Title: Kruse v. Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1121382
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: September 30, 2015

REL: 09/30/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2015
____________________
1121382
____________________
Frank Kruse, administrator ad litem for the
Estate of Dansby W. Sanders
v.
Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC, f/k/a R.T. Vanderbilt Company,
Inc.
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-10-900327)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Frank Kruse, administrator ad litem for the estate of
Dansby W. Sanders, appeals from a summary judgment entered by
the Mobile Circuit Court in favor of R.T. Vanderbilt Company,
1121382
Inc., now known as Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC 
("Vanderbilt"), 
in
a wrongful-death action.  We reverse and remand.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
Dansby 
W. 
Sanders 
("Dansby") 
was 
diagnosed 
with
mesothelioma on February 11, 2009; he sued numerous 
defendants
on February 11, 2010, alleging that he had been exposed to
asbestos through products manufactured and distributed by
those defendants during the 37-year period he worked for
Mobile Paint Company ("Mobile Paint").  Dansby filed an
amended complaint on September 1, 2010, naming Vanderbilt as
a defendant because of its role as a supplier of industrial
talc under the brand name "Nytal."
Dansby worked for Mobile Paint from 1965 to 2002. Mobile
Paint manufactured numerous types of architectural and
industrial paint.  Until 1975, Mobile Paint's production
facility was located on Conception Street in the City of
Mobile ("the Conception plant").  It is undisputed that the
Conception plant was an antiquated building without adequate
ventilation and that the facility was dusty.  In 1975, Mobile
Paint moved its operations to a band-new facility located in
Theodore ("the Theodore plant").  The Theodore plant had a
2
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ventilation system and there were exhaust systems over the
individual paint-mixing vats.  Dansby worked at both
facilities.
Each type of paint manufactured by Mobile Paint was
assembled by a recipe called a "batch ticket."  Each batch
ticket indicated the type and amount of raw materials to be
used for a particular type of paint.  Each type of raw
material on the batch ticket was assigned a code number.
Mobile Paint workers referred to the dry raw materials
generally as "pigment"; the dry raw materials included 
colors,
fillers, hardeners, and talc.  Many paints manufactured by
Mobile Paint, but not all,  contained talc.  At Mobile Paint,
code numbers 342 and 343 referred to specific types of talc:
code 342 referred to "Nytal 400" and code 343 referred to
"Nytal 300."  Although workers usually identified raw
materials by code numbers, some workers could relate code
numbers to brand names, including Dansby's coworkers, Jimmy
Sanders (no relation to Dansby) and James Nord.
Mobile 
Paint 
consisted 
of 
separate 
departments,
including, but not limited to, the "bull gang," warehouse,
production department, and filling department.  The bull gang
3
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received the materials on the loading dock and transported
them from boxcars and trucks to the warehouse, where they were
stored until needed.  The mixing of raw materials occurred in
the production department.  After a batch of paint was mixed,
it went to the filling department, where workers filled
containers with the mixed paint.
During his first three months at Mobile Paint, Dansby
worked on the bull gang.  At the Conception plant, all raw
materials were unloaded by hand because there were no
forklifts.  Jimmy Sanders testified that Nytal talc was one of
the products unloaded from boxcars.   Dansby testified that
1
the boxcars were "all kinds of dusty"; coworker James Nord
testified that the boxcars were "totally dusty";  and Jimmy
2
Sanders testified that the dust in the boxcars was very bad,
almost like smoke, because of bags that had broken open. 
Jimmy Sanders testified that he did not work on the bull
1
gang at the same time as Dansby because Jimmy Sanders had
moved into the filling department by the time Dansby was hired
by Mobile Paint.  He stated, however, that the conditions
would have been the same and that the same products continued
to be unloaded for use at the Conception plant when Dansby
worked on the bull gang.
James Nord testified that he started working for Mobile
2
Paint on the bull gang in early 1966, so he worked in that
department a few months after Dansby had been promoted to
another department.  
4
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Jimmy Sanders stated that the workers had to transfer the
contents of broken bags to new bags, which also exposed the
workers to dust.
After working on the bull gang, Dansby was promoted to
work inside the plant in the filling department. From 1965 to
1975, Dansby worked in the filling department at the
Conception plant.  In the filling department, Dansby hand-
filled cans of paint.  Later, when Mobile Paint obtained
machinery that could fill the paint cans, he operated
automatic filling machines.  Dansby testified that in his time
employed at Mobile Paint he spent "99 percent of [his] time"
in the filling department.  Nord, who worked for a period in
the mixing department, testified that almost every day Dansby
had to visit the portion of the Conception plant where mixing
was done in order to "pull paint."   Dansby did not wear a
3
mask when he went to pull paint. Nord testified that the
mixing department was very dusty because mixers cut open bags
of dry raw materials and poured them into the mills (the
machines that ground the pigments).  The grinding of the
Pulling paint involved agitating tanks filled with paint
3
and skimming partially solidified latex from the top of the
tank, a process that, according to the workers, takes
approximately 10 minutes.
5
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materials also created a lot of dust. Vanderbilt's shipping
records showed that it sold quantities of Nytal 300 and
Nytal 400 to the Conception plant in 1974 and 1975.  Nord also
stated that Nytal 300 and Nytal 400 were used every day in
mixing paint at the Conception plant.
In 1975, Mobile Paint opened the Theodore plant.  James
Hays, vice president of and technical director at Mobile
Paint, testified that Vanderbilt was a "major source" of talc
supplied to Mobile Paint from 1965 to 2009.  More
specifically, Hays stated that the types of talc he recalled
being used at the Theodore Plant were "[t]he Nytal 200, 300,
and 400."  Nord testified that "at the new factory" codes 342
and 343 were "very popular in just about all our oil paints."
He further confirmed that "343 was used a lot from the
mid-'70's to 2002 at [the] Theodore [plant]."  Additionally,
Vanderbilt shipping records indicated that Mobile Paint
purchased large quantities of Nytal 300 from Vanderbilt in
1976 and 1977.  In 1978, Mobile Paint also started purchasing
Nytal 400 from Vanderbilt, and it continued to purchase large
quantities of Nytal 300.  Those records show that Mobile Paint
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purchased Nytal 300 and 400 from Vanderbilt at least through
the year 2000.  
At the Theodore plant, the mixing department was located
on the second floor of the plant, what the employees called
"the mezzanine."  Everyone at the Theodore plant was required
to wear a mask when they were in the mixing department.  Both
Jimmy Sanders and Nord testified that Dansby knew about this
requirement.  Nord also testified that code 342 was not used
as often at the Theodore plant but that code 343 was used
every day and that mixing it produced a lot of dust.
Dansby continued to work in the filling department at the
Theodore plant from 1975 until his retirement in 2002.  Just
as he did at the Conception plant, Dansby had to enter the
mixing area of the plant in order to pull paint.  Nord
testified that Dansby entered the mixing area at least once
every day and sometimes three times a day from the day the
Theodore plant opened to the day Dansby retired because
pulling paint was part of his job.  Nord testified that he
observed Dansby just about every day because of this schedule.
Jimmy Sanders also testified that he observed Dansby in the
mixing department.  Both Jimmy Sanders and Nord testified that
7
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they could not definitively state that during the periods
Dansby was in the mixing department talc was being added to a
batch of paint.  Nord also stated that Dansby would have been
exposed to dust in his own area of the filling department
because it was located on the first floor below the mezzanine
and large amounts of dust floated down to the first floor from
the mezzanine and routinely had to be cleaned up.
Jimmy Sanders was specifically asked whether the Nytal
products contained asbestos.
"Q.  ...  [I]f they [the lawyers for the defendants]
were to ask you if you can testify if Dan Sanders
was ever exposed to an asbestos-containing product
after 1979, what would you say?
"A.  MS. BROCK:  Object to the form.
"[Sanders:]  Yes.  Since -- since the 341 and 342
was the asbestos -- was the asbestos material, oh,
yeah.
"BY MR. KEAHEY:
"Q.  But sitting --
"A.  I didn't know the difference, I didn't know
what it was -- that's what it was. No asbestos
because  all we know, to just get it together and
mix it.
"Q.  But you've learned since you left Mobile Paint
Company that the products you've talked about here
today, the pigments contained asbestos; is that
correct?
8
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"MS. BROCK:  Object to the form.
"[Sanders:] Yeah, I didn't know it until after Dan
died. I didn't know it, that's when I –-"
As noted above, on February 11, 2009, Dansby was
diagnosed with mesothelioma.  On February 11, 2010, Dansby
sued multiple defendants alleging that they had manufactured
and distributed various products containing asbestos to which
Dansby was exposed while he worked for Mobile Paint and
further alleging that such exposure caused him to develop
mesothelioma.  On September 1, 2010, Dansby amended his
complaint to add Vanderbilt as a defendant based on the fact
that it manufactured and sold industrial talc under the Nytal
brand name that Mobile Paint regularly used as a component in
its paint products.  Dansby died on October 10, 2010.  On
March 11, 2011, his widow Anna Sanders ("Sanders") filed an
amended complaint, both individually and as executor of
Dansby's estate, in which she added a wrongful-death cause of
action.  Sanders died on August 3, 2013.  On August 21, 2013,
Frank Kruse, administrator ad litem for Dansby's estate, was
substituted as a party plaintiff. 
In November 2011, Vanderbilt submitted its "Responses to
Plaintiff's Interrogatories and Requests for Production of
9
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Documents."  In those responses, Vanderbilt repeatedly stated
that "R.T. Vanderbilt never manufactured or sold a product
that 
contained 
asbestos"; 
that 
"R.T. 
Vanderbilt 
products 
never
contained asbestos"; and that "[t]he talc did not contain
asbestos and does not pose the same health risks as asbestos." 
Despite these categorical statements, Vanderbilt admitted in
its responses that, "[i]n the past, as a result of imprecise
definitions of asbestos, there was some confusion with the
distinction between non-asbestiform tremolite and tremolite
asbestos."  Specifically,
"[i]n the 1970's, certain entities (including
[the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health] 
and 
[the 
Mine 
Safety 
and 
Health
Administration]) mistakenly assumed or identified
asbestos in the talc.  As a result of incomplete or
faulty initial review, numerous efforts to correctly
characterize 
the 
mineral 
components 
of 
R.T.
Vanderbilt talc have been undertaken.  Many of these
studies have been sponsored by R.T. Vanderbilt as
part of the company's ongoing efforts to understand
the composition of its products.  R.T. Vanderbilt
has also sponsored efforts to determine if its talc
is capable of causing diseases typically associated
with exposure to asbestos.  ...  These studies
confirm that R.T. Vanderbilt's talc does not cause
'asbestos-related' disease.  Other studies not
sponsored by R.T. Vanderbilt ... confirm these
results."
Vanderbilt also related that
10
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"[s]ome early analysis of specific talc grades
containing a small amount of fibrous talc mistakenly
identified these talc fibers as chrysotile.  Other
analysis 
identified 
transitional 
fibers 
as
anthophyllite asbestos.  As a result of the
incorrect analysis, R.T. Vanderbilt labeled specific
talc products that were produced from approximately
1974-1978 with an [Occupational Safety and Health
Administration] asbestos standard warning label. 
The 
warning 
label 
on 
these 
products 
read
'Caution-Product Contains Asbestos Fibers: Avoid
Creating Dust. Breathing Asbestos Dust May Cause
Serious Bodily Harm.'"
On May 22, 2012, the trial court entered an amended
scheduling order in which it provided that, "[o]n or before
September 13, 2012, Defendants may file motions for summary
judgment on product identification and statute of limitations
issues."  To facilitate any such motions, the order required
that "depositions of Plaintiff, Plaintiff's fact witnesses,
family members, and product identification coworker witnesses
shall be completed by August 13, 2012."  The order also
provided that, "[o]n or before August 15, 2012, Plaintiff
shall identify expert witnesses to be called to testify in
this case."  Depositions of the plaintiff's experts were to be
"completed on or before February 28, 2013."4
The trial court later amended the scheduling order such
4
that Sanders's experts were to be deposed by May 31, 2013.
11
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On August 15, 2012, Sanders disclosed her expert
witnesses.  Among the experts Sanders listed in the disclosure
were:  Dr. Jerrold L. Abraham, a pathologist from Upstate
Medical University; Dr. Mark Rigler, a materials analyst and
microbiologist; materials analyst Richard L. Hatfield;
geologist and microscopist Sean Fitzgerald; and Dr. James R.
Millette, 
an 
environmental-materials 
analyst. 
 
Attached 
to 
the
disclosure as an exhibit was Dr. Abraham's report, in which he
stated:
"Most of the talc that the Mobile Paint Company used
came from RT Vanderbilt and Luzenac Corporation.
Some of the Vanderbilt talcs that were used from
1965 to 2002 include, but are not limited to NYTAL
200, NYTAL 300 and NYTAL 400. I am aware from my own
studies and those of other laboratories that NYTAL
contained 
asbestiform 
fibers, 
including
anthophyllite as well as asbestiform talc."
Dr. Abraham also asserted:
"There are numerous well documented mesotheliomas
developing in persons exposed to asbestiform talc
such as that contained in the NYTAL products.
Detailed mineralogical analysis of both the NYTAL
products and fibers recovered from patients' lung
tissue have confirmed the unusual mix of asbestiform
and non-asbestiform fibers of talc with many
asbestiform 'transitional' fibers in which the
crystalline structure in a single fiber can be shown
to match anthophyllite asbestos in one region of the
fiber and talc in another."
Dr. Abraham concluded:
12
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"Asbestos exposure is well known to be the cause
of nearly all malignant mesotheliomas. Based on all
the available information I can conclude to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that Mr.
Sanders' exposure to talc containing asbestos fibers
(including asbestiform talc) was a substantial
contributing cause of his malignant mesothelioma and
death."
On September 13, 2012, in accordance with the scheduling
order, Vanderbilt submitted a motion for a summary judgment
related to product identification, i.e., a motion addressing
the issue whether Dansby had ever been exposed to talc
supplied by Vanderbilt.  In the motion, Vanderbilt argued that
"[Sanders] has failed to come forth with any evidence that Mr.
Sanders was directly exposed to R.T. Vanderbilt talc while
working at Mobile Paint. Further, [Sanders] has failed to show
that Mr. Sanders' alleged exposure to R.T. Vanderbilt talc was
a 
substantial 
contributing 
factor 
to 
his 
injuries." 
Vanderbilt
noted that "[a]t no time during Mr. Sanders' two-day
deposition did he identify R.T. Vanderbilt, Nytal or talc as
a product or material that he worked with or around at Mobile
Paint." Vanderbilt insisted that "[t]here is no evidence that
Mr. Sanders ever personally worked with any R.T. Vanderbilt
talc." Vanderbilt argued:
13
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"To assume that Mr. Sanders was exposed to R.T.
Vanderbilt talc merely because he entered the
production department on occasion would be pure
speculation. First, not all paint contained talc.
...  And not all talc used at Mobile Paint was R.T.
Vanderbilt talc. Second, there is no evidence that
anyone was ever working with talc, much less R.T.
Vanderbilt talc, in the production department when
[Dansby] was present."
Vanderbilt further argued in the motion that 
"[e]ven 
assuming,
arguendo, that Mr. Sanders was somehow exposed to R.T.
Vanderbilt talc, a mere showing of minimum exposure is
insufficient.  In order to show causation in an asbestos
action, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct was
a substantial factor in causing the harm." In short,
Vanderbilt argued in its summary-judgment motion that Sanders
failed to produce evidence indicating that Dansby had been
exposed to a Vanderbilt product during his employment with
Mobile Paint and that, even if she had produced such evidence,
he did not demonstrate that Dansby's exposure to a Vanderbilt
product was a substantial factor in his injuries and
subsequent death. No portion of Vanderbilt's summary-judgment
motion raised the issue of a lack of evidence indicating that
Vanderbilt's products contained asbestos.  Vanderbilt did not
submit any supporting documents with its motion. 
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On September 17, 2012, the trial court set Vanderbilt's
motion to be heard on October 19, 2012.  Subsequently, the
parties agreed to reschedule the hearing for November 2, 2012.
On October 22, 2012, Sanders filed her response to
Vanderbilt's summary-judgment motion.  Sanders argued that,
"[d]espite 
Vanderbilt's 
contentions, 
the 
evidence 
in 
this 
case
shows that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether
Mr. Sanders was exposed to Vanderbilt's asbestos-containing
talc.  The record contains ample evidence to support the
conclusion 
that 
Mr. 
Sanders 
breathed 
the 
dust 
from
Vanderbilt's 
talc." 
 
The 
above-quoted 
statement 
was
accompanied by a footnote that stated:  "[Sanders's]
contention in this case is that R.T. Vanderbilt's Nytal talc
products contained asbestos.  No doubt this will be addressed
in the next round of motions for summary judgment, but for the
purposes of its instant Motion Vanderbilt has not contested
[Sanders's] contention."  Sanders in her response quoted
extensively from the deposition testimony of Dansby's
coworkers in an effort to show that Dansby had, in fact, been
exposed to Vanderbilt talc.  She also contended that whether
Dansby's exposure to Vanderbilt talc was a substantial factor
15
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in causing his injuries and subsequent death was an issue for
the jury.  Sanders, like Vanderbilt, did not submit documents
along with her response to the motion for a summary judgment,
choosing instead to rely on evidence already submitted in the
record.
On November 2, 2012, the trial court held a hearing on
Vanderbilt's motion for a summary judgment.  At the outset of
the 
hearing, 
Vanderbilt's 
counsel 
acknowledged 
that 
"[w]e 
have
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of product
identification of an asbestos containing product."  
Instead 
of
discussing the issue whether there was sufficient evidence
that Dansby had been exposed to a Vanderbilt product, however,
Vanderbilt's counsel proceeded to argue that "R.T. Vanderbilt
never 
manufactured 
asbestos 
containing 
products. 
R.T.
Vanderbilt talc never contained asbestos.  These are facts
that R.T. Vanderbilt has asserted from the very beginning of
being brought into this litigation."  Vanderbilt's counsel
insisted that "asbestos content" is "essential to a product
identification motion."  She further contended:
"It makes no sense to argue at this late date that
[Sanders] should be required to have time to prove
that -- to prove up evidence that our product did or
did not contain asbestos.  [Sanders] is required to
16
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come forward with that evidence now.  He doesn't –-
she doesn't get a second bite at the apple.  And
there's absolutely no evidence to dispute the fact
that R.T. Vanderbilt's talc did not contain
asbestos."
Sanders's counsel responded that, "as far as in product
identification and causation, asbestos content are basically
three different things.  And we're here today on product
identification summary judgment.  That's my understanding of
why we're here today.  And we've more than met that burden." 
Sanders's counsel proceeded to present multiple slides to the
trial court quoting the deposition testimony of 
witnesses that
he argued illustrated how often Dansby was exposed to Nytal. 
The following exchange between Sanders's counsel and 
the 
trial
court then occurred:
"MR. KEAHEY:  But geologically at least [our]
experts have found now and will be willing to
testify that those products definitely contained
asbestos.  But that's on down the road. And to me
that's causation.  That's the expert discovery and
I didn't want to get into that today because it was
my understanding today we're just here strictly on
product identification.  ...  Again, these are just
copies of the invoices which that alone, if you just
take the invoices, and you take the fact that
[Dansby] was there within probably fifty feet on a
conservative estimate, between these products being
used, 
that 
more 
than 
gives 
you 
product
identification.  And we go --
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"THE COURT:  You know what she's going to say, of
our product that contains no talc -- I mean,
contains no asbestos.
"MR. KEAHEY: Yes, sir, and they're contending that
it contains -- And that's going to really be the
real fight in the case to be honest with you.  Their
people are going to say it didn't contain it and our
people are going to say it did. And it's going to be
a jury question.  That's what happened in Delaware
about three or four months ago.  And so the Nytal
product, the Nytal 400, 300 and 200, were simply
different grades of the Nytal 100 which was the
product at issue in the Delaware trial about three
to four months ago.  And the plaintiff's experts in
that case did definitely convince the jury that that
product contained asbestos.  Again, I'm just trying
-- I'm not trying to get over into causation and the
expert."
After 
Sanders's 
counsel 
finished 
his 
argument,
Vanderbilt's counsel responded:  "Your Honor, I don't know
where to begin.  He still has not come forward with any
evidence in the record that there's asbestos in R.T.
Vanderbilt's talc."  The trial court asked Vanderbilt's
counsel to explain why the issue whether the talc contained
asbestos was not a jury question. Vanderbilt's counsel
answered:
"Because there isn't a question of fact. He hasn't
pointed to an affidavit, a deposition, any verified
interrogatory responses. There's no evidence --
[Sanders] has the burden now -- [Sanders] has the
burden of coming forward with admissible evidence to
show there's a question of fact on our position that
18
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there's no evidence that our product contains
asbestos. We have shown -- Excuse me. We have met
our burden in showing that there's a lack of
evidence to support [her] claim. Now, their burden
is to come forward looking at the specific evidence
in the record, not what's going on in another state,
not what is going on in Plaintiff's counsel's head,
not what he thinks talc litigation has become or
used to be or will be. We're talking about evidence
in the record.  ..."
On the same day the hearing was held on Vanderbilt's
summary-judgment motion, November 2, 2012, Sanders filed a
motion to compel the production of, among other things,
"5 grams each of NYTAL 300 [and] NYTAL 400" for testing.  On
December 21, 2012, Vanderbilt responded to the motion by
contending that "discovery closed on September 13, 2012, the
deadline 
for 
filing 
product 
identification 
motions 
for 
summary
judgment" and by noting that during two years of litigation
Sanders had never requested such samples.  Vanderbilt also
insisted that Sanders
"would have this Court believe that her experts have
been deprived of the opportunity to test Vanderbilt
talc -- nothing could be further from the truth.
R.T. Vanderbilt's talc is perhaps the most tested
talc in the world.  Reliable tests show that R.T.
Vanderbilt talc does not contain asbestos, and no
regulatory agency considers any of the components in
Vanderbilt talc to be asbestos.  The U.S. government
has tested R.T. Vanderbilt's talc, and these results
are in the public domain. [Sanders's] own experts
have been involved in litigation against R.T.
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Vanderbilt.  Not one but four of [Sanders's] experts
have tested R.T. Vanderbilt talc in the past.
[Sanders has] failed to show why her experts would
need samples to test when they have already tested
Vanderbilt talc in the past."
The response further claimed that "[Sanders's] own experts
have tested samples of the talc she now seeks.  Specifically,
Jerrold L. Abraham, M.D.; James R. Millette, Ph.D.; Dr. Mark
Rigler; and Richard Hatfield have all tested R.T. Vanderbilt
talc and have been retained as experts in numerous talc cases
in the past."
In January 2013, Sanders filed a reply to Vanderbilt's
response to the motion to compel, in which she argued:
"Vanderbilt's 
Response 
begins 
with 
the 
falsehood
that discovery closed in this case on September 13,
2012, basing this assertion on the fact that
September 13 was the deadline for defendants to file
motions 
for 
summary 
judgment 
on 
product
identification and statute of limitations issues.
This is quite simply not an issue related to
Vanderbilt's motion for summary judgment, which was
purely based on product identification grounds and
which essentially conceded -- at least for the
purposes of that Motion -- that R.T. Vanderbilt's
talc contained asbestos.  The asbestos content of
R.T. Vanderbilt's talc is properly addressed by
expert analysis of the talc, which is all that
[Sanders] seeks in this case.  As contemplated by
the Scheduling Order in effect in this case, an
additional deadline exists for motions for summary
judgment which are not based purely on product
identification and/or the statute of limitations.
[Sanders] anticipates that Vanderbilt will avail
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itself of this opportunity and file an additional
motion for summary judgment which will no doubt
contest the asbestos content of its talc.  But that
future deadline is immaterial to Vanderbilt's
argument that discovery closed on September 13 or
that the talc samples at issue were germane to its
prior-filed motion for summary judgment." 
In a supplemental reply to Vanderbilt's response to the
motion to compel, Sanders stated that her "experts have NOT,
in fact, tested any of the NYTAL line of [Vanderbilt] talc
products and several other [Vanderbilt] talc products."
(Capitalization in original.)  Sanders attached to her
supplemental reply a joint report authored by Dr. Rigler and
Hatfield.  In the report, Dr. Rigler and Hatfield stated, in
part:
"Talc products manufactured by [Vanderbilt] such as
Nytal and Motildene talcs, in addition to containing
fibrous talc, contains an amount of tremolite and
anthophyllite 
asbestos. 
The 
fact 
that 
R.T.
Vanderbilt talc products contain asbestos has been
proven by analytical laboratories numerous times
over 
the 
years. 
Analyses 
performed 
by 
R.T.
Vanderbilt, by this laboratory (MAC, LLC), by MVA
Scientific Consultants (Millette Van Der Wood and
Associates), and by MC line Laboratories all confirm
the presence of these forms of asbestos in Nytal
talc.  ... 
"It is our opinion that data from these
laboratories have conclusively shown that R.T.
Vanderbilt talc products contain, or have contained
in the past, various asbestiform minerals including
tremolite, anthophyllite, and chrysotile."
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The trial court heard arguments on Sanders's motion to
compel on January 25, 2013, and on January 29, 2013, the court
denied the motion.  
Dr. Rigler was deposed on April 12, 2013.  In his
deposition, Dr. Rigler stated: "R.T. Vanderbilt talcs,
specifically the ones that I'm referring to in my report, have
contained asbestos and may continue to contain asbestos at
this time if they are of the same batch, lot, year, that type
of thing, so that they have been verified to contain
asbestos."  Dr. Rigler also testified that he had produced a
summary of his report finding that 11 Vanderbilt talc products
"were verified to contain asbestos."  He stated that those
products included, among others, "Nytal 400."
Sean Fitzgerald was deposed on May 10, 2013.  Fitzgerald
testified that, "with a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty, ... the talc that was used by Mr. Sanders contained
asbestos, [and] the way it was used created exposure." More
specifically with regard to the asbestos content 
of 
Vanderbilt
talc, Fitzgerald was asked by Vanderbilt's counsel:
"[I]f you're asked at the trial, have you tested a
Nytal sample, you would say?
"A.  Yes.
22
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"Q.  And if you were asked at trial if you found --
if there was asbestos in the Nytal sample you
tested, you would say?
"A.  Yes."
Fitzgerald was also asked:  "If you are asked at the trial of
this case whether or not the tremolite or anthophyllite in
Nytal was asbestiform, what's your answer going to be?"  He
answered:  "They were asbestiform."  Finally, Fitzgerald was
asked:
"But in your opinion, the industrial talc sold by
Vanderbilt also includes tremolite asbestos and
anthophyllite asbestos, right?
"A.  It does."
Dr. Millette was deposed on May 9, 2013.  At his
deposition, Dr. Millette produced over 500 pages of
documentation on the testing of Vanderbilt talc products.  In
a 2010 report, Dr. Millette stated that he found asbestos in
Nytal talc.  Specifically, he stated that "Nytal 100 talc and
Nytal 100 HR talc (Samples V0087 and V0088) contain elongated
particles (particles with a minimum aspect ratio of 3:1).
These particles are mineral in nature and therefore are
elongated mineral particles (EMPs).  Both samples contain
23
1121382
fibrous tremolite, fibrous talc, fibrous anthophyllite and
fibrous transitional (anthopho-talc) minerals."
On July 7, 2013, the trial court entered a summary
judgment in favor of Vanderbilt.  In the sole paragraph
constituting the findings of fact, the trial court stated: 
"The record shows that R.T. Vanderbilt never manufactured or
sold an asbestos-containing product.  
The record 
further 
shows
that R.T. Vanderbilt's talc did not contain asbestos."  Based
on that finding, the trial court concluded:
"Pretermitting whether Dansby Sanders was
directly exposed to R.T. Vanderbilt talc, R.T.
Vanderbilt has met its burden on summary judgment by
showing that no genuine issue of material fact
exists as to whether Mr. Sanders was exposed to an
asbestos-containing 
product 
for 
which 
R.T.
Vanderbilt is responsible. Moreover, R.T. Vanderbilt
presented 
affirmative 
evidence 
that 
it 
never
manufactured or sold talc that contained asbestos.
Even if Mr. Sanders was exposed to R.T. Vanderbilt's
talc as [Sanders] alleges, the undisputed evidence
shows that the talc did not contain asbestos. Thus,
R.T. Vanderbilt has met its burden on summary
judgment by showing an absence of evidence exists to
support [Sanders's] claims."
(Emphasis added.)  The trial court further concluded that,
"[p]ursuant to Ala. R. Civ. P. Rule 54(b), this Court finds
there is no just reason for delay and expressly directs the
24
1121382
Clerk to enter final judgment in favor of Defendant R.T.
Vanderbilt Company, Inc."
On July 19, 2013, Sanders filed a "Motion for
Reconsideration of the Summary Judgment Entered in Favor of
Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC," in which Sanders asked the trial
court to vacate the summary judgment.  In the motion to
vacate, Sanders sought to "direct the Court's attention to
specific evidence on the record at the time of the summary
judgment hearing and to supplement the record with newly
discovered evidence," which she contended would demonstrate
that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether Nytal
talc contained asbestos.  Sanders noted that both Jimmy
Sanders's testimony that Nytal talc contained asbestos 
and Dr.
Abraham's report stating that Nytal talc contained asbestos
were in the record before Vanderbilt filed its summary-
judgment motion.  Additionally, Sanders cited the deposition
of Dr. Rigler, the expert report of Dr. Rigler and Hatfield,
the deposition testimony of Fitzgerald, and the report of Dr.
Millette as all confirming that Nytal talc contained asbestos. 
Sanders observed that those additional 
pieces of 
evidence 
were
not available at the time Vanderbilt filed its motion for a
25
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summary judgment because the depositions of her experts were
not scheduled to be completed until May 31, 2013.  Even so,
Sanders noted, the experts' opinions were available before 
the
trial court entered its order on summary judgment, which found
that "the undisputed evidence shows that the talc did not
contain asbestos."  Based on the evidence in the record,
Sanders argued, the trial court should vacate its summary
judgment in favor of Vanderbilt.  
On August 19, 2013, Vanderbilt submitted its response to
Sanders's motion to vacate.  In that response, Vanderbilt
argued that Sanders
"knew the opinions of her experts, as she disclosed
their opinions on August 15, 2012, before Vanderbilt
even filed its motion for summary judgment. [Sanders
has] failed to submit any explanation, much less a
reasonable one, as to why she failed to submit an
affidavit of any of her experts with their opinions
about Vanderbilt's talc."
As to the deposition testimony of Jimmy Sanders, Vanderbilt
contended that "any speculative testimony by Dansby Sanders'
coworkers that they believed NYTAL contained asbestos is
insufficient to create a material issue of fact where there is
no evidence to show that Dansby Sanders worked with Vanderbilt
talc."  Thus, Vanderbilt returned to its original argument
26
1121382
that Sanders had failed to demonstrate that Dansby had been
exposed to a Vanderbilt product.  
The trial court denied the motion to vacate without
further explanation.  In his capacity as administrator ad
litem, Kruse appeals the trial court's judgment.   
5
II.  Standard of Review
"In Pittman v. United Toll Systems, LLC, 882 So.
2d 842 (Ala. 2003), this Court set forth the
standard of review applicable to a summary judgment:
"'This Court's review of a summary
judgment is de novo.
"'"In 
reviewing 
the
disposition 
of 
a 
motion 
for
summary judgment, 'we utilize the
same standard as the trial court
in 
determining 
whether 
the
evidence before [it] made out a
genuine issue of material fact,'
Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.
2d 860, 862 (Ala. 1988), and
whether the movant was 'entitled
to a judgment as a matter of
law.' Wright v. Wright, 654 So.
2d 542 (Ala. 1995); Rule 56(c),
Ala. R. Civ. P. When the movant
makes a prima facie showing that
there is no genuine issue of
material fact, the burden shifts
to 
the 
nonmovant 
to 
present
substantial 
evidence 
creating
Kruse informs this Court in his appellate brief that
5
Vanderbilt is now the only remaining defendant in this action.
Vanderbilt does not dispute that assertion.
27
1121382
such 
an 
issue. 
 
Bass 
v.
SouthTrust 
Bank 
of 
Baldwin
County, 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98
(Ala. 
1989). 
 
Evidence 
is
'substantial' if it is of 'such
weight 
and 
quality 
that
fair-minded 
persons 
in 
the
exercise of impartial judgment
can 
reasonably 
infer 
the
existence of the fact sought to
be proved.'  Wright, 654 So. 2d
at 543 (quoting West v. Founders
Life Assurance Co. of Florida,
547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989)).
Our review is further subject to
the caveat that this Court must
review the record in a light most
favorable to the nonmovant and
must 
resolve 
all 
reasonable
doubts against the movant.  Wilma
Corp. 
v. 
Fleming 
Foods 
of
Alabama, Inc., 613 So. 2d 359
(Ala. 1993) [overruled on other
grounds, Bruce v. Cole, 854 So.
2d 47 (Ala. 2003)]; Hanners v.
Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So. 2d
412, 413 (Ala.1990)."'
"882 So. 2d at 844 (quoting Hobson v. American Cast
Iron Pipe Co., 690 So. 2d 341, 344 (Ala. 1997))."
Johnson v. Brunswick Riverview Club, Inc., 39 So. 3d 132, 135
(Ala. 2009).
III.  Analysis
Kruse argues that the trial court erred in entering a
summary judgment in favor of Vanderbilt on a ground not argued
in Vanderbilt's motion for a summary judgment.  Kruse
28
1121382
observes, correctly, that Vanderbilt's written motion for a
summary judgment did not raise the issue whether Sanders had
presented any evidence indicating that Vanderbilt products
contained asbestos.  Instead, the summary-judgment motion
argued that Sanders had failed to demonstrate that Dansby had
been exposed to a Vanderbilt product during his employment
with Mobile Paint.  Accordingly, Sanders's response to the
motion 
addressed 
solely 
the 
issue 
of 
"product 
identification,"
i.e., whether Dansby had ever been exposed to a Vanderbilt
product.   Sanders's response even noted that she expected
6
Vanderbilt to file another summary-judgment motion at a later
time challenging the assertion that its products contained
asbestos.  
Two weeks later at the hearing on the motion, Vanderbilt
raised the issue of asbestos content, and its counsel
discussed solely that issue throughout 
the hearing. 
 
Sanders's
counsel responded by observing that she had experts who would
testify as to the issue of asbestos content but that the issue
This 
Court 
has 
stated 
that 
"[b]ecause 
'product
6
identification is one element of causation,' ... the
'threshold requirement of any products liability action is
identification 
of 
the 
injury-causing 
product 
and 
its
manufacturer.'" Sheffield v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.,
595 So. 2d 443, 450 (Ala. 1992) (citations omitted).
29
1121382
before the trial court for the present 
summary-judgment 
motion
was whether Dansby had been exposed to a Vanderbilt product.
Sanders's counsel's argument to the trial court in the hearing
reflected that understanding.  Nonetheless, and despite the
directives of the trial court in its scheduling order as to
the timing of discovery and motions for summary judgment
relating to the issue of product identification as opposed to
its directives regarding the completion of discovery and
filing of motions regarding other issues, the trial court
entered a summary judgment for Vanderbilt solely on the basis
of a purported lack of evidence in the record demonstrating
that 
Vanderbilt's 
products 
contained 
asbestos. 
 
Kruse 
contends
that the trial court clearly erred by so concluding.  
Vanderbilt responds that Kruse
"grasps at straws ... because R.T. Vanderbilt did
not explicitly indicate that its talc was not
asbestos-containing in its original summary judgment
brief. This argument is meant to distract from the
real issue, which is that [Sanders] failed to
produce sufficient evidence to support a finding
that Mr. Sanders was 'directly exposed' to an
asbestos-containing 
product 
supplied 
by 
R.T.
Vanderbilt."
Vanderbilt's brief, p. 10.  Vanderbilt insists that it "did
argue that Mr. Sanders was not exposed to an asbestos-
30
1121382
containing R.T. Vanderbilt product in its original summary
judgment motion."  Id. at 10-11.  It then cites pages of its
motion that contain language nearly identical to the passage
in its brief quoted above, i.e., that Sanders failed to
produce evidence indicating that "Mr. Sanders was 'directly
exposed' to an asbestos-containing product supplied by R.T.
Vanderbilt."  The bulk of the remainder of Vanderbilt's brief
on appeal discusses the evidence pertaining to Dansby's
exposure to Vanderbilt products at Mobile Paint.
In responding to Kruse's argument, Vanderbilt performs a
sort of sleight-of-hand by conflating two issues into one.
Whether Dansby was exposed to a Vanderbilt product (product
identification) 
and 
whether 
Vanderbilt 
talc 
contained 
asbestos
are different issues. Consistent with the trial court's
scheduling order and the corresponding state of discovery at
the time it filed its motion for a summary judgment,
Vanderbilt clearly argued only the issue of product
identification/exposure in that motion.  Contrary to that
scheduling order and the state of discovery regarding issues
other than product identification, and contrary to 
the 
content
of its summary-judgment motion, Vanderbilt argued only the
31
1121382
issue of asbestos content at the hearing on that motion. 
Before us, Vanderbilt argues as if the two issues are one and
the same and, therefore, that Sanders had no reason to be
caught unaware in the trial court.  We disagree.
"'When the basis of a summary-judgment motion is a
failure of the nonmovant's evidence, the movant's burden ...
is limited to informing the court of the basis of its motion
-- that is, the moving party must indicate where the nonmoving
party's case suffers an evidentiary failure.'"  Farr v. Gulf
Agency, 74 So. 3d 393, 398 (Ala. 2011) (quoting Rector v.
Better Homes, Inc., 820 So. 2d 75, 80 (Ala. 2001)).  As noted,
Vanderbilt argued in its summary-judgment motion that Sanders
failed to present sufficient evidence that Dansby had been
exposed to a Vanderbilt product during his employment at
Mobile Paint.  It did not indicate that Sanders's case
suffered from a lack of evidence that Vanderbilt talc
contained asbestos.  Despite this, the trial court entered a
summary judgment in favor of Vanderbilt on the latter basis.
"[A] defendant who moves for a summary judgment on
the ground of 'a failure of the [plaintiff's]
evidence ... must indicate where the [plaintiff's]
case suffers an evidentiary failure.' Kennedy v.
Western Sizzlin Corp., 857 So. 2d 71, 78 (Ala.
2003). If such a summary-judgment motion 'does not
32
1121382
inform the trial court (and the [plaintiff]) of a
failure of the [plaintiff's] evidence on a fact or
issue, no burden shifts to the [plaintiff] to
present substantial evidence on that fact or issue.
Therefore, summary judgment for a failure of proof
not asserted by the motion for summary judgment is
inappropriate.' Tanner v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 874 So. 2d 1058, 1068 n.3 (Ala. 2003)
(citations omitted).
"Thus, ... a trial court should not grant a
summary judgment, and an appellate court will not
affirm one, on the basis of an absence of
substantial evidence to support an essential element
of a claim or affirmative defense unless the motion
for a summary judgment has properly raised that
absence of evidence and has thereby shifted to the
nonmoving party the burden of producing substantial
supporting evidence."
Hollis v. City of Brighton, 885 So. 2d 135, 140 (Ala. 2004).
See also Turner v. Westhampton Court, L.L.C., 903 So. 2d 82,
87 (Ala. 2004) (stating that "[s]ummary judgment cannot be
entered against the nonmoving party on the basis of a failure
of that party's proof unless the motion for summary judgment
has challenged that failure of proof").  Based on the
foregoing, it is clear that the trial court erred in entering
a summary judgment in favor of Vanderbilt on the basis of a
purported lack of record evidence that Vanderbilt products
contained asbestos.
33
1121382
Furthermore, in her motion to vacate the judgment,
Sanders 
subsequently 
presented 
substantial 
evidence 
that 
Nytal
talc contained asbestos.  Vanderbilt argues that that evidence
came too late and that Kruse offers no reason why the evidence
could not have been presented in response to its motion for a
summary judgment. "[O]nce the trial court enters a summary
judgment, '[a] post-judgment motion may not be used to
belatedly submit evidence in opposition to a motion for a
summary judgment.'  White v. Howie, 677 So. 2d 752, 754 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1995)."  Ex parte City of Montgomery, 758 So. 2d
565, 568 (Ala. 1999) (abrogated on other grounds).
The obvious reason Sanders did not present the evidence
earlier is that the summary-judgment motion did not indicate
that asbestos content was an issue being challenged at that
time.  Moreover, in addition to the content of the summary-
judgment motion itself, the trial court's scheduling order
provided that depositions of Sanders's experts would 
not 
occur
until after the deadline for filing "product identification"
motions for a summary judgment by any of the defendants.
As Sanders's counsel stated in the hearing on the
summary-judgment motion, asbestos content of Vanderbilt
34
1121382
products is an issue for expert testimony, but Sanders's
experts had yet to be deposed, in accordance with the trial
court's own scheduling order, and thus discovery on that issue
had not been completed at the time Vanderbilt filed its 
summary-judgment motion.  
Vanderbilt complains that Sanders could have submitted
affidavits from her experts before the trial court ruled on
Vanderbilt's 
summary-judgment 
motion 
because 
Sanders 
knew 
what
her experts would testify to when they submitted their expert-
disclosure statement, which was before Vanderbilt filed its
motion.  But again, Vanderbilt's argument ignores the fact
that the Sanders had no reason to believe that affidavits from
her experts on the issue of asbestos content were necessary to
rebut the summary-judgment motion.  The fact that Sanders was
put on notice of the issue at the summary-judgment hearing is
of no consequence because "[t]his Court has repeatedly
recognized that '"[t]he trial court can consider only that
material before it at the time of submission of the motion"
and that any material filed thereafter "comes too late."'"
Bean v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 591 So. 2d 17, 20 (Ala.
1991) (quoting Sheetz, Aiken & Aiken, Inc. v. Spann, Hall,
35
1121382
Ritchie, Inc., 512 So. 2d 99, 101 (Ala. 1987), quoting in turn
Osborn v. Johns, 468 So. 2d 103, 108 (Ala. 1985)).  Moreover,
after the hearing Sanders still had no reason to believe that
the trial court would enter a summary judgment on the issue of
the asbestos content in Nytal talc, given that the trial court
listened to Sanders's counsel's entire presentation at the
hearing addressing the issue of Dansby's exposure to Nytal
talc and, as part of that presentation, counsel's insistence
that product identification/exposure was the only issue
properly before the trial court.7
Even though the trial court's reason for entering a
summary judgment in favor of Vanderbilt was flawed, "we can
affirm a summary judgment on any valid legal ground presented
by the record, whether that ground was considered by, or even
Vanderbilt 
also 
objects 
that 
some 
of 
the 
evidence 
Sanders
7
presented in her motion to vacate the judgment was not in the
form of admissible evidence.  See Tanksley v. ProSoft
Automation, Inc., 982 So. 2d 1046, 1053 (Ala. 2007) (stating
that "[d]ocuments submitted in support of or in opposition to
a summary-judgment motion are generally required to be
certified or otherwise authenticated; if they are not, they
constitute inadmissible hearsay and are not considered on
summary judgment").  At a minimum, this is not true of the
deposition testimony from Jimmy Sanders, Dr. Rigler, and Sean
Fitzgerald, which in 
itself 
was 
substantial 
evidence
demonstrating a genuine issue of fact as to whether Nytal
contained asbestos.
36
1121382
if it was rejected by, the trial court, unless due-process
constraints require otherwise."  Wheeler v. George, 39 So. 3d
1061, 1083 (Ala. 2009).  Vanderbilt clearly presented in its
summary-judgment motion the argument that was contemplated by
the trial court's scheduling order, i.e., the argument that
Sanders had failed to present substantial evidence 
that Dansby
was exposed to Nytal supplied by Vanderbilt during his
employment with Mobile Paint. 
In examining the issue of Dansby's exposure to Nytal, we
note at the outset that Vanderbilt, in its motion for a
summary judgment, and Sanders, in her response to the motion,
argued for two different standards for establishing exposure
based on the same case:  Sheffield v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass
Corp., 595 So. 2d 443 (Ala. 1992).   In its motion for a
8
summary 
judgment, 
Vanderbilt 
cited Sheffield 
for 
the
proposition that, "[t]o sustain an asbestos action, a
The fact that the parties' arguments are based on
8
Sheffield is not surprising, given that Sheffield is the only
case from this Court that has substantively addressed the
issue of what a plaintiff is required to show in order to
establish that he or she was exposed to a defendant's asbestos
product.  Nearly all the cases in this Court that have
involved asbestos exposure have addressed the issue of the
accrual of the cause of action, which is not an issue in this
appeal.  See Griffin v. Unocal Corp., 990 So. 2d 291 (Ala.
2008), and the cases cited therein.
37
1121382
plaintiff must at the very least show that he was exposed to
an 
asbestos-containing 
product 
manufactured 
by 
the 
defendant."
Vanderbilt also cited Sheffield for its further contention
that "[t]he plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to
support a finding that the plaintiff was 'directly exposed' to
that defendant's asbestos-containing products."  
Conversely, in her response to the motion for a summary
judgment, Sanders argued that 
"[a]ny assertion by [Vanderbilt] in this case that
[Sanders] is required to show ... that Mr. Sanders
worked directly with or in close proximity to an
asbestos-containing product of the defendants which
was 
a 
substantial 
factor 
in 
causing 
his
asbestos-related injury fails in light of the
Alabama Supreme Court's findings in Sheffield."
Instead, Sanders insisted, "[t]he Supreme Court of Alabama in
Sheffield held that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on
the issue of causation and must, at a minimum, demonstrate
that the asbestos product manufactured by a specific
manufacturer was present at the plaintiff's job site."
We question whether the standard Kruse asserts that
Sheffield established -- the presence of the asbestos-
containing product at the plaintiff's "job site" -- means
anything different than the standard Vanderbilt argues that
38
1121382
Sheffield supplied -- direct exposure to the asbestos-
containing product.  A standard other than direct exposure
would not be logical, given that a plaintiff obviously must
establish that the product in question caused his or her
injuries.  Indeed, corroboration for that standard comes from
what appears to be the majority rule for causation used by
most courts throughout the country in asbestos 
litigation: 
the
"frequency-regularity-proximity" test propounded in Lohrmann
v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986).9
The Lohrmann court -- applying Maryland law -- stated that, to
establish proximate causation, "the plaintiff must introduce
evidence which allows the jury to reasonably conclude that it
is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was
a substantial factor in bringing about the result."  782 F.2d
at 1162.  The Lohrmann court concluded that this meant that,
"[t]o support a reasonable inference of substantial causation
from circumstantial evidence, there must be evidence of
exposure to a specific product on a regular basis over some
"Courts in every circuit but the D.C. Circuit, and the
9
First, Second, and Fifth Circuits have adopted the Lohrmann
test. In addition, Michigan, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Illinois, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Nebraska, and Oklahoma have
adopted the test."  Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 949 F.2d
167, 171 n.3 (5th Cir. 1991). 
39
1121382
extended period of time in proximity to where the plaintiff
actually worked."  782 F.2d at 1162-63.  
Regardless, for purposes of this case we need not decide
which of the two standards urged by the parties before us is
the correct standard (or whether we should even understand the
standard argued by Kruse to be really stating a different
standard than the one argued by Vanderbilt).  In this case,
Sanders satisfied even the possibly more challenging standard
urged by Vanderbilt.  
First, Sanders produced substantial evidence that the
particular asbestos-containing product at issue -- Nytal talc
-- was supplied by Vanderbilt to Mobile Paint at its
Conception plant and then at its Theodore plant.  Vanderbilt's
own shipping records indicated that Nytal talc was supplied to
Mobile Paint at the Conception plant in 1974 and 1975 and that
it was shipped to the Theodore plant through at least the year
2000.  Additionally, James Hays, vice president of Mobile
Paint, testified that Vanderbilt was a "major source" of talc
supply for Mobile Paint from 1962 until 2009, and he
specifically stated that Nytal was the product supplied by
Vanderbilt during that period.  Further, Dansby's coworker
40
1121382
James Nord testified that Nytal-coded products were "very
popular" at the Theodore plant and that code 343, Nytal 300,
"was used a lot from the mid-'70's to 2002 at Theodore."  
Second, Sanders also produced substantial evidence as to
the extent of Dansby's exposure to Nytal.  Witnesses confirmed
the presence and use of Nytal on a daily basis at both the
Conception plant and then at the Theodore plant. Witnesses
also testified to the dusty conditions created when pigments
were added to the paint mixture.  Witnesses testified that
Dansby entered the area where Nytal was used multiple times
per day for 37 years.  In addition, at least one witness
further testified that the filling room at the Theodore plant,
where Dansby worked beginning in the mid-1970s, was located
beneath the mixing room and that dust from the mixing area
entered Dansby's work area on a regular basis.
In sum, when the evidence is viewed, as it must be, in
the light most favorable to Kruse, the summary judgment
entered by the trial court cannot be sustained on mere
product-identification grounds. A reasonable inference exists
that Dansby was exposed to Nytal talc supplied by Vanderbilt
during the period he was employed by Mobile Paint.  Whether
41
1121382
that exposure was a "substantial factor" in causing Dansby's
mesothelioma is a separate issue.
IV.  Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred in entering
a summary judgment in favor of Vanderbilt.  The trial court
entered its judgment on a basis not contemplated by its own
scheduling order and, in fact, not presented in the motion for
a summary judgment filed in keeping with that order (and, in
any 
event, 
Sanders 
subsequently 
presented 
substantial 
evidence
contradicting that basis for the summary judgment). Sanders
also presented substantial evidence that Dansby was 
exposed 
to
Nytal talc supplied by Vanderbilt during his employment at
Mobile Paint, thus demonstrating a genuine issue of fact as to
the issue actually raised in the motion for a summary
judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is due
to be reversed and the cause remanded. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Moore, C.J., and Main and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Bolin, J., concurs in the result.
42