Title: Hackett v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 583, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 12, 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOSHUA N. HACKETT, 
  
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 583, 2005 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0110001893 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: March 31, 2006 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: June 12, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 12th day of June 2006, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Joshua Hackett, filed this appeal from 
the Superior Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief.  We 
find no merit to the issues raised in Hackett’s opening brief.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.   
(2) 
The record reflects that Hackett and his brother/co-defendant, 
Adam Hackett, went to trial in November 2002 on six counts of first degree 
robbery and related crimes.  During opening statements, the Superior Court 
declared a mistrial.  Thereafter, the State made a “wired” plea offer, which 
 
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required both brothers to plead guilty to two counts of first degree robbery 
and one count of possession of a deadly weapon.  The plea offer required 
each to serve a minimum of six years incarceration. On November 18, 2002, 
after discussions with their respective trial counsel, each brother pled guilty 
in accordance with the plea agreement.  In January 2003, prior to his 
sentencing, Hackett filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In March 
2003, he filed a motion seeking to dismiss his trial counsel.  The Superior 
Court allowed Hackett’s trial counsel to withdraw his representation and 
appointed substitute counsel to represent Hackett.  Through his new counsel, 
Hackett withdrew his request seeking to withdraw his guilty plea.  
(3) 
Consequently, on July 11, 2003, the Superior Court sentenced 
Hackett, in accordance with his plea agreement, to a total period of fifteen 
years at Level V incarceration to be suspended after serving thirteen years 
for probation.  Hackett did not appeal.  Instead, in July 2004, Hackett filed a 
motion for postconviction relief complaining about his court-appointed 
counsel.  After receiving responses from the State and both of Hackett’s 
court-appointed attorneys, the Superior Court denied the motion for 
postconviction relief on its merits.  This appeal followed. 
(4) 
In his opening brief on appeal, Hackett raises the following four 
issues: (i) the Superior Court erred by failing to obtain, in open court, 
 
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Hackett’s personal waiver of the pursuit of his motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea; (ii) his trial counsel was ineffective because he had a conflict of 
interest, which led to Hackett’s coerced guilty plea; (iii) his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to properly inform him about the “Rule 11 sentencing 
procedures;” and (iv) his substitute counsel was ineffective for failing to 
assist Hackett to withdraw his guilty plea and for “failing to investigate 
available supporting evidence.” 
(5) 
Hackett’s first claim is that the Superior Court was required to 
obtain, on the record, his “waiver of his right to withdraw his guilty plea.”  
Contrary to his contention, however, Hackett had no “right” to withdraw his 
guilty plea.  Superior Court Criminal Rule 32 provides that the Superior 
Court may permit withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing “upon a 
showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason.”  Accordingly, the 
decision to grant a motion to withdrawal a guilty plea rests within the sound 
discretion of the Superior Court.1  Hackett’s reliance on Webster v. State,2 
therefore, is unavailing.  Webster holds that the trial court must personally 
address the defendant before accepting a defendant’s waiver of his 
fundamental constitutional trial rights.3  In this case, counsel’s withdrawal of 
                                                 
1 Wells v. State, 396 A.2d 161 (Del. 1978) 
2 604 A.2d 1364 (Del. 1992). 
3 Id. at 1366-67. 
 
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Hackett’s motion is not equivalent to the waiver of a fundamental 
constitutional right.  Moreover, the sentencing transcript reflects that defense 
counsel, in Hackett’s presence, explained to the Superior Court the reasons 
for withdrawing the motion and Hackett’s agreement to withdraw the 
motion.  Under the circumstances, the Superior Court was well within its 
discretion 
to 
accept 
counsel’s 
withdrawal 
of 
Hackett’s 
motion.  
Consequently, Hackett’s first claim is without merit. 
(6) 
Hackett’s remaining three claims all challenge the effective 
assistance of his court-appointed attorneys.  To support a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, Hackett must demonstrate that (a) his 
counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and 
(b) there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s errors, he 
would not have pled guilty but would have insisted on going to trial.4  A 
defendant asserting a claim of ineffective assistance is required to make 
concrete allegations of cause and actual prejudice to substantiate a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel or else risk summary dismissal.5  Although 
not insurmountable, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s 
representation was professionally reasonable.6  
                                                 
4 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
5 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
6 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 
 
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(7) 
After considering Hackett’s motion, as well as the responses 
from both of Hackett’s court-appointed attorneys and the State, the Superior 
Court concluded that there was no merit to Hackett’s claim that his counsel 
had a conflict or that he was coerced into accepting the plea offer and had 
mistakenly pled guilty based on his counsel representation that he would 
receive a particular sentence.  The Superior Court noted that Hackett, under 
oath, stated that his decision to plead guilty was made knowingly and 
voluntarily and that he was satisfied with his counsel’s performance.  He 
also stated under oath that no promises had been made to him and that he 
understood the total sentence for his offenses ranged from six to sixty years. 
Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, we find no error in the 
Superior Court’s conclusion that Hackett was bound by his representations 
made under oath.7 
(8) 
Having carefully considered the parties= respective positions, 
we find it manifest that the judgment of the Superior Court should be 
affirmed on the basis of the Superior Court=s well-reasoned decision dated 
November 15, 2005.  The Superior Court did not err in concluding that 
Hackett’s claims lacked merit.  Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion 
                                                 
7 See Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
 
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in the Superior Court’s summary disposition of Hackett’s petition without 
holding a hearing.8   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
                                                 
8 See Maxion v. State, 686 A.2d 148, 151 (Del. 1996).