Title: Hayes v. Delamotte
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: January 10, 2018

Hayes v. Delamotte Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In 2001, plaintiff Doreen Hayes was diagnosed with a syrinx in her thoracic spine. Plaintiff’s last MRI, prior to the accident at issue in this case, was taken in May 2007. In 2008, plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle operated by her mother, defendant Barbara Delamotte. After the 2008 accident, plaintiff underwent spinal fusion surgery on plaintiff’s C6-7 and C7-T1 vertebrae. Plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint claiming that her mother and the unidentified vehicle caused the 2008 accident. Before trial, the defense retained Dr. Arthur Vasen, an orthopedic surgeon, to examine plaintiff and review her medical records, including cervical MRIs taken before and after the 2008 accident. The defense took Dr. Vasen’s videotaped deposition for use at trial rather than call him to give in-court testimony. At trial, plaintiff moved to have portions of Dr. Vasen’s deposition referring to reports of non-testifying doctors stricken from the video. The trial court denied the motion. At trial, defendants presented Dr. Vasen’s videotaped deposition. The trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction regarding the use of non-testifying experts’ opinions. Dr. Vasen testified that there were no differences between the MRIs taken before the accident in 2007 and after the accident in 2008. However, the films that Dr. Vasen showed in the tape were both labeled 2008. At the conclusion of the parties’ evidence, plaintiff’s counsel requested the opportunity to replay Dr. Vasen’s testimony during summation, and comment on the testimony, to demonstrate to the jury that the doctor compared MRI films marked with the same date. The trial court upheld defendant’s objection, and provided an additional limiting instruction as to the reports of non-testifying experts. Ultimately, the jury determined that plaintiff’s mother was solely responsible for the 2008 accident but found that plaintiff did not sustain a permanent injury proximately caused by that accident. Plaintiff was granted a new trial. At the second trial, the only issue presented was whether plaintiff sustained a permanent injury as a result of the 2008 accident. Dr. Vasen’s videotaped deposition was retaken for use at the second trial; plaintiff once again moved in limine to bar Dr. Vasen’s testimony about the findings of non-testifying doctors. This time, the court granted plaintiff’s motion. After the second trial, the jury found that plaintiff sustained a permanent injury proximately caused by the 2008 accident and awarded her $250,000 in damages. The Appellate Division found that the trial court improperly granted a new trial and reinstated the jury’s verdict in favor of defendant from the first trial. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff following the second trial. Because the trial court’s error in preventing plaintiff from replaying a portion of the deposition during summation at the first trial resulted in a miscarriage of justice, the trial court properly granted plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) Doreen Hayes v. Barbara Delamotte (A-4-16) (077819)Argued September 12, 2017 -- Decided January 10, 2018SOLOMON, J., writing for the Court. The Court considers whether the trial court’s decision to prevent plaintiff from replaying a portion of the deposition by the defense expert during summation resulted in a miscarriage of justice, such that it was proper for the trial court to grant plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. The Court also considers plaintiff’s argument that the defense expert’s videotaped testimony regarding the reports of non-testifying experts was inadmissible hearsay. In 2001, plaintiff Doreen Hayes was diagnosed with a syrinx in her thoracic spine. MRIs were taken to monitor the syrinx’s growth every six to nine months. That same year, plaintiff suffered a neck injury in an accident, and ultimately underwent surgery for a fusion at her C4-5 and C5-6 vertebrae. Plaintiff’s last MRI, prior to the accident at issue in this case, was taken in May 2007. In 2008, plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle operated by her mother, defendant Barbara Delamotte. The vehicle left the roadway and collided with trees and a telephone pole, allegedly to avoid a collision with an unidentified vehicle. After the 2008 accident, plaintiff consulted a neurosurgeon. The neurosurgeon examined plaintiff, ordered an MRI, and ultimately performed spinal fusion surgery on plaintiff’s C6-7 and C7-T1 vertebrae. Plaintiff filed a complaint claiming that her mother and the unidentified vehicle caused the 2008 accident. Before trial, the defense retained Dr. Arthur Vasen, an orthopedic surgeon, to examine plaintiff and review her medical records, including cervical MRIs taken before and after the 2008 accident. The defense took Dr. Vasen’s videotaped deposition for use at trial rather than call him to give in-court testimony. At trial, plaintiff moved in limine to have portions of Dr. Vasen’s deposition referring to reports of non-testifying doctors stricken from the video. The trial court denied the motion. At trial, defendants presented Dr. Vasen’s videotaped deposition. Prior to playing