Title: People v. Lamborn
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 85210
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: February 19, 1999

People v. Lamborn (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket No. 85210-Agenda 
18-September 1998.
Opinion filed February 19, 
1999.
JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the 
court:
The issue in this case is whether five 
photographs are "lewd" for purposes of the Illinois child pornography statute. 
720 ILCS 5/11-20.1 (West 1996). We hold that two of the five photographs are 
lewd.
Following a bench trial in the circuit court of 
Woodford County, defendant, Robert Lamborn, was convicted of two counts of 
producing child pornography. 720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(1)(vii) (West 1996). 
Defendant was also convicted of three counts of possessing child pornography. 
720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(6) (West 1996). The trial court sentenced defendant to 
concurrent prison terms of 10 years for the two production counts and concurrent 
3-year prison terms for the three possession counts. The trial court also fined 
defendant $2,000 for each production conviction, and $1,000 for each possession 
conviction. See 720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(c) (West 1996). The appellate court affirmed 
all defendant's convictions and sentences. No. 4-97-0723 (unpublished order 
under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed defendant's petition for leave to 
appeal. See 166 Ill. 2d R. 315. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in 
part and reverse in part the judgment of the appellate court.
FACTS
Two 13-year-old female victims, herein referred 
to as "Y" and "Z," went on a camping trip with defendant. The victims were 
friends, and Y knew defendant through his granddaughter. Defendant stipulated at 
trial that he knew that both Y and Z were under the age of 18; that he possessed 
the photographs at issue; and that he was the photographer of three of the 
photographs, Exhibit Nos. 2, 3, and 4. The State introduced as evidence the five 
photographs, which were taken on the camping trip.
Exhibit No. 1 depicts defendant standing in 
knee-high water completely naked, revealing a partial erection. Defendant is 
grabbing Z by the shoulder with his left arm, and the palm of his right hand is 
on the top of Z's head. Z is bending over slightly, and her right arm is 
extended around defendant's waist. Z is wearing a bikini swimsuit, but the 
bikini top is pulled down to her stomach, revealing her breasts.
In Exhibit No. 2, Y and Z are standing next to 
each other in knee-high water with one arm wrapped around the other's shoulder. 
Y and Z are topless, holding their bikini tops at their sides with their free 
hands. Y and Z are wearing bikini bottoms.
Exhibit No. 3 depicts Z standing in knee-high 
water with her back to the camera and her hands on her hips. Z's bikini bottom 
is slightly pulled down, partially revealing her buttocks. Y is in the 
background, fully covered by her bikini.
In Exhibit No. 4, Z is standing in knee-high 
water with her back to the camera. Z's bikini bottom is slightly pulled down, 
partially revealing her buttocks. Y is crouched down in the water next to Z. Y 
is fully covered by her bikini.
Exhibit No. 5 depicts defendant standing in 
knee-high water, completely naked, revealing a partial erection. Defendant has 
his left arm draped across Y's back. Y's right arm is resting on defendant's 
right shoulder. Y's bikini top is pulled down to her stomach, revealing her 
breasts.
Defendant's two convictions for producing child 
pornography involve Exhibit Nos. 2, 3, and 4. These photographs do not include a 
depiction of defendant. Defendant's three convictions for possessing child 
pornography concern all five photographs.
ANALYSIS
The United States Supreme Court recognized child 
pornography as "a category of material outside the protection of the First 
Amendment" in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113, 
1126, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 3358 (1982). The reason underlying this holding is that 
the crime of child pornography is an offense against the child and causes harm 
"to the physiological, emotional, and mental health" of the child. 
Ferber, 458 U.S.  at 758, 73 L. Ed. 2d  at 1123, 102 S. Ct.  at 3355. 
These harms result from "the trespass against the dignity of the child." 
United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987), citing 
Ferber, 458 U.S.  at 758, 73 L. Ed. 2d  at 1123, 102 S. Ct.  at 3355. 
"Human dignity is offended by the pornographer. American law does not protect 
all human dignity; legally, an adult can consent to its diminishment. When a 
child is made the target of the pornographer-photographer, the statute will not 
suffer the insult to the human spirit, that the child should be treated as a 
thing." Wiegand, 812 F.2d  at 1245. Child pornography is particularly 
harmful because the child's actions are reduced to a recording which could haunt 
the child in future years, especially in light of the mass distribution system 
for child pornography. See Ferber, 458 U.S.  at 759, 73 L. Ed. 2d  at 
1124, 102 S. Ct.  at 3355-56.
Thus, in Ferber, the Court held that a 
state could, consistent with the first amendment to the United States 
Constitution, prohibit the dissemination of material which depicts children 
under the age of 16 engaged in sexual conduct, regardless of whether the 
depiction is legally "obscene." Ferber, 458 U.S.  at 756, 73 L. Ed. 2d  
at 1122, 102 S. Ct.  at 3354; see also People v. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d 313, 326-27 (1988) (holding that the State may, consistent with both the federal 
and Illinois constitutions, proscribe the knowing possession of child 
pornography in the home). The general obscenity standard enunciated in 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419, 93 S. Ct. 2607 
(1973), therefore, does not govern the determination of whether material is 
child pornography. Ferber, 458 U.S.  at 764, 73 L. Ed. 2d  at 1127, 102 S. Ct.  at 3358; Geever, 122 Ill. 2d  at 323-25. To determine what 
constitutes child pornography: "A trier of fact need not find that the material 
appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not required that 
sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive manner; and the 
material at issue need not be considered as a whole." Ferber, 458 U.S. 
at 764, 73 L. Ed. 2d  at 1127, 102 S. Ct.  at 3358. Nevertheless, a state's right 
to regulate child pornography is limited. The law must adequately define the 
prohibited conduct; the category of prohibited "sexual conduct" must be suitably 
limited and described; the offense must be limited to works that visually depict 
sexual conduct by children below a specified age; and an element of 
scienter on the part of the defendant must be a component of the 
offense. Ferber, 458 U.S.  at 764-65, 73 L. Ed. 2d  at 1127, 102 S. Ct. 
at 3358-59.
In accordance with the standards set forth in 
Ferber, a person commits the offense of child pornography in Illinois 
by photographing or possessing photographs of any child whom the person knows or 
reasonably should know to be under the age of 18 where such child is "depicted 
or portrayed in any pose, posture or setting involving a lewd 
exhibition of the unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or, if such 
person is female, a fully or partially developed breast of the child or other 
person." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(1)(vii), (a)(6) (West 1996). 
The meaning of the term "lewd exhibition" is a question of statutory 
construction which this court reviews de novo. See Lucas v. 
Lakin, 175 Ill. 2d 166, 171 (1997). Parenthetically, we agree with the 
dissent that, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, 
the proper standard of review is whether, after viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. 
Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). Here, however, we are interpreting 
the meaning of the statutory term "lewd exhibition." See 720 ILCS 
5/11-20.1(a)(1)(vii), (a)(6) (West 1996). We must review the photographs 
themselves and determine whether those photographs are lewd under the child 
pornography statute. We are not faced with reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence. Therefore, the de novo standard of review is the correct 
standard of review for this appeal.
In the present case, defendant argues that the 
five photographs depict mere nudity without lewdness and thus are not child 
pornography. Defendant asserts that if the subjects of the photographs were 
fully clothed, the photographs would be unremarkable. According to defendant, 
the photographs neither depict sexual activity nor focus on nudity. Rather, the 
photographs capture uninhibited adolescent spontaneity. We disagree with 
defendant as to Exhibit No. 1 and Exhibit No. 5 and hold that these two 
photographs are lewd under the child pornography statute. Both of the lewd 
photographs depict defendant posing completely naked in knee-high water, with 
his arm around a topless victim.
This court has not previously defined "lewd." 
Our appellate court in People v. Walcher, 162 Ill. App. 3d 455 (1987), 
defined "lewd" as" '[o]bscene, lustful, indecent, lascivious, lecherous.' " 
Walcher, 162 Ill. App. 3d at 460, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 817 
(5th ed. 1981). The Walcher court held that certain photographs were 
lewd under the former Illinois child pornography statute, which prohibited the 
visual depiction of a minor in a pose involving a lewd exhibition of the 
genitals (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 11-20.1(a)(1)(vii)). 
Walcher, 162 Ill. App. 3d at 460-62. In finding the photographs lewd, 
the Walcher court reasoned that the central focus of the photographs 
was to exhibit and emphasize the genitals of young girls. Walcher, 162 
Ill. App. 3d at 461. The photographs were "obviously intended to excite sexual 
desire" and were "not simply incidental pictures of partial nudity." 
Walcher, 162 Ill. App. 3d at 461.
Likewise, in People v. Johnson, 186 
Ill. App. 3d 116, 121-22 (1989), the appellate court applied the 
Walcher court's definition of lewd in determining that photographs 
displaying the genitals of young girls and boys were lewd. The Johnson 
court noted that the photographs did not merely capture an "uninhibited moment 
of adolescent spontaneity." Johnson, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 122. Rather, 
the children were staged in erotic poses that provided an unobstructed view of 
the subjects' genitals, buttocks, and breasts. Johnson, 186 Ill. App. 
3d at 121-22.
Similarly, other courts have considered the 
following factors in assessing whether a visual depiction of a child constitutes 
the lascivious or lewd exhibition of the genitals: (1) whether the focal point 
of the visual depiction is on the child's genitals; (2) whether the setting of 
the visual depiction is sexually suggestive, i.e., in a place or pose 
generally associated with sexual activity; (3) whether the child is depicted in 
an unnatural pose, or in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child; 
(4) whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or nude; (5) whether the 
visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual 
activity; and (6) whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit 
a sexual response in the viewer. See, e.g., United States v. 
Wolf, 890 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Rubio, 834 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 
1987); United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986), 
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th 
Cir. 1987); People v. Kongs, 30 Cal. App. 4th 174, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 327 
(1995); State v. Gates, 182 Ariz. 459, 897 P.2d 1345 (App. 1994); see 
also People v. Hebel, 174 Ill. App. 3d 1, 20-22 (1988) (applying these 
six factors in determining that a search warrant was supported by probable cause 
to believe photographs in the defendant's possession constituted evidence of 
child pornography), overruled in part on other grounds, People v. 
Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d 187 (1994). The visual depiction need not involve all 
of these factors to be considered lewd. Villard, 885 F.2d  at 122; 
Hebel, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 20. Rather, the determination of whether the 
visual depiction is lewd will involve an analysis of the overall content of the 
depiction, taking into account the age of the minor. Villard, 885 F.2d  
at 122; Hebel, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 20. This determination must 
therefore be made on a case-by-case basis.
Exhibit Nos. 2, 3, and 4
Considering the overall content of Exhibit Nos. 
2, 3, and 4 in light of the preceding discussion, we hold that these three 
photographs are not lewd. Exhibit No. 2 depicts the topless victims standing 
next to each other in knee-high water with one arm wrapped around the other's 
shoulder. The victims are holding their bikini tops at their sides with their 
free hands. This photograph merely displays two teenage girls revealing their 
breasts while swimming together. Although nothing in this photograph detracts 
the viewer's attention from the nudity, the photograph does not depict the 
victims in sexually suggestive poses, and the victims are not necessarily in 
inappropriate attire, considering their age. This photograph is best described 
as capturing an uninhibited moment of adolescent spontaneity, in which two 
teenage girls whimsically pull off their bikini tops while swimming 
together.
Likewise, although the buttocks of one of the 
victims is partially revealed in Exhibit Nos. 3 and 4, the focus of these 
photographs is not on the victim's buttocks. Exhibit Nos. 3 and 4 depict the two 
victims together in the water. In both photographs, one of the victims is fully 
covered by her bikini, and the other victim has her back to the camera with her 
bikini bottom pulled down, partially revealing her buttocks. The second victim, 
fully covered by her bikini, is also in both of the photographs, thereby 
detracting the viewer's attention from the nudity. The victims are also not in 
sexually suggestive poses. In fact, the victims are not in any pose. Rather, the 
victims are talking while standing in the water and appear to be cleaning sand 
out of their swimsuits. Exhibit Nos. 3 and 4, therefore, merely reveal 
incidental pictures of partial nudity. Nudity without lewdness is not child 
pornography.
The State argues that we should consider that 
trial evidence indicated that it was defendant's idea for the victims to get 
undressed. The State also argues that we should consider the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the taking of these photographs, e.g., that 
defendant abused his position of supervision and trust over the victims by 
offering the victims cigarettes and alcohol while on the camping trip; and that 
the victims suffered severe emotional harm as a result of the photographs. It is 
the State's contention that we should apply a subjective standard in determining 
whether material is lewd for purposes of the child pornography statute. We 
disagree. Courts should apply an objective standard in determining whether 
material is child pornography. Accordingly, application of the sixth factor, 
i.e., whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a 
sexual response in the viewer, refers to the objective 
viewer.
Thus, whether defendant was aroused by the 
photographs is irrelevant in determining whether the photographs are lewd. A 
determination that a photograph constitutes child pornography focuses on the 
photograph itself, not on the effect that the photograph has on an individual 
viewer. See Villard, 885 F.2d  at 125. "Although it is tempting to judge 
the actual effect of the photographs on the viewer, we must focus 
instead on the intended effect on the viewer." (Emphasis in original.) 
Villard, 885 F.2d  at 125. "Private fantasies" are not within the ambit 
of the child pornography statute. See Villard, 885 F.2d  at 125; 
Wiegand, 812 F.2d  at 1245. Therefore, pictures of nude children do not 
necessarily become child pornography when they reach the hands of a pedophile. 
See Villard, 885 F.2d  at 125; Wiegand, 812 F.2d  at 1245. 
Accordingly, a defendant's intent does not create a lewd exhibition out of the 
otherwise innocent activity of children. See Gates, 182 Ariz. at 463, 
897 P.2d  at 1349.
From an objective viewpoint, Exhibit Nos. 2, 3, 
and 4 cannot be deemed to be intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in 
the viewer. These photographs depict the incidental nudity of two teenage girls 
who are swimming together in a river. The photographs show the teenagers engaged 
in nonsexual conduct that is not necessarily abnormal for the age and activity 
being photographed. Although we abhor defendant's exploitation of the victims in 
this case, an objective review of Exhibit Nos. 2, 3, and 4 reveals that these 
photographs are not lewd for purposes of the child pornography 
statute.
Exhibit Nos. 1 and 5
Considering the overall content of Exhibit Nos. 
1 and 5, we hold that these two photographs are lewd. Both of the photographs 
depict defendant standing completely naked in knee-high water with his arm 
around a topless victim. The focus of the photographs is on the nudity contained 
therein. Although the pictures also reveal the river and background trees, 
defendant and the victims are posed directly in front of the camera. Nothing in 
the photographs detracts from the view of the victims' breasts and defendant's 
genitals.
These photographs are not simply incidental 
pictures of partial nudity. The photographs reveal that defendant and the 
victims did not accidentally or suddenly lose their clothes. Defendant is 
completely naked, and his clothes are nowhere in sight. The tops of the victims' 
bikinis are deliberately pulled down to the bottom of their stomachs so as to 
reveal their breasts.
Further, the victims are depicted in an 
unnatural pose and in inappropriate attire. The topless 13-year-old victims are 
standing next to the completely naked 61-year-old defendant. In both 
photographs, defendant has a partial erection and is holding the victims in such 
a way as to draw them closer to him. In Exhibit No. 1, defendant is grabbing the 
victim by the shoulder with his left arm, and the palm of his right hand is on 
the top of the victim's head. Defendant appears to be pushing the victim 
downward. In Exhibit No. 5, defendant's left arm is draped across the victim's 
back, and his left hand is resting below the victim's breast. The bikini tops of 
both of the victims are pulled down to their stomachs, thereby exposing their 
breasts to the camera. These photographs certainly do not capture uninhibited 
adolescent spontaneity. The photographs depict the victims in poses involving a 
lewd exhibition of defendant's unclothed penis and of the victims' unclothed 
partially developed breasts. Defendant, therefore, possessed photographs that 
are lewd under our child pornography statute.
The dissent contends that our holding that 
Exhibit No. 2 is not lewd conflicts with our holding that Exhibit Nos. 1 and 5 
are lewd. The dissent's rationale is flawed. First, the dissent states that 
there is no material difference between the depiction of the victims in Exhibit 
No. 2 and the depiction of the victims in Exhibit Nos. 1 and 5, which we find to 
constitute child pornography. In support, the dissent reasons merely that the 
victims are topless in all three of these photographs. A proper determination of 
whether a photograph is lewd, however, requires a review of the overall content 
of the photograph. As we discussed in detail above, the overall content of the 
photographs demonstrates that Exhibit No. 2 is not lewd under our child 
pornography statute, and that Exhibit Nos. 1 and 5 are lewd.
Next, the dissent claims that we erroneously 
rely upon the fact that Exhibit Nos. 1 and 5 involve a lewd exhibition of 
defendant's unclothed penis, and of the victims' unclothed breasts. The 
dissent asserts that an adult's nudity is not covered by the child pornography 
statute. This statement is not correct to the extent that it finds defendant's 
nudity in the photographs to be irrelevant. Certainly, Exhibit Nos. 1 and 5 
would not constitute child pornography if they did not contain a child. Exhibit 
Nos. 1 and 5, however, each contain a depiction of a young victim baring her 
unclothed breasts. In addition, Exhibit Nos. 1 and 5 depict the defendant, 
totally nude, revealing his unclothed genitals, and with his arm around a 
topless victim. Defendant's presence in the photographs is a factor that 
supports our holding that Exhibit Nos. 1 and 5 are lewd.
Finally, the dissent questions our holding that 
Exhibit No. 2 is not lewd, given that we note our abhorrence with defendant's 
exploitation of the victims. As we previously stated, though, courts must apply 
an objective standard of review in determining whether material constitutes 
child pornography. Application of this objective standard requires us to focus 
on the photograph itself, and not on the circumstances surrounding the taking of 
the photograph, at which our comment is directed.
CONCLUSION
Exhibit Nos. 2, 3, and 4 are not lewd under our 
child pornography statute. Accordingly, we reverse defendant's convictions and 
vacate his sentences and fines on counts II and V for producing child 
pornography. We also reverse defendant's conviction and vacate his sentence and 
fine on count VI for possessing child pornography. Exhibit Nos. 1 and 5, 
however, are lewd under our child pornography statute. We therefore affirm 
defendant's convictions on counts III and IV for possessing child pornography. 
Defendant's concurrent three-year prison terms and fines for these two 
possession counts are affirmed. The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed 
in part and reversed in part.
Affirmed in 
part;
reversed in 
part;
sentences vacated in 
part.
JUSTICE RATHJE took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case.
JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
Defendant was convicted of two counts of 
producing child pornography (720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(1)(vii) (West 1996)) and 
three counts of possessing it (720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(6) (West 1996)) on the 
basis of five Polaroid photographs he took of two 13-year-old girls at a 
campsite near the Mackinaw River. The trial court sentenced defendant to 
concurrent prison terms of 10 years for the two production counts and 3 years 
for the possession counts.
Curiously, the prosecutor separated the five 
photographs into the two separate categories of production and possession for 
purposes of prosecution. The production charges were directed at the two 
Polaroid photos he personally took with the camera. The three possession charges 
were directed at the Polaroid photos in which he posed with one of the girls 
while the other girl snapped the picture. In truth, he could as well have been 
charged with both possession and production as to all of the photographs since 
this episode was a single frolic while two 13-year-old girls were in his 
custody.
The majority, applying a de novo 
standard of review, affirms defendant's convictions for possession of child 
pornography, but reverses his convictions for production of child pornography 
based solely on its own belief that the three photographs which form the basis 
for his production convictions are not "lewd" under the child pornography 
statute. A de novo standard of review, however, is inappropriate when 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a child pornography case. Moreover, 
one of the photographs in this case, State's Exhibit No. 2, could be deemed 
sufficient to support at least one of defendant's convictions for production of 
child pornography. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The majority is undoubtedly correct that this 
court will review questions of statutory construction, such as the meaning of 
the term "lewd exhibition" in the child pornography statute, under a de 
novo standard of review. Slip op. at 4. The de novo standard of 
review, however, is completely inappropriate when this court reviews the 
sufficiency of the evidence in a child pornography case. No statute has been 
cited which requires interpretation by this court. Once the trier of fact makes 
a factual determination that the photographs in question depict the victims in 
poses which focus on their breasts and buttocks and are obviously intended to 
excite sexual desire, this court has no authority to substitute its own judgment 
for that of the trier of fact.(1) 
See People v. Harre, 155 Ill. 2d 392, 398 (1993). Rather, this court, 
as a court of review, must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. 
Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d 24, 43 (1997).
When the correct standard of review is applied, 
State's Exhibit No. 2 is more than sufficient to support one of defendant's 
convictions for production of child pornography. State's Exhibit No. 2 does not 
depict the victims swimming or frolicking in the river, as the majority 
fancifully suggests. The topless 13-year-old children are posed, standing arm in 
arm and smiling coyly at the camera as they dangle the tops of their bikinis 
from their hands. The photograph depicts the victims performing a striptease, 
and the sexual content of the photograph is obvious. The majority's statement 
that it finds nothing "necessarily abnormal" about this "whimsical," 
"uninhibited display of adolescent spontaneity" is inexplicable. How can the 
majority justify its holding when it also proclaims,"[W]e abhor defendant's 
exploitation of the victims in this case"? Slip op. at 7.
Moreover, there is no material difference 
between the depiction of the victims in State's Exhibit No. 2 and State's 
Exhibit Nos. 1 and 5, which the majority agrees constitute child pornography. 
Thus, the majority's assertion that the victims are "not necessarily in 
inappropriate attire" in State's Exhibit No. 2 is self-contradictory. The 
victims are wearing exactly the same attire in State's Exhibit Nos. 1 and 5 as 
in State's Exhibit No. 2. In all three photographs, the victims are wearing 
bikinis and have removed their bikini tops to reveal their breasts. The only 
difference between State's Exhibit No. 2 and State's Exhibit Nos. 1 and 5 is 
that the victims are posed together rather than with defendant. While the 
presence of the nude defendant in State's Exhibit Nos. 1 and 5 is an obvious 
indicator that those photographs are "intended to excite sexual desire," his 
absence from the photograph in State's Exhibit No. 2 does not alter the 
comparable depiction of the children, nor does it somehow strip State's Exhibit 
No. 2 of its sexual content.(2)
It has been said that bad cases make bad law. 
This is just such a case. What the court is really choking on here is the 
10-year sentence meted out to this defendant on the production of child 
pornography charge. The range of sentences for this conviction is 4 to 15 years. 
720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(c) (West 1996); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(4) (West 1996). The range 
of sentences for the possession charge at the time of defendant's sentencing was 
one to three years.(3) 
720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(c) (West 1996); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(7) (West 1996). Defendant 
received a three-year sentence on that charge, which the majority is willing to 
affirm.
Parenthetically, a reasonable person would 
likely conclude that production of child pornography as defined in the statute 
is aimed most strongly at the person who is producing child pornography for 
purposes of distribution and use that is broader than the mere posing and 
snapping of a picture which the defendant did in this case. Hence, the shock to 
the majority of a 10-year sentence where the permissible range of sentences is 4 
to 15 years is understandable.
Yet, instead of opting to merely reduce the 
sentence, the majority opts to overthrow the accepted standard of review and 
erroneously asserts an improper a de novo standard. This approach, 
which overthrows the accepted and long-standing standard of review, creates a 
new and unfortunate standard simply to reach a desired result. This is a clear 
example of result-oriented decisionmaking which is improper and has long been 
rightfully condemned. The majority opinion thus distorts the law and clearly 
implies that the personal predilections of the individual members of this court, 
not reason and precedent, guide this court's decisionmaking.
Shocked at the lengthy sentence, the only 
correct and intellectually honest approach for the majority would have been to 
reduce the 10-year sentence, an approach that is legally acceptable and within 
the province of this court under Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4). See People v. 
O'Neal, 125 Ill. 2d 291, 298 (1988). For the reasons given, I respectfully 
dissent.
Footnotes
1. This court has applied a de novo 
standard of review when determining whether materials are obscene under the test 
established by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973). See City of Chicago v. 
Kimmel, 31 Ill. 2d 202, 207-08 (1964); City of Chicago v. Universal 
Publishing &amp; Distributing Co., 34 Ill. 2d 250, 252 (1966); City of 
Chicago v. Geraci, 46 Ill. 2d 576, 578 (1970). This standard of review is 
inappropriate in this case for two reasons. First, the Miller obscenity 
standard does not apply to child pornography. People v. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d 313, 320 (1988). Child pornography cases do not require a determination 
whether the work in question, taken as a whole, has serious literary, artistic, 
political or scientific value. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d  at 320. Second, this 
case does not involve an issue of constitutional interpretation. Defendant does 
not allege that the photographs he produced and possessed are constitutionally 
protected. A de novo standard of review was appropriate in the 
obscenity cases because the defendants argued the materials they possessed were 
protected under the first amendment, and this court had to make "an independent 
constitutional judgment as to whether the publications in issue are 
obscene or constitutionally protected." (Emphasis added.) Geraci, 46 Ill. 2d  at 578. This case, by contrast, begins and ends with a far more 
pedestrian inquiry: Are the photographs in question sexually suggestive? There 
is no constitutional question inherent in such an inquiry.
2. The majority emphasizes that State's Exhibit 
Nos. 1 and 5 "involv[e] a lewd exhibition of defendant's unclothed 
penis and of the victims' unclothed partially developed breasts." (Emphasis 
added.) Slip op. at 8. Defendant, however, is an adult, not a child, and his 
nudity is not covered by the child pornography statute.
3. After defendant's sentencing, the General 
Assembly increased possession of child pornography from a Class 4 felony to a 
Class 3 felony. See Pub. Act 90-68, §2, eff. July 8, 1997, codified at 720 ILCS 
5/11-20.1(c). The range of sentences for possession of child pornography is now 
to two to five years. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(6) (West 1996).