Title: Ind. Dep't of Ins. v. Everhart
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 84S01-1105-CV-282
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: January 20, 2012

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
Elizabeth H. Knotts 
Rori L. Goldman 
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
James O. McDonald 
Terre Haute, Indiana 
John P. Young 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE 
INDIANA TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION 
Steven L. Langer 
Valparaiso, Indiana 
Tara M. Worthley 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
No. 84S01-1105-CV-282 
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, 
INDIANA PATIENT’S COMPENSATION FUND, 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
v. 
ROBIN EVERHART, PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES 
K. EVERHART, JR., 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
Appeal from the Vigo Superior Court, No. 84D01-0410-CT-10001 
The Honorable Phillip I. Adler, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 84A01-0912-CV-614 
January 20, 2012 
Shepard, Chief Justice. 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Jan 20 2012, 10:03 am
2 
Robin Everhart filed suit against the Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund (PCF) to 
recover excess damages after settling a wrongful death claim against an emergency room 
physician in whose care her husband died.  The PCF asked the trial court to reduce its award of 
damages to account for the twenty percent chance that Robin’s husband would have died 
anyway, even in the absence of the physician’s negligence.  The trial court declined to do so, 
awarding Robin the statutory maximum $1 million in excess damages.  We affirm, but on 
slightly different grounds. 
Facts and Procedural History 
Around 2 p.m. on October 4, 2004, James K. Everhart, Jr. was riding his motorcycle on 
Margaret Avenue in Terre Haute, Indiana.  Tragically, Larry B. Perkins, an employee of 
Standard Forwarding Company, Inc., crashed his semi-truck into Everhart’s motorcycle and ran 
over Everhart. 
Because the accident occurred so close to a fire station and a bystander ran in to 
personally alert the paramedics, the paramedics arrived on the scene almost exactly as the first 
call came into the emergency dispatch.  Paramedic James Henderson and EMT Norm 
Loudermilk both testified that Everhart sustained massive injuries but that they were able to 
control his bleeding.  (Appellant’s App. at 16.) 
Henderson and Loudermilk both later came to expect Everhart would survive.  
(Appellant’s App. at 17.)  Although Everhart appeared unconscious when the paramedics loaded 
him into the ambulance, he opened his eyes and started speaking to Loudermilk after receiving 
an intravenous drip and oxygen.  (Appellant’s App. at 16.)  Initially, Everhart registered only a 
six on the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS), but he improved to an eleven and then a thirteen on the 
GCS during the ambulance ride to the hospital.  (Appellant’s App. at 17.)  Although the 
paramedics could not pick up a blood pressure reading for Everhart, Henderson testified that 
3 
their equipment would not have been sensitive enough to pick up a blood pressure of less than 
80/40 mmHg.  (Appellant’s App. at 18.) 
The paramedics transferred Everhart to the care of Dr. C. Bilston Clarke, a physician in 
the emergency room at Terre Haute Regional Hospital.  Despite Everhart’s severe bleeding at the 
scene, Dr. Clarke did not immediately administer a blood transfusion to Everhart.  Everhart later 
died of a cardiac arrest while still in Dr. Clarke’s care.  Everhart left behind his wife and son, 
Robin and Troy Everhart. 
Robin filed a wrongful death suit against Perkins and Standard Forwarding in October 
2004.  The parties settled for $1.9 million.  Robin amended her complaint in October 2005, 
adding a wrongful death claim against Dr. Clarke.  Again, the parties settled out of court, this 
time for a lump-sum payment and future payments with a total present value of $187,001.  Robin 
then filed a third amended complaint on June 17, 2008, adding a claim against the PCF that 
sought to recover excess damages over and above her settlement with Dr. Clarke. 
At trial, the parties disputed whether Everhart suffered a cardiac arrest in the ambulance 
or after arriving at the hospital.  Robin’s expert witness, Dr. Frank Miller, testified that if 
Everhart had suffered a cardiac arrest after arriving at the hospital, then he would still have stood 
an eighty percent chance of surviving his injuries if he had received proper medical care.  
(Appellant’s App. at 19–20.)  By contrast, the PCF’s expert witness, Dr. Geoffrey L. Billows, 
testified that if Everhart had suffered a cardiac arrest before arriving at the hospital, then he 
would only have stood a zero to three percent chance of surviving his injuries even with proper 
medical care.  (Appellant’s App. at 17.) 
Finding that Everhart did not suffer a cardiac arrest until after arriving at the hospital, the 
trial court accepted Dr. Miller’s opinion that Everhart stood an eighty percent chance of 
recovering had he received proper medical care.  (Appellant’s App. at 19–20.)  It accepted 
Henderson’s testimony that the equipment in the ambulance would not have been sensitive 
enough to pick up some blood pressure readings and Dr. Billows’ testimony that it would have 
4 
been physically impossible for anyone suffering a cardiac arrest to exhibit a GCS of thirteen.  
(Appellant’s App. at 18.) 
Relying on our holdings in Atterholt v. Herbst, 902 N.E.2d 220 (Ind. 2009), Cahoon v. 
Cummings, 734 N.E.2d 535 (Ind. 2000), and Mayhue v. Sparkman, 653 N.E.2d 1384 (Ind. 
1995), the PCF argued that it should not be responsible for the portion of Everhart’s injuries he 
probably would have sustained even in the absence of any medical negligence.  (Appellant’s 
App. at 82–85.)  The PCF therefore urged the trial court to reduce any award of damages by 
twenty percent to account for the chance that Everhart would have died anyway, even if Dr. 
Clarke had rendered proper medical care.  (Appellant’s App. at 21.)  The PCF further argued that 
it was entitled to a set-off in an amount equal to the payments Robin received in settlement from 
Standard Forwarding and Dr. Clarke’s insurance company.  (Appellant’s App. at 85.) 
Instead, after finding that the plaintiffs’ losses exceeded $3.15 million, the trial court held 
that our Mayhue line of cases applied only when a patient initially stood a fifty percent or worse 
chance of avoiding any injury.  (Appellant’s App. at 31.)  The court refused to reduce its overall 
finding on injuries by twenty percent and therefore awarded Robin and Troy the remaining $1 
million of the statutory cap.  (Appellant’s App. at 21, 32.)  Because the court found that Robin 
and Troy’s actual losses exceeded their recoveries from Standard Forwarding and Dr. Clarke’s 
insurance company plus the maximum amount of excess damages the trial court could impose on 
the PCF, the court found it unnecessary to address the PCF’s argument that it was further entitled 
to a set-off in the amount equal to what Robin and Troy already recovered in settlements.  
(Appellant’s App. at 28, 31.)  It further declined to address Robin’s response that it should 
reduce the amount of any set-off to account for Robin’s attorneys’ fees and expenses.  
(Appellant’s App. at 28, 31.) 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed based on our Mayhue line of cases and 
therefore remanded for further findings of fact as to the damages owed Robin, Troy, and 
Everhart’s estate.  Indiana Dep’t of Ins. v. Everhart, 932 N.E.2d 684 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).  We 
granted transfer.  Indiana Dep’t of Ins. v. Everhart, 950 N.E.2d 1208 (Ind. 2011) (table). 
5 
Standard of Review 
On an appeal from a final judgment, we review conclusions of law de novo.  Johnson v. 
Johnson, 920 N.E.2d 253 (Ind. 2010).  When a trial court has entered separate findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, we review findings of fact for clear error.  Ind. Trial Rule 52(A).  But a 
trial court’s characterization of an issue as a finding of fact does not constrain us when the issue 
more appropriately constitutes a question of law. 
I. 
Cahoon Did Not Address the Better-Than-Even Cases. 
The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act caps a recovery for a patient’s injury or death at 
$1,250,000.  Ind. Code § 34-18-14-3(a)(3) (2008).  The Act limits the liability of a qualified 
health care provider whose medical negligence proximately caused the injury or death to the first 
$250,000 of damages.  Ind. Code § 34-18-14-3(b).  If a judgment or settlement fixes damages in 
excess of a qualified health care provider’s liability, then a plaintiff may recover excess damages 
from the PCF.  Ind. Code § 34-18-14-3(c). 
In a suit to recover excess damages from the PCF, an earlier settlement with a qualified 
health care provider conclusively establishes his liability.  Ind. Code § 34-18-15-3(5) (2008).  
Nevertheless, in Herbst, we held that evidence of a patient’s preexisting risk of harm was still 
admissible for the purpose of determining the amount of excess damages to which the plaintiff 
was entitled.  Herbst, 902 N.E.2d at 222–23.  The fact that evidence of a preexisting risk of harm 
would also be relevant to liability were liability at issue did not preclude admitting that evidence 
for some other purpose.  See id. 
Our holding in Herbst was a necessary consequence of Cahoon, in which we held that a 
successful Mayhue claim for causing an increased risk of harm entitled a plaintiff to damages in 
proportion to that increased risk.  Cahoon, 734 N.E.2d at 541.  In Cahoon, a wife filed suit for 
the wrongful death of her husband, who stood only a twenty-five to thirty percent chance of 
6 
recovering even before a physician failed to diagnose his esophageal cancer.  Id. at 538.  We 
concluded that the appropriate measure of damages was equal to the total amount of damages 
ordinarily allowed in a wrongful death suit multiplied by the difference between the pre-
negligence and post-negligence chances of survival.  See id. at 540–41 (citing McKellips v. St. 
Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 476–77 (Okla. 1987)). 
The PCF therefore argues that our decision in Herbst required the trial court to reduce its 
award of damages in proportion to Everhart’s preexisting risk of death.  (Appellant’s Br. at 14.)  
But the PCF has not cited any Indiana cases in which a court held that a plaintiff who more likely 
than not would have avoided any injury but for the defendant’s negligence could only recover 
proportional damages.1  As both Robin and the trial court noted, however, all the decisions in our 
Mayhue line of cases involved patients who stood a fifty percent or worse chance of recovering 
before suffering some medical negligence.  (Appellant’s App. at 21; Appellee’s Br. at 10–14.) 
This distinction is not a coincidence, as Mayhue reflects a special concern for plaintiffs 
who stood a fifty percent or worse chance of recovering before suffering some form of medical 
negligence.  In Mayhue, a husband filed suit for loss of consortium after a physician negligently 
failed to diagnose cancer in his wife, who later passed away.  Mayhue, 653 N.E.2d at 1385–86.  
We affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny summary judgment to the defendant even though 
the wife would have stood less than a fifty percent chance of surviving even if the physician had 
                                                 
1 The PCF appears to have cited Smith v. Washington, 734 N.E.2d 548 (Ind. 2000), for this proposition in 
the summary of its argument.  (Appellant’s Br. at 7) (“The Indiana Supreme Court has already applied 
proportional damages to cases with a better-than-even pre-negligence chance of survival.”).  But this 
citation is somewhat misleading.  Several times in that opinion, we described Smith’s chances of avoiding 
injury in the absence of any medical negligence as amounting to an even fifty percent.  Smith, 734 N.E.2d 
at 550–51.  Moreover, we expressly declined to determine whether the applicability of our increased-risk-
of-harm analysis depended on a patient’s initial chances of recovering, in part because the patient had 
argued for its application before the trial court.  Id. 
7 
rendered proper medical care, and even though the husband therefore could not establish that the 
physician’s negligence was the cause-in-fact of her death.  Id. at 1385. 
As we noted in Mayhue, this situation presents an obvious problem because this type of 
plaintiff could never establish proximate cause under the traditional analysis no matter how 
negligent the physician’s conduct.  Id. at 1387.  We therefore fashioned a solution to this 
particular problem based on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965).2  Id. at 1388.  Other 
courts that based their loss-of-chance doctrines on Section 323 likewise made clear that their 
purpose in adopting a loss-of-chance doctrine was to ensure that patients with a fifty-percent or 
worse chance of recovering would still receive the same care as healthier patients by preventing 
physicians from claiming a blanket release from liability under the label of cause-in-fact.  See, 
e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 476–77 (Wash. 1983) (thirty-nine percent 
chance of recovery pre-negligence); see also Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., 688 P.2d 605, 
615–16 (Ariz. 1984) (five to ten percent chance); McKellips, 741 P.2d at 470 (chance uncertain).  
See generally John D. Hodson, Medical Malpractice:  “Loss of Chance” Causality, 54 A.L.R.4th 
10 (1987 & Supp. 2011). 
Mayhue’s scope is important because Cahoon established only the measure of damages in 
cases involving a Mayhue claim.  In Cahoon, we stated that “upon a showing of causation under 
Mayhue, damages are proportional to the increased risk attributable to the defendant’s negligent 
act or omission.”  Cahoon, 734 N.E.2d at 541.  Because bringing a Mayhue claim is only 
necessary when a plaintiff cannot establish cause-in-fact under traditional negligence principles, 
                                                 
2 The Restatement (Third) of Torts criticizes this approach because Section 323 appears in a chapter 
dealing with duties, not causation.  Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Liability for Physical and Emotional 
Harms § 26 cmt. n (2005).  More recent cases from other jurisdictions have trended away from this 
approach, preferring to recognize loss of chance as a legally cognizable injury in its own right.  See, e.g., 
Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 831–32 (Mass. 2008); see also Lord v. Lovett, 770 A.2d 1103, 
1105–06 (N.H. 2001); Alberts v. Schultz, 975 P.2d 1279, 1283 (N.M. 1999). 
8 
Cahoon did not, at least by its terms, apply to cases in which a plaintiff stood a better-than-even 
chance of recovering before suffering some form of medical negligence. 
Indeed, the general rule in a suit for negligence is that a plaintiff may recover damages 
for all injuries the defendant proximately caused.  See Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1220 
(Ind. 2000) (citing Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman by Smith, 622 N.E.2d 515, 519 (Ind. 1993); Peak v. 
Campbell, 578 N.E.2d 360, 361 (Ind. 1991)).  We therefore interpret the PCF’s argument as a 
request that we extend the Cahoon approach to cases involving patients who stood a better-than-
even chance of recovering.  We conclude that this case represents an inappropriate vehicle for 
deciding whether to do so. 
Decisions like Mayhue and Cahoon arose from the scholarly criticism that the traditional 
rule undercompensated some plaintiffs for their injuries and undercharged some physicians for 
their negligence.  See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal 
Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 Yale L.J. 1353, 
1377, 1387 (1981).  Under the traditional analysis, a plaintiff who could show only a forty-nine-
percent chance that the patient would not have suffered some injury but for the physician’s 
negligence would not recover anything.  See David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of 
Chance, 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 605, 627 (2001).  Because over a large number of cases it 
seems statistically certain that some of these less-than-even patients would have lived, this all-or-
nothing rule left some plaintiffs who had actually suffered an injury at the hands of a defendant 
out in the cold.  See King, supra, at 1377. 
But this coin had a flip-side:  A plaintiff who showed a fifty-one percent chance that the 
patient would not have died but for the physician’s negligence would be entitled to recover 
damages in the amount of 100 percent of her injuries.  See Fischer, supra, at 627.  Because over a 
large number of cases it seems statistically certain that some of these better-than-even patients 
would have died anyway, the all-or-nothing rule punished some physicians who did not actually 
cause any injury at all.  See King, supra, at 1387.  Assuming the probabilities of patients 
avoiding harm in the absence of medical negligence fell in an even distribution around a mean of 
9 
fifty percent, however, these errors may have simply canceled each other out, adequately 
compensating plaintiffs for injuries and deaths and adequately charging physicians for their 
negligence as classes, if not as individuals.  See Fischer, supra, at 631. 
Once courts addressed the problem of undercompensating plaintiffs by issuing decisions 
like Mayhue and Cahoon, however, some commentators argued that awarding proportional 
damages in less-than-even cases and full damages in better-than-even cases systematically 
imposed punitive damages on physicians.  E.g., Fischer, supra, at 628.  Thus, the argument goes, 
courts should extend decisions like Cahoon to better-than-even cases.  See Fischer, supra, at 628; 
Jonathan P. Kieffer, The Case for Across-the-Board Application of the Loss-of-Chance Doctrine, 
64 Def. Couns. J. 568, 568–69 (1997); King, supra, at 1387.  But others have defended awarding 
proportional damages at or below the fifty percent threshold and full damages above it.  E.g., 
Lori R. Ellis, Note, Loss of Chance as Technique:  Toeing the Line at Fifty Percent, 72 Tex. L. 
Rev. 369, 383 (1993); see also Fischer, supra, at 628–29 (acknowledging one-time tortfeasors 
and difficulty financing lawsuits as possible reasons for not extending proportional damages to 
better-than-even cases). 
