Title: Koschkee v. Taylor
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2017AP002278-OA
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 25, 2019

2019 WI 76 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP2278-OA 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Kristi Koschkee, Amy Rosno, Christopher 
Martinson and Mary Carney, 
          Petitioners, 
     v. 
Carolyn Stanford Taylor, in her official 
capacity as Wisconsin Superintendent of Public 
Instruction and Wisconsin Department of Public 
Instruction, 
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 25, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 10, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
R.G. BRABLEY, J. concurs. (opinion filed). 
KELLY, J. concurs. (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BADLEY, J. dissents, joined by DALLET, J. 
(opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, J. withdrew from participation.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the petitioners, there were briefs filed by Richard M. 
Esenberg, Brian McGrath, CJ Szafir, and Wisconsin Institute For 
Law & Liberty, Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Richard 
M. Esenberg. 
 
For the respondents, there was a brief filed by Ryan 
Nilsestuen, Benjamin R. Jones, and Wisconsin Department of 
Public Instruction, Madison. There was an oral argument by 
Lester A. Pines and Pines Bach LLP, Madison. 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Association of School Boards, Inc., and the Wisconsin School 
Administrators’ Alliance, Inc., by Michael J. Julka, Richard F. 
Verstegen, M. Tess O’Brien-Heinzen, and Wisconsin Association of 
School Boards, Inc. and School Administrators’ Alliance, Inc., 
Madison. There was an oral argument by Richard F. Verstegen. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Peggy Coyne, 
Mary Bell, Mark W. Taylor, Corey Otis, Marie Stangel, Jane 
Weidner, and Kristin A. Voss, by Lester A. Pines and Pines Bach 
LLP, Madison. With whom on the brief was Christina M. Ripley and 
Wisconsin Education Association Council, Madison. There was an 
oral argument by Jeffrey A. Mandell and Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, 
Madison.  
 
 
2019 WI 76
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP2278-OA 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Kristi Koschkee, Amy Rosno, Christopher 
Martinson and Mary Carney, 
 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Carolyn Stanford Taylor, in her official 
capacity as Wisconsin Superintendent of Public 
Instruction and Wisconsin Department of Public 
Instruction, 
 
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 25, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION for declaratory judgment.  Declaration of 
rights; relief granted. 
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   This is an original 
action brought by Kristi Koschkee et al., two licensed teachers 
and two school board members, against Superintendent of Public 
Instruction (SPI) Carolyn Stanford Taylor and the Department of 
Public Instruction (DPI).  The petitioners argue that the SPI 
and DPI must comply with the statutory requirement that, prior 
to drafting or promulgating an administrative rule, they must 
No. 
2017AP2278-OA   
 
2 
 
receive written approval from the governor.1  The SPI and DPI 
argue that this requirement of gubernatorial approval is 
unconstitutional as applied to the SPI because, pursuant to 
Article X, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, no other 
officer may be placed in a position equal or superior to that of 
the SPI with regard to the "supervision of public instruction." 
¶2 
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
gubernatorial 
approval 
requirement for rulemaking is constitutional as applied to the 
SPI and DPI, whether such approval authority is found in 2017 
Wis. Act 57 or in previous provisions of ch. 227.  Article X, 
Section 1 vests supervision of public instruction, an executive 
function, in the SPI.  In contrast, when the SPI, through the 
DPI, promulgates rules, it is exercising legislative power that 
comes not from the constitution but from the legislature.  
Stated 
otherwise, 
the 
legislature 
delegates 
part 
of 
its 
constitutional power to legislate to the SPI, DPI, and many 
other agencies in the form of rulemaking power.  That the SPI 
also has the executive constitutional function to supervise 
                                                 
1 The 
legislature 
imposed 
this 
requirement 
on 
all 
administrative agencies in 2011 with the passage of 2011 
Wis. Act 21.  The petitioners initially argued that they sought 
to force the SPI and DPI to comply with the Regulations from the 
Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act, 2017 Wis. Act 57 (REINS Act) 
which introduced the requirements that (1) agencies submit scope 
statements to the Department of Administration (DOA), and 
(2) hold a public comment and hearing period on proposed rules. 
The petitioners later conceded that the SPI and DPI complied 
with these two requirements, and that their challenge was based 
on 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
the 
gubernatorial 
approval 
requirement as applied to the SPI and DPI.   
No. 
2017AP2278-OA   
 
3 
 
public instruction does not transform the SPI's legislatively 
delegated rulemaking power into a constitutional supervisory 
function.  Therefore, it is of no constitutional concern that 
the governor is given equal or greater legislative authority 
than the SPI in rulemaking. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
2011 Wis. Act 21 (Act 21) amended sections of Wis. 
Stat. ch. 227 (2009-10), the Wisconsin Administrative Procedure 
Act.  Prior to the passage of Act 21, an agency2 planning to 
draft an administrative rule submitted a "statement of scope" to 
the Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB) for publication, and to 
the "individual or body with policy-making powers over the 
subject matter of a proposed rule" for approval.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.135(2) (2009-10).  A scope statement describes the rule 
and its objectives, the statutory authority for promulgating the 
rule, the time and resources required to develop the rule, the 
entities 
affected, 
and 
a 
summary 
of 
relevant 
federal 
regulations.  Wis. Stat. § 227.135(1)(a)-(f) (2017-18).3  After 
submitting the scope statement, the agency drafted the proposed 
                                                 
2 "Agency" is defined broadly.  An agency is "a board, 
commission, committee, department or officer in the state 
government, except the governor, a district attorney or a 
military or judicial officer."  Wis. Stat. § 227.01(1).  The SPI 
meets this description, and is therefore also considered an 
"agency" within the meaning of ch. 227. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP2278-OA   
 
4 
 
rule and submitted it to the legislature for review.  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 227.135-.19 (2009-10). 
¶4 
Act 21 altered this procedure.  Act 21 required an 
agency first to submit its scope statement to the governor for 
approval; agencies were prohibited from submitting a scope 
statement to the LRB until the governor issued a written notice 
of approval.  An agency could not "perform any activity in 
connection with the drafting of a proposed rule . . . until the 
governor and the individual or body with policy-making powers 
over the subject matter of the proposed rule approve[d]."  Wis. 
Stat. § 227.135(2).  Additionally, rather than submitting final 
drafts of proposed rules directly to the legislature for 
approval, agencies were required first to submit final drafts of 
proposed rules to the governor for approval.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.185.  The proposed rule could not be submitted to the 
legislature for approval unless and until the governor again 
approved the rule in writing.  Id.   
¶5 
We reviewed these gubernatorial approval requirements 
in Coyne v. Walker, 2016 WI 38, ¶6, 368 Wis. 2d 444, 879 N.W.2d 
520, and decided that they were "void as applied to the [SPI] 
and his subordinates."  Id., ¶4.  There was no majority opinion 
in Coyne.  Our mandate resulted from a one-justice lead opinion, 
a two-justice concurrence, and a one-justice concurrence, all of 
which agreed only on the outcome of the case. 
¶6 
In 
2017, 
the 
Wisconsin 
legislature 
passed 
the 
Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act, 2017 
Wis. Act 57 (REINS Act).  The REINS Act added the requirement 
No. 
2017AP2278-OA   
 
5 
 
that agencies submit scope statements to the Department of 
Administration (DOA), which determines whether the agency has 
authority to promulgate the rule.  REINS Act, § 3.  The DOA also 
makes a non-binding recommendation to the governor.  REINS Act, 
§ 3.  The REINS Act required agencies to hold a preliminary 
public hearing and comment period on the scope statement at the 
request of a co-chairperson of the Joint Committee on Review of 
Administrative Rules (JCROR).  REINS Act, § 5.   
¶7 
The REINS Act did not alter Act 21's requirement that 
an agency (1) submit a statement of scope to the governor for 
approval prior to drafting a proposed rule, and (2) submit a 
final draft of a rule to the governor for approval before 
submitting it to the legislature.   
¶8 
The petitioners conceded at oral argument that the SPI 
and DPI had submitted scope statements to the DOA and held 
preliminary public hearings and comment periods upon request.  
However, the petitioners assert that the REINS Act "variously 
amends and reenacts parts of a comprehensive statutory scheme" 
and that their challenge therefore encompasses the "full suite 
of requirements" of ch. 227.4  The petitioners ask us to overrule 
Coyne's mandate and hold that the SPI and DPI must comply with 
the "full suite of requirements" of ch. 227, including the 
requirement for written gubernatorial approval both before 
drafting a proposed rule and before submitting a final draft of 
                                                 
