Title: Faulconer v. Williams
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S44308
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: July 24, 1998

Filed:  July 24, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

JAY FAULCONER and SHEILA	
FAULCONER, husband and wife,		

	Respondents on Review,	

	v.					

BILLIE J. WILLIAMS, 	

	Defendant-Respondent,	

	and				

JOHN C. MACKEY and JEANNE L. 
MACKEY,			

	Petitioners on Review,	

	and				

ROBERT D. WEBB and CAROLYN 	
L. WEBB; RANDY L. BAHLER and 	
DONNA  J. BAHLER; KENNETH J. 	
STEVENSON and JOANNE 	
STEVENSON; JERRY L. LASATER 	
and DAWN LASATER; ELMER C. 	
WILLIAMS and MARIE E.WILLIAMS,

	Defendants-Respondents,	

	and 				

MICHAEL A. REVELLE and SANDRA 	
A. REVELLE,		

	Petitioners on Review.	

(CC 95-10169; CA A93542; SC S44308)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted November 5, 1997; reassigned April 3,
1998.

	Hilary E. Berkman, Corvallis, argued the cause and filed the 
brief for petitioners on review.

	George B. Heilig, of Cable, Huston, Benedict &amp; Haagensen,
LLP, Corvallis, argued the cause and filed the brief for
respondents on review.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.**

	GILLETTE, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed.  The case is remanded
to the circuit court for entry of a judgment quieting title to
the disputed parcel in favor of plaintiffs.

	*Appeal from Benton County Circuit Court,

	 Robert S. Gardner, Judge.

	 147 Or App 389, 936 P2d 999 (1997).

    **Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision; Graber, J., resigned March 31,
1998, and did not participate in this decision.

		GILLETTE, J.

		The issue in this real property dispute is whether an
express easement over plaintiffs' property was extinguished
through adverse possession, although deeds to the property given
after the claimed period of adverse possession continued to refer
to the easement.  The trial court held that the easement
continues to exist.  The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the easement was extinguished by adverse possession during the
period of ownership of one of plaintiffs' predecessors in
interest and that reference to the extinguished easement in later
deeds did not operate to recreate the easement.  Faulconer v.
Williams, 147 Or App 389, 936 P2d 999 (1997).  We allowed review
and now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.  

		The Court of Appeals reviewed the judgment of the trial
court de novo, ORS 19.415(3).(1)  We accept the facts as found by
the Court of Appeals and limit our review to questions of law. 
ORS 19.415(4).  The following facts are taken from the Court of
Appeals' decision and from other undisputed facts in the record.  

		The land in dispute is located in rural Benton County.(2) 
In the 1950s, that land and much of the surrounding area was
owned by Lewis and Nellie Passon.  The Passons lived in a house
on what is known as Tax Lot 300 (the servient estate).  Tax Lot
300, now owned by plaintiffs, is located on the east side of
Mountain View Drive, a north-south county road.  The Passons
began to sell off parcels of their holdings and, in 1957, they
sold Tax Lot 100 (the dominant estate), which is located
immediately to the east of Tax Lot 300, to Elmer and Billie Jean
Williams.  As part of that transaction, the Passons conveyed to
the Williams an express, 20-foot-wide, east-west easement over
Tax Lot 300 for a right of way to allow the Williams access to
Mountain View Drive.  The easement was described in metes and
bounds in the Williams' deed and lies over the north 20 feet of
Tax Lot 300.  Tax Lot 100 in turn was subject to a similar
easement for the benefit of other property then owned by the
Passons.

		At the time of the conveyance, there was no physical
access to Mountain View Drive from Tax Lot 100, and a road had to
be built.  A wire fence, remnants of which still stand today, ran
east-west between Mountain View Drive and Tax Lot 100.  That
fence, which was north of the Passons' house, ran along the
northern boundary of the Williams' property.  Lewis Passon
directed that a private road be constructed immediately south of
the fence, and he and Elmer Williams together cleared trees and
brush and built the road.  

		The road that Passon and Williams built lies over the
north 20 feet of the Williams' property (Tax Lot 100), but, in
fact, does not cross Tax Lot 300 at all.  Instead, the road lies
north of Tax Lot 300 and crosses property never owned by the
Passons.(3)  That is, the northern boundary of Tax Lot 300 does
not, as both the Passons and the Williams believed, extend
directly west from the corner of Tax Lot 100.  The northern
boundary to Tax Lot 300 is parallel to, but to the south of, the
northern boundary of Tax Lot 100, and the true southern boundary
of a 20-foot easement strip that runs along the northern side of
Tax Lot 300 lies within seven feet of the Passons' (now
plaintiffs') house.  Despite the metes and bounds description in
the deeds, neither the Passons nor the Williams actually were
aware of the discrepancy in the northern property lines of Tax
Lots 100 and 300.  

		After the private road was constructed, Lewis Passon
built a retaining wall and fence just to the south of the
roadway, along the actual northern boundary of his property.  He
planted trees and shrubs in the fenced area and maintained it as
part of his yard.  

		In 1959, the Passons sold Tax Lot 300 to the Williams. 
The deed conveying that property did not include reference to the
easement, but the Williams clearly knew of its existence, because
they owned one of the properties that benefited from the easement
and Elmer Williams had helped to build the roadway.  The Williams
conveyed Tax Lot 300 to the Fryers in 1964.  The Fryers sold that
lot to the Hendricksons in 1982, and the Hendricksons sold it to
plaintiffs in 1989.  All those conveyances provided that they
were "subject to" or were conveyed "except for" an easement
described by reference to the 1957 deed conveying Tax Lot 100
from the Passons to the Williams.  

		Notwithstanding the reference to the easement in their
deeds, all the subsequent owners of Tax Lot 300 believed that the
wire fence to the north of the private road lay along their true
northern property line.  All treated the disputed strip as their
own.  The Fryers extended the fence that Lewis Passon had built
so that it joined another fence running north-south along the
eastern boundary of the property, making east-west travel through
the actual easement impossible.  Within the easement strip, they
also planted a grape arbor and fir trees that have grown quite
large.  The Hendricksons used the property in the same way and
plaintiffs, too, believed that the easement ran along the
existing roadway.  Plaintiffs maintained the wall and fence
between the private road and their yard.  

		Defendants are all successors in interest of other
Passon grantees and are the owners of the dominant estates in
whose favor the 1959 easement was created.  Most of the
defendants believed, as did plaintiffs, that the existing private
road lay within the easement.  

		After a 1995 survey disclosed the mistake as to the
location of the easement, plaintiffs sued to quiet title.  They
asserted that they or their predecessors had acquired title to
the disputed 20-foot strip through either adverse possession or
abandonment.  The trial court disagreed.  With respect to the
abandonment question, the court ruled that plaintiffs had not
demonstrated that defendants ever took any action indicating
their intent to abandon their right to use the easement over
plaintiffs' property.  Turning to the adverse possession claim,
the trial court held that, although plaintiffs, along with their
predecessors in interest, used the property for the requisite 10-year period and that use was open, exclusive, and continuous,
they had not shown that the use was "hostile," inasmuch as they
had not shown that the use was adverse to defendants' interest in
the easement.  Finally, the court concluded that, even if the
Fryers' activities extinguished the easement by adverse
possession, they and, in turn, the Hendricksons, had recreated
the easement when they transferred Tax Lot 300 "subject to" or
"except for" the easement.  

		Plaintiffs appealed, assigning error to each of the
trial court's rulings.  As noted, the Court of Appeals reversed
on the grounds that the easement was extinguished by adverse
possession during the 18-year period of the Fryers' ownership and
that the reference to the extinguished easement in subsequent
deeds was insufficient to recreate the easement in favor of
defendants.  For the reasons that follow, we agree.  

		An express easement may be extinguished by adverse
possession.  Simpson v. Fowles, 272 Or 342, 344, 536 P2d 499
(1975).  For that to occur, all the elements of adverse
possession must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.  See 
Thompson v. Scott, 270 Or 542, 546-47, 528 P2d 509 (1974) (clear
and convincing evidence of all elements is necessary for
acquisition of easement by adverse possession).(4)  That means that
plaintiffs must establish by clear and convincing evidence that
their use of the land subject to the easement was actual, open,
notorious, exclusive, continuous, and hostile for the full
statutory period of ten years.(5)  Scott v. Elliott, 253 Or 168,
178, 451 P2d 474 (1969).  Failure to meet even one of those
elements will destroy a claim of adverse possession.

		We begin with the element of hostility or adversity,
because defendants' primary argument is that plaintiffs have
failed to prove that element.  

		In the context of adverse possession, the term
"hostile" means that the claimant possessed the property
intending to be its owner and not in subordination to the true
owner.  Mascall v. Murray, 76 Or 637, 643-44, 149 P 517 (1915); 
see also Sertic v. Roberts, 171 Or 121, 134, 136 P2d 248 (1943)
("Adverse possession depends upon the intent of the occupant to
claim and hold real property in opposition to all the world."). 
Additionally, when the claim is for adverse possession of an
easement, the claimant generally must show that his or her use of
the property is inconsistent with the existence of the easement. 
Horecny v. Raichl, 280 Or 405, 408, 571 P2d 495 (1977); see also
Tucker v. Nuding, 92 Or 319, 328-29, 108 P 903 (1919) (use
adverse to the enjoyment of an easement for a period sufficient
to create a prescriptive easement will destroy that easement).  

		The Court of Appeals found that this was a case in
which a party possesses land under the mistaken belief of
ownership.  Faulconer, 147 Or App at 394-95.  Under established
Oregon case law, inquiry into plaintiffs' intent to possess as
the true owner under that circumstance is unnecessary.  See,
e.g., Lee v. Hanson, 282 Or 371, 375, 578 P2d 784 (1978)
(possession of realty under the mistaken belief of ownership
satisfies the element of hostility without the need for further
inquiry into the claimant's subjective intent, but the belief
must result from pure mistake, rather than a mistake based upon
conscious doubt).  Because the use of the disputed strip by
plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest resulted from a
"pure mistake" as to the correct location of the easement, the
Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs' and their predecessors'
use of the easement cannot be said to have been permissive. 
Faulconer, 147 Or App at 395.  Under those circumstances, the
court held the actions of constructing and maintaining the fence
and retaining wall in the easement area, together with the
plantings, demonstrated that the use was "hostile."  Ibid.

		On review, defendants take issue on two separate
grounds with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that plaintiffs had 
satisfied the hostility requirement.  First, defendants argue
that the Court of Appeals did not give due consideration to the
difference between the adverse possession of land owned by
another and the adverse possession of an easement.  In
particular, they assert that, because the servient estate holder
(in this case, plaintiffs) owns the fee in the land and has the
right to use the land covered by the easement for normal
residential purposes, he or she must demonstrate more extensive
activity clearly inconsistent with the use of the easement in
order to show hostility.  Defendants also cite several cases from
other jurisdictions holding that, in the case of an easement that
never has been used, even fencing off the easement area is
insufficient to demonstrate adversity until (1) the need for the
right of way arises, (2) a demand is made by the owner of the
dominant estate that the easement be opened, and (3) the owner of
the servient estate refuses to do so.  Defendants urge this court
to adopt a similar rule in Oregon.  

		Second, defendants argue that the Court of Appeals'
reliance on the doctrine of "pure mistake" is misplaced for two
reasons.  First, an easement owner actually owns fee title to the
land and logically cannot operate under a "mistaken belief of
ownership."  Second, the Court of Appeals failed to take note of
the fact that, in 1968, the Fryers, during whose ownership the
court held that the easement was extinguished, had ordered a
survey that determined the true location of the easement and,
therefore, the Fryers cannot have possessed the easement area
under any mistaken belief of ownership.  We reject both of those
arguments. 

		We address the applicability of the doctrine of "pure
mistake" first, because it controls our analysis of both parts of
defendants' argument.  In Norgard v. Busher, 220 Or 297, 349 P2d
490 (1960), this court explained that pure mistake exists where a
deed correctly identifies the boundaries of the land conveyed,
but the person taking property under that deed actually occupies
other property that he mistakenly believes is covered by the
deed.  The court stated that "'the intent derived directly from
the physical senses, i.e., the intent to claim the land actually
occupied, should be regarded as overriding the less immediately
effective intent to hold in conformity with the deed.'"  Id. at
302, quoting Fuller, Adverse Possession -- Occupancy of Another's
Land Under Mistake as to Location of a Boundary, 7 Ore L Rev 329,
336 (1928).  The court distinguished the concept of "conscious
doubt," the existence of which would require exploration of the
possessor's actual intent, as in a case "where it appears that
the possessor was aware of the possibility that he might be
intruding upon his neighbor's land."  Id. at 302.  The court then
held that "possession under the mistaken belief of ownership
satisfies the element of hostility or adverseness in the
application of the doctrine of adverse possession."  Id. at 303
(emphasis added).  

		We hold that the "pure mistake" doctrine is equally
applicable in the easement context.  As noted above, the element
of hostility is met when the claimant intends to occupy the land
as the owner and not in subordination to the true owner.  In the
easement context, hostility entails an intent to occupy land 
without subordination to the rights of the holder of the dominant
estate.  Thus, if an adverse claimant occupies land that is
subject to an easement under the mistaken belief that the
easement lies elsewhere, and intends to possess that land as the
owner and not in subordination to the rights of others to use
that land for roadway purposes, then the element of hostility is
satisfied.  No further inquiry into the claimant's state of mind
is necessary.  

		We also reject defendants' argument that the Fryers
could not have operated under a mistaken belief in their
ownership of the 20-foot strip, because they had ordered a survey
in 1968 that disclosed the true location of the easement. 
Implicit in defendants' argument is the proposition that, after
1968, the Fryers had constructive knowledge of the fact that the
easement lay across what they considered to be their yard. 
However, the notion of "constructive knowledge" is inconsistent
with the reasoning behind the doctrine of pure mistake and plays
no role in our analysis.  Any time a deed describes the true
location of a boundary, particularly by metes and bounds, the
owner is on notice of that location.  "Pure mistake," however, is
based on the idea that the possessor "direct[s his] claim to an
object identified by the senses as a thing claimed"
notwithstanding that the deed describes other property.  Norgard,
220 Or at 302, quoting Bond v. O'Gara, 177 Mass 139, 58 NE 275,
276 (1900).  

		In this case, although the Court of Appeals, on de novo
review, did not make specific note of the existence of the 1968
survey, it concluded that the "Fryers occupied the easement
openly, notoriously, exclusively and hostilely, for over 10
years."  Faulconer, 147 Or App at 397.  It also stated that "on
de novo review, we agree with the trial court's factual
conclusions."  Id. at 391 n 1.  In contrast, the trial court
specifically found as follows: 

	"There is no convincing evidence that the Fryers were
even aware that the * * * easement was located on their
property.  They did have a survey done in 1960 [sic],
which, to one with some experience in surveys, showed
the * * * easement located on the Fryer[s'] property. 
However, the Court finds that most probably the
Fryer[s] assumed, as did everyone else, that the North
line of their property was the east/west fence on the
North side of the paved * * * road."  

That finding is consistent with the Court of Appeals' conclusion,
and is supported by evidence in the record.  Because the Fryers
subjectively but mistakenly believed that the private road was
located within the easement area and that they held an
unencumbered title to the 20-foot strip of property south of the
private road, their use of that disputed strip was hostile.  

		For the same reasons, we are unpersuaded by defendants'
argument that plaintiffs' adverse possession claim fails because
the Fryers' use of the property was not sufficiently inconsistent
with the right to use the easement.  The degree to which the
possessor's use is inconsistent with the dominant estate holders'
rights is relevant only to show adverseness or hostility.  Here,
plaintiffs have demonstrated hostility through the doctrine of
"pure mistake."  Moreover, none of the cases cited by defendants
pertaining to the treatment of so-called unused easements(6) by
courts in other jurisdictions involves a situation where all
parties were mistaken as to where the actual right of way was
located.  

		Because the Fryers' use of the property was open,
notorious, exclusive, and hostile and continued for the statutory
ten-year period, we hold that the easement was extinguished by
adverse possession during the Fryers' ownership.  Accordingly, so
long as plaintiffs can establish privity between the Fryers and
the Hendricksons and the Hendricksons and themselves, they
succeed on their claim.  Defendants contend that plaintiffs
cannot do so, however, even assuming that the Fryers acquired
title to the easement strip during their period of ownership.  

		Defendants acknowledge that an owner of property may
tack his or her ownership to that of a predecessor in privity
with him or her in order to transfer an adverse possessor's fully
vested rights.  Evans v. Hogue, 296 Or 745, 755, 681 P2d 1133
(1984).  They argue, however, that plaintiffs, who have not,
themselves, owned the property for ten years, cannot tack their
ownership to that of their predecessors, the Hendricksons,
because there is no evidence that the Hendricksons intended to
pass on any adverse possessory rights that they might have
acquired from the Fryers, or even that they knew that they had
acquired any such rights.  Under the circumstances, defendants
reason, there was no understanding on the part of the
Hendricksons that they were transferring unencumbered title to
the 20-foot strip and, therefore, plaintiffs are not in privity
with them and cannot tack.  

		In support of the foregoing argument, as well as a
second, independent point, defendants note that in 1982 the
Fryers transferred the property "subject to" the easement and
that the Hendricksons conveyed "except for" the easement in 1989. 
Defendants assert that the presence of that wording in those
deeds is affirmative evidence that neither the Fryers nor the
Hendricksons intended to pass unencumbered title.  Additionally,
defendants argue that each of those conveyances recreated the
easement in their favor.  Neither of those arguments is well
taken.  

		In Evans, this court considered whether a deed that did
not describe property acquired through adverse possession
nevertheless operated to transfer the grantor's interest in that
property.  This court held that, "where there is evidence of
intent between grantor and grantee to transfer the grantor's
interest in property, the grantee may acquire the grantor's
interest, vested and complete."  Evans, 296 Or at 756.  In that
case, this court concluded that evidence that the grantors
intended to sell, and the grantees thought that they had bought,
the land up to a presumed property line was sufficient to
demonstrate the requisite intent. 

		In the present case, there was evidence that plaintiffs
and all their predecessors in interest believed that the fence to
the north of the private road was their property line, that the
private road was constructed in the easement area, and that the
area inside the 20-foot strip was unencumbered.  Beginning with
the Passons and continuing down the chain of title, all the
owners of Tax Lot 300 behaved as if they had the exclusive right
to use the 20-foot strip.  They constructed, maintained, and
extended the retaining wall and the fence, thereby obstructing
the right of way, and they treated the property as part of their
yard.  Given the undisputed and universally held mistaken
understanding as to the correct location of the easement, that
evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that the grantors intended
to pass unencumbered title to the strip and that the grantees
thought that is what they were purchasing.  

		Neither does the existence of wording, both in the
deeds from the Fryers to the Hendricksons and from the
Hendricksons to plaintiffs, that referred to the extinguished
easement alter our conclusion.  Repeated reference in the deeds
to the easement simply represents the perpetuation of Lewis
Passon's original mistake.  Each grantor was willing to
acknowledge the existence of an easement, because each believed
that the property line was the fence north of the private road
and that the easement was located there.  Under those
circumstances, the references in no way constitute an
acknowledgment of the continued existence of an easement over
land to which each believed that he or she owned unencumbered
title.  

		For the same reasons, the references in the 1982 and
1989 deeds to the extinguished easement do not operate to
"recreate" the easement in favor of defendants.  Generally, once
an easement is extinguished, it is gone forever.  Witt v. Reavis,
284 Or 503, 509, 587 P2d 1005 (1978).  Although Oregon courts
have not before considered the question, courts in other
jurisdictions virtually are unanimous in holding that a mere
later reference to an already extinguished easement does not in
itself recreate the easement.  See, e.g., Breliant v. Preferred
Equities Corp., 918 P2d 314, 319 (Nev 1996); Davis v. Henning,
250 Va 271, 275, 462 SE2d 106, 108 (1995); Seebaugh v. Borruso,
220 AD2d 573, 574, 632 NYS2d 800, 801 (1995); Bart v. Wysocki,
558 So2d 1326, 1329 (La 1990); Smith v. Tippett, 569 A2d 1186,
1192-93 (DC App 1990); Capital Candy Co. v. Savard, 135 Vt 14,
16, 369 A2d 1363, 1365 (1976); McCurdy v. Wheeler, 235 F2d 22, 23
(DC Cir 1956) (all so holding).  According to those courts, any
such wording merely acknowledges the easement as a previously
existing right burdening the property being conveyed.  Davis, 250
Va at 275, 462 SE2d at 108; Bart, 558 So 2d at 1329.  A grantor
may recreate the easement de novo, but evidence of an intent to
do so must appear on the face of the deed.  Seebaugh, 220 AD2d at
574, 632 NYS2d at 801; Bart, 558 So 2d at 1329, Riccio v. De
Marco, 188 AD2d 847, 849, 591 NYS2d 569, 571 (1992).  

		The foregoing analysis is similar to that in Garza v.
Grayson, 255 Or 413, 467 P2d 960 (1970), in which this court held
that an appurtenant easement may be created in favor of a third
party to a transaction, so long as the grantor's intention to
impose the servitude is apparent either from the face of the deed
or from the surrounding circumstances.  Here, defendants, third
parties to the transactions between the Fryers and Hendricksons
and the Hendricksons and plaintiffs, are arguing that the Fryers
and the Hendricksons created an appurtenant easement in their
favor by referring to the easement in their deeds.  However, no
actual intention to impose such a servitude is apparent, either
on the face of the deed or from the surrounding circumstances. 
Indeed, just the opposite is the case.  The deeds merely describe
the easement by reference to the 1957 deed conveying Tax Lot 100
from the Passons to the Williams.  The surrounding circumstances
establish that that wording is merely a perpetuation of the
Passons' original mistake as to correct location of the northern
boundary of Tax Lot 300, and that neither the Fryers nor the
Hendricksons intended to convey an additional easement that would
allow a roadway to be constructed to within seven feet of their
house.  

		Neither the 1982 nor the 1989 deed recreates an
easement in defendants' favor de novo.  Accordingly, plaintiffs
have established the requisite privity between themselves and the
Hendricksons and between the Hendricksons and the Fryers so as to
allow them to tack their ownership to that of their predecessors
in interest.  They therefore are entitled to claim unencumbered
title to the 20-foot strip of land along the northern boundary of
Tax Lot 300.  

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed.  The case is remanded
to the circuit court for entry of a judgment quieting title to
the disputed parcel in favor of plaintiffs.  

1. 	The Court of Appeals stated that its review was de novo
under ORS 19.125(3).  Faulconer, 147 Or App 389, 391, 936 P2d 999
(1997).  In 1997, ORS 19.125 was renumbered as ORS 19.415.

2. 	To assist the reader, a map -- not to scale -- is
included on the facing page as "fig. A."  The disputed strip is
marked with cross hatching.  The present road -- described post 
-- lies immediately to the north of it.

3. 	Because the land to the north of Tax Lot 300 never was 
owned by the Passons, the remedy of reformation of the deeds to
conform them to the understanding of the original parties was not
available to plaintiffs.  

4. 	ORS 105.620, adopted by the legislature in 1989,
imposes a similar requirement.  That statute also contains other
requirements for the successful maintenance of a claim for
adverse possession, but it applies only to claims for title in
which the interest vested after 1989.  Here, plaintiffs claim and
the Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs' interest vested before
1989.  

5. 	ORS 12.050 establishes a 10-year statutory period to
acquire land through adverse possession.  It provides, in part:

		"An action for the recovery of real property, or
for the recovery of the possession thereof, shall be
commenced within 10 years."

6. 	The holdings in those cases also are premised on the
fact that the need for the right of way had not yet arisen and,
therefore, the easement was unused at the time of the adverse
possession claim.  Here, by contrast, the need for the right of
way arose as soon as the Passons sold Tax Lot 100 to the Williams
and virtually all parties, plaintiffs as well as defendants,
thought that the actual easement was, in fact, being used.