Title: Jordan v. Kollman
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 041885
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 22, 2005

PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
CLAUDE E. JORDAN, SR. 
 
v.  Record No. 041885 
 
J. CHRIS KOLLMAN, III 
 
 
OPINION BY 
JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
 
April 22, 2005 
J. CHRIS KOLLMAN, III 
 
v.  Record No. 041861 
 
CLAUDE E. JORDAN, SR. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
Marc Jacobson, Judge Designate 
 
 
Claude E. Jordan, Sr., a resident of the City of Colonial 
Heights ("the City"), appeals from the judgment of the 
Chesterfield County Circuit Court which awarded compensatory and 
punitive damages against him for defamation of J. Chris Kollman, 
III, the City's former mayor.  Kollman appeals the remittitur of 
the jury's award by the trial court.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court and enter 
final judgment on behalf of Jordan. 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
Kollman, then the mayor and a member of the City Council of 
the City, was re-elected to the City Council in the May 7, 2002, 
municipal election.  On May 5, 2002, the Sunday before the 
election, Jordan, a private citizen, composed and paid for the 
publication of two advertisements in The Progress Index, a 
newspaper of general circulation in the City (collectively 
"Jordan's ads").  The larger of Jordan's ads reads as follows: 
ATTENTION: ALL 10,000 COLONIAL HEIGHTS VOTERS 
Kollman/Hales/Farley voted to approve construction of 
over 200 apartments on Archer Avenue, mainly Federally 
subsidized, low income rentals . . .  certainly the 
worst Council action in our City's history . . . 
obviously the product of a lack of zoning vigilance 
. . . Is it true that the city had the opportunity to 
purchase the land on which the project is located 
something [sic] ago?  If so, why didn't 
Kollman/Hales/Farley and other council members 
purchase it and avoid all of these problems we now 
face and will continue to face forever more? . . . Bet 
you haven't seen or heard a word on the apartments 
from the incumbent . . . perhaps waiting until after 
the election to really tell the people what to expect 
. . .  these apartments are for real . . . ALL Voters 
should go and see . . . It's unbelievable that a 
massive housing project adjacent to a flood plain 
would be located in such a congested residential area 
. . . Think of the potential for crime, drugs, and 
demands on our school system . . . think of the impact 
on all of us . . . how much higher will reassessments 
go to pay the horrendous cost to the taxpayer . . . 
over $700,000 to widen Archer Avenue and untold costs 
for police, fire, and EMS services . . . Think of the 
pain from noise, frustration and inconvenience when 
300-500 vehicles are dumped twice daily onto presently 
quite [sic] residential streets like Carroll, 
Chesterfield, and Cambridge and onto already congested 
Boulevard and traffic arteries like Hamilton, 
Lynchburg, Westover, Temple, and E. Ellerslie . . . we 
NEED 10,000 voters got go [sic] to the polls-rain or 
shine-to retire the incumbents who have held power for 
up to 20 years . . . VOTE (every vote counts) for the 
3 challengers who have publicly stated NO MORE 
APARTMENT PROJECTS . . . the next one could be near 
you. PLEASE Vote for BUREN, FREELAND, and WOOD ON MAY 
7, 2002. 
 
C.E. Jordan 
 
2
Paid for by C.E. Jordan 
("the large ad").  The other of Jordan's ads states: 
Mr./Mrs. Colonial Heights: 
 
Don't like over 200 mostly Federally subsidized, low-
income apartments? Say Good-bye to those who approved 
the apartments . . . Support and Vote for the 3 
challengers who have publicly said "NO MORE APARTMENT 
PROJECTS!" 
 
VOTE BUREN,FREELAND AND WOOD 
ON TUESDAY, MAY 7, 2002 
Paid for by C.E. Jordan 
 
("the small ad"). 
 
Kollman narrowly won reelection to the City Council, coming 
in third among six candidates for the three seats up for 
election.  John Wood and Milton Freeland, whom Jordan supported, 
came in first and second.  In July 2002, the City Council 
elected Wood as mayor.1
 
Prior to the City Council's mayoral vote, Kollman filed a 
motion for judgment on June 12, 2002, alleging that Jordan's ads 
in The Progress-Index defamed him.  Kollman alleged that the 
large ad falsely stated that he "voted to approve . . . over 200 
. . . mainly Federally subsidized, low income rentals."  Kollman 
averred the small ad defamed him because it falsely implied he 
approved the apartment project as a member of City Council.  He 
                     
 
1 In the City of Colonial Heights, the City Council elects 
the mayor from its members after each general election.  The 
mayor is a voting member of City Council. 
 
3
asserted that Jordan's ads were false because "he never approved 
[the apartments] and actively opposed their construction." 
 
Kollman alleged that Jordan's statements were malicious and 
libelous per se.  Kollman contended the ads caused him to suffer 
"[i]mpairment of reputation; [d]iminished standing in the 
community; [p]ersonal humiliation; [i]njury and embarrassment; 
[e]motional distress and mental anguish; and [p]rofessional 
harm." Kollman sought compensatory damages of $1.0 million and 
punitive damages of $350,000. 
 
Jordan filed a demurrer, a motion for summary judgment at 
the close of Kollman's evidence and a motion to strike before 
the case was submitted to the jury.  He contended, among other 
things, that the ad statements were not defamatory because they 
were protected by the First Amendment as discussion of issues of 
public concern, that the statements were of opinion, and were 
true or substantially true.  Jordan also contended that if 
either of the ads were a false statement, its publication was 
not made with actual malice.  Jordan's demurrer was overruled 
and his motions were denied; however, the trial court ruled 
before trial that Jordan's ads, if libelous, were not defamatory 
per se but could only be defamatory per quod.2
                     
 
2 Kollman made no objection to the trial court's ruling on 
this point and made no assignment of cross-error to it. 
 
4
 
The jury returned its verdict for Kollman awarding 
compensatory damages of $75,000.00 and punitive damages of 
$125,000.00, plus pre-judgment interest of $4,990.26.  In 
response to Jordan's motion for remittitur, the trial court, by 
a letter opinion of April 1, 2004, put Kollman on terms to 
accept reduced compensatory and punitive awards of $15,000 and 
$35,000, respectively.  Kollman acceded to the remitted award 
and reserved his right to appeal pursuant to Code § 8.01-383.1.  
The trial court entered an order to that effect and both parties 
filed notices of appeal.  We awarded an appeal to each party. 
 
On appeal, Jordan assigns error to the trial court's: (1) 
overruling of his demurrer; (2) denial of his motion for summary 
judgment and subsequent motion to strike Kollman's evidence; (3) 
exclusion of all references to any actions the City Council took 
in relation to the Riverside Manor apartment development after 
the 2002 election; (4) exclusion of other paid political 
advertisements in The Progress-Index on May 5, 2002; (5) denial 
of Jordan's motion to set aside the jury's verdict or grant a 
new trial; and (6) failure, upon remittitur, to limit Kollman's 
recovery to nominal damages.  Kollman assigns error to the 
remittitur of his jury award and the elimination of pre-judgment 
interest.  He also alleges that the trial court erred in 
considering Jordan's net worth in its decision to remit the jury 
award. 
 
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Historically, a cause of action for defamation has been 
viewed as the means to protect a basic right because "[t]he 
individual's right to personal security includes his 
uninterrupted entitlement to enjoyment of his reputation."  The 
Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 7, 325 S.E.2d 713, 720 
(1985) (citing Fuller v. Edwards, 180 Va. 191, 197, 22 S.E.2d 
26, 29 (1942)).  In a written format, defamation is usually 
termed libel while spoken defamation, not reduced to writing, is 
slander.  See MacPherson v. Green, 197 Va. 27, 33, 87 S.E.2d 
785, 789 (1955). 
In Virginia, the elements of libel are (1) publication of 
(2) an actionable statement with (3) the requisite intent.  See 
generally The Gazette.  To be actionable, the statement must be 
both false and defamatory.  M. Rosenberg & Sons v. Craft, 182 
Va. 512, 518, 29 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1944); Ewell v. Boutwell, 138 
Va. 402, 415, 121 S.E. 912, 916 (1924).  See also Chapin v. 
Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1092 (4th Cir. 1993).  True 
statements do not support a cause of action for defamation.  
American Communications Network, Inc. v. Williams, 264 Va. 336, 
337, 568 S.E.2d 683, 684 (2002).  Further, statements of opinion 
are generally not actionable because such statements cannot be 
objectively characterized as true or false: 
 
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Thus, speech which does not contain a provably false 
factual connotation, or statements which cannot 
reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts 
about a person cannot form the basis of a common law 
defamation action.  Statements that are relative in 
nature and depend largely upon the speaker's viewpoint 
are expressions of opinion.  
 
Fuste v. Riverside Healthcare Ass'n, Inc., 265 Va. 127, 132-33, 
575 S.E.2d 858, 861 (2003) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Whether a statement is an actionable statement 
of fact or non-actionable opinion is a matter of law to be 
determined by the court.  Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 119, 
335 S.E.2d 97, 101 (1985).  We review such questions of law de 
novo.  Turner v. Caplan, 268 Va. 122, 125, 596 S.E.2d 525, 527 
(2004). 
If a statement is not opinion, the plaintiff in a 
defamation action has the burden of proving that the statement 
is false.  Williams v. Garraghty, 249 Va. 224, 235, 455 S.E.2d 
209, 216 (1995).  Further, "[s]light inaccuracies of expression 
are immaterial provided the defamatory charge is true in 
substance, and it is sufficient to show that the imputation is 
'substantially' true."  Saleeby v. Free Press, Inc., 197 Va. 
761, 763, 91 S.E.2d 405, 407 (1956).  A plaintiff may not rely 
on minor or irrelevant inaccuracies to state a claim for libel.  
See id.  Whether a plaintiff has sufficiently proven the falsity 
of the alleged defamatory statements is a jury question.  Thus, 
on appeal, we determine only whether there is sufficient 
 
7
evidence to support the jury's decision.  A trial court's 
judgment will not be set aside unless it is plainly wrong or 
without evidence to support it. Code § 8.01-680. 
The requisite intent a plaintiff must prove in a defamation 
action depends upon the plaintiff's status as a public or 
private figure and the damages sought.  While it is within the 
province of the states to "define . . . the appropriate standard 
of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory 
falsehood injurious to a private individual," public figure 
plaintiffs are governed by the standard established in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).  Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342, 347 (1974).  In New York 
Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80, the United States Supreme Court 
ruled a public official is prohibited "from recovering [any] 
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official 
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 
'actual malice.' "  The burden of proving "actual malice" is 
upon the plaintiff who must demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant realized that his statement was 
false or that he subjectively entertained serious doubt as to 
the truth of his statement.  Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of 
the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511, n.30 (1984).  To 
recover punitive damages, all defamation plaintiffs must show 
actual malice.  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50. 
 
8
As mayor of the City and an incumbent candidate for City 
Council, Kollman is a "public official" required to meet the New 
York Times malice standard.  Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 
401 U.S. 295, 299 (1971) ("As the mayor . . . the respondent 
. . . was without question a 'public official' within the 
meaning given the term in New York Times").  As a public 
official, Kollman was required to prove actual malice in 
Jordan's publication of the advertisements in order to recover 
either compensatory or punitive damages for defamation. 
In a defamation case, notwithstanding the jury's finding, 
we must make an independent review of the record.  The Gazette, 
229 Va. at 19, 325 S.E.2d at 727.  We must decide 
whether the evidence in the record on appeal is 
sufficient to support a finding of New York Times 
"actual malice" by clear and convincing proof. . . . 
[We] must examine the facts pertinent to the [jury] 
award and exercise independent judgment to "determine 
whether the record establishes actual malice with 
convincing clarity." 
 
Id., 325 S.E.2d at 727-28 (citations omitted).  In the course of 
our independent review, we review the facts in the light most 
favorable to Kollman, the prevailing party below.  Caplan v. 
Bogard, 264 Va. 219, 225, 563 S.E.2d 719, 722 (2002). 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
The parties' dispute centers around Kollman's actions as 
mayor and a member of City Council in relation to the 
development of certain real property.  In June 2000, RV Limited 
 
9
Partnership ("RV"), a real estate developer, submitted a site 
plan to the Colonial Heights Planning Commission for the 
construction of the Riverview Apartments ("Riverview") on Archer 
Avenue in the City.  The property was zoned for residential 
multi-family dwellings and had been so zoned since 1968.  RV 
proposed to build an 88-unit apartment building for federally 
subsidized, low-income tenants. 
 
Kollman and other members of City Council opposed Riverview 
because the site was in a flood plain and would require major 
expenditures by the City to widen Archer Avenue and to improve 
utility services.  The City would also likely incur costs for 
increased police and fire protection, as well as greater public 
school expenses. 
 
On December 5, 2000, Kollman, as mayor, wrote a letter to 
the Virginia Housing Development Authority ("VHDA"), expressing 
his concerns about Riverview: that the building site was in a 
floodplain, that the site may encroach on area wetlands, that 
the property was the site of an Indian burial ground, and that 
the City had no public transportation system to serve the needs 
of Riverview residents.  Kollman testified at trial that he 
opposed the construction of Riverview because of these concerns, 
but that he knew that raising these issues could not stop, but 
only delay the project. 
 
10
 
On December 12, 2000, City Council unanimously adopted and 
Kollman signed Resolution 00-49 to "clearly [express] the city's 
opposition to [the] proposed Riverview Apartments on Archer 
Avenue," which was transmitted to VHDA.  Kollman arranged a 
meeting with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to 
determine whether RV could legally build on the Riverview site.  
Kollman also sought the advice of the City Attorney, F. McCoy 
Little, to determine what further action the City Council could 
take against Riverview.  Specifically, Kollman asked Little if 
the City Council could pass a moratorium on apartment 
construction.  Little told Kollman that City Council did not 
have that authority. 
 
Ralph M. Goldstein, RV's attorney, approached Little in 
2001, to discuss the possible sale of the Riverview property to 
the City.  At a meeting with Little and Kollman, Goldstein 
conveyed RV's offer to sell the property for a price of $1.0 
million.  Because Kollman did not have authority to accept RV's 
offer on behalf of the City, he called a meeting of City Council 
for a closed session to be held June 12, 2001. 
 
At the City Council meeting in closed session, Goldstein 
presented a document detailing RV's expenditure of $682,530.07 
in costs to develop the Riverview site and conveyed the offer to 
sell the property to the City for $1.0 million.  At the meeting, 
Kollman and the other City Council members understood that if 
 
11
the City failed to purchase the property, RV would commence 
construction of Riverview on June 30, 2001. 
 
While Code § 2.2-3711(B) prohibits a governing body, like 
the City Council, from taking a binding vote in a closed 
session, Kollman and the other attendees testified that the 
Council took a poll and reached a "consensus" to make an offer 
on the Riverview property.  Subsequently, City Council 
authorized Little to offer RV $500,000 plus refunds of fees paid 
to the City in connection with the development of the property. 
 
Little made the offer to Goldstein on June 14, 2001.  On 
June 26, 2001, the City received Goldstein's letter on behalf of 
RV, rejecting the offer.  The City Council made no further offer 
or any other effort to purchase the Riverview property. 
 
On March 1, 2002, The Progress-Index carried an article 
featuring the Riverview construction project ("March 1st 
article").  Kollman was interviewed for the article and noted 
the City's opposition to the project in Resolution 00-49.  The 
March 1st article also contained the following account of the 
City's failed bid to purchase the property from RV:  
 
At one point in the negotiations between [RV] and 
the city, Kollman told The Progress-Index that . . . 
[RV] offered to sell their 7.377 acres to the city for 
$1 million—a site that was assessed in 2000 at 
$60,300, according to city assessor Ken Stickler. 
 
"They'd done some work at that point," Kollman 
related, "and paid some permit fees."  City Council, 
in closed session, made a counter offer of a half – 
million dollars, Kollman told The Progress-Index, 
 
12
which [RV] did not accept.  No further negotiations 
were attempted by either party. 
 
Kollman was quoted as to the number of units under construction 
at the time: "over 80 being built now at Riverview." 
 
The March 1st article also mentioned another parcel of land 
located next to Riverview on Archer Avenue.  It was reported 
that in 1996, the owner of that property had been denied 
financing from the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
to develop low-income housing apartments called Riverview Manor.  
However, the March 1st article went on to state that  
[the owner's] plans now call for 119 units.  He 
described his plan as "90 percent approved," provided 
he redo the site plans, meet all necessary criteria, 
and obtain financing.  His preliminary site plans were 
approved by the [City] Planning Commission in 1996. 
 
"We've just been holding off until they do 
something with that road," [the owner] said of Archer 
Avenue. 
 
 
Upon this factual milieu, we can proceed directly to 
Jordan's claim that Kollman's defamation action must fail 
because of the lack of proof of actual malice.  Based upon our 
independent review of the record, we agree with Jordan. 
In Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 
U.S. 657, 688 (1989), the United States Supreme Court noted that 
reckless disregard for the truth . . . requires more 
than a departure from reasonably prudent conduct. 
There must be sufficient evidence to permit the 
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained 
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication 
. . . . [and] that the defendant actually had a high 
degree of awareness of probable falsity. 
 
13
 
(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)  Shenandoah 
Publ'g House, Inc. v. Gunter, 245 Va. 320, 324, 427 S.E.2d 370, 
372 (1993) (adopting the "high degree of awareness" test for 
reckless disregard for the truth).  Based on the March 1st 
article, Jordan believed his advertisements represented the 
facts of the situation regarding the June 12, 2001, City Council 
action.  At trial, he testified that he believed that the ads 
were true at the time of writing and that he "stand[s] by those 
ads today."  Jordan argues that because he believed his ads were 
true, there is insufficient evidence to establish that he acted 
with actual malice. 
Kollman contends, however, that under St. Amant v. 
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968), Jordan's subjective belief 
that his statements were true is not sufficient to preclude the 
jury's finding of actual malice.  In St. Amant, the United 
States Supreme Court cautioned that 
[t]he defendant in a defamation action brought by a 
public official cannot, however, automatically insure 
a favorable verdict by testifying that he published 
with a belief that the statements were true. The 
finder of fact must determine whether the publication 
was indeed made in good faith. Professions of good 
faith will be unlikely to prove persuasive, for 
example, where a story is fabricated by the defendant, 
is the product of his imagination, or is based wholly 
on an unverified anonymous telephone call. . . . 
Likewise, recklessness may be found where there are 
obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant 
or the accuracy of his reports.  
 
 
14
Id. 
The record provides no clear and convincing evidence that 
Jordan's ads were "fabricated" by him or a "product of his 
imagination."  Rather Jordan testified that he relied on public 
information as reported in the March 1st article for the content 
of his ads: 
I took the information that I knew that had happened 
in closed session . . . and I knew from reading [the 
March 1st article] that [the apartments] were 
federally subsidized low income rentals. . . . I knew 
there were 88 [units] in the Riverview [apartments] 
and I had heard . . . there were going to be a hundred 
or more built on the adjacent property, so I just used 
[200] as a figure. 
 
There was no clear and convincing proof that there were "obvious 
reasons to doubt the veracity of the [March 1st article]."  St. 
Amant, 390 U.S. at 732. 
In The Gazette, 229 Va. at 50, 325 S.E.2d at 746, this 
Court affirmed a jury verdict in favor of a defamation plaintiff 
upon proof of actual malice because "[the defendant] abandoned 
all judgment and reason in composing and publishing the 
advertisement. [He had no] objective basis for the charge. . . . 
[and] no proper grounds [for his statement]." 
By contrast, the March 1st article shows that Jordan had an 
objective basis to charge that Kollman voted to approve 
Riverview and a legitimate reason to contend Kollman's actions 
led to Riverview's development.  Jordan was a concerned citizen 
 
15
who believed in good faith that City Council had made an ill-
advised decision which effectively allowed Riverview's 
construction.  We cannot find that there was clear and 
convincing evidence which would permit the jury to find Jordan 
acted with actual malice merely because he failed to comprehend 
the intricacies of City Council voting procedure. 
Thus Jordan's assertion that his ads were substantially 
true is more than a subjective belief—it is an honest conviction 
grounded in good faith.  Because there is not sufficient 
evidence that Jordan published the advertisements with reckless 
disregard for the truth, the record does not support a finding 
that Jordan acted with actual malice.  Without a showing of 
actual malice, Kollman's defamation claim must fail. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There is insufficient evidence in the record to support a 
finding under the clear and convincing proof standard that 
Jordan's ads in The Progress Index, which Kollman claimed as 
defamatory, were published with actual malice.  Thus, the trial 
court erred in denying Jordan's motion to strike the evidence 
and to set aside the jury's verdict.  Therefore, the judgment of 
the trial court will be reversed and final judgment will be 
entered for Jordan.3
                     
3 Because we reverse the trial court's judgment in 
favor of Kollman, we do not reach any of the issues in 
 
16
Reversed and final judgment. 
                                                                  
Kollman's appeal or any of Jordan's other assignments of 
error. 
 
 
17