Title: Wisconsin v. LeMere
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2013AP002433-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 20, 2016

2016 WI 41 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP2433-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Stephen LeMere, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(No cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 20, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 17, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire 
 
JUDGE: 
Kristina M. Bourget 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, A. W., J. dissents, joined by 
ABRAHAMSON, J. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: BRADLEY, R. G., J. did not participate    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Edward J. Hunt and Hunt Law Group, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Edward J. Hunt. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Sarah 
L. Burgundy, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 41
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2013AP2433-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2011CF333) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Stephen LeMere, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 20, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming the 
circuit court's judgment convicting Stephen LeMere (LeMere) of 
first-degree sexual assault of a child under the age of 13 and 
affirming its order denying his postconviction motion to 
withdraw his plea.1 
                                                 
1 State v. LeMere, No. 2013AP2433-CR, unpublished order 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2014). 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
2 
¶2 
In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), the 
Supreme Court of the United States held that the Sixth Amendment 
requires defense counsel to inform a client whether his plea to 
a criminal charge carries a risk of deportation.  Here, we 
assess Padilla in a different context: Does the Sixth Amendment 
require defense counsel to inform a client about the possibility 
of civil commitment, under Wis. Stat. ch. 980,2 when the client 
enters a plea to a sexually violent offense?  We conclude that 
it does not and thus affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I.  Factual and Procedural Background 
¶3 
The charges against LeMere arose out of events that 
occurred after a gathering in the City of Eau Claire on Friday 
evening, May 13, 2011, at the home of J.C. and his wife, A.C.  
LeMere was then 24.  During the gathering, LeMere and another 
visitor drank the majority of two 30 packs of beer, in addition 
to other alcohol in the house.  LeMere also took a narcotic pain 
killer.  Although his memory of the evening became "fuzzy," 
LeMere recalled playing drinking games throughout the night. 
¶4 
Also present that evening was C.R.C., J.C.'s 12-year-
old sister.  As Friday night wore on, C.R.C. fell asleep on the 
couch in the living room.  Around 5:30 on Saturday morning, 
C.R.C. awoke to the sound of LeMere opening his cell phone.  
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2011-
12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
3 
LeMere began sending text messages to A.C.'s phone, which C.R.C. 
had borrowed from her sister-in-law. 
¶5 
LeMere's first message to C.R.C. said something 
similar to "will you have sex with me?"  C.R.C. responded with a 
message saying, "No, I'm 12 years old, what are you doing, 
creeped out."  LeMere sent two more messages.  Although LeMere 
eventually took A.C.'s phone away from C.R.C. and deleted the 
messages, C.R.C. later recalled that one message said something 
to the effect of "I know you're young but you're cute for a 
young girl," while the other said something along the lines of 
"I want to have sex with you."  C.R.C. sent messages back saying 
"No."3 
¶6 
Feeling uncomfortable, C.R.C. left the living room and 
went into the kitchen.  While sitting on a chair, she heard the 
floor creaking outside the kitchen door.  She stood up and 
walked over to investigate, whereupon LeMere suddenly popped out 
and grabbed her by the throat, placing her in a choke hold in 
the hallway.  He placed the sharp edge of a knife against her 
                                                 
3 The next morning, J.C., who had been asleep with AC in 
another room, discovered three messages from C.R.C. on his 
phone.  One message, received at 5:31 a.m., said, "Can one of 
you guys come out here, I'm scared."  Another, received at 5:57 
a.m., said, "Can you let me in the room."  Suspicious, J.C. 
asked to see LeMere's phone.  He found no messages in LeMere's 
sent messages folder but reviewed four messages in the inbox.  
One message from A.C.'s phone read, "I'm 12 years old, what are 
you doing, I'm 12 years old, I'm going to tell [J.C.] and 
[A.C.]" 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
4 
throat.  C.R.C., struggling to breathe, asked him, "[P]lease 
don't." 
¶7 
Telling her to shut up and not say anything, LeMere 
grabbed her arm and brought her into the kitchen, where he 
pushed her against the refrigerator.  Holding the knife to her 
neck with one hand, he used his other hand to fondle her vaginal 
area and insert his finger into her vagina.  At some point, 
LeMere told C.R.C. that he would find her and kill her if she 
told anyone about what had happened.  Gathering her strength, 
C.R.C. pushed LeMere away, grabbed A.C.'s cell phone from the 
kitchen table, and ran outside.  There, she used A.C.'s phone to 
call her mother and asked to be picked up from the house. 
¶8 
In a criminal complaint filed May 18, 2011, the State 
charged LeMere with one count of first-degree sexual assault of 
a 
child 
under 
the 
age 
of 
13, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 948.02(1)(e) and 939.50(3)(b); one count of second-degree 
reckless endangerment, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 941.30(2) and 
939.50(3)(g); and one count of strangulation and suffocation, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.235(1) and 939.50(3)(h).  After 
LeMere's 
initial 
appearance 
and 
a 
subsequent 
preliminary 
hearing, the State filed an information, charging LeMere with 
the same three counts. 
¶9 
At an arraignment in early June 2011, LeMere pleaded 
not guilty.  His counsel asked the court to reduce the $20,000 
cash bond set at LeMere's initial appearance, but the court 
denied the request. 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
5 
¶10 Although the court set an August 2011 trial date, that 
date changed multiple times after a series of continuances.  
LeMere's counsel sought the first continuance in early August 
2011 after receiving medical records and a DNA report from the 
State indicating the presence of LeMere's semen in C.R.C.'s 
underwear and on a vaginal swab.  The court granted the request 
and adjourned the trial to give LeMere an opportunity to conduct 
an independent review of the medical and DNA evidence.  During 
the status conference on the motion for continuance, the court——
at the request of LeMere's counsel——confirmed on the record that 
LeMere did not feel that the adjournment would abridge his right 
to a speedy trial. 
¶11 In mid-September, LeMere requested that the court 
appoint new counsel.  At a status conference originally 
scheduled for the purpose of setting a new trial date, the court 
approved the request.  A few days later, the State Public 
Defender appointed George Miller as LeMere's new counsel.  
Attorney Miller first appeared on LeMere's behalf in early 
October 2011, at which time the court set a new trial date for 
the first week of February 2012. 
¶12 Before the February trial could go forward, Attorney 
Miller filed a motion on LeMere's behalf requesting a competency 
evaluation and a second adjournment of the trial.  In an 
attached affidavit, Attorney Miller explained that LeMere had 
made a suicide attempt and had subsequently received treatment 
in a hospital's behavioral health unit.  Based on the suicide 
attempt and statements that LeMere made to Attorney Miller and 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
6 
to guards at the Eau Claire County Jail, Attorney Miller 
concluded that LeMere was not competent to stand trial.  The 
court approved the request and adjourned the trial for a second 
time.  However, by the middle of February 2012, LeMere's 
competency no longer remained in doubt, so the court set an 
April 2012 trial date. 
¶13 A status conference scheduled for the middle of March 
2012 became a plea hearing when counsel for the parties informed 
the court4 that they had negotiated a plea agreement.  Under the 
agreement, LeMere agreed to plead guilty to first-degree sexual 
assault of a child under the age of 13, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 948.02(1)(e) and 939.50(3)(b).  The State agreed to ask the 
court to dismiss and read in not only the other two charges in 
the information——for second-degree reckless endangerment and for 
strangulation and suffocation——but also all charges against 
LeMere in a separate case arising out of an incident that 
occurred during LeMere's incarceration.5  Furthermore, while the 
agreement allowed each party to argue for whatever sentence it 
deemed appropriate, the State agreed to request an initial 
confinement period no greater than 30 years, rather than the 40-
year maximum available to the court. 
                                                 
4  Lisa K. Stark, Judge. 
5 The other case involved battery charges brought against 
LeMere after he used a broom head to strike and seriously injure 
a fellow inmate in the county jail. 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
7 
¶14 After Attorney Miller provided the court with LeMere's 
plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form at the plea 
hearing, the court engaged in a plea colloquy.  The court 
addressed potential consequences of LeMere's plea, including 
possible immigration repercussions, loss of his right to vote, 
prohibition of firearm possession, sex-offender registration 
requirements, and other limits that would affect him as a sex 
offender. 
¶15 As part of its discussion about the consequences of 
the plea, the court engaged in the following exchange with 
LeMere: 
[THE 
COURT:] 
In 
addition, 
although 
not 
necessarily likely, I do have to tell you that if you 
are incarcerated and the State thought it appropriate, 
they could petition for what's called a Chapter 980, 
or habitual——or that's not what it's called.  It's a——
I'm sorry.  I'm blanking on the name of the statute.  
As a sexually violent person, which could require 
further incarceration on a civil basis past criminal.  
I don't know that will happen.  I don't think that it 
likely will, but I don't know that.  I just want to be 
sure you understand that that's a potential. 
Now, did you understand what I just said to you 
about probation, election, firearms, limitations on 
your ability to work, sex offender registry, and the 
sexually violent offender issue? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Has anything I've talked about changed 
your mind about what you want to do here? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions for me? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am. 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
8 
THE COURT: Anything you don't understand about 
what we've talked about here? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am. 
¶16 Earlier in the hearing, the court confirmed that 
LeMere harbored no concerns about his own ability to understand 
the proceedings.  Attorney Miller similarly affirmed for the 
court that he believed that LeMere could comprehend the exchange 
with the court.  The court added its own observation regarding 
LeMere's demeanor and capabilities: 
I would note that Mr. [LeMere] is sitting at counsel 
table.  He doesn't appear unduly anxious.  He seems 
very solemn.  He from his——at least observing his 
facial demeanor, he appears that he understands the 
seriousness of this matter.  He's answering my 
questions appropriately, and I do find that he 
understands what he's doing, and he's capable of 
proceeding here today. 
¶17 Based on LeMere's responses throughout the plea 
colloquy, the court accepted his guilty plea for first-degree 
sexual assault of a person under the age of 13.  Consistent with 
the plea agreement, the court dismissed and read in the other 
charges.  At a subsequent sentencing hearing, the court ordered 
30 years of initial confinement followed by 15 years of extended 
supervision.  The court entered the judgment of conviction on 
August 3, 2012. 
¶18 One year later, LeMere filed a motion in the circuit 
court6 seeking to withdraw his plea and vacate his conviction.7  
                                                 
6 Kristina M. Bourget, Judge. 
7 LeMere's Wis. Stat. § 974.02 motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea, filed August 22, 2013, was timely under Wis. Stat. 
(continued) 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
9 
LeMere claimed that his guilty plea was neither informed nor 
knowing.  He argued that he did not receive effective assistance 
of counsel because his attorney never informed him that, at the 
end of the confinement portion of his sentence, he might be 
subject 
to 
civil 
commitment 
under 
Chapter 980. 
 
In 
an 
accompanying affidavit, LeMere set forth a detailed basis for 
his withdrawal request: 
Prior to the change of plea hearing, I met with George 
Miller, the attorney appointed to represent me.  We 
discussed the case.  However, Attorney Miller at no 
time told me that a conviction for the crime of 1st 
                                                                                                                                                             
§ 809.30 despite the fact that he filed it more than a year 
after his August 3, 2012 sentencing.   
Just three days after sentencing, LeMere filed his Notice 
of Intent to Seek Post-Judgment Relief, well within the 20-day 
time limit for notice set forth in § 809.30(2)(b).  But on 
February 7, 2013, LeMere's postconviction attorney appointed by 
the State Public Defender's office filed two motions: one motion 
with the circuit court seeking permission to withdraw, pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 809.30(4)(a), and one motion with the court of 
appeals requesting an extension of time for LeMere to file a 
postconviction motion or notice of appeal.  The State Public 
Defender agreed to appoint new counsel, who filed a notice of 
appearance on March 21, 2013.  The court of appeals granted the 
extension, allowing LeMere's new counsel to file a notice of 
appeal or a postconviction motion by April 29, 2013. 
Over the succeeding months, LeMere's new counsel filed 
three more motions for extension of time, each of which the 
court of appeals granted.  In response to the third request, the 
court of appeals set an August 22, 2013 deadline for filing a 
postconviction motion or notice of appeal.  Thus, the extensions 
kept LeMere's postconviction motion and subsequent appeal within 
the Wis. Stat. § 809.30 timeline, meaning "the time for appeal 
or postconviction remedy provided in s. 974.02" had not expired 
such that LeMere would need to file his motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea under Wis. Stat. § 974.06. 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
10 
Degree 
Child 
Sexual 
Assault——Sexual 
Contact 
with 
Person under Age of 13 could make me subject to 
lifetime commitment as a sexually violent person under 
Chapter 980.  If I had been aware of the Chapter 980 
consequence by counsel, I would not have entered a 
plea of guilty on March 26, 2012.  I would have 
insisted on taking this case to trial.  In the time 
between my guilty plea and my sentencing hearing, 
Attorney Miller never discussed with me that I could 
be subject to lifetime commitment as a sexually 
violent person under Chapter 980.  If I had been made 
aware of this consequence of my guilty plea in the 
period between my plea of guilty and my sentencing 
hearing, I would have insisted that Attorney Miller 
file a motion to withdraw my guilty plea. 
He also requested an evidentiary hearing pursuant to State v. 
Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979). 
¶19 The circuit court denied the motion for postconviction 
relief on the grounds that the facts alleged in LeMere's 
affidavit, "if true, [did] not constitute deficient performance 
of counsel."  In reaching that conclusion, the court read the 
Padilla case as limited to deportation and inapplicable to the 
possible consequence of civil commitment under Chapter 980.  
LeMere filed his notice of appeal on October 23, 2013, appealing 
from both the judgment of conviction entered in August 2012 and 
the October 2013 order denying his motion for postconviction 
relief. 
¶20 The court of appeals summarily affirmed.  State v. 
LeMere, No. 2013AP2433-CR, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 
16, 2014).  Relying on its decision in State v. Myers, 199 
Wis. 2d 391, 544 N.W.2d 609 (Ct. App. 1996), that "a potential 
Wis. Stat. ch. 980 commitment at some time in the future is 
merely a 'collateral consequence' of a guilty plea," the court 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
11 
applied the rule that "no manifest injustice occurs when a 
defendant is not apprised of consequences that are collateral to 
the plea." LeMere, unpublished order at 2.  As a result, the 
court of appeals determined that LeMere was not denied the 
effective assistance of counsel.  Moreover, the court of appeals 
concluded that it had no authority to overrule Myers by 
extending Padilla beyond the deportation context to require 
advice about Chapter 980 civil commitment.  Id. at 3 (citing 
Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 185-90, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997)). 
¶21 On November 17, 2014, LeMere filed a petition for 
review, which we granted on March 16, 2015. 
II.  Standard of Review 
¶22 Before sentencing, a circuit court should freely allow 
a defendant to withdraw his plea for any fair and just reason, 
unless the prosecution would be substantially prejudiced.  State 
v. Jenkins, 2007 WI 96, ¶2, 303 Wis. 2d 157, 736 N.W.2d 24; 
State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶28, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 
N.W.2d 199.  Where, as here, a defendant seeks plea withdrawal 
after sentencing, the burden on the defendant is much higher: 
"[A] defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea 
after sentencing must prove manifest injustice by clear and 
convincing evidence."  State v. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, ¶29, 343 
Wis. 2d 1, 819 N.W.2d 749. 
¶23 "Ineffective assistance of counsel is one type of 
manifest injustice."  State v. Ortiz-Mondragon, 2015 WI 73, ¶28, 
364 
Wis. 2d 1, 
866 
N.W.2d 717. 
 
Claims 
for 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel are mixed questions of fact and law, and 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
12 
we will uphold a circuit court's factual findings so long as 
they are not clearly erroneous.  State v. Shata, 2015 WI 74, 
¶31, 364 Wis. 2d 63, 868 N.W.2d 93 (citing State v. Carter, 2010 
WI 40, ¶19, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695).  "Whether 
counsel's performance satisfies the constitutional standard for 
ineffective assistance of counsel is a question of law, which we 
review de novo."  State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶21, 264 
Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305. 
III.  Discussion 
¶24 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence."  Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
similarly prescribes that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and 
counsel."  As the Supreme Court explained in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), "the right to counsel is the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel."  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 
n.14 (1970)).  Criminal defendants have the right to effective 
assistance of counsel not only at trial but also during the plea 
bargaining process.  Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405-06 
(2012) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985)). 
¶25 To succeed on a claim that his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance, a defendant must prove that (1) counsel 
performed deficiently and (2) the defendant suffered prejudice 
as a result 
of the deficient performance.  
Thiel, 264 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
13 
Wis. 2d 571, 
¶18 
(citing 
Strickland, 
466 
U.S. 
at 
687).  
Deficient performance occurred if "counsel's representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness."  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 688. 
¶26 "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be 
highly deferential."  Id. at 689.  "Counsel need not be perfect, 
indeed 
need 
not 
even 
very 
good, 
to 
be 
constitutionally 
adequate."  Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶19 (quoting State v. 
Williquette, 180 Wis. 2d 589, 605, 510 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 
1993), which had quoted Dean v. Young, 777 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th 
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1142 (1986)).  But Padilla 
made 
clear 
that 
"advice 
regarding 
deportation 
is 
not 
categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment" and 
may be the basis for a claim that counsel provided ineffective 
assistance.  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366; see also Chaidez v. 
United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1112 (2013). 
¶27 Last term, in State v. Shata and State v. Ortiz-
Mondragon, we evaluated the scope of counsel's obligation to 
provide effective assistance, as described in the second part of 
Padilla. 
 
Given 
Padilla's 
conclusion 
that 
advice 
about 
deportation is not categorically excluded from Sixth Amendment 
protection, Shata and Ortiz-Mondragon examined the scope of an 
attorney's obligation to provide advice about immigration 
consequences. 
 
In 
particular, 
the 
cases 
focused 
on 
the 
relationship between the advice an attorney must give and the 
degree of certainty that serious immigration consequences will 
result from a plea.  See Shata, 364 Wis. 2d 63, ¶5 (holding that 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
14 
an attorney's advice that a "guilty plea carried a 'strong 
chance' of deportation" constituted effective assistance where 
"deportation was not an absolute certainty"); Ortiz-Mondragon, 
364 Wis. 2d 1, ¶5 (concluding that an attorney's advice that a 
plea carried a "risk" of adverse immigration consequences was 
sufficient where federal immigration law was not "succinct, 
clear, and explicit" that the pending charge "constituted a 
crime involving moral turpitude" (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 
368)). 
¶28 In this case, LeMere turns our attention back to the 
categorical analysis in the first part of Padilla.  He argues 
that Padilla's categorical reasoning with regard to deportation 
applies with equal force to the possibility of civil commitment 
under Chapter 980 for people convicted of sexually violent 
offenses.  Whether Padilla's reasoning extends to collateral 
consequences beyond deportation is a matter of first impression 
in Wisconsin. 
¶29 To assess LeMere's claim, we must examine why the 
Supreme Court concluded that deportation cannot be viewed as 
"merely a 'collateral' consequence" of a criminal conviction.  
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359-60.  We then discuss civil commitment 
under Chapter 980 and determine that the Sixth Amendment does 
not 
require 
counsel 
to 
advise 
defendants 
regarding 
the 
possibility of civil commitment as a sexually violent person. 
A.  Padilla's Effect on Sixth Amendment Doctrine 
¶30 Our discussion begins with an explanation of the Sixth 
Amendment analytical framework that the Supreme Court altered in 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
15 
Padilla.  Before Padilla, state and federal courts evaluating 
the scope of the right to effective assistance of counsel 
"almost unanimously concluded that the Sixth Amendment does not 
require attorneys to inform their clients of a conviction's 
collateral consequences, including deportation."  Chaidez, 133 
S. Ct. at 1109 & nn.7-8 (citing cases from 10 federal appellate 
courts and appellate courts in 27 states and the District of 
Columbia).  Drawing on Due Process principles applicable to 
courts accepting guilty pleas, courts had held that, to render 
effective assistance, counsel needed to advise defendants about 
direct consequences of a plea but not collateral consequences.  
Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance 
of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 Cornell L. 
Rev. 697, 703-04 (2002). 
¶31 Direct consequences are those that have a "definite, 
immediate, and largely automatic effect on the range of a 
defendant's punishment."  State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, ¶60, 237 
Wis. 2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 477 (citing State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, 
¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199); see also State ex rel. 
Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 636, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998).  
Collateral consequences, on the other hand, "are indirect and do 
not flow from the conviction"; rather, they "may be contingent 
on a future proceeding in which a defendant's subsequent 
behavior affects the determination" or may "rest[] not with the 
sentencing court, but instead with a different tribunal or 
government agency."  Byrge, 237 Wis. 2d 197, ¶61; see also 
Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 636. 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
16 
¶32 In his Padilla dissent, Justice Scalia provided a 
constitutional foundation for the distinction between direct 
consequences and collateral consequences: "The Sixth Amendment 
guarantees the accused a lawyer 'for his defence' against a 
'criminal 
prosecutio[n]'——not 
for 
sound 
advice 
about 
the 
collateral consequences of conviction."  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 
388 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original). 
We have until today at least retained the Sixth 
Amendment's 
textual 
limitation 
to 
criminal 
prosecutions.  "[W]e have held that 'defence' means 
defense at trial, not defense in relation to other 
objectives that may be important to the accused."  
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 216 (2008) 
(Alito, J., concurring) (summarizing cases).  We have 
limited the Sixth Amendment to legal advice directly 
related to defense against prosecution of the charged 
offense . . . . 
There is no basis in text or in principle to 
extend the constitutionally required advice regarding 
guilty pleas beyond those matters germane to the 
criminal prosecution at hand . . . . 
Adding to counsel's duties an obligation to 
advise about a conviction's collateral consequences 
has no logical stopping point. 
Id. at 389-90 (first alteration in original). 
¶33 Of course, the Padilla majority, in the opinion 
written by Justice Stevens, pointedly noted that the Court had 
"never applied a distinction between direct and collateral 
consequences to define the scope of constitutionally 'reasonable 
professional assistance' required under Strickland."  Padilla, 
559 U.S. at 365.  Nonetheless, the opinion artfully responded to 
Justice Scalia's critique, not by "eschew[ing] the direct-
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
17 
collateral divide across the board," Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 
1112, but by implying that deportation was a sui generis 
consequence rather than a collateral consequence.  Justice 
Stevens wrote for the Court that "[d]eportation as a consequence 
of a criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to 
the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a 
direct or a collateral consequence."  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366 
(emphasis added). 
¶34 Regardless of how it was argued, the Court's holding 
in 
Padilla 
that 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment 
right 
to 
effective 
assistance of counsel requires counsel to advise defendants 
about the deportation consequences of their pleas was a 
departure from precedent and "breach[ed] the previously chink-
free wall between direct and collateral consequences" for Sixth 
Amendment purposes.  Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1110. 
¶35 Padilla clearly affected Wisconsin law.  Like courts 
in other states, the Wisconsin court of appeals had applied the 
distinction between direct and collateral consequences in the 
Sixth Amendment context.  State v. Santos, 136 Wis. 2d 528, 531, 
401 N.W.2d 856 (Ct. App. 1987) ("Deportation is a collateral 
consequence of a plea. . . .  [D]efendants need not be informed 
of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea."), abrogated by 
Padilla, 559 U.S. 356; see also State v. Brown, 2004 WI App 179, 
¶7 n.3, 276 Wis. 2d 559, 687 N.W.2d 543 ("[D]efense counsel's 
failure to advise a defendant of collateral consequences is not 
a sufficient basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim."). 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
18 
¶36 LeMere now seeks to extend the holding in Padilla to a 
consequence beyond deportation.  This requires us to examine 
what characteristics of deportation made it an exception to the 
general direct-collateral framework under the Sixth Amendment. 
¶37 Padilla involved a lawful permanent resident who had 
lived in the United States for more than 40 years but faced 
"virtually mandatory" deportation under federal law after he 
pled guilty to transporting a substantial quantity of marijuana 
in his tractor-trailer.  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359.  Padilla had 
agreed to plead guilty only after his counsel advised him that, 
because he had been in the country for a long time, he did not 
need to worry about the plea's deportation consequences.  Id.  
During postconviction proceedings, Padilla alleged that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel and would have 
insisted on proceeding to trial had he known the true 
immigration consequences of his plea.  Id.  The Supreme Court of 
Kentucky concluded that Padilla had no Sixth Amendment claim for 
ineffective assistance for faulty advice about the collateral 
consequence of deportation.  Id. at 359-60.  It then denied his 
request to withdraw his plea. 
¶38 The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that "[t]he 
collateral versus direct distinction is . . . ill suited to 
evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of 
deportation."  Id. at 366 (emphasis added).  "[B]ecause of its 
close connection to the criminal process," deportation fits into 
neither of the two traditional categories.  Id.  Although not a 
criminal 
punishment, 
the 
Court 
reasoned, 
deportation 
is 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
19 
nevertheless 
"particularly 
severe," 
unlike 
other 
civil 
consequences frequently deemed collateral.  Id. at 365.  Most 
collateral consequences do not amount to "the equivalent of 
banishment or exile."  Id. at 373 (quoting Delgadillo v. 
Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947)).  Moreover, the Court 
noted, for many non-citizens deportation becomes "nearly an 
automatic result" of a conviction.  Id. at 366.  Relevant 
federal immigration statutes spell out in "succinct, clear, and 
explicit" terms Padilla's immediate eligibility for deportation 
as a result of his conviction.  Id. at 368. 
¶39 Three years later, the Supreme Court conducted a 
valuable analysis of Padilla when asked to decide whether 
Padilla applied retroactively.  Chaidez involved a lawful 
permanent resident whose conviction subjecting her to mandatory 
deportation became final in 2004.  Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1105-
06.  At the time she entered her guilty plea, her attorney never 
advised her that the conviction could expose her to deportation.  
Id. 
at 
1106. 
 
Immigration 
officials 
commenced 
removal 
proceedings in 2009 after Chaidez applied for citizenship and 
her criminal conviction surfaced.  Id.  Hoping to avoid removal, 
she initiated a collateral attack against her guilty plea on 
grounds that her counsel provided ineffective assistance by 
failing to advise her of the deportation consequences of her 
plea.  Id. 
¶40 While 
the 
district 
court 
was 
considering 
her 
challenge, the Supreme Court decided Padilla.  Id.  Therefore, 
Chaidez sought retroactive application of Padilla, and the 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
20 
Supreme Court was required to consider Padilla under Teague v. 
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), to determine whether Padilla had 
stated a "new rule" of law.  Chaidez could not take advantage of 
a decision rendered years after her conviction became final if 
Padilla had articulated a new rule of law.  Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1107. 
¶41 In concluding that Padilla stated a new rule and that 
Chaidez could not rely on it to challenge her plea, the Court 
began by distinguishing Padilla from Strickland.  Id. at 1108.  
The Court observed that before the Padilla opinion engaged in 
traditional Strickland analysis, it answered a "threshold 
question": 
Was advice about deportation 'categorically removed' 
from the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
because it involved only a 'collateral consequence' of 
a conviction, rather than a component of the criminal 
sentence?  In other words, prior to asking how the 
Strickland test applied ("Did this attorney act 
unreasonably?"), Padilla asked whether the Strickland 
test applied ("Should we even evaluate if this 
attorney acted unreasonably?"). 
Id. (citation and footnote omitted).  In short, before the 
Padilla Court ever addressed the first prong of the Strickland 
test, it had to decide whether the Sixth Amendment applied at 
all.  Id. at 1111.8 
                                                 
