Title: Marbel Mendoza v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC04-1881
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 31, 2007

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Supreme Court of Florida  
No. SC04-1881 
MARBEL MENDOZA,  
Appellant,  
vs. 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee.  
No. SC05-2143 
MARBEL MENDOZA,  
Petitioner,  
vs.  
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent.  
[May 24, 2007]  
CORRECTED OPINION 
PER CURIAM. 
Marbel Mendoza appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion to 
vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, and petitions this Court for a writ of 
habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  We 
find that the circuit court erred in denying Mendoza’s postconviction claims. 
Neither in its order nor in the record did the circuit court evaluate the evidence 
presented at the postconviction evidentiary hearing.  We therefore reverse.  The 
circuit court judge who heard the evidence is now deceased, and thus a new 
evidentiary hearing is to be held upon remand.  We deny Mendoza’s habeas 
petition on the merits. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Mendoza was convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit 
robbery, attempted armed robbery, armed burglary with an assault, and possession 
of a firearm during the commission of a felony following the killing of Conrado 
Calderon.  The trial court sentenced him to death for the murder conviction, and 
we affirmed that sentence on direct appeal.  Mendoza v. State, 700 So. 2d 670, 672 
(Fla. 1997).  The facts of this case were fully set out in our opinion on direct 
appeal.  Briefly, Humberto Cuellar testified at Mendoza’s trial that he, Mendoza, 
and Lazaro Cuellar, Humberto’s brother, went to Calderon’s home with the 
intention of robbing Calderon.  Humberto testified that Lazaro remained in the car 
while Humberto and Mendoza approached Calderon.  Humberto and Mendoza 
were armed as they approached Calderon, who was also armed, outside of 
Calderon’s home.  During the ensuing struggle, Calderon shot Humberto in the 
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chest.  Humberto then ran to Lazaro’s car. As he ran, Humberto heard other shots.  
Less than a minute later, Mendoza arrived at Lazaro’s car and stated that he had 
shot Calderon. 
Following Mendoza’s convictions and the penalty phase, the jury 
recommended a sentence of death by a seven-to-five vote.  The trial court followed 
the jury’s recommendation, sentencing the defendant to death for the murder 
conviction, as well as a prison sentence of fifteen years for the conspiracy to 
commit robbery conviction, fifteen years for the attempted armed robbery with a 
firearm conviction, and life imprisonment for the armed burglary with an assault 
conviction.  State v. Mendoza, No. 92-9940C (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. order filed Aug. 2, 
1994).  In imposing this sentence, the trial court found two aggravating1 and no 
mitigating factors. 
Mendoza appealed his convictions and death sentence to this Court, raising 
nine issues.2  We rejected each of Mendoza’s claims and affirmed the convictions 
1.  The trial court found the following aggravating factors: (1) Mendoza was 
previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving a threat of 
violence to a person; and (2) the crime was committed while Mendoza was 
engaged or was an accomplice in the commission of or an attempt to commit, or in 
flight after committing or attempting to commit a robbery, and the crime was 
committed for pecuniary gain. 
2. Mendoza argued that (1) the evidence at trial did not prove burglary as an 
underlying crime to felony murder; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the 
admission of the sworn prior consistent statement of Humberto Cuellar; (3) the 
trial judge engaged in improper ex parte communications with jurors; (4) the trial 
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and death sentence.  Mendoza, 700 So. 2d at 679.  The United States Supreme 
Court thereafter denied Mendoza’s petition for writ of certiorari.  Mendoza v. 
Florida, 525 U.S. 839 (1998). 
Mendoza filed an amended motion for postconviction relief on September 5, 
2000, raising twenty-seven claims.3  The circuit court summarily denied the motion 
court erred in denying three challenges for cause to prospective jurors based on 
their beliefs concerning the death penalty; (5) the trial court erred in excluding 
mitigation evidence; (6) the trial court erred in allowing the State to improperly 
impeach Mendoza’s expert witness; (7) the trial court erred in finding the 
aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain; (8) 
the trial court erred in failing to adequately consider Mendoza’s proposed 
mitigation; and (9) the death penalty is not proportional. 
3. Mendoza raised the following claims: (1) Mendoza had insufficient 
access to public records; (2) Mendoza was denied a fair trial due to the cumulative 
effects of ineffective assistance of counsel, withholding of exculpatory or 
impeaching material, newly discovered evidence, and improper trial court rulings; 
(3) the State withheld evidence that was exculpatory and material; (4) trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to challenge jurors based on their biases toward the 
death penalty; (5) the State’s arguments and the trial court’s statements at trial 
presented impermissible considerations to the jury, misstated the law and facts, and 
were inflammatory and improper; (6) Mendoza was denied the right to an adequate 
mental health evaluation; (7) trial counsel failed to investigate and prepare 
mitigating evidence; (8) Mendoza is innocent of first-degree murder; (9) Mendoza 
is innocent of the death penalty; (10) incorrect penalty phase jury instructions were 
given by the trial judge; (11) the trial court gave erroneous instructions to the 
jurors on the standard by which they must judge expert testimony; (12) the jury 
received inadequate guidance on aggravating circumstances; (13) the State 
improperly introduced nonstatutory aggravating factors; (14) prosecutorial and 
judicial comments to the jury mischaracterized the importance of the jury’s role; 
(15) Florida’s rules prohibiting appellate counsel from interviewing jurors are 
unconstitutional; (16) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
State’s overbroad and vague arguments in aggravating circumstances; (17) 
execution by electrocution or lethal injection is cruel and unusual punishment; (18) 
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on January 26, 2001, and Mendoza appealed.  Following oral argument, we entered 
the following order: 
We have for review Mendoza’s appeal from the circuit court’s 
order summarily denying his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.850 motion.  We vacate the circuit court’s order and remand for an 
evidentiary hearing on the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
at the guilt and penalty phase of the original trial.  The Chief Judge of 
the Eleventh Judicial Circuit shall appoint a new circuit court judge to 
preside over these proceedings.  We dismiss Mendoza’s petition for 
writ of habeas corpus without prejudice. 
Mendoza v. State, Nos. SC01-735 & SC01-1963 (Fla. Apr. 3, 2001). 
On remand to the circuit court, a new trial judge was appointed to preside 
over the evidentiary hearings.  Six postconviction evidentiary hearings were held 
from April 22, 2003, through March 14, 2004, and the defense called a number of 
witnesses at those hearings to support its ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
The circuit court denied Mendoza’s postconviction motion claims in a very 
brief, two-page order, which simply set out the standards from case law for 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims and held: “This Court finds that the 
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional; (19) pretrial publicity and 
failure to change venue denied Mendoza a fair and impartial jury; (20) the trial 
court erred in refusing to find and consider mitigating circumstances clearly set out 
by the record; (21) the trial court’s sentencing order does not reflect an 
independent weighing or reasoned judgment; (22) Mendoza was denied a proper 
direct appeal because of omissions in the record; (23) it was unconstitutional for 
the judge and jury to consider Mendoza’s prior conviction in the penalty phase; 
(24) the death sentence was predicated on an automatic aggravating factor; (25) the 
trial judge was not impartial; (26) Mendoza is insane to be executed; and (27) the 
jury venire was not properly sworn before trial. 
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Defendant’s petition did not meet nor did it overcome the requirements of the 
above-mentioned case law.”  State v. Mendoza, No. F92-9940C (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 
order filed Aug. 18, 2004).  Mendoza appeals that denial, raising two issues.4 
Mendoza also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus, raising nine issues.5 
II.  ANALYSIS OF ISSUES ON POSTCONVICTION APPEAL 
Mendoza asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at both the 
guilt and penalty phases of his trial.  Mendoza asserts that his counsel was 
ineffective because his counsel relied on inconsistent theories as to the identity of 
the shooter in opening and closing statements; failed to call Lazaro Cuellar to 
testify; deficiently prepared the sole defense witness at trial; did not hire an 
investigator; failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence; improperly 
opened the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence; and called an improper 
4.  Mendoza asserts in his postconviction appeal that defense counsel was 
ineffective at the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. 
5.  Mendoza asserts in his habeas petition that appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal the following claims: (1) the trial 
court erred in limiting questioning regarding the victim’s illegal activities; (2) the 
trial court erroneously denied the defense motion for mistrial following the 
prosecutor’s improper remarks about the death penalty; (3) the trial judge made 
improper comments during voir dire; (4) the State made a variety of improper 
comments in its closing arguments at the guilt and penalty phases of trial; (5) the 
trial court erred in not granting defense motions relating to the State’s violation of 
the witness sequestration rule; (6) the trial court gave erroneous jury instructions 
regarding expert witness evidence; (7) various improper remarks were made by the 
prosecutor and trial judge about the jury’s note-taking; (8) the trial judge’s ex parte 
communication with jurors was improper; and (9) the trial court committed 
constitutional error in admitting evidence of pending robbery charges. 
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witness at the penalty phase.  To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant must first show that counsel’s performance was deficient. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  Second, the defendant must 
show that counsel’s deficiency prejudiced the defendant, which occurs when “there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.  In 
considering a circuit court’s denial of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
we apply a mixed standard of review and therefore defer to the circuit court’s 
factual findings, but review its legal conclusions de novo.  Sochor v. State, 883 So. 
2d 766, 772 (Fla. 2004). 
Despite the six days of evidentiary hearings and extensive presentation of 
testimony, the circuit court’s order essentially summarily denied Mendoza’s 
postconviction claims. We expressly remanded the circuit court’s previous 
summary denial of the postconviction motion for an evidentiary hearing on the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  As noted, evidentiary hearings were held, 
but following these extensive hearings, the circuit court neither stated on the record 
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nor rendered an order detailing its factual findings and the reasons for its decision 
on the postconviction motion.6 
A complete circuit court order enables this Court to review any factual and 
credibility questions with the appropriate standard of review.  The evidentiary 
record here presents factual conflicts which must be resolved by the circuit court in 
findings of fact.  Likewise, the circuit court’s determination as to the credibility of 
expert testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing needs to be set forth in an 
order.  Such factual and credibility determinations are not available in the instant 
case due to the brief and incomplete order of the circuit court. 
Circumstances exist in this case which prevent our remanding to the circuit 
court for further explanation of the postconviction judge’s decision on the basis of 
the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearings.7  Instead, we must remand for a 
new evidentiary hearing so that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims can be 
properly considered and determined on the evidence presented to the new 
6. We now require that following an evidentiary hearing, a circuit court 
“shall render its order, ruling on each claim considered at the evidentiary hearing 
and all other claims raised in the motion, making detailed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law with respect to each claim, and attaching or referencing such 
portions of the record as are necessary to allow for meaningful appellate review.”  
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(D).  Mendoza’s motion was filed before the effective 
date of this rule revision, but that does not affect the necessity of findings of fact 
and reasons for decisions in deciding motions which predate October 1, 2001, 
when these motions are still under consideration. 
7. The postconviction judge is deceased. 
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postconviction judge.  Without the circuit court’s determination in the instant case 
of the facts demonstrated at the evidentiary hearing or the credibility of the 
witnesses, we are unable to have a meaningful and appropriate appellate review. 
For instance, one of Mendoza’s claims is that trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to call Lazaro Cuellar to testify at the guilt phase of trial.  Arnaldo Suri 
and Barry Wax represented Mendoza at trial, and both testified at the evidentiary 
hearing.  Neither Suri nor Wax could remember why they did not call Lazaro to 
testify at trial but maintained that their reason was part of the defense strategy. A 
determination including an evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses is 
necessary on this claim. 
Mendoza also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in preparing and 
presenting exculpatory evidence of gunshot residue.  At trial, the defense presented 
only one witness: Gopinath Rao, a criminalist for the Miami-Dade County Police 
Department who testified as an expert in particle analysis.  Part of Rao’s testimony 
was demonstrated by the State to be inaccurate because he reported the wrong time 
that gunshot residue swabs were taken from Lazaro and Humberto.  This 
inaccurate testimony was highlighted by the State in its closing argument. 
Without a postconviction order setting forth factual findings in respect to 
this claim, we cannot determine on appeal the merits of the claim that counsel were 
ineffective in preparing their witness at trial.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 
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1055, 1065 n.9 (Fla. 2000) (without an evidentiary hearing and finding of fact by 
circuit court, it was unclear why defense counsel did not present certain evidence). 
Mendoza raised numerous other guilt and penalty phase claims that require 
an evaluation of the evidence and factual determinations.  Since the new 
evidentiary hearing will proceed under the clean slate rule in accordance with 
Preston v. State, 607 So. 2d 404, 407 (Fla. 1992), we will not further discuss here 
claims that should have had an evidence evaluation and factual findings.  Each of 
Mendoza’s claims and factual presentations must be made again.  This case again 
demonstrates how this Court’s appellate review of postconviction death penalty 
cases depends upon thorough and complete orders by the circuit court. 
III.  ANALYSIS OF HABEAS CLAIMS 
Though we are remanding for a new evidentiary hearing on the 
postconviction claims, we deny the claims raised in Mendoza’s petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus.  Mendoza argues in his petition that appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal the following claims: (1) the trial 
court erred in limiting questioning regarding the victim’s illegal activities; (2) the 
trial court erroneously denied the defense motion for mistrial following the 
prosecutor’s improper remarks about the death penalty; (3) the trial judge made 
improper comments during voir dire; (4) the State made a variety of improper 
comments in its closing arguments at the guilt and penalty phases of trial; (5) the 
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trial court erred in not granting defense motions relating to the State’s violation of 
the witness sequestration rule; (6) the trial court gave erroneous jury instructions 
regarding expert witness evidence; (7) various improper remarks were made by the 
prosecutor and trial judge about the jury’s note-taking; (8) the trial judge’s ex parte 
communication with jurors was improper; and (9) the trial court committed 
constitutional error in admitting evidence of pending robbery charges. 
When evaluating an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, we 
must determine: 
[F]irst, whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, 
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result. 
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986).  “The defendant has the 
burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or overt act upon which the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.”  Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 
1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000).  Moreover, “[t]he failure to raise a meritless issue does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Fennie v. State, 855 So. 2d 597, 607 
(Fla. 2003). “In fact, appellate counsel is not required to raise every conceivable 
nonfrivolous issue.”  Id. 
First, Mendoza argues appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
the issue on appeal that the trial court erred in denying the defense motion to 
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present evidence of the victim’s participation in bolito.8  Evidence is generally 
admissible at trial, provided it is relevant.  It is true that when evidence tends in 
any way to establish a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, it should be 
admitted.  Rivera v. State, 561 So. 2d 536, 539 (Fla. 1990).  “However, the 
admissibility of this evidence must be gauged by the same principle of relevancy as 
any other evidence offered by the defendant.”  Id.  Relevant evidence is defined as 
“evidence tending to prove or disprove a material fact.”  § 90.401, Fla. Stat. 
(1995). 
Mendoza argues that evidence that the victim was a bolitero was improperly 
excluded because it supported his defense to the robbery charges that Mendoza and 
the Cuellars’ purpose in approaching the victim on the day of the murder was to 
collect a debt.  However, we find that Mendoza’s argument is without merit 
because he has failed to demonstrate that this evidence is relevant to his claim of 
innocence to the robbery conviction.  Even if Mendoza was able and had been 
permitted to prove that the victim was a bolitero or that he was known to be one, 
such evidence would not have tended to prove a relevant fact.  From the fact that 
the victim was a bolitero it could not be lawfully inferred that Mendoza or the 
Cuellars ever made a loan to the victim or that their purpose in going to the 
8.  According to arguments made at trial and at the evidentiary hearing, 
“bolito” is an illegal lottery.  Evidence that the victim was a bolitero, or ran the 
lottery, was claimed to be a critical part of the defense theory. 
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victim’s house was to collect a debt. That inference would require stacking one 
inference upon another, which we decline to do.  See Merck v. State, 664 So. 2d 
939, 942 (Fla. 1995) (defendant could not demonstrate evidence was material or 
exculpatory without impermissibly stacking inferences).  Appellate counsel is not 
ineffective for failing to raise a meritless issue on direct appeal, and we therefore 
deny this claim. 
Mendoza also claims that the trial court should have granted the defense 
motion for mistrial after it altered its ruling on the admissibility of this evidence 
and that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising this issue on appeal.  
Before trial, the court granted the State’s motion in limine to prevent the defense 
from introducing evidence of the victim’s arrest for racketeering.  The trial judge 
stated at that time, however, that he did not have a problem with defense counsel 
asking the victim’s wife whether the victim was a bolitero.  Later, however, the 
trial judge limited the defense counsel’s questioning of the victim’s wife and police 
officers to whether they knew if the defendant was a bolitero at the time of his 
death.  The trial judge denied the defense’s motion for mistrial based on this 
evidentiary ruling. 
We find that the trial judge’s subsequent ruling did not significantly alter his 
original ruling on this evidence; he simply clarified that witnesses could only 
testify to information within their personal knowledge that the victim was a 
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bolitero at the time of this crime.  Therefore, the motion for mistrial was properly 
denied, and appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this issue on 
direct appeal. 
Mendoza next argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise the issue of the trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial based on improper 
prosecutorial comments during the State’s closing arguments.  The relevant 
comments in the prosecutor’s closing rebuttal argument were: 
If you don’t like the sentence, if you don’t want to give him the 
death penalty, don’t, but you promised in jury selection that this part 
of the trial is the guilt or innocence phase.  It has nothing to do with 
the penalty, nothing. And if you don’t like the penalty the other guys 
got, then adjust your recommendation then.  Don’t go for death. 
Forget about the death penalty–– 
The defense objected, and the trial court sustained the objection and gave the 
following instruction to the jury: 
This case must not [be] decided for or against anyone because you 
feel sorry for anyone or are angry.  Your duty is to determine whether 
the defendant is guilty or not guilty in accord with the law. 
Following the conclusion of the State’s rebuttal, the defense moved for a mistrial, 
which the trial court denied. 
“A ruling on a motion for mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court.  A motion for mistrial should be granted only when it is necessary to ensure 
that the defendant receives a fair trial.”  Cole v. State, 701 So. 2d 845, 853 (Fla. 
1997) (citation omitted).  We find that the trial court gave an appropriate curative 
- 14 -
instruction following the inappropriate comment by the prosecutor.  Mendoza has 
failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for 
mistrial.  We therefore deny Mendoza’s claim that his appellate counsel was 
ineffective on this basis. 
Mendoza next claims that several statements made by the trial court during 
voir dire were error that appellate counsel should have raised on direct appeal. 
Mendoza admits that the relevant comments were not objected to at trial but argues 
that they were fundamental error.  In the absence of fundamental error, appellate 
counsel has no obligation to raise an issue that was not preserved for review.  See 
Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 646 (Fla. 2000).  Fundamental error is error 
that “reaches down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of 
guilt could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.”  
Kilgore v. State, 688 So. 2d 895, 898 (Fla. 1997) (quoting State v. Delva, 575 So. 
2d 643, 644-45 (Fla. 1991)). 
Mendoza cites the following comments as the basis for this claim, each 
made by the trial judge during voir dire: 
Now I told you the defendant is presumed innocent.  That 
presumption stays with him throughout the trial until those jurors who 
are selected go into the jury room and find that he has been proven 
either not guilty, and then the case will be over, or if you should in 
your deliberations decide that he is guilty beyond and to the exclusion 
of every reasonable doubt, of course, the presumption of innocence 
leaves him at that stage. 
. . . . 
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You will understand that the defendant has an absolute right to 
remain silent and you are not to draw any inferences in this conduct. 
There may be a number of reasons why somebody remains silent; that 
is, somebody may not testify, and I am sure you can give many 
reasons why they have chosen to do that, whether they can’t articulate 
themselves, or perhaps it is their inability to remember the facts, or the 
lawyer’s recommendation not to testify. 
. . . . 
You may be asked who would like to hear from the defendant. 
Number one, understand that the defendant doesn’t have to do 
anything.  You understand that the defendant has an absolute right to 
remain silent. 
Now, you may personally feel that you would like to hear from 
him.  There is nothing wrong with that as long as you understand that 
he doesn’t have to do anything or say anything. 
While comments on the defendant’s silence or shifting the burden of proof 
to the defense can constitute error, we find that these particular comments were not 
fundamental error.  In previously considering a similar claim, we held: 
For an error to be so fundamental that it can be raised for the 
first time on appeal, the error must be basic to the judicial decision 
under review and equivalent to a denial of due process.  See State v. 
Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1993).  In cases in which courts have 
found judges’ or prosecutors’ comments to be fundamental error, the 
improper comments were made in the presence of the jury during the 
presentation of evidence or arguments.  In this case, however, the 
judge made the complained-of comment prior to voir dire and in the 
context of describing trial procedure to prospective jurors.  See 
Harmon v. State, 527 So. 2d 182, 186-87 (Fla. 1988). . . .  Our review 
of the record also demonstrates that subsequently throughout the trial 
the judge repeatedly instructed the jury to consider only the evidence 
presented at trial.  We find, under the circumstances of this case, that 
this comment does not constitute fundamental error when considered 
in context of the entire trial. 
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Randall v. State, 760 So. 2d 892, 901 (Fla. 2000) (some citations omitted).  We 
find that the comments in the instant case were not fundamental error, and 
appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise them on direct appeal. 
Mendoza also asserts that comments made by the prosecutor during her guilt 
phase closing arguments were fundamental error.  First, Mendoza asserts that the 
prosecutor denigrated the law before the jury in stating, “The Court is required to 
read to you a lot of instructions and many of them do not apply and I will discuss 
that with you.”  Mendoza also claims that the prosecutor’s remarks in closing 
arguments improperly accused the defense of perpetrating a fraud.  In commenting 
on the discrepancy between Rao’s testimony as to the time of the sampling and the 
actual timing, the prosecutor stated that the defense knew that the testimony Rao 
gave was false and asserted that the defense purposely attempted to mislead the 
jury.  Mendoza also claims that error occurred in the conclusion of the prosecutor’s 
closing argument: 
I’m going to sit down now and the defense attorney is going to 
have an opportunity to answer some questions for you and suggest to 
you how Criminalist Rao’s testimony, which suggested to you Lazaro 
Cuellar might have, could have, would have, maybe if, fired a gun 
except this whole conclusion is based on the wrong time and they 
purposely put it on to mislead you because they knew the right time. 
Let him explain to you how it is that they have any evidence 
whatsoever that contradicts what Humberto Cuellar told you and that 
you shouldn’t believe Humberto Cuellar. 
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No objections were made to these comments.  Even if the prosecutor’s comments 
were error, we find that they do not rise to the level of fundamental error such that 
appellate counsel could have successfully argued that this case warranted reversal 
on direct appeal.  Therefore, we deny this claim. 
Mendoza also asserts that certain comments during the prosecutor’s closing 
argument at the penalty phase of trial were reversible error.  These comments 
included remarks indicating that the defendant’s mitigating evidence was simply 
an excuse and that the testimony of one of the experts was “garbage.”  These 
comments were also not objected to, and so appellate counsel can only be deemed 
ineffective if the comments were fundamental error.  To constitute fundamental 
error, improper comments by the prosecutor must be so prejudicial that they would 
taint the jury’s verdict.  Fennie v. State, 855 So. 2d 597, 609 (Fla. 2003).  We find 
that the instant comments were not so egregious or so continuous as to constitute 
the same type of fundamental error that we have found in other cases.  See Brooks 
v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 905 (Fla. 2000) (finding fundamental error based on 
numerous, overlapping improprieties in the prosecutor’s penalty phase closing 
argument). 
In his next claim, Mendoza argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for 
not raising the issue that the trial court erred in denying the defense motion for 
mistrial due to the prosecutor’s violation of the sequestration rule. “[T]he rule of 
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sequestration is intended to prevent a witness’s testimony from being influenced by 
the testimony of other witnesses in the proceeding.” Wright v. State, 473 So. 2d 
1277, 1280 (Fla. 1985).  The trial court is given discretion in its enforcement of 
this rule.  Id.  The trial court held a hearing regarding the defense assertion that the 
State violated this rule because of the prosecutor’s conversation with its rebuttal 
witness, Richard Gallagher.  The trial court denied the motion for mistrial after 
Gallagher testified as to what he discussed with the prosecutor. Mendoza has 
failed to demonstrate that Gallagher’s testimony was in any way altered or 
influenced by the conversation that he had with the prosecutor. The hearing 
transcript reveals that Gallagher simply testified about evidence that had been 
carefully gathered and documented before trial.  See Lott v. State, 695 So. 2d 1239, 
1243 (Fla. 1997) (finding that trial court properly denied request for sanctions 
because rule of sequestration was not violated since three witnesses in question 
testified regarding facts about physical evidence found at the crime scene).  
Therefore, this claim was meritless, and appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for 
failing to raise a meritless claim. 
Mendoza next argues that appellate counsel should have raised the issue of 
the prosecutor’s introduction of improper nonstatutory aggravating factors at the 
penalty phase closing arguments.  The various comments made by the prosecutor 
that Mendoza argues introduced nonstatutory aggravators include: 
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The fact of the matter is the citizens in this country––and 
especially the citizens here in the State of Florida have decided that 
certain people and certain crimes warrant the death penalty. 
. . . . 
In your deliberations in the jury room the Judge tells you you 
are to go back there and first look at whether or not there are sufficient 
aggravating circumstances to warrant your recommending the death 
penalty before you even get to the mitigating. 
I suggest to you that there are, that this defendant’s actions and 
activities in this community, from what you have heard, warrants that 
you recommend that he receive the death penalty. 
. . . . 
. . . You heard nothing, nothing until after he had committed 
violent crimes against people in this community, that he wanted to say 
that he had mental problems and that is why or that is some excuse for 
what he did. 
Trial counsel did not object to any of these comments, and we find that Mendoza 
has failed to prove that the comments introduced nonstatutory aggravators or were 
fundamental error.  Therefore, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
raise this issue. 
Mendoza also argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
argue error due to the closing remarks by the prosecutor addressing Mendoza’s 
pending charges for robbery.  However, it is clear that this issue was raised on 
direct appeal, and we found it to be harmless error.  See Mendoza, 700 So. 2d at 
677-78 (“[T]he trial court erred in overruling appellant’s objection to the State’s 
question to Dr. Toomer during cross-examination and the comment in the State’s 
closing argument asking whether Dr. Toomer was aware that the defendant had a 
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pending trial in other robberies using a firearm.”).  Therefore, this claim is 
procedurally barred. 
Mendoza also argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise as an issue on direct appeal an error in the jury instructions on expert 
testimony.  However, we have reviewed the instruction given and find that it was a 
standard jury instruction that Mendoza does not argue has been invalidated by this 
Court.  We have held that “trial counsel’s failure to object to standard jury 
instructions that have not been invalidated by this Court does not render counsel’s 
performance deficient.”  Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 665 (Fla. 2000). 
Thus, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this as an issue on 
direct appeal. 
Mendoza next argues that the prosecutor violated the rules of discovery in 
presenting the medical examiner’s opinion that the laceration on Calderon’s head 
was consistent with having been caused by a Taurus nine millimeter gun. 
Mendoza fails to demonstrate what rule of discovery he is arguing on the basis of 
or how it was violated.  From the record cited to by Mendoza, it is clear that the 
defense did object to this testimony on the basis of a discovery violation—that 
counsel had not been informed that the State’s medical examiner had inspected the 
gun used by Humberto to hit the victim.  The trial court held a Richardson9 
9. Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971). 
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hearing, and the defense conceded that there was no prejudice.  Mendoza sets forth 
no argument to dispute this conclusion, and thus we do not find error. 
Next, Mendoza argues that comments by the trial judge and prosecutor led to 
the improper use of note-taking by the jury.  It is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court to determine whether a jury may take notes.  Kelley v. State, 486 So. 2d 
578, 583 (Fla. 1986).  Mendoza points to no case law or other support for his 
assertion that any comments at trial about the note-taking were improper.  We do 
not find that these comments were fundamental error. 
Mendoza also argues that error occurred during the penalty phase because 
the prosecutor’s closing arguments set forth that Mendoza threatened to kill a 
victim in a previous similar crime introduced at the penalty phase as an 
aggravating factor. While the victim, who testified at the penalty phase, never 
explicitly stated that the defendant threatened to kill him, he did clearly state that 
Mendoza’s accomplice told Mendoza to shoot the victim and then Mendoza hit the 
victim with the gun. We find that the prosecutor’s characterization of this 
testimony was accurate. 
Mendoza’s final arguments are that appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to successfully argue two of the issues raised to this Court on direct appeal.  
Mendoza does not explain how these arguments could have been successfully 
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argued to obtain a different result than that reached on appeal.  These claims are 
therefore denied because they are procedurally barred. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Because we conclude that the circuit court’s order effectively summarily 
denied postconviction relief, we remand to the circuit court for a new evidentiary 
hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  We deny Mendoza’s 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.  
Two Cases:  
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Dade County,  
Manuel A. Crespo, Judge - Case No. 92-9940C 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - Southern Region and 
Rachel L. Day and Carla Chavez, Assistant CCRC – Southern Region, Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Sandra S. Jaggard, 
Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida,
 
for Appellee/Respondent 
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