Title: Charles Cedeno v. Montclair State University, et als.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-110-98
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: April 13, 2000

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). PER CURIAM The issue in this appeal is whether a person who is statutorily disqualified from obtaining public employment as a result of a criminal conviction may maintain an action for an alleged wrongful discharge, in violation of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA) and the Law Against Discrimination (LAD). Although the Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Skilllman's opinion below, its opinion further addresses the interplay among the Forfeiture Statute, the LAD and CEPA. In 1986, Charles Cedeno applied for the position of Director of Purchasing at Montclair State University (Montclair). The job application form plaintiff completed asked whether he had any criminal convictions, which Cedeno falsely answered in the negative. In fact, Cedeno had been convicted of bribery in the State of Pennsylvania in 1982, when he was employed by the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA). Cedeno was hired by Montclair to fill the position. Cedeno was subsequently discharged from that position in June 1996. Prior to his discharge, Cedeno filed an internal complaint with Montclair's Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action Office alleging that his supervisor had harassed him and discriminated against him on the basis of his national origin and ancestry. That complaint was determined to be unfounded. Cedeno did not appeal that decision to the Montclair Board of Trustees or pursue any other avenue of administrative review. While his internal complaint was still under consideration, Cedeno filed an action against his supervisor and against Montclair, alleging that Montclair had begun to take steps to terminate him and characterizing that process as a retaliatory discharge, in violation of CEPA. He further alleged discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and age, in violation of the LAD. Cedeno also asserted claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, invasion of privacy, and denial of his right to free speech. During discovery, Montclair became aware of Cedeno's bribery conviction. Consequently, Montclair filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Cedeno's wrongful discharge claims were barred because he was disqualified from public employment pursuant to the Forfeiture Statute. The trial court issued a written decision denying the motion, finding that Cedeno's criminal conviction in Pennsylvania did not bar him from maintaining a wrongful discharge claim because it constituted after-acquired evidence, which is irrelevant during the liability stage of a discrimination case. In a published opinion, a majority of the Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the strong public policy underlying the Forfeiture Statute would be seriously undermined if Cedeno were allowed to pursue any form of monetary claim against the State. In reaching its decision, the majority specifically noted that other circumstances, such as aggravated sexual harassment, where there was a need to vindicate the policies of the LAD or CEPA and to compensate an aggrieved party for tangible physical or emotional harm, could lead to the conclusion that even a person who was absolutely disqualified from holding public employment should be allowed to seek compensation for harm suffered during that employment. It concluded however that even if Cedeno's allegations could be substantiated, there would be no basis for finding the kind of severe physical or emotional harm to him or aggravated wrongdoing that might warrant an award of monetary relief other than back pay. Judge Lesemann dissented, finding that the majority unduly subordinated the LAD and CEPA to the Forfeiture Statute. He would have affirmed the decision of the trial court. The matter is before the Supreme Court as of right, based on the dissent below. 1. The legislative intent of the Forfeiture Statute is to protect the public by precluding those who have once violated the public trust from having a second opportunity. (pp. 3-4) 2. Although both the LAD and CEPA also serve important public policies and should be construed liberally to effectuate those policies, given the quality of the proofs in this action, whatever value may be achieved by permitting Cedeno's case to proceed to trial is outweighed by the policy against allowing that same person to obtain public employment after having been convicted of bribery. (pp. 4-5) 3. Although a person absolutely disqualified from public employment may be able to allege facts that would constitute aggravated harm or egregious discriminatory conduct sufficient to survive motion for summary judgment, Cedeno has failed to allege such conduct or harm to overcome the high hurdle of the Forfeiture Statute. (pp. 5-6) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE O'HERN filed a separate dissenting opinion. Although Justice O'Hern agreed with the Court that the grant of back pay to Cedeno even from the date of discharge would conflict with the paramount public policy expressed in the Forfeiture Statute, he believed that the Court set the bar too high in requiring aggravated physical or emotional harm or egregious discriminatory conduct to sustain an award of monetary damages for employment discrimination. Instead, Justice O'Hern believed that it was not sound public policy to bar recovery for any injury suffered while employed when discriminatory conduct is pervasive during the term of employment. Thus, he would have allowed Cedeno's claims to go to trial and ultimately would have limited damages to compensation for emotional distress and/or physical harm or injury. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES GARIBALDI, STEIN, COLEMAN, and VERNIERO join in the Court's PER CURIAM opinion. JUSTICE O'HERN has filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE LONG joins. CHARLES CEDENO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MONTCLAIR STATE UNIVERSITY, a corporation of the State of New Jersey, and RAYE JEAN MASTRANGELO, Defendants-Respondents. Argued January 3, 2000-- Decided April 13, 2000 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 319 N.J. Super. 148 (1999). John G. Geppert, Jr., argued the cause for appellant (Wiley, Malehorn and Sirota, attorneys; Mr. Geppert, Eugene Huang and Arla D. Cahill, on the briefs). Steven J. Zweig, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent Montclair State University (John J. Farmer , Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Mary C. Jacobson and Jerry Fischer, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel). Howard M. Nirenberg argued the cause for respondent Raye Jean Mastrangelo (Nirenberg &amp; Varano, attorneys; Sandra N. Varano, on the brief). PER CURIAM. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES GARIBALDI, STEIN, COLEMAN, and VERNIERO join in this opinion. JUSTICE O'HERN filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE LONG joins. CHARLES CEDENO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MONTCLAIR STATE UNIVERSITY, A CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND RAYE JEAN MASTRANGELO, Defendants-Respondents. O'HERN, J. dissenting, I would reverse on the basis of the dissenting opinion in the Appellate Division. 319 N.J. Super. 148, 163-173 (1999). I appreciate that the Court has circumscribed its ruling to this limited context of a previously convicted person's statutory disqualification from office under N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2, but I believe that the Court has set the bar too high in requiring aggravated [physical or emotional] harm [to plaintiff] or egregious discriminatory conduct to sustain an award of monetary damages for employment discrimination. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 6). In Nicosia v. Wakefern Food Corp., 136 N.J. 401, 418-19 (1994), the Court expressed its concerns about the application of the after-acquired evidence doctrine in the context of an unlawful discharge based on invidious discrimination or retaliation. The Court observed that the policy concerns that are at stake in applying the after-acquired evidence defense to an unlawful discharge based on invidious discrimination differ from those that are implicated in private employment contract actions based on breach of an implied contract of employment that derives from a personnel manual. We observed that there may be an important distinction between the duties [of an employer] arising from the contract and the duties imposed by remedial legislation. Id. at 419-420 (citing Bazzi v. Western &amp; S. Life Ins. Co., 808 F. Supp. 1306, 1310 (E.D. Mich. 1992)). Subsequently, in a case brought under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA), the Supreme Court held that evidence of an employer's misconduct discovered after the employee's discharge in violation of ADEA, could not operate as a complete bar to relief but could limit an award of damages. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 115 S. Ct. 879, 130 L. Ed. 2d 852 (1995). The Practising Law Institute has noted: The gist of McKennon is that employers cannot escape liability for employment discrimination if, at the time of the adverse action, non-discriminatory reasons existed but could not have motivated the employer because they were then unknown. First, the Court emphasized the common purposes of all federal anti-discrimination statutes: to deter unlawful employment practices and to compensate victims for resultant injuries. The deterrent purpose would be undermined if employers knew they could escape liability for admitted discrimination merely by digging into work histories for windfall evidence of misconduct or dishonesty. Second, the Court identified the private, non-government litigant as a vital element in all these statutes. The potential litigant would be unduly discouraged if every discrimination claim carried the risk of total defeat based on subsequent disclosure and discovery of embarrassing evidence about the plaintiff unrelated to what motivated the employer. [William L. Kandel, Age Discrimination: Recent Decisions by Appellate Courts under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act Through Mid-1999, 616 PLI\Lit 7, 70 (1999).] Ordinarily, application of the McKennon balancing test serves to limit a plaintiff's recovery from the date of the unlawful discharge to the date that the information is uncovered. It is insufficient to show that the misconduct committed by the plaintiff was a terminable offense. The defendant must affirmatively show that plaintiff would have been terminated. Grady B. Murdock, et. al., Developments in Title VII and Section 1981, 614 PLI/Lit 419, 449 (1999). Thus, a claimant in after acquired evidence cases will ordinarily be entitled to compensation for back pay and emotional distress, but not to front pay and reinstatement (future lost wages). This result was foreshadowed in Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel and Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314 (D.N.J. 1993). A 1990 amendment to the LAD, L. 1990, c. 12, 1, specifically authorized recovery of emotional distress damages for discrimination claims and the statement accompanying the amendment emphasized that the LAD is to be liberally construed so that all common law remedies are available to persons protected by the LAD.See footnote 11 Assembly Judiciary Law and Public Safety Committee Statement to Bills No. 2872, 2118, and 2228 (1990) (reprinted at N.J.S.A. 10:5-3). Our cases have disapproved any requirement of expert testimony or independent corroboration as a prerequisite to an emotional distress award in a discrimination case. Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995); see also Bolden v. SEPTA, 21 F.3d 29, 34 (3d Cir. 1994) (expert medical testimony is not required to prove damages for emotional distress in a case brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983). Emotional distress is a probable consequence of discrimination and one of the personal hardships envisioned by the Legislature as justifying relief. N.J.S.A. 10:5-3. It would frustrate the purposes of the LAD if employers were permitted to discriminate against employees. Regardless of the details of an employee's pre- and post-hiring conduct, when the discriminatory conduct was pervasive during the term of employment . . . it would not be sound public policy to bar recovery for injury suffered while employed. Murillo v. Rite Stuff Foods, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 4th 833, 850, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 23 (1998). All that is required in a tangible employment actionSee footnote 22 is that the record demonstrate a substantial basis for an award of damages for emotional distress. Spragg v. Shore Care, 293 N.J. Super. 33, 62 (App. Div. 1996). In Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 153 N.J. 163, 178 (1998), the Court sustained an award of $875,000 in emotional distress damages for a whistle-blower. The Court did not require that he have established aggravated harm. When an award for emotional distress is based on personal humiliation or indignity suffered by the claimant, such an indignity must be the natural, proximate, reasonable and foreseeable result of the discrimination. Spragg, supra, 293 N.J. at 62 (citing Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 297, 315 (Ch. Div. 1970)). In this case, plaintiff has alleged that his contract was not renewed as a result of his employer's intentional discrimination and retaliation. The harassment that he experienced caused him to collapse at work and suffer a near heart attack. Plaintiff contends that his supervisor was aware of his anxiety attack and attempted to reprimand him both during and after the event. Even under the Court's standard, I believe that plaintiff should have his day in court to prove his emotional distress claim. Whatever his failings, Charles Cedeno did not cease to be a person, a human being who seeks redress for the humiliation that flows from a discriminatory act. I do agree with the Court that this is the exceedingly rare case in which a claimant may be denied back pay from date of discharge rather than the date of discovery of the wrongful conduct. Because the grant of back pay from the date of discharge would conflict with the paramount public policy expressed in N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2, the worker was not eligible for the pay and did not work for it. To sum up, [c]ourts must tread carefully in applying the after-acquired-evidence doctrine to discrimination claims. As noted in Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., supra, 31 F.3d at pages 1236-1237, The prospect of a defendant's thorough inquiry into the details of a plaintiff's pre and post-hiring conduct ... may chill the enthusiasm and frequency with which employment discrimination claims are pursued, even in cases where the victim of discrimination has nothing to hide, let alone cases where the potential plaintiff is not entirely blameless. Placed in context of the general pervasiveness of resume fraud and employee misconduct, the likely consequence of the widespread exploitation of after-acquired evidence will be underenforcement of [antidiscrimination statutes], and consequently underdeterrence of discriminatory employment practices. [65 Cal. App. 4th 844, 849, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 21 (footnotes omitted).] That result would be strongly inconsistent with public policy of New Jersey. Like LAD, CEPA promotes a strong public policy of the State. We view this legislation as a reaffirmation of this State's repugnance to an employer's retaliation against an employee who has done nothing more than assert statutory rights and protections and a recognition by the Legislature of a preexisting common-law tort cause of action for such retaliatory discharge. In New Jersey we are deeply committed to the principle that an employer's right to discharge an employee carries a correlative duty to protect his freedom to decline to perform an act that would constitute a violation of a clear mandate of public policy. [Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ., 138 N.J. 405, 431-32 (1994) (internal citations omitted).] NO. A-110 CHARLES CEDENO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MONTCLAIR STATE UNIVERSITY, a corporation of the State of New Jersey, and RAYE JEAN MASTRANGELO, Defendants-Respondents. DECIDED April 13, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz