Title: Illinois v. Espinoza
Citation: 2015 IL 118218
Docket Number: 118218
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: December 3, 2015

Illinois Official Reports 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
People v. Espinoza, 2015 IL 118218 
 
 
 
Caption in Supreme 
Court: 
 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
SANDRO ESPINOZA, Appellee.—THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE 
OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ANGELA DISERA, Appellee. 
 
 
Docket No. 
 
118218 
 
 
Filed 
 
 
December 3, 2015 
 
 
Decision Under  
Review 
 
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District; heard in that 
court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, the Hon. 
Victoria Kennison and the Hon. Robert P. Livas, Judges, presiding. 
 
 
Judgment 
 
Appellate court judgment affirmed. 
Counsel on 
Appeal 
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and James W. 
Glasgow, State’s Attorney, of Joliet (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor 
General, and Michael M. Glick and Jean M. Godfrey, Assistant 
Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People. 
 
Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Peter A. Carusona, 
Deputy Defender, and Lucas J. Walker, Assistant Appellate Defender, 
of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellees. 
 
 
Justices 
JUSTICE  THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with 
opinion. 
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Kilbride, Karmeier, 
Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
Digitally signed by 
Reporter of Decisions 
Reason: I attest to the 
accuracy and 
integrity of this 
document 
Date: 2016.01.08 
09:52:49 -06'00'
 
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OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
At issue in this case is whether a charging instrument that identifies the victim simply as 
“a minor” is sufficient pursuant to section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 
(Code) (725 ILCS 5/111-3 (West 2012)). In two separate criminal cases, the trial courts 
dismissed criminal complaints based upon the insufficiency of the charging instruments, 
where those charging instruments identified the victims only as “a minor.” The cases were 
consolidated on appeal. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed. 2014 IL 
App (3d) 120766. This court allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. 
R. 315(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the appellate court. 
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
On June 12, 2013, the State filed an information charging defendant Sandro Espinoza 
with domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West 2012)). The information stated that, 
“said defendant, knowingly, without legal justification made physical contact of an insulting 
or provoking nature with a minor, a family or household member, in that said defendant 
struck the minor about the face, in violation of Chapter 720, Section 5/12-3.2(a)(2), of the 
Illinois Compiled Statutes, 2012.” At Espinoza’s bond hearing, the State indicated that the 
victim was defendant’s son, who sustained a bloody nose. The trial court of Will County 
granted the State’s request for a no contact order, admonishing defendant that, as a condition 
of his bond, he was to have no contact with the minor, D.E. 
¶ 4 
 
At a subsequent pretrial hearing, defense counsel indicated that Espinoza wanted to plead 
guilty and accept the State’s plea offer. However, defense counsel also noted his concern that 
there were no identifiers in the complaint, and orally moved to amend the charging 
instrument. The trial court declined to consider the oral motion and directed defense counsel 
to file a written motion. The trial court also declined to accept Espinoza’s guilty plea to a 
complaint that was defective on its face. 
¶ 5 
 
Espinoza then filed a motion to amend the charging instrument, alleging that the victim 
of the offense was identified as a minor, which was a formal defect in the charging 
instrument, because the identity of the victim is an essential element that must be pled. 
Espinoza alleged that pursuant to section 111-5 of the Code, a charge may be amended by the 
State or the defendant at any time because of formal defects. 725 ILCS 5/111-5 (West 2012). 
Further, the formal defect in the case could be cured by identifying the victim in the 
complaint as D.E. 
¶ 6 
 
The State denied that the complaint was defective. The State argued that Espinoza was 
not prejudiced by the charging instrument, as full discovery had been tendered which 
included the full name of the minor victim, so that Espinoza could fully prepare his defense 
and would not be surprised at trial. The State noted that minors who are victims in juvenile 
proceedings are provided confidentiality regarding disclosure of identity, as evinced in 
section 5-901(3) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-901(3) (West 2012)). 
The State claimed that victims who are minors should be provided the same confidentiality. 
¶ 7 
 
The trial court found the charging instrument defective and granted Espinoza’s motion. 
The trial court ordered the State to amend the complaint. The State filed a motion to 
reconsider, which the trial court denied. The State then declined to amend the criminal 
 
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complaint and asked the court to dismiss the complaint as a sanction for its refusal. The trial 
court therefore dismissed the complaint. 
¶ 8 
 
Defendant Angela Disera was charged with endangering the life or health of a child (720 
ILCS 5/12C-5 (West 2012)). Specifically, the criminal complaint alleged that Disera 
committed the offense of endangering the life or health of a child “in that, said defendant 
willfully caused or permitted the life or health of a minor, a child under the age of 18 years, 
to be endangered, in that said defendant left the minor child alone at 1350 Sterling, Joliet, 
Will County, Illinois, without adult supervision.” 
¶ 9 
 
Disera filed a motion for a bill of particulars, noting that the complaint did not provide 
the name of the minor in question, nor did it provide any other identifying information about 
the minor. Disera observed that the police report named five different minors under the age 
of 18, three of whom allegedly were Disera’s children. Given the ambiguity in the complaint, 
Disera was unable to discern the identity of the complaining witness. The State responded by 
filing a bill of particulars under seal which stated the full name of the minor. Disera 
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the State had not amended the 
criminal complaint to identify the minor. The circuit court of Will County granted Disera’s 
motion to dismiss based on the insufficiency of the complaint. The State then filed a 
certificate of substantial impairment and a notice of appeal. 
¶ 10 
 
People v. Espinoza and People v. Disera were consolidated on appeal. As noted, the 
appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the trial courts. 2014 IL App (3d) 
120766. The majority noted that where an indictment or information charges an offense 
against persons or property, the name of the person or property injured, if known, must be 
stated in the charging instrument and the allegation must be proved as alleged. Id. ¶ 10. In the 
cases before it, the charging instruments at issue charged crimes committed against 
individual persons, but neither charging instrument contained any information suggesting the 
victims’ identities. Id. ¶ 11. Further, the State declined to cure the defects in the charging 
instruments. Under the circumstances, the trial courts acted properly in dismissing both 
criminal complaints. Id. 
¶ 11 
 
The majority also rejected the State’s claim that the trial courts erred because neither 
defendant could show that they were prejudiced by the failure to identify the alleged victims 
in the charging instruments. The majority observed that a pretrial challenge to the sufficiency 
of a charging instrument requires strict compliance with section 111-3 of the Code. Id. ¶ 12. 
Because the defendants each challenged the sufficiency of the charging instruments before 
trial, the defendants were entitled to demand strict compliance with section 111-3, and did 
not need to show prejudice. Id. 
¶ 12 
 
The majority next rejected the State’s claim it was not required to amend the charging 
instruments because any deficiencies in the charging instruments could be sought through a 
bill of particulars or through discovery. Although a charging instrument is no longer the 
exclusive means through which a defendant may obtain information concerning the charge 
against him, the majority noted that “[o]ur supreme court has never held or implied that the 
charging instrument no longer plays an important role in informing a defendant of the nature 
of the charges against him.” Id. ¶ 15. Finally, the majority rejected the State’s claim that its 
refusal to include the minor victims’ initials in the charging instrument was justified on 
public policy grounds. Id. ¶ 16. 
 
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¶ 13 
 
The dissenting justice would have held that the omission of the victims’ names did not 
render the charging instruments defective. Id. ¶ 24 (O’Brien, J., dissenting). The dissent 
would find that changes in criminal discovery rules eliminated much of the reliance on the 
indictment as a safeguard against a defendant being tried twice for the same offense. Id. 
Likewise, the changes in criminal discovery rules allowed a defendant access to much more 
information to aid in the preparation of a defense. Id. Given those changes, the dissent would 
find that the trial courts erred in dismissing the criminal complaints in these cases. 
 
