Title: MSE Building Company, Inc v. The Stewart/Perry Company, et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC-2022-0910
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 20, 2023

Rel: October 20, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2022-0910 
_________________________ 
 
MSE Building Company, Inc.  
 
v.  
 
The Stewart/Perry Company; Buc-ee's, Ltd.; Buc-ee's Alabama II, 
LLC; and Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company 
 
 
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court 
(CV-20-903422) 
 
STEWART, Justice. 
 
 
MSE Building Company, Inc. ("MSE"), the plaintiff below, appeals 
from a summary judgment entered in favor of The Stewart/Perry 
SC-2022-0910 
2 
 
Company ("Stewart/Perry"); Buc-ee's, Ltd., and Buc-ee's Alabama II, LLC 
(referred to collectively as "Buc-ee's"); and Philadelphia Indemnity 
Insurance Company ("Philadelphia"), the defendants below, finding, 
among other things, that MSE's claims against the defendants were 
unenforceable because MSE had violated § 34-8-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, 
which regulates contractors, by utilizing unlicensed sub-subcontractors 
in connection with a construction project. For the following reasons, we 
affirm the judgment in part and reverse the judgment in part.  
Background 
Buc-ee's hired Stewart/Perry as a general contractor to construct a 
store in Leeds.1 Stewart/Perry subcontracted with MSE to perform 
concrete work on the project. Both Stewart/Perry and MSE were licensed 
as general contractors under § 34-8-1. MSE contracted with PeopleHR, 
Express Employment Professionals ("Express"), and J.O.Y. Construction, 
LLC, for the provision of temporary laborers to supplement its existing 
employees on the project. The temporary laborers utilized the same 
 
1It appears that Buc-ee's, Ltd., originally owned the property upon 
which the store was to be constructed and that it sold that property to 
Buc-ee's Alabama II, LLC, but that both entities were involved in some 
capacity in the Leeds project. Accordingly, for ease of reference, "Buc-ee's" 
is used to refer to both Buc-ee's entities, unless otherwise specified. 
SC-2022-0910 
3 
 
timekeeping software as MSE employees, MSE determined the hourly 
wages it billed Stewart/Perry for the temporary laborers' work, and MSE 
paid for liability insurance for the temporary laborers. 
MSE's specific responsibilities on the project included, among other 
things, pouring concrete for foundations, slabs, piers, parking, curbs, 
sidewalks, ramps, and retaining walls. The Stewart/Perry and MSE 
contract explicitly authorized Stewart/Perry, Buc-ee's, and the project 
architect to reject MSE's work if it did not conform to the project 
requirements. That contract also provided: "For matters relating to 
aesthetic effect, Owner retains the final and absolute decision regarding 
whether the work by Subcontractor is acceptable and shall be final and 
binding on Subcontractor." 
 
In July 2020, shortly after MSE had completed a concrete pour for 
a paved area, Stewart/Perry discovered issues with the concrete paving. 
On July 31, 2020, Stewart/Perry e-mailed Steve Jones, MSE's president, 
and informed him that Stewart/Perry had found deficient concrete work, 
especially with the pavement and curbs, and it advised MSE to remove 
those areas and to transition its crews from paving to working on the 
retaining walls. Stewart/Perry attached to the e-mail pictures of the 
SC-2022-0910 
4 
 
areas of concern. Jones acknowledged that there were areas that needed 
to be removed and replaced. According to Stewart/Perry, MSE failed to 
correct the issues.  
On August 10, 2020, Buc-ee's representatives viewed the concrete 
paving with engineer Scott Ratcliff of Ratcliff Engineering Services, LLC. 
Ratcliff performed an inspection and provided results to Stewart/Perry 
indicating that the concrete did not meet the project requirements and 
specifications. 
Thereafter, 
the 
project 
architect 
also 
advised 
Stewart/Perry that the concrete work did not meet industry standards 
for forming, placing, and finishing concrete flatwork and curbs. On 
August 11, 2020, Buc-ee's e-mailed Stewart/Perry and advised 
Stewart/Perry that it could terminate MSE from the project. 
Stewart/Perry did not terminate MSE from the project but, instead, 
diminished the scope of its work. Stewart/Perry twice attempted to pay a 
portion of what MSE had billed, but MSE refused to accept the payments 
because it considered them to be incomplete.  
In September 2020, MSE recorded in the Jefferson Probate Court a 
materialman's lien in the amount of $1,615,350.40 on the Buc-ee's 
property related to its allegation of Stewart/Perry's nonpayment. 
SC-2022-0910 
5 
 
Stewart/Perry petitioned the Jefferson Probate Court, pursuant to § 35-
11-233, Ala. Code 1975, to transfer the lien to a bond in the amount of 
$2,019,188 issued to Stewart/Perry as principal by Philadelphia as 
surety. The Jefferson Probate Court then entered an order transferring 
the lien on the Buc-ee's property to the bond.  
Thereafter, MSE sued Stewart/Perry, Philadelphia, and Buc-ee's in 
the trial court, asserting against Stewart/Perry only claims alleging 
breach of contract, violation of the prompt-payment requirements of § 8-
29-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit; 
asserting against Stewart/Perry and Buc-ee's claims alleging negligence; 
and asserting against all the defendants a claim seeking to enforce a 
materialman's lien pursuant to § 35-11-210, Ala. Code 1975. MSE alleged 
that it was due $1,615,350.40, plus interest, costs, and attorney's fees.  
 
Stewart/Perry2 and Buc-ee's eventually moved for a summary 
judgment. Stewart/Perry argued, among other things, that MSE's claims 
for damages relied, at least in part, on an illegal contract with an 
unlicensed sub-subcontractor in violation of § 34-8-1 and that, as a result, 
 
2Philadelphia was represented by the same counsel that 
represented Stewart/Perry, and it joined in Stewart/Perry's filings. 
SC-2022-0910 
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it was barred from recovering any damages. In short, § 34-8-1 requires 
that certain entities defined as "general contractors" must be licensed by 
the State Licensing Board for General Contractors. In support of its 
summary-judgment motion, Stewart/Perry relied on White-Spunner 
Construction, Inc. v. Construction Completion Co., 103 So. 3d 781 (Ala. 
2012), and it submitted the following evidentiary material: deposition 
testimony from Steve Jones, MSE's president; affidavits from the State 
Licensing Board for General Contractors showing that PeopleHR, 
Express, and J.O.Y. Construction were not licensed as "general 
contractors" under § 34-8-1; the contract between Stewart/Perry and 
MSE; responses to interrogatories; and invoices MSE had received from 
PeopleHR, Express, and J.O.Y. Construction for the temporary laborers' 
wages. In support of its summary-judgment motion, Buc-ee's 
incorporated the arguments made by Stewart/Perry in its motion, and 
Buc-ee's argued that MSE's negligence claim against it failed as a matter 
of law and that its lien claim failed because the lien had been transferred 
to a bond. 
 
MSE filed a response in opposition to the summary-judgment 
motions in which it argued that Express and J.O.Y. Construction were 
SC-2022-0910 
7 
 
paid less than $50,000 and, therefore, were not required to be licensed as 
general contractors under § 34-8-1. MSE further argued that PeopleHR 
merely provided temporary laborers to MSE and was not a general 
contractor that performed any portion of the scope of MSE's work. MSE 
also asserted that, if the trial court determined otherwise, there 
remained questions of fact regarding the extent of PeopleHR's role on the 
project and the amount of damages recoverable because of its role on the 
project. To its response, MSE attached a copy of its contract with 
Stewart/Perry; a copy of its general contractor's license; deposition 
testimony from David Harrison, the corporate representative for 
Stewart/Perry; deposition testimony of Jones in which he testified to the 
totals paid to its subcontractors on the project; a copy of the PeopleHR 
staffing agreement; and a copy of the appellant's brief filed in White-
Spunner.3   
 
On June 29, 2022, the trial court entered a summary judgment that 
determined, in pertinent part: 
 
3MSE also attempted to submit an e-mail from the executive 
director of the State Licensing Board for General Contractors, an 
affidavit of a member and chairman of the Board, and an affidavit of 
Jones. Those documents were stricken on Stewart/Perry's motion. 
SC-2022-0910 
8 
 
"As background, in 2020, Plaintiff MSE performed 
concrete work on a construction project in Leeds, Alabama 
owned by Buc-ee's Alabama II, LLC under a subcontract MSE 
had with Stewart Perry, and MSE admits that it received at 
least $1.3 million for its work. MSE asserts various contract 
and tort claims against the Defendants in this case. 
 
"Based on the undisputed material facts, all of MSE's 
claims are barred as a matter of Alabama law because MSE 
seeks to recover money that is based on, dependent on, and 
stems 
from 
illegal 
work 
performed 
by 
unlicensed 
sub­subcontractors. Under Alabama law, any person who 
performs contracting work for over $50,000 must be licensed 
by the Alabama Licensing Board for General Contractors. See 
Ala. Code § 34-8-1(a). The law defines 'contracting' to include 
one who 'engages in construction.' Id. § 34-1-8(c). Further, 
MSE performed concrete work that is considered a recognized 
construction activity by the Alabama Licensing Board for   
General 
Contractors. 
(Ala. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ 
230-x-1-
.27(2)(a)(2)). If a person engaged in contracting fails to obtain 
a license, then the contractor's work is illegal and the entity 
that hired the contractor cannot recover against another 
when that entity's claim relies on, depends on, or stems from 
that illegal work. See, e.g., White-Spunner Constr., Inc. v. 
Constr. Completion Co., 103 So. 3d 781 (Ala. 2012).  Here, 
MSE admittedly used at least one unlicensed labor broker to 
perform construction work over $50,000 on the project. And it 
is undisputed that MSE seeks to recover money based on this 
illegal work. MSE's claims are barred as a matter of Alabama 
law as a result. 
 
"MSE argues that the Alabama Licensing Board for 
General Contractors does not consider labor brokers to be 
contractors requiring a license, and it submitted an email and 
affidavit purportedly from individuals associated with the 
Board. The documents consist of personal opinions, neither 
document discusses the facts before this Court, and neither 
document purports to be an official pronouncement of the 
SC-2022-0910 
9 
 
Board. Defendants moved to strike the email and the 
affidavit. The Court grants those motions because these 
exhibits consist of inadmissible evidence. It is the role of the 
Court to interpret and apply applicable Alabama licensing 
statutes to the facts of this case. The Court also grants the 
Defendants' motions to strike the affidavit of MSE's president 
Steve Jones. 
 
"MSE's claims are also due to be dismissed as a matter 
of Alabama law for alternative independent reasons as well. 
See, e.g., Gustin v. Vulcan Termite & Pest Control, Inc., 331 
So. 3d 601, 605 (Ala. 2020) (holding that a negligence claim 
will not lie when it is based on duties that arise from a 
contract); Rosenthal v. JRHBW Realty Inc., 303 So. 3d 1172, 
1187 (Ala. 2020) ('Where there is no duty, there can be no 
negligence.'); Blackmon v.  Renasant Bank, 232 So. 3d 224, 
229 n.4 (Ala. 2017) (noting that an unjust-enrichment claim 
and a breach-of-contract claim are 'mutually exclusive' and 
citing cases); Brannan & Guy, PC v. City of Montgomery, 828 
So. 2d 914, 921 (Ala. 2002) (holding that a quantum meruit 
claim is not cognizable when an express contract exists 
between the parties); Sullivan v. Mazak Corp., 805 So. 2d 674 
(Ala. 2000) (See, J., concurring) ('A party cannot recover on a 
claim of unjust enrichment where there is an enforceable 
express contract between the parties concerning the same 
subject matter on which the unjust-enrichment claim rests.')." 
 
MSE filed a motion pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., to vacate 
the summary judgment. Buc-ee's and Stewart/Perry filed separate 
responses opposing MSE's motion. On September 8, 2022, the trial court 
denied MSE's motion to vacate, and MSE timely filed a notice of appeal 
to this Court.  
 
SC-2022-0910 
10 
 
Standard of Review 
 
MSE appeals from a summary judgment, which we review de novo, 
applying the same standard applied by the trial court. We must first 
determine whether, when viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to MSE, the defendants made a prima facie showing that there 
existed no genuine issue of material fact and that they were entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. See Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross 
& Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 (Ala. 2004). 
If the defendants met that burden, then we must determine whether 
MSE produced "substantial evidence" demonstrating the existence of a 
genuine issue of material fact. Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 
So. 2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala. 2004). 
Discussion 
I. 
MSE first challenges the trial court's determination that MSE's 
claims were barred as a matter of law because MSE had utilized 
temporary laborers provided by an unlicensed general contractor in 
violation of § 34-8-1. More particularly, MSE challenges the trial court's 
finding that PeopleHR was required to be licensed as a general 
SC-2022-0910 
11 
 
contractor. A party seeking to nullify a contract based on the 
nonlicensure of an alleged general contractor must prove: "(1) that the 
alleged contractor was unlicensed; (2) that the contracted work was of the 
type covered by the licensure statute; and (3) that the 'cost' of the work 
was $[5]0,000 or more." Central Alabama Home Health Servs., Inc. v. 
Eubank, 790 So. 2d 258, 260 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000)(citing Tucker v. 
Walker, 293 Ala. 589, 592, 308 So. 2d 245, 247 (1975)). See also Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Hugh Cole Builder, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1238 (M.D. Ala. 
2001)(noting that, in determining whether a person was engaged in work 
covered by § 34-8-1, "Alabama courts have looked at many factors, such 
as, the intent of the parties, the amount of control by the person, and the 
type of work performed by the person"). 
There is no dispute regarding the first factor -- PeopleHR was not 
licensed as a general contractor under § 34-8-1. There is, however, a 
dispute as to whether the contracted work allegedly completed by 
PeopleHR was the type covered by § 34-8-1 and, thus, whether PeopleHR 
was required to obtain a general contractor's license. There is also a 
dispute regarding whether the amount MSE paid to J.O.Y. Construction 
SC-2022-0910 
12 
 
exceeded $50,000 and, thus, whether J.O.Y. Construction was required 
to have a general contractor's license under § 34-8-1.4 
MSE contends that People HR and the other labor brokers it used 
are temporary staffing agencies in the business of providing temporary 
laborers, which, in this case, supplemented MSE's workforce, and that 
those entities did not contract to perform construction activities covered 
under § 34-8-1. There was evidence indicating that the temporary 
laborers utilized the same timekeeping software as MSE employees, that 
MSE determined the hourly wages it billed Stewart/Perry for the 
temporary laborers' work, and that MSE paid for liability insurance for 
the temporary laborers.5 
 
4Stewart/Perry asserts that J.O.Y. Construction's invoices exceeded 
$50,000 but that, even if the amount J.O.Y. Construction billed is a 
disputed fact, it is not material because it is undisputed that PeopleHR 
billed more than $50,000. However, that fact is material to resolving the 
question of what portion of work was completed by an allegedly illegal 
unlicensed contractor versus work performed by the other contractors on 
the project who were not required to be licensed.  
  
5We also recognize that r. 230-X-1-.34, Ala. Admin. Code (State 
Licensing Bd. for Gen. Contractors), allows a managing employee with 
an ownership interest or a power of attorney who is also responsible for 
supervision of a company's management and construction practice to 
apply for licensure on behalf of the company; each individual employee is 
not required to be licensed.  
SC-2022-0910 
13 
 
As they did in the trial court, the defendants argue that this case is 
similar to, and controlled by, White-Spunner Construction, Inc. v. 
Construction Completion Co., 103 So. 3d 781 (Ala. 2012), upon which the 
trial court relied in determining that MSE's claims were barred by its use 
of at least one unlicensed contractor on the project. 
White-Spunner Construction, Inc., was a licensed general 
contractor involved in the construction of dormitory buildings at a 
university. White-Spunner subcontracted with Construction Completion 
Company ("CCC"), also a licensed general contractor, to provide labor, 
materials, and services in connection with the framing of the dormitory 
buildings. CCC then subcontracted with Buena Vista Construction, LLC, 
which was not licensed in Alabama, to provide CCC with workers on the 
project. Those workers wore CCC uniforms and were under the control 
and supervision of CCC while on the job site. Eventually, a dispute arose 
between White-Spunner and CCC regarding a perceived discrepancy 
between the actual work completed and the charges billed by CCC to 
White-Spunner. CCC sued White-Spunner and its surety seeking to 
recover for the work performed. White-Spunner filed a counterclaim and 
sought a declaratory judgment regarding the rights of the parties based 
SC-2022-0910 
14 
 
on an allegation that the contract between CCC and Buena Vista was 
illegal. The Mobile Circuit Court entered a summary judgment in favor 
of CCC, holding, among other things, that Buena Vista was a labor broker 
that provided temporary employees to CCC, who controlled their 
activities on the projects in the same way it controlled its own employees, 
and that, therefore, Buena Vista was not required to have a general 
contractor's license under § 34-8-1. White-Spunner appealed, and a 
plurality of this Court, in evaluating the plain language of § 34-8-1, 
determined that the statute contained no "labor broker" exception and 
that the ultimate issue for resolution was whether Buena Vista engaged 
in activities that required a license under the statute. The plurality of 
this Court explained that it was undisputed that the employees Buena 
Vista provided to CCC were used to frame buildings and to supervise 
other Buena Vista employees on the project and, "[i]mportantly, … [that 
it was] undisputed that Buena Vista employees did not work simply as 
consultants, equipment installers, or performers of menial labor. Rather, 
framing is specifically recognized as a construction activity by the 
Licensing Board for General Contractors." White-Spunner, 103 So. 3d at 
SC-2022-0910 
15 
 
790 (citing Ala. Admin. Code (State Licensing Bd. for Gen. Contractors), 
r. 230-X-1-.27). 
White-Spunner is distinguishable from the present case because, in 
that case, there was no dispute as to the role and the extent of the 
unlicensed contractor's involvement in construction and supervisory 
activities.  Here, there was evidence indicating that the temporary 
laborers were directed and supervised on the project by MSE's 
supervisor, not by a PeopleHR employee, and there is a dispute as to 
whether PeopleHR was engaged in construction activities. The 
defendants argue that concrete work, like framing, is recognized as a 
construction activity and that, therefore, PeopleHR was engaged in 
construction and required a general contractor's license under § 34-8-1. 
However, there is a dispute in this case regarding whether the temporary 
laborers were engaged in actual concrete work, construction, or 
supervisory activities that fall under the licensing requirements of § 34-
8-1 or whether they were engaged in menial labor.  
 
The evidence before the trial court indicated that the scope and the 
extent of the temporary laborers' activities were unclear. Jones testified 
that the temporary laborers were doing "mostly carpenter work and 
SC-2022-0910 
16 
 
forming and pouring" but that they were directed and supervised by an 
MSE supervisor. Jones also explained that, under the direction and 
supervision of MSE, the temporary laborers may have also "tie[d] in the 
rebar," "prepp[ed] the slab," placed "poly" sheets and vapor barrier 
guards, and placed stone. Jones testified that temporary laborers did not 
ordinarily pour the footings or finish the concrete. Jones could not 
pinpoint the activities in which the temporary laborers had been 
engaged.  
  
