Title: Dill v. Dill
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1200814
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 18, 2022

Rel: March 18, 2022
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2021-2022
____________________
1200814
____________________
Robert Louis Dill
v.
Douglas Dill
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division 
(CV-17-45)
BOLIN, Justice.
Robert Louis Dill appeals from a judgment entered by the Bessemer
Division of the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the circuit court") on a jury
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verdict in favor of Douglas Dill in Douglas's action contesting the
purported will of Walter Dill, Jr.
Facts and Procedural History
Walter and his wife Alva purchased a house which was on
Cottondale Drive in Hueytown, across the street from a house owned by
their son, Douglas, to be close to Douglas, his wife Peggy, and their
children.1  Walter and Alva enjoyed a close and loving relationship with
Douglas and his family for many years.   Alva died in February 2002.
After Alva died, Douglas and Peggy assisted Walter with such things as
preparing his meals and taking him to his appointments.  Peggy stated
that, around 2006, she began noticing that Walter was getting a "little
confused" and  "frail" and did not like getting out of the house very often.
After noticing those changes in Walter, Peggy assisted Walter with
balancing his checkbook when he would get confused and make mistakes. 
1Walter and Alva also had another son, Stanley Dill, who is
deceased. 
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Robert, Walter's brother, did not visit with Walter much before
Alva's death because Alva did not care for Robert.  However, after Alva
died, Robert started visiting Walter and spending time with him on a
frequent basis.  Robert began taking Walter to certain places and
appointments, such as the barbershop and doctor appointments.  Peggy
testified that, by 2008, Walter did not really trust anyone but Robert and
that Robert had "spread his wings over Walter." Peggy further stated that
Robert had started turning Walter against Douglas by telling Walter, who
was a deeply religious man, that Douglas was "no good," was "not a
Christian," and did not go to church.  Peggy testified that Walter's mental
condition was "slipping" during that time and that Walter was "confused
because he loved Douglas and wanted to trust him, but he loved Robert
and wanted to trust him too."  
Walter had approximately $80,000 in a joint checking account with
Douglas that was intended to help pay for Walter's future care.  Douglas
and Peggy discovered that Walter had written approximately $40,000
worth of checks from the joint account to Robert, one of which had been
used to purchase Robert a vehicle. Robert, Douglas, Peggy, and Walter
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then met at Walter's house to discuss the money that Walter had given to
Robert. Douglas testified that, when Robert learned that Walter had an
additional $39,000 in the joint account, Robert exclaimed: "Walt, Walt,
Walt, we got to get my money. We got to get money."  Douglas stated that
Walter responded by saying: "[J]ust calm down. We will get it sooner or
later." Thereafter, Douglas removed the $39,000 from the joint account
and placed the money in an account solely in his name to prevent Walter
from giving more money to Robert. 
In the meantime, Walter had some suffered medical setbacks,
including being diagnosed with pneumonia, that required Walter to be
hospitalized for a period.  Following Walter's hospitalization, he was
admitted to a nursing home for a rehabilitation stay.   When Walter was
discharged from the nursing home following the rehabilitation stay,
Robert arranged for Walter to enter a retirement community.  Douglas
and Peggy regularly visited Walter while he was hospitalized, while he
was in the nursing home, and while he was living in the retirement
community.  Walter walked with a pronounced stoop, and he began falling
on a regular basis while living in the retirement community. Eventually,
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in July 2012, Walter moved in with Robert and his wife Jean.2  Robert,
Jean, and their daughter, who was a nurse, became Walter's sole
caregivers.  Douglas and Peggy rarely visited with Walter once he moved
into Robert's home.  Douglas refused to visit more often, stating that
Robert's home was not a "good place to be" because Robert would "sit right
there on top of [Walter]" and monitor their conversations. Peggy described
Robert's home as a "hostile environment."
In November 2012, Douglas petitioned the Bessemer Division of the
Jefferson Probate Court ("the probate court"), seeking letters of
guardianship and conservatorship as to Walter. Douglas stated that he
had petitioned the probate court for a guardianship and conservatorship
as to Walter to preserve the remaining $39,000 that had been intended to
help pay for Walter's future care.  Robert also filed a petition in the
probate court for letters of guardianship and conservatorship as to Walter. 
In January 2013, Walter was referred to Dr. Rickey Fennell, Walter's
2There are several different dates referenced in the record regarding
when Walter moved in with Robert, but the most frequent references in
the record indicate that the move occurred in July 2012. 
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physician of 18 years, for a mental-status examination ordered as part of
the guardianship and conservatorship proceedings.  Dr. Fennell testified
that, during that examination,  Walter was oriented to person, place, and
time. Dr. Fennell stated that Walter scored a 24 out of 30 on the
examination, which, he said, indicated mild impairment.  Dr. Fennell
testified that he had never observed Robert attempting to influence
Walter in an inappropriate manner. Dr. Fennell explained that, based  on
the occasions when he had seen Walter and Robert together, he had
observed a loving and supportive relationship between the two. Dr.
Fennell stated that Walter could be stubborn when it came to his medical
care and that Robert could not influence him in that regard.  Dr. Fennell
further testified that if Walter had given Robert a large amount of money,
"it would be a problem" and not indicative of Walter's behavior that he
had observed over the years.   On March 25, 2013, Sydney Summey was
issued temporary letters of conservatorship regarding Walter. 
It appears from the record that Walter once had a will that made
Douglas the primary beneficiary of his estate. However, on December 11,
2013, Walter executed a new will ("the 2013 will") naming Robert as the
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executor and sole beneficiary of his estate.  The 2013 will provided, in
relevant part:
"I, Walter Jefferson Dill, Jr., am a single man at the time of
the execution of this, my Last Will and Testament. I have no
children. I have one (1) brother, Robert Louis Dill, one (1)
sister-in-law, Jean Dill and one (1) stepson, Douglas Leon
Dill."
It is undisputed that Walter had one living child at the time the 2013 will
was executed, namely, Douglas, who was Walter's son and not his stepson.
The attorney who prepared the 2013 will for Walter had previously
represented Robert in another matter. The attorney testified that, at the
time the 2013 will was executed, Walter spoke logically and rationally and
seemed to know exactly what he wanted in the will; that she had no
"qualms" about preparing the will and believed that the will was made
free of undue influence;  that she did not make a mistake in drafting the
will provision quoted above; and that, in preparing the will,  she relied on
the information given to her by Walter. Robert drove Walter to the
appointment to make the 2013 will, but he was not in the room with
Walter and the attorney at the time the will was prepared and executed. 
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Following a hearing on the petitions for letters of guardianship and
conservatorship, the probate court, on January 27, 2014, entered a
permanent order  appointing  Summey as Walter's conservator and Robert
as his guardian. Thereafter, Douglas tendered to Summey the remaining
$39,000 that he had removed from the joint account that he had shared
with Walter.  Summey explained that a probate court will appoint a
conservator for an individual upon determining that the individual lacks
the mental capacity to handle his or her business affairs. Summey further
testified that an individual that has been appointed a conservator still has
the capacity to make a will so long as the individual  knows the extent of
his or her property and the natural objects of his or her bounty.  
On April 11, 2017, Walter died at the age of 97.  On April 28, 2017,
Robert filed in the probate court a petition to admit for probate the 2013
will and an accompanying petition for the issuance of letters testamentary
to himself, as the personal representative appointed in the 2013 will.   On
that same date, the probate court entered an order both admitting
Walter's will to probate and granting letters testamentary to Robert. On
May 16, 2017, Douglas filed in the probate court a withdrawal of the
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waiver of notice of the filing of the petition to admit for probate the 2013
will, claiming that he had been misled into signing the waiver, and a
complaint contesting the will.  Douglas alleged in the complaint contesting
the 2013 will that Walter had been mentally incompetent at the time the
will was executed and that the will was procured as the result of undue
influence by Robert.  On May 22, 2017, Robert filed a response in
opposition to Douglas's withdrawal of waiver of notice and Douglas's will-
contest complaint, denying the allegations of each. 
