Title: Waranka v. Wadena Ins. Co.
Citation: 2014 WI 28
Docket Number: 2012AP000320
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 3, 2014

2014 WI 28 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP320   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Sharon A. Waranka Individually and as Personal  
Representative of the Estate of Nicholas 
Waranka, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Wadena Insurance Company, Auto Owners Insurance 
Company,  
Michael Eidenberger, Larry Neman and American 
Family  
Mutual Insurance Company, 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 
Scott R.  
Brewer, Zachary G. Nelson, Mark Jonas, 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners, 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 
          Defendant.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
348 Wis. 2d 111, 832 N.W.2d 133 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No: 2013 WI App 56  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 3, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 20, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Paul V. Malloy 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs by James O. Conway, Corrado Cirillo, and Olsen, Kloet, 
Gunderson & Conway, Sheboygan, and oral argument by Corrado 
Cirillo. 
 
 
2 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, the cause was argued by Susan 
R. Tyndall, with whom on the brief was Robert L. Jaskulski and 
Habush Habush & Rottier, S.C., Milwaukee.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 28
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2012AP320 
(L.C. No. 
2010CV219) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Sharon A. Waranka Individually and as Personal  
Representative of the Estate of Nicholas 
Waranka,   
 
Plaintiff-Appellant,   
 
 
v. 
 
Wadena Insurance Company, Auto Owners Insurance 
Company, Michael Eidenberger, Larry Neman and 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company,   
 
 
Defendants-Respondents, 
 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 
Scott R. Brewer, Zachary G. Nelson, Mark Jonas, 
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 
     
Defendant. 
   
FILED 
 
JUN 3, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. Petitioners, State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company, Scott R. Brewer, Zachary G. 
Nelson, and Mark Jonas (collectively referred to as State Farm) 
seek review of that part of a published decision of the court of 
No. 2012AP320 
   
 
2 
 
appeals that reversed the circuit court's order in this wrongful 
death action.1  The circuit court determined that the wrongful 
death damage limitations applied to an action brought by the 
plaintiff, Sharon A. Waranka (Waranka), seeking recovery for the 
out-of-state death of her husband.  The court of appeals 
disagreed.  It concluded that because the damage limitations in 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04 (2011-12)2 must be read together with the 
wrongful death statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.03, and because the 
latter expressly provides that it does not apply to deaths 
caused out of state, the Wisconsin wrongful death damage 
limitations do not apply.   
¶2 
 State Farm argues that Wis. Stat. § 895.04, which 
sets a monetary cap on the amount of non-economic damages a 
plaintiff can recover in a wrongful death action, can apply 
independently from Wisconsin's wrongful death statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 895.03.  According to State Farm, Michigan law, which 
does not set a cap on the amount of recoverable damages, is 
inapplicable. It asserts that when a conflict of laws analysis 
is conducted, the lack of significant ties to Michigan militates 
in favor of applying Wisconsin law. 
¶3 
We conclude that the limitations on wrongful death 
actions in Wis. Stat. § 895.04 necessarily refer to wrongful 
                                                 
1 Waranka v. Wadena Ins. Co., 2013 WI App 56, 348 Wis. 2d 
111, 832 N.W.2d 133 (reversing in part, affirming in part an 
order of the circuit court for Ozaukee County, Paul V. Malloy, 
Judge). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2012AP320 
   
 
3 
 
death actions created by Wis. Stat. § 895.03.  The language of 
the statutes, our case law interpreting both Wis. Stat. 
§§ 895.03 and 895.04, their statutory history, and the canon of 
statutory construction, in pari materia,3 dictate that Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.04 cannot be applied separately from Wis. Stat. § 895.03.   
¶4 
We further conclude that because Wis. Stat. § 895.03 
does not apply to deaths caused outside the state of Wisconsin, 
there is no conflict between Wisconsin law and Michigan's 
wrongful death statute.  Only Michigan's wrongful death statute 
applies here and thus we need not undertake a conflict of laws 
analysis.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
¶5 
Nicholas Waranka, a Wisconsin resident, went on 
vacation to an annual snowmobile event in Michigan.  The event, 
called "Rubbish Run," was held by patrons and friends of Port 
Washington Yamaha, a snowmobile dealership located in Port 
Washington, Wisconsin.  It was attended primarily by Wisconsin 
residents.   
¶6 
On the morning of January 30, 2009, Nicholas joined 
nine other individuals for a snowmobile ride through the 
Hiawatha National Forest.  During that ride, they came upon a 
snow embankment.  The first four riders avoided it. However, the 
remaining riders struck the embankment, lost control of their 
                                                 
3 In pari materia literally means "[o]n the same subject; 
relating to the same matter."  State v. Bobby G., 2007 WI 77, 
¶127 n.3, 301 Wis. 2d 531, 734 N.W.2d 81. 
No. 2012AP320 
   
 
4 
 
vehicles, and collided.  Nicholas and another individual died as 
a result of the injuries they sustained in the collision.  
¶7 
Nicholas was survived by his wife, Sharon Waranka, and 
his daughter.  Waranka filed a lawsuit in Ozaukee County, on 
behalf of herself and as a representative of Nicholas' estate, 
against several of the individuals who were part of the group 
that went riding that morning and the various insurance carriers 
providing coverage for the snowmobiles.  It is undisputed that 
each of the individual defendants is a resident of Wisconsin and 
that three of the five insurance carriers named as defendants 
insured snowmobiles garaged in Wisconsin pursuant to policies 
issued in Wisconsin.   
¶8 
Waranka alleged that the individual defendants were 
negligent in the operation of their snowmobiles and that their 
negligence led to Nicholas' death.  She sought damages for 
Nicholas' medical, funeral, and burial expenses, Nicholas' pain 
and suffering, the loss of services and financial support 
suffered by his survivors, the loss of parental training and 
guidance suffered by his daughter, and loss of society and 
companionship. 
¶9 
Waranka moved for a declaratory order determining that 
Michigan's Wrongful Death Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2922,4 
                                                 
4 Michigan Comp. Laws § 600.2922, in relevant part, 
provides: 
(1) Whenever the death of a person, injuries resulting 
in death, or death as described in section 2922a shall 
be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or fault of 
another, and the act, neglect, or fault is such as 
No. 2012AP320 
   
 
5 
 
applied to the damage issues in her lawsuit.  She asserted that 
Michigan law governed damages because Wisconsin's wrongful death 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.03,5 does not apply to deaths caused 
outside the state of Wisconsin.  She explained that a conflict 
of laws analysis was not needed because the statutes did not 
conflict.  A cause of action existed only under Michigan law.  
                                                                                                                                                             
would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the 
party injured to maintain an action and recover 
damages, the person who or the corporation that would 
have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be 
liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the 
death of the person injured or death as described in 
section 2922a, and although the death was caused under 
circumstances that constitute a felony. 
. . . . 
(6) In every action under this section, the court or 
jury may award damages as the court or jury shall 
consider 
fair 
and 
equitable, 
under 
all 
the 
circumstances including reasonable medical, hospital, 
funeral, and burial expenses for which the estate is 
liable; reasonable compensation for the pain and 
suffering, while conscious, undergone by the deceased 
during the period intervening between the time of the 
injury and death; and damages for the loss of 
financial support and the loss of the society and 
companionship of the deceased. . . . 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.03 states: 
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a 
wrongful act, neglect or default and the act, neglect 
or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, 
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action 
and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in 
every such case the person who would have been liable, 
if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action 
for damages notwithstanding the death of the person 
injured; provided, that such action shall be brought 
for a death caused in this state. 
No. 2012AP320 
   
