Title: Downes v. Industrial Commission
Citation: 113 Ariz. 90, 546 P.2d 826
Docket Number: 12240-PR
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: February 18, 1976

113 Ariz. 90 (1976) 546 P.2d 826 Mary Ann DOWNES and Ramon V. Estrada, Deceased, Petitioners, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, Respondent, Duval Sierrita Corporation, Respondent Employer, Duval Sierrita Corporation, Respondent Carrier. No. 12240-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. February 18, 1976. Rehearing Denied March 23, 1976. *91 Davis, Eppstein and Tretschok by Dale D. Tretschok, Tucson, for petitioners. Gregory L. Folger, Chief Counsel, The Industrial Commission of Ariz., Phoenix, for respondent. Twitty, Sievwright &amp; Mills by John F. Mills, Phoenix, for respondents Employer and Carrier. CAMERON, Chief Justice. This is a petition for review of a memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One, affirming a decision of the Industrial Commission of Arizona denying death benefits as a result of the death of Ramon V. Estrada. We must answer only one question and that is whether the deceased, Ramon V. Estrada, died in the course and scope of his employment. The facts necessary for a determination of this matter are as follows. On the evening of 18 December 1971, deceased, Ramon V. Estrada, was employed as a laborer for the respondent Duval Sierrita Corporation. He was working on the swing shift which starts at 3:30 p.m. and extends to 11:30 p.m. When the shift was started he was assigned to "A" dump, but later, at about 5:00, he was transferred to work as a helper on Drill No. 64. When he arrived at the drill he found it shut down because of electrical problems. He proceeded to clean up around the area of the drill and ate lunch at the normal lunchtime, between 7:30 and 8:00. The particular drill in question never did get into service that night and the crew, after cleaning up, had nothing to do. On the particular shift in question, a Lee Pitsch, because of his seniority as a laborer, was assigned the easier job of driving the water truck which delivered drinking water to the various crews throughout the open pit mine. Because it was cold that night, there was not a great demand for water and he finished his deliveries at about 8:00. He then stopped at Drill No. 64 and entered into a conversation with Estrada. The testimony is in dispute as to whether Estrada wished to borrow the truck to go use the bathroom or whether or not he and Pitsch agreed to change jobs for the rest of the shift. Estrada was not authorized to drive the water truck as it was the policy of Duval to require employees assigned to this job to accompany a trained driver for at least three shifts before they could qualify for such duty. The hearing officer found, however: After Estrada left with the pickup truck, Pitsch stayed. Mr. Capello, who was supervisor of the laborers, stated: *92 Estrada had borrowed the truck for this very same purpose a week before and had returned in about 10 minutes. The road taken by Estrada from the drill area was the same road he would have had to take to go to the change room where the bathroom was located. However, the testimony of Lee Pitsch taken at his deposition in Montana indicates that Estrada may have taken the truck for another purpose. At Pitsch's deposition taken in Montana, Pitsch indicated that he decided to stay at the drill site and let Estrada have the truck. Petitioner's attorney questioned him extensively on this point indicating that Pitsch had earlier stated that Estrada wanted the truck to go to the bathroom: In any event at approximately 8:10 p.m. the pickup was run over by a 150 ton ore truck driven by a fellow-employee and Estrada was crushed to death. Mary Ann Downes filed a claim with the Industrial Commission on behalf of herself, two step-children of the deceased, and the natural child of herself and deceased born after the accident. The hearing officer denied the petitioner's claim stating: We disagree with the hearing officer's conclusion. There is a presumption that if an employee is injured while on company property during working hours, he is injured while within the scope and course of his employment: And: There is a further presumption that when a workmen is killed on the job he was, at the time of the fatal accident, with in the scope and course of his employment: The petitioner, by showing that the deceased was injured and died on company premises during working hours, raised a rebuttable presumption that the deceased died in the scope and course of his employment. The evidence introduced to rebut this presumption indicated that deceased's absence from the drill site was unauthorized. The hearing officer then found that Estrada met his death without the scope and course of his employment. Even if we admit that the deceased's absence from the drill site was unauthorized, this is not dispositive of the matter. If the defendant was, in fact, going to use the bathroom as the evidence strongly suggests, he would be within the "personal comfort rule" and would be covered: If, however, as the respondent employer contended, the deceased had left the job site to roam around the mine while waiting for work to commence at the drill site, he would still be covered under the "idle time" rule. Larson has stated: In the instant case, there was nothing for deceased to do. Whether he had changed jobs with Pitsch or just wanted to do something else while waiting for work to commence is immaterial. Estrada was there, on company property. There is no evidence to indicate that he was not available for work when work was available. He was killed by a company truck driven by a company employee and he was killed during working hours. The evidence does not reasonably support a finding that overcomes the presumption that he was killed in the scope and course of his employment. Award set aside. STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and HAYS, HOLOHAN and GORDON, JJ., concur.