On May 23, 2017, Robert filed in the circuit court  a verified petition
to remove the administration of Walter's estate from the probate court to
the circuit court.  On June 16, 2017, the circuit court entered an order
removing the administration of Walter's estate to the circuit court. 
On October 30, 2018, Robert moved the circuit court to dismiss
Douglas's will contest, arguing that the only way the circuit court could
have obtained jurisdiction of the will contest is if the circuit court had
issued an order removing the will contest from the probate court. Robert
argued that the circuit court never entered an order removing the will
contest from the probate court; therefore, he said, the circuit court never
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properly obtained jurisdiction of the will contest.  In response, Douglas
noted that the will-contest complaint had been filed in the probate court
before the circuit court granted Robert's petition to remove the
administration of Walter's estate from the probate court to the circuit
court and, therefore, contended that, when the circuit court granted the
petition to remove the administration of Walter's estate, the circuit court
removed all aspects of the administration of the estate necessary to reach
a final settlement of the estate, including the will contest.  On November
9, 2018, the circuit court entered an order denying the motion to dismiss
filed by Robert.
On January 2, 2019, Robert again moved the circuit court to dismiss
the will contest, arguing that the circuit court could assume jurisdiction
over the will contest that was pending in the probate court without strict
compliance with  § 43-8-198, Ala. Code 1975.  Robert argued that,
pursuant to § 43-8-198, for a circuit court to obtain jurisdiction of a will
contest that is pending in a probate court,  the probate court in which the
will contest is pending must enter an order transferring the will contest
to the circuit court.  On January 3, 2019, Douglas filed a response in
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opposition to Robert's motion to dismiss, arguing that the prerequisites to
the circuit court's obtaining jurisdiction over the administration of
Walter's estate were met when Robert filed the petition for removal in the
circuit court and the circuit court entered the order removing the entire
administration of Walter's estate, including the will contest, to the circuit
court.  On April 14, 2021, the circuit court denied the motion to dismiss
and set the will contest for trial. 
The will contest proceeded to a jury trial on May 3, 2021.  Robert
moved for a judgment as a matter of law at the close of Douglas's case-in-
chief, and he filed a motion for a judgment as a matter of law on May 6,
2021, neither of which the circuit court granted.3  On May 6, 2021, the
jury returned a verdict in favor of Douglas. On May 7, 2021, the circuit
court entered a judgment in favor of Douglas on the jury's verdict.  On
May 14, 2012, Douglas moved the circuit court to correct its judgment and
to tax costs and attorneys fees against Robert and to allow him to file a
3It does not appear that Robert renewed his request for a judgment
as a matter of law on the record at the close of all the evidence. However,
we treat the May 6 motion as a renewed motion for a judgment as a
matter of law filed at the close of all the evidence.  
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submission of his fees and costs with the circuit court.  On May 27, 2021,
Robert moved the circuit court for a new trial. On July 8, 2021, the circuit
court entered an order granting Douglas's motion to correct the judgment
and denying Robert's motion for a new trial.  Robert appeals.
Jurisdiction
Robert argues that the circuit court never obtained jurisdiction to
consider the will contest because the probate court never entered an order
transferring the will contest to the circuit court as required by § 43-8-198. 
We note that "[m]atters of subject-matter jurisdiction are subject to de
novo review."  DuBose v. Weaver, 68 So. 3d 814, 821 (Ala. 2011).    If the
circuit never properly acquired  jurisdiction to consider the will contest,
the judgment entered by the trial court on the jury's verdict on May 7,
2021, is void and will not support an appeal. See  MPQ, Inc. v.