8 The Supreme Court of Utah has applied Chaidez in this 
manner, citing Chaidez for the proposition that, "when the 
alleged deficient performance is defense counsel's failure to 
inform a client of a particular consequence of a guilty plea, we 
must first consider whether Strickland applies at all."  State 
v. Trotter, 330 P.3d 1267, 1271 (Utah 2014) (holding that 
Padilla does not extend the Sixth Amendment to require counsel 
(continued) 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
21 
¶42 At one point, the Chaidez opinion appeared to focus on 
two factors——"the severity of the penalty and the 'automatic' 
way it follows from conviction"——to explain the "special 'nature 
of 
deportation'" 
and 
why 
the 
"collateral 
versus 
direct 
distinction" was "'ill-suited' to dispose of Padilla's claims."  
Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1112 (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366).  
Upon reflection, we think the Court viewed deportation as 
distinct from other consequences for multiple reasons.9 
¶43 Central to the Padilla Court's analysis was its 
emphasis on deportation as a "unique" consequence of conviction.  
As the Chaidez Court explained, Padilla "did not eschew the 
direct-collateral divide across the board."  Id.10  On the 
                                                                                                                                                             
to advise defendants about the collateral consequence of sex 
offender registration), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 944. 
9 But see Trotter, 330 P.3d at 1272 ("[T]he Court determined 
that 
deportation 
is 
uniquely 
ill-suited 
for 
the 
direct-
collateral divide because (1) it results automatically from the 
entry of the plea, and (2) it is a particularly severe penalty.  
Accordingly, any rationale for extending Padilla's reasoning to 
other 
contexts . . . must 
be 
rooted 
in 
both 
of 
these 
justifications." (citation omitted)). 
10 The Court's comment regarding the survival of the direct-
collateral 
distinction 
as 
a 
general 
rule 
has 
important 
consequences in Wisconsin in light of Padilla's abrogation of 
State v. Santos, 136 Wis. 2d 528, 401 N.W.2d 856 (Ct. App. 
1987).  In Santos, the defendant, a Cuban immigrant, sought 
postconviction withdrawal of his guilty plea to burglary 
charges.  Santos, 136 Wis. 2d at 529-30.  He argued that his 
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to inform him 
that the guilty plea could form the basis for his deportation.  
Id. at 530.  The court of appeals held that Santos did not 
receive 
ineffective 
assistance 
because 
deportation 
is 
a 
collateral consequence of a conviction and counsel need not 
inform defendants of collateral consequences.  Id. at 531-33.  
(continued) 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
22 
contrary, the Padilla Court twice used the word "unique" to 
describe the situation.  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365 (mentioning 
"the unique nature of deportation" (emphasis added)); id. at 366 
("Deportation 
as 
a 
consequence 
of 
criminal 
conviction 
is . . . uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a 
collateral consequence [of a criminal conviction]." (emphasis 
added)).  The Padilla Court understood the meaning of "unique." 
To call something "unique" is to say that it is "the only one of 
its kind."  Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2500 
(1986).  Throughout Padilla, the Court identified a number of 
factors that set deportation apart from other consequences. 
¶44 Certainly, 
the 
severe 
and 
automatic 
nature 
of 
deportation are both factors that contribute to its unique 
character.  The Padilla Court deemed deportation "a particularly 
severe 'penalty,'" and the Court used other similar adjectives 
and phrases——"harsh," "drastic," "unjust," the "equivalent of 
banishment," "exile"——throughout the opinion.  Padilla, 559 U.S. 
at 360-62, 373.  Additionally, the Court used some variation on 
the 
word 
"automatic" 
four 
times, 
and 
it 
emphasized 
the 
"virtually 
mandatory," 
"virtually 
inevitable," 
"practically 
                                                                                                                                                             
Notwithstanding Padilla's implicit abrogation of Santos with 
regard to the specific consequence of deportation, see Chaidez, 
133 S. Ct. at 1109 & n.8, the Court's reasoning in Chaidez 
indicates that the general direct-collateral framework applied 
in Santos persists, id. at 1110-11; cf. Commonwealth v. Abraham, 
62 
A.3d 343, 
350 
(Pa. 
2012) 
("Padilla 
did 
not 
abrogate 
application 
of 
[a 
direct 
versus 
collateral 
consequences] 
analysis in cases that do not involve deportation."). 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
23 
inevitable," "automatic," "nearly . . . automatic" nature of 
deportation after certain criminal convictions.  Id. at 359-60, 
364-66. 
¶45 But beyond the severe and automatic aspects of 
deportation, the Padilla Court also considered its "close 
connection to the criminal process."  Id. at 366.  Several 
times, the Court explained that, although removal proceedings 
are civil in nature, "deportation is nevertheless intimately 
related to the criminal process.  Our law has enmeshed criminal 
convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a 
century."  Id. at 365-66.  "[W]e find it 'most difficult' to 
divorce the penalty from the conviction in the deportation 
context."  Id. at 366 (quoting United States v. Russell, 686 
F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).  In the past, federal and state 
judges were able to make a binding recommendation against 
deportation (JRAD) at the time of sentencing.  Id. at 361-63.  
Today, defense counsel "may be able to plea bargain creatively 
with the prosecution in order to craft a conviction and sentence 
that reduce the likelihood of deportation."  Id. at 373. 
¶46 Highlighting 
deportation's 
close 
connection 
to 
criminal sanctions, the Padilla Court described deportation as a 
"penalty" at least five times: (1) "[D]eportation is an integral 
part——indeed, sometimes the most important part——of the penalty 
that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to 
specified crimes."  Id. at 364 (footnote omitted).  (2) "We have 
long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe 
'penalty.'"  Id. at 365 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
24 
149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893)).  (3) "Our law has enmeshed criminal 
convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a 
century."  Id. at 365-66 (citation omitted).  (4) "[W]e find it 
'most difficult' to divorce the penalty from the conviction in 
the deportation context."  Id. at 366 (quoting Russell, 686 F.2d 
at 38).  (5) "[T]he threat of deportation may provide the 
defendant with a powerful incentive to plead guilty to an 
offense that does not mandate that penalty in exchange for a 
dismissal of a charge that does."  Id. at 373. 
¶47 Finally, it must be noted that not all people 
convicted of certain crimes face deportation as a potential 
consequence of conviction; only noncitizens face deportation's 
penal effects.  Indeed, the Padilla Court used the word 
"noncitizen" 17 times and appeared to view noncitizens——"a class 
of 
clients 
least 
able 
to 
represent 
themselves"——as 
a 
particularly vulnerable class.  Id. at 370-71. 
¶48 A unique confluence of factors thus led the Padilla 
Court to articulate an extraordinary exception to the direct-
collateral framework——which the court otherwise declined to 
disturb——for the "penalty" of deportation.  In light of this 
exception, we now examine whether the possibility of civil 
commitment under Chapter 980 warrants a similar exception. 
B.  Evaluating the Consequence of Chapter 980 Commitment 
¶49 To determine whether the Sixth Amendment requires 
counsel 
to 
advise 
defendants 
about 
the 
possibility 
of 
Chapter 980 commitment, we review the same factors that set 
deportation apart from other consequences. 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
25 
1.  Deportation's Unique Nature Weighs Against Creating an 
Exception for Chapter 980 Commitment 
¶50 At the outset, we reemphasize that Padilla created a 
"new 
rule" 
when 
it 
determined 
that 
deportation 
was 
not 
"categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment's 
right to counsel."  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366.  The Court created 
the new rule, in large part, because of "the unique nature of 
deportation."  Id. at 365.  Extending Padilla to embrace the 
possibility of Chapter 980 commitment would initiate a more far-
reaching "new rule" not yet articulated by the Supreme Court.  
It would deviate from the characterization of deportation as 
"unique."  And, inevitably, it would do more than widen the 
breach in the substantially chink-free wall between direct and 
collateral consequences——it would effectively tear down that 
wall.  Chapter 980 commitment cannot be described as anything 
other than a classic collateral consequence.  State v. Myers, 
199 Wis. 2d 391, 394, 544 N.W.2d 609 (Ct. App. 1996).  Thus, 
without a directive and clear guidance from the Supreme Court, 
this court would be discarding any logical stopping point by 
establishing a new obligation under the Sixth Amendment to 
advise a defendant about a collateral consequence.  Padilla, 559 
U.S. at 390 (Scalia, J., dissenting).11 
                                                 
11 For 
example, 
the 
National 
Inventory 
of 
Collateral 
Consequences of Conviction, a database created by the American 
Bar 
Association, 
identifies 
as 
many 
as 
693 
collateral 
consequences of conviction in Wisconsin.  Am. Bar Ass'n, 
National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Conviction 
(continued) 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
26 
2.  The Severity of Chapter 980 Commitment 
¶51 Padilla emphasized the severity of deportation, using 
such phrases as the "harsh consequences" of deportation, which 
is a "drastic measure."  Id. at 360 (majority opinion).  Chaidez 
reiterated that deportation is "particularly severe."  Chaidez, 
133 S. Ct. at 1117 & n.4.  Non-citizens confronted with 
deportation 
"face 
possible 
exile 
from 
this 
country 
and 
separation from their families."  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 370.  
Deportation creates a permanent physical separation from the 
United States and, to a lesser extent, from people who live 
here.  If a person confronted with removal wished to maintain 
relationships with friends and family who live in this country, 
deportation's permanent physical separation could create a more 
onerous burden than time served in an American prison.  The 
person's friends and family likely would need to spend hundreds, 
if not thousands, of dollars on international travel expenses 
for a single physical reunion. 
¶52 LeMere argues that commitment under Chapter 980 is 
even 
more 
severe 
than 
removal 
from 
the 
country 
because 
commitment could last for the remainder of his lifetime.  He 
observes that a person deported from the United States remains 
entirely free outside this country and retains substantial 
personal liberty.  A person committed under Chapter 980, he 
argues, is confined under state control for an indefinite period 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2013), http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/search/?jurisdi
ction=50. 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
27 
of time, even after serving time in prison.  By focusing on the 
worst case scenario as though it were the norm, however, LeMere 
overstates, to a degree, the severity of Chapter 980 commitment.  
Although a person will remain committed "until such time as the 
person is no longer a sexually violent person," Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.06, Chapter 980 delineates numerous and regular procedures 
for reevaluating whether a person's commitment should continue. 
¶53 Chapter 980 
commitment 
is 
not 
intended 
to 
be 
permanent.  Within the first year after the person's commitment, 
the Department of Health Services (DHS) must conduct a new 
examination of the person's mental condition to determine 
whether discharge or supervised release would be appropriate.  
Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1).  Similar reevaluations follow annually 
after the first year.  Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1).  Furthermore, a 
person may bring a petition for discharge from commitment at any 
time, Wis. Stat. § 980.09(1), and may file a petition for 
supervised release on an annual basis, Wis. Stat. § 980.08(1).  
These frequent reevaluations assure that a person remains 
committed no longer than is necessary for treatment purposes.12 
¶54 Nevertheless, any time spent civilly committed results 
in a deprivation of liberty for the person subject to 
                                                 
12 A 2012 DHS report regarding discharge and supervised 
release from Chapter 980 commitments indicates that the 59 
patients 
discharged 
between 
2009 
and 
2011 
experienced 
commitments lasting approximately 8 to 9 years, on average.  
Gina Olson, WI Chapter 980 SVP Discharge & Supervised Release 
3, 8 (2012), https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/sites/default/files/l
egacy/SandRidge/InformationalPapers/C980Discharge1.pdf. 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
28 
commitment.  See State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 302, 541 N.W.2d 
115 (1995).  Despite regular reviews, the possibility undeniably 
exists that a person, once committed, will receive annual 
reports indicating that he or she remains a sexually violent 
person and has not made sufficient progress in treatment to earn 
outright discharge or even supervised release.  As Justice 
Kennedy 
described 
Kansas's 
civil 
commitment 
framework, 
"Notwithstanding its civil attributes, the practical effect of 
the . . . law may be to impose confinement for life."  Kansas v. 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372 (1997) (Kennedy, J, concurring); 
see also State v. Nelson, 2005 WI App 113, ¶15, 282 Wis. 2d 502, 
701 
N.W.2d 32 
("A 
Chapter 
980 
commitment . . . could 
be 
lifelong."). 
¶55 Accordingly, we acknowledge that civil commitment 
under 
Chapter 980 
is 
a 
severe 
consequence. 
 
Chapter 980 
commitment's continued deprivation of liberty after the end of a 
prison sentence makes it severe, particularly when it becomes 
"potentially indefinite."  Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 314; see also 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 364.  Once again, however, it is not 
designed or intended to be permanent.  Chapter 980 commitment's 
rehabilitative function——"provid[ing] care and treatment to 
those with mental disorders that predispose them to sexual 
violence," Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 302——moderates its severity.  
The rehabilitative objective at the core of commitment ensures 
that commitment is not necessarily as permanent a consequence as 
deportation's 
banishment 
would 
be. 
 
In 
sum, 
Chapter 980 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
29 
commitment, though severe, is not as uncompromisingly severe a 
consequence as deportation. 
3.  Chapter 980 Commitment Is Not Penal 
¶56 The rehabilitative aspect of Chapter 980 commitment 
also takes it out of the "penalty" category.  Chapter 980 
"creates a civil commitment procedure primarily intended to 
protect the public and to provide concentrated treatment to 
convicted sexually violent persons, not to punish the sexual 
offender."  State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 258, 541 
N.W.2d 105 (1995) (emphasis added).  "The emphasis on treatment 
in ch. 980 is evident from its plain language."  Id. at 266.  
"[T]reatment is a bona fide goal of this statute . . . ."  Post, 
197 Wis. 2d at 308. 
¶57 In upholding a similar statute from Kansas, the 
Supreme Court explained that "commitment under the Act does not 
implicate either of the two primary objectives of criminal 
punishment: retribution or deterrence."  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 
361-62.  The Court added: 
Hendricks focuses on his confinement's potentially 
indefinite 
duration 
as 
evidence 
of 
the 
State's 
punitive intent.  That focus, however, is misplaced.  
Far from any punitive objective, the confinement's 
duration is instead linked to the stated purposes of 
the commitment, namely, to hold the person until his 
mental abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat 
to others. 
Id. at 363.  The Supreme Court could not characterize civil 
commitment under Chapter 980 and similar statutes as a "penalty" 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
30 
without jeopardizing the now well-established constitutionality 
of these statutes. 
4.  Chapter 980 Commitment Is Not an Automatic Result of the 
Underlying Conviction 
¶58 Under federal law, a non-citizen convicted of certain 
offenses, like the drug offense in Padilla, automatically 
satisfies a statutory condition that serves as the basis for 
deportation.  In contrast, a person convicted of a sexually 
violent offense in Wisconsin does not automatically meet the 
definition of "sexually violent person," which requires proof of 
dangerousness 
beyond 
the 
fact 
of 
conviction. 
 
Indeed, 
Chapter 980 requires a second trial regarding the person's 
dangerousness and mental condition, and that trial occurs only 
if the Wisconsin Department of Justice or a district attorney 
petitions 
for 
commitment. 
 
These 
procedural 
requirements 
distinguish commitment under Chapter 980 from deportation under 
federal law and show that even a Chapter 980 petition is not an 
inevitable consequence of a conviction for a sexually violent 
offense. 
¶59 In Padilla, the Court explained that, under current 
federal law, "if a noncitizen has committed a removable 
offense . . . , 
his 
removal 
is 
practically 
inevitable."  
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 363-64 (emphasis added).  As we explained 
in Shata, "[T]he Court meant that Padilla was automatically 
deportable upon conviction, not that he would be automatically 
deported."  Shata, 364 Wis. 2d 63, ¶61.  Nevertheless, had 
immigration officials chosen to initiate removal proceedings 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
31 
against Padilla, his conviction would already have made him 
"eligible for deportation" under the federal statutes.  Padilla, 
559 U.S. at 368 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)).  A person 
who meets one of the "grounds of deportability under section 
1227(a)" may be subject to removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(a)(2) (2012).  To secure removal, the government "has 
the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that, in 
the case of an alien who has been admitted to the United States, 
the 
alien 
is 
deportable." 
 
8 
U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(3)(A).  
Sufficient evidence based on a conviction includes an "official 
record of judgment and conviction" and an "official record of 
plea, verdict, and sentence," among other documents.  Id. 
§ 1229a(c)(3)(B).  Though a person facing deportation does 
receive a hearing on the matter, the Supreme Court had good 
reason to describe deportation as "practically inevitable" upon 
conviction.  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364. 
¶60 An examination of the procedures in Chapter 980 
demonstrates that, in contrast, proof of conviction of a 
sexually violent offense does not alone provide a sufficient 
basis for a court to determine that a person qualifies as a 
sexually 
violent 
person 
for 
civil 
commitment 
purposes.  
Chapter 980 "prescribes a detailed procedure that the State must 
follow in order to commit a sexually violent person."  State v. 
Gilbert, 2012 WI 72, ¶21, 342 Wis. 2d 82, 816 N.W.2d 215.  A 
sexually violent person is someone convicted of a sexually 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
32 
violent offense specified under Wis. Stat. § 980.01(6)13 who also 
has been determined to be "dangerous because he or she suffers 
from a mental disorder that makes it likely that the person will 
engage in one or more acts of sexual violence."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.01(7). 
¶61 When a person convicted of a sexually violent offense 
comes due for release from the confinement portion of a sentence 
of imprisonment, the Wisconsin Department of Justice or a 
district attorney may choose to file a petition alleging that 
the person meets the definition of "sexually violent person."  
Wis. Stat. § 980.02(1).  Shortly after the filing, a court must 
determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the 
person fits the definition.  Wis. Stat. § 980.04.  If the court 
finds 
probable 
cause 
and 
orders 
the 
person's 
continued 
detention, the person will receive a trial, which may be to a 
jury, to determine whether he or she is sexually violent.  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.05(1)-(2).  The person enjoys many procedural 
rights.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 980.031, 980.034, 980.036.  
Furthermore, a person will not be found a "sexually violent 
person" unless the State persuades the finder of fact beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Wis. Stat. § 980.05(3). 
¶62 In treating Chapter 980 commitment as a collateral 
consequence of conviction, the court of appeals has similarly 
                                                 
13 LeMere pleaded guilty to first-degree sexual assault of a 
child under the age of 13 contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(e), 
a sexually violent offense under Wis. Stat. § 980.01(6)(a). 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
33 
described 
how 
"commitment 
will 
not 
automatically 
flow 
from . . . conviction": 
Although such a commitment will require a prior 
predicate 
offense, 
[the 
defendant's] 
offense, 
by 
itself, will not trigger a commitment.  Rather, a 
commitment will depend on [the defendant's] condition 
at the time of the ch. 980 proceeding and the evidence 
that the State will then present on his condition.  If 
the 
State 
were 
to 
initiate 
such 
commitment 
proceedings, [the defendant] will have the full 
benefit of the ch. 980 procedures, due process, and an 
independent trial, including the right to offer 
evidence to refute the State's charges. 
Myers, 199 Wis. 2d at 394. 
¶63 The nature of the second round of proceedings——which 
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a person convicted 
of a sexually violent offense also is a sexually violent person—
—distinguishes Chapter 980 commitment from deportation.  By 
virtue of his drug-trafficking conviction alone, Padilla became 
deportable under federal law.  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359 n.1 
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)).  Mere proof of the fact of 
his conviction would be sufficient for the federal government to 
secure removal.  Conviction of an offense defined as sexually 
violent under Chapter 980 does not similarly bring a person 
within the definition of "sexually violent person" by default.  
Instead, the State must still prove the second element of the 
definition of sexually violent person——that the person convicted 
of the sexually violent offense also is "dangerous because he or 
she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it likely that the 
person will engage in one or more acts of sexual violence."  
Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7).  Given that the state must prove not 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
34 
just the fact of conviction but also a degree of dangerousness, 
it is far from "inevitable" that a person convicted of a 
sexually violent offense will also be adjudged a sexually 
violent person. 
¶64 LeMere urges us to adopt the reasoning applied by the 
Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Hughes, 983 N.E.2d 439 
(Ill. 2012), a decision that extended Padilla to require advice 
about the possibility of commitment as a sexually violent person 
under Illinois law.14  Evaluating Illinois's civil commitment 
statute, the court observed that "it is certain that a person 
convicted of a sexually violent offense is eligible for 
commitment and the conviction alone will definitely subject the 
defendant to a mandatory comprehensive evaluation for commitment 
nearing the end of his prison term."  Id. at 455 (emphasis 
added). 
¶65 We disagree with the Hughes court's analysis, which 
focused on the "possibility of" or "eligibility for" commitment.  
Statistics discussed in one case before our court of appeals 
indicated that no more than 4.5 percent of people convicted of 
sexually violent offenses are even recommended for commitment 
proceedings under Chapter 980.  State v. Budd, 2007 WI App 245, 
                                                 
14 Unlike the Supreme Court of Utah, which decided Trotter, 
330 P.3d 1267, on May 20, 2014, the Supreme Court of Illinois 
did not have the benefit of Chaidez's February 20, 2013 
assessment of Padilla when it decided Hughes on November 29, 
2012, and denied rehearing on January 28, 2013. 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
35 
¶16, 306 Wis. 2d 167, 742 N.W.2d 887.15  Properly considering the 
"possibility" 
of 
Chapter 980 
commitment 
as 
part 
of 
the 
evaluation of whether commitment follows "automatically" from a 
conviction actually demonstrates how unlikely commitment is for 
the vast majority of people convicted of a sexually violent 
offense. 
5.  Chapter 980 Commitment Is Not Enmeshed in the Criminal 
Process 
¶66 Our evaluation of the nature of Chapter 980 commitment 
further counsels in favor of the conclusion that Chapter 980 
commitment is not "intimately related to the criminal process."  
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365.  To be sure, conviction of a sexually 
violent offense is a precondition to Chapter 980 commitment.  
But commitment is not an "integral part . . . of the penalty 
that may be imposed" on persons convicted of sexually violent 
offenses.  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364.  Rather, it is a 
rehabilitative program that is unlikely to affect the vast 
majority of people convicted of qualifying offenses.  In the 
rare event that the state does pursue Chapter 980 commitment, 
the state must prove the person's "dangerousness" in addition to 
                                                 
15 A recent DHS report with data through 2013 regarding 
Chapter 980 commitments includes statistics similar to those 
mentioned in Budd.  According to the report, the Department of 
Corrections refers only 3.3 percent of eligible inmates to DHS 
for possible Chapter 980 commitment.  See Deborah McCulloch, 
Chapter980 Overview 19 (2014), https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/sit
es/default/files/legacy/SandRidge/InformationalPapers/980Overvie
w2014.pdf (indicating only 657 referrals for commitment among 
19,689 eligible inmates screened by Department of Corrections). 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
36 
the 
fact 
of 
the 
underlying 
conviction. 
 
Though 
future 
eligibility for Chapter 980 commitment may be a factor that a 
defendant 
considers 
when 
contemplating 
a 
plea, 
possible 
commitment requiring proof of dangerousness beyond a reasonable 
doubt is not part and parcel of a conviction or its resultant 
punishment. 
6.  No Special Vulnerability or Class Status Warrants 
Particularized Consideration for Persons Convicted of Sexually 
Violent Offenses 
¶67 Unlike the "noncitizens" whose interests the Court 
considered in Padilla, people convicted of sexually violent 
offenses share no independent characteristic that provides a 
basis for developing an individualized exception for them.  
Noncitizens face deportation as a consequence of certain 
convictions because of their immigration status, a status that 
precedes any criminal proceedings against them.  Deportation 
becomes "an integral part . . . of the penalty that may be 
imposed" for any conviction because of the noncitizen status.  
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364.  A certain immigration status thus 
makes noncitizens uniquely vulnerable to a punitive consequence 
of conviction above and beyond traditional punishments such as 
confinement. 
¶68 Persons convicted of sexually violent offenses share 
no such common attribute that precedes conviction.  Although 
some persons convicted of sexually violent offenses may have a 
history of serious mental illness that could serve as the basis 
for the "dangerousness" element in the Wis. Stat. § 980.01(6) 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
37 
definition 
of 
"sexually 
violent 
persons," 
serious 
mental 
disorder is not a prerequisite for conviction of a sexually 
violent offense.  The absence of a common precondition for 
eligibility for Chapter 980 commitment reinforces the conclusion 
that an exception would be inappropriate. 
IV.  Conclusion 
¶69 Padilla specifically brought advice about the unique 
consequence 
of 
deportation 
within 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment's 
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.  We decline to 
create a similar exception for Chapter 980 civil commitment.  
Chapter 980 commitment is a collateral consequence of a plea 
resulting in conviction of a sexually violent offense.  Myers, 
199 Wis. 2d at 394.  The Sixth Amendment does not require 
defense counsel to inform a client about the possibility of 
civil commitment.  To reach this conclusion, we rely on the many 
factors that differentiate the possibility of Chapter 980 
commitment from the unique consequence of deportation. 
¶70 We are mindful of defendants' reasonable desires to 
make informed choices about the consequences of any plea they 
might make.  Certainly, the best practice for defense counsel is 
to discuss with the defendant any consequences of a plea that 
will have a meaningful impact on the defendant's decision to 
accept or reject a plea agreement.  But the Sixth Amendment 
makes no guarantee of perfect advocacy, Maryland v. Kulbicki, 
136 S. Ct. 2, 5 (2015) (per curiam) (citing Yardborough v. 
Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (per curiam)), and a best practice 
No. 
  2013AP2433-CR 
38 
does not rise to the level of implicating the constitutional 
interest set forth in Padilla. 
¶71 Therefore, we conclude that LeMere's assertion that 
his counsel never informed him about the possibility of civil 
commitment under Chapter 980 does not form the basis for a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Consequently, LeMere 
cannot withdraw his guilty plea. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶72 Rebecca G. Bradley, J., did not participate. 
 
No. 2013AP2433-CR.awb  
 
1 
 
 
¶73 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I agree that 
the criminal conduct described by the majority is heinous.  If 
we were called upon as a court to condemn such conduct, I am 
confident 
that 
there 
would 
be 
immediate 
and 
unanimous 
condemnation.1   
¶74 Our task in this review, however, is not to assess the 
defendant's conduct.  Rather, we are called upon to analyze and 
apply a rule of law.   
¶75 At issue is whether LeMere's counsel should have 
advised him that he is automatically eligible for involuntary, 
indefinite civil commitment after serving his criminal sentence.  
The precise issue is whether the Sixth Amendment requires 
defense counsel to inform a client about the possibility of 
civil commitment, under Wis. Stat. Chapter 980, when the client 
enters a plea to a qualifying sexually violent offense.   
¶76 The majority concludes that "LeMere's assertion that 
his counsel never informed him about the possibility of civil 
commitment under Chapter 980 does not form the basis for a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel."  Majority op., ¶71.   
¶77 In reaching its conclusion, the majority fails to 
recognize that like the deportation consequences analyzed in 
                                                 
1 LeMere pleaded guilty to first-degree sexual assault of a 
child 
under 
the 
age 
of 
13, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 948.02(1)(e) and 939.50(3)(b).  Majority op., ¶13.  He was 
sentenced to thirty years of initial confinement, followed by 
fifteen years of extended supervision.  Id., ¶17.  A "sexually 
violent offense" that qualifies a defendant for Chapter 980 
commitment includes any crime specified in Wis. Stat. 948.02(1).  
See Wis. Stat. § 980.01(6)(a). 
No. 2013AP2433-CR.awb  
 
2 
 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), a Chapter 980 
commitment is a particularly severe and automatic penalty of a 
guilty plea that is closely connected to the criminal process.  
Its elimination of procedural protections results in indefinite 
and even permanent civil commitment.  And like deportation, upon 
entry of a guilty plea there is automatic eligibility for this 
severe consequence. 
¶78 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that the Sixth 
Amendment requires counsel to advise a client of the consequence 
of Chapter 980 commitment.  I would reverse the court of appeals 
and remand to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing.2  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I. 
¶79 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to the assistance of 
counsel.  This right has been interpreted to mean a defendant is 
entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.  See, 
e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).  The 
right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the 
negotiation of a plea agreement.  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 
57 (1985).  Effective assistance of counsel requires that the 
                                                 
2 Pursuant to State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 804, 285 
N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979), a defendant alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel is entitled to an evidentiary hearing 
where trial counsel will testify.  The circuit court determines 
if trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel, and 
if so, whether it was prejudicial.  
See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 
No. 2013AP2433-CR.awb  
 
3 
 
defendant be provided sufficient information upon which to make 
a knowing and intelligent plea.  See id. at 56.  
¶80 Prior to Padilla, courts "almost unanimously concluded 
that the Sixth Amendment does not require attorneys to inform 
their 
clients 
of 
a 
conviction's 
collateral 
consequences, 
including deportation."  Chaidez v. U.S., 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1109 
(2013).  Defense counsel's only obligation was to advise clients 
of direct consequences of conviction.3  Id.   
¶81 Padilla, however, presented a paradigm shift.  In 
Padilla, the Supreme Court determined that the Sixth Amendment 
requires counsel to provide advice to a criminal defendant about 
the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea.  559 U.S. at 
366.   
¶82 Although 
Padilla 
did 
not 
eliminate 
the 
collateral/direct consequence test generally, it rejected the 
application, concluding that deportation's close connection to 
the criminal process makes it uniquely difficult to classify as 
either a direct or collateral consequence.  Id. at 365-66; see 
also Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1112.  The Padilla court explained 
that deportation, although technically a civil proceeding, is a 
particularly severe penalty and that eligibility for deportation 
                                                 
3 Typically, a collateral consequence is indirect, does not 
automatically flow from the conviction, and may depend on the 
subsequent conduct of a defendant.  State v. Brown, 2004 WI App 
179, ¶7, 276 Wis. 2d 559, 687 N.W.2d 543.  In contrast, a direct 
consequence of a plea has a definite, immediate, and largely 
automatic effect on the range of a defendant's punishment.  
State v. Byrge, 2000 WI 101, ¶60, 237 Wis. 2d 197, 614 N.W.2d 
477. 
No. 2013AP2433-CR.awb  
 
4 
 
is nearly automatic for non-citizen offenders.  559 U.S. at 365-
66.   
¶83 Following 
Padilla's 
analysis, 
we 
examine 
whether 
Chapter 980's close connection to the criminal process makes it 
uniquely difficult to apply a collateral-direct analysis.  As in 
Padilla, the determination rests on an examination of the 
severity of the penalty and the nearly automatic eligibility for 
deportation. 
II. 
¶84 The majority concludes that the consequence of a 
Chapter 980 commitment "does not rise to the level of 
implicating the constitutional interest set forth in Padilla."  
Majority op., ¶70.  In its effort to distinguish involuntary 
civil commitment from deportation, the majority contends that 
"LeMere overstates, to a degree, the severity of Chapter 980 
commitment."  Majority op., ¶52.   
¶85 Before embarking on a legal analysis of the severity 
of the consequence of Chapter 980 commitment, I pause to observe 
that this is not merely a matter of legal analysis, it is also 
one of common sense.  The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right 
to effective assistance of counsel.  To be effective, counsel 
must provide sufficient information to enable the defendant to 
make a knowing and intelligent plea. 
¶86 When assessing whether to accept a plea agreement, 
would a defendant want to be informed that upon entering the 
plea, he faces the consequence of a possible lifetime civil 
commitment after serving his criminal sentence?  Of course! 
No. 2013AP2433-CR.awb  
 
5 
 
¶87 I agree with the sentiment expressed by Justice 
Gableman at oral argument that the severity of Chapter 980 
commitment is essentially a given here.  In transitioning the 
focus from the severity inquiry to the automatic eligibility 
part of the analysis, he commented: 
Justice Gableman: "The part of this case that jumps 
out to me is not the severity of the possible 
consequence.  I don’t think anyone could argue about 
the severe restrictions on the liberty of the person 
committed under Chapter 980.  
¶88 Nevertheless, the majority endeavors to persuade the 
reader that Chapter 980 consequences are really not all that 
severe.  Relying on the procedural protections of Chapter 980 
proceedings, the majority determines that Chapter 980 commitment 
is not as severe a penalty as deportation because the commitment 
is not necessarily permanent and does not always last for a 
lifetime.  Majority op., ¶55.   
III. 
¶89 The majority errs in its attempt to minimize the 
severity of a Chapter 980 commitment.  Not only does it run 
afoul of common sense, it turns a blind eye to the parallel 
punitive trajectories of deportation and Chapter 980 commitment.  
In both, important procedural protections under the statute have 
been eliminated.  Similarly, the consequences for both are 
severe, and may even last for a lifetime. 
¶90 As we saw in Padilla, the elimination of procedural 
protections may heighten the severity of a civil proceeding to 
such an extent that counsel has an obligation under the Sixth 
Amendment to advise a client about the consequences of a guilty 
No. 2013AP2433-CR.awb  
 
6 
 
plea.  Just as the legislature eliminated important procedural 
protections from Chapter 980, important procedural protections 
that minimized the risk of deportation were eliminated from 
federal immigration law.  See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360-64.   
¶91 In the past, federal immigration law "included a 
critically important procedural protection to minimize the risk 
of unjust deportation."  Id. at 361.  Under prior law, the 
sentencing judge in both state and federal prosecutions had the 
power to make a recommendation against deportation.  Id.  This 
procedure, known as judicial recommendation against deportation 
("JRAD") was eliminated in 1990.  Id. at 362-63.  In 1996, the 
Attorney General's authority to grant discretionary relief from 
deportation was also eliminated.  Id. at 363.  The Padilla court 
explained, 
"[t]hese 
changes 
to 
our 
immigration 
law 
have 
dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen's criminal 
conviction."  Id. at 364.   
¶92 Similarly, over the years, "the legislature has 
steadily chipped away at those aspects of chapter 980 upon which 
we relied in determining that the statute was constitutional."  
In re Commitment of West, 2011 WI 83, ¶123, 336 Wis. 2d 578, 800 
N.W.2d 929 (Bradley, J., dissenting).  As previously explained, 
the elimination of important procedural protections from Chapter 
980 has made it easier to commit an individual, the nature of 
the commitment is now more restrictive, and the duration of 
institutionalization is longer.  Id.  Accordingly, "chapter 980 
increasingly resembles a punitive scheme."  Id., ¶129.   
No. 2013AP2433-CR.awb  
 
7 
 
¶93 It is now easier to commit an individual under Chapter 
980 than in the past because a jury must conclude only that it 
is "likely" an individual will engage in acts of sexual 
violence.  Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) (2013-14).  When Chapter 980 
was first enacted, a jury was required to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that it was "substantially probable that the 
person will engage in acts of sexual violence."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.01(7) (1993-94).   
¶94 Additionally, the nature of the commitment has become 
more restrictive.  When Chapter 980 was enacted, a commitment 
order could specify "institutional care in a secure mental 
health unit or facility . . . or other facility or supervised 
release."  Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(b) (1993–94).  The nature of 
the commitment is more restrictive today because the requirement 
that the Department of Health Services ("DHS") commit an 
individual 
in 
the 
"least 
restrictive 
manner" 
has 
been 
eliminated.  Now, a commitment order "shall specify that the 
person be placed in institutional care," and the DHS "shall 
place a person committed under s. 980.06 at the secure mental 
health facility."  Wis. Stat. §§ 980.06, 980.065(1m) (2013-14). 
¶95 Today, the duration of institutionalization at the 
outset is also longer because reexamination need not occur until 
twelve months after initial confinement.  Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1) 
(2013-14).  When the statute was first enacted, DHS was required 
to reexamine committed persons "within 6 months after an initial 
commitment."  Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1) (1993–94).  The erosion of 
procedural protections has raised the stakes of a defendant's 
No. 2013AP2433-CR.awb  
 
8 
 
guilty plea as the length of commitment and the number of 
individuals committed continue to increase.   
¶96 Historical data on Chapter 980 indicates that the 
number of individuals committed under the statute has grown well 
beyond expectation.  When Chapter 980 was enacted in 1994, it 
was "[a]nticipated at the time of adoption that the program 
would be small."  Deborah McCulloch, Sand Ridge Secure Treatment 
Center: History of Chapter 980 at 14.4  After implementation, 
however, "commitment rates significantly exceeded expectations."  
Id. at 15.  By 2001, Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center, the 
entity responsible for detaining individuals committed under 
Chapter 980, opened a $39 million facility with another $22 
million expansion planned in 2009.  Id. at 10. 
¶97 Not only have commitment rates exceeded expectations, 
but statistical data indicates that individuals have been 
subject to indefinite and even lifetime commitment under Chapter 
980.  In 2004, ten years after Chapter 980 was enacted, the 
author of Sand Ridge's informational paper on recidivism 
acknowledged that "[t]o date comparatively few patients have 
been released...."  David Thornton, Sand Ridge Secure Treatment 
Center, Wisconsin Dep't of Health Servs., Projecting the Amount 
of Sexual Recidivism Prevented by the Chapter 980 Program 
                                                 
4 Available 
at: 
 
https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/sites/ 
default/files/legacy/SandRidge/InformationalPapers/980Overview20
14.pdf. 
 
No. 2013AP2433-CR.awb  
 
9 
 
(Wisconsin's Civil Commitment for Sex Offenders) at 1.5  A later 
study released in 2013 reported that 24 people were discharged 
"due to death."  See State of Wisconsin Department of Health 
Services, 
Supervised 
Release 
Placements 
and 
Expenditures, 
Legislative Audit Bureau Report 13-12, 13 (Aug. 2013).6  For the 
24 people discharged due to death, Chapter 980 commitment was 
indeed permanent.   
IV. 
¶98 The majority attempts next to distinguish Chapter 980 
commitment from deportation by arguing that it is not as 
"automatic" as deportation.  Majority op., ¶¶58-65.  
¶99 It contends that the consequence of deportation is 
automatic because "if a noncitizen has committed a removable 
offense . . ., his removal is practically inevitable."  Id., ¶59 
(citing Padilla 559 U.S. at 363-64).  In contrast, the majority  
alleges that "a Chapter 980 petition is not an inevitable 
consequence of a conviction for a sexually violent offense."  
Majority op., ¶58.   
¶100 Reaching its conclusion, the majority ignores this 
court's interpretation of Padilla discussed in an opinion issued 
just last term.  The court in State v. Shata, 2015 WI 74, ¶101, 
364 Wis. 2d 63, 868 N.W.2d 93, concluded that Padilla did not 
                                                 
5 Available 
at: 
 
https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/sites/ 
default/files/legacy/SandRidge/InformationalPapers/PROJECTINGTHE
AMOUNTOFRECIDIVISMSAVEDBYTHE980PROGRAMSeptember2004Version.pdf. 
6 Available at:  http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lab/reports/13-
12full.pdf. 
No. 2013AP2433-CR.awb  
 
10 
 
require Shata's attorney to tell him that his conviction would 
absolutely result in deportation.  Instead, Shata interpreted 
Padilla to mean that counsel was required to advise the 
defendant that he was eligible for deportation.  
¶101 Shata 
stated 
"[a]lthough 
a 
controlled 
substance 
conviction makes an alien 'deportable,' such a conviction will 
not necessarily result in deportation."7  Id., ¶59 (internal 
citation omitted).  "Thus, the Court meant that Padilla clearly 
was deportable under that immigration statute, not that he 
clearly would be deported."  Id., ¶61 (citing Com. V. Escobar, 
70 A.3d 838, 842 (Pa. 2013)). 
¶102 Likewise, the majority disregards an essential part of 
Chaidez that further explains the holding in Padilla as it 
relates to the automatic nature of the consequence. Chaidez 
clarified that "[i]n Padilla v. Kentucky, this Court held that 
the Sixth Amendment requires an attorney for a criminal 
defendant 
to 
provide 
advice 
about 
the 
risk 
of 
deportation arising from a guilty plea."  Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 
1105 (internal citation omitted).  In case there was any 
question about its holding in Padilla, the United States Supreme 
Court in Chaidez again emphasized that it was the risk of 
deportation that was the automatic consequence:  
While Chaidez's petition was pending, this Court 
decided Padilla.  Our ruling vindicated Chaidez's view 
                                                 
7 The term "alien" is used here because I quote directly 
from Shata.  As the Sixth Circuit recognized  in Flores v. U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, 718 F.3d 548, 551 n.1. 
(6th Circuit 2013), using the term "alien" to refer to other 
human beings may be "offensive and demeaning." 
No. 2013AP2433-CR.awb  
 
11 
 
of the Sixth Amendment:  We held that criminal defense 
attorneys must inform non-citizen clients of the risks 
of deportation arising from guilty pleas.   
Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1106. 
¶103 Consequently, the correct focus for our analysis here 
is the risk of automatic eligibility for Chapter 980 commitment, 
rather than whether commitment itself is automatic.  Eligibility 
for commitment was the focus employed in People v. Hughes, 983 
N.E.2d 439 (Ill. 2012), which is particularly instructive here 
because it analyzed the very issues we now confront in 
Wisconsin. 
¶104 In Hughes, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded "that 
defense counsel has a minimal duty to advise a defendant who 
pleads guilty to a triggering offense subject to the provision 
of the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act that he will be 
evaluated 
for 
and 
may 
risk 
involuntary 
commitment 
after 
completing his prison term."  Id. at 457.  As the Hughes court 
explained, "it is certain that a person convicted of a sexually 
violent offense is eligible for commitment and the conviction 
alone will definitely subject the defendant to a mandatory 
comprehensive evaluation for commitment nearing the end of his 
prison term."  Id. at 455.   
¶105 Ignoring our analysis in Shata and the holding in 
Chaidez, the majority casts away Hughes, explaining: "We 
disagree with the Hughes court's analysis, which focused on the 
'possibility of' or 'eligibility for' commitment.  Statistics 
discussed in one case before our court of appeals indicated that 
no more than 4.5 percent of people convicted of sexually violent 
No. 2013AP2433-CR.awb  
 
12 
 
offenses are even recommended for commitment proceedings under 
Chapter 980."  Majority op., ¶65 (citing State v. Budd, 2007 WI 
App 245, ¶16, 306 Wis. 2d 167, 742 N.W.2d 887).  
¶106 However, 
the 
majority 
presents 
no 
supporting 
statistics with respect to deportation.  In fact, as Shata 
explained in detail, the United States cannot and does not 
remove 
all 
persons 
who 
might 
be 
deportable. 
 
Due 
to 
prosecutorial discretion, limited resources and the government's 
removal priorities, there are avenues for non-citizens to avoid 
deportation.  Shata, 364 Wis. 2d 63, ¶60 (citing Jeh Charles 
Johnson, Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of 
Undocumented Immigrants, at 2 (Nov. 20, 2014).8    
¶107 Given reduced procedural protections, indefinite and 
even permanent commitment, as well as automatic eligibility for 
Chapter 980 commitment, I determine that Chapter 980 is 
analogous to deportation.  It is a uniquely severe and automatic 
consequence of a criminal plea that is closely connected to the 
criminal process. 
¶108 Accordingly, I conclude that under Padilla, the Sixth 
Amendment required counsel to advise LeMere that upon entering a 
plea, he was subject to Chapter 980 consequences.  In assessing 
whether to accept the plea, LeMere should have been informed by 
his counsel that by entering the plea he could face an 
involuntary——and 
possible 
lifetime 
civil 
commitment——after 
completing his criminal sentence.  
                                                 
8 Available 
at: 
 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf. 
No. 2013AP2433-CR.awb  
 
13 
 
V. 
¶109 Although 
the 
majority 
concludes 
that 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment does not require counsel to advise a defendant 
regarding Chapter 980 commitment, it recommends that it would be 
the best practice for counsel to discuss any meaningful 
consequence of a plea.  Majority op., ¶70.  
¶110 Most criminal cases are now resolved by the plea 
process.  Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).  In 
Frye, the Unites States Supreme Court emphasized defense 
counsel's important duties and responsibilities in the plea 
process.  Id.  The Frye court explained that 94 percent of state 
convictions are resolved with a guilty plea and that "the 
negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a 
trial, is almost always the critical point for a defendant."  
Id.    
¶111 Hughes, 982 N.E.2d at 453, is consistent with a 
growing national movement toward providing defendants more 
No. 2013AP2433-CR.awb  
 
14 
 
information about the collateral consequences of conviction.9  
See generally, Symposium Issue:  Beyond the Sentence: Collateral 
Consequences of Conviction, 2015 Wis. L. Rev. 181-420 (2015).10  
For example, the American Bar Association (ABA has assembled a 
tool by which lawyers and defendants can easily search potential 
collateral consequences by state and offense type.11   
¶112 In contrast to the majority, I would follow Hughes and 
conclude that under Padilla, the Sixth Amendment requires 
counsel to advise a client regarding the consequence of a 
Chapter 980 commitment.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
                                                 
9 According to the Hughes court, "in recent years several 
scholars and commentators have brought to light potential 
problems 
inherent 
in 
a 
rigid 
categorical 
system 
of 
distinguishing 
between 
direct 
and 
collateral 
consequences, 
especially in the Sixth Amendment context, given this new 
landscape and the framework for analyzing claims of ineffective 
assistance."  People v. Hughes, 983 N.E.2d 439, 543-44 (Ill. 
2012) (citing McGregor Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”: 
The Seismic Evolution of Padilla v. Kentucky and Its Impact on 
Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 How. L.J. 795 (2011); Gabriel 
J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide 
to Padilla v. Kentucky, 25 Crim. Just. 21, 27–28 (2010); Jenny 
Roberts, 
Ignorance 
Is 
Effectively 
Bliss: 
Collateral 
Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty–Plea 
Process, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 119, 124–25 (2009); Jenny Roberts, The 
Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of 
Criminal 
Convictions: 
Involuntary 
Commitment 
of 
“Sexually 
Violent Predators”, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 670, 673–77 (2008); Gabriel 
J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of 
Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 
697, 701-02, 712-13 (2002)). 
10 Available at:  http://wisconsinlawreview.org/volume-2015-
no-2/. 
11 See 
Am. 
Bar 
Ass’n, 
ABA 
Collateral 
Consequences, 
http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/. 
No. 2013AP2433-CR.awb  
 
15 
 
¶113 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
 
No. 2013AP2433-CR.awb  
 
 
 
1