Title: Steven T. Marbley-El v. State of Indiana
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 71S03-1006-PC-329
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 24, 2010

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Steven T. Marbley-El, pro se  
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Westville, Indiana  
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nicole M. Schuster 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 71S03-1006-PC-329 
 
 
STEVEN T. MARBLEY-EL, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff  below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court,  
No. 71D01-0808-PC-35, 
The Honorable Jane Woodward Miller, Judge  
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 71A03-0907-PC-295 
_________________________________ 
 
June 24, 2010 
 
Per Curiam. 
 
 
Steven Marbley-El pleaded guilty to a robbery he committed in October 2006.  The trial 
court advised him that he was giving up his right to a jury trial on the robbery charges, but did 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Jun 24 2010, 2:28 pm
 
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not advise him he was giving up any right to a jury trial with respect to sentence enhancements.  
Marbley-El was sentenced to six years, which is two years more than the four-year advisory 
sentence for a Class C felony.  See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 (2008 Repl. Vol.).   
 
 
In post-conviction proceedings, Marbley-El argued the absence of a jury-trial  advisement 
about sentence enhancements entitled him to relief.  See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 
(1969) (requiring that a defendant be aware of his right to trial by jury before a trial court accepts 
a guilty plea).  The trial court denied relief and the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished 
memorandum decision.  Marbley-El v. State, No. 71A03-0907-PC-295, slip op. (Ind. Ct. App. 
Nov. 19, 2009), reh’g denied (2010).     
 
 
Marbley-El asserts he was entitled to a jury trial on any factors that enhanced his 
sentence beyond four years.  He relies on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531 
(2004); see also Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679 (Ind. 2005) (holding Indiana’s former 
sentencing scheme to be unconstitutional after Blakely).   
 
 
However, Blakely’s analysis does not apply here because Marbley-El committed the 
robbery after Indiana’s legislature enacted the present “advisory” sentencing scheme.  Courts 
may now impose any sentence within the statutory range for the crime; a sentence at the high end 
of the range under the present scheme is not an “enhanced sentence” for Blakely and Smylie 
purposes.  See, e.g., Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 489 (Ind. 2007).  Therefore, Marbley-
El was not entitled to a jury determination of the factors that led to his six-year sentence, and the 
trial court correctly did not advise him that he was.  
 
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We grant Marbley-El’s petition to transfer jurisdiction, and summarily affirm the Court 
of Appeals.  See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).   
 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.