Title: In Re: Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC16-181
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 16, 2017

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-181 
____________ 
 
 
IN RE:  AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA EVIDENCE CODE. 
 
[February 16, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for consideration the regular-cycle report1 of The Florida Bar’s 
Code and Rules of Evidence Committee (Committee), concerning legislative 
changes to the Florida Evidence Code and to section 766.102, Florida Statutes 
(2012).  We have jurisdiction,2 and, as discussed below, we decline to adopt, to the 
extent they are procedural, any of the legislative changes addressed in the 
Committee’s report.   
BACKGROUND 
Prior Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code 
                                          
 
 
1.  See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.140(b). 
 
 
2.  See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const. 
 
 
 
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It has been this Court’s policy to adopt, to the extent they are procedural, 
provisions of the Florida Evidence Code as they are enacted and amended by the 
Legislature.3  However, on occasion the Court has declined to adopt legislative 
changes to the Evidence Code because of significant concerns about the 
amendments, including concerns about the constitutionality of an amendment.4  In 
addition, the Court has declined to follow the Committee’s recommendation to 
adopt, to the extent it may be procedural, legislation creating section 766.102(12), 
                                          
 
 
3.  See In re Amends. to Fla. Evidence Code, 782 So. 2d 339, 342 (Fla. 
2000) (recognizing Court’s policy to adopt amendments to the Code to the extent 
they are procedural, but following Committee’s recommendation not to adopt one 
amendment) (citing In re Fla. Evidence Code, 372 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1979) 
(adopting Evidence Code enacted by Legislature to the extent it is procedural), 
clarified, In re Fla. Evidence Code, 376 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1979)); see also In re 
Amends. to Fla. Evidence Code, 53 So. 3d 1019 (Fla. 2011); In re Amends. to Fla. 
Evidence Code, 960 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 2007); In re Amends. to Fla. Evidence 
Code—Section 90.104, 914 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 2005); Amends. to Fla. Evidence 
Code, 891 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 2004); In re Amends. to Fla. Evidence Code, 825 So. 
2d 339 (Fla. 2002); In re Fla. Evidence Code, 675 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 1996); In re Fla. 
Evidence Code, 638 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1993); In re Amend. of Fla. Evidence Code, 
497 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1986); In re Amend. of Fla. Evidence Code, 404 So. 2d 743 
(Fla. 1981).   
  
 
4.  See, e.g., In re Amends. to Fla. Evidence Code, 144 So. 3d 536 (Fla. 
2014) (declining to follow the Committee’s recommendation to adopt section 
90.5021, Florida Statutes (2014), which establishes a fiduciary lawyer-client 
privilege); In re Amends. to Fla. Evidence Code, 782 So. 2d at 341-42 (declining 
to adopt amendments to section 90.803(22), Florida Statutes (1997), which allows 
the admission of former testimony although the declarant is available as a witness, 
in part because of concerns about its constitutionality). 
 
 
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Florida Statutes, which is not a part of the Florida Evidence Code.  See In re 
Amends. to Fla. Evidence Code, 144 So. 3d 536, 537 (Fla. 2014). 
Legislative Changes at Issue 
The legislative changes at issue in this case are those enacted since this 
Court considered the Committee’s 2013 regular-cycle report.  See In re Amends. to 
Fla. Evidence Code, 144 So. 3d at 536.  In this case, by a vote of 16-14, a majority 
of the Committee recommends that the Court not adopt, to the extent it is 
procedural, chapter 2013-107, sections 1 and 2, Laws of Florida (Daubert 
Amendment), which amended sections 90.702 (Testimony by experts) and 90.704 
(Basis of opinion testimony by experts), Florida Statutes (2012), of the Evidence 
Code to replace the Frye5 standard for admitting expert opinion evidence with the 
Daubert6 standard.  In addition to a separate majority report on the Daubert 
Amendment, the Committee provides a minority report urging the Court to adopt 
the Daubert Amendment.  The Committee also recommends, by a vote of 24-0-1, 
that the Court not adopt, to the extent it is procedural, chapter 2013-108, section 2, 
Laws of Florida (Same Specialty Amendment), which amended section 766.102 
                                          
 
 
5.  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Bundy v. State, 471 
So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985) (adopting Frye standard); Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 
1989) (same).  
 
6.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 
 
 
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(Medical negligence; standards of recovery; expert witness), Florida Statutes 
(2012), to require a standard-of-care expert witness in a medical malpractice action 
to specialize in the same specialty as the health care provider against whom or on 
whose behalf the testimony is offered.  Finally, the Committee recommends, by a 
vote of 24-0-1, that the Court adopt, to the extent it is procedural, chapter 2014-
200, section 1, Laws of Florida, which amended section 90.803(24), Florida 
Statutes (2013) (Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial; Hearsay 
exception; statement of elderly person or disabled adult) of the Evidence Code, the 
hearsay exception relating to reports of abuse by elderly persons or disabled adults.  
The Board of Governors of The Florida Bar approved the Committee’s 
recommendations.   
Consistent with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.140(b)(2), before 
filing its report with the Court, the Committee published its recommendations for 
comment.  According to the Committee’s report, the Committee received eighty-
one comments in support of the recommendation not to adopt the Daubert 
Amendment.  The Committee received twenty-nine comments opposing that 
recommendation.  The Committee also received two comments supporting the 
recommendation not to adopt the Same Specialty Amendment and no comments 
against that recommendation.  The Committee did not receive any comments 
 
 
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addressing its recommendation to adopt the changes to section 90.803(24) of the 
Evidence Code.   
After the Committee filed its report, the Court published the Committee’s 
recommendations for comment.  The Court received fifty-six comments in favor of 
the Committee’s recommendation not to adopt the Daubert Amendment and one 
hundred thirty-one comments in opposition to the Committee’s recommendation.7  
All nine comments filed with the Court addressing the Committee’s 
recommendation not to adopt the Same Specialty Amendment support that 
recommendation.  No comments were filed with the Court concerning the 
amendments to section 90.803(24).  The Committee filed a response to the 
comments filed with the Court.  The Court also heard oral argument in this case. 
After considering the numerous filings in this case, and having had the 
benefit of oral argument, for the reasons discussed below, we follow the 
Committee’s recommendation and decline to adopt, to the extent they are 
procedural, the changes to sections 90.702 and 90.704 of the Evidence Code made 
by the Daubert Amendment.  Also, as recommended by the Committee, we decline 
                                          
 
 
7.  Of those one hundred thirty-one comments, seventy-seven are form 
emails from “small business owners” repeating the same request that the Court 
“retain the Daubert expert witness standard that the Florida legislature passed in 
2013.”  
 
 
 
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to adopt, to the extent they are procedural, the amendments to section 766.102, 
Florida Statutes, made by the Same Specialty Amendment.  However, as further 
explained below, we decline to follow the Committee’s recommendation to adopt 
the changes made to section 90.803(24).  
DISCUSSION 
Daubert Amendment 
 
The Daubert Amendment amended sections 90.702 and 90.704, Florida 
Statutes (2012), to change the standard of admissibility for scientific expert 
evidence from the Frye standard to the Daubert standard and the standard found in 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702.  See ch. 2013-107, §§ 1 - 2, Laws of Fla.  The Frye 
test only applies to expert testimony based upon new or novel scientific evidence, 
and “in order to introduce expert testimony deduced from a scientific principle or 
discovery, the principle or discovery ‘must be sufficiently established to have 
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.’ ”  Flanagan 
v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993) (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 
1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).8  In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
509 U.S. 579 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules 
                                          
 
 
8.  The Court is aware that on October 20, 2016, the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals, in Motorola Inc. v. Murray, 147 A.3d 751 (D.C. 2016), rejected 
application of the Frye standard for the admissibility of scientific testimony in 
favor of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 
 
 
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of Evidence superseded Frye’s general acceptance test for the admissibility of 
scientific evidence.  Id. at 586-87.  In addition, in interpreting Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702, Daubert provides that “the trial judge must ensure that any and all 
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”  Id. at 
589.  Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as currently promulgated, intends to ensure 
reliability of scientific opinion evidence with the following requirements: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise if: 
 
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue; 
 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
 
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; 
and 
 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the 
facts of the case. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
In 2013, Florida’s Legislature rejected the longstanding Frye standard and 
adopted the Daubert standard and Federal Rule of Evidence 702 with two 
amendments to the Evidence Code.  First, the Legislature amended section 90.702 
to mirror Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as follows: 
 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining 
 
 
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a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify about it in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise, if: 
 
 
(1)  The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data; 
 
 
(2)  The testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods; and 
 
 
(3)  The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably 
to the facts of the case; however, the opinion is admissible only if it 
can be applied to evidence at trial. 
 
Ch. 2013-107, § 1, Laws of Fla.  Next, the Legislature amended section 90.704 as 
follows: 
 
The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by, or made known to, the expert at 
or before the trial.  If the facts or data are of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the subject to support the opinion expressed, the 
facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.  Facts or data that are 
otherwise inadmissible may not be disclosed to the jury by the 
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that 
their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s 
opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect. 
 
Ch. 2013-107, § 2, Laws of Fla. 
The Committee recommends the Court not adopt the Daubert Amendment, 
to the extent it is procedural.  In support of its recommendation, both the 
Committee and commenters who support the recommendation raised what we 
consider “grave constitutional concerns.”  Those concerns include undermining the 
right to a jury trial and denying access to the courts.  While the Court does not 
address the constitutionality of a statute or proposed rule within the context of a 
 
 
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rules case,9 the fact that there may be “grave concerns about the constitutionality of 
the amendment” has been a basis previously for the Court not adopting an 
amendment to the Evidence Code to the extent it is procedural.  See In re Amends. 
to Fla. Evidence Code, 782 So. 2d 339, 342 (Fla. 2000).  Accordingly, having 
heard oral argument and carefully considered the Committee’s recommendation 
and the numerous comments both submitted to the Committee and filed with the 
Court, we decline to adopt the Daubert Amendment to the extent that it is 
procedural, due to the constitutional concerns raised, which must be left for a 
proper case or controversy. 
Same Specialty Amendment 
 
The Same Specialty Amendment amended section 766.102(5)(a), Florida 
Statutes (2012), to require a standard-of-care expert witness in a medical 
malpractice action to specialize in the same specialty, rather than the same or 
similar specialty,10 as the health care provider against whom or on whose behalf 
                                          
 
 
9.  See, e.g., In re Amends. to Fla. Evidence Code, 144 So. 3d at 538 
(Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); In re Amend. to Fla. 
Evidence Code, 825 So. 2d at 341; In re Amends. to Fla. Evidence Code, 782 So. 
2d at 341; In re Amends. to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro.—Final Arguments, 957 So. 2d 
1164, 1167 (Fla. 2007). 
 
10.  Prior to the Same Specialty Amendment, section 766.102(5)(a), Florida 
Statutes, required an expert testifying about the prevailing standard of care in a 
medical malpractice action to (1) specialize in the same specialty as the health care 
provider against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered, or (2) 
specialize in a similar specialty that includes the evaluation, diagnosis, or treatment 
 
 
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the testimony is offered.  See ch. 2013-108, § 2, Laws of Fla.  The amendment also 
repealed section 766.102(14), Florida Statutes (2012), which recognized a trial 
court’s authority to disqualify or qualify an expert witness on grounds other than 
the qualifications in that section.11  See ch. 2013-108, § 2, Laws of Fla.  The 
Committee, the Board of Governors, and all those who commented on the Same 
Specialty Amendment urge the Court not to adopt that legislation, to the extent it is 
procedural.  Consistent with the Committee’s recommendation, we decline to 
adopt the Same Specialty Amendment, for the same reasons we declined to adopt 
section 766.102(12), which requires a standard-of-care expert witness to hold the 
same state license as the health care provider against whom, or on whose behalf, 
the expert is testifying or to have a valid expert witness certificate.  See In re 
Amends. to Fla. Evidence Code, 144 So. 3d at 537 (declining to adopt chapter 
2011-233, section 10, Laws of Florida, creating section 766.102(12), because of 
concerns that the statute “is unconstitutional, [has] a chilling effect on the ability to 
obtain expert witnesses, and is prejudicial to the administration of justice”).  
                                          
 
of the medical condition that is the subject of the claim and have the prior 
experience treating similar patients.  The Same Specialty Amendment removed the 
similar specialty option for qualifying a standard-of-care expert witness from the 
statute. 
 
11.  Before its repeal, section 766.102(14), Florida Statutes, provided that 
section 766.102 did “not limit the power of the trial court to disqualify or qualify 
an expert witness on grounds other than the qualifications in this section.” 
 
 
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The Committee and commenters in this case contend that requiring a 
standard-of-care expert witness to specialize in the same specialty, rather than the 
same or similar specialty, as the health care provider against whom or on whose 
behalf the testimony is offered has “a chilling effect on the ability to obtain expert 
witnesses,” making it more difficult for a victim of medical negligence to bring a 
medical malpractice action.  This raises concerns that, like the same-license 
requirement of section 766.102(12), the same-specialty requirement limits access 
to courts and is prejudicial to the administration of justice.  See id.; cf. Kukral v. 
Mekras, 679 So. 2d 278, 284 (Fla. 1996) (recognizing that “medical malpractice 
statutory scheme must be interpreted liberally so as not to unduly restrict a Florida 
citizen’s constitutionally guaranteed access to courts, while at the same time 
carrying out the legislative policy of screening out frivolous lawsuits and 
defenses”).   
In addition to the concerns raised by the Committee and the commenters, the 
section 766.102(5)(a) same-specialty requirement and the various other section 
766.102 expert-witness requirements12 are not part of chapter 90, Florida Statutes, 
                                          
 
 
12.  See, e.g., § 766.102(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016) (providing requirements for 
expert witnesses testifying on the standard of care for general practitioners); § 
766.102(6), Fla. Stat. (providing the requirements for expert witnesses testifying 
on the standard of care for nurses and other medical support staff); § 766.102(7), 
Fla. Stat. (providing the requirements for expert witnesses testifying on the 
standard of care as to administrative and other nonclinical issues in actions against 
hospitals or other medical facilities); § 766.102(9), Fla. Stat. (providing the 
 
 
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the Florida Evidence Code.  See In re Fla. Evidence Code, 372 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 
1979) (adopting, as the Court’s rules of evidence, the Evidence Code enacted by 
the Legislature, in part, to ensure that rules of evidence were codified in one place 
and were no longer “derived from multiple sources,” including case law, rules 
adopted by the Court, and statutes enacted by the Legislature), clarified, In re Fla. 
Evidence Code, 376 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1979).13  Rather, the section 766.102 
requirements, none of which this Court has adopted,14 are part of the legislative 
scheme for medical malpractice actions codified in chapter 766, Florida Statutes.  
                                          
 
requirements for expert witnesses testifying on the standard of care for emergency 
room physicians).   
 
13.  See also Charles W. Ehrhardt, Ehrhardt’s Florida Evidence § 102.1 
(2016 ed.) (recognizing that Court adopts, to the extent procedural, provisions of 
the Evidence Code as they are adopted and amended by the Legislature “to avoid 
having the evidence rules scattered in piece-meal fashion in various statutes and 
rules of procedures” and to have “a single comprehensive set of rules”).   
 
14.  Prior to the Committee’s 2013 recommendation to adopt section 
766.102(12), see In re Amends. to the Fla. Evidence Code, 144 So. 3d at 536, the 
Committee had only made recommendations to the Court concerning legislative 
changes to the Evidence Code.  The Committee had never made recommendations 
concerning any of the section 766.102 expert-witness requirements.  See Ehrhardt, 
supra, at § 102.1 (as reporter and primary drafter of the Florida Evidence Code and 
first chair of the Committee, recognizing that Committee’s recommendation 
concerning the section 766.102(12) expert-witness requirement “was unique” 
because “[s]ince its inception, the Committee believed its jurisdiction was limited 
to provisions of the Evidence Code” and noting that, for example, “the many 
amendments to the accident report privilege in section 316.066 and the rape shield 
statute in section 794.022 were never within scope of the [C]ommittee’s 
recommendations”). 
 
 
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It is likewise significant that this Court also has never adopted, to the extent 
it may be procedural, the section 766.102(14), Florida Statutes (2012), recognition 
of a trial court’s authority to qualify or disqualify an expert witness in a medical 
malpractice case on grounds other than those specified in section 766.102.  
Therefore, there is no reason for this Court to now adopt the repeal of that 
legislation to the extent that repeal might impact court procedure.  Finally, we do 
not address the substantive/procedural issue raised here because whether the 
Legislature’s amendments to section 766.102(5)(a) and repeal of section 
766.102(14) somehow run afoul of the trial court’s inherent power or this Court’s 
rule-making authority must be left for a proper case or controversy and not decided 
in this rules case.  See In re Amends. to Fla. Evidence Code, 782 So. 2d at 341. 
Amendments to Section 90.803(24) 
 
Chapter 2014-200, section 1, Laws of Florida, amended section 90.803(24) 
(Hearsay Exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial; Hearsay exception; 
statement of elderly person or disabled adult), Florida Statutes, the hearsay 
exception relating to reports of abuse by elderly persons or disabled adults.  The 
amendment to section 90.803(24) removes the alternative requirement that an 
elderly person or disabled adult testify, only requiring that such individuals be 
unavailable to do so.  The Committee recommends that the Court adopt that 
legislation, to the extent it is procedural. 
 
 
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Notwithstanding its recommendation, the Committee notes in its report that 
the statutory change raises constitutional issues:  “The amended statute would 
remain unconstitutional as to testimonial[15] statements in criminal cases where 
there has been no opportunity for prior cross-examination while it eliminates 
(potentially) constitutionally permissible application to nontestimonial[16] 
statements in the criminal context and all applicable statements in civil cases.”  
While the Committee concludes that case law, including Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004), and State v. Hosty, 944 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 2006), imposes the 
requirement of an opportunity for cross-examination regarding testimonial 
statements in criminal cases, we decline to adopt this amendment, to the extent it is 
procedural, in light of constitutional concerns.  See In re Amendments to Fla. 
Evidence Code, 782 So. 2d at 342 (declining to adopt chapter 98-2, section 1, 
Laws of Florida, amending section 90.803(22), Florida Statutes, which allows the 
                                          
 
 
15.  “Testimonial” statements include but are not limited to “material such as 
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to 
cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably 
expect to be used prosecutorially” as well as extrajudicial statements “contained in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions.”  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004). 
 
16.  “Nontestimonial” statements include those that, objectively considered, 
were given to, for example, police or a 911 operator describing what was actually 
happening at the time and to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency.  See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826-27 (2006).   
 
 
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admission of former testimony although the declarant is available as witness, in 
part because of concerns about its constitutionality).   
CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, for the forgoing reasons, we decline to adopt, to the extent they 
are procedural, chapters 2013-107, sections 1 and 2; 2013-108, section 2; and 
2014-200, section 1, Laws of Florida. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
CANADY, J., concurs. 
LAWSON, J., did not participate. 
 
 
POLSTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I respectfully dissent because, unlike the majority, I would adopt the Daubert 
standard as the Legislature amended the Florida Evidence Code in 2013.17  The 
majority rejects replacing the Frye standard with the Daubert standard and gives its 
reason for doing so as “grave constitutional concerns” about the Daubert standard, 
including undermining the right to a jury trial and denying access to courts.  
However, the United States Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), in 1993, and the standard has been 
                                          
 
 
17.  I agree with the majority’s decision to decline to adopt the same 
specialty and hearsay exception amendments.   
 
 
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routinely applied in federal courts ever since.  The clear majority of state 
jurisdictions also adhere to the Daubert standard.  See 1 McCormick on Evidence § 
13 (7th ed. June 2016 Supp.).  In fact, there are 36 states that have rejected Frye in 
favor of Daubert to some extent.  See Charles Alan Wright & Victor Gold, 29 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 6267, at 308-09 n.15 (2016).  Has the entire 
federal court system for the last 23 years as well as 36 states denied parties’ rights 
to a jury trial and access to courts?  Do only Florida and a few other states have a 
constitutionally sound standard for the admissibility of expert testimony?  Of 
course not. 
As a note to the federal rule of evidence explains, “[a] review of the caselaw 
after Daubert shows that the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather 
than the rule.”  Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.  
“Daubert did not work a ‘seachange over federal evidence law,’ and ‘the trial 
court’s role as gatekeeper is not intended to serve as a replacement for the 
adversary system.’ ”  Id. (quoting United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 
1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
 Furthermore, I know of no reported decisions that have held that the 
Daubert standard violates the constitutional guarantees of a jury trial and access to 
courts.  To the contrary, there is case law holding that the Daubert standard does 
not violate the constitution.  See, e.g., Junk v. Terminix Int’l Co., 628 F.3d 439, 
 
 
- 17 - 
450 (8th Cir. 2010) (rejecting legal merit of the constitutional claim “that the 
district court violated [appellant’s] Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial by 
improperly weighing evidence in the course of its Daubert rulings” and explaining 
that “Junk does not cite any case for the notion that a proper Daubert ruling 
violates a party’s right to a jury trial”); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. 
Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. 1995) (rejecting claim “that allowing the 
trial judge to assess the reliability of expert testimony violates [the parties’] federal 
and state constitutional rights to a jury trial by infringing upon the jury’s inherent 
authority to assess the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their 
testimony”); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142-43 (1997) 
(rejecting “argument that because the granting of summary judgment in this case 
was ‘outcome determinative,’ it should have been subjected to a more searching 
standard of review” and explaining that, while “disputed issues of fact are resolved 
against the moving party[,] . . . the question of admissibility of expert testimony is 
not such an issue of fact”).  
 
Accordingly, the majority’s and the committee’s “grave constitutional 
concerns” regarding the Daubert standard are unfounded.  We should adopt the 
Daubert standard as amended in the Florida Evidence Code by the Legislature in 
2013. 
CANADY, J., concurs. 
 
 
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Original Proceedings – Florida Bar Code and Rules of Evidence Committee 
Gregory Paul Borgognoni, Chair, Code and Rules of Evidence Committee, 
Borgognoni Law, PL, Coral Gables, Florida; Peter Anthony Sartes, II, Past Chair, 
Code and Rules of Evidence Committee, Law Offices of Tragos, Sartes & Tragos, 
Clearwater, Florida; Perry Michael Adair, Vice-Chair, Code and Rules of Evidence 
Committee, Becker & Poliakoff, P.A., Coral Gables, Florida; Patricia M. Dodson, 
Vice-Chair, Code and Rules of Evidence Committee, Ponte Vedra, Florida; James 
Norcross Floyd, Vice-Chair, Code and Rules of Evidence Committee, City 
Attorney’s Office, Tallahassee, Florida; John Wayne Hogan, Code and Rules of 
Evidence Committee, Terrell Hogan, Jacksonville, Florida; Andrew Hamilton, 
Code and Rules of Evidence Committee, Andrew Hamilton, P.A., Tampa, Florida; 
Judge Claudia Rickert Isom, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Code and Rules of 
Evidence Committee, Tampa, Florida; and John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive 
Director, and Krys Godwin, Bar Staff Liaison, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Michael R. Alford, Senior Vice President/Deputy General Counsel, on behalf of 
Raymond James Financial, Inc., Saint Petersburg, Florida; Moises Melendez of 
Sedgwick LLP, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Jane Anderson and Andrew Abramovich 
of Boyd & Jenerette, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida; Mark R. Antonelli of Gaebe, 
Mullen, Antonelli & Dimatteo, Coral Gables, Florida; Lewis F. Collins, Jr. of 
Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP, Tampa, Florida; Michael J. Corso of 
Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, P.A., Fort Myers, Florida; Michael Ross 
D’Lugo and Richards Huff Ford of Wicker Smith O’Hara McCoy & Ford, P.A., 
Orlando, Florida; Peter Reed Corbin of Ford & Harrison LLP, Jacksonville, 
Florida; Patrick Edward Quinlan of Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, 
P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida; Richard Paul Pravato of Law Office of Wolf & 
Provato, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Brett J. Yonon of Law Office of Wolf & 
Pravato, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Vincent Joseph Pravato of Law Office of Wolf 
& Pravato, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Brian Harris Malamud of Law Office of Wolf 
& Pravato, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Stephen Fink, Hollywood, Florida; Walter 
Gary Meloon, Orlando, Florida; Jose M. Rubio, Jr., Mascotte, Florida; Sam 
Arledge, Odessa, Florida; Richard May, Quincy, Florida; John Gory, Ocala, 
Florida; John Yunker, Osprey, Florida; Alan Chandler, Newberry, Florida; Dannie 
Griffin, Panama City, Florida; Dan Johnson, Sarasota, Florida; Richard Carroll, 
Rockledge, Florida; Richard Feagle, Archer, Florida; Cherly Kluesener, Mount 
Dora, Florida; Steve Hatfield, Sanibel, Florida; Tommy Pippin, Panama City, 
 
 
- 19 - 
Florida; Bob Mercer, Orlando, Florida; William Cowherd, Edgewater, Florida; 
Laura Mitchell, Cantonment, Florida; Tim Loughran, Oviedo, Florida; Jim 
Rackley, Jr., Tallahassee, Florida; Lloyd Johnson Sarber, III of Marks Gray, P.A., 
Jacksonville, Florida; Tim Barter, Bradenton, Florida; Nate Oglesby, Winter 
Garden, Florida; Jim Dietrich, Saint Cloud, Florida; Jo-Ann Taylor, Islamorada, 
Florida; Tim Dozier, Zephyrhills, Florida; Sandrine Kouyessein, Port Saint Lucie, 
Florida; Charles G. Fairbanks, Jr., Anthony, Florida; Grover McKee, Jr., 
Tallahassee, Florida; Pam Willis, Monticello, Florida; Carolina Diaz, Naples, 
Florida; Bob Nelson, Saint Augustine, Florida; Kjhh Hodges, Pompano Beach, 
Florida; Mike Jakubowski, North Port, Florida; Judy Powers, West Palm Beach, 
Florida; Brenda C. Smith, Punta Gorda, Florida; Mike Jensen, Orlando, Florida; 
Kevin Wheeler, Alva, Florida; Virginia Murphy, East Palatka, Florida; Frank 
Sweeney, Bradenton, Florida; Brice R. Holladay, Jacksonville, Florida; Michelle 
Smith, Winter Springs, Florida; Paul Scholer, Miami, Florida; Jack Chason, 
Tallahassee, Florida; James Baker, Jacksonville, Florida; Jess Dade, Ruskin, 
Florida; Mark De Jong, Bradenton, Florida; Gary Kallmeyer, Haines City, Florida; 
Uma Lekhram, Plant City, Florida; Ralph T. Rogers, Milton, Florida; Stephen 
Jones, Gainesville, Florida; Stephen Stump, Ocala, Florida; Brian Hershberger, 
Ocala, Florida; Glenn Birket, Orlando, Florida; Jerry E. Pierce, Winter Park, 
Florida; Steven A. Nisbet, Labelle, Florida; Jay Stees, Dunnellon, Florida; Gordon 
Koegler of Law Offices of Gordon Koegler, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Scott 
Marlo Newmark of Carner, Newmark & Cohen, LLP, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; 
David Haase, Lakeland, Florida; Rodger Mena, Lake City, Florida; David Batson, 
Jr., Tallahassee, Florida; Alan Cody, Fort Myers, Florida; Margaret Bigham, Gulf 
Breeze, Florida; Terri Alba, Plant City, Florida; Susan Soverns, Hollywood, 
Florida; Tina M. Noll, Dade City, Florida; Kelley Olson, Tallahassee, Florida; Roy 
Buncome, Fleming Island, Florida; Bob Dervaes, Yulee, Florida; Nancy J. Goulah, 
Tampa, Florida; Francis Morton McDonald, Jr. of McDonald Toole Wiggins, P.A., 
Orlando, Florida; Howard Gardner Butler of Butler Law Group, Jacksonville, 
Florida; David Robert Heil of David R. Heil, P.A., Winter Park, Florida; James 
Graber, Longwood, Florida; Jeff Godwin, Indialantic, Florida; John Doble, Odessa, 
Florida; James Richard Caldwell, Jr. of Rumberger Kirk & Caldwell, P.A., Tampa, 
Florida; Charles Henry Baumberger of Rossman, Baumberger, Reboso & Spier, 
P.A., Miami, Florida; Spencer Hal Silverglate of Clarke Silverglate, P.A., Miami, 
Florida; Tara C.F. Ryan, PhRMA, Washington, District of Columbia; J. David 
Williams, Progressive Insurance, Mayfield Village, Ohio; James M. Graber, 
Apopka, Florida; Jonathan Moore, Winter Park, Florida; Robert N. LaFontaine, 
Fort Myers, Florida; Lynn Hileman, Jacksonville Beach, Florida; Mikaela Olsen, 
Winter Garden, Florida; Debra Kneiss, Dania Beach, Florida; Terry Cole of 
Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; Wendy Frank Lumish of 
 
 
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Bowman and Brooke LLP, on behalf of Florida Attorneys of Bowman and Brooke 
LLP, Coral Gables, Florida; Mark Hicks and Mary Joanna Gniadek of Hicks, 
Porter, Ebenfeld & Stein, P.A., Miami, Florida, on behalf of The Doctors 
Company; Douglas Malcolm McIntosh and Kimberly Kanoff Berman of McIntosh, 
Sawran & Cartaya, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Dana Brooks Cooper of Barrett, 
Fasig & Brooks, Tallahassee, Florida; Sean Christopher Domnick of Domnick 
Cunningham & Whalen, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida; Michael John Thomas of 
Pennington P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; Brian Orr Sutter of All Injuries Law Firm, 
PA, Port Charlotte, Florida; Thomas Stoneham Edwards, Jr. of Edwards & Ragatz, 
P.A., Jacksonville, Florida, and Courtney Kneece Grimm of Bedell, Dittmar, 
Devault, Pillans & Coxe, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida, and Thomas Edward Bishop 
of Tanner Bishop, Jacksonville, Florida, on behalf of The Trial Lawyers Section of 
The Florida Bar; Gary M. Farmer, Sr. of Farmer Jaffe Weissing Edwards Fistos & 
Lehrman P.L., Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Howard Coleman Coker of Coker, 
Schickel, Sorenson, Posgay, Camerlengo & Iracki, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida; 
Joseph B. Jones of Shapiro Law Group, Bradenton, Florida; Jonathan Adam Huth 
of Murphy Anderson, Jacksonville, Florida; Lawton R. Graves of Murphy 
Anderson, Jacksonville, Florida; Nicole Tucker Melvani of Murphy Anderson, 
Jacksonville, Florida; Davis Daniel Balz of Murphy Anderson, Jacksonville, 
Florida; Gerald Anthony Giurato of Murphy Anderson, Jacksonville, Florida; Niels 
Murphy of Murphy Anderson, Jacksonville, Florida; William Newton Shepherd of 
Holland & Knight LLP, West Palm Beach, Florida; Gregory Robert Miller of 
Beggs & Lane RLLP, Tallahassee, Florida, Pamela Cothran Marsh of Berger 
Singerman, LLP, Tallahassee, Florida, A. Brian Albritton of Phelps Dunbar, 
Tampa, Florida, Marcos Daniel Jimenez D’Clouet of McDermitt Will & Emery, 
LLP, Miami, Florida, Neal Russell Sonnett of Neal R. Sonnett, P.A., Miami, 
Florida, James E. Felman of Kynes Markman & Felman, Tampa, Florida, Michael 
S. Pasano of Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, Miami, Florida, and Bruce Martin Lyons 
of Law Offices of Bruce M. Lyons, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Nathaniel Edward 
Green of Nathaniel E. Green, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida; John Allen Attaway, 
Jr., Publix Super Markets, Inc., Lakeland, Florida; T. Rankin Terry, Jr., Fort 
Myers, Florida; Henry Salas and David Orestes Caballero of Cole Scott & Kissane, 
P.A., Miami, Florida, on behalf of Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A.; Kurt Eugene Lee 
of Kurt E. Lee, PL, Sarasota, Florida; Cecil Pearce, Tallahassee, Florida, on behalf 
of Florida Insurance Council; Daniel A. Murphy of Shapiro, Goldman, Babboni & 
Walsh, Bradenton, Florida, on behalf of Shapiro, Goldman, Babboni & Walsh; 
George N. Meros, Jr. and Andy Velosy Bardos of GrayRobinson, P.A., 
Tallahassee, Florida, and William W. Large of Florida Justice Reform Institute, 
Tallahassee, Florida, on behalf of Florida Justice Reform Institute; Erin O’Dell 
O’Brien, Jacksonville, Florida, on behalf of CSX Transportation, Inc.; Craig S. 
 
 
- 21 - 
Hudson of Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Fort Lauderdale, 
Florida; Anthony Hunter Quackenbush of Kelley Uustal Trial Attorneys, Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida; James William Guarnieri, Jr. of Guarnieri Law Firm, PA, 
Brandon, Florida; Troy Alan Rafferty of Levin Papantonio Thomas Mitchell 
Rafferty & Proctor, P.A., Pensacola, Florida, on behalf of Florida Justice 
Association; Patrick Stephen McArdle of Grossman Roth & Partridge on behalf of 
Grossman Roth Yaffa & Cohen, P.A., Sarasota, Florida; Hayden Patrick O’Byrne 
of K&L Gates, LLP, Miami, Florida; Susan K. Spurgeon of Pennington, P.A., 
Tampa, Florida; Charles M. Trippe, Jr., Jacksonville, Florida, on behalf of Carol 
Ann Licko, Raquel A. Rodriguez, Paul C. Huck, Jr., Jason B. Gonzalez, Erik M. 
Figlio, and Jesse M. Panuccio; E. G. (Gerry) Morris, Austin, Texas, Bruce Lyons, 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Neal R. Sonnett, Miami, Florida, and Jeffrey S. Weiner, 
Miami, Florida, on behalf of the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers; Julianne M. Holt, Tampa, Florida, on behalf of the Florida Public 
Defender’s Association, Inc.; Rodolfo Sorondo, Jr. of Holland & Knight LLP, 
West Palm Beach, Florida, Roy Carroll Young of Young, Vanassenderp & Qualls, 
P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, and Bill Herrle, Tallahassee, Florida, on behalf of The 
National Federation of Independent Business/Florida and The Florida Chamber of 
Commerce; John Fletcher Romano of Romano Law Group, West Palm Beach, 
Florida, on behalf of Romano Law Group; Patrick Alexander Gillen of Newsome 
Melton, Orlando, Florida; William Carl Ourand, Jr. of Newsome Melton, Orlando, 
Florida; Laurie J. Briggs, West Palm Beach, Florida; Diana Santa Maria of Law 
Offices of Diana Santa Maria, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Todd Jordan 
Michaels of the Haggard Law Firm, Coral Gables, Florida, on behalf of Todd 
Jordan Michaels and The Haggard Law Firm; Seth Elliot Miller, Tallahassee, 
Florida, on behalf of Innocence Project of Florida, Inc.; Leslie Mitchell Kroeger of 
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida; Robert F. 
Spohrer of Spohrer & Dodd, Jacksonville, Florida; Robert Mark Brochin of 
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Miami, Florida; David J. Halberg of David J. 
Halberg, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida; Belvin Perry, Jr. of Morgan & Morgan, 
Orlando, Florida; Corinne Cotton Hodak of Corinne C. Hodak, P.A., Jacksonville, 
Florida; Robert Frank Melton, II of Newsome Melton, Orlando, Florida; Robert 
Eric Bilik of McGuireWoods LLP, Jacksonville, Florida, on behalf of 
McGuireWoods LLP; Michael Jason Winer of the Law Office of Michael J. Winer, 
Tampa, Florida, on behalf of the Workers’ Compensation Section of The Florida 
Bar; Timothy Michael Moore of Shook Hardy & Bacon, Miami, Florida; Mark 
Kenneth Delegal of Holland & Knight LLP, Tallahassee, Florida, on behalf of 
Chubb, Cook Group Incorporated, The Dow Chemical Company, Eli Lilly and 
Company, Glaxosmithkline LLC, Metlife, Inc., Novo Nordisk Inc., Smiths Group, 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Walgreens, Zimmer Biomet, 
 
 
- 22 - 
and American Tort Reform Association; Tiffany Roddenberry of Holland & 
Knight, Tallahassee, Florida, on behalf of American Coatings Association, Inc., 
Astrazeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, Boston Scientific Corporation, Brunswick 
Corporation (Boston Whaler, Sea Ray, Brunswick Commercial & Government 
Products, and Mercury Marine), Caterpillar, Inc., CSX Transportation, Inc., Deere 
& Company, Eli Lilly and Company, Ford Motor Company, Georgia-Pacific LLC, 
Hyundai Motor America, Johnson & Johnson, Merck & Company, Inc., Norfolk 
Southern Corporation, Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, and Pfizer, Inc.; 
Matthew Kerry Schwencke, West Palm Beach, Florida, on behalf of Searcy 
Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, PA; Gregory William Coleman of Critton 
Luttier and Coleman, West Palm Beach, Florida, on behalf of Past Presidents of 
The Florida Bar and other members of The Florida Bar; Dan Cytryn of Law 
Offices of Cytryn & Velazquez, P.A., Coral Springs, Florida; Eric Harald Faddis 
and Tiffany Marie Faddis of Faddis & Faddis, P.A., Orlando, Florida; Walter 
Gordon Campbell, Jr. of Krupnick Campbell Malone Buser Slama Hancock 
Liberman, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Brian Christopher Costa of Alvarez, 
Carbonell, Feltman & Da Silva P.L., Coral Gables, Florida; Stephen George 
Charpentier of Charpentier Law Firm, P.A., Melbourne, Florida; Edward Vincent 
Ricci of Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, P.A., West Palm Beach, 
Florida; James Read Holland, II of Harrell & Harrell, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida;  
Pete Hutchison Brock, II of Brock Law, LLC, Wesley Chapel, Florida; Daniel H. 
Perez of Alvarez, Carbonell, Feltman & Da Silva P.L., Coral Gables, Florida; 
Robert D. Melton of Robert D. Melton P.A., Orlando, Florida; Jack Roy Reiter of 
GrayRobinson, P.A., Miami, Florida; Stephen Ashley Barnes of Barnes Trial 
Group, Tampa, Florida, on behalf of Stephen Ashley Barnes and Barnes Trial 
Group; Howard Kraft Pita of Pita Weber Del Prado, Miami, Florida; William 
Patrick Geraghty and Daniel Francis Molony of Shook Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., 
Miami, Florida, on behalf of the Florida Attorneys of Shook, Hardy & Bacon 
L.L.P.; Gregory Andrew Reed of Simon, Reed & Salazar, P.A., Miami, Florida, on 
behalf of Simon Reed & Salazar, P.A.; Charles Emmanuel Fombrun of Alvarez, 
Carbonell, Feltman & Da Silva P.L., Coral Gables, Florida; Morgan Wood 
Streetman of Streetman Law, Tampa, Florida; Ryan Sean LeMontang of Alvarez, 
Carbonell, Feltman & Da Silva P.L., Coral Gables, Florida; Stephen Eugene Mahle 
of Stephen Mahle, P.A., Boca Raton, Florida; Elizabeth Walker Finizio of Finizio 
& Finizio, PA, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Stephen Watrel of Steve Watrel, P.A., 
Jacksonville, Florida; Julie Braman Kane of Colson Hicks Eidson, Coral Gables, 
Florida; Christina Marrero of Alvarez, Carbonell, Feltman & Da Silva P.L., Coral 
Gables, Florida; The Honorable Garrett Richter, President Pro Tempore, The 
Florida Senate, Tallahassee, Florida; Robert L. Simmons, Saint Petersburg, 
Florida, on behalf of Allstate Insurance Company; Kenneth Andrew Stoller, 
 
 
- 23 - 
Washington, District of Columbia, on behalf of American Insurance Association; 
The Honorable Larry Metz, The Florida House of Representatives, Tallahassee, 
Florida; David E. Bright, Washington, District of Columiba, on behalf of Alliance 
of Automobile Manufacturers and Charles H. Haake, Washington, District of 
Columbia, on behalf of Association of Global Automakers; Bryan Scott Gowdy of 
Creed & Gowdy, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida; Carlos Jesus Martinez, Public 
Defender, and John Eddy Morrison, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial 
Circuit, Miami, Florida, on behalf of The Florida Public Defender Association, 
Inc., 
 
 
Responding with Comments