Title: Village of Trempealeau v. Mike R. Mikrut
Citation: 2004 WI 79
Docket Number: 2003AP000552
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 16, 2004

2004 WI 79 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NOS.: 
03-0534; 03-0535; 03-0536; 03-0537; 03-0538;  
03-0539; 03-540; 03-541; 03-542; 03-543; 03-544; 
03-545; 03-546; 03-547; 03-548; 03-549; 03-550; 
03-551; 03-552; 03-553 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Village of Trempealeau,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Mike R. Mikrut,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 267 Wis. 2d 279, 670 N.W.2d 558 
(Ct. App. 2003-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 16, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 19, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Trempealeau   
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Damon   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: WILCOX, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there was a brief by 
Daniel W. Hildebrand, Michael R. Christopher, Cari Anne Renlund 
and DeWitt Ross & Stevens, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by 
Daniel W. Hildebrand. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Paul B. 
Millis and Skolos & Millis, S.C., Black River Falls, and oral 
argument by Paul B. Millis and C. Michael Chambers. 
 
 
 
 
 
2004 WI 79 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.  03-0534 through 03-0553  
(L.C. 
Nos. 
00FO000567 through 00FO000580 & 
00TR003333 through 00TR003338) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Village of Trempealeau,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Mike R. Mikrut,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 16, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.  Circuit courts in Wisconsin are 
constitutional courts with general original subject matter 
jurisdiction over "all matters civil and criminal."  Wis. Const. 
art. VII, § 8.  Accordingly, a circuit court is never without 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
¶2  A circuit court's ability to exercise its subject 
matter jurisdiction in individual cases, however, may be 
affected by noncompliance with statutory requirements pertaining 
to the invocation of that jurisdiction.  The failure to comply 
with these statutory conditions does not negate subject matter 
jurisdiction but may under certain circumstances affect the 
Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553  
 
2 
 
circuit court's competency to proceed to judgment in the 
particular case before the court.  A judgment rendered under 
these circumstances may be erroneous or invalid because of the 
circuit court's loss of competency but is not void for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
¶3  The issue in this case is whether a challenge to the 
circuit court's competency may be waived if not first raised in 
the original circuit court action.  The case law has not been 
consistent on whether and under what circumstances the issue of 
competency may be deemed waived.1  We hold that because 
                                                 
 
1    Some of the inconsistency in the case law appears to 
stem from its use of conclusory language.  Some cases simply 
equate competency with subject matter jurisdiction for purposes 
of deciding waiver.  See, ¶¶24-25, infra.  Others fail to 
distinguish among statutory pleading waiver rules, the common-
law waiver rule (requiring issues to be raised in the circuit 
court or be deemed waived on appeal), and estoppel.  See, ¶23 
n.5, infra.  We identify some of these areas of inconsistency 
but do not undertake to resolve all of them here. 
 
In particular, we note that there is an established line of 
cases holding, in conclusory fashion, that competency challenges 
premised 
upon 
noncompliance 
with 
mandatory 
statutory 
time 
limitations cannot be waived.  See, ¶¶12-13, 25, infra.  Because 
the competency challenge in this case is not premised upon 
noncompliance with statutory time limitations, we do not address 
the issue of waiver in this context except to note that these 
cases appear to simply perpetuate by rote the rule in older case 
law that statutory time limitations are "jurisdictional" and 
therefore cannot be waived.  See ¶25 n.6, infra.  We also note 
the recent enactment of legislation that may call into question 
this line of cases, at least in certain subject areas.  See, ¶12 
n. 4. 
 
We emphasize that the waiver issue presented here is 
distinct from statutory pleading waiver rules.  It is also 
distinct from the case law pertaining to pleading waiver rules 
as applied to competency challenges premised upon noncompliance 
Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553  
 
3 
 
competency does not equate to subject matter jurisdiction, a 
challenge to the circuit court's competency is waived if not 
raised in the circuit court.  The waiver rule is a rule of 
judicial administration, and therefore a reviewing court has the 
inherent authority to disregard a waiver and address the merits 
of an unpreserved argument.  In addition, Wis. Stat. §§ 751.06 
and 752.35 may allow discretionary appellate review of waived 
issues 
in 
extraordinary 
circumstances, 
and 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1) may provide an avenue for obtaining 
collateral relief from judgment on the basis of a waived 
argument if adequate grounds for relief can be established and 
the statute's time limitations have been met. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶4 
The defendant Mike Mikrut owns and operates a salvage 
yard in the Village of Trempealeau.  Between October 3, 2000, 
and November 9, 2000, Mikrut was issued a total of 21 citations 
for violations of three Village ordinances: seven citations for 
the storage of junked vehicles on private property; seven 
citations for failing to obtain a conditional use permit for the 
operation of a junk and salvage yard in an industrial district; 
and seven uniform traffic citations for the illegal storage of 
junked vehicles.  On June 14, 2001, the Honorable John Damon, 
Trempealeau County Circuit Court, found Mikrut guilty of all the 
                                                                                                                                                             
with statutory governmental notice of claim requirements.  See, 
¶23 n.6, infra.  Finally, the waiver issue here is also distinct 
from the estoppel case law, which sometimes uses the terminology 
of waiver.  Id. 
  
Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553  
 
4 
 
violations.  At two subsequent hearings the court considered the 
issue of penalty.  Because the violations had continued for 227 
days, 
the 
court 
ultimately 
imposed 
forfeitures 
totaling 
$104,193.  A written order entering judgment was signed December 
3, 2001, nunc pro tunc to November 15, 2001. 
¶5 
Mikrut moved for reconsideration; the motion was 
denied.  He appealed, asserting numerous errors: that his 
properties were legal nonconforming uses; that he did not need a 
conditional use permit; that the circuit court did not have 
personal jurisdiction over him; that the judgment was based on 
insufficient evidence; that the forfeitures were erroneous; and 
that the Village was equitably estopped from enforcing the 
ordinances because Mikrut had moved the vehicles to his 
properties at the Village's request.  The court of appeals 
rejected 
all 
Mikrut's 
claims 
in 
an 
unpublished 
decision 
affirming the judgment.  Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, Nos. 
01-3471 through 01-3490, unpublished slip op. (Ct. App. May 14, 
2002).  This court denied Mikrut's petition for review.   
¶6 
On November 25, 2002, more than 17 months after being 
found guilty of the ordinance violations and more than six 
months after the judgment was upheld on appeal, Mikrut moved to 
vacate the judgment, arguing for the first time that the Village 
did not follow certain statutory mandates in issuing some of the 
citations.  More specifically, Mikrut claimed that the citations 
were illegal because 1) the Village did not adopt a bond 
schedule for the particular ordinances Mikrut was charged with 
violating; 2) the citations were for ordinance violations that 
Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553  
 
5 
 
had a direct statutory counterpart contrary to Village Ordinance 
1-2-1; 
and 
3) 
the 
Village 
lacked 
authority 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 345.11 to issue uniform traffic citations for 
ordinance violations of the type charged against Mikrut.  Mikrut 
claimed that these defects in the issuance of the citations 
rendered the circuit court incompetent to exercise its subject 
matter jurisdiction, and that the judgments were accordingly 
void.  The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that 
Mikrut had waived the issue of the court's competency by failing 
to raise it at trial or on direct appeal.  Mikrut appealed, and 
the court of appeals affirmed.  Village of Trempealeau v. 
Mikrut, Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553, unpublished slip op. (Ct. 
App. August 12, 2003).  We accepted review.            
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶7 
Whether a circuit court has lost competency is a 
question of law that we review independently.  State v. Kywanda 
F., 200 Wis. 2d 26, 32-33, 546 N.W.2d 440 (1996); Village of 
Shorewood v. Steinberg, 174 Wis. 2d 191, 200, 496 N.W.2d 57 
(1993).  Whether an objection to the competency of the circuit 
court can be waived is also a question of law that we review de 
novo.  Kywanda F., 200 Wis. 2d at 32-33.     
III.  DISCUSSION 
 
¶8 
Article VII, section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides that: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the 
circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal within this state."  Accordingly, we have 
stated that in Wisconsin, "no circuit court is without subject 
Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553  
 
6 
 
matter 
jurisdiction 
to 
entertain 
actions 
of 
any 
nature 
whatsoever."  Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis. 2d 171, 176, 313 
N.W.2d 790 (1982)(citing Matter of Guardianship of Eberhardy, 
102 
Wis. 2d 539, 
307 
N.W.2d 881 
(1981)); 
Kline 
v. 
Burke 
Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922).  The "jurisdiction 
and the power of the circuit court is conferred not by act of 
the legislature, but by the Constitution itself."  Eberhardy, 
102 Wis. 2d at 550.  Thus, the subject matter jurisdiction of 
the circuit courts cannot be curtailed by state statute.2 
¶9  We have recognized, however, that a circuit court's 
ability to exercise the subject matter jurisdiction vested in it 
by the constitution may be affected by noncompliance with 
statutory requirements pertaining to the invocation of that 
jurisdiction in individual cases.  Mueller, 105 Wis. 2d at 176; 
Miller Brewing Co. v. LIRC, 173 Wis. 2d 700, 705 n.1, 495 
N.W.2d 660 (1993).  Because the circuit court's subject matter 
jurisdiction is plenary and constitutionally-based, however, 
noncompliance 
with 
such 
statutory 
mandates 
is 
not 
"jurisdictional" in that it does not negate the court's subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Kywanda F., 200 Wis. 2d at 33; Miller 
Brewing, 173 Wis. 2d at 705 n.1; Green County Dep't of Human 
Servs. v. H.N., 162 Wis. 2d 635, 656, 469 N.W.2d 845 (1991)("In 
the Interest of B.J.N." or "B.J.N."); Mueller, 105 Wis. 2d at 
                                                 
 
2  Federal law may confer exclusive jurisdiction over 
certain subject matters to the federal courts, precluding state 
court jurisdiction in those areas by operation of the Supremacy 
Clause.  
  
Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553  
 
7 
 
178.  Rather, a failure to comply with a statutory mandate 
pertaining to the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction may 
result in a loss of the circuit court's competency to adjudicate 
the particular case before the court.  Kywanda F., 200 Wis. 2d 
at 33-34; Miller Brewing, 173 Wis. 2d at 705 n.1; B.J.N., 162 
Wis. 2d at 656; Mueller, 105 Wis. 2d at 177.  "[A] defect of 
competency . . . is not jurisdictional."  Id. at 189. 
¶10 Whether 
a 
particular 
failure 
to 
comply 
with 
a 
statutory mandate implicates the circuit court's competency 
depends upon an evaluation of the effect of noncompliance on the 
court's power to proceed in the particular case before the 
court.  Miller Brewing, 173 Wis. 2d at 705 n.1.  Many errors in 
statutory procedure have no effect on the circuit court's 
competency.  Only when the failure to abide by a statutory 
mandate is "central to the statutory scheme" of which it is a 
part 
will 
the 
circuit 
court's 
competency 
to 
proceed 
be 
implicated.3  In re Bollig, 222 Wis. 2d 558, 567-68, 587 
N.W.2d 908 (Ct. App. 1998); see also Arreola v. State, 199 Wis. 
2d 426, 441, 544 N.W.2d 611 (Ct. App. 1996). 
¶11  In Bollig the court of appeals analogized the 
competency inquiry to the analysis which is used to determine 
                                                 
 
3   Prior to the distinction in our case law between subject 
matter jurisdiction and competency, the issue of whether 
noncompliance with a particular statutory requirement implicated 
the court's subject matter jurisdiction was sometimes determined 
by an evaluation of whether the statutory requirement was 
"mandatory" or "directory."  State v. Rosen, 72 Wis. 2d 200, 
204-08, 240 N.W.2d 168 (1976). 
  
Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553  
 
8 
 
whether a defect affecting personal jurisdiction is fundamental 
or technical, essentially treating competency as a question of 
legislative purpose.  Bollig, 222 Wis. 2d at 568.  "[T]he 
legislative purpose of the statutory scheme must be determined 
and a decision made about whether it could be fulfilled, without 
strictly following the statutory directive."  Id. at 568-69. 
¶12 Loss of competency can be triggered by a variety of 
defects in statutory procedure.  For example, in B.J.N, we 
concluded that the failure to timely hold a hearing on a request 
for an extension of a CHIPS order under Wis. Stat. § 48.365(2) 
resulted in a loss of the circuit court's competency to proceed, 
because 
without 
the 
statutorily-required 
hearing 
on 
the 
extension, the original order expired.  B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 
654.  We noted that Chapter 48 imposes other mandatory time 
limitations as well, the violation of which precipitates a loss 
of competency.4  See id. n.15 (collecting cases). 
¶13  Many "loss of competency" cases involve noncompliance 
with statutory time limitations such as those at issue in 
B.J.N., but circuit court competency has also been deemed lost 
                                                 
 
4   Recent legislation may have affected the continued 
viability 
of 
this 
body 
of 
case 
law: 
Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2m)(b)(specifying that failure to comply 
with time limitations for continuances, extensions of time or 
periods of delay in Ch. 48 "does not deprive the court of 
personal or subject matter jurisdiction or of competency to 
exercise that jurisdiction"); Wis. Stat. § 938.315(3)(to the 
same effect in Chapter 938). See 1995 Wis. Act 77, § 629 
(creating Wis. Stat. § 938.315(3), effective December 5, 1995); 
2001 
Wis. 
Act 
109, 
§§ 101k, 
9303(ln) 
(creating 
Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2m)(b) and providing that the statute first 
applies to continuances and extensions granted, and periods of 
delay that begin, on July 30, 2002).   
Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553  
 
