Title: Connie Anne Shaw v. Greg Leatherberry
Citation: 2005 WI 163
Docket Number: 2003AP002316
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 6, 2005

2005 WI 163 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2316 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Connie Anne Shaw, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Greg Leatherberry, Roger L. Finch and Amy Elve, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 6, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 7, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Gerald C. Nichol   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs (in the court 
of appeals) by A. Steven Porter and Porter, Jablonski & 
Associates, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by A. Steven 
Porter. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there were briefs by John M. 
Moore, Sheila M. Sullivan and Bell, Gierhart & Moore, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Sheila M. Sullivan. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Mark J. Steichen and 
Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field, LLP, Madison, on behalf of the 
Civil Trial Counsel of Wisconsin. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed (in the court of appeals) 
by Jeff Scott Olson and the Jeff Scott Olson Law Firm, S.C., 
Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers and 
the Wisconsin Employment Lawyers Association, and there was oral 
argument by Jeff Scott Olson. 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed (in the court of appeals) 
by G. Michael Halfenger and Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwaukee, and 
Laurence J. Dupuis, Milwaukee, on behalf of the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Wisconsin Foundation, Inc., and there was 
oral argument by G. Michael Halfenger. 
 
 
2005 WI 163
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP2316  
(L.C. No. 
1998CV2857) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Connie Anne Shaw, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Greg Leatherberry, Roger L. Finch and Amy Elve, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 6, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County, 
Gerald C. Nichol, Judge.   Reversed.   
 
¶1 
JON 
P. 
WILCOX, 
J.   This 
case 
comes 
to 
us 
on 
certification from the court of appeals.  The appellant, Connie 
Anne Shaw (Shaw), appealed an order of the Circuit Court for 
Dane County, Gerald C. Nichol, Judge, denying Shaw's motion for 
a new trial, and from the court's decision at trial imposing the 
middle burden of proof——clear and convincing evidence——on the 
liability questions put to the jury in the special verdict.   
 
 
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
2 
 
I 
¶2 
The court of appeals certified the following question:  
What standard of proof applies to cases alleging excessive use 
of force by the police brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(1994 & Supp. III 1998)1 in Wisconsin courts?   
¶3 
We conclude that the Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution2 requires Wisconsin courts to apply the 
lowest burden of proof——preponderance of the evidence——in civil 
rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive use of 
                                                 
1 Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code states: 
Every 
person 
who, 
under 
color 
of 
any 
statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress, except that in any action brought against a 
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such 
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall 
not be granted unless a declaratory decree was 
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.  For 
the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress 
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia 
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of 
Columbia. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. III 1998). 
2 "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States 
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the 
supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be 
bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any 
state to the contrary notwithstanding."  U.S. Const. art VI, 
cl.2.   
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
3 
 
force by police personnel.  As such, we reverse the order of the 
circuit court, and remand for a new trial on the issue of 
liability.   
II 
¶4 
In the early morning hours of January 17, 1998, Shaw 
was the victim of a hit-and-run accident on the Capitol Square 
in Madison.  As Shaw exited her vehicle to survey the damage, 
the other vehicle drove away.  Shaw pursued the car around the 
Square to the 600 block of West Washington Avenue, whereupon a 
female driver and two other female passengers exited their 
vehicle.  Shaw also left her car, and before she could say 
anything, the other driver punched her in the face.  A fight 
ensued, and eventually Shaw's attackers got back into their 
vehicle and sped away.   
¶5 
Shaw chased the other vehicle back around the Square 
and down East Washington Avenue at speeds of up to 80 miles per 
hour.  Shaw stated that she had hoped to spot a police officer 
along the way for help.  Eventually, they ended up in a 
commercial business parking lot.  Although she thought she could 
go to jail for her actions, she chased the occupants of the 
vehicle around the lot and rammed the other vehicle with her 
car.  The police later arrived at the scene, and Shaw was 
arrested by Officer Carrie Hemming.  Shaw was then taken to the 
Dane County Jail to be booked on charges of criminal damage to 
property and reckless endangerment of safety.   
¶6 
Deputy Sheriff Greg Leatherberry (Leatherberry) was 
the booking deputy on duty that night.   Leatherberry testified 
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
4 
 
that Shaw was cooperative and quiet at times, while at other 
times she was angry, loud, and noncompliant.  As part of the 
booking process, Leatherberry asked Shaw some standard medical 
questions.  Shaw told Leatherberry that she had post-traumatic 
stress disorder.  Furthermore, Leatherberry testified that when 
he asked Shaw if she was contemplating suicide, she did not 
immediately answer him.  When he asked a second time, Shaw 
exclaimed:  "You're God damn right I am!"  Leatherberry then 
asked the normal follow-up question of if she had ever thought 
about how she would try to commit suicide.  Shaw started to say 
something about how a person could "stuff," but she never 
completed 
the 
answer. 
 
This 
triggered 
Leatherberry's 
recollection of an incident in the prison where a person had 
committed suicide by stuffing a sock in his mouth.  Based on 
everything Shaw told him, Leatherberry made the decision to 
strip Shaw of her clothing.   
¶7 
Leatherberry handcuffed Shaw and escorted her to a 
segregation cell in the female housing area.  Deputy Roger Finch 
(Finch) was waiting at the holding cell when Leatherberry and 
Shaw arrived. Because Shaw was female, Deputy Amy Elve (Elve) 
was summoned to assist.  When asked to remove her clothing 
voluntarily, Shaw refused, and Leatherberry told her that the 
deputies would be forced to remove her clothing.  Shaw denies 
ever being given the opportunity to voluntarily remove her 
clothing in the sole presence of Elve.   
¶8 
Shaw testified that Leatherberry threw her across a 
cement block bunk, where she struck a cement block wall and fell 
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
5 
 
face-first on the bunk.  She also testified that Leatherberry 
put his knee in the back of her neck and jerked her handcuffed 
hands up so that her arms were perpendicular to her body.  The 
deputies proceeded to remove her clothes, and Shaw stated that 
Finch, who was holding the door of the cell open, stood in the 
doorway grinning at her.  After her clothing had been removed, 
Shaw was given a jail smock to wear.  Shaw testified that 
Leatherberry's actions caused her great pain and emotional 
distress, and Finch and Elve did not attempt to intervene to 
prevent Leatherberry from using excessive force, though they had 
the opportunity to do so.   
¶9 
The deputies, on the other hand, testified that Shaw's 
head never hit the wall, Leatherberry never put his knee on her, 
and no one pulled her handcuffed arms up.  Leatherberry 
testified that he used the necessary force to remove her 
clothing given Shaw's physical resistance.   
¶10 Shaw filed an action in Dane County Circuit Court on 
November 4, 1998, which alleged four claims for relief:  (1) 
that the deputies subjected her to an illegal strip search under 
Wis. Stat. § 968.255 (1997-98); (2) that the deputies tortiously 
assaulted and battered her; (3) that the deputies deprived her 
of her rights to be free from an illegal strip search and 
subjection to excessive force as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and made actionable 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (4) that Dane County and the 
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
6 
 
Sheriff of Dane County negligently trained the deputies.3  In 
regard to her § 1983 claim, Shaw claimed deprivations of her 
constitutional rights by Leatherberry's alleged use of excessive 
force and by Elve and Finch's failure to intervene on her behalf 
while Leatherberry mistreated her.   
¶11 On October 23, 2000, the defendants moved for summary 
judgment.  In an order dated February 13, 2001, the court 
granted summary judgment and dismissed each of Shaw's claims 
except for her claim that she was subjected to excessive force 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.   
¶12 On May 9, 2002, the deputies moved for summary 
dismissal of the complaint as they had not been personally 
identified or served.  At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, 
Shaw's counsel failed to appear, and the circuit court granted 
the motion.  Shaw moved to reopen and to amend her complaint to 
include the names of the individual deputies——Leatherberry, 
Finch, and Elve.  On May 22, 2002, the court vacated the 
dismissal and granted Shaw leave to amend her complaint.   
¶13 The jury trial was held from May 19 to May 22, 2003.  
The circuit court utilized an amended version of Wisconsin Jury 
Instruction-Civil 2155 entitled "Excessive Force in Maintaining 
Jail Security Federal Civil Rights: § 1983 Action" as agreed 
upon by the parties, except with respect to the appropriate 
burden of proof on the issue of liability.  Over Shaw's 
objection, the court used the middle burden of proof contained 
                                                 
3 The negligence claim was voluntarily abandoned by Shaw.   
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
7 
 
in Wisconsin Jury Instruction-Civil 205 for the liability 
questions in the special verdict.4  On the question of damages, 
the jury was instructed on the lower burden of proof.  Shaw 
argued that the jury should have been instructed on the lower 
burden of proof for each question in the special verdict.  The 
court was sympathetic to Shaw's position, but it felt obligated 
to follow the law in Wisconsin as articulated in cases such as 
Johnson v. Ray, 99 Wis. 2d 777, 299 N.W.2d 849 (1981) and 
Wirsing v. Krzeminski, 61 Wis. 2d 513, 213 N.W.2d 37 (1973), 
which stated that in civil claims alleged against police 
officers for excessive force, the proper standard is the middle 
burden of proof.   
¶14 At one point, the jury reported to the judge that it 
was "at a block" on the question relating to Leatherberry's 
liability.  However, after nearly five hours of deliberation in 
total, the jury later returned a verdict of 11-1 in favor of 
Leatherberry and Elve on the issue of liability, and 10-2 in 
favor of Finch on the issue of liability.5  In regard to damages, 
the jury voted 11-1 that Shaw should receive no money for past 
                                                 
4 For each individual deputy, the special verdict first 
asked the jury if Deputy Leatherberry used excessive and 
unnecessary force against Shaw or if Deputies Finch and Elve 
failed to act in violation of Shaw's right not to be subjected 
to excessive or unreasonable force.  Only if the jury answered 
in the affirmative did it reach the second question of whether 
the individual deputy's conduct caused harm to Shaw.    
5 Because the jury found in favor of each defendant on the 
question of excessive force or failure to intervene, it did not 
answer the question of causation for any of the defendants.   
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
8 
 
medical expenses; pain, suffering and disability; or future 
medical expenses.  However, the jury was unanimous in its 
decision to award Shaw $5000 in damages for mental pain and 
emotional distress.   
¶15 Shaw filed a motion for a new trial claiming, in part, 
that the circuit court erred by instructing the jury that she 
had to establish liability under the middle burden of proof.  In 
an order filed on July 17, 2003, the circuit court denied Shaw's 
motion for a new trial.  The court stated that under Wisconsin 
law, the middle burden of proof is used in excessive force cases 
involving police officers.  It also noted that the burden of 
proof is appropriately higher for police officers in assault 
cases because they are privileged to use force under some 
circumstances.   
III 
¶16 Preliminarily, we note that jurisdiction of § 1983 
actions does not rest exclusively in federal courts.  See Maine 
v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1980) ("Any doubt that state 
courts may also entertain such actions was dispelled by Martinez 
v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283-84, n.7 (1980).").  Prior to 
this conclusive statement of the United States Supreme Court, 
this 
court 
had 
held 
that 
Wisconsin 
state 
courts 
have 
jurisdiction to decide actions based upon § 1983.  Terry v. 
Kolski, 78 Wis. 2d 475, 479, 254 N.W.2d 704 (1977).  Indeed, 
"there are no longer any state court systems that refuse to hear 
§ 1983 cases[,]" and "[s]tate courts have emerged in recent 
years as the forum of choice for an increasing number of 
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
9 
 
plaintiffs 
suing 
state 
and 
local 
defendants 
under 
 . . . § 1983."  Steven H. Steinglass, Section 1983 Litigation 
in State Courts § 1:1, at 1-1, 1-4 (2002). 
¶17 The issue of what burden of proof is appropriate in a 
§ 1983 action alleging excessive force in state court is a 
matter of first impression before this court.  "Determination of 
the appropriate burden of proof in this case presents a question 
of statutory interpretation, a question of law which this court 
determines independently of other courts, benefiting from their 
analyses."  Carlson & Erickson Builders, Inc. v. Lampert Yards, 
Inc., 190 Wis. 2d 650, 658, 529 N.W.2d 905 (1995).  "Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo."  
State v. Stenklyft, 2005 WI 71, ¶7, 281 Wis. 2d 484, 697 
N.W.2d 769 (citing Columbus Park Hous. Corp. v. City of Kenosha, 
2003 WI 143, ¶9, 267 Wis. 2d 59, 671 N.W.2d 633).   
IV 
¶18 Shaw contends that the circuit court erroneously 
instructed the jury that she had to establish liability under 
the middle burden of proof——clear and convincing evidence——as 
detailed in Wisconsin Jury Instruction——Civil 205.  Shaw further 
asserts that the lower burden of proof——preponderance of the 
evidence——contained in Wisconsin Jury Instruction——Civil 200 was 
the proper burden of proof in a § 1983 state court action 
alleging excessive force by the police.  The deputies, on the 
other hand, argue that the circuit court utilized the proper 
burden of proof as established under this court's prior case 
law.  We agree with Shaw that the preponderance of the evidence 
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
10 
 
standard should have been used, and we remand on the issue of 
liability.  We do not remand on the issue of damages, as the 
jury properly considered damages under the lower burden of 
proof.   
¶19 The 
circuit 
court 
relied 
on 
Wisconsin 
Jury 
Instruction—Civil 2155 in concluding that the middle burden of 
proof was required in this case on the issue of liability.  
Specifically, the Comment to this jury instruction suggests that 
in cases alleging excessive force under § 1983, the middle 
burden of proof is appropriate on the special verdict questions 
of whether excessive force was used and whether such force 
caused injury to the plaintiff.6  See Wis JI——Civil 2155 (citing 
Johnson, 99 Wis. 2d 777; Wirsing, 61 Wis. 2d 513).   
¶20 The decisions relied upon by the circuit court 
involved civil tort actions alleging assault and battery by the 
police.  Johnson, 99 Wis. 2d at 781; Wirsing, 61 Wis. 2d at 519.  
Although the appropriate burden of proof was not the central 
issue in these decisions, this court observed that in tort 
actions alleging excessive force of a police officer, the 
plaintiff must satisfy the jury "by a clear and satisfactory 
preponderance of the evidence."  Johnson, 99 Wis. 2d at 783 
(citing Wirsing, 61 Wis. 2d at 520). 
¶21 The heightened burden of proof would have been 
appropriate if this case arose under state tort law.  However, 
                                                 
6 On the question of whether the defendants were acting 
under color of state law, the Comment states that the lower 
burden of proof is appropriate.  See Wis JI——Civil 2155.   
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
11 
 
Shaw's claim that the deputies tortiously assaulted and battered 
her was dismissed on summary judgment.  The sole cause of action 
tried was Shaw's claim under § 1983 that the deputies' actions 
deprived her of her federal constitutional rights.  As such, the 
proper focus of the analysis is determining the burden of proof 
under § 1983 and not the burden of proof under state tort law. 
¶22 To be sure, there is no explicit burden of proof 
contained within the text of § 1983.  In such a case "[w]here 
Congress has not prescribed the appropriate standard of proof 
and the Constitution does not dictate a particular standard, 
[the Supreme Court] must prescribe one."  Herman & MacLean v. 
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983).   
¶23 The deputies argue that there is no controlling 
federal authority establishing the burden of proof to be used 
for § 1983 claims alleging excessive use of force.  However, 
there is clear authority that federal courts consistently 
require plaintiffs to prove their § 1983 claims under the lower 
burden of proof——a preponderance of the evidence.  See, e.g., 
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 594 (1998).   
¶24 As a general matter, the Supreme Court has recognized 
that "[i]n a typical civil suit for money damages, plaintiffs 
must prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence."  
Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 387.  The burden of proof "serves to 
allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate 
the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision."  
Addington v. Tex., 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).  Specifically, the 
"preponderance-of-the-evidence standard allows both parties to 
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
12 
 
'share 
the 
risk 
of 
error 
in 
roughly 
equal 
fashion.'"  
Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 390 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 
423).   
¶25 The Supreme Court applies a clear and convincing level 
of proof "where particularly important individual interests or 
rights are at stake."  Id. at 389 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 
455 U.S. 745 (1982) (proceeding to terminate parental rights); 
Addington, 441 U.S. at 418 (involuntary commitment proceeding); 
Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1966) (deportation)).  "By 
contrast, imposition of even severe civil sanctions that do not 
implicate such interests has been permitted after proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence."  Id. at 389-90 (citing United 
States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 48-49 (1914)).  The Huddleston 
Court concluded that "[t]he interests of defendants in a 
securities case do not differ qualitatively from the interests 
of defendants sued for violations of other federal statutes such 
as the antitrust statute or civil rights laws, for which proof 
by a preponderance of the evidence suffices."  Id. at 390 
(emphasis added).   
¶26 Turning to a § 1983 case, in Crawford-El, a "litigious 
and outspoken" prison inmate serving a life sentence brought 
suit under § 1983 against a corrections officer alleging that 
the officer deliberately misdirected boxes containing legal 
materials and other personal belongings of his when he was 
transferred among various prisons.  Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 
578. 
 The prisoner claimed, in 
part, that 
the officer 
"deliberately misdirected the boxes to punish him for exercising 
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
13 
 
his First Amendment rights and to deter similar conduct in the 
future."  Id.  The district court dismissed Crawford-El's 
claims, in part, because "the First Amendment retaliation claim 
did not allege direct evidence of unconstitutional motive."  Id. 
at 581 (internal quotes omitted).  The Court of Appeals, 
District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, reviewed the 
dismissal of the First Amendment retaliation claim.  Id.  The 
primary opinion concluded that "unless the plaintiff offers 
clear and convincing evidence on the state-of-mind issue at 
summary judgment and trial, judgment or directed verdict (as 
appropriate) should be granted for the individual defendant."  
Id. at 583.   
¶27 The United States Supreme Court recognized that the 
heightened burden of proof in improper motivation cases was the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
attempt 
to 
address 
the 
problem 
of 
"insubstantial claims" and the concerns the court had "with the 
social costs of subjecting public officials to discovery and 
trial, as well as liability for damages."  Id. at 584-85.  
Nevertheless, the Crawford-El Court concluded that "[n]either 
the text of § 1983 or any other federal statute, nor the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, provide any support for imposing the 
clear and convincing burden of proof on plaintiffs either at the 
summary judgment stage or in the trial itself."  Id. at 594.  
From this determination, the Court rejected the court of 
appeals' requirement of a higher burden of proof on § 1983 
litigants.  Id.  "The unprecedented change made by the Court of 
Appeals in this case [] lacks any common-law pedigree and alters 
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
14 
 
the cause of action itself in a way that undermines the very 
purpose of § 1983——to provide a remedy for the violation of 
federal rights."  Id. at 594-95.   
¶28 In our view, the Court's decision in Crawford-El would 
not have been any different in an excessive force context.  That 
is, the clear and convincing evidence burden of proof undermines 
the remedial purpose of § 1983 just as much in an excessive 
force case as it does in a case such as Crawford-El, which 
concerned the failure to deliver a prison inmate's legal papers.   
¶29 In excessive force cases arising under § 1983, the 
Seventh Circuit has tacitly approved the preponderance of the 
evidence standard.  In McNair v. Coffey, for example, the 
Seventh Circuit recognized that "a § 1983 case is not a criminal 
prosecution, and the preponderance standard applies to civil 
claims of all sorts."  McNair v. Coffey, 234 F.3d 352, 355 (7th 
Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds by 533 U.S. 925 (2001), 
overruled on remand McNair v. Coffey, 279 F.3d 463 (7th Cir. 
2002).  See also Stone v. City of Chicago, 738 F.2d 896, 900-01 
(7th Cir. 1984) (analyzing jury instruction that utilized the 
preponderance of the evidence standard in an excessive force 
case arising under § 1983).7  Indeed, even looking beyond the 
                                                 
7 The Committee on Federal Civil Jury Instructions for the 
Seventh Circuit recently drafted a series of proposed pattern 
jury instructions, including an instruction for excessive force 
cases under § 1983 alleged by an arrestee or pretrial detainee.  
The instruction states in part: "In this case, Plaintiff claims 
that Defendant used excessive force against him.  To succeed on 
this claim, Plaintiff must prove each of the following things by 
a preponderance of the evidence: . . . ."  Fed. Civ. Jury 
Instructions of the 7th Cir. § 7.08 (2005).   
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
15 
 
Seventh Circuit, we have found many federal appellate decisions 
that utilize an ordinary civil burden of proof in § 1983 
excessive force cases.8   
¶30 All told, our review of federal law leads us to the 
conclusion that if Shaw had brought this cause of action in 
federal court, the appropriate burden of proof would have been 
the lower civil burden.   
¶31 The issue then becomes which burden of proof to apply 
in a § 1983 cause of action alleging excessive force in state 
court.  The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
"[j]ust as federal courts are constitutionally obligated to 
apply state law to state claims, [citing Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)] so too the Supremacy Clause 
imposes on state courts a constitutional duty 'to proceed in 
such manner that all the substantial rights of the parties under 
controlling federal law [are] protected.'"  Felder v. Casey, 487 
U.S. 131, 151 (1988) (quoting Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 
317 U.S. 239, 245 (1942)).  Inasmuch as the burden of proof is 
substantive, we hold that under the Supremacy Clause, the lower 
federal burden of proof applies in § 1983 excessive force cases 
in state court.   
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86, 105 (1st Cir. 
2001); Kerman v. City of N.Y., 261 F.3d 229, 243 n.10 (2d Cir. 
2001); Rogala v. Dist. of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 58 (D.C. Cir. 
1998); Tatro v. Kervin, 41 F.3d 9, 14-15 (1st Cir. 1994); Zuchel 
v. City & County of Denver, Colo., 997 F.2d 730, 735 (10th Cir. 
1993); Miller v. Taylor, 877 F.2d 469, 471 n.2 (6th Cir. 1989); 
Wing v. Britton, 748 F.2d 494, 496 (8th Cir. 1984).   
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
16 
 
¶32 In Garrett, the plaintiff, an injured seaman, filed an 
action for damages in state court under a federal admiralty law.  
Garrett, 317 U.S. at 240.  The trial court utilized the higher 
burden of proof under state law.  Id. at 242.  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court affirmed, determining that although federal law 
controlled the cause of action, the burden of proof is a 
procedural and not substantive rule.  Id.  Therefore, the court 
concluded that the burden of proof was controlled by state law.  
Id.  The United States Supreme Court reversed.  Id. at 249.   
¶33 The Court first made it clear that federal substantive 
law applied.  "We do not have in this case an effort of the 
state court to enforce rights claimed to be rooted in state law.  
The petitioner's suit rested on asserted rights granted by 
federal law and the state courts so treated it."  Id. at 243.  
Thus, because the cause of action arose under federal law "[t]he 
source of the governing law applied is in the national, not the 
state, governments."  Id. at 245.  The Court went on to state: 
If by its practice the state court were permitted 
substantially to alter the rights of either litigant, 
as those rights were established in federal law, the 
remedy afforded by the State would not enforce, but 
would actually deny, federal rights which Congress, by 
providing alternative remedies, intended to make not 
less but more secure.  The constant objective of 
legislation and jurisprudence is to assure litigants 
full protection for all substantive rights intended to 
be afforded them by the jurisdiction in which the 
right itself originates. . . . [I]n trying this case 
the state court was bound to proceed in such manner 
that all the substantial rights of the parties under 
controlling federal law would be protected. 
Id. at 245. 
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
17 
 
¶34 The Court concluded by determining that, as a general 
proposition, the burden of proof is a substantive aspect of the 
cause of action.  "The right of the petitioner to be free from 
the burden of proof imposed by the Pennsylvania local rule 
inhered in his cause of action. . . . [I]t was a part of the 
very substance of his claim and cannot be considered a mere 
incident of a form of procedure."  Id. at 249.  See also Raleigh 
v. Ill. Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20-21 (2000) ("Given its 
importance to the outcome of cases, we have long held the burden 
of proof to be a 'substantive' aspect of a claim.") (citing 
Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 
512 U.S. 267, 271 (1994); Dick v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 
437, 446 (1959); and Garrett, 317 U.S. at 249).  Thus, because 
the burden of proof is substantive and the cause of action arose 
under federal law, the Court held that the lower federal burden 
of proof applied.  Id.   
¶35 This case differs from Garrett in two respects.  
First, the cause of action arises under a federal civil rights 
statute and not a federal admiralty statute.  Second, the state 
court improperly shifted the burden of proof from the defendant 
to the plaintiff, as opposed to applying the wrong burden.  
However, we see no reason why the principles elicited in Garrett 
should not apply with equal vigor to a § 1983 excessive force 
cause of action in state court where a heightened burden of 
proof was imposed on the plaintiff.  See Felder, 487 U.S. at 138 
("[W]here state courts entertain a federally created cause of 
action, the 'federal right cannot be defeated by the forms of 
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
18 
 
local practice.'") (quoting Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 
U.S. 294, 296 (1949)).   
¶36 Thus, the burden of proof is a substantive aspect of 
this § 1983 claim.  See Raleigh, 530 U.S. at 20-21.  As such, 
when the circuit court exercised its concurrent jurisdiction 
over the federally created cause of action, it was required 
under the Supremacy Clause to instruct the jury on the lower 
burden of proof, a clear attribute of a § 1983 cause of action.   
¶37 However, even if the burden of proof were not a 
substantive aspect of the cause of action, federal law would 
still preempt Wisconsin law in this instance because a higher 
burden of proof is inconsistent with § 1983's purposes of 
compensation and deterrence.  In other words, the higher burden 
of proof utilized in state tort law causes of action is not 
"consistent with the goals of the federal civil rights laws, 
[and] instead '"stand[s] as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and 
execution 
of 
the 
full 
purposes 
and 
objectives 
of 
Congress."'"  Felder, 487 U.S. at 138 (quoting Perez v. 
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))).   
¶38 In Felder, the Court held that Wisconsin's notice of 
claim statute was preempted by federal law in § 1983 actions in 
state Court.  Id. at 138.  The Felder court noted that under the 
Supremacy Clause, "'the relative importance to the State of its 
own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid 
federal law,' for 'any state law, however clearly within a 
State's acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary 
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
19 
 
to federal law, must yield.'"  Id. (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 
U.S. 663, 666 (1962)).  With this concept in mind, the Court 
ultimately held the following: 
Because the notice-of-claim statute at issue here 
conflicts in both its purpose and effects with the 
remedial 
objectives 
of 
§ 1983, 
and 
because 
its 
enforcement in such 
actions 
will 
frequently and 
predictably 
produce 
different 
outcomes 
in 
§ 1983 
litigation based solely on whether the claim is 
asserted in state or federal court, we conclude that 
the state law is pre-empted when the § 1983 action is 
brought in state court.   
Id.  Thus, under the Felder analysis we now analyze whether a 
higher burden of proof in this context impermissibly interferes 
in its purpose and effects with the remedial objectives of 
§ 1983 or is outcome-determinative.   
¶39 Section 1983 originated in § 1 of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871.9  Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 503 
(1982).  "The 1871 Congress intended § 1 to 'throw open the 
doors of the United States courts' to individuals who were 
threatened with, or who had suffered, the deprivation of 
constitutional rights[.]"  Id. at 504 (quoting Cong. Globe, 42d 
Cong., 1st Sess., App. 46 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Lowe)).  
Indeed, "[t]he very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the 
federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians 
of the people's federal rights——to protect the people from 
unconstitutional action under color of state law, 'whether that 
                                                 
9 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch.22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 ("An Act to 
enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes.").   
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
20 
 
action be executive, legislative, or judicial.'"  Mitchum v. 
Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 
U.S. 339, 346 (1879)).  "Thus, § 1983 provides 'a uniquely 
federal remedy against incursions . . . upon rights secured by 
the Constitution and laws of the Nation,' Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 
239, and is to be accorded 'a sweep as broad as its language.'  
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)."  Felder, 487 
U.S. at 139.    
¶40 With this broad sweep, § 1983 seeks to "deter state 
actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive 
individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide 
relief to victims if such deterrence fails."  Wyatt v. Cole, 504 
U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-
57 (1978)).  The Supremacy Clause ensures that any state law 
forms, practices, and procedures that interfere with these 
purposes of the federal civil rights law are preempted.  See 
Felder, 487 U.S at 138.  The Supreme Court, in turn, closely 
scrutinizes any policy that undermines the remedial purpose of 
§ 1983.  See Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 594-95 (rejecting the 
imposition of a heightened burden of proof in a § 1983 action by 
an inmate alleging an interference with the right of access to 
the courts against a prison official).  Indeed, the Crawford-El 
Court recognized that "the heightened standard of proof directly 
limits the availability of the remedy."  Id. at 595 n.16.  If a 
federal court is not at liberty to undermine the remedial 
purposes of § 1983 through a heightened burden of proof, we 
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
21 
 
conclude that the Supremacy Clause preempts our state courts 
from imposing a higher burden of proof in § 1983 actions.   
¶41 Another aspect 
of 
the Felder 
Court's 
preemption 
analysis 
concerned 
whether 
the 
state 
law 
was 
outcome-
determinative in § 1983 litigation depending on whether the 
action was brought in state or federal court.  Felder, 487 U.S. 
at 138.  The Court determined that Wisconsin "may not alter the 
outcome of federal claims it chooses to entertain in its courts 
by demanding compliance with outcome-determinative rules that 
are inapplicable when such claims are brought in federal court."  
Felder, 487 U.S. at 152.  In other words, "[a] law that 
predictably alters the outcome of § 1983 claims depending solely 
on whether they are brought in state or federal court within the 
same State is obviously inconsistent with [the] federal interest 
in intrastate uniformity."  Id. at 153.  See also, Casteel v. 
Vaade, 167 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 481 N.W.2d 277 (1992).   
¶42 Although we conclude that a higher burden of proof in 
state court in this instance may not necessarily affect the 
outcome of every case, it does disrupt the federal interest in 
uniformity.  Furthermore, allowing different burdens of proof 
for the same action, based solely on where the action is 
brought, would be discriminatory against Wisconsin plaintiffs, 
and would, in effect, violate the purposes of § 1983.   
¶43 Thus, even if we set aside the fact that the burden of 
proof is a substantive aspect of the cause of action, when we 
consider the purposes and objectives of the federal civil rights 
law, the application of the higher burden of proof in state 
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
22 
 
court actions in this particular context is inconsistent with 
§ 1983 and is therefore preempted under the Supremacy Clause.   
¶44 Finally, we must determine the appropriate remedy in 
this case.  This court's decision in Bengston v. Estes, is 
clear: 
In Carle v. Nelson, 145 Wis. 593, 130 N.W. 467 (1911), 
we said that a party upon whom an instruction has cast 
a greater burden than the law requires can justly 
complain thereof when the answer is unfavorable to him 
and an erroneous instruction as to the burden of proof 
upon a material issue must be deemed to affect the 
substantial rights of the party.  We adhered to this 
principle in Heineman v. Old Nat. Bank, 157 Wis. 289, 
147 N.W. 360 (1914), and reaffirm it now.   
Bengston v. Estes, 260 Wis. 595, 600, 51 N.W.2d 539 (1952).  We 
again follow this principle here.  In this case, however, the 
court properly instructed the jury on the lower burden of proof 
in determining the amount of damages.  Thus, there is no basis 
for granting the plaintiff a new trial for damages, and we 
remand solely on the issue of liability.10   
V 
¶45 In sum, we conclude that the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution requires Wisconsin courts to apply 
the lowest burden of proof——preponderance of the evidence——in 
civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive 
                                                 
10 Although Shaw did not object to the jury's damage award 
in the trial court, she now asks this court to remand on all 
issues, including damages, in the interests of justice.  Because 
we believe the increased burden of proof on liability did not 
affect the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff for her 
injuries, we do not remand on this issue. 
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
23 
 
use of force by police personnel.  As such, we reverse the order 
and judgment of the circuit court, and remand for a new trial on 
the issue of liability. 
By the Court.—The circuit court is reversed, and the cause 
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.   
 
No. 
2003AP2316   
 
 
 
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