Title: DaRosa v. City of New Bedford
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11759
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 15, 2015

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SJC-11759 
 
JOHN DaROSA & others1  vs.  CITY OF NEW BEDFORD; MONSANTO COMPANY 
& others,2 third-party defendants. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     January 8, 2015. - May 15, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Public Records.  Municipal Corporations, Public record.  
Attorney at Law, Work product, Attorney-client 
relationship.  Privileged Communication.  Practice, Civil, 
Discovery. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
October 24, 2008. 
 
 
A motion to strike privilege and work product objections to 
certain documents and to compel their production, filed on May 
15, 2014, was heard by Richard T. Moses, J. 
 
                                                 
 
1 John Day, Diane Cosmo, Luis Barbosa, and Ermelinda 
Barbosa. 
 
 
2 Pharmacia Corporation; Solutia, Inc.; Cornell-Dubilier 
Electronics, Inc.; AVX Corporation (AVX); NSTAR Electric 
Company; NSTAR Gas Company; Tutor Perini Corporation; ABC 
Disposal Service, Inc.; Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company; and 
John Does 1-20.  A stipulation of dismissal with prejudice as to 
third-party defendants Monsanto Company, Pharmacia Corporation, 
and Solutia, Inc., was entered in the Superior Court in July, 
2014. 
2 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Judd J. Carhart, J., in the Appeals Court, 
and the case was reported by him to that court.  The Supreme 
Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate 
review. 
 
 
 
Shephard S. Johnson, Jr., for city of New Bedford. 
 
Mary K. Ryan (Cynthia M. Guizzetti with her) for AVX 
Corporation. 
 
John J. Gushue, for ABC Disposal Service, Inc., was present 
but did not argue. 
 
Mark P. Dolan & Stanley F. Pupecki, for Tutor Perini 
Corporation, submitted a brief. 
 
Michael R. Perry & Aaron D. Rosenberg, for NSTAR Electric 
Company & another, submitted a brief. 
 
John J. Davis & John M. Wilusz, for Massachusetts Municipal 
Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Martha Coakley, Attorney General, & Judy Zeprun Kalman, for 
the Commonwealth, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Brandon H. Moss, for Massachusetts Municipal Lawyers 
Association, Inc., amicus curiae, joined in a brief. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  In General Elec. Co. v. Department of Envtl. 
Protection, 429 Mass. 798, 801 (1999) (General Electric), we 
held that "materials privileged as work product . . . are not 
protected from disclosure under the public records statute 
unless those materials fall within the scope of an express 
statutory exemption."  We noted that there is not an express 
statutory exemption for work product and rejected the claim that 
work product is protected from disclosure by an implied 
exemption.  See id. at 801-806.  In General Electric, the 
parties were not yet in litigation, so the work product was 
sought under the public records act rather than in discovery.  
And in General Electric we did not reach the issue whether the 
3 
 
work product would be protected from disclosure under the 
"policy deliberation" exemption, G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-
sixth (d), known as exemption (d).  Here, the parties are in 
litigation, and the work product in the possession of the city 
of New Bedford (city) was sought in discovery.  We now revisit 
our holding in General Electric and explore the scope of the 
"policy deliberation" exemption in the context of work product 
sought in discovery from a municipality during litigation.  We 
conclude that "opinion" work product that, as codified in Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 26 (b) (3), 365 Mass. 772 (1974), was "prepared in 
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for [a] party or 
. . . that . . . party's representative" falls within the scope 
of exemption (d) and therefore falls outside the definition of 
"public records" under G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.  We also 
conclude that "fact" work product under Mass. R. Civ. P. 26 (b) 
(3) that was prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial 
falls within the scope of exemption (d), and therefore falls 
outside the definition of "public records," where it is not a 
reasonably completed study or report or, if it is reasonably 
completed, where it is interwoven with opinions or analysis 
leading to opinions.  Where work product is exempted from 
disclosure under the public records act, it is protected from 
4 
 
disclosure in discovery to the extent provided by Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 26.3 
 
Background.  The case underlying this appeal concerns 
liability for the costs of environmental cleanup of widespread 
soil contamination at and around a site that the city allegedly 
operated until the 1970s as an unrestricted ash dump for 
industrial and other waste (site).  In October, 2008, property 
owners from a neighborhood around the site filed a civil action 
in the Superior Court against the city bringing common-law 
claims and a claim under G. L. c. 21E4 seeking damages arising 
from the soil contamination.  In December, 2009, the city filed 
a third-party complaint alleging common-law claims and cost 
recovery claims under G. L. c. 21E against various third-party 
defendants.  After the original complaint was filed and before 
the city filed its third-party complaint, the city solicitor, on 
                                                 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Commonwealth and by the Massachusetts Municipal Association. 
 
