Title: State v. Dale H. Davidson
Citation: 2000 WI 91
Docket Number: 1998AP000130-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 2000

2000 WI 91 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Dale H. Davidson,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 
222 Wis. 2d 233, 589 N.W.2d 038 
 
 
 (Ct. App. 1998, Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 11, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
December 3, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Marquette 
 
JUDGE: 
Richard O. Wright 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BABLITCH, J., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Daniel J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by 
Jerome F. Buting, Pamela Moorshead, and Buting & Williams, S.C., 
Brookfield, and oral argument by Jerome F. Buting. 
 
 
 
Amicus Curiae brief by Dean A. Strang and 
Fitzgerald & Strang, S.C., Milwaukee, for Wisconsin Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
2000 WI 91 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 98-0130-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Dale H. Davidson,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   The State of Wisconsin seeks 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. 
Davidson, 222 Wis. 2d 233, 589 N.W.2d 38 (Ct. App. 1998), which 
reversed Dale Davidson's conviction for second-degree sexual 
assault of his thirteen-year-old niece on the grounds that the 
trial court improperly admitted evidence of the defendant's 
prior conviction for child sexual assault.  
¶2 
In a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Adams County, 
Judge Richard O. Wright, Dale Davidson was convicted of 
assaulting his niece, Tina H.  During trial, the circuit court 
permitted the State to introduce evidence of Davidson's 1986 
conviction for sexual assault of a six-year-old girl in its 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
2 
case-in-chief.  Upon his conviction, Davidson appealed, arguing 
that the admission of his prior conviction constituted an 
erroneous exercise of discretion and that such error was not 
harmless.  Davidson also argued that prosecutorial misconduct 
during closing statements warranted a new trial. 
¶3 
The court of appeals determined that under Wis. Stat. 
§  (Rule) 904.04(2)(1993-94),1 the trial court had erroneously 
exercised its discretion when it admitted evidence of Davidson's 
prior conviction.  Davidson, 222 Wis. 2d at 250-54.  Because it 
reversed his conviction on this ground, the court of appeals did 
not reach Davidson's prosecutorial misconduct claim. 
¶4 
The State petitioned this court for review.  The State 
articulated 
several 
reasons 
that 
review 
was 
warranted, 
including: (1) to clarify how courts should apply the three-step 
test for admissibility of other acts evidence articulated in 
State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 780, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998); 
(2) to clarify how courts should apply the "greater latitude 
rule," which permits a greater latitude of proof with regard to 
other acts evidence in sexual assault cases, while performing 
the Sullivan analysis; and (3) to clarify what degree of 
similarity must exist between the uncharged and charged offenses 
in order for other crimes evidence to be admissible.  
¶5 
We accepted review.  We now hold that, applying the 
three-step Sullivan analysis together with the greater latitude 
                     
1 Subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes refer to 
the 1993-94 volumes unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
3 
rule that is well established in Wisconsin law, the admission of 
evidence of Davidson's prior conviction did not constitute an 
erroneous exercise of discretion.  We also conclude that the 
defendant waived his objection to the prosecutor's statements 
during closing arguments when he failed to request a mistrial 
before the jury returned its verdict.  We therefore reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals and reinstate the judgment of 
the circuit court. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶6 
This case arose after Davidson's niece, Tina H., 
complained that he had sexually assaulted her during a camping 
trip in September 1995.  Tina, who is the daughter of Davidson's 
wife's sister, accompanied Davidson, his wife, and their three 
sons, ages 9, 11, and 13, on a weekend camping trip in the 
Davidsons' Winnebago camper.  On Sunday night, after she 
returned home from the camping trip, Tina first spoke to a close 
friend on the phone and disclosed the incident.  Tina then told 
her mother that Davidson had sexually assaulted her.   
¶7 
Tina gave the following account of the assault.  She 
reported that on Saturday evening, Davidson and his wife had 
allowed Tina and the three boys to drink a small amount of 
homemade wine while sitting around the campfire.  Tina stated 
that while they were seated around the campfire, Davidson had 
given her more wine from his own cup until his wife told him to 
stop.  Later, while Davidson and his wife stayed at the 
campfire, Tina and the boys went to bed.  The boys slept in a 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
4 
bed over the cab at the front of the camper, while Tina slept in 
the middle of the camper on a table that folded down into a bed. 
 When they went to bed, Davidson and his wife slept in a bedroom 
area at the rear of the camper. 
¶8 
Tina stated that at some time during the night, 
Davidson woke her and asked her to drink some more wine.  She 
agreed at first but then told Davidson that she felt sick. Tina 
reported that she then fell back to sleep, but that Davidson 
again woke her and told her to lie on her back so she would not 
get sick.  At some point, she heard the curtains being drawn 
around the other sleeping areas.  The next time she awoke, 
Davidson had pulled up her shirt and bra and was licking her 
breasts.  She rolled over, turning away from Davidson.  She 
stated that this same behavior occurred more than once during 
the night, but that she could not remember exactly when or how 
often.  The last time she awoke, Davidson had unbuttoned and 
unzipped her pants and was feeling her vagina.2  When she awoke 
and lifted her head, Davidson zipped her pants and left.  
¶9 
After 
Tina 
reported 
this 
assault, 
her 
parents 
contacted the police.  Davidson was subsequently charged with 
second-degree sexual assault of a child as a repeater.  
B.  TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 
                     
2 When she first reported the assault to her mother and to 
the police, Tina did not report that Davidson had touched her 
vagina.  However, Tina testified at trial that this touching had 
occurred, and the close friend to whom Tina spoke on Sunday 
night stated that Tina admitted this detail to her in their 
initial conversation.  
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
5 
¶10 Before Davidson's trial on this charge, the State 
filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence of 
Davidson's prior conviction for first-degree sexual assault of a 
six-year-old girl, Cindy P., in 1986.3  The prior assault 
occurred while Davidson was attending church in Park Falls, 
Wisconsin.  During the services, Cindy P. went to get a drink of 
water at the drinking fountain.  The drinking fountain was 
located next to the men's restroom and near a nursery in the 
lower level of the church.  While Cindy P. was standing at the 
fountain, Davidson approached her, put his hands inside her 
underwear, and touched her buttocks and front pubic area.  Cindy 
P. told Davidson that she had to go to the bathroom and left the 
area.  She later reported the incident to her mother, and 
Davidson was charged with first-degree sexual assault of a 
child.  He pled guilty and was sentenced to two years in prison. 
¶11 The State's motion in limine sought to admit evidence 
of Davidson's assault of Cindy P. under Wis. Stat. §  (Rule) 
904.04(2)4 to establish intent, motive, plan, and identity, and 
to fully present the State's case.   
                     
3 Initially, the State also sought to introduce evidence 
that another complaint had been filed against Davidson charging 
him with assaulting a four-year-old girl, L.W., in December 
1985.  However, the State later abandoned that part of its 
motion and sought only to introduce Davidson's conviction for 
assaulting Cindy P. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2) provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. 
 This subsection does not exclude the evidence when 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
6 
¶12 Before deciding the motion, the trial court heard 
extensive arguments on the admissibility of the evidence in the 
form of memoranda from each side, two pretrial hearings, and a 
discussion immediately before trial.   
¶13 In its memorandum opposing the motion, the defense 
argued that evidence of Davidson's assault of Cindy P. was 
inadmissible under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2) because it was 
not material to any fact of consequence in the case.  The 
defense contended that Davidson's guilty plea was not sufficient 
to put intent, motive, plan, or identity in issue.  The defense 
further argued that the evidence was inadmissible under Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 904.035 because the danger of unfair prejudice 
posed by the evidence outweighed its probative value.   
¶14 In its responsive memorandum, the State argued that 
Wisconsin precedent6 established that a "greater latitude of 
                                                                  
offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 904.03 provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.   
  
6 The State specifically cited State v. Plymesser, 172 Wis. 
2d 583, 597-98, 493 N.W.2d 367 (1992); State v. Friedrich, 135 
Wis. 2d 1, 27-35; 398 N.W.2d 763 (1987); Proper v. State, 85 
Wis. 615, 55 N.W.2d 1035 (1893); State v. Tabor, 191 Wis. 2d 
482, 488-91, 529 N.W.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1995); and State v. Parr, 
182 Wis. 2d 349, 360, 513 N.W.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1994). 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
7 
proof" applies in sexual assault cases.  The State contended 
that under these precedents the evidence was relevant and 
admissible to prove both motive and intent under Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 904.04(2).  The State also argued that the probative 
value of the evidence outweighed any potential for unfair 
prejudice under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.03. 
¶15 At the initial hearing on this motion, the trial judge 
noted that "the similarity in circumstances [between the Cindy 
P. 
assault 
and 
the 
charged 
offense] 
are 
[sic] 
possibly 
striking," but asked the State to explain what purpose the 
evidence could serve at trial "other than to show that the 
defendant, in fact, did it again?"  The State responded that the 
evidence should be admitted "not to show that he did it before, 
he did it again, but [because] who would believe a person would 
do something like this.  What is their motive; what is their 
motive to do something like that?"  The State also argued that 
the evidence might be relevant to establish opportunity or plan, 
to refute Davidson's contention that the alleged assault could 
not have taken place in the small camper while the rest of the 
family slept nearby.   
¶16 The judge indicated that he believed that the evidence 
might be admissible to establish opportunity, but doubted that 
it would be admissible to establish motive or plan.  In 
response, the defense argued that the two incidents were not 
very similar because no one else was present in the basement 
when Davidson assaulted Cindy P.  The judge acknowledged the 
defense's concern that the evidence would establish propensity 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
8 
rather than opportunity.  However, the judge decided to 
conditionally admit the evidence to establish opportunity, 
provided that the State was able to establish proof of the 
similarities between the incidents.  The prosecutor subsequently 
made an offer of proof that described the circumstances of the 
Cindy P. assault in more detail.   
¶17 At the final pretrial hearing, the judge again heard 
arguments on the motion.  The State indicated that it sought to 
introduce the evidence in order to establish the defendant's 
plan, scheme, and motive, and that "[t]he opportunity [to 
accomplish the assault] was created through [the defendant's] 
plan or through his method of sexually assaulting these young 
girls . . . ."  The State compared "the camping trip, the camper 
itself, the structure itself, and to the structure of the 
church, the fact that people were present in both of them."   
¶18 After listening to the State's argument, the court 
reiterated its previous determination.  The court pointed out 
that one of the similarities between the incidents was the 
possibility that the defendant would be discovered during the 
assault.  The court indicated that if evidence had been offered 
merely to establish motive, its prejudicial effect would 
outweigh its value as relevant evidence, but that the evidence 
was admissible to establish plan, scheme, or opportunity. 
¶19 Without 
waiving 
objection 
to 
admission 
of 
the 
evidence, the defense requested a ruling from the court limiting 
the 
arguments 
that 
the 
State 
could 
make 
regarding 
the 
defendant's motive.  The defense asked the court to rule that 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
9 
the State could only argue that the defendant had a motive to 
assault young girls and not that he had a more particular motive 
to assault young girls in situations in which there was a danger 
that he would be caught.  The defense contended that this latter 
argument would be improper and unfairly prejudicial because it 
"goes to pure propensity" and would have to be supported by 
expert 
testimony 
establishing 
that 
individuals 
with 
such 
motivations do exist and that the defendant is such an 
individual.   
¶20 The defense also suggested that, if it were to be 
introduced to the jury, the evidence should be put in the form 
of a stipulation of facts.  The defendant requested that the 
stipulation be drafted so as not to reveal the fact that the 
Cindy P. assault took place in a church, to eliminate any undue 
prejudicial effect. 
¶21 The trial court indicated that the evidence was 
admissible, with limitations.  The evidence would be introduced 
in the form of stipulation of facts and would be accompanied by 
a cautionary instruction to the jury.  The court suggested that 
the parties draft the cautionary instruction and draft the 
stipulation of the facts, eliminating any reference to the fact 
that the assault occurred in a church.  
¶22 After 
these matters 
were 
discussed, 
the defense 
reiterated its request for a ruling that it would be improper 
for the State to argue that the defendant had a particular 
motive to assault young girls under circumstances in which he 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
10
might be caught.  After hearing from both sides, the court gave 
the following ruling:  
 
[The State] is not going to be allowed to make an 
argument that would be an argument of propensity, 
plan, or scheme.  He is going to have to stick to it, 
if that's what he is introducing it for, but it can 
also be motive, but he is able to argue that, but the 
court – the only reason the court disparaged the 
motive part of it, is that if the only part, the only 
exception that was being argued by State, the court 
wouldn't be allowing it in, but I think with that, we 
have understanding on that.   
In addition, at the State's prompting, the court specifically 
noted that it had determined that the probative value of the 
evidence for the limited purposes for which it would be admitted 
outweighed its prejudicial effect.   
¶23 On the first day of trial, the State presented the 
parties' stipulation7 as well as a proposed jury instruction to 
                     
7 The stipulation stated: 
 
The 
district attorney and 
the attorney for 
defendant have stipulated or agreed to the existence 
of certain facts, and you must accept these facts as 
conclusively proved.  In this case, the district 
attorney and the defendant's attorney have stipulated 
to the following facts: 
1. 
On December 22, 1985, [Cindy P.'s mother], 
dob: 09-17-54, attended a gathering in a 
public building in Price County, Wisconsin, 
with her family.  [Cindy P.] dob: 10-28-79, 
age six (6), her daughter, was present with 
the family. 
2. 
The building has a main entrance allowing 
entry to the top floor where the gathering 
was held.  There are two stairways that 
allow access to the lower level where the 
restrooms and another room are located.  At 
the bottom of the steps the water bubbler is 
located next to the men's restroom.  Another 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
11
the court.  The defendant objected to the proposed instruction 
because it allowed the jury to consider the evidence for the 
purpose of establishing motive.  The defense argued that this 
contradicted the court's previous ruling.   
¶24 The court explained that it had not ruled that the 
evidence could not be admitted for the purpose of establishing 
motive.  Instead, the court had determined that the evidence 
would be unduly prejudicial if it were offered solely for the 
purpose of establishing motive.  However, because the evidence 
was offered not merely to establish motive but also to establish 
plan or scheme, the applicable purpose of motive could also be 
included in the instruction.   
¶25 The cautionary instruction that the court approved 
read as follows:  
 
                                                                  
service door allows entry to the lower level 
directly where the water bubbler is located. 
3. 
Approximately 
150 
people 
attended 
the 
gathering on the upper level.  There were 
additional adults and children gathered in 
the room on the lower level.   
4. 
During the gathering, [C.P.] left her family 
to get a drink of water at the bubbler 
located in the lower level next to the men's 
restroom. 
5. 
While 
getting 
a 
drink 
of 
water, 
the 
defendant approached [C.P.].  The defendant 
put his hands inside [C.P.]'s underwear and 
touched [C.P.]'s buttocks and front pubic 
area.  [C.P.] said she had to go to the 
bathroom and left the area. 
6. 
As a result of this conduct, the defendant 
plead [sic] guilty and was convicted of 
first degree sexual assault of [C.P.] on 
February 7, 1986. 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
12
Evidence has been received regarding a crime 
committed by the defendant for which the defendant is 
not on trial.   
Specifically, evidence has been received that the 
defendant in 1985 did have sexual contact with Cindy 
P., age six.  If you find that this conduct did occur, 
you should consider it only on the issue(s) of motive 
and plan or scheme.   
You may not consider this evidence to conclude 
that the defendant has a certain character or a 
certain character trait and that the defendant acted 
in conformity with that trait or character with 
respect to the offense charged in this case.  The 
evidence was received on the issue(s) of motive, that 
is, whether the defendant has a reason to desire the 
result of the crime, and plan or scheme, that is, 
whether such other conduct of the defendant was part 
of a design or scheme that led to the commission of 
the offense charged.   
You may consider this evidence only for the 
purpose(s) I have described, giving it the weight you 
determine it deserves.  It is not to be used to 
conclude that the defendant is a bad person or that he 
has a propensity to commit such offenses and for that 
reason is guilty of the offense charged. 
¶26 Trial proceeded.  At the close of the State's case-in-
chief, the prosecutor read the stipulation and the court read 
the cautionary instruction to the jury.8   
¶27 In its case, the defense challenged the credibility of 
Tina's story by presenting evidence suggesting that it was 
unlikely such an assault could have taken place in the small 
confines of the camper.  The defense also presented evidence 
that there was hostility between Tina's family and the Davidson 
                     
8 The 
court 
read 
the 
instruction 
to 
the 
jury 
both 
immediately after the evidence was introduced and during the 
closing instructions.  The transcript indicates that the court's 
reading of the instruction differed in minor respects from the 
proposed instruction. 
 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
13
family and that soon after the assault Tina's father had talked 
about suing the Davidsons. 
¶28 During closing arguments, the prosecutor compared the 
Cindy P. assault with the assault alleged by Tina, arguing that 
the two incidents were similar.  The prosecutor also made two 
arguably improper remarks during closing arguments, to which the 
defense objected.  The court sustained both objections, but the 
defense did not move for a mistrial at that time.   
¶29 The jury found Davidson guilty of second-degree sexual 
assault of a child.  Davidson was sentenced to twelve years in 
the intensive sanctions program, with two years of confinement. 
C.  COURT OF APPEALS PROCEEDINGS  
¶30 Davidson appealed, arguing that his conviction should 
be reversed because evidence of his prior conviction was 
improperly admitted and because the prosecutor made improper 
statements during the closing arguments.9   
¶31 On appeal, the court of appeals followed the three-
step analytic framework set forth in Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 
780-81, which asks (1) whether the evidence is offered for a 
proper purpose; (2) whether the evidence is relevant; and (3) 
whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
jury, or needless delay.  See Davidson, 222 Wis. 2d at 244-54.  
                     
