Title: Oakes v. Clark
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 708, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 10, 2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CALVIN OAKES,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 708, 2010 
 
Plaintiff Below,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and  
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
JOHN A. CLARK, 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
C.A. No. 10C-04-146 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  August 12, 2011 
Decided:  November 10, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 10th day of November 2011, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
On April 19, 2010, Calvin Oakes filed a legal malpractice 
complaint against his former attorney, John A. Clark, III, Esquire.  Clark had 
represented Oakes in the Family Court on a property division ancillary to 
Oakes’ divorce. 
(2) 
On June 4, 2010, Clark filed a motion to dismiss based on the 
affirmative defenses of “collateral estoppel and/or res judicata.”  According 
to Clark, “[t]he Family Court’s finding that Oakes was ‘evasive and 
untruthful’ bar[red] Oakes from asserting any claim against Clark based 
upon any aspect of the property division.” 
2 
 
(3) 
It appears from the record that the Superior Court held a 
hearing on the motion to dismiss on October 13, 2010.  At the conclusion of 
the hearing, the Superior Court dismissed Oakes’ complaint.  On appeal, we 
review the Superior Court’s dismissal de novo.1 
(4) 
Fairly read, Clark’s motion sought to dismiss Oakes’ complaint 
under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”) for “failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”2  Under Rule 12(b)(6), if the 
motion to dismiss presents “matters outside the pleading . . . the motion shall 
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.”3 
(5) 
The Court has carefully considered the parties’ positions on 
appeal and the Superior Court record, including the transcript of the October 
13, 2010 hearing.  On the record before us, it appears to the Court that 
“matters outside the pleading” were “presented” or otherwise taken into 
consideration by the Superior Court at the October 13, 2010 hearing.  It 
further appears that the Superior Court did not convert Clark’s motion to 
dismiss to a motion for summary judgment as required under Rule 12(b)(6).  
                                          
 
1 Ramirez v. Murdick, 948 A.2d 395, 399 (Del. 2008); See Haskins v. Kay, 2008 WL 
5227187 (Del. Supr.) (citing Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 968 (Del. 1978). 
2 Del. Super. Ct. Civil R. 12(b)(6).  
3 Id. 
3 
 
Under the circumstances of this case, the Court concludes that the October 
13, 2010 ruling of the Superior Court should be reversed as having been 
rendered erroneously on a motion to dismiss.4 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Superior Court’s 
dismissal of Oakes’ complaint is REVERSED, and this matter is 
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Order. 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice  
 
                                          
 
4 See Furman v. Del. Dep’t of Transp., __ A.3d __, 2011 WL 4963847 (Del. Supr.) 
(reversing and remanding for further proceedings relevant to a summary judgment 
motion).