Title: State v. Joseph F. Rizzo
Citation: 2002 WI 20
Docket Number: 1999AP003266-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 27, 2002

2002 WI 20 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
99-3266-CR 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Joseph F. Rizzo,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 57 
Reported at: 
241 Wis. 2d 241, 624 N.W.2d 854 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 27, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 16, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Fisher   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
SYKES, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Franklyn 
M. Gimbel, Kathryn A. Keppel and Gimbel, Reilly, Guerin & Brown, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Franklyn M. Gimbel. 
 
 
2002 WI 20 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  99-3266-CR  
(L.C. No. 
97 CF 637) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Joseph F. Rizzo,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 27, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, State of 
Wisconsin, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision 
reversing Joseph Rizzo's conviction for multiple counts of 
sexual assault and remanding his case for a new trial.1  The 
State argues that the court of appeals incorrectly concluded 
                                                 
1 See State v. Rizzo, 2001 WI App 57, 241 Wis. 2d 241, 624 
N.W.2d 854 (Ct. App. 2000), reversing and remanding a judgment 
of the circuit court for Kenosha County, Michael Fisher, Judge.  
Rizzo was also convicted for intimidating a victim, but that 
charge is not relevant to the questions before us. 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
2 
 
that its expert's testimony constituted Jensen2 evidence, that 
is, 
evidence 
that 
an 
alleged 
victim 
exhibited 
behaviors 
consistent with those commonly observed in sexual assault 
victims.  In addition, the State asserts that the court of 
appeals erred 
in 
determining that 
a 
new 
trial was the 
appropriate remedy and in concluding that the circuit court 
improperly denied Rizzo access to the treatment records of the 
complainant, D.F. 
¶2 
We agree with the court of appeals that the State 
introduced Jensen evidence.  However, we conclude that the 
proper remedy under the facts of this case is a remand for the 
circuit court to determine whether Rizzo was entitled to a 
pretrial psychological examination of D.F. under State v. Maday, 
179 Wis. 2d 346, 507 N.W.2d 365 (Ct. App. 1993).  Only if the 
circuit court determines on remand that the defendant was 
entitled 
to 
a 
psychological 
examination 
is 
a 
new 
trial 
necessary.  In addition, we determine that the court of appeals 
erred in concluding that the circuit court improperly denied 
Rizzo 
access 
to 
D.F.'s 
psychological 
treatment 
records.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand to the circuit court.  On remand, Rizzo's conviction will 
stand subject to the court's determination under Maday. 
I 
                                                 
2 "Jensen evidence" or "Jensen testimony" is in reference to 
this court's decision in State v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 432 
N.W.2d 913 (1988). 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
3 
 
¶3 
In June 1997, D.F. reported to police that Rizzo had 
sexual contact with her on several occasions beginning in 1995 
and continuing through April or May 1996.  She received 
treatment 
from 
Dr. 
Linda 
Marinaccio 
Pucci, 
a 
clinical 
psychologist, in 1996 after the assaults began.  The initial 
treatment lasted about four months, but D.F. returned to Dr. 
Pucci in the summer of 1997 for additional therapy. 
¶4 
Before trial, Rizzo moved the circuit court to order 
that D.F. submit to a pretrial psychological examination.  He 
also filed a motion requesting that the circuit court conduct an 
in camera review of Dr. Pucci's "files, assessments, reports, 
notes, memoranda, and other records." 
¶5 
In response to Rizzo's motions, the State provided a 
report prepared by Dr. Pucci, summarizing her knowledge of the 
case and her treatment of D.F.  At a hearing on the motions, the 
State agreed that the circuit court could conduct an in camera 
review of D.F.'s treatment records.  After conducting the in 
camera review, the court concluded that Rizzo was not entitled 
to the treatment records because Dr. Pucci's report fully 
summarized the contents of the records. 
¶6 
At a subsequent hearing, Rizzo's attorney summarized 
his position on the requested psychological examination of D.F.: 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: As far as the request for 
independent 
psychological, 
our 
position 
is 
with 
respect to that, that the State is intending to elicit 
expert 
testimony 
from 
Miss 
Pucci 
or 
Dr. 
Pucci 
concerning the issues that would be relevant to an 
independent fact finder's evaluation of whether a 
[sic] not a person is a victim of a sexual assault.  
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
4 
 
Then we believe that the predicate is laid based on 
the Maday criteria for the Court to order the alleged 
victim 
make 
herself 
available 
for 
independent 
psychiatric evaluation. 
(Emphasis added.)  In response, the State represented that it 
had initially intended to elicit Jensen evidence from Dr. Pucci.  
However, the State explained, after reviewing the case law, it 
decided not to use Dr. Pucci for Jensen evidence.  The 
prosecutor stated: 
 
I will withdraw questions of Dr. Pucci in the area of 
Jensen type of evidence . . . .  I am going to 
represent 
now, 
and 
will 
not 
intend 
on 
direct 
examination, subject to the defense opening the door 
based on cross-examination, elicit expert Jensen type 
testimony from Dr. Pucci . . . .  If I do think it is 
necessary to elicit some Jensen testimony, I will call 
another expert and certainly put the Court and defense 
on notice with a curriculum vitae attached. 
Based 
on 
the 
State's 
representations, 
the 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
Rizzo 
was 
not 
entitled 
to 
the 
requested 
psychological examination of D.F. 
¶7 
At trial, Dr. Pucci gave extensive factual testimony 
with regard to her knowledge and treatment of D.F.  Following 
this 
testimony, 
Dr. 
Pucci 
responded 
to 
the 
prosecutor's 
questions as to why "someone would, in this position" not 
immediately report a sexual assault.  She testified that often 
people are reluctant to report sexual assaults because of 
threats by the assailant, embarrassment, or a fear that no one 
will believe them.  Rizzo objected to this evidence and renewed 
his request for D.F.'s treatment records.  The court overruled 
Rizzo's objection to the evidence and denied his request for the 
records.  The jury found Rizzo guilty, and he appealed. 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
5 
 
