Title: G.S. v. Department of Human Services, Division of Youth and Family Services
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-174-97
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: February 17, 1999

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). GARIBALDI, J., writing for a unanimous Court. In this appeal, which arises out of a medication overdose administered to a child by a care-giver at a facility for retarded persons, the Court considers whether a finding of neglect is sustainable under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4) when the injury to the child is accidental. G.S. was the Saturday Coordinator for Respite Care at the Association for Retarded Citizens (ARC). She was solely responsible for the administering of medication brought by parents. On June 4, 1994, the mother of N.D., an autistic, non-verbal, developmentally disabled minor, dropped him off at ARC. M.B., an ARC worker who arrived at the same time, offered to take N.D. inside. The mother agreed and handed M.B. a bottle of Clonidine, an anti-hyperactive drug. The mother told M.B. that she had crushed it already. When M.B. went inside, she immediately delivered the vial to G.S. and repeated what the mother had told her. When the time came to administer N.D.'s medication, G.S. opened the bottle and found many crushed pieces. Confused about the dosage, G.S. consulted with M.B., who again repeated the mother's words, and further checked the dosage directions on the bottle. Although the dosage instructions directed the administration of one-half pill, none of the pills in the bottle were in whole form and G.S., therefore, did not know how big one pill was. Without attempting to obtain clarification from N.D.'s mother, G.S. simply assumed that the entire bottle, which contained seventy-eight pieces, was a single dose and gave N.D. the entire bottle. Shortly after he was given the medication, and one-half hour before his usual nap time, N.D. fell asleep. When his mother arrived to pick him up, he was in a semi-conscious state. On learning that G.S. had given him the entire bottle of Clonidine, N.D.'s mother rushed him to the hospital. There, he was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit with a diagnosis of prescription medication overdose. Doctors determined that he had ingested seventy-eight times the prescribed amount. Although he suffered no permanent harm, N.D. remained in the hospital for forty-eight hours. Thereafter, the Division of Youth and Family Services' (DYFS) Institutional Abuse Investigation Unit investigated the incident. DYFS subsequently notified G.S. that the Division's investigation concluded that her actions in administering the medication constituted neglect within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 and that its findings would be forwarded to the Central Registry. G.S. appealed DYFS's findings. On appeal, G.S. argued that her conduct could not be considered neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 because her actions were accidental. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division held that G.S.'s conduct could not support a finding of child neglect under that section, reasoning that a finding of neglect under that section required the injury to be caused by other than accidental means. The Appellate Division reversed DYFS's investigative findings and ordered that the report to the Central Registry be withdrawn. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination of whether action was sustainable under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4). The Appellate Division held that DYFS's action was not sustainable under that section as well, and reaffirmed its conclusion that accidentally caused injuries [should] not be treated as child abuse. The Supreme Court granted DYFS's petition for certification. HELD: N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4) can apply to some accidentally caused injuries; that G.S. did not intend the result of the over medication is irrelevant. 1. Although reviewing courts should give considerable weight to an agency's interpretation of a statute the agency is charged with enforcing, appellate courts are not bound by an agency interpretation of a strictly legal issue when that interpretation is inaccurate or contrary to legislative objectives. (p. 7) 2. Where the plain language of a statute is clear but commands a result that is inconsistent with the overall statutory scheme, the court must carefully examine the Legislature's intent and should consider the statute in light of other statutory provisions and the nature of the subject matter, and should strive for an interpretation that gives effect to all of the statutory provisions and that does not render any language inoperative, superfluous, void or insignificant. (pp. 7-10) 3. Nothing in the plain language of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b) compels the conclusion that accidental injuries cannot form the basis for a finding of neglect under that provision. (pp. 11-12) 4. When an act that produces an unforeseen result was done exactly as intended and there was nothing unusual about it other than the result itself, only the result was accidental, and the injury was not effected by accidental means. (pp. 12-14) 5. If an intentional act produces an unintended result, the injury is not accidental, and a parent or guardian can commit child abuse even though the resulting injury is not intended. (pp. 14-15) 6. Title 9's primary concern is the protection of children, not the culpability of parental conduct. Whether the resulting injury was intended is irrelevant to the determination of whether the injury was caused by accidental means. (pp. 15-16) 7. The phrase minimum degree of care contained in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b) refers to conduct that is grossly or wantonly negligent, but not necessarily intentional, and can cover conduct that ranges from slight inadvertence to malicious purpose to inflict injury. (pp. 17-19) 8. The proper focus of an inquiry under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 is on the harm to the child and not on the caregiver's intent. To hold otherwise would render DYFS unable to protect children from a wide range of conduct that clearly qualifies as neglect. (pp. 19-22) 9. A guardian fails to exercise a minimum degree of care when he or she is aware of the dangers inherent in a situation and fails adequately to supervise the child or recklessly creates a risk of serious injury to that child. Whether a parent or guardian has failed to exercise a minimum degree of care is to be analyzed in light of the dangers and risks associated with the situation and is a determination to be made by DYFS and the courts on a case-by-case basis. (pp. 23-24) 10. G.S. failed to exercise even a minimum degree of care toward N.D., and the facts surrounding her conduct are sufficient to hold her liable for child neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b). (pp. 24-26) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE GARIBALDI's opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 174 September Term 1997 G.S., Appellant-Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, Respondent-Appellant. Argued October 26, 1998 -- Decided February 17, 1999 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Jaynee LaVecchia, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel). Stephan Siegel argued the cause for respondent (Matlin and Siegel, attorneys). The opinion of the court was delivered by GARIBALDI, J. This appeal arises out of a medication overdose administered to a child by a care-giver at a facility for retarded persons. The child was hospitalized after G.S., the caregiver, failed to follow the facility's medication dispensation procedures and administered a dosage seventy-eight times the prescribed amount. Although the child recovered and the incident was, by all accounts, an accident, the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) concluded that G.S. had committed an act of child neglect within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21. G.S. appealed the investigative finding and the Appellate Division overruled DYFS's determination, concluding that accidental injuries cannot form the basis for a finding of neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21. This Court remanded for a determination of whether the finding of neglect was sustainable under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b). The Appellate Division again concluded that the finding of neglect was improper. DYFS now appeals that decision, urging us to find that accidental injuries can support a finding of neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b). We agree and reverse. The term "guardian" is defined as "[an] employee or volunteer, whether compensated or uncompensated, of an institution who is responsible for the child's welfare and any other staff person of an institution regardless of whether or not the person is responsible for the care or supervision of the child." N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 (a). No one disputes that G.S. is a guardian within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 (a). Nor does anyone dispute that N.D.'s "physical condition" was "impaired" by the over-medication. The question is whether G.S.'s accidental administration of seventy-eight times the prescribed dosage of Clonidine constituted a failure "to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . in providing [N.D.] with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof . . ." thereby rendering N.D. a neglected child under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b). [New Jersey Legislature Child Abuse Study Commission Interim Report, pursuant to Concurrent Res. No. 86 at 15-16 (Nov. 15, 1971)]. Accordingly, under Title 9, whether the guardian intended to harm the child is irrelevant. If a parent or guardian commits an intentional act that has unintended consequences, that action is considered "other than accidental" within the meaning of Title 9. State v. Demarest, supra, 252 N.J. Super. at 331, also supports our conclusion that the guardian's intent to injure the child is irrelevant to determining whether an injury was caused by accidental means. Demarest raised the question of what mental state is required to hold a parent criminally liable for endangering the welfare of a child under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a. The criminal provision incorporated, by reference, the definition of "abused" and "neglected" child contained in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21, the civil statute. The court concluded that the definition of child abuse and neglect contained in the civil provision "describe[d] only the kind of 'harm' to the child and not the mental state of the' accused required to establish an offense." Demarest, supra, 252 N.J. Super. at 331. The main goal of Title 9 is to protect children "from acts or conditions which threaten their welfare." Id. A standard that focuses on the caregiver's intent essentially imposes a mens rea requirement on the civil context and confounds the goals of criminal and civil abuse statutes. Id. at 330. Focusing on the guardian's intent also would prevent the State from safeguarding children in a substantial number of child neglect situations. Id. Title 9's primary concern is the protection of children, not the culpability of parental conduct. Id. Whether the resulting injury was intended is irrelevant to the determination of whether the injury was caused by accidental means. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE GARIBALDI's opinion. NO. A-174 G.S., Appellant-Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, Respondent-Appellant. DECIDED and any person or entity mandated by statute to consider child abuse or neglect information when conducting a background check or employment-related screening of an individual . . . seeking employment with an agency or organization providing services to children[.]