Title: David Joseph Pittman v. Edwin G. Buss, etc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC08-2486
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: June 30, 2011

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-146 
____________ 
 
DAVID JOSEPH PITTMAN,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-2486 
____________ 
 
DAVID JOSEPH PITTMAN, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
EDWIN G. BUSS, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[June 30, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
David Joseph Pittman appeals the postconviction court‘s order denying his 
motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 to vacate his 
first-degree murder convictions and sentences of death, and he petitions this Court 
 
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for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. 
Const.  We affirm the denial of rule 3.850 relief and deny the habeas petition. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
In this first-degree murder case in which a sentence of death was imposed, 
Pittman appeals the denial of his first rule 3.850 motion, after an evidentiary 
hearing.  The facts of the underlying crimes are set forth in the Court‘s opinion on 
direct appeal: 
 
The record reflects that, shortly after 3 a.m. on May 15, 1990, a 
newspaper deliveryman in Mulberry, Florida, reported to law 
enforcement authorities that he had just seen a burst of flame on the 
horizon.  When the authorities investigated they found the home of 
Clarence and Barbara Knowles fully engulfed in fire.  After the fire 
was extinguished, the police entered the house and discovered the 
bodies of Clarence and Barbara, as well as the body of their twenty-
year-old daughter, Bonnie.  Although all of the bodies were burned in 
the fire, a medical examiner determined that the cause of death in each 
instance was massive bleeding from multiple stab wounds.  In 
addition, the medical examiner testified that Bonnie Knowles' throat 
had been cut.  A subsequent investigation revealed that the fire was 
the result of arson, that the phone line to the house had been cut, and 
that Bonnie Knowles‘ brown Toyota was missing. 
 
A construction worker testified that, when he arrived at work at 
6:30 a.m. on the morning of the fire, he noticed a brown Toyota in a 
ditch on the side of the road near his job site.  Other testimony 
revealed that the location of the Toyota was about one-half mile from 
the Knowles residence.  The worker also observed a homemade 
wrecker, which he later identified as belonging to Pittman, pull up to 
the Toyota and, shortly thereafter, saw a cloud of smoke coming from 
that direction.  Another witness who lived near the construction site 
also saw the smoke and observed a man running away from a burning 
car.  This witness later identified Pittman from a photo-pack as the 
man she saw that morning.  Investigators determined that the car fire, 
like the earlier house fire, was the work of an arsonist. 
 
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At the time of the murders, another of the Knowles‘ daughters, 
Marie, was in the process of divorcing Pittman.  The divorce was not 
amicable and the State introduced testimony that Pittman had made 
several threats against Marie and her family.  The State also produced 
evidence that Pittman had recently learned that Bonnie Knowles had 
tried to press criminal charges against him for an alleged rape that had 
occurred five years earlier. 
 
Carl Hughes, a jailhouse informant, testified that Pittman told 
him that he had gone to the Knowles‘ house on the evening of the 
murders to speak with Bonnie Knowles about the problems he was 
having with her family.  Bonnie let Pittman in the house and, when 
she refused his sexual advances, he killed her to stop her cries for 
help.  Pittman then admitted to killing Barbara Knowles in the 
hallway outside Bonnie‘s bedroom and to killing Clarence in the 
living room as Clarence tried to use the phone.  Pittman also told 
Hughes that he burned the house, stole the Toyota and abandoned it 
on the side of the road, and later returned to the Toyota and burned it 
as well. 
 
The record further reflects that Pittman feared that the police 
suspected his involvement in the murders, and, at the prompting of his 
mother, Pittman turned himself in to the police on the day after the 
murders. 
 
In response to the prosecution's case, the defense presented 
testimony critical of the police investigation and attempted to 
establish that Marie, Pittman‘s former wife, and her new husband had 
a motive to commit the murders.  Pittman testified in his own defense 
and stated that he had nothing to do with the crimes charged. He also 
denied that he had told anyone he had committed the murders.  The 
jury found Pittman guilty of three counts of first-degree murder, two 
counts of arson, and one count of grand theft, and found him not 
guilty of burglary. 
 
In the penalty phase, the State established that Pittman was 
convicted of aggravated assault in 1985. In mitigation, Pittman 
presented the testimony of his mother that he was a difficult child to 
deal with and that she had disciplined him severely.  A clinical 
psychologist testified that Pittman's father was a paranoid 
schizophrenic; that as a child Pittman suffered from a severe attention 
deficit disorder with hyperactivity; and that Pittman has organic 
personality syndrome, which causes paranoia and an unstable mood.  
After hearing this testimony, the jury recommended the death penalty 
 
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for each murder conviction by a vote of 9 to 3.  In his sentencing 
order, the judge found two aggravating circumstances for each 
murder: (1) previous conviction of another capital or violent felony, 
and (2) the murders were heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  The judge then 
expressly rejected the mitigating factors of Pittman‘s being under the 
influence of extreme mental and emotional disturbance [1] and 
                                         
 
1.  Specifically, the trial court‘s findings with respect to mitigating 
circumstances were as follows: 
 
As to mitigating circumstances, the Court finds the following:  
 
1. That the three First Degree Murders for which the Defendant 
is to be sentenced were not committed while the Defendant was under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbances, nor were 
they mitigated by the use of alcohol as suggested.  To the contrary, the 
Court finds the Defendant [a] arranged the visit to his father‘s house 
on the eve of the murders, the first time in months that he had been to 
his father's house; [b] that he left the house by an outside door from a 
locked room; [c] walked the short distance in the early morning hours 
to the victim's home; and [d] there cut the telephone lines to the 
outside of the house.  
 
The Defendant upon entering the victim‘s home, systematically 
killed all the occupants of the house using a weapon that assured the 
least possibility of drawing the attention of witnesses.  He then 
proceeded in a knowledgeable way to pour gasoline about the house 
and out into the yard.  Testimony at the trial revealed that he 
understood the use of fire to destroy evidence.  Before setting the fire, 
however, he secured the keys to Bonnie Knowles car for the purpose 
of his getaway.  
 
The Defendant‘s actions and all other evidentiary circumstances 
considered show a direct conscious plan to kill and avoid 
apprehension.  These actions do not indicate a person functioning 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbances.  In 
regard to the influence of alcohol, other than the expert's opinion, the 
record does not reflect it to have been a factor in the commission of 
the murders.  
 
2. Except for the solicited opinions of the Defendant's expert 
that the Defendant's capacity to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law was substantially impaired, this mitigating 
circumstance is unsupported by any other evidence in the record.  
 
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To the contrary, these facts reveal that all the actions by the 
Defendant leading up to the killings, the nature of the killings 
themselves, the methodical steps taken to destroy evidence, to 
effectuate a getaway, and to establish an alibi were the product of 
deliberate thought.  These actions clearly show that the Defendant 
knew what he was doing and that it was unlawful.  Again the presence 
of alcohol as a mitigating factor is unsupported by the record except 
for the expert's opinion.  
 
THE COURT finds there is nothing in the record to 
demonstrate that the Defendant could not conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law.  
 
3. The expert has offered an opinion as a mitigating 
circumstance that the Defendant suffers brain damage.  Other than this 
opinion there exists no corroborating evidence to suggest the presence 
of this damage or its degree, nor its actual relationship to the murders.  
 
4. Additional mitigating circumstances offered in evidence are 
that the Defendant was and may still be a hyperactive personality, and 
that he may have suffered physical and sexual abuse as a child.  Also 
the expert testified that the Defendant was an impulsive person with 
memory problems and impaired social judgment.  
 
Taking all these mitigating circumstances in a light most 
favorable to the Defendant, the Court finds they have little if any 
connection to the murders.  The record speaks clearly of an individual 
who went about the killings and the destruction of evidence in a 
deliberate, methodical and efficient manner to such an extent that 
detection was nearly avoided.  But for a lady picking roses early one 
morning who happened to see the Defendant running from Bonnie 
Knowles' burning car, the case might not have been successfully 
prosecuted.  
 
While addressing meaningful facts, the record reflects another 
that enlightens upon the issues of the Defendant‘s intentions and his 
capacity to understand what he was doing was unlawful.  That fact 
was the Defendant's cutting of the telephone lines.  This was admitted 
by the Defendant to witness Hughes as being done before the 
Defendant entered the home of the victims.  
 
THE COURT, therefore, finds the aggravating circumstances 
established by the proper burden of proof to substantially outweigh all 
mitigating circumstances reflected in the record. 
 
 
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concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the proven 
mitigating factors.  The judge imposed the death penalty for each 
murder. 
 
Pittman v. State, 646 So. 2d 167, 168-69 (Fla. 1994).  On direct appeal, Pittman 
raised ten issues.2  The Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. 
 
Pittman filed a rule 3.850 motion in 1997 and then filed an amended motion 
in 2001.  After holding a Huff 3 hearing in March 2002, the postconviction court 
ruled that an evidentiary hearing was required on claims 1, 2, 3 and 7,4 and the 
                                                                                                                                   
Pittman v. State, 646 So. 2d 167, 169 n.2 (Fla. 1994). 
 
2.  The issues, as set forth in the Court‘s opinion on direct appeal, were as 
follows: 
 
The issues are as follows: (1) whether the trial court erred in 
allowing evidence of collateral crimes and bad acts; (2) whether the 
trial court erred in admitting identification testimony; (3) whether the 
trial court erred in excluding hearsay statements of a third party's 
alleged confession; (4) whether the trial court failed to hold a 
presentencing hearing; (5) whether the trial court rendered a legally 
insufficient sentencing order; (6) whether the heinous, atrocious or 
cruel aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally vague; (7) 
whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the heinous, 
atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance; (8) whether the trial 
court erred in failing to find the two statutory mental mitigating 
circumstances; (9) whether the trial court erred in failing to find 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances; (10) whether the death penalty 
is disproportionate in this case.  
Pittman, 646 So. 2d at 170 n.3. 
 
3.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
4.  Those claims, as denoted in the postconviction court‘s order denying 
relief, were as follows: (1) Pittman was deprived of his rights because either the 
 
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court summarily denied the remaining claims.  Pittman then filed a further 
amended motion in 2005, and the court, after holding a second Huff hearing in 
January 2006, again ruled that an evidentiary hearing was required on claims 1, 2, 
3 and 7.  The court held the evidentiary hearing on May 8-11, 2006.5  The court 
                                                                                                                                   
State failed to disclose evidence that was material and exculpatory or knowingly 
presented misleading evidence, or defense counsel unreasonably failed to discover 
and present exculpatory evidence, or the favorable evidence constitutes newly 
discovered evidence; (2) Pittman was deprived of his rights because either the 
State withheld evidence that was material and exculpatory in nature or presented 
misleading and false evidence, or defense counsel unreasonably failed to discover 
and present exculpatory evidence, or the favorable evidence constitutes newly 
discovered evidence; (3) Pittman was denied effective assistance of counsel in the 
guilt phase of the trial in that counsel failed to effectively investigate and prepare 
the case and failed to effectively challenge the testimony of a crucial state witness; 
and (7) Pittman was denied effective assistance of counsel in the sentencing phase 
of the trial in that counsel was rendered ineffective by the trial court‘s and State‘s 
actions, counsel failed to adequately investigate and prepare mitigating evidence, 
failed to provide the mental health experts with this mitigation, and failed to 
adequately challenge the State‘s case, and counsel failed to adequately object to 
Eighth Amendment error. 
 
5.  At the evidentiary hearing, the following witnesses testified for the 
defense: Carlos Battles, who was previously a child protective investigator with the 
Florida Department of Children and Families, testified concerning his investigation 
of Cindy Pittman whose mother told Battles that the child had witnessed her 
grandmother being killed by her ―brother-in-law‖ or by her ―uncle‖; Thomas 
Cosper, who was  previously a homicide detective for the Polk County Sheriff‘s 
Office, testified concerning various defense exhibits; Kathleen Anders, the ex-wife 
of inmate Carl Hughes, testified concerning statements that Hughes had made to 
her concerning the Pittman case; Dennis Gerald Waters testified concerning his 
trial testimony with respect to a disabled auto that he had seen on the side of the 
road and a wrecker he seen in the vicinity; James Troup testified concerning his 
trial testimony with respect to a burning auto he had seen on the side of the road; 
Tillie Amos Woody, a retired school teacher, testified concerning Pittman‘s 
behavior as a student in middle school; Robert Barker testified that when Pittman 
 
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was young he spent a lot of time at a junkyard Barker owned and later worked for 
Barker; Dr. Wu, a medical doctor, testified concerning the results of a PET scan of 
Pittman‘s brain; Jean Wesley, a teacher, testified concerning Pittman‘s 
performance in her class for emotionally handicapped and autistic children when 
Pittman was eleven or twelve years old; Michael Eugene Pittman, David‘s half 
brother, testified concerning David‘s life as a young child and teenager; Tammie 
Lynn Davis, who was five to seven years younger than David and was practically 
raised by David‘s mother and who testified at trial, testified concerning David‘s 
life as a teenager and young adult and certain events surrounding the murders; 
William Pittman, who is David‘s half brother and who testified at trial, testified 
concerning David‘s drug use and sexual abuse at the hands of an employer; Dr. 
Dee, a clinical psychologist and clinical neuropsychologist and who testified at 
trial, testified concerning the status of David‘s mental health; Hardy Pickard, an 
assistant state attorney who worked on the Pittman case, testified at length 
concerning various matters relating to the case; Raymond Reyome, a former 
inmate who was in jail pod 227 with Pittman, testified that he never saw Pittman 
discussing his case with anyone; David Pounds, a former jail inmate who was in 
the pod with Pittman and who testified at trial, testified that he, Pounds, was 
mentally ill at the relevant time and that he now has no memory of Pittman talking 
to him; John Thomas Schneider testified that he was a jail inmate in pod 227 with 
both Pittman and Carl Hughes and that Pittman kept his legal papers under the bed 
Hughes slept on and that Schneider saw Hughes reading the papers and writing 
things down and when he confronted Hughes about it Hughes said that Pittman had 
given him permission and that one night while Pittman was sleeping Hughes was 
reading his papers and Schneider woke Pittman and told him and that Schneider 
and Hughes then got into a fight because Hughes denied saying that Pittman had 
given him permission and that after the fight Hughes was transferred out of the 
pod; and Robert Norgard, Pittman‘s trial counsel, testified at length concerning 
various matters relating to the case. 
 
The following witness testified for the State: Martin Hodges, an investigator 
for the state attorney‘s office, testified that he interviewed Pounds prior to the 
evidentiary hearing, and that Pounds said he had been planning on changing his 
testimony because he did not believe in the death penalty and because he felt sorry 
for Pittman, but that he had decided against it because he would be lying and he 
did not want it to come back on him and that he had testified truthfully at trial. 
 
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also held a limited evidentiary hearing on a sub-claim on February 15, 2007.6  
Pittman subsequently filed an additional amendment in March 2007, raising two 
lethal injection claims, and the court held a third Huff hearing in April 2007.  The 
court ruled that an evidentiary hearing was not required on the new claims.  
Pittman then filed an additional amendment in June 2007, raising a newly 
discovered evidence claim with respect to witness Chastity Eagan.  The court held 
a fourth Huff hearing in June 2007 and ruled that an evidentiary hearing was 
required on this claim.  The court held the evidentiary hearing on July 27, 2007.7  
Several months later, on November 5, 2007, the court entered an order denying 
                                         
 
6.  At the evidentiary hearing, the following witnesses testified for the 
defense: Hardy Pickard, an assistant state attorney (ASA) who had worked on the 
Pittman case, testified concerning his notes with respect to Barbara Marie Pridgen, 
David Pittman‘s ex-wife; and Robert Norgard, Pittman‘s trial counsel, testified that 
Pickard‘s notes concerning Marie were never disclosed to him. 
 
7.  At the evidentiary hearing, the following witnesses testified for the 
defense: Chastity Eagan, whose mother lived with Marie Prigden for more than a 
year, testified that Marie did not act upset that her mother, father and sister had 
been killed but rather said she was glad they were dead because they had been 
working with a state agency to take her kids from her and that Marie had received 
some money after their deaths and had gone on a spending spree and that David 
Pridgen had said he killed three people; Rosa Greenbaum, a criminal defense 
investigator, testified that she had tried to locate Chastity Eagan before the July 
2006 evidentiary hearing but that Ms. Eagan‘s probation officer did not know 
where she could be located; and David Wayne Pridgen testified that he was at Fort 
Bragg, North Carolina, when the murders took place and that he did not recall 
telling Ms. Eagan that he had killed three people but that he may have been 
referring to his tour of duty in the Gulf War. 
 
The following witness testified for the State: John Van Shuman, a friend of 
David Pridgen‘s, testified that he had never heard David say that he killed three 
people. 
 
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postconviction relief.  Pittman filed the present appeal, raising nine guilt phase 
issues and three penalty phase issues.8  He also filed the present habeas petition, 
raising six issues.9 
                                         
 
8.  Pittman raises the following guilt phase claims in his present appeal: (1) 
whether the postconviction court erred in denying his claim under Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83(1963), with respect to inmate Carl Hughes; (2) whether the 
postconviction court erred in denying his Brady claim with respect to inmate David 
Pounds; (3) whether the postconviction court erred in denying his Brady claim 
with respect to the handwritten notes of other witness interviews; (4) whether the 
postconviction court erred in denying his Brady claim with respect to Dennis 
Waters‘ identification of the wrecker; (5) whether the postconviction court erred in 
denying his Brady claim with respect to the letter concerning William Smith; (6) 
whether the postconviction court erred in denying relief based on the cumulative 
effect of all the withheld and newly discovered evidence; (7) whether the 
postconviction court erred in denying his Giglio v. United States,405 U.S. 150 
(1972), claim; (8) whether the postconviction court erred in denying his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim; and (9) whether the postconviction court erred in 
denying his newly discovered evidence claim. 
 
Pittman also raises the following penalty phase claims: (10) whether the 
postconviction court erred in denying his Brady claim; (11) whether the 
postconviction court erred in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim; 
and (12) whether the postconviction court erred in denying his newly discovered 
evidence claim. 
 
