Title: James v. Peyton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 081310
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 17, 2009

Present:  All the Justices 
ESTATE OF ROBERT JUDSON JAMES,  
ADMINISTRATOR, EDWIN F. GENTRY, ESQ. 
 
v.  Record No. 081310 
 
KENNETH C. PEYTON 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
      April 17, 2009 
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY 
OF READING, PA 
 
v.  Record No. 081314 
 
KENNETH C. PEYTON 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CULPEPER COUNTY 
John R. Cullen, Judge 
 
In these consolidated interlocutory appeals arising from 
a personal injury action, we consider whether the circuit 
court erred in concluding that an amended motion for judgment 
properly names an administrator of an estate rather than the 
estate itself as a party defendant.  Specifically, we consider 
whether the language “Estate of Robert Judson James, 
Administrator, Edwin F. Gentry, Esquire” names a proper party 
to the personal injury action in question in these appeals. 
BACKGROUND 
Whether a pleading has adequately identified the proper 
party to be sued is a question of law.  Therefore, we review 
the record de novo on appeal.  Alcoy v. Valley Nursing Homes, 
Inc., 272 Va. 37, 41, 630 S.E.2d 301, 303 (2006); Wilby v. 
Gostel, 265 Va. 437, 440, 578 S.E.2d 796, 798 (2003); 
Transcontinental Ins. Co. v. RBMW, Inc., 262 Va. 502, 514, 551 
S.E.2d 313, 319 (2001). 
On April 5, 2004, Kenneth C. Peyton filed a motion for 
judgment1 in the Circuit Court of Culpeper County against 
Robert Judson James.  Peyton alleged therein that on February 
6, 2003, Peyton and James were involved in an automobile 
accident in Culpeper County at the intersection of Virginia 
Route 663 and U.S. Route 29.  Peyton alleged that as a 
proximate result of James’ negligent operation of his vehicle, 
Peyton suffered various personal injuries.  Peyton sought 
$500,000 in damages. 
At the time the April 5, 2004 motion for judgment was 
filed, Peyton’s counsel was apparently unaware that James had 
died on March 1, 2003 as a result of injuries he sustained in 
the accident.  James died intestate, and no administrator of 
his estate had qualified at the time the action was filed. 
On July 6, 2004, Peyton filed a “MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
AMEND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT/SUBSTITUTE ESTATE FOR DEFENDANT.”  
                     
1 The suit in this case was filed before we amended our 
rules, effective January 1, 2006, to provide that a civil 
action, which includes legal and equitable causes of action, 
is commenced by filing a “complaint.”  Rules 3:1 and 3:2; see 
also Ahari v. Morrison, 275 Va. 92, 95 n.2, 654 S.E.2d 891, 
893 n.2 (2008). 
 
2 
(Emphasis added.)  In that motion, Peyton requested that the 
circuit court grant “leave to substitute ‘the Estate of Robert 
Judson James, Administrator, Edwin F. Gentry, Esq.’ for the 
Defendant, Robert Judson James.”  The motion further averred 
that “the proper party is ‘the Estate of Robert Judson James, 
Administrator, Edwin F. Gentry, Esq.’”  A copy of the amended 
motion for judgment appended to Peyton’s motion for leave to 
amend styled the defendant as “the Estate of ROBERT JUDSON 
JAMES, Administrator, Edwin F. Gentry, Esq.”  The following 
pertinent allegations of fact are made in the body of the 
amended motion for judgment: 
2. Defendant, Robert Judson James, was a 
resident of Brandy Station, Virginia. 
 
