Title: Wadle v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 19S-CR-340
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: August 18, 2020

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 19S-CR-340 
Jordan B. Wadle, 
Appellant (Defendant), 
–v– 
State of Indiana, 
Appellee (Plaintiff). 
Argued: September 5, 2019 | Decided: August 18, 2020 
Appeal from the Fayette Superior Court,  
No. 21D01-1511-F3-912 
The Honorable J. Steven Cox, Special Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, 
No. 18A-CR-1465 
Opinion by Justice Goff 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices David, Massa, and Slaughter concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Aug 18 2020, 2:03 pm
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Goff, Justice. 
Historically, the prohibition against double jeopardy applied as a 
procedural bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, whether 
after acquittal or conviction. Over time, the protection evolved beyond the 
procedural context to embody a substantive bar to multiple convictions or 
punishments for the same offense in a single trial. Today, courts often 
treat these two strands of double jeopardy alike, applying the same 
analysis regardless of context. The historical record reveals our own 
vacillation on the issue.1 But just over two decades ago, this Court, in 
Richardson v. State, resolved any lingering doubt by treating both strands 
with equal reverence under the Indiana Constitution.  
In settling this issue, the Richardson Court adopted a comprehensive 
analytical framework—consisting of a “statutory elements” test and an 
“actual evidence” test—for deciding all substantive double-jeopardy 
claims under article 1, section 14. Subsequent application of these tests, 
however, proved largely untenable, ultimately forcing the Court to retreat 
from its all-inclusive analytical framework. What we’re left with today is a 
patchwork of conflicting precedent and inconsistent standards, ultimately 
depriving the Indiana bench and bar of proper guidance in this area of the 
law.  
To be sure, we commend our predecessors on the Richardson Court for 
their exhaustive survey, insightful analyses, and critical commentaries on 
the nuances of double-jeopardy law in Indiana (and beyond). At its very 
core, Richardson is a true work of legal scholarship. But when our case law 
evolves in unexpected and contradictory ways, we would be remiss in 
preserving the status quo.  
 
1 Compare Thompson v. State, 259 Ind. 587, 591–92, 290 N.E.2d 724, 726 (1972) (“Since Appellant 
has been subjected to only one judicial proceeding for the offenses charged, his claim of 
double jeopardy is inappropriate.”), with Elmore v. State, 269 Ind. 532, 534, 382 N.E.2d 893, 894 
(1978) (concluding that “a defendant may not be reprosecuted in a second trial for the same 
offense nor may he be twice sentenced for the same offense in a single proceeding”). 
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To that end, we expressly overrule the Richardson constitutional tests in 
resolving claims of substantive double jeopardy. Going forward, and with 
a focus on statutory interpretation, we adopt an analytical framework that 
applies the statutory rules of double jeopardy. See infra Section I.B.3. This 
framework, which applies when a defendant’s single act or transaction 
implicates multiple criminal statutes (rather than a single statute), consists 
of a two-part inquiry: First, a court must determine, under our included-
offense statutes, whether one charged offense encompasses another 
charged offense. Second, a court must look at the underlying facts—as 
alleged in the information and as adduced at trial—to determine whether 
the charged offenses are the “same.” If the facts show two separate and 
distinct crimes, there’s no violation of substantive double jeopardy, even if 
one offense is, by definition, “included” in the other. But if the facts show 
only a single continuous crime, and one statutory offense is included in 
the other, then the presumption is that the legislation intends for 
alternative (rather than cumulative) sanctions. The State can rebut this 
presumption only by showing that the statute—either in express terms or 
by unmistakable implication—clearly permits multiple punishment.  
The defendant here stands convicted of several offenses for leaving the 
scene of an accident after twice striking and seriously injuring his victim 
while driving drunk. Because we interpret the statutory offenses charged 
as alternative sanctions, we hold that the defendant’s multiple convictions 
violate the statutory rules of substantive double jeopardy. Accordingly, 
we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions for the 
trial court to vacate all but one of his convictions: Level 3 felony leaving 
the scene of an accident. And because this conviction alone justifies the 
penalty imposed, we further instruct the trial court to leave in place his 
sixteen-year sentence with two years suspended to probation.  
Facts and Procedural History 
Jordan Wadle went out drinking with some friends one night at a local 
bar in Connersville, Indiana. At some point that evening, Wadle 
apparently made unsolicited sexual advances toward a woman. The 
woman’s husband and his brother, Charles Woodward, later confronted 
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Wadle over the incident in the parking lot. Although physically 
unprovoked by his interrogators, Wadle went on the offensive, punching 
and kicking Woodward. Wadle then returned to his car, suggesting an 
end to the fracas. But as Woodward retreated, Wadle’s car struck him 
from behind. Hell-bent on causing further injury, Wadle struck 
Woodward a second time, pinning him under a guardrail adjacent to the 
bar. Wadle then sped away, leaving his broken victim behind. Police 
caught up with the suspected malefactor about an hour later just outside 
of town. Testing later revealed Wadle had a blood-alcohol level nearly 
twice the legal limit. Woodward ultimately survived the attack but spent 
nearly sixty days in the intensive care unit, having underwent surgery for 
a fractured skull and multiple broken ribs. 
The State charged Wadle with multiple offenses:  
Count I 
Level-3 felony aggravated battery; 
Count II 
Leaving the scene of an accident, elevated from a Class 
B misdemeanor to a Level 3 felony for his offense of OWI 
causing serious bodily injury (OWI-SBI);  
Count III 
OWI-SBI, elevated from a Level 6 to a Level 5 felony due 
to a previous OWI conviction; 
Count IV 
OWI endangering a person, elevated from a Class A 
misdemeanor to a Level 6 felony due to a previous OWI 
conviction; and 
Count V 
OWI with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more, 
elevated from a Class C misdemeanor to a Level 6 felony 
due to a previous OWI conviction. 
See I.C. § 35-42-2-1.5 (aggravated battery) (2014 Repl.); I.C. § 9-26-1-1.1(a), 
(b) (Supp. 2015) (leaving the scene); I.C. § 9-30-5-4(a) (OWI-SBI); I.C. § 9-
30-5-2(a), (b) (2010 Repl.) (OWI endangering another); I.C. § 9-30-5-1(a) 
(OWI with an blood-alcohol concentration of at least 0.08); I.C. § 9-30-5-
3(a) (Supp. 2015) (elevating the OWI misdemeanor offenses to Level 6 
felonies based on a previous OWI conviction). 
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The jury acquitted Wadle of Count I but found him guilty of the 
remaining charges. The trial court entered judgment of conviction and 
sentenced Wadle to an aggregate term of sixteen years executed with two 
years suspended to probation.2 
In a unanimous opinion, our Court of Appeals affirmed in part and 
reversed in part, holding that, under the Richardson “actual evidence” test, 
Wadle’s convictions under Counts II and III violated the Indiana Double 
Jeopardy Clause. Wadle v. State, 120 N.E.3d 253, 256–58 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2019) (citing Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999)). The panel 
recognized several cases in conflict with its holding. Id. at 258 n.4. But, 
while seeking clarification from this Court, the panel declined to address 
this tension in constitutional precedent on grounds that Wadle’s 
convictions also violated the common-law rules against double jeopardy. 
Id. Under these rules, the panel held, the same harm caused by Wadle 
(striking Woodward with his car while driving drunk) impermissibly 
supported both the elevation of his conviction under Count II and his 
conviction under Count III. Id. at 259. The panel applied the same 
reasoning to Wadle’s two other OWI convictions, both based on the same 
act of drunk driving. Id. To remedy these violations, the panel remanded 
with instructions for the trial court to vacate Wadle’s convictions under 
Counts III, IV, and V while leaving in place his conviction and sentence 
under Count II. Id. at 261–62. 
The State petitioned for transfer, which we granted, vacating the Court 
of Appeals decision. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 
 
2 While the court’s sentencing order indicates no specific term for each offense, the abstract of 
judgment identifies the term for each count to be served concurrently with two years 
suspended to probation. 
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Standard of Review 
This case presents several questions of law, both statutory and 
constitutional, which we review de novo. A.M. v. State, 134 N.E.3d 361, 
364 (Ind. 2019). 
Discussion and Decision 
Wadle argues that the jury used the evidence supporting the elevation 
of his leaving-the-scene offense to also prove the elements of his OWI-SBI 
offense, a violation of the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause under the 
Richardson “actual evidence” test. The State counters that Wadle’s 
convictions simply reflect punishment for two separate and sequential 
harms: OWI-SBI followed by leaving the scene of an accident. Urging 
deference to “the express directive of the legislature,” the State contends 
that Wadle’s convictions must stand because they represent “two 
independent criminally culpable decisions,” resulting in two different 
crimes. Pet. to Trans. at 8, 11; Reply in Support of Trans. at 4. 
The dispute here forces us to confront long-standing tensions in our 
double-jeopardy jurisprudence, an area of the law plagued by multiple 
contextual applications, competing policy concerns, and shifting doctrinal 
formulations. These variables, a perennial source of confusion for the 
bench and bar, set the stage for our analysis in Part I of this opinion. We 
follow this discussion with a summary of Richardson and an in-depth 
survey of its progeny, ultimately leading to our departure from that 
precedent. See infra Section I.A.2. We then reassess the protective scope of 
our Double Jeopardy Clause, concluding that it operates only as a 
procedural bar to successive prosecutions for the same offense. See infra 
Section I.B.1. From there, and after clarifying the basic statutory and 
common-law protections against multiple punishments in a single trial, 
we proceed to articulate an analytical framework in which to resolve 
claims of substantive double jeopardy under Indiana law. See infra 
Sections I.B.2–3. We conclude Part I by discussing other constitutional 
protections on which defendants may rely to supplement these claims—
protections, we believe, better suited to address the perpetual question of 
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whether a defendant’s actions warrant multiple punishments in a single 
trial. See infra Section I.B.4. Finally, we apply our analytical framework to 
Wadle in Part II of our opinion, resolving this case on the merits. 
I. Conflicting precedent under our Double Jeopardy 
Clause calls for a reassessment of its protections. 
The Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause, as with its federal counterpart, 
stands as a bedrock principle of our fundamental law. And yet, despite its 
façade of simplicity, few other constitutional guarantees present questions 
as vexing as those found in the ancient maxim that “[n]o person shall be 
put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” As a shield against the 
excesses of government prosecution, the basic premise of the Clause is 
clear enough. But the scope of its protection, and the circumstances in 
which it applies, engenders little consensus—and even significant 
confusion—among courts and commentators. Perhaps the most divisive—
and confounding—question posed by this constitutional guarantee centers 
on the meaning of a single phrase: “same offense.”  
A. How do we define “same offense”? 
The protective scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause turns on the 
meaning of “same offense,” a “phrase deceptively simple in appearance 
but virtually kaleidoscopic in application.” Whalen v. United States, 445 
U.S. 684, 700 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Indeed, “there has been, 
and remains, widespread confusion in the decisional law and in the 
commentary as to what constitutes the ‘same offense,’ and under what 
circumstances the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked.” 
Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 60 (Boehm, J., concurring).  
Historically, the prohibition against double jeopardy—rooted in the 
English common law pleas of autrefois acquit (former acquittal) and 
autrefois convict (former conviction)—applied as a procedural bar to 
successive prosecutions for the same offense. Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 
Yale L.J. 262, 262, 265–66 nn. 1, 11–12 (1965). Because early American 
penal codes defined only a handful of criminal offenses, a person seldom 
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committed more than one violation in the same act or transaction. Strict 
rules of pleading and procedure likewise prevented multiple convictions 
in a single trial. See Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: 
Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L.J. 1149, 1173–75 (1960) 
(summarizing common-law rules). By the mid-nineteenth century, 
however, this paradigm had shifted, the consequence of an expanding 
body of statutory law defining new—and often overlapping—criminal 
offenses.3 Relaxed rules of pleading and procedure opened the door to 
further change, allowing prosecutors to join multiple related charges 
against a defendant—and even fragment those charges—for a single 
criminal act. While minimizing the likelihood of unwarranted acquittal, 
these multi-count indictments “greatly enhance[d] the potential penalty 
for any given criminal transaction.”4 Note, Double Jeopardy and the Multiple-
Count Indictment, 57 Yale L.J. 132, 133 (1947). 
To protect the interests of the accused, then, the prohibition against 
double jeopardy evolved beyond the procedural context to embody a 
substantive bar to multiple convictions or punishments for the “same 
offense” in a single trial.5 Jay A. Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 Am. 
J. Legal Hist. 283, 289 (1963). While the issues raised by these two strands 
of double jeopardy vary, the “crucial inquiry” remains constant: whether 
one charged offense is the “same” as another charged offense to trigger 
the constitutional protection. Elmore v. State, 269 Ind. 532, 534, 382 N.E.2d 
 
3 The Indiana Revised Code of 1852 identified 120 crimes, more than double the number of 
offenses defined at the time of statehood in 1816. David J. Bodenhamer, Criminal Punishment 
in Antebellum Indiana: The Limits of Reform, 82 Ind. Mag. Hist. 358, 372 (1986). Felonies alone 
rose from twenty in 1824 to forty-three in 1852. Id. at 372 n.62. 
4 Legislative initiatives to codify and recodify the criminal code have attempted to mitigate 
this problem in recent decades, albeit with limited success. See Note, Res Judicata and Double 
Jeopardy in Indiana Criminal Procedure, 33 Ind. L.J. 409, 428 (1958) (proposing codification as 
one potential way to “reduce the number of overlapping” offenses that apply to the “same 
activity” or “fact situation”); I.C. Ann. § 35-41-4-3 cmt. at 368 (West 1978) (noting the limited 
effect of such efforts). 
5 We use “conviction” and “punishment” interchangeably. Both terms implicate disabilities 
beyond just excessive sentences (including collateral consequences or increased vulnerability 
to habitual-offender status).  
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893, 895 (1978). The methods or standards on which courts have relied to 
resolve this question warrant a closer look for the proper context to our 
decision. 
1. The meaning of “same offense” depends on the 
analytical framework applied.  
In resolving claims of double jeopardy, courts have generally relied on 
one of two tests: (1) the “statutory elements” (or “required evidence”) test 
and (2) the “actual evidence” test.6 See Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 42. The 
“statutory elements” test, as the name suggests, applies a comparative 
analysis of the statutory elements to determine whether two or more 
offenses are the “same.” Id. at 42 n.21. This test is the standard currently 
used by the federal judiciary. As articulated by the United States Supreme 
Court, “where the same act or transaction” violates two distinct statutes, 
the question is whether each statute “requires proof of a fact which the 
other does not.” Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) 
(emphasis added). If the answer to this question is “yes,” the two offenses 
are different; otherwise, the two offenses are the same. Id. 
The “actual evidence” test, on the other hand, looks to whether two or 
more offenses are the same based on the evidence actually presented at 
trial, rather than engaging in a strict comparative analysis of the statutory 
elements.7 Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 42 n.23. This test, in other words, calls 
for an analysis of the evidence as applied to, rather than as required by, 
 
6 Courts and commentators often group these two tests under the nominal umbrella of a 
“same evidence” test. See Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 42 & nn. 21, 23. Separate from this 
analytical framework is the “same transaction” test, which focuses on the defendant’s alleged 
conduct or behavior to determine whether a prior conviction or acquittal bars a second 
prosecution. See id. at 41–42. For an historical overview of other “same offense” tests applied 
by Indiana courts, see generally Note, Res Judicata and Double Jeopardy in Indiana Criminal 
Procedure, 33 Ind. L.J. 409 (1958). 
7 A variation of the “actual evidence” test is the “alleged evidence” test, which finds two or 
more offenses the same “if there is sufficient similarity between the allegations of the two 
indictments.” See Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 42 & n.22 (citation omitted). 
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each element of the statutory offense.8 Whereas the “statutory elements” 
test takes a more deferential approach to the legislative definition of an 
offense, the “actual evidence” test looks beyond the elements of a crime to 
determine whether two offenses are the “same.” 
Beyond these judicially-created tests, many states have enacted 
legislation prohibiting the conviction of a defendant—whether in a single 
trial or in successive proceedings—for both an offense and a “lesser 
included” offense. Jay A. Sigler, Double Jeopardy: The Development of a Legal 
and Social Policy 109 (1969). Indiana is no exception. See I.C. § 35-38-1-6 
(2019) (single trial); I.C. § 35-41-4-3 (subsequent prosecution). This 
statutory bar rests on the longstanding common-law recognition that a 
“lesser included” offense is the “same” as its greater (encompassing) 
offense. See, e.g., Kokenes v. State, 213 Ind. 476, 479, 13 N.E.2d 524, 525–26 
(1938) (“A prosecution for any part of a single crime, bars any further 
prosecution based upon the whole or a part of the same crime.”); Wininger 
v. State, 13 Ind. 540, 541 (1859) (relying on the same rule). See also 1 Joel 
Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Criminal Law § 682, at 705 (2d ed., 
1858) (illustrating this principle with concentric circles). Depending on the 
scope of protection, these statutes may expand or restrict the meaning of 
“same offense” in relation to the judicial tests described above. See 
generally Christen R. Blair, Constitutional Limitations on the Lesser Included 
Offense Doctrine, 21 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 445, 455–62 (1984). 
 
8 For example, unlike the crime of burglary, the offense of attempted armed robbery does not 
require evidence of breaking and entering. Compare I.C. § 35-43-2-1 (2019) (burglary), with I.C. 
§ 35-42-5-1 (robbery) and I.C. § 35-41-5-1 (attempt). Because the offenses aren’t the “same” 
under the “statutory elements” test, there’s no double-jeopardy violation. But when the 
analysis centers on the evidence as applied, that evidence, under the “actual evidence” test, 
may prove otherwise distinct elements under the respective statutory offenses. In Lee v. State, 
for example, the defendant argued that evidence of him barging into the victim’s house could 
have satisfied both (1) the breaking-and-entering element of burglary and (2) the substantial-
step element required for attempted armed robbery. This Court ultimately rejected that 
argument, citing evidence presented to the jury “beyond Lee’s barging through the front 
door.” 892 N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (Ind. 2008). But the case illustrates the possibility of finding 
double jeopardy based on the actual evidence used to convict, rather than relying solely on 
the evidence required by each element of the offense. 
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2. The “same offense” test in Richardson v. State created 
more confusion than clarity.  
In Richardson v. State, this Court adopted analytical variations of both 
the “statutory elements” test and the “actual evidence” test. 717 N.E.2d at 
49. As formulated by a majority of the Court, “two or more offenses are 
the ‘same offense’ in violation” of the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause “if, 
with respect to either [1] the statutory elements of the challenged crimes 
or [2] the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one 
challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another 
challenged offense.”9 Id. The “statutory elements” test generally tracks the 
federal Blockburger analysis. Id. at 50 n.41. The “actual evidence” test, on 
the other hand, examines whether—based on the charging information, 
jury instructions, and arguments of counsel at trial—there’s a “reasonable 
possibility” that the jury used the same evidence to support two or more 
convictions. Id. at 53; Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 720 (Ind. 2013).  
By articulating these tests, the Court in Richardson set out to create a 
“single comprehensive rule” for resolving all substantive double-jeopardy 
claims under the Indiana Constitution. Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 832 
(Ind. 2002). But despite this lofty goal, subsequent application of the rule 
quickly proved untenable, ultimately forcing the Court to retreat from its 
all-inclusive analytical framework. 
To begin with, the adoption of two tests, rather than one, did little to 
reconcile decades of conflicting precedent. See Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 49 
(drawing upon several early Indiana cases, none of which “presented a 
comprehensive analysis, a generally articulated test, or a standard of 
review for double jeopardy claims”). This generated more confusion than 
 
9 In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Sullivan agreed with the majority’s formulation of 
the actual-evidence test but found it unnecessary to extend that formulation beyond several 
categories of cases in which “this Court has been unwilling to impose multiple punishments 
upon a defendant who commits two crimes at the very same time against the same victim.” 
717 N.E.2d at 55 (Sullivan, J., concurring). Justice Boehm, with whom Justice Selby concurred, 
likewise agreed with the Court’s formulation of the actual-evidence test but rejected that test 
as grounded in constitutional doctrine. Id. at 57 (Boehm, J., concurring). 
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clarity, causing some courts to conflate the separate tests. In Berg v. State, 
for example, the Court of Appeals concluded that the actual-evidence test 
could not be met when one offense “required” certain evidence that “the 
other offense did not.” 45 N.E.3d 506, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (emphasis 
added). See also McElroy v. State, 864 N.E.2d 392, 397 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) 
(concluding that, under “either the statutory elements test or the actual 
evidence test,” each charged offense “requires” proof of facts not required 
by the other). 
Although likely devised for analytical flexibility in resolving complex 
double-jeopardy claims, the Richardson either/or approach has also led to 
inconsistent results, as courts selectively apply one test over another. For 
example, less than four months after Richardson, the Court of Appeals 
considered the actual-evidence test’s application to Indiana’s Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. See Chavez v. State, 722 
N.E.2d 885, 893 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). The RICO Act prohibits a person 
from committing a “corrupt business influence” through “a pattern of 
racketeering activity.” I.C. § 35-45-6-2(2). This “pattern of racketeering 
activity” refers to the commission of (or conspiracy to commit) at least two 
predicate offenses (among an enumerated list of forty) within five years of 
each other. I.C. § 35-45-6-1(d), (e). In Chavez, the defendant argued that his 
convictions for corrupt business influence under the RICO Act and for the 
predicate offenses supporting the RICO charge failed the actual-evidence 
test.10 722 N.E.2d at 893–94. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding 
that “double jeopardy analysis employed for single-course of conduct 
crimes is not analogous to double jeopardy analysis in complex criminal 
enterprise cases.” Id. at 894 (cleaned up). To conclude otherwise, the court 
reasoned, “would render RICO’s intended threat of cumulative 
punishment powerless.” Id. Invoking federal double-jeopardy principles, 
 
10 Along with the RICO Act violation, the State charged Chavez with dealing in marijuana and 
conspiracy to deal in marijuana. Chavez, 722 N.E.2d at 887. These separate charges are 
included among the predicate offenses enumerated under the RICO Act. See I.C. § 35-45-6-
1(e)(34) (committing or conspiring to commit dealing in marijuana). The charging information 
(included among the evidence introduced at trial) alleged that this conduct “amounted to a 
pattern of racketeering activity.” Chavez, 722 N.E.2d at 890. 
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the court found it illogical “that the legislature meant to substitute the 
RICO offense for the underlying predicate offenses rather than to permit 
prosecution” for both crimes. Id. (citing, among other federal precedent, 
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981)). 
A strict application of the actual-evidence test can also lead to illogical 
results—and not just in “complex criminal enterprise cases.” In Vestal v. 
State, the defendant appealed his conviction for burglary and theft—the 
latter crime committed during the former. 745 N.E.2d 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2001), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 773 N.E.2d 805 (Ind. 2002). Because the 
evidence proving the defendant’s intent to commit theft (a necessary 
element of burglary as the intended felony) established the theft itself, 
application of the actual-evidence test would have resulted in a finding of 
double jeopardy.11 The absurdity here, as the Court of Appeals correctly 
observed, is that the test treats the burglar who enters but fails to commit 
the theft just as harshly as the burglar who enters and completes the 
crime. 745 N.E.2d at 252. “The injustice,” the court added to emphasize its 
point, “would be exacerbated if the underlying crime to the burglary were 
rape, murder or other more serious crime.” Id. Concluding that Richardson 
“could not have intended such a result,” the Court of Appeals interpreted 
“same evidence” to mean “evidence of the same act.” Id. And because the 
defendant committed “two distinct acts” (burglary and theft), the court let 
both convictions stand. Id. On transfer, a majority of this Court found no 
double-jeopardy violation, reasoning that the evidence presented at trial 
“merely describe[d] the theft intended and did not compel the jury to find 
 
11 A conviction for burglary requires the State to prove that the defendant (1) broke into and 
entered a building (2) with the intent to commit a felony therein. I.C. § 35-43-2-1. A conviction 
for theft requires the State to prove that the defendant (1) knowingly or intentionally exerted 
unauthorized control over another person’s property (2) with intent to deprive the other 
person of any part of its value or use. I.C. § 35-43-4-2(a). 
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the completed theft as an element of the burglary.”12 773 N.E.2d at 807. 
This lack of persuasive reasoning compelled Justice Boehm to write 
separately, concurring in result but opining that the Court had effectively 
abandoned the actual-evidence test. Id. at 808. 
Around the time these cases were decided, the Court’s standard for 
analyzing actual-evidence test claims began to shift. As first articulated in 
Richardson, the test required a defendant to show “a reasonable 
possibility” that the jury used the same evidence “to establish the essential 
elements of one offense” and “the essential elements of a second 
challenged offense.” 717 N.E.2d at 53. Subsequent formulations of this 
standard required the defendant to show that the “same evidence used by 
the jury to establish the essential elements” of one offense was “included 
among the evidence establishing the essential elements” of another 
offense. Chapman v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Ind. 1999) (emphasis 
added). But in early 2002, the Court declared the test as “not merely 
whether the evidentiary facts used to establish one of the essential 
elements of one offense may also have been used to establish one of the 
essential elements of a second challenged offense.” Spivey, 761 N.E.2d at 
833. Rather, the Court specified, there is no violation of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause “when the evidentiary facts establishing the essential 
elements of one offense” establish less than all of “the essential elements 
of a second offense.” Id. Put simply, the “actual evidence” test, following 
Spivey, applies “to all the elements of both offenses.” Garrett, 992 N.E.2d at 
719 (emphasis added). 
By redefining the standard used to determine whether two offenses are 
the “same offense,” the Spivey Court—while invoking the actual-evidence 
 
