Title: Ronald A Jostock V Mayfield Township (Opinion - Leave Granted)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 165770
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 1, 2024

JOSTOCK v MAYFIELD TOWNSHIP 
 
Docket No. 165770.  Argued April 17, 2024 (Calendar No. 4).  Decided July 1, 2024. 
 
 
Ronald A. Jostock and Susan J. Jostock brought an action in the Lapeer Circuit Court 
against Mayfield Township, the Mayfield Township Board of Trustees, and A2B Properties, LLC, 
challenging under the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act (MZEA), MCL 125.3101 et seq., the 
township board’s decision to conditionally rezone property owned by A2B from Residential 
Agricultural District (R-1) to General Commercial District (C-2).  Consistently with principles 
central to Euclidean zoning, the township’s zoning ordinance, adopted in 1973, contains certain 
zoning districts and allows for certain uses in each zone; under the zoning ordinance, if a principal 
use is not expressly permitted in a particular zoning district, the use is prohibited.  Beginning in 
1968, the subject property was the location of the Lapeer International Dragway, and after the 
township’s zoning ordinance was adopted, the dragway operated as a lawful nonconforming use 
with limited hours of operation—a few hours a day for two days a week, plus some holidays.  In 
2018, A2B purchased the dragway, expanded the facilities, and increased its hours of operation.  
In 2019, in a separate action, other parties sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and the circuit 
court in that action entered a preliminary injunction limiting the hours in which the dragway could 
operate.  In May 2021, A2B filed a conditional-rezoning agreement with the township in 
accordance with the procedures set forth in MCL 125.3405, seeking to have the property rezoned 
to C-2, with limitations on when the dragway could operate.  Ultimately, the township board 
approved the conditional-rezoning agreement and conditionally rezoned the property as requested, 
subject to the terms of the conditional-rezoning agreement.  A2B then sought relief from the 
preliminary injunction issued in the other action, which the circuit court in that action denied.  
Thereafter, plaintiffs filed the instant action, seeking declaratory relief that the conditional 
rezoning was erroneous and injunctive relief to enjoin the conditional rezoning.  A2B and the 
township separately moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116 (C)(10).  The court, Nick 
O. Holowka, J., denied defendants’ motions.  Instead, the trial court granted declaratory relief to 
plaintiffs under MCR 2.116(I)(2) but denied plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.  In granting 
declaratory relief, the trial court noted that the rezoning was conditioned on A2B operating the 
dragway in a specified manner but that because operation of a dragway is not a permitted use in 
the C-2 district, A2B had erroneously bound itself to perform conditions it could not lawfully 
perform in that district.  On that basis, the trial court held that the conditional rezoning was invalid.  
The Court of Appeals, M. J. KELLY. P.J., and SWARTZLE and FEENEY, JJ., affirmed the trial court’s 
order, reasoning that the conditional-rezoning agreement was void because use as a dragway was 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth M. Welch 
Kyra H. Bolden 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Kathryn L. Loomis 
not an approved use for that area under the township’s zoning ordinance.  ___ Mich App ___ 
(June 1, 2023) (Docket No. 362635).  The Supreme Court granted A2B’s application for leave to 
appeal.  513 Mich 871 (2023). 
 
 
In a unanimous opinion by Justice VIVIANO the Supreme Court held: 
 
