Title: State v. Soto
Citation: 2012 WI 93
Docket Number: 2010AP002273-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2012

2012 WI 93 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP2273-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jon Anthony Soto, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 8, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Trempealeau 
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas E. Lister 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (Opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.    
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs and oral 
argument by Chandra N. Harvey, assistant state public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Maura 
F.J. Whelan, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
2012 WI 93
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2010AP2273-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2009CF28) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jon Anthony Soto, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order and judgment of the Circuit Court of 
Trempealeau County.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This case is before us 
on certification from the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 809.61 (2009–10).1  The court of appeals certified 
questions of statutory interpretation from the appeal of the 
decision of the circuit court for Trempealeau County2 that denied 
Jon Anthony Soto's postsentencing motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea. 
 
Soto 
contends 
that 
his 
right 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009–10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 The Honorable Thomas E. Lister presided. 
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
2 
 
§ 971.04(1)(g) to be present in the same courtroom as the 
presiding judge at his plea hearing was violated when the court 
conducted the hearing via videoconferencing technology.3  The 
State contends that if Soto had a right to be present in the 
same courtroom as the presiding judge, he waived it prior to 
pleading. 
¶2 
We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(g) provides a 
criminal defendant the statutory right to be in the same 
courtroom as the presiding judge when a plea hearing is held, if 
the court accepts the plea and pronounces judgment.  However, we 
also conclude that this statutory right may be waived and that 
Soto waived it prior to pleading and the court's pronouncement 
of judgment.  We so conclude because Soto appeared in a 
courtroom in the Trempealeau County courthouse; both his 
attorney and the prosecuting attorney also appeared in the same 
courtroom; through videoconferencing, the judge was able to see, 
speak to and hear Soto and Soto was able to see, speak to and 
hear 
the 
circuit 
court 
judge; 
the 
judge 
explained 
that 
videoconferencing would be used for the plea hearing if Soto 
                                                 
3 Different 
sources 
abbreviate 
the 
process 
of 
videoconferencing 
as 
"VCT" 
or 
"VTC," 
presumably 
meaning 
"videoconference 
technology" 
and 
"video 
teleconference," 
respectively.  Wisconsin Stat. §§ 885.50–.64 use the term 
"videoconferencing  technology" to refer to the process of 
communicating using "interactive technology that sends video, 
voice, and data signals over a transmission circuit so that two 
or more individuals or groups can communicate with each other 
simultaneously using video monitors."  Wis. Stat. § 885.52(3).  
In accordance with the statutes' terminology, we use the term 
"videoconferencing." 
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
3 
 
chose to enter a plea that day; and Soto expressly consented to 
the use of videoconferencing for the plea hearing.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the circuit court's order denying Soto's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
The facts relevant to Soto's appeal are limited 
primarily to the circumstances surrounding the hearing at which 
he pled guilty to second-degree reckless endangerment with the 
use of a dangerous weapon through the use of videoconferencing.  
We, therefore, summarize the underlying charges and proceedings 
only briefly. 
¶4 
On April 14, 2009, a criminal complaint was filed in 
Trempealeau County against defendant Soto for numerous harms 
Soto allegedly perpetrated upon a former girlfriend.  The 
complaint included one count of stalking resulting in bodily 
harm, one count of false imprisonment, two counts of aggravated 
battery and one count of second-degree reckless endangerment.  
All of these counts included sentence enhancements for the use 
of a dangerous weapon, domestic abuse and commission by a 
repeater.  These charges were subsequently incorporated into the 
information filed against Soto on May 4, 2009.  The information 
also included charges for first-degree sexual assault and 
attempted first-degree sexual assault, both of which included 
repeater enhancements. 
¶5 
On July 7, 2009, Soto, with the advice of counsel, 
entered into a plea agreement with the Trempealeau County 
District Attorney.  That same day, Soto completed the plea 
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
4 
 
questionnaire and waiver of rights form, expressly waiving those 
constitutional rights relating to a defendant's right to a trial 
in a criminal proceeding.  According to the agreement, Soto 
would plead guilty to second-degree recklessly endangering 
safety, 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.30(2), 
with 
the 
repeater 
enhancement removed, but with the dangerous weapon and domestic 
abuse enhancements included.  In exchange, the State agreed to 
dismiss and read-in the false imprisonment and aggravated 
battery charges with their enhancements.  Additionally, the 
State agreed to dismiss the stalking, first-degree sexual 
assault and attempted sexual assault charges. 
¶6 
The following day, July 8, 2009, the parties appeared 
in a courtroom at the Trempealeau County courthouse for a 
scheduled plea hearing.  Soto appeared with his attorney, James 
Kroner, and the State appeared by Trempealeau County District 
Attorney, Jeri Marsolek.  The Honorable Thomas E. Lister 
presided from the Jackson County courthouse in Black River 
Falls, and the individuals in the two courtrooms communicated 
via videoconferencing. 
¶7 
At the beginning of the plea hearing, Judge Lister 
acknowledged the use of videoconferencing and asked a series of 
questions relating to the acceptability of its use for the 
hearing.  Judge Lister asked those in the Trempealeau County 
courtroom whether they could see and hear him to their 
satisfaction, to which Attorneys Kroner and Marsolek both 
answered "Yes."  Additionally, the judge asked Soto and his 
attorney whether the use of videoconferencing was acceptable for 
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
5 
 
the proceeding, and both answered affirmatively.  After the 
defendant 
and 
his 
attorney 
agreed 
to 
the 
use 
of 
videoconferencing for the hearing, Kroner asked whether there 
was a court reporter present with Judge Lister, to which the 
judge replied affirmatively. 
¶8 
Judge Lister then engaged in a detailed colloquy with 
Soto to ensure that Soto's guilty plea and the corresponding 
waiver 
of 
his 
constitutional 
rights 
were 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily made.  The judge also asked 
Kroner whether he believed that Soto entered into the plea 
agreement knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; whether 
Kroner believed that Soto understood the possible penalties he 
could face; and whether Kroner believed that the plea agreement 
was in Soto's best interest.  Kroner responded to each of these 
inquiries affirmatively. 
¶9 
The court then confirmed Soto's understanding of his 
waiver of any potential intoxication and insanity defenses, as 
well as his loss of other civil rights implicated by pleading 
guilty to a felony.  Finally, Judge Lister once more asked Soto 
whether there was anything about the proceedings that Soto did 
not understand or that he wished to discuss with either the 
court or his attorney.  Soto replied, "No." 
¶10 The 
court 
then 
found 
that 
Soto 
understood 
the 
proceedings 
and 
that 
he 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily waived his constitutional rights while properly 
advised by counsel.  On those findings, the court accepted 
Soto's plea, found him guilty, and convicted him of second-
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
6 
 