4 Petitioner's Reply Br. at 3.   
No. 
2017AP2278-OA   
 
6 
 
a proposed rule to the legislature.  We accepted the petition 
for original action, and now conclude that the requirement that 
agencies receive gubernatorial approval prior to drafting a 
proposed rule and again before submitting it to the legislature 
for approval is constitutional as applied to the SPI and DPI.  
Accordingly, we overrule our prior decision in Coyne v. Walker, 
368 Wis. 2d 444.5 
                                                 
5 Because our decision in Coyne v. Walker, 2016 WI 38, 368 
Wis. 2d 444, 879 N.W.2d 520 addressed some of the same statutory 
provisions and constitutional concerns we examine today, we 
consider whether the doctrine of stare decisis should be 
employed in the case before us.  Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. 
Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶41, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 N.W.2d 417.   
Stare decisis is a principle of policy that can add 
certainty to the law.  State v. Denny, 2017 WI 17, ¶71, 373 
Wis. 2d 390, 891 N.W.2d 144.  However, stare decisis does not 
require us to retain constitutional interpretations that were 
objectively wrong when made.  See Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 
103, ¶21, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405.  This is so because 
such interpretations are unsound in principle.  State v. 
Luedtke, 2015 WI 42, ¶40, 362 Wis. 2d 1, 863 N.W.2d 592 
(citations omitted).  
Furthermore, our mandate in Coyne arises from a lead 
opinion, joined by one justice, a two-justice concurrence, and a 
one-justice concurrence.  When we are asked to overturn one of 
our prior decisions, lead opinions that have no common legal 
rationale with their concurrences are troublesome.  For example, 
we cannot analyze whether "[c]hanges or developments in the law 
have undermined the rationale behind a decision," Luedtke, 362 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶40, if there is no "rationale" to analyze.  We are 
in 
such 
a 
circumstance 
in 
the 
matter 
now 
before 
us.  
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude that 
an independent analysis of the issues presented herein better 
serves the interests of the public.  
No. 
2017AP2278-OA   
 
7 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶9 
We are required to interpret Article X, Section 1 in 
order to decide the pending controversy.  Interpretations of 
provisions 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
present 
legal 
questions.  Custodian of Records for the LTSB v. State, 2004 WI 
65, ¶6, 272 Wis. 2d 208, 680 N.W.2d 792.  This case also 
requires us to apply a statute.  The interpretation and 
application of a statute to a given set of facts present 
questions of law as well.  Marder v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. 
Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110. 
B.  Rulemaking Authority 
¶10 The Wisconsin Constitution establishes three separate 
branches of government, with "no branch subordinate to the 
other, no branch to arrogate to itself control over the other 
except as is provided by the constitution, and no branch to 
exercise the power committed by the constitution to another."  
State ex rel. Friedrich v. Dane Cty. Cir. Ct., 192 Wis. 2d 1, 
13, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995) (citation omitted).  Legislative power 
is vested in a senate and assembly, executive power is vested in 
a governor, and judicial power is vested in a unified court 
system.  Wis. Const. art. IV, V, VII.   
¶11 "Legislative power, as distinguished from executive 
power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them."  
Schuette v. Van De Hey, 205 Wis. 2d 475, 480-81, 556 N.W.2d 127 
(1996).  Powers constitutionally vested in the legislature 
include the powers:  "'to declare whether or not there shall be 
No. 
2017AP2278-OA   
 
8 
 
a law; to determine the general purpose or policy to be achieved 
by the law; [and] to fix the limits within which the law shall 
operate.'"  See, e.g., Schmidt v. Dep't of Res. Dev., 39 Wis. 2d 
46, 59, 158 N.W.2d 306 (1968) (quoting State ex rel. Wis. 
Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 505 220 N.W. 929 
(1928)). 
¶12 A "rule" is "a regulation, standard, statement of 
policy, or general order of general application that has the 
force of law and that is issued by an agency to implement, 
interpret, or make specific legislation enforced or administered 
by the agency or to govern the organization or procedure of the 
agency." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.01(13). 
 
Therefore, 
when 
administrative agencies promulgate rules, they are exercising 
legislative power that the legislature has chosen to delegate to 
them by statute.  See id. at 505-06 (the legislature "may 
delegate to administrative agencies the authority to exercise 
such legislative power as is necessary to carry into effect the 
general legislative purpose . . . .  It [] leads to confusion 
and error to say that the power to fill up the details and 
promulgate rules and regulations is not legislative power."); 
Brown Cty. v. DHFS, 103 Wis. 2d 37, 43, 307 N.W.2d 247 (1981) 
("Where the legislature has set forth the 'fundamentals of a 
law, it may delegate to administrative agencies the authority to 
exercise such legislative power as is necessary to carry into 
effect the general legislative purpose.'") (citations omitted). 
¶13 From time to time, the legislature has used its power 
to create administrative agencies, such as the Department of 
No. 
2017AP2278-OA   
 
9 
 
Health Services and the Department of Financial Institutions, 
and to delegate to agencies certain legislative powers.  The 
legislature created DPI in 1967.  Wis. Stat. § 15.37 (1967).  
¶14 Agencies are considered part of the executive branch.  
Citizens Concerned for Cranes and Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶14, 
270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612.  They possess "'only those 
powers [that] are expressly conferred or [that] are necessarily 
implied by the statutes under which [they] operate[].'"  See, 
e.g., Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 110 Wis. 2d 
455, 
461-62, 
329 
N.W.2d 
143 
(1983). 
 
The 
DPI 
is 
the 
administrative agency responsible for promulgating rules related 
to public instruction, and acts "under the direction and 
supervision of the [SPI]."  Wis. Stat. § 15.37. 
¶15 The powers delegated to administrative agencies by the 
legislature include the power to promulgate rules within the 
boundaries of enabling statutes passed by the legislature.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(a) ("Each agency may promulgate rules 
interpreting 
the 
provisions 
of 
any 
statute 
enforced 
or 
administered by the agency, if the agency considers it necessary 
to effectuate the purpose of the statute, but a rule is not 
valid 
if 
the 
rule 
exceeds 
the 
bounds 
of 
correct 
interpretation."); State ex rel. Castaneda v. Welch, 2007 WI 
103, ¶26, 303 Wis. 2d 570, 735 N.W.2d 131.   
¶16 In 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.19(1)(b), 
the 
legislature 
explained that its delegation of legislative power is a 
recognition of "the need for efficient administration of public 
policy," and it also outlined reservations of that delegation.  
No. 
2017AP2278-OA   
 
10 
 
Accordingly, 
in 
its 
general 
rulemaking 
delegation, 
the 
legislature "reserves to itself" all of the following: 
1.  The right to retract any delegation of rule-
making authority. 
2.  The right to establish any aspect of general 
policy by legislation, notwithstanding any delegation 
of rule-making authority. 
3.  The right and responsibility to designate the 
method for rule promulgation, review and modification.   
4.  The 
right 
to 
delay 
or 
suspend 
the 
implementation of any rule or proposed rule while 
under review by the legislature.   
§ 227.19 (1)(b)1.-4.   
¶17 We have long recognized that "the delegation of the 
power to make rules and effectively administer a given policy is 
a 
necessary 
ingredient 
of 
an 
efficiently 
functioning 
government."  Gilbert v. Med. Examining Bd., 119 Wis. 2d 168, 
184, 349 N.W.2d 68 (1984); see also Schmidt, 39 Wis. 2d at 58 
("[O]ur government could not efficiently operate without the 
administrator and administrative agency.").  The administration 
of state government is complex.  For example, "[t]he Wisconsin 
Administrative Code is more than 11,000 pages long with just 
under 1,800 chapters of regulations that affect businesses, 
local governments, licensed professionals, and consumers and 
touch[es] virtually every industry in Wisconsin."  See, e.g., 
Jodi E. Jensen, Regulatory Reform:  Moving Policymaking from 
State Agencies to the Legislature, 91 Wis. Law. 24, 25 (Oct. 
2018). 
No. 
2017AP2278-OA   
 