Birmingham Realty Co.,  78 So. 3d 391, 393 (Ala. 2011).
"Alabama law pertaining to will contests is well settled
and long-standing:
" 'In Alabama a will may be contested in two
ways: (1) under § 43-8-190, Code of Alabama 1975,
before probate, a contest may be instituted in the
probate court or (2) under § 43-8-199, Code of
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Alabama 1975, after probate and within six months
thereof, a contest may be instituted by filing a
complaint in the circuit court of the county in
which the will was probated.' "
Ex parte Floyd, 105 So. 3d 1193, 1195 (Ala. 2012) (quoting Stevens v.
Gary, 565 So. 2d 73, 74 (Ala. 1990).
In Jones v. Brewster, 282 So. 3d 854 (Ala. 2019), Justice Stewart,
writing for the Court, thoroughly explained the means by which a circuit
court obtains subject-matter jurisdiction over a will contest or the
administration of an estate:  
"Under Alabama law, a circuit court, under specified
conditions delineated in the pertinent statute, can obtain
subject-matter jurisdiction over a will contest or the
administration of an estate. The probate court has general and
original jurisdiction over matters involving the administration
of estates and the probating of wills. See Ala. Const. 1901, §
144; and § 12-13-1, Ala. Code 1975. Pursuant to § 43-8-190,
Ala. Code 1975, the probate court has jurisdiction over will
contests where a will has not been admitted to probate.
Section 43-8-190, Ala. Code 1975, states, in pertinent part:
" 'A will, before the probate thereof, may be
contested by any person interested therein, or by
any person, who, if the testator had died intestate,
would have been an heir or distributee of his
estate, by filing in the court where it is offered for
probate allegations in writing that the will was not
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duly executed, or of the unsoundness of mind of the
testator, or of any other valid objections thereto ....'
"A party, however, has the statutory right to seek a
transfer of a will contest from the probate court to the circuit
court pursuant to § 43-8-198, Ala. Code 1975, which reads:
" 'Upon the demand of any party to the
contest, made in writing at the time of filing the
initial pleading, the probate court, or the judge
thereof, must enter an order transferring the
contest to the circuit court of the county in which
the contest is made, and must certify all papers
and documents pertaining to the contest to the
clerk of the circuit court, and the case shall be
docketed by the clerk of the circuit court and a
special session of said court may be called for the
trial of said contest or, said contest may be tried by
said circuit court at any special or regular session
of said court. The issues must be made up in the
circuit court as if the trial were to be had in the
probate court, and the trial had in all other
respects as trials in other civil cases in the circuit
court ....'
"To comply with the statute, the following prerequisites must
be met: (1) the will must not be admitted to probate, although
it must be offered for probate before it can be contested, see
Hooper v. Huey, 293 Ala. 63, 67, 300 So. 2d 100, 104 (1974),
disapproved of on other grounds, Bardin v. Jones, 371 So. 2d
23 (Ala. 1979); (2) the party seeking the transfer must file a
written demand for the transfer in the probate court; (3) the
transfer demand must be filed at the time of the filing of the
will-contest complaint or other initial pleading; (4) the probate
court must enter a written order transferring the will contest
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to the circuit court; (5) the probate court must certify the
probate-court record pertaining to the will contest to the
circuit-court clerk; (6) the circuit-court clerk shall docket the
case in the circuit court; and (7) the circuit court must set the
will contest for a trial at a regular or a special session of court.
"After a will has been admitted to probate in the probate
court, jurisdiction in the circuit court cannot be invoked
pursuant to a transfer under § 43-8-198. Within six months
following the admission of the will to probate, however, a
person with an interest in the will may file a will contest
directly in the circuit court pursuant to § 43-8-199, Ala. Code
1975, which provides:
" 'Any person interested in any will who has
not contested the same under the provisions of this
article, may, at any time within the six months
after the admission of such will to probate in this
state, contest the validity of the same by filing a
complaint in the circuit court in the county in
which such will was probated.'