 
6 
 
In the alternative, Waranka contended that even if the court 
were to conduct a conflict of laws analysis on the damage 
issues, Michigan law would apply.   
¶10 State Farm6 asserted that Wisconsin law should govern 
the damage issues in this case.  It argued that although 
Wisconsin's wrongful death statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.03, did not 
apply, Waranka could still bring an action under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.04, which limits damages in wrongful death cases to 
$350,000.  According to State Farm, there was no reason to apply 
Michigan law because the case was brought in Wisconsin and it 
lacked significant contacts with Michigan.   
¶11 The circuit court issued an order stating that it 
would recognize the cause of action under Mich. Comp. Laws 
§ 600.2922(1), but that Wisconsin law would apply to the damage 
issues in the case.  It later denied Waranka's motion for 
reconsideration. 
¶12 Waranka filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing that 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04, which governs the terms and limits of 
wrongful 
death 
actions, 
could 
not 
apply 
separately 
from 
Wisconsin's wrongful death statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.03.  
Accordingly, she asserted that Michigan law should apply to the 
issue of damages.   
¶13 The court of appeals agreed with the circuit court 
that because Wisconsin's wrongful death statute does not apply 
to deaths caused in another state, Michigan's wrongful death 
                                                 
6 In the circuit court defendant Nelson took no position on 
whether Wisconsin law should apply to the issue of damages.   
No. 2012AP320 
   
 
7 
 
statute applied to Waranka's action.  Waranka v. Wadena Ins. 
Co., 2013 WI App 56, ¶7, 348 Wis. 2d 111, 832 N.W.2d 133.  
However, it disagreed with the circuit court's analysis of the 
damages issue.  It referenced the canon of construction that 
statutes passed in the same legislative act and on the same 
subject must be construed together, and noted that Wis. Stat. 
§§ 895.03 and 895.04 were created together.  Id. at ¶9.  
Accordingly, the court of appeals determined that the provisions 
in Wis. Stat. § 895.04 governing the terms and limits of 
wrongful death actions could not be applied separately from 
Wisconsin's wrongful death statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.03.  Id. at 
¶12.  
¶14 Because Wisconsin's wrongful death laws did not apply, 
the court of appeals reasoned that there was no conflict with 
Michigan's wrongful death statute and that no conflict of laws 
analysis was necessary.  Id. at ¶16.  Accordingly, it determined 
that the Michigan law on wrongful death would apply in its 
entirety.  Id.   
II 
 
¶15 In this case we are asked to address two issues.  
First, we are asked to determine whether Wis. Stat. § 895.04, 
governing the terms and limits of wrongful death actions, can be 
applied separately from Wisconsin's wrongful death statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 895.03.  Statutory interpretation is a question of law 
that we review independently of the determinations rendered by 
the circuit court and the court of appeals.  Petta v. ABC Ins. 
Co., 2005 WI 18, ¶12, 278 Wis. 2d 251, 692 N.W.2d 639. 
No. 2012AP320 
   
 
8 
 
 
¶16 Second, we are asked to determine whether Wisconsin or 
Michigan law applies to the issue of damages.  Such a 
determination also presents a question of law that we review 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.  Drinkwater v. Am. Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2006 WI 56, ¶14, 290 Wis. 2d 642, 714 N.W.2d 568. 
III 
 
¶17 We begin by addressing the interpretations of Wis. 
Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04.  Statutory interpretation focuses 
initially on the language of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 
110.  We consider the language in the context in which it 
appears.  Klemm v. Am. Transmission Co., 2011 WI 37, ¶18, 333 
Wis. 2d 580, 798 N.W.2d 223.  We also examine our case law 
interpreting the statute and its statutory history.  Nowell v. 
City of Wausau, 2013 WI 88, ¶21, 351 Wis. 2d 1, 838 N.W.2d 852; 
Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 
541, 749 N.W.2d 581.  Our inquiry is guided by the canon of 
statutory construction, in pari materia, that statutes passed in 
the same legislative act on the same subject must be construed 
together.  City of Menasha v. WERC, 2011 WI App 108, ¶11, 335 
Wis. 2d 250, 802 N.W.2d 531.  
 
