Title: Marble Technologies v. City of Hampton
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 090043
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: February 25, 2010

PRESENT:  Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and Millette, JJ., and 
Carrico and Lacy, S.JJ. 
 
MARBLE TECHNOLOGIES, INC., ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   OPINION BY 
v. 
 
Record No. 090043   
JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FEBRUARY 25, 2010 
CITY OF HAMPTON, ET AL.  
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 
Wilford Taylor, Jr., Judge 
 
This appeal involves the Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act, 
Code §§ 10.1-2100 through –2115 (the Act), and its implementing 
regulations.  The dispositive issue asks whether the General 
Assembly expressly or impliedly authorized a locality to utilize 
as a criterion for designating Chesapeake Bay Preservation Areas 
within its jurisdiction whether particular land is among the 
"lands designated as part of the Coastal Barrier Resources 
System," which is created by the Coastal Barrier Resources Act, 
16 U.S.C. §§ 3501 through 3510 (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (the 
federal Act).  Because we conclude that a locality is not 
expressly or impliedly authorized to do so, we will reverse the 
judgment of the circuit court.  
MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
The Act requires, inter alia, "the counties, cities, and 
towns of Tidewater Virginia [to] incorporate general water 
quality protection measures into their comprehensive plans, 
zoning ordinances, and subdivision ordinances."  Code § 10.1-
2100(A)(i); see also Code § 10.1-2109(B)-(D); 9 VAC § 10-20-10.1  
To further the Act's implementation, the General Assembly 
established the Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Board (the 
Board), Code § 10.1-2102, and in Code § 10.1-2107 authorized the 
Board to "promulgate regulations which establish criteria for 
use by local governments to determine the ecological and 
geographic extent of Chesapeake Bay Preservation Areas," that 
is, the "area delineated by a local government in accordance 
with [the Board's] criteria" and thereby made subject to the 
Act's restrictions.  Code § 10.1-2101; see also 9 VAC § 10-20-
40.  A Chesapeake Bay Preservation Area consists "of a Resource 
Protection Area [RPA] and a Resource Management Area."  9 VAC 
§§ 10-20-40 and 10-20-70.2 
                     
1 The term "Tidewater Virginia" includes the City of Hampton 
and a number of other jurisdictions.  Code § 10.1-2101.  "Any 
local government . . . not a part of Tidewater Virginia may 
. . . incorporate protection of the quality of state waters into 
their comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances and subdivision 
ordinances."  Code § 10.1-2110; see also 9 VAC § 10-20-10. 
2 The term "'Resource Protection Area' means that component 
of the Chesapeake Bay Preservation Area comprised of lands 
adjacent to water bodies with perennial flow that have an 
intrinsic water quality value due to the ecological and 
biological processes they perform or are sensitive to impacts 
which may result in significant degradation to the quality of 
state waters."  9 VAC § 10-20-40.  A "'Resource Management Area' 
[is] that component of the Chesapeake Bay Preservation Area that 
is not classified as the Resource Protection Area."  Id. 
2 
Pursuant to this authority, the Board promulgated criteria 
for a locality to utilize in designating lands within its 
jurisdiction to be included in an RPA.  9 VAC § 10-20-80. 
The Board's regulation establishes these relevant criteria: 
A. 
At a minimum, Resource Protection Areas 
shall consist of lands adjacent to water bodies with 
perennial flow that have an intrinsic water quality 
value due to the ecological and biological processes 
they perform or are sensitive to impacts which may 
cause significant degradation to the quality of state 
waters.  In their natural condition, these lands 
provide for the removal, reduction or assimilation of 
sediments, nutrients and potentially harmful or toxic 
substances in runoff entering the bay and its 
tributaries, and minimize the adverse effects of human 
activities on state waters and aquatic resources. 
 
B. 
The Resource Protection Area shall include:  
 
1. Tidal wetlands;  
 
2. Nontidal wetlands connected by surface 
flow and contiguous to tidal wetlands or 
water bodies with perennial flow;  
 
3. Tidal shores;  
 
4. Such other lands considered by the local 
government to meet the provisions of 
subsection A of this section and to be 
necessary to protect the quality of state 
waters; and  
 
5. A buffer area not less than 100 feet in width 
located adjacent to and landward of the 
components listed in subdivisions 1 through 4 
above, and along both sides of any water body 
with perennial flow. 
 
9 VAC § 10-20-80(A)-(B); see also 9 VAC § 10-20-40. 
3 
As directed by Code § 10.1-2109, the City of Hampton (the 
City) amended its zoning ordinance in 1990, creating Article Ten 
of the City's Zoning Code, which is entitled "Chesapeake Bay 
Preservation District," "to implement the Chesapeake Bay 
Preservation Act at the local level."3  City Zoning Ordinance 
§ 17.3-60.  In January 2008, the City took the action at issue 
in this appeal, amending its definition of the buffer area of an 
RPA.  Now the buffer area is defined as "[a] variable width 
buffer area not less than one hundred (100) feet in width. . . .  
The variable width buffer area shall also include lands 
designated as part of the Coastal Barrier Resources System not 
otherwise listed as a Resource Protection Area Feature where 
present."4  City Zoning Ordinance § 17.3-62(16)(iv).  The City 
                     
3 In contrast to the Board's criteria for an RPA, the City's 
zoning ordinance includes only the first three components of an 
RPA set forth in 9 VAC § 10-20-80(B) and a buffer area, 
foregoing the catchall component for "other lands."  9 VAC § 10-
20-80(B)(4). 
4 The City Zoning Ordinance defines the term "'Coastal 
Barrier Resources System'" as "an area comprised of undeveloped 
barrier islands and associated wetlands as designated under the 
Coastal Barrier Resources Act."  City Zoning Ordinance § 17.3-
62(5).  The lands included in the Coastal Barrier Resources 
System are designated on a map maintained by the Secretary of 
the Interior and may be revised by the Secretary or by an act of 
Congress.  See 16 U.S.C. § 3503; cf. Bostic v. United States, 
753 F.2d 1292, 1293-94 (4th Cir. 1985). 
4 
also amended its buffer area requirements for RPAs to 
incorporate the new definition.  City Zoning Ordinance § 17.3-
64(2)(b)(iii)(3). 
Marble Technologies, Inc. and Shri Ganesh, LLC 
(collectively, the plaintiffs), own two separate parcels of land 
located in the "Grand View" section of the City.  According to 
the plaintiffs, the "developable area" of their parcels was not 
included in an RPA or its buffer area prior to the 2008 
amendment to the City zoning ordinance.  Following the 
amendment, the plaintiffs' parcels fell entirely "within the RPA 
portion of the City's Chesapeake Bay Preservation District" 
because the parcels are included in the Coastal Barrier 
Resources System.  The plaintiffs contend that their parcels are 
thus subject to additional development restrictions.5 
Shortly after the amendment's passage, the plaintiffs filed 
a complaint seeking "declaratory and injunctive relief 
prohibiting the City's enforcement of the amendment as it 
                                                                  
The City Zoning Ordinance defines the term "Resource 
Protection Area (RPA) Feature" as "that portion of an RPA that 
is not in the buffer area" and includes only the first three 
components listed in Subsection B of 9 VAC § 10-20-80 and City 
Zoning Ordinance § 17.3-62(16).  City Zoning Ordinance § 17.3-
62(17). 
5 For example, land designated as part of the Coastal 
Barrier Resources System is "ineligible . . . for federal flood 
insurance on either new construction or substantial improvements 
to existing structures."  Bostic, 753 F.2d at 1293-94 (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 4028). 
5 
applies to the [p]laintiffs' property."6  The plaintiffs alleged, 
among other things, that the City had "exceeded its authority in 
violation of Virginia law and Dillon's [R]ule."  In response, 
the City demurred, arguing that the plaintiffs could not prevail 
because they "failed to allege that the challenged ordinances 
are 'unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious,'" did not exhaust 
available administrative remedies before seeking declaratory 
relief, and "failed to plead the necessary facts to give rise to 
injunctive relief."7 
The plaintiffs countered that the "arbitrary and capricious 
standard only arises in 'as applied' challenges," which they 
were not making.  Instead, the plaintiffs maintained that they 
were seeking a declaration that the 2008 amendment violates 
Dillon's Rule and is therefore void.  According to the 
plaintiffs, the exhaustion of administrative remedies rule was 
also not applicable because they were claiming the City exceeded 
its authority.  Finally, the plaintiffs asserted that they had 
"alleged sufficient facts to request either preliminary or 
permanent injunctive relief." 
                     
6 The plaintiffs named the City of Hampton as well as the 
City Council of the City of Hampton as defendants. 
7 The City also filed a "Plea in Bar" and "Motion to Drop" 
that the circuit court denied.  Those rulings are not challenged 
in this appeal.  See Rules 5:17(c) and 5:18(b). 
6 
Following a hearing, the circuit court overruled in part 
and sustained in part the City's demurrer, dismissing with 
prejudice the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief.  The 
court explained that an injunction would be unnecessary if the 
plaintiffs obtained declaratory relief.  Thus, the circuit court 
stated that "the sole issue" that remained was "whether the City 
acted ultra vires in passing this amendment to the zoning 
ordinance."  Shortly thereafter, the City answered the 
complaint, and the parties filed motions for summary judgment. 
In support of their motion for summary judgment, the 
plaintiffs argued that the 2008 zoning "[a]mendment 
impermissibly permits the federal government to alter the City's 
zoning scheme without further action of the City Council in 
violation of the Dillon Rule," as the General Assembly has not 
"express[ly] or implcit[ly] grant[ed localities the] authority 
to delegate any portion of" the responsibility for designating 
RPAs within the locality's jurisdiction.  The plaintiffs 
maintained that because the General Assembly authorized only 
localities to designate lands subject to the Act's restrictions, 
the City did not have authority to incorporate land into an RPA 
by referencing the Coastal Barrier Resources System.  The City, 
however, maintained that the General Assembly had "expressly and 
implicitly grant[ed] the City the power to enact the challenged 
7 
ordinances," which must be "presumed valid and constitutional."8  
The plaintiffs countered that the presumption of validity urged 
by the City "does not apply to a court's determination under the 
Dillon Rule as to whether the locality has any authority to 
act," and that the City had not been granted the authority 
claimed. 
After a hearing on the motions for summary judgment, the 
circuit court held that "the amendment is valid [and] does not 
violate Dillon's Rule" because "[t]he statute gives [the City] 
[this] authority."  The court concluded that the City possessed 
"both" express and implied authority to pass the 2008 amendment.  
Accordingly, the circuit court granted the City's motion for 
summary judgment, denied the plaintiffs' motion, and entered 
judgment for the City.  This appeal followed.  
ANALYSIS 
 
The issue we decide is whether the General Assembly 
expressly and/or impliedly authorized localities, through the 
Act or the regulations passed pursuant thereto, to utilize as a 
criterion for designating lands to be included in an RPA whether 
particular land is part of the federal Act's Coastal Barrier 
Resources System.  This issue is one of law, which we review de 
                     
8 The City also once again asserted that the plaintiffs had 
not exhausted their administrative remedies. 
8 
novo.9  Board of Zoning Appeals v. Board of Supervisors, 276 Va. 
550, 552, 666 S.E.2d 315, 316 (2008). 
Contrary to the City's argument that the zoning amendment 
at issue, as the legislative enactment of a locality, must be 
presumed valid unless proven to be clearly unreasonable, 
arbitrary, or capricious, "the Dillon Rule is applicable to 
determine in the first instance, from express words or by 
implication, whether a power exists at all.  If the power cannot 
be found, the inquiry is at an end."10  Commonwealth v. Board of 
                     
9 In June 2008, the Board reviewed the City's "revised Phase 
I program," which included the zoning amendments at issue, and 
concluded that the revised program was "consistent with § 10.1-
2109 of the Act and §§ 9 VAC 10-20-60 1 and 2 of the 
Regulations," subject to one modification.  The plaintiffs 
assert that the circuit court unduly relied on the Board's 
conclusion.  While the City disputes that assertion, it 
nevertheless argues that the Board's review "is strong, arguably 
conclusive evidence that the challenged ordinance is consistent 
with the Act, is valid and does not violate the Dillon Rule."  
Without deciding what weight, if any, the circuit court gave to 
the Board's conclusion, we reiterate that our review is de novo. 
10 [W]here a power is found to exist but the question 
is whether it has been exercised properly, then the 
"reasonable selection of method" rule may be 
applicable, and . . . the inquiry is directed to 
whether there may be implied the authority to execute 
the power in the particular manner chosen. 
Commonwealth v. Board of Arlington County, 217 Va. 558, 575, 232 
S.E.2d 30, 41 (1977). 
If a locality has the authority to enact a particular 
zoning ordinance, then 
[i]ts action is presumed to be valid so long as it is 
not unreasonable and arbitrary.  The burden of proof 
9 
Arlington County, 217 Va. 558, 575, 232 S.E.2d 30, 41 (1977); 
see also City Council of Alexandria v. Lindsey Trusts, 258 Va. 
424, 427, 520 S.E.2d 181, 182 (1999) (" 'The Dillon Rule of 
strict construction controls our determination of the powers of 
local governing bodies.' ") (citation omitted). 
The Dillon Rule provides that "municipal corporations have 
only those powers that are expressly granted, those necessarily 
or fairly implied from expressly granted powers, and those that 
are essential and indispensable."  Board of Zoning Appeals, 276 
Va. at 553-54, 666 S.E.2d at 317; accord Board of Supervisors v. 
Countryside Investment Co., 258 Va. 497, 502-05, 522 S.E.2d 610, 
612-14 (1999); City of Richmond v. Confrere Club of Richmond, 
239 Va. 77, 79, 387 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1990).  This is so because 
"[a] municipal corporation has no element of sovereignty.  It is 
a mere local agency of the state, having no other powers than 
such as are clearly and unmistakably granted by the law-making 
power."  Whiting v. Town of West Point, 88 Va. 905, 906, 14 S.E. 
                                                                  
is on him who assails it to prove that it is clearly 
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that it 
bears no reasonable or substantial relation to the 
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. 
Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 660, 107 S.E.2d 
390, 395 (1959); accord Cupp v. Board of Supervisors, 227 Va. 
580, 596-97, 318 S.E.2d 407, 415-16 (1984).  "[I]f the 
reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is fairly debatable[,] it 
must be sustained."  Carper, 200 Va. at 660, 107 S.E.2d at 395; 
accord Cupp, 227 Va. at 597, 318 S.E.2d at 416. 
10 
698, 699 (1892); see Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 
178 (1907) ("Municipal corporations are political subdivisions 
of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such 
of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to 
them.").  Thus, "[i]f there is a reasonable doubt whether 
legislative power exists, the doubt must be resolved against the 
local governing body."  Board of Supervisors v. Reed's Landing 
Corp., 250 Va. 397, 400, 463 S.E.2d 668, 670 (1995); accord 
Confrere Club, 239 Va. at 79-80, 387 S.E.2d at 473; City of 
Winchester v. Redmond, 93 Va. 711, 714, 25 S.E. 1001, 1002 
(1896). 
In applying the Dillon Rule, we first examine the plain 
terms of the legislative enactment to determine whether the 
General Assembly expressly granted a particular power to the 
municipal corporation.  See City of Chesapeake v. Gardner 
Enters., 253 Va. 243, 246-47, 482 S.E.2d 812, 814-15 (1997).  If 
the power is not expressly granted, we then "determine whether 
the power . . . is necessarily or fairly implied from the powers 
expressly granted by the statute."  Id. at 247, 482 S.E.2d at 
815.  "To imply a particular power from a power expressly 
granted, it must be found that the legislature intended that the 
grant of the express also would confer the implied."  Board of 
Arlington County, 217 Va. at 577, 232 S.E.2d at 42.  "Questions 
concerning implied legislative authority of a local governing 
11 
body are resolved by analyzing the legislative intent of the 
General Assembly."  Tabler v. Board of Supervisors, 221 Va. 200, 
202, 269 S.E.2d 358, 360 (1980).  "Legislative intent is 
determined from the plain meaning of the words used."  Confrere 
Club, 239 Va. at 80, 387 S.E.2d at 473; see Logan v. City 
Council, 275 Va. 483, 492, 659 S.E.2d 296, 301 (2008) ("We 
determine the General Assembly's intent from the words employed 
in the statutes.").  Thus, "[t]he central focus of our analysis 
[in applying the Dillon Rule] is to ascertain and give effect to 
the General Assembly's intent in enacting the provisions."  Id. 
With these principles in mind, we proceed to the question 
before us: whether the General Assembly expressly or impliedly 
authorized the City to use as a criterion for designating RPAs 
in its jurisdiction whether particular land is included in the 
Coastal Barrier Resources System pursuant to the federal Act.  
The General Assembly expressly authorized counties, cities, and 
towns "to exercise their police and zoning powers to protect the 
quality of state waters consistent with the provisions" of the 
Act.  Code § 10.1-2108.  That authority, however, is limited to 
using the criteria created by the Board.  The provisions of Code 
§ 10.1-2100(A)(ii) direct localities to "define and protect" 
Chesapeake Bay Preservation Areas "in accordance with criteria 
established by the Commonwealth."  The Act, in Code § 10.1-
2109(A) and (C), mandates that localities "use the criteria 
12 
developed by the Board to determine the extent of the Chesapeake 
Bay Preservation Area within their jurisdictions," and directs 
"[z]oning in Chesapeake Bay Preservation Areas [to] comply with 
all criteria set forth in or established pursuant to [Code] 
§ 10.1-2107," which is the provision empowering the Board to 
develop "criteria for use by local governments to determine the 
ecological and geographic extent of Chesapeake Bay Preservation 
Areas."  Code § 10.1-2107(A).  The provisions of Code § 10.1-
2111 reiterate that "[l]ocal governments shall employ the 
criteria promulgated by the Board to ensure that the use and 
development of land in Chesapeake Bay Preservation Areas shall 
be accomplished in a manner that protects the quality of state 
waters consistent with the provisions of [the Act]."  And the 
definition given the term "Chesapeake Bay Preservation Area" is 
that of "an area delineated by a local government in accordance 
with criteria established pursuant to § 10.1-2107."11  Code 
§ 10.1-2101.  Thus, we conclude the General Assembly expressly 
authorized localities to designate lands subject to the Act 
within their jurisdictions pursuant to the Board's criteria. 
In relevant part, the Board's criteria require a locality 
to include in an RPA the following components: 
                     
11 The regulations state that the Board "establishes the 
criteria that counties, cities and towns . . . shall use to 
determine the extent of the Chesapeake Bay Preservation Areas 
within their jurisdictions."  9 VAC § 10-20-30(B). 
13 
1. Tidal wetlands;  
 
2. Nontidal wetlands connected by surface flow and 
contiguous to tidal wetlands or water bodies with 
perennial flow;  
 
3. Tidal shores;  
 
4. Such other lands considered by the local government 
to meet the provisions of subsection A of this section 
and to be necessary to protect the quality of state 
waters; and  
 
5. A buffer area not less than 100 feet in width located 
adjacent to and landward of the components listed in 
subdivisions 1 through 4 above, and along both sides of any 
water body with perennial flow. 
 
9 VAC § 10-20-80(B).  Subsection C of that section states that 
"[d]esignation of the components listed in subdivisions 1-4 of 
subsection B of this section shall not be subject to 
modification unless based on reliable, site-specific information 
as provided for in 9 VAC [§] 10-20-105 and subdivision 6 of 9 
VAC [§] 10-20-130."  And subsection D mandates that "local 
government[]" determinations of "whether water bodies have 
perennial flow" must be done according to one of two methods and 
that "site-specific determinations shall be made or confirmed by 
the local government pursuant to 9 VAC [§] 10-20-105." 
In sum, the Board's criteria mandate that certain lands be 
included in an RPA and authorize the inclusion of "other lands" 
that both "meet the provisions of subsection A" and are 
14 
"necessary to protect the quality of state waters."12  After 
designating lands encompassed by subsections B (1) through (4), 
the locality must designate a "buffer area not less than 100 
feet in width located adjacent to and landward of the components 
listed" in subsections B (1) through (4) and "along both sides 
of any water body with perennial flow."  9 VAC § 10-20-80(B)(5). 
The foregoing review demonstrates that the General 
Assembly, acting through the Board, neither expressly nor 
impliedly granted localities the authority to designate RPAs 
based on criteria established by the federal government.  
Instead, the designations must be based on criteria established 
by the Board.  See Code §§ 10.1-2100(A)(ii) and -2109.  And, the 
Board's criteria do not include "lands designated as part of the 
Coastal Barrier Resources System not otherwise listed as a 
Resource Protection Area Feature."  City Zoning Ordinance 
§ 17.3-62(16)(iv). 
The City argues that its inclusion of lands covered by the 
federal Act in the buffer area is authorized by the "other 
                     
12 The City argues that the phrase "[a]t a minimum" in the  
first sentence of subsection A of 9 VAC § 10-20-80 means that 
localities are authorized to include additional lands in 
designating RPAs and are not restricted to those described in 
subsection A of 9 VAC § 10-20-80.  While the phrase "at a 
minimum" certainly suggests expansion, the General Assembly's 
intent that the criteria established by the Board be utilized to 
designate RPAs, and not alternative, locality-selected criteria, 
is clear.  Code § 10.1-2109. 
15 
lands" component, subdivision (4) of 9 VAC § 10-20-80(B).  This 
argument is without merit.  First, the Board's regulation treats 
lands designated under subsection B's "other lands" provision as 
separate from the buffer area, which is "located adjacent to and 
landward of the components listed in subdivisions 1 through 4."  
9 VAC § 10-20-80(B)(4),(5).  Second, the regulations do not 
authorize a "variable width buffer area" within a particular 
locality, but only authorize localities to designate uniform 
buffer areas of "not less than 100 feet in width."  9 VAC § 10-
20-80(B)(5).  The central reason why the City's argument is 
unavailing, however, is because the Board's criteria do not 
mention the federal Act or imply that a parcel's inclusion 
pursuant to the federal Act, as land the development of which 
the federal government does not want to encourage through 
"Federal expenditures and financial assistance," has any bearing 
upon, much less serves as a determinative factor when, 
designating land as part of an RPA.13  16 U.S.C. § 3501(b). 
                     
13 The City maintains that designating lands in buffer area 
on the basis of whether they are included Coastal Barrier 
Resources System is authorized by 9 VAC § 10-20-110's statement 
that "[t]he criteria may be employed in conjunction with other 
planning and zoning concepts to protect the quality of state 
waters."  We reject this argument.  "The criteria" noted above 
are found in Part IV of the regulations that govern the "use, 
development or redevelopment of land in Chesapeake Bay 
Preservation Areas," 9 VAC § 10-20-120 and § 10-20-130, and the 
maintenance of "[n]onconforming uses" and other exemptions and 
exceptions from the requirements of the Act, 9 VAC § 10-20-150.  
Part III of the regulations, specifically 9 VAC § 10-20-80, 
16 
Thus, the City ordinance, which makes inclusion in the 
Coastal Barrier Resources System a criterion for designating 
lands part of an RPA, violates the General Assembly's express 
mandate that a locality "use the criteria developed by the Board 
to determine the extent of the Chesapeake Bay Preservation Area 
within [its] jurisdiction[]."14  Code § 10.1-2109(A).  See 
Countryside, 258 Va. at 504-05, 522 S.E.2d at 613-14.  
Accordingly, the City's 2008 zoning amendments challenged in 
this appeal are void insofar as they include lands in its RPAs 
on the basis of the federal Act's applicability. 
                                                                  
contains the criteria governing the designation of RPAs. 
14 In reaching this conclusion, we do not express any 
opinion as to the propriety of a locality's looking to or 
incorporating federal standards when authorized by legislation 
to do so, and merely reaffirm the principle that even when a 
locality exercises discretion in the application of regulatory 
regimes, it is limited to the authority expressly or impliedly 
granted by the General Assembly.  
17 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court and enter final judgment in favor of Marble 
Technologies, Inc. and Shri Ganesh, LLC.15 
Reversed and final judgment. 
                     
15 The City argues that an independent ground exists for 
affirming the circuit court's judgment, i.e., that the 
plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies.  While 
the City raised this argument in both its demurrer and motion 
for summary judgment, the circuit court clearly stated after 
ruling on the demurrer that the "sole issue" remaining was 
"whether the City acted ultra vires in passing this amendment to 
the zoning ordinance."  Thus, we find no merit in the City's 
argument. 
In light of our decision, it is not necessary to address 
the remaining assignments of error. 
18