Title: Commonwealth v. Rivera
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12605
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 1, 2019

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12605 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CHRISTOPHER RIVERA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 7, 2019. - May 1, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Accessory and Principal. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 30, 2012. 
 
 
The case was tried before Raymond J. Brassard, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Jin-Ho King for the defendant. 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Eva G. Jellison, for Committee for Public Counsel Services 
& another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The issue presented on appeal is whether a 
defendant who witnessed a killing may be found guilty as an 
accessory after the fact to murder, in violation of G. L. 
c. 274, § 4, where the only "aid" or "assistance" alleged is 
2 
 
 
that the defendant made false and misleading statements to 
police detectives and refused to provide them with the telephone 
numbers they requested.  We conclude that, where the defendant 
did not provide the police with a false alibi or comparable 
information that would exculpate the principal felon (here, the 
killer), a false narrative of the crime that would give the 
principal a defense, or false information to assist in the 
principal's escape, the defendant's false statements and refusal 
to cooperate alone do not constitute the "aid" or "assistance" 
required to find a defendant guilty as an accessory after the 
fact under the statute.  Because the evidence was insufficient 
as a matter of law to sustain the conviction, we vacate the 
judgment of conviction and remand the matter to the Superior 
Court for issuance of a judgment of acquittal.1 
 
Background.  Because the defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence to prove that he was an accessory 
after the fact, we summarize the facts that the jury could have 
found in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  
Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 
215 (2007) and 460 Mass. 12 (2011). 
                                                          
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services and the Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
3 
 
 
 
Before dawn on October 16, 2011, the defendant, after 
visiting a friend's home to drink and socialize, was returning 
home with Hector Soto and Josue Santos in a motor vehicle driven 
by Santos.  They stopped at a convenience store in the Jamaica 
Plain neighborhood of Boston on the way so that Santos could buy 
a drink.  After Santos returned to his vehicle, Soto began 
arguing in the parking lot with Kenneth Soto (victim),2 who was 
with a group of friends who were in a vehicle parked next to 
Santos's vehicle.  The victim began to wrestle and exchange 
punches with Soto.  The defendant then stepped outside the 
vehicle and joined the fight to assist Soto.  During the course 
of the fight, Soto stabbed the victim.  Soto and the defendant 
then returned to the vehicle, and Santos quickly drove away.  In 
the vehicle, Soto and the defendant laughed together while 
talking about the fight.  Santos then dropped the defendant and 
Soto off at the defendant's home.  The victim later died from 
his stab wound. 
 
On October 23, 2011, Detectives Garrett G. Mitchell and 
Michael T. Walsh of the Boston police department interviewed the 
defendant at his home about the incident; the interview was 
recorded.  Mitchell told the defendant that they were there 
                                                          
 
 
2 The record does not suggest that Kenneth Soto and Hector 
Soto are related.  Because they share a surname, we refer to 
Hector Soto as "Soto" and Kenneth Soto as "the victim." 
4 
 
 
because they were investigating an incident "that happened over 
at [a convenience store] in Jamaica Plain" early on Sunday 
morning, October 16.  The defendant said that he had seen the 
news on television and knew that a young man had been killed 
there. 
 
When Mitchell asked the defendant where he was on Saturday 
night, October 15, he said he was at "Rashad's grandmother's 
house" in the Hyde Park neighborhood of Boston "until late," 
drinking, smoking, and watching television with some of his 
friends.  He said that he had driven there alone, returned home 
alone, and did not stop anywhere on his way home.  He told the 
detectives that he had "no idea" when he returned home. 
 
