Title: State v. Finn
Citation: 111 Ariz. 271, 528 P.2d 615
Docket Number: 2911
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: November 21, 1974

111 Ariz. 271 (1974) 528 P.2d 615 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. David John FINN, Appellant. No. 2911. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. November 21, 1974. *272 Gary K. Nelson, Former Atty. Gen., N. Warner Lee, Atty. Gen., by Stanley L. Patchell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Welliever, Smith &amp; McVay by J. Douglas McVay, Phoenix, for appellant. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal from a judgment of guilt to the crime of armed robbery, §§ 13-641 and 13-643 A.R.S. Appellant Finn was sentenced to a term of from five to fifteen years in prison. The issues presented by Finn on appeal are as follows: The facts necessary for a determination of this case are as follows. On 25 January 1973 a young man at the YMCA was homosexually assaulted and robbed. The assailant emerged from a Y men's room and followed the victim into an enclosed stairwell. This assailant, armed with a knife, grabbed and pushed the victim against the staircase whereupon he undid the victim's pants, fondled his genitals, and then robbed his victim. The assailant compelled the victim to remove all clothing except for socks and lie face down on the floor. The victim later informed Mr. Whitham, the downstairs clerk at the Y, of the incident as well as the appearance of his assailant. In the evening of 24 February 1973, another victim in this case was driving home when he stopped to use the restroom at Papago Park. Upon leaving the restroom, a person later identified by this victim as the defendant, David John Finn, approached the victim and asked him if he would "be interested in anything." When the victim responded with a "no" the defendant drew his gun and after being "frisked" the following transpired: In the beginning of March the victim of the robbery at Papago Park, while driving in the same vicinity, spotted the defendant driving a car. He noted the license number and reported it to the police. The investigation by the police disclosed the car belonged to Finn's roommate and that Finn had access to it. The Phoenix police brought by some photos for the victim to look at and he selected a photo of Finn and a warrant was issued for Finn's arrest. The Phoenix police were unable to locate Finn. On 17 March 1973 Finn was apprehended in Cranston, Rhode Island, by Officer Saccocia of Rhode Island, on the Arizona felony warrant. Finn was returned to Arizona to await trial. Defendant was admitted to bail pending trial. At the trial, Finn did not take the stand in his own defense and the jury returned a verdict of guilty. From this verdict and judgment of guilty to the crime of armed robbery defendant appeals. STATEMENT TO THE POLICE BY THE DEFENDANT Defendant was arrested in Cranston, Rhode Island, by Detective Sgt. Paul Saccocia of the Cranston Police Department. Sgt. Saccocia testified that at the time of the arrest he read to the defendant a standard Miranda rights card and: At this point defendant's attorney objected: The officer was allowed to answer. The officer further testified that later the defendant was taken to the police station: Defendant contends that these statements should not have been allowed absent (1) a hearing outside the jury, (2) an express finding by the court that the statements were voluntary, and (3) instructions to the jury concerning the voluntariness of the statements. We have stated: In the instant case, while the defendant's counsel did make some objection as to foundation and whether there was a knowing waiver, he made no motion to suppress prior to trial nor did he ask for a hearing outside the presence of the jury when the questions were asked. Neither does the evidence raise a question of voluntariness as to defendant's statements. The trial judge is not required, sua sponte, to enter into an examination outside the presence of the jury to determine possible involuntariness where the question of voluntariness is not raised either by the evidence or the defense counsel. We have stated: Nevertheless, defendant further contends that even though no instruction on voluntariness was requested, the court should have sua sponte given an instruction to the jury on the voluntariness of the confession. We also answered this contention in State v. Armstrong when we stated: Assuming that these statements were admission against interest, we find no error in their admission or their consideration by the jury without a specific finding of voluntariness or instruction concerning their voluntariness. REFUSAL TO ANSWER Defendant further contends that the defendant's statement in response to the officer's *276 question that "I wouldn't be crazy enough to tell you that," was in contravention of Finn's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Testimony concerning defendant's silence in response to questions when defendant was in custody or under circumstances wherein it is defendant's constitutional right to remain silent is not admissible. State v. Simoneau, 98 Ariz. 2, 401 P.2d 404 (1965); State v. Villalobos, 6 Ariz. App. 144, 430 P.2d 723 (1967). We have stated: In the instant case we are faced with a different situation. Had the defendant refused to answer questions or stated "I refuse to answer," that would have been clearly inadmissible. Simoneau, supra at 6. A defendant may, however, waive his right to remain silent and if he does, what he says may be used against him. The statement made by defendant herein falls on a middle ground. It is not clearly a refusal to answer, neither is it clearly a normal response to a question which indicates a willingness not only to answer but also a willingness that the questioning continue. Under the circumstances, we believe that there was no abuse of the trial court's discretion in admitting the answer. We are persuaded to this view by the fact that the defendant was clearly informed of his Miranda rights, there was no duress, he answered voluntarily, and also, though not persuasive, there was no objection to the question when it was asked at the trial. We find no error in the admission of this statement. HEARSAY TESTIMONY The defendant next contends that it was error to admit the statement by Mr. Whitham quoting the first victim's statement ("That's the man that robbed me") made three months after the crime. The first victim was called by the State to testify concerning the time he was robbed by defendant at the YMCA. This testimony was admissible as to common scheme, plan or design. State v. Kelly, Ariz., 526 P.2d 720, 1974; State v. Phillips, 102 Ariz. 377, 430 P.2d 139 (1967); State v. Jacobs, 18 Ariz. App. 471, 503 P.2d 826 (1973). The victim identified the defendant in the courtroom and also testified he recognized the defendant when he saw him at the YMCA several months after the robbery. The defense attempted, by cross examination, to impeach this identification of the defendant. The defense attempted to show that the victim did not have an adequate opportunity to see and identify his assailant at the time he was attacked since he was face down on the floor. The victim testified that the second time he saw the defendant he was "pretty sure" it was the defendant. The victim testified: To rebut defense's contention that the victim, at the time of the crime lacked time or ability to make an identification of his assailant, the State offered the testimony of Mr. Whitham who heard the victim several months after the crime occurred, identify David Finn as his assailant: Annotation in the American Law Report states: Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court, however, has gone further and stated: And this court has agreed with Traynor's interpretation. See State v. Taylor, 99 Ariz. 151, 407 P.2d 106 (1965); State v. Miranda, 98 Ariz. 11, 401 P.2d 716 (1965), reversed on other grounds. In the instant case the witness had testified as to the identification, the defendant had attempted to impeach that testimony. The testimony of the desk clerk was admissible, if not to corroborate the testimony of the witness as is the rule in most cases, but as appears to be the case in Arizona, following the California rule, for its substantive evidence value as well. Evidence of the first victim's out of court identification of the defendant was therefore admissible and it was not error to fail to exclude it. POLICEMAN'S REFERENCE TO KNOWING THE ACCUSED During the trial Officer Saccocia of Rhode Island responded to a prosecutor's question: Defendant contends that the fact the officer testified that he had known David before "[was] a clear suggestion that the appellant had previous substantial involvement of a criminal nature of which Officer Saccocia was aware." The general rule in Arizona is: We do not believe, however, that taken in the context of the trial before us, that the statements necessarily indicate that the defendant has a prior record or has had previous trouble with the police. Policemen do know people other than criminals and given the size of the community in the instant case, it is just as reasonable *279 to assume that the officer's prior contact with the defendant was not as the result of any prior bad acts or criminal conduct on the part of the defendant himself. While we would have preferred that the officer had not made this statement, taken in the context of the entire trial, we find no prejudice. Judgment affirmed. HAYS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, LOCKWOOD and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.