Title: Commonwealth v. Tillis
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12555
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: December 23, 2020

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SJC-12555 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  TARRANE TILLIS. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     December 10, 2019. - December 23, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Armed Home Invasion.  Armed 
Assault with Intent to Rob.  Joint Enterprise.  Evidence, 
Joint venturer.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Assistance of counsel, 
Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 3, 2014. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Bruce R. Henry, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on September 24, 2018, was heard 
by him. 
 
 
 
Dennis Shedd for the defendant. 
 
Jamie Michael Charles, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  The defendant appeals from his conviction of 
murder in the first degree and related charges following the 
                     
 
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
2 
 
 
shooting death of Cristino Diaz-Arias after a botched robbery 
attempt by the defendant and his coventurers.  The defendant's 
appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial was 
consolidated with his direct appeal. 
 
In sum, four robbers entered an apartment building in 
Lowell intending to rob the victim.  They knocked the apartment 
door off its hinges, forced their way into the apartment while 
the victim attempted to push the door closed, and then beat him.  
The victim managed to escape and yelled for his neighbors to 
call the police.  He chased three of the robbers, including the 
defendant, down a staircase as they fled out of the building.  
The fourth robber remained behind and continued to search the 
victim's apartment for money or drugs.  The victim eventually 
confronted the remaining robber at the top of the staircase.  
During the struggle, the fourth robber fatally shot the victim.  
By the time the shots were fired, the defendant was a few blocks 
away from the apartment building, near the getaway vehicle.  A 
Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of murder in the 
first degree with armed home invasion as the predicate offense 
for felony-murder.  The jury also convicted the defendant of 
armed home invasion and armed assault with intent to rob. 
 
The primary issue on appeal concerns the judge's denial of 
the defendant's request that the jury be instructed on 
withdrawal from a joint venture.  The defendant also raises two 
3 
 
 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  He contends that 
counsel should have requested a supplemental jury instruction to 
further explain the Commonwealth's burden to prove that the 
killing occurred during the course of the underlying felony.  In 
addition, he argues that counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting to a portion of the prosecutor's closing argument.  
The defendant also asks this court to exercise its extraordinary 
authority, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and to reduce the 
murder conviction to murder in the second degree.  For the 
reasons that follow, we affirm the convictions and the order 
denying the defendant's motion for a new trial. 
 
1.  Facts.  We recite the facts the jury could have found, 
reserving certain facts for later discussion. 
 
On December 18, 2013, the defendant and Roberto Ortiz Lopez 
visited an apartment in Nashua, New Hampshire, shared by 
Jonathan Rivera and his girlfriend.  The three men then went to 
the Lowell apartment of the defendant's friend, Kent Grays.  
They were seeking to find a place to stay in Lowell and "a way 
to make money."  Eventually, the group met up with another one 
of the defendant's friends, Donte Okowuga.2 
                     
 
2 Jonathan Rivera and Donte Okowuga testified at trial 
pursuant to cooperation agreements with the district attorney's 
office.  In exchange for Rivera's testimony, he was not charged 
with murder, and instead pleaded guilty to unspecified charges 
and received a sentence of seven to nine years' incarceration, 
with a term of probation to follow upon his release.  In 
4 
 
 
 
The defendant, Lopez, Rivera, Grays, and Okowuga discussed 
potential targets for a robbery.  At first, Grays discussed the 
possibility of robbing a drug dealer in Boston.  They rejected 
this idea because they did not want to travel that far and 
because they believed that the area was dangerous.  Grays then 
suggested robbing the victim, who lived on the third floor of an 
apartment building in Lowell.  The defendant knew that the 
victim sold large amounts of cocaine.  The other men agreed with 
this plan.  In preparation for the robbery, the defendant 
confirmed that Okowuga had stored two firearms in his vehicle. 
 
Grays proceeded to the victim's apartment in order to 
determine whether the victim was home and if the "coast was 
clear."  Okowuga drove the defendant, Lopez, and Rivera in a 
separate vehicle.  Grays telephoned the defendant to warn him 
that there were too many people inside the building.  As a 
result, the four men abandoned the plan and drove toward New 
Hampshire.  A short time later, the defendant received another 
telephone call from Grays indicating that it would then be 
                     
exchange for testifying, Okowuga agreed to plead guilty to armed 
home invasion and armed assault with intent to rob; he was 
sentenced to the agreed term of from twenty-five years to 
twenty-five years and one day on those charges.  In addition, 
the charge of murder was reduced to manslaughter, and he was 
sentenced to a period of twenty years of probation on the 
manslaughter charge. 
5 
 
 
possible to rob the victim.  Okowuga turned around and headed 
back to the victim's apartment building. 
 
En route, the defendant, Okowuga, Rivera, and Lopez 
discussed how they would carry out the robbery.  They decided 
that, after gaining entry, Okowuga and Rivera would detain the 
victim at gunpoint, while the defendant tied him up.  At the 
same time, Lopez would search the apartment for money or drugs. 
 
Okowuga parked a few blocks away, around the corner from 
the victim's apartment building.  The defendant reached under 
the front passenger seat, retrieved a bag containing two 
firearms, and handed it to Okowuga.  Okowuga gave one of the 
weapons to Rivera.  He tucked the other inside his coat pocket.  
Prior to entering the apartment building, Rivera passed the 
firearm to Lopez.  The defendant carried a folding knife in his 
pants pocket. 
 
At approximately 8 P.M., the defendant, Okowuga, Rivera, 
and Lopez entered the building and ascended two flights of 
stairs to the victim's apartment.  The defendant had concealed 
his face with the collar of his jacket and a hat so that the 
victim would not be able to recognize him.  Okowuga wore a mask, 
and the other men hid their features with hooded jackets.  The 
robbers confronted the victim as he was leaving his apartment.  
He struggled to shut the door, but Okowuga knocked it off its 
hinges. 
6 
 
 
 
The defendant, Okowuga, Rivera, and Lopez entered the 
victim's apartment.  Okowuga trained his gun on the victim while 
the defendant and Lopez beat the victim with their fists and hit 
him with plates and other household items.  The victim's next 
door neighbor heard the noise, opened his door, and saw the 
beating in progress.  One of the men threatened him, and the 
neighbor returned to his apartment. 
 
The victim was able to escape, and he ran from the 
apartment into the hallway, yelling, "Call the cops.  Call the 
cops."  Rivera noticed that neighbors had begun to gather in the 
hallway and became "a little scared because" of what the victim 
was saying.  Okowuga announced that he was "effing out of here," 
and then he ran down the stairs.  The defendant and Rivera 
followed.  The victim, who was bleeding from the forehead, 
chased the three would-be robbers down the stairs and out of the 
apartment building.  He grabbed a shovel near the front entrance 
and threw it at the fleeing men.  Thereafter, a neighbor who 
lived on the first floor asked the victim if she should 
telephone the police; the victim answered, "No, I can handle 
it." 
 
Lopez did not leave with the other coventurers.  The 
victim's next door neighbor saw Lopez, armed with a gun, 
standing inside the victim's apartment.  Lopez left the 
apartment as the victim returned home.  At the top of the 
7 
 
 
stairs, the victim charged at Lopez, indignantly asking, "You do 
this to me?  You do this to me?"  In response, Lopez shot the 
victim in the face and chest.  The next door neighbor then got 
into a fight with Lopez.  During the struggle, Lopez accidently 
shot himself in the hand; he ran down the stairs and out the 
front door. 
 
The defendant, Okowuga, and Rivera returned to the getaway 
vehicle that they had parked a few blocks away.  Before they 
reached the vehicle, Rivera heard gunshots.  As they were 
leaving, Okowuga drove past the victim's apartment building.  He 
picked up Lopez, who was running down the street.  Lopez told 
them that he had shot the victim.  Bleeding from a gunshot 
wound, Lopez demanded to be taken to a hospital.  Okowuga 
refused, and instead drove them all back to New Hampshire. 
 
Lopez gave the gun to the defendant, who placed it back in 
the bag.  A few days later, the defendant contacted Okowuga in 
order to help him sell the firearm.  The defendant met Okowuga 
in New Hampshire, where Okowuga sold the firearm to an 
acquaintance of the defendant. 
 
On February 8, 2014, the police obtained a warrant for the 
defendant's arrest.  He was apprehended in upstate New York and 
transported to Lowell on February 28, 2014.  He told 
investigators that he had heard about the incident, was not 
involved in the shooting, and wanted to "clear things up."  In a 
8 
 
 
subsequent interview, the defendant admitted to having 
participated in a plot to steal money or drugs from the victim.  
He insisted that he never went inside the victim's apartment, 
and left the building "before there was even a struggle" or 
"after a little struggle."  He fled because it was getting 
"crazy," with the victim yelling and the neighbors leaving their 
apartments.  "When [the victim] started hollering . . . it was 
like we exited."  When he was about a block away from the 
apartment building, the defendant heard gunshots. 
 
The defendant initially maintained that he did not know 
that one of his coventurers had entered the victim's apartment 
armed with a firearm.  The defendant said that he had not seen a 
firearm before the robbery.  After the robbery, he saw Lopez, 
who had shot himself, entering their vehicle carrying a gun.  
Pressed by the investigators, the defendant changed his 
statement and said that Lopez had been "showing off" a small gun 
inside the vehicle during the drive to the victim's apartment 
building.  The defendant agreed that Lopez must have put that 
small gun somewhere on his person because he did not "have it 
out" when they left the vehicle.  The defendant also said that 
he had entered the apartment building with a folding knife in 
his pocket. 
 
2.  Discussion.  In this consolidated appeal from his 
convictions and from the denial of his motion for new trial, the 
9 
 
 
defendant presses essentially two claims.  First, he contends 
that he was entitled to an instruction on withdrawal from a 
joint venture.  Second, he argues that he was deprived of the 
effective assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and art. 
12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts 
Constitution. 
 
a.  Withdrawal from a joint venture.  It was undisputed at 
trial that the defendant was a few blocks away from the 
apartment building when Lopez shot the victim.  The Commonwealth 
sought to prove the defendant guilty of felony-murder for his 
knowing participation in the crime of armed home invasion with 
the requisite shared intent to commit that crime.  See 
Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 466 (2009).  To prove 
felony-murder, the Commonwealth was required to prove that the 
act that caused the victim's death occurred during the 
commission or the attempted commission of the predicate felony.  
See Commonwealth v. Gallett, 481 Mass. 662, 673 (2019). 
 
An individual who participates in a joint venture is not 
guilty of a planned crime if he or she withdraws from the joint 
venture before that crime is completed.  Commonwealth v. 
Fickett, 403 Mass. 194, 201 (1988).  Withdrawal "amounts to an 
official absolution of guilt already incurred."  Moriarty, 
Extending the Defense of Renunciation, 62 Temp. L. Rev. 1, 4 
10 
 
 
(1989).  In Commonwealth v. Green, 302 Mass. 547, 555 (1939), we 
held that withdrawal requires "at least an appreciable interval 
between the alleged termination and [the commission of the 
crime], a detachment from the enterprise before the [crime] has 
become so probable that it cannot reasonably be stayed, and such 
notice or definite act of detachment that other principals in 
the attempted crime have opportunity also to abandon it."  See 
Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 118 (2010), cert. 
denied, 565 U.S. 1013 (2011), S.C., 474 Mass. 1008 (2016), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Cook, 419 Mass. 192, 202 (1994) (same).  
See also Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 18-19 (2018).  Once 
the defense of withdrawal is properly raised by a defendant, it 
is the Commonwealth's burden to prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the absence of abandonment.  Commonwealth v. Galford, 413 
Mass. 364, 372 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1065 (1993). 
 
The defendant requested an instruction on withdrawal from a 
joint venture, and renewed that request before and after the 
judge's final charge.  The judge declined to give such an 
instruction.3  He determined that the evidence did not support 
                     
 
3 At the defendant's first trial, which began on October 25, 
2016, the same judge instructed the jury, over the 
Commonwealth's objection, on withdrawal from a joint venture.  
On November 4, 2016, the judge declared a mistrial when the jury 
were unable to reach a verdict after three days of 
deliberations.  The retrial (the case before us) took place one 
month later. 
11 
 
 
the defendant's claim that he effectively withdrew from the 
joint venture to commit an armed home invasion.  Because the 
defendant preserved his claim, we review to determine whether an 
error was made and, if so, whether it was prejudicial.  See 
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 591 (2005). 
 
The trial judge reasoned that the crime of armed home 
invasion was complete at the time of the defendant's purported 
withdrawal.  The judge's finding was based on substantial 
evidence that the defendant and his coventurers, while armed 
with dangerous weapons, entered the victim's apartment and 
assaulted him.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Phap Buth, 480 Mass. 
113, 120, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 607 (2018). (discussing 
elements of armed home invasion).  Viewed in the light most 
favorable to the defendant, the evidence of a completed home 
invasion was not so clear cut.  In his statement to police, a 
redacted recording of which was admitted in evidence, the 
defendant raised the possibility that he and his coventurers had 
not entered the victim's apartment.  He noted that there had 
been "a lot of people inside the apartment" and that he and his 
coventurers had been "trying . . . to go in through the 
threshold where the door was already open . . . but when" they 
were trying to do so, "the crowd just came out . . .  By that 
time we -- I want to say there [were] too many people coming out 
of the apartment, so we ran out."  See Cook, 419 Mass. at 201  
12 
 
 
(instruction on withdrawal is required if it is supported by 
evidence viewed from defendant's perspective). 
 
Given the defendant's version of the events, the jury were 
required to determine whether he entered the victim's apartment 
itself or a secured common area.  See Commonwealth v. Stokes, 
440 Mass. 741, 747 n.7 (2004); Commonwealth v. Doucette, 430 
Mass. 461, 467 (1999).  Accordingly, the judge erred in finding 
that the defendant had completed the crime of armed home 
invasion prior to the purported withdrawal.  As discussed infra, 
however, this error is immaterial, because the defendant did not 
demonstrate a timely and effective withdrawal from what could 
have been, based on this explanation, an attempted armed home 
invasion.  See Commonwealth v. Morin, 478 Mass. 415, 422-423 
(2017). 
 
The crux of the defendant's argument is that, although he 
was present at the scene, he abandoned the plan to rob the 
victim of money or drugs.  The defendant claims that Lopez "must 
have noticed" that his three accomplices had left the apartment 
building.  He argues that Lopez, who stayed behind to search the 
victim's apartment for money or drugs, was engaged in an 
"independent effort" to steal from the victim, and was acting 
strictly on his own behalf when he shot the victim. 
 
Our jurisprudence on withdrawal from a joint venture 
focuses on the interval between the asserted withdrawal and the 
13 
 
 
commission of the offense, and the extent to which a defendant 
communicates the fact of withdrawal to a coventurer.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 464 Mass. 56, 74 (2013) (and cases 
cited).  Here, there was no evidence that the defendant 
effectively withdrew from the joint venture to commit the 
predicate offense of armed home invasion. 
 
The defendant did not testify.  Considered in the light 
most favorable to the defendant, the facts largely are derived 
from his somewhat self-serving statements to police.  They 
establish that the defendant entered the apartment building with 
the intent to steal money or drugs from the victim; that he was 
disguised and armed with a knife; that Lopez concealed a handgun 
somewhere on his person; that the defendant and his coventurers 
assaulted the victim at the threshold of the victim's apartment; 
and that the defendant fled because the victim alerted his 
neighbors. 
 
Having crossed the Rubicon by entering the apartment 
building to rob the victim while armed and disguised, and having 
assaulted the victim at the threshold of his apartment, the 
defendant did not effectively withdraw before the commission of 
an armed home invasion.  See Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 
at 118 (2010) (evidence did not support withdrawal instruction 
where there was no "appreciable interval" between alleged 
withdrawal and the commission of the planned crime); 
14 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Pucillo, 427 Mass. 108, 116 (1998) (judge 
properly instructed jury that withdrawal was not timely and 
effective "if [the] withdrawal comes so late that the crime 
cannot be stopped"); Cook, 419 Mass. at 202 (evidence was 
insufficient to suggest timely withdrawal from joint venture 
where defendant kicked and punched victims but left before fatal 
stabbing); Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 18 (2018) 
(withdrawal effective and timely if "the defendant withdraws 
from the planned crime before the commission of the crime has 
begun"). 
 
The defendant contends that the evidence warranting a 
withdrawal instruction is stronger than in Fickett, 403 Mass. 
at 196.  We disagree.  In that case, the defendant and an 
intoxicated victim went to several bars.  Id.  The victim, who 
paid for all of the drinks with a substantial sum of money, 
became a target for robbery.  Id.  The defendant telephoned an 
acquaintance, and both plotted to steal from the victim.  Id.  
The defendant testified that he abandoned the plan to rob the 
victim after he received a loan of one hundred dollars from the 
potential victim.  Id. at 196, 200.  The defendant told a 
taxicab driver, who was planning to help with the robbery, that 
he no longer wanted to steal from the victim.  Id. at 200.  The 
defendant called his coventurer and told him that "the victim 
had just lent him [one hundred dollars]," and that he did not 
15 
 
 
want anything "to do with what we had discussed."  Id. at 201.  
The defendant agreed to bring the victim to his coventurer's 
house to discuss it.  Id.  There, the defendant repeated that he 
did not want anything to do with a robbery.  Id. at 196, 201.  
The coventurer told the defendant and the victim that he would 
give them a ride home or to a bar.  Id. at 196.  En route to a 
bar, the coventurer stopped his vehicle, killed the victim, and 
stole his money.  Id. at 196, 201.  In sum, by contrast to the 
situation here, the defendant in that case had renounced his 
involvement in the robbery prior to the actual commission of the 
offense.  See id. at 196, 201. 
 
Accordingly, notwithstanding that the judge improperly gave 
an instruction on withdrawal at the defendant's first trial, the 
defendant was not entitled to such an instruction on retrial.  
See Cook, 419 Mass. at 202 (judge was not required to instruct 
on withdrawal where theory was unsupported by evidence). 
 
b.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
sought a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  He faults counsel for not having requested a 
supplemental instruction concerning the connection between the 
predicate felony and the killing.  The defendant also contends 
that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to a portion of 
the prosecutor's closing argument, in which the prosecutor urged 
16 
 
 
the jury to do [their] job."  After a hearing, the motion judge, 
who was also the trial judge, denied the motion. 
 
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
in a case of murder in the first degree, we apply the more 
favorable standard of review for a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 
338, 358 (2016), G. L. c. 278, § 33E. "We consider whether there 
was an error in the course of the trial (by defense counsel, the 
prosecutor, or the judge) and, if there was, whether that error 
was likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion."  Id., 
quoting Commonwealth v. Lessiur, 472 Mass. 317, 327, cert. 
denied, 577 U.S. 963 (2015). 
 
i.  Supplemental jury instruction.  The defendant argues 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a 
supplemental instruction regarding the Commonwealth's burden to 
prove that the act that caused the victim's death occurred 
during the commission or attempted commission of the predicate 
felony.  The judge instructed the jury that felony-murder 
required the Commonwealth to prove: 
"that the act which caused the death occurred during the 
commission or the attempted commission of the underlying 
felony.  As noted above, the underlying felony for this 
charge of felony murder in the first degree is armed home 
invasion.  The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the act that caused the death of the decedent 
occurred in connection with that felony and at 
substantially the same time and place.  A killing may be 
found to be connected with the felony if the killing 
17 
 
 
occurred as part of the effort to escape responsibility for 
the felony by the defendant or by another participant in 
the commission or the attempted commission of the 
underlying felony." 
 
See Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 520 (2017), citing 
Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 408 Mass. 463, 466 (1990); Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide 67 (2018). 
 
The defendant argues that his trial counsel should have 
requested a supplemental jury instruction based on Commonwealth 
v. Dellelo, 349 Mass. 525, 529 (1965), and Green, 302 Mass. 
at 555.  He argues that this instruction would have informed the 
jury that "a murder is not committed in the commission of a 
felony if the felony was completely over before the murder, and 
that the felony was completely over if there was an appreciable 
interval between the termination and the killing."  See Dellelo, 
supra (whether attempted crime was "completely over," so that it 
may not serve as basis for felony-murder liability, is question 
of fact for jury); Green, supra (defendant was required to have 
abandoned joint venture within "appreciable interval" of fatal 
act). 
 
According to the defendant, "everyone but Lopez" thought 
that the home invasion had been completed before the fatal 
shooting.  It therefore was for the jury, guided by an 
appropriate instruction, to decide whether the predicate felony 
of armed home invasion had been "completely over" before the 
18 
 
 
shooting.  The absence of such an instruction, he argues, 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.4 
 
In an affidavit submitted with his motion for new trial, 
trial counsel asserted that he did not consider asking the judge 
to supplement the felony-murder jury instructions.  The judge 
ruled that, based on the evidence at trial, the defendant was 
not entitled to a supplemental jury instruction.  Relying on 
Morin, 478 Mass. at 422, the judge concluded that the 
Commonwealth was not required to prove that the killing occurred 
during the course of the predicate felony. 
 
The requested supplemental instruction would not have 
enhanced the jury's understanding of the Commonwealth's burden 
to prove the third element of felony-murder, i.e., "that the act 
that caused the death occurred during the commission or 
attempted commission of the underlying felony."  Model Jury 
                     
 
4 During deliberations, the jury asked the judge the 
following questions: (1) "Is it possible to have a definition 
for joint venture?" and (2) "Can a joint venture be terminated 
and when?"  The judge responded to the first question by 
directing the jury to refer to specific pages of his written 
instructions.  As to the second question, the judge wondered 
whether the jury was asking about withdrawal from the joint 
venture before it concluded or the defendant's escape from the 
apartment building.  He asked the jury for clarification by 
writing on the note: "Can you be more specific as to what it is 
you are asking in the second question?"  Although trial counsel 
argued that the answer to the second question was "Yes," he 
agreed that the second question could use "more specificity."  
The jury returned a verdict an hour later without seeking 
further guidance from the court. 
19 
 
 
Instructions on Homicide 67 (2018).  We previously have 
determined that the Commonwealth need not prove that the killing 
occurred during the course of the predicate felony.  Morin, 478 
Mass. at 422  "For purposes of felony-murder, the homicide and 
the predicate felony need only to have occurred as part of one 
continuous transaction, and the connection is sufficient as long 
as the predicate felony and the homicide took place at 
substantially the same time and place.  The killing may occur 
after the completion of the predicate felony, so long as the 
killing is "within the res gestae of the felonious conduct" 
(quotations and citations omitted).  Id.  See Commonwealth v. 
Alcequiecz, 465 Mass. 557, 566-567 (2013) (evidence was 
sufficient where entire span of events -- from illegal entry to 
fatal stabbing -- occurred in less than nine minutes as part of 
"a single transaction consisting of an unbroken sequence of 
events"); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 459 Mass. 249, 251, 255-256, 
cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1080 (2011), quoting Dellelo, 349 Mass. 
at 530 ("the killing is referable to the robbery" if committed 
as part of predicate felony or incident to crime such as an act 
of escape or flight). 
 
Here, the judge properly instructed the jury that the 
killing must have occurred "at substantially the same time and 
place" as the underlying felony.  See Model Jury Instructions on 
Homicide 67 (2018).  This instruction was adequate to explain 
20 
 
 
"the required connection between the predicate felony and the 
killing."  See Alcequiecz, 465 Mass. at 566-567.  A failure to 
object to this language, or to request "additional instructions 
for clarification," does not constitute ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  Id. 
 
ii.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant's second 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel concerns a portion of 
the prosecutor's closing argument.  The prosecutor ended his 
closing argument by urging the jury to "do your job."  He 
argued: 
"Ladies and gentlemen, it's football season, and I don't 
know whether you're a football fan or not, but I'm sure 
you've heard the name of Bill Belichick, the coach of the 
Patriots.  And one thing he always says year after year 
after year, 'I tell my players do your job.'  And I ask 
you, if you do your job, and look at the case and look 
who's responsible, that you find the defendant guilty on 
all three indictments." 
 
 
In denying the motion for a new trial, the judge determined 
that it was improper for the prosecutor to argue that it is the 
jury's job to convict.  See Commonwealth v. Adams, 434 Mass. 
805, 822 (2001) (improper to argue that jury's "job" or "duty" 
is to return guilty verdict); Commonwealth v. Degro, 432 Mass. 
319, 328-329 (2000) (it was not permissible advocacy to suggest 
that jury's job is to convict).  The judge determined, however, 
that the error was not prejudicial.  "[T]he focus of the 
prosecutor's closing argument had been on what the evidence at 
21 
 
 
trial had been and how that evidence pointed to the defendant's 
guilt."  The jurors were instructed that their verdict must be 
based only on the evidence, and nothing but the evidence; they 
also were reminded that closing arguments are statements of 
opinion, and not evidence.  "The prosecution's case at trial was 
strong." 
 
We agree with the trial judge.  The statement, considered 
in the context of the entire closing argument, as well as the 
jury instructions, did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Washington, 459 
Mass. 32, 44 (2011); Commonwealth v. Montez, 450 Mass. 736, 750 
(2008). 
 
c.  Relief pursuant to G. L. 278, c. § 33E.  Finally, the 
defendant asks this court to exercise its extraordinary 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict on 
the murder conviction.  He argues that he is entitled to relief 
on two grounds.  First, a verdict of murder in the second degree 
would be more consonant with justice because he merely 
participated in the "remote outer fringes" of the joint venture.  
See Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 823-824 (2017), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Rolon, 438 Mass. 808, 824 (2003).  
Second, Lopez, the individual who pulled the trigger, was 
convicted of murder in the second degree. 
22 
 
 
 
We have reviewed the entirety of the record and discern no 
basis upon which to disturb the verdict.  The defendant's 
contention that he played a minor role in the armed home 
invasion is unavailing.  The jury would have been warranted in 
finding that the defendant played a central role in the crime 
that led to the victim's death.  The defendant's active 
participation in the joint venture included identifying a drug 
dealer to target, coordinating with an accomplice conducting 
reconnaissance, planning the robbery, and entering the apartment 
building while armed with a knife.  Furthermore, a disparity in 
sentences returned by a separate jury for a more culpable 
accomplice is not enough, standing alone, to warrant relief 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Burke, 
414 Mass. 252, 268 n.14 (1993); Commonwealth v. Todd, 408 Mass. 
724, 729-730 (1990). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgments of conviction and the order 
denying the motion for a new trial are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.