9 
 
in other circumstances as well: e.g., where the Department of 
Health and Family Services failed to prepare a statutorily-
mandated release plan in a Chapter 980 action, Arreola, 199 
Wis. 2d at 430-31, and where conditions precedent to the 
modification of a foreign child support order under the Uniform 
Interstate Family Support Act had not been met, Cepukenas v. 
Cepukenas, 221 Wis. 2d 166, 170, 584 N.W.2d 227 (Ct. App. 1998).  
On the other hand, in Kywanda F., 200 Wis. 2d at 36, we 
concluded that the failure to advise a juvenile in a delinquency 
proceeding of her right to judicial substitution did not result 
in a loss of circuit court competency.    
¶14 The concept of competency has been characterized as a 
"narrower concept" involving a "lesser power" than subject 
matter jurisdiction.  See Village of Shorewood, 174 Wis. 2d at 
200; B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 656; Bollig, 222 Wis. 2d at 555-56.  
As such, a judgment rendered by a court lacking competency is 
"not void for the lack of subject matter jurisdiction but 
invalid for the lack of competency to proceed to judgment."  
Mueller, 105 Wis. 2d at 178 (citing Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. 
v. Krist, 104 Wis. 2d 381, 303 N.W.2d 854 (1981), and 
Restatement of Judgments, ¶¶7, 10 at 43, 58-59 (1942)).  "If a 
court has the power, i.e., subject matter jurisdiction, to 
entertain a particular type of action, its judgment is not void 
even though entertaining it was erroneous and contrary to the 
statute."  Id. at 177-78. 
¶15  Mikrut did not raise his challenge to the circuit 
court's competency until long after the judgment against him had 
Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553  
 
10 
 
been upheld on appeal.  The circuit court and the court of 
appeals therefore held that the argument was waived.  The waiver 
rule is well-established in our common law.  "It is a 
fundamental principle of appellate review that issues must be 
preserved at the circuit court.  Issues that are not preserved 
at the circuit court, even alleged constitutional errors, 
generally will not be considered on appeal."  State v. Huebner, 
2000 WI 59, ¶10, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727.  The waiver 
rule is "not merely a technicality or a rule of convenience; it 
is an essential principle of the orderly administration of 
justice."  Id., ¶11.   
¶16  We have stated that "[t]he reasons for the waiver rule 
go to the heart of the common law tradition and the adversary 
system."  State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 
(1997).  The purposes underlying the waiver rule are as follows: 
The 
waiver 
rule 
serves 
several 
important 
objectives.  Raising issues at the trial court level 
allows the trial court to correct or avoid the alleged 
error in the first place, eliminating the need for 
appeal. . . . It also gives both parties and the trial 
judge notice of the issue and a fair opportunity to 
address the objection. . . . Furthermore, the waiver 
rule encourages attorneys to diligently prepare for 
and conduct trials. . . . Finally, the rule prevents 
attorneys from "sandbagging" errors, or failing to 
object to an error for strategic reasons and later 
claiming that the error is grounds for reversal. . . . 
For all these reasons, the waiver rule is essential to 
the efficient and fair conduct of our adversary system 
of justice. 
Huebner, 235 Wis. 2d 486, ¶12 (citations omitted). 
 
¶17  The waiver rule is a rule of judicial administration, 
and as such, a reviewing court has the inherent authority to 
Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553  
 
11 
 
disregard a waiver and address the merits of an unpreserved 
issue in exceptional cases.  State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 
766, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999).  Also, Wis. Stat. §§ 751.06 and 
752.35 
provide 
a 
procedural 
mechanism 
for 
discretionary 
appellate review and reversal on grounds not preserved in the 
circuit court.  In addition, Wis. Stat. § 806.07 may supply a 
procedure for obtaining collateral relief from judgment on the 
basis of an argument that has been waived, provided that one of 
the statute's grounds can be established and the motion is 
brought 
within 
the 
statute's 
time 
limitations.  
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1), (2). 
¶18 Wisconsin case law is inconsistent on the question of 
whether a challenge to the circuit court's competency is subject 
to the common-law rule of waiver.  In Mueller, this court held 
that "[i]f a court truly lacks only competency, its judgment is 
invalid only if the invalidity of the judgment is raised on 
direct appeal."  Mueller, 105 Wis. 2d at 178.  This appears to 
state a modified waiver rule, in which a competency challenge 
may be raised for the first time on direct appeal but will be 
deemed waived if not raised on direct appeal, that is, if raised 
for the first time in a collateral challenge. 
¶19 
 
However, 
in 
In 
the 
Interest 
of 
G.L.K., 
153 
Wis. 2d 245, 450 N.W.2d 498 (Ct. App. 1989), the court of 
appeals applied the standard accepted common-law waiver rule and 
held that a challenge to the circuit court's competency is 
waived if not raised in the circuit court.  Id. at 248.  The 
Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553  
 
12 
 
court thus declined to consider a competency argument raised for 
the first time on appeal.  Id.  
 
¶20 In 
Wall 
v. 
Wisconsin 
DOR, 
157 
Wis. 2d 1, 
458 
N.W.2d 814 (Ct. App. 1990), the court of appeals applied an 
entirely different sort of waiver rule, requiring competency to 
be raised in an initial pleading.  In Wall, the defendant 
Department of Revenue argued that the circuit court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff improperly 
served its petition for review from an adverse agency decision 
by regular mail rather than by certified mail or in person as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(a)1.  Id. at 6.  The 
department had filed a "Notice of Appearance" in the circuit 
court but then moved to dismiss four months later, arguing lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the service defect. 
¶21  Noting that the department's objection was more 
appropriately characterized as a challenge to the circuit 
court's competency rather than subject matter jurisdiction, the 
court of appeals in Wall held that the objection had been waived 
because the department had "submitted to the circuit court's 
jurisdiction by filing a 'Notice of Appearance'" and "did not 
allege in it any jurisdictional objections, but first raised the 
issue four months later in a motion to dismiss."  Id. at 7.  
Citing G.L.K., the court held that "[f]ailure to timely object 
to the court's competency to proceed constitutes a waiver of 
that objection."  Id. 
¶22  In fact, however, G.L.K. had applied the traditional 
common-law waiver rule, in which objections are considered 
Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553  
 
13 
 
waived for appeal purposes if not first preserved in the circuit 
court.  In contrast, the court of appeals in Wall appears to 
have applied a rule of pleading waiver, in which objections are 
waived and cannot be raised in the litigation in the circuit 
court if not included in the party's initial pleading.  The 
court reached this conclusion without analysis; the holding 
therefore represents an unexplained and unsupported expansion of 
G.L.K. and the common-law waiver rule. 
¶23  It may be that the court in Wall was extrapolating 
from 
the 
pleading 
and 
motion 
requirements 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 802.06, although it did not specifically say so.  
In any event, while the statute establishes pleading and motion 
requirements and waiver rules for defenses based upon personal 
and subject matter jurisdiction (and certain other defenses 
based upon defects in statutory procedure), it is silent as to 
whether defenses based upon lack of competency are waived if not 
pleaded. 
 
Regardless, 
a 
notice of 
appearance 
is 
not a 
substantive defensive pleading; it is therefore unusual that the 
court of appeals would have concluded that a competency 
challenge is waived if not included in a notice of appearance.5  
                                                 
 
5  In this regard, we emphasize again that the waiver 
question in this case is waiver by failure to raise and preserve 
an issue in the circuit court, precluding review as of right of 
that issue on direct appeal or collaterally.  This is distinct 
from the more restrictive rules of pleading waiver.  It is true 
that the broad language in Wall v. Wisconsin DOR, 157 Wis. 2d 1, 
458 N.W.2d 814 (Ct. App. 1980) appears to encompass more than a 
rule of pleading waiver; the court of appeals in this case 
relied upon this broad language for its waiver holding.  
Nevertheless, Wall is in fact a pleading waiver case, and one 
that is hard to justify, for the reasons we have stated. 
Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553  
 
14 
 
¶24 At the other end of the spectrum is In re Nadia S., 
219 Wis. 2d 296, 581 N.W.2d 182 (1998), a CHIPs case that this 
court concluded was moot because the circuit court lost 
competency when the order placing the child outside the home 
expired during the pendency of the appeal.  Addressing the 
unusual procedural posture of the case, we made the following 
broad statement on the issue of competency challenges and 
waiver: "like issues of subject matter jurisdiction, a court's 
loss of competence to adjudicate a matter cannot be waived by 
the parties."  Id. at 303.  Nadia S. cited B.J.N. for this 
proposition. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
In addition to the anomalous decision in Wall, the case law 
is also inconsistent on whether a competency challenge premised 
upon noncompliance with the governmental notice of claim 
statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 893.80(1) and 893.82(3), must be pleaded 
or deemed waived.  See Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 2000 WI 60, 
¶24, 235 Wis. 2d 610, 612 N.W.2d 59 ("[a] governmental entity 
must affirmatively plead that a plaintiff did not comply with 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a)"); Ibrahim v. Samore, 118 Wis. 2d 720, 
726, 
348 
N.W.2d 
554 
(1984)(failure 
to 
comply 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 893.82 "is not waived by a failure to plead it as 
an affirmative defense").  This court's decision in Gillen v. 
City of Neenah, 219 Wis. 2d 806, 824, 580 N.W.2d 628 (1998), 
discussing Figgs v. City of Milwaukee, 121 Wis. 2d 44, 357 
N.W.2d 548 (1984), addressed this issue tangentially but did not 
attempt to tackle it head on.  Neither do we attempt to do so 
here. 
 
Finally, confusion is generated in this area by the 
conclusory use of the terminology of waiver to resolve estoppel 
claims.  See Oney v. Schrauth, 197 Wis. 2d 891, 904, 541 N.W.2d 
229 (Ct. App. 1995)(statutory notice of claim "requirements 
cannot be waived and no basis exists for the equitable doctrine 
of estoppel"); J.F. Ahern Co. v. Wis. State Bldg. Comm'n, 114 
Wis. 2d 69, 83, 336 N.W.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1983)(same).  Waiver as 
used in this sense is substantive, not procedural.     
  
Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553  
 
15 
 
¶25  In fact, however, B.J.N. does not equate subject 
matter jurisdiction with competency for purposes of the waiver 
rule, nor does it support a blanket rule of nonwaiver for all 
challenges to the circuit court's competency.  Rather, in 
B.J.N., we acknowledged that "[n]o clear waiver rule has been 
developed in cases involving a court's loss of competence" but 
also noted that "we have consistently ruled that a court's loss 
of power due to the failure to act within statutory time periods 
cannot be stipulated to nor waived."  B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 
656-57 (emphasis added).  The language in Nadia S. attributing 
to B.J.N. a rule of nonwaiver for all competency challenges was 
therefore overbroad.  B.J.N. concluded only that a certain type 
of competency challenge is nonwaivable: loss of competency based 
upon noncompliance with mandatory statutory time periods.6   
                                                 
 
6   This conclusion in Green County Dep't of Human Servs. v. 
H.N., 162 Wis. 2d 635, 656-57, 469 N.W.2d 845 (1991)("B.J.N."), 
was a summary importation of the holdings of several older 
subject matter jurisdiction cases which had concluded that 
certain statutory time limitations were "jurisdictional" and 
therefore nonwaivable.  Id. at 657 n.19.  In these older cases, 
the 
question 
of 
waiver 
was 
subsumed 
in 
the 
substantive 
determination 
of 
whether 
noncompliance 
with 
a 
particular 
statutory requirement affected the court's jurisdiction, because 
subject matter jurisdiction was considered always nonwaivable.  
Id.  B.J.N. and numerous subsequent cases have now established 
that competency challenges do not affect the court's subject 
matter jurisdiction.  See, ¶¶8-14, supra.  Accordingly, because 
lack of competency does not equate to lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction——that 
is, 
loss 
of 
competency 
is 
not 
"jurisdictional"——the question of waiver becomes a separate 
inquiry from the substantive determination of whether the 
particular defect in statutory procedure affects the court's 
competency.  B.J.N., however, did not analyze the question 
separately, but merely invoked the holdings of the older subject 
matter jurisdiction cases to conclude that competency challenges 
Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553  
 
16 
 
 
¶26  To summarize, the cases regarding the waiver rule as 
applied to competency challenges have variously held as follows: 
1) competency challenges cannot be waived at all (Nadia S.); 2) 
competency challenges cannot be waived if the alleged lack of 
competency relates to noncompliance with mandatory statutory 
time limitations, but no clear rule exists in other situations 
(B.J.N.); 3) competency challenges may be raised for the first 
time on direct appeal but are waived if not raised on direct 
appeal, that is, if raised for the first time on collateral 
challenge (Mueller); 4) competency challenges are waived for 
purposes of appeal if not first raised in the circuit court 
(G.L.K.); and 5) competency challenges are waived if not raised 
in the initial pleading (Wall).  This conflicting body of case 
law cannot be reconciled. 
¶27  We conclude that the following principles are sound 
and should be maintained: the common-law waiver rule applies to 
challenges to the circuit court's competency, such that a 
challenge to the court's competency will be deemed waived if not 
raised in the circuit court, subject to the inherent authority 
of the reviewing court to disregard the waiver and address the 
merits of the unpreserved argument or to engage in discretionary 
                                                                                                                                                             
premised 
upon 
noncompliance 
with 
mandatory 
statutory 
time 
periods were nonwaivable.  B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 657 n.19.  
This, too, explains some of the inconsistency in the case law.  
The concurrence also appears to conflate the issue of waiver 
with the underlying substantive determination of whether the 
statute in question implicates the court's competency.  See, 
concurrence, ¶¶43-44. 
  
Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553  
 
17 
 
review under Wis. Stat. §§ 751.06 or 752.35.  Because competency 
does not equate with subject matter jurisdiction, we see no 
reason not to apply the rule of waiver to these challenges as a 
general matter.  A judgment rendered where competency is lacking 
is 
not 
void 
for 
lack 
of 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction.  
Accordingly, a categorical rule that competency objections can 
never be waived is not justified.  We withdraw the overbroad 
language in Nadia S. that attributed such a categorical rule of 
nonwaiver to the decision in B.J.N. 
¶28  On the other hand, the approach in Wall was also 
unjustified.  The failure to raise an objection to competency in 
a notice of appearance does not waive the right to bring such an 
objection in the circuit court action.  We overrule Wall to the 
extent that it purported to establish such a restrictive 
pleading waiver rule. 
¶29  Mueller and G.L.K. conflict to the extent that the 
former allows competency to be raised for the first time on 
direct appeal (but not collaterally) and the latter does not 
allow unpreserved competency challenges to be raised for the 
first time on appeal as of right.  We conclude that G.L.K. 
states the better rule: the waiver rule applies to challenges to 
the circuit court's competency.  The purposes underlying the 
waiver rule are well-served by applying it in this context.7  
                                                 
7 The important purposes underlying the waiver rule are 
summarized at ¶¶15-16, supra, and do not reduce to mere 
avoidance of reaching the merits or an "approach" that "makes 
this court's work easier: just say 'waiver,'" as suggested by 
the concurrence.  See, concurrence, ¶46. 
Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553  
 
18 
 
Requiring challenges to the circuit court's competency to be 
raised in the circuit court encourages diligent investigation 
and preparation of cases.  It also gives the circuit court and 
both parties a fair opportunity to address any objections to the 
court's competency to proceed and may diminish appeals on 
competency issues.  Accordingly, we clarify that Mueller should 
not be read as suggesting that a challenge to the court's 
competency need not be raised in the circuit court in order to 
preserve it for appeal. 
¶30  Accordingly, we hold that challenges to the circuit 
court's competency are waived if not raised in the circuit 
court, subject to the reviewing court's inherent authority to 
overlook 
a 
waiver 
in 
appropriate 
cases 
or 
engage 
in 
discretionary review of a waived competency challenge pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. §§ 751.06 or 752.35.  Because the competency 
challenge in this case is not premised upon noncompliance with 
statutory time limitations, we do not decide whether the 
particularized rule of nonwaiver stated in B.J.N. (statutory 
time periods cannot be waived) should be maintained. 
¶31  Applying these principles here, Mikrut waived his 
challenge to the circuit court's competency.  He failed to raise 
the alleged defects in the issuance of the citations in the 
circuit court before or at trial or after judgment, and, in 
fact, asserted the circuit court's lack of competency for the 
first time more than six months after the judgment was upheld on 
appeal.  Accordingly, we conclude that Mikrut cannot now bring 
his challenge to the circuit court's competency, having waived 
Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553  
 
19 
 
it by not asserting it in the original circuit court action, 
which was long ago upheld on appeal. 
¶32 As an additional line of argument, Mikrut contends 
that under Tridle v. Horn, 2002 WI App 215, 257 Wis. 2d 529, 652 
N.W.2d 418, competency challenges are not subject to waiver 
because a challenge to a void judgment may be asserted under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(d) at any time.  Tridle was an auto 
accident case in which the plaintiff sued the other driver as 
well as her own uninsured motorist (UM) carrier.  Id., ¶2.  The 
UM carrier answered but did not file a cross-claim for 
contribution or indemnification against the driver.  The UM 
carrier later obtained a judgment against the driver/tortfeasor 
as a sanction for noncompliance with discovery. Id., ¶3.  Three 
years later the driver moved for relief from judgment under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(d), alleging that the judgment was void 
because the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and 
competency based upon the failure of the UM insurer to file a 
cross-claim.  Id., ¶¶3, 12.   
¶33  The court of appeals in Tridle distinguished between 
subject matter jurisdiction and competency, but nonetheless 
agreed with the driver that the judgment was void on lack of 
competency grounds.  Id., ¶11.  The court further concluded that 
the 
driver's 
"motion 
to 
vacate 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(d) does not fail as untimely, despite the 
three-year span between the judgment and her motion, because the 
'reasonable time' requirement of § 806.07 does not apply to void 
judgments or orders."  Id., ¶12. 
Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553  
 
20 
 
¶34  The court in Tridle was partly right.  The "reasonable 
time" limitation in Wis. Stat. § 806.07(2) does not apply to 
motions 
to 
vacate 
void 
judgments 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(d).  Neylan v. Vorwald, 124 Wis. 2d 85, 
100, 368 N.W.2d 648 (1985).  However, as we have noted, a lack 
of competency does not negate subject matter jurisdiction or 
nullify the judgment.  Mueller, 105 Wis. 2d at 177-78.  Lack of 
competency is not "jurisdictional" and does not result in a void 
judgment.  Id.  Accordingly, it is not true that a motion for 
relief from judgment under Wis. Stat. § 806.07 on grounds of 
lack of circuit court competency may be made at any time.  We 
overrule Tridle to the extent that it held that a loss of 
competency voids the judgment and thereby authorized lack of 
competency 
to 
be 
raised 
by 
motion 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(d) at any time. 
¶35  If a judgment is rendered by a circuit court lacking 
competency and the competency challenge has been waived, 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h)——the 
"catch-all" 
provision allowing 
relief from judgment for "any other reasons justifying relief"——
may provide an avenue for relief in an extraordinary case.  
However, it is well-established that "finality is important and 
. . . subsection (h) should be used sparingly."  State ex rel. 
M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 122 Wis. 2d 536, 550, 363 N.W.2d 419 (1985). 
¶36  A motion pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) must be 
made "within a reasonable time."  Wis. Stat. § 806.07(2).  
Relief 
under 
subsection 
(h) 
requires 
"extraordinary 
circumstances;" the provision "should be used only when the 
Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553  
 
21 
 
circumstances are such that the sanctity of the final judgment 
is 
outweighed 
by 
'the 
incessant 
command 
of 
the 
court's 
conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts.'"  
Id. (quoting Bankers Mtg. Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970)(emphasis in 
original.))  As a general principle, Wis. Stat. § 806.07 
"attempts 
to 
achieve 
a 
balance 
between 
fairness 
in 
the 
resolution of disputes and the policy favoring the finality of 
judgments."  Edland v. Wis. Physicians Serv. Ins. Co., 210 
Wis. 2d 638, 644, 563 N.W.2d 519 (1997) (citing M.L.B., 122 
Wis. 2d at 542).  Thus, a court considering a motion for relief 
from judgment under subsection (h) "should not interpret 
extraordinary circumstances so broadly as to erode the concept 
of finality, nor should it interpret extraordinary circumstances 
so narrowly that subsection (h) does not provide a means for 
relief for truly deserving claimants."  Id. at 552. 
¶37 
Mikrut 
did 
not 
pursue 
relief 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) and therefore did not make any attempt 
to bring his case within the legal standards that govern the use 
of this statutory vehicle for obtaining collateral relief from 
judgment.  Accordingly, we do not address whether such relief 
would be timely or legally appropriate under the circumstances 
of this case. 
¶38  We conclude that challenges to the circuit court's 
competency are waived if not raised in the circuit court.  The 
waiver rule is a rule of judicial administration, and therefore 
a reviewing court has inherent authority to disregard a waiver 
Nos. 03-0534 through 03-0553  
 
22 
 
and address a competency argument in appropriate cases.  Also, 
Wis. Stat. §§ 751.06 and 752.35 may provide an avenue for 
discretionary review of an otherwise waived competency challenge 
in extraordinary cases.  In addition, Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) 
may provide a vehicle for collateral relief from judgment on the 
basis 
of 
an 
otherwise 
waived 
competency 
argument——again, 
however, only in extraordinary cases.  Mikrut's challenge to the 
circuit court's competency was waived. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.    
¶39 JON P. WILCOX, J.  did not participate.   
 
 
No.  03-0534 through 03-0553.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶40 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the majority opinion's bottom line.  I write separately 
because the opinion goes too far.   
¶41 As I understand the opinion, it holds that except for 
statutory time limits, every statutory mandate for invoking a 
circuit court's jurisdiction is waived if not first raised in 
the circuit court proceeding. 
¶42 The 
reason 
for 
this 
new 
rule, 
which 
requires 
overturning or casting great doubt on numerous prior opinions 
(many not cited), is as follows:  The black letter rule is that 
subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived; because Wisconsin 
circuit courts have total subject matter jurisdiction, subject 
matter jurisdiction in Wisconsin is never an issue in any case; 
competence is different from subject matter jurisdiction;8 the 
issue of competence is waived at the appellate level unless an 
objection is made in the circuit court. 
¶43 The majority opinion paints with too broad a brush.  
It substitutes a bright-line rule for the text of many statutes.  
Bright lines are good.  I wonder, however, whether we should 
adopt a bright line for a multitude of differently worded 
statutes.  I suggest it is too simplistic for the majority 
opinion to conclude that all the prior cases are inconsistent 
without even examining these cases carefully.  
                                                 
8 The majority opinion defines competence as adhering to 
statutory prerequisites except statutory time limits, which are 
not addressed.   
No.  03-0534 through 03-0553.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶44 This 
case 
presents 
a 
narrow 
issue 
relating 
to 
particular statutes.  It seems to me relatively easy to apply 
the rule set forth in past cases:  The court examines the 
statute and on that basis determines whether the statutory 
requirement can be waived.  
¶45 We should use caution in advancing the theme that if a 
litigant does not raise an issue in circuit court it is waived.9  
Let us hold lawyers and litigants to high standards and 
statutory requirements, but let us not revert to ancient common 
law where every error enabled a court to dismiss a case without 
looking at the merits of the case.  A saving grace of the 
opinion, although not a great comfort to litigants, is that it 
preserves the right of an appellate court to examine the merits 
of a competence issue despite any waiver.  
¶46 The approach taken by the majority opinion makes this 
court's work easier:  Just say "waiver." 
¶47 For the reasons set forth above, I write separately. 
¶48 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion.   
 
 
                                                 
9 For other recent decisions relying on the waiver doctrine, 
see, e.g., State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___ (Sykes, J., concurring); State v. Meeks, 2003 WI 104, 
263 Wis. 2d 794, 666 N.W.2d 859 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
No.  03-0534 through 03-0553.ssa 
 
 
 
1