Title: LISA ROBERTS V MECOSTA COUNTY GENERAL HOSPITAL
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 116573
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: April 24, 2002

_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 24, 2002  
LISA ROBERTS,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
Nos. 116563, 116570, 116573  
MECOSTA COUNTY GENERAL HOSPITAL, 
GAIL A. DESNOYERS, M.D., 
MICHAEL ATKINS, M.D., BARB DAVIS, and 
OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY OF BIG RAPIDS, P.C., 
formerly known as GUNTHER, DESNOYERS & MEKARU  
Defendants-Appellants.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
YOUNG, J.  
This case again calls into question the authority of  
courts to create terms and conditions at variance with those  
unambiguously and mandatorily stated in a statute.  We  
reaffirm that the duty of the courts of this state is to apply  
the actual terms of an unambiguous statute.  
In this medical malpractice case, the Court of Appeals  
concluded that defendants had waived their ability to object  
to the sufficiency of the notices of intent by failing to  
raise their objections before the filing of the complaint.  We  
hold that the statute of limitations cannot be tolled under  
MCL 600.5856(d) unless notice is given in compliance with all  
the provisions of MCL 600.2912b. We further hold that MCL  
600.2912b places the burden of complying with the notice of  
intent requirements on the plaintiff and does not implicate a  
reciprocal duty on the part of the defendant to challenge any  
deficiencies in the notice before the complaint is filed. In  
addition, because MCL 600.5856(d) is a tolling provision and  
a plaintiff relies on a tolling provision to negate a statute  
of limitations defense raised by a defendant, a defendant does  
not need to assert the defense or challenge a plaintiff’s  
compliance 
with 
MCL 
600.2912b, as required by MCL 600.5856(d),  
until the plaintiff files suit.  For these reasons, we reverse  
the Court of Appeals opinion and remand this matter for  
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
I. Facts and Proceedings  
Plaintiff was pregnant and sought treatment because she  
was experiencing severe pain in her abdomen.  She was  
diagnosed as having suffered a spontaneous abortion and a D &  
C was performed.  Plaintiff alleges that it was later  
2  
discovered that she had actually been suffering from an  
ectopic pregnancy, not a spontaneous abortion, and that her  
left fallopian tube had burst.
 Emergency surgery was  
performed 
to 
remove 
plaintiff’s 
left 
fallopian 
tube.  
Plaintiff claims that as a result of the second operation, she  
can no longer bear children because her right fallopian tube  
had previously been removed.  
Plaintiff decided to pursue a medical malpractice claim,  
alleging that defendants misdiagnosed her condition and  
subsequently performed an unnecessary operation.  
Plaintiff served a notice of intent on defendant Mecosta  
County General Hospital on September 19, 1996, and on the  
remaining defendants on September 23, 1996.  Serving these  
notices 
constituted 
plaintiff’s attempt to (1) meet the notice  
requirements 
for 
medical 
malpractice 
actions 
prescribed 
by 
MCL  
600.2912b and (2) toll the statute of limitations pursuant to  
MCL 600.5856(d).  
After 
the 
waiting period required under MCL 600.2912b had  
passed, 
plaintiff 
filed 
her 
complaint.1
 
Thereafter,  
1 Under the statute, a plaintiff must wait 182 days after 
serving 
notice 
to 
file a complaint. MCL 600.2912b(1). However, 
if a defendant fails to respond to the notice of intent within 
154 days, a plaintiff may file a complaint immediately and 
need 
not 
await 
the 
expiration 
of 
182 
days. 
MCL  
600.2912b(7),(8); Omelenchuk v City of Warren, 461 Mich 567, 
572-573, 609 NW2d 177 (2000). Defendants in the present case 
did not respond to the notices of intent within 154 days, so 
plaintiff filed a complaint in Mecosta Circuit Court on  
3  
defendants filed motions for summary disposition. Defendants  
argued, inter alia, that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the  
statute of limitations because the notices of intent failed to  
comply with the requirements outlined in MCL 600.2912b(4).2  
Specifically, defendants asserted that plaintiff’s notices  
failed to sufficiently state the standard of care, the manner  
in which the standard was breached, the action the defendants  
should have taken, and the proximate cause of the injury.  
February 25, 1997, before the expiration of 182 days.  
2 MCL 600.2912b(4) provides:  
The notice given to a health professional or 
health facility under this section shall contain a 
statement of at least all of the following:  
(a) The factual basis for the claim.  
(b) The applicable standard of practice or 
care alleged by the claimant.  
(c) The manner in which it is claimed that  
the applicable standard of practice or care was 
breached by the health professional or health 
facility.  
(d) The alleged action that should have been 
taken to achieve compliance with the alleged 
standard of practice or care.  
(e) The manner in which it is alleged the 
breach of the standard of practice or care was the 
proximate cause of the injury claimed in the 
notice.  
(f) The names of all health professionals and 
health facilities the claimant is notifying under 
this section in relation to the claim.  
4  
 
 
Defendants advanced the position that, since the notices were  
insufficient, the period of limitation was not tolled under  
MCL 600.5658(d) and had therefore expired. The trial court  
granted the motions for summary disposition.  
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that  
defendants had waived their ability to challenge plaintiff’s  
failure to comply with the notice requirements because they  
did not raise their objections before the time the complaint  
was filed:  
In short, defendants sandbagged, harboring the 
alleged error until plaintiff could no longer 
correct it and the only available remedy would be 
dismissal with prejudice. 
This Court cannot  
condone such conduct.  
. . . [T]he purpose behind subsection 2912b(1) 
is to encourage settlement without the need for 
formal litigation.  This purpose cannot be served  
if defendants are permitted to sit on alleged 
deficiencies in the notice of intent until after  
suit has been filed. If the purpose of the notice 
requirement 
is 
to 
encourage 
settlement 
of  
legitimate claims before litigation is commenced, 
then any claims of deficiencies in the notice need 
to be raised before the complaint is filed, not 
after.  
* * *  
Accordingly, we hold that any objections to a 
notice of intent under subsection 2912b(1) must be 
raised before the filing of the complaint.  Summary 
disposition based on any alleged defect in the 
notice of intent not raised by the defendant before 
the filing of the complaint is not appropriate. 
[240 Mich App 175, 184-186; 610 NW2d 285 (2000).]  
We 
granted 
defendants’ application for leave to appeal to  
5  
  
 
consider the propriety of the Court of Appeals holding that a  
plaintiff’s noncompliance with the provisions of § 2912b is  
waived by a defendant if no objection is raised before the  
filing of the complaint.  
II. Standard of Review  
Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de  
novo by this Court.  In re MCI Telecom, 460 Mich 396, 413; 596  
NW2d 164 (1999).  Similarly, we review de novo decisions on  
summary disposition motions. Herald Co v Bay City, 463 Mich  
111, 117; 614 NW2d 873 (2000).  
III. ANALYSIS  
A.  The Tolling Statute Mandates Compliance with 
all of MCL 600.2912b  
The limitation period for medical malpractice actions is  
two years. MCL 600.5805(5). This period is tolled under MCL  
600.5856(d)  
[i]f, during the applicable notice period under 
section 2912b, a claim would be barred by the 
statute of limitations or repose, for not longer 
than a number of days equal to the number of days 
in the applicable notice period after the date  
notice is given in compliance with section 2912b.  
[Emphasis added.]  
Plaintiff argues that the language “is given in  
compliance with section 2912b” indicates that the Legislature  
intended only the delivery provisions of § 2912b to be  
applicable to § 5856(d).  In other words, plaintiff’s position  
6  
  
is that, as long as § 2912b(2)3 is satisfied, the statute of  
limitations is tolled under § 5856(d), notwithstanding  
noncompliance with § 2912b(4). On the basis of a plain reading  
of the statute, we reject this contention.  
An 
anchoring 
rule of jurisprudence, and the foremost rule  
of statutory construction, is that courts are to effect the  
intent of the Legislature. People v Wager, 460 Mich 118, 123,  
n 7; 594 NW2d 487 (1999). To do so, we begin with an  
examination of the language of the statute.  Wickens v Oakwood  
Healthcare System, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001). If  
the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, then we  
assume that the Legislature intended its plain meaning and the  
statute is enforced as written. People v Stone, 463 Mich 558,  
562; 621 NW2d 702 (2001). A necessary corollary of these  
principles is that a court may read nothing into an  
unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of  
the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute  
3 MCL 600.2912b(2) provides:  
The notice of intent to file a claim required 
under subsection (1) shall be mailed to the last 
known professional business address or residential 
address of the health professional or health  
facility who is the subject of the claim.  Proof of  
the mailing constitutes prima facie evidence of 
compliance with this section.  If no last known  
professional business or residential address can 
reasonably be ascertained, notice may be mailed to 
the health facility where the care that is the 
basis for the claim was rendered.  
7  
 
itself. Omne Financial, Inc v Shacks, Inc, 460 Mich 305, 311;  
596 NW2d 591 (1999).  
Section 5856(d) clearly provides that notice must be  
compliant with § 2912b, not just § 2912b(2) as plaintiff  
contrarily contends.  Had the Legislature intended only the  
delivery provisions of § 2912b to be applicable, we presume  
that the Legislature would have expressly limited compliance  
only to § 2912b(2). However, the Legislature did not do so.  
Rather, it referred to all of § 2912b.  
Since the statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court is  
required to enforce § 5856(d) as written. Stone, supra. As a  
result, the tolling of the statute of limitations is available  
to a plaintiff only if all the requirements included in §  
2912b are met.  
B. The Notice of Intent Statute, MCL 600.2912b  
The Court of Appeals did not decide whether the trial  
court erred in determining that plaintiff’s notices of intent  
did not comply with § 2912b(4). Instead, the Court concluded  
that defendants had waived4 their ability to challenge the  
4 The Court of Appeals clearly used the term “waiver” in 
a colloquial sense and one at odds with the established legal 
meaning of this term.  As defined by this Court, “waiver” 
connotes an intentional abandonment of a known right. People  
v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 762, n 7; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 
Despite the dissent’s conclusory assertion to the contrary, 
there is no record basis in this case for concluding that 
defendants here advised plaintiff or anyone else that they 
were intentionally abandoning their right to contest the  
8  
sufficiency of the notices under that section, by failing to  
object to any deficiencies before the filing of the complaint.  
The notice of intent required for medical malpractice  
actions is statutorily mandated. MCL 600.2912b(1) provides:  
[A] person shall not commence an action  
alleging medical malpractice against a health  
adequacy of notice under § 2912b or their right ultimately to 
assert a statute of limitations defense to her malpractice 
claim. In fact, a review of the record produces a  
communication 
between 
defendants’ 
adjusters 
and 
plaintiff 
that 
is in direct contradiction to the meaning of “an intentional 
abandonment of a known right.”  Defendant Mecosta County 
General Hospital’s claim adjusters expressed in a writing 
requesting information that their information request “does 
not waive any rights Mecosta County General Hospital or the 
MHA Insurance Company may have to dispute any defects in any 
Notice of Intent or concede the validity of any such Notice.” 
Thus, 
contrary 
to 
the dissent’s assertion that defendants made 
“affirmative representations” so that there was a “voluntary 
relinquishment of a known right,” not only were there no such 
representations, defendants specifically stated in one of 
their communications that the right to challenge the notice of 
intent was not being waived. Therefore, in addition to the 
absence 
of 
any 
affirmative 
representations, 
this 
communication 
provides further evidence that our dissenting colleague’s 
assertion that defendants’ communications “reasonably led 
plaintiff to believe that her notice was sufficient, thereby 
waiving any objections related to the adequacy of the notice” 
is unsupportable.  
Rather, when referring to “waiver,” both the Court of 
Appeals and dissent appear to rely on the related concept of 
“forfeiture.”  As defined by this Court, a “forfeiture” is the 
failure to make a timely assertion of a right.  Carines,  
supra.  
In any event, for the reasons explained below, it is 
simply inappropriate to characterize defendants’ inaction as 
either a waiver or a forfeiture, because the statute at issue 
did not impose upon defendants a duty to assert that  
plaintiff’s notice was deficient until her complaint was 
filed.  
9  
professional or health facility unless the person 
has given the health professional or health  
facility written notice under this section not less 
than 182 days before the action is commenced. 
[Emphasis added.]  
Subsection 2912b(4) provides that “[t]he notice given to  
a health professional or health facility under this section  
shall contain a statement of at least” the facts, standard of  
care, action that should have been taken, breach, proximate  
cause, and the names of those being notified.  
The phrases “shall” and “shall not” are unambiguous and  
denote a mandatory, rather than discretionary action. People  
v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 542; 520 NW2d 123 (1994).  Likewise,  
the phrase “at least” plainly reflects a minimal requirement  
and cannot plausibly be considered ambiguous. Because § 2912b  
is unambiguous, we must enforce its plain language.  
Subsections 2912b(1) and (4) clearly place the burden of  
complying with the notice of intent requirements on the  
plaintiff. A clear and unambiguous statute requires full  
compliance with its provisions as written.  Northern Concrete  
Pipe, Inc v Sinacola Companies-Midwest, Inc, 461 Mich 316,  
320; 603 NW2d 257 (1999). Accordingly, plaintiff must fulfill  
the preconditions of § 2912b(4) in order to maintain a medical  
malpractice action.  
Further, nowhere does the statute provide that a  
defendant must object to any deficiencies in a notice of  
10  
 
intent before the complaint is filed.5 In the absence of such  
a statutory requirement, we do not have the authority to  
create and impose an extrastatutory affirmative duty on the  
defendant. Omne Financial, supra. The role of the judiciary is  
not to engage in legislation. Tyler v Livonia Schools, 459  
Mich 382, 392-393, n 10; 590 NW2d 560 (1999). The Legislature  
did not require that an objection to a notice of intent must  
be raised before a certain stage of the litigation.  
C. The Tolling Provision, MCL 600.5856  
Although the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that  
defendants had waived their ability to challenge the  
sufficiency of the notice of intent by creating and inserting  
a waiver provision into MCL 600.2912b, MCL 600.5856 provides  
an additional reason why waiver is inapplicable to the present  
case.  
5 The dissent suggests that its “waiver” analysis is 
derived from the structure of the statute. That argument is 
undercut by the fact that the statute provides an explicit 
remedy for a defendant’s failure to respond to the notice of 
intent.  It is well settled that when a statute provides a 
remedy, a court should enforce the legislative remedy rather 
than one the court prefers. Senters v Ottawa Savings Bank, 443 
Mich 45, 56; 503 NW2d 639 (1993). Although MCL 600.2912b(7) 
requires the defendant to respond to the notice of intent, 
subsection 8 clearly provides the remedy for a defendant’s 
failure to do so. That is, plaintiff may commence an action 
after only 154 days after notice has been given, as opposed to 
the 182 days otherwise required under subsection 1. However, 
nothing in § 2912b suggests that defendant waives his right to 
object to the sufficiency of the notice of intent by failing 
to respond before the complaint is filed.  
11  
The plain language of § 5856(d) clearly requires a  
medical 
malpractice 
plaintiff to comply with the provisions of  
§ 2912b in order to toll the limitation period.  Absent an  
express waiver of its right to contest the adequacy of  
plaintiff’s notice of intent or to assert the statute of  
limitations as a defense, defendant cannot forfeit, or  
“waive,” those rights until the tolling provision becomes an  
issue.  This is because a tolling provision effectively works  
to negate a statute of limitations defense raised by a  
defendant. Thus, unless done so expressly, the only ways in  
which a defendant could effectively “waive” any objections to  
plaintiff’s 
fulfillment of the requirements of § 5856(d) would  
be to fail to invoke the pertinent statute of limitations  
after a plaintiff files suit or to fail to object to the  
adequacy of the notice of intent after a plaintiff advances  
tolling as a response to a statute of limitations defense.  
In other words, under this statute, defendant’s failure  
to respond to plaintiff’s notice does not result in a waiver  
of a statute of limitations defense before a suit is even  
filed.  Accordingly, since plaintiff sought to rely on the  
tolling provision of § 5856(d) and that section plainly  
requires compliance with § 2912b, defendants cannot logically  
be considered to have waived their right to object to  
12  
 
 
plaintiff’s compliance with § 2912b before the filing of the  
suit.  
D. The Dissent  
The lynchpin of the dissent is its repeated assertion  
that 
“defendants 
in 
this 
case 
made 
affirmative 
representations  
that reasonably led plaintiff to believe that her notice of  
intent was adequate.”  Post at 6-7 (emphasis added).  We agree  
that, if a defendant affirmatively represents to a plaintiff  
that it waives any objection to plaintiff’s notice or  
expressly waives its statute of limitations defense, such  
representations could be binding in any subsequent litigation  
under this statute.  However, what is noteworthy about the  
dissent’s theory is the fact that, despite the repeated  
contrary assertions, not a single representation is cited,  
much 
less 
an 
affirmative representation, by any defendant that  
they acquiesced in the adequacy of the notices that plaintiff  
filed in this case. The oddity of the dissent’s analysis is  
that it relies on the absence of representations to establish  
a waiver. 
Indeed, the dissent is ultimately reduced to  
admitting that the so-called waiver it relies upon must be  
implied from the fact that defendants failed to include a  
disclaimer in each of the several written requests they made  
13  
 
 
of plaintiff for more information. Post at 6, n 8.6  
We agree with the dissent that a “[w]aiver requires an  
‘intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a known right.’”  
Post at 3, n 1. 
Carines, supra. 
However, as previously  
discussed, n 4, no such waiver occurred here. 
It is simply  
contradictory for the dissent to conclude that the failure to  
raise an issue in preliminary communications amounts to a  
waiver, 
while 
it 
simultaneously 
instructs 
that 
waiver 
requires  
an “intentional and voluntary relinquishment.”  
In reality, the dissent is not relying on a waiver  
analysis, but a forfeiture analysis. As we have defined the  
6 The dissent actually reasons that, because defendants 
contacted plaintiff for information following the issuance of 
her notice, “she had every reason to believe that the notice 
triggered the tolling provision of MCL 600.5856(d).”  Post at  
p 7.  As noted previously, n 4, a reference in this record 
concerning the adequacy of plaintiff’s notice was made in a 
September 6, 1996, letter to plaintiff from MHA.  In what  
surely must have been the product of an abundance of lawyerly 
caution, in that letter Mecosta and MHA specifically  
disclaimed any waiver of rights to contest defects in  
plaintiff’s 
notice. 
The 
dissent 
similarly 
cites 
a  
communication from defendants’ insurance claim adjusters that 
indicates that the failure to comply with medical information 
requests will force defendants’ insurers to consider the 
notice of intent defective as evidence that defendants made an  
affirmative representation that they were intentionally 
abandoning their right to contest the notice of intent.  Such  
is the world that the dissent would create that defendants  
must communicate at their peril with any potential plaintiff 
unless each such communication specifically disclaims any 
waiver of any right of defense available.  If the folly of 
this approach is not sufficiently self-evident, for the 
reasons set forth below, we reject the dissent’s game theory 
of 
litigation 
and 
in 
particular 
its 
“nonrepresentation 
implied 
waiver” theory.  
14  
 
term, a “forfeiture” is the failure to assert a right in a  
timely fashion.  Carines, supra.  The dissent has again  
confused these related, but distinct, concepts of forfeiture  
and waiver.  See, e.g., People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 216;  
612 NW2d 144 (2000).  
Even if the dissent’s argument is viewed as a forfeiture  
argument, it remains unpersuasive.  This is because a  
forfeiture 
necessarily requires that there be a specific point  
at which the right must be asserted or be considered  
forfeited.
 As noted above, § 2912b does not require a  
response to the adequacy of plaintiff’s notice. 
Thus, the  
first occasion that defendant must challenge the adequacy of  
the notice as required by the statute is after plaintiff has  
filed a complaint.  This duty to challenge the adequacy of the  
notice arises not because of the statute, but because of our  
court rules concerning pleading, MCR 2.111(F)(3), and summary  
disposition, MCR 2.116(D)(2).7  
7 The objection to the notice must be made under these 
rules because, in this malpractice case, if plaintiff failed 
to comply with the notice requirement, her claim was arguably 
barred by the controlling statute of limitations, an  
affirmative 
defense 
that must be pleaded in defendants’ motion 
for summary disposition or first responsive pleading.  Once  
the statute of limitations is asserted as a defense as it was  
below, then a plaintiff is free to argue that the statute was 
tolled under § 5856(d).  It is only at this point that a 
defendant is obligated to object to the adequacy of  
plaintiff’s notice under § 2912b.  
15  
 
In sum, in a medical malpractice case arising under this  
statute, it is only when the tolling provision becomes an  
issue that a defendant would be compelled to contest adequacy  
of the notice.  The Court of Appeals and the dissent argue for  
the extrastatutory requirement of an earlier obligation to  
object to the adequacy of the notice because they contend that  
the statute was intended to promote settlement negotiations.  
Whatever the merit of this policy argument, we are obligated  
to apply the unambiguous terms of the statute, not our policy  
preferences.  We conclude that the Legislature not only failed  
to require an earlier objection, it affirmatively provided a  
different remedy for a defendant’s failure to respond to the  
notice thus negating the “waiver” arguments offered by the  
Court of Appeals and the dissent. See n 5.  
For these reasons, regardless of whether it relies on  
waiver 
or 
forfeiture 
principles, 
the 
dissent’s 
argument 
fails.  
IV. Conclusion  
In light of the plain language of MCL 600.5856(d), we  
conclude that the statute of limitations in a medical  
malpractice action is not tolled unless notice is given in  
compliance with all the provisions of MCL 600.2912b. We  
further 
conclude 
that MCL 600.2912b did not require defendants  
to object to the sufficiency of the notices of intent before  
16  
 
the filing of the complaint.8
 In addition, because MCL  
600.5856(d) 
is 
a 
tolling provision and tolling provisions work  
to negate a statute of limitations defense raised by a  
defendant, defendants did not need to assert the defense or  
challenge plaintiff’s compliance with MCL 600.2912b, as  
required by MCL 600.5856(d), until plaintiff filed suit.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals and, recognizing that the panel did not reach a  
determination regarding whether the trial court erred in  
concluding that plaintiff’s notices of intent did not comply  
with § 2912b(4), we remand this matter to the Court of Appeals  
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred with YOUNG, J.  
8 
We 
express 
no 
opinion 
concerning 
plaintiff’s 
compliance 
or noncompliance with MCL 600.2912b, an issue that the Court 
of Appeals declined to answer.  
17  
___________________________________ 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
LISA ROBERTS,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 116563  
MECOSTA COUNTY GENERAL  
HOSPITAL, GAIL A. DESNOYERS, 
M.D., BARB DAVIS, AND 
OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY OF  
BIG RAPIDS, P.C., formerly known 
as GUNTHER, DESNOYERS & MEKARU,  
Defendants-Appellees.  
and  
MICHAEL ATKINS, M.D.,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
LISA ROBERTS,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 116570  
MECOSTA COUNTY GENERAL HOSPITAL,  
Defendant-Appellant,  
and  
___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
 
v 
GAIL A. DESNOYERS, M.D., MICHAEL 
ATKINS, M.D., BARB DAVIS, 
OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY OF  
BIG RAPIDS, P.C., formerly known 
as GUNTHER, DESNOYERS & MEKARU,  
Defendants.  
LISA ROBERTS,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 116573  
MECOSTA COUNTY GENERAL HOSPITAL, 
MICHAEL ATKINS, M.D., OBSTETRICS 
AND GYNECOLOGY OF BIG RAPIDS, P.C., 
formerly known as GUNTHER, DESNOYERS 
& MEKARU,  
Defendants-Appellees,  
and  
GAIL A. DESNOYERS, M.D., and 
BARB DAVIS,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
The majority implies that a statute must explicitly  
permit waiver before the waiver doctrine can operate to excuse  
noncompliance.  Moreover, the majority seems to confuse the  
concept 
of 
an 
affirmative 
representation 
indicating 
waiver 
and  
an explicit statement of waiver.  It seems to regard the  
latter as necessary in this case, but provides no authority to  
2  
 
support that assumption.  I disagree with the majority's  
analysis and would affirm the Court of Appeals application of  
the doctrine of waiver in this case.1  
I would not, and do not, infer waiver from mere silence.  
Moreover, I do not believe that either MCL 600.2912b or MCL  
600.5856(d) supports a requirement that a defendant object to  
alleged deficiencies in a notice of intent before the  
complaint is filed.  Therefore, I agree with the majority's  
conclusion that there is no duty to challenge deficiencies  
before the complaint is filed.  
Generally, I agree that, to begin the tolling of the MCL  
600.5856(d) statute of limitations, a plaintiff must fully  
comply with the requirements of MCL 600.2912b.  Compliance  
with the delivery provision of the notice statute alone is  
1The Court of Appeals initially couched its holding in 
these 
terms: 
 
"[D]efendants waived any alleged deficiencies in 
the notice of intent," (emphasis added).  It went on to  
emphasize 
that 
defendants 
"fail[ed] 
to 
complain." Ultimately, 
it held that a defendant must raise any objections to a notice 
of intent before a complaint is filed.  240 Mich App 175, 181, 
185; 610 NW2d 285 (2000).  
Waiver 
requires 
an 
"intentional 
and 
voluntary 
relinquishment of a known right."  Black's Law Dictionary (6th 
ed); see also Moore v First Security Casualty Co, 224 Mich App 
370, 376; 568 NW2d 841 (1997).  I would affirm the Court of  
Appeals decision to the extent that it applied the doctrine of 
waiver, but I would reverse the holding to the extent that it 
requires a potential defendant to object before a plaintiff 
files a complaint.  MCL 600.2912b does not require that a 
defendant respond in any way to a notice of intent.  
3  
 
 
insufficient.  However, I would hold that a prospective  
defendant can waive the specific content requirements for the  
notice of intent by an affirmative action.  
The majority neglects to consider an important fact in  
this 
case. 
 
Representatives 
of 
defendants' 
insurance 
companies  
corresponded 
with 
plaintiff's 
counsel 
without 
complaining 
that  
there were inadequacies in the notice of intent.2  A review of  
the parties' numerous written communications reveals that  
plaintiff cooperated with defendants' requests for medical  
records and other personal information related to plaintiff's  
2The majority points out that one defendant, Mecosta 
County General Hospital, reserved the right to object to 
plaintiff's notice of intent in a writing requesting  
information.  That letter from Mecosta, dated September 6, 
1996, refers to an earlier communication from plaintiff and 
states:
 "This letter does not waive any rights . . . ." 
(Emphasis added.)  However, plaintiff's amended notice of 
intent to Mecosta is dated September 19, 1996.  After that  
notice, plaintiff cooperated with Mecosta's requests for her 
personal medical history and access to plaintiff's medical 
records.
 None of those cooperative letters from Mecosta 
indicated any objections to the amended notice of intent or 
reserved a later objection.  
I would note that representatives of other defendants, 
particularly Gail DesNoyers and Barbara Davis, explicitly 
stated that plaintiff's failure to comply with their request 
for medical information "will force [defendants' insurer] to 
consider this pre-suit notice defective."  Presumably, once 
plaintiff complied with that request, those defendants had no 
objection premised on defective notice.  
Moreover, plaintiff provided evidence that each of 
defendant's insurers communicated with defendant after  
receiving the notice of intent without objecting to its 
content.  That evidence went uncontradicted by any defendant.  
4  
 
claim. 
I believe that these communications from defendants  
reasonably led plaintiff to believe that her notice was  
sufficient, thereby waiving any objections related to the  
adequacy of the notice.  
The majority also confuses the issue by focusing on the  
tolling provision, MCL 600.5856(d).  In order for these  
defendants to maintain a statute of limitations claim, they  
had to challenge the sufficiency of plaintiff's notice of  
intent.
 Thus, the disposition of this case turns on an  
analysis of the requirements of MCL 600.2912b, including  
whether defendants waived any challenge related to those  
requirements.  
Defendants advance no authority in support of their  
contention that the doctrine of waiver cannot be applied to a  
statutory provision that does not explicitly include the  
possibility of waiver.  Nor does the majority cite such  
authority.3
 The majority relies only on the "mandatory"  
nature of the notice provision and the proposition that an  
3The majority relies on Northern Concrete Pipe, Inc v  
Sinacola Companies-Midwest, Inc, 461 Mich 316; 603 NW2d 257 
(1999), and Onme Financial, Inc v Shacks, Inc, 460 Mich 305; 
596 NW2d 591 (1999), for the proposition that a clear and 
unambiguous statute requires full compliance with its  
provisions. 
 
However, 
neither 
decision 
addressed 
the 
equitable 
doctrine of waiver.  
5  
 
 
 
 
unambiguous statute requires full compliance.4
 However, I  
believe that the mandatory nature of the notice statute is not  
dispositive here, where it is undisputed that defendants had  
actual notice of plaintiff's intent to file suit.  
Waiver is an equitable doctrine, applied judicially to  
avoid injustice.  28 Am Jur 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 197.  
As is true with the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the  
possibility of waiver need not be set forth in the language of  
a 
statute.5
 
Where 
a 
defendant 
makes 
affirmative  
representations implying that he has no objections to the  
content of a notice, we may, as a matter of equity, find his  
4The majority emphasizes that MCL 600.2912b provides a 
remedy for a prospective defendant's failure to respond to a 
notice of intent.  I would point out that, by addressing a 
failure to respond, the remedy may preclude forfeiture, but it 
does not preclude waiver. Where defendants made affirmative  
representations that could only have been designed to induce 
plaintiff's reliance on her notice of intent, the statute 
provides no remedy for this plaintiff.  
5This Court has readily applied the doctrine of waiver in 
the criminal context. For example, we recently pointed out, 
in People v Krueger, 466 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2002), that 
a criminal defendant may waive the right, specifically 
conferred in MCL 768.3, to be present at trial.  See also  
People v Hyland, 212 Mich App 701; 538 NW2d 465 (1995); People  
v Staffney, 187 Mich 660; 648 NW2d 238 (1991). 
MCL 768.3  
provides in absolute terms that "No person indicted for a 
felony shall be tried unless personally present during the 
trial . . . ." It gives no indication of the possibility of 
waiver.  One would expect it to be more difficult for a 
criminal defendant to waive a right than a civil defendant. 
Hence, I see no need to examine the statute involved here for 
explicit permission to apply the equitable doctrine in this 
context.  
6  
 
later objections waived.6  
The 
defendants 
in 
this 
case 
made 
affirmative  
representations that reasonably led plaintiff to believe that  
her notice of intent was adequate.  In so doing, defendants  
encouraged plaintiff to rely on the 182-day tolling period  
initiated by that notice.  When plaintiff filed her complaint  
well within the extended limitation period,7 defendants cannot  
be permitted to object on statute of limitations grounds and  
the requirements of the notice provision.  The defense was  
affirmatively waived by defendants' actions.  
Presumably, plaintiff could have filed her malpractice  
claim within the statutory period of limitation but for the  
statutory requirement that she provide a notice of intent to  
file her claim.  After doing so, and particularly after  
6This is not to say, in the abstract, that a defendant 
waives an objection based on notice or the statute of 
limitations any time that the defendant participates in a 
lawsuit. When it enacted MCL 600.2912b and MCL 600.5856(d),  
the Legislature created a unique and complex set of  
requirements that intertwine the notice requirement with the 
statute of limitations. Under the circumstances of this case, 
I believe that defendants sufficiently implied that they had 
no objection premised on inadequate notice to preclude a 
statute of limitations objection.  
7Proper notice under the statute initiates a 182-day 
tolling period regardless of whether a defendant responds 
pursuant to MCL 600.2912b(7).  However, plaintiff filed her 
complaint immediately upon the expiration of the 154-day 
abbreviated waiting period, as soon as the statute permitted. 
See Omelenchuck v City of Warren, 461 Mich 567, 576-577; 609 
NW2d 177 (2000).  
7  
 
receiving communications from defendants' agents because of  
that notice, she had every reason to believe that the notice  
triggered the tolling provision of MCL 600.5856(d).  The  
requirements of MCL 600.2912b are vague. Neither the statute  
nor related case law provides any guidance about the quantity  
of detail a potential plaintiff must furnish regarding the  
malpractice claim.8  
The majority also implies that a challenge on the basis  
of the statute of limitations cannot be waived before the  
filing of suit.  Again, I disagree.  Where parties are engaged  
in 
settlement 
negotiations, 
for 
example, 
a 
potential 
defendant  
might agree to waive a statute of limitations defense to  
continue negotiations and avoid a claim being filed.  See,  
e.g., Wickings v Arctic Enterprises, Inc, 244 Mich App 125,  
148-150; 624 NW2d 197 (2000).9  Should settlement negotiations  
fail, 
the 
affirmative 
representation 
that 
the 
defendant 
waived  
a statute of limitations defense would bar any objection when  
the plaintiff filed a claim outside the statutory period.  
Similarly, 
defendants' 
communications 
to 
plaintiff 
here 
should  
8I wonder how much detail can reasonably be expected from 
a plaintiff who has not yet had the benefit of discovery.  
9Federal courts have recognized that the judiciary has 
equitable control over statutory periods of limitation, 
including tolling and waiver. See Bowen v City of New York, 
476 US 467, 479; 106 S Ct 2022; 90 L Ed 2d 462 (1986); Zipes  
v Trans World Airlines, Inc, 455 US 385, 398; 102 S Ct 1127; 
71 L Ed 2d 234 (1982).  
8  
operate to waive the statute of limitations defense.  
The effect of today's decision is to shorten the  
statutory 
period 
of 
limitation for a medical malpractice claim  
by more than half a year.  A potential plaintiff would be well  
advised to file a notice of intent at least 182 days before  
the period expires.  There is now no telling whether a notice  
will be deemed sufficient to trigger the tolling provision.  
In fact, even the plaintiff who follows a notice by inquiring  
whether additional information is needed risks suffering the  
consequence of a notice found to be technically inadequate.  
A plaintiff should not rely even on the formal response  
outlined in MCL 600.2912b(7).  If the complaint were filed  
more than two years after the malpractice claim accrued and  
the notice were sufficiently flawed, the claim would still be  
time-barred.  The Legislature could not have intended that  
result when it enacted MCL 600.2912b, which was designed to  
promote settlement.  
In conclusion, I would reverse the Court of Appeals  
decision to the extent that it imposed a duty to object to a  
deficient notice of intent before a complaint is filed.  
However, I would affirm the application of waiver to the  
notice and tolling statute combination.  These defendants  
communicated with plaintiff and investigated her claim as the  
notice statute contemplates, presumably in furtherance of the  
9  
 
possibility of a settlement.  The Court of Appeals recognized  
the unfairness of allowing them only much later to object that  
the notice of intent was defective because it gave  
insufficient 
information 
to 
promote 
pretrial 
investigation 
and  
settlement.  
When defendants affirmatively responded to plaintiff's  
notice of intent, they reasonably should have expected  
plaintiff to understand that they had no objections to its  
form or content.  By so doing, defendants affirmatively waived  
any objection premised on that notice.  Because the statute of  
limitations objection in this case is necessarily based on an  
inquiry into the adequacy of the notice of intent, the  
objection was affirmatively waived.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.  
10