3. Robert Judson James died on March 1, 2003. 
 
4. On June 28, 2004, Mr. Edwin F. Gentry, Esq. 
qualified as the Administrator of the Estate of 
Robert Judson James. 
 
By an order dated July 7, 2004, the circuit court granted 
Peyton’s motion for leave to amend.  On the same day, the 
clerk of the circuit court issued a notice of amended motion 
for judgment to be served on Gentry. 
On July 27, 2004, an answer and grounds of defense, 
captioned in the style of the amended motion for judgment, was 
filed.  The pleading admitted that Gentry qualified as the 
administrator of James’ estate.  The pleading was signed: 
3 
ESTATE OF ROBERT JUDSON JAMES 
By Counsel  
 
Peyton obtained service of process of the amended motion 
for judgment on American Casualty Company of Reading, 
Pennsylvania, his uninsured motorist carrier.  Thereafter, 
American Casualty filed a response and grounds of defense on 
October 6, 2004. 
Ultimately, on March 27, 2008, a motion for summary 
judgment was filed on behalf of “the Estate of Robert Judson 
James, Administrator, Edwin F. Gentry, Esq.”2  Principally 
citing Swann v. Marks, 252 Va. 181, 184, 476 S.E.2d 170, 171-
72 (1996), it was contended in the motion that Peyton’s action 
was a nullity because the named defendant was an estate.  The 
motion contained the further assertion that it was not 
sufficient to include a reference to the personal 
representative of the estate in the caption as “[t]his is not 
merely a mis-ordering of words,” because “[t]he personal 
representative and the estate are two different entities,” 
                     
 
2 The long interval between the filing of the initial 
pleadings and the motion for summary judgment was occasioned 
by ancillary proceedings, including the consolidation of this 
case with Peyton’s action against another driver involved in 
the same accident, the intervention of a workers’ compensation 
carrier asserting a right of subrogation, and extensive 
discovery.  None of these proceedings, recounted in a 
manuscript record of more than 1000 pages, are germane to 
issues raised in these appeals. 
 