11 
 
¶18 However, while the breadth of government legislation 
has resulted in some delegation of legislative power to 
agencies, such agencies remain subordinate to the legislature 
with regard to their rulemaking authority.  Stated otherwise, 
agencies "ha[ve] no inherent constitutional authority to make 
rules, and, furthermore, [their] rule-making powers can be 
repealed by the legislature."  Martinez v. DILHR, 165 Wis. 2d 
687, 698, 478 N.W.2d 582 (1992); Wis. Stat. § 227.19(1)(b)1.   
¶19 In addition, the case before us does not present 
issues that should give rise to a dogmatic exposition on the 
merits, or lack thereof, of administrative agencies.  Rather, we 
are asked to determine the extent to which the legislature can 
change a past delegation of rulemaking authority when the SPI's 
rulemaking is affected.   
¶20 Legislative change and control of rulemaking are 
within the constitutional power of the legislature.  Martinez, 
165 Wis. 2d at 698.  As we have explained, an agency's "'powers, 
duties and scope of authority are fixed and circumscribed by the 
legislature and subject to legislative change.'"  Id. (quoting 
Schmidt, 39 Wis. 2d at 56).  Because the legislature has the 
authority to take away an administrative agency's rulemaking 
authority completely, it follows that the legislature may place 
limitations and conditions on an agency's exercise of rulemaking 
authority, including establishing the procedures by which 
agencies may promulgate rules.  The legislature may therefore 
retract or limit any delegation of rulemaking authority, 
determine the methods by which agencies must promulgate rules, 
No. 
2017AP2278-OA   
 
12 
 
and 
review 
rules 
prior 
to 
implementation. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.19(1)(b)1.-4.; see, e.g., Wis. Realtors Ass'n v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm'n, 2015 WI 63, ¶23, 363 Wis. 2d 430, 867 N.W.2d 364. 
¶21 After the enactment of Act 21, agencies must first 
submit scope statements to the governor for approval; agencies 
may not submit scope statements to the LRB, or begin drafting 
any proposed rule, "until the governor issues a written notice 
of approval of the statement."  Wis. Stat. § 227.135(2).  
Additionally, rather than submit final drafts of proposed rules 
directly to the legislature for approval, agencies must first 
submit final drafts of proposed rules to the governor for 
approval.  Wis. Stat. § 227.185.  A proposed rule may not be 
submitted to the legislature without a second approval of the 
governor. 
 
§ 227.185. 
 
Act 
21 
therefore 
altered 
the 
legislature's delegation of rulemaking power to agencies by 
allowing the governor to block a proposed rule at two separate 
stages of the rulemaking process. 
C.  SPI's Constitutional Authority 
¶22 The constitutional genesis of the SPI is found in 
Article X, Section 1, which provides: 
The supervision of public instruction shall be vested 
in a state superintendent and such other officers as 
the 
legislature 
shall 
direct; 
and 
their 
qualifications, powers, duties and compensation shall 
be prescribed by law.  The state superintendent shall 
be chosen by the qualified electors of the state at 
the same time and in the same manner as members of the 
supreme court, and shall hold office for 4 years from 
the succeeding first Monday in July.  The term of 
office, time and manner of electing or appointing all 
No. 
2017AP2278-OA   
 
13 
 
other officers of supervision of public instruction 
shall be fixed by law. 
Wis. Const. art. X, § 1.  Article X, Section 1 does not define 
the term "supervision."   
¶23 When we interpret an undefined constitutional term we 
examine the common law as it existed at the time the 
constitutional provision was enacted, the constitutional debates 
that bore on the undefined term, the plain meaning of the term 
at the time the constitutional provision was adopted, and the 
earliest interpretation in laws passed shortly after adoption of 
the constitutional provision or our opinions that interpreted 
the provision.  See Polk Cty. v. State Pub. Def., 188 Wis. 2d 
665, 674, 524 N.W.2d 389 (1994) (citing State v. Beno, 116 
Wis. 2d 122, 136-38, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984)).    
¶24 Our examination of the common law functions of the SPI 
at 
statehood 
provides 
no 
guidance, 
because 
an 
officer 
responsible for public education did not exist prior to 1848.  
Therefore, Article X, Section 1 did not "incorporate[] an 
ancient common law office, possessing defined powers and duties, 
into the constitution.  Public instruction and its governance 
had no long-standing common law history at the time the 
Wisconsin Constitution was enacted."  Fortney v. Sch. Dist. of 
West Salem, 108 Wis. 2d 167, 182, 321 N.W.2d 225 (1982).   
¶25 However, an examination of the plain language of 
Article X, Section 1, the Constitutional Conventions of 1846 and 
1848, and early cases and statutes addressing the SPI's 
supervisory authority demonstrates that supervision is an 
No. 
2017AP2278-OA   
 
14 
 
executive function.  "Stated otherwise, the framers of the 
Constitution chose no specific duties for the [SPI] in regard to 
'supervision of public instruction.'"  Coyne, 368 Wis. 2d 444, 
¶185 (Roggensack, C.J., dissenting).  Rather, powers and duties 
of the SPI were prescribed by law.  Id., ¶143 (Prosser, J. 
concurring).      
¶26 Furthermore, the debates during the 18466 and 1848 
constitutional conventions surrounding the creation of the SPI 
confirm this plain-meaning interpretation of "supervision" as 
executive authority.  Delegate Marshall M. Strong, for example, 
thought the SPI should "travel over the state, organize the 
system, 
and 
awaken 
people 
to 
the 
importance 
of 
[public 
education]."  Journal of the Convention, reprinted in The 
Convention of 1846, 569 (Milo M. Quaife, ed., 1919).  Another 
delegate, Wallace W. Graham, thought "there could be no uniform 
system" of public education without an SPI, because the 
legislature needed to receive "an annual report of the state of 
schools throughout the state" from "a man whose entire business 
it is to visit and know all of the schools."  Id. at 568.  
Others disagreed and thought "the duties for a time might be 
                                                 
6 As we have explained previously, the constitution drafted 
in 1846 was not approved by Wisconsin voters.  However, it was 
rejected for reasons other than the article on education, and 
the 1846 and 1848 versions of the article on education were 
substantially identical.  See Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 
674, 685 n.5, 546 N.W.2d 123 (1996).  For this reason, the 
debates of 1846 are instructive in discerning the meaning of 
"supervision" as used in Article X. 
No. 
2017AP2278-OA   
 
15 
 
done by the secretary of state or some other officer already 
provided for, leaving to the legislature to [create an SPI] when 
the time came."  Id. at 569.  None, however, appeared to believe 
that the SPI would possess the power to make laws. 
¶27 The debates during the Constitutional Convention of 
1848, 
which 
led 
to 
the 
ratification 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, similarly demonstrate that supervision of public 
education is an executive function.  All writers reportedly "had 
agreed that the office [of the SPI] should have nothing to do 
with the machinery of the school system, or the management of 
the funds.  He might be a most improper person for that duty.  
His province was to put the system in operation."  Journal of 
the Convention to Form a Constitution for the State of Wisconsin 
324, Wisconsin Constitutional Convention (Tenney, Smith & Holt, 
printers, 1848).  Delegates recognized that "[t]he duties of a 
superintendent were not of a fixed and well known kind, like 
those of political officers."  Id. at 327.  As previously 
mentioned, neither the office of the SPI nor a uniform system of 
public instruction existed in Wisconsin prior to 1848.  For this 
reason, some argued that even the manner of choosing the SPI 
should be left to the legislature to decide.  No part of the 
discussion, however, involved the suggestion that the SPI should 
have the power to make laws. 
¶28 The dictionary definition of "superintend" at the time 
of the debates further suggests that the framers viewed the SPI 
as 
possessing 
executive, 
but 
not 
legislative, 
authority.  
Webster's An American Dictionary of the English Language (new 
No. 
2017AP2278-OA   
 
