Title: State v. Eubanks
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 122758
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: August 26, 2022

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 122,758 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
COREY A. EUBANKS, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
A sentence is illegal if it does not conform to the applicable statutory provisions, 
either in character or punishment. An illegal sentence can be corrected at any time.  
 
2. 
Kansas law allows district courts to order restitution as part of a criminal 
defendant's sentence. Restitution includes, but is not limited to, damage or loss caused by 
the defendant's crime. Restitution is due immediately unless (1) the court orders the 
defendant be given a specified time to pay or be allowed to pay in specified installments 
or (2) the court finds compelling circumstances that would render restitution unworkable, 
either in whole or in part. 
 
3. 
 
When read together, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6604(e) and K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-
3717(n) permit the district court to specify in its sentencing order the amount of 
restitution to be paid and the person to whom it shall be paid as a condition of postrelease 
supervision in the event the Prisoner Review Board declines to find compelling 
circumstances that would render a plan of restitution unworkable. These two statutes 
2 
 
 
 
create a presumption of validity to the court's journal entry setting the amount and 
manner of restitution. 
 
4. 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3717(n) does not require the journal entry to specify that 
restitution be paid as a condition of postrelease supervision.  
 
5. 
Plea agreements are akin to civil contracts. The primary rule for interpreting a 
contract is to ascertain the parties' intent. We exercise unlimited review over the 
interpretation of contracts and are not bound by the lower court's interpretations or 
rulings.  
 
6. 
A district court may only order restitution for losses or damages caused by the 
crime or crimes for which the defendant was convicted unless, under a plea agreement, 
the defendant has agreed to pay for losses not caused directly or indirectly by the 
defendant's crime. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed September 10, 
2021. Appeal from Douglas District Court; AMY J. HANLEY, judge. Opinion filed August 26, 2022. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court and remanding the case with directions is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part. Judgment of the district court is affirmed.  
 
Kasper Schirer, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for 
appellant.  
 
Brian Deiter, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Kate Duncan Butler, assistant 
district attorney, Charles E. Branson, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the 
briefs for appellee. 
3 
 
 
 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
STANDRIDGE, J.:  The State charged Corey A. Eubanks with burglary of a 
nondwelling, two counts of felony theft, and criminal damage to property. As part of a 
plea deal, he pled no contest to an amended charge of attempted theft in exchange for the 
State dismissing the original charges. The district court sentenced Eubanks to 10 months 
in prison and ordered him to pay restitution to the two victims of the burglary and theft 
"as a condition of [Eubanks'] postrelease."  
 
On direct appeal, Eubanks challenged the district court's award of restitution. He 
argued he did not agree to pay restitution to one of the victims because that loss resulted 
from the dismissed charges and was unrelated to his sole conviction for attempted theft. 
Eubanks also claimed his sentence was illegal because the district court lacked authority 
to order restitution as a condition of his postrelease supervision. A Court of Appeals 
panel affirmed the district court's restitution order, finding Eubanks affirmatively 
confirmed at the plea hearing and at sentencing that the plea agreement contemplated 
restitution to both victims. The panel also held the district court had authority to order 
restitution as a condition of Eubanks' postrelease supervision but remanded for the 
district court to issue a new journal entry clarifying the payment of restitution was a 
condition of postrelease supervision.  
 
On review, Eubanks argues the panel erred in affirming the district court's 
restitution order. He contends, as he did below, the district court lacked authority to order 
restitution as a condition of postrelease supervision and he did not agree to pay restitution 
to a victim whose loss was unrelated to his conviction for attempted theft.  
 
 
4 
 
 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
On March 11, 2018, a thief cut a section of the fence on the border of the Globe 
Quarry in Douglas County, broke into a locked trailer owned by Ditch Diggers, Inc., and 
stole a generator and chainsaws from the trailer. The thief also stole 300 to 400 feet of 
copper wire and three CAT batteries from the quarry property. Alan Platt owned the 
copper wire and the batteries.  
 
 
Law enforcement's investigation pointed to Eubanks as the perpetrator. The State 
charged Eubanks with burglary of a nondwelling, two counts of felony theft, and criminal 
damage to property.  
 
 
The parties appeared before the district court on October 30, 2019, where defense 
counsel advised the court that Eubanks had entered into a plea agreement with the State. 
The written plea agreement is not included in the record on appeal, but the prosecutor 
recited the terms of the agreement as follows:  
 
 
"The defendant is going to plead either guilty or no contest to the amended 
charge of attempted theft, which is a subsection of receiving stolen property, a level 10 
nonperson felony. 
 
 
"The State will agree to dismiss the remaining charges. Sentencing will be open. 
Defendant can argue whether—for the sentence of prison, probation, or whether it's 
consecutive or concurrent to what he's in KDOC for. And obviously the State will argue 
its position.  
 
 
"Pay restitution to the victims, and that amount is not available yet. 18-TR-2017, 
the State will dismiss at the defendant's costs, which he's free to ask the court to waive." 
(Emphasis added.)  
 
5 
 
 
 
Defense counsel agreed the prosecutor's recitation of the plea agreement was 
accurate and "essentially states what it is." Eubanks waived his right to a preliminary 
hearing on the amended charge of attempted theft, and the district court proceeded with 
the plea hearing. Eubanks confirmed he understood the charge against him, was aware of 
the maximum penalties he faced, understood he would relinquish certain rights by 
entering the plea agreement, was competent to enter the plea, and was not threatened or 
coerced to plead no contest. During the plea colloquy, the following exchange occurred: 
 
"THE COURT:  Okay. Now, the plea agreement was stated for the record. You 
heard [the prosecutor] state the plea agreement, correct? 
 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, ma'am. 
 
 
"THE COURT:  Is that the plea agreement as you understand it? 
 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, ma'am. 
 
 
"THE COURT:  Are you satisfied with that plea agreement? 
 
 
"THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, ma'am."  
 
Eubanks entered a plea of no contest to the attempted theft charge, which related 
to the property stolen from Platt. The district court found a factual basis for the plea 
based on evidence at the preliminary hearing on Eubanks' original charges. The court 
accepted Eubanks' plea and found him guilty of attempted theft. After the court scheduled 
the sentencing hearing, defense counsel stated, "[A]s soon as we hear something about 
restitution, we may well want a hearing with respect to the restitution."  
 
6 
 
 
 
At Eubanks' sentencing hearing, the district court asked if anyone wanted to speak 
before sentencing. Neither Platt nor anyone from Ditch Diggers was present, but the 
prosecutor stated,  
 
"I do have a statement. . . . And this is from [Alan] Platt, P-L-A-T-T, one of the two 
victims. He said . . . we were finishing a phase of a [job] for Douglas County road when 
all of the copper wire and ground rods, along with the fiberoptic wire off the scales on the 
conveyer were taken off. Also, three large 4D batteries were removed. . . . 
 
 
"The extra overtime and running to get the replacement parts was almost a full 
day long with the downtime of the plant. That was a lot of unneeded work. I can also say 
the owner of Ditch Diggers has also conveyed that this theft of the chainsaws and other 
property cost them significant downtime, so there was a direct impact on the parties 
because of the defendant's crimes."  
 
The prosecutor continued,  
 
 
"Judge, first of all, I will relate back to how this crime did impact the victims. 
There was almost $10,000 worth of property taken. And as part of the plea agreement the 
defendant has agreed to pay restitution. [Alan Platt] is $4,425.71. . . . And to Ditch 
Diggers, Inc., $4,601.04. And I will note that that does not include any labor, any time 
lost. This is simply for the value of the stolen equipment that was not recovered."  
 
 
In response, defense counsel advised that "with respect to restitution we'd like to 
have a hearing on the subject of the amount of restitution." The district court 
acknowledged Eubanks was entitled to a hearing but noted a restitution hearing would 
require the court to continue the sentencing hearing to a later date. After consulting with 
Eubanks, defense counsel said, "Well, I think under the circumstances since it's a very 
large amount of money and my client is entitled to justification by the parties involved as 
to their losses, I think we really need to have a hearing." (Emphases added.) When asked 
7 
 
 
 
how many witnesses the State would call at a restitution hearing, the prosecutor said she 
would call two. The prosecutor also said,  
 
"But I would like to put on the record that I provided a restitution order with the actual 
receipts for the—I mean, the value of the stolen property has been provided, so they're 
just going to take the stand and say exactly the same thing that's written here, and the 
defendant has agreed to pay restitution. So I've got two witnesses, Judge."  
 
