Title: People v. Rodriguez
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S251706
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: May 21, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
DAVID PHILLIP RODRIGUEZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S251706 
 
Fifth Appellate District 
F073594 
 
Kings County Superior Court 
12CM7070 
 
 
May 21, 2020 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, and Kruger concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ 
S251706 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
This case presents the question of whether a prosecutor 
impermissibly vouched for witness credibility by asserting in 
closing argument that two testifying officers would not lie 
because each would not put his “entire career on the line” or “at 
risk” and would not subject himself to “possible prosecution for 
perjury.”  The Court of Appeal answered this question in the 
affirmative.  The court further held that the error was 
prejudicial and therefore reversed the judgment of conviction.  
We affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On October 27, 2011, correctional officers Brian Stephens 
and Roger Lowder worked at the Substance Abuse Treatment 
Facility at Corcoran State Prison, where defendant David 
Rodriguez was an inmate.  
Stephens testified to the following:  At around 11:40 a.m. 
that day, he was in the prison patio area when he saw Rodriguez 
approximately 12 to 15 feet away inside a connecting hallway.  
Stephens had never seen Rodriguez before.  Stephens observed 
Rodriguez with an untucked shirt covering his waist and 
handcuffs on his wrists.  At a doorway to the hallway, Stephens 
met Rodriguez and told him to hold on.  Stephens looked over 
his shoulder to see if another officer could assist him.  He then 
saw a shiny object from his peripheral vision and felt a “[v]ery 
heavy and hard” blow on the back of his head.  As far as he knew, 
PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
he was only struck once.  A photograph of Stephens’s head was 
taken on the day of the incident and was introduced at trial as 
a defense exhibit.  Stephens testified that he sustained neck, 
shoulder, and head injuries, but that the head injury was under 
his hair and he could not see any injuries in the photograph.  
Stephens stated that at the time of trial he had been working 
for the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for 
approximately 17 and a half years. 
Lowder testified to the following:  On the day of the 
incident, at around 11:40 a.m., he heard someone yell “get 
down.”  From about 20 yards away, he then saw Rodriguez 
striking Stephens from behind.  Rodriguez had handcuffs on his 
wrists, but the chain from a waist restraint system was wrapped 
around his hands and another four to six inches of chain was 
hanging from his left fist.  Lowder said he saw Rodriguez twice 
raise his hands with chains in them and strike downward onto 
the back of Stephens’s head, neck, and shoulders.  Lowder 
testified that several correctional officers ran toward the 
altercation.  One sprayed Rodriguez with pepper spray.  
Rodriguez swung the chain within about two feet of another 
officer’s face, but did not hit him.  The officers subdued him.  
Lowder stated that at the time of trial he had been working for 
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for 
approximately 22 years nine months. 
The jury saw a very low-quality video of the incident.  
Lowder testified that the resolution of the video was too low to 
see Rodriguez striking Stephens.  Lowder and Stephens were 
the only witnesses to the incident who testified for the 
prosecution.  A third officer testified that he arrived on the scene 
after Rodriguez was down.  He said the chains from the restraint 
PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
system that normally go around an inmate’s waist were instead 
under Rodriguez’s body and were only attached at the wrist.  
Rodriguez testified on his own behalf.  He testified that on 
the day of the incident, correctional officers told him he had to 
go to class after he had been in his cell continuously for three or 
four weeks.  Once in class, he got the teacher’s permission to use 
the restroom.  After using the restroom, he walked out to the 
prison patio area.  Rodriguez said that he encountered Stephens 
and “got into a light argument” with him.  Rodriguez walked 
past him.  Stephens “tried to get out of my way, stumbled back 
and I just kept going forward.”  Rodriguez heard an alarm go off, 
then someone said “get down,” and “some shots” were fired.  
Rodriguez “got pepper sprayed and went to the ground.”  He 
stated that he never struck Stephens with anything.  According 
to Rodriguez, the waist restraints were around his waist at that 
time and therefore it was physically impossible to strike anyone 
with them.  The parties stipulated that about two weeks before 
the incident, Rodriguez was notified that his father, 
grandmother, and uncle had all passed away within a short 
period of time. 
During closing arguments, defense counsel argued that 
“the officers who testified aren’t credible.”  Defense counsel went 
on to question the officers’ version of events based upon the 
video.  After defense counsel’s arguments, the prosecutor then 
argued in closing: 
“The jury instructions provided by the Judge list a 
number of factors for you to consider when you are 
evaluating the credibility of witnesses.  I want to 
highlight one of those factors for you and that is 
motive to lie.  Who in this trial, when they testified 
PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
4 
before you, had a motive to lie, the officers or the 
defendant? 
[¶] . . . [¶] 
“What did Officer Stephens tell you?  He told you 
that he was attacked.  He was hit from behind.  Now, 
I ask you what motive would he have to lie?  Sort of 
anticipating a defense like this, when Officer 
Stephens was on the stand, I asked him, before that 
day, to your knowledge, had you ever seen the 
defendant before?  No.  Did you know the defendant?  
No.  So, you are being asked to believe by the defense 
that Officer Stephens, an officer, I think, with 17 
years of experience with the Department of 
Corrections, for some reason, would put his entire 
career on the line.  He would take the stand, subject 
himself to possible prosecution for perjury and lie 
and make up some story and tell you that this guy, 
who he didn’t know, attacked him and hit him on the 
back of the head.  For what reason?  What possible 
motive would he have to do that? 
“But you add to that the testimony of Officer Lowder.  
Officer Lowder testified this guy, the defendant, hit 
Officer Stephens.  So, now, we have two officers 
involved in this lie, apparently, according to the 
defendant.  Another officer with a long career.  His 
was over 20 years.  So, we’re supposed to believe 
that, for some reason, Officer Lowder would put his 
entire career with the Department of Corrections at 
PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
risk, subject himself to possible prosecution for 
perjury— ” 
At this point, defense counsel objected: “Assumes facts not in 
evidence.”  The trial court impliedly overruled the objection: 
“Excuse me.  Go ahead.  You may continue.”   The prosecutor 
finished the argument:  “To perjure himself before you and, for 
some reason, lie and tell you that this defendant hit Officer 
Stephens on the back of the head.  I submit to you what reason 
would he have to do that?  There’s no motive to lie that we know 
of.” 
 
The jury convicted Rodriguez as charged with two counts 
of assault by an inmate with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 
4501),1 and one count each of battery by an inmate on a non-
inmate (§ 4501.5), attempted battery by an inmate on a non-
inmate (§§ 664/4501.5), and attempting to deter or prevent an 
executive officer from performing a duty (§ 69).  Pursuant to an 
agreed disposition, Rodriguez admitted a prior strike (§§ 667, 
subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and the prosecution 
moved to dismiss prior prison term allegations (§ 667.5, subd. 
(b)). 
The trial court sentenced Rodriguez to 14 years eight 
months in prison, consisting of six years for assault by an inmate 
with a deadly weapon, doubled for the prior strike, plus a 
consecutive two years eight months for the other assault by an 
inmate with a deadly weapon conviction.  The sentences on the 
remaining counts were stayed pursuant to section 654. 
                                        
1  
All further unspecified statutory references are to the 
Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
6 
The Court of Appeal reversed.  It found that the prosecutor 
committed reversible error with respect to all counts by 
improperly vouching for Lowder’s and Stephens’s credibility 
during closing.  The court also concluded that the trial court 
committed reversible error with respect to the convictions for 
assault by an inmate with a deadly weapon by failing to instruct 
sua sponte on simple assault as a lesser included offense.  The 
Attorney General petitioned for review solely on the question of 
whether the prosecutor’s argument constituted impermissible 
vouching.  We granted the petition. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A.  Vouching for the Witnesses’ Credibility 
The Attorney General contends that the prosecutor’s 
closing argument did not constitute improper vouching because 
it did not rely on facts outside the record or invoke the prestige 
of the prosecutor or his office. 
“ ‘[A] prosecutor is given wide latitude to vigorously argue 
his or her case’ ” (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 768 
(Dykes)) and “ ‘may make “assurances regarding the apparent 
honesty or reliability of” a witness “based on the ‘facts of [the] 
record and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.’ ” ’ ”  
(People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 740 (Redd).)  “Improper 
vouching occurs when the prosecutor either (1) suggests that 
evidence not available to the jury supports the argument, or (2) 
invokes his or her personal prestige or depth of experience, or 
the prestige or reputation of the office, in support of the 
argument.”  (People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 415 
(Anderson).)  Referring to facts not in evidence is “clearly” 
misconduct “because such statements ‘tend[] to make the 
prosecutor his own witness—offering unsworn testimony not 
PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
subject to cross-examination.  It has been recognized that such 
testimony, “although worthless as a matter of law, can be 
‘dynamite’ to the jury because of the special regard the jury has 
for the prosecutor, thereby effectively circumventing the rules of 
evidence.”  [Citations.]’  [Citations.]  ‘Statements of supposed 
facts not in evidence . . . are a highly prejudicial form of 
misconduct, and a frequent basis for reversal.’ ”  (People v. Hill 
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 828 (Hill), overruled on another ground 
in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13.)  
We “view the statements in the context of the argument as a 
whole.”  (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1203.) 
 
Here, the prosecutor’s argument generally asking, “what 
motive would [Stephens] have to lie?” (see ante, at p. 4), was 
proper because it did not “suggest the prosecutor had personal 
knowledge of facts outside the record showing [Stephens] was 
telling the truth” or “invite[] the jury to abdicate its 
responsibility to independently evaluate for itself whether 
[Stephens] should be believed.”  (People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 313, 337–338.)  The prosecutor’s argument immediately 
after that concerning Stephens’s testimony that he had not seen 
Rodriguez before the day of the incident was based upon the 
record and was proper.  The prosecutor had asked Stephens on 
direct examination if he had ever seen Rodriguez before the day 
in question.  Stephens responded, “Not prior to that day, no.”  
The prosecutor was permitted to point this out. 
Furthermore, the prosecutor’s argument concerning the 
length of Stephens’s and Lowder’s careers was based upon the 
record and was proper as well.  Lowder testified he had been 
working for the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 
for approximately 22 years nine months.  Stephens testified that 
he had been working for the Department of Corrections for 
PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
approximately 17 and a half years.  The prosecutor was fully 
permitted to argue that Stephens had “17 years of experience 
with the Department of Corrections” and that Lowder was 
“[a]nother officer with a long career.  His was over 20 years.” 
However, the prosecutor’s arguments that the officers 
would not lie because each would not put his “entire career on 
the line” or “at risk” constitute impermissible vouching.  The 
prosecutor’s career-related arguments “convey the impression 
that evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the 
prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant and can 
thus jeopardize the defendant’s right to be tried solely on the 
basis of the evidence presented to the jury.”  (United States v. 
Young (1985) 470 U.S. 1, 18.)  The record here does not contain 
any direct or circumstantial evidence about whether the officers 
“would put” their “entire career on the line” or “at risk” by giving 
false testimony.  The officers did testify that they had served for 
17 and 20 years, but the length of an officer’s career does not 
supply evidence that the officer would risk the most severe 
career penalty (being fired) for testifying falsely.  The 
prosecutor’s arguments on these topics are thus based upon 
matters outside the record that were not subject to 
cross-examination. 
 
The Attorney General responds that the comments are 
proper as matters of common knowledge and inferences 
reasonably drawn therefrom.  We disagree.  Counsel may “draw 
from matters that are ‘ “ ‘ “not in evidence, but which are 
common knowledge or are illustrations drawn from common 
experience, history or literature.” ’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Ghobrial 
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 289.)  “[F]acts are deemed within the 
common knowledge of the jury only if they are matters of 
common human experience or well known laws of natural 
PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
9 
science.”  (People v. Love (1961) 56 Cal.2d 720, 732, disapproved 
on another ground in People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 637, 
fn. 2; accord, People v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 360; see, e.g., 
People v. Perez (1962) 58 Cal.2d 229, 242, disapproved on 
another ground in People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 335.)   
Even if true, the fact that a law enforcement officer would risk 
termination for providing false testimony is not a matter of 
common knowledge.  Instead, the validity of this assertion 
hinges on the inner workings of the relevant disciplinary 
procedures, including the disciplinary rules of the relevant law 
enforcement agency and the applicability of any collective 
bargaining agreement.  This kind of determination lies beyond 
the ken of the average juror.   
The Attorney General emphasizes that the prosecutor only 
stated that the officers put their careers “at risk” or “on the line,” 
but did not “firmly” state the officers would lose their jobs, as 
the Court of Appeal indicated.  (See People v. Rodriguez (2018) 
26 Cal.App.5th 890, 907 (Rodriguez).)  We agree with the 
Attorney General that the prosecutor did not “firmly” state that 
the officers would lose their jobs, as the Court of Appeal 
suggests.  Nonetheless, the prosecutor did convey to the jury 
that the officers would risk losing their jobs by lying on the 
stand.  There was no evidence in the record to support this 
contention.  Furthermore, the prosecutor’s statements conveyed 
that he knew information about the discipline of law 
enforcement officers that was not known to the lay juror.  This 
was improper.  (See United States v. Weatherspoon (9th Cir. 
2005) 410 F.3d 1142, 1146 [“while no such firm assurance was 
provided . . . [,] no such modest shade of difference in the level 
of impropriety calls for a different result”].)    
PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
 
To be clear, our cases have traditionally looked to 
statements of personal beliefs in assessing whether a prosecutor 
has improperly invoked personal prestige or the reputation of 
the office.  (See, e.g., People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 662, 
693–694 [“the prosecutor placed his own prestige and the 
prestige of his office behind the Vikings, and in so doing, 
improperly interjected into the trial his personal view of the 
credibility of the heart of the defense case”]; People v. Loker 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 739–740 [prosecutor improperly “injected 
his own experiences and beliefs into the argument”].)   This is 
not a case where the statements at issue involved reliance on 
the personal beliefs or honor or integrity of the attorney making 
the statement.   The main problem with the statements here is 
that they suggest “that evidence not available to the jury 
supports the argument.”  (Anderson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 415.)  
But the statements pose similar concerns to vouching in its more 
traditional forms.  When a prosecutor argues beyond the record 
about the career risks of untruthful testimony, the prosecutor 
invites the jury to fill in gaps in the evidentiary record by 
reference to the jury’s own surmise based on the special 
reputation of law enforcement agencies and officers for veracity, 
as well as suppositions about the special insight prosecutors 
may have into law enforcement disciplinary procedures.  The 
prosecutor thus “invite[s] the jury to rely on the prestige of the 
government and its agents rather than the jury’s own evaluation 
of the evidence.”  (U.S. v. Torres-Galindo (1st Cir. 2000) 206 F.3d 
136, 142.) 
The 
prosecutor’s 
comments 
regarding 
“possible 
prosecution for perjury” do not implicate quite the same 
concerns regarding improper vouching.  With at least one 
version of the oath administered to witnesses stating that the 
PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
11 
testimony is “under penalty of perjury” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2094, 
subd. (a)(2)), that someone may be subject to “possible 
prosecution for perjury” for knowingly providing false testimony 
at a trial may well be a more widely appreciated proposition 
than is the likelihood of termination from employment for such 
conduct. 
In light of our conclusion that it was misconduct to 
speculate about the potential employment consequences of lying 
on the stand, we need not determine if the prosecutor’s specific 
assertions regarding “possible” perjury prosecutions were 
acceptable.  That a perjury prosecution for false testimony was 
“possible” may have been a fact within the common knowledge 
of jurors; however, as the Attorney General conceded at oral 
argument, a lay juror would naturally think that a prosecutor 
would know more about when someone can be prosecuted for 
perjury than a juror.  For this reason, prosecutors are well 
advised to generally avoid raising the subject of future perjury 
prosecutions in their closing arguments. 
Finally, though the argument in this case crossed the line 
into impermissible vouching, we do not mean to suggest that 
appropriate and zealous advocacy is somehow prohibited.  When 
defense counsel argues that a witness has lied, the prosecutor is 
permitted to respond.  The prosecutor “ ‘may make “assurances 
regarding the apparent honesty or reliability of” a witness 
“based on the ‘facts of [the] record and the inferences reasonably 
drawn therefrom.’ ” ’ ”  (Redd, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 740.)  The 
error here is that the prosecutor’s arguments were based on 
matters outside the record and that is not permitted. 
 
  
PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
 
B.  Cases Relied Upon by the Parties  
We have briefly addressed vouching claims based upon 
similar career-risk arguments before, with some divergence in 
our precedent.  In Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at page 774, the 
prosecutor argued: “ ‘If you believe [defendant], [an officer] is 
lying, risking his career and everything it stands for, to 
somehow frame this man.’ ”  We concluded the claim was 
forfeited and, in any event, “the remark constituted fair 
comment on the evidence” that had been presented in that trial.  
(Ibid.)  In another instance, we doubted “that the argument was 
proper” when a prosecutor argued that if a testifying officer had 
lied he would have “ ‘risked his whole career of 17 years.’ ”  
(People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 946, overruled on 
another ground in Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 823, fn. 1.)   
The Attorney General argues that we approved a 
prosecutor’s closing argument in “[p]erhaps the case most 
similar to the present one.”  In People v. Anderson (1990) 52 
Cal.3d 453, in “briefly review[ing] the merits,” we found that 
“remarks [were limited] to facts of record, namely, the years of 
experience of officers involved,” and “inferences reasonably 
drawn therefrom,” when the prosecutor doubted the officers 
would “jeopardize” their reputation by lying on the witness 
stand “just to convict one defendant.”  (Id. at pp. 478–479.)  The 
Attorney General, however, attaches too much import to this 
discussion.  Because the claim there was forfeited, our 
observations were not necessary to the claim’s resolution.  (See 
People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 915 [“ ‘[W]e must view 
with caution seemingly categorical directives not essential to 
earlier decisions and be guided by this dictum only to the extent 
it remains analytically persuasive’ ”].)  Moreover, the prosecutor 
in Anderson doubted the officers would “ ‘jeopardize’ ” their 
PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
13 
reputation, but did not, as here, argue that officers would not 
put their “entire career on the line.”  The prosecutor’s arguments 
in Anderson were therefore more directly tied to evidence in the 
record, namely the officer’s years of experience, than the 
arguments here.  Whether an officer would be fired for testifying 
falsely would not depend on the number of years the officer had 
been working, but, conversely, an officer’s reputation could 
reasonably grow over time.   
The Attorney General argues that we should follow People 
v. Caldwell (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1262.  In Caldwell, in 
response to a defense argument that testifying officers had lied, 
the prosecutor argued that the officers would not commit 
perjury and “ ‘put their career on the line.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1270.)  
Caldwell found that the prosecutor “was not vouching for [the 
officers’] credibility; he was rebutting the defense attorney’s 
charge that the officers had lied about the photo lineup.”  (Id. at 
p. 1271.)  The Court of Appeal in this case disagreed:  “Defense 
counsel does not open the door for prosecutorial vouching every 
time he or she argues that a prosecution witness’s testimony is 
untrue.”  (Rodriguez, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 910.)  
Impermissible vouching — where counsel relies on evidence not 
available to the juror or invokes his or her personal prestige or 
depth of experience — does not become permissible simply 
because the speaker claims to be responding to something 
opposing counsel said.  (See People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 
849 [“A prosecutor’s misconduct cannot be justified on the 
ground that defense counsel ‘started it’ with similar 
improprieties”]; People v. Taylor (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 372, 383 
[“It is no answer to state that defense counsel also used 
questionable tactics during the trial and therefore the district 
attorney was entitled to retaliate”].)  We accordingly agree with 
PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
14 
the Court of Appeal and disapprove People v. Caldwell, supra, 
212 Cal.App.4th 1262.   
The argument here suffers from the same deficiencies, 
albeit to a lesser degree, as those addressed in People v. Woods 
(2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 106 (Woods).  In Woods, the prosecutor 
argued that: 
“ ‘In a day of videotapes and people standing out 
with video cameras, do you honestly believe that out 
of 12 officers that went to that location that day they 
all sat down and got together and cooked up what 
they are going to say, that they all agreed as to what 
was going to go into the report, and they allowed 
that report to be filed with their names in it and 
their serial numbers in it?  They are going to risk 
their careers and their livelihood for kilos of cocaine?  
For some heroin?  Maybe for some stolen Maserati 
car parts?  No.  For five rocks of cocaine?  That’s 
what this comes down to, ladies and gentlemen.  Mr. 
Woods and his cocaine that he tossed that day. 12 
officers, 12 individual careers, pensions, house 
notes, car notes.’  Defense counsel objected that 
there was no evidence to support the argument.  The 
court overruled the objection. 
“[The prosecutor] continued her argument, stating, 
‘Bank accounts, children’s tuition.’  Defense counsel 
asserted a ‘running objection,’ which the court 
overruled. 
“After the ruling on the objection, [the prosecutor] 
resumed the argument, saying, ‘Are these 12 officers 
PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
15 
willing to risk those things for Mr. Woods and his 
five rocks of cocaine?’ ”  (Woods, supra, 146 
Cal.App.4th at p. 114.) 
The Court of Appeal in Woods held that the argument 
strayed “into impermissible territory when [the prosecutor] 
implicitly 
suggested 
that 
all 
12 
unidentified, 
mostly 
nontestifying officers . . . had been involved in a case or cases 
involving higher stakes such as kilos of cocaine, heroin, and 
stolen Maserati parts, but had not risked their careers for the 
higher stakes case or cases; and the same 12 officers had 
mortgages, car loans, and children in private schools.  Although 
the officers’ financial obligations and experience were irrelevant 
to appellant’s guilt, [the prosecutor] argued these factual 
matters outside of the record to attempt to establish the veracity 
of the few members of the group of 12 officers who testified.”  
(Woods, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 115.)  While the 
prosecutor’s extrarecord arguments in Woods are more 
extensive than here, the overarching concern is the same in both 
cases.  In Woods, the prosecutor argued beyond the record to 
bolster the credibility of the testifying officers by suggesting that 
they would not risk their careers and jeopardize their financial 
obligations.  Here, the prosecutor also argued beyond the record 
to support the veracity of the testifying officers — specifically, 
that the officers would be putting their “entire career on the 
line.” 
The Attorney General also points to less analogous cases 
where we rejected claims of prosecutorial vouching.  However, 
in each case, the prosecutor’s statements were either more 
directly tied to the record than the arguments at issue here or 
were sufficiently general such that they would not convey to the 
PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
16 
jury that the prosecutor had any special knowledge about the 
subject.  (See People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 796 
[prosecutor argued that an expert was “ ‘so much more capable, 
with no agenda, and serving the bottom line to you’ ”; the 
comment was “reasonable commentary on the credibility of the 
witnesses”]; Redd, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 741 [prosecutor 
argued that a testifying officer “went the extra distance” and 
took his “job seriously”; the comments “were based upon facts 
established by the testimony”]; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 
Cal.4th 381, 433 [prosecutor argued witnesses had no motive to 
lie; the comments were “simply argument based on inferences 
from the evidence presented”]; People v. Medina (1995) 11 
Cal.4th 694, 757 [prosecutor argued that ballistics experts had 
no reason to lie, were not being paid for testifying, and told the 
truth to the jury; “the prosecutor properly relied on facts of 
record and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom”]; People 
v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1217–1218 [prosecutor 
argued, “ ‘[i]s that [expert], for 75 bucks going to come in here 
and, you know, make all of his findings up or try and sway 
them?’ ”; “the prosecutor reasonably inferred that [the expert] 
had received $75 for the . . . autopsy based on [testimony about 
payments].  Reference to this modest payment suggested that 
[the expert] had no motive to fabricate in making his report”].)  
The claims in Redd, Medina, and Davenport were forfeited on 
appeal as well.  (See Redd, at p. 741; Medina, at p. 757; 
Davenport, at p. 1095.)  These cases are therefore not dispositive 
of the issue before us now. 
C.  Conclusion 
Based upon the foregoing and the record in this case, we 
find that the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for the testifying 
officers’ credibility.  The Court of Appeal found that the 
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Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
17 
prosecutor’s vouching was prejudicial.  That court appears to 
have overstated the import and effect of the prosecutor’s 
remarks when it explained, “The impact of the prosecutor’s 
remarks depended on the truth of a number of propositions, 
none of which come close to being self-evident: that law 
enforcement officers of long tenure are more likely to be honest 
than other people; that they can firmly expect to lose their jobs 
if they lie or exaggerate when testifying against those accused 
of crime; that they face a grave risk of prosecution for perjury by 
the very prosecutors who have presented their testimony if they 
do this; or that these factors are so powerful in the minds of 
officers that they would feel no motivation to lie in order to 
maximize the punishment of those who attack them.”   
(Rodriguez, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 907, italics added.)  We 
doubt that a reasonable juror would have drawn these precise 
conclusions from the prosecutor’s remarks and therefore 
disapprove People v. Rodriguez, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th 890.  
Nevertheless, 
the 
Attorney 
General 
has 
not 
argued 
harmlessness here, and we express no view on the Court of 
Appeal’s conclusions that the statements were prejudicial.  We 
do observe, however, that courts have often found that brief 
statements such as those before us have limited prejudicial 
effect.  (See, e.g., State v. Whitfield (R.I. 2014) 93 A.3d 1011, 
1020, fn. 6.)  We therefore affirm the Court of Appeal’s reversal 
of the judgment.2 
 
                                        
2 
The Attorney General also does not contest the Court of 
Appeal’s reversal of Rodriguez’s convictions for assault with a 
deadly weapon on instructional error grounds.   
PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
We affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Rodriguez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XXX 26 Cal.App.5th 890 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S251706 
Date Filed: May 21, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Kings 
Judge:  James LaPorte 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Lauren E. Dodge, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Ricardo D. Garcia, Public Defender, and Albert J. Menaster, Deputy Public Defender, for the Los Angeles 
County Public Defender’s Office as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, 
Assistant Attorney General, Lewis A. Martinez, Nora S. Weyl, Louis M. Vasquez, Rachelle A. Newcomb, 
Janet E. Neeley and Amanda D. Cary, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Lauren Dodge 
1250 Newell Avenue, #220 
Walnut Creek, CA 94596 
(925) 948-1090 
 
Lewis A. Martinez 
Deputy Attorney General 
2550 Mariposa Mall, Room 5090 
Fresno, CA 93721 
(559) 705-2308