When Mitchell asked whom he was with in Hyde Park, the 
defendant said that "people kept coming in and out."  He 
initially said that he could not remember anyone who was there 
apart from Rashad, but later responded that he usually spends 
time with Joel,3 Paul, and Pat.  Recognizing that "Joel" was a 
reference to Soto, the detectives pressed the defendant for more 
information about Joel.  When asked where Joel lived, the 
defendant said that he lived "not too far from the baseball 
                                                          
 
 
3 The transcript of the October 23, 2011, police interview 
spells the name as "Joelle."  In the trial transcript, the 
spellings "Joelle" and "Joel" are used interchangeably.  We 
spell the name as "Joel" because that is Soto's middle name.  
Any difference in pronunciation is not discussed in the record. 
5 
 
 
field" in the Roslindale neighborhood of Boston.  When asked if 
Joel goes by another name, the defendant responded, "That's what 
I know him by."  Soto's middle name is "Joel" but, at trial, all 
who knew Soto referred to him by his first or last name or his 
nickname, "Nemo." 
 
When Walsh asked the defendant if he had the telephone 
numbers of Joel and the other persons who were there that night, 
the defendant said, "I have most of their numbers, yeah."  When 
the detective asked the defendant if he would give them those 
numbers, specifically asking for Joel's telephone number, the 
defendant responded:  "[I]t feels like the way you're doing it 
is, . . . whoever I give you, that's who you're going to go 
after, no matter what. . . .  I'm not into just involving other 
people . . . , and this is serious."  Walsh replied, "[I]f you 
don't want to give it to us, that's fine.  That's up to you." 
 
A grand jury indicted Soto for the murder of the victim, 
also indicting the defendant for assault and battery in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13A, and as an accessory after the 
fact to murder in violation of G. L. c. 274, § 4.  Soto and the 
defendant were tried together in the Superior Court in April 
2013.  A jury found Soto guilty of murder in the second degree 
and the defendant guilty as an accessory after the fact; the 
jury acquitted the defendant of assault and battery.  The 
6 
 
 
defendant timely appealed, and we transferred his appeal to this 
court on our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  General Laws c. 274, § 4, provides in relevant 
part: 
"Whoever, after the commission of a felony, harbors, 
conceals, maintains or assists the principal felon . . . or 
gives such offender any other aid, knowing that he has 
committed a felony . . . with intent that he shall avoid or 
escape detention, arrest, trial or punishment, shall be an 
accessory after the fact . . . ." 
 
The Commonwealth does not contend that the defendant 
"harbor[ed]," "conceal[ed]," or "maintain[ed]" Soto, or that he 
assisted Soto by allowing Soto to come to his home on the 
morning of the killing.  Rather, the Commonwealth argues that 
the defendant was an accessory after the fact to murder because 
he lied to the detectives in his interview about his own actions 
and whereabouts on the morning of the killing; referred to Soto 
as "Joel," claiming no knowledge of his first or last name or 
his nickname; and refused to provide the detectives with Soto's 
telephone number.  The Commonwealth contends that, by this 
conduct, the defendant "aided" or "assisted" Soto in evading 
capture or punishment for the killing, with the intent to help 
Soto evade capture or punishment. 
 
The evidence at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant lied to the police when he 
said that he drove home alone on the morning of the killing, and 
7 
 
 
when he claimed he knew Soto only by the name "Joel."  The 
evidence also established that the defendant declined to provide 
the detectives with Soto's telephone number after they 
specifically requested him to provide that information.  The 
question we must answer is whether that evidence suffices to 
prove the element of aid or assistance that is required to prove 
that the defendant was an accessory after the fact to murder.  
We conclude that it does not.  Because the failure of proof of 
that element alone dooms the conviction, we do not reach the 
other issue argued by the parties -- whether the evidence was 
sufficient to prove the required element that the defendant 
specifically intended during his interview to help Soto evade 
capture or punishment. 
 
"We have long recognized that the statute's definition of 
accessory after the fact 'is in the common law form' and 
'obviously has roots in the common law tradition.'"  
Commonwealth v. Perez, 437 Mass. 186, 190 (2002), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Devlin, 366 Mass. 132, 137 (1974).  Therefore, 
in determining the meaning of "aid" or "assist" in the 
codification of the common law accomplished by G. L. c. 274, 
§ 4, we must determine what these words mean in the context of 
this common-law crime.  See Perez, supra at 193 (because we are 
"constrained by our statute's common-law form," we must impose 
"the traditional common-law requirements"). 
8 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth contends that, in defining these words, we 
should recognize that "[t]he gravamen of the crime of accessory 
after the fact is 'the obstruction of justice,' caused by 
individual's actions," and cites Commonwealth v. Sims, 41 Mass. 
App. Ct. 902, 903 (1996), and Commonwealth v. Kelly, 1 Mass. 
App. Ct. 441, 448-450 (1973), in support.  But that is simply 
not our law.  As we noted in 2002 in Perez, 437 Mass. at 192-
193, the "alternative 'obstruction of justice' approach" to 
accessory liability was incorporated in Model Penal Code § 242.3 
(1980) as the offense of "hindering apprehension or 
prosecution," and that approach is now reflected in the law of 
many States.  See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-165 
(criminalizing "hindering prosecution" by way of, inter alia, 
"obstruct[ing], by means of . . . deception . . . any person 
from performing an act which might aid in the discovery or 
apprehension of [suspected offender]"); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-7-
303 (same); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 642.3 (same).  See also 2 
W.R. LaFave & A.W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 6.9, 
at 171 (1986) (in most jurisdictions, "accessory after the fact" 
offense "is characterized as 'hindering' apprehension or 
prosecution, or is otherwise described to reflect its true 
character as a crime involving interference with the processes 
9 
 
 
of government"; collecting statutes [footnote omitted]).4  This 
approach was also incorporated in the Proposed Criminal Code of 
Massachusetts, c. 268, § 11 (1972),5 as this court noted in 
                                                          
 
 
4 While some State statutes reflect a broader approach to 
accessory liability -- see, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 2921.32(A)(5) (forbidding "communicat[ion]" of "false 
information to any person" with intent to "hinder the discovery, 
apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of 
another") -- it is noteworthy that the drafters of the Model 
Penal Code expressly proposed a statute with limited reach.  
Model Penal Code § 242.3(5), which prohibits "volunteer[ing] 
false information" to law enforcement officers, was not intended 
to cover "[m]ere failure to report crime" or "giving misleading 
or even false answers to inquiries initiated by the police."  
Model Penal Code § 242.3 comment 4, at 235 (1980).  Rather, the 
choice of the word "volunteering" was intended to limit its 
reach only to "those who take the initiative in throwing the 
police off the track."  Id.  The delicate balance struck by the 
authors of this provision was premised "on the fear that a wider 
reach . . . would invite abusive charges by police against 
persons interviewed in the course of investigating crime."  Id. 
 
 
5 The Proposed Criminal Code of Massachusetts was drafted by 
the fifty-two members of the Criminal Law Revision Commission, 
each of whom were appointed by the Attorney General on behalf of 
the Governor's committee on law enforcement and administration 
of criminal justice.  Proposed c. 268, § 11, states in relevant 
part: 
 
"§ 11.  Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution. 
 
"(a) A person is guilty of hindering apprehension or 
prosecution if, with intent to hinder, prevent or delay the 
discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction or 
punishment of another person for the commission of an 
offense, he: . . . 
 
"(5) obstructs by force, intimidation, or deception anyone 
from performing an act which might aid in the discovery, 
apprehension, prosecution or conviction of such 
person . . ." 
 
10 
 
 
Devlin, 366 Mass. at 138-139, in 1974.  But as we recognized in 
Perez, supra at 193-194: 
"Despite the suggestion of an alternative approach in 
Commonwealth v. Devlin, supra at 138-139, the Legislature 
has not amended the statute to transform the crime of being 
an accessory after the fact into the more modern 
articulation of the crime as an obstruction of justice.  
Our statute remains consistent with the common-law approach 
to the crime of being an accessory after the fact, and, 
unless and until the statute is amended, we must continue 
to construe it consistent with its common-law roots." 
 
Because G. L. c. 274, § 4, has not subsequently been amended, it 
remains equally true today that we must adhere to the historical 
common-law approach in construing accessory after the fact 
liability. 
 
"At common law, the liability of an accessory after the 
fact was derived from the liability of the principal, the 
accessory being considered 'an accomplice in the original 
crime.'"  Perez, 437 Mass. at 190, quoting Devlin, 366 Mass. at 
136.  The examples of accessory after the fact cited by William 
Blackstone all involved physical conduct that assisted the 
principal in hindering his apprehension or accomplishing his 
escape:  "furnishing [the principal] with a horse to escape his 
pursuers, money or victuals to support him, a house or other 
                                                          
 
 
Section 11 was drafted expressly to broaden and replace 
G. L. c. 274, § 4, see Proposed Criminal Code of Massachusetts, 
c. 268, § 11 & Revision Commission Note, at 151-152, but it was 
never adopted by the Legislature.  See Commonwealth v. Perez, 
437 Mass. 186, 193-194 (2002); Commonwealth v. Cataldo, 423 
Mass. 318, 323 n.6 (1996). 
11 
 
 
shelter to conceal him, or open force and violence to rescue or 
protect him."  4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *38.  In the modern 
context, we continue to uphold convictions of accessory after 
the fact where, for instance, the defendants aided the 
principals in fleeing the scene of the crime, where they hid or 
destroyed evidence, or where they assisted in the disposal of 
stolen goods.  See Commonwealth v. Valleca, 358 Mass. 242, 243-
245 (1970) (attempt to sell stolen coins back to gallery from 
which they were stolen in return for "reward" sufficient to 
support conviction as accessory after fact to breaking and 
entering); Commonwealth v. Eagan, 357 Mass. 585, 590 (1970) 
("action in aiding [perpetrators] to leave the scene" sufficient 
to support conviction as accessory after fact); Sims, 41 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 903 (affirming conviction as accessory after fact of 
defendant who disposed of shooter's gun). 
 
The refusal to answer a police officer's questions or 
provide requested information alone cannot constitute "aid" or 
"assistance" under G. L. c. 274, § 4, because, unless a person 
is subpoenaed or ordered by a court to testify, no one has a 
legal obligation to answer a police officer's questions or to 
provide information in a criminal investigation.  See 
Commonwealth v. Warren, 475 Mass. 530, 538 (2016) ("[O]ur law 
guards a person's freedom to speak or not to speak to a police 
officer.  A person also may choose to walk away, avoiding 
12 
 
 
altogether any contact with police").  Where the defendant here 
was constitutionally entitled to refuse to provide the police 
with Soto's telephone number, his failure to do so cannot be 
deemed "aid" or "assistance" that would subject him to 
conviction as an accessory after the fact, regardless of his 
motive for the refusal. 
 
The defendant, however, did more than refuse to cooperate 
with the police by not revealing information; he lied to them 
about his whereabouts at the time of the killing and about his 
knowledge of "Joel's" other names.  There is no constitutional 
protection for lies.  A material false statement made under oath 
constitutes the crime of perjury.  G. L. c. 268, § 1.  
Commonwealth v. Carel, 105 Mass. 582, 585-586 (1870).  Willfully 
misleading a police officer is a crime in violation of G. L. 
c. 268, § 13B, where the false statements "reasonably could lead 
investigators to pursue a course of investigation materially 
different from the course they otherwise would have pursued."  
Commonwealth v. Paquette, 475 Mass. 793, 801 (2016).  But the 
defendant here could not be charged with perjury because his 
statements were not made under oath, and he was not charged with 
a violation of § 13B, perhaps because the Commonwealth would be 
unable to prove that the defendant's false statements under the 
circumstances in this case reasonably could have led the 
investigators to pursue a materially different course of 
13 
 
 
investigation.  See id. at 801-802 (under § 13B, "'He went that 
way' may well be misleading, but 'I don't know' likely is not").6 
 
Under Federal law, making a materially false statement to a 
Federal law enforcement officer during a Federal criminal 
investigation is a crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Wilson, 879 F.3d 795, 806-807 (7th Cir. 
2018) (affirming conviction of making false statements to 
Federal investigators); United States v. Phillipos, 849 F.3d 
464, 466 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 683 (2018) 
(same).  But our Legislature has not adopted a comparable law 
criminalizing all materially false statements made to State or 
local criminal investigators. 
 
Under the common law, "[t]he accessory was defined by his 
direct, personal assistance as one who receives and comforts, or 
conceals the principal felon."  Devlin, 366 Mass. at 136.  We 
conclude that a person may provide the principal felon with the 
"direct, personal assistance" necessary to be an accessory after 
the fact through words alone spoken to the police during an 
interview, but only where he or she "aids" or "assists" the 
                                                          
 
6 As earlier noted, the defendant claimed to have no 
personal knowledge of the killing.  Also, the Commonwealth 
acknowledged in closing argument that the detectives who 
interviewed the defendant knew that "Joel" was a reference to 
Soto.  They repeatedly told the defendant that they knew he was 
not telling the truth because they had been engaged in the 
investigation for one week and "kind of [knew] the whole 
picture." 
14 
 
 
principal by providing the police with a false alibi or 
comparable information that would exculpate the principal, a 
false narrative of the crime that would give the principal a 
defense, or false information to assist in the principal's 
escape.  This limiting principle is consistent with case law 
interpreting the common law of accessory after the fact 
liability.  See, e.g., State v. Clifford, 263 Or. 436, 442 
(1972) ("the lie [must], under the existing circumstances, [be] 
likely to aid the offender to escape arrest or punishment"); 
Tipton v. State, 126 Tex. Crim. 439, 444 (1934) (false statement 
must either "tend[] to raise any defense for [principal felon]" 
or "within itself indicat[e] an effort to shield or protect 
[principal felon]"); Stephens v. State, 734 P.2d 555, 557 (Wyo. 
1987) (contrasting "an affirmative statement . . . such as 
supplying a false alibi" with "passive nondisclosure").  Cf. 
State v. Budik, 173 Wash. 2d 727, 736-737 (2012) (crime of 
rendering criminal assistance, which "embodies many of the same 
principles" as accessory after the fact, "requires an 
affirmative act or statement that raises a defense for 
[principal felon]").  And it comports with our ordinary rules of 
statutory construction, which "require us to construe any 
criminal statute strictly against the Commonwealth."  Devlin, 
supra at 137-138. 
15 
 
 
 
In each of the Massachusetts cases where a defendant's 
conviction as an accessory after the fact was based in whole or 
in large part on his false statements to police, the defendant's 
false statements either provided the police with a false alibi 
or comparable information that would exculpate the principal, or 
a false narrative of the crime that would give the principal a 
defense.  Thus, in Commonwealth v. Wood, 302 Mass. 265, 269, 
270-271 (1939), superseded on another ground as recognized in 
Commonwealth v. Hurley, 455 Mass. 53, 69 n.15 (2009), we 
affirmed a conviction of accessory after the fact where the 
defendant, who resided in the home of a person who unlawfully 
induced abortions, falsely told the police that he had never 
seen the woman who died as a result of the abortion (and who had 
remained at the home for eight days) or the man who brought her 
there.7  Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Doherty, 353 Mass. 197, 
197, 203 (1967), overruled on another ground by Connor v. 
Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 572, 574 (1973), the husband and wife 
defendants were convicted as accessories after the fact to 
                                                          
 
7 The defendant in Commonwealth v. Wood, 302 Mass. 265, 269 
(1939), superseded on another ground as recognized in 
Commonwealth v. Hurley, 455 Mass. 53, 69 n.15 (2009), also 
assisted the principal by falsely telling the man who brought 
the woman to the house to obtain the abortion -- after the man 
found the woman exclaiming in pain on the day after the abortion 
-- that he was a doctor, that the pain was natural and nothing 
to worry about, and that the man should not call a doctor.  When 
the woman finally went to a hospital, the defendant told her 
brother "to try to keep their names out of it."  Id. at 270. 
16 
 
 
murder where the wife directed the killer and his friend to "get 
[the victim] out of here" (resulting in their moving him from 
the sofa in her home to the front porch), where they were among 
those who agreed that they would falsely tell the police "that 
two guys came up here and broke in and shot him," and where the 
husband falsely told the police that he had been in a fight, had 
run from the porch, and found the victim's body when he 
returned.  See Commonwealth v. McQuade, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 894, 
894-895 (1980) (defendant, who harbored bank robber at his 
apartment and concealed stolen goods and gun under his bed, lied 
to police that "he and [robber] had not left the apartment all 
afternoon"); Commonwealth v. Homsey, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 913, 914 
(1978) (defendant "chauffeured [robber] to and from his hideout" 
in defendant's car, and lied to police by claiming that 
defendant was not person who purchased vehicle from him that was 
used to commit robbery).8 
                                                          
 
8 The Commonwealth relies on Commonwealth v. Spezzaro, 250 
Mass. 454 (1925), in arguing that a defendant may be found 
guilty as an accessory after the fact for a false statement that 
did not exculpate the defendant or provide a false narrative of 
the crime.  In Spezzaro, the defendant was standing near a 
vehicle across the street from where the principal felon, who 
had just broken and entered a shop to steal fifty-eight rolls of 
cloth at approximately 2 A.M., was bringing the cloth into a 
building from a Packard automobile that the principal jointly 
owned with the defendant.  Id. at 454-457.  When questioned by 
police at the scene, the defendant falsely told the police that 
he did not know the principal and did not know who owned the 
Packard; he also said that he had not seen the principal "at any 
17 
 
 
 
Here, in contrast, the defendant's false statements about 
driving home alone without stopping provided only himself with a 
false alibi -- it did not exculpate Soto.  And by claiming no 
knowledge of the crime, apart from what he had heard on the 
news, and by stating that he knew Soto only by the name "Joel," 
he also did not give a false narrative of the crime (or, for 
that matter, any narrative regarding the crime) that could have 
provided Soto with a defense.  We therefore conclude that the 
defendant's false and misleading statements to the police did 
not "aid" or "assist" Soto in any way that would suffice for the 
                                                          
 
time that night."  Id. at 456.  In concluding that the evidence 
was sufficient to find the defendant guilty as an accessory 
after the fact, the court noted, "If these statements, made by 
the defendant at the time of his arrest, were intentionally 
false, they tended to show his guilt. . . .  [E]vidence of this 
kind is an admission from which guilt may be inferred."  Id. at 
457.  As the court's citations to Spezzaro in contemporaneous 
cases illustrate, the court viewed the defendant's false 
statements as evidence of consciousness of guilt, not as the aid 
or assistance that made the defendant an accessory after the 
fact.  See Commonwealth v. Cavedon, 301 Mass. 307, 315 (1938); 
Commonwealth v. DiStasio, 297 Mass. 347, 360, cert. denied, 302 
U.S. 683 (1937); Commonwealth v. Powers, 294 Mass. 59, 62 
(1936); Commonwealth v. Vellucci, 284 Mass. 443, 446 (1933); 
Commonwealth v. Gentile, 255 Mass. 116, 118 (1926).  Although 
not crystal clear from the opinion, the court appeared to 
conclude that the evidence indicated that the defendant was on 
the street in the early morning to aid the principal in his 
getaway.  See Spezzaro, supra at 458 ("it could have been found 
that the defendant had knowledge that the felony was committed 
by [the principal], and that the defendant was in this place, 
expecting the arrival of the Packard car, and was aiding and 
assisting the principal to avoid detention and arrest").  
18 
 
 
defendant to be found guilty of being an accessory after the 
fact to the murder committed by Soto.9 
 
Conclusion.  The defendant's conviction as an accessory 
after the fact to murder is reversed.  The judgment of 
conviction is vacated, and a judgment of acquittal is to be 
entered for the defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
 
9 Having concluded that the defendant did not provide the 
police with a false alibi or give a false narrative of the crime 
that could have provided the principal with a defense, we need 
not consider whether a defendant could be found guilty as an 
accessory after the fact where the police would not be 
reasonably likely to be led astray by the false alibi or 
narrative because they knew it to be false when they heard it.