 
At this point, defense counsel advised the district court that Eubanks had changed 
his mind about the restitution hearing and "under the circumstances he would just as soon 
go ahead and be sentenced." The court then personally addressed Eubanks, who 
confirmed he wanted to proceed with sentencing without contesting the amount of 
restitution requested by the State.  
 
 
The district court sentenced Eubanks to 10 months in prison and 12 months of 
postrelease supervision. The court also ordered Eubanks to pay restitution. The judge 
expressly stated,  
 
 
"I am going to order as a condition of your postrelease that you pay restitution to 
[Alan Platt] in the amount of $4,425.79, and to Ditch Diggers in the amount of $4,601.04. 
I should also note that that restitution can be worked on while you're in custody paying 
towards it as well."  
 
The sentencing journal entry of judgment reflected the district court's award of restitution 
to Platt and to Ditch Diggers.  
 
 
On direct appeal, Eubanks challenged the district court's restitution order. Eubanks 
argued he did not agree to pay restitution to Ditch Diggers, a victim of the dismissed 
charges. Eubanks also claimed the restitution award resulted in an illegal sentence 
8 
 
 
 
because the district court lacked authority to order restitution as a condition of postrelease 
supervision. See State v. Eubanks, No. 122,758, 2021 WL 4127725, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 
2021) (unpublished opinion). 
 
 
A Court of Appeals panel affirmed the district court's restitution order. First, the 
panel held the award of restitution to Ditch Diggers was valid because Eubanks had 
agreed to pay Ditch Diggers under the terms of the plea agreement. 2021 WL 4127725, at 
*3-4. Second, the panel found the district court had authority under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 
21-6604(e) and K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3717(n) to order restitution as a condition of 
postrelease supervision. But because the sentencing journal entry of judgment failed to 
state restitution was a condition of Eubanks' postrelease supervision, the panel remanded 
to the district court to issue a new journal entry expressly stating so. 2021 WL 4127725, 
at *4-5.  
 
 
We granted Eubanks' petition for review on both issues. Jurisdiction is proper. See 
K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (providing for petitions for review of Court of Appeals decisions); 
K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review Court of Appeals decisions 
upon petition for review). 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
Eubanks challenges the panel's decision affirming the district court's restitution 
order. First, he contends the panel erroneously found the district court had statutory 
authority to order restitution as a condition of postrelease supervision. Next, he contends 
the panel's remand to the district court for a new journal entry expressly stating restitution 
is a condition of Eubanks' postrelease supervision deprives the Prisoner Review Board 
(Board) of authority to consider workability of the restitution order. Finally, he contends 
9 
 
 
 
the panel erred in determining that he agreed to pay restitution to Ditch Diggers. We 
address each contention in turn.   
 
1. Restitution as a condition of postrelease supervision 
 
Eubanks argues the district court lacked statutory authority to order restitution as a 
condition of his postrelease supervision, thus rendering his sentence illegal. He asks this 
court to vacate that portion of the district court's restitution order. Eubanks did not raise 
this issue before the district court. But K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-3504 provides the legal 
authority to correct an illegal sentence at any time, so the panel appropriately considered 
Eubanks' argument for the first time on appeal. See State v. Hambright, 310 Kan. 408, 
411, 447 P.3d 972 (2019) (considering illegal sentence challenge for first time on direct 
appeal). 
 
Restitution is part of a criminal defendant's sentence. State v. Johnson, 309 Kan. 
992, 996, 441 P.3d 1036 (2019). A sentence is illegal if it does not conform to the 
applicable statutory provisions, either in character or punishment. K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-
3504(c)(1). Whether a sentence is illegal within the meaning of K.S.A. 22-3504 is a 
question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited review. State v. Sartin, 310 
Kan. 367, 369, 446 P.3d 1068 (2019). And whether the district court exceeded its 
statutory authority in ordering restitution as a condition of postrelease supervision 
requires interpretation of the applicable statutes, which also involves legal questions that 
we review de novo. See State v. Samuels, 313 Kan. 876, 880, 492 P.3d 404 (2021).  
 