¶18 In Wisconsin the right to bring suit for wrongful 
death is governed by Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04.  Cogger v. 
Trudell, 35 Wis. 2d 350, 353, 151 N.W.2d 146 (1967).  It is 
undisputed that the plain language of the wrongful death 
No. 2012AP320 
   
 
9 
 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.03, prevents its application to deaths 
caused outside of the state.  The statute provides: 
Recovery for death by wrongful act. Whenever the death 
of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect 
or default and the act, neglect or default is such as 
would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the 
party injured to maintain an action and recover 
damages in respect thereof, then and in every such 
case the person who would have been liable, if death 
had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for 
damages notwithstanding the death of the person 
injured; provided, that such action shall be brought 
for a death caused in this state. 
Wis. Stat. § 895.03 (emphasis added). 
 
¶19 If no Wisconsin wrongful death cause of action arises 
under Wis. Stat. § 895.03, the language of Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03 
and 895.04, our case law interpreting both statutes, their 
statutory history, and the canon of statutory construction, in 
pari materia, dictate that Wis. Stat. § 895.04 terms and 
limitations do not apply.  Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04 governs who 
may be a plaintiff in a wrongful death suit and what damages a 
plaintiff may seek to recover.  More specifically, it permits 
the personal representative of the decedent's estate or the 
person to whom recovery belongs to bring a wrongful death action 
and provides that non-economic damages are limited to $350,000.  
Wis. Stat. § 895.04.  In relevant part, it states: 
 
(1) An action for wrongful death may be brought by the 
personal representative of the deceased person or by 
the person to whom the amount recovered belongs.  
 
. . . 
 
(4) Judgment for damages for pecuniary injury from 
wrongful death may be awarded to any person entitled 
No. 2012AP320 
   
 
10 
 
to bring a wrongful death action. Additional damages 
not to exceed $500,000 per occurrence in the case of a 
deceased minor, or $350,000 per occurrence in the case 
of 
a 
deceased 
adult, 
for 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
companionship may be awarded to the spouse, children 
or parents of the deceased, or to the siblings of the 
deceased, if the siblings were minors at the time of 
the death.  
 
(5) If the personal representative brings the action, 
the personal representative may also recover the 
reasonable cost of medical expenses, funeral expenses, 
including the reasonable cost of a cemetery lot, grave 
marker and care of the lot. If a relative brings the 
action, 
the 
relative 
may 
recover 
such 
medical 
expenses, funeral expenses, including the cost of a 
cemetery lot, grave marker and care of the lot, on 
behalf of himself or herself or of any person who has 
paid or assumed liability for such expenses.  
 
. . . 
 
(7) Damages found by a jury in excess of the maximum 
amount specified in sub. (4) shall be reduced by the 
court to such maximum. The aggregate of the damages 
covered by subs. (4) and (5) shall be diminished under 
s. 895.045 if the deceased or person entitled to 
recover is found negligent. 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04. 
 
¶20 By 
its 
terms, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
895.04 
applies 
to 
"action[s] for wrongful death."  It follows Wis. Stat. § 895.03,7 
and 
the 
language 
of 
the 
two 
statutes 
are 
inextricably 
intertwined.  Wisconsin Stat. § 895.03 merely establishes the 
                                                 
7 Although 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
895.04 
initially 
immediately 
followed Wis. Stat. § 895.03, since their passage statutes have 
been inserted between the two: Wis. Stat. § 895.031 Recovery 
from estate of wrongdoer (created in 1937); Wis. Stat. § 895.035 
Parental liability for acts of a minor child (created in 1957); 
Wis. Stat. § 895.037 Abortion on or for a minor without parental 
consent or judicial waiver (created in 1991); and Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.038 Partial-birth abortions; liability (created in 1997). 
No. 2012AP320 
   
 
11 
 
cause of action, but "does not state who is entitled to maintain 
the action, the type and amount of damages recoverable, or to 
whom the recovery belongs.  Those determinations must be made by 
reference to the provisions of [Wis. Stat. §] 895.04."  Harris 
v. Kelley, 70 Wis. 2d 242, 248, 234 N.W.2d 628 (1975).  Indeed, 
the language in Wis. Stat. § 895.04 relies on the existence of a 
wrongful death claim.  It indicates who may bring a wrongful 
death claim and what may be recovered by a "person entitled to 
bring a wrongful death action."  Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4).  Absent 
a wrongful death action, no recovery may occur under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.04. 
 
