Title: Maurice Lamar Floyd v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC95-824
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: August 22, 2002

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC95824
____________
MAURICE LAMAR FLOYD,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[August 22, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
Maurice Lamar Floyd (Floyd) appeals his conviction of first-degree murder
and his sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm Floyd’s conviction and sentence of
death for premeditated murder, but reverse his conviction for armed burglary.  We
also reject application of the felony murder theory of Floyd’s guilt under these
facts.
Mary Goss, the victim in this case, was found dead at approximately 11:30
1. The indictment returned against Floyd was for premeditated murder or
felony murder (Count I), armed burglary of a dwelling (Count II), and aggravated
assault (Count III).  
2. When she testified at trial, Trelane was no longer married to Floyd.
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p.m. on July 13, 1998.  Police found her body on the ground beside her house
located on Bronson Street in Palatka, Florida.  The cause of Ms. Goss’s death was
a single .357 caliber gunshot that entered the left side of her face and proceeded to
sever her brain stem, killing her instantaneously.  Two days later, on July 15, 1998,
police found Floyd, Ms. Goss’s son-in-law, hiding in the attic of a house in the
Palatka area.  Floyd was subsequently charged with the murder of Ms. Goss.1
Testimony adduced at trial indicated that Floyd exhibited very controlling
behavior toward his wife, Trelane,2 who was Ms. Goss’s daughter.  On July 11,
1998 (extending into the early morning hours of July 12), Trelane had gone with
some of her cousins to a supper club to celebrate her birthday.  Floyd followed her
to the club and spotted her consuming alcohol and dancing.  He later approached
the group and told Trelane that it would be necessary for her to find another way
home, because he was going to take her car, which she had driven to the club.  In
the past Floyd had expressed his disapproval of Trelane’s alcohol consumption.  
When Trelane returned home around 5 a.m. on the morning of July 12, Floyd
informed her that he would not permit her to sleep, and he proceeded to increase
3. The record does not indicate whether the gun was loaded at that time. 
Later in the day on July 12 (one day before Ms. Goss was murdered), Trelane
surmised that the gun must have been a .357, because she saw a .357 on the toilet
tank in the bathroom when Floyd was showering.  She hid the gun behind the bar in
their apartment, and testified that she never saw the gun again.
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the volume on the televisions and the radio in their apartment.  He also threatened to
kill Trelane or someone she loved as a reprisal for her drinking or if she ever
attempted to run or hide from him.  Shortly thereafter, Trelane felt a gun being
placed beside her head as she was lying in bed.  Floyd pulled the trigger three
times, but the weapon did not fire.3  Trelane advised Floyd that she was going to
seek a divorce and testified at trial that she did not call the police about this incident
because she was in a very confused state.  
On July 13, the day Ms. Goss was murdered, Trelane and Floyd had a
heated argument on a Palatka street not far from their apartment.  Trelane had
stopped her car in the street to speak with a friend.  Her three-year-old goddaughter
was also in the vehicle.  Floyd was in his car behind Trelane and he insisted that
Trelane take her goddaughter home, calling Trelane a “whore.” Fearful for the
safety of both herself and her goddaughter, Trelane decided to seek protection in a
sheriff’s office.  Floyd followed and proceeded to ram his car into the back of
Trelane’s vehicle.  
A high speed chase ensued, during which Trelane sounded the horn on her
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automobile to warn both oncoming traffic and pedestrians who might be in harm’s
way.  The tires on both cars squealed as they slid into the parking lot at the
sheriff’s office.  Trelane exited her car and screamed for help.  Hearing both the
sounds of squealing tires and Trelane’s plaintive cries, Deputy Dean Kelly
responded from his desk inside the sheriff’s office.  Deputy Kelly was the only
armed officer in the vicinity as the events unfolded at approximately 7:30 p.m. that
evening.  Trelane hurriedly reported to Deputy Kelly that Floyd had rammed her car
and that she was fearful for her safety.  The deputy saw Floyd moving rapidly
toward them as they spoke, and he held out his hand to prevent Floyd from
accosting Trelane.  He then advised Floyd that he was going to be placed into
investigative custody until it could be determined exactly what had transpired. 
Deputy Kelly instructed Floyd to turn around and to place his hands behind his
back.  Floyd extended his hands in the air and backed up, insisting that he had
done nothing wrong and that he merely wanted to talk to his wife.  After the deputy
repeated his order for Floyd to submit to custody, Floyd fled the scene.  Deputy
Kelly began pursuit for a few moments but then halted, fearful of leaving Trelane
and her goddaughter defenseless if Floyd decided to double back to attempt to
harm them.  The subsequent efforts of a K-9 unit and other officers to apprehend
Floyd on the evening of July 13 were fruitless. 
4. Earlier on July 13, Floyd had transported Trelane’s three children to be
with their grandmother, Ms. Goss.
5. J.J. Jones was eight years old when he testified.  The trial judge engaged in
witness-qualification procedures to ensure that J.J. was capable of understanding
the proceedings and that he understood his responsibility to testify truthfully.  After
the trial judge indicated that he was prepared to have J.J. sworn as a witness, the
defense voiced no objection.
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After giving a statement to sheriff’s office personnel, Trelane called her
mother, Ms. Goss, from a pay phone at the sheriff’s office.  Trelane testified that
she “told her [mother] what was going on” regarding the incident at the sheriff’s
office.  Ms. Goss informed Trelane that Trelane’s three children were at Ms.
Goss’s house.4  After hearing what had transpired earlier on the street and at the
sheriff’s office between Trelane and Floyd, Ms. Goss said of Floyd, “I won’t let
him get my grandchildren.”  Ms. Goss was also aware that the twenty-one-year-old
Floyd was then on probation for previous violations of the law. 
During the trial, several witnesses described the subsequent events that led to
the death of Ms. Goss.  J.J. Jones, the oldest of Trelane’s three children, testified5
that on July 13, 1998, the day that Ms. Goss was killed, Floyd took him and his
two younger siblings to the home of their grandmother, Ms. Goss.  J.J. also stated
that after he had fallen asleep that evening, Ms. Goss awakened him and instructed
him to go to the home of her neighbor, Jeanette Figuero, and to call the police from
6. Ms. Goss’s husband, Clifford Goss, testified that his wife never received
guests in her home unless she was fully dressed.  He said that she would never have
company inside her home if she was not wearing undergarments.
 
7. LaJade Evans was six years old when she testified.  After the trial judge
and the State asked qualifying questions, LaJade was sworn as a witness.  The
defense did not object.
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there.  Before he exited Ms. Goss’s home, J.J. noted that she was clearly upset. 
As J.J. was moving toward Jeanette Figuero’s home, he noticed that Floyd was
“squeezing [Ms. Goss] behind the door” at the front of Ms. Goss’s home. 
Moments later he saw Ms. Goss running outside.  J.J. stated that he also observed
Floyd standing on Ms. Goss’s front porch and firing a gun three times.  J.J.’s two
siblings, LaJade Evans and Alex Evans, were directly behind him, as Ms. Goss had
awakened them also.  J.J. testified that he never saw Floyd leave the victim’s porch,
and that the last thing he observed before pounding on Jeanette Figuero’s door for
help was his grandmother, Ms. Goss, lying on her back.  J.J. eventually led the
police to the spot where he thought his grandmother’s body would be.  As one of
the officers directed a flashlight beam on the ground, the light revealed Ms. Goss’s
lifeless body.  Ms. Goss was clad only in a nightgown and was not wearing any
undergarments.6         
LaJade Evans, J.J. Jones’ younger sister, testified7 that she followed J.J. to
8. In the chronology of the trial, Jeanette Figuero testified before J.J. Jones.
9. Floyd’s objection to this testimony as inadmissible hearsay and lacking in
foundation was overruled.  Floyd did not object until Ms. Figuero had fully
completed her answer.  Gary Melendez, Figuero’s son, also testified that the
children said that “Maurice Floyd” shot Ms. Goss.  He said the children were
frightened, crying, and nervous when they first reached Figuero’s home.
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Ms. Figuero’s home to seek help.  LaJade saw Floyd on the victim’s porch,
shooting a gun at the victim.  LaJade said Floyd fired two shots from the porch,
and that she heard one more shot fired in the direction of the victim.  She added
that she saw Floyd running toward the victim’s home but that he did not go inside
the home again after having fired his weapon.  
Jeanette Figuero testified8 that during the evening of July 13, she heard three
gunshots followed by the sounds of pounding on her door and the plaintive cries of
a child or children saying, “Open the door, open the door, please open the door.” 
Figuero’s son, Gary Melendez, opened the door to allow J.J., LaJade, and Alex
into the home.  Figuero said the children were talking very fast and when she
inquired as to the problem, they exclaimed that their grandmother, Ms. Goss, had
been shot.  When she asked J.J. who shot Ms. Goss, he responded, “Maurice
Floyd.”9  Figuero also testified that she heard J.J. mention Floyd’s name when he
10. Relevant parts of J.J. Jones’ conversation with the 911 dispatcher were
played during the trial over Floyd’s hearsay objections.  On the 911 tape, J.J. Jones
said that “Maurice Floyd” was the person “who was shooting.”
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talked to the 911 dispatcher.10  The prosecutor asked Jeanette Figuero if she
believed that J.J. was “smart” and “bright,” and whether she believed him when he
said that Floyd had shot Ms. Goss.  Figuero answered that she believed J.J. was a
bright child and that she believed his version of the events, especially after she
called over to Ms. Goss from her front porch and received no response.
Figuero also testified that earlier in the evening on July 13, she had been
speaking with her neighbor, John Brown, from the porch of her house.  Brown
mentioned that a young male had been constantly walking up and down the
sidewalk in front of Ms. Goss’s home.  Subsequently, Figuero noticed that a young
African-American male was on Ms. Goss’s front porch, and was talking to Ms.
Goss for some time through the closed screen door.  She could not recognize the
young male because his back was to her and it was also dark.  After leaving her
porch for a few moments and then returning,  Figuero noticed that the young male
had apparently entered Ms. Goss’s home.  She heard the voice of an angry male
emanating from inside the victim’s home, addressing Ms. Goss in sometimes
profane tones.  Figuero testified that she clearly heard the young male say in an
11. The record indicates Figuero’s moral reluctance to relate exactly the
profane or sacrilegious statement made by the young male.  Therefore, she used
“GD” as a euphemism.  The record also indicates Figuero’s understanding that the
term “cracker” as used in this context was a reference to a white person.  The State
posits in its brief that Floyd’s reference was to Deputy Dean Kelly, who prevented
Floyd from accosting Trelane earlier in the evening outside the sheriff’s office.  The
State notes that Deputy Kelly is a white male and that Floyd is African-American.
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angry tone, “Why did she have to involve the GD crackers.”11  She also saw the
young male move menacingly toward a person who was sitting on the sofa in Ms.
Goss’s home.  The young male abruptly halted when he noticed that Figuero had
spotted him.  Figuero stated that she assumed at all times the young male was
addressing himself to Ms. Goss because she knew that Ms. Goss was in the home. 
Approximately twenty-five minutes after hearing the angry male’s voice, Figuero
heard the sounds of gunfire which led J.J. Jones and his siblings to appear at her
door.
John Brown, the neighbor with whom Figuero was speaking earlier that
evening, testified that on the evening of July 13 he saw two men walking up and
down the sidewalk in the vicinity of Ms. Goss’s house.  One man, dressed in
black, was noticeably taller than the other.  The shorter man eventually disappeared
from sight, but the taller man continued walking up and down the sidewalk.  The
man dressed in black eventually made his way up the steps of the home to Ms.
Goss’s front porch and began talking to her.  Brown testified that approximately an
12. Brown also said that the man who dropped off children at Ms. Goss’s
house drove a red Honda automobile.  This matches the general description of
Floyd’s automobile which was established through other trial testimony.
13. Floyd objected that the excited utterance exception was not a proper
basis to admit Stokes’s testimony regarding what the children had told him.  The
trial judge overruled the objection. 
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hour later he heard a loud “commotion” emanating from Ms. Goss’s house,
involving a loud, angry male voice.  He heard “two big shots” while he was still
inside his home and subsequently heard children running.  Proceeding to the
sidewalk in front of his home, Brown saw a man dressed in black run off the steps
of Ms. Goss’s home and then run up a side street in a northerly direction.  Brown
stated that this man “fit the general description” of the “black man” who had
dropped off children at Ms. Goss’ house earlier in the day on July 13.12
Police officers Stokes and Zike responded to the 911 call made from
Jeanette Figuero’s home.  Stokes spoke with J.J. Jones and his sister, LaJade
Evans, about what had happened.  He noted that they were in a very excited state
when he spoke with them.  He also stated that when he asked if the children had
seen the shooting, they responded that Floyd had fired a gun at their grandmother,
Ms. Goss.13  Zike testified that when he and Stokes entered Ms. Goss’s home
14. Ms. Goss’s husband, Clifford, testified that the lock on the door
appeared as if it had been kicked or broken.  He said the lock was not in that
condition when he left for work on July 13 at approximately 4 p.m.  Ms. Goss was
not at home when Clifford left for work.
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looking for suspects and clues, they noticed that “the door had been kicked in.”14   
The State did not produce the murder weapon at trial.  However, the State
did present evidence of a confession that Floyd made to a friend.  Tashoni Lamb
testified that Floyd visited her apartment around midnight on July 13, and that he
left after 6 a.m. on July 14.  Floyd asked to speak with Lamb privately, out of the
hearing of her children.  Lamb stated that Floyd pulled a gun out of the pants he
was wearing, placed it on a dresser in the apartment, and said, “I just shot Miss
Mary, the grandmother.”  She related that Floyd’s reason for shooting Ms. Goss
was that “she had threatened to call the police on him.”  Lamb stated that she did
not call the police because she concluded that they would certainly apprehend
Floyd.  She further testified that Floyd contacted her by phone later on July 14, a
day before he was arrested.   When the prosecutor asked at trial if anyone had ever
asked her to provide an alibi for Floyd, she responded, “Maurice did.”  She also
testified that during the phone conversation, Floyd asked, “Do you want to see me
die?”
When the State sought to introduce evidence of the bullet that killed the
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victim, Floyd objected, asserting that the State had failed to establish a proper chain
of custody for the bullet.  The trial judge sustained Floyd’s initial objection that the
testimony of Detective Mike Lassiter had not established a proper chain of
custody, noting that Lassiter could not positively state that the bullet and its jacket
were in the same condition at the trial as they were when he last saw them.   The
State then presented the testimony of Florida Department of Law Enforcement
(FDLE) agent Steve Leary, who was the person to whom the medical examiner
handed the bullet and jacket after removing them from the victim’s head.  Leary
testified that the bullet and jacket were in the same condition at trial as when he last
saw them.  The trial judge overruled Floyd’s subsequent chain-of-custody
objection, on the bases that Leary’s testimony established that the items in question
were in the same condition at trial as they were when he last saw them, and that
Floyd had not satisfied his legal burden of showing the probability that there had
been tampering with the bullet and jacket.  The trial judge did note, however, that
the State could not definitively account for the bullet and jacket in the interval
between the time Leary gave the items to an FDLE evidence technician and their
introduction into evidence at Floyd’s trial.  
Medical examiner Dr. Terence Steiner testified that the victim sustained a
gunshot injury to her face, facial bones, and brain.  The bullet entered the victim
15. In its verdict form, the jury found Floyd guilty based on the theories of
both premeditated murder and felony murder.  On the verdict form, the line for
Count I, indicating that the jury found Floyd  “GUILTY of First Degree
Premeditated Murder, and First Degree Felony Murder as charged in the
indictment” was checked,  and the verdict form was signed by the jury foreperson.
The jury found that the homicide involved a firearm.  The verdict form also
indicates that the jury found Floyd guilty of armed burglary of a dwelling, and that a
firearm was involved in this offense.  Floyd was convicted in 1999.
Additionally, the verdict form indicates that the jury found Floyd guilty of
aggravated assault.  Floyd does not challenge his conviction for aggravated assault. 
Nevertheless, we determine that competent, substantial evidence supports the
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through her left cheek, and the cause of death was trauma to the brain caused by a
single shot.  The manner of death was a homicide.  Dr. Steiner stated that during
the autopsy he recovered a spent bullet, a bullet jacket, and a lead fragment.  He
identified those items at trial as the ones he recovered during the autopsy.  When
Dr. Steiner was asked to describe the physical position of the victim when she was
shot, he first opined that based on blood spatter evidence, the victim was “standing
up.”  Moments later, however, he elaborated that “perhaps she was almost maybe
kneeling, but she was upright to the injury to the brain, severed the brainstem, which
is instantaneous, if you will, death.”
After Dr. Steiner’s testimony, the State rested and Floyd presented his
motion for judgment of acquittal, which was denied.  Floyd did not testify in his
own defense, nor did he present any witnesses or evidence on his behalf during the
guilt phase.  The jury convicted Floyd on all charges.15  
aggravated assault conviction.
16. See Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
17. Those statutory aggravating factors are:  (1) Floyd was on probation for
the felonies of burglary and accessory after the fact to robbery when he committed
the murder (great weight); (2) Floyd had previously been convicted of the violent
felony of the voluntary manslaughter of his brother (substantial weight); (3) Floyd
committed the murder while engaged in the commission of armed burglary of the
victim’s home (great weight); and (4) Floyd committed the murder for the purpose
of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest (substantial weight).
18. Those nonstatutory mitigating factors are:  (1) Floyd displayed exemplary
courtroom behavior in the face of much adversity; (2) Floyd assisted defense
counsel throughout the proceedings by taking notes and communicating with
counsel; (3) Floyd was successfully completing his probation for other offenses
before he committed the murder; and (4) Floyd expressed concern that his wife
conduct herself in such a way that she not use alcohol and that she not subject their
relationship to the potential stresses of the use of alcohol.   
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The State introduced victim impact evidence during the penalty phase, along
with evidence of Floyd’s prior conviction for a violent felony in North Carolina and
evidence of his current parole violation.  Floyd did not testify in the penalty phase,
nor did he present any witnesses or evidence on his behalf.  The jury recommended
a sentence of death by a vote of eleven to one.  A Spencer hearing16 was held prior
to the pronouncement of sentence.  In sentencing Floyd to death for the murder of
Ms. Goss, the trial judge found four statutory aggravating factors17 and no statutory
mitigating factors.  Four nonstatutory mitigating factors were found,18 with each
receiving little weight.  The trial judge also sentenced Floyd to thirty years for the
19. Those issues are:  (1) the trial judge impermissibly allowed the State to
exercise a peremptory challenge against a Hispanic prospective juror; (2) the trial
judge erred in denying the motion for acquittal; (3) the State failed to establish a
proper chain of custody for the bullet and jacket that were removed from the
victim’s head, and the trial judge improperly admitted those items into evidence; (4)
the trial judge improperly admitted hearsay evidence in the form of testimony by
State witness Jeanette Figuero, and allowed Ms. Figuero to bolster the credibility of
another State witness; (5) the trial judge erred in refusing to give the defense’s
requested jury instruction on circumstantial evidence; (6) fundamental error
occurred during the penalty phase regarding the jury instructions on mitigating
circumstances; (7) competent, substantial evidence did not support the trial judge’s
decision to instruct the jury on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) aggravating
circumstance during the penalty phase; (8) competent, substantial evidence did not
support the trial judge’s finding of the avoid arrest aggravating circumstance; (9)
the trial judge impermissibly admitted victim impact evidence during the penalty
phase, thereby compelling the jury to recommend a sentence of death; (10)
competent, substantial evidence did not support the trial judge’s finding of the
“committed during a burglary”aggravating circumstance; (11) fundamental error
occurred during the prosecutor’s penalty phase closing argument; (12) the
cumulative effect of errors occurring during the trial violated Floyd’s right to a fair
trial; and (13) the sentence of death is not proportional.
