Title: Commonwealth v. DaSilva
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11458
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 26, 2015

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SJC-11458 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  EMMANUEL DaSILVA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 5, 2014. - March 26, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Grand Jury.  Evidence, Grand jury proceedings, 
Testimony before grand jury, Prior misconduct, Hearsay, 
Relevancy and materiality, Impeachment of credibility, 
Exculpatory.  Witness, Impeachment.  Practice, Criminal, 
Capital case, Grand jury proceedings, Transcript of 
testimony before grand jury, Recording of proceedings, 
Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 2, 2007. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Frank M. Gaziano, J. 
 
 
 
John F. Palmer for the defendant. 
 
Dara Z. Kesselheim, Assistant District Attorney (Mark D. 
 
Zanini & Julie Sunkle Higgins, Assistant District 
Attorneys, with her) for the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  The defendant was a participant in a drive-by 
shooting on February 13, 2007, in the Roxbury section of Boston.  
The motive was revenge against David Evans for the shooting of a 
2 
 
family friend, "A.J.," and an assault on a family member.  
However, the targeted group of young men standing across the 
street from Evans's apartment at the time of the shooting had 
nothing to do with Evans.  One member of the group was killed, 
and two were wounded.  The defendant was convicted of murder in 
the first degree and various related offenses.  On appeal the 
defendant asserts error in (1) the admission of the grand jury 
testimony of a Commonwealth witness; (2) the admission of 
evidence of prior bad acts; (3) the admission of evidence that 
the defendant refused to have his custodial interrogation 
recorded; (4) the admission of evidence of 911 calls received by 
a police dispatcher; (5) the admission of evidence concerning 
the course of the investigation and the role of the grand jury; 
(6) the prosecutor's impeachment of a defense witness with her 
failure to report exculpatory evidence to police; (7) the 
prosecutor's closing argument; and (8) the judge's decision 
declining to give a so-called Bowden instruction.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980).  We 
affirm the convictions and decline the defendant's request that 
we grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Background.  The jury could have found the following 
facts.  We reserve other details for discussion of the 
particular issues. 
3 
 
 
A brief description of family relations is in order before 
we describe the events of February 13, 2007, that led up to the 
shooting later the same day.  A critical witness for the 
Commonwealth was Clarimundo DaSilva,1 who is an uncle of the 
defendant and a brother-in-law of Joseph Gomes.  Clarimundo and 
Gomes's parents lived in the same apartment building on Langdon 
Street in Roxbury.  The building was owned by Gomes's parents.  
The defendant and Gomes lived at different addresses, but were 
frequent visitors. 
 
At about 9 A.M. on February 13, 2007, Clarimundo's son 
Anthony arrived home and reported that someone with a gun was 
chasing him.  Clarimundo heard gunshots and telephoned the 
police.  An eyewitness saw a person chasing a dark-colored 
automobile down Langdon Street, shooting at it.  The person wore 
a red and white hooded sweatshirt.  When police officers 
arrived, they learned that the shooter had run into the DaSilva-
Gomes apartment building.  After conducting a sweep of the 
building to determine if the shooter was inside, the police 
ordered all residents to leave the building while they obtained 
a search warrant.  During the execution of the warrant the 
officers recovered a .380 semiautomatic Mauser pistol, personal 
                     
 
1 We refer to members of the DaSilva family by their first 
names. 
4 
 
papers in the name of "Joseph Gomes,"2 and a red, white, and 
black sweatshirt.  Five shell casings found in the street and 
sidewalk in front of the apartment building were determined to 
have been fired from the Mauser.  In addition, a bullet and tire 
with a hole were recovered from a tire store, where Evans's 
black Buick LaCrosse, a rental vehicle, had been taken for a 
tire replacement in February, 2007.  The bullet that was 
recovered had been fired from the Mauser. 
 
Evans had a second rental vehicle at the time, a silver 
Nissan Maxima with New Hampshire license plates.  The Nissan was 
seen several times in the vicinity of the apartment building 
during the day on February 13.  Clarimundo told the defendant 
that people in the Nissan had pointed at him.  The defendant and 
an unidentified third person who was with him told Clarimundo 
that the people in the Nissan were the people who had shot 
"A.J.," a friend of Anthony's. 
 
