Title: State v. Browning
Citation: 269 N.W.2d 450
Docket Number: 60637
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: August 30, 1978

269 N.W.2d 450 (1978) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. James Junior BROWNING, Appellant. No. 60637. Supreme Court of Iowa. August 30, 1978. *451 Cahill, Johnston, Poula &amp; Goetz, by Emmit J. George, Jr., Iowa City, for appellant. Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Ray W. Sullins, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Eugene J. Kopecky, Linn County Atty., for appellee. Considered en banc.[*] UHLENHOPP, Justice. This appeal involves two issues which arose in a prosecution on a charge of receiving stolen Sansui speakers in violation of § 712.1, Code 1975. Defendant stood trial on the charge. In instructing the jury, the trial court gave the usual instructions that defendant James Junior Browning was presumed innocent, that the burden of proof rested on the State to prove him guilty, and that before the jury could find him guilty the State had to prove all of the elements of the crime, enumerating them, by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. With reference to the element of defendant's knowledge that the speakers were stolen, the court stated in Instruction No. 13, over defendant's objection: In defendant's new-trial motion following a verdict of guilty, defendant charged the trial court with improper conduct during closing argument. Defense counsel stated he was unaware of the conduct himself. At the hearing on the motion defendant called two witnesses in support of the charge. Henry Davidson testified: Cleo Luter testified: In the course of its order overruling the new-trial motion the trial court stated: I. Defendant first contends that the trial court's permissible-inference language in Instruction 13 shifted the burden of proof to him and required him to establish his innocence, contrary to Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508, and State v. Monroe, 236 N.W.2d 24 (Iowa). We have here two separate concepts: placing the burden of proof on a party, and informing a jury that a specified kind of evidence permits an inference to be drawn. Mullaney and Monroe are of the former kind. In Mullaney a Maine statute placed the burden on the defendant to prove only manslaughter was committed, once the State proved murder. Monroe involved a statute which placed the burden on the defendant to prove accommodation, once the State proved delivery of a controlled substance. Present Instruction 13 stated that the inference in no way lessened the burden of proof resting on the State to prove the elements set forth in Instruction 8, and one of those elements in Instruction 8 was knowledge that the goods were stolen. Here we have a case of the second kind informing the jury that specified evidence permits a certain inference. This is different from the Mullaney proscription. The present inference has historically been permissible. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 93 S. Ct. 2357, 37 L. Ed. 2d 380; State v. Barr, 259 N.W.2d 841 (Iowa); State v. Lewis, 242 N.W.2d 711 (Iowa); State v. Rosewall, 239 N.W.2d 171 (Iowa); State v. Morrison, 183 N.W.2d 696 (Iowa); State v. Brightman, 252 Iowa 1278, 110 N.W.2d 315; State v. Girdler, 251 Iowa 868, 102 N.W.2d 877; State v. Hessians, 50 Iowa 135. See also Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 45 S. Ct. 470, 69 L. Ed. 904; United States v. Brotherton, 427 F.2d 1286 (8 Cir.); Sewell v. United States, 406 F.2d 1289 (8 Cir.); Aron v. United States, 382 F.2d 965 (8 Cir.). In the Barnes case the United States Supreme Court considered the issue of whether the historically permissible inference of guilty knowledge from recent possession comports with due process. The Court stated (412 U.S. at pages 844-846, 93 S. Ct. at 2362-2363, 37 L.Ed.2d at 387): The present evidence shows that several months before the incident in question defendant spoke with one Frazier about buying some speakers. On the evening of January 10, 1977, someone broke into the home of one Waller and stole two Sansui speakers. That same evening defendant brought *454 two speakerspositively identified by markings to be Waller's speakersto Frazier's apartment and sold them to him for $100. The jury could reasonably find that no plausible explanation was made for defendant's possession consistent with innocence. This record clearly satisfies the Barnes' test of due process. The State was not required in addition to negate that defendant himself was the thief. State v. Houston, 211 N.W.2d 598 (Iowa). We do not find merit in defendant's first contention. II. Defendant's second contention raises a question of fact as to whether the trial court denigrated defense counsel's argument in the eyes of the jury and thereby damaged the defense. We are very sensitive to words or acts of trial judges which communicate to the jury the judge's views about the prosecution or the defense, or about a witness or a party, in a criminal or civil lawsuit. Juries are aware of the judge's conduct. They tend to look upon him as the central impartial arbiter in the trial, and a judge can use perfectly proper words but use them in such way, or in other ways comport himself, so as to demonstrate to the jury his feeling about a claim or a defense or a person. State v. Larmond, 244 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Iowa) ("a trial court may not telegraph to a jury, by purposeful exclamations, gestures or facial expressions, his approval or disapproval, belief or disbelief, in the testimony of witnesses or arguments of counsel"). See also Wilson v. Ceretti, 210 N.W.2d 643 (Iowa). The other side of the coin is that a trial judge is an easy mark for anyone who wishes to claim prejudicial conduct. Week after week the judge sits on the bench listening to witnesses and counsel. He is after all a human being, not an automaton. He sometimes must scratch his head or shift from an uncomfortable position, or he may jot down notes about the pending case or another one or unconsciously turn his chair suddenly when struck by a novel contention or a difficult objection. After study of the present record we believe this trial judge's vehement denial of improper conduct reflects the fact. We think counsel's unawareness of demeaning conduct by the judge would be strange, had such conduct occurred. Likewise, defendant himself should have been aware of such conduct had it occurred, yet he did not testify to it nor did any juror. We do not cast aspersion upon defense counsel for presenting this issue in district court and here. He was in possession of the Davidson-Luter testimony and had a responsibility to defendant to present it. We simply hold on the record that the misconduct claimed is not established. That the trial judge was the target of the Davidson-Luter testimony is merely an occupational hazard. The case demonstrates again the necessity for care by judges lest their conduct be misinterpreted. They function in a glass house. We do not find merit in defendant's second contention. Opinions expressing our views on this subject include State v. Larmond, supra, 244 N.W.2d 233 (Iowa); State v. Glanton, 231 N.W.2d 31 (Iowa); State v. Thornburgh, 220 N.W.2d 579 (Iowa); State v. O'Kelly, 211 N.W.2d 589, cert. den. 417 U.S. 936, 94 S. Ct. 2652, 41 L. Ed. 2d 240, reh. den. 419 U.S. 887, 95 S. Ct. 160, 42 L. Ed. 2d 131; State v. Grady, 183 N.W.2d 707 (Iowa); and State v. Kimball, 176 N.W.2d 864 (Iowa). We thus uphold the judgment and sentence. AFFIRMED. All Justices concur except ALLBEE and McGIVERIN, JJ., who take no part. [*] MASON, J., serving after June 14, 1978, by special assignment.