Title: Janet Leigh Byers v. Labor and Industry Review Commission
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1995AP002490
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 18, 1997

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-2490 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Janet Leigh Byers, 
 
Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Labor and Industry Review Commission, 
 
Respondent-Co-Appellant, 
Northern Manufacturing Company and  
Paul Norenberg, 
 
Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  200 Wis. 2d 728, 547 N.W.2d 788 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
April 18, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 27, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Burnett 
 
JUDGE: 
James H. Taylor 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by Carol N. Skinner and Bakke Norman, S.C., New 
Richmond and oral argument by Carol N. Skinner.  
 
 
For the respondent-co-appellant the cause was 
argued by David C. Rice, assistant attorney general with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
For the appellants there was a brief by Thomas R. 
Jacobson and Lommen, Nelson, Cole & Stageberg, P.A., Hudson and 
oral argument by Thomas R. Jacobson. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Bruce F. Ehlke 
and Shneidman, Myers, Dowling, Blumenfield, Ehlke, Hawks & Domer, 
Madison for the AFSCME District Council 40. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Steven J. 
Schooler, John C. Talis and Lawton & Cates, S.C., Madison  for 
the AFSCME Council 24. 
 
 
 
No. 95-2490 
 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-2490 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Janet Leigh Byers, 
 
 
Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Labor and Industry Review Commission, 
 
 
Respondent-Co-Appellant, 
 
Northern Manufacturing Company, and Paul 
Norenberg, 
 
 
Appellants. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 18, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals reversing 
a judgment of the Circuit Court for Burnett County, James H. 
Taylor, Judge.
1 The court of appeals held that Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.03(2)(1991-92),
2 the exclusive remedy provision of the 
Worker's 
Compensation 
Act, 
bars 
Janet 
Leigh 
Byers, 
the 
                     
1 Byers v. LIRC, 200 Wis. 2d 728, 547 N.W.2d 788 (Ct. App. 
1996). 
2 All further references are to the 1991-92 Wisconsin 
Statutes.  
 
 
No. 95-2490 
 
 
2 
petitioner, from bringing a claim against Northern Manufacturing 
Company under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, Wis. Stat. Ch. 
111, Subch. II, for employment discrimination on the basis of 
sex.  
¶2 
The sole issue presented is whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.03(2), the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's 
Compensation Act (WCA), bars a claim brought under the Wisconsin 
Fair 
Employment Act (WFEA), 
prohibiting discrimination in 
employment, when the facts 
that 
are 
the 
basis for the 
discrimination claim might also support a worker's compensation 
claim. We answer this question in the negative, concluding that 
the legislature intended that the WCA exclusive remedy provision 
does not bar a claimant whose claim is covered under the WCA 
from pursuing a claim under the WFEA for discrimination in 
employment. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for remand to 
the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC).  
I. 
¶3 
The Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations 
(DILHR) dismissed the petitioner's WFEA claim on the ground of 
lack of jurisdiction and there has been no adjudication on the 
merits of the petitioner's WFEA claim. Accordingly, for purposes 
of this review, we take the facts asserted in the petitioner's 
complaint to be true and set forth the facts as follows.  
¶4 
The petitioner worked as a saw operator at Northern 
Manufacturing Company under the supervision of Paul Norenberg 
(collectively, the employer). The petitioner was involved in a 
consensual 
sexual 
relationship 
with 
a 
co-employee 
until 
 
