Title: Sojenhomer LLC v. Village of Egg Harbor
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2021AP001589
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 19, 2024

2024 WI 25 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP1589 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Sojenhomer LLC, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Village of Egg Harbor, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 407 Wis. 2d 587, 990 N.W.2d 267 
(2023 - published) 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 19, 2024   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 19, 2023   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Door  
 
JUDGE: 
David L. Weber   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, KAROFSKY, and PROTASIEWICZ, JJ., 
joined. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Richard J. Carlson, Ashley C. Lehocky and Town Counsel 
Law & Litigation, LLC, Kaukauna. There was an oral argument by 
Ashley C. Lehocky.  
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Tyler D. Pluff, Jon R. Pinkert, and Pinkert Law Firm LLP, 
Sturgeon Bay. There was an oral argument by Tyler D. Pluff.
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Clayton P. Kawski, 
assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was Joshua L. 
Kaul, attorney general, on behalf of Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation. There was an oral argument by Clayton P. Kawski, 
assistant attorney general.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Ryan Sendelbach, Claire 
Silverman, and League of Wisconsin Municipalities, Madison, on 
behalf of League of Wisconsin Municipalities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2024 WI 25 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2021AP1589 
(L.C. No. 
2020CV101) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Sojenhomer LLC, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Village of Egg Harbor, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JUN 19, 2024 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, KAROFSKY, and PROTASIEWICZ, JJ., 
joined. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   The Village of Egg Harbor 
had a problem.  The busy intersection of County Highway G and 
State Highway 42 was dangerous for both pedestrians and 
motorists.  Building a sidewalk along the east side of County 
Highway G would help solve the problem, but it required 
condemnation of .009 acres of property belonging to Sojenhomer 
LLC. 
No. 
2021AP1589   
 
3 
 
¶2 
Sojenhomer contested the condemnation, arguing that it 
violates Wis. Stat. §§ 32.015 and 61.34(3)(b) (2021-22).1  Those 
statutes 
provide 
that 
property 
cannot 
be 
acquired 
by 
condemnation to establish or extend a "pedestrian way," a phrase 
that Wis. Stat. § 346.02(8)(a) defines as "a walk designated for 
the use of pedestrian travel."  Sojenhomer argues that sidewalks 
are pedestrian ways, and that the Village therefore lacked 
authority to condemn the property to build a sidewalk.     
 
¶3 
We disagree.  When read in context, the definition of 
pedestrian way in § 346.02(8)(a) does not include sidewalks.  
Accordingly, we hold that §§ 32.015 and 61.34(3)(b) did not 
prohibit the Village from condemning Sojenhomer's property, and 
reverse the court of appeals' contrary decision.   
I 
 
¶4 
The Village began focusing on the safety issues with 
County Highway G around 2015.  Residents had voiced numerous 
concerns about the road, including that it was "too narrow" and 
lacked both adequate parking and "a safe place for pedestrians 
to walk."   
 
¶5 
In response to these complaints, the Village retained 
an engineering firm to study the problems and propose solutions.  
An engineer first summarized the issues, noting that the road 
had "no discernable ditches or storm sewer," which led to "on-
street flooding during large rain events as well as icing issues 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2021AP1589   
 
4 
 
in the winter months."  He also explained that there was "no 
continuous sidewalk for pedestrians," and that during the peak 
summer season, "the effective width of the roadway is narrowed 
due to parking on both sides of the roadway which further 
reduces 
the 
area 
available 
for 
pedestrians." 
 
This 
was 
particularly problematic since pedestrians often used County 
Highway G to access a nearby trail, and had to cross the road at 
a curve with limited visibility.   
 
¶6 
Together with the engineering firm, the Village 
developed a plan to address these safety concerns.  The plan 
included adding storm sewers, buried utility lines, and new 
street lighting; limiting parking to the west side of the road; 
improving crosswalks; and adding a new sidewalk on the east side 
of the road where Sojenhomer's property sits.  The Village 
planned to use its condemnation powers under Wis. Stat. §§ 32.05 
and 61.34 to acquire the property necessary for the project, 
including .009 acres that belonged to Sojenhomer.2  It is 
undisputed that the Village's sole reason for acquiring the .009 
acres was to build a sidewalk at that location.   
¶7 
Sojenhomer operates the Shipwrecked Brew Pub and 
Restaurant (the dark structure on the right side of the photo 
below) on the property, and previously used the .009 acres for 
parking, as depicted here:   
                                                 
2 The Village simultaneously sought to acquire a temporary 
limited easement over .071 acres of Sojenhomer's property for 
construction purposes.  That temporary limited easement is not 
at issue in this case.   
No. 
2021AP1589   
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶8 
Sojenhomer 
brought 
suit 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.05(5),3 which authorizes a landowner to challenge a 
municipality's right to take the landowner's property "for any 
reason other than that the amount of compensation offered is 
                                                 
3 The court of appeals noted that even though Sojenhomer's 
complaint did not cite § 32.05(5), it "appear[ed] to fall under" 
that statute.  See Sojenhomer LLC v. Village of Egg Harbor, 2023 
WI App 20, ¶9 n.2, 407 Wis. 2d 587, 990 N.W.2d 267.  In its 
briefing before this court, Sojenhomer confirms that this case 
is a "challenge of [a] taking under Wis. Stat. Sec. 32.05(5)."   
No. 
2021AP1589   
 
6 
 
inadequate."4  Id.; see also Christus Lutheran Church v. DOT, 
2021 WI 30, ¶¶23-24, 396 Wis. 2d 302, 956 N.W.2d 837 (explaining 
that 
an 
action 
pursuant 
to 
§ 32.05(5) 
may 
challenge 
a 
municipality's statutory authority to condemn the property).  In 
its complaint, Sojenhomer contended that the condemnation was 
prohibited by Wis. Stat. § 32.015, which bars the use of 
condemnation to acquire property to establish or extend "a 
pedestrian way . . . ."  See also Wis. Stat. § 61.34(3)(b) 
(imposing a similar restriction specifically on villages).  
According to Sojenhomer, sidewalks are pedestrian ways, and as a 
result, the Village may not condemn its property to build a 
sidewalk.   
 
¶9 
The circuit court5 granted summary judgment in the 
Village's favor.  As the circuit court explained, Sojenhomer's 
complaint depended on its central contention that sidewalks are 
                                                 
4 The statutory process for condemnation differs depending 
on the reason the municipality wants to condemn the property.  
Here the parties agree that the Village was required to, and 
did, comply with the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 32.05, which 
applies when a village seeks to condemn property for "public 
alleys, streets, [or] highways . . . ."  Pursuant to the 
requirements of that section, the Village issued a relocation 
order, obtained an appraisal of Sojenhomer's property, provided 
that appraisal to Sojenhomer, and attempted to negotiate a sale.  
See § 32.05(1)(a), (2)(a)-(b), (2a).  After Sojenhomer obtained 
a competing appraisal, and the parties were unable to reach a 
negotiated 
sale 
of 
the 
property, 
the 
Village 
made 
a 
substantially 
higher 
jurisdictional 
offer 
pursuant 
to 
§ 32.05(3).  Sojenhomer did not accept the jurisdictional offer, 
and instead brought this case.  See § 32.05(5).   
5 The Honorable David L. Weber of the Door County Circuit 
Court presided. 
No. 
2021AP1589   
 
7 
 
"pedestrian ways" as defined in Wis. Stat. § 346.02(8)(a).  The 
circuit court rejected that contention, however, concluding that 
"no sidewalks are pedestrian ways and no pedestrian ways are 
sidewalks."  That conclusion rested on two premises.  First, 
that sidewalks are defined by Wis. Stat. § 340.01(58) as part of 
the 
roadway, 
and 
municipalities 
indisputably 
may 
condemn 
property to expand roads.  See Wis. Stat. § 32.05.  And second, 
that reading "pedestrian way" to include sidewalks would result 
in surplusage, since § 346.02(8)(a) and (b) refer to both 
sidewalks and pedestrian ways.  Based on these premises, the 
circuit court held that "a sidewalk is not a pedestrian way," 
and thus that § 32.015 did not prohibit the Village from 
condemning Sojenhomer's property to build the sidewalk.   
 
¶10 Sojenhomer 
appealed, 
and 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed.  Like the circuit court, the court of appeals framed 
the central question as "whether a sidewalk is a 'pedestrian 
way' as that term is used in both Wis. Stat. §§ 32.015 and 
61.34(3)(b)."  Sojenhomer LLC v. Village of Egg Harbor, 2023 WI 
App 20, ¶25, 407 Wis. 2d 587, 990 N.W.2d 267.  The court of 
appeals concluded that all sidewalks are pedestrian ways because 
they fall within the "broad" and "general definition" of 
pedestrian way:  "[A] walk designated for the use of pedestrian 
travel."  Id., ¶26; see also § 346.02(8)(a).  Additionally, the 
court of appeals rejected the circuit court's concern that this 
interpretation would result in surplusage in § 346.02(8)(a) and 
(b), because "the term pedestrian ways is broader than the term 
sidewalks."  Sojenhomer, 407 Wis. 2d 587, ¶30.  For that reason, 
No. 
2021AP1589   
 
8 
 
the court of appeals concluded that these statutes' use of both 
the terms "pedestrian way" and "sidewalk" "still serves a 
necessary function even though the term 'pedestrian ways' 
includes sidewalks."  Id.; see also id., ¶31.  Therefore, the 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
decision 
dismissing the case.   
II 
 
¶11 This case involves statutory interpretation, which is 
a question of law that we review de novo.  See, e.g., Clean 
Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 2021 WI 72, ¶10, 398 Wis. 2d 433, 961 
N.W.2d 611. "When interpreting statutes, we start with the text, 
and if its meaning is plain on its face, we stop there."  Id.  
We also consider the broader statutory context, interpreting 
language consistently with how it is used in closely related 
statutes.  Id.  In doing so, we "generally give words their 
common, everyday meaning, but we give legal terms of art their 
accepted legal meaning."   State v. Kizer, 2022 WI 58, ¶6, 403 
Wis. 2d 142, 976 N.W.2d 356 (quoting another source).  
III 
¶12 The issue in this case is whether sidewalks are 
"pedestrian ways" as that term is defined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.02(8)(a).  If sidewalks are pedestrian ways, then the 
parties 
agree 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 32.015 
and 
61.34(3)(b) 
prohibited the Village from acquiring Sojenhomer's property to 
build one.  That is because both §§ 32.015 and 61.34(3)(b) 
No. 
2021AP1589   
 
9 
 
prohibit the use of condemnation to acquire property to 
establish or extend "a pedestrian way,"6 and it is undisputed 
that the reason the Village sought to acquire Sojenhomer's 
property was to build a sidewalk as part of its broader 
reconstruction of County Highway G.  See §§ 32.015, 61.34(3)(b).  
If sidewalks are not pedestrian ways, however, the condemnation 
was permissible under the Village's general authority to condemn 
property for road projects.  See Wis. Stat. § 61.34(3)(a) 
(stating that, except for the purpose of establishing or 
extending pedestrian ways, villages may acquire property by 
condemnation for public purposes, including roads, and that 
condemnation under that subsection "shall be as provided by ch. 
32").  
¶13 Sojenhomer argues that sidewalks are pedestrian ways.  
It 
asserts 
that 
the 
definition 
of 
"pedestrian 
way" 
in 
§ 346.02(8)(a) is broad, and encompasses all "walk[s] designated 
for 
the 
use 
of 
pedestrian 
travel" 
including 
sidewalks, 
recreational trails, walking paths, and anything else designed 
for use by pedestrians, regardless of location.    
                                                 
6 Section 32.015 states that "[p]roperty may not be acquired 
by condemnation to establish or extend . . . a pedestrian way, 
as defined in s. 346.02(8)(a)."  Section 61.34(3)(b) states that 
village boards "may not use the power of condemnation to acquire 
property for the purpose of establishing or extending . . . a 
pedestrian way, as defined in s. 346.02(8)(a)."  Neither party 
suggests that the slight differences in wording in these two 
sections (i.e. "to establish or extend" and "for the purpose of 
establishing or extending") is material.   
No. 
2021AP1589   
 
10 
 
¶14 The Village, however, urges a contextual reading of 
the definition of "pedestrian way," emphasizing how the rest of 
§ 346.02(8) and related statutes indicate that sidewalks and 
pedestrian ways are two entirely distinct, non-overlapping 
categories.  Thus, the Village argues that the limitations on 
condemnation in §§ 32.015 and 61.34(3)(b) do not apply to 
sidewalks at all.   
¶15 We agree with the Village.  The ordinary meaning of a 
statute is dictated by more than the literal meaning of a single 
phrase, read in isolation.  Rather, as we have emphasized 
before, statutes must be interpreted in their entirety, and in 
context. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Clean 
Wis., 
398 
Wis. 2d 433, 
¶10.  
Following 
that 
directive, 
we 
first 
analyze 
the 
text 
of 
§ 346.02(8) as a whole.  Then, we evaluate the statutory history 
and 
other 
related 
statutory 
provisions, 
before 
finally 
addressing the text of the limitations on condemnation contained 
in §§ 32.015 and 61.34(3)(b).  With the full statutory context 
in mind, we conclude that the definition of "pedestrian way" in 
§ 346.02(8)(a), and the limitations on condemnation in §§ 32.015 
and 61.34(3)(b), unambiguously exclude sidewalks.7  Accordingly, 
                                                 
7 When a condemnation statute is ambiguous, we "strictly 
construe the condemnor's power . . . while liberally construing 
provisions favoring the landowner . . . ."  Waller v. Am. 
Transmission Co., LLC, 2013 WI 77, ¶72, 350 Wis. 2d 242, 833 
N.W.2d 764 (quoting another source).  Because the statutes at 
issue are not ambiguous, we do not apply this principle of 
interpretation.  See DOJ v. DWD, 2015 WI 114, ¶32, 365 
Wis. 2d 694, 875 N.W.2d 545 ("[A] provision can be construed 
'liberally' as opposed to 'strictly' only when there is some 
ambiguity to construe." (quoting another source)).   
No. 
2021AP1589   
 
11 
 
we hold that §§ 32.015 and 61.34(3)(b) did not prohibit the 
Village from condemning Sojenhomer's property to build a 
sidewalk.   
A 
¶16 We begin with the full text of Wis. Stat. § 346.02(8), 
which provides: 
(8) Applicability to pedestrian ways 
(a) All of the applicable provisions of this 
chapter 
pertaining 
to 
highways, 
streets, 
alleys, roadways and sidewalks also apply to 
pedestrian ways.  A pedestrian way means a 
walk designated for the use of pedestrian 
travel. 
(b) Public utilities may be installed either 
above 
or 
below 
a 
pedestrian 
way, 
and 
assessments may be made therefor as if such 
pedestrian way were a highway, street, alley, 
roadway or sidewalk.   
¶17 To summarize, § 346.02(8) does three things.  First, 
it defines "pedestrian way" as "a walk designated for the use of 
pedestrian travel."  § 346.02(8)(a).  Second, it makes clear 
that all of the provisions of Wis. Stat. ch. 346 (titled "Rules 
of the Road") pertaining to highways, streets, alleys, roadways, 
and sidewalks also apply to pedestrian ways.  See id.  Third, 
and finally, it specifies that utilities may be installed above 
or below pedestrian ways, and assessments may be made for 
pedestrian ways, "as if" the pedestrian way were a sidewalk (or 
a highway, street, alley, or roadway).  § 346.02(8)(b). 
¶18 Reading the text of this section as a whole, we find 
several indications that the definition of pedestrian way does 
No. 
2021AP1589   
 
12 
 
not include sidewalks.   For starters, both § 346.02(8)(a) and 
(b) use the terms "sidewalk" and "pedestrian way" in ways that 
signify that each term has a separate, non-overlapping meaning.  
See Augsburger v. Homestead Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 133, ¶17, 359 
Wis. 2d 385, 856 N.W.2d 874 (explaining that when statutes use 
different terms "we generally consider each [term] separately 
and presume that different words have different meanings" 
(quoting another source)).  Section 346.02(8)(b) states that 
pedestrian ways shall be treated "as if" they were sidewalks for 
utility installation and assessment purposes.  The phrase "as 
if" signals that one category (pedestrian ways) should receive 
the same treatment as a different category (sidewalks).  That is 
the same way the legislature used "as if" in, for example, Wis. 
Stat. § 53.03, which states that Wisconsin courts "may treat a 
foreign country as if it were a state" in guardianship 
proceedings.8  See id. (emphasis added).  Just as foreign 
                                                 