4 
and, thus, “naming the estate is not a misnomer” which could 
be cured by a further substitution of the personal 
representative of the estate. 
On April 1, 2008, following a hearing conducted on the 
motion for summary judgment, the circuit court ruled that 
Peyton’s amended motion for judgment failed to properly 
identify Gentry, in his capacity as administrator of James’ 
estate, as the defendant.  Additionally, because Peyton’s 
motion to amend had asserted that the “estate” was to be 
substituted for the original defendant, the court ruled that 
the amended motion for judgment had identified the estate, not 
Gentry, as the defendant.  Accordingly, the court sustained 
the motion for summary judgment, ruling that Swann required 
that an action maintained against an estate could not be 
amended to substitute the personal representative since they 
are separate, distinct entities. 
Thereafter, on April 16, 2008, the circuit court 
conducted a hearing upon Peyton’s motion to reconsider the 
court’s April 1, 2008 order.  At that hearing, Peyton sought 
to distinguish Swann, contending that the amended pleading 
identifying the defendant as “the Estate of Robert Judson 
James, Administrator, Edwin F. Gentry, Esq.” was merely a 
misnomer, not a misjoinder.  Peyton requested the court to set 
aside the prior order granting summary judgment and, pursuant 
5 
to Code § 8.01-6, to permit a further amendment of the motion 
for judgment “correcting” the style of the defendant to be 
“Edwin F. Gentry, Esq., Administrator of the Estate of Robert 
Judson James.”  This should be permitted, Peyton contended, 
because Gentry had actual notice of the action and would not 
be prejudiced by allowing the further amendment. 
The circuit court initially announced its ruling from the 
bench, stating:  “It may be that the style of the amended 
motion for judgment was not worded as one might expect.  But 
Mr. Gentry, upon further review, is correctly named as the 
administrator.  He is, in fact, the duly qualified 
administrator by this Court and he was personally served with 
process.”  Reversing its prior determination, the court 
concluded that the amended motion for judgment properly 
identified Gentry, in his capacity as the administrator of the 
estate, rather than the estate itself, as the defendant. 
At the conclusion of the April 16, 2008 hearing, the 
circuit court entered an order vacating the April 1, 2008 
order.  In that order, the court expressly ruled that “the 
Defendant the estate of Robert Judson James, Administrator, 
Edwin F. Gentry, Esquire, is a proper party pursuant to this 
Court’s Order.” 
Thereafter, on June 30, 2008 and pursuant to Code § 8.01-
670.1, the circuit court entered an order certifying an 
6 
interlocutory appeal to this Court on the issue whether “the 
Defendant ‘The Estate of Robert Judson James, Administrator, 
Edwin F. Gentry, Esquire’ is a proper party to the action.”  
By orders dated November 8, 2008, we awarded these appeals, 
consolidating them for argument and decision. 
DISCUSSION 
Initially, we observe that the party filing a civil 
action has an obligation to express the nature of the claim 
being asserted, and the identity of the party against whom it 
is asserted, in clear and unambiguous language so as to inform 
both the court and the opposing party of the nature of the 
claim being made.  See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Benitez, 273 
Va. 242, 251-52, 639 S.E.2d 203, 207 (2007); Hensley v. 
Dreyer, 247 Va. 25, 30, 439 S.E.2d 372, 375 (1994).  Thus, 
when there is an ambiguity in the pleading, whether as a 
result of a defect in form or lack of clarity in the 
allegations made, the proponent has the burden to show that 
the pleading is sufficient to identify the claims being 
asserted and the party alleged to be liable on those claims. 
The motion for judgment filed by Peyton on April 5, 2004 
was proper in form in that it clearly stated a claim for 
personal injuries allegedly suffered by Peyton as a result of 
the negligence of Robert Judson James, who was identified in 
both the caption and throughout the body of the pleading as 
7 
the defendant.  The record does not disclose whether, prior to 
filing the pleading, Peyton’s counsel was aware that James had 
died on March 1, 2003. 
Prior to July 1, 1991, an action “filed against a 
deceased party was a nullity.”  Parker v. Warren, 273 Va. 20, 
24, 639 S.E.2d 179, 181 (2007) (citing Rennolds v. Williams, 
147 Va. 196, 198-200, 136 S.E. 597, 597-98 (1927)).  “Thus, if 
a litigant filed a personal action against a defendant who, 
possibly unbeknownst to the plaintiff, had died, . . . the 
statute of limitations would continue to run.”  Id.  Nor could 
the error, even if unintentional, be cured by substituting the 
executor or administrator of the deceased party’s estate 
“because the personal representative was a person distinct 
from the decedent, the mistaken naming of the decedent was not 
a misnomer and substitution of the personal representative did 
not relate back to the initial filing of the lawsuit.”  Id.  
(citing Rockwell v. Allman, 211 Va. 560, 561, 179 S.E.2d 471, 
472 (1971)); see also Swann, 252 Va. at 184, 476 S.E.2d at 
172. 
However, an amendment of Code § 8.01-229 in 1991 adding 
subsection (B)(2)(b) altered this long-standing rule “by 
providing that [an action] filed against a defendant who was 
deceased when the action was filed could be amended to 
substitute the decedent’s personal representative.”  Parker, 
8 
273 Va. at 24, 639 S.E.2d at 181.  Code 8.01-229(B)(2)(b) 
provides: 
 
If a person against whom a personal action may 
be brought dies before suit papers naming such 
person as defendant have been filed with the court, 
then such suit papers may be amended to substitute 
the decedent’s personal representative as party 
defendant before the expiration of the applicable 
limitation period or within two years after the date 
such suit papers were filed with the court, 
whichever occurs later, and such suit papers shall 
be taken as properly filed. 
 
Pursuant to Code § 8.01-229(B)(2)(b), Peyton’s July 6, 
2004 motion to amend the original motion for judgment was 
clearly authorized under the circumstances of this case.  
However, the amended motion for judgment remained subject to 
the rule requiring the motion to be clear and unambiguous in 
expressing the identity of the party the plaintiff intends to 
name as the defendant and upon what basis that party is liable 
to the plaintiff.  Here, unless the amended motion for 
judgment clearly identified Gentry, in his representative 
capacity, as the party being substituted as the party 
defendant in place of James, Code § 8.01-229(B)(2)(b) would 
not permit the substitution of a separate party defendant. 
Peyton acknowledges that the proper format for 
identifying a personal representative of an estate as a party 
defendant in a pleading is to list the personal representative 
by name followed by a description of the capacity in which he 
9 
or she is being sued.  He contends, however, that the 
“syntactical difference” between the proper form for such 
pleadings and the form used in the caption of his amended 
motion for judgment in this case is of no moment because “the 
words ‘Estate of Robert Judson James, Administrator, Edwin F. 
Gentry, Esq.’ . . . share the same meaning as ‘Edwin F. 
Gentry[,] Esq., Administrator, Estate of Robert Judson 
James.’ ”  Peyton further contends that even if the circuit 
court erred in determining that the form of the amended 
pleading was adequate to identify Gentry in his representative 
capacity as the party defendant, the defect in the pleading 
was nonetheless merely a misnomer and subject to correction by 
amendment.  This is so, he maintains, because unlike Swann, 
where the named party was only identified as the estate 
without reference to a personal representative in the original 
action filed, here the pleading identified Gentry as the 
personal representative in both the caption and the body of 
the pleading, and Gentry had actual notice of the action.  We 
disagree. 
In addition to discussing this same issue in Swann, we 
have addressed analogous issues in cases involving other types 
of relationships that require a person or entity that is not 
capable of appearing sui juris to sue or be sued through a 
fiduciary in a representative capacity.  In such cases, the 
10 
courts are required to determine whether the identification of 
the party comported with a recognized statutory form.  If it 
did not, the courts must determine whether the defect in the 
pleading constituted a misnomer, where the right person or 
entity was made a party but was incorrectly named in the 
pleading, or a misjoinder, where the person or entity 
identified by the pleading was not the person by or against 
whom the action could, or was intended to be, brought.  See, 
e.g., Cook v. Radford Community Hosp., Inc., 260 Va. 443, 451, 
536 S.E.2d 906, 910 (2000).  Where there is a misjoinder of a 
party who cannot sue or be sued directly, there is a 
corresponding nonjoinder of the fiduciary who is the proper 
party.  The distinction is significant.  It is permissible by 
amendment of the deficient pleading to correct a misjoinder 
under Code § 8.01-5, a misnomer under Code § 8.01-6, and a 
nonjoinder under Code §§ 8.01-5 and 8.01-7.  However, the 
statutes distinguish the circumstances under which the 
permitted correction will relate back to the original filing, 
effectively tolling the statute of limitations. 
In that regard, Code § 8.01-6, in pertinent part, 
provides that: 
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim 
is asserted, whether to correct a misnomer or 
otherwise, relates back to the date of the original 
pleading if (i) the claim asserted in the amended 
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 
11 
occurrence set forth in the original pleading, (ii) 
within the limitations period prescribed for 
commencing the action against the party to be 
brought in by the amendment, that party or its agent 
received notice of the institution of the action, 
(iii) that party will not be prejudiced in 
maintaining a defense on the merits, and (iv) that 
party knew or should have known that but for a 
mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, 
the action would have been brought against that 
party. 
 
In similar fashion, Code § 8.01-6.1 permits this relation back 
for amendments changing or adding a claim or defense, and Code 
§ 8.01-6.2(A) permits the same for amendments regarding a 
party’s trade name or corporate name.3 
Moreover, even when correction of a misjoinder and 
nonjoinder is permitted, the amendment is only allowed to 
bring in a proper defendant.  Likewise, a new plaintiff may 
                     
 
3 While the parties in this appeal do not reference Code 
§ 8.01-6.2(B), that statute provides that when an action is 
“filed against an estate of a decedent, and filed within the 
applicable statute of limitations, naming the proper name of 
the estate of the deceased and service is effected or 
attempted on an individual or individuals as executor [or] 
administrator . . . of the estate, such filing tolls the 
statute of limitations for such claim in the event the 
executor [or] administrator . . . of the estate [is] unable to 
legally receive service at the time service was attempted, or 
defend suit because [his] authority . . . excludes defending 
said actions, or [his] duties . . . had expired at the time of 
the service or during the time of defending said action.” 
 
 
While we express no opinion with regard to the scope of 
the application of this statute, we note that by its express 
terms it is inapplicable in this case because Gentry was 
legally able to receive service of the suit under the proper 
name of James’ estate. 
12 
not be substituted for an original plaintiff who lacked 
standing to bring the action.  Chesapeake House on the Bay, 
Inc. v. Virginia National Bank, 231 Va. 440, 442-43, 344 
S.E.2d 913, 915 (1986); see also Wells v. Lorcom House 
Condominiums’ Council of Co-Owners, 237 Va. 247, 253, 377 
S.E.2d 381, 384 (1989); Bardach Iron & Steel Co. v. Tenenbaum, 
136 Va. 163, 173, 118 S.E. 502, 505 (1923). 
In Cook, an action was filed in the name of a person who 
had been declared incompetent and for whom a guardian had been 
appointed.  The trial court denied a motion to amend the 
pleading to reflect that the guardian was the proper party 
plaintiff, ruling that the defect could not be cured by 
amendment and dismissed the action.  260 Va. at 446, 536 
S.E.2d at 907.  On appeal, we affirmed the judgment, 
concluding that the error in filing the action in the name of 
the incompetent constituted a misjoinder, not a misnomer.  Id. 
at 451, 536 S.E.2d at 910. 
Similarly, in Miller v. Highland County, 274 Va. 355, 650 
S.E.2d 532 (2007), we considered whether an action which named 
a locality as a party defendant, rather than the locality’s 
governing body, was subject to correction as a misnomer.  
Holding that the relevant statutory provision under which the 
action was brought required the action to be against the 
governing body, we concluded that there had not been a 
13 
misnomer because the plaintiff “did not incorrectly name the 
right entity[, the governing body], but named a different 
entity[, the locality].”  Id. at 368, 650 S.E2d at 537. 
We used the same rationale in Swann to conclude that 
“[t]he personal representative of a decedent and the 
decedent’s ‘estate’ are two separate entities; the personal 
representative is a living individual while the ‘estate’ is a 
collection of property.”  Swann, 252 Va. at 184, 476 S.E.2d at 
172.  Accordingly, we held that “one cannot be substituted for 
another under the concept of correcting a misnomer.”  Id. 
As in Cook and Miller, there was no dispute in Swann as 
to whether the pleading naming the incorrect party could have 
been interpreted as actually naming the proper party.  In each 
case, respectively, the pleading clearly named the 
incompetent, the locality, and the estate, not the guardian, 
the governing body, or the personal representative.  Thus, 
while these cases are instructive in resolving the present 
appeals, we must first consider whether the circuit court 
erred in ruling that Peyton’s amended motion for judgment 
adequately identified Gentry, in his representative capacity, 
as the party defendant. 
We addressed a similar “syntactical” conundrum in Herndon 
v. St. Mary’s Hospital, Inc., 266 Va. 472, 587 S.E.2d 567 
(2003).  In that case, we were required to consider whether 
14 
the parents of a minor child could bring an action in their 
own names as next friend of the child, rather than in the name 
of the child by them as his next friends.  We concluded that 
under the applicable statute an action for the benefit of a 
minor child must be brought in the name of the child by a next 
friend because the “established rule is that the minor child, 
not the next friend, is the real party in interest in such an 
action.”  Id. at 476, 587 S.E.2d at 570.  Accordingly, we held 
that the trial court did not err in dismissing the action, 
since the parents were not entitled to maintain the action for 
the child in their own names.  Id. at 477, 587 S.E.2d at 570.  
Although we were not required to address the question whether 
the court should have allowed the substitution of the child, 
by his parents as next friends, as the proper party, it is 
clear that, as in Cook, such an amendment would not have been 
allowed since the failure to name the proper party plaintiff 
cannot be cured by an amendment. 
In determining the adequacy of a pleading to identify a 
party, we consider the pleading as a whole.  Thus, whether a 
party named in a caption is a proper party to the action is to 
be determined not merely by how that party is identified in 
the caption of the pleading, but by the allegations set forth 
within a pleading that identify that party more specifically.  
15 
See McCormick v. Romans, 214 Va. 144, 147, 198 S.E.2d 651, 653 
(1973). 
As Peyton conceded during oral argument of these appeals, 
the amended motion for judgment is not a model of clarity.  
Indeed, there is a patent ambiguity between the caption of the 
amended motion for judgment and the allegations within that 
pleading.  The caption identifies “the Estate of Robert Judson 
James, Administrator, Edwin F. Gentry, Esq.” as the defendant; 
the allegations within the motion for judgment refer to the 
“Defendant, Robert Judson James.”  Although Peyton states in 
the motion for judgment that James died and that Gentry 
qualified as administrator of James’s estate, nothing within 
the body of the pleading clearly identifies Gentry in his 
capacity as administrator of James’ estate as the party 
defendant.  To the contrary, when the term “defendant” is used 
in the allegations of fact, the term clearly refers to James, 
as when, for example, it is alleged that Peyton’s vehicle was 
struck by “Defendant’s vehicle.” 
Just as in Herndon, where the order of the words 
identified the parents, not the child, as the plaintiffs who 
were further described as the “next friends” of the child, 
here, the most straightforward reading of the amended motion 
for judgment identifies “the Estate of ROBERT JUDSON JAMES” as 
the party defendant.  While the caption of the pleading goes 
16 
on to identify Gentry as the administrator of the estate and 
the body of the pleading recites the fact of his qualification 
as administrator, at best these references only serve to 
identify James’ estate more specifically.  They simply do not 
name Gentry, rather than the estate, as the party defendant 
when the pleading is read as a whole.  Accordingly, we hold 
that the circuit court erred in ruling that the amended motion 
for judgment identified Gentry, in his capacity as 
administrator of James’ estate, as the party defendant. 
Because we have determined that the estate was the party 
defendant named by the amended motion for judgment, it follows 
that this case is controlled by Swann, unless there is merit 
in Peyton’s contentions that Swann can be distinguished on the 
ground that despite the “misnomer” of the proper party 
defendant, here Gentry, the proper party, was identified in 
the amended motion for judgment and was actually served with 
that pleading.  Accordingly, Peyton contends that there would 
be no prejudice in allowing a correction of the “misnomer.”  
We disagree with those contentions. 
Peyton has misapprehended the difference between 
“misnomer” and “misjoinder.”  As was explained above, a 
“[m]isnomer arises when the right person is incorrectly named, 
not where the wrong defendant is named.”  Swann, 252 Va. at 
184, 476 S.E.2d at 172; see also Cook, 260 Va. at 451, 536 
17 
S.E.2d 910; Rockwell, 211 Va. at 561, 179 S.E.2d at 472.  Code 
§ 8.01-6 permits the correction of a misnomer where the party 
that was identified by the wrong name has notice and otherwise 
will not suffer prejudice by the amendment, and the statute 
relates the amendment back to the original filing, effectively 
tolling the statute of limitations.  In this case, the wrong 
defendant was named, and Code § 8.01-6 is not applicable to 
such a misjoinder.  Accordingly, the circuit court’s original 
determination to award summary judgment and to dismiss 
Peyton’s action in this case was correct, because a misjoinder 
is simply not subject to being legitimized by substituting the 
correct party.  The only resolution in such a case, in the 
absence of a statute of limitations bar, is to commence a new 
action against the proper party. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court erred 
in setting aside the order of April 1, 2008 awarding summary 
judgment to the Estate of Robert Judson James and in 
permitting the amended motion for judgment to be maintained 
against Edwin F. Gentry in his capacity as administrator of 
the estate.  Accordingly, the court’s order of April 16, 2008 
will be reversed, and because the applicable statute of 
limitations now bars Peyton’s action, final judgment will be 
entered here for the estate and American Casualty. 
18 
Record No. 081310 – Reversed and final judgment. 
Record No. 081314 – Reversed and final judgment. 
19