There was also evidence indicating that MSE used various 
equipment in performing its responsibilities on the project, including, 
among other equipment, an excavator, a skid steer, a dump truck, a fork 
lift, a man lift, and a scissor lift. There was also evidence indicating that 
MSE had executed a "vehicle/motorized mobile equipment indemnity 
agreement" with PeopleHR that specifically stated that MSE had 
"requested a temporary associate from PeopleHR whose duties will 
include driving a motor vehicle or other motorized mobile equipment." 
The foregoing evidence further convolutes the issue whether PeopleHR's 
temporary laborers were utilized in operating equipment, in performing 
menial labor, or in performing construction activities.  
SC-2022-0910 
17 
 
Accordingly, the evidence before the trial court, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to MSE, the nonmovant, demonstrated the existence 
of a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether "the contracted 
work was of the type covered by the licensure statute," and such a dispute 
should have been submitted to a jury for resolution. Central Alabama 
Home Health Servs., 790 So. 2d at 260 and 262 (affirming a trial court's 
denial of motion for judgment as a matter of law "[b]ecause there was 
sufficient evidence to at least produce a conflict on the issue whether [an 
unlicensed contractor's] services were those of a 'general contractor' ….). 
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's summary judgment insofar as it 
determined that MSE's claims were barred as a matter of law based on a 
violation of § 34-8-1.6  
II. 
 
6Because we reverse the summary judgment insofar as it barred 
MSE's claims as a matter of law, we pretermit discussion of MSE's 
arguments that the trial court's decision on this issue invaded the 
province of the State Licensing Board for General Contractors and 
violated the separation-of-powers doctrine, that the defendants should be 
estopped from arguing illegality, that the trial court erred in completely 
barring MSE's recovery of damages, and that the trial court erred in 
striking certain evidence MSE submitted in opposition to the summary-
judgment motions. 
SC-2022-0910 
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MSE also challenges the summary judgment on its negligence claim 
against Buc-ee's. As noted earlier, in its summary-judgment motion, Buc-
ee's specifically asserted that MSE's negligence claim against it failed as 
a matter of law. "The elements of a negligence claim are a duty, a breach 
of that duty, causation, and damage." Armstrong Bus. Servs., Inc. v. 
AmSouth Bank, 817 So. 2d 665, 679 (Ala. 2001) (citing AALAR, Ltd., Inc. 
v. Francis, 716 So. 2d 1141, 1144 (Ala. 1998)). A duty of care may arise 
when there is foreseeability that harm may result if care is not exercised. 
Id.  
Relying on Berkel & Co. Contractors v. Providence Hospital, 454 
So. 2d 496, 502 (Ala. 1984), MSE argues that Buc-ee's assumed a duty to 
act reasonably when it took affirmative steps to interject itself into the 
Stewart/Perry and MSE contractual relationship by inspecting and 
rejecting MSE's concrete work. MSE asserts that Buc-ee's had no 
engineering or concrete qualifications and that its rejection of MSE's 
concrete work was contrary to the project specifications. MSE further 
asserts that Buc-ee's directed Stewart/Perry to terminate MSE from the 
project, which, it asserts, caused MSE harm.   
SC-2022-0910 
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The evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to the 
summary-judgment motions demonstrated that Stewart/Perry directed 
MSE to remove the deficient concrete and to transition its crews to 
constructing the retaining walls before Buc-ee's viewed the concrete or 
advised Stewart/Perry that it could terminate MSE from the project. 
Moreover, Stewart/Perry did not terminate MSE from the project but, 
instead, diminished the scope of its work. Perhaps most importantly, 
however, the contract between Stewart/Perry and MSE explicitly 
authorized the owner of the property, Buc-ee's, to reject concrete work in 
its sole discretion and on an aesthetic basis. MSE did not present 
substantial evidence demonstrating that Buc-ee's wrongfully interjected 
itself into the Stewart/Perry and MSE contractual relationship, that Buc-
ee's breached any duty, or that Buc-ee's caused the alleged harm to MSE. 
Accordingly, the summary judgment on MSE's negligence claim against 
Buc-ee's is due to be affirmed. 
III. 
SC-2022-0910 
20 
 
MSE argues that its lien claim should be permitted to proceed.7  
MSE asserts that, considering §§ 35-11-221, -223, and -224, Ala. Code 
1975, in conjunction with one another, MSE is permitted to bring an 
action to enforce a materialman's lien and that its lien was not 
discharged merely because it was transferred to a bond, as Buc-ee's 
argued to the trial court.  
Section 35-11-224 "requires that liability for the debt be established 
and that a money judgment be entered against the debtor as a 
prerequisite to perfecting and enforcing the lien." Ex parte Grubbs, 571 
So. 2d 1119, 1120 (Ala. 1990). See also Valley Joist, Inc. v. CVS Corp., 
954 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006). Because we have reversed 
the summary judgment insofar as it held that MSE's claims were barred 
as a matter of law under § 34-8-1 and, as a result, the question of liability 
remains and depends upon the resolution of disputed facts, MSE's claim 
seeking to enforce the materialman's lien, likewise, remains for 
resolution in the trial court.   
 
7The trial court did not specifically address in its summary 
judgment MSE's claim to enforce its materialman's lien or its claim 
alleging violation of the prompt-payment requirements of § 8-29-1 et seq., 
Ala. Code 1975; however, it specifically stated that the judgment disposed 
of all claims.  
SC-2022-0910 
21 
 
IV. 
 
Finally, MSE argues that the trial court should not have entered a 
summary judgment against it on its claim seeking payment under § 8-
29-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, which is sometimes referred to as the 
"Prompt Pay Act."8 See Autauga Creek Craft House, LLC v. Brust, 315 
So. 3d 614 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020). Relying on Williams v. Limestone 
County Water & Sewer Authority, 223 So. 3d 240 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016), 
MSE asserts that Stewart/Perry did not substantively address its claim 
under the Prompt Pay Act in Stewart/Perry's summary-judgment 
motion, and, as a result, a summary judgment on that claim was 
improper.9  
 
 Section § 8-29-6 expressly provides that, if a contractor brings a 
civil action successfully demonstrating that an owner, contractor, or 
 
8See note 7, supra. 
 
9Stewart/Perry, in one sentence in its response brief, contends that 
a summary judgment was proper on MSE's "'claim'" because a Prompt 
Pay Act claim is merely an additional remedy that is part of a breach-of-
contract claim and, as a result, that issue did not need to be addressed 
separately. Stewart/Perry cites in a footnote legal authority from other 
jurisdictions purportedly holding that a claim under similar prompt-
payment acts is not a separate cause of action. The distinction between 
whether it is a cause of action or a remedy is irrelevant for purposes of 
this appeal. 
SC-2022-0910 
22 
 
subcontractor has not timely paid an amount in accordance with its 
contractual obligation and in violation of the Prompt Pay Act, a court 
shall award the amount due and interest, and "the party in whose favor 
a judgment is rendered shall be entitled to recover payment of reasonable 
attorneys' fees, court costs and reasonable expenses from the other 
party." Because a judgment was not rendered in its favor, MSE was not 
entitled to recover under § 8-29-6. As with its lien claim, MSE's ability to 
recover under § 8-29-6 is dependent upon its ability to successfully prove 
facts it was prevented from presenting based on the trial court's 
determination that its claims were barred as a matter of law under § 34-
8-1. Because the summary judgment on MSE's breach-of-contract claim 
against Stewart/Perry has been reversed, the summary judgment is 
likewise reversed on MSE's claim seeking recovery under the Prompt Pay 
Act. 
Conclusion 
 
The summary judgment, insofar as it determined that MSE's 
claims are barred as a matter of law under § 34-8-1, is reversed because 
there are material issues of disputed fact regarding whether the labor 
brokers utilized by MSE were required to obtain a general contractor's 
SC-2022-0910 
23 
 
license under § 34-8-1. Accordingly, the summary judgment on MSE's 
lien claim and prompt-payment claim is also reversed. The summary 
judgment on MSE's negligence claim against Buc-ee's is affirmed. In 
addition, the summary judgment is affirmed insofar as it was entered in 
favor of Stewart/Perry on MSE's claims of unjust enrichment and 
quantum meruit, because MSE did not challenge the judgment on those 
claims in its appellate brief. See Boshell v. Keith, 418 So. 2d 89, 92 (Ala. 
1982)("When an appellant fails to argue an issue in its brief, that issue is 
waived."). 
 
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Wise and Cook, JJ., concur.  
Sellers, J., concurs in the result.