8 In numerous other statutes, the legislature used the 
phrase "as if" in this same way.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 814.15 
(specifying that non-party assignees of civil causes of action 
are liable for costs "in the same manner as if the [assignee] 
were a party"); Wis. Stat. § 66.1105(5)(bf) (providing that 
specified tax forms and applications filed before May 31, 1999 
should be treated "as if the forms and application had been 
filed on or before December 31, 1997"); Wis. Stat. § 815.40(2) 
(stating that heirs, devisees, or grantees who receive title to 
a portion of a lot or parcel may be treated "as if" they 
received title to "the whole lot or parcel" in certain 
instances); Wis. Stat. § 645.63(1) (noting that one type of 
contingent insurance claim "shall be considered and allowed as 
if there were no such contingency").  Each time, the meaning is 
the same:  Something outside a specified category should be 
treated as if it falls within that category.    
No. 
2021AP1589   
 
13 
 
countries are not states, but should be treated as if they were 
for guardianship purposes, pedestrian ways are not sidewalks, 
but should be treated as if they were for utility-installation 
and assessment purposes.   
¶19 The language of § 346.02(8)(a) also suggests that 
sidewalks are not pedestrian ways.  That paragraph makes the 
rules of the road pertaining to sidewalks also applicable to 
pedestrian ways.  But if sidewalks are pedestrian ways, then the 
rules of the road applicable to sidewalks would already apply to 
pedestrian ways.  The point here, to be clear, is not that 
reading the term "pedestrian way" to include sidewalks would 
result in surplusage.  Although the court of appeals, the 
circuit court, and the parties all devoted substantial attention 
to 
whether 
the 
side-by-side 
references 
to 
sidewalks 
and 
pedestrian ways in § 346.02(8)(a) result in surplusage, we do 
not rely on the surplusage canon.  See State v. Rector, 2023 WI 
41, ¶19, 407 Wis. 2d 321, 990 N.W.2d 213 ("[S]tatuory language 
is read where possible to give reasonable effect to every word, 
in order to avoid surplusage." (quoting another source)).  
Rather, we rely on the side-by-side references to sidewalks and 
pedestrian ways in § 346.02(8) simply because the text itself 
indicates that these terms have separate, non-overlapping 
meanings.    
 
¶20 Additionally, 
interpreting 
the 
definition 
of 
"pedestrian way" to include all sidewalks requires us to read 
additional language into § 346.02(8)(a) and (b).  If Sojenhomer 
were right, and sidewalks are pedestrian ways, then we have to 
No. 
2021AP1589   
 
14 
 
read § 346.02(8)(a) and (b) as follows, with the additional 
language underlined: 
a)  All of the applicable provisions of this 
chapter 
pertaining 
to 
highways, 
streets, 
alleys, roadways and sidewalks also apply to 
pedestrian ways that are not sidewalks.  A 
pedestrian way means a walk designated for 
the use of pedestrian travel. 
(b) Public utilities may be installed either 
above 
or 
below 
a 
pedestrian 
way, 
and 
assessments may be made therefor as if such 
pedestrian way that is not a sidewalk were a 
highway, street, alley, roadway or sidewalk.  
As we have often said, we interpret the statutory language the 
legislature enacted, and will not read into a statute language 
that it does not contain or reasonably imply.  See, e.g., State 
v. Hinkle, 2019 WI 96, ¶18, 389 Wis. 2d 1, 935 N.W.2d 271; State 
v. Fitzgerald, 2019 WI 69, ¶30, 387 Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165.  
When we interpret the words the legislature enacted, without 
adding 
any 
additional 
language, 
it 
is 
apparent 
that 
§ 346.02(8)(a) and (b) simply clarify that a set of rules that 
would not otherwise apply to pedestrian ways (the rules of the 
road, utility-installation, and assessment provisions governing 
highways, 
streets, 
alleys, 
roadways, 
and 
sidewalks) 
are 
applicable.   
B 
 
¶21 Statutory history and the broader statutory context 
lend further support to our conclusion that sidewalks fall 
outside 
the 
definition 
of 
pedestrian 
way. 
 
The 
phrase 
"pedestrian way" first entered the statutes in 1949, when the 
No. 
2021AP1589   
 
15 
 
legislature adopted Wis. Stat. § 85.10(21)(g) (1949-50), and had 
the same definition as it does today:  "[A] walk designated for 
the use of pedestrian travel."  Id.9  That same section, § 85.10 
(1949-50), already contained a definition of "sidewalk":  "That 
portion of a highway between the curb lines and the adjacent 
property lines, unless local authorities designate otherwise."  
Wis. Stat. § 85.10(24) (1949-50).  This definition of sidewalk 
was subsequently modified to the one in force today, "that 
portion of a highway between the curb lines, or the lateral 
lines of a roadway, and the adjacent property lines, constructed 
for use of pedestrians."10  See Wis. Stat. § 340.01(58) (1957-
58).  As this history demonstrates, the legislature has always 
treated sidewalks and pedestrian ways as different things, with 
separate statutory definitions.   
¶22 Additionally, this history shows that "sidewalk" has——
from the beginning——been a term of art whose meaning differs 
dramatically from the ordinary meaning of that word.  Although 
one might ordinarily think of a sidewalk as separate from the 
highway, street, or alley it adjoins, the statutes have long 
defined sidewalks as part of that adjoining highway or roadway.  
                                                 
9 Additionally, 
the 
two 
other 
provisions 
relating 
to 
pedestrian ways in today's § 346.02(8)(a) and (b) also existed 
in substantially similar form in 1949.   
10 This modification clarified that sidewalks were not every 
portion of a highway between the curb lines and adjacent 
property lines, but only included such areas "constructed for 
use of pedestrians."  See Wis. Stat. § 340.01(58) (1957-58); see 
also 1957 Senate Bill 99, explanatory note. 
No. 
2021AP1589   
 
16 
 
Compare Wis. Stat. § 340.01(58), with Merriam-Webster, Sidewalk, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sidewalk 
("[A] 
usually paved walk for pedestrians at the side of a street.").  
Both "highway" and "roadway" are defined terms as well, meaning 
"all public ways and thoroughfares and bridges on the same" and 
"that portion of a highway between the regularly established 
curb lines or that portion which is improved, designed or 
ordinarily used for vehicular travel, excluding the berm or 
shoulder."  Wis. Stat. § 340.01(22), (54).  Because these terms 
are statutorily defined, their ordinary, dictionary definitions 
are 
irrelevant. 
 
See 
Rector, 
407 
Wis. 2d 321, 
¶10 
("In 
discerning plain meaning, we . . . give 'technical or specially-
defined 
words 
or 
phrases' 
their 
'technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning.'" (quoting another source)).   
 
¶23 The 
operative 
verbs 
in 
the 
separate 
statutory 
definitions 
of 
"pedestrian 
way" 
and 
"sidewalk" 
further 
demonstrate that these terms refer to different, distinct 
things.  Pedestrian ways are "walk[s] designated for the use of 
pedestrian travel," while sidewalks are a portion of the 
adjoining 
highway 
or 
roadway 
"constructed 
for 
use 
of 
pedestrians."  See §§ 346.02(8)(a), 340.01(58) (emphasis added).  
Whereas sidewalks are and always must be part of the adjoining 
highway, a pedestrian way may be created by designating a path 
or road as such.  Indeed, the first time the legislature used 
the term pedestrian way (other than in § 85.10(21)(g) (1949-
50)), it did so in this manner.  In that statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 83.42(6) (1973-74), the legislature authorized county highway 
No. 
2021AP1589   
 
17 
 
committees 
(with 
the 
approval 
of 
the 
Department 
of 
Transportation's rustic roads board) to "[d]esignate a rustic 
road or portion thereof as a pedestrian way or bicycle way or 
both."  See also 1983 Wis. Act 55 (repealing § 83.42(6) (1981-
82)).  This too suggests that pedestrian way refers to something 
narrower and more specific than all sidewalks.   
 
¶24 If 
Sojenhomer's 
broad 
reading 
were 
nevertheless 
correct, then we might expect to find evidence of that expansive 
meaning in other statutes referring to pedestrian ways.  But in 
fact, the phrase "pedestrian way" was all but ignored by the 
legislature for decades after it was adopted.  Before 1973, the 
only place the statutes referenced pedestrian ways was in the 
statutes defining that term, § 346.02(8) (1971-72) and its 
predecessor, § 85.10(21)(g) (1949-50).  And between 1973 (when 
the rustic roads statute we just mentioned was adopted) and 
2009,11 the legislature used the phrase "pedestrian way" just 
                                                 
11 In 2009, the legislature adopted Wis. Stat. § 84.01(35) 
(2009-10), which provided (subject to exceptions identified in 
rules promulgated by the Department of Transportation) that the 
Department "shall ensure that bikeways and pedestrian ways are 
established in all new highway construction and reconstruction 
projects funded in whole or in part from state funds or federal 
funds."  Section 84.01(35) was subsequently amended to require 
only that "the department . . . give due consideration to 
establishing bikeways and pedestrian ways in all new highway 
construction and reconstruction projects funded in whole or in 
part from state funds or federal funds."  § 84.01(35) (2021-22).   
No. 
2021AP1589   
 
18 
 
once.  That reference, defining "skywalk" as "any elevated 
pedestrian way," occurred in an act creating a comprehensive 
statutory scheme authorizing first-class cities to establish 
pedestrian malls.  See 1975 Wis. Act 255, § 2, codified at Wis. 
Stat. § 66.610(2)(o) (1975-76) ("'Skywalk' means any elevated 
pedestrian way.").  Notably, the legislature did not use the 
phrase "pedestrian way" elsewhere in that same statutory scheme 
even when it would fit.  For example, the legislature did not 
refer to pedestrian ways when it defined "pedestrian mall" to 
mean "any street, land or appurtenant fixture designed primarily 
for 
the 
movement, 
safety, 
convenience 
and 
enjoyment 
of 
pedestrians," even though a pedestrian mall would seemingly fall 
within 
Sojenhomer's 
broad 
reading 
of 
the 
definition 
of 
pedestrian way.  See 1975 Wis. Act 255, § 2, codified at Wis. 
Stat. § 66.610(2)(l) (1975-76).  The broader statutory history 
and context thus suggest that the legislature did not share 
Sojenhomer's broad understanding of the definition of pedestrian 
way.   
                                                                                                                                                             
This statute sheds little light on whether sidewalks are 
pedestrian ways.  To be sure, it suggests there is some 
connection between pedestrian ways and highways.  And highways 
can include sidewalks.  See Wis. Stat. § 340.01(58).  But this 
provision does not say whether a pedestrian way can be a part of 
a highway, let alone that sidewalks are a type of pedestrian 
way.  Instead, it simply directs the Department to consider 
establishing 
pedestrian 
ways 
in 
the 
context 
of 
highway 
construction and reconstruction projects.  See § 84.01(35).    
No. 
2021AP1589   
 
19 
 
C 
 
¶25 Finally, we find it significant that the legislature 
chose to omit sidewalks from the limitations on condemnation in 
Wis. Stat. §§ 32.015 and 61.34(3)(b).  These provisions both 
state that condemnation may not be used to acquire property to 
establish or extend "a recreational trail; a bicycle way, as 
defined in s. 340.01(5s); a bicycle lane, as defined in s. 
340.01(5e); or a pedestrian way, as defined in s. 346.02(8)(a)."  
See §§ 32.015; 61.34(3)(b).  This list is specific and, notably, 
identifies both bicycle lanes——which, like sidewalks, are 
statutorily defined as part of a highway or roadway, see Wis. 
Stat. § 340.01(5e)——and bicycle ways.  In other words, by using 
both the terms "bicycle way" and "bicycle lane," the legislature 
made particularly clear in both §§ 32.015 and 61.34(3)(b) that 
establishing or expanding on-road or off-road bicycle access 
through condemnation was not permitted.  But when it came to 
pedestrian 
access, 
the 
legislature 
used 
only 
the 
terms 
"recreational trail" and "pedestrian way," neither of which 
expressly include sidewalks or any other part of a highway or 
roadway.  See Wis. Stat. § 340.01(58).   
 
¶26 Sidewalks are not unusual or unfamiliar.  Rather, they 
are a ubiquitous feature of road projects across the state.  If 
the legislature wanted to prohibit the use of condemnation to 
build sidewalks anywhere in the state, then they could have done 
so clearly.  And it would have been easy to do so, either by 
specifically referencing sidewalks in §§ 32.015 and 61.34(3)(b), 
or by adding them to the definition of pedestrian way in Wis. 
No. 
2021AP1589   
 
20 
 
Stat. § 346.02(8)(a).  But they did not.  Instead, they 
incorporated a seldom-used phrase, "pedestrian way," which 
context and history indicate does not include sidewalks.  Given 
that, we conclude that the definition of "pedestrian way" in 
§ 346.02(8)(a) does not include sidewalks, and accordingly hold 
that 
the 
limitations 
on 
condemnation 
in 
§§ 
32.015 
and 
61.34(3)(b) did not prohibit the Village from condemning 
Sojenhomer's property to build a sidewalk.   
By the Court.—the decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
1 
 
¶27 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
C.J.   (dissenting).  
Wisconsin Statutes provide that a village may not acquire 
private property by condemnation to establish a "pedestrian 
way."1  The Village of Egg Harbor ("Village") condemned part of 
Sojenhomer 
LLC's 
("Sojenhomer") 
property 
to 
establish 
a 
sidewalk.  Whether a sidewalk is a "pedestrian way" is the issue 
before our court.  The trial court said "no."  The court of 
appeals said "yes."  I agree with the court of appeals.   
¶28 I agree with the analysis of the court of appeals, 
which held that the Village improperly used the power of 
condemnation to acquire Sojenhomer's property to build a 
sidewalk.  The plain language of the statute demonstrates that 
the term "pedestrian way" is broadly defined, and includes 
sidewalks.  A sidewalk——that portion of the highway created for 
the travel of persons on foot——is clearly a subset of pedestrian 
ways——walks set apart or assigned for the use of pedestrian 
travel.  It is a straightforward, common sense interpretation of 
the statutory language that a "walk designated for the use of 
pedestrian travel" necessarily includes that part of the highway 
"constructed for the use of pedestrians" and intended "for the 
use of persons on foot."  The Village exceeded its condemnation 
authority 
when 
it 
acquired 
Sojenhomer's 
property 
through 
condemnation to construct a sidewalk.  In other words, a closer 
look at the plain meaning of the statutes reveals that all 
sidewalks are pedestrian ways, but that not all pedestrian ways 
are sidewalks.  As a result, the Village cannot condemn this 
                                                 
1 Wis. Stat. § 32.015; Wis. Stat. § 61.34(3)(b).  
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
2 
 
property.  I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
Accordingly, I dissent.    
I 
¶29 It is undisputed that pursuant to its eminent domain 
authority, the Village condemned Sojenhomer's property to build 
a sidewalk as part of its plan to reconstruct portions of County 
Highway G.  Sojenhomer brought suit against the Village, arguing 
that the Village violated Wis. Stat. § 32.015's and Wis. Stat. 
§ 61.34(3)(b)'s 
prohibitions 
against 
villages 
using 
their 
condemnation 
powers 
for 
the 
purposes 
of 
establishing 
or 
extending a pedestrian way.  Sojenhomer argues that the 
statutory definition of a pedestrian way is broad enough to 
include a sidewalk.  Thus, as Sojenhomer argues, the Village 
violated the statute when it condemned and acquired his property 
to construct a sidewalk, as a sidewalk is a subset of a 
pedestrian way.   
¶30 The Village argues that it took Sojenhomer's property 
to construct a sidewalk, not a pedestrian way, and so the taking 
was justified pursuant to their condemnation powers.  In other 
words, the Village argues that the two terms have no overlap and 
a sidewalk is not a pedestrian way.  
¶31 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  
The circuit court denied Sojenhomer's motion for summary 
judgment.  The circuit court agreed with the Village that 
pedestrian ways and sidewalks are two distinct terms and granted 
the Village's summary judgment motion.  In its accompanying 
order, the circuit court concluded that as a matter of law, the 
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
3 
 
