Title: Tarr v. Hicks
Citation: 393 P.2d 557
Docket Number: 20411
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: June 22, 1964

393 P.2d 557 (1964) Florence Newby TARR, Plaintiff in Error, v. Ruth E. HICKS, Ralph H. Coyte, as Administrator with Will Annexed of the Estate of Bryant N. Newby, Jr., Deceased, the First National Bank of Longmont, Colorado, Executor of the Estate of Anna F. Newby, Deceased, George Newby, Lillian Gay, Grace Pruitt, Kate Ecton, C. A. Romigh, Helen Williamson, Estelle Johnston, and Lola Romigh, Defendants in Error. No. 20411. Supreme Court of Colorado. En Banc. June 22, 1964. Rehearing Denied July 13, 1964. *558 Harry L. Silverman, Denver, for plaintiff in error. Alden T. Hill, Fort Collins, for defendants in error, Ruth E. Hicks and Ralph H. Coyte as administrator with will annexed of Estate of Bryant N. Newby, Jr., Decd. Reynolds &amp; Connell, Carl W. Berueffy, Larry W. Moran, Boulder, for defendants in error, George Newby, Lillian Gay, Grace Pruitt, Kate Ecton, C. A. Romigh, Helen Williamson, Estelle Johnston and Lola Romigh. HALL, Justice. On March 13, 1933, Bryant N. Newby, Sr., (herein referred to as Newby, Sr.,) the then owner of valuable real property, by warranty deed conveyed the same to his wife, Anna F. Newby (herein referred to as Anna). By this deed, if valid, Newby, Sr., divested himself of the ownership of said property. He died intestate and without property on May 16, 1937. At the time of his death he left as his heirs at law: Following the death of Newby, Sr., an attorney representing the stepchildren notified Anna that the deed which she had received from her husband was invalid, could be set aside and proceedings for such purpose would be commenced unless the matter was promptly adjusted. *559 Following this threat, conferences were had between all the heirs of Newby, Sr., and their attorneys. As a result of these conferences a three-party agreement was entered into and signed on May 2, 1938. This agreement purported to define and was intended to define the rights and duties of all of the heirs. In this agreement Anna is designated as the party of the first part; George Newby, May Romigh, Lillian Gay, Grace Pruitt and Kate Ecton (the stepchildren) as parties of the second part, and Newby, Jr., and Florence as parties of the third part. The agreement contains several opening paragraphs wherein are recited reasons for the agreement. Therein reference is made to the deed, the validity of which had been questioned; to the fact that Newby, Sr., at the time of his death left no property requiring probate or administration of his estate, and in addition contains the following: 8. "Each of the parties of the second and third part agree that they will, at all *560 times, treat the party of the first part with respect and consideration and they will not request from her any personal loans or advancements." On June 20, 1938, Anna made her Will. This Will was prepared by her attorney, the attorney who represented her at the time the validity of the deed from Newby, Sr., was questioned and at all times during negotiations which culminated in the aforesaid three-party agreement. Without question, Anna, in making this Will, intended to comply with the terms of her contract, and the only variation between the Will and the contract is the fact that instead of, as provided in the contract, giving to her two children, "their heirs and assigns," they to receive "collectively" an undivided one-half of her estate, and giving to her five stepchildren, "their heirs and assigns," they to receive "collectively" an undivided one-half of her estate, she by her Will gave to each child an undivided one-fourth and to each stepchild an undivided one-tenth. Anna died April 8, 1957. Her Will was admitted to probate and The First National Bank of Longmont, nominated in the Will as Executor, was appointed Executor by the court, and as such has sold the real property involved and is holding some $70,000.00 for distribution to those entitled thereto. After execution of the agreement and prior to the death of Anna, Newby, Jr., died. Any rights that he may have acquired by virtue of the agreement or the Will of Anna are vested in the defendants in error Ruth E. Hicks and Ralph H. Coyte. After execution of the agreement and prior to the death of Anna, May Romigh died, and whatever rights that she may have acquired by virtue of the agreement or the Will are vested in the defendants, C. A. Romigh, Helen Williamson, Estelle Johnston, and Lola Romigh, heirs and successors of May Romigh. Shortly after the Will was admitted to probate the First National Bank of Longmont petitioned the county court for construction of the Will. The county court entered judgment construing the Will. Appeal from this county court judgment was taken to the district court and that court entered judgment construing the Will. Final disposition of proceedings for construction of the Will is to be found in In Re Estate of Newby, 146 Colo. 296, 361 P.2d 622, decided April 24, 1961, rehearing denied May 22, 1961. The above case should be considered in connection with the case now before us. In June of 1961, Hicks and Coyte, successors to the interests of Newby, Jr., commenced this action, wherein they seek a one-fourth interest in the estate of Anna. Their claim is predicated on the contract and the failure of Annathrough oversight, lack of understanding, or otherwiseto make a Will in strict legal conformity with the contract. The stepchildren and the heirs and successors of the deceased stepchild, May Romigh, answered the complaint and took the same position as Hicks and Coyte, and asked for similar relief. Florence, in her answer to the complaint, contends (1) that the Will of Anna is in conformity with the contract, and (2) if not in conformity therewith, varies therefrom only in that said Will does not bequeath and devise to the children as a class or to the stepchildren as a class, and that none of the plaintiffs is a member of or a survivor of either class; (3) that the contract was entered into "without consideration of any kind whatsoever from * * * Newby, Jr. and * * * Florence * * *"; (4) that neither Newby, Jr., nor May Romigh acquired any interest in the property by virtue of the agreement, and bequests made to them in the Will of Anna lapsed by reason of their predeceasing Anna, and (5) that plaintiffs' claim accrued more than six years prior to commencement of this action to recover thereon and is consequently barred by the six-year statute of limitations. *561 The Executor answered and took no position other than to express a desire to distribute the estate to those entitled thereto and as provided by law. Trial was to the court without a jury. The trial judge made extensive FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, wherein appears the following: "That Anna F. Newby did not intend to deprive Bryant N. Newby, Jr., and May Romigh, or their lawful heirs and assigns of their interests in her *562 estate; that this Court is now interpreting an agreementnot a will or deedand that by the words, `their heirs and assigns' in the agreement, Exhibit A, is meant persons taking alternatively or as substitutes, and such words could not and do not relate, to the extent of the estate to be conveyed or devised, but to the parties who were to take in the event of death; The judgment of the court provided that the property be divided as specified in the agreement, those living to get their share as therein provided, and that the portions allocated by the agreement to the two deceased parties to go to their respective heirs or legatees. Florence is here by writ of error seeking reversal and urges as reasons therefor: We shall consider assigned errors 1, 2, 3 and 6 together. Counsel sought by witnesses, Florence and her husband, to prove that there was no consideration flowing from Newby, Jr., or Florence to Anna to support Anna's agreement to make a Will. We need not determine whether Florence was precluded from testifying because of the Dead Man's Statute. The offered testimony was inadmissible for other reasons herein stated. It was the purpose of counsel for Florence by parol evidence to vary and wipe out essential terms of a written contract. The contracting parties were aware of the various considerations granted and received. Among other things which Anna received from Newby, Jr., are the following: (1) a settlement of all disputes and differences existing between the heirs of Newby, Sr.; (2) an assignment by Newby, Jr., of all of his interest in the estate of his father; (3) an agreement that Newby, Jr., treat Anna at all times with respect; (4) an agreement not to request any loans or *563 advancements from Anna, and (5) an agreement that all advancements made by Newby, Sr., be considered as gifts and that "* * * no one of the parties hereto shall have any claim against any other by reason of such gifts or advancements." Counsel for Florence, in support of his contention that parol evidence on the question of consideration should have been admitted, cites as authority cases and quotations from 32 C.J.S. Material therein deals with recitals in an agreement and is authority for the proposition that recitals are not conclusive and may be explained by parol. That is not the case here. Florence did not seek to explain recitals, but rather sought by parol evidence to do away with the written agreement of the parties. A complete answer to these contentions of Florence is found in Grand Junction Gospel Tabernacle v. Orvis, 113 Colo. 408, 157 P.2d 619, wherein it is said: In Collins v. Shaffer, 66 Colo. 84, 179 P. 152, this court said: The parties here are in complete disagreement as to whether execution of the agreement served to divest Anna of any title that she had and to vest the portion so divested in the children and stepchildren. The agreement was one dealing with and affecting real property. It was not merely a personal agreement. In the agreement it is provided that: Thus it appears that the parties considered the agreement as affecting title to real property and they decided to withhold the agreement from recording in the county where the property is located. We conclude that the agreement did serve to divest Anna of the fee simple title and to vest in the children and stepchildren an interest in the property. In the agreement it is provided that the children and grandchildren ratify the conveyance *564 from Newby, Sr., to Anna. It is further provided that they: Among other covenants are (1) a covenant not to mortgage; (2) a covenant not to sell. These covenants limited Anna's ownership and title. Had Anna died without making a Will, surely title to the property would vest in the children as contemplated by the contract. The trial court stated: We are referred to and find no decisions of this court which deal with the exact problem at hand. Other jurisdictions have resolved similar problems. In the case of In Re Estate of Johnson, 389 Ill. 425, 59 N.E.2d 825, a husband and wife entered into a postnuptial agreement. The husband paid to his wife $10,000 and she in turn agreed to make a Will and bequeath one-sixth of her estate to her husband's four children by a previous marriage. The wife made a Will, but, before making it, one child had died, so in her Will she gave to each of the three surviving children a one-twenty-fourth of her estate (a one-eighth instead of a one-sixth of her estate). In her Will she made mention of her contractual obligation and no doubt felt that her Will discharged that obligation. The court held to the contrary, and in the opinion is the following language: In Harris v. Harris, 130 W.Va. 100, 43 S.E.2d 225, the husband obtained a divorce and the parties made an agreement in writing as to support of the wife and children. Among other provisions of the agreement is the following: *565 The husband remarried and died owning real property. The second wife claimed an interest in the property. This claim was denied and the court said: As to assigned error No. 4, the record shows that the court admitted in evidence four letters exchanged by the attorneys representing the interested parties who later signed the agreement. These letters indicate the reasons for entering into the agreement. Also admitted in evidence over objections of Florence were three unsigned drafts of contracts prepared by attorneys representing some or all of the parties to the agreement. The drafts were designed to settle the rights and duties of the parties. As drawn they were unacceptable; they were modified and rewritten, and finally took on the form of the contract which is the basis of this action. Also admitted in evidence were the findings and judgments of the county court and the district court in the case of In Re Estate of Newby, supra. We conclude that it was proper and not error to admit these documents in evidence. They furnish background for the contract, and serve to show the intention of the parties. As to the assigned error No. 5, counsel's contention that the Will conforms to the contract is without merit. No doubt all of the parties to the contract and their attorneys were of the opinion that the Will discharged the duty imposed by the contract. In this they were mistakentheir mistake was one of law and not fact. We are in accord with the findings and conclusions of the trial court to the effect that the children and stepchildren at the time the contract was signed and by virtue thereof acquired a vested interest in the property. Newby, Jr., and May Romigh, prior to their deaths, had each acquired a vested interest in the real property. On their deaths their interests passed to their heirs or named beneficiaries. The trial judge so held and directed disposition of the property according to such determination and in conformity with the terms of the agreement as he, and we, interpret the same. The judgment is affirmed.