Title: HENDRICKSON v NEIMAN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 82-491
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 1983

N O . 82-491 I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1 9 8 3 LEILA HENDRICKSON, P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , V S . PAUL A . N E I M A N and HAVRE DISTRIBUTORS, I N C . , D e f e n d a n t s and R e s p o n d e n t s . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e T w e l f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f H i l l H o n o r a b l e B. W . Thomas, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f Record: F o r A p p e l l a n t : Howard F. S t r a u s e , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana F o r R e s p o n d e n t s : A l e x a n d e r & Baucus, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana Bosch, Kuhr, D u g d a l e , Warner & Kaze, H a v r e , Montana - - S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s : F e b r u a r y 1 7 , 1 9 8 3 D e c i d e d : June 1 0 , 1 9 8 3 C l e r k Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. On November 29, 1982, the District Court of Hill County entered a final order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Havre Distributors, Inc., pursuant to Rule 5 4 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P. Plaintiff appeals. We vacate the order and remand. At approximately 3:00 p.m. on Friday, May 1, 1981, Leila Hendrickson finished working her shift at the Iron Horse Pancake House in Havre, Montana, and attempted to cross First Street at Fourth Avenue in front of the Park Hotel. The hotel sits on the northwest corner of the inter- section. We include the following diagram for clarification: - -- - - - - - - - - - a - - - - - - - . - - - - . I " - 4 - - . ~ I K S T STREET - - . -- Hendrickson was c r o s s i n g from t h e n o r t h s i d e of t h e s t r e e t t o t h e s o u t h s i d e of t h e s t r e e t and was on t h e w e s t s i d e of t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n . F i r s t S t r e e t is a two-way s t r e e t w i t h a p a r k i n g l a n e on each s i d e of t h e s t r e e t and f o u r l a n e s of t r a f f i c (two l a n e s f o r westbound t r a f f i c and two l a n e s f o r eastbound t r a f f i c ) . A s s h e s t a r t e d t o c r o s s t h e s t r e e t i n f r o n t of t h e h o t e l , Hendrickson e n t e r e d a p e d e s t r i a n crosswalk b u t found it a t l e a s t p a r t i a l l y blocked by a beer d e l i v e r y t r u c k belonging t o d e f e n d a n t Havre D i s t r i b u t o r s , Inc. The r e a r wheels of t h e v e h i c l e extended i n t o t h e crosswalk from t h e w e s t , and t h e t r u c k extended even f u r t h e r i n t o t h e c r o s s - walk. I t was a l s o parked one-to-two f e e t from t h e curb. P l a i n t i f f walked o u t of t h e crosswalk around t h e back of t h e t r u c k and t h e n r e e n t e r e d t h e crosswalk. No o t h e r v e h i c l e s were parked between t h e d e l i v e r y t r u c k and t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n . Before proceeding a c r o s s F i r s t S t r e e t , s h e c h e c k e d i n b o t h d i r e c t i o n s f o r t r a f f i c . H e n d r i c k s o n c o n t i n u e d walking a c r o s s t h e s t r e e t through t h e o u t s i d e westbound l a n e . A v e h i c l e i n t h e o u t s i d e westbound l a n e stopped t o w a i t f o r h e r . A s s h e e n t e r e r d t h e i n s i d e westbound l a n e , s h e was s t r u c k by a v e h i c l e d r i v e n by d e f e n d a n t Neiman and was thrown o n t o t h e hood of h i s c a r . Both of Hendrickson's l e g s were broken by t h e impact, and due t o c o m p l i c a t i o n s s h e h a s been u n a b l e t o r e t u r n t o work. Neiman t e s t i f i e d i n h i s d e p o s i t i o n t h a t h e t h o u g h t t h e v e h i c l e stopped i n t h e o u t s i d e l a n e of t r a f f i c was w a i t i n g f o r a break i n t r a f f i c t o proceed around t h e d e l i v e r y t r u c k , which extended i n t o t h e o u t e r t r a f f i c l a n e . H e d i d n o t s e e p l a i n t i f f u n t i l he s t r u c k h e r . H i s v e h i c l e d i d n o t come t o a s t o p f o r s i x t y - t h r e e f e e t . Neiman was c i t e d f o r and p l e a d e d g u i l t y t o r e c k l e s s d r i v i n g and opera- t i o n of a n u n s a f e v e h i c l e . P l a i n t i f f brought s u i t a g a i n s t Neiman and a g a i n s t Havre D i s t r i b u t o r s , I n c . She a l l e g e d n e g l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t of Bavre D i s t r i b u t o r s , I n c . , f o r p a r k i n g s o a s t o p a r t i a l l y p r o t r u d e i n t o t h e o u t s i d e d r i v i n g l a n e and s o a s t o block t h e crosswalk. She a l s o a l l e g e d t h a t Neiman o p e r a t e d h i s v e h i c l e c a r e l e s s l y and r e c k l e s s l y and f a i l e d t o keep a p r o p e r lookout. A f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g t h e p l e a d i n g s , answers t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , d e p o s i t i o n s and a f f i d a v i t s on f i l e , and t h e b r i e f s and arguments of c o u n s e l , t h e D i s t r i c t Court g r a n t e d summary judgment t o Havre D i s t r i b u t o r s , Inc. Summary judg- ment was g r a n t e d on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e r e was no g e n u i n e i s s u e a s t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t , t h a t any n e g l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t o f Havre D i s t r i b u t o r s , I n c . , was n o t t h e proximate c a u s e of Hendrickson's i n j u r i e s and t h a t " p l a i n t i f f was i n j u r e d a s t h e r e s u l t o f t h e i n d e p e n d e n t , i n t e r v e n i n g n e g l i g e n t a c t o f d e f e n d a n t P a u l A. Neiman." P l a i n t i f f p r e s e n t s a s i n g l e i s s u e on a p p e a l : Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n g r a n t i n g summary judgment t o Havre D i s t r i b u t o r s , Inc.? Summary judgment may be g r a n t e d p u r s u a n t t o Rule 5 6 , M.R.Civ.P., when t h e r e is no genuine d i s p u t e over m a t e r i a l f a c t s and t h e moving p a r t y is e n t i t l e d t o a judgment a s a m a t t e r of l a w . The i n i t i a l burden of proof is upon t h e p a r t y moving f o r summary judgment. The moving p a r t y must d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t no g e n u i n e i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t s . Then, t h e p a r t y opposing t h e motion must come forward w i t h s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t h a t r a i s e s a g e n u i n e i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t . A l l - S t a t e Leasing Co. v. Top H a t Lounge, I n c . ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Mont . , 649 P.2d 1250, 1251-1252, 39 St.Rep. 425, 428. Havre D i s t r i b u t o r s , I n c . , a r g u e s t h a t t h e p o s i t i o n i n g of t h e d e l i v e r y t r u c k could n o t have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e a c c i d e n t . R a t h e r , t h e company a r g u e s t h a t t h e a c c i d e n t was caused by Neiman's i n d e p e n d e n t , i n t e r v e n i n g a c t s . Hendrick- s o n and Neiman b o t h a r g u e t h a t s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e e s t a b - l i s h e s n e g l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t of Havre D i s t r i b u t o r s , I n c . They a r g u e t h a t Havre D i s t r i b u t o r s , I n c . , owed a s t a t u t o r y d u t y of care t o p l a i n t i f f which was breached when t h e t r u c k w a s parked more t h a n e i g h t e e n i n c h e s from t h e c u r b and i n a crosswalk. S e c t i o n s 61-8-354 and -355, MCA. F u r t h e r , p l a i n - t i f f a r g u e s t h a t s h e f a l l s w i t h i n t h e class i n t e n d e d t o be p r o t e c t e d and t h a t Havre D i s t r i b u t o r s , I n c . , is a member of t h e c l a s s a g a i n s t whom a d u t y was imposed. W e a g r e e . W e d i s a g r e e , however, w i t h p l a i n t i f f ' s r e l i a n c e upon Azure v. C i t y o f B i l l i n g s ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 182 Mont. 234, 240-241, 596 P.2d 460, 464, f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t such a demon- s t r a t i o n is a l l t h a t is n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r t o h o l d Havre D i s t r i b u t o r s , I n c . , n e g l i g e n t p e r se. I t is a x i o m a t i c t h a t i n o r d e r t o h o l d a p a r t y n e g l i g e n t p e r se f o r a v i o l a t i o n o f s t a t u t e , a p l a i n t i f f must d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t such v i o l a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d t h e proximate c a u s e of t h e i n j u r y r e c e i v e d and t h e r e s u l t i n g damages. S e e , Azure, 182 Mont. a t 240, 596 P.2d a t 464; Kudrna v. Comet Corp. ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 175 Mont. 29, 39, 572 P.2d 183, 189. P l a i n t i f f a r g u e s t h a t t h e i l l e g a l p a r k i n g o f t h e t r u c k could have been a proximate c a u s e of t h e a c c i d e n t s i n c e s h e may have a l r e a d y been a c r o s s t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n had s h e n o t been r e q u i r e d t o d e t o u r around t h e v e h i c l e . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , s h e contends t h a t t h e j u r y could r e a s o n a b l y conclude t h a t i f t h e beer t r u c k was n o t p r o t r u d i n g i n t o t h e o u t e r d r i v i n g l a n e , Neiman would have recognized t h a t t h e v e h i c l e i n t h e r i g h t hand l a n e was stopped f o r some o t h e r purpose, such a s a p e d e s t r i a n . There is c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d a s t o where t h e d e l i v e r y t r u c k was p a r k e d , how f a r i n t o t h e t r a f f i c l a n e and i n t o t h e crosswalk it extended, and a s t o whether t h e t r u c k ' s p o s i t i o n c o u l d have been a proximate cause of t h e a c c i d e n t . A genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t s h e r e . O r d i n a r i l y , i s s u e s of n e g l i g e n c e a r e n o t s u s c e p t i b l e t o summary judgment and a r e b e t t e r determined a t t r i a l . Brown v. M e r r i l l Lynch, P i e r c e , Fenner & Smith, I n c . ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Mont. , 640 P.2d 453, 458, 39 St.Rep. 305, 310. L i a b i l i t y should n o t be a d j u d i c a t e d upon a motion f o r sum- mary judgment where f a c t u a l i s s u e s c o n c e r n i n g n e g l i g e n c e and c a u s a t i o n a r e p r e s e n t e d . Duchesneau v. S i l v e r Bow County ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 158 Mont. 369, 377, 492 P.2d 926, 931. F u r t h e r , where, a s h e r e , two d e f e n d a n t s a r e i n v o l v e d , summary judg- ment g r a n t e d i n f a v o r of one a l l o w s t h e remaining d e f e n d a n t t o i n t r o d u c e e v i d e n c e t h a t t e n d s t o s h i f t blame f o r t h e a c c i d e n t t o one no l o n g e r a p a r t y t o t h e a c t i o n . The summary judgment is v a c a t e d and t h e cause remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s . ~dd,i;bhd Chief J u s t i c e We concur: \ ibj.r, 4. & , ' / Justices Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. specially concurs as follows: I concur in the result but not in all that is said in the majority opinion. Specifically, I take issue with that portion of the majority opinion wherein it is stated: "Further, where, as here, two defendants are involved, summary judgment granted in favor of one allows the remaining defendant to introduce evidence that tends to shift blame for the accident to one no longer a party to the action." This is no reason to refuse summary judgment against the defendant not at fault. The majority opinion seems to take the position that summary judgment will never be granted in favor of one defendant, where there are multiple defendants, for the reason that the remaining defendants can shift the blame for the accident to one who is no longer a party to the action. Of course, if those defendants remaining in the case attempted to shift blame to a defendant in favor of whom summary judgment had been entered, the plaintiff could then reply by showing that the court had absolved the absent defendant. Nevertheless, the trial strategy of the parties is not relevant to a determination of whether there is a genuine issue of material fact foreclosing the entry of summary judgment. The only determination in this case is whether a jury issue exists with respect to the defendant. If no jury issue exists then summary judgment should be granted irrespective of what the remaining defendant argues at trial. Here there is a genuine issue of material fact on negligence and causation which forecloses the granting of summary judgment. Therefore, the case is properly remanded for trial. M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea: I j o i n i n t h e s p e c i a l concurrence of J u s t i c e Morrison.