Title: In re Adoption of K.L.P.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 90407
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: January 25, 2002

Docket No. 90407-Agenda 39-May 2001.
In re ADOPTION OF K.L.P., a Minor (R.R.E. et al., Appellees, 								v. R.P., Appellee; The County of Kendall, Appellant).
Opinion filed January 25, 2002.

	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	R.R.E. and his wife, T.M.D., filed a petition in the circuit
court of Kendall County seeking to adopt his two daughters from
an earlier relationship with R.P. On October 4, 1999, the circuit
court of Kendall County terminated the parental rights of R.P.,
pursuant to section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)
(West 1998)). R.P., whose request for court-appointed counsel had
been denied by the circuit court, promptly filed notice of appeal.
The appellate court, on its own motion, appointed attorney Anna
Wilhelmi to represent R.P. on appeal. When Wilhelmi sought
payment of interim fees for her services, the appellate court
entered an order directing the treasurer of Kendall County to pay
her $3,847.55 in reasonable attorney fees although the county had
not been a party to the adoption proceeding. The appellate court
subsequently granted the county's request to file a special and
limited appearance, but denied its motion to vacate the payment
order. Following Wilhelmi's filing of a petition for a rule to show
cause against the county treasurer for failure to pay the ordered
amount, the appellate court, on September 8, 2000, granted a stay
so that the county could seek further review of the payment order
by this court.
	On that same date, the appellate court filed its opinion in the
underlying case, in which it held on equal protection grounds that
an indigent parent facing involuntary termination of parental rights
in a proceeding under the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq.
(West 1998)) is entitled to the same procedural safeguards,
including representation by court-appointed counsel, as a similarly
situated parent in a proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act of
1987 (705 ILCS 405/1 et seq. (West 1998)). 316 Ill. App. 3d 110,
121-22. The appellate court explained its holding by stating:
			"Where a statute is defective on equal protection
grounds because of a constitutionally underinclusive
scheme, a court may extend the coverage of the statute to
include those who are aggrieved by the exclusion.
[Citation.] We also note that section 2.1 of the Adoption
Act provides that the Adoption Act and the Juvenile Court
Act should be construed in concert with one another. 750
ILCS 50/2.1 (West 1998). Accordingly, to avoid a
constitutional defect, we will construe the Adoption Act
as requiring the same procedural safeguards required by
the Juvenile Court Act in cases where indigent parents are
facing the involuntary termination of their parental
rights." 316 Ill. App. 3d at 122.
The appellate court reversed and remanded the matter to the circuit
court for a new hearing, at which R.P. would be entitled to court-appointed counsel if she established her indigence. R.R.E. and
T.M.D. did not seek leave to appeal that decision to this court.
	We granted the county's petition for leave to appeal. 134 Ill.
2d R. 317. The issue presented is whether the appellate court's
order that a county treasurer pay the fees of appellate counsel in a
case brought by private parties under the Adoption Act violates the
constitutional mandate of separation of powers. However, as will
be explained below, that question cannot be answered without first
addressing the merits of the equal protection analysis engaged in
by the appellate court.
	The county's separation of powers argument presents a
question of law, which we will review de novo. City of Belvidere
v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205
(1998). The appellate court's conclusion that the Adoption Act
must be construed to provide court-appointed counsel to indigent
parents "to avoid a constitutional defect" (316 Ill. App. 3d at 122)
is also subject to de novo review. We review de novo any decision
finding a statute unconstitutional. In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 296
(2001). All statutes are presumed to be constitutional and, thus, the
party challenging the constitutionality of the statute bears the
burden of rebutting this presumption. Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder,
187 Ill. 2d 341, 351 (1999). We will construe legislative acts so as
to affirm their constitutionality if we can reasonably do so. R.W.
Dunteman Co. v. C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill. 2d 153, 163
(1998).

I. BACKGROUND
	R.P. is the mother of three children. R.R.E. is the father of her
two daughters, K.L.P. and K.M.P. Several years prior to the
proceedings at issue here, the State removed R.P.'s three children
from her custody and placed the girls with their father and his
wife, T.M.D. The girls' half-brother was placed in the care of
R.P.'s mother.
	During these earlier proceedings, the circuit court, pursuant to
section 1-5(1) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-5(1)
(West 1998)), appointed the public defender to represent R.P.,
who was unable to employ counsel because she lacked the
financial means to do so. On two separate occasions, the court
entered orders authorizing the state to file a petition to terminate
R.P.'s parental rights. The Kendall County State's Attorney
subsequently filed a petition to terminate R.P.'s parental rights to
her son. However, no petition was filed regarding the girls. After
holding a hearing on the custody, visitation, and guardianship of
the two girls, the court entered an order on September 9, 1998,
awarding custody and guardianship to their father and step-mother,
and referring any motions or requests for visitation to the family
court. Further, the court ordered these two cases dismissed and the
files terminated.