¶ 14 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 15 
 
At issue in this case is the sufficiency of the charging instruments. As set forth in section 
111-3 of the Code, a defendant has a fundamental right to be informed of the nature and 
cause of criminal accusations made against him. People v. Rowell, 229 Ill. 2d 82, 92-93 
(2008). Section 111-3(a) provides: 
 
“(a) A charge shall be in writing and allege the commission of an offense by: 
 
(1) Stating the name of the offense; 
 
(2) Citing the statutory provision alleged to have been violated; 
 
(3) Setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged; 
 
(4) Stating the date and county of the offense as definitely as can be done; and 
 
(5) Stating the name of the accused, if known, and if not known, designate the 
accused by any name or description by which he can be identified with reasonable 
certainty.” 725 ILCS 5/111-3(a) (West 2012). 
This issue presents a question of law, so our review is de novo. Rowell, 229 Ill. 2d at 92. 
¶ 16 
 
The State first argues that the charging instruments at issue strictly complied with section 
111-3 and that the omission of the victims’ identities did not render the charging instruments 
deficient. The State points out that both charging instruments set forth the name of the 
offense, the statute violated, the elements of the offense, the date and county of the offense, 
and the name of the accused. The State asserts that identifying the victim is not required 
under section 111-3, nor is the name of the victim an element of the offense of domestic 
battery or endangering the life or health of a child. 
¶ 17 
 
Although neither section 111-3 nor the respective criminal code sections expressly state 
that the name of the victim is an element of the offense, it is well settled that “[w]here an 
indictment charges an offense either against persons or property, the name of the person or 
property injured, if known, must be stated, and the allegation must be proved as alleged.” 
People v. Walker, 7 Ill. 2d 158, 161 (1955). The purpose of alleging the name of the person 
or property injured is to enable the accused to plead either a formal acquittal or conviction 
under the indictment in the event of a second prosecution for the same offense. Id. Because 
the requirement is founded upon the protection of the right of the accused against double 
jeopardy, it is a substantial requirement designed to safeguard a constitutional right and is not 
a mere technical rule. Id. at 161-62. 
¶ 18 
 
In People v. Jones, 53 Ill. 2d 460 (1973), the court reiterated the holding in Walker. In 
Jones, the State argued that proof of the identity of an armed robbery victim was not an 
essential element of the crime charged and need not be alleged in the indictment. The Jones 
court disagreed, distinguishing cases finding that the identity of “victims” of forgery and the 
 
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sale of narcotics were not necessary allegations in the individual indictments. In contrast to 
those cases, the Jones court observed that armed robbery is a crime whose impact is focused 
more directly upon an individual victim than upon society in general, because danger to the 
person and the taking of property are the essence of the crime. Id. at 463. Therefore, the 
identity of the armed robbery victim was an essential allegation of an indictment charging 
that offense. 
¶ 19 
 
We further note that the legislature’s recent amendment to section 111-3 indicates that 
the legislature has acquiesced in this court’s jurisprudence concerning charging instruments. 
Effective January 1, 2014, the legislature added section 111-3(a-5) to the statute. That section 
states: 
 
“(a–5) If the victim is alleged to have been subjected to an offense involving an 
illegal sexual act including, but not limited to, a sexual offense defined in Article 11 
or Section 10–9 of the Criminal Code of 2012, the charge shall state the identity of 
the victim by name, initials, or description.” 725 ILCS 5/111-3(a-5) (West 2014). 
Recognizing that established case law requires the name of the person injured, if known, to 
be alleged in the charging instrument when the offense charged is against a person, the 
legislature added section 111-3(a-5) to permit the State to use alternative methods of 
identification with regard to the specified offenses in order to protect the victims of the 
specified crimes. 
¶ 20 
 
As the appellate court correctly found, then, where an offense charged is against a person 
or property, the name of the person or property injured, if known, is an element of the offense 
that must be alleged in the charging instrument pursuant to section 111-3. 725 ILCS 5/111-3 
(West 2012). Here, defendant Espinoza was charged with domestic battery, and defendant 
Disera was charged with endangering the life or health of a child. Both domestic battery and 
endangering the life or health of a child are crimes on which the impact is focused upon an 
individual. Accordingly, the identity of the victims was an essential allegation of the 
charging instruments. Consequently, the lower courts were correct that the State was required 
to include the names of the victims in each charging instrument in order to comply with 
section 111-3. 
¶ 21 
 
