Title: G C TIMMIS & CO V GUARDIAN ALARM CO
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 120035
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 2003

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                          
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 18, 2003  
G.C. TIMMIS & COMPANY,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v
 No. 120035  
GUARDIAN ALARM COMPANY,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
MARKMAN, J.  
This case concerns whether plaintiff acted as a real  
estate broker under § 2501(d) of the real estate brokers act  
(REBA), MCL 339.2501 et seq. 
The trial court denied  
defendant’s motion for summary disposition after finding that  
a question of fact remained concerning whether plaintiff  
participated 
in 
negotiations regarding the sale of a business.  
The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the trial court and  
 
held that REBA required plaintiff to be a licensed real estate  
broker because it had acted as a “finder.”  We reverse the  
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the  
trial 
court 
for 
a 
determination 
whether 
defendant’s  
transaction here constituted a “real estate” transaction for  
purposes of REBA.1  
I. BACKGROUND  
Plaintiff is a registered investment advisor, but it is  
not a licensed real estate broker.  Plaintiff introduced  
itself to defendant, a security-systems company, in order to  
discuss how it might assist defendant in acquiring other  
security-systems companies.  According to plaintiff, the  
parties entered into an oral contract, which specified that  
plaintiff would receive a “success fee” for any company  
plaintiff contacted on defendant’s behalf that defendant  
subsequently purchased.2  Plaintiff eventually introduced  
defendant to a company, MetroCell, a subsidiary of Rao  
Corporation.
 Subsequently, defendant purchased the alarm  
contracts 
of 
MetroCell and its customers, and plaintiff sought  
1 
 We deny plaintiff’s motion to file a postargument 
supplemental brief regarding plaintiff’s failure to submit at 
the time of oral argument a signed affidavit on defendant’s 
motion for summary disposition in the trial court. However, 
we do not find this issue dispositive of this case in any way.  
2 
 Defendant disputes the existence of such an oral  
contract.  
2  
 
 
the “success fee.”  However, defendant refused to pay,  
claiming that REBA precluded plaintiff from bringing suit  
because plaintiff had acted as an unlicensed real estate  
broker.  The trial court denied defendant’s motion for summary  
disposition, concluding that there was a genuine issue of  
material fact regarding whether plaintiff had acted as a “real  
estate broker.” 
The Court of Appeals, in a two-to-one  
decision, reversed.  247 Mich App 247; 635 NW2d 370 (2001).  
This Court granted plaintiff’s application for leave to  
appeal.3  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
Statutory interpretation is an issue of law that is  
reviewed de novo.  People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 329; 603 NW2d  
250 (1999).  
III. ANALYSIS  
This Court must determine whether plaintiff’s conduct  
fell within the scope of Michigan’s real estate brokers  
licensing act.  To determine whether plaintiff acted as a  
“real estate broker,” this Court must first determine: (a)  
whether the Legislature intended the definition of “real  
estate 
broker” 
to 
encompass the brokerage of non-“real estate”  
transactions; and, if so, (b) whether plaintiff conducted  
itself as a “real estate broker,” as defined in § 2501(d) of  
3 466 Mich 889 (2002).  
3  
 
the Occupational Code. MCL 339.101 et seq.  
A.  REBA LIMITED TO REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 
 
MCL 339.2501(d) provides:  
“Real estate broker” means an individual . . .  
[or entity] who with the intent to collect or 
receive 
a 
fee, 
compensation, 
or 
valuable  
consideration, sells or offers for sale, buys or 
offers to buy, provides or offers to provide market 
analysis, lists or offers or attempts to list, or 
negotiates the purchase or sale or exchange or  
mortgage of real estate, or negotiates for the 
construction of a building on real estate; who 
leases or offers or rents or offers for rent real  
estate or the improvements on the real estate for 
others, as a whole or partial vocation; who engages 
in property management as a whole or partial 
vocation; who sells or offers for sale, buys or  
offers to buy, leases or offers to lease, or  
negotiates the purchase or sale or exchange of a  
business, business opportunity, or the goodwill of  
an existing business for others; or who, as owner 
or otherwise, engages in the sale of real estate as 
a principal vocation. [Emphasis added.]  
When 
construing 
a 
statute, 
the 
Court’s 
primary 
obligation  
is to ascertain the legislative intent that may be reasonably  
inferred from the words expressed in the statute.  Chandler v  
Co of Muskegon, 467 Mich 315, 319; 652 NW2d 224 (2002). If  
the language of the statute is unambiguous, the Legislature is  
presumed to have intended the meaning expressed.  Tryc v  
Michigan Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135; 545 NW2d 642  
(1996).  
Real estate brokering is not the only profession  
regulated by the Legislature under the Occupational Code.  MCL  
4  
 
 
339.101 et seq. Rather, the Code regulates a number of other  
professions, including public accounting, barbering, hearing­
aid dealing, and residential building.  See MCL 339.720 et  
seq.; MCL 339.1101 et seq.; MCL 339.1301 et seq.; MCL 339.2401  
et seq. 
A common theme prevails throughout each of these  
articles—namely, that each article deals with a single or  
discrete group of identified professions.  For example,  
article 11 deals only with barbering and does not contain  
language that would suggest that it applies to any other  
professions, such as dog grooming.  
The doctrine of noscitur a sociis, i.e., that “a word or  
phrase is given meaning by its context or setting,” affords us  
assistance in interpreting § 2501(d).  See Koontz v Ameritech  
Services Inc, 466 Mich 304, 318; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). Thus, we  
utilize this doctrine, and apply this theme of a “single or  
discrete group of identified professions” in the Occupational  
Code to REBA. Because there is no reason to believe that in  
drafting 
REBA, the 
Legislature chose not to employ this “single  
or discrete group of identified professions” theme, we find  
this to be the first indication that REBA applies only to the  
brokering of real estate.  
However, our inquiry does not stop there.  Next, we apply  
noscitur a sociis to the individual phrases of § 2501(d), as  
well as to the other provisions of REBA because the emphasized  
5  
 
