Title: Ex Parte Smitherman Bros. Trucking, Inc.
Citation: 751 So. 2d 1232
Docket Number: 1981490
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 24, 1999

751 So. 2d 1232 (1999)
Ex parte SMITHERMAN BROTHERS TRUCKING, INC.
(In re William Harris v. Smitherman Brothers Trucking, Inc.).
1981490.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 24, 1999.
Bennett L. Pugh, Joseph H. Driver, and W. Bradford Kittrell of Carr, Allison, Pugh, Howard, Oliver &amp; Sisson, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioner.
William P. Roberts II and George H. Howell of Howell, Sarto &amp; Howell, Prattville, for respondent.
HOUSTON, Justice.
Smitherman Brothers Trucking, Inc. ("Smitherman"), petitions for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its April 9, 1999, order prohibiting Smitherman, through its medical case manager, from engaging in "any ex parte [oral] communication with any medical provider" for William Harris. Harris, one of Smitherman's employees, was injured on the job and has a workers' compensation claim pending. We grant the petition.[1]
*1233 The sole issue presented by this petition is whether Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-77(b), requires that all communications between an employer or an employer's case manager and a medical-care provider, concerning an employee's medical care for an on-the-job-injury, be in writing.[2]
Harris argues here, as he did in the trial court, that § 25-5-77(b) prohibits any oral communications between an employer's case manager and an injured employee's medical-care provider. Harris maintains that all communications must be in writing, either by letter through the mail or by documents transmitted by a fax machine. Smitherman contends that § 25-5-77(b) contains no such prohibition of oral communications. Smitherman further argues that portions of the Alabama Administrative Code clearly contemplate oral communications when they are reasonably necessary for the employer to fulfill its statutory obligation of providing and overseeing an employee's medical care.
This provision places an affirmative duty on an employer to pay for an employee's reasonably necessary medical expenses. Implicit in this provision is an employer's right to oversee that treatment so as to ensure not only that the employee receives the proper treatment, but also that that treatment is reasonably necessary and that it is provided in the most efficient and cost-effective manner, without compromising the quality of care. The Legislature reaffirmed this principle in Ala. Acts 1992, Act No. 537, which amended § 25-5-1. Section 1 of that Act contained the following statement of legislative intent:
Section 25-5-77(b) reads, in its entirety, as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
Harris relies exclusively on the sentences emphasized above. When read in context, however, these sentences do nothing more than place an affirmative duty on a treating physician, or an entity operating the facilities where treatment takes place, to provide to an employer or to an employee, on written request, a written professional opinion as to the extent of the employee's injury and any disability or a copy of the records supporting that opinion. Nothing in § 25-5-77(b) indicates that the Legislature intended to impose a *1235 blanket prohibition against all oral communications between an employer or an employer's case manager and an employee's medical-care provider. This Court cannot read into a statute words that are not there. A statute clear on its face must be applied, not construed. DeKalb County L.P. Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So. 2d 270 (Ala.1998).
Section 25-5-293(k) provides, in pertinent part:
Section 25-5-312 provides, in pertinent part:
Chapter 480-5-5 of the Alabama Department of Industrial Relations Workers' Compensation Administrative Code sets out rules and regulations governing bill screening, medical case management, and utilization review. Section 480-5-5-.01 provides in part:
Section 480-5-5-.02(13) defines "bill screening" as follows:
See also § 25-5-1(20) (defining "bill screening"). Section 480-5-5.02(43) defines *1236 "medical case management" as follows:
"Utilization review" is defined in § 480-5-5-.02(66) as follows:
See also § 25-5-1(19) (defining "utilization review"). Section 480-5-5-0.3(1)(a) provides, in pertinent part:
(Emphasis added.) Section 480-5-5-.29 provides, in part:
(Emphasis added.)
Our examination of the statutory and regulatory provisions outlined above indicates that an employer, through a designated case manager, has the right to oversee and manage an injured employee's medical care "in the most cost effective manner without compromising quality of care." Implicit within the regulatory provisions, and as expressly stated in § 480-5-5-.03, is the right of a case manager to contact a medical provider by telephone for the purpose of obtaining reasonably necessary information, so as to allow the case manager to assist the employer in *1237 fulfilling its statutory obligation to provide and oversee the employee's medical care.
We conclude, therefore, that Smitherman has a clear legal right to the relief sought. See Ex parte Woodward Iron Co., 277 Ala. 133, 167 So. 2d 702 (1964) (mandamus lies to require a trial court to vacate an unauthorized order in a workers' compensation case). We hasten to point out, however, that in issuing the writ of mandamus we express no opinion as to whether oral or written communications or a combination of both would be the best or most cost-effective means of overseeing an employee's medical care in any particular situation. Harris may be correct in arguing that "[w]ritten communications reduce the mishandling of claims, misunderstandings, delays, communication breakdowns, suspicion and resulting litigation." However, it is for the Legislature, not this Court, to address these policy considerations. If the Legislature wishes to require that all communications between an employer's medical case manager and a medical-care provider be in writing, then it may certainly do so; however, it has not done so yet. Likewise, our decision should not be construed as restricting the trial court's discretion to enter an order protecting an employee from unreasonable interference with his or her medical care by an employer or by an employer's case manager. (There is no evidence of such interference, harassment, etc., in the record before us.) We hold only that § 25-5-77(b) does not prohibit all oral communications between a medical case manager and a medical-care provider.[3]
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, COOK, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.
[1]  The Court of Civil Appeals has original jurisdiction of a petition for a writ of mandamus relating to a matter over which it would have appellate jurisdiction. Ala.Code 1975, § 12-3-11. The Court of Civil Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in workers' compensation cases. § 12-3-10; Ex parte Gamble, 709 So. 2d 67 (Ala.Civ.App.1998). The Court of Civil Appeals denied Smitherman's petition for mandamus relief, without an opinion, stating only that it was denying relief on the authority of Ex parte United Service Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501 (Ala.1993). Smitherman has renewed its request for relief by filing a new petition in this Court. See Rule 21(e)(1), Ala.R.App.P.
[2]  We pretermit a detailed discussion of the underlying facts. Suffice it to say that Smitherman's case manager, Universal Adjusters, Inc. ("Universal"), questioned the necessity of certain psychiatric treatment recommended by Harris's primary-care physician. After Universal had apparently contacted one of Harris's medical providers (a psychiatrist) by telephone, Harris successfully petitioned the trial court for an order enjoining any further oral communications.
[3]  The Legislature has adopted a psychiatrist-patient privilege. See Ala.Code 1975, § 34-26-2; see also Rule 503, Ala.R.Evid.; C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 414.01 (5th ed.1996). Recognizing that § 25-5-77(b) specifically requires a psychiatrist to provide to an employer or an employer's case manager a written statement of his or her professional opinion as to the extent of the employee's injury or disability, as well as the psychiatrist's records supporting that statement, and to testify with regard thereto, Harris "suggests" that this Court should reconcile the facially competing interests expressed in § 34-26-2 and § 25-5-77(b) by limiting the disclosure of information in a workers' compensation case to a psychiatrist's "opinions or evaluations." Harris argues that a psychiatrist's personal notes or records that could contain confidential communications between the patient and the psychiatrist should not be discoverable, even in the workers' compensation context. However, after examining the record, we conclude that the issue whether Harris may invoke a psychiatrist-patient privilege and thereby prevent the disclosure of certain information to his employer's case manager is separate from the issue presented by Smitherman's petitionwhether an employer's case manager is statutorily restricted to written communications with an injured employee's medical-care providers. Nothing in the record indicates that Harris raised a question regarding the psychiatrist-patient privilege in the trial court or that the trial court's order was in any way based on that privilege. To the contrary, the record clearly indicates that the two psychiatrists who have examined Harris to date have provided to the case manager not only their opinions and evaluations, but also their records and notes supporting those opinions and evaluations. Those records and notes divulge communications between Harris and the two psychiatrists. Therefore, even assuming, without deciding, that Harris could claim a psychiatrist-patient privilege and thereby prevent the disclosure of certain information, it appears that he may have waived that privilege. Furthermore, we note that the scope of the trial court's order is very broad. That order is not limited to psychiatrists; it prohibits "any" oral communications between Smitherman's case manager and "any medical provider" for Harris. Alabama law does not recognize a general physician-patient privilege of confidentiality. See Ex parte United Service Stations, Inc., supra; McElroy's, supra, at § 413.01. Therefore, the trial court's order, to the extent it applies to physicians not covered by a recognized privilege, could not be upheld even if we were to accept Harris's privilege argument.