Title: Roe v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 050909
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 2006

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton,∗ S.J. 
 
GEORGE JULIOUS ROE 
OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 050909 
 April 21, 2006 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Commonwealth may 
prosecute a criminal defendant for certain crimes when the 
circuit court had previously granted the Commonwealth's motion 
to dismiss indictments alleging the same crimes. 
 
The facts relevant to our disposition of this appeal are 
not in dispute.  In 2002, a grand jury for the City of 
Richmond indicted George Julious Roe for the following 
offenses:  abduction, use of a firearm in the commission of 
abduction, shooting into an occupied dwelling, and possession 
of a firearm by a convicted felon.  The defendant was 
scheduled to be tried in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Richmond on October 3, 2002.  On that date, the Commonwealth's 
attorney and the defendant's counsel were present in the 
circuit court.  However, the defendant was not present because 
he was in the custody of the United States Government, and the 
                     
∗ Senior Justice Compton participated in the hearing and 
decision of this case before his death on April 9, 2006. 
 
 
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Commonwealth had not made arrangements to procure his 
presence. 
Upon the Commonwealth's motion for a continuance, the 
circuit court considered evidence and arguments of counsel and 
denied the motion.  The Commonwealth made a motion to dismiss 
the above-referenced offenses.  The circuit court granted the 
motion and entered an order that stated in part: 
 
"The defendant was not present this day.  He 
was represented by appointed counsel, Michael 
Herring.  The Commonwealth was represented by George 
Townsend. 
 
"On motion of the attorney for the 
Commonwealth, the Court, having heard the evidence 
and argument(s) of counsel, DENIES Commonwealth's 
motion for a continuance. 
 
"The attorney for the Commonwealth moved to 
dismiss the offense(s) indicated below, which motion 
the Court granted. 
 
"CASE 
 
OFFENSE DESCRIPTION AND OFFENSE 
NUMBER 
 
INDICATOR (F/M) 
 
DATE 
 
"CR02-F-1434 
Use of a Firearm in the 07/04/01 
 
 
 
Commission of Abduction 
 
 
 
(F) 
 
"CR02-F-1435 
Shoot Into An Occupied 
07/04/01 
 
 
 
Dwelling (F)  
 
"CR02-F-1436 
Possession of a Firearm  07/04/01 
 
 
 
by a Convicted Felon (F) 
 
"CR02-F-1437 
Abduction (F)  
 
07/04/01" 
 
Subsequently, another grand jury for the City of Richmond 
indicted Roe for these same offenses.  The trial for these 
offenses was conducted on September 17, 2003.  Before the 
 
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commencement of the trial, Roe moved to dismiss the 
indictments because the charges had been dismissed by the 
circuit court's order dated October 3, 2002. 
Defendant's counsel argued before the circuit court, with 
a different judge presiding, that the Commonwealth was not 
entitled to proceed with these charges because they were 
dismissed in October 2002.  Defense counsel informed the 
circuit court that the Commonwealth made a motion to continue 
the trial in October 2002 because the Commonwealth was not 
prepared to proceed with its case and that the victim had 
repeatedly failed to appear.  The defendant also asserted that 
the Commonwealth chose not to request a nolle prosequi 
pursuant to Code § 19.2-265.3, but instead the Commonwealth 
specifically moved to dismiss the charges.  The Commonwealth 
responded that even though it made a motion to dismiss during 
the October 3, 2002 proceeding, the motion was in the nature 
of a motion for a nolle prosequi and that the dismissal was 
not with prejudice. 
 
The circuit court reviewed the above-referenced order and 
ruled: 
"I find that the Court had no power under the 
circumstances presented on October 3, 2002 to 
dismiss the case with prejudice.  It only had the 
power to dismiss on a motion to nol pros . . . it 
appears to have been phrased in the term motion to 
dismiss by the prosecutor in court that day. 
 
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"As I read the law the only power the Court has 
is to grant a motion to nol pros at that time.  
That's the way I interpret the order." 
 
 
The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss and 
conducted a bench trial.  At the conclusion of the trial, the 
defendant was convicted of abduction, use of a firearm in the 
commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a 
felon.  The defendant was sentenced to a total of 13 years 
with five years suspended. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
defendant's convictions.  Roe v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 
240, 609 S.E.2d 635 (2005).  The Court of Appeals held that 
the circuit court's ruling that the October 3, 2002 dismissal 
order constituted a nolle prosequi is a reasonable 
interpretation of that order and that the circuit court did 
not abuse its discretion.  Id. at 249, 609 S.E.2d at 639.  Roe 
appeals. 
 
The defendant argues in this Court that the circuit court 
erred by failing to dismiss the indictments that were the 
subject of the second prosecution.  The defendant states that 
the Commonwealth requested and received a dismissal of those 
charges in October 2002 as stated in the circuit court's 
dismissal order.  Continuing, the defendant asserts that the 
circuit court's subsequent ruling that the dismissal order 
constituted a nolle prosequi is erroneous and that the Court 
 
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of Appeals erred by affirming the judgment of the circuit 
court.  The Commonwealth responds that its motion to dismiss 
granted in the October 2002 order was the equivalent of a 
nolle prosequi and that the circuit court's interpretation of 
the October 2002 order is reasonable.  We disagree with the 
Commonwealth. 
 
It is well established in this Commonwealth that a 
circuit court speaks only through its written orders.  We have 
consistently applied this well-established principle.  Rose v. 
Jaques, 268 Va. 137, 147, 597 S.E.2d 64, 70 (2004); Upper 
Occoquan Sewage Authority v. Blake Construction Co., 266 Va. 
582, 588, 587 S.E.2d 721, 724 (2003); Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 262 Va. 661, 668, 553 S.E.2d 760, 763 (2001); Berean 
Law Group, P.C. v. Cox, 259 Va. 622, 626, 528 S.E.2d 108, 111 
(2000); Walton v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 94, 501 S.E.2d 
134, 140 (1998). 
 
Another well-established principle in our jurisprudence 
is that circuit courts have the authority to interpret their 
own orders.  Fredericksburg Constr. Co. v. J.W. Wyne 
Excavating, Inc., 260 Va. 137, 143-44, 530 S.E.2d 148, 152 
(2000); Rusty's Welding Service, Inc. v. Gibson, 29 Va. App. 
119, 129, 510 S.E.2d 255, 260 (1999).  However, a circuit 
court's authority to interpret its order is subject to 
judicial review and even though this Court accords deference 
 
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to the circuit court's interpretation, that interpretation 
must be reasonable.  Smoot v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 495, 
500, 559 S.E.2d 409, 412 (2002).  We apply an abuse of 
discretion standard in determining whether the circuit court's 
interpretation of its order is reasonable.  Id. 
 
Applying the aforementioned principles, we hold that the 
circuit court's interpretation of the October 2002 order is 
unreasonable and that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding 
otherwise.  Contrary to the ruling of the circuit court, the 
October 3, 2002 order did not grant a motion for nolle 
prosequi.  The Commonwealth specifically requested that the 
charges be "dismissed," not that the charges be nolle prossed.  
The circuit court speaks through its orders, and the October 
3, 2002 order specifies that "[t]he attorney for the 
Commonwealth moved to dismiss the offense(s) indicated below, 
which motion the Court granted." 
 
A nolle prosequi and a motion to dismiss are separate and 
distinct procedures.  Code § 19.2-265.3, which governs nolle 
prosequi, states:  "Nolle prosequi shall be entered only in 
the discretion of the court, upon motion of the Commonwealth 
with good cause therefor shown."  Pursuant to the plain 
language of Code § 19.2-265.3, the Commonwealth is not 
entitled to a nolle prosequi unless it demonstrates the 
 
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requisite good cause.  A dismissal at the request of the 
Commonwealth does not require a showing of good cause. 
We also observe that the General Assembly has enacted 
many statutes that contain both the terms "nolle prosequi" and 
"dismissed."  Examples of statutes that contain both terms 
include:  Code § 16.1-305.1 that governs disclosure of 
disposition in certain delinquency cases; Code § 17.1-213 that 
deals with disposition of papers in ended cases; Code § 19.2-
392.2 that governs expungement of police and court records; 
and Code § 51.1-124.28 that deals with legal representation of 
certain governmental officials.  We have repeatedly stated 
that "[w]hen the General Assembly uses two different terms in 
the same act, it is presumed to mean two different things."  
Simon v. Forer, 265 Va. 483, 490, 578 S.E.2d 792, 796 (2003); 
Greenberg v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 594, 601, 499 S.E.2d 266, 
270 (1998); Forst v. Rockingham Poultry Mktg. Coop., Inc., 222 
Va. 270, 278, 279 S.E.2d 400, 404 (1981).  Clearly, the 
General Assembly is aware of the difference between the terms 
"nolle prosequi" and "motion to dismiss," and the General 
Assembly has not used these terms synonymously. 
We hold that the circuit court abused its discretion when 
it concluded that the October 3, 2002 dismissal order granted 
the Commonwealth's motion for a nolle prosequi.  The 
Commonwealth failed to make such motion. 
 
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The facts and circumstances surrounding the entry of the 
October 2002 dismissal order indicate that the dismissal was 
with prejudice.  The Commonwealth failed to procure the 
presence of the defendant, who was in the custody of federal 
officials, and the Commonwealth was not prepared to proceed 
with its case against the defendant.  The circuit court had 
denied the Commonwealth's motion for a continuance, and the 
Commonwealth neglected to request a nolle prosequi.  Moreover, 
the Commonwealth does not identify any circumstances in the 
record that suggest that the order was entered without 
prejudice.1 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals, and we will dismiss the indictments. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
                     
1 The Commonwealth's remaining arguments are without 
merit.