Title: Naylor v. Billington
Citation: 378 S.W.2d 737
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: May 8, 1964

378 S.W.2d 737 (1964) E.W. NAYLOR and Harold Moore, Appellants, v. Isaac Edward BILLINGTON and Lillian A. Billington, Appellees. Supreme Court of Tennessee. May 8, 1964. Van Dyke &amp; Dunlap, Paris, for appellants. Aaron C. Brown, Paris, for appellees. HOLMES, Justice. The appellants, E.W. Naylor and Harold Moore, filed the original bill in this cause seeking to have declared void a deed from Henry County, Tennessee, to the appellee. The property described in this deed had been bought in by the County at a tax sale. The appellees demurred to the bill. The Chancellor sustained this demurrer. Appellants have perfected their appeal to this Court. The original bill alleges that the appellants are the owners in fee of a certain described parcel of land in the Eleventh Civil District of Henry County, Tennessee, having acquired said property by deed from Lakeview Manor, Inc., dated January 31, 1955, that appellants are residents of Davidson County, Tennessee, that, when appellants did not receive a statement for taxes on properties owned in Henry County, the appellant Naylor made inquiry as to the amount of taxes due on his property in Henry County and paid what he thought was the full amount of taxes owed on any property in which he had an interest in Henry County. The bill further alleges that the first knowledge the appellant Naylor had that he had not paid all such taxes was when he received a letter dated November 21, 1962 from an attorney advising him that the appellees had recently purchased a house and lot formerly owned by appellants from Henry County, which property had been sold to Henry County for delinquent taxes. This letter requested appellants to remove their furnishings from this property in order that appellees might take possession of same. The bill further alleges that an investigation was then made and it was discovered this particular lot had been assessed for taxes in the name of Naylor and Moore and that, when the appellant Naylor had sought to ascertain and pay all taxes owed on properties in which he had an interest in Henry County, the taxes on this lot were not included. The appellants tendered the amount alleged to have been stated by the *738 Clerk and Master to be the amount due in February 1963 for 1957, 1958 and 1959 taxes. The bill further alleges that taxes on this property for later years have been paid in the office of the Trustee of Henry County. The bill then alleges that on March 14, 1959 a bill was filed in the Chancery Court of Henry County to enforce the collection of taxes for the year 1957 on certain properties in Henry County, Tennessee, including the subject property, that the bill in this tax suit alleged that Naylor and Moore were the owners of the subject property, that, although appellants were residents of Davidson County, Tennessee, subpoena to answer was issued to the Sheriff of Henry County, Tennessee, that the Sheriff of Henry County did not execute this process and did not make due return thereof according to law. In this connection the bill states "Complainants allege that even though the sheriff made no return and even though there was no compliance with the provisions of Section 21-212, Tennessee Code Annotated," yet, a decree was entered October 12, 1959 ordering that publication be made as to appellants and nonresident defendants, that on May 17, 1960 the subject property was sold to Henry County and the sale was confirmed on October 16, 1960. The bill and exhibit thereto further state that by deed dated November 7, 1962, Henry County conveyed this property to the appellees for the sum of $240.00. This deed was recorded January 15, 1963. The bill further alleges that, although a proceeding to enforce the collection of ad valorem taxes on real estate is a proceeding in rem, T.C.A. § 67-2012 provides that such suit shall be prosecuted according to the rules of procedure of courts of chancery. Appellants allege they had no notice of this proceeding, there was no personal service of process upon them, nor was there any compliance with the statutes pertaining to dispensing with personal service. Appellants allege that for this reason the decree of the Court vesting title in Henry County is void and that, therefore, the deed from Henry County to the appellees is void and is a cloud on appellants' title and should be removed as such. In short, the bill alleges that in the tax case the property owner was before the Court only by publication, and not by personal service, that the ground for publication was that the Sheriff had made a not to be found return, when in fact the record in the tax case shows the Sheriff had made no return at all of the leading process issued in that case for the property owner. These averments of the bill present the question of whether or not the decree confirming the tax sale is void because jurisdiction over the defendant was acquired by publication based upon a not to be found return of the Sheriff, when the record shows no such return had in fact been made. The procedure to be followed for the enforcement of tax liens is set forth in T.C.A. § 67-2001 et seq. By T.C.A. § 67-2012, it is provided that all such suits, whether brought in the Chancery Court or Circuit Court, shall be prosecuted according to the rules of procedure for courts of chancery. T.C.A. § 21-212 provides: The statute provides for four additional grounds for process by publication which are not relevant to this case. This Code Section then provides: In Bradley v. Rock Gardens Utility Dist., 186 Tenn. 665, 212 S.W.2d 567, the Court, speaking through the present Chief Justice, reviewed the history of the last above quoted statute and, at 670 of 186 Tenn., at 659 of 212 S.W.2d, stated. In Davis v. Reaves, 75 Tenn. 585, in holding void a sale of land had in a chancery proceeding, the Court, at 589 of 75 Tenn., stated: At 592 of 75 Tenn., the Court further stated: In Bleidorn v. Pilot Mountain C. &amp; M. Co., 89 Tenn. 166, 15 S.W. 737, the Court held that no jurisdiction was acquired by publication when the ground for publication was not supported by facts stated under oath in the bill or by separate affidavit. In so holding, the Court, at 179 of 89 Tenn., at 739 of 15 S.W. stated: Proceedings to enforce a tax lien are proceedings in rem. T.C.A. § 67-2003 provides, in part: In State ex rel. v. Collier, 160 Tenn. 403, 23 S.W.2d 897, this Court, at 437 of 160 Tenn., held that the jurisdiction acquired by the seizure of the property is, not to pass upon the question of forfeiture absolutely, but to pass upon that question after an opportunity *740 has been afforded to its owner to appear and be heard upon the charges. The Court, in the Collier case, at 437 and 438 of 160 Tenn., at 908 of 23 S.W.2d, stated: While the Collier case was before the Court under the provisions of Chapter 115 of the Acts of 1921, the provision in that Act that "[s]aid suit shall be conducted in accordance with the practice in Courts of Chancery in this State" is in substance the same as the provision of T.C.A. § 67-2012 that "[a]ll such suits whether brought in the chancery court or circuit court shall be prosecuted according to the rules of procedure of courts of chancery." Since, as stated in Davis v. Reaves, supra, the return of the Sheriff, not to be found, is a legal prerequisite to a publication upon that ground and without such return any decree rendered by the Chancery Court is void as to such party, it results that under the averments of the bill filed in this case the Chancery Court was without jurisdiction to render the decree confirming the sale of this property to the county of Henry. We, therefore, conclude that the decision of this case is controlled by the decision of the Court in Tennessee Marble &amp; Brick Co. v. Young, 179 Tenn. 116, 163 S.W.2d 71, and the opinion of the Court of Appeals in West v. Jackson, 28 Tenn. App. 102, 186 S.W.2d 915, in which certiorari was denied by this Court. In the West case, there was no actual or constructive service of process upon the property owner in a suit brought to enforce a tax lien upon his property. In that case the property had been sold to the State at the tax sale and a decree confirming this sale had been entered. Later, after the period of redemption had expired, Jackson bought the property from the State and a deed was executed to him and his wife by the Commissioner of Finance &amp; Taxation, approved by the Governor and the Attorney General. After this deed was recorded, West filed suit against Jackson and wife to have the deed from the State to them declared void and removed as a cloud on his title. In sustaining the complainant's bill in the West case, the Court of Appeals at 106 and 107 of 28 Tenn.App., stated: In Lawrence County, Tenn. v. White, 200 Tenn. 1, 288 S.W.2d 735, this Court, in sustaining a bill to declare void a deed executed to a purchaser at a tax sale, cited with approval West v. Jackson, supra, stating, at page 11 of 200 Tenn., at page 739 of 288 S.W.2d: In addition to the cases mentioned in the above quotation from West v. Jackson, supra, the appellee relies upon Moore v. City of Memphis, 184 Tenn. 92, 195 S.W.2d 623. In the Moore case, at page 96 of 184 Tenn., at page 625 of 195 S.W.2d the Court stated: In that case, in referring to West v. Jackson, supra, the Court stated: In the Moore case, the property owner was a resident of Mississippi, there was no contention that the nonresident publication made for the taxpayer in the tax case was not supported by proper averments of a sworn bill or affidavit filed in the cause. The Moore case is wholly different from the case now before the Court. The appellee also relies upon Wynn v. Dickey, 187 Tenn. 1, 212 S.W.2d 671. In that case, at pages 5 and 6 of 187 Tenn., at pages 673, of 212 S.W.2d the Court stated: In the Dickey case, there is no suggestion that the Court entering the decree confirming the tax sale was without jurisdiction because of a failure to comply with the statutes relating to service of process by publication. That case is not authority for the decision of the present case. Since, under the averments of the bill in this case, the tax sale was void, T.C.A. § 67-2023 is not applicable. As stated in Tennessee Marble &amp; Brick Co. v. Young, supra, "This statute presupposes a valid vestiture of title in the purchaser at the tax sale." 124 of 179 Tenn., 75 of 163 S.W.2d. For the reasons stated, the decree of the Chancery Court sustaining the demurrer to the bill is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. The costs of the appeal are adjudged against the appellees. The costs in the Chancery Court will abide the determination of the cause in that Court.