Title: STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. COMBS
Citation: 175 P.3d 340, 2007 OK 65
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: September 11, 2007

STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. COMBS Annotate this Case STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. COMBS 2007 OK 65 175 P.3d 340 Case Number: SCBD-5219 Decided: 09/11/2007 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association, Complainant, v. ROLAND VINCENT COMBS, III, Respondent. BAR DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING ¶0 In this disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer, the complaint alleges in two counts unprofessional conduct deemed to warrant disciplinary sanctions. A trial panel of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal found that respondent's actions merit the imposition of professional discipline. It recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years and one day and that he pay the costs of this proceeding. Upon de novo review of the evidentiary materials presented to the trial panel, RESPONDENT IS ORDERED DISCIPLINED BY SUSPENSION FOR A PERIOD OF NINETY DAYS AND DIRECTED TO PAY THE COSTS OF THIS PROCEEDING. THE LATTER SHALL BE DUE NOT LATER THAN NINETY DAYS AFTER THIS OPINION BECOMES FINAL. Janis Hubbard, Assistant General Counsel, Oklahoma Bar Association, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Complainant. Jack S. Dawson, Esq., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent. OPALA, J. ¶1 In this disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer the issues to be decided are: (1) Does the record submitted for our examination provide sufficient evidence for a meaningful de novo consideration of the complaint and of its disposition? I INTRODUCTION TO THE RECORD ¶2 The Oklahoma Bar Association (Bar) commenced this disciplinary proceeding on 25 August 2006 against Roland Vincent Combs (respondent or Combs), a licensed lawyer, by filing a formal complaint in accordance with the provisions of Rule 6.1 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings (RGDP). ¶3 Upon conclusion of the hearing and after consideration of the testimony and admitted exhibits, the trial panel issued its report finding that respondent violated certain provisions of the rules of professional conduct. The panel recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years and one day and that he pay the costs taxed in this proceeding. II THE RECORD BEFORE THE COURT PROVIDES SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR A MEANINGFUL DE NOVO CONSIDERATION OF ALL FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS PROCEEDING ¶4 In a Bar disciplinary proceeding the court functions as an adjudicative licensing authority that exercises exclusive original cognizance. ¶5 The court's duty can fully be discharged only if the trial panel submits a complete record of the proceedings. ¶6 Having carefully scrutinized the record submitted to us in this proceeding, we conclude that it is adequate for our de novo consideration of respondent's alleged professional misconduct. III THE CHARGES AGAINST RESPONDENT A. Count I -- The Randles Complaint ¶7 In August of 2004 Kenard Randles (Randles) hired the respondent Combs to probate the estate of his deceased wife, Pamela Randles, and paid Combs a retainer of $1,800. Randles was not named the personal representative in his wife's will. It was Mr. Anthony Jameson (Jameson), the decedent's brother, who was appointed personal representative of the estate. ¶8 In connection with the estate's probate Combs brought suit for the wrongful death of the decedent and entered into a contingent fee agreement with Jameson under which 35% of any funds collected would be retained by Combs and the remaining 65% would be deposited to the estate's credit. Combs settled the wrongful death claim for $10,000. Of the total amount recovered, $3,500 belonged to Combs and $6,500 to the estate. ¶9 A minimum balance of $6,500 should have remained in Combs' trust account as the amount belonging to the estate of Pamela Randles. The recovered $10,000 was deposited in Combs' trust account in early May 2005. Within that month the balance in the trust account dropped to $500.73. During the month of June 2005 Combs' trust account balance fell as low as $31.31. The $6,500 due the estate was paid in June of 2006, after the Bar had begun investigating Combs' trust account handling in connection with this and another complaint. ¶10 Combs fully admits to and apologizes for withdrawing an excessive amount of money from the trust account and placing it in his operating account. During the time the balance fell below $6,500 Combs states that he was involved in activities connected with the opening a law office in Dallas, Texas and spent a considerable amount of time away from his Oklahoma City office. Combs testified that he relied on his Oklahoma City staff to deal with certain office affairs and stated that the removal of excessive funds from the trust account was caused by an error in communication between him and his staff by which he was led to believe he was entitled to the money as a fee. The staff testified that Combs was notified of the error within two months of the occurrence. Combs contends that he was not informed until much later, although the specific time frame within which he acquired the knowledge was not revealed. ¶11 Jameson testified that he phoned Combs periodically to inquire about the status of the account and of the estate and was told Combs was continuing to work on the matter. Jameson believed the $6,500 had been continuously maintained in the trust account. ¶12 In relation to count one the Bar alleges violations of the provisions of ORPC Rule 1.15, ¶13 Combs admits to a violation of ORPC Rule 1.15 (mishandling of funds) and in essence, concurrently with the specified admission, also admits to violating ORPC Rule 8.4(a), RGDP Rule 1.3, and RGDP Rule 1.4(b). We accept Combs' admission and find from clear and convincing evidence that his conduct, which violated those rules, constitutes grounds for the imposition of professional discipline. We employ three different culpability standards in evaluating mishandling of funds. Those are called (1) commingling; ¶14 Commingling occurs when the client's funds are combined with the lawyer's personal funds. Complete separation of a client's money from that of the lawyer's is the only way for maintaining proper accounting. ¶15 The second level of culpability is simple conversion. Rule 1.4(b) establishes that simple conversion occurs when an attorney applies a client's money to a purpose other than that for which it came to be entrusted to the lawyer. ¶16 The third level of culpability is misappropriation, i.e. "theft by conversion or otherwise." This occurs when an attorney has purposely deprived a client of money through deceit and fraud. ¶17 The Bar and the trial panel viewed Combs' conduct as rising to the third level of culpability --- to that of misappropriation. We disagree. There is no evidence that Combs purposely deprived Jameson of the funds by deceit or fraud or that Combs intentionally inflicted on Jameson grave economic harm. There is an admission of guilt and evidence supporting culpability for commingling and simple conversion. Combs transferred the money from the trust account to his operating account and used the money for personal expenses. ¶18 A violation of ORPC Rule 8.1(b) (a knowing failure to respond to a demand for information in a disciplinary matter) has been charged by the Bar. The trial panel did not rule on a violation of ORPC Rule 8.1(b) and Combs neither admits nor denies a violation. We must not be unmindful that the Bar bears the burden of proving facts by clear and convincing evidence. ¶19 The trial panel found Combs guilty of a violation of ORPC Rule 8.4(c) (that he engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation). Combs denies this violation and we do not find clear and convincing evidence that the respondent acted dishonestly or with the intent to defraud or deceive. The facts indicate that the money was removed from the trust account by error under the mistaken belief that the funds constituted an earned fee. The Bar contends that Combs made misrepresentations to Jameson by claiming to be "still working on [the estate]." A misrepresentation must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the declarant had an underlying motive (i.e., bad or evil intent) for making the statement. ¶20 The trial panel did not rule on a violation of RGDP Rule 5.2 (that Combs, in his response to the Bar's grievance, did not make a full and fair disclosure of all the facts and circumstances pertaining to his alleged misconduct or that Combs made a deliberate misrepresentation in his response) and Combs neither admits nor denies a violation. As we view the evidence, it shows Combs was extremely negligent in his accounting procedures and thus the material provided in regards to his trust account was very disorganized. That his accounting was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to audit does not mean that he did not provide all information or that he deliberately misrepresented the situation's reality. Combs has admitted to his mistakes and failures. We do not find clear and convincing evidence of a RGDP Rule 5.2 violation. B. Count 2 -- The "Rasel" Complaint ¶21 In June of 2005, in an agreement titled Commercial Purchase and Sale Agreement, Rasel A. Sheikh (Rasel) and Ayesha Khaton Sheikh (Ayesha) sold land owned by them to a third party. Located on this land were convenience stores owned by R & N Distributing Inc. (R & N). ¶22 In July of 2005 Rasel and Ayesha entered into a second agreement in connection with the land sale, titled Agreement Regarding Sale of Real Estate Property. Unlike the Commercial Purchase and Sale Agreement, Combs was identified as the attorney for R & N, though as in the case of the first agreement, the land sale proceeds were to be held in a trust account managed by Combs. ¶23 Combs, in accordance with the agreement, paid taxes and other expenses of R & N. Included in the disbursements was a $200,000 check to Rahman. The $200,000 was authorized for release in a letter to Combs from Ayesha. ¶24 The accounting records associated with the trust account were very poorly kept, Combs admits to this failure. Due to the extremely disorganized state of the records it is difficult accurately to state figures disbursed or transferred from the account. We feel it is sufficient to say that funds were transferred by Combs from the trust account to his personal account without permission from Rasel, Ayesha, and R & N, as required in the Agreement Regarding Sale of Real Estate Property. ¶25 Rasel and Ayesha claim Combs was their attorney. Combs claims he represented solely R & N. ¶26 Rasel claims he requested an accounting of the trust account funds in August and was not provided one. Instead, he was informed by Combs that "nothing was spent." Rasel further states that after discovering Combs disbursed $200,000 to Rahman he hired attorney Craig Brown to sue Combs. In December of 2005 Rasel, through Mr. Brown, requested an accounting of the trust account funds. Rasel claims that he was told by Combs' staff he would receive an accounting and the money in the trust account only if he agreed to fire his attorney. ¶27 Combs denies receiving any request from Ayesha or Rasel for an accounting prior to the request from Mr. Brown in December 2005. Combs admits that this accounting was not provided but contends he attempted to provide the accounting to Mr. Brown first. His appointment with Mr. Brown was canceled by the latter, and second, he saw a letter from Rasel to Mr. Brown terminating the latter's employment. ¶28 In April of 2006 Rasel, Ayesha and Combs entered into a Settlement Agreement as a result of which the civil lawsuit against Combs was dismissed and the Bar grievance withdrawn. ¶29 The Bar alleges in count two that respondent violated the provisions of ORPC Rule 1.8(h), ¶30 Combs specifically admits to a violation of ORPC Rule 1.15 (mishandling of funds) and in essence, concurrently with the specified admission, also admits to violations of ORPC Rule 8.4(a), RGDP Rule 1.3, and RGDP Rule 1.4(b). We accept Combs' admission and find by clear and convincing evidence that his conduct violated those rules and constitutes grounds for the imposition of professional discipline. Our discussion in regards to the violation of Rule 1.15 is the same with respect to count two as it is to count one. We find a lack of clear and convincing evidence that Combs purposely deprived Rasel and Ayesha of the funds by deceit or fraud or that Combs intentionally inflicted grave economic harm. We find Combs guilty of commingling and simple conversion. ¶31 The Bar asserts and the trial panel found Combs guilty of a violation of ORPC Rule 1.8(h) (that he made an agreement prospectively limiting his liability to a client for his personal malpractice, or settled a claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith) in connection with the Settlement Agreement. We disagree. Rule 1.8(h) deals with limitation of liability and is comprised of two components. The first of these bars a lawyer from prospectively limiting his liability for personal malpractice. This means that a lawyer may not enter into an agreement, prior to providing legal services, by which he reduces, or releases himself of, future liability for personal malpractice associated with those legal services. The second component states that if a lawyer settles a claim for past liability for personal malpractice, the lawyer must first advise the client or former client, in writing, to seek independent representation in connection with the settlement. A lawyer is not absolutely prohibited from settling a claim of personal malpractice liability, but rather is forbidden from doing so without first advising the lay client of the recommended presence of independent representation. ¶32 In regards to the alleged violations of ORPC Rule 8.1(b) and RGDP Rule 5.2 under count two, our discussion is consistent with that made under count one. Our examination of the record shows an absence of clear and convincing evidence to support the allegations. ¶33 The trial panel found Combs guilty of a violation of ORPC Rule 8.4(c) (that he engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation). Combs denies this violation and we do not find clear and convincing evidence that the respondent acted dishonestly or with the intent either to defraud or to deceive. Combs admits to converting the funds for his own use while believing he had proper permission to do so. The Bar and the trial panel contend that Combs misrepresented the status of funds to Rasel and refused to give him an accounting. Combs denies receiving such requests. Our view is that given the record evidence in regards to Rasel's character ¶34 The trial panel issued no specific ruling in relation to a violation of ORPC Rule 8.4(d) (that Combs engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice) and Combs neither admits nor denies a violation. This rule, properly understood, sanctions conduct that interferes with the administration of "judicial process." It covers only severe interference with judicial proceedings or conduct of such a severe nature that it harms our system of representative litigation as a whole. IV MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES ¶35 Mitigating circumstances may be considered in assessing the appropriate quantum of discipline. V RESPONDENT'S MISCONDUCT WARRANTS A SUSPENSION OF HIS LICENSE TO PRACTICE LAW FOR A PERIOD OF NINETY DAYS; HE IS ALSO DIRECTED TO PAY THE COSTS OF THIS PROCEEDING ¶36 A government's license to practice law is conferred not for the benefit of the individual licensee, but rather for that of the public. ¶37 This court has pronounced varying levels of discipline in matters involving mishandling of client funds. The disciplinary range has extended from censure to disbarment, depending in large part on the degree of harm to the client. VI SUMMARY ¶38 In sum, the record bears clear and convincing proof that respondent's participation in unprofessional conduct violates the rules that govern professional responsibility. After a thorough review of the record and upon due recognition of all the factors tendered in mitigation, ¶39 RESPONDENT IS ORDERED DISCIPLINED (1) BY SUSPENSION FOR A PERIOD OF NINETY DAYS AND (2) BY IMPOSITION OF COSTS OF THIS PROCEEDING, WHOSE PAYMENT SHALL BE DUE NOT LATER THAN NINETY DAYS AFTER THIS OPINION BECOMES FINAL. ¶40 Winchester, C.J., Edmondson, V.C.J., Hargrave, Opala and Kauger, JJ., concur ¶41 Watt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part I would impose a public reprimand on this respondent. ¶42 Taylor, J., dissenting I would impose a greater discipline. ¶43 Colbert, J., not participating FOOT