Later that afternoon Clarimundo drove to pick up his 
daughter at school.  The defendant accompanied him, and waited 
in the vehicle while Clarimundo went into the school.  When 
Clarimundo and his daughter returned, the defendant had left.  
He returned a short time later, and he appeared scared.  He told 
Clarimundo that he had seen the Nissan again on the way to the 
                     
 
2 Joseph Gomes and his father have the same name.  The 
papers recovered from the basement did not specify "Sr." or 
"Jr." 
5 
 
school, and said, "I don't want to stop . . . to wait for you 
with these crazy people around." 
 
Clarimundo testified that the defendant and Gomes left 
Langdon Street together at about 6 P.M. on February 13.  
Clarimundo told police about the Nissan, and one officer 
recalled seeing it in the Langdon Street neighborhood at least 
twice during the day on that day. 
 
Shortly after 6 P.M. on February 13, gunshots were fired 
from the passenger's side windows of a newer model silver 
Chevrolet Impala into a group of seven young men gathered on a 
sidewalk on Maywood Street in Boston.  They had been standing 
near Evans's Nissan Maxima, which was parked across the street 
from Evans's apartment.  One man was killed, and two were 
wounded.  The man who was killed bore a strong resemblance to 
Evans.  Police responded to two separate 911 calls made within 
one minute of the shooting.  The first 911 call was received at 
6:06 P.M.  The dispatcher issued calls to respond.  The second 
dispatch, at 6:07 P.M., included a partial description of the 
fleeing vehicle.  At 6:16 P.M. the dispatcher heard on the 
police radio that a Chevrolet Impala was stopped on Savin 
Street, which runs parallel to Maywood Street.  The driver of 
the vehicle was Gomes.3  The sole passenger was the defendant.4 
                     
 
3 Gomes and the defendant originally were tried together.  
However, the defendant's trial counsel became ill and was unable 
6 
 
 
Two .38 caliber shell casings were recovered from the 
defendant's seat in the vehicle, and four .38 caliber shell 
casings were recovered from the floor in front of his seat.  A 
seventh .38 caliber shell casing was recovered on Maywood Street 
at the scene of the shooting.  All seven casings were determined 
to have been fired from the same gun.  The defendant's 
fingerprints were found on a soda bottle on the floor area of 
his passenger seat.  They also were found on a cigarette package 
on the floor in the rear seat area.  No firearm related to the 
shooting ever was recovered. 
 
A projectile recovered from a survivor of the shooting was 
determined to have been fired from a .38 or .357 caliber 
revolver.  Another projectile was recovered from the kitchen of 
an apartment on Savin Street.  The projectile entered through 
the kitchen window at the time of the shooting.  The kitchen 
window faces Maywood Street and the vicinity of the shooting.  
That projectile was determined to have been fired from the same 
.38 or .357 caliber revolver.  On February 13, an officer 
waiting for a tow truck to remove Gomes's Chevrolet Impala from 
Savin Street saw Evans's Nissan go by.  He broadcast this 
                                                                  
to continue with the trial.  The defendant's motion to sever was 
allowed, and a mistrial was declared in his case.  That trial 
then proceeded as to Gomes. 
 
 
4 Witnesses testified that there were three or four persons 
in the drive-by vehicle.  No others were apprehended. 
7 
 
information over his radio.  The Nissan was stopped by police at 
about 7:45 P.M. on that day.  Evans was the front-seat 
passenger. 
 
The defense was a combination of alibi and shoddy police 
work.  The defendant's father testified that his son was at home 
on Dennis Street when he arrived home from work at 12:30 P.M. on 
February 13, 2007.  His son left the home at approximately 12:45 
P.M.  The father returned to work at 1:15 P.M.  The defendant's 
girl friend also lived with him on Dennis Street.  She testified 
that she returned home from work at about 5:30 P.M. on that day, 
and had dinner with the defendant, who was at home when she 
arrived.  At some point he left.  It was dark outside.  An 
investigator hired by the defense testified that he drove 
between the location of the Maywood Street shooting and the 
defendant's Dennis Street home following various routes at about 
6 P.M.  In heavy traffic it took him a little over two minutes.  
He then drove from the Dennis Street home to Savin Street in the 
vicinity where the Impala had been stopped.  It took him under 
six minutes to cover that distance.  The investigator's 
testimony was offered to rebut the testimony of police officers 
who suggested that it would not have been possible for Gomes to 
have driven from the scene of the shooting to the defendant's 
home, picked him up, and then driven to the location on Savin 
8 
 
Street by 6:16 P.M. on February 13, when his Impala was stopped 
by police. 
 
2.  Clarimundo's grand jury testimony.  The prosecutor 
impeached Clarimundo with his grand jury testimony after 
Clarimundo testified at trial that he did not see the defendant 
-- his nephew -- or talk to him during the afternoon or early 
evening of February 13, 2007.  Clarimundo's grand jury testimony 
indicated that he saw the defendant and talked to him several 
times during that period of time.  Moreover, Clarimundo's grand 
jury testimony provided the only evidence that the defendant 
knew of Evans, that he knew of Evans's connection to the Nissan, 
that he was aware of the shooting of A.J. and the events earlier 
in the day of February 13 at Langdon Street, and that the 
defendant and Gomes were together at about 6 P.M. -- shortly 
before the shooting.  Clarimundo's grand jury testimony was 
admitted for its probative value under Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 
Mass. 55 (1984).  The defendant asserts error in the admission 
of Clarimundo's grand jury testimony as probative evidence.  He 
contends that the use of the witness's grand jury testimony for 
probative purposes failed in multiple respects to meet the 
requirements of Daye. 
 
Daye permits the probative use of a witness's grand jury 
testimony that is inconsistent with his or her trial testimony 
provided certain conditions are met.  First, there must be an 
9 
 
opportunity for effective cross-examination of the witness at 
trial as to the accuracy of the grand jury testimony.  Daye, 393 
Mass. at 73.  Second, the grand jury testimony must be the 
statement of the witness and not merely a confirmation or denial 
of an allegation by the interrogator, and the grand jury 
testimony must not be coerced.  Id. at 74.  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(1)(A) (2014). 
 
As an initial matter the defendant argues that, under Daye, 
the judge was required to conduct a voir dire of Clarimundo 
before admitting his grand jury testimony for probative 
purposes.  There is no such requirement.  As we recently have 
noted, a voir dire often may be necessary, but it is not 
required where, as here, the direct and cross-examination of the 
witness adequately inform the decision of the trial judge.  See 
Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 466 Mass. 742, 755-756, cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 2312 (2014).  As we will discuss shortly, where 
Clarimundo's trial testimony and his grand jury testimony were 
plainly contradictory, a voir dire was not necessary.  The judge 
here educated himself thoroughly with Clarimundo's grand jury 
testimony, and he followed Clarimundo's trial testimony keenly, 
at times interrupting the prosecutor before defense counsel 
could object.  Clarimundo was reminded of his grand jury 
testimony on both direct and cross-examination, and he was 
afforded the opportunity to explain any inconsistencies between 
10 
 
his trial testimony and his grand jury testimony.  There was no 
error. 
 
The defendant maintains that Clarimundo's testimony before 
the grand jury was coerced and, therefore, inadmissible under 
Daye.  We disagree.  His grand jury testimony was developed 
largely through open-ended questions, and his answers generally 
were lengthy and rambling.  The judge found that Clarimundo said 
to the grand jury what he wanted to say.  Clarimundo's answers 
to questions were at times unresponsive or only loosely related 
to the questions put to him.  Although he had been summonsed, 
that alone does not amount to coercion.  See Commonwealth v. 
Beauchamp, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 591, 607 (2000).  The type of 
coercion contemplated by Daye does not include threats to seek 
contempt if the witness did not answer questions put to him or 
her, as occurred here.  The record does not indicate that 
Clarimundo had been pressured to inculpate his nephew or face 
contempt.  There is no suggestion that Clarimundo had been 
pressured to testify in a certain way.  See Daye, 393 Mass. at 
74 n.20.  There was no error. 
 
The defendant next argues that Clarimundo's testimony was 
not inconsistent with his grand jury testimony and that 
therefore Daye is not applicable.  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(1)(A)(i).  A judge has considerable discretion in 
deciding whether a witness's trial testimony and his or her 
11 
 
grand jury testimony are inconsistent under Daye.  The 
inconsistency need not be a contradiction in plain terms.  It is 
enough that the trial testimony "taken as a whole, either by 
what it says or by what it omits to say, affords some indication 
that the fact was different from the testimony of the witness" 
whom it is sought to contradict.  Daye, 393 Mass. at 73 n.16, 
quoting Commonwealth v. West, 312 Mass. 438, 440 (1942).  Here, 
the defendant complains that there were three instances where 
Clarimundo's grand jury testimony was not inconsistent with his 
trial testimony and therefore was admitted improperly. 
 
In the first instance, Clarimundo testified at trial that 
the only family member he saw outside during the time police 
cleared the house was Gomes.  He testified before the grand jury 
that while outside the house, he told the defendant that the 
Nissan drove by and people in the vehicle looked at them.  This 
was a direct contradiction.  It was enough that the judge could 
infer that where Clarimundo said he spoke to the defendant while 
outside the house, he also saw the defendant outside the house. 
 
The second instance in which the defendant claims that 
Clarimundo's grand jury testimony was admitted for probative use 
in the absence of any inconsistency with his trial testimony 
concerned whether the defendant explained why he had left the 
vehicle when Clarimundo went inside the school to get his 
cousin.  When asked at trial if the defendant offered any 
12 
 
explanation, Clarimundo said, "No."  The prosecutor was allowed 
to introduce Clarimundo's grand jury testimony given in response 
to the question at the grand jury, "Where do you go when [the 
defendant] comes back?"  Clarimundo's answer to that question 
was a rambling narrative that included the defendant's 
explanation for leaving the vehicle, namely, that he saw Evans's 
Nissan on the way to the school, and he "[didn't] want to stop 
. . . to wait for [Clarimundo] with these crazy people around."  
Clarimundo's grand jury testimony was in direct conflict with 
his trial testimony. 
 
In the third instance where the defendant contends there 
was no inconsistency between Clarimundo's trial testimony and 
his grand jury testimony, we discern a direct conflict.  At 
trial he testified that neither the defendant nor Gomes was 
present at Langdon Street during the afternoon or early evening 
of February 13, 2007.  In contrast, he testified before the 
grand jury that both men left the Langdon Street premises 
together at about 6 P.M. 
 
The defendant next argues that his statement to Clarimundo 
that he saw Evans's Nissan while they were driving to the school 
should not have been admitted because it was not a statement 
made under oath.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(A)(ii).  The 
argument is based on the fact that in his grand jury testimony 
Clarimundo was not describing the defendant's statement as 
13 
 
something the defendant said to him, but something Clarimundo 
told a police detective as what the defendant told him.  This 
hypertechnical argument is unpersuasive, and it is entirely 
reasonable to understand that the testimony served a dual 
purpose:  Clarimundo was describing both what the defendant told 
him and what he in turn passed along to police.  In any event, 
the conversation between Clarimundo and the detective was 
conveyed to the grand jury under oath.  We add that the parties 
agreed that this portion of Clarimundo's grand jury testimony 
could be admitted at trial. 
 
The final argument as to Clarimundo's grand jury testimony 
was that its admission violated the defendant's constitutional 
rights of confrontation and due process under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because 
he did not specifically acknowledge at trial that he made 
certain statements before the grand jury.  See Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 
400, 406 (1965).  Clarimundo did not deny making the statements 
to the grand jury that were admitted in evidence.  Although at 
times he claimed an inability to remember what he told the grand 
jury, the judge found that he was feigning memory loss.  
Clarimundo did not refuse to answer questions posed by defense 
counsel, who was able to fully probe Clarimundo's 
inconsistencies.  We conclude that in these circumstances the 
14 
 
defendant had an opportunity to effectively cross-examine 
Clarimundo.  There was no deprivation of due process or the 
right to confront and cross-examine the witness.  See 
Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 466 Mass. 742, 754-755 (2014); 
Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 451 Mass. 566, 574-577 (2008). 
 
3.  Prior bad act evidence.  The defendant maintains that 
the admission of the evidence of the shooting on Langdon Street 
during the morning of February 13, 2007, and related events 
through that afternoon was insufficient to support an inference 
of motive on the part of the defendant.  The general rule 
involved here is that "evidence of uncharged criminal acts or 
other misbehavior is not admissible to show a defendant's bad 
character or propensity to commit the charged crime, but may be 
admissible if relevant for other purposes such as 'common 
scheme, pattern of operation, absence of accident or mistake, 
identity, intent or motive.'"  Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 
122, 128 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Marshall, 434 Mass. 
358, 366 (2001).  Whether the probative value of such evidence 
outweighs the risk of prejudice is a determination committed to 
the sound discretion of the trial judge.  Commonwealth v. 
Horton, 434 Mass. 823, 827-828 (2001). 
 
The evidence of motive here is very strong.  The jury could 
have found that the defendant and Gomes sought revenge against 
Evans for shooting A.J. and chasing Anthony DaSilva.  An unknown 
15 
 
friend or member of the family fired the Mauser pistol at 
Evans's Buick on the morning of February 13, 2007, puncturing a 
tire.  The Mauser was traced to the Gomes family.  When Evans's 
Nissan was seen stalking the neighborhood that day, the 
defendant and Gomes decided to deliver a preemptive strike and 
drove to Maywood Street where Evans lived, but killed the wrong 
person.  Shell casings were found in the vehicle in which the 
defendant and Gomes were riding about ten minutes after the 
killing.  There was a sufficient nexus between the Langdon 
Street incident, the defendant, and the Maywood Street shooting 
to support admission of the prior bad act evidence.  There was 
no abuse of discretion. 
 
4.  Defendant's refusal to have his statement tape 
recorded.  The defendant gave a statement to police in which he 
said he had gone with Clarimundo to pick up his cousin at her 
school.  Clarimundo then drove him to his home on Dennis Street.  
Gomes came by to pick him up as it was getting dark.  They set 
out to buy some liquor, but were pulled over by police.  A 
female officer told him he was sitting on some shell casings or 
bullets.  He told her he knew nothing about them.  He was placed 
under arrest.  The defendant had declined to have the interview 
recorded, and the jury were so informed, over objection.  See 
Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 447-448 (2004).  
The defendant argues that it was error to admit evidence of his 
16 
 
refusal to have his statement tape recorded, where defense 
counsel had explicitly advised the jury that the defendant did 
not intend to make an issue of either the voluntariness of his 
statement or the absence of a recording.  He contends that the 
only basis for admitting such evidence was to show consciousness 
of guilt or a fear that the recording would incriminate him.  We 
disagree. 
 
Without any evidence of the defendant's refusal, the jury 
may have questioned the absence of a recording wholly apart from 
whether a DiGiambattista instruction were given.  The judge 
ruled that the Commonwealth was entitled to introduce evidence 
of the defendant's refusal to inform the jury that the police 
followed proper procedures.  See DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. at 
448-449 ("permissible for the prosecution to address any reasons 
or justifications that would explain why no recording was 
made").  This is especially true here, where a cornerstone of 
the defense was shoddy police work.  There was no suggestion at 
trial that the defendant's refusal somehow should be held 
against him.  There was no error. 
 
5.  Hearsay evidence in 911 calls.  A police dispatcher was 
allowed to testify about receiving the 911 calls concerning the 
shooting on Maywood Street.  She also was allowed to testify, 
over objection, that within ten minutes "after the shooting" she 
heard on the radio that a vehicle had been stopped in response 
17 
 
to her dispatches (emphasis added).  The defendant argues, as he 
did below, that this was inadmissible hearsay, offered for the 
truth of the matter.  He further argues that it was prejudicial 
because it minimized the likelihood that Gomes had picked him up 
after the shooting, a critical issue at trial. 
 
The prosecutor attempted to correct the problem, and the 
dispatcher then testified, referring to her computer-aided 
dispatch (CAD) terminal print-outs, that she heard on the police 
radio at 6:16 P.M. that a vehicle had been stopped, without 
reference to the time of the shooting.  On cross-examination 
defense counsel further clarified the dispatcher's testimony, 
eliciting from her that she did not know when the shooting 
occurred.  Although the dispatcher's original testimony using 
"the shooting" as a point of reference should have been struck, 
as requested, we are satisfied that the matter was 
satisfactorily rectified and that there was no prejudice.  
Moreover, redacted versions of the CAD print-outs were properly 
admitted showing the times of the incoming 911 calls and the 
time the officer communicated the stop of Gomes's vehicle over 
the police radio. 
 
6.  Decision to charge defendant.  The prosecutor 
questioned a detective about the course of investigations 
generally, including participants in the decision to arrest and 
charge someone with a crime.  Defense counsel objected and moved 
18 
 
to strike the testimony.  The judge did not strike the 
testimony, but he told the prosecutor to "move on."  The 
prosecutor immediately proceeded to ask the detective to explain 
the role of the grand jury.  There was no objection, and the 
detective answered, "The grand jury hears all evidence and 
decides whether to indict or not indict the target of the 
investigation" (emphasis added).  The defendant argues that this 
testimony was both irrelevant and prejudicial as to the 
testimony to which there was an objection and that there was a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice as to the 
testimony to which there was no objection.  As to the former, he 
contends that prejudice flowed from the witness's placement of 
the imprimatur of the police and prosecutorial hierarchy on his 
arrest and indictment.  With respect to the latter, he argues 
that a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice flowed 
from the incorrect testimony that the grand jury heard all 
evidence, which it does not. 
 
The defendant is correct in identifying this testimony as 
irrelevant.  It had no evidentiary value in this case, and the 
Commonwealth does not suggest otherwise.  If there is a need for 
the jury to be educated in such matters because of some 
relevance to the trial, special care must be taken to avoid 
putting the imprimatur of the State on the decision to arrest or 
to charge.  The evidence should have been struck. 
19 
 
 
That said, we discern no prejudice, where the witness was 
speaking generally, and not specifically to this case.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Akara, 465 Mass. 245, 262 (2013) (improper 
argument by prosecutor who urged jury to find joint venture 
because police, district attorney's office, and grand jury found 
sufficient evidence to charge not one but two people).  In 
addition, the judge's final instructions about the presumption 
of innocence and the absence of evidentiary value in an 
indictment adequately served to mitigate any potential for 
prejudice in this case. 
 
7.  Impeachment of defense witness.  The defendant's girl 
friend testified that she left work at 5 P.M. on the day of the 
shooting.  On her way home she stopped to get some take-out food 
for dinner.  She arrived home at about 5:30 P.M.  The defendant 
was home alone.  They ate dinner together.  After dinner, the 
defendant left.  It was dark outside.  She was impeached, 
without objection, with her failure to report exculpatory 
information to police.  The defendant argues that the prosecutor 
failed to lay the necessary foundation. 
 
Before a witness may be impeached for failure to report 
exculpatory evidence to police, the Commonwealth must establish 
"[1] that the witness knew of the pending charges in sufficient 
detail to realize that he possessed exculpatory information, [2] 
that the witness had reason to make the information available, 
20 
 
[and] [3] that he was familiar with the means of reporting it to 
the proper authorities."  Commonwealth v. Hart, 455 Mass. 230, 
238 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 
288, 296-297 (1981).  The defendant claims that the Commonwealth 
failed to establish the first element. 
 
The witness testified that as of the time of trial she had 
been dating the defendant for six years.  They lived together on 
Dennis Street as of February 13, 2007.  She learned that evening 
that he had been taken into custody.  She continued to see him 
on a regular basis during the ensuing four years and eight 
months.  Although the prosecutor did not specifically inquire 
whether she knew of the pending charges in sufficient detail to 
realize she possessed exculpatory information, it can reasonably 
be inferred from the circumstances of the events that evening 
and the fact of the ongoing relationship between the witness and 
the defendant that the witness knew she possessed exculpatory 
information.  See Hart, 455 Mass. at 239.  Moreover, she 
testified that the only reason she did not come forward was that 
she "didn't know [she] had to."  There was no error. 
 
8.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant cites 
five instances in the prosecutor's closing that he argues were 
improper argument.  Prosecutors are bound to "limit the scope of 
their arguments to facts in evidence and inferences that may 
reasonably be drawn from the evidence."  Commonwealth v. Coren, 
21 
 
437 Mass. 723, 730 (2002).  They may not "misstate the evidence 
or refer to facts not in evidence, [or] interject personal 
belief in a defendant's guilt" (footnote omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516-517 (1987). 
 