9 Before the court of appeals, the defendant also argued 
that the trial court improperly permitted the State to present 
rebuttal evidence.  However, the defendant has not raised that 
issue before this court. 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
14
The court also acknowledged that under Wisconsin law, a "greater 
latitude rule" applies to the admission of other acts evidence 
in sexual assault cases.  Id. at 243.   However, the court 
concluded that this rule applies only to the first step of the 
three-step analysis.  Id. at 251. 
¶32 Applying the greater latitude rule to the first step, 
the court of appeals decided that the evidence was offered for a 
proper purpose.  Id.  Next, the court considered whether the 
second step of the analysis had been satisfied and determined 
that the trial court had not adequately articulated its 
reasoning with regard to the second step.  Id. at 252.  
Reviewing the question independently, the court determined that 
the dissimilarities between the Cindy P. assault and the Tina H. 
assault outnumbered the similarities, and that evidence of the 
Cindy P. assault therefore was not probative of Davidson's 
motive, opportunity, or plan.  Id. at 253.  Because the court 
decided that the evidence was neither probative nor material, it 
did not need to reach the third step of the analysis, that is, 
whether the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the probative 
value.  Id.  The court then turned to the defendant's argument 
that the admission of the evidence was not harmless error; 
because the State did not respond to this argument, the court 
determined that the State had acquiesced in the conclusion that 
the error was prejudicial.  Id. at 253-54.  Accordingly, the 
court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction entered in 
the circuit court.  Id. at 254.  The State petitioned for 
review. 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
15
II.  ADMISSIBILITY OF OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE 
¶33 In this review, the first question we must examine is 
whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
when it admitted evidence of the Cindy P. assault at the 
defendant's trial on the charge of assaulting Tina H.   
A.  GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
¶34 The 
general 
legal 
principles 
surrounding 
the 
admissibility of evidence of a defendant's other crimes are 
familiar and well established.  The rule that specifically 
governs the admissibility of such evidence is Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 904.04(2).  It provides: 
 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. 
 This subsection does not exclude the evidence when 
offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
The party offering other crimes evidence must establish that the 
evidence is admissible for a proper purpose under § (Rule) 
904.04(2).  Like all evidence, other crimes evidence also must 
be relevant under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.01,10 and is subject to 
the balancing test of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.03.11  
                     
10 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 904.01 provides: "'Relevant 
evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence 
of 
any 
fact 
that 
is 
of 
consequence 
to 
the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence." 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 904.03 
provides: 
"Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
16
¶35 The three-step framework set forth in Sullivan is a 
restatement of the legal principles contained in these rules: 
 
1. 
Is the other acts evidence offered for an 
acceptable purpose under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
904.04(2)? 
 
2. 
Is the other acts evidence relevant under Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 904.01? 
 
3. 
Is 
the 
probative 
value 
of 
the 
evidence 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion, or delay under Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 904.03? 
We have sometimes described the same analysis in two steps, 
asking (1) whether the other crimes evidence is offered for one 
of the purposes set forth in Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2), and 
(2) whether the danger of prejudice from the admission of such 
evidence outweighs its probative value.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 
at 771 n.3.  See State v. Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d 583, 592-93, 
493 N.W.2d 367 (1992); State v. Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1, 19, 
398 N.W.2d 763 (1987); State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 254, 
378 N.W.2d 272 (1986).  The two-step analysis implicitly 
includes a determination of whether the evidence is relevant to 
an issue in the case.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 771 n.3; 
Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 19; Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 254.   
¶36 This is the general framework that governs the 
admissibility of other crimes evidence in all Wisconsin cases.  
However, alongside this general framework, there also exists in 
Wisconsin law the longstanding principle that in sexual assault 
                                                                  
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence." 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
17
cases, particularly cases that involve sexual assault of a 
child, courts permit a "greater latitude of proof as to other 
like occurrences."  Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 597-98; Friedrich, 
135 Wis. 2d at 19; Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 257; Day v. State, 
92 Wis. 2d 392, 404, 284 N.W.2d 666 (1979); State v. Tarrell, 74 
Wis. 2d 647, 658, 247 N.W.2d 696 (1976), withdrawn in part by 
Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 255-56; Hendrickson v. State, 61 Wis. 
2d 275, 279, 212 N.W.2d 481 (1973).  
¶37 This "greater latitude rule" was first articulated in 
Proper v. State.  The defendant in Proper was convicted of 
sexually assaulting a ten-year-old girl, Clara.  Proper v. 
State, 85 Wis. 615, 624-25, 55 N.W.2d 1035 (1893).  Clara was 
placed in the defendant's home after her father died and her 
mother was unable to care for her.  Id. at 617.  Other young 
girls also lived in the defendant's home, and Clara sometimes 
shared a bed with one of the other girls.  Id. at 618-19.  The 
case centered on Clara's allegation that the defendant had 
sexually assaulted her in her bedroom on several occasions.  Id. 
 At the trial, the circuit court allowed the jury to hear the 
testimony from another girl, Emma, that the defendant on a 
separate occasion had entered the girls' bedroom and sexually 
assaulted Emma while both girls were in the bed.  Id. at 621-22. 
¶38 In reviewing the admission of Emma's testimony to the 
jury, this court concluded that "[the defendant's] conduct on 
this 
occasion 
was 
corroborative 
of 
the 
evidence 
of 
the 
prosecutrix in respect to other indecent or criminal assaults, 
such as are charged in the information, and would tend to 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
18
sustain and render more credible her evidence of other such 
occurrences."  Id. at 629.  The court also stated that the 
defendant's actions in entering the room where both girls were 
sleeping and getting into the bed: 
 
[M]ay fairly be considered to have been for the 
purpose of renewing his former attempts to gratify his 
brutal passions, and would have a material bearing in 
support of the testimony of the prosecutrix both as to 
previous and subsequent assaults upon her, and would 
be admissible for that purpose; and that all that took 
place as a part of the transaction at that time would 
be competent. 
Id.  Pointing out that a "greater latitude of proof as to other 
like occurrences is allowed in cases of sexual crimes," the 
court determined that it was within the trial court's discretion 
to admit the evidence.  Id. at 630-31. 
¶39 Later cases reaffirmed the application of the "greater 
latitude rule" to the admissibility of other crimes evidence in 
sexual assault cases.  In Hendrickson, the defendant challenged 
his convictions for sexually assaulting his daughter on the 
ground that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of the 
defendant's prior sexual assaults against the same daughter and 
two other daughters.  Hendrickson, 61 Wis. 2d at 276.  This 
court affirmed the convictions, stating that "'[a] greater 
latitude of proof as to other like occurrences' is clearly 
evident in Wisconsin cases dealing with sex crimes, particularly 
those involving incest and indecent liberties with a child."  
Id. at 279.   
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
19
¶40 The State did not rely on the greater latitude rule in 
Fishnick, which involved the admission of evidence that the 
defendant attempted to lure a thirteen-year-old girl into his 
trailer one week before he assaulted a three-year-old girl.  
Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 257.  Nonetheless, this court 
specifically reaffirmed its commitment to the rule and explained 
that one of the reasons behind the rule is the need to 
corroborate 
the 
victim's 
testimony 
against 
credibility 
challenges.  Id.   
¶41 In Friedrich, the defendant appealed his conviction 
for sexually assaulting his niece on the grounds that the trial 
court erred by admitting testimony that the defendant, four and 
seven years before the charged assault, committed two other 
uncharged sexual assaults.  Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 17-18.  
This court concluded that because of the similarities between 
the charged crime and the other crimes, the other crimes 
evidence was admissible and relevant and that its probative 
value outweighed any prejudicial effect.  Id. at 24.  The court 
confirmed the vitality of the greater latitude rule, noting that 
it "is particularly appropriate in both incest cases and cases 
involving indecent liberties with children."  Id. at 25.   
¶42 In response to the dissent's contention that the court 
had approved the admission of evidence that was only relevant to 
establish the defendant's propensity, this court countered that 
the evidence was relevant because:  
 
To a person of normal, social and moral sensibility, 
the idea of the sexual exploitation of the young is so 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
20
repulsive that it's almost impossible to believe that 
none but the most depraved and degenerate would commit 
such an act.  The average juror could well find it 
incomprehensible that one who stands before the court 
on trial could commit such an act. 
Id. at 27-28.  The court acknowledged that the evidence also has 
some unavoidable potential to prove propensity; however, the 
court emphasized that the defendant's prior actions were also 
relevant to establish the defendant's plan, motive, or scheme to 
commit the crime charged at trial.  Id. at 28-29.  The court 
suggested 
that 
the 
difficulty 
sexually 
abused 
children 
experience in testifying, and the difficulty prosecutors have in 
obtaining admissible evidence in such cases, are among the 
reasons supporting the more liberal standard of admissibility in 
child sexual assault cases. Id. at 30-33 and n.17.  The court 
concluded that interpreting Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2) more 
liberally in sexual assault cases is "in conformity to both the 
letter and spirit of the statute in question and promotes the 
ends of justice."  Id. at 35.   
¶43 In the recent case of Plymesser, this court again 
applied the greater latitude rule to a determination of whether 
other crimes evidence was properly admitted in a child sexual 
assault case.  At the defendant's trial for sexually assaulting 
his daughter's thirteen-year-old friend in December 1989, the 
circuit court permitted the State to introduce evidence of the 
defendant's 1977 conviction for assaulting a friend's seven-
year-old daughter.  Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 586-87.  The 
defendant challenged his conviction in part on the ground that 
the admission of this evidence was improper.  Id. at 585.  This 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
21
court determined that the evidence was admissible to establish 
the defendant's motive.  Id. at 593-94.  Because the incidents 
bore striking similarities, and in light of the trial court's 
efforts to limit the prejudicial effect of the evidence, the 
court also concluded that the danger of unfair prejudice did not 
outweigh the probative value of the evidence.  Id. at 597. 
¶44 Thus, this court has consistently held that in sexual 
assault 
cases, 
especially 
those 
involving 
crimes 
against 
children, the greater latitude rule applies together with the 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
22
Sullivan framework.  Like many other U.S. jurisdictions,12 
Wisconsin courts permit "a more liberal admission of other 
                     
12 See, e.g., Ex parte Register, 680 So. 2d 225, 227 (Ala. 
1994)(noting that courts are more willing to admit evidence of 
other crimes in sex crime cases); State v. Roscoe, 910 P.2d 635, 
642 (Ariz. 1996)(stating that Arizona courts recognize a 
specific exception to the rule against admissibility of other 
crimes evidence "bad acts involving 'sexual aberration'" and 
that sexual assaults on a minor are always considered aberrant); 
State v. Tolman, 828 P.2d 1304, 1308-10 (Idaho 1992)(discussing 
the justification for permitting the introduction of other 
crimes evidence in child sexual abuse cases in order to 
corroborate testimony); Thacker v. Commonwealth, 816 S.W.2d 660, 
662 (Ky. App. 1991)(recognizing that under Kentucky Supreme 
Court precedent, the familiar rules governing the admission of 
other crimes evidence are applied "in an unusual manner" in 
child sexual assault cases); State v. Miller, 718 So. 2d 960, 
962-65 (La. 1998) (explaining that Louisiana has followed a 
national trend towards broader admissibility of other crimes 
evidence in child sexual abuse cases); State v. Wermerskirchen, 
497 
N.W.2d 
235, 
240-42 
(Minn. 
1993)(explaining 
that 
in 
Minnesota, other crimes evidence is admissible to establish a 
"common scheme or plan" in sex abuse cases and that such 
evidence may be admitted to establish the commission of the 
charged crime); State v. Stephens, 466 N.W.2d 781, 785-86 (Neb. 
1991)(stating that evidence of other similar sexual conduct has 
independent relevancy in cases involving sexual crimes); Keeney 
v. State, 850 P.2d 311, 316-17 (Nev. 1993)(explaining that in 
cases involving sex offenses against children, the court applies 
a more liberal standard to the admission of other crimes 
evidence); 
State 
v. 
Frazier, 
476 
S.E.2d 
297, 
300 
(N.C. 
1996)("This Court has been liberal in allowing evidence of 
similar offenses in trials on sexual crime charges."); State v. 
Tobin, 602 A.2d 528, 531-32 (R.I. 1992)(noting that in sexual 
assault cases evidence of other crimes is admissible to show the 
defendant's lewd disposition or intent); State v. Edward Charles 
L., Sr., 398 S.E.2d 123, 132-33 (W. Va. 1990)(holding that other 
crimes evidence may be admitted in cases involving child sexual 
assault 
in 
order 
to 
establish 
the 
perpetrator's 
lustful 
disposition); Gezzi v. State, 780 P.2d 972, 974-76 (Wyo. 
1989)(recognizing that the exceptions to the rule that other 
crimes evidence is generally inadmissible have been treated 
expansively in sexual assault cases, consistent with "that 
nationally predominant trend").   
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
23
crimes evidence" in sexual assault cases than in other cases.  
Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 31.  
¶45 Although the defendant acknowledges the existence of 
the greater latitude rule in Wisconsin, he argues that the rule 
applies only to the first step of the three-step analysis set 
forth in Sullivan.  To support this contention, the defendant 
relies on this court's statement in Hendrickson that the greater 
latitude rule is:  
                                                                  
In addition, under the recently enacted Federal Rule of 
Evidence 413, other crimes evidence of sexual assault "is 
admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter 
to which it is relevant" in criminal cases involving sexual 
assault.  Fed. R. Evid. 413.  The same is true of other crimes 
evidence of child molestation in criminal cases involving child 
molestation.  Fed. R. Evid. 414.   
With regard to the admissibility of other crimes evidence 
in sexual assault cases, Wigmore's treatise on evidence provides 
this commentary: 
The committing of a single previous rape . . . may not 
in itself indicate [a design to commit rape]  . . . . 
 Nevertheless, 
a single 
previous 
act, 
even 
upon 
another woman, may, with other circumstances, give 
strong indication of a design (not a disposition) to 
rape; . . . . 
 
Courts have shown altogether too much hesitation 
in receiving such evidence.  Even when rigorously 
excluded 
from 
any 
bearing 
it 
may 
have 
upon 
character . . . , 
it 
may 
carry 
with 
it 
great 
significance as to a specific design or plan to rape. 
 There is no reason why it should not be received when 
it does convey to the mind, according to the ordinary 
logical instincts, a clear indication of such a 
design.  There is room for much more common sense than 
appears in the majority of the rulings. 
 
2 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 
§ 357 (Chadbourn Rev. 1979). 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
24
 
[N]ot so much a matter of relaxing the general rule 
that it is not competent in a prosecution for one 
crime to introduce evidence of other offenses as it is 
a matter of placing testimony concerning other acts or 
incidents 
within 
one 
of 
the 
well 
established 
exceptions to such rule . . . . 
Hendrickson, 61 Wis. 2d at 279 (footnotes omitted).  
¶46 We cannot agree with the defendant that the greater 
latitude rule is only applicable to the first prong of the 
Sullivan analysis.  We find nothing in our precedents to support 
such a limitation on the rule's applicability.   
¶47 The language the defendant points to in Hendrickson 
does not support the defendant's contention when read in 
context.  Hendrickson did not separately articulate the three 
prongs of the Sullivan analysis, but instead conducted its 
entire analysis in terms of whether the evidence fell within one 
of the exceptions to the rule against introducing evidence of 
other crimes or acts under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.02.  See id. 
at 279-82.  The court's holding was that the evidence at issue 
fell within "(1) the general scheme or plan; and (2) the proof 
of motive or intent exceptions to the general rule against 
admitting testimony in a criminal prosecution concerning prior 
crimes, incidents or occurrences."  Id. at 282.   
¶48 Thus, it appears that in Hendrickson, analysis of the 
second and third prongs of the Sullivan framework was implicit 
in the analysis of whether the evidence fell within one of the 
"exceptions" set forth in Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2).  In 
that context, the court's statement that the greater latitude 
rule "is a matter of placing testimony concerning other acts or 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
25
incidents within one of the well established exceptions to such 
rule," Hendrickson, 61 Wis. 2d at 279, does not indicate that 
the greater latitude rule only applies to the first step in 
Sullivan.   
¶49 In addition, the authority that Hendrickson cited in 
support of the quoted language also fails to support the 
defendant's position.  After Hendrickson's statement that the 
greater latitude rule is "not so much a matter of relaxing the 
general rule that it is not competent in a prosecution for one 
crime to introduce evidence of other offenses," a footnote 
appears.  Hendrickson, 61 Wis. 2d at 279 and n.9.  The footnote 
quotes  State v. Midell and states:  
 
'This is a familiar problem and in Whitty v. State, 
this court thoroughly reexamined the fundamental rules 
underlying the admissibility of evidence of prior 
crimes, incidents or occurrences.  The court made it 
clear that such evidence is not admitted for purposes 
of proving general character, criminal propensity or 
general disposition on the issue of guilt or innocence 
 . . . .' 
Id. (quoting State v. Midell, 39 Wis. 2d 733, 737, 159 N.W.2d 
614 (1968)). Thus, Hendrickson did not limit the greater 
latitude rule to a single step of the analysis; it merely 
clarified that even though greater latitude applies, it does not 
overcome the prohibition against admitting other crimes evidence 
to establish a defendant's general character, disposition, or 
criminal propensity. 
¶50 We also observe that neither Friedrich nor Plymesser 
limited the application of the greater latitude rule to the 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
26
first step of Sullivan.  Instead, both cases described the rule 
as a general principle governing the analysis of whether the 
other crimes evidence at issue was properly admitted in the 
context of a sexual assault case.  See Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 
19 (indicating that the greater latitude rule is an additional 
principle affecting the exercise of trial court discretion in 
rulings on the admissibility of other crimes evidence in child 
sex crime cases); Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 597-98 (refusing to 
reject the greater latitude standard but explaining that it does 
not relieve the court of the duty to ensure that other acts 
evidence is offered for a proper purpose and is admissible under 
the other rules of evidence).  
¶51 We conclude that in sexual assault cases, especially 
those involving assaults against children, the greater latitude 
rule applies to the entire analysis of whether evidence of a 
defendant's other crimes was properly admitted at trial.  The 
effect of the rule is to permit the more liberal admission of 
other crimes evidence in sex crime cases in which the victim is 
a child.  
¶52 Although 
the greater 
latitude rule 
permits 
more 
liberal admission of other crimes evidence, such evidence is not 
automatically admissible.  See, e.g., Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 
265-66 (holding that at the defendant's trial for sexually 
assaulting a fourteen-year-old girl, evidence that the defendant 
made sexual advances toward an eighteen-year-old employee was 
inadmissible because it was more prejudicial than probative); 
Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 281-82 (finding that, as the State 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
27
conceded, evidence that the defendant stood in front of the 
window of his trailer home was not relevant and therefore should 
not have been admitted at the defendant's trial for sexual 
assault).  This is because: 
 
[T]he greater latitude standard does not relieve a 
court of the duty to ensure that the other acts 
evidence is offered for a proper purpose under sec. 
904.04(2) . . . .  Nor does it relieve a court of the 
duty to ensure the other acts evidence is admissible 
under sec. 904.03 and the other rules of evidence. 
Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 598.  In other words, courts still 
must apply the three-step analysis set forth in Sullivan.     
B.  ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE 
¶53 Having articulated the applicable legal principles, we 
now turn to the question presented in this case: whether the 
trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it 
admitted evidence that Davidson assaulted Cindy P. at his trial 
for assaulting Tina H.  On appeal, the question is not whether 
this court would have admitted the other crimes evidence, "'but 
whether the trial court exercised its discretion in accordance 
with accepted legal standards and in accordance with the facts 
of record.'"  Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 591 (quoting State v. 
Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 722, 745, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991)).  Thus, the 
trial court's exercise of discretion will be sustained if the 
trial court reviewed the relevant facts; applied a proper 
standard of law; and using a rational process, reached a 
reasonable conclusion.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 780-81.  If the 
trial court failed to articulate its reasoning, an appellate 
court will review the record independently to determine whether 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
28
there 
is 
any 
reasonable 
basis 
for 
the 
trial 
court's 
discretionary decision.  Id. at 781; State v. Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 
39, 51, 590 N.W.2d 918 (1999).    
1. Whether the evidence was offered for a proper purpose 
¶54 The first step in our analysis of whether evidence of 
the Cindy P. assault was properly admitted is to determine 
whether the evidence was offered for an acceptable purpose under 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2).  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772.   
¶55 The record indicates that during pretrial hearings, 
the State proposed various purposes for which the evidence could 
be admitted.  The trial court's rulings on which purposes were 
permissible are somewhat unclear.  The trial court ruled that 
the evidence could not be admitted solely for the purpose of 
establishing motive.  However, the court later concluded that 
because the evidence was admissible for the purposes of 
establishing opportunity and plan or scheme, it could be 
admitted for the purpose of motive as well.  The court reasoned 
that although the danger of prejudice outweighed the probative 
value of the evidence for the purpose of establishing motive, 
the danger of prejudice did not outweigh the evidence's 
probative value for the purpose of establishing plan or scheme. 
 The court apparently concluded that because the evidence was 
therefore admissible for at least one purpose, all applicable 
purposesmotive, opportunity, and plan or schemecould be 
submitted to the jury.  The jury instruction permitted the jury 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
29
to consider evidence of the Cindy P. assault for the purpose of 
establishing motive and plan or scheme.13 
¶56 Applying the greater latitude rule, the court of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
the 
evidence 
was 
offered 
for 
a 
permissible purpose under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2).  We 
agree. 
¶57 First, the trial court could reasonably have concluded 
that the evidence was admissible for the purpose of establishing 
motive.  Our cases establish that when the defendant's motive 
for an alleged sexual assault is an element of the charged 
crime, other crimes evidence may be offered for the purpose of 
establishing motive.  See Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 593 (citing 
Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 25; Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 260-61; 
State v. Mink, 146 Wis. 2d 1, 15, 429 N.W.2d 99 (Ct. App. 
1988)).   
¶58 The defendant in this case was charged with second-
degree sexual assault of a child in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(2).  At the time of the defendant's crime, the statute 
provided in relevant part:  "Whoever has sexual contact or 
sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 
                     
13 The defendant points out that the trial court's decision 
to submit the evidence to the jury for the purpose of 
establishing plan or scheme seems to conflict with its earlier 
statement that the State would not be allowed to make an 
argument of "propensity, plan, or scheme."  However, on the day 
of trial, the court clearly and unequivocally ruled that the 
jury could consider the evidence for the purpose of establishing 
motive and plan or scheme.   
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
30
16 years is guilty of a Class C felony."14  Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(2).  "Sexual contact" is defined by Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.01(5), which provided at the time of Davidson's offense: 
 
"Sexual contact" means any intentional touching by the 
complainant or defendant, either directly or through 
clothing by the use of any body part or object, of the 
complainant's or defendant's intimate parts if that 
intentional touching is either for the purpose of 
sexually 
degrading 
or 
sexually 
humiliating 
the 
complainant or sexually arousing or gratifying the 
defendant. 
Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5).15 
¶59 Thus the defendant's purpose or motive for allegedly 
touching Tina H. was one element of the charged crime, and 
evidence 
relevant 
to 
motive 
was 
therefore 
admissible.  
Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 595-96.  See also Fishnick, 127 Wis. 
2d at 260-61. 
¶60 The evidence also was admissible to establish plan or 
scheme.  Evidence of other crimes may be admitted for the 
purpose of establishing a plan or scheme when there is a 
concurrence of common elements between the two incidents.  
Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 24; State v. Spraggin, 77 Wis. 2d 89, 
99, 252 N.W.2d 94 (1977).  The defendant accurately points out 
that there were differences between the Cindy P. and Tina H. 
                     
14  Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(2) was subsequently amended so 
that second degree sexual assault of a child now constitutes a 
Class BC felony.  See 1995 Wis. Act 69 § 12 and Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(2)(1997-98). 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.01(5) was subsequently amended but 
the relevant portion of the definition remains the same.  See 
1995 Wis. Act 69 §§ 10-11 and Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5)(1997-98). 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
31
assaults.  The Cindy P. assault took place 10 years before the 
Tina H. assault, the victims were not the same age, the assaults 
took place in different places, and only the Tina H. assault 
involved touching of the victim's breasts.   
¶61 However, as the trial court noted, the circumstances 
of the two incidents bear striking similarities.  In both 
assaults, the victim was particularly vulnerable.  Tina H., a 
thirteen-year-old girl, had been drinking wine given to her by 
the defendant; Cindy P., a six-year-old girl, had ventured alone 
to the basement of the church to get a drink of water.  Also, 
both offenses took place in unlikely locations, in which the 
defendant 
could 
easily 
have 
been 
apprehended 
during 
the 
commission of the offense.  Tina H. was assaulted in a camper 
while family members slept nearby; Cindy P. was assaulted in the 
basement of the church, next to the men's room and near to an 
occupied nursery, while church services took place on the main 
floor.  Finally, both assaults involved touching the girls 
between the legs.   
¶62 Because of these common elements, and in light of the 
greater latitude rule, we conclude that the trial court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion when it allowed evidence of 
the Cindy P. assault to be submitted to the jury for the purpose 
of establishing plan or scheme.   
2.  Whether the evidence was relevant 
¶63 Having determined that the other crimes evidence was 
offered for permissible purposes under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
904.04(2), we next must examine whether the evidence was 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
32
relevant under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.01.  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 
2d at 772.  The trial court did not explicitly articulate in 
what manner it believed evidence of the Cindy P. assault was 
relevant under § (Rule) 904.01.  We therefore review the record 
independently to determine whether there is any reasonable basis 
for the trial court's implicit conclusion that the evidence was 
relevant. 
¶64 Relevance under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.01 has two 
components; the evidence must relate to some fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action, and it must have 
some tendency to make that fact more or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.01; 
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772. 
¶65 As already discussed, the defendant's motive for 
touching Tina H. was an element of the charged crime, and the 
Cindy P. assault related to that consequential fact.  Under our 
prior cases, the fact that the defendant denied sexually 
assaulting Tina H. does not change this conclusion.  "The state 
must prove all the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt, even if the defendant does not dispute all of the 
elements . . . .  Evidence relevant to motive is therefore 
admissible, 
whether 
or 
not 
defendant 
disputes 
motive." 
Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 594-95 (citing Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 
at 22, Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 260-61; and Mink, 146 Wis. 2d at 
15).  See also State v. Hammer, 2000 WI 92, ¶ 25, ___ Wis. 2d 
___, ___ N.W.2d ___ ("If the state must prove an element of a 
crime, then evidence relevant to that element is admissible, 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
33
even if a defendant does not dispute the element.").  It was 
reasonable to anticipate that jurors would have difficulty 
believing that the defendant could have any motive to sexually 
assault his young niece.  See Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 27-28 
("The average juror could well find it incomprehensible that one 
who stands before the court on trial could commit such an 
act.").  This provides a reasonable basis for the trial court's 
implicit conclusion that evidence of the Cindy P. assault 
related to the defendant's motive, a fact of consequence to the 
determination of the action.   
¶66 The 
record also 
supports 
the determination 
that 
evidence of the Cindy P. assault was relevant to another fact of 
consequencethe defendant's opportunity or plan to commit a 
sexual assault in such an unlikely place.  At trial, the defense 
presented evidence suggesting that it was nearly impossible that 
he could have assaulted Tina H. in the camper with his family 
nearby.  Evidence of the Cindy P. assault, which also took place 
under circumstances when there was a danger of discovery, 
related to the question of whether the defendant could have had 
the 
opportunity 
to 
commit 
an 
assault 
under 
unlikely 
circumstances.  See Proper, 85 Wis. at 629 ("[The defendant's] 
conduct on this occasion was corroborative of the evidence of 
the prosecutrix in respect to other indecent or criminal 
assaults, such as are charged in the information, and would tend 
to sustain and render more credible her evidence of other such 
occurrences.").   
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
34
¶67 Having determined that the other crimes evidence 
related to facts of consequence to the case, we next must 
examine whether it has any tendency to make those facts more or 
less probable.  "The measure of probative value in assessing 
relevance is the similarity between the charged offense and the 
other act."  Gray, 225 Wis. 2d at 58 (citing Sullivan, 216 Wis. 
2d at 786).  The defendant argues that even under the greater 
latitude rule, the Cindy P. assault was not relevant because it 
did not bear the substantial similarities to the charged crime 
that the other crimes evidence in Plymesser, Friedrich, Day, and 
Hendrickson bore to the charged crimes in those cases.  The 
defendant 
contends 
that 
"[t]he only 
similarity 
whatsoever 
between the [assault on Cindy P. and the alleged assault on Tina 
H.] is the involvement of minor children," and that the other 
alleged similarities between the Cindy P. and Tina H. assaults 
are "illusory."  (Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 35, 41.)  
¶68 We cannot agree.  To begin with, we note the obvious 
similarity that in both incidents, the defendant was sexually 
attracted to a child and acted on that sexual attraction by 
touching the child between her legs.  Furthermore, both victims 
were assaulted when they were particularly vulnerable; Cindy P. 
was assaulted while she was alone at the drinking fountain, and 
Tina H. was assaulted while she was sleeping, after her uncle 
repeatedly gave her wine.  Finally, both assaults occurred in 
locations in which there was a substantial risk of discovery.  
These similarities rendered evidence of the Cindy P. assault 
highly probative of the defendant's motive to assault Tina H. 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
35
and of the defendant's opportunity and plan to commit the 
assault in the camper while his family slept nearby.  
¶69 Indeed, the same degree of similarity was sufficient 
to satisfy this step of the analysis in Plymesser and Friedrich. 
¶70 In Plymesser, the defendant was charged with sexually 
assaulting a thirteen-year-old girl, Kelly, in December 1989.  
Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 586.  Kelly testified that the 
defendant was a friend of her family and that the assault 
occurred while the defendant was driving Kelly to his home.  Id. 
at 588.  She testified that the defendant pulled the car over, 
kissed her, touched her breasts and vaginal area, and made her 
touch his penis.  Id. at 588-89.  The defendant admitted that he 
had been drinking on the night in question, but denied 
assaulting Kelly.  Id. at 589.  The trial court permitted the 
State to introduce evidence of the defendant's 1977 conviction 
for assaulting a seven-year-old girl.  Id. at 589-90.  The 
victim of the defendant's previous assault was also a daughter 
of the defendant's friends.  Id. at 589.  After first denying 
the assault, the defendant confessed that after drinking a lot 
of beer, he had put his mouth on the seven-year-old girl's 
vagina.  Id.  On appeal, this court determined that the evidence 
was relevant to establish the defendant's motive for the charged 
crime and to corroborate the victim's testimony.  Id. at 595. 
¶71 In Friedrich, the defendant was accused of sexually 
assaulting his fourteen-year-old niece while she was babysitting 
his children.  Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 7-8.  The trial court 
permitted the State to present the testimony of two other girls 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
36
who claimed that the defendant had sexually assaulted them.  Id. 
at 17-18.  One girl testified that five years earlier, when she 
was ten years old, the defendant pulled her pants down and 
touched her genital area after he picked her up from school.  
Id. at 17.  The other girl testified that seven years before the 
trial, when she was thirteen years old, she was assaulted while 
babysitting the defendant's children.  Id. at 17-18.  While she 
was babysitting, she fell asleep; when she awoke, the defendant 
was sitting next to her.  Id. at 17.  She testified that he put 
his hand inside her pants and told her to move her legs.  Id. at 
17-18.  This court concluded that the other crimes evidence was 
relevant because it tended to establish the existence of a 
scheme or plan, which related to the defendant's intent to 
commit the charged crime.  Id. at 23-24. 
¶72 These cases demonstrate that defendant's past offense 
need not be identical to the charged offense in order to be 
probative.  Remoteness in time and differences in age are 
considerations, but they are not determinative.  Although there 
were differences between the Cindy P. and Tina H. assaults, the 
assaults shared many common features


both involved particularly 
vulnerable victims, took place in unlikely locations, and 
involved 
touching 
between 
the 
legs. 
 
Because 
of 
these 
similarities, and in view of the greater latitude rule as 
established in this court's precedents, the trial court could 
reasonably have concluded that the Cindy P. assault was 
probative of the defendant's motive, opportunity, and plan or 
scheme in the Tina H. assault.   
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
37
 
3. 
Whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially 
outweighed the probative value of the evidence 
¶73 Having concluded that evidence of the Cindy P. assault 
was offered for proper purposes under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
904.04(2) and was relevant under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.01, we 
now must determine whether under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.03 the 
probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice.  "'Unfair prejudice results when 
the proffered evidence has a tendency to influence the outcome 
by improper means or if it appeals to the jury's sympathies, 
arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish or 
otherwise causes a jury to base its decision on something other 
than the established propositions in the case.'"  Gray, 225 Wis. 
2d at 64 (quoting Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 789-90.).   
¶74 Although the trial court explicitly concluded that the 
probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by the danger 
of prejudice, the court did not explain its reasoning.  The 
court did state that if the evidence had been offered only to 
establish motive, the danger of prejudice would have outweighed 
the probative value.  Also, the court's determination that the 
evidence was admissible for the purposes of establishing 
opportunity, plan or scheme implicitly included a determination 
that the danger of prejudice did not outweigh the probative 
value of the evidence for those purposes. 
¶75 We conclude that the record contains a reasonable 
basis for the trial court's determination that the probative 
value of the other crimes evidence was not substantially 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
38
outweighed by the danger of prejudice under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
904.03.  The probative value of other crimes evidence "'depends 
partially upon its nearness in time, place, and circumstance to 
the alleged crime or element sought to be proved.'"  Plymesser, 
172 Wis. 2d at 595 (quoting Fishnick, 172 Wis. 2d at 261).  In 
applying § (Rule) 904.03 to the other crimes evidence in 
Plymesser, this court pointed to the distinct similarities 
between the incidents.  Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 596.  The 
court concluded that the fact that in both incidents the 
defendant drank with friends and then sexually assaulted the 
friends' daughters offset the thirteen-year gap in time between 
the assaults and the difference in the girls' ages.  Id.  
Likewise, in Friedrich, analysis under § (Rule) 904.03 focused 
on the common elements between the crimes:  the girls were of 
like age, they were part of the defendant's family or had a 
quasi-familial relationship with the defendant, the nature of 
the sexual contact was virtually identical, the defendant took 
advantage of the girls in a relationship of implied trust, and 
the defendant gratified his sexual desires through the physical 
contact.  Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 24.  Thus, similarities 
between the other crimes evidence and the charged crime may 
render the other crimes evidence highly probative, outweighing 
the danger of prejudice.   
¶76 As discussed, the Cindy P. and Tina H. incidents bore 
marked similarities.  
Both 
assaults 
involved 
particularly 
vulnerable victims, took place under circumstances in which 
there was a risk of discovery, and involved touching young girls 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
39
between the legs.  Consistent with Plymesser and Friedrich, the 
trial 
court 
could 
reasonably 
have 
determined 
that 
these 
similarities made the other crimes evidence highly probative of 
the defendant's motive, opportunity, plan or scheme to commit 
the charged crime.   
¶77 In addition, unlike the other crimes at issue in 
Friedrich, the Cindy P. assault was a charged, convicted crime, 
to which the defendant had pled guilty.  The high degree of 
reliability of the evidence of the Cindy P. assault increased 
its probative value.  See Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 55-56 and 
n.12 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that when prior 
acts resulted in an arrest, charge, or conviction, reliability 
may outweigh considerations of remoteness in time). 
¶78 The defendant argues that because the State's case was 
so dependent on Tina H.'s credibility and because the prosecutor 
referred to the Cindy P. assault in both the opening statement 
and closing arguments, the danger of prejudice outweighed the 
probative value of the evidence.  However, the trial court took 
steps to limit the danger of unfair prejudice posed by the 
evidence.  The evidence was introduced in the form of a 
stipulation rather than through testimony, minimizing the danger 
of arousing the jury's sympathies or horror at the Cindy P. 
assault.  Also, the elimination of any reference to the fact 
that the Cindy P. assault occurred in a church prevented the 
risk that jurors would be unfairly prejudiced by that fact.  
Furthermore, the court read a cautionary instruction to the jury 
immediately after the introduction of the Cindy P. evidence and 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
40
once again after the closing arguments.  Cautionary instructions 
help to limit the danger of unfair prejudice that might result 
from other crimes evidence.  Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 596-97 
(citing Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 262; Mink, 146 Wis. 2d at 17).  
¶79 In view of our precedents, we conclude that the trial 
court reasonably could have determined that the probative value 
of the Cindy P. evidence was not substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.03.   
¶80 In conclusion, we hold that under the three-step 
analytical framework set forth in Sullivan, and consistent with 
the greater latitude rule, the trial court's decision to admit 
evidence of the defendant's prior conviction for sexual assault 
did not constitute an erroneous exercise of discretion.   
III.  PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENTS DURING CLOSING ARGUMENTS 
¶81 Even if the admission of the other crimes evidence was 
not an error entitling him to a new trial, the defendant argues 
that a new trial is warranted on an alternative ground: 
prosecutorial misconduct during the closing arguments.  The 
defendant's argument relates to two separate statements made by 
the prosecutor during closing arguments.   
¶82 The first statement occurred near the beginning of the 
prosecutor's closing argument.  The prosecutor stated, "So what 
is the truth?  We talked a lot about the credibility of 
witnesses when we started this, and the bottom line is this, do 
you believe Tina as I do?"  The defense immediately objected, 
and the court sustained the objection, stating, "Counsel, you 
know better than that."  The defense did not request a mistrial 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
41
at that time.  The defense argues that this statement was 
grossly improper because the prosecutor invited the jury to 
trust his judgment rather than its own view of the evidence.  
The defense contends that the error was prejudicial because Tina 
H.'s credibility was so essential to the case. 
¶83 The second remark occurred during the prosecutor's 
rebuttal.  During cross-examination, the prosecutor had asked 
the defendant's wife whether she said "that fucker" when Tina 
H.'s mother first called and told her about the assault.  The 
defendant's wife denied making the statement, and the prosecutor 
did not question Tina H.'s mother on the matter.  The defense 
commented during closing arguments that the prosecutor's own 
witness never verified this statement.  On rebuttal, the 
prosecutor said, "Counsel made reference to the district 
attorney's question about that profanity word, that f---er, and 
he says my witness didn't even say that on the stand, and you 
know what, she didn't.  You know why she didn't?  I didn't ask 
the question."  The defense promptly objected, and the court 
told the prosecutor, "Let's talk about what is in the evidence." 
 The prosecutor moved on to other matters, and the defense did 
not request a mistrial at the time.  The defense argues that 
this comment in effect constituted unsworn testimony by the 
prosecutor that the defendant's wife made the alleged statement 
and that such error deprived the defendant of his constitutional 
right to confront the witnesses against him. 
¶84 The defendant did not move for a mistrial at the time 
either of these remarks were made or at any time before the jury 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
42
returned its verdict.  After the jury found the defendant 
guilty, the defendant filed a motion for mistrial due to 
prosecutorial misconduct based on these allegedly improper 
statements.  The defendant argued that the motion was properly 
characterized 
as 
a 
motion 
for 
mistrial 
rather 
than 
a 
postconviction motion, because the judgment of conviction had 
not yet been entered.   
¶85 At a hearing on the motion, the trial court indicated 
that the prosecutor's statements were in error and that in both 
instances, the court had "even with the tone of voice, 
basically, curtly sustained the objection when the comments were 
made."  However, the court held that neither error had so 
infected the trial with unfairness as to impact the defendant's 
due process rights.  Furthermore, the court held that the 
defendant's motion for a mistrial was not timely because it 
should have been made at the time of the prosecutor's alleged 
misconduct.  The trial court therefore concluded that whether 
the defendant's motion was construed as a motion for a mistrial 
or as a motion for a new trial, it must be denied.   
¶86 We conclude that the defendant waived his objections 
to the prosecutor's statement by failing to make a timely motion 
for mistrial.  A defendant's failure to move for a mistrial 
before the jury returned its judgment constitutes a waiver of 
his objections to the prosecutor's statements during closing 
arguments.  Haskins v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 408, 424, 294 N.W.2d 25 
(1980); Neely v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 38, 54-55, 292 N.W.2d 859 
(1980); State v. Patino, 177 Wis. 2d 348, 380, 502 N.W.2d 601 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
43
(Ct. App. 1993); State v. Holt, 128 Wis. 2d 110, 137, 382 N.W.2d 
679 (Ct. App. 1985).  "If defense counsel had not intended to so 
waive his complaints there existed ample opportunity to make 
said motion on the record," before or after the court charged 
the jury; failure to do so constitutes a waiver of those 
complaints.  Davis v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 284, 287, 212 N.W.2d 139 
(1973).  
¶87 The defendant argues that even if his motion for 
mistrial was not timely made, a new trial is warranted because 
the prosecutor's conduct constituted "plain error" under Wis. 
Stat. § 901.03(4) and to accomplish the ends of justice under 
Wis. Stat. § 752.35.16 
¶88 It is true that certain errors are so plain or 
fundamental that they cannot be waived.  Vollmer v. Luety, 156 
Wis. 2d 1, 21, n.5, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990).  When a defendant 
                     
16 We note that while the defendant points to Wis. Stat. 
§ 752.35 as authority for the discretionary reversal of his 
conviction, Wis. Stat. § 751.06 is the statute that governs the 
discretionary reversal authority of this court.  See Vollmer v. 
Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 7 and n.2, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990).  "[T]he 
court of appeals has the same broad discretion under sec. 
752.35, Stats., as does this court under sec. 751.06."  Id. at 
21. Under these statutes, appellate courts in Wisconsin have 
broad statutory authority to reverse judgments when (1) the real 
controversy has not been tried, or (2) there has been a 
miscarriage of justice and there is a substantial probability of 
a different result on retrial.  Id. at 19.   
In addition to this discretionary reversal power under the 
statutes, 
this 
court 
has 
the 
inherent 
power 
to 
conduct 
discretionary review of waived error when its appears to be in 
the best interests of judicial administration to do so.  Id. at 
12 (citing State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 536, 370 N.W.2d 222 
(1985)).   
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
44
alleges that a prosecutor's statements constituted misconduct, 
the test we apply is whether the statements "'so infected the 
trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a 
denial of due process.'"  State v. Wolff, 171 Wis. 2d 161, 167, 
491 
N.W.2d 
498 
(Ct. 
App. 
1992)(quoting 
Donnelly 
v. 
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). We cannot conclude 
that the prosecutor's statements in this case were so egregious 
as to constitute plain error.  The comments were limited in 
scope, and the trial court sustained the defendant's objections 
and directed the prosecutor to limit his argument to the facts 
in evidence.  The defendant made no motion for mistrial after 
the trial court addressed the objections.  "'[A]ll we can assume 
is that the defendant was satisfied with the court's ruling and 
curative measure, and that he had no further objections.  The 
defendant took his chances with the jury, curative instruction 
and all.'"  Neely, 97 Wis. 2d at 55 (quoting Neely v. State, 86 
Wis. 2d 304, 319, 272 N.W.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1980)).  Accordingly, 
we find no plain error and decline to grant a new trial in the 
interests of justice.  Neely, 97 Wis. 2d at 55.   
¶89 In sum, although the prosecutor's statements appear to 
have been improper, we conclude that the defendant waived his 
objections 
to 
the 
statements 
by 
failing 
to 
make 
a 
contemporaneous motion for mistrial.  We also determine that the 
prosecutor's statements did not constitute plain error or 
warrant reversal in the interests of justice. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
No. 
98-0130-CR 
 
 
45
¶90 Because the trial court's decision to admit the other 
crimes evidence was not an erroneous exercise of discretion, and 
because objection to the prosecutor's statements was waived and 
the statements do not constitute plain error or warrant reversal 
in the interests of justice, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
98-0130-CR.awb 
 
1 
¶91 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting). Although I have 
misgivings with the majority's expansive application of the 
greater latitude rule, I write separately to address its attempt 
to fit the "square peg" of prior acts evidence into the "round 
hole" of an acceptable statutory purpose of motive, plan, or 
scheme. 
¶92 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2) warns that prior 
acts evidence is not admissible to prove the character or 
propensity of the person charged with an offense.  Although 
there exist limited purposes for which such prior acts may be 
admitted, the "general rule is to exclude evidence of other bad 
acts to prove a person's character in order to show that the 
person acted according to his character in committing the 
present act."  State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 253, 378 
N.W.2d 272 (1985). 
¶93 Our other acts jurisprudence in child sexual assault 
cases continues to veer farther from the prohibition against 
propensity 
evidence 
set 
forth 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 
904.04(2).  Today the majority continues the trend in eroding 
the statutory mandate.  Its attempt to link Davidson's prior 
conviction to an acceptable statutory purpose is a thinly veiled 
endorsement of the unrestricted use of propensity evidence in 
child sexual assault cases. 
¶94 In Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 292, 149 N.W.2d 
557 (1967), this court noted the danger in admitting prior acts 
evidence.  The court set forth reasons for limiting the use of 
such evidence: 1) the overwhelming tendency to presume the 
98-0130-CR.awb 
 
