Title: State v. Jeffrey A. Huck
Citation: 2001 WI 104
Docket Number: 1999AP001284-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 2001

2001 WI 104 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-0743-CR, 99-1282-CR, 99-1283-CR, 99-1284-CR, 
 
99-1285-CR, 99-1286-CR, 99-1287-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
99-0743-CR 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
 
v. 
Jesse Franklin, 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner 
________________________ 
 
99-1282-CR, 99-1283-CR, 99-1284-CR 
99-1285-CR, 99-1286-CR, 99-1287-CR 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Jeffrey A. Huck,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  234 Wis. 2d 152, 610 N.W.2d 512 
 
 
 
 
 
and 
 
 
 
 238 Wis. 2d 445, 617 N.W.2d 906 
(Ct. App. 2000-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 11, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
May 31, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGES: 
Clare L. Fiorenza and Maxine A. White 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY and SYKES, J.J., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
2 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners there 
were briefs and oral argument by Richard D. Martin, assistant 
state public defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Gregory M. Posner-Weber, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2001 WI 104 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-0743 & 99-1282-CR through 99-1287-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jesse Franklin,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
__________________________________________ 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jeffrey A. Huck,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of decisions of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Defendants Jesse Franklin 
and Jeffery Huck seek review of two court of appeals' decisions 
in which the court denied the defendants' claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  The defendants were convicted in 
separate trials on misdemeanor counts by six-person juries.  
Both defendants argue that they received ineffective assistance 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-0743-CR & 99-1282-87-CR 
 
 
2 
because their trial attorneys failed to object to the six-person 
juries, even though around the time of their trials the court of 
appeals certified State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 580 N.W.2d 
171 (1998) to this court and we accepted this certification.  
The 
certified 
issue 
in 
Hansford 
was 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 756.096(3)(am) (1995-96),1 the statute authorizing six-person 
juries, was constitutional.   
¶2 
We conclude that the defendants did not receive 
ineffective 
assistance 
because 
they 
have 
failed 
to 
show 
prejudice as required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984).  Accordingly, we affirm the decisions by the court 
of appeals.   
I 
¶3 
Franklin was convicted of four misdemeanors in two 
separate trials.  One trial occurred on January 14-16, 1998, and 
the other occurred on May 14-15, 1998.  Both trials were 
conducted in Milwaukee County Circuit Court before six-person 
juries.  Franklin did not object to being tried by a six-person 
jury in either instance.   
                     
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) (1995-96) provided that 
"[a] jury in misdemeanor cases shall consist of 6 persons."  The 
legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) pursuant to 1995 
Wisconsin Act 427.  This statute was later repealed by Supreme 
Court Order 96-08, effective July 1, 1997; however, pursuant to 
this order, the language providing for six-person juries in 
misdemeanor cases was recreated under Wis. Stat. § 756.06(2)(am) 
(1997-98), also effective July 1, 1997.  See S.Ct. Order 96-08, 
207 Wis. 2d xv, xxiv-xxv.   
No. 
99-0743-CR & 99-1282-87-CR 
 
 
3 
¶4 
Huck was likewise tried by a six-person jury on 
several misdemeanor counts in Milwaukee County Circuit Court.  
His trial, which occurred on March 17-19, 1998, resulted in 
convictions 
on 
11 
counts 
of 
violating 
a 
domestic 
abuse 
injunction, two counts of criminal damage to property, and six 
counts of bail jumping.  Like Franklin, Huck also did not object 
to being tried by a six-person jury.   
¶5 
Both 
defendants 
filed 
post-conviction 
motions 
requesting new trials.  These motions alleged in part that they 
were entitled to new trials because they had been denied their 
constitutional right to a trial by jury of 12 persons and 
because 
their 
trial 
attorneys 
had 
rendered 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel by failing to object to juries of fewer 
than 12 persons.   
¶6 
Both defendants were denied relief by the circuit 
court.  In Franklin's case, the circuit court simply denied his 
motion as untimely.  In Huck's case, in response to his motion 
alleging ineffective assistance, the circuit court held a 
hearing pursuant to State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 
905 (Ct. App. 1979) and took trial counsel's testimony regarding 
the absence of an objection to a six-person jury.  After the 
hearing, the court denied the motion, concluding that Huck 
failed to prove prejudice to support his claim.   
¶7 
On appeal, the defendants again alleged that their 
trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to object to the 
six-person juries at their trials.  More specifically, they 
asserted that their attorneys were ineffective for failing to be 
No. 
99-0743-CR & 99-1282-87-CR 
 
