Title: DAVID A JAMES V ROY ALBERTS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 114454
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 15, 2001

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 15, 2001  
DAVID A. JAMES,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 114454  
ROY ALBERTS,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
TAYLOR, J.  
At 
issue 
is 
whether the volunteer doctrine bars plaintiff  
David James’s premises liability action for injuries incurred  
while he assisted defendant Roy Alberts in digging a trench.  
The trial court granted summary disposition to Alberts on the  
basis of the volunteer doctrine, which generally states that  
the only duty owed to a volunteer is to refrain from injuring  
him by a wilful or wanton act.  The Court of Appeals reversed  
because of binding Court of Appeals authority indicating that  
the volunteer doctrine is limited to respondeat superior  
liability.  We affirm the Court of Appeals decision, albeit  
for different reasons and in so doing abolish the volunteer  
doctrine.  
Facts and Proceedings  
On November 27, 1992, James assisted Alberts in digging  
a trench from Alberts’s house to his pole barn to put in  
conduit for electricity. According to James, the trench was  
about 40 feet long, 10 inches wide and 18 inches deep.  James  
fell as he stepped out of the trench and broke his left arm.  
He testified that just before he fell, he felt like he could  
not lift his left foot.  Alberts told James that he tripped  
over a partially buried cable. However, James did not see a  
cable.  
The parties disagreed regarding whether Alberts invited  
James to assist him in digging the trench.  Alberts testified  
that he did not think he called James shortly before he  
planned to dig the trench; rather, James just happened to stop  
by and helped.  In contrast, James testified that Alberts  
called him the night before the incident, seeking help in  
digging the trench.  
James sued Alberts for his injuries.  The trial court  
granted summary disposition for Alberts on the basis of the  
volunteer doctrine. It concluded that James was a volunteer  
and that, under the volunteer doctrine, Alberts was not  
2  
 
subject to liability for his injuries unless he caused them by  
a wilful and wanton act, which was not demonstrated here.  The  
Court of Appeals reversed.  234 Mich App 417; 594 NW2d 848  
(1999).  It reversed because MCR 7.215(H)(1) required it to  
follow Ryder Truck Rental v Urbane, 228 Mich App 519; 579 NW2d  
425 (1998), which held that the volunteer doctrine was limited  
to respondeat superior liability.  (The James panel stated  
that it believed that Ryder was wrongly decided.) The judges  
of the Court of Appeals were polled and a majority declined to  
convene a special panel.  234 Mich App 801; 600 NW2d 704  
(1999).  This Court granted leave to appeal.  461 Mich 1009  
(2000).  
The Volunteer Doctrine  
The applicability of a legal doctrine is a question of  
law. This Court reviews questions of law de novo. See Page  
v Klein Tools, Inc, 461 Mich 703, 709; 610 NW2d 900 (2000).  
We begin by noting two basic legal principles that  
generally guide negligence actions.  First, if a person is  
injured by the direct negligence of another, whom he is  
attempting to assist, the latter’s duty generally turns on  
foreseeability. See Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 439; 254  
NW2d 759 (1977) (“The questions of duty and proximate cause  
. . . both depend in part on foreseeability—whether it is  
foreseeable that the actor’s conduct may create a risk of harm  
3  
 
 
to the victim, and whether the result of that conduct and  
intervening causes were foreseeable.”)  Second, if a person  
assisting another’s servant is injured by the servant and  
tries to sue the servant’s master, the master’s liability  
turns on agency principles. Under fundamental agency law, a  
principal is bound by an agent’s actions within the agent’s  
actual or apparent authority.  Shinabarger v Phillips, 370  
Mich 135, 141; 121 NW2d 693 (1963); Central Wholesale Co v  
Sefa, 351 Mich 17, 25; 87 NW2d 94 (1957).  This agency law  
concept, which could operate uneventfully, for example, in  
contracts, 
was 
not 
without its problems historically in torts.  
One problem was how to harmonize agency law with what was  
known as the fellow-servant rule in torts.  
The fellow-servant rule generally barred an action  
against an employer for injuries resulting from a fellow  
servant’s negligence.  See Felgner v Anderson, 375 Mich 23,  
32; 133 NW2d 136 (1965).  Under this rule, if A had two  
employees, B and C, and B negligently injured C while  
operating within the scope of the authority given by A, C  
could not sue A.  However, if C was not a fellow servant to B,  
but rather a volunteer assisting B, the fellow-servant rule  
did not apply and C could, if agency law held sway, sue A.  
Thus, in these two situations, similar except for the employee  
or volunteer status of C, different results would obtain.  
4  
 
 
Said more theoretically, in the first hypothetical example,  
agency principles would be displaced by the fellow-servant  
rule, but in the second example, agency principles would  
control the outcome.  Not surprisingly, courts faced with a  
case in which a fellow servant was without remedy were loath  
to give an otherwise similarly situated volunteer a better  
outcome.  Thus a doctrine emerged, described as the volunteer  
doctrine, 
to 
place 
the volunteer under disabilities similar to  
those faced by the fellow servant.  This can be seen in  
Michigan1 in Johnson v E C Clark Motor Co, 173 Mich 277, 286;  
139 NW 30 (1912).  
In Johnson, the plaintiff was injured while working with  
the defendant’s employee to test a motor that the plaintiff  
was to purchase for his company.  The Court held that the  
injured person, were he a mere volunteer not working for his  
own (or his employer’s) interests, would be barred from  
recovery by the volunteer doctrine, even as he would have been  
barred by the fellow-servant rule if he had been a fellow  
servant. At 286, the Court stated the rule:  
“One who, having no interest in the work, 
voluntarily assists the servant of another, cannot 
recover from the master for an injury caused by the  
1For discussion of the volunteer doctrine in other  
states, see Kelly v Tyra, 103 Minn 176; 114 NW 750 (1908); 
Kentucky Lumber Co v Nicholson, 157 Ky 812; 164 SW 84 (1914);  
Callaham v Carlson, 85 Ga App 4; 67 SE2d 726 (1951); Poulson  
v Poulson, 1 Ill App 2d 201; 117 NE2d 310 (1954).  
5  
 
negligence or misconduct of such servant, since he 
can impose no greater duty on the master than a 
hired servant.”  
With the introduction of worker’s compensation law in  
1912, 
and 
the 
corresponding demise of the fellow-servant rule,  
the reasons for the volunteer doctrine had largely vanished.  
There 
remained 
no 
reason to legally disable volunteers because  
fellow servants were no longer without legal redress.  This  
Court noted this in Diefenbach v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea  
Co, 280 Mich 507, 512; 273 NW 783 (1937), where it held that  
this rationale for the doctrine  
is rendered somewhat doubtful due to the provisions 
of 
the 
various 
workmen’s 
compensation 
acts  
declaring that the negligence of a fellow servant 
shall be no defense to an action against the 
employer for injuries sustained in the course of 
the employment.  
The Diefenbach Court correctly concluded that the fellow­
servant rule, which created the need for the volunteer  
doctrine, was no longer part of our law.  This should have set  
the stage for the abolition of the volunteer doctrine.  
However, instead, the Diefenbach Court opted to retain the  
doctrine, stating at 512:  
The better view would appear to be that the 
volunteer cannot recover because no duty is owed to 
him other than not to injure him by wilful and 
wanton acts.  
Little analysis was provided for this new rationale, which  
arguably extended the doctrine to the context of direct  
6  
 
 
 
 
liability. We note that it was unnecessary to resort to the  
volunteer doctrine in order to reach the conclusion that the  
plaintiff was not entitled to recovery from the store as  
traditional agency principles would have led to the identical  
result.2  All of which is to say that we believe it would have  
been better for the Diefenbach Court to opine, as Justice  
Talbot Smith did sometime later with respect to another  
antiquated rule:  
The reasons for the old rule no longer 
obtaining, the rule falls with it.  [Montgomery v  
Stephan, 359 Mich 33, 49; 101 NW2d 277 (1960).][3]  
That we do today.  
We return this area of the law to traditional agency and  
tort 
principles, 
comfortable that they will better resolve the  
matters 
to 
which 
the 
doctrine 
might 
have 
applied.  
Accordingly, we agree, but for different reasons, with the  
2In Diefenbach, the plaintiff entered a grocery store, 
voluntarily involved himself in the pursuit of a rat, and was 
injured when one of the store clerks, intending to strike the 
rat, stabbed the plaintiff’s foot with a fish knife.  There is  
no indication that the store’s agents had actual or apparent 
authority to allow the plaintiff to participate in the rat 
chase.  This would have been fatal to the plaintiff’s claim 
against the store.  
3The Diefenbach Court’s retention of the volunteer  
doctrine created much confusion about the scope of the 
doctrine in the years that followed.  
Indeed, this can be 
seen in our Court of Appeals efforts to grapple with the rule 
in, e.g., Ryder, supra, in which the majority concluded that 
the volunteer doctrine was limited to respondeat superior 
liability, but the concurring opinion concluded that it also 
applies in the context of direct liability.  
7  
Court of Appeals that this doctrine does not bar plaintiff’s  
claim here, and affirm its reversal of the trial court’s grant  
of summary disposition for Alberts.  
Premises Liability Law  
In order to provide guidance on remand, we note that the  
present case is a premises liability action.  James’ claim is  
that he was injured by a condition of the land. The alleged  
injury occurred while he and Alberts were digging the trench;  
however, James contends that it arose out of a condition of  
the land, not out of the activity itself. In his complaint,  
James alleges that Alberts breached his duties as a landowner.  
This Court recently set forth the duty of a landowner  
with respect to conditions on his land in Stitt v Holland  
Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 596-597; 614 NW2d 88  
(2000):  
Historically, Michigan has recognized three 
common-law categories for persons who enter upon 
the land or premises of another: (1) trespasser, 
(2) licensee, or (3) invitee.  Michigan has not 
abandoned these common-law classifications.  Each  
of these categories corresponds to a different 
standard of care that is owed to those injured on 
the owner's premises. Thus, a landowner's duty to 
a visitor depends on that visitor's status.  
A "trespasser" is a person who enters upon 
another's land, without the landowner's consent. 
The landowner owes no duty to the trespasser except 
to refrain from injuring him by "wilful and wanton" 
misconduct.  
A "licensee" is a person who is privileged to 
enter the land of another by virtue of the  
8 
 
 
possessor's consent.  A landowner owes a licensee a  
duty only to warn the licensee of any hidden 
dangers the owner knows or has reason to know of, 
if the licensee does not know or have reason to  
know of the dangers involved.  The landowner owes  
no duty of inspection or affirmative care to make 
the premises safe for the licensee's visit.  
Typically, social guests are licensees who assume 
the ordinary risks associated with their visit.  
The final category is invitees. An "invitee"  
is "a person who enters upon the land of another 
upon an invitation which carries with it an implied 
representation, assurance, or understanding that 
reasonable care has been used to prepare the 
premises, and make [it] safe for [the invitee's] 
reception." The landowner has a duty of care, not 
only to warn the invitee of any known dangers, but 
the additional obligation to also make the premises 
safe, which requires the landowner to inspect the 
premises and, depending upon the circumstances, 
make any necessary repairs or warn of any 
discovered hazards.  Thus, an invitee is entitled 
to the highest level of protection under premises 
liability law. [Citations omitted.]  
Under Stitt, Alberts’ duty, as a landowner, turns on  
James’ status at the time of the injuries.  Once James’ status  
as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee is established, the next  
questions are whether Alberts breached the attendant duty and  
whether any such breach proximately caused the injuries at  
issue.  See, e.g., Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606,  
613; 537 NW2d 185 (1995), citing Riddle v McLouth Steel  
Products Corp, 440 Mich 85, 96; 485 NW2d 676 (1992).  We  
remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings  
to resolve these questions.  
9  
 
Conclusion  
We affirm the conclusion of the Court of Appeals and  
remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings  
consistent with this opinion.  
CORRIGAN, 
C.J., 
and 
CAVANAGH, 
WEAVER, 
KELLY, 
YOUNG, 
and 
MARKMAN,  
JJ., concurred with TAYLOR, J.  
10