Title: Higgins v. State
Citation: 565 So. 2d 698
Docket Number: 75110
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 1990

565 So. 2d 698 (1990)
Thomas HIGGINS, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 75110.

Supreme Court of Florida.
July 12, 1990.
Barbara M. Linthicum, Public Defender, and Nancy L. Showalter, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Edward C. Hill, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.
McDONALD, Justice.
We review Higgins v. State, 553 So. 2d 177, 179 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), because the court certified the following question:
*699 We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution, and answer the question in the negative.
By information the state charged that Higgins "unlawfully and willfully, by fire or explosion, damage[d] or cause[d] to be damaged a structure or contents thereof where persons are normally present," contrary to subsection 806.01(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1987).[1] The evidence disclosed that Higgins set fire to the mattress in his cell at the Union Correctional Institution. There was no claim, or evidence, that the building was damaged in any way.
Higgins requested in writing that a lesser charge of criminal mischief be given and verbally requested a charge on second-degree arson. The trial judge ruled this latter charge inapplicable, but grudgingly gave an instruction on attempted first-degree arson and on criminal mischief so that the jury could exercise its "jury pardon" powers if it decided to do so. The verdict form gave the jury four options: (1) guilty of first-degree arson; (2) guilty of attempted first-degree arson; (3) guilty of criminal mischief; and (4) not guilty. The jury convicted Higgins of first-degree arson. Higgins claims reversible error because of the failure to charge on second-degree arson.
In addressing whether the crime proscribed by subsection 806.01(2) is a necessarily lesser included offense of the crime defined in subsection 806.01(1), the district court opined:
*700 Id. at 178-79 (emphasis in original). On the facts in this case the district court reached the correct conclusion.
We hasten to add that, although second-degree arson is not a necessarily included offense of first-degree arson, it is, under certain circumstances and evidence, a proper permissive lesser included offense of first-degree arson.[2] For instance, had the charge and proof been that Higgins set fire to a building normally occupied by a large number of people, then a second-degree charge should also be given. A parallel discussion exists in Green v. State, 475 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1985), wherein Justice Overton, speaking for the Court, discussed the applicability of a third-degree murder instruction in a first-degree murder case.
The contention can no longer stand that because arson is a degree crime, a second-degree charge is mandated. In Green we noted:
Id. at 237. Thus, if the evidence would not support a conviction for second-degree arson, the trial judge did not err in refusing to give such an instruction. The burning of a building is a necessary ingredient of second-degree arson; it does not exist in this case.
As previously stated, the court afforded the jury an opportunity to convict of a lesser crime by charging on attempted arson and criminal mischief. There was no error in failing to instruct on second-degree arson in this case. Therefore, we approve the district court's affirmance of Higgin's conviction.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
[1]  § 806.01, Fla. Stat. (1987), reads as follows:

806.01 Arson. 
(1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged:
(a) Any dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its contents;
(b) Any structure, or contents thereof, where persons are normally present, such as: Jails, prisons, or detention centers; hospitals, nursing homes, or other health care facilities; department stores, office buildings, business establishments, churches, or educational institutions during normal hours of occupancy; or other similar structures; or
(c) Any other structure that he knew or had reasonable grounds to believe was occupied by a human being,
is guilty of arson in the first degree, which constitutes a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged any structure, whether the property of himself or another, under any circumstances not referred to in subsection (1), is guilty of arson in the second degree, which constitutes a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) As used in this chapter, "structure" means any building of any kind, any enclosed area with a roof over it, any real property and appurtenances thereto, any tent or other portable building, and any vehicle, vessel, watercraft, or aircraft.
(Emphasis added.)
[2]  § 806.01(2) arson is listed as a necessarily lesser included offense of § 806.01(1) arson in the Schedule of Lesser Included Offenses to the Florida Standard Jury Instructions (Criminal). We hereby amend that schedule by moving § 806.01(2) arson from the first category to the second, i.e., permissive lesser included offenses.