"Under § 43-8-199, only two perquisites exist: (1) the will must
have been admitted to probate no more than six months
earlier; and (2) the complaint must be filed directly in the
circuit court.
"Lastly, the administration of an estate in the probate
court can be removed to the circuit court pursuant to §
12-11-41, Ala. Code 1975. Section § 12-11-41 reads:
" 'The administration of any estate may be
removed from the probate court to the circuit court
at any time before a final settlement thereof, by
any heir, devisee, legatee, distributee, executor,
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administrator or administrator with the will
annexed of any such estate, without assigning any
special equity; and an order of removal must be
made by the court, upon the filing of a sworn
petition by any such heir, devisee, legatee,
distributee, 
executor, 
administrator 
or
administrator with the will annexed of any such
estate, reciting that the petitioner is such heir,
devisee, 
legatee, 
distributee, 
executor,
administrator or administrator with the will
annexed and that, in the opinion of the petitioner,
such estate can be better administered in the
circuit court than in the probate court.'
"To invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction over the
administration of an estate through removal, 'the filing of a
petition for removal in the circuit court and the entry of an
order of removal by that court are prerequisites to that court's
acquisition of jurisdiction over the administration of the estate
pursuant to § 12-11-41.'  DuBose v. Weaver, 68 So. 3d 814, 822
(Ala. 2011)(emphasis omitted).
"In a will contest, the subject-matter jurisdiction of both
the probate court and the circuit court is statutory and limited.
Kaller v. Rigdon, 480 So. 2d 536, 539 (Ala. 1985). In a long line
of cases, this Court has held that strict compliance with the
statutory language pertaining to a will contest is required to
invoke the jurisdiction of the appropriate court.  Boshell v.
Lay, 596 So. 2d 581, 583 (Ala. 1992)('In order to contest a will
under either of these methods, the contestant must strictly
comply with the statutory language in order to quicken
jurisdiction of the appropriate court.'); Marshall v. Vreeland,
571 So. 2d 1037, 1038 (Ala. 1990)('The requirements of § 43-8-
198 must be complied with exactly, because will contest
jurisdiction is statutorily conferred upon the circuit court.');
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Bullen v. Brown, 535 So. 2d 76, 78 (Ala. 1988)('It is clear that
will contest jurisdiction, being statutorily conferred, must
comply with the statutory language strictly in order to quicken
jurisdiction of the appropriate court.'); Kaller v. Rigdon, 480
So. 2d at 538 ('Because will contest jurisdiction is statutorily
conferred, the procedural requirements of the applicable
statute must be complied with exactly.'); Forrester v. Putman,
409 So. 2d 773, 775 (Ala. 1981)('There was neither a transfer
of a contest to the circuit court according to Code 1975, §
43-1-78[, now § 43-8-198], nor a circuit court contest of a will
admitted to probate according to Code 1975, § 43-1-79[, now §
43-8-199]. A circuit court's jurisdiction over a will contest is
statutory and limited.'); Ex parte Stephens, 259 Ala. 361, 363,
66 So. 2d 901, 903 (1953)(concluding that the words 'must
transfer the [will] contest' 'have been regarded as mandatory');
and Ex parte Pearson, 241 Ala. 467, 469, 3 So. 2d 5, 6
(1941)('It is familiar law in Alabama, the only way to quicken
into exercise a statutory and limited jurisdiction is by pursuing
the mode prescribed by the statute.')."
