Title: State v. Levi
Citation: 250 So. 2d 751, 259 La. 591
Docket Number: N/A
State: Louisiana
Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court
Date: June 28, 1971

250 So. 2d 751 (1971) 259 La. 591 STATE of Louisiana v. Theodore LEVI (Levy), Jr. No. 50918. Supreme Court of Louisiana. June 28, 1971. Rehearing Denied August 12, 1971. F. Louis Gonzales, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant. Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., Harry H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sargent *752 Pitcher, Jr., Dist. Atty., Ralph L. Roy, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee. SANDERS, Justice. The State charged Theodore J. Levy, Jr., the appellant, and James Edward Williams with the robbery of W. W. Kirk while armed with a dangerous weapon, a .44 caliber revolver. Williams pleaded guilty, and the State proceeded against Levy alone. In response to a defense motion for a bill of particulars, the State conceded that the revolver used by the defendant in the robbery was unloaded and unworkable. After hearing the evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged, and the trial judge sentenced the defendant to a term of 25 years in the state penitentiary. He has appealed, relying upon two bills of exceptions. Defendant reserved the first bill of exceptions to the refusal of the trial judge to give to the jury the following special charge requested by the defendant: He reserved the second bill of exceptions when, at the State's request, the trial judge gave to the jury the following special charge: The basic question posed is whether or not a person who commits a robbery by pointing an unloaded and unworkable pistol at the victim can be adjudged guilty of armed robbery, the aggravated form of robbery denounced by LSA-R.S. 14:64. The pertinent codal provisions provide: LSA-R.S. 14:64: LSA-R.S. 14:2(3): The distinction between armed robbery and simple robbery is that in the former the offender is armed with a dangerous weapon. In determining whether criminal conduct falls in the more serious category, we must be guided by the salutary principles set forth in LSA-R.S. 14:3. The code articles may not be extended by analogy but must be given a genuine construction in connection with the context and with reference to the purpose of the provision. See State v. Gonzales, 241 La. 619, 129 *753 So. 2d 796, 84 A.L.R.2d 1248; State v. Robertson, 241 La. 249, 128 So. 2d 646. In making robbery with a dangerous weapon an aggravated offense with severe penalties, LSA-R.S. 14:64 was designed to deter robbery fraught with danger of serious physical harm, not only to the victim, but to any person at the scene. In such a robbery, harm may occur to the victim, to the culprit, or to a third party. It can occur in various ways. The victim may be shot or struck with the weapon by the culprit. The culprit may be shot or struck by the victim or a third party.[2] A third party may be shot or struck by the culprit, the victim, or another third party. The highly charged atmosphere at the scene of a pistol-robbery is conducive to violence, whether the pistol is loaded or unloaded, workable or unworkable. Danger invites rescue. It also invites self-help. See State v. Johnston, 207 La. 161, 20 So. 2d 741; Bass v. State, Fla.App., 232 So. 2d 25; Baker v. United States, (U.S. 5th Cir.) 412 F.2d 1069. The overwhelming weight of authority throughout the country supports the rule that one may be convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon though the gun used was unloaded. See People v. Ash, 88 Cal. App. 2d 819, 199 P.2d 711; Turner v. State, 201 Tenn. 562, 300 S.W.2d 920; State v. Ashland, 259 Iowa 728, 145 N.W.2d 910; Hayes v. State, 211 Md. 111, 126 A.2d 576; State v. Montano, 69 N.M. 332, 367 P.2d 95; 46 Am.Jur., Robbery § 4, p. 141; 2 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure (Anderson 1957) § 546, p. 245; Annotation, 79 A.L.R.2d 1412, 1426-1430. In State v. Johnston, supra, this Court held that an assault with an unloaded revolver constituted an assault with a dangerous weapon as defined by LSA-R.S. 14:2, stating: *754 Defendant argues that the rejected jury instruction is proper, because it is based upon a jury-finding that the pistol was used exclusively as a firearm and not as a bludgeon. This argument, however, is faulty. When an empty gun is pointed at the victim and not actually used as a bludgeon, it may nonetheless be a dangerous weapon. Both a continuous threat and capability exist that it will be used as a bludgeon. In People v. Egan, 77 Cal. App. 279, 246 P. 337, the Court said: To be classified as a dangerous weapon under the cited articles, a pistol need not be capable of firing or inherently dangerous. See State v. Murff, 215 La. 40, 39 So. 2d 817; State v. Reynolds, 209 La. 455, 24 So. 2d 818. The criminal law is designed, not merely to fix the moral guilt of the offender, but also to protect the rights of the general public and the victim. A reasonable construction of the armed robbery provisions here can preserve that design. An unloaded revolver in the hands of a person intent on divesting another of his money is a dangerous weapon. We hold that a person who commits a robbery by pointing an unloaded and unworkable pistol at the victim can be adjudged guilty of armed robbery. For us to hold otherwise would be to build into our law an "unloaded weapon" defense that would defeat most prosecutions for armed robbery except when the offender is captured at the scene and his weapon seized. We affirm the special charge rulings of the trial judge. For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed. [1] LSA-R.S. 14:65: "Simple robbery is the theft of anything of value from the person of another or which is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, but not armed with a dangerous weapon. "Whoever commits the crime of simple robbery shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than five years." [2] As an illustration, the victim in the present case shot at the offenders as they left the scene.