 
4 G. L. c. 21E, the so-called Massachusetts "Superfund" law, 
provides, in relevant part, that "any person who . . . caused or 
is legally responsible for a release or threat of release of oil 
or hazardous material from a . . . site" -- including "any 
person who at the time of storage or disposal of any hazardous 
material owned or operated" the site, and "any person who . . . 
arranged for the transport, disposal, storage or treatment of 
hazardous material to" the site -- is (subject to statutory 
exceptions) strictly liable, jointly and severally, "to the 
commonwealth for all costs of assessment, containment and 
removal," and "to any person for damage to his real or personal 
property incurred or suffered as a result of such release or 
threat of release."  G. L. c. 21E, § 5 (a). 
5 
 
behalf of the city, retained Andrew Smyth, a consultant at TRC 
Environmental Corporation (TRC), to evaluate the issues related 
to the claims in the civil action and to identify sources of the 
contamination that may be legally responsible to pay for the 
cleanup.5  Smyth provided his services directly to the city 
solicitor in connection with the litigation pending against the 
city.6 
 
During the course of discovery, various third-party 
defendants moved to strike the city's privilege and work product 
objections to TRC documents and to compel their production.7  The 
third-party defendants asked, as part of the relief requested, 
that the city be compelled to produce documents that Smyth had 
prepared for the city, including two letters to the city 
solicitor and a fifty-two-page "evaluation report," described as 
                                                 
 
5 In the course of conducting response actions at the site 
of the contamination pursuant to G. L. c. 21E and 310 Code Mass. 
Regs. §§ 40.0000, the city of New Bedford (city) retained other 
consultants as "Licensed Site Professionals" for the site.  The 
city represents that the data and records of all licensed site 
professionals it retained in connection with the contaminated 
site, as well as the data and records that Andrew Smyth 
evaluated for the city solicitor, were made available during 
discovery to all parties involved in the present litigation. 
 
 
6 After the city retained outside legal counsel later in 
2009, Smyth provided his services directly to outside counsel. 
 
 
7 The motion was brought by third-party defendants Monsanto 
Company, Pharmacia Corporation, and Solutia, Inc., and was 
joined by AVX.  The motion was pursued by AVX after the three 
third-party defendants who originally brought the motion were 
dismissed from the case. 
6 
 
a draft, regarding the sources and occurrence of soil 
contamination in the relevant area of the city (collectively, 
TRC work product).  The city responded that the TRC work product 
was protected from discovery by the attorney-client privilege 
and the work product doctrine.  The motion judge rejected the 
city's claim of attorney-client privilege.  The judge also 
rejected the city's contention that the documents were protected 
from disclosure under the work product doctrine codified in 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 26 (b) (3), even though he found that the 
documents contained "information which was intended to assist 
the city solicitor in advising the [c]ity as to the potential 
litigation."  Citing General Electric, the judge concluded that 
the TRC work product, having been received by the city 
solicitor, constituted "public records" as defined in G. L. 
c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, and therefore was subject to discovery 
unless it fit "within an enumerated exception."  Because there 
is no enumerated exception for work product, and because the 
documents were not protected by the attorney-client privilege, 
the judge allowed the third-party defendants' motion, and 
ordered that the work product be produced.  The judge noted that 
"but for the public records law, said materials would clearly 
constitute attorney work product, and would be subject to a 
heightened standard for disclosure as codified in Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 26 (b) (3)." 
7 
 
 
Following the ruling, the city moved for a protective order 
to preclude the third-party defendants from inquiring into the 
TRC work product at a deposition.  The judge construed the 
motion as seeking a stay of the court's order, and allowed the 
motion to give the city an opportunity to file an interlocutory 
appeal.  The city petitioned a single justice of the Appeals 
Court for interlocutory review, and the single justice allowed 
the petition and reported it to a full panel of the Appeals 
Court.  We granted direct appellate review. 
 
On appeal, the city claims that the court should exercise 
its inherent authority to rule that the TRC work product, even 
if it consists of "public records," should be protected from 
discovery during pending litigation by the work product doctrine 
codified in Mass. R. Civ. P. 26 (b) (3).  The city also argues 
that these documents are not "public records" because they are 
protected from public disclosure by the "policy deliberation" 
exemption in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (d).  Finally, the 
city argues that the TRC work product is protected from 
disclosure by the so-called derivative attorney-client 
privilege. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Work product.  We begin our analysis by 
discussing the public records law.  Under the public records 
act, G. L. c. 66, § 10 (act), "Every person having custody of 
any public record, as defined in [G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-
8 
 
sixth], shall, . . . without unreasonable delay, permit it, or 
any segregable portion of a record which is an independent 
public record, to be inspected and examined by any person 
. . . ."  G. L. c. 66, § 10 (a).  "Public records," as defined 
in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, includes "all . . . 
documentary materials or data . . .  made or received by any 
officer or employee" of any agency, office, or authority of 
State or local government, unless such records fall within one 
of twenty exemptions.  Exemption (d), the so-called "policy 
deliberation" exemption, protects from public disclosure "inter-
agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters relating to policy 
positions being developed by the agency; but . . . shall not 
apply to reasonably completed factual studies or reports on 
which the development of such policy positions has been or may 
be based."  G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (d). 
 
