Title: McKinley v. Colorado Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co.
Citation: 431 P.2d 859
Docket Number: 21216
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: September 25, 1967

431 P.2d 859 (1967) Basil Leo McKINLEY, Plaintiff in Error, v. COLORADO FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a Colorado corporation, Defendant in Error. No. 21216. Supreme Court of Colorado, In Department. September 25, 1967. Smith &amp; Smith, Alamosa, for plaintiff in error. Henry Blickhahn, Alamosa, Wormwood, Wolvington, Renner &amp; Dosh, Denver, for defendant in error. KELLEY, Justice. The plaintiff, McKinley, owned a 1961 Ford automobile and a 1963 Ford automobile. The defendant, Colorado Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, insured each car under separate contracts which were identical except for the descriptions of the insured automobiles and the amounts of coverage under the respective medical payment provisions. Both policies were in force at the critical time. The policy covering the 1961 Ford (No. 46707) contained a $1000 medical payment provision, whereas the policy covering the 1963 Ford (No. 49791) had a $2000 medical payment limitation. While driving the 1961 model automobile, plaintiff had an accident which resulted in personal injuries, the medical expenses of which exceeded $3000. The defendant paid the $1000 under the terms of the policy covering the operation of the car actually involved in the accident. By this action the plaintiff seeks to recover an additional $2000 under the terms of the policy insuring the car he was not driving. Both parties moved for summary judgment. There was agreement between the parties as to the facts. The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law contain a comprehensive analysis of the policy provisions. The court resolved the question of law in favor of the defendant, denying the plaintiff's claim. We affirm. The court, in its findings, set forth the contentions of the respective parties succinctly, in this fashion: The medical payments coverage is defined by "Coverage C" of the policy, in pertinent part, thusly: Part IV of the policy, which defines "Automobile," in part, gives rise to the problem presented here. It reads: "AUTOMOBILE DEFINED * * *. * * * * * * Plaintiff, as to Policy No. 49791, contends that the language of subsection (4) above extends the coverage of the policy to "any land motor vehicle" and, of necessity, includes the vehicle he was driving at the time he sustained his injuries, in spite of the fact that it is not the vehicle described in that policy, but was the one described in Policy No. 46707. In disposing of this contention, the trial court noted: The trial court continued: The trial court relied, in part, on Holmes v. Phenix Ins. Co., 8 Cir., 98 F. 240, 47 L.R.A. 308, which is the leading case on "punctuation." In that decision the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that: See also Stoddard v. Golden, 179 Cal. 663, 178 P. 707, 3 A.L.R. 1060; Anderson &amp; Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 136 S.W.2d 800, 127 A.L.R. 1217. Other courts, under circumstances similar to those here, in order to effectuate the intent of the parties, have inserted or changed the punctuation. See English v. McNair, 34 Ala. 40; also, annotation: 3 A.L.R. 1062, 1068. The plaintiff insists that there is an ambiguity in the policy, so, consequently the court must construe the policy. We disagree. The trial court, in concluding its opinion, observed: We agree with both the reasoning and the conclusion of the trial court. The judgment is affirmed. MOORE, C. J., and SUTTON and PRINGLE, JJ., concur.