 
No. 95-2490 
 
 
3 
approximately August, 1990. In the year following the end of the 
relationship the co-employee repeatedly made unsolicited and 
unwelcome sexual advances towards the petitioner at their common 
workplace.  
¶5 
In August 1991 the petitioner obtained a restraining 
order barring the co-employee from contacting her. The following 
day, the petitioner took the restraining order to the employer 
and explained that the co-employee had been harassing her at 
work and that he was to have no contact with her. The petitioner 
reported various incidents of harassment including her abduction 
by the co-employee from the company parking lot. 
¶6 
Despite 
the 
restraining 
order, 
the 
co-employee 
continued to harass the petitioner at work. The petitioner 
confronted the employer on numerous occasions, reporting these 
incidents and asking the employer to take steps to stop the 
harassment. In response, the employer talked to the co-employee 
on a number of occasions but the co-employee continued to harass 
the petitioner at work.  
¶7 
The co-employee was arrested and jailed several times 
between August 1991 and December 1992 for violating the 
restraining order. The employer, however, did not terminate, 
suspend, 
or 
otherwise 
reprimand 
the 
co-employee 
for 
his 
continued acts of sexual harassment. Indeed, the employer 
allowed the co-employee to work at the common workplace under 
work release privileges while serving jail sentences for 
violating the restraining order.  
¶8 
After the employer failed to carry out a promise to 
terminate the co-employee, the petitioner, in consultation with 
 
 
No. 95-2490 
 
 
4 
a psychologist and a psychiatrist, notified the employer that 
she could not return to work while the co-employee continued to 
work at the company. 
¶9 
In 1992 the petitioner filed a complaint with the 
Equal Rights Division of DILHR alleging sex discrimination by 
the employer for allowing the co-employee to sexually harass her 
at work in violation of the WFEA.
3 DILHR found that, for purposes 
of the motion to dismiss, the petitioner had asserted a claim of 
discrimination under the WFEA. Nonetheless, DILHR dismissed the 
petitioner's discrimination complaint on the ground that the WCA 
provided her exclusive remedy for work-related injuries and thus 
DILHR was without jurisdiction to hear her WFEA claim.  
¶10 LIRC affirmed DILHR's order. LIRC relied on previous 
rulings of the commission and on two decisions of the court of 
appeals, Schachtner v. DILHR, 144 Wis. 2d 1, 422 N.W.2d 906 (Ct. 
App. 1988) and Norris v. DILHR, 155 Wis. 2d 337, 455 N.W.2d 665 
(Ct. App. 1990). 
¶11 On review, the circuit court concluded that the 
petitioner had stated a claim under the WFEA which was not 
barred by the WCA exclusive remedy provision. The circuit court 
entered judgment setting aside LIRC’s decision and remanding the 
cause to LIRC for further proceedings.  
                     
3 In 1993 the petitioner filed a claim under the Worker’s 
Compensation Act, alleging that her employer's failure to take 
sufficient action to stop the sexual harassment by her co-
employee 
had 
resulted 
in 
emotional 
injury. 
The 
Worker's 
Compensation Division of DILHR denied her claim and LIRC 
affirmed. LIRC's decision in that case is not part of the 
present case. 
 
 
No. 95-2490 
 
 
5 
¶12 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the judgment 
of the circuit court, holding that the WCA exclusive remedy 
provision precluded the petitioner from bringing a claim under 
the WFEA.  
II. 
¶13 The 
issue 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
presented, 
namely whether the petitioner's discrimination claim under the 
WFEA is barred by the WCA exclusive remedy provision, is a 
question of law. In some cases involving issues of statutory 
interpretation the courts give deference to the interpretation 
of the administrative agency because of the agency's expertise 
in the area. See Sauk County v. WERC, 165 Wis. 2d 406, 421-25, 
477 N.W.2d 267 (1991) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). But although 
LIRC has experience in resolving questions about the exclusive 
remedy provision of the WCA, the courts also have significant 
experience with this subject matter.  
¶14 Therefore we need not in this case defer to LIRC's 
expertise. 
"[W]hen 
this 
court 
is 
as 
competent 
as 
the 
administrative agency to decide the legal question involved" no 
special deference is due the agency's interpretation. Boynton 
Cab Co. v. DILHR, 96 Wis. 2d 396, 405-06, 291 N.W.2d 850 (1980). 
LIRC, the employer and the petitioner acknowledge that the court 
should decide the issue presented without deference to the 
commission's 
decision. 
We 
therefore 
determine 
the 
issue 
presented independently, benefiting from the analyses of DILHR, 
LIRC, the circuit court and the court of appeals. 
III. 
 
 
No. 95-2490 
 
 
6 
¶15 The legislature has adopted two statutes, the WCA and 
the WFEA, to address different kinds of work-related harms and 
to provide different remedies for the harms. One does not expect 
these two statutes to conflict with each other, yet this case 
appears to raise just such a conflict.  
¶16 We begin by noting that neither statute expressly 
mentions the other, yet, as the present case demonstrates, the 
WCA and the WFEA are both potentially applicable to the same set 
of facts. The WCA provides that when the conditions for an 
employer's liability under the Act exist, an employe's right to 
the recovery of compensation shall be the exclusive remedy 
against the employer and any other employe of the same employer. 
The WFEA is silent about its relation to the WCA but appears 
all-encompassing. We are thus left with the problem of whether 
the legislature intended the exclusive remedy provision of the 
WCA to apply to claims brought under the WFEA. 
¶17 In interpreting the two statutes, it is the court’s 
duty to harmonize them in a way that will give effect to the 
legislature's 
intent 
in 
enacting 
both 
statutes. 
City 
of 
Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 193 Wis. 2d 168, 184, 532 N.W.2d 690 
(1995). Because the statutes and the legislative history are 
silent about the relationship between the two acts, resolution 
of any conflict requires consideration of the purposes of the 
two statutes. 
¶18 
The Worker's Compensation Act (WCA) was enacted in 
1911. It provides a broadly applicable method for compensating 
persons who suffer work-related physical and mental injuries. By 
providing for a system of compensation distinct from actions in 
 
 
No. 95-2490 
 
 
7 
tort, the WCA embodies a legislative compromise between the 
interests of employes and employers in regard to work-related 
injuries. County of La Crosse v. WERC, 182 Wis. 2d 15, 29-31, 
513 N.W.2d 579 (1994).  
¶19 The WCA provides an alternative to tort liability, 
making employers strictly liable for injuries encompassed within 
the Act, but limiting the liability to compensation established 
by statute. County of La Crosse, 182 Wis. 2d at 30 and n.4 
(quoting Guse v. A.O. Smith Corp., 260 Wis. 403, 406-07, 51 
N.W.2d 21 (1952)). Under this compromise, employes are assured 
smaller but more certain recoveries than might be available in 
tort actions, while employers are freed from the risk of large 
and unpredictable damage awards. The court has recently stressed 
that courts must "exercise care to avoid upsetting the balance 
of interests achieved by the WCA." Weiss v. City of Milwaukee, 
No. 94-0171, op. at 5-6, (S. Ct. Mar. 4, 1997), 559 N.W.2d 588 
(1997) (citing County of La Crosse, 182 Wis. 2d at 30).  
¶20 The exclusive remedy provision of the WCA, Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.03(2), plays a key part in effecting this legislative 
compromise. The exclusive remedy provision mandates that when 
the conditions for an employer's liability under the WCA exist, 
the employe's right to recover compensation under the WCA shall 
be the employe's exclusive remedy against an employer. Section 
102.03(2) provides:  
 
 
 
No. 95-2490 
 
 
8 
Where such conditions [for an employer's liability 
under the WCA]
4 exist the right to the recovery of 
compensation under this chapter shall be the exclusive 
remedy against the employer, any other employe of the 
same employer and the worker’s compensation insurance 
carrier. 
¶21 
The Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (WFEA) was enacted 
in 1945 and the prohibition against employment discrimination on 
the basis of sex was added in 1961.
5 The WFEA is aimed at 
assuring equal employment opportunities for all persons by 
eliminating certain discriminatory practices.  
¶22 Unlike the WCA, the WFEA is concerned with deterring 
and remedying intangible injuries which rob a person of dignity 
and 
self-esteem 
and 
with 
eliminating 
a 
discriminatory 
environment in the workplace that affects not only the victim of 
discrimination but the entire workforce and the public welfare.
6  
                     
