Title: State v. Kelsey C.R.
Citation: 2001 WI 54
Docket Number: 1999AP003095
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 31, 2001

2001 WI 54 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-3095 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In the Interest of Kelsey C.R., a person Under 
the Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Kelsey C.R.,  
 
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  237 Wis. 2d 698, 616 N.W.2d 924 
 
 
(Ct. App. 2000-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 31, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
March 1, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Martin J. Donald 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
SYKES, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
PROSSER, J., joins concurrence. 
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there 
were briefs and oral argument by Susan E. Alesia, assistant state 
public defender. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was 
argued by Christian R. Larsen, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2 
 
2001 WI 54 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-3095 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Interest of Kelsey C.R., a person  
Under the Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Kelsey C.R.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This case arises out of a stop 
and pat-down search of Petitioner Kelsey C.R. (Kelsey).  Two 
police officers came upon Kelsey sitting alone after dark in a 
high-crime neighborhood.  The officers were concerned that she 
was a runaway so they began asking her questions.  After Kelsey 
had responded to a few questions, the police told her to "stay 
put."  Kelsey then fled from the police.  The police chased and 
eventually caught her.  The officers detained Kelsey, and had a 
pat-down search of her person for weapons conducted.  The police 
found a loaded handgun on Kelsey, and she was charged with 
FILED 
 
 MAY 31, 2001     
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
2 
possession of a dangerous weapon.  Kelsey moved the circuit 
court to suppress the results of the pat-down——the handgun——as 
evidence.  The circuit court denied her motion and the court of 
appeals affirmed.  We granted Kelsey's petition for review.   
¶2 
To resolve this case, we address three distinct points 
in the encounter between the police and Kelsey.  First, did the 
police 
seize 
Kelsey, 
thereby 
invoking 
her 
constitutional 
protection against unreasonable seizures, when they told her to 
"stay put" but she ran away?  Second, was the detention of 
Kelsey after she fled and the police caught her reasonable?  
Third, was the pat-down search of Kelsey reasonable? 
¶3 
We hold that the circuit court properly denied 
Kelsey's motion to suppress the evidence.  The police did not 
seize Kelsey when they told her to "stay put" but she ran away, 
because she did not yield to the police officers' show of 
authority.  Even if this initial exchange was considered a 
seizure, it was justified by the police community caretaker 
function.  We further hold that the investigative detention of 
Kelsey, after she fled from the police, was reasonable because 
the officers had reasonable suspicion that Kelsey had committed, 
was committing, or was about to commit, a crime.  Lastly, we  
hold that the pat-down search, or frisk, of Kelsey was 
No. 
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3 
reasonable.1  We conclude that the frisk was reasonable because 
the officers had reasonable suspicion that Kelsey may be armed 
and dangerous.  We therefore affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
¶4 
On March 1, 1999, at about 7:40 p.m., darkness had 
descended on the high-crime neighborhood of Eighth and Mitchell 
Streets in the City of Milwaukee, when Police Officers Bernard 
Gonzalez (Gonzalez) and Rafael Rivera (Rivera) observed a 
juvenile female who appeared to need their help.  The officers 
observed Kelsey sitting in the middle of the block leaning up 
against a storefront.  It was a commercial area, but most of the 
stores were closed and few people were around.  Gonzalez 
testified at the suppression hearing that it was not a good 
area, especially for a young female alone at night.  In 
addition, Kelsey appeared to be withdrawn, sitting in a huddled 
position with her hood up over her head. 
¶5 
The officers were concerned that Kelsey might be a 
runaway, so they stopped the police car and rolled down the 
window to ask her a few questions.  The officers were on the 
                     
1 Four other members of this court, Justices William A. 
Bablitch, Jon P. Wilcox, David T. Prosser, Jr., and Diane S. 
Sykes join this conclusion.  However, Justices Sykes and Prosser 
would hold that the pat-down search of Kelsey was reasonable 
because the police officers had an objectively reasonable need 
to transport Kelsey in the police car.  They, therefore, concur 
in the result, but not in the conclusion that the officers had 
reasonable suspicion that Kelsey may be armed and dangerous.  
Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley, although in disagreement with the mandate, agree with 
Justices Sykes and Prosser that the officers did not have 
reasonable suspicion that Kelsey may be armed and dangerous. 
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
4 
opposite side of the street from where Kelsey was located.  The 
police car was unmarked, but both officers were wearing their 
uniforms.  Gonzalez asked Kelsey if she was all right.  Kelsey 
responded that she was.  Gonzalez asked Kelsey how old she was. 
 Kelsey told him that she was 15.  When Gonzalez inquired as to 
where she lived, Kelsey pointed in a direction and said that she 
lived over there.  Gonzalez then asked Kelsey what she was 
doing.  Kelsey said that she was waiting for a friend.  This 
answer raised Gonzalez's curiosity, because he thought that most 
people waiting for a friend would be standing on the corner, 
rather that sitting in the middle of the block.  Gonzalez 
thought Kelsey's answers were evasive and was still concerned 
that Kelsey was a runaway, so he told her to "stay put" so he 
could make a U-turn with the police car to be on the same side 
of the street as Kelsey and ask her more questions.  Kelsey then 
fled. 
¶6 
After a 30-40 second chase, the officers caught 
Kelsey.  When asked why she ran, Kelsey told the officers that 
she was afraid, but could not explain why she was afraid.  The 
officers checked a national computer database which indicated 
that Kelsey was not a runaway.  Kelsey provided the officers 
with her telephone number.  Gonzalez called the number and spoke 
with Kelsey's mother.  She told Gonzalez that Kelsey was not a 
runaway, and asked Gonzalez to bring Kelsey home.  In addition, 
Kelsey's mother told Gonzalez that she could not understand why 
No. 
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5 
Kelsey fled the police.  At this time Gonzalez decided to issue 
Kelsey a citation for resisting or obstructing an investigation.2 
¶7 
Before the officers placed Kelsey in the police car to 
take her home, they wanted to perform a pat-down search.  
Because Kelsey was a female, the officers called for a female 
officer to conduct the search.  The closest female officer was 
downtown so the officers had to wait about 20 minutes for her to 
arrive.  While they were waiting for the female officer to 
arrive, Gonzalez described Kelsey as very cooperative.  When the 
female officer arrived, she immediately conducted a pat-down 
search of Kelsey.  During the search, she felt something hard in 
the front of Kelsey's jeans.  When she asked what the object 
was, Kelsey did not respond.  The female officer asked if she 
could take the object out.  Kelsey sighed and said yes.  The 
object was a small, loaded handgun.  Kelsey was then taken to 
the District 2 police station. 
¶8 
The State petitioned for a determination that Kelsey 
was delinquent based on the possession of a dangerous weapon by 
a person under 18, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.60(1997-98).3 
                     
2 Gonzalez testified during the motion to suppress hearing 
that he could not remember when he issued Kelsey the citation.  
There is no other evidence in the record that a citation for 
resisting or obstructing an investigation was ever issued.  
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.60 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) In 
this 
section, 
"dangerous 
weapon" 
means 
any 
firearm, loaded or unloaded . . . 
(2) (a) Any person under 18 years of age who possesses or 
goes armed with a dangerous weapon is guilty of a 
Class A misdemeanor.  
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
6 
 Kelsey moved to suppress the evidence found during the pat-down 
search, claiming that the officers did not have probable cause 
to arrest her for resisting or obstructing an investigation, and 
that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion for the 
investigative detention. 
¶9 
The circuit court denied Kelsey's motion to suppress. 
 The court concluded that there were two stops, one when the 
officers began asking Kelsey questions, and a second when the 
officers caught Kelsey after she fled.  The court held that the 
first stop was justified, because the officers had reasonable 
suspicion that Kelsey was a runaway.  The court held that the 
second stop was justified, because Kelsey fled from the police. 
 The court then determined that the pat-down search of Kelsey 
was reasonable, because the officers were doing good police work 
and were concerned with their safety.  After the court denied 
the motion to suppress, Kelsey admitted to being delinquent 
based on a violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.60.  Kelsey then 
appealed, claiming that the circuit court erroneously denied her 
suppression motion. 
¶10 The court of appeals affirmed.  First, the court 
concluded that the initial investigation, when the officers 
began asking Kelsey questions, was justified by the police 
community 
caretaker 
function, 
because 
the 
officers 
were 
concerned that Kelsey might be a runaway.  In addition, the 
                                                                  
