and offends notions of fundamental fairness.  An almost nine-
month delay before appointing counsel renders it unlikely, if 
not impossible, that a discharge hearing could be held within 
one year.  Implicit in the annual periodic examination process 
is that, even if judicial review of the examination report 
cannot always be completed within one year, the circuit court 
should ordinarily have at least taken the essential step of 
appointing counsel early within the one-year period. 
¶37 We have now accounted for 13 months of the 22-month 
delay.  The remaining nine months of the 22-month delay were not 
caused by the circuit court.  Part of the nine months is 
inherent in the review process.  For example, some time must be 
allotted for appointed counsel to talk with the client, to 
                                                 
42 See Thayer, 241 Wis. 2d 417, ¶¶8-9 (holding, inter alia, 
that Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1) allows a ch. 980 committee to retain 
an independent examiner). 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
26 
 
evaluate the matter, and for the independent examiner to 
schedule and conduct the independent examination.43   
¶38 In this case, there was additional delay because 
Beyer's first appointed counsel never contacted Beyer, because 
his first independent examiner never conducted an examination, 
and because his second independent examiner met an untimely 
death. 
¶39 Although neither the circuit court nor the State was 
responsible for these delays, neither was Beyer.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 980.09(2) requires little action by a ch. 980 committee 
who wishes to petition for discharge.  The statute allows for 
automatic review of the annual periodic examination report.  The 
statute appears to make the circuit court responsible for 
initiating and managing the judicial review of the annual 
periodic examination report after it is provided to the circuit 
court.   
¶40 The circuit court, in its order dismissing Beyer's pro 
se motion, stated that Beyer failed to take necessary action to 
facilitate the assignment of counsel to his case after the 
circuit court clerk, in September 2002, informed Beyer that he 
                                                 
43 Under Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2), a ch. 980 committee has the 
burden of proving that there is probable cause that he is no 
longer sexually violent.  Consequently, a ch. 980 committee's 
attorney must have specialized knowledge and may require 
significant time to prepare for the hearing.  Thus it is 
particularly important that a circuit court act promptly to 
appoint counsel.   
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
27 
 
should contact the State Public Defender.44  There is no evidence 
in the record, however, that Beyer's alleged inaction caused any 
significant 
delay. 
 
Because 
Beyer's 
alleged 
failure 
to 
communicate with the State Public Defender occurred sometime in 
September 2002, Beyer's inaction could not have contributed to 
seven months of the troublesome nine-month delay before the 
circuit court appointed counsel on November 26, 2002.   
¶41 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09(2) guarantees a ch. 980 
committee counsel for his probable cause hearing.  Thus, the 
court has a burden to make certain that the ch. 980 committee is 
able to retain his own counsel or to appoint counsel for the ch. 
980 committee.  Because Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) puts the 
procedural onus on the State, not the ch. 980 committee, the 
circuit court should have taken responsibility for appointment 
of counsel much earlier in the review process. 
¶42 In its decision dismissing Beyer's pro se motion for 
discharge, the circuit court pointed to the fact that on May 1, 
2002, Beyer filed a motion for a writ of habeas corpus and the 
circuit court then appointed an attorney to assist him with that 
                                                 
44 Beyer denies that he was ever directed to contact the 
State Public Defender.  However, "[f]indings of fact shall not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . ."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.17(2).  We do not decide whether the circuit court's 
finding that Beyer failed to contact the public defender is 
clearly erroneous.  While we note that Beyer contests this claim 
and that the factual bases for this finding appear not to have 
been litigated, a determination of whether this finding is 
clearly erroneous is not necessary to the outcome of this case. 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
28 
 
petition.45  The circuit court, it appears, was suggesting either 
that it believed Beyer already to be represented by counsel for 
the purpose of his probable cause hearing or that Beyer's habeas 
corpus action tolled the circuit court's obligation to act 
promptly upon the probable cause hearing. 
¶43 Even if the circuit court were correct in these 
assertions, the habeas proceeding would have excused just over 
one month of the nearly nine-month delay in appointing counsel 
for Beyer's probable cause hearing.  Beyer filed his petition 
for habeas corpus on May 1, 2002, two months after the DHFS 
provided the circuit court with the first annual periodic 
examination report and unsigned waiver form.  The circuit court 
dismissed his habeas motion on June 6, 2002, over five months 
before it appointed counsel and 10 months before it appointed an 
independent examiner.  Thus, even if we were to accept that the 
habeas 
proceeding 
tolled 
the 
requirement 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.09(2) to hold a probable cause hearing, over seven months 
of 
delay 
before 
appointing 
counsel 
is 
left 
completely 
unaccounted for.   
¶44 The circuit court failed to explain why it did not act 
on the unsigned waiver form in the two months before Beyer filed 
his habeas motion or why it did not act for five months after 
dismissing Beyer's habeas motion.  Further, the habeas motion 
                                                 
45 The habeas corpus petition was based on the delay of 
almost seven months in conducting Beyer's initial (six-month) 
periodic examination.  That delay is not before us. 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
29 
 
does not in any way explain the four-month delay in appointing 
the first independent examiner.   
¶45 Further, the circuit court's apparent beliefs that the 
habeas proceeding tolled the requirement that it appoint counsel 
for Beyer for the probable cause hearing and that Beyer's 
appointed habeas counsel was also his counsel for the probable 
cause hearing were unfounded.  Beyer's habeas counsel, Attorney 
Bates, was appointed for that proceeding only, and there is no 
evidence in the record that Attorney Bates performed work for 
Beyer outside the bounds of his appointment.  Nor has the 
circuit court or the State cited any case in which filing a 
habeas petition tolled the State's obligation to initiate the 
review process by appointing counsel after a ch. 980 committee 
does not waive his right to judicial review of an annual 
periodic examination report.   
¶46 To summarize:  No reason appears on the record to 
justify the delay in the circuit court's appointment of counsel.  
The circuit court was responsible for a delay that meant the 
probable cause hearing could not have been held until nine to 13 
months after the DHFS provided the circuit court with Beyer's 
first 
annual 
periodic 
examination 
report. 
 
This 
delay 
significantly weakened the protection of the annual periodic 
examination and Beyer's right to be heard at a meaningful time.  
Indeed, in the present case, Beyer was permitted but a single 
probable cause hearing on both his first and second annual 
periodic examination reports.  
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
30 
 
¶47 Regardless of whether the 13 months of delay were 
caused by the DHFS, the circuit court, the circuit court judge's 
assistant, the attorney general's office, Beyer's attorney, or 
some combination of them, the delay was unreasonably long 
because it deprived Beyer of his due process right to be heard 
at a meaningful time. 
IV 
¶48 Having established that Beyer's due process rights 
were violated by the untimely judicial review, we must now 
consider the remedy.  Beyer contends that because his right to 
due process was violated, he is entitled to discharge.  
¶49 The reports of both the DHFS examiner and the 
independent examiner concluded that Beyer continued to be a 
sexually violent person who was too dangerous to discharge from 
ch. 980 commitment.  At the tardy probable cause hearing, the 
circuit court agreed with the examiners. 
¶50 Discharge is not an appropriate remedy for a sexually 
violent person who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a 
mental disorder that makes it likely that he or she will engage 
in acts of sexual violence.46   
¶51 In State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, 262 
Wis. 2d 720, 665 N.W.2d 155, a ch. 980 committee who had been 
found by the DHFS and the circuit court to be a sexually violent 
person petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus based on the 
                                                 
46 State v. Schulpius, 2006 WI 1, ¶¶39-40, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___ N.W.2d ___. 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
31 
 
failure of the DHFS to conduct an initial evaluation within the 
six-month timeframe as required by Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1).47  
With one justice not participating and the justices divided on 
certain issues, the justices were nevertheless unanimous that 
release was not appropriate for an individual deemed dangerous 
under ch. 980.  The lead opinion, written by Justice Sykes and 
joined by Justice Wilcox and Justice Crooks, explained the 
problem with releasing a sexually violent person as follows: 
Release of a ch. 980 patient whose dangerousness or 
mental disorder has not abated serves neither to 
protect the public nor provide care and treatment for 
the patient.  Accordingly, release is not only 
inappropriate, it is not justifiable under the dual 
purposes of the statute: protection of the public from 
sexually violent persons likely to reoffend and care 
and treatment of the patient.  Mandamus and contempt 
are 
more 
appropriate 
to 
the 
purposes 
of 
the 
statute . . . .48 
¶52 Justice Bradley, in an opinion that Justice Bablitch 
and I joined, agreed that releasing Marberry was not an 
appropriate remedy: 
I understand and share the reticence of Justice Sykes' 
lead opinion for the remedy of release.  Marberry 
continues to suffer from a mental illness which makes 
it substantially probable that he will engage in acts 
of sexual violence if not continued in institutional 
care.  Release at this time would unduly endanger the 
public.49 
                                                 
47 Marberry, 262 Wis. 2d 720, ¶¶3-4.  Although the present 
case addresses a motion for discharge, not a habeas corpus 
petition, the requested remedy——release——is of course the same. 
48 Marberry, 262 Wis. 2d 720, ¶30 (Sykes, J., lead opinion) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
49 Id., ¶36 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
32 
 
¶53 When a ch. 980 committee continues to be a sexually 
violent person, the cost to the public of releasing him into 
society would simply be too high and would be contrary to ch. 
980's treatment objective.  Thus, we conclude that discharge is 
inappropriate in this case. 
¶54 When a circuit court fails to act promptly after the 
DHFS provides it with a ch. 980 committee's annual periodic 
examination report and unsigned waiver form, the appropriate 
remedies are similar to those set forth in Marberry.  In 
Marberry, the lead opinion concluded that when the delay was 
caused by the DHFS's failure to provide a periodic examination 
in a timely manner, the aggrieved ch. 980 committee should move 
for "a writ of mandamus to compel an initial or periodic 
reexamination, backed up by contempt, with a fine or jail as a 
sanction."50  In the present case, when the circuit court failed 
to take prompt action to appoint counsel and an independent 
examiner and hold a probable cause hearing under Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.09(2), Beyer should have moved for a writ of mandamus or a 
supervisory writ to compel the circuit court to take immediate 
action.  These remedies help ensure that a ch. 980 committee 
receives the process due to him while protecting the public from 
the discharge of dangerous persons and promoting effective 
treatment of sexually violent persons. 
¶55 We 
do 
not, 
however, 
place 
the 
entire 
onus 
of 
protecting a ch. 980 committee's due process rights on the 
                                                 
50 Id., ¶27. 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
33 
 
committee.  In Marberry, Justice Bradley, joined by two other 
justices, urged that a ch. 980 committee not bear the full 
responsibility for pursuing the above-enumerated remedies: 
Perhaps most problematic, however, is that the lead 
opinion's remedies are misdirected.  Rather than put 
the onus of ensuring compliance with the law on a 
mentally ill, institutionalized patient, I would put 
it where it belongs: on the Department of Health and 
Family Services [].51   
¶56 The State has an interest in treating only those ch. 
980 committees who remain sexually violent persons and an 
obligation to protect the due process rights of all its people.  
To this end, the institutional bodies of the State responsible 
for enforcement of ch. 980——the DHFS, the Department of Justice, 
and the circuit courts——should ensure prompt annual judicial 
review of ch. 980 committees' continued detention.  
¶57 These entities can implement procedures that guarantee 
a ch. 980 committee's due process rights at the critical stages, 
namely the annual periodic examination, the appointment of 
counsel, the appointment of an independent examiner, the 
                                                 
51 Id., ¶37 (Bradley, J., concurring); cf. McMillian, 132 
Wis. 2d at 282 ("According to the circuit court and the 
department, a petitioner in a certiorari action must not only 
properly file his action, but he must then additionally cajole 
and prod both the circuit court and the department to perform 
those actions already required of them by virtue of the filing 
of the action.  We reject this attempt to shift the blame for 
delay in the proceedings from those who have failed to act in 
the manner required by law to one who has complied with all 
legal requirements."); Watts, 122 Wis. 2d at 78 (quoting Doe v. 
Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 1981)) ("'[T]heir 
protection is illusory when a large segment of the protected 
class cannot realistically be expected to set the proceedings 
into motion in the first place.'").  
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
34 
 
probable cause hearing, and, if probable cause is found, the 
hearing on the issue of whether the ch. 980 committee is still a 
sexually violent person.  
¶58 The DHFS can assist the circuit court in efficient 
case management by diligently adhering to the procedures and 
time limits set forth in ch. 980.  As the agency charged with 
the custody, care, and control of ch. 980 committees, the DHFS 
plays an essential role in the annual periodic examination 
process.   
¶59 A circuit court must take appropriate steps to 
institute case management techniques by which the circuit court 
is advised of the critical steps in reviewing an annual periodic 
evaluation report, that is, the appointment of an attorney and 
independent examiner and the holding of a probable cause 
hearing.  Case management is essential to the efficient 
functioning of judicial review of commitments.  We refrain from 
setting out a specific procedure circuit courts must follow to 
implement a "tickler" and follow-up system that prompts the 
circuit court to assure that the matter is proceeding promptly.  
We leave the implementation of the case management system to 
circuit courts and administrative staff.  The circuit courts 
should not, however, rely on communication from the ch. 980 
committee to keep the probable cause hearing process moving 
along promptly.  This case demonstrates the problems that occur 
when no "tickler" and follow-up system is in place or when any 
such system fails and the circuit court neglects to hold a 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
35 
 
probable cause hearing at a meaningful time in violation of the 
due process rights of a ch. 980 committee. 
¶60 The State Public Defender's office must promptly 
appoint 
counsel, 
and 
counsel 
must 
exercise 
his 
or 
her 
responsibilities diligently.   
¶61 We commend the Attorney General's office for sending 
what it calls a "Paulick letter"52 to circuit courts in some ch. 
980 periodic review proceedings.  According to the State's 
description at oral argument, the Attorney General's office 
frequently sends a letter to a circuit court reminding it of the 
need to conduct a probable cause hearing.  The so-called 
"Paulick letter" would be helpful in every case to keep the 
judicial review process timely and to prevent due process 
violations.53 
¶62 The onus is on the DHFS, the Department of Justice, 
the bar, and the circuit courts to act promptly on an annual 
periodic examination report and unsigned waiver form.  
* * * * 
                                                 
52 In State v. Paulick, 213 Wis. 2d 432, 570 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. 
App. 
1997), the court of 
appeals 
held that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.09(2) requires only a paper hearing to determine whether 
probable cause exists to hold a hearing on whether the ch. 980 
committee is still a sexually violent person.  In response to 
the Paulick decision, the Attorney General apparently is sending 
what it calls a Paulick letter. 
53 In the present case, Assistant Attorney General Colas 
sent such a letter to the circuit court, but did so more than 
seven months after Beyer's unsigned waiver form was filed, too 
late to avoid the violation of Beyer's due process rights. 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
36 
 
¶63 After careful consideration of Wis. Stat. §§ 980.07(1) 
and 980.09(2)(a) and of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, we hold that due process requires that a ch. 980 
committee 
be 
granted 
a 
probable 
cause 
hearing 
within 
a 
meaningful time after the DHFS provides a copy of the annual 
periodic examination report of the ch. 980 committee to the 
circuit court pursuant to § 980.07(2).  We hold that, in this 
case, the delay in holding the probable cause hearing was 
unreasonably long and violated Beyer's due process right to be 
heard at a meaningful time. 
¶64 Nevertheless, we disagree with Beyer's contention that 
he must be released from commitment as a sexually violent 
person.  Beyer presently remains a sexually violent person.  
Release of a person who continues to be sexually violent under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) contravenes the purposes of ch. 980——
treatment of the committee's mental disorder and protection of 
the public——and is not required by the due process clause.  The 
appropriate remedy for a ch. 980 committee when a circuit court 
fails to take prompt action to appoint counsel or an independent 
examiner and hold a probable cause hearing under Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.09(2) is to move for a writ of mandamus or a supervisory 
writ to compel the circuit court to take immediate action.  If 
counsel or an independent examiner delays the proceedings, a ch. 
980 committee could move the circuit court for just and 
equitable relief such as an order to show cause why counsel or 
the independent examiner should not be discharged or why the 
independent examiner should not be ordered to conduct the 
No. 
2004AP1208   
 
37 
 
examination promptly or provide the examination report to the 
circuit court immediately. 
¶65 However, because a ch. 980 committee may encounter 
considerable obstacles to pursuing these remedies, the DHFS, the 
Department of Justice, the bar, and the circuit courts must bear 
substantial responsibility for ensuring prompt judicial review 
of the annual periodic examination reports.  
¶66 We 
therefore 
recommend 
appropriate 
precautionary 
measures to ensure that the due process violations that occurred 
in the present case do not occur in the future.  
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
¶67 DAVID T. PROSSER, JR., J., did not participate. 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2004AP1208.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶68 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   I concur 
in the majority opinion's conclusion that Deryl B. Beyer did not 
receive a timely Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2)(a) probable cause 
hearing.  Majority op., ¶2.  I also concur in the majority 
opinion's conclusion of what is an appropriate remedy.  Majority 
op., ¶3.  I write separately because under the facts of this 
case Beyer has not made a sufficient showing of state action 
that prejudiced him at the probable cause hearing.  Therefore, I 
conclude his right to due process of law was not violated by the 
interval between the filing of the report of his annual periodic 
examination and the probable cause hearing conducted pursuant to 
§ 980.09(2)(a).  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶69 Beyer claims that because there was a 22-month 
interval between the filing of his first annual periodic 
examination and the probable cause hearing available under Wis. 
Stat. § 980.09(2)(a), his right to due process was violated.  
The majority opinion agrees with this contention.  Majority op., 
¶2.  
¶70 The 22-month interval had many causes.  The undisputed 
facts show that on February 20, 2002, Beyer's first annual 
periodic examination was conducted.  On March 4, 2002, the 
Department of Health and Family Services timely filed the report 
and a form showing that Beyer had not waived his right to a 
probable cause hearing.  On August 26, 2002, Beyer requested a 
probable cause hearing, which request the court forwarded to 
Beyer's last counsel of record on September 9, 2002.  On 
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September 23, 
2002, 
the 
assistant 
attorney 
general 
wrote 
suggesting that the State Public Defender appoint counsel for 
Beyer for the probable cause hearing.  On October 23, 2002, the 
court held a status conference to determine how best to move the 
matter along.  On November 26, 2002, the court appointed an 
attorney to represent Beyer.  On December 19, 2002, counsel and 
the court agreed that Dr. Lynn Maskel would be contacted to do 
an independent psychological evaluation.   
¶71 On January 16, 2003, Beyer wrote the circuit court to 
complain that his attorney had not contacted him.  The clerk 
forwarded the letter to counsel that the court had appointed on 
November 26.  On March 28, 2003, Beyer moved to dismiss his 
attorney and for the appointment of another attorney.  The court 
held a phone conference on Beyer's motion on April 3, 2003.  On 
April 9, 2003, the circuit court granted Beyer's request for a 
new attorney and appointed Attorney Roger Merry to represent 
Beyer in the future. 
¶72 On August 5, 2003, the circuit court held another 
telephone status conference.  At that conference, Attorney Merry 
complained that Dr. Maskel had yet to file a report on Beyer's 
behalf, despite his repeated contacts of her.  That same day the 
circuit court appointed Dr. Ralph Underwager as a replacement 
independent psychological examiner.  Dr. Underwager began work 
on Beyer's behalf, but he died before he could file a report.  
Upon learning of Dr. Underwager's death, the court promptly 
appointed Dr. Hollida Wakefield, a colleague of Dr. Underwager, 
to complete an independent review of Beyer's mental condition.  
No.  2004AP1208.pdr 
 
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¶73 On February 25, 2003, Dr. Pierquet completed Beyer's 
second annual evaluation.  She concluded he remained sexually 
dangerous.  On January 6, 2004, Dr. Wakefield filed her report 
in which she concluded that there was a substantial probability 
that Beyer would re-offend.  On January 9, 2004, the circuit 
court 
conducted 
a 
telephonic 
probable 
cause 
hearing 
and 
determined that there was not probable cause to warrant a 
hearing on whether Beyer continued to be a sexually violent 
person.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶74 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09(2)(a) provides that a ch. 980 
committee may petition the court for discharge from custody or 
supervision.  It also provides that if the committee has not 
waived the right to petition, the court is to set a probable 
cause hearing to determine whether facts exist that warrant a 
hearing on whether the person is still sexually violent.  
Section 980.09(2)(a) contains no time limit for holding a 
probable cause hearing. Therefore, the State has an obligation 
to hold a hearing within a reasonable time.  See Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶75 Whether a violation of due process has occurred is a 
question 
of 
law 
that 
we 
review 
independently. 
State 
v. 
Aufderhaar, 2005 WI 108, ¶10, 283 Wis. 2d 336, 700 N.W.2d 4.    
B. 
Due Process 
¶76 The 
majority 
opinion 
relies 
on 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution to conclude that 
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Beyer has sustained a due process violation due to unreasonable 
delay in holding the probable cause hearing.  Majority op., ¶6.  
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part, "nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without 
due 
process 
of 
law 
. . ." 
(emphasis 
added).  
Accordingly, a due process violation can occur only as a result 
of state action or inaction when there is a duty to act.  See 
State v. Jadowski, 2004 WI 68, ¶42, 272 Wis. 2d 418, 680 N.W.2d 
810.   
¶77 We have held that in certain circumstances only an 
intentional delay by the State will violate a person's right to 
due process.  State v. Montgomery, 148 Wis. 2d 593, 595, 436 
N.W.2d 303 (1989) (concluding that "only an intentional delay by 
the State to avoid juvenile [court] jurisdiction constitutes a 
due-process violation").  We have also held that a due process 
violation may arise from "wrongful, arbitrary" actions of the 
government.  State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, ¶61, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 
647 N.W.2d 762.  The United States Supreme Court has held that 
the test to be applied to the timeliness by which a state holds 
a hearing 
or 
trial is 
one 
of 
reasonableness 
under the 
circumstances the case at hand presents.  Barker, 407 U.S. at 
533. 
¶78 Barker sets out four factors to consider when a claim 
is made that due process rights have been violated because of a 
delay in holding a hearing:  (1) the length of delay; (2) the 
reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right 
to a hearing; and (4) prejudice caused the defendant by the 
No.  2004AP1208.pdr 
 
5 
 
delay.  Id. at 530.  As Barker explains, "none of the four 
factors identified [is] either a necessary or sufficient 
condition to the finding of a deprivation of the [due process 
right]."  Id. at 533.  Barker's four factors inform my analysis.   
¶79 I agree with the majority opinion that a 22-month 
delay in holding a probable cause hearing is too long.  However, 
that 
delay 
is 
only 
a 
triggering 
event 
that 
requires 
consideration of an asserted due process violation.  Id. at 530.  
Here, there has been no allegation that the delay was intended 
to deny Beyer a probable cause hearing, and state action did not 
cause most of the delay.  
¶80 The majority opinion finds fault with the circuit 
court for what it characterizes as "not begin[ning] the process 
by which Beyer's annual periodic examination report would be 
reviewed until over six months after it received [it.]"  
Majority op., ¶34.  However, Beyer did not request a probable 
cause hearing until five months later.  Only 14 days after Beyer 
made his request, the court forwarded it to his last counsel of 
record and to the last counsel of record for the State.  
Fourteen days after that, the court determined that the public 
defender needed to appoint successor counsel for Beyer, and one 
month later the court held a status conference to see how 
preparations for the probable cause hearing were progressing.  
None of those time intervals was unreasonable.   
¶81 Furthermore, all of the delays between the October 23, 
2002 status conference and the telephonic probable cause hearing 
on January 9, 2004 were the result of events that do not 
No.  2004AP1208.pdr 
 
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constitute state action:  an appointed attorney that did not 
proceed with diligence; an appointed expert that did not 
complete the required report; an appointed expert who died 
before his report could be filed.   
¶82 And finally, the report that Beyer's expert filed on 
January 6, 2004 concluded that Beyer remained a sexually violent 
person who was substantially likely to re-offend, as had the 
State's initial periodic review that was filed March 4, 2002 and 
the State's second annual review, completed by Dr. Pierquet on 
February 25, 2003.  Therefore, Beyer was not prejudiced by the 
delay in conducting a probable cause hearing.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶83 Because Beyer has not made a sufficient showing of 
state action that prejudiced him at the probable cause hearing, 
I conclude that his right to due process of law was not violated 
by the interval between the filing of the report of his annual 
periodic examination and the probable cause hearing conducted 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.09(2)(a). 
 
Therefore, 
I 
respectfully concur in the majority opinion. 
¶84 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this concurrence. 
 
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