Title: Commonwealth v. Chesko
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12030
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 30, 2020

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SJC-12030 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  LEEANNE CHESKO. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     February 14, 2020. - November 30, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide. 
 Felony-Murder 
Rule.  Robbery. 
 Cellular 
Telephone. 
 Evidence, 
Medical 
record, 
Privileged 
record, 
Communication between patient and psychotherapist, State of 
mind, Hearsay, 
Inference. 
 Practice, 
Criminal, 
Instructions 
to jury, Assistance of counsel, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 23, 2011. 
 
 
The case was tried before 
Richard 
T. Tucker, 
J. 
 
 
 
Richard 
L. Goldman 
for the defendant. 
 
Nathaniel 
R. Beaudoin, 
Assistant 
District 
Attorney, 
for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, LeeAnne Chesko, 
of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder, 
                    
 
 
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
 
2 
 
with armed robbery as the predicate felony, after the victim, 
Francis 
P. Spokis, 
was found dead in his home.2 
 The defendant 
argues on appeal that the judge's failure to instruct on felony-
murder in the second degree, the admission of the defendant's 
cell site location information (CSLI), and the judge's 
instruction on inferences each resulted in a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  She further argues that 
it was prejudicial error for the judge to fail to admit a 
medical report in evidence and for the judge to restrict the 
defendant's cross-examination of a witness.  The defendant also 
maintains that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.  
In addition, she urges this court to exercise its authority 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce her verdict or order a new 
trial.  We affirm the defendant's conviction.  After a thorough 
review of the record, we also decline to exercise our authority 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
Background. 
 We summarize 
the facts that the jury could 
have found at trial, reserving certain details for our 
discussion of the legal issues. 
1.  Commonwealth's 
evidence. 
 Sometime 
around 
June to July 
2011, the defendant and her boyfriend, James Rutherford, came up 
                    
 
2 Indictments charging the defendant with armed robbery, 
home invasion, and aggravated assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon were nol prossed before jury empanelment. 
3 
 
with a plan to rob the victim, 
who lived in Rutland.3 
 The victim 
and the defendant had an ongoing relationship, in which he 
provided the defendant with drugs or money in exchange for 
sexual favors.  In the spring of 2011, the victim sold a parcel 
of land located behind an auto body shop that he owned on 
Franklin Street in Worcester, for $300,000.  The sale was 
published in a local newspaper.  Testimony showed that the 
defendant and Rutherford planned to rob the victim in early July 
while his wife and child were away on vacation.  They had to 
abandon their first attempt, only to return two days later to 
carry out the robbery. 
At the time, Rutherford lived in Worcester, and his former 
roommate, Rody Zapata, who testified under a cooperation 
agreement with the Commonwealth, presented the details of the 
first attempt at the robbery.  On multiple occasions during June 
and July 2011, Rutherford 
described 
a robbery 
plan to Zapata.4 
 
The defendant took part in three or four of these conversations.  
                    
 
3 James Rutherford was convicted in a separate trial of 
murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate 
premeditation and felony-murder, and his conviction was affirmed 
on appeal.  Commonwealth v. Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 640 
(2017). 
 
4 This testimony was bolstered by the testimony of two 
acquaintances of the defendant.  One testified that on July 1, 
2011, the defendant asked him to help her commit a robbery with 
Rutherford, and the other testified that about ten days before 
the murder, the defendant told him that she knew someone with a 
lot of money whom she wanted to rob. 
4 
 
She knew the person who would be robbed, but did not want that 
person to know she was involved.  Zapata was not told who the 
victim was going to be, but was told that the victim owned a 
business on Franklin Street in Worcester and that he had money. 
The plan was for the defendant to get high with the victim.  
She would leave a door to the house open and notify Rutherford 
and Zapata when to enter.  Rutherford and Zapata would tie up 
the victim and the defendant to make it seem that the defendant 
was not involved in the robbery, and then they would drive the 
victim to his auto body shop, which they would rob. 
On July 4, 2011, Zapata, the defendant, and Rutherford 
headed to the victim's home at around 11 A.M. to commit the 
robbery.  After the defendant was not able to reach the victim 
on his cellular telephone (cell phone), they drove to 
Rutherford's 
mother's 
house to borrow 
her cell phone.5 
 The three 
then drove to the victim's house.  Rutherford parked the car on 
the side of the road and got out of the car to check out the 
house.  Zapata testified that while he and the defendant were 
alone in the car, she told him that if the victim discovered 
that she was involved in the crime, they would have to "get rid 
                    
 
5 On July 4, 2011, there were multiple calls during the time 
frame of the planned robbery from the defendant's cell phone to 
the victim's cell phone.  The Commonwealth presented CSLI of 
these cell phone calls.  The Commonwealth also presented 
evidence that a call was placed from Rutherford's mother's cell 
phone to the victim's cell phone on July 4, 2011, at 2:52 P.M. 
5 
 
of him; kill him."  Rutherford returned to the car, and the 
three drove to return Rutherford's mother's cell phone.  The 
three then drove back to the victim's house, and Rutherford 
parked the car in a nearby parking area.  Zapata and Rutherford 
got out of the car, but Zapata angered the defendant when he no 
longer wanted to participate because Rutherford "started pulling 
out knives."  The defendant and Rutherford did not go forward 
with their plan at that time. 
On or about July 5, 2011, Rutherford visited his friend, 
Luz Hernandez, at her apartment in Worcester.  He asked her if 
he could use the storage unit on her back porch for the purpose 
of storing stolen items from a robbery he planned to commit.  He 
told Hernandez that he planned to commit the robbery the 
following day while the victim's family was away on vacation and 
that a friend might help him commit the crime.  Hernandez gave 
Rutherford a key to the storage unit. 
Zapata testified that a "couple days after" July 4, 2011, 
Rutherford told him that he committed the robbery and "offed" 
the victim. 
Evidence at trial supported that the victim's murder 
occurred between July 5 and July 6, 2011.  On July 5, 2011, 
Rutherford first went to his mother's house in the afternoon to 
borrow duct tape, and he returned that evening with the 
defendant.  At around 10 P.M. on July 5, 2011, surveillance 
6 
 
video from a convenience store in Holden showed the defendant 
and Rutherford drive into the store's parking lot.  The video 
showed the defendant leave the car and walk toward where the pay 
telephone was located on the property, and then return to the 
car.  Evidence showed that the victim's cell phone received 
three calls from the store's pay telephone at around 10 P.M. 
Hernandez testified that on the afternoon of July 6, 2011, 
Rutherford called her from the defendant's cell phone to tell 
her that he was at her apartment.  Hernandez returned to her 
apartment and saw the defendant sitting in the front passenger's 
seat of a car while Rutherford brought items from the car to 
Hernandez's storage unit.  In the subsequent days, Rutherford 
brought items to Hernandez's home, including a television stolen 
from the victim that Hernandez had agreed to purchase for $500. 
On the afternoon of July 10, 2011, the victim's wife and 
child returned home from vacation.  The victim's wife had not 
spoken to the victim during her vacation.  When she arrived 
home, she observed multiple days of mail in the mailbox, four 
days of newspapers on the ground in the driveway, missing items, 
and reddish-brown stains on the kitchen floor.  She contacted 
the police.  Included among the noticed missing items was a 
television, a video game system, a computer, and jewelry.  The 
victim's gun safe was open, and there was blood in front of the 
safe.  In the kitchen, officers observed the words "don't do 
7 
 
drugs" written in black marker on the tablecloth and on the 
countertop and they found a "black Sharpie pen" and cap on the 
kitchen floor.  Blood stains were found in various rooms of the 
house, and bloody footprints led down the basement stairs.  The 
victim was discovered, dead, at the bottom of the basement 
stairs.  On the floor near the victim, officers found a 
comforter with blood stains on it and pieces of duct tape.  The 
medical examiner testified that the victim suffered multiple 
stab wounds, abrasions, and lacerations, and a skull fracture.  
He further testified that the victim's principal cause of death 
was blood loss. 
The Commonwealth presented testimony that red-brown 
footprints observed throughout the victim's home were made by 
women's size seven Converse shoes and men's size eleven Viking 
boots, consistent with shoes that were worn by the defendant and 
by Rutherford, respectively. 
When searching Hernandez's apartment, police discovered 
multiple items that matched items stolen from the victim's 
house, including two televisions, a video game console, rifles, 
and various personal items.  Inside Hernandez's storage unit, 
officers found firearms, ammunition, items of clothing, and a 
pair of men's size eleven Viking boots and a pair of women's 
size seven Converse sneakers.  When police took Rutherford into 
custody on July 13, 2011, officers found keys that opened the 
8 
 
lock on Hernandez's storage unit, and an ammunition canister 
with what appeared to be bloody palm prints in Rutherford's car.  
Deoxyribonucleic acid on the ammunition canister matched the 
victim. 
The Commonwealth also presented telephone call records and 
CSLI evidence.  The records showed that although between July 1 
and July 6, 2011, the defendant's cell phone was used to call 
the victim's cell phone multiple times each day, there were no 
calls to the victim's cell phone after July 6, 2011.  The 
defendant's cell phone account was terminated on July 10, 2011.  
The CSLI for the defendant's cell phone showed, in part, that on 
July 4 and July 5, 2011, her cell phone moved from Worcester to 
Holden and back to Worcester on both days. 
2.  Defendant's 
evidence. 
 The defendant 
called 
expert 
Dr. 
Roger Gray to testify about Zapata's mental health.  Gray 
reviewed Zapata's medical evaluation dated October 1, 2011, 
opining that the information in the record was consistent with 
the diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder. 
Through the testimony of a forensic document examiner, the 
defendant also sought to demonstrate that she did not write 
"don't 
do drugs" 
in the victim's 
home.6 
                    
 
6 The defendant also introduced testimony from a police 
officer that on the night of June 29, 2011, the officer 
encountered Rutherford during a periodic check of a parking lot.  
A patfrisk of Rutherford turned up a pellet gun, black gloves, 
9 
 
 
Discussion. 
 1.  Felony-murder 
instruction. 
 The defendant 
argues that the judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on 
felony-murder in the second degree based on the predicate felony 
of armed assault with intent to rob, which carries a maximum 
sentence of twenty years in prison.  See G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b).  
She was not charged with armed assault with intent to rob.  The 
defendant contends that the lack of instruction on felony-murder 
in the second degree resulted in a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  The Commonwealth counters that the 
defendant did not request such an instruction and agreed at 
trial with the judge that the instruction was not needed, and 
argues that no rational view of the evidence supported an 
instruction on armed assault with intent to rob.  We conclude 
that the judge did not err in not providing an instruction on 
felony-murder in the second degree and therefore no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice occurred. 
As an initial matter, when discussing whether to provide an 
instruction on felony-murder in the second degree during the 
final charge conference, the judge stated that he did not think 
the instruction applied at all, and the defendant agreed.  The 
judge next stated, "I couldn't even come up with what the 
underlying felony would be that was distinct and separate from 
                    
 
and a "large knife."  Rutherford had the defendant's pocketbook 
in his possession, but the defendant was not present. 
10 
 
the actions . . . that resulted in the death of [the victim]."  
The defendant did not disagree.  "[W]here the felony later 
advanced by a defendant as the predicate for an instruction on 
felony-murder in the second degree is not itself the subject of 
a separate indictment, no error occurs if the trial judge does 
not charge the jury on it even though there may be sufficient 
evidence supporting such a charge -- at least where, as here, no 
party requested such an instruction or even brought the issue to 
the judge's 
attention 
at trial." 
 Commonwealth 
v. Stokes, 
460 
Mass. 311, 315 (2011). 
 
Moreover, the judge properly instructed the jury on felony-
murder where "any rational view of the evidence pointed to the 
charged crime of armed robbery, and not the lesser crime of 
armed assault 
with intent 
to rob." 
 Commonwealth 
v. Benitez, 
464 
Mass. 686, 693-694 (2013).  Although, as the defendant argues, 
there was evidence presented through Zapata's testimony that the 
initial, and unaccomplished, plan was to bring the victim to his 
shop in order to rob the safe there, "[w]hat matters is whether 
the actual evidence in the case reasonably would support a jury 
finding that the lesser predicate felony had been proved, and 
not the greater." 
 Id. at 694 n.12.  See Commonwealth 
v. Holley, 
478 Mass. 508, 528 (2017) (at time of defendant's trial, "an 
instruction on felony-murder in the second degree [was] 
11 
 
necessary when there [was] a rational basis in the evidence to 
warrant the instruction" [quotations and citation omitted]). 
To prove the crime of armed robbery in a joint venture, the 
Commonwealth must prove that the defendant or a coventurer, or 
both, "(1) was or were armed with a dangerous weapon; (2) either 
applied actual force or violence to the body of the person 
identified in the indictment, or by words or gestures put him in 
fear; (3) took the money or the property of another; and (4) did 
so with the intent (or sharing the intent) to steal 
it."  Benitez, 
464 Mass. 
at 690.  To prove the crime of armed 
assault with intent to rob in a joint venture, the Commonwealth 
must prove that the defendant or a coventurer, or both, while 
armed with a dangerous weapon, "assault[ed] a person with a 
specific or actual intent to rob the person assaulted" (citation 
omitted). 
 Id. at 694 n.12.  See G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b). 
 
In the present case, "[n]o reasonable juror would view 
[the] evidence as supporting a charge of armed assault with 
intent 
to rob rather than armed 
robbery." 
 Benitez, 
supra 
at 
694.  The medical examiner testified that the victim's principal 
cause of death was blood loss and that he suffered multiple stab 
wounds and other injuries.  The injuries suffered by the victim, 
along with Zapata's testimony that Rutherford planned to use 
knives during the July 4, 2011, attempt, satisfy the first two 
elements 
of armed robbery. 
 Id. at 690.  The evidence 
that 
12 
 
multiple items were removed from the victim's home and found by 
police at Hernandez's home and in Rutherford's car satisfied the 
third element 
of armed robbery. 
 Id.  The testimony 
of Hernandez 
that Rutherford gave her the television stolen from the victim 
in exchange for her promise to pay $500 and that she observed 
Rutherford moving the stolen items to her home from his car, 
coupled with Zapata's testimony that he, Rutherford, and the 
defendant planned to split the robbery proceeds three ways, 
satisfied 
the fourth element 
of armed robbery. 
 Id. 
 
If the jury did not believe that the defendant had 
committed the predicate felony of armed robbery, "they would 
have found the defendant not guilty; they could not have 
rationally concluded that [she] was guilty only of armed assault 
with intent 
to rob."  Id. at 694-695. 
 Therefore, 
the judge 
did 
not err by not providing, sua sponte, an instruction on felony-
murder in the second degree, and there was no substantial 
likelihood 
of a miscarriage 
of justice. 
 See Commonwealth 
v. Silva, 
482 Mass. 275, 288 (2019).7 
 Moreover, 
because 
there 
                    
 
7 In addition, the jury's questions regarding felony-murder 
did not, as the defendant argues, further demonstrate that the 
judge should have instructed on felony-murder in the second 
degree.  The judge provided a sufficient answer to the jury's 
question.  The jury asked (1) whether the second element of 
felony-murder could be met without the defendant being proved to 
actually cause the harm, and (2) for clarification on the second 
element because the instructions did not clearly explain what 
"knowingly participate" meant.  The judge answered in writing:  
(1) "The force and violence necessary is sufficient if it causes 
13 
 
was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, the 
defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this 
issue also is unsuccessful. 
 See id. at 288 n.16. 
 
2.  Admission 
of defendant's 
historical 
CSLI records. 
 The 
defendant next contends that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing 
to challenge 
the admission 
of her historical 
CSLI8 and 
that its admission resulted in a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  We agree with the Commonwealth that 
even if the CSLI should not have been admitted, it was 
cumulative of other evidence admitted at trial, and therefore, 
the admission did not result in a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage 
of justice.9 
 The defendant 
accordingly 
also cannot 
prevail on her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
                    
 
victim to be separated from his property" and (2) "'Knowingly 
participate' is used in its common meaning, as further refined 
by the instruction on joint venture." 
 
8 "[CSLI] 'refers to a cellular telephone service record or 
records that contain information identifying the base station 
towers and sectors that receive transmissions from a [cellular] 
telephone.'"  Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 20, 26 n.9, 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 330 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852, 853 n.2 (2015). 
 
9 Because we conclude that the admission of the CSLI did not 
result in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, 
we need not determine whether, as the defendant argues, the 
Commonwealth's application for the CSLI failed to meet both the 
reasonable grounds standard of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) and the 
probable cause standard set forth in Commonwealth v. Augustine, 
467 Mass. 230, 255 (2014), S.C. 470 Mass. 837 and 472 Mass. 448 
(2015) (Augustine I), which was decided seven months before the 
defendant's case was tried.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (government 
14 
 
 
In the days following the murder of the victim, the 
Commonwealth obtained the defendant's CSLI from June 10, 2011, 
to July 14, 2011, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).  The 
defendant's CSLI then was introduced at trial.  To prevail on 
her claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by 
failing to challenge the CSLI, the defendant must demonstrate 
that a challenge would have been successful and that the failure 
to bring the challenge resulted in a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage 
of justice. 
 Commonwealth 
v. Fulgiam, 
477 Mass. 
20, 
29, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 330 (2017) (we focus on "whether 
there was error and, if so, whether any such error was likely to 
have influenced the jury's conclusion" [quotations and citation 
omitted]).10 
                    
 
is required to provide "specific and articulable facts showing 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the [data] 
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation"); Fulgiam, supra at 27 (in Augustine I, "we 
concluded that government-compelled production of CSLI by 
cellular telephone service providers was a search in the 
constitutional sense, requiring a warrant under art. 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights," but that Augustine I 
standard applies only to past records requests if "the defendant 
raised the warrant issue before or during the trial and the 
defendant's conviction was not final at the time that Augustine 
I was decided"). 
 
10 The defendant specifically asserts that the testimony 
concerning the CSLI from July 2, 4, 5, and 6, 2011, prejudiced 
her, in part because the Commonwealth referred to the CSLI from 
these dates in closing argument. 
15 
 
Although the CSLI from July 4, 2011, showed the defendant's 
cell phone moving from Worcester to Holden and back to 
Worcester, other evidence also showed that the three were 
together and in the vicinity of the victim's home in Rutland on 
that day:  Zapata's testimony; Rutherford's mother, who lived in 
and was in Rutland at the time, testified that Rutherford 
borrowed her cell phone that day at some point between 1 P.M. 
and 2 P.M. and did not return it until after 5 P.M; Rutherford's 
mother's cell phone was used to place a call to the victim at 
2:52 P.M.; and Rutherford's stepfather testified that he 
observed Zapata lying down on the back seat of Rutherford's car 
when the three were trying to get his mother's cell phone.  And 
to the extent that the CSLI from July 5, 2011, also showed the 
defendant moving from Worcester to Holden and back to Worcester, 
and showed her cell phone in the vicinity of the convenience 
store near the time that calls were placed from the store's pay 
telephone, the surveillance video and the call record of the 
convenience store's pay telephone also showed this. 
In addition, the jury had other evidence before them 
regarding the defendant's involvement in the victim's murder, 
including the relationship between the defendant and victim and 
the knowledge she gained from the relationship; Zapata's 
testimony about the plan; the defendant's telling two other 
acquaintances that she planned to rob someone; and that the 
16 
 
bloody footprints matched the shoes that were worn by the 
defendant. 
3.  Denial 
of motion to admit 
privileged 
psychiatric 
records. 
 The defendant 
next argues 
that the judge abused 
his 
discretion in denying the defendant's motion to admit a two-page 
psychiatric report on Zapata, resulting in prejudicial error.  
We conclude that the judge was within his discretion in denying 
the defendant's motion. 
 
"All communications between a licensed psychologist and the 
individuals with whom the psychologist engages in the practice 
of psychology are confidential."  G. L. c. 112, § 129A.  See 
G. L. c. 233, § 20B.  To gain initial access to a privileged 
document, counsel must first meet particular requirements.  
See Commonwealth 
v. Dwyer, 
448 Mass. 
122, 147-149 
(2006) 
(Appendix) 
(describing 
protocols); 
Commonwealth 
v. Lampron, 
441 
Mass. 265, 268 (2004).  Insofar as relevant here, a party must 
first file a motion for the documents under Mass. R. Crim. P. 17 
(a) (2), 378 Mass. 885 (1979), and a hearing is held to 
determine whether the requested documents are presumptively 
privileged.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 1108 (2020).  Before any final 
pretrial conference, the defendant must then file a motion in 
limine in order to be able to use the presumptively privileged 
documents 
at trial. 
 See Dwyer, 
supra at 
150; Mass. G. Evid. § 
1108(g).  We review a judge's evidentiary ruling for an abuse of 
17 
 
discretion. 
 See Commonwealth 
v. Andre, 
484 Mass. 
403, 414 
(2020). 
 
The defendant here filed a motion before trial under 
the Dwyer protocol, 
requesting 
to be provided 
with Zapata's 
records from June 1, 2011, to August 30, 2011.  The motion was 
granted, and the judge noted that the records presumptively were 
privileged.  The defendant did not file a pretrial motion in 
limine 
to use the subject 
records 
at trial.  See Dwyer, 
448 
Mass. at 150.  During Zapata's trial testimony, the defendant 
orally moved to admit Zapata's psychiatric records in evidence, 
and the judge 
denied the motion.11 
The judge stated in his memorandum of decision that he 
denied the motion because the records presumptively were 
privileged; 
the defendant 
did not comply 
with Dwyer protocols; 
the opinion contained in the record should have been presented 
through the medical provider who created the document; and it 
was improper to allow the medical provider's expert opinion to 
be before the jury in written form without the Commonwealth 
having an opportunity to cross-examine her.  The judge further 
explained that the defendant had received the benefit of 
the Lampron-Dwyer 
protocol 
and the "functional 
equivalent 
of the 
                    
 
11 After the jury began deliberating, the defendant filed a 
motion for reconsideration of the judge's refusal to admit 
Zapata's medical records, which the judge also denied. 
18 
 
record's admission as an exhibit" because the defendant had had 
access to and use of the records; she was granted permission to 
have her expert review the records to formulate his assessment 
of Zapata, and Zapata himself had testified to "much of the 
report's content"; and he would remain on the witness stand for 
the remainder of his cross-examination by the defendant.  In 
addition, Zapata testified on direct and cross-examination 
regarding the content of the records, and the defendant's expert 
witness opined that based on the records he had reviewed, he 
agreed with the author that the defendant had schizoaffective 
disorder.  The judge acted within his discretion to deny the 
defendant's motion. 
We also conclude that counsel's failure to move pretrial to 
admit the report did not, as the defendant argues, result in 
ineffective 
assistance 
of counsel. 
 See Commonwealth 
v. Lee, 483 
Mass. 531, 544 (2019).  The judge did not deny the defendant's 
motion 
solely 
on the basis 
of counsel's 
failure 
to follow 
Dwyer 
protocols.  Instead, the judge also stated in his decision that 
the medical provider's opinion should have been presented 
through the testimony of that medical provider.  And as 
explained 
supra, 
the defendant 
received 
the "functional 
equivalent of the record's admission." 
 
4.  Testimony 
of Hernandez. 
 The defendant 
next argues 
that 
during the defendant's cross-examination of Hernandez, the judge 
19 
 
should have allowed in evidence statements that Rutherford made 
to Hernandez about his relationship with the defendant to rebut 
the Commonwealth's theory that the defendant and Rutherford were 
close.12 
 We agree with the Commonwealth 
that the judge 
correctly 
prohibited the defendant from eliciting this testimony as 
hearsay. 
 
The defendant argued that she was not offering the 
statements for their truth, but rather to show Rutherford's 
state of mind.  The Commonwealth argued that the statements were 
hearsay not falling within any exception and that it was not 
arguing that a joint venture was established because of the 
close relationship between the defendant and Rutherford.  The 
judge did not err in excluding the statements because, to the 
extent that the statements were relevant, Mass. G. Evid. § 401 
(2020), they were not being offered for a nonhearsay purpose, 
Mass. G. Evid. § 801(c)(2), (d)(2)(E), and they did not fall 
within the state of mind exception to hearsay, Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 803(3).  Therefore, there was no prejudicial error. 
5.  Instruction 
on use of inferences. 
 The defendant 
next 
argues that the judge failed to provide the jury with a clear 
                    
 
12 The statements the defendant sought to introduce included 
that Hernandez observed the defendant and Rutherford arguing, 
that Rutherford needed someone to help pay the rent and that 
that is why he and the defendant lived together, and that 
Rutherford did not want to be with the defendant but was doing 
the right thing because she was pregnant with his child. 
20 
 
instruction on the use of inferences.  In particular, she argues 
that the judge erred by failing to instruct that a "conviction 
should not be based upon the piling of inferences."  We agree 
with the Commonwealth that the judge gave a proper jury 
instruction. 
The judge instructed the jury, in part: 
"The word 'infer,' or the expression, 'to draw an 
inference,' means to find that a fact exists based on the 
proof of another fact or set of facts. . . .  An inference 
may be drawn, however, only if it is reasonable and 
logical, and not if it is speculative. . . .  In deciding 
whether to draw an inference, you must look at and consider 
all of the facts in the case in the light of reason, common 
sense, and your own life experience." 
 
The judge also provided two scenarios from an example of 
everyday 
life to illustrate 
the concept.13 
 When 
instructing 
the 
jury on joint venture, the judge stated, in part:  "The 
inferences you draw must be reasonable, and you may rely on your 
experience and common sense in determining the defendant's 
knowledge and intent."  The judge further instructed that the 
Commonwealth bore the burden of proving the defendant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The defendant did not object to the 
lack of an instruction on the piling of inferences, and we 
                    
 
13 The scenarios were:  (1) if puddles are seen on the 
ground in the morning, it can be inferred rain fell during the 
night, even though the day is bright and clear, but (2) an 
inference may be drawn only if it is reasonable and logical, and 
not speculative, so if the puddles are only on your street and 
not on other streets in your neighborhood, a broken water main 
or sprinkler may explain the water. 
21 
 
therefore review for whether, if there was error, the error 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
Although the instructions do not track with precision the 
Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court 
(2009) (model instructions), they provided an "adequate and 
clear instruction[] 
on the applicable 
law," Commonwealth 
v. Roberts, 
378 Mass. 
116, 130 (1979), 
S.C., 
423 Mass. 
17 
(1996), and neither the model instructions nor the supplemental 
instructions contain language about the piling of inferences.  
See Instruction 3.100 of the Criminal Model Jury Instructions 
for Use in the District 
Court. 
 See also Commonwealth 
v. Alleyne, 
474 Mass. 
771, 785 (2016) 
(as long as legal concepts 
were properly explained in jury instruction, judge need not use 
particular words); Instruction 2.240 of the Criminal Model Jury 
Instructions for Use in the District Court.  Moreover, the cases 
cited as support 
by the defendant, 
see Commonwealth 
v. Gonzalez, 
475 Mass. 396, 407 (2016); 
Commonwealth 
v. Mandile, 
403 Mass. 
93, 94 (1988), do not require that the suggested language be 
included 
in a jury instruction. 
 Gonzalez 
and Mandile 
both state 
that a conviction may not rest upon "the piling of inference 
upon inference or conjecture and speculation," but in both cases 
the court was addressing the sufficiency of the evidence, not 
the proper jury instruction. 
 See Gonzalez, 
supra 
at 
407; Mandile, 
supra at 
94.  In addition, 
the example 
that the 
22 
 
judge used to illustrate the concept of inferences, see note 
13, supra, did not "permit 
the drawing 
of remote or speculative 
inferences from assumed facts [or] the piling of inference upon 
inference." 
 See Commonwealth 
v. Gonzalez, 
28 Mass. App. Ct. 
906, 907 (1989). 
 See also Silva, 482 Mass. at 290, 
quoting 
Commonwealth 
v. Shea, 
398 Mass. 
264, 271 (1986) 
("The 
use of an illustration to explain an inference in connection 
with the concept of circumstantial evidence is permissible").  
Therefore, the judge did not err in instructing the jury on the 
use of inferences and no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice 
occurred. 
 See Commonwealth 
v. AdonSoto, 
475 Mass. 
497, 510-511 (2016). 
 
6.  Review 
under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  After 
a thorough 
review of the record, we do not find reason to exercise our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the defendant's 
verdict or order a new trial.  The defendant focuses her § 33E 
argument on the judge's felony-murder instruction 
and Commonwealth 
v. Brown, 
477 Mass. 
805, 823 (2017), 
cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018), arguing that the judge's 
instruction on felony-murder combined with the jury's questions 
cast doubt on the justice of the verdict.  She further argues 
that the defendant's conviction "rests on two pillars rejected 
in Brown: 
 (1) vicarious 
criminal 
liability 
for acts committed 
by joint venturers; and (2) imposition of a conclusive 
23 
 
presumption of malice from the intent to commit an inherently 
dangerous 
predicate 
felony." 
 See id. at 829 (Gants, 
C.J., 
concurring). 
 We concluded 
supra that 
the judge did not err in 
instructing the jury on felony-murder and that he provided 
adequate answers to the jury's questions.  In addition, as 
recognized 
by the defendant, 
the holding 
in Brown 
was 
prospective. 
 Id. at 834 (Gants, 
C.J., concurring). 
 
See Commonwealth 
v. Martin, 
484 Mass. 634, 645 (2020). 
 
Therefore, we decline to exercise our authority under § 33E to 
reduce the defendant's verdict or order a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.