Title: CLARK v HILDE CONSTRUCTION CO
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13845
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: March 27, 1978

No. 13845 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978 GEORGE CLARK, Claimant and Appellant, -vs- HILDE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Emloyer, and TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: Workers' compensation Court, Hon. William E Hunt, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Charles E. Snyder, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole and Dietrich, Billings, Montana H . Elwood English, Billings, Montana Cause Submitted on briefs; March 3, 1978, 1978 Decided: MAR 2 I! 1978 , . .- -2 Filed: M C z % z i - M r . Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court : Claimant appeals the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court, dated April 27, 1977, denying compensation for an alleged injury suffered in the course of h i s employment on July 11, 1975. O n Friday, July 11, 1975, a t approximately 4:00 t o 4:30 p.m., claimant was changing a t i r e on a truck he was operating for Hilde Construction Company, a t a job s i t e 7 or 8 miles north of Lame Deer, Montana. Claimant t e s t i f i e d that while changing the t i r e , he f e l t something "slip" in h i s back. H e received assis- tance from another worker, and proceeded t o complete h i s daily route. Claimant then drove t o h i s home i n Absarokee, Montana. H e t e s t i f i e d that when he arrived, he experienced serious pain i n h i s lower back, and could hardly walk. Claimant's wife, the sole witness t o see claimant during the period of time immediately following the injury, returned t o the family home i n Absarokee on Sunday, July 13, a f t e r a weekend i n Idaho Falls, Idaho. She t e s t i f i e d claimant was i n a great deal of pain and could not stand erect. On Monday, July 14, claimant attempted t o contact h i s foreman concerning the injury, but was unable t o reach him. He then reported the injury t o the secretary of h i s union, so that a replacement worker would be located. Hilde Construction Company received notice of the injury by claimant's claim for compensa- tion, dated August 22, 1975, and received by i t s carrier, Travelers Insurance Company on August 25, 1975. Following the injury, claimant consulted and was .treated by numerous physicians, neurosurgeons, orthopedic specialists and chiropractors. The diagnoses of the respective physicians a r e not clear regarding the nature of claimant's disorder. While some physicians conclude claimant manifests symptoms of multiple sclerosis, others diagnosed the condition as spondylolisthesis-- a defect i n or lack of solid bone i n portions of the spine, usually i n the lower spine. The cause came on for hearing before the Workers' Compensa- tion Court on November 4, 1976. In i t s findings of f a c t and conclusions of law, the Workers' Compensation Court denied compensation t o claimant, finding: "Claimant failed t o prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that he suffered an industrial accident resulting i n a compensable injury that s a t i s - f i e s the requirements of Sections 92-418 Injury o r injured defined; and 92-614(1) '* * * an injury arising out of and i n the course of h i s employment * * * I . " The determinative issue on t h i s appeal is whether claimant suffered a compensable "injury" within the course of h i s employ- ment. W e hold the Workers' Compensation Court was correct in concluding he did not. Section 92-418(1), R.C.M. 1947, s e t s forth the definition of "injury1' for purposes of compensation as : "(1) a tangible happening of a traumatic nature from an unexpected cause, or unusual s t r a i n , resulting i n either external or internal physical harm, and such physical condition as a result therefrom and excluding disease not traceable t o injury * * *.I' To establish a compensable injury, a claimant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the condition was proxi- mately caused by a tangible happening of a traumatic nature from an unexpected cause, o r unusual strain. McAndrews v. Schwartz, (1974), 164 Mont. 402, 523 P.2d 1379. Where a claimant's dis- order or disability is the result of a disease not traceable to a work related injury, it is, as a general rule, not com- pensable under the language of section 92-418(1). McAndrews v. Schwartz, supra; LaForest v. Safeway Stores, Inc., (1966), 147 Mont. 431, 414 P.2d 200. W e find claimant failed to satisfy h i s burden of proving "injury" . The bulk of the medical evidence tends t o establish that claimant's symptoms are the result of multiple sclerosis, a disease which, as presently understood, i s not traceable t o an "injury" such as that claimant purports t o have suffered. Indeed, claimant admitted having been treated for symptoms commonly associated with multiple sclerosis one year prior t o the accident. Claimant simply failed t o prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that h i s physical condition was proximately caused by an industrial injury . A t the hearing of November 4, 1976, D r . Howard E. Hultgren, a Billings chiropractor who had treated claimant, t e s t i f i e d he was of the opinion that claimant was suffering from spondylo- listhesis. D r . Hagen, a Billings orthopedist, also t e s t i f i e d by way of deposition, that claimant was suffering from spondylolisthesis, but the condition had existed prior to the accident as revealed by a comparison of X-rays taken both before and a f t e r the accident. Thus, the workers' Compensation Court could well have concluded the complained of physical condition, even i f not consided a "disease", predated the accident. It i s of course the rule, urged by claimant, that an employee who suffers from a preexisting condition i s entitled t o compensation i f the condition was aggravated or accelerated by an industrial injury. Rumsey v. Cardinal Petroleum, (1975), 166 Mont. 17, 530 P.2d 433; Gaffney v. Industrial Accident Bd., (1955), 129 Mont. 394, 287 P.2d 256; Weakley v. Cook, (1952), 126 Mont. 332, 249 P.2d 926. However, the c r i t i c a l shortcoming of claimant's case, even assuming, arguendo, the preexisting condition and the existence of the symptoms complained o f , is h i s failure t o establish the occurrence of a work related injury. Claimant's ultimate failure of proof of a work related injury is evident, when considering the evidence he failed t o introduce. Claimant clearly failed t o establish that the injury had "arisen out of and in the course of h i s employment" a s required by section 92-614(1), R.C.M. 1947. Williams v. Glacier Park Co., (1962), 140 Mont. 440, 373 P.2d 517. Claimant failed to locate and produce the co-worker who allegedly assisted him i n changing the t i r e following the claimed accident. In addition, the union secretary t o w h o m the accident was reported on Monday, July 14, 1975, was not located, produced a t t r i a l , nor deposed, although claimant was afforded a 30 day period following the hearing t o do so. Therefore, despite the availability of proof, claimant produced no witnesses t o corroborate h i s obviously self-serving testimony concerning the occurrence of the injury during the course of h i s employment. Where weaker evidence is offered, and it appears it was within the power of the offering party t o produce stronger and more satisfactory evidence, the offered evidence, i.e. claimant's testimony regarding the injury, is t o be viewed with d i s t r u s t . Section 93-2001-1, R.C.M. 1947. Further, section 93-1301-7, R.C.M. 1947, establishes the following presumptions: "5. That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse, if produced. "6. That higher evidence would be adverse from in£ erior , being produced . ' I Given the rules of evidence noted above, we conclude the Workers' Compensation Court could properly infer the testimony not produced would be adverse to claimant's position on the issue of whether the injury arose out of the course of his employment. The decision of the workers ' Compensation Court denying compensat ion is aff irmed. We Concur: Chief Justice n f- I . - . - i . . P C Hon. Bernard Thomas, District Judge, sitting.