Title: Meshna v. Scrivanos
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11618
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: April 10, 2015

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SJC-11618 
 
RON MESHNA & others1  vs.  CONSTANTINE SCRIVANOS & another.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 1, 2014. - April 10, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Tips.  Employment.  Notice. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
May 18, 2011.  
 
 
The case was heard by Thomas P. Billings, J., on a motion 
for summary judgment, and questions of law were reported by him 
to the Appeals Court. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review.  
 
 
 
Shannon Liss-Riordan for the plaintiffs. 
 
Diane M. Saunders (Andrew E. Silvia with her) for the 
defendants. 
                     
1 Ileana Ortiz, Ralph Sherrick, and Karen White.  The 
plaintiffs sued on behalf of themselves and all others similarly 
situated. 
 
2 NGP Management, LLC. 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Harris Freeman & Audrey R. Richardson for Labor Relations 
and Research Center, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 
& another. 
 
Christopher J. Anasoulis for DD Independent Franchise 
Owners, Inc. 
 
Ben Robbins & Martin J. Newhouse for New England Legal 
Foundation. 
 
Richard L. Alfred, Ariel D. Cudkowicz, C.J. Eaton, & 
Jessica S. Lieberman for Seyfarth Shaw LLP. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  The plaintiffs are current and former employees 
at Dunkin' Donuts stores who brought suit in the Superior Court 
against Constantine Scrivanos, a Dunkin' Donuts franchisee of 
stores that employed the plaintiffs, and NGP Management, LLC 
(NGP), which performs management functions for those stores.  
Among other claims, the plaintiffs maintained that the 
defendants had implemented a no-tipping policy at certain of 
their Dunkin' Donuts stores,3 and that the implementation of that 
policy, as well as the method of enforcing it, violated G. L. 
c. 149, § 152A (Tips Act).4  The Tips Act provides that no 
employer "shall . . . accept . . . any . . . deduction from a 
tip" given to any wait staff, service, or bartender employee, or 
                     
3 Constantine Scrivanos holds franchises for approximately 
sixty-six Dunkin' Donuts stores in Massachusetts; approximately 
forty-four of these stores had a no-tipping policy in place 
during the period relevant to the plaintiffs' claims. 
 
4 The plaintiffs also asserted claims of tortious 
interference with contractual or advantageous relations and 
unjust enrichment.  The claim for unjust enrichment was 
dismissed, and is not before us. 
 
 
 
3 
"retain . . . any tip" given to the employer directly.  G. L. 
c. 149, § 152A (b). 
Concluding that the no-tipping policy was not a violation 
of the Tips Act, a Superior Court judge allowed the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment on that claim.  The judge denied the 
motion on the claims alleging that the defendants' policy of 
placing money left as tips in the cash register, and a later 
policy of placing money left as tips in "abandoned change" cups, 
violated the Tips Act, because he determined that these claims 
raised triable issues of fact.  At the plaintiffs' request, the 
judge then reported two questions to the Appeals Court, pursuant 
to Mass. R. Civ. P. 64 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1403 (1996), 
and we allowed the plaintiffs' petition for direct appellate 
review.5 
The judge reported the following questions: 
"1. Does G. L. c. 149, § 152A allow an employer to 
maintain a no-tipping policy? 
 
"2. If a no-tipping policy is permitted under 
Massachusetts law, may an employer be liable 
under G. L. c. 149, § 152A if: 
 
"a.  The employer fails to communicate the 
no-tipping policy clearly to customers, who 
consequently leave tips that are retained by the 
                     
5 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by DD 
Independent Franchise Owners, Inc.; the Labor Relations and 
Research Center, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and the 
Massachusetts Fair Wage Campaign; the New England Legal 
Foundation; and Seyfarth Shaw LLP. 
 
 
 
4 
employer; and/or 
 
"b.  The employer clearly communicates the 
no-tipping policy to customers, who nonetheless 
leave tips that are retained by the employer?" 
 
We answer the first question, "Yes."  We answer question 2(a), 
"Yes," and 2(b), "No." 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts set forth in the 
judge's memorandum of decision, supplemented by the parties' 
joint statement of material facts, reserving some facts for 
later discussion.  Scrivanos is a franchisee operating 
approximately sixty-six Dunkin' Donuts stores in the 
Commonwealth.  He has established various limited liability 
companies and S corporations that own the stores for which he is 
a franchisee, and he is the manager of each of these 
corporations.  Scrivanos also established NGP, which manages and 
operates all of Scrivanos's Dunkin' Donuts locations in 
Massachusetts.  The plaintiffs are current and former employees 
of Scrivanos's Dunkin' Donuts stores.  They were paid on an 
hourly basis.  All of the plaintiffs earned at least the minimum 
wage under the Wage Act, G. L. c. 151, § 1. 
Sometime in 2003, the defendants instituted a no-tipping 
policy at all of their stores, but later withdrew the policy as 
to some stores.  When the plaintiffs' complaint was filed, the 
policy remained in effect in approximately two-thirds of 
 
 
 
5 
Scrivanos's Massachusetts stores, including all of the stores in 
which the plaintiffs worked.  Under the no-tipping policy, an 
employee is not permitted to accept a tip from a customer, even 
if the customer wants to leave a tip, and is required to inform 
a customer who attempts to leave a tip of the policy. 
The defendants have instituted various mechanisms for 
enforcing the no-tipping policy, including the placement of 
signs in the stores stating "no tipping" or "thank you for not 
tipping."  The size and location of the signs vary from store to 
store.  Additionally, the defendants instruct employees to 
inform customers of the no-tipping policy and to refuse to 
accept tips.  The defendants have communicated to employees that 
the acceptance of tips "will result in disciplinary action, up 
to and including termination."  Before commencement of this 
litigation, the defendants instructed employees to place "tips" 
that had been left by customers, notwithstanding the 
instructions about the no-tipping policy, in the cash register.  
After the filing of the plaintiffs' complaint in the Superior 
Court, an "abandoned change" policy was adopted.  Employees in 
stores with a no-tipping policy were instructed to place the 
money in abandoned change cups located near the cash register.  
Employees also were instructed to inform customers that the 
"abandoned change" cups were not for tips, and that any money 
 
 
 
6 
placed in the cups would be used to discount future customers' 
purchases, similar to a "take-a-penny, leave-a-penny" container. 
The plaintiffs asserted in their original complaint that 
both the defendants' no-tipping policy, and the policy of 
placing money left as "tips" in the cash register, violate the 
Tips Act.  After the implementation of the "abandoned change" 
policy, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint asserting that 
this new policy also violates the Tips Act. 
The defendants filed a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings.  After a hearing on the motion, a Superior Court 
judge held that the Tips Act did not prohibit implementation of 
a no-tipping policy, but that, if customers nonetheless left 
tips, those tips belonged to the employees, and an employer's 
retention of them would constitute a violation of the Tips Act.  
Concluding that a full record would be helpful for any appeal, 
the judge denied the plaintiffs' motion to report the case to 
the Appeals Court.  Discovery was conducted, and the defendants 
thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment.  A different 
Superior Court judge denied the motion in part, allowed it in 
part, and reported the questions to the Appeals Court.  We 
allowed the plaintiffs' petition for direct appellate review. 
Discussion.  The reported questions require that we 
construe the language of the Tips Act, and we apply familiar 
 
 
 
7 
principles of statutory construction to guide our 
interpretation.  "We look to the intent of the Legislature 
'ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and 
approved usage of the language, considered in connection with 
the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be 
remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that 
the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.'"  DiFiore v. 
American Airlines, Inc., 454 Mass. 486, 490 (2009), quoting 
Industrial Fin. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 367 Mass. 360, 364 
(1975).  "In addition, our respect for the Legislature's 
considered judgment dictates that we interpret the statute to be 
sensible, rejecting unreasonable interpretations unless the 
clear meaning of the language requires such an interpretation."  
Bednark v. Catania Hospitality Group, Inc., 78 Mass. App. Ct. 
806, 811 (2011), citing Commonwealth v. Dodge, 428 Mass. 860, 
865 (1999). 
We note, as an initial matter, that it is undisputed that 
the plaintiffs are employees entitled to the protections of the 
Tips Act.  The Tips Act "protect[s] the wages and tips of 
certain employees who fall within the ambit of the statute."  
Bednark v. Catania Hospitality Group, Inc., 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 
809.  These employees include service employees, service 
bartenders, and wait staff employees.  G. L. c. 149, § 152A (a).  
 
 
 
8 
Wait staff employees include counter staff who "serve[] 
beverages or prepared food directly to patrons," "work[] in a 
restaurant . . . or other place where prepared food or beverages 
are served," and have "no managerial responsibility."  Id.  The 
parties agree that the plaintiffs are "wait staff employees" 
within the meaning of the Tips Act. 
1.  Whether G. L. c. 149, § 152A, permits an employer to 
maintain a no-tipping policy.  General Laws c. 149, § 152A (b), 
provides that 
 
"[n]o employer or other person shall demand, request 
or accept from any wait staff employee, service employee, 
or service bartender any payment or deduction from a tip or 
service charge given to such wait staff employee, service 
employee, or service bartender by a patron.  No such 
employer or other person shall retain or distribute in a 
manner inconsistent with this section any tip or service 
charge given directly to the employer or person." 
 
 
Relying on language in this provision, the plaintiffs 
contend that the plain language of the Tips Act prohibits an 
employer from instituting a no-tipping policy.  They argue that 
G. L. c. 149, § 152A (b), does not permit an employer to take 
any "deduction from a tip," and that the defendants' prohibition 
on employees accepting tips in effect results in a "deduction 
from a tip" that the employee would have received absent the no-
tipping policy. 
The plaintiffs' interpretation is contrary to several 
tenets of statutory construction.  It would require that we 
 
 
 
9 
disregard the plain meaning of the words "retain" and 
"deduction" as used in G. L. c. 149, § 152A (b).  Moreover, 
because the statute explicitly concerns tips that have been 
"given," either directly to employees or to employers, the 
plaintiffs' interpretation distorts the syntax of that section, 
in order to read into it a provision the Legislature did not 
include. 
In the first sentence of G. L. c. 149, § 152A (b), an 
employer is prohibited from demanding, requesting, or accepting 
a "deduction" from a tip "given to [a covered] employee."  In 
construing a statute, where a word is commonly understood, it 
can "be given its ordinary meaning."  Flemings v. Contributory 
Retirement Appeal Bd., 431 Mass. 374, 375 (2000), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. 
Auth., 352 Mass. 517, 518 (1967).  According to several 
dictionary definitions, the word "deduct" means "to take away, 
as from a sum or amount."  See Webster's New Universal 
Unabridged Dictionary 520 (2003); 3 Oxford English Dictionary 
115 (1978).  A "deduction" is commonly defined as "something 
that is or may be deducted."  Webster's New Universal Unabridged 
Dictionary, supra.  See Black's Law Dictionary 501 (10th ed. 
2014) ("The act or process of subtracting or taking away"); 3 
Oxford English Dictionary, supra at 116 ("That which is deducted 
 
 
 
10 
or subtracted"). 
Thus, in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, 
an employer may not take away any amount from a "service charge, 
tip[, or] gratuity," G. L. c. 149, § 152A (a), that was "given 
to" a wait staff employee.  A tip that was "given to" an 
employee would include a tip that was handed directly to the 
employee or left on a counter for the employee, or a sum 
designated as a tip or gratuity on a customer's credit card 
slip.6  This reading of the first sentence of § 152A (b) is 
"consonant with sound reason and common sense."  Harvard 
Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 
Mass. 745, 749 (2006).  See DiGiacomo v. Metropolitan Prop. & 
Cas. Ins. Co., 66 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 346 (2006). 
The Tips Act also contemplates that tips intended for 
employees may be given directly to an employer.  An employer may 
"submit[] a bill, invoice or charge to a patron or other person 
that imposes a service charge or tip," G. L. c. 149, § 152A (d), 
for instance by submitting an invoice in connection with a 
private function at which the employer provides food and 
                     
6 Under G. L. c. 149, § 152A (a), a "[t]ip" is defined as 
 
"a sum of money, including any amount designated by a 
credit card patron, a gift or a gratuity, given as an 
acknowledgment of any service performed by a [covered 
employee]." 
 
 
 
 
11 
beverages.7  See Cooney v. Compass Group Foodservice, 69 Mass. 
App. Ct., 632, 635 (2007).  The second sentence of G. L. c. 149, 
§ 152A (b), addresses an employer's obligation in such a 
situation.  The sentence states that "[n]o . . . employer or 
other person shall retain" a tip or service charge "given 
directly to the employer."  The common definition of the word 
"retain" is "to keep possession of."  Webster's New Universal 
Unabridged Dictionary, supra at 1643.  Accordingly, the second 
sentence of G. L. c. 149, § 152A (b), addresses the circumstance 
in which tipping is permitted and a tip is actually given, 
albeit not directly to the employee; if payment of a tip or 
service charge is made to an employer, "the statute requires 
that the proceeds be remitted to the [covered] employees."  
Cooney v. Compass Group Foodservice, supra at 637.  The Tips Act 
is explicit in this regard, and prohibits an employer from 
retaining a service charge or tip that was paid to the employer 
                     
7 Under G. L. c. 149, § 152A (a), a "[s]ervice charge" is 
defined as 
 
"a fee charged by an employer to a patron in lieu of a 
tip to any [covered employee], including any fee designated 
as a service charge, tip, gratuity, or a fee that a patron 
or other consumer would reasonably expect to be given to a 
[covered employee] in lieu of, or in addition to, a tip." 
 
 
 
 
12 
rather than to the wait staff employee.8 
No language in G. L. c. 149, § 152A (b), or elsewhere in 
the Tips Act, see G. L. c. 149, § 152A (a)-(g), prohibits an 
employer from imposing a no-tipping policy.9  The Tips Act 
addresses circumstances in which tipping is permitted and wait 
staff employees have been given tips, directly or indirectly; it 
prescribes what the employer is required to do with such tips.  
Id. 
In support of their argument that a no-tipping policy is 
prohibited under the Tips Act, the plaintiffs point to the fact 
that the Legislature considered, but did not adopt, legislation 
                     
8 An employer also may impose a fee that is not a tip or 
service charge, invoice a customer directly for such a fee, and 
retain that amount. 
 
"Nothing in this section shall prohibit an employer 
from imposing on a patron any house or administrative fee 
in addition to or instead of a service charge or tip, if 
the employer provides a designation or written description 
of that house or administrative fee, which informs the 
patron that the fee does not represent a tip or service 
charge for wait staff employees, service employees, or 
service bartenders." 
 
G. L. c. 149, § 152A (d). 
 
9 As noted, all of the plaintiffs were paid at least the 
statutory minimum wage; we are not called upon here to consider 
circumstances governed by G. L. c. 151, § 7, pursuant to which 
an employer may pay a "tipped employee" an hourly wage which is 
lower than the statutory minimum wage, provided that specific 
conditions have been met, and that the employer pays an 
"additional amount" if the hourly wage combined with the 
employee's tips falls below the minimum wage established in 
G. L. c. 151, § 1. 
 
 
 
13 
proposed in 2010 House Doc. No. 4814, which stated that 
"[n]othing in [the Tips Act] shall prohibit any employer from 
establishing a policy prohibiting tipping."  We have 
consistently rejected similar arguments, recognizing that "[t]he 
practicalities of the legislative process furnish many reasons 
for the lack of success of a measure other than legislative 
dislike for the principle involved in the legislation."  Suffolk 
Constr. Co. v. Division of Capital Asset Mgt., 449 Mass. 444, 
457 n.18 (2007), quoting Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611, 
615B616 (1980).  See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287 
(2002), quoting Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994) ("several equally 
tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction"). 
Finally, the plaintiffs find support for their view in 
DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 454 Mass. 486, 496 (2009), 
where we stated that the "express purpose of the [Tips] Act [is] 
to protect gratuity payments given to, or intended for, 
[covered] employees."  The plaintiffs suggest that this language 
indicates that G. L. c. 149, § 152A, protects not only tips 
actually given, but also tips that customers intended covered 
employees to have, and would have given to those employees had 
they not been prevented from doing so by imposition of a no-
tipping policy. 
 
 
 
14 
We are not persuaded.  In that case, we addressed a 
question certified to us by the United States District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts concerning the definition of the 
term "service charge" in G. L. c. 149, § 152A (d).  We 
determined that the Legislature intended by this provision "to 
ensure that service employees receive all the proceeds from 
[assessed] service charges," DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 
supra at 493, and interpreted the term "service charge" to 
include a tip or gratuity as "nonexclusive examples of fees that 
constitute service charges."  Id. at 495.  Nothing in that 
decision supports the view that the Tips Act applies to tips 
that customers intended to give to employees but, because of a 
no-tipping policy, did not give. 
In sum, we do not construe G. L. c. 149, § 152A, to require 
that employers of wait staff employees must permit customers to 
give tips to such employees. 
2.  Liability under G. L. c. 149, § 152A, where a no-
tipping policy is in effect.  We turn to consideration of the 
second reported question, which relies upon a determination that 
imposition of a no-tipping policy is not contrary to the Tips 
Act.  The second reported question asks that we consider the 
circumstances in which an employer seeking to enforce a no-
tipping policy may be held in violation of the Tips Act if, 
 
 
 
15 
notwithstanding the implementation of such a policy, 
"customers . . . leave tips that are retained by the employer."  
For reasons we discuss, we conclude that, if an employer has not 
clearly communicated its no-tipping policy to customers, tips 
left by customers where service is provided by wait staff belong 
to those employees, and may not be retained by the employer.  On 
the other hand, where the employer has clearly communicated to 
customers that a no-tipping policy is in effect, money left by 
customers in establishments where service is provided by wait 
staff is not a tip that was given to wait staff employees, 
regardless of a customer's intent. 
a.  Tips retained by employer who has failed to communicate 
its no-tipping policy clearly to customers.  As discussed, the 
Tips Act defines particular circumstances in which a fee that is 
assessed by an employer is not a tip or service charge subject 
to the provisions of the Tips Act.  G. L. c. 149, § 152 (d).  
See note 8, supra.  In those circumstances, an employer must 
"inform[] the patron that the fee does not represent a tip or 
service charge for [covered employees]."  G. L. c. 149, 
§ 152 (d).  This requirement reflects the Legislature's concern 
that, absent such information, customers charged a fee by 
employers of wait staff employees will assume that the employer 
will remit that amount to its wait staff employees. 
 
 
 
16 
Similarly, unless an employer who has implemented a no-
tipping policy clearly conveys to customers that money they 
leave when paying their bill does not represent a tip for wait 
staff employees, it is readily conceivable that customers will 
have the reasonable expectation that the money they leave will 
be given to the wait staff employees.  The absence of a clear 
communication to customers of a no-tipping policy could permit 
employers to pocket sums not intended for them, and would 
facilitate "an 'end run' around the [Tips] Act."  DiFiore v. 
American Airlines, Inc., 454 Mass. at 496. 
General Laws c. 149, § 152A (b), prohibits employers of 
wait staff employees from "demand[ing], request[ing] or 
accept[ing]" a payment or deduction from a tip "given to" such 
employees.  Although an employer may adopt a no-tipping policy, 
it "may not escape [this] prohibition in . . . the [Tips] Act," 
DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., supra at 494, by failing to 
communicate to customers that the policy is in effect, and that 
the money they leave will not be kept by the employee as a tip.  
In the absence of such a communication of the no-tipping policy 
to customers, we conclude that "a sum of money . . . , given as 
an acknowledgment of any service performed by a [covered] 
employee," remains a "tip . . . that a patron . . . would 
reasonably expect to be given to a [covered] employee."  G. L. 
 
 
 
17 
c. 149, § 152A (a).  An employer who, in those circumstances, 
"demand[s], request[s] or accept[s]" any portion of such sums 
does so in contravention of the Tips Act.  See G. L. c. 149, 
§ 152A (b). 
b.  Tips retained by employer who has clearly communicated 
no-tipping policy to customers.  Where an employer who employs 
wait staff employees has clearly communicated a no-tipping 
policy that effectively conveys that money left by a customer 
will not be received by any wait staff employee as a tip, we 
conclude that any money that is nonetheless left by a customer 
is not a tip "given to" the wait staff employees because a 
customer cannot reasonably expect that this money has been given 
to the employees.  Accordingly, where there has been a clear 
communication of a no-tipping policy to customers, the employer 
has not violated G. L. c. 149, § 152A (b), if the sums of money 
that nonetheless have been left by customers are retained by the 
employer, or placed in an "abandoned change" cup for use by 
other customers.10 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated, we answer the first 
                     
10 A clear communication of the no-tipping policy could be 
accomplished through the posting of signs such as those 
conveying that employees may not accept tips.  In addition, 
employers could instruct wait staff employees to convey to 
customers orally the existence of a no-tipping policy, and could 
provide training regarding the content of the communication, as 
well as when during the various points of interaction with a 
customer the information should be conveyed. 
 
 
 
18 
reported question, "Yes."  We answer question 2(a), "Yes," and 
we answer question 2(b), "No."  The matter is remanded to the 
Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.