In General Electric, 429 Mass. at 799, we "consider[ed] 
. . . whether a governmental entity subject to the [act] . . . 
may withhold from public disclosure documents and other records 
on the basis of an implied exemption for materials covered by 
the work product doctrine."  When the Department of 
Environmental Protection (DEP) withheld a set of documents in 
response to a public records request, General Electric commenced 
an action in the Superior Court under G. L. c. 66, § 10 (b), 
seeking disclosure of the withheld documents, and the parties 
9 
 
filed cross motions for summary judgment.  See id. at 799-800.  
The judge allowed DEP's motion, "concluding that because the 
[act] should not be read as an implicit legislative abrogation 
of well-established legal doctrines, work product enjoys an 
implied exemption from disclosure under the statute."  Id. at 
800-801.  We disagreed, concluding that work product as defined 
in Mass. R. Civ. P. 26 (b) (3) is "not protected from disclosure 
under the [act] unless those materials fall within the scope of 
an express statutory exemption."  Id. at 801. 
 
In support of this conclusion, we noted the broad scope of 
the act and its definition of "public records."  See id.  We 
also noted that the act specifically declares that, in any court 
proceeding challenging the withholding of a requested document, 
"there shall be a presumption that the record sought is public, 
and the burden shall be upon the custodian to prove with 
specificity the exemption which applies."  G. L. c. 66, 
§ 10 (c).  See General Electric, 429 Mass. at 801.  We 
determined that "the statute's clear and unambiguous language 
mandates disclosure of requested public records limited only by 
the definition of public record found in G. L. c. 4, § 7, 
Twenty-sixth."  Id. at 802.  In short, we determined that the 
10 
 
only exemptions in the act are those identified in the act, and 
refused to imply any exemption from disclosure.8 
 
We further noted that the act was modeled on the Federal 
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012) (FOIA), which 
contains an exemption protecting from disclosure "inter-agency 
or intra-agency memorand[a] or letters which would not be 
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation 
with the agency."  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).  See General Electric, 
429 Mass. at 803-804.  The comparable exemption in the act, 
exemption (d), excluded from public disclosure "inter-agency or 
intra-agency memoranda or letters relating to policy positions 
being developed by the agency," and does not expressly exclude 
internal memoranda or letters that would not be available to a 
party in litigation with the agency.  G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-
                                                 
 
8 Apart from the "clear and unambiguous language" of the 
public records act (act), we concluded that the Legislature did 
not intend to include an implied exemption for work product 
because an exemption (k) that had been included in the bill that 
became the act when the bill was originally passed by the House 
of Representatives was excluded from the bill subsequently 
recommended by the conference committee and was not ultimately 
enacted.  See General Elec. Co. v. Department of Envtl. 
Protection, 429 Mass. 798, 802-803 (1999) (General Electric).  
Exemption (k) would have shielded from public disclosure all 
"records pertaining to any civil litigation in which an agency 
. . . is involved, except in response to a subpoena, and only 
prior to final judicial determination or settlement of such 
litigation."  Id.  See 1973 House Doc. No. 7433, § 1.  We 
declared, "The express deletion of this provision confirms our 
conclusion that the Legislature did not intend implicitly to 
incorporate a work product exemption."  General Electric, supra 
at 803. 
11 
 
sixth (d).  We concluded that the "differences between the two 
statutes reflect a conscious decision by the Legislature to 
deviate from the standard embodied in the Federal statute 
concerning the disclosure of [attorney work product]."  General 
Electric, supra at 804, quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston 
Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 433 (1983). 
 
Having concluded that the act includes no implied exemption 
for documents within the common-law work product doctrine, we 
vacated that part of the judgment that allowed the DEP to 
withhold documents under such an implied exemption, but affirmed 
that part of the judgment that authorized DEP to withhold 
documents if they met the requirements of the "policy 
deliberation" exemption in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (d).  
General Electric, 429 Mass. at 807.  We did not address the 
scope of this exemption, or whether it may protect from 
disclosure all or some of the documents that had been withheld 
under the common-law work product doctrine. 
 
Today, we revisit the reasoning and holding in General 
Electric.  We note that this appeal comes to us in a different 
posture from General Electric, in that it is not an appeal under 
the act from a judge's decision regarding a public records 
request, but rather an interlocutory appeal from a judge's 
12 
 
allowance of discovery of work product in a pending lawsuit.9  We 
also note that the judge appeared to understand General Electric 
to hold that work product otherwise protected from disclosure in 
litigation under Mass. R. Civ. P. 26 (b) (3) is not protected 
where it is received by a public employee.  The judge's decision 
did not address whether the reports at issue fall within 
exemption (d) of the act and for that reason are not public 
records under the act. 
 
We no longer hold to the view declared in General Electric 
that there are no implied exemptions to the public records act, 
and that all records in the possession of a governmental entity 
                                                 
 
9 AVX did additionally file a public records request with 
the city solicitor's office seeking access to "correspondence 
and evaluative material created by TRC Companies, Inc."  The 
city solicitor denied AVX's request, and -- instead of 
challenging the denial by bringing a civil action against the 
city solicitor pursuant to G. L. c. 66, § 10 (b) -- AVX filed an 
administrative appeal with the supervisor of public records 
(supervisor), also pursuant to G. L. c. 66, § 10 (b).  After we 
had taken the city's appeal in this case under advisement, the 
supervisor issued a letter ruling in which the city was "ordered 
to provide all responsive records to [AVX] in a manner 
consistent with this order."  Letter Determination of the 
Supervisor of Public Records, SPR 14/766, Mar. 10, 2015, at 4.  
The supervisor found that the city had "failed to meet its 
burden in withholding the responsive records pursuant to 
[e]xemption (d)," because its response did "not contain the 
specificity required for the denial of access to public 
records."  Id. at 2.  The supervisor also found that the city 
"had failed to meet[] its burden of specificity to show the 
[attorney-client] privilege exists."  Id. at 3.  After the 
supervisor issued this decision, the city requested that the 
decision be withdrawn pending resolution of the city's appeal to 
this court and, in the alternative, requested that the 
supervisor reconsider her decision and schedule a hearing on the 
matter.  The supervisor has yet to rule on the city's request. 
13 
 
must be disclosed under the act unless they fall within one of 
the exemptions identified in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.  In 
Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Division of Capital Asset Mgt., 449 Mass. 
444, 445-446, 455-461 (2007), we concluded that communications 
within the attorney-client privilege are impliedly exempt from 
the definition of "public records" and therefore are protected 
from public disclosure under the act.  We declared that "the 
attorney-client privilege is a fundamental component of the 
administration of justice," and that withdrawal of the privilege 
is "not required by the plain terms of the public records law" 
and would "severely inhibit the ability of government officials 
to obtain quality legal advice essential to the faithful 
discharge of their duties, place public entities at an unfair 
disadvantage vis-à-vis private parties with whom they transact 
business and for whom the attorney-client privilege is all but 
inviolable, and impede the public's strong interest in the fair 
and effective administration of justice."  Id. at 446. 
 
Later, in Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 459 Mass. 
209, 211-216 (2011), we determined that documents that had been 
provided in discovery by a defendant to the Attorney General in 
an enforcement action and were protected from disclosure to 
others by a protective order were not subject to disclosure 
under the act.  In response to the argument that such records, 
once received by the Attorney General, were not excluded from 
14 
 
the act by any exemption, we stated that the argument was "based 
on the mistaken premise that all documents in the hands of 
public officials must, absent an applicable exception, be made 
public notwithstanding a court order prohibiting their 
circulation."  Id. at 215.  We noted that the issuance of such 
protective orders is among the "inherent powers" of a court, and 
that such orders "serve to shield litigants and third parties 
from unwarranted disclosures, and, as a practical matter, to 
facilitate the discovery necessary for a trial."  Id. at 213-
214.  We also noted that the act "is silent on the issue of 
protective orders," and that, "as a matter of statutory 
construction," we did not believe that "the Legislature would 
endeavor to effect such a significant change to a long-standing 
and fundamental power of the judiciary by implication."  Id. at 
215.  In essence, we declared an implied exemption for records 
whose disclosure is limited by a court's protective order. 
 
Before considering whether an implied exemption for work 
product otherwise protected in discovery under Mass. R. Civ. P. 
26 (b) (3) might be necessary to preserve the fair 
administration of justice, we consider whether some or all such 
work product might be protected from disclosure under the act by 
the "policy deliberation" exemption in Twenty-sixth (d).10  We 
                                                 
 
10 The third-party defendants claim that the city waived its 
right to argue on appeal that the work product at issue in this 
15 
 
reject the suggestion that the Legislature, in crafting the 
exemptions under the act, intended that all such work product 
would be public records under the act and therefore would be 
available to the public upon request.  In General Electric, we 
concluded that the Legislature did not intend a separate, 
implied exemption for work product; we did not conclude that all 
work product would be outside the scope of other express 
exemptions.  In fact, we specifically affirmed "that part of the 
judgment declaring that [DEP] 'may withhold documents requested 
under G. L. c. 66, § 10 . . . if they meet the requirements of 
G. L. c. 4, § 7, [Twenty-sixth] (d).'"  General Electric, 429 
Mass. at 807.11  The holding in General Electric was concisely 
                                                                                                                                                             
case is within the scope of exemption (d) because the city 
failed to raise that argument in opposition to the third-party 
defendants' motion to strike the city's privilege objections and 
compel production.  We reject this claim where, at the hearing 
on the motion, the city solicitor stated that "the reference in 
[General Electric] to noted exemptions . . . would apply to work 
conducted in anticipation of litigation," and, at the hearing on 
the city's subsequent motion for a protective order, the judge 
declared that he had considered the "deliberative process 
exemption" in allowing the third-party defendants' motion. 
 
 
11 In General Electric, where the Department of 
Environmental Protection (DEP) had shared documents with the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency "as part of 
coordinated investigative or remedial efforts," we held that DEP 
was "entitled to assert protection of the shared materials under 
exemption (d)" even though exemption (d) only protects "inter-
agency or intra-agency" documents, and the public records 
statute defines "agency" to mean "agency of the commonwealth" 
and does not expressly include Federal agencies within the scope 
of that definition.  General Electric, 429 Mass. at 806-807.  
16 
 
summarized in the Suffolk Construction decision:  "We concluded, 
in relevant part, that the [act] and its history expressed the 
Legislature's intent to abrogate the broad attorney work-product 
privilege, and instead to provide to attorney work product the 
narrower, time-limited protection afforded under G. L. c. 4, 
§ 7, Twenty-sixth (d) . . . ."  Suffolk Constr. Co., 449 Mass. 
at 455, citing General Electric, supra at 802-804.12 
 
In discerning legislative intent, we recognize the 
importance of the difference in language that we identified in 
General Electric between exemption (d) and its Federal FOIA 
counterpart, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), but to understand the 
significance of those differences, we must look to the governing 
interpretation of FOIA exemption (5) in 1973, when exemption (d) 
was enacted.  In Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 
U.S. 73, 85-94 (1973) (Mink), the United States Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                                                             
But we did not reach the question whether any of the documents 
at issue otherwise met the requirements of exemption (d). 
 
 
12 We reject any suggestion that we can infer that the 
Legislature intended that all work product in the possession of 
a government agency be publicly available because the 
Legislature failed to enact exemption (k).  The proposed 
exemption (k) would have shielded much more than work product 
"prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for 
[a] party or . . . that . . . party's representative,"  Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 26 (b) (3), 365 Mass. 772 (1974), because it included 
all "records pertaining to any civil litigation in which an 
agency . . . is involved."  1973 House Doc. No. 7433, § 1.  
Although we recognize that we found the failure to enact 
exemption (k) significant in General Electric, 429 Mass. at 802-
803, we now conclude that little can be inferred from the 
rejection of so broad and ambiguous an exemption. 
17 
 
interpreted the rather barebones language of exemption (5), 
which exempts from disclosure "inter-agency or intra-agency 
memorand[a] or letters which would not be available by law to a 
party . . . in litigation with the agency."  The Court declared 
that the legislative history of exemption (5) demonstrates that 
it was "intended to incorporate generally the recognized rule 
that 'confidential intra-agency advisory opinions . . . are 
privileged from inspection'" in order to further the public 
policy of "'open, frank discussion between subordinate and chief 
concerning administrative action.'"  Id. at 86-87, quoting 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 38, 
48-49 (1958).  The Court quoted the following passage from the 
report of the Senate committee that drafted the legislation: 
"It was pointed out in the comments of many of the agencies 
that it would be impossible to have any frank discussion of 
legal or policy matters in writing if all such writings 
were to be subjected to public scrutiny.  It was argued, 
and with merit, that efficiency of Government would be 
greatly hampered if, with respect to legal and policy 
matters, all Government agencies were prematurely forced to 
'operate in a fishbowl.'  The committee is convinced of the 
merits of this general proposition, but it has attempted to 
delimit the exception as narrowly as consistent with 
efficient Government operation." 
 
Mink, supra at 87, quoting S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 9 (1965).  The Court noted the difficulty of attempting to 
ascertain in the absence of litigation whether documents would 
be available in discovery, where "we do not know whether the 
Government is to be treated as though it were a prosecutor, a 
18 
 
civil plaintiff, or a defendant."  Mink, supra at 86.  And, 
distinguishing "matters of law, policy, or opinion" from "purely 
factual material," the Court stated, "in the absence of a claim 
that disclosure would jeopardize state secrets, . . .  memoranda 
consisting only of compiled factual material or purely factual 
material contained in deliberative memoranda and severable from 
its context would generally be available for discovery by 
private parties in litigation with the Government" and would not 
be protected by exemption (5) (citation omitted).  Id. at 87-89, 
91. 
 
Later that year, when the Massachusetts Legislature was 
crafting the act, it made clear from the language of 
exemption (d) that it protected documents "relating to policy 
positions being developed by the agency," but did not protect 
"reasonably completed factual studies or reports on which the 
development of such policy positions has been or may be based."  
G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (d).  In short, although the 
legislative history is silent on this point, the Legislature 
avoided the difficulty of ascertaining in the absence of 
litigation what might be discoverable by omitting the litigation 
language in FOIA exemption (5), and the Legislature added 
language clarifying the focus on the formulation of policy that 
was only implied by the language in FOIA exemption (5), and 
19 
 
expressly incorporated the understanding stated in Mink 
regarding purely factual material.13 
 
The word "policy" is not defined in the act, but we discern 
from the language of exemption (d) of the act and from the 
historical context of its enactment that the word was intended 
to be defined broadly to accomplish the purpose it shares with 
exemption (5) of FOIA:  the protection of open, frank inter-
agency and intra-agency deliberations regarding government 
decisions.14  Compare General Electric, 429 Mass. at 807 ("The 
purpose of exemption [d] is to foster independent discussions 
between those responsible for a governmental decision in order 
to secure the quality of the decision"), with National Labor 
Relations Bd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975), 
quoting S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965), and 
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 
324 (D.D.C. 1966) ("the 'frank discussion of legal or policy 
matters' in writing might be inhibited if the discussion were 
made public; and . . . the 'decisions' and 'policies [ . . . ] 
                                                 
 
13 We note that it was not until 1975, almost one and one-
half years after the act was signed into law, that the United 
States Supreme Court explicitly stated that the work product 
doctrine is incorporated in exemption (5) of the Freedom of 
Information Act.  See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 154-155 (1975). 
 
 
14 Cf. Webster's New World Dictionary 1045 (3d ed. 1988) 
(broadly defining "policy" in relevant part as "a principle, 
plan, or course of action, as pursued by a government"). 
20 
 
formulated' would be the poorer as a result").  And where FOIA 
incorporates within its scope the Federal common-law 
"deliberative process privilege," we think that a parallel 
protection from disclosure under the public records statute was 
codified by the "policy deliberation" exemption in Twenty-
sixth (d).  See, e.g., National Council of La Raza v. Department 
of Justice, 411 F.3d 350, 356 (2d Cir. 2005), quoting Grand 
Cent. Partnership v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 482 (2d Cir. 1999) 
("An inter- or intra-agency document may be withheld pursuant to 
the deliberative process privilege if it is:  (1) 
'predecisional,' i.e., 'prepared in order to assist an agency 
decisionmaker in arriving at his decision,' and (2) 
'deliberative,' i.e., 'actually . . . related to the process by 
which policies are formulated'"). 
 
Where an agency, as here, is engaged in litigation, 
decisions regarding litigation strategy and case preparation 
fall within the rubric of "policy deliberation."  A decision 
made in anticipation of litigation or during litigation is no 
less a "policy" decision and is no less in need of the 
protection from disclosure provided by exemption (d) simply 
because it is made in the context of litigation.  See Bobkoski 
v. Board of Educ. of Cary Consol. Sch. Dist. 26, 141 F.R.D. 88, 
92-93 (N.D. Ill. 1992) ("trial related strategy discussions 
necessarily involve a governmental entity's deliberative process 
21 
 
whereby the entity's members review and select among various 
options presented," and "the value of such strategic discussions 
depends upon the open and frank recommendations and opinions 
that the deliberative process privilege attempts to foster").15  
If anything, the need for nondisclosure of materials relating to 
the government's preparation for litigation is even greater than 
the need for nondisclosure of deliberative materials in other 
contexts, because litigation is an adversarial process, where 
the disclosure of these materials might be used to the detriment 
of the government by its litigation adversary.  See National 
Council of La Raza, 411 F.3d at 356, quoting Department of 
Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 8-
9 (2001) (Klamath) ("deliberative process privilege . . . is 
based on 'the obvious realization that officials will not 
communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a 
potential item of discovery'"). 
 
In describing the scope of exemption (d) as it applies to 
litigation-related work product, it makes sense to apply the 
work product terminology we apply in discovery during civil 
litigation under Mass. R. Civ. P. 26.  We have recognized that 
there are two categories of work product under rule 26:  fact 
                                                 
 
15 See also Heggestad v. United States Dep't of Justice, 182 
F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2000) ("Documents covered by the 
deliberative process privilege are often also protected by the 
attorney work-product privilege"). 
22 
 
work product and opinion work product.  See Commissioner of 
Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 453 Mass. 293, 314 (2009) (Comcast).  
Under rule 26 (b) (3), "[t]he protection [for work product] is 
qualified, and can be overcome if the party seeking discovery 
demonstrates "'substantial need of the materials' and that it is 
'unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial 
equivalent of the materials by other means.'"  Id., quoting 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 26 (b) (3).  Opinion work product, which is 
described in rule 26 (b) (3) as "the mental impressions, 
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other 
representative of a party concerning the litigation," is 
"afforded greater protection than 'fact' work product."  
Comcast, supra.  We have yet to decide whether the protection of 
opinion work product is absolute, see id. at 315, but "at a 
minimum . . . a highly persuasive showing" is needed to justify 
the disclosure of opinion work product.  United States v. 
Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1204 (2d Cir. 1998).  See Comcast, supra, 
quoting Reporters' Notes to Rule 26, Mass. Ann. Laws Court 
Rules, Rules of Civil Procedure, at 545 (LexisNexis 2008) 
(disclosure of opinion work product might be appropriate "only 
in rare or 'extremely unusual' circumstances"). 
 
Opinion work product sought in anticipation of or during 
the pendency of litigation is related to "policy positions being 
developed by the agency" and therefore is protected from 
23 
 
disclosure by exemption (d).  Therefore, a litigant should not 
succeed in obtaining opinion work product that would be 
protected from discovery by rule 26 (b) (3) by seeking the 
opinion work product through a public records request.16  Fact 
work product is not protected from disclosure under 
exemption (d), even if related to policy positions being 
developed by the agency, if it is a "reasonably completed 
factual stud[y] or report[] on which the development of such 
policy positions has been or may be based."  G. L. c. 4, § 7, 
Twenty-sixth (d).  Where fact work product is not contained 
within a "factual study or report," or where it is contained in 
a "factual study or report" that is not "reasonably completed," 
then it, too, is protected from disclosure, at least until the 
study or report is reasonably completed.  Moreover, where a 
factual study or report is reasonably completed but is 
interwoven with opinions or with analysis leading to opinions, a 
                                                 
 
16 We recognize that exemption (d) protects documents from 
disclosure "only while policy is 'being developed,' that is, 
while the deliberative process is ongoing and incomplete."  
Babets v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Human Servs., 403 
Mass. 230, 237 n.8 (1988).  But we also recognize that the 
deliberative process is always ongoing and incomplete during the 
course of litigation, because every decision relevant to 
litigation may be revisited and revised as circumstances change.  
We leave for another day the question whether opinion work 
product might no longer be protected once the litigation is 
concluded.  That issue is not presented here, and may depend on 
the particular circumstances, such as the risk of similar 
litigation.  It suffices here to conclude that opinion work 
product is protected from disclosure under exemption (d) prior 
to and through the pendency of the litigation. 
24 
 
purely factual section of the report might fall outside 
exemption (d) but a discussion or analysis section interwoven 
with facts would be protected from disclosure.17 
 
Under this analysis, exemption (d) would permit a litigant 
to obtain more documents through a public records request, at 
least with respect to fact work product, than would be subject 
to discovery under rule 26.  See Suffolk Constr. Co., 449 Mass. 
at 455.  See also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 
432 F.3d 366, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("the [deliberative process] 
privilege and the [attorney work product] doctrine are not 
coterminous in their sweep").  We do not believe that this 
result is so inconsistent with the administration of justice 
that we should imply an exemption for work product under the act 
conterminous with the sweep of Mass. R. Civ. P. 26 (b) (3), and 
depart from our refusal to do so in General Electric.  Where 
opinion work product and some fact work product are already 
protected under exemption (d), where fact work product receives 
                                                 
 
17 Cf. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 432 
F.3d 366, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2005), quoting In re Sealed Case, 121 
F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Factual material is not 
protected under the deliberative process privilege unless it is 
'inextricably intertwined' with the deliberative material"); 
Mapother v. Department of Justice, 3 F.3d 1533, 1537-1538 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993), quoting Wolfe v. Department of Health & Human 
Servs., 839 F.2d 768, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Where an agency 
claims that disclosing factual material will reveal its 
deliberative processes, 'we must examine the information 
requested in light of the policies and goals that underlie the 
deliberative process privilege'"). 
25 
 
only qualified protection under rule 26 (b) (3), and where the 
Legislature specifically excluded from the scope of 
exemption (d) "reasonably completed factual studies or reports," 
the disclosure of fact work product that falls outside the scope 
of exemption (d) does not so interfere with the inherent power 
of the judiciary to ensure the fair disposition of cases that we 
must imply such an exemption.  Cf. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 459 
Mass. at 213-214.  Nor does it so interfere with the fair 
administration of justice that we can reasonably infer that the 
Legislature did not intend to require such disclosure.  Cf. 
Suffolk Constr. Co., 449 Mass. at 457-461. 
 
Finally, we conclude that the administration of justice is 
better served by requiring a public agency to disclose in 
discovery any requested fact work product that would be 
disclosed pursuant to a public records act request -- even if it 
would otherwise be protected under rule 26 (b) (3) were it not a 
public record -- rather than requiring the litigant to make a 
public records act request for these same documents.  See Babets 
v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Human Servs., 403 Mass. 
230, 237 n.8 (1988), citing Bougas v. Chief of Police of 
Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 64 (1976) ("It arguably would be 
anomalous if access to [public records], intended to be 
available even to the merely 'idly curious,' should be denied to 
those who, like the plaintiffs here, have a specific and 
26 
 
demonstrable need for them"); Friedman v. Bache Halsey Stuart 
Shields, Inc., 738 F.2d 1336, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (FOIA "acts 
as a 'floor' when discovery of government documents is sought in 
the course of civil litigation," such that "information 
available under the FOIA is likely to be available through 
discovery").  We recognize that this might require the judge in 
the underlying litigation to determine the scope of 
exemption (d) in resolving a discovery dispute, but a judge 
might have been asked to make the same determination if a 
litigant who made a public records act request appealed the 
denial of that request by a custodian of public records under 
G. L. c. 66, § 10 (b).  The difference is that it would likely 
take far longer to resolve the appeal of the public records 
request denial than it would to resolve a discovery dispute, and 
the appeal might not be decided before the underlying litigation 
is concluded.  Where work product is protected from disclosure 
under the act by exemption (d), it must be treated like any 
other work product under rule 26 (b) (3), and would be subject 
to disclosure only upon the showing of need set forth in that 
rule. 
 
In the case on appeal, the judge concluded that the 
documents at issue "clearly constitute attorney work product" 
under rule 26 (b) (3), and would be "public records" unless they 
fit within one of the enumerated exemptions, but did not address 
27 
 
whether the work product is protected from disclosure by 
exemption (d).  We conclude that the judge erred in failing to 
consider whether the documents at issue are protected from 
disclosure by exemption (d). 
 
We also consider the third-party defendants' argument that 
the documents could not be protected by exemption (d) because 
reports, letters, or memoranda written by an outside consultant 
to the city cannot be "inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or 
letters" as required by exemption (d).  Where a memorandum or 
letter received by the government was prepared at the 
government's request by a consultant hired by the government to 
assist it in the performance of its own functions, it is both 
"textually possible" and "in accord with the purpose" of 
exemption (d) to regard the document as an "intra-agency" 
memorandum or letter.  Klamath, 532 U.S. at 9-10, quoting 
Department of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 18 n.1 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (interpreting language in exemption [5] 
of FOIA).  There is no reason to require the disclosure of such 
documents simply because they were prepared by an outside 
consultant temporarily hired by the government rather than by a 
public employee.  See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077-1078 
& n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (report prepared for government by 
consultant was not necessarily outside scope of FOIA exemption 
for "inter-agency or intra-agency memorand[a] or letters," 
28 
 
because "[t]he [g]overnment may have a special need for the 
opinions and recommendations of temporary consultants, and those 
individuals should be able to give their judgments freely 
without fear of publicity"); Xerox Corp. v. Webster, 65 N.Y.2d 
131, 133 (1985) ("It would make little sense to protect the 
deliberative process when . . . reports are prepared by agency 
employees yet deny this protection when reports are prepared for 
the same purpose by outside consultants retained by agencies").  
Accordingly, we conclude that the work product in this case is 
not outside the scope of exemption (d)'s protection of "inter-
agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters" simply because 
Smyth was an outside consultant. 
 
The practical consequence of our holding today, stated 
simply, is that opinion work product that was prepared in 
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for a party or 
party representative is protected from discovery to the extent 
provided under Mass. R. Civ. P. 26 (b) (3), even where the 
opinion work product has been made or received by a State or 
local government employee.  So is fact work product that is 
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial where it is 
not a reasonably completed study or report, or, if it is 
reasonably completed, is interwoven with opinions or analysis 
leading to opinions.  Other fact work product that has been made 
or received by a State or local government employee must be 
29 
 
disclosed in discovery, even if it would be protected from 
discovery under rule 26 (b) (3) were it not a public record. 
 
2.  Derivative attorney-client privilege.  We also consider 
the city's argument that, regardless whether the documents are 
protected from disclosure by exemption (d), they are protected 
from disclosure under the derivative attorney-client privilege 
because Smyth "translated" for the city solicitor "technical 
information contained in laboratory data and field observations" 
relating to the site, and such assistance was necessary for the 
city solicitor to provide legal advice to the city.  Generally, 
the attorney-client privilege protects only "confidential 
communications between a client and its attorney undertaken for 
the purpose of obtaining legal advice."  Suffolk Constr. Co., 
449 Mass. at 448.  See Comcast, 453 Mass. at 303 (indorsing 
Wigmore's "classic formulation" of attorney-client privilege).  
However, we have recognized that the derivative attorney-client 
privilege "can shield communications of a third party employed 
to facilitate communication between the attorney and client and 
thereby assist the attorney in rendering legal advice to the 
client."  Id. at 306, citing United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 
918, 921-922 (2d Cir. 1961). 
 
The derivative attorney-client privilege is sharply limited 
in scope.  It attaches "only when the [third party's] role is to 
clarify or facilitate communications between attorney and 
30 
 
client," Comcast, 453 Mass. at 308, as where "the [third party] 
functions as a 'translator' between the client and the 
attorney," In re G-I Holdings Inc., 218 F.R.D. 428, 434 (D.N.J. 
2003), and is therefore "nearly indispensable or serve[s] some 
specialized purpose in facilitating the attorney-client 
communications."  Comcast, supra at 307, quoting Cavallaro v. 
United States, 284 F.3d 236, 249 (1st Cir. 2002).  The privilege 
does not apply simply because "an attorney's ability to 
represent a client is improved, even substantially, by the 
assistance" of an expert.  Comcast, supra.  In short, the 
derivative attorney-client privilege protects otherwise 
privileged communications between an attorney and client despite 
the presence of a third party where, without the assistance of 
the third party, what the client says would be "Greek" to the 
attorney, either because the client is actually speaking in 
Greek or because the information provided by the client is so 
technical in nature that it might as well be spoken in Greek if 
there were not an expert to interpret it for the attorney.  See 
id. at 306 (derivative privilege is exception to rule that 
"[d]isclosing attorney-client communications to a third party 
. . . undermines the privilege"). 
 
The communications at issue fail to meet this test.  Even 
if Smyth's analysis were critical to the city solicitor's 
ability to effectively represent the city because the technical 
31 
 
data would otherwise have been difficult to understand, Smyth 
was "translating" public record technical data relating to the 
site, not confidential communications from the client.  The 
purpose of the derivative attorney-client privilege is to 
maintain the privilege for communications between the attorney 
and the client in circumstances where a third party's presence 
would otherwise constitute a waiver of the privilege, and that 
purpose would not be fulfilled by shielding Smyth's analysis of 
technical data from disclosure.  See Comcast, 453 Mass. at 307-
310, and cases cited (reviewing Federal cases rejecting claim 
that similar communications from outside experts retained by 
client's attorney are within derivative attorney-client 
privilege).  Consequently, if the TRC work product is to be 
shielded from disclosure, that shield must rest on the work 
product doctrine, not the derivative attorney-client privilege.18 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, we vacate the 
judge's order allowing the third-party defendants' motion to 
compel production of the work product at issue in this case, and 
remand the matter to the motion judge so that he may determine 
                                                 
 
18 Because we conclude that the TRC work product is not 
privileged, we need not address the third-party defendants' 
additional claim that the city waived its right to assert the 
privilege by failing to take reasonable steps to maintain the 
confidentiality of the TRC work product after it had been 
inadvertently produced by TRC in February, 2013, in response to 
a keeper of records subpoena served on TRC by third-party 
defendants. 
32 
 
whether the work product, in whole or in part, is protected from 
disclosure under the act because it is exempted from the 
definition of "public records," under G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-
sixth (d).  Any work product that is a "public record" because 
it does not fall within exemption (d) (or any other exemption) 
shall be ordered to be produced in discovery by the city.  If 
any work product is not a "public record" because it falls 
within exemption (d) (or any another exemption), the work 
product may not be ordered to be produced in discovery unless 
the third-party defendants have made the required showing of 
need to justify disclosure of this work product under Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 26 (b) (3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.