Title: Richard A. Eberle v. Dane County Board of Adjustment
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1997AP002869
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 7, 1999

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-2869-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Richard A. Eberle and Barbara J. Eberle,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Respondents-
 
Petitioners, 
Burt Avedon and Silvana Avedon,  
 
Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
Dane County Board of Adjustment, 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, 
Sharon Clark-Gaskill, James E. Quackenbush, John 
A. Sayles, and Louise Klopp,  
 
Defendants-Respondents.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  221 Wis. 2d 597, 586 N.W.2d 699 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 7, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 5, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Sarah B. O’Brien 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Abrahamson, C.J., dissents 
 
 
(Opinion Filed) 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-cross respondents-
petitioners there were briefs by John A. Kassner and Wendel & 
Center, LLP, Madison and oral argument by John A. Kassner. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-cross appellant and 
the defendants-respondents there were briefs and oral argument by 
Rodney F. Knight, Deputy Corporation Counsel, Madison. 
 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Mark M. Leitner 
and Kravit, Gass, Hovel & Leitner, S.C., Milwaukee for the 
National Association of Home Builders and Wisconsin Builders 
Association. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Michael J. Modl 
and Axley Brynelson, LLP., Madison for the Wisconsin Realtors 
Association. 
 
 
No. 97-2869.ssa 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-2869 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Richard A. Eberle and Barbara J. Eberle,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross- 
          Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
Burt Avedon and Silvana Avedon,  
 
          Involuntary Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Dane County Board of Adjustment,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross- 
          Appellant, 
 
Sharon Clark-Gaskill, James E.  
Quackenbush, John A. Sayles, and Louise  
Klopp,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents.  
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.  
¶1 
N. 
PATRICK 
CROOKS, 
J.   Petitioners 
Richard 
and 
Barbara Eberle (Eberles) sought review in this case of the court 
of appeals’ decision to uphold the circuit court’s dismissal of 
various claims they alleged in connection with the Dane County 
Board of Adjustment’s (Board’s) denial of a special exception 
permit.  The Eberles contend that the effect of the permit 
denial was to deprive them of a legal means of access to their 
No. 97-2869 
 
2 
property. Following a certiorari review, the circuit court 
ordered the Board to issue the permit, a decision which the 
court of appeals affirmed and which has not been appealed to 
this court. 
¶2 
The issue before us is whether the circuit court 
properly dismissed the Eberles’ claims that the Board’s denial 
of 
the 
permit 
constituted 
an 
unconstitutional 
temporary 
regulatory taking under the federal constitution and Article I, 
§ 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  The circuit court initially 
declined to dismiss the art. I, § 13 claim and dismissed the 
federal claims as not ripe, in light of the availablility of the 
art. I, § 13 remedy.  Upon reconsideration, however, the circuit 
court dismissed the art. I, § 13 claim, based upon the rule of 
Reel Enterprises v. City of LaCrosse, 146 Wis. 2d 662, 677, 431 
N.W.2d 743 (Ct. App. 1988), review denied, 147 Wis. 2d 887, 436 
N.W.2d 29 (1988).  The court of appeals affirmed. 
¶3 
We hold that the Eberles have stated a valid temporary 
regulatory taking claim under Article I, § 13 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  To the extent that Reel prohibits the Eberles’ 
claim, we overrule that decision as contrary to the takings 
jurisprudence of this court and the United States Supreme Court. 
 Given our decision that the Eberles may pursue their art. I, 
§ 13 claim, we hold that the Eberles’ federal claims under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 are not ripe for review.  It follows that the 
Eberles are not entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988 at this point in the lawsuit, although nothing forecloses 
them from seeking such attorney's fees at a later stage in this 
No. 97-2869 
 
3 
litigation.  Consistent with these conclusions, we reverse the 
portion of the court of appeals’ decision dismissing the 
Eberles’ art. I, § 13 claim, affirm the rest of the court’s 
decision,1 and remand the matter to the circuit court. 
I. 
¶4 
The Eberles are real estate developers and builders 
who own a tract of land in the Town of Verona (Town), Dane 
County (County).  On January 11, 1994, after securing the 
approval of the County, the Eberles recorded a certified survey 
map dividing the land into two parcels, Lots 1 and 2.  Effective 
with the recording of the certified survey map, the zoning of 
Lots 1 and 2 was changed to classifications which would permit 
residential uses.   
¶5 
Prior to this rezoning, Lots 1 and 2 could be accessed 
from either of two public roads, Coray Lane and Timber Lane.  As 
a condition of the rezoning, however, the County, at the request 
of the Town,2 imposed a requirement that access to Lot 1 occur 
                     
1 Neither the Board nor the individual defendants responded 
to the Eberles’ petition for review or sought review in this 
court of the decision of the court of appeals to affirm the 
circuit court’s order directing the Board to issue the special 
exception permit.  Accordingly, we do not address the issue and 
the court of appeals’ ruling on that point shall remain intact.  
2 Counsel for the Eberles indicated at oral argument that 
the primary reason that the Town opposed access from Coray Lane 
was that Coray Lane’s location in the northwest corner of the 
township would require the Town’s emergency vehicles and school 
buses to drive approximately six miles further to reach the two 
lots than they would have to if access were from Timber Lane.  
See also Letter from Town to Dane County Board of Adjustment of 
5/10/95. 
No. 97-2869 
 
4 
from Timber Lane.  This requirement eliminated the possibility 
of accessing Lot 1 (and, due to the layout of the parcels, Lot 
2) from Coray Lane.  By recording the certified survey map, the 
Eberles effectively agreed to this access restriction.  
¶6 
On February 17, 1995, the Eberles sold Lot 1 to Burt 
and Silvana Avedon (Avedons) and contracted to build a home on 
the lot for them.  The deal required the Eberles to secure all 
necessary 
permits, 
including 
a 
special 
exception 
permit3 
allegedly required by a Dane County ordinance to build a 
driveway connecting Lots 1 and 2 to Timber Lane.4  The Eberles 
had petitioned the Dane County Board of Adjustment (the Board) 
for the special exception permit on January 20, 1995.  Following 
the sale, the Eberles began construction on the Avedons' home. 
                     
3 The dissent repeatedly mischaracterizes this permit as a 
“building permit,” in an apparent attempt to fit this case into 
particular language in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church 
v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).  It is undisputed, 
however, that the relevant permit is a “special exception 
permit."  As explained in footnote 4, the permit was allegedly 
required by Dane County Ordinance § 11.05(3)(a), which states in 
part, "Except as provided in section 11.05(2), a special 
exception permit is required . . . ." (Emphasis added). 
4 The special exception permit allegedly was mandated by a 
Dane County ordinance applicable to projects involving the 
filling of areas located within a certain distance of navigable 
waterways.  See Dane County Ordinance § 11.05(3)(a).  The 
majority of Lot 1 is connected to Timber Lane by a narrow strip 
of land approximately 1/2 mile long.  Any driveway from Lot 1 to 
Timber Lane would have to cross a small, unnamed tributary of 
the Sugar River which runs through the strip of land.  For 
purposes of this action, the Eberles accept that the tributary 
is navigable.  
No. 97-2869 
 
5 
¶7 
Following several public hearings,5 the Board voted 4 
to 1 to deny the permit on July 27, 1995.  The Board based the 
permit denial on its finding that the proposed driveway would 
cross a wetland and was not permitted by Dane County ordinances 
applicable to wetland zoning districts.  The Board concluded as 
a matter of law that "[a]ccess to Coray Lane would not intrude 
into [wetland areas] and is preferred access to public road."  
Compl. Ex. I at 3.  
¶8 
The Eberles requested reconsideration, which the Board 
denied on August 24, 1995.  The Eberles responded by seeking 
certiorari review of the denial in Dane County Circuit Court, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 59.99(10)(1993-94).6 
¶9 
Subsequently, the Avedons filed a separate lawsuit 
against the Eberles, seeking recission of the Lot 1 purchase 
contract and damages.  The Avedons alleged that the Eberles' 
failure to obtain the special exception permit deprived them of 
the ability to use Lot 1 by preventing the legal construction of 
any driveway to the property.  The Avedons’ suit was dismissed 
by stipulation of the parties after the Eberles agreed to 
                     
5 At these hearings, the Eberles presented detailed plans 
for the construction of a driveway from Lot 1 to Timber Lane.  
The proposed driveway included a bridge to cross the small 
tributary which ran through the land.  The Eberles also 
presented a soil erosion control plan.  There is no indication 
that the Board had any concerns with the Eberles' proposed 
plans; in fact, the record reveals that the Board commented 
favorably on the design numerous times during the hearings.  
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 59.99(10)(1993-94) was renumbered Wis. 
Stat. § 59.694(10)(1995-96) by 1995 Wis. Act 201.    
No. 97-2869 
 
6 
repurchase Lot 1 for $195,000 ($20,000 more than the price paid 
by the Avedons) and waive all claims for the work which had been 
completed on the home.7   
¶10 On 
March 
13, 
1996, 
the 
Eberles 
amended 
their 
complaint, adding as defendants the four individual Board 
members who had voted to deny the special exception permit.  In 
the amended complaint, the Eberles reasserted their claim for 
certiorari review.  They also alleged the following additional 
claims stemming from the denial of the special exception permit: 
 (1) inverse condemnation in violation of Wis. Stat. ch. 32 
(1995-96);8 (2) a "taking" without just compensation, or a 
“temporary taking” if the court orders the issuance of the 
permit, in violation of Article I, section 13 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution; (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for violations of the 
United States Constitution in the form of a "taking" or 
“temporary taking” without just compensation contrary to the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and  violation of the Eberles’ 
substantive and procedural due process rights contrary to the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.9  The Eberles sought actual 
                     
7 We do not determine whether, as the dissent contends, the 
Eberles might have avoided these damages.  The proper amount of 
damages is an issue for trial.  As we explain later in this 
opinion, our task at this point is only to determine whether the 
Eberles have stated a claim.    
8 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to 
the 1995-96 version.  
9 In their amended complaint, the Eberles also alleged 
claims under 42 U.S.C. §§  1985(3) and 1986.  The plaintiffs 
withdrew these claims in their Brief in Opposition to Motion to 
Dismiss, filed in the circuit court on May 16, 1996.    
No. 97-2869 
 
7 
damages totaling $1 million, punitive damages of $2 million, 
costs and attorney’s fees for all claims, and attorney’s fees 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
¶11 The Board and the individual defendants moved to 
dismiss all of the claims added by the amended complaint, 
contending that they failed to state claims upon which relief 
could be granted.  On September 6, 1996, the circuit court, 
Judge Sarah B. O'Brien presiding, reversed the Board’s denial of 
the permit and remanded the matter to the Board for a new 
hearing using the correct law and procedures comporting with due 
process.  The court ruled that the Board improperly applied 
standards for wetland zoning districts to property of the 
Eberles which did not appear on any Wisconsin Wetland Inventory 
Map.  The court also determined that the Board exceeded its 
jurisdiction and acted arbitrarily and unreasonably when it 
found that access from Coray Lane, which the County itself had 
prohibited, was preferable.10  Finally, the court found that the 
Board denied the Eberles due process of law by relying on an ex 
parte letter and an ex parte site visit.  In light of its 
decision to remand the case, the court deemed it unnecessary to 
consider the defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims added by 
the amended complaint or other issues raised by the pleadings.  
                     
10 The court inadvertently stated in its September 6, 1996, 
Decision and Order that the Board found that access from Timber 
Lane (rather than Coray Lane) was preferable.  As the court of 
appeals noted, the court corrected that error in a later 
Decision and Order.  See Decision and Order, November 8, 1996 at 
n.1, 1-2.     
No. 97-2869 
 
8 
¶12 Both 
the 
Eberles 
and 
the 
defendants 
sought 
reconsideration.  On November 8, 1996, Judge O'Brien determined 
that her September 6, 1996, decision to remand the matter was 
incorrect.  Finding that the record in this case was complete, 
the court reversed the Board’s decision and ordered the Board to 
issue the special exception permit to the Eberles.   
¶13 This time, the circuit court went on to address the 
additional claims raised by the amended complaint.  First, the 
court dismissed the Eberles’ claim of inverse condemnation under 
 Wis. Stat. ch. 32.  The court reasoned that the Board was not 
“a person possessing the power of condemnation,” as required by 
Wis. Stat. § 32.10.  Further, even if the complaint were amended 
to add Dane County as the defendant, the court characterized the 
Eberles' claim as a "temporary taking" claim, which, under Zinn 
v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 433, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983), cannot be 
remedied through ch. 32 but gives rise to a claim directly under 
Article I, § 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Pursuant to this 
reasoning, the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss 
the Eberles' art. I, § 13 claim.11  
¶14 Finally, the court dismissed the Eberles' federal 
constitutional claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, concluding that 
                     
11 The circuit court declined to address the individual 
defendants’ argument that this claim should be dismissed on 
grounds of immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  The court 
concluded that the issue of qualified immunity could be raised 
by summary judgment prior to trial but could not be decided on a 
motion to dismiss.  
No. 97-2869 
 
9 
they were not ripe for adjudication.12  Relying mainly on 
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 
473 U.S. 172, 194-95 (1985), the court concluded that the 
Eberles must exhaust their state law remedies, which in this 
case consisted of their art. I, § 13 taking claim, before their 
§ 1983 claims would be ripe.                
¶15 The defendants moved for reconsideration and the 
Eberles requested clarification of the November 8, 1996, order. 
 On July 11, 1997, Judge O'Brien issued a third decision and 
order in the matter.  Based on Reel, the circuit court reversed 
its November order and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss 
the Eberles' art. I, § 13 temporary taking claim.  The court 
reasoned that, under the rule of Reel, this case involved no 
legally imposed restriction, and thus, no taking, because the 
circuit court had reversed the Board's denial of the permit.  
¶16 The court also dismissed all of the Eberles' remaining 
claims.  The court dismissed the remaining 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
claims, finding that the Eberles’ procedural and substantive due 
process rights had not been violated.  In light of the dismissal 
of the § 1983 claims, the court ruled that the Eberles were not 
entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  
                     
12 In doing so, the court discussed only the Eberles' claim 
of a taking under the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, and did not mention the Eberles' substantive and 
procedural due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or their 
claim for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.   
No. 97-2869 
 
10
¶17 The 
Eberles appealed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
orders 
dismissing their claims13 and the Board cross-appealed from the 
circuit court's order requiring the Board to issue the special 
exception permit.  The court of appeals affirmed all of the 
circuit court's orders in an opinion filed August 20, 1998.  
Eberle 
v. 
Dane 
County 
Bd. 
of 
Adjustment, 
No. 
97-2869, 
unpublished slip op. at 3 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 1998).   
¶18 After an independent review of the record, the court 
of appeals determined that the circuit court had correctly 
ordered the Board to issue the special exception permit.  Id. at 
12.  The court of appeals also agreed with the circuit court 
that Reel required the dismissal of the art. I, § 13 temporary 
taking claim.14  Id. at 13. 
¶19 The 
court 
of 
appeals, 
like 
the 
circuit 
court, 
concluded that the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due process claims were not 
ripe.  See id. at 13-16.  Although the court concluded that the 
Board’s actions did implicate the Eberles’ rights to substantive 
and procedural due process, it stated that those actions had 
“been nullified” by the circuit court’s order to issue the 
permit and the court of appeals’ affirmance of that order.  Id. 
                     
13 The Eberles did not appeal the circuit court’s dismissal 
of their inverse condemnation claim under Wis. Stat. ch. 32.  
14 The court of appeals declined to consider the Eberles' 
argument that Reel is unconstitutional and contrary to other 
binding decisions, noting that the court of appeals does not 
have the power to overrule its own published decisions.  Eberle 
v. Dane County Bd. of Adjustment, No. 97-2869, unpublished slip 
op. at 13-14 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 1998) (citing Cook v. Cook, 
208 Wis. 2d 166, 189-90, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997)).  
No. 97-2869 
 
11
at 16 & n.13.  According to the court of appeals, the Board’s 
actions “represent the type of arbitrary and unreasonable agency 
action for which state-law certiorari proceedings canand in 
this case didprovide a full remedy.”  Id. at 16 n.13.   
¶20 Finally, the court of appeals rejected the Eberles’ 
claim for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  Id. at 17.  
Citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1983), the 
court of appeals ruled that § 1988 attorney’s fees were not 
available where no civil rights claim under § 1983 has been 
successfully stated.  Id. at 17.  
II. 
¶21  We granted the Eberles' petition for review of the 
court of appeals' decision.  Because that decision affirmed the 
circuit court's grant of a motion to dismiss the Eberles' 
amended complaint, the question before this court is whether the 
amended complaint states a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.  See Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 423.  In such situations, we 
are to construe the pleadings liberally in order "to do 
substantial justice between the parties."  Id.  Dismissal of the 
complaint is appropriate only if it seems certain that a court 
could not grant relief upon any set of circumstances that the 
plaintiffs could prove.  See id.   
III. 
¶22 Article 
I, 
§ 13 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
provides, "The property of no person shall be taken for public 
use without just compensation therefor."  When determining 
whether art. I, § 13 is triggered by factual allegations 
No. 97-2869 
 
12
concerning a particular piece of property, the threshold inquiry 
is whether the property has been "taken."  See Zealy v. City of 
Waukesha, 201 Wis. 2d 365, 378, 548 N.W.2d 528 (1996); Zinn, 112 
Wis. 2d at 424.   
A. 
¶23 A “taking” need not arise from an actual physical 
occupation of land by the government.  Howell Plaza, Inc., v. 
State Highway Comm’n, 92 Wis. 2d 74, 81, 87, 284 N.W.2d 887 
(1979) [hereinafter Howell Plaza II] (citing Howell Plaza, Inc., 
v. State Highway Comm’n, 66 Wis. 2d 720, 726, 226 N.W.2d 185 
(1975) [hereinafter Howell Plaza I]).  In expanding the 
definition of “taking” beyond actual physical invasions, in 
Howell Plaza I this court explained: 
 
[T]he absolute position . . . that there must be an 
actual 
physical 
occupation 
by 
the 
condemning 
authority, is not the only test of a “taking.”  There 
can be a “taking” if a restriction, short of an actual 
occupation, 
deprives 
the 
owner 
of 
all, 
or 
substantially all, of the beneficial use of his 
property. 
Howell Plaza I, 66 Wis. 2d at 726.     
 
¶24 In Howell Plaza II, recognizing that “[s]ome of the 
language in [Howell Plaza I] is broad enough to allow the 
finding of a ‘taking’ whenever a property owner is unable to 
beneficially use his property, even where this is only an 
indirect result of government action,” we refined the definition 
of “taking” which we had set forth in Howell Plaza I.  Howell 
Plaza II, 92 Wis. 2d at 87.  We stated that, “A taking can occur 
No. 97-2869 
 
13
absent physical invasion only where there is a legally imposed 
restriction upon the property’s use.”  Id. at 88.  
¶25 Takings which do not involve physical invasions of 
land are called “regulatory takings.”  See Hoepker v. City of 
Madison Plan Comm'n, 209 Wis. 2d 633, 651, 563 N.W.2d 145 
(1997).  Such takings are now well established in Wisconsin 
law.15  The rule applied by Wisconsin and federal courts is that 
a regulation or government action “must deny the landowner all 
or substantially all practical uses of a property in order to be 
considered a taking for which compensation is required.”  Zealy, 
201 Wis. 2d at 374.16   
¶26 Both the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the United States 
Supreme 
Court 
have 
recognized 
that 
just 
compensation 
is 
constitutionally required for “temporary regulatory takings,” or 
regulatory takings which continue for only a temporary period of 
time.  See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los 
Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987); Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 
429.  The leading case on temporary regulatory takings in 
                     
15 See 
Brian W. Ohm, 
Towards 
a 
Theory 
of 
Wisconsin 
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 4 Wis. Envtl. L.J. 173, 175 
(Summer, 1997) (calling this court "a national leader in the 
development of regulatory takings jurisprudence.")  
16 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 
(1994)(quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 
(1980)); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1015 (1992); Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 429, 334 N.W.2d 67 
(1983); Howell Plaza, Inc., v. State Highway Comm’n, 92 Wis. 2d 
74, 81-82, 284 N.W.2d 887 (1979); Just v. Marinette County, 56 
Wis. 2d 7, 15, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (quoting Buhler v. Racine 
County, 33 Wis. 2d 137, 143, 146 N.W.2d 403 (1966)).   
No. 97-2869 
 
14
Wisconsin is Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67 
(1983).17  Since this case involves an alleged temporary 
regulatory taking, we examine Zinn in some detail. 
¶27 Zinn was an action brought by Rose Zinn, the sole 
owner of the riparian rights to a lake and all of the land 
around it.  Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 420.  The Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR) issued a ruling which effectively reset the 
ordinary high water mark of the lake to a location beyond the 
boundaries of Zinn's land.  Id. at 421.  The ruling resulted in 
the statutory retitling of 200 acres of Zinn's land to the state 
in trust for the public and Zinn’s loss of ownership of the 
riparian rights.  Id.  The DNR granted Zinn’s petition for 
rehearing and rescinded the ruling almost two years from the day 
it took effect, thus reinstating Zinn’s ownership rights.  Id.  
¶28 Subsequently, Zinn filed a lawsuit against the state, 
alleging that the DNR's ruling, during the period it was in 
effect, constituted a taking of her land for public use 
requiring just compensation under Article I, § 13 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Id. at 422.  This court reversed the 
court of appeals' holding that Zinn's claim should be dismissed, 
holding that Zinn had stated a valid claim for a temporary 
regulatory taking under art. I, § 13.  Id. at 423-24.  
                     
17 For a discussion of Zinn, see Alemante Gebre-Selassie, 
Note, Inverse Liability of the State of Wisconsin for a De Facto 
“Temporary Taking” as a Result of an Erroneous Administrative 
Decision:  Zinn v. State, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 1431 (1984).  
No. 97-2869 
 
15
¶29 The Zinn court concluded that the DNR's ruling was a 
“legally imposed restriction on Zinn’s property” under Howell 
Plaza II and rejected the position that a temporary governmental 
restraint on property could not be a taking.  Id. at 427.  The 
court stated, "It would violate the constitutional mandate of 
the just compensation clauses of the Wisconsin and United States 
Constitutions 
to 
hold 
that 
a 
temporary 
taking 
is 
not 
compensable."18  Id. at 427-28.  Adopting the reasoning of 
Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Company v. 
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 653-54, 657 (1981), this court 
concluded:   
 
The test to determine whether there was a taking is 
whether the government action deprived the property 
owner of all or substantially all beneficial use of 
the property.  While the length of the time period of 
the restriction is a factor in determining whether 
such a deprivation has occurred once this test is 
satisfied there has been taking even though the 
property owner has regained full use of the property 
due to the government's rescission of the restriction. 
 The governmental unit which has taken the property 
must then provide just compensation for the period of 
the taking.  Therefore the fact that the DNR's ruling 
which took Zinn's property was later rescinded does 
not prevent Zinn, if her allegations are proven at 
trial, from recovering just compensation for the 
period in which her property was taken. 
Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 429 (emphasis added). 
¶30 The court in Zinn rejected the state’s argument that 
the ruling was not a taking because the DNR did not intend to 
take Zinn’s property.  Id. at 429-30.  We stated: 
                     
18 As noted earlier, the United States Supreme Court later 
reached the same conclusion in First English. 
No. 97-2869 
 
16
 
It is well established that “the constitution measures 
a taking of property not by what a state says, or by 
what it intends, but by what it does.”  San Diego, 450 
U.S. at 652-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting) [internal 
quotation omitted].  It is the effect of the state’s 
action that triggers the Just Compensation Clause, not 
the intent of the government in taking the action 
which led to the deprivation of private property 
rights.  If government action has the effect of taking 
private property for public use, just compensation 
must be made.  
Id. at 430 (emphasis in original).  This court also held that a 
decision of an administrative agency could constitute a taking, 
reasoning that the civil immunity of the individual decision-
makers did not alter the fact that just compensation is 
constitutionally due whenever a taking occurs.  Id. at 431. 
¶31 For these reasons, this court concluded that Zinn had 
stated a valid claim for a temporary regulatory taking under 
Article I, § 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Id. at 432.  The 
court then tackled the issue of the proper remedy for Zinn’s 
claim.  Id.  We concluded that in the absence of applicable 
legislatively 
prescribed 
procedures 
for 
obtaining 
just 
compensation, a claim for a taking may be brought directly under 
art. I, § 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  See id. at 437-38. 
See also Wisconsin Retired Teachers Ass'n, Inc. v. Employe Trust 
Funds Bd., 207 Wis. 2d 1, 28-29, 558 N.W.2d 83 (1997).  Since 
there were no existing statutory procedures for recovering just 
No. 97-2869 
 
17
compensation in cases involving temporary takings,19  Zinn, 112 
Wis. 2d at 437-38, we permitted Zinn to pursue her temporary 
regulatory taking claim directly under art. I, § 13.  See id. at 
423-24, 432.   
B. 
¶32 We are satisfied, based on the foregoing legal 
principles, that the Eberles have stated a valid claim for a 
                     
19 The court in Zinn specifically rejected the argument that 
a landowner who suffers a temporary taking should be required to 
proceed under Wis. Stat. § 32.10, which allows a landowner to 
sue for "inverse condemnation" if he or she "believes that his 
or her property has been taken by the government without 
instituting formal condemnation proceedings."  Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d 
at 432-33, 438.  In doing so, we explained that Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.10 (1979-80) does not apply to temporary takings:   
The statute is designed solely to deal with the 
traditional 
exercise 
of 
eminent 
domain 
by 
the 
government:  the government has occupied private 
property, plans to continue such occupation and the 
landowner is merely requesting just payment for this 
land.  In effect the land which has been taken by the 
government 
without 
first 
commencing 
condemnation 
proceedings 
is 
sold 
to 
the 
government 
by 
the 
landowner. 
 
But this is not the situation presented by the facts 
alleged in the complaint.  Here, the state, through 
the action of the DNR, has for a temporary period 
taken title to the plaintiff's land.  The ruling 
affecting the title transfer has since been rescinded 
and the state does not want the land and the plaintiff 
does not want to "sell" the land to the state.  The 
landowner simply wants just compensation for the 
period in which the state took the property which has 
since been returned.  Sec. 32.10, Stats., was simply 
not designed to remedy this type of taking. 
 
Id. at 433-34.  We note that the language of Wis. Stat. § 32.10 
has remained substantially the same since Zinn was decided.   
No. 97-2869 
 
18
temporary20 regulatory taking under Article I, § 13 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.21  We agree with the circuit court that 
the Eberles have alleged a claim for a taking.  The Eberles 
claim that the Board’s improper denial of the special exception 
permit temporarily deprived them of the ability to access their 
property by way of Timber Lane, the only legal means of access. 
 Certainly, under the circumstances of this case, a complete 
lack of legal access to a piece of land constitutes a 
deprivation of “all or substantially all practical uses” of that 
land.  Zealy, 201 Wis. 2d at 374.  The Eberles could hardly be 
expected to parachute onto their property in order to use it. 
                     
20 Because the circuit court eventually ordered the Board to 
issue the permit, any regulatory taking claim asserted by the 
Eberles would have to be for the temporary deprivation of use 
which occurred during the period in which the permit denial was 
in effect. Consistent with Zinn, we do not attempt to pinpoint 
this time period, leaving that issue to the determination of the 
circuit court upon remand.  See Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 427 & n.5. 
 We note, however, that if a regulatory taking is found to have 
occurred, the government must "pay just compensation for the  
period commencing on the date the regulation first effected the 
'taking'" and ending on the date that the regulation is 
rescinded.  Id. at 428 (quoting San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San 
Diego, 
450 
U.S. 
621, 
653-54, 
657 
(1981)(Brennan, 
J., 
dissenting)).      
21 Since the issue was not raised in this court, we do not 
address whether an Article I, § 13 claim can be brought against 
these particular defendants.  See Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 430-31.  
Similarly, the question of whether the Eberles' lack of 
compliance 
with 
the 
notice 
requirements 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(1)(b) is not before us.  See Decision and Order, July 
11, 1997 at 6-7 (citing Wisconsin Retired Teachers Ass'n, Inc. 
v. Employe Trust Funds Bd., 207 Wis. 2d 1, 558 N.W.2d 83 
(1997)).   
No. 97-2869 
 
19
 
¶33 Further, the Eberles have alleged a sufficient legally 
imposed restriction, as this court applied that criterion in 
Howell Plaza II and Zinn.  Unlike the plaintiff in Howell Plaza 
II, the Eberles do not allege that a taking resulted from a 
tentative development plan which the government has not yet 
implemented or a statement that permits would be denied by a 
person lacking the authority to deny or grant permits.  See 
Howell Plaza II, 92 Wis. 2d at 82-84, 89.  It is undisputed in 
this case that the Board had the legal authority to grant and 
deny special exception permits, and that it did, in fact, deny 
such a permit to the Eberles.  In addition, the record makes 
clear that the Eberles, unlike the plaintiff in Howell Plaza II, 
went to substantial efforts to obtain the permit they needed to 
build the driveway.  See id. at 84. 
¶34 Likewise, a comparison of the circumstances of this 
case to the facts of Zinn make plain that the Eberles have 
alleged a sufficient legally imposed restriction.  The court in 
Zinn held that Zinn had sufficiently alleged a legally imposed 
restriction because the DNR had the statutory authority to make 
the ruling, the ruling was binding on Zinn, and the ruling had 
the effect, under the applicable statutes, of retitling Zinn’s 
land to the state for public use.  Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 426-27. 
 Similarly, the Eberles alleged that the Board had the authority 
to deny the permit, that the permit denial was binding on the 
Eberles and legally precluded them from constructing the 
driveway, and that the denial had the effect of cutting off all 
access to the Eberles’ land.  We conclude that the Eberles' 
No. 97-2869 
 
20
allegations are sufficient to constitute a legally imposed 
restriction.   
¶35 We are unmoved by the Board’s contention that the 
Eberles should have sought a variance, requested rezoning of the 
parcel, or asked the County to lift the condition that access 
had to be from Timber Lane.  It would not make sense to require 
the Eberles to pursue a variance or rezoning when the zoning of 
the parcel permitted the construction of a driveway to the lot.22 
 Further, the record reveals that the Eberles, at the request of 
the Board, approached the Town concerning reconsideration of the 
access limitation, and the Town declined.  We are persuaded by 
the Eberles' argument that since the condition was required in 
the first instance by the Town, the Town's refusal to change its 
position is sufficient to demonstrate that the Eberles did what 
they could to get the access limitation lifted. 
                     
22 In this regard, the instant case is distinguishable from 
Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 201 Wis. 2d 365, 548 N.W.2d 528 
(1996).  The crux of the plaintiff’s complaint in Zealy was that 
the rezoning of the property from a residential classification 
to a classification which did not permit residential use 
effected a regulatory taking.  See Zealy, 201 Wis. 2d at 370-71. 
 This court determined that the plaintiff’s claim was not ripe 
because he did not seek rezoning and was not a taking because 
the land could still be used for other purposes, including 
farming, its “historical” use.  See id. at 372, 380.  See also 
Eternalist Foundation, Inc. v. City of Platteville, ___ Wis. 2d 
___, 593 N.W.2d 84, 90 (Ct. App. 1999).  In this case, unlike 
Zealy, the plaintiffs’ claim is not based on dissatisfaction 
with the way in which the property is zoned.  In fact, the 
Eberles themselves petitioned for the change to the current 
zoning.  Moreover, the Eberles have alleged facts in their 
amended complaint which, if proved, indicate that the Eberles 
cannot legally drive themselves or any equipment onto their land 
from a public roadway.  In such circumstances, the Eberles would 
have a difficult time using the land in this case for anything.  
No. 97-2869 
 
21
¶36 Because the Eberles have alleged facts which, if 
proved, would show that the Board’s denial of the special 
exception permit resulted in a legally imposed restriction which 
deprived the Eberles of all or substantially all practical use 
of Lot 1, we conclude that the Eberles have stated a valid claim 
for a temporary regulatory taking under Article I, § 13 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.23  We reverse that portion of the court 
of appeals opinion which affirms the circuit court's dismissal 
of the Eberles' art. I, § 13 claim and remand the matter to the 
circuit court for further proceedings.   
C. 
¶37  Before moving on, we must address the conclusion of 
the courts below that the court of appeals' decision in Reel 
Enterprises v. City of LaCrosse, 146 Wis. 2d 662, 431 N.W.2d 743 
(Ct. App. 1988), review denied, 147 Wis. 2d 887, 436 N.W.2d 29 
(1988), compelled the dismissal of the Eberles' Article I, § 13 
claim.  The circuit court and court of appeals reasoned in this 
case that the circuit court's reversal of the Board's denial of 
                     
23 The dissent claims that this conclusion leads us into 
“uncharted” territory.  See dissent at 1.  We find our course to 
be well mapped.   
This court held 16 years ago in Zinn that once the 
government takes action which strips a property owner of “all or 
substantially all beneficial use” of his or her property, just 
compensation is constitutionally required, regardless of whether 
the government later restores all use of the property to the 
property owner.  Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 429-30.  Four years after 
Zinn, the United States Supreme Court came to the same 
conclusion.  See First English, 482 U.S. at 321 (cited with 
approval in Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030 n.17). 
No. 97-2869 
 
22
the permit resulted in no legally imposed restriction, and thus, 
no taking, under the holding of Reel.  We agree with the Eberles 
that to the extent that Reel holds that no taking can result 
when a court reverses a decision of a governmental entity, Reel 
is incongruent with precedent of this court and the United 
States Supreme Court.24    
¶38 In 
Reel, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
allegations by the plaintiffs that various actions of the DNR 
constituted unconstitutional regulatory takings of their land 
had been properly dismissed by the circuit court.  See Reel, 146 
Wis. 2d at 665-66.  The Reel court based its holding on the 
conclusion that even though several of the alleged acts deprived 
the plaintiffs of all or substantially all use of their land, 
these acts did not constitute takings because they were not 
legally imposed restrictions on the use of the land.  Id. at 
666, 676.  With respect to the DNR’s refusal to approve a sewer 
extension, the court stated: 
 
DNR’s refusal to allow a sewer extension to the 
plaintiffs’ properties was a restriction on the use of 
their properties.  However, the circuit court reversed 
the DNR’s disapproval of the extension.  Consequently, 
                     
24 The Eberles also argue that Reel is contrary to Article 
I, § 9, the "remedy for wrongs" provision of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  This court has relied on art. I, § 9 in prior 
cases.  E.g., Estate of Makos v. Wisconsin Masons Health Care 
Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 41, 44, 52-54, 564 N.W.2d 662 (1997).  
Particular 
conditions 
must 
be 
met 
for 
a 
plaintiff 
to 
successfully establish an art. I, § 9 violation.  See Estate of 
Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 60, 67 (Crooks, J., concurring).  Because 
we overrule Reel on different grounds, we do not further address 
this argument.     
No. 97-2869 
 
23
DNR’s 
refusal 
was 
not 
a 
legally 
enforceable 
restriction on the use of the plaintiff’s properties. 
 It therefore could not be a taking.  Compare Howell 
Plaza II, 92 Wis. 2d at 86, 284 N.W.2d at 893 (taking 
cannot occur by restraint imposed by agency lacking 
legal authority to do so).  
 
A legally imposed restriction which the adopting 
agency later repeals, rescinds or amends may be a 
compensable temporary taking.  [First English], 482 
U.S. at , 107 S. Ct. at 2389; Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 
429, 334 N.W.2d at 73.  But if a court reverses the 
agency’s action which created the restriction, a 
legally imposed restriction does not exist and no 
taking has occurred. 
Id. at 676-77 (emphasis added).  
¶39 The court in Reel cited no authority in support of its 
novel rule that reversal of an agency action by a court converts 
an action which otherwise might have been actionable as a taking 
into one which is not, and our research did not uncover any.  It 
should be evident from our discussion to this point that this 
rule is unsupported by our decisions in Zinn and Howell Plaza 
II, both of which were cited by the court in Reel.  Other cases 
cited by Reel do not state (or even imply) that there is a 
distinction in takings law between those agency decisions which 
No. 97-2869 
 
24
are reversed by courts and those which are reversed by the 
agency itself.25  
                     
25 The Board and the dissent urge us to adopt the reasoning 
of the majority in Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Comm’n, 
953 P.2d 1188, 1195, 1204 (Cal. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 
179 (1998), that when an agency’s erroneous action is reversed 
by a court, there is no taking, because such delay is just a 
part of the process of developing property.  For reasons made 
clear in the text, we are not persuaded by the reasoning of 
Landgate.  We also point out that the argument of the majority 
in Landgate was  clearly considered and rejected by the United 
States Supreme Court in First English because Justice Stevens 
made the same argument in his dissenting opinion in First 
English.  See Landgate, 953 P.2d at 1205-06 (Chin, J., 
dissenting) (citing First English, 482 U.S. at 334 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)). 
The dissent would conclude that the Eberles’ eventual 
receipt of their permit renders the period in which the permit 
denial allegedly deprived them of the use of their land a mere 
“delay,” rather than a “taking.”  See dissent at 4.  This 
position is without merit, as we have previously explained.  See 
First English, 482 U.S. at 321; Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 429-30.  
See also City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 
No. 97-1235, 1999 WL 320798, at *16, *22-*23 (U.S. May 24, 1999) 
(holding that the question of whether a city’s repeated refusals 
to approve development plans deprived a landowner of all 
economically viable use of the land, and thereby amounted to a 
temporary regulatory taking, was properly submitted to a jury, 
and citing First English with approval); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 731, 744 (1997) (finding that a 
regulatory takings claim based on an agency’s denial of a 
building permit was ripe for adjudication); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 
1015, 1030 n.17 (holding categorically that a denial of all 
economically viable use of land is a taking, and citing First 
English with approval).  
It is important to keep in mind that the question before us 
at this stage of the litigation is whether there is any set of 
facts which, if proved by the Eberles, would entitle them to 
relief.  See Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 423.  If so, we are not 
permitted to uphold the dismissal of their complaint.  See id.  
  
No. 97-2869 
 
25
¶40 More importantly, however, the Reel court’s exclusion 
of actions reversed by courts from the pool of actions which 
might qualify as unconstitutional temporary takings is contrary 
to this court’s decision in Zinn and the United States Supreme 
Court’s decisions in First English and Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).  We explained in 
Zinn that once action by the government results in a sufficient 
deprivation in use of the property, “there has been taking even 
though the property owner has regained full use of the property 
due to the government’s rescission of the restriction.”  Zinn, 
112 Wis. 2d at 429.  Once there has been a taking, it is clear 
that just compensation is constitutionally required.  “[T]he 
just compensation requirement in the Fifth Amendment is not 
precatory:  once there is a ‘taking,’ compensation must be 
awarded. . . .”   Id. at 429 (quoting San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 
653-54 (Brennan, J, dissenting)).   
¶41 The United States Supreme Court later indicated its 
agreement with these principles in First English, in which the 
Court stated, “We merely hold that where the government’s 
activities have already worked a taking of all use of property, 
no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the 
duty to provide compensation for the period during which the 
taking was effective.”  First English, 482 U.S. at 321.  See 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030 n.17 (citing this language with 
approval).  The Court in First English assumed that the county 
ordinance at issue had deprived the landowner of all use of its 
property for a “considerable period of years,” and thus, 
No. 97-2869 
 
26
concluded that “invalidation of the ordinance without payment of 
fair value for the use of the property during this period of 
time would be a constitutionally insufficient remedy.”  First 
English, 482 U.S. at 322.    
¶42 The Reel rule runs counter to these settled rules of 
law.  To illustrate, imagine a decision by a governmental entity 
which constitutes an unconstitutional taking of land.  Under the 
above principles, the landowner is entitled to just compensation 
starting on the date the decision took effect.  Now imagine that 
the landowner succeeds in getting a court to overturn the 
entity’s decision.  In the absence of Reel, the effect of the 
court’s decision is to place an ending date on the temporary 
taking period, and thus, help to determine the amount of just 
compensation due the landowner.  Under Reel, however, the effect 
of the court’s decision is to convert the taking, after the 
fact, into something which was not a taking, and thereby wipe 
out the landowner’s ability to recover any just compensation.   
¶43 As such a result is not consistent with the law of 
takings established in cases of this court and the United States 
Supreme Court,26 we must 
overrule 
this holding 
in 
Reel.  
Accordingly, we overrule those portions of Reel which suggest 
                     
26 In Reel, the court of  appeals attempted to reconcile its 
decision with First English by adopting a narrow reading of that 
decision.  See Reel, 146 Wis. 2d at 678-79.  The dissent does 
the same.  We not persuaded by this reasoning, especially in 
light of Zinn, First English, Suitum, and Del Monte Dunes.  See 
Del Monte Dunes, 1999 WL 320798, at *16, *22-*23; Suitum, 520 
U.S. at 731, 744; First English, 482 U.S. at 321; Zinn, 112 
Wis. 2d at 429-30. 
No. 97-2869 
 
27
that a decision by a governmental entity which is reversed by a 
court is not a legally imposed restriction which could be 
cognizable as a taking.27  
IV. 
¶44 The Eberles have asserted two claims of a temporary 
regulatory taking contrary to the federal constitution under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983,28 one based on the Just Compensation Clause of the 
                     
27 Specifically, we overrule the language appearing on pages 
676 and 677 which is quoted in the text of this opinion, 
starting with “DNR’s refusal to allow a sewer extension,” Reel, 
146 Wis. 2d at 676, and ending with “a legally imposed 
restriction does not exist and no taking has occurred,” id. at 
677.   
In addition, we overrule those portions of Reel which 
suggest that Wis. Stat. § 32.10 may provide a remedy for a 
temporary taking.  See id. at 666, 674-75.  As we explained in 
footnote 16, we came to the opposite conclusion in Zinn.  
28 We agree with the court of appeals that any due process 
claims which might be characterized as other than regulatory 
taking claims were disposed of by the circuit court and court of 
appeals in connection with the certiorari review of the Board's 
denial of the permit.  See slip op. at 16 & n.13.  See also 
Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 199-200; Gosnell v. City of Troy, 
59 F.3d 654, 658-59 (7th Cir. 1995); Gamble v. Eau Claire County, 
5 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1993).  We note that in Gosnell, the 
Seventh Circuit concluded that Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 
(1990), did not impair the applicability of Williamson County to 
cases in which landowners allege substantive or procedural due 
process claims stemming from regulations which diminish the 
value of their land.   See Gosnell, 59 F.3d at 659.   
No. 97-2869 
 
28
Fifth Amendment and the other stated in terms of an unreasonable 
exercise of the police power under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.29  We use the same method for evaluating 
                                                                  
Further, we reject the Eberles' argument that they will be 
unable to recover consequential damages unless we permit them to 
bring their substantive and procedural due process claims.  This 
court has held that the just compensation required by Article I, 
§ 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution may include consequential 
damages.  See Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 283, 
177 N.W.2d 380 (1970) (determining that a statute limiting 
recovery for rent loss was an unconstitutional limit on the just 
compensation recoverable under art. I, § 13).  Both this court 
and the court of appeals have cited Luber with approval in cases 
involving temporary takings claims brought under art. I, § 13.  
See Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 437; W.H. Pugh Coal Co. v. State, 157 
Wis. 2d 620, 631, 635, 460 N.W.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1990), review 
denied, 464 N.W.2d 423 (1990).  See also Wisconsin Retired 
Teachers Ass'n, 207 Wis. 2d at 30-31.  But see Rotter v. 
Milwaukee County Expressway and Transp. Comm'n, 72 Wis. 2d 553, 
562-63, 241 N.W.2d 440 (1976); Hasselblad v. City of Green Bay, 
145 Wis. 2d 439, 442-44, 427 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1988).      
29 We recognized in Hoepker v. City of Madison Plan 
Commission, 209 Wis. 2d 633, 651 n.21, 563 N.W.2d 145 (1997), 
that a regulatory taking may involve either one of two theories: 
that property was taken without just compensation in violation 
of the Fifth Amendment or that the taking arose from an 
unreasonable exercise of the police power pursuant to the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  The Fifth Amendment Just Compensation 
Clause provides:  "[N]or shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation."  U.S. Const. amend. V.  
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause states:  "[N]or 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law. . . ."  U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV.  The essential difference between the two types of taking 
claims is the available remedy.  When a regulation is found to 
violate the Just Compensation Clause, the potential remedy is an 
exercise of eminent domain and payment of just compensation by 
the government.  See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 172.  In 
contrast, the potential remedy for a regulation which violates 
the Due Process Clause is invalidation of the regulation and 
actual damages.  See id. at 172.  
No. 97-2869 
 
29
the ripeness of a federal regulatory taking claim whether the 
claim arises 
under 
the 
Due 
Process 
Clause 
or 
the 
Just 
Compensation Clause.  See Hoepker, 209 Wis. 2d at 651 n.21 
(citing Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 197-200); Streff v. Town 
of Delafield, 190 Wis. 2d 348, 356, 526 N.W.2d 822 (Ct. App. 
1994).  The fact that a federal regulatory taking claim is 
predicated upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 also does not affect the 
ripeness analysis.  See generally Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning 
Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997); Williamson County Planning Comm’n 
v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).   Accordingly, for 
purposes of evaluating ripeness in the instant case, we do not 
distinguish between the Eberles’ two 42 U.S.C. § 1983 temporary 
regulatory taking claims.    
¶45 We have utilized a two-pronged test in determining 
whether a regulatory taking claim is ripe for adjudication:  
 
[W]here a regulatory taking claim is made, a plaintiff 
must prove that:  (1) a government restriction or 
regulation is excessive and therefore constitutes a 
"taking" 
of 
property; 
and 
(2) 
any 
proffered 
compensation is unjust.  See MacDonald, Sommer & 
Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986).  Both 
elements must be ripe before a claim is justiciable.  
See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. 
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 194 (1985). 
Hoepker, 209 Wis. 2d at 651.  See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 733-34.  A 
regulatory taking claim does not become ripe under the first 
element of this test “until the government entity charged with 
implementing the regulations has reached a final decision 
regarding the application of the regulations to the property at 
issue.”  Hoepker, 209 Wis. 2d at 651 (quoting Williamson County, 
No. 97-2869 
 
30
473 U.S. at 186).  See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 477 U.S. at 
348-49.  
¶46 In regard to the second element, the United States 
Supreme Court has explained that “because the Fifth Amendment 
proscribes takings without just compensation, no constitutional 
violation occurs until just compensation has been denied.”  
Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194 n.13.  See Hoepker, 209 
Wis. 2d at 652.   “[I]f a State provides an adequate procedure 
for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a 
violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the 
procedure and been denied just compensation.”  Hoepker, 209 
Wis. 2d at 652 (quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195).  
See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., No. 
97-1235, 1999 WL 320798, at *16 (U.S. May 24, 1999). 
¶47 The Eberles’ temporary regulatory taking claims fail 
the second element of the ripeness test.  As we have already 
explained, Wisconsin has a procedure for remedying temporary 
regulatory taking claims.  Plaintiffs seeking just compensation 
for a temporary regulatory taking may seek just compensation 
directly under Article I, § 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
No. 97-2869 
 
31
consistent with our holding in Zinn.30  The Eberles appropriately 
concede in their brief that their claims of temporary regulatory 
takings under the federal constitution would not be ripe if they 
are allowed to pursue their Article I, § 13 claim.  See Eberles’ 
Br. at 27-28. 
¶48 We hold that the Eberles’ federal regulatory taking 
claims are not ripe for our review.  Consequently, we affirm the 
                     
30 It 
should 
be 
noted 
that 
in 
concluding 
that 
the 
plaintiffs' regulatory taking claim was not ripe in Hoepker v. 
City of Madison Plan Comm'n, 209 Wis. 2d 633, 653, 563 N.W.2d 
145 (1997), we reasoned, in part, that "the legislature has 
established a procedure for inverse condemnation through which 
an individual may seek compensation for a regulatory taking.  
See Wis. Stat. § 32.10.  The [plaintiffs] have not utilized this 
procedure."  Hoepker, 208 Wis. 2d at 653.  In light of 
references in the opinion to a "temporary regulatory taking," 
see id. at 650, 653, 654, this language may appear to suggest 
that § 32.10 provides a remedy for a temporary taking.   
In 
Hoepker, 
however, 
it 
was 
not 
clear 
whether 
the 
plaintiffs' unripe regulatory taking claim would involve a 
temporary or permanent taking; under the applicable ordinance, 
the plaintiffs potentially could have been required to reserve 
land permanently or for only a five-year period.  See id. at 
649.  The discussion in Hoepker regarding § 32.10 was intended 
to address solely the potential permanent regulatory taking 
claim, which was the primary focus of the parties’ arguments.  
Accordingly, Hoepker should not be construed as supporting in 
any way the position that temporary takings can be remedied 
through § 32.10.  
No. 97-2869 
 
32
decision of the court of appeals upholding the circuit court’s 
dismissal of those claims.31 
V. 
¶49 Finally, we consider whether the Eberles may recover 
attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), which provides: 
 
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of 
sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of 
this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1681 et seq.], the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
of 1993 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb et seq.], title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d et 
seq.], or section 13981 of this title,, [sic] the 
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing 
party, other than the United States, a reasonable 
attorney's fee as part of the costs . . . ." 
 
42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b).  In determining the availability of 
attorney’s fees under § 1988, the threshold question is whether 
the plaintiff is a “prevailing party.”  Hensley v. Eckerhart, 
461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).  The United States Supreme Court has 
explained that a plaintiff may be considered a “prevailing 
party” under § 1988 if he or she “succeed[s] on any significant 
                     
31 We acknowledge that in Zealy, this court elected to 
address the merits of the plaintiff's claim under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.10 even though we determined that the claim was not ripe.  
Zealy, however, presented this court with a unique opportunity 
to clarify the law of regulatory takings in light of "extensive 
briefing by numerous interested persons and entities who filed 
amicus briefs, many of which exclusively discuss the takings 
issues raised in this case."  Zealy, 201 Wis. 2d at 372.  
Accordingly, we addressed the merits of the case in Zealy in 
"the interests of justice."  Id.  This case does not offer an 
equivalent opportunity to clarify the law, and only a few short 
amicus briefs have been filed.  Therefore, we do not believe 
that Zealy mandates that we consider the unripe takings claims 
here.  
No. 97-2869 
 
33
issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the 
parties sought in bringing suit.”  Id. (quoting Nadeau v. 
Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)).  See Texas State 
Teachers Ass’n v. Garland School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791-92 
(1989). 
¶50 Under the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), our 
ruling that the Eberles’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims were properly 
dismissed would seem to preclude the Eberles from recovering 
attorney’s fees under § 1988 in this suit.  The United States 
Supreme Court has held that “only a court in an action to 
enforce one of the civil rights laws listed in s. 1988 may award 
attorney’s fees.”  See North Carolina Dep’t of Transp. V. Crest 
St. Community Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 15 (1986).  
¶51 Since the Eberles’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims were 
dismissed only because they were not ripe, however, the 
situation is not so clear-cut.  The § 1983 claims might become 
ripe at some later stage in this litigation and the Eberles 
might successfully pursue them.  In that event, this might 
become “an action to enforce one of the civil rights laws listed 
in s. 1988,” id., and Eberles might be entitled to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988 attorney’s fees on the § 1983 claims and other claims 
under the reasoning of the Court in Hensley.   
¶52 In Hensley, the Court ruled that a plaintiff who 
prevails on some claims but not others may nevertheless be 
entitled to full attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  See 
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435.  Where claims in a civil rights case 
“involve a common core of facts or [are] based on related legal 
No. 97-2869 
 
34
theories,” the results obtained determine whether the fee should 
be reduced to reflect the lack of success on some claims.  Id.  
See Wallace v. Mulholland, 957 F.2d 333, 339 (7th Cir. 1992).  
¶53 If, in the future, the Eberles pursue and prevail on 
their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 temporary regulatory taking claims, they 
might qualify as “prevailing parties” deserving of attorney’s 
fees under § 1988.  At that point, if the Eberles have renewed 
their contention that they are entitled to § 1988 attorney's 
fees, the court should apply the reasoning of Hensley in order 
to determine whether the Eberles are entitled to attorney’s fees 
for other claims in this action.  At this early stage in the 
lawsuit, we are unable to determine whether the Eberles might 
later be entitled to attorney’s fees under § 1988.32  Therefore, 
we affirm the court of appeals on this issue.     
VI. 
                     
32 Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland School Dist., 489 
U.S. 782 (1989), does not affect our analysis in this regard.  
The Court in Texas State Teachers held that the petitioners were 
entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because they 
had prevailed on a First Amendment claim and thereby had 
“material[ly] alter[ed] the legal relationship of the parties in 
a manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee statute.”  
Texas State Teachers, 489 U.S. at 792-93.  Unlike the suit in 
Texas State Teachers, it is not clear at this point whether the 
Eberles’ suit will involve a civil rights claim listed in the 
statute.  If not, an award of attorney’s fees would not be 
appropriate.  See North Carolina Dep’t of Transp. V. Crest St. 
Community Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 15 (1986).  Although we 
cannot determine at this point in the lawsuit whether the 
Eberles may recover attorney's fees under § 1988, we stress that 
nothing in this opinion forecloses the Eberles from seeking 
attorney's fees under § 1988 at a future stage in this 
litigation.   
No. 97-2869 
 
35
¶54 In sum, we hold that the Eberles have stated a valid 
claim for a temporary regulatory taking under Article I, § 13 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  We conclude that the language in 
Reel upon which the circuit court and court of appeals relied is 
contrary to established precedent of this court and the United 
States 
Supreme 
Court, 
and 
accordingly, 
we 
overrule 
that 
language.   
¶55 In light of our holding that the Eberles have a valid 
state law remedy in their art. I, § 13 claim, we determine that 
the Eberles’ federal temporary regulatory taking claims under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 are not ripe for review.  Consequently, the 
Eberles may not seek attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 at 
this point in this lawsuit, although nothing prevents them from 
reasserting their right to § 1988 attorney's fees at a later 
stage in this litigation.  Consistent with these conclusions, we 
reverse the portion of the court of appeals’ decision dismissing 
the Eberles’ art. I, § 13 claim, affirm the rest of the court’s 
decision,33 and remand the matter to the circuit court.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded 
to the circuit court.   
                     
33 As we explained in footnote 1, the court of appeals’ 
ruling 
regarding 
the 
order 
to 
issue 
the 
permit 
remains 
unaffected by this opinion.  
No. 97-2869 
 
36
      
 
No. 97-2869.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶56 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).    
 A commentator recently described the takings jurisprudence of 
the U.S. Supreme Court as "a top contender for the dubious title 
of 'most incoherent area of American law.'"34  Without any 
acknowledgment of the unsettled nature of takings law and 
without reasoned analysis or explanation, the majority opinion 
today extends the law of temporary takings into new, uncharted 
spheres. 
¶57 The law is undisputed in Wisconsin that the state must 
compensate for temporary takings.  Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 
417, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983).  The question is whether this case 
fits within the cases relating to temporary takings.35 
                     
34 Jeanne 
L. 
Schroeder, 
Never 
Jam 
To-day: 
On 
the 
Impossibility of Takings Jurisprudence, 84 Geo. L.J. 1531, 1531 
(1996) ("A LEXIS search will produce hundreds of recent articles 
attempting to reconcile, critique, or condemn Supreme Court 
takings jurisprudence or to justify, reinterpret, or re-imagine 
the underlying theory of property.") 
35 The Zinn case is distinguishable from this case.  In Zinn 
the Department of Natural Resources issued a declaratory ruling 
under Wis. Stat. § 227.06 (1975) and later rescinded the ruling. 
 As a result of the initial declaratory ruling, title to Zinn's 
property was transferred to the state.  As a result of the later 
rescission, title to the land was transferred back to Zinn.  
This court concluded: "It is difficult to conceive of a greater 
restriction on the property, in the absence of actual physical 
occupancy, than the loss of title to private land.  We find that 
the allegations of the complaint, which demonstrate that the 
plaintiff temporarily lost title to her land to the state, are 
sufficient without more to allege a constitutionally compensable 
taking."  Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 427, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983).  
Under those circumstances, this court held there was a temporary 
taking. 
No. 97-2869.ssa 
 
2 
¶58 The majority opinion overturns Wisconsin precedent36 on 
the basis of First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los 
Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).  But the majority is 
extending First English beyond its express holding.  In First 
English, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed a temporary takings 
claim to proceed to trial with the allegation that an invalid 
ordinance 
imposing 
a 
moratorium 
on 
building 
in 
a 
flood 
protection area had denied the plaintiff all use of its property 
for many years.  The U.S. Supreme Court, however, very carefully 
confined its holding to the facts of the case, namely that an 
ordinance later declared invalid had denied the plaintiff all 
use of property.37 
¶59 The U.S. Supreme Court was careful to distinguish the 
facts in First English from the facts presented in the instant 
case.  In First English, the U.S. Supreme Court cautioned that a 
normal delay in obtaining permits, variances and the like, was 
quite a different question.  The U.S. Supreme Court limited its 
holding as follows:  "We limit our holding to the facts 
presented, and of course do not deal with the quite different 
questions that would arise in the case of normal delays in 
                     
36 See Reel Enterprises v. City of La Crosse, 146 Wis. 2d 
662, 677, 431 N.W.2d 743 (Ct. App. 1988), citing MacDonald, 
Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1983). 
37 Ultimately it was held that there was no taking in First 
English.  See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of 
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Cal. App. 
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990). 
No. 97-2869.ssa 
 
3 
obtaining 
building 
permits, 
changes 
in 
zoning 
ordinances, 
variances, and the like which are not before us." 
¶60 The holding in First English is distinguishable from 
the situation before us.  I would follow the courts that limit 
First English to its facts.  In each of these cases, as in the 
present case, an administrative body refused to allow the 
landowner's requested use.  Thereafter a court overturned the 
administrative decision and allowed the use requested.  See, 
e.g., Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Commission, 953 P.2d 
1188, 1204 (Cal.), cert. denied, 199 S. Ct. 179 (1998) (a delay 
resulting from a regulatory agency's error in denying an 
application for building that was corrected on appeal is not a 
temporary taking); Chioffi v. City of Winooski, 676 A.2d 786, 
788 (Vt. 1996) (board's improper denial of permit not a 
temporary taking); Smith v. Town of Wolfeboro, 615 A.2d 1252, 
1257 (N.H. 1992) (board improperly applying ordinance is not a 
taking); Stoner v. Township of Lower Merion, 587 A.2d 879, 886 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 604 A.2d 252 (1992) 
(compensation for temporary taking available only for taking 
effected by legislation or rule of continuing effect, not for 
withholding approval under ordinance allowing reasonable use of 
land); Lujan Home Builders, Inc. v. Town of Orangetown, 568 
No. 97-2869.ssa 
 
4 
N.Y.S.2d 850, 851 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (board's refusal to approve 
plat not a taking in substantive constitutional sense).38 
¶61 In all of these cases, the courts refused to view the 
relatively short time between the application and ultimate 
government approval of the application as a temporary taking.  
Each of these cases hold that regulatory delay inherent in the 
statutory process of obtaining agency permits and approvals, 
including an appeal to a court, is part of the regulation of 
land use and does not normally give rise to a temporary takings 
claim. 
                     
38 In contrast, the majority opinion cites no case, either 
federal or state, that has held that a denial of a permit or 
other agency approval that is reversed on appeal constitutes a 
temporary taking.  Instead, the majority opinion refers to two 
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases.  In both cases, unlike in this 
case, the landowners were ultimately denied their request to 
develop the land.  These two cases do not fall within the 
limiting language in First English.  Neither is applicable to 
the case at hand. 
First, Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 
725 (1997), a ripeness case, is not a temporary taking case; 
First English is not even cited by the Suitum Court.   
Second, in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 
Ltd., No. 97-1235, 1999 WL 320798 (U.S. May 24, 1999), five 
years elapsed and the City rejected 19 different site plans.  
The governmental unit denied the landowner's final development 
plan, denied just compensation and did not provide an adequate 
forum for seeking just compensation for this alleged taking.  
During the case the City bought the property in question.  This 
was a § 1983 case and most of the discussion in the U.S. Supreme 
Court opinion involves the right to jury trial.  First English 
is cited in the Del Monte Dunes opinion merely for the 
proposition that when a government condemns property for public 
use, it must provide a forum for seeking just compensation and 
provide just compensation if there is a taking. 
No. 97-2869.ssa 
 
5 
¶62 The result reached by the majority opinion interferes 
with the balancing of policies underlying our system of permits 
and approvals by agencies.  The permit process is imposed on the 
public as a whole to ensure the orderly development of real 
property, 
simultaneously 
benefiting 
and 
burdening 
property 
owners.  The protection of public rights may be accomplished by 
the exercise of the police power unless the damage to the 
property owner is too great and amounts to a confiscation.  
Short 
of 
that, 
the 
government 
retains 
the 
ability, 
in 
furtherance of the interests of all citizens, to regulate uses 
of land.  It is only when government regulation goes too far 
that there is an unconstitutional taking. 
¶63 I am not persuaded that delays in the development of 
property that are occasioned by administrative proceedings are 
compensable as takings, except perhaps in the most unusual 
circumstances.  A simple mistake in governmental decisionmaking 
for which a review remedy is available should not ordinarily 
constitute a temporary taking.  I am convinced that the public 
interest in having important land use decisions made in an 
orderly way justifies a temporary burden on a land owner.  This 
burden is the inevitable by-product of democratic government. 
¶64 In my opinion, the facts alleged in this case 
demonstrate nothing more than an ordinary delay associated with 
the usual process for obtaining such a permit, rather than a 
matter of constitutional magnitude.  Here, the Dane County Board 
of Adjustment denied the special exception permit and the 
circuit court subsequently reversed that denial.  The permit 
No. 97-2869.ssa 
 
6 
process, which includes appeal and review, worked in its 
intended fashion and the plaintiffs received the special 
exception permit they sought 14 months after applying for it. 
¶65 I hope that the majority opinion does not induce 
government officials and boards to avoid making decisions for 
fear that the decisions might later be challenged and give rise 
to lawsuits for damages. 
¶66 I also write to state my unease with certain facts 
indicating that the plaintiffs may have contributed to the 
circumstances giving rise to the damages they claim.  On January 
20, 1995, the plaintiffs petitioned the Board for a special 
exception permit.  On February 17, 1995, prior to obtaining the 
permit, plaintiffs sold Lot 1 under a sales agreement that 
required the plaintiffs to secure all necessary permits, 
including the special exception permit for constructing the 
driveway.  On July 27, 1995, after a series of public hearings 
at 
which 
the 
plaintiffs 
presented 
detailed 
plans 
for 
construction of the driveway, the Board voted 4 to 1 to deny the 
permit.  Subsequently, the purchasers filed a suit seeking 
rescission of the sales contract, which the plaintiffs settled 
at an amount that constituted a $20,000 loss.  On September 6, 
1996, the circuit court, on certiorari review, reversed the 
Board's denial of the permit. 
¶67 On these facts, it appears that the plaintiffs most 
likely would have avoided most, if not all, losses if they had 
obtained 
the 
special 
exception 
permit 
before 
beginning 
construction.  Instead, the plaintiffs took a calculated 
No. 97-2869.ssa 
 
7 
business risk founded upon their expectation that they would 
obtain the permit. 
¶68 In sum, I view the Dane County Board of Adjustment's 
denial of the special exception permit as falling within the 
realm of the ordinary processes of governmental decisionmaking 
and the losses claimed by plaintiffs as falling within the realm 
of the ordinary risks attendant to the business of real estate 
development.  Accordingly, I agree with the circuit court and 
would hold that plaintiffs have failed to state a takings claim 
upon which relief can be based under Article I, section 13 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶69 For the stated reasons, I dissent.