¶21 Consistent with the statutes' language, Wisconsin 
courts have declined to consider Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04 
separately.  For example, in Delvaux v. Vanden Langenberg, 130 
Wis. 2d 464, 492, 387 N.W.2d 751 (1986), the court rejected a 
plaintiff's argument that Wis. Stat. § 895.04 creates a separate 
and distinct cause action for the spouse and dependent children 
of the deceased, independent of any negligence of the decedent.  
It explained that "the threshold determination for the awarding 
of damages in a wrongful death action is the existence of 
liability for the wrongful death."  Id. at 496.  Additionally, 
it stated that the threshold determination is made by examining 
Wis. Stat. § 895.03, which provides that an action exists if the 
decedent could have recovered had he lived.  Id.  Thus, because 
the decedent could not have recovered had he lived, his widow 
and minor children did not have a cause of action premised upon 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04.  Id.  The court's analysis focused on the 
No. 2012AP320 
   
 
12 
 
fact that "sec. 895.03 must not be read in isolation from sec. 
895.04."  Id.  
¶22 Likewise, in Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 
294 N.W.2d 437 (1980), the court declined to consider the two 
statutes separately.  There, the court considered the question 
of whether punitive damages were recoverable under Wisconsin's 
wrongful death statute.  Id. at 312.  After quoting Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.03, the court proceeded to quote Wis. Stat. § 895.04(4) 
and (5), and determined that the damages recoverable were 
limited by those sections.  Id. at 312-13. 
¶23 Wisconsin courts have also uniformly applied Wis. 
Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04 as one unit, which together create a 
cause of action for wrongful death in Wisconsin.  
See 
Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, ¶55, 293 
Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216 (citing both statutes for the 
proposition that "[a] wrongful death claim refers to the 
statutory cause of action belonging to named persons for 
injuries suffered postdeath."); Cogger, 35 Wis. 2d at 353 ("[a] 
cause of action for wrongful death is purely statutory, being 
derived from sec. 895.03, Stats. (formerly sec. 331.03, Stats. 
1959) and sec. 895.04 (formerly sec. 331.04, Stats. 1959)."); 
Herro v. Steidl, 255 Wis. 65, 67, 37 N.W.2d 874 (1949) ("Sec. 
331.03, Stats., creates for the benefit of persons named in sec. 
331.04(1)(a) a cause of action for the wrongful death of a 
person."). 
 
Accordingly, 
our 
case 
law 
strongly 
supports 
interpreting Wis. Stat. § 895.04 as applicable only in wrongful 
death causes of action arising under Wis. Stat. § 895.03. 
No. 2012AP320 
   
 
13 
 
 
¶24 This interpretation is also suggested by the statutory 
history of Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04.  These statutes were 
enacted together in 1857 as sections 1 and 2 of the same 
statute, chapter 71.  Ch. 71, Laws of 1857.  Section 1 of 
Chapter 71 (which became Wis. Stat. § 895.03) created a cause of 
action for wrongful death in Wisconsin.  Section 2 of chapter 71 
(which became Wis. Stat. § 895.04), stated that "Every such 
action" shall be brought by a personal representative of the 
deceased and that the damages awarded shall not exceed $5,000. 
Ch. 71, Laws of 1857.  By stating "Every such action," section 2 
was explicitly referring to the wrongful death cause of action 
created in section 1.  
¶25 The language from section 2 explicitly referring to 
section 1 was retained after chapter 71 was separated into two 
statutes and renumbered as Wis. Stat. §§ 4255 and 4256 in 1878, 
and later when those statutes were renumbered as Wis. Stat. 
§§ 331.03 and 331.04 in 1925.  Even after Wis. Stat. § 331.031 
(permitting recovery from the estate of the wrongdoer) was 
inserted between the two statutes in 1939, Wis. Stat. § 331.04 
still began "Every such action . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 331.04 
(1939).  That language remained until 1949, when Wis. Stat. 
§ 331.04 was amended to read "An action for wrongful death may 
be brought . . . ," in an apparent attempt at clarification.  
Ch. 548, Laws of 1949.  Wisconsin Stat. §§ 331.03 and 331.04 
were renumbered as Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04 in 1965.  Ch. 
22, Laws of 1965.  The current Wis. Stat. § 895.04 begins with 
the same language. 
No. 2012AP320 
   
 
14 
 
¶26 Construing the statutes together is further supported 
by a canon of statutory construction which dictates that 
statutes created together and on the same topic be read in pari 
materia.  See Madison Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Circuit Court, 2011 
WI 72, ¶101, 336 Wis. 2d 95, 800 N.W.2d 442 (statutes dealing 
with the same subject must be interpreted in pari materia); 
State v. Clausen, 105 Wis. 2d 231, 244, 313 N.W.2d 819 (1982) 
("Sections of statutes relating to the same subject matter must 
be construed in pari materia.").  As Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03 and 
895.04 were created together and address the same subject, 
wrongful death, they must be read together.  Accordingly, we 
determine that Wis. Stat. § 895.04 cannot apply separately from 
Wis. Stat. § 895.03. 
¶27 Our analysis is further bolstered by the fact that the 
Michigan equivalents to the provisions in Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03 
and 895.04 are contained in a single statute, Mich. Comp. Laws 
§ 600.2922.  State Farm admitted that if the provisions in Wis. 
Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04 were still contained in a single 
statute, it could not argue that they should be split and the 
limits on damages applied separately from Wisconsin's cause of 
action for wrongful death.  However, if we were to adopt State 
Farm's position that Wis. Stat. § 895.04 could apply, we would 
have to split up Michigan's statute.  Such a result would 
violate the principle of in pari materia. 
¶28 Here, the facts dictate that neither Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.03 nor Wis. Stat. § 895.04 applies to Waranka's cause of 
action.  It is undisputed that the actions causing Nicholas' 
No. 2012AP320 
   
 
15 
 
death occurred in Michigan.  Wisconsin Stat. § 895.03 provides a 
cause of action for deaths caused only in Wisconsin and 
accordingly is not applicable here.  Because Wis. Stat. § 895.04 
cannot be separated from Wis. Stat. § 895.03, its limitations on 
damages also do not apply to Waranka's action.8 
IV 
¶29 Having determined that Wis. Stat. § 895.04 cannot 
apply separately from Wis. Stat. § 895.03, we turn next to the 
issue of whether Michigan or Wisconsin law applies to the 
damages in Waranka's action.  As background we note that despite 
the inapplicability of Wis. Stat. § 895.03 to deaths occurring 
outside of Wisconsin, an individual may bring a wrongful death 
action premised upon a death occurring in another state pursuant 
to that state's statutes.  Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 
(1951).   
¶30 In Hughes, the United States Supreme Court reversed 
the dismissal of a wrongful death action brought in Wisconsin 
for a death occurring in Illinois.  Id.  The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court had affirmed the dismissal, which was based on the 
language in Wis. Stat. § 895.03.  Id. at 610.  The United States 
Supreme Court rejected that analysis and determined that the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause required Wisconsin to recognize the 
right of action created by the Illinois wrongful death statute.  
                                                 
8 Neither party appealed the circuit court's determination 
that Wisconsin's law on comparative negligence, Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.045, applies to this case.  Unlike Wis. Stat. § 895.04, we 
observe that Wis. Stat. § 895.045 is not limited to wrongful 
death actions.  
No. 2012AP320 
   
 
16 
 
Id. at 611 (citing Art. IV, sec. 1 of the United States 
Constitution).  Consequently, litigants may bring suits in 
Wisconsin based on a death caused in another state pursuant to 
that state's wrongful death statutes based on full faith and 
credit. 
¶31 It is in this context that Waranka's case was brought, 
leaving us to determine which state's laws apply.  When choosing 
between multiple state laws, the threshold question for a court 
is "whether a genuine conflict exists between Wisconsin law and 
the law of the other state."  Sharp v. Case Corp., 227 Wis. 2d 
1, 10-11, 595 N.W.2d 380 (1999).  If there is a conflict then 
the court will proceed to a conflict analysis which considers 
first whether the other state has only minimal contacts with the 
action.  Beloit Liquidating Trust v. Grade, 2004 WI 39, ¶24, 270 
Wis. 2d 356, 677 N.W.2d 298. If more than minimal contacts 
exist, 
the 
court 
will 
then 
proceed 
to 
consider 
the 
predictability 
of 
results, 
maintenance 
of 
interstate 
and 
international order, simplification 
of the judicial task, 
advancement 
of 
the 
forum's 
governmental 
interests, 
and 
application of the better rule of law.  Id. at ¶25. 
¶32 State Farm asserts that a conflict exists because Wis. 
Stat. § 895.04 limits the amount of non-economic damages a 
plaintiff can recover in a wrongful death action, and Mich. 
Comp. Laws § 600.2922(6) does not.  It contends that due to this 
case's limited contacts with Michigan, Wisconsin law should 
prevail under a conflicts analysis.  Waranka argues that no 
conflict exists because Wisconsin's wrongful death law applies 
No. 2012AP320 
   
 
17 
 
to deaths caused only in Wisconsin.  Accordingly, Waranka 
maintains that no conflict analysis is necessary. 
¶33 We agree with Waranka.  Michigan Comp. Laws § 600.2922 
creates a cause of action for wrongful death in Michigan.  The 
statute permits juries to award damages that are "fair and 
equitable."  Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2922(6).  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 895.04 differs from the Michigan statute in that it places a 
monetary cap on the amount of non-economic damages a plaintiff 
may recover.  However, as discussed above, Wis. Stat. § 895.04 
does not apply independently from Wis. Stat. § 895.03, and Wis. 
Stat. § 895.03 does not apply to deaths caused outside of the 
state.  Thus, there is no applicable wrongful death statute from 
Wisconsin that conflicts with Michigan's wrongful death statute.     
¶34 The federal district court for the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin reached the same conclusion when addressing a similar 
scenario.  Shaver v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 284 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. 
Wis. 1968).  In Shaver, a widow brought an action in her own 
name and in her own right, premised on her husband's death in 
Michigan.  Id. at 701.  The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing 
that under Michigan's wrongful death law only the personal 
representative of the deceased could sue for wrongful death.  
Id.  The widow contended that Wisconsin law should control and 
that Wis. Stat. § 895.04 authorized her to bring the action.  
Id. at 702.  Disagreeing with the widow, the court stated: "By 
express legislative direction, Wisconsin does not apply its 
wrongful death statute, in whole or in part, to a death caused 
outside of the state of Wisconsin. Thus, there really is no 
No. 2012AP320 
   
 
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conflict of laws question here." Id.  Accordingly, the court 
determined that Michigan law governed and dismissed the suit.  
Id.  Shaver is persuasive and we follow its analysis here. 
¶35 In sum, we determine that there is no need to conduct 
a conflict of laws analysis.  Michigan's statute is the only 
applicable statute under which a wrongful death action premised 
on a death caused in Michigan can be maintained in Wisconsin.  
Here, where the cause of Nicholas' death was the snowmobile 
accident in Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2922 applies in 
full. 
V 
¶36 We conclude that the limitations on wrongful death 
actions in Wis. Stat. § 895.04 necessarily refer to wrongful 
death actions created by Wis. Stat. § 895.03.  The language of 
the statutes, our case law interpreting both Wis. Stat. 
§§ 895.03 and 895.04, their statutory history, and the canon of 
statutory construction, in pari materia, dictate that Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.04 cannot be applied separately from Wis. Stat. § 895.03.   
¶37 We further conclude that because Wis. Stat. § 895.03 
does not apply to deaths caused outside the state of Wisconsin, 
there is no conflict between Wisconsin law and Michigan law.  
Only Michigan law applies and thus we need not undertake a 
conflict of laws analysis.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
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