degree recklessly endangering safety with a deadly weapon.  At a 
later date, Soto was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, 
consisting of ten years of confinement and five years of 
extended supervision. 
¶11 Soto moved for postconviction relief wherein he sought 
to withdraw his guilty plea and to vacate the judgment.  Soto 
asserted that the proceeding at which he pled guilty via 
videoconferencing violated due process, as well as his statutory 
right to be present as provided in Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(g).  
Soto argued that he could not have effectively waived his right 
to challenge the use of videoconferencing because he was not 
aware that such right existed and that, therefore, any waiver 
was not an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right.   
¶12 On July 1, 2010, the court heard Soto's motion for 
postconviction relief and denied the motion.  Judge Lister 
reasoned that it was inconceivable that his sharing the same 
courtroom with Soto would have altered the proceeding in any 
relevant way.  Distinguishing State v. Peters, 2000 WI App 154, 
237 Wis. 2d 741, 615 N.W.2d 655, rev'd on other grounds, 2001 WI 
74, 244 Wis. 2d 470, 628 N.W.2d 797, and State v. Vennemann, 180 
Wis. 2d 81, 508 N.W.2d 404 (1993), Judge Lister noted the 
clarity of communications between the two courtrooms, the 
thorough colloquy between Soto and him, that both Soto and his 
attorney affirmatively agreed to proceed via videoconferencing 
and the multiple opportunities the court afforded Soto to seek 
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
7 
 
clarification or to reconsider his decision to plead at that 
time. 
¶13 Soto appealed.  The court of appeals certified the 
appeal, which certification we accepted. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶14 This certification asks us to determine whether Soto's 
guilty plea must be set aside to correct a manifest injustice.  
State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 473, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997).  
Soto bases his assertion of manifest injustice on a claimed 
statutory right to be present in the same courtroom as the judge 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(g), which he says was 
violated when videoconferencing was used at his plea hearing.  
Accordingly, we must construe and apply § 971.04(1)(g).  The 
interpretation of a statute and its application to a particular 
set 
of 
facts 
present 
questions 
of 
law 
that 
we 
review 
independently of the circuit court's decision, but benefitting 
from its analysis.  Rasmussen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2011 WI 52, 
¶14, 335 Wis. 2d 1, 803 N.W.2d 623.  Additionally, whether a 
defendant's undisputed statements and actions in a criminal 
proceeding constitute waiver of a statutory right is a question 
of law for our independent review.  State v. Ward, 2009 WI 60, 
¶17, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236.   
B.  Wisconsin Statutes § 971.04(1)(g) 
¶15 The primary issue presented is whether a criminal 
defendant has a statutory right under Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(g) 
to be "present" in the same courtroom as the presiding judge 
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
8 
 
when a guilty plea is made and judgment is pronounced.  This 
issue requires us to determine whether pleas may come within 
§ 971.04(1)(g).  If they do in this case, then we must interpret 
"present" specifically in regard to where the defendant must be 
located and whether the judge must be at the same location as 
the defendant.  Our discussion, therefore, begins with the plain 
language of the statute.4  Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 
WI 52, ¶20, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581. 
¶16 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.04 provides, in relevant part:  
 
(1) Except as provided in subs. (2) and (3), the 
defendant shall be present: 
 
(a) At the arraignment; 
 
(b) At trial; 
 
(c) During voir dire of the trial jury; 
 
(d) At any evidentiary hearing; 
 
(e) At any view by the jury; 
 
(f) When the jury returns its verdict; 
 
(g) At the pronouncement of judgment and the 
imposition of sentence; 
 
(h) At any other proceeding when ordered by the 
court. 
¶17 Plea 
hearings 
are 
not 
mentioned 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.04(1).  However, the State and Soto focus on para. (1)(g), 
                                                 
4 We note at the outset of our discussion that Soto does not 
assert that a constitutional right was abridged by the manner in 
which the plea hearing was conducted.  Although Soto's challenge 
was initially based in part on an alleged deprivation of due 
process, he has abandoned his constitutional challenge in this 
court.  
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
9 
 
which provides that a defendant must be present at a proceeding 
where there is a "pronouncement of judgment."  In that regard, 
we note that at the plea hearing Judge Lister said: 
 
I accept his plea of guilty, and I find him 
guilty, and upon this finding, it is adjudged that he 
is convicted of the crime of second degree recklessly 
endangering safety in violation of 941.30(2) of the 
Wisconsin Statutes, and that he is convicted of using 
or possessing a dangerous weapon in the course of 
committing that crime in violation of 939.63 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes as charged in Count 5 of the 
Amended Information, and I adjudge him convicted on 
this date, and I order a Judgment of Conviction 
entered in the record.  
¶18 Based on this statement from the court, we agree that 
Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(g) is relevant to Soto's claim because 
judgment was pronounced at the hearing where he pled guilty.5  
However, although § 971.04(1)(g) speaks to the defendant being 
"present," it says nothing about where the defendant or the 
judge are located.  If the judge and the defendant are required 
to be in the same location when judgment is pronounced, the use 
of videoconferencing for pleas when judgment is pronounced may 
be problematic.  This requires us to interpret § 971.04(1)(g). 
¶19 Statutory interpretation is undertaken to determine 
the statute's meaning, which we assume is expressed in the 
language chosen by the legislature.  Richards, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 
¶20.  If the meaning of the statute is clear from the plain 
language, we give effect to that language.  State ex rel. Kalal 
                                                 
5 It may be possible to have a plea accepted, but not have 
the court pronounce judgment.  As these are not the facts before 
us, we do not address this potential further. 
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
10 
 
v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 
633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We give statutory terms their "common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  Id., ¶45.   
¶20 Additionally, a plain meaning analysis may look to 
statutory context and structure.  See id., ¶46.  Indeed, the 
statutory context in which a term is used, including the 
language and structure of surrounding or closely related 
statutes, is often highly instructive in determining a term's 
meaning.  State v. Jensen, 2010 WI 38, ¶15, 324 Wis. 2d 586, 782 
N.W.2d 415.  The purposes underlying a statute are also useful 
in ascertaining a statute's meaning.  Sheboygan Cnty. Dep't of 
Health & Human Servs. v. Tanya M.B., 2010 WI 55, ¶28, 325 
Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 369.  Finally, when engaging in 
statutory interpretation, we are assisted by prior decisions 
that have examined the relevant statutes.  See DeHart v. Wis. 
Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WI 91, ¶15, 302 Wis. 2d 564, 734 N.W.2d 394.   
¶21 Therefore, when interpreting "present" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.04(1)(g), we look to common understandings of that term, 
its 
apparent 
purpose and surrounding provisions governing 
criminal procedure, as well as the related statute governing the 
use of videoconferencing, Wis. Stat. § 885.60.   
¶22 "Present" is not defined in the statutes.  However, 
from a plain meaning interpretation, we conclude that "present" 
under Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1) means that a criminal defendant has 
a right to personally appear at the proceedings where judgment 
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
11 
 
is pronounced, here, at the plea hearing.  Therefore, in the 
context of § 971.04(1)(g), "present" means the defendant is in a 
courtroom when the plea is made and judgment is pronounced.  
However, the statute is silent in regard to whether the judge 
must also be present in the same courtroom as the defendant.   
¶23 We have required that the defendant be in a courtroom 
because the statute clearly speaks to the defendant's presence 
at the location of the proceeding.  Requiring that the defendant 
be present in the courtroom is guided also by the belief that a 
courtroom is a setting epitomizing and guaranteeing "calmness 
and solemnity," see Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 583 (1965) 
(Black, J., dissenting), so that a defendant may recognize that 
he has had access to the judicial process in a criminal 
proceeding.  Finally, requiring the defendant to make his 
appearance in a courtroom avoids the potential or perceived 
problems that can occur when the defendant is located in another 
facility such as a jail, while the judge, prosecutor, and 
perhaps even defense counsel are in the courtroom.  See 
generally 
Anne 
Bowen 
Poulin, 
Criminal 
Justice 
and 
Videoconferencing Technology:  The Remote Defendant, 78 Tul. L. 
Rev. 1089 (2004).  
¶24 The purposes served by the defendant being "present" 
during a plea hearing and the context in which "present" is used 
are instructive.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶48.  For example, 
when a plea is taken on a felony, one statutory purpose served 
by the defendant's presence is to permit the circuit court to 
conduct a colloquy to determine whether there is a sufficient 
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
12 
 
factual basis for the plea and that the defendant is pleading 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(1); see State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶¶16-17, 253 
Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d 891.   
¶25 When the videoconferencing is such that the judge can 
see, speak to and hear the defendant and his counsel, and the 
defendant and his counsel can see, speak to and hear the judge, 
the statutory purpose of ascertaining whether the plea is being 
made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily can be fulfilled.  
Accordingly, it is not necessary to satisfying that purpose of 
"present" in Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(g) that the judge and the 
defendant both be at the same location.   
¶26 Pronouncement of judgment demonstrates the State's 
power to require compliance with the criminal code and to hold 
accountable those who do not comply.  Accordingly, another 
purpose served by the requirement that the defendant be present 
in a courtroom when judgment is pronounced is to effectively 
display the State's power.  At pronouncement of judgment, the 
power of the State resides in the court, then personified by the 
circuit court judge.  That state power is more forcefully 
exercised when the defendant and the judge are in the same 
courtroom, rather than having the defendant in a courtroom and 
the judge in a remote location.    
¶27 Furthermore, the Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1) requirement 
that "the defendant shall be present" applies to multiple 
paragraphs of § 971.04(1), such as (1)(b), "[a]t trial," (1)(c), 
"[d]uring voir dire of the trial jury," and (1)(f), "[w]hen the 
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
13 
 
jury returns its verdict."  One would expect that the judge 
would be present in the same courtroom as the defendant when a 
trial is ongoing, when the jury is being questioned prior to 
their selection and when the verdict is returned.  It would be 
contrary to the plain meaning of "present" to conclude that the 
term had different meanings for different paragraphs of subsec. 
(1) that employ a common introductory statement.  Accordingly, 
we conclude that under § 971.04(1)(g), Soto had a statutory 
right to be present in the same courtroom as the judge when he 
made his guilty plea because the judge accepted Soto's plea and 
pronounced judgment in regard to the crime to which Soto pled.   
¶28 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.04(1) has been mentioned in 
several 
Wisconsin 
opinions, 
but 
none 
of 
them 
involved 
circumstances similar to those presented herein.  For example, 
in Vennemann, we considered whether a convicted defendant was 
required to be present for a postconviction motion hearing.  
Vennemann, 180 Wis. 2d at 85.  Vennemann was in prison and the 
hearing was conducted with a telephone hookup between the court 
and Vennemann, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 967.08.  Id.  Therefore, 
communications between the judge and the defendant had no video 
component.  In addition, the audio component faded in and out, 
with the defendant often being unable to hear at all.  Id. at 
91-92.  We concluded that § 971.04(1)(d) did not apply to 
postconviction evidentiary hearings, id. at 93, and that a 
patchy telephone connection from prison was insufficient under 
§ 967.08 for the evidentiary issues presented.  Id. at 87-88.  
Therefore, although our decision today does not conflict with 
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
14 
 
our holding in Vennemann, because of the different focus of our 
discussion therein, we do not rely on Vennemann.  
¶29 In State v. Koopmans, 210 Wis. 2d 670, 563 N.W.2d 528 
(1997), we examined whether a defendant had waived her Wis. 
Stat. § 971.04(1)(g) right to be present at sentencing.  Id. at 
672-73.  The defendant was out of the country at the time set 
for sentencing.  Id. at 673-74.  The circuit court concluded 
that she had voluntarily absented herself from the sentencing 
proceedings and by doing so, she had waived her § 971.04(1)(g) 
right to be present at those proceedings.  Id. at 674.  The 
circuit court then sentenced her in absentia.  Id.  We concluded 
that being out of the country could not constitute being 
"present," as that term is used in § 971.04(1)(g).  Id. at 677-
79.  We also concluded that Koopmans had not waived her right to 
be present at the sentencing.  Id. at 677. 
¶30 However, Koopmans did not examine whether "present" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.04(1)(g) 
could 
be 
satisfied 
by 
videoconferencing.  Our decision in Koopmans did not have the 
occasion to interpret the term "present" and what conditions may 
fulfill the statutory directive, as we have done here.   
¶31 In addition to relying on the term "present" as it is 
used in Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(g), Soto also asserts that his 
right to be "physically present" under Wis. Stat. § 885.60(2)(a) 
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
15 
 
supports his interpretation of "present" under § 971.04(1)(g).  
Section 885.60 provides in relevant part:6 
(1) Subject to the standards and criteria set forth in 
ss. 885.54 and 885.56 and to the limitations of sub. 
(2), a circuit court may, on its own motion or at the 
request of any party, in any criminal case or matter 
under chs. 48, 51, 55, 938, or 980, permit the use of 
videoconferencing technology in any pre-trial, trial 
or fact-finding, or post-trial proceeding.  
 
(2)(a) Except as may otherwise be provided by 
law, a defendant in a criminal case and a respondent 
in a matter listed in sub. (1) is entitled to be 
physically present in the courtroom at all critical 
stages 
of 
the 
proceedings, 
including 
evidentiary 
hearings, 
trials 
or 
fact-finding 
hearings, 
plea 
hearings at which a plea of guilty or no contest, or 
an admission, will be offered, and sentencing or 
dispositional hearings.  
. . . . 
 
(d) If an objection is made by the defendant or 
respondent in a matter listed in sub (1), the court 
shall sustain the objection. 
¶32 Videoconferencing by its very nature implies that more 
than one location will be used for a proceeding.  Therefore, the 
statute envisions that the judge and the defendant may not be in 
the same location.  Wisconsin Stat. § 885.60(2)(a) employs the 
term "physically present" to describe the location of the 
defendant, rather than the term "present," as Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 885.60(2)(a) was amended in 2011, and no 
longer lists a plea hearing in which a guilty plea is offered.  
Instead, the amended § 885.60(2)(a) provides that a defendant 
"is entitled to be physically present in the courtroom at all 
trials and sentencing or dispositional hearings."  2011 Wis. Act 
32, § 3492r.  We confine our analysis and decision to the 
provision as it read at the time of Soto's plea hearing.  
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
16 
 
§ 971.04(1) does.  Accordingly, it might be argued that what is 
necessary to satisfy "physically present" may, or may not, be 
exactly the same as what is required to satisfy "present" under 
§ 971.04(1).  However, we note that § 885.60 was fully derived 
from a Supreme Court rule through a legislative delegation under 
Wis. Stat. § 751.12.  S. Ct. Order No. 07-12, 2008 WI 37, 305 
Wis. 2d xli (issued May 1, 2008, eff. July 1, 2008).  Section 
751.12 prohibits the supreme court from abridging, enlarging or 
modifying the substantive rights of any litigant when creating a 
Supreme 
Court 
rule 
under 
§ 751.12(1). 
 
Accordingly, 
§ 885.60(2)(a) 
cannot 
enlarge 
or 
diminish 
a 
defendant's 
statutory right established by § 971.04(1)(g).  
¶33 In the case before us, Soto expressly consented to the 
use of two locations.  The court questioned him thoroughly about 
the use of videoconferencing and whether he agreed to the use of 
videoconferencing for his plea.  Soto repeatedly assured the 
court that the videoconferencing equipment was working well and 
that he could see, speak to and hear the judge and that he 
agreed to proceed by videoconferencing.  He made no Wis. Stat. 
§ 885.60(2)(d) objection of any type.  Therefore, we conclude 
that § 885.60 has no relevance to whether Soto's plea was 
lawfully accepted during the videoconferencing used for his plea 
hearing.  
¶34 Returning 
now 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.04(1)(g) 
and 
applying the principles we have discussed to Soto's plea 
hearing, we conclude that Soto had a statutory right to be 
present in the same courtroom as the presiding judge when he 
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
17 
 
pled guilty and the judge accepted his plea and pronounced 
judgment in regard to the crime to which he pled.  However, that 
is not the end of our discussion because Judge Lister was 
diligent in acknowledging and questioning Soto about the use of 
videoconferencing. 
C.  Waiver 
¶35 The 
State 
contends, 
and 
we 
agree, 
that 
Soto 
affirmatively waived his statutory right to be present in the 
same courtroom as the presiding judge during the plea hearing.  
We begin by clarifying that this is not a case of forfeiture.  
We recently examined the distinction between forfeiture and 
waiver in State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶¶28–31, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 
761 N.W.2d 612.  Therein, we stated the distinction between the 
triggering of each theory as grounded in the existence of a 
volitional act:  "'Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the 
timely 
assertion 
of 
a 
right, 
waiver 
is 
the 
intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.'"  Id., ¶29 
(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)). 
¶36 One 
distinction 
between 
the 
two 
theories 
of 
relinquishment lies in the importance of the right being 
relinquished and the procedural efficiency of imposing an 
earlier final determination of the relinquishment of the right.  
See id., ¶¶30-31.  Rights that are subject to forfeiture are 
typically 
those whose relinquishment will not necessarily 
deprive a party of a fair trial, and whose protection is best 
left to the immediacy of the trial, such as when a party fails 
to raise an evidentiary objection.  See id., ¶30.  Forfeiture 
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
18 
 
promotes expediency and efficiency in proceedings leading up to 
and including trial, wherein the threat of immediately losing 
the right encourages diligent preparation and attention so as to 
avoid forgoing such rights as may be forfeited.  See id.  The 
mutual consolation of forfeiture is that each party can be 
confident that a right forfeited by the other will not be 
relitigated in some subsequent appeal or proceeding.  See id. 
¶37 In contrast to forfeiture, waiver typically applies to 
those rights so important to the administration of a fair trial 
that mere inaction on the part of a litigant is not sufficient 
to demonstrate that the party intended to forego the right.  See 
id., ¶31.  Rights subject to waiver require some affirmative 
relinquishment on the part of the holder.  See id.  Rights 
subject to waiver include constitutional protections such as the 
right to trial by jury, the right to counsel, and the right to 
refrain from self-incrimination.  State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, 
¶14, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727.  Additionally, certain 
statutory rights have been deemed sufficiently important as to 
require the affirmative relinquishment demanded by the doctrine 
of waiver.7  See State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, ¶¶35-39, 53-
54, 298 Wis. 2d 1, 724 N.W.2d 623 (explaining that a parent has 
a statutory right to counsel at the dispositional phase of a 
                                                 
7 We 
have 
previously 
acknowledged 
the 
imprecision 
in 
labeling certain scenarios subject to the "waiver rule," as that 
phrasing was often used to refer to forfeiture rather than true 
waiver.  See State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 
486, 611 N.W.2d 727.   
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
19 
 
termination of parental rights proceeding that is subject to 
waiver).  
¶38 Therefore, when determining whether a right is subject 
to forfeiture or waiver, we look to the constitutional or 
statutory 
importance 
of 
the 
right, 
balanced 
against 
the 
procedural efficiency in requiring immediate final determination 
of the right.  Accordingly, even where a right is not 
constitutionally protected, but where it is one of clear 
importance to the fair administration of justice, we will hold 
that the right is subject to waiver, rather than forfeiture.  
See Huebner, 235 Wis. 2d 486, ¶¶11, 14–15. 
¶39 Other courts and commentators have recognized that 
waiver is an important component of substantive rights.  See 
Michael E. Tigar, Foreword:  Waiver of Constitutional Rights:  
Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1970).  Indeed, the 
implied 
right 
to 
waive 
substantive 
rights, 
whether 
constitutional or statutory, affords criminal defendants a 
valuable bargaining chip at various stages of the proceedings.  
See id. at 8 ("It is waiver of rights that permits the system of 
criminal justice to work at all.").  Indeed, the applicability 
of waiver is demonstrated by the near-ubiquity of allowing 
waiver in criminal procedure.  See Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain 
Waivers Reconsidered:  A Legal Pragmatist's Guide to Loss, 
Abandonment and Alienation, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 2011, 2012-13 
(2000).  The policy underlying allowing waiver of important 
constitutional and statutory rights supports our conclusion that 
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
20 
 
the 
defendant's 
right 
to 
be 
present 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.04(1)(g) is subject to waiver. 
¶40 We conclude that a defendant's right to be present in 
the same courtroom as the presiding judge at the proceedings 
listed in Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(g) is particularly important to 
the actual or perceived fairness of the criminal proceedings.  
Therefore, if this right is to be relinquished, it must be done 
by waiver, the "intentional relinquishment of a known right."  
See Brunton v. Nuvell Credit Corp., 2010 WI 50, ¶37, 325 Wis. 2d 
135, 785 N.W.2d 302 (concluding that proper venue could be 
waived by an appearance and conduct evincing the intentional 
relinquishment of the right to proper venue).  
¶41 Our conclusion on the applicability of waiver must 
consider our holding in Koopmans.  As explained earlier, in 
Koopmans, we examined whether a defendant who had voluntarily 
absented herself from a scheduled sentencing hearing could be 
deemed to have waived her right to be present.8  It is important 
to note that contrary to the circumstances herein presented, 
Koopmans did not participate personally in the sentencing 
                                                 
8 Soto argues that Koopmans stands for a broad rule that the 
right to be present absolutely cannot be waived.  In light of 
the narrow question presented in that case, we do not read 
Koopmans as necessarily stating such a sweeping rule.  Instead, 
we conclude that the case should be read to hold that a 
defendant who absents herself from sentencing, without more, has 
not sufficiently demonstrated waiver of her right to be 
physically present.  See State v. Koopmans, 210 Wis. 2d 670, 
675, 563 N.W.2d 528 (1997) (phrasing the issue as "[w]hether a 
defendant may waive the right to be present at sentencing by 
knowingly[, intelligently] and voluntarily absenting himself or 
herself"). 
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
21 
 
hearing in any fashion.  We held that Koopmans' absence did not 
demonstrate that she had waived the right to be present.  
Koopmans, 210 Wis. 2d at 679–80.  Accordingly, we held that 
resentencing was necessary.  Id. at 680. 
¶42 Despite Koopmans' potentially broad statement that 
waiver was not available under Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(g) for a 
defendant who voluntarily absents herself from the sentencing 
proceeding, we conclude that the language of § 971.04(1)(g) and 
the policy of allowing waiver of many important constitutional 
and statutory rights requires that the right to be present in 
the same courtroom as the presiding judge also includes the 
corresponding 
right 
to 
waive 
that 
right 
and 
proceed 
by 
videoconferencing.   
¶43 The 
question underlying the appeal in Koopmans, 
whether waiver was shown by the facts of that case, should not 
be extrapolated to mean anything more than the right to be 
present cannot be forfeited by mere absence.  Understood in this 
light, Koopmans established the precursor for our holding today 
that waiver, rather than forfeiture, is the appropriate doctrine 
under which a criminal defendant may relinquish his right to be 
present in the same courtroom as the presiding judge when 
judgment is pronounced.   
¶44 Therefore, in accordance with Koopmans, Ndina and our 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(g), we conclude that a 
defendant in a criminal proceeding where judgment is pronounced 
may waive, but not forfeit, the right to be in the same 
courtroom as the presiding judge during those proceedings.  We 
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
22 
 
also note, however, that the showing necessary to demonstrate 
waiver of a right differs, depending on the right that is at 
issue.   
¶45 As we have explained, even where waiver is required, 
different 
types 
of 
rights 
require 
different 
showings 
to 
demonstrate that the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary.  For example, in State v. Denson, 2011 WI 70, 335 
Wis. 2d 681, 799 N.W.2d 831, we concluded that a circuit court 
is "not required to conduct an on-the-record colloquy" to 
determine whether a defendant is knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waiving his or her right not to testify.  Id., ¶63; 
see also Rao v. WMA Sec., Inc., 2008 WI 73, ¶22, 310 Wis. 2d 
623, 752 N.W.2d 220 (concluding that a party may waive the 
Wisconsin Constitution Article I, Section 5 right of trial by 
jury by failing to assert the right timely or by failing to pay 
a required jury fee).  Although a formal colloquy is often 
employed to show waiver, it is not the only way in which waiver 
may be shown.  See Denson, 335 Wis. 2d 681, ¶¶63–67.   
¶46 When videoconferencing is proposed for a plea hearing 
at which it is anticipated that judgment will be pronounced, the 
judge should enter into a colloquy with the defendant that 
explores the effectiveness of the videoconferencing then being 
employed.  In that regard, the judge shall ascertain whether the 
defendant and his attorney, if represented by counsel, are able 
to see, speak to and hear the judge and that the judge can see, 
speak to and hear the defendant and counsel.  The judge shall 
also ascertain, either by personal colloquy or by some other 
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
23 
 
means, whether the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily consents to the use of videoconferencing.  In so 
doing, questions should be asked to suggest to the defendant 
that he has the option of refusing to employ videoconferencing 
for a plea hearing at which judgment will be pronounced.  
¶47 In 
the 
case 
before 
us, 
Judge 
Lister 
carefully 
questioned Soto and counsel: 
THE COURT:  Can everyone hear me all right there? 
MS. MARSOLEK:  Yes. 
MR. KRONER:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  And can everyone see me all right? 
MS. MARSOLEK:  Yes. 
MR. KRONER:  Yes. 
. . . . 
THE COURT:  All right.  Mr. Kroner, are you satisfied 
with 
appearing 
at 
this 
plea 
hearing 
by 
video 
teleconferencing? 
MR. KRONER:  Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:  And, Mr. Soto, is it all right with you 
that 
we 
are 
doing 
this 
plea 
hearing 
by 
video 
teleconferencing? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.  
. . . . 
THE COURT:  And, Mr. Soto, do you wish to enter a plea 
today? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
. . . . (lengthy plea colloquy held) 
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
24 
 
THE COURT:  Mr. Soto, again, do you still wish to 
plead guilty? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:  Is there anything at all, Mr. Soto, about 
what's happening that you don't understand or that you 
would like to ask me or Mr. Kroner? 
THE DEFENDANT:  No.  
¶48 Based on the record presented in this case, we 
conclude that Soto waived his Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(g) right to 
be present in the same courtroom as Judge Lister during his plea 
hearing when judgment was pronounced.  Judge Lister's colloquy 
was sufficient to demonstrate that Soto and his attorney could 
see, speak to and hear Judge Lister and the judge could see, 
speak to and hear Soto and his counsel.  The colloquy 
demonstrated 
that 
the 
videoconferencing 
was 
functioning 
properly.  
¶49 Judge Lister also ascertained that Soto was knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily 
agreeing 
to 
the 
use 
of 
videoconferencing for the plea hearing.  Judge Lister asked Soto 
and his attorney whether proceeding via videoconferencing was 
acceptable, and each responded affirmatively.  His questions 
indicated that Soto did not have to agree to the use of 
videoconferencing, and the plea colloquy proceeded as it would 
have if all the parties and the judge were in the same 
courtroom.  After Judge Lister ascertained that Soto was making 
a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea, he offered Soto yet 
another opportunity to object to the use of videoconferencing.  
Judge Lister proceeded correctly.  Soto affirmatively waived his 
No. 
2010AP2273-CR   
 
25 
 
statutory right to be present in the same courtroom as the judge 
during the plea hearing where judgment was pronounced. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶50 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(g) provides a 
criminal defendant the statutory right to be in the same 
courtroom as the presiding judge when a plea hearing is held if 
the court accepts the plea and pronounces judgment.  However, we 
also conclude that this statutory right may be waived and that 
Soto waived it prior to pleading and the court's pronouncement 
of judgment.  We so conclude because Soto appeared in a 
courtroom in the Trempealeau County courthouse; both his 
attorney and the prosecuting attorney also appeared in the same 
courtroom; through videoconferencing, the judge was able to see, 
speak to and hear Soto and Soto was able to see, speak to and 
hear 
the 
circuit 
court 
judge; 
the 
judge 
explained 
that 
videoconferencing would be used for the plea hearing if Soto 
chose to enter a plea that day; and Soto expressly consented to 
the use of videoconferencing for the plea hearing.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the circuit court's order denying Soto's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
By the Court.—The order and judgment of the circuit court 
are affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2010AP2273-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶51 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with a number of the majority opinion's conclusions.  I dissent, 
however, because I disagree with the majority's conclusion that 
the record in the present case demonstrates that Soto, the 
defendant, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his 
right to be present in the same courtroom as the judge under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(g) when judgment was pronounced.   
¶52 First, I agree with the majority that under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.04(1)(g) Soto had a statutory right to be present in the 
same courtroom as the judge "at the pronouncement of judgment."  
Majority op., ¶27.   
¶53 Section 971.04 was created in its current form by the 
legislature in 1969,1 before widespread telephone conferencing 
and videoconferencing existed.  At that time, the legislature 
obviously did not contemplate long-distance telecommunications 
in the courtroom.  Rather, the legislature envisioned judicial 
proceedings with the plaintiff, defendant, judge, and court 
staff physically present in the same courtroom.  Telephone 
                                                 
1 Laws of 1969, ch. 255. 
Prior to 1969, Wis. Stat. § 957.07 (1967) provided:  "A 
defendant accused of a felony shall be personally present during 
the trial.  A defendant accused of a misdemeanor may at his 
written request and by leave of court be tried in his absence if 
represented by his attorney duly authorized for that purpose." 
No.  2010AP2273-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
conferencing2 and videoconferencing3 came into the courtroom at a 
later date.   
¶54 Thus, the date of the enactment of Wis. Stat. § 971.04 
supports the conclusion that Soto had a statutory right to be 
present in the same courtroom as the judge at the pronouncement 
of judgment.    
¶55 Second, I agree with the majority that the word 
"present" in Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1) should have the same meaning 
in each paragraph describing a proceeding, (a) though (g), of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1).  Majority op., ¶27.  It does not make 
sense for the same word to have different meanings in the same 
statute.  
¶56 Although the majority opinion frequently refers to the 
right of the defendant to be present at the plea hearing, the 
plea hearing is not mentioned in Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1) as a 
proceeding at which the defendant shall be present.4  The 
                                                 
2 Telephone or live audio-visual means, Wis. Stat. § 967.08, 
was authorized by supreme court order in 1987 to be used in 
certain limited contexts.  See S. Ct. Order, In the Matter of 
the Amendment of Rules of Civil, Criminal and Appellate 
Procedure: Proceedings by Telephone and Audio-Visual Means, 141 
Wis. 2d xiii (eff. Oct. 29, 1987). 
3 A rule governing the use of videoconferencing in the 
courts, Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 885.60, was created by supreme court 
order in 2008.  See S. Ct. Order 07-12, 305 Wis. 2d xli (eff. 
July 1, 2008). 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.04 provides as follows: 
Defendant to be present. (1) Except as provided in 
subs. (2) and (3), the defendant shall be present: 
(a) At the arraignment; 
(b) At trial; 
No.  2010AP2273-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
important proceeding for purposes of the statute and the instant 
case is the pronouncement of judgment.    
¶57 Third, I agree with the majority that the defendant 
may waive his statutory right to be present in the same 
courtroom as the judge at the time judgment is pronounced and 
proceed by videoconferencing.5  Majority op., ¶¶42, 44.  The law 
recognizes that a defendant may waive rights.      
¶58 Fourth, I agree with the majority that such a waiver 
must be shown to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  
Majority op, ¶45. 
¶59 I dissent, however, because I disagree with the 
majority's conclusion that the record in the present case 
demonstrates that Soto, the defendant, knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily waived his right to be present in the same 
courtroom as the judge under Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(g) when 
judgment was pronounced.  See majority op., ¶¶48-49. 
¶60 Soto asserts that he was not aware that he had such a 
right.  He argues that if he did not know he had the right he 
                                                                                                                                                             
(c) During voir dire of the trial jury; 
(d) At any evidentiary hearing; 
(e) At any view by the jury; 
(f) When the jury returns its verdict; 
(g) 
At 
the 
pronouncement 
of 
judgment 
and 
the 
imposition of sentence; 
(h) At any other proceeding when ordered by the court. 
5 This appeal does not address whether a defendant may waive 
the right to be present at other proceedings included in Wis. 
Stat. § 971.04(1).  Those are questions for another day.  
No.  2010AP2273-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
could not possibly knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waive the right.  See majority op., ¶11.  Soto has never had a 
hearing to assess his claim, which on its face undercuts the 
argument 
that 
any 
waiver 
was 
knowing, 
intelligent, 
and 
voluntary. 
¶61 It is difficult to understand how the majority can 
conclude that Soto's waiver of the right to be present at the 
pronouncement 
of 
judgment 
was 
knowing, 
intelligent, 
and 
voluntary when the majority acknowledges that Soto claims to be 
unaware that the right existed and that the circuit court did 
not inform Soto that the right existed. 
¶62 Indeed, in Brunton v. Nuvell Credit Corp., 2010 WI 50, 
325 Wis. 2d 135, 785 N.W.2d 302, a case relied upon by the 
majority at ¶40, the court explained that to establish a valid 
waiver of the statutory right the party relying on waiver must 
prove that the waiving party knew of the right being waived.  
Brunton explained:  "Establishing that a party knew of the right 
at 
issue 
[proper 
venue] 
is 
essential 
to 
establishing 
waiver. . . . Stated 
differently, 
a 
valid 
waiver 
that 
intentionally relinquishes a right must be done with actual 
knowledge of the right being waived."  Brunton, 325 Wis. 2d 135, 
¶36 (defendant's waiver of right to proper venue under Wis. 
Stat. § 421.401(2)). 
¶63 Similarly, in State v. Smith, 2012 WI 91, ¶¶52-57, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, a case involving the right to a 
jury trial, the court acknowledged the necessity that a 
defendant be informed that a constitutional right exists before 
No.  2010AP2273-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
he or she may knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive 
that right.  The court stated: "[The defendant] was never 
informed 
that 
he 
had a constitutional right to a jury 
determination of the drug quantity, nor was he ever given the 
opportunity to waive or invoke that right.  Accordingly, we hold 
that Smith did not waive his constitutional right to a jury 
determination of the drug quantity."  Smith, 2012 WI 91, ¶57.  
Even though the defendant in Smith had entered a stipulation to 
the quantity of drug involved, this court held that the 
defendant had not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waived the right to a jury trial on that issue because he was 
not informed that the right existed and he was not asked whether 
he wished to waive the right.  Smith, 2012 WI 91, ¶¶54-57. 
¶64 Nothing in the record in the present case demonstrates 
that the defendant knew he had a right to be present in the same 
courtroom as the circuit court judge.  He was not told such a 
right exists.  The majority's conclusion that there was a 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver is out of step with 
this court's case law and the record in the present case.  
¶65 The majority lays out the relevant portion of the 
transcript at paragraph 47.  The circuit court asked if everyone 
could see and hear.6  The circuit court then asked the 
defendant's attorney if he was "satisfied with appearing at the 
plea hearing by video teleconferencing" and asked the defendant 
if it was "all right with you that we are doing this plea 
hearing by video teleconferencing."  (Emphases added.)  
                                                 
6 The 
videoconferencing 
rule 
lays 
out 
technical 
and 
operational standards.  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 885.54(1)(a).  
No.  2010AP2273-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶66 A plea hearing is not one of the proceedings included 
in Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1) in which the defendant shall be 
present.  The circuit court asked the defendant's attorney and 
the defendant if it was all right with them to conduct "the plea 
hearing" by video teleconferencing.  Noticeably absent is the 
circuit court asking the defendant's attorney and the defendant 
if it was all right with them to conduct "the pronouncement of 
judgment" 
by 
video 
teleconferencing. 
 
According 
to 
§ 971.04(1)(g), it is at the "pronouncement of judgment" that 
the defendant shall be present.  Absent from the colloquy is an 
agreement to have judgment pronounced at a proceeding in which 
the defendant and the circuit court judge were in different 
courtrooms 
with 
the 
proceeding 
conducted 
using 
videoconferencing.     
¶67 Also crucially absent from the colloquy is any 
explicit statement to the defendant that he has the right to be 
present in the same courtroom as the circuit court judge at the 
"pronouncement of judgment" and that "he has the option of 
refusing 
to employ 
videoconferencing," which the majority 
asserts should be a part of the colloquy.  Majority op., ¶46.   
¶68 The defendant argues that he could not possibly have 
waived the right to be physically present at the pronouncement 
of judgment knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, because 
he claims he did not know such a right existed.  See majority 
op., ¶11.  Despite the defendant's claim that he was unaware the 
right existed and despite the colloquy not advising him of the 
right and not being focused on the pronouncement of judgment, 
No.  2010AP2273-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
the majority still concludes on the basis of a minimal colloquy 
and no evidentiary hearing that the waiver of the Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.04(1)(g) right to be present at the "pronouncement of 
judgment" was valid.    
¶69 The majority concludes that the waiver was valid  
because (1) the colloquy demonstrated that the defendant and his 
attorney could see, speak to, and hear the judge and vice versa, 
thereby 
demonstrating 
"that 
the 
videoconferencing 
was 
functioning properly," majority op., ¶48 (see also ¶46); and (2) 
the colloquy demonstrated that the circuit court's questions 
"suggest[ed] to the defendant that he has the option of refusing 
to employ videoconferencing" and that he voluntarily consented 
to its use.  Majority op., ¶46 (see also ¶49).  
¶70 The only part of the record on which the majority 
could rely to determine that the defendant's waiver of his 
presence 
at 
the 
pronouncement 
of 
judgment 
was 
knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary is the circuit court's question, "Is 
it all right with you that we are doing this plea hearing by 
video teleconferencing?" and the defendant's response, "Yes 
sir."  This is no assurance that the defendant's waiver of his 
presence at the pronouncement of judgment was truly knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.   
¶71 Imagine such a "waiver" in other contexts.  The court 
would 
not 
be 
satisfied 
that 
a 
defendant 
had 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to a jury trial 
if the circuit court simply asked, "Is it all right with you if 
I make the decision in your case?" and the defendant answered, 
No.  2010AP2273-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
"Yes, sir."  If a defendant is not given a clear explanation of 
the right at issue and a clear assurance that saying "no" to the 
circuit court is allowed, we should not hold that the defendant 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right. 
¶72 The majority states that "different types of rights 
require different showings to demonstrate that the waiver is 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary."  See majority op., ¶45.  
However, the requirement of showing that a waiver is knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary is the same from one right to 
another.  No matter what right is at issue, a court must advise 
the defendant of the specific right and ask questions to ensure 
the defendant understands the right.  Naturally, the questions 
necessary to ensure the defendant understands the right will 
differ depending on the nature of the right at issue.7  But the 
fact that different questions are relevant to demonstrate a 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver for different rights 
does not mean that the overarching requirement of showing that 
the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary is any 
different from one right to another.   
¶73 I do not suggest that this court ought to impose a 
rigid rule on circuit courts for how they must determine that a 
defendant's 
waiver 
of 
the 
right 
to 
be 
present 
at 
the 
pronouncement 
of 
judgment 
is 
knowing, 
intelligent, 
and 
voluntary.  However, to adhere to cases like Brunton and Smith, 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 2002 WI 7, ¶24, 249 
Wis. 2d 586, 638 N.W.2d 301 (providing specific instructions to 
circuit courts for finding a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
waiver of the right to a jury trial).    
No.  2010AP2273-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
this court should not conclude that a defendant's waiver is 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary unless it is assured from 
the record that the defendant knew of his or her right to be in 
the same courtroom as the judge, that the defendant knew he or 
she could exercise the right, that the defendant consented to 
the judge and defendant being in separate courtrooms, and that 
the defendant's consent was given voluntarily without threat or 
promise.8 
¶74 Furthermore, the majority's conclusion that the meager 
colloquy in the present case sufficiently establishes a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary waiver flies in the face of the 
express statements of this court in adopting rules regarding 
videoconferencing.  The comment in the Supreme Court's Order 
adopting videoconferencing states that the "intent of [Wis. 
Stat.] s. 885.60 [is] to scrupulously protect the rights of 
criminal defendants . . . by preserving to such litigants the 
right to be physically present in court at all critical stages 
of their proceedings."9   
¶75 A 
formal 
colloquy 
is 
not 
always 
an 
absolute 
requirement, depending on the right involved, but it is often an 
                                                 
8 As the majority explains, the circuit court should also 
ascertain that the videoconferencing technology is functioning 
properly, but the controversy in the present case is not about 
the quality of the technology.  A defendant who waives the Wis. 
Stat. § 971.04(1)(g) right to be present at the pronouncement of 
judgment might nonetheless have a colorable claim on other 
grounds if it turns out the quality of the videoconferencing 
technology is inadequate. 
9 See S. Ct. Order 07-12, 305 Wis. 2d xlvii-xlviii (eff. 
July 1, 2008) (emphases added). 
No.  2010AP2273-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
easy and good way of assuring a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver.  The majority relies on State v. Denson, 2011 
WI 70, ¶63, 335 Wis. 2d 681, 799 N.W.2d 831, in which the court 
held that "circuit courts are not required to conduct an on-the-
record colloquy to determine whether a defendant is knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently waiving his or her right not to 
testify."  See majority op., ¶45.  In contrast, such an on-the-
record colloquy is required for waiver of the right to testify.10 
¶76 The Denson court made this decision after considering 
at some length the unique potential troublesome consequences of 
a circuit court's conducting a colloquy on the right not to 
testify.  See Denson, 335 Wis. 2d 681, ¶¶64-66.11  Given the 
unique concerns if a colloquy on the right not to testify were 
required, the court held that it was acceptable for the issue of 
whether the waiver of the right not to testify was knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary to be decided at a postconviction 
evidentiary hearing.  Denson, 335 Wis. 2d 681, ¶68. 
¶77 Denson stands for the proposition that for the 
particular right at issue in that case, a non-existent or 
inadequate colloquy may not warrant automatic reversal.  Denson 
does not stand for the proposition that anything less than a 
                                                 
10 See State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶2, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 
N.W.2d 485. 
11 The court nonetheless recommended that circuit courts 
conduct an on-the-record colloquy because it is the "clearest 
and most efficient means of ensuring that the defendant has 
validly waived his or her right not to testify . . . ."  State 
v. Denson, 2011 WI 70, ¶67, 335 Wis. 2d 681, 799 N.W.2d 831 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
No.  2010AP2273-CR.ssa 
 
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knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver will suffice for a 
right subject to waiver.12  The record in the present case, 
unlike in Denson, does not sufficiently demonstrate that the 
defendant's 
waiver 
of 
the 
right 
to 
be 
present 
at 
the 
pronouncement 
of 
judgment 
was 
knowing, 
intelligent, 
and 
voluntary.  
¶78 In Denson there was a postconviction evidentiary 
hearing 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
waiver 
was 
knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.  In the present case, unlike in 
Denson, 
there 
was 
neither 
an 
adequate 
colloquy 
nor 
a 
postconviction evidentiary hearing to establish that Soto's 
waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Nothing in 
Denson changes the rule that the record must demonstrate to an 
appellate court that the defendant's waiver of the right to be 
present was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 
¶79 The majority also relies on Rao v. WMA Securities, 
Inc., 2008 WI 73, 310 Wis. 2d 623, 752 N.W.2d 220, for its 
proposition that a less demanding showing is required for the 
waiver of certain rights.  See majority op., ¶45.   
¶80 In Rao, the right in question was the "Article I, 
Section 5 right of trial by jury" in the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Rao, 310 Wis. 2d 623, ¶22.  Article I, Section 5 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution provides that the right of trial by jury 
may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner 
prescribed by law.  Section 5 reads in full as follows: 
                                                 
12 In Denson, it was established at a postconviction 
evidentiary hearing that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary.  Denson, 335 Wis. 2d 681, ¶71. 
No.  2010AP2273-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and 
shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the 
amount in controversy; but a jury trial may be waived 
by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed 
by law.  Provided, however, that the legislature may, 
from time to time, by statute provide that a valid 
verdict, in civil cases, may be based on the votes of 
a specified number of the jury, not less than five-
sixths thereof. (Emphasis added.) 
¶81 The 
question 
presented 
in 
Rao 
was 
whether 
the 
defendant waived the right of trial by jury "in the manner 
prescribed by law."  The court in previous cases had declared 
that a defendant "has no vested right under art. I, sec. 5 [of 
the Wisconsin Constitution], to the manner or time in which [the 
right of trial by jury] may be exercised or waived, since these 
are merely procedural matters to be determined by law."13  
¶82 The manner in which the Article I, Section 5 right of 
trial by jury may be waived is governed principally by Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 805.01(3).  Section (Rule) 805.01(3) sets forth 
two ways in which the right of trial by jury may be waived.  
First, a party's failure to demand a jury trial timely in 
accordance with § (Rule) 805.01(2) constitutes a waiver of the 
jury trial right.  Second, the parties or their attorneys of 
record may waive the right by written stipulation filed with the 
court or by oral stipulation made in open court and entered in 
the record.  A party may also waive the jury trial right by 
failing to pay the jury fee timely.  Wis. Stat. § 814.61(4).  
¶83 As both Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 805.01(3) and Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.61 make clear, a party's "waiver" of the Article I, 
                                                 
13 Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2005 WI 85, 
¶32, 282 Wis. 2d 69, 698 N.W.2d 643 (quotation marks omitted). 
No.  2010AP2273-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
Section 5 right of trial by jury need not be a "waiver" in the 
strict 
sense 
of 
that 
word, 
that 
is, 
an 
"intentional 
relinquishment of a known right."  Instead, a party may "waive" 
the Article I, Section 5 right of trial by jury by failing to 
assert the right timely (as when a party fails to demand a jury 
trial timely in accordance with § (Rule) 805.01(2)) or by 
violating a law setting conditions on the party's exercise of 
the jury trial right (as when a party fails to pay the jury fee 
timely in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 814.61).  The Rao court 
explained 
that 
this 
form 
of 
"waiver" 
is 
more 
akin 
to 
"forfeiture" than to "waiver" in the strictest sense of waiver 
being an intentional relinquishment of a known right.  
¶84 Thus, Rao does not stand for the proposition that some 
rights subject to a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver 
may be waived with a less demanding showing than others.  It 
stands simply for the proposition that in accordance with the 
very text of the Wisconsin Constitution, the right to a jury 
trial may be relinquished in the manner prescribed by law.    
¶85 The right in Rao was subject to forfeiture, by virtue 
of the Wisconsin Constitution and the relevant statutes and 
supreme court rule.  Conversely, the statutory right in the 
present case, as the majority holds, is subject to a waiver, 
which must be shown to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  
No such showing has been made in the present case.   
¶86 We have previously held that "[e]stablishing that a 
party knew of the right at issue is essential to establishing 
waiver. . . . Stated 
differently, 
a 
valid 
waiver 
that 
No.  2010AP2273-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
intentionally relinquishes a right must be done with actual 
knowledge of the right being waived."  Brunton, 325 Wis. 2d 135, 
¶36.  In the present case, there is nothing in the record to 
demonstrate that the defendant knew the right existed and, in 
fact, the defendant argues that he did not know the right 
existed.   
¶87 Following the court's reasoning in Denson, I would 
hold that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine 
whether the defendant's waiver of the right to be present at the 
pronouncement 
of 
judgment 
was 
knowing, 
intelligent, 
and 
voluntary.  
¶88 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶89 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
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