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
7 
court stated that this initial stop was justified by the 
authority granted to police to take runaways into custody.  
Second, the court held that the stop of Kelsey, after the police 
chase, was justified by the fact that Kelsey fled from the 
police.  Third, the court held that the pat-down search of 
Kelsey was reasonable because it was prudent for the officers to 
frisk Kelsey before placing her inside the police car.  The 
court concluded that the intrusion of a pat-down search was 
outweighed by the officers concern for their safety.  We granted 
Kelsey's petition for review. 
II 
¶11 This case presents three issues.  One, did the police 
officers seize Kelsey, thereby invoking her constitutional 
protection against unreasonable seizures, when Gonzalez told her 
to "stay put" but she ran away?  Two, was the investigative 
detention after she fled based on a reasonable suspicion that 
she had committed, was committing, or was about to commit, a 
crime?  Three, was the pat-down search of Kelsey based on a 
reasonable suspicion that she may be armed and dangerous? 
¶12 To resolve the issues presented by this case, we must 
review the circuit court's denial of Kelsey's motion to suppress 
evidence.  The issues in this case involve the constitutional 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.  The 
determination of whether there is reasonable suspicion for an 
investigative 
detention 
and 
a 
subsequent 
pat-down 
search 
presents a question of constitutional fact.  State v. Martwick, 
2000 WI 5, ¶18, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552.  We apply a 
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
8 
two-step standard of review to questions of constitutional fact. 
 Id.  First, we review the circuit court's findings of 
historical fact and uphold them unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Id.  Second, we review the circuit court's 
determination regarding reasonable suspicion de novo.  Id.  We 
benefit from the analyses of the circuit court and the court of 
appeals, however. 
III 
¶13 The parties make several arguments with respect to the 
issues before us.  The State contends that the initial exchange 
between the police and Kelsey, when the officers began asking 
her questions, told her to "stay put" but she ran away, was not 
a seizure.  The State asserts that not all police-citizen 
encounters are seizures.  For example, when a police officer 
seeks a citizen's voluntary cooperation through non-coercive 
questions, and does not restrain the citizen's liberty, then no 
seizure has occurred.  By contrast, the State argues that a 
seizure occurs when a police officer, by the application of 
physical force, or by a show of authority, has in some way 
restrained the liberty of a citizen.  The State claims that the 
initial exchange between Kelsey and the police, before Gonzalez 
told her to "stay put," was not a seizure because the police 
were just asking her questions in a non-confrontational manner. 
¶14 The State also argues that no seizure occurred when 
Gonzalez told Kelsey to "stay put" but she ran away.  According 
to the State, no seizure occurs when a police officer makes a 
show of authority to a citizen, but the citizen does not yield 
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
9 
to that show of authority.  The State claims that Gonzalez made 
a show of authority by telling Kelsey to "stay put," but Kelsey 
did not yield to that show of authority, rather, she ran away.  
¶15 Even if the initial encounter was a seizure, the State 
contends that it was justified by the police community caretaker 
function.  The State argues, and Kelsey concedes (Resp't-
Appellant-Pet'r's Br. at 10), that the police were conducting a 
bona fide community caretaker function by checking on Kelsey's 
welfare.  The State also argues that the limited privacy 
intrusion on Kelsey, asking Kelsey to "stay put" so that the 
officers could determine if she was a runaway, was outweighed by 
the public interest in the protection of juveniles. 
¶16 The 
State 
addresses 
the 
second 
issue, 
the 
constitutionality of the investigative detention after Kelsey 
fled, only in a footnote in its brief, stating that Kelsey does 
not challenge the constitutionality of this seizure.  The State 
suggests that Kelsey makes this concession because flight from 
the police justifies an investigative detention. 
¶17 With respect to the third issue, the State contends 
that the pat-down search of Kelsey was reasonable because the 
officers had reasonable suspicion that Kelsey was armed and 
dangerous.  According to the State, there are specific facts in 
the record, when judged in the totality of the circumstances, 
that lead to a reasonable suspicion that Kelsey was armed and 
dangerous.  First, the State argues that a relevant factor is 
that 
the 
pat-down 
search 
took 
place 
in 
a 
high-crime 
neighborhood.  Second, the State argues that we should consider 
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
10
the fact that the pat-down search occurred at night when few 
people were around.  The State claims that darkness is a factor 
because most assaults on police occur after dark.  Third, the 
State suggests that Kelsey's flight from the police is perhaps 
the most important fact supporting the pat-down search, because 
it indicates that Kelsey had something to hide, like a weapon.  
In addition to the suspicion Kelsey created by her flight, the 
State argues that this suspicion was increased, because Kelsey 
could not adequately explain why she fled. 
¶18 The State also contends that an additional fact 
supporting the reasonableness of the pat-down search was the 
need to place Kelsey in the police car.  According to the State, 
a police officer should be allowed to conduct a pat-down search 
of a person placed in a police car to guard against an ambush 
from the back seat.  The State argues that the officers had a 
need to place Kelsey in the police car, due to her mother's 
request that they bring Kelsey home, and that we should consider 
this need a factor in the totality of the circumstances 
justifying the pat-down search.              
¶19 Kelsey contends that her initial encounter with the 
police, when Gonzalez told her to "stay put" and she fled, was a 
seizure and is, therefore, subject to the constitutional 
requirement of reasonableness.  According to Kelsey, none of the 
justifications offered for this stop render this seizure 
reasonable. 
¶20 Kelsey argues that the seizure is not justified, 
because the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion that 
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
11
some criminal activity was taking, or had taken, place.  Kelsey 
asserts that Gonzalez did not have reasonable suspicion that she 
was involved in criminal activity, but that he only had a hunch 
that Kelsey might be a runaway. 
¶21 Kelsey claims that the officers did not have the 
statutory authority to take her into custody, because Gonzalez 
did not have reasonable grounds to suspect that she was a 
runaway.  Kelsey argues that the facts Gonzalez found suspicious 
were really facts demonstrating innocent conduct.  The fact that 
Kelsey was sitting in the middle of the block could be explained 
by the fact she that was tired or bored, rather than to indicate 
that she was lying about waiting for a friend.  Kelsey also 
disputes Gonzalez's claim that her answers to his questions were 
evasive.  Kelsey contends that she gave direct answers to 
Gonzalez's questions that should have dispelled, rather than 
increased his suspicion.  Kelsey also claims that her presence 
in a high-crime neighborhood, without additional facts, does not 
justify an investigative detention. 
¶22 Kelsey also argues that the initial stop cannot be 
supported by the police community caretaker function, because 
the public interest did not outweigh the intrusion on her 
privacy. 
 
Kelsey 
claims 
that 
the 
public 
interest 
in 
investigating runaways falls on the low end of the scale.  
Kelsey also argues that there were other alternatives available 
to the officers besides stopping her, such as asking her more 
questions or continuing to patrol the neighborhood.  In 
addition, Kelsey contends that the attendant circumstances did 
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
12
not support the stop, because the time of day, and the type of 
neighborhood, do not lead to a reasonable suspicion that she was 
a runaway, only to a hunch.   
¶23 Kelsey claims that this initial stop was illegal, and, 
therefore, all evidence gathered as result of this stop must be 
suppressed.  If the officers had not illegally stopped her, 
Kelsey argues that she would not have run, and, therefore, would 
not have been searched.  Consequently, Kelsey argues that 
evidence of the gun found in her jeans must be suppressed. 
¶24 Kelsey argues that this court should reaffirm the 
objective test for when a seizure occurs.  According to Kelsey, 
a seizure occurs when a reasonable person would not feel free to 
leave.  Kelsey urges us to reject the standard offered by the 
State, because the State's standard replaces the objective test, 
based on the officer's conduct, with a subjective test based on 
a citizen's reaction to that conduct.  Under the "free to leave" 
standard, 
Kelsey 
claims 
that 
she 
was 
seized, 
because 
a 
reasonable person would not have felt free to leave when ordered 
by the police to "stay put."        
¶25 Even if we conclude that this initial encounter was a 
legal stop, Kelsey contends that the pat-down search was 
unreasonable.4  The pat-down search was unreasonable because the 
police did not have a warrant, and there is no exception to the 
warrant requirement that applies.  Kelsey cites examples of the 
                     
4 Kelsey 
does 
not 
challenge 
the 
legality 
of 
the 
investigative detention after she fled from the police and they 
caught her.  (Resp't-Appellant-Pet'r's Br. at 7.)  
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
13
exceptions such as consent and search incident to arrest.  
Kelsey argues that this was not a consent search, because 
neither Gonzalez and Rivera, nor the female officer who 
conducted the search, asked Kelsey for her permission.  Kelsey 
also claims that this was not a search incident to arrest, 
because there was not an actual arrest. 
¶26 Kelsey also contends that the pat-down search was not 
a valid frisk for weapons.  According to Kelsey, there are no 
specific facts in the record that would support a reasonable 
suspicion that she was armed and dangerous.  Kelsey points to 
the fact that Gonzalez testified that he wanted the search 
conducted, because he was going to place her in the police car, 
not because of any suspicion that she was armed and dangerous.  
In this case, the search was conducted well before curfew on a 
person, Kelsey, who was not acting nervous, but instead was 
described as very cooperative.  Kelsey also argues that the fact 
that she was in a high-crime neighborhood, without other 
specific facts, does not justify a pat-down search.  
¶27 Kelsey also contends that the pat-down search was not 
justified by the police community caretaker function.  Kelsey 
claims that Gonzalez's decision to issue Kelsey a citation for 
resisting or obstructing an investigation removes this case from 
the 
community 
caretaker 
analysis. 
 
According 
to 
Kelsey, 
Gonzalez's role as community caretaker ended when he decided to 
issue Kelsey the citation. 
¶28 Kelsey 
also 
urges 
us 
to 
reject 
a 
blanket-rule 
permitting a pat-down search of every person placed in a police 
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
14
vehicle.  Kelsey argues that no state has adopted such a rule, 
and that this court has explicitly rejected such a rule.  Kelsey 
claims that a blanket-rule would allow the police to circumvent 
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment by asking 
a person to sit inside a police car.  In addition, Kelsey 
contends that such a rule would eliminate the Fourth Amendment's 
requirements for a pat-down search for weapons because an 
officer would not need reasonable suspicion that a person was 
armed and dangerous. 
IV 
¶29 We begin our analysis at the point of the first 
encounter between the police and Kelsey.  We consider whether 
the police seized Kelsey, when the officers told her to "stay 
put" but she ran away.  If this initial exchange was a seizure, 
then it is subject to the reasonableness requirement of both the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 
I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.5  We ordinarily 
                     
5 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states:  
[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution states:  
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
15
follow the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment when interpreting Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, ¶24, 
n.10, 236 Wis. 2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 72.   
¶30 Not 
all 
police-citizen 
encounters 
are 
seizures.  
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)(citing Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n.16 (1968)).  A seizure occurs "when an 
officer, by means of physical force or a show of authority, 
restrains a person's liberty."  State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 
243, 253, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996)(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 
n.16).  Included in this test for a seizure is the requirement 
that when a police officer makes a show of authority to a 
citizen, 
the 
citizen 
yields 
to 
that 
show 
of 
authority.  
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). 
¶31 In Hodari D., police officers came upon a group of 
young people huddled around a car.  499 U.S. at 622.  The 
officers were traveling in an unmarked police car, but were 
wearing jackets with the word "Police" on the front and back.  
Id.  When the group saw the officers approaching, they fled.  
Id. at 622-23.  This flight raised the officers' suspicion, so 
                                                                  
[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause, supported by 
oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
  
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
16
they chased the fleeing youths.  Id. at 623.  One of the fleeing 
youths was Hodari D.  Id.  As one of the officers was chasing 
Hodari D., he saw Hodari D. [the juvenile] throw away what 
appeared to be a small rock.  Id.  Shortly thereafter, the 
officer caught Hodari D. and handcuffed him.  Id.  The "rock" 
that Hodari D. threw away was later determined to be crack 
cocaine.  Id.  In the juvenile proceeding that followed, Hodari 
D. moved the court to suppress evidence of the cocaine.  Id.  
The trial court denied his motion without stating a reason.  Id. 
 The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the 
officer had seized Hodari D. when he saw the officer running 
after him.  Id.  The court held that this seizure was 
unreasonable and, therefore, that the evidence of cocaine had to 
be suppressed.  Id.  The California Supreme Court denied the 
State's petition for review, but the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.  Id. 
¶32 The United States Supreme Court reversed.  Id. at 629. 
 By examining dictionary definitions from the early 19th century 
to the present, the Court concluded that the word "seizure" 
requires actual physical control.  Id. at 624.  The Court then 
held that a seizure, when attempted by a show of authority 
rather than by the application of physical force, does not occur 
unless the citizen actually yields to the show of authority.  
Id. at 625-26.  As an example, the Court stated that a seizure 
does not occur when an officer yells, "[s]top, in the name of 
the law," at a fleeing citizen who continues to flee.  Id. at 
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
17
626.  Accordingly, the Court held that the officer did not seize 
Hodari D. until he caught him after the chase.  Id. at 629. 
¶33 We agree with the State and will follow the Hodari D. 
standard for when a seizure occurs.  In order to effect a 
seizure, an officer must make a show of authority, and the 
citizen must actually yield to that show of authority.  In the 
present case, Gonzalez did make a show of authority to Kelsey 
when he told her to "stay put."  An officer telling a citizen to 
"stay put" is similar to an officer telling a citizen "stop, in 
the name of the law."  Kelsey, like Hodari D., did not yield to 
the officer, when he made the show of authority.  See Hodari D., 
499 U.S. at 622-23.  When Gonzalez told Kelsey to "stay put," 
she ran away.  We, therefore, conclude that no seizure occurred 
in the present case, until the officers applied physical force 
to Kelsey, by catching her after the 30-40 second chase. 
¶34 Even if we considered this initial exchange between 
the police and Kelsey to be a seizure, it would be reasonable 
under the police community caretaker function.  The community 
caretaker function provides that the police may act in certain 
situations which are "'totally divorced from the detection, 
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the 
violation of a criminal statute.'"  State v. Anderson, 142 Wis. 
2d 162, 166, 417 N.W.2d 411 (Ct. App. 1987)(Anderson I)(quoting 
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
18
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)).6  Therefore, the 
police may seize a citizen without a warrant, when the police 
are performing a community caretaker function.  Anderson I, 142 
Wis. 2d at 166 (citing Cady, 413 U.S. at 441).  However, a 
seizure conducted under the community caretaker function still 
must satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Anderson I, 142 Wis. 2d at 167-68.   
¶35 To determine whether a seizure conducted under the 
community caretaker function is reasonable, this court must 
balance "the public need and interest furthered by the police 
conduct against the degree of and nature of the intrusion upon 
the privacy of the citizen."  Id. at 168.  In Anderson I, the 
court of appeals fashioned a three-step test to determine if a 
seizure based on the community caretaker function is reasonable. 
 Id. at 169.  A court must determine: "(1) that a seizure within 
the meaning of the [F]ourth [A]mendment has occurred; (2) if so, 
whether the police conduct was bona fide community caretaker 
activity; and (3) if so, whether the public need and interest 
outweigh the intrusion upon the privacy of the individual."  Id. 
¶36 We conclude that the three-step Anderson I test for a 
reasonable seizure under the community caretaker function is 
satisfied in the present case.  For step one, we assume for the 
purpose of this analysis that a seizure within the meaning of 
                     
6 State v. Anderson, 142 Wis. 2d 162, 166, 417 N.W.2d 411 
(Ct. App. 1987) (Anderson I), after numerous proceedings not 
relevant to the analysis of the present case, was reversed on 
other grounds in State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 454 N.W.2d 
763 (1990)(Anderson III). 
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
19
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
occurred. 
 
For 
step 
two, 
Kelsey 
appropriately concedes that the police were, at least at some 
point, performing a bona fide community caretaker activity by 
checking to see if Kelsey was a runaway.  For step three, we 
must consider the four relevant factors set forth in Anderson I 
to determine if the public need and interest outweighed the 
intrusion on Kelsey's privacy.  These four factors are:  
 
(1) the degree of the public interest and 
the exigency of the situation; (2) the 
attendant 
circumstances 
surrounding 
the 
seizure, 
including 
time, 
location, 
the 
degree 
of 
overt 
authority 
and 
force 
displayed; (3) whether an automobile is 
involved; 
and 
(4) 
the 
availability, 
feasibility 
and 
effectiveness 
of 
alternatives 
to 
the 
type 
of 
intrusion 
actually accomplished.   
 
Id. at 169-70. 
¶37 These four factors lead us to conclude that step three 
of the Anderson I test is satisfied in the present case.  First, 
the degree of public interest and the exigency of the situation 
support the reasonableness of the seizure.  There is a strong 
public interest in locating runaway children and juveniles, as 
evidenced by Wis. Stat. §§  48.19(1)(d)4 and 938.19(1)(d)4.7  In 
                     
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.19 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) A child may be taken into custody under any of the 
following: 
(d) Circumstances in which a law enforcement officer 
believes on reasonable grounds that any of the following 
conditions exists: 
4. The child has run away from his or her parents, 
guardian or legal or physical custodian. 
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
20
addition, 
the 
exigency 
of 
the 
situation 
supports 
the 
reasonableness 
of 
the 
seizure, 
because 
given 
all 
the 
circumstances 
discussed 
herein, 
something 
bad 
could 
have 
happened to Kelsey had the officers not approached her.  A 
juvenile, alone in a dangerous neighborhood, is vulnerable to 
kidnappers, sexual predators, and other criminals.  Second, the 
attendant circumstances surrounding the seizure support its 
reasonableness, because Kelsey was alone, after dark, in a 
dangerous neighborhood.  The degree of overt authority and the 
force displayed also support the reasonableness of the seizure 
because the intrusion on her was minimal, demonstrated by the 
fact that Gonzalez told Kelsey to "stay put," and did not apply 
any physical force.  The third factor does not apply because 
Kelsey was not in an automobile at the time.  Fourth, there were 
not any alternatives to asking Kelsey to stay where she was to 
answer some questions, that would have been either feasible or 
effective in dispelling the officers' concern that Kelsey was a 
runaway.  We, therefore, conclude that, if this initial exchange 
                                                                  
Wisconsin Stat. § 938.19 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) A juvenile may be taken into custody under any of the 
following: 
(d)  Circumstances in which a law enforcement officer 
believes on reasonable grounds that any of the following 
conditions exists: 
4.   The juvenile has run away from his or her 
parents, guardian or legal or physical custodian. 
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
21
was a seizure, then it was reasonable under the police community 
caretaker function. 
V 
¶38 We now turn to the second encounter between the police 
and 
Kelsey, 
by 
addressing 
the 
question 
of 
whether 
the 
investigative detention of Kelsey, after she fled, was based on 
a reasonable suspicion that she had committed, was committing, 
or was about to commit, a crime, and therefore was reasonable.  
Even though this issue is uncontested by the parties, it is 
important to consider the reasonableness of the investigative 
detention for an understanding of the entire encounter between 
the police and Kelsey.  Furthermore, many of the facts that 
justify the investigative detention of Kelsey also justify the 
pat-down search. 
¶39 As stated above, both the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution protect against unreasonable seizures.  
An 
investigative 
detention 
is 
a 
seizure 
that 
requires 
constitutional protection.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.  This 
protection provides that "a police officer may in appropriate 
circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for 
purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though 
there is no probable cause to make an arrest."  Id. at 22. 
¶40 Wisconsin law has recognized a Terry investigative 
detention as constitutional.  We have adopted the Terry standard 
in State v. Chambers, 55 Wis. 2d 289, 294, 198 N.W.2d 377 
(1972).  In addition, the legislature codified the Terry 
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
22
standard in Wis. Stat. § 968.24.8  To interpret § 968.24, we look 
to Terry and the cases following it, such as  State v. Waldner, 
206 Wis. 2d 51, 55, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996).  In Waldner, we 
stated that, for a police officer to conduct an investigative 
detention, the officer must possess "specific and articulable 
facts which would warrant a reasonable belief that criminal 
activity was afoot."  206 Wis. 2d at 55.  We review the facts in 
light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
detention.  State v. Jackson, 147 Wis. 2d 824, 833, 434 N.W.2d 
386 (1989). 
¶41 The 
test 
for reasonable 
suspicion 
that criminal 
activity is afoot is an objective, common-sense test.  Waldner, 
206 Wis. 2d at 55-56.  The test asks "[w]hat would a reasonable 
police officer reasonably suspect in light of his or her 
training and experience?"  Id. at 56 (citing State v. Anderson, 
155 Wis. 2d 77, 83-84, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990) (Anderson III). 
This objective, common-sense approach strikes a balance between 
society's interest in the police preventing and detecting crime, 
                     
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.24 provides: 
After having identified himself or herself 
as 
a 
law 
enforcement 
officer, 
a 
law 
enforcement officer may stop a person in a 
public place for a reasonable period of time 
when the officer reasonably suspects that 
such person is committing, is about to 
commit or has committed a crime, and may 
demand the name and address of the person 
and an explanation of the person's conduct. 
 Such detention and temporary questioning 
shall be conducted in the vicinity where the 
person was stopped.   
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
23
and the individual's privacy interest.  Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d at 
56. 
¶42 As stated above, we review the circuit court's 
conclusion that the investigative detention was reasonable with 
a two-step process.  First, we will uphold the court's findings 
of historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Martwick, 
2000 WI 5, ¶18.  Second, we review the court's determination of 
reasonableness de novo.  Id.  The findings of fact relied on by 
the circuit court to conclude that the investigative detention 
of Kelsey was reasonable are not clearly erroneous.  The circuit 
court relied on the fact the Kelsey was a juvenile female 
sitting alone in a dangerous neighborhood.  The fact that Kelsey 
was a minor and was sitting alone in a high-crime neighborhood 
is undisputed.  In addition, the circuit court relied on the way 
Kelsey was sitting.  It is undisputed that Kelsey was sitting in 
a huddled position with her hood up over her head.  The circuit 
court also found that Kelsey's flight from the police heightened 
the officers' suspicion.  The fact that Kelsey fled when 
Gonzalez told her to "stay put" is verified in the record and is 
undisputed.  Upon de novo review, we conclude that the circuit 
court's determination that Kelsey's appearance, sitting alone in 
a high-crime neighborhood, her demeanor, sitting in a huddled 
position with her hood up over her head, and her flight from the 
police all justified the stop is a correct application of the 
law.  In Anderson III, we held that flight from the police, in 
and of itself, creates reasonable suspicion that criminal 
activity is afoot.  155 Wis. 2d at 84.  
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
24
¶43 The totality of the circumstances here supports a 
finding of reasonable suspicion to detain Kelsey.  The fact that 
Kelsey was leaning against a store-front at a time when most of 
the stores were closed gave the officers reasonable suspicion 
that something was amiss.  It was dark outside, and there were 
few people around.  Criminal activity is more likely under such 
conditions.  A reasonable person in the officers' position would 
reasonably 
suspect, 
based 
on 
the 
totality 
of 
these 
circumstances, that Kelsey had committed, was committing, or was 
about to commit, a crime.  We therefore conclude that the 
investigative detention of Kelsey was reasonable. 
¶44 The other requirement for an investigative detention 
is that it must last only long enough to fulfill the purpose of 
the stop.  Griffith, 2000 WI 72 at ¶54.  In the present case, 
the purpose of the stop was to either confirm or dispel the 
officers' 
suspicion 
that 
Kelsey 
was 
engaged 
in 
criminal 
activity.  The officers asked Kelsey why she fled.  Kelsey said 
she was afraid but did not state why she was afraid.  This 
failure to explain adequately her flight increased the officers' 
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.  The officers then 
checked the computer and called Kelsey's mother to confirm that 
she was not a runaway.  Knowing that Kelsey did not flee because 
she was a runaway served to increase the officers' suspicion.  
The officers then decided to conduct a pat-down search of Kelsey 
for weapons.  Because Kelsey was a female, the officers called 
for a female officer to conduct the search, which is the 
preferred policy of the Milwaukee Police Department and a 
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
25
reasonable procedure.  See State v. Guy, 172 Wis. 2d 86, 91, 492 
N.W.2d 311 (1992).  Because the nearest female officer was 
downtown, the officers and Kelsey had to wait 20 minutes for the 
female officer to arrive.  Considering the totality of these 
circumstances, we conclude that the detention of Kelsey lasted 
only long enough to fulfill the purpose of the stop.  
¶45 The detention could also be justified by the police 
community caretaker function.  The investigative detention of 
Kelsey satisfies the three-step Anderson I test, set forth 
above.  For step one, there was a seizure of Kelsey.  An 
investigative detention is a seizure.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.  
For step two, the officers were conducting a bona fide community 
caretaker activity.  Even after Kelsey fled, the officers were 
still concerned that Kelsey might be a runaway.  In fact, 
Kelsey's flight heightened the officers' suspicion that she was 
a runaway.   
¶46 The four factors to be considered under step three of 
the Anderson I test also indicate that the public need and 
interest outweighed the intrusion on Kelsey's privacy.  The 
analysis of these factors to the investigative detention of 
Kelsey is nearly identical to the analysis applied to the 
initial encounter.  First, the degree of public interest and the 
exigency of the situation support the reasonableness of the 
investigative detention.  There is a strong public interest in 
locating 
runaway 
children, 
as 
evidenced 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§  48.19(1)(d)4 and 938.19(1)(d)4.  In addition, the exigency 
of 
the 
situation 
supports 
the 
reasonableness 
of 
the 
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
26
investigative detention because, as stated above, something bad 
could have happened to Kelsey had the officers not detained her 
after she fled.  Second, the attendant circumstances surrounding 
the investigative detention support its reasonableness because 
Kelsey was alone, after dark, in a dangerous neighborhood.  The 
third factor does not apply because Kelsey was not in an 
automobile at the time.  Fourth, there were not any alternatives 
to detaining Kelsey that would have been either feasible, or as 
effective, in dispelling the officers' concern that Kelsey was a 
runaway.  We therefore conclude, after applying the Anderson I 
test, that the investigative detention of Kelsey, following the 
police chase, was also reasonable under the police community 
caretaker function. 
VI 
¶47 We now consider the third point of the encounter 
between the police and Kelsey by examining whether the pat-down 
search of Kelsey was based on reasonable suspicion that she 
might be armed and dangerous.  A pat-down for weapons conducted 
by police, commonly known as a "frisk," is a search.  State v. 
Morgan, 
197 
Wis. 
2d 
200, 
208, 
539 
N.W.2d 
887 
(1995).  
Consequently, 
a 
frisk 
must 
satisfy 
the 
reasonableness 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  In Terry, the United States Supreme Court 
balanced 
a 
police 
officer's 
need 
for 
protection 
from 
a 
potentially dangerous citizen, against the citizen's privacy 
interest in personal security.  392 U.S. at 23-25.  The Court 
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
27
concluded that a police officer may conduct a frisk for weapons 
if the officer "reasonably believes that his safety may be in 
danger because the suspect he is investigating may be armed."  
State v. McGill, 2000 WI 38, ¶19, 234 Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 
795 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24).  The legislature codified 
this standard in Wis. Stat. § 968.25.9  As is the case with an 
investigative detention, the reasonable suspicion for a frisk 
must be based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant that intrusion."  State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 
139, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990)(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). 
¶48 The test for reasonable suspicion that a person may be 
armed and dangerous is an objective test.  Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d 
at 209.  As stated in Terry, the test is "whether a reasonably 
prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the 
belief that his safety or that of others was in danger."  392 
U.S. at 27.  In addition, the reasonableness of the officer's 
actions must be judged by considering the totality of the 
                     
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.25 provides in pertinent part: 
When a law enforcement officer has stopped a 
person for temporary questioning pursuant to 
s. 968.24 and reasonably suspects that he or 
she or another is in danger of physical 
injury, the law enforcement officer may 
search such person 
for 
weapons or 
any 
instrument or article or substance readily 
capable of causing physical injury and of a 
sort not ordinarily carried in public places 
by law abiding persons.  
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
28
circumstances surrounding the frisk.10  Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 
209. 
¶49 In 
the 
present 
case, 
there 
are 
specific 
and 
articulable facts in the record to support the conclusion that 
the frisk of Kelsey by the female officer was reasonable.11  The 
same facts that justified the investigative detention of Kelsey 
after the police chase also justify the frisk.  These are:  
                     
10 The dissent attempts to analyze the facts in this case 
separately to justify a conclusion that there is an absence of 
reasonable suspicion that Kelsey was armed and dangerous.  We 
are satisfied that the facts must be considered together, not in 
isolation, in order to apply the totality of the circumstances 
test, properly.  If that is done, it is clear that the pat-down 
search was reasonable.  This approach does not result in a 
blanket rule, but one that depends on consideration of all of 
the facts in each case, along with the reasonable inferences 
which can be drawn from those facts.  
11 The circuit court determined that the pat-down was 
reasonable because the officers were doing good police work and 
were concerned for their safety.  (Mot. Hr'g at 66.)  Although 
the circuit court concluded that "[t]he evidence in this motion 
doesn't necessarily support the suspicion that [Kelsey] was 
armed and dangerous," (Mot. Hr'g at 66) we may consider any fact 
in the record known to the officers at the time of the frisk.  
State v. McGill, 2000 WI 38, ¶24, 234 Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 
795.  The dissent correctly notes the requirement set forth in 
McGill that the facts we rely on must also be supported by the 
officer's testimony at the suppression hearing.  Dissent at ¶80. 
 In this case, Officer Gonzalez's testimony at the suppression 
hearing does support the facts that we rely on to conclude that 
there 
was 
reasonable 
suspicion. 
 
Moreover, 
the 
dissent 
incorrectly states that our conclusion cannot conflict with 
Officer Gonzalez's testimony that the only reason he ordered the 
 search was because he was going to place Kelsey inside the 
police car.  Dissent at ¶¶79-80.  As noted above, the test for 
whether there is reasonable suspicion to support a pat-down 
search is an objective test, not a subjective one, and, 
therefore, his reason is not controlling.  
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
29
Kelsey fled from the police; Kelsey's initial appearance—— 
sitting in the middle of the block leaning against a storefront; 
Kelsey's demeanor in sitting in a huddled position with her hood 
up over her head; Kelsey's age; it was dark outside and there 
were few people around.  See McGill, 2000 WI 38 at ¶32 (stating 
that this court has "consistently upheld protective frisks that 
occur in the evening hours, recognizing that at night, an 
officer's visibility is reduced by darkness and there are fewer 
people on the street to observe the encounter").  In addition, 
the officer's reasonable suspicion is supported by the fact that 
the frisk occurred in a high-crime neighborhood.  See Morgan, 
197 Wis. 2d at 211 (holding that "an officer's perception of an 
area as 'high-crime' can be a factor justifying a search").  We, 
therefore, 
conclude 
that 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, the frisk of Kelsey was based on a reasonable 
suspicion that she was armed and dangerous. 
¶50 There are two additional facts that support the frisk 
of Kelsey.  First, Kelsey could not adequately explain why she 
fled from the police.  She told the officers that she was 
afraid, but did not explain why she was afraid.  It was 
reasonable for the officers to believe that Kelsey fled because 
she might be hiding a weapon.  Second, when Gonzalez called 
Kelsey's mother, she asked him to bring Kelsey home.  When this 
request was made, the officers had a reasonable basis to place 
Kelsey inside the police car.  Courts in other jurisdictions 
have included placing someone inside a police car as a factor 
justifying a frisk for weapons.  See State v. Varnado, 582 
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
30
N.W.2d 886, 891 (Minn. 1998)(holding that "when an officer has a 
valid reasonable basis for placing a lawfully stopped citizen in 
a squad car, a frisk will often be appropriate without 
additional individual articulable suspicion"); State v. Evans, 
618 N.E.2d 162, 167 (Ohio 1993)(holding that "the driver of a 
motor vehicle may be subjected to a brief pat-down search for 
weapons where the detaining officer has a lawful reason to 
detain said driver in the patrol car"); and People v. Tobin, 269 
Cal. Rptr. 81, 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)(holding that "the need to 
transport a person in a police vehicle in itself is an exigency 
which justifies a pat-search for weapons").  As in Morgan, this 
court is not adopting a blanket-rule that a police officer may 
frisk a person just because the officer is going to place that 
person inside a police vehicle.  197 Wis. 2d at 215-16.  Such a 
rule might be found to eliminate the constitutional requirement 
that a search be reasonable.  However, we conclude that a 
reasonable basis to place someone inside a police vehicle is a 
factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances, 
when deciding the reasonableness of a pat-down search. 
¶51 In summary, we conclude that the circuit court was 
correct in denying Kelsey's motion to suppress the evidence of 
the handgun.  We conclude that the initial encounter between the 
police and Kelsey was not a seizure.  Even if it was, it was 
reasonable under the police community caretaker function.  We 
also conclude that the investigative detention of Kelsey was 
reasonable because the officers had reasonable suspicion that 
Kelsey had committed, was committing, or was about to commit, a 
No. 
99-3095 
 
 
31
crime.  We further conclude that the pat-down search of Kelsey 
was reasonable, because the officers had reasonable suspicion 
that she may be armed and dangerous. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
        
 
No. 99-3095.dss 
 
1 
¶52 DIANE S. SYKES, J. (concurring).  I respectfully 
concur.  I agree with the majority's two-part analysis of the 
stop in this case.  However, I agree with the dissent's 
assessment of the weapons frisk under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968), at least insofar as it concludes that the facts of this 
case do not establish an objectively reasonable suspicion that 
Kelsey was armed and dangerous. 
¶53 But that does not end the inquiry.  That the facts of 
this case are insufficient under Terry does not necessarily mean 
that the search was illegal and the gun must be suppressed.  It 
only means that the well-established Terry exception to the 
general rule against warrantless searches does not apply.  Other 
grounds justify the search.  
 
The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth 
Amendment is always "the reasonableness in all the 
circumstances of the particular governmental invasion 
of a citizen's personal security."  Reasonableness, of 
course, depends "on a balance between the public 
interest 
and 
the 
individual's right to 
personal 
security free from arbitrary interference by law 
officers."   
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (citing 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).  This evaluation turns on an assessment 
of "the 
degree to which 
[the search] intrudes upon an 
individual's privacy and . . . the degree to which it is needed 
for 
the 
promotion 
of 
legitimate 
governmental 
interests."  
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).  See also State 
v. McGill, 2000 WI 38, ¶18, 234 Wis. 2d 560, 568, 609 N.W.2d 795 
No. 99-3095.dss 
 
2 
(courts balance "the government's need to conduct the search 
against the invasion the search entails" in order to determine 
its reasonableness). 
¶54 Applying these general principles of Fourth Amendment 
law, I would conclude that when a law enforcement officer has an 
objectively reasonable need or basis to transport an individual 
in his squad car, the officer's paramount interest in protecting 
himself 
against 
attack 
by 
his 
passenger 
outweighs 
the 
individual's interest in being free from the personal intrusion 
of a weapons frisk.  This is not dependent upon any suspicion 
that the person being transported is armed and dangerous.  
Terry's requirement of reasonable suspicion for a weapons frisk 
in connection with an investigative stop properly balances the 
relative interests at stake in that sort of police-citizen 
encounter in the field. 
¶55 But when an officer is called upon in the course of 
his duties to transport an individual in a squad car, he 
necessarily exposes himself to greater risks than in the 
ordinary field investigation.  He will have his hands on the 
wheel, his eyes on the road, and his back to his passenger, and, 
as such, is extremely vulnerable to assault, much more so than 
in an ordinary field investigation.  Under these circumstances, 
I have no difficulty concluding that a weapons frisk, even 
absent reasonable suspicion that the passenger-to-be is armed 
and 
dangerous, 
is 
perfectly 
reasonable 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment. 
No. 99-3095.dss 
 
3 
¶56 This is not to say that I would find every search-
incident-to-squad-car-ride 
reasonable. 
 
There 
must 
be 
an 
objectively reasonable need or basis for providing the ride in 
the first place before the prospective passenger can reasonably 
be subjected to a weapons frisk.  It cannot be pretextual.  An 
officer 
cannot 
convert 
a 
routine 
traffic 
stop 
or 
field 
investigation into an opportunity to search by conjuring up a 
reason to provide a ride. 
¶57 Furthermore, I would not, in this case at least, 
conclude that it is constitutionally reasonable for an officer 
to conduct a weapons frisk anytime he merely places a person in 
a squad car during a traffic stop or field investigation.  That, 
it seems to me, might go too far, and in any event, is not the 
precise question in this case.  Placing someone in a squad car 
during the course of a traffic stop or field investigation does 
not necessarily present the substantially higher degree of risk 
to the officer's safety that giving someone a ride does.  Also, 
the practice is susceptible to greater abuse as a pretext for an 
otherwise unreasonable search.  Pretextual squad car rides, I 
think, are rare. 
¶58 I recognize that only a few courts have considered 
this question, and they are divided in their conclusions.  In 
United States v. Glenn, 152 F.3d 1047, 1049 (8th Cir. 1998), the 
Eighth Circuit held that an officer's decision to place a 
motorist stopped for a traffic violation in the back of the 
squad car while running a records check did not independently 
justify a frisk for weapons.  A contrary conclusion, according 
No. 99-3095.dss 
 
4 
to the court, "would permit law enforcement officers to pat down 
all traffic offenders simply by choosing to place them in the 
back seat of patrol cars during traffic stops."  Id. 
¶59 This case, however, involves not a temporary squad car 
detention but a squad car ride, which considerably heightens the 
risk to the officer and is less susceptible to the manipulation 
which concerned the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.  Glenn, 
therefore, is distinguishable. 
¶60 State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 891 (Minn. 1998), is 
factually similar to Glenn, and the Minnesota Supreme Court 
reached a similar conclusion.  The court focused, however, on 
the unreasonableness of requiring the motorist to wait in the 
squad 
car 
while 
the 
records 
check 
was 
being 
run, 
and 
acknowledged that under different circumstances, a frisk might 
be constitutionally permissible even in the absence of suspicion 
of armed dangerousness: 
 
[W]e agree that officer safety is a paramount interest 
and that when an officer has a valid reasonable basis 
for placing a lawfully stopped citizen in a squad car, 
a frisk will often be appropriate without additional 
individual 
articulable 
suspicion. 
 
However, 
the 
inability of a minor traffic violator to produce a 
driver's license in and of itself is not a reasonable 
basis to require the driver to sit in the back of the 
squad car.  We will not allow officers to contravene 
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
simply by requesting that a person sit in the squad 
car. 
 
Id. at 891-92. 
 
¶61 The Ohio Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion 
in State v. Evans, 618 N.E. 2d 162, 167 (Ohio 1993), a case 
No. 99-3095.dss 
 
5 
involving a weapons frisk prior to a temporary detention in the 
back of a squad car.  The court upheld the reasonableness of the 
search for these reasons: 
Here, the officers' pat-down search of defendant was 
in accordance with standard police procedure which 
dictates that protective measures be taken before a 
person is to be held in the back seat of a squad 
car. . . . Certainly, 
it 
is 
reasonable 
that 
the 
officer, who has a legitimate reason to so detain that 
person, is interested in guarding against an ambush 
from the rear. . . .  
 
We, therefore, find that the police officers' 
proffered justification in patting down the driver——
their own personal security——is legitimate.  When 
balanced 
against 
the 
driver's 
minimal 
privacy 
interests under these circumstances, we can only 
conclude that the driver of a motor vehicle may be 
subjected to a brief pat-down search for weapons where 
the detaining officer has a lawful reason to detain 
said driver in the patrol car. 
 
Id. (citations omitted).  Evans, like Glenn and Varnado, 
involved frisks incident to temporary squad car detentions, not 
frisks prior to squad car rides. 
 
¶62 In People v. Otto, 284 N.W. 2d 273, 276 (Mich. App. 
1979), the Michigan Court of Appeals upheld an officer's 
decision to frisk a hitchhiker prior to transporting him off the 
freeway.  The court focused on the reasonableness of the squad 
car transport as well as the reasonableness of the frisk, 
concluding that ticketing the hitchhiker and his companion but 
leaving them to continue walking on the freeway would have been 
dangerous and irresponsible, and that the officer's interest in 
No. 99-3095.dss 
 
6 
protecting 
himself 
from 
assault 
while 
transporting 
the 
hitchhikers was legitimate and substantial.  Id.  
 
¶63 Similarly, in People v. Tobin, 269 Cal. Rptr. 81, 84 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990), the California Court of Appeals held that 
an officer's need to transport the occupants of a vehicle that 
was about to be towed off the freeway justified frisking them 
for weapons before transporting them.  In Tobin, a police 
officer stopped a vehicle for registration irregularities and 
determined that the driver's license was suspended.  The 
passengers were either unlicensed or apparently intoxicated, and 
so the car had to be towed.  Instead of leaving the driver and 
his passengers on the freeway, the officer decided to drive them 
to a restaurant at the next exit where they could be picked up 
by friends.  Before doing so, however, he frisked them for 
weapons.  The court upheld the search, based upon the exigencies 
of the situation, in particular, the officer's duty to transport 
the driver and his passengers since they could not be permitted 
either to drive or to remain on the freeway on foot.  Id. at 84. 
 
¶64 In finding the search reasonable, the court in Tobin 
distinguished People v. Scott, 546 P.2d 327, 332-33 (Cal. 1976). 
 In Scott, the California Supreme Court concluded that absent 
reasonable suspicion of armed dangerousness under Terry, an 
officer 
may 
frisk 
for 
weapons 
prior 
to 
transporting 
an 
individual in a squad car only upon consent of the person to be 
No. 99-3095.dss 
 
7 
frisked and transported.  In Scott, a highway patrol officer 
came upon the defendant and his young son urinating on an island 
adjacent to the highway off-ramp.  The defendant appeared to be 
intoxicated and said he was returning his son to his ex-wife.  
The officer offered to give them a ride, but searched the 
defendant for weapons first.  The court concluded that the 
search was not incident to arrest and did not meet the criteria 
of Terry, and therefore invalidated it: 
We are not oblivious to the dilemma faced by the 
conscientious officers under the circumstances of this 
case.  The lateness of the hour, the dangers inherent 
to pedestrians on a freeway, the presence of a young 
child, the condition of the defendant, combined to 
suggest some remedial action was necessary.  The 
officers could have found cause to place defendant 
under arrest and to take him into custody.  A search 
before transporting the arrestee in the police vehicle 
would then have been proper.  Instead they exercised 
discretion, 
perhaps 
compassion, 
to 
avoid 
arrest. . . .  
 
The dilemma, however, is not insoluble.  We are 
required to accommodate the state's interest in the 
safety of police officers who volunteer to give rides 
not required by their duty, and the individual's right 
to be secure from unreasonable invasions of privacy.  
In our view the simple expedient of a warning and 
option 
will 
at 
once 
preserve 
both 
laudatory 
objectives.  Accordingly, in order for a pat-down 
search 
to 
be 
valid 
under 
these 
or 
similar 
circumstances 
the 
officer 
must first 
inform the 
individual that he has a right to refuse the ride but 
if he accepts it he will be subjected to a pat-down 
search for weapons.  Such a brief admonition will 
protect both the officer's safety and the individual's 
right to decide for himself whether he is willing to 
undergo a pat-down search in order to obtain the 
offered assistance of the police. 
 
No. 99-3095.dss 
 
8 
Id.  The court in Tobin essentially found that the squad car 
ride was not gratuitous but part of the officer's duty under the 
circumstances of that case, and therefore concluded that it was 
not subject to the Scott requirement of consent to search before 
transport.  Tobin, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 84. 
 
¶65 The dissent approves the Scott approach of "'the 
simple expedient of a warning and option,'" dissent at ¶94, and 
some courts have applied variations of it in evaluating the 
reasonableness of searches in this context.  See People v. 
Hannaford, 421 N.W.2d 608 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Village of 
Pemberville v. Hale, 709 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998);  
Commonwealth v. Rehmeyer, 502 A.2d 1332 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); 
People v. Lombardi, 727 A.2d 670, 674 (R.I. 1999).  But I do not 
believe that the expedient is simple to apply in the field in 
every case, or that it realistically takes into consideration 
the full range of circumstances that may give rise to a 
legitimate need to provide squad car transport.  And I do not 
believe that officers should be encouraged to find cause to 
arrest where they otherwise would not in order to justify giving 
someone a ride in the course of their duties, as the Scott court 
seemed to suggest should have been done in that case. 
¶66 Simply stated, police officers are sometimes called 
upon in the course of their duties to transport individuals who 
are not under arrest.  Not all of those individuals will behave 
No. 99-3095.dss 
 
9 
in such a way as to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that 
they are armed and dangerous.  Yet they may be.  And the risk to 
the officer's safety is considerably greater during a squad car 
transport than an investigative stop because the officer cannot 
watch the passenger's hands and cannot defend against an attack 
while driving the squad car.  Therefore, where, as in Otto, 
Tobin, and here, an officer has an objectively reasonable basis 
to transport a person in a squad car, it is not unreasonable to 
allow him to protect himself from assault during the transport 
by conducting a minimally intrusive protective frisk for 
weapons. 
¶67 This conclusion does not run afoul of Richards v. 
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997), or Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 
(2000), as the dissent suggests.  Richards rejected a blanket 
rule dispensing with the knock and announce rule in the 
execution of search warrants in all drug cases, and Florida v. 
J.L. declined to adopt a rule that an anonymous tip alleging 
possession of an illegal gun justifies a Terry stop without 
more.  The approach I advocate requires the customary post hoc 
assessment of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment in each 
case, and therefore does not establish a constitutionally 
impermissible "blanket rule."  
¶68 Applying this approach, I join with the majority in 
sustaining the search in this case.  Kelsey was a 15-year-old 
No. 99-3095.dss 
 
10
girl alone on the streets at night in early March in an unsafe 
area of the City of Milwaukee.  The police officers decided, 
reasonably, that her flight upon their approach, and the brief 
foot chase that ensued, did not justify an arrest but only a 
citation for resisting.  They further determined, based upon a 
phone call to her mother, that she was not a runaway.  Kelsey's 
mother asked them to bring her home. 
¶69 The Juvenile Justice Code specifies that under these 
circumstances, when a juvenile is detained for a civil offense, 
the officer "shall make every effort to release the juvenile 
immediately 
to 
the 
juvenile's 
parent, 
guardian 
or 
legal 
custodian."  Wis. Stat. §§ 938.19(1)(d)8 and 938.20(2)(ag).  
Because Kelsey was 15, the officers had the option of releasing 
her without adult supervision.  Wis. Stat. § 938.20(2)(c)("[i]f 
the juvenile is 15 years of age or older, the person who took 
the juvenile into custody may release the juvenile without 
immediate adult supervision after counseling or warning the 
juvenile as may be appropriate").  But under the circumstances 
of this case, and with a specific request from Kelsey's mother 
that they transport her home, the officers reasonably rejected 
that option in favor of complying with the mother's request as 
well as the statute's command that they "make every effort" to 
return Kelsey to her parent. 
No. 99-3095.dss 
 
11
¶70 Indeed, the facts of this case demonstrate the 
impracticality of the Scott approach across the wide spectrum of 
police duties and responsibilities.  Kelsey was a vulnerable 15-
year-old girl who would have been at risk of harm if the police 
had left her alone at night in an unsafe neighborhood.  Her 
wishes may or may not have coincided with her mother's.  Leaving 
it to Kelsey to decide whether she wanted the ride and the 
accompanying search would have violated her mother's request and 
better judgment and the statute's preference in this situation 
for returning juveniles to their parents. 
¶71 There was an entirely reasonable and legal basis for 
this particular squad car ride.  It was not a pretext to conduct 
an otherwise unreasonable search.  Under these circumstances, 
and upon this independent basis——even absent a reasonable 
suspicion that Kelsey was armed and dangerous under Terry——I 
would 
find 
the 
officer's 
protective 
frisk 
for 
weapons 
constitutionally reasonable.  
¶72 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER 
joins this concurring opinion.   
 
 
No. 99-3095.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶73 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  
Today's decision again affirms the constitutional requirement 
that officers must have reasonable suspicion, based on specific 
and articulable facts, that a suspect is armed and dangerous 
before conducting a pat-down search for weapons. 
¶74 But while paying lip service to this constitutional 
requirement, today's decision so waters down the reasonable 
suspicion standard that the majority opinion is in effect 
adopting the unconstitutional blanket rule proffered by the 
circuit court and court of appeals that the pat-down search of 
Kelsey was reasonable because it was prudent for the officers to 
frisk Kelsey before placing her inside the squad car.  
 
I 
 
¶75 The absence of reasonable suspicion that the suspect 
in this case was armed and dangerous could not be clearer.  The 
officer who ordered the search testified that the only reason he 
wanted to search the suspect was because he was about to place 
her in the squad car to take her home.  He further testified 
that it was standard policy to conduct a search before placing 
an individual in the squad car, although he noted that he 
usually asks the individual to consent to such a search.  He did 
not explain why he failed to obtain consent to search in this 
instance. 
No. 99-3095.ssa 
 
2 
¶76 The circuit court concluded that the officers in 
question exhibited good, even exemplary, police practice in 
taking Kelsey home.  Nevertheless, the circuit court concluded 
that the evidence did not support reasonable suspicion that 
Kelsey was armed and dangerous. 
¶77 I agree with the circuit court on both counts.  In 
showing concern for a girl huddled alone on the sidewalk, after 
dark, the officers performed their function as community 
caretakers.  In detaining her to determine whether she was a 
runaway and contacting her mother, the officers did their utmost 
to ensure that a vulnerable 15-year-old arrived home safely.  
The officers are to be commended for these actions. 
¶78 But under the constitutional standard that has been in 
place since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1968), an officer must have reasonable suspicion, 
based on specific and articulable facts, that an individual is 
armed and dangerous before conducting a pat-down search for 
weapons.  Anything less than this minimum requirement of 
reasonable suspicion constitutes an unlawful search under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
¶79 In this case, there was no reasonable suspicion that 
Kelsey was armed and dangerous.  The officer testified that the 
only reason he ordered a search was because he was about to 
transport Kelsey in the squad car, and that it is his policy to 
always search an individual for weapons before placing him or 
her in the squad car.  
No. 99-3095.ssa 
 
3 
¶80 The majority relies on our statement in State v. 
McGill12 that we may find reasonable suspicion based on any facts 
in the record that are known to an officer at the time of a 
frisk.13  But McGill makes clear that the facts upon which we 
rely must be "supported by [the officer's] testimony at the 
suppression hearing."14  Thus, the majority opinion cannot rely 
on McGill to draw a conclusion that conflicts with the officer's 
testimony.  
¶81 The majority justifies the frisk on six factors: (1) 
Kelsey's initial appearance, sitting on the sidewalk against a 
building, and her demeanor, sitting in a huddled position with 
her hood pulled over her head; (2) her age; (3) night time; (4) 
few people in the area; (5) high-crime area; and (6) Kelsey's 
fleeing from the officers because she was afraid but could not 
explain why she was afraid. 
¶82 First, the officer testified that Kelsey's initial 
appearance and demeanor made him concerned for her welfare.  The 
majority does not explain how the officer's concerns for 
Kelsey's welfare, which the officer described in his testimony, 
are consistent with a reasonable suspicion that she was armed 
and dangerous, which the officer did not mention in his 
testimony.  The majority merely concludes that the facts that 
supported the officer's concern for her welfare, thus justifying 
                     
12 2000 WI 38, ¶24, 234 Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795. 
13 Majority op. at ¶49 n.11. 
14 See McGill, 2000 WI 38 at ¶24. 
No. 99-3095.ssa 
 
4 
the detention under the community caretaker function, must have 
simultaneously supported a suspicion that Kelsey was armed and 
dangerous.15 
¶83 What explanation can there be for the unsupported 
conclusion that a girl who is huddled against a storefront with 
her hood over her head might reasonably be suspected of being 
armed and dangerous?  As the officer's own testimony shows, 
these facts are consistent with vulnerability, not dangerousness 
to others.  To conclude that the same facts justifying the stop 
also justify a suspicion that Kelsey was armed and dangerous is 
to disregard the tenor of the entire encounter. 
¶84 Second, the majority says that her age is a factor 
that would support the officer's unspoken suspicion that she was 
armed and dangerous.  Kelsey was 15 years old.  Is a younger or 
older person less likely to be suspected of being armed and 
dangerous?  The majority opinion does not tell us. 
¶85 Third, the majority points out that it was nighttime. 
 In McGill, 2000 WI 38 at ¶32, the court held that darkness was 
a factor to be considered in determining whether there was 
reasonable suspicion that a suspect was armed and dangerous, to 
the extent that the officer's visibility was reduced.  Here, 
however, the officer testified that the area was well lit, so 
that he could clearly observe Kelsey's face, hair color, and 
clothing from his patrol car on the opposite side of the street, 
                     
15 See majority op. at ¶49. 
No. 99-3095.ssa 
 
5 
at a distance of approximately 25 feet.16  Where an officer 
testifies that an area is well lit and that an individual can be 
clearly observed, the rationale set forth in McGill no longer 
applies.  
¶86 Fourth, the fact that few people were around does not 
give the officers reasonable suspicion that Kelsey was armed and 
dangerous.  At the time of Kelsey's frisk, there were three 
officers and a single 15-year-old girl, who was quiet and 
cooperative as she awaited the frisk and a ride home.17  
¶87 Fifth, the majority, like the circuit court, states 
that the frisk occurred in a high-crime area.  This fact is not 
supported by the record.  The officer testified that the area in 
question had a high rate of graffiti and was "not what [he] 
would consider a good area especially at night . . . [for] a 
fifteen year old girl."  This testimony is not the equivalent of 
testimony that they were in a "high-crime area" that would give 
                     
16 This testimony was necessary for the State's contention 
that Kelsey knew that she was fleeing police officers, as 
opposed to strange men approaching her at night in a deserted 
neighborhood.  The squad car was unmarked and the officers did 
not identify themselves as police officers.  However, one of the 
officers testified that the area was very well lit, so that 
Kelsey could probably see the officer's uniform at that 
distance. 
17 The officers' vulnerability under these facts is a far 
cry from McGill, in which this court found reasonable suspicion 
to frisk where an officer, acting alone and without backup, 
stopped a nervous and apparently intoxicated man.  McGill, 2000 
WI 38, ¶¶32-33. 
No. 99-3095.ssa 
 
6 
an officer a reasonable suspicion that an individual encountered 
in that area might be armed and dangerous.18 
¶88 Sixth, the majority says that Kelsey's flight from the 
officers supports the reasonable suspicion that she might be 
hiding a weapon.  At best, the majority has identified flight as 
a factor that supports a suspicion that Kelsey was hiding 
something.  Flight does not, however, support the suspicion that 
a suspect is hiding a weapon and is dangerous, which is the 
necessary quantum of suspicion under Terry. 
¶89 The majority's conclusion is directly contradicted by 
the officers' actions in this case.  If the officers suspected 
that Kelsey was armed and dangerous, they would not have delayed 
the frisk for twenty minutes while waiting for a female officer. 
 Delay in the frisk is inconsistent with the purpose of a Terry 
frisk, which is to protect the immediate safety interests of 
officers.  If the officers were concerned for their safety, they 
would have frisked Kelsey immediately.  Instead, the female 
officer arrived twenty minutes after the encounter to find 
Kelsey sitting calmly on the hood of the squad car.  This scene 
is not consistent with the purpose of a Terry frisk.  It is 
consistent with the officer's practice of frisking anyone who 
rides in the squad car. 
                     
18 Even if there were a basis in the record, this factor is 
of very limited import in a reasonable suspicion analysis.  See 
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 n.2 (1990) ("Even in high 
crime areas, where the possibility that any given individual is 
armed is significant, Terry requires reasonable, individualized 
suspicion before a frisk for weapons can be conducted."). 
No. 99-3095.ssa 
 
7 
¶90 In sum, I conclude, as did the circuit court and court 
of appeals, that there was no basis for reasonable suspicion 
that Kelsey was armed and dangerous.  The majority's effort to 
spin these facts into reasonable suspicion is contradicted by 
the officer's own testimony, the circuit court's findings, and 
common sense. 
 
II 
 
¶91 I now turn briefly to the final factor referred to by 
the majority: the fact that the officers were about to transport 
Kelsey in the squad car.  This court must reject a per se rule 
allowing officers to search individuals before placing them in 
the squad car, the so-called "search incident to squad car 
ride."  Such a rule would run afoul of U.S. Supreme Court case 
law that has rejected past efforts to do away with the need for 
specific and articulable facts that support a reasonable 
suspicion that an individual may be armed and dangerous.19  
                     
19 See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) 
(rejecting this court's attempt to create a blanket exception to 
the knock and announce rule where officers suspect drug 
dealing); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) (declining to 
adopt a "firearm exception" to Terry). 
The concurrence's proposed rule, though narrower than a per 
se rule for all squad car rides, is untenable nonetheless.  Such 
a rule replaces the necessary Fourth Amendment inquiry of 
whether the search was reasonable under the particular facts 
with an inquiry into whether the ride in the squad car was 
pretextual.  See Sykes, J., concurrence at ¶56. 
No. 99-3095.ssa 
 
8 
¶92 I conclude that the fact that an individual is about 
to be transported in a squad car provides no independent basis 
for establishing reasonable suspicion that an individual is 
armed and dangerous.  While I recognize the added vulnerability 
that arises when officers place an individual in the back seat 
of the squad car, the proper mechanism for addressing this 
vulnerability is to request an individual's consent to search 
before the individual is transported in the squad car.  
¶93 According to the testimony in this case, a request for 
consent to a frisk is already part of normal police practice.  
The officer testified that he usually seeks consent before 
conducting a search incident to squad car ride.  He further 
stated that if he does not receive consent, he will not put the 
individual in the back of the squad car. 
¶94 The officer's testimony reflects exemplary police 
practice, which strikes a viable balance between an individual's 
Fourth Amendment rights and an officer's concern for safety.  
The California Supreme Court has mandated a similar practice in 
such situations, stating that "the simple expedient of a warning 
                                                                  
The concurrence also assumes that a ride in a squad car 
always creates a greater risk of danger to an officer than a 
stop.  I do not know if this assumption is correct.  I would 
have to know the type of separation, if any, between the driver 
and the passenger. 
No. 99-3095.ssa 
 
9 
and option will at once preserve both laudable objectives."20  
This practice ensures that searches incident to squad car ride 
are based on consent, and therefore reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, without compromising officer safety.  As the officer 
in this case testified, if an individual denies consent, "I will 
not put them in the back of my squad [car].  We will find other 
ways to do things." 
¶95 In this case, the officer should have requested 
consent to search Kelsey before transporting her home in the 
squad car.21  Such a rule is more workable than the majority's 
undeveloped assertion that the decision to put an individual in 
a squad car should be "a factor justifying a frisk for 
                     
20 See People v. Scott, 546 P.2d 327, 332-33 (Cal. 1976) (an 
officer who proposes to give a private citizen a lift in the 
patrol 
car 
cannot 
lawfully 
subject 
the 
individual 
to 
a 
nonconsensual pat-down search for weapons when the individual is 
not under arrest and the officer has no duty to transport the 
individual and no reason to believe the individual is armed and 
dangerous; for a pat-down search to be valid the officer must 
inform the individual of the right to refuse the ride but that 
if the ride is accepted a pat-down search for weapons will be 
conducted). 
21 Whether Kelsey would have consented to the search is not 
before us, as it is undisputed that Kelsey was not asked for 
consent.  Moreover, the prospect that her refusal to give 
consent would have conflicted with her mother's wishes assumes 
that Kelsey's mother would have asked the officers to bring 
Kelsey home with the knowledge that such a ride would require 
the officer to search Kelsey.  The officer's testimony does not 
indicate that he informed Kelsey's mother of his policy of 
searching all occupants of his squad car.  Had he informed 
Kelsey's mother of his policy, there might have been no need for 
a squad car ride after all.  The prospect of a dilemma for the 
officers in this case is wholly speculative. 
No. 99-3095.ssa 
 
10
weapons."22  Without more explanation about the significance of 
this factor, the majority is leaving officers without guidance 
in determining when a search is justified before placing an 
individual in a squad car.  I conclude that a rule requiring 
consent under these circumstances provides better guidance to 
officers and courts and properly protects Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
¶96 In sum, two of the factors identified by the majority 
as justifying the frisk are not supported by the record in this 
case, and the remaining factors do not give rise to a reasonable 
inference that the officers reasonably suspected that Kelsey was 
armed and dangerous. 
¶97 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶98 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
                     
22 The 
cases 
cited 
by 
the 
majority 
for 
viewing 
an 
individual's transport in a squad car as a factor justifying a 
frisk do not provide clear support for this holding.  For 
example, in State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1998), the 
court found that the search in question violated the Fourth 
Amendment when the woman frisked (who had been placed in the 
squad car) was alone, was cooperative, and did not engage in 
behavior 
evoking 
suspicion 
that 
she 
might 
be 
armed 
and 
dangerous.  The court held that the fact that the search 
occurred at night and in a high-crime area did not support 
reasonable suspicion that the woman was armed and dangerous.   
In People v. Tobin, 269 Cal. Rptr. 81, 83-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1990), the court of appeals concluded that a "duty to transport" 
existed, distinguishing the facts of that case from People v. 
Scott, 546 P.2d 327 (Cal. 1976), in which the California Supreme 
Court rejected a frisk incident to squad car ride rule.  The 
State does not claim a duty to transport in the present case. 
No. 99-3095.ssa 
 
11