Title: Storm v. McClung
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S47680
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 7, 2002

Filed:  June 7, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

NANCY J. STORM,
Personal Representative for the Estate of
Jon E. Storm, Deceased,
	Respondent on Review/Petitioner on Review,
	v.
RICK McCLUNG,
	Respondent on Review,
	and
CITY OF OREGON CITY,
a municipal corporation,
	Petitioner on Review/Respondent on Review.
(CCV9605004; CA A99618; SC S47680, S47713)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted May 8, 2001.
	Robert E. Franz, Jr., Springfield, argued the cause for petitioner on review/respondent on
review City of Oregon City.  With him on the briefs were Kathryn D. Piele and Michael O.
Whitty.
	W. Eugene Hallman, of Hallman &amp; Dretke, Pendleton, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on
review/petitioner on review Storm.
	No appearance on behalf of respondent on review McClung.
	Maureen Leonard and Kathryn H. Clarke, Portland, filed 
briefs on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association.
	David L. Runner, Salem, filed a brief on behalf of amici
curiae SAIF Corporation, Pape Group, Inc., and Timber Products
Company.
	Marjorie A. Speirs and Janet M. Schroer, of Hoffman, Hart &amp;
Wagner, LLP, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae
Oregon Association of Defense Counsel.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.**
	DE MUNIZ, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed.  The case is remanded
to the circuit court for further proceedings.
	*Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court, Robert D. Herndon, Judge. 168 Or App 62, 4 P3d 66 (2000).
	**Kulongoski, J., resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision of this
case.  Balmer, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
		DE MUNIZ, J.
		Plaintiff, the widow of Jon Storm and the personal
representative of his estate, brought this wrongful death action,
under ORS 30.020 against the City of Oregon City (the city) for
the benefit of Storm's mother, Myrtha Storm, and his daughters,
Sonia and Tami Storm.  A jury found that Storm and the city were
each 50 percent negligent in causing Storm's death and awarded
damages.  In accordance with ORS 30.050, the trial court entered
a judgment for plaintiff that apportioned the damages between
Storm's mother and daughters.  The city appealed.  The Court of
Appeals held that Storm's daughters each had received a
substantial remedy under the Workers' Compensation Law and,
therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to any recovery on their
behalf.  Because the Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff
was not entitled to a recovery on behalf of her daughters, the
court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a retrial
limited to assessing damages on behalf of Storm's mother.  Storm
v. McClung, 168 Or App 62, 64-69, 4 P3d 66 (2000).  We allowed
each party's petition for review.
	     We take the following facts from the opinion of the
Court of Appeals: 
		"Storm was an employee of Bud's Towing, an Oregon
City business owned by Del Bullock.  Bullock was active
in civic affairs, at times loaning his business
equipment and employees for city projects.  Storm was
similarly involved; among other things, he was a member
of the Arbor Day Clean Up Committee, which Rick
McClung, the City's director of public works, chaired. 
The members of the committee other than McClung were,
like Storm, volunteers interested in the
'beautification and enhancement of the city.'
		"Storm died on May 4, 1994, in the process of an
Arbor Day project at the City's Clackamette Park, which
is located at the confluence of the Clackamas and
Willamette rivers.  The city wanted to top a number of
cottonwood trees in the park, both because the trees
were potentially dangerous and to create nesting sites
for birds.  It had previously paid a professional tree
service to fell a number of trees in the park; city
employees did not believe that they were qualified to
do the work safely.  The jury could have found that
topping a tree is more dangerous than felling it.  A
city employee examined the trees in April 1994 and
identified six that were particularly dangerous because
of their location and condition.  The City knew from
the employee's written report that tree 'F' contained
rotten wood, which increases the dangerousness of a
cottonwood.  McClung suggested that the Arbor Day
committee include topping those six trees among the
projects for its spring clean-up period, which ran for
several weeks in May and June.  If the City had been
unable to find volunteers, either through the committee
or otherwise, it would again have hired a contractor; 
its own employees would not have done the job.
		"Storm was one of the volunteers who worked on
topping the trees.  Bud's Towing provided equipment for
use on the job.  Bullock was present for only a small
part of the time, but Storm participated throughout the
day.  The equipment that Bud's Towing provided included
a crane that had a bucket at one end; of those present,
only Storm and Bullock were qualified to operate it. 
Michael Huffman, the person cutting the trees, stood in
the bucket thirty feet above the ground in order to top
the trees.  Storm did not originally do any of the
cutting because he had to operate the crane.  After the
group successfully topped several trees, it turned to
tree 'F.'  After Huffman had cut a significant distance
through the trunk of that tree, the top began to move
toward him, rather than away from him.  The movement
ultimately trapped the saw within the cut.  Huffman
shut off the saw, and the group spent about an hour
discussing what to do next.  Bullock arrived during the
discussion.
		"The group ultimately decided that Storm would go
up in the bucket, at least to retrieve the saw and see
exactly what the situation was, while Bullock operated
the crane.  Storm went up, pounded wedges into the saw
cut, and freed the saw.  Instead of coming down at that
point, he started the saw and attempted to finish
topping the tree.  The top again moved toward the saw
rather than away from the crane, but this time it came
completely down.  In doing so, the top knocked the
crane off the truck, threw Storm out of the bucket, and
landed on top of him.  Storm died soon afterwards. 
City employees observed and videotaped the entire
proceedings, but they were not involved in the
decisions and did not warn Storm or anyone else of the
dangers that the trees presented.
		"The jury found that Storm and the City were each
50 percent negligent in causing Storm's death. * * * 
The jury then determined that the estate's economic
damages were $147,923 and that its noneconomic damages,
on behalf of Tami, Sonia and Myrtha, were $400,000.  In
accordance with the jury's finding of comparative
fault, the court entered judgment against the City for
$73,961.50 in economic damages and $200,000 in
noneconomic damages.  It thereafter entered an order of
distribution under ORS 30.050, apportioning economic
damages of $24,653.83 each to Sonia and Tami and
$24,653.84 to Myrtha, and noneconomic damages of
$75,000 each to Sonia and Tami and $50,000 to Myrtha."
168 Or App at 64-66 (footnote omitted). 
		On review, plaintiff relies on this court's decision in
Neher v. Chartier, 319 Or 417, 879 P2d 156 (1994), and contends
that, as applied to Storm's daughters, the immunity provisions in
ORS 30.265(3)(a) (1) violate Article I, section 10, of the Oregon
Constitution, (2) because the workers' compensation benefits that
the daughters received are not a "substantial" remedy.  The city
asserts that the trial court erred in submitting plaintiff's
specification of negligence to the jury, that the Court of
Appeals decision with regard to Storm's daughters is correct and
that, in any event, the Recreational Land Act, former ORS 105.655
to ORS 105.680 (1971), repealed by Oregon Laws 1995, chapter 456,
section 9, and the Woodcutting Act, former ORS 105.685 to ORS
105.697 (1979), repealed by Oregon Laws 1995, chapter 456,
section 9, completely immunized the city.  Therefore, the city
contends that the Court of Appeals incorrectly ordered a retrial
to determine Storm's mother's damages.  
		We reject at the outset, for the reasons that the Court
of Appeals expressed, the city's argument regarding the
sufficiency of the evidence and the city's argument that the
immunity provisions in the Recreational Land Act or the
Woodcutting Act apply in this case.  168 Or App at 66-67.  We
turn to plaintiff's argument.
	     Relying on this court's decision in Neher, plaintiff
contends that application of the immunity provisions in ORS
30.265(3)(a) denied her daughters a remedy in violation of
Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution.  The Court of
Appeals rejected that argument on the ground that, unlike the
decedent's parents in Neher, who had received only burial
expenses under the Workers' Compensation Law, plaintiff's
daughters each had received death benefits and were entitled to
an additional $215 for every month that they attend college. 
That court concluded that, because those benefits were
"substantial," Neher was distinguishable and the application of
"ORS 30.265(3)(a) to Sonia and Tami [did] not violate Article I,
section 10."  168 Or App at 74.  
		 We need not decide whether the Court of Appeals
correctly concluded that Neher was distinguishable on the basis
that the workers' compensation benefits that Sonia and Tami
received were "substantial."  Rather, for the reasons that
follow, we reject plaintiff's argument that Article I, section
10, prohibits application of the immunity provisions in ORS
30.265(3)(a) to plaintiff's statutory wrongful death action.  
		We begin with Neher.  In that case, the decedent had
been hit and killed by a Tri-Met bus while crossing the street. 
The decedent's estate received workers' compensation benefits
(limited to burial expenses) because, at the time of the
accident, the decedent was in the course and scope of her
employment.  Her father, as personal representative of the
estate, also brought a statutory wrongful death action against
Chartier, the bus driver, and his employer, Tri-Met.  The trial
court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment,
concluding that ORS 30.265(3)(a) provided the defendants with
immunity from the plaintiff's wrongful death action.  
		The decedent's father appealed, arguing that ORS
30.265(3)(a) effected the denial of a remedy for his daughter's
death and, therefore, violated Article I, section 10.  The
defendants responded that Article I, section 10, "applies only to
rights established at common law, * * * and that wrongful death
is a statutory, not a common law, remedy."  Neher v. Chartier,
124 Or App 220, 223, 862 P2d 1307 (1993).  Therefore, the
defendants argued, the legislature could limit or even eliminate
entirely the wrongful death cause of action.  The Court of
Appeals affirmed, on different grounds, applying this court's
reasoning in Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or 508, 783 P2d 506
(1989).  Hale explained that the legislature may alter or limit a
cause of action "so long as the party injured is not left
entirely without a remedy."  Id. at 523.  The remedy provided,
explained the Hale court, simply must be "substantial."  Id. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals in Neher, relying on Hale, concluded
that, although $3,000 may be a small amount, the court could not
say that the plaintiff was denied a substantial remedy.  
		On review, this court reversed, holding that ORS
30.265(3)(a) violated Article I, section 10, because the
provision insulated the defendants from liability to the
decedent's parent while, at the same time, the wrongful death
statute recognized the existence of a right of recovery for
surviving parents.  Neher, 319 Or at 428.  The court began the
Neher opinion by observing that "[t]his court's case law * * *
interpreting Article I, section 10, * * * ha[d] failed
definitively to establish and consistently to apply any one
theory regarding the protections afforded by the remedies
guarantee."  Id. at 423.  The court then noted that it had
summarized the application of Article I, section 10, to
governmental bodies in Hale, which, relying on Noonan v. City of
Portland, 161 Or 213, 249-50, 88 P2d 808 (1939), had explained
that, "'Article I, § 10, Oregon Constitution, was not intended to
give anyone a vested right in the law either statutory or common;
nor was it intended to render the law static. * * *  The
legislature cannot, however, abolish a remedy and at the same
time recognize the existence of a right[.]'"  Neher, 319 Or at
423-24.  This court observed that it had stated in Hale that
Article I, section 10, "is not violated when the legislature
alters (or even abolishes) a cause of action, so long as the
party injured in not left entirely without a remedy."  Id. at
424.  That remedy, however, must be a "substantial one."  Id. 
		This court then discussed the application of Article I,
section 10, to public bodies.  The court first observed that, in
Mattson v. Astoria, 39 Or 577, 65 P 1066 (1901), the court had
held that a city's attempt to immunize all employees from
liability for defective conditions of roadways violated Article
I, section 10.  Neher, 319 Or at 425.  The Mattson court had
concluded that the legislature could limit the city's liability,
but the injured party must be allowed to proceed against the
person whose job it was to keep the streets in repair.  The Neher
court inferred that the premise of Mattson was to avoid leaving
the plaintiff without a remedy.  Neher, 319 Or at 425.  The court
noted that Batdorff v. Oregon City, 53 Or 402, 100 P 937 (1909),
supported a similar conclusion.  The court thus concluded that
"legislation extending tort immunity to public officers and
employees * * * violates Article I, section 10, if the effect of
the immunity provisions is to render tort plaintiffs 'without
remedy.'"  Neher, 319 Or at 426.  
		The Neher court then applied that conclusion to the
decedent's father by observing that, although the decedent's
estate recovered the remedy to which it was entitled under the
workers' compensation law, the estate was "not the only real
party in interest in the wrongful death action."  Id.  Under the
wrongful death statute, the court observed, the decedent's
parents were entitled to recover damages that might compensate
them for "pecuniary loss and for loss of the society,
companionship and services of the decedent."  Id.  Thus, the
court observed that, although the estate had not been left
without a remedy, the plaintiff, as a surviving parent, had no
remedy.
		As they had in the Court of Appeals, the defendants in
Neher argued that there was no violation of Article I, section
10, because the constitutional provision protected only rights
that existed at common law before the adoption of the Oregon
Constitution.  They argued that, because there was no common law
right of action for wrongful death, Article I, section 10, did
not protect such a cause of action.  This court, although
acknowledging that there was no right of action for wrongful
death recognized at common law, nevertheless, construed Noonan as
having rejected that notion:
		"In Noonan, this court recognized the
legislature's ability to change the law, and in fact to
abolish entirely a right of action, whether or not the
right involved had existed at common law at the time of
the Oregon Constitutional Convention.  In substance,
the distinction between a statutory claim and a common
law claim was abandoned for purposes of Article I,
section 10, analysis.  The legislature's ability to
make such alterations to rights of action, however, was
not unfettered: it could not 'abolish a remedy and at
the same time recognize the existence of a right.'"
Neher, 319 Or at 427-28 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). 
Consistent with Noonan, the court determined that the wrongful
death statute recognized the existence of a right of recovery for
surviving parents, but that the Tort Claims Act abolished the
parents' remedy against the municipality and its negligent
employees.  Therefore, the court concluded that ORS 30.265(3)(a)
violated Article I, section 10, in that case, because it left the
plaintiff without a remedy.
		After Neher, this court decided two other cases that
addressed a cause of action for wrongful death within the context
of Article I, section 10.  In Greist v. Phillips, 322 Or 281, 906
P2d 789 (1995), the plaintiff, as personal representative of her
son's estate, brought a statutory action for wrongful death.  A
jury awarded the plaintiff a substantial sum in both economic and
non-economic damages.  Under ORS 18.560, however, the trial court
modified the award of non-economic damages from $1.5 million to
$500,000.  The plaintiff appealed, challenging the application of
ORS 18.560. (3)  The plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the
application of ORS 18.560 violated Article I, section 10, of the
Oregon Constitution.  
		This court, citing Neher and Hale, reiterated and
affirmed the court's previous conclusion that "Article I, section
10, is not violated when the legislature alters (or even
abolishes) a cause of action, so long as the party injured is not
left entirely without a remedy."  Id. at 290.  The court then
observed that "the legislature is entitled to amend the amount of
damages available in a statutory wrongful death action without
running afoul of Article I, section 10, as long as the plaintiff
is not left without a substantial remedy."  Id.  The court
concluded that $500,000 was a substantial remedy and that ORS
18.560 did not violate Article I, section 10.  Although
discussing another section of the Oregon Constitution, the court
in Greist also observed that the right of action for wrongful
death is purely statutory and that there was no right of action
for wrongful death at common law.  Greist, 322 Or at 294.  
Therefore, the court explained, "[b]ecause wrongful death actions
are 'purely statutory,' they 'exist only in the form and with the
limitations chosen by the legislature.'"  Id.
		Later in Kilminster v. Day Management Corp., 323 Or
618, 919 P2d 474 (1996), the plaintiff, relying on Neher, argued
that the exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation law
did not preclude an action for wrongful death and that, if read
to do so, it would violate Article I, section 10.  After
addressing the scope and contours of the Workers' Compensation
Law, the court observed that the derivative nature of an action
for wrongful death under ORS 30.020 limited the plaintiff's right
to bring the claim:
	"ORS 30.020(1) provides a decedent's representative
with the right to bring a wrongful death action only
'if the decedent might have maintained an action had
the decedent lived.'  A decedent who is injured in the
course of the decedent's employment and whose injury is
covered under the exclusivity provision of the Workers'
Compensation Act could not have maintained an action
against the employer had he lived. * * * ORS 30.020(1),
by its own terms, does not give a decedent's personal
representative a right to sue the decedent's employer
for negligent wrongful death when the decedent never
had that right in the first place."
Id. at 624-25 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).	
		This court then responded to the plaintiff's claim that
the Workers' Compensation Law violated Article I, section 10, by
"taking away" the parents' claim for the wrongful death of their
son.  The court, citing Noonan, reaffirmed the principle that the
legislature cannot abolish a remedy and at the same time
recognize the existence of a right.  However, the court
explained, "[b]ecause the legislature has chosen not to provide
decedent's parents with a wrongful death action based on a theory
of negligence, and because Oregon has no common law action for
wrongful death, * * * [the parents] have suffered no legally
cognizable injury to their person, property, or reputation."  Id.
at 627.
		In Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or 83, 23
P3d 333 (2001), this court acknowledged the observation in Neher
that this court previously had failed definitively to establish
and consistently apply any one theory regarding the protections
afforded by the remedies guarantee.  Id. at 90.  The court
therefore examined the origins and meaning of the "remedy clause"
of Article I, section 10.  The court explained that "the word
'remedy' refers both to a remedial process for seeking redress
for injury and to what is required to restore a right that has
been injured."  Id. at 124.  The court also explained that the
history of the remedy clause in Article I, section 10, indicated
that its purpose was to protect "absolute [common-law] rights
respecting person, property, and reputation."  Id. (emphasis
added).
	Greist, Kilminster, and Neher recite that there was no
right of action for wrongful death at common law in Oregon. 
Plaintiff's counsel has presented this court with research that
counsel contends establishes that a common-law action for
wrongful death is legally cognizable in Oregon's courts and that
the Oregon courts should have acknowledged a common-law action
for wrongful death since Oregon's statehood. (4)  That question,
however, is beside the point in this case.  Plaintiff never has
alleged or asserted at any stage of these proceedings that the
instant action for recovery for death is a common-law one. 
Rather, plaintiff always has maintained that the action is one
brought under ORS 30.020.  Because plaintiff's claim is a
statutory one, the legislature may limit the action as it
chooses.
		In Neher, the court, relying on Hale and Noonan,
assumed that Article I, section 10, afforded protection to any
recognized cause of action regardless of whether that cause of
action existed at common law or was legislatively created.  As
the foregoing analysis demonstrates, that assumption was
incorrect.  The holding in Neher that the immunity provisions in
ORS 30.265(3)(a) that barred the plaintiff's statutory wrongful
death action denied the plaintiff a remedy in violation of
Article I, section 10, was error and is disavowed.  See Stranahan
v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or 38, 11 P3d 228 (2000) (setting out
criteria necessary for court to reconsider previous ruling under
Oregon Constitution).
		ORS 30.020(1) allows a decedent's personal
representative to bring an action for wrongful death on behalf of
surviving children and parents "if the decedent might have
maintained an action, had the decedent lived, against the
wrongdoer[.]"  As this court observed in Kilminster, the wrongful
death statute places a decedent's personal representative in the
decedent's shoes, imputing to the personal representative
whatever rights, and limitations to those rights, that the
decedent possessed.  Kilminster 323 Or at 624-25.
		Plaintiff, therefore, could bring a statutory action
for wrongful death against the city only if Jon Storm could have
brought such an action against the city had he lived.  ORS
30.265(3)(a) insulates from liability "[e]very public body and
its officers, employees and agents acting within the scope of
their employment or duties" for "[a]ny claim for injury to or
death of any person covered by any workers' compensation law." 
Storm was covered by workers' compensation.  Thus, ORS
30.265(3)(a) would have barred Storm from bringing a negligence-based action against the city for his injuries, had he survived. 
Likewise, plaintiff's statutory wrongful death action is barred
by the same immunity provisions.  It follows that the Court of
Appeals' dismissal of plaintiff's statutory wrongful death action
on behalf of her daughters was correct.  However, because the
city never has argued at any stage of the proceedings that a
claim on behalf of Storm's mother was barred by ORS 30.265(3)(a),
we leave in place the Court of Appeals' disposition as to that
part of the wrongful death claim.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed.  The case is remanded
to the circuit court for further proceedings.


1. 	ORS 30.265(3)(a) provides, in part:
		"Every public body and its officers, employees and
agents acting within the scope of their employment or
duties, or while operating a motor vehicle in a
ridesharing arrangement authorized under ORS 276.598,
are immune from liability for:
		"Any claim for injury to or death of any person
covered by any workers' compensation law."

2. 	Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides:
		"No court shall be secret, but justice shall be
administered, openly and without purchase, completely
and without delay, and every man shall have remedy by
due course of law for injury done him in his person,
property, or reputation."

3. 	ORS 18.560 provides:
		"(1) Except for claims subject to ORS 30.260 to
30.300 and ORS chapter 656, in any civil action seeking
damages arising out of bodily injury, including
emotional injury or distress, death or property damage
of any one person including claims for loss of care,
comfort, companionship and society and loss of
consortium, the amount awarded for noneconomic damages
shall not exceed $500,000.
		"(2) As used in this section:
		"(a) 'Economic damages' means objectively
verifiable monetary losses including but not limited to
reasonable charges necessarily incurred for medical,
hospital, nursing and rehabilitative services and other
health care services, burial and memorial expenses,
loss of income and past and future impairment of
earning capacity, reasonable and necessary expenses
incurred for substitute domestic services, recurring
loss to an estate, damage to reputation that is
economically verifiable, reasonable and necessarily
incurred costs due to loss of use of property and
reasonable costs incurred for repair or for replacement
of damaged property, whichever is less.
		"(b) 'Noneconomic damages' means subjective,
nonmonetary losses, including but not limited to pain,
mental suffering, emotional distress, humiliation,
injury to reputation, loss of care, comfort,
companionship and society, loss of consortium,
inconvenience and interference with normal and usual
activities apart from gainful employment.
		"(3) This section does not apply to punitive
damages.
		"(4) The jury shall not be advised of the
limitation set forth in this section."

4. 	This court previously has been apprised of the
questionable premise underlying the widely held view that there
was no common law action for wrongful death.  The court
acknowledged as much when it addressed the history of wrongful
death actions in Oregon in Goheen v. General Motors Corp., 263 Or
145, 150-51, 502 P2d 223 (1972).  In Goheen, the court first
pointed out Prosser's criticism of Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp 493,
170 Eng Rep 1033 (Nisi Prius 1808), the first case to declare
that no civil right of action for damages for the death of
another could stand:
	"* * * Lord Ellenborough, whose forte was never common
sense, held without citing any authority that a husband
had no action for loss of his wife's services through
her death, and declared in broad terms that 'in a civil
court the death of a human being could not be
complained of as an injury.'"
Goheen, 253 Or at 150-51.  The court then observed:
		"Meanwhile, the American courts allowed recovery
for wrongful death.  In 1848, however, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court in Carey v. Berkshire R.R.
Co., ignored earlier decisions by American courts to
the contrary and cited and adopted the rule as stated
in Baker v. Bolton.  Since then most American courts,
including this court, have adopted the rule holding
that there is no common law cause of action for
wrongful death."  
Id. at 151 (footnotes omitted).  To compensate for the lack of a
common-law right of action for wrongful death, Lord Campbell's
Act was adopted in England, and the states followed suit by
adopting similar statutes.  Id. at 153.  The original Oregon
Wrongful Death Act was included in the original Deady Code of
1862.  Since at least 1891, this court has adhered to the view
that no right of action for wrongful death existed at common
law.  See Putman v. Southern Pacific Co., 21 Or 230, 231-32, 27
P 1033 (1891) (so stating).