Title: Gluck Brothers, Inc. v. Breeden
Citation: 387 S.W.2d 825
Docket Number: N/A
State: Tennessee
Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date: March 4, 1965

387 S.W.2d 825 (1965) GLUCK BROTHERS, INC., Plaintiff in Error, v. Hobert BREEDEN, Defendant in Error. Supreme Court of Tennessee. March 4, 1965. *826 W.H. Inman, Taylor &amp; Inman, Morristown, for plaintiff in error. James K. Miller, Miller &amp; Noe, Morristown, for defendant in error. WHITE, Justice. This is a Workmen's Compensation case. The employee, defendant in error, was found to be totally and permanently disabled as the result of a heart attack, and was awarded benefits accordingly. From the unfavorable holding of the trial judge in the court below, the employer, plaintiff in error has perfected his appeal to this Court. Two assignments of error are made, viz.: (1) There is no material evidence to support the judgment of the court; and (2) The petitioner failed to prove the notice required by statute, such lack of notice conclusively prejudicing the defendant's rights. The facts are that the employee is a totally illiterate man who has worked as a laborer all of his life and has been in the employment of the defendant for approximately twelve years. He worked as a furniture assembler, particularly dressers and chests, and his work required him to lift a ten or twelve pound panel over his head, and to reach over his head with a two or three pound rubber hammer and "knock it down in them holes." On Monday, November 11, 1963, while at work, about 1:30 P.M., he suffered severe chest pains, but continued to work for the remainder of the day. The pains continued throughout the night, but he returned to work the following day. The pains continued and the employee, according to his testimony, kept getting weaker and weaker, whereupon at about 4:30 P.M. he sat down in the rest room. "I was sick enough to die, it seemed like my breath was cutting off." After work he went to his car and "a bad spell hit me again," and he fell into the car where he lay for some time before he was able to drive home. The discomfort continued all night and on Wednesday morning he was taken to Dr. James W. Richardson, who placed him in the hospital and treated him for a heart attack. The plaintiff's wife gave essentially the same testimony concerning the pains and illness of her husband. Additionally, she testified that about two and one-half weeks afterwards she contacted the plant nurse and told her that her husband had suffered a heart attack. She also related an incident wherein Jerry Allen, the foreman at Gluck Brothers, came to bring her husband's last pay check, and she stated that she told him at that time that her husband had suffered a heart attack. *827 The deposition of Dr. James W. Richardson the attending physician, was then introduced on behalf of the plaintiff. He testified that the plaintiff had suffered a myocardial infarction, and the onset of the attack was somewhere around the time the plaintiff first had the pains. The first question raised here is whether the evidence supports the holding that Mr. Breeden's heart attack arose out of his employment. In discussing the causal relationship between employment and heart attacks, this Court said in Coleman v. Coker, 204 Tenn. 310, 321 S.W.2d 540 (1959): Mr. Justice Swepston, writing for the Court, in Nashville Pure Milk Co. v. *828 Rychen, 204 Tenn. 575, 322 S.W.2d 432 (1958), said: The recent case of Ward v. Commercial Ins. Co., 213 Tenn. 100, 372 S.W.2d 292 (1963), approved the above language and stated that those cases resolve the question of law as to whether a death resulting from a heart attack in the course of employment can be compensable as arising out of the employment. The Court further stated: Thus, since the question is basically one of fact, it is necessary that we take note of the scope of review of this Court as concerns the facts found in the court below. It is settled law that we are to review the record only to determine if the trial judge's decision is supported by any material evidence. In White v. Whiteway Pharmacy, Inc., 210 Tenn. 449, 454, 360 S.W.2d 12, 15 (1962), this Court stated that in a workmen's compensation case: Our review in the instant case is, therefore, limited to an examination of the record to see if there is any material evidence to support the trial judge's finding that there was a causal connection between Mr. Breeden's employment and his fatal heart attack. We think that the medical testimony in the record, without a doubt, is material evidence sufficient to uphold the verdict. In discussing the value of medical testimony and medical opinion, 2 Larsen, Workmen's Compensation § 322 (1961), reads: In Lynch v. La Rue, 198 Tenn. 101, 278 S.W.2d 85 (1955), we discussed the value *829 of medical testimony and concluded as follows: In re-examining the medical testimony in this case we are of the opinion that the doctor's statements indicate at least a degree of certainty that the heart attack, the aggravation or acceleration of it, was caused by the employment. Specifically, we point to the language such as: In addition to this medical testimony is the proof that the plaintiff's work required an appreciable amount of physical activity, i.e. lifting, hammering, etc., and, also, the fact that the plaintiff's condition worsened as he continued working clearly shows that the work accelerated or aggravated the attack. We think that the above facts constitute sufficient material evidence to make it mandatory that we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The case sub judice is easily distinguished from the recent case of Cas Walker's Cash Stores, Inc. v. Livesay, Tenn., 385 S.W.2d 745 (opinion for publication released January 6, 1965; petition to rehear denied contemporaneously with the release of this opinion). In that case the evidence showed that the employee appeared normal when he went to work the morning of his attack; that when he left for home and lunch that day he appeared normal; that after eating his lunch and mowing a small part of his yard, he left to return to his work; that when he returned to the store where he worked he was pale and sweating; and, that he went back to lie down ten to fifteen minutes after returning to the store. Medical testimony was only that the decedent's employment "could or might" have contributed to the attack. At the same time, the other evidence, noted above, in no way supported an inference of a causal connection between the employment and the fatal heart attack. As a matter of fact, it showed the origin of the attack followed exertion in mowing the lawn and the onset occurred as he returned to his employment. As stated previously, in the instant case medical testimony positively links the heart attack with the stress and strain of the plaintiff's work. Secondly, the other evidence supports or gives rise to an inference that the employment precipitated the heart attack. Both of these elements are lacking in the Cas Walker's Cash Stores case. The first assignment is, therefore, overruled. The second assignment of error is that the petitioner failed to prove the notice required by Statute (T.C.A. § 50-1001), and such lack of notice conclusively prejudiced the defendant's rights. Plaintiff admits that he gave no written notice of his injury to the employer, however, he insists that the employer had actual notice. T.C.A. § 50-1001 requires an employee to give written notice of the accident and injury within thirty days on the penalty of having his petition dismissed. The courts have relieved an employee from the burden of written notice on two grounds, *830 namely: (1) waiver, based upon the conduct of the employer, or his representatives in recognition of the liability; and (2) excuse, based upon various grounds of inability, or faultless omission of the employee. Knowledge of the accident and injury on the part of the employer and lack of prejudice are elements considered by the court as affecting the reasonableness of the excuse made, or the justness of the application of the doctrine of waiver. Defendant cites the case of Aluminum Co. of America v. Rogers, 211 Tenn. 187, 364 S.W.2d 358 (1963), as authority for their position. That case held that a guard, who allegedly sustained an accidental injury (pain struck him while attempting to close a window), did no justify notice requirements when he merely told employer's desk sergeant that he was sick at his stomach and his arms and hips were hurting, nor did these statements give employer notice of injury which resulted in his death due to aggravation of a pre-existing diabetic condition. A second case relied upon by defendant is York v. Federal Chemical Co., et al., 188 Tenn. 63, 216 S.W.2d 725 (1949). In that case the court dismissed a petition for lack of notice since employee, who died of an infected thumb, had failed to report the infected condition, although he had reported the initial injury. The rationale was that the employer was prejudiced, owing to the lack of notice, because he was deprived of the privilege of securing proper medical attention in time, to treat the infected thumb and thereby, in all probability, save the life of the employee. On the other hand, it is the established law of this State that while knowledge of a fellow workman of the injury cannot be imputed to the employer, if an employee's superior is given notice of the accident and injury, this constitutes notice to the employer. Hotel Claridge Co. v. Blank, 169 Tenn. 575, 89 S.W.2d 758 (1936); Tennessee Products Corp. v. Gravitt, 182 Tenn. 54, 184 S.W.2d 164 (1945); Patterson v. Bessemer Coal, Iron &amp; Land Co., D.C., 192 F. Supp. 805 (1961). In the case now before us, there is uncontradicted testimony that the plant foreman visited Breeden in the hospital and was informed at that time that Breeden had suffered a heart attack while at work. The foreman had brought Breeden's last pay check to him. Also, there is testimony that Mrs. Breeden reported that her husband had suffered a heart attack to the plant nurse while plaintiff was still in the hospital. We think that these facts clearly demonstrate that the employer had notice through actual knowledge of the injury of Breeden. Notice to the foreman or the plant nurse of the accident and the injury is notice to the employer. Therefore, the second assignment is not well taken and is overruled. The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded to the trial court for the enforcement of this opinion. BURNETT, C. J., and DYER, HOLMES and CHATTIN, JJ., concur.