Title: Royal v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 942223
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 9, 1995

Present:  All the Justices 
 
THOMAS LEE ROYAL, JR. 
 
v.  Record No. 942223 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                            June 9, 1995 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 
 
Nelson T. Overton, Judge 
 
 
Thomas Lee Royal, Jr., was indicted for the capital murder 
of City of Hampton police officer Kenneth Earl Wallace and use 
of a firearm in the commission of the murder in violation of 
Code §§ 18.2-31 and -53.1, respectively.  Royal entered pleas 
of guilty on both charges and received sentences of death for 
the capital murder charge and three years' imprisonment for the 
firearm charge.  The trial court denied Royal's motion for 
reconsideration of the death sentence. 
 
We consider Royal's appeal of the imposition of the death 
penalty with the automatic review of the death sentence to 
which he is entitled under Code § 17-110.1. 
 
I.  The Guilt Phase 
 
At a hearing held by the trial court on September 19, 
1994, the Commonwealth presented the following facts as 
stipulated by the parties: 
 
 
On Monday, February 21st, 1994, Thomas Royal, 
Yancy M. Mitchener, Eldred Acklin, and Willie Sanders 
met in the vicinity of Chesapeake Court Apartments 
near Wythe Shopping Center.  Thomas Royal handed each 
of the other three a gun with the intention to kill 
Hampton police officer Curtis Cooper.  These four 
persons started to cross Wythe Shopping Center and 
they did not see Office[r] Cooper but did see Officer 
Kenneth E. Wallace of the Hampton Police Department. 
 
 
 
Thomas Royal pursued Officer Wallace, followed 
by Yancy M. Mitchener and Eldred Acklin.  Willie 
Cardell Sanders hung back.  Thomas Royal encountered 
 
 
 
 
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Officer Wallace and fired two shots from a .380 
caliber handgun at Officer Wallace while Officer 
Wallace was seated in his police cruiser on 
Pocahontas Place in Hampton, Virginia.  Thomas Royal 
fled.  Officer Wallace died as a result of a wound 
inflicted by Thomas Royal. 
 
 
 
Yancy M. Mitchener and Eldred Acklin both fired 
at the marked police car hitting the car but not 
Officer Wallace.  Both Mitchener and Acklin then fled 
following Thomas Royal.  Royal, Mitchener, and Acklin 
rejoined Sanders back at the Chesapeake Court 
Apartments.  All four eventually fled Hampton that 
night and spent it in a motel in Norfolk. 
 
Royal also introduced a letter he had written to Officer 
Wallace's father expressing his sorrow for the murder and 
asking for the family's forgiveness.  The trial court accepted 
Royal's guilty pleas after finding that the pleas were made 
freely and voluntarily following full consultation with 
counsel. 
 
II.  The Penalty Phase 
 
On October 19, 1994, the trial court conducted a hearing 
encompassing the proceedings required by Code §§ 19.2-264.4 and 
-264.5.  In addition to the testimony of the probation officer 
who prepared the pre-sentence report, the Commonwealth's 
evidence consisted of the testimony of Dr. Miller M. Ryans, a 
forensic psychiatrist who evaluated Royal; Detective Corporal 
Edgar A. Browning of the Hampton Police Department who, while 
investigating the murder of Officer Wallace, took a statement 
from Royal regarding the murder; Officer Curtis C. Cooper of 
the Hampton Police Department, Royal's intended victim; and Dr. 
Greg Wolber, a psychologist and rebuttal witness.  Royal 
 
 
 
 
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introduced the testimony of his wife, Pamela, and Dr. Andrew J. 
Billups, III, a psychologist. 
 
The Commonwealth's evidence showed that Royal's prior 
criminal record began in 1983 as a juvenile and included 
involvement with numerous offenses against property.  As an 
adult, he was convicted of destroying property, petit larceny, 
assault and battery, interfering with a police officer, 
trespass, and possession of cocaine.  In August 1994, shortly 
before his conviction for the murder of Officer Wallace, Royal 
was convicted of second degree murder and use of a firearm in 
the commission of the 1991 murder of James Smith. 
 
Dr. Ryans testified that Royal displayed six of the seven 
diagnostic criteria connected with an antisocial personality 
disorder.  For example, Royal did not "conform to social norms 
with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly 
performing acts that are grounds for arrest," exhibited 
"reckless disregard for safety of self or others," and 
displayed "lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to 
or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from 
another."  Dr. Ryans testified that there is no treatment for 
this condition and that, in Royal's case, this pattern of 
behavior was "gradually escalating."  As to his future 
dangerousness, Dr. Ryans stated that "I cannot say with 
reasonable medical certainty that under certain circumstances 
there would not be a repetition of violent behavior by this 
 
 
 
 
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individual that would put others at risk." 
 
Royal's expert, Dr. Billups, testified that school 
personnel had concluded that Royal was mentally retarded based 
on intelligence evaluations administered in 1982 and 1986.  Dr. 
Billups concluded, based on his own testing, that Royal 
functioned "in the borderline range of intelligence."  Dr. 
Billups agreed that Royal had an antisocial personality 
disorder and surmised that the conditions of his childhood, 
including encouragement from family members to engage in 
criminal acts, would have contributed to such a disorder.  This 
disorder, Dr. Billups testified, "has a chronic course that may 
become less evident or remit as the individual grows older, 
particularly by the fourth decade of life."  Finally, Dr. 
Billups testified that Royal had expressed genuine remorse and 
had the potential to be rehabilitated. 
 
At the close of the evidence, the trial court granted 
Royal's motion to strike the Commonwealth's evidence relating 
to the statutory predicate of vileness but not as to the future 
dangerousness predicate.  The trial court, after "taking into 
consideration all the evidence in the case, the report of the 
Probation Officer, the matters brought out on cross examination 
of the Probation Officer, and such additional facts as were 
presented by the accused," held that "there is a probability 
that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that 
would constitute a continuing threat to society."  The trial 
 
 
 
 
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court fixed Royal's sentence at death.  After offering Royal 
the opportunity to present any evidence or reason why the death 
penalty should not be imposed, the trial court entered judgment 
imposing the death penalty. 
 
Royal assigns error to a number of the trial court's 
actions during the sentencing phase of the proceedings.  These 
involve the type of evidence which the trial court could 
consider in determining the statutory predicate of future 
dangerousness, the sufficiency of the evidence to establish 
future dangerousness, the failure of the trial court to impose 
life imprisonment as an alternative to the death penalty, and 
the trial court's denial of Royal's motion for reconsideration 
of the imposition of the death penalty.  We consider Royal's 
assignments of error in order. 
 
a.  Admissibility of Evidence 
 
At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the 
Commonwealth stated that it was not proceeding on the statutory 
predicate of vileness, only on future dangerousness.  Royal 
asserts that, when future dangerousness is the sole statutory 
predicate relied on by the Commonwealth, Code § 19.2-264.2 
limits the relevant evidence solely to consideration of the 
defendant's record of past criminal convictions.  Therefore, 
Royal contends, the trial court erred in considering 
circumstances surrounding the murder of Officer Wallace in 
making a determination as to Royal's future dangerousness.  In 
 
 
 
 
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addition, Royal asserts that by allowing circumstances of the 
crime to be considered in determining future dangerousness, the 
offense becomes the sole basis for determining the sentence and 
thus, in this case, the death penalty is the "ipso facto result 
of the murder of a police officer."  This result, Royal argues, 
violates the principle of individualized sentencing required in 
death penalty cases.  Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 
303-04 (1976).  We disagree. 
 
The statutory provisions governing the imposition of the 
death penalty do not limit consideration of whether a defendant 
will be a future danger to the defendant's prior criminal 
record.  Both subsections B and C of Code § 19.2-264.4 
specifically provide that evidence of the circumstances of the 
offense may be considered.
1  Neither restricts this evidence to 
proceedings based on the vileness predicate.  We have 
previously rejected the restrictive construction of the 
                     
    
1Code § 19.2-264.4 provides, in pertinent part: 
 
 
B.  Evidence which may be admissible, subject to 
the rules of evidence governing admissibility, may 
include the circumstances surrounding the offense, the 
history and background of the defendant, and any other 
facts in mitigation of the offense. 
 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
 
C.  The penalty of death shall not be imposed 
unless the Commonwealth shall prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that there is a probability based 
upon evidence of the prior history of the defendant or 
of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the 
offense of which he is accused that he would commit 
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a 
continuing serious threat to society. 
 
 
 
 
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relevant statutes advanced by Royal and find no reason to 
depart from that position here.  Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 
370, 392, 345 S.E.2d 267, 283 (1986). 
 
