Title: State v. Anagnos
Citation: 2012 WI 64
Docket Number: 2010AP001812
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 2012

2012 WI 64 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP1812   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the matter of the refusal of Dimitrius 
Anagnos: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
         Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
   v. 
Dimitrius Anagnos, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS   
Reported at 337 Wis. 2d 57, 805 N.W.2d 722 
(Ct. App 2011-Published) 
PDC 2011 WI App 118 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 26, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 24, 2012   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert J. Kennedy 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs (Opinion filed).  
ROGGENSACK and GABLEMAN, J.J., join concurrence.  
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: CROOKS and PROSSER, J.J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Phillip A. Koss, district attorney for Walworth county, Zeke 
S. Wiedenfeld, assistant district attorney for Walworth county, 
Elkhorn and the cause was argued by Michael C. Sanders, 
assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs was J.B. Van 
Hollen, attorney general.   
 
For the defendant-respondent there were briefs and oral 
argument by Barry S. Cohen and Barry S. Cohen, S.C., Elkhart 
Lake.  
 
 
2012 WI 64
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP1812 
(L.C. No. 
2010TR334) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of the refusal of Dimitrius 
Anagnos: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Dimitrius Anagnos, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 26, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, State of 
Wisconsin, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision 
that affirmed the circuit court.  The order of the circuit court 
determined that the traffic stop of Dimitrius Anagnos's vehicle 
was unconstitutional and that his operating privileges should 
not have been revoked on account of his refusal to take a 
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
2 
 
chemical test to determine the presence or quantity of alcohol 
in his blood or breath.1     
¶2 
In this case, an officer conducted a traffic stop of 
Anagnos's vehicle.  Once the vehicle was stopped and the officer 
spoke with Anagnos, he determined that Anagnos was intoxicated 
and arrested him for operating while under the influence of an 
intoxicant (OWI).  It is undisputed that after the officer 
stopped the vehicle and spoke with Anagnos, the officer had 
probable cause to believe that Anagnos was operating while under 
the influence of an intoxicant.  The parties' arguments center 
on an earlier point in time, that is, the officer's initial 
decision to conduct the traffic stop.   
¶3 
The State argues that the circuit court erred when it 
refused to revoke Anagnos's operating privileges.  Citing Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)5.a., it contends that during a refusal 
hearing, a defendant cannot contest the constitutionality of the 
officer's initial decision to conduct a traffic stop.  Rather, 
it asserts, the statute limits the defendant to contesting 
whether there was probable cause to believe that he was 
operating under the influence of an intoxicant based on all the 
information the officer had gathered during a traffic stop and 
                                                 
1 See State v. Anagnos, 2011 WI App 118, 337 Wis. 2d 57, 805 
N.W.2d 722 (affirming an order of the circuit court for Walworth 
County, Robert J. Kennedy, Judge). 
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
3 
 
up until the moment of the arrest.2  In the alternative, the 
State 
argues 
that 
the 
traffic 
stop 
in 
this 
case 
was 
constitutional because it was based on probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion. 
¶4 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)5.a. does not 
limit the defendant to contesting whether the officer had 
probable cause to believe the defendant was operating while 
under the influence of an intoxicant.  The language of the 
statute provides that a defendant may also contest whether he 
was lawfully placed under arrest.  As part of this inquiry, the 
circuit court may entertain an argument that the arrest was 
unlawful because the traffic stop that preceded it was not 
justified by either probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 
¶5 
When we consider the totality of the facts and 
circumstances in this case, we conclude that the arresting 
officer pointed to specific and articulable facts, which taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to 
the reasonable suspicion necessary for an investigative stop.  
Because 
the 
stop 
of 
Anagnos's 
vehicle 
was 
supported 
by 
reasonable suspicion, the circuit court erred in concluding that 
the stop was unconstitutional and that Anagnos was not lawfully 
                                                 
2 Here, Anagnos was arrested for operating while under the 
influence of alcohol.  If the defendant was arrested for 
operating with a detectable amount of restricted controlled 
substance in his or her blood (OCS) or for having a prohibited 
alcohol concentration (PAC), Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)5.a. 
would permit the defendant to challenge whether the officer had 
probable cause to believe the person was operating a motor 
vehicle under those conditions.     
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
4 
 
placed under arrest.  Under these circumstances, we reverse the 
court of appeals and remand to the circuit court to revoke 
Anagnos's operating privilege under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(d).    
I 
¶6 
The events leading up to Anagnos's refusal to take a 
chemical test occurred at approximately 1:15 a.m. on January 31, 
2010.  At that time, Deputy Frami was on patrol in Lake Geneva 
when he observed a vehicle pull out of a parking lot and make a 
left turn by crossing a highway divided by an elevated median.  
He observed the vehicle accelerate rapidly to a stoplight, 
execute a second left turn without signaling, and again 
accelerate rapidly.  Based on these observations, Deputy Frami 
stopped the vehicle.  
¶7 
Once 
Deputy 
Frami 
approached 
the 
vehicle, 
he 
determined that its driver, Anagnos, was intoxicated.  He read 
Anagnos the Informing the Accused form as required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(4)(2009-10)3 and asked Anagnos to consent to chemical 
testing. 
 
Anagnos 
refused. 
 
Pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(9)(a), Deputy Frami promptly filed a notice of intent 
to revoke Anagnos's operating privileges.     
¶8 
Anagnos retained counsel and requested a hearing on 
the revocation notice. During the hearing, defense counsel 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(4) requires law enforcement 
officers, at the time of a request for a chemical test specimen, 
to inform the person that, among other things, refusal to take 
the test will result in revocation of operating privileges. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
5 
 
stipulated that once Deputy Frami stopped the vehicle and 
observed Anagnos, he had probable cause to believe Anagnos was 
driving while under the influence of alcohol.  Defense counsel 
also stipulated that Deputy Frami properly read the Informing 
the Accused form to Anagnos, and that Anagnos refused to take 
the chemical test.  The only issue challenged by defense counsel 
was the constitutionality of the stop.    
¶9 
The State and the defense disagreed about whether the 
relevant statutes permitted Anagnos to defend against revocation 
by contesting the constitutionality of the traffic stop.  The 
circuit court agreed that the permissible scope of a refusal 
hearing was "an interesting legal question," but it decided to 
take evidence about the constitutionality of the stop prior to 
ruling on that question.    
¶10 Deputy Frami testified that he was stopped at a red 
light at approximately 1:15 in the morning when he witnessed 
Anagnos's vehicle pulling out of a Taco Bell parking lot and 
turning left onto Highway 120.  That highway is divided by an 
elevated median, and Deputy Frami testified that Anagnos drove 
over the median in the course of turning left.   
¶11 Deputy Frami described the elevated median as "a 
concrete curb with . . . concrete paved in between the two curbs 
dividing northbound and southbound Highway 120 lanes."  He 
continued: "[The curb] raises maybe four or five inches, 
standard curb height, whatever height that would be; and then 
it's flat across the top with concrete until the other side of 
the curb where it comes back down again."    
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
6 
 
¶12 Deputy Frami testified that he was "familiar with 
other . . . concrete dividers for highways," including "dividers 
that are designed to permit an individual to cross over them."  
He explained: "They're usually gradually sloped, either convex 
or concaved angles and usually are not [perpendicular] to the 
roadway."     
¶13 Upon questioning by the circuit court, Deputy Frami 
agreed that the elevated median crossed by Anagnos "is not the 
usual type of barrier you're expected to be able to cross.  
You're not supposed to cross that barrier to turn in any 
direction normally."     
¶14 Deputy Frami testified that after executing the turn, 
Anagnos "rapidly accelerated" up to the nearest stoplight.  When 
the stoplight turned green, Deputy Frami observed Anagnos turn 
left onto Highway 50 without activating his turn signal and 
again "[take] off at a rapid acceleration."  On cross-
examination, Deputy Frami acknowledged that there were not any 
vehicles in addition to the ones driven by Anagnos and Deputy 
Frami in the vicinity, and that he could not confirm that 
Anagnos exceeded the speed limit at any time.     
¶15 The circuit court also heard testimony from Anagnos, 
who testified that he did not exceed the speed limit at any time 
and that he knew he had activated his turn signal because "I 
always put on a turn signal."  He also testified that, based on 
his own measurements, the height of the median he crossed was 
not four to five inches, but rather, was only one-and-a-half to 
two inches.  After further investigation, the State later 
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
7 
 
conceded that the elevated median was not four or five inches 
high as Deputy Frami estimated, but rather was two inches high 
and five feet, eight inches wide.     
¶16  Based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, the 
circuit court determined that Deputy Frami did not have probable 
cause to stop Anagnos because he did not observe Anagnos violate 
any law prior to the traffic stop.  The court asserted that 
Anagnos did not violate Wis. Stat. § 346.15 when he crossed the 
elevated median because the curb was only two inches high, 
rather than four to five inches as Deputy Frami had estimated.4  
It further determined that there was no evidence that Anagnos 
exceeded the speed limit, and that Anagnos was not required to 
activate his turn signal prior to turning onto Highway 50 
because the movement did not affect other traffic.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.34(1)(b).   
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.15 provides:  
Whenever any highway has been divided into 2 roadways 
by 
an 
intervening 
unpaved 
or 
otherwise 
clearly 
indicated dividing space or by a physical barrier 
constructed 
to 
substantially 
impede 
crossing 
by 
vehicular traffic, the operator of a vehicle shall 
drive only to the right of the space or barrier and no 
operator of a vehicle shall drive over, across, or 
within the space or barrier except through an opening 
or at a crossover or intersection . . . , except that 
an operator of a vehicle when making a left turn to or 
from a private driveway . . . may drive across a paved 
dividing space or physical barrier not constructed to 
impede crossing by vehicular traffic, unless the 
crossing is prohibited by signs . . . . 
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
8 
 
¶17 The circuit court pointed to the "mistakes [made] by 
the officer," specifically Deputy Frami's belief that the two 
left turns were illegal, when it concluded that the stop was not 
supported by reasonable suspicion.  Accordingly, the court 
determined that the stop was unconstitutional, and it entered an 
order "suppressing" the evidence obtained as a result of the 
stop.  Ultimately, the circuit court dismissed the State's case.5  
¶18 The court of appeals affirmed.  It concluded that the 
refusal 
hearing 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(9)(a)5.a., 
permitted the circuit court to consider the lawfulness of the 
traffic stop at the refusal hearing.  State v. Anagnos, 2011 WI 
App 118, ¶15, 337 Wis. 2d 57, 805 N.W.2d 722.  Like the circuit 
court, the court of appeals' reasonable suspicion analysis 
relied heavily on the premise that Anagnos broke no traffic 
laws.  Id., ¶13.  Noting that Deputy Frami did not testify that 
he suspected that Anagnos was intoxicated prior to the stop, the 
court of appeals concluded that the stop was unconstitutional 
because it was not supported by probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion.  Id. 
II 
                                                 
5 The court's order provided: "Based upon the suppression of 
evidence ordered above, the State is without sufficient evidence 
to meet its burden of proof to establish that the defendant 
unlawfully refused to submit to chemical testing, and therefore, 
the Court finds that the defendant's refusal to submit to 
chemical testing was REASONABLE, and the refusal charge is 
therefore DISMISSED."   
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
9 
 
¶19 This case presents two questions for our review.  
First, we must determine whether a defendant may raise the 
constitutionality of a traffic stop as a defense at a refusal 
hearing.  To answer this question, we are required to interpret 
the refusal hearing statute, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)5.  It is 
well established that this court interprets statutes independent 
of the determinations rendered by the circuit court and the 
court of appeals.  Megal Dev. Corp. v. Shadof, 2005 WI 151, ¶8, 
286 Wis. 2d 105, 705 N.W.2d 645. 
¶20 If we determine that a defendant may defend against a 
refusal on the basis of the constitutionality of the stop, we 
must determine whether the stop of Anagnos's vehicle was 
constitutional.  The stop was unconstitutional if it was not 
based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion.   
¶21 Whether 
there 
was 
probable 
cause 
or 
reasonable 
suspicion to conduct a stop is a question of constitutional 
fact, which is a mixed question of law and fact to which we 
apply a two-step standard of review.  State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, 
¶8, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634.  First, we review the circuit 
court's findings of historical fact under the clearly erroneous 
standard.  Id.  Second, we review the application of those 
historical facts to the constitutional principles independent of 
the determinations rendered by the circuit court and the court 
of appeals.  Id. 
III 
¶22 We 
begin 
by 
examining 
the 
relevant 
statutes.  
Wisconsin Statute § 343.305, known as the implied consent law, 
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
10 
 
provides that any person who drives on the public highways of 
this state is deemed to have consented to chemical testing upon 
request by a law enforcement officer.  Upon arrest of a person 
for violation of an OWI-related statute, a law enforcement 
officer may request the person to provide a blood, breath, or 
urine sample for chemical testing.6  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(a).  
At the time of the request for a sample, the officer must read 
to the person certain information set forth in § 343.305(4), 
referred to as the Informing the Accused form. 
¶23 If the person submits to chemical testing and the test 
reveals the presence of a detectable amount of a restricted 
controlled substance or a prohibited alcohol concentration, the 
person is subjected to an administrative suspension of his 
operating privileges.  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(7)(a).  The person 
has the right to an administrative hearing and to judicial 
review.  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(8).  The administrative hearing is 
limited to certain issues that are set forth by statute.  Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(8)(b)2.  
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(3)(a) enumerates a series of 
specific offenses, including Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63(1), 346.63(2), 
346.63(2m), 346.63(5), 346.63(6), 940.09, and 940.25.  For ease 
of reading, we collectively refer to these statutes as "OWI-
related statutes" throughout the opinion. 
As 
discussed 
above, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(3)(a) 
is 
implicated when a person is arrested for violation of an OWI-
related statute.  There are parallel provisions set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(am) (addressing persons driving or 
operating or on duty time with respect to a commercial motor 
vehicle) and Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar) (addressing persons 
involved in accidents that cause substantial bodily harm).  
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
11 
 
¶24 If, on the other hand, the person refuses to submit to 
chemical testing, he is informed of the State's intent to 
immediately revoke his operating privileges.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(9)(a).  The person is also informed that he may 
request 
a 
refusal 
hearing 
in 
court. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(9)(a)4. 
¶25 The issues that a defendant may raise at a refusal 
hearing are limited by statute to those set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(9)(a)5.  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(c); see also State v. 
Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d 15, 381 N.W.2d 300 (1986); Washburn County 
v. Smith, 2008 WI 23, 308 Wis. 2d 65, 746 N.W.2d 243; State v. 
Gautschi, 2000 WI App 274, 240 Wis. 2d 83, 622 N.W.2d 24.  If 
all of the issues under sub. (9)(a)5. are determined adversely 
to the person, the court shall revoke the person's operating 
privileges.  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(d).  However, "[i]f one or 
more of the issues is determined favorably to the person, the 
court shall order that no action be taken on the operating 
privilege on account of the person's refusal to take the test in 
question."  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(d).7  
                                                 
7 During the proceedings in the circuit court, the parties 
and the court seemed to believe that the refusal hearing had 
been converted into a suppression hearing.  The State asserts 
that it is not proper for the court to suppress evidence at a 
refusal hearing because it is an administrative proceeding, and 
the rules of criminal procedure do not apply.   
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
12 
 
¶26 The State argues that by virtue of sub. (9)(a)5.a., a 
defendant cannot contest the constitutionality of the officer's 
initial decision to conduct a traffic stop.  Rather, it asserts, 
Anagnos is limited to contesting whether there was probable 
cause to believe that he was operating while under the influence 
of an intoxicant based on all the information the officer had 
gathered during a traffic stop and up until the moment of the 
arrest.    
¶27 To evaluate the State's argument, we again turn to 
examine the statutory text.  Wisconsin Statute § 343.305(9)(a)5. 
provides that the issues a defendant may contest at a refusal 
hearing are limited as follows:  
a. Whether the officer had probable cause to believe 
the person was driving or operating a motor vehicle 
while 
under the influence of alcohol . . .  and 
whether the person was lawfully placed under arrest 
for violation of [an OWI-related statute]. 
                                                                                                                                                             
The discussion of "suppression" and the exclusionary rule 
is somewhat beside the point.  The question is not whether 
evidence of Anagnos's intoxication and refusal should be 
suppressed under the exclusionary rule as fruit of the poisonous 
tree.  Instead, the statute directs that the question in this 
case is whether the person was "lawfully placed under arrest."  
If the answer to this question is "no," the statute directs the 
court to "order that no action be taken" against the person.  
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(d).   
The 
parties 
did 
not 
make 
any 
arguments 
about 
what 
preclusive effect, if any, a determination in a refusal hearing 
that the person was not lawfully placed under arrest would have 
in a subsequent prosecution for OWI.  Accordingly, we do not 
address that question.  See the concurrence, which further 
discusses this issue. 
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
13 
 
b. Whether the officer complied with sub. (4) [by 
reading the Informing the Accused form to the person]. 
c. Whether the person refused to permit the test.  The 
person shall not be considered to have refused the 
test if it is shown by a preponderance of evidence 
that the refusal was due to a physical inability to 
submit to the test . . . unrelated to the use of 
alcohol, controlled substances, controlled substance 
analogs or other drugs.     
¶28 When interpreting a statute, we begin with the 
language of that statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 
110.  "Statutory language is read where possible to give 
reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  
Id., ¶46; see also Johnson v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 672, 676, 251 
N.W.2d 834 (1977); Dykstra v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 100 
Wis. 2d 120, 127, 301 N.W.2d 201 (1981); Wood County v. Bd. of 
Vocational, Technical & Adult Edu., 60 Wis. 2d 606, 615, 211 
N.W.2d 617 (1973) ("[T]his court can only attempt to construe a 
statute so that all parts have a function and meaning.").  
¶29 In this case, the relevant portion of the statute is 
found in sub. (9)(a)5.a.  That subsection permits circuit courts 
to consider "[w]hether the officer had probable cause to believe 
the person was driving or operating a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of alcohol . . . and whether the person was 
lawfully placed under arrest" for violation of an OWI-related 
statute.  (Emphasis added). 
¶30 According to the State, the inquiry of "whether the 
person was lawfully placed under arrest" for violation of an 
OWI-related statute is encompassed within the issue of whether 
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
14 
 
the officer had probable cause to believe the person was 
driving under the influence of alcohol, an issue that Anagnos 
has conceded.  To bolster this interpretation, the State relies 
on this court's decisions in Nordness and Smith.  In each of 
those cases, this court focused its inquiry on "[w]hether the 
officer had probable cause to believe the person was driving or 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol" 
and did not discuss "whether the person was lawfully placed 
under arrest."    
¶31 The interpretation advanced by the State, that the 
lawfulness of the arrest is encompassed within the inquiry of 
probable cause, is not compatible with the statutory language.  
It would render the statutory phrase "and whether the person was 
lawfully placed under arrest" mere surplusage.  See Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.    
¶32 The legislature's use of the conjunctive word "and" 
indicates 
that 
there are two issues set forth in sub. 
(9)(a)5.a., and that those two issues are independent.8  Not only 
can a defendant contest "[w]hether the officer had probable 
cause to believe the person was driving or operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol," but also, the 
defendant can contest "whether the person was lawfully placed 
under 
arrest" 
for 
violation 
of 
an 
OWI-related 
statute.  
Gautschi, 240 Wis. 2d 83, ¶6.  If the legislature had intended 
                                                 
8 See Bartholomew v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 
2006 WI 91, ¶79, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216. 
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
15 
 
to limit the inquiry set forth in sub. (9)(a)5.a. to "[w]hether 
the officer had probable cause to believe the person was driving 
or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol," we presume that it would not have included language in 
the statute indicating that courts must also inquire into 
"whether the person was lawfully placed under arrest for 
violation of [an OWI-related statute]."   
¶33 Further, neither Nordness nor Smith undermine this 
textually based interpretation of the statute.  In both cases, 
this court concluded (as we do here) that the issues that can be 
raised at a refusal hearing are strictly limited to the issues 
enumerated in the refusal hearing statute.9  Nordness, 128 
Wis. 2d at 19.  In both cases, the court zeroed in on the 
portion of the refusal hearing statute that was relevant to the 
arguments raised in the particular case: "whether the officer 
had probable cause to believe the person was driving or 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol."  
Neither case was presented with any question regarding the 
meaning of the statutory phrase "whether the person was lawfully 
placed under arrest for violation of [an OWI-related statute]," 
and the court did not address the meaning of that phrase in 
either case.    
                                                 
9 At the time that the Nordness case was decided, the 
refusal hearing statute was Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b)5. (1983-
1984).  The statute has been subsequently amended and renumbered 
to Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)5.  For purposes of our analysis, 
the content of the statute is substantially the same as it was 
when Nordness was decided. 
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
16 
 
¶34 In Nordness, the officer saw a vehicle weaving in the 
roadway and identified the driver as Nordness.  128 Wis. 2d at 
21.  The officer illuminated his red lights and siren, but the 
vehicle did not stop.  Id.  The officer followed the vehicle as 
it accelerated and then turned into a driveway, watched as the 
driver got out of the car and ran to the house, shouted for the 
driver to stop, and observed the driver turn around and mumble 
something unintelligible before disappearing toward the back of 
the house.  Id. at 21-22.   
¶35 Nordness 
never challenged the lawfulness of the 
officer's decision to attempt to pull him over.  Instead, 
Nordness argued that he was not actually the driver of the car.  
He argued that there was a "threshold determination to whether 
probable cause existed," that is, "whether the person charged 
with refusal to submit to chemical testing was in fact the 
driver of the motor vehicle."  Id. at 24, 19.   
¶36 The Nordness court "reject[ed] the argument that [the 
refusal hearing statute] encompasses anything more than the 
issues listed within that subsection," and accordingly, it 
likewise rejected the assertion that there was any "threshold" 
issue of whether Nordness was actually the driver of the car.   
Id. at 24.  It concluded that the question in the statute is 
whether the officer had probable cause to believe that the 
defendant drove while intoxicated, not whether it was actually 
the defendant who was driving while intoxicated.  Id. at 26-27.  
According to the Nordness court, making a factual determination 
about whether the defendant was "actually the driver of the car" 
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
17 
 
would "impermissibly broaden[] the revocation hearing's scope to 
consider" an issue that was not enumerated in the statute.  Id. 
at 26-27.   
¶37 In Smith, the defendant was pulled over after an 
officer observed him traveling on a two-lane highway at a rate 
of speed that appeared to be well above the posted speed limit.  
308 Wis. 2d 65, ¶8.  After being pulled over, Smith was arrested 
for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant.  Smith never challenged the legality of the stop.  
Rather, he challenged whether the officer had probable cause to 
arrest him for operating under the influence, given that there 
was no evidence that the officer conducted a field sobriety 
test.  Id., ¶24. 
¶38 We acknowledge that in both Nordness and Smith, the 
court used shorthand to summarize the issues that are enumerated 
in the refusal hearing statute.  We also acknowledge that, by 
using this shorthand, the court did not discuss the statutory 
language at issue here: "whether the person was lawfully placed 
under arrest" for violation of an OWI-related statute.  Instead, 
the court summarized the issues set forth in the refusal hearing 
statute as follows: "(1) whether the officer had probable cause 
to believe the person was driving under the influence of 
alcohol; (2) whether the officer complied with the informational 
provisions . . . ; (3) whether the person refused to permit the 
test; and (4) whether the refusal to submit to the test was due 
to a physical inability."  Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d at 28; Smith, 
308 Wis. 2d 65, ¶2 n.3.    
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
18 
 
¶39 In both cases, the court attempted to simplify 
complicated statutory language, and in so doing, the court 
focused on the portion of the refusal hearing statute that was 
directly implicated by the arguments advanced in each case.  In 
both cases, the relevant portion of the statute was "[w]hether 
the officer had probable cause to believe the person was driving 
or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol."  The lawfulness of a traffic stop was not at issue in 
either case.  The court's attempts to focus its inquiry on the 
statutory language relevant to the resolution of the cases 
before it should not be misunderstood as a conclusion that the 
phrase "whether the person was lawfully placed under arrest" for 
violation of an OWI-related statute is surplusage.  Neither 
Nordness nor Smith stands for the proposition that that phrase 
should be read out of the statute.10   
¶40  In the alternative, the State argues that if the 
statutory phrase "lawfully placed under arrest for violation of 
[an OWI-related statute]" must be given independent meaning, it 
means only that the person was actually arrested for an OWI 
offense.  Again, the State's alternative interpretation omits 
language from the statute.  The statute provides that the 
                                                 
10 "[Q]uestions which merely lurk in the record, neither 
brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to 
be considered as having been so decided as to constitute 
precedents."  Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925); see 
also MBS-Certified Public Accountants, LLC v. Wisconsin Bell 
Inc., 
2012 WI 15, ¶¶34, 34 n.15, 338 Wis. 2d 647, 809 
N.W.2d 857.  
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
19 
 
consideration for the circuit court was whether the person was 
"lawfully placed under arrest."  If the legislature meant to 
limit this defense to whether the person was actually placed 
under arrest, not whether the person was lawfully placed under 
arrest, we presume that the legislature would have not used the 
word "lawfully" in the statute.  
¶41 Here, Anagnos was not "lawfully placed under arrest" 
if he was seized during the course of an unconstitutional 
traffic stop.  See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 745-46 
(1984) (determining that a defendant was not "lawfully placed 
under arrest" because officers violated the Fourth Amendment by 
seizing the defendant in his home without a warrant and without 
exigent circumstances).  The traffic stop at issue in this case 
was unconstitutional if it was not based on probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion.11   
¶42 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)5.a. does 
not limit the circuit court to considering whether, based on all 
                                                 
11 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated. . . but upon probable cause . . . ."  See also 
Wis. Const. Art. I, § 11.   
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968), the United States 
Supreme Court determined that in appropriate circumstances, 
"reasonable suspicion" could justify a brief detention "for 
purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though 
there is no probable cause to make an arrest."  We have adopted 
this analysis under our own constitution, State v. Post, 2007 WI 
60, ¶12, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634, and the legislature has 
also codified the reasonable suspicion standard in Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.24.   
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
20 
 
the evidence gathered up until the moment of the arrest, the 
officer had probable cause to believe the defendant was 
operating while under the influence of an intoxicant.  The 
language of the statute provides that a defendant may also 
contest whether he was lawfully placed under arrest.  As part of 
this inquiry, the circuit court may entertain an argument that 
the arrest was unlawful because the traffic stop that preceded 
it was not justified by probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 
¶43 If the court concludes that the defendant was not 
"lawfully placed under arrest," then it has determined the issue 
set forth in sub. (9)(a)5.a. favorably to the defendant.  Under 
those circumstances, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(d) provides that 
"the court shall order that no action be taken on the operating 
privilege on account of the person's refusal to take the test in 
question."12   
                                                 
12 The State also advances a public policy argument based on 
a comparison between Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)5.a. (which sets 
forth the issues that can be considered in a refusal hearing in 
court) and Wis. Stat. § 343.305(8)(b)2. (which sets forth the 
issues that can be considered in an administrative suspension 
hearing based on a chemical test that reveals a prohibited 
amount of alcohol in the driver's blood). 
As explained above, the refusal statute plainly permits 
defendants to challenge both probable cause and whether the 
arrest was lawful.  By contrast, on its face, the chemical 
testing statute appears to permit defendants to challenge 
probable cause only, and not the lawfulness of the arrest.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(8)(b)2.e. ("If a test was requested under 
sub. (3)(a)," a defendant may challenge "whether probable cause 
existed for the arrest.")  The State asserts that permitting 
only those drivers who refuse chemical testing to challenge the 
lawfulness of the arrest will have the effect of encouraging 
drivers to refuse chemical testing. 
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
21 
 
IV 
¶44 We turn to reviewing the circuit court's determination 
that Anagnos was not lawfully placed under arrest.  The circuit 
court appeared to base this determination on its conclusion that 
Deputy Frami did not observe Anagnos violate any law prior to 
the stop.  Most significantly, the circuit court determined that 
Anagnos did not violate Wis. Stat. § 346.15 when he crossed the 
elevated median to turn left onto the divided highway, and the 
State does not now argue that any of Anagnos's other actions 
violated the rules of the road. 
¶45 For purposes of this opinion, we take the circuit 
court's conclusion about the legality of crossing the median at 
face value.  Although the height of the elevated median was 
contested at the circuit court, we are not certain that a 
factual determination about its height is dispositive of whether 
the statute was violated.  Under Wis. Stat. § 346.15, the 
determinative question appears to be whether a physical barrier 
was "constructed" to "impede crossing by vehicular traffic," and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Our decision in this case is based on the text of the 
statute at issue.  We make no attempt to offer an interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(8) 
in 
this 
opinion 
because 
the 
interpretation of that statute is not at issue in this case.   
In any event, we generally leave questions of public policy 
to the legislature.  See, e.g., Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 
95 Wis. 2d 173, 185-86, 290 N.W.2d 276 (1980)  In a case of 
refusal, the legislature plainly provided that a defendant can 
challenge the lawfulness of the arrest in a refusal hearing, and 
we are reticent to read those words out of the statute, as the 
State urges.  If we are wrong about the legislative intent, we 
suspect that the legislature will clarify its intent by amending 
the relevant statutes. 
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
22 
 
Deputy Frami testified that based on his experience, the 
elevated median crossed by Anagnos "is not the usual type of 
barrier you're expected to be able to cross."   
¶46 Even so, we assume, without deciding, that the circuit 
court correctly determined that Deputy Frami did not have 
probable cause when he conducted the traffic stop because he did 
not observe Anagnos violate Wis. Stat. § 346.15 or any other 
law.  Our assumption that driving over the elevated median was 
not unlawful, however, does not resolve the question of whether 
the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion.   
¶47 An investigative traffic stop may be supported by 
reasonable suspicion even when the officer did not observe the 
driver violate any law.  See Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶24 ("[I]t is 
clear that driving need not be illegal in order to give rise to 
reasonable suspicion" because such a standard "would allow 
investigatory stops only when there was probable cause to make 
an arrest."); State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 57, 556 N.W.2d 
681 (1996) ("The law allows a police officer to make an 
investigatory stop based on observations of lawful conduct so 
long as the reasonable inferences drawn from the lawful conduct 
are that criminal activity is afoot.").   
¶48 In evaluating whether an investigatory traffic stop is 
supported by reasonable suspicion, the officer must have more 
than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch."  
Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶10.  Rather, the officer "must be able to 
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together 
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" 
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
23 
 
the traffic stop.  Id.  This determination is based on "whether 
the facts of the case would warrant a reasonable police officer, 
in light of his or her training and experience, to suspect that 
the individual has committed, was committing, or is about to 
commit a crime."  Id., ¶13.    
¶49 The determination of whether a stop was objectively 
reasonable 
turns 
on 
the 
facts 
of 
each 
individual 
case.  
Nevertheless, the Waldner and Post cases are instructive.  
¶50 In Waldner, an officer observed a car driving on a 
main thoroughfare at a slow rate of speed at 12:30 in the 
morning.  206 Wis. 2d at 53.  The car stopped briefly at an 
uncontrolled intersection.  Id.  Then, the car turned onto a 
cross-street and accelerated at a high rate of speed.  Id.  The 
officer observed the car park into a legal parking space, where 
the driver opened the car door and proceeded to dump the 
contents of a plastic glass onto the roadway.  Id.  
¶51 Under these circumstances, this court recognized that 
"any one of these facts, standing alone, might well be 
insufficient" to provide reasonable suspicion.  Id. at 58.  We 
further acknowledged that all of the acts were lawful and each 
could have an innocent explanation.  Id. at 59.   
¶52 However, when we looked at the totality of the facts 
taken together, we concluded that "the whole [was] greater than 
the sum of its individual parts," amounting to reasonable 
suspicion to warrant an investigative stop: 
The building blocks of fact accumulate. And as they 
accumulate, reasonable inferences about the cumulative 
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
24 
 
effect can be drawn. In essence, a point is reached 
where the sum of the whole is greater than the sum of 
its individual parts. That is what we have here. These 
facts gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that 
something unlawful might well be afoot. 
Id. at 58. 
¶53 We were faced with a similar situation in Post.  At 
9:30 P.M., the officer witnessed a vehicle that was "canted such 
that it was driving at least partially in the unmarked parking 
lane."  301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶4.  The officer followed Post's car and 
observed that the vehicle continued to weave in an "S-type" 
pattern between the center line and the parking lane over two 
blocks.  Id., ¶5.  The officer later testified that the manner 
of Post's driving was a "clue that he may be intoxicated."  Id.  
¶54 In Post, we acknowledged that "weaving within a single 
lane can be insignificant enough that it does not [alone] give 
rise to reasonable suspicion," and further, that the officer 
"did not observe any actions that constituted traffic violations 
or which, considered in isolation, provided reasonable suspicion 
that criminal activity was afoot."  Id., ¶¶19, 28.  However, 
when 
we 
considered 
the 
"totality 
of 
the 
circumstances," 
including crossing over into the parking lane, weaving within 
the single lane, and the time of night, we concluded that the 
officer "presented specific and articulable facts, which taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to 
the reasonable suspicion necessary for an investigative stop."  
Id., ¶37.  
¶55 In this case, the circuit court carefully considered 
the evidence.  Nevertheless, it erred by considering the facts 
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
25 
 
articulated by Deputy Frami in isolation, and also by placing 
undue emphasis on whether any of these facts amounted to a 
violation of a law.  Throughout its oral decision, the circuit 
court repeatedly stressed that Anagnos "ha[d] not broken any 
law" and that Deputy Frami lacked reasonable suspicion to stop 
Anagnos's vehicle because he erroneously determined that Anagnos 
violated two traffic laws.  
¶56 When the totality of circumstances is considered in 
light of the constitutional principle that there need not be a 
violation of the law to give rise to a reasonable suspicion, a 
different picture emerges.  The facts, as articulated by Deputy 
Frami, lead to a reasonable suspicion that the driver of the 
vehicle made a series of unusual and impulsive driving choices, 
suggestive of impairment.   
¶57 In this case, Anagnos first attracted Deputy Frami's 
attention when he executed a turn by driving over an elevated 
median that was five feet, eight inches in width.  Deputy Frami 
testified that it "is not the usual type of barrier you're 
expected to be able to cross."  Under these circumstances, an 
objectively reasonable officer would conclude that Anagnos's 
choice to cross that median, rather than turning right and 
executing a legal U-turn at the break in the median, raised a 
suspicion that Anagnos was driving in an unusual manner.  Much 
like stopping at an uncontrolled intersection or weaving within 
a lane, executing a left turn over an elevated median that is 
more than five feet wide, though arguably not illegal, would 
encourage a reasonable officer to further monitor the driver.   
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
26 
 
¶58 Anagnos's 
subsequent 
actions, 
twice 
accelerating 
rapidly and executing a second left turn without signaling, 
could confirm to a reasonable officer that there was cause for 
suspicion.  That suspicion would reasonably be heightened by the 
officer's experience that he is more likely to encounter 
impaired drivers at 1:15 in the morning.      
¶59 Like the circuit court and the court of appeals, we 
recognize that Deputy Frami did not specifically testify that he 
suspected that Anagnos was impaired in some way.  In fact, 
during the hearing, Deputy Frami was only asked to testify about 
the facts he observed.  He was never asked about his subjective 
decision to execute the stop.     
¶60 Nevertheless, 
this 
gap 
in 
the 
record 
is 
not 
determinative.  The legal determination of reasonable suspicion 
is an objective test: "What would a reasonable police officer 
reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and 
experience."  Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d at 56.  Although the officer 
"must be able to point to specific and articulable facts" 
supporting reasonable suspicion, Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶10, and 
an officer's subjective belief can be considered in the totality 
of the circumstances, State v. Kyles, 2004 WI 15, ¶¶23-30, 269 
Wis. 2d 1, 675 N.W.2d 449, the legal determination of reasonable 
suspicion is by no means dependent upon the subjective belief of 
the officer.  When we consider the totality of the facts and 
circumstances as building blocks, we conclude that Deputy Frami 
"presented specific and articulable facts, which taken together 
with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to the 
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
27 
 
reasonable suspicion necessary for an investigative stop."  
Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶37.   
¶61 Because the stop of Anagnos's vehicle was supported by 
reasonable suspicion, the circuit court erred in concluding that 
Anagnos was not lawfully placed under arrest.  Under these 
circumstances, we reverse the court of appeals and remand to the 
circuit court to revoke Anagnos's driving privileges under Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(9)(d).    
V 
¶62 In sum, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)5.a. 
does not limit the defendant to contesting whether the officer 
had probable cause to believe the defendant was operating while 
under the influence of an intoxicant.  The language of the 
statute provides that a defendant may also contest whether he 
was lawfully placed under arrest.  As part of this inquiry, the 
circuit court may entertain an argument that the arrest was 
unlawful because the traffic stop that preceded it was not 
justified by either probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 
¶63 When we consider the totality of the facts and 
circumstances in this case, we conclude that the arresting 
officer pointed to specific and articulable facts, which taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to 
the reasonable suspicion necessary for an investigative stop.  
Because 
the 
stop 
of 
Anagnos's 
vehicle 
was 
supported 
by 
reasonable suspicion, the circuit court erred in concluding that 
the stop was unconstitutional and that Anagnos was not lawfully 
placed under arrest.  Under these circumstances, we reverse the 
No. 
2010AP1812   
 
28 
 
court of appeals and remand to the circuit court to revoke 
Anagnos's operating privilege under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(d). 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded. 
¶64 N. PATRICK CROOKS and DAVID T. PROSSER, J.J., did not 
participate.    
 
No.  2010AP1812.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶65 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  While I 
join the majority opinion, I write separately to clarify what 
the majority opinion does and does not address.  The majority 
opinion reverses the decision of the court of appeals that 
affirmed the circuit court's order dismissing the State's charge 
against Dimitrius Anagnos for improperly refusing to take a 
chemical test for the purpose of determining the presence or 
quantity of alcohol in his blood or breath, contrary to 
Wisconsin's implied consent law, Wis. Stat. § 343.305.  Both the 
circuit court and the court of appeals determined that the law 
enforcement officer's traffic stop of Anagnos's vehicle was 
unconstitutional, and therefore, Anagnos was not "lawfully 
placed under arrest for [a] violation of s. 346.63(1)" pursuant 
to 
§ 343.305(9)(a)5.a. 
 
See 
majority 
op., 
¶¶16-18.  
Consequently, both courts concluded that Anagnos's refusal to 
take the test was not improper.  See § 343.305(9)(d).  This 
court reverses, holding that the traffic stop of Anagnos's 
vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion.  See majority 
op., ¶5.  Accordingly, the majority opinion remands the cause to 
the 
circuit 
court 
with 
instructions 
to 
revoke 
Anagnos's 
operating privilege pursuant to § 343.305(9)(d), (10).   
¶66 In other words, the majority opinion addresses only 
the State's refusal charge against Anagnos.  The majority 
opinion does not address the separate charge against Anagnos for 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant 
(OWI), 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(a).  
No.  2010AP1812.akz 
 
2 
 
Moreover, because this court concludes, for purposes of the 
refusal charge, that the traffic stop of Anagnos's vehicle was 
supported 
by 
reasonable 
suspicion 
and 
was 
therefore 
constitutional, the majority opinion does not address what, if 
any, impact the opposite conclusion might have in a subsequent 
prosecution of the separate OWI charge.  See id., ¶25 n.7 
(clarifying that the majority opinion does not decide "what 
preclusive effect, if any, a determination in a refusal hearing 
that the person was not lawfully placed under arrest would have 
in a subsequent prosecution for OWI"). 
¶67 A refusal charge under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9) is 
distinct from charges of OWI or operating a motor vehicle with a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration 
(PAC) 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.63.  Indeed, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(d) clarifies that the 
determination on a refusal charge "does not preclude the 
prosecution of the person for violation of s. 346.63(1), (2m), 
(5) or (7) or a local ordinance in conformity therewith . . . ."1   
                                                 
1 In its entirety, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(d) states:  
At the close of the [refusal] hearing, or within 
5 days thereafter, the court shall determine the 
issues under par. (a)5. or (am)5.  If all issues are 
determined adversely to the person, the court shall 
proceed under sub. (10).  If one or more of the issues 
is determined favorably to the person, the court shall 
order that no action be taken on the operating 
privilege on account of the person's refusal to take 
the test in question.  This section does not preclude 
the prosecution of the person for violation of 
s. 346.63(1), (2m), (5) or (7) or a local ordinance in 
conformity 
therewith, 
or 
s. 346.63(2) 
or 
(6), 
940.09(1) or 940.25. 
No.  2010AP1812.akz 
 
3 
 
¶68 Likewise, despite the impressions of the circuit court 
and the parties in the instant case, see majority op., ¶¶17 & 
n.5, 25 n.7, a refusal hearing is distinct from a hearing that 
may be held in the prosecution of a separate OWI or PAC charge, 
such as a suppression hearing.  A refusal hearing is a special 
proceeding in which rules of civil, not criminal, procedure 
apply.  State v. Krause, 2006 WI App 43, ¶9, 289 Wis. 2d 573, 
712 N.W.2d 67.  In addition, because a refusal hearing is not 
criminal in nature, the constitutional right to counsel does not 
attach.  Id., ¶11.  Moreover, the State's burden of proof at a 
refusal hearing is "substantially less than at a suppression 
hearing."  State v. Wille, 185 Wis. 2d 673, 681, 518 N.W.2d 325 
(Ct. App. 1994).  At a refusal hearing, the State is required to 
"present evidence sufficient to establish an officer's probable 
cause to believe the person was driving or operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant."  State v. 
Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d 15, 35, 381 N.W.2d 300 (1986).  To that 
end, the State need persuade the circuit court only that the 
officer's account is plausible.  Id. at 36; Wille, 185 
Wis. 2d at 681.  By contrast, at a suppression hearing on an OWI 
or PAC charge, the State is required to present evidence 
sufficient to establish that probable cause existed to a 
reasonable certainty.  Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d at 36.  A mere 
possibility is not enough.  State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 
625, 184 N.W.2d 836 (1971).  Given that difference in burden of 
proof, it has been the law since 1994 that a defendant, 
unsuccessful at a refusal hearing, is not precluded from 
No.  2010AP1812.akz 
 
4 
 
relitigating the issue of probable cause at a subsequent 
suppression hearing on his or her OWI or PAC charge.  Wille, 185 
Wis. 2d at 682. 
¶69 The instant case concerns a refusal hearing, not a 
suppression hearing.  For purposes of the refusal charge only, 
this court is deciding that the traffic stop of Anagnos's 
vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion, and therefore, in 
light of his other concessions, Anagnos improperly refused to 
take a chemical test for the purpose of determining the presence 
or quantity of alcohol in his blood or breath.  The majority 
opinion does not address the separate charge against Anagnos for 
OWI.  I write separately to clarify that important distinction. 
¶70 Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
¶71 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence. 
 
No.  2010AP1812.akz 
 
 
 
1