Title: Commonwealth v. Garvey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12110
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 9, 2017

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SJC-12110 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JAMES GARVEY. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 8, 2016. - May 9, 2017. 
 
Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ.1 
 
 
Habitual Offender.  Controlled Substances.  Grand Jury.  
Practice, Criminal, Dismissal, Grand jury proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 1, 2014. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Carol S. Ball, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney (Kathleen 
Celio, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Robert A. O'Meara (Joseph M. Perullo also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  This case requires us to interpret G. L. c. 279, 
§ 25 (a), one provision in the habitual criminal statute, G. L. 
                     
 
1 Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
c. 279, § 25.  Section 25 (a) provides for an enhanced penalty 
where a defendant has two prior convictions resulting in State 
or Federal prison sentences of three years or more (qualifying 
sentences).  We conclude that § 25 (a) requires that the 
underlying convictions arise from separate incidents or episodes 
of criminal behavior.  We also conclude that, in this case, the 
Commonwealth failed to provide the grand jury with sufficient 
evidence to support the habitual offender portions of the 
indictments.  We therefore affirm the order dismissing the 
habitual offender portions of the indictments currently pending 
against the defendant. 
 
Background.  The defendant, James Garvey, was indicted on 
charges alleging violations of the controlled substances law, G. 
L. c. 94C.  After returning eight indictments relating to the 
charged drug crimes, the grand jury received evidence concerning 
the defendant's prior convictions, which the prosecutor 
introduced to establish probable cause for enhanced penalties to 
be available in relation to these drug offenses.  In particular, 
the grand jury heard that on March 13, 2002, the defendant was 
convicted of four offenses, each described in a separate count 
of a single indictment, and was sentenced to at least three 
years in State prison on each offense.  The offenses were (1) 
kidnapping, (2) receiving stolen property, (3) possession of a 
firearm with an obliterated serial number, and (4) unlawful 
3 
 
 
possession of a firearm.  The grand jurors did not, however, 
hear any evidence as to when these offenses occurred.2  The grand 
jury also heard that on December 5, 2002, the defendant was 
convicted of distribution of a class B substance and conspiracy 
to violate the controlled substance act, but they did not hear 
any testimony related to sentencing on those offenses. 
Based on the evidence presented relating to the alleged 
current drug offenses and the prior convictions, the grand jury 
ultimately voted to indict the defendant for trafficking in 200 
grams or more of oxycodone and hydromorphone, G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 32E (c) (4); trafficking in thirty-six grams or more of 
morphine, G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (c) (2); five counts of possession 
of a class B substance with the intent to distribute, G. L. 
c. 94C, § 32A (a), each as a subsequent offender, G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 32A (b); and possession of a class E substance with the intent 
to distribute, G. L. c. 94C, § 32D (a), as a subsequent 
offender, G. L. c. 94C, § 32D (b).  Each charge also carried 
                     
 
2 Based on the defendant's representation in his brief and 
on the Commonwealth's statement of the case in connection with 
the 2002 convictions, which the defendant filed as an exhibit to 
his motion to dismiss, it appears that the four convictions 
stemmed from an attempted armed robbery of a store in Arlington 
in 2001.  The defendant and one other person arrived in a stolen 
motor vehicle.  During the robbery, the two threatened the store 
clerks, locking one of the clerks in the basement.  When the 
police arrived and arrested the robbers, they found two firearms 
in the store.  The Commonwealth does not appear to dispute the 
defendant's representation that the four prior convictions 
shared a single date of offense. 
4 
 
 
habitual criminal and school zone enhancements.  See G. L. 
c. 279, § 25; G. L. c. 94C, § 32J. 
 
The defendant moved to dismiss the habitual offender 
portions of the indictments, arguing that the grand jury heard 
no evidence that his four underlying 2002 convictions arose from 
different criminal episodes.  A Superior Court judge allowed the 
motion in a margin endorsement, writing that "to be a[] habitual 
offender, one must have at least two prior convictions with 
qualifying sentences resulting from separate, prior criminal 
episodes" (emphasis in original; quotation omitted).  The 
Commonwealth appealed from the judge's order.  See G. L. c. 278, 
§ 28E; Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (1), as appearing in 422 Mass. 
1501 (1996).  We transferred the case from the Appeals Court on 
our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  Section 25 (a) requires a judge to sentence a 
person found guilty of the underlying felony to the maximum 
penalty prescribed by law for that felony, where that person has 
at least two prior convictions with qualifying sentences.  See 
Commonwealth v. Luckern, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 269, 269-270 (2015).  
In reviewing the judge's decision to dismiss the habitual 
offender portions of the indictments pending against the 
defendant, our task is to interpret the meaning of this statute.  
We address that question first, before considering whether the 
5 
 
 
Commonwealth presented adequate facts to enable the grand jury 
to make a probable cause determination. 
 
1.  Statutory interpretation.  We review questions of 
statutory interpretation de novo.  Commonwealth v. Martin, 476 
Mass. 72, 75 (2016).  General Laws c. 279, § 25 (a), as amended 
by St. 2012, c. 192, § 47, provides: 
 
"Whoever is convicted of a felony and has been 
previously twice convicted and sentenced to state prison or 
state correctional facility or a federal corrections 
facility for a term not less than [three] years . . . shall 
be considered a habitual criminal and shall be punished 
. . . for such felony for the maximum term provided by 
law." 
 
 
To determine the Legislature's intent, we look to the words 
of the statute, "construed by the ordinary and approved usage of 
the language, considered in connection with the cause of its 
enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the 
main object to be accomplished."  Boston Police Patrolmen's 
Ass'n v. Boston, 435 Mass. 718, 720 (2002), and cases cited.  
"We derive the words' usual and accepted meaning from sources 
presumably known to the statute's enactors, such as their use in 
other legal contexts and dictionary definitions."  Commonwealth 
v. Campbell, 415 Mass. 697, 700 (1993), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977).  Where the statutory 
language is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ends.  
Commissioner of Correction v. Superior Court Dep't of the Trial 
Court for the County of Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 124 (2006). 
6 
 
 
 
Both the Commonwealth and the defendant contend that the 
statute is unambiguous, but each interprets it differently.  The 
Commonwealth argues that the plain meaning of the statute 
requires simply that a defendant have two prior convictions with 
qualifying sentences in order to be considered a habitual 
criminal, regardless of whether those convictions stem from the 
same or different episodes.  The defendant, on the other hand, 
contends that the statute's plain meaning includes a separate-
episode element because of the Legislature's use of the word 
"habitual," in the text of the statute.  His argument is that a 
"habit" is generally defined as "a settled tendency of behavior" 
or "a behavior pattern acquired by frequent repetition," 
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1017 (2002), and that, 
therefore, a habitual criminal is someone who has committed a 
certain number of criminal acts on separate occasions. 
 
We do not find § 25 (a)'s meaning, at least in relation to 
the issue whether the necessary two prior convictions must 
relate to different criminal incidents, to be as clear and 
obvious as the Commonwealth and the defendant do.  Accordingly, 
we look to the history of the statute and our past decisions 
interpreting it, as well as to the rest of the statutory scheme, 
for guidance.3  See Commonwealth v. St. Louis, 473 Mass. 350, 355 
                     
 
3 Although Legislative intent controls, we note that G. L. 
c. 279, § 25 (a), is generally described as a "three strikes" 
7 
 
 
(2015); Commonwealth v. Galvin, 388 Mass. 326, 329 (1983).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 459 Mass. 422, 433 (2011) ("we 
turn to the history of the statute" where there is "lack of 
clarity"). 
a.  History of § 25 (a).  The Legislature developed a 
series of incarnations of repeat offender statutes, beginning in 
1818, before enacting what is now § 25 (a).  Contrary to the 
Commonwealth's assertion, the full statutory history of the 
habitual criminal statute demonstrates that the requirement of 
separate criminal episodes has been a crucial assumption 
underlying the statute's development. 
Earlier statutes, including those cited by the 
Commonwealth, provided for an enhanced penalty upon a second 
conviction, with further aggravation upon a third.  See St. 
1817, c. 176, §§ 5-6; St. 1827, c. 118, §§ 19-20; St. 1832, 
c. 73, § 1; St. 1833, c. 85, §§ 1-2; St. 1836, c. 4, §§ 17, 20-
22; St. 1843, c. 80.  Although there were slight variations 
among these statutes,4 the constant concept throughout was the 
                                                                  
law.  See, e.g., Fletcher v. Dickhaut, 834 F. Supp. 2d 10, 15-16 
(D. Mass. 2011) ("The statute operates as a 'three-strikes-and-
you're-out' law . . .").  While we do not depend (solely) on the 
rules of a sport for interpretation, we consider it relevant 
that most persons using that analogy would also understand that, 
in baseball, one cannot incur two strikes on a single pitch. 
 
 
4 The Commonwealth argues that changes to the statute in the 
1830s support its interpretation:  in 1832, the Legislature 
required prior convictions, sentences, and discharges, but it 
8 
 
 
Legislature's focus on separate prior incidents.  In 1853, the 
Legislature repealed the statute.  St. 1853, c. 375.  In 1887, 
the Legislature enacted the earliest version of the modern 
statute.  In doing so, it chose to omit the requirements that 
there be discharges between the commission and conviction of 
each prior crime, and also to omit an enhanced penalty for 
second convictions, leaving enhanced penalties only for those 
criminals who were convicted a third time.  See St. 1887, 
c. 435, § 1, in amended form at G. L. c. 279, § 25 (a).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Richardson, 175 Mass. 202, 208 (1900).  
When it took these steps, the Legislature added the phrase 
"habitual criminal" to the statute.  Id. at 202-203.  Against 
the backdrop of the earlier statutes, with their clear focus on 
separate and distinct convictions, we understand these changes 
                                                                  
removed the discharge requirement in 1836.  Compare St. 1832, 
c. 73, with St. 1836, c. 4, §§ 17, 20-22.  The 1836 amendment 
allowed two prior convictions to qualify even where there had 
not been a term of liberty between any of the crimes.  However, 
we disagree with the Commonwealth's argument that the 1836 
amendment also allowed prior convictions stemming from a single 
incident to qualify.  In fact, the decision the Commonwealth 
cites for the concept that "the previous convictions and 
sentences only need be shown," Commonwealth v. Richardson, 175 
Mass. 202, 207-208 (1900), was concerned with whether discharges 
between sentences on the prior qualifying convictions also must 
be shown, rather than with determining which convictions could 
qualify.  Moreover, the Richardson court may well have assumed 
that qualifying convictions must stem from separate episodes:  
the facts of that case involved prior convictions that, while 
tried in the same "term" of court, arose from separate criminal 
episodes occurring at different times and in different cities.  
Id. at 203, 206. 
9 
 
 
as showing that the Legislature sought to provide again for 
additional punishment for those criminals who had prior 
convictions for separate incidents; the intended effect was to 
limit these additional penalties to those facing a felony 
conviction after two previous convictions from separate 
incidents. 
 
This construction of § 25 (a) aligns with earlier decisions 
interpreting the statute and its prior incarnations.  In these 
prior cases, although the issue has not been directly raised, we 
and the Appeals Court have assumed that § 25 (a) requires that 
the underlying convictions be for "separate" or "distinct" 
criminal acts committed on different occasions.  In Richardson, 
175 Mass. at 208, the court emphasized that through the habitual 
criminal statute, the Legislature sought both to reform 
criminals and to protect the public from individuals who 
"persist[] in crime notwithstanding [prior] discipline."  We 
held that "two previous distinct convictions" resulting in 
consecutive sentences could qualify as the underlying 
convictions resulting in enhanced penalties, id. at 205, and, 
through the statement of the underlying facts, made clear that 
the two convictions were for two distinct criminal incidents.  
See id. at 203.  The Appeals Court has held that concurrent 
prison sentences also qualify under the statute, but similarly 
has emphasized that the qualifying convictions were for 
10 
 
 
"separate and distinct offences."  See Commonwealth v. Hall, 19 
Mass. App. Ct. 1004 (1985), S.C., 397 Mass. 466 (1986).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Keane, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 656, 660 (1996), 
citing Hall, supra.  More recently, where the two prior 
convictions stemmed from separate cases in Middlesex County and 
New Hampshire, the Appeals Court held that suspended sentences 
could qualify as well.  Luckern, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 273.  
Thus, the concept that the prior convictions must stem from 
separate episodes has been an implied assumption in our earlier 
holdings. 
b.  Statutory scheme and effects.  The Commonwealth further 
argues that the defendant's interpretation is not supported by a 
review of other statutes providing for enhanced penalties.  It 
points out that the Legislature has enacted other statutes 
punishing repeat offenders5 and armed career criminals,6 which 
contain language specifically requiring that the prior 
conviction be based on distinct offenses; and that, in 2012, the 
Legislature added a "violent habitual offender" provision to 
                     
 
5 See, e.g., G. L. c. 266, § 40 ("whoever is convicted . . . 
of three distinct larcenies, shall be adjudged a common and 
notorious thief, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
state prison for not more than twenty years or in jail for not 
more than two and one half years"). 
 
 
6 See, e.g., G. L. c. 269, § 10G (b) (providing for enhanced 
penalty where defendant has prior convictions, "arising from 
separate incidences," for two violent crimes, two serious drug 
offenses, or one of each). 
11 
 
 
§ 25, which also specifies that the prior convictions must 
relate to "separate and distinct incidents."7  See G. L. c. 279, 
§ 25 (b). 
The Commonwealth's claim is that the Legislature's 
inclusion of explicit references to the need for separate 
incidences in other statutes and especially in another section 
of § 25 itself, i.e., § 25 (b), implies that the Legislature 
intentionally excluded the "separate and distinct incident" 
element from § 25 (a).  We have generally been wary of the maxim 
of negative implication.  See Halebian v. Berv, 457 Mass. 620, 
628 (2010) ("the maxim of negative implication -- that the 
express inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of another 
-- 'requires great caution in its application'" [citation 
omitted]).  Caution is particularly justified here, where the 
statutes cited by the Commonwealth vary significantly.  Two of 
these statutes -- the armed career criminal act and the common 
and notorious thief statute -- do not aid the Commonwealth's 
argument, as the language and structure are different from 
                     
 
7 Section 25 (b) provides for enhanced penalties without 
parole for violent offenders who have two prior convictions from 
a list of nearly forty violent crimes, and limits prior 
convictions to "charges separately brought and tried, and 
arising out of separate and distinct incidents that occurred at 
different times, where the second offense occurred subsequent to 
the first conviction." 
12 
 
 
§ 25 (a).8  The third provision, § 25 (b), was added as part of 
criminal justice reform legislation enacted in 2012.  See St. 
2012, c. 192, § 47.  Those amendments added § 25 (b) in order to 
remove the possibility of parole for habitual violent offenders,9 
id., and broadened § 25 (a) to include suspended and Federal 
sentences.  See Luckern, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 269-270, 273.  See 
                     
 
8 Although the former, G. L. c. 269, § 10G, provides for 
enhanced penalties for "armed career criminals" with prior 
convictions, limited to those convictions "arising from separate 
incidences," the phrase "career criminal" does not appear in the 
body of the statute.  Thus, unlike § 25 (a), which includes the 
concept of separate episodes via the phrase "habitual criminal" 
in the text, § 10G explicitly states "separate incidences" to 
achieve that meaning.  See generally Commonwealth v. Resende, 
474 Mass. 455 (2016). 
 
 
The latter, G. L. c. 266, § 40, requires "distinct" 
convictions of specified crimes in the body of the statute, 
which provides for consolidated sentences for "common and 
notorious thie[ves]".  However, because it has a completely 
different purpose and structure from § 25 (a), it is unclear why 
we should read § 40 as similar enough to affect our 
interpretation of § 25 (a).  See Commonwealth v. Crocker, 384 
Mass. 353, 355 & n.2 (1981) (§ 40 focuses on sentencing and 
requires consolidated sentence, whereas § 25 [a] must be alleged 
by indictment and requires separate trial); Commonwealth v. 
McKnight, 289 Mass. 530, 548 (1935) ("[§ 40] and [its] procedure 
are quite different from cases where a heavier sentence is 
imposed [after prior convictions] and where there must be an 
allegation of the previous conviction as an integral part of the 
offence").  See also Resende, 474 Mass. at 466 (different 
structure and language between Federal and State armed career 
criminal acts implied that State Legislature had different 
sentencing scheme in mind). 
 
 
9 Norton, Patrick Will Sign Sentencing Bill, Expects More 
Debate Early Next Session (July 31, 2012), http://www. 
statehousenews.com/news/2012860 [https://perma.cc/HU9P-KL8J] 
("bill . . . eliminate[s] parole eligibility for certain three-
time violent offenders, a measure that proponents say targets 
the 'worst of the worst' and will improve public safety"). 
13 
 
 
generally Commonwealth v. Colturi, 448 Mass. 809, 812-813 (2007) 
(considering purpose of amendments as aid in interpretation).  
However, because the Legislature did not further amend § 25 (a), 
there is no indication that it intended to make material changes 
to the rest of § 25 (a).  Luckern, supra at 270.  See Colturi, 
supra at 812 (because we presume Legislature is aware of our 
prior decisions, "reenact[ment of] statutory language without 
material change" implies adoption of prior construction).  To 
the extent that § 25 (b) includes more specific language about 
distinct occurrences, it does not negate this court's and the 
Appeals Court's prior assumptions about § 25 (a). 
Thus, viewing § 25 (a) in light of its history, the 
statute's proper interpretation aligns with that adopted by the 
defendant and the motion judge:  the two prior convictions with 
qualifying sentences must have arisen from two separate criminal 
episodes or incidents. 
 
c.  Statute's effects and rule of lenity.  Moreover, taking 
the Commonwealth's proposed interpretation of § 25 (a) to its 
logical conclusion, the Commonwealth, in its discretion, could 
seek a habitual offender enhancement for any single incident in 
which a defendant committed three felonies, by parsing them into 
two separate prosecutions:  one with two substantive charges, 
and one with both a third substantive charge and a habitual 
criminal enhancement.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 9 (a), 378 Mass. 
14 
 
 
859 (1979); E.B. Cypher, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 25:56 
(4th ed. 2014) (prosecutor has broad discretion).  For example, 
a prosecutor could split a drug-and-firearm transaction into two 
cases:  the first case charging the defendant with possession of 
a firearm and possession of a controlled substance with intent 
to distribute, and the second charging conspiracy and a habitual 
criminal enhancement, based on the drug and firearm convictions 
in the first case.  See Commonwealth v. Gallarelli, 372 Mass. 
573, 576-577 (1977) (discussing separate prosecutions of 
conspiracy and substantive act).  Alternatively, prosecutors who 
were successful in prosecuting two charges may later learn of 
new facts that would support a third charge.  In both scenarios, 
there would be two prior convictions and sentences before the 
defendant was prosecuted for the third charge, even though all 
three charges arose from a single episode.  Thus, the statute's 
application would depend not on habitual criminal conduct but on 
how the Commonwealth chooses to prosecute any one criminal 
episode.  This cannot be what the Legislature intended.  See 
Lowery v. Klemm, 446 Mass. 572, 578-579 (2006), quoting Attorney 
Gen. v. School Comm. of Essex, 387 Mass. 326, 336 (1982) ("we 
will not adopt a construction of a statute that creates 'absurd 
or unreasonable' consequences"). 
 
Further, to the extent that the Commonwealth's argument 
raises a valid question about the meaning of § 25 (a), the rule 
15 
 
 
of lenity supports the interpretation advocated by the defendant 
and accepted by us.  See Commonwealth v. Resende, 474 Mass. 455, 
469 (2016) (in sentencing and substantive provisions, where 
"statute is ambiguous" or legislative intent is unclear, "the 
defendant is entitled to the benefit of any rational doubt" 
[citation omitted]).  Therefore, we conclude that § 25 (a) calls 
for enhanced penalties for defendants with two prior convictions 
with qualifying sentences only where those convictions stem from 
separate criminal incidents. 
 
2.  Probable cause.  Citing Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 392 
Mass. 445, 451 (1985), and other cases, the Commonwealth argues 
that even if there is in § 25 (a) a requirement of a separate 
criminal incident, at the grand jury stage, the Commonwealth 
only had to present evidence establishing that there were two 
prior convictions, not that those convictions related to 
distinct criminal episodes.  A court will normally avoid 
examining the evidence before the grand jury.  See Commonwealth 
v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 161-162 (1982).  However, we will 
inquire into the proceeding where, as here, the defendant 
alleges that the grand jury heard no evidence as to a charge or 
an essential element of a charge.10  See Commonwealth v. Rex, 469 
                     
 
10 Given the practical reality that a large majority of 
criminal cases are resolved by guilty pleas, the possibility of 
requiring no evidence of separate episodes until trial is of 
particular concern here, because the dismissal of a habitual 
16 
 
 
Mass. 36, 40-42 (2014) (considering whether grand jury heard 
"any" evidence as to elements of possession of child 
pornography). 
 
Here, the grand jury heard no evidence that would allow 
them to conclude that the defendant's prior convictions stemmed 
from separate criminal episodes.  As described supra, after the 
grand jury returned indictments on the new substantive drug 
charges, they heard testimony regarding four of the defendant's 
prior convictions.  However, the grand jury did not hear any 
information as to the underlying criminal acts.  In particular, 
they heard no information regarding when the offenses took place 
or how they were related to each other.11  Therefore, they would 
not have been able to determine whether the defendant's prior 
convictions arose out of separate episodes or out of a single 
criminal incident or spree.  As a consequence, without hearing 
any evidence of separate criminal events, the grand jury could 
not conclude that there was probable cause to believe that an 
essential element of the habitual offender statute existed.  See 
Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 565-566 (2013) 
                                                                  
offender charge can be a powerful motivator for defendants 
considering plea agreements. 
 
 
11 Because the grand jury heard no testimony that would 
support a determination that the prior convictions stemmed from 
separate criminal incidents or episodes, we do not opine whether 
testimony regarding the underlying scenario, described in note 
2, supra, would permit such a finding. 
17 
 
 
("complaint application must include information to support 
probable cause as to each essential element of the offense").  
Thus, the Commonwealth did not meet its burden for the grand 
jury properly to find probable cause for the habitual offender 
portions of the indictments. 
 
Conclusion.  The order of the Superior Court allowing the 
defendant's motion to dismiss the habitual offender portions of 
the indictments is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.