Title: Vessels v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 144, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 16, 2009

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JERMAINE VESSELS,  
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 144, 2009      
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
Cr. I.D. Nos. 0712022744 
 
 
 
§ 
                      0801037171 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  December 9, 2009 
 
 
Decided:     December 16, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 16th day of December 2009, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
1. 
Jermaine Vessels (“Vessels”), the defendant below, appeals from a 
Superior Court final judgment of conviction.  On appeal, Vessels claims that the 
Superior Court erred in sentencing him to 26 years at Level V incarceration.  We 
find no error and affirm. 
 
2
2. 
On November 29, 2007, Vessels shot Omar Kinard (“Kinard”), during 
an altercation involving Vessels, Kinard and others. 1   Kinard died the next 
morning.  During a foot chase leading to his arrest on November 30, 2007, Vessels 
threw a handgun (which was not the gun used to shoot Kinard).  The gun was later 
recovered by the police. 
3. 
On March 31, 2008, Vessels was charged with First Degree Murder,2 
Possession of a Firearm during the Commission of a Felony (PFDCF), 3  and 
Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited (PDWPP).4  Vessels had 
already been charged with PDWPP for the possession of the handgun recovered 
upon his arrest.  He pled guilty to that PDWPP charge in May 2008, and his 
sentencing was deferred pending the outcome of the Kinard homicide case. 
4. 
On January 5, 2009, Vessels pled guilty to Manslaughter (as a lesser 
offense of the original First Degree Murder count) and PFDCF, and the State 
entered a nolle prosequi on the remaining PDWPP charge.  The plea agreement 
was conditioned upon Vessels withdrawing his motion to suppress, which was 
                                                 
1 According to Vessels, in the afternoon of November 29, 2007, Kinard and his companions 
displayed weapons and put a gun to Vessels’ head.  Vessels was, therefore, nervous to see 
Kinard and the others walking in his direction later that evening.  Vessels ran behind a local 
business, retrieved a handgun hidden there, fired at Kinard and his companions, and fled the 
scene on foot.  He discarded the gun and some of his clothing as he ran.  
 
2 11 Del. C. § 636. 
 
3 11 Del. C. § 1447A. 
 
4 11 Del. C. § 1448. 
 
 
3
scheduled to be heard on that date.  The State later recommended that Vessels be 
sentenced to at least 15 years at Level V incarceration.  On March 13, 2009, the 
Superior Court sentenced Vessels to: (i) 25 years at Level V incarceration, 
suspended after 20 years, on the manslaughter conviction, (ii) 10 years at Level V 
incarceration, suspended after five years, on the PFDCF conviction, and (iii) 8 
years at Level V incarceration, suspended after 1 year on the PDWPP charge to 
which Vessels pled guilty in May 2008.5  This appeal followed.  
5. 
Vessels’ sole claim on appeal is that the Superior Court imposed an 
excessive and illegal sentence, because: (1) the sentence exceeds the cumulative 
mandatory minimum sentence for the three offenses (eight years),6 (ii) the sentence 
exceeds that recommended by the Delaware Sentencing Accountability 
Commission (SENTAC) guidelines, and (iii) the sentence exceeds the 15 years 
sentence recommended by the State.   
6. 
Appellate review of sentences is extremely limited.7  “To disturb a 
sentence on appeal, there must be a showing either of imposition of an illegal 
                                                 
5 Vessels had prior felony convictions.  Therefore, the sentences imposed on Vessels for the 
PFDCF (five years at Level V incarceration, before suspension) and the PDWPP (one year at 
Level V incarceration before suspension) convictions were mandatory minimal sentences (11 
Del. C. §§ 1447A(c), 1448(e)(1)(a)). 
 
6 The mandatory minimum sentence for manslaughter, a class B felony, is two years.  This 
calculation is somewhat misleading because the sentences imposed on Vessels for the PFDCF 
and PDWPP conviction did not exceed minimum terms mandated by the statute.  
 
7 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1992). 
 
 
4
sentence or of abuse of the trial judge’s broad discretion.”8  No such showing was 
made here.  
7. 
Our review “generally ends upon [a] determination that the sentence is 
within the statutory limits prescribed by the legislature.” 9   Because Vessels’ 
sentence for the manslaughter conviction (20 years at Level V incarceration before 
suspension) was within the statutory limits, any claim of an illegal sentence is 
without merit.10  The SENTAC guidelines are voluntary and non-binding, and they 
too do not provide “any legal or constitutional right to appeal … a statutorily 
authorized sentence.”11 
8. 
Nor does Vessels’ claim establish any basis to conclude that the 
Superior Court abused its discretion in sentencing him.  Vessels concedes that the 
Superior Court articulated all the mitigating and aggravating factors justifying the 
sentence imposed.12  The record also shows that before accepting the plea, Vessels 
was informed that he was facing up to 25 years incarceration on each of the 
                                                 
8 Howell v. State, 421 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1980). 
 
9 Ward v. State, 567 A.2d 1296, 1297 (Del. 1989). 
 
10 The statutory sentence range for a class B felony is 2 to 25 years to be served at Level V.  11 
Del. C. § 4205(b)(2). 
 
11 Mayes, 604 A.2d at 845. 
 
12 Moreover, failure to identify these factors would not provide basis for reversible error, because 
the SENTAC guidelines “provide no basis for appeal.”  Mayes, 604 A.2d at 846 (citing Gaines v. 
State, 571 A.2d 765, 767 (Del. 1990)).   
 
 
5
manslaughter and PFDCF charges, and understood that the Superior Court was not 
bound by any recommendation made about his sentencing.13  That the exercise of 
the Superior Court’s broad discretion yielded a result that differs from the 
SENTAC guidelines and the State’s non-binding recommendation, does not justify 
reversal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
              
 
  
 
 
 
 
        Justice 
                                                 
13 See Superior Court Criminal Rule 11(e)(1)(B) (providing that the attorney general’s sentence 
recommendation is not binding upon the Court).