Title: Seyfarth Shaw v. Lake Fairfax Seven Ltd. Partnersh
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 961021
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 10, 1997

Present:  All the Justices 
 
SEYFARTH, SHAW, FAIRWEATHER & GERALDSON 
 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.   Record No. 961021         January 10, 1997 
 
LAKE FAIRFAX SEVEN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
 
M. Langhorne Keith, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a law firm that 
filed an action to collect legal fees from a former client 
is required to establish with expert testimony that the fees 
charged to the former client were reasonable.  This appeal 
is presented to us in an unusual procedural posture in that 
the trial court sustained the defendants' motion to strike 
the plaintiff's evidence at the conclusion of the opening 
statements.   
 
The law firm, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, 
a limited partnership, filed its motion for judgment against 
Lake Fairfax Seven Limited Partnership and Thomson M. Hirst, 
individually, alleging the following.  The law firm was 
retained by the defendants to provide legal services related 
to a lease dispute between the defendants and a third party. 
 The law firm executed a written "retainer agreement" with 
Lake Fairfax Seven Limited Partnership, and Hirst personally 
guaranteed payment of the legal fees.  The retainer 
agreement specified hourly rates for the various attorneys 
who would perform the legal services.      
 
The law firm "properly billed the [d]efendants on a 
monthly basis at [the law firm's] ordinary and customary 
hourly rates for services rendered, as well as for incurred 
costs and disbursements.  The retainer agreement expressly 
obligate[d] the [d]efendants to make full payment within 30 
days from receipt of each monthly statement."  The 
defendants discharged the law firm without cause, the law 
firm properly billed the defendants for services rendered as 
well as incurred costs and disbursements, and the defendants 
have refused to make full payment on the outstanding bills, 
leaving a balance due of $81,377.90.  A copy of the written 
contract was attached as an exhibit to the motion for 
judgment.   
 
The trial court entered a pretrial conference order 
which required, among other things, that the law firm 
identify its expert witnesses at least 90 days before trial. 
 On the morning of trial, after counsel had made their 
opening statements to the jury, the defendants' counsel 
informed the court that the law firm had not identified any 
person who would render expert opinions at trial.  The 
defendants asserted that the law firm was required to 
present expert testimony to establish the reasonableness of 
the fees charged and that the law firm could not do so 
because it had not identified an expert witness within the 
time prescribed in the pretrial order.  The defendants' 
counsel, recognizing that his action was "a little 
premature," nevertheless filed with the court a written 
motion to strike the plaintiff's evidence.   
 
The law firm asserted that it was not required to 
present expert testimony to establish the reasonableness of 
the legal fees.  After the litigants argued their respective 
positions, the trial court recessed, reviewed the written 
memorandum in support of the motion to strike, and 
subsequently granted the motion.  The trial court entered a 
final order in favor of the defendants, and we awarded the 
law firm an appeal.   
 
The law firm argues that the trial court erred by 
granting the defendants' motion to strike the law firm's 
evidence at the conclusion of opening statements.  We agree. 
 
We are of opinion that a trial court should not grant a 
motion to strike the plaintiff's evidence before the 
plaintiff has had an opportunity to present evidence in 
support of the allegations in the motion for judgment.  
Indeed, we have stated on several occasions that we 
disapprove the grant of motions which "short circuit" the 
legal process thereby depriving a litigant of his day in 
court and depriving this Court of an opportunity to review a 
thoroughly developed record on appeal.  See CaterCorp, Inc. 
v. Catering Concepts, Inc., 246 Va. 22, 24, 431 S.E.2d 277, 
279 (1993); Renner v. Stafford, 245 Va. 351, 353, 429 S.E.2d 
218, 220 (1993); Carson v. LeBlanc, 245 Va. 135, 139-40, 427 
S.E.2d 189, 192 (1993).  We hold that the trial court erred 
by granting the motion to strike at the conclusion of the 
litigants' opening statements.   
 
Next, the law firm argues that the trial court erred in 
ruling that the law firm was required to present expert 
testimony establishing the reasonableness of the total fees 
and expenses.  The defendants do not contest the 
reasonableness of the hourly rates specified in the retainer 
agreement; rather, the defendants contend that the law firm 
expended an unreasonable amount of time in the performance 
of legal services and, therefore, the total amount of fees 
charged was unreasonable.  The defendants assert that the 
law firm was required to present expert testimony to 
establish the reasonableness of the total fees.  We agree 
with the law firm.  
 
An attorney who seeks to recover legal fees from a 
present or former client must establish, as an element of 
the attorney's prima facie case, that the fees charged to 
the client are reasonable.  The attorney, however, is not 
required to prove the reasonableness of the fees with expert 
testimony in all instances.   
 
In Mullins v. Richlands National Bank, 241 Va. 447, 403 
S.E.2d 334 (1991), we considered whether a bank that had 
recovered attorney's fees against several defendants, as 
permitted by provisions in promissory notes, was required to 
prove that the attorney's fees that the bank incurred to 
collect the debt were reasonable.  There, we stated: 
 
"In determining a reasonable fee, the fact finder 
should consider such circumstances as the time 
consumed, the effort expended, the nature of the 
services rendered, and other attending 
circumstances. . . .  Ordinarily, expert testimony 
will be required to assist the fact finder." 
Id. at 449, 403 S.E.2d at 335.   
 
In Tazewell Oil Company v. United Virginia Bank, 243 
Va. 94, 413 S.E.2d 611 (1992), we considered whether the 
evidence was sufficient to support an award of attorney's 
fees to a plaintiff under Code § 18.2-500(a), which permits 
recovery for conspiracy of "the costs of suit, including a 
reasonable fee to plaintiff's counsel."  In Tazewell, the 
trial court awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees in the sum 
of $472,000.  The plaintiff submitted to the trial court 
about 300 pages of contemporary time records detailing the 
activities for which the fees were sought in support of the 
motions for costs and attorney's fees.  The plaintiff also 
submitted affidavits of its attorneys on the subjects of the 
accuracy of the time billed and the reasonableness of the 
hourly rates charged.  Approving the trial court's award of 
attorney's fees in Tazewell, we applied the rationale 
established in Mullins, supra: 
 
"While expert testimony ordinarily is necessary to 
assist the fact finder, such testimony is not 
required in every case. . . .  In this case, 
expert testimony was not necessary because of the 
affidavits and detailed time records." 
 
Tazewell Oil Co., 243 Va. at 112, 413 S.E.2d at 621. 
 
Here, just as in Tazewell, we are of opinion that the 
law firm was not required to present expert testimony to 
prove the reasonableness of the total fees charged to the 
defendants.  The proffer of evidence that the law firm made 
after the trial court struck its evidence reveals that the 
law firm would have produced the following evidence at a 
trial.  The law firm executed a written contract with the 
defendants, and the contract identified the firm's attorneys 
who would perform work for the defendants and the hourly 
billing rates that would be charged by each attorney.  An 
attorney from the law firm would have testified about the 
nature of the legal services provided to the defendants, the 
complexity of those services, the value of those services to 
the defendants, and that the services were necessary and 
appropriate. 
 
Moreover, the law firm was entitled to present evidence 
about the time and effort that its attorneys expended on the 
defendants' behalf, and whether the fees incurred were fees 
ordinarily charged in similar types of legal representation. 
 The finder of fact could infer from this testimony that the 
law firm's fees were reasonable.   
 
Of course, once the law firm establishes its prima 
facie case, the defendants are entitled to present expert 
evidence, if they so desire, on the issue whether the law 
firm's fees were reasonable.  The finder of fact would be 
required to consider all the relevant evidence and determine 
whether the fees charged were reasonable. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court, and we will remand this case for a trial.   
 
Reversed and remanded.