16 
 
rev. ed. 1847-50) defined "superintend" as:  "[t]o have or 
exercise the charge or oversight of; to oversee with the power 
of direction; to take care of with authority; as an officer 
superintends the building of a ship or construction of a fort."  
Similarly, "superintendent" was defined as "one who has the 
oversight and charge of something with the power of direction."  
Id.; see Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 684, 546 
N.W.2d 123 (1996).  The framers of the Wisconsin Constitution 
understood the SPI's superintending function to be executive, 
not legislative, in nature. 
¶29 Our early cases regarding the SPI similarly confirm 
this plain-meaning analysis of Article X, Section 1 as granting 
the SPI the executive superintending function over public 
instruction, while giving the legislature the authority to 
determine 
the 
SPI's 
"qualifications, 
powers, 
duties 
and 
compensation."  For example, in State ex rel. Raymer v. 
Cunningham, 82 Wis. 39, 51 N.W.2d 1133 (1892), the SPI directed 
the Secretary of State to pay him more than his $1,200 salary, 
plus the expenses actually incurred for his clerk's salary and 
actual travel costs.  Id. at 39-40.  However, in 1892, the 
Wisconsin Constitution provided that the SPI's "compensation 
shall not exceed the sum of twelve hundred dollars annually."  
Id. at 46.   
¶30 Wisconsin's 
public 
education 
system 
had 
grown 
considerably since the ratification of the Constitution in 1848.  
For example, the number of school age children had grown from 
80,000 to more than 600,000, the value of public school property 
No. 
2017AP2278-OA   
 
17 
 
had grown from $50,000 to more than $10 million, and tax 
distributions for public education had grown from $92,000 to 
more than $4 million.  Id.  Raymer argued that the SPI had 
requested payment for greater expenses than he actually incurred 
as a way of evading the maximum constitutional salary of $1,200.  
Id. at 47-48.   
¶31 In our examination of the relationship between the 
legislature and Article X, Section 1, we said:  
[T]he section of the constitution cited prohibited the 
legislature from increasing the compensation of that 
officer beyond the amount named, yet it expressly 
authorized them to increase his duties and enlarge his 
powers 
and 
responsibilities 
ad 
libitum. 
 
This 
authority of the legislature has been from time to 
time freely exercised by especially enjoining new 
duties 
and 
imposing 
new 
and 
more 
onerous 
responsibilities. 
Id. at 47.  We concluded that even though the constitution 
allowed the SPI a maximum salary of $1,200, the legislature 
remained free to define the SPI's activities and obligations 
however it chose.  It was the legislature's province to make 
laws, and the SPI's province to administer them.  See id. at 50 
("[I]t is a maxim, in construing a state constitution, that the 
legislature is authorized to exercise any and all legislative 
powers not delegated to the general government nor expressly nor 
by necessary implication prohibited by the national or state 
constitution."). 
¶32 Similarly, 
after 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
was 
ratified in 1848, the first legislation passed regarding Article 
X, Section 1 provided: 
No. 
2017AP2278-OA   
 
18 
 
The 
superintendent 
shall 
have 
a 
general 
supervision over public instruction in this state, and 
it shall be his duty to devote his whole time to the 
advancement of the cause of education . . . .  To 
recommend the introduction and use of the most 
approved 
text 
books, 
and 
to 
secure 
as 
far 
as 
practicable uniformity in education throughout the 
state: . . . To collect such information as may be 
deemed important in reference to common schools in 
each county, town precinct and school district: [] to 
ascertain the condition of all the school funds in 
this state with the amount of the school funds due to 
each township from lands or other sources:  . . . to 
adjust and decide all controversies and disputes 
arising under the school lands without costs to the 
parties: [] to perform such other duties as the 
legislature or governor of this state may direct. 
Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 694 (quoting Section 3 of the Laws of 
1848, 
at 
127-29). 
 
The 
specific 
instructions 
that 
the 
legislature gave to the SPI, such as his obligation to recommend 
"the most approved books" and to "ascertain the condition of all 
the school funds in this state" as well as a general directive 
that the SPI was "to perform such other duties as the 
legislature or governor of this state may direct" support the 
conclusion that the legislature defines the SPI's powers and 
duties, while the SPI administers them. 
D.  Application 
¶33 Agencies in Wisconsin have no inherent authority to 
make 
rules. 
 
Their 
rulemaking 
authority 
comes 
from 
the 
legislature, and may be limited, conditioned, or taken away by 
the legislature.  See, e.g., Martinez, 165 Wis. 2d at 697; Wis. 
Stat. § 227.19(1)(b)1.-4.   
¶34 The 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
vests 
"supervision 
of 
public instruction," which is an executive function, in the SPI.  
No. 
2017AP2278-OA   
 
19 
 
However, the SPI's powers and duties are set by the legislature.  
The SPI therefore has two different sources for its authority, 
one which arises from the Wisconsin Constitution and the other 
which is created by legislative delegation.  The source for 
rulemaking is legislative delegation.  Because rulemaking is not 
"supervision of public instruction" within the meaning of 
Article X, Section 1, it is of no constitutional concern whether 
the governor is given equal or greater legislative authority 
than the SPI in rulemaking. 
¶35 This conclusion is consistent with our decision in 
Thompson, where we reviewed then-governor Thompson's original 
action 
to 
have 
1995 
Wis. 
Act 
27 
(Act 
27) 
declared 
constitutional.  Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 677-78.  Act 27 
"created a new state department, the Department of Education; a 
new Education Commission, which supervises the DOE; and a new 
office, the Secretary of Education."  Id. at 678.  The SPI was 
one of nine voting members of the Education Commission.  Id. at 
679.  The Secretary of Education served at the pleasure of the 
governor and could not be removed by the Education Commission.  
Id. at 678.  The newly created Secretary of Education and 
Education Commission were given some of the SPI's constitutional 
functions to supervise education.  Id. at 679. 
¶36 We held that Act 27 violated Article X, Section 1.  We 
identified two "consistent themes" regarding the SPI from the 
constitutional debates:  "first, that the system of education 
required uniformity; second, that the SPI was to provide this 
uniformity in an active manner by implementing the system of 
No. 
2017AP2278-OA   
 
20 
 
education."  Id. at 688-89.  We concluded that "the 'other 
officers' mentioned in [Article X, Section 1] were intended to 
be subordinate to the [SPI]" with regard to the "supervision of 
public instruction" as the phrase is used in Article X, Section 
1.  Id. at 698-99.  Because Act 27 elevated others to a position 
equal or superior to the SPI with regard to the supervision of 
public instruction, it was unconstitutional.  Id. at 698-99. 
¶37 The respondents argue that the provisions in this case 
are similarly unconstitutional because they elevate the governor 
to a position greater or equal to the SPI with regard to 
something the SPI does, as did 1995 Wis. Act 27.  The 
respondents point out that we held in Thompson that "the 
legislature may not give equal or superior authority to any 
'other officer'" over the supervision of public instruction.  
Id. at 699.  Article X, Section 1 requires that any "other 
officer" 
who 
participates 
in 
the 
"supervision 
of 
public 
instruction" must be subordinate to the SPI with regard to 
supervision of public instruction.  Id.   
¶38 A major flaw in the respondents' argument is the 
assumption 
that 
everything 
the 
SPI 
does 
arises 
from 
a 
constitutional grant of authority to the SPI under Article X, 
Section 1.  In reality, the SPI engages in some activities that 
arise from legislative enactments.  Rulemaking is one of those 
activities.    
¶39 Although Thompson requires that no other officer be 
placed in a position superior or equal to the SPI with regard to 
the SPI's exercise of supervision of public instruction under 
No. 
2017AP2278-OA   
 
21 
 
Article X, Section 1, rulemaking is not such a function.  
Rulemaking is a legislative power that does not fall within the 
SPI's supervisory constitutional authority under Article X, 
Section 1.  Rulemaking is a legislative delegation to the SPI; 
therefore, it may be limited or taken away, as the legislature 
chooses.  Wis. Stat. § 227.19(1)(b)1.-4.  That the governor may 
be placed in a position superior or equal to the SPI with regard 
to rulemaking is consistent with Thompson and with Article X, 
Section 1. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶40 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
gubernatorial 
approval 
requirement for rulemaking is constitutional as applied to the 
SPI and DPI, whether they are found in the REINS Act or in 
previous provisions of ch. 227.  Article X, Section 1 vests 
supervision of public instruction, an executive function, in the 
SPI.  In contrast, when the SPI, through the DPI, promulgates 
rules, the SPI is exercising legislative power that comes not 
from the constitution but the legislature.  Stated otherwise, 
the legislature delegates part of its constitutional power to 
legislate to the SPI, DPI, and many other agencies in the form 
of rulemaking power.  That the SPI also has the executive 
constitutional function to supervise public instruction does not 
transform the SPI's legislatively delegated rulemaking power 
into a constitutional supervisory function.  Therefore, it is of 
no constitutional concern that the governor is given equal or 
greater legislative authority than the SPI in rulemaking.   
By the Court.—Declaration of rights; relief granted. 
No. 
2017AP2278-OA   
 
22 
 
¶41 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
J., 
withdrew 
from 
participation. 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶42 REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
majority 
correctly 
upholds 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
the 
legislature's decision to require gubernatorial approval of 
administrative rulemaking.  I join the opinion except for those 
portions espousing the ostensible importance and necessity of 
the legislature's delegation of power to the administrative 
state.  See majority op., ¶17.1  The concentration of power 
within 
an 
administrative 
leviathan 
clashes 
with 
the 
constitutional allocation of power among the elected and 
accountable branches of government at the expense of individual 
liberty.  Although this case does not involve a challenge to the 
constitutionality 
of 
legislative 
delegations 
of 
power 
to 
administrative agencies, I encourage the court to be mindful of 
the structural separation of powers and the safeguards it 
employs to preserve the rule of law.  
¶43 The majority repeats the judiciary's longstanding 
perception that "the delegation of the power to make rules and 
effectively administer a given policy is a necessary ingredient 
of an efficiently functioning government."  Majority op., ¶17 
(quoting Gilbert v. Medical Examining Bd., 119 Wis. 2d 168, 184, 
349 N.W.2d 68 (1984) (emphasis added)).  The majority reiterates 
the notion that "[o]ur government could not efficiently operate 
                                                 
1 I agree with the majority that the issues in this case do 
not require an "exposition"——"dogmatic" or otherwise——of the 
constitutional legitimacy of the administrative state.  Majority 
op., ¶19.  I write in response to the majority's endorsement of 
the necessity of delegating legislative power to administrative 
agencies.  See majority op., ¶17. 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.rgb 
 
2 
 
without the administrator and administrative agency."  Majority 
op., ¶17 (quoting Schmidt v. Department of Res. Dev., 39 
Wis. 2d 46, 58, 158 N.W.2d 306 (1968) (emphasis added)).  The 
majority 
restates 
discredited 
principles, 
disregarding 
the 
incompatibility of "the system of bureaucratic rule that took 
root in the Progressive era and now reaches into virtually every 
realm of American life,"2 with the constitution's "deliberate 
calibration of incentives and control between the branches" 
reflected in the structural separation of powers.  Gabler v. 
Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶7, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 
N.W.2d 384. 
¶44 The idea that the administrative state is necessary 
for good and efficient government "reflect[s] this belief that 
bureaucrats might more effectively govern the country than the 
American people" and facilitated "the progressives usher[ing] in 
significant expansions of the administrative state, ultimately 
culminating in the New Deal."  Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 
135 S. Ct. 1199, 1223 n.6 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
Underlying the movement toward a burgeoning administrative state 
was the governing class's sneering contempt for the people who 
elect its members, along with impatience at any resistance of 
the people to the views of the enlightened: 
In government . . . the hardest of hard things is 
to make progress. . . .  Nowadays the reason is that 
the many, the people, who are sovereign have no single 
ear which one can approach, and are selfish, ignorant, 
                                                 
2 Charles J. Cooper, Confronting the Administrative State, 
25 National Affairs 96, 96 (Fall 2015). 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.rgb 
 
3 
 
timid, stubborn, or foolish with the selfishnesses, 
the ignorances, the stubbornnesses, the timidities, or 
the follies of several thousand persons,——albeit there 
are hundreds who are wise. 
Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 2, 197, 207-08 (June 1887).  Wilson 
lamented the inability of the unwashed masses to appreciate the 
suppositions of "perfectly instructed heads" who would produce 
"infallible, placidly wise maxims of government" because "[t]he 
bulk of mankind is rigidly unphilosophical, and nowadays [alas!] 
the bulk of mankind votes."  Id.  at 209. 
¶45 The philosophical roots of rule by bureaucratic 
overlords are antithetical to the Founders' vision of our 
constitutional Republic, in which supreme power is held by the 
people through their elected representatives, and "the creation 
of rules of private conduct" is "an irregular and infrequent 
occurrence."  DOT v. Association of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 
1252 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).  The people can keep their 
rightful powers only if each branch of government "jealously 
guard[s]" the responsibilities the people conferred upon them.  
Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶31 (quoting Barland v. Eau Claire 
Cty., 216 Wis. 2d 560, 573, 575 N.W.2d 691 (1998)).  "The co-
ordinate branches of the government . . . should not abdicate or 
permit others to infringe upon such powers as are exclusively 
committed to them by the Constitution."  Rules of Court Case, 
204 Wis. 501, 514, 236 N.W. 717 (1931).  Transferring to 
administrative agencies the core legislative duty of making laws 
abnegates powers the people gave their elected representatives.  
The consolidation of power within executive branch agencies 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.rgb 
 
4 
 
"often leaves Americans at the[ir] mercy" endowing agencies with 
"a nearly freestanding coercive power" and "[t]he agencies 
thereby become rulers of a sort unfamiliar in a republic, and 
the people must jump at their commands."  Phillip Hamburger, Is 
Administrative Law Unlawful? 335 (2014). 
¶46 More recently, "necessity" as a justification for the 
administrative state has been tied to the philosophy of a living 
constitution, under which the law may be molded to reflect 
changing circumstances in society, regardless of what the text 
actually 
says. 
 
Hamburger, 
supra 
¶4, 
at 
429. 
 
Living 
constitutionalism is grounded in sociology, not the law,3 and is 
inconsistent with the founding principle that "[t]o adapt the 
law to changing circumstances . . . the collective wisdom of the 
people's 
representatives 
is 
needed." 
Gutierrez-Brizuela 
v. 
Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
 
Those 
to 
whom 
the 
people 
have 
conferred 
constitutional powers may not circumvent those grants simply 
"because 
they 
believe 
that 
more 
or 
different 
power 
is 
necessary."  A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935).  Necessity "cannot be allowed to 
obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our 
constitutional system is to be maintained."  Id. at 530.  Even 
"[e]xtraordinary 
conditions 
do 
not 
create 
or 
enlarge 
constitutional power."  Id. at 528. 
                                                 
3 Phillip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? 429 
(2014). 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.rgb 
 
5 
 
¶47 The United States and Wisconsin Constitutions both 
vest exclusive powers in each of three independent branches of 
government, not four.  "The Constitution does not vest the 
Federal 
Government 
with 
an 
undifferentiated 
'governmental 
power,'" but rather, it "identifies three types of governmental 
power and, in the Vesting Clauses, commits them to three 
branches of Government."  Association of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 
at 1240 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Like the federal system, the 
Wisconsin Constitution establishes three branches of government, 
and "[t]he separation of powers doctrine is implicit in this 
tripartite division."  Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶11 (quoting 
Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI 52, ¶48, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 680 
N.W.2d 666; alteration in original).  Article IV, Section 1 
"vest[s]" 
the 
"legislative 
power . . . in 
a 
senate 
and 
assembly"; Article V, Section 1 "vest[s]" the "executive 
power . . . in a governor"; and Article VII, Section 2 "vest[s]" 
the "judicial power of this state . . . in a unified court 
system." 
 
See 
Gabler, 
376 
Wis. 2d 147, 
¶11. 
 
These 
constitutional "grants are exclusive," which has been understood 
to mean "only the vested recipient of that power can perform 
it."  Association of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. at 1241 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
¶48 "The people bestowed much power on the legislature, 
comprised of their representatives whom the people elect to make 
the laws."  Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶60.  "The separation of 
powers 'operates in a general way to confine legislative powers 
to the legislature.'"  League of Women Voters of Wis. v. Evers, 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.rgb 
 
6 
 
2019 WI __, ¶35, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ (quoting Goodland 
v. 
Zimmerman, 
243 
Wis. 459, 
467, 
10 
N.W.2d 180 
(1943)).  
Applying an originalist interpretation of the Constitution, some 
United States Supreme Court justices and several commentators 
have opined against the legislature relinquishing its vested 
legislative power "or otherwise reallocat[ing] it," echoing the 
historical understanding that "[t]he legislative c[ould not] 
transfer the power of making laws to any other hands:  for it 
being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it 
[could not] pass it over to others."  Association of Am. R.Rs., 
135 S. Ct. at 1243-44 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting John 
Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government § 141, 71 (J. Gough 
ed. 1947) (emphasis added; alterations in original).  See also 
Richard A. Epstein, Why the Modern Administrative State Is 
Inconsistent with the Rule of Law, 3 N.Y.U.J. of Law & Liberty 
491, 496 (2008) (the argument "that the Constitution authorizes 
the creation of independent agencies with aggregated powers of a 
legislative, executive, and judicial nature . . . fails so long 
as it depends on any form of originalism" and "the text itself 
points to a system whereby the tripartite division is meant to 
be rigid in law"); Hamburger, supra ¶4, at 336 ("[T]he 
government can bind Americans only through laws, and only 
through courts with juries and judges, thus preserving the most 
basic conditions of freedom.")  
¶49 Although a revival of the non-delegation doctrine has 
not garnered the votes of a majority on the Court, this was not 
always the case.  In the past, the Court recognized "[t]he 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.rgb 
 
7 
 
Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others 
the essential legislative functions with which it is thus 
vested."  A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp, 295 U.S. at 529.  
Despite acknowledging that the constitutional "text permits no 
delegation of those [legislative] powers" the Court has afforded 
much leeway for the legislature to transfer its constitutional 
powers to executive branch agencies, provided that "when 
Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress 
must 'lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to 
which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to 
conform.'"  Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 
457, 472 (2001) (alteration in original).  However, "the 
Constitution does not speak of 'intelligible principles.'  
Rather, it speaks in much simpler terms:  'All legislative 
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress.'"  Id. at 
487 (Thomas, J., concurring).   
¶50 Reallocating the making of rules, voluminous in number 
and 
significant 
in 
substance, 
from 
the 
legislature 
to 
administrative agencies housed within the executive branch, 
aggrandizes the power of the latter, at the risk of replacing 
the rule of law with the rule of men:  
The idea that the Executive may not formulate 
generally 
applicable 
rules 
of 
private 
conduct . . . has ancient roots in the concept of the 
'rule of law,' which has been understood . . . to mean 
that a ruler must be subject to the law in exercising 
his power and may not govern by will alone. 
Association of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. at 1242 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (quoted source omitted).  The concept of the rule of 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.rgb 
 
8 
 
law "presupposes at least two distinct operations, the making of 
law, and putting it into effect."  Id. (quoted source omitted; 
emphasis 
added). 
 
Delegating 
legislative 
functions 
to 
administrative agencies transforms the executive from the 
executor 
of 
laws 
into 
the 
lawmaker. 
 
Blackstone——whose 
separation of powers principles "profoundly influenced" the 
Founders——"defined a tyrannical government as one in which 'the 
right both of making and of enforcing the laws, is vested in one 
and the same man, or one and the same body of men,' for 
'wherever these two powers are united together, there can be no 
public liberty.'"  Id. at 1244 (quoted source omitted).   
¶51 The Founders recognized that maintaining the formal 
separation of powers was essential to preserving individual 
liberty.  
This devotion to the separation of powers is, in 
part, what supports our enduring conviction that the 
Vesting Clauses are exclusive and that the branch in 
which a power is vested may not give it up or 
otherwise reallocate it.  The Framers were concerned 
not just with the starting allocation, but with the 
"gradual concentration of the several powers in the 
same department."  The Federalist No. 51, at 321 (J. 
Madison). 
Id..  "Under the original understanding of the Constitution," 
the function of creating "generally applicable rules of private 
conduct . . . requires the exercise of legislative power," and 
"the discretion inherent in executive power does not comprehend 
the discretion to formulate generally applicable rules of 
private conduct."  Id. at 1242.  The judiciary, however, has 
blurred 
the 
lines 
distinguishing 
legislative 
power 
from 
executive power, classifying rulemaking as executive in nature 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.rgb 
 
9 
 
rather than the core legislative function it was formerly 
recognized to be.  See id. at 1246. 
¶52 The Wisconsin Constitution replicates the "separation 
of powers principles[] established at the founding of our nation 
and 
enshrined 
in 
the 
structure 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution."  See Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶11.  "'Each branch 
has exclusive core constitutional powers into which other 
branches may not intrude.'"  Id., ¶30 (quoting State v. Horn, 
226 Wis. 2d 637, 643, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999)).  These zones "are 
to be jealously guarded by each branch of government."  Gabler, 
376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶31 (quoting Barland, 216 Wis. 2d at 573) 
(internal marks omitted).  
¶53 The concept of the administrative state is nonexistent 
in either the United States or Wisconsin Constitutions, which 
means "administrative power runs outside the law."  Hamburger, 
supra ¶4, at 6. 
We have too long abrogated our duty to enforce the 
separation of powers required by our Constitution.  We 
have 
overseen 
and 
sanctioned 
the 
growth 
of 
an 
administrative system that concentrates the power to 
make laws and the power to enforce them in the hands 
of a vast and unaccountable administrative apparatus 
that finds no comfortable home in our constitutional 
structure.  The end result may be trains that run on 
time (although I doubt it), but the cost is to our 
Constitution and the individual liberty it protects. 
Association of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. at 1254-55 (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  In facilitating the vast expansion of the 
administrative state, the legislative and executive branches 
transferred power from the people's elected representatives and 
elected 
executives, 
bestowing 
it 
upon 
unelected 
and 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.rgb 
 
10 
 
unaccountable 
bureaucrats, 
thereby 
jeopardizing 
the 
constitution's safeguards against the tyrannical concentration 
of power.  "The administrative regime consolidates in one branch 
of government the powers that the Constitution allocates to 
different branches" resulting in "the exercise of power outside 
and above the law."  Hamburger, supra ¶4, at 6.   
To the Framers of the United States Constitution, 
the concentration of governmental power presented an 
extraordinary threat to individual liberty:  "The 
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, 
and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a 
few, or many, . . . may justly be pronounced the very 
definition of tyranny."  The Federalist No. 47, at 298 
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶4 (ellipsis by Gabler).  
¶54 In Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of 
Revenue, 2018 WI 75, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21, we "end[ed] 
our 
practice 
of 
deferring 
to 
administrative 
agencies' 
conclusions 
of 
law," 
thereby 
reclaiming 
the 
judiciary's 
constitutionally-vested authority to say what the law is.  Id., 
¶3 (Kelly, J., lead opinion).4  Rather than placidly accepting 
the administrative state as a necessary appendage to the 
government, this court should reconsider its acquiescence to 
                                                 
4 The legislature codified this principle in Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.57 (11) ("Upon review of an agency action or decision, the 
court shall accord no deference to the agency's interpretation 
of law."). 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.rgb 
 
11 
 
subdelegations5 of legislative power to administrative agencies 
within the executive branch when the appropriate case presents 
the opportunity.  It "is the obligation of the Judiciary not 
only to confine itself to its proper role, but to ensure that 
the other branches do so as well."  City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 
569 U.S. 290, 327 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  In this 
case, however, none of the parties raise the issue of whether 
"our delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our 
Founders' understanding of separation of powers."   Whitman, 531 
U.S. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
¶55 Passing 
legislation 
sometimes 
requires 
political 
courage.  Legislative initiatives may move slowly and some bills 
never become laws.  Consequently, "Congress often prefers to set 
a politically uncontroversial goal and leave it to the agencies 
to figure out the politically controversial means of achieving 
that goal."  Charles J. Cooper, Confronting the Administrative 
State, 25 National Affairs 96, 103 (Fall 2015).  Returning all 
lawmaking responsibilities to the legislature would remove the 
shroud over administrative rulemaking, placing the lawmaking 
process back in the public eye where it constitutionally 
belongs.   
                                                 
5 Because the people delegate power through constitutional 
grants, "when Congress purports to give its legislative power to 
the executive, the question is not whether the principal can 
delegate the power, but whether the agent can subdelegate it."  
Hamburger, supra ¶5 note 2, at 377.  "[T]he agent ordinarily 
cannot subdelegate the power to a sub-agent, as this runs 
counter to the apparent intent of the principal."  Id. at 380. 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.rgb 
 
12 
 
¶56 The objective of our Founders was not an "efficiently 
functioning government."6  The Founders designed a Constitution 
to safeguard individual rights and liberty.  The Wilsonian 
vision of rule by enlightened bureaucrats diminishes the power 
of the people, in derogation of the principles on which America 
was founded.  "The vesting of legislative power in a distinct 
political body is a stumbling block to modern intellectuals and 
a stone rejected by the builders of the federal bureaucracy, but 
it has been and remains a cornerstone in the constitutional 
architecture of free government."  Texas v. United States, 300 
F. Supp. 3d 810, 841 (N.D. Tex. 2018).  "Admittedly, the 
legislative process can be an arduous one.  But that's no bug in 
the constitutional design:  it is the very point of the design."  
Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1151 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
By separating the lawmaking and law enforcement 
functions, the framers sought to thwart the ability of 
an individual or group to exercise arbitrary or 
absolute power.  And by restricting lawmaking to one 
branch 
and 
forcing 
any 
legislation 
to 
endure 
bicameralism and presentment, the framers sought to 
make the task of lawmaking more arduous still. 
United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 670 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  The "inefficiency" inherent in the 
legislative process "'serves a valuable' liberty-preserving 
'function.'" 
 
Id. 
(quoted 
source 
omitted). 
 
"While 
the 
separation of powers may prevent us from righting every wrong, 
it does so in order to ensure that we do not lose liberty."  
                                                 
6 Majority op., ¶17. 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.rgb 
 
13 
 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 710 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
¶57 "The Framers could hardly have envisioned . . . the 
authority administrative agencies now hold over our economic, 
social, and political activities."  City of Arlington, 569 U.S. 
at 313 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  Rather than extolling the 
necessity of the administrative behemoth in Wisconsin, this 
court should "glance at the Constitution to see what it says 
about how [governmental] authority must be exercised and by 
whom."  See Association of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. at 1240 
(Thomas, J., concurring).  Through the Wisconsin Constitution, 
the people conferred exclusive powers on an elected executive, 
an elected legislature, and an elected judiciary, respectively.  
Noticeably absent from the Wisconsin Constitution is any 
apportionment 
of 
power 
to 
unelected 
and 
unaccountable 
administrators. 
 
Because 
the 
majority 
lends 
unquestioned 
credence 
to 
the 
extra-constitutional 
apparatus 
of 
the 
administrative state, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.dk 
 
1 
 
¶58 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  I join the majority 
opinion except with respect to ¶17. 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.awb 
 
1 
 
¶59 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  A mere three 
years ago, this court decided the very issue that it is 
reconsidering today.  In Coyne v. Walker, a majority of the 
court determined that 2011 Act 21 (Act 21) is "unconstitutional 
and therefore void as applied to the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction and his subordinates."  2016 WI 38, ¶4, 368 
Wis. 2d 444, 879 N.W.2d 520. 
¶60 Yet despite this clear mandate, here we are again.  A 
provision that does the very same thing as Act 21 is back before 
the court.  It comes to us through a new enactment (2017 Wis. 
Act 57) and with a catchy new name (the REINS Act), but the 
substance is identical.1 
¶61 And why are we here again?  At oral argument, counsel 
for the petitioners was asked, "you wouldn't be here asking a 
supreme court of the state of Wisconsin to overturn a decision 
that it just made two years ago if it were the same court, would 
you?"  In response, counsel acknowledged, "any lawyer has to 
make strategic decisions about what is likely to be successful."  
Indeed. 
¶62 Although nothing in our Constitution has changed since 
Coyne was decided, what has changed is the membership of the 
court.  This time around, a new majority of this court does an 
about-face and now concludes that the substance of Act 57 is 
                                                 
1 See majority op., ¶7 ("The REINS Act did not alter Act 
21's requirement that an agency (1) submit a statement of scope 
to the governor for approval prior to drafting a proposed rule, 
and (2) submit a final draft of a rule to the governor for 
approval before submitting it to the legislature."). 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.awb 
 
2 
 
constitutional.  To reach this conclusion, it throws the 
doctrine of stare decisis out the window.2   
¶63 Not 
only 
is 
the 
majority 
opinion 
doctrinally 
erroneous, it is also analytically unpersuasive.  As Justice 
Abrahamson wrote in Coyne:  "rulemaking is part of the 
'supervision of public instruction,' which Article X, Section 1 
vests in the superintendent."3  368 Wis. 2d 444, ¶85 (Abrahamson, 
J., concurring).  Act 21 is unconstitutional "because it grants 
the 
governor 
(and 
the 
Secretary 
of 
the 
Department 
of 
Administration) 
an 
unchecked 
veto 
power 
over 
the 
superintendent's 
rulemaking 
powers, 
thereby 
making 
the 
superintendent subordinate to the governor (and the Secretary) 
                                                 
2 "Stare decisis" is fundamental to the rule of law.  
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, 
¶94, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257.  It refers to the principle 
that requires courts to "stand by things decided."  State v. 
Harrell, 
199 
Wis. 2d 654, 
667, 
546 
N.W.2d 115 
(1996) 
(Abrahamson, J., concurring); see Black's Law Dictionary 1626 
(10th ed. 2014) defining "stare decisis" as "[t]he doctrine of 
precedent, under which a court must follow earlier judicial 
decisions when the same points arise again in litigation"). 
3 Article X, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides: 
The supervision of public instruction shall be vested 
in a state superintendent and such other officers as 
the 
legislature 
shall 
direct; 
and 
their 
qualifications, powers, duties and compensation shall 
be prescribed by law.  The state superintendent shall 
be chosen by the qualified electors of the state at 
the same time and in the same manner as members of the 
supreme court, and shall hold office for 4 years from 
the succeeding first Monday in July.  The term of 
office, time and manner of electing or appointing all 
other officers of supervision of public instruction 
shall be fixed by law. 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.awb 
 
3 
 
in the supervision of public instruction."  Id.  Act 57 suffers 
the same infirmity. 
¶64 Because the majority disregards binding precedent and 
arrives at a result that unconstitutionally transfers the vested 
authority of the Superintendent of Public Instruction to the 
governor, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶65 This case arises from a petition for original action 
filed by the Petitioners against the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction (SPI) and the Department of Public Instruction 
(DPI).  Majority op., ¶1.  The Petitioners seek a declaration 
that the SPI and DPI must comply with 2017 Wis. Act 57's (Act 
57) requirement that they receive the governor's approval prior 
to drafting or promulgating an administrative rule.  Id.  In 
response, the SPI and DPI argue, consistent with Coyne, 368 
Wis. 2d 444, that such a requirement is an unconstitutional 
usurpation of the SPI's vested constitutional authority.  Id. 
¶66 Relegating the discussion of stare decisis to a 
footnote, the majority states that it "consider[ed] whether the 
doctrine of stare decisis should be employed in the case before 
us."  Id., ¶8 n.5 (citation omitted).  It acknowledges that 
Coyne "addressed some of the same statutory provisions and 
constitutional concerns we examine today . . . ."  Id. 
¶67 However, it declines to apply the doctrine of stare 
decisis, reasoning that "stare decisis does not require us to 
retain constitutional interpretations that were objectively 
wrong when made . . . because such interpretations are unsound 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.awb 
 
4 
 
in principle."  Id. (citations omitted).  Further, it asserts 
that it is not required to follow Coyne because "our mandate in 
Coyne arises from a lead opinion, joined by one justice, a two-
justice concurrence, and a one-justice concurrence."  Id.  
Unsurprisingly, the majority ultimately grants the petitioners' 
requested relief.  Id., ¶2. 
II 
¶68 Neither of the majority's proffered rationales for 
departing from stare decisis is persuasive.  Stare decisis is 
fundamental to the rule of law.  Johnson Controls, Inc. v. 
Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶94, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 
N.W.2d 257.  Indeed, "[t]his court follows the doctrine of stare 
decisis scrupulously because of our abiding respect for the rule 
of law."  Id. 
¶69 "Fidelity to precedent ensures that existing law will 
not be abandoned lightly.  When existing law is open to revision 
in every case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of 
judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable results."  
Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, ¶37, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 
N.W.2d 266 (internal quotation and citations omitted). 
¶70 "No change in the law is justified by a change in the 
membership of the court . . . ."  Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients 
Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, ¶32, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216 
(citation omitted).  Adherence to precedent fosters confidence 
in the reliability of court decisions, promotes consistent 
development of legal principles, and contributes to the actual 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.awb 
 
5 
 
and perceived integrity of the Wisconsin judiciary.  See Johnson 
Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶95. 
¶71 Throwing caution to the wind, the majority disregards 
the principles that fundamentally underlie our legal system.  It 
contends that Coyne was "objectively wrong."  Majority op., ¶8 
n.6.  Further, it ascribes significance to the fact that the 
majority in Coyne consisted of three separate opinions.  Id. 
¶72 Apparently, "objectively wrong" is defined by the 
majority as what it subjectively thinks is wrong.  The majority 
provides no explanation for the assertion that Coyne was 
"objectively wrong" other than that it disagrees with it. 
¶73 Additionally, the split nature of the Coyne opinion is 
of no import.  The mandate of Coyne was clear despite the 
fractured nature of the opinions.  Although the four justices in 
the majority subscribed to differing rationales, they agreed on 
the 
essential 
conclusion: 
 
"We 
hold 
that 
Act 
21 
is 
unconstitutional 
and 
therefore 
void 
as 
applied 
to 
the 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.awb 
 
6 
 
Superintendent of Public Instruction and his subordinates."  
Coyne, 368 Wis. 2d 444, ¶4.4  Full stop. 
¶74 Such a decision creates no uncertainty and fosters no 
confusion. Act 57, at issue here, does not differ in any 
material respect from Act 21. 
¶75 Accordingly, I conclude that the doctrine of stare 
decisis applies here with full force.  The rule of law and the 
"actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process" demand 
it.  See Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶95. 
III 
¶76 The majority errs further in its substantive analysis 
of the separation of powers issues this case presents.  I joined 
Justice Abrahamson's concurrence in Coyne, and I believe that it 
remains the correct analysis here. 
¶77 In Coyne, Justice Abrahamson's concurrence determined 
that 2011 Wis. Act 21, which is in all material respects 
identical to Act 57, "unconstitutionally infringes on the 
'supervision of public instruction' vested in the superintendent 
                                                 
4 See 
also 
Coyne 
v. 
Walker, 
2016 
WI 
38, 
¶80, 
368 
Wis. 2d 444, 879 N.W.2d 520 (Abrahamson, J., concurring) ("I 
conclude, as do the lead opinion (which represents the views of 
only Justice Gableman) and Justice Prosser's concurrence, that 
2011 Wis. Act 21, which altered the process of administrative 
rulemaking, is unconstitutional as applied to the Superintendent 
of 
Public 
Instruction 
and 
the 
Department 
of 
Public 
Instruction."); id., ¶155 (Prosser, J., concurring) (concluding 
that Act 21 is unconstitutional "because it would give a 
governor authority to obstruct the work of an independent 
constitutional officer to such an extent that the officer would 
be unable to discharge the responsibilities that the legislature 
has given him.  An absolute veto power over a proposed rule is a 
check without a balance."). 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.awb 
 
7 
 
by Article X, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution."  Coyne, 
368 Wis. 2d 444, ¶93 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).  It reached 
this conclusion because Act 21 "gives 'equal or superior 
authority' 
[over 
the 
supervision 
of 
public 
instruction] 
to  . . . '[an]other officer.'"  Id., ¶100 (Abrahamson, J., 
concurring) (citing Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 699, 
546 N.W.2d 123 (1996)).5  The same is true of Act 57. 
¶78 Such 
a 
conclusion 
is 
supported 
by 
significant 
constitutional history as has been previously set forth by this 
court in Thompson and Coyne.  See Coyne, 368 Wis. 2d 444, ¶98 
(Abrahamson, J., concurring); Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 685-98.  
"The debates at the 1846 and 1847–48 Wisconsin constitutional 
conventions show that the drafters of the Wisconsin Constitution 
intended the public schools to be under the supervision of the 
SPI, and that the SPI was to be an elected, not appointed, 
public official."  Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 685. 
¶79 Delegates to the constitutional conventions echoed two 
consistent themes:  "first, that the system of education 
required uniformity[, and] second, that the SPI was to provide 
this uniformity in an active manner by implementing the system 
of education."  Id. at 688-89.  Accordingly, the framers 
"considered and explicitly rejected a proposal to select a 
superintendent by gubernatorial appointment and a proposal that 
                                                 
5 This court previously determined in Thompson that the 
former powers of the elected SPI cannot constitutionally be 
given to appointed "other officers" at the state level who are 
not 
subordinate 
to 
the 
SPI. 
 
Thompson 
v. 
Craney, 
199 
Wis. 2d 674, 678, 546 N.W.2d 123 (1996). 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.awb 
 
8 
 
would have allowed the legislature to vest 'the supervision of 
public instruction  . . . in such officers as shall hereafter be 
created by law.'"  Coyne, 368 Wis. 2d 444, ¶98 (Abrahamson, J., 
concurring) (citing Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 685-86).  "Simply 
put, the framers viewed the superintendent as 'indispensable,' 
'the foundation, the life of progressive education' who 'alone 
c[ould] give uniformity, energy, and efficiency to the system.'"  
Id. (citing Journal of the Convention, reprinted in The 
Convention of 1846, at 568, 570-71 (Milo M. Quaife ed. 1919). 
¶80 Consistent with this history and the determination of 
the Thompson court, the concurrence concluded that "rulemaking 
is a supervisory power of the superintendent and that 2011 Wis. 
Act 21 unconstitutionally gives the governor and the secretary 
of the Department of Administration the unchecked authority to 
block 
rulemaking 
by 
the 
superintendent." 
 
Coyne, 
368 
Wis. 2d 444, ¶99 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).  Act 57 does 
exactly the same thing.  Thus, the analysis presented in Justice 
Abrahamson's concurrence in Coyne is equally applicable to the 
issue in this case.  Just as Act 21 was unconstitutional three 
years ago, Act 57 remains unconstitutional today. 
¶81 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶82 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA FRANK 
DALLET joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2017AP2278-OA.awb 
 
 
 
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