Title: State v. Denson
Citation: 2011 WI 70
Docket Number: 2009AP000694-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 13, 2011

2011 WI 70 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP694-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Rickey R. Denson, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 13, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 14, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Rock-Janesville 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. Byron 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C. J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J. joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the appellant-petitioner there were briefs by Donna 
Odrzywolski, Wauwatosa, and oral argument by Donna Odrzywolski. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Maura 
F.J. Whelen, assistant attorney general with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general, and oral argument by 
Maura F.J. Whelen. 
 
 
 
 
2011 WI 70
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP694-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2002CF2097) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Rickey R. Denson, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 13, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished order of the court of appeals, State v. Denson, No. 
2009AP694-CR, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2010), 
that summarily affirmed an order by the Rock County Circuit 
Court1 
denying 
the 
defendant's 
postconviction 
motion 
for 
acquittal or, alternatively, a new trial.   
¶2 
After a trial in which the defendant, Rickey R. Denson 
(Denson), testified in his own defense, a jury found Denson 
guilty 
of 
first-degree 
recklessly 
endangering 
safety 
in 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Michael R. Fitzpatrick presided. 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
2 
 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.30(1) (2001-02),2 as a lesser 
included offense of attempted first-degree intentional homicide; 
and false imprisonment in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.30.3  The 
jury acquitted Denson of the remaining two charges of first-
degree sexual assault of a child contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(1)4 and negligent handling of a dangerous weapon 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(a).5  The circuit court 
entered judgment on the jury verdict.6 
¶3 
Denson 
moved 
the 
circuit 
court 
for 
a 
judgment 
acquitting him of the first two charges or, alternatively, an 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 941.30, "Recklessly endangering safety," 
provides, 
in 
relevant 
part: 
"(1) 
First-degree 
recklessly 
endangering safety.  Whoever recklessly endangers another's 
safety under circumstances which show utter disregard for human 
life is guilty of a Class F felony." 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.30, "False imprisonment," provides: 
"Whoever intentionally confines or restrains another without the 
person's consent and with knowledge that he or she has no lawful 
authority to do so is guilty of a Class H felony." 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02, "Sexual assault of a child," 
provides, in relevant part: "(1) First degree sexual assault.  
Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person 
who has not attained the age of 13 years is guilty of a Class B 
felony." 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 941.20, "Endangering safety by use of 
dangerous weapon," states, in relevant part: "(1) Whoever does 
any of the following is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor: (a) 
Endangers another's safety by the negligent operation or 
handling of a dangerous weapon . . . ." 
6 The Honorable Michael J. Byron presided. 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
3 
 
order granting him a new trial on the grounds that the circuit 
court failed to engage him in an on-the-record colloquy 
regarding his right not to testify.  Relying on this court's 
decision in State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 
N.W.2d 485, 
Denson 
argued 
that 
a 
criminal 
defendant's 
constitutional right not to testify is a fundamental right that 
can be waived only by the defendant personally with an on-the-
record colloquy.   
¶4 
The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing at which 
both Denson and his trial counsel testified.  The circuit court 
then denied Denson's postconviction motion, concluding that 
Denson knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his 
right not to testify. 
¶5 
Denson appealed, and the court of appeals summarily 
affirmed. 
¶6 
We granted Denson's petition for review and now 
affirm. 
¶7 
This case presents the following issues for our 
review: 
(1) 
Is a criminal defendant's constitutional right not to 
testify a fundamental right that can be waived only by 
the 
defendant 
personally 
with 
an 
on-the-record 
colloquy? 
(2) 
Once a defendant properly raises in a postconviction 
motion the issue of an invalid waiver of the right not 
to testify, what is an appropriate remedy to ensure 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
4 
 
that 
the 
defendant 
knowingly, 
voluntarily, 
and 
intelligently waived his or her right not to testify? 
(3) 
Did Denson knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
waive his right not to testify? 
¶8 
A criminal defendant's constitutional right not to 
testify is a fundamental right that must be waived knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently.  However, we conclude that 
circuit courts are not required to conduct an on-the-record 
colloquy 
to 
determine 
whether 
a 
defendant 
is 
knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently waiving his or her right not to 
testify.  While we recommend such a colloquy as the better 
practice, we decline to extend the mandate pronounced in Weed.  
In 
any 
case, 
once 
a 
defendant 
properly 
raises 
in 
a 
postconviction motion the issue of an invalid waiver of the 
right not to testify, an evidentiary hearing is an appropriate 
remedy to ensure that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently waived his or her right not to testify. 
¶9 
In 
this 
case, 
the 
circuit 
court 
conducted 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing 
and 
properly 
concluded 
that 
Denson 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right not 
to testify. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶10 We derive these facts from the testimony presented at 
trial.  To the extent that the facts are disputed, we so 
indicate. 
¶11 Up until August 2002, Denson had a six-year on again, 
off again romantic relationship with T.T.  For the last year of 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
5 
 
their relationship, the couple resided together in a house in 
Beloit, Wisconsin. 
¶12 On August 6, 2002, at around 6:00 p.m., T.T. returned 
home from work.  As the store manager of a restaurant, it was 
T.T.'s responsibility to bring the daily deposit to the bank.  
That evening, T.T. did not bring the deposit to the bank and 
instead drove directly home to bring dinner to her 11-year-old 
daughter, A.K.T.  A.K.T. and T.T.'s son then spent the night at 
their respective friends' houses. 
¶13 After dinner, Denson and T.T. started arguing over the 
couple's finances.  According to Denson, the argument began 
because he was angry at T.T. for paying for dinner with money 
out of the restaurant's deposit.  T.T., on the other hand, 
testified that Denson was angry because T.T. refused to look for 
her car title.  They continued to argue until they eventually 
fell asleep on the futon in the living room. 
¶14 Denson and T.T. awoke around 4:00 a.m. and resumed 
their argument.  At this point, their testimony significantly 
diverges.  For purposes of describing the remaining facts, we 
first recount T.T.'s testimony, followed by Denson's. 
¶15 According to T.T., the argument intensified when 
Denson threatened to break off the relationship but said that he 
could not leave because T.T. "was going to call the police on 
him anyway."  Specifically, Denson expressed that he was afraid 
to leave T.T. "because of what he's done to [T.T.'s] daughter," 
A.K.T.  Denson then informed T.T. that he had pulled A.K.T.'s 
pants down, performed oral sex on her, and fondled her breasts.  
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
6 
 
Denson's account evoked an earlier report given by A.K.T. to 
T.T.  T.T. then told Denson that "it didn't matter, whatever he 
did, he just needed to go, he needed to get out." 
¶16 At that point, T.T. testified, Denson came towards 
her, and she felt a sharp pain on the left side of her neck.  
When she reached up to her neck, she "felt something liquidy" 
and realized she was bleeding.  Denson proceeded to push T.T. 
back onto the futon and smother her face with a pillow.  T.T. 
managed to turn herself around and bite down on Denson's left 
pinkie finger until he let her go. 
¶17 T.T. then recounted how she, feeling lightheaded, went 
to the kitchen sink to splash cold water on her face.  While 
bent over the sink, she felt what she thought was a frying pan 
hit the back of her head.  Eventually, T.T. noticed a newly 
broken chair in the kitchen and figured that to be the object 
she was hit with. 
¶18 T.T. described how she thought she was going to die 
and had begged Denson to leave her alone.  She told him that she 
would not call the police; she just needed help.  Denson, 
however, instructed her to go down into the basement.  When T.T. 
refused, Denson picked her up and carried her over to the 
basement stairs, eventually shoving her down.  T.T. fell down 
the stairs and struck a brick wall at the bottom.  When asked 
how hard she landed against the brick wall, she responded, "Hard 
enough that it split my nose open." 
¶19 T.T. attempted to climb back up the stairs.  When she 
neared the top, Denson told her "that [she] needed to get back 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
7 
 
down the steps or he was going to kill [her]."  T.T. obliged, 
and Denson left for a few minutes.   
¶20 When Denson returned, he instructed T.T. to stand up 
against a post that was supporting the stairs.  T.T. again 
obliged, and Denson began tying her to the post with phone wire, 
cords, and torn sheets.  After stuffing her mouth with a towel, 
Denson kissed T.T. on the cheek and told her he loved her. 
¶21 Denson went back upstairs and eventually drove off in 
T.T.'s car. 
¶22 T.T managed to untie herself and get back upstairs.  
While unclear on how long she had been tied up, T.T. testified 
that by the time she made it upstairs, a clock indicated it was 
almost 10:00 a.m.  T.T. went outside and screamed for help.  A 
neighbor called 911, and shortly thereafter, police officers 
arrived. 
¶23 It is undisputed that T.T. suffered from stab wounds 
on her neck and shoulder, a laceration on her nose, and multiple 
bruises across her body.  It is further undisputed that Denson 
tied her up to the post in the basement.  However, Denson 
disputes the events that led up to T.T. being tied up. 
¶24 According to Denson, his argument with T.T. at 4:00 
a.m. on August 7, 2002, centered on Denson informing T.T. that 
he had fathered a child with another woman.  When Denson told 
T.T. that he planned to support the baby, T.T. responded by 
threatening to have Denson put in jail for molesting A.K.T. 
¶25 Denson testified that their argument turned physical.  
When he approached T.T., she "pulled her arm back . . . and 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
8 
 
[Denson] seen [sic] something in there, but [] didn't know 
exactly what it was, and [he] grabbed it."  When he grabbed the 
object, he cut his pinkie finger.  According to Denson, they 
wrestled with the object until T.T. fell backwards onto the 
futon.  Denson "felt something wet on [him]" and realized that 
T.T. had been cut. 
¶26 Denson indicated that T.T. then went into the kitchen 
and on her way, fell over an already broken chair.  She 
threatened Denson that "if you leave me, I'm going to say you 
did all this."  Denson told T.T. she should go to the hospital, 
but T.T. refused, stating, "[D]on't worry about it.  It's only a 
scratch." 
¶27 T.T. continued her threats to blame Denson.  By his 
own admission, he then brought her down to the basement and tied 
her up.  When asked on direct examination why he brought T.T. 
down to the basement, he responded, "Because she had told me 
that because I had a criminal record, they ain't going to 
believe me.  They going to believe her, and I panic."  Denson 
denied gagging T.T. and reported instead that he gave her a 
towel to help stop the bleeding. 
¶28 Denson conceded that he then drove away in T.T.'s car.  
Before leaving, however, he told T.T. that "as soon as [he] 
leave[s] town, [he] was just going to call someone to come and 
get her." 
¶29 On direct examination, Denson testified that he had no 
intention of killing T.T.: 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
9 
 
Q [Attorney Howard, counsel for Denson]: Did you at 
any point during this incident tell [T.T.] you 
intended to kill her? 
A [Denson]: No, I didn't. 
Q: Were you intending to? 
A: No, she——no, she——she attacked me. 
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶30 On August 8, 2002, the State charged Denson with 
attempted first-degree intentional homicide, false imprisonment, 
first-degree sexual assault of a child, and negligent handling 
of a dangerous weapon.   
¶31 Denson pled not guilty, and the case proceeded to a 
jury trial on October 26 through October 29, 2004.  The over 
two-year delay was due largely to the fact that Denson went 
through five attorneys.  Relevant to the issue before us today, 
Denson, through two of his attorneys, including his trial 
counsel, twice filed motions to sever and conduct a separate 
trial on the count of first-degree sexual assault of a child.  
Denson argued that joinder of the sexual assault count with the 
other three counts would unduly prejudice him because, inter 
alia, "if he chooses to testify, [Denson] will have to testify 
to two unrelated sets of facts that are separated in time by a 
matter of months."  The circuit court denied both motions. 
¶32 Denson was represented at trial by Attorney Robert C. 
Howard, III (Attorney Howard).  Initially, Denson asked not to 
be represented by Attorney Howard, and Attorney Howard was 
appointed only as standby counsel.  Denson subsequently filed 
several pro se motions, including at least three motions for 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
10 
 
dismissal, a motion for bond reduction, and a demand for a 
speedy trial.  Thereafter, Denson changed his mind and opted to 
have Attorney Howard represent him at trial. 
¶33 At trial, the State's key witnesses were T.T. and her 
daughter, A.K.T.  Denson testified in his own defense.  The 
circuit court did not engage Denson in a colloquy regarding his 
right not to testify.  In his defense, Denson denied sexually 
assaulting A.K.T. and maintained that T.T. was stabbed only 
after she attacked him.   
¶34 The 
jury 
found 
Denson 
guilty 
of 
first-degree 
recklessly endangering safety, as a lesser included offense of 
attempted 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide, 
and 
false 
imprisonment.  The jury acquitted Denson of the remaining two 
charges of first-degree sexual assault of a child and negligent 
handling of a dangerous weapon. 
¶35 The circuit court entered judgment on the jury 
verdict.  On the count of first-degree recklessly endangering 
safety, the circuit court sentenced Denson to ten years 
imprisonment, comprised of five years in initial confinement and 
five years extended supervision.  On the count of false 
imprisonment, the circuit court sentenced Denson to five years 
imprisonment, concurrent with the first count. 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
11 
 
¶36 On December 4, 2008,7 Denson filed a postconviction 
motion, requesting the circuit court to enter a judgment of 
acquittal or, alternatively, grant him a new trial on the 
grounds that the circuit court failed to engage him in an on-
the-record colloquy regarding his right not to testify.  Relying 
on this court's decision in Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, Denson argued 
that a criminal defendant's constitutional right not to testify 
is a fundamental right that can be waived only by the defendant 
personally with an on-the-record colloquy.  The circuit court's 
failure to engage Denson in such a colloquy, he argued, violated 
his right to due process of law and privilege against self-
incrimination guaranteed by the United States Constitution and 
the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶37 Guided by the court of appeals' decision in State v. 
Jaramillo, 2009 WI App 39, 316 Wis. 2d 538, 765 N.W.2d 855, the 
circuit court concluded that it was not required to engage 
Denson in an on-the-record colloquy regarding his right not to 
                                                 
7 On August 1, 2006, Denson's then appellate counsel filed a 
No-Merit Notice of Appeal.  The court of appeals conducted an 
independent review of the record, see Anders v. California, 386 
U.S. 
738, 
744 
(1967), 
and 
identified 
a 
potential 
issue 
concerning whether Denson properly waived his right not to 
testify.  See State v. Denson, No. 2006AP1864-CRNM, unpublished 
order (Wis. Ct. App. July 17, 2008).  Thereafter, Denson's 
current appellate counsel informed the court of appeals that she 
believes the issue raised by the court has arguable merit and 
wishes to pursue it.  Accordingly, the court of appeals 
dismissed the no-merit appeal and extended the time for Denson 
to file a postconviction motion.  State v. Denson, No. 
2006AP1864-CRNM, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. November 3, 
2008). 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
12 
 
testify.  Since Denson raised the issue, however, the circuit 
court determined that it was obligated to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing to determine whether Denson knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently waived his right not to testify. 
¶38 Both Denson and Attorney Howard testified at the 
evidentiary hearing.  When asked whether he "chose to testify," 
Denson answered, "Yes."  Denson acknowledged that he had 
discussions with Attorney Howard regarding his decision to 
testify.  However, Denson maintained that Attorney Howard never 
informed him of his right not to testify, never told him that 
the jury would be instructed not to use his silence against him, 
and never advised him that the decision was his alone.  Rather, 
according to Denson, their discussions focused on the idea that 
Denson "had to testify because [he] had no witnesses with 
[him]." 
¶39 On cross-examination, Denson agreed that his defense 
at trial was that he did not sexually assault A.K.T. and did not 
intentionally stab T.T.  When asked how he thought he would 
defend the case without testifying, Denson responded, "I have no 
idea."  Finally, Denson denied that Attorney Howard was ever 
appointed standby counsel. 
¶40 Attorney Howard, on the other hand, testified that he 
met with Denson personally at least six times and that they 
discussed at length Denson's right to testify and right not to 
testify.  According to Attorney Howard, Denson "strongly urged" 
him to present a self-defense case.  Given the fact that only 
T.T. and Denson had knowledge of what happened, Attorney Howard 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
13 
 
counseled Denson to testify but still made clear that the choice 
was Denson's. 
¶41 In 
addition, 
Attorney 
Howard 
stated 
that 
he 
specifically 
discussed 
with 
Denson 
the 
advantages 
and 
disadvantages of testifying: 
Q [Attorney Donna Odrzywolski, counsel for Denson]: 
 . . .  Did you tell [Denson] that his testimony 
could be used against him to convict him of, say, 
for example, false imprisonment? 
A [Attorney Howard]: Yes.  And, in fact, I told him 
that if he took the stand, the disadvantages of 
taking the stand in terms of making a decision would 
be that he would be subject to cross-examination 
from [the Assistant District Attorney] and that he 
would be asked, and I talked to him and I discussed 
with 
him 
at 
some 
length 
about 
thing, 
[sic] 
admissions that he would have to make with regard to 
number of criminal convictions and things like that 
that would not, that would be used against him and 
would be something that would be brought out in 
front of the jury.  So yes, I did discuss that. 
Q: Okay.  Ultimately, did you, did you discuss with 
Mr. Denson the fact that only he could make that 
decision? 
A: Yes. 
¶42 At the close of the evidentiary hearing, the circuit 
court concluded that the State met its burden of proving by 
clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
that 
Denson 
knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right not to testify.  
In particular, the circuit court found that Denson knew he had 
the right 
not 
to 
testify, 
knew 
of 
the 
consequences of 
testifying, and knew that he could exercise his right not to 
testify even if Attorney Howard recommended otherwise.  The 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
14 
 
circuit court based those findings on a determination that 
Attorney Howard's testimony was more credible than Denson's.  
Specifically, the circuit court noted that Denson's claim of 
being unaware of his right not to testify was inconsistent with 
his aggressive demeanor and involvement throughout the case: 
"The record in this case shows that Mr. Denson, whatever other 
shortcomings he might have, is not shy about stating his 
opinions about things, including in court and to professionals."  
Moreover, the circuit court found that Denson was untruthful 
regarding Attorney Howard's initial role as standby counsel.  In 
comparison, the circuit court found Attorney Howard's testimony 
to be believable and consistent with the record. 
¶43 The 
circuit 
court 
therefore 
denied 
Denson's 
postconviction motion. 
¶44 Denson appealed, and the court of appeals summarily 
affirmed.  Denson, No. 2009AP694-CR, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. 
App. Oct. 5, 2010).  Citing Jaramillo, 316 Wis. 2d 538, ¶¶16-18, 
the court of appeals observed that a circuit court is not 
required to engage a criminal defendant in an on-the-record 
colloquy to ensure that he or she is knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently waiving the right not to testify.  Denson, No. 
2009AP694-CR, unpublished order, at 2.  "To the extent Denson 
nevertheless urge[d] that the right not to testify should 
require an on-the-record colloquy to ensure its waiver is 
intentional," the court of appeals concluded that only the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court possesses the supervisory authority 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
15 
 
necessary 
to 
promulgate 
rules 
of 
criminal 
practice 
and 
procedure.  Id. at 2-3. 
¶45 In addition, the court of appeals rejected Denson's 
argument that the postconviction evidentiary hearing was an 
inadequate remedy for determining whether Denson knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right not to testify: 
Citing State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 
N.W.2d 485, Denson emphasizes our supreme court's 
acknowledgement that a postconviction motion [sic] may 
not always be a sufficient remedy for the waiver of a 
fundamental right.  Id., ¶47.  Inherent in this 
acknowledgement, 
however, 
is 
recognition 
that 
a 
subsequent hearing is sometimes an adequate remedy.  
In the present case, there is nothing to suggest that 
the postconviction evidentiary hearing was not an 
adequate remedy. 
Denson, No. 2009AP694-CR, unpublished order, at 3.   
¶46 Denson petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on December 8, 2010.  We now affirm. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶47 In this case, we must determine whether a criminal 
defendant's constitutional right not to testify is a fundamental 
right that can be waived only by the defendant personally with 
an on-the-record colloquy.  That question requires us to apply 
constitutional principles and is therefore one that we review 
independently.  See Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶12; State v. 
Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶16, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727. 
¶48 In addition, whether Denson knowingly, voluntarily, 
and intelligently waived his right not to testify presents a 
question of constitutional fact; that is, a question the 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
16 
 
determination of which is decisive of constitutional rights.  
See Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶13; State v. Garcia, 2010 WI App 26, 
¶5, 
323 
Wis. 2d 531, 
779 
N.W.2d 718. 
 
A 
question 
of 
constitutional fact presents a mixed question of fact and law 
and is reviewed using a two-step process.  See State v. 
Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶22, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463; 
Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶13; Garcia, 323 Wis. 2d 531, ¶5; State 
v. Arredondo, 2004 WI App 7, ¶12, 269 Wis. 2d 369, 674 
N.W.2d 647.  "First, we review the circuit court's findings of 
historical fact under a deferential standard, upholding them 
unless they are clearly erroneous."  Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 
¶22; see also Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶13.  "Second, we 
independently apply constitutional principles to those facts."  
Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶22. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. A criminal defendant's constitutional right not to 
testify is a fundamental right that must be waived 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 
¶49 "Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in 
his own defense, or to refuse to do so."  Harris v. New York, 
401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).  A criminal defendant's corollary 
rights to testify and not to testify are guaranteed by both the 
United States Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶50 In Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 53 n.10 (1987), the 
United States Supreme Court made explicit that a criminal 
defendant's right to testify on his or her own behalf is a 
fundamental constitutional right.  The right is rooted in 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
17 
 
several provisions of the federal constitution, including the 
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law,8 id. at 
51, and the Sixth Amendment's right to "compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in [the defendant's] favor,"9 id. at 52.  As 
the Supreme Court explained, logically included in a criminal 
defendant's right to be heard and right to call witnesses is a 
right to present one's own testimony.  See id. at 51-52. 
¶51 Likewise, Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution expressly guarantees criminal defendants "the right 
to be heard by himself" and the right "to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf."  
Consistent with the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Rock, this 
court has "affirm[ed] that a criminal defendant's constitutional 
right to testify on his or her behalf is a fundamental right."  
Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶39. 
¶52 In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized that a 
criminal defendant's right to testify is "a necessary corollary 
to the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony."  
                                                 
8 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in 
relevant part, that no state shall "deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law."  U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV, § 1. 
9 The Sixth Amendment grants a criminal defendant the right, 
inter alia, "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses 
in his favor."  U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
The Sixth Amendment is made applicable to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 
44, 52 (1987) (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 
(1967)); see also State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, ¶20 n.8, 326 
Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40. 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
18 
 
Rock, 483 U.S. at 52.  The Fifth Amendment protects against 
self-incrimination, providing that no person "shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."  U.S. 
Const. amend. V.10  The Supreme Court has described the 
relationship between the right to testify and the right not to 
testify as follows: "The Fifth Amendment's privilege against 
self-incrimination 
is 
fulfilled 
only 
when 
an 
accused 
is 
guaranteed the right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak 
in the unfettered exercise of his own will.  The choice of 
whether to testify in one's own defense is an exercise of the 
constitutional privilege."  Rock, 483 U.S. at 53 (internal 
quotations omitted). 
¶53 A criminal defendant's right not to testify is 
regarded as so significant that the Fifth Amendment "further 
guarantees that no adverse inferences are to be drawn from the 
exercise of that privilege," Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 
305 (1981), and "forbids either comment by the prosecution on 
the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such 
silence is evidence of guilt," Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 
609, 615 (1965). 
¶54 Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution is 
the state counterpart to the Fifth Amendment and provides, in 
relevant part, that no person "may be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself or herself."  See also 
                                                 
10 The 
Fifth 
Amendment's 
privilege 
against 
self-
incrimination is made applicable to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
19 
 
State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶40 & n.8, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 
N.W.2d 142.   
¶55 In Jaramillo, the court of appeals reasoned that 
because the right to testify is a fundamental right, it follows 
that "the constitutionally articulated corollary to the right to 
testify——the right not to testify——is fundamental as well."  316 
Wis. 2d 538, ¶10 (citing Rock, 483 U.S. at 51-53; Weed, 263 
Wis. 2d 434, 
¶39). 
 
We 
agree. 
 
Accordingly, 
a 
criminal 
defendant's constitutional right not to testify is a fundamental 
right.   
¶56 Because the right not to testify is a fundamental 
right, we must "'indulge every reasonable presumption against 
[its] waiver.'"  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) 
(quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)); 
see also Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882).  A waiver 
of 
a 
fundamental 
right 
is 
"ordinarily 
an 
intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."  
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464; see also State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 265, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).  Accordingly, a criminal 
defendant must knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive 
his or her right not to testify.   
¶57 In the case now before us, Denson argues that the 
right not to testify can be waived only by the defendant 
personally with an on-the-record colloquy.  Denson's argument is 
premised upon our decision in Weed, in which we held that "the 
constitutional right of a criminal defendant to testify on his 
or her own behalf is a fundamental right; therefore, waiver of 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
20 
 
the right to testify requires that a circuit court conduct an 
on-the-record colloquy."  263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶48.  According to 
Denson, it is only logical that we extend the holding in Weed to 
include the corollary right not to testify. 
¶58 We do not view the analysis so simply.  While we 
recommend an on-the-record colloquy as the better practice, we 
decline to extend Weed to include the right not to testify.   
B. Circuit courts are not required to conduct an on-the-
record colloquy to determine whether a defendant is 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waiving his or 
her right not to testify. 
¶59 In Weed, this court imposed upon circuit courts an 
affirmative duty to conduct an on-the-record colloquy to ensure 
that a criminal defendant is knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently waiving his or her right to testify.  263 
Wis. 2d 434, ¶40.  In that case, after a trial in which the 
defendant did not testify, a jury found her guilty of first-
degree intentional homicide.  Id., ¶¶5-6.  At trial, the circuit 
court did not conduct a colloquy with the defendant to ensure 
that she was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waiving 
her right to testify.  Id., ¶6.  The defendant filed a 
postconviction motion for a new trial, arguing, inter alia, that 
she did not validly waive her right to testify on her own 
behalf.  Id., ¶7.  The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing 
at which both the defendant and her trial counsel testified.  
Id.  Based upon "'the post-trial testimony of defendant's 
counsel, other choices made by the defendant during trial, and 
the court's interaction with the defendant during the course of 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
21 
 
the trial,'" the circuit court concluded that the defendant 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived her right to 
testify.  Id.  The court of appeals affirmed.  Id., ¶8. 
¶60 Upon review, this court affirmed, though on different 
grounds.  We concluded that a criminal defendant's right to 
testify is a fundamental right and that circuit courts are 
required to conduct an on-the-record colloquy to ensure that the 
defendant is knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waiving 
his or her right to testify.  Id., ¶40.  We arrived at our 
conclusion by considering other cases in which we have held that 
a circuit court must conduct a colloquy with the defendant, 
including when a defendant waives his or her right to counsel, 
see State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), 
and when a defendant waives his or her right to a jury trial, 
see State v. Anderson, 2002 WI 7, 249 Wis. 2d 586, 638 
N.W.2d 301.  Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶39.  We explained that the 
decision to waive such rights is "so fundamental to the concept 
of fair and impartial decision making, that their relinquishment 
must meet the standard set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458 (1938).  That is, the waiver must be an intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."  
Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶40 (internal quotations omitted).  We 
determined 
that 
"[t]his 
same 
rationale 
applies 
to 
the 
fundamental right of a criminal defendant to testify on his or 
her behalf."  Id. 
¶61 Accordingly, we held that in order to ensure that a 
defendant is knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waiving 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
22 
 
his or her right to testify, circuit courts should conduct an 
on-the-record colloquy with the defendant, outside the jury's 
presence, and inquire whether the defendant (1) is aware of his 
or her right to testify and (2) has discussed this right with 
his or her counsel.  Id., ¶43. 
¶62 In Weed, notwithstanding the fact that the circuit 
court did not conduct a colloquy with the defendant, we 
concluded 
that 
the 
defendant 
knowingly, 
voluntarily, 
and 
intelligently waived her right to testify based upon our review 
of the record and the evidence presented at the postconviction 
evidentiary hearing.  Id., ¶44.  Still, we reserved for another 
day the issue of whether a postconviction evidentiary hearing 
would always be sufficient to ensure that a criminal defendant 
validly waived his or her right to testify.  Id., ¶47 ("Since 
Weed was provided an adequate remedy from the post-conviction 
hearing and the parties did not fully brief the issue of remedy, 
we do not decide the appropriate remedy if a circuit court fails 
to conduct an on-the-record colloquy with a criminal defendant 
to ensure that the defendant is waiving his or her right to 
testify."). 
¶63 Turning to the central issue before us today, we 
decline to extend Weed to include the corollary to the right to 
testify——the right not to testify.  That is, we conclude that 
circuit courts are not required to conduct an on-the-record 
colloquy 
to 
determine 
whether 
a 
defendant 
is 
knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently waiving his or her right not to 
testify.   
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
23 
 
¶64 As the Weed court recognized, we are in the small 
minority of jurisdictions that impose an affirmative duty upon 
circuit courts to conduct an on-the-record colloquy to ensure 
that a criminal defendant is knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waiving his or her right to testify.11  263 
Wis. 2d 434, ¶41.  The vast majority of jurisdictions do not 
impose such a duty upon circuit courts,12 and in fact, many 
jurisdictions advise against it.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Webber, 208 F.3d 545, 552 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 760 (9th Cir. 1989); Illinois v. 
Shelton, 624 N.E.2d 1205, 1211 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Taylor v. 
Kansas, 843 P.2d 682, 688 (Kan. 1992); Massachusetts v. Waters, 
                                                 
11 Other jurisdictions that mandate a Weed-type colloquy 
include Alaska, see Mute v. Alaska, 954 P.2d 1384, 1386-87 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1998); Colorado, see Colorado v. Curtis, 681 
P.2d 504, 514-15 (Colo. 1984); Hawaii, see Tachibana v. Hawai'i, 
900 P.2d 1293, 1303 (Haw. 1995); South Carolina, see South 
Carolina v. Davis, 422 S.E.2d 133, 145 (S.C. 1992), overruled on 
other grounds by Brightman v. South Carolina, 520 S.E.2d 614, 
616 n.5 (S.C. 1999); Tennessee, see Momon v. Tennessee, 18 
S.W.3d 152, 162 (Tenn. 1999), reh'g granted, 18 S.W.3d 152, 175 
(Tenn. 2000) (concluding that a criminal defendant may waive the 
right to testify by signing a written waiver or by engaging in 
the voir dire procedure set out in the initial decision); and 
West Virginia, see West Virginia v. Neuman, 371 S.E.2d 77, 81-82 
(W. Va. 1988). 
12 For a comprehensive list of jurisdictions that do not 
require circuit courts to conduct an on-the-record colloquy to 
ensure that a criminal defendant is knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily waiving his or her right to testify, see Johnson 
v. Texas, 169 S.W.3d 223, 232 n.50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).  See 
also Michele C. Kaminski, Annotation, Requirement that Court 
Advise Accused of, and Make Inquiry with Respect to, Waiver of 
Right to Testify, 72 A.L.R.5th 403 (1999). 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
24 
 
506 N.E.2d 859, 865 (Mass. 1987).  Their reasons for not 
mandating an on-the-record colloquy are many.  See Martinez, 883 
F.2d at 760.  The most notable include that by advising the 
defendant of his or her right to testify, the circuit court 
might inadvertently influence the defendant to waive his or her 
right not to testify, might improperly intrude upon the 
attorney-client relationship or interfere with defense strategy, 
or might lead the defendant into believing that his or her 
defense counsel is somehow deficient.  See Webber, 208 F.3d at 
551-52; United States v. Ortiz, 82 F.3d 1066, 1069-70 (D.C. Cir. 
1996); Martinez, 883 F.2d at 760. 
¶65 We believe that these risks apply with even greater 
force to a circuit court's inquiry into a criminal defendant's 
decision 
to 
testify. 
 
Defense 
counsel 
has 
the 
primary 
responsibility for advising the defendant of his or her 
corollary rights to testify and not to testify and for 
explaining the tactical implications of both.  "[V]iewed 
objectively, 
the 
defendant's 
testimony 
may 
increase 
the 
likelihood of conviction."  Colorado v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117, 125 
(Colo. 1986).  In that sense, we believe it "unlikely that a 
competent defense counsel would allow a defendant to take the 
stand without a full explanation of the right to remain silent 
and the possible consequences of waiving that right."  Id.  Once 
a defendant, counseled by his or her attorney, makes the 
decision to testify, a circuit court's inquiry into whether the 
defendant is aware of his or her corollary right not to testify 
runs a real risk of interfering with defense strategy and 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
25 
 
inadvertently suggesting to the defendant that the court 
disapproves of his or her decision to testify.  For well over a 
century, the Supreme Court has made clear that circuit courts 
ought not to comment on a criminal defendant's decision to 
testify, lest the value of the right be diminished:  
[I]t 
must 
be 
remembered 
that 
men 
may 
testify 
truthfully, although their lives hang in the balance, 
and that the law, in its wisdom, has provided that the 
accused shall have the right to testify in his own 
behalf.  Such a privilege would be a vain one if the 
judge . . . should 
intimate 
that 
the 
dreadful 
condition in which the accused finds himself should 
deprive his testimony of probability.   
Allison v. United States, 160 U.S. 203, 207 (1895).  We believe 
that same principle holds true today. 
¶66 Therefore, different from our conclusion in Weed, see 
263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶¶41-42, we conclude that the risk that a 
circuit court's inquiry into a criminal defendant's decision to 
testify will influence the defendant to waive his or her right 
to testify or will improperly interfere with defense strategy 
outweighs the benefit of mandating an on-the-record colloquy to 
ensure that the defendant is knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently waiving his or her right not to testify. 
¶67 At the same time, as a practical matter, we recognize 
that conducting an on-the-record colloquy "is the clearest and 
most efficient means" of ensuring that the defendant has validly 
waived his or her right not to testify "and of preserving and 
documenting that valid waiver for purposes of appeal and 
postconviction motions."  See Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206; see 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
26 
 
also Anderson, 249 Wis. 2d 586, ¶23.  Here, for instance, we are 
mindful of the fact that had the circuit court engaged Denson in 
an on-the-record colloquy regarding his right not to testify, 
this case likely would not be before us.  Accordingly, we 
recommend an on-the-record colloquy as the better practice.  In 
fact, the Special Materials prepared by the Wisconsin Criminal 
Jury Instructions Committee already direct circuit courts to 
inquire into a criminal defendant's understanding of both the 
right to testify and the right not to testify.  See Wis JI——
Criminal SM-28. 
C. A postconviction evidentiary hearing is an appropriate 
remedy 
to 
ensure 
that 
a 
defendant 
knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently waived his or her right 
not to testify. 
¶68 In any case, whether or not the circuit court conducts 
an on-the-record colloquy, it remains that a criminal defendant 
must knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his or her 
right not to testify.  It follows that a defendant may raise in 
a postconviction motion the issue of an invalid waiver of the 
right not to testify.  Once a defendant properly raises the 
issue, we determine that a postconviction evidentiary hearing is 
an appropriate remedy to ensure that a defendant knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently waived his or her right not to 
testify.  This is the same remedy that we adopted to address a 
criminal defendant's claim that he or she did not validly waive 
the right to counsel, see Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206-07, or did 
not validly enter a guilty plea, see Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 
274-75. 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
27 
 
¶69 Relying on our decision in State v. Livingston, 159 
Wis. 2d 561, 464 N.W.2d 839 (1991), Denson urges us to adopt 
automatic reversal and a new trial as the appropriate remedy for 
when a circuit court does not conduct a colloquy with the 
defendant or when there is otherwise no evidence in the record 
that the defendant took a personal affirmative step to waive his 
or her right not to testify.13  See Anderson, 249 Wis. 2d 586, 
¶25.  However, as we explained in Livingston, the remedy of a 
new trial for a defendant who did not, on the record, personally 
and affirmatively waive his or her right to a jury trial is 
consistent with an express statutory mandate.  159 Wis. 2d at 
573.  Specifically, Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) provides, in relevant 
part, that "criminal cases shall be tried by a jury . . . unless 
the defendant waives a jury in writing or by statement in open 
                                                 
13 Denson also argues that a circuit court's complete 
failure to engage a criminal defendant in an on-the-record 
colloquy regarding his or her right not to testify should not be 
subject to harmless error analysis.  However, the harmless error 
rule has no application to this case.  The harmless error rule 
prohibits reversal for errors, even constitutional ones, not 
affecting a party's substantial rights.  See State v. Harvey, 
2002 WI 93, ¶39, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 (citing Wis. 
Stat. §§ 805.18, 972.11(1)).  As a preliminary matter, we have 
concluded that a circuit court does not err by failing to engage 
a criminal defendant in an on-the-record colloquy regarding his 
or her right not to testify.  More to the point, however, the 
State does not argue, and we do not adopt, the position that a 
circuit court's failure to conduct such a colloquy is harmless.  
Rather, we conclude that whether or not a circuit court conducts 
an on-the-record colloquy, once a defendant properly raises in a 
postconviction motion the issue of an invalid waiver of the 
right not to testify, the circuit court must conduct an 
evidentiary 
hearing 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
defendant 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his or her 
right not to testify. 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
28 
 
court . . . , on the record, with the approval of the court and 
the consent of the state."  (Emphasis added.)  In other words, 
pursuant to § 972.02(1), when a criminal defendant does not 
validly waive his or her right to a jury trial, "there must be a 
trial by jury."  Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d at 573.  On the other 
hand, when there is no statute that provides for a specific 
remedy for an invalid waiver of a fundamental right, as is the 
case with the right to testify and the right not to testify, it 
may be that "the ends of justice . . . can be served by allowing 
the defendant a postconviction hearing, [and] a new trial would 
be inappropriate."  Id. at 572. 
¶70 Accordingly, consistent with the remedy adopted in 
Klessig and Bangert, we conclude that once a defendant properly 
raises in a postconviction motion the issue of an invalid waiver 
of the right not to testify, the circuit court must conduct an 
evidentiary 
hearing 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
defendant 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his or her 
right not to testify.  The initial burden rests with the 
defendant to make a prima facie showing that he or she did not 
know or understand that he or she had the right not to testify.  
See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.  The burden then shifts to the 
State to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his 
or her right not to testify.  See id.; Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 
207.  In essence, the State will be required to demonstrate that 
the defendant knew he or she had the right not to testify, 
understood the consequences of waiving the right not to testify, 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
29 
 
and understood that the decision whether to testify was for him 
or her to make.  To so demonstrate, the State may utilize the 
entire record and may examine both the defendant and the 
defendant's trial counsel at the evidentiary hearing.  See 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 275 ("[P]ermitting the state to show by 
clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
that 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances demonstrates a knowing and voluntary plea in fact 
achieves the requirement of the constitutional standard.").  If 
the State is able to satisfy its burden, then the conviction 
will stand.  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 207.  On the other hand, if 
the State is unable to demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence 
that 
the 
defendant 
knowingly, 
voluntarily, 
and 
intelligently waived his or her right not to testify, then the 
defendant is entitled to a new trial.  See id. 
D. Denson knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived 
his right not to testify. 
¶71 In 
this 
case, 
the 
circuit 
court 
conducted 
a 
postconviction evidentiary hearing and concluded that the State 
met its burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence 
that Denson knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his 
right not to testify.  We agree. 
¶72 At the close of the evidentiary hearing, the circuit 
court made several findings of historical fact.  The circuit 
court found that Attorney Howard had consulted with Denson at 
least six times and that they had discussed at length Denson's 
corollary rights to testify and not to testify.  The circuit 
court further found that the subject of those discussions 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
30 
 
included the advantages and disadvantages of testifying and the 
fact that Denson did not have to testify, even if Attorney 
Howard recommended otherwise.  In addition, the circuit court 
denied that Denson was a naïve criminal defendant and in fact 
found Denson to be vocal and aggressive, especially concerning 
his opinions on counsel and defense strategy.  Finally, the 
circuit court found that Denson wanted to defend his case by 
claiming self-defense and had lied when he alleged that Attorney 
Howard was never standby counsel. 
¶73 All of these findings are supported by the record and 
are therefore not clearly erroneous.  At the evidentiary 
hearing, Attorney Howard testified that he and Denson discussed 
at length Denson's right to testify and right not to testify and 
their respective advantages and disadvantages.  Attorney Howard 
also testified that he informed Denson that the choice of 
whether or not to testify was Denson's.  The circuit court 
repeatedly 
remarked 
on 
Attorney 
Howard's 
credibility 
and 
accepted his testimony as true.  "Because matters of credibility 
are solely within the province of the trial court," Bryn v. 
Thompson, 21 Wis. 2d 24, 31, 123 N.W.2d 505 (1963), we will not 
disturb the circuit court's finding.   
¶74 The circuit court's finding that Denson was an 
experienced and vocal criminal defendant is also well supported 
by the record.  Denson had 15 prior criminal convictions.  
Attorney Howard was his fifth attorney in this case alone, and 
Denson initially wanted Attorney Howard to serve as only standby 
counsel.  Denson filed several pro se motions which, relatively 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
31 
 
speaking, were thorough and well-argued.  In addition, the 
hearing and trial transcripts before us demonstrate that Denson 
was not hesitant to interrupt and speak to the circuit court 
directly. 
¶75 Finally, at the evidentiary hearing, Denson himself 
testified that his strategy at trial was to show that he did not 
intentionally stab T.T. 
¶76 Applying these facts to the relevant constitutional 
standard, we conclude that Denson knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently waived his right not to testify.  In particular, 
it is clear from Attorney Howard's testimony that Denson knew he 
had the right not to testify and understood that the choice of 
whether to testify was his to make.  Indeed, when Denson himself 
was asked whether he "chose to testify," he answered, "Yes."  
Denson's knowledge and understanding of his right not to testify 
is further supported by the fact that he, through two of his 
attorneys, twice filed motions to sever and conduct a separate 
trial on the count of first-degree sexual assault, reasoning 
that joinder would unduly prejudice him "if he chooses to 
testify" to the two unrelated acts.   
¶77 It is also clear from Attorney Howard's testimony that 
Denson understood the consequences of waiving his right not to 
testify.  Specifically, Attorney Howard testified that he 
informed Denson that the State had the burden of proof such that 
Denson was not required to testify and that if Denson did take 
the stand, Denson would be subject to cross-examination and 
would have to admit to the number of his criminal convictions. 
No. 
2009AP694-CR   
 
32 
 
¶78 Finally, given the fact that Denson aggressively 
asserted himself throughout the proceedings and pushed for a 
case of self-defense, we find it highly unlikely that Denson 
blindly chose to testify. 
¶79 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Denson 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right not 
to testify. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶80 A criminal defendant's constitutional right not to 
testify is a fundamental right that must be waived knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently.  However, we conclude that 
circuit courts are not required to conduct an on-the-record 
colloquy 
to 
determine 
whether 
a 
defendant 
is 
knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently waiving his or her right not to 
testify.  While we recommend such a colloquy as the better 
practice, we decline to extend the mandate pronounced in Weed.  
In 
any 
case, 
once 
a 
defendant 
properly 
raises 
in 
a 
postconviction motion the issue of an invalid waiver of the 
right not to testify, an evidentiary hearing is an appropriate 
remedy to ensure that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently waived his or her right not to testify. 
¶81 In 
this 
case, 
the 
circuit 
court 
conducted 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing 
and 
properly 
concluded 
that 
Denson 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right not 
to testify. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2009AP694-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶82 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the majority's determination that an evidentiary hearing is 
the appropriate remedy when the defendant's motion properly 
demonstrates 
that 
the 
defendant 
did 
not 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right not to testify.  
I join the majority in affirming the circuit court's conclusion 
that the defendant in the present case knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily waived his right not to testify. 
¶83 I part company with the majority on the question 
whether an on-the-record colloquy with the defendant should be 
merely recommended as good practice or required.  The majority 
adopts the former position;  I would adopt the latter.1     
                                                 
1 The court of appeals apparently agrees with my position.  
It stated:   
We have previously noted that we do "not possess any 
supervisory authority which would permit [us] to 
promulgate 
rules 
of 
criminal 
practice 
and 
procedure." . . . Rather, 
"Wisconsin's 
constitution 
and statutes limit such a law-developing or law-
declaring 
function 
exclusively 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Supreme Court."  Our constitution gives the supreme 
court supervisory authority over all of the courts of 
this state, but delegates such authority to the court 
of appeals only over "the courts in the district."  A 
mandate that all courts in Wisconsin must conduct a 
colloquy 
to 
ensure 
a 
defendant 
knowingly 
and 
voluntarily waives the right not to testify must 
therefore come from the supreme court.  Although we 
cannot require a colloquy, we do recommend it as good 
practice.   
State v. Jaramillo, 2009 WI App 39, ¶¶16-17, 316 Wis. 2d 538, 
765 N.W.2d 855 (citations omitted). 
No.  2009AP694-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶84 The right to testify on one's own behalf is a 
fundamental right.2  Likewise, the right not to testify is a 
fundamental constitutional right.3  Neither right is presumed to 
be invoked or waived.4  Exercising either of the mutually 
exclusive (but complementary) fundamental rights necessarily 
requires the waiver of the other equally fundamental right.   
¶85 I conclude that an on-the-record colloquy should be 
mandated because, as the court precisely stated in State v. 
Klessig, 
211 
Wis. 2d 194, 
206, 
564 
N.W.2d 716 
(1997): 
"Conducting such an examination of the defendant is the clearest 
and most efficient means of insuring that the defendant has 
validly waived his right . . . and of preserving and documenting 
that valid waiver for purposes of appeal and postconviction 
motions.  Thus a properly conducted colloquy serves the dual 
purposes of ensuring that a defendant is not deprived of his 
constitutional rights and of efficiently guarding our scarce 
judicial resources.  We hope that our reaffirmation of the 
importance of such a colloquy will encourage the circuit courts 
to continue their vigilance in employing such examinations."   
                                                 
2 State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶37, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 
N.W.2d 485 (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 53 n.10 
(1987)). 
3 U.S. Const. amend. V ("No person  . . . shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . ."); 
Wis. Const. art. 1, § 8 ("No person . . . may be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself."). 
4 Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver 
of constitutional rights and "do not presume acquiescence in the 
loss of fundamental rights."  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 
464 (1938). 
No.  2009AP694-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶86 For waiver of the right to testify, this court has 
already balanced the benefits and risks of a mandatory colloquy 
in favor of requiring an on-the-record colloquy.5  Nothing 
supports the majority's arriving at a different balance in the 
present case when addressing a defendant's waiver of the right 
not to testify.   
¶87 The Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions Committee 
supports mandating a colloquy, explaining "that a similar 
inquiry [to the one made when a defendant seeks to waive the 
right to testify] should be conducted when the defendant decides 
to 
testify, 
because 
a 
constitutional 
right 
is 
involved 
regardless of the decision that is made."6 
¶88 The Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions Committee 
supports approaching the waiver of both the right to testify and 
the right not to testify in a consistent manner.  Special 
Material 28 (SM-28) provides a series of suggested inquiries 
that a court should engage in with a defendant and defense 
counsel to ensure a waiver of the right to testify or the right 
not to testify is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.7  The 
                                                 
5 State v. Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, at ¶41. 
6 3 Wis JI——Criminal, SM-28: Inquiry Regarding the Decision 
Whether to Testify, Comment at 2. 
7 Wis JI——Criminal SM-28 is entitled "INQUIRY REGARDING THE 
DECISIONS WHETHER TO TESTIFY," and provides: 
THE FOLLOWING IS INTENDED FOR USE WHEN THE DEFENDANT 
HAS DECIDED TO TESTIFY AND WHEN THE DEFENDANT SEEKS TO 
WAVIE THE RIGHT TO TESTIFY 
DIRECT THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS TO THE DEFENDANT: 
No.  2009AP694-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
questions provided are merely suggestions.  "If the defendant's 
replies indicate a possible lack of understanding, follow-up 
questions 
or 
allowing additional 
consultation 
between the 
defendant and defense counsel may be advisable."8 
¶89 Requiring 
a 
colloquy 
to 
waive 
both 
fundamental, 
complementary constitutional rights makes sense: it creates a 
consistent approach and should not present a challenge to the 
circuit courts.  
                                                                                                                                                             
"Do you understand that you have a constitutional 
right to testify?" 
"And do you understand that you have a constitutional 
right not to testify?" 
"Do you understand that the decision whether to 
testify is for you to make?" 
"Has anyone made any threats or promises to you to 
influence your decision?" 
"Have you discussed your decision whether or not to 
testify with your lawyer?" 
"Have you made a decision?" 
"What is that decision?" 
DIRECT THE FOLLOWING QUESTION TO DEFENSE COUNSEL: 
"Have you had sufficient opportunity to thoroughly 
discuss this case and the decision whether to testify 
with the defendant?" 
"Are you satisfied that the defendant is making the 
decision knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily?" 
THE COURT SHOULD STATE THE APPROPRIATE FINDING ON THE 
RECORD 
8 3 Wis JI——Criminal, SM-28: Inquiry Regarding the Decision 
Whether to Testify, Comment at 2.  
No.  2009AP694-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶90 The 
majority's 
approach 
creates 
inconsistent 
requirements for the circuit court in dealing with the waiver of 
these complementary fundamental constitutional rights.  In the 
process, 
the 
majority 
provides 
an 
inconsistent 
analysis, 
ultimately providing a confusing directive.   
¶91 In one breath, the majority portends the danger of 
influence and encroachment into the attorney-client relationship 
when a circuit court engages in an on-the-record colloquy 
regarding the right not to testify.  Majority op., ¶66.  In the 
next breath, the majority advises that conducting a colloquy "is 
the clearest and most efficient means" of ensuring that a 
defendant has validly waived the right not to testify, and so 
recommends it.  Majority op., ¶67.   
¶92 As I see it, requiring an on-the-record colloquy 
ensures 
a 
defendant 
is 
not 
deprived 
of 
a 
fundamental 
constitutional right and limits the need for a retrospective 
evidentiary hearing.  
¶93 Because constitutional rights and the interests of 
trial and appellate judicial efficiency are advanced by a 
consistent and clear bright-line rule, I would mandate an on-
the-record colloquy regarding a defendant's waiver of the right 
not to testify.   
¶94 For the foregoing reasons, I concur.  
¶95 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion.