Title: Ex Parte Alabama Power Co.
Citation: 431 So. 2d 151
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 1, 1983

431 So. 2d 151 (1983)
Ex parte ALABAMA POWER COMPANY.
(Re: Walter Lee SMITH and Mary Ruth Smith v. ALABAMA POWER COMPANY).
81-616.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 1, 1983.
*152 C. William Gladden, Jr., and James A. Bradford of Balch, Bingham, Baker, Hawthorne, Williams &amp; Ward, Birmingham, for petitioner.
Alex W. Newton and Stephen D. Heninger of Hare, Wynn, Newell &amp; Newton, Birmingham, for respondent.
EMBRY, Justice.
This is a petition for the writ of mandamus by Alabama Power Company, asking this court to grant the following relief: That the writ of mandamus issue directed to the Honorable Josh Mullins, as Circuit Judge of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, ordering and requiring him to enter judgment in favor of Alabama Power Company and to deny respondents' motion for new trial in accordance with the opinion of this court in Alabama Power Company v. Smith, 409 So. 2d 760 (Ala.1981).
The following pertinent facts are found in the record: Respondents Walter Lee and Mary Lou Smith's suit against Alabama Power Company was tried to a jury in the Jefferson County Circuit Court. On 2 October 1981, a verdict was rendered in favor of the Smiths. During the course of the trial, Alabama Power filed motions for a directed verdict, and JNOV, and, in the alternative, for a new trial; all of which were denied. Alabama Power then appealed to this court.
On appeal of that case, the issue presented was whether petitioners had presented sufficient evidence to establish that Alabama Power exerted sufficient control over the coal scales on which respondent Walter Lee Smith fell, which fall resulted in injuries to him, as to satisfy the duty element of a negligence action. Regarding that issue this court found:
Our holding in that case read as follows:
"REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS."
409 So. 2d  at 764.
Shortly after the decision in that case was released, on 5 October 1981, the Honorable Josh Mullins, the trial judge, entered the following order:
To allow plaintiffs to file an application for rehearing with this court, Judge Mullins vacated his order of 5 October 1981.
In their application for rehearing, plaintiffs vehemently urged this court to reconsider and withdraw its opinion, stating as follows:
Upon denial of plaintiffs' application we stated:
409 So. 2d  at 764.
Several weeks after our decision to deny rehearing, respondents filed a motion for new trial. That motion was set for hearing on 11 May 1982.
On 22 April 1982, the Smiths served notice to take the oral deposition, for the purpose of discovery, of an employee of Alabama Power. It then filed a motion to quash the notice, which was denied on the same day. On the following day Alabama Power filed a motion requesting the trial court to enter judgment in its favor. Its request for a hearing on this motion prior to the date set for the deposition of its employee was denied.
Alabama Power then petitioned this court for the writ of mandamus. On 6 May 1982 this court ordered all proceedings in the circuit court stayed pending our decision regarding this petition.
The petition for the writ of mandamus presents the issue, whether, in Alabama Power Company v. Smith, supra, there was a final adjudication regarding petitioner's control over the coal scales on which respondent Walter Smith fell. The Smiths contend that the motion for new trial is, in light of our opinion in this case, procedurally proper.
Alabama Power Company v. Smith, was brought to this court on an evidentiary issue. In Casey v. Jones, 410 So. 2d 5 (Ala. 1982), we clarified the distinctions between evidentiary challenges as follows:
410 So. 2d  at 8.
The Smiths contend this case was a "weight of the evidence" case, relying on Garmon v. King Coal Co., Inc., 409 So. 2d 776 (Ala.1982). There this court had occasion to consider the effect to be given an appellate court determination, on further litigation, that a jury verdict was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The decision of this court followed the reasoning in Universal Truck Loading Co. v. Taylor, 178 Miss. 143, 172 So. 756, 757 (1937). We quoted that court's opinion as follows:
409 So. 2d  at 779.
In Garmon it was clearly pointed out that we were not considering the "sufficiency of the evidence."
409 So. 2d  at 778, 779.
In Alabama Power Company v. Smith, we were presented with a completely different fact situation. Alabama Power had presented motions for directed verdict, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for new trial. The issue of sufficiency of the evidence as to control was before us both on appeal and on application for rehearing.
The opinion in that case, although not directly defining the sort of evidentiary challenge under consideration, left no room for doubt that we were aware the issue of sufficiency of the evidence for submission to the jury had been properly presented. The most telling evidence of the basis for our decision was the mandate issued; there was no express grant of a new trial. It is clear in light of the history of that case, the determination was that, as a matter of law, evidence regarding control was insufficient and Alabama Power's motions for judgment as a matter of law should have been granted.
The Smiths further contend the trial court should be allowed to consider a motion for new trial under Rule 50(c)(2). It provides:
Rule 50(c)(2), ARCP.
The United States Supreme Court treated the issue of whether the correlative Federal Rule of Civil Procedure could be so utilized in Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., 386 U.S. 317, 87 S. Ct. 1072, 18 L. Ed. 2d 75 (1967).
386 U.S.  at 324, 87 S. Ct.  at 1077-1078.
This court held, on first deliverance, that Alabama Power was entitled to a directed verdict because there was an insufficiency of evidence regarding control. Because we did not expressly grant a new trial, our prior decision terminated this litigation. See Sears, Roebuck &amp; Co. v. Haven Hills Farm, Inc., 395 So. 2d 991 (Ala.1981). Our mandate directed the trial court to enter judgment in accordance with our determination. The rule to be applied in this case is stated in § 991 of the American Jurisprudence Encyclopedia:
5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error § 991 (1962).
In Kinney v. White, 215 Ala. 247, 110 So. 394 (1926), this court, in a second appeal of that case, noted that in the prior appeal it had reversed and remanded the cause so "that the trial court may proceed with the cause and render a decree according to the opinion of this Court." 215 Ala. at 248, 110 So. 394. This court held the mandate meant exactly what it said:
215 Ala. at 248-49, 110 So. 394.
Unquestionably, the language employed by this court in the instant case, is just as clear, if not more so, than the language employed in Kinney. This is evidenced by the original entry of judgment by the trial court after reversal.
For the reasons stated, the trial court should, forthwith, enter judgment in favor of Alabama Power Company as mandated by the decision of this court in Alabama Power Co. v. Smith, 409 So. 2d 760 (Ala.1981). Failing to do so, then upon application of petitioner, the writ of mandamus *156 will issue from this court to compel that action.
WRIT OF MANDAMUS ISSUED CONDITIONALLY.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, ALMON and ADAMS, JJ., concur.