The State then argues that omission of the minor victims’ names from the charging 
instruments at issue were formal defects under section 111-5 of the Code that may be 
corrected by amendment prior to trial. The State admits that it refused to amend the charging 
instruments to correct the defects prior to trial, but argues that dismissal of the charging 
instruments was unwarranted because defendants conceded they suffered no prejudice or 
surprise. 
¶ 22 
 
Section 111-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/111-5 (West 
2012)), provides: 
“An indictment, information or complaint which charges the commission of an 
offense in accordance with Section 111–3 of this Code shall not be dismissed and 
may be amended on motion by the State’s Attorney or defendant at any time because 
of formal defects ***.” 725 ILCS 5/111-5 (West 2012). 
¶ 23 
 
The State is correct that Jones held that a misstatement concerning the identity of the 
victim of an offense against a person is a formal defect that may be amended pursuant to 
section 111-5. The timing of a challenge to a charging instrument determines whether a 
 
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defendant must show that he was prejudiced by a defect in the charging instrument. When an 
indictment or information is attacked for the first time posttrial, a defendant must show that 
he was prejudiced in the preparation of his defense. Rowell, 229 Ill. 2d at 93. However, when 
an indictment or information is challenged before trial, the indictment or information must 
strictly comply with the pleading requirements of section 111-3. Id. If the indictment or 
information does not strictly comply with the pleading requirements of section 111-3, the 
proper remedy is dismissal. Id. 
¶ 24 
 
The State has cited People v. Mahoney, 18 Ill. App. 3d 518 (1974), and People v. 
Santiago, 279 Ill. App. 3d 749 (1996), as directly supporting its claim that omission of a 
victim’s name from a charging instrument, when the victim’s identity is an essential element 
of the offense, does not render the charging instrument deficient absent prejudice or surprise. 
Those cases, however, are completely distinguishable, as the defendants in those cases 
challenged the charging instruments for the first time posttrial. In these cases, the charging 
instruments were challenged prior to trial, so the charging instruments were required to 
strictly comply with section 111-3. Given the timing of defendants’ challenges to the 
charging instruments, the defendants were not required to show that they were prejudiced by 
the defects in the charging instruments. Accordingly, the trial courts properly dismissed the 
charging instruments against defendants for failure to comply with the pleading requirements 
of section 111-3. 
¶ 25 
 
The State next argues in the alternative that this court should overrule the holding in 
Jones that the victim’s identity is an essential allegation of an instrument charging a crime 
against an individual. The State claims that a departure from stare decisis is warranted 
because: the law holding that a victim’s identity is an essential allegation is poorly reasoned 
and arbitrary; online court records subject victims to widespread public disclosure and 
potential invasions of privacy; and identifying the victim in a charging instrument is 
unnecessary to provide defendants with notice and to safeguard against double jeopardy. 
¶ 26 
 
“The doctrine of stare decisis ‘expresses the policy of the courts to stand by precedents 
and not to disturb settled points.’ ” Vitro v. Mihelcic, 209 Ill. 2d 76, 81 (2004) (quoting Neff 
v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 308-09 (1936), overruled on other grounds by Tuthill v. Rendelman, 
387 Ill. 321 (1944)). When a question has been deliberately examined and decided, the 
question should be considered settled and closed to further argument. People v. Williams, 235 
Ill. 2d 286, 294 (2009). Stare decisis is the means by which courts ensure that the law will 
develop in a principled and intelligible fashion and will not merely change erratically. 
Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 161 Ill. 2d 502, 510 (1994). 
¶ 27 
 
This case involves the statutory construction of section 111-3 of the Code. 725 ILCS 
5/111-3 (West 2012). The Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted section 111-3 as requiring 
an indictment charging an offense either against persons or property to state the name of the 
person or property injured, if known. When the legislature chooses not to amend a statute 
following a judicial construction, it will be presumed that the legislature has acquiesced in 
the court’s statement of the legislative intent. Blount v. Stroud, 232 Ill. 2d 302, 324 (2009). 
That presumption, however, is a jurisprudential principle and not a rule of law. Id. at 324-25. 
¶ 28 
 
As discussed, however, with regard to section 111-3, the supreme court’s interpretation is 
supported by the legislature’s amendment to section 111-3. Pub. Act 98-416 (eff. Jan. 1, 
2014). That amendment, which added section 111-3(a-5), would be completely unnecessary 
 
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if the identity of the victim was not an element of an offense against a person. Section 
111-3(a-5) acknowledges that a charge concerning an offense against a person, specifically 
an offense involving an illegal sexual act, must state the identity of the victim. The 
legislature therefore provided alternative methods of identification with regard to such 
offenses. 
¶ 29 
 
In addressing the State’s stare decisis argument, we note that, in the context of statutory 
construction, “stare decisis considerations are at their apex.” Williams, 235 Ill. 2d at 295. 
Considerations of stare decisis weigh more heavily in the area of statutory construction than 
in the common law because a departure from a statutory construction “amounts to an 
amendment of the statute itself rather than simply a change in the thinking of the judiciary 
with respect to common law concepts which are properly under its control.” Froud v. Celotex 
Corp., 98 Ill. 2d 324, 336 (1983). 
¶ 30 
 
Stare decisis, however, is not an inexorable command. Vitro, 209 Ill. 2d at 82. Any 
departure from stare decisis must be specially justified, and prior decisions should not be 
overruled absent good cause or compelling reasons. Id. Good cause exists “when governing 
decisions are unworkable or badly reasoned.” People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 146 (2007). 
“In general, a settled rule of law that does not contravene a statute or constitutional principle 
should be followed unless doing so is likely to result in serious detriment prejudicial to 
public interests.” Id. 
¶ 31 
 
The State has failed to demonstrate good cause or compelling reasons to depart from 
stare decisis. As noted, the State claims that departure from stare decisis is warranted 
because the case law holding that a victim’s identity is an essential allegation of a charging 
instrument is poorly reasoned and arbitrary. The State’s argument on this point is difficult to 
follow. The State asserts that a finding that the identification of the victim in a charging 
instrument is a formality that may be amended pursuant to section 111-5 contradicts the 
holding that the identity of the victim is an essential allegation in the charging instrument. 
The State does not further develop this argument. 
¶ 32 
 
In making this argument, the State contends that the 1955 Walker decision (People v. 
Walker, 7 Ill. 2d 158 (1955)) was the first Illinois Supreme Court case to address 
identification of a victim in the indictment. The State is incorrect. 
¶ 33 
 
As defendants point out, for more than 170 years, Illinois Supreme Court case law has 
held that charging instruments must identify the victim when the defendant is charged with 
an offense against a person. Defendants note that in 1837, well before the 1964 enactment of 
section 111-3, the Illinois Supreme Court found “it is well settled, that, in indictments for 
offences against the persons or property of individuals, the Christian and sur-names of the 
parties injured, must be stated, if the injured party be known.” Willis v. People, 2 Ill. 399, 401 
(1837). That holding has been consistently reaffirmed. See People v. Novotny, 305 Ill. 549 
(1922); People v. Smith, 341 Ill. 649 (1930); People v. Allen, 368 Ill. 368 (1937); People v. 
Flaherty, 396 Ill. 304 (1947); People v. Cheney, 405 Ill. 258 (1950); People v. Nelson, 17 Ill. 
2d 509 (1959). 
¶ 34 
 
In 1964, section 111-3 of the Code was enacted. As discussed, section 111-3 did not 
expressly state that a charging instrument must state the name of the person or property 
injured when the indictment charges an offense against persons or property. However, when 
statutes are enacted after judicial opinions are published, it must be presumed that the 
 
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legislature acted with knowledge of the prevailing case law. Burrell v. Southern Truss, 176 
Ill. 2d 171, 176 (1997). That the legislature acted with knowledge of the prevailing law is 
confirmed by section 111-3(a-5). As discussed, supra, section 111-3(a-5) recognizes an 
offense against a person, in that instance an offense involving an illegal sexual act, must state 
the identity of the victim. We cannot say that 170 years of case law, which includes more 
than 50 years of statutory construction, can be considered poorly reasoned and arbitrary 
precedent. 
¶ 35 
 
The State next argues that this court should depart from stare decisis because 
“identification of the victim in a charging instrument is an antiquated formality unnecessary 
to fulfill defendants’ constitutional right to notice of the charged offense or to safeguard 
against future prosecutions for the same offense.” In support of this claim, the State points to 
Jones, where the court stated that: 
 
“The liberalization of criminal pleading also reflects a lessening in importance of 
the indictment’s secondary functions. The indictment as a means of informing 
defendants of particulars concerning the case is now far overshadowed by the array of 
discovery procedures available to the defense. Similarly, the time when an indictment 
defined the limits of jeopardy has passed and a prior prosecution on the same facts 
may be proved by resort to the record. [Citation.] The primary safeguard of 
indictment by grand jury, which remains secured to criminal defendants, is to protect 
individuals from the caprice of the public prosecutor.” Jones, 53 Ill. 2d at 464. 
¶ 36 
 
The State seizes upon the preceding quotation from the Jones decision in support of its 
claim that a charging instrument need not identify the victim. The discussion of the 
liberalization of criminal pleading in the Jones court, however, was directed to its finding 
that the misstatement of the victim’s identity in the indictment was a formal defect that could 
be amended. Jones did not hold that the identity of the victim need not be included in a 
charging instrument alleging an offense against persons or property nor did Jones diminish 
the importance of the charging instrument. 
¶ 37 
 
In fact, subsequent to Jones, this court has continued to reinforce the importance of the 
charging instrument. As explained in People v. Meyers, 158 Ill. 2d 46, 51 (1994): 
 
“A defendant has the fundamental right, under both the Federal (U.S. Const., 
amend. VI) and the State Constitutions (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8), to be informed of 
the ‘nature and cause’ of criminal accusations made against him. In Illinois, this 
general right is given substance by section 111–3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 111–3(a)). Section 111–3 is ‘designed to 
inform the accused of the nature of the offense with which he is charged so that he 
may prepare a defense and to assure that the charged offense may serve as a bar to 
subsequent prosecution arising out of the same conduct.’ People v. Simmons (1982), 
93 Ill. 2d 94, 99-100.”  
¶ 38 
 
Likewise, the court in People v. Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d 1, 12-13 (2002), held: 
“It is well settled that due process requires that a charging instrument adequately 
notify a defendant of the offense charged with sufficient specificity to enable a proper 
defense. [Citations.] A person’s right to reasonable notice of a charge and an 
opportunity to mount a defense in court is basic in our system of jurisprudence. 
[Citation.] One of the oldest and most fundamental components of due process is the 
 
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general rule that criminal proceedings be initiated by an information or indictment 
containing: 
‘all the facts and circumstances which constitute the offense, ... stated with such 
certainty and precision, that the defendant ... may be enabled to determine the 
species of offense they constitute, in order that he may prepare his defence 
accordingly ... and that there may be no doubt as to the judgment which should be 
given, if the defendant be convicted.’ J. Archbold, Pleading and Evidence in 
Criminal Cases 44 (15th ed. 1862).” 
¶ 39 
 
Given the Illinois Supreme Court’s recognition of the continuing importance of the 
charging instrument, we find no merit to the State’s claim that requiring the State to identify 
the victim in a charging instrument as an element of an offense against a person or property 
is an “antiquated formality” which justifies a departure from stare decisis. The State’s 
general claims of “antiquated formalities” do not establish good cause or compelling reasons 
to abandon precedent. 
¶ 40 
 
