Title: Lewis v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 64, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 29, 2005

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JIMMIE LEWIS,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 64, 2005 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below - Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN03-06-0175 thru  
§                                    0177 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: July 25, 2005 
Decided: September 29, 2005 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 29th day of September 2005, upon consideration of the 
appellant’s brief filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s 
motion to withdraw, and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court 
that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Jimmie Lewis, was found guilty by a 
Superior Court jury of Carjacking in the Second Degree, Felony Theft and 
Resisting Arrest.  He was sentenced to a total of 8 years incarceration at 
Level V, to be suspended after 6 years for decreasing levels of probation.  
This is Lewis’s direct appeal. 
 
2
 
(2) 
Lewis’s trial counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims 
that could arguably support the appeal; and (b) the Court must conduct its 
own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally 
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without 
an adversary presentation.1 
 
(3) 
Lewis’s counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and complete 
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By 
letter, Lewis’s counsel informed Lewis of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and 
provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the accompanying 
brief and the complete trial transcript.  Lewis also was informed of his right 
to supplement his attorney’s presentation.  Lewis responded with a brief that 
raises ten issues for this Court’s consideration.  The State has responded to 
the position taken by Lewis’s counsel as well as the issues raised by Lewis 
and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
3
 
(4) 
Lewis raises ten issues for this Court’s consideration.  He 
claims that: (a) the evidence presented at trial was inconsistent and, 
therefore, insufficient to support his convictions; (b) the judge should have 
instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of unauthorized use of a 
motor vehicle; (c) the judge permitted the introduction of evidence that was 
unduly prejudicial; (d) the judge engaged in actions that were prejudicial to 
his case; (e) his carjacking and theft convictions violate double jeopardy; (f) 
he was denied his right to counsel; (g) he was denied his right to be tried by 
a jury of his peers; (h) the prosecutor failed to produce the required 
documentation of his habitual offender status; (i) the judge failed to take 
account of his mental status during the trial; and (j) his civil rights were 
violated by prison guards. 
 
(5) 
The evidence presented at trial was as follows.  At around 
12:30 a.m. on May 26, 2003, Patrick Geer was driving his car, a 1997 Ford 
Escort, in the City of Wilmington.  As he drove east on 4th Street towards 
King Street, he saw Jimmie Lewis standing on the corner.  When Geer 
stopped for a red light at the corner, Lewis asked him for a ride “up the hill,” 
which Geer took to mean Meetinghouse Hill.   Geer told Lewis he wasn’t 
going in that direction.  Nevertheless, Lewis opened the door on the 
 
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passenger side of the car and got in.  Geer decided to do what Lewis asked 
and made a U-turn on 4th Street to go back up the hill.   
 
(6) 
As they were driving, Lewis told Geer that he needed money 
and wanted the money in Geer’s wallet.  As they drove over the hill, Lewis 
told Geer to pull over and grabbed the steering wheel.  Geer drove under the 
I-95 overpass towards the gas station at the Adams Four Shopping Center 
and stopped.  Lewis started to fumble through his left pocket.  Thinking 
Lewis might be armed, Geer got out and tried to flag down passing cars.  He 
walked down the street towards the gas station, while Lewis continued to 
drive the car up 4th Street.  At the gas station, Geer told the attendant to call 
911.  As Geer waited for the police to arrive, Lewis pulled up in the car, 
moved over to the passenger side, shouted something to Geer and then 
pulled away.  The Wilmington police later took a statement from Geer at the 
gas station.   
 
(7) 
The next morning, Officer Jose Santana, who was on routine 
patrol with his partner, Officer Godwin, located Geer’s car at Harrison and 
Reed Streets, a few blocks from the gas station.  They observed Lewis 
getting out of the car and turned back around.  As they approached the car, 
they observed that Lewis was in the driver’s seat attempting to leave.  As the 
officers got out of their police vehicle, Lewis put the car keys in his pocket 
 
5
and locked the driver’s side door.  As Lewis reached over to lock the 
passenger side door, Officer Santana grabbed the door and held it open.  The 
officers then forcibly removed Lewis from the car and handcuffed him.     
 
(8) 
Lewis, who testified on his own behalf, had a different version 
of the events leading up to his arrest.  According to Lewis, he was traveling 
by train from Newark, New Jersey to North Carolina on the date of the 
incident.  Prior to the Wilmington stop he became aware that his carry-on 
baggage was missing, so he got off at the Wilmington stop.  He walked to 4th 
Street in search of a cab to go to a friend’s house.  At 4th Street, Geer 
stopped and asked him if he wanted a ride.  Lewis said yes, believing that 
Geer was driving a “gypsy cab.”   
 
(9) 
As they were driving, Geer reached over and grabbed Lewis 
between his legs, saying that he was interested in having sex.  Lewis refused.  
Geer told Lewis he would pay him $100 to find someone who would be 
interested in having sex.  Lewis drove off, leaving Geer at the gas station.  
He soon returned because he was not familiar with Wilmington, but Geer 
insisted that he continue his search.  When Lewis finally returned to the gas 
station, Geer was gone.  He waited twenty minutes and then decided to park 
the car.  Lewis stayed with the car the rest of the night until the police woke 
 
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him the next morning.  As he was raising his hands at the direction of the 
police, he accidentally hit the lock button of the door with his elbow. 
 
(10) Lewis’ first claim is that the evidence presented at trial was 
inconsistent and, therefore, insufficient to support his convictions.  In 
reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, this Court must 
determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.2  In so doing, we make no distinction 
between direct and circumstantial evidence.3  Moreover, it is for the jury to 
weigh the relative credibility of the witnesses and reconcile any conflicting 
testimony.4  Our review of the record in this case does not support Lewis’s 
claim.  There clearly was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support 
Lewis’s convictions of Carjacking in the Second Degree,5 Felony Theft6 and 
Resisting Arrest.7 
                                                 
2 Barnett v. State, 691 A.2d 614, 618 (Del. 1997). 
3 Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Del. 1990). 
4 Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1363 (Del. 1992). 
5 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 835(a) (“A person is guilty of carjacking in the second degree 
when that person knowingly and unlawfully takes possession or control of a motor 
vehicle from another person . . . by coercion, duress or otherwise without the permission 
of the other person.”). 
6 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 841(a) (“A person is guilty of theft when the person takes, 
exercises control over or obtains property of another person intending to deprive that 
person of it or appropriate it.”). 
7 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1257 (“A person is guilty of resisting arrest when the person 
intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a peace officer from effecting an arrest or 
detention of the person . . . .”). 
 
7
 
(11) Lewis claims that the judge committed error in his evidentiary 
rulings, by engaging in actions that were prejudicial to his case and by 
failing to instruct the jury on the charge of unauthorized use of a motor 
vehicle.  We have reviewed the transcript of the trial and can find no 
erroneous evidentiary rulings by the judge.  Nor can we discern any actions 
on the part of the judge that resulted in prejudice to Lewis’s case.  Finally, 
the transcript does not reflect any request for an instruction on unauthorized 
use of a motor vehicle.  In fact, such an instruction would have been 
completely inconsistent with Lewis’s testimony, which was that Geer had 
given him permission to drive his car.  As such, we find no error or abuse of 
discretion on the part of the Superior Court in failing to give an instruction 
on unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.  
 
(12) Lewis claims that his convictions of Carjacking in the Second 
Degree and Felony Theft violate double jeopardy because they prohibit the 
same conduct.  However, the fact that two criminal statutes may be 
construed to prohibit the same conduct does not mean that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause precludes the imposition, in a single trial, of cumulative 
punishments pursuant to those statutes.8  This Court has expressly 
recognized that, where the intent of the legislature to impose cumulative 
                                                 
8 Cook v. State, 600 A.2d 352, 355 (Del. 1991). 
 
8
sentences is clear, multiple punishments are not constitutionally barred.9  
The Delaware carjacking statute expressly states that “[n]othing in this 
section shall be deemed to preclude prosecution under any other provision of 
this Code.”10  Lewis’s consecutive sentences for Carjacking and Felony 
Theft are, thus, permissible, since the legislature clearly has provided for 
such multiple punishments.11  We, therefore, find Lewis’s double jeopardy 
claim to be without merit.  
 
(13) Lewis next claims that he was denied his right to counsel.  The 
record reflects that the judge denied Lewis’s pretrial request to discharge his 
public defender and have another one appointed.  It is well-settled that the 
right to counsel does not entail an absolute right to counsel of one’s choice.12  
We find no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the judge in denying 
Lewis’s request for new counsel and no merit to this claim. 
 
(14) Lewis’s next claim is that he was denied his right to be tried by 
a jury of his peers.  The basis for this claim is that most of the jurors were 
older than he and came from social and ethnic backgrounds different from 
his.  Lewis does not articulate why he believes the jury did not render a fair 
and impartial verdict based upon the evidence presented at trial, which is 
                                                 
9 LeCompte v. State, 516 A.2d 898, 901 (Del. 1986). 
10 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 835(d). 
11 LeCompte v. State, 516 A.2d at 901. 
12 In re Kennedy, 472 A.2d 1317, 1331 (Del. 1984). 
 
9
essential to his claim.13  In the absence of any facts supporting this claim, we 
find it to be without merit. 
 
(15) Lewis claims that the prosecutor improperly failed to produce 
documentation of his habitual offender status.  There is no factual basis for 
this claim, since the record reflects that the prosecutor initially filed a motion 
to have Lewis declared a habitual offender, with supporting documentation, 
but ultimately did not pursue that motion.  Information concerning Lewis’s 
prior criminal activity was contained in the presentence report, which was 
available to the judge in imposing sentence.  When a sentence is within the 
statutory limits, this Court will not find an abuse of discretion unless it is 
clear that the sentencing judge relied on impermissible factors or exhibited a 
closed mind.14  In the absence of any evidence that the judge either relied on 
impermissible factors or exhibited a closed mind in imposing sentence, we 
find no abuse of discretion on the part of the sentencing judge. 
 
(16) Lewis claims that the judge did not take proper account of his 
mental status for purposes of trial, including continuing the trial so that he 
could be evaluated and considering his mental condition as a mitigating 
factor in sentencing.  The record reflects that, on the morning of trial, Lewis 
claimed to be having a psychotic episode because he had forgotten to take 
                                                 
13 Banther v. State, 823 A.2d 467, 481 (Del. 2003). 
14 Weston v. State, 832 A.2d 742, 746 (Del. 2003). 
 
10
his medicine.  Defense counsel reported to the judge that Lewis had never 
mentioned mental health problems in any of their five pretrial interviews.  
The judge questioned Lewis directly about his mental health status and 
ordered trial to proceed pending the receipt of information from the prison.  
Defense counsel reported to the judge that Lewis had been prescribed two 
medications while in prison, one of which he refused to take, and that he 
originally had been placed in the “mental health pod,” but was now housed 
with the general population.   
 
(17) The record further reflects that, following the trial and prior to 
sentencing, the Superior Court ordered Lewis transferred to the Delaware 
Psychiatric Center for further evaluation.  The primary diagnosis in the 
report was that Lewis was malingering---that is, intentionally exaggerating 
his physical and psychological symptoms in order to avoid being sentenced 
to prison.  The record simply does not support Lewis’s claim that the 
Superior Court failed to take account of his mental health status.  To the 
contrary, the judge appropriately dealt with Lewis’s claims. 
 
(18)  Lewis’s final complaint deals with treatment he allegedly 
received at the hands of prison guards during the course of the trial.  The 
record does not reflect any factual basis for Lewis’s claims of mistreatment 
 
11
by guards.  To the extent Lewis complains that his civil rights have been 
violated, his remedy is a separate civil action, not an appeal in this Court.   
 
(19) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Lewis’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Lewis’s counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and has properly determined that 
Lewis could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice