Title: P. v. Stitely
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S028970
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: March 21, 2005

1 
Filed 3/21/05 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S028970 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
RICHARD STITELY, 
) 
Super. Ct. No. PA002330 
 
) 
 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
 
___________________________________ ) 
 
A jury convicted Richard Stitely (defendant) of the first degree murder of 
Carol Unger.  (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).)1  A related special circumstance of 
murder during the commission of unlawful sodomy was found true.  (§ 190.2, 
subd. (a)(17)(D).)  The jury also convicted defendant of the separate crime of 
forcible rape against Valery C.  (§ 261, subd. (a)(2).) 
After a penalty trial, the jury returned a death verdict.  The trial court 
declined to modify the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), and sentenced defendant to 
death for the sodomy murder.  The court also imposed and stayed a determinate 
term on the noncapital rape count.  This appeal is automatic.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, 
§ 11, subd. (a); § 1239, subd. (b).) 
                                             
 
1  
All unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
 
2 
We find no prejudicial error at defendant’s trial.  The judgment will be 
affirmed in its entirety. 
I.  GUILT PHASE EVIDENCE 
A.  Murder of Carol Unger and Related Sex Crimes 
1.  Carol’s Disappearance 
Carol Unger and her husband, Delbert, frequented the White Oak Inn, a bar 
located near their home.2  They went there both together and separately.  The 
couple had one child, Joey, during their marriage.  Carol had other children from a 
prior relationship, including her son Billy. 
At 8:30 p.m. on January 19, 1990, Billy called Delbert, who was alone at 
the White Oak Inn.  Delbert left the bar, and went to a restaurant with Billy.  They 
came home at 11:00 p.m.  Joey was there, but Carol was gone.  Delbert stayed 
awake until 1:00 a.m.  He heard nothing strange outside the house, which was well 
lit in front by a streetlight. 
Meanwhile, beginning at 9:30 the same night, several witnesses saw Carol 
at the White Oak Inn.3  Defendant, a semi-regular patron, was there too.  Carol sat 
at the bar, and defendant sat at a table.  According to both the bartender, Anthony 
Russo, and the waitress, Hazel Parrott, Carol and defendant each drank two or 
three beers.  Neither seemed intoxicated. 
Another regular patron, Shirley Cooper, saw Carol ask two or three men, 
including defendant, to dance with her.  Carol often danced with men who 
frequented the bar, even when her husband was present.  After one dance, 
                                             
 
2  
All events mentioned at the guilt phase occurred in the San Fernando 
Valley area of Los Angeles County. 
 
3  
Delbert testified that Carol routinely traveled to the bar by taxi and carried a 
large wallet or small clutch purse. 
 
3 
defendant returned to his table and Carol sat on a bar stool.  Cooper then saw 
defendant looking or staring at Carol. 
Carol eventually asked the bartender, Russo, to call a taxi because she 
wanted “to go home.”  Defendant intervened by offering her a ride and asking 
where she lived.  She accepted the offer, and canceled her cab request.  At some 
point, Carol asked Russo whether he knew defendant well.  Russo said “no,” but 
saw no reason to decline the ride.  By all accounts, Carol and defendant left the bar 
together around midnight.  This was the last time she was seen alive. 
When Carol failed to return home, Delbert called and visited the White Oak 
Inn.  He also reported her missing to police. 
2.  Discovery of Carol’s Body 
Around 11:00 a.m. on January 20, 1990, the day after Carol left the bar 
with defendant, Edward Berg found her body in an alley behind his workplace.  It 
was lying partially underneath the corner of Berg’s company van.  He called the 
police.  The police found no purse or wallet.  They identified Carol through 
Delbert’s report. 
Detective John Coffey and a coroner’s investigator, Debrah Kitchings, 
described the scene, as follows:  Carol was lying on her back with her legs spread 
apart, naked from the waist down.  Her jeans and underpants were gathered around 
one ankle, her shirt was bunched at the breast line, and her jacket was resting 
underneath the hip area.  Carol’s numerous injuries included scrape marks on the 
back and choke marks on the neck.  Pieces of foam rubber were found on her neck 
and head, in her underwear, and on the ground.  It appeared Carol had been 
sexually assaulted, dragged into the alley, and dumped under the van. 
3.  Medical Testimony about Carol’s Injuries 
Dr. Joseph Cogan, who performed the autopsy, testified that Carol was 
strangled to death based on the following premortem injuries:  Blood congestion 
 
4 
and petechial hemorrhages in the jaw and face showed that pressure had been 
applied to the neck, and that circulation had stopped to the head, for a “long” time.  
Internal hemorrhaging from blunt force trauma appeared on both sides of the neck 
and around the eyes and ears.  Carol’s thyroid cartilage, or Adam’s apple, was 
fractured — an injury consistent with manual strangulation.  However, the 
fracturing of the cricoid cartilage, which sits deeper in the neck, required greater 
pressure from a choke-hold maneuver.  Dr. Cogan also linked certain marks on the 
front of Carol’s neck to a ligature pulled from behind. 
Regarding nonlethal injuries, Dr. Cogan testified that two cuts on Carol’s 
left hand were caused by a sharp instrument, and were consistent with defensive 
knife wounds.  He also described abrasions and bruises on the extremities, two 
round marks or burns on the head, and bruising on the scalp.  The skin on Carol’s 
back had been scraped or dragged on a hard surface both before and after death. 
Dr. Cogan found multiple signs of sexual activity.  There were two tears in 
the anal opening, as well as tears, contusions, and hemorrhaging inside the anal 
cavity.  The anal injuries were inflicted before death, were caused by blunt force 
trauma, and were consistent with penile penetration.  Dr. Cogan found no vaginal 
tears.  Because the vaginal opening was “marital,” the lack of tearing was not 
inconsistent with forcible penetration.  Some darkening or reddening of the labia 
could have been a contusion. 
Investigator Kitchings testified that she saw “trauma” in Carol’s vaginal 
and anal areas at the crime scene.  Kitchings also estimated the time of death by 
comparing air and liver temperatures at 3:30 p.m. on January 20, 1990, a few 
hours after Carol was found.  She had most likely been dead for 15 hours (i.e., 
since 12:30 a.m. on January 20, 1990).  However, she could have died anywhere 
from 12 to 20 hours earlier (i.e., between 7:30 p.m. on January 19, 1990 and 3:30 
a.m. on January 20, 1990). 
 
5 
The evidence included an autopsy report and attached toxicology report.  
The parties stipulated that Carol’s toxicology tests revealed a .26 percent blood-
alcohol content, a result indicating intoxication. 
4.  Physical Evidence and Forensic Tests 
As discussed below, the police found torn seat cushions and foam debris 
during a search of defendant’s car.  Criminalist Susan Johnson testified that there 
was no difference in color, chemical composition, or cellular structure between the 
foam found on Carol’s body and the foam seized from defendant’s car.  The origin 
could have been the same. 
Criminalist Lloyd Mahanay made cotton swabs and microscope slides of 
the fluids in Carol’s vagina and anus.  Though he did not personally conduct such 
tests, he opined that any sperm found on these items would reflect ejaculation into 
each orifice.  Mahanay ruled out the possibility that semen from the vagina could 
have contaminated the anal swab, or that ejaculation on or in the vagina could 
have leaked into the anus. 
Serologist Alison Ochiae testified that Carol had type O blood, and that 
defendant was a type A secretor.  A secretor is one whose blood type appears in 
other bodily fluids.  Ochiae found sperm on the vaginal swabs and anal slides that 
Criminalist Mahanay had prepared.  Using the ABO method, Ochiae identified 
defendant as a possible sperm donor.  She also linked him to a stain on Carol’s 
jacket. 
The parties stipulated that Criminalist Mark Taylor performed DNA tests 
that could conclusively match the genetic materials in semen with the genetic 
materials in blood.  The DNA pattern found on Carol’s vaginal and anal swabs 
matched the DNA pattern obtained from defendant. 
5.  Defendant’s Statements to Police 
Based on information obtained at the White Oak Inn and other bars, 
 
6 
detectives learned that defendant worked at a radiator repair shop.  On February 2, 
1990, Detective Coffey and his partner visited defendant at work.  He agreed to 
accompany them to the police station.  When Detective Coffey peered inside 
defendant’s station wagon, he saw torn seats and foam debris similar to the foam 
found on Carol’s body.  Police impounded the car.  They later searched it with 
defendant’s consent. 
Defendant received and waived his constitutional rights during the ride to 
the police station.  Detective Coffey questioned defendant at the station, assisted 
by Detective Medina.  Coffey recorded the interview without defendant’s 
knowledge.  The jury heard the interview, and received the transcript. 
Defendant first told detectives that he last visited the White Oak Inn on 
January 26, 1990, and had not been there in the preceding two months.  Though he 
often went to bars on Friday nights, defendant recalled staying home on Friday, 
January 19, 1990, to save money.  He denied knowing Carol.  Detective Coffey 
asked about Valery C., a teenager who stayed with defendant and his daughter.  
Defendant said that Valery had falsely accused him of rape because he told her to 
pay rent or move. 
Detective Coffey said that witnesses saw Carol leave the bar with defendant 
on January 19, 1990.  Defendant then admitted that he drove her home.  He 
recalled seeing both a red van and a shadowy figure outside her house.4  
Supposedly, as Carol left the car, she took a steak knife from her purse.  Though 
defendant was scared, Carol did not threaten him with the knife, and instead 
                                             
 
4  
According to Carol’s husband, Delbert, a burgundy truck and green car 
were parked in the driveway the night Carol died.  Neither his family nor any of 
their immediate neighbors owned a red van. 
 
 
7 
mentioned her “old man.”5  Defendant claimed he sped away, and that nothing 
sexual or violent happened.  He initially lied because he did not want to upset 
Carol’s husband. 
Detective Coffey theorized that Carol died during a fight with defendant.  
Defendant said he might “stop talking,” and Coffey reaffirmed his right to do so.  
Nevertheless, defendant continued to assert his innocence, saying, “The only thing 
you can prove is I took her out of that bar, man.”  Defendant denied any fight.  He 
repeated that Carol “didn’t threaten” him with the knife or otherwise seem 
interested in “using” it on him.6 
Detective Coffey remarked that debris in Carol’s hair looked like debris in 
defendant’s car.  Defendant then conceded a struggle, giving the following 
account:  When they got to her house, Carol — who was “drunker than hell” — 
asked to visit another bar.  Defendant refused because he needed to go home.  
Defendant saw someone exit the house, and watched Carol draw the knife from 
her purse.  She exited and reentered the car.  He sped away at her request.  Carol 
again asked to go to another bar.  Defendant stopped the car.  Scared and unsure of 
her intent, he squeezed her hand to expel the knife.  She tried to bite him, and he 
grabbed her hair.  Carol opened the door.  Defendant kicked her in the face, 
ejecting her from the car.  He did not strangle or kill her. 
                                             
 
5 
Delbert never saw a knife in Carol’s possession at the bar or heard her talk 
about carrying one.  Other witnesses gave similar testimony, namely, Russo, the 
bartender, and Cooper, a regular bar patron.  Investigators found no knife in 
defendant’s car or near Carol’s body. 
 
6  
At this point in the interview on February 2, 1990, defendant signed a form 
authorizing a search of his home and car.  A short time later, however, he revealed 
that he could not read or write.  Detective Coffey then read the consent form to 
defendant.  He said he understood and agreed with it.  Defendant’s car was 
searched, and the contents were seized, on February 5, 1990. 
 
8 
Detective Coffey told defendant he intended to test bodily fluids found at 
the crime scene.  Defendant then admitted having vaginal intercourse with Carol 
in his car.  Coffey asked whether the act was “mutual,” and defendant said, 
“yeah.”  He reportedly initiated the sexual encounter, and Carol mentioned the 
lack of intimacy in her marriage.  Defendant said he had previously withheld this 
information because another “bitch,” Valery C., had falsely accused him of rape.  
Defendant adamantly denied having anal sex with Carol. 
Regarding Carol’s injuries, defendant acknowledged that he could have 
unintentionally “caused her death.”  However, he consistently maintained that he 
kicked her only once — possibly hitting her neck, chest, and shoulder — and that 
he never strangled or punched her. 
Finally, at Detective Medina’s request, defendant clarified that the sex act 
occurred after they left Carol’s house, while the knife was out of sight.  They 
subsequently fought because Carol — though drunk and “out of it” — wanted to 
go to another bar, and he wanted to go home.  In this final account, Carol held the 
knife down by her side when defendant kicked her from the car.  She said she 
wanted to “hurt somebody.”  However, she did not assault, threaten, or injure him 
with the knife.  Defendant claimed Carol was alive and clothed when he left her at 
a spot different from where her body was found.7 
B.  Rape of Valery C. 
The main witness on the noncapital rape count was the victim, Valery C.  
Valery testified that in June 1989, she was 16 years old, and five and one-half 
                                             
 
7 
Two days later, on February 4, 1990, defendant contacted police from his 
jail cell.  When Detective Coffey alluded to their prior conversation, defendant 
again denied raping or strangling Carol, or touching Valery C. 
 
 
9 
months pregnant.  She had been evicted from her own apartment, and did not live 
with her mother because they did not get along.  Valery therefore accepted an 
invitation from defendant’s daughter, S., to live with defendant and S.  According 
to Valery, defendant never told her to pay household expenses or to move out.  He 
slept on the couch, and the girls shared the lone bedroom. 
Valery testified that on June 28, 1989, she returned to the apartment at 11:00 
p.m.  Defendant was in the front room.  S. was gone.  Valery entered the bedroom, 
and closed the door.  She put on a long button-down shirt and underwear, and got 
into bed.  This was the first time she and defendant were alone together. 
According to Valery, the following events occurred:  Defendant entered the 
bedroom and shut the door.  He climbed on top of Valery, who was underneath the 
blankets.  Scared and confused, she started to scream.  Defendant grabbed her 
throat with one hand and threatened to kill her if she did not keep quiet.  
Defendant choked her for at least 20 seconds, causing her to cough when he 
finally released his grip. 
Valery continued:  Defendant pinned Valery’s arm over her shoulder.  
Saying she could not live there for free, defendant moved the blankets and 
unbuttoned her shirt.  He kissed her breasts, and placed his fingers into her vagina.  
Defendant then lowered her underpants, unzipped his trousers, and penetrated her 
vagina.  Defendant ignored Valery’s plea to stop because of her unborn baby.  
Instead, he withdrew his penis, placed Valery on her side, and then resumed 
intercourse.  After ejaculating, defendant left the room.  He did not smell like 
alcohol or seem intoxicated. 
Valery buttoned her shirt and cleaned herself in the bathroom.  When she 
entered the living room, defendant apologized and said she could call the police.  
She put on a pair of pants, and ran to meet her boyfriend in the park.  Crying and 
shaking, she told him what happened. 
 
10 
Almost immediately, at 11:45 p.m., Valery’s boyfriend called the police.  
As reflected by the 911 recording admitted at trial, both Valery and her boyfriend 
told the dispatcher about the rape.  Valery testified that she also called her mother. 
Valery continued her account:  Valery and her mother promptly went to the 
police station and reported the rape to a female officer.  Later, at the hospital, 
Valery declined an examination because no female doctor was available.  The next 
day, Valery discarded the button-down shirt because it repulsed her.  She retrieved 
her belongings from defendant’s apartment, and never returned to live there. 
The investigating officer, Angela Hougen, testified that she saw no bruises 
on Valery C.  However, Valery was distraught at the police station, and became 
more upset at the hospital while waiting for an exam. 
C.  Defense 
Defendant presented no evidence at the guilt phase. 
II.  PENALTY PHASE EVIDENCE 
A.  Prosecution Case 
1.  Other Violent Crimes 
The evidence showed that defendant, who was 41 years old at the time of 
the capital crime, committed prior violent crimes against his ex-wife and their two 
daughters.  Specifically, M., who was 20 years old at the time of trial, testified that 
defendant adopted her as a child while married to her mother, Deborah.  
According to M., defendant sodomized her in the family’s Texas home for three 
and one-half years, starting when she was five years old.  During this period, 
defendant also sodomized his biological daughter S., who is two years younger 
than M.  The acts usually happened on Saturdays when Deborah ran errands with 
her and defendant’s youngest child, R. 
M. described a typical sexual encounter with her father as follows: 
defendant told M. to undress in the bathroom, and to rub Vaseline in her anal area.  
 
11 
She complied out of fear.  While M. either leaned on the toilet or lay on the floor, 
defendant placed his penis in her anus.  Defendant ignored M.’s pleas to stop even 
though she bled and expressed pain.  Afterwards, defendant told M. to clean 
herself and to bring her younger sister, S., into the bathroom.  M. then saw 
defendant sodomize S., and heard S. scream.  Defendant threatened to kill both the 
girls and their mother if the sex acts were disclosed.  He smelled like liquor, but 
was not always drunk, when these acts occurred. 
M. testified that in 1981, at age eight, she disclosed these acts first to the 
babysitter and then to Deborah (the mother of M. and S.)  M. also signed an 
affidavit in Texas concerning the matter. 
Deborah testified that she and defendant married in 1973, and divorced 10 
years later.  According to Deborah, defendant abused alcohol, and the pair often 
fought.  At different times, defendant assaulted Deborah by (1) pointing a gun at 
her head and threatening to shoot her, (2) wielding a knife and threatening to stab 
her, (3) grabbing scissors and lunging at her, and (4) striking her with a makeup 
mirror and cutting her head.  Each act occurred in front of the children. 
Deborah testified that, while awaiting trial, defendant said, “[I]f they find 
M., she’ll hang me.”  Despite some initial doubts, Deborah believed defendant had 
molested their daughters.  She also described him as both smart and a good 
provider.  No one, including defendant, deserved execution in Deborah’s view. 
2.  Victim Impact Evidence 
Delbert Unger described Carol as “his whole life.”  He identified a 
photograph of them together, which was admitted into evidence. 
The pathologist, Dr. Cogan, testified that Carol was probably strangled for 
several minutes or more before she died, and that she likely experienced both 
cardiovascular and emotional distress.  It took great force to break both neck 
cartilages — trauma that would cause pain in a live person.  Dr. Cogan explained 
 
12 
that a lit cigarette could have made the round marks or burns on Carol’s head, and 
that most of the nonfatal injuries occurred while she was alive and susceptible to 
pain. 
B.  Defense Case 
1.  Character Evidence 
Three associates in the radiator repair business testified on defendant’s 
behalf:  (1) Wyatt Crawford, whose family employed defendant for 15 years in 
Texas, (2) Richard Donohue, who employed defendant in California before the 
capital crime, and (3) Eugene Pace, who employed defendant in California at the 
time of the crime.  These witnesses agreed that defendant was competent, 
courteous, and reliable.  His illiteracy did not affect his work.  Defendant never 
came to work impaired by alcohol.  The parties stipulated that he quit the first 
California job because others drank alcohol at work.  When defendant was 
arrested in Texas, his employer, the Crawford family, posted his bail. 
2.  Lack of Criminal Record 
The parties stipulated that defendant had no prior felony or misdemeanor 
convictions.  Another stipulation addressed the acts of sodomy reported to police 
in 1981 and described by M. at trial.  A Texas grand jury considered the matter 
shortly after it was reported and declined to proceed against defendant.  The case 
could have been refiled. 
3.  Good Conduct in Custody 
Deputy Sheriff Rust testified that defendant behaved well in jail during the 
capital trial.  The parties stipulated that inmates imprisoned for life without the 
possibility of parole (LWOP) receive the highest security available outside of 
Death Row.  If defendant remained discipline-free, he could teach auto repair and 
earn privileges in prison. 
 
13 
III.  PRETRIAL ISSUES 
A.  Severance 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the 
special circumstance murder of Carol from the forcible rape of Valery C.  He 
argues here, as below, that the prosecution improperly joined the two counts in 
order to bolster weak circumstantial evidence that defendant murdered Carol in the 
course of a sexual assault.  A federal due process violation allegedly occurred.  We 
disagree.8 
The trial court properly found that both offenses belonged to “the same 
[assaultive] class.”  (§ 954.)  Joinder therefore was statutorily allowed.  (Ibid.; 
People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 126.)  Defendant has never disputed this 
threshold point. 
Thus, defendant must show that a substantial danger of prejudice compelled 
severance.  (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 110.)  We ask whether the 
denial of severance was an abuse of discretion given the record before the trial 
court.  (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 508.)  A pretrial ruling that was 
correct when made can be reversed on appeal only if joinder was so grossly unfair 
                                             
 
8  
As will become clear, this claim fails, in part, because of how the case was 
pled and tried.  As noted, a sodomy-murder special circumstance accompanied the 
alleged murder.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(D).)  The prosecution moved to amend the 
information to allege a rape-murder special circumstance (id., subd. (a)(17)(C)), 
but the trial court denied the motion as untimely.  Hence, sodomy murder was the 
sole special circumstance alleged and tried here.  At trial, the prosecution sought a 
first degree murder conviction on two theories: felony-murder in the commission 
of rape, and premeditated murder.  Sodomy could not be used to prove first degree 
felony murder when the capital crime occurred.  (See § 189, as amended by Prop. 
115, approved by voters, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990); People v. Hart (1999) 20 
Cal.4th 546, 580, fn. 2; Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 297-299.)  
Hence, rape murder was the sole felony-murder theory of first degree murder. 
 
14 
as to deny due process.  (People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th 92, 127; People v. 
Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 576, 590.) 
Cross-admissibility is the crucial factor affecting prejudice.  (People v. 
Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 120.)  If evidence of one crime would be admissible 
in a separate trial of the other crime, prejudice is usually dispelled.  (People v. 
Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1315-1316.) 
Invoking the law applicable at the time of his trial, defendant argues that 
prior sex crimes may be used only for a relevant nondispositional purpose, like 
identity (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b)), and that the two joined counts are not 
sufficiently “distinctive” to show that the same person who raped Valery C. also 
attacked Carol.  (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 403; but see Evid. Code, 
§ 1108, subd. (a) [new posttrial statute providing that, in sex crime prosecutions, 
§ 1101 does not bar defendant’s other sex crimes if such evidence is not barred 
under § 352]; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 911-912.)  However, the 
degree of similarity required to prove mental state is far less exacting.  The two 
acts need only be sufficiently similar to suggest that the defendant probably had 
the same intent each time.  (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402.) 
While the trial court avoided the issue, evidence at both the preliminary 
hearing and trial that defendant choked and raped Valery C. suggested that he 
acted with similar criminal intent while having sexual intercourse with Carol — a 
victim who was also choked.  (See People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 
379 [not guilty plea disputes all elements of charged crime, including intent].)  
Indeed, jurors could not convict defendant of first degree murder on a felony-
murder-rape theory unless they found “specific intent to commit rape” beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  (People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 314.)  The chance that 
defendant acted with innocent intent with Carol is sharply reduced by evidence 
 
15 
that he committed a forcible, nonconsensual sex act upon Valery C. a few months 
earlier.  (People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 379.) 
Also, as the prosecutor stated in closing argument, the jury could 
reasonably infer from Valery C.’s rape accusation that defendant killed Carol to 
“cover up” the sexual assault, and to prevent her from reporting the crime as 
Valery had done.  This inference of a motive to kill, coupled with evidence that 
Carol was last seen alive with defendant and that she died soon after they left the 
bar, constituted circumstantial evidence that he intended, deliberated, and 
premeditated her death for purposes of proving first degree murder.  (People v. 
Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1284.) 
However, any lack of cross-admissibility is not, by itself, sufficient to show 
prejudice and bar joinder.  (§ 954.1; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 
667.)9  Here, the trial court considered other factors commonly used to assess 
prejudice, including the likelihood of inflaming the jury, the strength of the 
evidence, and the availability of the death penalty.  (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 1, 27-28.)  The court rejected the notion that the noncapital count was 
more “passionate” than the capital count, noting that the latter crime involved both 
sexual violence and murder.  The court also determined that circumstantial 
                                             
 
9  
Section 954.1 states, in part, that where “two or more different offenses of 
the same class of crimes or offenses have been charged together in the same 
accusatory pleading, . . . evidence concerning one offense or offenses need not be 
admissible as to the other offense or offenses before the jointly charged offenses 
may be tried together.”  The voters adopted this statute in Proposition 115, which 
took effect on June 6, 1990.  Section 954.1 applies to trials held after its enactment 
even where, as here, the charged crimes occurred before that time.  (Tapia v. 
Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.3d 282, 299-300.)  Section 954.1 codified existing 
case law (People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th 622, 667), and did not materially 
change the rules of severance.  (People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th 92, 126, fn. 7.) 
 
16 
evidence of defendant’s role in Carol’s murder seemed “pretty strong” compared 
to Valery C.’s firsthand account of the rape. 
This reasoning is persuasive.  In short, defendant fails to demonstrate that 
the denial of severance involved an abuse of discretion or caused gross unfairness 
at his trial.  As in other cases, we reject the claim.  (E.g., People v. Marshall, 
supra, 15 Cal.4th 1, 27-28 [noncapital sex crime properly joined with subsequent 
similar capital crime]; People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th 463, 507-509 [same].) 
B.  Miranda Claim 
Defendant argues that he invoked his privilege against self-incrimination by 
suggesting he might “stop talking” to the police on February 2, 1990, and that 
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) barred his subsequent 
statements during the same interview.  The trial court purportedly erred in denying 
a motion to suppress such evidence.  We disagree. 
Evidence at the suppression hearing consisted primarily of Detective 
Coffey’s testimony and the transcribed interview.  The relevant facts are as 
follows:  Coffey and another officer met defendant at work, and said they were 
investigating a homicide.  Defendant was cordial and offered to help.  He agreed 
to talk at the police station, and voluntarily entered the police car for this purpose.  
Defendant was not placed under arrest and was free to decline the ride.  
Meanwhile, detectives impounded defendant’s car.  He sat in the police car and 
calmly watched the process. 
The evidence further established that during the ride to the station, no 
discussion about the criminal investigation occurred.  However, in mentioning his 
marital history in Texas, defendant referred to women as “bitches.”  Concerned 
that defendant might discuss the capital crime, Detective Coffey read defendant 
his Miranda rights from an official card.  Defendant said he understood his rights, 
and agreed to waive each one.  No other conversation occurred in the police car. 
 
17 
The record of the suppression hearing also showed that defendant received 
no new Miranda warnings at the station.  Officers placed him in an interview 
room, activated the tape recorder, and asked questions.  After defendant admitted 
that he gave Carol a ride, Detective Coffey suggested that the pair fought.  The 
following exchange then occurred: 
DEFENDANT:  “Okay.  I’ll tell you.  I think it’s about time for me to stop 
talking.” 
COFFEY: 
  “You can stop talking.  You can stop talking.” 
DEFENDANT:  “Okay.” 
COFFEY: 
  “It’s up to you.  Nobody ever forces you to talk.  I told you 
that.  I read you all that (untranslatable).” 
DEFENDANT:  “Well, I mean (untranslatable) God damn accused of 
something that I didn’t do.  I’m telling you the truth.  And you’re not believe [sic] 
me.  You’re not believing me.  I’m telling you the truth.” 
COFFEY: 
  “Richard, the only problem is, I can prove otherwise.  The 
only reason I — listen to me.” 
DEFENDANT:  “The only thing you can prove is I took her out of that bar, 
man.  That’s all I did.  That’s the only thing I’ve done.”  (Italics added.) 
Detective Coffey explained at the suppression hearing that if defendant had 
decided to stop talking, the interview would have ended.  Because defendant’s 
statements were unclear in this regard, Coffey did not believe that questioning had 
to stop.  Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, Coffey “reinforced” the notion 
that defendant was free to exercise his right to silence. 
After hearing argument on both sides, the trial court found no Miranda 
violation and declined to suppress defendant’s statements.  The court determined 
that defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before the interview.  The 
 
18 
court also determined that he never stopped speaking freely with the police, and 
that he declined the detective’s offer to do so. 
To protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, a 
person undergoing a custodial interrogation must first be advised of his right to 
remain silent, to the presence of counsel, and to appointed counsel, if indigent.  
(Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 467-473, 478-479.)  As long as the suspect 
knowingly and intelligently waives these rights, the police are free to interrogate 
him.  (Id. at pp. 444, 475, 479.)  However, if, at any point in the interview, the 
suspect invokes his rights, questioning must cease.  (Id. at pp. 444-445, 473-474; 
see Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 [questioning cannot resume 
until request for counsel is granted or suspect restarts interview].)  Statements 
obtained in violation of these rules are inadmissible to prove guilt in a criminal 
case.  (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444, 476-477, 479; see People v. Sapp 
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 266; People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 79-80.) 
In order to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege after it has been waived, 
and in order to halt police questioning after it has begun, the suspect “must 
unambiguously” assert his right to silence or counsel.  (Davis v. United States 
(1994) 512 U.S. 452, 459 (Davis), italics added.)  It is not enough for a reasonable 
police officer to understand that the suspect might be invoking his rights.  (Ibid.)  
Faced with an ambiguous or equivocal statement, law enforcement officers are not 
required under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, either to ask clarifying questions or 
to cease questioning altogether.  (Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 459-462.)  Of 
course, such an approach may disadvantage suspects who, for emotional or 
intellectual reasons, have difficulty expressing themselves.  (Id. at p. 460.)  
However, a rule requiring a clear invocation of rights from someone who has 
already received and waived them “avoid[s] difficulties of proof” (id. at p. 458), 
and promotes “effective law enforcement.”  (Id. at p. 461.) 
 
