Title: Commonwealth v. Ruffin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12079
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: August 9, 2016

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SJC-12079 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WAYNE L. RUFFIN. 
 
 
August 9, 2016. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Practice, Criminal, Plea, New trial, 
Conduct of government agents, Presumptions and burden of 
proof.  Evidence, Guilty plea, Certificate of drug 
analysis, Presumptions and burden of proof. 
 
 
 
 
On July 26, 2007, the defendant, Wayne L. Ruffin, pleaded 
guilty to two counts of distribution of cocaine, in violation of 
G. L. c. 94C, §§ 32A and 32E.  Two other counts, alleging drug 
violations near a school zone or park, in violation of G. L. 
c. 94C, § 32J, were dismissed.  Thereafter, on October 3, 2007, 
the substances were tested at the William A. Hinton State 
Laboratory Institute, and Annie Dookhan was one of the two 
"assistant analysts" who signed the certificates of drug 
analysis (drug certificates).  Years later, after Dookhan's 
misconduct had been discovered, see generally Commonwealth v. 
Scott, 467 Mass. 336 (2014), the defendant unsuccessfully moved 
for a new trial, seeking to vacate his guilty pleas on the 
ground of Dookhan's misconduct.  The defendant appeals from the 
denial of that motion, as well as his renewed motion for a new 
trial.  We affirm. 
 
 
Consistent with due process considerations, a guilty plea 
may be accepted only when it is "intelligently and voluntarily 
made."  Scott, 467 Mass. at 345, quoting Commonwealth v. Furr, 
454 Mass. 101, 106 (2009).  A plea may be defective, for 
example, where it has been "involuntarily induced by government 
misconduct that since has been discovered."  Scott, supra at 
345-346.  In this case, the defendant contends that his pleas 
were not "knowing and voluntary" because he was unaware at that 
2 
 
 
 
time of the pleas of Dookhan's misconduct or that she would 
eventually test the alleged controlled substances in his cases.  
The motion judge properly rejected the argument.  Where 
governmental misconduct is alleged in circumstances such as 
these, we have applied the two prong-analysis of Ferrara v. 
United States, 456 F.3d 278, 290 (1st Cir. 2006).  See Scott, 
supra at 346.  The first prong has three parts.  "[T]the 
defendant first must show that egregious government misconduct 
preceded the entry of his guilty plea and that it is the sort of 
conduct that implicates the defendant's due process rights" 
(emphasis added).  Id. at 347.  Under the second part, the 
defendant must establish that the "egregious misconduct was 
undertaken 'by government agents' prior to the entry of the 
defendant's guilty plea" (emphasis added).  Id. at 348.  The 
third part requires a defendant to show a nexus between the 
government misconduct and the defendant's own case.  Id. at 350.  
If all three parts of the first prong are satisfied, the second 
prong of Ferrara requires a defendant to particularize the 
governmental "misconduct to his decision to tender a guilty 
plea."1  Id. at 354.     
 
 
Scott involved a drug certificate that, unlike the 
certificate in this case, antedated the defendant's guilty plea.  
Because of the unprecedented scope of Dookhan's misconduct, we 
focused on and recognized that the requisite nexus might be 
"impossible for the defendant to show."  Scott, 467 Mass. at 
351.  For that reason, we held that "in cases in which a 
defendant seeks to vacate a guilty plea under Mass. R. Crim. P. 
30 (b)[, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001),] as a result of 
the revelation of Dookhan's misconduct, and where the defendant 
proffers a drug certificate from the defendant's case signed by 
Dookhan on the line labeled 'Assistant Analyst,' the defendant 
is entitled to a conclusive presumption that egregious 
government misconduct occurred in the defendant's case."  Id. at 
352.  Underlying that presumption, however, is the assumption 
that the misconduct evidenced by the certificate antedated the 
guilty plea.   
 
 
Where a drug certificate signed by Dookhan postdates the 
defendant's guilty plea, the underlying assumption of Scott is 
absent.  The Scott presumption exists to relieve defendants of 
"costly administrative burden[s]," see Scott, 467 Mass. at 353, 
because "the only reliable and available basis . . . to assess 
whether Dookhan's wrongful conduct touched the defendant's case" 
                     
 
1 The defendant did not file his own affidavit in support of 
his motion to vacate his guilty pleas. 
3 
 
 
 
is contained in the drug certificate.  Id.  Where certificates 
indicate that Dookhan analyzed the drugs in the defendant's case 
after the plea proceedings were concluded, even presuming 
misconduct occurred at that time, her involvement cannot be said 
presumptively and retroactively to have induced the defendant's 
plea months earlier.  For the presumption articulated in Scott 
to apply, it is incumbent on the defendant to establish that the 
presumptive governmental misconduct antedated the plea.  See id. 
(where certificate antedated plea, "furnishing a drug 
certificate signed by Annie Dookhan as an assistant analyst in 
the defendant's case satisfies the defendant's evidentiary 
burden to establish each element of the first prong of the 
Ferrara analysis").  In this case, the defendant failed to 
satisfy his evidentiary burden with respect to the first prong 
of Ferrera.   
 
 
The serendipitous assignment of Dookhan as one of two 
chemists who tested the alleged controlled substances in the 
defendant's cases -- after his pleas had been accepted and he 
had been sentenced -- does not give rise to a presumptive basis 
for vacating the guilty pleas.  There being no basis to find 
that any governmental misconduct occurred in his case prior to 
the acceptance of his pleas, or that any governmental misconduct 
rendered the defendant's guilty pleas unintelligent or 
involuntary, the motion judge properly declined to vacate the 
guilty pleas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  a new trial affirmed. 
 
 
Alexandra H. Deal for the defendant. 
 
Laurie S. Yeshulas, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth.