Title: Bruton v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12, 2001
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 24, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
RAYMOND BRUTON,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 12, 2001
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  C.A. No. 00M-11-064
§
§
Submitted: April 17, 2001
  Decided:   May 24, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices
O R D E R
This 24th day of May 2001, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal
and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Raymond Bruton, filed this appeal from
an order of the Superior Court denying his petition for a writ of mandamus.
We find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
(2)
In this appeal, Bruton claims that: (a) his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated by two officers from Probation/Parole who forcibly
entered and searched his residence while conducting a home visit with a
probationer who was living with him; (b) his Fourth Amendment rights were
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violated by the use of seized drug paraphernalia belonging to the probationer
to establish a parole violation against him; and (c) his right to due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment was violated because witnesses who would
have testified that the drug paraphernalia did not belong to him were not
permitted to testify at his preliminary hearing or his revocation of parole
hearing.
(3)
In March 2000, two officers from Probation/Parole appeared at
Bruton’s residence for a routine home visit with probationer Cheryl Diggs,
who lived with Bruton.  Following a conversation between Bruton and the
officers at the front door, the officers entered the residence, handcuffed
Bruton and conducted a search that yielded a tablespoon with cocaine residue,
a glassine bag with cocaine residue, two electronic scales commonly used in
the distribution of drugs, 25 glassine bags commonly used for the packaging
of drugs, a balance scale commonly used in the distribution of drugs, and a
white powdery substance commonly used to dilute drugs.  
(4)
Diggs was arrested for violating her probation and Bruton was
arrested for violating his parole.  After a preliminary hearing at which Bruton
was represented by counsel, a hearing officer found probable cause to believe
1We do not reach the issue of whether the Superior Court had jurisdiction to decide
the petition for a writ of mandamus.  This Court has jurisdiction to determine the issues
presented in this matter pursuant to Semick v. Department of Corrections, Del. Supr., 477
A.2d 707, 708 (1984).
2Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998).
3Id. at 364.
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that Bruton had violated his parole.  Following a revocation hearing, the
Board of Parole revoked Bruton’s parole and ordered his incarceration.
Bruton then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that the
Superior Court direct the Board of Parole to reverse its decision.  The petition
was dismissed by the Superior Court for lack of jurisdiction.1
(5)
Bruton’s claims of Fourth Amendment violations are unavailing.
The United States Supreme Court has declined to extend the exclusionary rule
to proceedings other than criminal trials.2  Moreover, because “[a]pplication
of the exclusionary rule would both hinder the functioning of state parole
systems and alter the traditionally flexible, administrative nature of parole
revocation proceedings,” the United States Supreme Court has held that
evidence seized in violation of a parolee’s Fourth Amendment rights is not
barred in such proceedings.3  Thus, Bruton has no remedy in this proceeding
for any possible Fourth Amendment violation.
4Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486-89 (1972).
5Sawers v. New Castle County Board of Adjustment, Del. Supr., No. 144, 1988,
Walsh, J., 1988 WL 117514 (Oct. 26, 1988) (ORDER).
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(6)
Bruton’s claim that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
were violated because his witnesses were not permitted to testify is without
merit.  The United States Supreme Court has outlined the minimum
requirements of due process in parole revocation proceedings, at both the
preliminary hearing and parole revocation hearing stages.4  At both stages the
parolee is to be afforded the opportunity to present witnesses in his own
behalf.  Both the hearing officer and the Board of Parole, however, have the
discretionary authority to limit or bar testimony that is irrelevant or
duplicative.5  In this case, the only testimony Bruton’s witnesses were
prepared to offer was that the drug paraphernalia discovered in his residence
did not belong to him.  Because the record indicates that Bruton himself
offered this testimony both at the preliminary hearing and at the parole
revocation hearing and because the mere presence of the drug paraphernalia
in Bruton’s residence was sufficient to establish a parole violation, we
conclude that the decision of the preliminary hearing officer and the Board of
6Id.
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Parole not to permit additional testimony on the issue of ownership did not
constitute an abuse of discretion or violate Bruton’s due process rights.6
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ E. Norman Veasey
Chief Justice