Title: Barnes v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 473, 2000
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 16, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MARK BARNES,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 473, 2000
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN99-11-0216
§                   IN99-11-1205
§
Submitted: May 2, 2001
  Decided:   May 16, 2001
Before WALSH, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices
O R D E R
This 16th day of May 2001, upon consideration of the appellant’s
brief filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to
withdraw, and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
In July 2000, the defendant-appellant, Mark Barnes, was
convicted by a Superior Court jury of Possession of a Firearm by a Person
Prohibited and Theft of a Firearm.  On the first conviction, Barnes was
sentenced to two years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after six
months for eighteen months probation at Level III.  On the second
2
conviction, he was sentenced to one year incarceration at Level V, to be
suspended for 1 year at Level II probation.  This is Barnes’ direct appeal.
(2)
Barnes’ counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw
pursuant to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under
Rule 26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims
that could arguably support the appeal; and (b) the Court must conduct its
own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without
an adversary presentation.1
(3)
Barnes’ counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and
complete examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable
issues.  By letter, Barnes’ counsel informed Barnes of the provisions of
Rule 26(c) and provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the
accompanying brief and the complete trial transcript.  Barnes was also
informed of his right to supplement his attorney’s presentation.  Barnes
responded with two letters containing two issues for this Court’s
                                                          
1Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
3
consideration.2  The State has responded to the position taken by Barnes’
counsel as well as the issues raised by Barnes and has moved to affirm the
Superior Court’s judgment.
(4)
Barnes raises two issues for this Court’s consideration.  He
claims: i) his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to question witnesses
about inconsistencies in their testimony, point out the exculpatory nature of
certain evidence and object to certain evidence introduced by the State; and
ii) the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support his
conviction.
(5)
The facts adduced at trial were as follows:  On October 30,
1999, Eric Wagner, an officer with the Wilmington Police Department,
went to sleep at approximately 11:30 p.m., leaving his service revolver
and his wallet on top of the entertainment center in the den of his Wawaset
Park residence.  Wagner testified that he was awakened by a work-related
phone call around 2:00 a.m. and went downstairs to talk so he would not
wake his daughter, who was sleeping in an upstairs bedroom.  He then
discovered that his gun was missing, his wallet was open and there were
cigarette ashes scattered around the entertainment center. Wagner testified
                                                          
2Barnes’ January 16, 2001 letter was later supplemented by his April 6, 2001 letter.
4
that neither he nor his wife, Stacey, smoked and that they did not permit
anyone else to smoke in their house.
Stacey had been out with her friend, Linda Heintz, and her cousin,
Frances Quillen, that night.  Barnes, an acquaintance of Quillen’s, had
joined the group at a nightclub called the Big Kahuna in Wilmington.  At
closing time at 1:00 a.m., the group, including Barnes, Stacey’s sister and
two other male friends, decided to go to a bar in Pennsylvania.  They first
returned to the Wagners’ residence so Quillen could pick up her car and
belongings.  During the ride back to the Wagners’ residence, Stacey
Wagner and Barnes had a loud disagreement.  When the group returned to
the Wagners’ residence, Stacey entered the front door using her key.
Stacey testified that  she opened the back door to let her two friends in, but
did not know that Barnes had also entered the residence.  The two other
male friends came in their own car and did not enter the Wagner residence.
Stacey’s sister left in her car after arriving at the Wagner residence.
Quillen testified that, while at the Wagner residence, she observed
Barnes standing at the entertainment center smoking a cigarette.  After
telephoning a friend and learning that the bar in Pennsylvania was going to
close early, she went outside the residence and told the group that the plans
5
had changed.  At that point, Barnes was standing beside Quillen’s car
waiting for her.  Linda Heintz also observed Barnes near the entertainment
center.  She testified that she saw him light a cigarette, stand in front of the
entertainment center for 10-15 minutes looking intently at it, even though
the television set was off, and saw him touch something on top of it.
Heintz considered this behavior to be “unusual,” given that Barnes was in
a stranger’s home.  She also testified that, when Barnes left the residence,
he hurried to get ahead of her and was holding his arms at waist level, with
his elbows out.  Heintz did not observe Barnes take the gun.
Quillen testified that, after they left the Wagner residence, Barnes
asked her to drop him off in the City of Wilmington.  Because Quillen was
unfamiliar with Wilmington, Barnes directed her to where he wanted to be
dropped off.  Barnes was staying at the YMCA, but she did not see the
YMCA when she dropped him off.  After dropping Barnes off, Quillen
telephoned Eric Wagner to ask for directions out of Wilmington.  As she
was on her way home, Quillen received a call from Wagner telling her that
his gun had been taken.  Quillen then drove back to the Wagners’
residence.  Detective William Brown, who investigated the case, testified
that, based on Quillen’s description, he believed Barnes had been dropped
6
off at Eighth and West Streets, an area known for drug activity.  A search
of Barnes’ room at the YMCA did not yield the gun and it was never
recovered.
(6)
Barnes first claims that his counsel was ineffective.  This
Court will not consider on direct appeal any claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel that was not raised below.3  Accordingly, we will not consider
Barnes’ claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, as those claims
have been raised for the first time in this direct appeal.
(7)
Barnes also claims that there was insufficient evidence
presented at trial to sustain his convictions.  This claim is without merit.
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his
conviction of a crime, the relevant inquiry is “whether any rational trier of
fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”4  Direct evidence is
not necessary to establish guilt; circumstantial evidence is sufficient.5 A
conviction for Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited requires
                                                          
3Wing v. State, Del. Supr., 690 A.2d 921, 923 (1996).
4Seward v. State, Del. Supr., 723 A.2d 365, 369 (1999) (citing Robertson v. State, 596
A.2d 1345, 1355 (1991)).
5Seward at 369.
7
proof that the defendant is a “prohibited person” and that he “knowingly
possesse[d] . . . a deadly weapon . . . .”6  A conviction for Theft of a
Firearm requires proof that the defendant “[took], exercise[d] control over
or obtain[ed] a firearm of another person intending to . . . appropriate it.”7
We have reviewed in detail the transcript of the trial and conclude that the
evidence of Barnes’ guilt, while entirely circumstantial, was more than
sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict.8
(8)
This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has
concluded that Barnes’ appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any
arguably appealable issue.  We are also satisfied that Barnes’ counsel has
made a conscientious effort to examine the record and has properly
determined that Barnes could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is
AFFIRMED.  The motion to withdraw is moot.9
                                                          
611 Del. C. § 1448(b).  In this case, the parties stipulated that Barnes was prohibited by
law from possessing a firearm.
711 Del. C. § 1451(a).
8Williams v. State, Del. Supr., 539 A.2d 164, 167-68, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 969 (1988).
9Barnes also filed a motion to proceed pro se and for enlargement of time on March 7,
2001.  His fundamental complaint was that he had not been given enough time to prepare
8
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Randy J. Holland
Justice
                                                                                                                                                                            
his points for consideration by this Court.  We permitted Barnes to provide his counsel
with additional points and permitted additional time for the filing of an amended opening
brief and an amended response.  The motion is, therefore, moot.