Title: Bass v. State
Citation: 597 So. 2d 182
Docket Number: 89-KA-0244
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: March 25, 1992

597 So. 2d 182 (1992) Jimmy BASS and Markius Thomas v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 89-KA-0244. Supreme Court of Mississippi. March 25, 1992. Boyd P. Atkinson, Raymond L. Wong, Cleveland, for appellants. Michael C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Charles W. Maris, Jr., Sp. Ass't Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before HAWKINS, P.J., and SULLIVAN and McRAE, JJ. HAWKINS, Presiding Justice, For the Court: Jimmy Bass and Markius Thomas appeal from their convictions in the circuit court of the Second Judicial District of Bolivar County and sentences to twenty years for aggravated assault and thirty years for armed robbery. Upon this appeal we address the issues of the circumstances in which the juvenile record of a child witness is appropriate evidence on cross-examination, and whether a disturbance in the courtroom warrants a mistrial. Finding no error, we affirm. On July 17, 1988, Mary Townsend was working as a cashier at the "61 Quiki" convenience store in Cleveland, Mississippi. At approximately 10:30 p.m., three black males entered the store, and one of them ordered a hot dog. When Townsend went to fix the hot dog, one of the men told her: "I am going to rob you." She turned around, and he pointed a handgun at her and repeated: "I am going to rob you." He then told her to open the cash register and give him the money. She opened the register and started giving him the money. He grabbed the money, turned around and then shot Townsend twice. As the three men ran out the door, Townsend managed to push an alarm button and dial 911 before she became unconscious. Townsend was taken to the hospital where she underwent surgery to repair damage to her large and small intestines and large and small bowels. Bass and Thomas were indicted October 26, 1988, by the grand jury of the Second Judicial District of Bolivar County in a two-count indictment, Count One charging them with aggravated assault in shooting *183 Mary Townsend, and Count Two armed robbery of Mary Townsend. At the time of the robbery, Townsend was an employee of Scott Petroleum, Inc., doing business as "Quicki Stop," or "61 Quiki." Bass and Thomas took $185.00 in cash from the store. Trial of the defendants began on Wednesday, December 7, 1988. Fifteen-year-old Keith Thompson testified that he was in the vicinity of the 61 Quiki immediately after the robbery occurred. He testified that he was walking to another store to play video games when he saw Markius Thomas, Jimmy Bass and another male running down the highway away from 61 Quiki. Thompson testified that he had known Thomas and Bass a long time and recognized them as soon as he saw them. According to Thompson, Bass had what looked like a pistol in his hand and was trying to put it in his pocket while he ran. Thompson testified that he called Thomas and said: "Markius, come here," but Thomas told him that he would catch up with him later and kept running. Thompson also testified that about the time he saw the three blacks running, "I seen two police cars go to 61 Quiki." Thompson testified that he started to go to the 61 Quiki to see what happened but instead went home because he was afraid he might get into trouble. He also testified that the night before the robbery, Jimmy Bass let Thompson hold a .38 revolver which Bass had in his possession. Bass testified that he was with Thomas during the afternoon of July 17, 1988, but that he and Thomas were both at their respective homes that night. Thomas did not testify. Thomas and Bass each put witnesses on the stand who testified that they were at home on the night of July 17, 1988. On August 3 during the course of their investigation, the police questioned Thompson and a written statement was taken from him by George Serio, investigator with the Cleveland Police Department. In pre-trial discovery Thompson was listed as a potential State witness, and a copy of his written statement was furnished the defense. The youth court records are not a part of this record, but there is reference made by defense counsel that at the time of trial Thompson had been in training school four times, twice for shoplifting, once for receiving stolen property, and another for not attending school. Counsel also told the court that Thompson was sent to the training school on October 12, 1988, for failure to attend school. Thompson was returned from the training school to Cleveland to testify in this cause, and was in the local jail on Monday, December 5. On direct examination Thompson testified that he was in jail when he was asked by his cousin, Cedric Coleman, to "[T]ell them you don't know nothing about it. You know, tell them that Serio tried to told you that if you don't testify, he was going to try to do something to you." Thompson was asked if Serio had done this, and he answered, "No, sir." He was then asked, "Has anybody with the police department or me told you to tell anything but the truth?" He answered, "No, sir." On cross-examination Thompson was asked where he had been staying in Cleveland for the last two or three days, which was objected to; the objection sustained. The circuit judge then heard from counsel in chambers. Defense counsel then unsuccessfully sought permission to cross-examine Thompson about his youth court record. On their appeal Bass' and Thomas' first and main assignment of error is the refusal of the circuit judge to let them cross-examine Thompson on his juvenile record. Because this assignment presents both a serious and a close question, we quote at length from the trial record. BY THE COURT: BY MR. WONG [counsel for Thomas]: BY THE COURT: BY MR. WONG: BY THE COURT: BY MR. WONG: BY THE COURT: BY MR. WONG: BY MR. ATKINSON [counsel for Bass]: BY THE COURT: BY MR. HORAN [Assistant D.A.]: BY MR. WONG: BY MR. HORAN: BY MR. WONG: BY THE COURT: BY MR. HORAN: BY THE COURT: BY MR. ATKINSON: BY THE COURT: BY MR. WONG: BY THE COURT: BY MR. WONG: BY THE COURT: While the above proceedings were taking place, the circuit judge was informed by a deputy that one Frederick Norman, a defense witness, had been been seen talking to Thompson. Norman was brought in for questioning in chambers concerning this and admonished not to talk to the witnesses, either state or defense. Following this, Thompson was cross-examined before the jury. Following their trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty against both defendants and they were each sentenced to twenty years in prison for the aggravated assault charge and thirty years for the armed robbery charge. Mississippi Rules of Evidence (M.R.E.) 103(a)(2) states: This rule is a restatement of our case law. Johnson v. State, 416 So. 2d 679, 681 (Miss. 1982). See also Gates v. State, 484 So. 2d 1002, 1008 (Miss. 1986); Hammond v. Grissom, 470 So. 2d 1049, 1053 (Miss. 1985); Brown v. State, 338 So. 2d 1008, 1009-10 (Miss. 1976); Martin v. Wadlington, 337 So. 2d 706, 708 (Miss. 1976); Dazet v. Bass 254 So. 2d 183, 187-88 (Miss. 1971). Until the adoption of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence January 1, 1986, the general credibility of any adult witness could be attacked by questioning him as to any previous conviction, whether a felony or a misdemeanor, with the sole exception of traffic offenses. Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-13 (1972); Miss. Code Ann. § 63-9-15 (1972) (now repealed); Breland v. State, 221 Miss. 371, 73 So. 2d 267 (1954); Brown v. State, 96 Miss. 534, 51 So. 273 (1910). A different rule applied, however, as to youth court offenses. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-561(5) (Supp. 1979) provided: As can be seen from this statute, a youth court adjudication can be used to cross-examine a witness in a criminal proceeding to show "bias or interest." And, as to adult witnesses, M.R.E. 609 removes the absolute, carte blanche right to use prior convictions for impeachment purposes, substituting a balancing test explicated in Peterson v. State, 518 So. 2d 632 (Miss. 1987). As to youth court adjudications, M.R.E. 609(d) and the comment thereto provides: The official comment to Rule 609(d) provides: This rule authorizes cross-examination of a youth court offender if it would have been "admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission of the evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence." Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-561(5) and Rule 609(d) serve the same purpose, have the same objective, and although worded differently, provide the same general criterion for a trial judge in exercising his discretion to determine whether or not a previous youth court adjudication shall be admissible in the cross-examination of a minor witness. The only difference is that under the Rule an accused may not be cross-examined as to his prior youth court adjudications. The right to cross-examine as to prior convictions in order to show bias or interest was given Constitutional dimension in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974). Because the rule announced in that case is a right guaranteed an accused under the Sixth Amendment, it should be interpreted liberally to favor the accused. Davis v. Alaska, however, does not give the accused the absolute right under Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-13 or pre-rules case law to require a witness to disclose any prior convictions to attack his credibility simply because he had been convicted of a criminal offense. In Davis v. Alaska a 16-year-old boy named Green spoke to two men beside a parked car near his house as he was leaving on an errand. When he returned they were still there, and one had a crowbar. Later, a safe from the "Polar Bar" restaurant was found near the spot where Green had seen the two men. These men were subsequently indicted for burglary and larceny of the restaurant. At the time of their trial, Green was on probation by order of a juvenile court as a delinquent for having burglarized two cabins. The State moved the trial court for a protective order to prevent any reference during Green's cross-examination to his juvenile court record. The U.S. Supreme Court noted: 415 U.S. at 311, 94 S. Ct. at 1108, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 351. The Court then noted: 415 U.S. at 312, 94 S. Ct. at 1108, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 351. By specific questions Green was asked if, following discovery of the safe, he was upset that it was found on his property; whether he felt that he might be a suspect; whether he was uncomfortable; whether he suspected that the police thought he was involved; and if he was somehow connected with the theft. He was asked again if there was a possibility somehow that the police might think he was connected with the theft, and he testified that this had crossed his mind. Finally, he was asked if he had ever been questioned before by law enforcement officers, and he answered no. The Court sustained an objection to this question, and then noted: 415 U.S. at 313-14, 94 S. Ct. at 1109, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 352. The Court then held: 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S. Ct. at 1110, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 353-354. The Court then concluded that "the jurors were entitled to have the benefit of the defense theory before them so that they could make an informed judgment as to the weight to place on Green's testimony," which was crucial to the State's case. 415 U.S. at 317, 94 S. Ct. at 1111, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 354. The Court noted that while defense counsel was permitted to ask Green if he was biased, he was not permitted to "make a record from which to argue why Green might have been biased or otherwise lacked the degree of impartiality expected of a witness at trial." 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S. Ct. at 1111, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 355. The Court then held that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation had been denied because the defense had not been permitted to show a possible bias on the part of Green. 415 U.S. at 320, 94 S. Ct. at 1112, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 356. Because it is a polestar decision, and because of the similarities between Davis v. Alaska and this case, we specifically have given careful attention to the facts and trial records of that case, and quoted at length from the Court's opinion. As can be seen from the extended excerpts from Davis v. Alaska and the record in this case, there is a great similarity between the two. There are also differences. In Davis v. Alaska, Green, the 17-year-old witness, was on probation; in this case Thompson was brought from the training school to testify for the state. This in and of itself is not dispositive. In Davis v. Alaska the state sought and obtained a protective order to keep the defense from questioning Green about his youth court record. No such protective order was sought here, although the State did object to cross-examining Thompson about his youth court record, which was sustained by the circuit court. Neither is this difference dispositive. In Davis v. Alaska defense counsel specifically informed the court that the reason he wanted to question Green was not for general impeachment of his character, but to show his state of mind when he was questioned by the police. Specifically, he wanted to show that Green was himself on probation for burglary, from which defense counsel wished to show, or at least be able to argue to the jury, that Green's cooperation with the police was brought on by his fear of probation revocation or himself being suspected of the burglary. No such basis was offered by the defense in this case. Counsel simply told the court that they wished to cross-examine Thompson about all his convictions to show "bias or interest." In Davis v. Alaska Green had himself been sent to reform school for burglary. He was questioned about a burglary when the safe was found on his parents' property. There were no eyewitnesses to the burglary, and Green thought he might himself be suspected of the crime. Thompson had no reason to think in this case he might be suspected of the assault and robbery. In this case the circuit court clearly told defense counsel they could cross-examine Thompson to show special treatment, offers or concessions, or to show any bias or interest, but could not just ask him about his juvenile court record. The trial court in Davis v. Alaska offered no such opportunity to the defense. In Davis v. Alaska, following the trial court's ruling, defense counsel did on cross-examination seek to probe Green's state of mind when he was questioned by the police, and asked him if he had ever been questioned by the police before, to which he answered "no," and the court sustained the objection thereto. In this case defense counsel neither in chambers nor out of the presence of the jury made any profert of what they expected to show by cross-examining Thompson as to his youth court *191 record, except a generalized statement to show "bias or interest." Did they expect to show he had been promised anything to testify? Did they expect to show he wanted to return home from the training school, and thought if he testified for the state he would be shown leniency? None of this was brought to the attention of the circuit judge. Finally, in this case, counsel did not, as was done in Davis v. Alaska, attempt before the jury to explore Thompson's state of mind when he was questioned by the police or the state. In this case, weeks in advance of trial defense counsel was furnished the name of Thomas as a potential witness for the State and received a copy of his written statement to the police department. They had ample opportunity to interview him, question him in advance of trial, and learn enough about him, explore his background and test the credibility of what he proposed to testify, and to give the court some specific reason or basis, if they had one, why they wished to ask him about his juvenile court record. This was not done. Circuit judges should not be sandbagged into committing error. M.R.E. 103(a)(2); Johnson, 416 So. 2d at 681. Bass and Thomas also contend that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial after a disturbance occurred in the courtroom. During Bass' cross-examination of prosecution witness Anita Thompson, Thompson started crying when Bass sought to elicit testimony as to whether anyone tried to influence her testimony. When Thompson mentioned the name "Tyrone," an unidentified spectator ran out of the courtroom and was followed by a law enforcement officer. After this disturbance, the court recessed for lunch. After the recess, the court stated that it had decided to clear all of the spectators out of the courtroom for the remainder of the trial. The attorneys for Bass and Thomas moved for a mistrial. They argued that the disturbance unfairly prejudiced the minds of the jurors against Bass and Thomas. This motion was overruled. The general rule is that it is the duty of the trial court to maintain order in the courtroom and to take appropriate action when disturbances occur. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 970. Rule 5.15 of the Mississippi Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice provides that "[t]he court shall declare a mistrial upon the defendant's motion if there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceeding or conduct inside or outside the courtroom resulting in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the defendant's case." In Ladner v. State, 584 So. 2d 743, 753 (Miss. 1991), this Court held that it will not reverse on the failure to grant a mistrial unless the trial court abused its discretion in overruling the motion for a mistrial. See also Horne v. State, 487 So. 2d 213, 214-15 (Miss. 1986); Coley v. State, 378 So. 2d 1095, 1097 (Miss. 1980); Logsdon v. State, 183 Miss. 168, 170, 183 So. 503 (Miss. 1938). In Davis v. State, 530 So. 2d 694, 697 (Miss. 1988), quoting Schwarzauer v. State, 339 So. 2d 980, 982 (Miss. 1976), the Court stated: "[t]rial judges are peculiarly situated so as to decide (better and more logically than anyone else) when a trial should be discontinued." In this case, the trial court stated that it did not feel that the disturbance would cause substantial prejudice to Thomas and Bass because it was unlikely that the jurors even realized exactly what took place. The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial. After the disturbance, the court recessed for lunch. The court also cleared the spectators from the courtroom for the remainder of the trial in order to preclude another disturbance. The court was in the best position to decide what action needed to be taken and did take reasonable action. After a careful study of the record, we find that the remaining assignments of error are without merit. AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS and McRAE, JJ., concur. [1] Counsel is probably incorrect on the precise date he questioned Thompson. Trial began on December 7.