Title: Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility v. Walter L. Harvey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1993AP003110-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: November 14, 1995

No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  93-3110-D 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against WALTER L. HARVEY, Attorney at Law. 
 
FILED 
 
 
NOV 14, 1995 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
 
                                                                
   
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding. 
 
Attorney's 
license 
revoked. 
 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Walter L. Harvey appealed from the 
referee's conclusion that he engaged in conduct involving 
dishonesty, deceit and misrepresentation by using a power of 
attorney given to him by an elderly relative to convert to his own 
use more than $140,000 of the relative's assets, conversions that 
were not intended, known, authorized or ratified by her.  Attorney 
Harvey also appealed from the referee's recommendation that his 
license to practice law in Wisconsin be revoked as discipline for 
that misconduct.   
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
2 
 
We determine that the referee properly concluded that 
Attorney 
Harvey 
engaged 
in 
dishonesty, 
deceit 
and 
misrepresentation in this matter, as that conclusion is supported 
by facts based on testimony and documentary evidence presented at 
a lengthy disciplinary hearing.  Attorney Harvey has failed to 
establish that the facts found by the referee that support the 
conclusion regarding his misconduct are clearly erroneous.   
 
We further determine that the recommended license revocation 
is the appropriate discipline to impose for Attorney Harvey's 
misconduct.  He abused the fiduciary position he assumed on behalf 
of his relative for his own financial benefit and violated the 
trust she had placed in him to act in her best interests.  The 
egregious nature and extent of his misconduct renders Attorney 
Harvey unfit to be licensed by this court to represent others in 
the legal system.   
 
Attorney Harvey was admitted to practice law in Wisconsin in 
1962 and practiced in Madison.  In 1987, he relocated to Arizona, 
where he currently resides.  He has not been the subject of a 
prior disciplinary proceeding.  The facts found by the referee, 
Attorney Jean DiMotto, concern Attorney Harvey's use of a power of 
attorney to take more than $140,000 of a relative's assets during 
the six months preceding her death.   
 
From 1959 to 1987, Attorney Harvey developed and maintained a 
close relationship with Elyda Morphy, a first cousin of his 
mother.  Ms. Morphy, the widow of the former director of the 
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
3 
University of Wisconsin band, executed a will in 1968 in which she 
made two specific bequests -- $1000 to a church and $25,000 to 
Attorney Harvey -- and gave the residue of her estate to the 
University of Wisconsin Foundation to establish a fund in her late 
husband's name to provide scholarships to University of Wisconsin 
music students.  Her will named First Wisconsin National Bank as 
personal representative and a codicil she executed in 1976 did not 
substantially alter the disposition of her estate.    
 
In December, 1980, Ms. Morphy, then 85 years old,  entered a 
nursing home and let Attorney Harvey and his wife and daughter 
have whatever furniture and personal possessions she did not take 
with her.  The nursing home required a guaranty of all expenses 
she might incur and Attorney Harvey signed as guarantor, but 
throughout her nine-year residence there, Ms. Morphy paid all of 
those expenses.  Nursing home staff described Ms. Morphy as very 
intelligent, independent, careful with her assets and income, and 
private and precise, particularly in respect to her financial 
matters.  Three months after entering the nursing home, Ms. Morphy 
had her personal attorney, Myron Stevens, prepare and she executed 
a power of attorney appointing Walter Harvey her attorney in fact, 
a power Attorney Harvey never used.   
 
In 1984, Attorney Stevens discussed with Ms. Morphy who 
should have charge of her estate in the event she became 
incapacitated and she specified the bank she had named personal 
representative in her will.  Attorney Stevens then suggested that 
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
4 
her attorney in fact be given specific authorization to create a 
revocable living trust for her in the event of her incapacity, and 
he drafted such a provision in a new, durable power of attorney 
naming Attorney Harvey, which Ms. Morphy executed in March, 1984. 
 Attorney Stevens sent Attorney Harvey a copy of that new power, 
indicating to him the purpose for it.  Attorney Harvey never used 
that power.   
 
Ms. Morphy executed a third power of attorney in March, 1987, 
on the advice of her attorney when she told him she had discarded 
the 1984 power.  Her attorney advised her that she needed a power 
of attorney in force so that if she ever became incapacitated, 
Attorney Harvey could enter into a living trust for her with the 
bank.  The 1987 power did not differ substantially from its 
predecessor.   
 
At the same time he advised her to execute a new power of 
attorney, Attorney Stevens suggested that Ms. Morphy execute a 
codicil to her will specifically giving her furniture and 
furnishings, personal effects and remaining tangible personal 
property to Attorney Harvey and he drafted a codicil to accomplish 
that.  Ms. Morphy declined to execute that codicil because she 
believed it was unnecessary, as she already had made arrangements 
with Attorney Harvey to dispose of those items.  Attorney Stevens 
then sent the new power of attorney to Attorney Harvey, explaining 
the reason for it in a cover letter.  He also sent him a copy of 
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
5 
the unexecuted codicil and set forth his reason for advising Ms. 
Morphy to sign it and her reason for not doing so.   
 
Over the following two years, Attorney Harvey did not visit 
Ms. Morphy and did not use the power of attorney.  When he learned 
in mid-February, 1989, from a social worker at the nursing home 
that Ms. Morphy's physical condition had deteriorated, Attorney 
Harvey telephoned Attorney Stevens, who told him the 1987 power of 
attorney remained in effect, First Wisconsin National Bank 
continued to be the executor named in Ms. Morphy's will and the 
bequests to himself and to the University of Wisconsin Foundation 
remained unchanged.  The following month, Attorney Harvey and his 
wife visited Ms. Morphy and during that visit, Ms. Morphy told him 
words to the effect, "There is plenty in there for you and [your 
wife].  Go on and use it."  The referee found that Ms. Morphy's 
statement referred to the specific bequest to him in her will, not 
to her funds while she was alive.   
 
Shortly after that visit, Attorney Harvey met with Attorney 
Stevens and discussed using the power of attorney to obtain bank 
authorization for him to sign checks on Ms. Morphy's accounts and 
to gain access to her safe deposit box.  He also discussed making 
funeral arrangements, locating Ms. Morphy's heirs and arranging 
for the nursing home to dispose of her personal possessions.  The 
referee found that Attorney Harvey did not discuss his being 
appointed personal representative of Ms. Morphy's estate and 
Attorney Stevens its attorney.   
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
6 
 
Immediately following that meeting, Attorney Harvey had his 
name added on Ms. Morphy's savings and checking accounts, 
inventoried the contents of her safe deposit box and moved them to 
a new box in the name of himself and his wife.  A few days later 
he requested and received from Attorney Stevens a copy of Ms. 
Morphy's tax returns for the preceding three years, which listed 
her annuities, stocks and certificates of deposit and her earnings 
from them.   
 
Attorney Harvey first used Ms. Morphy's power of attorney on 
March 29, 1989, to liquidate her money market account at an 
investment company.  Following his return to Arizona, he received 
a check from the company payable to Ms. Morphy and himself as her 
attorney in fact in the amount of $34,866.96.  He cashed that 
check and used the proceeds for personal purposes.   
 
Attorney Harvey again visited Ms. Morphy in late April, 1989, 
as her condition had worsened.  She was for the most part 
bedridden and described as forgetful and occasionally confused.  
Following that visit and over the next six months, Attorney Harvey 
used the power of attorney on eight occasions to obtain Ms. 
Morphy's funds, which he used for his own purposes.  He made five 
withdrawals from her savings account, in the total amount of 
$73,500; he redeemed two certificates of deposit, with a total 
value of $10,374; he had some of her stock sold, for which he 
received $21,404.  The referee found that Ms. Morphy was not aware 
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
7 
of those transfers of her assets Attorney Harvey had made to 
himself.   
 
Contrary to Attorney Harvey's contention that the bank 
statements for Ms. Morphy's savings account and the statement 
reporting the liquidation of her money market account informed her 
of what he termed the "gifts" he was making to himself, the 
referee found no evidence to establish that those statements 
identified the savings account withdrawals by cashier's check 
payable to Attorney Harvey as attorney in fact or that Ms. Morphy 
in fact saw the money market account liquidation statement.  The 
referee 
also 
found no evidence that the cashing of the 
certificates of deposit was reported to Ms. Morphy and also found 
that she did not know of the stock sale.   
 
Attorney Harvey received most of Ms. Morphy's funds by check 
payable to himself as her attorney in fact.  He testified that he 
used the $140,145 for down payments and installments on two 
automobiles, payments on a leased home, furniture purchases, 
moving expenses and a temporary residence, law practice expenses, 
miscellaneous living expenses and his daughter's university 
tuition.   
 
During that six-month period, Attorney Harvey wrote to Ms. 
Morphy occasionally and telephoned the nursing home several times 
to inquire about her condition.  He spoke to nursing home staff, 
as Ms. Morphy was unable to converse on the telephone.   
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
8 
 
In early September, 1989, Ms. Morphy told the social worker 
who had been attending to her at the nursing home that she was 
concerned that the balance in her savings account reported on a 
recent bank statement was $6000 lower than it should have been.  
At Ms. Morphy's request, the social worker made an inquiry at the 
bank and it sent Ms. Morphy an authorization for her to sign 
requesting information concerning the account and documentation of 
the disbursements from it.  The bank sent a copy of that 
communication to Attorney Harvey as Ms. Morphy's attorney in fact. 
 Upon receiving that copy, Attorney Harvey called the social 
worker and asked her to assure Ms. Morphy that her money "was 
fine" and said that she had $75,000 to $80,000 in her savings 
account.  The notes the social worker wrote in Ms. Morphy's record 
reported that Attorney Harvey said he had taken some of the funds 
from the savings account "to invest it more wisely for a larger 
return on [Ms. Morphy's] behalf."   
 
In response to her inquiry, the bank informed Ms. Morphy by 
letter dated Friday, September 29, 1989, of the amounts and dates 
of deposits to and withdrawals from her savings account and 
included copies of the cashier's checks it had issued to Attorney 
Harvey as her attorney in fact.  The referee found that Ms. Morphy 
neither saw nor read that correspondence prior to her death, which 
occurred in the early hours of the following Monday, October 2, 
1989.   
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
9 
 
Shortly after Ms. Morphy's funeral, Attorney Harvey met with 
Attorney Stevens and insisted that he be appointed personal 
representative of her estate.  At that time, Attorney Stevens 
already was acting as attorney for the estate on behalf of the 
named personal representative and he agreed to petition the court 
for Attorney Harvey's appointment.   
 
The University of Wisconsin Foundation was notified of Ms. 
Morphy's death and of the provision in her will making it her 
residual beneficiary.  An official of the Foundation testified 
that during a three-way telephone conversation with Attorney 
Stevens and Attorney Harvey, he learned that Attorney Harvey, then 
living in California, was a beneficiary under Ms. Morphy's will 
and was seeking appointment to replace the bank as personal 
representative.  The official also was told that Attorney Harvey 
had been Ms. Morphy's attorney in fact under a power of attorney. 
  
 
When asked to consent on behalf of the Foundation to Attorney 
Harvey's being personal representative of the estate, the official 
questioned whether additional costs would result from his residing 
in California while the estate was being probated in Wisconsin.  
He also asked whether Attorney Harvey had used Ms. Morphy's power 
of attorney, as he was concerned that as personal representative, 
Attorney Harvey would be reviewing his own prior actions as 
attorney in fact.  The official wrote to Attorney Stevens on 
October 12, 1989 that, based on assurances he had been given that 
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
10 
administration expenses would not substantially increase and that 
Attorney Harvey had not used the power of attorney, the Foundation 
did not object to Attorney Harvey's appointment as personal 
representative.   
 
When several weeks passed and Attorney Harvey had not 
provided information needed to commence estate administration, 
Attorney Stevens wrote to him expressing concern.  The Foundation 
official received a copy of that letter and wrote to Attorney 
Stevens of his concern with the delay and reiterated that the 
Foundation's agreement not to object to Attorney Harvey's 
appointment as personal representative was premised on Attorney 
Harvey's assertions that he had not acted under the power of 
attorney and that his appointment would not substantially increase 
probate expenses.   
 
After Attorney Harvey was appointed personal representative, 
Attorney Stevens asked him for information concerning the estate's 
inventory.  On March 21, 1990, Attorney Harvey sent him stock 
certificates that had been in the safe deposit box and stated that 
Ms. Morphy had asked him "to accept substantial funds from her 
estate as a gift" and that in 1989 she "provided" him specified 
amounts from stocks, savings, certificates of deposit and a money 
market account.  Attorney Harvey did not disclose in that letter 
that he had obtained those funds by using the power of attorney.  
Prior to receiving that letter, Attorney Stevens had no knowledge 
of any "gifts" from Ms. Morphy to Attorney Harvey.   
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
11 
 
The referee found that Ms. Morphy did not intend to make a 
gift to Attorney Harvey of her funds while she was alive, 
rejecting as non-genuine three documents he offered to support his 
contention that she intended to do so.  The first of those 
documents is a photocopy of a typewritten note purportedly 
prepared and signed by Ms. Morphy and dated February 15, 1981, 
shortly after her move to the nursing home.  The note thanked 
Attorney Harvey for taking care of Ms. Morphy for the past 15 
years and for moving her and guaranteeing her obligations to the 
nursing home.  It states, in part, "I want you to have whatever is 
left of my possessions and accounts when the time comes, if any.  
If I outlast my accounts, then you must see me through.  I will 
have [Attorney] Stevens prepare a legal document so you will have 
authority to take care of me and handle these matters."  Attorney 
Stevens drafted the first power of attorney and she executed it 
the following month.   
 
The second document the referee found non-genuine is a 
photocopy of a note dated March 7, 1987 that Attorney Harvey 
claimed to have written at the direction of Ms. Morphy.  It is 
purportedly signed by her and states, "Walter, you should take 
whatever you want of my funds for you, [your wife and daughter].  
You have taken care of me for so long -- Just be sure [the nursing 
home] is paid, there is something left for scholarships and you 
handle my affairs afterward --."   
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
12 
 
The referee based her rejection of those documents as 
evidence of Ms. Morphy's intent to make a gift to Attorney Harvey 
on the following:  the originals allegedly were never found and 
not produced and were not with the originals of Ms. Morphy's other 
documents at the nursing home; no one other than Attorney Harvey 
saw Ms. Morphy sign the originals; the proffered copies were in 
Attorney Harvey's possession but he did not produce them in 1990 
when Attorney Stevens expressed concern about the lack of 
corroboration for the gifts Attorney Harvey claimed Ms. Morphy had 
made to him.  Based on that evidence, the referee found that the 
two documents were non-genuine, had not been signed by Ms. Morphy 
and were not evidence of any donative intent, testamentary or 
otherwise, of Ms. Morphy in respect to Attorney Harvey.   
 
The referee further noted that none of the three powers of 
attorney Ms. Morphy gave Attorney Harvey specifically authorized 
gifting, whether to the holder of the power or to anyone else.  
Attorney Harvey took the position that, based on the 1981 note, 
the purpose of those powers was gifting.  To the contrary, the 
referee found, the reason for the power Attorney Stevens 
repeatedly gave Attorney Harvey in notes and correspondence was to 
provide for the management of Ms. Morphy's affairs in the event 
she became incapacitated.  Moreover, the reason he communicated to 
Attorney Harvey for Ms. Morphy's not having executed the codicil 
he prepared regarding the disposition of her personal effects was 
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
13 
that Attorney Harvey was not to receive those by bequest but was 
to dispose of them after her death.   
 
The third document rejected by the referee as evidence of Ms. 
Morphy's donative intent was an original, handwritten page 
asserted to have been prepared initially by Ms. Morphy listing 
questions and comments about matters she wanted to discuss with 
Attorney Harvey when he visited her in March, 1987.  The top half 
of the list, apparently in Ms. Morphy's handwriting, makes 
reference to the nursing home's telephoning Attorney Harvey upon 
Ms. Morphy's death and his taking charge of funeral and burial 
arrangements and it specifies First Wisconsin National Bank as her 
"executor," questioning whether the bank would remove her 
furniture and personal effects.  Attorney Harvey testified that 
while he was discussing those matters with her, Ms. Morphy 
experienced difficulty writing and he took the pencil from her and 
added items to the list pursuant to their conversation.   
 
The first three of those additional items, written in all 
capital letters, relate to funeral and burial arrangements and 
Attorney Harvey's expenses in taking care of those matters and 
sets out his telephone number.  The referee found that those three 
items had been written during Ms. Morphy's conversation with 
Attorney Harvey but found that Attorney Harvey added the fourth 
item subsequent to that conversation.  That item states, "WALT AS 
PR & all Property + Accounts to Him."  (Presumably, "PR" is an 
abbreviation 
of 
"personal 
representative.") 
 
The 
referee's 
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
14 
findings that Attorney Harvey added that item subsequent to his 
discussion with Ms. Morphy and that it does not authentically 
reflect her wishes in respect to who was to be the personal 
representative of her estate and regarding the disposition of her 
property are based on the comparatively lighter pencil impressions 
of the fourth item and its different capitalization pattern 
compared to that of the first three items.   
 
After he received Attorney Harvey's letter of March 21, 1990 
informing him of the "gifts" of Ms. Morphy's funds, Attorney 
Stevens told Attorney Harvey that as attorney for the estate, he 
would have to advise the Foundation of those gifts.  Attorney 
Harvey agreed that Attorney Stevens would send the Foundation a 
copy of that letter listing those gifts.  At the same time, 
Attorney Harvey asked Attorney Stevens to file gift tax returns 
for the $140,000 he had taken from Ms. Morphy's assets but 
Attorney Stevens declined because he felt in good conscience he 
could not do so.   
 
When the Foundation received a copy of Attorney Harvey's 
letter disclosing the transfers of Ms. Morphy's assets to himself, 
it immediately retained counsel to determine whether those 
transfers were proper.  Shortly thereafter, the Foundation 
demanded formal administration of the estate and the removal of 
Attorney Harvey as its personal representative.  Attorney Harvey 
resigned as personal representative on June 5, 1990 and was 
replaced by another attorney.   
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
15 
 
One year later, Ms. Morphy's estate commenced an action 
against Attorney Harvey to recover the funds he had conveyed to 
himself under the power of attorney.  Attorney Harvey entered into 
a settlement of that litigation under the terms of which he waived 
entitlement to the $25,000 specific bequest under Ms. Morphy's 
will and agreed to pay the estate $88,196.18, the first $40,000 of 
which by December 1, 1991 and the remainder by January 15, 1992.  
The settlement agreement provided that if those payments were not 
made timely, the estate would be entitled to immediate entry of 
judgment against Attorney Harvey for the full amount of the 
transfers.  When Attorney Harvey did not make any payment, the 
estate took a judgment against him.  It is asserted in this 
proceeding 
that 
Attorney 
Harvey 
has 
paid 
nothing 
toward 
satisfaction of that judgment, the estate remains open and no 
funds have been distributed to the Foundation.   
 
Finding that Attorney Harvey's taking of Ms. Morphy's funds 
for his own use was not intended, known, authorized or ratified by 
her, the referee concluded that Attorney Harvey's use of Ms. 
Morphy's 
power 
of 
attorney 
constituted 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
deceit 
and 
misrepresentation, 
in 
violation 
of 
20:8.4(c).1  As discipline for that misconduct, the referee 
                     
     1  SCR 20:8.4 provides, in pertinent part:  Misconduct 
 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:   
 
. . . 
 
(c)  engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation.   
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
16 
recommended that Attorney Harvey's license to practice law be 
revoked.  The referee rejected Attorney Harvey's position that 
because he has stated his intention never to practice law in 
Wisconsin again, the protection of the public does not require 
suspension or revocation of his license.   
 
In recommending license revocation, the referee took into 
account not only the seriousness of Attorney Harvey's misconduct 
in respect to the amount of funds he converted but also his 
failure to acknowledge the seriousness of his wrongdoing.  The 
referee also considered a number of aggravating factors, including 
the deliberate and methodical nature of his dishonesty and deceit, 
the fact that it occurred within a family context and victimized a 
relative very close to him, the brief period of time during which 
he converted her funds, his deceit to several persons to conceal 
his conduct, and his failure to make any restitution during the 
ensuing five years.  In addition to license revocation, the 
referee recommended that Attorney Harvey be required to make 
restitution to Ms. Morphy's estate in the full amount of its 
judgment, including interest from the date of each of his 
conversions, and repay to the estate the gift tax paid for the 
"gifts" he reported to the tax authorities.   
 
In his appeal from the referee's findings, conclusions and 
recommendation, Attorney Harvey first argued that he was denied 
due process by the referee's findings that the two documents 
purportedly signed by Ms. Morphy were non-genuine and that a 
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
17 
portion of his notes of their visit were added after the event.  
That argument has no merit.  His contention that the Board of 
Attorneys Professional Responsibility (Board) never claimed those 
documents were not genuine is incorrect.  The record discloses 
that on more than one occasion the Board questioned the absence of 
the originals of the documents and objected to the admissibility 
of one of them, in part because it was a copy and had not been 
verified and the location of the original was unknown.  Also, the 
Board specifically asked Attorney Harvey whether he had written 
the last of the four items on Ms. Morphy's list at a later time.  
Moreover, it was Attorney Harvey who introduced the documents to 
support his position that his transfers of Ms. Morphy's money 
constituted gifts and the burden was on him to establish that they 
were genuine and evidenced Ms. Morphy's donative intent.   
 
Attorney Harvey's contention that in finding the documents 
non-genuine the referee improperly considered physical evidence 
without the benefit of expert testimony or expertise of her own 
might have merit were it not for the referee's specific finding 
that those documents were not evidence of Ms. Morphy's donative 
intent, testamentary or otherwise.  Accordingly, the findings of 
non-genuineness and post-event creation do not constitute an 
independent, necessary basis for the referee's conclusion in 
respect 
to 
Attorney 
Harvey's 
dishonesty, 
deceit 
and 
misrepresentation.  Neither do they serve as the basis of a 
conclusion in respect to additional misconduct.  At most, the 
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
18 
referee considered his offering of what she found to be non-
genuine documents an aggravating factor in determining the 
discipline to be recommended.  At all events, it is for this court 
to determine the appropriate discipline to impose for Attorney 
Harvey's misconduct.   
Attorney Harvey next argued that the 
referee erred in finding that Ms. Morphy's alleged statement to 
him in March, 1989 encouraging him to use what she termed "plenty 
in there for you and [your wife]" referred not to her assets while 
she was alive but to the $25,000 specific bequest to him in her 
will.  Contrary to Attorney Harvey's contention that the referee 
engaged in speculation and ignored the plain meaning of those 
words, the referee's finding is not clearly erroneous, as it is 
supported by the finding that the power of attorney Ms. Morphy had 
given to Attorney Harvey was not, as he claimed, intended 
primarily to enable him to make gifts to himself of her assets but 
to take care of her in the event she became incapacitated.  
Moreover, the statement attributed to Ms. Morphy is sufficiently 
ambiguous as to the time, the amount and the source of any 
purported gift to support the referee's finding.   
 
Attorney Harvey's third argument is that the referee erred by 
refusing to address the issues of whether the power of attorney he 
held authorized him to make gifts and whether he reasonably could 
have interpreted it to do so.  The referee stated that she did not 
reach those legal issues because the ultimate issue was whether 
Attorney Harvey breached his fiduciary duty by using the power of 
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
19 
attorney in a manner inconsistent with the grantor's intentions 
and wishes.  Thus, the referee's denial of Attorney Harvey's 
untimely motion to reopen the violation phase of the disciplinary 
hearing for the presentation of the testimony of two attorneys on 
the extent of authority in the power of attorney was proper.   
 
We also reject Attorney Harvey's argument that three of the 
referee's evidentiary rulings constituted error.  First, he 
asserted that the transcript of the partial deposition of Attorney 
Stevens, which had not been completed at the time of his death, 
should not have been admitted.  The referee properly determined 
that Attorney Harvey had a full opportunity to cross-examine 
Attorney Stevens on the matters addressed in the portion of the 
transcript she admitted.   
 
Second, the referee did not err in refusing to permit 
Attorney Harvey's counsel to make an offer of proof concerning a 
statement attributed to Attorney Stevens, which the referee ruled 
inadmissible as double hearsay.  There is no merit to Attorney 
Harvey's contention that the denial of the opportunity to make an 
offer of proof impermissibly infringed on his right to preserve 
for review what he believed was error.  The referee properly 
determined that the nature of the evidence sought to be introduced 
had been identified sufficiently in the record for review of the 
ruling.   
 
Third, the referee properly admitted the testimony of the 
successor personal representative regarding statements Attorney 
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
20 
Stevens made to him during a conversation about the estate and 
Attorney Harvey's use of the power of attorney.  The referee found 
applicable the exception to the inadmissibility of hearsay 
provided in Wis. Stat. § 908.045(6)(1993-94)2 authorizing the 
admission of statements of an unavailable declarant that have 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness comparable to those 
of the specific exceptions set forth in the statute.   
 
Attorney Harvey also contended that several of the referee's 
findings of fact are clearly erroneous and, consequently, they and 
the conclusion based on them must be rejected.  Attorney Harvey 
established only two "clear" errors in the referee's findings, 
neither of which is of any consequence to the referee's conclusion 
regarding his misconduct.  The referee found that one stock sale 
had not been completed at the time of Ms. Morphy's death and that 
all of the distributions of her funds were made payable to 
Attorney Harvey as attorney in fact.  The record, however, appears 
to establish that the stock transaction was completed prior to Ms. 
Morphy's death, although the payment of the funds extended beyond 
the date of death.  Also, three of Attorney Harvey's five 
withdrawals of funds from Ms. Morphy's savings account were by 
                     
     2  Wis. Stat. § 908.045 provides, in pertinent part:  Hearsay 
exceptions; declarant unavailable.  The following are not excluded 
by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
  
. . . 
 
(6)  OTHER EXCEPTIONS.  A statement not specifically covered 
by any of the foregoing exceptions but having comparable 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.   
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
21 
check payable to him individually, not as her attorney in fact.  
Nevertheless, it is undisputed that Attorney Harvey used the power 
of attorney in each instance of his taking Ms. Morphy's funds.   
 
The remainder of Attorney Harvey's arguments are without 
merit.  In part, they address the referee's findings based on her 
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.  They also make 
unsupported assertions regarding the kind of misconduct the 
referee concluded he had engaged in and her findings in respect to 
the Board's having met its burden of proof.   
 
On the basis of facts found by the referee and supported in 
the record, we adopt the referee's conclusion that Attorney Harvey 
engaged 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
deceit 
and 
misrepresentation by using Ms. Morphy's power of attorney to 
convert her funds to his own use.  We determine that the license 
revocation recommended by the referee is appropriate discipline to 
impose for that misconduct.  The fact that Attorney Harvey was not 
providing professional services to Ms. Morphy renders his 
misconduct no less egregious or reprehensible than an attorney's 
conversion of funds of clients or others in the course of a 
professional relationship.  We reject Attorney Harvey's assertion, 
as did the referee, that in the event we determine that he has 
engaged in professional misconduct, a private or public reprimand 
should be imposed.   
 
We 
do 
not 
impose 
the 
additional 
recommendations 
for 
disposition of this proceeding.  While the referee recommended 
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
22 
that Attorney Harvey be ordered to make restitution to the Morphy 
estate in the full amount of the judgment it had taken against 
him, together with interest on the amount of his conversions from 
the date of each of them, the judgment itself should furnish 
adequate assurance that the estate will be made whole.  In any 
event, should Attorney Harvey ever seek to have his license to 
practice law in Wisconsin reinstated, he will be required to show 
that he has made full restitution to the estate.  SCR 
22.28(4)(k).3 We reject Attorney Harvey's position that in the 
matter of restitution he should be given "credit" for the $25,000 
specific bequest in Ms. Morphy's will to which he waived 
entitlement in the settlement of the civil litigation.  That is a 
matter for the probate court to determine.    
 
Further, in respect to the recommendation that Attorney 
Harvey be required to reimburse the estate for the gift tax paid, 
there is no evidence in the record that in fact the estate paid a 
gift tax for the transfers Attorney Harvey reported as gifts.  If 
the estate made such a payment and did not obtain a refund 
following Attorney Harvey's settlement of the civil action brought 
                     
     3  SCR 22.28 provides, in pertinent part:  "Reinstatement. 
 
. . . 
 
(4)  The petition for reinstatement shall show that:   
 
. . . 
 
(k)  The petitioner has made restitution or settled all 
claims from persons injured or harmed by petitioner's misconduct 
or, if the restitution is not complete, petitioner's explanation 
of the failure or inability to do so.   
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
23 
against him by the estate, that matter may be addressed in the 
event he seeks reinstatement of his license.   
 
Lastly, we address the objection Attorney Harvey made to 
several items of costs asserted to have been incurred by the Board 
in this proceeding.  In its response to that objection, the Board 
acknowledged that a $12 charge for its counsel's telephone 
conference with an attorney attempting to locate Attorney Harvey 
and a $20 witness fee paid to a medical records clerk whose 
testimony at the disciplinary hearing proved unnecessary were not 
properly included in the costs and asked that they be withdrawn.  
In all other respects, Attorney Harvey's objection is denied.   
 
IT IS ORDERED that the license of Walter L. Harvey to 
practice law in Wisconsin is revoked, effective the date of this 
order.   
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of this 
order Walter L. Harvey pay to the Board of Attorneys Professional 
Responsibility the costs of this proceeding.   
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Walter L. Harvey comply with the 
provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose 
license to practice law in Wisconsin has been revoked.   
 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J., did not participate. 
 
No. 93-3110-D 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
93-3110-D 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary 
 
 
 
Proceedings Against 
 
 
 
Walter L. Harvey, 
 
 
 
Attorney at Law. 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HARVEY 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
November 14, l995 
 
 
Submitted on Briefs: 
October 6, 1995 
Oral Argument: 
 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
Abrahamson, J., did not participate 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For Walter L. Harvey there were briefs by E. 
Campion Kersten, James P. Gerlach, Thomas D. Bell and Kersten & 
McKinnon, S.C., Milwaukee, LaRowe, Gerlach & Roy, S.C., Reedsburg 
and Doar, Drill & Skow, S.C., New Richmond. 
 
 
For the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility there 
was a brief by Thomas J. Basting, Sr., and Brennan, Steil, Basting 
& MacDougall, S.C., Janesville.