For all the academic interest in this issue, however, very few courts in other jurisdictions 
have confronted it.  The PCF has cited Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Renzi v. Paredes, 890 
N.E.2d 806 (Mass. 2008), for the proposition that a Massachusetts court would apply 
proportional damages in a better-than-even case, but Renzi provides less support for this 
proposition than the PCF asserts.  In Renzi, a husband sued a physician for failing to diagnose 
his wife’s cancer.  Id. at 810.  The plaintiff’s expert witness testified that the wife would have 
stood a fifty-eight percent chance of surviving had the physician timely diagnosed her cancer 
from her mammogram, but the defendant’s expert testified that she would have stood only a 
twenty percent chance.  See id. at 811 & n.8.  The jury found that the physician’s negligence was 
not a substantial contributing factor in causing the wife’s death, but that it was a substantial 
10 
contributing factor in causing the loss of a substantial chance to survive.  Id. at 812.  
Nevertheless, the jury awarded the plaintiff full damages,3 apparently because the judge refused 
to instruct the jury on proportional damages.  Id. at 813–16. 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the trial court should have instructed the 
jury on proportional damages.  Id. at 813.  It noted that loss of chance and wrongful death were 
distinct theories of injury, and that the physician’s negligence proximately caused only the wife’s 
loss of chance, not her actual death.  Id.  Indeed, the Massachusetts court remanded for a new 
trial solely on the issue of damages, thereby accepting the jury’s finding that the physician’s 
negligence was not the proximate cause of the patient’s death.  Id. at 813.  Renzi therefore seems 
not to demonstrate that a Massachusetts court would apply proportional damages in a case like 
Robin Everhart’s, in which the plaintiff could show that the physician’s negligence did 
proximately cause the patient’s actual death, not merely a loss of chance. 
The case coming closest to bearing on point seems to be Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398 
(N.J. 1990).  In Scafidi, parents sued a physician for failing to prevent a premature birth by 
timely administering medication to halt the mother’s labor, seeking to recover for the wrongful 
death of their daughter.  Id. at 400–01.  The mother suffered from a preexisting condition that put 
the child at risk of premature birth and death.  Id.  The plaintiffs’ expert testified that if the 
physician had timely administered the medication, then the child would have stood a seventy-
five to eighty percent chance of avoiding premature birth.  Id.  But the defendant’s expert 
                                                 
3 This would be something of an understatement.  The plaintiff’s expert testified that the economic loss 
from the patient’s death amounted to a present value of $1,019,936.  Renzi, 890 N.E.2d at 811.  But the 
jury awarded “total economic losses” of $1.4 million.  Id. at 815.  The trial court entered judgment against 
the defendants in the amount of $2.8 million, which appeared to reflect the judge’s error in doubling the 
jury’s actual award of $1.4 million by adding the total to all of its constituent parts.  See id. at 812, 815.  
But the Supreme Judicial Court reversed because the jury instructions conflated standard wrongful death 
damages and loss-of-chance damages, calling into question the integrity of the $1.4 million figure in the 
first place.  Id. at 813–16. 
11 
testified that even if the physician had acted timely, then the child would still have stood only a 
twenty-five percent chance of avoiding premature birth.  Id.  The jury found that the physician 
was negligent but that his negligence did not proximately cause the child’s death.  Id. at 401. 
Remanding for a new trial, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court instructed the trial 
court that “any damages . . . assuming that defendant’s proofs include evidence that the infant’s 
premature birth and death might have occurred even if defendant’s treatment had been proper, 
should be apportioned to reflect the likelihood that the premature birth and death would have 
been avoided by proper treatment.”  Id. at 400 (emphasis added).  It is therefore possible to read 
Scafidi as indicating that the New Jersey Supreme Court would apportion damages to account for 
the mother’s preexisting condition even if the child had a better-than-even chance of survival. 
Still, even this quick survey of a theoretically thorny area of law makes it clear that both 
courts and commentators have been focusing on cases in which a single tortfeasor’s negligent 
conduct interacted with a preexisting medical condition.  That is not the case here.  Robin’s case 
differs from our Mayhue line of cases not only in that Everhart stood a better-than-even chance 
of recovering in the absence of any medical negligence, but also in that joint tortfeasors 
negligently caused him an indivisible harm.  That latter distinguishing fact triggers our rules on 
joint and several liability, which make it unnecessary for us to decide today whether to extend 
Cahoon to better-than-even cases. 
II. 
The Rule for Calculating Set-Offs Can Decide This Case. 
There is no critical need to decide the Cahoon valuation issue because of how the trial 
court’s peculiar findings of fact interact with the rules for calculating a set-off.  The court found 
that Robin and Troy’s total injuries exceeded the sum of all distinct, legally allowable awards of 
damages.  A double recovery would therefore have been impossible under a correct application 
of the set-off rules.  Even if we embraced the PCF’s reading of Mayhue and the resulting 
12 
application of Cahoon, the PCF would still have to pay the statutory maximum in excess 
damages. 
The PCF argues that the trial court should have reduced its finding on injuries by twenty 
percent to account for harm Dr. Clarke probably did not cause and then further reduced the 
damages by the amount of Robin’s settlement with Dr. Clarke’s insurance company and by the 
full value of her settlement with Standard Forwarding.  In other words, it says that after finding 
that Robin and Troy suffered injuries of at least $3,150,000, the trial court should have reduced 
that amount to $2,250,000 (twenty percent chance of death in any event), subtracted $250,000 
(Dr. Clarke’s insurance company) and then subtracted another $1.9 million (Standard 
Forwarding) to arrive at its final award of damages. 
Again, this contention ignores a critical distinction between the Mayhue cases and 
Robin’s case.  In the Mayhue cases, the chance that a patient would have suffered some injury 
regardless of a physician’s medical negligence arose from a natural, preexisting medical 
condition.  Here, the chance that Everhart would have died anyway arose as a result of the 
independent negligence of a joint tortfeasor. 
Two or more co-defendants constitute joint tortfeasors if their independent negligent 
conduct proximately caused some indivisible harm.  See Palmer v. Comprehensive Neurologic 
Servs., P.C., 864 N.E.2d 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).  At common law, joint tortfeasors were 
jointly and severally liable for the indivisible harm they caused a plaintiff.  Hoesel v. Cain, 222 
Ind. 330, 53 N.E.2d 165 (1944); see also Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Apportionment § A18 
(2005).  A plaintiff could sue any of the joint tortfeasors and recover damages in the amount of 
the entire harm even though another joint tortfeasor had a hand in the injury.  Hoesel, 222 Ind. at 
334, 53 N.E.2d at 170–71; Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Apportionment § 10. 
But the Legislature altered this landscape when it passed the Indiana Comparative Fault 
Act.  A leading effect of the Act was to abolish the rule that contributory negligence constituted a 
complete bar to recovery in most suits for negligence.  Ind. Code § 34-51-2-5 (2008).  Instead, 
13 
the Act requires a jury to allocate a percentage of responsibility for the plaintiff’s injuries to each 
defendant and any nonparty who contributed to those injuries, and each defendant need only pay 
his proportional share.  Ind. Code § 34-51-2-7, -8 (2008).  In exchange for giving negligent 
plaintiffs greater access to the courts, however, the Act abrogates the old rule of joint and several 
liability in suits to which the Act applies.  Huber v. Henley, 656 F. Supp. 508, 511 (S.D. Ind. 
1987) (“In return for the removal of the contributory negligence bar to recovery, plaintiffs lost 
the ability to recover the full measure of damages from any one joint tortfeasor.”).  Because the 
Act expressly exempted medical malpractice claims from its ambit, however, the historical rule 
of joint and several liability would appear to still apply to medical malpractice suits.  See Ind. 
Code § 35-51-2-1(b)(1) (2008); see also Palmer, 864 N.E.2d at 1099–1100.  But see Ind. Code 
§ 34-51-2-17 (2008) (imposing time limits on a qualified health care provider’s opportunity to 
plead a nonparty defense and allowing enlargements in limited circumstances).4 
A plaintiff who settled with one joint tortfeasor, however, might still wish to sue another 
joint tortfeasor to increase her recovery.  Historically, Indiana prevented the plaintiff from doing 
so under the release rule.  See, e.g., Cooper v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 390 N.E.2d 155, 157–58 
(Ind. 1979) (citing Bedwell v. DeBolt, 221 Ind. 600, 50 N.E.2d 875 (1943)) (plaintiff’s 
settlement with two defendant companies released remaining jointly and severally liable 
defendant). 
We abrogated the release rule in Huffman v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 588 
N.E.2d 1264 (Ind. 1992).  We noted that many authorities heavily criticized the release rule and 
argued for the modern rule that a release of one joint tortfeasor would not discharge any other 
joint tortfeasor, but that any payments accompanying the release would diminish the recovery the 
plaintiff could seek from subsequent joint tortfeasors by the amount of the payment.  Id. at 1266 
                                                 
4 Neither party contends that the old rule of joint and several liability does not apply here, nor does either 
party contend that the Court of Appeals erred in Palmer.  (Appellant’s Br. at 23; Appellee’s Br. at 8.) 
14 
(citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 50 (1982); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 885, 
886 (1979); 3 Harper, Gray & James, The Law of Torts 37 (2d ed., 1986)).  Under our present 
rule, the plaintiff in Cooper would have been able to continue her suit against the third company, 
but subject to a rule requiring the trial court to reduce the amount of her allowable damages to 
protect the third jointly and severally liable defendant.  See id. at 1267. 
We noted in Huffman that a trial court has the power and duty to reduce a jury verdict by 
an amount already received in an earlier settlement to ensure that a plaintiff does not receive 
more than one recovery.  Huffman, 588 N.E.2d at 1267 (citing Manns v. Indiana Dep’t of 
Highways, 541 N.E.2d 929 (Ind. 1989)).  Indeed, we had already held that when a jury returned a 
verdict against a jointly and severally liable defendant after another jointly and severally liable 
defendant had already settled in exchange for a covenant not to sue, a court should adjust pro 
tanto the amount of any damages determined by the jury verdict by subtracting any consideration 
received from the amount of any damages determined by the jury verdict.  Manns, 541 N.E.2d at 
934. 
The action in Manns arose before the effective date of the Comparative Fault Act, which 
would appear to abrogate Manns for cases that come within its provisions.  See Mendenhall v. 
Skinner & Broadbent Co., 728 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. 2000); see also Manns, 541 N.E.2d at 931.  
The Manns rule for set-offs, however, remains good law for cases that involve joint torfeasors 
but fall outside the Comparative Fault Act.5 
The Court of Appeals applied this same one-satisfaction doctrine in Palmer, the case the 
PCF cites for the proposition that a joint tortfeasor in a medical malpractice suit is entitled to a 
                                                 
5 In theory, the PCF could have fared even worse if the Comparative Fault Act applied.  In Mendenhall, 
we held that a joint tortfeasor who failed to plead a nonparty defense in accordance with the Act could not 
obtain a set-off in the amount of an earlier joint tortfeasor’s settlement at all.  Mendenhall, 728 N.E.2d at 
144–45. 
15 
set-off for any amount the plaintiff received in exchange for settling with another joint tortfeasor.  
Palmer, 864 N.E.2d at 1100–01.  In Palmer, the plaintiff filed suit against a physician, the 
physician’s professional corporation, and multiple non–qualified health care providers on a 
theory of joint and several liability for medical malpractice, seeking damages for the wrongful 
death of her husband.  Id. at 1095.  The non–qualified providers settled with the plaintiff in an 
aggregate amount that exceeded the jury’s subsequent $375,000 finding on total injuries.  Id. at 
1097 & n.4. The remaining joint tortfeasors filed a motion to correct error asking the trial court 
to reduce the award of damages by the amount of the earlier settlements.  Id. at 1097.  The court 
did so, entering judgment against the remaining joint tortfeasors in the amount of $0, and the 
Court of Appeals affirmed.  Id. at 1095, 1102. 
Here, the PCF belatedly concedes that Perkins and Dr. Clarke constitute joint tortfeasors.6  
(Appellant’s Br. at 23–24.)  Perkins’s negligent driving and Dr. Clarke’s negligent medical care 
both caused a single indivisible harm:  Everhart’s death.  Under the pure common law rule of 
joint and several liability, Robin could have sued either Perkins or Dr. Clarke and recovered 
from the defendant of her choice damages in the entire amount of the injuries she and Troy 
suffered.  The second defendant, however, would have been entitled to a set-off from the total 
judgment against him in the amount of any settlement Robin reached with the first.  Because the 
PCF assumes Dr. Clarke’s liability over and above the statutory cap in the Medical Malpractice 
Act, the PCF is entitled to the same set-off and no more. 
The trial court found that Robin and Troy suffered injuries of at least $3.15 million.  
Under the Manns rule for set-offs, the court should have reduced its finding on total injuries by 
$1.9 million on account of the settlement with Standard Forwarding.  The court should have 
                                                 
6 Actually, the PCF actively advances this theory at the very end of its brief, not so much to point us to the 
appropriate rules for calculating a set-off, but rather merely to establish that it is entitled to some set-off, 
before going on to argue that the common fund doctrine should not reduce that set-off.  (Appellant’s Br. 
at 23–24.) 
16 
further reduced that amount by another $250,000 on account of the settlement with Dr. Clarke’s 
insurance company.  The convenient result:  $1 million in uncompensated damages, which is 
precisely equal to the statutory limit of the PCF’s liability for excess damages.7 
And this result would not change if the trial court had applied Cahoon in apportioning 
damages.  Cahoon apportions damages between all the parties who should fairly bear some of the 
loss.  The PCF concedes that Dr. Clarke caused eighty percent of the plaintiffs’ injuries.  
Because the only possible causes of Everhart’s death are two known joint tortfeasors, however, 
this concession is tantamount to conceding that Standard Forwarding caused the remaining 
twenty percent.  Initially, the PCF would be responsible for $2,520,000 in damages, whereas 
Standard Forwarding would be responsible for $630,000.  At most, the PCF would therefore only 
be entitled to a set-off on account of the settlement with Standard Forwarding to the extent that it 
exceeded Standard Forwarding’s liability.  Giving the PCF the benefit of this set-off in the 
amount of $1,270,000 and a further $250,000 set-off on account of the settlement with Dr. 
Clarke’s insurance company would still leave a remaining $1 million in uncompensated damages 
for the PCF to cover in excess damages payable to Robin and Troy. 
Reducing the finding on injuries by twenty percent and then subtracting the full $1.9 
million from the remainder, and then another $250,000, as the PCF asks, effectively ignores that 
Standard Forwarding, not Robin and Troy, should bear the remaining loss.  Indeed, doing so 
                                                 
7 This very well may have been the thought process of the appellee’s counsel when, in his proposed 
findings of fact, he asked the trial court to find injuries of “at least $3,150,000,” an otherwise odd number 
given evidence and argument that Robin and Troy suffered injuries as high as $54,120,000.  (Appellant’s 
App. at 14.)  This very well may also have been the court’s thought process when it adopted the 
appellee’s counsel’s proposed findings of facts with very few changes.  (Appellant’s App. at 15–32.)  Our 
inability to know for sure, however, is one reason why we do not encourage trial courts to adopt proposed 
findings of fact wholesale.  See Cook v. Whitsell-Sherman, 796 N.E.2d 271, 273 n.1 (Ind. 2003).  But we 
recognize that this practice is a practical response to the need to keep the docket moving despite an 
enormous volume of cases and a lack of law clerks and other resources that might make the practice 
unnecessary.  Prowell v. State, 741 N.E.2d 704, 708–09 (Ind. 2001). 
17 
would magically wipe out $630,000 of Robin and Troy’s total recovery and leave the PCF with a 
windfall in the same amount.  In essence, the PCF would succeed in turning the one-satisfaction 
doctrine from a shield into a sword.  The purpose of the one-satisfaction doctrine is to prevent a 
plaintiff from realizing more than one recovery.  It is plainly not to reduce a plaintiff to realizing 
less than one full recovery. 
As a result, we do not see any grounds on which we could reduce the trial court’s award 
of $1 million in excess damages, so deciding whether to extend or halt Cahoon’s advance would 
seem unnecessary at best.  Because we hold that the PCF was not entitled to a set-off, we also 
need not address Robin’s argument that the trial court should reduce any set-off based on fees 
and expenses. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court. 
Dickson, Sullivan, Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.