2 
defendant guilty because he is a person likely to commit such 
acts; 2) the tendency to condemn not because of the defendant's 
actual guilt but because he may have escaped punishment for 
previous acts; 3) the injustice in attacking a person who is not 
prepared 
to show 
that 
the 
evidence 
used 
for 
attack is 
fabricated; and 4) the confusion of issues that may result from 
the introduction of other crimes.  Id. 
¶95 Despite Whitty's admonitions, the majority sanctions 
the admission of Davidson's prior act by contorting the 
definitions of the acceptable purposes enumerated under Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2).  The majority approves the use of the 
prior act to establish motive and erroneously subscribes to the 
view that motive is an element of second-degree sexual assault 
of a child.  Majority op. at ¶¶59, 65.  It is not.  "While 
motive may be shown as a circumstance to aid in establishing the 
guilt of a defendant, the State is not required to prove motive 
on the part of a defendant in order to convict."  Wis JI-
Criminal 175. 
¶96 Sexual gratification is inherent in the crime of 
sexual assault, and a defendant's conduct reveals this purpose. 
 When the identity of the defendant is in issue or there is a 
claim that the sexual contact was "innocent" and occurred by 
mistake, prior acts evidence may be relevant.  State v. 
Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1, 53, 398 N.W.2d 763 (1987) (Heffernan, 
C.J., dissenting).  In this case Davidson did not assert a 
defense of mistake or raise the issue of identity, but rather he 
asserted that the alleged assault never occurred.  Thus, neither 
98-0130-CR.awb 
 
3 
motive nor even the purpose of sexual gratification was at 
issue.   
¶97 The circuit court acknowledged as much in one of its 
earlier motion hearings to determine the admissibility of 
Davidson's prior conviction.  Aware that Davidson's defense to 
the charge was that the sexual assault never occurred, the court 
noted: 
 
As far as plan or motive, like I say, the defendant 
has a good point on that.  Quite simply, that if you 
get to the incident happening at all, plan or motive 
is no longer a serious issue.  That's the way I see 
the case, at this point. 
Nevertheless, the circuit court subsequently retreated and 
allowed the conviction into evidence not solely to establish 
motive, 
which 
the 
court 
recognized 
would 
be 
unfairly 
prejudicial, but additionally to establish plan, scheme, or 
opportunity.  This decision was an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.   
¶98 By allowing the prior act into evidence to establish 
motive, the circuit court admitted propensity evidence that it 
acknowledged would be highly prejudicial.  In effect, this 
evidence suggested to the jury that because Davidson previously 
had committed a sexual assault against a minor, he had the 
proclivity to perpetrate an assault upon his 13-year-old niece. 
 Davidson was thereby subjected to defending against both his 
present charge and a past act for which he had already served 
his punishment. 
98-0130-CR.awb 
 
4 
¶99 The majority cites several cases in support of its 
liberal admission of prior acts evidence under the guise of 
motive.  See State v. Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d 583, 593, 493 
N.W.2d 367 (1992); Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 22; Fishnick, 127 
Wis. 2d at 260-61.  These cases warrant a thorough re-
examination, however, because they validate the indiscriminate 
use of other acts evidence when motive is not at issue and when 
the defendant's conduct alone establishes the purpose of sexual 
gratification.   
¶100 Both Fishnick and Friedrich do contain the magic 
cautionary words: "[o]ther-acts evidence is admissible when 
probative of the elements of a crime, subject to the general 
rule excluding character evidence." Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 
250; Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 22.  However, the words of 
caution have a toothless effect here because the majority's 
analysis is tantamount to a blanket rule permitting character 
evidence in child sexual assault cases.  This approach amounts 
to an unwarranted relaxation of the evidentiary standard under 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2). 
¶101 In further relaxation of this evidentiary standard, 
the 
majority 
approves 
the 
use 
of 
Davidson's 
10-year-old 
conviction to prove plan or scheme under the statute.  "Evidence 
showing a plan establishes a definite prior design, plan or 
scheme which includes the doing of the act charged."  State v. 
Spraggin, 77 Wis. 2d 89, 99, 252 N.W.2d 94 (1977).  This 
requires more than a similarity between the prior act and the 
charged offense.  Indeed, there must be a linkage between the 
98-0130-CR.awb 
 
5 
two acts that permits the conclusion that the prior act led to 
the commission of the charged offense.  State v. DeKeyser, 221 
Wis. 2d 435, 448, 585 N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1998).  See also 
Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 39 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting) 
(citing Cleary, McCormick on Evidence, § 190, p.559 (3d ed. 
1984)). 
¶102 The threshold measure for this similarity is nearness 
of time, place, and circumstance of the other act to the alleged 
offense.  Hough v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 807, 814, 235 N.W.2d 534 
(1975).  It is difficult to imagine how Davidson's sexual 
contact with a six-year-old girl in the basement of a church 
constituted a step towards the commission, a decade later, of 
the alleged assault of his 13-year-old niece in a family camper. 
 The two acts represent distinct events, separated by a 
significant period of time and occurring at different places 
under dissimilar circumstances.  They are not part of a 
particular plan to achieve a specific purpose.    
¶103 To 
justify 
the 
admission 
of 
Davidson's 
prior 
conviction, the majority nevertheless asserts that there exist 
striking similarities between the two acts in the potential for 
discovery, the vulnerability of the minor victims, and the type 
of sexual contact involved.  The majority's assertion is 
unpersuasive.  I agree with the court of appeals that the 
likelihood of discovery in a church basement while people are 
either upstairs or down the hall in a separate room is markedly 
different than the potential for discovery in a situation in 
which family members are sleeping four or five feet away. 
98-0130-CR.awb 
 
6 
¶104 Furthermore, although both victims were vulnerable 
because they were minors, the vulnerability of a six-year-old 
approached 
by 
a 
stranger 
differs 
considerably 
from 
the 
vulnerability of a 13-year-old confronted by her uncle with 
other family members nearby.  Finally, the type of sexual 
contact presented in both incidents, the touching of the girls 
between their legs, is a type of contact unfortunately at issue 
in an overwhelming number of sexual assault cases.     
¶105 The general similarities between the two incidents do 
not reveal a unified plan or scheme to justify the use of 
Davidson's prior conviction in his prosecution for sexually 
assaulting his niece.  The majority's approval of Davidson's 
prior conviction as admissible other acts evidence stands in 
direct contravention of Whitty, 34 Wis. 2d at 292, which 
expressed utmost concern over the potential of unfair prejudice 
and urged the exercise of restraint in admitting prior acts 
evidence.   
¶106 As the court of appeals noted, this court recently 
reaffirmed the vitality of Whitty in State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 
2d 768, 775, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998).  Although not a sexual 
assault 
case, 
Sullivan 
recognized 
the 
significant 
danger 
underlying the liberal acceptance of prior acts evidence.  Yet, 
the majority pays only lip service to Sullivan and overlooks the 
reinvigoration of Whitty.  It accomplishes this by applying the 
three-prong test in its analysis while ignoring the substance of 
Sullivan's holding, which requires a careful determination of 
98-0130-CR.awb 
 
7 
prior acts so that unfair prejudice through the use of character 
evidence is avoided. 
¶107 This court now has an established pattern of admitting 
prohibited propensity evidence.  In a rare exception to this 
established pattern, the court recently approved the exclusion 
of other acts evidence in a sexual assault case.  However, 
predictably it was in a case in which the defendant, not the 
State, sought to introduce the evidence.  See State v. 
Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d 285, 595 N.W.2d 661 (1999).  The majority 
reached this conclusion notwithstanding its acknowledgement that 
a less stringent standard for admissibility applies when a 
defendant offers prior acts for purposes of exoneration.  Id. at 
304.  
¶108 Unfortunately 
our 
post-Whitty 
jurisprudence 
consistently reveals that courts may freely permit prior acts 
evidence in child sexual assault cases to show the defendant's 
propensity to abuse children.  Despite Sullivan's valiant 
attempt to revitalize Whitty and its call to exercise restraint 
in prior acts determinations, this court has once again 
contorted the definitions of the acceptable statutory purposes 
to meet the facts.   
¶109 Rather than endeavoring to stretch beyond repair the 
definitions of the acceptable purposes under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
904.04(2), the majority should simply lay all its cards on the 
table and acknowledge that it is sanctioning the blanket use of 
propensity evidence in child sexual assault cases.  However, the 
majority maintains its refuge under the cloak of the very 
98-0130-CR.awb 
 
8 
statute it simultaneously erodes.  The dissimilarities between 
Davidson's prior act and present charge are pronounced and do 
not serve to establish any acceptable purpose under Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 
904.04(2). 
 Instead, 
Davidson's prior 
conviction 
constitutes propensity evidence excluded under the statute.  
¶110 An honest and forthright approach by the majority 
would serve us all better than perpetrating the artifice of 
adherence to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2).  Because the 
majority engages in legal gymnastics to justify the admission of 
propensity evidence in contravention of the statute, I dissent. 
¶111 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and JUSTICE WILLIAM A. BABLITCH join this dissenting 
opinion. 
 
 
98-0130-CR.awb 
 
1