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armed burglary conviction, and to five years for the aggravated assault conviction. 
The five-year sentence for aggravated assault was ordered to run concurrently with
the thirty-year sentence for armed burglary.  This appeal followed.
APPEAL
Floyd raises several issues on appeal. 19  We address issues pertinent to the
guilt-innocence phase first, followed by penalty phase issues.
Guilt-Innocence Phase
20. We reject the State’s contention that this issue is not preserved for
review.  Floyd clearly had a continuing objection before the trial judge which we
determine was sufficient to preserve the issue.
21. We have previously determined that Hispanics constitute a cognizable
ethnic group for purposes of preventing peremptory challenges based solely on
group membership.  See State v. Alen, 616 So. 2d 452, 454-55 (Fla. 1993).
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Jury Selection
Floyd asserts in his first issue that the trial judge impermissibly allowed
the State to exercise a peremptory challenge to excuse Noel Rios from the
prospective panel, who was identified as a Hispanic male.20  Floyd contends that
the trial judge impermissibly allowed the State to strike Rios from jury service
based on racial grounds.21  We disagree. 
During voir dire, two persons, Young and Hardyman, raised their hands
(indicating a “yes,” or affirmative, response) when the trial judge asked if any
members of the venire had religious, moral, or conscientious objections to the
imposition of the death penalty.  The record does not indicate whether Rios raised
his hand in response to this question.  Young and Hardyman consistently adhered
to the view, after questioning by the trial judge, the State, and the defense, that they
would have difficulty in voting to recommend a sentence of death.  Defense
counsel subsequently engaged in the following exchange with Rios:
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  How do you feel about the death penalty?
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RIOS:  I don’t know.
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Don’t know at this point?
RIOS:  No.
After this exchange, defense counsel moved on to questions unrelated to the death
penalty.  The State then resumed its questioning of the entire group of prospective
jurors that included Young, Hardyman, and Rios.  The State asked:
Is there among you, except for — except for Mr. Young and Mr.
Hardyman, anyone that would not seriously consider, if we reach the
penalty phase, recommending the death sentence?  Is there anyone that
would not?
The record does not indicate any answer or other conduct in response to the
question.  The State concluded its questioning by saying, “Thank you, Your
Honor.”
Young and Hardyman were excused for cause.  The State attempted to use
one of its peremptory challenges to excuse Rios.  Defense counsel objected, noting 
that Rios was a Hispanic male, with which the trial judge and the State agreed.  The
trial judge then asked the State to provide its reason for the peremptory challenge,
pursuant to the dictates of Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759, 764-65 (Fla. 1996). 
The prosecutor stated the following:
[When defense counsel] asked Mr. Rios about his feelings about the
death penalty, he, by body language and by answer expressed what I
perceived to be a negative response with regard to imposition of the
death penalty.  I saw that response and noted his apparent . . . what I
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perceived to be a dislike for or non-agreement with the death penalty.
I determined peremptorily that he could [be] excused because his answers 
had been conjured earlier.  But when [defense counsel] asked the question, 
he left me with a definite question that [Mr. Rios] would not vote for the 
death penalty, or was at least equivocal at best.
The trial judge examined the genuineness of the State’s reasons for the strike, and
determined that they were race-neutral.  
Peremptory challenges are presumed to be exercised in a nondiscriminatory
manner.  See Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764.  The trial court’s decision regarding a
peremptory challenge that is alleged to be racially motivated turns primarily on an
assessment of credibility and will be affirmed on appeal unless it is clearly
erroneous.  See id. at 764-65.  Our focus here is on the genuineness of the State’s
reason for excusing  Rios.  In giving his reason for the peremptory challenge, the
prosecutor noted that Rios provided an equivocal answer regarding his views on
the death penalty.  We have previously determined that no error occurs when a trial
judge excuses a prospective juror for cause due to that person’s expression of
equivocal views on the death penalty.  See Sims v. State, 681 So. 2d 1112, 1117
(Fla. 1996) (prospective juror excused for cause after responding “I am not sure”
to prosecutor’s question of whether she could vote to recommend a sentence of
death); see also Fernandez v. State, 730 So. 2d 277, 281 (Fla. 1999) (four
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prospective jurors excused for cause based on “equivocal responses” they gave to
inquiries as to whether they could follow the law and recommend a sentence of
death).  Similarly, then, under the circumstances in Floyd’s case the exercise of a
peremptory challenge based on the equivocal response of Rios regarding his views
on the death penalty does not implicate racial discrimination and is imbued with the
requisite genuineness and race-neutrality.  
Floyd’s assertion that the State’s comments concerning Rios’s body
language demonstrate an intent to engage in purposeful discrimination is unavailing. 
The State’s comments regarding Rios’s body language were made within the
context of commenting on the oral equivocation voiced by Rios concerning the
death penalty.  In the cases upon which Floyd relies, unlike in his own, the State
relied completely on a prospective juror’s body language or on unelaborated bad
feelings by the State toward a prospective juror, or the trial judge failed to examine
the genuineness of the State’s proferred reasons for striking a member of a
protected group.  Thus, those cases are all distinguishable.
Floyd makes two further assertions in this regard which we also determine to
be unavailing.  First, Floyd contends that the trial judge committed reversible error
by noting for the record that three members of the panel actually selected for jury
service were African-American.  Floyd asserts that this action was an error of law
-20-
because the racial composition of the jury is irrelevant to whether a particular
peremptory challenge was independently racially motivated.  The case on which
Floyd primarily relies, State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1993), stands for the
much narrower proposition that the trial judge may not look to the composition of
the venire as a substitute for asking the proponent of a peremptory challenge for a
reason for the challenge.  Such did not occur in Floyd’s case.  We further
determine that Floyd is entitled to no relief under Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400
(1991).  Powers reflects that a criminal defendant may object to race-based
exclusions of jurors that are effected through peremptory challenges, regardless of
whether the defendant and the excluded jurors share the same race, which is not
violated here.  We further note that in Melbourne we stated that “the racial make-up
of the venire” is one circumstance that a trial judge may take into account when
determining the genuineness and race-neutrality of the reason given for a
peremptory challenge.  See Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764 n.8.
Finally, Floyd asserts that the State’s striking of Rios was pretextual because
the State did not question Rios during voir dire.  Again, we disagree.  In State v.
Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1988), receded from in part on other grounds by
Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1996), we noted that one factor included
in the nonexclusive list of indicia of pretextual discrimination is the “failure to
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examine the [prospective] juror or [engaging in mere] perfunctory examination,
assuming neither the trial court nor opposing counsel had questioned the
[prospective] juror.”  (Emphasis added.)   See also Overstreet v. State, 712 So. 2d
1174, 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (citing Slappy).  In Floyd’s case defense counsel
questioned Rios and elicited the equivocal response on which the State relied as a
genuine, race-neutral reason for excusing Rios.  We conclude that the trial judge did
not err in allowing the State to exercise a peremptory challenge against Rios.
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
Floyd next asserts that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for
judgment of acquittal because the circumstantial evidence in the case was
inconsistent with Floyd’s reasonable hypothesis of innocence.  In moving for a
judgment of acquittal, a defendant “admits not only the facts stated in the evidence
adduced, but also admits every conclusion favorable to the adverse party that a jury
might fairly and reasonably infer from the evidence.”  Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d
44, 45 (Fla. 1974).  We have further stated that:
A motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted in a
circumstantial evidence case if the state fails to present evidence from
which the jury can exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of
guilt.  Consistent with the standard set forth in Lynch [v. State, 293
So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1974)], if the state does not offer evidence which is
inconsistent with the defendant’s hypothesis, “the evidence [would be]
such that no view which the jury may lawfully take of it favorable to
22. We discuss the relief to which Floyd is entitled regarding his convictions
for armed burglary and felony murder, and the finding of the murder in the course
of a felony aggravator, in a subsequent section of this opinion.  We therefore do
not discuss his claim regarding his motion for judgment of acquittal on the armed
burglary charge.  
-22-
the [state] can be sustained under the law.”  [Lynch,] 293 So. 2d at 45. 
The state’s evidence would be as a matter of law “insufficient to
warrant a conviction.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.380.
It is the trial judge’s proper task to review the evidence to
determine the presence or absence of competent evidence from which
the jury could infer guilt to the exclusion of all other inferences.  That
view of the evidence must be taken in the light most favorable to the
state.  The state is not required to “rebut conclusively every possible
variation” of events which could be inferred from the evidence, but
only to introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the
defendant’s theory of events.  Once that threshold burden is met, it
becomes the jury’s duty to determine whether the evidence is
sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence beyond
a reasonable doubt.
State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187, 188-89 (Fla. 1989) (citations and footnote omitted). 
Floyd asserts that the trial judge should have granted his motion for judgment
of acquittal regarding the charge of first-degree murder because he did not
premeditate the killing.22  Floyd contends that the State failed to present evidence to
allow the jury to exclude his hypothesis that the killing resulted from nothing more
than a “heat of passion” argument in which Floyd did not have a fully formed
conscious purpose to kill.  We disagree.  
Premeditation is “more than a mere intent to kill; it is a fully formed
-23-
conscious purpose to kill.”  Green v. State, 715 So. 2d 940, 943 (Fla. 1998).  The
use of circumstantial evidence is proper to show that a killing was premeditated. 
See Woods v. State, 733 So. 2d 980, 985 (Fla. 1999).  Floyd brought a gun with
him to the victim’s home on the night of the killing.  The defendant’s predetermined
choice of weapon can be a key factor in determining whether he acted with
premeditation.  See Spencer v. State, 645 So. 2d 377, 380-81(Fla. 1994) (evidence
that defendant had made previous threats upon his victim-wife, and then parked in
area away from victim’s house and subsequently stabbed her repeatedly with steak
knife he had brought with him was sufficient to establish premeditation); Larry v.
State, 104 So. 2d 352, 354 (Fla. 1958) (nature of the weapon used and manner in
which homicide is committed are factors determining whether the defendant acted
with premeditation); Wysocki v. State, 715 So. 2d 346, 347-48 (Fla. 4th DCA
1998) (in charge of attempted premeditated murder, inference supporting
conclusion of premeditation could be drawn from fact that one or more defendants
arrived at victim’s home with baseball bat that was ultimately used to beat the
victim).  Floyd’s deliberate selection and transportation of a gun to the victim’s
home is clearly inconsistent with his theory that he argued with the victim and
simply shot her in a moment of uncontrolled rage without having fully formed a
conscious purpose to kill.
-24-
Moreover, Floyd was in Ms. Goss’s home for a significant period of time
before chasing her, firing shots at her, and eventually killing her.  In Roberts v.
State, 510 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1987), we determined that a defendant had premeditated
his actions when he drove up beside a car occupied by three people  on a secluded
section of a beach, impersonated a police officer and requested identification from
two of the car’s occupants, and then proceeded to beat one of the occupants with
a baseball bat who had questioned whether the defendant was truly a police officer. 
In concluding that the defendant in Roberts had a fully formed conscious purpose
to kill, we rejected the defendant’s theory that the killing was nothing more than a
“‘spontaneous, blind and unreasoning reaction’ to the circumstances leading up to
the murder.”  Id. at 888.  The events in Roberts appear to have occurred in a time
frame equal to, and probably shorter than, the time elements in Floyd’s case,
thereby strengthening the conclusion that Floyd had many opportunities to
premeditate his actions.  Floyd argued with the victim in her home for a significant
period of time.  He told Tashoni Lamb that the victim “threatened to call the police
on him.”  J.J. Jones and LaJade Evans testified that Floyd chased the victim while
still in the home and pinned her between a door and door frame at the front of her
home.  The children then saw or heard a total of three shots being fired.  They
surmised that the third shot must have produced the fatal injury because J.J. Jones
-25-
was able to direct police to the spot where he saw Ms. Goss’s body lying after the
third shot was fired.  J.J. saw the victim’s body lying on the ground moments
before he began pounding on neighbor Jeanette Figuero’s front door for help.  
We do not endeavor to state with precision the exact moment Floyd
premeditated the murder.  We simply note that he had many opportunities, at
several junctures, to do so before he made and implemented the fateful decision to
employ a deadly weapon and actually place it in use.  We further note that one day
prior to the fateful events of July 13 that led to Ms. Goss’s death, Floyd threatened
to kill his wife or someone she loved.  “No definite length of time for
[premeditation] to exist has been set and indeed could not be.”  Larry, 104 So. 2d
at 354.  Moreover, premeditation may be evinced by the defendant’s actions in
choosing and transporting a certain weapon and employing that weapon in
performance of the killing.  See Spencer; Larry; Wysocki.  The facts of Floyd’s
case are inconsistent with his “heat of passion” theory.  In a circumstantial evidence
case in which there is inconsistency between the defendant’s theory of innocence
and the evidence when viewed most favorably to the State, the question is for the
finder of fact to resolve and the motion for judgment of acquittal must be denied. 
See Orme v. State, 677 So. 2d 258, 262 (Fla. 1996).
We further reject Floyd’s contention that Tien Wang v. State, 426 So. 2d
-26-
1004 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), and Forehand v. State, 171 So. 241 (Fla. 1936), compel
the conclusion that the killing of Ms. Goss was not premeditated.  In Tien Wang, a
husband who was having marital difficulties with his wife confronted his wife’s
stepfather when the stepfather attempted to shepherd the wife/stepdaughter to her 
homeland.  A violent quarrel ensued between the husband and the stepfather, and
culminated when the husband stabbed the stepfather.  No witness testified to seeing
the stabbing, though three witnesses testified that they saw the husband chase the
stepfather down a street, and one witness testified that the husband struck the
stepfather.  The district court noted that “[t]here was no direct evidence elicited by
the State bearing on the element of premeditation,”  Tien Wang, 426 So. 2d at
1006, and concluded that the evidence was not entirely inconsistent with the
husband’s hypothesis that he had never fully formed a conscious purpose to kill. 
Conversely, the State in Floyd’s case presented evidence of his premeditation
which is highly inconsistent with his “heat of passion” hypothesis.  Therefore, relief
based on Tien Wang is not warranted.  
Similarly, no relief is warranted under Forehand, in which a defendant shot
and killed a deputy sheriff who was struggling with the defendant’s brother.  In
Forehand there was virtually no evidence that the defendant contemplated killing the
deputy until he saw him struggling with his brother.  Floyd’s threatening statements,
23. The other cases on which Floyd relies for support of his assertion that
the killing was not premeditated are distinguishable because:  the defendant acted in
a reflexive manner similar to the defendant in Forehand; the defendant was under a
dominating fear of the victim resulting from the victim’s repeated abuse of the
defendant; or the State failed to produce sufficient evidence of premeditation.  No
situation similar to any of these cases occurred in Floyd’s case.  Therefore, no
relief is warranted.  
-27-
his choice of a firearm as a weapon, and his transportation of it to the   victim’s
home, along with his subsequent actions as he placed the weapon in use, clearly
distinguish his case from Forehand.23  
We further reject Floyd’s contention that his motion for judgment of
acquittal should have been granted because the State produced inconsistent
testimony regarding the identity of the killer.  Specifically, Floyd claims that the
testimony of the victim’s neighbor, John Brown, conflicts with the testimony of
LaJade Evans regarding the whereabouts and identity of the person who shot Ms.
Goss.  Floyd contends that he “could not have fired the fatal shot” because John
Brown saw a man running in a different direction than the one in which LaJade
Evans testified that she saw Floyd running.  Floyd fails to take into account that
LaJade Evans and J.J. Jones testified that they saw him firing a gun at Ms. Goss,
and that on both direct and cross-examination neither identified anyone else in the
-28-
area who could have fired the shots.  He also fails to demonstrate that LaJade
Evans and John Brown saw events transpiring in the same time frame or from the
same vantage point.  Most important, John Brown testified that the man he saw
running from the vicinity of Ms. Goss’s home appeared to be the man who had
dropped off children earlier in the day at Ms. Goss’s home.  The record shows that
Floyd dropped off his wife’s children earlier in the day on July 13.  According to
John Brown, the man who dropped off the children was driving a red Honda
automobile, which generally matched the description of Floyd’s vehicle.  There is
no plausible explanation how someone other than Floyd happened to be present at
the scene of the killing to fire the fatal shot at precisely the time that a third bullet
killed Ms. Goss after Floyd had fired and missed with two shots.  Floyd’s scenario
cannot be deemed to be a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.  The State is not
required to “‘rebut conclusively every possible variation’ of events which could be
inferred from the evidence, but only to introduce competent evidence which is
inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of events.”  State v. Law, 559 So. 2d at
189; see also Beasley v. State, 774 So. 2d 649, 659 (Fla. 2000) (because the State
presented competent, substantial evidence that was inconsistent with defendant’s
theory that an unknown perpetrator killed the victim, trial judge did not err in
denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal).  This the State has done. 
-29-
Therefore, relief is not warranted.
Based upon the circumstantial evidence in this case, we therefore determine
that the trial judge did not err in denying Floyd’s motion for judgment of acquittal
regarding the charge of premeditated murder.  We further conclude that competent,
substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict on this charge.  See State v. Law,
559 So. 2d at 188 (in circumstantial evidence case, when competent, substantial
evidence supports the jury verdict, this Court will not reverse on appeal). 
Chain of Custody
Floyd next contends that the trial judge improperly admitted evidence of the
projectile and casing removed from the victim’s head by the medical examiner.  He
claims that the State did not establish a proper chain of custody for the evidence
and that the possibility of tampering was not definitively excluded.  He also asserts
that because the trial judge stated, as he overruled the chain of custody objection,
that there was a point in time during which the whereabouts of the evidence were
unknown, the bullet and associated material necessarily should not have been
admitted.  We disagree.
The items admitted by the trial judge were probative of the State’s theory that
the victim died instantaneously when a bullet fired by Floyd severed the victim’s
brain stem.  After the trial judge sustained Floyd’s initial objection regarding the
-30-
chain of custody, the State presented testimony from Florida Department of Law
Enforcement (FDLE) agent Steve Leary.  Leary was present when the medical
examiner removed the items from the victim, and he had possession of them
immediately thereafter.  He testified that the items were in the same condition as
when he had handed them over to an FDLE evidence technician.  The mere fact
that the State could not conclusively show the precise location of the items in the
interval between Leary’s delivery of them to the evidence technician and his
testimony at trial does not by itself indicate a probability of tampering, which is
what Floyd was required to demonstrate in this situation.  See State v. Taplis, 684
So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (party attempting to exclude relevant physical
evidence based on gap in chain of custody must show probability of tampering);
see also Jordan v. State, 707 So. 2d 816, 818 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (when gap in
chain of custody is alleged, party seeking to prevent introduction of relevant
physical evidence must show a probability of evidence tampering because “[a]
mere possibility of tampering is insufficient”) (relying on State v. Taplis), approved,
720 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 1998); Bush v. State, 543 So. 2d 283, 284 (Fla. 2d DCA
1989) (“A mere break in the chain of custody is not in and of itself a basis for
exclusion of physical evidence.  Rather, the court should consider the probability
that the evidence has been tampered with during the interim for which it is
-31-
unaccounted.”).  A bare allegation by a defendant that a chain of custody has been
broken is not sufficient to render relevant physical evidence inadmissible.  See
Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 954, 959 n.4 (Fla. 1996).  Moreover, absent an abuse of
discretion a reviewing court should not second-guess a trial judge’s decision
regarding the admissibility of evidence.  See, e.g., Ray v. State, 755 So. 2d 604,
610 (Fla. 2000); Jent v. State, 408 So. 2d 1024, 1039 (Fla. 1981).  The trial judge
here did not abuse his discretion in admitting the disputed items into evidence.  No
relief is warranted on this issue, and we also decline Floyd’s invitation to depart
from the “probability” standard applied in Taplis and other cases.
Hearsay and Bolstering
Floyd asserts that the trial judge erred in overruling hearsay and foundation
objections to the testimony of Jeanette Figuero, given in response to the
prosecutor’s question concerning what J.J. Jones and LaJade Evans told her once
they were inside her home, when she responded:
And then the children just told me what happened, said their
grandmother was shot, when I asked them what was the matter.
Floyd did not object until Ms. Figuero had fully completed her answer, nor
did Floyd move to strike the question and subsequent answer or ask that a curative
instruction be given to the jury.  Even if the objections were well founded, any error
24. In light of the competent, substantial evidence presented by the State
which supports Floyd’s conviction based on a theory of premeditated murder, we
further reject Floyd’s contention that the admission of Ms. Figuero’s statement
constituted fundamental error.
-32-
regarding the admission of these statements is harmless, at best.  See generally
State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986).24   J.J. Jones personally testified as
to what he told Ms. Figuero, and the comments by Ms. Figuero were, in many
respsects, cumulative to the direct eyewitness reports.  Therefore, the error, if any,
in admitting Ms. Figuero’s statement was harmless.  See Torres-Arboledo v. State,
524 So. 2d 403, 408 (Fla. 1988).
Floyd further contends that Ms. Figuero improperly bolstered the credibility
of J.J. Jones when, in response to the prosecutor’s inquiries, she confirmed that
she believed J.J.’s version of the events and stated her belief that J.J. was a “bright”
child.  Floyd’s defense counsel did not contemporaneously object to this
testimony.  Moreover, all of the cases on which Floyd relies are distinguishable.  In
those cases either defense counsel timely objected to the asserted improper
bolstering, a policeman improperly bolstered the credibility of the only eyewitness
to the defendant’s criminal act, or an expert opined on a matter not related to her
expertise.  None of these situations occurred in Floyd’s case.  We therefore reject
Floyd’s assertion of entitlement to relief on the basis of fundamental error.
-33-
Jury Instruction:  Circumstantial Evidence
 
Floyd raises as his next issue the trial judge’s denial of his request to instruct
the jury regarding circumstantial evidence.  Floyd proposed his own special
instruction, which the trial judge declined.  Thus, the issue was preserved for
review.  See State v. Heathcoat, 442 So. 2d 955, 956 (Fla. 1983) (in criminal case,
issue regarding denial of requested jury instruction is preserved for review when the
record clearly indicates that “a request was made for a specific instruction and that
the trial court clearly understood the request and just as clearly denied [it]”).  We
determine that the trial judge did not err in denying the requested special jury
instruction.  We have previously stated that when proper instructions on reasonable
doubt and burden of proof are given, an instruction on circumstantial evidence is
“unnecessary.”  See In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 431 So. 2d
594, 595 (Fla. 1981); Trepal v. State, 621 So. 2d 1361, 1366 (Fla. 1993) (citing In
re Standard Jury Instructions).  Floyd makes no assertion that the instructions on
reasonable doubt and burden of proof were not given or that they were faulty.  We
determine that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the requested
instruction on circumstantial evidence.  
Jury Instruction:  Burglary
Floyd asserts that he is entitled to relief under Valentine v. State, 774 So. 2d
25. One of the defendant’s convictions in Valentine was for burglary of a
conveyance with an assault or battery.  
-34-
934 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), review dismissed, 790 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 2001).  On this
point we agree, noting that in Floyd’s case the jury instruction on burglary was
similar to the instruction for which relief was granted in Valentine.  We therefore
reverse Floyd’s conviction for armed burglary.  
In Valentine, the trial judge instructed the jury with regard to a burglary
charge:25
Before you can find the defendant guilty of burglary, the State
has to prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
One is that Ramon Valentine entered or remained in a
conveyance owned by or in the possession of Johanny Rosa;
Two, that Ramon Valentine did not have the permission or
consent of Johanny Rosa or anyone authorized to act for her to enter
or remain in the conveyance at that time, and at the time of entering or
remaining in the conveyance, Ramon L.Valentine had a fully formed
conscious intent to commit the offense of burglary with an assault or
battery in that conveyance.
. . . .
Even though an unlawful entering or remaining in a conveyance
is proved, if the evidence does not establish that it was done with the
intent to commit burglary with an assault or battery, the defendant
must be found not guilty.
Valentine v. State, 774 So. 2d at 937.
In analyzing the above instruction the district court in Valentine stated:
This instruction suggests to the jury that it could convict Valentine [the
defendant] if it found that he formed the requisite intent while he
26. The burglary statute under which the defendant in Delgado was charged,
section 810.02(1), Florida Statutes (1989), stated:
Burglary means entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance
with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at
the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to
enter or remain.  
Delgado, 776 So. 2d at 236.
27. In Floyd’s case, the trial judge instructed the jury as follows:
Before you can find the Defendant guilty of burglary, the State
must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
-35-
remained in the [victim’s] vehicle.  However, because this is not a case
where the facts could support a “surreptitious remaining,” Valentine
could not be convicted of burglary unless he had the requisite intent
when he entered the [victim’s] vehicle.  
Id.  The district court in Valentine granted relief, based on our opinion in Delgado
v. State, 776 So. 2d 233, 240-42 (Fla. 2000), despite the lack of an objection from
the defendant to the jury instruction with regard to burglary.  See Valentine, 774 So.
2d at 937.   In Delgado, this Court interpreted the “remaining in” language in
Florida’s burglary statute26 to allow a conviction for burglary based upon a
defendant remaining in an occupied dwelling only when the defendant’s
“remaining” therein was performed “surreptitiously.” 
The instruction in Floyd’s case was substantially similar to that in
Valentine.27  Similar to the situation in Valentine, the jury instruction in this case
Number 1:  Maurice Floyd did enter or remain in a structure
owned by or in the possession of Mary Goss.
Number 2:  Maurice Floyd did not have the permission or
consent of Mary Goss or anyone authorized to act for her to enter or
remain in the structure at that time.
Number 3:  At the time of entering or remaining in the structure,
Maurice Floyd had a fully formed conscious intent to commit the
offense of murder in that structure.
. . . .
A person may be guilty of burglary if he or she had the intent to
commit the crime described in the charge.
28. The jury ultimately found Floyd guilty of armed burglary.  In Count II of
the indictment returned against him, Floyd was charged with violating sections
810.02(1) and (2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), which state:
810.02 Burglary.—
(1) “Burglary” means entering or remaining in a dwelling, a
structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense
therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the
defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the first degree, punishable by
imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as
provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if, in the course of
committing the offense, the offender:
. . . . 
(b) Is or becomes armed within the dwelling, structure, or
conveyance, with explosives or a dangerous weapon . . . .
The trial judge also gave an instruction on armed burglary.
-36-
suggests that the jury could have convicted Floyd of burglary28 if it found that he
formed an intent to commit murder while he remained in Ms. Goss’s home.  As in
Valentine, this case is not one “where the facts could support a ‘surreptitious
29. We are aware that in enacting section 810.015(2), Florida Statutes (2001),
the Legislature stated its intent “that the holding in Delgado v. State . . . be
nullified.”  However, the Legislature also stated that subsection (2) of § 810.015
would “operate retroactively to February 1, 2000.”  The events in Floyd’s case
occurred well before February 1, 2000.  Therefore, because the events in Floyd’s
case do not fall within the window established by the Legislature for retroactive
application of section 810.015(2), we need not address the issue of the retroactive
effect of the statute.  See R.C. v. State, 793 So. 2d 1078, 1079 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA
2001) (reversing defendant’s conviction for burglary of a dwelling, based on
Delgado v. State, and noting that the Legislature’s language in section 810.015(2)
regarding the nullification of Delgado did not apply because the defendant’s actions
took place prior to February 1, 2000).
-37-
remaining.’” Valentine, 774 So. 2d at 937.  Therefore, Floyd is entitled to have his
conviction for armed burglary reversed due to fundamental error in the jury
instruction.29  The reversal of Floyd’s conviction for armed burglary requires that
we also strike the finding of the murder in the course of a felony aggravating
circumstance in this case.  Moreover, the theory of Floyd’s guilt based on felony
murder cannot stand.  As noted supra, however, the jury also found Floyd guilty
based on the theory of premeditated murder.  Competent, substantial evidence still
supports Floyd’s conviction for premeditated murder. 
Penalty Phase
Jury Instructions:  Mitigating Circumstances
Floyd makes three concurrent assertions of fundamental error regarding the
jury instructions, or lack thereof, concerning mitigating factors.  First, he asserts
30. Moreover, after all penalty phase instructions had been read to the jury,
Floyd’s defense counsel answered affirmatively when the trial judge inquired as to
whether “the instructions [had] been delivered as [he] indicated they would be
delivered.”
-38-
that fundamental error occurred when the trial judge, in reading the instructions to
the jury, said only that the jury could consider “[a]ny other circumstance of the
offense” committed by Floyd.  The standard jury instructions require that, unless
the defendant requests a different instruction, the trial judge instruct jurors that they
may consider as mitigation “[a]ny [other] aspect of the defendant’s character,
record, or background” and “[a]ny other circumstance of the offense.”  Fla. Std.
Jury Instr. (Crim.) 113 (1997).  Floyd never lodged an objection to this instruction
as it was read to the jury.30  Floyd nevertheless claims that fundamental error
occurred because the effect of the trial judge’s misreading of the instruction was
that, in the absence of an instruction that it could consider aspects of Floyd’s
character, record, or background as mitigation, the jury concluded that it could
only consider aggravating circumstances of the killing.  Several points militate
against this assertion.  
Jury instructions are subject to the contemporaneous objection rule, and in
the absence of a contemporaneous objection at trial, relief regarding error in the
instructions can be granted on appeal only if that error is fundamental.  See Archer
-39-
v. State, 673 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1996).  Fundamental error is that which “reaches
down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict . . . could not
have been obtained without [that] error.”  Id. at 20.  When a contemporaneous
objection could easily have been lodged to bring the lack of completeness or clarity
of a jury instruction to the trial judge’s attention, we have previously declined to
conclude that fundamental error occurred.  See Archer, 673 So. 2d at 20 (no
fundamental error occurred when trial judge utilized the term “reasonable doubt” in
jury instruction but then did not define that term for jury, especially in light of lack
of contemporaneous objection made to jury instruction as given).  In State v.
Wilson, 686 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1996), we determined that no fundamental error
occurred when a preliminary instruction on reasonable doubt was utilized by the
trial court that was arguably ambiguous though not entirely incorrect.  Though we
noted that the trial judge ultimately gave the correct instruction, we also
unmistakably stated in Wilson:
In any event, even if it could be said that the judge committed
error in making the preliminary comments on reasonable doubt, the
error would not be fundamental.  Any perceived ambiguity could have
been clarified by the simple expedient of calling it to the judge’s
attention through a proper objection.
Id. at 570.  Our reasoning in Archer and Wilson is applicable here because the
asserted error in the trial judge’s reading of the instruction “could have been
-40-
clarified by the simple expedient of calling it to the judge’s attention through a
proper [contemporaneous] objection.”  Wilson, 686 So. 2d at 570.  When we
further consider that Floyd’s defense counsel had and in fact utilized the
opportunity in his penalty phase closing argument to fully present and discuss all of
the mitigating factors he believed the jury should consider—including those related
to character and background—we are unpersuaded by Floyd’s assertion of
fundamental error.  When we further consider the three strong aggravating factors
present in this case, the possible mitigating factors, and the eleven to one jury
recommendation for a sentence of death, we conclude that a perfect instruction
would not have in any way altered the jury’s recommendation here.  Therefore, we
determine that no relief based on fundamental error is warranted on this matter.
As his next concurrent assertion regarding fundamental error in the jury
instructions, Floyd contends that the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury that
Floyd’s chronological age of twenty-one years could be considered as a mitigating
factor.  Floyd further contends that the trial judge also fundamentally erred by not
considering age as a mitigating factor before imposing a sentence of death.  We
have previously stated:
[W]here the defendant has requested an instruction on age and
submitted reliable evidence tending to link his or her chronological age
to “some other [relevant] characteristic of the defendant or the crime,”
-41-
an appropriate instruction should be given.
Campell v State, 679 So. 2d 720, 726 (Fla. 1996).  Floyd did not explicitly request
the trial judge to provide an instruction on age as a mitigating factor, nor did he
present compelling evidence which could reasonably be inferred to suggest his
desire for such an instruction.  In the absence of both a request for an instruction
on age and any evidence on which the trial judge could base a decision to find it as
a mitigating factor, we determine that no error occurred.  See also Cooper v. State,
492 So. 2d 1059, 1063 (Fla. 1986) (“There is no per se rule which pinpoints a
particular age as an automatic factor in mitigation.”). 
In his final contention regarding the jury instructions on mitigating
circumstances, Floyd claims that fundamental error resulted from the trial judge’s
refusal to give his instruction that “only in rare instances can [the trial judge] impose
a sentence different than the jury recommend[s].”  Floyd contends that the trial
judge’s refusal to give this instruction resulted in the denigration of the role and
responsibility of the jury and therefore violated Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S.
320 (1985).  The record reflects that the trial judge employed the standard jury
instruction on this matter.  We have repeatedly stated that this instruction properly
and fully apprises the jury of its role and responsibility in the penalty phase.  See,
e.g., Archer, 673 So. 2d at 21; Sochor v. State, 619 So. 2d 285, 291-92 (Fla.
31. Floyd further contends that fundamental errors committed by the trial
judge were compounded by his failure to instruct the jury with regard to two
proposed nonstatutory mitigators:  exemplary courtroom behavior and assistance
to defense counsel with note-taking and other communication.  While the issue
regarding these proposed nonstatutory mitigators is preserved for review, we
nevertheless have determined that no fundamental error occurred with regard to jury
instructions concerning mitigating factors.  We also note that the trial judge
ultimately found the two factors in question as nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances.  Moreover, when we consider that three strong aggravating factors
remain in this case, it is clear that no error—fundamental or otherwise—occurred
with regard to the jury instructions concerning mitigating factors that would cast
doubt on the validity of the outcome of the trial itself.  See Archer, 673 So. 2d at
20.  Thus, no fundamental error could have been “compounded” by the trial
judge’s failure to provide an instruction to the jury concerning two proposed 
nonstatutory mitigators.
32. Though the trial judge instructed the jury on the HAC aggravator, in his
sentencing order he ultimately declined to find the existence of the aggravator.
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1993).  No relief is warranted.31  
Jury Instruction:  HAC Aggravating Circumstance
The next major issue presented by Floyd is the propriety of the trial judge’s
decision to instruct the jury on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) aggravating
circumstance.32  Floyd objected to the giving of the HAC instruction, thus
preserving the issue for review.  Floyd first asserts that the trial judge erred in
relying primarily on evidence adduced during the guilt phase for his decision to
instruct the jury on the HAC aggravator.  We disagree.  See Brown v. State, 721
So. 2d 274, 277-78 (Fla. 1998) (trial judge relied primarily on evidence adduced
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during the guilt phase for decision to instruct on HAC aggravator).
The heart of Floyd’s assertions regarding the jury instruction on the HAC
aggravator is that competent, substantial evidence did not support the trial judge’s
decision to give the HAC instruction.  Therefore, Floyd claims, the jury was
inflamed by the instruction to the point that it thought every murder was heinous,
atrocious, or cruel regardless of the circumstances and thereby felt compelled to
recommend a sentence of death.  Again, we disagree.  First, we note that
competent, substantial evidence existed which supported the trial judge’s decision
to utilize the HAC instruction.  After Floyd had argued with her, Ms. Goss roused
her sleeping grandchildren and sent them out into the night to Jeanette Figuero’s
home for safety and help, with instructions to call the police.  Floyd chased her to
both the front and back of the house, causing Ms. Goss to run outside in only her
nightgown, even without undergarments.  Floyd then pursued her further as he
made chase and fired two shots at her, which were off target, before firing the third
and fatal shot.  The third shot killed Ms. Goss instantaneously.  The victim’s fear,
emotional strain, and terror during the events leading up to this murder may have
been properly considered in determining whether the HAC aggravator existed,
despite the nearly instantaneous nature of the victim’s death.  See Pooler v. State,
704 So. 2d 1375, 1378 (Fla. 1997).  Also, “[t]he victim’s mental state may be
33. Because we conclude that there was competent, substantial evidence as
discussed above for the trial judge’s decision to instruct the jury on the HAC
aggravator, we accordingly reject Floyd’s assertion that a determination of the error
committed by the trial judge hinges on the exact body position of the victim as the
fatal shot entered her body.
We further reject Floyd’s reliance on Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060 (Fla.
1990).  Floyd’s theory that the killing was based only on an act committed in the
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evaluated for purposes of [a determination of the existence of the HAC aggravator]
in accordance with a common-sense inference from the circumstances.”  Id. at
1378.  Moreover, where competent, substantial evidence supports the trial judge’s
decision to do so, it is not error to instruct the jury on the HAC aggravator.  See
Cave v. State, 727 So. 2d 227, 229 (Fla. 1998) (no error where competent,
substantial evidence supported both the instruction on the HAC aggravator and the
trial judge’s ultimate finding of HAC); Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d at 277 n.7 (no
error in instructing jury on HAC aggravator where competent, substantial evidence
also supported finding of HAC).  It is not illogical to conclude that Ms. Goss was
in a significant state of emotional strain and terror as she ran, barely clad, outside
her home in an attempt to elude a killer who not only chased her with a deadly
weapon but also fired and missed with multiple shots before mortally wounding her
by severing her brain stem with the third shot.  Thus, we find no error in the trial
judge’s decision to instruct on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating
circumstance.33
heat of passion is obviated by the State’s competent, substantial evidence
supporting an instruction on the HAC aggravator.
34. The trial judge gave substantial weight to this aggravator in his sentencing
order.
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Avoid Arrest Aggravating Circumstance
Floyd asserts a lack of competent, substantial evidence to support the trial
court’s finding of the aggravating circumstance that the killing of Ms. Goss was
committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an
escape from custody.  We agree with the trial judge’s determination that evidence
established beyond a reasonable doubt that Floyd committed the murder for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing his lawful arrest.34    
In Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 47-48 (Fla. 2000), we stated that when 
a killing of a police officer is not involved, the proof regarding the finding of the
avoid arrest aggravator “must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the
victim was murdered solely or predominantly for the purpose of witness
elimination.”  We have also stated that “the avoid arrest aggravator can be
supported by circumstantial evidence through inference from the facts shown.” 
Foster v. State, 778 So. 2d 906, 918 (Fla. 2000).  Furthermore, in Guzman v. State,
721 So. 2d 1155, 1160 (Fla. 1998), we stated:
We have found the avoiding-arrest aggravator in cases where the
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defendant’s own statements demonstrate that the primary motive for
the murder was the elimination of witnesses.  See, e.g., Remeta v.
State, 522 So. 2d 825, 827 (Fla. 1988) (“Anytime I seen a witness, I
took him out, or at least shot him.”); Kokal v. State, 492 So. 2d 1317,
1319 (Fla. 1986) (“[D]ead men can’t tell lies.”) . . . .
We also note that “[a] confession is direct evidence in Florida.”  Walls v. State,
641 So. 2d 381, 390 (Fla. 1994) (determining that defendant’s own incriminating
confession of having committed the murder provided primary support for finding 
avoid arrest aggravator).  
Tashoni Lamb, whom Floyd visited not long after Ms. Goss was killed,
testified that Floyd asked to speak with her privately and proceeded to exhibit a
firearm and place it on a dresser.  Floyd then stated, “I just shot Miss Mary, the
grandmother.”  Lamb testified that Floyd expressed the reason for the shooting to
be because “[Ms. Goss] had threatened to call the police on him.”   
Ms. Goss was aware that Floyd was on probation for previous offenses and
that he had fled from Deputy Dean Kelly at the sheriff’s office after refusing to
submit to custody to afford Kelly an opportunity to investigate the confrontation
between Floyd and Trelane, Floyd’s wife.  Floyd was undoubtedly aware that a
probation violation would produce serious repercussions. 
Floyd places primary reliance on a trio of cases for his assertion that the
avoid arrest aggravator is inapplicable; however, each case is distinguishable.  In
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Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416 (Fla. 1998), a key witness who testified that the
defendant shot the victim because the victim saw the defendant’s face also testified
that the defendant shot the victim because he resisted the defendant’s robbery
attempt.  Conversely, there is no such contradiction of Tashoni Lamb’s testimony
that Floyd confirmed the reason he killed Ms. Goss was because she was going to
report him to the police.  Moreover, we also stated in Urbin that the factual situation
there “more closely resemble[d] the fatal confrontation in Cook v. State, 542 So.
2d 964, 970 (Fla. 1989), wherein we found that the facts indicated that the
defendant ‘shot instinctively, not with a calculated plan to eliminate [the victim] as a
witness.’”  Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 416.  No such instinctive or reflexive shooting
occurred in this case.  In a similar manner, in Mahn v. State, 714 So. 2d 391, 403
(Fla. 1998), we determined that the defendant’s statement that “she tried to get me,
and I struck her too, stabbed her,” with regard to the death of a female victim, did
not provide sufficient evidence that the defendant’s dominant motive was witness
elimination.  Unlike the statement in Mahn, Floyd’s confession to Tashoni Lamb
here clearly shows witness elimination as a motive for the killing of Ms. Goss.  We
agree with the trial judge that Floyd’s confession provides direct proof of witness
elimination as Floyd’s dominant motive.  In the third case upon which Floyd relies,
Consalvo v. State, 697 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1996), we actually upheld the finding of the
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avoid arrest aggravator and upon analysis conclude that  no relief is justified under
Consalvo.
We cannot agree with Floyd’s position that the sole or dominant motive for
the killing was revenge as to his wife’s failure to follow his directives not to smoke,
drink, or stay out late at night.  Although the issue may be debated and contested,
such does not overcome the direct evidence which supports the determination
below beyond a reasonable doubt.  See generally Knight v. State, 721 So. 2d 287,
298 (Fla. 1998).  Considering all of the evidence discussed supra, especially
Floyd’s uncontradicted confession of having killed Ms. Goss because she “had
threatened to call the police on him,” we determine that no relief is warranted on the
issue of the avoid arrest aggravating circumstance.     
Victim Impact Evidence
Floyd claims that the trial judge impermissibly admitted victim impact
evidence during the penalty phase which prejudiced jurors against him and
compelled them to return a recommendation of a sentence of death.  Floyd
provides no precedent in which we have held that reversible error occurred
regarding the admission of victim impact evidence in situations similar to his case. 
His assertion is basically a policy argument that we should recede from the
following language in Windom v. State, 656 So. 2d 432, 438 (Fla. 1995):  
35. We further reject Floyd’s contention that the trial judge should have
received victim impact evidence only during the Spencer hearing.  Floyd cites no
precedent in support of this argument.
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We do not believe that the procedure for addressing victim impact
evidence, as set forth in the statute, impermissibly affects the weighing
of the aggravators and mitigators which we approved in State v.
Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943, 94 S.Ct.
1950, 40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974), or otherwise interferes with the
constitutional rights of the defendant.  Therefore, we reject the
argument which classifies victim impact evidence as a nonstatutory
aggravator in an attempt to exclude it during the sentencing phase of a
capital case.
We decline Floyd’s invitation to recede from Windom, and find no error in the
admission of victim impact evidence in this case.35  
Prosecutor’s Penalty Phase Closing Argument
Floyd asserts that fundamental error occurred when the prosecutor, without
a defense objection voiced, ended his penalty phase closing argument by saying:
Let the final chapter be justice was done.  This man not only deserves
but the law requires that he receive the death penalty.
Relying on Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1996), Floyd claims that
fundamental error occurred because a jury is never required to vote to recommend
the death penalty.  In Henyard, a prosecutor on three separate occasions told jurors
that if the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, they must
recommend a sentence of death.  We determined in that case that the prosecutor
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had misstated the law, but that the comments did not rise to the level of
fundamental error when viewed in the totality of the entire trial.  We further
determined that if any error occurred such was harmless.  Here, with regard to the
prosecutor’s statement, to the extent that it might have implied that the jury was
bound by law and had no option but to recommend a sentence of death, we
disapprove its content.  However, the remark in Floyd’s case was isolated, not
repeated as in Henyard, and could be interpreted as an evaluation of the evidence
and the conclusions to be drawn from such evidence.  Moreover, just as in
Henyard, the trial judge here properly instructed the jury on its role in the sentencing
process.  Given the three strong aggravators in Floyd’s case and the paucity of
mitigation, we determine that any error that may have been engendered by the
prosecutor’s statements was harmless.  Any error with regard to this issue in no
way “affected the foundation of the case.”  Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134, 137
(Fla. 1970).   Therefore, we deny relief on this issue.
Cumulative Error
Floyd states that the cumulative effect of errors committed throughout his
trial entitles him to relief.  We disagree.  Any errors that occurred during Floyd’s
trial were harmless.  There is no reasonable probability that the cumulative effect of
these errors affected Floyd’s right to a fair trial.  Therefore, we deny relief on this
36. The aggravating circumstances which remain are:  Floyd was on
probation for the felonies of burglary and accessory after the fact to robbery when
he committed the murder of Ms. Goss (great weight); Floyd had previously been
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issue.   See generally Whitton v. State, 649 So. 2d 861, 864-66 (Fla. 1994)
(applying cumulative error analysis and determining there was no reasonable
probability that the cumulative impact of harmless errors affected either the jury’s
verdict or the defendant’s overall right to a fair trial).  
Proportionality
Finally, Floyd claims that his sentence of death is not proportional under the
circumstances of his case and the decisions of this Court.  Floyd emphasizes that
the killing of Ms. Goss was nothing more than a “heat of passion” slaying for
which a sentence of death is not warranted.  We rejected Floyd’s “heat of passion”
assertion, supra, and therefore find the cases on which Floyd relies for this point to
be inapplicable.
Nor do we find a proportionality problem here despite our striking of the 
murder in the course of a felony aggravating circumstance and our determination
that a theory of Floyd’s guilt based on felony murder cannot stand.  As discussed
supra, competent, substantial evidence supports the conviction in this case on the
charge of premeditated murder.  Also, three aggravating circumstances remain after
striking the murder in the course of a felony aggravator,36 in contrast to scant
convicted of a violent felony for the voluntary manslaughter of his brother
(substantial weight); and Floyd committed the murder for the purpose of avoiding
or preventing a lawful arrest (substantial weight).   
37. The defendant in Williams was on parole when he committed the capital
crime for which he was sentenced to death.  
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mitigation given little weight by the trial judge.  When sufficient aggravating
circumstances have remained after the striking of others on appeal and those
remaining aggravators were not outweighed by mitigating circumstances, we have
previously affirmed a trial judge’s sentence of death.  See, e.g., Hill v. State, 515
So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1987) (affirming the sentence of death despite the striking of the
cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating circumstance, where three other
aggravating circumstances remained and were not outweighed by statutory
mitigating circumstance of defendant’s age); Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d 525 (Fla.
1987) (affirming the sentence of death despite the striking of aggravating
circumstances of cold, calculated, and premeditated, pecuniary gain, and
committed during course of an attempted robbery, where two other aggravating
circumstances remained in contrast to no mitigating circumstances).  
In Williams v. State, 437 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1983), we affirmed a sentence of
death when the trial judge found the aggravating circumstances of committed by a
person under sentence of imprisonment37 and having committed a prior violent
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felony.  Both of these aggravating circumstances also remain in Floyd’s case.  The
trial judge in Williams found no mitigating circumstances, despite the presentation
of evidence at the sentencing hearing that the defendant was a good and kind
person.  In Floyd’s case the trial judge found, but gave little weight to, the
mitigating circumstances that Floyd displayed exemplary courtroom behavior, that
he assisted his defense counsel with notetaking, that he was successfully
completing his probation before murdering Ms. Goss, and that he expressed
concern that his wife not subject their marriage to the stresses attendant to alcohol
consumption.  We determine that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
giving little weight to these mitigating circumstances and in deciding that they did
not outweigh the aggravating circumstances.  Moreover, when we consider that
although the murder in the course of a felony aggravator no longer applies, three
aggravating circumstances still remain which are not outweighed by the scant
mitigation in Floyd’s case, “we [conclude] that the erroneous consideration of the 
[murder in the course of a felony] aggravating circumstance . . . [does not present]
such a change under the circumstances of this sentencing proceeding that its
elimination could possibly compromise the weighing process of either the jury or
the judge.”  Hill, 515 So. 2d at 179. 
Floyd’s argument that the cases of Farinas v. State, 569 So. 2d 425 (Fla.
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1990), and White v. State, 616 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1993), demonstrate the lack of
proportionality in his death sentence is misplaced.  In both Farinas and White, our
decision that a life sentence was proper was based in large measure on the
significant amount of mental health mitigation present in each case.  No similar
situation exists here and, therefore, relief based on Farinas and White is not
warranted.  Our proportionality review leads us to conclude that the death sentence
was properly imposed in Floyd’s case.
CONCLUSION
In our view, the only relief to which Floyd is entitled is the reversal of his
conviction for armed burglary and the striking of the murder in the course of a
felony aggravating circumstance.  Competent, substantial evidence supports his
conviction for premeditated murder, and the sentence of death for this conviction is
proportional.  Competent, substantial evidence also supports Floyd’s conviction
for aggravated assault.  Accordingly, we affirm Floyd’s conviction for first-degree
murder and the sentence of death, along with the conviction and sentence for
aggravated assault.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, PARIENTE, and QUINCE, JJ.,
concur.
LEWIS, J., concurs specially with an opinion.
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WELLS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
LEWIS, J., concurring specially.  
I fully concur in the majority’s reasoning and determination in this case to
affirm the conviction and sentence for first-degree murder (based on the
premeditated murder theory) and to affirm the conviction and sentence for
aggravated assault.  It is with reluctance, however, that I concur in the majority’s
decision to reverse Floyd’s  conviction for armed burglary and the striking of the
aggravating factor related thereto.  In Delgado v. State, 776 So. 2d 233, 238-40
(Fla. 2000), a majority of this Court interpreted the “remaining in” language in
Florida’s burglary statute to allow a conviction for burglary, when the defendant
remains in an occupied dwelling, but only when the defendant has “surreptitiously
remained therein.”  I am respectful that under the rule of stare decisis the reasoning
in Delgado controls the issue with regard to Floyd’s armed burglary conviction
here.  Nevertheless, I continue to hold the view that Delgado was wrongly decided
and that the dissent in Delgado, with which I concurred, expressed the proper
interpretation of the burglary statute as applied to the events both in that case and in
the instant case.
38.  See § 810.02, Fla. Stat. (1989).
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WELLS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in affirming Floyd’s conviction for first-degree murder and his
sentence of death.  However, I dissent from the majority’s reversing of Floyd’s
conviction for armed robbery.  This Court’s decision in Delgado v. State, 776 So.
2d 233, 240 (Fla. 2000), is not applicable to Floyd’s conviction.
In Delgado, 776 So. 2d at 240, this Court receded from this Court’s
established precedent to determine that the “remaining in” language of Florida’s
burglary statute38 applied “only in situations where the remaining in was done
surreptitiously.”  The original Delgado opinion was released by this Court on
February 3, 2000, see Delgado, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S79 (Fla. Feb. 3, 2000), but was
subsequently withdrawn when the revised opinion dated August 24, 2000, was
released.  See Delgado, 776 So. 2d at 233.  The revised opinion did not alter the
February 3, 2000, Delgado opinion’s new interpretation of the burglary statute.
On May 25, 2001, the Governor approved House Bill 953, which created
section 810.015(2), Florida Statutes (2001).  See ch. 2001-58, § 1, at 404, Laws of
Fla.  Section 810.015(2) states that “[i]t is the intent of the Legislature that the
holding in Delgado v. State, Slip Opinion No. SC88638 be nullified.”  The statute
further provides that the burglary statute should be construed in accord with this
39.  The Braggs court subsequently reversed the burglary conviction,
determining that it was bound to follow Delgado until this Court explicitly recedes
from Delgado.  See id.  The court certified the following question of great public
importance to this Court:
WHETHER SECTION ONE OF CHAPTER 2001-58, LAWS OF
FLORIDA, HAS LEGISLATIVELY OVERRULED DELGADO V.
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Court’s precedent as established prior to Delgado.  See § 810.015(2), Fla. Stat.  In
nullifying Delgado, the Legislature stated that section 810.015(2) “shall operate
retroactively to February 1, 2000.”  This retroactivity provision was obviously
included so that the original February 3, 2000, Delgado decision would be included
in the nullification.  As the Third District Court of Appeal recently stated in Braggs
v. State, 815 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (en banc):
[I]t is permissible to consider the legislative history of chapter 2001-58
to determine why the February 1, 2000 date was chosen.  It turns out
that the Delgado opinion was first released by the Florida Supreme
Court on February 3, 2000.  It is evident the February 1 date was
chosen in an effort to turn back the clock to the interpretation of the
burglary statute as it existed two days prior to the original release of
the Delgado opinion.  As stated in the House of Representatives
legislative history, “The purpose of this provision is to ‘resettle’ the
law with respect to pending burglaries . . . .”  House of
Representatives Committee on Crime Prevention, Corrections &
Safety Final Analysis, Bill No. HB953(PCB CPCS 01-03), June 26,
2001.  
It is therefore clear that the statement of intent in chapter 2001-
58 is meant to apply to pending cases, which would include the appeal
now before us.
Id. at D380 (citation and footnotes omitted).39  Thus, contrary to the majority’s
STATE, 776 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2000), FOR CRIMES COMMITTED
ON OR BEFORE JULY 1, 2001.
40.  The majority states that Floyd is entitled to relief under Valentine v.
State, 774 So. 2d 934, 937 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), review dismissed, 790 So. 2d
1111 (Fla. 2001).  However, the majority fails to recognize that this Court dismissed
review of Valentine on May 11, 2001, prior to the enactment of section 810.015.
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determination, see majority op. at 37, note 28, the retroactivity provision was not
included to make section 810.015(2) only applicable to crimes occurring on or after
February 1, 2000.40
Another reference in the legislative staff analysis prepared for House Bill 953
supports the conclusion that the retroactivity language in section 810.015(2) was
included to completely nullify the Delgado decision.  In discussing what would
occur to the defendant in Delgado after the enactment of section 810.015, the
analysis states:
Since this defendant has been granted a new trial based on a
construction of the statute which would be expressly rejected by the
Legislature, and it would be the intent of the Legislature that the law be
returned to what it was before he was granted a new trial, it is unclear
how the courts will resolve the matter of the Delgado retrial.  On one
hand, the restoration of the law back to the same posture it was when
he was tried initially would indicate that the basis for the new trial has
been nullified as a matter of law.  On the other hand, the law as applied
to this particular case is that he receive a new trial.  If he is retried, he
will either get a retrial based on the very same law under which he was
initially convicted, or be the only person in Florida to get a retrial
based on the Court’s erroneous interpretation of burglary.
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Fla. H.R. Comm. on Crime Prev., Correct. & Saf., HB 953 (2001) Staff Analysis 7
(final June 26, 2001) (on file with comm.) (emphasis added).  Thus, the Legislature
clearly intended to nullify Delgado so that Delgado would not be applicable to
defendants convicted of burglary under this Court’s precedent prior to Delgado.
This Court’s decision in Jimenez v. State, 810 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 2001), also
supports this conclusion.  Immediately after we released the Delgado opinion, Jose
Jimenez filed a 3.850 motion asserting that Delgado should be applied retroactively
to invalidate Jimenez’s 1994 burglary conviction.  See Jimenez, 810 So. 2d at 512. 
This Court denied relief for two reasons.  First, the Delgado decision did not meet
the criteria of the analysis provided by Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980),
and therefore was not given retroactive application to Jimenez’s final burglary
conviction.  Second, this Court denied relief because “the Legislature declared that
Delgado was decided contrary to legislative intent and that this Court’s
interpretation of the burglary statute in Jimenez’s direct appeal was in harmony with
legislative intent.”  Id. at 513.  This Court’s second reason for denying Jimenez
relief–that Jimenez’s conviction was in harmony with legislative intent–supports my
conclusion that Floyd’s armed burglary conviction, which is also in harmony with
legislative intent, should be affirmed.
I conclude that Delgado is not applicable to Floyd’s conviction for armed
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burglary and that Floyd is not entitled to have that conviction reversed.  The intent
of section 810.015 is to validate all burglary convictions which were properly based
on the law as established prior to Delgado.  See Braggs, 815 So. 2d at 660; see also
Jimenez, 810 So. 2d 513.  In her dissent in Braggs, Judge Green was precisely
correct as to what should be the plain effect of this Court’s decision and opinion in
Jimenez, as noted by Judge Ervin in his dissent in Foster v. State, 27 Fla. L.
Weekly D1360, D1362 (Fla. 1st DCA June 12, 2002).  Likewise, I agree with the
analysis set forth by Judge Ervin on this issue.  Floyd was properly convicted of
armed burglary under this Court’s precedent as established prior to Delgado, and
therefore his conviction is valid.  See, e.g., Raleigh v. State, 705 So. 2d 1324 (Fla.
1997); Jimenez v. State, 703 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1997).  I would affirm Floyd’s
conviction for armed burglary and give force and effect to the undeniable legislative
intent that the Delgado decision be nullified.
Moreover, in view of the date that Floyd’s crimes were committed, there is
no logical reason to apply Delgado.  Burglary is a statutory crime, the definition of
which is within the prerogative of the Legislature.  Floyd committed this crime on
July 13, 1998, a time when the burglary statute had been defined so that Floyd’s
actions would have constituted burglary under Routly v. State, 440 So. 2d 1257
(Fla. 1983), and Ray v. State, 522 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), which are two
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of the cases listed in section 810.015(2), Florida Statutes.  Floyd was convicted on
April 7, 1999, which was likewise before the Delgado decision was issued.  Simply
because Delgado was issued while Floyd’s case was on appeal provides no reason
why he should receive the benefit of that nullified decision.  The key date for Floyd
was July 13, 1998, when he committed the crime, because he was on notice at that
time as to what the burglary statute said and meant.  He should not receive this
windfall.  Rather, this Court should give deference to the Legislature, which is here
clearly appropriate.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Putnam County,
William A. Parsons, Judge - Case No. 98-1315CF-52
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Christopher S. Quarles, Assistant Public
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Judy Taylor Rush, Assistant Attorney
General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellee