Title: Commonwealth v. Adams
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12709
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 9, 2020

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SJC-12709 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JAMES L. ADAMS. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     September 5, 2019.  -  September 9, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Rape.  Joint Enterprise.  Constitutional Law, Double jeopardy, 
Waiver of constitutional rights.  Collateral Estoppel.  
Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  Evidence, Joint venturer, Relevancy 
and materiality.  Practice, Criminal, Double jeopardy, 
Collateral estoppel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 25, 2011. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Sandra L. Hamlin, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Scott A. Katz for the defendant. 
 
Kate Cimini, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  The defendant was indicted on nine counts of 
forcible rape of a child and one count of contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor.  He was charged as a principal in three 
2 
 
 
of the counts of rape, and as a joint venturer in three counts 
of rape where Calvin Spencer was charged as a principal, and 
three where Joseph Brown was so charged.1  After a jury trial, 
the defendant was acquitted on all counts in which he had been 
charged as a principal, and all counts alleging oral rape where 
he had been charged as a joint venturer.  He was convicted of 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor.  The jury were 
unable to reach a verdict with respect to the remaining four 
counts.  Before attempting to retry the defendant, the 
Commonwealth conducted extensive additional deoxyribonucleic 
acid (DNA) testing on the clothing the victim had been wearing, 
and at the retrial, the Commonwealth introduced the results of 
some of those additional tests.  At his second jury trial, 
conducted by the same judge, the defendant was convicted as a 
joint venturer in vaginal and anal rapes committed by his two 
coventurers. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that subjecting him to a 
second trial violated the constitutional protection against 
double jeopardy.  Specifically, he contends that, because he was 
acquitted of oral rape as a joint venturer, the jury at his 
first trial necessarily found that he was not a joint venturer 
as to any of the rapes, and thus he could not be retried on the 
                     
 
1 The three counts for each defendant alleged one count each 
of vaginal, oral, or anal rape. 
3 
 
 
other counts involving joint venture.  The defendant maintains 
as well that certain evidence, in particular, the DNA test 
results from his first trial, as well as the subsequent testing, 
should not have been admitted.  After careful review of the 
record at both trials, we affirm the convictions. 
 
1.  Facts.  Because the defendant's double jeopardy claim 
depends on the evidence presented at his first trial, we recount 
that evidence in some detail, viewing it in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth; where the evidence at the two 
trials differed substantively, we indicate those differences.  
 
In April, 2011, the fourteen year old victim was a patient 
in a residential treatment program at McLean Hospital (McLean) 
and was attending school on the McLean grounds.  On April 5, 
2011, the victim had a pass to go to Boston for a Portuguese 
lesson.  She left McLean at approximately 3:30 P.M., and 
traveled by bus and by Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority (MBTA) trains on the Red and Green Lines to a coffee 
shop near Boston University.  When the victim arrived at 
approximately 5:30 or 6 P.M., she believed that she might have 
been "a little late" for the meeting.  After waiting briefly for 
her instructor, who did not appear, the victim rode the Green 
Line back to downtown Boston.  She went to the MBTA's South 
Station, hoping to buy drugs for a friend at McLean who had 
given her money to do so. 
4 
 
 
 
Unable to find any cocaine to purchase, the victim rode a 
Red Line train back to Harvard Square.  She eventually arrived 
at an area near the Harvard Square MBTA station known as "the 
pit," where she hoped to be able to purchase drugs.  There, she 
met four men:  Armando Hernandez, Spencer, Brown, and the 
defendant.2  She told them that she was nineteen years old and a 
college student.  After talking with the victim for some time, 
the four men walked toward Harvard Yard.  The victim followed, 
hoping that they were going to a place where they would have 
drugs.  When the men got onto a bus, the victim went with them. 
 
On the bus, the men passed around bottles of liquor.  The 
victim drank most of a bottle of brandy.  Hernandez, who had 
suffered a recent injury, produced a prescription bottle, took a 
Percocet pill, and gave one or more pills to Spencer.  Spencer, 
Brown, the defendant, and the victim got off the bus near 
Central Square; Hernandez did not get off with them.  By that 
time, the victim was feeling lightheaded and dizzy.  One of the 
men went to a liquor store, and the victim and the other two men 
crossed the street to an apartment building on Massachusetts 
Avenue.3  When someone left the building, the group went inside.  
                     
 
2 At trial, the victim identified three of the men by 
distinguishing characteristics:  a tall man (Brown), a short man 
(Spencer), and a man carrying a white Blackberry or similar 
mobile device (the defendant). 
 
5 
 
 
They went upstairs in the elevator, and arrived in an area with 
a series of hallways that were unlit except for a light coming 
from a bathroom located at one end.  They sat on the floor in 
the hallway; at some point Spencer rejoined them.  One man gave 
the victim a Percocet; they also all smoked marijuana.4  The 
victim took ten or eleven puffs; thereafter, she felt "very 
unaware of everything," and unable to think.  At that point, the 
bathroom light was off. 
 
The man sitting next to the victim asked her if she had 
ever "been with" a black man.  She replied that she had not, 
then apparently passed out.  When she came to, most of her 
clothing had been removed.  The victim was unable to move her 
own body much.  One of the investigating officers testified that 
the defendant told police that two men (Spencer and Brown) were 
having sex with the victim at the same time, and in different 
ways, moving her into different positions.  The same officer 
testified that the defendant told him that he had masturbated 
while Spencer and Brown had sex with the victim.  The victim 
testified that she was "in and out of passing out"; at one 
point, she heard one of the men ask another if she were dead.  
                     
 
3 The victim did not identify the man at the first trial; at 
the second trial, she indicated that it had been the short man, 
Spencer, who had gone to the liquor store. 
 
 
4 The victim testified that she had not previously taken a 
Percocet or smoked marijuana. 
6 
 
 
The assaults "just stopped" thirty minutes after they had begun; 
the victim was clear on the time, because she "checked [her] 
phone." 
 
The men helped the victim dress.  By then she was able to 
walk to the elevator by leaning on someone.  The three men took 
her to the elevator and went downstairs with her.  One of the 
men walked her to the Central Square MBTA stop; at that point, 
she was able to "walk in a straight line."5  The man asked if he 
could call her the following day; she said "sure."6  He also told 
her that "it would be better next time if you weren't so drunk."   
The victim rode a Red Line train from Central Square to Harvard 
Square.  She arrived at approximately 9 P.M., thought that she 
was well in time to return to McLean as scheduled, sat down on 
the floor of the station, and slept on and off for about one-
half hour.  When she woke up, she sent a text message to a 
friend, who testified as a first complaint witness.  The victim 
then called her program and asked someone to pick her up at the 
Harvard Square station because she would be late returning if 
she took the bus. 
                     
 
5 At the first trial, the victim did not identify the man 
who walked her to Central Square.  At the second trial, the 
victim indicated that it had been the man with the Blackberry 
(the defendant). 
 
 
6 At the second trial, the victim testified that she gave 
the man who walked her home her cellular telephone number and he 
sent her a text message to confirm that it was the right number. 
7 
 
 
 
Later that evening, the victim went to an emergency room.  
A doctor there observed bruising on her labia and cervix and a 
tear on her hymen.  She also had a rug burn on her back, from 
when she had been lying on her back, and felt pain in her 
rectum.  At trial, the doctor testified about the collection of 
evidence from the victim's body and her clothing, as well as to 
the effect of the combination of the drugs and alcohol the 
victim had consumed. 
 
Approximately two weeks after the incident, Cambridge 
police conducted an identification of the defendant through a 
photographic array.  They examined the victim's cellular 
telephone, surveillance video footage from the Central Square 
and South Station MBTA stations, and surveillance video 
recordings from the apartment house on Massachusetts Avenue; 
investigators also examined and took samples from the hallway in 
the building, to which the victim was able to lead them.  The 
hallway contained numerous stains from bodily fluids on the 
carpet, moldings, and walls, but forensic testing yielded 
nothing useful for the defendant's case. 
 
During an interview, the defendant told police that he had 
been present at the scene and had masturbated while watching the 
other men; he was able to describe the men's actions, but denied 
having sex with the victim himself and denied that she had been 
forced.  The defendant's and the victim's statements to police 
8 
 
 
were introduced at trial through testimony by an investigating 
officer. 
 
DNA testing was performed on samples obtained from swabs of 
the victim's body and some of her clothing.  The testing was 
divided into sperm and non-sperm portions.  The non-sperm 
portion of the vaginal swab yielded one DNA profile that matched 
the victim.  The sperm portion contained a mixed profile; within 
that, the major profile matched Spencer, and the defendant and 
Brown were excluded as potential contributors.7  The victim's bra 
(that and her shoes were the only items of clothing that she was 
still wearing when she woke up) contained amylase8 but not sperm 
cells.  The defendant matched the major DNA profile obtained 
from the bra,9 and the victim and Spencer were included as 
potential contributors to the minor profile; Brown was excluded.  
The sperm fraction of the sample from the victim's tank top was 
a single source that matched Spencer.  The victim matched the 
profile of the major contributor to the mixed, non-sperm 
                     
 
7 The probability of a random individual matching the 
profile was one in 319.5 trillion of the Caucasian population, 
and one in 298.3 trillion of the African-American population.  
All of the coventurers were African-American. 
 
 
8 Amylase is a component of saliva that also may be present 
in breast milk, urine, and feces. 
 
 
9 The probability of a random individual matching the major 
profile was 1 in 116.4 billion of the Caucasian population, and 
1 in 2.467 billion of the African-American population. 
9 
 
 
fraction, and the defendant and Spencer could not be excluded as 
potential contributors to the minor profile; Brown was excluded.  
No sperm or seminal fluid was found in samples taken from the 
victim's mouth. 
 
After the jury were unable to reach a verdict on some of 
the charges, the Commonwealth conducted more extensive DNA 
testing on the victim's skirt and the front and back panels of 
her underwear.  In this testing, Spencer was identified as the 
major profile in the sperm fraction of the testing, and the 
defendant could not be excluded10 from the sperm fraction of a 
mixture on the underwear that contained DNA from at least three 
men.  The defendant also could not be excluded from a non-sperm 
mixture on the victim's skirt and her tank top, by comparable 
ratios to those of the underwear. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Waiver.  As a threshold matter, we 
note that the defendant raised his double jeopardy claim for the 
first time on appeal; he did not file a motion to dismiss the 
indictments on double jeopardy grounds prior to his retrial.  
Relying on Commonwealth v. Spear, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 583 (1997), 
the Commonwealth argues that the double jeopardy claim therefore 
                     
 
10 The mixture of three men from which the defendant and 
Spencer could not be excluded would have matched 5,062 out of 
5,426 African-American men in the database, and 6,209 
Caucasians. 
10 
 
 
is waived, and the court should not consider it.  We do not 
agree. 
 
In Spear, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 584-585, as here, the 
defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial as to some charges, 
and the defendant did not move to dismiss those charges before 
his second trial.  After he was convicted at his second trial, 
the defendant argued on direct appeal that his right to be 
protected against being subject to double jeopardy had been 
violated.  Id.  In those circumstances, the Appeals Court held 
"that by failing to assert the defense of double jeopardy prior 
to his second trial, the defendant waived the right to do so" on 
appeal, id. at 587; accordingly, the court expressed no view on 
the merits of the defendant's double jeopardy claim.  Id. at 587 
n.6. 
 
In subsequent similar cases, the Appeals Court has done 
likewise; in no case has it considered whether such a claim 
raises a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Davis, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 484, 493 (2013); 
Commonwealth v. Green, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 98, 101-102 (2001).  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 905, 906 (2001) 
(double jeopardy claim was waived, but it would not have 
succeeded on merits).  We nonetheless have observed that the law 
concerning double jeopardy waiver is "not entirely clear," see 
11 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Carlino, 449 Mass. 71, 76 n.13 (2007), and cases 
cited, and take this opportunity to clarify it. 
 
The Appeals Court's decision in Spear, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 
584-585, 587, was decided before we held that "[a]ll claims, 
waived or not, must be considered."  See Commonwealth v. 
Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 293 (2002).  To be sure, there are 
differences in how we evaluate the consequences of an error -- 
i.e., if we determine there was error, how we determine whether 
the defendant is entitled to any relief -- depending on whether 
the claim was raised and properly preserved in the trial court 
or whether it was waived.11  Regardless of how, ultimately, we 
determine the consequences of an error, the important point for 
present purposes is that our prevailing practice is to consider 
all of the claims that are argued before us, including waived 
                     
 
11 For claims that were raised and properly preserved, we 
generally consider whether the error was "prejudicial" or 
"harmless," see Commonwealth v. Vinnie, 428 Mass. 161, 163 
(1998); Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994), or, 
in the case of constitutionally-rooted claims, whether the error 
was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt," see Commonwealth v. 
Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 700-701 (2010); Vinnie, supra.  For claims 
that were not raised or properly preserved, we examine whether 
the error gave rise to "a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice."  See Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 13 (1999), 
citing Commonwealth v. Freeman, 352 Mass. 556, 564 (1967). 
 
 
Other standards are applicable in cases involving preserved 
claims of structural error, see Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 
Mass. 443, 454 (2019), and in direct appeals from convictions of 
murder in the first degree, see Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 
Mass. 678, 681-682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014). 
12 
 
 
claims, provided the record before us is sufficient to enable us 
to do so. 
 
In sum, we do not follow the Appeals Court's approach in 
Spear and its progeny.  Although the defendant indeed did waive 
his claim by not asserting it in the Superior Court, we 
nonetheless consider the claim and ask whether a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice arose from retrying the 
defendant on the four remaining charges. 
 
Although we conclude that a double jeopardy claim must be 
considered even if it is raised for the first time after a 
defendant's retrial, it is distinctly advantageous to a 
defendant to raise such a claim before retrial.  Otherwise, the 
defendant risks not only an erroneous conviction, but also the 
irremediable loss of the right not to be tried twice for the 
same offense.  See Costarelli v. Commonwealth, 374 Mass. 677, 
680 (1978), quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660-
661 (1977).  That also is why we routinely provide appellate 
review of double jeopardy claims before a retrial, where a 
defendant seeks relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, from the denial 
of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, brought after 
the defendant's trial ended in a mistrial, but before the 
retrial.  See, e.g., Pinney v. Commonwealth, 479 Mass. 1001, 
1001 (2018); Commonwealth v. Hebb, 477 Mass. 409, 409-410 
13 
 
 
(2017).  See also Neverson v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 174, 175-
176 (1989). 
 
b.  Double jeopardy.  Turning to the substance of the 
defendant's claim, the defendant argues that, in acquitting him 
of oral rape by joint venture, the jury necessarily found that 
he was not a joint venturer at all, and that this finding 
therefore precluded a retrial.  The defendant's argument arises 
from "the issue-preclusion component of the [d]ouble [j]eopardy 
[c]lause, [under which], 'when an issue of ultimate fact has 
once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue 
cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future 
lawsuit.'"  See Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 
352, 356 (2016), quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 
(1970).  "[T]he double jeopardy clause precludes the government 
from relitigating any issue that was necessarily decided by a 
jury's acquittal in a prior trial."  Yeager v. United States, 
557 U.S. 110, 119 (2009), citing Ashe, supra.12 
 
The United States Supreme Court first articulated this 
principle in Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445-447.  The defendant in that 
case was charged with several counts of armed robbery arising 
                     
 
12 "Unlike the United States Constitution, the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights does not include a double jeopardy clause, 
but our statutory and common law have long embraced the same 
principles and protections."  Kimbroughtillery v. Commonwealth, 
471 Mass. 507, 510 (2015). 
14 
 
 
from a single incident in which a group of masked men broke into 
a house and robbed six people who were playing poker.  Id. at 
437-438.  He first was tried only on the charge of robbing one 
of the victims.  Id. at 438.  According to the Court, "[t]he 
proof that an armed robbery had occurred and that personal 
property had been taken from [the first victim] as well as from 
each of the others was unassailable. . . . But the State's 
evidence that the [defendant] had been one of the robbers was 
weak."  Id.  The defendant was acquitted.  Id. at 439.  Over the 
defendant's objection, he was tried a second time, this time for 
the robbery of one of the other victims.  Id. at 439.  At the 
second trial, the defendant was convicted notwithstanding the 
first jury's apparent determination that the defendant had not 
been one of the robbers.  Id. at 440.  The Court held that the 
second trial violated collateral estoppel13 principles embodied 
in the double jeopardy clause.  Id. at 444-445.  In doing so, 
the Court explained that to determine whether a second trial is 
precluded, a court must, "with realism and rationality, . . . 
'examine the record of [the] prior proceeding, taking into 
account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant 
matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded 
                     
 
13 Our jurisprudence equates the terms "collateral estoppel" 
and "issue preclusion."  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Martinez, 
480 Mass. 777, 788 (2018); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 476 Mass. 
367, 375 (2017). 
15 
 
 
its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant 
seeks to foreclose from consideration'" (citation omitted). Id. 
at 444. 
 
Having examined the record of the defendant's first trial, 
the Court observed, see id. at 445: 
"[T]he record is utterly devoid of any indication that the 
first jury could rationally have found that an armed 
robbery had not occurred, or that [the first victim] had 
not been a victim of that robbery.  The single rationally 
conceivable issue in dispute before the jury was whether 
the [defendant] had been one of the robbers.  And the jury 
by its verdict found that he had not.  The [F]ederal rule 
of law, therefore, would make a second prosecution for the 
robbery of [the second victim] wholly impermissible." 
 
 
Unlike in Ashe, 397 U.S. at 438-439, the defendant here was 
not tried on the various charges seriatim; he was tried 
simultaneously on all of the charges and was acquitted on some, 
but the jury were unable to reach a verdict on the remainder.  A 
similar circumstance was before the United States Supreme Court 
in Yeager, 557 U.S. at 119.  In that case, the defendant was 
tried on multiple counts of five Federal offenses, which, for 
simplicity, the Court referred to as the "fraud counts" and the 
"insider trading counts."  Id. at 113-114.  After a lengthy 
trial, the jury acquitted the defendant on the fraud counts but 
were unable to reach a verdict on the insider trading counts.  
Id. at 114-115.  The defendant claimed that the acquittals were 
the result of the jury's finding that he had not had any insider 
information, a fact that also was critical to the insider 
16 
 
 
trading counts, and therefore the government was precluded from 
retrying him on those counts.  Id. at 115.  A lower appellate 
court had ruled that a retrial was not precluded; that court 
reasoned that if the jury had made such a finding, they would 
not have been unable to reach a verdict, but instead would have 
acquitted the defendant on the insider trading counts.  Id. 
at 116. 
 
The United States Supreme Court, however, rejected this 
reasoning: 
"A hung count is not a 'relevant' part of the 'record of 
[the] prior proceeding.' . . . Because a jury speaks only 
through its verdict, its failure to reach a verdict 
cannot -- by negative implication -- yield a piece of 
information that helps put together the trial puzzle. . . . 
A host of reasons -- sharp disagreement, confusion about 
the issues, exhaustion after a long trial, to name but a 
few -- could work alone or in tandem to cause a jury to 
hang.  To ascribe meaning to a hung count would presume an 
ability to identify which factor was at play in the jury 
room.  But that is not reasoned analysis; it is guesswork.  
Such conjecture about possible reasons for a jury's failure 
to reach a decision should play no part in assessing the 
legal consequences of a unanimous verdict that the jury did 
return" (footnotes omitted). 
 
Yeager, 557 U.S. at 121-122, quoting Ashe, supra at 444. 
 
 
The Yeager Court thus concluded "that the consideration of 
hung counts has no place in the issue-preclusion analysis."  
Yeager, 557 U.S. at 122.  Under the holding in Yeager, 
therefore, we may not draw the seemingly obvious inference that, 
as the jury reached deadlock rather than outright acquitting the 
defendant of the vaginal and anal rapes as a joint venturer, 
17 
 
 
they must not have found that he was completely innocent of 
those offenses.  We must disregard the counts where the jury 
were unable to reach a verdict, and examine the record of the 
first trial "with realism and rationality," Ashe, 397 U.S. 
at 444, to determine whether there was any rational basis for 
the first jury's decision to acquit the defendant of the oral 
rapes, other than a finding that he was not a joint venturer as 
to the entire incident.  See id.  It is the defendant's burden 
"'to demonstrate that the issue whose relitigation he seeks to 
foreclose was actually decided' by [the first] jury's verdict of 
acquittal."  Bravo-Fernandez, 137 S. Ct. 352, 359 (2016), 
quoting Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 233 (1994). 
 
The evidence at the first trial established that the victim 
had been raped and that the defendant was present at the scene, 
along with Brown and Spencer.  Indeed, the defendant told police 
that he had seen Brown and Spencer having sex with the victim, 
and said that she had not been forced.  The age of the victim, 
and her intoxicated condition, also were not live issues at 
trial.  The primary question for the jury, as to each joint 
venture indictment, was whether the man alleged to be the 
principal assailant committed the charged vaginal, oral, or anal 
rape.  The jury had to make this determination based on slim 
evidence specifically connecting each man to each act.  Although 
she knew that, at certain points, two men were performing sex 
18 
 
 
acts on her simultaneously, the victim was unable to specify 
which men raped her.  In addition, while the victim testified 
that she could feel someone ejaculating in her mouth, emergency 
room physicians found no sperm or other DNA evidence there. 
 
Reading the record with "realism and rationality," Ashe, 
397 U.S. at 444, we conclude that the defendant's acquittal on 
the charge of oral rape by joint venture was at least as likely 
to have been the result of the jury's inability to determine, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, whether Brown and Spencer had each 
committed an oral rape as it was to have been the result of a 
determination that the defendant was not a joint venturer at 
all. 
 
The defendant argues that it was essentially undisputed 
that the victim was orally raped by two of the three men 
present.  Because he was acquitted of oral rape as a principal 
actor, the jury must have found that it was Brown and Spencer 
who committed the oral rapes, and the defendant's acquittal as a 
joint venturer indicated that he did not share their intent.  As 
discussed, however, the evidence at the first trial was at best 
equivocal on this point.  Indeed, the defendant's own closing 
argument emphasized the paucity of evidence that he or Brown had 
"any kind of sex with" the victim.  Moreover, even if the jury 
did, as the defendant suggests, find that he was not a joint 
19 
 
 
venturer as to the oral rapes, it does not follow that he was 
not a joint venturer as to the alleged vaginal and anal rapes. 
 
In sum, the defendant has not carried his burden of proving 
that the issue whether he was a joint venturer with respect to 
the vaginal and anal rapes was actually was decided at his first 
trial.  Accordingly, there was no error, let alone any 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, in retrying the 
defendant on those charges. 
 
c.  Admissibility of evidence.  Before his second trial, 
the defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude all 
testimony and DNA evidence tending to show that he personally 
committed any of the rapes.  He argued that because he had been 
acquitted as a principal of all charges, allowing such evidence 
would violate collateral estoppel principles derived from the 
guarantee against double jeopardy.  The motion was denied.  The 
defendant now challenges the admission, at his second trial, of 
the victim's testimony that "at least" two of the three men had 
raped her orally,14 which, he argues, suggested that all three 
                     
 
14 At the first trial, the victim testified that she was 
raped by two of the men.  At the second trial, the victim 
testified that there had been at least two men having sex with 
her at one time. The victim testified at the second trial: 
 
 
Q.:  "[W]as there any way for you to distinguish between 
the men that were having sex with you in the hallway?" 
 
 
A.:  "I could tell with the penises in my mouth that at 
least one was hairier and at least one was a lot more shaven." 
20 
 
 
                     
 
 
Q.:  "But were you able to tell whether there were just two 
or whether there were three different penises?" 
 
 
A.:  "I was not able to tell.  But it was definitely at 
least two different ones." 
 
 
The following day, she testified: 
 
 
Q.:  "So you testified yesterday that you could tell that 
there were at least two men because there were some distinctions 
between them?" 
 
 
A.:  "Yes." 
 
 
. . . 
 
 
Q.:  "[S]o you said that there were at least two men that 
forced their penises into your mouth.  Was this something that 
only happened twice or did it happen more than that?" 
 
 
A.:  "Several times." 
 
 
Q.:  "Okay.  And how do you know it was several times?" 
 
 
A.:  "Because there were at least two different like 
feeling . . . like in my throat, I could feel like two different 
ones." 
 
 
In addition, the prosecutor used similar language without 
objection in her closing argument, stating, for example, that 
"there were at least two different men raping" the victim, and 
that "what the evidence does show is that at the least, [the 
defendant] participated, that he aided, he assisted his friends, 
that he tried to help make the rapes succeed."  To the extent 
the defendant challenges the closing argument, we find no 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. 
21 
 
 
might have done so, and of evidence, not admitted at the first 
trial, that the defendant's DNA was found on the victim's 
underwear and skirt.15  There was no further objection at trial.16 
 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the 
collateral estoppel component of the double jeopardy clause in 
the Federal Constitution does not bar "relevant and probative 
evidence that is otherwise admissible under the Rules of 
Evidence simply because it relates to alleged criminal conduct 
for which a defendant has been acquitted."  See Dowling v. 
United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348 (1990).  Nor does such evidence 
violate the Federal due process clause.  Id. at 352-354.  For 
purposes of the Massachusetts Constitution, however, this court 
                     
 
15 Between the two trials, additional samples of the 
victim's clothing were tested.  Seminal fluid, including sperm 
cells, was found on her skirt and on the interior front and rear 
panels of her underwear.  As to the skirt, the sperm fraction 
matched only Spencer, but the defendant could not be excluded as 
a potential contributor to the non-sperm fraction.  As to the 
front panel of the underwear, while the major profile of the 
sperm fraction matched Spencer, there was insufficient 
information to identify other contributors.  The defendant could 
not be excluded as a contributor to the non-sperm fraction.  As 
to the rear panel of the underwear, the defendant was included 
as a potential contributor to the minor profile of the sperm 
fraction. 
 
 
16 The second trial predated our decision in Commonwealth v. 
Grady, 474 Mass. 715, 716-717 (2016), in which we ruled, for 
prospective purposes only, that a motion in limine can be 
sufficient to preserve an objection regardless of whether it is 
based on constitutional or other grounds.  Here, however, the 
defendant asserted a constitutional ground for excluding 
evidence, and so we treat the issue as preserved. 
22 
 
 
has rejected the Court's holding in Dowling, and has found 
Justice Brennan's dissent in that case persuasive.  See 
Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 472 Mass. 535, 546-547 (2015). 
 
In Dorazio, supra at 536, a case decided after the 
defendant's second trial in this matter, the defendant was tried 
for sex offenses against two victims.  At trial, a young girl, 
J.D., testified that the defendant had assaulted her, in an 
unrelated incident, during the same general period of time and 
in a similar manner.  Id. at 538.  J.D.'s testimony was 
introduced as prior bad act evidence, to demonstrate absence of 
accident or mistake, notwithstanding that the defendant had been 
acquitted at a prior trial of assaulting J.D.  Id. at n.7.  In 
addition, J.D.'s father and a police officer also testified 
about this alleged incident.  Id. at 538-539. 
 
In that case, we noted that, under Federal rules, such 
evidence might be admissible because the standard of proof for 
the introduction of bad act evidence -- more likely than not -- 
is much lower than the standard of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Dorazio, 472 Mass. at 543.  We concluded however, "that 
the collateral estoppel protections necessarily embraced by 
art. 12 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights] warrant the 
exclusion of the acquittal evidence in the circumstances of this 
case, a subsequent criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual 
conduct with minors."  Id. at 547.  We observed that the Dowling 
23 
 
 
court's "hypertechnical" approach to collateral estoppel 
"offends the principles of the presumption of innocence, the 
significance of being treated 'legally innocent' that results 
when the prosecution fails to prove a defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and notions of fairness and finality."  Id. 
at 547-548. 
 
Here, however, some of the evidence the defendant 
challenges is materially different from the type of evidence 
that was admitted improperly in Dorazio.  The victim did not 
affirmatively testify at the defendant's second trial that the 
defendant himself had raped her, nor did the prosecutor argue 
that the defendant had done so.  Indeed, on cross-examination by 
defense counsel, the victim testified that she could not say 
with any certainty that the defendant was one of the men who had 
raped her.  In our view, the victim's use of the phrase "at 
least" does not bear the weight the defendant places on it.  In 
context, the victim's words reflect her effort to testify 
accurately concerning her memory of the incident, and do not 
suggest an insinuation that the defendant engaged in physical 
conduct of which he had been acquitted.  The victim testified 
that she had passed out and come to multiple times, and that her 
memory was "very choppy" or "fragmented," and she emphasized 
that she was not sure of the number of times certain acts took 
place or the particular individuals involved, or the order of 
24 
 
 
the acts, before clarifying, for example, that an act had 
occurred "at least three" times.  There was no error in the 
admission of the victim's testimony. 
 
With respect to the new DNA evidence, however, the question 
is different.  The additional DNA testing indicated that the 
defendant was excluded as a potential contributor to the mixed 
minor sperm profile on the back panel of the victim's underwear, 
containing a mixture of three males, in which Spencer matched 
the major profile.17  The defendant also could not be excluded as 
a contributor to the mixed, non-sperm fractions elsewhere on the 
underwear, on the victim's tank top, and on the victim's skirt.  
See notes 7, 9, and 10, supra.  This evidence was not relevant 
to whether the defendant had participated as a joint venturer in 
the vaginal and anal rapes.  And unlike the defendant's argument 
as to the acquittal of oral rape as a finding that he did not 
participate at all as a joint venturer, this evidence did 
introduce for the jury's consideration "facts determined in the 
defendant's favor at the first trial."  See Dorazio, 472 Mass. 
at 545, quoting Commonwealth v. Benson, 389 Mass. 473, 478, 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983).  Just as in Dorazio, supra at 
                     
 
17 Within the mixed "minor" profile, the defendant's DNA was 
the "major profile."  The likelihood of the appearance of this 
profile was 1 in 1,961 African-American males, 1 in 1,255 Asian 
males, 1 in 2,242 Caucasian males, and 1 in 1,171 Hispanic 
males. 
25 
 
 
548, the DNA evidence tended to establish that the defendant 
personally had committed the rapes, or had had sexual contact 
with the victim, and required the defendant to some extent to 
defend against the charges of involvement as a principal on 
which he had been acquitted.  It was of a different character, 
and more incriminating, than the DNA evidence from the victim's 
body that had been introduced at the first trial, from which the 
defendant was excluded, and that also was admitted at the second 
trial.  The additional DNA evidence should not have been 
introduced. 
 
Nonetheless, introduction of the additional DNA evidence 
did not prejudice the defendant.  The defendant's DNA was not a 
match for any of the samples taken from the victim's body.  The 
prosecutor elicited testimony that the presence of the 
defendant's DNA on the underwear and other clothing could be 
explained by his removing a condom (he told police that he had 
worn one initially while masturbating) and then handling the 
garments.  As noted, the victim did not identify the defendant 
as one of her direct assailants.  And the prosecutor, in her 
closing argument, did not assert that the defendant had 
personally committed any of the rapes, but only argued 
forcefully that the defendant was guilty of rape by joint 
venture.  The jury were instructed properly on the elements of 
joint venture liability, and that each indictment specifically 
26 
 
 
alleged that either Brown's or Spencer's penis penetrated the 
victim's vagina or anus. 
 
Most significantly, the expert's testimony emphasized that 
the major profile in the sperm fraction on the victim's 
underwear and skirt matched Spencer, with the possibility of 
another individual matching that same profile as one in 3.536 
trillion African-Americans in the population.  He described the 
fact that the defendant's DNA was "an inclusion" on the rear 
panel of the underwear as follows: 
"So we were able to have enough of this sample to -- to 
do -- gain some more information on that minor profile in 
the rear panel to see -- you know, we know we have a major 
male matching Calvin Spencer, but can you -- can we gain 
more information about what remains in that minor." 
 
This did not tend to point to the defendant as a principal in 
the rapes or to focus the jury's attention on the possible 
presence of the defendant's DNA.  In addition, other than the 
one point on the rear panel of the underwear,18 the mixed non-
sperm samples from which the defendant could not be excluded 
also would have included approximately eighty-seven percent of 
the male population in the United States (4,747 out of a 
database of 5,426 males or 2,471 out of a database of 2,858 
males).  Thus, while improper, the admission of the additional 
                     
 
18 Approximately 1 in 1,961 African-American males would 
have matched the minor profile.  See note 17, supra. 
27 
 
 
DNA evidence likely would not have had an effect on the jury's 
verdict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.