Title: Collins v. Superior Court
Citation: 158 Ariz. 145, 761 P.2d 1049
Docket Number: CV-88-0167-PR
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: September 15, 1988

158 Ariz. 145 (1988) 761 P.2d 1049 Richard Kenneth COLLINS, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF the State of Arizona, In and For the COUNTY OF MARICOPA, Honorable Michael J. O'Melia, a judge thereof, Respondent Judge. STATE of Arizona ex rel. Thomas E. COLLINS, Maricopa County Attorney, Real Party in Interest. No. CV-88-0167-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. September 15, 1988. Debus, Bradford and Kazan, Ltd. by Lawrence I. Kazan, Phoenix, for petitioner. Thomas E. Collins, Maricopa County Atty. by H. Allen Gerhardt, Deputy Atty., Phoenix, for respondent judge. Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for real party in interest. CAMERON, Justice. I. JURISDICTION Petitioner, Richard Kenneth Collins, seeks review of an order of the court of appeals denying Petitioner's petition for special action. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(3), Ariz.R.Civ. App.P. 23, 17B A.R.S., and Ariz.R.Sp. Act. 8(b), 17B A.R.S. II. ISSUES PRESENTED We consider only one question: III. FACTS Petitioner was involved in an automobile accident on 13 May 1987 in which two people were killed. The police officer investigating the accident believed petitioner was driving under the influence of alcohol and that this impairment was the sole cause of the accident. Petitioner was taken to the Phoenix Police Department and Arizona's Implied Consent *146 Law was explained to him. Petitioner was requested to submit to a breath test. Petitioner refused. After this refusal a search warrant was issued by Justice of the Peace Donald Stump, of the Tolleson Justice Court, and at 12:48 a.m. a quantity of blood was removed from Petitioner without Petitioner's consent. At trial, Petitioner requested that the blood test results be suppressed during the trial. The trial court denied his motion, and the Petitioner sought relief in the court of appeals which was denied. We granted the petition for review because we believe the trial judge and the court of appeals erred. IV. LAW The applicable statutes read: A.R.S. § 28-691(A), (B) and (D) (1987). Subsection M, referred to above, reads as follows: A.R.S. § 28-692(M) (1987). In State v. Cocio, we held that § 28-692(M) is a narrow exception. We stated that: State v. Cocio, 147 Ariz. 277, 286, 709 P.2d 1336, 1345 (1985). In the instant case, blood was not drawn for medical purposes by medical personnel, but solely as a result of the search warrant. In the recent case of State v. Brita we stated: State v. Brita, 158 Ariz. 121, 123, 761 P.2d 1025 (1988); see State v. Brita, 154 Ariz. 517, 744 P.2d 429 (App. 1987). We are not alone in holding that, in applying similar implied consent laws, blood taken solely as a result of a search warrant after the defendant has refused to submit to the taking of blood sample is inadmissible. See State v. Hitchens, 294 N.W.2d 686 (Iowa 1980); People v. Cords, 75 Mich. App. 415, 254 N.W.2d 911 (1977); State v. *147 Steele, 93 N.M. 470, 601 P.2d 440 (App. 1979); Pena v. State, 684 P.2d 864 (Alaska 1984); but see Pena, 684 P.2d at 868 (Comton, J., dissenting). We believe that Cocio and Brita are dispositive of this matter. V. DISPOSITION The matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to suppress the evidence of the involuntary blood sample. Relief granted. GORDON, C.J., FELDMAN, V.C.J., and HOLOHAN and MOELLER, JJ., concur.