Title: STATE v. TYLER
Citation: 2009 OK 69, 218 P.3d 510
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: September 22, 2009

STATE v. TYLER Annotate this Case STATE v. TYLER 2009 OK 69 218 P.3d 510 Case Number: 104956 Decided: 09/22/2009 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. PORSHA MONIQUE TYLER, Defendant, and REGINA SANDERS, Appellant. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION IV Honorable Edward C. Cunningham, Trial Judge ¶0 After Porsha Monique Tyler (defendant) was arrested on August 25, 2005, Regina Sanders (bondsman) posted a $50,000 appearance bond for the defendant. The defendant did not appear for her arraignment on April 18, 2006, and her attorney obtained an indefinite continuance. The defendant appeared for her arraignment on April 20, 2006, but when she failed to appear for a motion hearing on May 16, 2006, the trial court issued a bench warrant and ordered her bond forfeited. The bondsman moved to exonerate the bond. The motion was denied, and the bondsman appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. On certiorari, we hold that CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED. Paul Hesse, Canadian County District Attorney's Office, El Reno, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellee, James A. Choate, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellant Sanders. KAUGER, J.: ¶1 The issues presented are whether: 1) the trial court continued the defendant's arraignment in contravention of FACTS ¶2 Regina Sanders (bondsman) was a surety bondsman working as an agent for Dennis Berglan, a professional bondsman affiliated with Advise Bail Bonds. ¶3 The trial court conducted a preliminary hearing on March 10, 2006, bound the defendant over for trial, and set a formal arraignment date for April 18, 2006. The defendant did not appear for her formal arraignment, but her attorney was present and informed the court that the defendant was absent due to "travel problems." The bondsman was not present at the hearing. The trial court granted a continuance. 3. The Defendant did not appear for District Court Arraignment on 4-18-06, however, Counsel for the Defendant appeared on her behalf and advised the Court there were travel complications preventing the Defendant's appearance; 4. The Court did not authorize a bench warrant or bond forfeiture and advised defense counsel to have the defendant appear as soon as she resolved the travel issues. ¶4 The defendant appeared before the court on April 20, 2006, and she was arraigned. The trial court ordered the defendant to appear on May 16, 2006, for a motion hearing. She failed to appear. The trial court issued a second bench warrant for the defendant's arrest on May 26, 2006, and ordered that her bond be forfeited. The trial court notified the bondsman of the bond forfeiture. The bondsman responded by filing two motions to stay payment of the bond forfeiture. The trial court stayed the proceedings until December 1, 2006. ¶5 On December 4, 2006, the bondsman filed a Motion to Exonerate Bond. The State objected to the bondsman's motion. After a hearing, on March 27, 2007, the trial court denied the bondsman's Motion to Exonerate Bond. The bondsman responded by filing a second Motion to Exonerate Bond on May 3, 2007. The State again objected. After a second hearing, the trial court denied the bondsman's second motion on September 5, 2007. The bondsman filed her petition in error on September 18, 2007, appealing both orders denying her motions to exonerate the bond. ¶6 On March 12, 2008, the cause was assigned to the Court of Civil Appeals. On October 14, 2008, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court. The bondsman petitioned for rehearing on November 3, 2008, and also moved for a stay of the appeal pending resolution of the underlying criminal case. The Court of Civil Appeals stayed the appeal until January 26, 2009. On February 24, 2009, the defendant appeared before the trial court and entered a plea of guilty to the charge of possession of a controlled dangerous substance with the intent to distribute. She received a seven year suspended sentence and was placed on supervised probation and ordered to pay costs and fees. ¶7 The Court of Civil Appeals denied the bondsman's petition for rehearing on March 20, 2009. The bondsman petitioned for certiorari on April 8, 2009, and we granted the petition on May 26, 2009. I. ¶8 TITLE ¶ ¶10 Section 1332(A) provides that if there is a breach of the undertaking, the court shall issue a warrant and forfeit any property deposited as bail, and the clerk shall notify the bondsman by mailing a copy of the order within thirty days. ¶11 The bondsman does not argue that the trial court failed to conform to the requirements of §1332(A) when it issued a bench warrant, ordered a forfeiture, and notified the bondsman after the defendant's failure to appear at a motion hearing on May 26, 2006. Instead, she challenges the trial court's decision to grant an indefinite continuance rather than issue a bench warrant and forfeit the bond when the defendant failed to appear at her arraignment on April 18, 2006. She argues that the trial court was required by §1332(A) to forfeit the bond on April 18, 2006. If the court had done so, when the defendant appeared on April 20, 2006, the bond would have been exonerated as a matter of law. The bondsman maintains that in that instance, she would not have reinstated the bond. Thus, when the defendant later failed to appear at the motion hearing on May 16, 2006, her bond would no longer have been secured by the bondsman. ¶12 There are several statutes which give a trial court authority to continue the date of a defendant's arraignment, even if the defendant is absent. Title ¶13 A trial court's finding on the question of whether to vacate an order of forfeiture and exonerate a bond is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. ¶14 We have held that it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to refuse to continue an arraignment when good cause, such as illness, prevents the defendant from appearing before the court. In Pruitt v. State, We have no hesitancy in saying that in the call of a criminal case, either for hearing, arraignment, trial, or judgment, or upon any other occasion when his presence in court may be lawfully required, if a defendant, on account of illness, is unable to be present, and such fact is made to satisfactorily appear, it would be either error or an abuse of discretion to refuse either to pass the case or grant a continuance, or upon sufficient showing to vacate and set aside the order of forfeiture. ¶15 Section 1332(A) provides that if there is a "breach of an undertaking," a trial court "shall" issue an arrest warrant and order of forfeiture. In the construction of statutes, the word "shall" is commonly considered to be mandatory. II. ¶16 AN INDEFINITE CONTINUANCE OF THE ARRAIGNMENT MADE WITHOUT NOTICE TO THE BONDSMAN MATERIALLY INCREASED HER RISK AND OPERATED TO DISCHARGE HER OBLIGATION. ¶17 The bondsman next argues that even if the trial court had discretion to continue the arraignment, the continuance materially increased her risk, and the bond should have been exonerated. The State counters that the continuance did not materially increase the bondsman's risk. ¶18 In State v. Vaughn, ¶19 In James v. State, . . . if on a scheduled appearance date, the defendant or his attorney appears and the hearing is set over for another day certain, no further notice is required to be given the bondsmen, and his liability on the bond continues. ¶20 Although the briefs assert that the defendant was told to appear within forty-eight hours, neither the court minute, nor the court's findings of fact contain any mention of a forty-eight hour period. Here, the trial court did not continue the arraignment to a date certain, but instead instructed the defendant to appear "as soon as she resolved the travel issues." CONCLUSION ¶21 The trial court was not prohibited by §1332(A) from granting a continuance of the arraignment. However, in order for the bondsman to remain liable for the bond, the trial court was required to notify her by continuing the arraignment to a day certain. Because it granted an indefinite continuance without the bondsman's knowledge or consent, her risk was materially increased, and the trial court was required to exonerate the bond. The trial court abused its discretion by denying the bondsman's motion to exonerate the bond. The trial court is instructed to enter an order exonerating the bond. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED. EDMONDSON, C.J., HARGRAVE, OPALA, KAUGER, COLBERT, and REIF, J.J., concur. TAYLOR, V.C.J., WATT and WINCHESTER, J.J., dissent. FOOT