Title: Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12695
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 13, 2019

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC–12695 
 
JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD No. 23656  vs.  SEX 
OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 7, 2019. - September 13, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act.  
Evidence, Sex offender, Expert opinion.  Internet. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
October 26, 2016. 
 
 
The case was heard by Paul D. Wilson, J., on a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Eric Tennen for the plaintiff. 
 
John P. Bossé for the defendant. 
 
Elizabeth Caddick, for Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Laurie Guidry & Ryan Panaro, pro se, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The plaintiff, John Doe No. 23656 (Doe), appeals 
from his classification as a level two sex offender.  For the 
reasons that follow, we affirm the classification.1 
 
1.  Background.  In 1980, when he was thirty years old, Doe 
pleaded guilty to two counts of rape, G. L. c. 265, § 22, and 
one count of assault with intent to rape, G. L. c. 265, § 24, 
stemming from three separate incidents involving three different 
women.  Each of the women was a stranger to Doe.  He was 
sentenced to three concurrent terms of from sixteen to eighteen 
years in State prison, which he served until his release in 
1996. 
 
Shortly thereafter, when Doe was forty-seven years old, he 
was convicted of one count of indecent assault and battery on a 
person over the age of fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13H, and one 
count of open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior, G. L. 
c. 272, § 16.  He was sentenced to from two and one-half to 
three years in State prison on the second charge, and from four 
and one-half to five years from and after on the first charge.  
He completed serving this sentence in 2005. 
 
In 2007, Doe was adjudicated a sexually dangerous person 
(SDP) and civilly committed to the Massachusetts Treatment 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services and by Laurie Guidry and 
Ryan Panaro. 
3 
 
 
Center.  In 2012, he was found no longer sexually dangerous and 
was released. 
 
In July 2010, prior to his release from civil commitment, 
the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) notified Doe of its 
intent to classify him as a level three (high risk) sex 
offender.  Doe requested an evidentiary hearing.  Following that 
hearing, in March 2011, Doe was classified as a level three sex 
offender.  He sought judicial review, and prevailed in his 
appeal; the matter was remanded for a new hearing.  A second 
hearing was conducted in June 2015, with the same result.  Doe 
again sought judicial review.  While review was pending, we 
decided Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 298 (2015) (Doe No. 
380316), a case in which we heightened the relevant standard of 
proof to "clear and convincing evidence."  Accordingly, Doe was 
granted a third de novo hearing. 
 
In a written decision following the June 2016 hearing, Doe 
was classified as a level two (moderate risk) sex offender.  Doe 
sought judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, and a judge of 
the Superior Court affirmed SORB's classification.  Doe appealed 
to the Appeals Court, and we transferred the case to this court 
on our own motion. 
 
2.  Sex offender registration law.  In 1999, the 
Legislature enacted a set of statutes establishing a State-wide 
4 
 
 
sex offender registry.  See G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q, inserted 
by St. 1999, c. 74, as amended by St. 2003, c. 26, § 12.  The 
registry is "an extensive statutory registration scheme for sex 
offenders designed to protect the public from the danger of 
recidivism posed by sex offenders and to aid law enforcement 
officials in protecting their communities" (quotations and 
citation omitted).  See Noe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 5340 
v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 480 Mass. 195, 196 (2018) (Noe).  
Individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses, as defined 
by G. L. c. 6, § 178C, are required to register upon release 
from custody, where applicable, or on notification of an 
obligation to register.  See Noe, supra, citing G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178E (a), (c). 
 
Upon initial registration, individuals are classified into 
one of three "levels of notification."  Moe v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 467 Mass. 598, 601 (2014).  Classifications are 
made "on an individualized basis according to [each 
individual's] risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness."  
St. 1999, c. 74, § 1.  Under SORB's regulations, three 
determinations must be made:  "(a) the offender's risk of 
reoffense; (b) the offender's dangerousness as a function of the 
severity and extent of harm the offender would present to the 
public in the event of reoffense; and (c) in consideration of 
the foregoing, whether and to what degree public access to the 
5 
 
 
offender's personal and sex offender information . . . is in the 
interest of public safety."  Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. 
No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Board, 482 Mass. 643, 
650 (2019) (Doe No. 496501), quoting 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.20(2) (2016). 
 
Where SORB determines that the "risk of reoffense is low 
and the degree of dangerousness posed to the public is not such 
that a public safety interest is served by public availability 
[of registration information]," it assigns a sex offender a 
level one designation.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (a).  Where 
the risk of reoffense is "moderate" and the degree of 
dangerousness is "such that a public safety interest is served 
by public availability of registration information," SORB 
assigns a level two designation.  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (b).  
Where the risk of reoffense is "high" and the public safety 
interest merits "active dissemination" of registration 
information, SORB assigns an offender a level three designation.  
G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (c).  Although neither the statute nor 
SORB's regulations specify the "degree of dangerousness" 
required for each classification, we have determined that a 
"moderate" degree of dangerousness is required for a level two 
classification.  See Doe No. 496501, 482 Mass. at 651. 
 
In making a classification determination, SORB is guided by 
a nonexhaustive list of twelve statutory risk factors.  See 
6 
 
 
G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1) (a)-(l).  SORB has promulgated specific 
guidelines for the application of each statutory factor, 
consisting of thirty-eight relevant aggravating and mitigating 
considerations.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33 (2016) 
(guidelines).  SORB prepares a recommended classification for 
every sex offender.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178L (1).  Before a 
classification is made final, an individual has the opportunity 
to request an evidentiary hearing before a hearing examiner. 
G. L. c. 6, § 178L.  Thereafter, an individual is entitled seek 
judicial review in the Superior Court of a final classification.  
See G. L. c. 6, § 178M; G. L. c. 30A, § 14. 
 
A reviewing court may set aside or modify a classification 
decision if it is "in excess of SORB's statutory authority or 
jurisdiction, violates constitutional provisions, is based on an 
error of law, or is not supported by substantial evidence."  See 
Doe No. 496501, 482 Mass. at 649, citing G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).  
The individual bears the burden of proving the error in the 
board's decision.  See Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. at 300. 
 
3.  Discussion.  On appeal, Doe raises three issues with 
respect to his final classification.  Doe argues that the 
hearing examiner improperly disregarded the testimony of his 
expert witness in evaluating the evidence; that there was 
insufficient evidence to classify him as a level two sex 
offender; and that, even if he could be classified as a level 
7 
 
 
two sex offender, his registration information should not be 
made available on the Internet. 
 
a. Expert testimony.  Doe maintains that the hearing 
examiner improperly discredited the testimony of Doe's expert 
witness because the expert did not consider each of the risk 
factors relevant to SORB's determination. 
 
In 2015, Dr. Leonard Bard, a psychologist, evaluated Doe to 
assess his risk of reoffense.  Bard testified at Doe's 2015 
hearing, where he was qualified as an expert witness.  During 
the 2016 hearing, before the same hearing examiner, Doe 
submitted Bard's earlier "Forensic Psychological Evaluation" and 
the transcript of his 2015 testimony.  Bard opined that Doe 
posed a low risk of reoffending, primarily due to Doe's advanced 
age.2 
 
We have recognized that, as some of the SORB risk factors 
relate to an offender's mental or physical condition, "the 
accuracy of the classification decision may well be enhanced by 
the addition to the evidentiary record of additional expert 
evidence in the form of testimony or reports."  See Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 89230 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
                     
 
2 Doe was sixty-five years old at the time of his evaluation 
in 2015, and sixty-nine when the matter came before this court. 
 
8 
 
 
452 Mass. 764, 773 (2008).3  Where offered by the individual, a 
hearing examiner must consider testimony "from a licensed mental 
health professional that discuss psychological and psychiatric 
issues, including major mental illness, as they relate to the 
offender's risk of reoffense."  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.33(35).  See also 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.04(4). 
 
Bard's analysis deviated from a full application of all the 
risk factors delineated in SORB's guidelines.  Whereas the 
guidelines assist SORB in determining both an offender's "risk 
of reoffense" as well as his or her "degree of dangerousness 
posed to the public," 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33, Bard 
testified that his "focus tends to be more on the likelihood or 
the risk of somebody offending rather than the particular level 
of dangerousness."  Accordingly, he did not examine certain 
factors that focused solely on the degree of dangerousness.4 
                     
 
3 "[T]he evidentiary classification hearing may be conducted 
by an individual board member or hearing examiner who is not 
required to have any [medical] expertise or even training."  See 
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 89230 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 452 Mass. 764, 773-774 (2008).  "It is in 
everyone's best interests -- including the best interests of sex 
offenders themselves -- that the board work from accurate, up to 
date, and thorough information."  Id. at 774, quoting Roe v. 
Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. 418, 430 (2001).  See id. at 781 
(Spina, J., concurring) ("Agency expertise is no substitute for 
necessary evidence"). 
 
 
4 Certain SORB factors concern both risk of reoffense and 
degree of dangerousness, while others address only one or the 
other.  For example, factor 19, "Level of Physical Contact," 
states, "Sexual assault involving penetration has been shown to 
9 
 
 
 
That Bard did not focus on "degree of dangerousness" 
factors is not disqualifying.  An expert need not examine every 
factor relevant to a fact finder's determination in order to 
provide helpful testimony.  Indeed, parties regularly employ 
expert witnesses to testify about some, but not all, elements of 
a claim, charge, or defense.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Zeininger, 459 Mass. 775, 791, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 967 (2011) 
(expert testified only as to breathalyzer evidence); Renzi v. 
Paredes, 452 Mass. 38, 42-43 (2008) (experts called to testify 
variously regarding standard of care, causation, or amount of 
damages); Bernier v. Boston Edison Co., 380 Mass. 372, 384 
(1980) (expert in negligence case testified only as to speed of 
vehicle).  Cf. Commonwealth v. McHoul, 372 Mass. 11, 14 (1977) 
(in determination of sexual dangerousness, psychiatrist need not 
testify as to each element).5 
 
Moreover, Bard's assessment of the risk of reoffense, 
alone, could have been dispositive.  Where the risk of reoffense 
                     
cause increased psychological harm to the victim.  The offender 
who engages in penetration . . . poses an increased degree of 
dangerousness."  803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(19).  The factor 
makes no mention of likelihood of reoffense. 
 
 
5 That experts need not always examine every element and 
reach an opinion reflective of all considerations that would be 
relevant to the fact finder is further evinced by Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 704 (2019) ("An opinion is not objectionable just because it 
embraces an ultimate issue").  Were the expert's task otherwise, 
the rule would require, rather than permit, experts to reach the 
ultimate issue. 
10 
 
 
is determined to be low, a hearing examiner cannot determine 
that an individual is a level two sex offender, regardless of 
the degree of dangerousness.6  Accordingly, it would not have 
been appropriate to disregard Bard's testimony on the ground 
that he did not examine Doe's degree of dangerousness.  Unlike 
the fact finder at a trial, a hearing examiner is not "free to 
accept or reject all or part of the expert testimony" simply 
because it did not address all of the factors.  Contrast 
Charrier v. Charrier, 416 Mass. 105, 112 (1993) (judge or jury 
"not bound to accept the opinion of an expert witness even if it 
is uncontradicted"); Commonwealth v. Matthews, 406 Mass. 380, 
391 (1990) (jury could disregard expert testimony). 
 
Rather, an agency must "explain[] on the record its reasons 
for rejecting portions of [an expert's] testimony."  See Police 
Dep't of Boston v. Kavaleski, 463 Mass. 680, 694 (2012).  See 
Robinson v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 20 Mass. App. 
                     
 
6 A level two designation may be given only where SORB 
determines both that "the risk of reoffense is moderate and the 
degree of dangerousness [merits] public availability of 
registration information" (emphasis added).  See G. L. c. 6. 
§ 178K (2) (b).  The absence of either requirement precludes a 
level two designation.  See Central Trust Co. v. Howard, 275 
Mass. 153, 158 (1931) ("The word 'or' is not synonymous with the 
word 'and'").  See also 1A N.J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, 
Statutes & Statutory Construction § 21:14 (7th ed. 2009) ("Where 
two or more requirements are provided in a section and it is the 
legislative intent that all of the requirements must be 
fulfilled to comply with the statute, the conjunctive 'and' 
should be used"). 
11 
 
 
Ct. 634, 639 (1985) (where "there is uncontradicted testimony 
concerning a subject which is beyond the common knowledge and 
experience of the finder of fact, that testimony may not be 
rejected without a basis for such rejection in the record").  
Cf. Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 612, 625-626 (2010) (error for board to 
disregard mitigating evidence).  See also New Boston Garden 
Corp. v. Assessors of Boston, 383 Mass. 456, 470 (1981) (board 
must have "explicit and objectively adequate reason" to reject 
uncontradicted evidence [citation omitted]).  That an expert's 
testimony spoke to some, but not all, of the relevant 
considerations is not an "objectively adequate reason" to reject 
the testimony. 
 
Yet, the hearing examiner did not disregard Bard's 
testimony.  To the contrary, in her thirty-five page written 
decision, the hearing examiner did indeed consider Bard's 
analysis.7  While the examiner found the expert's testimony 
useful in some respects,8 she declined to "wholly adopt" the 
expert's conclusions. 
                     
 
7 Although the hearing examiner noted that Bard's 
methodology "does not specifically address the issue of 
dangerousness," she appropriately did not conclude that his 
testimony must therefore be disregarded. 
 
 
8 The hearing examiner relied on Bard's testimony, for 
example, to support the proposition that "sexual recidivism risk 
declines with age."  There is a "gradual decline" starting at 
12 
 
 
 
The hearing examiner found and relied upon the presence of 
"other regulatory risk factors," which the expert did not 
consider aggravating, including "adjudication as a [sexually 
dangerous person,] treatment refusal, multiple [v]ictims, high 
level of physical contact, and victim impact [statements]."  By 
assigning greater weight to these additional factors than did 
Bard, the hearing examiner reached a different conclusion.  Doe 
is not entitled to a guarantee that SORB will reach the same 
conclusion as his expert; he is entitled only to careful 
consideration of his expert's testimony.  See Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 10800, 459 Mass. 603, 637 (2011) (Doe No. 
10800) ("The opinion of a witness testifying on behalf of a sex 
offender need not be accepted by the hearing examiner even where 
the board does not present any contrary expert testimony").  See 
also Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 1211 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 750, 764 (2006).  Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 85 Mass. 
App. Ct. 1, 11 (2014) ("Doe is entitled to consideration, not 
acceptance, of the expert testimony"). 
                     
approximately age forty that becomes "substantial" after age 
sixty.  The hearing examiner concluded, "Given the testimony of 
Dr. Bard and the well-established supporting research regarding 
the incremental inverse relationship between advancing age and 
reduce recidivism, I find the [p]etitioner's current age of 66 
to offer mitigating weight within my decision." 
13 
 
 
 
Significantly, the hearing examiner also appears to have 
expressed some skepticism about Bard, wholly unrelated to his 
selection of risk factors.  She noted that Bard "had no memory" 
nor "any records" of evaluating Doe prior to 2015, but that 
record evidence demonstrated that Bard did, in fact, evaluate 
Doe in 1987.  At the time, Bard had "opined that [Doe] did not 
meet criteria as a sexually dangerous person," but Doe 
"subsequently reoffended in 1997, within one year after his 
release to the community."  The hearing examiner was entitled to 
consider this evidence in determining how much weight to assign 
the expert's ultimate conclusions.  There was no error in the 
treatment of the expert's testimony. 
 
b.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  Doe contends that the 
weight of the evidence was insufficient to support a 
classification as a level two sex offender. 
 
A level two classification requires a finding, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that "(1) the offender's risk of reoffense 
is moderate; (2) the offender's dangerousness is moderate; and 
(3) a public safety interest is served by Internet publication 
of the offender's registry information."  Doe No. 496501, 482 
Mass. at 656.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (b).  Each element 
must be established by this standard.  See Doe No. 496501, 
14 
 
 
supra.9  Establishing facts by clear and convincing evidence is 
"a greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence, 
but less than the proof beyond a reasonable doubt required in 
criminal cases."  Doe No. 380316, 473. Mass. at 309. 
 
In reviewing a SORB classification, we "give due weight to 
the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge 
of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority 
conferred upon it."  G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).  Credibility 
determinations and factual disputes are the province of the 
board or hearing examiner that heard the evidence.  Doe No. 
10800, 459 Mass. at 633.  The hearing examiner has discretion to 
determine how much weight to ascribe to each factor under 
consideration.  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 68549 v. 
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 470 Mass. 102, 109–110 (2014). 
 
Here, the hearing examiner considered a wide range of 
factors that bore on Doe's risk of reoffense and degree of 
dangerousness, as well as the utility of public availability of 
                     
 
9 In Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 482 Mass. 643, 656-657 (2019) (Doe No. 
496501), we announced the requirement that hearing examiners 
make separate and explicit findings on each of these three 
elements.  "Separate determinations supported by separate 
findings improve the rigor and accuracy of final classifications 
and provide for more effective judicial review."  Id.  Such 
findings were not made in this case.  Nonetheless, reviewing 
courts retain discretion whether to remand for explicit and 
separate findings.  For the reasons that follow, we do not 
exercise that discretion here. 
15 
 
 
Doe's information, as set forth in G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1), and 
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33.10  In weighing the balance of the 
aggravating and mitigating factors, the examiner determined that 
a level two classification was appropriate. 
 
As a preliminary matter, we note that the hearing 
examiner's analysis considered, in part, Doe's refusal to 
receive non-confidential sex offender treatment.  As discussed 
infra, such consideration was improper in light of our decision 
in Commonwealth v. Hunt, 462 Mass. 807, 820 (2012).  Having 
removed the refusal to receive nonconfidential treatment from 
consideration, we analyze the remainder of the hearing 
examiner's classification decision.  Ultimately, we determine 
that there was substantial evidence to support a level two sex 
offender classification by clear and convincing evidence.11 
 
i.  Nonconfidential sex offender treatment.  In the context 
of civil commitment proceedings to determine whether an 
individual is sexually dangerous, we have held that it is error 
to consider the refusal to obtain nonconfidential treatment as 
                     
 
10 "Factors that are not specifically referenced in a final 
classification decision are deemed inapplicable."  See 803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.33. 
 
 
11 Doe's final classification determination was issued in 
September 2016 and was premised on information current at that 
time.  Nothing in this opinion should be taken to indicate that 
Doe would be unsuccessful in seeking reclassification at a later 
date. 
16 
 
 
an aggravating factor, where that treatment involved admitting 
to unlawful behavior.  See Hunt, 462 Mass. at 820. 
"Where, as here, a sex offender is required to waive the 
confidentiality of statements made in treatment to a sex 
offender therapist in order to obtain treatment, the sex 
offender is faced with a problematic choice.  If he [or 
she] agrees to waive confidentiality and seek treatment, 
all that he [or she] admits during treatment, including 
past sexual offenses, may be used against him [or 
her] . . . [including] to prosecute him [or her] for 
offenses that have yet to be adjudicated. . . .  If he [or 
she] avoids incriminating himself [or herself] by refusing 
to waive confidentiality, he [or she] is denied any sex 
offender treatment, and his [or her] refusal to enter 
treatment may be admitted in evidence and used by the 
qualified examiners and the Commonwealth's expert 
witnesses . . . to support their opinion that he [or she] 
is [a sexually dangerous person]." 
 
Id. at 811. 
 
In Hunt, supra at 810, the individual was required to sign 
an agreement that "nothing he said or disclosed in treatment or 
in discussions with his therapist would be confidential."  See 
Ainsworth v. Risley, 244 F.3d 209, 215 (1st Cir. 2001), vacated 
sub nom. Ainsworth v. Stanley, 536 U.S. 953, aff'd on reh'g, 317 
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 999 (2003) ("The 
program's requirement that participants admit to their crimes is 
widely believed to be a necessary prerequisite to successful 
treatment").  Here, too, Doe's treatment options required a 
waiver of confidentiality.  As a consequence, admissions Doe 
made during treatment later might have been used as evidence 
against him.  Not only is "sex offender treatment without 
17 
 
 
confidentiality . . . laden with risk for the sex offender," but 
also "the relationship of trust between therapist and sex 
offender [is] compromised" where the individual seeking 
treatment cannot speak honestly to his or her therapist.  See 
Hunt, 462 Mass. at 818.  Under these conditions, Doe declined to 
participate in the treatment. 
 
Pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1), factors "relevant to 
the risk of reoffense" include: 
"(h) the sex offender's participation in sex offender 
treatment and counseling while incarcerated or while on 
probation or parole and his response to such treatment or 
counseling." 
 
Expanding upon this provision, SORB guidelines state that 
offenders who "refuse to participate in" treatment present an 
"increased risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness."  See 
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(24). 
 
SORB maintains that the refusal of treatment is indicative 
of an increased risk of reoffense.12  We have determined, 
                     
 
12 Doe's expert witness, Dr. Leonard Bard, disagreed with 
this premise.  He testified that, in his view, while completion 
of treatment mitigates risk, "[t]he research has shown 
that . . . lack of participation neither increases nor decreases 
risk [of reoffense]."  "Ideally, the [SORB guideline] factors 
would always reflect current research."  Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 
297, 313 (2015) (Doe No. 380316).  As we have noted, "guidelines 
that fail to heed growing scientific consensus in an area may 
undercut the individualized nature of the hearing to which a sex 
offender is entitled, an important due process right."  See Doe, 
Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 205614 v. Sex Offender Registry 
Bd., 466 Mass. 594, 608 (2013).  Where "there is reason for some 
18 
 
 
however, that where, as here, "sex offender treatment is 
conditioned on a waiver of confidentiality, refusal of treatment 
alone is insufficient to support an inference that the 
[individual] does not want to be treated."  See Hunt, 462 Mass. 
at 819.13  "If the Commonwealth were to provide sex offender 
therapy without requiring a waiver of confidentiality, then this 
inference arising from refusal would be fair and reasonable."  
Id.  An inference that does not fairly and logically follow at 
an SDP hearing fares no better at a SORB hearing.  We therefore 
extend the determination we made in Hunt to SORB classification 
proceedings, deciding that the refusal of nonconfidential 
treatment cannot be used to infer an unwillingness to be 
treated. 
 
It is no answer, as SORB suggested at argument before us, 
that no "liberty interests" are at stake in a SORB hearing.  A 
sex offender's risk classification level "has dramatic 
consequences for his liberty and privacy interests," including, 
                     
concern as to whether [SORB's] guidelines continue to reflect 
accurately the current state of scientific knowledge," we 
continue to encourage the agency to update the guidelines in 
accordance with the latest scientific developments (citation 
omitted).  Doe No. 380316, supra at 308. 
 
 
13 SORB decisions must be supported by "substantial 
evidence," G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (e), defined as "such evidence 
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion" (citation omitted).  Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. 
No. 68549 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 470 Mass. 102, 109 
(2014). 
19 
 
 
but not limited to, "affirmative reporting requirements, as well 
as the possibility of extended incarceration for failing to meet 
those requirements."  Doe No. 380316, 473 Mass. at 311.  "We 
recognize that the potential consequences arising from a 
[criminal] conviction" -- or, in the civil context, an SDP 
proceeding -- "are greater than those arising from 
classification as a sex offender . . . but a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest is at issue in both proceedings."  
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 914 v. Sex Offender Registry 
Bd., 460 Mass. 336, 340 (2011).  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry 
Bd. No. 205614 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 593, 596 
(2013) ("sex offender registration law implicates 
constitutionally protected liberty and privacy interests").  See 
also Doe No. 10800, 456 Mass. at 624 n.8. 
 
Because the treatment offered to Doe was not confidential, 
his refusal to participate does not support an inference that he 
did not want to be treated.  On the contrary, Doe "explained 
that he is not against treatment," but "stated the reasons for 
his refusal were related to the legal appeal of his case"; "[he] 
testified that treatment at [the treatment center] is not 
confidential and information regarding treatment participating 
could be used against individuals during Section 9 hearings."  
Insomuch as the hearing examiner relied upon Doe's refusal to 
engage in nonconfidential treatment to infer his unwillingness 
20 
 
 
to engage in treatment, such an inference was improper.  We 
therefore excise from the hearing examiner's determination any 
reliance on 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(24),14 and we review what 
remains to determine whether substantial evidence existed to 
classify Doe as a level two sex offender. 
 
ii.  Risk of reoffense.  The hearing examiner found several 
factors present that indicate a "high risk of reoffense," 
including Doe's several medical diagnoses for paraphilia,15 803 
Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(1); his commission of an additional 
offense after an extensive period of incarceration and civil 
commitment, 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(2); and his prior 
adjudication as a sexually dangerous person, 803 Code Mass. 
                     
 
14 The absence of this factor does not sufficiently upset 
the balance of factors to modify the ultimate sex offender 
classification determination.  Indeed, the hearing examiner did 
not significantly rely on this factor.  Refusal of treatment 
constituted only four sentences of the hearing examiner's 
thirty-five page decision.  Unlike certain other factors, this 
factor was not assigned "considerable weight." 
 
 
15 "The essential features of a Paraphilia are recurrent, 
intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors 
generally involving . . . nonconsenting persons that occur over 
a period of at least [six] months."  Doe, Sex Offender Registry 
Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 633 
n.29 (2011), quoting American Psychiatric Association, 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 566 (4th 
ed. 2000).  See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 685 (5th ed. 2013) 
("paraphilia denotes any intense and persistent sexual interest 
other than sexual interest in genital stimulation or preparatory 
fondling with phenotypically normal, physically mature, 
consenting human partners"). 
21 
 
 
Regs. § 1.33(5).  She also found the presence of numerous "risk-
elevating" factors related to Doe's governing offenses, 
including that his offenses were committed against victims who 
were strangers to him, 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(7); his use 
of violence in committing those offenses, 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.33(8); his commission of the offenses in public locations, 
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(16); and that his offenses were 
committed against multiple separate victims, 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.33(22).  She also identified several "risk-elevating" 
factors unrelated to Doe's governing offenses, including his 
prior probation and parole violations, 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.33(10), (13), and violence unrelated to sexual assaults, 803 
Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(11).  The hearing examiner did not 
merely list these factors; she provided a detailed account of 
the evidence she considered and an explanation of the relative 
weight that she assigned each factor.16 
 
The hearing examiner also gave due consideration to the 
mitigating factors put forth by Doe, including his advanced age, 
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(30); strong social support systems, 
                     
 
16 The hearing examiner also considered Doe's prior 
substance abuse with respect to alcohol and marijuana, 803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.33(9), but assigned it "minimal aggravating 
weight" due to the passage of time.  She similarly examined 
Doe's behavior while incarcerated, 803 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 1.33(12), assigning it little aggravating weight due to Doe's 
subsequent successful completion of twelve years in custody 
"without any noted behavioral incidents." 
22 
 
 
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(33); and stability in the community, 
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(34); as well as the psychological 
evaluations he submitted, 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(35).17  In 
weighing the balance of the aggravating and mitigating factors, 
the examiner determined that Doe's risk of reoffense was 
"moderate." 
 
Doe does not dispute the facts underlying these 
considerations.  Rather, he contends that the hearing examiner 
did not properly balance the aggravating factors against the 
mitigating factors.  He argues that the aggravating factors 
largely were present "decades ago," and merited little weight, 
whereas the mitigating factors played a greater role in his life 
at the time of classification. 
 
Doe's progress toward a stable and productive life since 
his discharge from civil commitment is commendable.18  Yet "[o]ur 
                     
 
17 The hearing examiner also noted that Doe participated in 
several short-term forms of sex offender treatment prior to 
reoffending in 1997, 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(32).  After his 
incarceration in 1997, Doe declined to participate in 
nonconfidential treatment programs. 
 
 
18 As the hearing examiner noted, since being discharged 
from civil commitment, Doe has worked to help other former 
inmates transition back into society.  "Amongst various 
endeavors, [Doe] picks these men up from [the treatment center,] 
helps them find shelters and soup kitchens, guides them in 
obtaining income, health care and employment options, educates 
them about the sex offender registration process, and assists 
them in finding treatment programs and [Alcoholics Anonymous and 
Narcotics Anonymous] groups." 
 
23 
 
 
review of a hearing examiner's decision does not turn on 
whether, faced with the same set of facts, we would have drawn 
the same conclusion, but only whether a contrary conclusion is 
not merely a possible but a necessary inference" (citation 
omitted).  Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 3839 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 472 Mass. 492, 500–501 (2015) (Doe No. 
3839).  See Ten Local Citizen Group v. New England Wind, LLC, 
457 Mass. 222, 231 (2010) ("A court may not displace an 
[agency's] choice between two fairly conflicting views, even 
though the court would justifiably have made a different choice 
had the matter been before it de novo" [citation omitted]).  
Regardless of whether we would have reached the same conclusion, 
there was substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's 
determination that Doe posed a "moderate" risk of reoffense. 
 
iii.  Degree of dangerousness.  The hearing examiner did 
not make an explicit determination, supported by separate 
findings, that Doe posed a moderate degree of dangerousness.  
See Doe No. 496501, 482 Mass. at 656-657 (explicit and separate 
findings required).19   Nonetheless, we determine that, in this 
                     
 
19 In classifying Doe as a level two sex offender, the 
hearing examiner made the implicit finding that he posed a 
"moderate" degree of danger.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. 1.20(2) 
(2016) (public availability of individual's information was 
determined in part by consideration of both risk of reoffense 
and dangerousness); G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (b) (level two 
designation requires degree of dangerousness sufficient to merit 
public availability of registration information).  Cf. Doe No. 
24 
 
 
case, more detailed findings are not necessary to our review.  
See id. at 657 n.4 ("whether SORB's existing findings are 
sufficiently explicit to enable proper review is a question best 
left to the reviewing court").  Although the findings regarding 
risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness are intermingled 
in the hearing examiner's decision, we have little difficulty 
parsing them.  The hearing examiner's analysis of each factor 
was meticulous, and indicates the presence of sufficient factors 
to merit a determination that Doe posed a "moderate" degree of 
dangerousness.20 
 
"In determining whether an individual poses a moderate 
degree of dangerousness at the time of evaluation, a hearing 
examiner must consider 'the severity and extent of the harm the 
offender would present to the public in the event of 
reoffense.'"  Doe No. 496501, 482 Mass. at 659, quoting 803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.20(2)(b) (2016).  Doe's governing offenses 
included several instances of using physical violence to force 
victims to perform sexual acts. 
                     
496501, 482 Mass. at 655 (level two classification implies 
finding of third element:  that public safety interest is served 
by Internet publication). 
 
 
20 Given his "moderate" risk of reoffense, so long as Doe 
posed at least a "moderate" degree of dangerousness, he properly 
would be classified as a level two sex offender.  See G. L. 
c. 6, § 178K (2) (c) (level three classification requires "high" 
risk of reoffense). 
25 
 
 
 
The hearing examiner accounted for Doe's high level of 
physical contact during the commission of his offenses, 803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.33(19).  See Doe No. 496501, 482 Mass. at 659 
("contact offenders" more dangerous than "noncontact 
offenders").  She also considered Doe's commission of offenses 
against four different victims, 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(22); 
the fact that the victims were strangers to Doe, 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 1.33(7); and Doe's use of violence both related and 
unrelated to sexual assaults, 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(8), 
(11).  The hearing examiner also considered Doe's probation and 
parole violations, 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(10), (13), as 
well as several victim impact statements submitted by one of 
Doe's victims, see 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(38).  Finally, 
the hearing examiner weighed Doe's prior adjudication as a 
sexually dangerous person, 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(5), which 
is considered a "high risk" factor under the guidelines. 
 
In their totality, the factors present were sufficient to 
support a determination that Doe's degree of dangerousness was 
"moderate."  Contrast Doe No. 496501, 482 Mass. at 659-660 ("an 
individual is generally unlikely to pose a moderate degree of 
dangerousness . . . where his or her risk of reoffense relates 
only to noncontact offenses that do not put a victim in fear of 
bodily harm by reason of a contact sex offense"). 
26 
 
 
 
iv.  Internet publication.  The hearing examiner explicitly 
determined that the public availability of Doe's personal 
information would serve the interest of public safety.  She did 
not, however, make separate and explicit findings in support of 
this element.  Nonetheless, because "the underlying facts of the 
case . . . so clearly dictate the appropriate classification 
level," we do not exercise our discretion to remand for further 
findings on this element.  See Doe No. 496501, 482 Mass. at 657 
n.4. 
 
As discussed, the hearing examiner found that Doe posed a 
moderate risk of committing new offenses.  Doe's prior offenses 
were committed against strangers in public locations.  In one 
instance, Doe's victim was a minor.  Accordingly, public 
availability of Doe's name, photograph, address, and offenses 
would enable members of the public to take precautions to avoid 
encountering Doe in situations in which the members of the 
public are vulnerable.  It would also enable residents, 
including those with minor children, to determine whether Doe 
lives in their neighborhood, which might have an impact on their 
decisions regarding the supervision of their children. 
 
Of course, once Doe's information is published on the 
Internet, it will become nearly impossible later to remove.  See 
Moe, 467 Mass. at 605 ("once a sex offender's registry 
information is published on SORB's Web site, it is likely to be 
27 
 
 
republished on other Web sites that are not controlled by SORB 
that publicly identify sex offenders").  Yet, aware of the 
consequences of Internet publication, the hearing examiner 
determined that, on balance, such a measure was necessary for 
the protection of the public.  We cannot say that a contrary 
conclusion was required by the evidence.  See Doe No. 3839, 472 
Mass. at 501. 
 
Because we determine that there was substantial evidence to 
support each element by clear and convincing evidence, we 
conclude that there was no error in the hearing examiner's 
classification of Doe as a level two sex offender. 
 
c.  Exemption from Internet publication requirement.  Doe 
maintains that, even if he is classified as a level two sex 
offender, his registration information should not be subject to 
Internet publication. 
 
Prior to 2013, the sex offender registration law required 
publication on the Internet of registry information for level 
three sex offenders.  In 2013, the Legislature amended the law 
to require publication also for level two sex offenders.  See 
St. 2013, c. 38, §§ 7, 9.21  We determined in Moe, 467 Mass. 
                     
 
21 The purpose of requiring Internet publication was not to 
punish the individual sex offender.  Rather, the change in the 
law was intended "to make it easier for members of the public to 
access registry information related to level two sex offenders, 
and presumably thereby to permit the public better to defend 
themselves and those in their care from the risk of sexual 
28 
 
 
at 616, that the requirement did not apply retroactively to 
level two sex offenders classified on or before July 12, 2013, 
the effective date of the amendment.  In so deciding, we stated: 
"What shifts the balance in favor of the plaintiff class is 
that retroactive application would require Internet 
publication of the registry information of persons who SORB 
implicitly concluded were not so dangerous that their 
information needed to be published on the Internet to 
protect the public safety, and who SORB may have classified 
as level one offenders if SORB had known that Internet 
publication would be a consequence of a level two 
classification." 
 
Moe, supra at 615-616.  Considering also the rights of those 
individuals classified as sex offenders, we observed that "at 
least some of these offenders 'acted in reasonable reliance upon 
the previous state of the law' in choosing not to challenge 
their level two classifications specifically because such 
classifications did not subject them to Internet publication of 
their registry information."  Id. at 616, quoting Leibovich v. 
Antonellis, 410 Mass. 568, 578 (1991). 
 
Accordingly, we determined that application of the 
amendments to individuals classified prior to July 12, 2013, was 
an unconstitutional violation of due process.  Moe, 467 Mass. at 
615.  We stated explicitly, however, that "[n]othing in this 
order affects the ability of SORB to publish on the Internet the 
registry information of any individual who was given a final 
                     
assault by these offenders."  See Moe v. Sex Offender Registry 
Bd., 467 Mass. 598, 612 (2014). 
29 
 
 
classification as a level two sex offender after July 12, 2013."  
Id. at 616.22  After that date, hearing examiners and classified 
individuals alike were aware that a level two classification 
would come with the consequence of Internet publication. 
 
Doe received his final classification as a level two sex 
offender in September 2016.  At the time of that classification, 
SORB relied upon the belief that so classifying him would expose 
Doe's registration information on the Internet.  Doe, in turn, 
did not fail to challenge his classification in reliance on an 
understanding that Internet publication would not apply to him.  
See Moe, supra at 614-615.  Because the date of his final 
classification falls after July 12, 2013, the requirement of 
Internet publication applies to Doe.23  See Doe No. 380316, 473 
                     
 
22 Amendments are retroactive in their operation, and 
thereby may implicate due process rights, where they mandate "a 
substantial new legal consequence (Internet publication of 
offender's registry information) to events completed on or 
before the date of their enactment (SORB's final determination 
that offender should be given level two classification) that 
previously had been expressly prohibited."  See Moe, 467 Mass. 
at 609.  Here, the new legal consequence applied after, not 
before, SORB's final determination. 
 
 
23 Doe contends that, if not for the errors in his original 
hearing in February 2011, he would have received a level two 
final classification prior to the change in the statute 
requiring Internet publication.  In essence, Doe argues that he 
is being punished for invoking his right to judicial review.  
However, Doe was classified as a level three sex offender in 
2011, and so he would have been subject to Internet publication 
in any event.  His eventual level two classification came only 
in 2016, when he was an older man, when the burden of proof had 
been raised to clear and convincing evidence, and when SORB was 
30 
 
 
Mass. at 315 (upholding Internet publication of level two sex 
offender classified after effective date). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
                     
aware that a level two classification carried with it the 
consequence of Internet publication.