Title: SCHUMAN v STUDY COMMISSION
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13771
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: April 4, 1978

No. 13771 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 THEODORE A. SCHUMAN et al., Petitioners and Appellants, THE STUDY COMMISSION OF YELLOWSTONE COUNTY et al., Respondents and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Honorable Bernard W. Thomas, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Jones, Olsen and Christensen, Billings, Montana Paul G. Olsen argued, Billings, Montana For Respondents: Honorable Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena Helena, Montana Moulton, Bellingham, Longo and Mather, Billings, Montana William H. Bellingham argued, Eillings, Montana Submitted: September 30, 1977 CPY . "- .- ?97Q Filed: Honorable Robert M. Holter, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n place of M r . Chief J u s t i c e Haswell, delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This is an appeal from an order of t h e District Court, Yellowstone County, affirming and declaring v a l i d t h e September 1 4 , 1976, City of B i l l i n g s and Yellowstone County a l t e r n a t i v e form of government e l e c t i o n s . Pursuant t o s e c t i o n s 16-5101 t o 16-5115, R.C.P1. 1947, t h e Yellowstone County Board of County Commissioners estab- l i s h e d t h e Yellowstone County Study Commission (County Study Commission) and t h e B i l l i n g s Municipal Council established t h e B i l l i n g s Study Commission (City Study Commission). Each study commission held i n excess of 50 public meetings t o examine both present and a l t e r n a t i v e forms of c i t y and county governments. They i n v i t e d public questions and suggestions. I n addition, t h e county study cornmission held f i v e public hearings and t h e c i t y study commission held four public hearings from Play, 1975 t o June, 1976, t o e l i c i t preferences as t o c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of l o c a l government, views on county-city government consolidation, and r e a c t i o n s t o t h e study commissions' t e n t a t i v e r e p o r t s . Each study commission presented a f i n a l r e p o r t t o t h e public. The City Study Commission d i s t r i b u t e d approximately 23,000 copies of its f i n a l r e p o r t . This r e p o r t included a summary of t h e commission's findings, key provisions of t h e c h a r t e r form of government which t h e City Study Commission proposed a s an a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e e x i s t i n g c i t y government, t h e e n t i r e proposed c h a r t e r , a comparison between t h e then e x i s t i n g form of c i t y government and t h e proposed c h a r t e r form, c e r t i f i c a t e s e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e then e x i s t i n g plan of government and t h e proposed c h a r t e r form, and a form of o f f i c i a l b a l l o t . he County Study Commission d i s t r i b u t e d approximately 26,000 s i m i l a r f i n a l r e p o r t s o f f e r i n g a proposed coinmissioner- a d m i n i s t r a t o r c h a r t e r form of county government a s an a l t e r n a - t i v e t o t h e e x i s t i n g t r a d i t i o n a l county commission form. The c i t y v o t e r s on September 1 4 , 1976, voted 7,238 t o 6,268 i n favor of t h e proposed c h a r t e r form of government t o r e p l a c e t h e mayor-council form of government. The county e l e c t o r s on t h a t day, by a 9,720 t o 8,776 v o t e , r e j e c t e d t h e proposed c h a r t e r form of county government and r e t a i n e d t h e county c o m i s s i o n form. More than 1 0 q u a l i f i e d e l e c t o r s of both t h e c i t y and county f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r j u d i c i a l review on September 30, 1976, i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court, Yellowstone County, pursuant t o s e c t i o n 16-5115.15, R.C.M. 1947. The e l e c t o r s contested t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e e l e c t i o n s and claimed s e c t i o n 16-5115.1, R.C.M. 1947, was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . These i s s u e s were t r i e d by t h e D i s t r i c t Court which made f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law affirming t h a t t h e e l e c t i o n s of September 1 4 , 1976, and t h e proceedings leading t h e r e t o w e r e v a l i d , and granted judgment t o t h a t e f f e c t . I t i s from t h e f i n d i n g s , conclusions and judgment t h a t t h i s appeal is taken. This Court has repeatedly s t a t e d it w i l l not overturn f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law i f supported by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence and by t h e law. Evidence w i l l be viewed i n t h e l i g h t most favorable t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g party. Mont . Rule 52, M.R.Civ.P.; Luppold v. L e w i s , (1977), I 563 P.2d 538, 34 St.Rep. 227; Morgen & Oswood Construction Mont . Co. v. Big Sky of Montana, Inc. (1976), , 557 P.2d 1017, 33 St.Rep. 1 1 2 1 . The judgment of t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court i s presumed t o be c o r r e c t and w i l l be upheld u n l e s s c l e a r l y shown t o be erroneous; t h e burden of such showing i s upon t h e appellant. Kamp v. F i r s t National Bank and T r u s t Co., (1973), 1 6 1 Mont. 103, 504 P.2d 987. W e f i n d t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of l a w Of t h e ~ i ~ t r i c t Court a r e supported by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence- Appellants next claim t h e c i t y and county v o t e r s were not given t h e choice between t h e established form of govern- ment and an a l t e r n a t i v e form a s mandated by A r t . X I , Section 9 ( 1 ) , 1972 Montana Constitution. Instead, appellants a l l e g e t h e choice offered w a s between two a l t e r n a t i v e forms of government. I t i s obvious t h a t i n each case the c i t y and county study commissions presented c h a r t e r forms of govern- ment which d i f f e r e d i n basic composition from any then e x i s t i n g form. The c r u c i a l question i s whether t h e established (whether c a l l e d "present" o r "existing") forms of government were offered t o t h e v o t e r s a t a l l . The D i s t r i c t Court found they were. The b a l l o t s presented t o t h e v o t e r s were i n t h e follow- ing forms: B i l l i n g s City Form Yellowstone County Form F-------- ----------- --- 7 ------___ -- t - i 1 . - - . - - . * , - _ I -. .- - . .. - I' i . I I I BALLOT O!i ALTERiiBTIETE ) I BALOT O$ALTER;MTWE , I I FOf _ _ - h ! ..- OF . - GOVER!lMEIT _ _ __. f FORFA O f LOCAL GOYEBi4?AEIIT I - I - ( I3 the proposed form of I majority of the votes cast on t h e question. 1 tion also fails. If the proposed form is I option requires only a plurality of I option for adoption. . - I -. -1. - - . I PLEASE V ~ Y E d~ I Vo16for Ons. - . I 1 . D - - 1 I 1 . Vote for One. _ I FOR the zdoption of the self-government 1 a -- 1 I charter proposed in the report of the Ye[- For adoption of the charter form of city govern- 1 bwstone County Study Commission. I ment proposed in the report of the Billings City I t - - I i - Study Commission. I I I FOR the existing county commission I I form of county government 1 I I For the present mayor-counci~form of city I I I government 2. I I vote for ~ n a . I Sub-option to be included in the new form of I . , 2. 9 I I government, if it is adopted. Yellowstone County Vote for One I / elections: . * I I sub-option to be included in the proposed charter form I I of c~ty government, it the proposed charter form ot city 1 1 I - II Shall be conducted on a partisan basis. government is adopted. Article Ill. Sect~on 3.06, Elec- 1 - 1. tion. The procedure tor the nomination and electfon of 1 I ' 1 a!l city officials shall be as prescribed by state law. I I _ Shall be conducted on a non-paclsan basis. 1 - - I I I - , I 1 For Partisan elections. - I I I I I L , - , , , , , , , , , - - - - - - - - - - J 1 I I For on-partisan elections. * ' _ i I I . - - - - , , , , , - - - - - - - - - - - - - J The b a l l o t form w a s adopted s o t h e v o t e r s would be c l e a r l y required t o v o t e p o s i t i v e l y , t h a t is, v o t e f o r t h e i r choice - and n o t a g a i n s t one of t h e o t h e r forms. That i n t h e c i t y e l e c t i o n t h e v o t e r s adopted a new governmental form, while i n t h e county v o t e r s r e t a i n e d t h e o l d form, i s t h e s t r o n g e s t evidence t h e v o t e r s were f u l l y informed and n o t confused by t h e b a l l o t s nor t h e i s s u e s . But, a p p e l l a n t s argue, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n 1975 changed t h e form from "present" t o " e x i s t i n g " l o c a l government by t h e adoption of Chapter 106, Laws 1975, e n t i t l e d "AN ACT TO CREATE A NEW TITLE I N THE REVISED C O D E S OF MONTANA DEALING WITH L O C A L GOVERNMENTv. The t i t l e c r e a t e d by Chapter 106 i s T i t l e 47A of t h e Revised Codes of Montana. Appellants claim t h a t s e c t i o n 47A-3-202 e t seq., R.C.M. 1947, varied t h e forms of l o c a l government from those under T i t l e s 1 1 and 16, R.C.M. 1947. U n t i l 1975, l o c a l governments developed through many years of growth and s t a t u t o r y change. There was no s i n g l e government code a s such; r a t h e r , t h e various provisions under which l o c a l governments operated w e r e s c a t t e r e d through- o u t t h e whole Montana Code, b u t were mainly found i n T i t l e s 1 1 and 16. Indeed, Chapter 106, Laws 1975, is prefaced by t h i s declaration: "WHEREAS, t h e e x i s t i n g state s t a t u t e s governing l o c a l government a r e confused, c o n t r a d i c t o r y , s c a t t e r e d and r e p e t i t i v e , r e s u l t i n g i n delay o r i n a c t i o n i n response t o pressing problems * * *." That was t h e s i t u a t i o n when T i t l e 47A w a s enacted. The t r i a l c o u r t found, and w e concur, t h a t t h e r e l e v a n t p o r t i o n s of Section 47A-3-202 e t seq. contain t h e s a m e e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of form of government a s were presented under t h e former c o d i f i c a t i o n . A t most, it i s a recod- i f i c a t i o n . Therefore, it follows t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l mandates were observed and an alternative and the established (whether called "present" or "existing") forms were presented to the electors for their choice. - Lastly, appellants argue that section 16-6115.1, R.C.M. 1947 compels the selection of an "existing" form of government and thereby violates the 1972 Montana Constitution: Art. XI, Sections 3(1) and 9(1), 1972 Montana Constitution: "Section 3(1). The legislature shall provide nethods for governing local government units and procedures for incorporating, classifying, merging, consolidating, and dissolving such units and altering their boundaries. The legislature shall provide such optional or alternative forms of government that each unit or combination of units may - adopt, amend, or abandon an optional or altern- ative form by a majority of those voting on the question." (Emphasis added.) "Section 9 (1) . The legislature shall, within four years of the ratification of this constitution, provide procedures requiring each local govern- ment unit or combination of units to review its structure and submit one alternative form of govern- ment to the qualified electors at the next general or special election." (Emphasis added.) Art. 11, Sections 1 and 2, 1972 Montana Constitution: "Section 1. All political power is vested in and derived from the people. All government of right originates with the people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole." "Section 2. The people have the exclusive right of governing themselves as a free, sovereign and independent state. They may alter or abolish the constitution and form of government whenever they deem it necessary." Appellants claim this is true because section 16-5115.1 states that unless the electors chose an alternative form of government, then their "existing" form of government shall be as defined by section 16-5115.1. In this manner appellants claim the study commissions and the legislature locked the citizens into a situation which prevented them from exercising their rights. We preface discussion with some of the rules which apply generally t o a l l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l inquiry. I n Board of Regents of Higher Education v. Judge, (1975), 168 Mont. 433, 443, 543 P.2d 1323, t h e Court held: " ' * * * t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n must r e c e i v e a broad and l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c o n s i s t e n t with t h e purpose of t h e framers and t h e people i n adopting it, t h a t it may s e r v e t h e needs of a growing s t a t e ; t h e proper i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision r e q u i r e s u s t o remember t h a t it i s a p a r t of t h e organic law--organic n o t only i n t h e sense t h a t it i s fundamental, b u t a l s o i n t h e sense t h a t it i s a l i v i n g t h i n g designed t o meet t h e needs of a progressive s o c i e t y , amid a l l t h e d e t a i l changes t o which a progressive s o c i e t y i s subject. '" Nor can w e omit t h e wisdom of J u s t i c e Oliver Wendell Holmes when he wrote: "* * * t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s must n o t be too l i t e r a l . W e must remember t h a t t h e machinery of govern- ment would n o t work i f it w e r e n o t allowed a l i t t l e play i n its j o i n t s . * * * " Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U . S . 499, 501, 51 S.Ct. 228, 75 L.Ed. 482. I n Martien v. P o r t e r , (1923), 68 Mont. 450, 464, 219 P. 817, t h i s Court held: " W e e n t e r upon a consideration of t h i s case, bearing i n mind a r u l e of construction d i c t a t e d by reason and sanctioned by a u t h o r i t y and long usage, t h a t whenever an Act of t h e l e g i s l a t i v e assembly is a s s a i l e d a s unconsti- t u t i o n a l , t h e question presented t o t h e c o u r t is n o t whether it is p o s s i b l e t o condemn b u t whether it is p o s s i b l e t o uphold. " I n t h e e a r l y c a s e of Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat 419, 6 L.Ed. 678, * * * Chief J u s t i c e Marshall declared: " ' I t has been t r u l y s a i d , t h a t t h e presumption is i n favor of every l e g i s l a t i v e A c t , and t h a t t h e whole burden of proof lies on him who de- c l a r e s its u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . ' I t has been i n v a r i a b l y held by t h i s c o u r t t h a t t h e c o n s t i - t u t i o n a l i t y of an Act of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e w i l l be held unless i t s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y appears beyond - a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis added.) These r u l e s were r e c e n t l y r e s t a t e d by t h i s Court b u t with a somewhat more r e s t r i c t i v e burden f o r t h e proponent: "We cominence i n q u i r y i n t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l questions with t h e w e l l - s e t t l e d r u l e t h a t when t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of a s t a t u t e i s under s c r u t i n y , t h e s t a t u t e i s presumed t o be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and t h e p a r t y a t t a c k i n g it has t h e burden of proving its i n v a l i d i t y . * * * This presumption of v a l i d i t y a p p l i e s t o a l l l e g i s l a t i v e enactments and it is t h e duty of t h e c o u r t t o r e s o l v e a l l conceivable doubts i n favor of v a l i d i t y whenever possible." (Emphasis added.) Reeves v. I l l e E l e c t r i c Co., (1976), Mont. I 551 P.2d 647, 650, 33 St.Rep. 542. 542. W e have e a r l i e r i n t h i s opinion held s e c t i o n s 47A-3- 203, e t seq., t o be c o d i f i c a t i o n s of t h e various forms of l o c a l government u t i l i z e d under o l d T i t l e s 1 1 and 16, Revised Codes of Montana. W e now hold s e c t i o n 16-5115.1, 2.C.M. 1947, t o be of t h e same vein; it merely is t h e "road map" by which one f i n d s h i s way i n t o T i t l e 47A. Nor does t h i s holding contravene any r i g h t s of t h e c i t i z e n s under A r t . 11, Sections 1 and 2 , by t e l l i n g them " t h i s i s i t " . A r t . X I , Section 3 ( 1 ) f i x e s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y upon t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o provide o p t i o n a l o r a l t e r n a t i v e forms of government; cer- t a i n l y it can be implied t h a t t h i s includes t h e power of defining whatever forms they were t o make such a l t e r n a t i v e s t o . This adds t o , r a t h e r than d e t r a c t s from, t h e r i g h t s of t h e people t o choose t h e i r own governments s i n c e they now have a d e f i n i t i o n of t h e system. Moreover, t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n recognizes changing conditions i n s o c i e t y r e q u i r i n g o r d e r l y and unhur- r i e d r e v i s i o n from t i m e t o time of its governmental systems. That is t h e r e a l s p i r i t of it; t o s t i f l e t h a t s p i r i t by t o o l i t e r a l l y i n t e r p r e t i n g l e g i s l a t i o n thereunder is not i n t h e i n t e r e s t s of s o c i e t y . Fundamental purposes must be t h e o b j e c t i v e and reasonableness t h e watchword. I t i s then t o t h e end r e s u l t of a l l of t h e proceedings of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , study commissions and e l e c t i o n s t o which we must address ourselves. Through t h e l e g i s l a t i v e enact- ments, governments were reviewed and t h e i r forms defined; a l t e r n a t e forms were s t u d i e d , and one a l t e r n a t e s e l e c t e d which seemed b e s t s u i t e d t o t h e study commissions and t h e people. The people were afforded reasonable choices between t h e e s t a b l i s h e d form and an a l t e r n a t i v e form and made t h e i r s e l e c t i o n s . N o w t o say t h e whole proceeding is unconstitu- t i o n a l because of some vague claim t h a t t h e r e might be some d i f f e r e n c e between t h e o l d and newer s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n s o r t h a t those d e f i n i t i o n s coerce s e l e c t i o n , l e a d s t o an absurd r e s u l t . C e r t a i n l y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l construction should n o t reach such a r e s u l t . S t a t e ex r e l . Ronish v. School D i s t . No. 1 of Fergus County, (1960), 136 Mont. 453, 348 W e hold t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of t h e e x i s t i n g form of government under s e c t i o n 16-5515.1, R.C.M. 1947, n o t t o be an imposition of any p a r t i c u l a r form of government upon a l o c a l body, but i n s t e a d t o be compliance with t h e c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l mandates of A r t . X W e a f f i r m t h e d e c i s i o n Hon. Robert M. Holter, D i s t r i c t , / ' Judge, s i t t i n g i n p l a c e of M r . . I / J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell. /' i W e conc : .d,/f%i, /f$d. Jack D. ~ h a n s t r o m , s i t t i n g n p l a c e of M r . J u s t i c e John C. Harrison ' P