Title: Painter v. Simmons
Citation: 380 S.E.2d 663
Docket Number: 871390
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: June 9, 1989

380 S.E.2d 663 (1989)
Royce L. PAINTER, Jr.
v.
David L. SIMMONS.
Record No. 871390.

Supreme Court of Virginia.
June 9, 1989.
*664 F. Guthrie Gordon, III (Janice L. Redinger, Gordon &amp; Wyatt, Charlottesville, on brief), for appellant.
Peter D. Menk (Jeffrey D. Gaines, Black, Menk, Noland &amp; Gaines, Staunton, on brief), for appellee.
Present: All the Justices.
LACY, Justice.
In 1986 Royce Painter and David Simmons both worked for Fenco, Inc. at its facilities located on VanFossen Lane in Staunton. VanFossen Lane is a private road which provides access to the Fenco facilities as well as other businesses located on the VanFossen property along the lane. On the morning of March 11, Painter, after checking in for work, was struck by a car while walking north on VanFossen Lane from one of Fenco's buildings to another. The car was driven by Simmons, who was on his way to work.
Painter applied for and received workers' compensation benefits through Fenco. He also filed this negligence action against Simmons. The trial court sustained Simmons' plea in bar, holding that Painter's exclusive remedy was the Workers' Compensation Act. We now consider Painter's appeal of that decision.
If the acts which gave rise to Painter's injury "arose out of" and "in the course of" Simmons' employment with Fenco, the Workers' Compensation Act is Painter's exclusive remedy. If such acts did not "arise out of" and "in the course of" Simmons' employment with Fenco, Simmons is an "other party" under the Workers' Compensation Act and Painter may maintain a separate action for negligence against him. Code §§ 65.1-40, 65.1-41, 65.1-103.
In Brown v. Reed, 209 Va. 562, 165 S.E.2d 394 (1969), we held that the Workers' Compensation Act was the exclusive remedy for an employee injured by a fellow employee on a private road or passageway on the business premises which separated buildings of the employer and was adjacent to the parking lot. Although neither employee was "on the job" at the time of the accident, one employee was leaving work and the other was arriving at work.
Recently, we again held that the Workers' Compensation Act was the exclusive remedy of an employee injured by a fellow employee when both employees had terminated their work day and were leaving a privately owned parking lot where spaces were allocated to their employer. Barnes v. Stokes, 233 Va. 249, 252-53, 355 S.E.2d 330, 331-32 (1987).
Painter refers to the above cases as "parking lot" cases, significant because they provide a clear demarcation for the applicability of the Act in these types of cases. Painter argues that extending application of the Act beyond the boundaries of the parking lot will lead to the unmanageable and undesirable results of a "reasonable distance" standard. See 1 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 15.12.(a) (1952) (characterizing the "reasonable distance" standard, as traditionally applied, as a "widely-varying subjective standard").
In making this argument, Painter fails to consider the rationale we consistently have utilized to determine whether the Act applied. Merely being in a parking lot utilized by employees is not enough to impose coverage of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act. See Fouts v. *665 Anderson, 219 Va. 666, 250 S.E.2d 746 (1979).
In both Brown and Barnes, we relied on the rationale of Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 48 S. Ct. 221, 72 L. Ed. 507 (1928), to determine whether the accidents arose out of and in the course of the employment. In determining whether death benefits were available under the Utah Compensation Act, the United States Supreme Court stated that
In Bountiful Brick, a brickyard employee was killed on his way to work when crossing railroad tracks adjacent to the brickyard. The railroad company's right of way was fenced, but employees of the brickyard entered the right of way from the east fence, crossed the tracks, exited through a gap in the fence, and proceeded to the north entrance of the brickyard. Additional methods of entering the brickyard were available to the employees including a public road crossing the railroad tracks as well as brickyard entrances on the north and west sides of the yard. Based on an analysis of the time and situs of the accident, coverage was permitted under the Utah Act.
The accident in the instant case occurred at a place and time where Fenco expected both Painter and Simmons to be for employment purposes. VanFossen Lane is an acknowledged route of egress and ingress to and between the employer's facilities. Simmons clearly was using the lane for no purpose other than to commence his work for the day as anticipated by his employer. We previously have stated that:
Brown, 209 Va. at 564, 165 S.E.2d  at 396.
For the reasons set out above we will affirm the judgment of the trial court sustaining Simmons' plea in bar.
Affirmed.