The defendant argues that the prosecutor went beyond the 
evidence when he asked the jury to use their "common sense" to 
consider "how quickly people call 911 when people have been 
shot."  He argues that this provided the basis for the 
prosecutor's argument that nine minutes passed between the time 
of the shooting and the time Gomes's vehicle was seen on Savin 
Street.  The woman who placed the first 911 call testified that 
she heard a loud bang and her children ran to the window to see 
what had happened.  They came running, asking her to help.  She 
went to the window to see what had happened and saw two men on 
the ground.  She promptly called 911 on her cellular telephone, 
which was already in her hand.  She estimated that approximately 
one minute had passed from the time she heard the bang to the 
point where she looked out the window.  The officer who stopped 
the Gomes's vehicle testified that the actual stop occurred at 
about 6:15 P.M.  Adding one minute to the period of time from 
the completion of the 911 call to the time Gomes's vehicle was 
stopped (not just seen) results in approximately ten minutes.  
Although the "common sense" argument was contrary to the 
testimony of the 911 caller, this one-minute variance does not, 
22 
 
in our view, create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992).  
Moreover, it was in response to defense counsel's suggestion, 
without basis, that the time was fifteen to twenty minutes. 
 
The defendant next contends that the prosecutor exceeded 
the scope of the evidence when he described the shooting 
incident on Langdon Street as motive for the shooting on Maywood 
Street.  For the reasons stated above as to the propriety of the 
admission of evidence of prior bad act evidence on the question 
of motive, we conclude that the prosecutor's argument was 
properly grounded in the evidence. 
 
The third instance cited by the defendant is the 
prosecutor's statement that the defendant told Clarimundo that 
"[t]hose are the people who shot A.J.," when Clarimundo's 
testimony before the grand jury was, "They said, that's the 
people who shot A.J." (emphasis added).  We perceive no error in 
this aspect of the prosecutor's closing argument.  The evidence 
indicates that the "they" to whom Clarimundo was referring was 
the defendant and an unidentified third person.  It is a 
reasonable inference to draw from Clarimundo's description of 
the event that both persons were speaking and giving Clarimundo 
consistent information.  Thus, the defendant inferably was a 
contributor of the information in question. 
23 
 
 
The defendant contends that the prosecutor suggested, 
without evidentiary support, that "part of the plan" of the 
defendant and Gomes was "not to leave any evidence behind" by 
firing from inside the vehicle and thus keeping the shell 
casings inside the vehicle.  This argument had evidentiary 
support.  There was evidence that "flashing lights" were seen 
coming from "the rear seat and the passenger seat" of the 
vehicle.  There also was evidence that spent shell casings are 
ejected through an ejection port of a semiautomatic gun and 
often pop out in the direction of the shooter.  No shell casings 
were recovered from the scene of the Maywood Street shooting.  
The argument was fair comment. 
 
The defendant's final assertion of prosecutorial misconduct 
in closing argument involves a claim of vouching where the 
prosecutor stated that the government had discretion to dismiss 
the charges and that "the suggestion that we are here to save 
face, frankly, is offensive."  The comment was in response to 
defense counsel's argument that "it's the Commonwealth that's 
been on a mission for the last couple of weeks to save face.  To 
save face from a bad decision.  What do I mean? . . .  Things 
are not always [as] they first appear to be." 
 
This argument was improper vouching.  We have commented 
frequently on the problem of "fighting fire with fire."  See 
Kozec, 399 Mass. at 519.  Emotional responses to defense 
24 
 
counsel's closing argument seldom produce a professional result, 
let alone a good result; and this instance is no exception.  
Moreover, defense counsel's closing argument on this point was 
entirely appropriate.  Nevertheless, defense counsel promptly 
objected, and the judge immediately told the jury to disregard 
the prosecutor's comment.  The jury are presumed to have 
followed that instruction.  See Commonwealth v. Barros, 425 
Mass. 572, 580 (1997). 
 
9.  Bowden instruction.  There is no merit to the claim 
that the judge declined to give the requested so-called Bowden 
instruction.  See Bowden, 379 Mass. at 485-486.  The defendant 
was permitted to argue that the police investigation was 
inadequate, a prevalent theme throughout this trial.  There was 
no error in the decision to decline to give the requested 
instruction.  See Commonwealth v. Lao, 460 Mass. 12, 22-23 
(2011). 
 
10.  G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the entire 
record and the briefs, and we see no reason to exercise our 
power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the degree of guilt 
or order a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.