19 
As in prior cases, we follow Davis here.  (People v. Gonzalez (2005) 34 
Cal.4th 1111, 1125; People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 510; People v. 
Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 129-130.)  A reasonable officer in Detective 
Coffey’s position would have concluded that defendant’s first remark (“I think it’s 
about time for me to stop talking”) expressed apparent frustration, but did not end 
the interview.  Defendant agrees that this statement was ambiguous under Davis, 
supra, 512 U.S. 452, and that the police were not required to stop asking questions 
at that point.  Nevertheless, Coffey did stop the interrogation, and twice reminded 
defendant of his right to “stop talking.”  This cautious approach gave defendant a 
chance to clarify whether questioning should proceed — something defendant 
concedes the officer was not constitutionally required to do. 
Contrary to what defendant claims, he did not clarify his ambiguous 
remarks or clearly invoke his constitutional privilege by saying “Okay.”  This 
nonsubstantive response merely implied that defendant understood what he had 
just heard, and that he could “stop talking” if he so chose.  Detective Coffey’s 
subsequent comments also do not support defendant’s related claim that he was 
badgered into resuming the interrogation.  Consistent with his neutral stance 
throughout the exchange, Coffey again reminded defendant that talking was 
optional (“[i]t’s up to you”), and alluded to the prior Miranda warning (“I read 
you all that”).  However, instead of exercising the right to silence that Detective 
Coffey purposefully “reinforced,” defendant protested his innocence and 
continuing talking about the crime.  Under the circumstances, nothing prevented 
Coffey from continuing the exchange.  We therefore uphold admission of the 
entire police interview at trial.10 
                                             
 
10  
In People v. Michaels, supra, 28 Cal.4th 486, we found no Miranda 
violation under strikingly similar facts.  The defendant in Michaels waived his 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
20 
C.  Death Qualification of Jurors 
1.  Sequestration Issues 
Defendant insists the trial court erred by failing to conduct the entire death-
qualifying voir dire “individually and in sequestration” as set forth in Hovey v. 
Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80 (Hovey).  He claims violations of his 
federal constitutional rights to due process and an impartial jury. 
Before jury selection, and on its own motion, the trial court determined that 
Hovey, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1, did not apply.  This ruling was correct.  Defendant’s 
trial occurred after voters approved Proposition 115, which added new section 223 
to the Code of Civil Procedure.  (See Tapia v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.3d 
282, 299-300 [applying statute to proceedings held after Prop. 115 took effect on 
June 6, 1990].)  Then, as now, the statute provided that the voir dire of prospective 
jurors in capital cases “shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the other 
jurors.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 223.)11  This provision had the intent and effect of 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
constitutional rights, and was asked to describe the capital crime.  He hesitated, 
saying “ ‘I don’t know if I should without an attorney.’ ”  (Id. at p. 509, italics 
omitted.)  The interrogating officer replied that defendant could stop talking, and 
that he did not have to answer any question he disliked.  Defendant said, “ ‘Okay, 
that one,’ ” and then confessed.  (Ibid., italics omitted.)  On appeal, defendant 
argued that even if his reference to counsel was ambiguous, he clearly invoked his 
right to silence by saying “Okay.”  Applying Davis, supra, 512 U.S. 452, we 
rejected the claim.  The defendant in Michaels never clearly “assert[ed] a right to 
refuse to answer any questions, ask[ed] that the questioning come to a halt, or 
request[ed] counsel.”  (People v. Michaels, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 510.)  As noted 
above, defendant’s remarks are no less equivocal in the present case. 
 
11  
At the time of trial, Code of Civil Procedure section 223 stated:  “In a 
criminal case, the court shall conduct the examination of prospective jurors.  
However, the court may permit the parties, upon a showing of good cause, to 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
21 
abrogating the sequestration rule of Hovey, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1, which was not 
constitutionally compelled.  (See id. at p. 80 [invoking court’s “supervisory 
authority over California criminal procedure”]; see also People v. Navarette 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 490; People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1199; 
People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1180; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 
690, 713.)  We reject defendant’s contrary claim.12 
Defendant alternatively complains that to the extent the court decided that 
group voir dire was “practicable” (Code Civ. Proc., § 223), it applied statutory law 
in a manner that denied him due process and an impartial jury.  Prospective jurors 
allegedly gave monosyllabic, unconsidered, and parroted answers that concealed 
their true views on capital punishment.  The record does not support the claim. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or shall 
itself submit to the prospective jurors upon such a showing, such additional 
questions by the parties as it deems proper.  Voir dire of any prospective jurors 
shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the other jurors in all criminal 
cases, including death penalty cases.”  (As added by Prop. 115, approved by 
voters, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990).)  Effective January 1, 2001, the statute was 
amended to give counsel for each party an expanded, though not unlimited, right 
to examine prospective jurors through direct oral questioning.  However, the 
provision regarding group voir dire remained unchanged.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 223, 
as amended by Stats. 2000, ch. 192, § 1; People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 
455 & fns. 17 & 18.) 
12  
The Attorney General argues that defendant has forfeited his right to 
complain about the lack of Hovey voir dire because he never sought individual 
sequestered voir dire of the whole panel below.  As noted, the trial court raised the 
issue sua sponte to address the procedural changes made by Proposition 115.  The 
Attorney General cites no authority for his assumption that such a sua sponte 
ruling is immune from appellate review.  Thus, consistent with other similar cases, 
we reject the Hovey claim solely on the merits.  (See, e.g., People v. Navarette, 
supra, 30 Cal.4th 458, 490; People v. Slaughter, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1199; 
People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1180.) 
 
22 
Initially, the trial court advised counsel of its intent to apply Code of Civil 
Procedure section 223, and of the procedures that would be used.  Thus, the court 
said it would assume primary responsibility for conducting the oral examination, 
and that counsel would be allowed to ask appropriate follow-up questions.  
Prospective jurors, the court said, would be examined as a group in open court.  
However, the court made clear that many questions, including some involving 
capital punishment, would be asked at the bench on a select basis.  Counsel were 
told to “expect to approach the bench quite a bit,” because the court planned to ask 
“sensitive” questions and to probe “exotic” answers in this private manner. 
Prospective jurors completed a 25-page questionnaire, which they signed 
under penalty of perjury.  One section — six pages and 14 questions — concerned 
capital punishment.  To enhance questioning, the court gave counsel advance 
copies of the questionnaires in the same order in which each prospective juror 
would be orally examined.  The court said it planned to make preparatory notes on 
“every single one” of its copies of the questionnaires. 
As promised, the court began death qualification by asking each 
prospective juror, in open court, four questions similar to ones appearing on the 
questionnaire.  These questions sought to discover whether prospective jurors 
would “automatically” vote for a certain penalty (Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 
391 U.S. 510, 522, fn. 21 (Witherspoon), italics omitted), and whether their views 
on capital punishment would “ ‘prevent or substantially impair’ ” the performance 
of their duties in keeping with their oath and the court’s instructions.  (Wainwright 
v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 (Witt) [clarifying the Witherspoon standard].)13 
                                             
 
13  
The court asked whether jurors, because of their views on capital 
punishment, and notwithstanding the evidence in the case, would (1) refuse to 
convict defendant of first degree murder to prevent a penalty trial, (2) refuse to 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
23 
Depending upon the answers given either orally or in writing, the trial court 
often asked follow-up questions about the person’s views on capital punishment.  
In many instances, such clarification occurred at the bench so that other 
prospective jurors could not hear the exchange.  The court permitted counsel to 
ask additional questions, particularly as to matters discussed at the bench. 
Based on these facts, and as a threshold matter, it appears the defense had 
ample opportunity to object to the manner in which the trial court conducted group 
voir dire under applicable statutory law, and to propose individual sequestered voir 
dire as a solution to any perceived problems.  Thus, as the Attorney General 
maintains, defendant’s failure to raise any such complaint below forfeits the issue 
on appeal.  (People v. Vieira (March 7, 2005, S026040) __ Cal.4th __, __.) 
The claim lacks merit in any event.  Defendant is wrong insofar as he 
implies that no individual, sequestered examination on capital punishment 
occurred.  We also cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision to ask questions 
both in open court and at the bench produced meaningless, lockstep answers.  
Indeed, these procedures enabled counsel on both sides to challenge certain 
individuals for cause — sometimes successfully — based on their death penalty 
views.  Defendant provides no “specific example of how questioning prospective 
jurors in the presence of other jurors prevented him from uncovering juror bias.”  
(People v. Navarette, supra, 30 Cal.4th 458, 490.)  Thus, consistent with other 
post-Proposition 115 cases upholding similar limited sequestration procedures, we 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
find the special circumstance true to prevent a penalty trial, (3) automatically 
refuse to vote for death and automatically vote for LWOP, and (4) automatically 
refuse to vote for LWOP and automatically vote for death. 
 
 
24 
find no constitutional or other error.  (E.g., People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th 
690, 713-714 [same trial judge and procedures as in present case].) 
2.  General Adequacy of Questioning 
Defendant asserts that other deficiencies in death qualification prevented 
him from adequately questioning prospective jurors, and deprived him of federal 
due process guarantees.  For instance, defense counsel objected to the “breakneck 
speed” of voir dire, and asked the trial court to slow down by “about 15 percent.”  
Defendant also claims the court made too few inquiries, as evidenced by its use of 
four standard questions and by its rejection of two proposed defense questions.14 
Defendant did not frame his complaints about the pace and scope of voir 
dire below in terms of a due process violation.  However, assuming without 
deciding that this federal claim has been preserved (see People v. Yeoman (2003) 
31 Cal.4th 93, 117-118, 133 (Yeoman) [federal constitutional claim not waived 
when legal standard and relevant facts are essentially the same as state law claim 
timely raised at trial]), no constitutional or other error occurred. 
Recent decisions of this court have emphasized the importance of 
meaningful death-qualifying voir dire.  We have reminded trial courts of their duty 
to know and follow proper procedure, and to devote sufficient time and effort to 
                                             
 
14  
Before jury selection, defendant urged the court to ask three additional 
questions on (1) how prospective jurors would feel about unpleasant photographs 
of the decedent, (2) whether death should always be the penalty for convicted 
killers, and (3) whether LWOP is a fair punishment for convicted killers.  The trial 
court agreed to give a modified version of the first question, asking whether the 
photos would affect jurors’ ability to be “fair.”  However, the court concluded that 
the other two questions were irrelevant and misleading because they did not 
concern first degree special-circumstance killings, or address the jury’s duty to 
consider and weigh the evidence.  The court also decided that counsel’s questions 
largely duplicated the written questionnaire and the planned oral examination. 
 
 
25 
the process.  (See People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th 425, 454-455; People v. 
Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 966-967.)  At bottom, both the court and counsel 
“must have sufficient information regarding the prospective juror’s state of mind 
to permit a reliable determination as to whether the juror’s views [on capital 
punishment] would ‘ “prevent or substantially impair” ’ the performance of his or 
her duties.”  (People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 445.)  Otherwise, 
reversible error can occur.  (E.g., id. at pp. 446-452 [over defense objection, court 
erroneously excused five prospective jurors for cause based on inherently 
ambiguous responses to legally flawed questionnaire]; People v. Heard, supra, 31 
Cal.4th at pp. 964-966 [over defense objection, court erroneously excused one 
prospective juror for cause based on ambiguous answers to imprecise and 
incomplete oral examination].) 
Nonetheless, the trial court has broad discretion over the number and nature 
of questions about the death penalty.  We have rejected complaints about “hasty” 
(People v. Navarette, supra, 30 Cal.4th 458, 487-488) or “perfunctory” voir dire.  
(People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, 855.)  We also have found no error 
where the court relied heavily on three, four, or five general questions tracking 
language from Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. 510, and Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 
424.  (E.g., People v. Hernandez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 855-856; People v. 
Navarette, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 487; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
926, 973-974; People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 586.)  These cases found 
voir dire to be adequate because the court and/or counsel asked additional 
questions to clarify ambiguous responses and to reliably expose disqualifying bias. 
Such is the case here.  Both the court and counsel posed follow-up 
questions where necessary to glean prospective jurors’ views on penalty.  
Defendant cites no instance in which the trial court (1) erroneously retained a 
prospective juror who should have been excused for cause, (2) erroneously 
 
26 
excused for cause a prospective juror who should have been retained, (3) decided 
any challenge for cause absent sufficient information to do so, or (4) allowed a 
biased juror to serve in the case.  Hence, defendant has not shown that the pace or 
scope of death qualification — including rejection of two defense questions — 
constituted an abuse of discretion or violated his constitutional rights. 
IV.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Defendant claims insufficient evidence supports both first degree murder 
theories presented at trial:  (1) murder in the commission of forcible rape, and (2) 
willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder.  Federal due process guarantees 
allegedly compel reversal of the murder count.  We disagree. 
1.  Rape Murder 
Defendant notes that he could be convicted of first degree murder under a 
felony-murder-rape theory if he accomplished sexual intercourse against Carol’s 
will by means of force or fear.  (See § 261, subd. (a)(2); People v. Maury (2003) 
30 Cal.4th 342, 403.)  He insists the prosecution did not prove these elements 
because there was no real injury to Carol’s vagina, and because he told detectives 
that she consented to vaginal sex.  However, viewing all of the evidence most 
favorably to the judgment, we reject the claim.  (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 
Cal.3d 557, 578; see Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307.) 
The evidence suggested that defendant formed a sexual interest in Carol 
inside the bar the night she was killed.  After only one dance, defendant looked or 
stared at her with such intensity that his conduct was noticed by at least one 
bystander.  When Carol told the bartender that she planned to leave by taxi, 
defendant — who apparently continued to watch her closely — volunteered to 
drive her home.  Defendant made this offer even though he did not know where 
Carol lived, and even though the pair hardly knew each other. 
 
27 
The jury could infer that Carol had no similar interest in defendant.  By 
asking him to dance, Carol treated defendant no differently than other bar patrons 
with whom she danced the same night or on prior occasions.  She did not follow 
defendant to his table afterwards, but returned to her barstool instead.  Moreover, 
Carol balked at being alone with defendant.  Though she eventually accepted a 
ride from him, she first asked the bartender whether it was safe to go. 
In a related vein, Carol told the bartender that she was going home to her 
family.  The jury could have accepted this statement at face value, and concluded 
that Carol did not intend to have sexual relations with defendant after she left the 
bar.  Such evidence was “clearly probative” of both lack of consent and rape, and 
supported conviction under the prosecution’s first degree felony-murder theory.  
(People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 264 [rape-murder victim’s statement 
about going home to sleep, which she made after enduring defendant’s sexual 
advances in bar, suggested she did not thereafter consent to sex with him].) 
Against this backdrop, defendant apparently saw Carol consume alcohol in 
the bar.  He also later told the police that she was drunk while riding in his car.  To 
rational jurors, defendant might have believed that Carol’s condition would make 
her receptive or vulnerable to his sexual advances once they were alone together. 
However, subsequent events indicate that Carol rejected such advances and 
that — consistent with evidence in the Valery C. case — defendant forced her to 
have sex anyway.  Carol likely died within 30 minutes of leaving the bar with 
defendant.  During that time, a violent struggle occurred in his car, as evidenced 
by Carol’s defensive and other injuries, the seat foam stuck to her body, and 
defendant’s own statements.  Jurors also learned that he penetrated and ejaculated 
into her vaginal and anal cavities.  Given the compressed time frame, and the sheer 
number of violent and sexual acts, the jury could reasonably conclude that they 
 
28 
were part of one continuous criminal transaction in which defendant forced Carol 
to submit to both vaginal and anal intercourse against her will. 
Defendant highlights his statements to police indicating that Carol 
consented to vaginal sex, and that they fought afterwards about whether to visit 
another bar.  However, the jury could have discredited this account.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1084 [finding substantial evidence that 
consensual sex did not precede violence, and that violence accompanied sex].)  
Defendant initially denied knowing Carol or being in the bar the night she was 
killed.  When Detective Coffey disclosed contrary evidence, defendant admitted 
driving Carol home, but insisted no sex or violence occurred.  Only after Coffey 
implied that defendant’s semen would be found in Carol’s body did he admit 
vaginal intercourse.  He also eventually admitted a struggle in his car.  In addition, 
defendant denied anal intercourse — a stance inconsistent with medical, blood, 
and DNA evidence indicating that defendant forcibly sodomized Carol.  Faced 
with defendant’s changing stories and with evidence contradicting much of what 
he said, jurors could infer that none of his exculpatory statements about sex was 
true, and that he lied to defeat both sodomy and rape charges. 
Contrary to what defendant further implies, the lack of vaginal injury does 
not preclude the jury from finding rape or prevent this court from upholding that 
determination on appeal.  (People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1084; see 
People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1027 [rape involves force sufficient “to 
overcome the will of the victim,” and does not require evidence that such force 
“physically facilitated sexual penetration or prevented the victim from physically 
resisting her attacker”].)  Here, of course, the jury was free to accept testimony by 
Dr. Cogan and Investigator Kitchings describing apparent trauma to Carol’s 
vagina, e.g., bruised labial skin.  The inference that such injury occurred during 
nonconsensual sex was strengthened by evidence that Carol’s body was found 
 
29 
naked from the waist down with her legs spread apart.  (People v. Berryman, 
supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1084.)  Such degrading circumstances could have convinced 
jurors that there was nothing lawful about defendant’s sexual encounter with 
Carol, including the act of vaginal intercourse. 
In sum, we find sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction of 
first degree murder under a felony-murder-rape theory. 
2.  Premeditated Murder 
Defendant argues that evidence of premeditation and deliberation was 
insufficient to support the first degree murder conviction.  Under this approach, 
Carol’s strangulation was impulsive or accidental.  Defendant points to the lack of 
any evidence that he procured a weapon in advance or planned the killing.  
Suggesting he had no motive to kill, defendant notes that he and Carol were virtual 
strangers who met on friendly terms in the bar. 
An intentional killing is premeditated and deliberate if it occurred as the 
result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash 
impulse.  (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125, applying People v. 
Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27.)  However, the requisite reflection need not 
span a specific or extended period of time.  “ ‘ “Thoughts may follow each other 
with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly 
. . . .” ’ ”  (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 332.) 
Appellate courts typically rely on three kinds of evidence in resolving the 
question raised here:  motive, planning activity, and manner of killing.  (People v. 
Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125, applying People v. Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d 
15, 26-27.)  These factors need not be present in any particular combination to find 
substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation.  (People v. Pride (1992) 3 
Cal.4th 195, 247.)  However, “[w]hen the record discloses evidence in all three 
categories, the verdict generally will be sustained.”  (People v. Proctor (1992) 4 
 
30 
Cal.4th 499, 529.)  In conducting this analysis, we draw all reasonable inferences 
necessary to support the judgment.  (People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1124, 
citing People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) 
As noted, the murder occurred during a sexually motivated attack.  It 
appears defendant became fixated upon Carol after she asked him to dance.  He 
paid close attention to her words and movements afterwards, and made sure she 
did not take a taxi home.  The evidence further indicated that not long after they 
drove away from the bar, and while they were alone in his car, defendant forcibly 
raped and sodomized Carol, and subjected her to lethal violence.  The jury could 
reasonably have believed that defendant killed Carol “to silence her as a possible 
witness to her own sexual assault.”  (People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 247.) 
It also appears defendant planned the fatal confrontation to some extent.  
After watching Carol much of the night, he offered her a ride home.  Far from 
being altruistic, this offer could reasonably be seen as a pretext for the pair to be 
alone.  Such circumstances made Carol vulnerable not only to sexual assault, but 
also to murder.  Indeed, as revealed during the police interview, defendant knew 
when he left the bar with Carol that Valery C. had formally accused him of rape.  
The jury could have concluded that defendant decided before the murder to ensure 
that Carol, a subsequent rape victim, did not survive to report the crime. 
The manner of killing also suggests premeditation.  The pathologist, Dr. 
Cogan, testified that lethal pressure had been applied to Carol’s neck for a “long” 
time.  This evidence suggests defendant had ample opportunity to consider the 
deadly consequences of his actions.  (See, e.g., People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th 
463, 510 [strangulation of sexual assault victim for up to five minutes suggested 
deliberate plan to kill her].)  However, instead of easing the pressure on Carol’s 
neck (as he did during the rape of Valery C.), defendant used multiple means of 
strangulation, namely, manual choking sufficient to break the thyroid cartilage, 
 
31 
use of a choke hold sufficient to break the cricoid cartilage, and application of a 
ligature sufficient to damage the neck.  Such acts seem calculated to ensure death.  
(See People v. Bonillas (1989) 48 Cal.3d 757, 792 [describing ligature 
strangulation as inherently deliberate act].) 
Accordingly, we find substantial evidence of first degree premeditated 
murder, and decline to reverse the conviction on this ground. 
B.  Evidentiary Rulings 
1.  Autopsy Photographs 
In several hearings held outside the jury’s presence, the court and counsel 
debated the admissibility of autopsy photographs.  The disputed items included 
three photos of Carol’s dissected neck (exhibits Nos. 46, 47, and 48), and two 
photos of her dissected anus (exhibits Nos. 61 and 62). 
As noted further below, the prosecution’s offer of proof included voir dire 
testimony by the pathologist, Dr. Cogan, that all five photographs played a critical 
role in explaining his views on sexual trauma and the cause of death.  The defense 
countered by arguing that the pictures were unduly gruesome and prejudicial.  
Hence, to prevent admission of the neck photographs, defense counsel offered to 
stipulate to strangulation as the cause of death.  Counsel also sought to exclude the 
anal photographs to prevent jurors from mistakenly blaming defendant for surgical 
damage caused by the autopsy procedure itself. 
The trial court ruled that none of the photographs was exceptionally bloody 
or gruesome, and that all plainly supported the prosecution’s case.  Declining to 
sanitize the crime by excluding this evidence, the court concluded that its 
probative value substantially outweighed any prejudicial impact.  (See Evid. Code, 
§ 352.) 
 
32 
Defendant now contends that admission of the photographs constituted an 
abuse of discretion, and violated his rights to due process and a reliable verdict 
under the federal Constitution.  We reject the claims. 
Defendant did not seek to exclude this evidence on constitutional grounds 
below.  However, assuming without deciding that this federal claim has been 
preserved (see Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th 93, 117-118, 133), no error occurred.  
The neck photographs showed that multiple strangulation methods and sustained 
pressure caused deep injuries in the form of hemorrhaging and cartilage fractures 
while Carol was alive.  Such evidence supported the intent to kill and 
premeditation elements of the first degree murder charge, and weakened any 
inference of a rash killing.  Similarly, photographs inside the anal cavity revealed 
tearing and bleeding consistent with forcible penetration before death — 
information that supported the sodomy-murder special circumstance.  We reject 
defendant’s claim that photographs are irrelevant or inadmissible simply because 
they duplicate testimony, depict uncontested facts, or trigger an offer to stipulate.  
(People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 132-133; People v. Pride, supra, 3 
Cal.4th 195, 243.) 
Nor did the trial court err in concluding that relevance outweighed 
prejudice.  The photographs are unpleasant, but not to the point of distracting the 
jury from its proper function.  Contrary to what defendant assumes, jurors could 
“distinguish between the wounds inflicted from the murder and the disfigurement 
caused by the autopsy.”  (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 751.)  Also, any 
overlap between photographs was insubstantial, particularly since Dr. Cogan 
relied on each one during his testimony.  (See, e.g., People v. Cain (1995) 10 
Cal.4th 1, 29.) 
We have upheld the use of autopsy photos to prove guilt in other capital 
trials, including images of dissected tissue and excised organs.  (E.g., People v. 
 
33 
Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 932-934; People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 
754-755; People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th 1, 27-29.)  We do so again here. 
2.  Detective Coffey’s Interview Techniques 
The prosecution called Detective Coffey to describe the murder 
investigation, including defendant’s statements at the police station.  When first 
examined on the latter topic, Coffey mentioned specific interview techniques used 
in this case.  They included speaking in a stern voice, and disclosing incriminating 
evidence whenever it seemed defendant was “not being truthful.” 
A bench conference then occurred in which the court and counsel discussed 
the logistics of presenting the recorded interview to the jury — a recording that 
was three and one-half hours long.  During this conference, the court authorized 
the prosecution to elicit additional testimony concerning Coffey’s reasons for 
asking defendant certain questions.  The court also overruled defense counsel’s 
objection that the interview itself provided the “best evidence,” and that the 
proffered testimony was unnecessary. 
Hence, when describing defendant’s statements about his conduct on 
January 19, 1990, Detective Coffey repeatedly testified that defendant changed his 
story when confronted with conflicting evidence.  Coffey twice said that this 
process exposed apparent “lies” on defendant’s part.  Defense counsel objected 
throughout this exchange solely on grounds the prosecution asked Coffey leading 
and argumentative questions, and assumed facts not in evidence. 
Defendant now contends the trial court allowed Detective Coffey to attack 
defendant’s veracity in violation of state law rules restricting both expert and lay 
opinion testimony on the issue.  (See Evid. Code, §§ 800, 801; People v. Melton 
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 744; People v. Sergill (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 34, 38-40; but 
see People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 946-947 [suggesting that Cal. Const. 
art. I, § 28, subd. (d), known as Prop. 8’s Truth-in-Evidence provision, repealed 
 
34 
such rules for crimes committed after its June 1982 effective date].)  The ruling 
supposedly usurped the jury function (thereby violating the Fifth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments), and allowed the prosecutor to exploit defendant’s “lies” 
in closing argument. 
We reject these claims.  First, as noted by the Attorney General, defendant 
did not seek to exclude the evidence below on any theory raised here.  As in prior 
cases involving a failure to object on similar grounds, the claims have been 
forfeited on appeal.  (People v. Anderson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 453, 478.) 
Second, defendant misreads the record.  Detective Coffey highlighted the 
twists and turns in a long interrogation.  Nothing in this testimony or the trial 
court’s rulings indicated that Coffey was offering an opinion for direct jury 
consideration on the issue of defendant’s credibility.  No reasonable juror would 
have viewed the evidence this way.  Moreover, Coffey’s testimony mirrored the 
interview heard by the jury, including defendant’s own admissions about lying and 
changing his account.  Just as we find no flaw in the questions the court allowed 
the prosecutor to ask, we find nothing harmful in the answers Coffey gave. 
3.  Evidence Carol Left the Bar with Another Man 
During opening remarks and, later, on cross-examination of bar patron 
Cooper, the defense tried to inform the jury that Carol left the White Oak Inn with 
other men before January 19, 1990, the day of the murder.  Each time, the trial 
court sustained the prosecution’s objection, and barred such evidence absent an in 
limine offer of proof establishing its relevance. 
The issue arose again on cross-examination of bartender Russo.  Abiding 
by the court’s ruling, defense counsel moved outside the jury’s presence to ask 
Russo whether, consistent with his preliminary hearing testimony, he saw Carol 
leave the bar with a man other than her husband in the weeks before the murder.  
Defendant argued that Carol’s behavior with other men was admissible under 
 
35 
Evidence Code section 1103, subdivision (a)(1) to prove that she acted the same 
way with defendant the night she died.15  Defendant insisted that exclusion of the 
evidence would violate his constitutional right to a fair trial.  The prosecution 
renewed its relevance objection. 
After a hearing, defendant’s motion was denied.  The court ruled that to the 
extent the defense sought to imply that Carol had a history of consenting to sex 
with men after leaving the bar, the proffered evidence violated Evidence Code 
section 1103, subdivision (c)(1).16  In addition, the court exercised its discretion 
                                             
 
15  
Evidence Code section 1103, subdivision (a)(1) states, in part, that evidence 
of a crime victim’s character in the form of “specific instances of conduct” is not 
inadmissible under section 1101 of the same code where the defendant seeks to 
prove “conduct of the victim in conformity” with such evidence in a criminal case.  
Proposition 8’s Truth-in-Evidence provision, which ended most restrictions on the 
use of relevant evidence in criminal cases, explicitly exempted both Evidence 
Code section 1103 and Evidence Code section 352 from its reach.  (See Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d); People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1081-1082.) 
 
16  
Evidence Code section 1103, subdivision (c)(1) provides that, “in any 
prosecution under Section 261 . . . or under Section 286 . . . of the Penal Code, . . . 
evidence of specific instances of the complaining witness’ sexual conduct . . . is 
not admissible by the defendant in order to prove consent by the complaining 
witness.”  The trial court observed that no “complaining witness” survived the 
alleged crime, and that defendant was not separately charged “under Section 261 
. . . or under Section 286” with rape and sodomy, respectively.  However, to the 
extent “consent” bore on the rape-murder theory of first degree murder and the 
sodomy-murder special circumstance, the court ruled that the statute barred 
evidence that Carol left the bar with other men.  The court explained that whether 
a woman is dead or alive, she should not be “vilified” by her sexual history “on 
the issue of consent.”  On appeal, defendant claims the court erred in applying 
Evidence Code section 1103, subdivision (c)(1) where, as here, none of the 
enumerated sex crimes is charged as a substantive offense.  However, we need not, 
and do not, decide the issue.  As explained above, the trial court properly excluded 
the evidence on another viable ground — Evidence Code section 352. 
 
 
36 
under Evidence Code section 352, and excluded the evidence as unduly 
prejudicial.  The court emphasized that the offer of proof concerned “only one 
very amorphous incident in which [Carol] left the bar with another man.  For what 
purpose, for what reason, it is unknown.” 
Defendant argues here, much as below, that the trial court abused its 
discretion under state law, and violated his right to present a defense and to 
receive both a fair trial and reliable verdict under the federal Constitution.  The 
ruling allegedly prevented jurors from inferring that Carol, who was intoxicated, 
voluntarily left the bar with defendant, and engaged in consensual sexual relations 
with him.  We disagree. 
As defendant seems to concede, evidence that Carol previously left the 
White Oak Inn with another man had no probative value other than to suggest that 
she did so in order to have sex, and that she acted in a similar fashion when she 
left the bar with defendant.  However, in addition to any prohibition that might 
apply under Evidence Code section 1103, subdivision (c)(1), the foregoing 
inference was speculative for reasons the trial court explained.  The offer of proof 
contained no information about Carol’s conduct on prior occasions, and merely 
insinuated that she was a promiscuous person.  “The court is not required to admit 
evidence that merely makes the victim of a crime look bad.”  (People v. Kelly 
(1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 523.)  Thus, the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion 
in concluding that the evidence lacked probative value, and that the risk of 
confusion and prejudice was great.  We reject defendant’s contrary claim. 
4.  Carol’s Intoxicated State 
During Dr. Cogan’s cross-examination, the parties stipulated that, 
consistent with the toxicology report attached to the autopsy report, Carol had a 
.26 blood-alcohol level, and was intoxicated.  At the bench, defense counsel 
complained that the stipulation was inadequate absent additional evidence about 
 
37 
Carol’s condition.  Counsel wanted the jury to know, for instance, that a .08 blood-
alcohol level is sufficient to commit a drunk driving offense.  (See Veh. Code, 
§ 23152, subd. (b).)  The trial court replied by sharing the prosecution’s relevance 
concerns, and by saying it might exclude such evidence if the defense proffered it. 
Nonetheless, the defense subsequently moved to introduce evidence 
explaining Carol’s intoxicated state.  First, in proceedings held largely in the 
prosecutor’s absence, counsel sought funds to hire an expert to testify as described 
below.  Second, in another hearing held within the prosecutor’s presence, counsel 
argued that such evidence was relevant and should be admitted by the court. 
Fairly understood, and viewing these proceedings as a whole, defendant 
offered to admit expert testimony that would establish:  (1) the amount of alcohol 
Carol consumed the night she was killed based on her height, weight, and blood-
alcohol content, (2) the general effect of that blood-alcohol content in lowering a 
person’s sexual “inhibitions,” and (3) the general likelihood that a person whose 
inhibitions had been lowered in this manner would have consented to sexual 
relations.  Defendant also sought admission of evidence that Carol’s blood-alcohol 
level exceeded the .08 standard needed to violate the Vehicle Code.17 
The trial court questioned whether defendant followed the proper funds 
procedure in capital cases.  (See § 987.9, subd. (a) [capital trial judge does not 
decide funds motion].)  The court declined to admit the proffered evidence in any 
event.  The court reasoned that the defense theory was speculative and irrelevant, 
and that the potential for jury confusion and undue prejudice was great. 
                                             
 
17  
Defense counsel conceded that his expert witness did “not know how 
intoxication would affect [Carol], because he didn’t personally know [Carol] or 
her habits.”  Instead, the expert would show “how a certain level of intoxication, 
namely 0.26 blood alcohol, would affect people in general.” 
 
 
38 
Defendant claims here, as below, that the trial court abused its discretion in 
not allowing him to prove that Carol was intoxicated according to Vehicle Code 
standards, and that she therefore consented impulsively to sex.  The error was 
allegedly prejudicial because his pretrial statements about consent were otherwise 
uncorroborated, and the prosecutor tried to minimize Carol’s intoxication in 
closing argument.18 
The trial court properly excluded defendant’s evidence on relevance 
grounds.  (See Evid. Code, § 210.)  Nothing in the offer of proof showed how 
Carol’s blood-alcohol content and intoxication affected her judgment and behavior 
the night she was killed, or increased the chance that she did, in fact, consent to 
vaginal and anal intercourse.  Defendant essentially wanted jurors to speculate on 
intoxication, inhibition, and impulse.  Speculative inferences are, of course, 
irrelevant.  (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1035.) 
The trial court also did not abuse its broad discretion to the extent it 
excluded the proffered evidence under Evidence Code section 352.  (See People v. 
Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10 [such rulings receive great deference on 
appeal].)  Defendant essentially sought to prove that people act under the influence 
of alcohol in ways they do not ordinarily behave.  This is common knowledge.  
Hence, the proffered evidence would have had little impact on lay jurors, who 
presumably know as well as any expert how to assess the effect of alcohol on 
impulse and inhibitions.  (See People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 654-655 
                                             
 
18  
Defendant also claims, without meaningful or independent analysis, that the 
ruling violated his federal and state constitutional rights to present a defense, to 
effective representation, to due process and equal protection, and to a reliable 
verdict.  Though he invoked none of these theories below, we assume without 
deciding that the claims have been preserved.  (See Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th 93, 
117-118, 133.)  However, as discussed above, no error of any kind occurred. 
 
39 
[upholding exclusion of expert testimony on how defendant’s blood-alcohol level 
affected criminal intent since evidence “contained little if any information a 
layperson would not know”].)  Nothing in the instructions prevented the jury from 
concluding that Carol’s intoxication caused her to consent to sexual intercourse. 
Finally, defendant could not have been prejudiced by any error in excluding 
evidence that a .26 blood-alcohol level makes people too drunk to drive and 
lowers their sexual inhibitions.  Carol died after a violent struggle with defendant, 
a virtual stranger.  The condition and position of her body bore the classic signs of 
murder in the course of a forcible sexual assault.  On the one hand, jurors knew 
Carol had been drinking in the bar and was intoxicated.  Indeed, counsel argued 
that Carol was the perfect “date” because she was a promiscuous person whose 
resistance had been lowered by alcohol.  On the other hand, the evidence also 
showed that defendant had recently forced another vulnerable victim to have sex, 
and that he likely acted with similar intent here.  Defendant’s insistence that he 
and Carol fought violently about bar-hopping (not about sex) seemed inherently 
implausible, particularly in light of other patent untruths about their encounter 
(e.g., his denial of anal intercourse despite the presence of his semen in Carol’s 
anal canal).  Because evidence that he murdered her during a forcible rape and 
sodomy was strong, the challenged ruling could not have affected the verdict. 
C.  Instructional Issues 
1.  Self-Defense and Imperfect Self-Defense 
During a conference on jury instructions, the trial court advised counsel that 
it planned to instruct on both first and second degree murder in connection with 
the alleged murder of Carol.  Defense counsel replied by requesting additional 
instructions on (1) the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter based on 
“imperfect” self-defense (see People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 674-680; 
CALJIC No. 5.17), and (2) the defense of justifiable homicide based on “perfect” 
 
40 
self-defense.  (See §§ 197, 198; CALJIC Nos. 5.12, 5.13.)  For support, counsel 
cited defendant’s statements to police that Carol drew a knife in his car, as well as 
Dr. Cogan’s testimony about the cuts on Carol’s hand.  Counsel theorized that 
Carol tried to kill defendant with the knife, that she cut her hand when he grabbed 
the knife, and that he strangled her in self-defense. 
Finding this scenario unduly speculative, the court refused to instruct in the 
requested manner.  Thus, as relevant here, the jury received first degree murder 
instructions under both premeditation and felony-murder-rape theories.  The jury 
also received second degree murder instructions reflecting both an express and 
implied malice approach. 
Defendant insists he offered valid theories of imperfect and perfect self-
defense at trial, and that the court erred in refusing such instructions.  This ruling 
purportedly violated his right to present a defense, to trial by jury, and to due 
process under the federal Constitution. 
An unlawful killing involving either an intent to kill or a conscious 
disregard for life constitutes voluntary manslaughter, rather than murder, when the 
defendant acts upon an actual but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense.  
(See People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 87-89, 91; People v. Barton (1995) 
12 Cal.4th 186, 199; In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 771, 783; People v. 
Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 679.)  In addition, a homicide is justifiable and 
noncriminal where the actor possessed both an actual and reasonable belief in the 
need to defend.  (People v. Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 199-200; People v. 
Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 674-675.)  In either case, “the fear must be of 
imminent harm.  ‘Fear of future harm — no matter how great the fear and no 
matter how great the likelihood of the harm — will not suffice.  The defendant’s 
fear must be of imminent danger to life or great bodily injury.’ ”  (People v. 
Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082, quoting In re Christian S., supra, 7 
 
41 
Cal.4th at p. 783.)  The trial court need not give such instructions on request 
absent substantial evidence to support them.  (In re Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th 
at p. 783; see People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 684-685 & fn. 12.) 
Applying these principles here, no error occurred.  Aside from the 
inconsistent accounts defendant gave to police, there is no evidence Carol brought 
a knife to the murder scene.  According to her husband and other witnesses, Carol 
never carried a knife when she went to the White Oak Inn.  Also, the medical and 
physical evidence showed that Carol — the victim of lethal force — struggled with 
her attacker and suffered defensive knife wounds.  Such evidence undermines the 
present instructional claim by suggesting that defendant (not Carol) possessed a 
knife, and that Carol (not defendant) defended against its use. 
Even assuming the police interview constitutes substantial evidence that 
Carol possessed and displayed a knife the night she was killed, there is no 
substantial evidence of “actual fear of an imminent harm” sufficient to support 
either imperfect or perfect self-defense instructions.  (In re Christian S., supra, 7 
Cal.4th 768, 783.)  In fact, defendant’s statements affirmatively negate any such 
fear or belief.  Defendant told police that Carol pulled the knife from her purse 
when a shadowy figure, perhaps her “old man,” appeared in front of the house.  
Defendant also reported that Carol held the knife down by her side after they had 
consensual sex and while they debated going to another bar.  On the one hand, 
defendant worried about Carol’s apparent plan to “hurt somebody.”  On the other 
hand, he maintained in the face of persistent police questioning that she showed no 
interest in using the knife against him, and that she did not threaten him with it in 
any way.  This evidence shows that defendant did not perceive any imminent 
threat of harm from the knife. 
Thus, an essential element is missing from defendant’s claim that he could 
not be convicted of murder because he acted either in self-defense or upon an 
 
42 
unreasonable belief in the need to do so.  The trial court did not err in refusing to 
instruct along such lines. 
2.  Reasonable and Mistaken Belief in Consent 
In discussing felony-murder-rape instructions bearing on the first degree 
murder charge, the trial court told counsel that it would not instruct on whether 
defendant acted with an actual and reasonable, but mistaken, belief that Carol 
consented to sexual intercourse.  (See People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 
360-361; People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 153-158; CALJIC No. 10.65.)  
According to the court, no evidence supported such a defense, and only “straight 
consent” could counter the prosecution’s claim that defendant forcibly raped 
Carol.  The court cited defendant’s statements to police that Carol agreed to have 
vaginal sex, and that they only fought afterwards about going to another bar. 
Defense counsel urged the court to change its mind, and to include CALJIC 
No. 10.65 in its felony-murder-rape instructions.  When asked to explain this 
request, counsel pointed to Carol’s intoxicated state.  Counsel theorized that, 
because intoxication presumably impaired Carol’s ability to communicate, 
defendant could have believed she consented to vaginal sex even if she did not.  
However, the court found no evidentiary support for this view.  The court returned 
to its earlier theme that either defendant murdered Carol in the commission of a 
forcible rape, or she actually consented to vaginal intercourse and clearly 
communicated that fact to him. 
Undaunted, defense counsel also asked for CALJIC No. 10.65 as part of the 
sodomy-murder special-circumstance instructions.  The court said it was not 
prepared to discuss that matter, and that only the felony-murder-rape instructions 
were under review at that time.  A confusing exchange then occurred in which 
counsel apparently agreed to save arguments concerning the special circumstance 
allegation until later (“Okay”), but in which the court seemed to either misstate or 
 
43 
misunderstand counsel’s position concerning the requested instruction (“I agree 
with you it doesn’t apply to the rape”).  In any event, consistent with its own views 
on the subject, the court declined to give CALJIC No. 10.65 as part of the felony-
murder-rape instructions.  Regarding the latter theory of first degree murder, the 
lone “consent” instruction the court ultimately gave was CALJIC No. 1.23.1, 
which speaks in terms of a sexual act freely, voluntarily, and knowingly 
performed.  (See § 261.6.) 
Defendant now asserts the trial court erred in rejecting his request for a 
mistake of fact instruction as to the forcible rape of Carol.  Defendant renews his 
claim that Carol’s impaired state might have made it seem like she consented to 
vaginal sex even if she did not.  The court’s decision allegedly violated 
defendant’s right to present a defense, to trial by jury, and to due process under the 
federal Constitution.19 
The mistake of fact defense reflected in CALJIC No. 10.65 has two 
components.  First, the defendant must have “honestly and in good faith, albeit 
mistakenly, believed that the victim consented to sexual intercourse.”  (People v. 
                                             
 
19  
The Attorney General argues that defendant “invited” any instructional 
error, and is estopped from seeking reversal of the judgment on this ground.  
Citing the trial court’s statement to this effect, the Attorney General claims 
defense counsel “agreed” CALJIC No. 10.65 “should not be given as to rape.”  
However, as explained above, the court appears to have misstated or 
misinterpreted counsel’s stance.  More to the point, the court’s decision to 
withhold CALJIC No. 10.65 with respect to the felony-murder-rape theory was 
not induced by defendant, but by the court’s unwavering belief that the instruction 
lacked evidentiary support.  (People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1031-1032.)  
There also seems to be no plausible tactical reason why defendant would forgo the 
chance to escape a first degree murder conviction based on his reasonable belief in 
consent as to rape.  (See People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 641.)  Thus, we 
reject the claim of invited error. 
 
 
44 
Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th 354, 360-361. fn. omitted.)  This subjective component 
involves evidence of “equivocal conduct” by the victim that the defendant mistook 
for consent.  (Id. at p. 361.)  Second, an objective component asks whether the 
defendant’s mistaken belief regarding consent was “reasonable under the 
circumstances.”  (Ibid.)  In order to give such an instruction upon request, the trial 
court must find substantial evidence supporting each feature of the defense.  (Ibid; 
see People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th 342, 424 [sua sponte duty to so instruct].) 
Any error was harmless.  The trial court ultimately granted defendant’s 
request for CALJIC No. 10.65 in connection with the sodomy-murder special-
circumstance allegation.  This instruction said that defendant would lack the 
requisite intent and would not be guilty of the crime of sodomy if he possessed “a 
reasonable and good faith belief that [Carol] voluntarily consented to engage in 
sodomy.”  (CALJIC No. 10.65 (1990 rev.).)  Jurors unanimously found the special 
circumstance allegation true beyond a reasonable doubt.  Hence, they necessarily 
rejected mistake of fact as a defense to unlawful sodomy.  Because the rape and 
sodomy were closely connected in their commission, we conclude that, under any 
applicable standard, the jury would not have reached a different conclusion under 
CALJIC No. 10.65 as to first degree felony murder than it reached as to the 
felony-murder special circumstance. 
On this basis, we reject the claim of reversible instructional error. 
3.  “Sexual Intercourse” 
The standard rape instruction given here (CALJIC No. 10.00), like the rape 
statute itself (§ 261, subd. (a)), does not define “sexual intercourse.”  Defendant 
claims the trial court erred in not sua sponte defining the term as vaginal 
penetration, and thereby violated his federal and state due process rights to a jury 
trial on all elements of first degree felony murder.  Defendant assumes jurors 
mistakenly used evidence of anal penetration to find he raped Carol. 
 
45 
However, as defendant concedes, we have held that “sexual intercourse” 
has a common meaning in the context of rape, that no technical elaboration is 
required, and that the term can only refer to vaginal penetration or intercourse.  
(People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 676; cf. People v. Hughes (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 287, 349-350 [presuming jurors do not know legal definition of rape 
where court failed to instruct on rape as target offense of burglary].)  Also, no risk 
of confusion exists where the court properly gives other instructions defining 
sodomy as anal penetration.  (People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 676; see 
§ 286, subd. (a); CALJIC No. 10.20.)  Thus, defendant could not have been 
convicted of nonconsensual sexual intercourse and rape based on anal penetration 
used to prove sodomy.  We see no basis on which to distinguish or reconsider 
People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th 619.  We therefore decline to do so. 
4.  Consciousness of Guilt 
The trial court gave CALJIC No. 2.03, which states that the defendant’s 
“willfully false” statement about the charged crime may show “a consciousness of 
guilt,” but is “not sufficient by itself to prove guilt.”  Defendant claims this 
instruction violated his federal and state constitutional rights (effective 
representation, due process, impartial jury, and reliable verdict). 
However, the instruction applied based on defendant’s inconsistent and 
contradicted statements to police attempting to minimize involvement in the 
capital crime.  (People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 202 [instruction proper 
where evidence supports it].)  We also have upheld CALJIC No. 2.03 against all 
other challenges raised here.  The instructional language sufficiently protects 
against conviction based on the defendant’s false statements or consciousness of 
guilt alone.  (People v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th 495, 531-532.)  Nor is it 
argumentative or biased in the prosecution’s favor.  (People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 
1 Cal.4th 103, 127-128.)  Finally, insofar as the jury believed defendant lied about 
 
46 
the charged crimes, the instruction did not generate an irrational inference of 
consciousness of guilt.  (People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th 619, 678.)  No error 
occurred. 
5.  Circumstantial Evidence 
Defendant argues that CALJIC No. 2.01, the standard instruction on 
circumstantial evidence of guilt, violated his federal and state constitutional rights 
(due process, trial by jury, privilege against self-incrimination, and reliable 
verdict).  He apparently faults the trial court for not deleting language barring the 
jury from accepting an interpretation favorable to the prosecution and unfavorable 
to the defense unless no other “reasonable” interpretation exists.  (Ibid.)  Though 
defendant overlooks this fact, another instruction applied the same principles to 
the special circumstance determination.  (CALJIC No. 8.83.) 
A long line of cases upholds these instructions against challenges 
indistinguishable from those raised here.  (E.g., People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 
43, 95-96; People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th 287, 346-347; People v. Seaton, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th 598, 667-668.)  Consistent with these authorities, we reject 
defendant’s assertion that jurors divorced the circumstantial evidence instructions 
from other instructions giving defendant the benefit of any “reasonable doubt.”  In 
light of the reasonable doubt instructions, the circumstantial evidence instructions 
did not impermissibly diminish the prosecution’s burden of proof or create a 
mandatory presumption in favor of the prosecution’s theory of the case.  Nor did 
anything in the challenged instructions penalize defendant for not waiving his 
privilege against self-incrimination and presenting a more favorable and 
“reasonable” account at trial.  Finally, there was no instructional error for the 
prosecutor to exploit in this regard.  He accurately described the circumstantial 
evidence instructions for the jury. 
 
47 
Defendant also contends the trial court erroneously denied his request for 
CALJIC No. 2.02, which applies the circumstantial evidence principles contained 
in CALJIC Nos. 2.01 and 8.83 to the issue of mental state, including specific 
intent.  Under this view, the court should have at least given a modified version of 
CALJIC No. 2.02 that deleted the language disputed above in connection with 
other similar instructions.  Defendant claims violations of his federal and state 
constitutional rights to present a defense, to a jury trial, to due process, and to a 
reliable verdict.20 
The trial court followed settled law and properly concluded that the 
requested instruction was subsumed in other instructions.  “[T]here is no need to 
give CALJIC No. 2.02 when the trial court gives a more inclusive instruction 
based upon CALJIC No. 2.01, unless the only element of the offense that rests 
substantially or entirely upon circumstantial evidence is that of specific intent or 
mental state.  [Citation.]  Because mental state or specific intent was not the only 
element of the case resting upon circumstantial evidence, the trial court did not 
commit error by providing only the more inclusive instructions.”  (People v. 
Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th 287, 347; accord, People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 
                                             
 
20  
The Attorney General insists defendant has forfeited his right to complain 
about the failure to give CALJIC No. 2.02, because his request for that instruction 
below did not embrace the modification he now claims should have been made.  
However, the Attorney General concedes that defendant has not forfeited his 
closely related claim that the trial court erred in giving an unmodified version of 
CALJIC No. 2.01, even though defendant did not seek a similar modification at 
trial.  In making the latter point, the Attorney General relies on section 1259, 
which allows appellate review of “any instruction given, refused or modified, even 
though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the substantial rights 
of the defendant were affected thereby.”  This statute seems to preserve all 
challenges to the circumstantial evidence instructions raised here.  (See People v. 
Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 976, fn. 7.) 
 
48 
1158, 1221-1222; People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 849.)  Defendant 
presents no compelling reason to reconsider this analysis, which applies under the 
circumstances of the present case.  We thus decline to do so. 
D.  Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Defendant contends the prosecutor made several statements during closing 
argument that rendered the guilt trial fundamentally unfair (thus violating his 
federal constitutional rights to due process and an impartial jury), and involved 
deceptive and reprehensible conduct (thus violating state law).  (See Darden v. 
Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181; People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th 1158, 
1202; People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 167.)  Such alleged acts of 
misconduct, defendant urges, were prejudicial and compel reversal of the 
judgment.  As explained below, we disagree. 
1.  Alleged Misstatements of the Evidence 
Defendant faults the prosecutor for conflating evidence of rape bearing on 
first degree felony murder with evidence of sodomy used to prove the felony-
murder special circumstance.  Defendant cites only one example, as follows:  “[I]n 
the autopsy report and the testimony itself, Dr. Cogan formulated the opinion of 
not only the rape issue . . . but also sodomy.”  (Italics added.)  Defendant contends 
this statement was false because the autopsy report mentioned only anal trauma 
and sodomy, not genital trauma or rape. 
Defendant’s failure to object at trial bars him from challenging this 
comment for the first time on appeal.  We agree with the Attorney General that the 
alleged misconduct is not so serious that a curative admonition would have been 
ineffective.  (People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th 92, 159.) 
We also reject the claim on the merits.  The prosecutor did not state or 
imply that proof of one sex crime constituted proof of the other sex crime, or that 
the autopsy report alone reached any conclusions about rape as opposed to 
 
49 
sodomy.  Instead, the prosecutor reasonably suggested that Dr. Cogan’s written 
and testimonial opinions together showed that Carol was raped and sodomized 
during the lethal attack.  (See People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th 107, 169 
[noting prosecutor’s wide latitude to draw reasonable inferences from evidence].)  
Furthermore, the prosecutor urged jurors to find rape and sodomy based on the 
brutalized condition of Carol’s body, the sexually suggestive position in which it 
was found, and the presence of defendant’s semen in both the vaginal and anal 
canals.  The prosecutor did not misstate the evidence of sexual assault, including 
the contents of the autopsy report. 
Defendant also claims the prosecutor misstated the evidence of Carol’s 
intoxication.  The relevant facts are as follows:  Arguing that the prosecution did 
not prove lack of consent to either vaginal or anal intercourse, defense counsel 
portrayed Carol as a promiscuous woman who, though married, drank heavily and 
sought “male attention” in bars.  Counsel theorized that Carol’s intoxication 
caused her to consent to sex and to provoke a fight out of anger or shame.  In 
rebuttal, the prosecutor urged jurors not to blame the victim.  He first asked the 
rhetorical question whether “somebody who has a drink or two gets to be raped 
and sodomized and killed?”  (Italics added.)  Then, in describing Carol as a loving 
wife and mother who fought to save her life, the prosecutor said she was “under 
the influence a little” when she died.  (Italics added.)  Defense counsel 
successfully objected and sought an admonition, as discussed below. 
Defendant contends the prosecutor falsely portrayed Carol as only mildly 
impaired, citing both comments italicized above.  Assuming the claim has been 
preserved for appeal, we conclude that, under any applicable standard, the jury 
could not have “construed or applied the prosecutor’s remarks in an objectionable 
fashion.”  (People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th 92, 163.)  The prosecutor prefaced 
the first challenged remark with a reminder that Carol had a .26 blood-alcohol 
 
50 
reading and was intoxicated.  Similarly, in sustaining defense counsel’s objection 
to the second challenged remark, the trial court made clear that Carol was “under 
the influence, period.”  The prosecutor agreed, reminding jurors that the parties 
had stipulated to Carol’s intoxication.  Finally, the instructions advised jurors that 
any stipulated fact was deemed conclusively proved, and that statements by the 
attorneys were not evidence.  Under the circumstances, no prejudicial misconduct 
on victim intoxication occurred. 
2.  Alleged Misstatements of Law 
Defendant insists the prosecutor repeatedly mischaracterized the crime of 
first degree premeditated murder, as follows:  The prosecutor initially suggested 
that defendant could be convicted of first degree premeditated murder if he acted 
with “intent to kill” and to eliminate Carol as a witness to her own sexual assault.  
The trial court called both attorneys to the bench and ordered the prosecutor to 
clarify that he needed to prove premeditation and deliberation in addition to intent 
to kill.  Later, the prosecutor said “all I have to [prove is]” that defendant 
“inten[ded] to kill” Carol in order to cover up the rape and sodomy.  The defense 
objected and sought a curative admonition.  As a result, both the court and the 
prosecutor reminded jurors that first degree premeditated murder required 
premeditation and deliberation as well as intent to kill.  In keeping with this theme, 
the prosecutor argued that even if the sexual attack on Carol was opportunistic, 
defendant had decided to kill her by the time the struggle began in his car. 
Defendant now claims the prosecutor misstated the law by excising 
premeditation and deliberation from first degree premeditated murder.  (See 
People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 830-831 [prosecutor overlooked force or fear 
element of robbery].)  Assuming the claim has been preserved for appeal, the jury 
could not have been misled as defendant suggests.  The trial court took swift 
action to correct any suggestion that first degree premeditated murder involved no 
 
51 
mental state other than intent to kill.  The instructions also identified and defined 
the elements of first degree premeditated murder, including the prosecution’s duty 
to prove the “willful, deliberate and premeditated” nature of the killing.  As noted 
earlier, the jury knew statements made in closing arguments had no binding effect.  
The instructions also told jurors to “follow the law” as stated by the court.  We 
assume the jury abided by the court’s admonitions and instructions, and thereby 
avoided any prejudice.  (People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 168.) 
3.  Reference to Penalty 
In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor urged jurors not to accept defense 
counsel’s view of the evidence or to return a second degree murder verdict.  The 
prosecutor theorized that counsel wanted to avoid both a “penalty phase” and any 
“special circumstance issue.”  Counsel objected and requested a bench conference.  
Anticipating counsel’s concerns, the trial court struck the quoted language from 
the record.  The court also told the jury not to consider “any issue of penalty phase 
whatsoever.”  The prosecutor agreed, explaining to the jury that only guilt was 
then under review. 
Contrary to what defendant now claims, no prejudice occurred.  The 
challenged reference was brief, fleeting, and mild.  (See People v. Kipp (2001) 26 
Cal.4th 1100, 1130.)  The trial court told jurors to ignore the remark as soon as it 
was made.  They received another warning against considering penalty shortly 
before guilt deliberations began.  We can only assume jurors properly performed 
their duty and followed their instructions in this regard. 
4.  Alleged Attacks on Counsel 
Defendant contends the prosecutor repeatedly disparaged defense counsel 
in rebuttal argument.  The prosecutor told jurors to avoid “fall[ing]” for counsel’s 
argument in favor of a second degree murder verdict, to view counsel’s argument 
as a “ridiculous” attempt to allow defendant to “walk” free, to view counsel’s 
 
52 
statement as an “outrageous” attempt to demean the victim and treat her as a “Jane 
Doe”, and to view counsel’s argument as a “legal smoke screen.”21 
No misconduct occurred.  This case does not involve such forbidden 
prosecutorial tactics as falsely accusing counsel of fabricating a defense or 
otherwise deceiving the jury.  (People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846.)  
The prosecutor simply used colorful language to permissibly criticize counsel’s 
tactical approach.  (Ibid.; see People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 575-576 
[upholding reference to defense as “smokescreen”].)  These comments were 
explicitly aimed at counsel’s closing argument and statement, rather than at him 
personally.  We see no improper attack on counsel’s integrity. 
E.  Cumulative Error 
Defendant argues that the cumulative effect of all guilt phase errors 
rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.  However, we either have rejected his 
claims and/or found any assumed error to be nonprejudicial on an individual basis.  
Viewed as a whole, such errors do not warrant reversal of the judgment. 
                                             
 
21  
Regarding the Attorney General’s argument that defendant has forfeited all 
of these claims, we reach the following conclusions.  First, because defendant’s 
objection to the “Jane Doe” remark was promptly overruled, his failure to request 
a curative admonition seems justified.  (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th 800, 820-
821 [objection and/or request of admonition not required where futile or 
impracticable].)  Hence, this claim has been preserved for appeal.  Second, when 
the trial court sustained defendant’s objection to the “walk” comment, he should 
have asked that jurors be admonished to disregard it — an omission that is 
unexcused and that waives the claim.  (Id. at p. 820)  Third, defense counsel did 
not object to any of the other alleged attacks on his integrity.  Such claims of 
misconduct clearly have been forfeited.  (Ibid.) 
 
 
53 
V.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Defendant’s Forcible Sodomy of his Daughters  
1.  Background 
A week or so before the cause was called to trial on July 7, 1992, the 
prosecution advised the defense both orally and in writing about witnesses who 
might describe criminal activity involving defendant’s use or threatened use of 
violence under section 190.3, subdivision (b) (factor (b)).  The list included 
defendant’s daughter, S., and his ex-wife, Deborah.  The prosecutor also disclosed 
his ongoing investigation of a 1981 arrest in Texas for sexual assault.  The search 
had been hampered, he said, by the lack of any record of conviction and the 
difficulty obtaining interstate police reports.  While he did not know who accused 
defendant of the Texas crimes, the prosecutor promised to “immediately” disclose 
that information if it involved “the daughters or someone I believe I can use at the 
penalty phase.” 
On July 17, 1992, the day after the jury was sworn, the prosecutor told both 
the court and counsel that he had just received police records faxed from Texas 
confirming that defendant’s 1981 arrest involved rape and/or sodomy against both 
daughters.  The prosecutor said that he had not yet located either victim.  
Nonetheless, he gave notice of his intent to introduce their testimony about violent 
sex crimes prompting the 1981 arrest.  The prosecutor gave the defense copies of 
the faxed material. 
Counsel responded by accusing the prosecutor of delay in disclosing the 
circumstances of the Texas sex crimes.  Counsel sought exclusion of this evidence 
under both section 190.3 and due process principles, because adequate notice was 
not given until after trial had begun.  However, the motion failed.  The court 
determined that the prosecution had acted diligently and fulfilled all notice 
requirements.  Finding no unfair surprise, the court cited preliminary hearing 
 
54 
testimony in which Valery C. said that S. had mentioned being sexually abused by 
defendant. 
Shortly before the penalty phase, the court considered the admissibility of 
the Texas sex crimes on grounds other than notice.  The prosecutor said he had not 
yet located S., and that only M. and Deborah might testify at trial.  He called both 
witnesses at the hearing as part of his offer of proof.  (See Evid. Code, § 402.) 
Specifically, M. testified that defendant threatened, frightened, and 
sodomized both her and S. as children in Texas.  According to M., the abuse of 
both girls began when M. was five and ended when she was eight, and occurred 
once or twice a week when their mother was not home.  Deborah testified, in turn, 
that M. told her and others about the abuse.  The parties stipulated that these 
accusations led to defendant’s 1981 arrest, and ended in a “no bill” grand jury 
proceeding in Texas.  It was further established by stipulation and judicial notice 
that such a proceeding occurs when an insufficient number of grand jurors (i.e., 
fewer than nine of 12) find probable cause of a crime, and means the suspect is not 
indicted or held for trial.  Also, the grand jury may reconsider the case and issue 
an indictment later. 
The defense moved to exclude the Texas sex crimes on two grounds.  First, 
defendant claimed he had been acquitted by the grand jury, and that the evidence 
was thus barred under factor (b).  Second, defendant insisted the acts were stale 
and prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352.  He argued their admission 
would be abusive and unfair. 
These claims were rejected.  The trial court declined to view the Texas 
grand jury’s failure to indict as a “final adjudication on the merits.”  The court also 
refused to exclude the Texas sex crimes under Evidence Code section 352.  
However, defendant was allowed to tell penalty jurors about the favorable 
outcome of the Texas case. 
 
55 
As noted, M. and Deborah testified at the penalty phase consistent with 
their accounts at the evidentiary hearing.  The defense established that the Texas 
grand jury did not indict defendant for sodomy against M. and S.  An instruction 
prevented penalty jurors from considering any violent criminal acts in aggravation 
under factor (b) unless they were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
On appeal, defendant contends use of the factor (b) sex crimes violated 
state statutory law in several respects, and impaired his federal and state 
constitutional rights to due process and a reliable verdict.  We now address each 
claim.22 
2.  Notice Requirements 
Defendant argues here, as below, that the trial court should have excluded 
the factor (b) sex crimes because the prosecution did not timely disclose certain 
details before trial, like the victims’ identities.  We disagree. 
The defense generally must receive notice of aggravating evidence “prior to 
trial.”  (§ 190.3.)  Depending upon the circumstances, we have defined this 
concept to mean either before the case is called to trial (People v. Daniels (1991) 
52 Cal.3d 815, 879) or before the start of jury selection.  (People v. Johnson 
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 51.)  In any event, notice given later in time does not require 
exclusion of the evidence where it is newly discovered, and the delay is not 
unreasonable, unexcused, or prejudicial.  (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 
                                             
 
22  
The Attorney General summarily contends that defendant failed to object 
on due process grounds below, and that he therefore has forfeited any such 
constitutional claim on appeal.  However, as noted above, counsel explicitly raised 
defendant’s due process rights when litigating notice under section 190.3.  Similar 
fair trial concerns accompanied all other timely defense objections to admission of 
the factor (b) sex crimes.  Hence, it appears defendant has preserved his present 
claims insofar as they are framed in due process terms. 
 
 
56 
619.)  At no point must the section 190.3 notice recite every circumstantial fact 
surrounding a factor (b) crime.  The purpose of the statute is met where the 
defendant has a reasonable chance to defend against the charge.  (People v. Arias, 
supra, 13 Cal.4th 92, 166; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 258.) 
The trial court properly applied these rules here.  The prosecution informed 
the defense well before trial that at least one daughter, S., would describe factor 
(b) crimes — crimes that logically included the incest S. had revealed to Valery C.  
At the same time, the prosecution disclosed that the factor (b) evidence might 
include sex crimes underlying defendant’s 1981 Texas arrest, and that his two 
daughters might be the victims.  While the prosecutor did not confirm the latter 
fact until after the jury was sworn, he shared such information as soon as it arrived 
from out of state.  Only a few weeks passed between the first and second 
notifications.  Even the latter notice came near the start of trial, before any guilt 
evidence was introduced.  Thus, defendant was adequately apprised of the 
prosecution’s intent to admit evidence of the sodomy involving his daughters. 
3.  Acquittal Defense 
Defendant contends he was “prosecuted and acquitted” for the factor (b) 
sex crimes in Texas, and that such acts were therefore barred under section 190.3.  
According to this theory, the grand jury’s failure to indict defendant under a 
probable cause standard constituted an implied determination that he was not 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Defendant is mistaken. 
Section 190.3 expressly permits proof of any violent criminal activity, 
whether or not it led to prosecution and conviction, except as to any offense 
resulting in an acquittal.  (People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 754.)  We have 
strictly limited this statutory notion of an acquittal to a judicial determination on 
the merits of the truth or falsity of the charge.  (People v. Bacigalupo, supra, 1 
Cal.4th 103, 133-134; People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 390.)  Thus, an 
 
57 
acquittal after prosecution does not occur for purposes of section 190.3 where the 
trial court dismissed the case under section 995 for lack of probable cause as to 
guilt.  (People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 774.)  We have reached the same 
result even where a statutory bar prevents refiling of the dismissed charge.  
(People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 907.) 
Here, there was no judicial determination on the merits as to whether 
defendant forcibly sodomized his daughters.  The Texas proceeding involved a 
discretionary charging decision by the grand jury.  Indeed, it seems even further 
removed from an “acquittal” than a section 995 proceeding in which pending 
criminal charges are dismissed by a judge.  Nothing in the grand jury proceeding 
itself prevented defendant from being later charged, prosecuted, and convicted of 
the same crimes.  None of the features commonly associated with acquittals exists 
here.  (Cf. People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 271 [double jeopardy principles 
bar retrial if court finds evidence at trial was insufficient to support conviction as 
matter of law].)  The trial court properly reached the same result. 
4.  Evidence Code Section 352 
According to defendant, Evidence Code section 352 virtually compelled 
exclusion of the factor (b) sex crimes because they were too remote and 
prejudicial, and because M.’s testimony was untrustworthy.  However, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. 
The prosecution may offer, in aggravation, violent criminal acts committed 
at any time in the defendant’s life.  (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 
1158; People v. Bacigalupo, supra, 1 Cal.4th 103, 134.)  The time gap between the 
forced serial sodomy of defendant’s daughters and the present trial is not 
unusually long by capital standards.  (E.g., People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
543, 585, and cases cited.)  Also, because factor (b) expressly permits admission 
of criminal violence at the penalty phase, the trial court cannot exclude all such 
 
58 
evidence as unduly prejudicial.  (Id. at p. 586.)  This information shows the 
defendant’s propensity for violence, and helps jurors decide whether he deserves 
to die.  (People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 349-350.)  As for M.’s credibility, 
this issue affects the weight, not the admissibility, of her factor (b) testimony.  It 
was for the jury to decide, based on proper instruction, whether she properly 
recalled and recounted defendant’s violent acts.  (People v. Catlin, supra, 26 
Cal.4th 81, 172; People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 587.) 
B.  Photograph of Carol while Alive 
Near the start of the penalty trial, the court and counsel repeatedly 
discussed the admissibility in the prosecution’s case-in-chief of two photographs 
of Carol while she was alive.  One depicted Carol and her husband Delbert 
together, and the other depicted Carol with several family members.  The 
prosecution offered the pictures as victim impact evidence under Payne v. 
Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808 (Payne), and its progeny.  The defense opposed 
admission of the photographs on these grounds.  Counsel argued that the photos 
were irrelevant and prejudicial because they were taken at unknown times, and 
because they did not show the kind of harm contemplated by the cases on which 
the prosecution relied. 
The trial court excluded the group family photo, but admitted the photo of 
Carol and Delbert, marking it exhibit No. 85.  The prosecution introduced the 
latter item while Delbert was on the witness stand.  In the process, the prosecution 
asked one substantive question, “How did you feel about your wife?”  As noted, 
Delbert said she was his “whole life.” 
Defendant argues here, much as below, that exhibit No. 85 was irrelevant.  
Its admission purportedly violated his right to due process under the federal and 
 
59 
state Constitutions, and his right to a reliable verdict under the federal 
Constitution.  We disagree.23 
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment 
barred evidence of a murder victim’s personal traits and the effect of the murder 
on surviving relatives.  (Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496, 509 (Booth); see 
South Carolina v. Gathers (1989) 490 U.S. 805, 811-812 [barring prosecutorial 
argument on the matter].)  Four years later, in Payne, supra, 501 U.S. 808, the 
high court reversed itself, and held that the states could choose to admit evidence 
of the “specific harm” the defendant had caused, to wit, the loss to society and the 
victim’s family of a “unique” individual.  (Id. at p. 825.)  According to Payne, the 
federal Constitution bars such evidence only if it is “so unduly prejudicial” as to 
render the particular trial “fundamentally unfair.”  (Ibid.) 
Shortly after Payne, this court held that victim impact evidence is generally 
admissible as a circumstance of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a).  (People 
v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 835-836.)  Payne and Edwards apply even 
where, as here, the murder occurred while Booth, supra, 482 U.S. 496, was in 
effect.  (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 394-395.) 
The challenged photograph helped illustrate Delbert’s expression of love 
for Carol — testimony that defendant does not contest.  As a whole, such evidence 
implied that Carol’s loved ones suffered grief and pain over her loss.  Thus, the 
                                             
 
23  
The Attorney General insists defendant moved to exclude this evidence 
only under Evidence Code section 352 below, and that he therefore has forfeited 
his constitutional claims.  However, as noted above, the court and counsel debated 
both the relevance and fairness of admitting exhibit No. 85.  In so doing, they 
referred to the same authorities that defendant cites here, including the 
constitutional principles in Payne, supra, 501 U.S. 808.  We therefore reject the 
proposed procedural bar. 
 
 
60 
jury could consider this evidence in determining whether death or LWOP was the 
appropriate punishment.  (E.g., People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 444 
[allowing photos of murder victims taken at unspecified times].)  Contrary to what 
defendant implies, the photograph was not irrelevant or unduly prejudicial simply 
because it did not depict Carol exactly as she appeared to defendant, or because he 
knew nothing about her marriage.  (People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 
1183 [rejecting claim that victim impact evidence involves “only circumstances 
known or reasonably foreseeable to the defendant at the time of the crime”].)  No 
error occurred. 
C.  Carol’s Intoxicated State 
Before opening statements at the penalty phase, the defense moved to 
explore the issue of Carol’s intoxication — a request the trial court had denied at 
the guilt phase.  Once again, counsel sought to present both argument and 
evidence, including expert testimony, concerning the .08 blood-alcohol standard 
used for drunk driving (see Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)), and the general effect 
of a .26 blood-alcohol level on sexual consent.  Defendant claimed such evidence 
would rebut any victim impact testimony that Carol was an ideal wife, and would 
raise lingering doubt as to his guilt of forcible rape and sodomy. 
Ruling on the issue, the trial court allowed defendant to tell jurors that 
Carol was “highly intoxicated” when she left the bar with him.  Also, if the 
prosecution idealized Carol, the court promised to allow appropriate rebuttal, 
apparently about her drinking and socializing in bars.  However, alluding to its 
guilt phase ruling, the court otherwise denied defendant’s motion on relevance 
grounds.  The court found nothing in the offer of proof linking Carol’s blood-
alcohol content and intoxication to her own sexual behavior.  Later, before closing 
arguments, the court denied another defense request to mention the .08 blood-
alcohol standard contained in the Vehicle Code. 
 
61 
Here, much as below, defendant maintains that evidence offered to explain 
Carol’s intoxication was relevant and admissible for reasons given at the guilt 
phase, and that the trial court continued to err insofar as it excluded such evidence 
at the penalty phase.  The argument in favor of admission is purportedly stronger 
at the penalty phase, because of defendant’s federal constitutional right to present 
relevant mitigating evidence in the form of lingering doubt as to his guilt of the 
capital crime.  Defendant claims prejudice insofar as the prosecution argued that 
Carol’s intoxication did not cause her to consent to vaginal or anal sex with him. 
Defendant’s claim fails at the threshold.  A capital defendant has no federal 
constitutional right to have the jury consider lingering doubt in choosing the 
appropriate penalty.  “Such lingering doubts are not over any aspect of [a 
defendant’s] ‘character,’ ‘record,’ or a ‘circumstance of the offense.’ ”  (Franklin 
v. Lynaugh (1988) 487 U.S. 164, 174, quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 
U.S. 104, 110; accord, People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 676.)  In any event, 
nothing the high court has said about the constitutional significance of mitigation 
makes such evidence more relevant, competent, and admissible at the penalty 
phase than it is at the guilt phase.  Evidence that is inadmissible to raise reasonable 
doubt at the guilt phase is inadmissible to raise lingering doubt at the penalty 
phase.  (See McKoy v. North Carolina (1990) 494 U.S. 433, 440 [same test of 
relevance applies to mitigation at penalty phase as in any other context]; People v. 
Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 116 [trial court retains discretion at 
penalty phase to exclude proffered mitigation as irrelevant or unduly prejudicial].) 
Defendant’s evidence of victim intoxication at the penalty phase suffered 
from the same logical gaps that justified its exclusion at the guilt phase.  Nothing 
showed that Carol’s blood-alcohol content and intoxication affected her 
willingness to consent to sex.  In seeking to create or reinforce lingering doubt, the 
defense simply wanted jurors to assume that because Carol’s .26 blood-alcohol 
 
62 
content far exceeded the statutory limit for drunk driving, she must have consented 
to sexual relations with defendant.  Such speculative inferences would have added 
nothing to what jurors presumably knew.  No abuse of discretion occurred. 
Even so, defendant could not have been prejudiced.  The penalty evidence 
showed that defendant threatened and sodomized his daughters while they were 
quite young.  The abuse lasted several years, and defendant repeatedly ignored the 
victims’ cries of pain.  More recently, defendant choked and raped Valery C. — 
one of the convictions entered in the present case.  At the time, Valery was a 
pregnant teenager who had moved into defendant’s home, and who had never been 
alone with him before.  Again, defendant refused the victim’s pleas to stop.  
Finally, with respect to the capital crime, the evidence showed that defendant 
brutally raped, sodomized, and murdered Carol.  Carol apparently died struggling 
to save her own life, and likely experienced great pain.  The crime occurred as 
soon as defendant — who perceived Carol as drunk — got her alone in his car.  
Thus, in choosing the appropriate punishment, jurors knew that defendant had a 
long history of sexually assaulting females who were vulnerable or in his care, and 
that his crimes had escalated in violence.  The admission of evidence either 
comparing Carol’s blood-alcohol level to the drunk driving standard or exploring 
the general effect of intoxication on sexual impulse could not have produced a 
more favorable sentence under any applicable standard. 
D.  Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Defendant contends that prosecutorial misconduct occurred throughout the 
penalty trial in violation of his federal constitutional rights to due process and an 
impartial jury.  He presents these alleged improprieties in the order they occurred 
at trial, providing a brief analysis of each one.  We first categorize, and then reject, 
these claims. 
 
63 
1.  Alleged Inflammatory Remarks 
Defendant insists the prosecutor prejudiced the jury against him in the 
following ways:  (1) referring in opening statements to the aggravating evidence as 
“shocking,” “vicious,” and “unspeakable”, (2) asking M. on direct examination to 
describe defendant’s “bad” acts even though they might be “difficult” to discuss, 
and (3) suggesting in closing argument that defense counsel should not have cross-
examined M. about the “tissues” she used to clean herself after being sodomized 
as a child. 
Defendant objected successfully to the foregoing remarks.  However, he 
failed to request a curative admonition below, and offers no excuse for not doing 
so on appeal.  We agree with the Attorney General that the claims are barred.  
(People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th 800, 820.)  Nevertheless, we see no harm even 
assuming some misconduct occurred.  None of the incidents seemed so serious or 
inflammatory that they would prevent jurors from following their instructions and 
ignoring material as to which an objection had been sustained.  (People v. Padilla, 
supra, 11 Cal.4th 891, 956-957.) 
Defendant also claims the prosecutor improperly referred in closing 
argument to Carol and Valery C. as innocent victims who suffered pain and 
degradation at defendant’s hands.  The prosecutor observed that, at the time of the 
crimes, Carol was a wife and mother, and Valery was a pregnant and homeless 
teenager. 
First, defendant failed to object at trial.  We therefore agree with the 
Attorney General that defendant has forfeited the present claim.  (People v. Cole, 
supra, 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1233.) 
Second, the challenged remarks constituted permissible victim impact 
argument under Payne, supra, 501 U.S. 808, 825.  As noted earlier, the prosecutor 
was free to ask penalty jurors to consider any special traits that made the victims 
 
64 
vulnerable to attack, and the unique pain that either the victims or their families 
experienced as a result of the charged crimes.  The record supports the 
prosecutor’s arguments.  The trial was not fundamentally unfair in this regard.  
(E.g., People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1233-1234 [allowing argument 
about physical pain defendant inflicted on victim during surprise attack]; People v. 
Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th 381, 444 [allowing argument about emotional grief and 
loss experienced by victims’ families].) 
2.  Alleged Disregard of Evidentiary Rulings 
Twice during his examination of M., the prosecutor asked about events not 
disclosed during the in limine hearing concerning evidence of the factor (b) 
crimes.  One question asked whether M. had “tried to interrupt” a fight between 
her mother and defendant, and the other question asked if she had heard a “taped 
message” between defendant and her mother in the months before trial.  When the 
defense objected to the first question, the court summoned counsel to the bench to 
discuss the matter.  However, as soon as the second question was asked, the court 
called a conference without any prompting from the defense.  Counsel then 
objected at the bench.  Each time, the court reprimanded the prosecutor for trying 
to admit aggravating evidence not included in his offer of proof.  During the 
second hearing, the court threatened to admonish the prosecutor in front of the jury 
or to grant a mistrial if the problem recurred. 
Defendant maintains the prosecutor improperly tried to elicit inadmissible 
evidence in violation of a court ruling.  (People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 
373.)  It appears the claim has been preserved for appeal even though no request 
for an admonition was made at trial.  The court made clear after sustaining the 
second defense objection that it was not prepared to take any other curative action 
at that time.  (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th 800, 820-821.)  But, any 
impropriety was not so egregious as to render the trial unfair or to prejudice 
 
65 
defendant.  (People v. Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 373.)  The disputed questions 
involved events that were extremely minor compared to the sodomy murder of 
Carol, the rape of Valery C., and the forced serial sodomy of defendant’s 
daughters.  The court also intervened before M. could give any damaging details.  
We reject the claim. 
3.  Alleged Misstatements of the Evidence 
In closing argument, the prosecutor reminded jurors not to allow personal 
feelings about capital punishment to interfere improperly with their oath and the 
court’s instructions.  To illustrate such bias, the prosecutor referred to defendant’s 
ex-wife Deborah, who testified that she opposed death for defendant or anyone 
else in his situation.  The specific comment was that if Deborah had undergone 
voir dire, “she would have been excused for cause.”  The trial court overruled 
counsel’s timely objection — an objection that the Attorney General reasonably 
suggests was sufficient to preserve the claim for appeal.  (See People v. Hill, 
supra, 17 Cal.4th 800, 820-821.) 
Defendant now contends the challenged remark was unfounded and 
incorrect.  However, even assuming the prosecutor misspoke for the reasons 
defendant suggests, jurors were merely being asked to perform their lawful 
sentencing function.  Defendant could not have been prejudiced as a result. 
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor incorrectly summarized the facts 
concerning defendant’s sodomy of his daughters.  First, the prosecutor said that 
defendant began sodomizing S. when she was “three years old.”  Second, the 
prosecutor said that “each” girl was sodomized “twice weekly” for “[t]hree and a 
half years.”  Defendant suggests that even though these comments mirrored M.’s 
testimony at the in limine hearing, they found no support in her trial testimony, 
which was less specific in this regard. 
 
66 
Preliminarily, the trial court overruled two defense objections to the first 
comment and told the prosecutor to continue with his argument.  As the Attorney 
General seems to concede, defendant’s failure to request an admonition does not 
forfeit the claim, because the request would probably have been denied.  (People 
v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th 800, 820-821.)  However, defendant failed to object to 
the second comment.  We agree with the Attorney General that it cannot be 
challenged for the first time here.  (Id. at p. 820.) 
On the merits, the challenged comments do not warrant reversal of the 
judgment.  First, as to when the molestation of S. began, M. testified at trial that 
defendant started molesting her (M.) at age five, and that the abuse lasted three 
and one-half years, ending when she was eight years old.  M. also testified that 
during the same three and one-half year period, S. was “typically” or “normally” 
sodomized on the same occasions as M.  (M. also saw S. being abused more than 
once.)  Hence, the evidence does not foreclose the inference that defendant started 
molesting S. at the same time he started molesting M.  Since S. was two years 
younger than M., defendant’s sodomy of S. could have begun when she was three 
years old.  No factual misstatement occurred. 
As to the second comment about the frequency of these acts, M. testified at 
trial that they usually happened on Saturdays when her mother ran errands with R.  
M. also described a typical encounter as one in which defendant first sodomized 
M. and then sodomized S.  Even assuming this testimony did not support the 
prosecutor’s twice-weekly estimate as to each girl, we see no harm.  M. indicated 
that defendant regularly and brutally sodomized both daughters for several years 
while they were young and vulnerable. 
Defendant further contends no evidence supported the prosecutor’s 
assertion in closing argument that defendant might commit sodomy in prison if 
sentenced to LWOP.  (See People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 153 [argument 
 
67 
on future dangerousness proper where based on evidence of past crimes].)  
However, even where a capital defendant has shown a preference for sexual 
violence against women, it is not improper to suggest that he might prey on 
inmates and/or prison staff.  (People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th 701, 761; People 
v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1380.)  In any event, the trial court sustained 
defense counsel’s objection and told jurors to disregard the reference to future 
sodomy.  We can only assume they followed the instruction, and did not allow this 
isolated remark to affect the verdict. 
4.  Alleged Misstatements about Sentencing Discretion 
In closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized the standard instruction on 
sentencing discretion (CALJIC No. 8.88 (1989 rev.)), and used a chart of that 
instruction as a visual aid.  He said that if jurors decided that aggravation 
substantially outweighed mitigation, then “it’s your responsibility, duty and 
obligation pursuant to your oath, if you think it’s warranted,” to impose the death 
penalty.  He later made similar remarks about death as the “appropriate” penalty.  
The prosecutor also described the aggravating and mitigating factors in detail (see 
§ 190.3, factors (a)-(k)), including defendant’s character and background 
evidence.  (Id., factor (k).) 
Defendant seems to contend that the prosecutor mischaracterized death as 
automatic, mandatory, or nondiscretionary in the present case.  As defendant 
suggests, jurors are “free to reject death [based on] any constitutionally relevant 
evidence or observation that it is not the appropriate penalty.”  (People v. Brown 
(1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 540, fn. & italics omitted, revd. on other grounds sub nom. 
California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538.)  The law also does not “require any 
juror to vote for the death penalty unless, upon completion of the [individual and 
normative] ‘weighing’ process, he decides that death is the appropriate penalty 
under all the circumstances.”  (Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 541.) 
 
68 
First, we agree with the Attorney General that because defendant failed to 
raise any objection at trial, he has forfeited the present claim.  (See People v. 
Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1221.) 
Second, no misconduct occurred.  Consistent with applicable law and the 
court’s instructions, the prosecutor made clear that in order to return a death 
verdict, jurors must determine that aggravation substantially outweighed 
mitigation, and that death was the appropriate penalty.  Indeed, the prosecutor 
tempered his “duty” reference by urging jurors to choose death only “if [they] 
think it’s warranted.”  Consistent with the court’s instructions, prosecutorial 
argument clearly and correctly implied that sentencing involved a normative 
weighing process, and that all relevant mitigation should be considered.  Nothing 
indicated that jurors lacked discretion in the manner defendant suggests.24 
E.  Cumulative Error 
Defendant complains about the cumulative effect of alleged constitutional 
defects at his penalty trial, including prosecutorial misconduct.  We have 
individually rejected his claims of error and/or found any assumed error to be 
nonprejudicial.  Such errors are no more compelling or prejudicial when 
considered together.  We decline to reverse the death judgment on this ground. 
                                             
 
24  
Defendant cites two other alleged improprieties in the prosecutor’s closing 
argument, namely, that defense witnesses testified “under subpoena”, and that 
defense counsel might refer to capital punishment as “state murder.”  Counsel 
successfully objected each time, and the prosecutor admitted in front of the jury 
that no evidence supported the subpoena reference.  Whatever the precise nature 
of defendant’s vague misconduct claims, the remarks were brief and mild, and the 
trial court immediately disapproved their use.  No harm could have ensued. 
 
69 
F.  Constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law 
Defendant contends that, in many respects, the 1978 death penalty law 
under which he was sentenced denied him a fair and reliable penalty determination 
under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and under parallel 
provisions of the California Constitution.  As defendant concedes, we have 
rejected these claims before.  We do so again here. 
1.  Death Eligibility 
The homicide and death penalty statutes adequately narrow the class of first 
degree murderers eligible for the death penalty.  The scheme is not overbroad 
because it permits capital exposure for many first degree murders (People v. 
Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 154-155), including unintentional felony murder.  
(People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543, 601.)  Nor are the special 
circumstances overinclusive in number or scope.  (People v. Ray, supra, 13 
Cal.4th 313, 356.)  Prosecutorial discretion to invoke the death penalty law does 
not render its application unconstitutional.  (People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th 
342, 438.)  The prosecutor has not been delegated the judicial sentencing function 
in violation of separation of powers principles.  (People v. Bemore, supra, 22 
Cal.4th 809, 858.)  Defendant has not shown on this record or through any 
judicially noticeable means that his contrary claims are empirically accurate and 
legally meritorious.  (People v. Michaels, supra, 28 Cal.4th 486, 541.) 
2.  Core Adjudicative Principles 
The trial court did not err in failing to modify the standard capital 
sentencing instructions by requiring the jury to (1) find proof of aggravating 
factors (in addition to other violent crimes) beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) find 
that aggravation outweighs mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) find that 
death is the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt, (4) reach unanimity as 
to the aggravating factors, and (5) presume that LWOP is the appropriate sentence.  
 
70 
(People v. Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th 119, 196; People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th 
92, 190.)  Contrary to what defendant implies, the death penalty scheme does not 
violate either constitutional or statutory law insofar as it fails to allocate a burden 
of proof, or establish a standard of proof, for finding aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances and for selecting the appropriate penalty.  (People v. Welch, supra, 
20 Cal.4th 701, 767-768.)  Recent high court decisions, such as Blakely v. 
Washington (2004) 542 U.S. __ [124 S.Ct. 2531], Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 
584, and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, do not require 
reconsideration or modification of our long-standing conclusions in this regard.  
(People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 731; People v. Prieto (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 226, 262-263, 275.) 
3.  Death Selection 
The sentencing factors contained in section 190.3, particularly factor (a) 
(circumstances of the capital crime) and factor (b) (other violent criminal activity), 
are not impermissibly vague.  (Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-
980, affg. People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th 569, 594-595.)  These factors also 
did not bias the jury in favor of death insofar as they allowed evidence of guilt to 
be used as evidence in aggravation.  (People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th 313, 358.)  
In addition, the trial court did not err in failing to (1) delete assertedly inapplicable 
sentencing factors, (2) instruct as to which sentencing factors are aggravating and 
which are mitigating, (3) instruct that the absence of mitigation in certain statutory 
categories was not aggravating, and (4) instruct on the definition of mitigation.  
(People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th 287, 404.)  The standard instructions in 
CALJIC No. 8.88 (1989 rev.) adequately advised jurors on the scope of their 
discretion to reject death and to return an LWOP verdict.  (People v. Rodrigues, 
supra, 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1192; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979.)  
The trial court did not prevent meaningful appellate review by failing to require a 
 
71 
written statement of the jury’s findings and reasons for imposing a death sentence.  
(People v. Davenport, supra, 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1232.)  No instruction on the 
meaning of LWOP was required.  (People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th 619, 688-
689.) 
4.  Appellate Review 
California’s automatic appeals process is constitutional even though it 
affords no intercase proportionality review.  (People v. Anderson, supra, 25 
Cal.4th 543, 602; see Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 50-51.)  Although his 
death sentence is theoretically subject to intracase proportionality review (People 
v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 602), defendant apparently raises no such 
claim.  His sentence is not grossly disproportionate to his moral culpability in any 
event.  In addition, the appellate review process is not impermissibly influenced by 
political considerations in capital cases.  (People v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1100, 
1140-1141.) 
G.  Determinate Sentencing 
After denying the automatic motion to modify the death verdict and 
pronouncing judgment on the capital count (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), the trial court 
imposed a determinate sentence on the noncapital count.  (See § 1170, et seq.)  
Consistent with the probation report, which it read solely for noncapital sentencing 
purposes, the court chose the upper term of eight years for the rape of Valery C.  
(See § 264, subd. (a).)  The prison term was then made consecutive to the death 
sentence.  As explained further below, the court relied on “both the youth and 
vulnerability of the victim” in making these decisions.  (Italics added.)  However, 
the court stayed execution of the determinate term because it had relied, in part, on 
the facts of the noncapital crime in refusing to modify the death verdict. 
Defendant insists we must reverse and remand for resentencing because the 
trial court cited insufficient reasons to support its sentencing choices.  Defendant 
 
72 
did not raise this claim below.  However, his hearing predated our decision in 
People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353, 357-358, which imposed a prospective 
contemporaneous objection requirement on complaints like those raised here.  We 
therefore agree with the parties that the claim has not been forfeited, and that it 
may be raised for the first time on appeal.  (People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th 
463, 552.)  Nevertheless, it fails on the merits. 
Under the statutes and rules in existence at the time of defendant’s hearing, 
the trial court was required to state its reasons for making discretionary sentencing 
choices.  Two such choices included imposition of the upper term and the decision 
to make one sentence consecutive to another.  In deciding to aggravate a sentence 
in this manner, the court was prohibited from using the same reason more than 
once, and was required to cite different circumstances to support each choice.  
(See § 1170, subds. (b) & (c); People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th 331, 349-350.) 
The record shows compliance with these rules.  The trial court cited two 
factors in aggravation and no factors in mitigation when sentencing defendant for 
the forcible rape of Valery C.  First, the crime seemed aggravated in the court’s 
view because the victim was relatively young, i.e., 16 years old.  Second, the court 
found the victim to be “particularly vulnerable.”  The court explained at the 
hearing to modify the death verdict that Valery was pregnant, that she depended 
on defendant for shelter, and that she had no other apparent place to go.  Contrary 
to what defendant claims, a crime victim can be deemed vulnerable in this context 
for reasons not based solely on age, including the victim’s relationship with the 
defendant and his abuse of a position of trust.  (People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 
583, 638.)  The court properly applied these principles.  The record supports the 
determinate sentence challenged here. 
 
73 
VI.  DISPOSITION 
We affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Stitely 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S028970 
Date Filed: March 21, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Howard J. Schwab 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Joel Levine and Jo Anne Keller, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. 
Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, John R. Gorey and Peggie Bradford Tarwater, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Joel Levine 
695 Town Center Drive, Suite 875 
Costa Mesa, CA  92626 
(714) 662-4462 
 
Jo Anne Keller 
P.O. Box 8032 
Berkeley, CA  94707 
(510) 558-0459 
 
Peggie Bradford Tarwater 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 620-6097