Title: Commonwealth v. Bastaldo
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11763
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 25, 2015

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SJC-11763 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ELVIN BASTALDO. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     February 5, 2015. - June 25, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Mayhem.  Arrest.  Resisting Arrest.  Identification.  Evidence, 
Identification, Consciousness of guilt, Flight.  Practice, 
Criminal, Identification of defendant in courtroom, Request 
for jury instructions, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 14, 2013. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Constance M. Sweeney, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
Bethany C. Lynch, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Karen A. Newirth, of New York, & Sarah L. Leddy, for The 
Innocence Project, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Jessica LaClair, for Juan Bastaldo, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  In the parking lot of a night club in 
Springfield, the defendant, Elvin Bastaldo, punched the victim, 
Juan Benito, several times in the face using brass knuckles, 
blinding him in one eye, while the victim was standing near a 
police officer who was arresting the defendant's brother, Juan 
Bastaldo (Juan).1  The defendant was convicted by a Superior 
Court jury of mayhem, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 14, and 
resisting arrest, in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 32B.2,3 
 
On appeal, the defendant claims that he is entitled to a 
new trial because (1) the judge abused her discretion in denying 
the defendant's requested cross-racial and cross-ethnic 
eyewitness identification jury instruction where two of the 
three eyewitnesses were "Caucasian" and the defendant was a 
                                                          
 
 
1 Because the defendant, Elvin Bastaldo, and his brother, 
Juan Bastaldo, share the same last name, we will refer to the 
brother as Juan and Elvin as the defendant.  We note that the 
victim, Juan Benito, shares the same first name as the 
defendant's brother; we will refer to him only as the victim. 
 
 
2 The trial judge dismissed an indictment charging assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious 
bodily injury, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (c) (i), as duplicative of 
the mayhem charge.  The defendant was sentenced to serve from 
six to seven years in State prison on the mayhem conviction, and 
two years in a house of correction on the resisting arrest 
conviction, to be served concurrently with the mayhem sentence. 
 
 
3 The defendant and Juan were tried together.  Juan was 
convicted of assault and battery causing serious bodily injury, 
two counts of assault and battery, and resisting arrest.  Juan's 
appeal was stayed in the Appeals Court pending our opinion in 
this case. 
3 
 
"dark-skinned Hispanic of Dominican descent"; (2) the admission 
of three in-court eyewitness identifications created a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice where it was the 
first time any of them had formally identified the defendant;4 
and (3) the judge committed prejudicial error by giving a 
consciousness of guilt instruction that suggested to the jury 
that the defendant was the assailant.5 
 
We conclude that because this case was tried before our 
opinion issued in Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 376, 382 
(Appendix) (2015), where we prospectively required that a jury 
instruction on cross-racial eyewitness identification be given 
in these circumstances, the judge did not abuse her discretion 
in declining to give the defendant's requested cross-racial and 
cross-ethnic instruction.  We now revise the content of the 
provisional model jury instruction regarding cross-racial 
                                                          
 
 
4 It is not clear from the briefs whether the defendant 
challenges the admission of all three or only two of the in-
court eyewitness identifications.  Out of an abundance of 
caution, we treat the defendant's argument as challenging the 
admission of all three in-court eyewitness identifications. 
 
 
5 The defendant also claims that the judge abused her 
discretion by denying his motion to expand the appellate record 
to include a photograph of the defendant.  This issue was 
rendered moot after the Commonwealth responded to our request at 
oral argument by supplementing the record with the photograph of 
the defendant that the defendant had sought to add to the 
record.  The Commonwealth agrees that the photograph is 
"accurate as to the defendant's general appearance and skin tone 
at the time of trial."  A photograph of the victim had been 
admitted in evidence as an exhibit at trial. 
4 
 
identification that we issued in Gomes, as well as our guidance 
as to when such an instruction should be given.  In criminal 
trials that commence after the issuance of this opinion, a 
cross-racial instruction should always be included when giving 
the model eyewitness identification instruction, unless the 
parties agree that there was no cross-racial identification.  We 
authorize judges in their discretion to include a cross-ethnic 
eyewitness identification instruction in appropriate 
circumstances. 
 
We further conclude that where this case was tried prior to 
the issuance of Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228 (2014), 
and Commonwealth v. Collins, 470 Mass. 255 (2014), the admission 
of the in-court eyewitness identifications did not create a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  Finally, although 
under the circumstances of this case the judge erred in 
instructing the jury regarding consciousness of guilt, we 
conclude that the error was not prejudicial.  We therefore 
affirm the judgments of conviction.6 
 
Background.  The jury could have found the following facts 
from the evidence admitted at trial.  At approximately 12:30 
A.M. on September 2, 2012, Juan and three companions (not 
                                                          
 
 
6 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Innocence Project, Inc., and Juan Bastaldo. 
 
5 
 
including the defendant) attempted to enter a night club in 
Springfield.  The victim, who, by his description, served as the 
"doorman, security, [and] host" of the club, denied their entry 
because the companions with Juan were under twenty-one years of 
age.  A brief verbal and physical altercation ensued in which 
Juan punched the victim in the chest, and the victim countered 
by punching Juan below the eye.  Springfield police officer 
Thomas Liebel, who was working a security detail at the club, 
ordered Juan to leave the area, which he did. 
 
The club closed at 2 A.M.  As Liebel walked to his vehicle 
to leave, Juan and two or three other men appeared from a nearby 
alleyway and headed toward the main entrance of the club.7  When 
they attempted to enter the club, Liebel approached them and 
ordered them to leave.  The victim was standing inside the club 
near the entrance, along with Ronald Kenniston, a club employee 
who worked as a "bar back-up."  As soon as the victim opened the 
entrance door, Juan punched the victim in the side of the face. 
 
Liebel moved to arrest Juan, but when Juan "went for" 
Liebel, Liebel sprayed him with mace.  Juan and the other men 
                                                          
 
 
7 Officer Thomas Liebel testified that there were three men 
with Juan, including the defendant, and he identified the 
defendant in court.  He noted that the defendant wore dark 
clothing, another Hispanic male wore a dark-colored shirt and a 
white Yankees baseball cap, and the third man wore "an orange 
outfit." 
 
6 
 
ran away, but Liebel gave chase and caught Juan.  The victim 
followed to make sure Liebel was all right, and stood near 
Liebel as he struggled to handcuff Juan.  The victim was then 
suddenly struck in the face.  He did not see from where the blow 
came, but it rendered him dazed and blind in his left eye.  When 
he turned around to defend himself, he saw the defendant, whom 
he had never seen before, standing a foot or two in front of 
him.  The defendant punched the victim in the face two or three 
more times. 
 
The defendant then approached Liebel and yelled in English, 
"I am going to fuck you up, Officer."  The defendant came within 
three feet of Liebel before police sirens sounded and the 
defendant "bolted."  Liebel watched the defendant run through a 
large parking lot, transmitted a description of the defendant's 
clothing and location over the police radio, and learned one 
minute later that the defendant had been arrested.  Liebel soon 
saw the defendant again before he was placed inside a police 
transport vehicle with Juan, where they threatened and cursed 
Liebel in English. 
 
Kenniston had been standing approximately fifteen feet away 
from the victim when a person "came up from behind [the victim] 
and sucker punched his eye a few times."   He identified the 
defendant at trial as the person who threw the "sucker" punches.  
Kenniston testified that he got a good look at the defendant's 
7 
 
face, and observed a silver object in the defendant's hand that 
covered three of his fingers.  He also watched the defendant 
throw an object across the street, which sounded like metal when 
it landed, before the defendant ran away.8  Kenniston saw police 
officers catch up to the defendant, tackle him, arrest him, and 
bring him back to Liebel. 
 
Kenniston then drove the victim to a local hospital.  On 
the way, he passed the police transport vehicle and saw that the 
defendant was in custody.9  The victim was later transferred to 
Massachusetts General Hospital, where he underwent surgery on 
his eye.  At the time of trial, the victim was still blind in 
his left eye. 
 
The defendant testified at trial that he and Juan had 
arrived at the club at approximately 9:05 P.M. by themselves and 
remained inside until 2 A.M.  He then left with Juan but Juan 
stayed near the entrance to talk with someone while the 
defendant continued walking.  The defendant had not walked far 
when he turned around to see that there was fighting and that a 
police officer had handcuffed Juan.  He saw that Juan had lost a 
shoe, so he retrieved it and walked over toward him and the 
                                                          
 
 
8 Liebel testified that when the defendant punched the 
victim, he observed "brass knuckles" covering each knuckle of 
the defendant's right hand.   
 
 
9 No formal showup identification ever took place. 
 
8 
 
officer who had handcuffed him, asking, "What happened?"  When 
the police were about to take Juan away, the defendant walked 
through a parking lot in the direction of his house.  Before he 
reached the street, he was grabbed by the police and thrown to 
the ground.  The defendant stated that he did not see anyone 
strike the victim, and did not punch the victim himself.10 
 
Discussion.  1.  Cross-racial and cross-ethnic eyewitness 
identification instruction.  At the charge conference, the 
defendant's attorney requested the following cross-racial and 
cross-ethnic eyewitness identification instruction: 
"In this case, the identifying witnesses are of a 
different race or ethnicity than the defendant.  Scientific 
studies have shown that it is more difficult to identify 
members of a different race or ethnicity than members of 
one's own.  In addition, studies reveal that even people 
with no prejudice against other races and substantial 
contact with persons of other races still experience 
difficulty in accurately identifying members of a different 
race or ethnicity.  Quite often people do not recognize 
this difficulty in themselves.  You should consider this in 
evaluating the reliability of the witnesses' identification 
of the defendant." 
 
 
As to the race or ethnicity of the eyewitnesses, Kenniston 
and Liebel testified that they are Caucasian; no evidence was 
                                                          
 
 
10 The defendant testified that he had been an amateur 
fighter in the Dominican Republic for approximately eight years, 
and continued boxing for approximately six months after he came 
to the United States.  He said that he came to the United States 
in 2000 and worked "on and off" for approximately eight years at 
a hotel as a dishwasher and kitchen assistant, but did not speak 
any English.  He said he was unable to work at the time of the 
incident because of medical problems "with [his] head." 
9 
 
offered regarding their ethnicity.  The victim testified that 
his father is Puerto Rican and his mother is Italian, and he 
considers himself Hispanic.  No evidence was offered regarding 
the race of the victim; based on his photograph, his skin color 
appears to be brown. 
As to the defendant's race or ethnicity, the defendant 
testified that he is from the Dominican Republic but did not 
discuss his racial identity.  Liebel testified that the person 
who struck the victim was Hispanic.  Kenniston was also asked if 
the person who struck the victim was Hispanic, and he responded: 
"Yeah . . . .  Well, I mean I don't know the classification 
because . . . I have friends that are . . . black, Puerto 
Rican, and they can speak two languages, so . . . just 
because they are a certain color, I'm not going to say they 
are Spanish or Black. . . .  I really need to talk to them 
to know what they are." 
 
The defendant's written request for a cross-racial and cross-
ethnic instruction stated that he is Hispanic.  On appeal, he 
characterizes himself as a "dark-skinned Hispanic of Dominican 
descent."  Based on his photograph, his skin color appears to be 
black. 
 
The Commonwealth objected to the request and questioned 
whether the identifications were truly cross-racial or cross-
ethnic, as the evidence only showed that the witnesses may have 
different ethnic backgrounds.  The Commonwealth also asked that 
10 
 
if a cross-racial or cross-ethnic instruction were given, it not 
apply to the victim because he was also Hispanic. 
 
The judge declined the defendant's request for an 
instruction, stating that Kenniston and Liebel are of different 
ethnicity from the defendant, but "[w]e are not talking about a 
cross-racial identification here."  The judge also stated that, 
even if she were to assume that the identification was similar 
to a cross-racial identification, it is "far from settled" that 
such an instruction should be given, and giving such an 
instruction "is hardly the standard in the courts at this 
point."  She acknowledged that we were considering the Report 
and Recommendations of the Supreme Judicial Court Study Group on 
Eyewitness Evidence (July 25, 2013) (Study Group Report),11 and 
that the proposed jury instructions regarding cross-racial 
identification were "very controversial" in the Superior Court.  
The judge instead instructed the jury in accordance with the 
then-existing model eyewitness identification instruction, based 
on Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 296, 310-311 (Appendix) 
(1979), as modified in Commonwealth v. Cuffie, 414 Mass. 632, 
640-641 (Appendix) (1993), and Commonwealth v. Santoli, 424 
                                                          
 
 
11 See Supreme Judicial Court Study Group on Eyewitness 
Evidence:  Report and Recommendations to the Justices (July 25, 
2013) (Study Group Report), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/eyewitness-evidence-
report-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/WY4M-YNZN]. 
 
11 
 
Mass. 837, 845 (1997), including the instruction regarding the 
possibility of a good faith mistake.  See Commonwealth v. 
Pressley, 390 Mass. 617, 620 (1983).  Because the defendant 
objected at the close of the instructions to the absence of the 
requested instruction, we review its denial for prejudicial 
error.  See Commonwealth v. Meas, 467 Mass. 434, 454, cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 150 (2014). 
 
In Gomes, 470 Mass. at 366-367, we concluded that a 
principle of eyewitness identification may be appropriate for 
inclusion in a model jury instruction "where there is a near 
consensus in the relevant scientific community adopting that 
principle."  Because it was not argued that the identifications 
in that case were cross-racial, we did not address that issue, 
but we included an instruction on cross-racial identification in 
the provisional model jury instruction that we required to be 
given, where appropriate, in trials that commence after the 
issuance of that opinion.  Id. at 376, 382 (Appendix).  That 
instruction provided that, in deciding whether a witness's 
identification is accurate, a jury should consider "whether the 
witness and the offender are of different races -- research has 
shown that people of all races may have greater difficulty in 
accurately identifying members of a different race than they do 
in identifying members of their own race."  Id. at 382 
(Appendix).  Including that instruction reflected our conclusion 
12 
 
that this principle had been adopted by a near consensus in the 
relevant scientific community.  Id. at 382 n.10 (citations 
providing support for near consensus on cross-racial 
identification).  But we declined to give the new provisional 
model jury instruction any retroactive application, id. at 376, 
so it has no bearing on this case, which was tried one year 
before the issuance of Gomes. 
 
Under our case law at the time of trial, a judge was not 
precluded "in the exercise of discretion from instructing a jury 
that, in determining the weight to be given eyewitness 
identification testimony, they may consider the fact of any 
cross-racial identification and whether the identification by a 
person of different race from the defendant may be less reliable 
than identification by a person of the same race."  Commonwealth 
v. Hyatt, 419 Mass. 815, 819 (1995).  But a defendant "was not 
entitled to such an instruction."  Commonwealth v. Bly, 448 
Mass. 473, 496 (2007) ("While we acknowledge the significant 
body of scientific literature on the problems inherent in cross-
racial identification, . . . we have never held that those 
problems require a jury instruction when cross-racial 
identification testimony is offered, and we decline to do so 
here" [citation omitted]).  Therefore, the judge did not err in 
declining to read the requested instruction. 
13 
 
 
Although it was not error before Gomes for the judge to 
decline to give a cross-racial instruction, such an instruction 
must be given in trials that commence after Gomes where there is 
a cross-racial identification.  See Gomes, 470 Mass. at 376, 382 
(Appendix).  The existence of the "cross-race effect" (CRE) -- 
that people are generally less accurate at identifying members 
of other races than they are at identifying members of their own 
race -- has reached a near consensus in the relevant scientific 
community and has been recognized by courts12 and scholars13 
                                                          
 
 
12 See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 382 & n.10 
(Appendix) (2015) (provisional model instruction includes 
instruction on cross-race effect [CRE], to be given "if witness 
and offender are of different races"); State v. Guilbert, 306 
Conn. 218, 237-238 (2012) (CRE accepted by "[c]ourts across the 
country"); State v. Cabagbag, 127 Haw. 302, 310-311 (2012) 
("Researchers have found that several variables tend to affect 
the reliability of an eyewitness's identification," including 
CRE); State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 299 (2011) (research 
justifies giving cross-racial instruction "whenever cross-racial 
identification is in issue at trial"); State v. Lawson, 352 Or. 
724, 775 (2012) (noting "widespread acceptance of the [CRE] in 
the scientific community"). 
 
 
13 See Study Group Report, supra at 134 (proposed jury 
instruction stating that "people of all races and all 
ethnicities may have greater difficulty in accurately 
identifying members of a different race or a different 
ethnicity"); National Research Council of the National 
Academies, Identifying the Culprit:  Assessing Eyewitness 
Identification 96 (2014) (National Academies) (existence of CRE 
"generally accepted" and it "occurs in both visual 
discrimination and memory tasks, in laboratory and field 
studies, and across a range of races, ethnicities, and ages").  
See also Hourihan, Benjamin, & Liu, A Cross-Race Effect in 
Metamemory:  Predictions of Face Recognition Are More Accurate 
for Members of Our Own Race, 1 J. Applied Research in Memory & 
 
14 
 
alike.  We remain convinced that jurors who are asked to 
evaluate the accuracy of an identification should be informed of 
the CRE.14 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Cognition 158, 158 (2012) ("The [CRE] . . . in face recognition 
is one of the most replicated findings in cognitive and social 
psychology"). 
 
 
14 Although there is a near consensus in the relevant 
scientific community that the CRE may arise regardless of racial 
prejudice, there is no near consensus regarding the explanation 
for the CRE.  See J.C. Brigham, L.B. Bennett, C.A. Meissner, & 
T.L. Mitchell, The Influence of Race on Eyewitness Memory, in 2 
Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology 267-268 (2007) (Brigham et 
al.); Meissner & Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own–
Race Bias in Memory for Faces:  A Meta–Analytic Review, 7 
Psychol., Pub. Pol'y, & L. 3, 6-7, 21 (2001).  See also National 
Academies, supra at 96 (existence of CRE is "generally accepted" 
but causes of it are "not fully understood"); Young, Hugenberg, 
Bernstein, & Sacco, Perception and Motivation in Face 
Recognition:  A Critical Review of Theories of the Cross-Race 
Effect, 16 Personality & Social Psychol. Rev. 116, 116 (2012) 
("despite the straightforward nature of the CRE, the social 
ramifications of face recognition errors, and the decades of 
research devoted to the topic, isolating a primary mechanism 
responsible for the effect has proven vexing"). 
 
