Title: Century Tel of Alabama, LLC v. Dothan/Houston Cty Comm. Dist.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1131313
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 30, 2015

REL:09/30/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2015
____________________
1131313
____________________
Century Tel of Alabama, LLC, and Qwest Communications
Company, LLC
v.
Dothan/Houston County Communications District and Ozark/Dale
County E-911, Inc.
Appeal from Houston Circuit Court
(CV-14-900042)
BOLIN, Justice.
Dothan/Houston 
County 
Communications 
District 
and
Ozark/Dale County E-911, Inc. ("the districts"), sued Century
Tel 
of 
Alabama, LLC ("CTA"), and Qwest Communications Company,
1131313
LLC ("Qwest") (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the
defendants"), seeking, among other things, to recover E-911
charges that the defendants were alleged to have not properly 
billed and collected in accordance with the Emergency
Telephone Service Act, § 11-98-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the
ETSA").  The defendants moved the circuit court to dismiss the
complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P.  The
circuit court denied the defendants' motion. The defendants
then petitioned this Court, pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R. App.
P., for permission to appeal from the circuit court's
interlocutory order.  We granted the petition.
I. Facts and Procedural History
A. The Pre-2012 Local 911 Fee System
1. The Emergency-Communications Districts
In 1984, the Alabama Legislature enacted the ETSA  for the
1
purpose of shortening the time for a citizen to request and
receive emergency-services aid via emergency 911.  § 11-98-3,
Ala. Code 1975.  The ETSA provided that the governing body of
The legislature by Act No. 2012-293, Ala. Acts 2012,
1
significantly revised the ETSA, effective October 1, 2013. 
Quotations from and citations to the ETSA in this opinion are
the pre-October 1, 2013, version of the ETSA, unless otherwise
indicated.  See discussion infra.
2
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a 
municipality 
or 
county 
may 
create 
an 
emergency-
communications district within its jurisdiction to provide
enhanced 911 ("E-911") service, which was defined in the 1984
act as "a telephone exchange communications service whereby a
public safety answering point  (PSAP) designated by the
customer may receive telephone calls dialed to the telephone
number 911." § 11-98-1(3), Ala. Code 1975.   The ETSA provided
2
that the emergency-communications districts are political and
legal subdivisions of the State of Alabama with the power to
sue and be sued in their corporate names.  § 11-98-2, Ala.
Code 1975. In addition to the "authority, and powers necessary
to establish, operate, maintain, and replace an emergency
communications system," the ETSA granted the emergency-
communications districts the authority "to prosecute[] and
defend civil actions in any court having jurisdiction." § 11-
98-4(f)(1), Ala. Code 1975. The districts are emergency-
communications districts created pursuant to the ETSA and
provide E-911 services to the citizens of Houston and Dale
Counties.   
The amendment to § 11-98-1, effective October 1, 2013,
2
revised this definition, which is now found at § 11-98-
1(a)(8).
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Before the ETSA was amended effective October 1, 2013,
the 
emergency-communications 
districts 
were 
funded 
by
emergency-telephone-service charges ("911 charges") that were
assessed to users of residential- and business-telephone
services by the emergency-communications districts. § 11-98-
5(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975.  The ETSA required that 911 charges
be assessed for every "exchange access line" or "exchange
access facility," i.e., telephone line. § 11-98-5(c), Ala.
Code 1975.  The ETSA also required that 911 charges be
assessed against those receiving telephone service through
voice-over-Internet-protocol ("VoIP") or other "similar
technology." § 11-98-5.1(c), Ala. Code 1975.   The telephone-
3
service providers were required by the ETSA to collect the 911
charges from the telephone-service users and then to remit
those 
911 
charges 
to 
the 
emergency-communications 
districts 
on
a monthly basis. § 11-98-5(c) and (e), Ala. Code 1975.  The
telephone-service providers were entitled to retain from the
gross receipts remitted to the emergency-communications
districts an administrative fee in an amount equal to one
Section 
11-98-5.1 
was 
repealed 
effective 
October 
1, 
2013.
3
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percent of the total remitted. § 11-98-5(e), Ala. Code 1975. 
The defendants are telephone-service providers.  
The emergency-communications districts were entitled to
audit annually the books and records of the telephone-service
providers with respect to the collection and remittance of 911
charges. § 11-98-5(e), Ala. Code 1975. The districts levied
the 911 charges in Houston and Dale counties pursuant to the 
ETSA. 
2. The Commercial Mobile Radio Service Board
Pursuant to § 11-98-7 of the ETSA, the Commercial Mobile
Radio Service ("CMRS") Board ("the CMRS Board") was created
for the purpose of levying a CMRS emergency-telephone-service
charge on each CMRS connection –- which is defined as a mobile
or wireless telephone number –- that has a place of primary
use within the State of Alabama. §§  11-98-6(5) and -7(b)(1),
Ala. Code 1975.  Before October 1, 2013, each CMRS provider
was required to collect the CMRS 911 service charges from each
CMRS connection to which it provided CMRS service and then to
remit those service charges to the CMRS Board. § 11-98-8, Ala.
Code 1975.  The moneys remitted to the CMRS Board were
deposited into the CMRS fund, which was maintained by the CMRS
5
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Board. § 11-98-7(2), Ala. Code 1975.  Those funds were
subsequently 
dispersed 
to 
the 
emergency-communications
districts. § 11-98-7(3), Ala. Code 1975.  
The CMRS providers were required to provide to the
emergency-communications-district management-review board an
annual accounting of the CMRS 911 services charges collected
and remitted. § 11-98-8(e), Ala. Code 1975.  The CMRS
providers were required by the ETSA to collect and remit the
CMRS 911 service charges to the CMRS Board.  However, if the
CMRS providers failed to do so, the CMRS Board could seek
enforcement of the statute in the Montgomery Circuit Court. §
11-98-8(g), Ala. Code 1975.          
B. The 2012 Amendments to the ETSA
In 2012, the Alabama Legislature enacted Act No. 2012-
293, Ala. Acts 2012, which substantially overhauled the ETSA. 
The legislature created a statewide 911 Board ("the 911
Board") and 911 fund. §§  11-98-4.1 and 11-98-5.2, Ala. Code
1975, respectively.  The 911 Board replaced and superseded the
CMRS Board, and the CMRS fund was incorporated into the newly
created 911 fund. § 11-98-4.1, Ala. Code 1975.  However, the
legislature left intact §§ 11-98-2 and 11-98-4, which created
6
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and gave authority to the emergency-communications districts. 
Thus, the districts continue to exist and have all the powers
and authority set forth by §§ 11-98-2 and 11-98-4 prior to the
2012 amendments to the ETSA.      
As part of the 2012 amendments, the legislature
substantially amended § 11-98-5 to provide for a "single,
monthly statewide 911 charge ... on each active voice
communications service connection [wireline and mobile
telephones] in Alabama that is technically capable of
accessing a 911 system." § 11-98-5(a), Ala. Code 1975.  The
telephone-service providers are required to collect the 911
charges from the telephone-service subscribers on a monthly
basis and then to remit the 911 charges collected to the 911
Board. § 11-98-5(a) and (b), Ala. Code 1975.  The 911 charges
are then deposited in the 911 fund for subsequent distribution
to the emergency-communications districts. § 11-98-5.2(b)(1),
Ala. Code 1975.  The amended version of § 11-98-5 did not
retain 
subsection 
(e), 
which 
allowed 
the 
emergency-
communications districts, at their discretion, to require the
telephone-service providers to submit to an annual audit of
the service providers' books and records with respect to the
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collection and remittance of 911 charges.   Instead, the
legislature added  § 11-98-13, Ala. Code 1975, which requires
the 911 Board to conduct a biennial audit of the telephone-
service providers in order to ensure the accuracy of the 911
charges and other information required to be submitted to the
911 Board by the telephone-service providers. The 2012
amendments to the ETSA became effective on October 1, 2013.
  C. The Districts’ Audit Request and Complaint
The districts sought to audit the defendants' billing
records to determine the defendants' compliance, prior to the
2012 legislative amendments to the ETSA, with the ETSA. The
districts contend that they initiated the audits before the
October 1, 2013, effective date of the 2012 amendments to the
ETSA. The defendants refused to comply with the requested
audits.  The districts state that they have determined from
the limited information available to them  that the defendants
have provided telephone services to customers within the
districts' jurisdiction without collecting and remitting to
the districts the required 911 charges, in violation of the
ETSA.  The districts state that by billing and collecting less
than the required amount of 911 charges, the defendants have
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been able to offer their telephone services at a lower cost to
customers and have thereby gained a competitive 
advantage over
other telephone-service providers.  
On January 21, 2014, the districts sued the defendants,
asserting claims alleging a violation of the ETSA for failing
to properly bill, collect, and remit the 911 fees; negligence; 
wantonness; and breach of a fiduciary duty.  The districts
sought to require the defendants to comply with the requests
for audits and to recover and remit any unpaid 911 charges.  
On March 10, 2014, the defendants moved the Houston
Circuit Court to dismiss the districts’ complaint pursuant to
Rules 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P.  The defendants noted that the
legislature repealed the local 911 fee system as part of the
2012 amendments to the ETSA and replaced it with the single
statewide fee scheme that became effective on October 1, 2013. 
The defendants contended that all the duties the districts
alleged the defendants violated were part of the now repealed
local 911 fee system.  Relying upon Cooper v. Ken Hilton Ford,
486 So. 2d 424 (Ala. 1986), the defendants argued that no
cause of action may be brought for violation of a statute
after the statute being sued upon has been repealed.  Thus,
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the defendants argued that the districts had no cause of
action and that their complaint must be dismissed. The
defendants further argued that the ETSA lacks an express
private right of action to enforce any alleged violation of
the act; that the districts had failed to state any tort or
wantonness claim; and that the ETSA does not create a
fiduciary duty on the part of the defendants to collect 911
fees. 
On July 23, 2014, the circuit court entered an order
denying the defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the
alternative, for a more definite statement. On July 30, 2014,
the defendants moved the circuit court to certify for
interlocutory appeal a controlling question of law for an
appeal by permission pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P.  The
circuit 
court certified for 
interlocutory appeal two
controlling questions of law, and the defendants petitioned
this Court for a permissive appeal.  Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P. 
This Court granted the petition. 
II. Standard of Review
This Court has stated:
"'The appropriate standard of review under
Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] is
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whether, when the allegations of the
complaint are viewed most strongly in the
pleader's favor, it appears that the
pleader 
could 
prove 
any 
set 
of
circumstances that would entitle [him] to
relief. 
Raley 
v. 
Citibanc 
of
Alabama/Andalusia, 474 So. 2d 640, 641
(Ala. 1985); Hill v. Falletta, 589 So. 2d
746 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991). In making this
determination, 
this 
Court 
does 
not 
consider
whether the plaintiff will ultimately
prevail, but only whether [he] may possibly
prevail.  Fontenot v. Bramlett, 470 So. 2d
669, 671 (Ala. 1985); Rice v. United Ins.
Co. of America, 465 So. 2d 1100, 1101 (Ala.
1984). We note that a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal is proper only when it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of the claim
that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.
Garrett v. Hadden, 495 So. 2d 616, 617
(Ala. 1986); Hill v. Kraft, Inc., 496 So.
2d 768, 769 (Ala. 1986).'
"Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala.
1993)."
DGB, LLC v. Hinds, 55 So. 3d 218, 223 (Ala. 2010).  "'Inasmuch
as the issue before us is whether the trial court correctly
denied a Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss,
"[t]his Court must accept the allegations of the complaint as
true."'"  Ex parte Walker, 97 So. 3d 747, 749 (Ala. 2012)
(quoting Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Youth Servs., 880 So. 2d
393, 397 (Ala. 2003)).
III. Discussion
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This Court has stated the following with regard to
permissive appeals pursuant to Rule 5(a), Ala. R. App. P.:
"In the petition for a permissive appeal, the
party seeking to appeal must include a certification
by the trial court that the interlocutory order
involves a controlling question of law, and the
trial court must include in the certification a
statement of the controlling question of law. Rule
5(a), Ala. R. App. P. In conducting our de novo
review of the question presented on a permissive
appeal, 'this Court will not expand its review ...
beyond the question of law stated by the trial
court. 
Any 
such 
expansion 
would 
usurp 
the
responsibility entrusted to the trial court by Rule
5(a).' BE & K, Inc. v. Baker, 875 So. 2d 1185, 1189
(Ala. 2003)."
Alabama Powersport Auction, LLC v. Wiese, 143 So. 3d 713, 716
(Ala. 2013).  The circuit court certified the two following
controlling questions of law: 
"(1) Does Act 2012-293, which eliminated local
911 charges from October 1, 2013, forward, prohibit
local 911 districts from suing for damages from
telephone providers for allegedly under-billing 911
fees prior to October 1, 2013? 
"(2) Does the [ETSA] authorize a right of action
by local 911 districts seeking damages from
telephone providers for allegedly failing to bill
911 charges?"