 
MCL 125.3405 of the MZEA allows a municipality to engage in conditional rezoning.  In 
that regard, MCL 125.3405(1) provides that an owner of land may voluntarily offer in writing, and 
the local unit of government may approve, certain use and development of the land as a condition 
to a rezoning of the land or an amendment to a zoning map.  In this case, the township’s zoning 
ordinance does not expressly address conditional rezoning or provide procedures to accomplish 
conditional rezoning.  The keystone of a conditional rezoning is that the conditions are voluntarily 
offered by the property owner in writing, and the local unit of government cannot require the 
landowner to offer conditions as a requirement of rezoning.  Conditional rezoning is a type of 
rezoning, and therefore, conditional rezoning is a legislative function, just as zoning and traditional 
rezoning are.  Reading MCL 125.3405(1) in context within the entire MZEA, conditional rezoning 
is invalid under MCL 125.3405(1) if the proposed use is not a permitted use—either by right or 
after special approval—within the proposed zoning district.  A2B’s assertion—that MCL 
125.3405(1) broadly grants local governments discretion to allow uses inconsistent with their 
zoning ordinances on a development-by-development basis, without being tied to any standards 
for approving the proposed use—was inconsistent with rules of statutory interpretation for several 
reasons.  First, that interpretation would render nugatory the phrase “as a condition to rezoning of 
the land or an amendment to a zoning map” in that the type of zoning district a property is 
conditionally rezoned to would be immaterial.  Second, A2B failed to read the provision in the 
context of the entire MZEA, and its interpretation was inconsistent with provisions of the 
township’s Euclidean-based zoning ordinance; i.e., that certain uses are allowed in some zones but 
not in others, and that if a use is not permitted in a zoning district, then it is prohibited in that 
district.  Finally, A2B’s interpretation would largely circumvent the need for use variances under 
MCL 125.3604 by allowing a property owner to avoid having to show that an unnecessary hardship 
exists to obtain a variance; and just because the township’s zoning ordinance does not allow for 
variances, it does not follow that the MZEA should be interpreted in a way that would circumvent 
the use-variance process.  Given the Court’s interpretation of MCL 125.3405—that conditional 
rezoning is invalid under MCL 125.3405(1) if the proposed use is not a permitted use, either by 
right or after special approval, within the proposed zoning district—whether the conditional 
rezoning in this case was valid depended on whether a dragway is a permitted use in the C-2 zoning 
district.  Because the parties did not specifically address this issue below, the judgments of the trial 
court and the Court of Appeals were vacated, and the case was remanded to the trial court for 
further proceedings.   
 
 
Vacated and remanded. 
 
FILED  July 1, 2024 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
RONALD A. JOSTOCK and SUSAN J. 
JOSTOCK, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
 
 
v 
No. 165770 
 
MAYFIELD TOWNSHIP and MAYFIELD 
TOWNSHIP BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 
 
 
Defendants, 
 
and 
 
A2B PROPERTIES, LLC, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
 
VIVIANO, J. 
At issue is whether Mayfield Township could conditionally rezone a property to 
allow the use of a dragway when a dragway is not otherwise a permitted use in the new 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Elizabeth T. Clement   
 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth M. Welch 
Kyra H. Bolden 
 
 
 
2 
 
zoning district.  We hold that a conditional rezoning is invalid under MCL 125.3405(1) if 
the proposed use is not a permitted use—either by right or after special approval—within 
the proposed zoning district.  Whether a dragway is a permitted use in the new zoning 
district was not an issue specifically addressed by the parties in the proceedings below, and 
we believe the trial court should have an opportunity to decide that issue with the benefit 
of our interpretation of MCL 125.3405(1).  Therefore, we vacate the judgments of the 
Lapeer Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals and remand to the Lapeer Circuit Court for 
further proceedings. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The property at issue is located in defendant Mayfield Township (hereinafter, “the 
Township”) and has been the location of the Lapeer International Dragway since 1968.  In 
1973, the Township adopted its current zoning ordinance.  The property is located in what 
the zoning ordinance designates as R-1 (Residential Agricultural District).  Thus, for 
decades the dragway operated as a lawful nonconforming use with limited hours—a few 
hours a day for two days a week, plus some holidays.1  In 2018, defendant A2B Properties, 
 
1 If a use exists at the time a zoning ordinance is enacted, that use may continue despite not 
conforming to the zoning ordinance.  See MCL 125.3208(1) (“If the use of a dwelling, 
building, or structure or of the land is lawful at the time of enactment of a zoning ordinance 
or an amendment to a zoning ordinance, then that use may be continued although the use 
does not conform to the zoning ordinance or amendment.”); Mayfield Township Zoning 
Ordinance, § 1502(2) (“Except as otherwise provided in this Section, any nonconforming 
lot, use, sign, or structure lawfully existing on the effective date of this Ordinance or 
subsequent amendment thereto may be continued so long as it remains otherwise lawful.  
There may be a change of tenancy, ownership, or management of any existing 
nonconforming uses of land, structure and land in combination.”). 
 
 
3 
 
LLC (hereinafter, “A2B”) purchased the dragway, expanded the facilities, and extended its 
hours of operation. 
In 2019, nearby landowners, who are not the plaintiffs in the present case, sued A2B 
and others in the Lapeer Circuit Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to abate 
what they characterized as a nuisance.  In 2019, the circuit court entered a preliminary 
injunction that limited the dragway’s hours of operation.  The court amended the 
preliminary injunction in 2020.  A2B sought leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, which 
denied leave for failure to persuade it of the need for immediate appellate review.  Neuhard 
v Mayfield Twp, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 17, 2020 
(Docket No. 354837). 
In May 2021, A2B filed a conditional-rezoning agreement with the Township, 
seeking to have the property rezoned to C-2 (General Commercial District), subject to 
limitations on the dragway’s hours and operations.  A public hearing was held before the 
 
However, the status as a nonconforming use means the property owner cannot 
expand that use without otherwise bringing the use into compliance with the zoning 
ordinance.  See Mayfield Township Zoning Ordinance, § 1502(3)(d)(1) (“No 
nonconforming use or structure shall be enlarged upon, expanded, or extended, including 
extension of hours of operation.  Normal maintenance and incidental repair of a 
nonconforming use shall be permitted, provided that this does not violate any other section 
of this Ordinance.”); see also Norton Shores v Carr, 81 Mich App 715, 720; 265 NW2d 
802 (1978) (“It is the law of Michigan that the continuation of a nonconforming use must 
be substantially of the same size and same essential nature as the use existing at the time 
of passage of a valid zoning ordinance.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
In separate litigation that is still ongoing, plaintiffs contend that the dragway’s status 
as a lawful nonconforming use was terminated because of destruction.  For purposes of this 
opinion, we take no position as to whether the dragway lost its status as a lawful 
nonconforming use. 
 
4 
 
Township’s planning commission (hereinafter, “the Township Planning Commission”), 
which recommended that the Township’s board of trustees (hereinafter, “the Township 
Board”) approve the conditional-rezoning agreement.  A public hearing was held before 
the Township Board, which voted to approve the conditional-rezoning agreement and 
conditionally rezoned the property to C-2 subject to the terms of the conditional-rezoning 
agreement. 
Once the conditional rezoning became effective, A2B filed a motion in the circuit 
court action, seeking relief from the preliminary injunction.  The circuit court denied the 
motion, holding that because dragway operations are not a permitted use in the C-2 district, 
the conditional rezoning was invalid.  The circuit court denied A2B’s motion for 
reconsideration, and the Court of Appeals denied leave for failure to persuade it of the need 
for immediate appellate review.  Neuhard v New Lapeer Int’l Dragway, unpublished order 
of the Court of Appeals, entered February 2, 2022 (Docket No. 359146).2 
In July 2021, plaintiffs in the present case, Ronald and Susan Jostock, who live near 
the dragway, sued A2B, the Township, and the Township Board.  Plaintiffs sought 
declaratory relief that the conditional rezoning was erroneous and sought injunctive relief 
to enjoin the conditional rezoning.3  A2B and the Township filed separate motions for 
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).  The trial court denied those motions, 
instead granting declaratory relief to plaintiffs under MCR 2.116(I)(2); it denied plaintiffs’ 
 
2 As of the time the parties filed their briefs in this Court, that case remained pending in 
the Lapeer Circuit Court. 
3 They also appealed the Township Board’s conditional-rezoning decision but later dropped 
that claim. 
 
5 
 
request for injunctive relief.  The trial court noted that the rezoning was conditioned on 
A2B operating the dragway in a specified manner.  But because operation of a dragway is 
not a permitted use in the C-2 district, A2B had bound itself to perform conditions it could 
not lawfully perform.  As a result, the trial court concluded that the conditional rezoning 
was invalid. 
A2B appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a unanimous 
opinion.  Jostock v Mayfield Twp, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (June 1, 2023) 
(Docket No. 362635); slip op at 1, 6.  The Court of Appeals first noted that plaintiffs did 
not contest that A2B and the Township satisfied all conditions for a valid conditional-
rezoning agreement.  After rejecting plaintiffs’ argument regarding spot zoning—an issue 
that we have not asked the parties to brief—the Court turned to whether the conditional 
rezoning was consistent with the Township’s zoning ordinance.  The Court noted that the 
conditional rezoning would allow the property to be used for track rental, vehicle testing, 
and organized racing, none of which was an allowed use in a C-2 district.  The panel then 
continued its analysis as follows: 
Defendant-appellant argues that the trial court should not be permitted 
to add a requirement to a conditional zoning agreement that the agreed use 
be allowed under the existing zoning.  It is the Township ordinances, rather 
than the trial court, that impose limitations on the uses of property in a C-2 
zoned area[;] however, obviously, if the agreed use were already permitted 
under the existing zoning ordinance, a conditional zoning agreement would 
not be required. 
When the agreed rezoning anticipates a use excluded by the zoning 
district in question, it is fatal to the operation of the conditional zoning 
agreement.  Thus, the conditional zoning agreement was void according to 
Mayfield Ordinance § 1101, and as the trial court held, “there is no 
reasonable governmental interest being advanced” by the agreement.  
Accordingly, we hold that plaintiffs met their burden in challenging the 
 
6 
 
conditional zoning.  See Kyser [v Kasson Twp], 486 Mich [514,] 521[; 786 
NW2d 543 (2010)].  [Jostock, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6.] 
A2B sought leave to appeal in this Court, and we granted the application, directing 
the parties to brief: 
(1) whether MCL 125.3405 allows for uses not otherwise authorized in a 
particular zone; (2) what mechanism was used to authorize the current use as 
a dragway, and whether that mechanism is available to authorize or expand 
the use of the appellant’s property; (3) whether operation of a dragway is an 
authorized use under C-2; and (4) whether the township’s conditional 
rezoning of the appellant’s property is valid under MCL 125.3405.  The time 
allowed for oral argument shall be 20 minutes for each side.  MCR 
7.314(B)(1).  [Jostock v Mayfield Twp, 513 Mich 871, 871 (2023).] 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“We review de novo a trial court’s determination regarding a motion for summary 
disposition.  Summary disposition is appropriate if there is no genuine issue regarding any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Clam Lake 
Twp v Dep’t of Licensing & Regulatory Affairs, 500 Mich 362, 372-373; 902 NW2d 293 
(2017) (citations and quotation marks omitted).  Questions of statutory interpretation and 
application, including the interpretation and application of municipal ordinances, are 
reviewed de novo.  Bonner v Brighton, 495 Mich 209, 221-222; 848 NW2d 380 (2014). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Township has a Euclidian zoning ordinance, meaning that the zoning ordinance 
contains certain zoning districts and allows certain uses in each zone.4  A key aspect of 
 
4 The term “Euclidean zoning” comes from Euclid v Ambler Realty Co, 272 US 365; 47 S 
Ct 114; 71 L Ed 303 (1926), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the 
 
 
7 
 
Euclidean zoning is that if a principal use is not expressly permitted in a zoning district, it 
is prohibited.  See Pittsfield Twp v Malcolm, 375 Mich 135, 142; 134 NW2d 166 (1965) 
(“Under the ordinance which specifically sets forth permissible uses under each zoning 
classification, . . . absence of the specifically stated use must be regarded as excluding that 
use.”).  This is true under the Township’s zoning ordinance.  See Mayfield Township 
Zoning Ordinance, § 300 (“No building or structure, or part thereof, shall hereafter be 
erected, constructed, placed, altered, or moved; and no new use or change-in-use shall be 
made of any building, structure, or land, or part thereof; except in conformity with the 
provisions of this Ordinance.”) (emphasis added).5 
The state law applicable to zoning in townships is generally the same as the law 
applicable to municipalities across the state.  The Michigan Zoning Enabling Act (MZEA), 
MCL 125.3101 et seq., applies to townships, cities, villages, and counties, although 
townships are treated differently than cities and villages in some respects.6  For example, 
as discussed further below, townships and counties can only grant use variances if, prior to 
 
village’s zoning ordinance was within the village’s police power.  See generally 1 
Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning (4th ed), §§ 10:1 and 10:2 (discussing Euclid 
and the basic principles of Euclidean zoning). 
5 Under the Township’s zoning ordinance, accessory uses that are “customarily incidental” 
to permitted principal uses are also allowed.  See, e.g., Mayfield Township Zoning 
Ordinance, §§ 401(15) and 1101(9).  No party has argued that the dragway is an accessory 
use. 
6 Prior to the MZEA’s adoption in 2006, see 2006 PA 110, there were separate zoning 
enabling statutes for cities and villages, for counties, and for townships, respectively.  See 
Saugatuck Dunes Coastal Alliance v Saugatuck Twp, 509 Mich 561, 577; 983 NW2d 798 
(2022); id. at 602 (VIVIANO, J., dissenting). 
 
8 
 
February 15, 2006, they had granted a use variance or had an ordinance that expressly 
authorized the granting of a use variance.  See MCL 125.3604(9)(b). 
In the Township, if a property owner wishes to have its property rezoned, the 
property owner must file a petition for rezoning and follow the procedures stated in 
Mayfield Township Zoning Ordinance, § 2100.  Rezoning is accomplished by amending 
the zoning ordinance.  Mayfield Township Zoning Ordinance, § 2100; see also MCL 
125.3202.  The Township Planning Commission first reviews the proposal and holds a 
public hearing.  Mayfield Township Zoning Ordinance, § 2100.  The Township Planning 
Commission then provides a recommendation to the Township Board, which may hold 
additional public hearings if the Board considers it necessary, after which the Township 
Board may adopt the proposed zoning ordinance amendment.  Id.7 
When the MZEA was adopted in 2006, the Legislature included a provision, MCL 
125.3405, allowing a municipality to engage in conditional rezoning.8  MCL 125.3405 
states in full: 
(1) An owner of land may voluntarily offer in writing, and the local 
unit of government may approve, certain use and development of the land as 
a condition to a rezoning of the land or an amendment to a zoning map. 
 
7 Under § 2100, the Township Planning Commission is also required to submit a proposed 
zoning ordinance amendment to the County for review before sending its recommendation 
to the Township Board. 
8 This was previously allowed under the prior zoning acts for local governments.  See 
former MCL 125.286i, as added by 2004 PA 577 (Township Zoning Act); former 
MCL 125.584g, as added by 2004 PA 579 (City and Village Zoning Act); former MCL 
125.216i, as added by 2004 PA 578 (County Zoning Act).  Each zoning act contained a 
provision nearly identical with MCL 125.3405, with the only difference being the 
specification of the relevant local unit of government. 
 
9 
 
(2) In approving the conditions under subsection (1), the local unit of 
government may establish a time period during which the conditions apply 
to the land.  Except for an extension under subsection (4), if the conditions 
are not satisfied within the time specified under this subsection, the land shall 
revert to its former zoning classification. 
(3) The local government shall not add to or alter the conditions 
approved under subsection (1) during the time period specified under 
subsection (2) of this section. 
(4) The time period specified under subsection (2) may be extended 
upon the application of the landowner and approval of the local unit of 
government. 
(5) A local unit of government shall not require a landowner to offer 
conditions as a requirement for rezoning.  The lack of an offer under 
subsection (1) shall not otherwise affect a landowner’s rights under this act, 
the ordinances of the local unit of government, or any other laws of this state. 
Although some municipalities have adopted conditional-rezoning provisions, see Pierson, 
The Background to Michigan’s Conditional Zoning Authorization, 32 Mich Real Prop Rev 
67, 70 (Summer 2005), the Mayfield Township Zoning Ordinance does not expressly 
address conditional rezoning or provide procedures for conditional rezoning.  As the Court 
of Appeals has explained, “the keystone of a conditional rezoning is that the conditions are 
voluntarily offered by the property owner in writing, and the local unit of government 
cannot require the landowner to offer conditions as a requirement for rezoning.”  Connell 
v Lima Twp, 336 Mich App 263, 268; 970 NW2d 354 (2021).  Conditional rezoning is a 
type of rezoning; therefore, conditional rezoning is a legislative function, just as zoning 
and traditional rezoning are.  See id. at 283, 285. 
 
10 
 
B.  CONDITIONAL REZONING DOES NOT ALLOW FOR USES NOT OTHERWISE 
PERMITTED IN A PARTICULAR ZONE 
At its core, the issue in this case is one of statutory interpretation: Does MCL 
125.3405 provide a township with authority to approve a conditional-rezoning application 
that would allow a use not otherwise permitted in the proposed zoning district?  The 
principles that guide our interpretation of statutes are, by now, well known: 
We interpret statutes to discern and give effect to the Legislature’s intent, 
and in doing so we focus on the statute’s text.  Undefined terms are presumed 
to have their ordinary meaning, unless they have acquired a peculiar and 
appropriate meaning in the law, in which case we accord them that meaning.  
The statute must be considered as a whole, reading individual words and 
phrases in the context of the entire legislative scheme.  Unambiguous statutes 
are enforced as written.  [Clam Lake Twp, 500 Mich at 373 (citations and 
quotation marks omitted).] 
Additionally, “[w]hen possible, we strive to avoid constructions that would render any part 
of the Legislature’s work nugatory.”  People v Seewald, 499 Mich 111, 123; 879 NW2d 
237 (2016). 
A2B’s interpretation of the statute is inconsistent with our principles of statutory 
interpretation.  First, A2B would read MCL 125.3405(1) in a way that renders a portion of 
that provision nugatory.  A2B argues that when granting a conditional-rezoning request, a 
township may approve any use presented by an applicant, even one that is not otherwise 
permitted in the proposed new zoning district for the property.  In essence, A2B would 
shorten MCL 125.3405(1) so that it reads: “An owner of land may voluntarily offer in 
writing, and the local unit of government may approve, certain use and development of the 
land.”  In doing so, it would render nugatory the phrase that follows: “as a condition to a 
rezoning of the land or an amendment to a zoning map.”  Both “rezoning of the land” and 
 
11 
 
“an amendment to a zoning map” involve changing the zoning classification for a specific 
property or properties.  See Connell, 336 Mich App at 267. 
If we were to accept A2B’s argument, the type of zoning district a property is 
conditionally rezoned to would be immaterial.  For example, under A2B’s argument, 
instead of conditionally rezoning the property in this case to C-2, it would have been just 
as proper to conditionally rezone it to RM (multiple-family residential) in order to approve 
the use of the dragway.  But if a use can be one that is not permitted in the new zone—i.e., 
it is irrelevant what the property is zoned to as long as the municipality allows the use when 
it grants the conditional rezoning—then the language “as a condition to a rezoning of the 
land or an amendment to a zoning map” does no work in MCL 125.3405(1).  In other 
words, A2B would apply the conditions only to the approval of the proposed use and 
development, not to the rezoning or map amendment.  This would unnecessarily and 
improperly render the latter portion of MCL 125.3405(1) nugatory.  See Seewald, 499 Mich 
at 123. 
Second, A2B fails to read MCL 125.3405(1) in the context of the entire MZEA, and 
its interpretation is inconsistent with provisions in the Township’s zoning ordinance.  As 
noted, the entire need for rezoning stems from the principles central to Euclidean zoning 
that are contained in the Township’s zoning ordinance: (1) that certain uses are allowed in 
some zones but not in others and (2) that if a use is not permitted in a zoning district, then 
it is prohibited in that district.  Mayfield Township Zoning Ordinance, § 300 prohibits new 
uses that do not conform with its zoning ordinance, and the provision for each zoning 
district lists uses permitted by right and those uses permitted after special approval, see 
Mayfield Township Zoning Ordinance, Articles IV through XIII.  These restrictions are 
 
12 
 
consistent with the Township’s authority to zone under MCL 125.3201.  A2B would read 
MCL 125.3405(1) as broadly granting local governments discretion to allow uses 
inconsistent with their zoning ordinances on a development-by-development basis, 
untethered to any standards for approving the proposed use.  Nothing in the Township’s 
zoning ordinance or the MZEA grants such unfettered discretion. 
Relatedly, A2B’s interpretation of MCL 125.3405(1) would largely circumvent the 
need for use variances under MCL 125.3604.9  Unlike a conditional rezoning, a property 
 
9 MCL 125.3604 governs appeals to zoning boards and applications for variances.  
Regarding use variances specifically, it states: 
(7) If there are practical difficulties for nonuse variances as provided 
in subsection (8) or unnecessary hardship for use variances as provided in 
subsection (9) in the way of carrying out the strict letter of the zoning 
ordinance, the zoning board of appeals may grant a variance in accordance 
with this section, so that the spirit of the zoning ordinance is observed, public 
safety secured, and substantial justice done.  The ordinance shall establish 
procedures for the review and standards for approval of all types of variances.  
The zoning board of appeals may impose conditions as is otherwise allowed 
under this act. 
*   *   * 
(9) The authority to grant variances from uses of land is limited to the 
following: 
(a) Cities and villages. 
(b) Townships and counties that as of February 15, 2006 had an 
ordinance that uses the phrase “use variance” or “variances from uses of 
land” to expressly authorize the granting of use variances by the zoning board 
of appeals. 
(c) Townships and counties that granted a use variance before 
February 15, 2006. 
 
 
13 
 
owner seeking a use variance must show an “unnecessary hardship.”  MCL 125.3604(7).  
Under A2B’s interpretation of MCL 125.3405(1), instead of having to apply for a use 
variance when a proposed use is not permitted in the underlying zoning district, a property 
owner could simply conditionally rezone the property to any district.  And as long as the 
conditional-rezoning agreement allows for the proposed use, that would be sufficient to 
allow the use.  By doing so, the property owner would be able to avoid having to show that 
an unnecessary hardship exists. 
Here, the Township’s zoning ordinance does not allow for use variances other than 
temporary uses.  See Mayfield Township Zoning Ordinance, § 1708(2) (“A use variance 
shall not be permitted, except as described under Section 1707.4, Approval of Temporary 
Uses.”).  But the fact that the zoning ordinance does not allow for use variances does not 
mean the MZEA should be interpreted in a way that circumvents the use-variance process. 
 
(10) The authority granted under subsection (9) is subject to the 
zoning ordinance of the local unit of government otherwise being in 
compliance with subsection (7) and having an ordinance provision that 
requires a vote of 2/3 of the members of the zoning board of appeals to 
approve a use variance. 
(11) The authority to grant use variances under subsection (9) is 
permissive, and this section shall not be construed to require a local unit of 
government to adopt ordinance provisions to allow for the granting of use 
variances. 
 
14 
 
In summary, we agree with all of the amici10 in this case that, in order to be valid 
under MCL 125.3405(1), the proposed use must be a permitted use within the proposed 
zoning district—either by right or after special approval.11 
The question of whether the conditional rezoning of A2B’s property is valid 
depends on whether a dragway is a permitted use in the C-2 zoning district in the Township.  
Both lower courts held that the conditional-rezoning agreement was void under the 
Township’s zoning ordinance because it allowed a use not otherwise permitted in the new 
zoning district.  But the issue of whether a dragway is a permitted use in the C-2 district 
was not specifically addressed by the parties in the proceedings below.  Therefore, we 
believe the trial court should be given an opportunity to address this question and any other 
questions that the parties may properly raise in light of our holding regarding 
MCL 125.3405(1).12 
 
10 The amici who have submitted briefs in this case include the Real Property Law Section 
of the State Bar of Michigan, the Michigan Townships Association, the Michigan 
Association of Planning, the Michigan Municipal League, and the Government Law 
Section of the State Bar of Michigan.  
11 To be clear, this does not mean that the proposed use must be explicitly listed as one of 
the enumerated permitted uses in the proposed zoning district.  Many zoning ordinances, 
including the Township’s, include language indicating that uses similar to those 
specifically listed are permitted in a given zoning district.  If the proposed use falls under 
such a provision, the conditional rezoning would not be barred by the statute as we have 
interpreted it in this opinion. 
12 To be clear, we take no position on the proper interpretation of the Township’s zoning 
ordinance with respect to whether a dragway is a permitted use in the C-2 zoning district. 
 
15 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
A conditional rezoning is invalid under MCL 125.3405(1) if the proposed use is not 
a permitted use—either by right or after special approval—within the proposed zoning 
district.  Whether the conditional rezoning in this case is valid depends on whether a 
dragway is a permitted use in the Township’s C-2 zoning district.  Therefore, we vacate 
the judgments of the Lapeer Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals and remand to the 
Lapeer Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
 
Elizabeth M. Welch 
 
Kyra H. Bolden