Title: Town of Boone v State of North Carolina, et al
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 93A15
State: north-carolina
Issuer: north-carolina Supreme Court
Date: November 6, 2015

NO. COA13-1457 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 18 November 2014 
 
 
AARON BYRD and  
ERIC COOMBS, 
 
Petitioners, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Franklin County 
No. 13 CVS 450 
FRANKLIN COUNTY, NORTH  
CAROLINA 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by Petitioners from order entered 24 September 2013 
by Judge Robert H. Hobgood in Franklin County Superior Court.  
Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 August 2014. 
 
Currin & Currin, by Robin T. Currin, George B. Currin, and 
Catherine A. Hofmann, for petitioners-appellants. 
 
Davis Sturges and Tomlinson, by Aubrey S. Tomlinson, Jr., 
for respondent-appellee. 
 
 
DILLON, Judge. 
 
 
Aaron Byrd and Eric Coombs (“Petitioners”) appeal from a 
superior court’s order affirming a decision by Franklin County, 
made by its Board of Adjustment, determining that Petitioners 
could not operate a shooting range on their property without a 
special use permit, requiring approval by the County’s Board of 
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Commissioners.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm, in part, 
and reverse, in part, the superior court’s order. 
I. Background 
This appeal involves the application of the Franklin County 
Unified Development Ordinance (“UDO”) to a shooting range.  
Pursuant to the UDO, property in the County is divided into 
zoning districts.  The UDO contains a Table of Permitted Uses 
(the “Table”) and identifies in which zoning districts each use 
set out in the list may be allowed.  For each use listed, the 
Table provides (1) in which zoning districts said use is allowed 
as a matter of right, without any further approval by the 
County; 
(2) 
in 
which 
zoning 
districts 
said 
use 
is 
a 
“conditional” use, requiring approval by the County Board of 
Adjustment; (3) in which zoning districts said use is a 
“special” use, requiring approval by the County Board of 
Commissioners; and (4) in which zoning districts said use is not 
allowed at all.  The UDO further provides that any “[u]ses not 
specifically listed in the Table [] are prohibited.”  The Table 
does not specifically list shooting ranges or gun ranges. 
Petitioners desire to operate a shooting range on a tract 
of land they own in Franklin County (the “Property”).  In the 
Spring of 2012, Petitioners contacted County officials to 
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determine whether the UDO regulated their proposed shooting 
range. 
Initially, the County Planning Director verbally informed 
Petitioners that the UDO did not allow a shooting range to 
operate in the County since this use was not listed in the UDO 
Table.  The Planning Director recommended that Petitioners make 
a request to the County Board of Commissioners to amend the UDO 
to include shooting ranges as a use in the Table. 
Subsequently, however, sometime prior to November 2012, the 
Planning Director had another conversation with Petitioners in 
which he informed them that their proposed shooting range did 
fall within a use category listed in the Table, namely the 
category entitled “Grounds and Facilities for Open Air Games and 
Sporting Events” (hereinafter “Open Air Games”).  He informed 
Petitioners that an Open Air Game was considered a special use 
in the Property’s zoning district, and, therefore, Petitioners 
would need to apply to the Board of Commissioners for a special 
use permit to operate a shooting range on the Property. 
Based on this subsequent conversation, Petitioners applied 
for a special use permit; however, on 3 December 2012, 
-4- 
 
 
Petitioners’ 
application 
was 
denied 
by 
the 
Board 
of 
Commissioners.1 
Also, in December 2012, Petitioners received two written 
communications (the “December Letters”) from a County code 
enforcement officer.  The first communication, dated 9 December 
2012, informed Petitioners that “in order to conduct the 
proposed shooting club a Special Use Permit must be obtained” 
and ordered Petitioners to “cease and desist any and all 
activity associated with a shooting range” on the Property.  The 
second communication, dated 11 December 2012, stated that it was 
a “Final Notice of Violation” and ordered Petitioners to “halt 
all activities of the proposed shooting range immediately” or 
face “civil penalties,” “legal action seeking injunction[,] 
and/or possible criminal action.” 
On 2 January 2013, Petitioners appealed from the December 
Letters to the Board of Adjustment.  After conducting a hearing 
on the matter, the Board of Adjustment upheld the code 
enforcement officer’s decisions in the December Letters, and 
ordered Petitioners to cease and desist all activities regarding 
the shooting range.  The Board of Adjustment’s order was 
                     
1  
Petitioners filed a separate appeal to this Court (COA13-
1456) challenging the trial court’s order affirming the Board of 
Commissioners’ denial of their special use permit. 
-5- 
 
 
affirmed by the Franklin County Superior Court by order entered 
on 24 September 2013.  Petitioners filed written notice of 
appeal to this Court on 8 October 2013. 
II. Jurisdiction 
As a preliminary matter, the County contends that this 
Court need not consider the merits of Petitioners’ appeal, 
arguing that Petitioners failed to file their original appeal to 
the Board of Adjustment within the time allowed under the UDO.  
Section 24-1 of the UDO states that “[a]n appeal from any final 
order or decision of the administrator may be taken to the board 
of adjustment by any person aggrieved” but that the appeal “must 
be taken within 30 days after the date of the decision or order 
appealed from.”  (Emphasis added).  The County also contends 
that Petitioners waived any challenge to the decision that a 
special use permit was required by actually applying for the 
permit. 
In the present case, Petitioners appealed from the December 
Letters to the Board of Adjustment on 2 January 2013, within 30 
days of receiving them.  The County, however, argues that the 
appeal was not timely because the 30-day appeal clock commenced, 
not when Petitioners received the December Letters, but months 
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earlier when the County Planning Director verbally informed 
Petitioners that they would need the special use permit. 
Based on the facts of this case, we believe that the 
December Letters from the County represented “a final order or 
decision” from which Petitioners, as “aggrieved” parties, could 
appeal to the Board of Adjustment.  Therefore, Petitioner’s 
appeal was timely. 
We also do not believe Petitioners waived their right to 
challenge the December Letters before the Board of Adjustment 
simply because they had previously been told by a County 
official that they would need a special use permit and 
Petitioners, out of an abundance of caution, followed this 
avenue before establishing a shooting range on the Property.  
Where a landowner can establish a use on its property as a 
matter of right without governmental approval, the landowner 
does not lose this right simply because the landowner applies 
for a special use permit at the direction of a governmental 
official rather than immediately challenging the officer’s 
interpretation of the law.  See Graham Court Associates v. Town 
Council of Town on Chapel Hill, 53 N.C. App. 543, 281 S.E.2d 418 
(1981) (a landowner was informed that he needed a special use 
permit; applied for a special use permit and was denied; then 
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challenged whether the special use permit was required and this 
Court held that it was not).  Accordingly, the County’s 
contentions are overruled, and we turn to the merits of 
Petitioners’ arguments on appeal. 
III. Analysis 
In this appeal, Petitioners contend that the superior court 
erred 
in 
its 
interpretation 
of 
the 
UDO. 
 
Specifically, 
Petitioners argue that the UDO does not regulate shooting ranges 
and, therefore, they do not need any approval from the County to 
operate a shooting range on the Property.  Petitioners also 
argue that the superior court erred by concluding that shooting 
ranges were regulated by the UDO as an Open Air Game.  
Petitioners primarily rely on this Court’s holding in Land v. 
Village of Wesley Chapel, 206 N.C. App. 123, 697 S.E.2d 458 
(2010). 
Essentially, Petitioners challenge the interpretation of 
the UDO by the Board of Adjustment and superior court.  
“Reviewing courts apply de novo review to alleged errors of law, 
including challenges to a board of adjustment’s interpretation 
of a term in a municipal ordinance.”  Morris Communs. Corp. v. 
City of Bessemer, 365 N.C. 152, 155, 712 S.E.2d 868, 871 (2011) 
(citations omitted).  “Under de novo review a reviewing court 
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considers the case anew and may freely substitute its own 
interpretation of an ordinance for a board of adjustment’s 
conclusions of law.”  Id. at 156, 712 S.E.2d at 871 (citation 
omitted). 
For the reasons stated below, we agree with Petitioners 
that the superior court erred in its interpretation of the UDO 
by concluding that the shooting range fell within the Open Air 
Games category in the Table.  However, we disagree with 
Petitioners that the UDO does not regulate shooting ranges at 
all, but it does in fact prohibit shooting ranges anywhere in 
the County by providing that “[u]ses not specifically listed in 
the Table [] are prohibited.”  Accordingly, we hold that the 
superior court did not err in affirming the County’s order that 
Petitioners cease and desist from operating a shooting range on 
the Property. 
A.  Shooting Ranges are not Open Air Games 
 
