Title: People v. Liu
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S248130
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: November 21, 2019

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
SI H. LIU, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S248130 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Eight 
B279393 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
GA090351 
 
 
November 21, 2019 
 
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. LIU 
S248130 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
We retread in this case ground recently traveled in People 
v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 (Romanowski).  At issue 
once more is how to assess the value of stolen access card 
information — a term encompassing information related to 
credit and debit cards, bank accounts, and similar financial 
devices.  (See Pen. Code, § 484e, subd. (d) (section 484e(d)); id., 
§ 484d, subd. (2).)1   
 
What we concluded in Romanowski is that courts 
conducting that analysis must do what they do in all theft cases:  
figure out “how much [the stolen property] would sell for.”  
(Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 915.)  Discerning that 
amount is an endeavor that calls for some subtlety and may 
depend on more than one factor.  Further complicating the 
inquiry in this context is the lack of a legal market for stolen 
access card information.  But instead of engaging in that 
nuanced inquiry, the Court of Appeal here simply assumed that 
the value of what the defendant obtained using the stolen 
information sets a floor on the fair market value of the stolen 
access card information she unlawfully used.  Because the Court 
of Appeal’s reasoning falls short of what Romanowski requires, 
and because both parties agree that further factfinding is 
                                        
1  
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 
otherwise noted. 
PEOPLE v. LIU 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
2 
necessary to resolve this case, we vacate the judgment and 
remand. 
I. 
 
Defendant Si H. Liu advertised loan services in local 
newspapers.  Those offerings were a front for nefarious ends:  
Liu was running a fraudulent scheme targeting immigrants in 
the Los Angeles area.  When unwitting readers sought help 
obtaining financing, Liu asked them for sensitive documents 
and information — such as driver’s licenses and social security 
numbers — as well as credit and debit cards.  She then went on 
personal spending sprees, sometimes by surreptitiously opening 
new lines of credit in her victims’ names, but most often by 
simply charging purchases to their credit or debit card accounts.  
All told, Liu fraudulently charged thousands of dollars. 
 
The law eventually caught up with Liu.  The People 
charged her with nearly two dozen criminal counts related to 
her fraudulent activities.  Those charges included burglary, 
unlawfully acquiring the personal identifying information of 10 
or more people, and — most relevant here — theft of access card 
information under section 484e(d).  At trial, a jury convicted Liu 
on all counts.  The Court of Appeal reversed one of her 
convictions but affirmed the rest.  Five of Liu’s convictions for 
theft of access card information under section 484e(d) were 
among those upheld on appeal and they are at issue here. 
 
In November 2014, while Liu’s direct appeal was pending, 
California voters approved Proposition 47:  The Safe 
Neighborhoods and Schools Act.  To decrease the number of 
people in prison for nonviolent crimes, Proposition 47 reduced 
the punishment prescribed by law for a wide swath of crimes in 
California.  Many offenses once punishable as felonies are now 
PEOPLE v. LIU 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
3 
treated as misdemeanors.  Such crimes include, with a few 
exceptions not relevant here, “obtaining any property by theft 
where the value of the money, labor, real or personal property 
taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950).”  
(§ 490.2, subd. (a) (section 490.2(a)).)  What’s more, Proposition 
47’s changes apply not just to future offenders, but also to 
certain people currently serving prison sentences for past 
convictions.  Someone who “would have been guilty of a 
misdemeanor” if Proposition 47 had “been in effect at the time 
of [his or her] offense” may seek relief.  (§ 1170.18, subd. (a).)  
Specifically, a person in that position may “petition for a recall 
of sentence before the trial court that entered the judgment of 
conviction in his or her case” and “request resentencing in 
accordance with” Proposition 47’s changes.  (§ 1170.18, subd. (a); 
but see People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal. 5th 1128, 1134 [those 
sentenced after Proposition 47 are entitled, under the provisions 
of that proposition, “to initial sentencing . . . and need not invoke 
the resentencing procedure”].) 
 
After the Court of Appeal issued its decision in Liu’s direct 
appeal, Liu petitioned the trial court for Proposition 47 relief.  
She sought resentencing on five of her convictions for theft of 
access card information.  Her petition, which she filed pro se, 
argued that the value of the property she obtained was “not 
more than $950.”  After a brief hearing on Liu’s petition for 
resentencing, the trial court denied the petition because Liu was 
“not eligible” for relief.  The court did not elaborate.   
 
Liu appealed the trial court’s denial of her Proposition 47 
petition.  While that appeal was pending, we decided 
Romanowski.  What we concluded is that theft of access card 
information under section 484e(d) qualifies as a “theft” offense 
under section 490.2(a) — and that Proposition 47 therefore 
PEOPLE v. LIU 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
4 
reduced such thefts to misdemeanors where “ ‘the value of the 
. . . property taken’ ” was less than $950.  (Romanowski, supra, 
2 Cal.5th at p. 917, quoting § 490.2(a).)  The value of stolen 
access card information, we continued, means the same thing as 
it does for all theft offenses:  “ ‘reasonable and fair market 
value.’ ”  (Romanowski, at p. 914, quoting § 484, subd. (a) 
(section 484(a)).) 
 
With the benefit of Romanowski, the Court of Appeal 
affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s pre-
Romanowski denial of Liu’s Proposition 47 petition.  (People v. 
Liu (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 143, 153 (Liu).)  The Court of Appeal 
based its decision on the value of what Liu had obtained with 
her victims’ access card information.  (Id. at p. 149.)  “Surely,” 
the Court of Appeal explained, “stolen access card information 
would sell for at least the value of the property obtained by a 
defendant who used the information . . . .”  (Ibid., italics added.)  
Because the record established that Liu unlawfully obtained 
more than $950 using what she stole in relation to three of her 
convictions, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial 
of Liu’s petition on those counts.  (Ibid.)  But because the same 
could not be said for her other two convictions, the Court of 
Appeal reversed and remanded for further proceedings on those 
two counts.  (Ibid.)  
II. 
 
We granted review to decide whether the Court of Appeal 
properly applied our decision in Romanowski.  We conclude that 
it did not. 
A. 
 
Because theft of access card information in violation of 
section 484e(d) is a theft offense under section 490.2(a), we held 
PEOPLE v. LIU 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
5 
in Romanowski that courts must value stolen access card 
information just as they would any stolen property in a theft 
case.  They must determine “a reasonable approximation of the 
stolen information’s value, rather than the value of what (if 
anything) a defendant obtained using that information.”  
(Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 914.)  That’s because the 
value of property a defendant acquires using the illicitly 
obtained access card information “is punished as a separate 
crime” under section 484g.  (Ibid.)  Under that section, “the 
value of all money, goods, services, and other things of value 
obtained” by using stolen access card information determines 
the severity of the offense.  (§ 484g.)2  
 
Yet the same is not true for the offense at issue in this case:  
theft of access card information in violation of section 484e(d).  
For that offense, courts must calculate “how much stolen access 
card information would sell for” to determine whether it falls 
above or below the $950 threshold.3  (Romanowski, supra, 2 
Cal.5th at p. 915.)  When performing this calculation, courts 
must determine the value of the information at the time of the 
“acqui[sition] or ret[ention]” of information on which criminal 
liability is based.  (§ 484e(d).)  Someone seeking relief under 
                                        
2  
Besides being charged with the theft of access card 
information, Liu was charged with and convicted of three counts 
of grand theft by means of illegally obtained access card 
information in violation of section 484g.  The Court of Appeal 
later reversed her conviction for one of those counts.  
3  
Our decision about a forgery statute in People v. 
Franco (2018) 6 Cal.5th 433 does not affect our conclusion here.  
This case — like Romanowski, but unlike Franco — is “a theft 
case,” not a forgery case.  (Franco, at p. 438.)  So it is 
Romanowski, not Franco, that governs. 
PEOPLE v. LIU 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
6 
Proposition 47, we concluded, bears the “ultimate burden” of 
showing she is eligible to receive it.  (Romanowski, supra, 2 
Cal.5th at p. 916.) 
 
In Romanowski we acknowledged the “potential difficulty 
of putting a price on this property” (id. at p. 911) because the 
“ ‘fair market value’ of stolen access card information,” traded in 
illicit markets,  “will not always be clear”  (id. at p. 915).  Unlike 
everyday retail products such as shoes or electronics, or data 
about human behavior harvested from the online activity of 
consenting users, unlawfully obtained access card information 
cannot be bought and sold legally.  The utility of such 
information for obtaining merchandise or services, moreover, 
tends to be contingent rather than certain.  As with the prize 
money one may glean from an earlier purchased lottery ticket, 
the ultimate worth of stolen access card information often 
depends on facts not known at the time of acquisition.  Access 
card information can nonetheless be sold in illicit markets, and, 
with disturbing frequency, it is.  That there exists no lawful 
market for this information, and often no clear sense of what it 
will purchase or for how long, may complicate the calculation of 
its fair market value.  But as we held in Romanowski, any added 
complication “does not relieve courts of th[e] duty” to make that 
calculation.  (Ibid.)  To the contrary, “the possibility of illegal 
sales” of access card information is a key factor in the analysis 
— and one that warrants careful attention.  (Ibid.)   
 
The possibility of such sales — and ultimately, the value of 
the stolen access card data — tends to be driven by multiple 
factors.  Consider the credit limit on a credit card or the account 
balance on a debit card.  Assuming the unwitting fraud victim 
isn’t continuing to pay down the credit card balance or 
replenishing the account balance, these values represent the 
PEOPLE v. LIU 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
7 
maximum amount someone possessing stolen access card 
information could charge to (or withdraw from) the victim’s 
account.  The higher the credit limit (or account balance), the 
more valuable the information — at least if the thief or potential 
purchaser of the data knows the limit (or balance) when she 
acquires the access card information.  (See Stack, Here’s How 
Much Your Personal Information Is Selling for on the Dark Web 
(Dec. 6, 2017) (Experian) <https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-
experian/heres-how-much-your-personal-information-is-selling-
for-on-the-dark-web/> [as of November 19, 2019].)4 
 
No matter how high the credit limit or account balance, 
would-be purchasers are unlikely to pay much for stolen account 
information unless they believe they can exploit it.  So how 
readily, if at all, stolen access card information can be used 
matters.  Someone will find it easier to make unauthorized 
charges if she has not just the card number and expiration date, 
but also the security code on the back (what’s sometimes called 
a CVV2 code) and the card’s billing ZIP code.  One might thus 
place a premium on more detailed access card information, even 
if the relevant credit limit (or account balance) is lower.  
(Experian, supra; Franklin et al., An Inquiry into the Nature 
and Causes of the Wealth of Internet Miscreants (2007) Online 
Credentials 
and 
Sensitive 
Data, 
p. 
11 
(Franklin) 
 
[as of November 19, 2019].) 
 
But even such detailed information may not squelch fully 
the perils inherent in buying stolen access card information.  
                                        
4  
All Internet citations in this opinion are archived by year, 
docket 
number, 
and 
case 
name 
at 
. 
PEOPLE v. LIU 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
8 
Such buyers bear the risk that their purchase will become — or 
already is — useless.  Stolen credit and debit cards often get 
frozen or canceled, particularly when a cardholder or their 
financial institution catches a whiff of fraud.  The value of stolen 
access card information may typically be discounted to account 
for these risks.  And by that same principle, freshly stolen access 
card information may fetch a higher price than stale information 
because it is more likely to be active.  (Franklin, supra, at p. 11; 
Ablon, et al. Markets for Cybercrime Tools and Stolen Data 
(2014) 
p. 
11 
(RAND) 
<https://www.rand.org/content 
/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR610/RAND_RR610.
pdf> [as of November 19, 2019].)   
 
The dynamics of supply and demand matter for illegal 
markets, too, just as they do for legal ones.  (Experian, supra; 
Franklin, supra, Inferring Global Statistics and Trends, at p. 
12.)  Suppose a hacker successfully attacks a major retailer and 
then puts information related to thousands of access cards up 
for sale online.  The resulting supply glut may reduce (at least 
for a time) the illegal market price of comparable stolen access 
card information.  (See RAND, supra, at p. 8.)  In other words, 
the value of stolen access card information depends in no small 
part on how much comparable information is available on the 
illegal market — and how many people are looking to buy it.  
(See Black’s Law Dict. (10th ed. 2014) p. 1785 [describing a “fair 
market value” as “the point at which supply and demand 
intersect”].)    
 
These factors don’t cover the waterfront of what a court 
may consider in determining whether a defendant’s proposed 
valuation of stolen access card information is objectively 
reasonable.  Nor do they encompass all of the methods useful in 
discerning the value of stolen access card information.  But they 
PEOPLE v. LIU 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
9 
demonstrate that the inquiry Romanowski requires for 
determining the severity of a section 484e(d) offense — 
assessing how much the stolen access card information in 
question would sell for — is a nuanced endeavor.   
 
The inquiry is nonetheless eminently feasible.  Where the 
facts otherwise presented to the trial court don’t already offer 
some bearing on this question, the best place to start may be 
consulting, perhaps with help from an expert witness, the 
current trends in illicit markets for stolen access card 
information and the prevailing price of illegally obtained 
comparable information.  (See Peretti, Data Breaches: What the 
Underground World of “Carding” Reveals (2008) 25 Santa Clara 
Computer & High Tech. L.J. 375, 381–389, 412 [describing 
sophisticated online illegal market for stolen access card 
information]; Franklin, supra, at p. 1 [similar]; cf. People v. 
Tijerina (1969) 1 Cal.3d 41, 45 [noting “that the price charged 
by a retail store from which merchandise is stolen” is ordinarily 
“sufficient to establish the value of the merchandise” because it 
tends to “accurately reflect the value of the merchandise in the 
retail market”].)  Such an expert might help identify what 
considerations are relevant to the fair market value analysis in 
any given case.  
B. 
 
The Court of Appeal sought to apply Romanowski on the 
thin record before it.  But we conclude, as the parties agree, that 
this case should be remanded to the trial court for further 
factfinding in light of Romanowski and today’s decision. 
1. 
 
What little evidence the record contains about the value of 
the access card information Liu stole consists of the amounts she 
PEOPLE v. LIU 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
10 
unlawfully charged to her victims’ accounts.  We agree such 
evidence may be considered — so long as it’s done “with the goal 
of determining the [stolen access card information’s] fair market 
value.”  (Caretto v. Superior Court (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 909, 
920.)  Evidence of unauthorized charges may tend to show that 
someone could use the stolen information in question.  And at 
least if the ability to make such charges was knowable when a 
defendant acquired the access card information, such charges 
may offer a clue as to how much value could be extracted from 
that information.  Both facts could bear on the fair market value 
of stolen access card information. 
 
But evidence of unauthorized charges — while conceivably 
relevant — does not, as the Court of Appeal assumed, set a floor 
on how much someone would be willing to pay for it.  (See Liu, 
supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 149.)  That figure may be gleaned 
from using a range of methods and involves various factors, such 
as: (1) the access card’s credit limit or the account balance, if 
knowable when the defendant engages in the acquisition or 
retention of information that serves as the basis for criminal 
liability under section 484e(d); (2) the amount of account 
information possessed by the defendant; (3) how much the value 
of the information has been diminished because of its sale in 
illicit markets; (4) how recently the information was stolen; and 
(5) the prevalence of comparable information on the illicit 
market.  The extent to which these factors (and others) are 
relevant to calculating the fair market value of stolen access 
card information in any given case is a factual question.  
 
The Court of Appeal assumed that unauthorized charges 
necessarily reflect the minimum fair market value of stolen 
access card information.  That alluring assumption may simplify 
the inquiry.  But it conflates the value of the access card 
PEOPLE v. LIU 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
11 
information itself with the value of the property obtained 
through use of the stolen access card information.  Whereas the 
former is punished under section 484e(d), the latter, as we have 
noted, “is punished as a separate crime” under section 484g.  
(Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 914.) 
 
A hypothetical illustrates why the two values are not 
bound, or even especially likely, to be identical.  Consider a 
defendant who maxes out a $10,000 credit limit using stolen 
access card data.  Does “common sense” tell us that someone 
would have paid $10,000 for the stolen access card information 
he used?  (Liu, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 149.)  Would-be 
buyers in that situation might as well just hold on to their 
$10,000 in cash.  Or they could go out and buy (legitimately) the 
$10,000 worth of goods they would have bought (fraudulently) 
using the stolen access card information.  There would be little, 
if any, reason to go through the trouble of buying the stolen 
access card information. 
 
Inherent in the codified concept of a “reasonable and fair 
market value” (§ 484(a)), moreover, is the notion that 
comparable property is of comparable worth.  But the Court of 
Appeal’s insistence that the fair market value of stolen access 
card information could be no lower than the value of the 
property obtained by a defendant using that information risks 
creating disparate valuations of similar stolen access card 
information.  Consider two more hypothetical defendants.  One 
is prudent and makes small purchases to avoid detection.  The 
other is daring and makes big purchases to maximize her 
reward.  Under the approach taken by the Court of Appeal, the 
latter defendant would face a drastically higher floor on the fair 
market value of the access card information she stole — even if 
she stole precisely the same information as her more prudent 
PEOPLE v. LIU 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
12 
counterpart.  So such a doctrinal shortcut risks results that are 
irreconcilable with Romanowski.  
2. 
 
Having rejected the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, we must 
now decide how to proceed with this case.  On that question, the 
parties agree.  They ask us to remand for further factfinding 
about the fair market value of the access card information Liu 
stole with respect to all of her section 484e(d) convictions.  
Indeed, the People concede it’s “impossible to determine” 
whether the trial court concluded Liu was ineligible for relief 
because it: (1) thought that, contrary to our later decision in 
Romanowski, Proposition 47 didn’t apply to violations of 
section 484e(d) at all; or (2) made a factual finding about the 
value of the stolen access card information at issue here.  If 
anything, the People tell us, the record suggests the trial court 
did the former — and thus did not determine “the access cards’ 
value, let alone [apply] the reasonable and fair market value test 
mandated” by Romanowski.    
 
We share the People’s impression about this record’s 
inscrutability on the issue before us.  The course suggested by 
the parties is therefore the right one.  The trial court has yet to 
consider Liu’s petition in light of Romanowski, and has not 
developed the record with an eye to making the factual findings 
Romanowski demands.  The trial court should get that chance.  
We thus vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand 
with instructions to direct the trial court to conduct that inquiry 
in the first instance.  (Cf. People v. Rodriguez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 
1123, 1132–1133.)  On remand, Liu bears the “ultimate burden” 
of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she 
PEOPLE v. LIU 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
13 
is eligible for Proposition 47 relief.  (Romanowski, supra, 
2 Cal.5th at p. 916; Evid. Code, § 115.) 
III. 
In Romanowski, we required a straightforward, if 
somewhat nuanced, analysis from courts assessing the 
reasonable and fair market value of stolen access card 
information.  Courts must assess how much such information 
would sell for, even though it cannot be sold legally.  In 
conducting that inquiry, the value of what a defendant obtained 
using stolen access card information may be somewhat relevant.  
But if so, it must be considered along with potentially more 
probative pieces of the pricing puzzle, such as: (1) the access 
card’s credit limit or the account balance, if knowable when the 
defendant engages in the acquisition or retention of information 
that serves as the basis for criminal liability under 
section 484e(d); (2) the amount of account information possessed 
by the defendant; (3) how much the value of the information has 
been diminished because of its sale in illicit markets; (4) how 
recently the information was stolen; and (5) the prevalence of 
comparable information on the illicit market. 
To allow for the proper valuation in this case, we vacate 
the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand with 
instructions to send the case back to the trial court for further 
factfinding as to the reasonable and fair market value of the 
access card information at issue. 
 
 
 
 
PEOPLE v. LIU 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
14 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Liu 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 21 Cal.App.5th 143 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S248130 
Date Filed: November 21, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Robert P. Applegate 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
David R. Greifinger, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 
Assistant Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer, Noah P. Hill, and Tita Ngyuen, Deputy Attorneys General, 
for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
David R. Greifinger 
Law Offices of David R. Greifinger 
15515 West Sunset Boulevard, No. 214 
Pacific Palisades, CA 90272 
(424) 330-0193 
 
Noah P. Hill  
Deputy Attorney General 
300 S. Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6082