Furthermore, the statutory scheme comports with the 
constitutional requirement of individualized sentencing.  Where 
the sentencing body is required to find a statutorily 
prescribed aggravating factor to qualify a defendant for 
consideration of the death penalty, "[t]he aggravating 
circumstance may be contained in the definition of the crime or 
in a separate sentencing factor (or in both)."  Tuilaepa v. 
California, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 2635 (1994).  
Therefore, the circumstances of the crime appropriately may be 
considered when determining whether the statutory predicate of 
future dangerousness exists.  The individualized sentencing 
required by the Constitution is further satisfied when, having 
established the statutory predicate, the sentencing body then 
proceeds to consider whether the death penalty should be 
imposed in each specific case.  See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 
862, 879 (1983).  
 
Royal also contends that the trial court erred in not 
limiting the evidence relating to the murder of Officer Wallace 
to that stipulated by the parties in the guilt phase of the 
trial.  Specifically, Royal objects to the admission of 
Detective Browning's testimony and a videotape in which Royal 
told Browning that he planned to kill Officer Cooper to avoid 
 
 
 
 
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threatened harm to his family, a story Royal later admitted was 
false. 
 
A function of stipulations is to identify factual matters 
which are not in dispute.  The stipulations recited factual 
events which occurred when Wallace was murdered.  They did not 
include an agreement precluding either Royal or the 
Commonwealth from offering other particulars of the crime for 
the factfinder's consideration.  Therefore, neither the 
Commonwealth nor the trial court was under any obligation to 
limit evidence of the crime to the stipulated facts. 
 
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in considering 
relevant evidence in addition to Royal's prior criminal record 
and the factual stipulations in determining whether Royal would 
be a future danger to society. 
 
b.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
Royal next argues that the trial court erred in 
determining that he would be a future danger to society because 
the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case of 
future dangerousness and, therefore, his motions to strike the 
Commonwealth's evidence should have been granted. 
 
In determining whether the trial court erred in denying 
Royal's motion to strike the Commonwealth's evidence of future 
dangerousness, we consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth.  It is undisputed that Royal 
planned the murder of Officer Cooper and furnished each of the 
 
 
 
 
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three co-conspirators with the weapons for the crime.  
Moreover, when Royal realized the officer in the car was not 
his original intended victim, Officer Cooper, he did not 
abandon his plan.  He proceeded to murder Officer Wallace, not 
because of any acrimony toward Officer Wallace, but apparently 
because Officer Wallace was there and Officer Cooper was not.  
Dr. Billups, Royal's expert witness described Royal's mental 
capacity as borderline, which he explained as "not high enough 
to be considered normal, but yet not low enough to be 
considered retarded."  Nevertheless, the evidence shows that 
Royal had the capacity to, and did, plan a serious criminal 
offense, recruit others to participate, and execute the plan.  
More importantly, killing a person under these circumstances 
shows clear disregard for human life.  This evidence, combined 
with the "escalating nature" of Royal's antisocial personality 
disorder, is sufficient to support a finding that Royal would 
be a future danger to society. 
 
Royal asserts, however, that comments made by the trial 
court while ruling on Royal's motion to strike the 
Commonwealth's evidence show that the trial court erroneously 
shifted the burden to him to disprove that he was a future 
danger.  Those comments, however, must be considered in 
context. 
 
Royal based his motion to strike, in part, on Dr. Ryans' 
statement that he could not state with medical certainty that 
 
 
 
 
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under certain circumstances Royal would not repeat violent 
behavior that would put others at risk.  Royal characterized 
this testimony as "equivocal."  In response, the Commonwealth 
argued that the issue of future dangerousness was not for Dr. 
Ryans or any other qualified medical person to decide, but for 
the trier of fact to resolve based on the medical evidence as 
well as all other relevant evidence.  In denying the motion to 
strike, the trial court commented that, 
 
[i]n fairness or in passing, if Dr. Ryans or anyone 
else had sat there and said as a matter of psychiatry 
or psychology we were able to say to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty that Mr. Royal wouldn't 
do this again, I would have listened to them. 
 
Taken in context, the court's comment does not establish a 
requirement of affirmative expert testimony that Royal was or 
would not be a future danger to society as a prerequisite to 
such a finding by the court.  Rather, this comment was directed 
at the evidentiary weight the trial court would give to Dr. 
Ryans' testimony.  Nothing in the trial court's statement 
placed the burden of proof on Royal to affirmatively show that 
he would not be a future danger to society. 
 
Finally, Royal argues that the finding of future 
dangerousness was flawed because the Commonwealth was bound by 
the expert testimony of Dr. Ryans, which did not establish 
future dangerousness, and because Royal's prior conviction for 
second degree murder was on appeal and therefore should not 
have been considered as evidence of future dangerousness.  We 
 
 
 
 
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disagree.  Dr. Ryans' testimony was not an affirmative opinion 
that Royal either would or would not be a future danger to 
society.  This statement did not preclude the Commonwealth from 
proving future dangerousness by other evidence.  Furthermore, 
the trial court was entitled to consider Royal's prior murder 
conviction even though that conviction was on appeal at the 
time of sentencing.  Peterson v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 289, 
297-98, 302 S.E.2d 520, 525-26, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 
(1983).  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying 
Royal's motion to strike. 
 
c.  Imposition of the Death Penalty 
 
Royal argues that the trial court erred in not considering 
life imprisonment as a viable sentencing alternative.  Dr. 
Billups testified that Royal had potential for rehabilitation 
and that his antisocial personality disorder might subside or 
go into remission by his fourth decade of life.  On this basis, 
Royal asserts that lengthy incarceration is appropriate.  The 
record shows, however, that the trial court did consider Dr. 
Billups' testimony, but concluded that, based on the evidence, 
rehabilitation would not occur and that Royal's criminal record 
was one of increasing violence.  In sum, the trial court 
appropriately considered all the evidence and decided against 
the position advanced by Royal. 
 
d.  Recusal 
 
Royal assigns error to the trial court's failure to grant 
 
 
 
 
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his motion for reconsideration in which he asserted that the 
trial judge should vacate the sentence of death, recuse 
himself, and ask that a new judge be appointed to impose 
sentence.  This action was necessary, Royal argues, because of 
the substantial publicity surrounding the case and, 
specifically, the public pressure directed toward the judge to 
impose the death penalty. 
 
We find no merit in this assignment of error.  Public 
notoriety of a trial does not prove that a sentence is 
improperly imposed.  Beaver v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 521, 536, 
352 S.E.2d 342, 350, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1033 (1987).  The 
record is devoid of any indication that the trial court's 
sentencing decision was affected by public pressure or 
publicity.  The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in 
refusing to recuse himself on this basis and did not err in 
denying Royal's motion for reconsideration.   
 
III.  Statutory Review 
 
Pursuant to Code § 17-110.1(C), we must review Royal's 
death sentence to determine whether it was imposed under the 
influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor 
and whether it is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty 
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the 
defendant. 
 
Royal argues that the death penalty was imposed under the 
influence of passion and was arbitrary and disproportionate 
 
 
 
 
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because the trial court stated that the "mitigating factors are 
not sufficient, in the view of the Court, to make any 
substantial difference in this situation."  This statement, 
Royal asserts, shows that the trial court "must have 
overlooked" the mitigating factors, including Royal's guilty 
pleas, his remorse for the crime, as shown in the letter to 
Officer Wallace's father, his fatherless home life surrounded 
by relatives involved in criminal activities, his attempts at 
work and marriage, and his mental retardation.  Thus, Royal 
concludes, the sentence imposed was arbitrary.  We disagree. 
 
The trial court reviewed the aggravating and mitigating 
evidence, finding that it showed "a life or a record of 
increasing violence."  The trial court noted that the 
mitigating circumstances might engender "a distinct degree of 
sympathy for Mr. Royal for some of the things which [have] 
brought him to the place where he is."  In the trial court's 
view, however, those circumstances did not change the pattern 
of escalating violence which had risen to the level of capital 
murder of a police officer.  There is no indication that the 
trial court's sentencing decision was influenced by passion, 
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. 
 
Finally, the death penalty was neither excessive nor 
disproportionate in this case.  We have reviewed cases 
involving the capital murder of a police officer in which the 
penalty imposed was life imprisonment or death based solely on 
 
 
 
 
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a finding of future dangerousness.  Based on that review, we 
conclude that sentencing bodies in Virginia generally have 
imposed the death penalty in circumstances substantially 
similar to those presented in this case.  See, e.g., Delong v. 
Commonwealth, 234 Va. 357, 362 S.E.2d 669 (1987), cert. denied, 
485 U.S. 929 (1988); Beaver, 232 Va. at 524, 352 S.E.2d at 344; 
Evans v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 468, 323 S.E.2d 144 (1984), 
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1025 (1985).  Accordingly, we hold that 
the death penalty imposed here is neither excessive nor 
disproportionate. 
 
In conclusion, we find no reversible error among the 
issues presented by Royal's appeal.  Having conducted the 
review mandated by Code § 17-110.1, we decline to commute the 
sentence of death.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of 
the trial court. 
 
Affirmed.