Title: ALLSTATE INSUR CO V ROBERT DANIEL MCCARN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 122849
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 30, 2004

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 30, 2004 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 122849 
ROBERT DANIEL MCCARN, ET AL., 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
NANCY S. LABELLE, personal representative
of the estate of KEVIN CHARLES LABELLE,
deceased, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
TAYLOR, J.   
AFTER REMAND 
This case is before us for the second time. 
In 
Allstate Ins Co v McCarn, 466 Mich 277; 645 NW2d 20 (2002) 
(McCarn I), we held that the shooting death of Kevin 
LaBelle was “accidental” and, thus, an “occurrence” within 
the meaning of the insurance policy at issue. 
Because the 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
shooting was an “occurrence” covered under the policy, it 
gave rise to Allstate’s potential liability. 
However, 
because the Court of Appeals had not addressed whether the 
criminal-acts exception in the policy precluded coverage,1 
we remanded the matter to that Court. On remand, the Court 
of Appeals held that the criminal-acts exception precludes 
coverage in this case.2
 We disagree and reverse the 
decision of the Court of Appeals. 
We remand to the trial 
court for further proceedings. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
We set forth the facts in our previous opinion: 
This case arises out of the death of 
sixteen-year-old Kevin LaBelle on December 15,
1995, at the home of defendants Ernest and 
Patricia 
McCarn, 
where 
their 
grandson, 
then 
sixteen-year-old defendant Robert McCarn, also 
resided. 
On that day, Robert removed from under
Ernest’s bed a shotgun Robert’s father had given
him the year before. 
The gun was always stored
under Ernest’s bed and was not normally loaded.
Both Robert and Kevin handled the gun, which
Robert believed to be unloaded. 
When Robert was 
handling the gun, he pointed it at Kevin’s face
from approximately one foot away. 
Robert pulled
back the hammer and pulled the trigger and the
gun fired, killing Kevin. 
Nancy LaBelle, representing Kevin’s estate,
brought the underlying action against Robert and
his grandparents, Ernest and Patricia McCarn, who
had a homeowners insurance policy with plaintiff 
1 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 3,
2000 (Docket No. 213041). 
2 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued November 15,
2002 (Docket No. 213041). 
2  
 
 
 
Allstate. 
Allstate brought the present action,
seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no
duty to indemnify defendants Robert, Ernest, or
Patricia McCarn. 
Plaintiff and defendants moved for summary
disposition in the declaratory action. The trial 
court granted defendants’ motions for summary
disposition and denied plaintiff’s, holding that
the events constituted an “occurrence” within the 
meaning of Allstate’s policy. 
The trial court 
also held that Robert McCarn’s conduct was not 
intentional or criminal within the meaning of
Allstate’s policy. 
Allstate appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which reversed the trial court in an unpublished
opinion.1  The Court attempted to apply our recent
decisions in Nabozny v Burkhardt2 and Frankenmuth 
Mut Ins Co v Masters3 and concluded that “Robert’s 
intentional actions created a direct risk of harm 
that precludes coverage.” [McCarn I at 279-280.] 
1 Issued October 3, 2000 (Docket No. 213041). 
2 461 Mich 471; 606 NW2d 639 (2000). 
3 460 Mich 105; 595 NW2d 832 (1999). 
This Court reversed the decision of the Court of 
Appeals, holding that the “accident” was an “occurrence” as 
defined in the insurance policy at issue, thus giving rise 
to Allstate’s potential liability. 
Id. at 291. 
Once a 
court decides that liability may exist under an insurance 
policy, it may then determine whether coverage is precluded 
by an exception. 
Allstate Ins Co v Freeman, 432 Mich 656, 
668; 443 NW2d 734 (1989). 
Because the Court of Appeals 
originally found no liability, it did not determine whether 
the criminal-acts exclusion precluded coverage under the 
3  
 
 
 
