Title: Frease v. Glazer
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S47016
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 29, 2000

FILED:  JUNE 29, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
DIANN FREASE,fka DIANN TORABI,
Plaintiff-Adverse Party,
	v.
PETER K. GLAZER,
Defendant-Relator.
(CC 9809-06647; SC S47016)
	En Banc
	Original proceeding in mandamus.*
	Argued and submitted May 15, 2000.
	Bradley F. Tellam, Barran Liebman LLP, Portland, argued
the cause and filed the brief for defendant-relator.  With him on
the brief were William A. Davis, Marianne M. Ghim, and Alan
Gladstone, Abbott, Davis, Rothwell, Mullin &amp; Earle, P.C.,
Portland.
	Lori DeDobbelaere, Lachenmeier, Enloe &amp; Rall, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the brief for plaintiff-adverse party. 
With her on the brief was Rudy R. Lachenmeier, Portland.
	LEESON, J.
	Peremptory writ to issue.
	*On petition for writ of mandamus from an order of the
Multnomah County Circuit Court.
	LEESON, J.
	In this tort action, the trial court granted
plaintiff's motion to compel production for in camera review of
defendant's files relating to defendant's legal representation of
plaintiff's ex-husband, Torabi.  Defendant objected to the motion
on the grounds that the files were protected by the attorney-client privilege and that the materials in the files were
defendant's work product.  The trial court ruled that: (1)
defendant's client had waived the attorney-client privilege by
fleeing the jurisdiction and; (2) in any event, plaintiff had
presented evidence sufficient to justify in camera review to
determine the applicability of the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege.  Defendant then brought the present
mandamus proceeding, and this court issued an alternative writ of
mandamus.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that
defendant is entitled to a peremptory writ of mandamus directing
the trial court to vacate its order compelling in camera review
of defendant's files relating to his representation of Torabi.
	The record reveals the following facts.  Plaintiff and
Torabi, who is a native of Iran, were married in May 1992. 
During their marriage, they had one child, born in June 1995. 
Plaintiff and Torabi entered into a stipulated dissolution of
their marriage in July 1996.  Under the terms of the dissolution
judgment, plaintiff was awarded sole custody of the child, and
Torabi had visitation rights.  The judgment prohibited Torabi
from removing the child from the United States without the
permission of the court and required him to surrender his United
States and Iranian passports to plaintiff before exercising his
visitation rights with the child.  The judgment also required
each party to notify the court if he or she intended to move to a
residence that was located more than 60 miles away from the other
party.  Finally, the judgment awarded Torabi the parties'
residence, subject to a lien in favor of plaintiff in the amount
of $43,000, which plaintiff assigned to her parents in March
1997.  Defendant did not represent Torabi in the dissolution
matter.
	In July 1996, plaintiff took the child from Oregon to
Hawaii.  Torabi subsequently retained defendant, who filed 
motions for an order to show cause why plaintiff should not be
held in contempt for removing the child from Oregon and to change
custody of the child from plaintiff to Torabi.  The trial court
scheduled a hearing on the show-cause motion for September 11,
1996. 
	Plaintiff returned to Oregon in August 1996, and
defendant took her deposition on August 27.  At the conclusion of
the deposition, the parties agreed to postpone the show-cause
hearing that had been scheduled for September 11, 1996, on the
conditions that plaintiff return the child to Oregon by September
3, provide Torabi with make-up visitation starting the next day,
and immediately surrender her passport to her attorney, Matthews. 
On August 28, Matthews scheduled a mediation session for the
parties for September 11, 1996, at the same time that they were
to appear at the hearing on the motions to show cause and to
change custody that the parties conditionally had agreed to
postpone.  Also on August 28, plaintiff went into hiding with the
child, and she did not return the child to Oregon on September 3,
1996.  On September 4, Matthews resigned as plaintiff's attorney.
	Defendant appeared for the hearing on the motions to
show cause and to change custody on September 11.  Plaintiff did
not appear, either personally or through an attorney.  Defendant
explained to the court that, as he understood the situation, 
plaintiff was not going to appear and that Matthews had resigned
as her attorney.  After that hearing, the circuit court entered
an order transferring legal and physical custody of the child to
Torabi.  The order, which defendant drafted, contained no
requirement that Torabi surrender his passports to plaintiff as a
condition of custody.
	Plaintiff was arrested for custodial interference in
February 1998, approximately 17 months after she had gone into
hiding with the child.  After plaintiff's arrest, Torabi took
custody of the child.  For the next several months, plaintiff
sought to have the criminal charges against her dismissed and to
regain legal custody of the child.  Defendant provided legal
advice to Torabi throughout that period.  In June 1998, Torabi
disappeared with the child.  Although there is no conclusive
proof, the most reasonable inference is that Torabi took the
child to Iran.
	In September 1998, plaintiff filed this action against
defendant.  Her complaint asserts claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress and misrepresentation, based on
defendant's appearance at the show-cause hearing on September 11,
1996.  According to plaintiff's complaint, defendant knew that
the September 11 show-cause hearing had been canceled because,
"at the deposition [the parties] had postponed the hearing by
agreement and subsequently scheduled a mediation to occur on that
very date."  The complaint alleges that defendant failed either
to inform the court of those events or of the fact that two
attorneys had made telephone calls to him indicating that they
might be representing plaintiff.  Because of defendant's conduct,
the complaint alleges, "[p]laintiff was not allowed the
opportunity to be heard regarding the Motion and Order to Show
Cause," and, as a result, she "wrongfully lost custody of her
daughter and no longer has access to her daughter and in all
likelihood, will never see her daughter again."  The complaint
seeks damages of more than $2 million.   
	In November 1998, plaintiff's parents received an order 
allowing them to take possession of Torabi's house to satisfy the
money judgment against Torabi that plaintiff had assigned to them
in March 1997.  The moving company that packed Torabi's
possessions made an inventory of what he had left behind, which
included three letters that defendant had written to Torabi in
February, March, and April 1998, regarding Torabi's ongoing
custody dispute with plaintiff.  Torabi apparently had left the
letters on his desk.  Plaintiff's parents disclosed the contents
of the letters to plaintiff. 
	On November 15, 1999, after defendant had filed a
motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims, but before the
court had ruled on the motion, plaintiff filed a motion to compel
production of defendant's files relating to his representation of
Torabi.  Defendant objected to the motion to compel on grounds of
relevance, the attorney-client privilege, and the work-product
doctrine.  Plaintiff offered two theories to support her argument
that the attorney-client privilege did not bar production of the
documents.  First, she argued that Torabi had waived the
privilege when he left behind the three letters that plaintiff's
parents had acquired when they took possession of Torabi's house. 
Second, she asserted that Torabi had retained defendant in
furtherance of his intent to commit or plan to commit a crime or
fraud, so the materials were not covered by the attorney-client
privilege under OEC 503(4)(a). (1)
	On November 19, 1999, the trial court ordered defendant
to turn over his files regarding his representation of Torabi for
review in camera.  The court explained the basis for the order as
follows:
		"[T]here is evidence in all of the
documentation that I have had presented to
me, a plan, to commit a criminal act.  The
evidence of that plan to commit a criminal
act is that there was an order regarding
custody and an order regarding turning over
passports.
		"I'm also well aware, as I'm sure any member of
the bar is aware, that it is illegal to take a child
out of the jurisdiction of the Court, flee to another
country, when the other party has any rights whatsoever
to that child.  That by seeking an order changing
custody, without the previous turnover of the passport,
that that was done intentionally.  It was done
intentionally to increase [Torabi's] ability and rights
over that child.  They're not rights -- ability to flee
the country, because there is no other reason to take
out of an order turning over the passport.
"* * * * *
"I'm also making a note that once
someone has committed a criminal act and fled
the country, and I believe there is no
question or dispute about that here, they've
left behind part of their attorney-client
privilege.  They've fled the country, they
have refused to respond, that they have
waived that privilege to attorney-client
relationship." (2)
	This mandamus proceeding followed.  The issues are
twofold: (1) whether the trial court erred as a matter of law
when it held that Torabi waived the attorney-client privilege
when he fled the jurisdiction; and (2) whether the trial court
erred in ordering in camera review of defendant's files to
determine whether material in those files contained evidence that
might establish the applicability of the crime-fraud exception to
the attorney-client privilege.  
	The attorney-client privilege is codified as Rule 503
of the Oregon Evidence Code.  It provides, in part:
		"(2) A client has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent any other person from
disclosing confidential communications made for the
purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional
legal services to the client:
		"(a) Between the client or the client's
representative and the client's lawyer or a
representative of the lawyer;
	"* * * * *
		"(3) The privilege created by this section may be
claimed by the client, a guardian or conservator of the
client, the personal representative of a deceased
client, or the successor, trustee, or similar
representative of a corporation, association, or other
organization, whether or not in existence. The person
who was the lawyer or the lawyer's representative at
the time of the communication is presumed to have
authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of
the client."
	Although the attorney-client privilege belongs
exclusively to the client, State ex rel OHSU v. Haas, 325 Or 492,
505, 942 P2d 261 (1997), the client's attorney may claim the
privilege on the client's behalf, OEC 503(3).  An attorney's
statutory authority to do so is consistent with an attorney's
ethical obligation to protect a client's confidences and secrets. 
See DR 4-101 (defining confidences as "information protected by
the attorney-client privilege").
	The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest and
most widely recognized evidentiary privileges.  See State v.
Jancsek, 302 Or 270, 274, 730 P2d 14 (1986) (so stating, citing
Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence, 146 (1982)); Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 US 383, 389, 101 S Ct 677, 66 L Ed 2d 584
(1981) (same, citing 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence, § 2290 (McNaughton
rev 1961)).  The purpose of the privilege "'is to encourage full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law
and administration of justice.'"  Haas, 325 Or at 500 (quoting
Upjohn, 449 US at 389).  However, the attorney-client privilege
is not absolute.  A client may waive it voluntarily, OEC 511;
Haas, 325 Or at 498, and OEC 503 creates exceptions to it.  One
such exception is relevant to this case:
"(4) There is no privilege under this section:
		"(a) If the services of the lawyer were sought or
obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to
commit what the client knew or reasonably should have
known to be a crime or fraud[.]"
OEC 503(4)(a).  A party seeking to invoke the crime-fraud
exception to the attorney-client privilege "must show that the
client, when consulting the attorney, knew or should have known
that the intended conduct was unlawful."  State ex rel N. Pacific
Lbr. v. Unis, 282 Or 457, 464, 579 P2d 1291 (1978).
	In this case, the parties do not dispute the existence
of the attorney-client privilege.  The first question is whether
Torabi waived that privilege by fleeing the jurisdiction.  OEC
511 provides that a client waives the attorney-client privilege
by voluntarily disclosing or consenting to the disclosure of "any
significant part of the matter or communication."  The trial
court did not hold that Torabi voluntarily waived the privilege. 
Rather, as noted, the trial court held that, "once someone has
committed a criminal act and fled the country, * * * they have
waived [the attorney-client privilege]."  Although plaintiff
concedes that there is no authority to support the trial court's
"waiver-by-flight" theory, she argues that such a ruling
nonetheless should be upheld in circumstances where someone flees
the jurisdiction with a child.
	 We find no support in the wording of OEC 511 or
elsewhere for the trial court's "waiver-by-flight" theory or the
notion that, as a matter of law, a custodial parent who flees the
jurisdiction with his or her own child waives the attorney-client
privilege.  The trial court erred in holding that Torabi waived
his attorney-client privilege by fleeing the jurisdiction.
	We turn to the question whether the trial court erred
in ordering defendant to turn over his files concerning his
representation of Torabi for in camera review to determine
whether the contents of those files support application of the
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege.  As a
preliminary matter, we address the appropriate legal standard for
a trial court to apply in determining whether it is appropriate
to order an in camera review of materials for which the attorney-client privilege has been asserted.  Although neither the
Evidence Code nor this court's prior cases addresses that issue,
the United States Supreme Court has addressed it.
	In United States v. Zolin, 491 US 554, 109 S Ct 2619,
105 L Ed 2d 469 (1989), the Court first noted that disclosure of
allegedly privileged materials to a trial court for the purpose
of having the court determine the merits of a claim of privilege
does not have the legal effect of terminating the privilege.  491
US at 568.  The Court also noted that in camera review is the
least intrusive means for determining whether the crime-fraud
exception applies.  Id. at 572.  The Court held that a "lesser
evidentiary showing is needed to trigger in camera review than is
required ultimately to overcome the [attorney-client] privilege." 
Id.  Under Zolin, before a trial court may engage in in camera
review at the request of the party opposing the attorney-client
privilege on the basis of the crime-fraud exception, that party
"must present evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief
that in camera review may yield evidence that establishes the
exception's applicability."  Id. at 574-75. 
	We conclude that Zolin provides an appropriate
framework for determining whether a trial court may order in
camera review of allegedly privileged materials to determine if
they fall within the crime-fraud exception, and we adopt that
approach as the correct means for determining the applicability
of the crime-fraud exception under OEC 503(4)(a). (3)  We turn to
the facts of this case to determine whether plaintiff produced
evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief that in camera
review might yield evidence that the crime-fraud exception
applies to defendant's files concerning his representation of
Torabi.
	As noted, plaintiff contends that Torabi retained
defendant in 1996 for the purpose of obtaining custody of his and
plaintiff's child so that he could flee the jurisdiction with the
child.  The record contains two pieces of evidence regarding
Torabi's intent.  First is the September 11, 1996, order changing
custody of the child from plaintiff to Torabi.  Unlike the
divorce judgment, which had required Torabi to give his passports
to plaintiff when he exercised his visitation rights with the
child, the change-of-custody order contained no requirement that
Torabi give his passports to plaintiff.  Plaintiff contends that
the only possible reason that Torabi would have retained
defendant to seek custody of the child without the passport
provision was to further Torabi's plan to flee with the child. 
The only other evidence that plaintiff presented to establish
that Torabi had retained defendant in furtherance of his plan was
plaintiff's "gut feeling" that Torabi was going to take the child
to Iran.
	We agree with defendant that, on this record, plaintiff
has not presented evidence to support a reasonable belief that an 
in camera review of defendant's files regarding his
representation of Torabi might yield evidence that supports
application of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege.  Plaintiff does not dispute that Torabi had grounds
for moving to change custody of the child after plaintiff had
left the jurisdiction, thereby preventing Torabi from exercising
his right to visitation.  Nothing in the fact that Torabi
exercised his right to move for a change of custody, or that the
ensuing order did not contain the passport requirement, suggests
that Torabi retained defendant's services to assist him in
fleeing with the child almost two years later.  Plaintiff's "gut
feeling" that Torabi had intended to flee the country with the
child is not evidence that would help to establish a reasonable
belief regarding Torabi's intent when he retained defendant to
represent him.  Neither does that "gut feeling" support a
reasonable belief that anything in defendant's files regarding
his representation of Torabi might establish that the crime-fraud
exception applies.  
	On this record, we conclude that plaintiff failed to
produce sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that
in camera review might yield evidence that the crime-fraud
exception applies to defendant's files concerning his
representation of Torabi.  Accordingly, the trial court erred in
ordering defendant to turn over those files for in camera
review. (4)
	A peremptory writ shall issue directing the trial court
to vacate its order compelling in camera review of defendant's
files regarding his representation of Torabi.
	Peremptory writ to issue.

1. 	The relevant parts of OEC 503 are quoted later in this
opinion.

2. 	The trial court did not rule on plaintiff's argument
that Torabi had waived the attorney-client privilege when he left
behind the three letters that plaintiff's parents had acquired
when they took possession of Torabi's house.

3. 	We note that, if the party asserting the privilege
under OEC 503 believes that the party opposing the privilege has
not presented evidence that is sufficient to support a reasonable
belief that in camera review might yield evidence that
establishes the applicability of the crime-fraud exception, then
the party asserting the privilege may challenge the trial court's
order to inspect the materials by seeking relief in mandamus, as
defendant has done in this case.  However, having opposed
plaintiff's motion for in camera review, defendant was not
required to seek relief in mandamus at that time to avoid waiving
the right to do so.  The party asserting the attorney-client
privilege, who properly has opposed a motion for in camera
review, in a proceeding brought after in camera review, may seek
a writ of mandamus on either or both of the following grounds: 
(1) that the trial court erred in holding that there was
sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that in camera
review might yield evidence that establishes the applicability of
the crime-fraud exception; or (2) that, after reviewing the
allegedly privileged materials in camera, the trial court erred
in holding that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that
the crime-fraud exception applies to some of or all the
materials. 

4. 	In light of our holding, we need not address
defendant's argument that his files also are protected as work
product.