Title: Redding v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 185, 2006
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 14, 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DEANDRE REDDING, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 185, 2006 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0203014274 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: May 30, 2006 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: July 14, 2006 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 14th day of July 2006, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Deandre Redding, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s March 31, 2006 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior 
 
2
Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening 
brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and AFFIRM. 
 
(2) 
In October 2002, Redding was found guilty by a Superior Court 
jury of Robbery in the First Degree, Burglary in the First Degree, Theft of a 
Firearm, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, 
Wearing a Disguise During the Commission of a Felony, and Endangering 
the Welfare of a Child.  He was sentenced to a total of 8 years of Level V 
incarceration, to be followed by probation.  Redding’s convictions and 
sentences were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.2 
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Redding claims that: a) his prosecution for both 
robbery and burglary constituted a double jeopardy violation and was 
motivated by a malicious intent; b) his trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to move for a suppression hearing and object on double 
jeopardy grounds to his convictions of both robbery and burglary; and c) the 
Superior Court should have granted his procedurally barred claims under 
Rule 61’s “interest of justice” exception. 
 
(4) 
 Redding’s first claim is that his prosecution violated double 
jeopardy and was motivated by malice.  However, Redding offers no factual 
support for his argument that the State engaged in a malicious prosecution.  
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Redding v. State, Del. Supr., No. 81, 2003, Steele, J. (Sept. 23, 2003).  
 
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Moreover, Redding’s argument that his prosecution for both robbery and 
burglary constitutes a double jeopardy violation is incorrect as a matter of 
law.3  We, therefore, find Redding’s first claim to be without merit.   
 
(5) 
In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Redding must demonstrate that his counsel’s representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the proceedings would have been different.4  Although not insurmountable, 
the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a “strong 
presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable.”5  
Redding has failed to demonstrate that his counsel erred by failing to move 
for a suppression hearing or object on double jeopardy grounds to his 
convictions of both robbery and burglary or that any alleged error on the part 
of his counsel resulted in prejudice to him.  For these reasons, we find that 
this claim, too, is without merit. 
 
(6) 
Redding’s final claim is that the Superior Court should have 
granted his claims under Rule 61’s “interest of justice” exception.  We find 
that the Superior Court correctly determined that the “interest of justice” 
                                                 
3 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 827; Cook v. State, 600 A.2d 352, 354-56 (Del. 1991). 
4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
5 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
 
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exception did not apply to Redding’s claims.  There was no evidence of a 
“colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a 
constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, 
integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of 
conviction.”6  We, therefore, find Redding’s final claim to be without merit. 
 
(7) 
It is manifest on the face of Redding’s opening brief that the 
appeal is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled 
by settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is 
implicated, clearly there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
   
 
 
                                                 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5).