9.  Pittman raises the following claims in his present habeas petition: (1) 
whether appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the sufficiency of 
the evidence; (2) whether the Florida Supreme Court erred in affirming the 
exclusion of certain evidence; (3) whether the Florida Supreme Court erred in 
affirming Pittman‘s convictions and sentences where the State withheld pertinent 
facts; (4) whether appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that 
Pittman‘s death sentences were based on an improper aggravator; (5) whether 
appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that the prosecutor used 
improper argument in the penalty phase; and (6) whether appellate counsel was 
ineffective in failing to argue that the penalty phase jury was misled by improper 
comments and instructions. 
 
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II.  APPEAL OF RULE 3.850 MOTION 
A.  Brady Claim Concerning Carl Hughes 
 
In this claim, Pittman asserts that the postconviction court erred in denying 
his Brady claim with respect to inmate Carl Hughes.  The United States Supreme 
Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), held that a prosecutor must 
disclose material information that is favorable to the defense.  To establish a Brady 
violation, a defendant must show the following: (1) the State suppressed evidence, 
either exculpatory or impeaching, that was favorable to the defense; (2) the State 
did so either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the defendant was prejudiced.  
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).  To satisfy the prejudice prong, 
the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that had the suppressed 
evidence been disclosed the jury would have reached a different verdict.  Id.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient ―to undermine confidence in the 
verdict.‖   Id. at 290 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley,514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)).   A 
court‘s decision with respect to a Brady claim is a mixed question of law and fact, 
and a reviewing court will defer to the lower court‘s factual findings if they are 
supported by competent, substantial evidence, but will review the court‘s 
application of law to facts de novo, Mordenti v. State, 894 So. 2d 161, 168 (Fla. 
2004); Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 913 (Fla. 2000), and the reviewing court will 
 
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review the cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence de novo.  Mordenti, 894 
So. 2d at 168.   
 
In this claim, Pittman asserts that the State failed to disclose certain evidence 
with respect to inmate Carl Hughes, including the following: (1) certain facts 
concerning Hughes‘ ex-wife, Kathleen Anders; (2) Assistant State Attorney (ASA) 
Pickard‘s letter dated October 11, 1990, to Detective Cosper; (3) Cosper‘s 
handwritten notes of a July 6, 1990, interview with Hughes; and (4) Hughes‘ 
presentence investigation report.  Pittman asserts that the postconviction court 
erred in denying relief on this claim.  This issue was addressed at length at the 
evidentiary hearing below, and the postconviction court ruled as follows: 
 
The Defendant alleges that Carl Hughes, who testified against 
Mr. Pittman at the trial, was placed with Mr. Pittman so that he could 
assist the State.  The defense argues that Mr. Hughes acted as a State 
agent and that the State‘s action in placing Mr. Hughes with Mr. 
Pittman violated Mr. Pittman‘s Sixth Amendment rights.  The 
Defendant alleges that the State withheld favorable evidence 
concerning Carl Hughes a witness for the State at the Defendant‘s 
trial.  Mr. Hughes testified at trial that the Defendant had confessed to 
the murders he was charged with.  Mr. Hughes‘s ex-wife, Kathleen 
Anders, was called by the defense as a witness at the evidentiary 
hearing.  Ms. Anders testified that Mr. Hughes asked her for money 
when he was incarcerated at the Polk County Jail and became angry 
with her when she said she didn‘t have the money.  Ms. Anders 
testified that Mr. Hughes told her he was trying to keep her from 
being arrested, and he had been asked by the Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement to obtain information regarding the Pittman case.  
Ms. Anders testified that Mr. Hughes told her that she was under 
surveillance.  Ms. Anders testified that she spoke with Assistant State 
Attorney David Bergdoll and was given a polygraph test.  At the 
evidentiary hearing, Assistant State Attorney Hardy Pickard testified 
 
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that he did not recall learning of any polygraph being given to Ms. 
Anders or about any potential criminal charges against her.  Ms. 
Anders said she was in contact with FDLE agent Randy Dey, and she 
did not recall if Mr. Hughes asked her to tell Mr. Dey that he had 
some information on Pittman.  Ms. Anders testified that she did 
frequently relay messages back and forth between Mr. Hughes and 
Mr. Dey, but they were not related to Mr. Pittman‘s case.  Mr. 
Norgard, the Defendant‘s trial counsel testified at the evidentiary 
hearing that if he had known of a threat of criminal prosecution to Mr. 
Hughes‘ wife by the State Attorney‘s office or law enforcement it 
would have been an area of impeachment he would have gone into, 
and he would have wanted to contact Mr. Hughes‘ wife to inquire 
about the threat.  At the trial, Mr. Hughes testified that he did not get 
any rewards or incentives for testifying.  Mr. Norgard testified that if 
he had contacted Ms. Anders and learned that Hughes had said he 
needed to get information against Mr. Pittman to save her from 
prosecution, he would have pursued the evidence as indicating that 
Mr. Hughes was an agent within the meaning of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment. 
 
A review of the direct and cross-examination of Mr. Hughes at 
trial shows that any purported deal Mr. Pittman thinks Mr. Hughes 
received was addressed on direct examination and cross-examination 
at trial.  On cross-examination it was brought out that Mr. Hughes had 
written a letter to the sentencing judge prior to his sentencing letting 
him know of his cooperation with FBI, and FDLE on HUD cases and 
in the David Pittman case.  It was also brought out that ASA Bergdoll 
told the court at sentencing that looking at the cooperation and full 
magnitude of his case they had arrived at a recommendation of 6 years 
rather than 85 years. . . .  Even assuming the undisclosed evidence 
regarding Ms. Anders had some impeachment value, the Court finds 
that the Defendant has not shown any reasonable probability that this 
information weakens the case against the Defendant so as to give rise 
to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability or might have led to a 
different jury verdict. 
 
The Defendant alleges that . . .  a letter from Mr. Pickard to 
Detective Cosper addressing the possibility of holding Mr. Hughes in 
contempt if he refused to testify constituted Brady material and should 
have been disclosed to defense counsel.  The Court does not find that 
this letter constitutes Brady material.  This matter was specifically 
 
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addressed at trial, and Mr. Hughes admitted that he knew he could be 
incarcerated for more time for contempt if he refused to testify. 
 
The Defendant alleges that  . . . some handwritten notes of an 
interview Detective Cosper had with Mr. Hughes on July 6, 1990, 
constituted Brady material.  The defense particularly focused on a 
handwritten note by Detective Cosper that said ―real off on time of 
occurrence.‖  The defense argues that they were not advised that the 
interview took place, and information showing more contact between 
Mr. Hughes and law enforcement was important because it could be 
used to show that Mr. Hughes‘ story improved as he met with law 
enforcement.  At the evidentiary hearing, the defense was not able to 
elicit any further information from Mr. Cosper regarding what he 
might have meant by, ―real off on time of occurrence.‖  Mr. Pickard 
testified that he may not have been aware of all the contacts Detective 
Cosper had with Mr. Hughes.  The court does not find that this note 
constitutes material information under Brady.  The Court does not 
find that the evidence could have any reasonable probability of 
producing a different outcome at the trial. 
 
The Defendant alleges that . . .  Mr. Hughes‘ PSI prepared in 
his State Court case constitutes Brady material that should have been 
disclosed to the defense.  Defense Counsel Robert Norgard testified 
that he could have filed a motion requesting Mr. Hughes‘ PSI.  The 
defense has not shown that defense counsel could not have obtained 
the PSI through the exercise of reasonable diligence, and the Court 
finds no Brady violation. 
 
 
Based on this record, we conclude that Pittman has failed to show that the 
postconviction court erred in denying this claim.  Pittman has failed to show that 
the State suppressed admissible evidence that was favorable to the defense, that the 
State did so either willfully or inadvertently, and that the defendant was thereby 
prejudiced.  Specifically, Pittman has failed to show that, had the evidence been 
disclosed, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a 
 
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different verdict.  Under the above standard of review, Pittman has failed to show 
that the State committed a Brady violation with respect to this claim.   
B.  Brady Claim Concerning David Pounds  
 
In this claim, Pittman asserts that the State failed to disclose certain evidence 
with respect to inmate David Pounds, including the following: (1) Pounds‘ PSI and 
jail and prison records, and (2) Detective Cosper‘s notes concerning a June 18 or 
19, 1990, interview with Pounds.  Pittman asserts that the postconviction court 
erred in denying relief on this claim.  This issue was addressed at length at the 
evidentiary hearing below and the postconviction court ruled as follows: 
 
The Defendant alleges that there was undisclosed impeachment 
evidence regarding witness David Pounds.  Mr. Pounds testified at the 
Defendant‘s trial for the State.  The Defense claims that the State 
improperly withheld David Pounds‘ 1990 PSI, which included a 
detailed psychological history of Pounds and could have been used to 
address the mental health of Mr. Pounds.  Assistant State Attorney 
Hardy Pickard testified that he never looked into Mr. Pounds‘ mental 
health issues.  Mr. Norgard testified at the evidentiary hearing that if 
he had been aware of information in the PSI regarding Mr. Pounds‘ 
mental health he would have explored it through discovery to see how 
he could use it to impeach Mr. Pounds at the trial.  Defense counsel 
did not ask the Court to provide the PSI to the defense.  The defense 
has not shown that defense counsel could not have obtained the PSI 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence, and the Court finds no 
Brady violation. 
 
Mr. Pounds listed the names of other people he thought might 
have been in the jail pod along with him and Mr. Pittman in a 
transcript of a taped statement taken on June 25, 1990.  Mr. Pounds 
included the name of Carl Hughes as one of the people.  The defense 
tried unsuccessfully to obtain information regarding the jail records 
and alleges that the State was in possession of a police report 
concerning jail locations and recreation yard schedules for May 18-21, 
 
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1990, that should have been provided to the defense.  The exhibit 
showed that Carl Hughes was not listed as being in the jail at the time.  
The defense alleges that the jail roster could have been used to locate 
inmate Reyome and impeach David Pounds by demonstrating that Mr. 
Hughes was never in the same jail pod with Mr. Pounds.  The jail log 
would not have shown that Mr. Pittman and Hughes were never 
together, or that Mr. Pounds and Mr. Hughes were never together.  
Mr. Reyome‘s testimony at the evidentiary hearing indicated that 
inmates in Pod 227 could see and talk to inmates in Pod 228. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing, Assistant State Attorney Pickard 
testified that he was unaware of Detective Cosper‘s handwritten notes 
of his interviews with David Pounds on June 4, 1990, June 18, 1990, 
and June 25, 1990.  Police reports and Pound‘s taped statements to 
law enforcement on June 4, 1990, and June 25, 1990, were disclosed 
to the defense at the time of the trial.  The defense alleges that the 
State violated Brady by not providing Detective Cosper‘s handwritten 
notes, which indicated he may have interviewed Pounds on June 18, 
1990.  In a 1990 deposition, Detective Cosper acknowledged only two 
interviews with David Pounds.  At the time of trial, David Pounds 
indicated that Detective Cosper only spoke to him twice.  Detective 
Cosper‘s handwritten notes of June 18, 1990, are very abbreviated and 
appear to do nothing more than confirm contact information and 
coincide with Detective Cosper‘s arrangement to interview Pounds at 
the DOC reception center.  At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Norgard 
discussed as an example of impeachment a reference to Carl Hughes 
in Mr. Pound‘s June 25 statement, and its relationship to undisclosed 
evidence demonstrating that Mr. Pounds and Mr. Hughes were not in 
the jail pod together with Mr. Pittman.  As indicated above, the State 
Attorney‘s office was not aware of the handwritten notes of Detective 
Cosper.  At the evidentiary hearing, Detective Cosper was not able to 
provide any relevant information to further explain the notes he took 
at the three interviews.  The Court does not find . . . anything in the 
[handwritten] notes that could reasonably be taken to put the case in 
such a different light that it undermines confidence in the verdict. 
 
The defense alleges that the newly discovered information 
regarding David Pounds undermines confidence in the outcome of Mr. 
Pittman‘s trial.  The Court does not find that the evidence could have 
any reasonable probability of producing a different outcome at the 
trial. 
 
- 17 - 
 
The Defendant‘s allegations with regard to ineffective 
assistance of counsel are addressed more fully in [a different claim].  
However, the Court does not find that the evidence supports a 
conclusion that trial counsel‘s performance with regard to discovering 
this information with regard to Mr. Pounds falls below an objective 
standard of reasonableness, or that but for his errors the outcome 
might have been different. 
 
 
Based on this record, we conclude that Pittman has failed to show that the 
postconviction court erred in denying this claim.  Pittman has failed to show that 
the State suppressed admissible evidence that was favorable to the defense, that the 
State did so either willfully or inadvertently, and that the defendant was thereby 
prejudiced.  Specifically, Pittman has failed to show that, had the evidence been 
disclosed, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a 
different verdict.  Under the above standard of review, Pittman has failed to show 
that the State committed a Brady violation with respect to this claim. 
C.  Brady Claim Concerning the Handwritten Notes 
 of Other Witness Interviews 
 
 
In this claim, Pittman asserts that the State failed to disclose the notes of 
witness interviews, including the following: (1) notes taken by Dectective Cosper 
and ASA Pickard during a May 31, 1990, interview with Barbara Marie Pittman in 
which she indicated that her sister, the victim Bonnie, was known for ―making up 
physical ailments,‖ and in which she indicated that Pittman ―and my parents had 
[a] pretty good relationship‖; and (2) notes showing the correct address of Aaron 
Gibbons, a witness concerning the George Hodges letter.  Pittman asserts that the 
 
- 18 - 
postconviction court erred in denying relief on this claim.  This issue was 
addressed at the evidentiary hearing below and the postconviction court ruled as 
follows: 
Defendant alleges that notes taken by Detective Cosper of an 
interview of Marie Pittman, Defense exhibit 13, indicated that Marie 
Pittman told him that Bonnie made up physical ailments.  The defense 
alleges this statement by Marie was never disclosed to them.  The 
defense alleges that had this information been provided to the defense 
they could have argued to the jury that the rape allegation was another 
example of Bonnie‘s fabrications or was being used to strengthen 
Marie‘s position in a pending divorce and custody battle. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing Detective Cosper was not able to add 
to the information contained in his abbreviated notes, and the State 
Attorney‘s office was not aware that these notes existed.  The Court 
[finds that] . . . [a]lthough the notes might contain some information 
that might be considered favorable to the defense, there is no 
reasonable probability that the jury verdict would have been different 
had the suppressed information been used at trial. 
 
Mr. Pittman also alleges that the State withheld information 
from Mr. Cosper‘s notes that Mr. Pittman had a good relationship 
with Marie Pittman‘s parents. . . .  [However,] the statement regarding 
Mr. Pittman‘s relationship with his wife‘s parents does not indicate 
what period of time is being discussed.  At the evidentiary hearing 
Detective Cosper was not able to add to the information contained in 
his abbreviated notes, and the State Attorney‘s office was not aware 
that these notes existed.  The Court [finds that] . . . [a]lthough the 
notes might contain some information that might be considered 
favorable to the defense, there is no reasonable probability that the 
jury verdict would have been different had the suppressed information 
been used at trial. 
 
. . . . 
 
The Defendant also alleges that the State withheld information 
from the defense concerning its investigation of the George Hodges 
letter.  The Defendant alleges that the State withheld evidence 
contained in a note from Dee Dee Wright to Mr. Pickard advising him 
that Mr. Gibbons had not taken off, and he had moved to a specific 
address.  The Defendant alleges this information was intentionally 
 
- 19 - 
withheld from the defense in order to keep them from having further 
access to Mr. Gibbons. . . . 
 
The Defendant alleges the information that was withheld clearly 
contributed to the trial court‘s decision to exclude the evidence.  The 
Defendant argues that had everything been revealed to the defense, 
the defense would have been permitted to present Mr. Watson‘s 
confession to the murder.  At the evidentiary hearing Assistant State 
Attorney Pickard testified that he had no knowledge of Mr. Gibbons 
supposedly taking off, and he said that both Mr. Gibbons and Mr. 
Watson showed up in court for a hearing that was held with regard to 
the George Hodges letter.  The Court finds that the defense has not 
supported any reason to believe the trial court‘s decision to exclude 
the evidence would have been affected by disclosure of this 
information. 
 
 
Based on this record, we conclude that Pittman has failed to show that the 
postconviction court erred in denying this claim.  The court‘s factual findings are 
supported by competent, substantial evidence and the court properly applied the 
law.  Pittman has failed to show that the State suppressed admissible evidence that 
was favorable to the defense, that the State did so either willfully or inadvertently, 
and that the defendant was thereby prejudiced.  Specifically, Pittman has failed to 
show that, had the evidence been disclosed, there is a reasonable probability that 
the jury would have reached a different verdict.  Under the above standard of 
review, Pittman has failed to show that the State committed a Brady violation with 
respect to this claim. 
D.  Brady Claim Concerning Dennis Waters‘ 
 Identification of the Wrecker 
 
 
- 20 - 
 
In this claim, Pittman asserts that the State failed to disclose the fact that 
Dennis Waters had advised law enforcement officers that his identification of the 
wrecker as belonging to Pittman was uncertain.  Pittman asserts that the 
postconviction court erred in denying relief on this claim.  This issue was 
addressed at the evidentiary hearing below and the postconviction court ruled as 
follows: 
 
The defense alleges that there is new information that could be 
used to impeach the testimony of witness Dennis Waters.  At the 
evidentiary hearing, Dennis Waters testified that he was concerned 
that his testimony at the trial did not convey the doubt he had 
regarding the wrecker he saw on the morning after the murders.  Mr. 
Waters testified that he had advised law enforcement officers of his 
doubts that the wrecker was in fact Mr. Pittman‘s wrecker.  In pre-trial 
deposition on December 27, 1990, Mr. Waters identified the wrecker 
he saw at Mr. Barker‘s place as being similar to the wrecker he saw 
on Prairie Mine Road.  At trial, Mr. Waters identified the wrecker as 
being the same wrecker after noting some distinctive Bondo on the 
hood.  The defense claims that information that Mr. Waters‘ 
identification was equivocal could have been used as valuable 
impeachment.  Although Mr. Norgard testified at the evidentiary 
hearing that he was unaware of any information that Mr. Waters‘ 
identification of the wrecker was equivocal, the equivocal nature of 
Mr. Waters‘ deposition had already put the defense on notice that he 
had vacillating levels of certainty on the matter.  The Court finds the 
defense‘s allegation of a Brady violation in this matter to be without 
merit.  
 
 
Based on this record, we conclude that Pittman has failed to show that the 
postconviction court erred in denying this claim.  The court‘s factual findings are 
supported by competent, substantial evidence and the court properly applied the 
 
- 21 - 
law.  Pittman has failed to show that the State suppressed admissible evidence that 
was favorable to the defense, that the State did so either willfully or inadvertently, 
and that the defendant was thereby prejudiced.  Specifically, Pittman has failed to 
show that, had the evidence been disclosed, there is a reasonable probability that 
the jury would have reached a different verdict.  Under the above standard of 
review, Pittman has failed to show that the State committed a Brady violation with 
respect to this claim. 
E.  Brady Claim with Respect to Evidence 
 Concerning William Smith 
 
 
In this claim, Pittman asserts that the State failed to disclose William 
Smith‘s statement that the man who had been arrested for the murders looked like 
the same person he had seen behind a car dealership two or three weeks prior to the 
crimes.  Pittman claims that the postconviction court erred in denying relief on this 
claim.  This issue was addressed at the evidentiary hearing below and the 
postconviction court acknowledged it in its order and then summarily denied relief: 
The Defendant alleges that Mr. Smith was interviewed in July of 1990 
by the State, and he told them that the individual he had seen behind 
the convenience store looked like an individual he had seen at a car 
dealership 2 or 3 weeks before that time.  The Defendant alleges that 
the defense was never provided with this information despite the fact 
that statements of witnesses are required to be disclosed pursuant to 
rule 3.220, Fla. R. Crim. P.  The defendant alleges that had defense 
counsel known about this statement, the statement could have been 
used to cast doubt on Mr. Smith‘s identification of the Defendant. 
 
 
- 22 - 
 
Based on this record, we conclude that Pittman has failed to show that the 
postconviction court erred in denying this claim.  Pittman has failed to show that 
the State suppressed admissible evidence that was favorable to the defense, that the 
State did so either willfully or inadvertently, and that the defendant was thereby 
prejudiced.  Specifically, Pittman has failed to show that, had the evidence been 
disclosed, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a 
different verdict.  Under the above standard of review, Pittman has failed to show 
that the State committed a Brady violation with respect to this claim.   
F.  Cumulative Effect of All the Withheld and Newly Discovered  
Evidence and Evidence of Ineffective 
 Assistance of Counsel 
 
 
In this claim, Pittman asserts that the postconviction court erred in denying 
relief based on the cumulative effect of all the withheld evidence and newly 
discovered evidence and evidence of ineffective assistance of trial counsel (IAC), 
as discussed below.  The various individual allegations made by Pittman were 
addressed at length at the evidentiary hearing below and in the postconviction 
court‘s order denying relief, and the court concluded as follows with respect to this 
claim: 
 
The Defendant alleges that the new Jones evidence must be 
evaluated cumulatively with the Brady evidence and the evidence of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and when this is done confidence has 
been undermined in the reliability of Mr. Pittman‘s trial.  The Court 
does not find any reasonable probability that the new evidence argued 
 
- 23 - 
by the Defendant in this Claim when considered cumulatively along 
with his other claims of Brady violations and claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel would have made a difference in the outcome of 
the verdict.  [This claim] of the Defendant‘s Motion is denied. 
 
 
Based on this record, we conclude that Pittman has failed to show that the 
postconviction court erred in denying this claim.  Specifically, as noted herein, 
Pittman has failed to show (1) that the State committed any Brady violations; (2) 
that the asserted newly discovered evidence qualifies as such under Jones v. State, 
709 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1998); and (3) that trial counsel was ineffective.  Whether 
Pittman‘s claims are evaluated individually or cumulatively, Pittman has failed to 
show that he is entitled to relief under the applicable standards of review. 
G.  Giglio Claim 
 
In this claim, Pittman asserts that the postconviction court erred in denying 
his Giglio claim with respect to Carl Hughes and other matters.  The United States 
Supreme Court in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972), held that a 
prosecutor cannot knowingly present false testimony against a defendant.  To 
establish a Giglio violation, it must be shown that (1) the prosecutor presented 
false testimony; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the false 
evidence was material.  Guzman v. State, 941 So. 2d 1045, 1050 (Fla. 2006).  Once 
the defendant establishes the first two prongs, the State bears the burden of 
showing that the false evidence was immaterial by showing that its use was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id.  To do this, the State must show that 
 
- 24 - 
―there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.‖  Id.  
(quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1138 (Fla.  1986)).  A court‘s decision 
with respect to a Giglio claim is a mixed question of law and fact, and a reviewing 
court will defer to the lower court‘s factual findings if they are supported by 
competent, substantial evidence, but will review the court‘s application of law to 
facts de novo.  Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 785 (Fla. 2004). 
 
Pittman asserts that the State knowingly presented false or misleading 
evidence with respect to Carl Hughes‘ testimony that he received no benefit in 
exchange for his testimony (―I was given no favors‖) and that he gave no 
interviews between June 26, 1990, and September 11, 1990.  Pittman asserts that 
the postconviction court erred in denying relief on this claim.  This issue was 
addressed at the evidentiary hearing below and the postconviction court ruled as 
follows: 
 
In his Motion, the defense alleges that State witness, Carl Hughes‘s 
testimony was less than truthful regarding his relationship with the State.  
The Defendant alleges that Mr. Hughes made statements that he was going 
to attempt to get statements from Mr. Pittman and that doing so was part of 
the deal with the State that existed prior to his placement with Mr. Pittman.  
The Defendant alleges that Mr. Hughes decided not to go through with his 
testimony but was coerced into doing so when the State threatened to 
prosecute him and a family member unless he went through with the deal.  
The defense alleges that an interview Mr. Hughes had with Detective Cosper 
on July 6, 1990 was never disclosed to the defense.  This matter is fully 
discussed by the Court under Claim I.  The Defendant also alleges that the 
State violated Mr. Pittman‘s due process rights by allowing Mr. Hughes to 
testify that he had been advised by other inmates that Mr. Pittman talked 
about this case nonstop and indicated to some inmates that he may have 
 
- 25 - 
done it.  The Defendant claims that the State knew that this wasn‘t the case; 
and they failed to disclose that they knew that another inmate, Elton Ard, 
had indicated that Mr. Pittman had never given an indication that he had 
killed anyone.  The Court does not find that this allegation has any merit, 
and it was not supported by the defense at the evidentiary hearing. 
 
 
Based on this record, we conclude that Pittman has failed to show that the 
postconviction court erred in denying this claim.  The court‘s factual findings are 
supported by competent, substantial evidence and the court properly applied the 
law.  Pittman has failed to show that the prosecutor presented false testimony and 
that the prosecutor knew the testimony was false.  Under the above standard of 
review, Pittman has failed to show that the State committed a Giglio violation with 
respect to this claim. 
H.  Ineffectiveness Claim 
 
In this claim, Pittman asserts that the postconviction court erred in denying 
his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel with respect to the guilt phase of 
the trial.  Following the United States Supreme Court decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel embodies the right to effective assistance of counsel), this Court held that 
two requirements must be met to satisfy the deficient performance and prejudice 
prongs of Strickland:  
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards. 
 
- 26 - 
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  A court 
considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a 
specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is 
clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied. 
 
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted). 
 
Several additional criteria apply to such claims.  First, there is a strong 
presumption that counsel‘s performance was not ineffective.  See Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 689 (―Judicial scrutiny of counsel‘s performance must be highly 
deferential.‖).  Second, ―[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that 
every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct 
the circumstances of counsel‘s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct 
from counsel‘s perspective at the time.‖  Id.  Third, the defendant must ―overcome 
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‗might be 
considered sound trial strategy.‘ ‖  Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 
101(1955)).  Specifically, ―strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and 
counsel‘s decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.‖  
Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000). 
 
Because both prongs of the ineffectiveness test set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), present mixed questions of law and fact, this 
Court employs a mixed standard of review.  Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771 
 
- 27 - 
(Fla. 2004).  The Court will defer to the postconviction court‘s factual findings as 
long as they are supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record, and 
the Court will review the lower court‘s legal conclusions de novo.  Id. at 772. 
 
In this claim, Pittman argues that his trial attorneys, Norgard and Trogolo, 
were ineffective in failing to do the following: in failing to elicit from James Troup 
the fact that even though there was smoke inside the Toyota when he came upon it 
on the side of the road, the smoke was not yet coming out of the car; in failing to 
contact inmate John Schneider in person; in failing to obtain inmate Pounds‘ PSI; 
and in failing to dispute Waters‘ level of certainty in identifying the homemade 
wrecker.  This issue was addressed at the evidentiary hearing below, and the court 
addressed it at length its order denying relief.  Specifically, with respect to Troup, 
the court ruled as follows: ―The Court does not find that counsel‘s performance fell 
below a reasonable standard with respect to this allegation.  To the extent counsel‘s 
failure to elicit the information from Mr. Troup might be considered deficient 
performance, the Court finds the second prong of the Strickland standard has not 
been met.  There is no reasonable basis to assume that but for such deficient 
performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.‖  With 
respect to Schneider, the court ruled as follows: ―To the extent counsel‘s failure to 
interview Mr. Schneider might be considered deficient performance, the Court 
finds the second prong of the Strickland standard has not been met.  There is no 
 
- 28 - 
reasonable basis to assume that but for such deficient performance, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.‖  And with respect to this claim overall, the 
court concluded as follows: 
 
The Defendant has not shown that counsel‘s performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness with respect to the 
allegations he makes in [this claim] of his Motion.  In addition, to the 
extent it might be argued that there was deficient performance, the 
Court does not find there is any reasonable probability that the result 
of the proceedings would have been different but for such 
deficiencies.  [This claim] of Defendant‘s motion is denied. 
 
 
Based on this record, we conclude that Pittman has failed to show that the 
postconviction court erred in denying this claim.  The court‘s factual findings are 
supported by competent, substantial evidence and the court properly applied the 
law.  Pittman has failed to show that counsel rendered deficient performance in the 
guilt phase and that the defendant was thereby prejudiced.  Under the above 
standard of review, Pittman has failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective in 
this respect. 
I.  Newly Discovered Evidence Claim 
 
In this claim, Pittman asserts that the postconviction court erred in denying 
relief on his newly discovered evidence claim.  This Court has held that two 
requirements must be met in order for a conviction to be set aside on the basis of 
newly discovered evidence: (1) to be considered newly discovered, the asserted 
evidence must have been unknown to the trial court, to the party, or to counsel at 
 
- 29 - 
the time of trial, and it must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could not 
have known of it by the use of due diligence; and (2) the newly discovered 
evidence must be of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on 
retrial.  Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998).  To reach this latter 
conclusion, the trial court is required to consider all newly discovered evidence 
that would be admissible at trial and then evaluate the weight of both the newly 
discovered evidence and the evidence that was introduced at trial.  With respect to 
a trial court‘s ruling on a newly discovered evidence claim following an 
evidentiary hearing, as long as the court‘s findings are supported by competent, 
substantial evidence, a reviewing court will not ―substitute its judgment for that of 
the trial court on questions of fact, likewise of the credibility of  the witnesses as 
well as the weight to be given to the evidence by the trial court,‖ Blanco v. State, 
702 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1997) (quoting Demps v. State, 462 So.2d 1074, 1075 
(Fla. 1984)), but the court‘s application of law to facts is subject to de novo review.  
Preston v. State, 970 So. 2d 789, 798 (Fla. 2007). 
 
In this claim, Pittman asserts that newly discovered evidence with respect to 
investigator Carlos Battles shows that Pittman is entitled to a new trial.  He asserts 
that the postconviction court erred in denying relief on this claim.  This issue was 
addressed at the evidentiary hearing below and the postconviction court ruled as 
follows: 
 
- 30 - 
 
The Defendant raises a claim of newly discovered evidence of 
innocence with respect to information obtained by Carlos Battles 
when he was employed by the Department of Children and Family 
Services as a child protection investigator.  At the evidentiary hearing 
the Defense introduced Mr. Battles‘ case file of the investigation as 
Defense Exhibit 1.  In the case file, Mr. Battles listed information that 
Marie Pittman had told him that Cindy Pittman needs counseling for 
sexual abuse and that Cindy had witnessed her grandmother being 
killed by her brother-in-law.  At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Battles 
testified that this stood out in his mind that the child had witnessed a 
murder.  The defense argues that information that Cindy may have 
witnessed the murders is inconsistent with the State‘s theory of 
prosecution and consistent with other theories such as Marie and her 
husband being involved in the murder.  The defense argues that 
Defense Exhibit 1 and the testimony of Mr. Battles is newly 
discovered evidence under Jones. 
 
This claim of newly discovered evidence involves hearsay 
statements from Marie Pridgen given to a Mr. Battles in 1998.  Cindy 
Pittman was four years old when her grandparents were murdered in 
1990, and the statement Marie made to DCF investigators was eight 
years after the murders.  Mr. Battles testified that he never questioned 
Cindy about the allegation, and he had no idea if the child actually 
saw a murder.  Detective Cosper testified at the evidentiary hearing 
that Marie Pittman never told him that Cindy had witnessed the 
murders.  The Court finds no credible basis that this information 
meets the Jones requirements as newly discovered evidence.  In 
particular, the Court does not find that this evidence is of such a 
nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. 
 
 
Based on this record, we conclude that Pittman has failed to show that the 
postconviction court erred in denying this claim.  Specifically, Pittman has failed 
to show that the asserted evidence is of such a nature that it would probably 
produce an acquittal on retrial.  See Jones, 709 So. 2d at 521.  Under the above 
 
- 31 - 
standard of review, Pittman has failed to show that the asserted evidence meets the 
Jones standard for newly discovered evidence. 
J.  Brady Claim Concerning the Penalty Phase 
 
In this claim, Pittman asserts that the State committed a Brady violation by 
failing to disclose the fact that Pittman‘s wife, Marie, told ASA Pickard that 
Pittman had a crank, or low-grade methamphetamine, problem.  He asserts that the 
postconviction court erred in denying relief on this claim.  This issue was 
addressed at the evidentiary hearing below and the postconviction court ruled as 
follows: 
The Court does not believe that the State willfully tried to keep 
information contained in the notes from the defense and the testimony 
of Mr. Pickard at the evidentiary hearing indicated that he did make 
an effort when a deposition was taken of Ms. Pridgen by the defense 
to tell the defense about things he was going to go into that hadn‘t 
been covered in the deposition. 
 
For a Brady violation to be established it is necessary that the 
evidence withheld from the defense be of such a material nature that 
there exists a reasonable probability that the jury verdict would have 
been different had the suppressed information been used at the trial.  
None of the information from the notes comes close to being of such a 
material nature, and the court does not find that the State‘s failure to 
disclose the notes or the information contained in the notes constitutes 
a Brady violation. 
 
 
Based on this record, we conclude that Pittman has failed to show that the 
postconviction court erred in denying this claim.  The court‘s factual findings are 
supported by competent, substantial evidence and the court properly applied the 
 
- 32 - 
law.  Pittman has failed to show that the State suppressed admissible evidence that 
was favorable to the defense, that the State did so either willfully or inadvertently, 
and that the defendant was thereby prejudiced.  Specifically, Pittman has failed to 
show that had the evidence been disclosed, there is a reasonable probability that 
the jury would have reached a different verdict.  Under the above standard of 
review, Pittman has failed to show that the State committed a Brady violation with 
respect to this claim. 
K.  Ineffectiveness Claim Concerning 
 the Penalty Phase 
 
In this claim, Pittman asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in the penalty 
phase in failing to present additional evidence of mental health issues and other 
mitigation.  He asserts that the postconviction court erred in denying relief on this 
claim.  He claims that defense counsel was ineffective in the following ways: (1) in 
failing to present four additional witnesses—Robert Barker, Michael Pittman, Jean 
Wesley and Tilly Woody—to attest to his substance abuse and life-long afflictions, 
and (2) in failing to elicit additional information from three witnesses—Tammy 
Davis, William Pittman, and Dr. Dee—who testified during the penalty phase.  
This issue was addressed at the evidentiary hearing below and the postconviction 
court addressed it at length in its order denying relief, concluding as follows: 
 
Although the testimony of these witnesses presents a harsh and 
depressing picture with respect to Mr. Pittman‘s childhood, drug use 
and sexual abuse, the court does not find that the defense has shown 
 
- 33 - 
that trial counsel‘s performance with regard to presenting mental 
health and other mitigation evidence fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness.  Dr. Dee testified at trial regarding Mr. Pittman‘s 
mental health issues, drug problems, and sexual abuse.  Claim VII of  
Defendant‘s Motion is denied. 
 
 
Based on this record, we conclude that Pittman has failed to show that the 
postconviction court erred in denying this claim.  The court‘s factual findings are 
supported by competent, substantial evidence and the court properly applied the 
law.  Pittman has failed to show that counsel rendered deficient performance in the 
penalty phase and that the defendant was thereby prejudiced.  Under the above 
standard of review, Pittman has failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective in 
this respect. 
L.  Newly Discovered Evidence Claim Concerning 
 the Penalty Phase 
 
 
In this claim, Pittman asserts that Dr. Wu‘s testimony at the evidentiary 
hearing concerning the results of a PET scan of Pittman‘s brain taken in 2002 
constitutes newly discovered evidence that requires a new penalty phase 
proceeding in light of the following statement in the trial court‘s sentencing order: 
―The expert [Dr. Dee] has offered an opinion as a mitigating circumstance that the 
Defendant suffers brain damage.  Other than this opinion there exists no 
corroborating evidence to suggest the presence of this damage or its degree, nor its 
actual relationship to the murders.‖  At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Wu testified 
 
- 34 - 
that the scan results, which show decreased frontal lobe activity, were consistent 
with Dr. Dee‘s trial testimony. 
 
This Court addressed a similar situation in Miller v. State, 926 So. 2d 1243 
(Fla. 2006): 
 
Finally, Miller argues that the PET scan offers new information.  
However, Dr. Krop testified at trial that Miller suffered from a frontal-
lobe deficiency.  Moreover, Dr. Krop testified at the evidentiary 
hearing that the information revealed from the PET scan supported his 
initial conclusion of a frontal lobe deficiency.  Therefore, although the 
results from the PET scan were not known at the time of the trial, this 
additional evidence is not the type of evidence that is ―of such nature 
that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.‖  Because it 
appears that the results would have only corroborated Dr. Krop's 
testimony, we deny Miller's claim.     
Miller, 926 So. 2d at 1259 (citation omitted) (quoting Scott v. Dugger, 604 So.2d 
465,468 (Fla. 1992)). In the present case, the PET scan results of Pittman‘s brain 
taken twelve years after the crime would only have corroborated Dr. Dee‘s trial 
testimony, and this is not the type of evidence that would probably produce a 
different sentence on remand.  On this record, Pittman has failed to show that he is 
entitled to relief on this claim. 10   
III.  HABEAS CORPUS PETITION 
A. Whether Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective in Failing to Challenge the 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
                                         
 
10.  To the extent Pittman raises any other claims or subclaims with respect 
to the denial of his rule 3.850 motion, we find those claims and subclaims to be 
without merit. 
 
- 35 - 
 
 
First, claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (IAAC) are 
properly presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  Freeman v. State, 761 
So. 2d 1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000).  Consistent with the standard for ineffectiveness of 
trial counsel set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 So. 2d 668 (1984), the 
standard for IAAC has two prongs.  A court must determine the following:  
first, whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, 
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result.  
 
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986); see also Freeman, 761 So. 
2d at 1069; Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 (Fla. 2000).  In raising such a 
claim, ―[t]he defendant has the burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or 
overt act upon which the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.‖  
Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1069; see also Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997, 1001 (Fla. 
1981).  Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may not be used to 
camouflage issues that should have been presented on direct appeal or in a 
postconviction motion.  See Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000).  
―If a legal issue ‗would in all probability have been found to be without merit‘ had 
counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the failure of appellate counsel to raise 
 
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the meritless issue will not render appellate counsel‘s performance ineffective.‖  
Id. (quoting Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 86 (Fla. 1994)). 
 
In this claim, Pittman asserts that the evidence of guilt is insufficient and 
that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise this issue.  This claim, 
however, warrants no relief.  As set forth in the Court‘s opinion on direct appeal, 
the evidence of guilt was clearly sufficient:  
 
A construction worker testified that, when he arrived at work at 
6:30 a.m. on the morning of the fire, he noticed a brown Toyota in a 
ditch on the side of the road near his job site.  Other testimony 
revealed that the location of the Toyota was about one-half mile from 
the Knowles residence.  The worker also observed a homemade 
wrecker, which he later identified as belonging to Pittman, pull up to 
the Toyota and, shortly thereafter, saw a cloud of smoke coming from 
that direction. Another witness who lived near the construction site 
also saw the smoke and observed a man running away from a burning 
car.  This witness later identified Pittman from a photo-pack as the 
man she saw that morning.  Investigators determined that the car fire, 
like the earlier house fire, was the work of an arsonist. 
 
At the time of the murders, another of the Knowles‘ daughters, 
Marie, was in the process of divorcing Pittman.  The divorce was not 
amicable and the State introduced testimony that Pittman had made 
several threats against Marie and her family.  The State also produced 
evidence that Pittman had recently learned that Bonnie Knowles had 
tried to press criminal charges against him for an alleged rape that had 
occurred five years earlier. 
 
Carl Hughes, a jailhouse informant, testified that Pittman told 
him that he had gone to the Knowles‘ house on the evening of the 
murders to speak with Bonnie Knowles about the problems he was 
having with her family.  Bonnie let Pittman in the house and, when 
she refused his sexual advances, he killed her to stop her cries for 
help.  Pittman then admitted to killing Barbara Knowles in the 
hallway outside Bonnie‘s bedroom and to killing Clarence in the 
living room as Clarence tried to use the phone.  Pittman also told 
Hughes that he burned the house, stole the Toyota and abandoned it 
 
- 37 - 
on the side of the road, and later returned to the Toyota and burned it 
as well. 
Pittman, 646 So. 2d at 168.  Further, in all death cases, this Court independently 
reviews the record on appeal to assess the legal sufficiency of the evidence, 
regardless whether the issue was raised, see, e.g., Hojan v. State, 3 So. 3d 1204, 
1217 (Fla. 2009), and our review of the record on appeal in this case yielded no 
error in this respect.  See Pittman v. State, 646 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1994).  Thus, 
because the underlying claim has no merit, appellate counsel cannot be deemed 
ineffective for failing to raise it.  See Groover v. Singletary, 656 So. 2d 424, 425 
(Fla. 1995) (―Appellate counsel's failure to raise nonmeritorious issues does not 
constitute ineffective assistance.‖). 
B.  Whether this Court Erred in Affirming the Exclusion 
 of Certain Evidence 
 
 
In this claim, Pittman asserts that this Court erred in affirming the trial 
court‘s ruling on an evidentiary issue.  This Court ruled as follows: 
 
In his third claim, Pittman asserts that the trial court erred by 
excluding the hearsay testimony of George Hodges, a death row 
inmate who alleged that his stepson had implicated himself in the 
Knowles family murders.  Early in the trial, the prosecution received 
an unsolicited letter from Hodges.  In this letter, Hodges stated that he 
had received a letter from his stepson in which the stepson stated that 
he had killed three people in a failed burglary attempt and that he then 
burned the house.  The trial judge gave defense counsel a few days in 
which to investigate the allegations.  Then, at a hearing on the matter, 
the judge held that Hodges' testimony concerning what his stepson 
had told him was hearsay that did not fit within any exception and was 
therefore inadmissible.  We find that the trial judge correctly excluded 
 
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Hodges‘ testimony as substantive evidence under the hearsay rule and 
that there is no applicable hearsay exception. 
Pittman, 646 So. 2d at 171-72 (footnote omitted).  Pittman asserts that this ruling is 
contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent.11  This claim, however, is 
procedurally barred.  See, e.g., Porter v. Crosby, 840 So. 2d 981, 984 (Fla. 2003) 
(―[C]laims raised in a habeas petition which petitioner has raised in prior 
proceedings and which have been previously decided on the merits in those 
proceedings are procedurally barred in the habeas petition.‖).  A habeas petition is 
not a second appeal. 
C.  Whether This Court Erred in Affirming the Convictions and 
 Sentences Where the State Withheld Pertinent Facts 
 
 
In this claim, Pittman asserts that this Court erred in affirming his 
convictions and sentences because the State withheld information that was 
pertinent to his appeal.  This claim, however, warrants no relief.  First, this claim is 
procedurally barred.  See Smith v. State, 931 So. 2d 790, 805 (Fla. 2006) (―Smith 
alleges that he was deprived of due process in his direct appeal because of the 
State's failure to disclose facts pertinent to his direct appeal.  These claims are 
                                         
 
11.  Pittman cites two cases to support this claim: Holmes v. South Carolina, 
547 U.S. 319, 319-20 (2006) (holding that a defendant‘s rights are ―abridged by 
evidence rules that infring[e] upon a weighty interest of the accused and are 
arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve‖), and 
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600 (1994) (holding that whereas a 
statement against interest is admissible under the federal hearsay rule, a hearsay 
statement that is collateral to a statement against interest is not admissible). 
 
- 39 - 
procedurally barred because they were or should have been litigated on direct 
appeal or were or should have been brought in his 3.850 motion.‖).  And second, 
on the merits, Pittman has failed to show that the postconviction court erred in 
rejecting his Brady and Giglio claims, as discussed above.  
D.  Whether Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective in Failing to 
 Argue that Pittman‘s Death Sentences Were 
 Based on an Improper Aggravator 
 
 
In this claim, Pittman asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the prior 
violent aggravating circumstance was established by each of the contemporaneous 
murders.  He asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise this 
claim on appeal.  This claim, however, warrants no relief.  The underlying issue 
has already been decided adversely to Pittman.  See, e.g., Bevel v. State, 983 So. 
2d 505, 517 (Fla. 2008) (―This Court has repeatedly held that where a defendant is 
convicted of multiple murders, arising from the same criminal episode, the 
contemporaneous conviction as to one victim may support the finding of the prior 
violent felony aggravator as to the murder of another victim.‖) (quotation marks 
omitted).  Appellate counsel cannot be blamed for failing to raise a meritless claim.  
See Groover v. Singletary, 656 So. 2d 424, 425 (Fla. 1995).    
E.  Whether Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective in Failing to 
 Argue that the Prosecutor Used Improper 
 Argument in the Penalty Phase 
 
 
- 40 - 
 
The gist of this claim is that the prosecutor made improper comments to the 
jury during the penalty phase closing argument, and that appellate counsel was 
ineffective in failing to raise this issue on appeal.  This claim, however, warrants 
no relief.  Generally, appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to 
raise a claim that was not preserved.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Singletary, 695 So. 2d 
263, 266 (Fla. 1996) (―[A]ppellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise 
claims which were not preserved due to trial counsel‘s failure to object.‖).  An 
exception to this rule is where the alleged error rises to the level of fundamental 
error.  See Owen v. Crosby, 854 So. 2d 182, 188 (Fla. 2003).   Fundamental error 
is error that reaches ―down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a 
verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged 
error.‖  Spencer v. State, 842 So. 2d 52, 74 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Brown v. State, 
124 So. 2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1960)).  To constitute fundamental error, improper 
comments ―must be so prejudicial as to taint the jury‘s recommended sentence.‖  
Fennie v. State, 855 So. 2d 597, 609 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Thomas v. State, 748 So. 
2d 970, 985 n.10 (Fla. 1999)). 
 
In the present case, trial counsel voiced no objection to most of the 
prosecutor‘s comments underlying this claim.  None of those comments rise to the 
level of fundamental error, and appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for 
failing to raise them on appeal.  See Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 
 
- 41 - 
(Fla. 2000) (―If a legal issue ‗would in all probability have been found to be 
without merit‘ had counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the failure of appellate 
counsel to raise the meritless issue will not render appellate counsel‘s performance 
ineffective.‖).  As to those comments to which counsel did object, to the extent that 
any of those comments were improper, none was of such a nature as to undermine 
confidence in the correctness of the result, and appellate counsel cannot be deemed 
ineffective for failing to raise those comments on appeal.  
F.  Whether Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective in Failing to Argue 
 that the Penalty Phase Jury Was Misled by Improper 
 Comments and Instructions  
 
 
The gist of this claim is that the trial court erred in instructing the jury 
concerning its role in the sentencing process, and appellate counsel was ineffective 
in failing to raise this issue on appeal.  This claim, however, warrants no relief.  
First, with respect to the underlying claim, it is procedurally barred.  See Dufour v. 
State, 905 So. 2d 42, 67 (Fla. 2005) (addressing a claim that the trial court‘s 
comments with regard to the advisory role of the jury unconstitutionally minimized 
the jury‘s role in the sentencing process: ―a claim of error regarding the 
instructions given by the trial court should have been presented on direct appeal 
and is not cognizable through collateral attack‖).  And second, on the merits, 
Pittman has failed to show how the judge‘s instructions were anything but 
consistent with Florida‘s statutory scheme, and this Court has consistently held that 
 
- 42 - 
the standard penalty phase jury instructions fully advise the jury of the importance 
of its role, correctly state the law, and do not denigrate the role of the jury.  See 
Jones v. State, 998 so. 2d 573, 590 (Fla. 2008); Miller v. State 926 So. 2d 1243, 
1257 (Fla. 2006); Perez v. State, 919 So. 2d 347, 368 (Fla. 2005); Card v. State, 
803 So. 2d 613, 628 (Fla. 2001); Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 283 (Fla. 1998).  
Appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective in failing to raise a nonmeritorious 
claim.  See Peede v. State, 955 So. 2d 480, 503 (Fla. 2007). 12 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the postconviction court‘s order denying 
Pittman‘s rule 3.850 motion, and we deny his habeas petition. 
 
It is so ordered.  
LEWIS, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
CANADY, C.J., concurs in result. 
QUINCE, J., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring in result. 
                                         
 
12.  To the extent Pittman raises any other claims or subclaims with respect 
to his habeas corpus petition, we find those claims and subclaims to be without 
merit.  
 
- 43 - 
 
I concur in result for two reasons.  The first reason is that the majority could 
be read to approve of the trial court‘s misstatements of the law—statements that 
there is a due diligence requirement in Brady and statements that appear to 
emphasize that the prosecutor did not have knowledge of notes in the possession of 
police in denying Pittman‘s Brady claims.  The second reason is that I disagree 
with the manner in which the majority sets forth the prejudice prong of Brady. 
As to the trial court‘s misstatements of the law, the majority could be read to 
approve of a due diligence requirement in Brady when Brady has no such 
requirement.  Although the majority correctly sets forth the elements of a Brady 
claim by citing to Strickler, majority op. at 11, it approves of the trial court‘s order 
that appears to impose a due diligence requirement.  By quoting the trial court‘s 
order without correcting its misstatements, majority op. at 12-17, the majority 
opinion could be deemed to have engrafted that requirement back into Brady. 
This would of course be a serious misstatement of the purpose of Brady, 
which imposes the important requirement on prosecutors ―to learn of any favorable 
evidence known to the others acting on the government‘s behalf in the case,‖ Kyles 
v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995), and to produce that evidence if it is material.  
This Court has explicitly stated: ―[W]e point out that there is no ‗due diligence‘ 
requirement in the Brady test and that the prosecutor is charged with possession of 
 
- 44 - 
what the State possesses . . . .‖  Archer v. State, 934 So. 2d 1187, 1203 (Fla. 2006).  
As more fully explained by this Court in Archer: 
[W]e have held that a defendant is not required to compel production 
of favorable evidence which is material, in that the evidence tends to 
negate the guilt of the accused or tends to negate the punishment.  To 
comply with Brady, the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of 
any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government‘s 
behalf in the case and to disclose that evidence if it is material.  The 
postconviction court is in error to the extent that the court‘s order is 
read to mean that [the defendant] had to demonstrate ―due diligence‖ 
in obtaining favorable evidence possessed by the State or that the 
prosecutor‘s obligation was only to give to [the defendant] favorable 
evidence which was in the prosecutor‘s personal possession. 
Id. at 1203 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  Of course, if the defendant knew 
of the evidence or had possession of it, then there could not be a Brady claim 
because the evidence could not be found to have been withheld from the defendant.  
See Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1042 (Fla. 2000) (―Although the ‗due 
diligence‘ requirement is absent from the Supreme Court‘s most recent formulation 
of the Brady test, it continues to follow that a Brady claim cannot stand if a 
defendant knew of the evidence allegedly withheld or had possession of it, simply 
because the evidence cannot then be found to have been withheld from the 
defendant.‖). 
 
With regard to the PSIs of the State witnesses who testified against the 
defendant, the majority quotes the trial court‘s order, which states: ―Defense 
counsel did not ask the Court to provide the PSI to the defense.‖  Majority op. at 
 
- 45 - 
15.  However, I know of no way that the defendant would have had access to those 
PSIs and know of no reason why a defense lawyer would have automatically filed 
a motion to obtain the PSIs of all testifying witnesses.  The defense would most 
likely be accused of going on a fishing expedition.  If the PSI contains information 
favorable to the defendant, especially in the case of State witness Pounds in which 
a mental issue was revealed, then it was incumbent on the State to produce it. 
 
The trial court also appears to base its denial of the Brady claim, at least in 
part, on the fact that the prosecutor did not have knowledge of material in the 
possession of police.  The trial court‘s order repeatedly states that the prosecutor or 
State Attorney‘s Office was not aware of the existence of notes in the possession of 
a detective.  See majority op. at 16, 18-19.  The majority does not clarify that it 
makes no difference under Brady whether the prosecutor in this case, Hardy 
Pickard, had possession or knowledge of the notes because the prosecutor is 
charged with the knowledge of the police agencies that participate in the 
investigation of the case.  See Archer, 934 So. 2d at 1203 (―[T]he prosecutor is 
charged with possession of what the State possesses . . . .‖); see also Gorham v. 
State, 597 So. 2d 782, 784 (Fla. 1992) (―Even though the police did not reveal 
Johnson‘s informant status to the state attorney who prosecuted Gorham‘s case, the 
state attorney is charged with constructive knowledge and possession of evidence 
withheld by other state agents, such as law enforcement officers.‖ (emphasis 
 
- 46 - 
added)); Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 503, 508 (Fla. 2003) (finding a Brady 
violation where the prosecutor failed to disclose that the police had paid an 
informant a $500 reward); cf. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (―[T]he individual prosecutor 
has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the 
government‘s behalf in the case, including the police.‖ (emphasis added)). 
I also concur in result only because I disagree with the manner in which the 
majority sets forth the prejudice prong.  In my view, it continues to be extremely 
important to always express the prejudice prong of Brady in terms of a probability 
sufficient ―to undermine confidence in the verdict,‖ Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 
263, 290 (1999) (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435), and not a reasonable probability 
of a different result.  The United States Supreme Court has explained: 
The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not 
have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its 
absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a 
verdict worthy of confidence.  A ―reasonable probability‖ of a 
different result is accordingly shown when the government‘s 
evidentiary suppression ―undermines confidence in the outcome of the 
trial.‖ 
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 
(1985)).  The majority initially sets forth the standard in terms of undermining 
confidence in the outcome, majority op. at 11, but then repeatedly states as to 
prejudice that Pittman has failed to show that had the evidence been disclosed that 
 
- 47 - 
―there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different 
verdict.‖  Majority op. at 14-15, 17, 19, 21-22, 32.   
 
I agree with the ultimate result to affirm because in my view the sum total of 
all of the information that Pittman alleges to be favorable as Brady material would 
not either singularly or cumulatively undermine confidence in the outcome of 
either the guilt or penalty phase.  I further agree that no ineffective assistance of 
counsel has been demonstrated, and I agree that as to the guilt-phase newly 
discovered evidence claim, Pittman has not demonstrated that the evidence of what 
Marie Pittman told Carlos Battles about Cindy Pittman is of such a nature that it 
would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.  I also agree that the penalty-phase 
newly discovered evidence claim is without merit as the PET scan results are not 
of such a nature that they would probably produce a different sentence.   
For all these reasons, I would affirm the trial court‘s result but not its 
reasoning.  Accordingly, because the majority opinion quotes in full, and appears 
to adopt, the trial court‘s erroneous statements and reasoning, and because I 
disagree with the manner in which the majority sets forth the Brady prejudice 
prong standard, I concur in result only. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Polk County,  
Harvey A. Kornstein, Judge – Case No. CF90-2242A1-XX 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
- 48 - 
 
Martin McClain of McClain and McDermott, P.A., Wilton Manors, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Katherine V. 
Blanco, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent