Title: Graham v. Commonwealth
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 950948
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 1995

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and 
 
     Keenan, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
ANDRE L. GRAHAM, 
A/K/A LUIS A. RIVAS 
 
v.  Record No. 950948 
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
                                      November 3, 1995 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
 
John F. Daffron, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal of a capital murder conviction, we consider 
(1) whether the trial court erred in excluding a prospective 
juror for cause, and (2) whether a defendant can be found guilty 
of capital murder, under Code § 18.2-31(7), when he was the 
"triggerman" in the premeditated killing of one person, but was 
only an accomplice in the killing of the other person as part of 
the same act or transaction. 
 
Among other charges, Andre L. Graham was convicted by a jury 
of the capital murder of Rebecca W. Rosenbluth as part of the 
same act or transaction as the killing of Richard A. Rosenbluth, 
her husband.  Code § 18.2-31(7).  The jury fixed punishment for 
this offense at life imprisonment and a fine of $100,000.  The 
trial court sentenced Graham in accordance with the jury's 
verdict. 
 
The evidence at trial showed that, on November 30, 1993, 
Chesterfield County police discovered the bodies of Richard and 
Rebecca Rosenbluth in their home.  Richard Rosenbluth had been 
shot twice in the head, and Rebecca Rosenbluth had been shot 
three times in the head and once in the neck.  All these gunshot 
wounds were lethal. 
 
 
 
 
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Both of Mr. Rosenbluth's gunshot wounds and two of Mrs. 
Rosenbluth's wounds were inflicted by a handgun linked to 
Graham's co-defendant, Mark Sheppard.
*  About one week prior to 
these murders, Sheppard had accidentally shot his friend, Benji 
Vaughn, using the same handgun.  
 
Mrs. Rosenbluth's other two wounds were inflicted by a .45 
caliber handgun, which the police found in the apartment of 
Priscilla Booker, Graham's girlfriend, immediately after Graham 
had telephoned Booker from the jail instructing her to "get rid 
of it."  Booker testified that Graham had obtained the handgun in 
September 1993. 
 
Other circumstantial evidence linked Graham and Sheppard to 
the Rosenbluth murders.  They were both seen in possession of the 
Rosenbluths' vehicles.  Graham pawned several items of the 
Rosenbluths' jewelry, and the police found Mrs. Rosenbluth's comb 
and brush set in Priscilla Booker's apartment.  
 
At the time of his arrest, Sheppard had in his possession 
Mrs. Rosenbluth's watch and one of Mr. Rosenbluth's company 
credit cards.  When the police searched Sheppard's place of 
residence, they discovered the Rosenbluths' stereo equipment, a 
piece of their luggage, and the license plates to one of their 
 
     
*Sheppard's convictions arising from these events are 
reviewed by this Court in Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. ___, 
___ S.E.2d ___ (1995), decided today. 
 
 
 
 
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vehicles.  In addition, Sheppard's fingerprint was identified on 
a package of razor blades found in the Rosenbluths' home.  
 
The evidence also showed that Graham and Sheppard were 
involved in the business of selling cocaine, and Graham admitted 
to the police that he had made several sales of cocaine to Mr. 
Rosenbluth.  On occasion, Mr. Rosenbluth used credit cards to 
obtain hotel rooms for Graham and received cocaine from him in 
exchange.  Graham told Priscilla Booker that Mr. Rosenbluth owed 
him money. 
 
The Rosenbluths both had ingested cocaine shortly before 
they died.  Traces of cocaine were found in their kitchen and 
den.  Based on the above evidence, the prosecution argued that 
Graham and Sheppard killed the Rosenbluths and stole their 
property to "settle" existing drug debts. 
 
On appeal, Graham first argues that the trial court erred in 
granting the Commonwealth's motion to exclude prospective juror 
James Summers for cause.  He contends that the record shows that 
Summers did not have a fixed view against imposition of the death 
penalty.  Graham asserts that, in striking a juror who had only 
"a general hesitancy" about his ability to consider the death 
penalty, the trial court caused "the prejudicial effect of 
impaneling a jury more prone to impose the death penalty." 
 
In response, the Commonwealth argues that this claim is moot 
because the jury did not impose the death penalty, but fixed 
Graham's punishment at life imprisonment.  We agree with the 
 
 
 
 
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Commonwealth. 
 
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), the Supreme 
Court held that a sentence of death cannot be upheld if the jury 
that imposed or recommended the sentence was chosen by excluding 
members of the venire solely because they expressed general 
objections to capital punishment.  See id. at 522.  The rationale 
underlying this rule is that any such exclusions of potential 
jurors results in a jury that is "death prone."  See id. at 
520-21.  However, prospective jurors may be excused for cause if 
they state that they could never vote to impose the death 
penalty, or that they would refuse even to consider its 
imposition in the case before the court.  Id. at 522 n.21; Morgan 
v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728 (1992). 
 
This Witherspoon inquiry is relevant, however, only when a 
sentence of death has been imposed.  As this Court explained in 
Lewis v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 31, 35, 235 S.E.2d 320, 323 
(1977), "a Witherspoon error affects only the sentence of death 
and not the conviction for which the penalty is imposed."  See 
also Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 545 (1968).  Thus, 
the Witherspoon error alleged here, that the trial court erred in 
excluding prospective juror Summers for cause because he 
expressed a "general hesitancy" about his ability to consider the 
death penalty, is rendered moot by Graham's sentence of life 
imprisonment. 
 
We next consider Graham's argument that the trial court 
 
 
 
 
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erred in instructing the jury that it could find him guilty of 
capital murder if it found that he was the immediate perpetrator 
with respect to one killing, but only an accomplice in the other 
killing.  Graham asserts that the Commonwealth was required to 
prove that he was the immediate perpetrator, the triggerman, in 
both killings.  In support of this argument, Graham relies on 
Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370, 388, 345 S.E.2d 267, 280 
(1986), in which this Court held that, except in the case of 
murder for hire, only the immediate perpetrator of a homicide may 
be convicted of capital murder.  We disagree with the conclusion 
advanced by Graham. 
 
We first note that Graham does not dispute that the evidence 
is sufficient to establish he was an accomplice in the murder of 
Richard Rosenbluth.  Instead, Graham bases his argument on the 
fact there is no evidence that he was the triggerman in that 
murder. 
 
In Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 615, 292 S.E.2d 798 
(1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1228 (1983), this Court explained 
that 
 
Code § 18.2-31, defining capital murder, was first 
enacted by the General Assembly in 1975 as part of a 
statutory scheme enacted to eliminate the "unbridled 
choice between the death penalty and a lesser sentence" 
prohibited by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
  
 
. . . . 
 
 
Subsequent amendments to the murder statutes, including 
those enacted in response to Furman in 1975, have 
changed the substance and the procedure of the 
statutes, but not their evident purpose.  That purpose 
is gradation.  The General Assembly grades murder in 
 
 
 
 
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order to assign punishment consistent with prevailing 
societal and legal views of what is appropriate and 
procedurally fair. 
 
Id. at 635-36, 292 S.E.2d at 810. 
 
The language of Code § 18.2-31(7) evidences a legislative 
determination that the described offense is qualitatively more 
egregious than an isolated act of premeditated murder.  This 
result is accomplished by the addition of a gradation crime to 
the single act of premeditated murder.  Under this subsection, 
the gradation crime is the defendant's killing of more than one 
person as part of the same act or transaction. 
 
Although this Court has not addressed the precise issue that 
Graham raises, we have examined a related issue under Code 
§ 18.2-31(4) and (5), in which the gradation crimes were robbery 
and rape.  In James Dyral Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 563, 
273 S.E.2d 57 (1980), the defendant argued that, to be convicted 
of capital murder during the commission of a robbery or a rape, 
the prosecution was required to prove that he was a principal in 
the first degree to the gradation crimes.  We disagreed, holding 
that 
 
[Code] § 18.2-31 does not require proof that a 
defendant charged with murder during the commission of 
a robbery or a rape was a principal in the first degree 
to the crimes of robbery or rape.  It is only necessary 
that the Commonwealth prove that the defendant was the 
triggerman in the murder and an accomplice in the 
robbery or rape to convict him of capital murder. 
 
Id. at 573, 273 S.E.2d at 63; see also Watkins v. Commonwealth, 
229 Va. 469, 485-86, 331 S.E.2d 422, 434-35 (1985), cert. denied, 
 
 
 
 
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475 U.S. 1099 (1986). 
 
We conclude that this holding is dispositive of the issue 
before us, and that Code § 18.2-31(7) does not require proof that 
a defendant charged with capital murder, in the premeditated 
killing of more than one person as part of the same act or 
transaction, was the triggerman in each murder referenced in the 
indictment.  Rather, this section requires proof only that the 
defendant was the triggerman in the principal murder charged, and 
that he was at least an accomplice in the murder of an additional 
person or persons as part of the same act or transaction. 
 
As stated above, Graham does not dispute that the evidence 
is sufficient to establish he was an accomplice in the murder of 
Richard Rosenbluth.  Further, he does not dispute that the 
evidence is sufficient to establish that he was the triggerman in 
the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of Rebecca 
Rosenbluth.  Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not 
err in its instructions to the jury on the offense charged under 
Code § 18.2-31(7). 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court's 
judgment. 
 
Affirmed.