Moreover, we note that the State effectively is asking this court to amend section 111-3 to 
eliminate the requirement that the victim’s identity must be alleged in a charging instrument 
when the charging instrument alleges an offense against a person or property. We decline to 
do so as we see no reason to depart from well-established precedent in order to adopt the 
State’s position. In addition, as discussed, in enacting section 111-3(a-5), the legislature 
recently reaffirmed that the identity of the victim is an element of an offense against a 
person. 725 ILCS 5/111-3(a-5) (West 2014). Adopting the State’s position would render 
section 111-3(a-5) void. This court must avoid an interpretation that would render any 
portion of a statute meaningless or void. Sylvester v. Industrial Comm’n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232 
(2001). 
¶ 41 
 
Finally, the State argues that departure from stare decisis is warranted based upon the 
public policy objective of protecting minor victims’ privacy interests. The State notes that a 
departure from stare decisis is warranted when following a settled rule of law “is likely to 
result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests.” People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 
146 (2007). The State claims that identification of the minor victims’ names in the charging 
instruments, which are available to the public, would violate the minors’ rights to privacy and 
potentially subject them to ridicule or embarrassment. The State further contends that use of 
the minor victims’ initials in the charging instruments would not adequately protect the 
victims’ privacy. The State maintains that a minor victim must be identified only as a 
“minor” in a charging instrument in order to shield the minor victim from harmful public 
exposure and to protect the minor’s privacy interests. 
¶ 42 
 
Somewhat inexplicably, the State points to the recently enacted section 111-3(a-5) in 
support of its claim that a minor victim must be identified only as a “minor” in the charging 
instrument. The State notes that section 111-3(a-5) provides that if a charging instrument 
alleges an offense involving an illegal sexual act, the charging instrument can identify the 
victim by name, by initials, or by description. The State argues that permitting the use of 
initials or other description to identify the victims of sexual assault in a charging instrument 
demonstrates that flexibility of the pleading requirements in section 111-3(a) is justified to 
protect the privacy interests of vulnerable victims. 
 
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¶ 43 
 
Section 111-3(a-5) does not support the State’s argument. Although section 111-3(a-5) 
allows identification of a victim of an illegal sexual act by name, initials or description, 
section 111-3(a-5) does not state that there need not be any identification of the victim 
whatsoever, which is the State’s position. Rather, the legislature deemed the alternatives set 
forth in section 111-3(a-5) sufficient to protect a victim, while also protecting a defendant’s 
rights. In discussing House Bill 2471, which added section 111-3(a-5), Representative 
Cassidy explained: 
“ ‘House Bill 2471 is a joint initiative of the Cook County State’s Attorneys Office as 
well as advocates for victims of sexual assault and human trafficking. This will 
provide an opportunity at an earlier point in a case for a victim’s private identifying 
information to be protected from public dissemination and allow the prosecutors to 
create a charging instrument with... without the victim’s full name on it. Of course, in 
discovery all of it... all the information is available to the... to the defendant, so the 
defendant’s rights are protected.’ ” 98th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Apr. 
10, 2013, at 103-04 (statements of Representative Cassidy). 
¶ 44 
 
The State has failed to persuade this court that minor victims of nonsexual offenses 
should be provided greater protections than those provided to victims of illegal sexual acts. 
As noted, in this case, the State refused to amend the charging instruments at issue to state 
the name of the victims, the initials of the victims, or any description at all other than “a 
minor.” Further, to the extent that the State is asking this court to depart from stare decisis 
based upon public policy considerations, these considerations are better left to the legislature 
and not this court. “The primary expression of Illinois public and social policy should 
emanate from the legislature.” Charles v. Seigfried, 165 Ill. 2d 482, 493 (1995). 
¶ 45 
 
Pursuant to section 111-3, the State was required to identify the victims in the charging 
instruments at issue. Because the State failed to amend the charging instruments to strictly 
comply with section 111-3 prior to trial, the trial courts properly dismissed those charging 
instruments. Moreover, the State has failed to set forth any good cause or compelling reason 
to justify departing from stare decisis in these cases. For these reasons, the judgment of the 
appellate court is affirmed. 
 
¶ 46 
 
Appellate court judgment affirmed.