¶8 
The court of appeals determined that the State had 
reneged on its pretrial representation that it would not present 
Jensen evidence, thus precluding a "level playing field" under 
Maday.  The court's decision in Maday requires that given 
certain prerequisites, a defendant must have the opportunity to 
show a "compelling need" for the complainant to submit to a 
pretrial psychological examination.  See 179 Wis. 2d at 360.  
The court of appeals also determined that the circuit court 
should have granted Rizzo access to D.F.'s treatment records.  
Concluding that Rizzo was denied his rights to due process and a 
fair trial, the court reversed Rizzo's conviction and remanded 
his case for a new trial. 
II 
¶9 
This case presents several issues.  We must first 
address a threshold question of whether Dr. Pucci gave Jensen 
testimony as an expert within the scope of Maday.  Because we 
conclude that she did after the State represented she would not, 
we must also determine whether the court of appeals correctly 
concluded that a new trial was the proper remedy.  Finally, we 
must decide whether the court of appeals correctly determined 
that Rizzo was improperly denied access to D.F.'s treatment 
records.  In addressing the questions before us, we begin with a 
discussion of the two cases that form the backdrop for the 
issues in this case, Jensen and Maday. 
III 
¶10 In State v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 432 N.W.2d 913 
(1988), this court considered the admissibility of expert 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
6 
 
testimony that a child sexual assault complainant's behavior was 
consistent with the behaviors of sexual assault victims.  The 
complainant in Jensen delayed in reporting an alleged sexual 
assault to several family members and told others nothing at 
all.  147 Wis. 2d at 243-44.  The first person she told about 
the alleged assault was her school guidance counselor, who met 
with her because she had been "acting out" in class, writing a 
lot of notes to boys, wearing tight clothes, and had pinched a 
boy's buttocks.  Id. at 244.   
¶11 At trial, the counselor testified as an expert on the 
behavior of sexually abused children.  Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 
245.  He explained that the complainant's acting out behaviors 
were consistent with the behavior of children who were victims 
of sexual abuse.  Id. at 246-47.  The counselor also explained 
that, in his experience, some children who are sexual assault 
victims do not tell anyone about it for a long period of time.  
Id. at 247. 
¶12 The defendant in Jensen argued that the circuit court 
erred 
in 
admitting 
the 
counselor's 
comparison 
of 
the 
complainant's acting out behavior with the behaviors of sexual 
assault victims generally.  147 Wis. 2d at 248-49.  In upholding 
the circuit court's determination, this court concluded that 
"[b]ecause a complainant's behavior frequently may not conform 
to commonly held expectations of how a victim reacts to sexual 
assault, courts admit expert opinion testimony to help juries 
avoid making decisions based on misconceptions of victim 
behavior."  Id. at 252.  Some of the complainant's behavior was 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
7 
 
similar to the normal behavior of adolescents.  Id. at 246.  
Nevertheless, the court determined, "an expert opinion is useful 
for disabusing the jury of common misconceptions about the 
behavior of sexual assault victims."  Id. at 251 (citing State 
v. Robinson, 146 Wis. 2d 315, 333, 431 N.W.2d 165 (1988)).3 
¶13 Subsequently, in Maday, the court of appeals addressed 
the question of whether and under what circumstances a defendant 
is entitled to a pretrial psychological examination of a 
complainant when the State seeks to offer Jensen evidence.  The 
State in Maday sought to introduce Jensen testimony from five 
experts who had personally interviewed two complainants.  Maday, 
179 Wis. 2d at 350, 355.  The circuit court rejected the 
defendant's 
request 
that 
the 
complainants 
submit 
to 
psychological examinations.  Id. at 350. 
¶14 The court of appeals reversed, reasoning as follows:  
 
The state has put the behavior of the two victims 
into issue when it proposed to present, in its case-
in-chief, 
testimony 
from 
five 
experts 
that 
the 
victims' behaviors were consistent with the behaviors 
of other victims of sexual abuse.  Fundamental 
fairness requires that Maday be given the opportunity 
to present relevant evidence to counter this evidence 
from the state.  In order to obtain that evidence, 
Maday must be given the opportunity to discover the 
psychological condition of the victims.   
                                                 
3 Thus, as this court noted in State v. Dunlap, 2002 WI 19, 
¶33, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, also released today, the 
circuit court may allow an expert witness to give an opinion 
about the consistency of a complainant's behavior with the 
behavior of victims of the same type of crime only if the 
testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding the 
evidence or in determining a fact in issue.  See Jensen, 147 
Wis. 2d at 256. 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
8 
 
Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 357.  Rejecting the State's argument that 
a 
defendant 
could 
sufficiently 
rebut 
the 
State's 
Jensen 
testimony through the responsive mechanisms of cross-examination 
and testimony by nonexamining experts, the court explained that 
"[a] defendant who is prevented from presenting testimony from 
an examining expert when the state is able to present such 
testimony is deprived of a level playing field."  Id. 
¶15 However, 
recognizing 
the 
need 
to 
balance 
the 
defendant's right to present relevant evidence with the privacy 
interests of the victim, the court of appeals in Maday declined 
to determine that a defendant is entitled to a pretrial 
psychological examination in every case where the State intends 
to introduce Jensen evidence.  Rather, the court concluded, the 
defendant must present the circuit court with "evidence that he 
or she has a compelling need or reason" for the examination.  
Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 360. 
¶16 The court identified seven factors for circuit courts 
to consider in determining whether to grant the defendant's 
request:  (1) the nature of the examination requested and the 
intrusiveness inherent in that examination; (2) the victim's 
age; (3) the resulting physical or emotional effects of the 
examination on the victim; (4) the probative value of the 
examination to the issue before the court; (5) the remoteness in 
time of the examination to the alleged criminal act; (6) the 
evidence already available for the defendant's use; and (7) 
whether, based on the testimony of the defendant's named expert, 
a personal interview with the victim is essential before the 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
9 
 
expert can form an opinion, to 
a 
reasonable 
degree of 
psychological 
or psychiatric 
certainty, 
that 
the victim's 
behaviors are consistent with the behaviors of other victims of 
sexual abuse.  Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 360 (citing State v. 
Delaney, 417 S.E.2d 903, 907 (W. Va. 1992)).  The court of 
appeals remanded for the circuit court to make a determination 
in light of these factors.  Id. at 362. 
IV 
 
¶17 We begin our analysis of Rizzo's case by determining 
whether Dr. Pucci gave Jensen testimony as an expert within the 
scope of Maday.  If Dr. Pucci's testimony was not Jensen 
evidence, then Rizzo would not have been entitled to a 
determination under Maday.  In addition, not all State witnesses 
in sexual assault trials who give Jensen evidence will trigger a 
determination under Maday.  If Dr. Pucci was not the type of 
expert that triggers Maday's protections, then Rizzo would not 
have been entitled to a Maday determination. 
¶18 The determination of whether Dr. Pucci gave Jensen 
testimony as an expert within the scope of Maday requires that 
we apply legal standards to the facts of Rizzo's case.  Whether 
a given set of facts meets a particular legal standard is a 
question of law for our independent review.  State v. Brandt, 
226 Wis. 2d 610, 618, 594 N.W.2d 759 (1999). 
 
