Title: State v. Ramon Lopez Arias
Citation: 2008 WI 84
Docket Number: 2006AP000974-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 9, 2008

2008 WI 84 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP974-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Ramon Lopez Arias, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 9, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 1, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Clark   
 
JUDGE: 
Jon M. Counsell   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BUTLER, JR., J., join the 
dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was oral argument by 
David H. Perlman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Lora B. Cerone, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 84
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP974-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2005CF131) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Ramon Lopez Arias, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Clark County, 
Jon M. Counsell, judge.  Reversed and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This case comes before 
us by certification from the court of appeals.  Ramon Arias 
(Arias) was charged with one count of carrying a concealed 
weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 941.23 and 939.51(3)(a) (2005-
06);1 one count of possession of a switchblade knife, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 941.24 and 939.51(3)(a); and one count of 
possession with intent to deliver no more than five grams of 
                                                 
1 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version, unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
2 
 
cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school zone, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. §§ 961.41(1m)(cm)1r, 939.50(3)(f) and 961.49(2)(f).     
¶2 
After a preliminary hearing, the circuit court granted 
Arias's motion to suppress the weapon and the drugs obtained 
pursuant to the search conducted following a police dog's sniff 
of the exterior of the vehicle in which Arias was a passenger.  
The State appealed the order suppressing the evidence, and the 
court of appeals certified two issues to this court:  (1) 
"whether, under the Wisconsin Constitution, a dog sniff of a 
stopped vehicle is a 'search'"; and (2) "whether the vehicle 
stop was unreasonably prolonged in duration by the officer's 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
3 
 
controlled substance investigation."2  In its certification, the 
court of appeals explained: 
Here, the period of time to consider is the time 
consumed by the officer asking drug questions and 
preparing to release the dog, and then by the dog 
sniff itself.  As we set forth above, the videotape 
                                                 
2 The parties' briefs raise a third issue:  Whether the 
police dog was sufficiently reliable that his perceived alert to 
the vehicle provided probable cause that the vehicle contained 
drugs.  However, both Arias and the State agree in the briefs 
they submitted to us that this issue was not raised before the 
circuit court, although the dissent attempts to shift the 
reader's focus to this very issue in order to support its 
disagreement with the holding of the majority opinion.  While we 
are vested with the authority to consider issues not raised 
before the circuit court, County of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 
Wis. 2d 153, 171-72, 288 N.W.2d 129 (1980), we decline to do so 
here.  The issue of whether the police dog was sufficiently 
reliable to establish probable cause has factual underpinnings 
that make it inappropriate for this court to resolve during this 
appeal.  See, e.g., Wurtz v. Fleischman, 97 Wis. 2d 100, 107 
n.3, 293 N.W.2d 155 (1980) (observing that the power to make 
factual determinations is reserved to the circuit courts and 
should be exercised by this court only under "appropriate 
procedures in the exercise of its constitutional grant of 
original jurisdiction").  At the circuit court, Rennie's 
testimony that D'Jango alerted to drugs within Schillinger's 
vehicle came in as uncontroverted evidence.  Arias did not 
challenge the reliability of the dog's alert.  The dissent 
chooses to omit this part of the case's history. 
Instead, the dissent devotes a large part of its opinion to 
a long lament that the majority opinion does not address whether 
the drug-sniffing dog actually "alerted" to the presence of 
drugs in Megan Schillinger's vehicle and if it did, whether the 
dog's alerts were reliable.  Dissent, ¶¶63-66.  We do not 
address those issues because Arias never presented them to the 
circuit court and also because this matter is before us on 
certification of two issues:  (1) "whether, under the Wisconsin 
Constitution, a dog sniff of a stopped vehicle is a 'search'"; 
and (2) "whether the vehicle stop was unreasonably prolonged in 
duration by the officer's controlled substance investigation."     
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
4 
 
shows that this period was approximately one minute 
and eighteen seconds. 
¶3 
We answer both certified questions in the negative.  
First, we conclude that a dog sniff of the exterior of a vehicle 
located in a public place does not constitute a search under the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Second, we conclude that Colby-
Abbotsford Police Department Officer Brian Rennie (Rennie), who 
performed 
a "controlled substance investigation," did not 
unreasonably prolong his seizure of Arias.  In so concluding, we 
determine that the circuit court's finding that the dog sniff 
prolonged the detention by "approximately 38 minutes" is clearly 
erroneous.  The great weight and clear preponderance of the 
evidence shows that the dog sniff prolonged the detention by no 
more than 78 seconds.  Under the totality of the circumstances 
herein presented, the 78 seconds during which the dog sniff 
occurred is a not an unreasonable incremental intrusion upon 
Arias's 
liberty. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
dog 
sniff 
did 
not 
unreasonably prolong in duration the controlled substance 
investigation, which comported with the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and with Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Therefore, we reverse the order of the 
circuit court and remand for further proceedings.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
On August 20, 2005, Rennie, accompanied by his police 
dog, D'Jango, sat in his police cruiser located in the parking 
lot of a flower shop, running radar detection on Highway 13.  
While there, he observed Arias exit a grocery store with three 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
5 
 
12-packs of beer and place them in a vehicle he knew belonged to 
Megan Schillinger (Schillinger).  From his acquaintance with 
Schillinger, Rennie knew her to be 17 years of age.  When 
Schillinger began driving the vehicle containing both the beer 
and Arias, Rennie stopped them because he believed that 
Wisconsin law prohibited minors from operating vehicles that 
contain intoxicants.3    
¶5 
Rennie pulled Schillinger over and called for back-up 
at approximately 10:45 p.m.  He approached the car; explained to 
Schillinger why he had stopped her; and then he took her 
driver's license back to his squad car.  Though Rennie testified 
at the preliminary hearing that at this point he radioed 
dispatch to relay Schillinger's driver's license information, 
the State does not challenge the circuit court's finding to the 
contrary:  the circuit court found that Rennie did not radio in 
Schillinger's information until 11:27 p.m.  Rennie then returned 
to Schillinger's vehicle, where he administered a preliminary 
breath test to her to determine whether she had consumed 
alcohol.  The breath test registered "zero."  Rennie then asked 
Schillinger if there were any drugs in the car.  Schillinger 
replied "no."  Rennie then asked Schillinger if she and Arias 
were "carrying around anything with [them]."  She again replied 
"no."  At this point, Rennie returned to his squad car and 
released D'Jango to perform a sniff around the exterior of 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.93 prohibits a minor from driving a 
vehicle that contains intoxicants. 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
6 
 
Schillinger's vehicle.  The State concedes that Rennie did not 
have a reasonable suspicion of drug activity prior to the dog 
sniff. 
¶6 
The surveillance video taken from Rennie's squad car 
captures the activity of D'Jango, who alerts by sitting, which 
is called a "pass holder."  D'Jango appears on the video 
accompanied by Rennie.  D'Jango proceeds to the passenger side 
of the car, where he sits and barks.  D'Jango then gets up and 
jogs to the driver's side of the car, where he also sits and 
barks.  The time that elapsed from Rennie's question about drugs 
to the completion of D'Jango's sniff was one minute and 18 
seconds.  D'Jango's sniff concluded four minutes and ten seconds 
after Rennie stopped Schillinger's vehicle.   
¶7 
As a result of what he perceived as D'Jango's positive 
alert on the vehicle, Rennie instructed Arias to exit the 
vehicle and performed a "pat-down" search of him.  After 
searching Arias, Rennie instructed Schillinger to exit the 
vehicle, and he performed a "pat-down" search of her.  He then 
proceeded to search Schillinger's car. 
¶8 
Inside the car, Rennie found a plastic bag containing 
a powdery substance that Arias identified as "coke" stuck 
between the front seats.  Rennie also found a switchblade knife 
that "popped out" when he placed his weight on the front seat.  
Both items belonged to Arias.  
¶9 
Officer Jason Bauer, who arrived on the scene in 
response to Rennie's call for back-up, handcuffed Arias and 
searched him again, for the officers' safety.  Rennie placed 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
7 
 