 
4 
aware of the court of appeals' certification of Hansford to this 
court and for failing to offer it in support of a request for 
trial by a jury of 12.  The court of appeals certified Hansford 
to us on December 11, 1997.  The issue on certification was 
"whether Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am), which provides for six-
person juries in criminal misdemeanor cases, violates art. I, 
§ 7 or art. I, § 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution."  See 
Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d at 229 (footnotes omitted).  We accepted 
certification of this issue on January 23, 1998, and issued a 
decision on June 19, 1998, finding the statute unconstitutional. 
¶8 
In Franklin's case, the court of appeals, in a one-
judge decision, affirmed the circuit court's judgments of 
conviction and order denying Franklin's motion for post-
conviction relief.  In particular, with respect to his claim for 
ineffective assistance, the court concluded that Franklin was 
not entitled to relief because he had failed to allege any error 
that was committed in the fact-finding process at trial and 
failed to prove that he suffered any prejudice resulting from 
his six-person jury trials.  The court admitted that it was 
conceivable that Franklin's chances for acquittal or hung juries 
may have been greater with 12 jurors than with six.  However, 
the court stated that this assertion was speculative at best and 
was insufficient to establish prejudice.   
¶9 
The court of appeals also issued a one-judge decision 
in Huck's case, affirming the circuit court's judgments of 
conviction and orders denying post-conviction relief.  With 
respect to Huck's ineffective assistance claim, the court held 
No. 
99-0743-CR & 99-1282-87-CR 
 
 
5 
that, because the statute authorizing six-person juries was 
still good law at the time that Huck was tried, the failure of 
Huck's counsel to raise the issue at trial did not constitute 
deficient performance by counsel.  Therefore, no claim for 
ineffective assistance could be established. 
¶10 We are presented with one issue on review:  whether 
the misdemeanants in these consolidated cases were denied the 
right to effective assistance of counsel when their attorneys 
failed to object to the six-person jury statute which was found 
unconstitutional in Hansford.  We conclude that, because the 
defendants have failed to prove that any deficient performance 
prejudiced their defense, the defendants have failed to prove 
that they were denied effective assistance of counsel.  As a 
result, we affirm the decisions of the court of appeals. 
II 
¶11 For ineffective assistance of counsel claims, this 
state has adopted the analysis from Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.  
In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court noted that "[t]he 
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning 
of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result."  Id. at 686.  To this end, the 
Court developed a two-pronged test to determine whether the 
assistance was so defective that reversal of conviction is 
required.  Id. at 687.  Under this test, a defendant must show 
(1) that his or her counsel's representation was deficient and 
No. 
99-0743-CR & 99-1282-87-CR 
 
 
6 
(2) that this deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the 
defense.  Id.   
¶12 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents 
a mixed question of fact and law.  State v. Erickson, 227 
Wis. 2d 758, 768, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999).  The circuit court's 
findings of fact will not be overturned on appeal unless they 
are clearly erroneous.  Id.  Whether the trial counsel's conduct 
was deficient and whether it was prejudicial to the defendant 
are questions of law reviewed by this court de novo.  Id.; State 
v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 634, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985).  
¶13 Under the deficient performance prong, we examine 
whether "counsel's 
representation fell 
below 
an 
objective 
standard of reasonableness."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.  The 
defendants assert that the performances of their attorneys fell 
below this standard because their attorneys knew or should have 
known of the court of appeals' certification of Hansford to this 
court and should have objected to six-person juries in light of 
this knowledge.  We, however, need not address this issue 
because, even if the attorneys had performed deficiently, the 
defendants cannot prove prejudice under the second prong of the 
Strickland analysis.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (a court 
need not address both components of the inquiry if the defendant 
makes an insufficient showing on one).   
¶14 To prove prejudice, a defendant is required to show 
that "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."  
Id. at 687.  In other words, "[t]he defendant must show that 
No. 
99-0743-CR & 99-1282-87-CR 
 
 
7 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome."  Id. at 
694.  Under this test, a defendant "need not show that counsel's 
deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in 
the case."  Id. at 693.  However, "[i]t is not enough for the 
defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on 
the outcome of the proceeding."  Id.  The defendant's burden is 
to show that counsel's errors "actually had an adverse effect on 
the defense."  Id.  
¶15 Applying this test, we conclude that the defendants 
have failed to prove prejudice.  In particular, the defendants 
have not shown that, but for their attorney's failure to object, 
there was a reasonable probability for a different result in 
their cases.  A six-person jury in and of itself is an 
insufficient basis for us to conclude that the defendants were 
deprived of a fair trial whose result is reliable.  In State v. 
Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶¶17-19, 31, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 
727 (3-1-3 decision), it was stated that, in view of our holding 
in Hansford, a six-person jury does not automatically render the 
trial invalid or affect the accuracy of the proceeding.  
 
Nothing in Hansford suggests that having a six-
person jury trial is equivalent to having no jury 
trial at all.  Hansford did not state that a six-
person jury is procedurally unfair or that it is an 
inherently invalid factfinding mechanism.  Hansford 
only held that a six-person jury trial is not 
consistent with the historical meaning of the right to 
No. 
99-0743-CR & 99-1282-87-CR 
 
 
8 
a jury trial under art. I, § 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  The court reached this conclusion based 
on a careful examination of the history of the 
Wisconsin Constitution and this court's longstanding 
interpretation of the right to trial by jury in art. 
I, §§ 5 and 7. 
 
We find nothing in Hansford to support the 
conclusion that the difference between a six-person 
jury trial and a twelve-person jury trial is so 
fundamental that a six-person jury trial, which was 
conducted 
without 
objection 
under 
the 
express 
authority of a statute, is automatically invalid. 
 
. . .  
 
The use of a six-person jury rather than a twelve-
person 
jury 
did 
not 
undermine 
the 
fundamental 
integrity of Huebner's trial.  Rather, "this case 
concerns the application of a constitutional principle 
that 'does not affect the basic accuracy of the 
factfinding process at trial.'" 
Id. at ¶¶18-19, 31 (citations omitted).  We affirm this 
interpretation of Hansford from Huebner.  Indeed, our holding in 
Hansford 
was 
based 
on 
information 
from 
this 
state's 
constitutional conventions and our previous decisions which 
interpreted a criminal defendant's right to a trial by jury to 
mean the right to a jury of 12 persons.  Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 
at 234-43.  Our holding, however, was never based on the notion 
that a jury of less than 12 persons is fundamentally unfair or 
unjust to a defendant. 
¶16 While it is conceivable that the chances for acquittal 
or a hung jury would be greater in juries of 12 than in juries 
of six, this conclusion alone is insufficient to provide a basis 
for finding that there was a reasonable probability for a 
different result.  We do not find any reason why six-person 
No. 
99-0743-CR & 99-1282-87-CR 
 
 
9 
juries would undermine the confidence of an otherwise fair and 
error-free trial.  Thus, beyond mere speculation, we cannot 
conclude that the six-person juries had an actual adverse effect 
on the defense in the defendants' cases, and therefore, the 
defendants are not entitled to a reversal of their convictions. 
 Cf. State v. Zivcic, 229 Wis. 2d 119, 125, 598 N.W.2d 565 (Ct. 
App. 1999) (the court refused to overturn Zivcic's conviction 
based solely on the fact that he was tried and convicted by a 
six-person jury to which he did not object). 
¶17 The defendants argue, however, that prejudice should 
not be strictly defined according to Strickland in their cases. 
Strickland's 
definition, 
they 
assert, 
cannot 
reach 
every 
situation 
where 
an 
attorney's 
ineffective 
assistance 
has 
prejudiced the defense.  Instead, they contend that we should 
define prejudice according to whether their attorneys' deficient 
performances denied them a fundamental constitutional right that 
rendered their trials unfair.  When viewed in this manner, they 
assert that prejudice was established when they were deprived of 
their right to a 12-person jury.  This denial made the trial 
unfair because it gave the prosecution an advantage in proving 
its case to only six jurors instead of 12. 
¶18 The defendants' argument relies primarily on our 
holding in State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 558 N.W.2d 379 
No. 
99-0743-CR & 99-1282-87-CR 
 
 
10
(1997).2  In Smith, the prosecutor breached his plea agreement 
with Smith by recommending a sentence during Smith's sentencing 
hearing even though he had agreed not to make any such 
recommendation.  Id. at 262.  Smith argued that he received 
ineffective assistance because his attorney failed to object to 
the prosecutor's breach and this conduct resulted in prejudice 
to him.  Id. at 268.  Smith's prejudice argument, however, did 
not assert that, but for his attorney's deficient performance, a 
different result was probable.  Instead, his argument alleged 
that he was prejudiced because he failed to receive the plea 
agreement promised to him by the State.  Id. at 267-68.  Smith 
asserted, however, that prejudice could be presumed in his case 
in light of his attorney's deficient performance. Id. at 264.   
                     
2 The defendants also cite State v. Ludwig, 124 Wis. 2d 600, 
369 N.W.2d 722 (1985), and State v. Fritz, 212 Wis. 2d 284, 569 
N.W.2d 48 (Ct. App. 1997), to support their argument that the 
court may find prejudice without relying on the Strickland, 
"reasonable 
probability 
of 
a 
different 
result" 
standard.  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  Similar to State 
v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997), Fritz also 
involved an attorney's deficient performance (advising the 
defendant Fritz to commit perjury) resulting in the loss of a 
plea bargain.  Fritz relied on Smith in concluding that Fritz 
did not have to demonstrate the probability of a different 
result to prove prejudice. See Fritz, 212 Wis. 2d at 297.  In 
light of 
this reliance, 
we 
will 
not 
analyze 
this 
case 
separately.  
Ludwig also involved an attorney's deficient performance 
(failing to inform the defendant Ludwig of a plea offer) 
resulting in the loss of a plea offer.  We conclude, however, 
that Ludwig does not warrant separate analysis because we 
interpret its holding as consistent with the Strickland standard 
for prejudice.  See Ludwig, 124 Wis. 2d at 609-12.   
No. 
99-0743-CR & 99-1282-87-CR 
 
 
11
¶19 In examining Smith's arguments, we noted that the 
Strickland Court highlighted certain unique instances where a 
court must presume prejudice, stating:   
 
"In certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is 
presumed.  Actual or constructive denial of the 
assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed 
to result in prejudice.  So are various kinds of state 
interference with counsel's assistance.  Prejudice in 
these circumstances is so likely that case-by-case 
inquiry 
into 
prejudice 
is 
not 
worth 
the 
cost.  
Moreover, such circumstances involve impairments of 
the Sixth Amendment right that are easy to identify 
and, for that reason and because the prosecution is 
directly responsible, easy for the government to 
prevent." 
Id. at 278 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692).  We then 
listed specific cases where either we or the United States 
Supreme Court have concluded that prejudice should be presumed. 
Id. at 278-80; See also Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 770-71 
(describing three different categories in which the court 
presumes prejudice).  
¶20 In our analysis in Smith, however, we never directly 
addressed 
whether 
such 
breaches 
of 
plea 
agreements 
were 
encompassed within one of the presumption categories.  Instead, 
we concluded that prejudice automatically occurs in such cases 
based on Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), a case 
similar to Smith's case in which the prosecutor had also 
breached a plea agreement.  Smith, 207 Wis. 2d at 281-82.  In 
Santobello, the Court held that, based on the interests of 
justice and on the duty of a prosecutor to keep promises to a 
defendant, any breach would result in remand to the circuit 
No. 
99-0743-CR & 99-1282-87-CR 
 
 
12
court, either for specific performance under the agreement or to 
permit the defendant to withdraw his plea.  Santobello, 404 U.S. 
at 262-63.  In Smith, we recognized Santobello as holding that a 
defendant 
has 
a 
substantive 
right 
to 
the 
prosecution's 
fulfillment of the terms of a plea agreement and that a breach, 
unobjected to by defense counsel, constituted a deprivation of 
that substantive right.  Smith, 207 Wis. 2d at 278.  Although 
Santobello was decided before Strickland, we noted that it 
relied on similar principles of fairness.  Id. at 276.    
¶21 In our conclusion in Smith, we stated as follows:  
 
[W]e conclude that when a prosecutor agrees to make no 
sentence 
recommendation 
but 
instead 
recommends 
a 
significant prison term, such conduct is a material 
and substantial breach of the plea agreement.  Such a 
breach of the State's agreement on sentencing is a 
"manifest injustice" and always results in prejudice 
to the defendant.  The breach of a material and 
substantial term of a plea agreement by the prosecutor 
deprives the defendant of a sentencing proceeding 
whose result is fair and reliable.  Our conclusion 
precludes any need to consider what the sentencing 
judge would have done if the defense counsel had 
objected to the breach by the district attorney.  
Rather, our conclusion is premised on the rule of 
Santobello, that when a negotiated plea rests in any 
significant degree on a promise or agreement of the 
prosecutor, such promise must be fulfilled.   
Id. at 281 (citations and footnote omitted).  Thus, this case 
established a per se rule of prejudice in all instances where 
the prosecutor committed a material and substantial breach of 
the plea agreement.  Id. at 282. 
¶22 The defendants urge us to follow the holding in Smith 
and to conclude that the denial of a 12-person jury, without 
No. 
99-0743-CR & 99-1282-87-CR 
 
 
13
objection of counsel, is always prejudicial to defendants in 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  They argue that, as 
in Smith, the interests of justice require such a holding 
because the defendants have been denied their right to a jury 
trial as required by Hansford.  For several reasons, however, we 
conclude 
that 
such 
a 
finding 
of 
automatic 
prejudice 
is 
unwarranted in six-person jury cases.   
¶23 First and foremost, as we noted above, six-person 
juries do not lead us to the conclusion that the result of the 
trial was automatically unfair or unreliable or that the 
fundamental integrity of the trial was undermined.  Indeed, as 
in a prosecutor's breach of a plea agreement, the harmful 
effects of a six-person jury are difficult to measure.  However, 
in contrast to a prosecutor's breach, six-person juries do not 
invoke interests of justice factors which require an automatic 
finding 
of 
prejudice. 
 
Breaches 
of 
plea 
agreements 
by 
prosecutors not only adversely affect the integrity of the 
proceeding and undermine the outcome, but also impair the 
defendant's and the public's faith in the fairness of the 
criminal justice system.  We do not find anything inherent in a 
six-person jury that results in similar concerns.   
¶24 Second, 
even 
assuming 
that 
the 
defendants 
were 
deprived of a specific right as a result of their attorneys' 
failure to object, the denial of a right does not automatically 
require us to presume prejudice or find actual prejudice.  Cf. 
Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 769-74 (declining to presume or find 
actual prejudice even though the counsel's conduct effectively 
No. 
99-0743-CR & 99-1282-87-CR 
 
 
14
deprived the defendant of a statutorily-required right to 
peremptory challenges).  Indeed, we have noted that prejudice 
will not result unless a counsel's deficient performance 
deprives the defendant of a substantive or procedural right.  
Smith, 207 Wis. 2d at 278.  However, we have held that, when not 
falling within one of the three presumptions enumerated in 
Strickland, prejudice will only result when the counsel's errors 
have deprived the defendant of a fair trial whose result is 
reliable.  See, e.g., Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 773-74; Pitsch, 
124 Wis. 2d at 646.  We have provided for only a few limited 
exceptions.  See, e.g., Smith, 207 Wis. 2d at 271.  The 
defendants have not proven that any errors committed by their 
attorneys lead to such prejudice. 
¶25 Third and finally, none of the presumptions enumerated 
under Strickland apply.  We defined these "rare" instances in 
Erickson, stating that a court will presume prejudice (1) "when 
the effective assistance of counsel has been eviscerated by 
forces unrelated to the actual performance of the defendant's 
attorney"; (2) "when, although the defendant is actually given 
counsel, 'the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent 
one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a 
presumption of prejudice is appropriate'"; or (3) when "[i]n 
other, 
more 
limited, 
circumstances 
the 
actual 
assistance 
rendered by a particular attorney has been deemed so outside the 
bounds necessary for effective counsel that a court has presumed 
prejudice."  Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 770-71 (citation omitted). 
No. 
99-0743-CR & 99-1282-87-CR 
 
 
15
In short, the defendants' cases do not fit within any of these 
limited circumstances. 
¶26 The defendants have clearly presented their claims as 
ineffective assistance in this case.  We proceed under this 
claim and according to Strickland, regardless of the potential 
for 
other 
consequences 
if 
this 
case 
had 
been 
presented 
differently.  Cf. State v. Damaske, 212 Wis. 2d 169, 200, 567 
N.W.2d 
905 
(Ct. 
App. 
1997) 
("[T]here 
is 
a 
significant 
distinction between the consequences on appeal of trial-court 
error and the consequences of that same error when it is raised 
in 
an 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
context."). 
 
Under 
Strickland, we conclude prejudice has not been proven. 
III 
¶27 In sum, we conclude that the defendants have not 
established claims for ineffective assistance of counsel because 
they have failed to show prejudice as required under Strickland. 
 Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' decisions.  The 
defendants are not entitled to reversals of their convictions.   
By the Court.—The decisions of the court of appeals are 
affirmed. 
 
No.99-0743-CR.ssa  
 
1 
¶28 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  
How a court states the question presented in a case often 
determines the response.  But in the present cases, no matter 
how the question is stated, the response is the same. 
¶29 The majority opinion states the question presented in 
these cases as follows: Did the defendants receive ineffective 
assistance of counsel because their trial attorneys failed to 
object to six-person juries, even though around the time of 
their trials this court had accepted certification of State v. 
Hansford,3 challenging the constitutionality of the statute 
authorizing six-person juries?  The majority opinion responds 
"no."  Why?  Because, according to the majority opinion, the 
defendants failed to show prejudice: the defendants received a 
fair, impartial trial by a jury of six persons.  
¶30 However, I respond "yes."  Why?  Because, according to 
our past cases, when a criminal accused requests a jury trial, a 
jury of any number other than 12 persons is a denial of a 
fundamental right guaranteed by the Wisconsin Constitution.4  
Failure to accord an accused a jury of 12 persons is prejudicial 
per se.5  According to Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) (1999-2000), only 
the defendant can waive a 12-person jury and only by a personal 
and affirmative statement in open court.  Because the defendants 
                     
3 State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998). 
4 Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d at 230. 
5 State v. Wingo, 2000 WI 31, ¶¶2, 18, 233 Wis. 2d 467, 609 
N.W.2d 162; Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d at 243; State v. Cooley, 105 
Wis. 2d 642, 645-46, 315 N.W.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1981). 
No.99-0743-CR.ssa  
 
2 
in the present cases did not waive their right to a 12-person 
jury in the manner set forth in § 972.02(1), the defendants are 
entitled to a new trial even when they did not preserve the 
error by objecting in the circuit court. 
¶31 As I see it, here are the top 20 relevant questions to 
be asked and answered in the present cases.  
¶32 Question 1: Did each defendant in the present cases 
demand a jury trial?  
¶33 Answer: Yes.  
¶34 Question 2: How many jurors sat on each jury?   
¶35 Answer: Six. 
¶36 Question 3: Did the defendants in the present cases 
personally and affirmatively agree to a jury of fewer than 12 
persons?   
¶37 Answer: No.  
¶38 Question 4: Did defense counsel in the present cases 
personally and affirmatively agree to a jury of fewer than 12 
persons?   
¶39 Answer: No. 
¶40 Question 5: Did defense counsel or the defendants in 
the present cases object at trial to a jury of fewer than 12 
persons?   
¶41 Answer: No. 
¶42 Question 6: Why was a six-person jury used in each of 
the present cases? 
No.99-0743-CR.ssa  
 
3 
¶43 Answer: Both counsel and the circuit courts assumed 
that 
the 
statute 
authorizing 
a 
six-person 
jury 
was 
constitutional and in effect.6 
¶44 Question 7: Does a jury of fewer than 12 persons in a 
criminal case satisfy the right to jury trial guaranteed by the 
Wisconsin Constitution?   
¶45 Answer: No.  According to State v. Hansford, 219 
Wis. 2d 226, 241, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998), "a criminal defendant's 
right to a trial by jury as guaranteed by art. I, § 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, is the right to a jury of 12 persons."  
¶46 Question 8: Does the state constitutional right to 
trial by jury in a criminal case mean only a jury of 12 persons, 
not a lesser or greater number?  
¶47 Answer: Yes.  See the Hansford case cited in the 
answer to question 7 and the cases cited in answer to question 
13. 
¶48 Question 9: Can a jury of any number other than 12 
persons ever render a valid verdict in a criminal case in 
Wisconsin? 
¶49 Answer: Yes.  
¶50 Question 10: When? 
¶51 Answer: 
When 
an 
accused 
agrees 
personally 
and 
affirmatively on the record in accordance with Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.02(1) to a jury of a number other than 12 persons.7 
                     
6 Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) (1995-96). 
No.99-0743-CR.ssa  
 
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¶52 Question 11: Can an accused be deemed to agree to a 
jury of any number other than 12 persons by silence or by 
inference from the record?   
¶53 Answer: No.  A waiver of a 12-person jury must be by 
the accused personally and on the record.  Waiver will not be 
presumed.8  "Neither circumstantial evidence nor reasonable 
inference will support a waiver."9   
¶54 Question 12: If defense counsel agrees to a jury of 
fewer than or more than 12 persons, is that good enough to waive 
a 12-person jury? 
                                                                  
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 972.02(1) (1999-2000) provides that 
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this chapter, criminal cases 
shall be tried by a jury selected as prescribed in s. 805.08, 
unless the defendant waives a jury in writing or by statement in 
open court or under s. 967.08(2)(b), on the record, with the 
approval of the court and the consent of the state." 
In State v. Albright, 96 Wis. 2d 122, 129-30, 291 N.W.2d 
487 (1980), the court concluded that "certain constitutional 
rights of a criminal defendant are so fundamental that they are 
deemed to be personal rights which must be waived personally by 
the defendant.  In this category of personal rights is found the 
decision . . . whether to request a trial by jury . . . ." 
(citation omitted). 
In the Ledger case, the prosecutor and defense counsel 
mutually agreed to allow a 13-person jury to deliberate and 
render a verdict.  The accused agreed to this arrangement in 
person and affirmatively on the record; on appellate review he 
did not challenge the sufficiency of the colloquy or the waiver. 
 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
no 
constitutional 
impediment existed.  State v. Ledger, 175 Wis. 2d 116, 126, 499 
N.W.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1993). 
8 State v. Cleveland, 50 Wis. 2d 666, 670, 184 N.W.2d 899 
(1971). 
9 State v. Cleveland, 50 Wis. 2d at 670. 
No.99-0743-CR.ssa  
 
5 
¶55 Answer: No.  This court has held that neither counsel 
nor the court nor any other entity can act in any way or to any 
degree so as to waive on the accused's behalf his or her right 
to trial by a jury of 12 persons.10  "[T]he defendant's personal 
waiver . . . may not be inferred or presumed."11 
¶56 Question 13: What remedy is afforded a criminal 
accused who asks for a jury trial and then is tried, without 
objection by the accused or defense counsel, by a jury of other 
than 12 persons or is tried by the court without a jury?   
¶57 Answer: A new trial.  Thus when defense counsel in the 
Cooley case agreed to proceed in a criminal trial with an 11-
member jury, the court of appeals concluded that because the 
accused did not personally and affirmatively agree to a jury of 
fewer than 12 persons, a new trial must be ordered.12  
¶58 In the Cleveland case, when an accused demanded a jury 
trial and was then tried by the court (a "zero-person" jury) 
without any objection by the accused, the supreme court held 
that the right to a jury trial was violated and "there must be 
an automatic reversal of conviction."13   
                     
10 State v. Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d 561, 569, 464 N.W.2d 839 
(1991). 
11 State v. Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d at 569-70. 
12 State v. Cooley, 105 Wis. 2d at 645-46 (cited with 
approval State v. Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d at 569, 574). 
13 State v. Cleveland, 50 Wis. 2d at 670 (a jury waiver must 
be on the record; it will not be presumed). 
No.99-0743-CR.ssa  
 
6 
¶59 In a third case, Wingo,14 the accused was tried by a 
six-person jury because counsel and the circuit court mistakenly 
believed that Wis. Stat. § 756.096(3)(am) (1995-96) authorizing 
a six-person jury was in effect.  Neither the defendant nor 
defense counsel objected to the six-person jury.  Neither the 
defendant nor defense counsel personally and affirmatively 
waived the accused's right to trial by a 12-person jury.  The 
accused asserted ineffective assistance of counsel. Ignoring the 
ineffective assistance of counsel argument, the court concluded 
that 
the 
parties' 
failure 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
statutory 
requirements of waiving a 12-person jury denied the accused a 
jury of 12 persons guaranteed under Wisconsin law.  The Wingo 
court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial because 
the accused had been denied a trial by a jury of 12 persons. 
¶60 Thus, to answer question 13, the proper remedy when an 
accused has not personally and affirmatively waived a trial by a 
12-person jury is a "reversal and remand for a new trial," even 
when the defendant does not raise the issue until after the 
trial.15 
¶61 Although the defendants in the three cases described 
above received a fair and impartial trial by a jury of 11 
                     
14 State v. Wingo, 2000 WI 31, 233 Wis. 2d 467, 609 N.W.2d 
162. 
15 "[W]here the defendant has been denied the right to a 
jury trial or an appropriate personal waiver thereof, we have no 
alternative other than to remand for a new jury trial or the 
personal, informed waiver by the defendant of such right."  
State v. Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d at 575. 
No.99-0743-CR.ssa  
 
7 
persons, 
by 
the 
court, 
or 
by 
a 
jury 
of 
six 
persons, 
respectively, the appellate court ordered a new trial in each 
instance on the ground that the defendant did not personally and 
affirmatively waive a jury of 12 persons.  
¶62 Question 14: Why did defense counsel and counsel for 
the State in the present cases debate the validity of the 
convictions on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel 
when none of the above cases was decided on that basis?  
¶63 Answer: Because, as defense counsel and counsel for 
the State explained at oral argument, counsel concluded that the 
ineffective assistance of counsel argument was the only route 
available after State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 
611 N.W.2d 727, by which to challenge a six-person jury.16 
Counsel had concluded that it was useless for them to argue to 
this court the merits of reversing the Huebner decision, which 
was less than a year old.  Thus counsel for both the defense and 
state framed this case as presenting the question of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  
¶64 Question 15: What does the Huebner decision hold?  
¶65 Answer: The only Huebner holding is that Huebner's 
conviction was affirmed.  In concluding that Huebner stands for 
any rule of law, counsel erred in counting the justices' votes. 
                     
16 The court explicitly stated in Huebner that it was not 
addressing the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶18, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 
727. 
No.99-0743-CR.ssa  
 
8 
Huebner was a 4-to-3 decision on the mandate, but it was a 1-3-3 
decision on the reasoning.  
¶66 In Huebner, four justices agreed to affirm the 
conviction rendered by a six-person jury.  One of the four 
justices, Justice Prosser, asserted that a six-person jury was 
constitutional.  Three of the four justices agreed that a six-
person jury was unconstitutional, but they concluded that a 
defendant who did not object to the use of a six-person jury at 
a 
misdemeanor 
trial, 
as 
authorized 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 756.096(3)(am) 
(1995-96) 
(declared 
unconstitutional 
in 
Hansford), may not obtain a new trial.  Three other justices 
agreed that a six-person jury was unconstitutional, but they 
concluded that a verdict rendered by a six-person jury to which 
Huebner did not consent was invalid and that a new trial should 
be ordered. 
¶67 Although only a careful reader would spot it, when the 
majority opinion in the present case refers to the Huebner 
opinion,17 the majority opinion is referring to what three 
justices of the court opined in Huebner.  Huebner is not 
precedent. 
¶68 Question 16: Was there ineffective assistance of 
counsel in the present cases?   
¶69 Answer: There is no need to ask or answer this 
question in light of Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) (1999-2000) and the 
case law.  For example, in Wingo, after trial the accused sought 
                     
17 See majority op. at ¶15. 
No.99-0743-CR.ssa  
 
9 
a new trial, arguing his trial counsel was ineffective in 
failing to challenge the six-person jury.  Ignoring the 
ineffective assistance of counsel argument, the Wingo court 
concluded that the parties' failure to comply with the statutory 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) governing waiving a 12-
person jury required a reversal of the conviction and a new 
trial.18   
¶70 Question 17: Let's test out the ineffective assistance 
of counsel argument anyway.  What about the prejudice prong of 
the Strickland19 test for ineffective assistance of counsel? 
¶71 Answer: This court has consistently held that it is 
prejudicial per se for an accused to be denied a trial by jury. 
 That the accused had a fair and impartial trial by fewer than 
12 persons20 or by a court without a jury is irrelevant.21  The 
accused did not get his constitutionally guaranteed right of a 
12-person jury.  Denial of this constitutionally guaranteed 
right is not harmless error.  
¶72 As early as 1971 in Cleveland, this court stated that 
"[t]he right to a jury trial is fundamental.  Sound public 
policy demands that when that right is violated [by the 
                     
18 See State v. Wingo, 2001 WI 31 at ¶¶2, 18; see also State 
v. Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d at 573; State v. Cooley, 105 Wis. 2d 
at 645-46. 
19 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
20 State v. Wingo, 2000 WI 31; State v. Cooley, 105 Wis. 2d 
at 642. 
21 State v. Cleveland, 50 Wis. 2d 666.  
No.99-0743-CR.ssa  
 
10
defendant's failure to waive the right to a jury trial on the 
record] there must be an automatic reversal of conviction."22   
¶73 In Hansford the accused had a six-person jury to which 
he objected.  The supreme court held that the circuit court 
erred in not granting the accused a 12-person jury.  The 
Hansford court did not apply the harmless error test to hold 
that the accused had a fair trial with a six-person jury.  
Rather the Hansford court stated emphatically that "[b]ecause 
the defendant was not afforded the right to a jury of 12 
persons, as guaranteed by art. I, §  7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, his conviction for obstructing an officer must be 
reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court."23 
¶74 Ignoring the Hansford case (and the prior cases), the 
majority opinion now applies a harmless error test to a six-
person jury but fails to explain why Hansford reversed a 
conviction if the error of a trial by a six-person jury was 
harmless.24   
¶75 Question 18: What about the deficient performance 
prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of 
counsel? 
¶76 Answer: Because the error in conducting a trial with a 
jury of fewer than 12 persons without an accused's personal and 
                     
22 State v. Cleveland, 50 Wis. 2d at 670.  
23 Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d at 243 (emphasis added). 
24 See majority op. at ¶15. 
No.99-0743-CR.ssa  
 
11
affirmative consent is prejudicial per se under our case law, 
there is no need to analyze the deficient performance prong. 
¶77 Question 19: What is the proper remedy in this case? 
¶78 Answer: A new trial.  In each of the cases described 
above, when the accused did not receive a jury of 12 persons and 
did not personally and affirmatively agree to a trial conducted 
without a jury of 12 persons, the accused got a new trial.  
¶79 Question 20: Which justices are joining this dissent? 
¶80 Answer: I am authorized to state that Justices ANN 
WALSH BRADLEY and DIANE S. SYKES join this dissent.  
¶81 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
 
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