282 So. 3d at 857-59.
On April 28, 2017, the probate court entered an order admitting the
2013 will to probate and granting letters testamentary to Robert as the
personal representative of Walter's estate, thereby judicially creating the
administration of Walter's probate estate. On May 16, 2017, after Walter's
will had been admitted to probate, Douglas filed in the probate court  a
will-contest complaint alleging that the 2013 will had been procured by
the undue influence of Robert and that Walter was mentally incompetent
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at  the time the will was executed.  On May 23, 2017, Robert filed in the
circuit court a verified petition to remove the administration of Walter's
estate from the probate court to the circuit court.  On June 16, 2017, the
circuit court entered an order removing the administration of Walter's
estate to the circuit court. 
Because the 2013 will was admitted to probate before Douglas filed
his will-contest complaint in the probate court, the will contest could not
have been properly transferred from the probate court to the circuit court
upon order of the probate court pursuant to § 43-8-198.   Section 43-8-198
must be read in conjunction with § 43-8-190.  Bond v. Pylant, 3 So. 3d 852
(Ala. 2008).   Accordingly, the circuit court could not have acquired
subject-matter jurisdiction of the will contest pursuant to § 43-8-198.  See
Jones, 282 So. 3d at 858 (holding that, after a will has been admitted to
probate in the probate court, the jurisdiction of the circuit court cannot be
invoked pursuant to a transfer under § 43-8-198).
In a case in which a will has been admitted to probate before the
commencement of a will contest, a person with an interest in the will may,
within six months following the admission of the will to probate,
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commence a will contest directly in the circuit court pursuant to §
43-8-199, Ala. Code 1975.  The only requirements necessary to commence
a will contest under § 43-8-199 are that  (1) the will must have been
admitted to probate no more than six months earlier and (2) the will-
contest complaint must be filed directly in the circuit court. Jones, 282 So.
3d at 858.  Generally, the will-contest complaint in this case would have
been deemed improperly filed under § 43-8-199, because Douglas filed the
will-contest complaint in the probate court rather than in the circuit court
as required by § 43-8-199.  See Bond v. Pylant, 3 So. 3d at 855 (holding
that a will-contest complaint filed in the probate court after a will has
been admitted to probate is a nullity).
However, although Douglas's will-contest complaint was filed in the
probate court, that complaint is nevertheless deemed to have been 
properly filed pursuant to § 43-8-199, because, in Jefferson County, the 
probate court has concurrent equitable jurisdiction over estates with the
circuit court, pursuant to Ala. Acts 1971, Act No. 1144, § 1. McElroy v.
McElroy, 254 So. 3d 872 (Ala. 2017). This Court explained in McElroy:
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"In nearly identical circumstances, this Court has held that
the Mobile Probate Court, which also shares general equity
jurisdiction concurrent with that of the circuit courts of this
State in the administration of the estates of deceased persons,
see Act No. 974, Ala. Acts 1961, had jurisdiction to consider a
will contest filed after the will was admitted for probate based
on the concurrent jurisdiction imparted to the probate court by
Act No. 974. See Coleman v. Richardson, 421 So. 2d 113 (Ala.
1982) (analyzing former § 43-1-79, Ala. Code 1975, which is
now codified at § 43-8-199, and holding that the probate court
had jurisdiction over the will contest even though it was filed
in the probate court after the will was admitted for probate
based on the conference of concurrent equity jurisdiction by
Act No. 974). Accordingly, we conclude that the probate court
had jurisdiction over the appellants' will contest at the time it
was filed. See Daniel v. Moye, 224 So. 3d 115, 131 n.9 (Ala.
2016) (noting that 'there are currently four counties in
Alabama -- Mobile, Jefferson, Shelby, and Pickens -- in which
the probate courts have been vested with concurrent equitable
estate jurisdiction with the circuit court to try will contests
after a will has been admitted to probate' (emphasis added))."
254 So. 3d at 876.
 After Douglas filed the will-contest complaint in the probate court,
which possesses concurrent equity jurisdiction over estates with the
circuit court, the circuit court's jurisdiction over the administration of
Walter's estate -- the entirety of Walter's estate including the pending will
contest -- was properly invoked pursuant to § 12-11-41 by Robert's filing,
in the circuit court, the petition to remove the administration of Walter's
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estate and the circuit court's entry of an order removing the
administration of Walter's estate to the circuit court. Jones, 282 So. 3d at
858.  See also DuBose v. Weaver, 68 So. 3d at 822.  The " '[a]dministration
of the estate is a broad concept involving all matters necessary to reach
a final settlement of the estate. ...  When the administration of the estate
is removed, all aspects of the administration must be removed.' " McElroy,
254 So. 2d at 876 (quoting Ex parte Clayton, 514 So. 2d 1013, 1017 (Ala.
1987)).  Generally, "[o]nce the administration and settlement of an estate
are removed from the probate court, the probate court loses jurisdiction
over the estate, and the circuit court obtains and maintains jurisdiction
until the final settlement of the case." Oliver v. Johnson, 583 So. 2d 1331,
1332 (Ala. 1991). Accordingly, because the administration of Walter's
estate was properly removed from the probate court to the circuit court
pursuant to § 12-11-41, the circuit court acquired subject-matter
jurisdiction over the administration of the estate, including the pending
will contest. 
The Merits
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Robert argues that the circuit court erred in entering a judgment on
the jury's verdict in favor of Douglas in the will contest.
Rule 28(a), Ala. R. App. P., requires that an appellant's brief contain,
among other things, the following:
"(5). Statement of the Case; Requirements for Civil
Cases; Special Requirement for Briefs on Appeal to the Court
of Criminal Appeals. A statement of the case, indicating briefly
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and the
disposition in the court below, with appropriate references to
the record ....
"....
"(7). Statement of the Facts.  A full statement of the facts
relevant to the issues presented for review, with appropriate
references to the record ..., except that no statement of the
facts need be included in a brief in a case in which a writ of
certiorari has issued and briefing has been ordered. Facts must
be stated accurately and completely."
Robert's appellate brief fails to satisfy the minimum requirements
of Rule 28(a).  Although Robert's brief contains a statement of the case, it
fails to contain appropriate citations to the record. Further, although the
brief contains a section entitled "Statement of Facts," the statement of the
facts presented is woefully inadequate relative to the issues presented for
review. There are no relevant background or contextual facts presented
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necessary for a clear understanding of the issues presented, including no
mention of Walter's mental capabilities; no mention of Dr. Fennell's
findings; 
no 
mention 
of 
the 
petitions 
for 
guardianship 
and
conservatorship; no mention of the familial relationships between Walter,
Douglas, and Robert; no mention of the relevant provision of the 2013 will
quoted earlier in this opinion; and no discussion of the time line relative
to Walter's living situation and his ultimately moving in with Robert. The
statement of facts contained in Robert's brief essentially contains a 
shortened statement of the case and some quotes from the testimony of
Dr. Fennell indicating that Walter was stubborn, that Walter and Robert
had a loving relationship, and that Dr. Fennell never witnessed Robert
influencing Walter in an in appropriate manner.  Those statements of Dr.
Fennell reproduced in Robert's brief are not a complete statement of facts
relevant to the issues presented for review as required by Rule 28(a)(7). 
When an appellant fails to comply with the minimum requirements of
Rule 28(a), this Court will affirm the judgment of the trial court. See
University of So. Alabama v. Progressive Ins. Co., 904 So. 2d 1242 (Ala.
2004).
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However, even if Robert had satisfied the minimum requirements of
Rule 28(a), the record evidence supports the trial court's submission of
Douglas's claims to the jury.  This Court has stated:
" ' "When reviewing a ruling on a motion for a
JML [judgment as a matter of law], this Court uses
the same standard the trial court used initially in
deciding whether to grant or deny the motion for a
JML. Regarding questions of fact, the ultimate
question is whether the nonmovant has presented
sufficient evidence to allow the case to be
submitted to the jury for a factual resolution. The
nonmovant must have presented substantial
evidence in order to withstand a motion for a JML.
A reviewing court must determine whether the
party who bears the burden of proof has produced
substantial evidence creating a factual dispute
requiring resolution by the jury. In reviewing a
ruling on a motion for a JML, this Court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant and entertains such reasonable
inferences as the jury would have been free to
draw. Regarding a question of law, however, this
Court indulges no presumption of correctness as to
the trial court's ruling." '
"City of Birmingham v. Brown, 969 So. 2d 910, 915 (Ala. 2007)
(quoting Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors Life Ins.
Co., 875 So. 2d 1143, 1152 (Ala. 2003))."
Furrow v. Helton, 13 So. 3d 350, 353 (Ala. 2008).   
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Douglas, as the will contestant, had the burden of establishing, by
substantial evidence, that Walter lacked testamentary capacity or that
Robert exerted undue influence over Robert.  To prove undue influence,
Douglas was required to show
" '(1) that a confidential relationship existed between a favored
beneficiary and the testator; (2) that the influence of or for the
beneficiary was dominant and controlling in that relationship;
and (3) that there was undue activity on the part of the
dominant party in procuring the execution of the will.' " 
Furrow, 13 So. 3d at 353-54 (quoting Clifton v. Clifton, 529 So. 2d 980, 983 
(Ala. 1988)).
Douglas presented evidence that, when viewed in a light most
favorable to him, indicates the following: Walter and his wife Alva enjoyed
a close and loving relationship with Douglas and his family for many
years, and, after Alva died, Douglas and Peggy assisted Walter  with his
meals and took him to appointments.  Peggy noticed that, around 2006, 
Walter began getting a "little confused," and she then began assisting him
with balancing his checkbook when he would get confused and make
mistakes. 
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Robert did not visit with Walter much before Alva's death because
of Alva's dislike of Robert. However, after Alva's death, Robert started
visiting Walter frequently and began taking Walter to certain places and
appointments, such as the barbershop and doctor appointments.  Peggy
testified that, by 2008, Walter did not really trust anybody but Robert and
that Robert had "spread his wings over Walter." Peggy further stated that
Robert had started turning Walter against Douglas by telling Walter that
Douglas was "no good" and "not a Christian."  Peggy testified that Walter's
mental condition was further "slipping" during this time.    
Eventually Douglas and Peggy discovered that Walter had written
approximately $40,000 worth of checks to Robert and that Robert was
exuberant to learn that Walter had an additional $39,000 in the bank,
allegedly exclaiming to Walter that "we got to get my money."   
Walter had some medical setbacks and hospitalizations that
ultimately led to Walter's moving in with Robert and his family in July
2012. Walter became totally dependant on Robert and his family for his
care.  Douglas and Peggy refused to visit Walter on a regular basis while
he was living at Robert's home because, they asserted, the atmosphere at
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Robert's home was "hostile" and it was not a "good place to be" because
Robert would "sit right there on top of [Walter]" and monitor his 
conversations. 
A mental examination conducted by Dr. Fennell as part of the
guardianship and conservatorship proceedings indicated that Walter had
a mild impairment. Walter was appointed a temporary conservator in
March 2013. In December 2013, Walter executed the 2013 will, in which
he stated that he had no children and that Douglas was his stepson when,
in fact, Douglas is Walter's son. The 2013 will was prepared by an
attorney who had previously represented Robert, and Robert accompanied
Walter to the attorney's office on the day the will was executed.
Approximately one month after the 2013 will was executed, the probate
court, following a hearing, entered an order finding that Walter lacked the
mental capacity to handle his affairs and appointed a permanent
conservator for Walter.  Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the
circuit court erred in entering a judgment on the jury's verdict in favor of
Douglas in the will contest.
Conclusion
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Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's judgment
entered on the jury verdict in this case.
AFFIRMED.
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, Stewart, and
Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Sellers, J., concurs in the result.
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