Title: Fidanque v. Oregon Govt. Standards and Practices
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S43705
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: November 27, 1998

Filed:  November 27, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

DAVID FIDANQUE and JANET ARENZ,

	Petitioners on Review,

	v.

STATE OF OREGON, by and through
the Oregon Government Standards
and Practices Commission,
	Respondent on Review.

(CC 94C-11492; CA A86332; SC S43705)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted May 9, 1997; resubmitted June 11, 1998.

	Thomas M. Christ, ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc., Portland,
argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioners on review.

	Rives Kistler, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause for respondent on review.  With him on the brief were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor
General. 

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen, 
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.**

	GILLETTE, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

	*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court,

	 Paul Lipscomb, Judge.

	 141 Or App 495, 920 P2d 154 (1996).

    **Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision; Graber, J., resigned March 31,
1998, and did not participate in this decision.

		GILLETTE, J.

		Plaintiffs are two paid lobbyists for the American
Civil Liberties Union.  They brought this action for declaratory
and injunctive relief, seeking a judicial determination that ORS
171.743,(1) a statute requiring certain lobbyists to pay a biennial
registration fee to the Oregon Government Standards and Practices
Commission (Commission), is constitutionally unsound.  Plaintiffs
based their complaint on two provisions of the Oregon
Constitution -- sections 8 and 26 of Article I -- and on the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.(2)  On cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court concluded
that the statute violates both of the Oregon constitutional
guarantees and entered judgment accordingly.  The Court of
Appeals reversed that decision.  Fidanque v. Oregon Govt.
Standards and Practices, 141 Or App 495, 920 P2d 154 (1996).  We
allowed plaintiffs' petition for review and now conclude that ORS
171.743 violates Article I, section 8, of the Oregon
Constitution.  Consequently, we reverse the decision of the Court
of Appeals.  

		The challenged statute was enacted in 1993 and was
added to a previously existing body of statutes devoted to the
regulation of legislative lobbying.  Pursuant to those
provisions, which are found in ORS chapter 171, "lobbyists" are
required to register with the Commission by filing and
periodically updating a statement identifying themselves and whom
they represent and describing their clients' areas of interest. 
ORS 171.740.  Lobbyists also must file regular statements
disclosing the amount of money expended for the purpose of
lobbying, including the names of any legislative or executive
official for whose benefit they make any expenditure exceeding
$25.  ORS 171.745(1).

		"Lobbyists" are defined for purposes of the above
statutes by ORS 171.725(8):

		"'Lobbyist' means:

		"(a) Any individual who agrees to provide personal
services for money or any other consideration for the
purpose of lobbying.

		"(b) Any person not otherwise subject to paragraph
(a) of this subsection who provides personal services
as a representative of a corporation, association,
organization or other group, for the purpose of
lobbying.

		"(c) Any pubic official who lobbies."(3) 

(Emphasis added.)  "Lobbying" is defined, in turn, by ORS
171.725(7):

		"'Lobbying' means influencing, or attempting to
influence, legislative action through oral or written
communication with legislative officials, solicitation
of others to influence or attempt to influence
legislative action or attempting to obtain the good
will of legislative officials." 

		In 1993, the legislature amended the registration
provision at ORS 171.740 to require lobbyists to reregister every
two years.  At the same time, it enacted ORS 171.743, the
registration fee statute that is the subject of the present
challenge.  That statute provides: 

		"(1) The Oregon Government Standards and Practices
Commission shall impose and collect the following
lobbyist registration fees:

		"(a) For each person described in ORS 171.725(8)
and registered with the commission, $50.

		"(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this
subsection, for each person described in ORS
171.725(8)(b) and registered with the commission and
who is not compensated for the person's services as a
representative of a corporation, association,
organization or other group, $0.

		"(2) Fees are nonrefundable.

		"(3) All moneys received by the commission under
this section shall be paid into the General Fund in the
State Treasury to the credit of the commission.  Such
moneys are continuously appropriated and shall be used
only for the administration and enforcement of the
powers and duties of the commission."

		Plaintiffs do not challenge the preexisting statutory
requirements that they register with the state and disclose
certain aspects of their lobbying activities.  Their sole
objection is to the additional imposition of a registration fee.  

		In keeping with our traditional practice, we first
address the claims asserted under the Oregon Constitution.  See
State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 262-65, 666 P2d 1316 (1983)
(explaining that paradigm).  Although we could begin our inquiry
under either Article I, section 8, or Article I, section 26, we
choose the former because, as it turns out, plaintiffs' claim is
vindicated fully under that provision.

		Our starting point is the analytical framework, first
set out in State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 649 P2d 569 (1982),
that this court traditionally has employed in evaluating Article
I, section 8, challenges.  The court summarized that framework in
State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 163-64, 838 P2d 558 (1992):

	"In State v. Robertson, * * * this court
established a framework for evaluating whether a law
violates Article I, section 8.  First, the court
recognized a distinction between laws that focus on the
content of speech or writing and laws that focus on
proscribing the pursuit or accomplishment of forbidden
results. * * * The court reasoned that a law of the
former type, a law 'written in terms directed to the
substance of any "opinion" or any "subject" of
communication,' violates Article I, section 8,

"'unless the scope of the restraint is wholly
confined within some historical exception
that was well established when the first
American guarantees of freedom of expression
were adopted and that the guarantees then or
in 1859 [when the Oregon Constitution went
into effect] demonstrably were not intended
to reach.' * * * 

	"Laws of the latter type, which focus on forbidden
results, can be divided further into two categories. 
The first category focuses on forbidden effects, but
expressly prohibits expression used to achieve those
effects. * * * Such laws are analyzed for
overbreadth[.] 

	"* * * * *

	"The second kind of law also focuses on forbidden
effects but without referring to expression at all.  Of
that category, this court wrote:

"'If [a] statute [is] directed only against
causing the forbidden effects, a person
accused of causing such effects by language
or gestures would be left to assert (apart
from a vagueness claim) that the statute
could not constitutionally be applied to his
particular words or other expression, not
that it was drawn and enacted contrary to
Article I, section 8.'"  

(Emphasis, citations, and footnote omitted.)

		Plaintiffs argue, first, that ORS 171.743 is written in
terms directed to the substance of a subject of communication. 
They argue that, although the statute applies, by its terms, to
"lobbyists," its real object is "lobbying," an activity that
primarily is defined in terms of a particular type of speech,
viz., speech that pertains to, and is designed to influence,
legislative action. 

  		The state responds that, by its terms, ORS 171.743
applies to lobbyists as a professional group, and not to the act
of lobbying itself.  The state acknowledges that the profession
is defined, at least in part, by the type of communication in
which its practitioners engage, but, it argues that that fact
does not, and cannot, mean that that type of communication is the
object of the statute, for purposes of Article I, section 8:

	"Many professions are associated with expression. 
The practice of law, for example, is defined as
advising another person about his or her particular
legal rights.  See State Bar v. Security Escrows, Inc.,
233 Or 80, 89, 377 P2d 334 (1962) (defining practice of
law).  Teaching consists of communicating about
specific disciplines; psychiatry consists of
communication between the patient and the doctor about
the patient's state of mind; and securities brokers
promote and sell stocks and bonds.

	"If plaintiffs are correct, any law that regulates
a person's ability to practice those professions would
automatically be invalid unless it comes within a well-established historical exception."

		We agree with the state that the mere fact that a
profession is associated with a certain kind of expression does
not transform every statute that regulates that profession into
an attack on expression.  At the same time, we recognize that
that proposition goes only so far:  At some point, there may be
so little to distinguish between the saying of a thing and the
"profession" of saying it that permitting a regulation on the
theory that it is directed at the profession, rather than at the
statement, would represent a triumph of form over substance.  And
that, in this court's view, is the case here.  Lobbying is
political speech, and being a lobbyist is the act of being a
communicator to the legislature on political subjects.

		There is no question that ORS 171.743 applies to
persons who are defined, to a large extent, by their association
with a certain variety of speech.  ORS 171.743 imposes a fee on
"person[s] described in ORS 171.725(8) and registered with the
commission," viz., registered lobbyists.  The persons described
in ORS 171.725 -- "lobbyists" -- are defined by their
participation in lobbying, an activity that is primarily
expressive.  Of course, participation in a certain kind of
expression is by no means the only thing that defines the
lobbying profession under the statute.  Lobbyists also are
defined by their involvement in "attempt[ing] to obtain the good
will of legislative officials" and by the fact that they operate
in a representative and, often, paid capacity.  ORS 171.725(7)
and (8).  But even those criteria of lobbying are bound up
closely with the essentially expressive nature of the profession. 
Lobbying is expression, for the purposes of the first Robertson
category, and ORS 171.743 extracts a fee for engaging in that
activity.(4) 

		The foregoing brings us again to the wording of the
statute.  The state argues, and we can assume for the purposes of
this opinion, that a fee may be charged for the expenses that the
government incurs as the result of a particular communicative
activity, such as the expense of providing added police
protection for a parade.  The state argues here that that is all
that ORS 171.743 does.  Therefore, the state reasons, the statute
is constitutional.

		Whatever might be the permissibility of a fee imposed
specifically and directly for the purpose that the state
espouses, it is clear from its wording that the present version
of ORS 171.743 does something different.  As noted, the statute
directs that the money collected "shall be used only for the
administration and enforcement of the powers and duties of the
commission."  In spite of the use of the word "only," those
powers and duties extend far beyond keeping a record of
lobbyists.  See generally ORS ch 244 (declaring public office to
be a public trust, establishing standards for ethical behavior of
public officials, and establishing Oregon Government Standards
and Practices Commission to oversee enforcement of standards). 
Thus, the statute directs that a fee be imposed on a certain
variety of communicative activity -- political speech -- for the
purpose of funding a government agency that not only is
responsible for registering lobbyists, but also has a number of
other duties relating to state and local government officials. 
The work of that agency is of great importance, to be sure, but
the protection of the communicative activity is constitutionally
mandated. 

		The state argues in the alternative that, whatever the
facial scope of the statute, the amount of the fee imposed
actually is a reasonable approximation -- in fact, a significant
undercharge -- of the true cost of operating the lobbyist
registration program.  It cites legislative history that
indicates that the legislature relied on an estimate made by
legislative counsel to the effect that the cost to the Commission
was at least $100 for each lobbyist registered.

		We reject that argument for two reasons.  The first is
that the statute on its face does not tie the fee to the costs
associated with registering lobbyists.  To resort to legislative
history to augment the statutory meaning in the manner suggested
is contrary to this court's practice in cases, like this one, in
which the meaning of a statute is clear from the wording of the
statute itself, viewed in context.  See PGE v. Bureau of Labor
and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-11, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (setting
out hierarchical paradigm for statutory construction).  The
second is that the history on which the state relies, even if we
were to reach it, is not sufficiently detailed to allow this
court to determine whether the criteria used in making the
estimate were such as to make them meaningful for constitutional
purposes.  At bottom, the question whether the amount of the fee
does or does not approximate the cost to the Commission of
operating the lobbyist registration program is one of fact,
perhaps appropriate to a case involving an "as applied" challenge
to an otherwise facially valid statute, but not to a facial
challenge like that mounted here.(5)

		 Based on the foregoing analysis, we hold that ORS
171.743 impermissibly restricts the right to speak, write, or
print freely on any subject whatever under Article I, section 8,
of the Oregon Constitution.  It is unconstitutional.

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

1. 	The text of ORS 171.743 is set out below, ___ Or at ___
(slip op at 3-4).

2. 	Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides:

		"No law shall be passed restraining the free
expression of opinion, or restricting the right to
speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever;
but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of
this right."

	Article I, section 26, of the Oregon Constitution, provides:

		"No law shall be passed restraining any of the
inhabitants of the State from assembling together in a
peaceable manner to consult for their common good; nor
from instructing their Representatives; nor from
applying to the Legislature for redress of their
greviances [sic]."

		The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:

		"Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."

The First Amendment is made applicable to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See, e.g., New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 264 n 4, 84 S Ct 710, 11
L Ed 2d 686 (1964) (so holding).

3. 	Certain persons who otherwise might be subjected to the
requirements of ORS 171.740 and 171.745 are exempted from those
requirements by ORS 171.735.  Exempted categories of individuals
include members of the news media, legislative officials acting
in an official capacity, unpaid lobbyists who limit their
lobbying activities to formal appearances before legislative
committees and certain other public bodies, and persons who spend
no more than 24 hours and $100 per calendar quarter on lobbying. 
ORS 171.735.

4. 	At first blush, the fee requirement appears to be
content-neutral, a fact perhaps best illustrated by the
circumstance that, when paid lobbyists are aligned both for and
against a particular legislative proposal, each is subject to
paying the fee.  But that scenario does not keep the lobbying
activity from being protected expression.  Viewed with a longer
lens, ORS 171.743 requires payment of a fee that can be avoided
by the simple expedient of never espousing a preference
concerning the content of Oregon statutory law, except for the
purposes of generating good will.  So viewed, the statute turns
out not to be content-neutral at all.  Its focus is political
speech.

5. 	The state does not argue that the fee imposed by ORS
171.743 can be justified by any historical or other exception to
the scope of Article I, section 8, and we know of none.