Title: State v. Ryce
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 111698
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: February 26, 2016

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 111,698 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DAVID LEE RYCE, 
Appellee. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
If an individual operates or attempts to operate a vehicle in Kansas, K.S.A. 2014 
Supp. 8-1001 implies the individual's consent to the testing of blood, breath, urine, or 
other bodily substances for alcohol content in certain circumstances. The statute also 
establishes a procedure for obtaining the express consent of the individual, in which case 
the testing is the product of the consent exception to the warrant requirement imposed by 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 15 of the Kansas 
Constitution Bill of Rights. If the individual expressly refuses to submit to testing, the 
refusal equates to a withdrawal of implied consent.  
 
2. 
Even in light of the implied consent exception of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1001, an 
individual who operates or attempts to operate a vehicle in Kansas possesses a personal 
and deeply rooted expectation of privacy in his or her blood, breath, urine, and other 
bodily substances. This expectation of privacy is protected by the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.  
 
 
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3. 
The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures but only those 
that are unreasonable. In a criminal context, searches conducted without a warrant are per 
se unreasonable unless a specifically established and well-delineated exception to the 
warrant requirement applies. This warrant requirement espouses a marked preference for 
searches authorized by detached and neutral magistrates to ensure that searches are not 
the random or arbitrary acts of government agents but rather intrusions authorized by law 
and narrowly limited in objective and scope. Consequently, police must, whenever 
practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant 
procedure. 
 
4. 
When a statute is challenged for violating the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, 
being facially unconstitutional—that is, unconstitutional under any circumstances, not 
just the circumstances that apply to a particular case—a court considers only applications 
of the statute in which it actually authorizes or prohibits conduct. The proper focus of the 
constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for 
whom the law is irrelevant.  
 
5. 
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025 makes it a crime to refuse to submit to or complete a 
test or tests deemed consented to under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1001(a). In other words, it 
makes it a crime to withdraw the implied consent that arises under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-
1001 by expressly refusing the test. Consequently, a court considering a facial challenge 
to K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025 must recognize that consent is a valid exception to the 
warrant requirement and consider only the constitutionality of punishing an individual for 
 
3 
 
 
 
withdrawing consent to search, not for refusing to submit to a test authorized under a 
warrant exception other than consent.  
 
6. 
When the State seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, it 
has the burden of proving that consent was freely and voluntarily given. To be free and 
voluntary, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
require that consent not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or 
covert force. The determination of whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary or 
was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be 
determined from the totality of all the circumstances, and knowledge of the right to refuse 
consent is one factor to be taken into account. 
 
7. 
As a corollary of the requirement that consent to a search must be voluntary, 
consent may be revoked or withdrawn at any time before the search has been completed. 
Thus, Fourth Amendment principles recognize that consent implied through K.S.A. 2014 
Supp. 8-1001 can be withdrawn.  
 
8. 
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits a state from 
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. Freedom from 
physical restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause from arbitrary governmental action, and K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025(b) imposes 
restraints on freedom because it sets out graduated sentencing severity levels for refusing 
to submit to a test and all levels require some term of imprisonment.  
 
 
4 
 
 
 
9. 
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025 punishes an individual for withdrawing his or her 
consent to a search even though the right to withdraw consent is a corollary to the 
constitutional requirement that consent be free and voluntary. Thus, K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-
1025 violates the fundamental right to be free from an unreasonable search. Because a 
fundamental right is involved, the strict scrutiny standard applies to a due process 
analysis. 
 
10. 
Under the strict scrutiny test, the State may prevail even when significantly 
encroaching upon personal liberty if it can show a subordinating interest which is 
compelling and that the infringement on a fundamental liberty interest is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest.  
 
11. 
The State has compelling interests it seeks to protect through K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 
8-1025. Those interests can be categorized as:  (1) criminal justice interests—deterring 
test refusals, deterring recidivism, holding offenders accountable, and reducing the 
difficulties in prosecution and potential evasion of prosecution altogether; 
(2) encouraging public safety; and (3) protecting the safety of those who deal with the 
suspect and perform the test.  
 
12. 
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025 is not narrowly tailored to serve the State's interests, 
and it is facially unconstitutional.  
 
 
5 
 
 
 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; GREGORY L. WALLER, judge. Opinion filed February 26, 
2016. Affirmed. 
 
Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district 
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellant.  
 
Patrick H. Dunn, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
LUCKERT, J.:  The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 15 
of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights protect against unreasonable searches, which in 
the criminal context means a search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant or a well-
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. One of these well-recognized 
exceptions—the consent exception—arises when an individual voluntarily agrees to 
allow a search. Courts have generally recognized a search based on consent cannot 
proceed once a suspect's consent is withdrawn because, at that point, the search would no 
longer be voluntary. See State v. Johnson, 297 Kan. 210, Syl. ¶ 8, 301 P.3d 287 (2013); 
State v. Edgar, 296 Kan. 513, 527, 294 P.3d 251 (2013). 
 
Premised on this consent exception, Kansas has established a mechanism for the 
warrantless search of a driving under the influence (DUI) suspect's blood, breath, urine, 
or other bodily substances to determine the alcohol content. Specifically, under K.S.A. 
2014 Supp. 8-1001, an individual has, by operating or attempting to operate a vehicle in 
Kansas, provided implied consent to alcohol or drug testing. This appeal raises a 
threshold question of whether the general rule regarding the withdrawal of consent 
applies when a driver impliedly consents to testing under 8-1001(a) in exchange for 
 
6 
 
 
 
driving privileges but then refuses to expressly consent to testing when requested by a 
law enforcement officer. In other words, is implied consent irrevocable?  
 
We hold the general rule allowing an express withdrawal of consent applies to 
DUI testing under 8-1001:  Once a suspect withdraws consent, whether it be express 
consent or implied under 8-1001(a), a search based on that consent cannot proceed. But 
this is only a preliminary question in this appeal. The ultimate question is whether, when 
a driver exercises the constitutional right to withdraw consent, Kansas may criminally 
punish the individual for this choice under the criminal refusal statute, K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 
8-1025. We conclude it cannot. Applying the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, we recognize Kansas has compelling 
interests in combating drunk driving and prosecuting DUI offenders. Nevertheless, by 
criminally punishing a driver's withdrawal of consent, 8-1025 infringes on fundamental 
rights arising under the Fourth Amendment. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025, therefore, must 
withstand strict scrutiny by being narrowly tailored to serve the State's interests. We hold 
that K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025 does not meet this test and is facially unconstitutional. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On December 9, 2012, a Sedgwick County sheriff's deputy observed a man, later 
identified as David Lee Ryce, driving a car down a street in reverse. The deputy 
momentarily lost sight of Ryce but then saw Ryce pull out of a nearby parking lot and 
drive on the left side of the street. The deputy executed a traffic stop and, upon making 
contact with Ryce, noticed a strong odor of alcohol and Ryce's bloodshot and watery 
eyes. Ryce admitted to the deputy he had enjoyed "a few drinks," and the deputy noted 
Ryce's slow, lethargic, and slurred speech. Ryce told the deputy he did not have his 
driver's license. 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
The deputy administered field sobriety tests. Ryce complied but demonstrated 
impairment throughout the tests. The deputy also learned Ryce's car registration did not 
match its tag and that Ryce's driver's license was suspended. The deputy arrested Ryce 
and transported him to the county jail. 
 
At the jail, the deputy gave Ryce the written and oral notice required under 
Kansas' implied consent law, specifically the notice defined in K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-
1001(k), and asked Ryce to submit to a breath test to determine the presence of alcohol. 
The notice informed Ryce, among other things, that a refusal to submit to testing could 
result in administrative proceedings to suspend Ryce's driver's license and could also 
result in criminal charges. Despite these warnings, Ryce refused to submit to a breath 
test, and no testing occurred.  
 
The State charged Ryce, who had four prior DUI convictions, with the nonperson 
felony of refusing to submit to testing for the presence of alcohol or drugs, in violation of 
8-1025(a). In addition, the State charged Ryce with three misdemeanors:  driving while 
suspended, driving without a tag, and improper backing. 
 
Ryce moved to dismiss the test refusal charge on the grounds that 8-1025 
unconstitutionally punished the exercise of his right to withdraw consent to a warrantless 
search—a right he argues arises under the Fourth Amendment and § 15 of the Kansas 
Constitution Bill of Rights. He also cited the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court ruled, after a hearing, 
that while a defendant had no right to refuse to submit to a chemical test for alcohol, it 
was nonetheless unconstitutional to criminalize this refusal. The district court accordingly 
 
8 
 
 
 
dismissed the 8-1025 charge and granted the State's motion to dismiss the remaining 
counts without prejudice. 
 
The State appealed the district court's ruling, filing its appeal with this court under 
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3601(b)(1) and K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3602(b)(1) (permitting an 
appeal directly to this court from the district court for cases in which a Kansas statute has 
been held unconstitutional). We conducted oral argument in Ryce's appeal on the same 
day we heard three other appeals relating to the constitutionality of 8-1025:  State v. 
Wilson, No. 112,009, State v. Nece, 111,401, and State v. Wycoff, No. 110,393, all of 
which are being decided this day.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, the State argues it did not violate Ryce's Fourth Amendment rights 
because the implied consent procedures set out in chapter 8, article 10 of the Kansas 
Statutes Annotated—primarily those in K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1001—remove, or at least 
reduce, any privacy expectation in one's blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances 
when circumstances exist that permit testing under the statute. The State also argues this 
court has repeatedly determined that the implied consent procedure creates a 
constitutionally valid alternative to a search warrant under either the Fourth Amendment 
or § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. Because 8-1001 provides that every 
driver has given implied consent, and because consent constitutes a valid warrant 
exception, the State reasons that 8-1025 merely punishes a driver for not cooperating with 
a test the driver already consented to by driving on Kansas roads in a way that established 
probable cause to suspect the driver of a DUI offense. In essence, according to the State, 
8-1025 merely punishes a driver for obstructing a law enforcement officer in the exercise 
of official duty. The State argues it may also constitutionally punish a DUI suspect who 
 
9 
 
 
 
does not submit to testing because, in addition to the consent exception, the search could 
be justified under several other well-delineated exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant requirement. Succinctly put, the State argues Ryce had no constitutional right to 
refuse to submit to the test. 
 
In reply, Ryce asserts 8-1025 is facially unconstitutional, meaning unconstitutional 
in all circumstances and not just in how it was applied to him. He reasserts the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendment arguments he made before the district court. In addition, for the 
first time on appeal, he argues that 8-1025:  (1) violates his right to be protected from 
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 10 
of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights and (2) implicates the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions. 
 
We focus our analysis on the original argument Ryce made in the district court—
specifically, whether 8-1025 facially violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. In 
addressing this argument, we structure our analysis with the following elemental 
questions:  (1) What does the language of 8-1025 and the statute it incorporates, 8-1001, 
provide? (2) Does the Fourth Amendment apply to the tests contemplated by 8-1025 and 
8-1001 and, if so, what are the overarching Fourth Amendment principles that guide our 
analysis? (3) What is the test to be applied to Ryce's facial challenge of 8-1025? (4) How 
do past cases upholding nonconsensual searches impact our analysis? (5) Does statutory 
consent in Kansas provide irrevocable consent? and (6) If a person has the right to 
withdraw consent, do the United States and Kansas Constitutions prevent the State from 
criminally punishing a person for doing so?  
 
By answering these elemental questions, we can resolve the ultimate issue Ryce 
presented to the district court regarding the facial constitutionality of 8-1025. This 
 
10 
 
 
 
ultimate issue presents a question of law subject to unlimited review. State v. Soto, 299 
Kan. 102, 121, 322 P.3d 334 (2014).  
Our unlimited review of this question of law is subject to the rules of statutory 
interpretation. In this case, we must interpret two statutes. First, because Ryce challenges 
8-1025, we must apply and interpret it. Second, because 8-1025 references and 
essentially stands on the shoulders of the implied consent provision, we must apply and 
interpret 8-1001. In interpreting both statutes, we ascertain legislative intent by looking to 
these statutes' plain language, giving common words their ordinary meaning. If the plain 
language is unambiguous, we, like all Kansas courts, ordinarily do "not speculate as to 
the legislative intent behind it and will not read into the statute something not readily 
found in it.' Cady v. Schroll, 298 Kan. 731, 738-39, 317 P.3d 90 (2014)." University of 
Kan. Hosp. Auth. v. Board of Comm'rs of Unified Gov't, 301 Kan. 993, 998-99, 348 P.3d 
602 (2015). 
 
In addition, we presume 8-1025's constitutionality and resolve any doubts in favor 
of its validity. "[I]f there is any reasonable construction [of 8-1025] that will maintain the 
legislature's apparent intent" and render the statute constitutional, we will adopt it. Soto, 
299 Kan. at 121 (citing State v. Gaona, 293 Kan. 930, 935, 270 P.3d 1165 [2012]); see 
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381, 125 S. Ct. 716, 160 L. Ed. 2d 734 (2005) (principle 
of constitutional avoidance is "tool for choosing between competing plausible 
interpretations of a statutory text" to avoid decision of constitutional questions). 
 
With these rules of statutory interpretation in mind, we begin our analysis with the 
statutory language of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025 and K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1001.  
 
 
11 
 
 
 
1. What does the language of 8-1025 and 8-1001 provide?  
 
The legislature concisely worded the prohibitory language in K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 
8-1025. The crime of test refusal is specific, occurring when a person refuses "to submit 
to or complete a test or tests deemed consented to under subsection (a) of K.S.A. 8-1001." 
(Emphasis added.) This criminal refusal statute only applies if the DUI suspect has 
previously refused DUI testing under 8-1001 or has been previously convicted of a DUI 
offense. Upon conviction under 8-1025, graduated penalties apply. A first or second 
offense is a nonperson misdemeanor and requires imprisonment for at least 48 hours 
followed by probation or additional jail time. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025(b)(1)(A). Third 
and subsequent offenses are classified as nonperson felonies, and a conviction results in 
mandatory imprisonment. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025(b)(1)(D). These penalties are equal 
to or greater than the penalties imposed for a DUI conviction. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-
1001(k)(4). 
 
The phrase "deemed consented to" in 8-1025 echoes the language of the 
referenced provision, 8-1001(a). That provision provides, in part:   
 
"Any person who operates or attempts to operate a vehicle within this state is 
deemed to have given consent, subject to the provisions of this article [10 of chapter 8 of 
the Kansas statutes], to submit to one or more tests of the person's blood, breath, urine or 
other bodily substance to determine the presence of alcohol or drugs." (Emphasis added.) 
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1001(a).  
 
"Deemed" consent, as used in 8-1025 and 8-1001, equates to the "implied" consent to 
testing given by a person who operates or attempts to operate a vehicle in Kansas—
someone we will simply refer to as a "driver." See Johnson, 297 Kan. at 222. 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
These provisions seem straightforward enough—8-1025 penalizes drivers who 
refuse to submit to a test that they have impliedly consented to under 8-1001. But the 
statutory scheme quickly becomes more complex—as stated in 8-1001, a driver is 
deemed to have given consent to submit to testing "subject to the provisions" of article 10 
of chapter 8 of the Kansas statutes. These provisions limit the circumstances under which 
"[a] law enforcement officer shall request a person to submit to a test or tests deemed 
consented to under subsection (a)." K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1001(b). Among the 
restrictions, 8-1001(k) requires an officer to give a driver a written and oral advisory 
before testing. The notice must include, among other things, an explanation that the 
driver will face certain consequences if he or she refuses to submit to the testing, 
including the potential loss of driving privileges, the admission of the refusal into 
evidence, and criminal charges.  
 
The statute contemplates two responses once a law enforcement officer has read 
the advisory. First, the driver can submit to the testing. Our caselaw has explained that a 
test taken after the driver receives the advisory required by 8-1001(k) "is the product of 
the consent exception to the warrant requirement." Johnson, 297 Kan. 210, Syl. ¶ 8. In 
other words, agreeing to submit to testing reaffirms the implied consent and conveys 
actual, express consent. Second, the driver can do as Ryce did and refuse to submit to the 
testing and face potential civil and criminal consequences. We have equated an express 
refusal with a withdrawal of implied consent. E.g., State v. Garner, 227 Kan. 566, 572, 
608 P.2d 1321 (1980).  
 
If a driver refuses to submit to testing, thereby withdrawing any implied consent, 
8-1001 envisions two outcomes. In some instances, no testing will occur. Even without 
testing, a refusal carries consequences because evidence of the driver's refusal is 
admissible at a DUI trial, administrative proceedings may result in a revocation of the 
 
13 
 
 
 
suspect's driver's license, and the State may file a criminal complaint charging the suspect 
with a crime under 8-1025. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1001(k)(4), (k)(5), (k)(7); K.S.A. 2014 
Supp. 8-1002(c). In other instances, 8-1001 permits testing over a driver's express refusal. 
Compelled testing can occur if the driver committed a traffic offense and was involved in 
an accident or collision resulting in serious injury or death. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-
1001(b)(2), (d); but see State v. Declerck, 49 Kan. App. 2d 908, 317 P.3d 794, rev. 
denied, 299 Kan. 1271 (2014) (holding 8-1001[b][2], [d] unconstitutional to the extent it 
allows a search after a traffic infraction combined with an accident resulting in injury or 
death, if there is no probable cause that drugs or alcohol were involved). 
 
In addition, the statute permits testing in one instance where the driver neither 
expressly consents nor expressly refuses. That circumstance is limited to situations where 
the driver:  (1) is "medically unable to consent," (2) has committed a traffic offense, and 
(3) was involved in a serious injury or fatal accident. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1001(b)(2), 
(d), (h); but see State v. Dawes, No. 111,310, 2015 WL 5036690 (Kan. App. 2015) 
(unpublished opinion) (holding K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 8-1001[a] and [b][2] unconstitutional 
as applied to unconscious drivers). 
 
We are not concerned in this appeal with compelled testing for drivers who are 
medically unable to consent or for drivers who otherwise are tested without their express 
consent. Rather, we must judge the facial constitutionality of 8-1025 and its punishment 
for refusal to submit to testing—that is, the driver's express withdrawal of consent—in 
light of Ryce's argument that he was exercising a constitutional right under the Fourth 
Amendment by revoking his consent. Because Ryce's claim rests on the Fourth 
Amendment, as a threshold matter we must consider whether the Fourth Amendment 
applies and, if so, what overarching principles control our analysis. 
 
 
14 
 
 
 
2. Does the Fourth Amendment apply and, if so, what are the overarching Fourth 
Amendment principles that guide our analysis? 
 
The Fourth Amendment provides:  "The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . ." U.S. Const. 
amend. IV. "The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal 
privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State." Schmerber v. California, 
384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966); see also Union Pacific 
Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251, 11 S. Ct. 1000, 35 L. Ed. 734 (1891) ("No 
right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right 
of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint 
or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."). 
 
The Fourth Amendment's right to privacy, and thus the rule against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, is enforceable against the states and must be upheld by federal and 
state courts alike. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650-53, 655-67, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 
6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961) (reaffirming that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporates Fourth Amendment rights, including the rule excluding 
evidence that was obtained through an unreasonable search or seizure). Additionally, § 15 
of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights is nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment and 
offers the same protections. State v. Williams, 297 Kan. 370, 376, 300 P.3d 1072 (2013). 
Thus, while we focus our analysis on the Fourth Amendment, the same applies to § 15. 
 
2.1. Does the Fourth Amendment apply? 
 
Preliminarily, the State argues we should not consider Ryce's Fourth Amendment 
arguments because the breath test requested by the officer would not have breached the 
 
15 
 
 
 
type of privacy protected by the Constitution and, therefore, would not be considered a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The State acknowledges that past 
decisions have recognized breath tests are indeed searches under the Fourth Amendment 
but argues these cases fail to consider that every driver in Kansas agrees to the search 
because of operation of 8-1001(a). In other words, the State contends that blanket implied 
consent, which every driver gives in exchange for the privilege of operating or attempting 
to operate a vehicle in Kansas, eviscerates any expectation of privacy in one's bodily 
substances and fluids. The State secondarily argues this reduced privacy expectation 
weighs in its favor when the reasonableness of the search is evaluated.  
 
Certainly, Fourth Amendment protections from governmental searches or seizures 
are limited to "expectation[s] of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable." 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984). 
Applying that standard, the United States Supreme Court has provided us an answer to 
the arguments posed by the State—which is that, regardless of implied consent laws, 
individuals have an expectation of privacy in bodily substances and fluids, and a breath 
test remains a search under the Fourth Amendment.  
 
Most recently, in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, ___,133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558, 
185 L. Ed. 2nd 696 (2013) (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 
84 L. Ed. 2d 662 [1985]), the Supreme Court held that the "invasion of bodily integrity" 
necessary to conduct a blood test for the purpose of collecting evidence of intoxication 
"implicates an individual's 'most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy'" and 
is most certainly a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. At the same 
time, the Court recognized that "all 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that 
require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent 
to BAC [blood alcohol content] testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on 
 
16 
 
 
 
suspicion of a drunk-driving offense." 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1566. Yet the Court 
still firmly held a Fourth Amendment privacy interest arose; contrary to the State's 
argument, these drivers had a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in their bodily 
integrity. Although speaking of a blood test, the McNeely Court approvingly cited its 
prior opinion in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 616-17, 626, 
109 S. Ct. 1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989), which discussed other types of BAC tests. 
 
In Skinner, the Supreme Court initially had concluded that a blood test, with its 
"physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." 489 U.S. at 616 (citing Schmerber, 384 
U.S. at 767-68). Turning to breath tests, like the one Ryce refused to take, the Court had 
stated:   
 
"Much the same is true of the breath-testing procedures required under Subpart D of the 
regulations. Subjecting a person to a breathalyzer test, which generally requires the 
production of alveolar or 'deep lung' breath for chemical analysis [citations omitted] 
implicates similar concerns about bodily integrity and, like the blood-alcohol test we 
considered in Schmerber, should also be deemed a search." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-17.  
 
Finally, the Skinner Court had noted that urine tests "can reveal a host of private medical 
facts" and "may in some cases involve visual or aural monitoring of the act of urination." 
Given those circumstances, "'[t]here are few activities in our society more personal or 
private than the passing of urine.'" 489 U.S. at 617 (quoting National Treasury 
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 [5th Cir. 1987]). 
 
By citing Skinner, the McNeely court acknowledged this analysis. Nevertheless, in 
McNeely, after citing Skinner, the Supreme Court observed that it had also stated "that 
people are 'accorded less privacy in . . . automobiles because of th[e] compelling 
 
17 
 
 
 
governmental need for regulation,' California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392, 105 S. Ct. 
2066, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1985)." McNeely, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1565. Despite 
reduced privacy expectations and abundant regulation of automobiles, the Court observed 
that it had "never retreated . . . from our recognition that any compelled intrusion into the 
human body implicates significant, constitutionally protected privacy interests." 569 U.S. 
at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1565.  
 
Likewise, this court has repeatedly held that the tests authorized by 8-1001 
constitute searches subject to Fourth Amendment protections. For example, State v. 
Murry, 271 Kan. 223, 226, 21 P.3d 528 (2001), states:  "Despite statutory language [in 8-
1001] authorizing the taking of the blood sample, any such bodily invasion must still be 
constitutionally sound. The Fourth Amendment is implicated when blood samples are 
drawn from the body." (Emphasis added.) The same rule applies to the type of breath test 
at issue in this case. See State v. Jones, 279 Kan. 71, 76, 106 P.3d 1 (2005) (discussing 
K.S.A. 8-1012 and holding that extracting deep lung breath for chemical analysis is a 
search subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment).  
 
Consequently, we reject the State's argument that a breath test would not have 
been a search:  The implied consent provision of 8-1001 does not mean Ryce, by taking 
the wheel of a vehicle after drinking, lost his reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
bodily integrity. Nor, as our discussion of McNeely illustrates, do we find a general 
reduced privacy expectation because Kansas adopted an implied consent law. In other 
words, the Fourth Amendment provides constitutional protections for Ryce's "'most 
personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy'" that attach to alcohol testing 
procedures. McNeely, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 (quoting Winston, 470 U.S. at 
760). Despite the implied consent in 8-1001, a breath, blood, or urine test is still a search.  
 
 
18 
 
 
 
That said, we still have a lingering Fourth Amendment concern:  The text of the 
Fourth Amendment protects us from "searches and seizures," but Ryce does not complain 
of his seizure and no search occurred after Ryce refused to submit to testing. Ultimately, 
this case turns on the classification of the action punished by 8-1025—whether 8-1025 
punishes a constitutionally protected act, as Ryce argues, or an unprotected act, as the 
State argues. As a result, and as we will more fully discuss, we base our ultimate 
conclusion regarding the constitutionality of 8-1025 on a violation of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its protection of fundamental rights (like 
Fourth Amendment rights) against governmental interference. See County of Sacramento 
v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 140 L. Ed. 2d 1043 (1998).  
 
Nevertheless, because Ryce claims the Fourth Amendment as the source for the 
fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause, even though no search occurred, 
we start with the Fourth Amendment. We must consider whether the Fourth Amendment 
permitted the State to declare that Ryce could not legally withdraw his implied consent.  
 
2.2. What overarching Fourth Amendment principles guide our analysis? 
 
"[T]he Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but only 
those that are unreasonable." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619. In other words, "[t]he ultimate 
standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." Cady v. Dombrowski, 
413 U.S. 433, 439, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973). In defining the Fourth 
Amendment's touchstone of reasonableness in a criminal context, the United States 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that searches conducted without a warrant "'"are per 
se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions."'" Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452, 192 L. Ed. 
2d 435 (2015) (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 
 
19 
 
 
 
2d 485 [2009]; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 
[1967]); see State v. Johnson, 297 Kan. 210, 223, 301 P.3d 287 (2013); State v. Sanchez-
Loredo, 294 Kan. 50, 55, 272 P.3d 34 (2012).  
 
This "warrant requirement" espouses a marked preference for searches authorized 
by detached and neutral magistrates to ensure that searches "are not the random or 
arbitrary acts of government agents," but rather intrusions "authorized by law" and 
"narrowly limited" in objective and scope. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621-22. Consequently, 
"police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and 
seizures through the warrant procedure." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 
L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).  
 
As we touched on before, one of the established and well-delineated exceptions to 
the warrant requirement is an individual's consent to a search. See Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973); Johnson, 297 
Kan. at 223. Other exceptions include "search incident to a lawful arrest; stop and frisk; 
probable cause plus exigent circumstances; the emergency doctrine; inventory searches; 
plain view or feel; and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses." Johnson, 
297 Kan. at 223. None of these exceptions rests solely on probable cause, although most 
require probable cause plus other circumstances for a warrant exception to apply. See 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 ("Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful 
'notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause.'"). 
 
The State relies on many of the warrant exceptions to argue that Ryce had no 
constitutional right to refuse the deputy's request that Ryce submit to testing. According 
to the State, beyond consent, one of the other exceptions can provide a constitutional and 
categorical basis to search DUI suspects. Thus, according to the State, even if Ryce 
 
20 
 
 
 
successfully argues he had a right to withdraw his consent he cannot meet his burden of 
establishing the facial unconstitutionality of 8-1025.  
 
The State's arguments about the application of other exceptions gives us pause 
because the plain language of 8-1025 provides a specific penalty limited to the refusal to 
submit to a search "deemed consented to." Indeed, to administer a test "deemed 
consented to," an officer must take specific steps, such as providing the person with oral 
and written notices of a variety of rights and consequences. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-
1001(k). If an officer relied on something else to search, i.e., a warrant or a warrant 
exception other than consent, then the withdrawal of consent—or even the presence of 
express consent—would be irrelevant to the authority to perform the test. As it stands, the 
United States Supreme Court has recently provided a test establishing the proper scope of 
our consideration as to whether Ryce met his burden of establishing facial 
unconstitutionality. Consequently, we next turn to a consideration of that test.  
 
3. What is the test to be applied to Ryce's facial challenge of 8-1025? 
 
The State relies on the traditional explanation of the facial unconstitutionality test. 
As stated in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95 L. Ed. 2d 
697 (1987):  "A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult 
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." (Emphasis added.) The State, 
by pointing to warrant exceptions other than consent, essentially argues there are some 
circumstances in which the Fourth Amendment would permit an officer to require a 
driver to submit to a test even if the consent exception did not apply. In those situations, 
the driver would have no constitutional right to refuse. Consequently, the State argues, 
Ryce cannot establish that there is "no set of circumstances" under which 8-1025 could 
 
21 
 
 
 
be constitutionally applied. The dissent agrees with this position. But, as recently 
explained by the United States Supreme Court in Patel, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2443, a 
decision filed after the oral arguments in this case, the State and dissent use too wide a 
lens. Patel emphasizes that when it comes to Fourth Amendment challenges, the "no set 
of circumstances" test becomes more focused. Patel emphasizes that the scope of 
circumstances we examine is determined and limited by the application of the statute—
we do not consider the entire universe of possible scenarios, we must instead look to the 
circumstances actually affected by the challenged statute. 576 U.S. at ___, 192 L. Ed .2d 
at 2451. 
 
Patel involved a facial challenge to a Los Angeles city ordinance authorizing 
police officers to inspect hotel records without a search warrant. The hotel operator 
argued that the ordinance violated the Fourth Amendment, and in response, Los Angeles 
pointed out hypothetical circumstances in which a search would be constitutionally 
appropriate regardless of any statutory authority—such as when police were responding 
to an emergency, a hotel operator consented, or officers had a warrant. Because such 
circumstances would occasionally exist, Los Angeles reasoned it could not be said that 
the statute operated unconstitutionally in all circumstances, even if some searches 
pursuant to the ordinance did not comply with the Fourth Amendment. As a result—at 
least according to Los Angeles—the ordinance could not be subject to a facial attack.  
 
The Patel Court rejected this argument, however, noting that these scenarios 
envisioned by Los Angeles—though they might have justified the search on a basis 
separate from the ordinance—were irrelevant to a determination of whether the 
ordinance was facially valid. The Court determined that in the context of the Fourth 
Amendment, the appropriate focus of a claim of facial unconstitutionality is to consider 
"only applications of the statute in which it actually authorizes or prohibits conduct." In 
 
22 
 
 
 
other words, "'[t]he proper focus of the constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the 
law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.'" 576 U.S. at ___, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2451 (quoting Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894, 112 S. 
Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 [1992]). Other warrant exceptions, which might have 
justified the search under circumstances not contemplated by the ordinance, were 
irrelevant to a determination of whether the ordinance was facially valid. 
 
The Patel Court observed that this approach was necessary when dealing with the 
Fourth Amendment because the "no set of circumstances" rule would "preclude facial 
relief in every Fourth Amendment challenge to a statute authorizing warrantless 
searches," in part because the determination of the reasonableness of a search is 
inherently factual. 576 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2450-51. The Court further explained: 
 
"If exigency or a warrant justifies an officer's search, the subject of the search must 
permit it to proceed irrespective of whether it is authorized by statute. Statutes 
authorizing warrantless searches also do not work where the subject of a search has 
consented. Accordingly, the constitutional 'applications' that petitioner claims prevent 
facial relief here are irrelevant to our analysis because they do not involve actual 
applications of the statute." 576 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2451. 
 
In sum, the officer would not be relying on the search authorizing ordinance if 
there was some other constitutional basis for the search. There would always be a 
hypothetical set of circumstances where a warrantless search would be reasonable. 
But those sets of circumstances, the Patel Court explained, are not the focus of 
facial challenges. 
 
While the Patel opinion focused on the city ordinance authorizing a warrantless 
search (comparable in our case to 8-1001), the Court briefly noted the effect of a separate 
 
23 
 
 
 
statute that penalized refusal to submit to the search (somewhat comparable, in our case, 
to 8-1025). The penalty provision at issue in Patel was a general statute that applied to 
any interference with the duty of an officer. Cf. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-5904(a)(3) 
(defining the crime of interference with law enforcement as "knowingly obstructing, 
resisting or opposing any person authorized by law to serve process in the service or 
execution or in the attempt to serve or execute any writ, warrant, process or order of a 
court, or in the discharge of any official duty"). Because the Los Angeles penalty 
provision applied to a person's failure to cooperate with all searches, including those 
authorized by a warrant, a warrant exception, or the search ordinance, the city argued that 
the search ordinance could be read to "match" the penalty provision—meaning it should 
have "independent effect" and cover all circumstances where an officer would be 
constitutionally entitled to search the hotel's records. See 576 U.S. at ___ n.1, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2451 n.1. 
 
The Patel Court rejected this argument, stating:  "This argument gets things 
backwards. An otherwise facially unconstitutional statute cannot be saved from 
invalidation based solely on the existence of a penalty provision that applies when 
searches are not actually authorized by the statute." 576 U.S. at ___ n.1, 135 S. Ct. at 
2451 n.1. The converse would also be true:  A facially unconstitutional penalty statute 
cannot be saved based on the possibility of a constitutional search justified by an 
exception not mentioned in the penalty statute, 8-1025. 
 
Thus, in applying Patel to this case, we must focus on the language of K.S.A. 
2014 Supp. 8-1025, which defines the criminal conduct as a "refus[al] to submit to or 
complete a test or tests deemed consented to under subsection (a) of K.S.A. 8-1001," and 
on K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1001(a), which also refers to circumstances where a driver is 
"deemed to have given consent." (Emphasis added.) In State v. Garner, 227 Kan. 566, 
 
24 
 
 
 
572, 608 P.2d 1321 (1980), we recognized that a driver "withdraw[s] that [implied] 
consent by expressly refusing the test." In other words, 8-1025 specifically criminalizes 
the withdrawal of consent.  
 
As in Patel, a warrant or some warrant exception (such as exigent circumstances) 
might sometimes justify the State demanding a DUI suspect submit to testing, 
irrespective of any implied consent provided by 8-1001. See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 
U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) (recognizing DUI 
investigations can present "circumstances [that] will make obtaining a warrant 
impractical such that the dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream will support an 
exigency justifying a properly conducted warrantless blood test"). Indeed, Kansas' 
general obstruction statute, K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-5904(a)(3), might punish those 
situations as interfering with the execution of a warrant or otherwise interfering in the 
"discharge of official duty" without need to resort to 8-1025. See K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-
1001(b) ("[a] law enforcement officer shall request a person to submit to a test"). 
Moreover, it is conceivable that a suspect might be charged for refusing to submit to a 
test "deemed consented to" under 8-1025, and then, after an officer obtains a warrant, 
subsequently be charged for obstruction under 21-5904(a)(3) for resisting the warrant 
search. While not entirely clear from the slim record, this appears to have been the 
situation in another case this day decided, State v. Wilson, ___ Kan. ___, ___ P.3d ___ 
(No. 112,009).   
 
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025 does not contain broad language penalizing failure to 
cooperate with a warrant search or a search conducted pursuant to a warrant exception; it 
does not generally criminalize a suspect's obstruction of a valid search. Rather, it 
narrowly and unambiguously penalizes a driver for refusing to submit to a search 
"deemed consented to." Contrary to the dissent's position, we cannot read 8-1025 to apply 
 
25 
 
 
 
to a failure to cooperate with a search conducted pursuant to a warrant. By its own terms, 
the statute applies when certain persons "refus[e] to submit to or complete a test or tests 
deemed consented to under subsection (a) of K.S.A. 8-1001." When that person has 
expressly refused consent—which would make the warrant necessary—it would be 
incongruous and oxymoronic to say the person was deemed to have consented to the test. 
Even under the principle of constitutional avoidance, whereby we choose between 
competing plausible statutory interpretations so as to avoid deciding constitutional 
questions, we are precluded from adding words to or striking words from 8-1025 to 
criminalize any action other than refusing to submit to a test deemed consented to—that 
is, we cannot read 8-1025 to do more than criminalize the withdrawal of implied consent. 
See Hoesli v. Triplett, Inc., 303 Kan. 358, 367, 361 P.3d 504 (2015) ("[T]he court's duty 
to give effect to the plain language of an unambiguous statute is not diluted just because 
that effect renders the statute unconstitutional. . . . '[W]e cannot use the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance to change the meaning of unambiguous statutory language.'").  
 
Consequently, under Patel, Ryce can meet his burden of establishing that 8-1025 
is facially unconstitutional if he persuades us that the State cannot punish him for 
revoking his implied consent. We recognize this is somewhat of an analytical departure 
from prior facial challenges and that the State relies on the cases decided without the 
benefit of Patel's guidance. To examine whether Patel affects the persuasiveness of those 
opinions, we examine those cases.  
 
4. How do past cases upholding nonconsensual searches impact our analysis?  
 
When considering the constitutionality of searches conducted in situations where a 
driver (1) refuses to submit to testing under the implied consent statute or (2) is 
physically unable to expressly consent to testing, historically this court and others have 
 
26 
 
 
 
not relied on the consent exception but have looked to other, categorical exceptions to the 
warrant requirement—that is, per se exceptions that would always apply when the 
conditions of an implied consent statute, such as 8-1001, are satisfied. Most often, in the 
absence of express consent, Kansas caselaw has constitutionally justified testing a DUI 
suspect's bodily substances by relying on the warrant exceptions of (1) search incident to 
arrest or (2) probable cause plus exigent circumstances arising from the evanescent nature 
of blood alcohol content, which naturally dissipates in the bloodstream—i.e., the 
evanescent evidence exception. E.g., Murry, 271 Kan. at 226 (citing Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 [1966], to invoke exigent 
circumstances exception when conscious driver did not consent); Garner, 227 Kan. at 
571-72 (citing Schmerber and invoking search incident to arrest exception in case where 
DUI suspect was unconscious and unable to expressly consent or withdraw consent). As 
we will discuss, recent cases from other jurisdictions have relied on the search incident to 
arrest exception, the special needs exception, and a general reasonableness test.  
 
Most cases relying on a categorical exception to the warrant requirement trace 
back to Schmerber, which represents the Supreme Court's first foray into considering 
intrusions into the human body. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767-68 ("[W]e write on a clean 
slate."). Armando Schmerber was arrested at a hospital while receiving treatment for 
injuries after a car crash. When Schmerber refused to submit to a blood test, a police 
officer directed medical personnel to draw and test a blood sample. The results of the 
blood test were admitted at trial over Schmerber's objections that this evidence violated 
his Fourth Amendment rights, and Schmerber was convicted of driving under the 
influence.  
 
The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the admission of evidence obtained from 
this warrantless search. The Court concluded the arresting officer in Schmerber "might 
 
27 
 
 
 
reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay 
necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of 
evidence.'" 384 U.S. at 770-71. The Supreme Court was particularly concerned with the 
body's natural metabolization of alcohol, and it noted that the arresting officer had 
brought the accused to a hospital and there was no time to secure a warrant before the 
evidence disappeared. 384 U.S. at 770. The Supreme Court also held that blood tests are 
"commonplace" and a reasonable method to test blood-alcohol level, as they extract 
minimal amounts of blood and the procedure involves almost no risk or pain. 384 U.S. at 
771. "Given these special facts," the Court concluded, "an attempt to secure evidence of 
blood-alcohol content in this case was an appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest." 384 
U.S. at 771. The Schmerber Court cautioned, however, that while it held "that the 
Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual's body under 
stringently limited conditions," its decision "in no way indicates that it permits more 
substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions." 384 U.S. at 772. 
 
In State v. Brunner, 211 Kan. 596, 602, 507 P.2d 233 (1973), disapproved on 
other grounds by State v. Murry, 271 Kan. 223, 21 P.3d 528 (2001), this court quoted 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771, and read it to "hold that the warrantless arrest of the accused 
was valid, having been made on probable cause, and that the subsequent 'search' by way 
of the blood sample 'was an appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest.'" The court did, 
however, also cite to cases recognizing the evanescent nature of blood alcohol content. 
211 Kan. at 602 (citing, e.g. United States v. Dionisio, 420 U.S. 1, 8, 93 S. Ct. 764, 35 L. 
Ed. 2d 67 [1973]). 
 
This court's subsequent decision in Garner illustrates how, at least for a period of 
time, this court categorically tied the constitutionality of a nonconsensual test under 8-
1001 to the search incident to arrest exception. The Garner court stated that "[t]he 
 
28 
 
 
 
constitution permits the taking of a blood or breath test as an incident to arrest, regardless 
of refusal under the conditions" of the statute. Garner, 227 Kan. at 571.  
 
Cases latching onto the search-incident-to-arrest language in Schmerber remove 
the language from its context. The Schmerber Court declined to conclude that probable 
cause alone would justify a search within a suspect's body. 384 U.S. at 768. In so doing, 
it recognized cases suggesting the police possessed "an unrestricted 'right . . . to search 
the person of the accused when legally arrested, to discover and seize the fruits or 
evidence of crime.'" 384 U.S. at 769 (referencing two factors supporting this suggestion:  
first, concerns about officer safety and destruction of evidence, and second, the fact that it 
would be impractical to attempt to confine a search only to weapons). But the Schmerber 
Court declined to extend this exception wholesale to DUI-type cases because officer 
safety and destruction of evidence considerations had "little applicability with respect to 
searches involving intrusions beyond the body's surface." 384 U.S. at 769. Instead, the 
Supreme Court stated: "In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence [of 
intoxication] will be found, these fundamental human interests [in dignity and privacy] 
require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an 
immediate search." 384 U.S. at 770. The Court also compared the situation to a search of 
a dwelling, which ordinarily requires a warrant, and stated that "'absent an emergency, no 
less could be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned', even when 
the search was conducted following a lawful arrest." (Emphasis added.) McNeely 569 
U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770). 
 
In essence, neither of the two purposes traditionally underlying the search incident 
to lawful arrest exception (officer safety and preservation of evidence) applies to the 
testing of blood alcohol content. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 
2473, 2484, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014) (discussing cases beginning with Chimel v. 
 
29 
 
 
 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 [1969], establishing and 
applying two-part test for search incident to arrest:  officer safety and destruction of 
evidence within the control of the arrestee). Alcohol in the bloodstream poses no threat to 
officer safety, and when discussing preservation of evidence with respect to the search 
incident to lawful arrest exception (as distinct from the evanescent evidence exception), 
the reasoning is to prevent destruction of evidence within a suspect's control. See, e.g., 
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009). Evidence 
of alcohol within the bloodstream is not in a suspect's control once he or she is monitored 
and will diminish at a predictable rate. See State v. Milligan, 304 Or. 659, 671, 748 P.2d 
130 (1988). Consequently, Schmerber indicates that a warrantless search of bodily 
substances for blood alcohol content cannot be justified by the search incident to arrest 
exception, even if it does not explicitly espouse that holding. Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has recently emphasized that the search incident to arrest exception was limited to 
"'personal property . . . immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.'" Riley, 
573 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 2484. 
 
Perhaps because of the Schmerber Court's recognition that blood alcohol content 
testing did not meet the two-prong test for the search incident to arrest exception, this 
court moved away from reliance on the exception and toward categorical use of an 
exigent circumstances exception, particularly exigencies posed by the evanescent nature 
of alcohol in the bloodstream. In Murry, this court disapproved of any language in 
Brunner implying that an arrest is constitutionally required before a blood sample may be 
taken. Murry, 271 Kan. at 233. We recognized that Schmerber created a three-part test to 
determine whether a warrantless blood draw was reasonable:  (1) There must be exigent 
circumstances such that the delay needed to obtain a warrant would threaten the 
destruction of evidence, (2) there must be probable cause to believe that the suspect has 
been driving under the influence of alcohol, and (3) the procedures used to extract the 
 
30 
 
 
 
blood must be reasonable. 271 Kan. at 227. Applying these factors, the court concluded 
all three prongs were easily met when testing occurs under 8-1001. As to the first prong, 
the court broadly held that "blood alcohol evidence can be taken from a suspect without a 
warrant . . . because of the exigency created by the evanescent nature of blood alcohol 
and the danger that important evidence would disappear without an immediate search." 
271 Kan. 223, Syl. ¶ 2. Regarding the other prongs, the specific provision in 8-1001 
invoked by the officer required the officer to have probable cause and, as the Schmerber 
Court had concluded, the extraction of blood was reasonable. 271 Kan. at 233; see 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770. 
 
After the broad holding in Murry recognizing the evanescent evidence exception 
for blood alcohol testing, Kansas courts strayed from a case-by-case analysis and 
categorically held that warrantless, nonconsensual searches were reasonable. Along the 
way, this court cited other United States Supreme Court cases for support, including 
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559, 103 S. Ct. 916, 74 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1983) 
(discussing the Fifth—not Fourth—Amendment but broadly stating that "Schmerber . . . 
clearly allows a State to force a person suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit 
to a blood-alcohol test"); 459 U.S. at 560 n.10 (still discussing the Fifth—not Fourth—
Amendment but broadly stating that "a person suspected of drunk driving has no 
constitutional right to refuse to take a blood-alcohol test"). See, e.g., Martin v. Kansas 
Dept. of Revenue, 285 Kan. 625, 635-36, 176 P.3d 938 (2008) (considering whether 
illegal seizure required suppression of alcohol testing during administrative proceeding to 
revoke license; citing Neville and Schmerber and stating testing based on implied consent 
"is reasonable in light of the State's compelling interest in safety on the public roads"), 
abrogated on other grounds by City of Atwood v. Pianalto, 301 Kan. 1008, 1011-13, 350 
P.3d 1048 (2015); State v. Bristor, 236 Kan. 313, 315, 691 P.2d 1 (1984) (rejecting a 
driver's argument challenging his express consent to a breath test on the grounds he was 
 
31 
 
 
 
not allowed to consult with counsel and not given Miranda warnings and citing 
Schmerber for the proposition that "blood test does not violate the Fourth Amendment 
right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures"); Standish v. Department of 
Revenue, 235 Kan. 900, 904, 683 P.2d 1276 (1984) (stating, in a license revocation 
proceeding, that "blood test does not violate the Fourth Amendment right to be free of 
unreasonable searches and seizures; it is a reasonable test").  
 
Like Kansas, other jurisdictions also read Schmerber, Neville, and other United 
States Supreme Court cases as recognizing a per se evanescent evidence exception when 
the state tested the blood alcohol content of DUI suspects. But not all did so. Recently, 
several courts discussed how technological advances in testing, as well as increased ease 
of acquiring a search warrant via electronic communication between law enforcement 
officials and a neutral magistrate, undermined the use of the evanescent nature of blood 
alcohol evidence as a justification for a categorical exception to the warrant requirement 
in DUI cases. The United States Supreme Court resolved the split in McNeely, 569 U.S. 
at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1563 (collecting cases reflecting the two readings of Schmerber). 
 
In McNeely, a Missouri DUI suspect refused breath and blood testing. Missouri 
had an implied consent statute markedly similar to 8-1001. See Mo. Ann. Stat. 
§§ 577.020.1; 577.041 (West 2011). Despite the driver's refusal, a law enforcement 
officer, acting under the authority of the Missouri implied consent statute, ordered a 
blood test without obtaining a warrant. The Court focused on the question of whether "the 
natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream establishes a per se exigency that 
suffices on its own to justify an exception to the warrant requirement for nonconsensual 
blood testing in drunk driving situations." (Emphasis added.) 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1558; see State v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Mo. 2012), aff'd 133 S. Ct. 1552 
(2013). 
 
32 
 
 
 
 
The Supreme Court rejected a per se or categorical rule and declined to read 
Schmerber as a license to "depart from careful case-by-case assessment of exigency." 569 
U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1561. Although the Court acknowledged the natural 
metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream, the Court noted at least three contrary 
considerations that led it to reject a per se exception to the warrant requirement for blood 
alcohol testing:  (1) The dissipation was gradual and not a "'now or never'" situation, 
(2) the nature of the testing already necessitates some delay while transporting the 
suspect, and (3) communication technology "advances in the 47 years since Schmerber 
was decided . . . allow for the more expeditious processing of warrant applications." 569 
U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1561; see 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. 1562 (discussing 
telephonic and electronic warrants, communication between law enforcement officers and 
magistrates by e-mail and videoconferencing, and use of standardized warrant 
applications in DUI cases); see also K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-2502(a) ("A search warrant 
shall be issued only upon the oral or written statement, including those conveyed or 
received by electronic communication."[Emphasis added.]). 
 
Rather than approve reliance on a per se or categorical warrant exception, the 
Supreme Court held that "[i]n those drunk-driving investigations where police officers 
can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly 
undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do 
so." McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1561. Whether circumstances supported "an 
exigency justifying a properly conducted warrantless blood test" must be decided on a 
case-by-case basis. 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1561. 
 
Post-McNeely, courts have heeded the United States Supreme Court's concern 
about "the 'considerable overgeneralization' that a per se rule would reflect. [Citation 
 
33 
 
 
 
omitted.]" 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1561. And while McNeely clearly set aside 
reliance on a per se rule relating to evanescent evidence, some courts have interpreted the 
United States Supreme Court's subsequent remand of Aviles v. Texas, 571 U.S. ___, 134 
S. Ct. 902, 187 L. Ed. 2d 767 (2014), for application of McNeely to indicate no per se or 
categorical exception should be made for blood alcohol testing.  
 
For example, a Texas informed consent statute mandated a blood draw when an 
arresting officer had a credible reason to believe from a reliable source that a DUI suspect 
had two or more prior DUI convictions. On remand of Aviles, the Texas Court of Appeals 
held that this provision created an unconstitutional, categorical per se exception to the 
warrant requirement. Aviles v. State, 443 S.W.3d 291 (Tex. App. 2014), petition for 
discretionary rev. filed August 8, 2014. The Texas Court of Appeals likewise found 
unconstitutional another provision of its implied consent statute allowing a mandatory 
blood test—one relating to the suspect being involved in an injury accident. Weems v. 
State, 434 S.W.3d 655, 665 (Tex. App. 2014), rev. granted August 20, 2014. The various 
panels of the Texas Court of Appeals reached these holdings because they read the 
Supreme Court's rulings in McNeely and Aviles to (1) proscribe all categorical or per se 
rules for warrantless blood testing and (2) emphasize that the reasonableness of a search 
must be judged on the totality of the circumstances.  
 
Likewise, the Kansas Court of Appeals, citing McNeely, has reached similar 
conclusions and, as a result, has held that statutory implied consent cannot categorically 
justify all blood alcohol testing. State v. Declerck, 49 Kan. App. 2d 908, 909, 922, 317 
P.3d 794, rev. denied 299 Kan. 1271 (2014); State v. Dawes, 2015 WL 5036690 (Kan. 
App. 2015) (unpublished opinion). In addition, courts in Idaho and Nevada have held 
their respective state's implied consent law violated the Fourth Amendment to the extent 
 
34 
 
 
 
the statute allowed a search based solely on implied consent. State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 
416, 421-23, 337 P.3d 575 (2014); Byars v. State, 336 P.3d 939, 945-46 (Nev. 2014). 
 
We need not decide at present whether we agree with the holdings of our Court of 
Appeals and these other courts regarding the existence of a categorical warrant exception 
for implied consent or any other exception. That is because in Ryce's case, officers did 
not conduct a search in reliance on implied consent—indeed, there was no search—and 
Ryce does not challenge the constitutionality of those provisions in 8-1001 that rely on 
implied consent as the basis for a search.  
 
Nevertheless, we cite these cases discussing the existence of any categorical 
exceptions to the warrant requirement in DUI-type cases because they inform our 
analysis of the cases cited by the parties in their attempts to explain the legal landscape 
before and after Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561, 185 L. 
Ed. 2d 696 (2013), which altered some prevalent legal assumptions about Fourth 
Amendment searches of DUI suspects. In essence, post-McNeely decisions fall into two 
camps. One camp reads McNeely to indicate only that the exigent circumstances arising 
from the evanescent nature of DUI evidence cannot be applied categorically; this camp 
leaves open the option that some other exception might apply categorically. The second 
reads McNeely to indicate that no warrant exception can categorically justify a DUI 
search. Recognizing these distinctions becomes especially important as we consider the 
impact of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 192 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2015), 
on decisions upholding the constitutionality of criminal refusal statutes, almost all of 
which predate Patel.  
 
In large part, the courts that ultimately find a criminal refusal statute constitutional 
agree that the primary question is whether the State could have tested a suspect 
 
35 
 
 
 
regardless of a person's consent (or lack thereof). In other words, the courts cast the 
underlying inquiry as being whether, had a search been performed without a person's 
consent, the search would have been reasonable under any other Fourth Amendment 
warrant exception. See, e.g., Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 806 F.2d 1447, 1450 
(9th Cir. 1986) ("Consent in the constitutional sense is only required where the defendant 
has a legal right to refuse."); Williams v. State, 167 So. 3d 483, 487 (Fla. Dist. App. 2015) 
("If [the defendant] had a Fourth Amendment right to refuse a breath test, criminalizing 
his assertion of that right would be unconstitutional."); State v. Hoover, 123 Ohio St. 3d 
418, 423, 916 N.E.2d 1056 (2009) ("Asking a driver to comply with conduct he has no 
right to refuse . . . does not violate the constitution.").  
 
Most of these cases have relied on an exception to the warrant requirement—
usually the search incident to arrest exception, the exigent circumstances exception 
arising because of the evanescent nature of blood alcohol evidence, or the special needs 
exception and its related examination of whether an intrusion is negligible and the search 
is reasonable. Several states have employed a general reasonableness analysis untethered 
from any warrant exception. In other words, these decisions have relied on the existence 
of a categorical warrant exception, as the State tries to argue here. Presumably, 
application of a categorical exception would obviate the need to conduct a case-by-case 
analysis of constitutionality. Courts have imposed similar reasoning to uphold 
nonconsensual searches under an implied consent statute. See, e.g., Burnett, 806 F.2d at 
1450 (pre-McNeely; examining Alaska's implied consent statute and holding "the 
breathalyzer examination in question is an appropriate and reasonable search incident to 
arrest which appellants have no constitutional right to refuse"); Williams, 167 So. 3d at 
492-93 (post-McNeely; holding that a warrantless post-arrest breath test is permissible 
under general reasonableness test); State v. Won, 136 Hawaii 292, 361 P.3d 1195 (2015) 
(post-McNeely; holding that general reasonableness is not a warrant exception; the 
 
36 
 
 
 
legislature cannot create a per se warrant exception by enacting an implied consent 
statute; and consent to a search may be revoked or withdrawn at any time before the 
search has been completed), vacating 134 Hawai'i 59, 77-79, 332 P.3d 661 (Hawai'i App. 
2014) (holding that warrantless post-arrest breath test is permissible under general 
reasonableness test); State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 2015) cert. granted 136 S. 
Ct. 615 (2015) (post-McNeely; categorically applying search incident to arrest exception 
to validate test refusal statute in situation of a breath test but specifically leaving open the 
question of whether the categorical exception applies to blood or urine tests), aff'g on 
other grounds, 844 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. App. 2014) (post-McNeely; finding a criminal 
refusal statute reasonable because probable cause existed to believe that a defendant had 
been driving while impaired, which would have supported issuance of a search warrant to 
require defendant to submit to test); State v. Trahan, 870 N.W.2d 396, 403-04 (Minn. 
App. 2015) (distinguishing Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Bernard, which held 
breath test could be performed under search incident to arrest exception, and concluding:  
the same exception did not apply to blood test, exigent circumstances did not justify a 
warrantless search, and the test refusal statute as applied to defendant deprived defendant 
of due process); State v. Wiseman, 816 N.W.2d 689, 694 (Minn. App. 2012) (pre-
McNeely; holding Minnesota's implied consent statute was not based on consent but on 
probable cause and exigent circumstances); State v. Turner, 263 Neb. 896, 899, 644 
N.W.2d 147 (2002) (pre-McNeely; citing Neville, 459 U.S. 553, to conclude that an 
implied consent statute "does not involve a question of involuntariness, want of due 
process, or self-incrimination," and that the right to refuse a chemical test is "governed 
purely by statute"); State v. Birchfield, 2015 ND 6, 858 N.W.2d 302 (2015), cert. granted 
136 S. Ct. 614 (2015) (post-McNeely; relying on special needs exception and general 
reasonableness to justify a search); Hoover, 123 Ohio St. 3d at 423 (pre-McNeely; relying 
on probable cause alone, independent of any warrant exception, to justify search); Rowley 
v. Com., 48 Va. App. 181, 187, 629 S.E.2d 188 (2006) (pre-McNeely; holding implied 
 
37 
 
 
 
consent is irrevocable and citing Burnett, which relied on exigency, as authority); see also 
State v. Isaacson, No. A13-1245, 2014 WL 1271762 (Minn. App. 2014), (unpublished 
opinion) rev. granted June 17, 2014 (agreeing with the Minnesota Court of Appeals' 
reasoning in Bernard, 844 N.W.2d 41); State v. Chasingbear, No. A14-0301, 2014 WL 
3802616 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion) (post-McNeely; citing Neville for 
the proposition that any right to refuse testing is statutory, not constitutional, and so the 
right to refuse is not a fundamental right and also concluding the criminal refusal statute 
survives rational basis scrutiny); State v. Poitra, No. A14-0572, 2014 WL 3892709 
(Minn. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion), rev. granted October 14, 2014 (not discussing 
McNeely; holding the Fourth Amendment does not apply to criminal refusal statute 
because no search occurs and noting that defendant did not raise a due process argument); 
State v. Ornquist, No. A13-1590, 2014 WL 2565662 (Minn. App. 2014) (unpublished 
opinion) (same); State v. Johnson, No. A13-2252, 2014 WL 2565771 (Minn. App.) 
(unpublished opinion), rev. granted (2014) (same).  
  
We agree with Ryce that after McNeely there may be grounds to question any case 
that categorically applies a warrant exception to blood alcohol testing. In fact, as 
discussed, some courts have read McNeely to prohibit categorical reliance on any warrant 
exception. Still other courts remain open to the possibility of a categorical exception, but 
after examining the tests or principles relating to one or more exceptions, have 
determined that categorical application of the warrant exception or exceptions do not 
apply to DUI investigations. See State v. Fierro, 2014 S.D. 62, 853 N.W.2d 235 
(recognizing a driver's right to withdraw consent and holding that if a driver does so the 
consent exception to warrant requirement cannot justify blood alcohol testing, and also 
concluding that the special needs exception to the warrant requirement does not apply in 
the DUI context); State v. Villarreal, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2014 WL 6734178 (Tex. Crim. 
2014) (analyzing each warrant exception and concluding none could be applied 
 
38 
 
 
 
categorically to DUI testing), reh. denied ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 9591511 (Tex. 
Crim. 2015).  
 
Nevertheless, we know from McNeely that, if anything, at times the evanescent 
evidence exception may apply when under the totality of circumstances a delay in 
obtaining a warrant would mean that a valid test could not be performed. Missouri v. 
McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013). Thus, in 
circumstances where the evanescent evidence exception applies, a search would be 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and a driver would arguably not have any 
Fourth Amendment right to refuse to cooperate with a test. So, if we were to look to 
whether any or all warrant exceptions applied (and, in particular, the exigent 
circumstances exception arising because of the evanescent nature of the evidence), the 
question of whether the State could constitutionally charge an 8-1025 violation would 
necessarily be decided on a case-by-case basis. Recalling our previous discussion of the 
facial unconstitutionality test, the possibility that the evanescent evidence exception 
would apply means that there are some theoretical circumstances where a search is 
reasonable regardless of implied consent and some theoretical circumstances where a 
defendant would correspondingly have no Fourth Amendment right to refuse. See United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1987) ("A facial 
challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount 
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under 
which the Act would be valid." [Emphasis added.]).  
 
But under Patel, in Fourth Amendment situations we do not consider the entire 
universe of possible, theoretical circumstances; we must only apply the plain language of 
8-1025 and consider the circumstances where that statute is relevant. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 
8-1025 depends on statutory implied consent and a driver's express refusal—an express 
 
39 
 
 
 
withdrawal of consent—to testing. We recognize that, pre-Patel, courts examining 
whether any warrant exception justifies a nonconsensual search have applied criminal 
refusal statutes that are worded in a manner similar to 8-1025. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. 
§ 28.35.032 (2014); Fla. Stat. § 316.1939 (2014); Minn. Stat. § 169A.20 (2006). 
Nevertheless, in light of Patel, and given the wording of 8-1025 and our caselaw 
indicating that refusal to submit to testing is really withdrawal of consent, our decision 
regarding whether 8-1025 is constitutional under Fourth Amendment principles 
ultimately depends on the application of the consent exception alone. Similar to Patel, if 
an officer requested to search a DUI suspect based on a warrant or some other warrant 
exception, the officer would not be "deeming" the person to have consented. Consent 
would be irrelevant.  
 
Consequently, we next examine Fourth Amendment caselaw regarding the consent 
exception and the recognition of the right to withdraw consent.  
 
 
5. Is implied consent in Kansas irrevocable consent? 
 
The State argues implied consent is irrevocable. If true, the State would 
have its categorical exception to the warrant requirement—consent—and Ryce's 
refusal to submit would not be an act protected by the Fourth Amendment. We 
reject that argument.   
 
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 
(1973), the United States Supreme Court reiterated that "'[w]hen a prosecutor seeks to 
rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that 
the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.' Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 
U.S. 543, 548, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797 [1973]." To be free and voluntary, "the 
 
40 
 
 
 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not be coerced, by explicit or 
implicit means, by implied threat or covert force." 412 U.S. at 228. The determination of 
"whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or 
coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all 
the circumstances" and "knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken 
into account." 412 U.S. at 227.  
 
Consistent with the requirement of voluntariness, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that "[a] suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search 
to which he consents." Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 114 L. Ed. 
2d 297 (1991). And, in a broader sense, a consensual encounter or search "will not trigger 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature." Florida v. Bostick, 501 
U.S. 429, 434, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991).  
 
In light of those principles, courts have generally recognized that, "[a]s a corollary 
of the requirement that consent to a search must be voluntary, consent to a search may be 
revoked or withdrawn at any time before the search has been completed." Won, 136 
Hawaii at 307 (holding DUI suspect had a state constitutional right to withdraw implied 
consent); see also United States v. Ortiz, 669 F.3d 439, 445 (4th Cir. 2012) (any consent 
given is valid until it is withdrawn by the defendant); Painter v. Robertson, 185 F.3d 557, 
567 (6th Cir. 1999) (party consenting to search "at any moment may retract his consent"); 
United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 651 (4th Cir. 1996) ("'A consent to search is not 
irrevocable, and thus if a person effectively revokes . . . consent prior to the time the 
search is completed, then the police may not thereafter search in reliance upon the earlier 
consent.'"); United States v. Mitchell, 82 F.3d 146, 151 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Consent to 
search may, of course, be withdrawn or limited by a criminal suspect."); United States v. 
McFarley, 991 F.2d 1188, 1191 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[O]nce consent is withdrawn or its 
 
41 
 
 
 
limits exceeded, the conduct of the officials must be measured against the Fourth 
Amendment principles."); United States v. Carter, 985 F.2d 1095, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(recognizing a constitutional right to withdraw one's consent to a search); Won, 136 
Hawaii at 306-07 (collecting additional cases); 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure:  A Treatise 
on the Fourth Amendment § 8.1(c) (5th ed. 2012) ("[C]onsent usually may be withdrawn 
or limited at any time prior to the completion of the search."). 
 
We applied these principles in State v. Edgar, 296 Kan. 513, 294 P.3d 251 (2013), 
in which we considered whether a suspect could revoke an implied consent under K.S.A. 
2010 Supp. 8-1012(a) (whereby a person is "deemed to have given consent to submit to a 
preliminary screening test" for alcohol and drugs). The police officer in Edgar told the 
suspect that he did not have a right to refuse a preliminary breath test, which misstated 
the law; because of that mistake, the driver argued his express consent was coerced and 
invalid. Ultimately, we agreed. 296 Kan. at 526, 530. In reaching that conclusion, we 
noted the preliminary breath test statute "provides that a driver's refusal to take the test is 
a traffic infraction, which means that refusal is always an option for the driver." 296 Kan. 
at 527. We also cited Ortiz, 669 F.3d at 445, and Carter, 985 F.2d at 1097, for the 
propositions that (1) any consent to a search is valid until it is withdrawn and (2) the right 
to withdraw consent is a constitutional right. 296 Kan. at 527. 
 
Nevertheless, the State presents an argument not raised in Edgar:  whether the 
acceptance of a privilege—specifically, the right to operate or attempt to operate a 
vehicle in Kansas—in exchange for implied consent makes the implied consent 
irrevocable. If implied consent is irrevocable (and assuming it meets the Fourth 
Amendment requirements for valid consent), then the consent exception rendered the 
proposed search in Ryce's case reasonable and limited or perhaps even destroyed any 
right he had to refuse. In reality, however, the State's arguments for irrevocable consent 
 
42 
 
 
 
are based on already defined exceptions to the warrant requirement. Like its arguments 
for application of the search incident to arrest exception, we find the following exceptions 
inapplicable and insufficient to render consent irrevocable.   
 
The State cites three United States Supreme Court decisions in support of its 
argument that Kansas' implied consent law establishes that every driver has given 
irrevocable consent to testing as provided for under 8-1001:  Samson v. California, 547 
U.S. 843, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250 (2006); Board of Ed. of Dist. 92 of 
Pottowatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 153 L. Ed. 2d 735 (2002); and 
Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 66 S. Ct. 1277, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1477 (1946), vacated by 
330 U.S. 800 (1947). We find each of these cases distinguishable and unpersuasive.  
 
Samson addressed a search conducted pursuant to a California law that allowed 
parole officers to search a parolee or the parolee's property without a warrant and even 
without suspicion. As a condition of receiving parole, the law required a prisoner to 
clearly and unambiguously agree to the terms of the warrantless searches. Significant to 
our considerations in Ryce's case, in upholding the legality of these parole searches, the 
Supreme Court declined to base its analysis on the concept of consent or waiver. See 
Samson, 547 U.S. at 843 n.3 ("[W]e need not reach the issue whether 'acceptance of the 
search condition constituted a consent."); 547 U.S. at 863 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
("[T]he State's argument that a California parolee 'consents' to the suspicionless search 
condition is sophistry.").  
 
Instead, the Court stated and held:  "Examining the totality of the circumstances 
pertaining to petitioner's status as a parolee, 'an established variation on imprisonment,' 
[citation omitted], including the plain terms of the parole search condition, we conclude 
that petitioner did not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as 
 
43 
 
 
 
legitimate." 547 U.S. at 852. In other words, there was no "search" within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.  
 
In contrast and as we have already discussed, both this court and the United States 
Supreme Court have recognized that testing blood to determine blood alcohol content 
"implicates an individual's 'most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.'" 
McNeely, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1558. While a breath test is less invasive, it still 
"implicates similar concerns about bodily integrity." Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 617, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989). In other 
words, Kansas drivers do not have the same diminished expectation of privacy as did the 
parolees in Samson.  
 
The United States Supreme Court later explained the importance of the reduced 
privacy interest to the Samson analysis, also noting two other factors that were important 
to its outcome—actual notice (i.e., not merely implied consent by virtue of a statute) of 
the State's right to conduct the search and the lack of discretion regarding the 
circumstances justifying a search. Specifically, in Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. 
Ct. 1958, 1970, 186 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2013), the Court explained the Samson analysis is rooted 
in "'traditional standards of reasonableness'" and requires a court to weigh "'the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests' against 'the degree to which [the search] 
intrudes upon an individual's privacy.'" (Quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 
300, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408 [1999].). Discussing Samson and other cases, the 
Court explained: 
 
"In some circumstances, such as '[w]hen faced with special law enforcement 
needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the Court has 
found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search 
or seizure reasonable.' Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330, 121 S. Ct. 946, 148 L. Ed. 
 
44 
 
 
 
2d 838 (2001). Those circumstances diminish the need for a warrant, either because 'the 
public interest is such that neither a warrant nor probable cause is required,' Maryland v. 
Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990), or because an 
individual is already on notice, for instance because of his employment, see Skinner, 
supra, or the conditions of his release from government custody, see Samson v. 
California, 547 U.S. 843, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250 (2006), that some 
reasonable police intrusion on his privacy is to be expected. The need for a warrant is 
perhaps least when the search involves no discretion that could properly be limited by the 
'interpo[lation of] a neutral magistrate between the citizen and the law enforcement 
officer.' Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 103 L. Ed. 
2d 685 (1989)." (Emphases added.) King, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1969-70. 
 
In contrast, despite the implied consent provided for under 8-1001, drivers in 
Kansas do not have a diminished expectation of privacy, and they do not necessarily have 
express notice that they are impliedly consenting to testing by operating or attempting to 
operate a vehicle in Kansas (although 8-1001 requires law enforcement officers to give 
such a notice in seeking a driver's express consent). In addition, McNeely implicitly 
recognized the discretionary determinations an officer must make in order to decide if a 
search to test blood alcohol content is warranted by reaffirming that a neutral magistrate 
should review the circumstances in every case where the law enforcement officer can 
reasonably obtain a warrant. Therefore, we conclude that Samson does not stand for the 
proposition that every motorist in Kansas provides an irrevocable implied consent to a 
search in exchange for the everyday privilege of operating or attempting to operate a 
vehicle. See McNeely, 569 U.S. at ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1561, 1565.  
 
Another circumstance discussed in King arises in a second case cited by the State, 
Earls, 536 U.S. 822—the special needs exception. In Earls, high school students 
challenged the constitutionality of a school's suspicionless urinalysis drug testing policy 
that required all students who participated in competitive extracurricular activities to 
 
45 
 
 
 
submit to drug testing. The Court noted that "'special needs' inhere in the public school 
context." 536 U.S. at 829. As a result, "'Fourth Amendment rights . . . are different in 
public schools than elsewhere; the "reasonableness" inquiry cannot disregard the schools' 
custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.'" 536 U.S. at 829-30 (quoting Vernonia 
School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564 [1995]).  
 
The Supreme Court explained the special needs exception in Skinner, 489 U.S. at 
619. The Court outlined a two-step inquiry for determining whether the special needs 
exception applies:  First, a court should determine whether "'"special needs, beyond the 
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement 
impracticable."'" 489 U.S. at 619 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S. 
Ct. 3164, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709 [1987]). Second, a court should balance the governmental and 
privacy interests at stake to determine whether a warrant should nonetheless be required. 
See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-20. 
 
In Skinner, applying the two-prong test, the Supreme Court ruled that federal 
regulations requiring warrantless blood and urine searches of employees involved in 
some train accidents (and permitting warrantless tests for employees who violated certain 
safety rules) were constitutional. The Supreme Court explained that alcohol abuse was a 
recurrent problem in train operations. In addition, the Court stated: 
 
"The Government's interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to 
ensure safety, like its supervision of probationers or regulated industries, or its operation 
of a government office, school, or prison . . . 'presents "special needs" beyond normal law 
enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause 
requirements.'" 489 U.S. at 620. 
 
 
46 
 
 
 
 But the government's interest was not presented as one in criminal justice. Instead, the 
tests in Skinner were "special needs" because they were designed "not to assist in the 
prosecution of employees, but rather 'to prevent accidents and casualties in railroad 
operations that result from impairment of employees by alcohol or drugs.'" 489 U.S. at 
620-21.  
 
When it came to balancing the government's needs against an individual's privacy 
interests, the Supreme Court concluded that seeking a warrant would likely frustrate the 
government's purpose in the search, which was to protect the public. Indeed, the delay in 
obtaining a warrant risked the destruction of evidence—an especially large risk in 
Skinner because it was up to railroads to arrange the tests and collect the samples, and 
railroad supervisors (1) were "not in the business of investigating violations of the 
criminal laws" and (2) were not expected to be familiar with warrant procedures. 489 
U.S. at 623. Additionally, the circumstances permitting a warrantless blood search were 
so narrowly defined that there were virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate. 
489 U.S. at 622. 
 
In contrast, the circumstances of DUI testing satisfy neither of the Skinner prongs. 
As to the first prong, nothing suggests the implied consent statute is designed for some 
need beyond those of normal law enforcement. "The [implied consent] statute was 
enacted to combat the increasing problem of drunk driving," and the primary purpose of 
an 8-1001 search is to collect evidence for a DUI prosecution. See State v. Adee, 241 
Kan. 825, 831, 740 P.2d 611 (1987) ("'The very purpose of the implied consent law [8-
1001] is to . . . coerce a motorist suspected of driving under the influence to "consent" to 
chemical testing, thereby allowing scientific evidence of his blood alcohol content to be 
used against him in a subsequent prosecution for that offense.'"); State v. Bristor, 236 
Kan. 313, 319, 691 P.2d 1 (1984) ("The very purpose of the implied consent law is . . . to 
 
47 
 
 
 
coerce . . . 'consent' to chemical testing, thereby allowing scientific evidence of [the 
suspect's] blood alcohol content to be used against him in a subsequent prosecution."). 
This purpose is not "beyond the normal need for law enforcement." See Skinner, 489 U.S. 
at 619.  
 
Protection of the public is certainly a corresponding purpose of the implied 
consent statute. The primary purpose of conducting a search under a DUI implied consent 
statute is a "general interest in crime control." See Lynch v. City of New York, 589 F.3d 
94, 100 (2d Cir. 2009); Fierro, 853 N.W.2d at 242-43 ("The primary purpose of the 
warrantless seizure of [a DUI suspect's blood] was evidentiary and prosecutorial."). 
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court has declined to apply the special needs 
exception when "the immediate objective of the searches was to generate evidence for 
law enforcement purposes." Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83-84, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 
149 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2001).  
 
With prosecution in mind and in light of Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133 
S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013), the State cannot credibly claim that in the DUI 
context the warrant and probable cause requirement is categorically "impracticable." 
McNeely specifically instructs that "the general importance of the government's interest 
[in DUI cases] does not justify departing from the warrant requirement without showing 
exigent circumstances that make securing a warrant impractical in a particular case." 569 
U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1565-66. Although the McNeely Court was not discussing the 
special needs exception, the statement impacts the considerations for determining 
whether the exception applies to given circumstances. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.  
 
In considering the second prong of the special needs exception, the balancing 
stage, courts have particularly focused on the reasonableness of an individual's 
 
48 
 
 
 
expectation of privacy. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-700, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 
96 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1987). In closely regulated industries with a long tradition of 
government supervision, the very nature of the work has significantly reduced an 
individual's or owner's expectation of privacy. 482 U.S. at 702-03. The State, citing to the 
extensive regulation of automobiles and driving, suggests the same applies here. But as 
we have noted, McNeely rejected this suggestion. McNeely, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 
1558 (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662 
[1985]).  
 
In addition, many of the other factors balanced in Skinner simply do not apply to 
an 8-1001 search. Unlike the situation in Skinner, (1) the law enforcement officers 
involved in a typical DUI case should certainly be familiar with warrant procedures; 
(2) technological advances have greatly reduced the time needed to obtain a warrant; and 
(3) the statute permits the police to request a chemical test if in the officers' opinion there 
is reasonable grounds for suspicion, a litmus test that is not so narrowly defined that there 
would be nothing for a neutral magistrate to evaluate. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622-23.  
 
We thus conclude that the special needs exception does not apply to searches 
proposed under 8-1001. Thus, Earls, which applied the exception in the situation of a 
school district regulating participation in extracurricular activities, does not convince us a 
DUI implied consent is irrevocable in light of the caselaw establishing that (1) a warrant 
should be obtained before DUI testing whenever practicable and (2) for the consent 
exception to the warrant requirement to apply, the consent must be voluntary and can be 
withdrawn. 
 
The final United States Supreme Court case cited by the State to support its 
argument that a DUI suspect's implied consent is irrevocable is Zap, 328 U.S. 624. In 
 
49 
 
 
 
Zap, the Court recognized that a Navy contractor, "in order to obtain the government's 
business, specifically agreed to permit inspection" of his records, thereby waiving any 
claim to privacy in those records which he otherwise might have had. 328 U.S. at 628. 
The Court's holding in Zap was thus primarily focused on the existence of a "contractual 
agreement for inspection" of business records and on the fact the contractor had 
knowingly "waived" his rights pursuant to a "business undertaking for the government." 
328 U.S. at 629-30. Despite the contractor's contemporaneous "protest" to the inspection, 
328 U.S. at 627, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a search conducted with the 
cooperation of the contractor's employees, noting the agents "were lawfully on the 
premises. They obtained by lawful means access to the documents. That much at least 
was granted by the contractual agreement for inspection." 328 U.S. at 629.  
 
The interest of the Navy as a party to a business transaction varies dramatically 
from the law enforcement interests of the government in a DUI investigation. And the 
privacy interests of all drivers who operate or attempt to operate a vehicle in Kansas vary 
dramatically from those of a contracting party to a business transaction. Moving beyond 
different interests at issue, the express and contractual consent to search involved in Zap 
differs from a widespread, categorical implied consent invoked by operation of 8-1001, a 
consent that may occur without knowledge one is granting permission to search. The 
distinction is explained in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. 
Ed. 2d 854 (1973). 
 
In Schneckloth, the United States Supreme Court discussed Zap as it explained its 
reasoning for rejecting a strict waiver standard as the test for determining whether the 
consent exception to the warrant requirement applied. Instead of a strict waiver standard, 
the Court adopted a standard requiring the State to "demonstrate that the consent was in 
fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied." 412 
 
50 
 
 
 
U.S. at 248. The Court repeatedly emphasized that "it is only by analyzing all the 
circumstances of an individual consent that it can be ascertained whether in fact it was 
voluntary or coerced." 412 U.S. at 233. Citing Zap and other consent cases, the Court 
noted they evidenced a "careful sifting of the unique facts and circumstances of each 
case." 412 U.S. at 233; cf. McNeely, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1561 (holding "an 
exigency justifying a properly conducted warrantless blood test" must be decided on a 
case-by-case basis). In Zap, the unique facts showed a contract between a contractor and 
the government that expressly provided access to business accounts and records.  
 
Implied consent is not an express contract. We do not read Zap to stand for the 
proposition that a DUI suspect irrevocably consents to a search based on the legislature's 
enactment of a statute that implies the consent of every person who operates or attempts 
to operate a vehicle in Kansas. See State v. Won, 136 Hawaii 292, 308, 361 P.3d 1195 
(2015) (citing federal cases for support of holding that under the Hawaii Constitution 
implied consent cannot be irrevocable; "[C]onsent may not be predetermined by statute, 
but rather it must be concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, consent was 
in fact freely and voluntarily given."); State v. Villarreal, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2014 WL 
6734178, at *12 (Tex. Crim. 2014) (holding that Zap did not "stand for the proposition 
that the government may exact from a citizen a generalized irrevocable waiver of Fourth 
Amendment rights in exchange for the enjoyment of everyday privileges, such as driving 
on the State's roadways"), reh. denied ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 9591511 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2015).  
 
In addition to Samson, Earls, and Zap, the State cites State v. Bussart-Savoloja, 40 
Kan. App. 2d 916, 927-28, 198 P.3d 163 (2008), in which a panel of the Court of Appeals 
broadly stated a defendant has "no constitutional right to refuse to be tested." The 
Bussart-Savoloja court explained that Kansas' implied consent law was remedial and its 
 
51 
 
 
 
purpose was to "coerce submission to chemical testing through the threat of statutory 
penalties such as license revocation." The court concluded that "a defendant's right to 
refuse consent in the context of driving under the influence is different from other areas." 
40 Kan. App. 2d at 927-28. To support this conclusion, the court quoted from the United 
States Supreme Court decision in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559, 103 S. Ct. 
916, 74 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1983), and cited to a law journal article, Melilli, The 
Consequences of Refusing Consent to A Search or Seizure:  The Unfortunate 
Constitutionalization of an Evidentiary Issue, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 901, 922 (2002). Neither 
supports the conclusion that there is no right to revoke an implied consent. See 40 Kan. 
App. 2d at 928. 
 
Granted, statements in Neville, if taken out of context, support the Court of 
Appeals conclusion. For example, the Neville Court stated:  "[A] person suspected of 
drunk driving has no constitutional right to refuse to take a blood-alcohol test." Neville, 
459 U.S. at 560 n.10 (quoted in Bussart-Savaloja, 40 Kan. App. 2d at 928). Likewise, in 
the context of a due process discussion, the Neville Court stated that "Respondent's right 
to refuse the blood-alcohol test, by contrast, is simply a matter of grace bestowed by the 
South Dakota legislature." 459 U.S. at 565. Earlier in the Neville opinion, the Court had 
explained:  "Schmerber, then, clearly allows a State to force a person suspected of driving 
while intoxicated to submit to a blood alcohol test." 459 U.S. at 565 (citing Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 [1966]). The Court then 
recognized that South Dakota had enacted a right to refuse in order "to avoid violent 
confrontations." 459 U.S. at 565.  
 
But, as discussed in McNeely, Schmerber did not allow the State to compel a 
warrantless search in every case. And to read the Neville Court's statements to indicate 
some other categorical exception results in the type of overgeneralization the McNeely 
 
52 
 
 
 
Court cautioned against when it said: "Circumstances may make obtaining a warrant 
impractical such that the alcohol's dissipation will support an exigency, but that is a 
reason to decide each case on its facts, as in Schmerber, not to accept the 'considerable 
overgeneralization' that a per se rule would reflect." McNeely, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1555. In addition, we feel constrained from reading Neville as a strong pronouncement 
on Fourth Amendment issues because the sole question before the Neville Court was 
whether admitting a DUI suspect's test refusal into evidence violated the Fifth 
Amendment. Neville, 459 U.S. at 554. The McNeely decision, a Fourth Amendment case, 
favorably cites Neville but only in the Fifth Amendment context. McNeely, 569 U.S. at 
___, 133 S. Ct. at 1566 (citing Neville as support for the statement that implied consent 
"laws impose significant consequences when a motorist withdraws consent; typically the 
motorist's driver's license is immediately suspended or revoked, and most States allow the 
motorist's refusal to take a BAC test to be used as evidence against him in a subsequent 
criminal prosecution.").  
 
The analysis by Professor Melilli in the law review article quoted by the Bussart-
Savoloja Court of Appeals panel is more consistent with a post-McNeely view 
disfavoring categorical rules. The professor explained:  "A search conducted upon 
probable cause and a warrant (or some substitute for the requirement of a warrant) is not 
an unreasonable search. There simply is no 'right' to avoid such a search." (Emphasis 
added.) 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 920. Although recognizing that consent would be one such 
exception, the author argued that the implied consent provided for in statutes such as 8-
1001 could not satisfy the consent exception to the warrant requirement because, "[a]side 
from proceeding with the fundamental task of driving, the driver has done nothing that 
could be said to be a truly voluntary consent to a search." 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 920-21. 
Nevertheless, the author concluded:  "These so-called 'implied consent' statutes pass 
constitutional muster under the Fourth Amendment" because they apply when there is 
 
53 
 
 
 
"probable cause and the exigency of dissipating blood-alcohol levels excusing the 
requirement of a warrant." (Emphasis added.) 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 921. If anything, the 
article supports Ryce's argument that—post-McNeely—there is a constitutional right to 
refuse to submit to a breath test requested on the basis of implied consent.   
 
Indeed, most states hold that a test of bodily substances cannot depend on a Fourth 
Amendment consent exception to the warrant requirement if the suspect refuses to submit 
to testing. See, e.g; People v. Harris, 225 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1, 8, 10, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
729 (2014) (reading McNeely to suggest that "refusal to submit to a chemical test under 
an implied consent law operates as a withdrawal of consent and renders any subsequent 
test nonconsensual" but deciding testing in that case was permitted on grounds that "there 
is nothing in the implied consent law to indicate that such measures are within the scope 
of the consent, and so in these cases the implied consent law gives way to the 
constitutional rules of Schmerber and its progeny"); State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 337 
P.3d 575 (2014) ("[I]rrevocable implied consent operates as a per se rule that cannot fit 
under the consent exception because it does not always analyze the voluntariness of that 
consent."); State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 646, 339 P.3d 368 (2013) (holding right to 
withdraw consent is inherent in requirement that consent be voluntary); State v. Brooks, 
838 N.W.2d 563, 569 (Minn. 2013) (stating that if someone refuses to comply with their 
previously implied consent, the police may not administer the test); State v. Fierro, 2014 
SD 62, ¶ 23, 853 N.W.2d 235 (2014) (rejecting the argument that an implied consent 
statute permitted "compelled, warrantless blood draws in every case" because the statute, 
"by itself, does not provide an exception to the search warrant requirement").  
 
We recognize Virginia has reached a contrary conclusion based on its caselaw 
holding that a driver's implied consent "is not 'qualified' or 'conditional'" and thus 
"allow[ing] it to be unilaterally withdrawn would 'virtually nullify the implied Consent 
 
54 
 
 
 
Law.' [Citation omitted.]" Rowley v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 181, 187, 629 S.E.2d 
188 (2006) ("The act of driving constitutes an irrevocable, albeit implied, consent to the 
officer's demand for a breath sample."). But as we have discussed, our caselaw 
recognizes that a Kansas driver's consent is revocable, and, as we said in State v. Edgar, 
296 Kan. 513, 294 P.3d 251 (2013), with regard to K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 8-1012, the right 
to revoke consent implied by 8-1001 rests on constitutional grounds.  
 
Nothing the State has presented causes us to change course from our previous 
caselaw. It would be inconsistent with Fourth Amendment principles to conclude consent 
remained voluntary if a suspect clearly and unequivocally revoked consent. Thus, we 
conclude the Fourth Amendment principles recognize that a consent implied through 8-
1001 can be withdrawn. See Won, 136 Hawaii at 308.  
 
In sum, when an officer requests a search based solely on having deemed that the 
driver had impliedly consented to the search, the driver has a right grounded in the Fourth 
Amendment to refuse to submit. And, as previously noted, K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025 
does not apply to any proposed search other than one "deemed consented to." K.S.A. 
2014 Supp. 8-1025 does not reach as far as the State or the dissent assert.  
 
Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly protect drivers like Ryce 
from criminal penalties under 8-1025 when no search actually occurs—by not searching, 
officers are actually respecting the assertion of the Fourth Amendment. Likewise, the 
issue in this case is not whether 8-1025 subjects Ryce or others to an unreasonable search 
or seizure but whether its criminalization of Ryce's refusal is constitutionally permissible. 
 
Even though the text of the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly cover the 
situation in this case because no search occurred, Ryce argues he is entitled to a remedy 
 
55 
 
 
 
under the Fourth Amendment. Alternatively, he suggests a remedy could be granted 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State counters by citing 
our caselaw upholding 8-1001 when considering a due process challenge and the caselaw 
of other states finding that criminal refusal statutes do not violate due process. We thus 
now turn to the root issue in Ryce's case.  
  
6. Can the State constitutionally punish a person for withdrawing consent?  
 
We first consider whether the Fourth Amendment protections, by themselves, 
prohibit a state from punishing a person for withdrawing consent. Because we determine 
it does not, we will then turn to the parties' due process arguments. 
 
6.1. Is a Fourth Amendment remedy appropriate?  
 
Two United States Supreme Court cases suggest that whether a state may 
criminally penalize Ryce's refusal to submit to an unreasonable search may be resolved 
through the Fourth Amendment:  See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546, 87 S. Ct. 1737, 
18 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1967), and Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 540, 87 S. Ct. 
1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967). Both were Fourth Amendment cases, and both end with 
compelling language. In See, the Court stated:  "[A]ppellant may not be prosecuted for 
exercising his constitutional right to insist that the fire inspector obtain a warrant 
authorizing entry upon appellant's locked warehouse." See, 387 U.S. at 546. Similarly, in 
Camara, the Court stated:   
 
"Assuming the facts to be as the parties have alleged, we therefore conclude that 
appellant had a constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to 
search and that appellant may not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to 
the inspection." (Emphasis added.) 387 U.S. at 540. 
 
56 
 
 
 
 
A few years later, discussing See and Camara, the Court summarized these holdings, 
stating:  "In each case a majority of this Court held that the Fourth Amendment barred 
prosecution for refusal to permit the desired warrantless inspection." Wyman v. James, 
400 U.S. 309, 324-25, 91 S. Ct. 381, 27 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1971).  
 
At first glance, these cases support Ryce's reliance on the Fourth Amendment. But 
closer examination leads to the opposite conclusion. 
 
 In both See and Camara, the United States Supreme Court was faced with a 
statute that expressly authorized a warrantless search. See See, 387 U.S. at 541; Camara, 
387 U.S. at 526. The focus of the Court's inquiry was whether the statute permitting the 
search in the first place—not the criminal penalty provision—was constitutional. In fact, 
discussions of the criminal penalty provisions themselves were relegated to footnotes. 
And since the Court found the search-authorizing statutes unconstitutional, the related 
convictions under a general statute prohibiting "resist[ing] . . . the execution" of the 
search-authorizing statute could not stand. Camara, 387 U.S. at 527 n.2, 534; see also 
See, 387 U.S. at 542 n.1, 545-46.  
 
Unlike the statutes at issue in See and Camara, the statute challenged in Ryce's 
case—8-1025—does not authorize a search but instead imposes criminal penalties if a 
suspect refuses to permit a search deemed consented to under 8-1001. We are not here 
concerned with whether any provision of 8-1001, the search-authorizing and implied 
consent statute, is constitutional. Rather, our concern focuses on whether, when the police 
request a search deemed consented to under 8-1001, the State may criminalize a suspect's 
refusal. 
 
 
57 
 
 
 
Second, even if See and Camara are not distinguishable on this basis, we question 
the validity of relying solely on the Fourth Amendment, absent any search, in light of the 
subsequent decision in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 
140 L. Ed. 2d 1043 (1998). In that case, parents of a motorcycle passenger killed in a 
high-speed chase brought a claim. The parents alleged their child was deprived of his 
right to life in violation of substantive due process when sheriff's officers deliberately and 
recklessly violated a sheriff's department order regulating high-speed pursuits. In defense, 
the county argued the substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment 
should be dismissed because Fourth Amendment principles regarding the reasonableness 
of a seizure applied. The Supreme Court rejected that argument.  
 
In its analysis, the Court first noted its reluctance to "'expand the concept of 
substantive due process.'" 523 U.S. at 842 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 
115, 125, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 117 L. Ed. 2d 261 [1992]). Indeed, "'[w]here a particular 
Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a 
particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion 
of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.'" Lewis, 523 
U.S. at 842 (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273, 114 S. Ct. 807, 127 L. Ed. 2d 
114 [1994]); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 
2d 443 (1989). Still, the Court concluded the Fourth Amendment did not provide an 
explicit textual source for the protection sought because it "covers only 'searches and 
seizures,' neither of which took place here." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843.  
 
We face similar relevant facts here, and the same conclusion applies. Although 
Ryce was seized, his seizure is not the source of his complaint. And he was not searched. 
Rather, his claim rests on rights flowing from the Fourth Amendment.  
 
 
58 
 
 
 
The Lewis Court also cautioned against bringing new rights under the penumbra of 
substantive due process. 523 U.S. at 842-43. But this concern does not prevent 
application of a due process analysis in this case because the Fourth Amendment right to 
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures—a right Ryce exercised by withdrawing 
his implied consent and refusing to expressly consent to testing—is deeply rooted in our 
history and is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." See Washington v. Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. 702, 720-21, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1997); Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973) (recognizing the 
Fourth Amendment right to refuse to consent); see also Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern PA v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992) 
("The most familiar of the substantive liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 
are those recognized by the Bill of Rights.").  
 
We are thus satisfied that the Supreme Court's expressed reluctance to expand the 
concept of substantive due process does not prevent a substantive due process analysis in 
this case. But that does not answer the question of how, if at all, the Due Process Clause 
applies to Ryce's claim. 
 
6.2. What protection does the Due Process Clause provide Ryce? 
 
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits a state from 
depriving a person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV § 1. "[F]reedom from physical restraint 'has always been at the core of the 
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.'" Kansas 
v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1997) (quoting 
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 118 L. Ed. 2d 437 [1992]). K.S.A. 
2014 Supp. 8-1025(b) clearly imposes restraints on freedom because it sets out graduated 
 
59 
 
 
 
sentencing severity levels for refusing to submit to a test, and all levels require some term 
of imprisonment. Because 8-1025 results in a deprivation of liberty, the Due Process 
Clause "imposes procedural and substantive due process requirements." State v. Hall, 287 
Kan. 139, 142-43, 195 P.3d 220 (2008). In this appeal, neither party raises a procedural 
due process claim. Consequently, we focus on substantive due process.  
 
Our starting point requires us to recognize that "the Constitution does not forbid 
'every government-imposed choice in the criminal process that has the effect of 
discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights.'" Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 
236, 100 S. Ct. 2124, 65 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1980) (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 
17, 30, 93 S. Ct. 1977, 36 L. Ed. 2d 714 [1978]). The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized a framework of tests used to determine which statutorily imposed choices 
violate substantive due process protections. Under these tests, we must first determine 
which of three levels of scrutiny apply to our review of 8-1025. See State v. Voyles, 284 
Kan. 239, 258, 160 P.3d 794 (2007). 
 
6.3. What level of scrutiny applies? 
 
The highest level of scrutiny, "strict scrutiny," applies to judicial review of statutes 
implicating fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. An intermediate level of 
judicial review, "heightened scrutiny," applies in situations presenting discrimination 
based on gender or illegitimacy. Finally, the lowest level of judicial scrutiny, the "rational 
basis" test, applies in all other situations. See Voyles, 284 Kan. at 258. No party suggests 
the intermediate level of scrutiny applies in this case, nor do we. But the parties disagree 
on which of the other two standards applies. 
 
 
60 
 
 
 
The State relies on cases that impose the lowest level of review—the rational basis 
test—when considering the constitutionality of an implied consent or a test refusal 
statute. In fact, the State emphasizes that this court has repeatedly upheld the 
constitutionality of 8-1001 even when recognizing the coercive aspects of implying 
consent in exchange for a license to drive. Martin v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 285 Kan. 
625, 635, 176 P.3d 938 (2008), abrogated on other grounds by City of Atwood v. 
Pianalto, 301 Kan. 1008, 1011-13, 350 P.3d 1048 (2015); Furthmyer v. Kansas Dept. of 
Revenue, 256 Kan. 825, 835, 888 P.2d 832 (1995); Standish v. Department of Revenue, 
235 Kan. 900, 904, 683 P.2d 1276 (1984); Popp v. Motor Vehicle Department, 211 Kan. 
763, 766, 508 P.2d 991 (1973).  
 
The Kansas cases cited in support of the State's argument dealt with challenges 
regarding the procedure for administratively revoking drivers' licenses because of a test 
refusal. In such procedural due process situations we have recognized that "limited due 
process applies." Martin, 285 Kan. at 632. This was further explained in Barnes v. 
Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 238 Kan. 820, 824, 714 P.2d 975 (1986), where we cited to 
two decisions of the United States Supreme Court discussing procedural due process in 
the context of driver's license revocations:  Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 
2612, 61 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1979), and Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S. Ct. 1723, 52 L. 
Ed. 2d 172 (1977). As recognized in those cases, a different test applies in the procedural 
as opposed to substantive due process context. In a procedural due process context, courts 
apply the so-called Eldridge criteria or factors. See Mackey, 443 U.S. at 10-11; Dixon, 
431 U.S. at 112-13; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. 
Ed. 2d 18 (1976) (identifying three factors:  [1] "the private interest that will be affected 
by the official action"; [2] "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards"; and [3] "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the 
 
61 
 
 
 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail."). 
 
The Kansas cases regarding procedural due process attacks on 8-1001 are also 
distinguished because they recognize that driver's licenses are a privilege, not a right. See 
Martin, 285 Kan. 625 (collecting cases). Here, Ryce asserts his right to be free from an 
unreasonable search. The procedural due process cases cited by the State provide some 
guidance, however, in that they discuss the State's interest in controlling drunk drivers. 
And while those recognized interests are relevant to an analysis of substantive due 
process—regardless of whether we apply a rational basis or strict scrutiny standard—the 
cases are otherwise not applicable. They do not address substantive due process issues 
and provide no guidance as to the standard of scrutiny applicable in this case. Nor do they 
answer or affect the question before us regarding 8-1025, which imposes a criminal 
penalty that deprives a person of liberty. 
 
The State also relies on decisions by the Minnesota appellate courts and the North 
Dakota Supreme Court that apply the rational basis test when analyzing the 
constitutionality of those states' criminal refusal statutes. In the most recent of these 
opinions, State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 2015), cert. granted 136 S. Ct. 615 
(2015), the Minnesota Supreme Court first reasoned the search incident to arrest 
exception categorically justifies a warrantless search of drivers' breath through a chemical 
test. 859 N.W.2d at 767-68. Because the search complied with the Fourth Amendment, 
the court determined that the driver did not have a fundamental right to refuse the 
constitutional search. Applying the lowest level of scrutiny, the court held the statute did 
not offend due process, stating:  "[I]t is rational to conclude that criminalizing the refusal 
to submit to a breath test relates to the State's ability to prosecute drunk drivers and keep 
Minnesota roads safe." 859 N.W.2d at 774. 
 
62 
 
 
 
 
We do not find this reasoning persuasive for several reasons. First, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court examined whether any warrant exception justified a search, in which case 
a driver would not have the right to refuse to submit to the testing. But the Minnesota 
court filed its decision several months before Patel was decided. After Patel, we begin 
our inquiry into facial unconstitutionality with the plain language of 8-1025, which 
criminalizes a refusal to complete a test justified on the basis of implied consent, rather 
than being justified on a warrant exception other than consent. With the benefit of Patel 
and its instruction to limit a facial constitutionality consideration to the language of the 
statute as opposed to other grounds that might make a search constitutional, we reject 
even potential categorical reliance on the search incident to arrest exception.  
 
Second, even if we took the broader approach adopted by the Minnesota court, we 
disagree with the analysis. As we have discussed, we read the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Schmerber to indicate the search incident to arrest exception does not 
categorically allow warrantless testing in DUI cases. See Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757, 768-70, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (declining to extend search 
incident to arrest exception wholesale to DUI-type cases because officer safety and 
destruction of evidence considerations had "little applicability with respect to searches 
involving intrusions beyond the body's surface"); see also Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 
___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1565, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) (discussing Schmerber and 
emphasizing need for warrant unless totality of circumstances justified application of the 
evanescent evidence exception). The Bernard majority reaches its conclusion by 
distinguishing between testing of blood, which requires penetrating the body's surface, 
and breath and other testing that does not. However, based on Schmerber's discussion that 
breath and urine testing also implicated significant personal privacy concerns and its 
determination that neither officer safety nor destruction of evidence justifies the 
 
63 
 
 
 
application of the exception, we disagree with the Bernard court's decision. We view the 
Bernard dissent's analysis of the exception, and its ultimate conclusion that it does not 
apply, as far more sound. See generally Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 774-79 (Page and Stras, 
JJ., dissenting); Williams v. State, 167 So. 3d 483, 491-92 (Fla. Dist. App. 2015) 
(rejecting the Bernard majority opinion). 
 
Consequently, we do not find the Bernard majority's reasoning or its decision to 
use the rational basis test persuasive. The revocation of implied consent is the exercise of 
a fundamental Fourth Amendment right.  
 
Interestingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not cite or adopt the reasoning of 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals unpublished decision in State v. Chasingbear, No. A14-
0301, 2014 WL 3802616 (Minn. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion), which the State asks 
us to follow. The State's reliance parallels the path of other courts because Chasingbear 
has been relied upon by other courts. See, e.g., United States v. Sugiyama, ___ F. Supp. 
3d ___, No. 15-5065, 2015 WL 4092494 (D. Md. 2015); State v. Birchfield, 2015 ND 6, 
858 N.W.2d 302 (2015), cert. granted 136 S. Ct. 614 (2015). Regardless of what the 
Minnesota Supreme Court felt about the Chasingbear rationale, our review persuades us 
we should not adopt it for a variety of reasons.  
 
First, the Chasingbear court recognized a "legal paradox" created by (1) holding 
that a DUI suspect has no right to refuse to be tested, while at the same time, (2) holding 
that the suspect "retains the constitutional right not to actually be tested without a warrant 
or a valid warrant exception." In the end the court concluded that "[t]he somewhat 
competing notions may be difficult to comprehend using linear reasoning, but . . . [l]egal 
paradoxes exist and make some constitutional anomalies challenging, if not perplexing, 
but they do not render them wrong or illogical." Chasingbear, 2014 WL 3802616, at *6. 
 
64 
 
 
 
The court thus seems to have concluded that just because no one understands how a 
refusal statute can be constitutional does not mean it is necessarily unconstitutional. We 
find this wholly unsatisfying and at odds with the fundamental principles of the Fourth 
Amendment and the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.  
 
Second, the Chasingbear court narrowly defined the right at issue, describing it as 
the "right to refuse to provide a breath sample to reveal the precise quantity of alcohol in 
[a person's body]." 2014 WL 3802616, at *10. So defined, the Chasingbear defendant 
had no fundamental right at stake, since the specific right to refuse to submit to chemical 
testing involved a modern situation not deeply rooted in national history and tradition. 
Cf. Downtown Bar and Grill v. State, 294 Kan. 188, 194, 273 P.3d 709 (2012) 
(explaining that if a nonfundamental right is at issue, the substantive due process rational 
basis test, as opposed to strict scrutiny, applies). We think this conclusion is incorrect. 
 
Rhetorically, this approach could render the Fourth Amendment practically 
meaningless in modern society because the State could specifically criminalize the 
refusal to submit to a search of almost anything. Then, by narrowly defining the Fourth 
Amendment right at stake to include only the particular object of the State's search, the 
State could avoid substantive due process issues by claiming the right at stake was not 
deeply rooted in our history. Cf. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 
2484, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014) (deciding how the search incident to arrest doctrine 
applies to modern cell phones, which the Court noted "are now such a pervasive and 
insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were 
an important feature of human anatomy. A smart phone of the sort taken from [the 
defendant] was unheard of ten years ago."). Notably, McNeely did not define the right at 
stake so narrowly. McNeely, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1561 ("In those drunk-driving 
investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood 
 
65 
 
 
 
sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the 
Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so."). 
 
Third, the cases cited by Chasingbear for support are not convincing. The 
Chasingbear court seems to have reached its due process conclusion largely because of 
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559, 103 S. Ct. 916, 74 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1983), in 
which the United States Supreme Court stated that a suspect has no right to refuse an 
alcohol test. But, as we have already discussed, Neville actually considered whether a 
defendant had a Fifth Amendment right to refuse a chemical test on the grounds of self-
incrimination, and the Court determined no such right occurred. See Neville, 459 U.S. at 
554-56. Here, we have determined that a fundamental right guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment is at stake.  
 
A recent case from the North Dakota Supreme Court, which extensively discussed 
Chasingbear and mentioned many other Minnesota cases, is similarly unpersuasive. 
Birchfield, 2015 ND 6. The North Dakota Supreme Court first stressed that "the McNeely 
Court referred to acceptable 'legal tools' with 'significant consequences' for refusing to 
submit to testing." 2015 ND 6, at ¶ 13. While this is true, McNeely does not endorse the 
use of criminal penalties for test refusal. The plurality opinion only referred to two 
consequences, stating:  "[T]ypically the motorist's driver's license is immediately 
suspended or revoked, and most States allow the motorist's refusal to take a [blood 
alcohol] test to be used as evidence against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution." 
See McNeely, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1566 (plurality opinion). Conspicuously 
missing from that description of "significant consequences" is the criminalization of a 
refusal to submit to testing. We decline to speculate as to why, but in any event, McNeely 
cannot be read to have considered statutes like 8-1025 and to have approved of them—
that simply was not the issue before the McNeely Court.  
 
66 
 
 
 
 
Then, the North Dakota court considered the general reasonableness of the test 
refusal statute. We discussed this test in the context of the State's reliance on Samson v. 
California, 547 U.S. 843, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250 (2006), and Board of Ed. of 
Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 153 L. Ed. 2d 735 (2002). As 
we noted, general reasonableness applies in limited circumstances, such as "[w]hen faced 
with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal 
intrusions, or the like." Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330, 121 S. Ct. 946, 148 L. 
Ed. 2d 838 (2001). This is not a case involving special law enforcement needs. Nor, as 
stated in McNeely, is there a diminished expectation of privacy. And the intrusion for 
testing of bodily substances is not minimal. McNeely, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 
(quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662 [1985]).  
 
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has often repeated that in a criminal 
context searches conducted without a warrant "'"are per se unreasonable . . . subject only 
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."'" Los Angeles v. Patel, 
576 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452, 192 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2015) (quoting Arizona v. 
Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 [2009]; Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 [1967]). General 
reasonableness—untethered from the special needs exception—is not a recognized 
warrant exception in a criminal context. See United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 534-35 
(10th Cir. 1994) ("[P]recedent neither establishes nor condones application of an 
amorphous 'reasonableness' test to determine the constitutionality of a warrantless 
search."); State v. Baughman, 29 Kan. App. 2d 812, 815, 32 P.3d 199 (2001) ("[W]e 
think it wise to avoid 'the wild card of general reasonableness' as the rationale for our 
decisions in Fourth Amendment cases.'"). 
 
 
67 
 
 
 
In summary, none of the cases cited by the State convince us Ryce has asserted a 
nonfundamental right. We find more persuasive the decision in State v. Trahan, 870 
N.W.2d 396 (Minn. App. 2015), a recent case from Minnesota that suggests a 
fundamental right is at issue.  
 
In Trahan, the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered the impact of Bernard 
when a defendant challenged Minnesota's criminal test refusal statute after being 
convicted because he refused to cooperate with a blood test. The court distinguished the 
breath test at issue in Bernard because, "[u]nlike breath, blood does not naturally and 
regularly exit the body." 870 N.W.2d at 401. Specific to blood tests, relying on 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966), the 
court concluded the search incident to arrest exception did not categorically apply. 
870 N.W.2d at 401-02. The court also held that the facts of the case did not present 
exigent circumstances. 870 N.W.2d at 403. Turning to a due process analysis, the court 
concluded strict scrutiny should be applied to an analysis of whether the defendant had 
been denied due process analysis "[b]ecause a warrantless search of Trahan's blood 
would have been unconstitutional under these circumstances, Trahan's fundamental right 
to be free from unreasonable searches is implicated." Trahan, 870 N.W.2d at 404. 
 
We agree with the conclusion in Trahan, although we do not limit it to blood 
searches and apply it to breath searches as well. Without question, the Fourth 
Amendment freedom from unreasonable searches is a freedom protected by the Bill of 
Rights—it is a fundamental right. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 303-04, 41 
S. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647 (1921) (discussing Fourth and Fifth Amendments:  "[S]uch 
rights are declared to be indispensable to the 'full enjoyment of personal security, 
personal liberty and private property'; . . . they are to be regarded as of the very essence 
of constitutional liberty."), overruled on other grounds Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 
 
68 
 
 
 
306, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 32, 83 S. 
Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963) ("Implicit in the Fourth Amendment's protection from 
unreasonable searches and seizures is its recognition of individual freedom. That 
safeguard has been declared to be 'as of the very essence of constitutional liberty' the 
guaranty of which 'is as important and as imperative as are the guaranties of the other 
fundamental rights of the individual citizen.'").  
 
In adopting 8-1025, the legislature respected, at least textually, the Fourth 
Amendment—the statute does not authorize searches. But the statute infringes on the 
right to be free from an unreasonable search and chills assertion of the Fourth 
Amendment. In fact, 8-1025 does more than chill the exercise of Fourth Amendment 
rights; it specifically punishes the assertion of the right to a reasonable search as 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.  
 
"To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is 
a due process violation 'of the most basic sort.' [Citation omitted.]" United States v. 
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372, 102 S. Ct. 2485, 73 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1982). In Goodwin, the 
United States Supreme Court explained that "while an individual certainly may be 
penalized for violating the law, he just as certainly may not be punished for exercising a 
protected statutory or constitutional right." 457 U.S. at 371-72 (holding prosecutors 
cannot vindictively enhance charges after a defendant had successfully asserted the right 
to a jury trial); see United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-82, 88 S. Ct. 1209, 20 L. 
Ed. 2d 138 (1968) (declaring due process violation when statute made capital convictions 
available only to defendants who exercised their right to a jury trial, noting:  "If the 
provision had no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights 
by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it would be patently 
unconstitutional."); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264-65, 88 S. Ct. 419, 19 L. Ed. 
 
69 
 
 
 
2d 508 (1967) (declaring unconstitutional a statute that limited individuals' ability to 
work at defense facilities if they were registered with communist organizations because it 
"put appellee to the choice of surrendering his organizational affiliation, regardless of 
whether his membership threatened the security of a defense facility, or giving up his 
job" and failed the "axiomatic" principle "that '[p]recision of regulation must be the 
touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms'").   
 
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025 relates to 8-1001, which creates a procedure for a 
search based on consent, and punishes an individual for withdrawing his or her consent 
even though the right to withdraw consent is a corollary to the United States Supreme 
Court's requirement that a consent to search must be free and voluntary in order for the 
resulting search to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Won, ___ P.3d at 
___, 2015 WL 7574360. And the Fourth Amendment provides a fundamental right to be 
free from an unreasonable search. See Trahan, 870 N.W.2d at 404 ("Because a 
warrantless search of Trahan's blood would have been unconstitutional under these 
circumstances, Trahan's fundamental right to be free from unreasonable searches is 
implicated.). But see State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 2015), cert. granted, 83 
U.S.L.W. 3916 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2015) ("Having decided that the search of Bernard's breath 
would have been constitutional, we find no fundamental right at issue here, as Bernard 
does not have a fundamental right to refuse a constitutional search."). 
 
Because a fundamental right is involved we apply strict scrutiny. 
 
6.4. Does 8-1025 serve a compelling interest? 
 
Under the strict scrutiny test, the State may prevail even when significantly 
encroaching upon personal liberty if it can show "'a subordinating interest which is 
 
70 
 
 
 
compelling'" and that the infringement on a fundamental liberty interest is "narrowly 
tailored to serve" that interest. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39, 83 S. Ct. 328, 
9 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1963) (quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524, 80 S. Ct. 412, 4 
L. Ed. 2d 480 [1960]); Reno, 507 U.S. at 302; In re Care & Treatment of Hay, 263 Kan. 
822, 831-33, 953 P.2d 666 (1998). In this context, "[p]recision of regulation must be the 
touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms." Button, 371 U.S. 
at 437-38.  
 
Our first task, therefore, is to determine whether a compelling interest justifies the 
criminalization of a driver's refusal to submit to blood alcohol testing. In an effort to 
determine the State's interest in criminalizing a test refusal, we reviewed the legislative 
history surrounding 8-1025. It reveals that, in 2009, the Kansas Legislature created the 
Kansas DUI Commission and charged it with reviewing DUI statutes in Kansas and other 
states. The stated goals, as relevant to 8-1025, were to "assure highway safety by 
changing behavior by DUI offenders as early as possible[] and provide significant 
restrictions on personal liberty at some level of frequency and quantity of offenses." 
Supplemental Note on Substitute for Senate Bill No. 7. Among other recommendations, 
the commission proposed a test refusal statute.   
 
The minutes and record of written testimony before the legislative committees 
reflect more specific reasons for seeking the adoption of 8-1025, including:  (1) to deter 
test refusals because refusals allow offenders to evade prosecution and punishment, 
which means no addiction evaluation occurs, no treatment can be ordered, and the 
offender is not deterred from reoffending; (2) to hold DUI offenders accountable; and 
(3) to reduce the resources currently expended in order to prosecute DUI cases where a 
defendant refused testing. See Minutes, Senate Judiciary Committee, January 26-28, 
2011, and March 9, 2012. 
 
71 
 
 
 
 
In addition, we must consider the interest we have previously recognized relating 
to Kansas' DUI statutes. Primarily, we have repeatedly noted the State's compelling 
overall interests in both combating and penalizing drunk driving and in protecting public 
safety on the roads. See McNeely, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1565; Martin v. Kansas 
Dept. of Revenue, 285 Kan. 625, 635, 176 P.3d 938 (2008). As we have discussed, this 
interest is sufficiently compelling to allow some encroachment on Fourth Amendment 
rights in the DUI context, at least to the extent we have approved the use of civil penalties 
such as suspension of driving privileges to encourage a suspect to provide actual, 
contemporaneous consent to a chemical test for alcohol. See McNeely, 569 U.S. at ___, 
133 S. Ct. at 1566-67; Martin, 285 Kan. at 635. We have done so because of the 
magnitude of the drunk driving problem and because the State has the ability to regulate 
who may drive on the road. See, e.g., Martin, 285 Kan. at 632-33; State v. Mertz, 258 
Kan. 745, 761, 907 P.2d 847 (1995) ("A sanction which revokes a privilege is a remedial 
sanction, not a punitive sanction."); see also McNeely, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1566 
(plurality opinion) (recognizing license revocation as a tool to coerce submission to a 
blood draw).  
 
In addition, we have noted that testing "eliminate[s] mistakes from objective 
observation alone" in that it "disclose[s] the truth" when a driver denies drinking and 
"protect[s]" the person who smells of alcohol or exhibits physical clues of intoxication 
but is not. State v. Garner, 227 Kan. 566, 571, 608 P.2d 1321 (1980). We also recognize 
that encouraging cooperation in testing helps protect the safety of law enforcement 
officers and, if involved, medical personnel. See, e.g., State v. Adee, 241 Kan. 825, 831, 
740 P.2d 611 (1987); State v. Bristor, 236 Kan. 313, 319, 691 P.2d 1 (1984). 
 
 
72 
 
 
 
Thus the State's interest in adopting 8-1025 can be categorized as:  (1) criminal 
justice interests—deterring test refusals, deterring recidivism, holding offenders 
accountable, and reducing the difficulties in prosecution and potential evasion of 
prosecution altogether; (2) encouraging public safety; and (3) protecting the safety of 
those who deal with the suspect and perform the test. We do not dispute that these 
interests are compelling. Consequently, we next must determine whether 8-1025 is 
narrowly tailored to serve those interests, and we consider each interest in turn. 
 
6.5. Is 8-1025 narrowly tailored to serve the criminal justice interests? 
 
When considering the criminal justice interests, we find it significant that the 
McNeely Court, after recognizing that "[n]o one can seriously dispute the magnitude of 
the drunken driving problem," reiterated "the general importance of the government's 
interest in this area does not justify departing from the warrant requirement without 
showing exigent circumstances that make securing a warrant impractical in a particular 
case." 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1565 (plurality opinion). Given the availability of a 
warrant, we question whether 8-1025 is narrowly tailored.  
 
The impact of the warrant tool is significant. With regard to the State's interest in 
reducing test refusals, according to the McNeely Court, "field studies in States that permit 
nonconsensual blood testing pursuant to a warrant have suggested that, although warrants 
do impose administrative burdens, their use can reduce breath-test-refusal rates and 
improve law enforcement's ability to recover BAC evidence." 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1567 (plurality opinion). 
  
 
73 
 
 
 
In other words, the constitutionally approved tool is capable of achieving the same 
goals as those targeted by the test refusal statute. But Kansas has sometimes elected to 
avoid use of the Fourth Amendment warrant tool; for example, the legislature limited an 
officer's ability to obtain a search warrant compelling a blood sample after a defendant 
refused testing. Compare Adee, 241 Kan. at 829-33 (holding pre-2008 version of the 
implied consent statute prohibited an officer from obtaining a search warrant to compel a 
blood sample after a defendant refused testing), and Hoeffner v. Kansas Dept. of 
Revenue, 50 Kan. App. 2d 878, 335 P.3d 684 (2014) (holding K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1001 
retained the prohibition) with City of Dodge City v. Webb, 50 Kan. App. 2d 393, Syl. ¶ 4, 
329 P.3d 515 (2014) (holding law enforcement personnel are statutorily entitled under the 
Kansas implied consent law to obtain a warrant to draw blood from a driver even after the 
driver refuses to submit to a breathalyzer test), rev. granted in part June 29, 2015.  
 
We need not decide today whether that limit applied to Ryce because, either way, 
8-1025 is not narrowly tailored. If the legislature statutorily restricted the use of a 
warrant, thereby removing this tool from the State's toolbox, it cannot then punish a 
driver who refuses to consent to a warrantless search on the notion that otherwise the 
driver will be able to avoid accountability. Alternatively, if a warrant was available, the 
State could have served all its criminal justice purposes without punishing Ryce's 
exercise of a constitutional right. It could have (1) held Ryce accountable for driving 
while intoxicated, (2) deterred his refusals by legitimately threatening a warrant search, 
(3) reduced costs of prosecution by obtaining a warrant, searching, and finding evidence, 
and (4) if Ryce failed to comply with the warrant, the State could charge him with 
interference with law enforcement under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-5904(a)(3). Simply put, 
the legislature did not narrowly and precisely draw 8-1025 when it chose to criminally 
punish an individual for exercising his or her Fourth Amendment rights.  
  
 
74 
 
 
 
Granted, it would no doubt be easier to prosecute DUI cases without the need to 
obtain a warrant, especially since test refusal carries penalties equal to that of drunk 
driving. But the warrant requirement is "not merely 'an inconvenience to be somehow 
"weighed" against the claims of police efficiency.'" Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ___, 
___, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014); see also Martin, 285 Kan. at 647-
48 (Rosen, J., dissenting) ("I am extremely mindful of the paramount public objective of 
removing intoxicated drivers from our public roads and highways; however, achievement 
of this goal should not be at the expense of the protections guaranteed by our 
Constitution.").  
 
We recognize there will be circumstances when a warrant cannot be timely 
obtained. But in those circumstances, exigent circumstances and the evanescent nature of 
the evidence may justify a warrantless search, as explained in McNeely. Or it might be 
that the specific circumstances of a case would give rise to a warrant exception other than 
exigent circumstances. The tools available to the State under the Fourth Amendment 
remain perfectly suited and capable of accomplishing the same ends as 8-1025. 
 
The State could theoretically tailor a refusal penalty statute to apply to those 
specific situations where a search would be constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 
And it could provide for graduated penalties that match or exceed the penalties for DUI 
offenses. Such a statute would more narrowly fit the longstanding caselaw in which this 
court has relied on warrant exceptions other than consent. While our task is not to 
evaluate the best options for a statute to achieve the State's goals, this discussion 
illustrates that the method the State has chosen—8-1025—is not precisely and narrowly 
tailored so as to avoid interfering with a fundamental right.  
 
 
75 
 
 
 
In essence, through the use of a warrant and through statutes that are narrowly 
tailored to fit the permissible grounds for search, including narrowly tailored criminal 
refusal statutes, the State can encourage drivers to expressly consent to testing and 
achieve all of its interests related to increasing cooperation with the testing process. See 
Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 806 F.2d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(distinguishing between refusal to submit and refusal to consent and viewing distinction 
as meaningful in large part because consent was irrelevant given that the chemical tests 
qualified for the search incident to lawful arrest or exigent circumstances exception); 
People v. Harris, 225 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1, 5, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729 (2014) (same); State 
v. Hill, No. 2008-CA-0011, 2009 WL 1485026, at *4 (Ohio App. 2009) (unpublished 
opinion) (same).  
 
6.6. Is 8-1025 narrowly tailored to serve public safety? 
 
In addition, the criminal refusal penalty is not narrowly tailored to achieve the 
State's compelling interest in promoting safety on the roads. We reach this conclusion for 
several reasons. First, civil penalties for refusal mean the obstinate driver loses his or her 
license—thus (hopefully) keeping that driver off the road. While Ryce's case shows that 
not all drivers without licenses will refrain from driving, the State may theoretically seek 
a warrant for an alcohol test and enact criminal penalties, including jail time, for refusing 
to submit to a valid Fourth Amendment search. The State could both protect 
constitutional rights and public safety—we do not find the DUI problem as presenting the 
State with the need for an "either/or" solution. State v. Brown, 245 Kan. 604, 612-13, 783 
P.2d 1278 (1989) (explaining that if an "officer states that a search warrant can be 
obtained and, in fact, there are grounds for the issuance of a warrant, the statement is 
correct and does not constitute coercion). As the Minnesota Court of Appeals held:   
 
 
76 
 
 
 
"We recognize that the available alternatives may not be as efficient as the 
current procedure under the test-refusal statute. But these alternatives serve the state's 
compelling interest in securing the safety of its roadways without infringing on a driver's 
fundamental right to refuse an unreasonable search of his blood." State v. Trahan, 870 
N.W.2d 396, 404 (Minn. App. 2015) (holding criminal refusal statute as applied did not 
meet strict scrutiny and violated driver's due process rights).  
 
6.7. Is 8-1025 narrowly tailored to protect the safety of testing personnel? 
 
The compelling interest in avoiding the need to physically force someone to 
submit to a blood draw, which implicates the safety of the suspect, the officers, and the 
medical staff, is paramount. But the civil penalties for refusing a test already coerce a 
suspect's cooperation and contemporaneous consent. Even if the threat of criminal 
penalties were needed to gain cooperation (and we have been presented with no evidence 
this is so), the Fourth Amendment permits police to seek a warrant or rely on another 
warrant exception other than consent. A suspect has no right to avoid a search justified 
under the Fourth Amendment, and if 8-1025 was limited only to these situations, a police 
threat of procuring a warrant could provide a nearly identical threat of criminal penalties.  
 
6.8. Overall, is 8-1025 narrowly tailored? 
 
We do not find 8-1025 to be limited and narrowly tailored. It is impermissibly 
broad because it allows the State to criminally punish those who refuse a search that is 
not grounded in the Fourth Amendment. Because the State can achieve the same ends 
through constitutional means, the State's objective in cases like Ryce's can only be "to 
chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise 
them." See also Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581 ("If the [law] had no other purpose or effect 
than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to 
 
77 
 
 
 
exercise them, then it would be patently unconstitutional."). Investigative and 
prosecutorial efficiency alone is not an interest that can survive strict scrutiny.   
 
In essence, the State's reasons are not good enough, and its law not precise 
enough, to encroach on the fundamental liberty interest in avoiding an unreasonable 
search. See Robel, 389 U.S. at 265-68. Accordingly, we conclude that 8-1025 is facially 
unconstitutional. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Because we conclude that K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025 violates a suspect's Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights and, thus, § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of 
Rights, we need not and do not reach whether it violates the Fifth Amendment 
prohibitions against compelled self-incrimination. See U.S. Const. amend. V; see, e.g., 
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559, 562-64, 103 S. Ct. 916, 74 L. Ed. 2d 748 
(1983); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 
(1966); State v. Brown, 286 Kan. 170, 173, 182 P.3d 1205 (2008). We also do not reach 
Ryce's argument that Miranda warnings must be given along with a police officer's 
request for a chemical test. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. 
Ed. 2d 694 (1966); State v. Schultz, 289 Kan. 334, 340, 212 P.3d 150 (2009). Nor do we 
decide whether K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025 is unconstitutional under the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions. See, e.g., Dolan v. Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 
129 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1994); State v. Mueller, 271 Kan. 897, 27 P.3d 884 (2001). 
 
Although the reasons for our decision differ from those of the district court, an 
appellate court can affirm the district court if the court was right for the wrong reason. 
State v. May, 293 Kan. 858, 870, 269 P.3d 1260 (2012). We, therefore, hold that K.S.A. 
 
78 
 
 
 
2014 Supp. 8-1025 is facially unconstitutional and affirm the district court's decision to 
dismiss the count against Ryce that criminalizes his refusal to submit to the test.  
 
Affirmed.  
 
* * * 
 
STEGALL, J., dissenting:  At root, this appeal asks the question:  What conduct is 
actually prohibited by K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025? If that conduct is, in all circumstances 
and at all times, constitutionally protected, it cannot be criminally sanctioned by the State 
and the statute is facially unconstitutional. But if, in some circumstances, the prohibited 
conduct is not constitutionally protected, then the constitutionality of the statute can only 
be determined on a case-by-case, as applied, basis. Because Ryce asserts a facial 
challenge to K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025, he must demonstrate that the prohibited conduct 
is always constitutionally protected in order to prevail. Stated another way, if the State 
can demonstrate that the statute could be applied to prohibit conduct that is not 
constitutionally protected, then we cannot declare the statute to be facially 
unconstitutional.  
 
Given this, the outcome of Ryce's appeal hinges entirely on our interpretation of 
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025. And our interpretation of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025 turns on 
which interpretive rules we follow while assessing the statute's meaning. The majority 
properly recites those interpretive rules only to promptly skirt them. Slip op. at 10. First, 
we are guided by our ordinary method of statutory interpretation, beginning with the 
plain language of the statute, giving common words their ordinary meaning. State v. 
Urban, 291 Kan. 214, 216, 239 P.3d 837 (2010). But, when the constitutionality of a statute 
turns on the interpretive meaning we choose to give to that statute, we must apply a 
 
79 
 
 
 
second interpretive lens which instructs us, if possible, to choose a "'plausible 
interpretation[] of a statutory text'" that avoids unconstitutionality over other 
interpretations that render the statute constitutionally infirm. Hoesli v. Triplett, Inc., 303 
Kan. 358, 368, 361 P.3d 504 (2015) (quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381, 125 
S. Ct. 716, 160 L. Ed. 2d 734 [2005]). 
 
We recently described this rule of constitutional avoidance as the court's "duty to 
construe a statute as constitutionally valid when it is faced with more than one reasonable 
interpretation." Hoesli, 303 Kan. at 367. This duty does not arise, however, when there is 
"only one reasonable meaning [that] can be gleaned from the statutory text." 303 Kan. at 
367. "[I]t is 'our mandate to construe statutes in a fashion to avoid a constitutional 
infirmity where possible.' [Citation omitted.] But, we cannot use the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance to change the meaning of unambiguous statutory language." 
State v. Thompson, 836 N.W.2d 470, 484 (Iowa 2013) (quoted in Hoesli, 303 Kan. at 
368). 
 
This is consistent with our earlier formulation of the avoidance doctrine. In State 
v. Durrant, 244 Kan. 522, 534, 769 P.2d 1174 (1989), we stated: 
 
"This court not only has the authority, but also the duty, to construe a statute in such a 
manner that it is constitutional if the same can be done within the apparent intent of the 
legislature in passing the statute. To accomplish this purpose the court may read the 
necessary judicial requirements into the statute." 
 
In State v. Marsh, 278 Kan. 520, 539, 102 P.3d 445 (2004), overruled on other 
grounds 548 U.S. 163, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 165 L. Ed. 2d 429 (2006), we reaffirmed the rule 
that the avoidance doctrine is appropriate where statutory language is ambiguous or 
vague, but inappropriate "if its application would result in rewriting an unambiguous 
 
80 
 
 
 
statute." Statutory ambiguity has been described in a myriad of ways, but fundamentally, 
a "statute is ambiguous when two or more interpretations can fairly be made." Petty v. 
City of El Dorado, 270 Kan. 847, 851, 19 P.3d 167 (2001). That is to say, "'the statute 
must be genuinely susceptible to two constructions after, and not before, its complexities 
are unraveled. Only then is the statutory construction that avoids the constitutional 
question a "fair" one.'" Marsh, 278 Kan. at 538 (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 224, 238, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350 [1998]). 
 
In sum, the rule of constitutional avoidance states that if a court can genuinely, 
reasonably, plausibly, or fairly interpret and construe statutory language consistent with 
legislative intent in a manner that also preserves it from impermissibly encroaching on 
constitutional limits, the court must do so. At the same time, the rule does not extend so 
far as to permit a court to impose an unreasonable, implausible, or unfair interpretation 
on statutory language that either changes the meaning of unambiguous language or runs 
directly counter to clear legislative intent.  
 
Both sides of this calculus—which are fully encompassed in the judicial decision 
to either apply the rule or not to apply the rule—are rooted in the practice of judicial 
restraint when exercising the power of judicial review. And judicial restraint is itself 
rooted in the principles of separation of powers—it is both a doctrinal and a pragmatic 
judicial acknowledgement of the constitutional bedrock that the legislative branch, not 
the judicial branch, makes the law. The "'basic democratic function'" of the avoidance 
doctrine is to maintain "'a set of statutes that reflect, rather than distort, the policy choices 
that elected representatives have made.'" Marsh, 278 Kan. at 538 (quoting Almendarez-
Torres, 523 U.S. at 238). However, "'if a court reads an ambiguity into an unambiguous 
statute simply for the purpose of avoiding an adverse decision as to the constitutionality 
of that statute, the court would be exercising legislative powers and thereby usurping 
 
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those powers.'" Marsh, 278 Kan. at 542 (quoting Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. 
Supp. 2d 564, 597 [S.D.N.Y. 2002]); see also Solomon v. State, No. 114,573, 303 Kan. ___, 
___, ___ P.3d ___, 2015 WL 9311523, at *17 (2015) (Stegall, J., concurring) (delineating 
proper from improper exercise of judicial restraint).  
 
Today's majority loses its way early in its analysis of the statutory language by 
asking the wrong question—i.e., "is implied consent irrevocable?" Slip op. at 6, 39. This 
is not surprising given that at first blush, consent appears to be the lodestar of the 
statutory scheme. But by making this case about a person's right to consent or not to 
consent to a search, the analysis quickly and necessarily bogs down in a lengthy 
consideration of the principles of consent—implied and otherwise. But these principles 
are not fundamentally constitutional in nature—which is to say, the existence of consent 
only enters the analysis if the state does not have an otherwise constitutional Fourth 
Amendment right to perform a search.  
 
By making this case about consent, the majority effectively looks at this appeal 
through the wrong end of the telescope and ends up with a myopic interpretation of 
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025. If it were merely a question of whether the majority's 
interpretation of the statute (criminalizing the revocation of implied consent) is 
reasonable, I would have no quarrel. But this is a due process challenge arising out of 
rights protected by the Fourth Amendment. Our analysis must therefore contend 
principally with the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment—viz., the right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. The proper question to ask in this appeal is 
whether K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025 always results in an interference with this Fourth 
Amendment right. This framing would allow the court to vindicate the principle of 
constitutional avoidance by considering whether there is a reasonable, plausible, or fair 
competing interpretation of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025 that does not, or may not in all 
 
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circumstances, violate a person's due process right to insist that he or she not be searched 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. And, in fact, there is genuinely such an alternative 
interpretation. 
 
Beginning at the wrong place, today's majority ends up concluding that K.S.A. 
2014 Supp. 8-1025 makes it "a crime to withdraw the implied consent that arises under 
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1001 by expressly refusing the test." Slip op., Syl. ¶ 5. In so doing, 
the majority dramatically narrows and limits the applicability of the actual elements of 
the crime set forth in the statute and rejects out of hand any broader consideration of 
whether the statutory language actually makes it a crime to "refus[e] to submit to a test 
authorized under a warrant exception other than consent." Slip op., Syl. ¶ 5. The majority 
likewise rejects the third possibility that the statute makes it a crime to refuse to submit to 
certain tests "conducted pursuant to a warrant." Slip op. at 24. Under either of these latter 
two interpretive possibilities, there is no constitutional right to refuse the test. There is, in 
fact, no legally operative "consent" that might be "revoked." This is because of the well-
settled principle that a person has no right to refuse consent to a search that is authorized 
by the Fourth Amendment—either because it is a search pursuant to a warrant or it is a 
search pursuant to a warrant exception other than consent. See, e.g., South Dakota v. 
Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560 n.10, 103 S. Ct. 916, 74 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1983) (no right to 
refuse a constitutionally valid blood-alcohol test under Schmerber exigency standard); 
Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 806 F.2d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Consent in 
the constitutional sense is only required where the defendant has a legal right to refuse."); 
United States v. Habig, 474 F.2d 57, 61 (7th Cir.) (Corporate officer has no constitutional 
right to refuse production of corporate records in response to a lawful request.), cert. 
denied 411 U.S. 972 (1973); State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 773 (Minn.), cert. 
granted 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015) (A defendant "does not have a fundamental right to refuse 
a constitutional search."); State v. Turner, 263 Neb. 896, 899, 644 N.W.2d 147 (2002) 
 
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(When a search is constitutionally valid "a suspect's right to refuse a chemical test is a 
matter governed purely by statute."); see also, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 
543, 550, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1968) ("When a law enforcement officer 
claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the 
occupant has no right to resist the search."); State v. Bennett, 288 Kan. 86, 92, 200 P.3d 
455 (2009) ("the Fourth Amendment does not protect against all searches and seizures, 
but only those that are unreasonable"); State v. Seabury, 267 Kan. 431, 438, 985 P.2d 
1162 (1999) (obstructing the execution of a search warrant supported a misdemeanor 
obstruction charge). 
 
Therefore, if the statute is interpreted broadly enough to encompass either of the 
two latter factual scenarios, it can be saved from encroaching on any constitutionally 
protected right—at least in the circumstances described by those scenarios. The only 
remaining question is whether such an interpretation of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025 is 
genuinely reasonable, plausible, or fair. In my view, it is. 
 
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025, by its own terms, makes it a crime for certain persons 
to "refus[e] to submit to or complete a test or tests deemed consented to under subsection 
(a) of K.S.A. 8-1001." Notably, the plain language of the statute criminalizes the physical 
act of refusing to submit to a test, not, as the majority would have it, the claiming of a 
specific legal status—i.e., "withdrawing consent to search." The other element of the 
crime, in addition to refusal, is simply a definition of the kind of test which it is a crime 
to refuse. "Tests deemed consented to" is a broad term and applies to "all quantitative and 
qualitative tests for alcohol and drugs" of a person "who operates or attempts to operate a 
vehicle within this state." K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1001(a). That is the extent of the statute's 
own terms. A literal rendition of the statute that reads the referenced provisions of K.S.A. 
2014 Supp. 8-1001(a) directly into the elements of the crime looks like this:  K.S.A. 2014 
 
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Supp. 8-1025 makes it a crime for a person with certain clearly defined prior convictions, 
who has operated or attempted to operate a vehicle in the state of Kansas, to refuse to 
submit to or complete any quantitative or qualitative test for alcohol or drugs. Nowhere in 
the statute's plain language is there any reference to withdrawing or revoking consent, or 
otherwise asserting any legal right. The majority simply adds this gloss onto the language 
because it has analytically painted itself into the corner of "consent."  
 
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1001(a) indicates that the tests at issue in K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 
8-1025 are "subject to the provisions" of Chapter 8, Article 10 of the Kansas Statutes. As 
the majority points out, Article 10 "limit[s] the circumstances under which '[a] law 
enforcement officer shall request a person to submit to a test or tests deemed consented to 
under subsection (a).' K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1001(b)." Slip op. at 12. Importantly, while 
Article 10 restricts the circumstances in which a law enforcement officer may administer 
a test, it is far from clear that Article 10 does anything to limit the class of tests "deemed 
consented to under subsection (a)." K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1001(b). 
 
Regardless, rather than confirming the majority's characterization of K.S.A. 2014 
Supp. 8-1025 as criminalizing the revocation of consent, a quick perusal of the many 
different conditions imposed on law enforcement by the remainder of Chapter 8, Article 
10 actually demonstrates that such tests were contemplated by the legislature in 
circumstances in which consent is irrelevant. For example, K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1001(p) 
contemplates that in some circumstances, the tests deemed consented to will actually be 
administered pursuant to either a search warrant or a search incident to arrest. Thus, if a 
law enforcement officer obtained the warrant expressly contemplated by K.S.A. 2014 
Supp. 8-1001(p), and requested "such test or tests" pursuant to that warrant, a person 
would have no legal right to refuse to submit to that test. Assuming the validity of the 
warrant, such a hypothetical person could be convicted of refusing to submit to that 
 
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test—a test expressly "deemed consented to"—without any due process violation of that 
person's Fourth Amendment rights. That person's consent, implied or actual, revoked or 
not, would be entirely beside the point.  
 
Likewise, exigency continues to be a possible source of legal authority, on a case-
by-case basis, for a search via a "test deemed consented to." See Missouri v. McNeely, 
569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013). In part, this is because, as 
a matter of law, tests that are statutorily "deemed consented to" may in actual fact not be 
consented to—or the deemed consent may be constitutionally infirm. See, e.g., State v. 
Declerck, 49 Kan. App. 2d 908, 909-10, 922, 317 P.3d 794, rev. denied 299 Kan. 1271 
(2014); State v. Dawes, No. 111,310, 2015 WL 5036690, at *4 (Kan. App. 2015) 
(unpublished opinion). But this does not mean that the tests are somehow no longer in the 
statutory category of tests "deemed consented to." They plainly are. The majority 
dismisses this common sense, plain reading approach as "oxymoronic," reasoning that 
when a "person has expressly refused consent . . . it would be incongruous . . . to say the 
person was deemed to have consented to the test." Slip op. at 25. Here the majority 
mistakenly concludes that a determination of whether a certain test belongs in the 
statutory class of tests "deemed consented to" is contingent upon, not the test, but the 
person's response to a lawful request to submit to the test. According to the majority, 
simply by refusing to submit to a test, a person can render the test requested one that no 
longer belongs in the statutory category of a test deemed consented to. The internal 
inconsistencies are clear. This is no way to conduct statutory analysis. 
 
In my view, the determination of whether any requested test fits the statutory class 
of tests "deemed consented to" should be made by looking at the statutory scheme, not by 
looking to the legal or practical effectiveness of that statutorily "deemed" consent. And 
there is nothing to prevent the State from lawfully seeking to administer a "test deemed 
 
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consented to"—even in circumstances where that statutory declaration is legally or 
factually ineffective—other than the Fourth Amendment. If the Fourth Amendment has 
otherwise been complied with, the test may proceed, and a refusal to submit is, in fact, a 
refusal to submit to a test deemed consented to.  
 
This is not only a possible reasonable, plausible, and fair interpretation of the 
statutory language, it is the most reasonable, plausible, and fair interpretation—especially 
in light of the plain language of the statute. To illustrate the point one final time:  The 
question must be asked, is it possible for a "test deemed consented to" to be lawful 
without consent? The answer is, of course, yes. The physical act of refusing to submit to 
such a test can be criminalized by the state without running afoul of the defendant's due 
process rights. Because there are numerous scenarios in which a reasonable application of 
the actual language and elements contained in K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025 would not be 
unconstitutional, the statute should survive any facial challenge. By rejecting that 
reasonable application of the actual language and elements of the statute in order to strike 
it down as facially unconstitutional, the majority has neglected our interpretive duty to 
avoid a finding of unconstitutionality when a reasonable, plausible, and fair alternative is 
genuinely available.  
 
Because it is reasonable to conclude that the statute prohibits conduct, in some 
circumstances, that is not constitutionally protected, the constitutionality of the statute 
can only be determined on a case-by-case, as applied, basis and we should not declare the 
statute to be facially unconstitutional. In so doing, today's decision has undermined the 
"basic democratic function" of our avoidance doctrine which functions to maintain, 
insofar as is possible, "the policy choices that elected representatives have made." 
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 238.  
 
 
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