Title: Purnell v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 671, 2002
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: September 16, 2003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
PHILLIP PURNELL,
§
No. 671, 2002
§
    
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§
Court Below:  Superior Court of 
§
the State of Delaware in and for
              v.
§
New Castle County
§
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
Cr.A. Nos. IN01-11-1420 through
§
IN01-11-1423
Plaintiff Below,
§
Appellee.
§
Submitted: May 20, 2003
Decided:    September 16, 2003
 Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, BERGER and STEELE, Justices.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED.
John S. Malik, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant.
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire, John Williams, Esquire (argued), Department
of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee.
VEASEY, Chief Justice:
1Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
In this appeal, we consider the validity of a second search following a lawful
Terry1 stop.  Here, a police officer conducted a pat-down search incident to a Terry
stop and found no weapons.  Later, the officer conducted an additional search,
without consent, after the pat-down had been concluded.  The record shows that the
purpose of the additional search was not to protect the officers, but to gather
evidence.  The Superior Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the fruit of
the second search.  We reverse on the ground that the search violated the suspect’s
Fourth Amendment right that protects individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures.  Any evidence gathered pursuant to this second search should have been
suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. 
Facts
On November 9, 2001, at approximately 4:00 p.m., the police received a tip
from a confidential informant who had supplied reliable information in the past.  The
informant told an officer that two black males were standing on the corner of Fourth
and Delamore Streets in Wilmington and were in possession of narcotics and
handguns.  The informant also provided information on the clothing the two men were
wearing.  One man was wearing black pants and a black three-quarter length jacket
partially made out of leather.  The jacket had white writing on the back.  This man was
2
said to have held the drugs.  The second man wore a three-quarter length jacket made
entirely of leather.  The informant stated that this man was Shannon Black.  He also
wore a black hat trimmed in red with white writing on the front.  Black was said to
have had a handgun in his waistband and possibly had drugs in his possession as well.
After receiving the tip, Detective Vincent Jordan and two other undercover
officers immediately drove to the area the informant had identified.  Upon arrival, the
detectives were unable to locate the two men in the vicinity.  The officers decided,
however, to circle the block looking for the two individuals.  A half-block from the
area identified by the informant the officers noticed a man entering a Chinese
restaurant.  The man fit the description given by the informant of the unidentified man.
The man had on a three-quarter length jacket with leather sleeves and white writing on
the back.  Detective Jordan testified that the man was not walking to the restaurant
from the vicinity of Fourth and Delamore.  Rather, he was walking from the opposite
direction.  Also, at no time did it appear to the detectives that the man was doing
anything unusual or suggestive of criminal activity.
After a moment the man emerged from the Chinese restaurant.  As the man
walked out of the restaurant the three officers approached him, identified themselves,
escorted the man to their unmarked car and told him they were investigating a
complaint regarding handguns and narcotics.  The man was later identified as the
3
appellant, Phillip Purnell.  The detectives asked Purnell if they could speak with him,
and he agreed.  The police then asked if they could pat him down for weapons, and
he again agreed.
One of the officers conducted the pat-down but found no weapons.  The
officer did, however, detect a large bulge in Purnell’s right pants pocket.  When asked
what the bulge was, Purnell stated it was approximately $300 in cash that he had
earned from a temporary job.  Purnell then gave consent for the detective to remove
the money from his pocket.  Detective Jordan testified that the money was “very
crumpled up in disarray” and appeared to total more than $300.
After the search, the officers asked Purnell to provide identification and state his
business abroad.  Purnell produced valid identification and told the detectives that he
was visiting his grandmother.  He then pointed down the street to a house the police
believed to be vacant.  The officers also asked Purnell how he had traveled to his
grandmother’s house.  Purnell responded that he had taken the bus.  This aroused the
detectives’ suspicions, however, because during the pat-down the officer felt what he
believed to be a remote control automobile keypad in Purnell’s jacket.  The officers
then conducted a second, nonconsensual search of Purnell and removed the keypad
from his jacket.  Purnell told the officers that the keys belonged to his grandfather’s
Buick which he had permission to drive.
2Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4
Parked on the street near the house Purnell had pointed to was a black Buick.
The detectives asked Purnell if the vehicle was his or his grandfather’s.  Purnell stated
that it was neither his nor his grandfather’s.  The officers then walked toward the car
and pressed the keypad they had taken from Purnell.  The doors of the car unlocked.
The detectives then locked the car and requested a K-9 unit to conduct a search of the
vehicle.  The officers also ran a license plate check of the vehicle and found that it was
registered to Purnell.
The detectives detained Purnell until the K-9 unit arrived.  Upon arrival a drug-
sniffing dog alerted to the presence of drugs in the car.  The officers then towed the
car and transported Purnell to the Wilmington Police Station.
At the station the officers ordered Purnell to remove his jacket.  As he removed
his jacket a small bag of marijuana fell from the left sleeve of the jacket.  A further
search of Purnell also revealed four more small bags of marijuana.  Purnell was read
his Miranda2 rights.  He then made a statement admitting that he purchased five small
bags of marijuana from an unknown black male.  He also stated that the Buick
belonged to him and that there was more marijuana in the trunk of the car.  The
officers then obtained a warrant to search the car where they discovered  in the trunk
3DEL CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4752 (2001). 
4DEL CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4755 (2001).
5DEL CODE ANN., tit. 16, § 4768 (2001).
6DEL CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4771 (2001).
5
a large quantity of marijuana and, in the passenger area, plastic bags used to package
marijuana for sale.
Purnell was indicted on charges of Possession with Intent to Deliver Marijuana,3
Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping Controlled Substances,4 Possession of a Controlled
Substance Within 300 Feet of a Park,5 and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.6  Purnell
filed a motion to suppress evidence.  At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the
court denied the motion.  
Then Purnell entered into a Stipulated Trial Agreement with the State whereby
he waived his right to a trial and admitted to having committed the charged offenses.
Purnell did, however, preserve his right to appeal the order denying the motion to
suppress.  The court then sentenced Purnell to the mandatory minimum term of three
years for the Possession with Intent to Deliver Marijuana charge.  On the remaining
charges he received probationary sentences.  Purnell now appeals the sentence that
resulted from the denial of his motion to suppress. 
Issue on Appeal
7Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1261 (Del. 2001).
8Id.
6
Purnell makes one argument on appeal:  that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the stop.  He asserts three reasons
for error:  (1) the totality of the circumstances did not establish reasonable and
articulable suspicion of criminal activity; (2) the keys used to search his vehicle were
seized in violation of his rights; and (3) the search of his vehicle, by unlocking the car
doors with the keypad, was performed without a warrant in violation of his rights.  The
State asserts that the search was valid and that the trial court properly denied the
motion.
We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s refusal to grant a motion to
suppress evidence.7  Thus, the judgment is reversible only if “this Court finds the
Superior Court’s decision to be clearly erroneous.”8
9Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 860 (Del. 1999).  (Jones was decided under the Delaware detention statute and
the Delaware Constitution, but for this purpose the analysis under the United States Constitution is the same.)
10Id. at 863.
11Id.
12Id. at 862 (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991)).
7
Reasonable and Articulable Suspicion to Stop
A trial court’s determination whether a police officer possessed reasonable and
articulable suspicion to stop a person is an issue of law and fact.9  In this case the
facts are not in dispute.  Therefore, this aspect of the issue is reviewed de novo.
Purnell contends the police officers did not possess reasonable and articulable
suspicion to stop and question him.  The State argues that the stop was proper.  To
determine whether the stop was proper this Court must first examine the point at which
Purnell was stopped.  Then we must determine whether the officers had reasonable
and articulable suspicion at that time to make the stop.10
A stop occurs when a police officer displays conduct that “would communicate
to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to ignore the police presence.”11
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution a seizure “‘requires
either physical force . . . or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of
authority.’”12  Here Purnell was approached by the police officers after he left the
Chinese restaurant.  After approaching Purnell, the officers advised him that they were
13Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626.
14Woody, 765 A.2d at 1262.
15Id. at 1263.
8
investigating a complaint regarding handguns and narcotics.  They then asked Purnell
if he wished to speak with them and he agreed.  Afterward, the officers escorted
Purnell to their unmarked vehicle.
In California v. Hodari D. the United States Supreme Court ruled that
submission to the assertion of authority constitutes a seizure.13  Purnell submitted to
the officers’ authority when he followed them to their car.  Furthermore, a reasonable
person probably would not have believed he or she was able to leave after agreeing to
speak with the officers and being escorted to the officers’ car.  Thus, a stop occurred
at this point, and this Court must determine whether the officers had reasonable
articulable suspicion to make the stop.
In certain circumstances, “law enforcement officers may stop or detain an
individual for investigatory purposes, but only if the officer has reasonable articulable
suspicion to believe the individual to be detained is committing, has committed, or is
about to commit a crime.”14  Reasonable and articulable suspicion is a less stringent
standard than the probable cause standard and requires a quantum of proof that is less
than preponderance of the evidence.15  In determining whether reasonable and
16Id. (quoting Jones, 745 A.2d at 861 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981))).
17Id. at 1262.
18Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
9
articulable suspicion exists a court “must examine the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the situation ‘as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, trained police
officer in the same or similar circumstances, combining objective facts with such an
officer’s subjective interpretation of those facts.’”16  Courts will defer to the
experience and training of police officers.17
In this case Purnell matched the description given by an informant who had
given reliable information in the past.  Purnell was wearing the black jacket with the
white writing on the back and the black pants described by the informant.  He was also
in the general vicinity of the area where the informant had stated that the crime
occurred.  Although Purnell was seen walking from a direction opposite from the area
identified by the informant, he was, nevertheless, in the vicinity.
In Adams v. Williams, the United States Supreme Court found that a tip
provided by an informant was sufficient to justify a stop where the informant was
known personally by the officer and had given reliable information in the past.18  The
Court held that the circumstances surrounding the stop present “a stronger case than
19Id.
20Id. at 147.
21Jones, 745 A.2d at 873-74.
22Id. at 858.
10
obtains in the case of an anonymous telephone tip.”19  Specifically, the Court ruled that
“the information carried enough indicia of reliability to justify the officer’s forcible
stop.”20  
In Jones v. State this Court did not find that reasonable articulable suspicion
existed from an informant’s tip.21  Jones, however, involved merely a tip from an
anonymous caller who stated that there was a “suspicious black male wearing a blue
coat” in the vicinity.22  
The informant in Purnell’s case was known to the police as a source of  reliable
information.  Furthermore, the informant gave a detailed description of what each of
the males was wearing and the activity they were engaging in.  The officers spotted
Purnell, who matched the description of the unidentified man given by the informant.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the officers did possess reasonable
articulable suspicion to stop Purnell, given that he matched the description provided
by the informant and was in the vicinity stated by the informant.  Therefore, the trial
court properly found that there was reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Purnell.
23Adams, 407 U.S. at 146.
24Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
25Hicks v. State, 631 A.2d 6, 11 (Del. 1993) (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993)).
26Adams, 407 U.S. at 146.
11
Seizure of the Keys
Purnell asserts that the officers’ search and seizure of the keys in his jacket was
an illegal search and seizure, in violation of his constitutional rights under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The State argues that the search was
proper.
Pursuant to a brief stop of an individual an officer “may conduct a limited
protective search for concealed weapons.”23  This is known as a “Terry search.”24
“[T]he purpose of a Terry search is ‘not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow
the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence.’”25  “So long as the
officer is entitled to make a forcible stop, and has reason to believe that the suspect
is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to this
protective purpose.”26
As noted, a permissible search for weapons is very limited.  “‘[I]f the protective
search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no
27Hicks, 631 A.2d at 11 (quoting Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373).
28Id. at 7-8.  Hicks was the woman’s boyfriend but did not mention this to the officer.
29Id. at 8.
30Id.
31Id.
12
longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed.’”27  Therefore, a search
outside of the scope of the limitations of a Terry stop is illegal.
In Hicks v. State an officer detained a woman in her car, in a residential
driveway, for a traffic violation.  Soon after the stop, a crowd gathered around the
officer and the woman in the car.  Of the members of the crowd, one man, the
defendant Hicks, was extremely close to the officer and was constantly asking the
officer questions.28  Hicks also kept his hands concealed in his pocket.  The officer
was apprehensive and concerned about his exposure to harm from Hicks.  The officer
asked Hicks to leave, but he refused.  At this point the officer detained Hicks and
conducted a pat-down search for weapons.  The officer felt a large bulge which the
officer thought might be a weapon.  The officer removed the object and discovered
it was a green pouch.  After opening the pouch the officer found it contained money
and a sandwich bag.29  Knowing that drugs are frequently packaged in sandwich bags
the officer seized the pouch and decided to examine further its contents to determine
if it concealed drugs.30  The officer later found drugs in the pouch.31
32Id. at 9.
33Id. at 10.
34Id. at 11.
13
On appeal, Hicks argued that the officer’s conduct was illegal, asserting that the
stop and pat-down were impermissible, as was the seizure and search of the pouch.32
This Court held that the stop and pat-down of Hicks were legal, 33 but that the
reexamination of the contents of the pouch violated state and federal constitutional law.
Specifically, we held that, “Once the pouch was removed, seized and inspected by the
arresting officer, no reasonable basis remained to believe that Hicks was presently
armed and dangerous.”34  Thus, a reexamination of the pouch was held to be outside
the scope of the protective search.
In this case the officers conducted two searches of Purnell.  The first was a
search for weapons.  The Superior Court correctly found that this search was proper.
The informant had relayed to the officers that the men were armed.  Furthermore, the
officers knew from experience that people who deal in drugs are often armed.  Thus,
the officers were justified in searching Purnell for weapons to protect themselves.
The second search occurred after the officers knew that Purnell was unarmed.
In ruling on the legality of this search the trial court found:
The defendant was then asked how he got there.  He said he came by
bus.  The officers [sic] who conducted the pat-down thought he had felt
35Trial Transcript at 104.
14
keys or keypad in the defendant’s pocket.  Asked to see it.  Defendant
showed it to him.  And it’s the keys to a Buick.
* * *
But, as I said, in any event, the Court has no evidence that there was any
demand that the keys be given up.  And the evidence is that the defendant
freely and voluntarily gave them up.35
The Court’s findings are inaccurate and not clearly supported by the record.
The testimony of Detective Jordan revealed two things.  First, his testimony  was not
definite on whether the officers received permission to search for the keys.  He stated
only that he “believe[d]” they asked to continue the search.  Second, Detective 
36The record states:
Purnell’s Attorney:  Okay.  Now, with the renewed interest – and, again, not to beat this to death – but
with the renewed interest in the car keys, the affidavit of probable cause, and I don’t think the report
as well nor the affidavit of probable cause for the arrest indicates that Mr. Purnell was asked for
permission to go into his jacket pocket to retrieve the keys.
Is it your testimony today that he was asked permission to go into his pocket to retrieve the keys?
Detective Jordan:   I believe they asked to continue their search.  Whether there was permission
granted for the keys, that I don’t recall.  I know he specifically gave permission to take the money out.
The keys, I don’t recall.
Trial Transcript at 45-46.
37No. 451, 1998,  2000 Del. LEXIS 90 (Del. Feb. 29, 2000) (ORDER).
15
Jordan did not recall whether permission was given to seize the keys.36  The record
also revealed that the police report explicitly indicates that permission was given to
conduct the first search and that Purnell gave permission for them to seize the money.
The report does not state, however, that they received permission to conduct the
second search or that Purnell gave permission for them to take the keys.
The State argues the seizure of the keys was proper and cites this Court’s
decision in Mosley v. State.37  In Mosley, an officer noticed a piece of plastic
protruding out of the defendant’s brassiere during the course of a pat-down search in
connection with a drug deal.  After noticing the plastic, the female officer believed it
to contain narcotics so “she placed her hand over the area and felt a ‘rocky substance’
38Id. at *2.
39508 U.S. 366 (1993).
40Id. at *3.
41Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375-76 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990)).
42Id. at 375 (alteration in original) (quoting Horton, 496 U.S. at 136) (citing 
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)).
16
that she suspected was crack cocaine.”
38  The officer seized the object and determined
that the plastic bag appeared to contain crack cocaine.  Mosley was then arrested.
On appeal Mosley argued that the seizure of the drugs was illegal.  Citing
Minnesota v. Dickerson39 as controlling, we disagreed, holding that, “a police officer
may seize non-threatening contraband detected during a pat-down search if the identity
of that contraband is immediately apparent from plain sight or plain touch.”40 
In Dickerson the United States Supreme Court ruled that contraband may be
seized without a warrant where the contraband is in plain sight.  The Court based its
holding on a prior case, Horton v. California.41  Specifically, the Dickerson Court
cited Horton’s holding that if “the police lack probable cause to believe that an object
in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object - i.e.,
if ‘its incriminating character [is not] “immediately apparent,”’ the plain-view doctrine
cannot justify its seizure.”42
The State’s argument in support of the second search fails for several reasons.
First, the keys were not seized during the pat-down search but during a subsequent
43WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 494 (8th ed.  2002).
18
search.  The officers did not have authority to conduct this second search because the
first search revealed that Purnell did not have any weapons.  Thus, the second search
was not for the purpose of protecting the officers.
Second, the incriminating character of the keys was not “immediately apparent.”
The officers had no reason to know whether the keys were linked to the Buick.  Even
if the officers did suspect that the keys belonged to the Buick, it was still not
“immediately apparent” that the Buick contained drugs.  Thus the keys were not of an
“incriminating character.”  Furthermore, the State cannot support its argument by
contending that because Purnell stated he had taken the bus, the officers knew he was
lying and the keys incriminated him on this point.  Detective Jordan admitted during
his testimony that Purnell could have had the keys in his possession and still could
have taken the bus.  Thus, this reason also does not give the keys an “incriminating
character.”
Finally, in this context one cannot reasonably describe car keys as
“contraband.”  Webster’s Dictionary defines contraband as “goods or merchandise
the importation, exportation, or sometimes possession of which is forbidden.”43  The
cases that the State cites all deal with instances where a police officer felt or saw
drugs, or what the officer believed to be drugs.  Clearly, drugs are contraband.  In
44In Adams the United States Supreme Court stated, “The purpose of this limited search is not to discover
evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his  investigation without fear of violence. . . .”  Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (emphasis added).
19
Purnell’s case, however, the officers felt keys and a keypad, which  they clearly
believed to be keys and a keypad.  Neither keys nor a keypad, in this situation, are
contraband.  The State’s reliance on Mosley and Dickerson, therefore, lacks merit. 
A search pursuant to a Terry stop is conducted for the limited purpose of
protecting the officer by determining if the person stopped has weapons.  The officers
in this case knew from the first search that Purnell was not in possession of weapons.
After Purnell stated that he took the bus to the area the officers conducted a second
search.  This was not a search for weapons.  Rather, it was a search for evidence.44
The record indicates that the State does not have proof that Purnell gave permission
to conduct this search or to remove the keys from his pocket.  Given that Terry
searches may be conducted only for a limited purpose, Purnell’s right to be protected
from an unreasonable search and seizure was violated by the officers’ second search.
The trial court, therefore, abused its discretion by denying Purnell’s motion to
suppress the evidence that was based on the illegal search and seizure of the keys.
Warrantless Search of the Vehicle
Purnell contends that the officers conducted a warrantless, and thus illegal,
search of his vehicle by unlocking the doors to the Buick.  We find no need to address
45See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) (holding that “evidence seized during an unlawful
search could not constitute proof against the victim of the search” (citing 
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914))).
20
this issue, as all evidence obtained as a result of the search and seizure of the keys is
fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been suppressed.45 
Conclusion
Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court is REVERSED.