Title: PEOPLE OF MI V TYRONE ELLIS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 121729
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: March 26, 2003

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chie f Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MARCH 26, 2003  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 121729  
TYRONE ELLIS,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
MEMORANDUM OPINION  
Defendant seeks leave to appeal from the Court of Appeals  
judgment affirming his bench trial convictions of carjacking,  
MCL 750.529a, and felonious assault, MCL 750.82, as well as  
the scoring of variables under the sentencing guidelines as a  
second-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.10. We affirm.  
However, we take this opportunity to note that the  
practice that appears to have been utilized by the trial court  
in this case, commonly referred to as a “waiver break,” is  
unethical and a ground for referral to the Judicial Tenure  
Commission in the future.  
 We have previously noted the impropriety of this  
practice.  In a statement denying leave to appeal on November  
2, 1999, this Court wrote:  
In this case, the trial court dismissed the 
felony-firearm 
charge 
while 
convicting 
the  
defendant of malicious destruction of property, 
which destruction was the product of a firearm  
discharge.  Thus, the verdict rendered was patently 
inconsistent.  Moreover, the trial court gave no 
explanation for its dismissal of the felony-firearm 
charge.  The Supreme Court previously held that a 
trial judge sitting as the trier of fact may not  
enter an inconsistent verdict.  While juries are 
not held to rules of logic, or required to explain 
their decisions, a judge sitting without a jury is 
not afforded the same lenience.  People v Vaughn, 
409 Mich 463 (1980).  Moreover, because of double 
jeopardy principles, the error of the trial court 
in dismissing a claim and rendering an inconsistent 
verdict cannot be corrected on appeal. [People v 
Walker, 461 Mich 908 (1999).]  
The present case suggests that, despite our statement in  
Walker, the “waiver break” practice continues to be employed  
by at least some criminal trial courts in Michigan.  
Defendant was charged with six counts arising from a  
single occurrence: carjacking, assault with intent to murder,  
armed robbery, intentionally firing a gun from a vehicle,  
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and  
being a felon in possession of a firearm.  The trial court  
found defendant guilty of carjacking and felonious assault as  
a lesser included offense of the charged assault with intent  
to murder.  Defendant was acquitted of the remaining charges.  
Regarding the felonious assault conviction, the trial court  
stated:  
The Court notes that as a lesser [included 
offense] of assault with intent to murder, it has 
been 
proven 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt 
that  
defendant Ellis had this gun, and he fired this gun 
either to injure or to make the complainants 
fearful of an injury; that is, a battery.  And that  
he had the ability to do this.  And that he did  
this with a gun.  
2  
This clear statement of the factual findings is plainly  
inconsistent with acquittals on the charges of felony-firearm  
and felon in possession of a firearm and cannot be rationally  
reconciled.  
Accordingly, we are left with the impression that the  
trial court afforded defendant a “waiver break” for waiving  
his right to a jury.  That is, in exchange for waiving his  
right to a jury trial, defendant was rewarded with acquittals  
of the firearm charges, although those acquittals are clearly  
inconsistent with the factual findings of the trial court.  
As we noted in our unanimous statement in Walker, this  
judicial practice is an improper one. A decision to drop or  
plea bargain charges is one that lies with one or both of the  
parties, not the court.  Regardless of any benefit that may be  
realized by the trial court because of a party’s strategic  
decision, such as the expedited docket management resulting  
from a defendant waiving his right to a jury, it is not within  
the power of the judicial branch to dismiss charges or acquit  
a defendant on charges that are supported by the case  
presented by the prosecutor.  See Const 1963, art 3, § 2  
(establishing the separation of powers).  
Further, a trial court’s decision of not guilty, whether  
proper or not, is constitutionally protected by double  
jeopardy principles.  US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15.  
As a result, a trial judge that rewards a defendant for  
waiving a jury trial by “finding” him not guilty of a charge  
for which an acquittal is inconsistent with the court’s  
factual findings cannot be corrected on appeal.  
3  
Despite the inability of 
the 
appellate 
process 
to correct  
the effects of an improper “waiver break” in the form of  
inconsistent verdicts, we reiterate that this judicial  
practice violates the law and a trial judge’s ethical  
obligations.1  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
1See, e.g., Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1 
(“A judge should always be aware that the judicial system is 
for the benefit of the litigant and the public, not the 
judiciary.”), Canon 2B (“A judge should respect and observe 
the law.  At all times, the conduct and manner of a judge  
should promote public confidence in the integrity and  
impartiality of the judiciary.”), and Canon 3A(1) (“A judge 
should be faithful to the law and maintain professional 
competence in it.”).  
4