policy. 
Because the Court of Appeals had not addressed 
this exclusion, we remanded the issue to that Court to 
determine if it applied. McCarn I at 291. 
On remand, the Court of Appeals, in a split opinion, 
applied the two-pronged test from Freeman and concluded 
that Robert acted criminally under the first prong of the 
test because his actions constituted manslaughter under MCL 
750.329. 
Slip op at 2-4. 
The Court of Appeals determined 
that the applicability of the exclusionary clause “turns on 
whether LaBelle’s death was reasonably expected to result 
from Robert’s criminal act.” Slip op at 3. The panel then 
concluded that “a person who points a gun at another 
person’s face and intentionally pulls the trigger without 
checking to see whether the gun is loaded can reasonably 
expect that injury will result.” 
Slip op at 4. 
The 
dissenting judge also applied the two-pronged test from 
Freeman, but concluded that “reasonable minds could differ 
regarding whether Kevin’s death occurred as the natural, 
foreseeable, expected, and anticipated result of Robert’s” 
acts. Slip op at 3 (White, J., dissenting). 
We granted 
defendants’ application for leave to appeal. 
469 Mich 947 
(2003). 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
To 
determine 
whether 
Allstate 
is 
obligated 
to 
indemnify the McCarns, we examine the insurance policy at 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
issue. 
Issues involving the proper interpretation of 
insurance contracts are reviewed de novo. 
Cohen v Auto 
Club Ins Ass’n, 463 Mich 525, 528; 620 NW2d 840 (2001). 
An insurance policy must be enforced in accordance with its 
terms, which are given their “commonly used meaning” if not 
defined in the policy. 
Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Masters, 
460 Mich 105, 112, 114; 595 NW2d 832 (1999). 
III. ANALYSIS 
When this case was last before us, in interpreting the 
following language, “Allstate will pay damages . . . 
arising from an occurrence,” we concluded that, on the 
basis of undisputed facts, the shooting was an accident 
triggering Allstate’s liability. Justice Cavanagh, writing 
for the Court, said: 
[T]his case does not present a question of
fact. The fact that Robert believed the gun was
unloaded is a matter about which there is no 
genuine issue of material fact. This is because
there is nothing in the record to reasonably
support a conclusion that, contrary to Robert's
testimony that he believed the gun was unloaded,
he consciously believed the gun was loaded, or 
even contemplated that there was any possibility
that it was loaded when he pulled the trigger.
Even plaintiff, the insurer, acknowledged that
Robert believed the firearm was unloaded when he 
pulled the trigger . . . . 
[McCarn I, supra at 
285-286.] 
To this set of facts we then applied the requisite 
subjective test and concluded that Robert’s expectation 
that no bodily harm would result from an unloaded gun was 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reasonable. 
Id. at 291. 
The wisdom of shooting even an 
unloaded gun at another in the first place was, and is, not 
before us. 
In this case, we deal with other policy language, 
which is commonly described as the criminal-acts exclusion. 
It states: 
We do not cover any bodily injury or 
property 
damage 
intended 
by, 
or 
which 
may
reasonably 
be 
expected 
to 
result 
from 
the 
intentional or criminal acts or omissions of, any
insured person. This exclusion applies even if: 
a) such insured person lacks the mental 
capacity to govern his or her conduct; 
b) such bodily injury or property damage is
of a different kind or degree than intended or
reasonably expected; or 
c) such bodily injury or property damage is
sustained by a different person than intended or
reasonably expected. 
This exclusion applies regardless of whether
or not such insured person is actually charged 
with, or convicted of a crime. 
This language directs us to apply a two-pronged test. 
There is no insurance coverage if, first, the insured acted 
either 
intentionally 
or 
criminally, 
and 
second, 
the 
resulting injuries were the reasonably expected result of 
an insured’s intentional or criminal act. 
We agree with 
the Court of Appeals that the first prong of this test—that 
there was an intentional or criminal act—has been met. 
6  
 
 
Answering the second prong of the test, whether the 
resulting injury was the reasonably expected result of this 
criminal act, requires this Court to engage in an objective 
inquiry. Allstate Ins Co v Freeman, 432 Mich 656, 688; 443 
NW2d 734 (1989) (opinion by Riley, J.). That is, we are to 
determine whether a reasonable person, possessed of the 
totality of the facts possessed by Robert, would have 
expected the resulting injury. 
This requirement to base 
the objective reasonability test on all the facts has been 
discussed by scholars of tort law: 
“The conduct of the 
reasonable person will vary with the situation with which 
he is confronted. The jury must therefore be instructed to 
take the circumstances into account . . . .”  Prosser & 
Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 32, at 175. 
We have held 
similarly in our cases, “[T]he reasonable person standard 
examines the totality of the circumstances to ensure a fair 
result.” Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 391; 501 NW2d 155 
(1993). 
This means that here we must consider not just 
that Robert, as the Court of Appeals described it, 
“point[ed] a gun at another person’s face and intentionally 
pull[ed] the trigger,” but also, as Allstate itself 
acknowledges, that Robert thought the gun that he pointed 
was unloaded. 
Slip op, November 15, 2002, p4; McCarn I, 
7  
 
 
 
                                                 
supra at 286.3
 Thus, we are called on to determine if a 
reasonable person would have expected bodily harm to result 
when the gun, in the unloaded state Robert believed it to 
be, was “fired.” 
The answer is no because, obviously, an 
unloaded gun will not fire a shot. As this Court explained 
in McCarn I, supra at 290-291: 
[No] bodily harm could have been foreseen
from Robert’s intended act, because he intended
to pull the trigger of an unloaded gun, and,
thus, it was not foreseeable, indeed it was 
impossible, under the facts as Robert believed
them to be, that shot would be discharged. 
To recapitulate, the proper test is that we are to 
first determine what Robert actually believed about the gun 
being loaded, not what a reasonable third party would have 
believed on that issue. 
Then, using that belief as a 
starting point, we are to determine in the second step if a 
reasonable person, possessed of Robert’s belief, would have 
expected bodily harm to result from pulling the trigger. 
In fact, because reasonable minds could not differ that an 
3 That Robert believed the gun was unloaded is 
uncontested. 
Allstate has never argued, as it might have,
that Robert did not believe the gun was unloaded. 
To the 
contrary, Allstate’s brief in support of its motion for
summary disposition notes that Robert pulled the trigger 
even though “he thought the gun was unloaded.” 
Even when 
arguing most recently before this Court, counsel for 
Allstate said, “It is a fact that he subjectively believed
that the gun was unloaded,” and, “Subjectively he believed
it wasn’t loaded.” 
Because Allstate did not contest this 
issue, there is no disputed issue of fact regarding his
belief. 
8  
 
 
 
 
unloaded gun will not fire a shot, it is appropriate under 
MCR 
2.116(C)(10) 
to 
grant 
summary 
disposition 
to 
defendants. 
IV. RESPONSE TO DISSENTS 
The dissent of Justice Weaver is predicated on the 
notion that insurance policies should not cover the acts of 
foolish, reckless, or even lawless people. 
This is a 
peculiar view because these are among the very people that 
society wishes to be insured and, in some circumstances, 
such as motor vehicle insurance, even requires to be 
insured. 
MCL 500.3101. 
She seems to regard insurance as 
solely benefiting the insured and thus when it pays out it 
is a form of reward. This overlooks, however, the societal 
benefit that insurance provides to those injured or damaged 
by 
the 
acts 
of 
insured 
but 
otherwise 
uncollectible 
individuals. 
The true beneficiary of liability insurance 
is not the insured, but his injured victim. 
The Court of 
Appeals said this aptly twenty years ago: 
[I]t is unlikely that [an] insured [is]
induced to engage in the unlawful conduct by
reliance upon the insurability of any claims 
arising therefrom or that allowing insurance 
coverage 
. . . would induce future similar 
unlawful conduct . . . . Nor does it appear that
the policy was obtained in contemplation of a
violation of the law. Furthermore, coverage does
not allow the wrongdoer unjustly to benefit from
his wrong. 
It is not the insured who will 
benefit, but the innocent victim who will be
provided 
compensation 
for 
her 
injuries. 
9  
 
 
[Vigilant Ins Co v Kambly, 114 Mich App 683, 687;
319 NW2d 382 (1982) (citations omitted).] 
As for Justice Young’s dissent, he posits that the 
majority opinion is based on the majority’s public policy 
notions. 
We disagree. 
Rather, our decision is based 
entirely on the language of the insurance policy at issue 
here. 
The policy excludes coverage of injuries which “may 
reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or 
criminal acts” of the insured. 
Because one would not 
reasonably expect injury to result from pulling the trigger 
of an unloaded gun, coverage is not excluded. 
He further indicates that the majority has conflated 
the subjective and objective inquiries called for by the 
policy and has gutted the exclusion of any use to the 
insurer. We again disagree. We have simply drawn the line 
the policy calls for between what the insured believed at 
the point of the intentional or criminal act and applied to 
that belief what a reasonable person could expect to result 
from that act. Thus if, as here, an insured believes a gun 
is unloaded, and in this case it is conceded by the insurer 
that Robert indeed did believe that, then no reasonable 
person could believe, given that starting point, that a 
shot would come from the gun when fired.  On the other 
hand, if an insured believes a gun is loaded and operable 
when he points it at someone and pulls the trigger but, for 
10  
 
 
 
                                                 
whatever reason, expects no shot to come from it and thus 
does not expect harm to result, there would be no coverage 
because a reasonable person would expect a shot to come 
from a loaded, operable gun and that harm would result from 
that.4  The point is the insured’s expectations of what will 
result from his act are irrelevant. 
It should also be pointed out that we believe that the 
effect of Justice Young’s position would be that if a harm 
or injury results from an intentional or criminal act it 
will almost never be covered under a policy with this 
exclusion. This result can be seen in his approach to this 
case. Because he can reason back and know that the gun was 
loaded, he concludes that the policy exclusion dictates 
that there is no insurance coverage. 
Yet, we believe such 
hindsight reasoning is an improper mode of analysis for 
this accident. 
In hindsight, an insurer might always be 
able to reason backwards from an accident and conclude 
that, by definition, a reasonable person would not have 
done whatever precipitated such accident. 
The dissents’ approaches would eviscerate insurance 
policies of much of their value to insureds, leaving only 
“occurrences 
that 
were 
truly 
unexplainable” 
covered. 
McCarn I, supra at 289. 
Yet, unforeseen, unfortunate 
4 This is essentially what happened in Freeman. 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
consequences of explicable or even intentional acts are 
“the very purpose of insurance . . . .” 
Id. at 288.  As 
this Court stated in McCarn I, supra at 288, “We must be 
careful not to take the expectation of harm test so far 
that we eviscerate the ability of parties to insure against 
their own negligence.” 
“Otherwise, liability insurance 
coverage for negligence would seem to become illusory.” 
Id.  “The problem, as we see it, with the dissent’s opinion 
is that it undermines the ability of insureds to protect 
themselves against their own foolish or negligent acts.” 
Id.  “However, the impetus for insurance is not merely, or 
even principally, to insure oneself for well thought out 
and reasoned actions that go wrong, but to insure oneself 
for foolish or negligent actions that go wrong. Indeed, it 
is obviously the latter that are more likely to go astray 
and to precipitate the desire for insurance.” 
Id. 
To the 
extent that the dissents would erode the ability of 
insureds to protect themselves against theirs—or their 
family 
members’—foolish 
or 
stupid 
acts, 
they 
would 
eviscerate insurance contracts of much of their purpose and 
value. 
This is simply to say that with Justice Young’s 
approach there would be seemingly no coverage for any 
intentional 
or 
criminal 
act 
where 
there 
was 
injury 
resulting from the act. 
This would narrow those having 
insurance 
in 
such 
circumstances 
greatly 
and 
perhaps 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
entirely. 
This disturbing outcome cannot be what this 
policy provision intended, nor is it what the policy 
language calls for. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We hold that there is no question of fact whether 
Kevin’s death was the reasonably expected result of 
Robert’s act. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for further 
proceedings. 
Clifford W. Taylor
Marilyn Kelly
Stephen J. Markman 
CAVANAGH, J. 
I concur in the result only. 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 122849 
ROBERT DANIEL MCCARN, ET AL, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
NANCE S. LABELLE, personal representative
of the estate of KEVIN CHARLES LABELLE,
deceased, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
WEAVER, J. (dissenting). 
I would hold that the intentional and criminal acts 
exclusion of the homeowner’s insurance policy at issue 
excludes coverage in this case. 
I would remand this case 
to the trial court for entry of summary judgment for 
defendant. 
I, therefore, dissent from both the result and 
reasoning of the lead opinion. 
After sharing a bowl of marijuana, Robert McCarn 
intentionally aimed a shotgun at Kevin LaBelle’s face 
without checking whether the shotgun was loaded. 
McCarn’s 
testimony revealed that he was horse playing, but intended 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to frighten LaBelle into sharing some crackers with him. 
When McCarn pulled the trigger, the gun discharged and 
LaBelle was killed. 
McCarn pleaded nolo contender to a 
charge of manslaughter, MCL 750.321. 
The intentional or criminal acts exclusion of the 
policy now at issue unambiguously states: 
We do not cover any bodily injury or 
property 
damage 
intended 
by, 
or 
which 
may
reasonably 
be 
expected 
to 
result 
from 
the 
intentional or criminal acts or omissions of, any
insured person. This exclusion applies even if: 
a) such insured person lacks the mental 
capacity to govern his or her conduct. 
b) such bodily injury or property damage is
of a different kind or degree than intended or
reasonably expected; or 
c) such bodily injury or property damage is
sustained by a different person than intended or
reasonably expected. 
This exclusion applies regardless of whether
or not such insured person is actually charged 
with, or convicted of a crime. 
Unambiguous insurance policy language must be enforced as 
written. 
Farm Bureau Ins Co v Nikkel, 460 Mich 558, 570; 
596 NW2d 915 (1999). 
This Court addressed a similar exclusionary clause in 
Allstate Ins Co v Freeman, 432 Mich 656, 685; 443 NW2d 734 
(1989). The exclusion at issue in Freeman provided: 
We do not cover any bodily injury or 
property damage which may reasonably be expected
to result from the intentional or criminal acts 
2  
 
 
 
of an insured person or which is in fact intended
by an insured person. [Freeman at 685.] 
Freeman held that the exclusionary clause at issue in that 
case relieved the insurer of liability if “(1) the insured 
acted either intentionally or criminally, and (2) the 
resulting injuries occurred as the natural, foreseeable, 
expected, 
and 
anticipated 
result 
of 
an 
insured’s 
intentional or criminal acts.” 
Id. at 700 (emphasis in 
original). 
Though similar to the policy at issue in Freeman, 
there are important differences to the policy language at 
issue in this case. 
The criminal acts exclusion of the 
homeowner’s insurance policy at issue in this case is 
broader 
than 
that 
in 
Freeman. 
It 
includes 
three 
subsections 
that 
expressly 
expand 
the 
scope 
of 
the 
exclusion. Relevant to this case, subsection b provides 
“[t]his exclusion applies even if . . . Such
bodily 
injury 
or 
property 
damage 
is 
of 
a 
different 
kind 
or 
degree 
than 
intended 
or 
reasonably expected. . . .” 
Subsection b applies because “even if” indicates that the 
subsections are included in and help define the policy 
exclusion. 
Thus, consideration of the specific policy 
language at issue in this case requires some adjustment to 
Freeman’s second prong for this case. 
Subsection b shifts 
the inquiry away from the actual injury that resulted from 
intentional or criminal actions, to whether any bodily 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
injury or property damage could be reasonably expected to 
result from the actions. 
Nevertheless, to the extent the policy at issue in 
this case is similar to the policy at issue in Freeman, 
Freeman’s 
two-pronged 
objective 
test 
is 
instructive. 
Freeman, supra at 700, correctly identified the first 
question under policy language before the Court as whether 
“the insured acted either intentionally or criminally.” 
I 
agree with the lead opinion that the policy requirement 
that McCarn acted intentionally or criminally is met. 
McCarn acted intentionally when he pulled the trigger of a 
gun while pointing it at LaBelle’s face. 
As correctly 
explained by the Court of Appeals, McCarn’s actions were 
also criminal. 
Regarding whether it was reasonable to expect injury 
or property damage would result from the intentional or 
criminal act, it is the consensus of this Court Freeman 
correctly employed an objective inquiry. 
The dispositive 
question under the language of this policy and the facts of 
this case should be, therefore, whether a reasonable person 
would expect bodily injury or property damage to result 
when a person points a gun at another person’s face without 
determining whether the gun was loaded and then pulls the 
trigger. 
4  
 
 
 
 
  
 
While the lead opinion acknowledges that the language 
“may 
reasonably 
be 
expected” 
dictates 
an 
objective 
standard, ante at 7, the lead opinion’s rationale only 
pretends to be objective. 
By focusing on McCarn’s belief 
that the gun was unloaded, ante at 7, the lead opinion 
abandons the objective standard in favor of the subjective 
belief of a teenager under the influence of marijuana. 
Fortunately, the lead opinion’s rationale will not bind 
future decisions, because it was joined by only two other 
justices. 
One justice joins the lead opinion in result 
only. 
Three 
justices 
agree 
that 
the 
lead 
opinion 
incorrectly transforms the objective standard into a 
subjective standard. 
An established rule in construing insurance contracts 
is that “[a]n insurer is free to define or limit the scope 
of coverage as long as the policy language fairly leads to 
only 
one 
reasonable 
interpretation 
and 
is 
not 
in 
contravention of public policy.” Heniser v Frankenmuth Mut 
Ins Co, 449 Mich 155, 161; 534 NW2d 502 (1995). 
The lead 
opinion implies that it is against public policy to deny 
coverage in this case. 
Ante at 8. 
To indirectly support 
this suggestion, the lead opinion vaguely alludes to the 
no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. 
Ante at 8.  However, 
the lead opinion utterly fails to understand that the no­
5  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
fault act is irrelevant to this case because there is an 
important difference between no-fault insurance and the 
homeowner’s 
insurance. 
In 
the 
no-fault 
act, 
the 
Legislature expressly requires that the insurer provide 
residual coverage for intentionally caused damages. 
MCL 
500.3135(3)(a). 
There is no such requirement imposed on 
homeowner’s insurance providers by any statute. 
Had the 
Legislature 
intended 
to 
require 
homeowner’s 
insurance 
providers to cover criminal and intentional acts it could 
have done so. 
Thus the lead opinion has not established 
that the homeowner’s insurance policy exclusion at issue is 
against public policy.1
 The lead opinion twists the 
1 Not only is the no-fault act irrelevant to the this
case, the lead opinion’s citation of Vigilant Ins Co v
Kambly, 114 Mich App 683, 687; 319 NW2d 382 (1982) is also
entirely irrelevant and inapplicable. 
Vigilant involved 
whether a medical malpractice insurer was required to 
provide coverage for a malpractice claim against a doctor
who engaged in sexual activity with a patient under the
guise of medical treatment. 
It should be noted that 
medical malpractice is governed by different statute than
homeowner’s insurance. Moreover, the malpractice insurance
policy in that case contained no criminal or intentional
acts exclusion. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals panel declined
to read a criminal and intentional acts exclusion into the 
policy. 
The panel concluded, supra at 687-688, that the
doctor’s actions were a covered form of malpractice and
noted “[i]n this instance, there is great public interest
in 
protecting 
the 
interests 
of 
the 
injured 
party.”
Nevertheless, the panel noted, id at 687, that there are
“public policy considerations raised by [the medical 
malpractice insurer] which prohibit the insurability of
criminal or intentionally tortuous conduct” which were not
present on the facts of that case. Thus, Vigilant does not 
support the lead opinion’s policy-making intentions.
6 
 
 
 
         
                                                 
 
objective standard required by the policy exclusion at 
issue in this case into a subjective standard in order to 
justify holding “an insurer liable for a risk it did not 
assume.”2 
In this case, interpreting the unambiguous terms of 
this homeowner’s insurance policy exclusion, the relevant 
focus is on whether any bodily injury or property damage 
could reasonably be expected from the McCarn’s intentional 
or criminal act. 
The intentional and criminal acts 
exclusion of the homeowner’s insurance policy at issue in 
this case plainly and unambiguously excludes coverage under 
these facts since bodily injury can reasonably be expected 
to result when, without first determining that a gun is 
unloaded, a person points the gun at another person and 
pulls the trigger. 
For these reasons, I dissent from the lead opinion and 
would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals excluding 
coverage under the intentional and criminal acts exclusion 
of the home owner policy at issue. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan 
2 Farm Bureau, supra at 568, citing Auto-Owners Ins Co 
v Churchman, 440 Mich 560, 567; 489 NW2d 431 (1992).
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
                                                 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 122849 
ROBERT DANIEL MCCARN, ET AL, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
And 
NANCY S. LABELLE, personal representative
of the estate of KEVIN CHARLES LABELLE,
deceased, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
YOUNG, J. (dissenting). 
I concur fully in the dissenting opinion of Justice 
WEAVER, but write separately to highlight the import of 
Justice TAYLOR’S lead opinion: 
Today, the members of the 
lead opinion,1 for unarticulated policy reasons of their 
own, ignore the explicit contract language at issue and 
obliterate the distinction recognized in our law between 
1 I note that the lead opinion has garnered only three
votes for its rationale; Justice CAVANAGH has concurred only
in 
the 
result. 
Therefore, 
the 
lead 
opinion 
has 
no 
precedential value. 
People v Jackson, 390 Mich 621, 627;
212 NW2d 918 (1973). 
 
 
    
                                                 
 
subjective and objective standards in insurance exclusion 
provisions.2 
In an apparent policy-driven view that even the most 
fanciful beliefs merit insurance coverage, the standard 
articulated by the lead opinion conflates any meaningful 
distinction between a subjective and objective contractual 
standard. 
The lead opinion cites no precedent or other 
legal authority for its position. 
There is none. 
The new 
alleged “objective standard” announced in the lead opinion 
today leaves an insurer unable to exclude even the most 
dangerous intentional or criminal behavior from coverage as 
a matter of law, so long as an insured claims to believe 
that something innocuous would result from his dangerous 
conduct.3
 The policy language of exclusion at issue here 
2  I can only hope that this departure from the general
principle that contracts are to be enforced as written is a
limited one that will not recur. Compare, Wilkie v Auto-
Owners Ins Co, 469 Mich 41, 51; 664 NW2d 776 (2003),
wherein this Court reinforced the “bedrock principle of
American contract law that parties are free to contract as
they see fit, and the courts are to enforce the agreement
as written absent some highly unusual circumstance, such as
a contract in violation of law or public policy.” 
3 I do not believe that it is possible for Allstate to 
disprove Robert’s claimed beliefs regarding the status of
the gun. Allstate could prove that the belief was not
reasonable under the circumstances, but I am unsure how
they could prove that the belief did not in fact exist.
Moreover, the evidence does not support a finding that
Allstate conceded that Robert thought the gun was unloaded. 
2  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
could not more explicitly preclude coverage for the 
intentional or criminal 
conduct of an insured. 
I believe 
it to be the view of those joining the lead opinion that it 
would violate an as yet unarticulated “public policy” if an 
insurer could by contract preclude coverage under the facts 
of 
this 
case. 
Indeed, 
the 
lead 
opinion 
(and 
its 
bastardization of the traditional objective standard that 
should be applied here) seems driven by its concern that 
“an intentional or criminal act . . . will almost never be 
covered by a policy with this exclusion”. 
My response is 
that I am prepared to enforce the contract the parties have 
made as written.4 
Insurance 
contracts 
generally 
provide 
indemnity 
against 
injuries 
caused 
by 
“accidents”. 
When 
they 
expressly 
exclude 
coverage 
for 
injuries 
caused 
by 
At most, Allstate merely agreed that Robert said he 
believed the gun to be unloaded. 
Conceding that Robert
made a statement and conceding that his statement was true
are entirely different matters. 
4 The lead opinion suggests that I conclude that an
intentional or criminal act “will almost never be covered 
under a policy with this exclusion”. 
I do not. 
I do 
believe that each case will turn on its facts and that what 
is “reasonable” may have to be determined by a trier of
fact. 
I am agnostic regarding whether all, a majority or
no cases involving a criminal act are covered under policy
language at issue here so long as the policy language is
given meaning. I will not, as the lead opinion does, ignore
the contract language and “direct the verdict” as a matter
of law by manipulating the traditional objective standard
of review. 
3  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
intentional or criminal behavior as determined by a 
“reasonable person” objective standard, I am prepared to 
apply 
the 
traditional, 
unvarnished 
objective 
standard 
Michigan courts have employed in assessing whether the 
injury was “reasonably expected”. 
The intentional or criminal acts exclusion of the 
policy at issue precludes coverage for injuries or damage 
“which may reasonably be expected to result” from the 
intentional or criminal acts or omissions of an insured. 
For time out of mind until now, common law courts have 
understood the distinction between subjective and objective 
standards.5
 An objective test assesses what a reasonable 
5 For an example of how we have consistently described
the reasonable person objective standard in Michigan,
Radtke v Everett, 
442 Mich 368, 390-391, 501 NW2d 155,
166 (1993) describes the standard as follows: 
As described by Dean Prosser, the reasonable
person standard has been carefully crafted to
formulate one standard of conduct for society:
The standard of conduct which the community
demands must be an external and objective one,
rather than the individual judgment, good or bad,
of the particular actor; and it must be, so far
as possible, the same for all persons, since the
law can have no favorites. 
* * * 
The 
courts 
have 
gone 
to 
unusual 
pains 
to 
emphasize the abstract and hypothetical character
of this mythical person. He is not to be 
identified with any ordinary individual, who 
might occasionally do unreasonable things; he is 
4  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
person would have believed, while a subjective test is 
concerned about determining what the actual actor believed. 
In this context, where all members of this Court agree the 
contract requires application of an objective standard, I 
contend that what may “reasonably be expected to result” 
from an insured’s acts is the conclusion a reasonable 
person reaches after examining all of the pertinent 
information available to the insured. See footnote 5. The 
belief of the insured, on the other hand, is the subjective 
conclusion reached by the insured armed with the same 
information. 
While the belief of the insured may be a 
a prudent and careful person, who is always up to
standard.... He is rather a personification of a
community 
ideal 
of 
reasonable 
behavior,
determined by the jury's social judgment. The
chief advantage of this standard is that it 
enables triers of fact to look to a community
standard rather than an individual one, and at
the same time to express their judgment of what
that standard is in terms of the conduct of a 
human being.’ Furthermore, the reasonable person
standard 
examines 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances to ensure a fair result. Hence, the
reasonable 
person 
standard 
is 
sufficiently
flexible to incorporate gender as one factor,
without destroying the vital stability provided
by uniform standards of conduct (Emphasis added;
internal citation omitted). 
Justice Taylor approvingly cited to this passage in 
his concurring statement in Sidorowicz v Chicken Shack, 
Inc, 469 Mich 912; 673 NW2d 106 (2003). Thus, his position 
in the present case is hard to reconcile with his previous
position regarding the correct application of the objective
reasonable person standard. 
5  
 
 
   
                                                 
fact, it is not an ultimate fact6 essential to determining 
what may reasonably be expected to result from an insured’s 
actions. 
The 
lead 
opinion 
errs 
in 
using 
the 
insured’s 
subjective belief (purportedly) “as a starting point,” then 
insisting that the “objective” evaluation proceed by 
determining whether a reasonable person, 
sharing the 
insured’s subjective belief, would expect the same result. 
Requiring 
that 
the 
reasonable 
person 
take 
as 
a 
determinative fact the insured’s subjectively beliefs about 
his acts violates every known formulation or application of 
the traditional objective standard. 
The majority cites no 
authority for its contrary and idiosyncratic formulation of 
its “objective” standard. 
It is noteworthy that, in other 
contexts, this Court has expressly repudiated similar 
efforts to make subjective an objective standard.7 
Thus, it is unclear why (and on what authority) the 
lead opinion concludes that a reasonable person should be 
required to possess the same (and entirely subjective) 
belief as the insured. 
6 Black’s Law Dictionary defines ultimate facts as
those “facts essential to the right of action or matter of
defense; facts necessary and essential for decision by
court.” 
7 See, Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368; 501 NW 2d 155
(1993). 
6  
 
 
                                                 
As I argued in McCarn I, a reasonable person could 
certainly come to a different belief regarding the expected 
consequences under the known and undisputed facts of this 
case.8  Under the standard announced by the lead opinion, I 
cannot envision a single scenario where a “reasonable 
person” expectation could ever diverge from the insured’s 
expectation.9  More critically, I am at a loss to determine 
any difference, much less a qualitative one, 
between the 
purported objective standard articulated in the lead 
opinion today and the policy exclusion language found to 
8 It is important to recall that all of the facts and 
circumstances known about this shooting were provided by 
McCarn’s deposition testimony. McCarn owned the shotgun and
admitted that he did not check to see whether the gun was
loaded before he deliberately pulled the trigger when the
barrel of the gun was one foot away from his friend’s face.
He also admitted to being the last person to use the gun,
and could not recall whether he unloaded the gun on that
occasion because he put the gun away “hot” — hurriedly in
order to avoid being caught using the weapon without adult
supervision. He further admitted to intentionally pulling
the trigger of the gun in an effort to frighten the victim
into sharing crackers. According to the lead opinion, none
of these undisputed facts provided by McCarn himself are
relevant in evaluating how a reasonable person would have
assessed the circumstances of the shooting because it 
concludes that the only relevant fact is the insured’s 
stated subjective belief that his gun was unloaded. 
9 Indeed, the lead opinion incentivizes insureds to
manufacture their “beliefs” about insurance controversies 
because, no matter how incompatible with the circumstances
or logic, the insured’s belief is the one that must be 
assumed by the “reasonable person” when applying the lead
opinion’s so-called “objective” test. 
7  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
require a subjective determination in Metropolitan Ins v 
DiCicco.10  There, a policy which excluded damage “expected 
or intended from the standpoint of the insured” was found 
to require a subjective standard of expectation.11 
I note that, had the views of the lead opinion 
garnered majority support, the subjective standard 
would 
have 
become 
the 
uniform 
standard 
for 
all 
insurance 
policies, no matter what language was actually used. Under 
the standard articulated by the lead opinion, an insurance 
company would be required to provide coverage even where, 
for example, an insured believes that his gun was magical 
and would only play “The Star Spangled Banner” when the 
trigger was pulled. After all, using the insured’s claimed 
belief as a starting point, no reasonable person would 
expect that bodily harm would result from a rousing 
rendition of our national anthem.12  I invite those Justices 
10 432 Mich 656; 443 NW2d 734 (1989). 
11 Id., 672. Had the policy language in this case been
similar to that found in DiCicco, I might agree with the
lead opinion’s resolution. 
12 The majority disclaims that its new objective test
is anything novel and that all it is doing is drawing a 
“line … between what the insured believed at the point of
the intentional or criminal act and applied it to what a
reasonable person could expect to result from that act.” 
8  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
joining the lead opinion to explain why its analysis today 
would permit a contrary result. 
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the 
Court of appeals. 
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Maura D. Corrigan 
Ante at 11 (emphasis added). 
In actuality, the lead
opinion is not considering what a reasonable person would
expect to result from the insured’s act, but the insured’s
stated subjective belief about the consequences of his act.
This 
is 
the 
“Russian 
Roulette” 
theory 
of 
objective
standards: “if I think the bullet is in another chamber,
I’m covered.” 
Consequently, I see nothing inconsistent with my
hypothetical example (using an insured’s absurd belief that
his gun would play the national anthem when discharged as a
basis for recovery under this policy) and the lead 
opinion’s application of its so-called objective standard
to the known facts of this case. Id. And the lead opinion
is especially hard pressed to explain why an insured’s
absurd beliefs should not be given absolute credence when
it applies its version of the objective standard when the
insured says he thought the gun was inoperable, unloaded,
or simply magical. 
9