A.  Dr. Pucci's Testimony as Jensen Evidence 
¶19 The court of appeals concluded that Dr. Pucci's 
testimony was "tantamount to" Jensen evidence.  The State 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
10 
 
asserts that Dr. Pucci's testimony was not Jensen evidence 
because she did not offer an opinion that D.F.'s behavior was 
"consistent with" the behavior of persons known to be sexual 
assault victims. 
¶20 Dr. 
Pucci's 
testimony 
upon 
direct 
examination 
contained a detailed description of her interactions with and 
treatment of D.F.  This included her factual testimony that D.F. 
had reported a sexual assault to her and that the bulk of D.F.'s 
1997 treatment was in response to the sexual assault.  As Dr. 
Pucci's factual testimony concluded, the prosecutor engaged her 
in the following exchange: 
 
Q 
Did you ever discuss with [D.F.] in the course[] 
of your treatment why she delayed this report for 
over a year? 
 
A 
Yes.  We talked about why she finally did report 
it, and she talked about not wanting to report it 
when I saw her in 1996 because she and her family 
didn't want to press charges; and that changed 
throughout the course of time, and by 1997 she 
did want to report it . . . . 
 
Q 
Dr. Pucci, do you have an opinion as to a 
reasonable degree of psychological certainty why 
someone would not report a crime like this under 
these circumstances? 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: 
It's overruled.  The witness 
may answer. 
 
A 
Could you repeat the question? 
 
Q 
Do you have an opinion to a reasonable degree of 
psychological certainty why someone would, in 
this position, would not immediately report a 
crime like this? 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
11 
 
 
A 
Often people are reluctant to report this kind of 
crime because of threats the offender or the 
abuser makes to them about it, either directly 
telling them not to tell or threatening them if 
they do tell.  Often people are embarrassed.  
They may be afraid they are not going to be 
believed.  Sometimes they have some positive 
feelings about the abuser and may not want to get 
that person into trouble.  Those tend to be the 
most common reasons. 
¶21 We agree with the court of appeals that Dr. Pucci's 
testimony made the requisite comparison between D.F.'s behavior 
and the common behaviors of sexual assault victims.  In arguing 
that it did not, the State is asking this court to hold that Dr. 
Pucci's testimony would have been Jensen evidence only if she 
had used magic words such as "D.F.'s behaviors are consistent 
with that of persons known to be sexual assault victims."  We 
decline to adopt such a mechanistic approach.  Instead, we 
determine that a jury would interpret the prosecutor's questions 
along with Dr. Pucci's answer to provide the comparison that is 
the essence of Jensen evidence.4 
¶22 The phrasing of the prosecutor's questions and the 
substance of Dr. Pucci's answer combined to send a clear message 
to the jury that D.F.'s behaviors were consistent with those of 
known sexual assault victims.  The factual portion of Dr. 
                                                 
4 The 
concurrence's 
conclusions 
with 
respect 
to 
the 
applicability of State v. Maday, 179 Wis. 2d 346, 507 N.W.2d 365 
(Ct. App. 1993), depend upon its distinction between sexual 
assault victim "reporting" behavior and "acting out" behavior.  
According to the concurrence, Jensen evidence includes only the 
latter.  However, as the concurrence is itself forced to 
concede, the case law does not recognize this distinction.  
Concurrence at ¶64 & n.9. 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
12 
 
Pucci's testimony established that she knew D.F. to be a sexual 
assault victim.  The prosecutor then solicited her expert 
opinion as to what someone would do "under these circumstances" 
and "in this position."  This made it apparent to the jury that 
a direct comparison was to be drawn between D.F. and others in 
her circumstances or position, which, according to the factual 
testimony of Dr. Pucci, were the circumstances or position of a 
sexual assault victim.5 
¶23 In addition, upon redirect examination, Dr. Pucci gave 
further testimony that reinforced for the jury that she was 
equating D.F.'s behaviors with those commonly observed in known 
sexual assault victims: 
 
Q 
Dr. Pucci, what was your recollection of the 
reason [D.F.] did not want to report this in 
1996? 
 
A 
She did not want to press charges against Mr. 
Rizzo, and she just wanted him to leave them 
alone and just wanted him to go away and not hurt 
anyone again. 
 
Q 
Did she ever discuss with you anything in regard 
to concerns about whether or not she would be 
believed?  Was that ever discussed that you 
recall or not? 
 
A 
She told me that he, that Mr. Rizzo, had told her 
that if she told anyone she would not be 
believed. 
 
 . . . . 
 
                                                 
5 For these same reasons, we reject the State's argument 
that Dr. Pucci's opinion testimony was not "based on" her 
examination of D.F. 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
13 
 
Q 
1997.  Dr. Pucci, I'm framing that question in 
terms of your contact with her in 1997.  Did she 
indicate at that time whether that was something 
she had internalized as a reason she didn't want 
to report, or was she discussing that with you as 
one of the many things that was said? 
 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. 
 
 
THE COURT: 
 
Overruled. 
 
A 
My impression is that she had internalized it. 
The reasons that Dr. Pucci gave in explaining why D.F. did not 
report the sexual assault are strikingly similar to the reasons 
she gave earlier in her testimony explaining why sexual assault 
victims generally delay reporting.  This similarity would also 
lead a jury to make the comparison that is the essence of Jensen 
evidence. 
 
B. 
Whether Dr. Pucci Was an Expert within the Scope of Maday 
¶24 The State also argues that Mayday is inapplicable 
because it did not "hire" Dr. Pucci as an expert.  The State's 
argument is based primarily on its reading of State v. David 
J.K., 190 Wis. 2d 726, 528 N.W.2d 434 (Ct. App. 1994).  It 
emphasizes the court of appeals determination in David J.K. that 
"the psychological examination of the complainant authorized in 
Maday is strictly limited to situations in which the prosecution 
retains experts in anticipation of trial in order to present 
Jensen evidence."  Id. at 735 (emphasis added).  According to 
the State, it did not "retain" Dr. Pucci as an expert; rather, 
she was D.F.'s treating therapist.  Because Dr. Pucci was D.F.'s 
treating therapist, the State contends, it was merely taking 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
14 
 
"the facts and the witness as it found them."  In essence, the 
State's position is that it is shielded from Maday because it 
was D.F. who "retained" Dr. Pucci, not the State. 
¶25 We disagree with the State's characterization of Dr. 
Pucci as falling outside the intended scope of Maday.  By 
reading too much into David J.K. and interpreting the concept of 
"retain" in an overly restrictive manner, the State's position 
overlooks the core rationale underlying Maday. 
¶26 The core rationale in Maday was one of basic fairness.  
If one side is to introduce testimony by a psychological expert 
who has examined the victim, the other side must also be able to 
request such an opportunity in order to level the playing field.  
Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 357.  A jury will generally give the 
opinion of a psychological expert who has examined a party 
greater weight than the opinion of an expert who has not.  The 
State's position suggests that the key fact in Maday was that 
its experts were the prototypical "hired guns."  However, in 
Maday, the key fact was that the psychological experts had 
personally interviewed and examined the complainant. 
¶27 Moreover, the court of appeals in David J.K. did not 
focus on the distinction between "hired gun" experts and other 
experts.  Instead, in determining that Maday did not apply, the 
court in David J.K. contrasted the reason the defendant before 
it was seeking pretrial psychological examinations with the 
reason the defendant in Maday sought an examination.  David 
J.K., 190 Wis. 2d at 734.  In Maday, the defendant sought a 
psychological examination in order to rebut the State's Jensen 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
15 
 
evidence.  See id. (citing Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 352 & n.3).  In 
David J.K., the defendant sought psychological examinations in 
order to challenge the two victims' competency along with their 
credibility.  Id.  The court in David J.K. concluded that the 
defendant "failed to make any showing that the victims lacked 
mental competency to testify," and therefore, was not entitled 
to examinations.  Id. 
¶28 We read the court of appeals statement in David J.K. 
that a Maday determination is limited to situations where the 
State "retains experts in anticipation of trial in order to 
present Jensen evidence" as a reiteration of its holding in 
Maday.  Maday sets forth the correct standard in detail: 
 
