Title: Linda M. Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc.
Citation: 2001 WI 109
Docket Number: 1998AP002162
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2001

2001 WI 109 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-2162 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Linda M. Green,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., a/k/a Smith &  
Nephew Perry,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 192 
Reported at:  238 Wis. 2d 477, 617 N.W.2d 881 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 12, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
February 27, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Charles F. Kahn, Jr. 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., joins Part I of concurrence. 
 
 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
WILCOX, J., joins concurrence. 
 
Dissented: 
SYKES, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
PROSSER, J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Joseph D. Kearney, Milwaukee; Donald R. Peterson, 
Sherry A. Knutson and Peterson Johnson & Murray, S.C., Milwaukee; 
Thomas W. Merrill, Constantine L. Trela, Jr., Hille R. Sheppard,  
 
 
2 
Robert N. Hochman and Sidley & Austin, Chicago, Illinois, and 
oral argument by Joseph D. Kearney. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by 
Robert L. Habush, Mary S. Young, Virginia M. Antoine and Habush, 
Habush, Davis & Rottier, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
Robert L. Habush. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by O. Thomas 
Armstrong and Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee, Mary A. Wells, L. 
Michael Brooks, Jr., and Wells, Anderson & Race LLC, Denver, CO, 
and Hugh F. Young, Jr., Reston, VA, on behalf of the Product 
Liability Advisory Council, Inc. 
 
2001 WI 109 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-2162 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Linda M. Green,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., a/k/a Smith &  
Nephew Perry,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.  
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case arises from a products 
liability claim brought by Linda M. Green (Green) against Smith 
& Nephew AHP, Inc. (S&N).  Green alleged that S&N manufactured 
defective and unreasonably dangerous latex medical gloves, which 
caused her to suffer injuries arising from allergic reactions to 
the proteins in those gloves.  Accordingly, Green claimed, S&N 
should be held strictly liable for these injuries.       
¶2 
At the close of the trial on Green's claim, the jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Green and against S&N.  The 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Judge Charles F. Kahn, Jr., 
entered judgment on the verdict.  S&N subsequently appealed, but 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
2 
the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court judgment in its 
entirety.  Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2000 WI App 192, 
238 Wis. 2d 477, 617 N.W.2d 881.   
¶3 
S&N now argues to this court that the jury verdict 
and, consequently, the circuit court judgment and court of 
appeals decision affirming that verdict were the result of four 
distinct legal errors.  S&N thus presents four issues for 
review:  (1) Did the circuit court err in instructing the jury 
that a product can be deemed defective and unreasonably 
dangerous based solely on consumer expectations about that 
product?  (2) Did the circuit court err in instructing the jury 
that a product can be deemed defective and unreasonably 
dangerous regardless of whether the manufacturer of that product 
knew or could have known of the risk of harm the product 
presented to consumers?  (3) Could the jury properly find that 
S&N's gloves were defective and unreasonably dangerous where the 
evidence introduced at trial showed that the gloves contained a 
substance that causes an allergic reaction in 5 to 17 percent of 
their consumers?  (4) Did the circuit court err in admitting 
certain opinion evidence regarding the safety of S&N's gloves?  
¶4 
Upon review of the issues presented by S&N, we 
conclude as follows.  First, the circuit court did not err in 
instructing the jury that a product can be deemed defective and 
unreasonably dangerous based solely on consumer expectations 
about that product.  Second, the circuit court did not err in 
instructing the jury that a product can be deemed defective and 
unreasonably dangerous regardless of whether the manufacturer of 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
3 
that product knew or could have known of the risk of harm the 
product presented to consumers.  Third, the jury could properly 
find that because the evidence introduced at trial showed that 
S&N's gloves contained a substance which causes an allergic 
reaction in 5 to 17 percent of their consumers, those gloves 
were defective and unreasonably dangerous.  And fourth, although 
the circuit court erred in admitting the opinion evidence at 
issue, this error was harmless and, therefore, does not warrant 
a new trial.   
¶5 
In light of these conclusions, we hold that the jury 
verdict in this case was not the result of reversible error.  
Thus, we hold that the court of appeals correctly affirmed the 
circuit court's entry of judgment on the verdict.  
I 
 
¶6 
On review, this court regards the evidence adduced at 
trial in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.  
Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, 115 Wis. 2d 289, 314, 340 
N.W.2d 704 (1983).  "This is especially true where, as here, the 
verdict has the approval of the [circuit] court."  Id.  In the 
case at hand, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Green.  
Hence, we review the evidence adduced at trial in the present 
case in the light most favorable to Green. 
A 
 
¶7 
Green is a health care worker.  She began employment 
at St. Joseph's Hospital in Milwaukee in 1978 where, prior to 
the commencement of this action, she worked as a radiology 
technologist and, beginning in 1986, as a CT scan technologist. 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
4 
 During the course of this employment, hospital rules required 
Green to wear protective gloves while attending patients.  To 
comply with these rules, Green wore powdered1 latex gloves 
manufactured by S&N.  Initially, Green used one or two pairs of 
gloves per shift.  However, upon her promotion to the CT 
department, this use began increasing and, by about 1987 or 
1988, Green's job required her to don up to approximately forty 
pairs of gloves per shift.  
 
¶8 
Prior to 1989, Green never had experienced allergies; 
however, in 1989 Green began suffering various health problems. 
 Early that year, Green's hands became red, cracked, and sore, 
and began peeling.  In response to this condition, she applied 
hand lotion, changed the soap she used, changed the type of hand 
towels 
she 
used, 
and 
tried 
various 
other 
remedies.  
Nevertheless, the rash continued. 
 
¶9 
By September 1989, Green's condition deteriorated.  
Her rash spread to her upper trunk and neck, and she began 
experiencing chronic cold-like symptoms such as a runny nose and 
watery eyes.  Green's symptoms grew increasingly severe, 
eventually 
culminating 
in 
an 
acute 
shortness 
of 
breath, 
coughing, and tightening of the throat.  As a result, Green 
spent significant time in the hospital:  approximately one day 
in September 1989; approximately five days beginning in late 
                     
1 S&N "powdered" some brands of its gloves with cornstarch 
in order to facilitate donning and removal of the gloves.   
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
5 
March 1990; approximately five days in February 1991; and 
approximately three days beginning in late April 1991. 
¶10 After undergoing various treatments and tests, Green 
was diagnosed in May 1991 with latex allergy.  This allergy has 
compelled Green to avoid contact with latex, thus causing her to 
change jobs and limit the items she purchases, things she eats, 
and activities in which she participates.  Moreover, Green's 
latex allergy caused her to develop asthma, thereby further 
limiting her lifestyle. 
B 
¶11 In 1994 Green commenced the present products liability 
action against S&N.  Green alleged that the S&N gloves which she 
had used at St. Joseph's Hospital were defective in two 
respects:  (1) the gloves contained excessive levels of allergy-
causing latex proteins; and (2) the cornstarch with which S&N 
powdered its gloves increased the likelihood that persons would 
inhale the latex proteins.  Green conceded that the proteins in 
S&N's gloves naturally occur in the rubber-tree latex from which 
they are produced.  Green also conceded that S&N did not add any 
proteins to its gloves.  However, Green argued that although S&N 
could have significantly reduced the protein levels in and 
discontinued powdering its gloves by adjusting its production 
process, S&N nonetheless utilized a production process that 
maintained these defects in the gloves.  These defects, Green 
alleged, created the unreasonable danger that S&N's gloves would 
cause consumers to develop latex allergy and suffer allergy-
related conditions.  Moreover, Green alleged that as a result of 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
6 
these unreasonably dangerous defects, S&N's gloves caused her to 
develop latex 
allergy 
and 
allergy-related 
conditions 
and, 
therefore, suffer injuries.  Consequently, Green claimed, S&N 
should be held strictly liable for these injuries. 
¶12 At the subsequent trial on Green's claim, the parties 
presented in pertinent part the following evidence to the jury. 
 Latex allergy is caused by exposure to latex proteins.  Upon 
exposure to latex proteins, some persons' immune systems produce 
antibodies to expel those proteins.  The likelihood that such a 
person's immune system will produce antibodies in response to 
latex proteins increases in relation to the person's exposure to 
the proteins.  Once a person's immune system produces these 
antibodies, he or she is "sensitized" to latex.  Subsequent 
exposure to latex then may cause that person to develop 
progressively worse allergic reactions including irreversible 
asthma and even anaphylaxis, a hypersensitivity which, upon 
exposure to even a small amount of latex proteins, may trigger a 
life-threatening 
allergic 
reaction——anaphylactic 
shock.2  
However, at the time Green began experiencing her injuries, the 
health care community generally was unaware that persons could 
develop latex allergy. 
¶13 The primary cause of latex allergy is latex gloves 
and, for this reason, latex allergy disproportionately affects 
members of the health care profession.  According to Green's 
                     
2 Green suffered anaphylactic shock during the May 1991 
allergy test at which she was diagnosed with latex allergy.   
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
7 
medical experts, the vast majority of people with latex allergy—
—up to 90 percent——are health care workers.  And while latex 
allergy is not common among the general population, Green's 
medical experts testified that it affects between 5 and 17 
percent of all health care workers in the United States.3  
¶14 Green further presented evidence that high-protein, 
powdered latex gloves are more dangerous than low-protein, 
powderless gloves.  For example, one of Green's medical experts 
cited a study in which researchers tested how latex-sensitive 
persons reacted to various protein levels in latex gloves.  In 
this study, the researchers found that while 75 percent of the 
tested individuals reacted to high-protein gloves, only 7 
percent reacted to low-protein gloves.  Similarly, another of 
Green's medical experts read to the jury a statement developed 
by a joint subcommittee of the American Academy of Allergy, 
Asthma and Immunology and the American College of Allergy, 
Asthma and Immunology (ACAAI Statement), which provides in part: 
 
[L]atex allergy is the result of the exposure of 
susceptible individuals to latex rubber proteins.  
Medical devices, principally latex gloves, are the 
largest single source of exposure to these potent 
allergens.  Exposure to [latex proteins] may be by 
direct 
contact 
with 
an 
offending 
device 
or 
by 
inhalation of allergen carried by cornstarch powder 
with which most powdered gloves are coated. . . .  
 
 
Allergic 
sensitization 
to 
constituent 
latex 
rubber proteins is linked to exposure to latex 
allergens in the vast majority of cases.  Direct 
                     
3 Although Green's experts did not agree on a single figure, 
their figures all fell within the 5 to 17 percent range.  
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
8 
exposure 
to latex allergens 
results from 
either 
contact exposures to medical devices and latex gloves 
or from respiratory exposure to latex aeroallergen 
[i.e., aerosolized latex proteins] carried by donning 
glove powders.  
 
. . .  
 
[The] risks of acute allergic reactions and of 
occupational asthma can be reduced only by curtailing 
exposure to latex rubber proteins.  We recommend that 
the following steps, which utilize currently available 
devices, be taken to reduce these risks:  
 
. . .   
 
 
Only low-allergen latex gloves should 
be purchased and used.  This will reduce the 
occurrence of reactions among sensitized 
personnel and should reduce the rate of 
sensitization.  
 
 
Only powder-free latex gloves should be 
purchased and used.  This will reduce latex 
rubber aeroallergen  levels and exposure. 
 
American College of Allergy, Asthma and Immunology, ACAAI 
Statement Concerning the Use of Powdered and Non-powdered 
Natural 
Rubber 
Latex 
Gloves 
(1997) 
(citations 
omitted), 
available at http://allergy.mcg.edu/physicians/joint.html; see 
also Green, 2000 WI App 192, ¶25 (quoting ACAAI Statement in 
part).  Based on such evidence, both of these experts opined 
that high-protein gloves are much more likely than low-protein 
gloves to cause latex sensitization and allergic reactions.4  In 
addition, citing similar supporting evidence, these medical 
experts stated that powdered latex gloves, unlike powderless 
                     
4 Even two of S&N's experts agreed that low-protein gloves 
generally are safer than high-protein gloves. 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
9 
gloves, pose a substantial risk insofar as they allow latex 
proteins to become aerosolized and, thus, easily inhaled.5  For 
these reasons, one of the experts specifically concluded that 
high-protein, 
powdered 
latex 
gloves 
are 
defective 
and 
unreasonably dangerous.  
¶15 Green's experts also testified that the S&N gloves 
which Green had used at St. Joseph's Hospital were high-protein, 
powdered latex gloves.  One of Green's experts discussed a study 
conducted at Mayo Clinic in which researchers tested 30 brands 
of latex gloves.  Of the 30 brands, only 3 had protein levels 
greater than the S&N gloves at issue.  That witness similarly 
discussed another Mayo Clinic study in which researchers tested 
13 brands of latex gloves.  Of those brands, S&N's gloves 
contained more than 100 times the level of latex proteins than 
10 of the 12 other brands.  Further, several witnesses noted——
and S&N did not dispute——that the S&N gloves which Green had 
used were powdered with cornstarch.     
¶16 Green also presented evidence that the powder and high 
protein levels in S&N's gloves caused her latex allergy and 
allergy-related conditions.  In the opinion of one testifying 
doctor, Green's exposure to S&N's gloves caused her to become 
sensitized to latex in 1989 and subsequently caused her to 
                     
5 As explained at trial, latex proteins tend to adhere to 
the cornstarch powders in powdered latex gloves.  Hence, when a 
person dons or removes his or her gloves and the powder 
consequently is released into the air, the latex proteins 
adhering to that powder become aerosolized.  These aerosolized 
proteins may be inhaled.  
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
10
develop asthma and other allergy-related conditions.  As the 
doctor further opined, the likelihood of Green having developed 
a latex allergy had she been exposed only to low-protein, 
powderless gloves would have been "very remote."  
¶17 Finally, Green presented evidence that S&N could have 
eliminated the alleged unreasonably dangerous defects in its 
latex gloves by altering its glove production process.  S&N did 
not dispute that different production processes in use during 
the 1980s could have been used to manufacture lower-protein, 
powderless latex gloves. 
¶18 At the close of the case, the circuit court instructed 
the jury on the law surrounding Green's claim for strict 
liability.  The court explained:   
 
A manufacturer of a product who sells or places on the 
market a defective product which is unreasonably 
dangerous to the ordinary user or consumer and which 
is expected and does reach the consumer without 
substantial change in the condition in which it is 
sold is regarded by law as responsible for harm caused 
by the product even though he or she has exercised all 
possible care in the preparation and sale of the 
product provided the product was being used for the 
purposes for which it was designed and intended to be 
used.  A product is said to be defective when it is in 
a condition not contemplated by the ordinary user or 
consumer 
which is unreasonably dangerous 
to the 
ordinary user or consumer, and the defect arose out of 
design, manufacture or inspection while the article 
was in the control of the manufacturer.  A defective 
product is unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary user 
or consumer when it is dangerous to an extent beyond 
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary user 
or consumer possessing the knowledge of the product's 
characteristics which were common to the community.  A 
product is not defective if it is safe for normal use. 
 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
11
 
A manufacturer is not under a duty to manufacture 
a product which is absolutely free from all possible 
harm to every individual.  It is the duty of the 
manufacturer not to place upon the market a defective 
product 
which 
is 
unreasonably 
dangerous 
to 
the 
ordinary user or consumer. 
The court then put this law into the context of Green's case: 
 
Question No. 1 on the verdict form is "Were the 
latex gloves manufactured or sold by defendants [S&N] 
to which Linda Green was exposed, defective and 
unreasonably dangerous to a prospective user"? . . .  
 
Now, ladies and gentlemen, before you can answer 
the first question yes . . ., you must be satisfied by 
the greater weight of the credible evidence to a 
reasonable certainty that 1. the product was in a 
defective condition; 2. the defective condition made 
the product unreasonably dangerous to people; 3. the 
defective condition of the product existed when the 
product was under the control of the manufacturer; and 
4. the product reached the user or consumer without 
substantial change in the condition in which it was 
sold. 
 
There is no claim in this case that [S&N's] latex 
gloves failed to perform their intended purpose of 
protecting against the transmission of bloodborne 
pathogens.  You may find the latex gloves were 
dangerous beyond the reasonable contemplation by an 
ordinary user or consumer, even if they served their 
intended purpose. 
 
Lack of knowledge on the part of [S&N] that 
proteins in natural rubber latex may sensitize and 
cause allergic reactions to some individuals is not a 
defense to the claims made by the plaintiff [Green] in 
this action.  A manufacturer is responsible for harm 
caused by a defective and unreasonably dangerous 
product even if the manufacturer had no knowledge or 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
12
could [not] have known of the risk of harm presented 
by the condition of the product.6 
                     
6 As we discuss in Part II of this opinion, these jury 
instructions differ in some respects from the pattern strict 
products liability jury instruction, Wis JI——Civil 3260.  The 
pattern instruction provides: 
 
A manufacturer of a product who sells (places on 
the market) a defective product which is unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer, or to his or her 
property, and which is expected to and does reach the 
user or consumer without substantial change in the 
condition in which it is sold, is regarded by law as 
negligent even though he or she has exercised all 
possible care in the preparation and sale of the 
product, provided the product was being used for the 
purpose for which it was designed and intended to be 
used. 
 
 
A product is said to be defective when it does 
not reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which 
such product was sold and intended to be used, and the 
defect arose out of design, manufacture, or inspection 
while 
the 
article 
was 
in 
the 
control 
of 
the 
manufacturer.  A defective product is unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer when it is dangerous 
to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by the 
ordinary user (consumer) possessing the knowledge of 
the product's characteristics which were common to the 
community.   
 
 
A manufacturer is not under a duty to manufacture 
a product which is absolutely free from all possible 
harm to every individual. . . .  
 
 
It is the duty of the manufacturer not to place 
upon 
the 
market 
a 
defective 
product 
which 
is 
unreasonably dangerous to the user (consumer). 
 
 
Before you can answer the first question [on the 
special verdict form] yes, that (name of product) was 
defective so as to be unreasonably dangerous, you must 
be satisfied by the greater weight of the credible 
evidence to a reasonable certainty that:  (1) the 
product 
was 
in 
a 
defective 
condition; 
(2) 
the 
defective condition made the product unreasonably 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
13
 
¶19 After receiving these instructions, the jury returned 
a verdict in favor of Green.  The jury found that S&N's gloves 
were defective and unreasonably dangerous.  It additionally 
found that this defective and unreasonably dangerous condition 
caused Green's injuries.  Based on these findings, the jury 
awarded Green $1,000,000 in damages.   
¶20 S&N subsequently moved for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, a new trial, or remittitur.  The circuit court 
denied S&N's motions and entered judgment on the jury's verdict. 
¶21 S&N appealed, arguing that the jury verdict and, thus, 
the circuit court judgment entered on that verdict resulted from 
several legal errors.  However, the court of appeals rejected 
S&N's arguments and, in a unanimous opinion, affirmed the 
circuit court judgment.   
 
¶22 S&N then petitioned this court to review the court of 
appeals decision.  We granted review.7 
II 
 
¶23 Strict products liability holds manufacturers and 
other sellers of products accountable for selling defective and 
                                                                  
dangerous to persons or property; (3) the defective 
condition of the product existed when the product was 
under the control of the manufacturer; and (4) the 
product 
reached 
the 
user 
(consumer) 
without 
substantial change in the condition in which it was 
sold. 
 
Wis JI——Civil 3260.  
7 Parts 
II(B)(1) 
and 
IV(A) 
of 
this 
opinion 
contain 
additional facts.  
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
14
unreasonably 
dangerous 
products 
that 
cause 
injuries 
to 
consumers.  Since 1967, Wisconsin has adhered to the rule of 
strict products liability set forth in the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 402A (1965): 
 
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical 
Harm to User or Consumer 
 
(1) One 
who 
sells 
any 
product 
in 
a 
defective 
condition 
unreasonably 
dangerous 
to the 
user or 
consumer or to his [or her] property is subject to 
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the 
ultimate user or consumer, or to his [or her] 
property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of 
selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or 
consumer without substantial change in the condition 
in which it is sold. 
(2) The 
rule 
stated 
in 
Subsection 
(1) 
applies 
although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care 
in the preparation and sale of his [or her] product, 
and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the 
product from or entered into any contractual relation 
with the seller. 
See Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). 
 To prevail on a claim under this rule, a plaintiff must prove 
all of the following five elements:   
 
(1) that the product was in defective condition when 
it left the possession or control of the seller, (2) 
that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer, (3) that the defect was a cause . . . of the 
plaintiff's injuries or damages, (4) that the seller 
engaged in the business of selling such product or, 
put negatively, that this is not an isolated or 
infrequent transaction not related to the principal 
business of the seller, and (5) that the product was 
one which the seller expected to and did reach the 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
15
user or consumer without substantial change in the 
condition it was when he [or she] sold it. 
Id.  
¶24 In the case at hand, S&N initially contends that the 
circuit court incorrectly instructed the jury regarding the 
first two elements of this standard.  Specifically, S&N argues 
that the circuit court erroneously instructed the jury that:  
(1) a product can be deemed defective and unreasonably dangerous 
based solely on consumer expectations about that product; and 
(2) a product can be deemed defective and unreasonably dangerous 
regardless of whether the manufacturer of that product knew or 
could have known of the risk of harm the product presented to 
consumers.  Accordingly, S&N asks us to review the circuit 
court's jury instructions. 
¶25 On review, this court will affirm a circuit court's 
choice of jury instructions so long as the selected instructions 
fully and fairly inform the jury of the relevant law.  Nowatske 
v. Osterloh, 198 Wis. 2d 419, 428-29, 543 N.W.2d 265 (1996).  
The issue of whether the jury instructions fully and fairly 
explained the relevant law is a question of law, which this 
court reviews de novo.  County of Kenosha v. C&S Mgmt., Inc., 
223 Wis. 2d 373, 395, 588 N.W.2d 236 (1999). 
A 
 
¶26 We first review whether the circuit court erred in 
instructing the jury that a product can be deemed defective and 
unreasonably dangerous based solely on consumer expectations 
about that product.  As S&N indicates, the circuit court 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
16
deviated from the pattern products liability jury instruction, 
Wis JI——Civil 3260, which provides in pertinent part that "[a] 
product is said to be defective when it does not reasonably fit 
for the ordinary purposes for which such product was sold and 
intended to be used," and instead instructed the jury that "[a] 
product is said to be defective when it is in a condition not 
contemplated 
by 
the 
ordinary 
user 
or 
consumer 
which 
is 
unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary user or consumer."  
(Emphasis added.)  This "consumer-contemplation" instruction, 
S&N contends, defined "defect" by the same terms that the 
circuit court, in accordance with Wis JI——Civil 3260, defined 
"unreasonable danger":  "[a] defective product is unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer when it is dangerous to an 
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary 
user or consumer possessing the knowledge of the product's 
characteristics which were common to the community."  (Emphasis 
added.)  S&N asserts that the circuit court's jury instruction 
thus 
erroneously 
merged 
the 
elements 
of 
"defect" 
and 
"unreasonable danger" into a single element based solely on 
consumer contemplation.   
1 
¶27 S&N maintains that the consumer-contemplation standard 
enunciated in the jury instructions is at odds with current 
Wisconsin law.  According to S&N, this court has recognized that 
the consumer-contemplation test is not appropriate in all strict 
products liability cases.  S&N observes that in Sumnicht v. 
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 338, 360 N.W.2d 2 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
17
(1984), we cited a list of five permissive factors that "may be 
beneficial to plaintiffs in proving their case[s]": 
 
1) [C]onformity of defendant's design to the practices 
of other manufacturers in its industry at the time of 
manufacture; 2) the open and obvious nature of the 
alleged danger; . . . 3) the extent of the claimant's 
use of the very product alleged to have caused the 
injury and the period of time involved in such use by 
the claimant and others prior to the injury without 
any harmful incident . . .; 4) the ability of the 
manufacturer to eliminate danger without impairing the 
product's usefulness or making it unduly expensive; 
and 5) the relative likelihood of injury resulting 
from the product's present design. 
Id. at 372 (quoting Collins v. Ridge Tool Co., 520 F.2d 591, 594 
(7th Cir. 1975)).  By approving of this list, S&N asserts, this 
court indicated that factors other than consumer expectations 
may be important to determining whether a product is defective 
and 
unreasonably 
dangerous. 
 
Accordingly, 
S&N 
concludes, 
pursuant to Sumnicht, Wisconsin applies a "hybrid consumer 
expectation risk-benefit test."8  
 
¶28 Based on its reading of Sumnicht, S&N argues that the 
court of appeals erred in affirming the circuit court's 
deviation from the pattern jury instruction.  S&N contends that 
had the circuit court instructed the jury about the defect 
element 
of 
Green's 
claim 
according 
to 
the 
pattern 
jury 
instruction 
(i.e., 
in 
terms 
of 
whether 
the 
gloves 
were 
reasonably fit for their intended purpose), the jury could have 
considered the Sumnicht factors set out above.  This, S&N 
                     
8 S&N borrows this term from John S. Allee et. al, Product 
Liability, § 2.05[2][c], at 2-41 n.23 (2000).   
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
18
asserts, would have allowed the jury to consider not only 
consumer expectations about S&N's gloves, but also facts such 
as:  the gloves' effectiveness in preventing the spread of 
disease; the gloves' potential danger to only 5 to 17 percent of 
consumers; and S&N's inability to know of and, therefore, to 
eliminate the danger presented by the gloves' alleged design 
defects.  But by instructing the jury solely in terms of 
consumer contemplation, S&N argues, the circuit court prevented 
the jury from considering the Sumnicht factors, including the 
risks and benefits of its gloves.  S&N thus concludes that the 
circuit court's jury instruction erroneously incorporated a 
products liability standard that conflicts with Sumnicht.     
 
¶29 We disagree.  In Vincer v. Esther Williams All-
Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 
(1975), this court adopted Comment g to § 402A, which provides 
that a product is defective "where the product is, at the time 
it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by 
the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to 
him [or her]."  Id. at 330 (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 402A (1965)) (emphasis added).  Similarly, in the same 
case, this court adopted Comment i to § 402A, which provides in 
pertinent 
part 
that 
a 
defective 
product 
is 
unreasonably 
dangerous where it is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which 
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, 
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its 
characteristics."  Id. at 331 (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 402A (1965)) (emphasis added).  These Comments provide 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
19
that although defect and unreasonable danger are distinct 
elements to a claim in strict products liability, both elements 
are based on consumer expectations.  See Sumnicht, 121 Wis. 2d 
at 367-70.  
Accordingly, 
based on 
our adoption of the 
definitions set out in these Comments, we concluded in Vincer:  
 
[T]he test in Wisconsin of whether a product contains 
an unreasonably dangerous defect depends upon the 
reasonable 
expectations 
of 
the 
ordinary 
consumer 
concerning 
the 
characteristics 
of 
this 
type 
of 
product.  If the average consumer would reasonably 
anticipate the dangerous condition of the product and 
fully appreciate the attendant risk of injury, it 
would not be unreasonably dangerous and defective.  
This is an objective test and is not dependent upon 
the knowledge of the particular injured consumer. 
Vincer, 69 Wis. 2d at 332 (emphasis added).  Indeed, since 
Vincer, we frequently have reiterated that Wisconsin applies a 
consumer-contemplation test in strict products liability cases. 
 See, e.g., Beacon Bowl, Inc. v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 176 
Wis. 2d 740, 792, 501 N.W.2d 788 (1993) ("Put another way, [a 
product] is defective and unreasonably dangerous when it is in a 
condition 
not 
contemplated 
by 
the 
ultimate 
consumer 
and 
unreasonably dangerous 
to 
that consumer."); 
Sumnicht, 121 
Wis. 2d at 369-70 (noting that the Vincer test is the law in 
Wisconsin); Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 87 Wis. 2d 
605, 620-21, 275 N.W.2d 641 (1979) (quoting Vincer); Kozlowski 
v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 87 Wis. 2d 882, 893, 275 N.W.2d 915 
(1979) (noting the Vincer court's adoption of Comments g and i); 
accord Netzel v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 51 Wis. 2d 1, 10-11, 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
20
186 N.W.2d 258 (1971) (approving a jury instruction based on the 
consumer-contemplation standard).   
¶30 Sumnicht is consistent with this precedent.  In 
Sumnicht, 121 Wis. 2d at 346, 348-49, we reviewed a strict 
products liability claim in which the plaintiff, Sumnicht, 
alleged that a design defect in the defendants' automobiles 
exacerbated the injuries that he sustained during a traffic 
accident.  In examining this claim, we acknowledged that states 
differ 
regarding 
their 
approaches 
to 
products 
liability 
standards.  As we explained: 
 
Two separate approaches have emerged to evaluate 
design defect——a consumer-contemplation test and a 
danger-utility [i.e., risk-benefit] test. . . .  
 
Under 
the 
consumer-contemplation test, . . . a 
product is defectively dangerous if it is dangerous to 
an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by 
the ordinary consumer who purchased it with the 
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to the 
product's characteristics. 
 
 
Under 
[the 
danger-utility 
test] 
approach, 
a 
product is defective as designed if, but only if, the 
magnitude of the danger outweighs the utility of the 
product.  The theory underlying this approach is that 
virtually all products have both risks and benefits 
and that there is no way to go about evaluating design 
hazards intelligently without weighing danger against 
utility.  There have been somewhat different ways of 
articulating this . . . test.  But in essence, the 
danger-utility test directs attention of attorneys, 
trial judges, and juries to the necessity for weighing 
the danger-in-fact of a particular feature of a 
product against its utility. 
Id. at 367-68 (quoting Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 99 
at 698-99 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)) (footnotes 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
21
and quotations omitted)).  We then unequivocally held that 
"Wisconsin is committed to the consumer-contemplation test for 
determining whether a product is defective."  Id. at 368.  
 
¶31 After 
reaffirming 
Wisconsin's 
legal 
standard 
for 
products liability, we examined what evidence was necessary to 
support Sumnicht's claim.  The defendants argued that we could 
not sustain the jury verdict that their automobiles were 
defective and unreasonably dangerous because there was no proof 
of 
"an 
alternative, 
safer 
design, 
practicable 
under 
the 
circumstances."  Id. at 370 (quotation omitted).  In rejecting 
this argument, we explained that we have "refrained from 
adopting mandatory factors that must be weighed when determining 
if a product is defective and unreasonably dangerous."  Id. at 
371.  We did, however, suggest that the set of five permissive 
factors cited by S&N "may be beneficial to plaintiffs in proving 
their case[s]."  Id. at 372.  
 
¶32 But 
contrary to 
S&N's contentions, 
the 
Sumnicht 
factors did not change the nature of Wisconsin's consumer-
contemplation test.  In listing the Sumnicht factors, this court 
merely recognized that consumer expectations about products may 
vary depending on the nature of and consumer familiarity with 
those products.  These factors are not supplements to the 
consumer-contemplation test, to be considered in addition to 
consumer expectations.  Nor are these factors independent legal 
tests.   
¶33 Rather, the Sumnicht factors are considerations that 
may be relevant to determining whether the ordinary consumer 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
22
could anticipate and, hence, contemplate an alleged unreasonably 
dangerous defect.  For example, one of the Sumnicht factors is 
"[c]onformity of the defendant's design to the practices of 
other manufacturers in the industry at the time of manufacture." 
 Id. at 372.  This factor does not allow a plaintiff to prove 
that a manufacturer's design is defective simply by proving that 
the design did not conform with other manufacturers' designs for 
similar products.  Id. at 371 ("The question is not whether any 
other manufacturer has produced a safer design, but whether the 
specific product in question is defective and unreasonably 
dangerous.").  Instead, this factor may allow a plaintiff to 
show that because the defendant manufacturer's design differed 
from other contemporary manufacturers' designs, an ordinary 
consumer familiar with the other manufacturers' designs may not 
be able to contemplate the potential danger presented by the 
relevant aspect of the defendant manufacturer's design.  To 
further illustrate, another Sumnicht factor is "the ability of 
the manufacturer to eliminate danger without impairing the 
product's usefulness or making it unduly expensive."  Id. at 
372.  This factor does not imply that in determining a 
manufacturer's liability, a trier of fact must balance the 
danger that the manufacturer's product presents to consumers 
with the benefits or cost-value of the product; Sumnicht 
expressly rejected such a risk-benefit analysis.  Id. at 368; 
see also id. at 371 ("A product may be defective and 
unreasonably dangerous even though there are no alternative, 
safer designs available.").  To the contrary, this factor allows 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
23
parties to show that due to the inherent nature or cost of a 
particular product, the ordinary consumer may expect, for 
example, the product to include more or less safety devices.   
¶34 In sum, the Sumnicht factors must be understood and 
applied in light of the consumer-contemplation test.  Instead of 
abrogating 
or 
redefining 
Wisconsin's 
products 
liability 
standard, Sumnicht reiterated this state's devotion to the 
consumer-contemplation 
test: 
 
Wisconsin 
strict 
products 
liability law applies the consumer-contemplation test and only 
the consumer-contemplation test in all strict products liability 
cases.  
¶35 In the present case, the circuit court properly 
instructed the jury on this standard.  As the court of appeals 
aptly noted, the circuit court's instruction was "essentially a 
clone of Comment g to § 402A, which was adopted by Vincer."  
Green, 2000 WI App 192, ¶16.  And as explained above, in 
products liability cases, this state adheres solely to the 
consumer-contemplation test delineated in § 402A, adopted in 
Dippel, and further defined in Vincer.  Therefore, we hold that 
based on our prior products liability caselaw, the circuit court 
did not erroneously exercise its discretion in instructing the 
jury that it could find S&N's gloves to be defective and 
unreasonably dangerous based solely on consumer expectations 
about those gloves. 
2 
 
¶36 S&N 
further 
contends 
that 
a 
number 
of 
policy 
considerations gravitate against this court's continued use of 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
24
the consumer-contemplation test.  S&N thus argues that this 
state should abandon its exclusive reliance on the consumer-
contemplation test. 
¶37 According to S&N, consumers do not always have 
expectations regarding the relevant design aspects of a product. 
 S&N suggests that while most consumers likely have expectations 
about how safely a product will perform its basic functions or 
serve its intended use, they generally do not have expectations 
about——or, oftentimes, even know of——technical or mechanical 
design aspects of the product.  Thus, in cases involving 
technical or mechanical matters, consumer contemplation may be 
an inappropriate measure for liability. 
 
¶38 In addition, S&N posits that in many circumstances, 
the consumer-contemplation test may bar manufacturer liability 
and, therefore, contravene public safety.  S&N suggests that in 
cases where a consumer sustains injuries caused by a product 
containing a patent defect, the consumer-contemplation test may 
prevent recovery because, due to the obvious nature of the 
defect, the defect——i.e., the condition of the product——would 
not be beyond the contemplation of the ordinary consumer.  
Consequently, S&N argues, for manufacturers to avoid liability 
under a pure consumer-contemplation standard, they simply need 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
25
to ensure that any unreasonably dangerous defects in their 
products are patent and, thus, obvious to the ordinary consumer.9 
 
¶39 Finally, S&N claims that a pure consumer-contemplation 
test, without consideration of the risks and benefits of a 
product, will unnecessarily cause many useful products to be 
taken off the market.  S&N contends that by finding a particular 
product to be defective and unreasonably dangerous, a trier of 
fact effectively is condemning the entire product line.  Thus, 
S&N argues, a finding that a particular product is defective and 
unreasonably dangerous will cause the product's manufacturer or 
other sellers to remove the product from the market.  S&N 
postulates that, under the consumer-contemplation test, this may 
eliminate entire lines of beneficial products without any 
consideration of the good that the products generate.  
¶40 We fail to see that any of these policy considerations 
advanced by S&N warrant this court to overrule Sumnicht, Vincer, 
Dippel, and the rest of Wisconsin products liability law.  
First, we do not agree with S&N that the consumer-contemplation 
test is inappropriate in cases involving complex products.  The 
consumer-contemplation test imposes liability where a product 
is:  (1) "in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate 
consumer"; and (2) "dangerous to an extent beyond that which 
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer."  Vincer, 69 
                     
9 This argument suggests that S&N recognizes that at least 
one of the Sumnicht factors, "the open and obvious nature of the 
alleged danger," must be understood in light of the consumer-
contemplation test.  Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 
Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 338, 372, 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984).  
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
26
Wis. 2d at 330-31 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A 
cmts. g and i).  Neither of these elements necessarily require 
proof that at the time of injury, the plaintiff pursuing a claim 
in products liability knew of or understood the defective or 
unreasonably dangerous condition of the product that caused his 
or her injury.   
¶41 We agree with S&N that in many instances, ordinary 
consumers may not know of or fully understand the technical or 
mechanical design aspects of the product at issue.  In such 
instances, the technical or mechanical product design features 
of the product will comprise "condition[s] not contemplated by 
the ultimate consumer."10  Id. at 330 (quotation omitted).  Thus, 
the inquiry in those cases must focus on whether the design 
features 
present 
an 
unreasonable 
danger 
to 
the 
ordinary 
consumer. 
¶42 A determination of "unreasonable danger," like a 
determination that a product is in a condition not contemplated 
by the ordinary consumer, does not inevitably require any degree 
of scientific understanding about the product itself.  Rather, 
it requires understanding of how safely the ordinary consumer 
would expect the product to serve its intended purpose.  If the 
                     
10 Indeed, if an injured consumer knows of and understands——
i.e., contemplates——at the time of his or her injury the 
condition of the design feature that caused that injury, the 
consumer likely would be unable to prove that the injury-causing 
product was defective and/or unreasonably dangerous.  See Vincer 
v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 
326, 332, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975).  
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
27
product falls below such minimum consumer expectations, the 
product is unreasonably dangerous.   
¶43 These standards are straightforward and may be applied 
even in "complex" cases.  This court frequently has upheld use 
of the consumer-contemplation test in cases involving complex 
products. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Beacon 
Bowl, 
176 
Wis. 2d 
740 
(electricity); Sumnicht, 121 Wis. 2d 338 (automobile design); 
Ransome, 87 Wis. 2d 605 (electricity).  Additionally, this court 
has rejected the argument that the average jury cannot properly 
evaluate the often complex economic and engineering data 
presented at products liability trials.  Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 
Wis. 2d 551, 561-62, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975), overruled in part on 
other grounds by Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 600 n.1, 235 
N.W.2d 677 (1975).  As we have explained, "juries are always 
called upon to make decisions based upon complex facts in many 
different kinds of litigation. . . .  The problems presented in 
products 
liability 
jury 
trials 
would 
appear 
no 
more 
insurmountable than similar problems in other areas of the law." 
 Id.  For these reasons, we reject the notion that the consumer-
contemplation 
test 
cannot 
be 
applied 
in 
cases 
involving 
technical or mechanical matters. 
¶44 Second, we acknowledge that in some cases, the open 
and obvious nature of a design defect may defeat claims for 
strict products liability.  This does not mean, however, that 
manufacturers can avoid all liability by making unreasonably 
dangerous design defects open and obvious to the ordinary 
consumer.  Wisconsin recognizes several other causes of action 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
28
which may be applicable against manufacturers that produce 
products with open and obvious dangers.  The open and obvious 
nature of a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition does 
not inherently bar claims based on, for example, negligence, 
breach of implied warranty, or breach of express warranty.  We 
do not believe, as S&N suggests, that simply because strict 
products liability may not allow recovery in all circumstances 
involving defective and unreasonably dangerous products, we 
should abandon our current products liability standard.  
¶45 And third, this court does not agree with S&N that the 
consumer-contemplation test unnecessarily eliminates products 
from the marketplace.  An otherwise defective and unreasonably 
dangerous product may in many cases be made safe for consumer 
use by means of adequate warnings or instructions.  Arbet, 66 
Wis. 2d at 556-57; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A 
cmts. h, j (1965).  If, even in light of warnings or 
instructions, a product remains defective and unreasonably 
dangerous to the ordinary consumer, we see no reason that the 
product should remain on the market.  
¶46 For these reasons, we decline S&N's invitation to 
abandon or qualify this state's exclusive reliance on the 
consumer-contemplation test.  We reaffirm that Wisconsin is 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
29
committed to the consumer-contemplation test in all strict 
products liability cases.11  
B 
 
¶47 We next review whether the circuit court erred in 
instructing the jury that a product can be deemed defective and 
unreasonably dangerous regardless of whether the manufacturer of 
that product knew or could have known of the risk of harm the 
product presented to consumers.  S&N contends that the circuit 
court erroneously instructed the jury that "[a] manufacturer is 
responsible for the harm caused by a defective and unreasonably 
dangerous product even if the manufacturer had no knowledge or 
could [not] have known of the risk of harm presented by the 
condition of the product."  As S&N points out, one of the 
primary policies underlying products liability law is to 
encourage manufacturers to produce safer products.  To advance 
this policy, S&N further indicates, the law imposes liability on 
manufacturers 
who 
fail 
to 
eliminate 
from 
their 
products 
unreasonably dangerous defects, which present a risk of harm to 
consumers.  However, S&N asserts that manufacturers cannot 
consciously eliminate potentially harmful defects from their 
                     
11 We note that other than changing gender references in 
1994, the Wisconsin Civil Jury Instructions Committee (the 
Committee) has not substantively amended Wis JI——Civil 3260 
since it initially published the instruction in 1971.  That is, 
the Committee in effect has not updated this instruction since 
approximately four years before Vincer, 69 Wis. 2d at 330-31, in 
which this court adopted Comments g and i to § 402A.  In light 
of Vincer and our present holding, we suggest that the Committee 
consider revisiting Wis JI——Civil 3260.  
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
30
products when the manufacturers do not and cannot know that 
those defects exist.  Consequently, S&N argues, imposing 
liability on manufacturers that do not and cannot know of the 
risk of harm that their products present to consumers does not 
encourage manufacturers to produce safer products.  Rather, S&N 
claims, imposing liability in such circumstances transforms 
strict products liability into absolute liability, a legal 
standard that this court specifically disavowed in Dippel v. 
Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 459-60, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). 
¶48 S&N contends that in order to avoid imposing absolute 
liability, current Wisconsin products liability law necessarily 
includes an element of foreseeability.  Alternatively, S&N and 
amicus curiae, Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.,12 
suggest that if this court concludes that current Wisconsin law 
does not recognize that foreseeability of the risk of harm is an 
element of strict products liability, "it would be time to 
change Wisconsin law" by adopting the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts 
§ 2(b) 
(1998), 
which 
does 
include 
an 
element 
of 
foreseeability.  
1 
 
¶49 As a preliminary matter, we note that Green contends 
S&N not only failed to properly preserve this issue in the 
circuit court, but specifically conceded to the circuit court 
                     
12 Product 
Liability 
Advisory 
Council, 
Inc. 
is 
an 
association representing 132 manufacturers, including S&N.  It 
joins S&N in urging this court to reverse the court of appeals 
decision.  
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
31
that foreseeability of the risk of harm presented by a product 
is irrelevant to a strict products liability claim.  Prior to 
trial, Green moved in limine to exclude any reference or 
evidence pertaining to S&N's "lack of knowledge as to latex 
allergy, its possible causes, or its connection with latex 
gloves at any time, on the grounds that such [knowledge] is 
irrelevant to [Green's] claim based upon strict products 
liability."  S&N responded to Green's motion that it "agree[d] 
with [Green] that lack of knowledge regarding latex allergy is 
irrelevant and therefore inadmissible in this case."  The 
circuit court, however, denied Green's motion. 
 
¶50 Similarly, 
S&N 
conceded at 
the jury 
instruction 
conference that its inability to foresee the risk of harm 
presented by its gloves should not be a factor in assessing 
Green's claim.  Green had requested that the circuit court 
instruct the jury that S&N's lack of knowledge about latex 
allergy was not a defense to Green's products liability claim.  
S&N objected to this proposed instruction not because the 
instruction misstated the law, but rather because it was 
"already covered in the [j]ury instructions."  That is, S&N 
accepted that the instruction was correct, but objected merely 
because it believed the instruction was duplicative.   
 
¶51 S&N did not raise the present issue until its motions 
after the verdict.  As such and in light of S&N's concessions to 
the circuit court, Green argues that S&N waived this issue. 
 
¶52 In general, this court will not address issues that 
have not been properly preserved in the lower courts.  Apex 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
32
Elecs. Corp. v. Gee, 217 Wis. 2d 378, 384, 577 N.W.2d 23 (1998). 
 However, when an issue involves a question of law, has been 
briefed by the opposing parties, and is of sufficient public 
interest to merit a decision, this court has discretion to 
address the issue.  Id. 
 
¶53 When we accepted review in the present case, we 
exercised our discretion in part to address the issue of whether 
foreseeability of the risk of harm is an element in strict 
products liability claims.  This issue is a question of law, has 
been briefed by Green and S&N pursuant to an order of this 
court, and is of sufficient public interest to warrant a 
decision.  Therefore, we address S&N's arguments regarding this 
issue on their merits. 
2 
¶54 As explained above, S&N contends that this court's 
existing caselaw provides that foreseeability of the risk of 
harm is an element of strict products liability.  According to 
S&N, in order to avoid transforming strict liability into 
absolute liability, this court previously recognized that when 
considering whether a particular product is defective and 
unreasonably dangerous, the trier of fact must consider whether 
the manufacturer could have foreseen the risk of harm presented 
by its product.  Relying on three Wisconsin Supreme Court cases—
—(1) Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 
338, 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984); (2) Sharp v. Case Corp., 227 Wis. 2d 
1, 595 N.W.2d 380 (1999); and (3) Glassey v. Continental Ins. 
Co., 176 Wis. 2d 587, 500 N.W.2d 295 (1993); —in support of its 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
33
contention, S&N argues that where, as in the present case, a 
manufacturer does not and cannot foresee the risk of harm 
presented by its product, strict products liability does not 
apply. 
 
¶55 We reject this argument.  Foreseeability of harm is an 
element of negligence.  As this court explained just last term: 
 "A negligence action requires the proof of four elements:  (1) 
A duty of care on the part of the defendant; (2) a breach of 
that duty; (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the 
injury; and (4) an actual loss or damage as a result of the 
injury."  Morden v. Continental AG, 2000 WI 51, ¶45, 235 Wis. 2d 
325, 611 N.W.2d 659 (quotation omitted).  With regard to the 
first of these elements, duty of care, the court further 
explained:   
 
The duty of any person is the obligation of due care 
to refrain from any act which will cause foreseeable 
harm to others. . . .   The duty of care of a 
defendant is established when we can state that it was 
foreseeable that the defendant's acts or omission 
could harm or injure another person. 
Id. at ¶46 (quotation and citations omitted).  Negligence 
liability thus hinges in large part on the defendant's conduct 
under circumstances involving a foreseeable risk of harm.  D.L. 
v. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581, 610, 329 N.W.2d 890 (1983). 
 
¶56 By 
contrast, 
unlike 
negligence 
liability, 
strict 
products liability focuses not on the defendant's conduct, but 
on the nature of the defendant's product.  D.L., 110 Wis. 2d at 
610; see also Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 603 n.2, 235 
N.W.2d 677 (1975) ("[I]n a sec. 402A case the focus is upon the 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
34
condition of the product[;] in an ordinary negligence case the 
focus is upon the conduct creating a particular condition of a 
product."); Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 259, 201 N.W.2d 825 
(1972) ("Dippel makes it absolutely clear that the doctrine of 
foreseeability, although a recognized doctrine where ordinary 
negligence in tort is involved, has no part in the concept of 
strict liability in tort."); cf. Krueger v. Tappan Co., 104 
Wis. 2d 199, 206-08, 311 N.W.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1981) (suggesting 
that because "duty to warn" claims are not based on § 402A and 
focus on the manufacturer's conduct rather than the product's 
condition, such claims are more akin to negligence than to 
strict products liability).  As explained in Comment m to 
§ 402A, strict products liability  
 
does not rest upon negligence. . . .  The basis of 
liability is purely one of tort.  
 
. . .  
 
 
The rule [of strict products liability] does not 
require any reliance on the part of the consumer upon 
the reputation, skill, or judgment of the seller who 
is to be held liable, nor any representation or 
undertaking on the part of that seller.   
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. m (1965).  In other 
words, strict products liability imposes liability without 
regard to negligence and its attendant factors of duty of care 
and foreseeability.  Dippel, 37 Wis. 2d at 461; see also id. at 
460 ("From the plaintiff's point of view the most beneficial 
aspect of the rule [of strict products liability] is that it 
relieves 
[the 
plaintiff] 
of 
proving 
specific 
acts 
of 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
35
negligence."); Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc., 2001 WI 
81, ¶18, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (explaining that strict 
products liability "is not based upon negligence").  Strict 
products 
liability 
"applies 
although . . . the 
seller 
has 
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his 
product."  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(2)(a) (1965).  
Thus, regardless of whether a manufacturer could foresee 
potential 
risks 
of 
harm 
inherent 
in 
its 
defective 
and 
unreasonably dangerous product, strict products liability holds 
that manufacturer responsible for injuries caused by that 
product. 
 
¶57 This is not to say that strict products liability is 
tantamount to absolute liability.  Dippel, 37 Wis. 2d at 459-60. 
 Strict products liability does not impose liability in every 
instance that a consumer is injured while using a product.  
Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 87 Wis. 2d 605, 617, 275 
N.W.2d 641 (1979).  Rather, to prevail under a strict products 
liability theory,  
 
the plaintiff is required to prove that the product 
was in a defective condition when it left the 
possession or control of the seller; that it was 
unreasonably dangerous to the [ordinary] user or 
consumer; that the defect was a cause . . . of the 
plaintiff's injuries or damages; that the seller was 
engaged in the business of selling the product . . .; 
and that the product was expected to and did reach the 
user or consumer without substantial change in the 
condition in which it was sold.  
Kemp v. Miller, 154 Wis. 2d 538, 551, 453 N.W.2d 872 (1990) 
(citing Dippel, 37 Wis. 2d at 460).  Additionally, the plaintiff 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
36
must overcome the potential defense of contributory negligence. 
 Id.  But under no circumstance must the plaintiff prove that 
the risk of harm presented by the product that caused his or her 
injury was foreseeable.  Fuchsgruber, 2001 WI 81, ¶21 ("It is 
not necessary [in a products liability case] to show duty in 
terms of foreseeability." (quoting Greiten, 70 Wis. 2d at 603)). 
 
¶58 None of the cases cited by S&N——Sumnicht, Sharp, and 
Glassey——support a contrary position.  As noted above, Sumnicht 
involved a claim that automobiles sold by the defendants were 
defective and unreasonably dangerous because certain design 
aspects of those vehicles enhanced the plaintiff's injuries 
during a collision.  121 Wis. 2d at 346, 348-49.  Before this 
court analyzed the issues in that case, we explained: 
 
[W]e must first note that the risk that a car may be 
in an accident is reasonably foreseeable by the 
[defendants], and, therefore, the [defendants] have a 
duty to anticipate that risk.  Arbet [v. Gussarson, 66 
Wis. 2d 551, 558, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975)].  We 
reemphasize the following from the Larsen decision: 
 
We perceive no sound reason, either in logic 
or experience, nor any command in precedent, 
why the manufacturer should not be held to a 
reasonable duty of care in the design of its 
vehicle consonant with the state of the art 
to minimize the effect of accidents.  The 
manufacturers are not insurers but should be 
held to a standard of reasonable care in 
design to provide a reasonably safe vehicle 
in which to travel. . . .  The duty of 
reasonable care in design should be viewed 
in light of that risk.  While all risks 
cannot be eliminated nor can a crash-proof 
vehicle be designed under the present state 
of the art, there are many common-sense 
factors in design, which are or should be 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
37
well known to the manufacturer that will 
minimize or lessen the injurious effects of 
a collision.  The standard of reasonable 
care is applied in many other negligence 
situations and should be applied here. 
 
Larsen [v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 
(8th Cir. 1968)], cited with approval in Arbet, 66 
Wis. 2d at 560. 
Id. at 374-75.  S&N contends that this language injected an 
element of foreseeability into Wisconsin products liability 
law.13 
 
¶59 S&N misreads Sumnicht.  This language in Sumnicht 
addressed the issue of "intended use," a concept interwoven with 
the defense of contributory negligence.  See Arbet, 66 Wis. 2d 
at 559 (citation omitted).  As explained above, contributory 
negligence is a defense to strict products liability claims.  
See Dippel, 37 Wis. 2d at 460.  A consumer may be found to be 
contributorily negligent if he or she sustains injuries from a 
product while abusing or misusing, or after altering that 
product.  Id.; accord Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. 
h (1965) (explaining that a seller of a product is not 
responsible for injuries arising out of abnormal handling, 
abnormal preparation, or abnormal consumption of the product).  
                     
13 S&N also argues that the fourth Sumnicht factor——"the 
ability 
of 
the 
manufacturer 
to 
eliminate 
danger 
without 
impairing 
the 
product's 
usefulness 
or 
making 
it 
unduly 
expensive"——relates to the concept of foreseeable risk of harm. 
 121 Wis. 2d at 372 (quotation omitted).  But as we explain 
above, this factor must be examined in light of the consumer-
contemplation test:  it relates to the ordinary consumer's 
reasonable expectations, not to the manufacturer's conduct.  
Thus, we find this argument to be without merit.  
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
38
Thus, intended use, or "foreseeable use," is at issue in many 
products liability cases. 
 
¶60 However, foreseeable use must not be confused with 
foreseeable risk of harm.  As explained above, in tort law, the 
former concept relates to the consumer's conduct and the defense 
of contributory negligence; the latter concept relates the 
manufacturer's 
conduct 
and, 
hence, 
solely 
to 
negligence 
liability. 
 
¶61 In Arbet, the decision from which Sumnicht quoted the 
language at issue, this court held that collisions are a 
"foreseeable 
use" 
of 
vehicles. 
 
66 
Wis. 2d 
at 
560.  
Approximately ten years later, in Sumnicht, this court quoted 
Arbet for this holding.  121 Wis. 2d at 374-75.  Sumnicht, 
however, did not expand the meaning of the Arbet quotation to 
hold that foreseeability of the risk of harm is an element of 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
39
strict products liability.14  Therefore, Sumnicht fails to 
support S&N's argument.    
 
¶62 S&N also cites as support for its argument this 
court's decision in Sharp, 227 Wis. 2d 1.  In Sharp, the 
plaintiff brought claims for, among other things, strict 
products liability and failure to warn.  Id. at 9.  The jury 
rejected the strict products liability claim, but found in favor 
of the plaintiff on the failure to warn claims.  Id. 
¶63 On review, the defendant in Sharp argued that:  
 
the jury's finding [on the strict products liability 
claim] that the product was not unreasonably dangerous 
is inconsistent with the jury's finding that after 
manufacture and sale of the product, [the defendant] 
learned of a defect posing a serious hazard that 
originated at and was unforeseeable at the time of 
                     
14 We 
acknowledge 
that 
in 
Arbet, 
while 
explaining 
foreseeable use as relating to the defense of contributory 
negligence, this court referred to the negligence concept of 
foreseeable risk of harm.  See Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 
551, 558-60, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975).  Indeed, Larsen v. General 
Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968), the case that 
provided the language quoted in Arbet, which in turn provided 
the language quoted above from Sumnicht, was a negligence case——
not a products liability case.  However, in the term following 
our Arbet decision, this court clarified the difference between 
negligence and strict products liability and, in doing so, 
overruled Arbet to the extent that it "revived the issue of the 
exercise of ordinary care by the manufacturer in products 
liability cases."  Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 600 n.1, 
235 N.W.2d 677 (1975); see generally id. at 599-604.  In quoting 
Arbet in Sumnicht, we did not overrule our partial overruling of 
Arbet.  As this court reemphasized in Glassey v. Continental 
Ins. Co., 176 Wis. 2d 587, 604, 500 N.W.2d 295 (1993), more than 
eight years after Sumnicht:  "Foreseeability is not an element 
considered in strict products liability claims, but instead is 
an element of negligence." 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
40
manufacture and that [the defendant] did not use due 
care in warning about the danger. 
Id. at 20.  In dismissing this argument, we explained: 
 
We do not see any inconsistency between the two 
findings complained of in this case.  A defect 
imposing a serious hazard may not be unreasonably 
dangerous.  We agree with the circuit court that "the 
jury 
could 
have 
found 
that . . . the 
defects . . . were not foreseeable at the point of 
sale, but became apparent later."  Accordingly, we 
hold that the special verdict findings are not fatally 
inconsistent. 
Id.   
 
¶64 In the present case, S&N contends that the Sharp 
court's 
explanation 
that 
"the 
jury 
could 
have 
found 
that . . . the defects . . . were not foreseeable at the point 
of sale, but became apparent later" leaves no doubt that a jury 
may reject a strict products liability claim simply because the 
defendant manufacturer could not have foreseen the risk of harm 
presented by its product.  Id.  That is, S&N contends that in 
this sentence, this court recognized foreseeability as an 
element of strict products liability. 
¶65 S&N misinterprets this sentence.  In Sharp, we 
explained that although the jury may have found that the 
defendant's product posed a "serious hazard," thus giving rise 
to a duty to warn consumers of that hazard, it did not 
necessarily follow that the jury must have found that the 
defendant's product was unreasonably dangerous and, therefore, 
could give rise to strict products liability.  Our explanation 
that 
"[a] 
defect 
imposing 
a serious 
hazard 
may not be 
unreasonably dangerous" explained why the jury rejected the 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
41
strict products liability claim.  Id.  By contrast, our 
following sentence, "the jury could have found that . . . the 
defects . . . were not foreseeable at the point of sale, but 
became apparent later," explained why the jury found the 
defendant liable for negligently breaching its post-sale duty to 
warn consumers of the risk of harm presented by its product.  
Id. (quotations omitted).  Contrary to S&N's argument, this 
latter sentence did not provide that foreseeability is an 
element of Wisconsin products liability law.15  
 
¶66 Finally, S&N maintains that this court's decision in 
Glassey supports the position that foreseeability must be 
considered in strict products liability claims.  In Glassey, 176 
Wis. 2d at 597, we examined in part whether a plaintiff can 
recover under strict products liability when he or she has 
substantially changed the product at issue.  We concluded that a 
plaintiff cannot recover under such circumstances because his or 
her claim fails as a matter of law to satisfy the fifth element 
of strict products liability:  "'that the product was one which 
the seller expected to and did reach the user or consumer 
without substantial change in the condition it was when [the 
                     
15 Even assuming arguendo that foreseeability is an element 
of strict products liability, we question whether it would have 
barred the plaintiff's recovery in Sharp v. Case Corp., 227 
Wis. 2d 1, 595 N.W.2d 380 (1999).  By finding that the defendant 
manufacturer in Sharp breached its post-sale duty to warn the 
plaintiff about the hazardous defects in the product at issue, 
the jury must have concluded that at least at the time of the 
plaintiff's injury, the product presented a foreseeable risk of 
harm.   
     
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
42
seller] sold it.'"  Id. at 599 (quoting Dippel, 37 Wis. 2d at 
460).   
¶67 In addition, however, we examined how our holding 
accorded with the public policy behind products liability law.  
As we explained, when this court recognized the cause of action 
for strict liability in tort, we identified several policy 
considerations supporting our decision to make manufacturers and 
other sellers of products responsible for placing defective and 
unreasonably dangerous products into the stream of commerce:  
(1) the seller of a product is "'in the paramount position to 
distribute the costs of the risks'" presented by the products by 
passing along costs to consumers or by purchasing insurance; (2) 
consumers have "'the right to rely on the apparent safety of the 
product and . . . it is the seller in the first instance who 
creates the risk by placing the defective product on the 
market'"; and (3) "'the manufacturer has the greatest ability to 
control the risk created by [its] product since [it] may 
initiate or adopt inspection and quality control measures 
thereby 
preventing 
defective 
products 
from 
reaching 
the 
consumer.'"  Id. at 602-03 (quoting Dippel, 37 Wis. 2d at 450-
51).  Applying these policies to the issue that was before us in 
Glassey, we concluded that where "[t]he manufacturer or seller 
is not the one who creates the risk," imposing liability on the 
manufacturer or seller would not "achieve any significant 
reduction of risk" or serve the equitable purpose of imposing 
the cost of the risk on the party that created the dangerously 
defective product.  Id. at 603.  Accordingly, we held in Glassey 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
43
that imposing liability on a manufacturer when the product at 
issue has undergone a substantial change since it left the 
manufacturer's 
control 
would 
not 
advance 
the 
policies 
undergirding Wisconsin products liability law.  Id.       
¶68 Citing our policy discussion in Glassey, S&N argues 
that imposing liability on a manufacturer that did not and could 
not foresee the risk of harm presented by its product——like 
imposing liability on a manufacturer whose product has undergone 
a substantial change since it left the manufacturer's control—— 
does not "achieve any significant reduction of risk."  Id.  This 
argument falls short for two reasons.  First, Glassey is 
directly at odds with S&N's position.  As noted above, Glassey 
underscored that "[f]oreseeability is not an element considered 
in strict liability claims."  Id. at 604.  We cannot fathom that 
this holding could be clearer.  And considering this holding, we 
fail to see that Glassey lends any support to S&N's argument. 
¶69 Second, S&N's argument focuses solely on one public 
policy underlying strict products liability while ignoring a 
second, more important policy consideration.  Although products 
liability law is intended in part to make products safer for 
consumers, the primary "rationale underlying the imposition of 
strict liability on manufacturers and sellers is that the risk 
of the loss associated with the use of defective products should 
be borne by those who have created the risk and who have reaped 
the profit by placing a defective product in the stream of 
commerce."  Kemp, 154 Wis. 2d at 556; see also D.L., 110 Wis. 2d 
at 646 ("The concept of strict [products] liability rests on the 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
44
public policy of allocating the costs of the risks associated 
with putting goods into the stream of commerce."); Ransome, 87 
Wis. 2d at 619 ("'public policy demands that the burden of 
accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption 
be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost 
of production'" (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A 
cmt. c (1965))); Greiten, 70 Wis. 2d at 604 ("Dippel is based 
upon the public-policy premise that a seller is socially 
responsible for what [it] puts into the stream of commerce 
irrespective of his degree of care."); Howes, 56 Wis. 2d at 260 
(holding that strict products liability rests on the policy 
"that a manufacturer should be strictly liable in tort when [it] 
places a defective article on the market that causes injury" 
(quotation omitted)).  In a case where a manufacturer places an 
unforeseeably defective and unreasonably dangerous product on 
the market, the manufacturer both creates the risk of harm and 
reaps the profit from the defective and unreasonably dangerous 
product; this is distinguishable from a case where, as in 
Glassey, the product is not defective and unreasonably dangerous 
until it is substantially altered by a consumer.  In the former 
instance, the manufacturer creates the risk of harm, whereas in 
the latter circumstance, the consumer creates the risk of harm. 
 To be certain, imposing liability on the manufacturer under 
either circumstance may not materially affect a reduction of 
future risk.  However, holding the manufacturer accountable in 
the former circumstance——unlike the latter circumstance——will 
serve the equitable purpose of imposing the cost of the risk on 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
45
the party that created the risk.  Thus, contrary to S&N's 
position, our policy discussion in Glassey does not suggest that 
foreseeability is or should be an element in products liability 
cases.  
¶70 For this reason and the reasons set forth above, we 
reemphasize the long-standing rule that foreseeability of the 
risk of harm plays no role in current Wisconsin products 
liability law.  Accordingly, we hold that current Wisconsin law 
does not support S&N's contention that the circuit court erred 
in instructing the jury that it could find S&N's gloves to be 
defective and unreasonably dangerous regardless of whether S&N 
knew or could have known of the risk of harm its latex gloves 
presented to consumers. 
3 
¶71 S&N and amicus curiae suggest in the alternative, 
however, that if Wisconsin strict products liability law 
currently does not include an element of foreseeability, this 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
46
court should adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2(b) 
(1998).16  Section 2(b) provides that a product: 
 
is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of 
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or 
avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative 
design by the seller or other distributor, or a 
predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, 
and the omission of the alternative design renders the 
product not reasonably safe.    
¶72 Comment a to § 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts 
explains that § 2(b) incorporates an element of foreseeability 
of risk of harm and a risk-benefit test.  As such, § 2(b) 
departs from the consumer-contemplation test set forth in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), and blurs the 
distinction 
between 
strict 
products 
liability 
claims 
and 
negligence claims.  See Morden v. Continental AG, 2000 WI 51, 
¶46, 235 Wis. 2d 325, 611 N.W.2d 659 (explaining that under 
                     
16 We note that there has been considerable controversy over 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2(b).  See, e.g., Marshall S. 
Shapo, A New Legislation:  Remarks on the Draft Restatement of 
Products Liability, 30 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 215, 218 (1997) 
(stating that the Restatement (Third) of Torts is not a 
description of the existing law, but rather is the creation of 
drafters who acted as "a sounding board for essentially 
political discussion"); Frank J. Vandall, Constructing a Roof 
Before the Foundation is Prepared:  The Restatement (Third) of 
Torts:  Products Liability Section 2(b) Design Defect, 30 U. 
Mich. J.L. Reform 261, 261-65 (1997) (characterizing § 2(b) as 
"a wish list from manufacturing America" in which "[m]essy and 
awkward concepts such as precedent, policy, and case accuracy 
have been brushed aside for the purpose of tort reform"); 
Symposium, A Critical Analysis of the Proposed Restatement 
(Third) of Torts:  Products Liability, 21 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 
411, 412-13, 419-20 (1995) (criticizing § 2(b) as being "a 
vehicle for social reform" rather than a restatement of the 
existing 
law, 
and 
citing 
numerous 
articles 
with 
similar 
observations). 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
47
Wisconsin law, foreseeability of the risk of harm is an element 
of negligence, not strict products liability); Meyer v. Val-Lo-
Will Farms, Inc., 14 Wis. 2d 616, 622, 111 N.W.2d 500 (1961) 
(explaining that negligence 
claims 
require 
a 
risk-benefit 
analysis).  In this sense, for the reasons explained above, 
§ 2(b) is fundamentally at odds with current Wisconsin products 
liability law.   
¶73 But we are more troubled by the fact that § 2(b) sets 
the bar higher for recovery in strict products liability design 
defect cases17 than in comparable negligence cases.  Section 2(b) 
does not merely incorporate a negligence standard into strict 
products liability law.  Instead, it adds to this standard the 
additional requirement that an injured consumer seeking to 
recover under strict products liability must prove that there 
was a "reasonable alternative design" available to the product's 
manufacturer.  Thus, rather than serving the policies underlying 
strict products liability law by allowing consumers to recover 
for injuries caused by a defective and unreasonably dangerous 
product without proving negligence on the part of the product's 
manufacturer,18 § 2(b) increases the burden for injured consumers 
not only by requiring proof of the manufacturer's negligence, 
but also by adding an additional——and considerable——element of 
                     
17 Design defect cases are cases such as the one at hand, in 
which the product at issue conforms with its intended design, 
but the design itself allegedly is defective and unreasonably 
dangerous.  
18 See Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55 
(1967).  
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
48
proof to the negligence standard.  This court will not impose 
such a burden on injured persons.  Accord Sumnicht v. Toyota 
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 338, 371, 360 N.W.2d 2 
(1984) (rejecting the argument that Wisconsin strict products 
liability requires proof of an alternative, safer design).   
¶74 Where 
a 
manufacturer 
places 
a 
defective 
and 
unreasonably dangerous product into the stream of commerce, the 
manufacturer, not the injured consumer, should bear the costs of 
the risks posed by the product.  Because § 2(b) unduly obstructs 
this equitable principle, we refuse to adopt § 2(b) into 
Wisconsin law.  Accord Sharp v. Case Corp., 227 Wis. 2d 1, 19, 
595 N.W.2d 380 (1999) (declining to adopt the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts (1998)).   
III 
 
¶75 We next examine whether the jury could properly find 
that S&N's gloves were defective and unreasonably dangerous 
where the evidence introduced at trial showed that the gloves 
contained a substance that causes an allergic reaction in 5 to 
17 percent of their consumers.  S&N contends that as a matter of 
law, a faultlessly manufactured product that contains no 
impurities 
cannot 
be 
rendered 
defective 
and 
unreasonably 
dangerous simply because some persons suffer an allergic 
reaction to that product.  In essence, S&N's argument is that 
where a consumer suffers an allergic reaction to a product that 
is safe to the majority of the population, that reaction is not 
the result of a defect in the product, but rather a "defect" in 
the consumer——a propensity for allergies.  Thus, although S&N 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
49
accepts as fact the evidence Green adduced at trial to the 
effect that health care workers were the "ordinary consumers" of 
S&N's latex gloves and that those latex gloves could cause an 
allergic reaction in 5 to 17 percent of health care workers in 
the United States, S&N nonetheless contends that Green's case 
fails as a matter of law. 
 
¶76 Because S&N does not dispute the evidence relevant to 
this issue, resolution of this issue requires us to apply the 
law to an undisputed set of facts.  This presents a question of 
law, which we review de novo.  Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 
245, 274, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998).   
 
¶77 To reiterate, in order to prevail in a products 
liability case, a plaintiff has the burden to prove that the 
product at issue is defective and unreasonably dangerous.  
Vincer, 69 Wis. 2d at 330, 331.  A product is defective if it is 
"in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer."  Id. 
at 330 (quotation omitted).  A product is unreasonably dangerous 
where it is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary consumer."  Id. at 331 (quotation 
omitted). 
 
¶78 Applying this standard to the facts of the case at 
hand, we initially conclude that the issue here is not whether 
S&N's gloves were defective.  The evidence at trial showed that 
S&N's gloves were flawed in two respects:  (1) they contained 
excessive levels of allergy-causing proteins; and (2) they were 
powdered with cornstarch, which allowed the latex proteins to 
become aerosolized and, consequently, easily inhaled.  The 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
50
evidence further showed that both of these flaws can cause some 
consumers 
to 
suffer 
injuries——i.e., 
allergic 
reactions.  
Finally, the parties do not dispute that at the time Green 
became sensitized to latex and consequently began suffering 
allergic reactions, the health care community was unaware that 
persons could be allergic to latex; hence, the "ordinary 
consumer" of S&N's gloves——i.e., health care workers——could not 
have contemplated at the time of Green's sensitization that 
S&N's gloves contained flaws that could cause injuries.  Based 
on this evidence, the jury reasonably found that S&N's gloves 
were in a condition not contemplated by the ordinary consumer——
i.e., that the gloves were defective.  For this reason, the only 
issue at hand is whether a product that causes an allergic 
reaction in 5 to 17 percent of its consumers can be deemed 
unreasonably dangerous.   
¶79 We 
acknowledge, 
as 
S&N 
emphasizes, 
that 
most 
jurisdictions hold that where a consumer suffers an unusually 
rare idiosyncratic reaction to a particular product, strict 
products liability does not allow the consumer to impose 
liability on the product's manufacturer.  See, e.g., Adelman-
Tremblay v. Jewel Cos., 859 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding 
that under Wisconsin law, the plaintiff could not recover where 
her "extremely rare" allergic reaction to fingernail glue was 
the only reported instance of such a reaction out of over 
1,000,000 products sold); Gordon v. Proctor & Gamble Distrib. 
Co., 789 F. Supp. 1384, 1385 (W.D. Ky. 1992) (noting "the 
general rule that a plaintiff's unusual or rare idiosyncratic 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
51
sensitivity does not provide a basis for recovery under any 
theory of product liability"); Mountain v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 
312 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (holding that under Wisconsin 
law, the plaintiff could not recover where her allergic reaction 
to shampoo was one of only three reported instances of such a 
reaction out of 225,000,000 products sold); Simeon v. Doe, 618 
So. 2d 848 (La. 1993) (holding that the plaintiff could not 
recover for a reaction to bacteria in raw oysters where the 
reaction occurred in only .6 to 1.9 of 100,000 persons in the 
general population); Booker v. Revlon Realistic Prof'l Prods., 
Inc., 433 So. 2d 407 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the 
plaintiff could not recover where her possible allergic reaction 
to hair relaxer was one of only four reported complaints of such 
a reaction out of 7,000,000 applications of the product sold).  
This rule is not, however, an innate bar to recovery in cases 
involving injuries arising from an allergic reaction.   
¶80 We perceive the "idiosyncratic reaction" rule not as a 
recognition that in cases of unusually rare idiosyncratic 
reactions, the injury-causing defect is in the consumer rather 
than the product at issue.  Contra, e.g., Simeon, 618 So. 2d at 
851 (explaining that in cases of idiosyncratic reaction, the 
"'defect' is really found in the person rather than the 
product").  Instead, we conclude that this rule, properly 
interpreted, reflects that in cases involving unusually rare 
idiosyncratic reactions, the injured party typically cannot show 
that his or her injury was sufficiently common to render the 
injury-causing product dangerous to an extent beyond that which 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
52
the 
ordinary 
consumer 
would 
contemplate. 
 
That 
is, 
the 
"idiosyncratic reaction" rule is not a legal prohibition, but a 
frequent evidentiary shortcoming.   
¶81 Virtually 
no 
product 
is 
entirely 
safe 
for 
all 
consumers under all conditions, even when being used as 
intended.  We presume that the ordinary consumer recognizes as 
much.  Thus, when the ordinary consumer purchases or uses a 
product, we must assume that consumer contemplates there is at 
least some danger involved.  But to impose liability on the 
manufacturer of the product, an injured consumer must prove more 
than that the product posed some danger; the consumer must prove 
that the product is dangerous beyond the extent contemplated by 
the ordinary consumer.  Sharp, 227 Wis. 2d at 20.   
¶82 This does not mean, however, that to prevail on a 
strict products liability claim, an injured consumer must prove 
that the product at issue is potentially dangerous to every 
consumer.  Because product defects vary, the magnitude of danger 
necessary to render a product dangerous to an extent beyond that 
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer——i.e., 
unreasonably dangerous——must be evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis.   
¶83 With regard to how this standard applies to allergy-
causing products, we find guidance in the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 402A cmt. j (1965).  Comment j provides that a 
manufacturer can, in some circumstances, prevent a product from 
being rendered unreasonably dangerous by issuing appropriate 
warnings or directions for use.  Id.  The Comment then notes 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
53
that "[w]here . . . the product contains an ingredient to which 
a substantial number of the population are allergic, and the 
ingredient is one whose danger is not generally known . . . the 
seller is required to give warning against it."  Id.  By 
negative implication, this means that where a product "contains 
an ingredient to which a substantial number of the population 
are allergic, and the ingredient is one whose danger is not 
generally known," the product, absent warning or directions, is 
unreasonably dangerous.  Id.; see also Schuh v. Fox River 
Tractor Co., 63 Wis. 2d 728, 737, 218 N.W.2d 279 (1974) ("In the 
absence of a warning to the contrary, the jury could well 
conclude that the machine was unreasonably dangerous and 
defective in its design.").  Following this guidance, we 
conclude that in order to prove that an allergy-causing product 
is unreasonably dangerous, a plaintiff must prove the following 
elements:  (1) the product contains an ingredient that can cause 
allergic reactions in a substantial number of consumers; and (2) 
the ordinary consumer does not know that the ingredient can 
cause allergic reactions in a substantial number of consumers.  
Upon the plaintiff making this showing, the burden then shifts 
to the manufacturer to prove that the product includes a warning 
or directions that effectively alert the ordinary consumer that 
the ingredient can cause allergic reactions in a substantial 
number of consumers; if the manufacturer fails to meet this 
burden, a trier of fact can properly conclude that the product 
is unreasonably dangerous.     
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
54
¶84 Employing this test in the case at hand, we conclude 
that the jury could properly have found that S&N's gloves were 
unreasonably dangerous.  First, Green met her initial burden.  
There was evidence that S&N's gloves contained an ingredient——
latex proteins——which can cause allergic reactions in 5 to 17 
percent of their consumers.  From this, the jury reasonably 
could conclude that S&N's gloves contained an ingredient that 
can cause an allergic reaction in a "significant number" of 
consumers.19  Additionally, the evidence at trial indicated that 
at the time of Green's sensitization, the ordinary consumer did 
not know that latex proteins could cause allergic reactions in 
approximately 
one-in-twenty 
to 
one-in-six consumers. 
 And 
second, S&N failed to show that its gloves included warnings or 
directions alerting consumers of the gloves' potential to cause 
allergic reactions.  Therefore, with regard to this issue, we 
affirm the jury finding.  Accord Stinson v. E.I. DuPont De 
Nemours & Co., 904 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding 
that where evidence showed that isocyanates potentially can 
cause injury to 7 percent of exposed persons, the evidence was 
                     
19 We take notice that the United States Bureau of Labor 
Statistics reported that in 1989, the year during which S&N's 
gloves sensitized Green to latex, approximately 7,551,000 people 
in the United States worked in the health care industry.  Bureau 
of the Census, United States Dept. of Commerce, Statistical 
Abstract of the United States 1991 410 (111th ed. 1991).  
Assuming pursuant to the evidence Green introduced at trial that 
latex allergy potentially can affect 5 to 17 percent of this 
class, this means that in 1989, latex allergy potentially could 
have affected between 377,550 and 1,283,670 persons in the 
health care industry alone.  This suggests that latex allergy is 
a far cry from an unusually rare idiosyncratic reaction. 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
55
sufficient to submit to a jury the question of whether 
isocyanates are unreasonably dangerous); Ray v. Upjohn Co., 851 
S.W.2d 646, 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that evidence that 
isocyanates potentially can cause injury to 5 percent of exposed 
persons is sufficient to sustain a verdict that isocyanates are 
unreasonably dangerous).     
¶85 In sum, we hold that a product can be deemed defective 
and unreasonably dangerous where that product contains a 
substance which, unbeknownst to the ordinary consumer, can cause 
an allergic reaction in 5 to 17 percent of its consumers.  
Moreover, we conclude that because the evidence introduced at 
trial in the present case indicated that, unbeknownst to the 
ordinary consumer, the latex proteins in S&N's gloves could 
cause allergic reactions in 5 to 17 percent of the gloves' 
users, and because S&N failed to show that their gloves included 
adequate warnings or instructions regarding this potential 
danger, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that 
S&N's gloves were defective and unreasonably dangerous. 
IV 
 
¶86 We last examine whether the circuit court erred in 
admitting certain opinion evidence regarding the safety of S&N's 
gloves.  If we conclude that the circuit court did so err, we 
then must determine whether this error necessitates a new trial. 
 
¶87 S&N maintains that the circuit court erred in reading 
to the jury a summary of testimony by Paul Cacioli (Cacioli), 
which included Cacioli's opinions that he considered the "high 
level 
of 
protein" 
in 
S&N's 
gloves 
to 
be 
"unsafe 
and 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
56
unacceptable" and that "a lower protein glove is a safer glove." 
 S&N contends that Cacioli was not qualified pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 907.02 (1997-98)20 to provide such opinions.  Moreover, 
S&N argues that these opinions were the "primary evidence 
regarding the safety of S&N's gloves."  S&N accordingly claims 
there is a reasonable possibility that the admission of 
Cacioli's opinions contributed to the jury's verdict.  Thus, S&N 
concludes that the circuit court's admission of Cacioli's 
opinions was not harmless error and, therefore, this court must 
remand this case for a new trial. 
 
¶88 Green argues in response that Cacioli was qualified to 
express the opinions at issue.  In the alternative, Green 
contends that even if the circuit court erred in admitting 
Cacioli's opinions, in light of the substantial other evidence 
which Green presented at trial regarding the safety of S&N's 
gloves, this error did not affect a substantial right of S&N 
and, hence, was harmless.  Accordingly, Green maintains that 
this court should affirm the court of appeals decision, which 
upheld the circuit court's entry of judgment on the jury 
verdict. 
A 
 
¶89 Section 907.02 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides: 
 
Testimony by experts.  If scientific, technical, 
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
                     
20 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
57
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
(Emphasis added.)  The determination of whether a witness is 
qualified to testify as an expert under § 907.02 is a matter 
within the discretion of the circuit court.  Glassey v. 
Continental Ins. Co., 176 Wis. 2d 587, 608, 500 N.W.2d 295 
(1993).  On review, we will sustain the circuit court's 
discretionary determination so long as the circuit court 
"examined the facts of record, applied a proper legal standard 
and, using a rational process, reached a reasonable conclusion." 
 Id.    
 
¶90 In the present case, we must apply this standard to 
determine whether the circuit court properly exercised its 
discretion in ruling that Cacioli was qualified to provide the 
opinions at issue and, hence, whether the circuit court properly 
admitted those opinions at trial.  The record reflects that at 
the time of Green's trial, Cacioli held a bachelor of science 
degree and a Ph.D. in organic chemistry, and had pursued several 
postdoctoral 
fellowships 
at 
various 
institutions. 
 
After 
completing his formal education, Cacioli served as the business 
manager for a consulting firm's chemistry division.21  He then 
joined Ansell, Inc. (Ansell), a manufacturer of latex medical 
gloves, where he worked as the Director of Research and 
Development at the time of Green's trial.   
                     
21 Neither party contends that the focus of the research in 
Cacioli's fellowships or Cacioli's experience at the consulting 
firm is relevant to the present issue.  
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
58
¶91 While 
at 
Ansell, 
Cacioli 
consulted 
with leading 
experts 
in 
the 
field 
of 
latex 
allergy 
and 
formed 
an 
informational program regarding latex allergy, in which he 
employed several medical experts.  As a result, Cacioli observed 
latex allergy testing, learned some of the language and issues 
of the field, and became aware of the protein levels in 
competing companies' latex gloves.  He further was familiar with 
and implemented processes that altered the protein levels in 
Ansell's latex gloves.   
¶92 However, Cacioli specifically denied being an expert 
in the field of latex allergy.  When Green's attorney questioned 
Cacioli during a deposition about whether a high protein level 
in a latex glove could be deemed unsafe, Cacioli replied: 
 
Could I clarify one thing in this terminology of 
unsafe? . . .   
 
 
It's basically this terminology of unsafe, we're 
very much in the dark about what is safe and what is 
unsafe.  There has been no definition at this point in 
time to us as to what is considered to be safe, and 
there are conflicting opinions, as well, from the 
knowledgeable people in this area.  I can only make 
that statement from what I believe is unsafe, and I'm 
not an expert in that area, so I'd just like to 
clarify that. 
(Emphasis added.)  Cacioli then explained that he was an expert 
only 
in 
manufacturing 
processes 
and 
quality 
control.22  
                     
22 Green's attorney seemed to recognize as much.  After 
Cacioli disclaimed any expertise in the safety of various 
protein levels, the following exchange occurred: 
Q: 
[Green's attorney]:  I am asking you, within the 
level 
of 
your 
competence 
and 
your 
experience. . . .   
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
59
Nonetheless, 
the 
circuit 
court 
ruled 
that 
based 
on 
his 
background, Cacioli was qualified to provide an expert opinion 
regarding the safety of various protein levels in latex gloves. 
¶93 This ruling was in error.  To be sure, Cacioli knew of 
and could manipulate protein levels in latex gloves, and had 
some knowledge of the language and issues of the medical 
community that studied latex allergy.  However, Cacioli was not 
a medical doctor, had no formal experience, training, or 
education in latex allergy, and had no first-hand knowledge of 
how 
or 
why 
various 
protein 
levels 
affected 
individuals.  
Instead, he culled his knowledge by associating with and 
observing medical doctors and others who had devoted their 
careers to the study of allergy and immunology.  We cannot 
conclude from the fact that Cacioli seems to have acquainted 
himself with people qualified to testify about the effects of 
                                                                  
 
I want to make clear for you that I wasn't asking 
you to testify as Dr. Beezhold or someone like 
that. 
 
You do think you're competent, do you not, to 
discuss manufacturing practices, don't you? 
 
A: 
[Cacioli]:  That is my field of expertise, yes. 
 
Q: 
And safe manufacturing processes?  
 
A: 
Yes. 
 
Q: 
And quality control? 
 
A: 
Yes. 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
60
various protein levels in latex gloves that Cacioli was 
qualified to testify on this subject. 
¶94 But more importantly, we accord great weight to the 
fact 
that 
Cacioli 
specifically 
disclaimed 
any 
expertise 
regarding the safety of different protein levels in latex 
gloves.  As the court of appeals previously has observed, a 
witness called upon to provide expert testimony may establish 
his or her qualifications by means of his or her own testimony. 
 James v. Heintz, 165 Wis. 2d 572, 579, 478 N.W.2d 31 (Ct. App. 
1991); cf. Wis. Stat. § 906.02 ("Evidence to prove personal 
knowledge may . . . consist of the testimony of the witness."). 
 The circuit court must accept this foundational testimony 
unless "it finds the testimony not credible or there is contrary 
credible evidence that undercuts the proffered foundation."  Id. 
 Like the court of appeals in the present case, we hold that if 
a 
witness's 
own 
testimony 
can 
establish 
the 
witness's 
qualifications, the witness's testimony similarly might limit 
the witness's qualifications.  Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, 
Inc., 2000 WI App 192, ¶22, 238 Wis. 2d 477, 617 N.W.2d 881.  
¶95 In 
the 
present 
case, 
as 
noted 
above, 
Cacioli 
specifically disavowed being qualified to testify regarding the 
safety of different protein levels in latex gloves.  The circuit 
court made no findings to the contrary, nor do we find any 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
61
evidence to the contrary in the record.23  For these reasons, we 
hold that Cacioli was not qualified to provide the opinions at 
issue and, accordingly, the circuit court erred in admitting 
those opinions.     
B 
 
¶96 Although we hold that the circuit court's admission of 
Cacioli's opinions was in error, we still must determine whether 
such error requires us to reverse the court of appeals decision 
and remand this case for a new trial.  As provided by Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.18(2): 
 
No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new 
trial granted in any action or proceeding on the 
ground 
of . . . improper 
admission 
of 
evidence 
. . . unless in the opinion of the court to which the 
application is made, after an examination of the 
entire action or proceeding, it shall appear that the 
error complained of has affected the substantial 
rights of the party seeking to reverse or set aside 
the judgment, or to secure a new trial. 
(Emphasis added.)  For an error to "affect the substantial 
rights" of a party, there must be a reasonable possibility that 
the error contributed to the outcome of the action or proceeding 
at issue.  State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543, 547, 370 N.W.2d 
222 (1985); see also Town of Geneva v. Tills, 129 Wis. 2d 167, 
184-85, 384 N.W.2d 701 (1986) (noting that the standard set 
forth in Dyess applies in civil cases as well as criminal 
                     
23 Ironically, in light of Cacioli's disclaimer regarding 
the limits of his expertise, by ruling that Cacioli was 
qualified to provide the opinions at issue, the circuit court in 
effect ruled that Cacioli——or at least his disclaimer——was not 
credible.     
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
62
cases).  A reasonable possibility of a different outcome is a 
possibility 
sufficient 
to 
"undermine 
confidence 
in 
the  
outcome."  Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 544-45 (quotation omitted).  
Where the erroneously admitted evidence affects constitutional 
rights or where the outcome of the action or proceeding at issue 
is 
weakly 
supported 
by 
the 
record, 
a 
reviewing 
court's 
confidence in the outcome may be more easily undermined than 
where the erroneously admitted evidence was peripheral or the 
outcome was strongly supported by evidence untainted by error.  
Id. at 545. 
 
¶97 With this standard in mind, we examine the facts 
surrounding the circuit court's admission of Cacioli's opinions. 
 The primary issue in the case at hand was whether S&N's gloves 
were defective and unreasonably dangerous.  Cacioli's opinions 
that a low-protein glove is safer than a high-protein glove and 
that the high levels of latex proteins in S&N's gloves rendered 
them unsafe and unacceptable directly addressed this issue.  
 
¶98 However, the jury heard similar evidence from several 
other sources, which were not affected by error.  For example, 
one of Green's experts told the jury of a study in which 75 
percent of tested latex-sensitive individuals reacted to high-
protein latex gloves, but only 7 percent reacted to low-protein 
gloves.  Similarly, the jury learned of the ACAAI statement, 
which provided:  "Only low allergen latex gloves should be 
purchased and used.  This will reduce the occurrence of 
reactions among sensitized personnel and should reduce the rate 
of sensitization."  In addition, two of Green's medical experts 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
63
testified that high-protein gloves are much more likely than 
low-protein 
gloves 
to 
cause 
sensitization 
and 
allergic 
reactions.  Further, one of these doctors specifically testified 
that high-protein, powdered latex gloves are defective and 
unreasonably dangerous.  And even two of S&N's experts agreed 
that low-protein gloves are safer than high-protein gloves.  
Finally, the jury heard evidence regarding the Mayo Clinic 
studies in which S&N's gloves were found to have considerably 
higher protein levels than almost all other tested brands of 
latex medical gloves. 
 
¶99 Moreover, the jury learned that Cacioli did not 
consider himself to be an expert on how different protein levels 
affect glove users.  One of S&N's experts read to the jury 
Cacioli's 
deposition 
testimony 
in 
which 
he 
specifically 
disclaimed such expertise.  Thus, the credibility and foundation 
of Cacioli's opinions was thrown into doubt before the jury, and 
the jury could make an informed decision whether to attach any 
credence to those opinions.  
¶100 In 
light 
of 
these 
facts, 
we 
cannot 
discern 
a 
reasonable 
possibility 
that, 
absent 
the 
circuit 
court's 
admission of Cacioli's opinions, the outcome of the trial would 
have been any different.  Consequently, we conclude that the 
circuit court's error in admitting Cacioli's testimony was 
harmless and, therefore, does not warrant a new trial. 
V 
 
¶101 In conclusion, we hold that S&N has failed to show 
that the jury verdict should not stand.  Contrary to S&N's 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
64
contentions, the circuit court fully and fairly instructed the 
jury regarding the relevant law.  As the circuit court 
explained, a product can be deemed defective and unreasonably 
dangerous based solely upon consumer expectations about that 
product.  Indeed, because the consumer-contemplation test is the 
exclusive standard in Wisconsin strict products liability law, 
if a trier of fact is to find a product to be defective and 
unreasonably dangerous, it must do so based solely upon consumer 
expectations about the product at issue.  Additionally, the 
circuit court correctly instructed the jury that a product can 
be deemed defective and unreasonably dangerous regardless of 
whether the manufacturer of that product knew or could have 
known of the risk of harm the product presented.  As this court 
repeatedly has emphasized, foreseeability is not an element of 
this state's strict products liability law. 
 
¶102 We further reject S&N's argument that as a blanket 
rule, a product cannot be deemed defective and unreasonably 
dangerous based on the fact that it causes allergic reactions in 
a minority of its consumers.  Where a product contains a 
substance that, unbeknownst to the ordinary consumer, can cause 
an allergic reaction in a substantial number of the product's 
users, the product may be deemed defective and unreasonably 
dangerous.  In the present case, because the evidence introduced 
at trial indicated that the ordinary consumer was not aware at 
the time of Green's injuries that the protein levels and 
cornstarch powder in S&N's gloves could cause an allergic 
reaction in 5 to 17 percent of the gloves' consumers, we 
No. 
98-2162 
 
 
65
conclude that the jury reasonably found S&N's gloves to be 
defective and unreasonably dangerous. 
 
¶103 Finally, while we agree with S&N that the circuit 
court's admission of Cacioli's opinions was in error, we do not 
agree with S&N that this error necessitates a new trial.  Due to 
the substantial amount of evidence that mirrored Cacioli's 
opinions and because the jury was informed that Cacioli did not 
consider 
himself 
qualified 
to 
provide 
such 
opinions, 
we 
determine that the circuit court's error was harmless. 
 
¶104 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that jury 
verdict in the case at hand is legally sound.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals, which upheld the 
circuit court's entry of judgment on the verdict.  
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 98-2162.ssa 
 
1 
¶105 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).  I 
join all but Part IV of the majority opinion.  I do not join 
Part IV because I do not agree with what the opinion identifies 
as the evidentiary error in the present case.  The opinion 
concludes that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion in finding Dr. Cacioli qualified to give expert 
testimony regarding glove safety. 
¶106 An appellate court will uphold a circuit court's 
discretionary decision that an expert witness is qualified to 
answer a particular question if the circuit court "examined the 
facts of record, applied a proper legal standard and, using a 
rational process, reached a reasonable conclusion."24 
¶107 The majority sets forth two grounds for concluding 
that the circuit court's discretionary decision to admit Dr. 
Cacioli's testimony regarding glove safety was an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  First, Dr. Cacioli did not have the 
requisite qualifications to testify regarding glove safety 
because he "was not a medical doctor, had no formal experience, 
training, or education in latex allergy, and had no first-hand 
knowledge of how or why various protein levels affected 
individuals."25  Second, and "more importantly," Dr. Cacioli 
"specifically disclaimed any expertise" in glove safety by 
stating "I'm not an expert in that area" as part of his response 
to a question regarding the relative safety of high protein 
                     
24 See majority op. at ¶89. 
25 See majority op. at ¶93. 
No. 98-2162.ssa 
 
2 
levels.26  Neither basis for concluding that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in admitting Dr. Cacioli's 
testimony on glove safety follows from our case law. 
 
I 
 
¶108 As to the first basis offered by the majority opinion, 
ample authority exists for the proposition that an individual 
may be qualified to give expert testimony based on association 
with and observation of professionals in a particular field.27  
Additionally, I see no support in the case law for the 
majority's conclusion that Dr. Cacioli could not testify because 
he "was not a medical doctor"28; lacked "formal" experience, 
                     
26 See majority op. at ¶94. 
27 Compare 
majority 
op. 
at 
¶93 
(Cacioli 
"culled 
his 
knowledge by associating with and observing medical doctors and 
others who had devoted their careers to the study of allergy and 
immunology") with Henning v. Ahearn, 230 Wis. 2d 149, 178-82, 
601 N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that an attorney whose 
practice focused on business should not be precluded from 
testimony regarding the practice of business executives merely 
because he was not a business executive). 
28 Wisconsin case law has repeatedly stressed that a 
witness's "label" is not relevant to the determination of 
whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert on a 
given subject.  See, e.g., Karl v. Employers Ins., 78 Wis. 2d 
284, 297, 254 N.W.2d 255 (1977) ("law traditionally has 
permitted limited testimony of a medical nature by one not 
licensed as a medical doctor, if he is, in fact, qualified as an 
expert") (citation and quotation omitted); Wester v. Bruggink, 
190 Wis. 2d 309, 319-20, 527 N.W.2d 373 (Ct. App. 1994) 
("[W]hether a witness qualifies to testify as an expert depends 
on the witness's background, education, and experience rather 
than a particular label.") (citation omitted).  
No. 98-2162.ssa 
 
3 
training, or education in latex allergy29; and did not have 
"first-hand knowledge" of how latex proteins affect allergic 
individuals.30  Experience, not licensure, is the key.  Expertise 
may be derived from experience working in a field of endeavor 
rather than from studies or diplomas.31  And Dr. Cacioli's 
experience, training, and education in latex are extensive.32  I 
am concerned that the majority's conclusion regarding Dr. 
Cacioli's qualifications raises the bar in Wisconsin regarding 
who is qualified to testify as an expert witness. 
¶109 As to the second basis offered by the majority 
opinion, I, unlike the majority opinion, would not give "great 
weight"33 to Cacioli's statement that "I am not an expert in that 
                     
29 The rule of evidence regarding the admission of expert 
testimony and the cases applying it speak only of "experience, 
training, 
and 
education" 
and 
not 
of 
"formal 
experience, 
education, and training," as the majority opinion does.  See 
majority op. at ¶93; Wis. Stat. § 907.02; 7 Dan Blinka, 
Wisconsin Practice: Wisconsin Evidence § 702.4, at 489 (2d ed. 
2001) ("Expertise, then, is a function of knowledge; it may be 
evidenced by academic degrees and licensure, but is not limited 
to these trappings."). 
30 See generally 7 Dan Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Wisconsin 
Evidence § 702.601, at 500-01 (2d ed. 2001) (suggesting that the 
law liberally allows experts to testify regarding knowledge that 
comes from interactions with others, as opposed to first-hand 
experience; concluding that "what distinguishes experts from lay 
witnesses, in part, is their ability to rely on hearsay 
sources"). 
31 Black v. Gen. Elec. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 195, 212, 278 N.W.2d 
224 (Ct. App. 1979). 
32 See majority op. at ¶¶90-91. 
33 See majority op. at ¶94. 
No. 98-2162.ssa 
 
4 
area," any more than I would give great weight to a witness's 
statement that "I am an expert in that area."  What matters is 
not the witness's view of self.  Rather, what matters is whether 
the circuit court determines in the exercise of its discretion 
that the witness has the requisite experience, training, and 
education to qualify as an expert in a court of law.34 
¶110 I would conclude that the error in the present case 
lay in the circuit court's failure to submit to the jury Dr. 
Cacioli's statement that "I am not an expert in this area" and 
Dr. Cacioli's explanation about the state of knowledge on the 
safety issue, alongside his response to the questions regarding 
glove safety.35  Dr. Cacioli's statement and explanation go to 
the weight, not the admissibility, of his testimony.  Like the 
majority opinion, however, I conclude that any error was 
harmless.36 
 
II 
 
¶111 Finally, I wrote a concurrence on the issue of 
harmless error in In re the Termination of Parental Rights to 
                     
34 Compare majority op. at ¶¶94-95 with Leahy v. Kenosha 
Memorial, 118 Wis. 2d 441, 453, 348 N.W.2d 607 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(noting that the witness had admitted that she was not an expert 
in a particular field but listing this factor as one of many for 
the circuit court to consider in evaluating her qualifications 
as an expert). 
35 See majority op. at ¶99. 
36 See majority op. at ¶¶96-100.   
 
No. 98-2162.ssa 
 
5 
Jayton S.: Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110 ¶¶37-42, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J. concurring).  My 
views on harmless error expressed in that concurrence apply to 
the present case as well.  Rather than repeat the concurrence 
verbatim in the present case, I refer the reader to the Evelyn 
C.R. case. 
¶112 For these reasons, I write separately. 
¶113 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins Part I of this opinion. 
No.98-2162.npc 
 
1 
 
¶114 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.    (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority's decision today and write separately only to 
remark upon the harmless error test utilized by the majority.  
See majority op. at ¶96.  The majority's standard is whether 
there is "a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to 
the outcome," and that a "reasonable possibility" is one 
"sufficient to 'undermine confidence in the outcome.'"  Id. 
(quoting State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 544-45, 370 N.W.2d 222 
(1985)).  Since the standard for harmless error is the same for 
civil, as well as criminal, cases (Town of Geneva v. Tills, 129 
Wis. 2d 167, 184-85, 384 N.W.2d 701 (1986)), it is imperative 
that the standard be accurately conveyed.  
¶115 For at least the past 35 years, this court has 
wrestled with formulating a standard for harmless error.  See, 
e.g., Pulaski v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 450, 456-57, 129 N.W.2d 204 
(1964); State v. Spring, 48 Wis. 2d 333, 339-40, 179 N.W.2d 841 
(1970); Wold v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 356-57, 204 N.W.2d 482 
(1973); State v. Grant, 139 Wis. 2d 45, 406 N.W.2d 744 (1987).  
In an attempt to formulate a single, uniform test for harmless 
error, Dyess "conclude[d] that the test of prejudice as 
formulated in Strickland subsumes the various statements of the 
harmless error test that this court has used over the years."  
No.98-2162.npc 
 
2 
Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 545.37  The Strickland case referred to is 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984), and the test 
is whether "there is a reasonable probability" that "but for" 
the error, "the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the outcome."  466 U.S. at 694 
(emphasis added).   Dyess obviously adopted that test, but 
incorrectly assumed that there was no real difference between 
using 
"reasonable 
possibility" 
instead 
of 
"reasonable 
probability." 124 Wis. 2d at 544.  Granted, Dyess applied its 
test by stating that "[i]n the present case, the probability to 
be weighed is whether the defendant would have been acquitted." 
 Id. at 546 (emphasis added).  However, as evident in the 
majority's opinion here today,38 Wisconsin courts have frequently 
                     
37 Dyess' single test for harmless error standard has not 
been without controversy.  State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 370 
N.W.2d 222 (1985).  In addition to the majority opinion's 
discussion of Dyess' harmless error standard, authored by 
Justice Day, in State v. Grant, 139 Wis. 2d 45, 406 N.W.2d 744 
(1987), 
Chief 
Justice 
Heffernan, 
Justice 
Day, 
Justice 
Abrahamson, and Justice Callow separately concurred on the Dyess 
issue.  The controversy has continued.  See State v. Dodson, 219 
Wis. 2d 
65, 
92-98, 
580 
N.W.2d 
181 
(1998) 
(Crooks, 
J., 
concurring, joined by Justice Steinmetz and Justice Wilcox).    
38 See also Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 2001 WI 111, ___ Wis. 2d 
___, ___ N.W.2d ___; Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 
110, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; and Nommensen v. American 
Cont’l Ins. Co., 2001 WI 112, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  
(I have written dissents or concurrences in these cases.)  But 
see State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d 
___ (Strickland's 
probability 
sufficient to undermine the 
confidence in the outcome test used to determine ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim). 
No.98-2162.npc 
 
3 
used the term "reasonable possibility," and have not indicated 
that, in the context of a harmless error standard, possibility 
means probability.39   
¶116 There can be no doubt that there is a significant 
difference between what is reasonably probable and what is 
reasonably possible.  "A possibility test is the next thing to 
automatic reversal."  Wold v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 356-57, 204 
N.W.2d 482 (1973).40  While I agree that the focus should be "on 
whether the error 'undermine[s] confidence in the outcome,'" 
(Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 545 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694)), if that error need only possibly undermine the confidence 
in the outcome, rather than probably, appellate courts, and 
circuit courts considering motions after verdict and post-
convictions motions, will find themselves invading the purview 
of the jury.  A cornerstone of the common law is deference to 
the jury, which is diluted by determining whether the alleged 
error possibly, and only possibly, may have affected the jury's 
decision.  
                     
39 According to my research, on few occasions since Dyess 
has this court, in a majority opinion, noted that reasonable 
possibility 
means 
reasonable 
probability. 
 
See 
State 
v. 
Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 372 n.40, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999); see 
also State v. Huntington, 216 Wis. 2d 671, 695-96, 575 N.W.2d 
268 (1998).  However, several court of appeals opinions have 
applied the Dyess harmless error test using the correct 
"reasonable probability" standard.  See, e.g., State v. A.H., 
211 Wis. 2d 561, 569, 566 N.W.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. 
Joseph P., 200 Wis. 2d 227, 237, 546 N.W.2d 494 (Ct. App. 1996). 
  
40 Wold's "reasonable probability" test for harmless error 
was replaced by Dyess' "reasonable possibility" test.  
No.98-2162.npc 
 
4 
¶117 I do not take issue with the term "reasonable 
possibility," so long as it is made clear that this term means 
reasonable probability, and probability is the standard to be 
applied.  Accordingly, I offer the following test for harmless 
error, which makes clear that Dyess' use of the term "reasonable 
possibility" is intended to require "reasonable probability": 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 805.18(2) provides that an error 
requires reversal only where it has "affected the 
substantial rights of the party" claiming error.  We 
have long recognized that the focus of a court's 
analysis under this statute is whether, in light of 
the 
applicable 
burden 
of 
proof, 
the 
error 
is 
significant enough to "undermine confidence in the 
outcome" of the trial.  Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 544-45. 
 An 
error 
is 
significant 
enough 
to 
undermine 
confidence in the outcome if there is a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome without the error. 
 Dyess 
made 
it 
clear 
that 
"probability" 
is 
substantially 
the 
same 
as 
"possibility" 
under 
Wisconsin law.  Id. at 544. 
¶118 Even 
though 
the 
majority 
used 
a 
"reasonable 
possibility" 
test, 
the 
alleged 
error 
at 
issue 
here——the 
admission of Paul Cacioli's expert opinion regarding the safety 
of Smith & Nephew's gloves——would be harmless under the more 
stringent "reasonable probability" test.  As the majority points 
out, the jury heard evidence similar to that offered by Cacioli 
from other sources.  See majority op. at ¶98.  Also, the jury 
heard that Cacioli did not consider himself an expert on the 
issue of how protein levels affect those who use the gloves.  
See id. at ¶99.  Given Cacioli's proviso, the jury could have 
accepted or disregarded his opinion.  However, there was other 
similar 
evidence 
that 
the 
jury 
could 
have 
relied 
upon.  
No.98-2162.npc 
 
5 
Consequently, there is no reasonable probability that the 
admission of Cacioli's opinion, assuming arguendo, it was error 
to do so, affected the jury's verdict.  
¶119 That Wisconsin courts have often used "reasonable 
possibility" rather than "reasonable probability" should not 
dissuade the court from correcting such missteps today.  See, 
e.g., State v. Sullivan 216 Wis. 2d 768, 792, 576 N.W.2d 30 
(1998); State v. Alexander, 214 Wis. 2d 628, 653, 571 N.W.2d 662 
(1997).  There is no time like the present——dum fervet opus41——
when the court has before it five cases wherein it discusses the 
harmless error standard, to clarify Dyess.   
¶120 For the reasons stated herein, I respectfully concur. 
¶121 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this opinion. 
 
 
                     
41 "While the action is fresh; in the heat of action."  
Black's Law Dictionary 518 (7th ed. 1999).  
98-2162.dss 
 
1 
 
¶122 DIANE S. SYKES, J. (dissenting).  I respectfully 
dissent.  The majority opinion is seriously out of step with 
product liability law as it has evolved since this court adopted 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A in Dippel v. Sciano, 37 
Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).  The majority blurs the 
distinctions between design, manufacturing, and failure-to-warn 
product defects.  The majority also keeps Wisconsin in the much-
criticized and rapidly dwindling minority of jurisdictions that 
rely exclusively on a consumer contemplation test to determine 
liability in design defect cases.  And finally, the majority 
opinion's language about the role of foreseeability in product 
liability law is misleading and overbroad. 
¶123 Strict liability in tort is imposed upon sellers of 
defective products that are unreasonably dangerous.  Dippel, 37 
Wis. 2d at 459-60 (adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 402A (1965)); see also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability §§ 1, 2 (1998).  Products can be defective and 
unreasonably dangerous in different ways, and so product 
liability cases fall into three distinct categories depending 
upon the nature of the alleged defect: 1) manufacturing defects 
(arising from a mistake in the manufacturing process); 2) design 
defects (arising from an unsafe product design); and 3) defects 
arising from an inadequate or nonexistent warning of a known 
danger.  
See 
Wis 
JI——Civil 
3200, 
3260, 
3262; 
see 
also 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 1 cmt. a 
(1998) ("[a]bundant authority recognizes the division of product 
98-2162.dss 
 
2 
defects into manufacturing defects, design defects, and defects 
based on inadequate instructions or warnings"). 
¶124 In 1997, the American Law Institute issued the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.  In the 
introduction to the Third Restatement, the ALI describes the 
evolution of product liability law in this way: 
 
To understand its place in the law, products liability 
must be examined in historical context.  In 1964 The 
American Law Institute adopted § 402A as part of the 
Restatement Second of Torts.  Section 402A was 
entitled "Special Liability of Seller of Product for 
Physical Harm to User or Consumer."  It marked the 
first recognition by the Institute of privity-free 
strict liability for sellers of defective products.  
The major thrust of §  402A was to eliminate privity 
so that a user or consumer, without having to 
establish negligence, could bring an action against a 
manufacturer, as well as against any other member of a 
distributive chain that had sold a product containing 
a manufacturing defect.  Section 402A had little to 
say about liability for design defects or for products 
sold with inadequate warnings.  In the early 1960s 
these areas of litigation were in their infancy. 
 
In restating the law of products liability more 
than a quarter of a century later, the Institute had 
before it thousands of judicial decisions that had 
fine-tuned the law of products liability in a manner 
hardly imaginable when Restatement Second was written. 
 Issues that had not occurred to those members 
involved in drafting Restatement Second had become 
points of serious contention and debate in the courts. 
 What should be the governing standard for design and 
warning liability?  Is there a cause of action for 
defective prescription drug design?  What rule should 
govern when a plaintiff establishes that enhanced harm 
was suffered as a result of a defect in a defendant's 
product, beyond that which would have resulted from 
other causes, but the plaintiff cannot quantify the 
amount of the enhancement? 
 
98-2162.dss 
 
3 
On almost every page of Restatement Third, Torts: 
Products Liability, the Institute has had to respond 
to questions that were not part of the landscape 35 
years ago.  This Restatement is, therefore, an almost 
total overhaul of Restatement Second as it concerns 
the liability of commercial sellers of products. 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, at 3 (1998) 
(emphasis added). 
¶125 The Third Restatement sets forth the following general 
rule of strict product liability: 
 
§ 1.  Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor 
for Harm Caused by Defective Products 
 
 
One engaged in the business of selling or 
otherwise 
distributing 
products 
who 
sells 
or 
distributes 
a 
defective 
product 
is 
subject 
to 
liability for harm to persons or property caused by 
the defect. 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 1 (1998). 
¶126 The Third Restatement also sets forth the separate 
standards of liability that have developed over time for 
manufacturing defects, design defects, and defects based upon 
inadequate instructions or warnings: 
 
§ 2.  Categories of Product Defect 
 
 
A product is defective when, at the time of sale 
or distribution, it contains a manufacturing defect, 
is defective in design, or is defective because of 
inadequate instructions or warnings.  A product: 
 
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the 
product departs from its intended design even though 
all possible care was exercised in the preparation and 
marketing of the product; 
 
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable 
risks of harm posed by the product could have been 
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable 
98-2162.dss 
 
4 
alternative design by the seller or other distributor, 
or 
a 
predecessor 
in 
the 
commercial 
chain 
of 
distribution, and the omission of the alternative 
design renders the product not reasonably safe; 
 
(c) 
is 
defective 
because 
of 
inadequate 
instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of 
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or 
avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or 
warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a 
predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, 
and the omission of the instructions or warnings 
renders the product not reasonably safe. 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 (1998).   
¶127 I would adopt the Third Restatement's recapitulation 
of the law as it has developed since the Second Restatement and 
Dippel, especially in the areas of design and warning defects, 
which the Restatement's authors acknowledge were not addressed 
in § 402A.  
¶128 Strict 
liability 
without 
fault 
makes 
sense 
in 
manufacturing defect cases because it is often impossible to 
prove what went wrong in the manufacturing process to cause the 
dangerous defect, and because, as between the seller and the 
consumer, the seller is in a better position to control or 
distribute the risk of loss through quality control, insurance, 
and higher prices.  Dippel, 37 Wis. 2d at 450-51; Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 cmt. a (1998).  
¶129 However, product liability for design and warning 
defects has a different rationale: 
 
In contrast to manufacturing defects, design 
defects and defects based on inadequate instructions 
or warnings are predicated on a different concept of 
responsibility.  In the first place, such defects 
cannot 
be 
determined 
by 
reference 
to 
the 
98-2162.dss 
 
5 
manufacturer's 
own 
design 
or 
marketing 
standards 
because those standards are the very ones that 
plaintiffs attack as unreasonable.  Some sort of 
independent 
assessment 
of 
advantages 
and 
disadvantages, to which some attach the label "risk-
utility balancing," is necessary.  Products are not 
generically 
defective 
merely 
because 
they 
are 
dangerous. 
 
. . . .  
 
In general, the rationale for imposing strict 
liability 
on 
manufacturers 
for 
harm 
caused 
by 
manufacturing defects does not apply in the context of 
imposing liability for defective design and defects 
based on inadequate instruction or warning.  Consumer 
expectations as to proper product design or warning 
are typically more difficult to discern than in the 
case of a manufacturing defect.  Moreover, the element 
of deliberation in setting appropriate levels of 
design safety is not directly analogous to the setting 
of levels of quality control by the manufacturer.  
When a manufacturer sets its quality control at a 
certain level, it is aware that a given number of 
products may leave the assembly line in a defective 
condition and cause injury to innocent victims who can 
generally 
do 
nothing 
to 
avoid 
injury. 
 
The 
implications 
of 
deliberately 
drawing 
lines 
with 
respect to product design safety are different. . . .  
 
Most courts agree that, for the liability system 
to be fair and efficient, the balancing of risks and 
benefits in judging product design and marketing must 
be done in light of the knowledge of risks and risk-
avoidance techniques reasonably attainable at the time 
of distribution.  To hold a manufacturer liable for a 
risk that was not foreseeable when the product was 
marketed 
might 
foster 
increased 
manufacturer 
investment 
in 
safety. 
 
But 
such 
investment 
by 
definition 
would 
be 
a 
matter 
of 
guesswork.  
Furthermore, manufacturers may persuasively ask to be 
judged by a normative behavior standard to which it is 
reasonably possible for manufacturers to conform.  For 
these reasons, Subsections (b) and (c) speak of 
products 
being 
defective 
only 
when 
risks 
are 
reasonably foreseeable. 
98-2162.dss 
 
6 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 cmt. a 
(1998). 
¶130 Wisconsin law on product defects arising out of 
inadequate instructions or warnings approximates the Third 
Restatement, in that liability is not imposed unless the seller 
knew or should have known of the particular danger connected 
with the use of the product.42  Tanner v. Shoupe, 228 Wis. 2d 
357, 368, 596 N.W.2d 805 (Ct. App. 1999); Westphal v. E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co., 192 Wis. 2d 347, 363, 531 N.W.2d 386 (Ct. 
App. 1995); Krueger v. Tappan Co., 104 Wis. 2d 199, 206, 311 
N.W.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1981); Wis JI——Civil 3262. Wisconsin law on 
design defects and defects arising out of inadequate warnings 
should be brought into conformity with the Third Restatement. 
¶131 Our leading design defect case, Sumnicht v. Toyota 
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 338, 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984), 
which declared allegiance to the consumer contemplation test for 
determining 
product 
design 
defectiveness, 
represents 
the 
minority rule.  "In a minority of jurisdictions the failure of a 
product to meet consumer expectations suffices, in and of 
                     
42 Allergy cases fit most readily into the failure-to-warn 
category of product liability cases, because by definition, a 
product that is dangerous only to those who have allergic 
sensitivity to it cannot be considered dangerous when put to 
ordinary use by an ordinary consumer without such sensitivity.  
See Adelman-Tremblay v. Jewel Cos., 859 F.2d 517, 523-24 (7th 
Cir. 
1988). 
 
Even 
then, 
the 
unusual 
susceptibility 
or 
idiosyncratic reaction of a consumer will not give rise to 
product liability for failure-to-warn unless the seller knew or 
had reason to know of the allergy-causing propensity of the 
product.  Id.  This case was not litigated on a failure-to-warn 
theory.   
98-2162.dss 
 
7 
itself, to establish liability in cases predicated on design 
defect.  These jurisdictions represent a distinct minority, and 
there are reasons to believe their numbers may diminish over 
time."  Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 
cmt. d at 73.  The authors of the Third Restatement note that 
decisions relying exclusively on a consumer expectations test 
for determining liability in design defect cases have been 
"roundly criticized."  Id. at 76. 
¶132 Just as there is little justification for imposing 
liability for lack of a warning absent proof that foreseeable 
risks could have been reduced by a warning, there is little 
justification for imposing liability for a product design defect 
absent proof that foreseeable risks could have been reduced by 
an alternate design.  This is not to say that strict product 
liability is synonymous with negligence; it is not.  See 
Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc., 2001 WI 81, ¶2, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (strict product liability "is 
liability in tort, not liability for negligence").  The focus 
remains on the defectiveness of the product rather than the 
conduct of the seller.43  Id. at ¶24.  But we must have some 
principled standards by which to evaluate product defectiveness 
                     
43 Our failure-to-warn product liability cases tend to rely 
upon the language of negligence, which is misleading inasmuch as 
strict product liability is not a species of negligence.  The 
Third Restatement's formulation of the standards of liability in 
both 
design and warnings 
cases keeps 
the 
focus on the 
defectiveness of the product rather than the conduct of the 
seller, and therefore avoids any confusion with negligence. 
98-2162.dss 
 
8 
in design and warning defect cases; otherwise strict liability 
will become absolute liability.  Evaluating design and warning 
defectiveness solely by reference to consumer expectations comes 
close to imposing absolute liability.  Consumers generally do 
not have specific expectations as to product designs and 
warnings, beyond the obvious expectation that they will be safe. 
¶133 In Sumnicht, this court adhered to the consumer 
contemplation test for use in design defect cases, but also 
outlined a list of factors to assist in the determination of 
dangerous defectiveness: 
 
The relevant factors are: 
 
"(1) 
[C]onformity 
of 
defendant's 
design 
to 
the 
practices of other manufacturers in its industry at 
the time of manufacture; 2) the open and obvious 
nature of the alleged danger;  . . .  3) the extent of 
the claimant's use of the very product alleged to have 
caused the injury and the period of time involved in 
such use by the claimant and others prior to the 
injury without any harmful incident. . . . 4) the 
ability of the manufacturer 
to 
eliminate 
danger 
without impairing the product's usefulness or making 
it unduly expensive; and 5) the relative likelihood of 
injury resulting from the product's present design." 
Sumnicht, 121 Wis. 2d at 372 (quoting Collins v. Ridge Tool Co., 
520 F.2d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 1975)).  This list sounds an awful 
lot like the formulation contained in the Third Restatement and 
its commentary, and therefore conflicts with language elsewhere 
in Sumnicht about the primacy of the consumer contemplation 
test.  The majority opinion resolves this internal conflict in 
favor of exclusive reliance on the consumer contemplation test. 
 I would not.  As the list of factors quoted above and the Third 
98-2162.dss 
 
9 
Restatement make clear, consumer expectations are relevant but 
not dispositive in the determination of whether a product design 
is defective and unreasonably dangerous.44 
¶134 For the foregoing reasons, I would adopt § 2 of the 
Third 
Restatement 
and 
reverse 
and 
remand 
this 
case 
for 
application of its standard of liability.  That is, the alleged 
design defect in the latex gloves that caused an allergic 
                     
44 The majority opinion actually goes so far as to state 
that "Wisconsin strict products liability law applies the 
consumer-contemplation test and only the consumer-contemplation 
test in all strict products liability cases."  Majority op. at 
¶34.  This is a considerable overstatement.  As noted above, we 
do not use the consumer contemplation test in cases in which the 
product 
defect 
is 
an 
inadequate 
or 
nonexistent 
warning.  
Similarly overstated is the majority's assertion that "under no 
circumstances" in a strict product liability case "must the 
plaintiff prove that the risk of harm presented by the product 
that caused his or her injury was foreseeable."  Majority op. at 
¶57.  As noted above, liability is not imposed in strict product 
liability cases premised on inadequate or nonexistent warnings 
unless the seller knew or should have known of the danger, that 
is, unless the danger was foreseeable. 
98-2162.dss 
 
10
reaction in Linda Green would be evaluated based upon whether 
"the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have 
been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable 
alternative design . . . and the omission of the alternative 
design renders the product not reasonably safe."  Restatement 
(Third) 
of 
Torts: 
Products 
Liability 
§ 2(b) 
(1998).  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
¶135 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER 
joins this dissent.