Title: MacLaurin v. City of Holyoke
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11865
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 18, 2016

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11865 
SJC-11866 
 
ROBERT MacLAURIN1 & another2  vs.  CITY OF HOLYOKE & others.3 
 
ROBERT MacLAURIN4 & another5  vs.  CITY OF HOLYOKE & others.6 
 
 
 
Hampden.     September 10, 2015. - August 18, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ.7 
 
 
Fire Prevention.  Practice, Civil, Action in nature of 
certiorari.  Administrative Law, Hearing. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
1 Individually and as president of Sylvan, Inc., trustee of 
the 215 Chestnut Street Realty Nominee Trust. 
 
2 215 Chestnut Street Realty Nominee Trust. 
 
3 Holyoke Fire Department and Chief of Holyoke Fire 
Department. 
 
4 Individually and as president of Sylvan, Inc., trustee of 
the 11 Spring Street Realty Nominee Trust. 
 
5 11 Spring Street Realty Nominee Trust. 
 
6 Holyoke Fire Department and Chief of Holyoke Fire 
Department. 
 
 
7 Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
Civil actions commenced in the Hampden Division of the 
Superior Court Department on April 26, 2012, and May 14, 2012, 
respectively. 
 
 
After transfer to the Western Division of the Housing Court 
Department and consolidation, the case was heard by Robert 
Fields, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Thomas D. Moore for the plaintiffs. 
 
Kara Lamb Cunha for the defendants. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Jason R. Ferenc for Greater Holyoke Rental Housing 
Association 
 
Joseph N. Schneiderman for Fire Chiefs Association of 
Massachusetts. 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, Benjamin K. Golden, 
Assistant Attorney General, Steven P. Rourke, Special Assistant 
Attorney General, & Peter Senopoulos for the State Fire Marshal. 
 
 
LENK, J.  We are called upon in these consolidated cases to 
construe G. L. c. 148, § 26I, the residential sprinkler 
provision, one of a number of provisions requiring the 
installation of automatic sprinkler systems contained in G. L. 
c. 148, the fire prevention act.  The residential sprinkler 
provision mandates the installation of automatic sprinklers in 
new residential buildings of four or more units, and in such 
existing buildings when they are "substantially rehabilitated so 
as to constitute the equivalent of new construction."  See G. L. 
c. 148, § 26I. 
3 
 
In 2006, the plaintiff, Robert MacLaurin,8 purchased the 
second of two vacant apartment buildings in the city of Holyoke 
(city), which he intended to rehabilitate and return to 
occupancy.  As existing residential buildings of four or more 
units, the buildings were subject to the residential sprinkler 
provision.  MacLaurin contends that the renovations he undertook 
on the buildings do not meet the statutory standard triggering 
the requirement that sprinklers be installed.  Concluding, to 
the contrary, that the two buildings had been substantially 
rehabilitated within the meaning of the residential sprinkler 
provision, the city's fire chief ordered, without a hearing, 
that automatic sprinkler systems be installed in each building. 
The residential sprinkler provision differs from all of the 
other automatic sprinkler provisions in the fire prevention act9 
in that it contains no statutory right of appeal.  After several 
agencies had declined jurisdiction, MacLaurin filed complaints 
seeking relief in the nature of certiorari and declaratory 
                                                 
8 For convenience, we refer to Robert MacLaurin, both in his 
personal capacity and as trustee of both the 215 Chestnut Street 
Realty Nominee Trust and the 11 Spring Street Realty Nominee 
Trust, as well as the 215 Chestnut Street Realty Nominee Trust 
and the 11 Spring Street Realty Nominee Trust themselves, as a 
single entity. 
 
9 See, e.g., G. L. c. 148, § 26A ("high rise buildings" of 
more than seventy feet in height); G. L. c. 148, § 26G 
(commercial buildings of more than 7,500 square feet); G. L. 
c. 148, § 26G 1/2 ("[n]ightclubs, dance halls, discotheques, 
[and] bars" having capacity of at least one hundred); G. L. 
c. 148, § 26H ("[l]odging or boarding houses"). 
4 
 
judgment, challenging the orders as arbitrary and capricious.  
Following a remand of the consolidated matters for 
reconsideration in light of additional facts, which the fire 
chief concluded had no effect on his decision, a judge of the 
Housing Court affirmed the chief's orders, and this appeal 
followed. 
The statutory standard that installation of automatic 
sprinklers is necessary only where an existing multi-unit 
residential building has been "substantially rehabilitated so as 
to constitute the equivalent of new construction" is not defined 
in the residential sprinkler provision or anywhere else in the 
fire prevention act, and the language does not appear in any 
other section of the fire prevention act.  Moreover, there is no 
controlling appellate jurisprudence and no applicable Statewide 
guidance akin to that which has been developed by entities such 
as the automatic sprinkler appeals board, in considering appeals 
from the requirement to install sprinklers under other statutory 
provisions, all of which do include a statutory right of appeal. 
In construing the meaning of the statutory standard that 
installation of automatic sprinklers in existing residential 
buildings is required only when a building has been 
"substantially rehabilitated so as to constitute the equivalent 
of new construction," we therefore turn to fundamental 
principles of statutory interpretation.  See, e.g., Boston 
5 
 
Police Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Boston, 435 Mass. 718, 719-720 
(2002).  In doing so, we consider the ordinary meaning of the 
words the Legislature used, in conjunction with their 
specialized meaning in certain contexts, the course of the 
enactment of the automatic sprinkler provisions within the fire 
prevention act, as well as the goals the Legislature intended to 
achieve.  We conclude that, in order to require the installation 
of sprinklers in an existing multi-unit residential building, 
the rehabilitation must be so substantial that the physical 
structure is rendered "the equivalent of new construction," 
i.e., in essence as good as new.10  Where the rehabilitation is 
suitably substantial in this regard, a corollary is that the 
cost of installation of automatic sprinklers ordinarily will 
approximate the cost of installing sprinklers in a comparable 
newly constructed building. 
Although the fire chief's decision states that, after the 
modifications were complete, the buildings had been 
"substantially rehabilitated so as to constitute the equivalent 
of new construction," the decision neither contains any explicit 
findings of fact nor sets forth the test used to evaluate the 
nature of the work done.  Given this, coupled with the absence 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., L. Rosenthal & D. Listokin, New or Rehab: 
Striking a New Balance Under California's Affordable Housing 
Standards, University of California at Berkeley, Program on 
Housing and Urban Policy, Working Paper No. W09-002 (Mar. 2009). 
6 
 
of controlling authority, the Housing Court judge was not in a 
position to ascertain whether the fire chief's interpretation of 
G. L. c. 148, § 26I, reasonably reflects the intent and purpose 
of the residential sprinkler provision, nor could the judge  
have ascertained whether the application of that interpretation 
is supported by the facts of record.  Accordingly, no 
determination properly could be reached as to whether the 
decision was legally erroneous or so devoid of factual support 
as to be arbitrary and capricious.  See State Bd. of Retirement 
v. Woodward, 446 Mass. 698, 703-704 (2006).  Thus, the judgment 
affirming the fire chief's decision must be vacated and, with 
the guidance we now provide as to the meaning of "substantially 
rehabilitated so as to constitute the equivalent of new 
construction," the matter remanded to the chief of the city fire 
department for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.11 
Background and prior proceedings.12  The two vacant 
apartment buildings at issue here were built in the late 1800s, 
                                                 
11 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the State 
Fire Marshal, the Fire Chiefs Association of Massachusetts, and 
the Greater Holyoke Rental Housing Association. 
 
12 The facts are taken from apparently undisputed facts in 
the parties' briefs, documents in the record, and statements in 
the orders and decisions of the fire chief and the Housing 
Court.  The fire chief's decision does not include express 
findings of fact, and because the matters were considered in the 
Housing Court on petitions for certiorari, the Housing Court 
judge also made no findings of fact. 
7 
 
of wood frame construction with brick facade.  One, a three-
story building on the corner of Essex and Chestnut Streets, has 
a total of twenty apartments on three floors and two commercial 
spaces on the ground floor; the other, a four-story building on 
the corner of Main and Spring Streets, has a total of thirteen 
apartments on four floors and two commercial spaces on the 
ground floor.13  Each has sustained fire damage in the past, 
including while empty.  MacLaurin purchased both buildings, 
which had been boarded and abandoned, with the intent to 
rehabilitate them and return them to occupancy.  He obtained 
building permits, hired contractors, and undertook the proposed 
work;14 each portion of the work, such as electrical and plumbing 
modifications, was approved by the relevant city inspectors as 
it was completed. 
The city adopted G. L. c. 148, § 26I, a "local option" 
                                                 
13 The residential sprinkler provision is applicable to 
buildings "occupied in whole or in part for residential 
purposes."  See G. L. c. 148, § 26I. 
 
14 MacLaurin acquired the Essex Street property in July, 
2004, and applied for a building permit to "restore and repair 
building including walls, floors and ceilings:  patch and 
replace plaster as needed, and repaint; also reconstruct rear 
porches" in November, 2008.  The building permit issued in May, 
2009. 
 
MacLaurin acquired the Main Street property in June, 2006, 
and applied for a building permit in June, 2007.  A building 
permit issued in September, 2007, to "restore and repair 
building including walls, floors and ceilings:  patch and 
replace plaster as needed, and repair; also reconstruct rear 
porches." 
8 
 
statute, in February, 1996.15  On its face, the city's general 
application form for a building permit requires that a plan for 
an automatic sprinkler system be submitted with the application, 
and it is undisputed that sprinkler plans,16 and modifications to 
one set of plans, were attached to MacLaurin's permit 
applications.17  During the course of the several-year period in 
which the work was being done, MacLaurin submitted to the 
building inspector several reports from licensed structural 
engineers stating that the work was not structural, that the 
buildings were not being "substantially rehabilitated" within 
the meaning of G. L. c. 148, § 26I, and thus that the 
requirement for installation of automatic sprinklers had not 
been triggered.  When the work was essentially complete, 
                                                 
15 A local option statute is applicable only where a 
municipality chooses to adopt its provisions.  See, e.g., Adams 
v. Boston, 461 Mass. 602, 609 (2012), and cases cited; Connors 
v. Boston, 430 Mass 31, 37 (1999); 1010 Memorial Dr. Tenants 
Corp. v. Fire Chief of Cambridge, 424 Mass. 661, 668 n.4 (1997).  
With the exception of high rise buildings, see G. L. c. 148, 
§ 26A, the sprinkler provisions in the fire prevention act were 
all initially adopted as local option provisions. 
 
16 The plans were apparently "sprinkler narrative letters," 
describing a proposed system in general terms and specifying the 
types of components that would be used; they were not diagrams 
of the floor plans showing where particular components would be 
installed, nor were cost estimates provided in connection with 
the plans. 
 
17 The parties dispute whether the submission of such plans 
was a prerequisite for the issuance of building permits, and 
whether the fire chief made statements to that effect to 
MacLaurin. 
9 
 
MacLaurin sought inspection by the city in order to determine 
what else remained to be done so that certificates of occupancy 
could issue.  In February, 2012, the city's building 
commissioner, the assistant building commissioner, and a fire 
department captain made onsite inspections of each building.  
The fire chief then issued orders requiring automatic sprinkler 
systems be installed in each building. 
MacLaurin sought review of the fire chief's orders before 
the State fire marshal, the State building code appeals board, 
and the automatic sprinkler appeals board; each declined to hear 
his appeals, citing a lack of jurisdiction.18  MacLaurin then 
filed complaints seeking relief in the nature of certiorari, 
G. L. c. 249, § 4, and declaratory judgment, in the Superior 
Court.  The cases were transferred to the Housing Court on joint 
motions of the parties, and then were consolidated.  MacLaurin 
claimed, among other things, that the fire chief's 2012 orders 
contained significant factual errors, particularly concerning 
the scope and nature of the work, such as whether substantial 
portions of walls and ceilings had been opened so as to have 
facilitated sprinkler installation.  In light of documents 
                                                 
18 Although the statute provides no route of appeal for 
owners of multi-unit residential buildings if the buildings are 
less than seventy feet tall, guidance issued by the State board 
of building regulations and standards states, without apparent 
basis, that such an owner aggrieved by a decision of a 
municipality's fire official may appeal to the State fire 
marshal. 
10 
 
attached to MacLaurin's complaint containing factual information 
that apparently had not been before the fire chief, a Housing 
Court judge remanded the matter to the city for further 
investigation and determination whether automatic sprinklers 
were required.  Without conducting a hearing, the fire chief 
concluded that the additional documents had no bearing on his 
decision that automatic sprinklers were required, and, a few 
days after the orders of remand, issued essentially the same 
orders as he had previously (2013 orders). 
In March, 2014, the same Housing Court judge who had 
ordered the remand conducted a hearing on the fire chief's 2013 
orders, and, in July, 2014, the judge issued a decision 
affirming the orders that automatic sprinklers must be 
installed.  He stated that, "viewed through the lens" of the 
deferential standard of review applicable in a petition for 
certiorari, the fire chief's determination was not "so devoid of 
factual support as to be arbitrary and capricious."  The judge 
noted that the fire chief's decisions were not constrained by 
any controlling authority, the fire department had inspected the 
properties, and the fire chief had reached a conclusion based on 
the "extent of the renovation, its costs, and its costs relative 
to the overall value of the property; all factors that upon 
facts which 'reasonable men might deem proper' to support it" 
(citation omitted).  MacLaurin appealed from the Housing Court 
11 
 
judge's affirmance of the fire chief's orders, and we 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion. 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  MacLaurin filed 
complaints in the nature of certiorari, G. L. c. 249, § 4, in 
the absence of a statutory right of appeal.  The purpose of an 
action in the nature of certiorari is "to relieve aggrieved 
parties from the injustice arising from errors of law committed 
in proceedings affecting their justiciable rights when no other 
means of relief are open."  Figgs v. Boston Housing Auth., 469 
Mass. 354, 361 (2014), quoting Swan v. Justices of the Superior 
Court, 222 Mass. 542, 544 (1916).  The function of judicial 
"review in an action in the nature of certiorari is 'to correct 
substantial errors of law apparent on the record adversely 
affecting material rights.'" MacHenry v. Civil Service Comm'n, 
40 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 634 (1996), quoting Commissioners of 
Civil Serv. v. Municipal Court of Boston, 369 Mass 84, 90 
(1975).  "To obtain certiorari review of an administrative 
decision, . . . three elements must be present:  (1) a judicial 
or quasi judicial proceeding, (2) from which there is no other 
reasonably adequate remedy, and (3) a substantial injury or 
injustice arising from the proceeding under review."  Indeck v. 
Clients' Sec. Bd., 450 Mass. 379, 385 (2008).  In the 
12 
 
circumstances, MacLaurin's complaint meets these requirements.19 
Because the fire chief's determination was discretionary, a 
reviewing court in these circumstances is limited to determining 
whether the decision is legally erroneous or so devoid of 
factual support as to be arbitrary and capricious.  State Bd. of 
Retirement v. Woodward, 446 Mass. 698, 703-704 (2006); 
Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. Auditor of the Commonwealth, 
430 Mass. 783, 790-791 (2000).  See Figgs v. Boston Housing 
Auth., supra at 361, quoting Garrity v. Conservation Comm'n of 
Hingham, 462 Mass. 779, 792 (2012) (standard of certiorari 
review "may vary according to the nature of the action for which 
review is sought").  Unlike the ordinary situation in reviewing 
an action for relief in the nature of certiorari, however, where 
the controlling precedent against which a reviewing court 
measures whether a decision is legally erroneous or lacks 
relevant factual support is more or less evident, in this case 
                                                 
19 Although there was no adjudicatory hearing, the chief's 
investigation and written decisions, based on physical 
inspection of the premises and written documentation gathered 
from multiple sources, including documents submitted by 
MacLaurin and city records, were quasi judicial proceedings.  
See Frawley v. Police Comm'r of Cambridge, 473 Mass. 716, 726-
727 (2016) (quasi judicial proceeding where city police chief 
determined that retired police officer's application for gun 
license did not meet statutory standard).  See also Hoffer v. 
Board of Registration in Med., 461 Mass. 461, 457 (2012).  It is 
undisputed that the absence of a statutory right of appeal left 
MacLaurin with no other route of appeal, and the injury asserted 
reaches, at least according to MacLaurin's documents, into 
hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
13 
 
there are no appellate decisions involving the statutory 
standard of "substantially rehabilitated so as to constitute the 
equivalent of new construction."  Nor are there interpretations 
of that standard by any authoritative Statewide body, given the 
absence of a statutory avenue of administrative review.  In such 
circumstances, deference is to be accorded the fire chief's 
decision only if the reviewing court can ascertain whether the 
decision comports with apparent statutory purposes. 
2.  Statutory interpretation.  "Our primary duty in 
interpreting a statute is 'to effectuate the intent of the 
Legislature in enacting it.'"  Wheatley v. Massachusetts 
Insurers Insolvency Fund, 456 Mass. 594, 601 (2010), S.C., 465 
Mass. 297 (2013), quoting International Org. of Masters v. Woods 
Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 392 Mass. 811, 
813 (1984).  In order to determine whether the fire chief's 
conclusion that automatic sprinklers must be installed in 
MacLaurin's buildings accurately reflects the legislative 
purpose and intent, we first must discern the meaning of 
"substantially rehabilitated so as to constitute the equivalent 
of new construction" within the residential sprinkler provision.  
To do so, we begin with the plain language of the provision.  
See Local 589, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts Bay 
Transp. Auth., 392 Mass. 407, 415 (1984), quoting Bronstein v. 
Prudential Ins. Co of Am., 390 Mass. 701, 704 (1984) 
14 
 
("[s]tatutory language is the principal source of insight into 
legislative purpose"). 
"Words that are not defined in a statute[, as here,] should 
be given their usual and accepted meanings," derived "from 
sources presumably known to the statute's enactors, such as 
their use in other legal contexts and dictionary definitions."  
Seidman v. Newton, 452 Mass. 472, 477-478 (2008), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977).  We 
interpret the statutory language "according to the intent of the 
Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the 
ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in 
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be 
effectuated."  Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Boston, 435 
Mass. 718, 719-720 (2002), quoting O'Brien v. Director of the 
Div. of Employment Sec., 393 Mass. 482, 487-488 (1984). 
Because the fire chief appears to have considered the 
meaning of "substantially rehabilitated so as to constitute the 
equivalent of new construction" of a residential building of 
four or more units to be essentially the same as the meaning of 
"major alterations" in the context of renovation of an existing 
commercial building, G. L. c. 148, § 26G, we also examine the 
15 
 
ordinary meaning of "major alteration."20 
To "rehabilitate" something generally means to return it 
from disuse or a poor condition to a useable condition.21  
"Alteration," on the other hand, implies a less extensive change 
to something already in existence.  See, e.g., The American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 55 (3d ed. 1996) 
("[t]he condition resulting from altering; modification"; to 
alter is "[t]o change or make different; modify"); Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 63 (2002) ("the act or action 
                                                 
20 Apparently the only case in the Commonwealth to have 
addressed the meaning of the statutory standard in the 
residential sprinkler provision is a Superior Court judge's 
decision in Iodice vs. Newton, Mass. Superior Ct., No. 971098D 
(Middlesex County Oct. 1, 1999) (Iodice).  While recognizing 
that the "substantially rehabilitated . . ." standard is not 
identical to the "major alteration" standard of the commercial 
sprinkler provision, the judge concluded there that the 
legislative purposes underlying the commercial sprinkler 
provision and the residential sprinkler provision are similar, 
and that the factors applicable to a determination whether a 
commercial building has undergone "major alterations" under the 
standard established in Congregation Beth Sholom & Community 
Ctr., Inc. v. Building Comm'r of Framingham, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 
276, 279 (1989) (Beth Sholom), are equally applicable in 
determining whether a residential building of four or more units 
has been "substantially rehabilitated as to be the equivalent of 
new construction."  See discussion of the fire chief's decision, 
part 3, infra. 
 
21 See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 1521 (3d ed. 1996) (to rehabilitate is "[t]o restore to 
good health or useful life"; "[t]o restore to good condition, 
operation, or capacity"); Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 1914 (2002) (rehabilitation is "the restoration of 
something damaged or deteriorated to a prior good condition); 8 
Oxford English Dictionary 381 (1978) (rehabilitation is "[t]he 
action of replacing a thing in, or restoring it to, a previous 
condition or status"). 
16 
 
of altering"; "the quality or state of being altered"; to alter 
is "to become different in some respect: undergo change usu. 
without resulting difference in essential nature"); 1 Oxford 
English Dictionary 255 (1978) ("[t]he action of altering or 
making some change in a thing"; to alter is "[t]o make [a thing] 
otherwise or different in some respect; to make some change in 
character, shape, condition, position, quantity, value, etc. 
without changing the thing itself for another; to modify, to 
change the appearance of").  Cf. 28 C.F.R. § 36.402(b) (2010).  
"Major" is defined as "greater in . . . rank, importance, or 
interest:  superior"; "notable or conspicuous in effect or 
scope"; "the greater. . . of two things, species, etc. that have 
a common designation"; "being greater than the rest."  See 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1363 (2002); 6 
Oxford English Dictionary 57 (1978).  See also The American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1084 (3d ed. 1996).  
"Substantial" is commonly understood as something "[t]hat is, 
constitutes, or involves an essential part, point, or feature; 
essential, material"; "of or relating to the main part of 
something"; "to a large degree or in the main."  See 10 Oxford 
English Dictionary 54-55 (1978); Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 2280 (2002).  See also The American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1791 (3d ed. 1996) 
These differences in common meaning underscore that the 
17 
 
Legislature did not intend "major alteration" and "substantially 
rehabilitated" to be functionally synonymous.  See Commonwealth 
v. Williamson, 462 Mass. 676, 679 (2012), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Young, 453 Mass. 707, 713 (we "presume, as we must, that the 
Legislature intended what the words of the statute say" 
[citation omitted]); City Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of Bank 
Incorporation, 346 Mass. 29, 31 (1963) ("The distinction between 
'may' and 'shall' is not lightly to be held to have been 
overlooked in legislation").  Where "different words with 
different meaning" are used in different sections of a statute, 
see Commonwealth v. Millican, 449 Mass. 298, 301 (2007), citing 
Champigny v. Commonwealth, 422 Mass. 249, 252-253 (1996), "they 
cannot be construed interchangeably, but must be construed in 
relation to one another."  Commonwealth v. Millican, supra. 
Moreover, in electing to use the phrase "substantially 
rehabilitated," which is a term of art in certain contexts,22 the 
                                                 
22 See Fifth Edition of the Massachusetts State Building 
Code (1990), 780 Code Mass. Regs.; User's Guide to the Fifth 
Edition, Secretary of the Commonwealth; United States Department 
of Housing and Urban Development, Nationally Applicable 
Recommended Rehabilitation Provisions (May 1997); United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, The Status of 
Building Regulations for Housing Rehabilitation -- A National 
Symposium, at iii, 3, 16-17, 24-25 (Aug. 1995); Boca National 
Fire Prevention Code, 1990: Model Building Regulations for the 
Protection of Public Health, Safety, and Welfare, National Fire 
Prevention Association (9th Ed.) (1990).  Cf. Handbook of Injury 
and Violence Prevention, 6.4.1.2.2, at 104-105; 6.4.1.3.2, at 
105-106 (2007).  See also D. Madrzykowksi & R.P. Fleming, 
National Fire Sprinkler Association, Review of Sprinkler 
18 
 
Legislature clearly incorporated a very specific degree of 
modification which is considerably more extensive than what is 
required to constitute a "major alteration."  In the context of 
building construction, the phrase "substantial rehabilitation" 
has been used since at least the late 1960s to describe a 
building that has been modified so extensively that it has been 
rendered essentially "as good as new," with a concomitant 
extension of its expected useful life.23  Similar terms are used 
by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) in providing low-cost financing for creation of affordable 
housing;24 by State agencies, builders, and housing advocates;25 
                                                                                                                                                             
Systems:  Research and Standards, NISTIR 6941, at 16 (rev. Dec. 
2002); The Fire Protection Research Foundation, 2013 Cost of 
Residential Sprinkler Final Report (Sept. 2013), at 4. 
 
23 Section 235(R) of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. 
17152, Pub. L. 90-448 (Aug. 1, 1968) (no longer in effect), 
defined "substantial rehabilitation" as 
 
"the improvement of a unit in substandard condition to a 
decent, safe and sanitary level . . . . Units are in 
substandard condition when, while they may be structurally 
sound, they do not provide safe and adequate shelter, and 
in their present condition endanger the health, safety, or 
well-being of the occupants. . . .  The defects are either 
so critical or so widespread that the structure should be 
extensively repaired. . . .  The rehabilitation should be 
of such scope that, when completed, all the components in 
the house are operable and should not be anticipated to 
require any work or major expense over and above normal 
maintenance for the first one-fourth to one-third of the 
mortgage term." 
 
24 See Eidson v. Pierce, 745 F.2d 453, 457, 463 (7th Cir. 
1984); Rehabilitation Guidelines 1980, no. 3, Statutory 
19 
 
and in State26 and Federal tax law,27 rent control law, and 
certain historic preservation and environmental laws.28  See 
Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 
                                                                                                                                                             
Guideline for Building Rehabilitation (1980).  See, e.g., L. 
Weiss, States and Urban Strategies. California's Urban Strategy, 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (Sept. 1980).  
See generally, W. Duncan, Substantial Rehabilitation & New 
Construction (Springer Science & Business Media, Nov. 11, 2013). 
 
25 See D. Listokin & B. Listokin, United States Department 
of Housing and Urban Development, Barriers to the Rehabilitation 
of Affordable Housing, vol. I, at 19 (May 2001) ("Minor rehab 
refers to repairs [activities short of replacements that 
maintain the home] and improvements [activities that enhance the 
residential structure] of a minor nature, such as replacing or 
refinishing cabinets, fixtures, and finishes.  Moderate rehab 
involves more extensive improvements, such as new wiring and 
heating and cooling systems, as well as new cabinets, fixtures, 
and finishes.  Substantial rehab entails removal of all interior 
walls and mechanical equipment and installation of a new space 
plan").  See id. at 7 n.7 ("with substantial rehab, the entire 
[house] is often gutted"). 
 
26 See, e.g., Eilbott, P. and W. Kempey, New York City's tax 
abatement and exemption program for encouraging housing 
rehabilitation, Public Policy 26 (Fall 1978) at 571-597. 
 
27 See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 235.1206; 24 C.F.R. part 971, 
Appendix (no longer in effect); 12 U.S.C. § 1709(k) (2012).  See 
generally Cheverine & Hayes, Rehabilitation Tax Credit:  Does It 
Still Provide Incentives?, 10 Va. Tax. Rev. 167 (1990); Ramsey, 
Broder, Chiavieollo, Duffly, Dunnels, Larson, Sterling, & 
Vernon, The Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act -- 
An Overview, 28 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 177 (1993). 
 
28 See, e.g., National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as 
codified in 54 U.S.C. §§ 300101, 3060103 ("substantially 
altered"); 26 C.F.R. § 1.48 ("qualified rehabilitated 
building"); Georgia Trust for Historic Preservation, The 
application of building and fire codes to existing buildings 
(1985); Tosi v. Boston Rent Control Bd., 13 Mass. App. Ct. 921 
(1982) (landlord not entitled to tax exemption for substantial 
renovation of rent controlled units because units were not as 
good as new after renovation).  Cf. St. 1970, c. 842, § 1. 
20 
 
(1989) quoting National Labor Relations Bd. v. Amax Coal Co., 
453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981) ("It is . . . well established that 
'[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled 
meaning under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless 
the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to 
incorporate the established meaning of these terms'"); G. L. 
c. 4, § 6, Third ("Words and phrases shall be construed 
according to the common and approved usage of the language; but 
technical words and phrases and such others as may have acquired 
a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law shall be construed and 
understood according to such meaning").  Furthermore, by the 
addition of the phrase "so as to constitute the equivalent of 
new construction," to modify the term "substantially 
rehabilitated," the Legislature emphasized, for those unfamiliar 
with the term of art, its intent that, to meet the statutory 
standard, an existing residential building must have been 
rendered "as good as new." 
That the Legislature intended "substantially rehabilitated 
so as to constitute the equivalent of new construction" to mean 
something more than a "major alteration" is also apparent in the 
structure of the automatic sprinkler provisions within the fire 
prevention act, the process of their enactment, and the history 
of the enactment of the residential sprinkler provision. 
First, the residential sprinkler provision was enacted on 
21 
 
January 2, 1990, see St. 1989, c. 642, § 1, eight months after 
the Appeals Court's decision in Congregation Beth Sholom & 
Community Center, Inc. v. Building Comm'r of Framingham, 27 
Mass. App. Ct. 276, 279 (1989) (Beth Sholom), construing the 
meaning of "major alteration" under G. L. c. 148, § 26G, with 
respect to installation of automatic sprinklers in existing 
commercial buildings.29  Thus, when the Legislature was 
considering the proper statutory language to describe the extent 
of work necessary to require automatic sprinklers in existing 
                                                 
29 Like the residential sprinkler provision, the language in 
the commercial sprinkler provision establishing when 
modifications are sufficiently extensive so as to trigger the 
requirement for installation of automatic sprinklers is not 
defined in the provision or elsewhere in the fire prevention 
act.  In concluding that "'major alterations' would include any 
work, not repairs, which is 'major' in scope or expenditure, and 
which results in changes affecting a substantial portion of the 
building," the Appeals Court turned to the several legislative 
objectives of the commercial sprinkler provision: 
 
"The automatic sprinkler requirement . . . is a fire 
safety measure.  The Legislature obviously intended . . . 
to give some protection to owners of older buildings 
against the large expense of installing sprinklers.  Fire 
safety concerns would predominate, however, when, because 
of certain changes to an older building, imposition of the 
sprinkler requirement would be reasonable.  This could 
occur . . . when such significant work is being done to it 
that the extra cost of installing sprinklers would be 
moderate in comparison to the total cost of the work 
contemplated.  It would also occur when the physical work 
being done is of such scope that the additional effort 
required to install sprinklers would be substantially less 
than it would have been if the building were intact." 
 
Beth Sholom, supra at 279. 
22 
 
residential buildings of four or more units, it had before it 
the Appeals Court's then recently issued decision defining the 
extent of the work that had to be undertaken in order to require 
installation of automatic sprinklers in existing commercial 
buildings of more than 7,500 square feet.  Yet it chose not to 
adopt the "major alteration" language.  See Boehm v. Premier 
Ins. Co., 446 Mass. 689, 691 (2006), quoting Selectmen of 
Topsfield v. State Racing Comm'n, 324 Mass. 309, 313 (1949) 
("[T]he Legislature is presumed 'to know the preexisting law and 
the decisions of this court'"). 
Second, the structure of the fire prevention act, and the 
course of enactment of the various automatic sprinkler 
provisions within the fire prevention act, indicate that each 
automatic sprinkler provision is applicable to a particular type 
of structure, being used for a specific purpose, and is intended 
to address the perceived risks of fire in uses of that type.  
The provisions expanding the types of buildings in which 
automatic sprinklers must be installed were added incrementally 
over a period of years, each following a widely publicized, 
devastating fire in a building of that type.  The provisions do 
not contain the same language, do not reference each other, and 
do not incorporate a common set of definitions. 
Consistent generally with the national pattern of automatic 
23 
 
sprinkler legislation,30 the mandate that automatic sprinklers be 
installed in a particular type of structure, being used for a 
particular purpose, was extended over time under the fire 
prevention act.  The mandate moved from covering larger 
structures and more dangerous uses that the Legislature deemed 
to create greater risks of harm, to smaller buildings and less 
dangerous uses, where fewer lives were perceived as being at 
risk.31  At the same time, reflecting the concern that owners of 
existing buildings be afforded some protection from prohibitive 
                                                 
30 See M. Bromann, The Design and Layout of Fire Sprinkler 
Systems 1-8 (2d ed. 2001); R.P. Fleming, National Fire Sprinkler 
Association, The Fire Sprinkler Situation in the United States, 
(2002); Shelhamer, How Fire Disaster Shaped the Evolution of the 
New York City Building Code, International Code Council, 
Building Safety Journal, vol. VIII, no. 6 (2010).  See also T. 
Wieczorek & Perdu, The Debate About Residential Fire Sprinklers, 
PM Magazine, vol. 93, no. 7 (International City/County 
Management Association, Aug. 2011); The Network for Public 
Health Law, Residential Sprinkler Systems:  Consideration of 
Policy and Litigation Strategies for Reducing Residential Fire 
Injuries, Residential Sprinkler Systems, Issue Brief (updated 
Dec. 2011); Fire Sprinkler History -- NFSA, NFPA & Tyco, 4 The 
Station House 1 (Feb. 2005); The History of the National Fire 
Sprinkler Association, http://www.nfsa.org/?page=NFSABIO 
[https:/perma.cc/65G4-2NMK].  Cf. Adomeit, The Station Nightclub 
Fire and Federal Jurisdictional Reach:  The MultiDistrict, 
MultiParty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 2002, 25 W. New Eng. 
L. Rev. 243 (2003). 
 
31 Legislation requiring the installation of automatic 
sprinklers first appeared, nationally, in the early 1900s, 
following a devastating fire in a clothing factory in New York 
in 1911 that resulted in more than one hundred deaths, see, 
e.g., Behrens, The Triangle Shirtwaist Company Fire of 1911:  A 
Lesson in Legislative Manipulation, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 361 (1983), 
and is today governed by Federal requirements under the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration.  See 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1910.159 (1981). 
24 
 
costs, the Legislature required automatic sprinklers first in 
new construction, then in existing buildings, and first in 
commercial buildings, where costs are more readily recouped, 
then in larger residential buildings.32 
Under the fire prevention act, automatic sprinklers were 
first required in 1972, in new high rise buildings throughout 
the Commonwealth, for buildings built after March 1, 1974.  See 
G. L. c. 148, § 26A; St. 1973, c. 395, § 1.33  In 1982, following 
a deadly fire in Fall River,34 the commercial sprinkler 
provision, applicable to new nonresidential buildings of more 
than 7,500 square feet, and existing such buildings when they 
underwent "major alterations," was adopted.  See St. 1982, 
c. 545, § 1.35  In 1986, following a rooming house fire that 
                                                 
32 In the past several years, bills to extend the automatic 
sprinkler requirement to new one- and two-family buildings have 
been introduced several times, but have not been released from 
committee.  See, e.g., 2015 House Doc. No. 3475. 
 
33 This provision was enacted following a fire in a luxury 
high rise hotel that killed nine firefighters. 
 
34 See A Monumental Tribute:  Notre Dame's WWI Statue 
Survived Fire, Herald News, Aug. 2, 2009; Fire Destroys Landmark 
Church, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1982. 
 
35 Although initially a local option provision, in 2009 the 
commercial sprinkler provision became a Statewide mandate.  See 
St. 2008, c. 508, § 1.  While the revised language eliminated 
most of the waiver provisions that had been added to it, see St. 
1986, c. 284, § 1; St. 1986, c. 526; G. L. c. 148, § 26G, fourth 
par.; St. 1989, c. 416, § 2, the provision for waivers or 
reasonable alternatives in buildings having "architectural or 
historical significance" was retained.  See St. 2008, c. 508, 
25 
 
resulted in multiple deaths, sprinklers were required in new and 
existing lodging and rooming houses.  See G. L. c. 148, § 26H.  
Again in 1986, after a major fire in the Prudential Center in 
Boston, sprinklers were required in existing, and not just new, 
high rise buildings across the Commonwealth, G. L. c. 148, 
§ 26A 1/2, with a ten-year phase-in period.  St. 1986, c. 633, 
§ 2.  In 1989, the lodging house sprinkler provision of G. L. 
c. 148, § 26H, was modified to include a five-year phase-in 
period after a municipality adopted it, St. 1989 c. 330, and, 
separately, to contain a statutory right of appeal.  St. 1989, 
c. 557, § 2.  One week after the then Governor signed the 
provision adding the phase-in period, a lodging house fire in 
Lynn resulted in numerous fatalities.  After unsuccessful 
efforts to repeal the phase-in period,36 the residential 
sprinkler provision was enacted.  Explicitly incorporating 
lodging and rooming houses, already covered by the provisions of 
G. L. c. 148, § 26H, amongst an enumerated list of residential 
buildings, it became effective on January 2, 1990, less than six 
months after the fire in Lynn.  See G. L. c. 148, § 26I; 
St. 1989, c. 642, § 1. 
                                                                                                                                                             
§ 1. 
 
36 See Task Force, State House News Service (Aug. 21, 1989); 
Coakely, New Law Diluted Sprinkler Regulation, Boston Globe, 
Aug. 10, 1989; Preventable Deaths in Lynn, Boston Globe, 
Editorial, Aug. 15, 1989. 
26 
 
The language of the residential sprinkler provision has 
remained virtually unchanged since its enactment.  For 
municipalities choosing to adopt it, the provision requires 
sprinklers in a wide variety of buildings:37  new multi-unit 
residential apartment buildings of more than four units; new 
residential buildings such as fraternities, dormitories, hotels, 
motels, and group homes; and existing buildings of these types 
if they are substantially rehabilitated so as to constitute the 
equivalent of new construction.  Unlike any other provision of 
the fire prevention act, the residential sprinkler provision did 
not include a phase-in period immediately following its 
enactment, and does not afford a statutory right of appeal.  
Also unlike the other sprinkler provisions, it does not contain 
any mechanism for waivers, alternatives, or acceptable 
modifications to the sprinkler requirement. 
                                                 
37 "In a city, town or district which accepts the provisions 
of this section, any building hereafter constructed or hereafter 
substantially rehabilitated so as to constitute the equivalent 
of new construction and occupied in whole or in part for 
residential purposes and containing not less than four dwelling 
units including, but not limited to, lodging houses, boarding 
houses, fraternity houses, dormitories, apartments, townhouses, 
condominiums, hotels, motels and group residences, shall be 
equipped with an approved system of automatic sprinklers in 
accordance with the provisions of the state building code.  In 
the event that adequate water supply is not available, the head 
of the fire department shall permit the installation of such 
other fire suppressant systems as are prescribed by the state 
building code in lieu of automatic sprinklers.  Owners of 
buildings with approved and properly maintained installations 
may be eligible for a rate reduction on fire insurance."  G. L. 
c. 148, § 26I. 
27 
 
Finally, in 2004, following a widely publicized fire with 
multiple fatalities at a Rhode Island nightclub, sprinklers were 
required to be retrofitted in existing nightclubs, bars, 
discotheque and dance halls, and other places designed or used 
for "similar entertainment purposes" with a capacity of more 
than one hundred people.  See G. L. c. 148, § 26G 1/2; St. 2004, 
c. 304, § 5.  This legislation effectively created a retrofit 
requirement for small establishments, because larger such venues 
already were required to have sprinklers under the terms of the 
commercial sprinkler provision.  Certain uses of structures 
within this category -- "a house of worship, restaurant, lecture 
hall, auditorium, state or local government building, 
educational function facility, or other similar place of 
assembly" -- were apparently perceived as being less dangerous 
and were exempted from the sprinkler requirement.  G. L. c. 148, 
§ 26G 1/2, fourth par. 
While phase-in provisions were adopted for other types of 
existing buildings, only the commercial sprinkler provision and 
the residential sprinkler provision contain a two-part standard 
requiring automatic sprinklers in new buildings and when a 
certain level of modification is made to an existing structure, 
reflecting their shared legislative objective of enhancing fire 
safety, while at the same time affording protection to owners of 
existing buildings.  By requiring the installation only when 
28 
 
building modifications are of a specific order of magnitude (a 
"major alteration" or "substantially rehabilitated so as to 
constitute the equivalent of new construction"), owners of such 
existing buildings are spared the significant costs of sprinkler 
installation when performing what amounts to ordinary, even if 
costly, upkeep of their buildings. 
At the same time, however, the differences in statutory 
language, and the Legislature's recognition of the varying 
degrees of dangerousness amongst different types of buildings, 
indicate the legislative intent to impose distinct thresholds 
for requiring installation of sprinklers in existing qualifying 
commercial buildings38 rather than in existing qualifying 
                                                 
38 Large existing commercial buildings may present the risks 
inherent in a "funnel effect," where many people try to reach 
few exits through narrow corridors or doorways.  In addition, 
certain aspects of the construction of many commercial 
buildings, such as open ducts that are used for heating and 
cooling systems, allow fire to spread rapidly throughout the 
building.  By the same token, however, the costs of sprinkler 
installation may be significantly lower in such a building than 
in an older residential building, because the large open spaces 
and construction techniques such as dropped ceilings tend to 
facilitate installation.  See D. Madrzykowksi & R.P. Fleming, 
Review of Residential Sprinkler Systems:  Research and 
Standards, NISTIR 6941 (rev. Dec. 2002). See also M. Bromann, 
The Design and Layout of Fire Sprinkler Systems, at 15 (2d ed. 
2001). 
 
Similarly, studies have shown that the use of modern 
construction materials in new residential buildings has resulted 
in fires that combust and spread much more quickly than in older 
structures, because of the more volatile nature of the materials 
used.  Older residential buildings, on the other hand, tend to 
be built of materials such as stone, brick, and plaster, which 
29 
 
residential buildings.  Accordingly, establishing that an 
existing residential building has undergone modifications 
significant enough to qualify as "major alterations" is not 
sufficient to show that the building has been substantially 
rehabilitated so as to constitute the equivalent of new 
construction. 
We conclude that the residential sprinkler standard under 
G. L. c. 148, § 26I, is satisfied when rehabilitative work is so 
extensive that the building itself, considered as a whole, has 
been rendered "the equivalent of new construction," whether in 
terms of the materials and construction techniques used, the 
building's systems, its market value, its expected future useful 
life, or other comparable measures of equivalence to new 
construction.  See United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Nationally Applicable Recommended Rehabilitation 
Provisions (May 1997).  This understanding of the statutory 
standard is consistent with the dual legislative purposes of 
enhancing fire safety and protecting property owners of existing 
residential buildings from the disproportionate costs of 
automatic sprinkler installation when attempting to perform 
                                                                                                                                                             
are fire-retardant.  Likewise, while newer residential buildings 
often have air conditioning ducts that allow fire to spread 
rapidly, older residential buildings generally do not.  See 
Roman, New Fires, New Tactics, National Fire Protection 
Association Journal (Dec. 29, 2014).  Thus, the need for 
sprinklers in a new residential building may be greater than in 
an older one. 
30 
 
desirable ordinary repairs and maintenance, even if extensive in 
nature, to retain a building in a habitable condition.39  See, 
e.g., 1010 Memorial Dr. Tenants Corp. v. Fire Chief of Cambridge 
& another, 424 Mass. 661, 664-665 (1997).  This, in turn, 
furthers the ancillary goals of retaining and adding to existing 
housing stock, as well as avoiding an increase in abandoned 
residential buildings,40 which themselves present an increased 
risk of fire. 
 
3.  Fire chief's decisions.  With this standard in mind, we 
examine the fire chief's decisions to ascertain whether they 
comport with the statutory objectives.  Here, in reaching his 
determination that MacLaurin's buildings had been substantially 
                                                 
39 See Bukowksi & Babrauskas, Developing Rational, 
Performance-based Fire Safety Requirements in Model Building 
Codes, Fire and Materials, vol. 18, at 173, 176, 180-181 (1994); 
D. Madrzykowski & R.P. Fleming, Review of Residential Sprinkler 
Systems:  Research and Standards, National Fire Sprinkler 
Association, NISTIR 6941, at 5, 16 (rev. Dec. 2002).  See also 
R.P. Fleming, The Fire Sprinkler Situation in the United States 
(2012). 
 
40 In 1983, then Governor Michael Dukakis announced that 
homelessness was his highest social service priority, pointing 
to estimates that Massachusetts had somewhere between 5,000 to 
10,000 homeless residents.  Among other initiatives during his 
term in office, public assistance requirements were amended so 
that homeless persons could receive benefits, the Legislature 
enacted a stringent condominium conversion law requiring four 
years' notification to tenants, and funding was obtained to 
create thousands of new and rehabilitated housing units for low 
income residents.  See J. Alter, S. Doherty, N. Finke Greenbert, 
S. Agrest, V.E. Smith, G. Raine, Homelessness in America, 
Newsweek, Jan. 2, 1984, at 12-13, in Housing the Homeless, J. 
Erickson and C. Wilhelm, eds. (Rutgers, 1986), republished with 
a new introduction by J. Erickson (2012). 
31 
 
rehabilitated so as to be the equivalent of new construction, 
the chief stated that he looked to decisions of the automatic 
sprinkler appeals board (construing G. L. c. 148, § 26G), and to 
provisions in the State building code.  While the decisions do 
not state so explicitly, they suggest the fire chief's 
familiarity with Beth Sholom, supra at 279, the only appellate 
decision to have construed the "major alteration" standard in 
the commercial sprinkler provision, requiring installation of 
sprinklers in existing commercial buildings of more than 7,500 
square feet whenever construction is extensive enough to be a 
"major alteration."  The chief also appears to have been 
cognizant of a 1999 Superior Court judge's decision construing 
the residential sprinkler provision.   See note 20, supra. 
The fire chief, however, did not rely expressly on any 
identified interpretation of the statutory standard, nor did he 
set forth such an interpretation.41  If anything, the decisions 
suggest rather that the "major alteration" and "substantially 
rehabilitated so as to constitute the equivalent of new 
                                                 
41 The February, 2012 (Main Street), and March, 2012 (Essex 
Street), orders generally relied on the same factors:  reported 
observations from the inspections in February, 2012; various 
municipal records, including fire department records; and 
documents that had been submitted by MacLaurin to the building 
inspector during the course of construction.  In the 2013 
orders, the fire chief noted also that he had sought guidance in 
decisions of the automatic sprinkler appeals board and the State 
building code, both with reference to the commercial sprinkler 
provision. 
32 
 
construction" standards were viewed as functionally equivalent.  
The decisions neither make clear what facts the fire chief found 
and applied, nor how he weighed their relative importance.42  
While expressing some skepticism as to the validity of 
MacLaurin's total project cost and sprinkler installation 
estimates, the decisions do not reflect any assessment of the 
relative costs of sprinkler installation compared with total 
project costs,43 a factor that is identified in both Beth Sholom, 
                                                 
42 The fire chief stated, without discussion, that the work 
included upgrades to "all major systems" (plumbing, electrical, 
and gas); that each building, which had sustained previous fire 
damage, was of a "balloon" construction with a wooden frame that 
would allow a fire to move rapidly between floors; that the 
actual work undertaken would have facilitated the installation 
of automatic sprinklers; and that, at least as to Essex Street, 
MacLaurin had submitted automatic sprinkler plans in conjunction 
with his initial applications for building permits.  The chief 
commented that he viewed the submission of these plans as an 
indication that, from its inception, MacLaurin had considered 
the project to be a substantial rehabilitation (a view MacLaurin 
disputes). 
 
43 While the fire chief stated that he considered the cost 
of the projects, the particular work involved, and the relative 
cost of sprinklers in each building, his 2012 orders questioned 
the accuracy of MacLaurin's claimed total project costs of 
$207,062 (Essex Street) and $178,353 (later adjusted to 
$186,851) (Main Street), and of his projected costs to install 
automatic sprinklers of $124,800 (Essex Street) and $133,700 
(Main Street), suggesting that the total project costs were too 
low and the sprinkler installation estimates were too high.  The 
fire chief did not provide alternative figures. 
 
The 2013 orders adopted MacLaurin's figures without 
comment, and did not address the costs of sprinkler 
installation.  Those orders contain no discussion of the costs 
of sprinklers, other than a comment that the costs of 
installation would have been "substantially less" had sprinklers 
33 
 
supra at 279, and Iodice vs. Newton, Mass. Superior Ct., No. 
971098D (Middlesex County Oct. 1, 1999) (Iodice), as being 
relevant to the determination whether work undertaken is a 
"major alteration."  Further, nothing in the decisions indicates 
consideration of the dual statutory objectives, and whether the 
modifications undertaken were so substantial that they 
constituted "the equivalent of new construction." 
The difficulty of judicial review is enhanced by the 
absence of express findings of fact as to key points, certain of 
which MacLaurin disputes.  For example, in addition to the 
record being unclear as to what the project costs and sprinkler 
installation cost estimates were determined to be, the record is 
at least as unclear as to specific aspects of the scope and 
nature of the actual physical work performed.  Significantly, 
given its importance relative to the costs and difficulty of 
automatic sprinkler installation, the fire chief made no 
findings as to the contested issue of the extent of the walls 
and ceilings that were opened, replaced, or repaired by being 
covered with gypsum board.44 
                                                                                                                                                             
been installed when the permits issued.  The only discussion of 
costs in the 2013 orders compares the total project costs with 
the (extremely low) assessed values of the buildings. 
 
44 In particular, as to the Essex Street building, the fire 
chief noted that "substantial portions of both walls and 
ceilings throughout the entire building were opened up," a point 
that MacLaurin disputes as incorrect and inconsistent with 
34 
 
In light of the foregoing, the Housing Court judge was not 
in a position to review the fire chief's decisions under G. L. 
c. 148, § 26I, and a remand for further proceedings, with the 
guidance we provide, is necessary.  On remand, after taking such 
additional evidence as may be appropriate, and applying the 
standard we have identified, the fire chief should clearly 
determine and identify the particular facts on which he bases 
his conclusion whether the rehabilitative work undertaken on 
each building was so substantial as to be the equivalent of new 
construction. 
4.  Whether a hearing was required.  MacLaurin also argues 
that the fire chief acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 
failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing in order to allow him 
to present evidence and be heard.  MacLaurin contends that such 
a hearing was necessary to establish an acceptable record for 
review on appeal, based on written findings of fact and a 
clearly articulated rationale for the decision made.  He 
maintains as well that an evidentiary hearing is 
constitutionally mandated before an order may issue requiring a 
residential property owner to pay for a potentially cost 
prohibitive sprinkler system, and that the decision to require 
                                                                                                                                                             
documentation for the project.  Moreover, with respect to the 
Main Street building, as to which the fire chief also concluded 
that sprinkler installation would have been facilitated by 
virtue of the work done there, the record does not reflect any 
mention of walls or ceilings being similarly "opened up." 
35 
 
installation of automatic sprinklers without a hearing was a 
violation of his due process rights. 
As noted, the residential sprinkler provision is the only 
section of the fire prevention act requiring the installation of 
automatic sprinklers that does not contain language affording a 
statutory right of appeal.45  In support of his contention that a 
hearing was constitutionally mandated, MacLaurin points to the 
Appeals Court's decision in Yerardi's Moody St. Restaurant & 
Lounge v. Selectmen of Randolph, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 296, 302-304 
(1985) (Yerardi's), citing Milligan v. Board of Registration in 
Pharmacy, 348 Mass. 491, 495-496 (1965) (Milligan).  In the 
Yerardi's case, citing Konstantopoulos v. Whately, 384 Mass. 
123, 132 (1981), the court held that a restaurant owner was 
entitled to a hearing when a city board denied his application 
for a later closing hour, which had been permitted to other 
nearby restaurants, even though the licensing statute contained 
no right to a hearing after the denial of a request to expand 
closing hours.46  Without determining whether the denial of an 
                                                 
45 Amendments to the residential sprinkler provision that 
would provide a statutory right of appeal have been introduced a 
number of times; none have come to a vote.  See, e.g., 2015 
House Doc. No. 2143; 2013 House Doc. No. 982. 
 
46 As here, other provisions of the statute applicable in 
Yerardi's Moody St. Restaurant & Lounge v. Selectmen of 
Randolph, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 296, 299-300 (1985), such as an 
order to reduce licensed operating hours, did provide a right to 
a hearing. 
36 
 
extension of licensing hours was of constitutional dimension, 
the court in the Yerardi's case concluded that the aggrieved 
restaurant owner was nonetheless entitled to notice and a 
hearing under a long-standing common law "ethic that pervades 
our legal system" "where government exerts power upon an 
individual in a matter of consequence."  Yerardi's, supra at 
303, citing Milligan, supra. 
The situation here is, to some extent, similar, and we need 
not reach the question whether the fire chief's decision was of 
constitutional dimension to conclude that, in the circumstances 
here, a hearing would have been appropriate.47  There was no 
                                                 
47 Consideration might well have been given to holding such 
a hearing early in the project, when adjustments could be made 
most cost-effectively, or another form of fire prevention system 
instead deemed sufficient, the types of resolutions that the 
automatic sprinkler appeals board is authorized to make.  See 
discussions in Iodice, supra, and Beth Sholom, supra.  We note 
that many of the factors relied upon to determine that 
sprinklers are necessary in this case (the age of the buildings, 
the type of construction, the history of a previous fire) were 
known when the building permits issued.  A hearing early in the 
process might have allowed resolution of material factual 
questions, such as the extent and scope of the project 
(particularly the extent to which walls and ceilings would be 
replaced) and the cost of installation of a particular sprinkler 
system, which are of significance in determining whether 
sprinklers are required. 
 
Here, for example, an expert report indicated some 
question, with respect to the Main Street building and its 
connection to the street, as to whether water pressure from the 
street would be adequate in the building to support a sprinkler 
system.  Were the water supply thereby inadequate, MacLaurin 
might be statutorily exempt from any requirement to install 
sprinklers.  See G. L. c. 148, § 26I. 
37 
 
controlling decisional authority as to the applicable standard, 
key facts were in dispute, and there is no statutory avenue for 
review.  The fire chief's orders clearly "exert[ed] power upon 
an individual in a matter of consequence."  Yerardi's, supra at 
303, citing Milligan, supra at 495-496.  While determinations 
such as these are made in the exercise of discretion, that 
discretion is not unlimited.  "[B]esides the unreviewable 
elements in [such] decisions, there are other elements 
submissible to the test of elementary justice that is invoked by 
the words 'arbitrary or capricious.'"  Id. at 301.  In these 
particular circumstances, an appropriate opportunity for 
MacLaurin to be heard was warranted. 
Conclusion.  The matter is remanded to the Housing Court 
for entry of an order vacating the judgment affirming the fire 
chief's determination that automatic sprinklers are required in 
the buildings at 213-215 Chestnut Street/108-116 Essex Street 
and 268-272 Main Street/11 Spring Street, and remanding the 
matter to the Holyoke fire department.  On remand, the head of 
the fire department shall consider anew, consistent with this 
opinion and after evaluation of the existing record and such 
additional information as may be submitted by either party, 
whether the properties have been substantially rehabilitated 
within the meaning of G. L. c. 148, § 26I, so as to require the 
installation of automatic sprinkler systems.  Thereafter, if 
38 
 
necessary, further proceedings consistent with this opinion will 
be had in the Housing Court. 
So ordered.