Title: People v. Falbe
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 87900
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: January 21, 2000

Docket No. 87900-Agenda 21-September 1999.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. GABRIELLA L. FALBE et 
al., Appellees.
Opinion filed January 21, 2000.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendants, Gabriella L. Falbe and Marzeal Marshall, were charged in the 
circuit court of Marion County with violations of section 401(c)(2) of the 
Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 1998)) 
(unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to deliver), said conduct allegedly 
occurring while defendants were on a public way within 1,000 feet of a church, a 
circumstance enhancing a Class 1 felony to a Class X felony (720 ILCS 
570/407(b)(1) (West 1998)). Defendants filed motions challenging the 
constitutionality of section 407(b)(1), arguing that the statute violates due 
process, proportionality and equal protection clauses of the Illinois and United 
States Constitutions. The circuit court found the statute to be 
"unconstitutionally vague with regard to the given facts, to wit: the triggering 
of the enhanced penalty do [sic] solely to police action in selecting 
the locus of the offense by a traffic stop." The State appealed to the Appellate 
Court, Fifth District, where the cases were consolidated and subsequently 
transferred to this court pursuant to appellate court orders citing Supreme 
Court Rules 302(a) and 365 (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a); 155 Ill. 2d R. 365). Although 
Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 603), rather than Rule 302(a), applies in this criminal 
context, the principles are the same. People v. Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d 1, 
8 (1999). We now reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for 
further proceedings.
Since neither the facts nor the credibility of witnesses is contested, the 
constitutional issue having come before the circuit court on stipulated facts, a 
purely legal question is presented for which de novo review is 
appropriate. See Wilson v. Department of Revenue, 169 Ill. 2d 306, 310 
(1996); People v. Wardlow, 183 Ill. 2d 306, 309 (1998).
According to the facts stipulated, on April 3, 1998, the Centralia police 
department received information that defendants, Marzeal Marshall and Gabriella 
Falbe, had in their possession a large quantity of cocaine at their Centralia 
residence. Officer Brian Atchison placed the residence under surveillance while 
other officers were obtaining a search warrant. However, before the officers 
arrived to execute the warrant, defendants left the residence in a motor 
vehicle. Atchison followed them and, in the vicinity of the 300 block of West 
Nollman, observed defendants' vehicle exceed the speed limit. He stopped the 
vehicle, according to the stipulation, on a public way within 1,000 feet of a 
church. Both defendants were subsequently arrested, and a search of Gabriella 
Falbe resulted in the discovery of more than 70 grams of cocaine. Defendants 
acknowledged that Marshall had handed the cocaine to Falbe after the traffic 
stop to hide and hold for him. Given the foregoing stipulated facts, and 
acknowledging that "legal issues," rather than "factual ones," were to be 
resolved, the circuit court took the matter under advisement, subsequently 
rendering its ruling by docket entry.
In that entry, the court recited the stipulated facts in the form of 
findings, and went on to hold the statute "unconstitutionally vague with regard 
to the given facts." The court found, "based on the facts in this case, the 
compelling state interest to enhance the penalty for drug delivery in specified 
protected zones is neither promoted or served." In so finding, the circuit court 
attributed dispositive significance to the traffic stop which resulted in the 
discovery of drugs on Falbe's person, holding that proximity to a church was 
"the direct result of police activity in a traffic stop without any 
showing that defendants started, stopped or ever intended to stop in the 
protected zone." (Emphasis in original.) Thus, the circuit court reasoned, the 
"purpose" of the statute was not served when applied to these defendants.
It is our duty to affirm a statute's constitutionality and validity if 
reasonably possible. People v. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 140, 144 (1995); 
People v. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d 489, 499 (1992). The statute enjoys a 
presumption of constitutionality (People v. Lantz, 186 Ill. 2d 243, 254 
(1999)), and any doubts must be resolved in favor of the validity of the law in 
question (People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104, 111 (1995)). Since the 
circuit court apparently based its ruling upon a perceived due process 
violation, we first address principles applicable to due process analysis.
The determination of whether a statute is void for vagueness must be made in 
the factual context of each case. Lee v. Nationwide Cassel, L.P., 174 Ill. 2d 540, 549 (1996); People v. Bales, 108 Ill. 2d 182, 189 (1985). 
Due process demands that a statute must not be so vague that persons of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at either its meaning or its application. 
People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 356 (1996). Where, as here, the 
statute does not impinge on first amendment rights, due process is satisfied if: 
(1) the statute's prohibitions are sufficiently definite, when measured by 
common understanding and practices, to give a person of ordinary intelligence 
fair warning as to what conduct is prohibited, and (2) the statute provides 
sufficiently definite standards for law enforcement officers and triers of fact 
that its application does not depend merely on their private conceptions. 
Warren, 173 Ill. 2d  at 356.
Insofar as due process principles limit the legislature's authority in the 
first instance to enact statutes in furtherance of the state's police power, 
they prohibit only arbitrary or unreasonable use of that power. People v. 
Brown, 98 Ill. 2d 374, 380 (1983). To constitute a legitimate exercise of 
the police power, a legislative enactment must bear a reasonable relationship to 
the public interest intended to be protected, and the means adopted must be a 
reasonable method of accomplishing the desired result. Brown, 98 Ill. 2d  at 380. In other words, the statute must be reasonably designed to remedy the 
evils which the legislature has determined to be a threat to the public health, 
safety and general welfare. People v. Reed, 148 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1992). 
It is not our role to determine whether the legislature has chosen the best or 
most effective means of resolving the problems addressed by this statute. 
Lantz, 186 Ill. 2d  at 254.
Arguing in support of the circuit court ruling, defendants reiterate that 
court's observation that the record is devoid of evidence defendants would have 
stopped in the protected zone around the church, or delivered drugs in the 
vicinity, had Officer Atchison not stopped them within the zone. They argue 
"because the subjective motivation of Atchison and not defendants' intentional 
conduct, determined the location and thus the nature of the offense, 'fair 
notice' of the unlawful conduct was not provided here." They contend that the 
statute allows for arbitrary enforcement of the law. Defendants conclude that 
the purpose of the statute, "to deter drug sales in these zones," is not served 
in the instant case, "because defendants' [sic] had not intended to 
stop in the zone or commit a crime there." We find merit in neither the 
defendants' due process arguments, nor in the circuit court's analysis.
First, the statute is not vague. Section 401 of the Act proscribes four 
separate acts, making it "unlawful for any person knowingly to manufacture or 
deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled or 
counterfeit substance or controlled substance analog." 720 ILCS 570/401 (West 
1998). A person who commits any one of those acts "on any public way within 
1,000 feet of the real property comprising any church [or other specified 
locations] *** is guilty of a Class X felony." 720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1) (West 
1998). The statutory scheme contemplates a two-part analysis: Has defendant 
committed an offense set forth in section 401? If so, did the offense take place 
within one of the protected zones enumerated in section 407(b)(1)? The conduct 
prohibited by section 401 is clearly defined. Defendants cite no case authority 
holding section 401 vague, nor do they even argue to that effect. Moreover, 
there is no mistaking that enhancement to a Class X felony will result if the 
conduct proscribed in section 401 is committed within one of the protected zones 
enumerated in section 407(b)(1). That determination is merely a matter of 
measurement. We find the statute's prohibitions are sufficiently definite to 
give fair warning as to what conduct is prohibited, and they provide adequate 
standards for law enforcement officers and triers of fact in the application of 
its provisions. See Warren, 173 Ill. 2d  at 356.
Second, implicit in the ruling of the circuit court, and in defendants' 
position, is the conclusion that a defendant who possesses drugs with an intent 
to deliver, but who does not intend to consummate a drug transaction within the 
protected zone, is not subject to a Class X felony under section 407(b)(1), that 
application of the statute's enhancing provisions to those facts does not serve 
the purpose of the statute. In support of that conclusion, the court found, and 
defendants argue, that the act of the police officer in stopping defendants' 
vehicle within the protected zone somehow created an offense, or an enhancing 
circumstance, which otherwise would not have existed. We find nothing of merit 
in either proposition.
To read the statutes so as to require an intent to actually consummate a 
delivery within the protected zone would entail insertion of language into the 
statutes which the legislature has not seen fit to include. The legislature 
could have specified that a defendant who possesses a controlled substance with 
intent to deliver must intend to actually deliver it within 
the protected zone; however, the legislature apparently chose a different 
course. That the legislature did chose a different course is evident 
when we examine the remaining proscriptions of the statute-the ones defendants 
have conveniently ignored. In addition to delivery and possession with intent to 
deliver, section 401 also prohibits "manufacture" and "possession with intent to 
manufacture." Those offenses can also be committed within the protected zone 
without any intent to actually deliver within the zone. If the 
legislature meant only to punish those who have delivered within the 
zone, and those who have a present intent to conduct drug transactions there, 
the prohibitions against manufacture and possession with intent to manufacture 
would seem to be superfluous, since the mere presence of drug traffickers and 
quantities of drugs would not inevitably lead to deliveries within the 
protected zone. Clearly, it was the presence of both drug traffickers 
and quantities of drugs that the legislature sought to discourage in these 
sensitive areas. Their mere presence makes it more likely that drug 
deliveries will take place in the zone, whether or not deliveries are initially 
intended there.
We cannot say that the legislature's determination in this regard is 
irrational. To the contrary, it follows logically that the presence of drug 
traffickers and quantities of drugs in these areas is likely to result in an 
increase of drug transactions with all their attendant evils. Nor can we say 
that the decision to single out certain areas for protection is arbitrary 
because each of the protected zones specified in section 407 appears to 
correspond to a segment of our society which may well be considered particularly 
vulnerable and less able to protect itself from the incursions of drug 
trafficking. Generally speaking, schools, public housing, parks, places of 
worship, nursing homes, assisted-living centers, and senior citizens are 
frequented by those who may be least able or willing to deal with drug 
trafficking and the crimes associated with it. Whether by virtue of the 
recklessness and inexperience of youth, the deprivations and disappointments of 
poverty, the lowering of defenses associated with relaxation and recreation, the 
beliefs and ideals of worship, or the infirmity of age, each of the groups 
normally associated with the protected zones may be less able or willing to 
protect itself. There is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in the legislature's 
use of the police power to protect those citizens most vulnerable and in need of 
protection.
Nor do we find the "locus" of the traffic stop in this case in any way 
relevant to the constitutional issue that confronted the circuit court. If, as 
alleged, defendants possessed cocaine with intent to deliver, at a time when 
they passed through the protected zone, then the enhanced sentencing provisions 
of section 407 apply to them. The officer conducting surveillance could have 
followed them to their destination and arrested them there. The statute would 
still apply to defendants so long as they concurrently possessed cocaine with 
intent to deliver, and at a time when they were within a protected zone. It does 
not matter that defendants' entry into the protected zone may have been 
transient. The sequencing of the statutory scheme does not require that the 
underlying offense commence or terminate within the zone. Nor does it matter 
that defendants may not have intended to make a delivery within the zone. 
Indeed, it would be reasonable to presume that persons possessed of both the 
intent to deliver and a quantity of drugs, packaged in a manner ready for retail 
distribution, would not be adverse to transacting business within a protected 
zone through which they are passing if a willing buyer appears on the scene. The 
likelihood of a delivery within the zone is thus increased by the mere presence 
of drugs and drug traffickers.
Defendants argue that the police could "deliberately arrange a drug 
transaction within 1000 feet of a 'safety zone', in order to effect an enhanced 
penalty." However, these defendants do not contend that they were lured into the 
zone. From the facts stipulated, it appears that they entered voluntarily 
without the encouragement of law officers. The defendants' conduct brought them 
within the express terms of the statute, not within the hypothetical posed. 
Thus, they do not have standing to challenge the statute as it might be applied 
to others in different circumstances. People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 232 (1995); People v. Blackorby, 146 Ill. 2d 307, 320-21 (1992). 
Section 407 affords these defendants fair warning of what conduct is prohibited; 
it provides adequate standards for law enforcement officers and triers of fact 
in the application of its provisions; and it constitutes a legitimate exercise 
of the police power. It comports with due process standards and the circuit 
court erred in ruling otherwise.
Defendants, noting that it is the correctness of the circuit court's ruling, 
not its reasoning, which must be reviewed (People v. Nash, 173 Ill. 2d 423, 432 (1996)), raise an alternative theory in support of that ruling. They 
argue that section 407(b)(1) is unconstitutional because it violates the 
establishment clauses of both the first amendment to the United States 
Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. I) and the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 
1970, art. I, §3).
The establishment clause of the first amendment (U.S. Const., amend. I) 
prohibits state and federal action "favoring the tenets or adherents of any 
religion or of religion over nonreligion." McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 638, 55 L. Ed. 2d 593, 608, 98 S. Ct. 1322, 1334 (1978) (Brennan, J., 
concurring, joined by Marshall, J.); In re Marriage of Zucco, 150 Ill. 
App. 3d 146, 154 (1986). Our own state constitution provides in pertinent part 
that "[n]o person shall be required to attend or support any ministry or place 
of worship against his consent, nor shall any preference be given by law to any 
religious denomination or mode of worship." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §3. The 
restrictions of the Illinois Constitution concerning the establishment of 
religion have been held to be identical to those imposed by the first amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States. People ex rel. Klinger v. 
Howlett, 56 Ill. 2d 1, 3-4 (1973). Thus, any statute which is valid under 
the first amendment is also valid under the Constitution of Illinois. 
Howlett, 56 Ill. 2d  at 4.
In determining whether government action offends the establishment clause 
courts have continued to apply the essential elements of the tripartite test 
established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745, 91 S. Ct. 2105 (1971) (see Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232, 138 L. Ed. 2d 391, 420, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2015 (1997)), notwithstanding the United States 
Supreme Court's professed "unwillingness to be confined to any single test or 
criterion" (Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679, 79 L. Ed. 2d 604, 
613, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1362 (1984)), and its periodic criticism of the test 
itself (see Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. 
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 129 L. Ed. 2d 546, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994); Lamb's 
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384, 124 L. Ed. 2d 352, 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993)). Nonetheless, it is obvious from a reading 
of Agostini that the United States Supreme Court has not abandoned 
Lemon. The parties in this case cite Lemon as the applicable 
test and we find it both applicable and useful in lieu of a viable, structured, 
alternative analysis. Under Lemon, to pass constitutional muster, a 
statute's legislative purpose must be secular, its principal or primary effect 
cannot advance or inhibit religion, and it must not foster an excessive 
governmental entanglement with religion. Lemon, 403 U.S.  at 612-13, 29 L. Ed. 2d  at 755, 91 S. Ct.  at 2111; Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 
222-23, 232, 138 L. Ed. 2d 391, 414, 420, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2010, 2015 (1997); 
Pre-School Owners Ass'n of Illinois, Inc. v. Department of Children &amp; 
Family Services, 119 Ill. 2d 268, 279 (1988).
Defendants first argue that the statute does not serve a legitimate secular 
purpose. They arrive at that conclusion having begun from a snippet of 
"legislative history," a brief discussion among four state representatives 
during which one indicated that religious leaders and mayors in his district 
were concerned about drug trafficking around churches, another asked if studies 
had been done on the efficacy of an analogous enactment, the "Safe School Zone 
Law," in deterring crime in the vicinity of schools, a third suggested that 
enactment of that measure had not deterred crime in school zones, and a fourth 
asked if drug trafficking around churches was really a problem. Defendants do 
not offer us any insight into the thoughts of the 114 remaining representatives, 
or the 59 members of the senate, all of whom had a vote to cast when this 
legislation was passed and enacted into law. In any event, from this meager 
empirical and rhetorical premise, defendants conclude that legislators knew "the 
Safe School Zone enhanced penalty provision ha[d] not deterred drug transactions 
near schools," and that "the church safe zone enhanced penalty would not effect 
its stated purpose" either, and defendants surmise that there was no "actual 
problem with drug transactions near churches," ergo, the legislature "was not 
addressing a legitimate societal problem; rather, the legislature sought merely 
to assuage the religious community in Representative Jones' district."
Consideration of the statutory scheme of section 407, and its component 
parts, belies defendants' contention. As touched upon earlier, in the due 
process segment of our analysis, we find section 407's enhanced penalty 
provisions are obviously intended to protect segments of our society which may 
well be considered particularly vulnerable and less able to deal with the 
incursions of drug trafficking and its related evils. The unifying factor is 
vulnerability, not religion. The secular purpose of the statute is to "deter 
narcotics activity" (Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d at 503), protecting those 
the legislature deemed in need of protection through harsher punishment for drug 
traffickers who commit certain offenses within close proximity of sensitive 
areas where the vulnerable population may be located. As noted in People v. 
Carter, 228 Ill. App. 3d 526, 534-35 (1992), "Places of worship reach out 
and extend an invitation to the public; doors are unlocked; security is 
relaxed." The very ideals of those who worship there can make them vulnerable in 
the same sense that school children, the poor, and the aged may be at risk. 
Religion has not been singled out for special treatment. We can discern a 
broad-based secular purpose from the face of the statute; we need not, as 
defendants suggest, inquire into the irrelevant motives of those who enacted it. 
See Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249, 110 L. Ed. 2d 191, 215, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2371 (1990). A statute will be invalidated on the 
ground that a secular purpose is lacking only where there is no question that 
the statute or activity was motivated wholly by religious considerations. 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680, 79 L. Ed. 2d 604, 614, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1362 (1984).
Defendants claim that the statute violates the second prong of the 
Lemon test because its primary effect is to advance religion. We 
disagree. Defendants surely argue tongue in cheek when they state: "The statute 
confers a benefit on an explicitly religious basis by extending to clergy and 
worshippers governmental protection given to no other class of people, save 
students, teachers, and public housing residents." (Emphasis added.) 
Defendants omit school bus drivers, anyone out for a stroll through a public 
park, senior citizens, residents in nursing homes, and workers in all of the 
aforementioned facilities. Defendant's assertion is baseless. Neither the 
purpose of the statute nor its primary effect is the advancement of religion. 
Defendants' contention that the statute is meant to protect religious-related 
structures, buildings and real property is no more convincing for similar 
reasons.
Defendants attempt to meet the third prong of the Lemon test by 
claiming that uncertainty over the definition of a "place of worship," as used 
in the statute, may create excessive governmental entanglements between church 
and state. Defendants suggest that courts may have to decide what constitutes 
religious worship.
Defendants pose an interesting hypothetical wherein pagan worshipers gather 
in an abandoned barn to sacrifice a cat while a defendant delivers cocaine to an 
undercover officer outside. Is the barn a "place of worship?" They raise another 
wherein the Old Order Amish worship in their homes and barns. Defendants ask if 
either of those sites would constitute a "place used primarily for religious 
worship" within the meaning of the statute. As intriguing as those questions may 
be to defendants, they do not apply to defendants' circumstances. Defendants do 
not contest that they were within 1,000 feet of "a church." They stipulated to 
that effect. For purposes of our analysis here, we need not address the issue of 
what constitutes a "place of worship." That term, as it is employed in the 
statute, is neutral as to denomination and expansive in its scope, as the 
legislature no doubt intended. We assume, as the Supreme Court did in Larkin 
v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 120 n.3, 74 L. Ed. 2d 297, 303 n.3, 
103 S. Ct. 505, 509 n.3 (1982), that courts will construe the term in its 
broadest sense, so as to avoid "serious constitutional questions."
Defendants have not met the standards of the Lemon test and, 
consequently, have not shown that the statute violates the establishment clause. 
Since we have already determined that the circuit court erred when it ruled that 
the statute fails to comport with due process, we reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court and remand this matter for further proceedings.
Circuit court judgment reversed;
cause remanded.
JUSTICE BILANDIC, dissenting:
This court has no jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal. This appeal should 
therefore be dismissed, and the cause should be transferred to the appellate 
court.
In Rehg v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 152 Ill. 2d 504, 508-09 
(1992), this court noted that a circuit court order holding only that a 
statute is unconstitutional "as applied" in a particular case is not directly 
appealable to this court under Supreme Court Rule 302(a)(1). In People v. 
Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d 1, 8-10 (1999), a majority of this court overruled 
Rehg and determined that this court has jurisdiction over all appeals 
from circuit court orders holding statutes unconstitutional, even if the circuit 
court declares the statute unconstitutional only as applied to that case. I 
dissented in Fuller, and I continue to adhere to the rationale set 
forth in that dissent. See Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d  at 21-24 (Bilandic, J., 
dissenting). Here, the circuit court declared section 407(b)(1) to be 
"unconstitutionally vague with regard to the given facts, to wit: the triggering 
of the enhanced penalty do [sic] solely to police action in selecting 
the locus of the offense by a traffic stop." Because the circuit court held only 
that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to defendants in this case, the 
circuit court's order is not directly appealable to this court, and we therefore 
do not have jurisdiction over the State's appeal. For this reason, I 
respectfully dissent.
JUSTICE FREEMAN, also dissenting:
To deal effectively with its case load, this court must husband its time and 
resources properly. The majority ignores these realities. Its continued 
invocation of jurisdiction, where none exists, imposes an undue burden upon this 
court, and severely curtails the role of our appellate court in constitutional 
review. Jurisdiction is not appropriate in this case. Accordingly, I must 
dissent.
Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 603) provides:
Thus, with the exception of cases in which a defendant has been sentenced to 
death, the jurisdiction of this court in criminal cases is limited to appeals in 
which a statute of the United States or of Illinois has been held invalid.
This court has long recognized the distinction between a statute which is 
unconstitutional on its face and a statute which is unconstitutional as applied. 
When a statute is unconstitutional on its face, the statute is invalid from its 
inception and has no force and effect upon any person or entity. People v. 
Zeisler, 125 Ill. 2d 42 (1988); People v. Manuel, 94 Ill. 2d 242 
(1983); Van Driel Drug Store, Inc. v. Mahin, 47 Ill. 2d 378 (1970). In 
contrast, when a statute is unconstitutional as applied, the statute itself is 
not invalid; it is simply not applied to a particular person or entity because 
to do so would violate a constitutional right. See East St. Louis Federation 
of Teachers, Local 1220 v. East St. Louis School District No. 189 Financial 
Oversight Panel, 178 Ill. 2d 399 (1997); People v. Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d 201 (1992); see also 1 N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §2.06 
(5th ed. 1994). It follows that when a statute is declared unconstitutional on 
its face, the parties may appeal directly to this court under Rule 603. However, 
when a statute is found to be unconstitutional as applied, the statute has not 
been declared invalid and jurisdiction properly lies in the appellate court.
In the case at bar, a police officer observed defendants' vehicle exceed the 
speed limit, and stopped the vehicle on a public way within 1,000 feet of a 
church. The officer searched defendant Gabriella Falbe and found more than 70 
grams of cocaine on her person. Unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to 
deliver is a Class 1 felony. 720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 1998). However, if the 
conduct takes place within 1,000 feet of a church, the Class 1 felony is 
enhanced to a Class X felony. 720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1) (West 1998). Since 
defendants were apprehended within 1,000 feet of a church, they were charged 
with a Class X felony.
In the trial court, defendants argued that section 407(b)(1) was 
unconstitutional as applied. The trial court agreed. The court found that 
defendants' arrest near the church was "the direct result of police activity in 
a traffic stop without any showing that defendants started, stopped or 
ever intended to stop in the protected zone." (Emphasis in original.) The court 
ruled that "based on the facts in this case, the compelling state interest to 
enhance the penalty for drug delivery in specified protected zones is neither 
promoted or served."
The trial court declared section 407(b)(1) unconstitutional as applied, not 
invalid on its face. Indeed, in People v. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d 489 
(1992), this court upheld the constitutionality of section 1407(b)(1) (Ill. Rev. 
Stat. 1989, ch. 56½, par. 1407(b)(1), now codified at 720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1) 
(West 1998)) with respect to commission of drug crimes within 1,000 feet of 
public housing. See also People v. R. L., 158 Ill. 2d 432 (1994); 
People v. Brooks, 271 Ill. App. 3d 570 (1995). And in People v. 
Pacheco, 281 Ill. App. 3d 179 (1996), our appellate court upheld the 
validity of section 407(b)(1) with respect to commission of drug crimes within 
1,000 feet of school property. See also People v. Owens, 240 Ill. App. 
3d 168 (1992); People v. Clark, 231 Ill. App. 3d 571 (1992). Since 
section 407(b)(1) is constitutional on its face, but was declared invalid as 
applied, an appeal to the appellate court was appropriate.
As Justice McMorrow observed in her dissent in People v. Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d 1, 27-28 (1999) (McMorrow, J., dissenting), Rule 603 and Rule 302(a) 
(134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)) are:
On the other hand, a decision of the circuit court holding a statute 
unconstitutional as applied affects only the particular litigants and not the 
public at large. Such a decision is not infused with the sense of urgency and 
public importance which justify bypassing the normal appellate review process. 
I, for one, have faith in the ability of our appellate court judges to deal 
effectively with their jurisdictional case load. To invoke direct appellate 
jurisdiction, as the majority does in the present case, is to effectively 
curtail participation of the appellate court in the constitutional review 
process.
In his dissent in Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d  at 22, Justice Bilandic 
observed:
Justice McMorrow elaborated:
The majority is not justified in invoking jurisdiction in the present case. 
The appellate court should be given an opportunity to resolve constitutionality 
of the statute in question. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this dissent.