Title: Dome Laboratories v. Farrell
Citation: 599 P.2d 152
Docket Number: 
State: Alaska
Issuer: Alaska Supreme Court
Date: September 7, 1979

Dome Laboratories v. Farrell Annotate this Case 599 P.2d 152 (1979) DOME LABORATORIES, a division of Miles Laboratories, Inc., Massengill Company, Schering Corporation, G.D. Searle & Company, SmithKline and French Laboratories, a division of Smithkline Corporation, and Gilbert P. Blankinship, M.D., Appellants, v. Barbara Anne FARRELL, by and through her natural mother and parent, Janice F. Farrell, Janice F. Farrell and Thomas A. Farrell, Jr., Appellees. No. 3725. Supreme Court of Alaska. September 7, 1979. *153 Robert L. Eastaugh and George N. Hayes, Delaney, Wiles, Moore, Hayes & Reitman, Inc., Anchorage, for Dome Laboratories, appellant. Donna C. Willard and Robert L. Richmond, Richmond, Willoughby & Willard, Anchorage, for Massengill Co., appellant. Charles W. Hagans and Sanford M. Gibbs, Hagans, Smith, Brown, Erwin & Gibbs, Anchorage, for Schering Corp., appellant. Russellyn S. Carruth, Burr, Pease & Kurtz, Inc., Anchorage, for G.D. Searle & Co., appellant. *154 Henry J. Camarot and Judith J. Bazeley, Merdes, Schaible, Staley & DeLisio, Inc., Anchorage, for SmithKline and French Laboratories, appellant. Kenneth P. Jacobus, Hughes, Thorsness, Gantz, Powell & Brundin, Anchorage, for Gilbert P. Blankinship, M.D., appellant. Michelle V. Minor, Anchorage, for appellees. Before RABINOWITZ, C.J., and CONNOR, BOOCHEVER, BURKE and MATTHEWS, JJ. OPINION RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice. This appeal arises out of the voluntary dismissal of a medical malpractice and products liability case which was filed in superior court on February 9, 1977, by Barbara Anne Farrell, a minor, by and through her natural mother, Janice F. Farrell, and also by her parents, Janice F. and Thomas A. Farrell, Jr. The suit named as defendants three physicians and eleven corporations which manufacture and disseminate drugs in Alaska. The complaint essentially alleged that one or more of the defendants negligently ordered x-rays made of Janice Farrell's entire pelvic region during her pregnancy, or negligently prescribed or manufactured certain drugs taken by Janice while she was pregnant, which caused chromosome breakage in the unborn fetus and resulted in Barbara Farrell being born with certain serious physical and mental defects. Approximately one and one-half months after the suit was initiated, and after extensive interrogatories and requests for production had been filed by the plaintiffs upon most of the defendants, but before any of the defendants' interrogatories to the plaintiffs had been answered, the plaintiffs' attorney asked for the Farrells' consent to his withdrawal from the case. The superior court entered two orders on April 22, 1977; the first order permitted the attorney to withdraw from his representation of the Farrells and the second order stayed all proceedings for a period of sixty days to enable the Farrells to decide on new counsel. The Farrells were unable to secure new counsel in the period allowed and were still without counsel when motions for summary judgment were filed by various defendants, including Dr. Blankinship, Dome Laboratories, The Schering Corporation, SmithKline and French Laboratories, and G.D. Searle & Co., appellants herein. Based upon suggestions made by Ms. Michelle Minor, an attorney who appeared as a friend of the court solely for the purpose of representing the Farrells at the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, the Farrells prepared their own motion for dismissal without prejudice or, alternatively, for a stay of all further action in the case for a period of eight months. After a hearing in which the superior court considered both the numerous defendants' motions for summary judgment and the plaintiffs' motion for dismissal without prejudice, the superior court entered a judgment in which it dismissed with prejudice the claims of the parents, Janice and Thomas Farrell, upon their consent to the dismissal. The claims of Barbara Ann Farrell were dismissed without prejudice, and each party was required to bear its own costs and attorney's fees. The superior court further ruled that "[t]his judgment having disposed of all issues before the court, the court does not consider the motions of the various defendants for summary judgment on the merits." Appeal was taken from this judgment by the defendants in the case below. Under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a),[1] there are three ways in which a *155 plaintiff may obtain a voluntary dismissal of an action. Civil Rule 41(a)(1)[a] allows the plaintiff to file a notice of dismissal "at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs..."[2] This method of dismissal is a "`matter of right running to the plaintiff and may not be extinguished or circumscribed by adversary or court.'"[3] The plaintiff may also obtain a dismissal by filing a stipulation to that effect signed by all parties who have appeared in the action.[4] If the plaintiff is unable to meet the criteria for either of these methods of dismissal, the action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance only upon order of the court.[5] The issue in the present case revolves around this third type of voluntary dismissal. The parties have argued the factual issue of whether or not the motions for summary judgment were filed prior to the Farrells' motion to dismiss without prejudice. However, in the context in which this case is to be decided, the order in which the motions were filed is not critical. It is only where the plaintiff is asserting, as a matter of law, an absolute right to a dismissal that the order in which the motions were filed is determinative.[6] The grant of a motion for voluntary dismissal by order of the court pursuant to Civil Rule 41(a)(2) is, in the first instance, a matter of the exercise of sound discretion by the trial court.[7] In deciding such a motion, federal courts have generally taken one of two approaches.[8] Under the first approach the courts traditionally ask whether the defendant has suffered some "plain legal prejudice" other than the continuing prospect of a second suit on the same cause of action.[9] The second approach *156 involves a balancing of the interests of both the plaintiff and the defendant in the dismissal in order to obtain a result which will be fair and equitable under all the circumstances of the case.[10] We think the latter balancing approach is the more appropriate one and, therefore, we employ this test in resolving the question of whether the superior court abused its discretion in granting the Farrells' motion for voluntary dismissal.[11] In reaching the decision whether or not to grant a motion for voluntary dismissal, the trial court should consider factors such as whether the defendant has filed an answer and has gone to great expense in preparing for trial;[12] how long the action has been pending; whether or not the plaintiff has been diligent;[13] whether adequate reasons have been advanced for the dismissal;[14] whether the motion is made after the defendant has moved for summary judgment and in order to avoid summary judgment against the plaintiff;[15] and whether the trial court has spent substantial time familiarizing itself with the action.[16] It should be noted, however, that once a trial court has exercised its discretion in granting a Civil Rule 41(a)(2) motion for dismissal, on appeal the appellant must show that the trial court failed to exercise or abused its discretion, or exercised an unpermitted discretion.[17] Proper analysis of the cases relied upon by appellants in support of their contention that the superior court abused its discretion in granting the motion for voluntary dismissal discloses the presence, in those cases, of more compelling factual circumstances *157 warranting the denial of the motion than are present in the case at bar. Illustrative of appellants' decisional authority is Thomas v. Amerada Hess Corp., 393 F. Supp. 58 (M.D.Pa. 1975), a civil action brought against oil companies for damages under the Sherman, Clayton and Economic Stabilization Acts, in which the federal district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for voluntary dismissal which was filed fourteen months after the bringing of the action. The court based its denial of the plaintiffs' motion mainly upon the great expense of extensive pretrial proceedings already incurred by the defendants and the dilatoriness of the plaintiffs in pursuing further discovery on their own behalf. The court stated, in part: The fact that motions for summary judgment have been filed; the extent of defendants' efforts and expenses already expended in preparation for trial; excessive and duplicitous expense of defending a second action; and not the least, insufficient explanation for the need to take a dismissal are factors to be considered in deciding a Rule 41(a)(2) motion... . Motions for summary judgment have been filed; and should they be denied, the case would be immediately thereafter listed for trial. Great effort and expense have been expended by defendants, not only in response to plaintiffs' comprehensive discovery requests, but in obtaining admissions from them used as a basis for their summary judgment motions. To require the defendants to defend a similar case at another time might necessitate a similar outlay of effort and expense. Obviously, a second try would give plaintiffs additional time for pursuing discovery with the experience of the first behind them, but possible smoother sailing in another venture is insufficient reason for permitting them to start anew. To the extent that plaintiffs have failed to complete discovery to their satisfaction in this action, it is due to their own dilatoriness in failing to pursue further depositions after they had a reasonable time to study documents and information produced by defendants. Id. at 70 (citations omitted).[18] We think the instant case is distinguishable from those decisions relied upon by appellants. *158 The Farrells had compelling reasons for filing the Civil Rule 41(a)(2) motion for dismissal when they did. They were unable to secure new counsel during the sixty-day period on the stay entered by the superior court for the express purpose of allowing them to engage new counsel. The Farrells encountered the same disability during the subsequent thirty-day period which was allowed by the superior court in a "Notice to Plaintiffs and Order" requiring the Farrells to "file with this Court and serve on counsel for defendants either: (a) a pleading indicating that they intend to proceed with the prosecution of this litigation in propria persona [(that is, that they intend to represent themselves)], or (b) the [identity] of their counsel." The superior court determined that if neither step was taken within thirty days, it would "entertain a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to prosecute... ." Shortly after the latter time period had elapsed and the Farrells were still unable to secure new counsel, the motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice was filed.[19] We also find it significant that, upon comparing the present case to the cases cited by appellants, it is apparent the Farrells' action, at the time the motion for dismissal without prejudice was filed, had not progressed nearly so far as those cited cases in terms of time and expense of litigation. Though the suit had been pending for nearly six months,[20] the proceedings were stayed for two of those months, and the Farrells had been given an additional month to indicate their intention to proceed with the case, as discussed above. It is true that after filing of the complaint, the Farrells' original attorney served fairly extensive interrogatories upon all of the present appellants as defendants in the suit below.[21] However, from the record it appears that only the appellant, G.D. Searle & Co., filed answers to the interrogatories propounded to them by the Farrells.[22] The motions for summary judgment were brief and did not evidence significant efforts expended by any of the appellants toward legal research and memoranda writing.[23] All of the motions for summary judgment were based *159 primarily on a single affidavit by Dr. Blankinship's expert witness which stated: "Given the date of last menstrual period, the date of birth of the infant and the dates of treatment by Dr. Blankinship, it is a medical fact that no action by Dr. Blankinship could possibly have caused or contributed to the birth defects described in the complaint and accompanying article." Thus, we find the apparent outlay of effort in discovery and preparation for trial by the appellants in this case is substantially less significant than that expended in the cases relied upon by appellants. The status of the law suit at the time the Civil Rule 41(a)(2) motion for dismissal without prejudice was filed, together with the Farrells' showing of reasons for requesting the dismissal, and the lack of any demonstrable prejudice to appellants, persuades us that a satisfactory basis has been demonstrated for concluding that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion for voluntary dismissal.[24] Appellants further contend that the superior court erred in failing to impose costs and attorney's fees as a term and condition of its grant of the Farrells' motion for voluntary dismissal. The decision whether to impose the condition of payment of costs and attorney's fees is clearly part of the trial court's discretionary function in deciding a Civil Rule 41(a)(2) motion for dismissal without prejudice. The federal courts have so interpreted the identical federal rule. As the court of appeals stated in American Cyanamid Co. v. McGhee, 317 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir.1963): By its very language [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 41(a)(2) gives the court power to grant or deny a motion made under the rule and `upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.' Here the court has an express judicial function to perform... . [D]ismissals by the court on motion under 41(a)(2) plainly puts upon the court a definite duty to perform: to grant or deny the motion, and to establish `such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.' [footnote omitted] Permitting the trial court, in its discretion, to attach conditions to the order of dismissal prevents defendants from being unfairly *160 affected by the dismissal.[25] Thus, the question here is whether the denial of such fees constitutes an abuse of discretion on the part of the superior court. We have previously upheld a grant of attorney's fees to the defendant upon dismissal of the plaintiff's case without prejudice.[26] The dismissal in Miller v. Wilkes, 496 P.2d 176 (Alaska 1972), followed the filing of a motion for preliminary injunction and opposition thereto. Thus, we have indicated a receptiveness to the award of attorney's fees upon dismissal without prejudice in some circumstances where the federal courts have generally been unwilling to do so.[27] The apparent difference in approach is due to the fact that attorney's fees in Alaska may be granted on two independent grounds: (1) Alaska R.Civ.P. 82(a) fees to the prevailing party and (2) Alaska R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) fees as a "term or condition" of dismissal without prejudice.[28] The fees in the Miller case were awarded pursuant to Rule 82(a).[29] However, in the present case, appellants have made no claim that they are entitled to attorney's fees as the prevailing parties under Civil Rule 82(a). Therefore, the rationale of the federal cases with respect to attorney's fees under Civil Rule 41(a)(2) is persuasive. Given the particular factual circumstances of this case, we hold that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in failing to award attorney's fees to appellant as a term or condition of its grant of the Farrells' motion for voluntary dismissal.[30] One additional aspect of this appeal deserves brief mention. Counsel for appellants argue cogently before this court that the superior court erred in failing to impose certain other terms and conditions, in addition to attorney's fees, with its grant of the Farrells' motion. More particularly, in their briefs and at oral argument before this court, counsel for appellants take the position that given: the fact that they will be subjected to an indefinite period of uncertainty as to the possible exposure to liability for damages; the need for the creation of reserves in anticipation of the finding of liability; and the injury to the reputation, credit standing, and insurance posture of appellant Gilbert P. Blankinship, M.D., the superior court in granting the dismissal motion should have conditioned its order on the proviso that the Farrells' remaining claims for relief be filed within one *161 year from the date of the dismissal order provided that the Farrells make a preliminary showing establishing a claim for relief against the named defendants. Review of the record shows that these arguments were not advanced to the superior court.[31] Thus, whatever merit they might contain, they are not relevant to the scope of this court's present inquiry into the question of whether the superior court abused its discretion in not making these proposed terms and conditions part of its aforementioned order granting the Farrells' motion for voluntary dismissal.[32] Affirmed.