Title: The Florida Bar v. William Henry Winters
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC10-1332
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 6, 2012

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-1332 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR  
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
WILLIAM HENRY WINTERS  
Respondent. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-1333 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR  
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
MARC EDWARD YONKER  
Respondent. 
 
[September 6, 2012] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review these consolidated cases with a referee's report 
recommending that Respondents, William Henry Winters and Marc Edward 
Yonker, be found guilty of professional misconduct and admonished.  We have 
 
 
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jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  As explained below, we approve the 
referee‘s findings of fact and his recommendation that Respondents be found guilty 
of violating Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 4-7.10 and 3-4.3; however, we 
disapprove the referee‘s recommendation that Respondents be found not guilty of 
violating rules 4-8.4(b), 4-8.4(c), and 4-8.4(d) and his recommendation as to 
discipline.  Instead, we conclude that Respondent Winters should be suspended 
from the practice of law for ninety-one days and Respondent Yonker should be 
suspended for sixty days.   
FACTS 
 
On July 9, 2010, The Florida Bar filed separate complaints against William 
Henry Winters and Marc Edward Yonker.  The complaints alleged various 
instances of misconduct by Winters and Yonker in relation to their departure as 
employees from the Law Firm of Richard Mulholland and Associates 
(―Mulholland Firm‖).  Essentially, the complaints alleged that in 2001,1 Winters 
and Yonker made secret plans to leave the Mulholland Firm and begin practicing 
together, and that in the process, Winters and Yonker:  (1) themselves and through 
a former paralegal for the Mulholland Firm, solicited Mulholland Firm clients to 
terminate representation by the Mulholland Firm and be represented by Winters‘ 
                                         
 
1.  The prosecution of this disciplinary matter was deferred by the Bar until 
the completion of civil litigation by Richard Mulholland against Winters and 
Yonker.        
 
 
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and Yonker‘s new firm; (2) made misrepresentations to the Mulholland Firm and 
to Mulholland Firm clients; (3) made copies of and took possession of Mulholland 
Firm client files without authorization; and (4) improperly used a third attorney‘s 
name, who never actually joined the new firm, in their new firm name on 
documents.  The complaints alleged that through this conduct, Respondents 
violated numerous Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.2 
The two cases were consolidated at the referee level, and on July 20, 2011, 
the referee filed his report and recommendation.  The referee found that during the 
time that Winters and Yonker were considering their exit from the Mulholland 
Firm, Winters had discussions with a third attorney about forming a new firm.  
Based on the ongoing discussions, letterhead was generated that included the third 
attorney‘s name.  When the attorney realized his name had been included, he 
promptly notified Winters that he was not interested in becoming part of the law 
firm and that the letterhead should no longer be used.  However, the letterhead was 
used for a short period of time thereafter.   
The referee further found that when Winters and Yonker decided to leave 
the Mulholland Firm they ―began contacting clients who they had represented 
                                         
 
2.  Respondents were not charged with violating rule 4-5.8, governing the 
procedures for lawyers leaving law firms, because that rule was not in existence in 
2001.  Rule 4-5.8 was adopted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006.  See In re 
Amend. R. Regulating Fla. Bar, 916 So. 2d 655, 702-04 (Fla. 2005).   
 
 
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during the course of their employment with the Mulholland law firm.‖  He further 
found that Respondent Yonker took client files from the Mulholland Firm over a 
lunch period and had information from those files copied for his own personal use, 
and that such ―was not within the scope of his employment and was not done for 
advancing the good of the law firm,‖ and that Respondent Winters ―maintained 
control over less than ten files‖ after leaving the law firm, and that those files were 
recovered within a few days by the law firm.  The referee recommended that 
Winters and Yonker be found guilty of violating rule 4-7.10(f) (lawyers may state 
or imply that they practice in a partnership or authorized business entity only when 
that is the fact), due to the improper inclusion of the third attorney‘s name on the 
new firm letterhead for a short period of time, and rule 3-4.3 (misconduct and 
minor misconduct—conduct not otherwise enumerated), due to their personal use 
of the files of the Mulholland Firm.  The referee recommended that Respondents 
be found not guilty of all other charged rule violations.    
The Bar filed a petition seeking review of the referee‘s recommendations 
that Winters and Yonker be found not guilty of violating rules 4-8.4(b) 
(commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on lawyer‘s honesty, 
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects), 4-8.4(c) (conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and 4-8.4(d) (conduct 
prejudicial to administration of justice), and the referee‘s recommended discipline. 
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
I.  RECOMMENDATIONS OF GUILT 
The standard of review for a referee's recommendations as to guilt is 
whether the referee's factual findings are sufficient under the applicable rules to 
support the recommendations as to guilt.  See Fla. Bar v. D‘Ambrosio, 25 So. 3d 
1209, 1216 (Fla. 2009); Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 913 So. 2d 554, 557-58 (Fla. 2005).  
Here, the Bar first argues that the referee erred in recommending that Winters and 
Yonker be found not guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(b).  The Bar argues that 
Winters‘ and Yonker‘s ―personal use‖ of the Mulholland Firm‘s client files 
constituted acts of criminal theft under section 812.014, Florida Statutes (2001), 
and that theft inherently reflects adversely on a lawyer‘s honesty, trustworthiness, 
or fitness as a lawyer.  We agree.  At the time of the misconduct here, as now, 
criminal theft was defined as knowingly obtaining or using the property of another 
with intent to temporarily or permanently: (a) deprive the other person of a right to 
or benefit from the property; (b) appropriate the property to one‘s own use or the 
use of another person not entitled to use the property.  § 812.014(1), Fla. Stat. 
(2001).  Winters‘ and Yonker‘s conduct in appropriating client files from their 
employer for their own personal use constitutes theft.  The referee‘s factual 
 
 
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findings do not support the recommendation that Respondents be found not guilty 
of violating rule 4-8.4(b).  Accordingly, this recommendation is disapproved.    
 
The Bar next argues that Winters‘ and Yonker‘s conduct with regard to the 
client files constituted conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation in violation of rule 4-8.4(c).  In support of its argument, the Bar 
cites to the Court‘s decision in Florida Bar v. Shankman, 908 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 
2005).  In Shankman, the respondent, a partner in a firm, was found guilty of, 
among many other rule violations, violating rule 4-8.4(c) for (1) failing to disclose 
to the firm and keeping for himself a bonus from a client, over and above the 
reduced fee that he caused the firm to accept in the case; (2) failing to inform the 
firm of an unemployment benefits client‘s potential whistleblower action, directing 
that the client‘s case be closed out, and proceeding to represent the client and settle 
the whistleblower action after he left the firm; and (3) taking five other clients 
without the firm‘s knowledge by omitting them from the list of clients he took.  Id. 
at 383.  We conclude that, similar to the conduct in Shankman, Winters‘ and 
Yonker‘s conduct in copying client files and maintaining possession of client files 
without the Mulholland Firm‘s permission violated rule 4-8.4(c).  Accordingly, the 
referee‘s recommendation as to this issue is disapproved.    
The Bar next argues that the same conduct that violated rules 4-8.4(b) and 
(c) also violated rule 4-8.4(d).  Rule 4-8.4(d) states, in pertinent part, that a lawyer 
 
 
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―shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.‖  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-8.4(d).   
The Bar argues that because Respondents‘ conduct was dishonest, it was inherently 
prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of this rule.  We agree.  
Although the Court has held that this rule ―applies only when a lawyer engages in 
misconduct while employed in a legal capacity,‖  Fla. Bar v. Brake, 767 So. 2d 
1163, 1168 (Fla. 2000) (emphasis added),3 we conclude that because Respondents‘ 
misconduct in this case occurred in their capacities as associate attorneys of the 
Mulholland Firm, it was sufficiently ―in connection with the practice of law‖ to be 
covered by this rule.  Accordingly, we disapprove the referee‘s recommendation 
that Respondents be found not guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(d).   
 
 
                                         
 
3.  Our caselaw and the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar are clear that, in 
general, an attorney‘s conduct while not acting as an attorney can subject him to 
disciplinary proceedings.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-4.3 (―The commission by a 
lawyer of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice, whether the 
act is committed in the course of the attorney‘s relations as an attorney or 
otherwise . . . may constitute a cause for discipline.‖); Brake, 767 So. 2d at 1168 
(stating that rules and professional ethics still apply to an attorney who is not 
acting as an attorney and that ―[e]ven in personal transactions . . . attorneys must 
‗avoid tarnishing the professional image or damaging the public‘ ‖) (quoting Fla. 
Bar v. Della-Donna, 583 So. 2d 307, 310 (Fla. 1989)).  However, because rule 4-
8.4(d) specifically states that a lawyer shall not ―engage in conduct in connection 
with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice,‖ this rule 
is an exception.  Brake, 767 So. 2d at 1168.  
 
 
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II.  DISCIPLINE 
The standard of review for a referee‘s recommendation as to discipline is as 
follows: 
In reviewing a referee's recommended discipline, the Court's scope of 
review is broader than that afforded to the referee's findings of fact 
because, ultimately, it is our responsibility to order the appropriate 
sanction.  See Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); 
see also art. V, ' 15, Fla. Const.  However, generally speaking this 
Court will not second-guess the referee's recommended discipline as 
long as it has a reasonable basis in existing caselaw and the Standards 
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 
555, 558 (Fla. 1999).  
 
Fla. Bar v. Ratiner, 46 So. 3d 35, 39 (Fla. 2010).  Here, the referee recommended 
that Respondents be found guilty of violating only rule 4-7.10(f) and rule 3-4.3  
and as a sanction, recommended that Respondents be admonished.   
As explained above, we conclude that Respondents‘ misconduct also 
violated rules 4-8.4(b), 4-8.4(c), and 4-8.4(d).  When these additional rule 
violations are considered, it is clear that the referee‘s recommendation of an 
admonishment is not supported.4   
                                         
 
4. Minor misconduct is the only type of misconduct for which an 
admonishment is an appropriate discipline.  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-5.1(b).  
Under the rules, misconduct may not be regarded as minor if it involves 
―dishonesty, misrepresentation, deceit, or fraud on the party of the respondent.‖  R. 
Regulating Fla. Bar 3-5.1(b)(1)(E).  
 
 
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We conclude that under the caselaw and standards, the appropriate sanction 
for Respondent Winters is a ninety-one-day suspension, and the appropriate 
sanction for Respondent Yonker is a sixty-day suspension.  Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions 5.12 and 7.2 provide, respectively, that suspension is appropriate 
―when a lawyer knowingly engages in criminal conduct . . . that seriously 
adversely reflects on the lawyer‘s fitness to practice law‖ or ―when a lawyer 
knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional 
and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.‖  
See also Shankman, 908 So. 2d at 387 (imposing ninety-one-day suspension where 
attorney received bonus from client after causing firm to accept reduced fee, failed 
to disclose bonus to his partners in law firm, failed to make full disclosure to 
partners regarding clients he took to another law firm, divided fees with 
nonlawyers, and failed to timely file response to summary judgment motion);  Fla. 
Bar v. Kossow, 912 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 2005) (imposing thirty-day suspension 
where attorney represented clients outside of firm where he was employed and 
kept fees for himself, lied about his activities, and used firm resources in his 
representation of outside clients); Fla. Bar v. Arcia, 848 So. 2d 296, 300 (Fla. 
2003) (imposing three-year suspension where attorney represented clients outside 
of firm where he was employed and kept fees for himself in violation of his 
employment agreement, solicited clients or potential clients by intercepting phone 
 
 
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calls directed to firm, deposited fees from firm clients into separate account for his 
own professional association, intercepted firm mail in order to take checks made to 
his own professional association, induced firm clients to pay fees directly to him 
and his own professional association by preparing misleading documents and 
stationery, and used firm resources during office hours to conduct his fraudulent 
activities); Fla. Bar v. Cox, 655 So. 2d 1122, 1123 (Fla. 1995) (imposing thirty-day 
suspension where attorney represented clients outside of firm where he was 
employed and kept some of the fees for himself, corresponded with and billed 
outside clients on firm stationery, and initially lied about his activities when 
confronted).     
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, William Henry Winters is hereby suspended from the practice 
of law for ninety-one days.  Marc Edward Yonker is suspended from the practice 
of law for sixty days.  The suspensions will be effective thirty days from the filing 
of this opinion so that Respondents can close out their practice and protect the 
interests of existing clients.  If either Respondent notifies this Court in writing that 
he is no longer practicing and does not need the thirty days to protect existing 
clients, this Court will enter an order making his suspension effective immediately.  
Respondents shall fully comply with Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(h).  
Respondent Winters shall accept no new business from the date this opinion is 
 
 
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filed until he is reinstated.  Respondent Yonker shall accept no new business from 
the date this opinion is filed until his suspension is completed. 
 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from William Henry 
Winters and Marc Edward Yonker, jointly and severally, in the amount of 
$24,750.00, for which sum let execution issue.  
  
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., concurs in result. 
 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION. 
 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director and Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Staff 
Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, and Henry Lee Paul, Bar Counsel, 
and Chardean Mavis Hill, Assistant Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Donald A. Smith, Jr. and Todd William Messner of Smith, Tozian & Hinkle, P.A., 
Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Respondents