	On April 6, 1999, R.R.E. and T.M.D. filed adoption petitions
in the circuit court of Kendall County, pursuant to the Adoption
Act (750 ILCS 50/5(C) (West 1998) (petition to adopt a related
child)). The petitions alleged that R.P. was an unfit parent under
several of the definitions of unfitness contained in the Act (750
ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (D)(d), (D)(e), (D)(f), (D)(g), (D)(m) (West
1998)) and sought termination of her parental rights so that the
girls could be adopted by their stepmother.
	R.P., who had received the assistance of counsel in the earlier
juvenile court proceedings, again requested that the court appoint
counsel for her. The court denied her request but gave her
additional time to employ counsel. At the next court date, she
informed the court that she could not afford to hire an attorney and
that she had been rejected as a client by the local legal services
agency. The trial court again refused her request to appoint counsel
and set the matter for hearing.
	R.P. appeared pro se at the fitness hearing. She testified on
her own behalf, but did not call any witnesses. The court found her
unfit. At the best interests hearing, R.P. neither testified nor called
any witnesses. At the conclusion of the hearing and later in its
written order, the court stated that the allegations of unfitness had
been proved and that it was in the best interests of the children that
the petition for adoption be granted.
	Following R.P.'s filing of a timely notice of appeal, the
appellate court, on its own motion, appointed attorney Anna M.
Wilhelmi to represent her. The appellate court denied R.R.E. and
T.M.D.'s motion to reconsider this decision.
	On the merits, R.P. argued on appeal that the circuit court's
refusal to appoint an attorney for her in the adoption proceeding
violated the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection because she would have been entitled to court-appointed counsel had the proceedings continued under the
Juvenile Court Act. The appellate court agreed, holding that to
avoid a constitutional defect, the Adoption Act must be construed
to require the same procedural safeguards, including the right to
counsel, as the Juvenile Court Act. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 122.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Procedural Setting
	Our task is complicated by the unusual procedural posture of
this case. The named parties are the natural mother, on one side,
and the natural father and his wife, on the other. The real parties
in interest, at least with regard to the issue on appeal, are
Wilhelmi, who wishes to be paid for her successful representation
of her client, and the county, which disputes its obligation to pay.
These two parties, in their briefs and at oral argument, have argued
entirely different issues to this court. The county argues that it
cannot be compelled to pay Wilhelmi's fees because the payment
order violates the doctrine of separation of powers. Wilhelmi
argues that equal protection requires all indigent respondent
parents be provided with assistance of court-appointed counsel in
proceedings to terminate parental rights, whether the petition is
filed under the Adoption Act or the Juvenile Court Act. In the end,
the parties have not directly engaged each other's arguments.
Nevertheless, the record and the thorough opinion of the appellate
court are sufficient for our determination of the issues.

B. Separation of Powers
	The county, as appellant, has framed the issue in this appeal
as one of separation of powers. The county describes itself as a
"stranger" to the adoption proceedings and questions "whether
county monies may properly be disbursed to counsel for one of the
parties in what essentially is a private civil action." In addition, the
county is concerned about the holding in the underlying case,
which "would suggest that the county now has the obligation to
provide legal representation to all indigent litigants in all
termination cases, regardless of how they commence." Thus, the
county characterizes the order of the appellate court as "ultra
vires" and as a violation of the separation of powers provision of
the Illinois Constitution.
	Article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution states: "The
legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No
branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another." Ill.
Const. 1970, art. II, §1. "The purpose of this doctrine is to insure
that each of the three branches of government retains its own
sphere of authority, free from undue encroachment by the other
branches." People v. Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d 109, 116 (2001). Although
some slight overlap among the three functions is inevitable, such
overlap does not necessarily create encroachment of constitutional
dimension. See Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367,
411 (1997).
	Thus, when a circuit clerk, an officer of the judicial branch,
challenged state statutes and county ordinances that required her
to obtain approval from the executive branch of county
government prior to making expenditures for computers and
software for the circuit clerk's office, this court held that
separation of powers was not violated. Pucinski v. County of Cook,
192 Ill. 2d 540, 547-48 (2000). We concluded that "[a]s long as
spending decisions by the counties do not imperil the operation of
the courts, separation of powers principles do not warrant
intervention by the court." Pucinski, 192 Ill. 2d  at 548.
	The present case involves a factually opposite situation. Here,
an order of the appellate court requires a county treasurer to
disburse county funds where the expenditure was neither
anticipated or budgeted by the executive branch nor authorized by
the legislative branch of county government. The county argues
that only the state legislature, not the judicial branch, is
constitutionally empowered to order its treasurer to make such
payments.
	None of the cases cited by the county in support of its
separation of powers argument involve a court ordering an agency
of the executive branch to expend funds for a particular purpose
not required by statute. Our own research reveals the case of In re
Peak, 59 Ill. App. 3d 548, 552 (1978), in which the appellate court
held that, in the absence of statutory authority, the juvenile court
could not order that a minor be treated at a private psychiatric
hospital or that the Department of Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities pay for such care. "The circuit court
may not exceed its statutory authority no matter how desirable or
beneficial the attempted innovation might be." Peak, 59 Ill. App.
3d at 551-52.
	However, the judicial branch may, indeed must, intervene in
matters generally reserved to the other branches of state
government when an action of the executive or legislative
branches offends the Illinois or United States Constitutions. Thus,
in People v. Stinger, 22 Ill. App. 3d 371, 374 (1974), a case cited
by the county, the appellate court held that the circuit court did not
have the authority to order the State's Attorney to have a court
reporter transcribe testimony before a grand jury at county
expense. As Stinger noted, there was no requirement,
"constitutional or otherwise," that the testimony of witnesses
before a grand jury be recorded. Stinger, 22 Ill. App. 3d at 372. By
implication, if recording such testimony were mandated by the
constitution or by statute, the trial court's order would not have
unduly encroached upon the powers of the executive branch. The
cases cited by the county in support of its separation of powers
argument do not address the circumstance in which an action is
constitutionally mandated. Yet, this is precisely the claim
advanced by Wilhelmi on behalf of her client and, by extension,
to justify her fees.
	Constitutionally based judicial decisions often impose a
financial burden on other branches or agencies of government. For
example, in Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 68 L. Ed. 2d 627, 101 S. Ct. 2202 (1981), the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a Connecticut statute governing paternity
actions that required the party requesting paternity tests to bear the
costs of such tests. The Court held, on due process grounds, that
given the interests at stake the indigent putative father was entitled
to a paternity test at state expense. Little, 452 U.S.  at 9-12, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at 634-36, 101 S. Ct.  at 2207-09. The Court noted that " 'a
cost requirement, valid on its face, may offend due process
because it operates to foreclose a particular party's opportunity to
be heard.' " Little, 452 U.S.  at 16, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at 639, 101 S. Ct. 
at 2211, quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113, 120, 91 S. Ct. 780, 787 (1971) (holding that due
process prohibits a state from denying indigent parties access to its
divorce court based on their inability to pay filing fees and costs).
Key in Little and Boddie were the " 'fundamental' character" and
constitutional significance of the private interests at stake and the
fact that the parties had "no choice of an alternative forum" to
resolve their dispute. Little, 452 U.S.  at 16 n.12, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at
638 n.12, 101 S. Ct.  at 2210 n.12.
	Because, as in Little and Boddie, the result that we reach
below is constitutionally mandated, the incidental effect it may
have on the fisc of Kendall County does not violate the separation
of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution.

C. A Parent's Right to Counsel
	Any discussion of the right of a parent facing termination of
parental rights to the assistance of counsel must begin with the
United States Supreme Court decision in Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640, 101 S. Ct. 2153
(1981), which was announced the same day as the decision in
Little. After seeking and obtaining an adjudication of neglect of
Abby Lassiter's minor child, the North Carolina Department of
Social Services petitioned to terminate her parental rights. In the
year that had elapsed between the adjudication of neglect and the
filing of the petition, Lassiter was convicted of second degree
murder and sentenced to a term of 25 to 40 years' imprisonment.
Lassiter, 452 U.S.  at 20, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at 645, 101 S. Ct.  at 2156.
She was served with summons, but took no action in the
termination case, although she discussed it with the attorney who
was handling her criminal appeal. She requested that counsel be
appointed to represent her in the termination proceeding, but her
request was denied by the trial court. Lassiter, 452 U.S.  at 21-22,
68 L. Ed. 2d  at 646, 101 S. Ct.  at 2157.
	Reasoning that it is a "defendant's interest in personal
freedom" that "triggers the right to appointed counsel" (Lassiter,
452 U.S.  at 25, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at 648, 101 S. Ct. at 2158), the Court
explained that, in civil cases, where the concern was a matter of
fourteenth amendment due process, rather than sixth amendment
right to counsel, "as a litigant's interest in personal liberty
diminishes, so does his right to appointed counsel." Lassiter, 452 U.S.  at 26, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at 649, 101 S. Ct.  at 2159. The Court then
applied the three elements from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976), that must be weighed
against the presumption that there is no right to appointed counsel
unless there is a risk of loss of liberty: "the private interests at
stake, the government's interest, and the risk that the procedures
used will lead to erroneous decisions." Lassiter, 452 U.S.  at 27, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at 649, 101 S. Ct.  at 2159.
	The Court concluded that, despite the importance of parental
rights, consideration of these three factors would not always rebut
the presumption that the Constitution mandates court-appointed
counsel only for indigent criminal defendants facing a jail
sentence. Lassiter, 452 U.S.  at 31, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at 652, 101 S. Ct. 
at 2161. Indeed, the Court concluded that on the facts of this case,
Abby Lassiter was not entitled to court-appointed counsel.
Lassiter, 452 U.S.  at 33, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at 653, 101 S. Ct.  at 2163.
	Thus, under Lassiter and the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, an indigent parent does not necessarily
have a right to court-appointed counsel in a termination
proceeding brought by the State; rather, "the decision whether due
process calls for the appointment of counsel for indigent parents
in termination proceedings [is] to be answered in the first instance
by the trial court, subject, of course, to appellate review." Lassiter,
452 U.S.  at 32, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at 652, 101 S. Ct.  at 2162.
	When the Illinois legislature enacted the Juvenile Court Act
of 1987, it provided that the parent of a minor who is the subject
of proceedings under the Act will be provided with the assistance
of court-appointed counsel if the parent is financially unable to
employ counsel. 705 ILCS 405/1-5 (West 1998). Thus, an
indigent parent in a termination proceeding brought under the
Juvenile Court Act is entitled to court-appointed counsel, not
because the due process clause of the Illinois or United States
Constitutions mandates it, but because the legislature has chosen
to guarantee the assistance of counsel to indigent parents rather
than requiring courts to engage in the case-by-case determination
permitted under Lassiter.
	The Supreme Court subsequently decided a case that is
factually and procedurally more similar to the present case. In
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 136 L. Ed. 2d 473, 117 S. Ct. 555
(1996), the father and stepmother filed their adoption petition in
the chancery court of the State of Mississippi, seeking to terminate
the parental rights of the natural mother. After the adoption was
granted, the mother filed a timely notice of appeal, but was unable
to proceed with her appeal because a state statute conditioned the
right to appeal in civil cases on prepayment of costs, including the
cost of preparation of a trial transcript. The state supreme court
denied her application to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed
her appeal. M.L.B., 519 U.S.  at 107-09, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 482-83,
117 S. Ct.  at 559-60.
	After tracing the history of its decisions regarding access to
judicial process, the Court summarized:
			"In States providing criminal appeals, *** an indigent's
access to appeal, through a transcript of relevant trial
proceedings, is secure under our precedent. [Citation.]
That equal access right holds for petty offenses as well as
for felonies. But counsel at state expense, we have held,
is a constitutional requirement, even in the first instance,
only when the defendant faces time in confinement.
[Citation.] When deprivation of parental status is at stake,
however, counsel is sometimes part of the process that is
due. [Citation.] It would be anomalous to recognize a
right to a transcript needed to appeal a misdemeanor
conviction-though trial counsel may be flatly denied-but
hold, at the same time, that a transcript need not be
prepared for M.L.B.-though were her defense sufficiently
complex, state-paid counsel, as Lassiter instructs, would
be designated for her." M.L.B., 519 U.S.  at 123, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 492, 117 S. Ct.  at 567.
The Court based its reasoning, in part, on Lassiter, but also clearly
distinguished between an indigent parent's right to access to the
appellate process from her right to counsel at state expense.
M.L.B., 519 U.S.  at 112-13, 136 L. Ed. 2d  at 485, 117 S. Ct.  at
562. Thus, although an indigent appellant parent cannot be denied
a transcript with which to pursue an appeal as of right, she is not
necessarily entitled to court-appointed counsel to assist her. The
former is governed by the equal protection decision of M.L.B.; the
latter by the due process decision in Lassiter.
	On this issue, the county relies on Rosewell v. Hanrahan, 168
Ill. App. 3d 329 (1988), a decision of the appellate court that post-dates Lassiter but predates M.L.B. The minor child had resided
with his maternal grandparents for over five years when the
grandparents filed a petition under the Adoption Act. The trial
court appointed private counsel to represent the respondent
mother, who initially appeared pro se. During the trial, the parties
reached an agreement and the petition was withdrawn in favor of
entry of an agreed order. Rosewell, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 330.
Counsel subsequently filed a petition for fees, which was granted
by the trial court. The Cook County treasurer then filed a motion
to vacate the payment order. The trial court denied the motion,
finding that due process required the appointment of counsel.
Rosewell, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 331.
	The appellate court noted that the single provision of the
Adoption Act that allows for the appointment of counsel for the
respondent parent applies only if the alleged parental unfitness is
due to physical or mental illness (see 750 ILCS 50/13(B)(c) (West
1998)). Rosewell, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 331. The appellate court
further found that it was not required to engage in the three-factor
analysis set out in Lassiter, because a case brought by a private
party under the Adoption Act does not involve state action:
		"There is no indication that the State or any of its agencies
participated in the proceedings or sought to encourage the
filing of the petition or subsequent order of permanent
custody. The mere fact that there is a statute which allows
for individuals to bring private adoption proceedings does
not of itself turn this action into 'State' action." Rosewell,
168 Ill. App. 3d at 332.
Based on this reasoning, the county asserts R.P. was not entitled
to the assistance of court-appointed counsel, even if she had
demonstrated indigence, because the petition was brought by
private parties under the Adoption Act.
	The county distinguishes an earlier case, In re Adoption of
Sotelo, 130 Ill. App. 3d 398 (1985), which held that although the
Adoption Act contains no statutory requirement of representation
by counsel, the respondent mother was entitled to court-appointed
counsel. The county correctly notes that Sotelo was neither an
equal protection nor a due process decision and can, therefore, be
limited to its unusual factual situation-proceedings were brought
concurrently under both the Juvenile Court Act and the Adoption
Act and the appellate court found it impossible to determine which
statute the trial court was applying and what grounds the court
used to determine unfitness. Sotelo, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 401.
	The county urges this court to adopt a bright-line
rule-proceedings under the Adoption Act do not involve state
action and, therefore, no right to counsel exists, with the exception
of that provided in a single, narrow, statutory provision that is not
applicable in the present case. See 750 ILCS 50/13(B)(c) (West
1998).
	Wilhelmi, on the other hand, would have this court read
Lassiter and M.L.B., together, as creating an equal protection right
to counsel for indigent parents, whether their parental rights are at
stake in a proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act or under the
Adoption Act. She asserts that the use of the judicial system to
terminate parental rights is, by definition, state action no matter
who initiated the petition or which statute governs. The only
authority she cites for this sweeping proposition is the fundamental
nature of the rights of parents and the "final, irrevocable, and
gravely permanent" effect of their termination.
	There is, however, some precedent for viewing the utilization
of the judicial process by a private party to affect the constitutional
rights of another as "state action." In Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 92 L. Ed. 1161, 68 S. Ct. 836 (1948), the Court held that use of
the state's judicial process to enforce a racially restrictive covenant
was state action violating the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment: "It is clear that but for the active
intervention of the state courts, supported by the full panoply of
state power, petitioners would have been free to occupy the
properties in question without restraint." Shelley, 334 U.S.  at 19,
92 L. Ed.  at 1183, 68 S. Ct.  at 845.
	Almost two decades after deciding Shelley, the Court used the
same reasoning to hold that a state constitutional amendment
guaranteeing property owners the absolute discretion to decline to
sell or rent their property violated the equal protection clause.
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381, 18 L. Ed. 2d 830, 838, 87 S. Ct. 1627, 1634 (1967). Using the power of the court to
encourage or enforce racial discrimination, under this view, is state
action that violates equal protection.
	In the adoption context, the claim of state action when the
court system is utilized to terminate parental rights is, perhaps,
even stronger than in Shelley. Adoption exists only as a creature
of statute. In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 62 (1993). Prospective
adoptive parents cannot achieve their goal of parenthood by
contract or other private means; they must involve the court.
	In other contexts, however, this court has repeatedly
expressed reluctance to base a finding of state action on the mere
fact that a state court is the forum for the dispute. See People v.
Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 94, 107 (1995); People v. DiGuida, 152 Ill. 2d 104, 125 (1992); see also L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law
1698 (1988) ("To contemporary commentators, however, Shelley
and Reitman appear as highly controversial decisions. In neither
case, a commonly voiced view has it, is the Court's finding of
state action supported by any reasoning which would suggest that
'state action' is a meaningful requirement rather than a nearly
empty or at least extraordinarily malleable formality").
	We need not resolve the question whether every case brought
under the Adoption Act implicates "state action," for Shelley and
its progeny need not be invoked to find the state action in this
case. The state filed the initial petition under the Juvenile Court
Act, seeking adjudication of the minor children as neglected.
R.P.'s right to counsel in that matter was guaranteed by statute.
705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 1998). The girls were placed in the
custody of their father and stepmother as a direct result of this
state action. The adoption petition, although filed by private
parties, essentially took the place of the petition to terminate
parental rights that the State was authorized but declined to file.
Thus, this case is clearly distinguishable from Rosewell, which
involved a purely private adoption. As the appellate court noted:
		"Under these circumstances, the specter could be raised
that the state intentionally chose to forego prosecution of
a termination of parental rights petition, knowing that the
accomplishment of its goal could be reached with greater
ease and less expense without its involvement in a
proceeding to terminate parental rights if the respondent
could be denied the benefit of court-appointed counsel."
316 Ill. App. 3d at 119.
	Because of this procedural history, the equal protection
question posed by this case is not whether an indigent respondent
parent may be treated differently depending on whether
termination of parental rights is sought by the State or by
prospective adoptive parents. The equal protection question posed
by this case is whether an indigent respondent parent may be
treated differently depending on whether termination of her rights
is sought by the State or by the person who obtained custody or
guardianship of the child as a result of state action. Having
precisely defined the categories to which equal protection analysis
must be applied, we now turn to the constitutional question.
	Equal protection analysis is identical under the United States
and Illinois Constitutions. Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid,
171 Ill. 2d 314, 322 (1996). The essential test of equal protection
is whether government deals with similarly situated individuals in
a similar manner. Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 322. In reviewing a
claim that the guarantee of equal protection has been violated, the
court applies strict scrutiny to classifications of individuals that
affect fundamental rights. Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 323. A parent's
interest in maintaining a parental relationship with her child is
clearly a fundamental liberty interest, protected by the equal
protection provisions of both the state and federal constitutions.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 606,
102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394-95 (1982); R.C., 195 Ill. 2d  at 301-02. We,
therefore, will apply a strict scrutiny analysis to determine whether
providing counsel to indigent respondent parents in cases carried
to conclusion under the Juvenile Court Act but denying counsel to
indigent respondent parents in cases dismissed after guardianship
or custody has been awarded to prospective adoptive parents, who
thereafter file their own adoption petitions, violates constitutional
guarantees of equal protection. Such a classification will survive
strict scrutiny only if necessary to promote a compelling state
interest and narrowly tailored to serve that interest. People v.
Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d 489, 500 (1992).
	By statute, the respondent parent's right to counsel attaches
when the State files an action under the Juvenile Court Act. 705
ILCS 405/1-5 (West 1998). The people of the State of Illinois are
the real party in interest in such a proceeding (In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d 1, 6 (1991), citing People v. Piccolo, 275 Ill. 453, 455 (1916)), and
are represented by the State's Attorney (705 ILCS 405/1-6 (West
1998)). Section 2-28 of the Juvenile Court Act requires the circuit
court to conduct a permanency hearing within 12 months of the
entry of a temporary custody order and at least every six months
thereafter. 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 1998). At the permanency
hearing, the circuit court determines the status of the child by
selecting a permanency goal from among those listed in the
statute. 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 1998). The circuit court then
enters an order setting forth the "future status of the minor,
including the permanency goal, and any order necessary to
conform the minor's legal custody and status to such
determination." 705 ILCS 405/2-28(3)(a) (West 1998).
	All of these provisions were followed in this case and after
many months and numerous hearings, the circuit court authorized 
the State to file a petition to terminate R.P.'s parental rights
"within 30 days." Two and one-half months later, when no petition
had been filed, the circuit court granted the State leave to file a
petition to terminate "instanter." The State did file a petition with
regard to R.P.'s son, but did not file petitions to terminate her
rights to her daughters. Instead, the State scheduled the matter for
a hearing on custody and guardianship. Once these issues were
resolved in favor of the father and step-mother, the matter was
dismissed. The record does not reveal whether the State sought the
dismissal (there is no written motion for dismissal), but clearly the
State did not seek to keep these files active. Neither did R.R.E. and
T.M.P., who did not file a petition to terminate R.P.'s parental
rights under the Juvenile Court Act, although the statute would
have permitted them to do so. 705 ILCS 405/2-13(1) (West 1998)
(providing that "any adult person" may initiate a petition). Of
course, had they done so, R.P. would have been entitled to the
assistance of court-appointed counsel. Instead, as a result of the
custody order and the dismissal, R.P. was left to attempt to obtain
visitation in family court, without the assistance of counsel; R.R.E.
and T.M.P. were free to seek termination of her parental rights by
means of an adoption petition, with the knowledge that R.P. would
not have the assistance of the public defender; and the county was
spared the additional expense of providing counsel for R.P. and of
prosecuting the case.
	Thus, dismissing a case initially brought under the Juvenile
Court Act so that the prospective adoptive parents may file a
petition under the Adoption Act saves the State the cost of
providing counsel for the indigent parent and the services of the
State's Attorney to prosecute the case. This cannot be deemed a
compelling state interest. Indeed, these expenses are anticipated by
the county at the time the original juvenile court action is brought.
As the appellate court so aptly noted:
		"The state undoubtedly has a legitimate pecuniary interest
in providing counsel in as limited a number of cases as
possible. However, it cannot be said that the state's
interest is significant enough to overcome a parent's
'commanding' interest in the 'accuracy and justice of the
decision to terminate his or her parental status.' " 316 Ill.
App. 3d at 122, quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S.  at 27, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at 650, 101 S. Ct.  at 2160.
	We, therefore, hold that where, as here, significant state action
has resulted in the custody or guardianship of the minor child
being placed with a person other than the parent, equal protection
requires that the parent be provided with the assistance of counsel,
if she is indigent, in a subsequent action to terminate her parental
rights, whether that action is brought pursuant to the Juvenile
Court Act or by the child's guardian or custodian pursuant to the
Adoption Act.
	We need not decide the equal protection issue in the case that
arises between private individuals and is litigated entirely under
the Adoption Act. That question is best left to the legislature or to
be fully briefed and argued by the parties when and if such a case
arises. The appellate court's conclusion that the Adoption Act
creates a constitutionally underinclusive scheme and must be
construed to require the assistance of counsel in all cases is, if not
in error, at least premature.

D. Right to Counsel on Appeal
	Having concluded that R.P., assuming she is indigent, should
have been provided with the services of court-appointed counsel
before the circuit court, we must next address the issue posed by
this appeal, whether the county must pay the fees of the attorney
appointed by the appellate court to represent her on appeal. The
answer to that question depends on whether an indigent
respondent parent has the right to counsel on appeal when her
parental rights have been terminated in an action brought by the
State under the Juvenile Court Act.
	That question was answered in the affirmative by In re
Harrison, 120 Ill. App. 3d 108 (1983). The Harrison children were
adjudicated neglected in a proceeding brought by the State under
the Juvenile Court Act. The mother was represented by court-appointed counsel throughout the proceedings and the State's
petitions to terminate her parental rights were denied. The State
then appealed. The attorney who had represented the mother
sought to be appointed her counsel on appeal. His motion was
denied by the trial court, so he filed a motion with the appellate
court. The appellate court took the motion with the case and, in the
end, allowed the motion and affirmed the order of the trial court.
Harrison, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 109.
	On the issue of the right to appellate counsel, the appellate
court rejected the respondent mother's constitutional equal
protection and due process arguments. Finding Lassiter inapposite,
because it did not mandate counsel in all cases, the appellate court
declined to engage in the three-part Mathews v. Eldridge analysis,
but did find a statutory basis for the appointment of appellate
counsel. Harrison, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 110.
	Reading the section of the Juvenile Court Act that provides
for the appointment of counsel at the trial court level (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1981, ch. 37, par. 701-20(1), subsequently amended and
codified at 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 1998)), together with the
section guaranteeing the right to appeal (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch.
37, par. 701-20(3), now codified at 705 ILCS 405/1-5(3) (West
1998)), the appellate court held: "It is totally inconsistent with the
purpose and policy of the Juvenile Court Act *** to deny the
natural parents who are indigent the right to counsel on appeal."
Harrison, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 113.
	The court found support for this conclusion in the decisions
of other states. For example, the Supreme Court of Iowa had held
that the right-to-appeal provision in its juvenile court act " 'was
not intended to be limited to those cases in which the minor child
or his parents were financially able to afford such appeal.' "
Harrison, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 112-13, quoting In re Chambers, 261
Iowa 31, 35, 152 N.W.2d 818, 821 (1967). We agree with the
holding in Harrison, which has been the unquestioned rule in
Illinois for many years.
	In summary, R.P., as an indigent respondent parent, should
have been given assistance of court-appointed counsel in the
underlying case because the initial state action requires that the
subsequent adoption proceeding be conducted with the same
procedural safeguards that would have been provided if the
petition to terminate her parental rights had been brought under the
Juvenile Court Act. If that had been the case, she would also have
been entitled to court-appointed appellate counsel.
	Indeed, the county does not dispute that, had the termination
proceeding continued under the Juvenile Court Act, R.P. would
have been entitled to the services of an attorney from the Kendall
County public defender's office and, had her rights been
terminated in that proceeding, to the services of court-appointed
appellate counsel. It is the unusual procedural posture of this case
that the county finds unsatisfying. The county has been ordered to
pay an expense it did not elect to incur and did not anticipate. The
county's concern for fiscal responsibility is both understandable
and commendable. However, the result in this case is mandated by
the Illinois and United States Constitutions and by long-standing
judicial interpretation of the Juvenile Court Act.

III. CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the order of the appellate court that
the county treasurer of Kendall County pay Anna Wilhelmi
$3,847.55 in reasonable attorney fees is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE THOMAS took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	I agree with the majority in all respects save the reasoning
employed to arrive at the conclusion that the adoption action was
"state action." 
	The majority adequately sets out the pertinent facts. The State
did prosecute an action under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705
ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 1994)) to remove the children from
their mother's custody. That action preceded the instant adoption
action. The majority relies heavily on this fact, framing the issue
as
			"not whether an indigent respondent parent may be
treated differently depending on whether termination of
parental rights is sought by the State or by prospective
adoptive parents[; rather, the issue is] whether an indigent
respondent parent may be treated differently depending on
whether termination of her rights is sought by the State or
by the person who obtained custody or guardianship of the
child as a result of state action." Slip op. at 13.
The majority does not explain its reliance on this distinction,
however, and I do not believe that it forms a proper basis for the
majority's conclusion that there was "state action" in the adoption
action. It would overstate matters to say that the custody
proceeding and the adoption action were entirely unrelated, but
they are not the same action, nor is the adoption action properly
characterized as a continuation of the juvenile court action. The
juvenile court action was not a necessary precursor to the adoption
action. A person need not have custody or guardianship in order to
file an adoption action in which parental rights are sought to be
terminated. See 750 ILCS 50/1(F)(b) (West 1994) (among persons
"available for adoption" are children "to whose adoption no
consent is required pursuant to Section 8 of [the Adoption] Act"
(referring to 750 ILCS 50/8, which notes that consents or
surrenders are not required of parents found to be an unfit
person)); 750 ILCS 50/2 (West 1994) (no requirement that a party
have custody or guardianship in order to file adoption action). Nor
am I aware of any legal effect which the court hearing the adoption
action must accord to any previous order of custody or
guardianship. The fact that children may have been removed from
a parent's custody is legally irrelevant to the question of whether
his or her parental rights should be terminated in a subsequent
adoption action.
	The only basis offered by the majority for its linkage of the
juvenile court action and the adoption action is its speculation that
the State and the father colluded to deprive the mother of counsel
in order to save the State money. Slip op. at 13, 15. I find this quite
unsettling. First, it is merely speculation. There could be any
number of reasons for the State not instituting a proceeding to
terminate parental rights, and there are also a number of non-nefarious reasons why prospective adoptive parents might wish to
proceed with an adoption action themselves, with counsel of their
choosing, rather than hanging their hopes on the State's
prosecution of a termination action under the Juvenile Court Act.
I believe it is improper to ascribe such callow motives to the office
of the State's Attorney and the children's father. Moreover, I do
not see how this speculation can form the basis for linking the
juvenile court action and the adoption action. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has stated that the motives of the State are beside the point:
"[m]ere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private
party is not sufficient to justify holding the State responsible for
those initiatives under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05, 73 L. Ed. 2d 534, 547,
102 S. Ct. 2777, 2786 (1982).
	In the final analysis, I agree with the majority that the
adoption action, involving termination of parental rights, does
constitute state action. However, we may reach this conclusion
without blurring the lines between a custody action and an
adoption action or imputing base motives to the State and the
children's father. Regardless of motivations, state action may be
found where "the private entity has exercised powers that are
'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.' " Blum, 457 U.S.  at 1005, 73 L. Ed. 2d  at 547, 102 S. Ct.  at 2786, quoting
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353, 42 L. Ed. 2d 477, 485, 95 S. Ct. 449, 455 (1974). I would submit that the
instant case falls squarely within this category. Clearly, individuals
traditionally had no power to terminate other persons' parental
rights. Rather, this power was traditionally reserved to the state. I
would find that the adoption action constituted state action for this
reason, rather than because of the " 'specter' " (slip op. at 13,
quoting 316 Ill. App. 3d at 119) that the office of the State's
Attorney knowingly conspired with the children's father to deprive
the mother of counsel in an action to terminate her parental rights,
in order to save the State money.