 
One theory is that the CRE arises not from race per se, but 
from people's general tendency to think categorically about 
members of the "out group" (persons of other races) while 
thinking in an individuated manner about members of the "in 
group" (persons of the same race).  Id. at 123.  Another theory 
is that less interaction and familiarity with members of other 
races results in a weaker ability to distinguish between faces 
of other races.  Id. at 116-117.  See Brigham et al., supra at 
266 (studies have yielded mixed results, some showing smaller 
CRE in people reporting more interracial contact, and others 
finding no relationship between contact and CRE). 
 
 
Prior to Gomes, the District Court issued a model 
supplemental cross-racial instruction, which invited the jury to 
consider whether other factors may overcome the difficulty in 
making a cross-racial identification.  It states in part, "For 
 
15 
 
 
We take this opportunity, however, to consider when a 
cross-racial instruction should be given.  In Bly, 448 Mass. at 
496, we declared that it is within a judge's discretion to give 
a cross-racial instruction "when warranted by the evidence," and 
our provisional instruction in Gomes, 470 Mass. at 382 
(Appendix), provides that the instruction should be given when 
the "witness and offender are of different races."  See Study 
Group Report, supra at 134 (proposed supplemental cross-racial 
and cross-ethnic instruction should be given "[i]f the witness 
and the perpetrator are of a different race or ethnicity").  But 
we have yet to discuss when the evidence warrants such an 
instruction and who, if anyone, should determine whether the 
witness and the person identified are of different races, 
perhaps because the cross-racial character of an identification 
is often not contested.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Engram, 43 
Mass. App. Ct. 804, 805 n.1 (1997) (defendant was black and at 
argument "it was agreed that the identifying witnesses were 
white"). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
example, you may conclude that the witness had sufficient 
contacts with members of the defendant's race that (he) (she) 
would not have greater difficulty in making a reliable 
identification."  Instruction 9.160 of the Model Jury 
Instructions for Use in the District Court (2009).  We are not 
convinced that there is a near consensus in the relevant 
scientific community in support of the example given in this 
instruction. 
 
16 
 
 
The social science research establishing the CRE often does 
not define race.  See Chiroro, Tredoux, Radaelli, & Meissner, 
Recognizing Faces Across Continents:  The Effect of Within-Race 
Variations on the Own-Race Bias in Face Recognition, 15 
Psychonomic Bull. & Rev. 1089, 1091 (2008) ("Face recognition 
researchers have investigated the [CRE] for almost [forty] 
years, but few have attempted to provide a definition of race.  
This is not surprising, since the concept of race is notoriously 
unclear, with most biologists asserting that it has no 
defensible definition" [emphasis in original]).  Roy S. Malpass, 
a leading scholar on the CRE, highlights the difficulty of 
defining race in this area of research, stating, "There seems to 
be no good and consistent way to refer to all the various 
'races,'" and "the old racial names just don't seem to work, 
especially in complex multiethnic societies."  They All Look 
Alike to Me, in The Undaunted Psychologist:  Adventures in 
Research 77 (1993) ("This problem has not been solved in a 
satisfying way.  We have to acknowledge it, and get on with the 
inquiry about facial recognition -- even if we have to 
communicate by using some not so terribly appropriate 
terminology").  For example, what is the race of a person whose 
grandparents on his father's side were an African-American and 
an Asian-American, and on his mother's side were a Caucasian and 
17 
 
a Native American?  See id.  And what evidence would be 
admissible to ascertain the person's race?15 
 
In facial recognition studies, the person making the 
identification is generally asked to self-identify his or her 
race, and that self-identification is accepted as the person's 
race for purposes of the study;16 the race of the person who is 
                                                          
 
 
15 We shall not return to the days where a single drop of 
"colored" blood defined a person as an African-American, and the 
law attempted to ascertain a person's race by tracing his or her 
ancestry.  Johnson, The Re-Emergence of Race as a Biological 
Category:  The Societal Implications -- Reaffirmation of Race, 
94 Iowa L. Rev. 1547, 1559-1560 (2009) ("Although not predicated 
on any currently acceptable scientific basis, the 'one drop of 
blood' rule represented the law of the land and served as a 
vehicle to classify individuals by race and to establish whites 
and whiteness as the dominant racial category").  See Hickman, 
The Devil and the One Drop Rule:  Racial Categories, African 
Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1161, 1227 
(1997) (in cases that adjudicated whether someone was black 
under one drop of blood rule, party with burden of proof often 
undertook something akin to a "human title search," tracing his 
or her ancestry back several generations).  Cf. Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540-542 (1896) (Plessy was ordered by 
conductor to vacate railway carriage for whites and to move to 
carriage for "colored race" because he was seven-eighths 
Caucasian and one-eighth "African blood"). 
 
 
16 See, e.g., Gross, Face Recognition and Own-Ethnicity Bias 
in Black, East/Southeast Asian, Hispanic, and White Children, 5 
Asian Am. J. Psychol. 181, 183 (2014) (Face Recognition) (where 
study participants were children, "[c]hildren's parents reported 
their child's ethnicity on a parental consent form"); Hourihan, 
Fraundorf, & Benjamin, Same Faces, Different Labels:  Generating 
the Cross-Race Effect in Face Memory with Social Category 
Information, 41 Memory Cognition 1021, 1023 (2013) (participants 
"self-identified" as African-American or Hispanic on 
demographics questionnaire); MacLin & Malpass, Racial 
Categorization of Faces:  The Ambiguous Race Face Effect, 7 
Psychol., Pub. Pol'y, & L. 98, 105 (2001) (participants self-
 
18 
 
identified is generally determined based on the physical 
appearance of the person's face, including but not limited to 
skin color.17  Although social scientists "refer to the 
phenomenon as the [CRE] . . . the operative factor is perceived 
facial physiognomic characteristics, regardless of racial 
classification per se."  Wells & Olson, The Other-Race Effect in 
Eyewitness Identification:  What Do We Do About It?, 7 Psychol., 
Pub. Pol'y, & L. 230, 234 (2001).  See McKone, Stokes, Liu, 
Cohan, Fiorentini, Pidcock, Yovel, Broughton, & Pelleg, A Robust 
Method of Measuring Other-Race and Other-Ethnicity Effects:  The 
Cambridge Face Memory Test Format, 7 PLOS ONE, no. 10, Oct. 
2012, at 1 (McKone) ("we use the term race of a face to refer to 
the relatively large physical differences in faces with ancestry 
from different major world regions, such as Europe, Asia, or 
Africa" [emphasis in original]).18  In short, when we speak of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
identified as Hispanic by self-report while signing in for 
experiment). 
 
 
17 See, e.g., Face Recognition, supra at 184 (author and 
four undergraduate students selected photographs of Asian, 
black, Hispanic, and white persons "that appeared to be good 
exemplars of the four ethnicities"); Wilson & Hugenberg, When 
Under Threat, We All Look the Same:  Distinctiveness Threat 
Induces Ingroup Homogeneity in Face Memory, 46 J. Experimental 
Social Psychol. 1004, 1005 (Wilson & Hugenberg) (2010) 
(photographs were "pretested to ensure that they were 
consistently categorized as 'White' or 'Hispanic'"). 
 
 
18 See S.M. Smith & V. Stinson, Does Race Matter?  Exploring 
the Cross-Race Effect in Eyewitness Identification, in Critical 
 
19 
 
cross-racial identification in the context of eyewitness 
identification, we mean that based on facial appearance, the 
person who made the identification is likely to have perceived 
the person identified to be of a different race. 
 
Because differences in race based on facial appearance lie 
in the eye of the beholder, we shall not ask judges to determine 
whether a reasonable juror would perceive the identification to 
be cross-racial.  Rather, we shall direct that a cross-racial 
instruction be given unless all parties agree that there was no 
cross-racial identification.  This obviates any need for the 
judge to decide whether the identification was actually cross-
racial, or whether jurors might perceive it to be.  If the jury 
receive such an instruction but do not think the identification 
was cross-racial, they may simply treat the instruction as 
irrelevant to their deliberations.  Consequently, we amend our 
provisional instruction in Gomes to the extent that, in criminal 
trials that commence after the issuance of this opinion, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Race Realism:  Intersections of Psychology, Race, and Law 106 
(2008) ("operationally defining race is very difficult in [the 
eyewitness identification] context, and it may be more useful to 
consider perceived facial variability instead"); Sporer, Special 
Theme:  The Other-Race Effect and Contemporary Criminal Justice:  
Eyewitness Identification and Jury Decision Making:  Eyewitness 
Identification:  Recognizing Faces of Other Ethnic Groups:  An 
Integration of Theories, 7 Psychol., Pub. Pol'y, & L. 36, 36 n.1 
(2001) ("the term race is only used for differences in 
physiognomy"). 
 
20 
 
following instruction should be included when giving the model 
eyewitness identification instruction, unless all parties agree 
to its omission: 
"If the witness and the person identified appear to be of 
different races, you should consider that people may have 
greater difficulty in accurately identifying someone of a 
different race than someone of their own race."19 
 
 
We also take this opportunity to consider whether a cross-
ethnic instruction should be included with the cross-racial 
instruction.  Ethnicity is generally distinct from race; for 
instance, a person who identifies as Hispanic may be of any 
race.20  Yet, in facial recognition studies, the terms "race" and 
                                                          
 
 
19 The model instruction announced in Gomes, 470 Mass. at 
376, was made provisional "to allow for public comment and 
possible future revision," and the Supreme Judicial Court Rules 
Committee solicited public comments on the provisional 
instruction through May 29, 2015.  See Notice Inviting Comment 
on Provisional Jury Instruction Regarding Eyewitness Evidence, 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/case-legal-res/rules-of-court/rule-
changes-invitations-comment/invitation-to-comment-provisional-
jury-instructions-eyewitness-identification.html 
[http://perma.cc/8LBP-YJX7].  The cross-racial instruction 
announced today may again be amended once we release a revised 
model instruction.  Even when our model instruction is no longer 
provisional, it is still subject to revision as the research 
regarding eyewitness identification evolves.  See Gomes, supra 
at 368 ("we acknowledge the possibility that, as the science 
evolves, we may need to revise our new model instruction's 
description of a principle"). 
 
 
20 See State v. Romero, 191 N.J. 59, 68 (2007), quoting 
United States Census Bureau, Overview of Race and Hispanic 
Origin:  Census 2000 Brief 1-2 ("Hispanics may be of any race").  
See also Gross, Own-Ethnicity Bias in the Recognition of Black, 
East Asian, Hispanic and White Faces, 31 Basic & Applied Social 
 
21 
 
"ethnicity" are often conflated and used interchangeably; when 
they are defined separately, ethnicity may refer to "the smaller 
physical differences that exist within a race, such as with 
ancestry from Norway versus Greece within Europe, or China 
versus Japan within Asia, or Nigeria versus Ethiopia within 
Africa."  McKone, supra at 1.  From our review of the social 
science, we are aware of studies that support the conclusion 
that people are better at recognizing the faces of persons of 
the same ethnicity than a different ethnicity.21  But there is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Psychol. 128, 129 (2009) (Own-Ethnicity Bias) ("Within the 
community that identifies itself as Hispanic, there is much 
cultural and physical diversity.  Nonetheless, within this 
population there are those who present distinctive physical 
profiles, having mixed Spanish and Central and South American 
Indian heritage").  Cf. Reyes, The 2010 Census and Latinos:  
What Race Are We?, Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 6, 2010, 
available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0406/The-2010-
Census-and-Latinos-What-race-are-we [http://perma.cc/8SLW-P9N9] 
(opining that "overwhelming majority of Hispanics are a 
combination of Spanish and indigenous peoples" so race option of 
"multiracial" on census may better suit many Hispanic people). 
 
 
21 See Own-Ethnicity Bias, supra at 132 (study revealed that 
white participants recognized white faces better than they 
recognized Hispanic, Asian, and black faces, but found no 
significant difference between Hispanic participants' 
recognition of white faces and Hispanic faces); Platz & Hosch, 
Cross-Racial/Ethnic Eyewitness Identification:  A Field Study, 
J. Applied Social Psychol. 972, 979, 981 (1988) (Mexican-
American and white convenience store clerks better recognized 
customers of their own group than customers of other group); 
Wilson & Hugenberg, supra at 1006-1008 (white undergraduate 
students showed CRE when identifying white and Hispanic faces in 
control group of experiment studying own-race identifications).  
See also Chiroro, Tredoux, Radaelli, & Meissner, Recognizing 
 
22 
 
not yet a near consensus in the relevant scientific community 
that people are generally less accurate at recognizing the face 
of someone of a different ethnicity than the face of someone of 
their own ethnicity.  See American Bar Association Policy 104D:  
Cross-Racial Identification, 37 Sw. U. L. Rev. 917, 927 (2008) 
("The research on cross-ethnicity identification is less clear-
cut"); State v. Romero, 191 N.J. 59, 71 (N.J. 2007) ("The most 
that can be said is that research in the area has begun").  See 
also McKone, Hall, Pidcock, Palermo, Wilkinson, Rivolta, Yovel, 
Davis, & O'Connor, Face Ethnicity and Measurement Reliability 
Affect Face Recognition Performance in Developmental 
Prosopagonosia:  Evidence from the Cambridge Face Memory Test -- 
Australian, 28 Cognitive Neuropsychol. 109, 135 (2011) ("The 
existence of other-race effects on face memory is well 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Faces Across Continents:  The Effect of Within-Race Variations 
on the Own-Race Bias in Face Recognition, 15 Psychonomic Bull. & 
Rev. 1089, 1091 (2008) (white South African participants better 
recognized white South African faces than white North American 
faces, and black South African participants better recognized 
black South African faces than black North American faces).  See 
generally Marcon, Meissner, & Malpass, Cross-Race Effect in 
Eyewitness Identification, in Encyclopedia of Psychology & Law 
173 (2008) ("Studies have evidenced the CRE across a wide 
variety of ethnic and racial groups.  While the original 
research in this area dealt primarily with Whites and Blacks in 
the United States, more recent studies have included samples 
from Canada, Great Britain, Germany, Turkey, South Africa, and 
parts of the Middle East and Asia.  Whites, Blacks, Asians, 
Hispanics, Natives/Indians, Jews, and Arabs, among others, have 
been included in these studies with each demonstrating a CRE in 
face identification performance"). 
23 
 
established.  However, the question of whether . . . ethnicity 
of faces within a race influences face recognition has received 
less attention").  In Romero, supra at 66, a non-Hispanic 
Caucasian male identified a Hispanic male that the trial court 
determined was also Caucasian.  The New Jersey Supreme Court 
investigated the social science research and concluded that 
"[s]ocial science research does not tie identification 
unreliability directly to ethnic differences in the same way 
that racial differences can affect identification reliability."  
Id. at 63. 
 
For now, we leave the decision to add ethnicity to the 
cross-racial instruction in the judge's sound discretion.22  
Where the persons involved in the identification self-identify 
as being of the same race but different ethnicity, and look as 
categorically different as people of different races, a cross-
ethnic instruction will generally be appropriate, because the 
research suggests that cross-ethnic facial recognition in these 
circumstances has reliability issues similar to the CRE.  See 
note 21, supra.  Ethnicity should also generally be included in 
the instruction where, for example, a non-Hispanic eyewitness 
                                                          
 
 
22 The instruction would read:  "If the witness and the 
person identified appear to be of different races or 
ethnicities, you should consider that people may have greater 
difficulty in accurately identifying someone of a different race 
or ethnicity than someone of their own race or ethnicity." 
 
24 
 
identifies a defendant who is Hispanic and looks multiracial, 
because the jury may not know whether to attribute the 
difference in appearance to race or ethnicity or both; an 
instruction that only references race might inadvertently lead 
the jury to ignore facial characteristics that are relevant to 
the CRE.23  But the addition of ethnicity may not be appropriate 
where, for example, the witness and the person identified appear 
to be of the same race, but one is Australian and the other 
North American.24  Until the social science reaches a near 
consensus, we will not require the inclusion of ethnicity in the 
                                                          
 
 
23 In contrast with our earlier case law regarding cross-
racial identifications, where we effectively declared that it 
was never an abuse of discretion to decline to give such an 
instruction, see Commonwealth v. Bly, 448 Mass. 473, 496 (2007), 
we leave open the possibility that, under these or comparable 
circumstances, it might be an abuse of discretion to decline a 
request to add ethnicity to the cross-racial identification 
instruction. 
 
 
24 See McKone, Stokes, Liu, Cohan, Fiorentini, Pidcock, 
Yovel, Broughton, & Pelleg, A Robust Method of Measuring Other-
Race and Other-Ethnicity Effects:  The Cambridge Face Memory 
Test Format, 7 PLOS ONE, no. 10, Oct. 2012, at 3-5 (2012) (white 
North American participants showed nonsignificant CRE toward 
white Australian faces compared with white North American 
faces).  See also Sporer & Horry, Recognizing Faces from Ethnic 
In-Groups and Out-Groups:  Importance of Outer Face Features and 
Effects of Retention Interval, 25 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 
424, 426-427 (2010) (Turkish participants in study did not 
recognize Turkish faces significantly better than white German 
faces); Luce, The Role of Experience in Inter-Racial 
Recognition, 1 Personality & Social Psychol. Bull. 39, 40 (1974) 
(Japanese participants recognized Japanese faces only slightly 
better than Chinese faces, and Chinese participants recognized 
Chinese faces only slightly better than Japanese faces). 
25 
 
model instruction but will leave its inclusion to the discretion 
of the judge based on the circumstances of the identification. 
 
2.  Admission of in-court eyewitness identifications.  The 
first time that the victim, Kenniston, and Liebel made a formal 
identification of the defendant was in court during their 
testimony.  The defendant now challenges the admission of these 
in-court identifications.  Because there was no motion to 
suppress or objection at trial, "the error, if any, is reviewed 
for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice."  
Commonwealth v. Brown, 451 Mass. 200, 207 (2008). 
 
We recently announced the following prospective rule in 
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 241-242 (2014), to be 
applied in trials that commence after the issuance of the 
opinion on December 17, 2014:  "Where an eyewitness has not 
participated before trial in an identification procedure, we 
shall treat the in-court identification as an in-court showup, 
and shall admit it in evidence only where there is 'good reason' 
for its admission."  See Commonwealth v. Collins, 470 Mass. 255, 
265 (2014) (we shall prospectively apply new rule in Crayton 
where, before trial, witness made "something less than an 
unequivocal positive identification" during nonsuggestive 
procedure).  Because the defendant's trial took place before the 
issuance of Crayton and Collins, those prospective rules do not 
apply in this case.  Instead, we evaluate the alleged errors 
26 
 
under the existing law at the time of trial.  See Crayton, supra 
at 245 (no abuse of discretion in admission of in-court 
identifications where doing so was "in accord with the case law 
existing at the time of [the judge's] decision").  See also 
Collins, supra at 261 (defense counsel not ineffective for 
failing to object to admission of in-court identification when 
its admission "conformed to our case law"). 
 
Prior to Crayton, an in-court identification was excluded 
if, in the totality of the circumstances, it was "tainted by an 
out-of-court confrontation . . . that [was] 'so impermissibly 
suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification.'"  Crayton, supra at 238, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Carr, 464 Mass. 855, 877 (2013).  An in-court 
identification was admissible in the absence of any prior out-
of-court confrontation.  Crayton, supra ("where there had been 
no out-of-court identification to taint the in-court 
identification, the judge's admission of the in-court 
identification conformed to our case law").  Because the 
defendant does not assert that any out-of-court confrontation 
took place involving Liebel, there was no error in the admission 
of his in-court identification. 
 
We also find no error in the admission of the in-court 
identification made by Kenniston.  Kenniston saw the defendant 
in police custody near the crime scene when he drove the victim 
27 
 
to the hospital, and a police officer directing traffic said to 
Kenniston, "Yeah, we got [the assailant].  He's right over 
there."  But a few moments before this exchange, from close 
range and in a well-lit area, Kenniston not only observed the 
defendant punch the victim but also saw him flee and get chased, 
tackled, and arrested.  Under these circumstances, the officer's 
confirmation that the police arrested the assailant told 
Kenniston nothing more than what he had seen with his own eyes, 
and was not so impermissibly suggestive as to create a 
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. 
 
We also find no error in the admission of the in-court 
identification made by the victim.  The victim testified that 
between the original event and the trial, he saw a photograph of 
the defendant in a newspaper given to him by police.  We 
recognize that it might be unnecessarily suggestive for police 
to provide a newspaper article about the relevant crime to a 
witness and ask whether the person shown in the newspaper 
photograph is the assailant.  Compare Commonwealth v. Jules, 464 
Mass. 478, 489-490 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Horton, 434 
Mass. 823, 835 (2001) (in absence of police manipulation or 
prompting, "simple exposure to the media is not sufficient 
ground to suppress an identification [on constitutional 
grounds]").  But the level of suggestiveness ultimately depends 
on the context of the confrontation.  See Commonwealth v. 
28 
 
Cavitt, 460 Mass. 617, 632 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Miles, 420 Mass. 67, 77 (1995) (unnecessarily suggestive 
procedure must be proved "in light of the totality of the 
circumstances").  Here, there is no evidence in the record 
detailing the circumstances of the victim's viewing of the 
newspaper photograph, such as what the police said to him, or 
how long after the initial event he saw it.  It was the 
defendant's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that any out-of-court confrontation with the victim was so 
impermissibly suggestive as to create a substantial likelihood 
of irreparable misidentification.  The defendant has failed to 
satisfy that burden, especially where the victim, after the 
first "sucker punch" blinded him in one eye, saw the assailant 
stand within "a foot or two" of him and punch him once or twice 
more in the face.25 
                                                          
 
 
25 The defendant also argues that the admission of the 
eyewitnesses' statements indicating the level of certainty in 
their identifications was erroneous.  There was no objection at 
trial, and no error in their admission under existing law.  See 
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 596 (2005) (determination 
of weight to give to identification and "any statements of 
certainty or uncertainty" is left to jury); Commonwealth v. 
Watkins, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 69, 74-75 (2005) (we have "not 
precluded witness testimony regarding certainty, or prohibited 
counsel from probing the subject or arguing about it").  In this 
case, we decline to consider the defendant's proposal to adopt 
the Study Group's recommendation to limit the admissibility of 
certainty testimony, see Study Group, supra at 113, where there 
was no objection to its admission at trial and the relevant 
 
29 
 
 
3.  Consciousness of guilt instruction.  The judge 
instructed the jury regarding consciousness of guilt based on 
the evidence that the assailant ran away after punching the 
victim and discarded the brass knuckles.26  Because the 
consciousness of guilt instruction was given over the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
identifications were admissible under the law prior to 
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228 (2014). 
 
 
26 The judge read the following instruction: 
 
 
"There has been evidence in this case alleging that 
[the defendant] may have fled when he was about to be 
arrested for one of the offenses for which he is now on 
trial and/or that he may have intentionally tried to 
conceal . . .  what is alleged to be a dangerous weapon in 
this case by supposedly discarding it, throwing it away. 
 
 
"If the Commonwealth has proved one or both of these 
actions, you may take into consideration whether such 
action indicates feelings of guilt by [the defendant], and 
whether in turn such feelings of guilt might tend to show 
actual guilt with respect to the charges under 
consideration. 
 
 
"You are not required to draw such inferences and you 
should not do so unless they appear to be reasonable in 
light of all the circumstances of this case.  If you decide 
that such inferences are reasonable, it will be up to you 
to decide how much importance to give it or them, but 
always keep in mind that there may be numerous reasons why 
an innocent person might do such things.  Such conduct does 
not necessarily express feelings of guilt. 
 
 
"Please also always bear in mind that persons having 
feelings of guilt does not necessarily mean they are 
guilty, for such feelings are often times found in innocent 
people.  Also, even if you do draw an inference of guilt 
from a determination of consciousness of guilt, you may not 
base a conviction solely on evidence of consciousness of 
guilt.  That alone will not support a conviction." 
 
30 
 
defendant's objection, we review for prejudicial error.  See 
Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 452-453 (2008). 
 
An instruction on consciousness of guilt is appropriate 
where the jury may draw an inference of guilt "'from evidence of 
flight, concealment, or similar acts,' such as false statements 
to the police, destruction or concealment of evidence, or 
bribing or threatening a witness."  Commonwealth v. Morris, 465 
Mass. 733, 737-738 (2013), quoting Stuckich, supra at 453.  A 
defendant's flight is often considered "classic evidence" of 
consciousness of guilt.  Commonwealth v. Vick, 454 Mass. 418, 
426 (2009).  The inference of guilt may be drawn in part from 
the premise that a person flees "because he feels guilt 
concerning that act" and the person feels guilt concerning the 
act because he "committed that act."  Commonwealth v. Toney, 385 
Mass. 575, 584 (1982). 
In contrast, a consciousness of guilt instruction regarding 
flight is generally inappropriate where there is no dispute that 
the crime was committed by the person fleeing from the crime 
scene, and the only contested issue is the identification of the 
defendant as the fleeing offender.  See Commonwealth v. Pina, 
430 Mass. 266, 272 (1999), citing Commonwealth v. Groce, 25 
Mass. App. Ct. 327, 331-332 (1988).  Under these circumstances, 
if the jury finds that it was the defendant who fled, the jury 
will find him guilty, not because flight evidences consciousness 
31 
 
of guilt but because flight reveals the defendant to be the 
assailant.  See Vick, 454 Mass. at 439 (Botsford, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) ("for the jury to consider the 
evidence that the assailant 'fled' from the immediate scene of 
the shooting as consciousness of guilt on the defendant's part, 
they would need first to conclude, based on separate evidence, 
that the defendant was in fact the shooter; otherwise, they 
would have no basis on which to ascribe the act of fleeing to 
the defendant at all");  Groce, supra at 331-332 (consciousness 
of guilt instruction was "inapposite" where "[t]here [was] no 
dispute that the same individual committed the offense and fled 
from the scene").  In these circumstances, a consciousness of 
guilt instruction would provide no relevant guidance to the jury 
but would pose the risk that the jury might think the judge was 
suggesting that the defendant was the person who fled and 
therefore the person who committed the crime.  Groce, supra at 
332 (judge who gave consciousness of guilt instruction "may well 
have conveyed the notion to the jury that he believed that it 
was the defendant who fled and, thus, that the victim's 
identification testimony was accurate").  Where, as here, the 
only live issue at trial was identification and it was plain 
that the person who fled was the assailant, the risk that a 
consciousness of guilt instruction might imply that the 
defendant was the person who fled outweighed the negligible 
32 
 
benefit of instructing the jury that flight may be evidence of 
consciousness of guilt.  Therefore, the judge erred in giving 
the instruction. 
The error, however, was not prejudicial for two reasons.  
First, the evidence of the defendant's guilt in this case was 
overwhelming.  Although the defendant contends the case rests 
solely on three unreliable eyewitness identifications, the most 
compelling evidence of guilt comes from Kenniston's testimony 
that the person he saw "sucker punch" the victim was the same 
person whom he saw flee and be tackled by the police.  This 
testimony did not rest on facial recognition; it would have 
mattered little if Kenniston had never seen the assailant's 
face.  Where the defendant was the only person tackled by the 
police, and Kenniston saw that it was the assailant who was 
tackled, Kenniston's testimony provided compelling evidence of 
the defendant's guilt.27  The eyewitness identifications of 
Liebel and the victim corroborated Kenniston's testimony.  
Liebel's testimony was stronger because, unlike the victim, he 
had not been blinded by a punch and saw the defendant menacingly 
                                                          
 
 
27 The only evidence elicited on cross-examination of 
Kenniston that put in question whether he saw the assailant 
being arrested was that Kenniston admitted that, while driving 
the victim to the hospital, he asked a police officer, "Did you 
get the guy that did it?" and the officer responded, "Yeah, we 
got him.  He's right over there."  However, Kenniston had 
earlier testified that the officer asked him, in essence, if the 
defendant "was him or not," and Kenniston said, "Yeah, right." 
33 
 
approach within a few feet of him after having beaten the 
victim.  Although Liebel lost sight of the defendant after 
watching him run, Liebel reported the direction where the 
defendant fled and the defendant was soon tackled, arrested, and 
brought back to where Liebel was holding Juan.  There was no 
formal show-up identification, but Liebel saw that the defendant 
was the person the police had arrested, and he did not tell his 
fellow officers that they arrested the wrong man.  The 
defendant's testimony is also so inconsistent with all the other 
evidence in the case and so improbable that it "adds to our 
confidence in the jury's verdict."  Commonwealth v. Rosado, 428 
Mass. 76, 81 (1998) ("sheer implausibility of defendant's own 
alibi" supported conclusion of no prejudicial error).  In view 
of the overwhelming weight of the evidence against the 
defendant, we are confident that the jury's verdict "was not 
substantially swayed by the error" in giving the consciousness 
of guilt instruction.  See Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 
348, 353 (1994). 
Second, the risk that the jury understood the judge to be 
suggesting that the defendant was the person who fled was small.  
The judge began her instruction by saying that "[t]here has been 
evidence in this case alleging that [the defendant] may have 
fled when he was about to be arrested . . . and/or that he may 
have intentionally tried to conceal . . . what is alleged to be 
34 
 
a dangerous weapon."  The inclusion of the word "alleging" made 
clear that the jury needed to evaluate the quality of that 
evidence, and that the judge did not intend to suggest that the 
evidence should be credited.  Moreover, the judge gave the 
consciousness of guilt instruction immediately following the 
eyewitness identification instruction, in which the judge 
emphasized several times that the Commonwealth bears the burden 
of proving the defendant's identity beyond a reasonable doubt.  
See Pina, 430 Mass. at 272 (no prejudicial error in giving 
consciousness of guilt instruction where judge emphasized that 
prosecutor bore burden of proving identity of defendant as 
perpetrator).  Therefore, giving the consciousness of guilt 
instruction did not constitute prejudicial error. 
Conclusion.  The judgments of conviction against the 
defendant are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.