Title: Kozmina v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 092395
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: March 4, 2011

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, 
JJ., and Koontz, S.J.∗ 
 
ANASTASIA KOZMINA 
 
v.  Record No. 092395  
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 4, 2011 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Jonathan C. Thacher, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
by denying the defendant’s motion to disqualify the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney from prosecuting a charge of first-
offense refusal to take a breath test in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-268.3.  
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
Anastasia Kozmina (“Kozmina”) was tried and found guilty 
by the Fairfax County General District Court for refusal of a 
breath test in violation of Code § 18.2-268.3.  She appealed 
the case to the Circuit Court of Fairfax County.  Prior to her 
trial in the circuit court, Kozmina filed a motion to 
disqualify the Commonwealth’s Attorney from prosecuting the 
case.  Kozmina argued that Virginia law does not permit the 
prosecution of a first-offense refusal by the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney and that only the Attorney General was permitted to 
                     
∗ Justice Koontz presided and participated in the hearing 
and decision of this case prior to the effective date of his 
retirement on February 1, 2011; Justice Kinser was sworn in as 
Chief Justice on February 1, 2011. 
prosecute the case.  Specifically, she argued that Code 
§ 15.2-1627 does not grant the Commonwealth’s Attorney the 
statutory authority to prosecute the case because a first-
offense refusal is a civil offense.1  The trial court denied 
Kozmina’s motion and found her guilty of refusal of a breath 
test in violation of Code § 18.2-268.3. 
Kozmina timely filed her notice of appeal to this Court, 
and we granted an appeal on the following assignment of error: 
1. 
The trial court erred in denying Ms. Kozmina’s 
motion to remove the Assistant Commonwealth’s 
Attorney as counsel for the Commonwealth from trial 
of the case. 
 
II.  Analysis 
A.  Standard of Review 
An issue of statutory interpretation is a pure question 
of law which we review de novo.  Conyers v. Martial Arts World 
of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 
(2007). 
When the language of a statute is unambiguous, 
we are bound by the plain meaning of that 
language.  Furthermore, we must give effect to 
the legislature’s intention as expressed by the 
language used unless a literal interpretation of 
the language would result in a manifest 
                     
1 The Court is aware of pending legislation regarding this 
issue.  House Bill 1809 proposes to amend Code § 15.2-1627 by 
adding a specific provision permitting attorneys for the 
Commonwealth and their assistants to "enforce the provisions 
of subsection D of § 18.2-268.3."  As of the date of this 
opinion, the Bill has passed the House and Senate but has not 
yet been signed by the Governor. 
 
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absurdity.  If a statute is subject to more than 
one interpretation, we must apply the 
interpretation that will carry out the 
legislative intent behind the statute. 
 
Id. (citations omitted).  Additionally, “[t]he plain, obvious, 
and rational meaning of a statute is to be preferred over any 
curious, narrow, or strained construction.”  Meeks v. 
Commonwealth, 274 Va. 798, 802, 651 S.E.2d 637, 639 (2007) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
B.  Commonwealth’s Attorneys May Prosecute First-Offense 
Refusal Cases Pursuant to Code § 18.2-268.3  
 
Code § 15.2-1627(B) outlines the duties and powers of 
Commonwealth’s and assistant Commonwealth’s Attorneys 
generally.  It declares that they 
shall have the duties and powers imposed upon 
[them] by general law, including the duty of 
prosecuting all warrants, indictments or 
informations charging a felony, and [they] may 
in [their] discretion, prosecute Class 1, 2 and 
3 misdemeanors, or any other violation, the 
conviction of which carries a penalty of 
confinement in jail, or a fine of $500 or more, 
or both such confinement and fine. 
 
Code § 15.2-1627(B).  In this appeal, Kozmina argues that 
because a first violation of Code § 18.2-268.3 is a civil 
offense pursuant to subsection (D) of that statute, and 
because a first-offense refusal is not punishable by a fine of 
$500 or more, confinement in jail, or both, Code § 15.2-1627 
does not give a Commonwealth’s Attorney the statutory 
authority to prosecute a first-offense refusal.   
 
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We previously have recognized that “[w]hile it is clear 
that Commonwealth's Attorneys are limited in the matters they 
may pursue, they are not entirely confined to criminal 
actions.”  Moreau v. Fuller, 276 Va. 127, 134, 661 S.E.2d 841, 
845 (2008).  In fact, the legislature specifically has 
provided Commonwealth’s Attorneys with numerous civil 
responsibilities, including, among others, “enjoining common 
nuisances relating to alcohol, Code § 4.1-335, and instituting 
seizures of property used in the sale and distribution of 
drugs, Code § 19.2-386.1.”2  Id. at 134-35, 661 S.E.2d at 845 
(footnote omitted). 
                     
2 Additional Commonwealth’s Attorney’s civil 
responsibilities include: Code §§ 2.2-3126(B) (conflict of 
interest opinions); 3.2-3947(B) (enjoining pesticide 
violations); 3.2-4505(2) (apple injunctions); 3.2-4749 (farm 
produce injunctions); 8.01-622.1(B) (enjoining assisted 
suicide); 8.01-637(A) (instituting actions in quo warranto); 
10.1-1320.1 (seeking fines and penalties for Air Pollution 
Control Board); 18.2-245(b) (enjoining continuing sales frauds 
in addition to any available criminal sanctions); 18.2-339 
(enjoining gambling); 18.2-371.2(D) (civil actions for sale of 
tobacco to minors); 18.2-384(1) (determining obscenity of 
books); 21-220 (enjoining pollution of tidal waters); 32.1-
125.2(B) (medical care facilities and services injunctions); 
40.1-49.6(A) (must represent the Commonwealth in civil matters 
involving enforcement of health and safety labor 
provisions); 48-8 (prostitution injunctions); 54.1-2964(B) 
(enjoining violations of laws relating to the disclosure of 
interest in facilities and clinical laboratories); 54.1-3943 
(Attorney solicitation injunctions); 55-525.31(D) (Consumer 
Real Estate Settlement Protection Act injunctions); 57-23 
(appointment or removal of trustees of public cemeteries); 57-
25 (condemnation of land to establish local cemeteries); 57-
59(C) (charitable solicitation and terrorism injunctions); 
58.1-339.10(D) (assisting the State Forester in collecting 
 
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Consequently, it is necessary to look to the statutory 
scheme in question to determine the legislature’s intent 
regarding whether Commonwealth’s and assistant Commonwealth’s 
Attorneys may prosecute first-offense violations of Code 
§ 18.2-268.3.  It is not necessary to look further than the 
text of the relevant statutes. 
Code § 18.2-268.3(A) declares: 
It shall be unlawful for a person who is 
arrested for a violation of § 18.2-266 [driving 
while intoxicated], 18.2-266.1 [unlawful for a 
person under the age of 21 to operate a motor 
vehicle after illegally consuming alcohol], or 
subsection B of § 18.2-272 [driving after 
forfeiture of license] or of a similar 
ordinance to unreasonably refuse to have 
samples of his blood or breath or both blood 
and breath taken for chemical tests to 
determine the alcohol or drug content of his 
blood as required by § 18.2—268.2 and any 
person who so unreasonably refuses is guilty of 
a violation of this section. 
 
Code § 18.2-268.3(D) further declares that “[a] first 
violation of this section is a civil offense and subsequent 
violations are criminal offenses.  For a first offense the 
court shall suspend the defendant's privilege to drive for a 
period of one year.”  Additionally, if a person is found to 
                                                                
taxes); 58.1-3354 (correcting assessments); 59.1-68.4 (Home 
Solicitations Sales Act and deceptive trade practices 
injunctions); 62.1-194.1(B) (enjoining obstruction or 
contamination of waters); and 62.1-194.3(c) (enjoining 
obstruction or dumping in the Big Sandy River.  See Moreau, 
276 Va. at 134-35 n.3, 661 S.E.2d at 845 n.3. 
 
 
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have violated Code § 18.2-268.3, and within 10 years prior to 
the date of the refusal has been previously found guilty under 
this section, that person is guilty of either a Class 1 or 
Class 2 misdemeanor, depending on the number of prior 
violations.  Code § 18.2-268.3(D). 
Significantly, Code § 18.2-268.4(B) provides that “[t]he 
procedure for appeal and trial of a first offense of § 18.2-
268.3 shall be the same as provided by law for misdemeanors.”  
(Emphasis added.)  In this case, Kozmina objected to the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney’s involvement on appeal and trial of 
her first-offense refusal in the Circuit Court of Fairfax 
County.  Clearly, Code § 15.2-1627(B) authorizes a 
Commonwealth’s or assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney to 
represent the Commonwealth in misdemeanor cases.  Permitting a 
Commonwealth’s or assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney to 
prosecute a first-offense refusal case is part of “[t]he 
procedure for appeal and trial” of such a charge, as 
contemplated by Code § 18.2-268.4(B).   
III.  Conclusion 
Despite the fact that first-offense refusal cases under 
Code § 18.2-268.3 are civil in nature, Commonwealth’s and 
assistant Commonwealth’s Attorneys are vested with the 
authority to prosecute them under Code § 18.2-268.4(B) because 
the legislature has directed that the “procedure for appeal 
 
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and trial” under this Code section “shall be the same as 
provided by law for misdemeanors.”  Code § 18.2-268.4(B).  
Under Code § 15.2-1627(B), misdemeanors are prosecuted by 
Commonwealth’s Attorneys and their assistants.  The trial 
court properly denied Kozmina’s motion to remove the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney from the trial of the case.  We will 
affirm the trial court’s judgment holding that Kozmina is 
guilty of first-offense refusal of a breath test in violation 
of Code § 18.2-268.3. 
Affirmed. 
 
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