Dr. Vasen’s testimony, the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction regarding the use of non-testifying experts’ opinions. Dr. Vasen testified that there were no differences between the MRIs purportedly taken on May 4, 2007 (before the accident) and May 17, 2008 (after the accident). However, the films that Dr. Vasen showed in the tape were both labeled May 17, 2008. The parties did not address that issue at the deposition or before the close of evidence at trial. At the conclusion of the parties’ evidence, plaintiff’s counsel requested the opportunity to replay Dr. Vasen’s testimony during summation, and comment on the testimony, to demonstrate to the jury that the doctor compared MRI films marked with the same date. Defendant objected to the request. After conducting a N.J.R.E. 104(a) hearing and reviewing Dr. Vasen’s videotaped deposition outside the presence of the jury, the court upheld defendant’s objection, reasoning that there was no expert testimony to differentiate between the films or to evaluate their potential mislabeling. In its charge to the jury, the trial court provided an additional limiting instruction as to the reports of non-testifying experts. Ultimately, the jury determined that plaintiff’s mother was solely responsible for the 2008 accident but found that plaintiff did not sustain a permanent injury proximately caused by that accident. Plaintiff moved for a new trial. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that plaintiff did not receive substantial justice because the jury gave greater weight to Dr. Vasen’s testimony than to that of plaintiff’s expert. Thereafter, a second trial was conducted, concerning only the issue of whether plaintiff sustained a permanent injury as a result of the 2008 accident. Dr. Vasen’s videotaped deposition was retaken for use at the second trial. Although Dr. Vasen resolved the issues as to the dates of the MRIs he reviewed, plaintiff once again moved in limine to bar Dr. Vasen’s testimony about the findings of non-testifying doctors. This time, the court granted plaintiff’s motion. After the second trial, the jury found that plaintiff sustained a permanent injury proximately caused by the 2008 accident and awarded her $250,000 in damages. 1 Defendant appealed. The Appellate Division found that the trial court improperly granted a new trial and reinstated the jury’s verdict in favor of defendant from the first trial. The Court granted plaintiff’s petition for certification. 227 N.J. 376 (2016).HELD: Because the trial court’s error in preventing plaintiff from replaying a portion of the deposition during summation at the first trial resulted in a miscarriage of justice, the trial court properly granted plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. Further, the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Vasen to bolster his testimony using “congruent” opinions in reports of non-testifying doctors during the first trial rather than simply explain the sources of information used in forming his opinion.1. A trial court grants a motion for a new trial only if, having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law. A miscarriage of justice can arise when there is a manifest lack of inherently credible evidence to support the finding, when there has been an obvious overlooking or under-valuation of crucial evidence, or when the case culminates in a clearly unjust result. (pp. 12-14)2. In Condella v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., the trial court found that “it is within the trial court’s discretion to allow counsel to show portions of the videotaped trial testimony and make comment thereon during summation.” 298 N.J. Super. 531, 535 (Law Div. 1996). The Court agrees with that holding and also that the following safeguards suggested in Condella should be considered when portions of videotaped trial testimony are utilized during summation. First, the replay during summation “should not be so lengthy as to constitute a second trial emphasizing only one litigant’s side of the case.” Id. at 536. Second, “to guard against the edited portions of the videotape misstating the evidence” and to prevent them from being “presented out of context,” the proponent should raise the issue with the court before playing an edited part of the tape. Ibid. (pp. 14-16)3. Here, plaintiff requested to have brief portions of Dr. Vasen’s testimony replayed to demonstrate that the MRIs compared by the expert bore the same date. Use of those portions would not have constituted a “second trial” overemphasizing plaintiff’s case. The proposed use of the video would not have been an attempt to misuse Dr. Vasen’s testimony, but merely a legitimate attempt to emphasize a certain aspect of his testimony. Lastly, the trial court conducted a Rule 104 hearing and reviewed the video. The trial court did not make a finding and defendant did not claim that the video had been edited or that Dr. Vasen’s testimony was taken out of context. The portion of the videotaped deposition sought to be played thus met the requirements of Condella, which the Court adopts as modified. Dr. Vasen’s videotaped deposition was in evidence once it was played at trial. As with any other piece of evidence adduced at trial, counsel was permitted to fairly comment upon it and play portions during closing argument. Merely pointing to dates on MRIs or other images does not require expert testimony because reading the dates and realizing that they are the same is not beyond the ken of the average juror. (pp. 16-18)4. In sum, counsel may refer to, read, or play portions of videotaped fact or expert testimony given at trial during closing, as long as (1) counsel’s comments are confined to the facts shown or reasonably suggested by the evidence introduced during the course of the trial, and (2) the concerns set forth in Condella are met. Plaintiff was entitled to replay the deposition and draw the jury’s attention to the discord between the dates stamped on the MRIs to which Dr. Vasen pointed and the dates he ascribed to them. Because the trial turned on the weight assigned to expert testimony, the denial of that opportunity worked an injustice, and a new trial was necessary. (pp. 18-21)5. Although a testifying expert may detail the reasons underlying his or her opinion and the sources upon which his or her opinion is based, an expert witness should not be allowed to relate the opinions of a nontestifying expert merely because those opinions are congruent with the ones he has reached. Notwithstanding the cautionary instruction given, the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Vasen to bolster his testimony using “congruent” opinions in reports of non-testifying doctors during the first trial rather than simply explain the sources of information used in formulating his opinion. (pp. 21-23) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff following the second trial is REINSTATED. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ- VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 4 September Term 2016 077819DOREEN HAYES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.BARBARA DELAMOTTE, Defendant-Respondent, andGEICO INSURANCE COMPANY1, Defendant. Argued September 12, 2017 – Decided January 10, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Kimberly L. Gozsa argued the cause for appellant (Levinson Axelrod, attorneys; Kimberly L. Gozsa, on the brief). Stephen A. Rudolph argued the cause for respondent (Rudolph & Kayal, attorneys; Stephen A. Rudolph, on the brief). Donald A. Caminiti argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (Breslin & Breslin, attorneys; Donald A. Caminiti and Jessica E. Choper, on the brief).1 Plaintiff’s original complaint included GEICO Insurance Company, but the party’s name was subsequently amended to GEICO Insurance Group. 1 JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court. Following an automobile accident, plaintiff Doreen Hayesfiled a complaint against Barbara Delamotte and the GeicoInsurance Company (collectively, defendants) seeking damages forpersonal injuries. At the first jury trial, defendantspresented, by videotaped deposition, the expert testimony of anorthopedic surgeon who had examined plaintiff. Defendants’expert compared what he described as two different MagneticResonance Images (MRIs) of plaintiff’s cervical spine, one thathe identified as a pre-accident image taken in 2007 and one thathe identified as an image taken after the 2008 accident. Thedoctor also testified, over plaintiff’s objection, to theopinions contained in reports of non-testifying physicians. Although the doctor identified the MRIs he referenced aspre- and post-accident images, the MRIs, which were labeled,bore the same post-accident “Exam Date.” The parties did notaddress the MRI labeling issue at the time of the deposition orduring trial. Plaintiff’s counsel, however, sought to replay aportion of the videotaped deposition during summation to showthat both MRIs bore labels reflecting the same post-accidentdate. Defense counsel objected. The trial court deniedplaintiff’s request, reasoning that expert testimony would benecessary to establish that the MRIs in the video were in factthe same. 2 The trial resulted in a judgment in favor of defendants.Plaintiff moved for a new trial, which was granted by the trialcourt on the ground that plaintiff “did not receive substantialjustice” because “the jury gave greater weight” to the testimonyof defendants’ expert than to that of plaintiff’s expert. During the second trial, the defense expert testified againvia a video deposition taken for use at the second trial. Thesecond trial ended in a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff.Defendant appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed. Theappellate panel concluded that the trial court improperlygranted plaintiff’s motion for a new trial and reinstated thejury’s finding from the first trial in favor of defendants. We now reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division andreinstate the jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff following thesecond trial. Because the trial court’s error in preventingplaintiff from replaying a portion of the deposition duringsummation at the first trial resulted in a miscarriage ofjustice, the trial court properly granted plaintiff’s motion fora new trial. I. A. We derive the facts pertinent to this appeal from therecord of the first trial. 3 In 2001, prior to the accident and injury at issue,plaintiff was diagnosed with a syrinx, or fluid-filled hole, inher thoracic spine, which caused back, chest, neck, arm, and legpain. MRIs were taken to monitor the syrinx’s growth every sixto nine months. That same year, plaintiff suffered a neckinjury in an accident, and ultimately underwent surgery for acervical fusion at her C4-5 and C5-6 vertebrae in 2002.Following that surgery, plaintiff received physical therapy butno other continued treatment. Plaintiff’s last MRI, prior tothe accident at issue in this case, was taken in May 2007. In 2008, plaintiff was a front-seat passenger in a vehicleoperated by her mother, defendant Barbara Delamotte. Thevehicle left the roadway and collided with trees and a telephonepole, allegedly to avoid a collision with an unidentifiedvehicle. Emergency personnel extracted plaintiff and her motherfrom their car using the “jaws of life” and transported them tothe hospital, where they were treated and released. After the 2008 accident, plaintiff’s family physicianprovided treatment and ordered a cervical MRI. Becauseplaintiff’s condition did not improve, she consulted a painmanagement specialist, an orthopedic surgeon, and aneurosurgeon. The neurosurgeon, Dr. Robert Sabo, examinedplaintiff, ordered another MRI, and ultimately performed spinalfusion surgery on plaintiff’s C6-7 and C7-T1 vertebrae. 4 B. Plaintiff filed a complaint claiming that her mother andthe unidentified vehicle caused the 2008 accident. Plaintiffalleged that she sustained permanent injuries in that accident,and her complaint named Delamotte and plaintiff’s own insurancecarrier, GEICO Insurance Company, with whom plaintiff haduninsured motorist coverage, as defendants, along with “JohnDoe” defendants connected with the unknown vehicle. Beforetrial, defendants retained Dr. Arthur Vasen, an orthopedicsurgeon, to examine plaintiff and review her medical records,including cervical MRIs taken before and after the 2008accident. Defendants took Dr. Vasen’s videotaped deposition foruse at trial rather than call him to give in-court testimony.At trial, plaintiff moved in limine to have portions of Dr.Vasen’s deposition referring to reports of non-testifyingdoctors stricken from the video, arguing that those reportspresented opinions on complex medical issues and thatplaintiff’s counsel was unable to cross-examine those experts.The trial court denied the motion. At trial, defendants presented Dr. Vasen’s videotapeddeposition. Prior to playing Dr. Vasen’s testimony, the trialcourt gave the jury a limiting instruction regarding the use ofnon-testifying experts’ opinions. The trial court explained, “Iinstruct you as the jury in this case you are not to consider 5 any such out of Court statements by any non-testifying expertsas substantive proof of the content of those statements.”2 Dr.Vasen testified that there were no differences between the MRIspurportedly taken on May 4, 2007 (before the accident) and May17, 2008 (after the accident). However, the films that Dr.Vasen showed in the tape were both labeled May 17, 2008. Theparties did not address that issue at Dr. Vasen’s deposition orbefore the close of evidence at trial. At the conclusion of the parties’ evidence, plaintiff’scounsel requested the opportunity to replay Dr. Vasen’stestimony during summation, and comment on the testimony, todemonstrate to the jury that the doctor compared MRI filmsmarked with the same date.3 Defendant objected to the request.After conducting a N.J.R.E. 104(a) hearing and reviewing Dr.Vasen’s videotaped deposition outside the presence of the jury,the trial court upheld defendant’s objection to plaintiff’sshowing and commenting on a part of the doctor’s testimonyduring summation. The judge reasoned that there was no expert2 On direct examination, plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Sabo, discussed the treatment plaintiff received while under the care of other doctors. Dr. Sabo was also asked about the findings of other non-testifying doctors during cross-examination. The court gave the same instruction before the testimony of Dr. Sabo.3 During arguments on the objection, defense counsel noted that, in addition to the issue with the dates, the MRIs were labeled “lumbar views” when they were, in fact, “cervical films.” 6 testimony from Dr. Vasen, Dr. Sabo, or the radiologist who tookthe MRIs to differentiate between the films or to evaluate theirpotential mislabeling. C. Prior to the parties’ closings, the trial court found thatdefendants’ negligence caused the accident as a matter of law.Based on that finding, the court explained that the jury wouldhave to assess the percentage of fault attributable toplaintiff’s mother and the unknown vehicle and to determinewhether plaintiff sustained a permanent injury proximatelycaused by the 2008 accident. In its charge to the jury, thetrial court provided an additional limiting instruction as tothe reports of non-testifying experts that mirrored its earlierinstruction. Ultimately, the jury determined that plaintiff’smother was solely responsible for the 2008 accident but foundthat plaintiff did not sustain a permanent injury proximatelycaused by that accident. Therefore, judgment was entered infavor of defendants. Plaintiff moved for a new trial, arguing that it wasreversible error for the court to bar counsel from showing apart of Dr. Vasen’s videotaped testimony or commenting on Dr.Vasen’s comparison of the MRI films during summation. Inassessing plaintiff’s argument, the trial court found that itsdecision to bar the video replay was legally correct. The court 7 reasoned that replaying the testimony would have beenprejudicial. Despite those findings, the court grantedplaintiff’s motion for a new trial, concluding that plaintiff“did not receive substantial justice” because “the jury gavegreater weight to Dr. Vasen’s testimony than to Dr. Sabo.” Thereafter, a second trial was conducted. Because thefirst trial resulted in a determination that plaintiff’s mother(hereinafter “defendant”) was solely responsible for theaccident, the second trial concerned only the issue of whetherplaintiff sustained a permanent injury as a result of the 2008accident. Dr. Vasen’s videotaped deposition was retaken for useat the second trial. Although Dr. Vasen resolved the issues asto the dates of the MRIs he reviewed, plaintiff once again movedin limine to bar Dr. Vasen’s testimony about the findings ofnon-testifying doctors. This time, the court grantedplaintiff’s motion in limine, citing Agha v. Feiner, 198 N.J. 50(2009), on the ground that the opinions of the non-testifyingexperts were being used improperly to validate Dr. Vasen’sopinions. After the second trial, the jury found that plaintiffsustained a permanent injury proximately caused by the 2008accident and awarded her $250,000 in damages. Defendant appealed. The Appellate Division found that thetrial court improperly granted a new trial and reinstated thejury’s verdict in favor of defendant from the first trial. 8 The appellate panel noted that “there was no credibleevidence or expert testimony in the record that the MRI filmswere incorrectly used,” and determined that the trial court“aptly held that an expert would have been required to testifythat [Dr.] Vasen was reviewing the same MRI films or that therewas a mislabeling in order to challenge his credibility.” Thepanel agreed with the trial court that the decision to bar thevideo replay was legally correct, because it would have beenprejudicial to allow the testimony to be replayed. Theappellate panel determined that, arguably, the video replaywould have given rise to unfair surprise. The Appellate Division also held that the trial courtusurped the jury’s function as factfinder when it found that the“jury gave greater weight to Dr. Vasen’s testimony than to Dr.Sabo.” As a result, the panel held there was no ruling in thefirst trial that prejudiced either party, reversed the trialcourt’s grant of a new trial, and reinstated the jury’s verdictin favor of defendants. This Court granted plaintiff’s petitionfor certification. 227 N.J. 376 (2016). We granted leave toappear as amicus curiae to the New Jersey Association forJustice (NJAJ). II. A. 9 Plaintiff claims that the Appellate Division erred inreversing the trial court’s order granting a new trial and inreinstating the jury’s verdict in favor of defendant. Plaintiff asserts that an attorney may comment in summationon any evidence admitted at trial. Relying on Condella v.Cumberland Farms, Inc., 298 N.J. Super. 531, 535–36 (Law Div.1996), plaintiff argues that attorneys can replay videotapedtestimony during summation because it is actual testimonyadmitted at trial. Plaintiff also argues that, at the first trial, defendantimproperly elicited medical opinions of non-testifying doctorsthat were consistent with those of defendants’ expert, Dr.Vasen. Thus, plaintiff asserts, the panel’s ruling conflictswith James v. Ruiz, 440 N.J. Super. 45, 51 (App. Div. 2015), inwhich the Appellate Division held that counsel should not ask aquestion for the purpose of having the jury consider absentexperts’ hearsay opinions about complex and disputed matters. The NJAJ, aligned with plaintiff, first argues that thevideo replay did not “constitute the introduction of newevidence” and as such counsel should have been permitted to playDr. Vasen’s testimony without additional “expert testimony toaddress any inconsistencies in the evidence presented.” Second,the NJAJ asserts that the trial court properly precluded theadmission of non-testifying experts’ hearsay opinions in the 10 second trial, pursuant to James, 440 N.J. Super at 51. Inraising its first argument, the NJAJ emphasizes that Dr. Vasen’svideo testimony was introduced by the defense and could thus beproperly replayed during summation by plaintiff. In addition,the NJAJ notes that plaintiff “was not obligated to alter orcure any deficiencies in the testimony of defendant’s medicalexpert.” In the alternative, the NJAJ posits that if counselwere required to have expert testimony to note theinconsistencies with the MRIs, Dr. Vasen’s testimony should havebeen stricken in its entirety. B. Defendant points out that the trial court first indicatedthat it did not know what swayed the jury but then, in grantinga new trial, held that “it is clear that the jury gave greaterweight to Dr. Vasen’s testimony than to Dr. Sabo.” Defendantagrees with the appellate panel that Dr. Vasen’s testimony “wasnot the exclusive means by which the jury could have reached itsverdict” and that the verdict could have been based on a numberof considerations, including the jury’s rejection of Dr. Sabo’stestimony or plaintiff’s testimony. Finally, defendant highlights the panel’s agreement thatthe trial judge’s “decision to bar the video replay was legallycorrect because 'a video replay during summation would have beenprejudicial given the lack of testimony by any medical expert or 11 radiologist who could have explained the discrepancy in thefilms displayed by [Dr.] Vasen during his testimony.’” III. A. “A jury verdict is entitled to considerable deference and'should not be overthrown except upon the basis of a carefullyreasoned and factually supported (and articulated)determination, after canvassing the record and weighing theevidence, that the continued viability of the judgment wouldconstitute a manifest denial of justice.’” Risko v. ThompsonMuller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 521 (2011) (quotingBaxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 597-98 (1977)). Atrial court therefore grants a motion for a new trial only “if,having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to passupon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly andconvincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justiceunder the law.” Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 511-12 (1994)(quoting R. 4:49-1(a)). “The standard of review on appeal from decisions on motionsfor a new trial is the same as that governing the trial judge --whether there was a miscarriage of justice under the law.”Risko, 206 N.J. at 522; accord R. 2:10-1 (“The trial court’sruling on such a motion shall not be reversed unless it clearlyappears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the 12 law.”). We have explained that a “miscarriage of justice” canarise when there is a “manifest lack of inherently credibleevidence to support the finding,” when there has been an“obvious overlooking or under-valuation of crucial evidence,” orwhen the case culminates in “a clearly unjust result.” Risko,206 N.J. at 521-22 (quoting Lindenmuth v. Holden, 296 N.J.Super. 42, 48 (App. Div. 1996)). Here, the trial court found that it had properly barredplaintiff’s counsel from replaying the video because the requestto replay the video “was not based on any evidential foundationestablished in the trial record” and because “the showing wouldbe highly prejudicial to the defendants.” The court found,nevertheless, “that if a new trial is not granted on at leastthe damages aspect of the case, the plaintiff herself wouldlikely suffer an injustice” given that “the jury gave greaterweight to Dr. Vasen’s testimony than to Dr. Sabo[’s testimony].” We have noted that, when evaluating the decision to grantor deny a new trial, “an appellate court must give 'duedeference’ to the trial court’s 'feel of the case.’” Id. at 522(quoting Jastram v. Kruse, 197 N.J. 216, 230 (2008)). That isnot to say, however, that we must accept the trial court’s legalreasoning: “[a] trial court’s interpretation of the law and thelegal consequences that flow from established facts are notentitled to any special deference.” Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. 13 Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). Wealso note that “it is well-settled that appeals are taken fromorders and judgments and not from opinions, oral decisions,informal written decisions, or reasons given for the ultimateconclusion.” Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 191, 199(2001) (collecting cases). A trial court judgment that reachesthe proper conclusion must be affirmed even if it is based onthe wrong reasoning. Isko v. Planning Bd., 51 N.J. 162, 175(1968); see also MacFadden v. MacFadden, 49 N.J. Super. 356, 359(App. Div. 1958) (“The written conclusions or opinion of a courtdo not have the effect of a judgment. From them no appeal willlie. 'It is only what a court adjudicates, not what it says inan opinion, that has any direct legal effect.’” (quotingSuburban Dep’t Stores v. City of East Orange, 47 N.J. Super. 472, 479 (App. Div. 1957))). B. With those principles in mind, we turn to the evidentiarydetermination that plaintiff claims created an injustice andsupports the trial court’s grant of a new trial: the decisionto bar her from replaying and commenting on Dr. Vasen’sdeposition during summation. 1. “[C]ounsel is allowed broad latitude in summation.”Colucci v. Oppenheim, 326 N.J. Super. 166, 177 (App. Div. 1999). 14 That latitude is not without its limits, and “counsel’s commentsmust be confined to the facts shown or reasonably suggested bythe evidence introduced during the course of the trial.” Ibid.;accord State v. Bogen, 13 N.J. 137, 140 (1953). Further,counsel “should not misstate the evidence nor distort thefactual picture.” Colucci, 326 N.J. Super. at 177 (quotingMatthews v. Nelson, 57 N.J. Super. 515, 521 (App. Div. 1959)).Within those limits, however, “[c]ounsel may argue from theevidence any conclusion which a jury is free to reach.” Ibid.“Indeed, counsel may draw conclusions even if the inferencesthat the jury is asked to make are improbable. . . .” Ibid. In Condella, the trial court found that “it is within thetrial court’s discretion to allow counsel to show portions ofthe videotaped trial testimony and make comment thereon duringsummation.” 298 N.J. Super. at 535. We agree with that holdingbut note that the exercise of such discretion depends uponwhether counsel’s comments are “confined to the facts shown orreasonably suggested by the evidence introduced during thecourse of the trial.” Colucci, 326 N.J. Super. at 177; accordBogen, 13 N.J. at 140. We also agree that the following safeguards suggested inCondella should be considered when portions of videotaped trialtestimony are utilized during summation. First, the replayduring summation “should not be so lengthy as to constitute a 15 second trial emphasizing only one litigant’s side of the case.”Condella, 298 N.J. Super. at 536. Second, “to guard against theedited portions of the videotape misstating the evidence” and toprevent them from being “presented out of context,” theproponent should raise the issue with the court before playingan edited part of the tape. Ibid.; see N.J.R.E. 104(a).4 Thosesafeguards ensure that one party’s side of the case is not“unduly emphasize[d]” over the other, Condella, 298 N.J. Super.at 536, and that any edited portions “are a fair and accuraterepresentation of the witness’ testimony,” id. at 537. Here, plaintiff requested to have brief portions of Dr.Vasen’s testimony replayed to demonstrate that the MRIs comparedby the expert bore the same date. Use of those portions wouldnot have constituted a “second trial” overemphasizingplaintiff’s case. The proposed use of the video would not havebeen an attempt to misuse Dr. Vasen’s testimony, but merely alegitimate attempt to emphasize a certain aspect of histestimony, namely, the dates on the MRIs to which he pointed in4 In Condella, the plaintiff requested permission to replay a portion of the defense expert’s testimony as well as defense counsel’s opening. 298 N.J. Super. at 533. The video at issue in Condella was taken via cameras in the courtroom. Ibid. The court granted the plaintiff’s request to replay the trial testimony, but denied the plaintiff’s request as to the defense’s opening statement. Here, Dr. Vasen’s testimony was recorded and presented as testimony at trial. We discern no difference between the request made in Condella related to trial testimony and the request in this case. 16 the video. Lastly, the trial court conducted a Rule 104 hearingand reviewed the video. In its opinion granting plaintiff’smotion for a new trial, the trial court found that the proposedvideo replay “was not overly lengthy” but because “theplaintiff’s application . . . was not based on any evidentialfoundation established in the trial record,” the replay “wouldmisstate the evidence and mislead the jury.” However, the trialcourt did not make a finding and defendant did not claim thatthe video had been edited or that Dr. Vasen’s testimony wastaken out of context. The portion of the videotaped depositionsought to be played thus met the requirements of Condella, whichwe now adopt as modified. We further find that Dr. Vasen’s videotaped deposition wasin evidence once it was played at trial. As with any otherpiece of evidence adduced at trial, counsel was permitted tofairly comment upon it and play portions during closingargument. See Condella, 298 N.J. Super. at 535; see also Statev. Muhammad, 359 N.J. Super. 361, 372-73 (App. Div. 2003)(concluding it was proper for a prosecutor to replay videotestimony during summation in criminal matters). Counsel wasfree to argue the import of the dates on the MRIs and to drawconclusions from those dates, so long as those conclusions weregrounded in the evidence. See Colucci, 326 N.J. Super. at 177. 17 We disagree with the determination “that an expert wouldhave been required to testify that [Dr.] Vasen was reviewing thesame MRI films or that there was a mislabeling in order tochallenge his credibility.” Under this State’s jurisprudence,expert testimony “concern[s] a subject matter that is beyond theken of the average juror.” State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208(1984). Merely pointing to dates on MRIs or other images doesnot require expert testimony because reading the dates andrealizing that they are the same is not beyond the “ken of theaverage juror.” In sum, we hold that counsel may refer to, read, or playportions of videotaped fact or expert testimony given at trialduring closing, as long as (1) “counsel’s comments [are]confined to the facts shown or reasonably suggested by theevidence introduced during the course of the trial,” Colucci,326 N.J. Super. at 177, and (2) the concerns set forth inCondella are met. It was, in short, error to preclude the videoreplay during the first trial. We next consider whether that error produced a miscarriageof justice, warranting a new trial. 2. During both trials, the dispositive issue was whetherplaintiff sustained a permanent injury proximately caused by the2008 accident. That issue was fleshed out for the jury by the 18 testimony of plaintiff, plaintiff’s husband, and the parties’expert witnesses. The parties’ experts came to oppositeconclusions regarding the 2008 accident’s impact on plaintiff’sspine. Their testimony was key to the outcome of the firsttrial and the jury’s determination as to whether plaintiffsustained a permanent injury. We have concluded that the trialcourt abused its discretion by not allowing plaintiff to pointout what was plainly visible on the videotaped testimony of Dr.Vasen played at trial -- that the MRIs examined and compared byDr. Vasen bore the same date. Plaintiff’s counsel should havebeen able to raise that fact and argue that it undermines thereliability of Dr. Vasen’s testimony that plaintiff did notsuffer a permanent injury in the 2008 accident. Because experttestimony was vital to the outcome of the trial, the trialcourt’s refusal to allow plaintiff’s counsel to replay a portionof Dr. Vasen’s deposition was an error that resulted in a“miscarriage of justice under the law,” warranting a new trial.R. 2:10-1. Defendant claims “it is unfair and inequitable for[p]laintiff to play any portion of Dr. Vasen’s video duringsummations, as that same opportunity was not available todefendant (to play portions of Dr. Sabo’s trial testimony, as hetestified live).” However, it was defendant who chose toutilize a videotaped deposition of Dr. Vasen in lieu of in-court 19 testimony. In addition, both defendant and plaintiff were awareof the contents of the video. The fact that plaintiff chose topresent Dr. Sabo’s testimony live does not make it “unfair” or“inequitable” for plaintiff to utilize Dr. Vasen’s videotapeddeposition to her advantage during summation. Nor does defensecounsel’s failure to discover the labeling discrepancy renderplaintiff’s use of the video during summation “inequitable.” The Appellate Division found that, arguably, the replaywould have constituted unfair surprise. Unfair surprise is aproper basis to exclude evidence not properly provided to theopposing party during discovery. See Balian v. Gen. Motors, 121 N.J. Super. 118, 127 (App. Div. 1972). The prohibition againstunfair surprise prevents the introduction of evidence notproperly disclosed by the opposing party, id. at 127, but doesnot prevent counsel from using to their strategic advantage theevidence properly presented at trial by an adversary. A party’suse of evidence in its closing argument cannot be an “unfairsurprise” to the adverse party that properly produced,introduced, and admitted the same evidence at trial. Here, plaintiff was entitled to replay the deposition anddraw the jury’s attention to the discord between the datesstamped on the MRIs to which Dr. Vasen pointed and the dates heascribed to them. Because the trial turned on the weightassigned to expert testimony, we find that the denial of that 20 opportunity worked an injustice. Thus, although we disagreewith the reason for which the trial court granted plaintiff’smotion for a new trial, we agree that a new trial was necessary.We therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division andreinstate the verdict of the second jury. IV. Having resolved that a new trial was properly granted bythe trial court, we address only briefly plaintiff’s argumentthat, at the first trial, Dr. Vasen’s videotaped testimonyregarding the reports of non-testifying experts was inadmissiblehearsay. A. “[U]nder N.J.R.E. 703, an expert may give the reasons forhis opinion and the sources on which he relies, but thattestimony [cannot] establish the substance of the report of anon-testifying [expert].” Agha, 198 N.J. at 64. In otherwords, an expert may not “alert[] the jury to evidence it wouldnot otherwise be allowed to hear.” State v. Burris, 298 N.J.Super. 505, 512 (App. Div. 1997). That is because “experttestimony [cannot] serve as 'a vehicle for the wholesale[introduction] of otherwise inadmissible evidence.’” Agha, 198 N.J. at 63 (quoting State v. Vandeweaghe, 351 N.J. Super. 467,480-81 (App. Div. 2002) (alteration in original) (internalquotation marks omitted), aff’d, 177 N.J. 229 (2003)). 21 Although a testifying expert may detail the reasonsunderlying his or her opinion and the sources upon which his orher opinion is based, “[a]n expert witness should not be allowedto relate the opinions of a nontestifying expert merely becausethose opinions are congruent with the ones he has reached.”Krohn v. N.J. Full Ins. Underwriters Ass’n, 316 N.J. Super. 477,486 (App. Div. 1998). Said in a different way, the contents ofa non-testifying expert’s report may not be used as a “tiebreaker” between competing experts. James, 440 N.J. Super. at 51. Even when admitted, therefore, hearsay statements reliedupon by an expert may be used for the limited purpose ofapprising the jury of the basis of the testifying expert’sopinion, but not for the correctness of the non-testifyingexpert’s conclusion, and the trial court must, upon request,instruct the jury regarding the limited use of the hearsay.Agha, 198 N.J. at 63. B. Here, before the first trial, plaintiff moved in limine topreclude Dr. Vasen from referring to the opinions of non-testifying experts. The trial court denied the motion, admittedthe testimony, and gave the following limiting instruction: “Iinstruct you as the jury in this case you are not to considerany such out of Court statements by any non-testifying expertsas substantive proof of the content of those statements.” 22 Over the course of his direct examination, defense counselasked Dr. Vasen whether a non-testifying doctor “indicate[d]that there was a problem” at a specific part of plaintiff’sspine and additionally asked whether doctors noted a “problemat” the location of the purported injury. That testimonyimpermissibly sought to establish the substance of the reportsof non-testifying physicians, see Agha, 198 N.J. at 64, and“alert[ed] the jury to evidence it would not otherwise bepermitted to hear,” Burris, 298 N.J. Super. at 512.Notwithstanding the cautionary instruction given, the trialcourt erred in permitting Dr. Vasen to bolster his testimonyusing “congruent” opinions in reports of non-testifying doctorsduring the first trial rather than simply explain the sources ofinformation used in formulating his opinion. V. For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment ofthe Appellate Division and reinstate the jury’s verdict in favorof plaintiff following the second trial. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. 23