Title: Commonwealth v. Hardy
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12637
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: June 12, 2019

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SJC-12637 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  SUZANNE HARDY. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     February 5, 2019. - June 12, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Motor Vehicle, Homicide, Operating to endanger.  
Reckless Endangerment of a Child.  Wanton or Reckless 
Conduct. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 1, 2015. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Richard J. Carey, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Marissa Elkins for the defendant. 
 
Shane T. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  In June 2014, the defendant, Suzanne Hardy, was 
involved in a multivehicle accident in Brimfield in which her 
two nephews -- four year old Dylan Riel and sixteen month old 
2 
 
Jayce Garcia -- were fatally injured.1  The defendant and her 
four year old son were seriously injured, but survived.  At the 
time of the accident, Dylan was seated in the rear middle seat 
of the defendant's four-door sedan with the seat belt fastened, 
but without an age and size appropriate child safety "booster" 
seat, and Jayce was seated in the rear passenger's side 
position, in a front-facing safety seat with the straps set too 
high, rather than an age and size appropriate rear-facing safety 
seat. 
 
The defendant was indicted on two counts of manslaughter, 
G. L. c. 265, § 13; two counts of negligent motor vehicle 
homicide, G. L. c. 90, § 24G (b); one count of assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b); 
and three counts of reckless endangerment of a child, G. L. 
c. 265, § 13L.  The defendant was convicted of manslaughter of 
Dylan, reckless endangerment of Dylan, and negligent motor 
vehicle homicide of Dylan and Jayce. 
 
On appeal, the defendant raises two arguments.  First, she 
contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
convictions of involuntary manslaughter and reckless 
endangerment of a child relating to Dylan.  Second, she argues 
that, during closing argument, the Commonwealth improperly 
                     
 
1 The children will be referred to by their first names to 
avoid confusion. 
3 
 
argued inferences not supported by the evidence and appealed to 
the passions and sympathies of the jury.  We conclude that there 
was insufficient evidence to show that the defendant's actions 
amounted to wanton or reckless conduct, and as such, we vacate 
the convictions of involuntary manslaughter and reckless 
endangerment of Dylan.  The defendant's two convictions of 
negligent homicide are affirmed.2 
 
1.  Background.  The defendant challenges the sufficiency 
of the evidence; therefore, we summarize the facts in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, see Commonwealth v. 
                     
 
2 The defendant argues that the prosecutor made two improper 
remarks during closing argument that unduly prejudiced her and 
as a result warrant a new trial.  The defendant makes this claim 
only in regard to the manslaughter and reckless endangerment 
charge.  She contends that the prosecutor's statement that the 
crash would have been survivable if Dylan and Jayce were 
properly restrained was outside the evidence and was central to 
the question whether the defendant was reckless for not properly 
securing Dylan in a booster seat.  Because we conclude that 
there was insufficient evidence to support the manslaughter and 
reckless endangerment convictions, we need not address whether 
the defendant was prejudiced by the prosecutor's allegedly 
inappropriate comments. 
 
To the extent that the defendant makes a due process 
challenge (and it is not clear that she does) that the 
prosecutor's other comments that appealed to juror sympathies 
warrant a new trial on the negligent homicide convictions, we 
disagree.  The prosecutor stated that first responders "did not 
need to see" what they saw when responding to the accident.  At 
the end of the prosecutor's closing argument, the judge 
specifically identified the statement and forcefully instructed 
the jury to disregard it.  The instruction adequately cured any 
potential prejudice regarding the negligent homicide 
convictions.  See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 455 Mass. 372, 385 
(2009). 
4 
 
Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979), reserving pertinent 
facts for the discussion of the arguments.  On the morning of 
June 20, 2014, Nicole Riel, mother of Dylan and Jayce, met the 
defendant in a parking lot to leave her children with the 
defendant.3  Riel had to work, so the defendant planned to take 
the children to Dylan's baseball practice later that afternoon, 
and Riel planned to meet them there when she got out of work.  
The defendant had two children of her own -- a four year old son 
and a two year old daughter.  The defendant's children's safety 
seats were installed in her vehicle, a four-door sedan, but her 
children were not with her when she picked up Dylan and Jayce.  
Riel secured Dylan, the four year old, into a booster seat and 
placed Jayce, the sixteen month old, in a front-facing safety 
seat in the defendant's vehicle.4 
The defendant drove the children to her home, where she 
lived with her parents, so that they could play.  Meanwhile, the 
defendant and her parents decided to leave for vacation with 
Dylan that day.  The defendant had planned to take her two 
children and Dylan to meet her parents at their destination the 
                     
 
3 The defendant often babysat her nephews while their mother 
was at work.  Dylan was the son of the defendant's brother.  
Although not biologically related, the Hardy family also were 
close with Jayce, Dylan's half-brother. 
 
4 Riel had secured Jayce in a front-facing safety seat in 
her own vehicle from the time he was approximately one year old. 
5 
 
following day, but decided to leave that day instead, as Dylan's 
baseball practice was canceled. 
 
After her plans changed, the defendant decided to drive to 
Riel's house to return Jayce to his mother and pick up an 
overnight bag for Dylan to take on vacation.  As the defendant 
placed her two nephews and her son in her vehicle, her father 
observed that there were only two safety seats in her vehicle's 
back seat.  He took a booster seat out of his wife's vehicle and 
placed it against the rear driver's side door of the defendant's 
vehicle.  The defendant picked up the booster seat, opened her 
vehicle's rear door, looked into the back seat, closed the door, 
and placed the booster seat in the trunk of her vehicle. 
 
When the defendant left, her son was in the rear driver's 
side of the vehicle in his booster seat, Jayce was in the front-
facing safety seat behind the front passenger's seat with the 
straps set at an improper height, and Dylan was buckled into the 
rear middle seat with a shoulder and lap belt but no booster 
seat.  The defendant's son was about one month older than Dylan, 
but Dylan was larger -- he was forty-four inches tall and 
weighed fifty-four pounds.5 
                     
 
5 According to G. L. c. 90, § 7AA, Dylan was required to be 
secured in a booster seat.  General Laws c. 90, § 7AA, states:  
"A passenger in a motor vehicle on any way who is under the age 
of [eight] shall be fastened and secured by a child passenger 
restraint, unless such passenger measures more than [fifty-
seven] inches in height.  The child passenger restraint shall be 
6 
 
 
At around 4:30 P.M., the defendant was driving 
approximately the speed limit, fifty-five miles per hour, on a 
four-lane highway in Brimfield.  This stretch of the highway was 
relatively flat; had four lanes, two eastbound and two 
westbound; and was divided in the middle by a double yellow 
line.  A dump truck with an attached trailer was stopped in the 
left-hand eastbound lane ahead, as the driver waited to make a 
left turn into a parking lot.  The truck was stopped for 
approximately thirty seconds to one minute, while the driver 
waited for westbound traffic to clear in order to make the turn.  
The truck's trailer attachment's turn signal was on.  The 
defendant's vehicle approached the truck from behind without 
slowing down, then quickly swerved into the right eastbound lane 
and struck the guardrail on the right side of the road.  It 
crossed both eastbound lanes in front of the truck and then 
crossed the double yellow line into oncoming westbound traffic.  
The defendant's vehicle struck the back of a sport utility 
vehicle in the left westbound lane before hitting a sedan 
traveling in the right westbound lane head-on.  The two vehicles 
were traveling between fifty and fifty-nine miles per hour at 
the time of impact.  Two State police accident reconstruction 
experts testified that the defendant did not apply her brakes at 
                     
properly fastened and secured according to the manufacturer's 
instructions." 
7 
 
any time leading up to the collision.  Dylan and Jayce did not 
survive the crash.6,7 
At trial, the Commonwealth's medical examiner determined 
the cause of death was the same for each child -- blunt force 
trauma of the head and neck with atlanto-occipital 
disarticulation.  This type of injury occurs when "the head and 
the body are not in synchronization," such as when the body is 
restrained or stationary and the head continues to move forward 
at a high speed causing it to become unattached from the spine 
internally.  The medical examiner was not an expert in child 
safety seats and could not say whether Jayce would have survived 
if his seat had been rear-facing or whether Dylan would have 
survived if he had been in a booster seat. 
One of the accident reconstruction experts testified that 
all three child safety seats were capable of being properly 
installed in the back seat.  According to State law and 
manufacturer recommendations, based on their ages and weights, 
Dylan should have been in a booster seat and Jayce, although in 
                     
6 The defendant and her son suffered severe injuries.  The 
defendant was unresponsive when first responders arrived and was 
transported to a level one trauma center via helicopter.  Her 
son suffered a head injury and severe skeletal damage to his 
torso. 
 
7 The driver of the sedan that was hit and her seventeen 
month old daughter, who was secured in a front-facing safety 
seat in the rear of the vehicle, were severely injured but 
survived. 
8 
 
a proper safety seat, should have been rear-facing.  The 
accident reconstruction expert testified to the safety benefits 
of a booster seat and how it can position a child so that the 
seat belt aligns with the strong points of the body.  If 
properly used, a booster seat allows the body to "slow down and 
ride down . . . collision forces and make [a crash] survivable."  
In addition, the expert testified that weather, solar glare, and 
mechanical defects were not factors in this collision.  In the 
expert's opinion, a "normal person" in the defendant's position 
would have been able to avoid the collision by perceiving the 
trailer ahead of her, and the crash was the result of the 
defendant's inattentiveness to the road in front of her. 
2.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant moved for 
required findings of not guilty on all counts at the close of 
the Commonwealth's case and again at the close of all evidence.  
The motion was allowed as to one count of reckless endangerment 
of a child, as to the defendant's son, at the close of the 
Commonwealth's evidence, but the motions were otherwise denied.  
On appeal, the defendant contends that the judge erred when he 
denied the motions and ruled, both during trial and again after 
the jury's verdicts, that securing Dylan with a regular seat 
belt, but not placing him in a booster seat, was a legally 
sufficient basis to convict her of manslaughter and reckless 
endangerment of a child.  The Commonwealth contends that the 
9 
 
defendant's conduct created a substantial risk of bodily injury 
sufficient to satisfy the elements of recklessness for both 
involuntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment of a child. 
 
The elements of the crime of manslaughter are derived from 
the common law.  Commonwealth v. Carter, 481 Mass. 352, 364 
(2019).  In Carter, we reiterated the long-standing definition 
of manslaughter as "an unlawful homicide, unintentionally caused 
. . . by an act which constitutes such a disregard of probable 
harmful consequences to another as to constitute wanton or 
reckless conduct" (citation omitted).  Id.  Wanton or reckless 
conduct "involves a high degree of likelihood that substantial 
harm will result to another," and depends on whether the 
defendant realized the risk of harm or if a reasonable person, 
who knew what the defendant knew, would have realized such risk.  
Commonwealth v. Earle, 458 Mass. 341, 347 & n.9 (2010), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 399 (1944). 
As a general rule, the requirement of "wanton or reckless 
conduct" may be satisfied by either the commission of an 
intentional act or an intentional omission where there is a duty 
to act.  Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462 Mass. 482, 497 (2012).  "To 
constitute wanton or reckless conduct, as distinguished from 
mere negligence, grave danger to others must have been apparent, 
and the defendant must have chosen to run the risk rather than 
alter [her] conduct so as to avoid the act or omission which 
10 
 
caused the harm."  Welansky, 316 Mass. at 398.  See Commonwealth 
v. Dragotta, 476 Mass. 680, 686 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Levesque, 436 Mass. 443, 452 (2002).  Although our cases state 
frequently that "[t]he essence of wanton or reckless conduct is 
intentional conduct," see Commonwealth v. Catalina, 407 Mass. 
779, 789 (1990), quoting Welansky, supra at 399, wanton or 
reckless conduct does not require that the actor intended the 
specific result of her conduct, but only that he or she intended 
to do the wanton or reckless act.  Commonwealth v. Life Care 
Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 456 Mass. 826, 832 (2010). 
 
Reckless endangerment of a child, on the other hand, is a 
crime created by the Legislature.  See G. L. c. 265, § 13L 
(§ 13L).  To prove reckless endangerment of a child, the 
Commonwealth must prove "(1) a child under age eighteen, (2) a 
substantial risk of serious bodily injury or sexual abuse, and 
(3) the defendant wantonly or recklessly (i) engaged in conduct 
that created the substantial risk, or (ii) failed to take 
reasonable steps to alleviate that risk where a duty to act 
exists."  Commonwealth v. Coggeshall, 473 Mass. 665, 667–668 
(2016).  The definition of "wanton or reckless" under § 13L is 
drawn from the common-law definition of wanton or reckless, 
barring one distinction.  See id. at 670.  Unlike the common-law 
meaning of wanton or reckless, under § 13L the Commonwealth does 
not have the option of proving a defendant's objective or 
11 
 
subjective state of mind -- the defendant actually must be aware 
of the risk.  Id. (in this regard § 13L evinces "a clearly 
expressed legislative intent to depart from the common-law 
meaning of the words 'wanton or reckless'").  Therefore, to 
uphold the defendant's manslaughter conviction we must conclude 
that the defendant or a reasonable person in the same 
circumstances would have realized the gravity of the danger.  
Id. at 669-670.  To uphold her § 13L conviction, we must 
conclude that the defendant was actually aware of the risk.  Id. 
at 670.  Nonetheless, even though the awareness element is 
different, the conduct that defines "wanton or recklessness" is 
the same under both manslaughter and § 13L.  See id. at 669-670.  
That is, if the conduct is wanton or reckless under § 13L, then 
it is wanton or reckless under the involuntary manslaughter 
standard.  However, because involuntary manslaughter can be 
measured by the reasonable person standard, conduct that is 
wanton or reckless under the involuntary manslaughter standard 
will not always be wanton or reckless conduct under § 13L. 
 
This court, as well as the Appeals Court, has had many 
occasions to define what type of conduct is "wanton or reckless" 
concerning the care of children.  See Commonwealth v. Hendricks, 
452 Mass. 97, 104-106 (2008) (wanton or reckless conduct under 
§ 13L where defendant [1] went on high-speed nighttime chase 
with police while his three year old child was in vehicle, and 
12 
 
[2] fled on foot with child with police in pursuit because 
defendant knew such pursuit would place child at substantial 
risk of harm); Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 416 Mass. 114, 118 
(1993) (failure to provide medical care to young child in 
distress is reckless conduct in support of involuntary 
manslaughter conviction); Commonwealth v. Leonard, 90 Mass. App. 
Ct. 187, 194 (2016) (wanton or reckless conduct under § 13L 
where defendants were consuming alcohol along with teenagers in 
defendants' home, were aware that minor victim was vomiting 
after consuming large volume of alcohol, and did not heed 
victim's requests to be taken to hospital); Commonwealth v. 
Figueroa, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 251, 259-261 (2013) (wanton or 
reckless conduct under § 13L where, after defendant's boyfriend 
dropped her infant grandson, defendant [1] refused plea of 
infant's mother to take infant to hospital, and [2] took 
mother's telephone to prevent her from calling 911); 
Commonwealth v. Power, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 398, 407 (2010) 
(violation of statutory and regulatory standards was wanton or 
reckless conduct in support of involuntary manslaughter 
conviction where toddler died in defendant's day care facility); 
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 752, 758-759 (2009) 
(wanton or reckless conduct in support of conviction of assault 
and battery upon child where defendant failed to give child 
13 
 
timely medical attention even though there was high likelihood 
that child would suffer substantial bodily injury without it). 
 
Likewise, we have considered the type of conduct that is 
"wanton or reckless" when operating a motor vehicle.  See 
Hendricks, 452 Mass. at 104-106; Commonwealth v. DeSimone, 349 
Mass. 770, 770-771 (1965) (defendant passing vehicle, weaving 
through traffic, following too closely, and again passing 
vehicle sufficient to constitute wanton or reckless conduct for 
manslaughter conviction); Commonwealth v. Moore, 92 Mass. App. 
Ct. 40, 45-46 (2017) (wanton or reckless operation of vehicle 
where defendant led police on high-speed chase through busy city 
streets at rush hour and made no effort to slow down or steer 
away from intersection before collision that struck victim); 
Commonwealth v. Guaman, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 36, 41 (2016) (wanton 
or reckless operation of motor vehicle supported manslaughter 
conviction where defendant chose to drive after being visibly 
drunk and continued to drive after striking victim, hearing 
victim scream, and hearing witnesses yelling at defendant to 
stop).  In these cases, "a high degree of likelihood that 
substantial harm will result to another" flowed from the 
intentional conduct.  Earle, 458 Mass. at 347, quoting Welansky, 
316 Mass. at 399. 
 
Perhaps it is a testament to prosecutorial discretion, 
trial judges properly dismissing cases based on insufficient 
14 
 
evidence, and juries conscientiously performing their function 
that we have had few occasions to review convictions on the 
basis that the evidence was insufficient to prove "wanton or 
reckless" conduct.  See, e.g., Dragotta, 476 Mass. at 686-689 
(not wanton or reckless conduct where defendant's infant 
suffered significant injuries from defendant's boyfriend because 
there was no evidence that defendant should have known boyfriend 
was so manifestly unfit to care for victim that grave danger 
existed when infant was left in boyfriend's care); Pugh, 462 
Mass. at 484 (no wanton or reckless conduct where defendant in 
labor decided to give birth unassisted); Life Care Ctrs. of Am., 
Inc., 456 Mass. at 833-834 (insufficient evidence to support 
involuntary manslaughter conviction where nursing home resident 
died as result of negligence, but no individual behavior could 
be found to have been wanton or reckless); Commonwealth v. 
Santos, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 558, 561 (2018) (defendant's act of 
leaving child in front of television while defendant used 
bathroom was not reckless even though child previously had 
wandered from home).  But see Santos, supra at 562 (searching 
for missing child for only ten minutes and not calling police 
was reckless conduct). 
Moreover, in all cases, not just those in which there is a 
horrific tragedy as there is here, we must look at the conduct 
that caused the result to determine whether it was wanton or 
15 
 
reckless, not the resultant harm.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Flynn, 420 Mass. 810, 815 (1995) (evidence was insufficient to 
support guilty verdict because Commonwealth failed to prove that 
defendant's conduct was cause of victim's death); Commonwealth 
v. Michaud, 389 Mass. 491, 498-499 (1983) (where infant died of 
starvation, total evidence, including physical appearance of 
child at time of death and conjectural evidence that mother did 
not appropriately feed child, was insufficient to establish 
wanton or reckless culpability). 
 
Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, no rational juror could find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant's actions were wanton or 
reckless.  The evidence showed that Dylan and Jayce died as a 
result of the collision.  The jury were permitted to infer from 
the evidence that the defendant's negligent driving contributed 
to the collision.  Experts with the State police testified that 
the defendant was driving approximately the speed limit, but did 
not apply her brakes at any time leading up to collision.  
Neither weather, solar glare, nor mechanical defects were 
factors in the collision.  One of the experts concluded that a 
"normal person" in the defendant's position would have been able 
to avoid the collision by perceiving the trailer ahead of her 
and that the crash was the result of the defendant's 
inattentiveness to the road in front of her.  The defendant's 
16 
 
general inattentiveness alone, however, is insufficient to 
support a finding of recklessness.  Cf. Hendricks, 452 Mass. at 
104-106; Moore, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 45-46; Guaman, 90 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 41. 
 
The evidence also showed that the defendant acknowledged 
the booster seat provided by her father, but that she placed it 
in the trunk of her vehicle rather than secure it in the 
backseat with the two safety seats already installed, even 
though three child safety seats were capable of being properly 
installed at the same time.  The Commonwealth relies on this 
evidence to support the inference that the defendant recognized, 
and thereafter disregarded, the risk of harm from securing Dylan 
without a booster seat.  Although this evidence suggests that 
the defendant appreciated the risk of not securing Dylan in a 
booster seat, it does not support an inference that grave danger 
from not securing Dylan in a booster seat was apparent.  Put 
differently, there was not sufficient evidence for the jury to 
find that the defendant was aware, or that a reasonable person 
would have been aware, that failing to secure Dylan in a booster 
seat created a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm 
would result.  See Dragotta, 476 Mass. at 686.  This was not a 
situation where the defendant's conduct had a likely consequence 
of substantial harm.  See Commonwealth v. Chapman, 433 Mass. 
481, 488 (2001) (wanton or reckless conduct where defendant left 
17 
 
baby unattended for three minutes in water deep enough to drown, 
waited from three to five minutes once seeing baby had drowned 
before calling 911, and made no effort to revive baby using 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation).  To reach that conclusion, we 
would have to conclude that operating a motor vehicle with an 
improperly restrained child is per se an inherently dangerous 
activity, even absent other factors that enhance its 
dangerousness.  See, e.g., Hendricks, 452 Mass. at 104-106; 
Moore, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 45-46. 
In addition, the evidence showed that a child of Dylan's 
size legally was required to be secured in a booster seat.  See 
G. L. c. 90, § 7AA.  The defendant's failure to comply with the 
Massachusetts law that required a child of Dylan's size to be 
secured in a booster seat does not, by itself, amount to wanton 
or reckless conduct.  Power, 76 Mass. App. Ct. at 407.  Again, 
the jury could find that securing a four year old with only a 
seat belt was negligent, but recklessness is more than a mistake 
of judgment or even gross negligence; it is conduct that is 
"substantially more than negligence."  See Hendricks, 452 Mass. 
at 103.  See also Michaud, 389 Mass. at 499. 
The Commonwealth argues that if the defendant's decision to 
improperly restrain the children in her vehicle or her 
"dangerous driving" -- including inattentiveness, an unsafe lane 
change, collision with the guardrail, and overcorrection into 
18 
 
oncoming traffic -- alone are not enough to satisfy the 
recklessness elements of both crimes, then, in the totality of 
the circumstances, her conduct was reckless.  The Commonwealth 
cites Hendricks, 452 Mass. at 104-105, as support for its 
position that dangerous driving combined with other evidence is 
sufficient to show recklessness.  The evidence here fell 
markedly short of the evidence that proved recklessness in 
Hendricks.  The "dangerous driving" in Hendricks consisted of a 
deliberate high-speed nighttime chase to evade and elude police.  
Id. at 103.  That defendant was traveling with his child in 
excess of twice the speed limit on unpaved, narrow roads 
containing sharp turns.  Id.  The defendant's general 
inattentiveness here is not the same intentional wanton or 
reckless conduct as that at issue in Hendricks. 
3.  Conclusion.  Our cases demonstrate that something much 
greater than negligence is necessary to affirm convictions of 
involuntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment of a child.  
See Commonwealth v. Bouvier, 316 Mass. 489, 495 (1944).  Where 
negligence may result from "inadvertence, incompetence, 
unskillfulness, or failure to take [adequate] precautions," 
recklessness "requires a conscious choice of a course of action 
. . . with knowledge of the serious dangers to others involved" 
(citation omitted).  Boyd v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 446 
Mass. 540, 547 (2006).  Under that standard, there was not 
19 
 
legally sufficient evidence to show that the defendant's conduct 
was wanton or reckless.  Therefore, the judgments of conviction 
of manslaughter and reckless endangerment of a child are 
reversed, the verdicts are set aside, and the case is remanded 
to the Superior Court for the entry of required findings of not 
guilty.  The two convictions of negligent motor vehicle homicide 
are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.