Village did not exceed Wis. Stat. § 32.015's restrictions on its 
condemnation authority when the Village condemned Sojenhomer's 
property to, among other things, construct a sidewalk.  The 
circuit 
court 
interpreted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.02(8)(a)'s 
"pedestrian way" as separate and distinct from its definition of 
a sidewalk, based at least in part on the fact that both terms 
appear in the statute, so the Legislature would have intended 
the terms to have different and distinct meanings to avoid 
surplusage.  The circuit court treated pedestrian ways as 
separate and distinct from sidewalks.   
¶32 Sojenhomer appealed.  The court of appeals reversed 
the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the Village.  
Agreeing with Sojenhomer, the court of appeals held the general 
definition of a pedestrian way in Wis. Stat. § 346.02(8)(a) is 
"broad" 
enough 
that 
a 
pedestrian 
way 
"plainly" 
includes 
sidewalks.  Sojenhomer LLC v. Village of Egg Harbor, 2023 WI App 
20, ¶2, 407 Wis. 2d 587, 990 N.W.2d 267.  The court of appeals 
continued: 
As Sojenhomer correctly observes, the general 
definition 
of 
pedestrian 
way 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
346.02(8)(a) is broader than the definition of a 
sidewalk because a pedestrian way can——but need not——
be adjacent to a roadway.  In other words, the term 
pedestrian way includes both:   (1) sidewalks——i.e., 
walks adjacent to a roadway for the use of pedestrian 
travel, see Wis. Stat. § 340.01(58); and (2) all other 
walks designated for pedestrian travel that are not 
adjacent to a roadway, such as a walking path through 
a parcel of property.  
Id., ¶29. 
¶33 The court of appeals determined that interpreting 
pedestrian ways in this way would not create surplusage in Wis. 
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
4 
 
Stat. § 346.02(8)(a).  "Because the term pedestrian ways is 
broader than the term sidewalks, the inclusion of the term 
sidewalks in para. (a) makes the provisions pertaining to 
sidewalks in ch. 346 applicable to all pedestrian ways that are 
not sidewalks."  Sojenhomer, 407 Wis. 2d 587, ¶30.  The court of 
appeals also determined that interpreting pedestrian ways in 
this 
way 
would 
not 
create 
surplusage 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.02(8)(b) either.  "[B]ecause the term pedestrian way is 
broader than the term sidewalk, the term sidewalk in para. (b) 
serves the purpose of permitting a pedestrian way that is not a 
sidewalk to be treated as if it were a sidewalk for assessment 
purposes."  Id., ¶31.  The court of appeals concluded that 
the two terms do not create surplusage in the statutes 
because each term has a textual function and neither 
term could be omitted without changing the meaning of 
those provisions. 
. . .  
Put differently, if the word "sidewalks" were omitted 
from para. (a), then the provisions pertaining to 
sidewalks in ch. 346 would not apply to pedestrian 
ways that are not sidewalks.  Accordingly, the term 
"sidewalks" still serves a necessary function even 
though the term "pedestrian ways" includes sidewalks. 
. . .  
Of course, we recognize that there is some 
overlap in Wis. Stat. § 346.02(8) by interpreting the 
term pedestrian way to include sidewalks, but such 
overlap does not create surplusage or render any 
language meaningless. 
Id., ¶¶3, 30, 32. 
¶34 Hence, all sidewalks are a type of the broader defined 
pedestrian way.  But not all pedestrian ways are sidewalks.  
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
5 
 
Accordingly, the court of appeals held that for purposes of 
interpreting and applying Wis. Stat. § 32.015 and Wis. Stat. 
§ 61.34(3)(b), a sidewalk is a pedestrian way, so "the Village 
used the power of condemnation to establish a pedestrian way, in 
violation of [§ ]32.015 and [§ ]61.34(3)(b)."  Id., ¶4.   
¶35 The court of appeals also considered the Village's 
public safety concerns and concluded neither Wis. Stat. § 32.015 
nor Wis. Stat. § 61.34(3)(b) "create any exceptions, much less 
an exception for safety concerns."  Id., ¶46.  Thus, the court 
of appeals reasoned that when the Village used its powers of 
condemnation to acquire Sojenhomer's property to construct a 
sidewalk, the Village violated § 32.015's and § 61.34(3)(b)'s 
prohibitions against a village acquiring property through its 
condemnation authority to establish or extend a pedestrian way.  
¶36 Unlike my colleagues, I would affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals.  Sound statutory construction principles 
dictate that a sidewalk is a pedestrian way, but a pedestrian 
way need not be limited to a sidewalk.  It is the Legislature 
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
6 
 
that legislates policy choices, not the court.2  So, we must 
analyze the plain language of the statutes to find the statute's 
plain meaning. 
II 
¶37 This case requires us to interpret and consider the 
term "pedestrian way" in Wis. Stat. § 32.015 (and its corollary 
Wis. Stat. § 61.34(3)(b)).3  More specifically, if a "sidewalk" 
is a "pedestrian way," then the Village is statutorily forbidden 
from seizing Sojenhomer's private property via condemnation in 
order to construct a sidewalk.  If a "sidewalk" is not a 
                                                 
2 "Judicial deference to the policy choices enacted into law 
by the legislature requires that statutory interpretation focus 
primarily on the language of the statute."  State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  "In construing or interpreting a statute the 
court is not at liberty to disregard the plain, clear words of 
the statute."  Id., ¶46 (quoting State v. Pratt, 36 Wis. 2d 312, 
317, 153 N.W.2d 18 (1967)).  "We assume that the legislature's 
intent is expressed in the statutory language."  Id., ¶44.  We 
assume this because "[i]t is the enacted law, not the unenacted 
intent, that is binding on the public."  Id.; see also Antonin 
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 17 (1997) ("It is the law 
that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver . . . . Men may 
intend what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact 
which bind us.").  "Therefore, the purpose of statutory 
interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it 
may be given its full, proper, and intended effect."  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶44. 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 32.015 ("Property may not be acquired by 
condemnation to establish or extend a recreational trail; a 
bicycle way, as defined in s. 340.01(5s); a bicycle lane, as 
defined in s. 340.01(5e); or a pedestrian way, as defined in s. 
346.02(8)(a)."); Wis. Stat. § 61.34(3)(b) ("The village board 
may not use the power of condemnation to acquire property for 
the purpose of establishing or extending a recreational trail; a 
bicycle way, as defined in s. 340.01(5s); a bicycle lane, as 
defined in s. 340.01(5e); or a pedestrian way, as defined in s. 
346.02(8)(a)."). 
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
7 
 
pedestrian way, then the Village is within its right to seize 
private property to construct or expand an existing roadway.  
¶38 "[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the language 
of the statute."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  "Statutory language is 
given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical or special definitional meaning."  Id.; Bruno v. 
Milwaukee Cnty., 2003 WI 28, ¶8, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656 
("We have long recognized that when a court construes . . . [a] 
statute, 
words 
must 
be 
given 
their 
common 
meaning.'").  
"[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it 
is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole . . . and 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  "Statutory language is read where 
possible to give effect to every word, in order to avoid 
surplusage."  Id.; see also State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 
894, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991); Bruno, 260 Wis. 2d 633, ¶24; Crown 
Castle USA, Inc., v. Orion Constr. Grp. LLC, 2012 WI 29, ¶13, 
339 Wis. 2d 252, 811 N.W.2d 332.  In determining meaning, "the 
context and structure of the statute[s] are important, and we 
interpret the statute[s] in light of 'surrounding or closely-
related statutes.'"  Masri v. LIRC, 2014 WI 81, ¶30, 356 
Wis. 2d 405, 850 N.W.2d 298 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶46); see also Aero Auto Parts, Inc. v. DOT, 78 Wis. 2d 235, 
239, 253 N.W.2d 896 (1977) (citation omitted) ("A statutory 
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
8 
 
subsection may not be considered in a vacuum, but must be 
considered in reference to the statute as a whole and in 
reference to statutes dealing with the same general subject 
matter.); Brey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2022 WI 7, 
¶11, 400 Wis. 2d 417, 970 N.W.2d 1 ("A statute's context and 
structure are critical to a proper plain-meaning analysis.")   
¶39 "'If this process of ascertainment yields a plain, 
clear statutory meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the 
statute is applied according to this ascertainment of its 
meaning.'"  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (quoting Bruno, 260 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶20).  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.  Id., ¶45.  "Where statutory 
language is unambiguous, there is no need to consult extrinsic 
sources of interpretation, such as legislative history."  Id., 
¶46.  "[A] statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being 
understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more 
senses."  Id., ¶47.  The test is reasonableness:  whether, in 
examining the language of the statute, "'well-informed persons 
should 
have 
become 
confused,' 
that 
is, 
whether 
the 
statutory . . . language reasonably gives rise to different 
meanings."  Id. (quoting Bruno, 260 Wis. 2d 633, ¶21) (emphases 
in original).  Thus, conducting a statutory interpretation 
analysis "involves the ascertainment of meaning, not a search 
for ambiguity."  Id.  
¶40 Canons of statutory construction, like dictionaries, 
aid courts in determining the common and approved usage of words 
in the statute to ascertain their plain meaning.  Swatek v. 
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
9 
 
