Title: Andrade v. City of Milwaukee Board of Fire and Police Commissioners
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2020AP000333
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 30, 2024

2024 WI 17 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP333 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Erik A. Andrade, 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
City of Milwaukee Board of Fire and Police 
Commissioners, 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 399 Wis. 2d 390, 965 N.W.2d 178 
(2021 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 30, 2024   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 9, 2023   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Conen   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, KAROFSKY, and PROTASIEWICZ, 
JJ., joined. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Brendan P. Matthews and Cermele & Matthews, S.C., 
Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Brendan P. Matthews.  
 
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Stacie H. Rosenzweig and Halling & Cayo, S.C., Milwaukee. There 
was an oral argument by Stacie H. Rosenzweig. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Scott B. Thompson, T.R. 
Edwards, and Law Forward, Inc., Madison, on behalf of Black 
Leaders Organizing for Communities.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William E. Fischer, 
Kyle J. Gulya, and Von Briesen & Roper, S.C., Neenah, on behalf 
of League of Wisconsin Municipalities.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jonathan Cermele and 
Cermele Law, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of Milwaukee Police 
Association and Green Bay Professional Police Association.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2024 WI 17
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP333 
(L.C. No. 2019CV564) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Erik A. Andrade, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Milwaukee Board of Fire and Police 
Commissioners, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 30,2024 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, KAROFSKY, and PROTASIEWICZ, JJ., 
joined. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.  Former Milwaukee Police Officer 
Erik Andrade challenges his termination for a series of posts 
and comments he made on 
Facebook.  The posts garnered 
significant local and national attention following a civil 
rights lawsuit that brought them to light.  As part of its 
internal investigation into the posts, the Milwaukee Police 
Department informed Andrade of the policies he potentially 
No. 
2020AP333   
 
2 
 
violated and scheduled an interview.  During that interview, 
Andrade reviewed and read the relevant portions of those 
policies out loud.  The investigator then questioned Andrade 
about the posts, one by one.  Andrade was afforded the 
opportunity 
to 
respond 
to 
their 
intended 
meaning, 
his 
understanding of how they might be received by the public and 
affect the Department's work, and whether he believed they 
violated Department policy.   
¶2 
Following the internal investigation, the Department 
formally charged Andrade with violating two policies.  Both 
charges cited Andrade's posts as the basis for the violations.  
The responsibility then shifted to Chief of Police Alfonso 
Morales to determine his guilt and impose the appropriate 
punishment.  The Chief had internal affairs reach out to the 
Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office, which explained 
that Andrade's posts would diminish his credibility in court so 
severely that they would no longer use him as a witness.  Given 
the critical importance of testifying in police work, this fact 
convinced the Chief that termination was appropriate.  The Chief 
formally found Andrade guilty of the charges and discharged him 
for one of them.  The Chief filed a complaint containing the 
same charges and allegations with the entity that reviews his 
decision——the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners.  Neither 
the initial charges, the Chief's order of discharge, nor the 
complaint with the Board mentioned Andrade's inability to 
testify. 
No. 
2020AP333   
 
3 
 
¶3 
After a full evidentiary trial, the Board issued a 
detailed decision determining that Andrade was guilty of the 
violations and the punishments he received were appropriate.  
Andrade then filed two actions in the circuit court.  The first—
—a statutory appeal under Wis. Stat. § 62.50(20) (2017-18)1——
focused on whether there was just cause to sustain the charges.2  
The second——a petition for a writ of certiorari——alleged that 
the Board committed legal and jurisdictional errors.  The 
circuit court upheld the Board's decision, Andrade appealed on 
his certiorari petition, and the court of appeals affirmed.   
¶4 
Before us, Andrade challenges his termination on 
procedural grounds.  First, he contends it fell short of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee.  He argues that 
due process required the Department to explain why Chief Morales 
terminated him instead of imposing a lesser form of discipline.  
As such, the Department should have told him that Chief Morales 
made his decision based on the DA's determination that they 
would no longer use Andrade as a witness.  Andrade insists that 
the Department's failure to tell him this prior to termination 
means he was not given an explanation of the evidence supporting 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version. 
2 Wisconsin. Stat. § 62.50(20) reads in part:  "Any officer 
or member of either department discharged, suspended or reduced, 
may, within 10 days after the decision and findings under this 
section are filed with the secretary of the board, bring an 
action in the circuit court of the county in which the city is 
located to review the order." 
No. 
2020AP333   
 
4 
 
his termination in violation of the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill.3 
¶5 
The law does not support Andrade's claim.  For public 
employees terminable only for cause, Loudermill generally 
entitles a terminated employee to notice of the charges, an 
explanation of the evidence supporting them, and some pre-
termination opportunity to respond.  The scope and nature of the 
pre-termination procedures can vary depending on the nature of 
the post-termination proceedings and the interests that are 
implicated.  The Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantees 
in this context are not rigid and formal; they are flexible, 
giving employers wide latitude on the process and nature of the 
notice due when terminating employees.   
¶6 
Here, the Department notified Andrade of his conduct 
(the Facebook posts) and what policies this conduct violated.  
The Department provided Andrade an opportunity to respond to the 
allegations before the Chief imposed punishment.  The Chief's 
decision to terminate was confirmed after a full administrative 
hearing before the Board, as well as judicial review of the 
Board's decision.  We conclude the Due Process Clause does not 
require a more exacting and rigid pre-termination process than 
what Andrade received.   
¶7 
Andrade's second argument is that Chief Morales's 
complaint did not comply with Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13) because it 
did not sufficiently explain the reasons for the discharge.  
                                                 
3 470 U.S. 532 (1985). 
No. 
2020AP333   
 
5 
 
However, the complaint listed the policies Andrade violated and 
referenced the Facebook posts that formed the basis for the 
violations.  The statute requires nothing more.    
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶8 
On 
January 
26, 
2018, 
Milwaukee 
police 
officers 
arrested Milwaukee Bucks player Sterling Brown, using force and 
shocking him with a Taser.  Officer Erik Andrade transported 
Brown to the police station after his arrest.  Later that day, 
Andrade posted about the encounter on his personal Facebook 
page.4  Over the following months, Andrade posted a number of 
other "inappropriate, disrespectful and defamatory comments"——as 
the Chief would later describe them——on Facebook.  
¶9 
Sometime later, a member of the City of Milwaukee 
Common Council shared Andrade's posts with the Department.  The 
Department's Internal Affairs Division opened an investigation 
in May.  Things escalated on June 19 when Sterling Brown sued 
the City, Chief Morales, and the police officers present at the 
scene of his arrest, including Andrade.  Brown's complaint cited 
many of Andrade's offensive posts as an admission that Andrade 
and other officers could engage in "unlawful attacks and arrests 
of African Americans without justification" or a "fear of real 
discipline."  That same day, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel 
                                                 
4 Andrade posted the following:  "Nice meeting Sterling 
Brown 
of 
the 
Milwaukee 
Bucks 
at 
work 
this 
morning! 
LOL#FearTheDeer."  "Fear the Deer" is a popular slogan for the 
Milwaukee Bucks. 
No. 
2020AP333   
 
6 
 
published an article about the lawsuit featuring Andrade's 
posts.   
¶10 The day after Brown filed the lawsuit, an officer from 
Internal Affairs called Andrade to inform him that they were 
investigating allegations he posted inappropriate content on 
social media.  Internal affairs also sent Andrade a written 
notice, which he signed, that summarized several of the 
offending posts and referenced two Department policies (called 
"Core Values") that his conduct implicated.5  The notification 
further warned, "Disciplinary action may result," and set the 
date Andrade was "required to provide verbal responses and/or 
'Memorandum' Reports(s)."6 
¶11 Internal Affairs interviewed Andrade on June 28.  
During the interview, investigators asked Andrade to read aloud 
                                                 
5 The Department summarized the posts as follows:  "The 
Milwaukee Police Department is presently investigating you 
concerning 
an 
allegation-That 
you 
allegedly 
posted 
an 
inappropriate comment regarding your on-duty contact with 
Milwaukee Bucks basketball player Mr. Sterling Brown on social 
media.  It is also alleged that you posted other inappropriate 
comments to include one with a picture of NBA Basketball player 
Kevin Durant, a shared post from a Facebook account that alleged 
that African Americans lie to police, a comment celebrating 
overtime pay accompanying a use of force, comments via your 
Facebook account regarding innocent African Americans, police 
brutality and mass incarceration, and a comment regarding 
Cleveland Cavaliers NBA basketball player JR Smith."   
6 The parties state that in response, Andrade filed a 
"written response to charges."  Several witnesses at the hearing 
before the Board referenced it as well.  However, a copy does 
not appear to be in the record. 
No. 
2020AP333   
 
7 
 
relevant portions of the Department policies he was given notice 
of earlier.   
¶12 The first policy violation concerned social media use.  
This was based on Core Value 1.00 (entitled "Competence") 
referencing "Guiding Principle" 1.05.  Core Value 1.00 reads:  
"We are prudent stewards of the public's grant of authority and 
resources.  We are accountable for the quality of our 
performance and the standards of our conduct.  We are exemplary 
leaders and exemplary followers."  Guiding Principle 1.05 
provides:  "All department members shall be familiar with 
department policy, procedures and training and shall conduct 
themselves accordingly."  Investigators therefore had Andrade 
read portions of the Department's social media policy during the 
interview. 
 
Andrade 
read 
Standard 
Operating 
Procedure 
685.15(A)(5), which provides:  "As public employees, members do 
not lose their rights under the First Amendment of the U.S. and 
Wisconsin constitutions.  However, speech, on or off duty, 
pursuant 
to 
your 
official 
duties 
and 
professional 
responsibilities as members of the Milwaukee Police Department 
is not protected.  Members are free to express themselves as 
private citizens on [social media sites] to the degree that 
their 
speech 
is 
not 
disruptive 
to 
the 
mission 
of 
the 
department."  Andrade also read Standard Operating Procedure 
685.15(A)(10):  "Members must be aware that their communication 
on [social networking sites] can be used by a skilled defense 
No. 
2020AP333   
 
8 
 
attorney in impeaching testimony in association with their 
professional duties as a member of the department."7 
¶13 In addition to the social media policies, Andrade was 
also asked to read Core Value 3.00 (entitled "Integrity") and 
Guiding Principle 3.01.  Core Value 3.00 reads:  "We recognize 
the complexity of police work and exercise discretion in ways 
that are beyond reproach and worthy of public trust.  Honesty 
and truthfulness are fundamental elements of integrity.  It is 
our duty to earn public trust through consistent words and 
actions.  We are honest in word and deed."  Andrade also recited 
Guiding Principle 3.01:  "Our behavior shall inspire and sustain 
the confidence of our community.  Whether on or off duty, 
                                                 
7 Andrade insists that he had no idea his ability to testify 
was relevant to his discipline.  He suggests this warning only 
pertained to the violation of Core Value 1.00, which he is not 
appealing, and for which he was suspended, not terminated.  And 
even then, Andrade says, he was only on notice that a skilled 
defense attorney could use his postings for impeachment, not 
that he wouldn't be able to testify at all.   
The record paints a much different picture.  All of this 
was investigated together——same documents, same interview, based 
on the same Facebook posts——before the Chief imposed discipline.  
Andrade was well aware that his credibility as a witness was 
relevant to the investigation over his posts.   
In addition, Andrade took down his Facebook page the very 
day Brown filed his lawsuit.  He said he felt that he was being 
made to "look a certain way"; he was being "portrayed as a 
racist in the media nationwide."  Andrade's posts were all over 
CNN, ESPN, and sports outlets of all kinds.  Andrade testified, 
"I'm 
seeing 
my 
name 
everywhere, 
I'm 
getting 
calls 
from 
everybody."  It is hard to imagine that a police officer facing 
this 
magnitude 
of 
criticism 
would 
fail 
to 
consider 
the 
possibility that it could affect his ability to serve as a 
credible witness.   
No. 
2020AP333   
 
9 
 
department members shall not behave in such a way that a 
reasonable person would expect that discredit could be brought 
upon the department, or that it would create the appearance of 
impropriety or corruptive behavior."  Andrade acknowledged he 
was familiar with these policies. 
¶14 The investigator then reviewed each post with Andrade, 
one by one.  He asked standard questions such as whether Andrade 
made the post, what the post meant, why he posted it, how it 
might be received by the public, whether he regretted posting 
it, and whether he thought it violated Department policy.   
Generally, Andrade admitted the posts were his and explained 
that they were designed to educate, enlighten, and/or be 
humorous.  Although he acknowledged they could be seen as 
unprofessional by some, he did not believe they violated 
Department policy.   
¶15 On August 23, 2018, the Department officially charged 
Andrade with violating the same Core Values and Guiding 
Principles he was put on notice of prior to and during his 
interview.  The first charge alleged that Andrade violated Core 
Value 1.00; the second alleged that Andrade violated Core Value 
3.00.  Both violations were a result of Andrade's Facebook posts 
that contained "inappropriate, disrespectful and defamatory 
comments to various memes and videos."   
¶16 This put the ball in the court of Chief of Police 
Alfonso Morales.  Chief Morales had to determine whether to find 
Andrade guilty of the charges and what discipline to impose.  
The Chief had Internal Affairs reach out to the Milwaukee County 
No. 
2020AP333   
 
10 
 
District Attorney's Office and asked whether Andrade's posts 
would affect his credibility as a witness.  They said yes.  The 
comments diminished his credibility so severely that the office 
would never call him to testify.  Even more, Kent Lovern, the 
second in command at the DA's Office, stated that the posts 
would fall into the category of Brady material.8  This means that 
if Andrade served as a witness in a criminal proceeding, the 
District Attorney's Office would be required to disclose 
evidence of Andrade's bias and untrustworthiness to defense 
counsel as impeachment evidence.   
¶17 Lovern would later testify before the Board that his 
office added Andrade to an internal list of officers subject to 
such disclosures.  The list contained three categories of 
officers:  (1) never call as a witness; (2) call with 
qualifications; and (3) call anytime, but disclose.  Andrade 
fell into the first category.  Lovern testified that the DA's 
office would not prosecute cases relying primarily on the 
testimony of officers placed into the do not call category.   
¶18 This was of grave concern to Chief Morales.  He 
believed 
that 
the 
ability 
to 
testify 
was 
an 
"extremely 
important" aspect of policing.  He likened it to Detective Mark 
Fuhrman in the trial of O.J. Simpson, whose use of racist terms 
significantly damaged his credibility.  The mere presence of an 
                                                 
8 If a witness previously behaved in a way that harms his or 
her credibility, the prosecutor is constitutionally required to 
turn evidence of this behavior over to the defendant.  Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 
U.S. 150, 154 (1972). 
No. 
2020AP333   
 
11 
 
officer unable to testify on an investigation could stymie or 
taint a later prosecution.  Chief Morales therefore determined 
that while he would have handed down a severe punishment 
regardless, the inability to testify changed the calculus and 
persuaded him that termination was appropriate.   
¶19 On September 12, 2018, almost three weeks after the 
Department issued formal charges, Chief Morales issued an order 
that found Andrade guilty of the charges and imposed discipline.  
The Chief suspended Andrade for 30 days without pay for 
"[p]osting content to a social networking site that was 
disruptive to the mission of the department."9  And for the 
charge of "Failure to inspire and sustain the confidence of our 
community,"10 the Chief discharged him from the Department.  The 
order did not explain the reasoning for the chosen level of 
discipline.  
¶20 The Chief's decision, however, is not the final word.  
Wisconsin law requires Milwaukee to establish a Board of Fire 
and Police Commissioners.  Wis. Stat. § 62.50(1h).  One of the 
Board's duties is to review a police chief's disciplinary 
decisions.  Wis. Stat. § 62.50(17).  After the chief discharges 
or suspends an officer for more than five days, he must file his 
written notice of discharge with the Board along with a 
                                                 
9 Andrade violated "Core Value 1.00-Competence, referencing 
Guiding 
Principle 
1.05, 
referencing 
Standard 
Operating 
Procedures relating to Social Networking Sites (SNS), Section 
685.15(A)(5)." 
10 Andrade violated "Core Value 3.00-Integrity, referencing 
Guiding Principle 3.01." 
No. 
2020AP333   
 
12 
 
complaint "setting forth the reasons for the discharge or 
suspension."  Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13).  The discharged officer 
then may choose to appeal the chief's decision to the Board.  
Id.  In that case, the Board holds a trial where the discharged 
officer "shall have full opportunity to be heard in defense and 
shall be entitled to secure the attendance of all witnesses 
necessary for the defense at the expense of the city."  Wis. 
Stat. § 62.50(16).  In the end, the Board is tasked with 
determining whether there is "just cause" to sustain the charges 
and, 
if 
so, 
what 
discipline 
to 
impose. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 62.50(17)(a)-(b).  It does so by analyzing and applying seven 
standards 
set 
forth 
in 
the 
statutes.11 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 62.50(17)(b).   
¶21 Accordingly, Chief Morales filed a complaint with the 
Board, listing the two violations and the punishment for each.  
The complaint stated that Andrade's Facebook posts were the 
                                                 
11 They are:  (1) "Whether the subordinate could reasonably 
be expected to have had knowledge of the probable consequences 
of the alleged conduct"; (2) "Whether the rule or order that the 
subordinate allegedly violated is reasonable"; (3) "Whether the 
chief, before filing the charge against the subordinate, made a 
reasonable effort to discover whether the subordinate did in 
fact violate a rule or order"; (4) "Whether the effort described 
under subd. 3. was fair and objective"; (5) "Whether the chief 
discovered substantial evidence that the subordinate violated 
the rule or order as described in the charges filed against the 
subordinate"; (6) "Whether the chief is applying the rule or 
order 
fairly 
and 
without 
discrimination 
against 
the 
subordinate"; 
and 
(7) 
"Whether 
the 
proposed 
discipline 
reasonably relates to the seriousness of the alleged violation 
and to the subordinate's record of service with the chief's 
department."  Wis. Stat. § 62.50(17)(b). 
No. 
2020AP333   
 
13 
 
basis for both violations.  Andrade appealed the Chief's 
decision to the Board, and in December 2018, a hearing examiner 
presided over 
a two-day trial 
before a panel of three 
commissioners.   
¶22 The panel split up Andrade's trial into two phases.12  
During phase one, the panel heard evidence and arguments 
regarding the first five "just cause" standards.  Both sides 
gave opening and closing statements.  Both sides called 
witnesses and conducted direct and cross examinations.  And both 
sides presented exhibits.  After each side rested, the panel 
examined the five standards and concluded that the evidence 
supported both charges.  The panel then moved to the second 
phase during which it heard evidence and arguments regarding the 
final two standards, including what discipline to impose.  In 
the end, the panel determined that both the suspension and the 
                                                 
12 Although not relevant to our determination that he 
received sufficient pre-termination notice, Andrade's actions 
before and during the trial contradict his argument that he was 
blindsided by the Chief's testimony about the inability to 
testify.  A month before trial, Andrade's attorney listed Chief 
Deputy District Attorney Kent Lovern on his witness list, and 
then subpoenaed the Brady disclosure list created and maintained 
by 
the 
DA's 
office. 
 
During 
trial, 
Andrade's 
attorney 
extensively questioned Lovern about the list and Andrade's 
ability to testify.  The City continues to point out in briefing 
that Andrade obviously knew of the list and thought it might be 
relevant; why else would it be subpoenaed and addressed through 
cross-examination by Andrade's attorney?  Yet Andrade ignores 
all of this in his briefing and represents he had no idea any of 
this was relevant. 
No. 
2020AP333   
 
14 
 
discharge punishments were appropriate.13  It issued a written 
decision memorializing and explaining its determination on 
January 4, 2019.14   
¶23 Andrade then filed two appeals to the circuit court——a 
statutory appeal and a petition for a writ of certiorari——which 
the court consolidated.  Andrade challenged the panel's decision 
on several bases.15  Relevant here, he argued that the Board did 
not have just cause to sustain the second charge (for which he 
was terminated) and that——contrary to the notice mandates of due 
process and Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13)——he was unaware prior to the 
hearing that his inability to testify was an issue.  
¶24 The court disagreed.  After reviewing the record, the 
court found substantial evidence to support the panel's just 
                                                 
13 The dissent apparently disagrees.  It spends considerable 
time 
suggesting 
the 
punishment 
Andrade 
received 
was 
inappropriate and egregious, selecting and quoting favored 
testimony from the hearing.  None of this is before us, however.  
The Board confirmed the Chief's choice of discipline; it is 
inappropriate given the procedural posture of this case to 
second guess this conclusion. 
14 The Board concluded in part:  "Andrade's posts managed to 
repeat every negative stereotype plaguing big city police 
departments, i.e., racism, use of excessive force, disregard for 
ethnic sensitivities, distrust of the public, and incurring 
excessive overtime.  The negative impact of the posts was 
magnified by the extensive local and national publicity that 
followed. . . . We 
conclude 
that 
the 
posts 
and 
comments 
undermined trust in the department, disrupted the mission of the 
department, 
undermined 
public 
confidence, 
discredited 
the 
department, and created the appearance of impropriety and 
corruption in the department." 
15 The Honorable Jeffrey A. Conen of the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2020AP333   
 
15 
 
cause decision on the merits.  It also held that the Chief 
complied with the notice requirements of due process and Wis. 
Stat. § 62.50(13).  The Chief did not charge Andrade for his 
inability to testify; rather, it was an "impact" of the conduct 
leading to the charges.  
¶25 Andrade appealed the court's certiorari decision to 
the court of appeals, which affirmed.  Andrade v. City of 
Milwaukee 
Bd. 
of 
Fire 
& 
Police 
Comm'rs, 
No. 
2020AP333, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2021).  Andrade 
followed with a petition for review to this court, but we held 
the matter in abeyance pending our decision in Green Bay 
Professional Police Ass'n v. City of Green Bay, 2023 WI 33, 407 
Wis. 2d 11, 988 N.W.2d 664.16  After deciding Green Bay, we 
granted Andrade's petition. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶26 The question in this case is whether the Milwaukee 
Police Department complied with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause and Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13) when it terminated 
Andrade. 
 
Procedurally, 
this 
question 
comes 
to 
us 
via 
                                                 
16 Green 
Bay 
involved 
an 
officer's 
challenge 
to 
an 
arbitration decision upholding his demotion.  Green Bay Pro. 
Police Ass'n v. City of Green Bay, 2023 WI 33, ¶1, 407 
Wis. 2d 11, 988 N.W.2d 664.  Before us, the officer claimed he 
was not afforded sufficient due process under Loudermill.  Id., 
¶11.  We held that the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard 
the law when he determined that the Department provided adequate 
notice to the officer.  Id.  Given the deferential standard of 
review, Loudermill's requirements were not squarely presented to 
us.  Id., ¶12. 
No. 
2020AP333   
 
16 
 
certiorari, and in this context, we limit our review to two 
questions:  whether the Board proceeded on a correct theory of 
law and whether it kept within its jurisdiction.17  Gentilli v. 
Bd. of Police and Fire Comm'rs of Madison, 2004 WI 60, ¶21, 272 
Wis. 2d 1, 680 N.W.2d 335.  Andrade at times argues both, but he 
does not develop a separate argument as to why the Board 
exceeded its jurisdiction.  Given that we have said proceeding 
"on a correct theory of law includes complying with the 
requirements of due process," we will analyze Andrade's claim on 
this basis and will not separately examine whether the Board 
exceeded its jurisdiction.  Miller v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of 
Lyndon Station, 2023 WI 46, ¶9, 407 Wis. 2d 678, 991 N.W.2d 380; 
see also Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, 
¶24, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35 ("We do not step out of our 
                                                 
17 We normally ask four questions on certiorari:  (1) 
whether the decision-maker "kept within its jurisdiction"; (2) 
"whether it proceeded on a correct theory of law"; (3) "whether 
its action was arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable and 
represented its will and not its judgment"; and (4) "whether the 
evidence was such that it might reasonably make the order or 
determination in question."  Voters with Facts v. City of Eau 
Claire, 2018 WI 63, ¶71, 382 Wis. 2d 1, 913 N.W.2d 131 (quoting 
another source).  But a statutory appeal under Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.50 permits the circuit court to review the Board's "just 
cause" determination, and the court's final decision cannot be 
appealed.  Wis. Stat. § 62.50(22); Gentilli v. Bd. of Police and 
Fire Comm'rs of Madison, 2004 WI 60, ¶14, 272 Wis. 2d 1, 680 
N.W.2d 335.  Thus, when officers initially file both an appeal 
under § 62.50 and a petition for a writ of certiorari in the 
circuit court, appellate courts only review the former two 
certiorari 
questions 
because 
the 
latter 
two 
mirror 
the 
unappealable just cause determination conducted by the circuit 
court 
under 
§ 62.50. 
 
Gentilli, 
272 
Wis. 2d 1, 
¶21.  
Accordingly, Andrade only appealed the certiorari decision to 
the court of appeals and to us.   
No. 
2020AP333   
 
17 
 
neutral role to develop or construct arguments for parties; it 
is up to them to make their case.").   
A.  Due Process 
¶27 We begin with the constitutional challenge.  Andrade 
argues that the Board proceeded on an incorrect theory of law 
because Chief Morales violated his due process rights when he 
terminated Andrade without mentioning his inability to testify 
as a basis for the punishment.   
¶28 The 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution provides that states cannot "deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."  U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  To establish a due process violation, 
there must first be "a liberty or property interest of which a 
person has been deprived."  Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 
219 (2011).  The Supreme Court has held that a public employee 
subject to termination only for cause, like Andrade, has a 
property interest in continued employment.  Cleveland Bd. of 
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985).  This is not 
in dispute.  Thus, the question before us is whether the 
procedures used to deprive Andrade of that interest were 
constitutionally sufficient.  Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 219. 
¶29 Since every deprivation is different, the demands of 
due process vary as well.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
334 (1976).  But the Supreme Court has addressed what due 
process demands in particular situations.  Loudermill is one 
such instance.  Loudermill arose as two consolidated cases, the 
No. 
2020AP333   
 
18 
 
first of which involved an employee who was dismissed for 
dishonesty but had no opportunity to rebut or respond prior to 
termination.  470 U.S. at 535.  The second case involved a bus 
mechanic who was dismissed for failing an eye exam, and 
similarly had no opportunity to respond.  Id. at 536, 548.  
State law provided that both employees could only be terminated 
for cause.  Id. at 535.  The Court therefore considered what 
process the Constitution requires an employer to provide when 
terminating a public employee who may only be discharged for 
cause.  Id.   
¶30 After considering the various interests,18 the Court 
concluded that "some kind of hearing" is required before 
discharging a for-cause employee.  Id. at 542.  The components 
of the "hearing" must include "oral or written notice of the 
charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, 
and an opportunity to present his side of the story."  Id. at 
546.  The Court explained that this process "need not be 
elaborate"——the formality, scope, and procedural requirements 
                                                 
18 The Supreme Court has outlined three factors to guide the 
determination of what due process requires:  
First, the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government's interest, including the function involved 
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail. 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
No. 
2020AP333   
 
19 
 
may "vary, depending upon the importance of the interests 
involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings."  Id. at 
545; id. at 547 n.12.  The point of the pre-termination process 
is to provide "an initial check against mistaken decisions——
essentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are 
true and support the proposed action."  Id. at 545-46.    
¶31 Andrade's basic contention is that he was not given an 
explanation of the evidence supporting his discharge prior to 
his termination.19  Andrade focuses on the fact that, even though 
Chief Morales would have disciplined him no matter what, his 
discipline would not have risen to the level of discharge absent 
the fact that Andrade could no longer testify.20  In his eyes, 
                                                 
19 Andrade's briefing is not entirely consistent on when he 
believes this notice was required.  But his reply brief and 
statements during oral argument make clear that he is focusing 
on the pre-termination notice——that is, notice prior to his 
termination on September 12, 2018. 
20 As potential evidence that the inability to testify was 
simply an after-the-fact rationalization, Andrade represents 
that he was still testifying up until the date of his discharge.  
This suffers from three flaws.   
First, the record does not support his contention.  Andrade 
cites to an exchange his attorney had with Attorney Lovern 
during cross-examination where his attorney stated:  "I want you 
to assume that Andrade was chairing a trial up until the day——
for your office up until the day he was fired.  Would that be 
inconsistent with your testimony today?"  Attorney Lovern said 
no, because he recalled telling his assistant to put Andrade on 
the Brady list as soon as he met with members from the 
Department.  Andrade's attorney then said that he could provide 
"that information after this."  Based on this record, he never 
did.  When performing common law certiorari review——which is the 
case here——we review "the record compiled by the municipality 
No. 
2020AP333   
 
20 
 
then, his inability to testify constituted evidence against him 
that the Chief should have disclosed prior to terminating him.  
Andrade argues he needed this information so that he could make 
any plausible arguments that might prevent the discipline.   
¶32 Not so.  Andrade confuses the factors leading to the 
Chief's choice of discipline with the evidence of the violations 
in the first place.  Chief Morales did not charge Andrade for 
his inability to testify.  As the Chief explained, his 
conclusions about the policy violations differed from his 
decision about how to discipline Andrade.  Loudermill does not 
require an explanation of the reasons discharge was the chosen 
punishment as opposed to suspension or something lesser.  
Rather, Loudermill just requires an explanation of the basic 
reasons the employee is being disciplined.  Andrade proposes far 
                                                                                                                                                             
and [do] not take any additional evidence on the merits of the 
decision."  Ottman v. Town of Primrose, 2011 WI 18, ¶35, 332 
Wis. 2d 3, 796 N.W.2d 411.  We therefore cannot rely on a 
representation that is not in the record. 
Second, at this stage of the proceedings, we accept the 
Board's findings of fact——which Andrade does not challenge——as 
long as "any reasonable view of the evidence supports them."  
Id., ¶53.  In its decision, the Board recounted and credited the 
testimony of Chief Morales and Attorney Lovern, among others, 
who testified regarding conversations they had before the 
termination about Andrade's inability to testify.  Accepting 
Andrade's representation runs contrary to the factual findings 
of the Board that ground our review. 
Finally, even if the DA's Office used Andrade as a witness 
up till the time of the discharge, that fact is irrelevant to 
the legal issue before us:  whether the pre-termination process 
was constitutionally sufficient.  Whether Andrade actually could 
be used as a witness or was guilty of violating Department 
policy is simply not before us. 
No. 
2020AP333   
 
21 
 
more rigid, formal, and exhaustive notice requirements than 
Loudermill 
commands. 
 
Nothing 
in 
Loudermill 
requires 
an 
exhaustive pre-termination explanation of every fact or factor 
that might be considered in the disciplinary process.  An 
employer need not detail all the consequences of an employee's 
misconduct, nor must it show in detail how those consequences 
might inform the employer's choice of discipline.  The employer 
must simply notify the employee of the charges and evidence and 
give them an opportunity to respond.  That's exactly what 
happened here.  
¶33 From the beginning, Andrade was told by Internal 
Affairs that they were investigating him for violating two 
identified Department policies because he posted inappropriate, 
disrespectful, 
and 
defamatory 
comments 
on 
Facebook.  
Investigators showed him and asked him about every concerning 
post.  He knew that violations such as this could lead to 
discipline up to and including suspension and discharge.  And 
following the investigation, the Department charged Andrade with 
violating the previously identified policies due to his Facebook 
posts.21  He was therefore on notice of the charges (the rule 
                                                 
21 Andrade and the amicus brief by the Milwaukee Police 
Association contend that even if no notice of the discharge 
rationale was necessary, the procedures giving Andrade notice of 
the nature of the investigation and the investigatory interview 
itself were insufficient.  They say Loudermill requires notice 
of the "charges," which requires something more than an 
investigation.  This reads Loudermill too woodenly, as we have 
explained.  And in any event, the Department formally notified 
Andrade of the charges on August 23, 2018 prior to his 
termination on September 12.  This notice included the policies 
violated and the behavior that caused those violations——the 
No. 
2020AP333   
 
22 
 
violations) and the evidence supporting them (the Facebook 
posts).  It should not have surprised Andrade, then, when the 
Chief discharged him for one of the violations.22   
¶34 Even more, Loudermill instructs that the "nature" of 
the post-termination review informs the "formality," "procedural 
requisites," and "scope" of the pre-termination process.  Id. at 
545; id. at 547 n.12.  Here, there can be no question Andrade 
received thorough post-termination review.  After discharging 
Andrade, the Chief filed a formal complaint with the Board that 
explained the charges and evidence.  The Board then held a full-
blown trial, giving Andrade the opportunity to call his own 
witnesses and cross-examine the Department's.  Afterward, the 
Board considered seven comprehensive standards in making its 
"just cause" determination.  The end result was a detailed, ten-
page 
written 
decision 
containing 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions of law, thereby providing a robust substantive, 
procedural, and evidentiary check on the discipline Andrade 
received.  After that, Andrade appealed to the circuit court, 
which reviewed the Board's just cause determination.  These 
extensive post-termination procedures eliminate any doubt that 
Andrade had all the notice and opportunity to be heard that the 
Constitution requires. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Facebook posts.   
22 Even if one might consider the ability to testify as 
additional evidence that Andrade's conduct failed to sustain the 
confidence of the community, Loudermill does not require 
employers to notify employees of every jot and tittle supporting 
their decision.     
No. 
2020AP333   
 
23 
 
¶35 In sum, we hold that Andrade received all the process 
he was due under the Fourteenth Amendment.  He received 
sufficient pre-termination notice of the charges and evidence 
against him, and he was afforded an opportunity to respond.  
This was supported by post-termination review at multiple 
levels.  Andrade received the "initial check against mistaken 
decisions" that Loudermill commands.  Id. at 545.  Therefore, 
his contention that the Board applied an incorrect theory of law 
when it sustained the charges against him is not supported by 
the facts or law. 
B.  Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13) 
¶36 Andrade also briefly argues that Chief Morales failed 
to comply with Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13).  This provision requires 
the police chief to notify the Board of a discharge or 
suspension greater than five days, and to include "a complaint 
setting forth the reasons for the discharge or suspension."  
§ 62.50(13).  Andrade contends the complaint did not do so 
because it failed to mention the inability to testify.   
¶37 Andrade's error here is similar to his analytical 
error regarding due process.  He suggests the "reasons for the 
discharge" language means he must be informed of the reasons the 
punishment rose to the level of discharge rather than a 
suspension or some other lesser punishment.  But that's not what 
the statute says.  It says "reasons for the discharge or 
suspension"——in other words, the reason some serious form of 
discipline was imposed.  The statute does not require an 
No. 
2020AP333   
 
24 
 
explanation of all the reasons a specific level of discipline 
was chosen.   
¶38 Here, the complaint Chief Morales filed with the Board 
was simple, straightforward, and consistent with the statute.  
The Chief listed the Department policy Andrade violated for 
charge one, the punishment of a 30-day suspension, along with 
the evidence supporting the violation——the Facebook posts.  The 
complaint also listed the Department policy Andrade violated for 
charge two, the punishment of discharge, along with the evidence 
supporting the violation——the Facebook posts.  As we explain 
above, the inability to testify was not the conduct that 
violated the policies, but rather a consequence of Andrade's 
conduct 
that 
informed 
the 
level 
of 
punishment 
imposed.  
Therefore, the complaint submitted by Chief Morales to the Board 
complied with § 62.50(13). 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶39 Andrade challenges the process by which he was 
terminated.  He argues that the Due Process Clause required 
Chief Morales to notify him of the reasons underlying the 
Chief's choice of discipline.  Andrade also contends that the 
complaint submitted by Chief Morales to the Board did not set 
forth the reasons for the discharge in compliance with Wis. 
Stat. § 62.50(13).  Based on the facts of this case, neither 
challenge succeeds.  Both pre-termination and in the complaint 
to the Board, Andrade received the process due to him under 
Wisconsin law and the U.S. Constitution.   
No. 
2020AP333   
 
25 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
1 
 
¶40 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
C.J.   (dissenting).  
Because of his behavior on social media, Officer Erik Andrade 
("Andrade") may very well have ultimately received the same 
discipline.  I do not condone his behavior.  But as an accused, 
Andrade is owed certain due process rights, rights which are 
constitutionally and statutorily protected.1  Andrade was denied 
these due process rights.  
¶41 Fundamental to those basic due process rights, Andrade 
has the right to receive notice of what he is being charged 
with.  He has a statutory right to receive notice as to the 
evidence supporting the decision to terminate him.  And, after 
having been placed on notice but before the discipline was 
imposed, Andrade has the fundamental due process right to 
present a defense as to why the proposed action should not be 
taken.  Because Andrade was denied these fundamental due process 
rights, I dissent.  
I 
¶42 While employed with the Milwaukee Police Department 
("the Department"), Andrade posted and shared multiple posts to 
                                                 
1 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV ("No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws."). 
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
2 
 
his private Facebook page.2  A local alderman obtained a 
screenshot of Andrade's social media posts and shared it with 
the assistant chief of police.  Shortly after being notified, 
the Department's Internal Affairs office followed up on the 
screenshot, conducting an extensive investigation into Andrade's 
social media posts.   
¶43 At the conclusion of a lengthy investigation into 
Andrade's 
posts, 
Andrade 
was 
charged 
with 
violating 
two 
provisions of the Department's Code of Conduct——core values3 and 
                                                 
2 Officer 
Andrade's 
posts 
stemmed 
initially 
from 
the 
Department's high-profile arrest of Milwaukee Bucks player 
Sterling Brown.  Brown allegedly double-parked in a disabled 
parking spot outside of a Walgreens store and responding 
officers tased and forcibly arrested him.  Brown subsequently 
filed a civil lawsuit against the Department and the officers 
involved in his arrest, arguing the Department used excessive 
force and deprived him of his civil rights.  Andrade was present 
at Brown's arrest and assisted with transport and was therefore 
one of the officers named as a defendant in Brown's complaint.  
He was the only officer not disciplined for his role.  However, 
Andrade's social media postings came to light in part because  
Brown's complaint highlighted several of Andrade's postings as 
an admission that officers had free rein to engage in "unlawful 
attacks and arrests of African-Americans without justification" 
and without "fear of real discipline."  
Andrade's right to due process is not conditioned on how 
the court or the public perceives the content of his posts.  
This dissent does not attempt to excuse or overlook the posts; 
they are inexcusable.  However, courts have a responsibility to 
safeguard the due process rights of all litigants, regardless of 
any personal feelings on what litigants stand accused of.  
3 The pertinent core value provisions of the Department's 
Code of Conduct are as follows:  
1.00 - Competence.   
We are prudent stewards of the public's grant of 
authority and resources.  We are accountable for the 
quality of our performance and the standards of our 
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
3 
 
social media use.4  Per the Chief's charging order, Andrade 
"post[ed] 
content 
to 
a 
social 
networking 
site 
that 
was 
                                                                                                                                                             
conduct. We are exemplary 
leaders and exemplary 
followers.   
 
. . .  
 
3.00 - Integrity.  
We recognize the complexity of police work and 
exercise discretion in ways that are beyond reproach 
and worthy of public trust. Honesty and truthfulness 
are fundamental elements of integrity.  It is our duty 
to earn public trust through consistent words and 
actions.  We are honest in word and deed.    
[Guiding Principle] 3.01 
Our behavior shall inspire and sustain the confidence 
of our community. Whether on or off duty, department 
members shall not behave in such a way that a 
reasonable person would expect that discredit could be 
brought upon the department or that it would create 
the appearance of impropriety or corruptive behavior.   
4 The pertinent provisions of the Department's Standard 
Operating Procedures on Social Networking Sites (SNS) are: 
[685.15  USE OF SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES] 
A. 
PRECAUTIONS AND PROHIBITIONS. 
. . .  
5. 
As public employees, members do not lose their 
rights under the First Amendment of the U.S. and 
Wisconsin Constitutions.  However, speech, on or 
off duty, pursuant to your official duties and 
professional responsibilities as members of the 
Milwaukee Police Department is not protected. 
Members are free to express themselves as private 
citizens on SNS to the degree that their speech 
is 
not 
disruptive 
to 
the 
mission 
of 
the 
department. 
. . .  
10. Members must be aware that their communication on 
SNS can be used by a skilled defense attorney in 
impeaching testimony in association with their 
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
4 
 
disruptive to the mission of the department" and "fail[ed] to 
inspire and sustain the confidence of our community."  The Chief 
issued a personnel order outlining Andrade's discipline for 
violating those two provisions of the Department's Code of 
Conduct, imposing a 30-day suspension without pay in response to 
Andrade "[p]osting content to a social media networking site 
that was disruptive to the mission" of the Department.  However, 
in response to Andrade's "[f]ailure to inspire and sustain the 
confidence of our community," the Chief terminated Andrade.  As 
required by Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13), the Chief notified the Board 
of Police and Fire Commissioners ("the Board") of his decision 
to suspend and terminate Andrade.  Andrade then appealed his 
termination. 
¶44 During Andrade's two-day post-termination disciplinary 
appeal hearings, the Chief repeatedly testified that it was the 
fact that he could not use Andrade as a witness that resulted in 
his termination.  But for Andrade's inability to be used as a 
witness, the Chief testified that 
[Andrade] was going to get disciplined.  He brought 
discredit to the department on discipline and as I 
stated earlier, the purpose of firing him is I can't 
use him as a witness in court.   
¶45 According to the Chief's testimony, the district 
attorney's inability to use Andrade as a witness in court was 
the sole reason the Chief terminated Andrade: 
[MPD Counsel]  . . . I think your testimony was he 
only got fired because the DA's position 
                                                                                                                                                             
professional 
duties 
as 
a 
member 
of 
the 
department. 
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
5 
 
took 
it 
over 
the 
edge. 
To 
bring 
discredit to the department would have 
only led to severe discipline. Is that 
fair? 
[Chief] 
Yes.  
[MPD Counsel] Same thing with the second charge.  You 
wouldn't have fired him for failing to 
inspire and sustain the confidence in 
our community but for the DA's decision.  
Is that fair? 
[Chief] 
That is fair.  
[MPD Counsel] I don't want to beat a dead horse, 
although I know that expression is not 
supposed to be used anymore.  Are you 
saying that [Andrade] was solely fired 
because of the DA's decision at the end 
of the day? 
 . . .  
[Chief] 
Yes.  
¶46 The district attorney's assertion that he would not be 
able to use Andrade as a witness put the "inability to testify" 
directly at issue.  In fact, the Chief testified that "if there 
was a DA that would use [Andrade]," then he would welcome 
Andrade to reapply to the Department.  The Chief again testified 
that he would not have dismissed Andrade but for that 
determination: 
[MPD Counsel] 
Now let's assume that wasn't the case.  
Let's assume he could still testify.  
Would this still be discipline-worthy 
conduct by Mr. Andrade? 
[Chief] 
Absolutely.  
[MPD Counsel] 
Can you give us a sense of how serious it 
would be without the testimony piece of 
it? 
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
6 
 
[Chief] 
It would imposed heavy discipline (sic).  
I probably would have not -– or I would 
not have dismissed him.  I would not have 
fired him had it not been for his 
inability to testify in court or be used 
by the district attorney's office to 
testify in court.  
¶47 The Board ultimately upheld the  imposed discipline, 
concluding that "[Andrade's] posts and comments undermined trust 
in the department, disrupted the mission of the department, and 
created the appearance of impropriety and corruption in the 
department" so the resulting termination "underscore[d] the 
seriousness of the offense."  Andrade appealed his termination 
to the Milwaukee County circuit court,5 which, on review, upheld 
the Board's decision.  The court of appeals also upheld 
Andrade's termination, determining the reason Andrade had been 
terminated——the inability to testify as a witness——was "a 
consequence of his failure to inspire and sustain the confidence 
of the community and the harm he has done to the department's 
mission."  Andrade v. City of Milwaukee Bd. of Fire & Police 
Comm'rs, No. 2020AP333, unpublished slip op., ¶36 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Aug. 31, 2021).  Finally, Andrade petitioned this court for 
review.  
II 
¶48 The United States Constitution recognizes due process 
as a fundamental right afforded all litigants.  This fundamental 
right to due process "includes the right to . . . procedural due 
process."  State v. Hager, 2018 WI 40, ¶40, 381 Wis. 2d 74, 911 
N.W.2d 17.  "Procedural due process imposes constraints on 
                                                 
5 The Hon. Jeffrey A. Conen, presiding.  
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
7 
 
governmental decisions which deprive individuals of 'liberty' or 
'property' interests within the meaning of the Due Process 
Clause 
of 
the . . . Fourteenth 
Amendment." 
 
Matthews 
v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).  "Procedural due process 
requires that government action 'be implemented in a fair 
manner.'"  Hager, 381 Wis. 2d 74, ¶40; see also State v. Laxton, 
2002 WI 82, ¶10 n.8, 254 Wis. 2d 185, 647 N.W.2d 784; United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).  To succeed on a 
procedural 
due 
process 
claim, 
"a 
plaintiff 
must 
show 
a 
deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected 
interest in 'life, liberty, or property' without due process of 
law."  Penterman v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 211 Wis. 2d 458, 473, 
565 N.W.2d 521 (1997) (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 
125-26 (1990)). 
¶49 "The minimum procedural protections required by the 
Due Process Clause vary depending on the context."  Miller v. 
Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Vill. of Lyndon Station, 2023 WI 46, 
¶12, 407 Wis. 2d 678, 991 N.W.2d 380 (citing Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
at 334 ("[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands.") (quoting 
another 
source)). 
 
"The 
essential 
requirements 
of 
due 
process . . . are 
notice 
and 
an 
opportunity 
to 
respond."  
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985).  
Due process fundamentally requires "the opportunity to be 
heard."  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (quoting 
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).  "The opportunity 
to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed 
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
8 
 
action should not be taken is a fundamental due process 
requirement."  Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546.  "If the right to 
notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, then, it is 
clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can 
still be prevented."  Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972). 
¶50 Though the Board upheld the Chief's decision to 
terminate Andrade over his perceived inability to testify, 
Andrade was not provided with that information as the basis for 
discharge 
until 
post-termination. 
 
Through 
this 
failure, 
Andrade's constitutional right to due process, as guaranteed 
under Loudermill, was violated.  Through this failure, Andrade 
was likewise denied the statutory procedural rights he was due 
as required by Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13), which required the Chief 
to provide Andrade with the reasons for his discharge and to do 
so at the same time he imposed the correlating discipline.  
Andrade 
was 
provided 
alternative 
reasons 
for 
discharge 
throughout the pre-termination process——for violation of two 
provisions of the Department's Code of Conduct——before he was 
finally provided the actual reason necessitating his discharge——
his perceived inability to testify——in the post-termination 
proceedings.  
 
A.   Per Loudermill, Andrade Was Owed More Due  
Process Than He Received. 
¶51 The majority is correct that "due process guarantees 
in this context are not rigid and formal; they are flexible."  
Majority op., ¶5.  However, the process due cannot be so 
flexible as to have no solid parameters or shape at all.  At its 
foundation, procedural due process requires that the accused be 
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
9 
 
provided "notice and an opportunity to respond" to the charges 
presented, as well as "an explanation of the employer's 
evidence."  Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546.  
¶52 Relying on its prior determination in Eldridge,6 in 
Loudermill, the United States Supreme Court held that procedural 
due process entitles a tenured public employee "to [pre-
termination process] consisting of oral or written notice of the 
charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, 
and an opportunity to present his side of the story."  
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546.  The pre-termination process itself 
does not necessarily need to be formal, so long as it affords 
the employee an opportunity to make any "plausible arguments" 
that might prevent the discipline.  Id. at 544.  A pre-
termination hearing "should be an initial check against mistaken 
decisions——essentially, a determination of whether there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the 
employee are true and support the proposed action."  Id. at 545-
46.  
¶53 Loudermill and its predecessor Eldridge combine to 
place very specific obligations on the government, "impos[ing] 
constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals 
                                                 
6 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (finding 
that "identification of the specific dictates of due process 
generally 
requires 
consideration 
of 
three 
distinct 
factors:  First, the private interest that will be affected by 
the 
official 
action; 
second, 
the 
risk 
of 
an 
erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and 
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural 
safeguards; 
and 
finally, 
the 
Government's 
interest . . ."). 
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
10 
 
of . . . 'property' interests."  Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332.  The 
government 
must 
provide 
an 
employee 
with 
notice 
and 
an 
opportunity to be heard regarding the specific charges that are 
determined after an investigation has been completed, as well as 
the specific evidence related to the charges.  That notice and 
opportunity to be heard on the specific charges and evidence 
must be provided pre-termination.  As to the Eldridge factors, 
the 
property 
interest 
affected 
is 
high:  Andrade 
faced 
termination from his job as a police officer.  That high 
interest is juxtaposed against the minimal governmental interest 
at stake.  That governmental interest is minimal given that all 
the Chief, and ultimately the Board, had to do was provide 
Andrade with the appropriate notice of the real reason for his 
termination——his 
perceived 
inability 
to 
testify, 
not 
his 
"failure 
to 
inspire 
and 
sustain 
the 
confidence 
of 
the 
community."  
¶54 Yet, Andrade was not provided these basic requirements 
of due process pre-termination.  The parties do not dispute the 
fact that Andrade had a legitimate property interest in 
retaining his job, as the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized the importance of protecting this property interest: 
[T]he 
significance 
of 
the 
private 
interest 
in 
retaining employment cannot be gainsaid.  We have 
frequently recognized the severity of depriving a 
person of the means of livelihood.  While a fired 
worker may find employment elsewhere, doing so will 
take some time and is likely to be burdened by the 
questionable circumstances under which he left his 
previous job.  
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543 (citations omitted).   
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
11 
 
¶55 By not complying with the "imposed constraints" on 
their decision to deprive Andrade of his property interest, the 
Chief, and ultimately the Board, ran the risk of erroneous 
deprivation of Andrade's property interest.  And, this is what 
occurred.  Due process guards against the accused having to 
guess what the accuser is thinking by requiring the accuser to 
provide the accused with specific notice.  But here, Andrade was 
forced to play a bait-and-switch guessing game due to the lack 
of specificity provided him which due process requires.  The 
lack of notice thus impacted Andrade's "opportunity to be 
heard," Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267, and his corresponding ability 
to mount a robust defense to the deprivation of his property 
interest.  
¶56 The majority mistakenly relies on the presence of a 
witness list to show that Andrade was in fact on notice such 
that Loudermill's requirements were satisfied.  Majority op., 
¶22 n.12.  But this reliance is misplaced:  Loudermill requires 
pre-termination "notice and an opportunity to respond."  The 
witness list in question was filed post-termination, after 
Andrade had already been deprived of his property interest.  
While a witness list may provide some helpful context in 
preparing a legal defense, a witness list, by itself, does not 
provide enough due process to satisfy the requirements of 
Loudermill by identifying the perceived inability to testify as 
the reason for Andrade's termination.  
¶57 Notably, the notice required under Loudermill differs 
from the notice required under a Chapter 164, Wis. Stats., PI-21 
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
12 
 
notice.7  While 
Loudermill requires employers to provide 
employees with notice and the chance to respond to "charges" 
leveled after an investigation but before termination, PI-21 
notice requires that the employee be "informed of the nature of 
the investigation prior to any interrogation."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 164.02(1)(a). 
 
The 
purpose 
of 
the 
PI-21 
notice 
and 
investigatory hearing is to focus the officer on the areas of 
questioning and the "nature of the investigation."  Andrade 
participated in a PI-21 and was put on notice of two charges for 
which he was being investigated.  The investigatory notice 
specifically——and only——referenced Core Value 1.00 (Competence) 
and Guiding Principle 1.05, as well as Core Value 3.00 
(Integrity) and Guiding Principle 3.01 as the basis for which 
Andrade was being investigated.  Andrade testified that he 
provided a written response to these specified charges.8  He also 
had the opportunity to respond verbally in the accompanying 
interview process.  
¶58 But Andrade was not "informed of the nature of the 
investigation" into his conduct.  The PI-21 provided no reason 
for Andrade to believe that his ability to testify was somehow 
at issue or being questioned.  That allegation appeared nowhere 
on the form itself.  Nor was it raised during the ensuing 
                                                 
7 The PI-21 is intended to comply with the requirements of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 164.02(1)(a), 
which 
states 
that 
"the 
law 
enforcement officer under investigation shall be informed of the 
nature of the investigation prior to any interrogation." 
8 As the majority likewise notes, while the parties 
reference this written response in the record, the response does 
not appear to be a part of the official record.  
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
13 
 
interview process, when Andrade had the opportunity to respond. 
While Andrade read the Department's social media policies aloud 
during his PI-21, the policies themselves did not inform him 
that he was being terminated for his perceived inability to 
testify.  In fact, testimony from the interviewing officer 
confirms that Andrade's perceived inability to testify was not 
something the Department's Internal Affairs Division considered 
during its investigation into Andrade's conduct.9 
¶59 Since Andrade was not placed on notice of the real 
reason for his termination until post-termination, he was robbed 
of the "full panoply of due process protections" he was owed 
pre-termination.10  That included his ability to respond to the 
charges leveled and provide evidence to challenge the charges 
and discipline imposed.  While the district attorney alleged 
that Andrade would have been unable to be used as a witness 
going forward, Andrade did not have a reasonable opportunity to 
challenge that assertion prior to being terminated.  Had he been 
provided access to the "full panoply of due process protections" 
from the beginning, Andrade may have had the opportunity to 
present evidence in his defense to challenge his termination.  
He could have defended himself differently, or more robustly, 
                                                 
9 At the post-termination hearings, Andrade's interviewing 
officer testified that Andrade's perceived inability to testify 
was 
"not 
something 
that 
[the 
Internal 
Affairs 
Division] 
specifically looked at, no.  That was something that was brought 
in as a consideration by the chief's office as to the 
discipline" after the initial investigation concluded.  
10 Andrade, No. 2020AP333, ¶51 n.1 (Dugan, J., dissenting). 
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
14 
 
had he known with specificity that his property interest was at 
stake.  
¶60 For example, had Andrade actually been provided due 
process, perhaps Andrade could have presented evidence as to 
other officers charged with violating the same provisions of the 
code of conduct that he was,11 in an attempt to make any 
"plausible 
arguments" 
that 
might 
prevent 
the 
discipline.  
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 544.  He could have challenged the 
blanket assertion that he could not testify, providing proof of 
other similarly Giglio-impaired officers12 who nonetheless were 
                                                 
11 According to the testimony of the president of the 
Milwaukee Police Association ("MPA"), when the Chief and others 
were determining the level of discipline to impose on Andrade, 
there were three similarly situated officers who were charged 
with violations of the same social media policy provision as 
Andrade, Standard Operating Procedure 685.15(A)(5).  One officer 
"took a one-day suspension apparently after he trashed the 
department [publicly] on Facebook."  Another officer was charged 
with posting content to a social media networking site "that was 
destructive to the mission of the department," and received a 
four-day suspension for his violation; this officer was offered 
the opportunity to reduce his four-day suspension for violation 
of the policy down to a two-day suspension if he wrote a letter 
of apology to the individuals he targeted in his post.  Finally, 
a third officer had two charges, one for violating the same 
social media policy provision as Andrade, and another for 
violating Core Value 3.00 Guiding Principle 3.01, also for use 
of Facebook.  He was suspended one day for the first charge of 
violating the social media policy, and had his second charge 
(the Facebook post charge for making public comments and 
threatening to injure a gunshot victim he was responsible for 
guarding) dismissed by the Chief.  
12 "The United States Supreme Court first imposed a duty on 
the prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence to defendants 
in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)."  State v. Wayerski, 
2019 WI 11, ¶71, 385 Wis. 2d 344, 922 N.W.2d 468 (Ziegler, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part).   
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
15 
 
able to testify in order "to present reasons . . . why [the] 
proposed action should not be taken . . . ."  Loudermill, 470 
U.S. at 546.13  He could have provided evidence of the fact that 
the basis for his termination appeared nonsensical, given that 
the same district attorney's office was using him to chair a 
homicide trial up until the date of his discharge.14  Such 
challenges would have been appropriate, given that "[p]rocedural 
due process requires that government action 'be implemented in a 
                                                                                                                                                             
In the wake of Brady, courts responded to the 
need to refine its application and scope.  In Giglio 
v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972), the 
Supreme Court held that in addition to exculpatory 
evidence, the prosecution is required to disclose 
favorable, material evidence that could be used to 
impeach prosecution witnesses.  
Wayerski, 385 Wis. 2d 344, ¶74 (Ziegler, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part). 
13 The MPA president testified: 
There is no testimony or evidence in the record that 
Officer Andrade can't testify in municipal court and 
that he can't testify in federal court.  Both of those 
things would be in Milwaukee County and in previous 
cases where an officer has been determined not to be 
able to testify in those places, that's been in the 
Internal Affairs file. . . .  Again, no evidence that 
he can't testify, period, but there is no evidence 
that he won't be allowed to testify in municipal court 
or in federal court.  
14 Andrade's 
counsel 
represented 
repeatedly 
throughout 
briefing and at oral argument that at the same time the district 
attorney's office was pushing for Andrade's termination over a 
perceived inability to testify, the district attorney's office 
was using Andrade as a witness chairing a homicide trial.  This 
assertion is repeated and alluded to in the post-termination 
appeal hearing record, though documentation supporting this 
representation does not appear in the record.   
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
16 
 
fair manner.'"  Hager, 381 Wis. 2d 74, ¶40; see also Laxton, 254 
Wis. 2d 185, ¶10 n.8. 
¶61 The Milwaukee Police Association ("MPA") maintains 
records and "comparables" on the individuals who are under 
investigation, as well as the outcomes of those investigations.  
In the post-termination appeal hearings, the MPA's president 
relied on those records to testify that from his experience in 
handling 
and 
tracking 
officer 
discipline, 
the 
level 
of 
discipline Andrade received compared to other officers charged 
with the same social media policy provision violation was 
"egregious":   
In all cases, when we compare what one officer did to 
another officer and ultimately, what the discipline 
that was doled out was, it is a difficult process 
because they are all different, but if you take a look 
at, say, this person posted something on Facebook or 
social networking and, then, you compare what the 
discipline ended up being, we have already discussed 
the results, that this is egregious as far as 
discipline.  
In his testimony, the MPA president based his opinion on the 
fact that other officers charged with the same violation tended 
to receive suspensions or written reprimands rather than 
termination: 
[Andrade's Counsel] 
Do you recall the average length of 
discipline 
for 
individuals 
that 
were 
not 
discharged? 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
. . .  
[MPA] 
I think it was, like, 30 days or 
less, 
maybe 
even 
ten 
days 
or 
less. . . .  
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
17 
 
[Andrade's Counsel] Do 
you 
recall 
three 
of 
the 
disciplines were reprimands and two 
were dismissed outright? 
[MPA] 
I am looking at them now, yes. 
Absolutely. 
[Andrade's Counsel] 
The highest discipline was ten days 
besides the 30-day one? 
[MPA] 
That is correct.  
¶62 There were officers who were initially discharged for 
violation of code of conduct provisions.  And those officers, 
unlike Andrade, committed crimes yet were still not disciplined 
to the level Andrade was.15  
¶63 The MPA's president also testified as to the district 
attorney's assertion that Andrade could not serve as a witness 
going 
forward, 
calling 
the 
district 
attorney's 
assertion 
"unprecedented":  
[MPA] 
I think we have established and I think 
Officer Andrade probably -– I won't speak 
for him -– wishes that those posts 
weren't put out there, but certainly, 
these posts don't rise to the subjective 
level of the district attorney's office 
                                                 
15 Of the officers who were discharged, one was originally 
discharged but had the discharge reduced to a 35-day suspension, 
even though "his situation garnered significant media attention" 
as Andrade's did.  A second officer, who was charged with 
violating Core Value 3.00 Guiding Principle 3.01 by "[b]ehaving 
in such a way that a reasonable person would expect that 
discredit could be brought upon the Department," received only a 
district-level written reprimand, although her emails also 
contained material that likewise contained what both counsel and 
the MPA president described as "overtly racist" content.  
Another officer was charged with "intentionally or with reckless 
disregard for the truth mak[ing] an untrue statement" for lying 
to federal agents and Internal Affairs, yet was promoted to 
detective and was allowed to continue testifying.  
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
18 
 
to say that they are impeachable toward 
credibility. 
[MPD Counsel] 
So 
you 
disagree 
with 
the 
DA's 
determination. 
[MPA] 
I 
absolutely 
do, 
yes. 
It 
is 
unprecedented. 
[MPD Counsel] 
So your testimony is that the DA's office 
has never deemed anyone unable to serve 
as a witness in criminal cases -– an 
officer.  
[MPA] 
No. 
That 
is 
interesting. 
 
That 
is 
perception.  The way you look at one post 
and the way I look at a post are two 
different things and certainly, when I 
was 
specifically 
talking 
about 
an 
individual 
who 
posts 
something 
on 
a 
social 
network 
to, 
then, 
be 
so 
compromised 
that 
he 
can 
no 
longer 
testify, I have never heard of that. 
¶64 The record bears that out as well.  Counsel asserted 
throughout briefing and oral argument before this court that 
nearly 120 officers were included on the Giglio-impaired list, 
yet Andrade was the one "being singled out."  The other officers 
were still able to remain on the force and testify, challenging 
the notion that Andrade was somehow uniquely situated and his 
termination was the only logical result to his charges. 
¶65 Given that the most stringent discipline imposed for 
similar code of conduct violations were suspensions, it seems 
highly suspect to demand that Andrade be on notice of something 
he was never charged with, and be on notice of a discipline that 
no other officers facing the same violation received.  It is a 
disservice to due process to demand that Andrade defend himself 
against an accusation provided after the fact, and defend 
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
19 
 
himself against a discipline which by all accounts was above and 
beyond what others in his situation endured.16   
¶66 It is not reading Loudermill "too woodenly" as the 
majority asserts, majority op., ¶33 n.21, to recognize that due 
process demands Andrade be on notice and provided with the 
actual reason for his termination prior to depriving him of his 
property interest in continued employment.  Nor is it demanding 
more than due process requires to expect that Andrade be 
provided the evidence substantiating the actual reason for his 
termination, so as to enable him to defend himself and his 
interests.  Andrade's perceived inability to testify was not 
merely a consequence of Andrade's misconduct, as the majority 
states.  Majority op., ¶¶32, 38.  Andrade's perceived inability 
to testify was the "sole" reason for his termination.  The Chief 
testified as much during Andrade's post-termination hearing in 
front of the Board.  Accordingly, this "sole" reason for 
                                                 
16 This apparent disparity is found by a full review of the 
testimony 
in 
the 
record. 
Particularly 
given 
the 
opening 
paragraph of this dissent, it is disingenuous to insinuate that 
the dissent is "suggesting the punishment Andrade received was 
inappropriate and egregious" or that it is second guessing the 
discipline imposed upheld.  Majority op., ¶22 n.13.  Rather, the 
dissent respects the constitutional and statutory process that 
is due.  The dissent shines light on the hole at the foundation 
of the majority's argument——that Andrade was provided, in any 
measure, the notice he was due.  As I stated at the outset, 
Andrade may have ultimately received the same discipline due to 
his conduct.  Again, I do not condone his behavior.  But Andrade 
was owed the "essential requirements of due process" prior to 
the 
imposed 
discipline 
and 
deprivation 
of 
his 
property 
interests.  The record amply supports that Andrade was denied 
these "essential" due process protections. 
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
20 
 
termination cannot be both a consequence of the decision to 
terminate and a part of the decision to terminate.  
¶67 Due process is "flexible" per Eldridge but it is not 
flexible on "[t]he essential requirements" of "notice and an 
opportunity to respond" and "the opportunity to present reasons, 
either in person or in writing, why [the] proposed action should 
not be taken . . . ."  Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546.  And, if the 
due process right "to notice and a hearing is to serve its full 
purpose, then, it is clear that it must be granted at a time 
when the deprivation can still be prevented," so it must be 
provided 
pre-deprivation 
of 
Andrade's 
property 
interest.  
Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 81.  
¶68  Andrade was provided notice and the opportunity to 
respond to the charges of two specific violations of two 
provisions of the Department's Code of Conduct.  Had those 
specified charges been the reason that Andrade was terminated, 
due process could have been satisfied.  But Andrade was 
terminated for a third, unspecified and unnoticed reason.  
Andrade's fundamental due process rights were impermissibly 
violated.   
 
B.   Per Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13), Andrade Was Owed 
More Due Process Than He Received. 
¶69 Andrade was also owed a heightened level of due 
process per Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13), which required the Chief to 
provide a complaint "setting forth the reason[]" for Andrade's 
termination.  The statute seems to require even broader due 
process protections than are due under the "flexible" Eldridge 
standard Loudermill relies on.  But, given that the Chief failed 
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
21 
 
to comply with the statute's directive to supply the reason for 
Andrade's 
termination, 
Andrade's 
due 
process 
rights 
were 
violated.   
¶70 "[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the language 
of the statute."  State ex. rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  "If 
the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the 
inquiry."  Id.  "Statutory language is given its common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  Id.  Finally, "[i]n construing 
or interpreting a statute the court is not at liberty to 
disregard the plain, clear words of the statute."  Id., ¶46. 
¶71 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.50(13) provides the disciplinary 
process 
for 
handling 
police 
officer 
suspensions 
or 
terminations.17  Section 62.50(13) mandates that where discharge 
                                                 
17 Section 
62.50(13) 
provides, 
in 
pertinent 
part, 
as 
follows: 
NOTICE OF DISCHARGE OR SUSPENSION; APPEALS.  The chief 
discharging or suspending for a period exceeding 5 
days any member of the force shall give written notice 
of the discharge or suspension to the member and, at 
the same time the notice is given, shall also give the 
member 
any 
exculpatory 
evidence 
in 
the 
chief's 
possession related to the discharge or suspension.  
The chief shall also immediately report the notice of 
the discharge or suspension to the secretary of the 
board of fire and police commissioners together with a 
complaint setting forth the reasons for the discharge 
or suspension and the name of the complainant if other 
than the chief.  Within 10 days after the date of 
service of the notice or a discharge or suspension 
order the members so discharged or suspended may 
appeal from the order of discharge or suspension or 
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
22 
 
or suspensions are concerned, the chief must provide the officer 
facing 
discipline 
with 
notice 
of 
the 
discipline 
and 
simultaneously provide a complaint "setting forth the reasons 
for the discharge or suspension."  Id.  
¶72 The statute's process requirements align with the 
"essential requirements of due process" from Loudermill, namely, 
providing the accused with "notice and an opportunity to 
respond" to the specific charges filed.  Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 
546.  By requiring the Chief to provide written notice of the 
"reasons for the discharge" to the offending officer and the 
Board, this statutory process provides the accused with "[t]he 
opportunity to present reasons . . . why the proposed action 
should not be taken."  Id.  Compliance with the statute ensures 
that the officer facing discipline is provided both with notice 
as to the specific charges levied, and the opportunity to 
respond and defend against those noticed charges.  The Board's 
limited role then is to work within the parameters of those 
specified charges in determining whether the accused violated 
the rules or orders noticed in the charges filed.  See Wis. 
                                                                                                                                                             
discipline 
to 
the 
board 
of 
fire 
and 
police 
commissioners, by filing with the board a notice of 
appeal in the following or similar form . . . .  
(Emphasis added.) 
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
23 
 
Stat. § 62.50(17)(b)5.  This procedural due process structure is 
reiterated throughout the applicable statutory section.18  
¶73 But the Chief put Andrade on notice of two "charges" 
pre-termination that he recognized post-termination as differing 
from the actual reason for Andrade's termination.  Pre-
termination, Andrade was charged with "failure to inspire the 
confidence of the community" and terminated on the basis of that 
noticed charge.  But post-termination, the Chief identified that 
Andrade's perceived inability to testify was actually the sole 
"charge" necessitating his termination.  The statute requires 
the Chief to have provided Andrade with notice on that "reason 
for the discharge" in the complaint he filed with the Board.  
But the Chief neglected to do so.  That failure to comply with 
the statutory requirements interfered with Andrade's "essential" 
due process rights to be on notice of the actual charge for 
which he faced termination. 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 62.50(16) ("The accused shall 
have full opportunity to be heard in defense and shall be 
entitled to secure the attendance of all witnesses necessary for 
the defense . . . ."); § 62.50(17)(a) ("Within 3 days after 
hearing the matter the board . . . shall . . . determine whether 
by a preponderance of the evidence the charges are sustained.  
If the board or panel determines that the charges are sustained, 
the board shall at once determine whether the good of the 
service requires that the accused be permanently discharged or 
be suspended without pay for a period not exceeding 60 days or 
reduced in rank.  If the charges are not sustained the accused 
shall be immediately reinstated in his or her former position, 
without prejudice."); § 62.50(17)(b) ("No police officer may 
be . . . discharged 
by 
the 
board . . . based 
on 
charges 
filed by . . . the 
chief . . . unless 
the 
board 
determines 
whether there is just cause, as described in this paragraph, to 
sustain the charges."). 
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
24 
 
¶74 The 
majority 
incorrectly 
reads 
the 
statute 
to 
"require[] nothing more" than that the complaint list the 
policies which Andrade violated and reference the social media 
postings forming the basis of the violations.  Majority op., ¶7.  
But what the statute actually requires is clear:  that the chief 
immediately report the notice of the discharge or suspension to 
the secretary of the Board, "together with a complaint setting 
forth the reasons for the discharge or suspension."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 62.50(13) (emphasis added).  While the Chief and the Board 
determined 
that 
Andrade 
violated 
two 
provisions 
of 
the 
Department's Code of Conduct, the record posits that the Chief 
would have disciplined Andrade for those infractions, but 
instead terminated him because of the district attorney's office 
determination that they would not be able to use Andrade as a 
witness going forward.  The Chief testified repeatedly to this 
effect in the post-termination appeal hearings.  This actual 
reason 
for 
Andrade's 
termination 
appears 
nowhere 
in 
the 
complaint, though it is statutorily required.  
¶75 The 
Chief 
failed 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
"reasons" 
requirement of Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13) when he put Andrade on 
notice of termination for reasons other than the actual reason 
for Andrade's termination.  The Chief also failed to comply with 
the statute's "timing" requirement.  Andrade received notice of 
the 
actual 
reason 
for 
his 
termination 
during 
the 
post-
termination appeal hearings.  These hearings took place some two 
months after the Chief issued his personnel order and complaint 
outlining his imposed discipline, namely, Andrade's termination 
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
25 
 
for "failure to inspire confidence in our community."  But the 
statute demands the terminated officer be provided something 
more:  the reasons for termination at the time of imposed 
discipline.   
¶76 Since the Chief failed to include the inability to 
testify——what he admitted was the "sole" reason that Andrade was 
discharged——in 
the 
complaint 
accompanying 
the 
notice 
of 
discharge, the Chief failed to comply with the plain directive 
of Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13).  Andrade's due process rights were 
violated.  
III 
¶77 Andrade did not receive due process when he was 
terminated from the Department for his perceived inability to 
testify.  Andrade was deprived of his property interest without 
having ever been placed on notice of the actual charge, nor 
provided the opportunity to respond.  This deficient process 
fails to satisfy either the "flexible" Eldridge standard relied 
on in Loudermill or the more demanding standard required by Wis. 
Stat. § 62.50(13).  It is not necessary to consider the content 
of the offensive Facebook postings.  They are distasteful and 
unbecoming of police officers.19  But due process, even when 
flexible, demands certain "essential requirements" be met, 
                                                 
19 Though the contexts between this case and Miller v. 
Carroll differ, the warning I provided should be heeded by all 
public officials.  The risks of public officers using social 
media vastly outweigh the benefits.  See Miller v. Carroll, 2020 
WI 56, ¶67, 392 Wis. 2d 49, 944 N.W.2d 542 (Ziegler, J., 
concurring) (cautioning the Wisconsin bench about the hazards of 
using social media such as Facebook in order to avoid due 
process violations of parties' rights). 
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
26 
 
namely, that the accused be provided "notice and an opportunity 
to respond."  Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546.  These "essential 
requirements" of due process were not provided here.  Due 
process under the statute required the Chief to provide Andrade 
with a complaint "setting forth the reasons" for Andrade's 
termination at the time that discipline was imposed.  The Chief 
testified that the sole reason for Andrade's termination was his 
perceived 
inability 
to 
testify. 
 
Yet, 
that 
reason 
for 
termination was not provided to Andrade until post-termination.  
¶78 Ultimately, due to his behavior, Officer Andrade may 
still have received the same discipline.  In pointing out that 
Andrade was not provided the process he was due, this dissent 
does not condone his behavior.  Rather, this dissent respects 
the constitutional and statutory process Andrade was due, and 
acknowledges that due process requires Andrade receive notice of 
the facts that support the discipline and what he is being 
disciplined for.  He was not provided that.  
¶79 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.   
¶80 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2020AP333.akz 
 
1