Title: WREN v. YATES
Citation: 2022 OK 88
Docket Number: 
State: Oklahoma
Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Date: November 8, 2022

WREN v. YATES Annotate this Case WREN v. YATES 2022 OK 88 Case Number: 119642 Decided: 11/08/2022 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. CHELSEY ANN WREN, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. ROBERT LEE YATES, Defendant/Appellant. ORDER OF SUMMARY DISPOSITION ¶1 Rule 1.201 of the Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules provides that "[i]n any case in which it appears that a prior controlling appellate decision is dispositive of the appeal, the court may summarily affirm or reverse, citing in its order of summary disposition this rule and the controlling decision." Okla. Sup. Ct. Rule 1.201. ¶2 After reviewing the record in this case, THE COURT FINDS that its decision in Milne v. Hudson, 2022 OK 84, __ P.3d __, involves the same primary legal questions as those in this appeal. Our holding in Milne disposes of the issue raised here. ¶3 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the trial court's order issuing a Final Order of Protection against Appellant Yates is AFFIRMED. DONE BY ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE THE 7th day of November 2022. /s/CHIEF JUSTICE CONCUR: KANE, V.C.J., AND KAUGER, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, COMBS (by separate writing), ROWE AND KUEHN, JJ. CONCUR IN RESULT: DARBY, C.J. (by separate writing) CONCUR IN JUDGMENT: GURICH, J. (by separate writing) Darby, C.J, concurring in result: ¶1 I concur in the Court's judgment, but disapprove of the majority's use of Oklahoma Supreme Court Rule 1.201 to resolve the decision by summary disposition. Appellate decisions by summary disposition should only be utilized in circumstances when the prior controlling appellate decision is dispositive of the appeal. See e.g., McBee v. Fraire, 2022 OK 22, 505 P.3d 932. Milne v. Hudson, 2022 OK 84, ___ P.3d ___ is not dispositive because the issue of jurisdiction in this case, and others like it, is factually driven. Here we have parties with different or unknown tribal statuses, and potentially very different locations from that in Milne--one county was completely included within recognized reservations1 and the other2 is not. These cases demand precise determinations as to each parties' status, the location of relevant events, and the existence and/or interplay of tribal law on the relevant subject matter with that of state and federal law. At the very least, this Court's majority opinion should provide the relevant background and affirm by Okla. Sup. Ct. R. 1.200(b), affirmance by memorandum opinion. ¶2 I also reiterate my understanding that federal jurisprudence requires a comprehensive understanding of the facts in each case to appropriately evaluate tribal or state jurisdiction when there is no clear preemption. Milne v. Hudson, 2022 OK 84, ¶¶ 11-12, ___ P.3d ___ (Darby, C.J., concurring). As stated in my concurring opinion in Milne v. Hudson, 2022 OK 84, ___ P.3d ___, jurisdictional challenges between the State of Oklahoma and Tribal Nations must be reviewed on a fact-specific, case-by-case determination. Ibid., ¶ 1, ___ P.3d ___ (Darby, C.J., concurring) (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 , 79 S. Ct. 269, 3 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1959); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 , 117 S. Ct 1404, 137 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1997); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 , 101 S. Ct. 1245, 67 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1981); Fisher v. District Court of Sixteenth Judicial District of Montana, in and for Rosebud County, 424 U.S. 382 , 96 S. Ct. 943, 47 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1976)). The majority disregards decades of well-settled precedent in concluding that the Indian/non-Indian and member/nonmember status of a party does not matter with respect to questions of jurisdiction. See Majority Op., ¶ 2 n.1. Obviously these factual distinctions do matter. See Williams, 358 U.S. 217 , 222 (Defendant's status as member Indian was significant for recognizing exclusive tribal jurisdiction); Fisher, 424 U.S. 382 (member Indian status of all parties involved was significant to finding tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction); Montana, 450 U.S. 544 ; (the location and status of persons was significant; the tribe was unable to regulate hunting and fishing of non-Indian persons on non-Indian fee land within reservation borders), Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 , 100 S. Ct. 2069, 65 L. Ed. 2d 10 (1980) (status as a member or nonmember Indian was significant; state had jurisdiction to tax nonmember Indians in reservations). See also, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 , 110 S. Ct. 2053 109 L. Ed. 2d 693 (1990) (Indian tribal court did not have inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indian); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 , 98 S. Ct. 1011, 55 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1978) (Indian tribal courts do not have inherent jurisdiction to punish non-Indians.). ¶3 In this case, Justice Gurich's concurring opinion recites the relevant facts available from the record on appeal. As she has already done so, we find it unnecessary to repeat the facts here. Because the state district court's exercise of jurisdiction is not preempted by federal law, and does not infringe on the Chickasaw Nation's right to govern themselves, the district court's exercise of jurisdiction was proper. See Milne v. Hudson, 2022 OK 84, ¶ 2, ___ P.3d. ___ (Darby, C.J., concurring). Consequently, the district court order must be affirmed. FOOT