Title: Adoption of a Minor
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11797
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 7, 2015

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11797 
 
ADOPTION OF A MINOR. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     March 2, 2015. - May 7, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Adoption, Parent's consent.  Parent and Child, Adoption.  Minor, 
Adoption.  Practice, Civil, Adoption.  Notice.  Consent.  
Words, "Lawful parent." 
 
 
 
 
Petition filed in the Middlesex Division of the Probate and 
Family Court Department on April 25, 2014. 
 
 
A motion to proceed without further notice was heard by 
Jeffrey A. Abber, J., and a question of law was reported by him 
to the Appeals Court. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Patience Crozier for the petitioners. 
 
Kari Hong, of California, & Mary L. Bonauto & Vickie Henry, 
for American Academy of Adoption Attorneys & others, amici 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  The petitioners, J.S. and V.K, a married same-
sex couple, filed a joint petition for adoption in the Probate 
 
 
2 
and Family Court, seeking to adopt their son Nicholas.1  Nicholas 
was born to J.S. in 2014, during the petitioners' marriage.  He 
was conceived through in vitro fertilization (IVF),2 using a 
known sperm donor3 selected by J.S. and V.K., whose names appear 
on his birth certificate.  The petitioners sought to adopt their 
son as a means of ensuring recognition of their parentage when 
they travel outside the Commonwealth, or in the event of their 
relocation to a State where same-sex marriage is not recognized. 
The petitioners filed a motion to proceed with the adoption 
without further notice, arguing that, as Nicholas's lawful 
parents, they could consent to the adoption, no other consent 
was necessary, and no notice to any other person was required 
under G. L. c. 210, § 4.  While recognizing the petitioners as 
Nicholas's legal parents in Massachusetts, a Probate and Family 
Court judge issued an interlocutory order denying the motion, 
and reserving and reporting to the Appeals Court the question 
"whether the lawful parents of a child must give notice to the 
known biological father/sperm donor pursuant to G. L. c. 210, 
                     
1 A pseudonym. 
 
2 In vitro fertilization (IVF) is "[a] procedure by which an 
egg is fertilized outside a woman's body and then inserted into 
the womb for gestation."  Black's Law Dictionary 956 (10th ed. 
2014).  Another form of assisted reproductive technology, 
artificial insemination, is "[a] process for achieving 
conception, whereby semen is inserted into a woman's vagina by 
some means other than intercourse."  Id. at 135. 
 
3 The sperm donor is the brother of V.K. 
 
 
3 
§ 2," in conjunction with their petition for adoption.  We 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion to consider 
the correctness of the judge's ruling.  See Roberts v. 
Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Boston, Inc., 438 Mass. 187, 188 & 
n.4 (2002), citing O'Brien v. Dwight, 363 Mass. 256, 276 (1973).4  
We conclude that G. L. c. 210, § 2, does not require the lawful 
parents of a child to give notice of the petition for adoption 
to a known sperm donor, and, accordingly, answer the reported 
question, "No." 
Discussion.  Adoption of children in the Commonwealth is 
governed by G. L. c. 210 (adoption statute).  "The law of 
adoption is purely statutory, Davis v. McGraw, 206 Mass. 294, 
297 (1910), and the governing statute, G. L. c. 210[], is to be 
strictly followed in all its essential particulars.  Purinton v. 
Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 197 (1907)."  Adoption of Tammy, 416 
Mass. 205, 210 (1993).  We interpret a statute by looking "first 
to its language as the 'principal source of insight into 
legislative intent.'"  Adoption of Daisy, 460 Mass. 72, 76 
(2011), quoting Water Dep't of Fairhaven v. Department of Envtl. 
                     
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the American Academy of 
Adoption Attorneys; American Academy of Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Attorneys; American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine; Boston IVF; IVF New England; Lambda Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, Inc.; Massachusetts LGBTQ Bar Association; 
National Center for Lesbian Rights; New England Fertility 
Society; Path2Parenthood; RESOLVE:  The National Infertility 
Association; and RESOLVE New England. 
 
 
4 
Protection, 455 Mass. 740, 744 (2010).  "Where the meaning of 
the language is plain and unambiguous, we will not look to 
extrinsic evidence of legislative intent 'unless a literal 
construction would yield an absurd or unworkable result.'"  
Adoption of Daisy, supra, quoting Boston Hous. Auth. v. National 
Conference of Firemen & Oilers, Local 3, 458 Mass. 155, 162 
(2010).  If the meaning of the statutory language is not plain, 
we look to "the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all 
[the statute's] words construed by the ordinary and approved 
usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause 
of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied 
and the main object to be accomplished."  Garney v. 
Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement Sys., 469 Mass. 384, 388 
(2014), quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934). 
1.  Notice requirement.  The adoption statute requires the 
written consent of certain persons before a decree of adoption 
may issue.  Under G. L. c. 210, § 2, 
"[a] decree of adoption shall not be made . . . 
without the written consent of the child to be adopted, if 
above the age of twelve; of the child's spouse, if any; of 
the lawful parents, who may be previous adoptive parents, 
or surviving parent; or of the mother only if the child was 
born out of wedlock and not previously adopted." 
 
The notice requirements for any person whose consent is required 
under this provision are set forth in G. L. c. 210, § 4.5 
                     
5 General Laws c. 210, § 4, provides, in part: 
 
 
5 
By its plain language, G. L. c. 210, § 4, requires notice 
of a petition for adoption to be given only to those persons 
from whom written consent to the adoption must be obtained.  See 
G. L. c. 210, §§ 2, 4.  No notice is required for persons not 
expressly included in G. L. c. 210, § 2.  See Petition for 
Revocation of a Judgment for Adoption of a Minor, 393 Mass. 556, 
560 (1984).  "The statutory notice provision sets forth who is 
to be notified," and a person who does not fit into one of the 
statutory categories "is not entitled to notice."  Id.  Because 
G. L. c. 210, § 2, does not include the category of "sperm 
donor" among those from whom consent is required as a 
prerequisite to adoption, under the plain language of the 
statute, no notice to a sperm donor is required.  See Adoption 
of Daisy, supra at 77, quoting Commissioner of Correction v. 
Superior Court Dep't of the Trial Court for the County of 
Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 126 (2006) ("We do not read into the 
statute a provision which the Legislature did not see fit to put 
there, nor add words that the Legislature had an option to, but 
chose not to include"). 
Thus, if the known sperm donor is entitled to notice of the 
                                                                  
 
"If the written consent required by [G. L. c. 210, 
§ 2,] is not submitted to the court with the petition, the 
court shall, except where the court under [G. L. c. 210, 
§ 3,] has determined that such consent and notice is not 
required, order notice by personal service upon the 
parties . . . ." 
 
 
6 
petitioners' petition for adoption, the only potentially 
applicable category of persons to whom notice must be given 
under G. L. c. 210, § 2, is that of "lawful parent."  We turn, 
therefore, to consideration of the category of "lawful parent," 
as that term is used in the statute, and whether it has any 
application to the known sperm donor here. 
2.  Lawful parent.  In his reservation and report, the 
judge stated as an "undisputed fact[]" that J.S. and V.K. are 
Nicholas's lawful parents.  As an initial matter, we agree that, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 46, § 4B, J.S. and V.K. are Nicholas's 
lawful parents, and that, as residents of the Commonwealth, they 
are not required to adopt their son in order to establish their 
parentage.6  "[A]ny child born as a result of artificial 
insemination with spousal consent is considered to be the child 
of the consenting spouse."  Hunter v. Rose, 463 Mass. 488, 493 
                     
6 Pursuant to G. L. c. 46, § 4B, "[a]ny child born to a 
married woman as a result of artificial insemination with the 
consent of her husband, shall be considered the legitimate child 
of the mother and such husband."  We read this language to mean 
that, where a married woman is artificially inseminated, and her 
spouse consents to such insemination, the resulting child is the 
legal child of both spouses.  See Hunter v. Rose, 463 Mass. 488, 
492-493 (2012) (recognizing as marital children in Commonwealth 
two children of same-sex couple, conceived through assistive 
reproductive technology and born into California domestic 
partner relationship); Della Corte v. Ramirez, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 
906, 907 (2012), citing Goodridge v. Department of Pub. Health, 
440 Mass. 309 (2003) ("We do not read 'husband' to exclude same-
sex married couples, but determine that same-sex married 
partners are similarly situated to heterosexual couples in these 
circumstances"); G. L. c. 4, § 6, Fourth ("words of one gender 
may be construed to include the other gender and the neuter"). 
 
 
7 
(2012), citing G. L. c. 46, § 4B.  We also understand G. L. c. 
46, § 4B, which refers specifically to "artificial 
insemination," to include parentage of a child born though the 
use of any assisted reproductive technology.  See Okoli v. 
Okoli, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 371, 377 (2012) (concluding that G. L. 
c. 46, § 4B, is applicable to IVF procedures).  Therefore, 
lawful parentage, and its associated rights and 
responsibilities, is conferred by statute on the consenting 
spouse of a married couple whose child is conceived by one woman 
of the marriage, through the use of assisted reproductive 
technology consented to by both women.  See G. L. c. 46, § 4B.  
Because Nicholas was born to J.S., his biological mother, after 
an IVF procedure to which V.K., her spouse, consented, J.S. and 
V.K. are his lawful parents. 
That conclusion, however, does not address whether, under 
G. L. c. 210, § 2, a known sperm donor also may be a "lawful 
parent" for purposes of the notice requirement.  In his 
reservation and report, the Probate and Family Court judge noted 
that "the statute does not differentiate between an anonymous 
sperm donor and a known sperm donor," but stated that he was 
"not convinced" that "absent a determination by [an appellate] 
court, . . . the known biological father/sperm donor is 
precluded from filing a subsequent action to establish his 
paternity in accordance with G. L. c. 215, § 6." 
 
 
8 
We have observed previously, in dicta, that, although the 
adoption statute "does not comment on the [parental] rights and 
obligations, if any, of the [sperm donor] . . . inferentially he 
has none."  R.R. v. M.H., 426 Mass. 501, 502, 509-510 (1998) 
(concluding that surrogacy agreement between plaintiff father, 
who had donated sperm, and defendant mother, who had agreed to 
act as surrogate and then changed her mind during pregnancy, was 
unenforceable).  As to a child of a marriage who is conceived 
via artificial insemination or IVF, as here, G. L. c. 46, § 4B, 
by its nature, contemplates that a third party must provide 
genetic material for the child's conception.  Nonetheless, as is 
consistent with our paternity statutes and long-standing 
presumption of the legitimacy of marital children, see D.H. v. 
R.R., 461 Mass. 756, 760 (2012), and cases cited, G. L. c. 46, 
§ 4B, confers legal parentage only upon the mother's consenting 
spouse, not the sperm donor.  It is thus presumed that marital 
children have only two lawful parents:  the biological mother 
and her spouse. 
In certain contexts, however, we have concluded that there 
are circumstances in which a "putative father"7 may establish 
paternity, or claim at least some of the associated rights and 
obligations of parentage, where the child's mother was married 
                     
7 A putative father is an "alleged biological father."  
Black's Law Dictionary 725 (10th ed. 2014). 
 
 
9 
to someone else at the time of the child's conception.  See 
G. L. c. 209C, § 6 (a) (for child born during marriage or within 
300 days after termination of marriage, husband is presumed to 
be father of child and must be joined in any paternity action).  
Where the mother was married when the child was born, a putative 
father who is not the mother's spouse may establish paternity in 
one of two ways only:  either through a voluntary acknowledgment 
of paternity executed by both parents, or through an 
adjudication of paternity by a court of competent jurisdiction.  
See Smith v. McDonald, 458 Mass. 540, 544 (2010). 
A voluntary acknowledgment of paternity requires that the 
mother and her spouse sign an affidavit denying that the spouse 
is the child's father; the putative father and the mother must 
then sign a notarized acknowledgment of parentage stating that 
they are the parents of the child.  These documents must be 
filed with the court or the registrar of vital records.  See 
G. L. c. 209C, § 11 (a); D.H. v. R.R., supra at 761-762.  A 
putative father also may file a complaint in equity in the 
Probate and Family Court, seeking to establish paternity.  Where 
the mother was married to someone else at the time of the 
child's birth, a putative father may "establish paternity 
[through adjudication] only if he has a substantial relationship 
with the child . . . and alleges he is the child's biological 
 
 
10 
father" (citation omitted).8  D.H. v. R.R., supra at 763.  See 
C.C. v. A.B., 406 Mass. 679, 691 (1990) (requiring putative 
father to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, 
"substantial parent-child relationship with the child" in order 
                     
8 A sperm donor, although a genetic parent meeting the 
definition of a "putative father," "should not be treated as a 
legal parent."  Kindregan, Collaborative Reproduction and 
Rethinking Parentage, J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Lawyers 43, 48 
(2008).  The reality today is that families take many different 
forms, and we recognize that a genetic connection "between 
parent and child can no longer be the exclusive basis for 
imposing the rights or duties of parenthood."  Id. at 60.  As 
commentators suggest, see id. at 47-50, the better view is that 
a sperm donor may assert parentage only where he donates "sperm 
for, or consents to, assisted reproduction . . . with the intent 
to be the parent of [the] child."  Uniform Parentage Act § 703 
(2002).  Indeed, the Uniform Parentage Act presumes that a sperm 
donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted 
reproduction.  See Uniform Parentage Act § 702 (2002) 
(commenting that sperm donor cannot sue to establish parental 
rights).  In the circumstances here, the sperm donor clearly 
donated the sperm with the intent that J.S. and V.K be the 
child's legal parents; a potential change of heart, years hence, 
would not alter that conclusion. 
 
Moreover, to bring a claim in equity to establish paternity 
requires establishing a "substantial parent-child relationship" 
between the putative father and the child.  See C.C. v. A.B., 
406 Mass. 679, 690 (1990).  In the context of assisted 
reproductive technology, a putative father also may be a 
biological family member of one of the spouses; the petitioners 
indicate in their brief that choosing such a donor may allow a 
nonbiological parent to have a biological tie to the child.  The 
existence of a relationship such as that of an uncle, cousin, or 
other family member, however, when coupled with being a sperm 
donor, does not itself give rise to a "substantial parent-child 
relationship."  See id. at 689.  Contrast Youmans v. Ramos, 429 
Mass. 774, 776, 782 (1999) (characterizing maternal aunt's 
relationship with child to be "substantial mother-daughter 
relationship" where aunt was sole caretaker for child; child 
learned to walk, talk, and read while in aunt's care; aunt 
oversaw all medical care, schooling, and extracurricular 
activities; and child referred to aunt as "mom"). 
 
 
11 
for complaint for paternity of child of married mother to 
"proceed beyond preliminary stages").  Once a putative father 
successfully establishes his paternity and becomes the legal 
father of the child, the presumed father, the mother's spouse, 
logically, then, loses his legal parentage, either by consenting 
to a voluntary acknowledgment that he is not the child's father, 
or by a judgment of paternity.  See D.H. v. R.R., supra at 761; 
Smith v. McDonald, supra at 544; C.C. v. A.B., supra at 690-691. 
Even if, as the judge contemplated, a known sperm donor 
could bring an action in accordance with G. L. c. 215, § 6, to 
establish his paternity, nothing in G. L. c. 210, § 2, reflects 
any legislative intent that consent to adoption is required of 
one who may have a theoretical basis to attempt to establish 
parentage in the future.  Indeed, the adoption statute does not 
require that notice of an adoption of a marital child be given 
to a putative father whose parental rights have not been 
determined.  See Adoption of a Minor, 338 Mass. 635, 643-644 
(1959) (consent of putative father who was not lawful parent at 
time of adoption was not required).  See also G. L. c 210, § 4A 
(requiring notice to be given only to putative fathers of 
children born out of wedlock). 
In Adoption of Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 213 n.5 (1993), a case 
 
 
12 
with facts similar to those here,9 we noted that the sperm donor 
provided his written consent to a joint adoption, "[a]lthough 
not required by the statute."  Here, following the plain and 
unambiguous language of the adoption statute, see Adoption of 
Daisy, 460 Mass. 72, 77 (2011), we make explicit the conclusion 
reached implicitly in Adoption of Tammy, supra.  We will not 
extend the notice requirements of G. L. c. 210, § 4, beyond the 
enumerated categories of persons whose consent was required by 
the Legislature under G. L. c. 210, § 2.  See Adoption of Tammy, 
supra at 210. 
Conclusion.  Because G. L. c. 210, § 2, does not require 
the lawful parents of a child to give notice of the petition for 
adoption to a known sperm donor, we answer the reported 
question, "No."  The order denying the petitioners' motion to 
proceed with the adoption without further notice is reversed.  
The matter is remanded to the Probate and Family Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                     
9 In that case, a same-sex couple decided to have a child, 
and one spouse conceived through IVF using the sperm of a known 
donor, who was the cousin of the other spouse.  Adoption of 
Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 207 (1993).