12 The jury instructions related the charging information on both crimes. For burglary, the 
State alleged that the defendant “[broke] and enter[ed] the building or structure of another 
person, with intent to commit a felony, to-wit: broke and entered the Bottle Shop, with the 
intent to commit theft.” See Vestal, 773 N.E.2d at 806 n.5. And for theft, the State alleged that 
the defendant “knowingly or intentionally exert[ed] unauthorized control over property of 
another person, with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use, to wit, 
took [several bottles of alcohol and several cartons of cigarettes, along with] $92 in cash.” See 
id. 
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test—effectively narrowed the scope of protection under the Indiana 
Double Jeopardy Clause. And this shift in analytical standard illuminated 
other problems in the Court’s double-jeopardy jurisprudence. In Gross v. 
State, the defendant appealed his convictions for murder and robbery as a 
Class A felony, arguing that evidence of the same bodily injury (the 
victim’s death) impermissibly elevated both offenses.13 769 N.E.2d 1136, 
1138 (Ind. 2002). The Court initially concluded that the evidence proving 
the elements of murder fell short of proving each element of robbery as a 
Class A felony (specifically, the knowing or intentional taking of property 
from another person). Id. at 1139. Under Spivey, then, the Court found no 
double-jeopardy violation. Id. But that didn’t end the inquiry. In reversing 
its method of analysis, the Court went on to find a “reasonable 
possibility” that the jury relied on evidence “establishing all the essential 
elements of robbery as a Class A felony to establish also all the essential 
elements of murder.” Id. (emphasis added). 
The problem with Gross, other than its analytical infidelity to Spivey, is 
that it renders the survival of a defendant’s double-jeopardy challenge 
contingent on the sequence of analysis rather than any underlying 
principled legal theory.14 This has left the actual-evidence test vulnerable 
to arbitrary application. In Hines v. State, for example, this Court found a 
double-jeopardy violation “because the facts establishing criminal 
confinement would also establish battery,” even though the facts 
establishing the latter offense would not have established the former 
offense. 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1222 (Ind. 2015). See also Bradley v. State, 867 
 
13 A conviction for murder required the State to prove that the defendant “knowingly or 
intentionally kill[ed] another human being.” I.C. § 35-42-1-1(1) (1998). And a conviction for 
robbery as a Class A felony required the State to prove that the defendant (1) knowingly or 
intentionally took property from another person (2) by putting a person in fear or using or 
threatening the use of force (3) that resulted in serious bodily injury. I.C. § 35-42-5-1. 
14 As noted above, Spivey found no double-jeopardy violation because the evidence 
establishing the elements of one offense established less than all the elements of a second 
offense. 761 N.E.2d at 833–34. Gross, on the other hand, effectively permits conviction for two 
offenses—Crime A and Crime B—if the evidence used to prove the elements of Crime A also 
prove the elements of Crime B, even when Crime B requires additional evidence to prove 
Crime A. 
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N.E.2d 1282, 1284–85 (Ind. 2007) (same). But in Carrico v. State, this Court 
found no double-jeopardy violation where evidence establishing murder 
established only one element of B felony robbery, even though evidence 
establishing the latter crime may have established the former. 775 N.E.2d 
312, 314 (Ind. 2002). See also Robinson v. State, 775 N.E.2d 316, 320 (Ind. 
2002) (same). 
Failing to resolve all double-jeopardy claims under “a single 
comprehensive rule,” the Court increasingly turned to the rules of 
statutory construction and common law announced by Justices Sullivan 
and Boehm in their respective Richardson concurrences. See, e.g., Pierce v. 
State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind. 2002). Under this analytical framework, 
described as “separate from and additional to” the protections under the 
actual-evidence test, Guyton v. State, 771 N.E.2d 1141, 1145 (Ind. 2002) 
(Dickson, J., concurring in result), the Court has retreated even further 
from Richardson, generating confusion among the bench and bar over the 
proper standard to address claims of double jeopardy, see Joel Schumm, 
The Mounting Confusion over Double Jeopardy in Indiana, Res Gestae, Oct. 
2002, at 27–29. 
What we’re left with, then, is a patchwork of conflicting precedent, a 
jurisprudence of “double jeopardy double talk” that underscores 
Richardson’s inherent flaws. See Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law 
Made Simple, 106 Yale L.J. 1807, 1807 (1997). The shifting standards and 
inconsistent application of controlling tests create an unpredictable 
approach to double jeopardy, ultimately depriving our courts of clear 
guidance and preventing the Indiana bar—defense counsel and 
prosecutors alike—from effectively preparing their cases and representing 
their clients.  
For these reasons, we expressly overrule the constitutional tests 
formulated in Richardson as they apply to claims of substantive double 
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jeopardy.15 We must now decide on the proper analytical framework for 
resolving these claims going forward. 
B. What’s the proper analytical framework for resolving 
claims of substantive double jeopardy? 
The “statutory elements” test and the “actual evidence” test have both 
proven inadequate, rendering our substantive double-jeopardy law either 
too restrictive or too generous of protection.16 The latter test, as we have 
seen, is fair in principle but unwieldly in practice, subject to illogical 
results and vulnerable to confusion and misapplication. The “statutory 
elements” test, on the other hand, though relatively easy to apply, offers 
little protection to criminal defendants: so long as one charged offense 
diverges from another charged offense based on a single element of proof, 
prosecutors can easily circumvent the test. 
The more practical approach, we believe, follows the familiar rules of 
statutory construction embraced by Justice Boehm in his concurring 
Richardson opinion. By adopting this methodology, we recognize the 
importance of charting a clear path going forward. To that end, we begin 
(1) by reassessing the protective scope of our Double Jeopardy Clause and 
 
15 Currently, the actual-evidence test also applies to the bar against procedural double 
jeopardy (i.e., successive prosecutions for the same offense). See Garrett, 992 N.E.2d at 721.  
The Garrett Court appears to have limited its application of Richardson to the actual-evidence 
test only, implicitly excluding the statutory-elements test from claims of procedural double 
jeopardy. See id. (finding “no reason why the Richardson actual evidence test would not apply 
any time there are multiple verdicts, not simply multiple convictions, on the same facts”). 
Because Wadle’s case presents no question of procedural double jeopardy, we expressly 
reserve any conclusion on whether to overrule Richardson in that context. 
16 The consensus among leading scholars is that “[neither] of the tests is adequate to 
implement the basic policies of double jeopardy.” Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L.J. 262, 275 
(1965). See also Sigler, Double Jeopardy, supra, at 64, 101 (writing that, as judicial “stopgap” 
measures developed in response to the proliferation of overlapping criminal statutes, the tests 
“add contradictory and unpredictable elements” to the law); Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, 
Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81, 115 (concluding that both 
tests will ultimately fail of their intended purpose); Note, Double Jeopardy and the Multiple-
Count Indictment, 57 Yale L.J. at 136–37 (noting “uncertainty and inconsistency” in the tests). 
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(2) by clarifying the basic protections against multiple punishments in a 
single trial. We then (3) articulate an analytical framework in which to 
resolve claims of substantive double jeopardy and (4) consider other 
constitutional protections on which defendants may rely to supplement 
these claims. 
1. The Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause protects only 
against successive prosecutions for the same offense. 
The question of whether constitutional double-jeopardy analysis 
applies to both the successive-prosecution and multiple-punishment 
contexts is a divisive one. Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy and 
Multiple Punishment: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 77 U. Colo. L. Rev. 595, 600 
(2006) (citing cases and commentary espousing opposite views). Courts 
often treat both strands the same, and “cases dealing with one context cite 
precedent from another without commenting on any potential difference 
between the two.” Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 59 (Boehm, J., concurring). 
After all, the reasoning goes, “the prosecution may not do in one trial 
what it is prohibited from doing in two trials.” Elmore, 269 Ind. at 534, 382 
N.E.2d at 894–95. But such an approach, Justice Boehm opined in 
Richardson, “results in an unsatisfactory compromise that breeds confusion 
and impairs the important values underlying the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.” 717 N.E.2d at 58. We agree. 
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A “primary purpose” of the Double Jeopardy Clause is “to preserve the 
finality of judgments.” Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978).17 By ensuring 
finality, this constitutional guarantee shields against governmental 
harassment in that it bars the state from making “repeated attempts to 
convict an accused for the same offense.” Thompson v. State, 259 Ind. 587, 
591, 290 N.E.2d 724, 726 (1972). Indeed, the absence of such restraint 
would subject the defendant “to embarrassment, expense and ordeal,” 
effectively “compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and 
insecurity.” Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). Finality also 
minimizes the risk of wrongful conviction upon retrial. Without the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, the state would have unfettered opportunity at 
“honing its trial strategies and perfecting its evidence” to ensure the 
defendant’s condemnation. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982). Whereas 
multiple punishments in a single trial raise concerns over excessiveness, a 
subsequent prosecution for the same offense “increases the financial and 
emotional burden on the accused, prolongs the period in which he is 
stigmatized by an unresolved accusation of wrongdoing, and may even 
 
17 Our citation here to federal authority should not be read to “preclude formulation of an 
independent standard for analyzing state constitutional claims.” Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 
921, 929 (Ind. 1998). The Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause and its federal counterpart under 
the Fifth Amendment both “look to a common interwoven history.” See id. But this shared 
past does not mean that “the framers of the Indiana Constitution and the authors of the Fifth 
Amendment had the same objectives.” Id. at 932. To the contrary, our Framers drafted the 
Indiana Bill of Rights fully aware that its “provisions would be the only constitutional 
protections against state and local government encroachment on individual rights.” Hon. 
Loretta H. Rush & Marie Forney Miller, A Constellation of Constitutions: Discovering & 
Embracing State Constitutions as Guardians of Civil Liberties, 82 Alb. L. Rev. 1353, 1369–70 (2019). 
Indeed, more than a century would pass before Hoosiers would enjoy similar protections 
under the federal constitution. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795–96 (1969) (applying 
the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause to the states through incorporation under the 
Fourteenth Amendment). Even today, overdependence on federal law threatens to “strip a 
state constitution of its autonomous authority,” weakening the division-of-powers framework 
on which our federal system of government stands. Rush & Forney Miller, A Constellation of 
Constitutions, 82 Alb. L. Rev. at 1357–58. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-340 | August 18, 2020 
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enhance the risk that an innocent defendant may be convicted.”18 See 
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503–04 (1978) (footnotes omitted). 
To be sure, both strands of double jeopardy—substantive and 
procedural—share a “core policy” of preventing the state “from 
prosecuting and punishing arbitrarily, without legitimate justification.” 
Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L.J. at 267. But the procedural bar to double 
jeopardy, “whether following acquittals or convictions,” placates 
“concerns that extend beyond merely the possibility of an enhanced 
sentence” or excessive punishment. See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 518 
(1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).19 And for this 
reason, our Double Jeopardy Clause should focus its protective scope 
exclusively on successive prosecutions for the “same offense.” 
Our conclusion here does not suggest that defendants enjoy no 
protection from multiple punishments in a single proceeding; it does, 
however, shift our analysis to other sources of protection—statutory, 
common law, and constitutional. 
 