We begin our analysis by reviewing the relevant statutory provisions. Kansas law 
allows district courts to order restitution as part of a criminal defendant's sentence. 
Restitution "shall include, but not be limited to, damage or loss caused by the defendant's 
crime." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6604(b)(1). Restitution is due immediately unless (1) 
10 
 
 
 
"[t]he court orders that the defendant be given a specified time to pay or be allowed to 
pay in specified installments" or (2) "the court finds compelling circumstances that would 
render restitution unworkable, either in whole or in part." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-
6604(b)(1)(A) and (B). 
 
 
When a district court sentences a defendant to prison or jail, "the court may 
specify in its order the amount of restitution to be paid and the person to whom it shall be 
paid if restitution is later ordered as a condition of parole, conditional release or 
postrelease supervision." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6604(e). The postrelease supervision 
statute, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3717, addresses restitution as follows: 
 
"If the court that sentenced an inmate specified at the time of sentencing the 
amount and the recipient of any restitution ordered as a condition of parole or postrelease 
supervision, the prisoner review board shall order as a condition of parole or postrelease 
supervision that the inmate pay restitution in the amount and manner provided in the 
journal entry unless the board finds compelling circumstances that would render a plan of 
restitution unworkable." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3717(n).  
 
At sentencing here, the district court orally stated the amount and the recipients of 
restitution to be paid, ordering it "as a condition of [Eubanks'] postrelease" and noting 
Eubanks also could work towards paying restitution while in custody. Citing K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 21-6604(e) and K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3717(n), the panel found the district court 
had authority to order restitution as a condition of Eubanks' postrelease supervision. 
Eubanks, 2021 WL 4127725, at *4-5. 
 
Eubanks argues the panel's ruling contradicts a plain reading of the relevant 
statutes. He contends only the Board can set conditions of postrelease supervision, while 
a court's authority is limited to specifying the amount and manner of the restitution. To 
the extent Eubanks is arguing the panel found the district court has unconditional 
11 
 
 
 
authority to order restitution as a condition of postrelease supervision, Eubanks makes a 
valid point. But what Eubanks fails to acknowledge is that the statutes in play here 
provide overlapping roles for the district court and the Board when it comes to restitution 
and postrelease supervision. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6604(e) and 22-3717(n) must be read 
together. The former statute gives the district court authority to order the amount and 
recipient of restitution, "if restitution is later ordered [by the Board] as a condition of . . . 
postrelease supervision." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6604(e). The latter statute provides that 
the court's order setting the amount and recipient of restitution is a conditional one 
subject to reduction or elimination if the Board ultimately finds the restitution plan 
unworkable. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3717(n). When read together, these two statutes 
create a presumption of validity to the court's journal entry setting the amount and 
manner of restitution.  
 
And that is exactly what happened here. In ordering Eubanks to pay restitution, the 
district court stated from the bench,  
 
 
"I am going to order as a condition of your postrelease that you pay restitution to 
[Alan Platt] in the amount of $4,425.79, and to Ditch Diggers in the amount of $4,601.04. 
I should also note that that restitution can be worked on while you're in custody paying 
towards it as well."  
 
The court's restitution order as pronounced from the bench does not limit or 
interfere with the Board's inherent authority to reduce or eliminate restitution at the time 
of release if the Board finds the restitution plan unworkable. For this reason, we conclude 
the court's restitution order at sentencing conforms to K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3717(n) and 
is not illegal.  
 
12 
 
 
 
Notably, our conclusion today is consistent with the holding in State v. Alderson, 
299 Kan. 148, 322 P.3d 364 (2014). A jury convicted Alderson of first-degree murder. At 
sentencing, the district court ordered restitution in the amount of $119,899.86. The court's 
journal entry stated:  "'The Court finds that restitution is owed in this case, as set out 
below, and advises the Secretary of Corrections' Board of Pardon and Parole that 
defendant's release from incarceration should be made contingent upon defendant making 
restitution.'" 299 Kan. at 150. Well over 10 years after sentencing, and while Alderson 
was still in prison, a private collection corporation retained by the State made written 
demand on Alderson to pay his restitution. Alderson filed a motion requesting release 
from the restitution order based on its dormancy under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 60-2403(d). 
We concluded the language in the journal entry was too ambiguous to subject the 
defendant to restitution collection during imprisonment and the district court did not have 
authority to impose parole conditions. Therefore, we held that "the district court did not 
enter an enforceable restitution judgment when it sentenced Alderson. It instead provided 
an advisory calculation of damages for the benefit of the Kansas Prisoner Review Board. 
There being no judgment of restitution, the judgment could not become dormant." 299 
Kan. at 151. Likewise, here, the sentencing court entered an order specifying the amount 
and recipient of restitution as a condition of postrelease supervision, an order which is 
advisory in nature because it is subject to reduction or elimination as a postrelease 
supervision condition if the Board ultimately finds the restitution plan unworkable.  
 
On direct appeal, the panel found "no merit in Eubanks' assertion that the district 
court lacked the authority to order him to pay restitution as a condition of postrelease 
supervision." Eubanks, 2021 WL 4127725, at *5. Based on this finding, the panel 
remanded "for the district court to issue a new journal entry by way of an order nunc pro 
tunc clarifying that the payment of restitution is to be a condition of Eubanks' postrelease 
supervision." Eubanks, 2021 WL 4127725, at *5. The panel's finding and direction on 
remand appears to suggest it found the district court had unconditional authority to order 
13 
 
 
 
restitution as a condition of Eubanks' postrelease supervision. To the extent the panel did 
so, we disapprove and specifically hold the court's authority to order restitution as a 
condition of postrelease supervision is conditional in nature because it is subject to 
reduction or elimination by the Board at the time it sets the conditions of postrelease 
supervision. Notwithstanding the panel's finding and remand order, we affirm its ultimate 
decision finding that the district court's oral restitution order at sentencing did not result 
in an illegal sentence. See State v. Overman, 301 Kan. 704, 712, 348 P.3d 516 (2015) (if 
court reaches correct result, its decision will be upheld even though it relied on the wrong 
ground or assigned erroneous reasons for its decision).  
 
2. Restitution as stated in the journal entry of judgment 
 
At the sentencing hearing, the district court pronounced from the bench the 
amount and the recipients of restitution to be paid as a condition of Eubanks' postrelease 
supervision specifically, $4,425.79 to Platt and $4,601.04 to Ditch Diggers. Although the 
journal entry of judgment set forth the restitution amount to be paid to each victim, it did 
not expressly state the restitution was ordered as a condition of his postrelease 
supervision. Based on this omission, the panel found the journal entry imposed a sentence 
at variance with that pronounced from the bench and remanded for the district court to 
issue a nunc pro tunc journal entry clarifying the restitution ordered is to be a condition of 
Eubanks' postrelease supervision. Eubanks, 2021 WL 4127725, at *5 (citing State v. 
Mason, 294 Kan. 675, 677, 279 P.3d 707 [2012]) ("'A criminal sentence is effective upon 
pronouncement from the bench; it does not derive its effectiveness from the journal entry. 
A journal entry that imposes a sentence at variance with that pronounced from the bench 
is erroneous and must be corrected to reflect the actual sentence imposed.'"). 
 
14 
 
 
 
On review, Eubanks argues the panel's remand for a new journal entry stating 
restitution is a condition of postrelease supervision necessarily will deprive the Board of 
authority to consider restitution workability.  
 
We find it unnecessary to consider Eubanks' argument because, based on the plain 
language of the applicable statutes, the panel erred in deciding to remand for a nunc pro 
tunc order.  
 
Again, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3717(n) provides:  
 
"If the court that sentenced an inmate specified at the time of sentencing the amount and 
the recipient of any restitution ordered as a condition of parole or postrelease supervision, 
the prisoner review board shall order as a condition of parole or postrelease supervision 
that the inmate pay restitution in the amount and manner provided in the journal entry 
unless the board finds compelling circumstances that would render a plan of restitution 
unworkable." 
 
Here, the district court "specified at the time of sentencing the amount and the 
recipient of any restitution ordered as a condition of parole or postrelease supervision." 
(Emphasis added.) See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3717(n). Thus, the Board is required to 
"order as a condition of . . . postrelease supervision that the inmate pay restitution in the 
amount and manner provided in the journal entry unless the [B]oard finds compelling 
circumstances that would render a plan of restitution unworkable." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 
22-3717(n). The statute does not require the journal entry to specify that restitution be 
paid as a condition of postrelease supervision; it only requires the journal entry to state 
the restitution amount and manner in which the restitution is to be paid. In this case, the 
journal entry stated the restitution amount as $9,026.75 and the manner in which the 
restitution to be paid as: 
 
15 
 
 
 
"$ 4425.71 Alan J Platt, 2016 Clark Road, Richmond KS 66080 
"$ 4601.04 Ditch Diggers Inc, PO Box 258, Salina KS 67402-0258."  
 
Based on the analysis above, we reverse the panel's remand order directing the 
district court to issue a new journal entry providing that the payment of restitution was to 
be a condition of Eubanks' postrelease supervision.  
 
3. Restitution to Ditch Diggers 
 
Eubanks argues the panel erred in concluding he agreed to pay restitution to Ditch 
Diggers as part of his plea agreement. He claims the terms of the plea agreement recited 
at the plea hearing did not provide for restitution payments on dismissed charges. 
Because Ditch Diggers' loss was unrelated to his only conviction (attempted theft of 
Platt's copper wire and CAT batteries), Eubanks asks this court to vacate the portion of 
the district court's order awarding restitution to Ditch Diggers.  
 
Eubanks did not raise this issue before the district court. Generally, a party may 
not raise a claim for the first time on appeal. State v. Kelly, 298 Kan. 965, 971, 318 P.3d 
987 (2014). But the Court of Appeals exercised its prudential authority to consider the 
issue because it involved a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and was 
determinative of the case. See State v. Gray, 311 Kan. 164, 170, 459 P.3d 165 (2020) 
(appellate courts not obligated to review a new claim even if an exception would support 
decision to do so); Johnson, 309 Kan. at 995 (listing exceptions to general rule that new 
legal theory may not be asserted for the first time on appeal).  
 
Plea agreements are akin to civil contracts and thus may be analyzed similarly. 
State v. Frazier, 311 Kan. 378, 382, 461 P.3d 43 (2020). The primary rule for interpreting 
a contract is to ascertain the parties' intent. Peterson v. Ferrell, 302 Kan. 99, 104, 349 
16 
 
 
 
P.3d 1269 (2015). We exercise unlimited review over the interpretation of contracts and 
are not bound by the lower court's interpretations or rulings. Trear v. Chamberlain, 308 
Kan. 932, 936, 425 P.3d 297 (2018). 
 
As discussed, a sentencing court has authority to order a criminal defendant to pay 
restitution, "which shall include, but not be limited to, damage or loss caused by the 
defendant's crime." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6604(b)(1). A district court 
"may only order restitution for losses or damages caused by the crime or crimes for 
which the defendant was convicted unless, pursuant to a plea bargain, the defendant has 
agreed to pay for losses not caused directly or indirectly by the defendant's crime." State 
v. Dexter, 276 Kan. 909, 919, 80 P.3d 1125 (2003); see State v. Ball, 255 Kan. 694, 701, 
877 P.2d 955 (1994) (sentencing court has authority to enter agreed-upon restitution 
amount where defendant agrees to pay restitution for each charged offense in exchange 
for State's agreement to dismiss some of the charges). 
 
Eubanks contends the panel wrongly framed his issue as one claiming the terms of 
his plea agreement were ambiguous. He asserts his real argument was that the terms 
stated orally on the record at the plea hearing did not include an agreement to pay 
restitution for Ditch Diggers' loss. Eubanks alleges the panel improperly read into the 
plea agreement a promise to pay restitution to Ditch Diggers when he only agreed to pay 
for the loss resulting from the attempted theft of Platt's copper wire and batteries. 
Eubanks also argues restitution to Ditch Diggers is unwarranted because his attempted 
theft of Platt's copper wire and batteries was not the proximate cause of Ditch Diggers' 
loss.  
 
Eubanks' argument is unpersuasive. Whether Ditch Diggers' loss related to 
Eubanks' conviction for attempted theft is irrelevant because he agreed—under the terms 
17 
 
 
 
of the plea agreement as recited and acknowledged by both parties at the plea hearing and 
later confirmed at sentencing—to pay restitution to Ditch Diggers.  
 
 
The State initially charged Eubanks with burglary of a nondwelling, two counts of 
felony theft, and criminal damage to property. Under the plea agreement, Eubanks agreed 
to plead no contest to a single charge of attempted theft in exchange for the dismissal of 
the four original charges. The amended attempted theft charge related to the property 
stolen from Platt.  
 
The written plea agreement is not included in the record on appeal. But at the plea 
hearing, the prosecutor recited the terms of the plea agreement to include payment of 
"restitution to the victims." (Emphasis added.) Defense counsel agreed the prosecutor's 
recitation of the plea agreement was accurate. Eubanks also personally confirmed the 
plea agreement was as described by the prosecutor and he was satisfied with the plea 
agreement.  
 
At sentencing, the prosecutor read a statement from Platt about the losses he 
incurred as a result of the theft. The prosecutor advised the court the owner of Ditch 
Diggers "also conveyed that this theft of the chainsaws and other property cost them 
significant downtime, so there was a direct impact on the parties because of the 
defendant's crimes." The prosecutor reiterated "how this crime did impact the victims," 
and specifically stated Eubanks had agreed to pay restitution under the plea agreement, 
separately identifying the value of Platt's and Ditch Diggers' unrecovered stolen property. 
(Emphasis added.)  
 
In response, defense counsel advised the district court Eubanks wanted a hearing 
on the amount of restitution. Notably, counsel did not specifically challenge the amount 
of restitution owed to Ditch Diggers or otherwise allege that Eubanks should not pay 
18 
 
 
 
restitution to Ditch Diggers. Rather, counsel stated that "it's a very large amount of 
money and my client is entitled to justification by the parties involved as to their losses." 
(Emphases added.) The prosecutor said that if a restitution hearing were held, she would 
call two witnesses to testify about the value of the stolen property. Although the 
prosecutor did not identify the witnesses by name, it is clear from the context of the 
prosecutor's statement she was referring to Platt and a representative of Ditch Diggers. 
When Eubanks later decided to forgo a restitution hearing and proceed with sentencing, 
he agreed the amount of restitution requested by the State was not in question because he 
was not contesting it.  
 
Without a written document detailing the plea bargain, the best evidence of what 
the parties intended is their words—and in Eubanks' case, silence—at the district court. 
The State recited the plea bargain using the word victims in the plural. Eubanks affirmed 
this recitation, saying it matched the written copy he had. He never objected, expressed 
confusion, or asked questions about the prosecutor's word choice. At sentencing, when 
the State revisited restitution, Eubanks again remained silent. He never indicated, either 
personally or through his attorney, that he did not believe he needed to pay Ditch Diggers 
as part of the plea agreement. No one in the courtroom expressed any ambiguity on this 
point. Based on the record, the parties understood the plea agreement included restitution 
to Ditch Diggers and acted in accordance with that understanding. And Eubanks' remarks 
about possibly wanting a restitution hearing concerned the value of the property rather 
than the identity of the person owed. Eubanks' continued silence at these hearings 
establishes he understood that despite only pleading to a single charge, he agreed to pay 
restitution to all of his victims.  
 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the analysis above, we  
 
• affirm the panel's decision concluding the district court's restitution order did 
not result in an illegal sentence, 
• affirm the panel's decision concluding the terms stated orally on the record at 
the plea hearing included an agreement to pay restitution for Ditch Diggers' 
loss, and  
• reverse the panel's remand order directing the district court to issue a new 
journal entry providing that the payment of restitution was to be a condition of 
Eubanks' postrelease supervision.  
 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court and remanding the 
case with directions is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Judgment of the district court 
is affirmed.