Title: Rodriguez v. City of Somerville
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11767
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 20, 2015

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SJC-11767 
 
EDGAR RODRIGUEZ1  vs.  CITY OF SOMERVILLE. 
 
 
July 20, 2015. 
 
 
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.  Moot Question.  Practice, Civil, 
Moot case, Presentment of claim under Massachusetts Tort 
Claims Act, Interlocutory appeal.  Governmental Immunity.  
Municipal Corporations, Governmental immunity, Liability 
for tort.  Notice, Claim under Massachusetts Tort Claims 
Act. 
 
 
 
After the plaintiff, Edgar Rodriguez acting on behalf of 
his minor son Rodrigo, commenced this negligence action against 
the city of Somerville (city), the city filed a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 
(1974), claiming that the plaintiff failed to meet the 
presentment requirements set forth in the Massachusetts Tort 
Claims Act (Act).  See G. L. c. 258, § 4.  A judge in the 
Superior Court denied the motion, concluding that the letter 
satisfied the statutory requirements.  The city appealed, and in 
doing so argued that the appeal, which was interlocutory, was 
proper pursuant to the doctrine of present execution.  The 
Appeals Court concluded that the doctrine of present execution 
does not apply and dismissed the appeal.  See Rodriguez v. 
Somerville, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 1 (2014).  The case is now before 
this court on further appellate review. 
 
 
Background.  The essential background, as set forth in the 
Appeals Court's decision, is as follows: 
 
 
"On April 14, 2011, Rodrigo Rodriguez, a second grade 
student at the Argenziano School in [the city], was injured 
                                                 
 
1 As father and next friend of Rodrigo Rodriguez. 
2 
 
when a metal door frame fell off the front door of the 
school and struck him in the head.  On May 11, 2011, an 
attorney representing the minor and his parent and next 
friend, Edgar Rodriguez, sent a letter to the mayor of [the 
city]." 
 
Id. at 2.  The plaintiff maintains that the letter was meant to 
satisfy the presentment requirements of G. L. c. 258, § 4, and 
in his complaint filed on March 29, 2013, alleged that "[t]imely 
and proper presentment was made to [the city] pursuant to [G. L. 
c. 258, § 4]."2 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Mootness.  We address, as an initial 
matter, the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the city's appeal to 
this court as moot.  He argues that the presentment question is 
moot because the original pleadings in the case have been 
superseded by subsequent pleadings, filed while this appeal has 
been pending.  Among other things, the plaintiff has filed an 
amended complaint; the city has, in turn, filed an amended 
answer; and additional parties on both sides have been joined.  
None of this, however, negates the underlying issue regarding 
whether the plaintiff made proper presentment to the city in the 
first instance, and whether, as the city contends, the appeal is 
proper pursuant to the doctrine of present execution.  If the 
city is correct that presentment was improper and that the 
plaintiff's original complaint should have been dismissed, the 
city would no longer be a party to the case, regardless of any 
subsequent filings or proceedings in the trial court.  The 
city's appeal, therefore, is not moot. 
 
                                                 
 
2 General Laws c. 258, § 4, provides in relevant part: 
 
 
"A civil action shall not be instituted against a 
public employer on a claim for damages . . . unless the 
claimant shall have first presented his claim in writing to 
the executive officer of such public employer within two 
years after the date upon which the cause of action arose, 
and such claim shall have been finally denied by such 
executive officer in writing . . . .  The failure of the 
executive officer to deny such claim in writing within six 
months after the date upon which it is presented, or the 
failure to reach final arbitration, settlement or 
compromise of such claim according to the provision of 
section five, shall be deemed a final denial of such 
claim." 
3 
 
 
2.  Present execution.  We next consider whether the appeal 
is proper under the doctrine of present execution.  Generally, 
"an aggrieved litigant cannot as a matter of right pursue an 
immediate appeal from an interlocutory order unless a statute or 
rule authorizes it."  Elles v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Quincy, 
450 Mass. 671, 673-674 (2008).  Pursuant to the doctrine of 
present execution, however, "an interlocutory order is 
immediately appealable if it concerns an issue that is 
collateral to the basic controversy . . . and the ruling will 
interfere with rights in a way that cannot be remedied on appeal 
from the final judgment" (citations and quotations omitted).  
Shapiro v. Worcester, 464 Mass 261, 264 (2013).  "Orders denying 
motions to dismiss based on immunity from suit fall into this 
limited class of cases" because they are "collateral to the 
rights asserted in the underlying action" and "the right to 
immunity from suit would be lost forever if such orders were not 
appealable until the close of litigation."  Id.  Accordingly, we 
have previously held that the doctrine of present execution 
applies in cases involving claims of immunity from suit pursuant 
to G. L. c. 258, § 10.  See Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312, 
315-317 (2002) (denial of motion to dismiss based on immunity 
from suit under  to G. L. c. 258, § 10 [j], immediately 
appealable pursuant to doctrine of present execution). 
 
 
Here, the question is whether a claim of defective 
presentment pursuant to G. L. c. 258, § 4, is similarly 
immediately appealable.  We conclude that it is, as we similarly 
concluded in Shapiro v. Worcester, 464 Mass at 264.  In the 
Shapiro case we considered whether the doctrine of present 
execution authorized the city of Worcester to seek interlocutory 
review of the denial of its motion to dismiss as it "relate[d] 
to the retroactivity of the presentment requirement."  Id. at 
265.  We held that it did because 
 
"[a]s with the exceptions to the waiver of sovereign 
immunity, the presentment requirement is collateral to the 
substantive aspects of the Act, and the city's right to 
avoid harassing litigation would be lost forever if it were 
unable to appeal immediately the judges' orders that the 
presentment requirement does not apply 
retroactively . . . ." 
 
Id.  That the Shapiro case involved a question of retroactivity, 
and this case does not, is of no moment.  The presentment 
requirement protects government officials from having to face 
unnecessary and potentially harassing litigation.  Allowing an 
appeal on the basis that presentment was deficient furthers that 
4 
 
important public interest.  See Daveiga v. Boston Pub. Health 
Comm'n, 449 Mass. 434, 435 n.2 (2007) (noting that appeal from 
denial of motion to dismiss predicated on defective presentment 
pursuant to G. L. c. 258, § 4, was before court pursuant to 
doctrine of present execution); Bellanti v. Boston Pub. Health 
Comm'n, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 401, 405-406 (2007) (noting that in 
Daveiga case, this court "accepted the view that the denial of a 
motion for summary judgment brought on the basis of defective 
presentment related to immunity under G. L. c. 258 and was 
immediately appealable under the doctrine of present 
execution").  Cf. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352-353 (2006) 
(considering Federal law analogous to present execution and 
noting that "it is not mere avoidance of a trial, but avoidance 
of a trial that would imperil a substantial public interest, 
that counts when asking whether an order is 'effectively' 
unreviewable if review is to be left until later"). 
 
 
3.  Presentment.  Having determined that the doctrine of 
present execution applies, and that the city's appeal is 
therefore properly before us, we turn to the underlying question 
whether the plaintiff met the presentment requirements of G. L. 
c. 258, § 4.3 
 
 
Pursuant to the statute, a claimant must, prior to 
instituting an action against a public employer on a claim for 
damages, present his claim in writing to the appropriate 
executive officer of the public employer.  The purpose of the 
presentment requirement is to "ensure[] that the responsible 
                                                 
 
3 The plaintiff argues that the city of Somerville (city) 
waived the defense of defective presentment by failing to comply 
with the requirements of Mass. R. Civ. P. 9 (c), 365 Mass. 751 
(1974).  Because proper presentment is a condition precedent, 
the rule requires the plaintiff to plead performance of the 
condition in his complaint.  He did so.  In response to the 
complaint, the city filed its motion to dismiss, clearly stating 
its claim of defective presentment -- that was the single basis 
for the motion -- and the defense was properly raised in the 
motion.  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974).  
When the city subsequently filed its answer, it again raised 
defective presentment as an affirmative defense, albeit not as 
specifically or as particularly as it could have.  Given the 
circumstances of the case, and the fact that the plaintiff was 
clearly on notice of the city's claim of defective presentment, 
we reject the plaintiff's claim of waiver.  We note as well the 
city's assertion that the plaintiff raises the waiver argument 
for the first time on appeal. 
5 
 
public official receives notice of the claim so that that 
official can investigate to determine whether or not a claim is 
valid, preclude payment of inflated or nonmeritorious claims, 
settle valid claims expeditiously, and take steps to ensure that 
similar claims will not be brought in the future."  Gilmore v. 
Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 718 (1994), quoting Lodge v. District 
Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 21 Mass. App. Ct. 277, 283 
(1985).  Although the plaintiff here presented a written letter 
to the appropriate official -- the mayor of the city -- the 
contents of the letter were insufficient to meet the 
requirements of the statute. 
 
 
A letter purporting to constitute presentment does not have 
to be absolutely precise.  See Martin v. Commonwealth, 53 Mass. 
App. Ct. 526, 529-530 (2002), and cases cited.  The letter does, 
however, have to "'identify[] the legal basis of a plaintiff's 
claim' and must 'not [be] so obscure that educated public 
officials . . . find themselves baffled or misled with respect 
to [whether] a claim' is being asserted 'which constitutes a 
proper subject for suit' under G. L. c. 258."  Id., quoting 
Gilmore v. Commonwealth, supra at 723.  The plaintiff's letter 
does not meet these requirements. 
 
 
Sent by counsel then representing the plaintiff, the letter 
in this case did nothing more than state that the minor son was 
injured in an accident at a public school in the city and that 
counsel was seeking a copy of the school's report of the 
incident as well as reports of any other incidents at the same 
school.  The letter also stated that any bill for photocopying 
or related fees should be sent to counsel's office.  It appeared 
to be, in essence, a public records request, and reasonably 
could have been interpreted by the city as a precursor to a 
potential claim, where plaintiff's counsel was simply gathering 
information to determine whether the plaintiff might have a 
claim to press.  It did not identify any legal basis for a claim 
against the city, much less actually "present" a claim that the 
city could reasonably be expected to investigate. 
 
 
Under § 4, a public employer must respond to a claim by 
denying it, or by arbitrating, compromising, or settling it, 
within six months.  See also G. L. c. 258, § 5 (detailing 
arbitration, compromise, and settlement of claims made under 
Act).  The purpose of presentment is to give fair notice of a 
claim, and of its nature and circumstances.  If a purported 
presentment does not fulfil that purpose, the public employer 
cannot meaningfully consider the claim or properly respond.  The 
letter in this case did not serve the statutory purpose:  it did 
6 
 
not reasonably put the city on notice that the plaintiff was 
presently making a claim against it.  Presentment was therefore 
deficient.  On that basis, the city's motion to dismiss the 
plaintiff's complaint should have been allowed. 
 
 
Conclusion.  The plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal 
as moot is denied.  The Superior Court judge's order denying the 
motion to dismiss is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
Jason D. Grossfield, Assistant City Solicitor, for the 
defendant. 
 
David M. Hass for the plaintiff.