In addition to seeking the recovery of any unpaid 911 charges
required to be levied prior to October 1, 2013, the districts
also sought in their complaint to require the defendants to
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"provide information relating to their service within the
Districts and their billing, collecting and remitting of 911
charges."  However, the circuit court did not include in its
certified controlling questions of law any reference to the
districts' request for an accounting.  Because this Court will
not expand its review beyond the questions of law stated by
the circuit court, we will not address any issue relating to
that request.  Wiese, supra. Therefore, the only issues before
this Court are those included in the controlling questions of
law identified in the circuit court's certification. 
Question 1
"Does Act 2012-293, which eliminated local 911
charges from October 1, 2013, forward, prohibit
local 911 districts from suing for damages from
telephone providers for allegedly under-billing 911
fees prior to October 1, 2013?" 
The defendants contend that the repealed-statute rule 
prohibits the districts from suing to collect unpaid 911
charges requested to be levied prior to October 1, 2013. 
Specifically, the defendants argue that no cause of action may
be brought for violation of a statute after that statute has
been repealed.  This Court has explained:
"'"There can be no question that the
effect of the repeal of a statute or part
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thereof is to destroy the effectiveness of
the repealed act in futuro and to divest
the right to proceed under the statute,
which, except as to proceedings past and
closed, is considered as if it had never
existed."'"
Cooper v. Ken Hilton Ford Sales, Inc.,  486 So. 2d 424, 425
(Ala. 1986) (quoting Wilkinson v. State ex rel. Morgan, 396
So. 2d 86, 88 (Ala. 1981), quoting in turn Saad v. Cline, 51
Ala. App. 668, 670, 288 So. 2d 731, 732 (Ala. Civ. App.
1974)(emphasis omitted)). However, the repealed-statute rule
is not without an exception. 
"It is a general rule ... that when a statute is
repealed it stands as if it had never existed,
except as to vested rights which have accrued under
its operation ... 'The Legislature has full power to
take away by statute rights, not vested, which have
been conferred by statute. If the repealing statute
is general and unconditional, without a saving of
pending proceedings and prosecutions, these fall
with the statute which may have authorized them.'"
Blake v. State ex rel. Going, 178 Ala. 407, 411, 59 So. 623,
625 (1912)(quoting Luke v. Calhoun, 56 Ala. 415, 416 (1876)). 
Thus, the repealed-statute rule will not operate to divest a
claimant's right to proceed under a repealed statute when the
claimant had accrued vested rights under the prior operation
of the statute.  
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The 
defendants 
contend 
that 
Act 
No. 
2012-293
"unquestionably" repealed all the original local 911 fee
provisions of the ETSA and replaced those provisions with the
statewide 911 fee provisions.  The defendants argue that the
repealing legislation did not contain a savings clause, which
would have allowed the local 911 fee provisions to be enforced
beyond their repeal.  Thus, the defendants argue that any
right the districts had to sue to recover unpaid local 911
charges under the original provisions of the ETSA disappeared
when the local 911 fee provisions were repealed effective
October 1, 2013.  
The districts respond by arguing that the repealed-
statute rule does not operate to bar their claim because, they
say, Act No. 2012-293 did not repeal the pertinent provisions
of the ETSA; rather, they assert, Act No. 2012-293 simply
amended the pertinent portions of the ETSA. We agree.  
Before Act No. 2012-293 became effective on October 1,
2013, § 11-98-5 imposed a duty upon the telephone-service
providers to collect the 911 charges from the telephone-
service subscribers and then to remit those charges to the
emergency-communications districts on a monthly basis.  In
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2012, the legislature enacted Act No. 2012-293, which
expressly provided in the title: "Enrolled, An Act relating to
E-911 services, to amend Section[] ... 11-98-5."  The amended
version of § 11-98-5 created a "single, monthly statewide 911
charge" on each wireline- and mobile-telephone connection in
Alabama capable of accessing 911. § 11-98-5(a), Ala. Code
1975. Pursuant to § 11-98-5, as amended, 
the 
telephone-service
providers are required to collect the 911 charges from the
telephone-service subscribers on a monthly basis and then to
remit those collected 911 charges to the statewide 911 Board
created in the 2012 act, §§ 11-98-4.1 and 11-98-5(a) and (b),
Ala. Code 1975. The 911 charges are then deposited into the
newly created 911 fund for subsequent distribution to the
emergency-communications districts. § 11-98-5.2(b)(1), Ala.
Code 1975.
Section 11-98-5, which provides for the imposition,
collection, and remittance of the 911 charges was, according
to the express language of Act No. 2012-293, amended and not
repealed.  The amended version simply changed the manner in
which the 911 charges were billed, collected, and remitted. 
Rather than the telephone-service providers' collecting the
16
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911 charges from the telephone-service subscribers and then
remitting those 911 charges directly to the local emergency-
communications districts as was the procedure under the pre-
amendment version of § 11-98-5, the telephone-service
providers now collect the 911 charges from the telephone-
service subscribers and remit those charges to the 911 Board,
which, in turn, disburses those charges to the local
emergency-communications districts.
The amended version of the ETSA makes it clear that the
new statewide 911 Board was entitled to receive on October 1,
2013, the effective date of the amendments, the new statewide
911 charges collected from the telephone-service subscribers
by the telephone-service providers. The express amendatory
language to the ETSA provides that the statewide 911 Board is
entitled to receive only the new statewide 911 charges on 
October 1, 2013, and has no rights to the pre-October 1, 2013,
local 911 fees that were required to be collected by the
telephone-service providers and remitted to the local
emergency-communications districts.  The local emergency-
communications districts were left intact by Act 
No. 
2012-293,
as the act did not repeal or substantially amend §§  11-98-2
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and 11-98-4, which created and gave authority to the local
emergency-communications districts. Accordingly, we conclude
that Act No. 2012-293 amended § 11-98-5, rather than repealed
it, and does not act to divest the local emergency-
communications districts of their rights to receive the local
911 fees levied before October 1, 2013.  Therefore, we answer
4
the first certified question in the negative.
Question 2
"Does the [ETSA] authorize a right of action by
local 911 districts seeking damages from telephone
providers for allegedly failing to bill 911
charges?"
The defendants argue that the districts' claims are
barred because, they argue, the ETSA does not authorize a
private right of action against telephone-service providers
for failing to bill and collect the 911 charges from the
telephone-service subscribers. "One claiming a private right
of action within a statutory scheme must show clear evidence
of a legislative intent to impose civil liability for a
violation of the statute."  American Auto. Ins. Co. v.
McDonald, 812 So. 2d 309, 311 (Ala. 2001).  
Because we have concluded that Act No. 2012-293 amended
4
rather than repealed § 11-98-5, we need not discuss the
vested-right exception to the repealed-statute rule. 
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Prior to October 1, 2013, the telephone-service providers
had a duty under the ETSA to bill and collect from the
telephone-service subscribers the local 911 fees and then to
remit those fees to the local emergency-communications
districts.  As discussed above, the 2012 amendments to the
ETSA did not divest the local emergency-communications
districts of their rights to receive the local 911 fees levied
prior to October 1, 2013. 
Section 11-98-4(f), Ala. Code 1975, as amended, provides:
"In addition to other authority and powers necessary
to establish, operate, maintain, and replace an
emergency 
communication 
system, 
the 
board 
of
commissioners shall have the following authority:
"(1) To sue and be sued, to prosecute,
and defend civil actions in any court
having jurisdiction of the subject matter
and of the parties."
 Here, the legislature expressly vested the local
emergency-communications 
districts 
with 
the 
right 
"to
prosecute ... civil actions" necessary to operate or maintain
the emergency-communications system.  The districts' action
alleging a violation of the ETSA by the defendants for failing
to properly bill and collect the 911 fees from the telephone-
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service subscribers certainly falls within the scope of those
civil actions expressly authorized by the current § 11-98-
4(f), because the enforcement of the defendants' duties to
bill and collect the 911 fees used to fund the E-911 services
is necessary to operate and maintain the emergency-
communications system.  Accordingly, we answer the second
certified question in the affirmative.  
5
Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the circuit
court's judgment denying the defendants' motion to dismiss.
AFFIRMED.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Parker, Shaw, Main, Wise, and
Bryan, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result. 
Because we have concluded that the districts have a
5
statutory right of action, we pretermit discussion of the
remaining issues related to this question.
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MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
In my view, Act No. 2012-293, Ala. Acts 2012, effectively
repealed, rather than amended, the statutory provision
imposing the local 911 charges that are the subject of the
plaintiffs' claims and replaced that statutory provision with
one 
providing 
for 
similar, 
but 
different, 
charges. 
Nonetheless, I concur in the result because the plaintiffs'
right to the charges imposed by the former statute were vested
at the time of the repeal of the statute.  See Blake v. State
ex rel. Going, 178 Ala. 407, 411, 59 So. 623, 625 (1912)
(noting the "general rule" that "when a statute is repealed it
stands as if it had never existed, except as to vested rights
which have accrued under its operation"). 
21