Cnty. of Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 47, 61, 531 N.W.2d 45 (1995); Antonin 
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of 
Legal Texts 140 (2012) ("Grammar Canon") ("Words are to be given 
the meaning that proper grammar and usage would assign them.");  
Scalia & Garner, supra at 56 ("Supremacy of Text Principle") 
("Of course, words are given meaning by their context, and 
context includes the purpose of the text."); see also Scalia & 
Garner, supra at 167 ("The Whole Text Canon") ("Context is a 
primary determinant of meaning.").   
¶41 Let's take a closer look at the statutory text.  
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 32.015 
limits 
a 
village's 
power 
of 
condemnation and states:  
Property may not be acquired by condemnation to 
establish or extend a recreational trail; a bicycle 
way, as defined in s. 340.01(5s); a bicycle lane, as 
defined in s. 340.01(5e); or a pedestrian way, as 
defined in s. 346.02(8)(a). 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶42 Wisconsin Stat. § 61.34 echoes the same limitation on 
a village's condemnation power and addresses powers of village 
boards.  This statute contains "express language"4 which limits a 
village's condemnation power: 
The 
village 
board 
may 
not 
use 
the 
power 
of 
condemnation to acquire property for the purpose of 
establishing or extending a recreational trail; a 
bicycle way, as defined in s. 340.01(5s); a bicycle 
lane, as defined in s. 340.01(5e); or a pedestrian 
way, as defined in s. 346.02(8)(a). 
                                                 
4 See Wis. Stat. § 61.34(1) ("The powers hereby conferred 
shall be in addition to all other grants and shall be limited 
only by express language."). 
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
10 
 
§ 61.34(3)(b) (emphasis added). 
¶43 The crux of the issue is whether a sidewalk is a 
pedestrian way.  Both Wis. Stat. § 32.015 and Wis. Stat. § 61.34 
note that the term "pedestrian way" is defined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.02(8)(a).  We look next to the language of § 346.02(8), 
"Applicability to Pedestrian Ways," which provides:   
(a)  All of the applicable provisions of this chapter 
pertaining to highways, streets, alleys, roadways and 
sidewalks also apply to pedestrian ways.  A pedestrian 
way means a walk designated for the use of pedestrian 
travel.  
(b)  Public utilities may be installed either 
above or below a pedestrian way, and assessments may 
be made therefor as if such pedestrian way were a 
highway, street, alley, roadway or sidewalk. 
(Emphasis added).   
¶44 Under a straightforward reading of the plain text of 
Wis. Stat. § 346.02(8), sidewalks are a subset of pedestrian 
ways.  A "pedestrian way" is statutorily defined as a walk 
designated for the use of pedestrian travel.  Dictionaries from 
the time of § 346.08(a)'s adoption5 define a "walk" as: 
A place laid out or set apart for walking, or resorted 
to by those who walk; a path, avenue, sidewalk, or 
promenade for pedestrians. 
A place prepared or set apart for walking; a way for 
foot-passengers at the side of a street or road, or a 
sidewalk; a public promenade. 
A place designed for walking; a path specially 
arranged or paved for walking; as a graveled walk in a 
                                                 
5 The term "pedestrian way" first appeared in 1949, in Wis. 
Stat. § 85.10(21)(g).  See 1949 Wis. Act 135, Laws of 1949.  It 
was later renumbered, but the substance of the law has remained 
the same. 
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
11 
 
garden; 
sometimes, 
a 
sidewalk; 
an 
avenue 
for 
promenading, a promenade. 
Walk, Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English 
Language (Medallion ed. 1940) 2671; walk, The New Century 
Dictionary of the English Language 2168-69 (1952); walk, 
Webster's Second New Int'l Dictionary of the English Language 
2867 (unabr. 1934).  "Designated" means "to mark or point out; 
appoint; assign; set apart."  Designate, The New Century 
Dictionary of the English Language 405 (1952); see also 
designate, Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the 
English Language 688 (Medallion ed. 1940) ("[t]o mark out or 
name for a specific purpose"); designate, Webster's Second New 
Int'l Dictionary of the English Language 708 (unabr. 1934) 
("[t]o indicate or set apart for a purpose or duty.").  Finally, 
"pedestrian" means "characterized by or connected with walking; 
of or belonging to movement on foot."  Pedestrian, Funk & 
Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language 1821 
(Medallion ed. 1940); see also pedestrian, Webster's Second New 
Int'l Dictionary of the English Language 1802-03 (unabr. 1934) 
("[o]f, or pertaining to, walking"); pedestrian, The New Century 
Dictionary of the English Language 1269-70 (1952) ("[g]oing or 
performed on foot; walking; pertaining to walking").  
¶45 A sidewalk is evidently "a place laid out or set apart 
or designed for walking," a "way for foot-passengers at the side 
of a street or road," and "a path specially arranged or paved 
for walking."  This understanding is reflected in the statutory 
definition of a sidewalk.  "'Sidewalk' means that portion of a 
highway between the curb lines, or the lateral lines of a 
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
12 
 
roadway, and the adjacent property lines, constructed for use of 
pedestrians."  Wis. Stat. § 340.01(58).  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 66.0907(1) ("Sidewalks") further defines a sidewalk by its 
location and its purpose.  A sidewalk is located "on either or 
both sides of the street" and "for the use of persons on foot."  
Reiterating a sidewalk's purpose again, § 66.0907(1) states, 
"The sidewalk shall be kept clear for the use of persons on 
foot."  See also sidewalk, Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 
(unabr. 
1993) 
(defining 
"sidewalk" 
as 
"a 
walk 
for 
foot 
passengers usu[ally] at the side of a street or roadway"). 
¶46 Thus, a sidewalk——that portion of the highway created 
for the travel of persons on foot——is clearly a subset of 
pedestrian ways——walks set apart or assigned for the use of 
pedestrian travel.  It is a straightforward, common sense 
interpretation of the statutory language that a "walk designated 
for the use of pedestrian travel" necessarily includes that part 
of the highway "constructed for the use of pedestrians" and 
intended "for the use of persons on foot."  
¶47 Furthermore, this plain meaning analysis yields the 
understanding that all sidewalks are pedestrian ways, but not 
all pedestrian ways are sidewalks.  The statute defining a 
pedestrian way is broad, placing no limitations on where such a 
"walk designated for the use of pedestrian travel" may be 
located.  It includes walks designated for the use of pedestrian 
travel whether or not that pedestrian way is located within a 
highway, or whether it is a skywalk,6 or a walking path in a 
                                                 
6 Wis. Stat. § 62.71(2)(o) ("'Skywalk'" means any elevated 
pedestrian way."). 
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
13 
 
public park not adjacent to the highway.  In contradistinction, 
sidewalks 
are 
narrowly 
defined 
and 
constrained 
by 
their 
location.  Sidewalks are that "portion of a highway between the 
curb lines, or the lateral lines of a roadway, and the adjacent 
property line . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 340.01(58).  All sidewalks 
then are pedestrian ways.  But pedestrian ways, which are not 
located within the highway right-of-way, like skyways or walking 
paths, are not sidewalks. 
¶48 I return to the crux of the issue.  A closer look at 
the plain meaning of the statutes reveals that all sidewalks are 
pedestrian ways, but that not all pedestrian ways are sidewalks.  
Because all sidewalks are pedestrian ways, the Village is 
statutorily forbidden from seizing Sojenhomer's private property 
via condemnation in order to construct a sidewalk. 
III 
¶49 The majority appears to concede that the statutory 
definition of a pedestrian way, "a walk designated for the use 
of pedestrian travel," Wis. Stat. § 346.02(8), would include 
sidewalks if not for "context."7  The majority skips right over 
the plain language of the statutes and their common sense 
                                                 
7 See majority op., ¶3 ("When read in context, the 
definition of pedestrian way in § 346.02(8)(a) does not include 
sidewalks."); id., ¶15 ("The ordinary meaning of a statute is 
dictated by more than the literal meaning of a single phrase, 
read in isolation.")  The Village also appears to have made this 
concession, that the statutorily defined term "pedestrian way" 
would normally include sidewalks, requesting this court hold 
"the term 'pedestrian way' is not [a] broad term meant to 
encompass all walks designated for pedestrian travel . . . ."  
Elsewhere, the Village asserts "[s]idewalks[] . . . are designed 
solely for the purpose of pedestrian travel." 
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
14 
 
interpretation.  Instead, the majority fixates on invented 
context.  But the context it invents does not alter the common 
sense 
conclusion 
that 
the 
statutory 
definitions 
lead 
to:  Sidewalks are pedestrian ways.  The majority, starting at 
the 
wrong 
location, 
unsurprisingly 
arrives 
at 
the 
wrong 
destination.   
¶50 The 
meaning 
of 
these 
statutes 
is 
plain 
and 
unambiguous.  Sidewalks are pedestrian ways.  And, as it should, 
our interpretation of these statutes "involves the ascertainment 
of 
meaning, 
not 
a 
search 
for 
ambiguity." 
 
Bruno, 
260 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶25.  But, citing to Wis. Stat. § 346.02(8)(a), the 
majority rejects this plain meaning of the text.  In its stead, 
the majority inserts its invented contextual meaning.   
¶51 Both Wis. Stat. § 32.015 and Wis. Stat. § 61.34(3)(b) 
use 
"pedestrian 
way" 
which 
is 
defined 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.02(8)(a). 
 
Section 
346.02(8)(a) 
broadly 
defines 
a 
"pedestrian way" as "a walk designated for the use of pedestrian 
travel."  As the court of appeals rightly pointed out, "This 
plain language is both simple and broad"; it simply defines a 
pedestrian way, while not "plac[ing] any limitations on where 
such 'a walk' for 'pedestrian travel' might be located."  
Sojenhomer, 407 Wis. 2d 587, ¶26.  
¶52 Where a sidewalk is intended for the use of persons or 
pedestrians traveling on foot, a pedestrian way is "a walk 
designated for the use of pedestrian travel."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.02(8)(a).  While at first blush these definitions might 
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
15 
 
seem distinct, a thorough examination of the statutes reveals 
that these definitions meaningfully coexist statutorily.   
¶53 The majority nonetheless adopts the Village's argument 
that a sidewalk and a pedestrian way must be two distinct, non-
overlapping or nested terms because sidewalk and pedestrian way 
are listed independently, in close proximity, and in separate 
subsections of Wis. Stat. § 346.02(8).  It rather simply 
concludes that because the two terms are listed independently, 
then they must be intended to be interpreted differently and can 
have no commonality nor overlapping meaning.8  Majority op., 
¶¶18-19.   
¶54 While we interpret statutes so as to avoid surplusage,9 
when ascertaining statutory meaning, "surplusage is not to be 
                                                 
8 The majority explicitly states it is not relying on the 
surplusage canon, as the lower courts did, in interpreting 
sidewalks and pedestrian ways to have "separate, non-overlapping 
meanings." 
 
Majority 
op., 
¶19. 
 
However, 
the 
majority 
nonetheless appears to be implicitly relying on the surplusage 
canon.  The majority argues that in interpreting Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.02(8)(a) and (b), if "sidewalks are pedestrian ways, then 
the rules of the road applicable to sidewalks would already 
apply to pedestrian ways" which would render language in para. 
(a) duplicative and unnecessary.  Id.  Presumably to avoid this 
duplicative result, the majority argues the terms "pedestrian 
way" and "sidewalk" must be absolutely distinct from each other.  
It is difficult to see how this argument does not reflect at 
least an implicit reliance on the surplusage canon.  See Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("Statutory language is read where possible 
to give reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid 
surplusage." (quoting another source)); Antonin Scalia & Bryan 
A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 
(2012) ("Surplusage canon") ("If possible, every word and every 
provision is to be given effect. None should be ignored.  None 
should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to 
duplicate another provision or to have no consequence."). 
9 See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46; Bruno v. Milwaukee Cnty., 
2003 WI 28, ¶24, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656.   
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
16 
 
assumed merely because the legislature has used a broad term."  
Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, ¶150, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 
914 N.W.2d 21 (Ziegler, J., concurring).  This is especially so 
where 
statutorily-provided 
definitions 
overlap 
because 
one 
statutorily-defined term (pedestrian way) is broadly defined, 
while the other statutorily-defined term (sidewalk) is more 
narrowly defined.  See id., ¶149 (Ziegler, J., concurring) 
(determining that it "may not be possible to avoid complete 
overlap" among statutorily-defined terms where "the ordinary 
meaning" of one of them "is so broad").  Sometimes the 
legislature, 
as 
here, 
"deliberately 
paints 
with 
a 
very 
broad . . . brush."  Georgina G. v. Terry M., 184 Wis. 2d 492, 
540, 516 N.W.2d 678 (1994) (Bablitch, J., dissenting).   
¶55 I acknowledge that Wis. Stat. § 346.02(8) employs both 
the term "sidewalk" and the term "pedestrian way" in two 
separate sentences, in close proximity.  And under some 
circumstances, these things might suggest that the terms have 
wholly distinct meanings.  But a logical answer exists to this 
assumption:  A sidewalk is always a pedestrian way, but the term 
"pedestrian way" is broader than solely being a sidewalk.10   
                                                 
10 An even closer inspection of the statutes also supports 
the 
interpretation 
I 
adopt. 
 
Consider 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.02(8)(a) provides "[a]ll of the applicable provisions of 
[Wis. Stat. ch. 346] pertaining to highways, streets, alleys, 
roadways and sidewalks also apply to pedestrian ways."  Thus, 
under para. (a), provisions pertaining to sidewalks in ch. 346 
also apply to all pedestrian ways.  Because the term pedestrian 
ways is broader than the term sidewalks, the inclusion of the 
term sidewalks in para. (a) makes the provisions pertaining to 
sidewalks in ch. 346 applicable to all pedestrian ways that are 
not sidewalks.  Put differently, if the word "sidewalks" was 
omitted from para. (a), then the provisions pertaining to 
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
17 
 
¶56 The majority also surmises that the "as if" language 
in Wis. Stat. § 346.02(8)(b) supports its conclusion that a 
sidewalk and pedestrian way are entirely distinct concepts.  It 
opines that a sidewalk——statutorily defined as that portion of 
the highway constructed for use of pedestrians——and a pedestrian 
way——statutorily defined as a walk designated for the use of 
pedestrian 
travel——are 
distinct 
because 
of 
the 
statutory 
language "as if."  The majority relies on § 346.02(8)(b), which 
states, "Public utilities may be installed either above or below 
a pedestrian way, and assessments may be made therefore as if 
such pedestrian way that is not a sidewalk were a highway, 
street, alley, roadway or sidewalk" (emphasis added).  According 
to the majority, if a pedestrian way could be treated "as if" it 
was a sidewalk, then a pedestrian way cannot be understood to 
include a sidewalk:  the one term is entirely separate and 
distinct from the other.  Majority op., ¶18.  This is because 
"[t]he ordinary meaning of a statute is dictated by more than 
the literal meaning of a single phrase, read in isolation."  
                                                                                                                                                             
sidewalks in ch. 346 would not apply to pedestrian ways that are 
not sidewalks.  Sojenhomer LLC v. Village of Egg Harbor, 2023 WI 
App 20, ¶30, 407 Wis. 2d 587, 990 N.W.2d 267.  Accordingly, 
under this statute, the term "sidewalks" still serves a 
necessary function even though the term "pedestrian ways" 
includes sidewalks. 
Like para. (a), the term sidewalk in para. (b) could not be 
omitted without changing the meaning of the statutory language.  
So, neither sidewalk nor pedestrian way lose their individuality 
under my statutory interpretation analysis.  Each maintains its 
individual purpose, because while all sidewalks are pedestrian 
ways, not all pedestrian ways are sidewalks.  The statutory 
meaning is plain.   
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
18 
 
Id., ¶15.  But then the majority proceeds to do what it decries.  
It reads a single phrase——"as if"——in isolation, rather than in 
context.  It is more sensible to conclude that sometimes a 
pedestrian way is not a sidewalk and the "as if" language 
recognizes this fact.  With this reading, the statute has 
meaning.11   
¶57 The majority argues that if sidewalks are pedestrian 
ways, then we have to read the additional language "that are not 
sidewalks" into Wis. Stat. § 346.02(8)(a) and (b).  Majority 
op., ¶20.  According to the majority, § 346.02(8)(a) and (b) 
would then be read to include the underlined language: 
(a)  All of the applicable provisions of this 
chapter 
pertaining 
to 
highways, 
streets, 
alleys, 
roadways and sidewalks also apply to pedestrian ways 
that are not sidewalks. A pedestrian way means a walk 
designated for the use of pedestrian travel. 
(b)  Public utilities may be installed either 
above or below a pedestrian way, and assessments may 
be made therefor as if such pedestrian way that is not 
a sidewalk were a highway, street, alley, roadway or 
sidewalk. 
Majority op., ¶20.  But understanding sidewalks are pedestrian 
ways does not "read additional language into § 346.02(8)(a) and 
(b)."  The plain text defines a pedestrian way as being broader 
than solely sidewalks, but all sidewalks are pedestrian ways.  
So, by definition, it is understood that a pedestrian way 
                                                 
11 The 
majority's 
framing 
of 
the 
"as 
if" 
modifier 
"torture[s] ordinary words until they confess to ambiguity."  W. 
States Ins. Co. v. Wis. Wholesale Tire, Inc., 184 F.3d 699, 702 
(7th Cir. 1999).  And we know that "[s]tatutory interpretation 
involves the ascertainment of meaning, not a search for 
ambiguity."  Bruno, 260 Wis. 2d 633, ¶25. 
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
19 
 
contains all sidewalks but also non-sidewalks.  Thus, when the 
statute says that pedestrian ways may be treated "as if" they 
are 
sidewalks, 
the 
words 
"pedestrian 
ways 
that 
are 
not 
sidewalks" have not been added.  Rather, it is simply what the 
text reasonably implies. 
¶58 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
agreed 
with 
Sojenhomer's 
observation that:  
[T]he general definition of pedestrian way in Wis. 
Stat. § 346.02(8)(a) is broader than the definition of 
a sidewalk because a pedestrian way can——but need  
not——be adjacent to a roadway.  In other words, the 
term pedestrian way includes both:  (1) sidewalks——
i.e., walks adjacent to a roadway for the use of 
pedestrian travel, see Wis. Stat. § 340.01(58); and 
(2) all other walks designated for pedestrian travel 
that are not adjacent to a roadway, such as a walking 
path through a parcel of property. 
Sojenhomer, 407 Wis. 2d 587, ¶29.  Thus, interpreting the term 
"pedestrian way" to include a "sidewalk" does not require 
reading words into the text.  In fact, the majority's attack can 
be turned around on itself.  It could be said the majority's 
interpretation reads words into the statute:  "A pedestrian way 
means a walk designated for the use of pedestrian travel, 
excluding sidewalks." 
¶59 This interpretation, that sometimes a pedestrian way 
is a sidewalk, forecloses the majority's concern that the 
legislature "chose to omit sidewalks from the limitations on 
condemnation in Wis. Stat. §§ 32.015 and 61.34(3)(b)" even 
though the term is "not unusual or unfamiliar."  Majority op., 
¶26.  First, this concern has no bearing on the question 
presented in this case, whether sidewalks are pedestrian ways.  
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
20 
 
Second, the statutory limitations on the use of condemned 
property include, among other things, a pedestrian way.  Since 
these statutes are understood to broadly define pedestrian ways 
as including all sidewalks, the legislature necessarily also 
expressly limited village boards' condemnation powers to acquire 
property to construct a sidewalk when it expressly limited the 
village boards' condemnation powers to acquire property to 
construct a pedestrian way.12  The fact that the term "sidewalk" 
does 
not 
appear 
in 
the 
condemnation 
statutes 
is 
tangential:  "sidewalks" are already incorporated by reference 
in Wis. Stat. § 32.015 and Wis. Stat. § 61.34(3)(b) through the 
term "pedestrian way."   
¶60 The 
majority 
concludes 
"that 
the 
definition 
of 
'pedestrian way' in [Wis. Stat.] § 346.02(8)(a), and the 
limitations on condemnation" in Wis. Stat. § 32.015 and Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 61.34(3)(b), 
"unambiguously 
exclude 
sidewalks."  
Majority op., ¶15.  The majority's conclusion is incorrect.  
Section 32.015, and its corollary section 61.34(3)(b), limits 
condemnation powers from being used to establish or extend a 
pedestrian way, and pedestrian ways include all sidewalks.  
Section 32.015 also limits condemnation powers from being used 
to establish or extend a bicycle way.  A bicycle way is defined 
                                                 
12 The majority's reliance on statutory history likewise 
fails at this juncture.  Majority op., ¶¶21-23.  Even assuming 
the majority is correct that the statutory history shows that 
sidewalks and pedestrian ways have been defined separately, all 
that would prove is that the terms have been defined separately.  
It would not prove that sidewalks and pedestrian ways do not 
have overlapping meanings such that sidewalks are a type of 
pedestrian way. 
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
21 
 
as "any path or sidewalk or portion thereof designated for the 
use of bicycles, electric scooters, and electric personal 
assistive mobility devices by the governing body of any city, 
town, village, or county."  Wis. Stat. § 340.01(5s) (emphasis 
added).  Accordingly, the condemnation statutes limit the 
Village's condemnation of Sojenhomer's property to build a 
sidewalk under any reading of the statute.  Given that 
pedestrian ways already include sidewalks, had sidewalks been 
listed in the statute it would have been redundant.13    
¶61 The majority also claims the term pedestrian way 
"refers to something narrower and more specific than all 
sidewalks."  Majority op., ¶23.  The majority makes its 
unfounded claim without ever having established or defined what 
a pedestrian way is.  Had the majority conducted a plain meaning 
analysis on the statutory text, it would have concluded that the 
opposite is, in fact, true.  Pedestrian ways are broadly 
                                                 
13 These condemnation statutes together demonstrate that 
while a village's powers are often broad——including, among other 
things, the power to manage village property, highways, streets, 
and the power to act for public health, safety, and welfare——
that power is not limitless.  But the majority repeatedly 
references the Village's public safety concerns as a basis for 
seizing 
Sojenhomer's 
property, 
seemingly 
justifying 
the 
Village's violation of the statutes limiting their condemnation 
power.  While Wis. Stat. § 61.34(1) recognizes the broad powers 
village boards may have to govern, including power to act on 
behalf of public safety, the statute also says these broad 
powers are conferred "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law" and 
"[t]he powers . . . shall be limited only by express language."  
The statutes, by "express language," § 61.34(1), limit a 
village's power to condemn and acquire property.  No such 
exception for public safety concerns exists in either statute.   
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
22 
 
defined, such that all sidewalks are pedestrian ways, but not 
all pedestrian ways are sidewalks.14 
¶62 In sum, a pedestrian way is defined as a "walk 
designated for the use of pedestrian travel."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.02(8)(a).  A sidewalk is more narrowly defined as "that 
portion of a highway . . . constructed for use of pedestrians" 
and "for the use of persons on foot."  Wis. Stat. § 340.01(58); 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0907(1).  Were the majority correct, then a 
sidewalk could never be a walk designated for pedestrian travel.  
This strained interpretation is untethered from the plain 
meaning of the statutory language.  
¶63 Conducting a plain meaning analysis on the language of 
these varied statutes reveals that this statutory scheme is 
unambiguous and there is no surplusage under my interpretation 
of the statutes.  Simply, Wis. Stat. § 32.015 and Wis. Stat. 
§ 61.34(3)(b) limit a village's ability to use its condemnation 
powers to acquire property to establish or extend a pedestrian 
way.  A sidewalk is a pedestrian way.  I conclude that these 
statutes are internally consistent and comport with common sense 
as sidewalks are included within the term "pedestrian ways," but 
not all pedestrian ways are sidewalks.  Because the statute is 
                                                 
14 In another place, the majority infers that since the 
legislature has rarely used the term "pedestrian way" after 
first placing it in the statutes, the legislature likely 
intended pedestrian way to have a narrow meaning.  Majority op., 
¶¶23-24.  This too, fails to disprove that pedestrian ways are 
not broadly defined so as to include all sidewalks.  The 
opposite inference can likewise be made:  The legislature rarely 
used the term after its initial use because the term is broadly 
defined.  
No.  2021AP1589.akz 
 
23 
 
neither ambiguous nor is there surplusage, we do not need to 
consult extrinsic sources to confirm statutory meaning.  Thus, a 
sidewalk is a pedestrian way for purposes of applying the 
limitation of § 32.015, and the Village is precluded from 
obtaining this property through condemnation.  
¶64 As an aside, the Village was likely not without 
recourse.  It could potentially obtain property through other 
means, including paying the landowner a fair price.  What the 
Village could not do was use its power of condemnation to 
acquire Sojenhomer's property to construct a sidewalk.   
IV 
¶65 In condemning and acquiring Sojenhomer's property for 
the purpose of constructing a sidewalk, the Village violated 
Wis. Stat. § 32.015's and Wis. Stat. § 61.34(3)(b)'s express 
limitations on its condemnation power. 
¶66 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶67 I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY and BRIAN HAGEDORN join this dissent.