Title: Javier Dejesus Ventura v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC08-483
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 18, 2010

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-483 
____________ 
 
JAVIER DEJESUS VENTURA,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[February 18, 2010] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
We have for review Ventura v. State, 973 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008), in 
which the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the admissibility of a 
Department of Corrections release-date letter as a permissible means of 
establishing the defendant‟s status as a prison-releasee reoffender.  See id. at 638.  
In the process, the Third District relied upon the reasoning and rule of law 
articulated in Yisrael v. State, 938 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (en banc) 
(Yisrael I), disapproved in part, 993 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 2008).  See Ventura, 973 So. 
2d at 638.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
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We stayed proceedings in this case pending our disposition of Yisrael, in 
which we (1) approved the decision of the First District in Gray v. State, 910 So. 
2d 867 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), and (2) disapproved the reasoning and rule of law 
articulated by the Fourth District in its underlying decision, but ultimately 
approved the result reached by that court on other grounds.  See Yisrael v. State, 
993 So. 2d 952, 960-61 (Fla. 2008) (Yisrael II).  We then accepted jurisdiction in 
this case to resolve the conflict between Ventura and the decisions of this Court in 
Yisrael II and State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986).   
With regard to the Yisrael issue, the Third District relied upon the rule 
articulated in Yisrael I to erroneously state that a Department of Corrections 
(DOC) release-date letter standing alone is admissible under the public-records 
exception to the hearsay rule to establish a defendant‟s criminal history for the 
purposes of imposition of a prison-releasee-reoffender sentence.  This Court 
disapproved that rule in Yisrael II.  However, upon review of the appellate record, 
it is clear that, although not reflected in the opinion of the Third District, the trial 
court was actually supplied with a signed release-date letter, written under seal, 
and an attached Crime and Time Report.  In Yisrael II, we held that these DOC 
records can together be used to render the entire report admissible as a public 
record.  See Yisrael II, 993 So. 2d at 960-61 (approving usage of the signed 
release-date letter, written under seal, as authentication of an attached Crime and 
 
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Time Report); see also §§ 90.803(6), 90.902(11), Fla. Stat (2003).  Further, 
Ventura concedes that both documents (i.e., the signed release-date letter under 
seal and the Crime and Time Report) were provided to the trial court.  
Accordingly, as we did in Yisrael II, we approve the ultimate result reached by the 
Third District Court of Appeal below because the signed and under seal release-
date letter provided in this case was used as a permissible means of authenticating 
an attached Crime and Time Report, but disapprove its reliance upon the rule 
expressed in Yisrael I.  See Yisrael II, 993 So. 2d at 960-61; see also Smith v. 
State, 990 So. 2d 1162, 1164-65 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Parker v. State, 973 So. 2d 
1167, 1168-69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), review denied, 1 So. 3d 173 (Fla. 2009).   
Next, the district court improperly utilized an “overwhelming evidence” test 
when considering whether the impermissible testimony of a witness which clearly 
undermined and violated the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent constituted 
harmless error.  Unlike some evidentiary errors, such as the admission of a 
cumulative or irrelevant photograph, a comment on the right to remain silent 
strikes at the heart of our criminal justice system.  This Court has clearly stated that 
it is constitutional error to penalize an individual for exercising the Fifth 
Amendment privilege; therefore, the prosecution may not introduce during trial the 
fact that an individual has relied upon this protection in the face of accusation.  See 
Simpson v. State, 418 So. 2d 984, 984-85 (Fla. 1982) (quoting Jones v. State, 200 
 
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So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)); see also DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1131.  As 
we stated in DiGuilio: 
It is clear that comments on silence are high risk errors because 
there is a substantial likelihood that meaningful comments will vitiate 
the right to a fair trial by influencing the jury verdict and that an 
appellate court, or even the trial court, is likely to find that the 
comment is harmful under Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18 
(1967)].   
491 So. 2d at 1136-37.  Accordingly, commenting on the silence of an accused is 
not a viable strategy for obtaining convictions, and any comment—direct or 
indirect—by anyone at trial on this right is constitutional error that should be 
avoided.  See DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1136, 1139.   
During the trial proceedings below, a detective made two comments with 
regard to Ventura‟s silence, as follows:  
A.  Along with the victims, the defendant‟s [sic] wouldn‟t give any 
statements. 
 
. . . .  
 
A. Yes.  The suspects were in custody and the defendant then declined 
to make statements. 
(Emphasis supplied.)  The Third District determined that the comments were 
improper and stated:  “We fail to see how the detective‟s comment, twice repeated, 
could have been anything other than an intentional cheap shot at Ventura‟s 
constitutional rights.”  Ventura, 973 So. 2d at 637.  The court clearly and correctly 
recognized the egregious conduct.  However, the district court then held that the 
 
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error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the overwhelming evidence 
of guilt.”  Id.   
 
Unfortunately, the Third District expressed an incorrect harmless error 
analysis.  In DiGuilio, we fully explicated the application of the harmless error 
doctrine to a comment on a defendant‟s right to remain silent.  In doing so, we 
explicitly expressed that the harmless error analysis is not an “overwhelming-
evidence test.”  DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1139.   
[H]armless error analysis must not become a device whereby the 
appellate court substitutes itself for the jury, examines the permissible 
evidence, excludes the impermissible evidence, and determines that 
the evidence of guilt is sufficient or even overwhelming based on the 
permissible evidence. . . .  
Overwhelming evidence of guilt does not negate the fact that an 
error that constituted a substantial part of the prosecution‟s case 
may have played a substantial part in the jury‟s deliberation and 
thus contributed to the actual verdict reached, for the jury may 
have reached its verdict because of the error without 
considering other reasons untainted by error that would have 
supported the same result. 
 
 
. . . .  
 
The harmless error test . . . places the burden on the state, as the 
beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively 
stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed 
to the conviction.  Application of the test requires not only a close 
examination of the permissible evidence on which the jury could have 
legitimately relied, but an even closer examination of the 
impermissible evidence which might have possibly influenced the jury 
verdict. . . .  
 
 
. . . .  
 
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. . .  The test must be conscientiously applied and the reasoning 
of the court set forth for the guidance of all concerned and for the 
benefit of further appellate review.  The test is not a sufficiency-of-
the-evidence, a correct result, a not clearly wrong, a substantial 
evidence, a more probable than not, a clear and convincing, or even an 
overwhelming evidence test.  Harmless error is not a device for the 
appellate court to substitute itself for the trier-of-fact by simply 
weighing the evidence.  The focus is on the effect of the error on the 
trier-of-fact.  The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility 
that the error affected the verdict.  The burden to show the error was 
harmless must remain on the state.  If the appellate court cannot say 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict, 
then the error is by definition harmful. 
DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1136, 1138-39 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied) 
(quoting People v. Ross, 429 P.2d 606, 621 (Cal. 1967) (Traynor, C.J., dissenting), 
rev‟d, 391 U.S. 470 (1968)).   
Since restating the test in DiGuilio, this Court has provided further guidance 
on the correct analysis of harmless error.  For example, in Rigterink v. State, 2 So. 
3d 221 (Fla. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3563 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2009) 
(No. 08-1229), this Court discussed and applied the harmless error analysis in a 
circumstance where competent, substantial evidence supported the convictions, but 
the record did not demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not 
contribute to the verdict.   
In sum, the evidence suggests that Rigterink has entangled 
himself in a web of deceit and these circumstances may indicate guilt.  
However, our harmless-error test is not guided by a sufficiency-of-
the-evidence, correct-result, not-clearly-wrong, substantial-evidence, 
more-probable-than-not, clear-and-convincing, or overwhelming-
 
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evidence test.  If any of these were the proper test, we might agree that 
the admission and publication of Rigterink‟s videotaped interrogation 
constituted harmless error.  The simple answer to the simple question 
of whether there is competent, substantial evidence to support the 
charges that Rigterink committed these crimes is “Yes.”  However, 
the actual question that we must ask—and the constitutional 
protection that we must address—are not so simple.  We have 
specifically rejected sufficiency-of-the-evidence approaches through 
our decision in DiGuilio, and we will not recede from established 
precedent by, on the one hand, paying lip service to its requirements 
and then, on the other, employing reasoning that would be clearly 
contrary to the pertinent legal standard. . . .    
Under a proper analysis, we conclude that the jury most 
assuredly, and very seriously, considered and substantially included 
Rigterink‟s videotaped interrogation in reaching its verdicts. 
Therefore, the erroneous publication and admission of this videotape 
during Rigterink‟s capital trial “contributed to” his convictions. . . .   
[W]e reverse Rigterink‟s convictions and sentences and remand for a 
new capital trial during which this videotape is excluded.  This is not 
because Rigterink is innocent; rather, it is because the rules 
established to guard fundamental constitutional protections were not 
followed, and, under these facts, we cannot say that the videotape—
which should have been suppressed based upon proper legal 
analysis—did not “contribute to” his convictions.  The murders 
committed in this case were horrific, gruesome, and worthy of 
condemnation; moreover, there is evidence to support the verdicts 
returned by the jury.  However, the rule of law must prevail and we 
must not allow the ends of punishment to trump the means that our 
state and federal Constitutions require. 
 
 
. . . .  
 
 
 
We are not nor do we consider ourselves a super-jury; rather, 
we are an appellate tribunal charged with the task of determining 
“whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the 
verdict.”  If such a possibility exists, it is our duty to remand for a new 
trial, which shall be free from the offending error.  The test is not 
whether the jury reached what we believe to be the correct result but 
 
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is, instead, whether a reasonable possibility exists that the 
constitutional violation contributed to the defendant‟s convictions. 
Id. at 255-57 (citations omitted) (some emphasis supplied) (quoting DiGuilio, 491 
So. 2d at 1139).  
 
The district court noted only one factor in the harmless error analysis (i.e., 
permissible evidence of guilt), but that one factor is not the determinative test.  We 
have explicitly rejected the overwhelming evidence test as a proper analysis of 
harmless error.  Specifically, the decision of the Third District does not address a 
proper analysis and does not discuss whether there is a reasonable possibility that 
the constitutional error affected the verdict.  Our colleague in dissent suggests that 
our decision is based on an erroneous assumption that the district court failed to 
give consideration to the correct harmless error analysis.  We cannot assume that 
an analysis was conducted or review that which remains hidden behind the written 
opinion.  In other words, the decision does not reflect any consideration by the 
appellate court of whether the impermissible comments contributed to the 
conviction, as required in an analysis of harmless error.  Instead, as written, the 
appellate court appears to have “substitute[d] itself for the trier-of-fact by simply 
weighing the evidence” instead of focusing on the “effect of the error on the trier-
of-fact.”  DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1139 (emphasis supplied).  It is important for the 
test to be “conscientiously applied and the reasoning of the court set forth for the 
guidance of all concerned and for the benefit of further appellate review.”  Id.    
 
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The harmless error rule functions to conserve judicial labor while providing 
an “equal degree of protection for the constitutional right to a fair trial, free of 
harmful error.”  Id. at 1135.  The analysis of the impermissible comments in the 
decision below and the announced principle of law does not demonstrate this 
balance.   
Accordingly, we quash and remand to the Third District Court of Appeal for 
reconsideration upon application of our decision in DiGuilio.  In addition, we 
approve the ultimate result reached by the Third District on the Yisrael issue, but 
disapprove its analysis and reasoning based upon the rule expressed in Yisrael I. 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
CANADY, J., dissenting. 
 
I disagree with the majority‟s decision to quash and remand the decision of 
the Third District Court of Appeal.  On the Yisrael1 issue, the majority recognizes 
that the Third District reached the correct result.  On that basis, I would discharge 
                                          
 
 
1.  Yisrael v. State, 993 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 2008). 
 
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jurisdiction on the Yisrael issue.  For the reasons I will explain, I would also 
discharge jurisdiction on the DiGuilio2 issue. 
 
With respect to the DiGuilio issue, I disagree with the majority‟s conclusion 
that “the district court improperly utilized an „overwhelming evidence test‟” and 
therefore “expressed an incorrect harmless error analysis.”  Majority op. at 3-4.  
This is not a case in which the appellate court failed to acknowledge the DiGuilio 
standard.  The Third District accurately stated the DiGuilio standard: “The 
harmless error test . . . places the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the 
error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict.”  Ventura v. State, 973 So. 2d 634, 637 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2008) (emphasis added) (quoting DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1138). 
 
Notwithstanding this express and correct acknowledgement of the DiGuilio 
standard by the Third District, the majority here concludes that the Third District‟s 
decision “does not reflect any consideration by the appellate court of whether the 
impermissible comments contributed to the conviction.”  Majority op. at 8.  For the 
majority to reach that conclusion, it must assume that the district court failed to 
give any consideration to the precise test which the district court stated as the 
governing test.  Such an assumption is unwarranted. 
                                          
 
 
2.  State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986). 
 
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In condemning the district court‟s reference to “overwhelming evidence,” 
the majority condemns an element of harmless error analysis which this Court 
itself has repeatedly employed.  In numerous cases, we have expressly relied on the 
existence of overwhelming evidence of guilt in reaching the conclusion that an 
error was harmless.  See, e.g., Hojan v. State, 3 So. 3d 1204, 1210 (Fla. 2009) 
(“Based on this other extensive evidence, we conclude that even if admission of 
the statement was error, it was harmless error.”), cert. denied, 78 U.S.L.W. 3319 
(U.S. Nov. 30, 2009) (No. 09-5780); Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So. 2d 495, 517 (Fla. 
2005) (stating in harmless error analysis that “[t]here was overwhelming 
permissible evidence of Fitzpatrick‟s guilt”); Hutchinson v. State, 882 So. 2d 943, 
952 (Fla. 2004) (stating in harmless error analysis that improperly admitted 
“testimony adds little, if anything, to the overwhelming evidence of guilt”); Walton 
v. State, 847 So. 2d 438, 448 (Fla. 2003) (“Clearly, taken in conjunction with the 
presence of the overwhelming evidence before the court supporting its conclusions 
as to Walton‟s leadership role in the burglary planning, this mistaken statement by 
the trial court within its final order was harmless.”); Chavez v. State, 832 So. 2d 
730, 754, 762 (Fla. 2002) (stating that “given the overwhelming evidence of 
Chavez‟s guilt, the error in admitting his last confession would be harmless” and 
stating that “[g]iven the overwhelming evidence of Chavez‟s guilt, on this record, 
there is no possibility that admission of the [bloody] mattress contributed to the 
 
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outcome of the proceedings”); Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239, 248 (Fla. 1996) 
(relying in harmless error analysis on conclusion that “the other evidence presented 
at trial of Henyard‟s guilt was extensive and overwhelming”). 
 
There is no question that “overwhelming evidence” cannot be the alpha and 
omega of harmless error analysis.  Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 
(1967)—which articulated the harmless error standard from which the DiGuilio 
standard was derived—itself questioned the California courts‟ “emphasis, and 
perhaps overemphasis, upon the court‟s view of „overwhelming evidence.‟”  
Nonetheless, in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969), the Court 
concluded that the erroneous admission of the confessions of codefendants who did 
not take the stand was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the Chapman 
standard because “apart from [those confessions] the case against Harrington was 
so overwhelming.”  See also Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 431 (1972) 
(referring in harmless error analysis to “overwhelming” “independent evidence of 
guilt”). 
 
In determining whether beyond a reasonable doubt an error did not 
contribute to a guilty verdict, the weight of the properly admitted evidence must be 
evaluated.  The United States Supreme Court has recognized that in harmless error 
analysis, an error must “be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence 
presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a 
 
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reasonable doubt.”  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308 (1991) (emphasis 
added).  Likewise, in DiGuilio we acknowledged the required “analysis of the 
strength and nature of the permissible evidence of guilt and of the strength and 
nature of the impermissible” matters presented to the jury.  491 So. 2d at 1137 
(emphasis added).  A conclusion that the properly considered evidence of guilt is 
overwhelming may naturally flow from such a quantitative assessment or analysis 
of the strength and nature of the evidence. 
 
As the precedents mentioned above amply demonstrate, a reviewing court‟s 
reference to overwhelming evidence of guilt does not establish that the court 
employed an incorrect test for harmless error.  I therefore dissent from the 
majority‟s application of a requirement which is inconsistent with the precedents of 
this Court. 
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D05-872 
 
 
(Dade County) 
 
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, Roy A. Hiemlich and Andrew Stanton, 
Assistant Public Defenders, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
 
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Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Richard L. Polin, Bureau 
Chief, Angel L. Fleming and Rolando A. Soler, Assistant Attorneys General, 
Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent