Title: Kelley et al. v. Dailey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1130010
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 2014

REL:06/06/2014 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
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____________________
Ex parte David Labbe, mayor of the City of Valley Grande,
and City of Valley Grande
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Marcus Kelley et al.
v.
W. Alan Dailey, County Coroner of Dallas County, et al.)
(Dallas Circuit Court, CV-13-900002)
BOLIN, Justice.
The City of Valley Grande ("the City") and its mayor,
David Labbe, who was sued in his official capacity
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(hereinafter collectively referred to as "the petitioners"),
petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the
Dallas Circuit Court to vacate its order denying the
petitioners' motion for a summary judgment and to enter a
summary judgment for the petitioners on the claims asserted
against them by Marcus Kelley, Yolanda Kelley, and Jeffery
Barlow, Jr. (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the
plaintiffs").  We grant the petition and issue the writ.
Facts and Procedural History
The Valley Grande Volunteer Fire Department ("the fire
department") 
was 
incorporated 
on 
August 
22, 
1983, 
specifically
for "charitable purposes within the meaning of Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954."  The
petitioners state that the City was incorporated sometime
after the fire department was created.  On August 4, 2008, the
City entered into an agreement with the fire department
pursuant to which the fire department agreed to provide fire-
protection service to the City "without remuneration." 
However, the petitioners did acknowledge in the fire-service
agreement that the City "ha[d] in the past and likely [would]
continue to provide [the fire department] with some level of
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annual funding."  The evidence presented in support of the
petitioners' summary-judgment motion indicates that the City
made annual donations of $15,000 to the fire department in the
years 2010-2012.  Mayor Labbe testified in his affidavit that
the City  does not maintain a fire department and that it does
not employ, train, or supervise firefighters.  Mayor Labbe
testified that the City and the fire department are separate
entities and that the City does not maintain or reserve any
right of control over the fire department. 
On January 25, 2011, James Barlow, Sr., and his mother,
Bertha Yeager, were killed in a house fire.  W. Alan Dailey,
the coroner for Dallas County, pronounced Barlow and Yeager
dead at the scene and directed members of the fire department
to remove the remains of the deceased from the house.  The
plaintiffs allege that the fire department represented 
that it
had recovered all the decedents' remains.   The plaintiffs
1
state that in April 2011 the family discovered a body bag at
the scene of the fire that contained additional remains of
Barlow. 
 
The complaint asserts that the plaintiffs were the
1
"caregivers" to and next of kin of the decedents. 
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On January 4, 2013, the plaintiffs sued the petitioners,
among others, asserting claims of negligence; wantonness;
intentional 
infliction 
of 
emotional 
distress; 
fraud;
suppression; 
and 
negligent 
and/or 
wanton 
hiring, 
training, 
and
supervision of the individual firefighters against both the
City and the mayor.  On February 12, 2013, the petitioners
answered 
the 
complaint, 
asserting 
certain 
affirmative
defenses, including immunity.
On February 25, 2013, the petitioners moved the trial
court for a summary judgment, arguing, among other things, 
that the petitioners did not employ, supervise, or train any
firefighters; that petitioners did not reserve any right of
control over the fire department; that the petitioners were
entitled to immunity pursuant to the Volunteer Service Act, §
6-5-336, Ala. Code 1975; that the City was immune from suit
for intentional torts of its agents, officers, or employees
pursuant to § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975; and that the
petitioners could not be liable for negligent and/or wanton
hiring, 
training, 
or 
supervision 
of 
the 
individual
firefighters 
because, 
they 
said, 
no 
master-servant
relationship existed between the City and the 
fire department.
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On June 11, 2013, the plaintiffs filed their response in
opposition to the motion for a summary judgment, arguing that
the fire department is de facto the fire department for the
City pursuant to a contract entered into between the City and
the fire department in which the fire department agreed to
provide fire-protection service to the City in exchange for
annual funding provided by the City.  The plaintiffs further
argued that a master-servant relationship existed between the
City and the fire department such that the City could be held
liable for the actions of the fire department.  
On August 28, 2013, the trial court entered an order
denying the petitioners' summary-judgment motion.  This
petition followed.  Because of the procedural posture of this
case, we address only those issues grounded on a claim of
immunity; we do not address, and the petitioners did not
argue, the claim alleging negligent hiring, training, or
supervision of the individual firefighters.         
Standard of Review
This Court has stated the following regarding the
exception to the general rule that the denial of a motion for
a summary judgment is not reviewable by a petition for a writ
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of mandamus and the appropriate standard of review on a
petition for a writ of mandamus:
"'While the general rule is that the denial of
a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable, the
exception is that the denial of a motion for summary
judgment grounded on a claim of immunity is
reviewable by petition for writ of mandamus.' Ex
parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala. 2000). A writ
of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available
only when there is: '(1) a clear legal right to the
order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to
do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and
(4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.'
Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272
(Ala. 2001)."
Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541, 543 (Ala. 2003).  However, 
"whether review of the denial of a summary-judgment
motion is by a petition for a writ of mandamus or by
permissive appeal, the appellate court's standard of
review remains the same. If there is a genuine issue
as to any material fact on the question whether the
movant is entitled to immunity, then the moving
party is not entitled to a summary judgment. Rule
56, Ala. R. Civ. P. In determining whether there is
a material fact on the question whether the movant
is entitled to immunity, courts, both trial and
appellate, must view the record in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, accord the
nonmoving party all reasonable favorable inferences
from the evidence, and resolve all reasonable doubts
against the moving party, considering only the
evidence before the trial court at the time it
denied the motion for a summary judgment. Ex parte
Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala. 2000)." 
Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002).
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Discussion
The petitioners argue that the Volunteer Service Act
immunizes the individual firefighters from liability in this
case.  The petitioners further argue, in reliance on Hollis v.
City of Brighton, 885 So. 2d 135 (Ala. 2004), that, because
the individual firefighters are immune from civil liability,
they are protected from the vicarious liability for the
firefighters' tortious acts.  The plaintiffs contend that the
petitioners are liable for the actions of the fire department 
because of a contractual relationship, as well as a master-
servant relationship that they say exists between the
petitioners and the individual firefighters.
Section 6-5-336, Ala. Code 1975, provides: 
"(a) This section shall be known as 'The
Volunteer Service Act.'
"....
"(c) For the purposes of this section, the
meaning of the terms specified shall be as follows:
"(1) Governmental entity. Any ...
municipality ...;
"(2) 
Nonprofit 
corporation. 
Any
corporation which is exempt from taxation
pursuant to Section 501(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. Section 501(a);
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"(3) 
Nonprofit 
organization. 
Any
organization which is exempt from taxation
pursuant to Section 501(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. Section 501(c), as
amended; 
"(4) Volunteer. A person performing
services for a nonprofit organization, a
nonprofit corporation, a hospital, or a
governmental entity without compensation,
other 
than 
reimbursement 
for 
actual
expenses incurred. The term includes a
volunteer serving as a director, officer,
trustee, or direct service volunteer.
"(d) Any volunteer shall be immune from civil
liability in any action on the basis of any act or
omission of a volunteer resulting in damage or
injury if:
"(1) The volunteer was acting in good
faith and within the scope of such
volunteer's official functions and duties
for a nonprofit organization, a nonprofit
corporation, hospital, or a governmental
entity; and 
"(2) The damage or injury was not
caused by willful or wanton misconduct by
such volunteer.
"(e) 
In 
any 
suit 
against 
a 
nonprofit
organization, nonprofit corporation, or a hospital
for civil damages based upon the negligent act or
omission of a volunteer, proof of such act or
omission shall be sufficient to establish the
responsibility of the organization therefor under
the 
doctrine 
of 
'respondeat 
superior,'
notwithstanding 
the 
immunity 
granted 
to 
the
volunteer with respect to any act or omission
included under subsection (d)."
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This Court has specifically addressed the Volunteer
Service Act in the context of fire-protection services
provided by a volunteer fire department and the liability of
a municipality for the alleged negligent and wanton acts of
the firefighters.  In Hollis, supra, the plaintiffs sued the
City of Brighton alleging that the volunteer fire department
had negligently failed to extinguish a fire that destroyed
their house.  The plaintiffs alleged that the City of Brighton
had undertaken a duty to provide skillful fire-protection
services by creating a volunteer fire department and then had
breached that duty through the negligent acts of the
firefighters.  The plaintiffs also alleged that the City of
Brighton was vicariously liable for the negligent or wanton
acts of the individual firefighters in failing to extinguish
the fire that destroyed their house. 
The City of Brighton argued in support of its motion for
a summary judgment that it was entitled to substantive
immunity from the plaintiffs' claims for direct liability and
vicarious liability for the acts or omissions of the fire
department and its firefighters. The city also argued that the
Volunteer Service Act immunized the volunteer firefighters
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from individual liability and thereby protected the city from
vicarious liability for the firefighters' torts.  The
plaintiffs argued in response to the motion for a summary
judgment that the City of Brighton was not entitled to
substantive immunity on their claims of direct and vicarious
liability of the city for the tortious acts of the fire
department and its firefighters.  The plaintiffs also argued
that the Volunteer Service Act was not applicable because,
they said, the firefighters were not "volunteers" within the
meaning of the Volunteer Service Act.  The plaintiffs
contended that the firefighters were not volunteers because
the city paid the firefighters a stipend of $10 per fire for
expenses.  The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor
of the City of Brighton.
On appeal, this Court concluded that the firefighters 
were "volunteers" within the meaning of the Volunteer Service
Act and that, "in creating a volunteer fire department, a city
does not thereby undertake a legally enforceable duty to
provide skillful fire protection."  Hollis, 885 So. 2d at 141. 
This Court reasoned that "because, in creating a volunteer
fire department, a city is relegated to the vagaries of
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volunteer manpower, the undertaking by the city is too
indistinct to support a legally enforceable duty to provide
skillful fire protection."  Hollis, 885 So. 2d at  141.  Thus,
this Court affirmed the summary judgment as to the direct-
liability claim against the city because "the [c]ity did not
owe a duty to provide skillful fire protection."  Id.
As to the claim seeking to hold the City of Brighton
vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of the
firefighters, this Court stated: 
"The vicarious liability of a putative master
under the rule of respondeat superior depends upon
the liability of the putative servant. See Larry
Terry Contractors, Inc. v. Bogle, 404 So. 2d 613,
614 (Ala. 1981) ('"[W]hen [a] principal and his
agent are sued in [a] joint action in tort for
misfeasance or malfeasance of the servant, and his
liability for the conduct of said servant is under
the rule of respondeat superior, a verdict in favor
of the servant entitles the master to have the
verdict 
against 
him 
set 
aside."') 
(quoting
Louisville & N.R.R. v. Maddox, 236 Ala. 594, 600,
183 So. 849, 853 (1938)), and Gore v. City of
Hoover, 559 So. 2d 163, 165 (Ala. 1990), overruled
on other grounds, Franklin v. City of Huntsville,
670 So. 2d 848 (Ala. 1995) (holding that a city
could not be held vicariously liable for the act of
a magistrate who was immune from liability). Thus,
if a putative servant is not liable, either because
he is innocent or because he is immune, no liability
exists to be visited upon the putative master under
the rule of respondeat superior. Id.
"....
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"As discussed above, the firefighters, the
putative servants in the case now before us, were
volunteers who did not receive compensation for
their 
service 
as 
volunteer 
firefighters.
Consequently, they were immune from liability for
negligence under the Volunteer Service Act. Because
the firefighters were immune from liability for
negligence under the Volunteer Service Act, no
liability for negligence could befall them to be
visited upon the City [of Brighton], the putative
master in the case now before us. While the
plaintiffs allege not only negligence but also
wantonness by the firefighters, and while § 6–5–336
excepts wanton volunteers from the immunity, a city
cannot be liable for wanton conduct. Town of Loxley
v. Coleman, 720 So. 2d 907, 909 (Ala. 1998), and
Hilliard v. City of Huntsville, 585 So. 2d 889, 892
(Ala. 1991)."
Hollis, 885 So. 2d at 141-42.  Thus, this Court affirmed the
summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claim against the City of
Brighton alleging vicarious liability based on the acts or
omissions of the volunteer firefighters.  Hollis, supra.
Here the plaintiffs seek to circumvent the immunity
afforded by the Volunteer Service Act by arguing that the fire
department was not a volunteer department within the meaning
of the Volunteer Service Act but, rather, that it was a
professional fire department operating under the control of
the City.  The plaintiffs base their contention that the fire
department is a professional fire department on the
contractual relationship that exists between the City and the
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fire department and the annual donations made by the City to
the fire department.  
Initially we note that Mayor Labbe testified in his
affidavit that the City does not maintain a fire department
and that it does not employ, train, or supervise firefighters. 
Mayor Labbe further testified that the City and the fire
department are separate entities and that the City does not
maintain or reserve any right of control over the fire
department.  The plaintiffs failed to present any evidence to
the contrary in their response in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment.
The agreement entered into by the City and the fire
department specifically provided that the fire department
would provide the City fire-protection services "without
remuneration."  Nothing in the agreement granted the City any
authority to control, train, or supervise the firefighters or
the fire department.  Although the agreement specifically
provided that the individual firefighters would not be paid
salaries, it did provide that the City would provide the fire
department with some level of funding.  In fact, the City
donated to the fire department $15,000 for the years 2010-
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2012.  Section 11-43-140, Ala. Code 1975, specifically
provides that "[c]ities and towns may maintain and operate a
volunteer ... fire department and may do any and all things
necessary to secure efficient service." (Emphasis added.) 
Municipalities may enter into contracts in furtherance of a
governmental purpose. § 11-40-1, Ala. Code 1975.  Further, §
9-3-18(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides that it is the intent of
the legislature to provide assistance to organized volunteer
fire departments, which are deemed to be "public in nature, as
they protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public."
Therefore, "any municipality ... may donate money, property,
equipment, or other thing of value to [organized volunteer
fire departments]." § 9-3-18(b), Ala. Code 1975.  Based on the
foregoing statutory provisions, the attorney general has
opined that a municipality may, and in fact should, contract
with a volunteer fire department to provide fire services to
its citizens in exchange for funds and equipment.  See Op.
Att'y Gen. No. 2005-046 (January 19, 2005); Op. Att'y Gen. No.
92-00260 (April 24, 1992); and Op. Att'y Gen. No. 84-00279
(May 15, 1984). 
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We conclude that the agreement between the City and the
fire department, as well as the donations made to the fire
department by the City, does not alter the fire department's
status as a "volunteer" fire department.  Nothing in the
agreement between the City and the fire department or  in the
donations made by the City to the fire department can be
construed as converting the volunteer fire department to a
professional fire department.  The foregoing statutory
provisions allow municipalities, including the City, to enter
into contracts and to make monetary donations to volunteer
fire departments in exchange for fire-protection services
without altering the volunteer status of the fire department.
Having determined that the fire department is a
"volunteer" fire department, we must conclude that its
firefighters are thus immune from liability for their
negligent acts under the Volunteer Service Act.  Because the
firefighters are immune from liability for their negligent
acts, the City is likewise immune from liability for the
negligent acts of the firefighters.  Hollis, supra.  Further,
because the City cannot be held liable for wanton or
intentional conduct, it is likewise immune from suit for those
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claims asserted by the plaintiffs alleging wanton and/or
intentional conduct by the City. § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975;
Hollis, supra; and Walker v. City of Huntsville, 62 So. 3d 474
(Ala. 2010).  Finally, the claims asserted against Mayor Labbe
in his official capacity are simply claims asserted against
the City.  Dickinson v. City of Huntsville, 822 So. 2d 411
(Ala. 2001).  Accordingly, Mayor Labbe enjoys the same
protections from suit in this case as does the City.
Conclusion
The petitioners have established a clear legal right to
the relief sought.  Accordingly, we grant the petition for a
writ of mandamus in this case and direct the trial court to
enter a summary judgment for the petitioners.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED. 
Stuart, Parker, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs specially.
Moore, C.J., dissents.
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MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
Although § 6-5-336, Ala. Code 1975, the Volunteer Service
Act, speaks in terms of "immunity" for the parties to whom it
is directed, in Hollis v. City of Brighton, 885 So. 2d 135,
141 (Ala. 2004), this Court held that a municipality, by
relying upon the services of a volunteer fire department, does
not "undertake a legally enforceable duty to provide skillful
fire protection."  With this in mind, and given the main
opinion's reliance upon  Hollis, I concur.   
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