Title: Brigham v. Dade County
Citation: 305 So. 2d 756
Docket Number: 44878
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 13, 1974

305 So. 2d 756 (1974)
Dana P. BRIGHAM, Petitioner,
v.
DADE COUNTY, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, Respondent.
No. 44878.

Supreme Court of Florida.
November 13, 1974.
Rehearing Denied January 28, 1975.
*757 Dana P. Brigham of Brigham &amp; Brigham, Miami, for petitioner.
Stuart Simon, Co. Atty., and St. Julien P. Rosemond, Asst. Co. Atty., for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
We review by writ of certiorari a per curiam without opinion decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, upholding a record proper order of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida which dismissed a petition for writ of certiorari of Dana P. Brigham sought to be directed to Respondent Dade County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, because "Petitioner has failed to join an indispensable party, the zoning applicant Minema Corporation, within the thirty day jurisdictional period." The order of the Circuit Court was a final one dispositive of Petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari which attacked the validity of a zoning regulation change made by Dade County as applied for by the Minema Corporation concerning its real property in Dade County, Florida.
Petitioner maintained in its petition for writ of certiorari filed in the Circuit Court that the County had no jurisdiction to grant the zoning change and desired that the Circuit Court have the record of the administrative proceedings resulting in the change brought before the court and reviewed.
After dismissal of the petition for writ of certiorari, the Petitioner, as appellant, took an appeal from the Circuit Court order of dismissal to the District Court of Appeal, Third District, and presented the following point of law:
It is our view that conflict exists between the decision of the District Court and the rationale of Great American Insurance Co. of New York v. Peters (1932) 105 Fla. 380, 141 So. 322, and Orlando Transit Co. v. Florida Railroad &amp; Public Utilities Commission (1948), 160 Fla. 795, 37 So. 2d 321.
It was said in the Peters case: "The real respondent is the tribunal whose judgment is sought to be quashed ..."
In the Orlando Transit Co. case intervention was disallowed by this Court to certain corporate carriers in a certiorari review of orders of the Florida Railroad &amp; Public Utilities Commission.
In explanation of disallowance of intervention, it was said by this Court:
As we understand it the writ of certiorari sought in this situation is not an original proceeding in which persons' rights are to be initially adjudicated, but it is sought to review completed administrative action wherein it is claimed that the essential requirements of law have not been followed. In such situation it is not absolutely necessary that interested third party persons be joined as respondents. In some situations involving administrative action so many third parties may have interests that to require their joinder along with the administrative agency would be impracticable and defeating to the cause of action.
We note the record discloses that when Petitioner herein petitioned the Circuit Court for a writ of certiorari challenging the jurisdiction of the Dade County Commission in the zoning change matter, he mailed notice thereof both to Dade County and the Minema Corporation, the recipient or applicant for the zoning change.
We find nothing in the appellate rules relating to appeals or to petitions for writs of certiorari requiring joinder of the Minema Corporation as an indispensable condition to a review of the Dade County zoning change.
In this situation we conclude the order of the trial court affirmed by the District Court concerning the joinder of the Minema Corporation as an indispensable party was improper.
Accordingly, we quash the judgment of the District Court with direction that the order of the trial court be vacated and that further proceedings be had under the writ of certiorari in the trial court as may thereafter be deemed advisable. We do not wish to be understood as having passed upon any phase of the cause below on its merits than that which has been considered herein.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C.J., and ERVIN, McCAIN, DEKLE and OVERTON, JJ., concur.
BOYD, J., dissents.