Title: Bogle v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC20-1054
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 27, 2021

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC20-1054 
____________ 
 
BRETT A. BOGLE, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
May 27, 2021 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Brett A. Bogle, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the 
circuit court’s order summarily denying his third successive motion 
for postconviction relief, which was filed under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.851.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, 
§ 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the 
postconviction court’s denial of relief. 
Background 
In 1992, Bogle was convicted of the first-degree murder of 
Margaret Torres, burglary with assault or battery, and retaliation 
 
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against a witness.  Bogle v. State (Bogle I), 655 So. 2d 1103, 1104-
05 (Fla. 1995).  The trial judge sentenced Bogle to death after a 
second penalty phase resulted in a jury recommendation of death 
by a vote of ten to two.  Id. at 1105.  This Court affirmed Bogle’s 
convictions and sentences on direct appeal, id. at 1110, and Bogle’s 
death sentence became final in 1995.1 
In his initial postconviction motion, Bogle challenged the hair 
analysis testimony of FBI agent Michael Malone.  Bogle v. State 
(Bogle II), 213 So. 3d 833, 844 (Fla. 2017).   This Court affirmed the 
denial of Bogle’s initial postconviction motion and denied habeas 
relief.  Id. at 855.  In 2014, after he received a 2013 letter from the 
Department of Justice and the FBI regarding Malone’s testimony, 
Bogle again challenged Malone’s testimony in a second successive 
postconviction motion.  Bogle v. State (Bogle III), 288 So. 3d 1065, 
1067 (Fla. 2019).  In this second successive postconviction motion, 
Bogle cited the 2013 letter as newly discovered evidence that 
Malone’s trial testimony overstated the reliability of microscopic 
hair comparison.  Id.  In September 2017, the circuit court entered 
 
 
1.  Bogle v. Florida, 516 U.S. 978 (1995) (cert. denied). 
 
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an order summarily denying Bogle’s second amended successive 
postconviction motion, finding that the newly discovered evidence 
claim regarding the 2013 letter was procedurally barred.  Id. at 
1068.  This Court affirmed the circuit court’s summary denial of 
relief.  Id. at 1069. 
On October 10, 2017, Bogle filed a third successive 
postconviction motion alleging that a 2017 letter from the United 
States Senate Judiciary Committee requesting information from the 
FBI regarding Malone’s testimony constituted newly discovered 
evidence of both Brady2 and Giglio3 violations.  The 2017 letter 
referenced two internal FBI memoranda from 1991 and a third 
memorandum from 1997, but overall the 2017 letter contained the 
same claims about Malone’s testimony that were the subject of 
Bogle’s previous postconviction motion regarding the 2013 letter.  
Bogle argued that the information in the 2017 letter undermines 
confidence in the outcome of his trial and sentencing, and warrants 
an evidentiary hearing and a new trial or sentencing proceeding.  
 
 
2.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
3.  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
 
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The circuit court summarily denied relief on June 17, 2020, 
concluding that Bogle’s claim was procedurally barred.  This appeal 
followed. 
Analysis 
Bogle challenges the summary denial of his newly discovered 
evidence claim based on the 2017 letter.  This Court reviews the 
postconviction court’s decision to summarily deny Bogle’s third 
successive postconviction motion de novo.  Duckett v. State, 231 So. 
3d 393, 398 (Fla. 2017).  Summary denial of a successive 
postconviction motion is appropriate “[i]f the motion, files, and 
records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to 
no relief.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B). 
As we have previously held, Bogle cannot use a successive 
3.851 motion to litigate issues that he could have raised in his 
initial postconviction motion.  Bogle III, 288 So. 3d at 1068 (citing 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2); Schwab v. State, 969 So. 2d 318, 325 
(Fla. 2007)).  The issues which Bogle has raised in the present case 
are not distinguishable from those raised in his previous 
postconviction motions. 
 
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In his first rule 3.851 postconviction motion, Bogle alleged a 
Brady violation because the State did not furnish Malone’s bench 
notes to the defense team.  Bogle II, 213 So. 3d at 844.  The bench 
notes revealed a contradiction with Malone’s hair-matching 
testimony, which Malone explained as a transcription error.  Id.  
This Court concluded that no Brady violation had been 
demonstrated.  Id.  In his second rule 3.851 postconviction motion, 
Bogle alleged that the State withheld exculpatory evidence about 
the asserted unreliability of Malone’s testimony (in violation of 
Brady) and knowingly presented Malone’s “false” testimony (in 
violation of Giglio).  Bogle III, 288 So. 3d at 1068. 
In the present case, Bogle alleges that the 2017 letter 
establishes that the State was aware of the limits of hair 
comparison but still presented Malone’s testimony that overstated 
the results of hair analysis.  The postconviction court concluded 
that the information surrounding the reliability of Malone’s 
testimony has already been “litigated, denied, and affirmed on 
appeal.”  We agree with the postconviction court’s analysis.  Bogle’s 
present complaint regarding the 2017 letter contains nothing that 
was not pursued in Bogle’s previous postconviction motions or at 
 
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the time of his 3.851 evidentiary hearing.  The existence of a new 
document that refers to the same information previously 
determined not to justify relief does not qualify as newly discovered 
evidence.  See Duckett v. State, 231 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2017) (2014 
review of Malone’s hair analysis did not constitute newly discovered 
evidence). 
Because Bogle fails to allege new or different grounds for relief, 
his claim is procedurally barred as successive under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.851(e)(2), which states: 
A motion filed under this rule is successive if a state 
court has previously ruled on a postconviction motion 
challenging the same judgment and sentence.  A claim 
raised in a successive motion shall be dismissed if the 
trial court finds that it fails to allege new or different 
grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the 
merits; or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the 
trial court finds that the failure to assert those grounds 
in a prior motion constituted an abuse of the procedure; 
or, if the trial court finds there was no good cause for 
failing to assert those grounds in a prior motion; or, if the 
trial court finds the claim fails to meet the time limitation 
exceptions set forth in subdivision (d)(2)(A), (d)(2)(B), or 
(d)(2)(C). 
 
Even assuming that Bogle’s claim is not procedurally barred, 
we conclude that Bogle has failed to demonstrate that the alleged 
newly discovered evidence—the 2017 letter—is of such a nature 
 
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that it would likely produce an acquittal on retrial.  First, the hair 
evidence was not the only evidence supporting a conviction in the 
present case.  This Court previously determined that “Bogle had the 
motive to kill Torres and had threatened her life,” Bogle II, 213 So. 
3d at 846, and that Bogle was seen after the murder and “his 
forehead was scratched, his clothes were dirty, and his crotch was 
wet.”  Id. at 838 (quoting Bogle I, 655 So. 2d at 1105).  Moreover, 
“Bogle’s DNA profile was the sole match to the semen found on the 
vaginal swabs [from the victim] . . . .”  Id. at 851.  Finally, 
mitochondrial DNA testing conducted after the trial has now 
confirmed that the pubic hair found on Bogle’s pants was 
consistent with the victim’s profile.  Id. at 843; Bogle III, 288 So. 3d 
at 1069 (“DNA evidence showing that Bogle’s semen was in the 
murder victim’s body and underwear overwhelms the significance of 
Malone’s testimony that a pubic hair of the victim was on Bogle’s 
pants.”).  In light of this evidence, the exclusion of Malone’s hair 
testimony would not have resulted in an acquittal. 
 
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Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the postconviction court’s 
summary denial of Bogle’s third successive motion for 
postconviction relief. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, 
COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County, 
Michelle Sisco, Judge – 291991CF012952000AHC 
 
Todd G. Scher of Law Office of Todd G. Scher, P.L., Hollywood, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Timothy 
A. Freeland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee