Title: Redtop Market, Inc., and River Road Auto Repair, by and through its owner, Rickey Bolton v. State of Alabama ex rel. Arthur Green, District Attorney for the Bessemer Division of the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1060855
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 30, 2010

Rel 12/30/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
____________________
1060855
____________________
Redtop Market, Inc., and River Road Auto Repair, by and
through its owner, Rickey Bolton 
v.
State of Alabama ex rel. Arthur Green, District Attorney for
the Bessemer Division of the Tenth Judicial Circuit of
Alabama
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court 
(CV-03-905)
PER CURIAM.
Redtop Market, Inc., and River Road Auto Repair, by and
through its owner, Rickey Bolton (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "Redtop"), appeal from the trial court's order
1060855
2
granting the State of Alabama on the relation of Arthur Green,
district attorney for the Bessemer Division of the Tenth
Judicial Circuit of Alabama, relief under Rule 60(b)(6), Ala.
R. Civ. P.  We vacate the order, dismiss the action, and
dismiss the appeal.
Facts and Procedural History
On July 1, 2003, Redtop filed a complaint seeking a
judgment declaring that certain gaming machines Redtop wished
to operate in its place of business were "bona fide coin-
operated amusement machines" under § 13A-12-76, Ala. Code
1975.  According to the complaint, Green had refused to
approve the gaming machines for use as amusement machines and
had taken the position that the operation of the machines
would violate §§ 13A-12-20 through 13A-12-76, Ala. Code 1975.
The complaint alleged that "the machines in question are
primarily games of skill and not chance and therefore, should
be allowed to be operated."
After conducting a hearing, the trial court on February
3, 2004, entered an order holding that the gaming machines
were bona fide coin-operated amusement machines under § 13A-
12-76, Ala. Code 1975.  The trial court's order stated that
1060855
3
"any and all law enforcement agencies, including the Jefferson
County Sheriff's Department and all local municipal law
enforcement authorities, [shall] abstain from seizing or
charging criminally any individuals operating or possessing
[the gaming machines] in Jefferson County."
On February 27, 2004, the State filed a motion for a new
trial or a rehearing.  After conducting a hearing, the trial
court denied the motion for a new trial on July 1, 2005.  On
August 11, 2005, the State filed a notice of appeal to this
Court.  In State v. Redtop Market, Inc., 937 So. 2d 1013 (Ala.
2006), this Court held that the State's motion for a new trial
had been denied by operation of law on May 27, 2004; thus, the
State's appeal was untimely.  Therefore, this Court dismissed
the appeal. 
On January 18, 2007, the State filed a motion under Rule
60(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., seeking relief from the trial
court's February 3, 2004, order.  The Rule 60(b)(6) motion
alleged that this Court in Barber v. Jefferson County Racing
Ass'n, 960 So. 2d 599 (Ala. 2006), examined gaming machines
that were essentially identical to the gaming machines at
issue in the present case and held that such gaming machines
1060855
4
are illegal gambling devices.  The State asked the trial court
to find that the gaming machines at issue in the present case
are illegal gambling devices and to lift its injunction
preventing law-enforcement agencies from seizing the machines
or from criminally charging individuals found to be operating
or possessing the machines in Jefferson County.  On January
26, 2007, the trial court granted the State's motion and
lifted the injunction.
On February 23, 2007, Redtop filed a motion to set aside
the January 26, 2007, order or to stay that order pending
appeal.  The trial court denied that motion on February 26,
2007.  On March 7, 2007, Redtop filed a notice of appeal to
this Court.   
Discussion
After the appeal in this case was taken, this Court
released its opinion in Tyson v. Macon County Greyhound Park,
Inc., 43 So. 3d 587 (Ala. 2010), which held that the Macon
Circuit Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to interfere
in the enforcement of criminal laws through the issuance of an
injunction in a civil action.  That holding is dispositive in
the present case.  
1060855
5
In Tyson, Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., d/b/a
VictoryLand ("VictoryLand"), filed an action in the Macon
Circuit Court against John M. Tyson, Jr., individually and in
his official capacity as special prosecutor and task-force
commander of the Governor's Task Force on Illegal Gambling,
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief stemming from
Tyson's arrival at the premises of VictoryLand for the purpose
of seizing machines that, Tyson said, were illegal gambling
devices.  In its complaint, VictoryLand asserted that its
activities were lawful and that it would suffer irreparable
injury if the machines were seized.  The circuit court entered
a written order barring Tyson from taking further action
pending a hearing to be held a few days later.  Tyson filed an
emergency motion in this Court to stay or to vacate the
circuit court's order.  
This Court held that "[t]he general rule is that a court
may not interfere with the enforcement of criminal laws
through a civil action; instead, the party aggrieved by such
enforcement shall make his case in the prosecution of the
criminal action." Tyson, 43 So. 3d at 589.  We also noted that
"[t]his Court has recognized an exception to the general rule
1060855
6
whereby the equitable powers of the court can be invoked to
avoid irreparable injury when the plaintiff contends that the
statute at issue is void," 43 So. 3d at 589, but we held that
"[t]he complaint in this action does not present a situation
in which the plaintiff acknowledges that his conduct is
prohibited by a statute and then challenges the enforceability
of the statute." 43 So. 3d at 590.  Therefore, based on those
propositions, we held that the circuit court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction, and we vacated the order before us,
dismissed the action, and dismissed the appeal.
As did the plaintiffs in Tyson, Redtop sought a judgment
declaring the operation of the gaming machines to be legal,
and, like the trial court in Tyson, the trial court in this
case, in its February 3, 2004, order, enjoined all law-
enforcement agencies "from seizing or charging criminally any
individuals operating or possessing [the gaming machines] in
Jefferson County."  Such a declaration would impermissibly
interfere with the enforcement of criminal laws through a
civil action.  Also, no exception to the general rule applies
in the present case because Redtop does not challenge the
enforceability of any statute.  Instead, Redtop alleges that
1060855
7
the gaming machines are legal because, it says, the machines
meet the definition of a "bona fide coin-operated amusement
machines" under § 13A-12-76, Ala. Code 1975.  Therefore, like
the circuit court in Tyson, the circuit court in the present
case lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action, and
all orders entered by the trial court in this case are void.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we vacate the order before us,
dismiss the action, and dismiss the appeal.
ORDER VACATED; ACTION DISMISSED; APPEAL DISMISSED.
Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and Shaw, JJ.,
concur.
Murdock, J., concurs specially.
Cobb, C.J., concurs in the result.
1060855
8
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
In Tyson v. Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., 43 So. 3d
587 (Ala. 2010), this Court held that a circuit court
exercising its civil jurisdiction did not have subject-matter
jurisdiction 
over 
an 
action 
seeking 
to 
restrain 
the
enforcement of this State's criminal laws.  Among other
things, this Court supported its holding with the following
observations: 
"The general rule is that a court may not
interfere with the enforcement of criminal laws
through a civil action; instead, the party aggrieved
by such enforcement shall make his case in the
prosecution of the criminal action:
"'It is a plain proposition of law that
equity will not exert its powers merely to
enjoin 
criminal 
or 
quasi 
criminal
prosecutions, "though the consequences to
the 
complainant 
of 
allowing 
the
prosecutions to proceed may be ever so
grievous 
and 
irreparable." 
Brown 
v.
Birmingham, 140 Ala. [590,] 600, 37 South.
[173,] 174 [(1904)]. "His remedy at law is
plain, adequate, and complete by way of
establishing and having his innocence
adjudged in the criminal court." Id.'
"Board of Comm'rs of Mobile v. Orr, 181 Ala. 308,
318, 61 So. 920, 923 (1913). See also 22A Am.Jur.2d
Declaratory Judgments § 57 (2003) ('A declaratory
judgment will generally not be granted where its
only effect would be to decide matters which
properly should be decided in a criminal action.')."
1060855
9
Tyson, 43 So. 3d at 589.
The present case well demonstrates the wisdom of the
above-quoted general principles and the harmony of those
principles with the doctrine of the separation of powers as
provided in § 43 of the Alabama Constitution.  If we limit
"matters which properly should be decided in a criminal
action" to criminal actions, a mistake in favor of a criminal
actor serves only to immunize from further law-enforcement
efforts the specific past acts alleged in the indictment or
information.  On the other hand, if such a mistake is made in
a civil case like the present one, the result could be
injunctive or other relief that could tie the hands of law
enforcement in the future so as, in effect, to immunize from
further law-enforcement efforts all future acts of the same
nature by the prevailing party and possibly other similarly
situated actors in the county in which the decision is
rendered.  In practical effect, the result would be a change
by civil judicial decree for that county of what has been
prescribed by the legislature as the uniform statutory
criminal law for the entire state.  The judiciary would, in
one fell swoop, be able to interfere with both the legislative
1060855
10
and executive branches, contrary to § 43 of the Alabama
Constitution.
Alabama's constitution prescribes to the legislative
branch of our State government the task of promulgating
criminal laws for the sake of the public's safety, health,
and welfare.  It prescribes to the executive branch of State
government the task of enforcing criminal laws to the same
end.  It is essential to the integrity of the delegation of
these respective tasks to these particular branches and to the
realization of these purposes in a uniform manner throughout
the various counties to adhere to the notion that an order
from the judicial branch of the nature at issue in this case
is subject to future, collateral attack as beyond the
jurisdiction of the civil court that entered it.  Maintaining
this integrity and meeting these purposes dictate that the
potential prospective, binding effect of the order of a single
court not be dependent upon the immediate stance taken by, or
the skill or diligence of, a local official in relation to the
trying of a single civil action, the preserving of error in
that action, or the pursuing of a timely and effective appeal
from any adverse judgment.  
1060855
See generally City Council of Montgomery v. West, 40 So.
1
215, 215 (Ala. 1906) (not reported in Alabama Reports)
(holding that a court exercising civil jurisdiction is
"without power to enjoin the commission of threatened crimes,
or to restrain threatened prosecutions for the commission of
alleged crimes," even when "the ordinance or statute for the
alleged violation of which the prosecution is threatened, is
absolutely void" and averment is made that there "would be
11
Related to the foregoing, I note that our opinion in
Tyson stated that this Court has recognized an exception to
the general rule whereby the equitable powers of the court can
be invoked to avoid irreparable injury when the plaintiff
concedes that his or her conduct falls within a criminal
statute but contends that the statute itself is void.  43
So. 3d at 589.  Because this exception is again referenced in
the opinion in this case, I find it appropriate to make note
here of questions regarding the correctness of this exception
that have arisen for me since Tyson was decided.  
Most fundamentally, it appears to me that the above-
described principles and purposes could be defeated as
effectively by a civil action that adjudicates a criminal
statute or ordinance to be void as by a civil action that
successfully seeks on some other ground to prevent particular
conduct from being prosecuted under that criminal statute or
ordinance in the future.   I question whether any exception
1
1060855
repeated and numerous prosecutions" that would "inflict
irreparable injury" but making no reference to any exception
to this general rule). Similarly, if an ordinance purports to
declare legal certain activity that would otherwise run afoul
of a State criminal statute, I question whether there is any
difference in adjudicating in a civil action for prospective
effect the validity of that ordinance and a similar
adjudication of the legality of the activity at issue in the
absence of an ordinance that purports to legalize it.
12
that allows such a result could be correct since it is those
principles and purposes that inform the general rule.
Although there are indeed numerous cases that articulate
an exception to the general rule for civil actions seeking an
adjudication that an enactment is void (which I understand to
be a reference to facial voidness), it may be observed that
such cases, particularly early ones, usually involved the
validity of local ordinances, rather than State criminal
statutes.  See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs of Mobile v. Orr, 181
Ala. 308, 318, 61 So. 920, 923 (1913) (noting the "plain
proposition of law that equity will not exert its powers
merely to enjoin criminal or quasi criminal prosecutions," but
subsequently observing that the Court had recognized "the
power ... of the equity courts to interfere by injunction
where quasi criminal prosecutions under municipal ordinances
will destroy or impair property rights" and citing a series of
1060855
Compare, e.g., Bessemer v. Bessemer Water Works, 152 Ala.
2
391, 44 So. 663 (1907) (involving local ordinances imposing
restrictions on businesses and property that in all other
respects were "perfectly legitimate and highly useful"); Brown
v. Birmingham, 140 Ala. 590, 37 So. 173 (1904); Old Dominion
Tel. Co. v. Powers, 140 Ala. 220, 37 So. 195 (1904); Bryan v.
13
cases involving alleged violations of municipal ordinances
(emphasis added)); Franklin Soc. Club v. Town of Phil
Campbell, 204 Ala. 259, 85 So. 527 (1920); Walker v. City of
Birmingham, 216 Ala. 206, 112 So. 823 (1927).  Such cases
arguably do not implicate the above-described concerns as to
the separation and independence of the legislative and
executive branches of State government, nor the need for
statewide uniformity in the application of State criminal
statutes, in the same manner as do cases seeking to adjudicate
the viability of a criminal statute enacted by the legislative
branch of State government for enforcement throughout the
State. 
Assuming that an exception of the nature expressed in
Tyson is available, however, I also have come to question
whether we as a Court failed in Tyson to observe adequately
that the risk of irreparable injury that must be shown must be
to property and enterprises other than those that are the
subject of the enforcement action itself.   By extension, it
2
1060855
City of Birmingham, 154 Ala. 447, 450, 45 So. 922, 923 (1908)
(addressing on its merits the trial court's denial of
equitable relief in a case where the "threatened enforcement
of the ordinance would not only greatly diminish the value of
the property, but will practically destroy its value, by
forbidding the use to which it is better or exclusively
adaptable," in this case a cemetery); Town of Cuba v.
Mississippi Oil Co., 150 Ala. 259, 43 So. 706 (1907); Port of
Mobile v. L. & N.R.R., 84 Ala. 115, 4 So. 106 (1888);
Montgomery v. L. & N.R.R., 84 Ala. 127, 4 So. 626 (1888), with
Ex parte State ex rel. Martin, 200 Ala. 15, 16, 75 So. 327,
328 (1917) ("The property right sought to be asserted ... does
not ... bring [the plaintiff's] cause within the exception ...
recognized in the cases noted in Board of Com'rs of Mobile v.
Orr, 181 Ala. 308, 61 So. 920 [(1913)].  The fact, if so, that
complainant has brought into the state or has in his
possession a beverage that, though in fact not prohibited,
will subject or has subjected him to arrest and his beverage
to seizure, cannot avail to invest the court of equity with
jurisdiction in the premises. The issue, whether the beverage
is within the prohibitory laws, can be fully determined by the
court in which the prosecution and the proceedings on seizure
are heard."); Caudle v. Cotton, 234 Ala. 126, 127, 173 So.
847, 848 (1937) (dissolving an injunction against law
enforcement's seizure of gambling devices and noting that
"[p]erhaps the case of Ex parte State, 200 Ala. 15, 75 So. 327
[(1917)], furnishes an illustration more nearly in point to
the instant case" than others); Kennedy v. Shamblin, 234 Ala.
230, 231, 174 So. 773, 774 (1937) (affirming the trial court's
denial of equitable relief where "the only property rights
involved are such as the complainant has in said slot
machines, in which he has invested his money and the profits
which said machines are taking").  See also Dickey v. Signal
Peak Enters., 340 Ark. 276, 280, 9 S.W.3d 517, 519 (2000)
(holding that a threatened prosecution did not fall within the
exception to the general preventing a chancery court from
restraining prosecutorial efforts because the threatened
prosecution "was aimed exclusively at illegal gambling
operations, not lawful business operations");  Billy/Dot, Inc.
v. Fields, 322 Ark. 272, 908 S.W.2d 335 (1995).
14
may be questioned whether in a circumstance where there is a
1060855
15
commingling of both allegedly illegal enterprises with legal
enterprises the complainant has not voluntarily undertaken a
risk for which a court exercising civil jurisdiction may not
provide relief.
While 
I 
therefore 
question 
whether 
this 
Court's
articulation of an exception in Tyson was correct, it is not
necessary to answer this "question" in order to decide the
case before us.  I agree with the main opinion that the
exception articulated in Tyson is not applicable here, and I
therefore concur in that opinion.