Title: Lunsford v. Mills
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 385PA13
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: December 19, 2014

NO. COA12-1377 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 20 August 2013 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Dare County 
Nos. 09 CRS 85-88, 91 
ROBERT T. WALSTON, SR. 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 17 February 2012 
by Judge Cy A. Grant in Superior Court, Dare County.  Heard in 
the Court of Appeals 21 May 2013. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 
Sherri Horner Lawrence, for the State. 
 
Mark Montgomery for Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
McGEE, Judge. 
 
 
Robert T. Walston, Sr. (Defendant) was indicted for 
offenses involving two sisters, E.C. and J.C., ranging from June 
1988 to October 1989.  In 1994, E.C. and J.C. were interviewed 
by "law enforcement and/or Social Services[.]"  They did not 
report the incidents with which Defendant was later charged. 
E.C. and J.C. told each other of the incidents in January 2001, 
but they did not share details or specifics.  They told their 
parents, but no one called law enforcement. 
-2- 
"[N]ear the end of 2008[,]" J.C. contacted law enforcement 
to report the offenses.  The indictments were filed 12 January 
2009, approximately two decades after the alleged events. 
Superseding indictments were filed 14 November 2011.  At the 
time of trial, E.C. was twenty-nine years old, and J.C. was 
twenty-seven years old.  Defendant was convicted on 17 February 
2012 of one count of first-degree sex offense, three counts of 
first-degree rape, and five counts of indecent liberties with a 
child.  Defendant appeals. 
I. Character Evidence of Defendant's Respectful Treatment of 
Children 
 
Defendant first argues the trial court erred in excluding 
testimony that Defendant was "respectful around children and 
interact[ed] in a positive way with children." 
A. Preservation of the Error for Review 
We must first address whether the issue is preserved for 
our review.  Counsel and the trial court evidently discussed 
"issues" regarding certain witnesses.  This discussion was not 
recorded or transcribed.  Counsel then presented arguments as to 
whether the trial court should admit Defendant's evidence "with 
regard 
to 
specific 
character 
traits 
of 
[Defendant]."  
Specifically, Defendant sought to introduce good character 
evidence of Defendant's respectful treatment of children.  The 
trial court denied Defendant's request to make a "brief proffer" 
-3- 
of evidence through witness testimony, stating: "I'm not going 
to allow that.  I don't think I need to do a proffer on that."   
Defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief with this 
Court on the same date that he filed his brief, arguing that his 
constitutional right to present a defense was denied when the 
trial court refused his request to make a proffer of evidence.  
Although Defendant stated in his MAR that his counsel "did not 
make a formal proffer of the testimony of these witnesses[,]" 
his counsel did make the following statement to the trial court: 
If I may, Judge, in the way of proffer 
rather 
than 
calling 
the 
witnesses 
and 
offering them later, if I might just offer, 
Your 
Honor, 
that 
it 
would 
have 
been 
[D]efendant's intention and in anticipation 
that I would have been asking Mr. Anthony 
Ralph, Mr. Jessie Walston, Timmy Walston, 
Bett Beasley, Jim Beasley, Molly Walston, 
Amelia Twiddy, Crystal Maqueda, Christina 
Purtee, Carolyn Ambrose, would have asked 
each and every one of those people this same 
series 
of 
questions 
about 
observing 
interactions with children.  Based on my 
interviews each would say they have seen him 
in several different settings with numerous 
groups of children.  I would have asked each 
of them if they had an opinion as to whether 
these 
allegations 
are 
consistent 
or 
inconsistent with his character for how he 
deals or treats children.  Each of those 
individuals, 
Your 
Honor, 
based 
on 
my 
interviews, would have testified that they 
do have an opinion and that in their opinion 
these allegations are inconsistent with the 
caring, respectful way they have always seen 
him dealing with children, that that -- this 
is not part of his character and it is 
inconsistent with his character.  There 
-4- 
would be other witnesses to testify to that 
but hopefully that is enough to preserve our 
exception, Judge, and we'd ask the Court to 
accept that as our proffer and what that 
testimony would be. 
 
"[I]n order for a party to preserve for appellate review 
the exclusion of evidence, the significance of the excluded 
evidence must be made to appear in the record and a specific 
offer of proof is required unless the significance of the 
evidence is obvious from the record."  State v. Simpson, 314 
N.C. 359, 370, 334 S.E.2d 53, 60 (1985); see also State v. 
Mackey, 352 N.C. 650, 660, 535 S.E.2d 555, 560 (2000).  The 
"essential content or substance of the witness' testimony must 
be shown before we can ascertain whether prejudicial error 
occurred."  Simpson, 314 N.C. at 370, 334 S.E.2d at 60. 
"'The practice of permitting counsel to insert answers 
rather than have the witness give them in the presence of the 
court should not be encouraged.'"  Id.  (quoting State v. 
Willis, 285 N.C. 195, 200, 204 S.E.2d 33, 36 (1974)).  "The 
words of the witness, and not the words counsel thinks the 
witness might have used, should go in the record."  Simpson, 314 
N.C. at 370, 334 S.E.2d at 60.  "The better practice is to 
excuse the jury and complete the record in open court in the 
absence of the jury."  Id.  "While the principles are usually 
cited in situations where particular testimony of a witness 
-5- 
already on the stand is excluded, they apply with equal vigor 
when the witness is not permitted to testify at all."  Simpson, 
314 N.C. at 370, 334 S.E.2d at 60-61. 
The trial court in Simpson denied the defendant's request 
"to have the assistant district attorney testify."  Simpson, 314 
N.C. at 370-71, 334 S.E.2d at 61.  Counsel's offer of proof as 
to what the witness would have testified to was:  
His observations, if Your Honor please, are 
what I'm interested in, what he observed on 
the 13th of June 1983 and what he saw and 
how the defendant appeared to him; whether 
or not it would be the same as what's in the 
motion, Judge, I don't know. 
 
Simpson, 314 N.C. at 371, 334 S.E.2d at 61 (emphasis removed).  
Our Supreme Court held the offer "insufficient to establish the 
'essential content or substance' of the witness' testimony. 
Defense counsel himself admitted that he did not know what the 
prosecutor's testimony would be."  Id. 
The trial court's decision in the present case to deny a 
proffer of witness testimony is incorrect.  The words of the 
witnesses should go in the record, not the words counsel thinks 
the witnesses might have used.  Willis, 285 N.C. at 200, 204 
S.E.2d at 36.  Since the trial court denied a proffer from the 
witnesses, we have only the proffer from Defendant's counsel to 
review.  The offer of proof, quoted above, was a specific 
forecast of what the testimony would be.  Counsel did not 
-6- 
express doubt as to the content of the testimony.  Rather, he 
based his forecast on interviews with the witnesses.  This fact 
indicates that counsel did not merely guess what the witnesses 
might say, but gave a reasonable forecast of the evidence.  We 
hold that counsel's offer of proof is sufficient to establish 
the essential content or substance of the excluded testimony. 
Because of this holding, the affidavits attached to 
Defendant's motion for appropriate relief are unnecessary to 
preserve this issue for review.  We therefore deny Defendant's 
motion for appropriate relief and analyze the merits of 
Defendant's argument. 
B. Analysis of the Merits 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding 
testimony that Defendant was respectful around children and 
interacted in a positive way with children.  We agree. 
i. Rule 
"Generally, [e]vidence of a person's character or a trait 
of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving 
that 
he 
acted 
in 
conformity 
therewith 
on 
a 
particular 
occasion[.]"  State v. Banks, 191 N.C. App. 743, 746, 664 S.E.2d 
355, 358 (2008) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(a)) 
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
-7- 
See also State v. Squire, 321 N.C. 541, 546, 364 S.E.2d 354, 357 
(1988). 
"However, an exception is provided for an accused, who may 
present evidence of a pertinent trait of his character in an 
attempt to prove he acted in accord with this trait."  Banks, 
191 N.C. App. at 746, 664 S.E.2d at 358.  The exception harbors 
an important right of the accused to present evidence which 
tends to lessen the likelihood of the accused's guilt.  See 1 
Brandis & Broun on North Carolina Evidence § 88 (7th ed. 2011). 
"[T]he use of the word 'pertinent,' in the context of Rule 
404(a)(1), is 'tantamount to relevant.'"  Banks, 191 N.C. App. 
at 746-47, 664 S.E.2d at 358 (quoting Squire, 321 N.C. at 547, 
364 S.E.2d at 358). 
Thus, in determining whether evidence of a 
character trait is admissible under Rule 
404(a)(1), the trial court must determine 
whether the trait in question is relevant; 
i.e., whether it would "make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action" more or less 
probable than it would be without evidence 
of the trait. 
 
Banks, 191 N.C. App. at 747, 664 S.E.2d at 358. 
An "accused must tailor his character evidence to a 
'pertinent' trait, but the trait may be general in nature 
provided that it is relevant in the context of the crime 
charged."  Squire, 321 N.C. at 548, 364 S.E.2d at 358.  "The 
-8- 
trial judge may, in his sound discretion, limit the number of 
character witnesses a defendant may call to the stand."  State 
v. McCray, 312 N.C. 519, 537, 324 S.E.2d 606, 618 (1985). 
In McCray, "the defendant was permitted to offer some 
evidence of his good character, but was not permitted to offer 
all of evidence which he was prepared to offer on this issue."  
Id.  (emphasis in original).  Our Supreme Court assumed arguendo 
that the exclusion of additional character witnesses was error 
and concluded that "any possible error was harmless[.]"  Id. 
By contrast, in the present case, the trial court excluded 
all testimony of Defendant's character for respectful treatment 
of children.  Defendant was charged with multiple counts of 
first-degree sex offense, first-degree rape, and indecent 
liberties with a child.  The State cites State v. Hoffman, 95 
N.C. App. 647, 383 S.E.2d 458 (1989), to support its argument 
that the testimony does not qualify for admission under Rule 
404(a).  The entire discussion of this issue in Hoffman is: 
[The defendant] also contends that the trial 
judge 
erred 
by 
not 
allowing 
[the] 
defendant's witnesses to testify that he had 
not molested their children and by not 
allowing several children to testify that he 
had not molested them.  Such testimony was 
totally irrelevant.  We have examined each 
exception 
upon 
which 
[the] 
defendant's 
assignment of error is based and conclude 
that 
the 
trial 
court 
did 
not 
err 
in 
excluding the testimony. 
 
-9- 
Hoffman, 95 N.C. App. at 648, 383 S.E.2d at 459. 
This Court described the problem in Hoffman, not as a 
violation of Rule 404(a), but as a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 8C-1, Rule 405(a) (on the proper form of character evidence).  
See State v. Murphy, 172 N.C. App. 734, 743, 616 S.E.2d 567, 573 
(2005), vacated on other grounds, 361 N.C. 164, 696 S.E.2d 527 
(2006).  The testimony in Hoffman was evidently about the 
defendant's specific acts involving children. 
Murphy is the only case interpreting this issue in Hoffman.  
In Murphy, the defendant sought to introduce testimony of 
"specific acts of nonviolence towards other children."  Murphy, 
172 N.C. App. at 743, 616 S.E.2d at 573.  The Court recited the 
rule that, "where evidence of character or a trait of character 
is admissible under Rule 404, 'proof may be made by testimony as 
to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion.'" 
Murphy, 172 N.C. App. at 744, 616 S.E.2d at 573 (quoting Rule 
405(a)).  "Thus, elicitation of evidence regarding [the] 
defendant's character during direct testimony must have been 
accomplished via opinion or reputation testimony rather than 
specific instance testimony."  Murphy, 172 N.C. App. at 744, 616 
S.E.2d at 574. 
The present case is distinguishable from Hoffman and 
Murphy.  Defendant did not seek to elicit specific acts 
-10- 
testimony.  Rather, Defendant sought to elicit opinion evidence 
from several witnesses:  "Each of those individuals, Your Honor, 
based on my interviews, would have testified that they do have 
an opinion and that in their opinion these allegations are 
inconsistent with the caring, respectful way they have always 
seen him dealing with children[.]"  Counsel forecast that the 
opinions would have been that the State's allegations were 
inconsistent with Defendant's character for respectful treatment 
of children. 
Testimony of Defendant's character for respectful treatment 
of children is relevant because it has a tendency to make the 
existence 
of 
"any 
fact 
that 
is 
of 
consequence 
to 
the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence."  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 
401 (2011).  Evidence of character for respectful treatment of 
children tends to make the facts central to the charges, that 
Defendant committed, inter alia, first-degree statutory rape of 
a child, less probable than they would be without such evidence.  
Testimony of this character trait is therefore relevant and 
"pertinent."  The offer indicates the evidence would have been 
in the proper form of opinion testimony, rather than testimony 
of specific acts or instances. 
-11- 
ii. Prejudice Analysis 
In Banks, where the defendant was charged with first-degree 
murder and felonious discharge of a firearm, the trial court 
excluded character evidence that the defendant was peaceful and 
law-abiding.  This Court held that the exclusion was prejudicial 
because "the evidence presented a close case as to whether [the] 
defendant committed the homicide in self-defense."  Banks, 191 
N.C. App. at 747, 664 S.E.2d at 359.  In evaluating the 
"closeness" of the case, this Court considered both the State's 
evidence and the defendant's evidence. 
The evidence in the case before us also presents a "close 
case" as to whether Defendant committed the offenses.  The 
charges were prosecuted approximately two decades after the 
alleged events.  The State's case relied heavily on the 
testimony of E.C. and J.C.  There were no other eye witnesses to 
the events described in the indictments, other than E.C. and 
J.C.  Defendant testified in his defense and denied the 
allegations.  Defendant also presented evidence that tended to 
undermine the assertions of E.C. and J.C.  Considering the 
State's and Defendant's presentations, the evidence in this case 
is closely balanced.  Thus, opinion testimony that Defendant 
treated children with respect could have affected the jury's 
determination of whether Defendant committed these offenses. 
-12- 
The trial court's exclusion of opinion testimony regarding 
Defendant's character for respectful treatment of children 
prevented Defendant from offering evidence of a pertinent 
character 
trait. 
 
Defendant 
demonstrated 
a 
reasonable 
possibility that, had the trial court not committed this error, 
the result at trial would have been different.  See N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 15A-1443(a) (2011).  Defendant was prejudiced by the 
error and is entitled to a new trial. 
Because of the likelihood that the subsequent issues may 
recur during a new trial, we address Defendant's remaining 
arguments.  State v. Harris, 149 N.C. App. 398, 404, 562 S.E.2d 
547, 550 (2002). 
II. Use of "Victim" in Jury Instructions 
 
Defendant next argues the trial court erred in identifying 
E.C. and J.C. as "victims," rather than "alleged victims" in its 
instructions to the jury.  We agree in this case. 
 
Defendant relies on State v. Castaneda, 196 N.C. App. 109, 
674 S.E.2d 707 (2009), in which the trial court twice referred 
to an alleged accomplice as an "accomplice." 
"It has long been held in this State that 
even the slightest intimation from a judge 
as to the strength of the evidence, or as to 
the credibility of a witness, will always 
have 
great 
weight 
with 
a 
jury; 
and, 
therefore, the court must be careful to see 
that neither party is unduly prejudiced by 
any expression from the bench which is 
-13- 
likely to prevent a fair and impartial 
trial." 
 
Castaneda, 196 N.C. App. at 117, 674 S.E.2d at 713 (quoting 
State v. McLean, 17 N.C. App. 629, 632, 195 S.E.2d 336, 338 
(1973)).  N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1222 and 15A-1232 "prohibit the 
trial court from expressing any opinion in the presence of the 
jury on any question of fact to be decided by the jury."  
Castaneda, 196 N.C. App. at 117, 674 S.E.2d at 713.  In 
Castaneda, the sole issue of fact at trial was whether the 
defendant acted as an accomplice.  This Court held that the 
trial court's use of "accomplice" was prejudicial error.  
Castaneda, 196 N.C. App. at 118, 674 S.E.2d at 713. 
 
In the present case, the trial court denied Defendant's 
request to modify the pattern jury instructions from "victim" to 
"alleged victim" to avoid the implication that the trial court 
"has reached some conclusion."  The issue of whether E.C. and 
J.C. were indeed the victims of the charged offenses was in 
dispute at trial.  E.C. and J.C. testified as to several 
incidents 
of 
sexual 
assault, 
whereas 
Defendant 
presented 
evidence that there "were no signs of sexual assault" in 1994 
and that an investigator did not pursue a physical examination 
because "[n]othing in the interview [of E.C. and J.C.] indicated 
there was any type of sexual assault[.]"  The issue of whether 
-14- 
sexual offenses occurred and whether E.C. and J.C. were 
"victims" were issues of fact for the jury to decide. 
In contending that the trial court's use of the term 
"victim" was not error, the State cites State v. Allen, 92 N.C. 
App. 168, 374 S.E.2d 119 (1988), State v. Richardson, 112 N.C. 
App. 58, 434 S.E.2d 657 (1993), and State v. Henderson, 155 N.C. 
App. 719, 574 S.E.2d 700 (2003). 
In Allen, this Court noted that, by using the term 
"victim," the trial court "was not intimating that [the] 
defendant had committed any crime."  Allen, 92 N.C. App. at 171, 
374 S.E.2d at 121.  However, the use of the term "victim" in the 
case before us does intimate the trial court's belief that E.C. 
and J.C. were sexually assaulted.  As discussed above, whether 
sexual offenses occurred was a disputed issue of fact for the 
jury to resolve.  Whether Defendant was the perpetrator was not 
the sole issue of fact for the jury to determine, as presumably 
was the case in Allen.  Because it is distinguishable, Allen 
does not conclusively determine the issue in the present case.  
By using the term "victim," the trial court resolved a disputed 
issue of fact that was for the jury to determine.  The use of 
the word "victim" was therefore error. 
 
In Richardson, cited by the State, this Court reviewed only 
for plain error because the defendant failed to object at trial.  
-15- 
Richardson is distinguishable because Defendant in the present 
case 
objected 
repeatedly 
to 
the 
proposed 
instructions.  
Moreover, the Court found no prejudice in Richardson because the 
defendant 
was 
not 
convicted 
on 
charges 
for 
which 
the 
instructions contained the word "victim."  Richardson, 112 N.C. 
App. at 67, 434 S.E.2d at 663. 
In the case before us, Defendant was convicted of offenses 
for which the jury instructions contained the word "victim." 
[D]efendant has been charged with three 
counts of first degree rape.  For you to 
find [D]efendant guilty of this offense the 
State must prove three things beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
First, that [D]efendant engaged in vaginal 
intercourse with the victim. . . . 
 
Second, at the time of the acts alleged the 
victim was a child under the age of 13 
years. 
 
And third, that at the time of the acts 
alleged [D]efendant was at least 12 years 
old and was at least four years older than 
the victim. 
 
So if you find from the evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt that on or about the 
alleged date [D]efendant engaged in vaginal 
intercourse with the victim, [J.C.], in 
[D]efendant's car and that at the time the 
victim was a child under the age of 13 
years, and that [D]efendant was at least 12 
years old and was at least four years older 
than the victim, it would be your duty to 
return a verdict of guilty. 
 
-16- 
The jury convicted Defendant of all three charges of first-
degree rape.  "It must be assumed on appeal that the jury was 
influenced by that portion of the charge which is incorrect."  
Castaneda, 196 N.C. App. at 117, 674 S.E.2d at 713.  The jury 
convicted Defendant of offenses for which the jury instructions 
contained error. 
 
In Henderson, this Court rejected the argument that, 
because the "defendant was acquitted of 9 of the 13 charges 
brought against him[,]" the State's case was weak.  Henderson, 
155 N.C. App. at 723, 574 S.E.2d at 703.  This Court concluded 
that the defendant failed to show prejudice.  The Court does not 
explain how the defendant fails to show prejudice, but quotes a 
statement from Richardson that the North Carolina Conference of 
Superior Court Judges promulgated the pattern jury instructions 
used.  Henderson, 155 N.C. App. at 723, 574 S.E.2d at 703-04.  
Our Supreme Court has held that the pattern jury instruction 
"has neither the force nor the effect of law[.]"  State v. 
Warren, 348 N.C. 80, 119, 499 S.E.2d 431, 453 (1998).  Henderson 
does not conclusively determine the issue because the balance of 
the evidence evidently was not as close as in the present case. 
For the reasons discussed in Section I.B.ii of this 
opinion, we must conclude the error was prejudicial.  The 
State's and Defendant's evidence were in equipoise, such that 
-17- 
the jury reasonably might have reached a different verdict had 
this error not occurred. 
III. Excluded Expert Testimony 
 
Defendant next argues the trial court erred in excluding 
expert testimony. 
 
The State filed a motion in limine, seeking the suppression 
of Defendant's proposed expert testimony regarding "repressed" 
or "recovered" memories.  The trial court excluded the testimony 
of the expert witness. 
If 
scientific, 
technical 
or 
other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine 
a 
fact 
in 
issue, 
a 
witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, 
training, 
or 
education, 
may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion, 
or otherwise, if all of the following apply: 
 
(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient 
facts or data. 
 
(2) The testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods. 
 
(3) The witness has applied the principles 
and methods reliably to the facts of the 
case. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702 (2011).  The rule reflects 
recent amendments by the General Assembly.  The amended Rule 702 
applies to actions "arising on or after" 1 October 2011.  2011 
N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 317, § 1.1; 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 283, 
§ 4.2. 
-18- 
In State v. Gamez, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2013 
WL 3663744 (16 July 2013), this Court recently held "the trigger 
date 
for 
applying 
the 
amended 
version 
of 
Rule 
702(a) 
is . . . the date that the bill of indictment was filed."  The 
indictments in the present case were originally filed on 12 
January 2009.  However, the superseding indictments were filed 
on 14 November 2011. 
Gamez does not contemplate a superseding indictment.  
Black's Law Dictionary defines "supersede" as "annul, make void, 
or repeal by taking the place of[.]"  Black's Law Dictionary 
(9th ed. 2009).  The superseding indictment annuls or voids the 
original indictment.  We hold that the "trigger date" is the 
date the superseding indictment was filed.  Because there is no 
discussion of the amendments to Rule 702 in the record, it 
appears that the trial court applied the prior version of Rule 
702.  Should this issue recur upon retrial, we remand for 
application of the amended Rule 702. 
IV. Evidence of Prior Acts 
Defendant next argues the trial court erred in admitting 
testimony under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2011).  We 
disagree. 
-19- 
A. Summary of Prior Acts 
The State offered testimony from K.B., a witness who 
testified that, when she was somewhere "between the ages of 
eight 
and 
ten, 
eight 
and 
nine[,]" 
and 
Defendant 
was 
"[a]pproximately 18, 19[,]" he took her for a ride on his 
motorcycle.  Defendant was a neighbor of K.B.  Defendant and 
K.B. were alone, and he drove down an unpaved "service road[.]"  
Defendant "came up behind [K.B.]."  He "placed one of his hands 
on [her] breast area over [her] shirt."  "Then he reached the 
other hand down and started rubbing [her] genital area again on 
the outside of [her] clothing, kind of pulled [her] closer to 
him and pressed himself into [her] buttocks, lower back area."  
K.B. did not report the incident to anyone.  K.B. was forty-one 
years old at the time of trial. Defendant moved in limine to 
exclude this evidence.  The trial court admitted the testimony. 
B. Summary of Alleged Acts 
 
E.C. testified that Defendant's wife used to babysit E.C. 
and J.C. and that they would go to Defendant's house for the 
babysitting.  When Defendant's wife was away from the house, 
Defendant told E.C. "that he needed to talk to [her]."  
Defendant picked up E.C. and put her on his lap.  He "stuck his 
hands first underneath [her] shirt and [rubbed her] chest area."  
Defendant "went still down through the side buttons under [her] 
-20- 
underwear and started rubbing the outside of [her] vagina." 
Then, 
Defendant 
"stuck 
his 
finger 
inside 
[her] 
vagina." 
Defendant told E.C. "that it was [their] secret and that if 
[she] told anyone that he would kill [her] mom and dad and [E.C. 
and J.C.] would have to live with him forever." 
 
J.C. testified that she and E.C. went to Defendant's home 
for Defendant's wife to babysit them.  On an occasion in which 
E.C. and J.C. were left alone with Defendant, Defendant called 
J.C. over.  Defendant picked J.C. up and put her in his lap.  
Defendant "began rubbing the inside of [her] legs and rubbing 
[her] vagina through [her] pants."  He carried J.C. to the 
bathroom and "stuck his penis in [her] vagina."  Defendant told 
J.C. that "it was [their] little secret and that if [she] told 
that he would hurt [her] family or [she] would never see [her 
family] again."  On another occasion, Defendant was alone with 
J.C. and drove her to the dead end of a gravel road.  J.C. 
testified that Defendant put "his penis in [her] vagina at that 
time." 
"Evidence 
of 
other 
crimes, 
wrongs, 
or 
acts 
is 
not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
that he acted in conformity therewith."  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 
404(b).  "It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
-21- 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or 
accident."  Id. 
"We review de novo the legal conclusion that the evidence 
is, or is not, within the coverage of Rule 404(b).  We then 
review the trial court's Rule 403 determination for abuse of 
discretion."  State v. Beckelheimer, 366 N.C. 127, 130, 726 
S.E.2d 156, 159 (2012).  Our Supreme Court "has been markedly 
liberal in admitting evidence of similar sex offenses by a 
defendant."  Id. 
"Though it is a rule of inclusion, Rule 404(b) is still 
constrained by the requirements of similarity and temporal 
proximity."  Beckelheimer, 366 N.C. at 131, 726 S.E.2d at 159 
(internal 
quotation 
marks 
omitted). 
 
"Prior 
acts 
are 
sufficiently similar if there are some unusual facts present in 
both crimes that would indicate that the same person committed 
them.  We do not require that the similarities rise to the level 
of the unique and bizarre."  Id.  (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
The 
acts 
and 
the 
charged 
offenses 
are 
similar 
in: 
Defendant's access to the girls: in the prior act, by living 
down the street from the girl, and in the charged cases, by the 
girls being left in the care of Defendant and his wife; the 
girls' relatively young ages at the time of the acts; and that 
-22- 
the touchings occurred while Defendant was alone with the girls.  
These similarities are sufficient to support the State's theory 
of Defendant's plan or scheme. 
As 
to 
temporal 
proximity, 
the 
prior 
acts 
occurred 
approximately nine to ten years before the charged acts 
occurred.  "Remoteness in time is less important when the other 
crime is admitted because its modus operandi is so strikingly 
similar to the modus operandi of the crime being tried as to 
permit a reasonable inference that the same person committed 
both crimes."  Beckelheimer, 366 N.C. at 132-33, 726 S.E.2d at 
160.  Our Supreme Court in Beckelheimer relied on State v. 
Carter, 338 N.C. 569, 451 S.E.2d 157 (1994) (holding 404(b) 
evidence admissible despite eight-year lapse).  Beckelheimer, 
366 N.C. at 132-33, 726 S.E.2d at 160.  Given the similarities 
in the incidents, the remoteness in time here was not so 
significant as to mandate the exclusion of the evidence of the 
prior acts. 
As to the Rule 403 prejudice determination, the trial court 
gave a limiting instruction to the jury that evidence 
is about to be received tending to show that 
[Defendant] engaged in sexual activity with 
[K.B.].  This evidence is being received 
solely for the purpose of showing that 
[D]efendant had a motive for the commission 
of the crime charged in this case, that 
[D]efendant had the 
intent which is a 
necessary element of the crime charged in 
-23- 
this case, and there existed in the mind of 
[D]efendant a plan, scheme, system or design 
involving the crime charged in this case or 
that [D]efendant had the opportunity to 
commit the crime. 
 
The trial court instructed the jury that if it believed "this 
evidence [the jury] may consider it but only for the limited 
purpose for which it [was] received."  Although Defendant 
contends the trial court did not give the same careful 
consideration to Defendant's objection that the trial court in 
Beckelheimer apparently afforded the defendant's objection, we 
cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting this evidence. 
V. Conclusion 
First, Defendant adequately preserved for our review the 
issue regarding excluded good character evidence.  The trial 
court erred in excluding the testimony of these witnesses, and 
this error was prejudicial to Defendant.  Second, the use of the 
word "victim" in the jury instructions was prejudicial error in 
this case.  Third, should the issue regarding expert testimony 
recur upon retrial, we remand for application of the amended 
N.C.R. Evid. 702.  Fourth, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting N.C.R. Evid. 404(b) evidence regarding 
prior bad acts with K.B. 
New trial. 
-24- 
Judges STEPHENS and HUNTER, JR. concur.