When the state manifests an intent during its case-in-
chief to present testimony of one or more experts, who 
have personally examined a victim of an alleged sexual 
assault, and will testify that the victim's behavior 
is consistent with the behaviors of other victims of 
sexual 
assault, 
a 
defendant 
may 
request 
a 
psychological examination of the victim. 
179 Wis. 2d at 359-60 (emphasis added). 
¶29 In State v. Schaller, 199 Wis. 2d 23, 544 N.W.2d 247 
(Ct. App. 1995), the court of appeals attempted to distinguish 
between a State psychological expert who has "personally 
examined" a complainant within the meaning of Maday and one who 
has not.  The court explained that Maday involved experts who 
had conducted "psychological examinations" or "psychological 
interviews" with a complainant.  Id. at 34.  In upholding the 
circuit court's denial of the defendant's request for a pretrial 
psychological examination, the court in Schaller noted that the 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
16 
 
State's experts did not testify that they had "examined" the 
complainant.  Id.  Similarly, in State v. Mainiero, 189 
Wis. 2d 80, 91, 525 N.W.2d 304 (Ct. App. 1994), the court of 
appeals referred to a Maday expert as one who has "personally 
interviewed" the complainant.   
¶30 We agree with the court of appeals' determination in 
Schaller that the fact that a Jensen witness has had previous 
"professional interaction" with the complainant does not by 
itself trigger Maday.  Given the facts before us, however, we 
must clarify the distinction between an expert that may trigger 
Maday 
and 
an 
expert 
who 
has 
only 
minimal 
"professional 
interaction" with a complainant as contemplated in Schaller. 
¶31 Although the court in Schaller emphasized that none of 
the State's experts testified that they had conducted a 
psychological examination of the complainant, it also noted, 
somewhat ambiguously, that the State's psychological expert had 
met 
with 
the 
complainant 
on 
one 
occasion 
to 
"evaluat[e] . . . her present functioning and . . . her past 
experiences."  199 Wis. 2d at 34.  While we do not purport to 
set forth a bright line rule that will prove definitive in every 
case, the distinction between a psychological expert that 
triggers Maday and one that does not will depend in part on the 
extent and nature of the contact between the expert and the 
complainant. 
¶32 We must not lose sight of the fundamental fairness 
principle that drives the Maday decision.  If the State is to 
introduce Jensen evidence through a psychological expert who has 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
17 
 
become familiar with the complainant through ongoing treatment, 
or through an intensive interview or examination focused on the 
alleged sexual assault, the defendant must have the opportunity 
to show a need to meet that evidence through a psychological 
expert of its own.  As the Maday court explained in support of 
its holding, "a definitive opinion requires an extensive 
interview plus review of material on the victim's life and 
behaviors."  179 Wis. 2d at 357. 
¶33 With these principles in mind, we conclude that it 
would strain logic and ignore fairness to determine that a 
psychological expert such as Dr. Pucci does not trigger Maday.  
Dr. Pucci was not just any professional who briefly encountered 
D.F. after a reported sexual assault.  Dr. Pucci was a clinical 
psychologist who had an extensive, ongoing relationship with 
D.F.  She interviewed, examined, and diagnosed D.F.  Moreover, 
Dr. Pucci testified that the bulk of her treatment of D.F. in 
1997 was directed at the sexual assault.  In short, the extent 
and nature of Dr. Pucci's contacts with D.F. bring her within 
the ambit of Maday. 
¶34 In addition, we agree with Rizzo and the court of 
appeals that the State "retained" Dr. Pucci in the sense meant 
by David J.K.  Although there is no assertion by Rizzo that Dr. 
Pucci received a specific witness fee, the State admitted that 
it "paid three times" for Dr. Pucci's flights, hotel, rental 
cars, and meals in order to bring her from Tennessee, where she 
had relocated since treating D.F. 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
18 
 
¶35 More to the point, however, we determine that even if 
the State had not compensated or reimbursed Dr. Pucci, she would 
still have been a Maday expert.  A determination of whether the 
State "retains" an expert for purposes of Maday cannot stand or 
fall on whether or how it has compensated its expert.  Such a 
determination would thwart the fundamental principle underlying 
Maday and would allow the State to subvert Maday by, for 
example, obtaining an expert willing to volunteer her time.  For 
the same reasons, we conclude that an expert's status as the 
complainant's treating therapist does not preclude that expert 
from being "retained" by the State for purposes of Maday. 
¶36 In sum, given the nature of Dr. Pucci's interactions 
with D.F., she was an expert within the scope of Maday.  Her 
testimony 
contained 
Jensen 
evidence 
because 
she 
made 
a 
comparison between D.F.'s behavior and the behaviors of sexual 
assault victims generally. 
¶37 It is important to emphasize that our decision does 
not tie the State's hands in presenting expert witnesses in 
sexual assault trials.  It does not require that a defendant 
receive a determination under Maday whenever the State calls a 
complainant's treating psychologist as a witness.  Here, the 
State would have been free to elicit factual and opinion 
testimony from Dr. Pucci without triggering Maday if it had 
called a different witness in order to introduce Jensen 
evidence.  Indeed, before trial, this is precisely the course 
the State represented that it would follow if it determined that 
Jensen evidence was necessary. 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
19 
 
¶38 In addition, Maday's own balancing test prevents a 
defendant from receiving a pretrial psychological examination in 
every case where the State wishes to call a psychological expert 
who has examined the victim to give Jensen testimony.  A 
conclusion that a defendant is entitled to a Maday determination 
is not equivalent to a conclusion that the defendant is entitled 
to a psychological examination.  For that, the defendant must 
show a "compelling need" for the examination under Maday.   
¶39 We are mindful of the need to protect the privacy 
interests of sexual assault victims and to ensure that they are 
not 
re-victimized 
by 
the 
intrusiveness 
of 
a 
defense 
psychological examination unless necessary to preserve the 
competing constitutional rights of the defendant.  Sexual 
assault complainants should not be caught needlessly between 
their privacy interests and the vigorous prosecution of the 
alleged perpetrators.  However, as we have indicated, it is only 
when the State seeks to admit Jensen evidence through a Maday 
expert that a complainant will face the possibility of a defense 
psychological examination.  In many cases, the experts involved 
will not fall within the confines of Maday. 
¶40 Likewise, we stress that the very purpose of the Maday 
test is to account for the privacy interests of the victim in 
the face of the defendant's competing constitutional rights.  
See 179 Wis. 2d at 359-60.  The factors under Maday represent 
substantial hurdles that a defendant seeking a psychological 
examination must clear.  They ensure that the privacy interests 
of victims are properly protected, and they preclude defense 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
20 
 
psychological examinations that amount to nothing more than 
fishing expeditions.  These factors, together with the obstacles 
that the defendant faces in asserting that the State's witness 
is an expert within the meaning of Maday, constitute a carefully 
crafted system of procedural and substantive safeguards that 
ensure the protection of the victim's privacy interests.6 
V 
¶41 Because the State introduced Jensen evidence through 
an expert within the scope of Maday after Rizzo was denied a 
pretrial 
psychological 
examination 
based 
on 
the 
State's 
representation that this evidence would not be offered, we must 
determine the remedy due Rizzo.  The court of appeals concluded 
that Rizzo was deprived of his rights to due process and a fair 
trial and, accordingly, that the appropriate remedy was a new 
trial.  Whether an individual is denied a constitutional right 
is a question of law for this court's independent review.  State 
v. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721, 748, 546 N.W.2d 406 (1996).  
Similarly, the determination of the proper remedy in the face of 
a constitutional violation is a question for our independent 
review.  See State v. Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d 441, 447, 477 N.W.2d 
277 (1991). 
                                                 
6 Thus, the concurrence paints the implications of our 
decision with too broad a brush.  The combined effect of the 
procedural and substantive safeguards we discuss is that a 
sexual assault complainant will be subject to a psychological 
examination only when (1) the State insists on using a Maday 
expert to present Jensen evidence and (2) the defendant prevails 
under the seven factors of Maday, which specifically recognize 
and account for the intrusive nature of the examination. 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
21 
 
¶42 The State suggests two possible remedies.  First, the 
State asserts that this court can and should apply the factors 
in Maday and determine as a matter of law that Rizzo failed to 
show he was entitled to a pretrial psychological examination.  
In the alternative, the State asks that we remand for the 
circuit court to apply the Maday factors.  In addition, the 
State contends, even if the circuit court determines Rizzo was 
entitled to a psychological examination under Maday, the 
disallowance of the examination is subject to a harmless error 
analysis.  We agree with the State that a remand for a Maday 
determination is in order, but we reject the State's assertion 
that Rizzo's case is subject to a harmless error analysis. 
¶43 Normally, the determination of whether the defendant 
has presented evidence demonstrating a compelling need for a 
pretrial psychological examination is a matter for the circuit 
court's discretionary determination.  See Schaller, 199 Wis. 2d 
at 33-34.  Here, the court never exercised its discretion by 
applying Maday because the State represented that it would not 
offer Jensen evidence through Dr. Pucci.  Consequently, Rizzo 
did not have an adequate opportunity to develop arguments or 
evidence to show he had a compelling need for a psychological 
examination under Maday.  Accordingly, we do not attempt to 
apply Maday on the present record in order to determine whether 
Rizzo failed to make the required showing. 
¶44 At the same time, however, neither Rizzo nor the court 
of appeals has adequately explained why a new trial is 
necessarily the remedy.  When the State introduced its Jensen 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
22 
 
evidence through Dr. Pucci, it was Rizzo's right to a pretrial 
determination under Maday that was violated.  Only if Rizzo 
should 
have 
been 
granted 
his 
request 
for 
a 
pretrial 
psychological examination did the State's introduction of Jensen 
evidence violate his rights to due process and a fair trial.  
Because, as we have already noted, the circuit court never had 
the opportunity to exercise its discretion in applying the Maday 
factors, we do not know whether Rizzo would have been able to 
survive a determination under Maday.  Therefore, we remand for 
the circuit court to apply Maday. 
¶45 We reject, however, the State's invitation to apply a 
harmless error analysis.  The test for harmless error is whether 
there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to 
the conviction.  State v. Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d 646, 668, 575 
N.W.2d 475 (1998); State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543, 370 
N.W.2d 222 (1985).  A reasonable possibility is a possibility 
sufficient to undermine our confidence in the outcome.  State v. 
Grant, 139 Wis. 2d 45, 51, 406 N.W.2d 744 (1987). 
¶46 The State explains that the harmless error analysis 
would proceed as follows:  "if Rizzo's expert, after examining 
D.F., does not offer an opinion that, had it been admitted at 
trial, would have affected the result of the trial, then any 
error in not allowing the examination and thereby excluding the 
expert's testimony was harmless."  We determine that the 
harmless error test need not be applied here as the State 
asserts. 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
23 
 
¶47 Although the test for "compelling need" under Maday is 
undoubtedly different than the test for harmless error, a 
determination that the psychological examination was necessary 
to 
level 
the 
playing 
field 
seems 
inconsistent 
with 
a 
determination that the absence of such an examination was 
harmless error.  A decision by the circuit court that a 
defendant is entitled to a pretrial psychological examination of 
the victim is tantamount to a determination that fundamental 
fairness requires that the defendant be given the opportunity to 
present 
relevant 
evidence 
to 
counter 
the 
State's 
Jensen 
evidence.  Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 357.  Accordingly, we do not 
apply a harmless error analysis.  Instead, we direct that if the 
circuit court determines that Rizzo was entitled to a pretrial 
psychological examination, then he should receive a new trial. 
VI 
¶48 Finally, 
we 
must 
determine 
whether 
Rizzo 
was 
improperly denied access to D.F.'s treatment records.  Before 
trial, the circuit court conducted an in camera review of the 
records in accordance with State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600,  
499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993).  The State agreed that Rizzo had 
made the preliminary showing of materiality necessary for an in 
camera review.  The court compared the records to Dr. Pucci's 
summary report and concluded that Rizzo was not entitled to the 
records: 
 
Well, the Court has had the opportunity to review 
the psychological file, and what I did first was go 
over the summary and see what the summary said; and 
then I began to page through the doctor's file . . . .  
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
24 
 
Well, very frankly, if you go through this entire file 
and you go through it essentially line by line, you 
won't find anything different than what you find in 
her summary. . . .  [T]here is really no information 
that is contained in this file that you don't know 
about already that would be exculpatory in any way or 
even lead to anything that is exculpatory . . . . 
Subsequently 
at 
trial, 
after 
Dr. 
Pucci 
gave 
her 
Jensen 
testimony, Rizzo again raised the issue of access to the 
treatment records, arguing that he needed them to effectively 
cross-examine her.  The circuit court denied Rizzo's request, 
concluding "[t]here has been no showing that would satisfy the 
Court that would be appropriate." 
¶49 We review under the clearly erroneous standard the 
findings of fact made by the circuit court.  Shiffra, 175 
Wis. 2d 
at 
605. 
 
However, 
we 
independently 
apply 
any 
constitutional principles involved to the facts as found.  
Mainiero, 189 Wis. 2d at 88. 
¶50 Rizzo does not contend that the circuit court made 
clearly erroneous fact findings.  Instead, he asserts that Dr. 
Pucci's testimony "opened the door" to cross-examination as to 
the source of her additional, unanticipated testimony.  He 
relies on the court of appeals' conclusion that Dr. Pucci's 
Jensen testimony went "beyond the scope of her summary report."  
In addition, he argues that the records were essential to 
impeach her and attack her credibility.  He concludes that 
without the records, he was deprived of his constitutional right 
to present a defense.  We disagree. 
¶51 Before trial, the circuit court found that there was 
nothing relevant in D.F.'s treatment records that was not also 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
25 
 
in Dr. Pucci's summary report.  Although Dr. Pucci ventured 
beyond the scope of her summary report at trial in that the 
report did not say she would give Jensen testimony, it does not 
automatically follow that Rizzo was entitled to D.F.'s treatment 
records.  Because Dr. Pucci's factual testimony was anticipated, 
her Jensen testimony did not change the scope of relevant 
information in D.F.'s treatment records.  The argument that 
Rizzo could somehow impeach Dr. Pucci's expert knowledge of the 
common behaviors of sexual assault victims by accessing the 
treatment records of one of her patients is not persuasive. 
¶52 Rizzo also argues that he needed D.F.'s treatment 
records to cross-examine Dr. Pucci because it was unclear 
whether a statement in quotation marks in Dr. Pucci's summary 
report was attributable to Dr. Pucci or to D.F.'s parents.  The 
statement said that D.F. was "lying, and manipulative, and good 
at diverting attention."  Dr. Pucci testified that these were 
not the parents' exact words, but rather her interpretation of 
what they had said.  She explained that she placed them in 
quotation marks to signify that she was quoting another source, 
an intake form. 
¶53 Rizzo's position appears to be that he was entitled to 
cross-examine Dr. Pucci using the treatment records because if 
the records would have revealed the source of the quote as 
D.F.'s 
parents, 
this 
would 
have 
undermined 
Dr. 
Pucci's 
credibility.  We do not adopt Rizzo's position because it would 
eviscerate the procedure for in camera review set forth in 
Shiffra, which protects a victim's confidential records.  In 
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
26 
 
effect, Rizzo's position would provide that the defendant must 
receive full access to the victim's treatment records in every 
case in order to effectively cross-examine an expert who treated 
the victim.  That is in stark contrast to the in camera 
procedure 
under 
Shiffra, 
which 
specifically 
balanced 
the 
victim's interest in confidentiality against the constitutional 
rights of the defendant.  See 175 Wis. 2d at 609-10. 
¶54 In short, Dr. Pucci's Jensen testimony did not 
undermine the basis for the circuit court's original decision 
denying Rizzo access to D.F.'s treatment records.  Furthermore, 
under Shiffra, a defendant is not entitled to the records of a 
victim's treating therapist simply to impeach the therapist's 
credibility.  Therefore, we determine that when the circuit 
court denied Rizzo's renewed request for the records, it 
correctly reaffirmed its pretrial decision.7 
VII 
¶55 In sum, we conclude that the State introduced Jensen 
testimony through an expert within the scope of Maday after 
representing to the circuit court that it would not do so.  
Consequently, Rizzo was deprived of his right to a pretrial 
determination under Maday.  We determine that the proper remedy 
under the facts of this case is a remand for the circuit court 
to 
determine 
whether 
Rizzo 
was 
entitled 
to 
a 
pretrial 
                                                 
7 On remand, if Rizzo receives a new trial because the 
circuit court determines that he was entitled to a psychological 
examination under Maday, the court may or may not need to 
revisit the treatment records issue, depending on how the 
parties' strategies unfold.  
No. 
99-3266-CR   
 
27 
 
psychological examination of D.F.  Only if the court determines 
on remand that Rizzo was entitled to a psychological examination 
is a new trial necessary.  In addition, we determine that the 
court of appeals erred in concluding that Rizzo was improperly 
denied access to D.F.'s treatment records.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the court of appeals and remand for the circuit court to 
make a determination under Maday.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
No.  99-3266-CR.dss 
 
 
 
1
 
¶56 DIANE 
S. 
SYKES, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
The central 
question in this case concerns the scope of Jensen8 for purposes 
of Maday.9  I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the 
expert testimony at issue in this case is Jensen evidence.  
Jensen must be read in the context of its facts, in light of the 
type 
of 
evidence 
actually 
in 
dispute 
in 
that 
case.10  
Alternatively, if the expert testimony at issue in this case 
comes under the umbrella of Jensen, I would conclude that this 
particular type of Jensen evidence does not trigger a Maday 
request for a defense psychological examination of the victim. 
¶57 Jensen involved the sexual assault of an 11-year-old 
girl by her stepfather.  As in many sexual assault cases, 
especially those involving children, the victim did not report 
the abuse immediately.  She ultimately disclosed it to her 
school guidance counselor, who met with her because of concerns 
about changes in her behavior, particularly a marked onset of 
sexually precocious "acting out" behavior.  State v. Jensen, 147 
Wis. 2d 240, 244-45, 432 N.W.2d 913 (1988).   
¶58 The State presented the counselor as a fact and expert 
witness at trial, questioning him briefly about the phenomenon 
of delayed reporting in sexual assault cases, and in more detail 
about the significance of the victim's post-assault "acting out" 
                                                 
8 State v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 432 N.W.2d 913 (1988). 
 
9 State v. Maday, 179 Wis. 2d 346, 507 N.W.2d 365 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
 
10 See Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 248-49. 
No.  99-3266-CR.dss 
 
 
 
2
behavior and its consistency with the behavior of sexual assault 
victims generally.  On appeal, however, and significant to the 
application of Jensen after Maday, the defendant challenged only 
the latter category of the counselor's opinion testimony, as the 
following passage of the opinion makes clear:   
 
On 
review 
the 
defendant 
challenges 
the 
admissibility of only one part of Mr. Bosman's [the 
counselor's] 
testimony, 
namely, 
Mr. 
Bosman's 
comparison of L.J.'s [the victim's] "acting out" 
behavior with the behavior of child sexual abuse 
victims.  The defendant objects only to the circuit 
court's decision to admit the question, "In your 
opinion . . . are the kinds of acting out behavior 
that the teachers described to you that they were 
seeing in L—— consistent with children who were 
victims of sexual abuse?" and the witness's answer, 
"Yes." 
Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 248-49. 
¶59 Jensen argued that this testimony amounted to an expert 
opinion that the victim was telling the truth, impermissible 
under State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92, 352 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. 
App. 1984).  Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 249.  This court disagreed, 
concluding that an expert's opinion about the consistency of a 
sexual assault victim's behavior with that of other sexual 
assault victims is admissible if it helps the factfinder 
understand the evidence or decide a fact in issue.  Id. at 256-
57.  The court emphasized, however, that the expert testimony 
may not be expressed as an opinion about the credibility of the 
victim, 
because 
Wisconsin 
law 
prohibits 
a 
witness 
from 
testifying "'that another mentally and physically competent 
witness is telling the truth.'" Id. at 249 (quoting Haseltine, 
120 Wis. 2d at 96). 
No.  99-3266-CR.dss 
 
 
 
3
¶60 The court then concluded that the guidance counselor's 
testimony about the significance of the victim's post-assault 
"acting out" behavior did not constitute an impermissible 
opinion about the victim's credibility but merely explained how 
the counselor's concerns precipitated his meeting with the 
victim during which she disclosed the abuse.  Jensen, 147 
Wis. 2d at 249.  The court further concluded that the opinion 
evidence was admissible to rebut the defense theory that the 
victim had fabricated the assault.  Id. 
¶61 Understood in context, therefore, Jensen evidence is 
expert testimony about the consistency of a sexual assault 
victim's post-assault reactive changes in behavior——conduct 
separate from the facts of the assault and the manner in which 
the victim reported it——with that of sexual assault victims 
generally.11 
Under 
State 
v. 
Maday, 
179 
Wis. 2d 346, 
507 
N.W.2d 365 (Ct. App. 1993),12 when the State intends to introduce 
this type of psychological opinion testimony through an expert 
who has conducted a personal examination of the victim, the 
defense may request a court-ordered psychological examination of 
the victim by an expert of the defendant's choosing.  As the 
majority notes, Maday requests are evaluated according to a 
seven-factor analysis that balances the potentially traumatic 
                                                 
11 Jensen did not involve "rape trauma syndrome" testimony, 
that 
is, 
opinion 
evidence 
that 
the 
victim 
manifested 
psychological symptoms shared by all rape victims, offered to 
prove that the victim was in fact sexually assaulted.  Jensen, 
147 Wis. 2d at 245-46 n.1.   
No.  99-3266-CR.dss 
 
 
 
4
effect of a court-ordered clinical psychological examination on 
the victim against the defendant's need for the evidence.13 
¶62 Maday's "leveling-of-the-playing field"14 approach makes 
sense if Jensen evidence is understood as the type of evidence 
actually at issue in Jensen, that is, opinion testimony about 
the diagnostic significance of a victim's post-assault change in 
behavior.  This type of evidence puts the victim's post-assault 
psychological condition at issue where it otherwise would not 
be.  When the state seeks to introduce such evidence through a 
Maday-type expert——one who has conducted a personal examination 
of the victim for purposes of evaluating his or her post-assault 
change in behavior for consistency with that of other sexual 
assault victims——the state puts the defendant at an evidentiary 
disadvantage.15  In this situation, the notion that the defendant 
should be entitled to ask for a court-ordered psychological 
examination of the victim is understandable on fundamental 
fairness grounds. 
¶63 But the threat of an inherently intrusive court-ordered 
psychological examination of a sexual assault victim should not 
be present where, as here, the State presents garden-variety, 
expert 
testimony 
about 
the 
common 
phenomenon 
of 
delayed 
reporting in sexual assault cases, even if that testimony comes 
in through a Maday-type expert who has personally examined the 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 359-60. 
 
13 Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 360-61; majority op. at ¶16. 
 
14 Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 357. 
 
15 Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 357. 
No.  99-3266-CR.dss 
 
 
 
5
victim, and even if the expert draws a Jensen-type consistency 
comparison.  This sort of expert testimony does not make the 
victim's psychological condition an issue, and therefore does 
not put the defense at an evidentiary disadvantage without its 
own psychological examination of the victim. 
¶64 I recognize that the court's holding in Jensen is 
expressed in broad terms, extending its theory beyond its 
factual context.16  But applying the Jensen label to all expert 
testimony drawing consistency comparisons about victim behavior, 
regardless of its type, is conceptually problematic, and, more 
importantly, unnecessarily puts sexual assault victims at risk 
of being 
ordered 
to undergo the 
ordeal 
of 
an unwanted 
psychological examination under Maday. 
¶65 Of course, a victim may refuse to submit to a court-
ordered psychological examination, but then, according to Maday, 
the state must forego the use of the examining expert's 
testimony.17  This puts the victim in something of an untenable 
                                                 
16 In a separate case also announced today, State v. Dunlap, 
2002 WI 19, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __, this court concludes 
that expert testimony comparing a child sexual assault victim's 
reporting behavior to the common reporting behavior of child 
sexual 
assault 
victims——e.g., 
delayed 
and 
progressive 
disclosure, confusion about the timing and physical details of 
the assault——is admissible under Jensen.  Other cases have also 
applied Jensen broadly, without recognizing any distinction in 
the type of expert testimony at issue.  See State v. Huntington, 
216 Wis. 2d 671, 697-98, 575 N.W.2d 268 (1998); State v. 
DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d 774, 794-95, 456 N.W.2d 600 (1990); State 
v. Vinson, 183 Wis. 2d 297, 309-12, 515 N.W.2d 314 (Ct. App. 
1994). 
 
17 Maday, 179 Wis. 2d 361-62. 
No.  99-3266-CR.dss 
 
 
 
6
position if he or she wants the prosecution to put on its best 
case for conviction, as crime victims usually do. 
¶66 It is important to note that Jensen relied heavily on 
certain explanatory language in Haseltine,18 as well as this 
court's earlier opinion in State v. Robinson, 146 Wis. 2d 315, 
431 N.W.2d 165 (1988).19  Both Haseltine and Robinson held that 
expert testimony explaining a sexual assault victim's reporting 
behavior in the context of common reporting behaviors of sexual 
assault victims generally is admissible to rebut a defense 
suggestion that such behavior is inconsistent with a claim of 
having been sexually assaulted.20 
 
For example, an incest victim may not immediately 
report the incest, or may recant accusations of 
incest.  Jurors might reasonably regard such behavior 
as an indication that the victim was not telling the 
truth.  An expert could explain that such behavior is 
common among incest victims as a result of guilt, 
confusion, and a reluctance to accuse a parent.  
Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d at 97.  This kind of expert testimony (in 
Robinson it was an explanation of the victim's emotional 
"flatness" upon reporting the assault) "serves a particularly 
useful role by disabusing the jury of some widely held 
misconceptions about sexual assault victims."  Robinson, 146 
Wis. 2d at 335. 
                                                 
 
18 State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92, 97, 352 N.W.2d 673 
(Ct. App. 1984).   
 
19  State v. Robinson, 146 Wis. 2d 315, 431 N.W.2d 165 
(1988).   
 
20 Robinson, 146 Wis. 2d at 334-35; Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 
at 96-97. 
No.  99-3266-CR.dss 
 
 
 
7
¶67 Considered against the backdrop of Haseltine and 
Robinson, therefore, the import of Jensen was twofold: 1) it 
legitimized 
the 
"consistency 
comparison" 
form 
of 
expert 
testimony (i.e., opinion testimony that the victim's behavior is 
"consistent with" that of other sexual assault victims); and 2) 
it extended the Robinson doctrine of admissibility, derived from 
the language in Haseltine, to expert explanations of other types 
of victim reactive behavior, specifically, post-assault changes 
in behavior separate and distinct from the manner in which the 
victim reports the assault.  Jensen thus contained important 
developments in the law of evidence regarding both the form and 
the substance or type of permissible expert testimony in this 
area. 
¶68 The difference in type (rather than form) of expert 
testimony authorized in Jensen from that previously authorized 
in Robinson and referenced in Haseltine becomes important for 
purposes of Maday.21  Robinson-type expert testimony about common 
                                                 
21 The majority focuses only on the form of the expert 
testimony to determine whether it fits within the ambit of 
Jensen for purposes of Maday.  I agree with the majority's 
conclusion that Dr. Pucci, the State's expert, essentially 
expressed her opinion in the form of a Jensen-style consistency 
comparison even though she did not use the phrase "consistent 
with" or similar "magic words" in stating her opinion.  In 
authorizing the admissibility of the consistency comparison form 
of opinion testimony in this area, Jensen suggested that there 
is no "legally significant" distinction between an explicit 
consistency comparison and expert testimony that is merely 
descriptive of the victim's behavior as against that of other 
sexual assault victims.  Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 253.  But the 
majority here does not look beyond the form of the expert 
testimony to consider its substance or type, which is important 
to the determination of whether the evidence fits within Jensen 
for purposes of Maday.  
No.  99-3266-CR.dss 
 
 
 
8
victim reporting behavior, stated in the form of a Jensen-style 
consistency comparison has become relatively routine in sexual 
assault 
cases. 
Jensen-type 
expert 
testimony 
about 
the 
psychological significance of post-assault changes in a victim's 
behavior is more unusual, and tends to make the victim's 
psychological condition more central to the case.  It also comes 
closer to being substantive (albeit circumstantial) evidence 
that the crime occurred, rather than merely rehabilitative 
evidence rebutting a defense attack on inconsistencies in the 
victim's manner of reporting the assault.     
¶69 These distinctions may be difficult to draw, but they 
make an important difference under Maday.  If the State seeks to 
buttress its case by emphasizing the victim's post-assault 
psychological condition through expert testimony about victim 
behavior that would otherwise not be part of the case, a court-
ordered psychological examination of the victim may be justified 
under Maday. 
¶70 But there is no justification for subjecting a sexual 
assault victim to the invasiveness of such an examination where 
the expert testimony concerns only a comparison of the way in 
which the victim reported the crime——which is an essential and 
unavoidable part of every sexual assault case——to the reporting 
behavior of sexual assault victims generally.  In other words, 
there is no justification for including comparison testimony 
about victim reporting behavior under the umbrella of Jensen for 
purposes of Maday. 
No.  99-3266-CR.dss 
 
 
 
9
¶71 If indeed all expert testimony drawing any consistency 
comparison between a victim's behavior and that of other sexual 
assault victims constitutes Jensen evidence, then Maday requests 
should be limited to those cases in which the proffered Jensen 
evidence puts the victim's post-assault psychological condition 
at issue in a significant way.  Only then does fundamental 
fairness require that the defense be given the same access to a 
clinical examination of the victim as the state, and only if the 
court, after analyzing the case under the seven-factor test in 
Maday, concludes that the defendant's interests outweigh the 
victim's. 
¶72 The seven-factor Maday analysis, therefore, should be 
preceded by an evaluation of the type of expert testimony the 
State seeks to introduce, the form the expert opinion will take, 
and the purposes for which it is offered.  If the proposed 
expert testimony concerns the common reporting behaviors of 
sexual assault victims and is offered as educative evidence to 
disabuse the jury of misconceptions about victims or to rebut a 
defense attack on these issues, then Maday does not come into 
play. 
¶73 This is (or should be) so even if the testimony comes 
from a Maday-type examining expert in the form of a Jensen-style 
consistency comparison, because this sort of testimony simply 
cannot be said to place the victim's psychological condition in 
issue, and, therefore, does not give rise to any of Maday's 
fundamental fairness concerns. Under these circumstances, the 
No.  99-3266-CR.dss 
 
 
 
10
victim's privacy interests will always outweigh the defendant's 
discovery interests. 
¶74 If, on the other hand, the proposed testimony is an 
opinion 
by 
an 
examining 
expert 
about 
the 
psychological 
significance of a victim's post-assault change in behavior, is 
stated in the form of a consistency comparison, and is offered 
in whole or in part as circumstantial evidence that the alleged 
assault occurred, then Maday is triggered and the seven-factor 
analysis should be undertaken.  Under these circumstances, the 
Maday concerns about a "level playing field" may indeed be 
present. 
¶75 The disputed evidence in this case consists of the 
State's expert's explanation of the 14-year-old victim's delay 
in reporting the defendant's sexual abuse in the context of the 
phenomenon 
of 
delayed 
reporting 
in 
sexual 
assault 
cases 
generally.  This evidence is not similar to the type of expert 
testimony at issue in Jensen and did not put the victim's post-
assault psychological condition at issue in any significant way, 
so the fundamental fairness considerations of Maday are plainly 
not present.22 
¶76 Accordingly, while I concur with the majority's 
decision to reverse the court of appeals, I disagree with its 
analysis of the scope of Jensen for purposes of Maday.  I would 
                                                 
22 I agree, however, with the majority's conclusion that Dr. 
Pucci was an expert who personally examined the victim within 
the meaning of Maday.  The fact that she was the victim's 
treating psychologist retained by the victim's family rather 
than a litigation expert retained by the State is not relevant 
to the fundamental fairness analysis under Maday. 
No.  99-3266-CR.dss 
 
 
 
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hold that the disputed expert testimony in this case was not 
Jensen evidence.  Alternatively, if it was Jensen evidence, then 
it was not the type of Jensen evidence that triggers a Maday 
request for a defense psychological examination of the victim.  
The admission of the evidence in the absence of a Maday 
determination was not error.  I would reverse the court of 
appeals without remanding for application of Maday. 
  
 
 
 
 
No.  99-3266-CR.dss 
 
 
 
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