Arias in his squad car, removed the beer from Schillinger's car 
and told her that she was free to leave.  The detainment 
concluded at approximately 11:27 p.m.  
¶10 Rennie did not issue Schillinger a citation for 
transporting intoxicants as a minor until the next day.  Rennie 
stated that he had drug evidence in his squad car that he wanted 
to deliver to the police station and that the encounter had led 
him to conclude that he "had a bigger concern with [Arias]" than 
in immediately issuing a ticket to Schillinger.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶11 "Whether police conduct constitutes a 'search' within 
the meaning of the [Wisconsin Constitution] is a question of 
law" subject to our independent review.  State v. Miller, 2002 
WI App 150, ¶5, 256 Wis. 2d 80, 647 N.W.2d 348.  "The question 
[of] 
whether 
police 
conduct 
violated 
the 
constitutional 
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is a 
question 
of 
constitutional 
fact" 
that 
we 
also 
review 
independently.  State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, ¶23, 236 Wis. 2d 
48, 613 N.W.2d 72. 
¶12 Upon review of an order granting a motion to suppress 
evidence, we uphold the circuit court's findings of historic 
fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  State v. Fonte, 2005 WI 
77, ¶11, 281 Wis. 2d 654, 698 N.W.2d 594.  A finding is clearly 
erroneous if "it is against the great weight and clear 
preponderance of the evidence."  State v. Sykes, 2005 WI 48, ¶21 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
8 
 
n.7, 279 Wis. 2d 742, 695 N.W.2d 277 (quoting State v. 
Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, ¶36, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 648 N.W.2d 367).   
B. 
Search 
¶13 Arias asks us to conclude that the dog sniff of the 
exterior of Schillinger's vehicle was a search within the 
meaning of Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
and that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct such 
a search.  Article I, Section 11 is the state analogue to the 
Fourth Amendment and protects persons against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.4 
¶14 The United States Supreme Court has determined that a 
dog sniff of the exterior of a vehicle is not a search within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Illinois v. Caballes, 543 
U.S. 405, 410 (2005); see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 
696, 707 (1983).  The Supreme Court first announced that a dog 
sniff is not a search in Place.  Id.  There, the defendant 
aroused the suspicion of law enforcement officers at Miami 
International Airport, who relayed their suspicion to law 
enforcement officers in New York, the defendant's destination.  
Place, 462 U.S. at 698.  Agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency 
                                                 
4 Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides:   
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause, 
supported 
by 
oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
9 
 
seized the defendant's luggage after he arrived at LaGuardia 
Airport and detained it for 90 minutes so that a narcotics 
detection dog could survey it.  Id. at 698-99.  The dog sniffed 
the defendant's luggage and signaled that one of his bags 
contained drugs.  Id. at 699.  The officers then secured a 
search warrant and found cocaine inside the bag to which the dog 
had alerted.  Id. 
¶15 Although the Supreme Court ruled that the 90-minute 
interlude between the detention of the luggage and the dog sniff 
was an unreasonably long seizure warranting suppression of the 
cocaine, the Court also concluded that the dog sniff did not 
constitute a search.  Id. at 707.  The Court reasoned that a dog 
sniff "discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics" and, 
accordingly, 
provides 
distinct 
limits 
on 
lawful 
private 
interests that can be revealed through a sniff.  Id.  
¶16 Place's conclusion that a dog sniff is not a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment was reinforced by 
Caballes.  In Caballes, the defendant was stopped for speeding 
and, while the detaining officer issued a ticket for that 
offense, another officer who arrived at the scene separately 
permitted his dog to canvass the exterior of the defendant's 
car.  Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406.  The dog alerted to the trunk, 
and the officers found marijuana inside.  Id.  The Supreme Court 
concluded that, because the driver was lawfully seized for a 
traffic violation, and because a dog sniff of the exterior of a 
vehicle did not constitute a search, the intrusion of the dog 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
10 
 
sniff did not "rise to the level of a constitutionally 
cognizable infringement."  Id. at 409. 
¶17 Wisconsin courts have also addressed the question of 
whether a dog sniff constitutes a search.  The court of appeals, 
in Miller, phrased the question presented as whether the "use of 
a drug-sniffing dog to detect the presence of marijuana inside 
Miller's car violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution."  Miller, 256 Wis. 2d 80, ¶5.   
¶18 In Miller, the use of a dog sniff of the exterior of a 
vehicle followed the execution of a search warrant for a 
residence where police officers had found marijuana.  Id., ¶2.  
Subsequent to the search of the residence, the officers checked 
the cars located nearby on the street, with the assistance of a 
narcotics detecting dog.  Id., ¶3.  The dog alerted three times 
to a particular car, and the officers found marijuana in the 
car.  Id.  In upholding the circuit court's denial of the 
defendant's motion to suppress, the court of appeals concluded 
that dog sniffs are not searches under the Fourth Amendment.  
Id., ¶¶4, 9.  However, the court did not separately analyze the 
issue under Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
and its actual holding addresses only the Fourth Amendment.  
Id., ¶10.  Therefore, whether a dog sniff is a search under 
Article I, Section 11 remained an open question.   
¶19 Generally, we have interpreted provisions of the 
Wisconsin Constitution consistent with the United States Supreme 
Court's interpretation of their counterparts in the federal 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
11 
 
constitution.  State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶39, 252 Wis. 2d 
228, 647 N.W.2d 142.  However, on occasion, we have interpreted 
a provision in the Wisconsin Constitution more broadly than the 
United States Supreme Court has interpreted a parallel provision 
in the United States Constitution.  State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, 
¶56, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899 (interpreting Article I, § 8 
more 
broadly 
than 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
interpreted the Fifth Amendment); State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 
¶45, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582 (also interpreting Article 
I, § 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution more broadly than the Fifth 
Amendment).  
¶20 Historically, we have interpreted Article I, Section 
11 of the Wisconsin Constitution in accord with the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.  See, e.g., 
State v. Malone, 2004 WI 108, ¶15, 274 Wis. 2d 540, 683 N.W.2d 
1; State v. Guzman, 166 Wis. 2d 577, 586-87, 480 N.W.2d 446 
(1992); State v. Williams, 47 Wis. 2d 242, 249, 177 N.W.2d 611 
(1970).  Our coordination of Article I, § 11 with the Supreme 
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence began long before we were 
required 
to 
follow 
the 
Supreme 
Court's 
Fourth 
Amendment 
jurisprudence by its decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961).  For example, in Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 
89 (1923), we excluded evidence that was obtained in violation 
of Hoyer's constitutional rights under Article I, § 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, an interpretation consistent with the 
United States Supreme Court's use of the exclusionary rule under 
the Fourth Amendment.  Hoyer, 180 Wis. at 412 (citing Amos v. 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
12 
 
United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921)).  State v. Eason, 2001 WI 
98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625, represents the only time we 
have departed from the Supreme Court's construction of the 
Fourth Amendment in our interpretation of Article I, Section 11.5   
¶21 There are sound policy reasons for this consistency in 
our jurisprudence.  By following the Supreme Court's Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence in interpreting Article I, Section 11, 
we impart certainty about what the law requires for those who 
will apply our decisions with respect to searches and seizures, 
and we provide distinct parameters to those who must enforce the 
law while maintaining the constitutionally protected rights of 
the people.  Therefore, were we to conclude that a dog sniff of 
the exterior of a vehicle in a public place constitutes a search 
under Article I, Section 11, we would be undertaking a 
significant departure from the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment 
                                                 
5 In State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 
625, 
we 
examined 
whether 
the 
evidence 
presented 
to 
the 
magistrate was sufficient to issue a no-knock search warrant.  
Id., ¶1.  After we concluded that the evidence was not 
sufficient, we addressed whether a good faith exception should 
be applied to the officers' conduct in executing the warrant.  
Id., ¶3.  In concluding that a good faith exception could be 
shown if the State proved the officers reasonably relied upon 
the warrant, we held that "[t]he burden is upon the State to 
also show that the process used in obtaining the search warrant 
included a significant investigation and a review by either a 
police officer trained and knowledgeable in the requirements of 
probable cause and reasonable suspicion, or a knowledgeable 
government attorney."  Id.  While we explained that such a 
process was followed, although not overtly stated in United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), we specifically required it 
to satisfy Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶63.   
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
13 
 
jurisprudence 
in 
interpreting 
the 
right 
to 
be 
free 
of 
unreasonable searches under the Wisconsin Constitution.   
¶22 We are unwilling to undertake such a departure here.  
First, we note that there is no constitutionally protected 
interest in possessing contraband under the United States 
Constitution, United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 
(1984), nor is there a constitutionally protected interest in 
possessing 
contraband 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  
Moreover, 
the 
occupant 
of 
a 
vehicle 
has 
no 
reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the air space surrounding a vehicle 
that he is occupying in a public place.  State v. Garcia, 195 
Wis. 2d 68, 74-75, 535 N.W.2d 124 (Ct. App. 1995).  
¶23 Second, a dog sniff is much less intrusive than 
activities that have been held to be searches.  Place, 462 U.S. 
at 707.  When a dog sniffs around the perimeter of a vehicle, 
the occupant of the vehicle is not subjected to the embarrassing 
disclosure or inconvenience that a search often entails.  Id.  
The dog sniff reveals only the presence or absence of narcotics, 
a contraband item.  Id.  Indeed, a dog sniff is unique as a 
means of detection because, as the Supreme Court has observed, a 
dog sniff gives limited information that is relevant only to 
contraband for which there is no constitutional protection.  Id. 
¶24 Arias asserts constitutional protection for a place, 
the area surrounding the outside of Schillinger's vehicle.  
However, 
the 
proscription 
against 
unreasonable 
searches 
contained within Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution is meant to protect people, not things or places, 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
14 
 
aside from their relationships to people affected by government 
action.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); 
Garcia, 195 Wis. 2d at 74.  The protection afforded to people in 
relation to things and places is the expectation that people 
will be free from government intrusion into places or things in 
which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.  See 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52; State v. Bruski, 2007 WI 25, ¶¶23-24, 
299 Wis. 2d 177, 727 N.W.2d 503.  As the court of appeals has 
explained, the occupant of an auto parked in a public place 
cannot contend that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the air space around the exterior of the vehicle.  Garcia, 
195 Wis. 2d at 74.  Accordingly, because of the limited 
intrusion resulting from a dog sniff for narcotics and the 
personal interests that Article I, Section 11 were meant to 
protect, we conclude that a dog sniff around the outside 
perimeter of a vehicle located in a public place is not a search 
under the Wisconsin Constitution.6 
                                                 
6 Arias also contends that a dog sniff is a search under the 
Wisconsin Constitution because dogs are "animate creatures prone 
to weakness and error."  He then argues that their fallibility 
causes dog sniffs to be searches, and therefore, they cannot be 
employed without reasonable suspicion.  We reject this argument 
for at least two reasons:  First, the reliability of a dog sniff 
does not bear on whether it is a search, but on whether it 
should be employed by law enforcement in crime detection under 
any circumstance.  Second, if a dog sniff were held to be a 
search and the officer could employ it if he had reasonable 
suspicion of drug activity, that reasonable suspicion would not 
cause the dog sniff to become more reliable. 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
15 
 
C. 
Seizure 
¶25 The 
next 
question 
we 
must 
address 
is 
whether 
conducting the dog sniff unreasonably prolonged Arias's seizure.  
As we explained above, the federal and state constitutions 
protect persons against unreasonable searches and seizures.  
U.S. Const. amend. IV.; Wis. Const. art. I, § 11.  Although our 
legal lexicon often presents "searches and seizures" as an 
inseparable 
tandem, 
the 
two 
are 
constitutionally 
and 
analytically distinct.  We have set out the parameters of a 
"search" under the federal and state constitutions as they 
relate to a dog sniff.  A seizure differs from a search, as it 
"deprives the individual of dominion over his or her person or 
property."  Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990).   
1. 
Duration of the dog sniff 
¶26 Before discussing the general legal principles that 
may be applied, or the parties' positions in regard to whether 
the 
detention 
satisfies 
the 
constitutional 
standard 
of 
reasonableness, we must first resolve one predicate issue:  By 
how much time did the dog sniff extend the traffic stop?  Arias 
contends that the circuit court's conclusion that D'Jango's 
sniff prolonged the stop by "approximately 38 minutes" is not 
clearly erroneous; and therefore, the dog sniff unreasonably 
prolonged his seizure.  In contrast, the State argues that the 
circuit court's finding with regard to the extension of the stop 
is clearly erroneous.  The State maintains that it was not the 
dog sniff that extended the stop, but rather the "probable cause 
of drug activity," which the dog sniff generated, that extended 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
16 
 
the stop.  Accordingly, the State contends that the actual time 
spent on the dog sniff is 78 seconds, because that is the time 
that elapsed between Rennie's question to Schillinger about 
whether the car contained drugs and the conclusion of D'Jango's 
sniff.  The State supports its contention that the 78 seconds is 
the proper focus by emphasizing that the court of appeals, in 
certifying the case, identified 78 seconds as the time for us to 
consider.    
¶27 The circuit court's finding that the dog sniff 
prolonged Schillinger and Arias's detention by "approximately 38 
minutes" is clearly erroneous.  Thirty-eight minutes was the 
approximate amount of time that elapsed from the conclusion of 
D'Jango's sniff to Arias's arrest.  We conclude that it is 
against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence 
to find, as it appears the circuit court did, that the 38-minute 
interval is attributable to the time it took to complete the dog 
sniff.  The 38 minutes that Schillinger and Arias were detained 
following the dog sniff was occupied by Rennie's search of the 
vehicle, his pat-down searches of Arias and Schillinger and the 
activities flowing from the vehicle search.  It was those 
activities, not the dog sniff, that extended the detention by 
"approximately 38 minutes."   
¶28 For example, when Rennie saw that D'Jango had alerted 
to Schillinger's vehicle, he concluded that he had probable 
cause to search the vehicle and its occupants.7  Rennie first 
                                                 
7 We do not determine here whether Rennie's assessment that 
D'Jango's alert provided probable cause was accurate.     
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
17 
 
instructed Arias to exit the vehicle, and then he conducted a 
"pat-down" search of Arias.  He applied the same process with 
Schillinger.  He then searched the vehicle, finding cocaine and 
a switchblade knife inside.  The discovery of contraband 
precipitated Arias's arrest.  It is these activities, not the 
dog 
sniff, that occupied the latter 38 minutes of the 
detainment.8  Accordingly, it was clearly erroneous for the 
circuit court to find that the dog sniff prolonged the detention 
by 38 minutes.  Therefore, we consider the 78-second extension 
of Arias's detention in deciding whether Rennie's "controlled 
substance 
investigation" 
was 
reasonable 
under 
all 
the 
circumstances.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 19; Griffith, 236 Wis. 2d 48, 
¶38.  
2. 
General principles 
¶29 As explained above, this constitutional challenge 
arises in the course of a traffic stop.  Because a traffic stop 
                                                 
8 The dissent devotes considerable energy to protesting our 
conclusion that the dog sniff did not prolong the detention by 
38 minutes.  However, the parties agree that the dog sniff 
itself occupied only 78 seconds.  Once Rennie determined that 
D'Jango alerted to Schillinger's car, he engaged in the 
activities recounted above that related to his investigation of 
whether drugs were located in the car.  The circuit court 
confirmed that the issue to be addressed was whether the time 
taken by the dog sniff, itself, was lawful.  In framing the 
issue that the court believed Arias was asking it to address, 
the 
court 
said, 
"you're 
concerned, 
potential 
points 
of 
contention and argument is that that initial stop was extended 
beyond what would normally be required for that stop to allow a 
dog sniff slash search to take place.  And that is your 
concern."  To which Arias's lawyer responded, "That is correct, 
Your Honor."  
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
18 
 
deprives a detained individual of dominion over his or her 
person and vehicle, a traffic stop is a seizure.  See Delaware 
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); Malone, 274 Wis. 2d 540, 
¶24.  Although it is universally accepted that a traffic stop 
constitutes a seizure, courts disagree over what level of proof 
is necessary to support a traffic stop.  Some courts, for 
example, the Supreme Court in Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 
(1998), and this court in Malone, have concluded that a traffic 
stop is an investigative detention.  Investigative detentions, 
referred to as "Terry-stops," are analyzed under a two-part 
inquiry to determine whether they pass constitutional muster.  
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968); Griffith, 236 Wis. 2d 
48, ¶26.  
¶30 First, courts determine whether the seizure was 
justified at its inception.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20.  Second, 
courts determine whether an officer's action "was reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place."  Id. at 20.  Terry explained 
that in order for a search to be reasonable, "[t]he scope of the 
search must 'be strictly tied to and justified by' the 
circumstances 
which 
rendered 
[the 
search's] 
initiation 
permissible."  Id. at 19 (citation omitted).  The United States 
Supreme Court in Terry reasoned that "[t]he sole justification 
of the search in the present situation is the protection of the 
police officer and others nearby, and [the search] must 
therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably 
designed to discover . . . instruments for the assault of the 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
19 
 
police officer."  Id. at 29.  The term "the scope of" was not 
defined solely with relation to the purpose for which the stop 
was made, but rather, also with relation to the public interest 
of protecting the personal safety of the officer and others, 
within the parameters of the detainee's Fourth Amendment rights.  
Id.; see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 48, 411-12 (1997);9 
Griffith, 236 Wis. 2d 48, ¶38.  
¶31 Different constitutional interests are affected by a 
search,10 as compared with the interests affected by a seizure.11  
See, e.g., Griffith, 236 Wis. 2d 48, ¶¶26-27.  We note that when 
"the scope of" a search is reviewed, the focus is on where and 
                                                 
9 As the Supreme Court has explained, the "touchstone of our 
analysis" is the "reasonableness in all the circumstances of the 
particular governmental invasion."  Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 
408, 411 (1997).  "[R]easonableness 'depends on a balance 
between the public interest and the individual's right to 
personal security free from arbitrary interference by law 
officers.'"  Id. (citations omitted). 
10 Searches 
affect 
privacy 
interests, 
such 
as 
bodily 
integrity and those places that a person has reserved for his or 
her individual use.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
361 (1967) (Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring).   
11 Seizures affect personal liberty interests such as the 
freedom of movement and the possession of one's property.  See 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979).   
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
20 
 
how the search was conducted.12  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.  
Where and how the search was conducted are important factors by 
which to judge the invasiveness of a search because the 
constitutional right affected by a search is the privacy 
interests of the person searched.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Mr. 
Justice Harlan, concurring).   
¶32 By contrast, when a seizure that was lawful at its 
inception and does not encompass an arrest is reviewed, the 
scope of the continued investigative detention is examined to 
determine whether it lasted "no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop,"  Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 
491, 500 (1983), and whether the investigative means used in the 
continued seizure are "the least intrusive means reasonably 
                                                 
12 Terry explains:  "This Court has held in the past that a 
search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the 
Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and 
scope."  Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1968).  And further:  "The 
scope of the search must 'be strictly tied to and justified by' 
the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible."  
Id. at 19.  And further:  "[The] sounder course is to . . . make 
the scope of the particular intrusion, in light of all the 
exigencies of the case, a central element in the analysis of 
reasonableness."  Id. at 18 n.5. 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
21 
 
available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion," id.13  In 
that vein, we consider whether the officer diligently pursued 
his investigation to confirm or dispel his suspicions.  United 
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985).  In Royer, the 
Supreme Court held that the means employed to continue Royer's 
seizure became unreasonably invasive when Royer, who was stopped 
in a public area of an airport terminal, was taken to a non-
                                                 
13 In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), two officers 
stopped Royer in a concourse of the Miami International Airport.  
Id. at 493.  They identified themselves and asked to see his 
identification and ticket.  Id. at 494.  When they noticed that 
his driver's license bore the name Royer, but his ticket was in 
the name of Holt, they questioned him about it.  Id.  Apparently 
unsatisfied with Royer's response and without returning his 
ticket or identification, they asked him to accompany them to a 
private room adjacent to the concourse.  Id.  Then, without 
Royer's consent, the officers retrieved Royer's luggage from the 
airline and brought it to the room where they had taken him.  
Id.  They asked if they could search it.  Id.  Royer produced a 
key for one of the bags, but said he did not know the 
combination for the lock on the other bag.  Id.  Both bags were 
searched and drugs were found.  Id. at 494-95.  This entire 
process took approximately 15 minutes.  Id. at 495.   
The Supreme Court concluded that from the moment Royer was 
taken to a private room while the officers retained his 
identification and ticket the means of his seizure became 
unreasonably intrusive.  Id. at 501.  The Court concluded that 
the investigative detention became a confinement equivalent to 
an arrest.  Id.  However, at that point there was not probable 
cause to arrest him.  Id. at 503.  The "least intrusive means" 
to satisfy the officers' suspicions were not employed; and 
therefore, Royer's Fourth Amendment rights were violated.  Id. 
at 504.  One of the less restrictive means suggested by the 
Court that could have been employed to confirm or put aside the 
officers' reasonable suspicion that Royer was transporting drugs 
was the use of a drug sniffing dog.  Id. at 505-06.  The Court's 
decision is driven by the means used to continue Royer's 
seizure. 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
22 
 
public location such that the "stop" became a "confinement."  
Royer, 460 U.S. at 501. 
¶33 Griffith presented a different type of challenge to 
the constitutionality of a seizure.  Our inquiry there focused 
on "the incremental intrusion" that was occasioned by an 
officer's 
questioning 
Griffith 
to 
determine 
whether 
that 
intrusion was unreasonable.  Griffith, 236 Wis. 2d 48, ¶4.  Our 
concern was whether the duration of the investigative stop was 
unconstitutionally extended when the officer asked Griffith, a 
passenger in the stopped vehicle, to step outside of the vehicle 
and answer questions concerning who he was and where he was 
going.  Id.  We were not concerned with the means used to 
continue Griffith's seizure, as the Supreme Court was in Royer.      
¶34 In evaluating the challenge Griffith presented, we 
employed a three-part14 test that focused on the reasonableness 
of the continued seizure: 
Consideration 
of 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
such 
seizures involves a weighing of the gravity of the 
public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to 
which the seizure advances the public interest, and 
the severity of the interference with individual 
liberty.  
                                                 
14 There are occasions when the first two parts of this test 
are collapsed into one.  See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 
106, 109 (1977). 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
23 
 
Id., ¶37 (citation omitted).15  We reviewed the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether the "questioning transformed 
the reasonable seizure into an unreasonable one."  Id., ¶41.16  
We did so because the United States Supreme Court and this court 
have repeatedly eschewed bright-line rules for identifying 
whether a seizure is reasonable; instead, courts have focused on 
the totality of the circumstances that relate to each seizure.  
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); Griffith, 236 Wis. 2d 
48, ¶41.  There remains no hard-and-fast time limit for when a 
detention 
has 
become 
too 
long 
and 
therefore 
becomes 
unreasonable.  Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685-86; Griffith, 236 Wis. 2d 
48, ¶54.   
                                                 
15 We note that this inquiry is somewhat different than that 
employed in State v. Malone, 2004 WI 108, 274 Wis. 2d 540, 683 
N.W.2d 1.  In Malone, we were addressing the limiting certified 
question of whether an officer may request passengers to exit a 
vehicle and answer questions that were related to the reason for 
the traffic stop.  Id., ¶1.  In State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, 
236 Wis. 2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 7, our discussion was not limited by 
a certified question.  See id., ¶4. 
16 We noted that Griffith was not compelled to answer the 
officer's questions.  Id., ¶48.  Further, the driver did not 
have a valid license so we concluded that there was a public 
interest in determining whether the car could be driven by 
another occupant or had to be towed.  Id., ¶47.  And in 
addition, we concluded that there was a public interest in 
obtaining the identification of witnesses to police-citizen 
encounters.  Id., ¶48.  The entire encounter from the initial 
stop to Griffith's answering the questions asked took only a few 
minutes.  Id., ¶51.  In addition, law enforcement was diligently 
pursuing the suspected traffic violation that had led to the 
initial seizure.  See id., ¶55.  Therefore, we concluded that, 
on balance, the incremental intrusion upon Griffith's liberty 
occasioned by the questioning was not unreasonable.  Id., ¶63.   
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
24 
 
3. 
The parties' positions 
¶35 The parties do not dispute that the traffic stop falls 
under Knowles and Terry.  We note that a "routine traffic stop 
. . . is a relatively brief encounter and 'is more analogous to 
a so-called "Terry-stop" than to a formal arrest.'"17  Knowles, 
525 U.S. at 117.  With respect to the first part of the Terry 
inquiry, Arias concedes that the initial interference with his 
liberty was justified.  He acknowledges that Rennie acted with 
lawful authority when he stopped Schillinger's vehicle.  
¶36 However, Arias contends that Rennie impermissibly 
extended the seizure by allowing D'Jango to sniff the vehicle 
because the "dog sniff occur[red] outside the scope of the 
initial traffic stop."  Arias's brief, at 25.  Therefore, he 
asserts that the time taken by the dog sniff transformed a 
reasonable and lawful seizure into an unreasonable and unlawful 
seizure.  Stated otherwise, he contends that the dog sniff 
expanded the reason for the initial stop, when the expansion was 
not supported by reasonable suspicion of drug activity.  He 
relies on State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. 
App. 1999) and State v. Gammons, 2001 WI App 36, 241 Wis. 2d 
296, 625 N.W.2d 623.    
¶37 The State asserts that State v. Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d 
600, 558 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1996) should control our decision.  
It contends that Gaulrapp's explanation that it is the duration 
                                                 
17 We have previously cited the Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 
113 (1998), view of traffic stops and assumed that it applied.  
See, e.g., Malone, 274 Wis. 2d 540, ¶24.   
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
25 
 
of time by which the traffic stop was extended that is 
controlling, not the subject matter of the question that is 
asked, which we should apply here by analogy to the dog sniff.      
4. 
Reasonableness of the dog sniff 
¶38 Succinctly stated, the question we must decide is 
whether the 78 second intrusion upon Arias's liberty that was 
caused by the dog sniff was reasonable.  "Reasonableness . . . 
depends 'on a balance between the public interest and the 
individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary 
interference by law officers.'"  Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 
106, 
109 
(1977) 
(citation 
omitted). 
 
A 
seizure 
becomes 
unreasonable when the incremental liberty intrusion resulting 
from the investigation supersedes the public interest served by 
the 
investigation. 
 
Id. 
 
In 
sum, 
an 
unconstitutional 
continuation of a once lawful seizure can occur when the 
extension of time for that needed to satisfy the original 
concern that caused the stop becomes unreasonable or when the 
means used to continue the seizure becomes unreasonable, both of 
which are evaluated under the totality of the circumstances 
presented.    
¶39 Under the totality of the circumstances before us, we 
examine the public interest, the degree to which the continued 
seizure advances the public interest and the severity of the 
interference of Arias's liberty interest.  Griffith, 236 Wis. 2d 
48, ¶37.  The dog sniff occurred so Rennie could ascertain 
whether there were drugs in Schillinger's vehicle.  In that 
regard, the public interest in "prevent[ing] the flow of 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
26 
 
narcotics into distribution channels" has long been recognized 
as significant.  Place, 462 U.S. at 704.  The use of a narcotics 
sniffing dog furthers this public interest by locating narcotics 
that may not otherwise be detected.18  The dog sniff was part of 
the on-going traffic stop of Schillinger that occurred because 
she was a minor and was transporting alcohol that Arias had 
placed in her vehicle.  The dog sniff of Schillinger's vehicle 
took 78 seconds to further the public's interest.  This brief 
78-second 
extension 
of 
Arias's 
seizure 
is 
significantly 
outweighed by the importance of preventing the flow of illegal 
drugs.19   
¶40 In 
addition, 
Rennie 
diligently 
pursued 
his 
investigation in a manner that could quickly confirm or dispel 
his suspicions relative to the stop of Schillinger's vehicle.  
Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686.  He observed beer being loaded into a 
car that was driven by Schillinger, whom he knew was under age.  
He 
quickly 
sought 
to 
ensure 
that 
Schillinger 
was 
not 
intoxicated, first by administering a preliminary breath test to 
                                                 
18 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561-62 
(1980) (Powell, J., concurring).   
Few problems affecting the health and welfare of our 
population 
. . . cause greater concern than the 
escalating use of controlled substances . . . [a]nd 
many drugs . . . may be easily concealed.  As a 
result, the obstacles to detection of illegal conduct 
maybe unmatched in any other area of law enforcement.   
19 Many articles have been written on the havoc that illegal 
drugs visit on children and adults.  See, e.g., Josephine 
Gittler, The American Drug War, Maternal Substance Abuse and 
Child Protection, 7 J. Gender, Race & Just. 237 (2003). 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
27 
 
her and then by inquiring whether drugs were in the vehicle.  He 
released D'Jango to sniff the outside perimeter of the car.  All 
these tasks took only 4 minutes, 10 seconds to accomplish.  
Rennie's actions were systematic and efficient.  Arias was not 
taken to a non-public location as the defendant was in Royer.  
He remained seated in the passenger compartment of Schillinger's 
vehicle.  Therefore, the incremental intrusion on Arias's 
liberty is time-focused, as it was in Griffith.  On balance, we 
conclude that the incremental intrusion upon Arias's liberty 
interest 
that 
resulted 
from 
the 
78-second 
dog 
sniff 
is 
outweighed 
by 
the 
public's 
interest 
served 
thereby.  
Accordingly, Arias was not subjected to an unreasonable seizure.    
¶41 Our conclusion is consistent with the discussion in 
Gaulrapp.  In Gaulrapp, the court of appeals was faced with the 
contention that asking a question about drugs and firearms, 
without a reasonable suspicion that Gaulrapp possessed either, 
caused a lawful seizure to become constitutionally infirm.  
Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d at 608.  In its discussion, the court of 
appeals correctly noted that no seizure occurs when law 
enforcement asks a question without a reasonable suspicion 
justifying the question so long as an answer is not compelled.  
Id. at 609.  The court then noted that it was "the extension of 
a detention past the point reasonably justified by the initial 
stop, not the nature of the questions asked, that [may] 
violate[] the Fourth Amendment."  Id.  Gaulrapp is in accord 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
28 
 
with numerous federal and state courts.20  Similarly to Gaulrapp, 
here the relevant inquiry is not whether a dog sniff was 
conducted, or a question was asked, but whether Arias's 
detention was unreasonably extended.  Id.; see also, Florida v. 
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991). 
¶42 Arias 
contends 
that 
Caballes 
stands 
for 
the 
proposition that a dog sniff conducted without reasonable 
suspicion of drug possession is per se violative of the federal 
Constitution unless the dog sniff is conducted simultaneously 
with activities germane to what precipitated the traffic stop in 
the first instance.  We disagree.  We do not read Caballes so 
narrowly.  Indeed, Caballes observes that a traffic stop may 
become unlawful if it is "prolonged beyond the time reasonably 
required to complete" the activities attendant to the stop.  
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407.  As we have stated above, the time 
taken to complete the traffic stop and the dog sniff were 
reasonable.   
¶43 Furthermore, Arias's reliance on Betow and Gammons is 
misplaced.  In Betow, the court of appeals concluded that 
Betow's continued detention after he was stopped for speeding 
was not warranted by the facts available to the detaining 
officer.  Betow is distinguishable from the case before us 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., United States v. Mesa, 62 F.3d 159 (6th Cir. 
1995); United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1994); 
Henderson v. State, 551 S.E.2d 400 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); State v. 
Gutierrez, 51 P.3d 461 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002); State v. Hight, 
781 A.2d 11 (N.H. 2001); State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 
2002).  
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
29 
 
because the incremental intrusion on Betow's liberty interest 
was unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances 
presented.  This is so because Betow's traffic stop for speeding 
had been concluded when the officer asked if he could search 
Betow's vehicle.  Betow, 226 Wis. 2d at 92.  Betow refused the 
officer's request.  Id.  Betow also asked the officer for 
permission to leave.  Id.  Notwithstanding Betow's request, the 
officer refused to permit him to leave.  Additionally, instead 
of honoring Betow's request, the officer had his dog make 
"several passes around the car."  Id. at 93.  Next, the officer 
placed the dog inside Betow's car, where the dog located a 
packet of marijuana.  Id.   
¶44 By contrast, the traffic stop of Schillinger was on-
going when the dog sniff of the outside of the vehicle occurred; 
the dog was not placed inside of Schillinger's vehicle; Arias 
had 
not 
asked 
to 
leave 
and 
been 
required 
to 
remain.  
Accordingly, the incremental intrusion upon Betow's liberty was 
significantly greater than that which occurred here.   
¶45 We note that Betow contains broad dicta that might be 
read so as to cause confusion with the appropriate inquiry for 
evaluating the constitutionality of a continuing seizure.  For 
example, Betow asserts: 
[T]he scope of the officer's inquiry, or the line of 
questioning, may be broadened beyond the purpose for 
which the person was stopped only if additional 
suspicious factors come to the officer's attention——
keeping in mind that these factors, like the factors 
justifying the stop in the first place, must be 
"particularized" and "objective."   
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
30 
 
Id. at 94.  This dicta misstates the manner in which courts are 
to evaluate the reasonableness of the continuation of a seizure 
that was lawful at its inception.  Betow was clarified by 
Gaulrapp's explanation that, "[n]o seizure occurs when police, 
without the reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop, ask 
questions of an individual . . . so long as the police do not 
convey that compliance with the request is required."  Gaulrapp, 
207 Wis. 2d at 609.  The dicta in Betow quoted above is also 
inconsistent with Bostick, which concludes that law enforcement 
questions do not result in a seizure, so long as answers are not 
compelled.  Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437.  As we have explained, the 
appropriate inquiry involves balancing the public interest in 
the seizure, the degree to which the continued seizure advances 
the public interest and the severity of the interference with 
the liberty interest of the person detained.  Griffith, 236 
Wis. 2d 48, ¶37.  
¶46 Gammons is also distinguishable from the totality of 
the circumstances presented here.   In reversing the circuit 
court's refusal to suppress the evidence, the court of appeals 
in Gammons employed, in part, the dicta from Betow.  Gammons, 
241 Wis. 2d 296, ¶18.  However, in examining the totality of the 
relevant circumstances we note that the reason for the initial 
seizure had been satisfied, id., ¶2; the driver and the two 
passengers had provided identification, id.; the officer had run 
computer checks on all three, id.; the officer asked to search 
the vehicle and the driver had refused, id., ¶3.  Thereafter, 
the officer threatened the driver with the further detainment so 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
31 
 
that he could use a drug sniffing dog, id., and the driver then 
consented to the search of the vehicle, id.  Accordingly, the 
incremental intrusion upon Gammons's liberty interest was 
significantly greater than the intrusion upon Arias's liberty 
interest.     
¶47 In sum, we observe that neither the Fourth Amendment 
nor Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution prohibit 
all seizures.  Only unreasonable seizures are violative of 
constitutional rights.  In examining the reasonableness of 
Arias's seizure, we balance the public's interest in preventing 
the distribution of illegal drugs, the furtherance of that 
interest by the continued seizure of Schillinger's vehicle and 
the effect on Arias's liberty interest under the Fourth 
Amendment 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
11 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109; Griffith, 236 Wis. 2d 
48, ¶37.  The incremental extension of time expended in this 
stop that was occasioned by the dog sniff was a brief 78 
seconds.  It was only the 78 seconds of the dog sniff that added 
to Rennie's efficient efforts to confirm or allay his suspicions 
that led to the initial stop.  This incremental liberty 
intrusion does not outweigh the public interest served by it; 
therefore, the incremental intrusion occasioned by the dog sniff 
satisfies our test for reasonableness.  Griffith, 236 Wis. 2d 
48, ¶38.  Accordingly, the "controlled substance investigation" 
comported with the strictures of the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
32 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶48 In conclusion, we answer both questions certified to 
us by the court of appeals in the negative.  First, we conclude, 
in accordance with federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, that 
a dog sniff of the exterior of a vehicle located in a public 
place 
does 
not 
constitute 
a 
search 
under 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Second, we conclude that Rennie's "controlled 
substance 
investigation" did not unreasonably prolong his 
seizure of Arias.  In so concluding, we determine that the 
circuit court's finding that the dog sniff prolonged the 
detention by "approximately 38 minutes" is clearly erroneous.  
The great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence shows 
that the dog sniff prolonged the detention by 78 seconds.  Under 
the totality of the circumstances herein presented, the seventy-
eight seconds is not an unreasonable incremental intrusion upon 
Arias's 
liberty. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
dog 
sniff 
did 
not 
unreasonably prolong in duration the controlled substance 
No. 
2006AP974-CR   
 
33 
 
investigation, which comported with the Fourth Amendment and 
with Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.21   
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is reversed, 
and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings.  Following remand, if a party moves the circuit 
court to determine whether the dog sniff was sufficient to 
establish probable cause to conduct a search of Schillinger's 
vehicle, our decision does not preclude the circuit court from 
holding a hearing on such a motion, if the circuit court chooses 
to do so.   
 
                                                 
21 As the reader moves to a review of the dissent, it is 
important to keep in mind that the dissent is an attempt to 
shift the reader's focus from the two certified questions we 
accepted this case to decide, and onto a discussion of issues 
that were never raised before the circuit court.  That is, Arias 
provided no testimony before the circuit court that D'Jango had 
not alerted or that he had a history of unreliability in regard 
to the alerts he made.  Rennie's testimony that D'Jango alerted 
to the presence of drugs, which he believed provided probable 
cause to search Schillinger's vehicle, was not objected to or 
controverted.  Accordingly, Arias never argued that the dog 
sniff was not sufficient to support probable cause to search 
Schillinger's vehicle where the drugs and weapon were found.  
This history of the case is not apparent in the dissent. 
No.  2006AP974-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶49 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Our circuit 
court judges serve on the front line of the court system. Day in 
and day out they are called upon to make tough decisions. The 
circuit court judge here made one of those tough decisions.  
¶50 It is not always politically well-received when you 
have the goods——the drugs——on the defendant and yet suppress 
that evidence based on the state and federal constitutions. 
Judges make those tough calls because of their commitment to the 
rule of law and adherence to their oath of office. We expect no 
less of them.  
¶51 Those same judges have a right to expect of us that 
when their case is appealed and we review it, that we neither 
misconstrue 
their 
findings 
of 
fact 
nor 
their 
rationale. 
Unfortunately, the majority here does both.  
¶52 In addition, the majority advances a novel and 
problematic constitutional analysis. It fails to follow the test 
announced by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1968), and instead substitutes a new test. 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶53 There are two time periods relevant in the case. The 
first is the 78 seconds between the time Officer Rennie 
completed the breath analysis test with Schillinger and the time 
D'Jango completed the sniff of the vehicle. The second time 
period is the 38-minute stretch (which includes the 78 seconds) 
between the completion of the breath analysis and the time 
No.  2006AP974-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
Officer 
Rennie 
called 
in 
Schillinger's 
driver's 
license 
information to dispatch.  
¶54 The majority concludes that the 78-second extension of 
the traffic stop during which the dog sniff occurred "is not an 
unreasonable 
incremental 
intrusion 
upon 
Arias's 
liberty." 
Majority op., ¶48. In reaching this conclusion, the majority 
determines that "the circuit court's finding that the dog sniff 
prolonged the detention by 'approximately 38 minutes' is clearly 
erroneous." Id.  
¶55 I agree with the majority that the appropriate focus 
is the 78 seconds. However, I cannot join the majority's 
conclusion that the circuit court erred in determining that the 
dog sniff prolonged the detention by 38 minutes. Rather, the 
circuit court found that the stop was prolonged by 38 minutes 
but that the length of the canine sniff was only a small part of 
the 38 minutes.  After the completion of the dog sniff, the 
constitutional analysis must rely upon an assessment of probable 
cause.  
A 
¶56 A threshold problem with the majority's analysis is 
that it misconstrues the circuit court's factual findings and 
its rationale. In its decision on Arias's motion, the circuit 
court focused on the fact that Officer Rennie did not request 
Schillinger's driver's license information until well after the 
dog sniff was conducted. This led the court to determine that 
the dog sniff had delayed the traffic stop. The court expressly 
No.  2006AP974-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
found that the dog sniff accounted for "roughly one minute" (not 
all 38 minutes) of the extension of the seizure. 
¶57 As a separate finding of fact, the circuit court 
determined 
that 
the 
stop 
was 
prolonged 
in 
total 
for 
approximately 38 minutes, that is, for the dog sniff and the 
subsequent questioning, search, and arrest. The court next 
concluded that there were no objective and articulable facts 
giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity 
justifying the entire extension: 
Were there other objective and articulable facts that 
would give the officer a reasonable suspicion that 
either Ms. Schillinger or the defendant had been 
engaged in illegal activity allowing an extension of 
the stop? The court concludes no.  
¶58 In other words, the circuit court did not make a 
finding that the dog sniff alone extended the traffic stop by 38 
minutes. Rather, it made a determination that the traffic stop 
was extended by 38 minutes without reasonable suspicion, and 
that part of the extension included the dog sniff.  
¶59 Thus, the majority has attributed a factual finding to 
the circuit court that the circuit court did not make. This 
misconstruction of the circuit court's decision leads to a void 
in the majority opinion. It has determined that a 78-second 
extension for a dog sniff is not unreasonable. However, it has 
not analyzed whether the rest of the 38-minute extension is 
reasonable.  
¶60 The closest the majority comes to an explanation is 
its statement that the remainder of the 38-minute extension is 
attributable to activities other than the dog sniff. Id., ¶27. 
No.  2006AP974-CR.awb 
 
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However, it does not explain why it matters what activities 
filled the 38 minutes. The ultimate issue in this case is 
whether the extension of the traffic stop can be justified 
regardless of what activities took place during the extension.  
¶61 In other words, the majority has misconstrued the 
circuit court's rationale. The circuit court's reasoning was 
based on whether a 38-minute extension of a traffic stop without 
reasonable suspicion was justified. It was not premised on the 
entire 38 minutes being occupied by the dog sniff.  
¶62 I cannot endorse the majority's conclusion that the 
circuit court clearly erred. The circuit court did not find that 
the dog sniff alone prolonged the stop by 38 minutes. Moreover, 
the circuit court's reasoning had to account for the entire 38 
minutes by which Rennie extended the stop. The majority's 
account fails to account for the entire period.  
B 
¶63 Nonetheless, I agree that the appropriate focus for 
this court is the 78 seconds of the dog sniff. On one hand, if 
the dog sniff established probable cause, then the extension of 
the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion was only 78 
seconds. On the other hand, if the dog sniff did not establish 
probable cause, the circuit court is correct that there was an 
impermissible 38-minute extension of the traffic stop without 
"objective and articulable facts that would give the officer a 
reasonable 
suspicion 
that 
either 
Ms. 
Schillinger 
or 
the 
defendant had been engaged in illegal activity allowing an 
extension of the stop." However, if the dog sniff failed to 
No.  2006AP974-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
establish probable cause, then the search of the vehicle was 
impermissible on that basis (in addition to an unreasonable 38-
minute extension of the traffic stop). 
 ¶64 In Wisconsin, a dog alert can provide probable cause 
for a search only where "the dog is trained in narcotics 
detection and has demonstrated a sufficient level of reliability 
in detecting drugs in the past and the officer with the dog is 
familiar with how it reacted when it smelled contraband." State 
v. Miller, 2002 WI App 150, ¶12, 256 Wis. 2d 80, 647 N.W.2d 348. 
¶65 The circuit court's decision in this case was based on 
its determination that the extension of the traffic stop was not 
based on reasonable suspicion. It never made a determination 
that the dog sniff established probable cause to conduct the 
search of Arias and the vehicle. Because the court determined 
there was no reasonable suspicion to extend the seizure, it did 
not need to determine whether there was probable cause. As noted 
by the court of appeals in its certification to this court, the 
circuit court has not made the findings of fact necessary to 
establish probable cause: "There was no factual finding by the 
circuit court as to whether the dog actually did indicate the 
presence of controlled substances." 
¶66 Arias argues to this court that the dog sniff here did 
not establish probable cause. He argues that that D'Jango is not 
sufficiently reliable for his alerts to establish probable 
cause.1 In addition, Arias argues that the circuit court never 
                                                 
1 See State v. Miller, 2002 WI App 150, ¶12, 256 Wis. 2d 80, 
647 N.W.2d 348; Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).  
No.  2006AP974-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
made a finding of fact that D'Jango actually alerted on 
Schillinger's car.2 Upon remand the circuit court will have an 
opportunity to address the issue of probable cause.3 See mandate 
of the court following majority op., ¶48. 
II 
¶67 The second reason that I cannot join the majority is 
that its constitutional analysis is problematic. It fails to 
apply the second part of the two-prong test set forth in Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Accordingly, its approach conflicts 
with precedent of the United States Supreme Court as well as 
precedent from this state. 
¶68 The 
majority 
sets 
forth 
the 
correct 
test 
for 
determining 
whether 
an 
extension 
of 
a 
traffic 
stop 
is 
                                                 
2 Officer Rennie testified that when D'Jango alerts he "sits 
passively." See Majority op., ¶6. However, when deployed here, 
D'Jango sat, barked, jogged from one side of the car to the 
other, and sat and barked again. It is questionable whether 
sitting and barking is tantamount to sitting "passively." Even 
the court of appeals in its certification to this court stated 
that it was "not apparent from the videotape" that D'Jango sat 
passively. Having reviewed the squad video, I agree that it is 
not apparent that D'Jango ever sat passively.  
3 The majority states that it does not address whether the 
dog alerted or whether there was probable cause because the 
issues were not presented to the circuit court and because they 
were not certified questions.  
When this court grants direct review upon certification, it 
acquires jurisdiction "of an appeal," which includes all issues, 
not merely the issues certified, unless the court by order 
limits the issues on certification.    Wis. Stat. §§ 808.05(2); 
(Rule) 809.61; State v. Schweda, 2007 WI 100, ¶49, 303 
Wis. 2d 353, 736 N.W.2d 49 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); State 
v. Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d 672, 677, 482 N.W.2d 364 (1992); State 
v. Stoehr, 134 Wis. 2d 66, 70, 396 N.W.2d 177 (1986).  Here, the 
order did not limit the issues.  
No.  2006AP974-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
constitutional. First, a court must determine whether the 
seizure was justified at its inception, and second, it must 
determine whether the extension of the seizure "was reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place." Majority op., ¶30 (quoting 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20. As the majority notes, the parties 
agree that the initial seizure was justified at its inception. 
Majority op., ¶35. So far, so good. 
¶69 Inexplicably, however, rather than applying the second 
part of the test set forth——whether the extension of the seizure 
"was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place"——the majority 
changes the test. It states that "the question we must decide is 
whether the 78-second intrusion upon Arias's liberty that was 
caused by the dog sniff was reasonable." Majority op., ¶38. What 
happened to the rest of the test? The majority simply jettisons 
the second requirement that an extension of a seizure relate to 
the circumstances that justify the initial seizure.  
¶70 The circumstances that justified the initial seizure 
in this case were Officer Rennie's reasonable suspicion that a 
minor was transporting beer. However, the majority makes no 
attempt to explain how the extension of the seizure in order to 
conduct a dog sniff for drugs reasonably relates to those 
circumstances. Instead, it simply concludes that because the 
public 
has 
a 
significant 
interest 
in 
curbing 
narcotics 
distribution, a brief extension of the seizure is reasonable. 
Id., ¶39. 
No.  2006AP974-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
¶71 The failure to apply the test set forth is crucial to 
the majority's conclusion. The extension of the seizure in this 
case is wholly unrelated to the circumstances that justified the 
initial seizure. Extending the traffic stop to deploy a drug-
sniffing dog is not related in the slightest to transportation 
of beer by a minor. Thus, the extension of the seizure is not 
"reasonably 
related 
in 
scope 
to 
the 
circumstances 
which 
justified the interference in the first place," and is therefore 
unconstitutional. 
¶72 Supreme Court precedent on this matter is clear. In 
Florida v. Royer, the Court was adamant that "[a]n investigative 
detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary 
to effectuate the purpose of the stop." 460 U.S. 491, 500 
(1983). In addition to being circumscribed in time, the Court 
stated that the "scope of the detention must be carefully 
tailored to its underlying justification." Id.  There is no 
question that detention here lasted "longer than [was] necessary 
to effectuate the purpose of the stop," namely investigating 
whether Schillinger was transporting beer. Similarly, the scope 
of the detention was not carefully tailored to its underlying 
justification. Rather, it was expanded to conduct a dog sniff 
for 
drugs, 
which 
bears 
no 
relation 
to 
the 
underlying 
justification for the stop.  
¶73 The approach taken by the majority is also contrary to 
United States v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005). In that case, 
while one officer was writing a warning ticket during a traffic 
stop, another officer walked a drug-sniffing dog around the 
No.  2006AP974-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
defendant's vehicle. Id. at 406. The Court was explicit that a 
seizure justified by the interest of issuing a citation can 
become unlawful when expanded beyond the time reasonably 
required to issue the citation. Id. at 407. Because the dog 
sniff in Caballes occurred as the citation was being issued, 
there was no expansion. In contrast, the dog sniff here took 
place separately from the measures necessary to investigate a 
minor transporting beer.  
¶74 The majority opinion also conflicts with Wisconsin 
precedent. In State v. Betow, an officer stopped Betow for 
speeding. 226 Wis. 2d 90, 92, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999). 
The officer checked Betow's license and registration and asked 
for permission to search the car. Betow refused, but the officer 
detained him in order to deploy a drug-sniffing dog. Id., 92-93. 
The court of appeals determined that a valid traffic stop may be 
extended if "the officer becomes aware of additional suspicious 
factors which are sufficient to give rise to an articulable 
suspicion that the person has committed or is committing an 
offense" other than the one giving rise to the initial stop. Id. 
at 94. Because there were no such factors present in Betow, the 
court of appeals determined that extension of the seizure was 
unlawful.  
¶75 Following Betow requires a determination that the 
extension of the seizure in this case was unconstitutional. The 
State has presented no argument that Officer Rennie became aware 
of additional suspicious factors that would give rise to an 
articulable suspicion that Schillinger or Arias had committed or 
No.  2006AP974-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
were committing an offense other than the one that justified the 
initial seizure. Nonetheless, the stop was extended.  
¶76 The majority attempts to distinguish Betow on the 
ground that the traffic stop in that case had concluded and 
Betow refused the officer's request to search the car. Majority 
op., ¶43. The majority does not explain how it is able to divine 
that the traffic stop in Betow had been concluded when the 
officer extended the seizure. Betow was still detained and there 
is no indication in Betow that the officer had returned his 
license and registration. Contrary to the majority's assertion, 
the problem in Betow is that the traffic stop for speeding had 
not been concluded.  
¶77 Moreover, the fact that Betow refused a request fails 
to explain the majority's view that the extension of the search 
in that case was impermissible and the search in the present 
case was permissible. Schillinger and Arias were not given the 
opportunity to refuse the search. Officer Rennie retained 
Schillinger's license and registration and simply conducted the 
search.  
¶78 In State v. Gammons, a police officer performed a 
traffic stop for a missing rear license plate. 2001 WI App 36, 
¶2, 241 Wis. 2d 296, 625 N.W.2d 623. After checking the driver's 
license and registration, the officer asked to search the 
vehicle, and the driver refused. Id., ¶3. When the officer 
stated that he was going to have a dog sniff the vehicle, the 
driver acquiesced to a search. Id.  
No.  2006AP974-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
¶79 The court of appeals determined that the initial stop 
in Gammons was permissible. Id., ¶7. However, it determined that 
because the officer stated that he was going to deploy his dog, 
thereby moving the driver to acquiesce to the search, "the stop 
was transformed into an unlawful detention." Id., ¶24. That is, 
the extension of the scope was not "reasonably related to the 
circumstances justifying the initial police interference." Id., 
¶11 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20).  
¶80 Gammons dictates the outcome in this case. As in 
Gammons, the search here was extended beyond the time necessary 
to complete the initial stop, and the extension was not at all 
related 
to 
the 
circumstances 
justifying 
the 
initial 
interference.  
¶81 The majority states that Gammons is distinguishable 
from the present case on the ground that the driver acquiesced 
to a search because "the officer threatened the driver with 
further detainment so that he could use the drug sniffing dog." 
Majority op., ¶46. Apparently, the majority thinks that the 
incremental intrusion upon liberty resulting from the threat of 
further detainment is greater than the incremental intrusion on 
liberty of actual further detainment to deploy a drug sniffing 
dog. That view is untenable. 
¶82 Although the majority articulates the correct test for 
determining 
whether 
the 
extension 
of 
a 
traffic 
stop 
is 
constitutional, it fails to apply the test. Its approach 
conflicts with precedent of both the United States Supreme Court 
and this state. Applying the correct test, the extension of the 
No.  2006AP974-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
seizure here is unconstitutional because the extension was not 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified 
the initial traffic stop.  
III 
¶83 In sum, I agree with the majority that the appropriate 
focus here is the 78 seconds of the dog sniff. However, I 
disagree with its conclusion that the circuit court clearly 
erred in "finding that the dog sniff prolonged the detention by 
'approximately 38 minutes.'" Majority op., ¶48. That conclusion 
misconstrues the circuit court's findings of fact and rationale. 
In addition, the majority advances a novel and problematic 
constitutional analysis. It fails to follow the test announced 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and 
instead substitutes a new test. Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶84 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this dissent. 
 
No.  2006AP974-CR.awb 
 
1