Petitioners argue that the superior court erred in its 
interpretation of the UDO by concluding that shooting ranges 
fall within the Open Air Games category of the Table.  Based on 
the superior court’s interpretation, a shooting range would be 
allowed in the Property’s zoning district with a special use 
permit approved by the Board of Commissioners.  We agree with 
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Petitioners that, applying this Court’s holding in Land, supra, 
shooting ranges do not fall within the Open Air Games category. 
In Land, this Court held that a shooting range did not fall 
within the use category “privately owned outdoor recreational 
facility” contained in the Union County Land Use Ordinance.  206 
N.C. App. at 132, 697 S.E.2d at 464.  In the present case, the 
category at issue in the UDO Table describes the use as property 
used for “Grounds and Facilities for Open Air Games and Sporting 
Events[.]”  However, the Table further qualifies this category 
description as those uses which fall within the NAICS code 
713940.2  NAICS code 713904 is labeled “Fitness and Recreational 
Sports Centers” and is comprised of establishments “primarily 
engaged in operating fitness and recreational sports facilities 
featuring 
exercise 
and 
other 
active 
physical 
fitness 
conditioning or recreational sports activities such as swimming, 
skating, or racquet sports.”  Shooting ranges, though, do not 
fall within NAICS code 713904, but rather under NAICS code 
713990, 
labeled 
“All 
Other 
Amusement 
and 
Recreational 
Industries,” a code which the County did not use as a reference 
for the Open Air Games category. 
                     
2  
The North American Industry Classification System (“NAICS”) 
is a number system used by businesses and governmental agencies 
throughout North America. 
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We note that there are other uses listed in the Table which 
do reference NAICS code 713990, the code assigned to shooting 
ranges.  However, these categories are for “Golf Courses” and 
“Riding Stables” and not for any use within which a shooting 
range would fall.  The UDO provides that the NAICS codes are 
meant to provide a reference to determine which uses fall within 
a given category, but the codes are not meant to enlarge the 
scope of a category beyond the category’s descriptive title.  
Specifically, the UDO Table provides that the NAICS codes “are 
for reference purposes only, and do not mean that all uses under 
a specified code heading as provided in the [NAICS] Manual are 
permitted or conditional uses in the applicable zone.” 
Here, if the County had intended shooting ranges to be 
considered an Open Air Game, the County could have added the 
NAICS code assigned to shooting ranges as a reference for the 
category; however, the County did not do so.  Accordingly, we 
believe the proper interpretation is that shooting ranges are 
not Open Air Games in the Table. 
B. 
The UDO Prohibits Shooting Ranges in the County 
 
Petitioners argue that since the Table does not contain a 
category for shooting ranges, the UDO does not regulate shooting 
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ranges, and, therefore, the County cannot prevent them from 
operating a shooting range on their Property.  We disagree. 
Our Supreme Court has provided the following guidance when 
construing ordinances: 
Zoning ordinances should be given a fair and 
reasonable construction, in the light of 
their terminology, the objects sought to be 
attained, the natural import of the words 
used in common and accepted usage, the 
setting in which they are employed, and the 
general structure of the Ordinance as a 
whole. * * * Zoning regulations are in 
derogation of common law rights and they 
cannot be construed to include or exclude by 
implication 
that 
which 
is 
not 
clearly 
[within] their express terms. It has been 
held that well-founded doubts as to the 
meaning of obscure provisions of a Zoning 
Ordinance should be resolved in favor of the 
free use of property. 
 
Yancey v. Heafner, 268 N.C. 263, 266, 150 S.E.2d 440, 443 (1966) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted). 
We believe that the UDO is unambiguous in prohibiting 
shooting ranges in the County.  UDO section 6-1 states that 
“[u]ses not specifically listed in the Table of Permitted Uses 
are prohibited.”  Based on a “fair and reasonable construction” 
of this language, the County clearly recognized that it could 
not list every conceivable way that property could be used, and, 
therefore, it sought to provide that any use not listed would be 
prohibited unless and until any said use not listed was added to 
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the UDO through an amendment thereto approved by the Board of 
Commissioners.  Otherwise, landowners would be allowed to 
operate a shooting range or any other use not specifically 
listed in the Table anywhere in the County. 
Petitioners argue that our holding in Land compels us to 
conclude that since shooting ranges are not expressly excluded 
by the UDO, they must be allowed.  We believe that Petitioners’ 
interpretation of Land is overly broad and would lead to absurd 
results. 
The central issue in Land was whether a shooting range on 
the property of the aptly named Dr. Land was regulated by the 
Union County Ordinance.  The ordinance, like the UDO, contained 
a table of permitted uses.  The ordinance also stated that 
“those uses that are listed shall be interpreted liberally to 
include other uses that have similar impacts to the listed use,” 
and that “uses that are not listed [] and that do not have 
impacts that are similar to those of the listed uses are 
prohibited.”  Land, 206 N.C. App. at 129, 697 S.E.2d at 462.  
Union County opposed Dr. Land’s shooting range. 
This Court in Land rejected the interpretation of the 
ordinance advocated by Union County that “all uses not expressly 
permitted are implied prohibited.”  Id. at 130, 697 S.E.2d at 
-13- 
 
 
462.  The Court disfavored the ordinance’s approach towards 
unlisted uses, stating that “a citizen seeking to use his land 
for otherwise legal purposes would have to speculate as to which 
governmentally permitted use was ‘similar to’ a nebulous 
category in the [ordinance]” and further that the approach 
“leaves landowners exposed to decisions to the arbitrary and 
capricious whims of zoning authorities who may disagree with the 
landowner’s decision concerning ‘similarity of use.’”  Id. at 
132, 697 S.E.2d at 464.  In conclusion, the Court held that 
“absent a clear [ordinance] regulating shooting ranges, Dr. Land 
was not required to obtain a special use permit.”  Id. 
 
We construe this Court’s holding in Land narrowly to the 
language of the ordinance that was before it, namely one which 
states that permitted uses are those uses which are listed and 
“other uses that have similar impacts to” those listed while 
prohibiting all other uses.3  We believe that the language in the 
                     
3  
We need not address to what extent Land applies to the 
interpretation of ordinances which provide a means by which an 
unlisted use might be permitted if similar to a listed use.  We 
note, for example, that in contrast to the Land Court’s concern 
regarding unlisted uses and the “similar to” language as 
conferring too much discretion to county officials, this Court 
in Fairway Outdoor Adver. v. Town of Cary, applied the language 
of an “unlisted use” provision in an ordinance that provided for 
a level of discretion to the town’s planning director to permit 
certain unlisted uses, but that ordinance provided criteria for 
exercising that discretion. ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 739 S.E.2d 
-14- 
 
 
UDO is clear in prohibiting shooting ranges even though it does 
not specifically mention “shooting ranges” by name.  Unlike the 
ordinance in Land, the UDO does not contain a similarity 
provision.  It would be absurd to state that a use is allowed as 
a matter of right everywhere in a county, simply because the 
county failed to list the use expressly by name in its 
ordinance.4  Otherwise where an ordinance provides that property 
within a residential district can only be used for residential 
purposes and for no other purpose and under Petitioners’ 
interpretation, the residential property owner could use his 
property not only for residential purposes but also for any 
commercial use which the ordinance fails to specifically 
mention.  Petitioners’ argument is overruled. 
                                                                  
579, 583 (2013).  Further, we note that, more recently, this 
Court applied ordinance language providing that in determining 
whether an unlisted use is permitted, “the use addressed by this 
ordinance that is most closely related to the land use impacts 
of the proposed [unlisted] use shall apply[.]”  Fort v. County 
of Cumberland, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 761 S.E.2d 744, 747 
(2014) (concluding that a firearms training facility – a use not 
listed in the ordinance - was “similar” to the listed use 
category “Recreation/Amusement Outdoor”). 
4  
We have held that a firearms training facility was not 
allowed in a particular zoning district because this use did not 
fall 
within 
the 
use 
category 
“SCHOOLS, 
public, 
private, 
elementary or secondary.”  Fort v. County of Cumberland, ___ 
N.C. App. ___, 721 S.E.2d 350 (2012) (“Fort I”). 
 
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For the foregoing reasons, we reverse that portion of the 
trial 
court’s 
order 
determining 
that 
the 
UDO 
required 
Petitioners to obtain a special use permit to operate their 
shooting range.  However, in light of our holding that 
Petitioners’ shooting range was not a permitted use within the 
County, we affirm the ultimate result reached by the trial court 
albeit on different grounds. 
 
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART. 
Judge DAVIS concurs. 
Judge HUNTER, Robert C., concurs in part and dissents in 
part. 
NO. COA13-1457 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 18 November 2014 
 
AARON BYRD and ERIC COOMBS, 
 
Petitioners, 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Franklin County 
No. 13 CVS 450 
FRANKLIN COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA, 
 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
 
 
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the trial 
court 
erred 
by 
interpreting 
the 
Franklin 
County 
Unified 
Development Ordinance (“UDO”) as including shooting ranges under 
the category of “Open Air Games.”  However, because I believe 
that Land v. Village of Wesley Chapel, 206 N.C. App. 123, 697 
S.E.2d 458 (2010), is controlling, I respectfully dissent from 
the majority’s position that the UDO prohibits any land use that 
it does not specifically name.  
 In Land, the landowner challenged a cease-and-desist order 
issued by a zoning administrator prohibiting him from using a 
shooting range on his private property.  Land, 206 N.C. App. at 
126, 697 S.E.2d at 460.  The trial court found in favor of the 
landowner, and the Village of Wesley Chapel (“the Village”) 
appealed.  Id. at 124, 697 S.E.2d at 459.  The Village argued 
 
 
 
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that its land use ordinance regulated every conceivable use of 
property, whether or not the use was specifically mentioned.  
Id. at 129, 697 S.E.2d at 462.  The applicable provisions of the 
ordinance read as follows: 
(a) The presumption established by this 
ordinance is that all legitimate uses of 
land are permissible within at least one 
zoning district with the county. Therefore, 
because the list of permissible uses set 
forth in Section 146 (Table of Permissible 
Uses) cannot be all-inclusive, those uses 
that 
are 
listed 
shall 
be 
interpreted 
liberally to include other uses that have 
similar impacts to the listed uses. 
 
(b) All uses that are not listed in Section 
146 and that do not have impacts that are 
similar to those of the listed uses are 
prohibited. 
Nor 
shall 
Section 
146 
be 
interpreted to allow a use in one zoning 
district when the use in question is more 
closely related to another specified use 
that is permissible only in other zoning 
districts. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Village argued that because its 
ordinance did not list the operation of a shooting range as a 
permissible land use, such use was implicitly prohibited under 
subsection (b).  
 
Citing long-standing common law principles of the “free use 
of property,” this Court rejected the philosophy embedded in the 
Village’s ordinance, and in the UDO here, that “everything is 
proscribed except that which is allowed.”  Id. at 131, 697 
 
 
 
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S.E.2d at 463.  The problem with such an ordinance, as expressed 
by the Court, was that “it fails to clearly place the public on 
notice as how a particular use is to be classified absent an 
explicit mention in the [ordinance].”  Id.  Citing Yancey v. 
Heafner, 268 N.C. 263, 266, 150 S.E.2d 440, 443 (1966), which 
itself quoted Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice, Second Edition 
(1962 supplement), Vol. 1, Section 184), this Court reaffirmed 
the notion that “[z]oning regulations are in derogation of 
common law rights and they cannot be construed to include or 
exclude by implication that which is not clearly [sic.] their 
express terms.”  Id.  Based on these principles, the Court held 
that, despite the language in subsection (b) prohibiting all 
uses not explicitly mentioned in the ordinance, the landowner 
was not required to obtain a special use permit absent a clear 
mandate within the ordinance regarding shooting ranges.  Id. at 
132, 697 S.E.2d at 464. 
 
I find Land to be dispositive on the issue presented here.  
The majority attempts to distinguish Land on the fact that the 
Village’s ordinance contained a provision allowing “other uses 
that have similar impacts” to those explicitly mentioned, and 
the UDO does not contain a similar clause.  I do not find this 
distinction material to our analysis.  Rather than relying on 
the “similar impacts” provision to form the basis of its 
 
 
 
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holding, the Land Court cited long-standing precedent in 
rejecting the notion that a zoning ordinance may prohibit uses 
not explicitly allowed.  See, e.g., In re Application of 
Construction Co., 272 N.C. 715, 718, 158 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1968) 
(“A zoning ordinance, however, is in derogation of the right of 
private property and provisions therein granting exemptions or 
permissions are to be liberally construed in favor of freedom of 
use.”); In re Couch, 258 N.C. 345, 346, 128 S.E.2d 409, 411 
(1962) (“Zoning ordinances are in derogation of the right of 
private property, and where exemptions appear in favor of the 
property owner, they should be liberally construed in favor of 
such owner.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Coleman v. 
Town of Hillsborough, 173 N.C. App. 560, 564, 619 S.E.2d 555, 
559 (2005) (“Zoning regulation is in derogation of common law 
property rights and therefore must be strictly construed to 
limit such derogation to that intended by the regulation.”).   
The Land Court made clear that the law favors uninhibited 
free use of private property over governmental restrictions.  
Despite this principle, the majority asserts that it would be 
absurd for a use to be allowed as a matter of right because the 
county failed to expressly restrict the use in its zoning 
ordinance.  I believe that it would be similarly absurd, but 
more importantly, unlawful, to support the notion that an 
 
 
 
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otherwise legal use of private property is automatically 
disallowed simply because the government failed to identify it 
by name in a zoning ordinance. 
Based on the holding in Land, I am bound to conclude that 
the UDO’s provision prohibiting all uses not explicitly allowed 
in the ordinance is in derogation of the common law and is 
without legal effect.  Therefore, I would reverse the trial 
court’s order.