18 Of course, the concept of finality itself isn’t written in stone and may be outweighed by 
other policy interests. The State may prosecute a defendant a second time if, for example, the 
first trial ends in mistrial, an appellate court determines that the first trial was tainted with 
error, or if a second offense arising from the same conduct isn’t complete at the time of the 
first trial. See, respectively, Brock v. State, 955 N.E.2d 195, 200 (Ind. 2011) (“[T]he defendant may 
be retried only if the government demonstrates that the mistrial was justified by a manifest 
necessity or that the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.”) (quotation marks 
and citation omitted); Townsend v. State, 632 N.E.2d 727, 731 (Ind. 1994) (“Generally, double 
jeopardy does not bar retrial in cases of reversal for trial error.”); Cherry v. State, 275 Ind. 14, 
20, 414 N.E.2d 301, 305 (1981) (suggesting that the State may prosecute a second trial for a 
crime that was “not complete at the time of the first trial”). 
19 Citing the need for doctrinal consistency, the majority in Dixon rejected the idea of applying 
separate analyses to “same offense” under the respective strands of substantive and 
procedural double jeopardy. See 509 U.S. at 704 (finding it “embarrassing to assert” that the 
phrase “has two different meanings—that what is the same offense is yet not the same 
offense”). But that approach, we believe, fails to account for the difference in underlying 
policies. What’s more, this Court has defined “same offense” differently in other contexts. See, 
e.g., Howard W. Anderson III, Note, Determining When Two Offenses Are the Same Under 
Indiana’s Criminal Rule 4, 80 Ind. L.J. 825 (2005) (discussing the variation in standards used by 
the Court).  
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2. The substantive bar to double jeopardy restrains the 
judicial power to impose multiple punishments for 
the same offense, not the legislative authority to 
define crimes and fix punishments. 
Indiana has long recognized the common-law principle that a “lesser 
included” offense is the “same” as its greater (encompassing) offense. See, 
e.g., Kokenes, 213 Ind. at 479, 13 N.E.2d at 525–26 (“A prosecution for any 
part of a single crime, bars any further prosecution based upon the whole 
or a part of the same crime.”); Wininger, 13 Ind. at 541 (relying on the same 
rule). Applying variations of this principle, this Court has declined to 
convict and punish a defendant in a single trial for (1) an offense and its 
lesser-included offense, (2) two offenses consisting of the same act, (3) one 
offense consisting of the same act as an element of another offense, (4) an 
elevation of an offense imposed for the same “behavior or harm” as 
another offense, and (5) a conspiracy where the overt act is the same act as 
another offense. See Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 55–56 (Sullivan, J., 
concurring) (citing cases).20 And today, we have legislation codifying these 
principles. See I.C. § 35-38-1-6 (2019) (prohibiting a trial court from 
entering judgment of conviction and sentence for both an offense and an 
“included offense”); I.C. § 35-41-5-3 (prohibiting conviction of “both a 
conspiracy and an attempt with respect to the same underlying crime” 
and prohibiting conviction of “both a crime and an attempt to commit the 
same crime”).  
Under these sources of authority, the substantive bar to double 
jeopardy restrains the courts’ power to impose multiple punishments for 
 
20 We emphasize that, while the cases cited by Justice Sullivan generally reflect longstanding 
principles of Indiana law, they may rely on overruled sources of Indiana authority or apply 
analyses under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Purter v. State, 
515 N.E.2d 858, 860 (Ind. 1987) (citing Elmore, 269 Ind. 532, 382 N.E.2d 893, for the proposition 
that “[t]his court has adopted” the federal Blockburger test). We further emphasize the limited 
precedential value of these cases because each substantive double-jeopardy claim turns on a 
unique set of facts, which—along with the applicable statutory offenses—an appellate court 
reviews de novo. See infra, Pt. I.B.3. 
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the same offense, not the legislative authority to define crimes and fix 
punishments. See Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 55 (Sullivan, J., concurring) 
(citing precedent in which “this Court has been unwilling to impose 
multiple punishments” in a single trial); id. at 65 (Boehm, J., concurring) 
(concluding that courts should resolve substantive double-jeopardy claims 
“either by explicit direction from the legislature . . . or by commonly cited 
rules of statutory construction and presumed legislative intent”). In other 
words, a court may not exceed its authority by convicting and punishing a 
defendant in a single trial beyond what the statutes clearly permit. See 
Jackson v. State, 625 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (Ind. 1993) (holding that multiple 
punishments may “be imposed for ‘the same offense’ where the will of the 
legislative body to do so is clear”); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Axtell, 69 Ind. 199, 
202 (1879) (reciting the principle that a “court cannot create a penalty by 
construction, but must avoid it by construction, unless it is brought within 
the letter and the necessary meaning of the act creating it”); Gillespie v. 
State, 9 Ind. 380, 384–85 (1857) (concluding that the defendant’s conviction 
for “assault and battery” in lieu of “assault and battery with intent to 
murder” fell within “the language and the spirit” of Indiana’s 1852 
included-offense statute).21 
With this premise in mind, we now proceed to articulate an analytical 
framework in which to resolve claims of substantive double jeopardy. 
3. Analysis of a substantive double jeopardy claim 
considers (a) the statutory offenses charged as well as 
(b) the facts underlying those offenses. 
Substantive double jeopardy claims come in two principal varieties: (1) 
when a single criminal act or transaction violates a single statute but 
harms multiple victims, and (2) when a single criminal act or transaction 
violates multiple statutes with common elements and harms one or more 
 
21 The statute cited in Gillespie permitted the conviction for “any offense, the commission of 
which is necessarily included in that with which [the defendant] is charged in the 
indictment.” 9 Ind. at 384 (citation omitted). 
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victims. Our decision today in Powell v. State, --- N.E.3d --- (Ind. 2020), 
implicates the former scenario; this case implicates the latter. In either 
circumstance, the dispositive question is one of statutory intent. See 
Paquette v. State, 101 N.E.3d 234, 239 (Ind. 2018) (single statutory 
offense/multiple victims); Emery v. State, 717 N.E.2d 111, 112–13 (Ind. 
1999) (multiple statutory offenses/single victim).  
a. The Statutory Offenses Charged 
When multiple convictions for a single act or transaction implicate two 
or more statutes, we first look to the statutory language itself. (The mere 
existence of the statutes alone is insufficient for our analysis.) If the 
language of either statute clearly permits multiple punishment, either 
expressly or by unmistakable implication,22 the court’s inquiry comes to an 
end and there is no violation of substantive double jeopardy.  
If, however, the statutory language is not clear, a court must then apply 
our included-offense statutes to determine statutory intent. See Collins v. 
State, 645 N.E.2d 1089, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that, to resolve a 
claim of substantive double jeopardy, our included-offense statutes guide 
judicial “analysis of legislative intent”), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other 
grounds, 659 N.E.2d 509 (Ind. 1995). Under Indiana Code section 35-38-1-6, 
a trial court may not enter judgment of conviction and sentence for both 
an offense and an “included offense.” An “included offense,” as defined 
by our legislature, is an offense  
(1) that “is established by proof of the same material elements or less 
than all the material elements required to establish the commission 
of the offense charged,” 
(2) that “consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an 
offense otherwise included therein,” or 
 
22 Our tax code, for example, expressly permits the imposition of an excise tax on the delivery, 
possession, or manufacture of a controlled substance, “in addition to any criminal penalties” 
imposed under Title 35. I.C. § 6-7-3-20. 
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(3) that “differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less 
serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or 
public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to 
establish its commission.” 
I.C. § 35-31.5-2-168.23 
If neither offense is an included offense of the other (either inherently 
or as charged), there is no violation of double jeopardy. If, however, one 
offense is included in the other (either inherently or as charged), the court 
must then look at the facts of the two crimes to determine whether the 
offenses are the same. Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 67 (Boehm, J., concurring). 
See also Bigler v. State, 602 N.E.2d 509, 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that 
“analysis of legislative intent” in Indiana, unlike the federal Blockburger 
test, “does not end with an evaluation and comparison of the specific 
statutory provisions which define the offenses”).24 This brings us to the 
second step of our inquiry.  
 
23 This definition is a variation of the Model Penal Code’s included-offense statute, adopted in 
Indiana in 1976. Compare 1 Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 1.07(4) at 101–02 (Am. Law 
Inst. 1985) with Pub. L. No. 148-1976, § 1, 1976 Ind. Acts 718, 720 (codified as amended at I.C. § 
35-31.5-2-168). See also Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 65 (Boehm, J., concurring) (noting that 
Indiana’s included-offense statutes “were taken in 1976 from the Model Penal Code”). The 
“main objective of Section 1.07” was “to limit the multiplicity of prosecutions and convictions 
for what is essentially the same conduct.” 1 Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 1.07 cmt. 
at 104. 
24 Indeed, a “[c]onviction of an offense and an ‘included offense’” under this rule “would not 
necessarily be barred under the Blockburger test.” See 1 Model Penal Code and Commentaries 
§ 1.07 cmt. at 108. See, e.g., Sering v. State, 488 N.E.2d 369, 375–76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (holding 
that, while “not the ‘same offense’ under a Blockburger analysis,” the offense of “operating a 
vehicle with BAC of .10% is a lesser included offense” of OWI “because the former offense 
differs from the latter offense in that a less serious risk of harm to the public interest is 
required to establish its commission”). Of course, Blockburger’s “statutory elements” test still 
governs our analysis of substantive double-jeopardy claims under the federal constitution. See 
Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466, 477 (Ind. 1997). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-340 | August 18, 2020 
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b. The Facts Underlying the Charged Statutory 
Offenses 
Once a court has analyzed the statutory offenses charged, it must then 
examine the facts underlying those offenses, as presented in the charging 
instrument and as adduced at trial.25 Bigler, 602 N.E.2d at 521. Based on 
this information, a court must ask whether the defendant’s actions were 
“so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and 
continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Walker v. State, 
932 N.E.2d 733, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), cited with approval by Hines, 30 
N.E.3d at 1219.26 
If the facts show two separate and distinct crimes, there’s no violation 
of substantive double jeopardy, even if one offense is, by definition, 
“included” in the other.27 But if the facts show only a single continuous 
crime, and one statutory offense is included in the other, then the 
prosecutor may charge these offenses only as alternative (rather than as 
 
25 This approach substantially mirrors the analytical framework we use to determine whether 
a party is entitled to an included-offense instruction at trial. See Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 
567 (Ind. 1995) (explaining that, “if a trial court has determined that an alleged lesser included 
offense is either inherently or factually included in the crime charged, it must look at the 
evidence presented in the case by both parties”). This is important because the standard used 
to identify an included-offense at trial effectively delineates the scope of the double-jeopardy 
protection on appeal. See Moore v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1203, 1208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (“In light of 
the well-settled prohibition against convictions for both a greater offense and its included 
offense, if a Wright analysis determines that crime ‘B’ is an included offense of crime ‘A’, then 
double jeopardy precludes convictions for both.”). 
26 The continuous-crime doctrine is “a rule of statutory construction and common law” 
applicable to “situations where a defendant has been charged multiple times with the same 
offense,” rather than with “two distinct chargeable crimes.” Hines, 30 N.E.3d at 1219 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also Walker, 932 N.E.2d at 737 (noting that the 
doctrine encompasses charges against a defendant for “an offense and a lesser included 
offense”). 
27 Otherwise, a defendant could not be convicted for committing theft against a person on 
Monday and for committing robbery against that same person on Friday. See Emery, 717 
N.E.2d at 114 (Boehm, J., concurring in result); Tingle v. State, 632 N.E.2d 345, 350 (Ind. 1994) 
(theft is an inherently included offense of robbery). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-340 | August 18, 2020 
Page 26 of 37 
cumulative) sanctions.28 The State can rebut this presumption only by 
showing that the statute—either in express terms or by unmistakable 
implication—clearly permits multiple punishment.  
4. The bar against multiple punishments in a single trial 
enjoys other state constitutional protections. 
Our conclusions today do not suggest that protection from multiple 
punishments in a single prosecution falls beyond the constitutional pale. 
To the contrary, legislators and prosecutors do not necessarily have free 
rein to authorize multiple punishments or to indict on multiple 
overlapping offenses. The Indiana Bill of Rights offers a larger framework 
of constitutional guarantees designed to protect Hoosiers “from the 
excesses of government.” Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard, Second Wind for 
the Indiana Bill of Rights, 22 Ind. L. Rev. 575, 576 (1989). Our constitution 
also authorizes independent appellate review and revision of a criminal 
sentence found “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the 
character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B) (implementing article 
7, sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution). Substantive double-
jeopardy protections in Indiana operate in harmony with, not in isolation 
from, these supplemental constitutional protections. And their importance 
to our decision today warrants more than passing reference. 
 
28 This presumption rests on two premises: First, it would be unreasonable to expect the 
legislature to consider the implications of all potential overlapping offenses when it adopts or 
amends a criminal statute. Indeed, penal sanctions permeate virtually every corner of the 
Indiana Code (not just Title 35). See, e.g., I.C. § 6-5.5-7-3 (classifying tax fraud and tax evasion 
as a Level 6 felony); I.C. § 25-22.5-8-2 (criminalizing the unlawful practice of medicine and 
other unlicensed health occupations); I.C. § 3-14-3-1.1 (classifying voting fraud as a Level 6 
felony). Second, the prohibition against cumulative punishment, absent clear statutory 
language to the contrary, corresponds with the principles of due process rooted in the 
constitutional rule of lenity. See Healthscript, Inc. v. State, 770 N.E.2d 810, 816 (Ind. 2002) 
(recognizing that, while “legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity,” a 
statutory offense must give “fair warning” in plain terms “of what the law intends to do if a 
certain line is passed”) (citations omitted). 
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a. Article 1, Section 16 
Article 1, section 16 of the Indiana Constitution requires that all 
penalties be “proportioned to the nature of the offense.” While the 
responsibility for defining crimes and setting penalties lies with the 
legislative branch, section 16 “makes clear that the State’s ability to exact 
punishment for criminal behavior is not without limit.” Conner v. State, 
626 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ind. 1993). To be sure, our courts have struggled to 
articulate consistent, objective standards to identify whether a punishment 
is proportionate or disproportionate to an offense: Absent “a showing of 
clear constitutional infirmity,” this Court generally will “not disturb the 
legislative determination of the appropriate penalty.” State v. Moss-Dwyer, 
686 N.E.2d 109, 111–12 (Ind. 1997). Other times, we ask if the severity of 
the punishment would “shock public sentiment and violate the judgment 
of a reasonable people.” Clark v. State, 561 N.E.2d 759, 765 (Ind. 1990) 
(citation omitted). But even then, we typically defer to legislative 
discretion. See id. 
Still, other circumstances implicating section 16’s proportionality clause 
clearly call for judicial intervention. Specifically, this Court has long 
interpreted section 16 as prohibiting the legislature from imposing 
“punishment for a lesser included offense which is greater in years . . . 
than the greater offense.” Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 253, 240 N.E.2d 
815, 817 (1968). To impose such a penalty amounts to an abuse of 
“Constitutional power to define criminal offenses and set penalties 
thereof.” Id. at 252, 240 N.E.2d at 817. See also Heathe v. State, 257 Ind. 345, 
349, 274 N.E.2d 697, 699 (1971) (“The constitutional mandate that ‘all 
penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense’ requires that 
the maximum for a lesser offense be less than the maximum for a higher 
offense.”). 
b. Article 1, Section 13 
Our Bill of Rights also constrains the prosecutor’s broad discretionary 
power to pursue multiple charges for the same offense. Article 1, section 
13 of the Indiana Constitution guarantees the defendant’s right, in “all 
criminal prosecutions,” to “demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
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against him.”29 This protection entitles the defendant to “clear notice of the 
charge or charges against which the State summons him to defend” at 
trial. Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 565 (Ind. 1995). Clear notice, by way 
of the prosecutor’s indictment or information, allows the defendant to 
prepare his defense and protects him “from being placed twice in 
jeopardy for the same offense.” Id. And due process entitles him to limit 
that defense to the crimes charged. Young v. State, 30 N.E.3d 719, 720 (Ind. 
2015). “If there is reasonable doubt as to what the charge includes, such 
doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant.” Id. at 723 (cleaned up). 
By definition, a lesser-included offense implicates a defendant’s due 
process right to fair notice: unless the defendant himself requests an 
instruction on the offense (thereby waiving the notice requirement), he 
must defend against a charge not specifically pleaded in the prosecutor’s 
indictment or information. Blair, Constitutional Limitations, supra, at 451–
52. See also Young, 30 N.E.3d at 723 (observing that lesser inclusion and fair 
notice are not necessarily coextensive). Some courts have held that the 
indictment itself is “sufficient notice to the defendant that he may be 
called to defend the lesser included charge.” Blair, Constitutional 
Limitations, supra, at 452 (citing cases). But this conclusion rests on a theory 
that compares the statutory elements of the included offense with the 
elements of the greater offense—a theory not entirely consistent with this 
Court’s precedent or (as discussed above) with presumed legislative 
intent. See Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 566–67 (citing I.C. § 35-41-1-16 (1993), 
recodified at I.C. § 35-31.5-2-168)). Indeed, an included offense in Indiana 
need not contain the same elements as the charged offense; rather, the 
 
29 Our federal constitution similarly guarantees that, in “all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to . . . be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.” U.S. Const. 
amend. VI. 
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former may be “inherently included” or “factually included” within the 
latter.30 See id. 
Because our legislature has expanded the potential range of included 
offenses beyond their mere statutory elements, the prosecutor must draft 
her charging instrument with sufficient precision to give the defendant 
proper notice of those offenses. Otherwise, deficient pleading notice—
whether due to the omission of a statutory element or the omission of an 
operative fact—may bar an instruction on an alleged included offense, let 
alone a conviction on that offense.31 See Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567 
(prohibiting a trial court from giving “a requested instruction on the 
alleged lesser included offense” if it’s “neither inherently nor factually 
included in the crime charged”); Peek v. State, 454 N.E.2d 450, 453 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1983) (reciting the principle that clear notice “operates to bar a 
conviction of a lesser included offense unless the charging instrument 
alleges all of the essential elements of that offense”) (citation omitted). At 
the same time, there’s nothing to prohibit the defendant from requesting 
such an instruction, so long as the evidence adduced at trial supports it. 
See Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567. If the prosecutor can “wield factual 
omissions as a sword to preclude lesser offenses, an accused should be 
able to similarly rely on them as a shield to limit his defense to those 
 
30 An offense is “inherently included” if it “may be established by proof of the same material 
elements or less than all the material elements defining the crime charged” or if “the only 
feature distinguishing the two offenses is that a lesser culpability is required to establish the 
commission of the lesser offense.” Young, 30 N.E.3d at 724 (quoting Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 566) 
(cleaned up). An offense is “factually included” when “the charging instrument alleges that 
the means used to commit the crime charged include all of the elements of the alleged lesser 
included offense.” Id. (cleaned up).  
31 A defendant may have constructive notice of an inherently included offense from our 
appellate court decisions. See Blair, Constitutional Limitations, 21 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 453. See 
also Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567 (citing precedent to support the conclusion that reckless 
homicide is “an inherently included offense” of murder). But there is no constructive notice 
when the issue is one of first impression, see Blair, Constitutional Limitations, supra, at 453, or, 
for that matter, when there is conflict in precedent or when the statutes charged have been 
significantly amended. 
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matters with which he stands accused.” Young, 30 N.E.3d at 725 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Finally, we note that, while the legislature may enact procedures for 
amending a charging instrument, it’s limited in how it regulates 
amendments of substance (rather than of form).32 And these procedural 
measures may never interfere with the defendant’s due process right to 
clear notice of the charges against him. See, e.g., Hinshaw v. State, 188 Ind. 
147, 153, 122 N.E. 418, 420 (1919) (striking down as void, “so far as it 
applies to indictments,” an act requiring the “opposing party” to move for 
specificity of allegations in all criminal pleadings). 
c. Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 
The preceding sections under our Bill of Rights aren’t the only potential 
constitutional remedies for a defendant facing cumulative punishment. 
Article 7, section 4 of the Indiana Constitution vests in this Court “the 
power to review all questions of law and to review and revise the sentence 
imposed.” Our Court of Appeals exercises similar authority in criminal 
cases, “to the extent provided by rule.” Ind. Const. art. 7, § 6. These 
constitutional mandates, as implemented through Indiana Appellate Rule 
7(B), permit a criminal offender to challenge the trial court’s sentence as 
“inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 
offender.” 
Despite the criticism it’s received, article 7’s review-and-revise clause 
stands as an effective check on the legislative proliferation of overlapping 
 
32 Our criminal code permits the prosecutor to amend a charging instrument “at any time” to 
correct an “immaterial defect” (e.g., grammatical errors or misjoinder of parties) or for any 
other defect that’s not prejudicial to “the substantial rights of the defendant.” I.C. § 35-34-1-
5(a). A prosecutor may amend the charging instrument for “matters of substance,” but only 
before the commencement of trial. I.C. § 35-34-1-5(b). 
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criminal offenses and on the prosecutor’s multi-count indictment.33 See 
Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. 2003) (recognizing, as one factor 
driving the potential need to revise a cumulative sentence, the 
prosecutor’s decision “to charge multiple aspects of the same event as 
separate counts defined by separate criminal statutes”). To be sure, article 
7 vests no authority in an appellate court to vacate a conviction, 
potentially increasing the defendant’s vulnerability to habitual-offender 
status or leaving him with no remedy to mitigate the collateral 
consequences of his offense. A defendant invoking Rule 7(B) also faces the 
prospect of a more severe sentence on appeal than what the trial court 
imposed. McCullough v. State, 900 N.E.2d 745, 749–50 (Ind. 2009). But 
when applied within the larger framework of constitutional guarantees 
designed to protect against “the excesses of government,” Rule 7(B) offers 
a potentially valuable device in the defendant’s legal toolbox—a device 
intended to curb cumulative punishment in a single proceeding “without 
turning conceptualistic handsprings.” See Note, Double Jeopardy and the 
Multiple-Count Indictment, 57 Yale L.J. at 138 (noting the practical 
simplicity of sentencing review in contrast to double-jeopardy analysis). 
We now proceed to the merits of Wadle’s claim. 
 
33 For several years after its ratification and adoption, Indiana’s appellate courts consistently 
declined to exercise their article 7 authority, expressing the “view that this power appears to 
go beyond that power which [we had] always possessed.” See Parker v. State, 265 Ind. 595, 604, 
358 N.E.2d 110, 114 (1976). See also McHaney v. State, 153 Ind. App. 590, 594, 288 N.E.2d 284, 
286 (1972) (exercising restraint for fear of becoming an unintended “superlegislature”). 
Whatever the merits of this criticism, suffice it to say that independent appellate review of 
trial court sentencing rests firmly on the authority of the Indiana General Assembly (by way 
of the 1965 Judicial Study Commission) and, ultimately, the Hoosier electorate (by way of 
constitutional ratification). See Randall T. Shepard, Robust Appellate Review of Sentences: Just 
How British Is Indiana?, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 671, 671–73 (2009). 
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II. Because the statutory offenses charged indicate 
alternative (rather than multiple) punishments, 
Wadle’s convictions violate double jeopardy. 
To reiterate our test, when multiple convictions for a single act or 
transaction implicate two or more statutes, we first look to the statutes 
themselves. If either statute clearly permits multiple punishment, whether 
expressly or by unmistakable implication, the court’s inquiry comes to an 
end and there is no violation of substantive double jeopardy. But if the 
statutory language is not clear, then a court must apply our included-
offense statutes to determine whether the charged offenses are the same. 
See I.C. § 35-31.5-2-168. If neither offense is included in the other (either 
inherently or as charged), there is no violation of double jeopardy. But if 
one offense is included in the other (either inherently or as charged), then 
the court must examine the facts underlying those offenses, as presented 
in the charging instrument and as adduced at trial. If, based on these facts, 
the defendant’s actions were “so compressed in terms of time, place, 
singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single 
transaction,” then the prosecutor may charge the offenses as alternative 
sanctions only. But if the defendant’s actions prove otherwise, a court may 
convict on each charged offense. 
Here, of the four offenses for which Wadle stands convicted, the State 
concedes that two of them—OWI endangering a person (Count IV) and 
OWI with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more (Count V)—
violate double jeopardy. We agree, even under our new analytical 
framework. Neither statute clearly permits cumulative punishment and 
the latter offense is an included offense of the former. See Kovats v. State, 
982 N.E.2d 409, 414 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that misdemeanor OWIs 
are lesser included offenses of a felony OWI). What’s more, neither party 
insists that the facts show two distinct crimes. 
That leaves Wadle with two convictions: (1) leaving the scene of an 
accident, and (2) OWI causing serious bodily injury (or OWI-SBI). An 
“operator of a motor vehicle” commits the first offense, a Class B 
misdemeanor, when he or she “knowingly or intentionally” leaves the 
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scene of an accident without providing the necessary information and 
assistance. I.C. § 9-26-1-1.1(a), (b) (2015 Supp.). This offense becomes a 
Level 3 felony when, as here, the operator leaves the scene of an accident 
“during or after the commission of the offense of operating while 
intoxicated causing serious bodily injury (IC 9-30-5-4).” I.C. § 9-26-1-
1.1(b)(4). The second offense, OWI-SBI, occurs when a person “causes 
serious bodily injury to another person when operating a vehicle . . . while 
intoxicated.” I.C. § 9-30-5-4(a) (2014). This offense rises from a Level 6 
felony to a Level 5 felony if, at the time of committing the offense, the 
person had been convicted of OWI within the preceding five years. Id.  
Neither statute clearly permits multiple punishments, either expressly 
or by unmistakable implication. To be sure, both statutes—respectively—
permit an enhanced punishment. But an enhanced punishment, whether 
based on attendant circumstances or on a prior conviction, presents no 
“double jeopardy issue at all.” See Workman v. State, 716 N.E.2d 445, 448 
(Ind. 1999) (enhanced punishment based on “circumstances surrounding” 
the crime). See also Mayo v. State, 681 N.E.2d 689, 694 (Ind. 1997) 
(enhancement is neither “a new jeopardy” nor an “additional penalty” for 
an earlier offense, but rather “a stiffened penalty for the latest crime”) 
(citation omitted). Because the elevation is “not a separate offense or 
conviction,” double-jeopardy analysis is simply inapposite. Workman, 716 
N.E.2d at 448. See also Woods v. State, 234 Ind. 598, 608, 130 N.E.2d 139, 
143–44 (1955) (applying this principle to vacate several OWI convictions). 
With no statutory language clearly permitting multiple convictions, we 
now analyze the offenses charged under our included-offense statutes. 
Here, both statutes involve operating a vehicle while intoxicated resulting 
in serious bodily injury. The only difference is that one offense (OWI-SBI) 
creates “a less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, 
or public interest” than the other offense (leaving the scene “during or 
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after” OWI-SBI).34 See I.C. § 35-31.5-2-168(3). See also Sering v. State, 488 
N.E.2d 369, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (the offense of “operating a vehicle 
with BAC of .10% is a lesser included offense” of OWI “because the 
former offense [a class C misdemeanor] differs from the latter offense [a 
class A misdemeanor] in that a less serious risk of harm to the public 
interest is required to establish its commission”). Given the “disparate 
classification of the two offenses,” see id., we conclude that Level 5 felony 
OWI-SBI is included in (i.e., is the “same” as) the offense of Level 3 felony 
leaving the scene of an accident. 
Having determined that one offense is included in the other, we must 
now look at the facts to determine whether the two offenses are the same. 
Within a matter of “minutes,” Wadle physically attacked Woodward in 
the parking lot, retreated to his car, struck his victim twice, pinned him 
under a guardrail, and then fled the scene. Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 118, 247. Wadle, 
according to the prosecutor, had but a single objective—he “wanted a 
fight so he started one and he finished it by running over a man twice his 
age.” Id. at 61. Elaborating on the mayhem caused that fateful night, the 
prosecutor, in both opening and closing arguments, characterized Wadle’s 
actions as a virtually seamless string of events: “There was one person 
who was acting up in the bar that night. One person asking for a fight, one 
person who took off their shirt. One person who used his vehicle to chase 
down and strike a man,” the prosecutor continued, “one person who 
drove over the curb across the grass, one person who backed up and 
drove over that man a second time. One person who didn’t stop until he 
hit a guard rail. One person who fled the scene.” Id. at 60.  
Because Wadle’s actions were “so compressed in terms of time, place, 
singleness of purpose, and continuity of action,” we consider them “one 
continuous transaction.” See Walker, 932 N.E.2d at 735. Cf. id. at 737–38 
 
34 The mere reference in the leaving-the-scene statute to the separate offense of OWI-SBI 
evinces no statutory intent to permit conviction and punishment under both. Cf. I.C. § 6-7-3-20 
(2019) (“The excise taxes required by this chapter are intended to be in addition to any 
criminal penalties under IC 35-48-4 [offenses related to controlled substances].”) (emphasis 
added). 
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(concluding that the doctrine did not apply because each statutory 
offense—burglary, robbery, and criminal confinement—was a “distinct 
chargeable crime” with multiple victims involved, not “an offense and a 
lesser included offense”); Firestone v. State, 838 N.E.2d 468, 472 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2005) (holding that convictions for rape and criminal deviate 
conduct did not violate the doctrine because the defendant “clearly 
committed two different offenses at different times”). 
Still, the State contends that the legislature intended to punish Wadle 
“for the two separate and sequential harms that he caused: OWI causing 
serious bodily injury and then leaving the scene of an accident.” 
Appellee’s Br. at 8 (emphasis added). In other words, because “Wadle 
committed OWI causing serious bodily injury before he left the scene of 
the accident,” the State argues that his conviction for both offenses 
resulted in no double-jeopardy violation. Id. at 11. We disagree and find 
no such evidence of legislative intent.  
Our General Assembly defined the leaving-the-scene offense as a Level 
3 felony when the operator leaves the scene of an accident “during or 
after” committing OWI-SBI. See I.C. § 9-26-1-1.1(b)(4) (Supp. 2015). But 
that phrase articulates no definite period in which one offense begins and 
the other ends.35 See Hines, 30 N.E.3d at 1220 (noting that “our Legislature 
has the inherent power to define crimes, including when a crime may 
subsist for a definite period or cover successive, similar occurrences”) 
(citations omitted). Without clear legislative guidance, there’s “simply no 
way to make sense out of the notion that a course of conduct is ‘really’ 
only one act, rather than two or three, or, indeed, as many as one likes.” 
Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 
1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81, 114. Accord Eddy v. State, 496 N.E.2d 24, 27–28 (Ind. 
1986) (declining to interpret the phrases “during” or “while committing” 
as requiring the “chronological completion” of one offense before the 
 
35 In fact, the phrase “during or after” makes any temporal restriction to the offense even more 
indefinite than language found in other statutory offenses. See, e.g., I.C. § 35-42-1-1 (2014 
Repl.) (defining felony murder as the knowing or intentional killing of another person “while 
committing” one of several enumerated crimes).  
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completion of another offense). And prosecutors cannot avoid double 
jeopardy “by the simple expedient of dividing a single crime into a series 
of temporal or spatial units.” Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977). 
Accord Jackson v. State, 14 Ind. 327, 328 (1860) (“The state cannot split up 
one crime and prosecute it in parts.”). Even if we could distinguish 
Wadle’s acts to find two separate offenses, the prosecutor made no 
temporal distinction in either the charging instrument or the jury 
instructions, both of which alleged that Wadle “knowingly or 
intentionally fail[ed] to stop . . . at the scene of the accident as required by 
law during or after he caused serious bodily injury” to Woodward. 
Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 104 (emphasis added). See also id. at 123, 134. 
In sum, we conclude that the separate statutory offenses—Level 5 
felony OWI-SBI and Level 3 felony leaving the scene of an accident—
present alternative (rather than cumulative) sanctions on which to charge 
Wadle. 
When the defendant is found guilty of both the included offense and 
the greater offense, the trial court may not enter judgment and sentence 
for the included offense. I.C. § 35-38-1-6 (2014 Repl.). To remedy Wadle’s 
conviction for both offenses, then, we accept the State’s proposal of 
vacating his Level 5 felony OWI-SBI conviction (Count III) while leaving 
in place his Level 3 felony conviction for leaving the scene (Count II).36 
(See Appellee’s Br. at 14.) And because this conviction alone justifies the 
penalty imposed, see I.C. § 35-50-2-5, we further instruct the trial court to 
 
36 The State argues in the alternative that we “may remedy the violation by reducing either 
conviction to a less serious form of the same offense if doing so will eliminate the [double-
jeopardy] violation.” Appellee’s Br. at 13 (citing Zieman v. State, 990 N.E.2d 53, 64 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2013)). But our included-offense statute prohibits the trial court from entering judgment 
and sentence for the included offense when the defendant is found guilty of both the included 
offense and the charged offense. I.C. § 35-38-1-6. The only remedy, then, is to vacate 
conviction of the included offense. Simply reducing Wadle’s conviction to a “less serious 
offense” threatens to circumvent his constitutional right to “clear notice of the charge or 
charges against which the State summon[ed] him to defend” at trial. See Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 
565 (citing Ind. Const. art. 1, § 13). 
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leave in place Wadle’s sixteen-year sentence with two years suspended to 
probation. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons above, we hold that Wadle’s multiple convictions 
violate the statutory prohibition against substantive double jeopardy. 
Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with 
instructions for the trial court to vacate his convictions on all counts, save 
for his Level 3 felony conviction for leaving the scene of an accident 
(Count II). And because this conviction alone justifies the penalty 
imposed, see I.C. § 35-50-2-5, we further instruct the trial court to leave in 
place Wadle’s sixteen-year sentence with two years suspended to 
probation. 
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur. 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLA N T  
Cara Schaefer Wieneke 
Wieneke Law Office, LLC 
Brooklyn, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Curtis T. Hill, Jr.  
Attorney General of Indiana 
Caroline G. Templeton 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana