Title: Mar-Lee Corporation v. Steele
Citation: 359 P.2d 364
Docket Number: 19684
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: February 14, 1961

359 P.2d 364 (1961) MAR-LEE CORPORATION, a Colorado Corporation, and T. W. N. Co., a Colorado Corporation, Petitioners, v. Robert W. STEELE, as District Judge of the Second Judicial District, sitting in and for the City and County of Denver, Respondent. No. 19684. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. February 14, 1961. Donaldson, Hoffman &amp; Goldstein, Denver, for petitioners. Galligan &amp; Foley, Denver, for respondent. MOORE, Justice. This is an original proceeding instituted in this court in which petitioners secured the issuance of a rule directed to the respondent to show cause why the district court of the City and County of Denver should not be directed to vacate an order entered in an action there pending, and to proceed to trial and determination of that cause on the merits as a class action. Pursuant to the requirement of the rule, respondent made answer. The circumstances thus shown to exist, which form the basis of this controversy, are as follows: Mar-Lee Corporation and T. W. N. Company, hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs or by name, filed an action in the district court in which eleven persons were named as defendants together with "all other persons similarly situated" and "All Unknown Persons Who Claim Any Interest in the Subject Matter of This Action." Personal service of summons was had upon the named defendants, and service by publication had on the unknown defendants. It was alleged in the complaint that plaintiffs owned certain real estate located in Mar-Lee Manor Filing No. 2 in Denver; that the named defendants were owners of lots in various blocks within said addition and were representative of a classnamely all the owners of real estate within the addition; that the class thus represented by the named defendants consisted of so many *365 persons that it would be "impractical to bring them before the Court, but all members of the class have similar interests involving common questions of law and fact and a common relief is sought against all; that the Defendants will fairly insure the adequate representation * * *" of all the members of the class. The particular relief sought by the plaintiffs in said action was an adjudication that certain "Protective Covenants" appearing of record purporting to restrict the use of lots in the addition to occupancy as residences, should be held not to prevent the erection of a church building on the property owned by plaintiffs. The named defendants joined issue, asserted the validity of the restrictive covenant, and questioned the authority of the court to determine the rights of all property owners in the addition in a "class action". The answer contained, inter alia, the following: November 10, 1960, the trial judge ruled as follows: No further action was taken in the district court. December 19, 1960, the petition for issuance of the rule to show cause was filed in this court. We conclude that the rule to show cause should be discharged for the reason that petitioners have an adequate remedy at law by writ of error under procedures which are well defined. We have no reporter's transcript before us. We cannot properly determine the propriety of the court's ruling in the absence of a reporter's transcript. Under the situation presented following the trial court's ruling, counsel for petitioners had only to elect to stand on the record as made, and it would thereupon have been the duty of the trial court to enter a judgment of dismissal which would be subject to review by writ of error. This procedure has been approved under comparable situations in Mooney v. Carter, 114 Colo. 267, 160 P.2d 390; Kinzbach v. Midwest Plumbing &amp; Heating Company, 128 Colo. 370, 262 P.2d 548; Mobley v. Cartwright, 141 Colo. 413, 348 P.2d 379; Chartier v. Winslow Crane Service Company, 142 Colo. 294, 350 P.2d 1044. If petitioners desire review they can elect to stand on the record as made, whereupon the trial court, consistent with its previous ruling, should enter judgment of dismissal, the correctness of which would be subject to review by writ of error. SUTTON, J., not participating.