language does not stand alone, and thus it cannot be read in  
a vacuum. Instead, “[i]t exists and must be read in context  
with the entire act, and the words and phrases used there must  
be assigned such meanings as are in harmony with the whole of  
the statute . . . .”  Arrowhead Dev Co v Livingston Co Rd  
Comm, 413 Mich 505, 516; 322 NW2d 702 (1982). “[W]ords in a  
statute should not be construed in the void, but should be  
read together to harmonize the meaning, giving effect to the  
act as a whole.”  Gen Motors Corp v Erves (On Rehearing), 399  
Mich 241, 255; 249 NW2d 41 (1976)(opinion by COLEMAN, J.).  
Although a phrase or a statement may mean one thing when read  
in isolation, it may mean something substantially different  
when read in context.  McCarthy v Bronson, 500 US 136, 139;  
111 S Ct 1737; 114 L Ed 2d 194 (1991); Hagen v Dep’t of Ed,  
431 Mich 118, 130-131; 427 NW2d 879 (1988).  “In seeking  
meaning, words and clauses will not be divorced from those  
which precede and those which follow.”  People v Vasquez, 465  
Mich 83, 89; 631 NW2d 711 (2001), quoting Sanchick v State Bd  
of Optometry, 342 Mich 555, 559; 70 NW2d 757 (1955). “It is  
a familiar principle of statutory construction that words  
grouped in a list should be given  related meaning.” Third  
Nat’l Bank in Nashville v Impac Ltd, Inc, 432 US 312, 322; 97  
S Ct 2307; 53 L Ed 2d 368 (1977); see also Beecham v United  
States, 511 US 368, 371; 114 S Ct 1669; 128 L Ed 2d 383  
6  
 
(1994).  
The emphasized language of REBA’s definition of “real  
estate broker,” part IIIA above, includes the phrase, one “who  
. . . negotiates the purchase or sale . . . of a business,  
business opportunity, or the goodwill of an existing business  
for others . . . .”  MCL 339.2501(d). In interpreting this  
language, we examine its context and must give it a meaning  
that is not only logically related to the type of broker  
specifically defined in § 2501(d), but also a meaning  
logically related to the other five phrases used in § 2501(d)  
to define a “real estate broker,” and the other provisions of  
REBA. Vasquez, supra at 89.  
Section 2501(d) defines not merely a broker, but  
specifically a “real estate” broker, and thus provides the  
first indication that the Legislature intended that REBA apply  
only to persons brokering real estate. Further, immediately  
following REBA’s definition of “real estate” broker, the  
Legislature defines “real estate” salesperson, in terms that  
expressly cross-reference the definition of “real estate”  
broker, i.e., a “real estate salesperson” is one who is  
employed by a “real estate broker.”  The Legislature also  
defines five other terms in § 2501,4 all of which are defined  
4 “Property management,” “property management account,” 
“property management employment contract,” “employment,” and 
(continued...)  
7  
by express reference to “real estate” or “real property.”  The  
Legislature 
then 
employs six definitional phrases in § 2501(d)  
to give meaning to the term “real estate broker,” and each of  
those phrases, with the exception of the one at issue, either  
expressly uses or references the term “real estate.”5  The  
Legislature 
proceeds 
to 
employ 
these 
same 
definitional 
phrases  
in giving meaning to “real estate salesperson.”  
Moreover, there are other textual indicators that REBA  
applies only to “real estate.” 
First, the courses an  
applicant must complete in order to receive a license under  
this act, a license as a “real estate” broker, all not  
surprisingly concern real estate.6  Second, amid this focus on  
real estate, there is nothing within REBA that suggests any  
legislative intent that it apply to non-“real estate”  
4(...continued) 
“independent contractor relationship.”  MCL 339.2501(a)­
(c),(f), and (g).  
5 Section 2501(d) defines a “real estate broker” as one 
who, for a fee, “sells . . . or buys . . . real estate”; 
“rents . . . real estate”; “leases . . . real estate”; or “who 
otherwise engages in the sale of real estate.”  A 1994  
amendment of REBA expanded the definition of “real estate 
broker” to include one who “engages in property management,” 
defined in MCL 339.2501(a) as “the leasing or renting . . . of 
real property . . . .”  
6 MCL 339.2504(3). For example, these courses include: 
(1) real estate licensing law and related regulatory laws; (2) 
real 
property 
law; 
(3) 
conveyances, 
including 
contracts, 
deeds 
and leases; (4) appraisal of real property; and (5) real 
estate securities and syndications.  
8  
 
transactions.7  Thus, application of the “single or discrete  
group of identified professions” theme, along with an  
examination of the text of § 2501(d), as well as the text of  
REBA’s surrounding provisions, together suggest that REBA’s  
licensing requirement only applies to “the purchase or sale  
. . . of a business, business opportunity, or the goodwill of  
an existing business”8 when that purchase or sale involves a  
7 For example, MCL 339.2502 creates the board of real  
estate brokers; MCL 339.2504 mandates continuing education 
requirements 
of 
real 
estate brokers; MCL 339.2505 provides the 
licensing requirements of real estate brokers; MCL 339.2506  
states the method by which a real estate salesperson’s license  
is issued; MCL 339.2507 mandates that a real estate  
salesperson’s license be returned by the real estate broker  
department upon termination of employment; MCL 339.2508 
defines the scope of a real estate broker’s license; MCL 
339.2509 provides for the issuance of associate real estate  
broker’s licenses; MCL 339.2510 sets forth the commissions to 
which a real estate salesperson is lawfully entitled; MCL 
339.2512b provides that referral of prospective tenants does 
not 
constitute 
participation in a real estate transaction; and 
MCL 339.2514 states that nonresidents can become real estate  
brokers.  
8 Purchase of “the premises in which [the] business is 
conducted” is one way to acquire “goodwill.”  Black’s Law  
Dictionary 
(6th 
ed)(emphasis added). In our judgment, because 
goodwill 
can 
be 
acquired merely through a business’s premises, 
i.e., real estate, and because the surrounding text and 
provisions of 
REBA relate only to real estate, we find that the 
“goodwill” language of § 2501(d) applies only to situations in 
which the purchase or sale of an existing business’s goodwill 
is made in conjunction with the purchase or sale of the 
premises in which that goodwill was acquired.  We believe that  
such language was inserted in § 2501(d) to prohibit an 
unlicensed broker from contending: (1) that it can be  
compensated for that portion of a real estate transaction that 
involves non-“real estate,” including the purchase or sale of 
the existing business’s goodwill, or (2) that it can be 
(continued...)  
9  
 
  
real estate transaction.  
The purpose of REBA, which is to protect the integrity of  
real estate transactions by ensuring that they are brokered by  
persons 
expert 
in 
that realm, requires the interpretation that  
REBA applies only to real estate transactions. The conclusion  
that the emphasized language of § 2501(d) applies only to real  
estate transactions affords reasonable meaning to this  
language within the context of the provisions that surround  
it, while maintaining the focus of REBA on transactions  
involving the purchase or sale of business real estate.  
Alarm contracts are not real estate and, thus, at least  
on the basis of the present record, REBA is not applicable to  
this transaction, which apparently involved only the purchase  
of such contracts. However, because our interpretation of §  
2501(d) has not been previously set forth, and because this  
case was resolved on summary disposition where the record may  
not have been fully developed in light of this interpretation,  
8(...continued) 
compensated 
for 
the 
entire transaction because the purchase or 
sale of the business’s real estate was incidental to the  
purchase or sale of the existing business’s goodwill. 
Moreover, the meaning we accord “goodwill” as it is used in 
REBA is not, as the dissent asserts, “patently false and taken 
out of context,” post at 7 n 3, because, as set forth in its 
dictionary definition, goodwill can be acquired, among other 
ways, through the “premises in which the business is  
conducted.”  
10  
 
we remand this matter to the trial court for a determination  
of whether a real estate transaction was involved here.  
B. “REAL ESTATE BROKER”  
If, on remand, the trial court determines that  
defendant’s purchase of MetroCell’s contracts involved a real  
estate transaction, the trial court must then address a  
further issue: whether plaintiff is prohibited by MCL  
339.2512a from seeking compensation for its services because  
plaintiff was not a licensed “real estate broker.”  MCL  
339.2501(d).  
As previously stated, § 2501(d) defines a “real estate  
broker” as an individual or entity that “sells . . . buys  
. . . or negotiates the purchase or sale . . . of a business,  
business opportunity, or the goodwill of an existing business  
for others. . . .” MCL 339.2512a provides:  
A person engaged in the business of, or acting  
in the capacity of, a person required to be 
licensed under this article, shall not maintain an 
action in a court of this state for the collection  
of compensation for the performance of an act or 
contract for which a license is required by this 
article without alleging and proving that the 
person was licensed under this article at the time 
of the performance of the act or contract.  
The Court of Appeals held that “plaintiff’s activities  
constituted ‘negotiations [for] the purchase or sale or  
exchange of a business’ as contemplated by the act and that,  
therefore, [plaintiff] was required to procure a real estate  
11  
 
 
 
brokers license in order to collect fees for its service.”  
247 Mich App 252-253.  In reaching this conclusion, the  
appellate court relied on Cardillo v Canusa Extrusion  
Engineering Inc, 145 Mich App 361; 377 NW2d 412 (1985),  
observing:  
Here, plaintiff found business assets for 
defendant to purchase, conduct which falls squarely 
within the definition of activities performed by a 
“real estate broker” under the act. . . . [I]t is 
clear that plaintiff’s conduct in attempting to 
locate business assets for purchase by defendant 
constitutes action of a “real estate broker” as  
defined by the statute. [247 Mich App 256-257.]  
In Cardillo, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant  
orally agreed to pay a fee for successfully finding a buyer  
for the defendant’s engineering firm. The defendant moved for  
summary disposition, contending that REBA precluded the  
plaintiffs from bringing an action seeking compensation  
because 
the 
plaintiffs were unlicensed as real estate brokers.  
Cardillo, supra at 364-365. Although the plaintiffs claimed  
not to be brokers, the Court of Appeals opined:  
In interpreting this statute, the trial court 
concluded that a mere finder or middleman is not  
included in the definition of a broker. We do not  
agree. . . . Sometimes, performing one of the usual  
functions, such as finding a purchaser, will be 
enough to subject a person to the broker licensing 
requirement. 
 * * *  
Under this analysis [after reviewing REBA], we 
would hold that in finding a purchaser for  
defendants’ assets under a commission agreement, 
plaintiffs were subjected to [REBA]. [Id. at 368,  
12  
 
 
  
 
 
371 (emphasis added).]  
Thus, under Cardillo, one must be a licensed real estate  
broker when one merely performs one of the “usual functions”  
of a real estate broker, including among other things  
“finding” a purchaser for real estate.  
However, in our judgment, REBA does not require one to be  
a licensed real estate broker when one merely performs a  
“usual function” of a real estate broker, such as “finding” a  
purchaser.
 Rather, REBA expressly requires that one be a  
licensed real estate broker only if, for a fee, one “sells or  
buys” real estate or “negotiates” a real estate transaction  
for another.  MCL 339.2501(d). 
Accordingly, to the extent  
that Cardillo holds otherwise, we believe that it reads too  
much into § 2501(d), and, thus, we reject its interpretation  
of this provision.  
In rejecting Cardillo’s interpretation of § 2501(d), we  
instead believe that Turner Holdings, Inc v Howard Miller  
Clock Co, 657 F Supp 1370 (WD Mich, 1987), correctly  
interpreted this provision.  In that case, the court held that  
one need not possess a real estate broker’s license for merely  
“identifying and advising” a client about a purchase of a  
business.9  Likewise, unless plaintiff’s actions here are  
9 In the present case, the Court of Appeals refused to  
follow Turner Holdings because “decisions of a federal  
(continued...)  
13  
 
 
 
 
covered by § 2501(d)—that is, unless plaintiff’s activities  
can reasonably be characterized as “sell[ing], . . . buy[ing],  
. . . or negotiat[ing]” the purchase or sale of real estate  
for another for a fee, it is not required to possess a real  
estate license.  
Although, in our judgment, Cardillo’s interpretation of  
REBA is incorrect, we agree with Judge WHITE in her dissent in  
the instant case,10 and would also remand to the trial court  
for consideration of whether plaintiff, in fact, “negotiated”  
a real estate transaction with MetroCell (or its parent Rao  
Corporation).
 There is a genuine issue of material fact  
9(...continued) 
district court interpreting Michigan law are not binding 
precedent on Michigan courts . . . [and] [w]e further decline 
to extend the reasoning of Turner Holdings to the present 
case, and reaffirm the Cardillo Court’s interpretation and 
application of the statute as correct.” 247 Mich App 258. Of  
course, we agree that federal decisions interpreting Michigan 
law are not binding on Michigan courts, but we do find Turner  
Holdings nonetheless to be persuasive.  
10 In her dissent, Judge WHITE stated:  
Taken 
in 
the 
light 
most 
favorable 
to  
plaintiff, there is a genuine issue whether  
plaintiff seeks compensation for the performance of 
an act . . . for which a license is required by the 
statute.  Plaintiff does not claim compensation for 
offering to buy MetroCell or for any negotiating 
respecting the sale. 
Rather, plaintiff seeks 
compensation for providing information concerning 
the nature of the industry, the approach defendant 
should take to strengthen its position in the 
industry, and the type of business it should  
attempt to acquire, and for targeting MetroCell as 
such a business. [247 Mich App 261.]   
14  
 
relating to whether plaintiff participated in real estate  
negotiations.  For example, defendant offered the following  
evidence 
of 
plaintiff’s 
participation 
in 
real 
estate  
negotiations: (a) that plaintiff’s lawyer sent defendant a  
letter, acknowledging that it “represented [defendant] in  
negotiations with Rao Corporation for the purchase of  
MetroCell Security over a period of several weeks”; (b) that  
plaintiff’s business brochure stated that plaintiff often  
engaged in transactions requiring it to perform “acquisition  
negotiations”; and (c) that plaintiff had meetings with Rao  
Corporation to engage in business “discussions” of some  
uncertain character. 
However, plaintiff presented the  
following evidence in response: (a) that plaintiff only  
introduced itself to defendant as an investment banker; (b)  
that 
the 
alleged 
oral contract between plaintiff and defendant  
never mentioned negotiations; (c) that the purpose of  
plaintiff’s 
initial 
meeting with Rao Corporation was merely to  
determine whether MetroCell was for sale; and (d) that the  
only evidence regarding negotiations are those that occurred  
between defendant and MetroCell, not between plaintiff and  
MetroCell.  Therefore, if, on remand, the trial court  
determines that a real estate transaction occurred here, the  
trial court must then determine also whether plaintiff  
“negotiated” such transaction.  
15  
 
IV. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT  
The dissent criticizes the majority’s interpretation of  
§ 2501(d) by asserting that we “ignore[] the clear language  
of the REBA” and “sidestep[] the plain meaning of the words  
. . . .” 
Post at 1, 6.
 We respectfully, but strongly,  
disagree. Although we may reach a different conclusion than  
the dissent, we do not “ignore” the language of the statute.11  
Rather, our conclusion that the real estate brokers act is  
limited 
to 
transactions involving real estate is predicated on  
the following analysis: (1) that § 2501(d) defines a specific  
type of broker, a “real estate” broker; (2) that the  
Legislature defines other occupations in this provision, all  
of which expressly cross-reference “real estate” broker; (3)  
that the Legislature defines five other terms in § 2501, all  
of which are defined by express reference to “real estate” and  
“real property”; (4) that five of the six definitional phrases  
used by the Legislature in § 2501(d) either expressly use or  
reference the term “real estate”; (5) that the Legislature  
then proceeds to employ these same definitional phrases in  
giving meaning to “real estate salesperson”; (6) that all the  
11  Nor have we rejected the dissent’s interpretation of 
the statute in order to avoid the “enforcement of a policy 
[that we] reject as unsound.”  Post at 11. 
Rather, the 
majority has taken no position on the “soundness” of a broader 
or narrower REBA and, instead, has rejected the dissent’s 
interpretation entirely on its own merits.  
16  
 
 
courses that a person is required by the statute to complete  
to become a “real estate broker” concern real estate; and (7)  
that other sections of REBA only discuss “real estate” and  
“real estate brokers.” Thus, it is only on the basis of its  
language that we reach our conclusions concerning the meaning  
of REBA.12  
12 Moreover, we disagree with the dissent that the  
interpretative 
doctrine 
of 
noscitur 
a 
sociis 
cannot 
“properly” 
be applied in the instant context because the language being 
defined in § 2501(d) has only a single “customary meaning.” 
Post at 10-11. We disagree, and we believe that the dissent’s 
“pig” hypothetical example makes our point. Concerning this 
hypothetical example, noscitur a sociis can not only be 
“accurately” applied, but must necessarily be applied. 
Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, the term “pig” does not 
have a single, invariable meaning.  Rather, it has several 
separate and distinct meanings, including: (1) a swine; (2) a 
person who is gluttonous, greedy, or slovenly; or (3) an 
oblong mass of metal that has been run into a mold of sand 
while 
still 
molten. 
 
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary 
(2d ed).  Further, “pig” may also be defined as: (4) a segment 
of a citrus fruit or an apple; (5) a device that fits within 
an oil or gas pipeline to clean or inspect its insides; or (6) 
an earthenware pitcher, jar or other vessel.  New Shorter  
Oxford English Dictionary (4th ed). That the first of these  
definitions would suggest itself to a “native speaker of 
English as the common, most likely meaning of the term,” post 
at 10, n 5, is surely a correct, but an irrelevant, 
observation on the part of the dissent.  We do not accord  
words “default” definitions on the basis of their order of  
appearance in the dictionary.  Rather, because the term “pig” 
has several different meanings, we initially apply noscitur a  
sociis (whether or not in an explicit fashion) to accord it 
one of these meanings–that which is contextually related to 
the language that surrounds “pig.”  Such a meaning, we assume, 
is that which is most likely intended by the lawmaker.  In the  
dissent’s 
hypothetical 
example, 
after 
examining 
the  
immediately surrounding terms, all of which have in common 
that they relate to animals, we accord “pig” its only meaning 
possessed in common with these other terms, i.e., “a swine.” 
(continued...)  
17  
 
Next, 
the 
dissent 
contends 
that 
the 
majority’s  
interpretation 
that 
REBA 
applies 
only 
to 
transactions 
involving  
real estate is in error because it “ignores the historical  
evolution of the statute,” which evidences the legislative  
intent that REBA “encompasses the brokerage of business  
opportunities that do not involve real estate transactions.”  
Post at 8, 13. However, because the meaning of § 2501(d) can  
be reasonably ascertained, in our judgment, by examining its  
language, including the context of this language, and  
therefore is not ambiguous, there is no need to resort to the  
legislative 
history 
of 
the 
act 
to 
assist 
in 
our  
interpretation.  Nonetheless, to the extent that this history  
is examined, we believe that it is consistent with our  
interpretation of REBA.  
In 
1919, 
the 
Legislature enacted the brokers license act,  
1919 PA 306, which was titled, “An act to define, regulate,  
and license real estate brokers, real estate salesmen and  
12(...continued) 
Moreover, our analysis would not necessarily stop there. 
Instead, depending on the matter in controversy, noscitur a  
sociis might have to be further applied to determine an even 
narrower 
common 
characteristic between “a swine” and the other  
listed terms, for example, that each of these terms can be 
characterized as an animal that is a mammal.  Similarly, we 
believe that the instant phrase is susceptible to different 
meanings, at least until noscitur a sociis refocuses our  
interpretative gaze from the phrase itself to the words and 
phrases that surround it.  
18  
 
business chance brokers and to provide a penalty for a  
violation of the provisions hereof.”  Section 2 of that act  
defined “business chance broker” as “any person, firm,  
partnership 
association, 
copartnership 
or 
corporation, 
who 
for  
compensation or valuable consideration sells or offers for  
sale, buys or offers to buy, or negotiates the purchase or  
sale or exchange of a business, business opportunity, or the  
good will of an existing business for others as a whole or  
partial vocation.”  On the basis of this definition, this  
Court found in Hague v Delong, 292 Mich 262; 290 NW 403  
(1940), that a person must be a licensed real estate broker  
even though a transaction does not involve real estate.  
Subsequently, in 1943, the Legislature eliminated this  
separate provision concerning “business chance brokers” and  
expanded the definition of “real estate broker” to include the  
activities previously assigned to a business chance broker.  
While we agree with the dissent concerning the facts of  
this history, we do not agree about its significance. While  
the dissent views the 1943 amendments as evidencing the  
Legislature’s intent that the broad definition of “business  
chance broker,” as defined in Hague, be fully retained as part  
of REBA’s modified definition of “real estate broker,” we view  
this differently.  Rather, the Legislature can just as easily  
be viewed as having transferred a phrase, originally defining  
19  
a broad term (“business chance brokers”) occurring within a  
broad act (encompassing both “real estate” and “business  
chance” brokers), and reincorporated this phrase within the  
definition of a more narrow term (“real estate broker”)  
occurring within a more narrow act (encompassing only “real  
estate” brokers).  Not only does the term itself that is being  
defined (here, “real estate broker,” rather than “business  
chance broker”) afford some textual clue about its own  
definition, see discussion at 8, but the different statutory  
contexts within which the term is located (here, a statute  
confined to real estate brokers, rather than one encompassing  
both real estate and business chance brokers) affords some  
textual clue about its meaning.  We do not believe that a  
given grouping of words—in this case “business, business  
opportunity or good will of an existing business”—has an  
invariable meaning regardless of what it purports to be  
defining, regardless of the words and phrases that surround  
it, regardless of the organization of the statute in which it  
is contained, and regardless of the overall purposes of this  
statute.  
Moreover, we believe that it is necessary to ask why the  
Legislature in 1943 would have undertaken this apparently  
substantial rewrite of REBA–modifying its title, and amending  
the statute in accordance with this title modification by  
20  
eliminating coverage for “business chance brokers,” and  
limiting 
the 
statute’s coverage to “real estate brokers”–if it  
had intended that there be no change whatsoever in the scope  
of the act’s coverage. By itself, the decision to alter the  
statute suggests some intent to effect a substantive change in  
the statute.  Further, consider that this alteration of the  
statute occurred against the backdrop of a decision of this  
Court finding that the 1919 act was clear and encompassed  
transactions 
involving the sale of all businesses, real estate  
or otherwise.  
For these reasons, we cannot join the dissent in  
concluding that the Legislature intended that “real estate  
broker” within REBA be understood to mean “broker,” or “a  
broker of all things, real estate or otherwise.”  
V. CONCLUSION  
REBA applies only to real estate transactions.  Further,  
under § 2501(d), one must only be a licensed real estate  
broker when, for a fee, one “sells or buys” real estate or  
“negotiates” a real estate transaction for another.  
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court  
of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for a  
determination of whether a real estate transaction occurred  
here. If no such transaction occurred, the trial court must  
merely determine whether an oral contract existed between  
21  
plaintiff and defendant and compensate plaintiff accordingly.  
However, if the trial court determines that a real estate  
transaction occurred, then, consistently with the language of  
§ 2501(d) and this opinion, the trial court must also  
determine whether plaintiff’s actions constituted those of a  
“real estate broker” and proceed accordingly.  
Stephen J. Markman 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor  
22  
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
G.C. TIMMIS & COMPANY,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v
 No. 120035  
GUARDIAN ALARM COMPANY,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
YOUNG, J. (dissenting).  
The majority ignores the clear language of the REBA, MCL  
339.2501 et seq., favoring instead an interpretation whose  
result the majority deems more palatable. The majority also  
ignores the historical evolution of the statute, which is not  
dispositive but is entirely consistent with the unambiguous  
language of the statute. 
I believe that the statute  
encompasses the brokerage of business opportunities that do  
not involve real estate transactions. Accordingly, I would  
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.  Because the  
majority concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent.  
Plaintiff maintains that transaction it allegedly  
contracted to perform, which did not involve real estate, is  
not covered by the REBA and thus plaintiff was not required to  
be licensed under that act as a precondition of bringing suit  
for breach of the alleged agreement.  The majority contends  
that the issue in this case is whether the Legislature  
“intended” the definition of real estate broker to encompass  
the brokerage of non-real estate transactions.  Ante at 3.  
However, rather than seeking to divine a free floating  
legislative intent, I believe that the Court’s task in this  
case is to determine whether the words actually used by the  
Legislature encompass the brokerage of business opportunities  
that do not involve real estate.  
Our obligation of giving effect to the intent of the  
Legislature begins by examining the language of a statute.  
The words of a statute provide the most reliable evidence of  
legislative intent.  Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 65; 503  
NW2d 435 (1993).  If the language of the statute is clear, the  
Legislature must have intended the meaning expressed, and the  
statute is enforced as written.  Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass'n,  
448 Mich 22, 27; 528 NW2d 681 (1995).  It is only in the face  
of an ambiguity that a court may properly look outside the  
words 
utilized 
in 
the statute to ascertain legislative intent.  
Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119  
(1999).  Finally, in construing a statute, we must give the  
words used by the Legislature their common, ordinary meaning.  
2  
 
 
 
 
MCL 8.3a.1  
Over the past several years, a majority of this Court has  
consistently 
adhered 
to the philosophy that the plain language  
of a statute should be applied without regard to the  
“legislative wisdom” of the outcome.  This philosophy is  
grounded in the belief that separation of powers principles  
preclude the judiciary from engaging in judicial legislation  
or otherwise “saving” the citizenry from the actions of its  
duly elected legislators.  See People v Borchard-Ruhland; 460  
Mich 278; 597 NW2d 1 (1999); People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484;  
596 NW2d 607 (1999); Perez v Keeler Brass Co, 461 Mich 602;  
608 NW2d 45 (2000); People v Hermiz, 462 Mich 71; 611 NW2d 783  
(2000); Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439; 613 NW2d 307 (2000);  
Mudel v Great  Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691; 614  
NW2d 607 (2000); Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 Mich 143;  
615 NW2d 702 (2000); People v Glass, 464 Mich 266; 627 NW2d  
261 (2001); Michigan United Conservation Clubs v Secretary of  
State, 464 Mich 359; 630 NW2d 297 (2001); Pohutski v City of  
Allen Park, 465 Mich 675; 641 NW2d 219 (2002); Robertson v  
DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich 732; 641 NW2d 567 (2002);  
1  Indeed, the statutory construction rules, MCL 8.3 et  
seq., provide a compelling justification, if any were needed, 
for hewing closely to the common meaning of the words employed 
in a statute: The Legislature is drafting its statutes in 
reliance that courts will follow the statutory canons of 
construction the Legislature has adopted.  
3  
 
 
People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335; 646 NW2d 127 (2002); Sington  
v Chrysler Corp, 467 Mich 144; 648 NW2d 624 (2002); Mack v  
Detroit, 467 Mich 186; 649 NW2d 47 (2002); Weakland v Toledo  
Engineering Co, Inc, 467 Mich 344; 656 NW2d 175 (2003); In re  
Certified 
Question 
(Kenneth 
Henes 
Special 
Projects 
Procurement  
v Continental Biomass Industries, Inc), 468 Mich 109; 659 NW2d  
597 (2003).  I do not believe that the majority’s opinion can  
be 
easily 
squared 
with 
the 
principles 
of 
statutory  
construction outlined in the previously cited cases.  
A. The Clear Language of the Statute is not Limited to 
Real Estate Transactions  
The statute at issue is contained in the Occupational  
Code.
 MCL 339.2501(d) defines “real estate broker” as  
follows:  
"Real estate broker" means an individual, sole 
proprietorship, 
partnership, 
association, 
corporation, common law trust, or a combination of 
those entities who with intent to collect or  
receive 
a 
fee, 
compensation, 
or 
valuable  
consideration, sells or offers for sale, buys or 
offers to buy, provides or offers to provide market 
analyses, lists or offers or attempts to list, or 
negotiates the purchase or sale or exchange or  
mortgage of real estate, or negotiates for the 
construction of a building on real estate; who  
leases or offers or rents or offers for rent real  
estate or the improvements on the real estate for 
others, as a whole or partial vocation; who engages 
in property management as a whole or partial 
vocation; who sells or offers for sale, buys or  
offers to buy, leases or offers to lease, or  
negotiates the purchase or sale or exchange of a  
business, business opportunity, or the goodwill of  
an existing business for others; or who, as owner  
4  
 
 
or otherwise, engages in the sale of real estate as 
a principal vocation. [Emphasis added.]  
The plain language of the statute defines a real estate broker  
as, among other things, one who “negotiates the purchase . .  
. of a business, business opportunity, or the goodwill of an  
existing business for others . . . .”  There is no textual  
indication in the statute that brokering a “business,”  
“business opportunity,” or the “goodwill of an existing  
business” 
is 
limited 
to only those transactions involving real  
estate.  To the contrary, the clear language of “business,  
business 
opportunity, or the goodwill of an existing business”  
encompasses the brokerage of transactions without regard to  
real estate.  The majority does not discuss the plain meaning  
of the statutory language; rather, the majority’s analysis  
sidesteps the plain meaning of the words and proceeds directly  
to the use of a canon of statutory construction and other  
contextual tools to explain why the plain language could not  
possibly mean what it so obviously says.  
In fact, by its very definition, the term “goodwill”  
refutes any notion that real estate is the factor common to  
all the actions assigned to real estate brokers by the  
Legislature.
 Goodwill is an intangible asset defined as  
“[t]he favor which the management of a business wins from the  
public” and “[t]he fixed and favorable consideration of  
customers 
arising 
from 
established 
and 
well-conducted  
5  
 
 
 
 
  
 
business.” Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed).2 Thus, contrary  
to the majority’s assertions, goodwill has nothing to do with  
real estate; rather, it attaches only to an ongoing business  
concern.3  The irreducible problem faced by the majority is  
2 See also Random House Webster's College Dictionary 
(2002), which defines goodwill as “an intangible, salable 
asset arising from the reputation of a business and its 
relations with its customers.”  
3 The majority’s quotation of Black’s Law Dictionary, 
wherein the majority states that “[p]urchase of ‘the premises 
in which the business is conducted’ is one way to acquire 
goodwill” is patently false and taken out of context. Ante at 
9 n 8.  
Read in its entirety, the passage states:  
The custom of patronage of any established 
trade or business; the benefit or advantage of 
having established a business and secured its  
patronage by the public. And as property incident  
to business sold, favor vendor has won from public, 
and probability that all customers will continue 
that patronage. It means every positive advantage 
that has been acquired by a proprietor in carrying 
on his business, whether connected with the  
premises in which the business is conducted, or 
with the name under which it is managed, or with 
any other matter carrying with it the benefit of 
the 
business. 
[Black's 
Law 
Dictionary 
(6th 
ed)(emphasis added).] 
 Thus, when an ongoing business and its physical assets are 
purchased, goodwill comes with it. However, purchase of the 
premises alone does not convey goodwill. Similarly, the 
purchase of only the ongoing business without its physical 
assets will convey goodwill.  
The majority is compelled to ignore the fact that 
goodwill is never associated with anything other than the 
value of the continued patronage of an ongoing business 
(continued...)  
6  
 
 
 
that it cannot fit this round peg into its square hole.  That  
is, the majority cannot declare the term “goodwill” to mean  
“real estate” without completely emasculating the definition  
of “goodwill.” The majority makes a conscientious effort to  
ignore the fact that the word “goodwill” is a legal term of  
art that is distinct from real estate or any other physical  
asset.  
B. Misuse of Statutory Construction Canons  
Of 
importance, 
I believe that the majority misuses canons  
of statutory construction to actually deprive the words of the  
statute their customary meaning.4  This is contrary to the  
well-understood principle that statutory construction aids  
should not be utilized to create an ambiguity where one does  
3(...continued) 
concern in order to advance its argument that the 
REBA concerns  
only real estate transactions. See Pontiac Trust Co v Newell, 
266 Mich 490, 501; 254 NW 178 (1934)(“[G]oodwill cannot exist 
without a going concern . . . .”).  
4 In addition to misconstruing canons of statutory 
construction, the majority also invents new ones.  After  
noting that each article in the Occupational Code “deals with 
a single or discrete group of identified professions,” the 
majority proceeds to utilize and quote the “‘single or 
discrete 
group 
of 
identified professions’ theme” as a divining 
rod for legislative intent.  Ante at 5-6 and 9. This method  
appears to be an application of a variant of the principle of 
in pari materia, not noscitur a sociis, which is properly used 
only where an ambiguity exists. Tyler v Livonia Pub Schools, 
459 Mich 382, 390, 392; 590 NW2d 560 (1999).  It appears 
obvious that the majority is willing to ignore distinctions 
between interpretive canons in order to arrive at its 
preferred construction of REBA.  
7  
 
  
not otherwise exist.  See In re Certified Question (Henes v  
Continental Biomass), supra. Under the doctrine of noscitur  
a sociis, “the meaning of questionable words and phrases in a  
statute may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of  
words or phrases associated with it.” Black's Law Dictionary  
(5th ed) (emphasis added).  United States Supreme Court  
Justice Antonin Scalia discussed the meaning of this rule by  
illustration: "If you tell me, 'I took the boat out on the  
bay,' I understand 'bay' to mean one thing; if you tell me, 'I  
put the saddle on the bay,' I understand it to mean something  
else." A Matter of Interpretation, (Princeton, New Jersey:  
Princeton University Press, 1997), p 26.  Using Justice  
Scalia’s example as a guide, it is clear that the common  
meaning of the terms “business, business opportunity, or the  
goodwill 
of 
an 
existing business” are not contextually altered  
by the rest of the language in the REBA.  
I offer the following as an example to illustrate the  
majority’s 
abuse 
and 
misapplication of this canon of statutory  
construction.  Suppose that a hypothetical statute were to  
preclude 
ownership 
of the following animals without a license:  
Duck, Goose, Bittern, Swan, Heron  
Presume that the word “bittern” had no commonly understood  
meaning that could be discerned by resort to a dictionary.  In  
order to determine the meaning of the word, the doctrine of  
8  
 
 
noscitur a sociis could be utilized to reasonably come to the  
conclusion that a bittern is a type of waterfowl.  That is,  
where the meaning of the word is not apparent, the meaning  
could be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words  
associated with it.  
Now suppose that the hypothetical example were altered  
slightly, and the statute listed these animals:  
Duck, Goose, Pig, Swan, Heron  
Unlike bittern, the word “pig” does have a fixed, commonly  
understood meaning, and it is not “waterfowl.”5
 However,  
under the majority’s analysis, the doctrine of noscitur a  
sociis could properly be used to come to the conclusion that  
a pig is a waterfowl (despite the clear, unambiguous meaning  
of pig), because all the surrounding terms were waterfowls.6  
5 We agree with the majority that “pig” does have many 
meanings beyond swine. Ante at 18 n 12.  However, none of the 
alternatives cited in the majority opinion, such as an “oblong 
mass of metal,” would suggest themselves to a native speaker 
of English as the common, most likely meaning of the term as 
used in our hypothetical statute.  
6 The majority uses noscitur a sociis to suggest, not 
that the correct definition of “pig” is a swine, but that the 
level of abstraction should move from “waterfowl and swine” to  
animals or mammals.  The majority must do so because it 
desires to give no meaning (at least not the meaning every 
other person familiar with these terms would give them) to the 
REBA terms that originally constituted the business chance 
broker statute.  Surely, the majority’s approach is unlimited 
by any common sense.  Thus, using the majority’s method, we 
could abstract the meaning to the point that we could  
characterize the terms in our hypothetical statute as meaning 
(continued...)  
9  
 
 
Similarly, despite the clear and unambiguous meaning of  
“business, business opportunity, or the goodwill of an  
existing business,” the majority concludes that these words  
are limited to those involving “a real estate transaction.”  
Ante at 10. By misuse of the rules of construction, I believe  
the majority is amending the statute in order to avoid giving  
meaning to the words the Legislature has employed because to  
do so would result in the enforcement of a policy the majority  
rejects as unsound.  The doctrinal difference separating me  
from the majority is that I am satisfied with applying the  
plain meaning of the statutory words, whereas the majority is  
uncomfortable with a construction that results in licensed  
real estate brokers being the only persons in Michigan  
authorized to buy and sell businesses for others for a fee.  
This is an admittedly odd result, but one of the Legislature’s  
making.  As my colleague Justice TAYLOR has observed elsewhere,  
6(...continued) 
“English words” or “nouns.”  The majority must make such an 
abstraction because giving the equivalents of “pig” in REBA  
their obvious meaning results in a construction the majority 
does not like.  The majority fails to explain why it is 
appropriate, given goodwill’s definite meaning as a term of 
art (which is completely divorced from the term “real 
estate”), to “abstract” the term in the manner it does. The  
action taken by the majority is actually a redefinition, not 
an abstraction.  Moreover, it is also unclear what principle, 
if any, the majority employs to discern the appropriate level 
of “abstraction” to be used in any given application of its 
new rule of construction.  This is no longer a principle of  
statutory construction. It is a rule of deconstruction.  
10  
I “take comfort in the fact that the Legislature is free to  
amend" this statute if it now considers that the statute no  
longer reflects a sound policy choice.  People v Hermiz, supra  
at 80 n 13.  I fully agree with the proposition that "the  
Legislature should not have to suffer judicial interference  
with the choice made in its legislative product." Id. at 81.  
Thus, in my view, it remains the duty of the Legislature, not  
this Court, to change the state’s licensing policy.  
C. The Historical Import of the Statutory Phrase  
In addition to ignoring the most obvious, common meaning  
of the disputed statutory provisions, which as the primary  
consideration, resolves the question before the Court, the  
majority ignores the historical evolution of the statute and  
the distinct meaning given to the “business chance broker”  
provisions.  While this history is by no means dispositive,  
REBA’S text being the most compelling basis for determining the  
intent of that statute, it does provide additional comfort  
that the construction I offer is sound.  
In 
1919, 
the 
Legislature enacted the brokers license act,  
1919 PA 306, which was titled "An act to define, regulate, and  
license 
real 
estate 
brokers, real estate salesmen and business  
chance brokers and to provide a penalty for a violation of the  
provisions [of the act]."  
Section 2 of the brokers license act defined “business  
11  
 
chance broker,” and provided in pertinent part:  
A business chance broker within the meaning of  
this 
act 
is 
any 
person, 
firm, 
partnership 
association, copartnership or corporation, who for  
a compensation or valuable consideration sells or  
offers for sale, buys or offers to buy, or  
negotiates the purchase or sale or exchange of a  
business, business opportunity, or the good will of  
an existing business for others as a whole or  
partial vocation. [1919 PA 306 (emphasis added).7]  
In 1943, the “business chance broker” section was  
eliminated, 
and 
the 
provisions 
delineating 
the  
responsibilities of business chance brokers were transferred  
verbatim to the real estate broker licensing act. Thus, the  
statutory definition of real estate broker was expanded to  
include those activities previously assigned to business  
chance brokers.  The formerly separate business chance broker  
provision incorporated into the real estate broker provision  
is highlighted below:  
A real estate broker within the meaning of  
this 
act 
is 
any 
person, 
firm, 
partnership 
association, copartnership or corporation, who with 
intent to collect or receive a fee, compensation or 
valuable consideration, sells or offers for sale, 
buys or offers to buy, appraises or offers to  
appraise, lists or offers or attempts to list, or 
negotiates the purchase or sale or exchange or 
mortgage of real estate, or negotiates for the 
construction of buildings thereon, or who leases or  
7  In 1937, a provision was added to § 3 of the act, 
stating that  "[t]he commission of a single act prohibited 
under 
the 
Michigan 
statutes 
defining, 
regulating 
and 
licensing 
real estate brokers and salesmen shall constitute a violation  
thereof." 1937 PA 188.  Under that amendment, even isolated 
transactions were governed by the act.  
12  
 
offers to lease or rents or offers for rent any 
real estate or the improvements thereon for others, 
as a whole or partial vocation, or who sells or  
offers for sale, buys or offers to buy, leases or  
offers to lease, or negotiates the purchase or sale  
or exchange of a business, business opportunity, or  
the good will of an existing business for others, 
or who, as owner or otherwise, engages in the sale 
of real estate as a principal vocation. [1943 PA 
57.]  
From these legislative actions, I conclude that the  
Legislature made a deliberate and conscious decision not to  
eliminate activities formerly performed by business chance  
brokers, but to reassign to real estate brokers those  
activities previously performed by business chance brokers.  
Therefore, an evaluation of those activities historically  
performed 
by 
business 
chance 
brokers 
is 
particularly  
instructive 
on 
understanding 
the 
definition 
of 
these  
activities reassigned to real estate brokers that are at issue  
in this case.  
Before its statutory introduction in 1919, the term  
“business chance broker” did not exist in Michigan. The term  
and its function were entirely a creation of the Legislature.8  
While there are but a few cases addressing the “business  
chance broker,” there is clear indication in our case law that  
8 See Miller v Stevens, 224 Mich 626, 630-631; 195 NW 481 
(1923). “[C]ounsel cite us to no authority, and we have not 
discovered any, where the subject of ‘business chance broker’ 
is mentioned or discussed, outside the act referred to, which 
apparently coined the term and defines it for the purposes of 
the act.”  
13  
 
the activities of a business chance broker were not limited to  
transactions involving real estate.  
Hague v DeLong, 292 Mich 262; 290 NW 403 (1940), involved  
the stock sale of a company.  There, this Court held that a  
brokerage firm was precluded from collecting a commission on  
the sale of all the capital stock of a company because  
plaintiff was not licensed as a business chance broker.9  The  
issue dividing the evenly split Court in Hague was whether the  
agreement was for the mere sale of stock or for the “sale of  
a business” within the meaning of the act.  The prevailing  
side held that the agreement was for the sale of the business  
and that the sale of stock was merely incidental.10 The dissent  
concluded that the agreement was merely for the sale of stock.  
The dissent acknowledged, however, that if the purpose of the  
stock transaction were the sale of the business, plaintiff  
would be precluded from recovery because he was not licensed  
9 Plaintiff arranged the sale of all the capital stock of 
the American Broach and Machine Company to the Sundstrand 
Machine Tool Company. The sale of the stock “would result in 
a transfer of the business, at least pro tanto.” Id. at 296.  
10 In support of the conclusion that the Sundstrand 
Company purchased the business and not merely the stock, the 
opinion indicates that, in addition to the stock, Sundstrand 
subsequently purchased “valuable patents and patents pending, 
the services of Mr. Lapointe, a lease, and an option to 
purchase the real estate and buildings.” Id. at 277. These  
items were apparently not part of the commission agreement 
between plaintiff and defendant.  
14  
 
 
as required by the act.11  
Thus, in Hague, decided three years before the statutory  
transfer of the functions of business chance brokers, the  
activities of a business chance broker were unanimously  
determined to encompass efforts that did not involve real  
estate transactions—in that case, the sale of stock.  The  
majority here not only ignores the plain meaning of the words,  
but also the  historical meaning given to the business chance  
broker provisions.  To the contrary, I believe that the clear  
language of the statute, in addition to the historical meaning  
given to “business chance brokers,” militates against a  
conclusion that the Legislature in 1943 intended that the  
transferred business chance broker duties became limited to  
only 
those 
transactions involving real estate.  Thus, contrary  
to the majority’s assertion that stockbrokers were not  
“intended to fall within REBA,” ante at 11, the statutory text  
and historical construction of this language indicate that  
stockbrokers 
were 
in 
fact subject, as business chance brokers,  
under identical statutory language.  
It is certainly within the Legislature’s constitutional  
prerogative and authority to decide what activities require  
11 The dissent also acknowledged that, because there was  
no sale of an interest in real estate, the commission 
agreement was not required to be in writing for the purpose of 
the statute of frauds. Id. at 302.  
15  
 
 
licensure.  I tend to agree that the choices made by the  
Legislature 
in 
enacting 
legislation 
regulating 
business 
chance  
brokers, 
and 
subsequently real estate brokers, may make little  
sense in today’s economy.  However, I do not believe that this  
Court has the constitutional authority to “fix” the statute to  
better suit our modern economy according to our own policy  
assumptions.  Rather, it is the responsibility of the  
Legislature to rescind or amend statutes that are no longer  
viable.  
Under the clear language of the statute, supported by the  
historical interpretation and eventual transfer of the  
activities of the business chance broker into those assigned  
to real estate brokers, 
I believe that the statute  
encompasses the brokerage of business opportunities that do  
not involve real estate transactions. 
Therefore, the  
plaintiff was required to be a licensed real estate broker as  
a precondition to entering into the alleged contract and is  
now precluded by MCL 339.2512a from suing to enforce any such  
contract.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority  
opinion and would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.  
Robert P. Young, Jr.  
16  
 
 
                                          
v
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
G. C. TIMMIS & COMPANY,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 120035  
GUARDIAN ALARM COMPANY,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
WEAVER, J. (dissenting).  
I dissent from the majority for the reasons stated in  
parts A and C only of Justice Young’s dissent.  
Elizabeth A. Weaver