4 The conditions for liability are set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§§ 102.03(1)(a)-(e). We assume for purposes of this decision, 
but do not decide, that the facts underlying the petitioner's 
WFEA claim meet these conditions.  
5 Wis. Stat. § 111.321 provides: "Subject to ss. 111.33 to 
111.36, no employer . . . may engage in any act of employment 
discrimination as specified in s. 111.322 against any individual 
on the basis of . . . sex [or other protected status]."  
Sexual harassment is identified in the Act as a form of 
employment 
discrimination 
because 
of 
sex. 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.36(1)(b). Section 111.36(1)(b) provides that "employment 
discrimination 
because 
of 
sex 
includes . . . [e]ngaging 
in 
sexual 
harassment . . . or 
permitting 
sexual 
harassment 
to 
substantially interfere with an employe's work performance or to 
create an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment." 
6 The Act's declaration of policy begins as follows: 
The legislature finds that the practice of unfair 
discrimination 
in 
employment 
against 
properly 
qualified individuals by reason of their [sex or other 
protected status] substantially and adversely affects 
the general welfare of the state. Employers, labor 
organizations, 
employment 
agencies 
and 
licensing 
agencies 
that 
deny 
employment 
opportunities 
and 
 
 
No. 95-2490 
 
 
9 
¶23 In the WFEA the legislature declared it state policy 
to utilize the full protective force of law to assure the rights 
of all individuals to obtain and enjoy gainful employment free 
from 
employment 
discrimination 
based 
on 
sex 
and 
other 
characteristics. Section 111.31(2) provides as follows: 
 
It is the intent of the legislature to protect by law 
the rights of all individuals to obtain gainful 
employment 
and 
to 
enjoy 
privileges 
free 
from 
employment discrimination because of [sex and other 
protected 
status] 
and 
to 
encourage 
the 
full, 
nondiscriminatory 
utilization 
of 
the 
productive 
resources of the state to the benefit of the state, 
the family and all the people of the state. 
The purpose of the WFEA is to deter and to remedy discriminatory 
conduct of employers which infringes employes' civil rights. The 
legislature has directed that the WFEA is to be liberally 
construed for the accomplishment of this purpose. Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.31(3)
7 
¶24 The purposes of the two statutes are very different. 
The WCA focuses on the employe and his or her work-related 
injury 
while 
the 
WFEA 
focuses 
on 
employer 
conduct 
that 
undermines 
equal 
opportunity 
in 
the 
workplace. 
The 
WCA 
compensates an employe for workplace injury, including mental 
                                                                  
discriminate in employment against properly qualified 
individuals solely because of their [sex or other 
protected status] deprive those individuals of the 
earnings that are necessary to maintain a just and 
decent standard of living.  
 
Wis. Stat. § 111.31(1). 
7 The court has also stated that the language used in the 
WCA "should be liberally construed to effectuate the beneficent 
purposes intended, as can reasonably be done." Waunakee Canning 
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 268 Wis. 518, 526, 68 N.W.2d 25 
(1955). 
 
 
No. 95-2490 
 
 
10
injury; it is designed to relieve the financial burdens of 
injured workers and to protect employers from financial burdens 
by providing them with immunity from tort actions. The WFEA is 
designed 
to 
provide 
statutory 
redress 
for 
employment 
discrimination. The court has stated that a complainant under 
the WFEA acts "as a 'private attorney general' to enforce the 
rights of the public and to implement a public policy that the 
legislature considered to be of major importance." Watkins v. 
LIRC, 117 Wis. 2d 753, 764, 345 N.W.2d 482 (1984). 
¶25 DIHLR has the power to "order such action . . . as 
will 
effectuate 
the 
[WFEA's] 
purpose." 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.39(4)(c). The court has stated that the WFEA "evinces a 
legislative intent that DILHR have authority to fashion an 
appropriate remedy for a victim of discrimination that comports 
with the purposes of the Act." Watkins, 117 Wis. 2d at 763-64 
(attorney fees available under WFEA claim). The WCA, in 
contrast, gives no authority to the administrative agency to 
make a finding of discrimination, to order the employer to 
desist from discrimination, to reinstate an employe who has been 
discriminatorily discharged, actually or constructively, or to 
redress the discriminatory conduct that has been expressly 
defined as contrary to the public policy of this state.  
¶26 Because the WCA does not identify, fully remedy or 
adequately deter an employer's discriminatory conduct, it cannot 
adequately 
address 
discrimination 
in 
the 
workplace. 
Sole 
reliance 
on 
the 
WCA 
would 
neither 
address 
employment 
discrimination nor serve as a deterrent against employment 
discrimination. 
Indeed, 
had 
the 
legislature 
intended 
the 
 
 
No. 95-2490 
 
 
11
purposes of the WFEA to be accomplished through the WCA, 
enactment of the WFEA might have been a hollow legislative 
gesture.  
¶27 The employer in this case argues that the two statutes 
are, at times, applicable to the same set of facts and that 
under such circumstances the legislature intended the WCA to 
trump other statutes regulating the workplace. The exclusive 
remedy provision of the WCA, according to the employer, applies 
in the present case because the petitioner's claim has its roots 
in the workplace and the petitioner seeks remedy under the WFEA 
for a claim encompassed within the WCA. In other words, the 
employer's argument is that only an employe whose claim is not 
covered by the WCA may bring a WFEA claim. 
¶28 We conclude that the legislature intended the WCA 
exclusive remedy provision not to bar the petitioner's sex 
discrimination claim even if her claim were covered under the 
WCA.
8 Our conclusion is based on several factors. 
                     
8 For 
discussions 
of 
worker's 
compensation 
and 
discrimination claims, see Deborah A. Ballam, The Workers' 
Compensation Exclusivity Doctrine: A Threat To Workers' Rights 
under State Employment Discrimination Statutes, 27 Am. Bus. L.J. 
95 (1989); John D. Copeland, Workers' Compensation, Exclusivity, 
and the "Balderdash" Response, 1996 Ark. L. Notes 1; Ruth C. 
Vance, Workers' Compensation and Sexual Harassment in the 
Workplace: A Remedy for Employees, or a Shield for Employers?, 
11 Hofstra Lab. L.J. 141 (1993); Darryll M. Halcomb Lewis, 
Sexual Harassment Under Workers' Compensation Law, 43 Labor L.J. 
297 (1993); Carlos M. Quinones, Workers' Compensation Law—The 
Sexual Harassment Claim Quandary: Workers' Compensation as an 
Inadequate and Unavailable Remedy: Cox v. Chino Mines/Phelps 
Dodge, 24 N.M. L. Rev. 565 (1994); Martha S. Davis, Rape in the 
Workplace, 41 S.D. L. Rev. 411 (1996). 
 
 
No. 95-2490 
 
 
12
¶29 First, this conclusion comports with our goal of 
harmonizing the two statutes. As we explained, the WCA and the 
WFEA address two separate harms. The two statutes should be read 
so 
that 
neither 
statutory 
scheme 
frustrates 
the 
other's 
purposes. The legislature's intent will be upheld by protecting 
the integrity of both statutory schemes and preserving the 
policies of both statutes to the greatest extent possible. We 
should interpret the reach of the WCA exclusive remedy provision 
in a manner that does not effectively abrogate the purposes of 
the WFEA. 
¶30 If we were to interpret the WCA exclusive remedy 
provision as the employer proposes, only employes whose claims 
were not covered under the WCA would be afforded relief under 
the WFEA. Those employes whose claims for physical or mental 
injuries were covered by the WCA, those perhaps most harmed by 
discriminatory conduct violating the WFEA, would be limited to 
worker's compensation. Nothing in the WFEA indicates that its 
effect is to be limited to only those acts of employment 
discrimination which do not result in a claim covered under the 
WCA.  
¶31 The 
employer's 
proposed 
interpretation 
does 
not 
comport with the legislature's expressed policy that the WFEA be 
liberally construed to achieve the important societal goals set 
forth therein. On the other hand, reading the WFEA so that no 
one is excluded from its protection because of the WCA exclusive 
remedy provision, and reading the WCA so that employes receive a 
sure but limited remedy for their work-related injuries and 
 
 
No. 95-2490 
 
 
13
employers remain protected from court actions in tort arising 
out of those injuries gives both statutes maximum effect.  
¶32 Second, the employer's interpretation of the WCA and 
WFEA, namely that no claim covered by the WCA can be the subject 
of a WFEA claim, is contrary to the court's interpretation of 
the WCA.  
¶33 While the supreme court has held that the exclusive 
remedy provision in the WCA was intended to preempt an employe’s 
common law tort claims against her employer,
9 it has not held 
that all actions based on facts forming a claim covered under 
the WCA are barred by the WCA exclusive remedy provision. Indeed 
the court has recognized that the WCA does not bar claims that 
are not in tort. In County of La Crosse, 182 Wis. 2d at 31-32, 
the court held that the exclusive remedy provision of the WCA 
does not bar an employe from seeking arbitration under a 
collective bargaining agreement for a refusal to rehire even 
though the physical injury underlying the collective bargaining 
complaint of termination without proper cause was covered under 
the WCA.  
                     
9 The court has repeatedly stated that § 102.03(2) precludes 
an injured employe from maintaining a negligence action, a 
common law action in tort, against his or her employer and 
fellow employe. See Weiss v. City of Milwaukee, No. 94-0171, op. 
at 6-7 and n.7 (S. Ct. Mar. 4, 1997), 559 N.W.2d 588 (1997) 
(collecting cases).  
LIRC urges the court to disavow Lentz v. Young, 195 Wis. 2d 
457, 536 N.W.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1995), which, LIRC contends, 
improperly suggests that work-related injuries arising from 
intentional conduct are not covered under the WCA. Because we 
assume that the petitioner's claim in the present case is 
covered under the WCA we do not address the issue posed in 
Lentz.  
 
 
No. 95-2490 
 
 
14
¶34 The court of appeals has wrestled with the question of 
whether the WCA exclusive remedy provision bars a claim under 
the WFEA. In Schachtner, 144 Wis. 2d 1, the court of appeals 
rejected the employe's contention that the WCA exclusive remedy 
provision was enacted to limit only an employer's common law 
tort liability. The court of appeals held that the exclusive 
remedy provision of the WCA barred an employe who was refused 
rehire after a work-related injury from pursuing a handicap 
discrimination complaint under the WFEA. The court of appeals 
relied on cases in which the WCA exclusive remedy provision was 
applied to defeat claims for work-related injuries
10 and on 
Professor Larson's treatise, which states that exclusivity 
provisions relieve an employer "of statutory liability under all 
                     
10 The court of appeals relied on cases in which tort 
actions were barred by the exclusive remedy provision and on 
Saxhaug v. Forsyth Leather Co., 252 Wis. 376, 382-83, 31 N.W.2d 
589 (1948), which involved a statute. In Saxhaug, the court held 
that an employe's decedent was barred by the WCA exclusive 
remedy provision from bringing a wrongful death action which 
relied on the safe-place statute, Wis. Stat. § 101.11. Saxhaug 
is not determinative of Schachtner or the present case. 
The safe-place statute is of a different nature than the 
WFEA. Unlike the WFEA, the safe-place statute "does not create a 
cause of action in favor of or against anyone." Holzworth v. 
State, 238 Wis. 63, 68, 298 N.W. 163 (1941). Rather, "[i]t lays 
down a standard of care and if those to whom it applies violate 
the provisions of the statute, they are guilty of negligence." 
Id. Application of the WCA exclusive remedy bar to tort actions 
brought in conjunction with the safe-place statute, as in 
Saxhaug, does not suggest that the WCA exclusive remedy 
provision is intended to preclude all statutory causes of 
actions brought to remedy work-related wrongs. 
The relations between the safe-place statute and the WCA, 
on the one hand, and between the WFEA and the WCA, on the other, 
are too distinct to be instructive in this case. 
 
 
No. 95-2490 
 
 
15
state and federal statutes, as well as of liability in contract 
and in admiralty, for an injury covered by the compensation 
act." Schachtner, 144 Wis. 2d at 7 (quoting 2A A. Larson, 
Worker's Compensation Law, sec. 65.30 (1987)).
11 
¶35 In Norris, 155 Wis. 2d 337, the court of appeals 
allowed an employe 
to bring 
a WFEA 
claim 
for handicap 
discrimination based on a refusal to rehire. The court of 
appeals made clear that the action was not barred by the WCA 
because in Norris, unlike in Schachtner, the facts underlying 
the refusal to rehire did not meet the conditions for an 
employer's liability under the WCA. The court of appeals, 
relying on Schachtner, stated:  
 
We conclude that to the extent that coverage of 
employers' acts overlaps under both Acts, the Worker's 
Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy. To 
hold otherwise would give precedence to an Act which 
does not contain an exclusivity provision over an Act 
that does. The legislature is unlikely to have 
intended such a result.  
Norris, 155 Wis. 2d at 341.  
¶36 LIRC 
argues 
in 
the 
present 
case 
that, 
absent 
reconsideration of Schachtner and Norris, the petitioner states 
a claim for refusal to rehire based on an injury in the course 
                     
11 Professor Larson's 
statement 
that a 
state worker's 
compensation act precludes a claim brought under a federal 
statute appears to be incorrect. The supremacy clause of the 
federal Constitution, U.S. Const. art VI, § 2, requires that any 
conflict between a state and a federal statute be resolved in 
favor of the commands of the federal statute.  
Professor Larson's reference to liability in contract is 
also incorrect in Wisconsin. See County of La Crosse v. WERC, 
182 Wis. 2d 15, 513 N.W.2d 579 (1994) (claim for arbitration 
regarding violations of collective bargaining agreement not 
barred by WCA exclusive remedy provision). 
 
 
No. 95-2490 
 
 
16
of employment, Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3), and that the WCA provides 
the exclusive remedy for such a claim.
12 Relying on Schachtner 
                     
12 Wis. Stat. § 102.35(3) provides:  
Any employer who without reasonable cause refuses to 
rehire an employe who is injured in the course of 
employment, where suitable employment is available 
within the employe's physical and mental limitations, 
upon order of the department and in addition to other 
benefits, has exclusive liability to pay to the 
employe the wages lost during the period of such 
refusal, not exceeding one year's wages.  
 
In County of La Crosse, 182 Wis. 2d at 33-36, the court 
reasoned that a refusal to rehire which was due to an injury 
covered under the WCA but which was distinct in time and place 
from that injury was not controlled by § 102.03(2), the WCA 
exclusive remedy provision, because the refusal to rehire did 
not satisfy all the conditions set forth in § 102.03(1). See 
also Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 2d 615, 
619-20, 273 N.W.2d 220 (1979) (tort action for bad faith in 
processing and paying a worker's compensation claim was not 
barred by the WCA exclusive remedy provision because the tort 
was separate and distinct from the WCA claim). 
We do not rely on this reasoning in the present case 
because of the difficulty of discerning whether the constructive 
discharge alleged is separate and distinct from the emotional 
injury suffered as a result of the sexual harassment. The court 
of appeals and the circuit court appear to have come to opposite 
conclusions on this question. 
The court also held that the "exclusive liability" language 
in § 102.35(3) was not intended to bar law suits but rather to 
impose the penalty for unreasonable refusals to rehire solely on 
the employer rather than on the insurance carrier. County of La 
Crosse, 182 Wis. 2d at 36-37. The court noted, however, that it 
was not presented with the question of whether § 102.35(3) 
precludes an employe who is injured in the course of employment 
from bringing a tort action against an employer for refusal to 
rehire. County of La Crosse, 182 Wis. 2d at 39.  
In County of La Crosse, 182 Wis. 2d at 37, the court did 
not have to overrule Schachtner and Norris because those cases 
involved statutory causes of action and County of La Crosse was 
viewed as a contract claim. The court distinguished Schachtner 
and Norris on the facts presented. 
 
 
No. 95-2490 
 
 
17
and Norris, LIRC contends that because the legislature provided 
for increased compensation under the refusal to rehire provision 
of the WCA, § 102.35(3), application of the exclusive remedy 
provision to the petitioner's constructive discharge claim would 
not abrogate the purposes of the WFEA. At oral argument, counsel 
for LIRC made clear that its argument was premised on the 
court's agreement with Schachtner and Norris. Counsel for LIRC, 
however, urged the court to overrule Schachtner and Norris and 
we agree with LIRC's position.  
¶37 We conclude that we can best preserve the purposes of 
the WCA and the WFEA by steering a different course than did the 
court of appeals in Schachtner and Norris. The holding in 
Schachtner and the reasoning in Norris are clearly inconsistent 
with our analysis today. Because these decisions do not give 
effect to the legislature's intent in enacting the WFEA, we 
overrule Schachtner and disavow the reasoning of Norris.
13  
                     
13 Marson v. LIRC, 178 Wis. 2d 118, 503 N.W.2d 582 (Ct. App. 
1993), and Finnell v. DILHR, 186 Wis. 2d 187, 519 N.W.2d 731 
(Ct. App. 1994), are also inconsistent with our holding today. 
In Marson the court of appeals held that a compromise settlement 
of 
a 
worker's 
compensation 
claim 
precludes 
recovery 
of 
"additional relief for the same injury in an alternative forum," 
in that case, a WFEA handicap discrimination claim. Marson, 178 
Wis. 2d at 128. In Finnell the court of appeals relied on Marson 
to reach the same result. To the extent Marson and Finnell stand 
for the proposition that "[t]he right of the employee to recover 
compensation provided for by worker's compensation is exclusive 
of all remedies against the employer," Marson, 178 Wis. 2d at 
127 (emphasis added), we overrule these cases.  
Because we hold that an employe may pursue a claim under 
the 
WFEA 
when 
the 
facts 
that 
are 
the 
basis 
for 
the 
discrimination claim might also support a WCA claim, the 
possibility of double recovery may arise if claims are brought 
under both statutes. The parties have not addressed the double 
recovery issue, and we do not reach it.  
 
 
No. 95-2490 
 
 
18
¶38 Several other state courts that have addressed the 
issue 
presented 
here 
have 
concluded 
that 
an 
employment 
discrimination claim is not barred by a worker's compensation 
exclusivity provision.
14 In so holding, the Supreme Court of 
Florida stated:  
 
[W]orkers' compensation is directed essentially at 
compensating a worker for lost resources and earnings. 
This is a vastly different concern than is addressed 
by 
the 
sexual 
harassment 
laws. 
While 
workplace 
injuries rob a person of resources, sexual harassment 
robs the person of dignity and self-esteem. Workers' 
compensation addresses purely economic injury; sexual 
harassment laws are concerned with a much more 
tangible injury to personal rights. 
Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Securities, Inc., 552 So. 2d 
1099, 1104 (Fla. 1989). In Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Telephone 
Co., 362 N.W.2d 642, 646 (Mich. 1984), the Supreme Court of 
Michigan reasoned similarly, stating:  
 
Whatever 
may 
have 
been 
the 
intention 
of 
the 
Legislature in enacting the exclusive remedy provision 
of the worker's compensation act, if it intended in 
enacting 
civil 
rights 
legislation 
that 
workers 
discharged in violation of such legislation could 
recover for resulting physical, mental or emotional 
injury that intention would necessarily supersede or 
modify the scope of other legislation that otherwise 
would defeat the intent to permit such recovery. 
¶39 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
legislature intended that the WCA exclusive remedy provision 
                     
14 See, e.g., Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Securities, 
Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1989); Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell 
Telephone Co., 362 N.W.2d 642, 645 (Mich. 1984); Reese v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 731 P.2d 497 (1987), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Phillips v. City of Seattle, 766 P.2d 1099 (Wash. 
1989); Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Inc., 840 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 
1992); Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 575 N.E.2d 428 (Ohio 1991). 
See also Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054, 1065-67 (Cal. 1990) 
(claim for wrongful termination brought under "whistleblower" 
statute 
not 
barred 
by 
worker's 
compensation 
exclusivity 
provision). 
 
 
No. 95-2490 
 
 
19
does not bar a complainant whose claim is covered under the WCA 
from pursuing a discrimination in employment claim under the 
WFEA. We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
and remand the cause to the circuit court for remand to LIRC. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded.