Title: Leonard v. State
Citation: 232 N.E.2d 882, 249 Ind. 361
Docket Number: 30,966
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: January 15, 1968

249 Ind. 361 (1968)
232 N.E.2d 882
LEONARD
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 30,966.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed January 15, 1968.
*362 Richard C. Ver Wiebe, of Fort Wayne, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and Murray West, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
LEWIS, C.J.
The appellant was charged with the crime of embezzlement. He appeals from a conviction after a finding of guilty by the Trial Judge. The indictment, omitting the formal parts, reads as follows:
Leonard was the attorney for a guardian who was acting in the estate of a minor ward. It was the practice of the guardian to sign blank checks drawn on the guardianship account and to deliver the checks to her attorney, the appellant. Leonard would fill in the name of the payee and deliver the checks. On at least one occasion the appellant inserted his own name as the payee, endorsed the check and deposited the same in his own personal checking account, and then withdrew the funds for his own purposes. The check on which Leonard inserted his own name as payee was not intended for him, and was intended for a creditor of the guardianship.
Basically, the appellant raises the following claimed errors:
The crime of embezzlement as covered by the indictment is found in Burns' Indiana Statutes, Anno., § 10-1704, (1956 Repl.), and the pertinent parts of this section of the statute are as follows:
Appellant contends the State must prove that appellant had possession of the guardian's funds and that the mere possession *364 of a negotiable instrument does not meet this test, and that appellant, therefore, cannot be guilty of embezzlement, and if he is guilty of any crime it must be an offense connected with a negotiable instrument. Here we find that appellant obtained access to the funds by means of the check signed in advance by the guardian. It is true, appellant did not have actual possession of the funds and could not have embezzled the actual funds. However, the law is well established in Indiana that mere access to the item converted is not sufficient to sustain a conviction for embezzlement, but access coupled with the wrongdoer being in a position of trust and confidence has been held to be sufficient. This Court said in Colip v. State (1899), 153 Ind. 584, 55 N.E. 739:
See also Young v. State (1932), 204 Ind. 331, 183 N.E. 100. In Warren v. State (1945), 223 Ind. 552, 62 N.E.2d 624, the appellant was convicted of the larceny of four cans of Prestone. It was alleged he had embezzled the goods rather than having been guilty of larceny. This Court affirmed the conviction saying:
From the above cases it is clear that proof of access in a situation of confidence and trust with an unlawful conversion of the goods by the entrusted party will sustain a conviction of embezzlement. The attorney-client relationship is certainly one of trust and confidence, and in the case at bar the evidence makes it crystal clear that attorney Leonard had the complete confidence of the client-guardian, and that the client-guardian had on numerous occasions entrusted appellant with *365 executed checks with blank payees. The appellant abused that confidence and, therefore, brought himself clearly within the doctrine of Colip v. State, supra, and the succeeding Indiana cases which have sustained this doctrine.
The State of Indiana in the trial of this cause introduced as evidence certain ledger sheets and other written records from the bank where appellant had a checking account. As part of this documentary evidence photo copies of canceled checks drawn on Leonard's account were placed in evidence. At least one of the checks introduced in evidence was signed by the guardian and the appellant had inserted his own name as payee. The appellant now contends that his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution were violated. It is the contention that for the State of Indiana to present in evidence records from appellant's bank violated his guaranteed freedom from illegal search and seizure. He also contends that for the State of Indiana to present photo copies of checks drawn on his account violates his right to freedom from self-incrimination. Appellant takes the mistaken position that the records held by the bank were his records rather than the records of the bank. We must only decide the question of whether the bank lawfully had possession of the records, and appellant does not even contend that all of the documents were not lawfully in the possession of his bank. If the documents were lawfully in the possession of the bank, and they were, then the appellant cannot be held to claim unlawful search and seizure since he did not have possession of the documents. The law in Indiana is well settled that unlawful search and seizure is a personal privilege. Tyler v. State (1931), 202 Ind. 559, 177 N.E. 197; May v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 523, 112 N.E.2d 439. In Minton v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 307, 214 N.E.2d 380, this Court said:
*366 The foregoing rule applies to the question of self-incrimination which appellant seeks to interpose. Appellant cites State v. Pence (1909), 173 Ind. 99, 89 N.E. 488, in which case a druggist was charged with selling whiskey without a license. The State attempted to compel him to produce applications made to him by persons desiring to purchase liquors upon which sales were made by him. The Court held that he could not be compelled to produce these records, and this Court said:
State v. Pence, supra, has one obvious difference from the case at bar, and that is in the Pence case the documents sought by the State of Indiana were in Pence's possession and were his documents, while the appellant Leonard is complaining of documents belonging to the bank, and rightfully and lawfully in the possession of the bank.
In Remmer v. United States (1953), 205 F.2d 277, vacated 74 S. Ct. 450, 347 U.S. 227, 98 L. Ed. 654, rehearing granted 75 S. Ct. 288, 348 U.S. 904, 99 L. Ed. 710, re-affirmed 222 F.2d 720, certiorari granted 76 S. Ct. 63, 350 U.S. 820, 100 L. Ed. 733, the following statement is made:
In United States v. Wernes (1946), 157 F.2d 797, the following statement appears:
See also United States v. White (1944), 322 U.S. 694, 64 S. Ct. 1248, 152 A.L.R. 1202, 88 L. Ed. 1542.
Appellant's rights and privileges under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States were not violated as claimed.
Appellant's last assigned error concerns the method of impanelment of the grand jury. He contends that Burns' Indiana Statutes, Anno., § 4-3304, (1933 Repl.), requires that at one drawing the county clerk is to draw the names of the prospective jurors for both the grand and petit juries. Since this is a mandatory statute, it is appellant's ultimate conclusion that the grand jury was illegally impaneled.
Essentially appellant is attempting to attack the impanelment of the grand jury by stating that they committed error in not selecting the prospective petit jurors, but in no way does he state that the grand jury itself was erroneously selected, nor does he show any bad faih on the part of the jury commissioners. In Rudd v. State (1952), 231 Ind. 105, 107 N.E.2d 168, this Court made the following statement:
*368 In Butler v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 484, 229 N.E.2d 471, this Court stated:
In raising improper compliance with statutes on appeal, this Court has held that the appellant must show how he was prejudiced. In Brown v. State (1964), 245 Ind. 604, 201 N.E.2d 281, this Court said:
See, also, Lennox and Matthews, etc. v. Rozzelle (1952), 231 Ind. 343, 108 N.E.2d 621, and Schwartzkopf v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 201, 204 N.E.2d 342.
*369 The appellant has not shown how the method of impanelment of the grand jury was prejudicial to his rights, nor has he sustained his burden in showing that there was not a substantial compliance with the statute. At most he has only shown that the petit jury was merely impaneled at a later time and has not shown any adverse results of it.
The appellant having raised no valid errors, we affirm.
Arterburn, Hunter, Jackson and Mote, JJ., concur.
NOTE.  Reported in 232 N.E.2d 882.