Title: FERMO v SUPERLINE PRODUCTS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13649
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: January 10, 1978

No. 13649 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 VICTOR FERMO, Claimant and Respondent, -vs- SUPERLINE PRODUCTS, Employer, and AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: Workers' Compensation Court Honorable William E. Hunt, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Anderson, Symmes, Forbes, Peete and Brown, Billings, Montana Richard F. Cebull argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Hoyt and Bottomly, Great Falls, Montana John C. Hoyt argued, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: September 20, 1977 Decided : JAN 1 0 1 9 B M r . Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court: O n March 28, 1975, claimant f i l e d a claim for compensation with the Montana Division of Workers' Compensation, as a result of an injury sustained by claimant i n the course and scope of h i s employment on February 26, 1975. Claimant received temporary t o t a l disability benefits for the period February 28, 1975 through August 24, 1975, approximately when he returned t o h i s work. Insurer offered claimant $1,452 as a compromise settlement for claimant's impairment. On July 28, 1976, claimant f i l e d a petition for hearing with the Workers' Compensation Court. The matter came for t r i a l before the Workers' Compensation Court on August 25, 1976. The Court issued findings of fact and conclu- sions of law holding claimant entitled t o a permanent p a r t i a l disability award of 125 weeks a t claimant's permanent p a r t i a l disability rate of $60 per week, which equals the sum of $7,500. The Workers' Compensation Court ordered $7,500 to be paid t o claimant i n a lump sum. The order was stayed, pending the insurer's appeal t o t h i s Court. The sole issue on appeal is whether or not there i s sub- s t a n t i a l evidence t o support the workers' Compensation Court's findings that claimant i s entitled t o a permanent p a r t i a l dis- a b i l i t y award of $7,500. Claimant's occupation requires the loading and unloading of trucks, either by use of a f o r k l i f t or manual labor, and the occasional driving of a semi-truck. O n February 26, 1975, claimant sustained an injury t o h i s l e f t w r i s t when a hack or bundle of brick f e l l on h i s l e f t arm. The injury aggravated a preexisting injury, claimant having fractured h i s navicular bone some 20 years prior to the instant injury. A s a result of the recent w r i s t injury, claimant underwent a surgical procedure known as a radial styloidectomy in April 1975. Claimant s t i l l complains of symptoms which, examining physicians agree, might be remedied only by a w r i s t fusion. O n December 30, 1975, a Great Falls orthopedic surgeon and claimant's treating physician, evaluated claimant's condition .and rated h i s disability: "He (sic) permanent disability i s approximately 25% disability of the whole man." O n January 22, 1976, a f t e r consultation with the insurer, the treating orthopedic surgeon sent a l e t t e r t o insurer stating: "The permanent p a r t i a l impairment of t h i s man's l e f t w r i s t amounts t o 11%. This -is based on loss of motion. * * *" This evaluation was based on the American Medical Association's Guide t o the Evaluation of Physical Impairment. O n March 18, 1976, claimant was examined by a second physician a t the request of the insurer, but no disability rating by t h i s second doctor i s found i n the record. Based upon the examining physician's ratings of claimant's disability, claimant's counsel concluded the following potential recoveries were available t o claimant and these options were presented t o the Workers' Compensation Court i n h i s brief: Using the doc tor' s ratings a t claimant' s weekly permanent p a r t i a l rate of $60 the following computations were presented: " 1 1 % of the upper extremity equal 30.8 weeks o r $1,848.00 " 7% of the whole man equal 35 weeks o r $2,100.00 "25% of the upper extremity equals 70 weeks or $4,200.00 "25% of the whole man equal 125 weeks or $7,500.00." The basic dispute is the insurer's contention that claimant i s not entitled t o a disability rating as to the "whole man" when claimant's disability is limited t o the w r i s t , one extremity. Thus, the issue becomes whether a claimant who sustains an industrial injury t o an extremity of the body, i s limited i n h i s claim for compensation for permanent p a r t i a l disability benefits t o the specified injury statute, section 92-709, R.C.M. 1947, or whether a claimant i s also entitled t o permanent p a r t i a l disability benefits under section 92-703.1, R.C.M. 1947, which provides for the payment of compensation for injury t o any member of the body, where the injury causes p a r t i a l disability. I n the instant case it i s argued by the insurer that the claimant cannot collect under section 92-703.1 because he has suffered no loss i n earning capacity and the record shows he i s earning more money a f t e r the injury, than before. The record also clearly shows the doctor gave him a 25 percent rating of disability based on the whole man. This Court on these facts holds that an award calculated solely i n terms of a percentage disability figure applied t o previous earnings w i l l stand, regardless of whether actual post injury earnings are greater than before the injury. This w i l l not bar a recovery under section 92-703.1, a s long as other evidence sufficiently estab- lishing the degree of disability appears i n the record. Actual post injury earnings are but one item of evidence t o be considered i n the determiration of future earning capacity. This Court i n Shaffer v. Midland Empire Packing Co., (1953), 213, 127 Mont. 2111 259 P.2d 340, 342, s e t out the t e s t for loss of earning capacity: "The t e s t * * * is not whether there has been a loss of earnings or income caused by the injury, but rather has there been a loss of earning capa- city--a loss of a b i l i t y t o earn in the open labor market ." I n Midland-Ross Corporation v. Industrial Commission, (1971), 107 Ariz. 311, 486 P.2d 793, the court held that evidence that claimant was required t o work i n pain rebutted the presumption of no loss of earning capacity raised by claimant's return t o h i s former employment. The rationale of the Arizona case extends t o nonschedule permanent p a r t i a l injuries the schedule-injury presumption that a definite physical impairment w i l l probably sooner or l a t e r have an adverse effect on earning capacity. It may be years before the effect i s f e l t . But a man with a stiffened arm or damaged back or badly weakened eye w i l l presumably have a harder time doing h i s work well and meeting the competition of young and healthy men. When a man stands before the Workers' Compensation Court with proven permanent physical injuries, for which the exclusive remedy clause has abolished a l l possibility of common-law damages, it i s not justifiable t o t e l l him he has undergone no impairment of earning capacity, solely on the strength of current pay checks. Usually the rebutting evidence attacks the post injury wage i t s e l f and shows that i t s size i s an unfair criterion of capacity. Unreliability of post injury earnings may be due t o a number of variables : 1. Increase i n general wage levels since the accident. 2. Claimant's own maturity o r training. 3. Longer hours worked by the claimant a f t e r the accident. 4 . Payment of wages disproportionate t o capacity to work out of sympathy t o claimant. The ultimate objective of the disability t e s t i s by discounting the above variables to determine the wage that would have been paid i n the open labor market under normal employment conditions to claimant a s injured, taking wage levels, hours of work, and claimant's age and s t a t e of training as of exactly the same period used for calculating actual wages earned before the injury. Therefore, it i s uniformily held without regard to statutory variations i n the phrasing of the t e s t , that a finding of dis- a b i l i t y may stand even i f there is evidence of some actual post injury earnings equaling o r exceeding those received before the accident. Travelers Insurance Company v. McLellan, (1961), 288 F.2d 250. I n the instant case the record clearly shows claimant i s performing the same work as before and earning more money. How- ever, it also discloses claimant's pain is so extreme that a t times he cannot conduct h i s work with the speed and efficiency he had before the accident. It seems very likely a w r i s t fusion w i l l be required to relieve the pain which w i l l affect h i s body function a s a whole. W e note that the Workers' Compensation Act has always been liberally construed i n favor of the injured workman. section 92-838, R.C.M. 1947; Rumsey v. Cardinal Petroleum, (1975), 166 Mont. 17, 530 P.2d 433; State ex r e l . Romero v. District Court, (1973), 162 Mont. 358, 513 P.2d 265. Here, there seems t o be a loss of capacity t o perform as well as before the injury, and a loss of a b i l i t y t o compete and earn i n the open market. This qualifies claimant under the standard t o be applied when determining h i s right t o be paid under section 92-703.1 for diminished earning capacity. The workers' Compensation award made under section 92-703.1, -3 R.C.M. 1947, i s affirmed. Justice // L 4 - We Concur: