Title: Boynton v. Kilgore
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 051041
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 13, 2006

1
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
FRANCES BOYNTON, ET AL. 
OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 051041 
 
 
 
  JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
January 13, 2006 
JERRY W. KILGORE, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
VIRGINIA, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Melvin R. Hughes, Jr., Judge 
 
Frances Boynton and eleven other former employees of the 
Office of the Attorney General (collectively “the former 
employees”) appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court of the 
City of Richmond, which sustained a demurrer to their amended 
motion for judgment.  At issue in this appeal is whether the 
Virginia Personnel Act, Code § 2.2-2900 et seq. (“VPA”), applies 
to employees of the Office of the Attorney General so that the 
twelve involuntarily separated employees qualify for severance 
benefits under the Workforce Transition Act of 1995, Code § 2.2-
3201 et seq. (“WTA”).  Because we find that the Virginia 
Personnel Act does not cover employees of the Office of the 
Attorney General, we will affirm the trial court’s judgment. 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The former employees were full-time employees of the Office 
of the Attorney General until October 18, 2002, when they were 
involuntarily separated from employment due to budget 
 
 
2
constraints.  Upon termination of employment, the former 
employees sought severance benefits provided under the WTA. 
The Attorney General and the Comptroller of the 
Commonwealth denied their request, contending the former 
employees were ineligible for WTA severance benefits because 
they are not included in the list of employees eligible for 
benefits as set forth in Code § 2.2-3202.1 
After exhausting their administrative remedies, the former 
employees filed a motion for judgment against the Attorney 
General and the Comptroller in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Richmond, seeking WTA severance benefits.  The trial court 
sustained the demurrer of the Attorney General and the 
Comptroller, but permitted the former employees to file an 
amended motion for judgment.  In the amended motion for 
judgment, the former employees allege they are eligible for WTA 
severance benefits under Code § 2.2-3202(A)(i) because they were 
full-time Commonwealth employees “covered by the Virginia 
Personnel Act.” 
The Attorney General and the Comptroller again demurred, 
arguing that the former employees are exempt from the VPA under 
                     
1 The former employees were awarded five weeks of severance 
pay under other provisions of state law, but were denied all 
benefits under the WTA. 
 
 
 
3
Code § 2.2-2905(1) and therefore cannot be included within Code 
§ 2.2-3202(A)(i). 
The trial court sustained the demurrer in a letter opinion 
dated January 28, 2005, which was incorporated into an order 
dated February 24, 2005 that dismissed the amended motion for 
judgment with prejudice.  The trial court’s letter opinion held 
that “the autonomy of the Attorney General in personnel matters” 
would be disrupted if the VPA covered employees of the Office of 
the Attorney General and “that without coverage of the VPA 
extending to them, plaintiffs are not eligible to the severance 
benefits allowed by the WTA.” 
We awarded the former employees this appeal. 
II. ANALYSIS 
The former employees raise six assignments of error, which 
all center on a single dispositive issue: whether the provisions 
of Code § 2.2-2905(1), which exempt from the VPA all “[o]fficers 
and employees for whom the Constitution specifically directs the 
manner of selection,” includes employees of the Office of the 
Attorney General.2  The parties agree that if the foregoing 
statute includes employees of the Office of the Attorney 
                     
2 Code § 2.2-2905 states, in relevant part: “The provisions 
of this chapter shall not apply to: . . . Officers and employees 
for whom the Constitution specifically directs the manner of 
selection.” 
 
 
4
General, then the former employees are not covered by the VPA 
and are thus ineligible for the WTA benefits claimed. 
The WTA provides that certain employees of the Commonwealth 
who are involuntarily separated from employment are eligible for 
transitional severance benefits.  Code § 2.2-3201.  Code § 2.2-
3202 then lists those employees entitled to the WTA severance 
benefits.  Employees of the Office of the Attorney General are 
not specifically named in the statutory list.3  The former 
employees contend, however, that Code § 2.2-3202(A)(i) includes 
them because each was a “full-time employee of the Commonwealth 
(i) whose position is covered by the Virginia Personnel Act 
(§ 2.2-2900 et seq.).” 
The former employees argue they are covered by the VPA 
because the plain language of Code § 2.2-2905(1) lists those 
employees of the Commonwealth who are exempt from the VPA, and 
they are not among those exempted; therefore, they must be 
included within the VPA’s coverage.  In particular, the former 
                     
3 Code § 2.2-3202(A) states, in relevant part:  
 
Any full-time employee of the Commonwealth (i) whose 
position is covered by the Virginia Personnel Act 
(§ 2.2-2900 et seq.) . . . and (a) who, on or after 
January 1, 1995, is involuntarily separated . . . and 
(b) for whom reemployment with the Commonwealth is not 
possible because there is no available position for 
which the employee is qualified or the position 
offered to the employee requires relocation or a 
reduction in salary, shall be eligible, under the 
 
 
5
employees contend they are not within the exemption group 
asserted by the Attorney General in Code § 2.2-2905(1) because 
they are neither officers nor employees “for whom the 
Constitution specifically directs the manner of selection” under 
the plain language of the statute. 
The former employees note that the Constitution of Virginia 
makes no reference to employees of the Office of the Attorney 
General and the Attorney General cites to none.  Because courts 
are obliged to apply the plain meaning of a statute unless doing 
so results in a “manifest absurdity” or irreconcilable statutory 
conflict, they argue that the trial court erred in failing to 
follow the plain language of the statute when it sustained the 
demurrer.  The former employees aver that as the plain language 
of Code § 2.2-2905(1) does not exempt them from the VPA, and no 
manifest absurdity or statutory conflict exists to require an 
alternate construction of the statute’s text, they must be 
covered by the VPA and therefore entitled to WTA severance 
benefits under Code § 2.2-3202(A)(i). 
Anticipating the argument of the Attorney General and the 
Comptroller, the former employees further posit that VPA 
coverage of employees of the Office of the Attorney General for 
purposes of receiving WTA severance benefits does not create a 
                                                                  
conditions specified, for the transitional severance 
benefit conferred by this chapter. 
 
 
6
conflict between the statutory authority given to the Governor 
and the Attorney General as to employees of the Office of the 
Attorney General.  This is so, they contend, because 
involuntarily severed employees are no longer employees and 
therefore no longer subject to the Attorney General’s control.  
Consequently, they argue that the facts of this case do not 
create a conflict in the respective authority of the Governor 
and the Attorney General; therefore, that issue need not be 
addressed in the case at bar.  If a conflict between the 
Governor’s authority and the Attorney General’s were to arise in 
another context of VPA coverage, the former employees contend 
the courts could then determine how to harmonize the statutes in 
that future case. 
In response, the Attorney General4 argues that employees of 
the Office of the Attorney General, including the former 
employees, are not covered by the VPA because the exemption 
under Code § 2.2-2905(1) for officers “for whom the Constitution 
specifically directs the manner of selection” includes 
individuals working under such an officer’s control.  Thus, 
because the Attorney General is exempt from the VPA under Code 
                     
4 On appeal, the Attorney General represents not only the 
Attorney General, but also the Comptroller of the Commonwealth; 
reference to the “Attorney General” thus encompasses both 
parties where the context would so indicate. 
 
 
7
§ 2.2-2905(1), individuals whose positions are controlled by the 
Attorney General are necessarily exempt as well.5 
The Attorney General contends that to hold otherwise would 
establish conflicting authority over personnel decisions between 
the Governor and the Attorney General, and a direct and 
irreconcilable conflict between several statutes.  Under Code 
§ 2.2-103(B), the Governor is the “Chief Personnel Officer of 
the Commonwealth,” and is charged with “direct[ing] the 
execution of” the VPA.  The VPA establishes a “system of 
personnel administration” for Commonwealth employees.6  Code 
§ 2.2-2900.  It states, inter alia, that “[n]o establishment of 
a position or rate of pay, and no change in rate of pay shall 
become effective except on order of the appointing authority and 
approval by the Governor.”  Code § 2.2-2901(C). 
While the Governor has final authority over personnel under 
the foregoing provisions of the VPA, Code §§ 2.2-501 and –502 
give the Attorney General final authority over the personnel of 
the Office of the Attorney General.7  The Attorney General thus 
                     
5 The Constitution of Virginia sets out the manner of 
selecting the Attorney General in Article V, § 15. 
6 The VPA contains various provisions on a wide range of 
subjects, including protecting the right of Commonwealth 
employees to use tobacco products, Code § 2.2-2902, and creating 
employment preferences for veterans.  Code § 2.2-2903. 
7 Code § 2.2-501 states, in relevant part: “The Attorney 
General shall appoint a chief deputy Attorney General and may 
appoint the necessary deputy Attorneys General and assistant 
Attorneys General and fix their salaries within the limitation 
 
 
8
contends that if the VPA applies to employees of that Office, as 
asserted by the former employees, both the Governor and the 
Attorney General would have the same and contemporaneous 
authority over employees of the Office of the Attorney General.  
To avoid this conflict, the Attorney General argues that the 
proper construction of the VPA exemption in Code § 2.2-2905(1) 
includes not only the Attorney General, but also the employees 
under his control. 
We find the Attorney General’s arguments persuasive. 
There is no statutory basis to support the contention that 
the former employees could be covered by the VPA solely for the 
purpose of qualifying for WTA severance benefits under Code 
§ 2.2-3202(A)(i) as former employees, but not covered as VPA 
employees for other purposes.  Consequently, contrary to the 
former employees’ position, the VPA’s applicability to all 
employees of the Office of the Attorney General must be examined 
in the case at bar.  Although this case ultimately addresses 
eligibility for WTA severance benefits, our decision on that 
issue necessarily derives from resolving the predicate issue of 
                                                                  
of the funds provided for the purpose in the general 
appropriation act.” 
Code § 2.2-502 states: “The Attorney General may appoint 
such persons as he deems necessary for the efficient conduct of 
his office, and apportion, out of the appropriation for his 
office, such salaries among such persons as he deems proper 
. . . .” 
 
 
9
whether employees of the Office of the Attorney General are 
exempt from the VPA under Code § 2.2-2905(1). 
Because statutory interpretation presents a pure question 
of law, it is subject to de novo review by this Court.  Ainslie 
v. Inman, 265 Va. 347, 352, 577 S.E.2d 246, 248 (2003).  When 
interpreting statutes, courts “ascertain and give effect to the 
intention of the legislature.”  Chase v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 
266 Va. 544, 547, 587 S.E.2d 521, 522 (2003).  That intent is 
usually self-evident from the words used in the statute.  Id.  
Consequently, courts apply the plain language of a statute 
unless the terms are ambiguous,8 Tiller v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 
418, 420, 69 S.E.2d 441, 442 (1952), or applying the plain 
language would lead to an absurd result.9  Cummings v. Fulghum, 
261 Va. 73, 77, 540 S.E.2d 494, 496 (2001).  Courts also employ 
the rules of statutory construction when the plain language of 
two or more statutes conflict.  See, e.g., Wertz v. Grubbs, 245 
Va. 67, 70, 425 S.E.2d 500, 501 (1993) (using principles of 
                     
8 Ambiguity exists if the text can be “understood in more 
than one way or refers to two or more things simultaneously [or] 
when the language is difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful 
import, or lacks clearness or definiteness.”  Brown v. Lukhard, 
229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985) (citation omitted).  
We find that the text of Code § 2.2-2905(1) is unambiguous, so 
this exception to the general rule is inapplicable to the case 
at bar. 
9 The phrase “absurd result” is used “to describe situations 
in which the law would be internally inconsistent or otherwise 
incapable of operation.”  Cook v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 111, 
116, 597 S.E.2d 84, 87 (2004). 
 
 
10
statutory construction to resolve an apparent conflict between 
the unambiguous language of two statutes). 
When Code § 2.2-2905(1) is examined in light of the 
authority granted to the Governor (in the VPA) and the Attorney 
General (in Code § 2.2-501 et seq.), the reading advocated by 
the former employees presents an irreconcilable conflict between 
the statutory authority of the Governor and that of the Attorney 
General.  The Governor is “Chief Personnel Officer” charged with 
executing the VPA.  Code § 2.2-103.  Under the VPA’s provisions, 
“[n]o establishment of a position or rate of pay, and no change 
in rate of pay shall become effective except on order of the 
appointing authority and approval by the Governor.”  Code § 2.2-
2901(C).  Employees covered by the VPA are thus subject to the 
Governor’s direct authority regarding such personnel decisions. 
That gubernatorial authority, if the former employees’ 
viewpoint is sustained, is directly contrary to the Attorney 
General’s statutory authority to make personnel decisions 
relating to the employees of his or her office.  This is self-
evident from the clear appointment power in Code §§ 2.2-501 and 
–502, coupled with the Attorney General’s authority to set “such 
salaries among such persons as he deems proper.”  Code § 2.2-
502.  Apart from the legislature’s funding prerogatives, there 
 
 
11
are no statutory restrictions on these powers granted to the 
Attorney General. 
Thus, the former employees’ proffered reading of the 
pertinent statutes would give the Governor and the Attorney 
General simultaneous, unrestricted authority to create 
positions, determine salaries, and appoint personnel for the 
Office of the Attorney General.  This construction creates an 
unworkable and irreconcilable conflict between the authority of 
the Governor and that of the Attorney General.  Because such a 
literal construction of Code § 2.2-3202(A)(i) creates a conflict 
between statutory provisions, we must turn to the rules of 
statutory construction to determine the General Assembly’s 
intent and resolve the conflict.  See Moore v. Commonwealth, 155 
Va. 1, 11-12, 155 S.E. 635, 638-39 (1930) (using principles of 
statutory construction to resolve conflict between two code 
provisions);10 see also Wertz v. Grubbs, 245 Va. at 70, 425  
                     
10 In approaching how to resolve a conflict between two 
statutes, the Court in Moore cited this language from Golden 
Valley County v. Lundin, 203 N.W. 317, 319 (N.D. 1925): 
 
The legislative intention must primarily be determined 
from the language of the statute.  And if the language 
is plain, certain and unambiguous, so that no doubt 
arises from its own terms as to its meaning, then 
there is no room for interpretation, and the statute 
must be given effect according to its terms.  But the 
legislative intention must be sought from the whole 
act, and not merely from certain parts of it; and 
where certain provisions of an act are inconsistent 
 
 
12
S.E.2d at 501 (1993) (same).11 
When faced with apparently conflicting statutes, this Court 
applies “a well-established principle of statutory construction.  
If possible, we must harmonize apparently conflicting statutes 
to give effect to both.”  Phipps v. Liddle, 267 Va. 344, 346, 
593 S.E.2d 193, 195 (2004); see also Kirkpatrick v. Board of 
Supervisors, 146 Va. 113, 125, 136 S.E. 186, 190 (1926) (“where 
two statutes are in apparent conflict they should be construed, 
if reasonably possible, so as to allow both to stand and to give 
force and effect to each.”).  Indeed, whenever “a given 
                                                                  
with other provisions of the same act, then it becomes 
incumbent upon the courts to determine which must 
prevail in order to carry out the legislative purpose 
and intention. 
Moore, 155 Va. at 11, 155 S.E. at 638. 
11 The principles permitting courts to construe statutes 
where a literal construction of the statute’s plain language 
results in a “manifest absurdity” are arguably applicable here 
as well.  When applying the plain language of a statute causes 
illogical or unworkable conflict either internally or in light 
of another statute, the plain language is insufficient to 
determining the statute’s meaning.  See Frey v. Jefferson 
Homebuilders, Inc., 251 Va. 375, 378, 467 S.E.2d 788, 790 
(1996).  Language giving simultaneous, unrestricted authority to 
two elected officials is “absurd” in light of the manifest 
difficulties implementing, enforcing, and prioritizing 
conflicting employment decisions of either official. 
Some cases analyzing apparent conflicts between statutes 
rely on the determination of “manifest absurdity” before turning 
to the rules of statutory construction to resolve the conflict.  
See, e.g., Buzzard v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 641, 653-54, 114 
S.E. 664, 667-68 (1922) (harmonizing statutes to avoid a 
statutory conflict that would lead to an absurd result).  Our 
case law establishes, however, that this intermediary step is 
not required where, as in the case at bar, a literal 
 
 
13
controversy involves a number of related statutes, they should 
be read and construed together in order to give full meaning, 
force, and effect to each.”  Ainslie, 265 Va. at 353, 577 S.E.2d 
at 249; see also Ragan v. Woodcroft Village Apts., 255 Va. 322, 
325, 497 S.E.2d 740, 742 (1998) (“We accord each statute, 
insofar as possible, a meaning that does not conflict with the 
other statutes.”). 
Here, the conflict only arises if the VPA applies to 
employees of the Office of the Attorney General through Code 
§ 2.2-2905(1).  By reading Code § 2.2-2905(1) to encompass both 
the Attorney General – an officer “for whom the Constitution 
specifically directs the manner of selection” – and those 
employed under the Attorney General’s authority, the statutory 
conflict between the powers of the Governor and the Attorney 
General is avoided.  This construction harmonizes the Code 
provisions thereby eliminating an otherwise untenable conflict, 
while giving effect to the statutes establishing the Governor’s 
authority and that of the Attorney General.  The Governor’s 
powers under the VPA are unaffected as to any Commonwealth 
employees other than employees of the Office of the Attorney 
General, and the Attorney General’s powers are limited to those 
                                                                  
construction of statutory text creates a direct conflict with 
another statute. 
 
 
14
employees and allow recognition of the General Assembly’s intent 
as expressed in Code § 2.2-501, et seq. 
Furthermore, this construction gives effect to the General 
Assembly’s intent without causing the Court to usurp the 
legislature’s right to write statutes.  Whenever interpreting 
and construing a statute, we are mindful that “[c]ourts are not 
permitted to rewrite statutes.”  Anderson v. Commonwealth, 182 
Va. 560, 566, 29 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1944).  Our construction of 
Code § 2.2-2905(1) is consistent with our well-settled 
principles of statutory construction in light of the clear 
conflict between statutes that would result from a literal 
reading. 
Accordingly, we hold that employees of the Office of the 
Attorney General, including the former employees, are not 
covered by the VPA because they are exempt under Code § 2.2-
2905(1).  Because the former employees are not covered by the 
VPA, they are ineligible to receive WTA benefits under Code 
§ 2.2-3202(A)(i).  Consequently, the trial court did not err in 
sustaining the Attorney General’s demurrer and dismissing the 
amended motion for judgment with prejudice.  We will therefore 
affirm the trial court’s judgment. 
Affirmed.