Title: State v. Miller
Citation: 257 Kan. 844
Docket Number: 71,687
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: June 2, 1995

257 Kan. 844 (1995)
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellant,
v.
GEORGE D. MILLER, Appellee.
No. 71,687

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 2, 1995.
Edwin R. Smith, county attorney, argued the cause, and Carla J. Stovall, attorney general, was with him on the briefs for the appellant.
Jean K. Gilles Phillips, assistant appellate defender, argued the cause, and Joycelyn Lucas, student intern, and Jessica R. Kunen, chief appellate defender, were with her on the brief for the appellee.
*845 The opinion of the court was delivered by
ABBOTT, J.:
This is a direct appeal by the State pursuant to K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 22-3602(b)(1) from the dismissal of a complaint charging the defendant, George D. Miller, with burglary, contrary to K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-3715, and theft, contrary to K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-3701.
The dispositive issues are the lack of a record and the effect of a law enforcement officer making an arrest outside the officer's jurisdiction.
The defendant was charged with one count of theft and one count of burglary arising from an incident at the John Knight residence in Osage City, Osage County, Kansas.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that his arrest, which was made in the city of Lyndon, in Osage County, was unlawful because it was made by Osage City police officers outside their jurisdiction. The State filed a brief in opposition, arguing that the arrest was a valid citizen's arrest and that summary dismissal because of a technical defect was improper. After the presentation of evidence the magistrate judge granted the defendant's motion, and the complaint was dismissed. The magistrate judge relied on State v. Hennessee, 232 Kan. 807, 658 P.2d 1034 (1983). Both counsel believed at the time that a record was being made when evidence was presented to the magistrate judge.
The State appealed to the district court. Both parties then were informed no record had been made of the earlier proceedings. Both parties filed briefs giving somewhat different versions of what occurred and what the testimony was. The district judge, by letter, informed the parties that unless he heard from them he would decide the case on the motions and briefs submitted.
The parties then filed a stipulated statement of facts which the district judge considered in addition to the defendant's written motion to dismiss and briefs filed by the State.
The stipulated facts, in pertinent part, are as follows:
....
The parties agreed that the defendant relied on State v. Hennessee, 232 Kan. 807, as controlling authority, and the State contended the remedy for a jurisdictional violation is suppression of evidence, not dismissal of the case, as was affirmed in Hennessee. The State also contended that the Osage City police officers made a valid citizen's arrest pursuant to K.S.A. 22-2403.
The district judge denied the State's appeal in a one-paragraph order, which states:
The stipulation of facts filed by the parties does not significantly differ from the facts set forth in the defendant's motion to dismiss.
The memorandum of law sets forth K.S.A. 22-2401a, which provides in pertinent part:
The district judge then adopted the defendant's argument as follows:
The first problem here is the lack of a record. The parties were under the impression when the case was briefed and argued in this court that there was no record of the evidence presented to the magistrate judge. After oral argument in this court, the parties learned that a record had been made of the proceedings before *848 the magistrate judge and was available to be transcribed. The State requested permission to have the transcript prepared and filed with this court.
This court has consistently held that new evidence cannot be presented for the first time on appeal. See Volt Delta Resources, Inc. v. Devine, 241 Kan. 775, 782, 740 P.2d 1089 (1987). The record of proceedings before the magistrate judge was never presented to the district judge and therefore will not be considered by this court.
The stipulated facts form a sufficient basis for the district court and this court to render a decision. This is so even though the State in at least one area has not offered sufficient evidence in the record on appeal to support its position.
I. CITIZEN'S ARREST
The State concedes that the Osage City police officers were not acting within their jurisdiction pursuant to K.S.A. 22-2401a(2) when they arrested the defendant in Lyndon. They were outside the city limits of Osage City, and there was no request for assistance from Lyndon or Osage County law enforcement, nor were they in fresh pursuit.
The State acknowledges this court's decision in Hennessee but distinguishes it and instead relies on this court's earlier decision in State v. Shienle, 218 Kan. 637, 545 P.2d 1129 (1976). Shienle involved a car stolen in Prairie Village, Kansas. The suspect was the victim's ex-husband. The victim informed police of a Missouri bar the suspect frequented. A Prairie Village officer located the car across the state line in Kansas City, Missouri. The officer requested the assistance of Missouri police, who confirmed that the car was reported as stolen. The Missouri officer advised the Kansas officer that he would patrol the area and that the Kansas officer should call him by radio if he needed assistance. The Missouri officer also advised the Kansas officer that if the suspect showed up and attempted to flee, the suspect should be detained until help arrived. When the suspect showed up, touched the door handle of the car, and then proceeded down an alley, the Kansas officer ordered the suspect to stop. He identified himself as a police officer and arrested *849 the suspect, at one point drawing his service revolver. The Missouri officer arrived and advised the suspect of his rights. The suspect admitted he was in possession of the car, but the trial court suppressed the confession, holding that the statement was the fruit of an illegal arrest in Missouri. 218 Kan. at 638-39.
This court concluded that the arrest was legal. 218 Kan. at 639. This court recognized that generally a police officer acting within his official capacity cannot make an arrest outside the jurisdiction from which his authority is derived but then stated:
Looking at Missouri law, this court cited State v. Fritz, 490 S.W.2d 30 (Mo.), cert. denied 411 U.S. 985 (1973), which held that a warrantless arrest for a felony in Missouri by a federal treasury agent acting outside his official jurisdiction is legal when made upon probable cause. This court also recognized that warrantless arrests by police officers in foreign jurisdictions have been justified as arrests by private citizens in other states, citing cases from California and Delaware. 218 Kan. at 641.
This court determined that the Kansas officer had probable cause to believe the defendant had committed a felony in Missouri (bringing stolen property into the state) as well as in Kansas by stealing the car from his former wife and driving it into Missouri. This court also pointed out that the actions of the Kansas officer were reasonable and justifiable. He enlisted the help of the Missouri police and then arrested the defendant before defendant could make his escape. 218 Kan. at 642. The Missouri police officers were immediately notified of the arrest. This court adopted the following test:
The State contends that the case at bar is more similar to Shienle than to Hennessee. Its argument is that the defendant's warrantless arrest by an Osage City police officer outside his jurisdiction was lawful as a citizen's arrest. K.S.A. 22-2403 provides for arrests by private persons:
We note that Hennessee did not discuss whether the defendant's arrest in Stafford County by the Pratt County sheriff may have been lawful as a citizen's arrest. The argument was simply not made to this court.
The defendant argues that the plain language of K.S.A. 22-2403 shows it does not apply to his arrest by an Osage City police officer. The defendant highlights the opening language of the statute: "A person who is not a law enforcement officer...." The defendant reasons that a person who is a law enforcement officer remains a law enforcement officer even when outside the officer's normal jurisdiction. He contends that because the person who arrested him as a law enforcement officer, 22-2403 clearly does not apply.
The defendant's argument is incorrect. Although K.S.A. 22-2403 does not specifically define the term "law enforcement officer," the definition of that term for purposes of the Kansas code for criminal procedure, including K.S.A. 22-2403, is found in K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 22-2202(13):
*851 Because Officer Mitalski was not acting within the scope of his authority pursuant to K.S.A. 22-2401a at the time of the defendant's arrest, Officer Mitalski was not a law enforcement officer as that term is used in K.S.A. 22-2403. A law enforcement officer cannot be deemed to have given up the rights he or she would enjoy as a citizen merely by virtue of being employed as a law enforcement officer. Officer Mitalski was eligible to make a citizen's arrest pursuant to K.S.A. 22-2403 when acting outside the scope of his powers under K.S.A. 22-2401a.
As recognized by this court in Shienle, 218 Kan. at 640-41, the general rule is that a law enforcement officer who makes a warrantless arrest outside the territorial limits of the officer's jurisdiction must be treated as a private person. That court cited the following: People v. Alvarado, 208 Cal. App. 2d 629, 25 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1962), cert. denied 374 U.S. 840 (1963); People v. McCarty, 164 Cal. App. 2d 322, 330 P.2d 484 (1958); State v. Hodgson, 57 Del. 383, 200 A.2d 567 (1964); McCaslin v. McCord, 116 Tenn. 690, 94 S.W. 79 (1906); and 5 Am.Jur.2d, Arrest § 50, p. 742. Other cases holding that arrests by law enforcement officers outside their assigned jurisdictions were lawful as citizen's arrests include the following: State v. Goldberg, 112 Ariz. 202, 540 P.2d 674 (1975); Phoenix v. State, 455 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1984); State, Dept. of Public Safety v. Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1981); State v. MacDonald, 260 N.W.2d 626 (S.D. 1977).
This court in Shienle recognized that an arrest by a Kansas law enforcement officer outside the officer's jurisdiction was lawful as a citizen's arrest. The defendant distinguishes Shienle as relying on Missouri, rather than Kansas, law to justify the arrest as a citizen's arrest. That is a distinction without a difference. Like Missouri, Kansas recognizes the validity of citizen's arrests. K.S.A. 22-2403. A citizen's arrest may be effected when a felony has been committed and the person making the arrest has probable cause to believe the person arrested is guilty of that felony or when any crime except a traffic infraction has been or is being committed by the arrested person in the view of the person making the arrest.
Here, we need look no further than the probable cause issue. According to the stipulation, the officers had actual knowledge a *852 burglary and theft had occurred in Osage City. A juvenile being investigated for an unrelated burglary told a third officer, who relayed the information to the arresting officers, "that the defendant herein may have been involved" in the Osage City burglary and theft. (Emphasis added.) That someone not involved in a burglary and theft tells a third person that someone else may have been involved in a specific burglary and theft would not lead a reasonably cautious law enforcement officer to believe reasonable grounds existed to arrest the person so named.
We were led to believe from the briefs and oral argument that evidence was introduced before the magistrate judge that would provide probable cause, but the stipulation does not contain any evidence showing probable cause. Since there is no probable cause in the record on appeal to support a citizen's arrest, we cannot uphold the defendant's arrest as a citizen's arrest on the record before us.
We need not address the defendant's "under color of office" argument, which should be considered by the district judge on remand. See, for example, Phoenix v. State, 455 So. 2d  at 1025.
The defendant also argues that Officer Mitalski did not act under exigent circumstances in arresting him, a requirement imposed by Shienle. The Kansas citizen's arrest statute, K.S.A. 22-2403, contains no requirement that a citizen's arrest be made under exigent circumstances, nor is such a requirement in the cases from other jurisdictions. However, in the interest of safeguarding against improper use of police power, such a requirement may be appropriate when a law enforcement officer makes a citizen's arrest. There is no information in the record concerning whether the defendant's arrest here was made under exigent circumstances. The facts do show that the arrest was made in the early hours of the morning and that the officers felt there was enough information to obtain an arrest warrant after information was obtained from juveniles interrogated about an unrelated case. The defendant reasons that the arrest was not made in good faith because, rather than obtaining an arrest warrant, the Osage City officers left their jurisdiction under the "guise" of an investigation in order to defeat the territorial limits of K.S.A. 22-2401a. The fact that the officers elected *853 to proceed without an arrest warrant does not show bad faith. There may have been exigent circumstances because rather than take the time to obtain an arrest warrant, the defendant's immediate arrest was necessary in order to prevent the defendant from disposing of any stolen property he might have had in his possession should he find out that he had been "ratted on."
The district court erred in finding that the defendant's arrest was unlawful under Hennessee. On remand, the court should consider whether the arrest was valid as a citizen's arrest in accordance with this opinion.
II. DISMISSAL OF CHARGES
The State also argues that even if the defendant's arrest was unlawful, dismissal of the charges was an inappropriate remedy. In Hennessee, this court affirmed the district court's dismissal of charges where the defendant's arrest was unlawful pursuant to K.S.A. 22-2401a. However, in Hennessee, neither the parties nor this court discussed whether another remedy, such as suppression of evidence, would have been a more appropriate remedy. Hennessee provides no authority for dismissal of charges as the only remedy for an unlawful arrest.
This issue was squarely addressed by this court in State v. Weis, 246 Kan. 694, 792 P.2d 989 (1990). Weis was detained and questioned without probable cause and arrested after she made incriminating statements. The trial court dismissed the complaint. This court stated:
*854 This court agreed with the district court's determination that Weis' statements were tainted by the illegal arrest and therefore inadmissible. This court then stated:
The defendant distinguishes Weis because there, the defendant's arrest was unlawful because the police did not have probable cause, whereas here, the defendant's arrest was unlawful because the police violated the scope of their authority pursuant to K.S.A. 22-2401a. The defendant's argument seems to be that an arrest outside the officer's jurisdiction is more egregious than an arrest without probable cause; therefore, in the former instance dismissal is necessary, whereas in the latter a lesser remedy may be appropriate. An arrest with probable cause outside the officer's jurisdiction seems, if anything, less egregious than an arrest made in the officer's jurisdiction but without probable cause. In either scenario, Weis makes it clear that dismissal of a criminal complaint lies in the trial court's discretion and is appropriate "only under extremely compelling circumstances."
"[I]t is generally accepted that the illegal arrest does not affect the power of the state to proceed with the prosecution. That is, an illegal arrest does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction over the defendant or otherwise preclude his trial." 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.9 (2d ed. 1987). See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, *855 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975); Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 32 L. Ed. 283, 8 S. Ct. 1204 (1888); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 30 L. Ed. 421, 7 S. Ct. 225 (1886); United States ex rel Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 421 U.S. 1001 (1975). See also United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. ___, 119 L. Ed. 2d 441, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (court found to have jurisdiction despite defendant's forcible abduction from Mexico).
The rule is that if the accused is in the jurisdiction of the court, the court has jurisdiction to try the accused regardless of how the accused was brought into the jurisdiction. There are exceptions, such as when an accused has been tortured by law enforcement personnel, etc., none of which occurred in Hennessee or in the case at bar. An unlawful arrest may affect the admissibility of evidence.
The compelling circumstances necessary to justify dismissal are not present here. Even if the defendant was unlawfully arrested, there is no indication that the State lacked sufficient evidence to try the defendant for the crimes with which he was charged. The magistrate judge abused his discretion in dismissing the charges against the defendant, and the district judge erred in denying the State's appeal.
Suppression of any statement the defendant made at the time of the defendant's arrest may be appropriate, as well as applying the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Neither the magistrate judge nor the district judge addressed suppression and there has been no indication whether any evidence may have been the product of an unlawful arrest. It is left to the district judge to determine whether any evidence should be suppressed.
To the extent State v. Hennessee, 232 Kan. 807, 658 P.2d 1034 (1983), is inconsistent with any part of this opinion, it is overruled.
Reversed and remanded.
HOLMES, C.J., and ALLEGRUCCI, J., concur in the result.