Title: Bunting v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 138, 2011
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 30, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SHAWN BUNTING,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
          Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 138, 2011 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0407024013 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                         Submitted: July 29, 2011 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: August 30, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 30th day of August 2011, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Shawn Bunting, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s February 21, 2011 order adopting the Commissioner’s January 
18, 2011 report, which recommended that Bunting’s second motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 be denied.1  We 
find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in July 2004, Bunting was arrested on 
numerous drug charges.  Prior to trial, Bunting moved to suppress the drug 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §512(b); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62. 
 
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evidence seized from his residence.  Following a hearing, the Superior Court 
denied the motion.  After a four-day jury trial in Superior Court, Bunting moved 
for a partial judgment of acquittal.  The Superior Court also denied that motion.   
 
(3) 
Bunting was found guilty of Possession With Intent to Deliver 
Marijuana, Maintaining a Dwelling for Keeping Controlled Substances, 
Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping Controlled Substances, Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia and Driving While License Suspended or Revoked.2  He was 
sentenced as a habitual offender to life in prison.  This Court affirmed Bunting’s 
convictions on direct appeal.3  The Superior Court also denied Bunting’s first 
postconviction motion.  His appeal to this Court was dismissed.4 
 
(4) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his second 
postconviction motion, Bunting claims that a) his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to interview the passenger of the car he was driving when 
arrested and object to the inadmissible testimony of a police officer; b) his Sixth 
Amendment right to confront his accusers was violated; c) the Fourth Amendment 
prohibition against unlawful searches and seizures was violated with respect to 
both his car and residence; and d) the Superior Court should have considered the 
                                                 
2 Bunting was found not guilty of Possession of Cocaine. 
3 Bunting v. State, Del. Supr., No. 224, 2005, Ridgely, J. (Sept. 7, 2006). 
4 Bunting v. State, Del. Supr., No. 117, 2008, Berger, J. (July 23, 2008). 
 
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merits of his claims under Rule 61(i) (5) because all of his claims involve 
violations of his constitutional rights. 
 
(5) 
When considering a motion for postconviction relief, the Superior 
Court must first determine whether the defendant has met the procedural 
requirements of Rule 61 before considering the merits of the defendant’s claims.5  
Under Rule 61(i) (1), a claim for postconviction relief must be brought within one 
year of the defendant’s conviction becoming final.  In this case, Bunting filed his 
second postconviction motion more than three years after his conviction became 
final.6  As such, the Superior Court properly determined that Bunting’s second 
postconviction motion was time-barred under Rule 61(i) (1).   
 
(6) 
The Superior Court also properly determined that Bunting’s claims 
were procedurally barred under Rule 61(i) (2), (3) and (4).  Because none of 
Bunting’s claims was asserted in his previous postconviction motion, he is barred 
from asserting them in this proceeding under Rule 61(i) (2).  Bunting’s claim that 
his Sixth Amendment rights were violated and that his Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated with respect to the police search of his car were not raised in the 
proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction and, therefore, are barred as 
procedurally defaulted under Rule 61(i) (3).  His claim that his Fourth Amendment 
                                                 
5 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m). 
 
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rights were violated with respect to the police search of his residence is barred 
under Rule 61(i) (4) because it was formerly adjudicated on direct appeal.   
 
(7) 
Bunting’s final claim is that, because his attorney provided ineffective 
assistance that resulted in violations of his constitutional rights and because the 
remainder of his claims implicate his constitutional rights, the Superior Court 
should have reached the merits of his claims under Rule 61(i) (5), which 
overcomes the time and procedural bars in cases of constitutional violations that 
result in “a miscarriage of justice.”   
 
(8) 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must demonstrate that his counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would 
have been different.7  Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is 
highly demanding and leads to a strong presumption that the representation was 
professionally reasonable.8  The defendant must make concrete allegations of 
ineffective assistance, and substantiate them, or risk summary dismissal.9  
 
(9) 
Bunting’s claim that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by 
failing to interview the passenger of the car he was driving when arrested and 
                                                 
7 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
8 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
9 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
 
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object to testimony given by a police officer is factually and legally baseless.  The 
record reflects that Bunting’s counsel interviewed the passenger of the car Bunting 
was driving when arrested.  The record also reflects that she testified that Bunting 
was in control of the vehicle at the time of his arrest and that the drugs found there 
belonged to him.  There was, moreover, nothing improper about the police 
officer’s testimony at trial, since he was the one who prepared the police report.   
 
(10) Because there is no merit to Bunting’s claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, that claim provides Bunting with no basis for overcoming Rule 61’s 
time and procedural bars pursuant to Rule 61(i) (5).  Likewise, his conclusory 
allegations of constitutional violations do not serve to overcome Rule 61’s time 
and procedural bars.  The record in this case does not reflect any constitutional 
violations resulting in a “manifest injustice.”  As such, the Superior Court properly 
applied the time and procedural bars to deny Buntings’ claims.          
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice