Title: McAdams v. Marquette University
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2017AP001240
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 2018

2018 WI 88 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP1240 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
John McAdams, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Marquette University, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 6, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 19, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
David A. Hansher 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
R.G. BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
KELLY, J., concurs, joined by R.G. BRADLEY, J. 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J., dissents, joined by 
ABRAHAMSON, J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ZIEGLER, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there were briefs (in the 
court of appeals) by Richard M. Esenberg, Brian McGrath, Clyde 
Taylor, Thomas C. Kamenick, and Wisconsin Institute for Law & 
Liberty, Milwaukee.  There was an oral argument by Richard M. 
Esenberg. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief (in the 
court of appeals) by Stephen T. Trigg, Ralph A. Weber, and Gass 
Weber Mullins LLC, Milwaukee.  There was an oral argument by 
Ralph A. Weber. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Law and 
University Professors and Academics by Bernardo Cueto and Great 
Lakes Justice Center, La Crosse, with whom on the brief were 
Erin Elizabeth Mersino and Great Lakes Justice Center, Lansing, 
Michigan. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Association 
of Jesuit Colleges and Universities by Thomas L. Shriner, Jr., 
Aaron R. Wegrzyn, and Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwaukee. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the State of 
Wisconsin by Ryan J. Walsh, chief deputy solicitor general, with 
whom on the brief were Brad D. Schimel, attorney general, and 
Amy C. Miller, assistant solicitor general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of American 
Association of University Professors by Frederick Perillo and 
The Previant Law Firm, S.C., Milwaukee, with whom on the brief 
were Risa L. Lieberwitz and American Association of University 
Professors, and Aaron M. Nisenson, Nancy A. Long, and American 
Association of University Professors, Washington, D.C. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Metropolitan 
Milwaukee Association of Commerce by Michael B. Apfeld and 
Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Milwaukee. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Thomas More 
Society by Andrew Bath, Esq. and Thomas More Society, Chicago, 
Illinois. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of The National 
Association of Scholars, Edward J. Erler, Duke Pesta, and Mark 
Zunac by James R. Troupis and Troupis Law Office, Cross Plains, 
 
 
3 
with whom on the brief was Kenneth Chesebro, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Association of Independent Colleges and Universities by Andrew 
A. Hitt, Michelle L. Dama, and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, 
Madison. 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of National 
Association of Manufacturers by Bryan J. Cahill, Michael B. 
Apfeld, and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Milwaukee. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of University 
Academic Senate of Marquette University by Amy L. MacArdy and 
Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren S.C., Milwaukee. 
 
 
 
2018 WI 88
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP1240 
(L.C. No. 
2016CV3396) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John McAdams, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Marquette University, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court 
for Milwaukee County, David A. Hansher, Judge.  Reversed and 
remanded. 
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   Marquette University suspended a 
tenured faculty member because of a blog post criticizing an 
encounter between an instructor and a student.  Dr. John McAdams 
took exception to his suspension, and brought a claim against 
the University for breach of contract.  He asserts that the 
contract guarantees to him the right to be free of disciplinary 
repercussions for engaging in activity protected by either the 
doctrine of academic freedom or the United States Constitution.  
The University denies Dr. McAdams' right to litigate his breach 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
2 
of contract claim in our courts.  Instead, it says, we must 
defer to its procedure for suspending and dismissing tenured 
faculty members.  It claims we may not question its decision so 
long as it did not abuse its discretion, infringe any 
constitutional rights, act in bad faith, or engage in fraud. 
¶2 
The University is mistaken.  We may question, and we 
do not defer.  The University's internal dispute resolution 
process is not a substitute for Dr. McAdams' right to sue in our 
courts.  The University's internal process may serve it well as 
an informal means of resolving disputes, but as a replacement 
for litigation in our courts, it is structurally flawed. 
¶3 
The undisputed facts show that the University breached 
its contract with Dr. McAdams when it suspended him for engaging 
in activity protected by the contract's guarantee of academic 
freedom.  Therefore, we reverse the circuit court and remand 
this cause with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Dr. 
McAdams, conduct further proceedings to determine damages (which 
shall include back pay), and order the University to immediately 
reinstate 
Dr. 
McAdams 
with 
unimpaired 
rank, 
tenure, 
compensation, and benefits, as required by § 307.09 of the 
University's Statutes on Faculty Appointment, Promotion and 
Tenure (the "Faculty Statutes").1 
                                                 
1 This case is before us on bypass of the court of appeals 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.60 (2015-16).  We are 
reviewing an order of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, the 
Honorable David A. Hansher presiding, that denied Dr. McAdams' 
motion for summary judgment and granted the University's cross-
motion for summary judgment. 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
3 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Dr. McAdams' Contract with the University 
¶4 
Dr. McAdams has been a professor of political science 
at Marquette University since 1977; he received tenure in 1989.  
His most recent contract is evidenced by an appointment letter 
dated March 1, 2014.  It incorporates, and is therefore subject 
to, the University's Faculty Statutes, the Faculty Handbook, and 
the other documents identified in the agreement: 
This 
appointment/contract 
is 
subject 
to 
the 
University's 
statutes 
on 
Faculty 
Appointment, 
Promotion and Tenure [the Faculty Statutes].  As a 
Marquette faculty member, you agree to comply with 
applicable Marquette academic and business policies, 
including 
those 
found 
in 
the 
Faculty 
Handbook, 
University Policies and Procedures (UPP) and the 
Marquette University Intellectual Property Policy.[2] 
When we refer to the "Contract" in this opinion, we mean the 
appointment letter of March 1, 2014, along with all the 
authorities it incorporates. 
¶5 
"Tenure" at the University means: 
[A] faculty status that fosters an environment of free 
inquiry without regard for the need to be considered 
for reappointment.  Tenure is reserved for Regular 
Faculty who are recognized by the University as having 
the capacity to make unique, significant, and long-
term future contributions to the educational mission 
of the University.  Tenure is not a reward for 
services performed; it is a contract and property 
right granted in accordance with this Chapter[.] 
                                                 
2 The Faculty Statutes and the Faculty Handbook constitute 
the equivalent of contract provisions.  See Little Chute Area 
Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council, 2017 WI App 11, ¶31, 373 
Wis. 2d 668, 
892 
N.W.2d 312 
("The 
parties 
may 
agree 
to 
incorporate another document by reference, . . . ."). 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
4 
Faculty Statute § 304.02.  Tenured faculty are entitled to 
yearly reappointment: 
Excepting cases of intervening termination for 
cause and cases of leave of absence or retirement as 
provided below, every tenured member of the Regular 
Faculty will be tendered notification of compensation, 
and every non-tenured member of the Regular Faculty 
not otherwise notified as provided in Section 304.07, 
will be tendered an annual reappointment, at a rank 
and compensation not less favorable than those which 
the faculty member then enjoys, . . . . 
Faculty Statute § 304.09; see also § 304.07 ("Unless tenured, no 
faculty member is entitled to reappointment."). 
¶6 
The 
Faculty 
Statutes 
forbid 
the 
suspension 
or 
dismissal of a faculty member without cause:  "The cognizant 
appointing authority of the University may initiate and execute 
procedures by which a faculty member's reappointment may be 
denied or revoked, or any current appointment may be suspended 
or terminated, for cause as defined therein."  Faculty Statute 
§ 306.01. 
B.  The Incident 
¶7 
On November 9, 2014, Dr. McAdams published a post on 
his personal blog, the Marquette Warrior, in which he criticized 
a philosophy instructor, Cheryl Abbate, for her interchange with 
a student attending her Theory of Ethics class.3  Dr. McAdams' 
                                                 
3 Before he published the post, Dr. McAdams contacted 
Instructor Abbate for comment.  She refused.  In emailed 
conversations with others, she explained that she believed he 
contacted her "so it would look like he 'got both sides.'"  She 
said she believed Dr. McAdams is a "flaming bigot, sexist, and 
homophobic idiot," who "wants to insert his ugly face into my 
class business to try to scare me into silence." 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
5 
blog post said that, after Instructor Abbate listed a number of 
issues on the board, including "gay rights," she "airily said 
that 'everybody agrees on this, and there is no need to discuss 
it.'"  One of the students approached Instructor Abbate after 
class and said that the issue of gay rights should have been 
open for discussion.  The blog post says Instructor Abbate 
replied that "some opinions are not appropriate, such as racist 
opinions, sexist opinions," that "you don't have a right in this 
class to make homophobic comments," that she would "take 
offense" if a student opposed women serving in certain roles, 
that a homosexual individual would take similar offense if a 
student opposed gay marriage, and that "[i]n this class, 
homophobic comments, racist comments, will not be tolerated."  
The blog post says Instructor Abbate "then invited the student 
to drop the class."  Dr. McAdams commented that Instructor 
Abbate employed "a tactic typical among liberals now," namely 
that "[o]pinions with which they disagree are not merely wrong, 
and are not to be argued against on their merits, but are deemed 
'offensive' and need to be shut up."  Dr. McAdams then quoted 
Charles Krauthammer for the proposition that "[t]he proper word 
for that attitude is totalitarian."  Finally, the blog post 
contained a clickable link to Instructor Abbate's contact 
information and to her own, publicly-available website.4 
¶8 
Two days later, after having received an email 
criticizing her conduct in this incident, Instructor Abbate 
                                                 
4 The entire text of the blog post appears in the attached 
exhibit. 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
6 
filed 
a 
formal 
complaint 
against 
Dr. 
McAdams 
with 
the 
University.  The incident came to national attention after other 
media outlets picked up the story from Dr. McAdams' blog post.  
Instructor Abbate subsequently received some strongly-worded and 
offensive communications (emails, blog comments, and letters) 
from third parties, including some that expressed violent 
thoughts.  Almost all of the feedback occurred after the story 
spread beyond Dr. McAdams' blog post. 
¶9 
By letter dated December 16, 2014, Dean Richard Holz 
suspended Dr. McAdams (with pay), but identified no reason for 
doing so.  Dean Holz's follow-up letter of January 30, 2015, 
identified 
the 
blog 
post 
of 
November 
9, 
2014, 
as 
the 
justification for the suspension.  It also stated the post 
violated Faculty Statute § 306.03, and that, therefore, the 
University intended to revoke his tenure and terminate his 
employment because his "conduct clearly and substantially fails 
to meet the standards of personal and professional excellence 
that generally characterizes University faculties." 
¶10 The process for suspending or dismissing a tenured 
faculty member appears in chapters 306 and 307 of the Faculty 
Statutes (the "Discipline Procedure").  On August 14, 2015, the 
University notified Dr. McAdams that, pursuant to the Discipline 
Procedure's requirements, the Faculty Hearing Committee (the 
"FHC") would convene to consider his case.  The FHC is an 
advisory body whose membership consists solely of University 
faculty members.  The FHC described its charge in this case as 
follows: 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
7 
Under both the Faculty Statutes and the Statutes 
for the University Academic Senate, the FHC acts as an 
advisory body in contested cases of appointment non-
renewal, or for suspension or termination of tenured 
faculty for absolute or discretionary cause.  Its 
advice is presented to the President.  The specific 
charge of the Committee in such cases is to convene a 
hearing "to determine the existence of cause" as 
defined in Sections 306.02 and .03 of the Faculty 
Statutes, 
"and 
to 
make 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions."  Those conclusions may, if the Committee 
finds it is warranted by the evidence, contain a 
recommendation "that an academic penalty less than 
dismissal" be imposed. 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
¶11 One of the FHC's members, Dr. Lynn Turner, publicly 
expressed her opinion of Dr. McAdams, his blog post, and 
Instructor Abbate, prior to her appointment.  She, along with 
several of her colleagues, signed an open letter published in 
the Marquette Tribune.  The letter says, in relevant part: 
The following department chairs in the Klingler 
College 
of 
Arts 
& 
Sciences 
deplore 
the 
recent 
treatment of a philosophy graduate student instructor 
by political science professor John McAdams on his 
Marquette Warrior blog.  We support Ms. Abbate and 
deeply regret that she has experienced harassment and 
intimidation as a direct result of McAdams's actions.  
McAdams's actions——which have been reported in local 
and national media outlets——have harmed the personal 
reputation of a young scholar as well as the academic 
reputation 
of 
Marquette 
University. 
 
They 
have 
negatively affected campus climate, especially as it 
relates to gender and sexual orientation.  And they 
have led members of the Marquette community to alter 
their behavior out of fear of becoming the subject of 
one of his attacks. 
Perhaps worst of all, McAdams has betrayed his 
role as a faculty member by pitting one set of 
students against another, by claiming the protection 
of academic freedom while trying to deny it to others, 
and by exploiting current political issues to promote 
his personal agenda.  This is clearly in violation 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
8 
of . . . the Academic Freedom section of Marquette's 
Faculty Handbook[.] 
. . . . 
McAdams . . . has failed to meet the standards we 
aspire to as faculty, as well as the broader ethical 
principles that guide Marquette's mission as a Jesuit, 
Catholic institution. 
¶12 Dr. McAdams requested that Dr. Turner recuse herself 
from the FHC's work because the letter created the appearance of 
bias against him.  The FHC unanimously rejected the request, 
stating that the letter evidenced no disqualifying bias because, 
inter alia, her comments did not bear on the issues the 
committee would decide.  In any event, the FHC said, this cannot 
be a disqualifying factor because "every single one of the 
committee members present at our last meeting admit to having 
formed a prior positive or negative opinion of the propriety of 
Dr. McAdams's Nov. 9, 2014 blog post."  The FHC said it would be 
unable to do its work if its membership were limited to those 
who had not already formed an opinion about the subject matter 
of Dr. McAdams' case. 
¶13 Over the course of four days, the FHC received 
documentary and testimonial evidence from the University and Dr. 
McAdams.  After completing its work, the FHC forwarded its 
report, titled "In the Matter of the Contested Dismissal of Dr. 
John C. McAdams" and dated January 18, 2016 (the "Report"), to 
the 
University's 
President, 
Michael 
Lovell. 
 
The 
Report 
concludes as follows: 
The Committee [the FHC] therefore concludes that 
discretionary 
cause 
under 
FS 
[Faculty 
Statute] 
§ 306.03 has been established, but only to the degree 
necessary to support a penalty of suspension.  The 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
9 
Committee 
concludes 
that 
the 
University 
has 
established neither a sufficiently egregious failure 
to meet professional standards nor a sufficiently 
grave lack of fitness to justify the sanction of 
dismissal.  Instead, the Committee concludes that only 
a lesser penalty than dismissal is warranted.  The 
Committee 
thus 
recommends 
that 
Dr. 
McAdams 
be 
suspended, without pay but with benefits, for a period 
of no less than one but no more than two semesters. 
In keeping with its role as an advisory body, the Report made 
only a recommendation to President Lovell:  "For the reasons 
stated above, the Committee recommends that the University 
suspend Dr. McAdams, without pay but with benefits, for a period 
of one to two semesters." 
¶14 By letter of March 24, 2016 (the "Discipline Letter"), 
President Lovell informed Dr. McAdams that, after "carefully 
reviewing [the FHC's] report along with the transcriptions of 
your formal hearing last September," he had "decided to accept 
your fellow faculty members' recommendation to suspend you 
without pay."  The suspension became effective April 1, 2016, 
and was to continue until the end of the fall 2016 semester.  
President Lovell——on his own initiative——added an additional 
term to the FHC's recommended sanction.  He informed Dr. McAdams 
that his resumption of duties (and pay) would be "conditioned 
upon you delivering a written statement to the President's 
Office by April 4, 2016," which would be shared with Instructor 
Abbate, and which must contain the following: 
•  Your 
acknowledgement 
and 
acceptance 
of 
the 
unanimous judgment of the peers who served on the 
Faculty Hearing Committee. 
•  Your affirmation and commitment that your future 
actions and behavior will adhere to the standards 
of higher education as defined in the Marquette 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
10 
University Faculty Handbook, Mission Statement and 
Guiding Values. 
•  Your acknowledgement that your November 9, 2014, 
blog post was reckless and incompatible with the 
mission and values of Marquette University and you 
express deep regret for the harm suffered by our 
former graduate student and instructor, Ms. Abbate. 
Dr. McAdams refused to write the required letter. 
II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶15 On May 2, 2016, Dr. McAdams filed a complaint against 
the University in the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, asserting 
(inter alia) that the University breached his Contract by 
suspending and then dismissing him.5  He demanded damages, an 
injunction requiring reinstatement as a tenured member of the 
Marquette faculty, and costs and attorneys' fees.  Both parties 
                                                 
5 Dr. McAdams' complaint contained six counts, which (in 
summary form) claimed the following: 
(1) The University breached the Contract when it 
suspended him without cause on December 16, 2014; 
(2) The University breached the Contract when it 
suspended him without cause and without pay on April 
1, 2016; 
(3) The University breached the Contract when it 
failed to tender reappointment contracts for the 2015-
16 and 2016-17 academic years; 
(4) The 
University 
breached 
the 
Contract 
by 
conditioning his reinstatement to the faculty on 
submission of a letter accepting the FHC's judgment 
and expressing regret for his actions; 
(5) The University breached his due process rights as 
guaranteed by the Contract; and 
(6) The University breached the Contract's implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
11 
eventually moved for summary judgment.  On May 4, 2017, the 
circuit court issued a decision and order granting summary 
judgment in favor of the University and dismissing Dr. McAdams' 
complaint with prejudice.6 
¶16 The circuit court concluded it must defer to the 
University's resolution of Dr. McAdams' claims:  "[T]he Court 
finds the following:  (1) The FHC Report deserves deference; 
(2) The [suspension] letter from President Lovell deserves 
deference; . . . ."  McAdams v. Marquette Univ., No. 2016CV3396, 
Order for Summary Judgment, 7 (Cir. Ct. for Milwaukee Cty. May 
4, 2017).  It said it must defer because "public policy compels 
a constraint on the judiciary with respect to Marquette's 
academic decision-making and governance," out of a recognition 
that "[p]rofessionalism and fitness in the context of a 
university professor are difficult if not impossible issues for 
a jury to assess."  Id. at 11. 
¶17 The circuit court also concluded that the University's 
internal 
dispute 
resolution 
process 
afforded 
Dr. 
McAdams 
sufficient 
"due 
process": 
 
"[T]he 
Court 
finds 
the 
following:  . . . (3) Dr. McAdams was afforded due process that 
he was entitled to during the FHC hearing; . . . ."  Id. at 7.  
It explained that "Dr. McAdams expressly agreed as a condition 
of his employment to abide by the disciplinary procedure set 
forth in the Faculty Statutes," procedures that the court said 
                                                 
6 The Honorable David A. Hansher presided at the summary 
judgment hearing, authored the summary judgment decision and 
order, and issued the judgment. 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
12 
afforded "Dr. McAdams . . . a detailed, quasi-judicial process 
which gave him an adequate opportunity to meaningfully voice his 
concerns."  Id. at 11. 
¶18 We accepted Dr. McAdams' petition to bypass the court 
of appeals and now reverse the circuit court's judgment. 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
13 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶19 We review the disposition of a motion for summary 
judgment de novo, applying the same methodology the circuit 
courts apply.  Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 
315, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987); see also Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc. 
v. 
Jackson 
Cty., 
2010 
WI 95, 
¶11, 
328 
Wis. 2d 613, 
785 
N.W.2d 615 ("We review the grant of a motion for summary 
judgment de novo, . . . .").  First, we "examine the pleadings 
to determine whether a claim for relief has been stated."  Green 
Spring Farms, 136 Wis. 2d at 315.  Then, "[i]f a claim for 
relief has been stated, the inquiry . . . shifts to whether any 
factual issues exist."  Id.  Summary judgment is appropriate 
only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (2015-16)7; see also Columbia 
Propane, L.P. v. Wis. Gas Co., 2003 WI 38, ¶11, 261 Wis. 2d 70, 
661 N.W.2d 776 (citing § 802.08(2) (2001-02)). 
¶20 The 
only 
dispute 
before 
us 
is 
the 
proper 
interpretation of a contract.  This presents a question of law, 
which we review de novo.  Deminsky v. Arlington Plastics Mach., 
2003 
WI 15, 
¶15, 
259 
Wis. 2d 587, 
657 
N.W.2d 411 
("Interpretation of a contract is a question of law which this 
court reviews de novo."). 
                                                 
7 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
14 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
¶21 Before we reach the merits of Dr. McAdams' complaint, 
we must explain why we do not defer, as the circuit court did, 
to 
the 
results 
of 
the 
University's 
internal 
Discipline 
Procedure.  We will then address Dr. McAdams' claim that the 
University breached his Contract. 
A.  Deference to the University 
¶22 The 
circuit 
court 
deferred 
to 
the 
University's 
conclusion that it had not breached the Contract for three 
reasons.  First, it said Dr. McAdams agreed to be bound by the 
University's Discipline Procedure.  McAdams, No. 2016CV3396, 
Order for Summary Judgment, 11.  Second, it analogized the 
Discipline Procedure to an arbitration and concluded that it 
must afford the results of the University's process the same 
deference we give to arbitration awards.  See id. at 13-14.  And 
third, it said it should defer to the University for the same 
reasons we have historically given either "great weight" or "due 
weight" deference to administrative agency decisions.8  See id. 
at 11-13.  For the reasons we discuss below, we will not defer 
to the University on any of these bases.  And neither the 
circuit court nor the University has offered any other ground 
upon which we could conclude that Dr. McAdams' right to litigate 
his contract claim in our courts is either foreclosed or 
limited. 
                                                 
8 See Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 659–60, 
539 N.W.2d 98 (1995), overruled by Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 
2018 WI 75, ¶¶82-84, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
15 
¶23 We begin with the proposition that "litigants must be 
given their day in court.  Access to the courts is an essential 
ingredient of the constitutional guarantee of due process."  
Piper v. Popp, 167 Wis. 2d 633, 644, 482 N.W.2d 353 (1992); see 
also 
Armstrong 
v. 
Manzo, 
380 
U.S. 545, 
552 
(1965) 
("A 
fundamental requirement of due process is 'the opportunity to be 
heard.'  It is an opportunity which must be granted at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."  (citation 
omitted)); see also State ex rel. Universal Processing Servs. of 
Wis., LLC v. Circuit Court of Milwaukee Cty., 2017 WI 26, ¶5, 
374 Wis. 2d 26, 892 N.W.2d 267 ("The Wisconsin Constitution 
requires the state to provide a judicial system for the 
resolution of disputes.  Access to state courts for conflict 
resolution is thus implicit in the state constitution."); 
Penterman v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 211 Wis. 2d 458, 474, 565 
N.W.2d 521 (1997) ("The right of access to the courts is secured 
by the First and Fourteenth Amendment[s].  It entitles the 
individual to a fair opportunity to present his or her claim.  
Such a right exists where the claim has a 'reasonable basis in 
fact or law.'  Judicial access must be 'adequate, effective, and 
meaningful.'" (footnote and citations omitted) (quoted sources 
omitted)). 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
16 
¶24 The scope of judicial review is, however, subject to 
statutory and judicially-developed limitations.9  And, of course, 
parties may choose to have their disputes resolved through 
extra-judicial means, thereby confining the judiciary's review 
to a very limited role.10  We conclude that none of these 
substitutionary or limiting principles apply to Dr. McAdams' 
contract dispute with the University.11 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 227.57 (describing scope of 
judicial review afforded to administrative agency decisions); 
Ottman v. Town of Primrose, 2011 WI 18, ¶35, 332 Wis. 2d 3, 796 
N.W.2d 411 (describing the court's common-law certiorari review 
as limited to:  "(1) whether the municipality [or administrative 
agency or inferior tribunal] kept within its jurisdiction; 
(2) whether it proceeded on a correct theory of law; (3) whether 
its action was arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable and 
represented its will and not its judgment; and (4) whether the 
evidence was such that it might reasonably make the order or 
determination in question"). 
10 See, 
e.g., 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 788.10(1)(a)-(d) 
(limiting 
judicial 
review 
of 
arbitration 
awards 
to 
circumstances 
"(a) [w]here the award was procured by corruption, fraud or 
undue means; (b) [w]here there was evident partiality or 
corruption on the part of the arbitrators, or either of them; 
(c) [w]here the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in 
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, 
or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the 
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of 
any party have been prejudiced; [or] (d) [w]here the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a 
mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter 
submitted was not made"); Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10, Jefferson v. 
Jefferson Educ. Ass'n, 78 Wis. 2d 94, 116, 253 N.W.2d 536 (1977) 
("Under common law rulings, an award may be set aside for fraud 
or partiality or gross mistake by the arbitrator; fraud or 
misconduct by the parties affecting the result; or want of 
jurisdiction in the arbitrator."). 
11 Neither the University nor the circuit court identified 
any statutory limitations on the scope of judicial review 
available in this case, and so we do not address any here. 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
17 
1.  Contractual Limitations on Judicial Review 
¶25 The most obvious reason we will not defer to the 
University is simply that the parties never agreed that its 
internal Discipline Procedure would either replace or limit the 
adjudication of their contract dispute in our courts.  They 
certainly could have agreed to an extra-judicial resolution of 
their contract dispute.  This is a common feature in society 
today and is accomplished most often through an arbitration 
agreement.  "[A]rbitration is a matter of contract[,] and a 
party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute 
which he has not agreed to submit."  Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10, 
Jefferson v. Jefferson Educ. Ass'n, 78 Wis. 2d 94, 101, 253 
N.W.2d 536 (1977) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting 
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 
U.S. 574, 582 (1960)); see also Dane Cty. v. Dane Cty. Union 
Local 
65, 
AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, 
210 
Wis. 2d 267, 
278–79, 
565 
N.W.2d 540 (Ct. App. 1997) (Arbitration "is an informal process, 
where the parties have bargained to have a decision maker who is 
not restricted by the formalistic rules that govern courtroom 
proceedings.").  It is true, as the University argues, that Dr. 
McAdams agreed he would submit to the University's Discipline 
Procedure when he accepted the Contract.  But the Discipline 
Procedure does not describe an arbitration-style agreement. 
¶26 Our exhaustive review of the Faculty Statutes reveals 
no indication that the University and Dr. McAdams agreed the 
Discipline Procedure would supplant the courts or limit their 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
18 
review of a contractual dispute.12  Two of the Faculty Statutes 
acknowledge Dr. McAdams' right to seek judicial adjudication of 
his claims.  The first describes the right negatively by 
demarcating a period of time in which the parties agree not to 
litigate: 
So long as the periodic compensation and benefits 
provided by the faculty member's appointment are both 
continued, 
and 
during 
such 
further 
periods 
of 
negotiation, mediation, hearing, or review as the 
parties may mutually stipulate, both parties shall 
diligently continue in good faith to attempt a 
mutually-acceptable resolution of the issues between 
them by one or more of the procedures described in the 
three preceding sections, and neither shall, during 
such period, resort to or encourage litigation, 
demonstration, or tactics of duress, embarrassment, or 
censure 
against 
the 
other; 
provided 
that 
this 
paragraph shall not be construed so as to require the 
University to continue the faculty member's duty 
assignment during such period. 
Faculty Statute § 307.08 (emphasis added).  That period had 
elapsed by the time Dr. McAdams filed his suit because his pay 
had been terminated and the Discipline Procedure had concluded.  
                                                 
12 As an integrated part of the Contract, we interpret the 
Faculty Statutes as we would any other contract provision.  
Seitzinger v. Cmty. Health Network, 2004 WI 28, ¶22, 270 
Wis. 2d 1, 676 N.W.2d 426 ("The primary goal in contract 
interpretation is to give effect to the parties' intentions.  We 
ascertain the parties' intentions by looking to the language of 
the contract itself." (citation omitted)); see also Tufail v. 
Midwest Hosp., LLC, 2013 WI 62, ¶28, 348 Wis. 2d 631, 833 
N.W.2d 586 (stating that courts construe contract language 
"according to its plain or ordinary meaning, . . . consistent 
with 'what a reasonable person would understand the words to 
mean under the circumstances'" (internal citation omitted) 
(quoted source omitted)). 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
19 
So this provision recognizes Dr. McAdams' right to bring his 
claim to court. 
¶27 The 
Faculty 
Statutes 
also 
contain 
an 
explicit, 
positively-stated recognition of Dr. McAdams' right to litigate: 
To 
the 
extent 
that 
none 
of 
the 
foregoing 
procedures produces a resolution of the issues arising 
out of a timely objection to a faculty member's non-
renewal, suspension, or termination, at or prior to 
the time specified in the preceding paragraph, the 
University 
shall, 
for 
a 
period 
of 
six 
months 
thereafter, or until the final determination of any 
judicial action which may be commenced within such 
period to test the validity of the non-renewal, 
suspension, or termination, hold itself ready to 
reinstate the faculty member, with unimpaired rank, 
tenure, compensation, and benefits, to the extent that 
the faculty member's entitlement thereto may be 
judicially adjudged or decreed, or conceded by the 
University in such interval. 
Faculty Statute § 307.09 (emphasis added).  This provision 
unambiguously recognizes that the University's suspension and 
dismissal decisions are subject to litigation in our courts.  It 
was with good reason that the University conceded, during oral 
arguments, that it had no express agreement with Dr. McAdams 
that the Discipline Procedure would preclude his right to 
litigate his cause here. 
¶28 The University and Dr. McAdams could have agreed that 
the court would defer to the Report and Discipline Letter in the 
same way we defer to arbitration decisions.  They could have 
done that, but they did not.  They did the opposite:  The 
University agreed it would defer to the court's adjudication of 
Dr. McAdams' right to reinstatement. 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
20 
¶29 The Faculty Statutes' description of our role does not 
resemble the method by which we review arbitration awards.  When 
we review a party's challenge to such a decision, we focus on 
the process that produced the award:  "[T]he court will not 
overturn the arbitrator's decision for mere errors of law or 
fact, but only when 'perverse misconstruction or positive 
misconduct [is] plainly established, or if there is a manifest 
disregard of the law, or if the award itself is illegal or 
violates strong public policy.'"  City of Madison v. Madison 
Prof'l Police Officers Ass'n, 144 Wis. 2d 576, 586, 425 N.W.2d 8 
(1988) (alteration in original) (quoted source omitted).  We 
will confirm arbitration awards even when they are incorrect:  
"Because arbitration is what the parties have contracted for, 
the parties get the arbitrator's award, whether that award is 
correct or incorrect as a matter of fact or of law."  Id. 
¶30 The Faculty Statutes do not contemplate this type of 
review.  They actually anticipate that the court will reach the 
merits of Dr. McAdams' claim.  The purpose of the "judicial 
action" identified in Faculty Statute § 307.09 is to "test the 
validity" of the suspension.  It is not to test the process that 
led to the suspension; it is instead to determine whether there 
was a legitimate basis for it.  This is a question of merit, not 
procedure. 
¶31 The University makes this understanding even more 
explicit by pledging to "hold itself ready to reinstate" the 
faculty member "to the extent that the faculty member's 
entitlement thereto may be judicially adjudged or decreed."  
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
21 
Faculty Statute § 307.09.  This is not evocative of an 
arbitration-style review, which would exhaust itself upon 
declaring the decision is either defective or sound.  A 
declaration that a faculty member is entitled to reinstatement 
is a substantive evaluation of the underlying dispute's merits.  
Thus, the Faculty Statutes acknowledge that the court will 
conduct an unabridged inquiry into the parties' compliance with 
their contractual obligations, not an arbitration-style review. 
¶32 Therefore, the circuit court erred when it concluded 
it must defer to the University because "Dr. McAdams expressly 
agreed as a condition of his employment to abide by the 
disciplinary procedure set forth in the Faculty Statutes, 
incorporated by reference into his contract."  See McAdams, No. 
2016CV3396, Order for Summary Judgment, 11.  The circuit court's 
analysis ended prematurely because it failed to even mention the 
Faculty Statutes that describe the relationship between the 
University's Discipline Procedure and Dr. McAdams' right to 
bring the dispute to court. 
¶33 We conclude that the Contract's plain meaning is that 
the parties did not agree that the Discipline Procedure would 
substitute for, or limit, Dr. McAdams' right to litigate in our 
courts.  This cannot end our analysis, however, because the 
circuit court deferred to the University on the additional 
ground that the Discipline Procedure is analogous to an arbitral 
proceeding.  It concluded that the Report and Discipline Letter 
are entitled to the same deference we afford to arbitration 
awards, see id. at 13-14, even if there was no agreement that 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
22 
the Discipline Procedure would authoritatively resolve their 
dispute. 
2.  The Discipline Procedure's Fundamental Procedural Flaws 
¶34 The Report and Discipline Letter are not entitled to 
deference as something comparable to an arbitration award.  The 
Discipline Procedure is an intricate, thorough, and extensive 
process.  Indeed, at least superficially, it closely resembles a 
judicial proceeding.  In light of the 123-page Report the FHC 
produced, the process obviously consumed a great deal of several 
faculty members' attention and valuable time.  But all of this 
cannot make up for the unacceptable bias with which the FHC was 
infected, or the FHC's lack of authority to bind the parties to 
its decision.  Although these shortcomings are enough to 
convince us that we must not defer to the Discipline Procedure's 
results, there is an even greater shortcoming at the heart of 
the process:  The Discipline Procedure has nothing to say about 
how the actual decision-maker is to decide the case.  The 
Faculty Statutes recognize that, at Marquette University, the 
authority to suspend or dismiss tenured faculty members rests 
exclusively with the president, and that his exercise of 
discretion 
is 
subject 
to 
no 
procedural 
requirements 
or 
limitations.  There is no process here to which we can defer.  
We will address each of these defects in turn. 
* 
¶35 The FHC, to which the Faculty Statutes commit the 
responsibility for conducting the Discipline Procedure, was not 
an impartial tribunal.  But it is the only entity authorized by 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
23 
the Discipline Procedure to hear testimony from the contesting 
parties.  "[T]he Faculty Hearing Committee (hereinafter the FHC) 
serves as the advisory body in cases of contested appointment 
non-renewal, 
and 
suspension 
or 
termination 
(hereinafter 
dismissal) 
of 
a 
tenured 
faculty 
member 
for 
absolute 
or 
discretionary cause."  Faculty Statute § 307.07(1).  The FHC is 
"composed of seven tenured faculty members elected by the 
faculty as a whole under the supervision of the Committee on 
Committees and Elections."  § 307.07(6). 
¶36 The FHC holds hearings at which the faculty member may 
participate with assistance of counsel.  Faculty Statute 
§ 307.07(11), (14).  It is the University's responsibility, 
through its designee, to present the case against the faculty 
member.  § 307.07(13) ("The University Administration must 
appear at the hearing by a designated representative, and it 
must make the initial showing.").  The FHC may receive both 
documentary and testimonial evidence.  § 307.07(10), (15).  The 
University bears the burden of making its case with "clear and 
convincing evidence in the record considered as a whole."  
§ 307.07(13). 
¶37 Once the FHC has received the parties' evidence and 
conducted its deliberations, it issues "findings of fact and 
conclusions."  Faculty Statute § 307.07(18).  If it decides 
dismissal 
is 
not 
warranted, 
"its 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions will set forth a recommendation to that effect 
together with supporting reasons."  See id.  Finally, the FHC 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
24 
conveys its findings of fact and conclusions to the University 
president and to the affected faculty member.  § 307.07(19). 
¶38 The Faculty Statutes describe a procedure and tribunal 
that, on their face, are characteristic of an arbitral system.  
Confidence in an arbitration's outcome, however, is predicated 
on confidence in the arbitrator.  That is why we presume parties 
intend their arbitrators to be impartial.  See Borst v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 2006 WI 70, ¶3, 291 Wis. 2d 361, 717 N.W.2d 42 ("We 
adopt a presumption of impartiality among all arbitrators, 
whether named by the parties or not."); Nicolet High Sch. Dist. 
v. Nicolet Educ. Ass'n, 118 Wis. 2d 707, 712-13, 348 N.W.2d 175 
(1984) ("A final and binding arbitration clause signifies that 
the parties to a labor contract desire to have certain 
contractual disputes determined on the merits by an impartial 
decision-maker whose determination the parties agree to accept 
as final and binding." (quoting City of Oshkosh v. Oshkosh Pub. 
Library  Clerical & Maint. Emps. Union Local 796–A, 99 
Wis. 2d 95, 103, 299 N.W.2d 210 (1980)); Diversified Mgmt. 
Servs., Inc. v. Slotten, 119 Wis. 2d 441, 448, 351 N.W.2d 176 
(Ct. App. 1984) ("If parties are to be encouraged to submit 
their disputes to arbitration as an alternative to litigation, 
they must be assured an impartial tribunal.").  Cf. Commonwealth 
Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147 (1968) 
(stating that federal statutory "provisions show a desire of 
Congress to provide not merely for any arbitration but for an 
impartial one").  That is also why, with respect to arbitrations 
governed by the Wisconsin Arbitration Act, we will set aside an 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
25 
award "[w]here there was evident partiality . . . on the part of 
the arbitrators."  Wis. Stat. § 788.10(1)(b). 
¶39 In this case, the FHC's impartiality was compromised 
by one of its members.  Prior to her appointment to the FHC, Dr. 
Lynn Turner made her opinion of Dr. McAdams and his blog post 
available for all to see and read.  By subscribing her name to 
an open letter published in the Marquette Tribune, Dr. Turner: 
a.  Deplored Dr. McAdams' treatment of Ms. Abbate; 
b.  Expressed support for Ms. Abbate's position in the 
dispute; 
c.  Asserted 
that 
Ms. 
Abbate 
had 
been 
harassed 
and 
intimidated as a direct result of Dr. McAdams' blog 
post; 
d.  Stated that Dr. McAdams had harmed Ms. Abbate's 
personal and academic reputation; 
e.  Claimed Dr. McAdams had created a negative campus 
climate and caused members of the Marquette community to 
fear becoming subjects of his attacks; 
f.  Accused Dr. McAdams of betraying his role as a faculty 
member by asserting the protection of academic freedom 
and exploiting political issues to further his personal 
agenda; 
g.  Stated that Dr. McAdams' action was a clear violation 
of the Academic Freedom section of the Faculty Handbook; 
and 
h.  Concluded that Dr. McAdams had "failed to meet the 
standards we aspire to as faculty, as well as the 
broader 
ethical 
principles 
that 
guide 
Marquette's 
mission as a Jesuit, Catholic institution." 
¶40 Remarkably, 
the 
FHC 
said 
this 
evidenced 
no 
disqualifying bias because she had not commented on anything the 
FHC would be considering.  The Report Dr. Turner helped produce 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
26 
says otherwise, as evidenced by the following excerpts (keyed to 
the lettered paragraphs above): 
a.  "[T]he Committee concludes that the University has 
established by clear and convincing evidence that Dr. 
McAdams's conduct with respect to his November 9, 2014 
blog post violated his obligation to fellow members of 
the Marquette community by recklessly causing indirect 
harm to Ms. Abbate through his conduct, harm that was 
substantial, foreseeable, easily avoidable, and not 
justifiable." 
b.  "As the AAUP has feared, Dr. McAdams's use of selective 
quotations from Ms. Abbate's classroom and after-class 
discussion has resulted in a chilling effect on Ms. 
Abbate——indeed she is no longer on the campus to speak 
at all." 
"Ms. Abbate, who was by all indications a star 
graduate student, was unable to focus on preparing her 
dissertation topic defense by the end of November." 
c.  "University spokesperson Brian Dorrington later stated, 
in reference to Dr. McAdams's suspension, that '[t]he 
university has a policy in which it clearly states 
that it does not tolerate harassment . . . .'" 
d.  "Dr. McAdams has also stated that he does not have an 
obligation to protect the reputations of members of 
the Marquette community."  "Dr. McAdams has stated 
that the harm to Ms. Abbate occurred due only to 
truthful reporting of facts."  "[I]t was 'Abbate's 
actions,' not his, 'that caused the problem.'"  "Dr. 
McAdams does not accept that Ms. Abbate was harmed by 
this incident." 
e.  "The speech of other faculty at Marquette may be 
chilled as well as a result of this incident." 
"Junior faculty in the Political Science Department 
appear to have great anxiety that they may be Dr. 
McAdams's next targets . . . ." 
f.  "If 
the 
University 
presses 
forward, 
Dr. 
McAdams 
promises, Marquette will 'become ground zero in the 
battle over freedom of expression in academia' and 
will be 'the poster child for political correctness on 
America's campuses.'" 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
27 
g.  "But academic freedom has its limits, limits that are 
slightly more pronounced in the case of extramural 
statements, and Dr. McAdams's Nov. 9 blog post 
exceeded those limits by recklessly causing harm 
indirectly 
to 
Ms. 
Abbate 
that 
was 
substantial, 
foreseeable, easily avoidable, and not justified." 
e.  "The Committee therefore concludes that this conduct 
clearly and substantially failed to meet the standard 
of personal and professional excellence that generally 
characterizes University faculties." 
If Dr. Turner did not know she would be addressing matters on 
which she had already taken a very public and definite stand, 
she should have recused herself once she discovered the 
connection. 
¶41 The Faculty Handbook says that a "member of . . . the 
Faculty 
Hearing 
Committee 
whose 
impartiality 
might 
be 
compromised by participating in the processing of the grievance 
ought to recuse himself or herself from consideration of the 
grievance."  Faculty Handbook art. 8.02 (Conflicts of Interest).  
Parties to an arbitration agreement may contractually calibrate 
the level of bias they find acceptable, and we will generally 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
28 
accept whatever standard upon which they agree.13  The Faculty 
Statutes, however, do not describe the level of disqualifying 
bias.  But we take notice that the American Arbitration 
Association says that an arbitrator should "have no relation to 
the underlying dispute or to the parties or their counsel that 
may create an appearance of bias," nor should she have any 
"personal 
or 
financial 
interest 
in 
the 
results 
of 
the 
proceeding."14  And when an arbitrator fails to disclose 
information that may call his impartiality into question, we 
inquire into 
                                                 
13 "The judiciary should minimize its role in arbitration as 
judge of the arbitrator's impartiality.  That role is best 
consigned to the parties, who are the architects of their own 
arbitration process, and are far better informed of the 
prevailing ethical standards and reputations within their 
business."  Richco Structures v. Parkside Vill., Inc., 82 
Wis. 2d 547, 561, 263 N.W.2d 204 (1978) (quoting Commonwealth 
Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) 
(White, J., concurring)); see also Richco Structures, 82 Wis. 2d 
at 557 ("Because arbitration is a contractual arrangement, 
albeit endorsed and implemented by statute, our construction of 
'evident partiality' should also be structured to enhance the 
parties' opportunity to assess an arbitrator's qualifications 
with a minimum of judicial interference.").  Cf. Sphere Drake 
Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617, 620 (7th Cir. 
2002) ("Parties are free to choose for themselves to what 
lengths they will go in quest of impartiality. . . .  [A]ll 
participants 
may 
think 
the 
expertise-impartiality 
tradeoff 
worthwhile; the [federal] Arbitration Act does not fasten on 
every industry the model of the disinterested generalist 
judge."). 
14 See 
American 
Arbitration 
Association, 
Employment:  
Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures 15 (available at 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/employment_arbitration_r
ules_and_mediation_procedures_0.pdf) (listing qualifications of 
neutral arbitrators). 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
29 
whether the reasonable person, as a party to the 
arbitration proceeding, upon being advised of the 
undisclosed matters, would have such doubts regarding 
the prospective arbitrator's impartiality that he or 
she would investigate further, would demand that the 
arbitration be conducted on terms which would provide 
checks on the arbitrator's exercise of discretion, or 
would take other protective measures to assure an 
impartial arbitration and award. 
Richco Structures v. Parkside Vill., Inc., 82 Wis. 2d 547, 562, 
263 N.W.2d 204 (1978). 
¶42 Under any reasonable standard of impartiality, Dr. 
Turner would be disqualified.  She publicly inserted herself 
into the dispute and expressed a personal interest in its 
outcome.  And she did not just express her opinions on these 
matters in passing——she committed herself to them in writing.  
Having done so, she could not decide the FHC proceedings in 
favor of Dr. McAdams without contradicting what she had already 
said to the entire Marquette University campus.  These are not 
anonymous members of the public to whom she would be admitting 
that her initial convictions were mistaken.  They are her 
professional colleagues and students.  The natural human impulse 
to resist acknowledging a mistake, especially in light of the 
audience to whom she would be making the acknowledgement, is 
sufficiently powerful to affect Dr. Turner's consideration of 
the dispute.  If an arbitrator evidenced this level of bias, we 
would set aside the resulting award.  The FHC's composition was 
unacceptably compromised by Dr. Turner's bias. 
* 
¶43 The Discipline Procedure is not analogous to an 
arbitration proceeding, as the circuit court assumed, for the 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
30 
further reason that it resulted in mere advice, not in an 
authoritative decision.  The point of an arbitration is to 
produce a final and binding resolution of the parties' dispute.  
City of Manitowoc v. Manitowoc Police Dep't, 70 Wis. 2d 1006, 
1012, 236 N.W.2d 231 (1975) (stating that "an arbitration award 
must finally settle the controversy"); Dundon v. Starin, 19 
Wis. 278 (*261), 283-85 (*266-67) (1865) (reversing judgment 
because the arbitration award was not "final and definite"); see 
also Dane Cty. Union Local 65, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 210 Wis. 2d at 
279 ("Arbitration is also designed to bring an end to 
controversy.  Employees, unions and employers all rely on the 
finality of arbitration decisions in ordering their affairs."). 
¶44 The Discipline Procedure, however, is incapable of 
producing such a result.  The Report says the FHC is just an 
advisory body:  "Under both the Faculty Statutes and the 
Statutes for the University Academic Senate, the FHC acts as an 
advisory body in contested cases of appointment non-renewal, or 
for suspension or termination of tenured faculty for absolute or 
discretionary cause."  See Faculty Statute § 307.07(1) ("[T]he 
Faculty Hearing Committee . . . serves as the advisory body in 
cases of contested appointment non-renewal, and suspension or 
termination . . . of a tenured faculty member for absolute or 
discretionary cause.").  In keeping with the nature of that 
body, it issues nothing authoritative.  The Report says the end 
result of the FHC's work is merely advice:  "[The FHC's] advice 
is presented to the President."  See § 307.07(18) ("If the FHC 
concludes that an academic penalty less than dismissal is 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
31 
warranted by the evidence, its findings of fact and conclusions 
will set forth a recommendation to that effect . . . ."). 
¶45 If we are supposed to defer to the Discipline 
Procedure because of its resemblance to an arbitration, the 
analogy does not hold up.  This process cannot produce one of 
its essential hallmarks.  We defer to arbitration decisions 
because they are authoritative resolutions of the disputes they 
address.  The Discipline Procedure produced advice, not a 
decision.  We do not defer to advice. 
* 
¶46 The FHC's lack of authority leads us to the final 
reason we cannot give arbitration-style deference to the 
University's decision to suspend Dr. McAdams:  There was no 
relevant process to which we could defer.  In one sense, all of 
the time, energy, and resources that went into the Discipline 
Procedure and the richly-detailed Report are distractions from 
the necessary focus of our analysis.  Neither the FHC nor the 
Report decided anything.  It was President Lovell, not the FHC, 
who decided whether Dr. McAdams would be disciplined.  It was 
President Lovell, not the FHC, who decided the nature of the 
discipline that should be imposed.  It was President Lovell, not 
the FHC, who had the authority to impose the discipline.  It was 
President Lovell who actually meted out the discipline when he 
sent Dr. McAdams the Discipline Letter.  And it was President 
Lovell who created the conditions on reinstatement that have 
kept Dr. McAdams in suspension limbo.  Consequently, the 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
32 
Discipline Letter, not the FHC's Report, is the relevant point 
of reference.15 
¶47 We assume, for the purpose of this case only, that the 
University must engage the Discipline Procedure's mechanisms 
before it disciplines a tenured faculty member.16  But as a 
matter of process, the Discipline Procedure controls only the 
FHC, not the president.  To the extent it references the 
                                                 
15 We note that Dean Holz's letter of January 30, 2015, 
suggests the University's Board of Trustees may play some role 
in the dismissal of a faculty member (it says discipline "shall 
become effective at the time of approval by the University's 
Board of Trustees").  However, nothing in the Report, the 
Faculty Handbook, the Faculty Statutes, the Contract, or any 
other authoritative documents in the record indicates that the 
Board of Trustees had any role in Dr. McAdams' suspension or 
dismissal.  Nor does the Discipline Letter, authored by 
President Lovell, mention any role for the Board of Trustees.  
Indeed, with respect to imposition of the sanctions, the letter 
speaks exclusively in the first person, indicating President 
Lovell's 
understanding 
that 
disciplinary 
authority 
lies 
exclusively with him. 
16 We offer this caveat because the Discipline Procedure 
does not explicitly determine the order of events.  For 
instance, Faculty Statute § 307.07(1) simply says the FHC is 
"the advisory body" with respect to suspension of a tenured 
faculty member.  It does not say the contest must be submitted 
to the FHC, and as discussed above, it has no authority to 
resolve the contest anyway.  And although Article 4, § 1.01.1(1) 
of the Faculty Handbook says the FHC must comply with the 
Discipline Procedure, it does not impose a similar requirement 
on the president.  Perhaps that mandate exists in other 
documents governing the University's procedures, but nothing in 
the record expressly requires the president to wait until the 
FHC completes its work before dismissing a tenured faculty 
member.  We have not been asked to opine on this question, and 
the answer ultimately has no effect on our analysis in this 
case; the purpose of this aside is to confirm we are not 
deciding the question. 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
33 
president's role at all, it does nothing but identify him as the 
recipient of the FHC's advice. 
¶48 The Discipline Procedure is silent with respect to how 
the president must proceed after receiving the Report.  Nor is 
there any separate set of rules, procedures, or standards that 
describe what the president must do with the FHC's advice.  
Based on the material before us, the president may adopt the 
advice in its entirety, reject it out of hand, pick and choose 
amongst the findings and conclusions, or add his own.  Although 
the Discipline Letter indicates President Lovell carefully read 
the Report and adopted the FHC's suspension recommendation, the 
Discipline Procedure did not require him to do so.  Nor is there 
any rule, procedure, or standard that forbade his sua sponte 
imposition of the additional conditions that resulted in Dr. 
McAdams' unending suspension——conditions the FHC had never 
considered. 
¶49 As a matter of process, therefore, there is a hard 
break between the Discipline Procedure and the actual decision 
to suspend Dr. McAdams.  While the dispute was in the hands of a 
body that had no authority to resolve it (the FHC), the case was 
subject to the detailed Discipline Procedure.  However, once it 
reached the actual decision-maker (President Lovell), there were 
no procedures to govern the decision-making process.  The 
Discipline Procedure does not tell President Lovell how to reach 
his decision, and nothing in the record before us suggests the 
president's decision must have any relationship to the FHC's 
work.  As far as the Faculty Statutes and Faculty Handbook are 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
34 
concerned, the president may proceed as if the Report said 
nothing but that the FHC had completed the Discipline Procedure.  
Consequently, the efficient cause of Dr. McAdams' suspension 
without pay was the Discipline Letter, and there is no evidence 
that it resulted from any prescribed procedure at all.  It was 
the product of President Lovell's exercise of unfettered 
discretion.  Even if we were inclined to defer to the 
authoritative resolution of Dr. McAdams' case (as opposed to the 
FHC's Report), there is quite literally nothing to which we 
could apply an arbitration-style review. 
3.  The Administrative Agency Deference Doctrine 
¶50 The circuit court also said it would defer to the 
University's decision for the same reasons the judiciary often 
defers to administrative agency decisions.  McAdams, No. 
2016CV3396, Order for Summary Judgment, 11.  The circuit court 
cited an Ohio intermediate appellate court for this proposition, 
which said, in pertinent part:  "Even though we . . . are 
hesitant to equate a private university's hearing powers to that 
of a statutorily mandated administrative body, we do find 
rationale and guidance from the standard of review adopted by 
administrative agencies, especially when the involved parties 
have bound themselves contractually."  Yackshaw v. John Carroll 
Univ. Bd. of Trs., 624 N.E.2d 225, 228 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). 
¶51 We will not defer to the University's decision under 
the Yackshaw rationale for two reasons.  First, the basis for 
Yackshaw's analogy no longer obtains in Wisconsin.  We recently 
ended the practice of deferring to an administrative agency's 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
35 
conclusions of law.17  We decided the practice was unsound in 
principle, and there is no apparent reason it would become 
sounder if we resurrected it for use in contract disputes 
between two private parties. 
¶52 Second, Yackshaw's analysis is flawed because it 
deferred to a dispute resolution process that incorporated 
several of the fundamental defects discussed above.  At John 
Carroll University the process of dismissing a professor begins 
with a hearing before the Faculty Board of Review (the "FBR").  
See id. at 226-27.  Like the FHC here, the FBR is composed of 
university employees.  See id. at 226-28.  And like the process 
we are considering today, the FBR does not actually resolve the 
disputes it hears.  It just makes recommendations to the Board 
of Trustees.  See id. at 226-27.  The Yackshaw opinion suggests 
the Board of Trustees enjoys the same autonomy as the University 
president in this case.  It is not bound by the FBR's 
recommendation, and there are apparently no rules, procedures, 
or standards that govern how it actually makes its decision.  
See id.  It could accept, reject, or alter the FBR's work at 
will.  See id.  The dispute resolution process described by 
Yackshaw allowed the Board to exercise unfettered discretion in 
terminating one of its professors. 
                                                 
17 Tetra 
Tech 
EC, 
Inc. 
v. 
DOR, 
2018 
WI 75, 
¶3, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  By "conclusions of law" we 
mean both the interpretation of the law and the application of 
that law to the facts of a case.  See id., ¶¶3, 108.  In this 
context, deference would include interpretation of the Contract 
and its application to undisputed facts. 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
36 
¶53 Additionally, Yackshaw's deference appears to have 
been founded on the court's unwarranted attribution of the non-
authoritative FBR's procedures to the authoritative Board of 
Trustees' decision.  It seems the court was especially impressed 
by the FBR's six-day hearing in which it received forty-five 
exhibits and heard from fifteen witnesses who together produced 
a nine-hundred page transcript.  So when it said "we find that 
the university did not deny Yackshaw's procedural rights under 
his contract," it was presumably referring to the FBR's 
procedures.  See id. at 229.  It certainly could not have been 
referring to the actual decision-maker——the Board of Trustees——
whose decision was not subject to any procedural requirements or 
standards at all.  We cannot take guidance from Yackshaw, 
therefore, because it did not analyze whether a court should 
defer to a defendant's standard-free assessment of a plaintiff's 
claims, which is what happened both there and here. 
¶54 Yackshaw's 
value 
is 
further 
weakened 
by 
its 
tendentious rejection of McConnell v. Howard University, 818 
F.2d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1987) as an "obscure" case in which the court 
was preoccupied by questions unrelated to deference.18  McConnell 
squarely addressed the same deference proposition at issue in 
Yackshaw, 
which 
in 
turn 
is 
the 
same 
argument 
Marquette 
University advances here.  See McConnell, 818 F.2d at 67-68.  
                                                 
18 "McConnell seems to be the obscure one. . . .  [T]he 
McConnell court appeared preoccupied, and rightfully so, with 
the failure of the university to honor the contract."  Yackshaw 
v. John Carroll Univ. Bd. of Trs., 624 N.E.2d 225, 228-29 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1993). 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
37 
After thorough consideration, the McConnell court rejected it in 
terms bordering on exasperation.  See id. at 67.  Accepting this 
proposition, it said, would mean that "any Trustees' decision to 
fire a tenured faculty member is largely unreviewable, with 
judicial scrutiny limited to a modest inquiry as to whether the 
Trustees' decision was 'arbitrary,' 'irrational' or infected by 
improper motivation."  Id.  It understood that deference in this 
context would demote tenure from a substantive right to a matter 
of mere procedure:  "Such a reading of the contract renders 
tenure a virtual nullity.  Faculty members like Dr. McConnell 
would have no real substantive right to continued employment, 
but only certain procedural rights that must be followed before 
their appointment may be terminated."  Id.  This, it said, is 
"an astonishing concept."  Id.  We agree. 
¶55 The Milwaukee County Circuit Court here nonetheless 
determined that the administrative agency deference doctrine 
required 
it 
to 
defer 
because 
"[t]he 
parties' 
contract 
incorporates a specialized standard for cause that focuses on 
issues of professional duties and fitness as a university 
professor." 
 
McAdams, 
No. 
2016CV3396, 
Order 
for 
Summary 
Judgment, 11.  "Professionalism and fitness in the context of a 
university professor," it said, "are difficult if not impossible 
issues for a jury to assess."  Id.  We cannot credit this 
rationale——judges and juries frequently address themselves to 
some of the most complex matters in life.  When a case presents 
issues beyond our ken, we turn to expert witnesses.  McConnell 
conclusively answers the circuit court's concern as well: 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
38 
[W]e do not understand why university affairs are more 
deserving of judicial deference than the affairs of 
any other business or profession.  Arguably, there 
might be matters unique to education on which courts 
are 
relatively 
ill 
equipped 
to 
pass 
judgment.  
However, this is true in many areas of the law, 
including, for example, technical, scientific and 
medical issues.  Yet, this lack of expertise does not 
compel courts to defer to the view of one of the 
parties in such cases.  The parties can supply such 
specialized knowledge through the use of expert 
testimony. 
McConnell, 818 F.2d at 69. 
¶56 If academics are capable of discussing university 
affairs in their cloisters, there is no reason they cannot do so 
as experts in our courts.  The complexity of a contract's 
subject matter does not convince us that we must give 
administrative-agency style deference to one of the disputing 
parties. 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
39 
* 
¶57 In sum, we do not defer to the University for 
contractual reasons because the Contract does not say the 
Discipline Procedure either substitutes for litigation in our 
courts or limits our review.  We also do not afford arbitration-
style deference to the University's decision because the FHC was 
compositionally biased, the Discipline Procedure did not (and 
could not) produce an authoritative decision, and the individual 
with the authority to resolve the dispute was subject to no 
procedures whatsoever.  Finally, we do not defer to the 
University in the manner we have previously deferred to 
administrative agencies because that practice is unsound in 
principle. 
¶58 The dissent says we should nonetheless defer to the 
University, and that failing to do so "renders meaningless a key 
part of shared governance, reducing the faculty's role in this 
decisionmaking to nothing."  Dissent, ¶173.  The author, 
however, does not identify the key part of shared governance we 
have rendered meaningless, nor could she.  The faculty's 
authority to share in the University's governance comes from the 
Faculty Statutes and Faculty Handbook, not some formless notion 
of what shared governance ought to be.  We have taken these 
authorities as they are, and scrupulously examined their 
provisions.  The faculty's role is what our opinion says it is 
because that is the arrangement upon which the University and 
its faculty members have agreed.  It is not our place to rewrite 
their management structure to give the faculty a more muscular 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
40 
role in the University's affairs than they currently have.  
Because the dissent identified no Faculty Statute or Faculty 
Handbook provision that we have overlooked or misconstrued, we 
decline 
the 
implicit 
invitation 
to 
disregard 
what 
these 
authorities so plainly say. 
B.  Merits of the Suspension Decision 
¶59 Dr. McAdams says that publishing his blog post is an 
act of academic freedom and that the Contract protects him from 
discipline because of such acts.  The circuit court decided this 
case on cross-motions for summary judgment, which means we apply 
the same methodology as the circuit court upon review. 
¶60 This methodology requires that we first determine 
whether Dr. McAdams has stated a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.  See Green Spring Farms, 136 Wis. 2d at 315.  The 
University does not argue here that Dr. McAdams has failed to 
state a claim, and our review confirms that he adequately 
alleged the existence of an enforceable contract and that each 
count identifies an alleged failure to abide by the Contract's 
terms. 
¶61 The next step in our summary judgment analysis is to 
determine whether one of the parties is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.19  In this case, that determination turns on two 
                                                 
19 See Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2); see also Columbia Propane, 
L.P. v. Wis. Gas Co., 2003 WI 38, ¶11, 261 Wis. 2d 70, 661 
N.W.2d 776 (citing § 802.08(2) (2001-02)).  To the extent there 
are factual disputes, we have accepted the version favorable to 
the 
University. 
 
We 
conclude 
that 
these 
minor 
factual 
differences are not material because they had no substantive 
effect on our analysis. 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
41 
issues.  The first is whether the doctrine of academic freedom 
encompasses the publication of Dr. McAdams' blog post.  If it 
does, then we must decide whether the University nonetheless had 
"discretionary cause" to suspend Dr. McAdams. 
1.  Academic Freedom and the Blog Post 
¶62 Although we address ourselves to the concept of 
"academic freedom," we do so only to the extent necessary to 
determine whether it reaches Dr. McAdams' blog post.  Our 
analysis is narrowly focused and begins with the definition of 
"academic freedom" as it appears in the University's Faculty 
Handbook: 
Academic freedom is prized as essential to 
Marquette University and to its living growth as a 
university.  Professorial academic freedom is that 
proper to the scholar-teacher, whose profession is to 
increase knowledge in himself/herself and in others.  
As proper to the scholar-teacher, academic freedom is 
grounded on competence and integrity. 
When scholar-teachers carry on their academic 
lives in educational institutions, integrity requires 
both respect for the objectives of the institution in 
which they choose to carry on their academic lives and 
attention to the task of reevaluating these objectives 
as a necessary condition of living growth in human 
institutions. 
The 
University, 
because 
it 
prizes 
academic 
freedom, 
proposes 
the 
following 
safeguards* 
[footnoting a reference to the AAUP's Statement of 
Principles of Academic Freedom] to that freedom: 
a. The teacher is entitled to full freedom in research 
and in the publication of results, subject to the 
adequate performance of his/her other academic 
duties; but research for pecuniary return should be 
based upon an understanding with the authorities of 
the institution. 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
42 
b. The teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom 
in discussing his/her subject.  This freedom must 
be integrated with the right of the students not to 
be victimized and the rights of the institution to 
have its accepted aims respected. 
c. The college or university teacher is a citizen, a 
member of a learned profession, and an officer of 
an educational institution.  When he/she speaks or 
writes as a citizen, he/she should be free from 
institutional censorship or discipline, but his/her 
special position in the civil community imposes 
special obligations.  As a man/woman of learning 
and an educational officer, he/she should remember 
that the public may judge his/her profession and 
institution by his/her utterances.  Hence, he/she 
should at all times be accurate, should exercise 
appropriate restraint, should show respect for the 
opinions of others, and should make every effort to 
indicate that he/she is not an institutional 
spokesperson. 
Faculty Handbook, III.C. (Rights and Responsibilities, Academic 
Freedom). 
¶63 The University acknowledges this definition came from 
the 
American 
Association 
of 
University 
Professors' 
1940 
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (the 
"1940 Statement").20  During their arguments, both the University 
and Dr. McAdams had recourse to that document, as well as to 
subsequent, AAUP-authored,21 explanatory documents such as the 
1970 Interpretive Comments (the "1970 Comments").  Consequently, 
we will refer to those sources as necessary to understand the 
scope of the academic freedom doctrine. 
                                                 
20 The Report said "all [University] faculty members are 
guaranteed academic freedom, defined in the Faculty Handbook 
using language taken directly from [AAUP's] groundbreaking 1940 
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure." 
21 We refer to the American Association of University 
Professors as the "AAUP." 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
43 
¶64 The AAUP, which participated as amicus curiae, said 
the doctrine of academic freedom comprises three elements:  
teaching; research; and extramural comments.  The categories 
correspond 
to 
the 
separately-lettered 
paragraphs 
in 
the 
University's definition (see supra Faculty Handbook, III.C.).  
The University and Dr. McAdams agree that we should understand 
the blog post as an "extramural comment," a type of expression 
made in Dr. McAdams' personal, not professorial, capacity.  
Because the parties agree the blog post is covered by one of the 
categories of academic freedom, the contest is over whether its 
contents remove the doctrine's protection. 
¶65 The definition of "extramural comment" recognizes that 
a professor occupies a "special position in the community," one 
that comes with "special obligations."22  In the original 
definition in the 1940 Statement, and in the definition above, 
these special obligations included the duty to "exercise 
appropriate restraint," to "show respect for the opinions of 
others," and to "make every effort to indicate that they are not 
speaking for the institution."23  However, the AAUP recognizes 
that the special obligations "are generally not viewed as 
                                                 
22 American 
Association 
of 
University 
Professors 
[hereinafter 
"AAUP"], 
Policy 
Documents 
and 
Reports, 
1940 
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, with 
1970 Interpretive Comments 14 (11th ed. 2014) (available at 
https://www.aaup.org/file/1940%20Statement.pdf); 
see 
also 
Faculty Handbook, III.C. (Academic Freedom). 
23 See AAUP, Policy Documents and Reports, 1940 Statement of 
Principles 
on 
Academic 
Freedom 
and 
Tenure, 
with 
1970 
Interpretive 
Comments 
14 
(11th 
ed. 
2014) 
(available 
at 
https://www.aaup.org/file/1940%20Statement.pdf). 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
44 
binding obligations."  The Report, after tracing the evolving 
nature of these "special obligations," essentially agreed: 
[I]t 
appears 
that 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
"special 
obligations" that limit a faculty member's freedom to 
make extramural statements has changed.  It is 
doubtful that there is any longer a binding obligation 
to 
be 
"accurate" 
at 
all 
times 
in 
making 
such 
statements, or to "exercise appropriate restraint," or 
to "show respect for the opinions of others," on pain 
of dismissal. 
¶66 The Report observed that the special obligations now 
appear to be "'responsibilities to their subject, to their 
students, to their profession, and to their institution;' the 
obligation to be clear that they are not speaking for their 
institution; 
and 
the 
'particular 
obligation 
to 
promote 
conditions of free inquiry and to further public understanding 
of 
academic 
freedom.'"24 
 
We 
will 
use 
the 
University's 
understanding of "special obligations" in our analysis. 
                                                 
24 The FHC's Report said it took this understanding of 
"special obligations" from the 1970 Comments.  It chose to adopt 
this interpretation for three reasons: 
First, Marquette's definition of academic freedom is 
taken essentially verbatim from the 1940 Statement, 
and there is nothing in the Faculty Handbook that 
indicates any intent to depart from the 1940 Statement 
as employed and understood by universities generally.  
Second, the 1970 Interpretive Comments were approved 
not just by the AAUP, but by the Association of 
American Colleges, of which Marquette University is a 
member.  Third, whatever plausibility the conditions 
had as a limit on extramural freedom in 1940, by 2015, 
or even by 1980 when Section 307.07 of the Faculty 
Statutes was adopted, such a constricted view of the 
freedom to engage in public debate would be far 
outside the mainstream, and there is no indication 
that 
Marquette's 
administration 
or 
faculty 
view 
(continued) 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
45 
¶67 The documents on which both parties rely also provide 
the analytical structure we are to use in analyzing whether an 
extramural comment has lost the protection of the academic 
freedom doctrine.  It is a two-step process, in which the first 
determines whether the comment itself demonstrates the faculty 
member is clearly unfit to serve:  "The controlling principle is 
that a faculty member's expression of opinion as a citizen 
cannot constitute grounds for dismissal unless it clearly 
demonstrates the faculty member's unfitness for his or her 
position."25  If the comment meets this standard, the second part 
of the analysis considers the broader context of the faculty 
member's complete record before deciding whether the extramural 
comment is protected by the doctrine of academic freedom:  "[A] 
final decision should take into account the faculty member's 
                                                                                                                                                             
Marquette's adoption of the norms of academic freedom 
as atypical. 
At least one other court has used the AAUP's subsequent 
publications to interpret and limit the reach and effect of the 
special obligations.  See Adamian v. Jacobsen, 523 F.2d 929, 935 
(9th Cir. 1975) ("That the University has adopted the Statement 
of Principles virtually word for word suggests that it also 
accepts the narrowing interpretation placed on it by the 
Association."). 
25 AAUP, Policy Documents and Reports, 1940 Statement of 
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretive 
Comments 
15 
n.6 
(11th 
ed. 
2014) 
(available 
at 
https://www.aaup.org/file/1940%20Statement.pdf) 
(internal 
quotation mark omitted) (quoting AAUP, Policy Documents and 
Reports, Committee A Statement on Extramural Utterances 31 (11th 
ed. 2014)). 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
46 
entire record as a teacher and scholar."26  The Report 
demonstrates the FHC adopted this analytical structure. 
¶68 The University's briefing, however, introduced two 
problematic aspects to the analysis.  First, the University 
failed to limit the initial inquiry to a consideration of what 
the blog post, on its face, says about Dr. McAdams' fitness to 
serve as a professor.  Whereas the FHC-endorsed structure begins 
with a tight focus on the relationship between the comment (and 
only the comment) and the professor's fitness, the University 
now says the question is whether the extramural comments 
"clearly demonstrate the faculty member's unfitness for their 
position considering their entire record as a teacher and 
scholar."  Although the University's formulation properly 
recites the two elements of the analysis, it flattens the 
inquiry into one step.  And in doing so, it expanded the initial 
step so broadly that it subsumed the entire analysis.  It is 
important to keep the two parts of the analysis separate because 
the first step serves the critically important function of 
keeping our focus where it belongs——on the extramural comment 
itself.  The AAUP says this step provides a stringent standard 
of proof for dismissal.  So strict, in fact, that "[e]xtramural 
utterances rarely bear upon the faculty member's fitness for the 
position."27 
                                                 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
47 
¶69 The University introduced a second problematic aspect 
to the analysis when it uncoupled the doctrine of academic 
freedom from any stable reference points.  The University 
posited that educational institutions assume academic freedom is 
just one value that must be balanced against "other values core 
to their mission."  Some of those values, it says, include the 
obligation to "take care not to cause harm, directly or 
indirectly, to members of the university community," "to respect 
the dignity of others and to acknowledge their right to express 
differing opinions," to "safeguard[] the conditions for the 
community to exist," to "ensur[e] colleagues feel free to 
explore undeveloped ideas," and to carry out "the concept of 
cura personalis," which involves working and caring "for all 
aspects of the lives of the members of the institution."  These 
are worthy aspirations, and they reflect well on the University.  
But they contain insufficiently certain standards by which a 
professor's compliance may be measured.  Setting the doctrine of 
academic freedom adrift amongst these competing values would 
deprive the doctrine of its instructive power; it would provide 
faculty members with little to no guidance on what it covers. 
¶70 Combined, these two problematic aspects allow the 
University to use any extramural comment as an excuse to 
reconsider a faculty member's association with the institution, 
which is what occurred here.  The University's analysis did not 
begin with an inquiry into whether the blog post, on its face, 
is so egregious that it clearly demonstrates that Dr. McAdams is 
unfit to serve as a professor.  Instead, it used the extramural 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
48 
comment merely as a key to open a door onto a broad vista of 
considerations in which it compared the professor's entire 
career and person against the University's mission to care "for 
all aspects of the lives of the members of the institution."  
The extramural comment is not supposed to be a key to other 
materials the University may wish to place in the "unfitness" 
balance.  The extramural comment goes in the balance alone.  
Only if the balance clearly tips to "unfitness" may the 
University then proceed to a comprehensive review of Dr. 
McAdams' career. 
¶71 On the other hand, the analytical structure described 
by the AAUP, and adopted by the FHC, provides a stable framework 
within which to evaluate whether the doctrine of academic 
freedom protects a specific extramural comment.  Although the 
doctrine may not be susceptible to precise definition, still it 
is sufficiently certain that it can inform faculty members what 
is required of them.28  The AAUP properly limits the analysis to 
whether the actual extramural comment, on its face, clearly 
demonstrates that the professor is unfit to serve.  This very 
narrow inquiry explains why the AAUP can confidently state that 
"[e]xtramural utterances rarely bear upon the faculty member's 
fitness for the position."29  If we adopted the alternative 
                                                 
28 See Mgmt. Comput. Servs., Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & 
Co., 206 Wis. 2d 158, 178, 557 N.W.2d 67 (1996) ("[A] contract 
must be definite as to the parties' basic commitments and 
obligations."). 
29 See supra n.25. 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
49 
structure now favored by the University, academic freedom would 
be nothing but a subjective, post-hoc analysis of what the 
institution might find unacceptable after watching how events 
unfolded.  And this would likely chill extramural comments to 
the point of extinction.  It would be a fearless professor 
indeed who would risk such a comment, knowing that it licenses 
the University to scrutinize his entire career and assay it 
against the care of "all aspects of the lives of the members of 
the institution." 
¶72 The defects inherent in the University's alternative 
analytical structure, however, represent just one of two 
problems with its assessment.  The second is that the University  
conducted 
the 
analysis 
backwards. 
 
With 
the 
benefit 
of 
hindsight, the University reverse-engineered its conclusion that 
Dr. McAdams is a plainly unfit professor because of unknown 
third parties' reactions to his blog post.  The blog post caused 
"harm," the University said, in the form of critical, sometimes 
vile, sometimes violently-worded, responses sent to Instructor 
Abbate after the story had received national attention.  Its 
"unfitness" analysis proceeded as follows:  Instructor Abbate 
suffered harm because she received offensive communications from 
third parties; the communications were prompted by Dr. McAdams' 
blog 
post 
(directly 
or 
indirectly); 
Dr. 
McAdams 
has 
a 
responsibility not to harm his students; a professor is unfit to 
serve if he violates his responsibilities to the University's 
students.  Quod erat demonstrandum.  But the University can 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
50 
reach this conclusion only because its analysis traveled in 
reverse.  So quod non erat demonstrandum. 
¶73 Performing the analysis in the correct direction leads 
to the unavoidable conclusion that the blog post has nothing 
relevant to say about Dr. McAdams' fitness as a professor.  The 
University's end point is where we start——that is, we consider 
first whether the challenged extramural comment, on its face, 
violated 
Dr. 
McAdams' 
"responsibilities 
to . . . [the 
University's] 
students." 
 
Although 
Instructor 
Abbate 
was 
functioning as a University instructor, we will consider only 
her status as a student for purposes of this analysis.  The 
University identified several aspects of the blog post that it 
believes were problematic.  For instance, it says Dr. McAdams 
relied on improperly obtained information (the surreptitious 
recording of the conversation between Instructor Abbate and the 
student); he identified Instructor Abbate by name; he linked to 
her contact information; he drafted the post in a way that would 
subject Instructor Abbate to public contempt; and the post 
contains factual errors. 
¶74 The undisputed facts show that none of the aspects of 
the blog post about which the University is concerned could have 
violated Dr. McAdams' responsibility to Instructor Abbate.  The 
FHC's Report acknowledged that there is no prohibition against 
naming a student in a blog post.  Nor is it improper for a 
faculty member to link to a student's personal webpage, even 
when that webpage lists the student's contact information.  The 
Report acknowledged this is still true even when the blog post 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
51 
is critical of the student.  Nor do blogging faculty members 
have a general obligation to ensure every statement they make in 
a post is accurate.30 
¶75 The Report reflects significant discomfort with the 
surreptitious recording the student made of his interaction with 
Instructor Abbate and the recording's role in relation to the 
blog post.  But the University does not claim that Dr. McAdams' 
instigated the recording; its concern, apparently, is that he 
listened to it and subsequently distributed it to other media 
outlets. 
 
However, 
the 
University 
identified 
no 
law 
or 
University rule that prohibited the student from making the 
recording, or forbade Dr. McAdams from reviewing or distributing 
it once made.  Ultimately, the recording is not even material to 
the dispute——Dr. McAdams could have written the blog post 
without the recording because the student himself related the 
event to him.  It may be distasteful for students to secretly 
record their instructors' conversations, but the question here 
is whether Dr. McAdams' use of the recording (or relationship to 
it) violated any responsibilities he owed to Instructor Abbate.  
The University has not identified any, so the recording can have 
no bearing on this inquiry. 
¶76 Finally, there is the University's assertion that Dr. 
McAdams drafted the blog post in such a way that it would 
subject Instructor Abbate to public contempt.  The blog post is 
                                                 
30 Although the University takes issue with the accuracy of 
some of the blog post's factual statements, it does not suggest 
that any of the inaccuracies are legally actionable. 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
52 
certainly critical of her, so one could reasonably foresee that 
it would engender critical responses.  We do not understand the 
University to argue that an extramural comment that causes such 
responses 
is 
beyond 
the 
pale——an 
extraordinarily 
unusual 
argument for an educational institution to make——so we perceive 
its concern to be about the responses that go beyond the realm 
of reasonable criticism.  But the University did not identify 
any aspect of what Dr. McAdams actually wrote to support its 
charge.  Instead, it used third-party responses to the blog post 
as a proxy for its allegedly contempt-inducing nature.  Here 
again, the University demonstrates that reverse-engineering a 
conclusion is not the most reliable method of conducting an 
analysis.  In this instance, the University caught itself up in 
the "post hoc ergo propter hoc" fallacy.  Just because vile 
commentary followed the blog post does not mean the blog post 
instigated or invited the vileness.  The University must 
identify which part of the blog post is supposed to have been 
responsible for eliciting the offensive remarks.  It did not 
even attempt to do so.  Our review of the blog post reveals that 
it makes no ad hominem attack on Instructor Abbate, nor does it 
invite readers to be uncivil to her, either explicitly or 
implicitly.  Because the University's logical fallacy represents 
the entirety of its assertion that Dr. McAdams wrote the blog 
post to subject Instructor Abbate to contempt, we must reject 
it. 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
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* 
¶77 We conclude that Dr. McAdams' blog post qualifies as 
an extramural comment protected by the doctrine of academic 
freedom.  The post is incapable of clearly demonstrating Dr. 
McAdams is unfit to serve as a professor because, although the 
University identified many aspects of the blog post about which 
it was concerned, it did not identify any particular way in 
which the blog post violated Dr. McAdams' responsibilities to 
the institution's students.  Consequently, the blog post retains 
the protection it presumptively enjoyed as an extramural 
comment. 
2.  Breach and Remedy 
¶78 Because the doctrine of academic freedom protects the 
blog post, we must now determine whether the University breached 
the Contract when it suspended Dr. McAdams.  Although nothing in 
the record imposes any procedural restrictions on President 
Lovell's authority to suspend or dismiss Dr. McAdams, he is 
nonetheless subject to the Contract's substantive restrictions.  
Chief amongst these is the promise that a professor may not be 
suspended or dismissed without cause:  "The cognizant appointing 
authority of the University may initiate and execute procedures 
by which a faculty member's reappointment may be denied or 
revoked, or any current appointment may be suspended or 
terminated, for cause as defined therein."  Faculty Statute 
§ 306.01; see also Faculty Statute § 307.07(2) ("A faculty 
member who has been awarded tenure at Marquette University may 
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54 
only be dismissed upon a showing of absolute or discretionary 
cause, . . . ."). 
¶79 "Cause" 
comes 
in 
two 
varieties: 
 
absolute 
and 
discretionary.  Faculty Statute § 306.01 ("Cause may be either 
absolute or discretionary.").  Dean Holz's letter of January 30, 
2015, which commenced the Discipline Procedure, said the 
University was proceeding under the latter.  Discretionary cause 
includes: 
[T]hose circumstances, exclusive of absolute cause, 
which arise from a faculty member's conduct and which 
clearly and substantially fail to meet the standard of 
personal and professional excellence which generally 
characterizes 
University 
faculties, 
but 
only 
if 
through this conduct a faculty member's value will 
probably be substantially impaired.  Examples of 
conduct that substantially impair the value or utility 
of a faculty member are:  serious instances of 
illegal, 
immoral, 
dishonorable, 
irresponsible, 
or 
incompetent conduct. 
Faculty Statute § 306.03. 
¶80 But 
discretionary 
cause 
cannot 
include 
activity 
encompassed by the doctrine of academic freedom:  "In no case, 
however, shall discretionary cause be interpreted so as to 
impair the full and free enjoyment of legitimate personal or 
academic freedoms of thought, doctrine, discourse, association, 
advocacy, or action."  Faculty Statute § 306.03.  The University 
is subject to additional restrictions if the discipline includes 
dismissal:  "Dismissal will not be used to restrain faculty 
members in their exercise of academic freedom or other rights 
guaranteed them by the United States Constitution."  Faculty 
Statute § 307.07(2). 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
55 
¶81 There can be no genuine dispute that the University 
commenced proceedings against Dr. McAdams because of his blog 
post of November 9, 2014.  Dean Holz's letter of January 30, 
2015, identified the blog post as the offense for which the 
University sought the revocation of Dr. McAdams' tenure and his 
dismissal from the faculty.31  The letter identified the date of 
the offense as November 9, 2014, and elaborated, in pertinent 
part, as follows: 
On November 9, 2014, you chose to post on the 
Internet 
a 
story 
prompted 
by 
a 
secretly-taped 
conversation between a student and a graduate student 
instructor. 
 
While 
you 
left 
the 
undergraduate 
student's name out of your post, and later insisted 
that his anonymity be protected, you posted without 
permission the graduate student instructor's name, Ms. 
Cheryl Abbate. 
The decision to write and publish the blog post, Dean Holz 
concluded, proved that Dr. McAdams' "conduct clearly and 
substantially fails to meet the standards of personal and 
professional excellence that generally characterizes University 
faculties.  As a result, your value to this academic institution 
is substantially impaired." 
                                                 
31 The University must give formal notice that it is 
commencing disciplinary proceedings; the notice must contain a 
detailed description of the offense for which the University 
seeks to impose discipline.  Faculty Statute § 307.03 ("The 
notice shall include:  . . . [t]he statute allegedly violated; 
the date of the alleged violation; the location of the alleged 
violation; a sufficiently detailed description of the facts 
constituting the violation including the names of the witnesses 
against the faculty member."). 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
56 
¶82 Upon completion of the FHC's proceedings, the Report 
recommended discipline based on the blog post: 
Dr. 
McAdams's 
conduct, 
however, 
goes 
beyond 
simply making factual errors in a blog post, or 
publicly naming a graduate student in the course of 
criticism, or linking to a page with her contact 
information, 
or 
publicly 
presenting 
a 
one-sided 
criticism of the teaching of a colleague.  It goes 
beyond posting an extramural blog post that is 
uncivil, assuming his Nov. 9 blog post could fairly be 
characterized as uncivil in some way.  Instead, Dr. 
McAdams used improperly obtained information in a way 
that he should have known could lead to harm, harm 
that could easily have been avoided.  His use of a 
surreptitious recording, along with Ms. Abbate's name 
and contact information, to hold Ms. Abbate up for 
public contempt on his blog, recklessly exposed her to 
the foreseeable harm that she suffered due to Dr. 
McAdams's 
actions. 
 
Dr. 
McAdams's 
irresponsible 
behavior in using the recording in this way fell far 
short 
of 
his 
obligations 
to 
Ms. 
Abbate 
as 
a 
professional colleague and as a fellow member of the 
Marquette community.  We find that such seriously 
irresponsible conduct clearly and substantially fails 
to meet the standard of professional excellence that 
generally characterizes university faculties, although 
not, as we explain in Subsection V.A.4 below, to the 
degree necessary to support a penalty of dismissal. 
¶83 The Discipline Letter, in which President Lovell 
detailed his decision to accept the FHC's recommendation, made 
it clear that Dr. McAdams was being sanctioned for his blog 
post.  President Lovell said, "I found that the Faculty Hearing 
Committee's written statements . . . unequivocally summarize why 
you should be seriously reprimanded for your actions," following 
which he reproduced the Report's conclusion that we excerpted 
immediately above. 
¶84 The 
blog 
post, 
however, 
is 
a 
contractually-
disqualified basis for discipline.  Discretionary cause cannot 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
57 
include anything that would "impair the full and free enjoyment 
of 
legitimate 
personal 
or 
academic 
freedoms 
of 
thought, 
doctrine, discourse, association, advocacy, or action."  See 
Faculty Statute § 306.03.  Suspending Dr. McAdams for publishing 
the blog post would, of course, "impair" his "full and free 
enjoyment of . . . academic freedoms."  See id. 
¶85 Beginning 
with 
the 
inception 
of 
the 
Discipline 
Procedure, and ending with President Lovell's decision to 
suspend Dr. McAdams, the basis for the University's actions has 
been the blog post.  The dissent says we neglected to consider 
other "key" facts in determining whether the University breached 
the Contract, such as Dr. McAdams' efforts to bring his blog 
post 
to 
national 
attention 
(with 
the 
attendant 
negative 
responses directed at Instructor Abbate).  Dissent, ¶142.  This 
is not a key fact, and neither are any of the others the dissent 
identifies.  All of them are derivative of the blog post, and 
for that reason they cannot stand as an alternative, independent 
basis for the suspension decision.  Therefore, the University 
had no justifiable cause to suspend Dr. McAdams on December 16, 
2014, affirm the suspension on January 30, 2015, or increase the 
discipline to suspension without pay effective April 1, 2016.  
We conclude the University breached the Contract when it took 
these decisions. 
¶86 The dissent believes there is more to the analysis and 
that we have stopped prematurely.  It says "[t]he majority errs 
in conducting only half of the academic freedom analysis.  It 
fails to recognize, much less analyze, the academic freedom of 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
58 
Marquette as a private, Catholic, Jesuit university."  Id., 
¶140.  The author observes that "[a]cademic freedom thrives not 
only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among 
teachers 
and 
students, 
but 
also . . . on 
autonomous 
decisionmaking by the academy itself."  Id., ¶138 (omission in 
original) (quoting Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 
U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985) (internal citations omitted)). 
¶87 Much of the dissent, if not most, comprises a 
fetchingly poetic ode to the importance of the University's 
academic freedom in immanentizing its mission.  The problem with 
odes, however, is that their poetry so often comes at the 
expense of precision.  Here, the imprecision resulted in the 
misapplication of one of the principles wrapped up in the 
concept of institutional academic freedom.  The dissent is aware 
of it, but addressed it only in passing:  "The term 'academic 
freedom' is used to denote both the freedom of the academic 
institution to pursue its ends without interference from the 
government, as well as the freedom of the individual teacher to 
pursue desired ends without interference from the institution."  
See dissent, ¶148 (emphasis added). 
¶88 A university's academic freedom is a shield against 
governmental interference; the dissent, however, would reforge 
it as a sword with which to strike down contracts it no longer 
wishes to honor.  But none of the cases on which the dissent 
relies convert this pacific principle into such a destructive 
tool.  The dissent says that part of an institution's academic 
freedom is the right "to determine for itself on academic 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
59 
grounds who may teach."  Id., ¶153 (quoting Sweezy v. N.H. by 
Wyman, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).32  
That is true, as far as it goes——but it does not go far enough 
to address the circumstances here.  When the decision to hire is 
complete, the relationship is no longer a simple matter of 
academic compatibility.  The employment contract adds a legally 
enforceable aspect to the relationship.  An aspect, we would do 
well to remember, that the Faculty Statutes invite us to 
adjudicate. 
¶89 Operationalizing 
the 
dissent's 
ode 
would 
have 
disastrous consequences for academic freedom.  The outward-
facing protection against governmental interference would turn 
inward, pitting the institution's academic freedom against the 
faculty's academic freedom.  The result would be a never-ending 
pitched battle in which each side tries to expand its own sphere 
of academic freedom at the expense of the other.  That 
reimagining of this doctrine has no support in the Contract, the 
Faculty Statutes, the Faculty Handbook, or our cases.  And there 
is probably no better way of ending the University's carefully 
balanced 
shared 
governance 
than 
turning 
a 
cooperative 
relationship into an adversarial contest.  Therefore, we decline 
the dissent's invitation to consider whether the University may 
excuse its breach of the Contract as an exercise of its academic 
freedom. 
                                                 
32 See also Feldman v. Ho, 171 F.3d 494, 495-96 (7th Cir. 
1999) (recognizing educational institution's right to not offer 
a contract of employment). 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
60 
* 
¶90 There remains the question of Dr. McAdams' remedy for 
the University's breach of the Contract.  The parties disagree 
with respect to his current status——the University says he is 
suspended; Dr. McAdams says the suspension has turned into a de 
facto dismissal.  The difference depends on the effect of a 
certain condition President Lovell included in the Discipline 
Letter.  The letter says Dr. McAdams may not return to the 
faculty until he submits a letter to the University (to be 
shared with Instructor Abbate) no later than April 4, 2016, that 
includes: 
•  Your [Dr. McAdams'] acknowledgement and acceptance 
of the unanimous judgment of the peers who served 
on the Faculty Hearing Committee. 
. . . . 
•  Your acknowledgement that your November 9, 2014, 
blog post was reckless and incompatible with the 
mission and values of Marquette University and you 
express deep regret for the harm suffered by our 
former graduate student and instructor, Ms. Abbate. 
Dr. McAdams says this condition creates a de facto dismissal 
because it requires, at least in part, that he recant activity 
protected by the doctrine of academic freedom.  The University 
claims these are reasonable pre-conditions to the resumption of 
professorial duties in light of the basis for his sanction. 
¶91 Dr. McAdams did not write the missive required by the 
Discipline Letter.  Nonetheless, the University confirmed he was 
still suspended——not dismissed——even after expiration of the 
deadline stated in the Discipline Letter.  On April 13, 2016, 
President Lovell wrote to Dr. McAdams "to clarify that your 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
61 
status with the University is unchanged and you remain in a 
suspended status as outlined in my March 24th letter."  The 
University's brief also acknowledges Dr. McAdams has not been 
terminated. 
 
It 
wrote: 
 
"Dr. 
McAdams 
argues 
in 
a 
footnote . . . that his continued suspension is a de facto 
termination.  But the conditions for his return were appropriate 
according to his own expert and Judge Hansher, and his refusal 
to do what is appropriate does not constitute a termination by 
Marquette."  (Emphasis added.)  Nothing in the record indicates 
his status has changed since then. 
¶92 We will accept the University's concession that it has 
not dismissed Dr. McAdams and that he has merely been suspended 
from his status as a tenured member of the Marquette University 
faculty (without pay).  Because we have concluded that the 
suspension breached the Contract, it must be ended and Dr. 
McAdams must be restored to the faculty.  The Faculty Statutes 
require the University to comply with our determination of Dr. 
McAdams' right to reinstatement: 
[T]he University shall, for a period of six months 
thereafter, or until the final determination of any 
judicial action which may be commenced within such 
period 
to 
test 
the 
validity 
of 
the . . . suspension, . . . hold 
itself 
ready 
to 
reinstate the faculty member, with unimpaired rank, 
tenure, compensation, and benefits, to the extent that 
the faculty member's entitlement thereto may be 
judicially adjudged or decreed, . . . . 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
62 
Faculty Statute § 307.09.33 
¶93 Therefore, we hold the University to its contractual 
promise to reinstate Dr. McAdams to the faculty of Marquette 
University with unimpaired rank, tenure, compensation, and 
benefits.  See Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 2010 
WI 44, ¶37, 324 Wis. 2d 703, 783 N.W.2d 294 ("When a contract 
specifies remedies available for breach of contract, the 
intention of the parties generally governs."); Faculty Statute 
§ 307.09.  Because the suspension was invalid ab initio, the 
University may not enforce any of the reinstatement conditions 
identified in the Discipline Letter.34 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶94 We do not defer to the University's determination that 
it did not breach its Contract with Dr. McAdams.  The 
                                                 
33 Dr. McAdams filed his complaint to "test the validity of" 
his suspension, and we have concluded the suspension was not 
valid.  Further, he filed his complaint within the time required 
by Faculty Statute § 307.09.  He commenced this case on May 2, 
2016, with the filing of his complaint in the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court, which is within six months of the Discipline 
Letter.  See Wis. Stat. § 801.02(1) ("A civil action in which a 
personal judgment is sought is commenced as to any defendant 
when a summons and a complaint naming the person as defendant 
are filed with the court, . . . .").  The six-month window commenced with 
President Lovell's issuance of the Discipline Letter on March 24, 2016, because that is the 
document that imposed the discipline under consideration in this case. 
34 Because we base our conclusion on the University's 
concession that Dr. McAdams has not been dismissed, we do not 
address whether the University violated its promise that 
"[d]ismissal will not be used to restrain faculty members in 
their exercise of . . . rights guaranteed them by the United 
States Constitution."  Faculty Statute § 307.07(2). 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
  
 
63 
University's Discipline Procedure neither substitutes for, nor 
limits, Dr. McAdams' right to litigate his claims in our courts. 
¶95 We conclude that the University breached the Contract 
by suspending Dr. McAdams for exercising his contractually-
protected right of academic freedom.35  Consequently, we reverse 
the circuit court's order and judgment, and remand with 
instructions to: 
(1) Enter judgment in favor of Dr. McAdams on his 
claims that the University breached the Contract by 
suspending him without cause on December 16, 2014 
(with pay), affirming the suspension on January 30, 
2015, and then increasing the discipline to suspension 
without pay effective April 1, 2016 (Complaint, counts 
one and two);  
(2) Enter 
an 
order 
requiring 
the 
University 
to 
immediately reinstate Dr. McAdams to the faculty of 
Marquette University with unimpaired rank, tenure, 
compensation, and benefits (including the tendering of 
any documents necessary to accomplish those ends); 
(3) Conduct such other and further proceedings as are 
consistent 
with 
this 
decision, 
including 
the 
determination of Dr. McAdams' damages (which shall 
include back pay).36 
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court 
are reversed, and the cause is remanded with instructions. 
¶96 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J., did not participate. 
 
                                                 
35 Both the concurring and dissenting opinions address what 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution might have 
to say about this case.  The court, however, does not rely upon 
the United States Constitution for any part of its decision. 
36 We express no opinion on the merits of any part of Dr. 
McAdams' complaint except as expressly addressed herein. 
No.  2017AP1240 
 
 
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¶97 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  In this 
unprecedented dispute between a university and a professor, 
academic freedom was put on trial.  Would the sacred "right of 
faculty members to speak as citizens——that is, 'to address the 
larger community with regard to any matter of social, political, 
economic or other interest without institutional discipline or 
restraint'"1——succumb to the dominant academic culture of micro-
aggressions, trigger warnings and safe spaces2 that seeks to 
silence 
unpopular 
speech 
by 
deceptively 
recasting 
it 
as 
violence?  In this battle, only one could prevail, for academic 
freedom cannot coexist with Orwellian speech police.  Academic 
freedom means nothing if faculty is forced to self-censor in 
fear of offending the unforeseen and ever-evolving sensitivities 
of adversaries demanding retribution.  
¶98 "[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an 
opinion is . . . robbing the human race; posterity as well as 
the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, 
                                                 
1 American Association of University Professors, Statement  
on Civility, https://www.aaup.org/issues/civility (last visited 
June 18, 2018). 
2 Some 
universities 
recognize 
the 
incompatibility 
of 
insulating students from micro-aggressions, via trigger warnings 
and safe spaces, with academic freedom:  "Our commitment to 
academic freedom means that we do not support so-called 'trigger 
warnings,' we do not cancel invited speakers because their 
topics might prove controversial, and we do not condone the 
creation of intellectual 'safe spaces' where individuals can 
retreat from ideas and perspectives at odds with their own." 
John Ellison, Dean of Students at the University of Chicago, 
Letter to Class of 2020, https://news.uchicago.edu/sites/default
/files/attachments/Dear_Class_of_2020_Students.pdf (last visited 
June 18, 2018).  
No.  2017AP1240.rgb 
 
2 
 
still more than those who hold it.  If the opinion is right, 
they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for 
truth:  if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, 
the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, 
produced 
by 
its 
collision 
with 
error."3 
 
Many 
American 
universities were founded "on the illimitable freedom of the 
human mind" to develop, articulate, examine and communicate 
ideas in order to "follow truth wherever it may lead."4  
Marquette University's own mission includes "the search for 
truth, the discovery and sharing of knowledge."5  When academic 
freedom was under attack for being "dangerous" and "oppressive" 
forty years ago, one of America's oldest universities reaffirmed 
that "[t]he history of intellectual growth and discovery clearly 
demonstrates the need for unfettered freedom, the right to think 
the unthinkable, discuss the unmentionable, and challenge the 
unchallengeable."6  Over time, academia has begun to abandon this 
                                                 
3 John Stuart Mills, On Liberty, in Utilitarianism and On 
Liberty 88, 100 (Mary Warnock ed., 2d ed. 2003) (1859). 
4 Thomas Jefferson, University of Virginia, Comprehensive 
Standards 3.7.4: Academic Freedom, http://www.virginia.edu/sacs/
standards/3-7-4.html (last visited June 18, 2018). 
5 Marquette 
University, 
Mission 
Statement, 
http://www.marquette.edu/leadership/values.php 
(last 
visited 
June 18, 2018).  
6 Yale University, 1974 Report of the Committee on Freedom 
of 
Expression 
at 
Yale, 
https://yalecollege.yale.edu/deans-
office/reports/report-committee-freedom-expression-yale 
(last 
visited June 18, 2018).  
No.  2017AP1240.rgb 
 
3 
 
Jeffersonian creed,7 replacing it with groupthink tribalism 
seeking to silence disfavored viewpoints.8 
¶99 I join the majority in full.  The opinion ably 
addresses academic freedom in a manner narrowly tailored to this 
case, which was easily resolved by applying the language of 
Marquette's contract with McAdams to the undisputed facts.  The 
court correctly concludes that the contract guarantees McAdams 
academic freedom, academic freedom encompasses his blog post, 
and Marquette's suspension of McAdams breached the contract.   
¶100 I write separately because academic freedom, and 
concomitantly, free speech, is increasingly imperiled in America 
and within the microcosm of the college campus.  A broader 
discussion of the significance and meaning of academic freedom 
will benefit universities who contractually extend academic 
freedom to professors, as Marquette did, as well as courts 
across the nation tackling these issues. 
I 
¶101 The United States Supreme Court has discussed the 
importance of academic freedom in a variety of cases, but has 
not definitively expounded its meaning.  In Keyishian v. Bd. of 
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967), the Court described academic 
                                                 
7 See Bradley Campbell & Jason Manning, The End of Academe:  
Free Speech and the Silencing of Dissent, Chron. of Higher Educ. 
(Jan. 
21, 
2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/The-End-of-
Academe-Free/242290. 
8 See Daniel B. Klein & Charlotta Stern, Groupthink in Acade
mia, Am. Enterprise Inst. (Nov. 14, 2007), https://www.aei.org/w
p-content/uploads/2011/10/20071113_GroupthinkinAcademia.pdf. 
No.  2017AP1240.rgb 
 
4 
 
freedom as being "of transcendent value to all of us and not 
merely to the teachers concerned.  That freedom is therefore a 
special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate 
laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."  See 
also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) ("The vigilant 
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than 
in the community of American schools."); Barenblatt v. United 
States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959) (describing "academic teaching-
freedom and its corollary learning-freedom" as "so essential to 
the well-being of the Nation); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 
234, 250 (1957) (plurality) ("The essentiality of freedom in the 
community 
of 
American 
universities 
is 
almost 
self-
evident . . . .  Teachers and students must always remain free 
to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and 
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and 
die.").   
¶102 Specific 
definitions 
can 
be 
found 
in 
other 
authoritative sources.  Black's Law Dictionary defines academic 
freedom as "the right (esp. of a university teacher) to speak 
freely about political or ideological issues without fear of 
loss of position or other reprisal."9  The American Association 
of University Professors (AAUP) defines academic freedom as the 
liberty 
to 
"speak 
or 
write 
as 
citizens . . . free 
from 
                                                 
9 Academic Freedom, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
 
No.  2017AP1240.rgb 
 
5 
 
institutional 
censorship 
or 
discipline."10 
 
Russell 
Kirk 
described academic freedom as a principle that teachers and 
scholars should be "protect[ed] . . . from hazards that tend to 
prevent [them] from meeting [their] obligations in the pursuit 
of truth."11  
¶103 The roots of academic freedom are ancient.  Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr. attributed the concept's origin to Socrates.  
See Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail (Apr. 
16, 1963), in The Autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr. 187, 
194 (Clayborne Carson ed., 1998).  The search for truth to which 
the founder of the first academy, Plato, was dedicated, has been 
identified as the progenitor of academic freedom.  Larry D. 
Spurgeon, A Transcendent Value:  The Quest to Safeguard Academic 
Freedom, 
34 
J.C. 
& 
U.L 
111, 
117 
(2007). 
 
The 
modern 
                                                 
10 American Association of University Professors, 1940 
Statement 
of 
Principles 
on 
Academic 
Freedom 
and 
Tenure, 
https://www.aaup.org/report/1940-statement-principles-academic-
freedom-and-tenure (last visited June 18, 2018).  The AAUP, 
founded in 1915, is a non-profit organization representing the 
interests of over 40,000 faculty, librarians, graduate students, 
and academic professionals at institutions of higher learning 
across the country.  AAUP appears as amicus in this case in 
support of McAdams and declares it "is committed to advancing 
academic freedom, the free exchange of ideas, and higher 
education's contribution to the common good."  As the first 
organization to develop codes of academic freedom, AAUP's 
statements remain the model.  Julie H. Margetta, Taking Academic 
Freedom Back to the Future:  Refining the "Special Concern of 
the First Amendment", 7 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 1, 5 (2005).  As 
the court explains, Marquette does not dispute that it adopted 
AAUP's 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure.  See majority op., ¶¶61-62, n.20.  
11 Russell Kirk, Academic Freedom:  An Essay in Definition 1 
(1955) (quotation marks omitted). 
No.  2017AP1240.rgb 
 
6 
 
understanding of academic freedom likely originated in German 
principles of Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit, the freedom to 
teach and the freedom to learn, respectively.  Julie H. 
Margetta, Taking Academic Freedom Back to the Future:  Refining 
the "Special Concern of the First Amendment", 7 Loy. J. Pub. 
Int. L. 1, 5 (2005).  The German conception of academic freedom 
encompassed students, perhaps a recognition that inhibiting the 
freedom of teachers impedes learning.  
¶104 The concept appears in American history as early as 
the eighteenth century in Thomas Jefferson's founding vision of 
the University of Virginia:  "This institution will be based on 
the illimitable freedom of the human mind.  For here we are not 
afraid to follow truth wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate any 
error so long as reason is left to combat it."12  Nineteenth 
century academics did not confine their exercise of academic 
freedom to the classroom, but understood the principle to 
protect their "right to express their opinions even outside the 
walls of academia, even on controversial subjects."  Geoffrey R. 
Stone, A Brief History of Academic Freedom, in Who's Afraid of 
Academic Freedom? 5 (Akeel Bilgrami & Jonathan R. Cole eds., 
2015).  Protection of extramural speech——expression beyond the 
boundaries of the university——endures:  "Freedom of extramural 
                                                 
12 University 
of 
Virginia, 
Comprehensive 
Standards 
3.7.4: Academic Freedom, http://www.virginia.edu/sacs/standards/
3-7-4.html (last visited June 18, 2018). 
No.  2017AP1240.rgb 
 
7 
 
utterances is a constitutive part of the American conception of 
academic freedom."13 
¶105 Academic freedom encompasses "two distinct concepts":  
(1) "professional academic freedom" tied to AAUP standards, and 
(2) the "legal concept of academic freedoms" tied to the First 
Amendment.  Margetta, supra ¶7, at 4-5.  Academic freedom has 
also been expressed as a right under the First Amendment, which 
in public universities serves as the source for academic 
freedom.  See generally Donald A. Downs, Academic Freedom:  What 
It Is, What It Isn't, and How to Tell the Difference, Pope Ctr. 
Series on Higher Educ., May 2009, at 1.  The AAUP specifically 
accords extramural statements protections that are coextensive 
with the First Amendment, noting that a university questioning a 
professor's fitness should "remove from consideration any 
supposed rhetorical transgressions that would not be found to 
exceed the protections of the First Amendment."14  Academic 
freedom and free speech are interconnected concepts and frequent 
companions.  I discuss these doctrines synchronously because 
Marquette guaranteed McAdams both rights and contractually 
shielded him from discipline for his exercise of either. 
                                                 
13 AAUP, Statement on Civility, https://www.aaup.org/issues/
civility (last visited June 18, 2018).  
14 AAUP, 
Ensuring 
Academic 
Freedom 
in 
Politically 
Controversial 
Academic 
Personnel 
Decisions 
(Aug. 
2011), 
https://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/895B2C30-29F6-4A88-80B9-
FCC4D23CF28B/0/PoliticallyControversialDecisionsreport.pdf. 
No.  2017AP1240.rgb 
 
8 
 
II 
¶106 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
repeatedly 
recognized the importance of academic freedom and freedom of 
expression on America's college campuses, without which "our 
civilization will stagnate and die."  Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250.  
In 1957, the Court noted the "essentiality of freedom in the 
community of American universities" as "almost self-evident," 
concluding 
that 
"[s]cholarship 
cannot 
flourish" 
unless 
"[t]eachers and students . . . always remain free to inquire, to 
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding."  
Id. 
¶107 A decade later, the Court affirmed:  "Our Nation is 
deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom" which is "a 
special concern of the First Amendment."  Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 
603 (1967).  The role "played by those who guide and train our 
youth" in America's universities cannot be understated.  Id. 
(quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250).  Public discourse on 
controversial topics is essential to our success as a nation.  
Id.  "To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders 
in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our 
Nation."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶108 In 1972, the Court stressed that the "college 
classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the 
'marketplace of ideas.'"  Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 
(1972).  The Court "reaffirm[ed] this Nation's dedication to 
safeguarding academic freedom."  Id. at 180-81.  And, in 2003, 
it emphasized that "universities occupy a special niche in our 
No.  2017AP1240.rgb 
 
9 
 
constitutional tradition."  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 
329 (2003). 
¶109 This collection of cases establishes the centrality of 
academic freedom on college campuses, and the judicial branch's 
responsibility to vigilantly protect it.  Several federal 
appellate courts have acknowledged the right of university 
professors 
"to 
disseminate 
publicly 
[their] 
views 
as . . . teacher[s] or scholar[s]."  Omosegbon v. Wells, 335 
F.3d 668, 677 (7th Cir. 2003).  Protecting academic freedom is 
particularly pressing when the views expressed "fall outside the 
mainstream."  Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 605 
F.3d 703, 708 (9th Cir. 2010).  "Without the right to stand 
against 
society's 
most 
strongly-held 
convictions, 
the 
marketplace of ideas would decline into a boutique of the banal, 
as the urge to censor is greatest where debate is most 
disquieting and orthodoxy most entrenched."  Id. 
¶110 For example, a federal district court denied the 
University of Illinois' motion to dismiss a newly hired 
professor's breach of contract action against the University for 
rescinding the contract based on the professor's profanity-laden 
diatribe against Israel, which he posted on Twitter.  Salaita v. 
Kennedy, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1075-84 (N.D. Ill. 2015) 
(classifying professor's personal tweets as a matter of public 
concern and determining Salaita's complaint sufficiently alleged 
a First Amendment claim); see also Starsky v. Williams, 353 F. 
Supp. 900, 922-24, 927 (D. Ariz. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in 
part, 512 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1975) (firing professor for 
No.  2017AP1240.rgb 
 
10 
 
participating in a protest and making profane remarks critical 
of administration violated AAUP standards that prohibit such 
discipline as well as a First Amendment right to express 
unpopular views); Adamian v. Jacobsen, 523 F.2d 929, 931, 934 
(9th Cir. 1975) (professor who made profane comments, disrupted 
campus ceremonies, and incited potential violent confrontation 
during Vietnam and Kent State protest cannot be disciplined for 
such political agitation; remanded for further proceedings). 
¶111 It is the expression of opinions divergent from what 
is currently politically correct that needs protection under the 
doctrine of academic freedom.  "If there is any principle of the 
Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than 
any other it is the principle of free thought——not free thought 
for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we 
hate."  United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting).  If academic freedom does not protect 
dissident viewpoints, the doctrine is worthless.  After all, 
"[i]ntellectual advancement has traditionally progressed through 
discord and dissent, as a diversity of views ensures that ideas 
survive because they are correct, not because they are popular."  
Rodriguez, 605 F.3d at 708. 
¶112 Academic freedom, however, is not limitless.  Like 
Marquette, many universities have adopted the AAUP's 1940 
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure.  With 
rights come responsibilities and the AAUP guides the exercise of 
No.  2017AP1240.rgb 
 
11 
 
academic freedom in its Statement on Professional Ethics.15  For 
example, this ethics code for professors demands the practice of 
"intellectual honesty," the protection of students' academic 
freedom, and the avoidance of creating any impression of 
speaking on behalf of the university. 
¶113 Courts have also circumscribed some limits around 
academic freedom.  It does not impede a "university's ability to 
control its curriculum," Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 
488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998), or "to regulate the content of what is 
or is not expressed" when it is the university that is speaking, 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 
833-34 
(1995).16 
 
But, 
the 
doctrine 
does 
preclude 
universities from punishing academic speakers who publicly 
discuss matters of public concern beyond the classroom.  See 
Vikram Amar & Alan Brownstein, Academic Freedom, 9 Green Bag 2d 
17, 25-26 (2005).  Just as no citizen could "be punished for 
writing a book that angers the state legislature——no matter how 
outrageous or offensive the book might be," id., professors at 
universities should not be punished for speaking on matters of 
                                                 
15 AAUP, 
Statement 
on 
Professional 
Ethics 
(1966), 
https://www.aaup.org/report/statement-professional-ethics 
(last 
visited June 18, 2018). 
16 Similarly, the First Amendment does not protect all 
speech.  See State v. Breitzman, 2017 WI 100, ¶¶51-54, 378 
Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93 (explaining classes of speech not 
protected). 
No.  2017AP1240.rgb 
 
12 
 
public concern even if——especially if——that speech does not 
conform with mainstream thought.17 
III 
¶114 Courts have been "particularly vigilant" when there is 
an "alleged assault" on the First Amendment involving academic 
freedom.  Larry D. Spurgeon, A Transcendent Value:  The Quest to 
Safeguard Academic Freedom, 34 J.C. & U.L 111, 150 (2007) ("A 
'special concern' means that courts should be particularly 
vigilant when an alleged assault on the First Amendment involves 
academic speech.").  The First Amendment protects speech of 
university employees when it involves "matters of public 
concern"——speech that can be "fairly considered as relating to" 
issues 
"of 
political, 
social, 
or 
other 
concern 
to 
the 
community."18  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); see 
also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968).19 
                                                 
17 The court received a variety of amicus briefs from 
private businesses concerned about the reverberations of this 
case on the private sector.  Their fears are unfounded. 
University campuses inhabit a unique environment.  The doctrine 
of 
academic 
freedom 
has 
no 
application 
within 
private 
enterprise, unless of course a private entity incorporates the 
doctrine 
into 
employee 
contracts. 
 
Marquette 
University, 
although a private institution, chose to guarantee academic 
freedom to McAdams in his contract. 
18 The text of the First Amendment provides: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; 
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; 
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to 
petition 
the 
Government 
for 
a 
redress 
of 
grievances. 
(continued) 
No.  2017AP1240.rgb 
 
13 
 
¶115 The Court struck down a West Virginia law compelling 
all teachers and students to salute the American Flag while 
pledging allegiance to it and those who refused were expelled 
from school.  W. Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 626-30 (1943).  The Court, declaring the law violative of 
the First Amendment, proclaimed:  "If there is any fixed star in 
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high 
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force 
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."  Id. at 
642. 
¶116 In Keyishian, the Court nullified New York laws 
requiring university professors to certify they were not 
communists.  385 U.S. at 603-04.  Concerned about both academic 
freedom and the First Amendment, the Court identified the 
"chilling effect upon the exercise of vital First Amendment 
rights" when vague and general restrictions cause a teacher to 
                                                                                                                                                             
As a private entity, Marquette, of course, is neither 
Congress nor the government, and can adopt and enforce rules not 
implicated by the Constitution.  Marquette, however, chose to 
incorporate into McAdams' contract rights guaranteed "by the 
United States Constitution." 
19 These two cases are often discussed together in assessing 
whether speech of a public employee was protected, which is 
known as the Pickering-Connick test.  But cf. Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006) ("[E]xpression related to 
academic 
scholarship 
or 
classroom 
instruction 
implicates 
additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted 
for by this Court's customary employee-speech jurisprudence."). 
No.  2017AP1240.rgb 
 
14 
 
"guess what conduct or utterance may lose him his position."  
Id. at 604. 
¶117 Similarly, the Court held unconstitutional an Oklahoma 
law requiring teachers to take a "loyalty oath" disclaiming 
affiliation "directly or indirectly" with any organization or 
group determined "to be a communist front or subversive 
organization."  Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 186 (1952).  
The Court held the law infringed individual constitutional 
rights, was an "assertion of arbitrary power," and offended due 
process.  Id. at 188-91.  It recognized that "inhibiting 
individual freedom of movement" when a teacher may have 
innocently joined a group would "stifle the flow of democratic 
expression and controversy at one of its chief sources."  Id. at 
191. 
¶118 Sweezy involved a professor who was convicted for 
refusing to answer political association questions.  354 U.S. at 
238-45.  The Court reversed the conviction, emphasizing academic 
freedom and freedom of expression.  Id. at 249-50.  Recognizing 
freedom of expression as a "fundamental principle of democratic 
society," the Court professed the significance of divergent 
voices:  "Mere unorthodoxy or dissent from the prevailing mores 
is not to be condemned.  The absence of such voices would be a 
symptom of grave illness in our society."  Id. at 251. 
¶119 Finally, in Shelton, the Court struck down an Arkansas 
statute requiring teachers to annually file an affidavit listing 
"every organization to which [they have] belonged or regularly 
contributed within the preceding five years."  364 U.S. at 480.  
No.  2017AP1240.rgb 
 
15 
 
The Court held this law abridged teachers' constitutional rights 
by inhibiting free speech, assembly, and association.  Id. at 
485-89.  "Such unwarranted inhibition upon the free spirit of 
teachers . . . has an unmistakable tendency to chill that free 
play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to 
cultivate and practice . . . ."  Id. at 487 (quoting Wieman, 344 
U.S. at 195 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
IV 
¶120 In every case presenting the Supreme Court with the 
issue, it unfailingly declared the importance of academic 
freedom and freedom of expression in academia.  It struck down 
many laws that undoubtedly had the support of a majority of the 
people.  In the midst of the fear and tension gridlocking 
American international politics during the Cold War, few would 
publicly object to ensuring that teachers——entrusted with 
educating 
the 
future 
leaders 
of 
America——would 
denounce 
Communism and would not influence students to become Communists.  
Despite the good intentions underpinning such laws, the Court 
repeatedly struck them down and continually emphasized the 
importance of academic freedom, the need for free expression on 
college campuses, and the significant value that opposing 
viewpoints play in the advancement of ideas.  From Aristotle 
challenging the then-predominant belief that the Earth was flat 
to Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton asserting the 
then-preposterous idea that women should vote, the past is 
replete with examples of unpopular ideas proven right when 
No.  2017AP1240.rgb 
 
16 
 
freely aired and debated.  To squelch discussion of any idea 
jeopardizes our future. 
¶121 Academic freedom exists to further the search for 
truth through vigorous open inquiry, discourse, and debate.  
See, e.g., Healy, 408 U.S. at 180.  Permitting debate ensures 
"the 
security 
of 
the 
Republic, 
the 
very 
foundation 
of 
constitutional government."  DeJonge v. State of Oregon, 299 
U.S. 353, 365 (1937) ("to the end that government may be 
responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if 
desired, may be obtained by peaceful means").  And, as Pickering 
instructs, criticisms of campus administration are part of the 
public debate.  391 U.S. at 573-74. 
¶122 This court acknowledged the importance of academic 
freedom, specifically the freedom to criticize university 
administration, almost sixty years ago when it decided State ex 
rel. Ball v. McPhee, 6 Wis. 2d 190, 94 N.W.2d 711 (1959), 
overruled in part on other grounds, Stacy v. Ashland Cty. Dep't. 
of Public Welfare, 39 Wis. 2d 595, 159 N.W.2d 630 (1968).  In 
that case, this court recognized that a university should not be 
able to discharge a professor on the basis of the professor's 
expression of philosophical disagreements with administration:  
"Surely a teacher in a state college is entitled to some 
academic freedom in criticizing school programs with which he is 
in disagreement.  Such acts of criticism do not qualify as 
either inefficiency or bad behavior."  Id. at 204. 
No.  2017AP1240.rgb 
 
17 
 
V 
¶123 Professional academic freedom is often regarded to be 
"alive and well"20 as the dearth of court cases may corroborate.  
News reports of intra-campus clashes between professors and 
administrators21 suggest otherwise, although many disputes never 
reach the courts for obvious reasons, not least among them, "it 
is always dangerous to shoot at the king."22  However, when 
"there is a breach in the academic fortress . . . the next line 
of defense, in some instances, is the court."23  This is one of 
those instances. 
¶124 McAdams, as he had done many times before, wrote a 
blog post on a matter of public concern calling into question 
the prevailing orthodoxy on Marquette's campus.24  The impetus 
for this particular blog post arose after an undergraduate 
student, J.D., turned to McAdams for help because J.D. was 
                                                 
20 Larry D. Spurgeon, A Transcendent Value:  The Quest to 
Safeguard Academic Freedom, 34 J.C. & U.L 111, 130 (2007). 
21 Heather MacDonald, The Penn Law School Mob Scores A 
Victory, 
Wall 
St. 
J. 
(Mar. 
18, 
2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-penn-law-school-mob-scores-a-
victory-1521397094; Erika Christakis, My Halloween Email Led to 
a 
Campus 
Firestorm, 
The 
Wash. 
Post 
(Oct. 
28, 
2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/my-halloween-email-led-
to-a-campus-firestorm--and-a-troubling-lesson-about-self-
censorship/2016/10/28/70e55732-9b97-11e6-a0ed-
ab0774c1eaa5_story.html?utm_term=.7fae2361b7d7. 
22 Spurgeon, supra note 20, at 130. 
23 Id. 
24 McAdams has been employed as a professor at Marquette 
since 1977.  Marquette granted him tenure in 1989. 
No.  2017AP1240.rgb 
 
18 
 
troubled by how his Philosophy teacher (who was a graduate 
student), and Marquette's Philosophy Department Chair Nancy Snow 
and Assistant Chair Sebastian Luft had shut down his attempt to 
understand why the topic of same sex marriage had been censored 
during a class discussion.  Abbate invited J.D. to drop the 
class and Snow told him to "change his attitude so he comes 
across as less insolent and disrespectful," later calling him a 
"little 
twit" 
and 
a 
"jackass" 
in 
email 
exchanges 
with 
colleagues.  Absurdly, Marquette's Faculty Hearing Committee 
would later support its disciplinary recommendation against 
McAdams by citing Marquette's Guiding Values, which obligate 
professors to "respect the dignity of others" to "acknowledge 
their right to express differing opinions" and to "nurture an 
inclusive, diverse community that fosters . . . vigorous yet 
respectful debate." 
¶125 McAdams reached out to Abbate for comment, but Abbate 
declined the opportunity to respond.  The blog post reported on 
the student's experience and discussed McAdams' political view 
of popular tactics used for "shutting people up."  It was 
critical of Marquette and of censorship.  Unlike the Philosophy 
Department faculty's criticisms of J.D., it did not contain any 
intemperate language or ad hominem attack.  The blog post did 
not contain a call to action or make any demands inciting 
violence or attack.  In fact, Marquette's Dean of Arts and 
Sciences did not believe the post was harmful to Abbate at all 
and Abbate apparently agreed, remarking:  "When I saw the blog I 
was pleasantly surprised."     
No.  2017AP1240.rgb 
 
19 
 
¶126 Despite her pleasant surprise, Abbate flamed this 
fire.  She drafted a formal letter of complaint insisting that 
Marquette discipline McAdams for the blog.  Abbate also asserted 
she had been "the target of harassing emails, sent by [McAdams'] 
followers," although as of the date of that statement, Abbate 
had only received a single email critical of her.  Two weeks 
later, Abbate threatened to sue Marquette and subject it to 
adverse publicity, unless the University acceded to her demands 
that 
the 
University 
fire 
McAdams, 
punish 
J.D., 
and 
pay 
"reparations" to her.25 
¶127 J.D. and Abbate each shared their respective sides of 
the story with online news sources——J.D. with College Fix26 and 
Abbate with the Daily Nous.27  Other news sources picked up the 
story and it became national news.28  After the story went viral, 
Abbate received numerous emails, some in support, some critical, 
and others vile and threatening. 
                                                 
25 A short time later, Abbate left Marquette for University 
of Colorado. 
26 Matt Lamb, Student told he can't openly disagree with gay 
marriage in class at Jesuit college, The C. Fix (Nov. 17, 2014), 
http://www.thecollegefix.com/post/20138/.  
27 Justin Weinberg, Philosophy Grad Student Target of 
Political 
Smear 
Campaign, 
Daily 
Nous 
(Nov. 
18, 
2014), 
http://dailynous.com/2014/11/18/philosophy-grad-student-target-
of-political-smear-campaign/. 
28 See, e.g., Colleen Flaherty, Ethics Lesson, Inside Higher 
Ed (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/11/
20/marquette-u-grad-student-shes-being-targeted-after-ending-
class-discussion-gay; Todd Starnes, Teacher to student:  If you 
don't support gay marriage, drop my class, Fox News:  Opinions 
(Nov. 22, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2014/11/22/teach
er-to-student-if-dont-support-gay-marriage-drop-my-class.html. 
No.  2017AP1240.rgb 
 
20 
 
¶128 Marquette found itself embroiled in a controversy it 
did not initiate.  In response, it suspended McAdams from 
teaching, banished him from campus, and initiated disciplinary 
proceedings against him.  After hearings, the Faculty Hearing 
Committee (FHC) recommended McAdams be suspended without pay.  
Marquette's President, Michael Lovell, accepted the FHC's 
recommendation but as a condition of reinstatement as a member 
of the faculty, demanded McAdams express his "deep regret"——a 
proviso reminiscent of forced confessions of guilt for imaginary 
crimes in oppressive regimes.  Instead of abiding by its 
contract, which guaranteed academic freedom, Marquette breached 
it.  As the court correctly holds, McAdams' blog post plainly 
falls within the definition of academic freedom under McAdams' 
contract. 
¶129 Marquette subjected a tenured professor to discipline 
for writing something that triggered an adverse response from 
third parties over whom he has no control, thereby holding 
McAdams responsible for the actions of third parties.  Allowing 
this retribution to stand would set a dangerous precedent, 
leading faculty to self-censor for fear of third-party reactions 
to speech and post hoc disapproval of it.  If universities 
impose culpability on professors for the actions of others, it 
will undoubtedly cause the same chilling effect and result in 
the same stifling of expression that led the Supreme Court to 
strike down the legal imposition of "not-a-communist" promises, 
loyalty pledges, and disclosures of association in Keyishian, 
No.  2017AP1240.rgb 
 
21 
 
Weiman, and Shelton, respectively.  And academic freedom would 
be severely wounded, perhaps fatally.   
VI 
¶130 "And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose 
to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do 
injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her 
strength.  Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth 
put to the worse, in a free and open encounter."  John Milton, 
Areopagitica 166-67 (James Russell Lowell ed., 1890) (1644). 
¶131 Academic freedom is deeply entrenched in the history 
of this country and its college campuses.  Universities are 
unique places for intellectual growth, where both students and 
professors can "follow truth wherever it may lead."  Those who 
engage in the pursuit of truth, who propound ideas and challenge 
others, must enjoy the freedom to speak on matters of public 
concern without the sword of Damocles menacing their discourse. 
¶132 "Mere unorthodoxy or dissent from the prevailing mores 
is not to be condemned.  The absence of such voices would be a 
symptom of grave illness in our society."  Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 
251.  Suppression of viewpoints confronting the current cultural 
orthodoxy would surely lead to academic stagnation and imperil 
the future of America.  If institutional silencing of non-
majority viewpoints replaces the search for truth, higher 
education becomes nothing more than an echo chamber of familiar 
and recycled perspectives, and the dialectic dies with it. 
No.  2017AP1240.rgb 
 
22 
 
¶133 The court ensures the dialectic is alive and well in 
Wisconsin, and academic freedom along with it. I join the 
majority opinion in full.   
 
 
No.  2017AP1240.dk 
 
1 
 
¶134 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  I offer this brief 
concurrence because I believe that not only was the FHC 
compositionally biased, the University's Discipline Procedure is 
itself structurally biased.  The FHC cannot be considered 
impartial because, even though it was hearing the case, it was 
also one of the contending parties:  The FHC is the University 
inasmuch as it is composed entirely of University employees.  
Faculty Statutes § 307.07(6).  But it was not just the FHC——
everyone in the disciplinary process was a University employee.  
Thus, the University (by its designated prosecutor1) presented 
its case to the University (in the form of the FHC2), which then 
made a recommendation to the University (in the person of 
President Michael Lovell3).  We have long known the problems 
attendant upon allowing a party to decide its own case: 
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; 
because 
his 
interest 
would 
certainly 
bias 
his 
judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.  
With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men, 
are unfit to be both judges and parties, at the same 
time; . . . . 
The Federalist No. 10, at 59 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 
1961).  Echoing Madison, the United States Supreme Court has 
said that "no man can be a judge in his own case[,] and no man 
                                                 
1 See 
Faculty 
Statute 
§ 307.07(11) 
(stating 
the 
"Administration may appear or be represented by its legal 
counsel").  At the hearing, the University appeared by two 
attorneys. 
2 See Faculty Statute § 307.07(1). 
3 See Faculty Statutes § 307.07(18)-(19); Faculty Handbook 
art. 4, § 1.01.1(1). 
No.  2017AP1240.dk 
 
2 
 
is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the 
outcome."  In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). 
¶135 And yet, the University tells us we are to defer to 
its determination that it did not breach its contract with Dr. 
McAdams.  That proposition threatens the very concept of 
contract.  A contract is supposed to bind the parties to 
ascertainable obligations.  Mgmt. Comput. Servs., Inc. v. 
Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 206 Wis. 2d 158, 178, 557 N.W.2d 67 
(1996) ("[A] contract must be definite as to the parties' basic 
commitments and obligations.").  But if in a contract between 
Mr. Smith and Mr. Brown, Mr. Smith is the unreviewable judge of 
whether 
he 
has 
himself 
breached 
the 
contract, 
then 
his 
contractual obligations mean nothing but what he wishes them to 
mean.  That, of course, is no contract at all. 
¶136 I am not the only one to notice how this type of 
structural bias can turn tenure into employment-at-will.  The 
D.C. Circuit in McConnell v. Howard University, 818 F.2d 58 
(D.C. Cir. 1987), recognized the incongruity of casting a 
university as the unreviewable judge of its dispute with one of 
its faculty members.  "If we were to adopt a view limiting 
judicial review over the substance of the Board of Trustees' 
decision, we would be allowing one of the parties to the 
contract to determine whether the contract had been breached."  
Id. at 68.  I agree with McConnell that it "would make no sense 
for a court blindly to defer to a university's interpretation of 
a tenure contract to which it is an interested party."  Id. at 
No.  2017AP1240.dk 
 
3 
 
69.  Doing so "would make a sham of the parties' contractual 
tenure arrangement."  Id. at 68. 
¶137 I am authorized to state that REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY 
joins this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
1 
 
¶138 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  At its core, 
academic freedom is a professional principle, not merely a legal 
construct.1  It embraces the academic freedom of the faculty as 
well as the academic freedom of the institution.  "Academic 
freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited 
exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also . . . on 
autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself."  Regents of 
Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985) 
(internal citations omitted). 
¶139 Within academic freedom lies the concept of shared 
governance.  It includes the right of faculty to participate in 
the governance of the institution on academic-related matters.  
Shared governance in colleges and universities has been forged 
over decades to address the specific issues that arise in the 
workplace of higher education. 
¶140 The majority errs in conducting only half of the 
academic freedom analysis.  It fails to recognize, much less 
analyze, the academic freedom of Marquette as a private, 
Catholic, Jesuit university.  As a result, it dilutes a private 
educational institution's autonomy to make its own academic 
decisions in fulfillment of its unique mission. 
                                                 
1 Rachel B. Levinson, Academic Freedom, Shared Governance, 
and the First Amendment after Garcetti v. Ceballos, Stetson 
University College of Law, 31st Annual National Conference on 
Law 
and 
Higher 
Education 
2 
(Feb. 
2011), 
https://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/4C126513-1194-4317-8123-
459BD9F30A6D/0/Stetson2011AcadFreedomFirstAmdmtoutline.pdf. 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
2 
 
¶141 Further, 
the 
majority 
compounds 
this 
error 
by 
rendering meaningless a key component of shared governance, 
reducing the faculty's bargained-for role in reviewing dismissal 
for cause to "nothing" or a mere "distraction."  In disregarding 
the 
faculty 
hearing 
committee's 
expertise 
and 
unanimous 
recommendation, it throws aside a process that is mutually 
agreed upon and time-honored.  Apparently, the majority thinks 
it is in a better position to address concerns of academic 
freedom than a group of tenured faculty members who live the 
doctrine every day. 
¶142 Additionally, the majority conducts its analysis with 
a selective view of the facts.  Missing from its opinion are key 
facts that informed McAdams' action.  After publishing the blog 
post, McAdams actively promoted it to local and national media 
outlets. 
 
The 
record 
reflects 
that 
McAdams 
did 
so 
by 
"distributing copies of the audio recording to interested 
journalists and bloggers, posting follow-up stories linking back 
to the Nov. 9 post, creating a category of posts linked to 
Abbate by name, and arranging to appear on radio and television 
interviews about the story and subsequent controversy."  McAdams 
wrote that he was aware that "'[w]hen one does something that 
gets national publicity, some jerks are going to say nasty 
things." 
¶143 That prophecy was fulfilled here.  Within hours of the 
blog post, Abbate started receiving negative emails, which only 
multiplied in the following weeks.  She feared for her safety at 
Marquette and within weeks withdrew her dissertation proposal 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
3 
 
and 
transferred 
to 
another 
university 
despite 
adverse 
consequences to her academic progress. 
¶144 The travesty of the majority opinion lies not just in 
its decision for Marquette University.  Because Marquette has 
adopted a definition of academic freedom and uniform procedures 
that have been embraced by many other colleges and universities, 
the decision is far reaching.  The majority's decision to so 
readily discard institutional academic freedom and to disrespect 
part of the time-honored and bargained-for shared governance 
procedures will reverberate throughout this state. 
¶145 Finally, because I determine that the doctrine of 
academic freedom does not protect McAdams from discipline, I 
address his argument that the First Amendment does.  McAdams is 
wrong.  His contract does not give him the full-throated First 
Amendment rights that would be given a private citizen vis-à-vis 
the government. 
¶146 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶147 The majority errs first by curbing its discussion of 
academic freedom.  It takes an expansive view of McAdams' 
academic freedom, but does not pay any mind to the academic 
freedom of the university. 
¶148 "Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent 
and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, 
but also . . . on autonomous decisionmaking by the academy 
itself[.]"  Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12 (internal citations 
omitted).  The term "academic freedom" is used to denote both 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
4 
 
the freedom of the academic institution to pursue its ends 
without interference from the government, as well as the freedom 
of the individual teacher to pursue desired ends without 
interference from the institution.2  Piarowski v. Illinois Cmty. 
                                                 
2 The definition of academic freedom in Marquette's faculty 
handbook focuses on this second type of academic freedom, 
"[p]rofessorial academic freedom," or "that proper to the 
scholar-teacher."  Marquette University, Handbook for Full-Time 
Faculty, "Rights and Responsibilities" 47 (version approved Aug. 
27, 
2013, 
last 
amended 
Nov. 
13, 
2017), 
http://www.marquette.edu/provost/_includes/documents/Facultyhand
booklastupdatedMay82018numbered.pdf.  Marquette's definition of 
academic freedom follows closely that of the AAUP's 1940 
Statement 
of 
Principles 
on 
Academic 
Freedom 
and 
Tenure.  
Marquette's definition provides in relevant part: 
Academic freedom is prized as essential to Marquette 
University and to its living growth as a university.  
Professorial academic freedom is that proper to the 
scholar-teacher, 
whose 
profession 
is 
to 
increase 
knowledge in himself/herself and in others.  As proper 
to the scholar-teacher, academic freedom is grounded 
on competence and integrity. 
When scholar-teachers carry on their academic lives in 
educational 
institutions, 
integrity 
requires 
both 
respect for the objectives of the institution in which 
they choose to carry on their academic lives and 
attention to the task of reevaluating these objectives 
as a necessary condition of living growth in human 
institutions. 
The University, because it prizes academic freedom, 
proposes the following safeguards to that freedom: 
 . . .  
c.  The college or university teacher is a 
citizen, a member of a learned profession, and an 
officer of an educational institution.  When 
he/she speaks or writes as a citizen, he/she 
should be free from institutional censorship or 
discipline, but his/her special position in the 
civil community imposes special obligations.  As 
(continued) 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
5 
 
Coll. Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1985) (citations 
omitted); see also Feldman v. Ho, 171 F.3d 494, 495 (7th Cir. 
1999); J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom:  A "Special Concern of 
the First Amendment", 99 Yale L.J. 251 (1989). 
¶149 To manifest this freedom to pursue their ends, 
educational institutions set their own missions.  As a Catholic, 
Jesuit institution, Marquette University operates according to 
certain guiding values.  These values include the "holistic 
development of students" and a "commitment to the Jesuit 
tradition and Catholic social teaching."3  It is also a guiding 
value of the institution to foster "vigorous yet respectful 
debate." 
¶150 Marquette's status as a Jesuit institution is a 
cornerstone of its identity.  According to amicus Association of 
Jesuit Colleges and Universities:  "Being 'Catholic, Jesuit 
universities' is not simply one characteristic among others but 
is [their] defining character, what makes [them] to be uniquely 
                                                                                                                                                             
a man/woman of learning and an educational 
officer, he/she should remember that the public 
may judge his/her profession and institution by 
his/her utterances.  Hence, he/she should at all 
times be accurate, should exercise appropriate 
restraint, should show respect for the opinions 
of others, and should make every effort to 
indicate that he/she is not an institutional 
spokesperson. 
Id. 
3 See 
Marquette 
University, 
http://www.marquette.edu/about/mission.php (last visited June 
22, 2018). 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
6 
 
what [they] are. . . . As Jesuit colleges and universities, 
[they] are a continuation of the Ignatian heritage and of the 
distinctive tradition of Jesuit education." 
¶151 Jesuit 
institutions 
operate 
under 
the 
"Ignatian 
pedagogy."  This educational philosophy encourages faculty to 
consider the "context" of the individual students in the 
classroom and "uniquely characterizes the relationship the 
faculty member has with the student [with whom] he [or] she 
attempts to create a teaching/learning environment."4 
¶152 Private institutional learning environments present 
unique concerns and a particular need for independence in 
decision making.  If the founding principles of each individual 
university are to be given life, the institution must possess 
the freedom to determine the consistency or inconsistency of 
actions with those principles. 
¶153 Institutional academic freedom is inclusive of four 
"essential freedoms":  "to determine for itself on academic 
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be 
taught, and who may be admitted to study."  Sweezy v. State of 
N.H. by Wyman, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring).  Although no court has clearly defined the scope of 
institutional academic freedom, McAdams' conduct and the faculty 
hearing committee procedures at issue in this case appear to 
                                                 
4 Dr. Susan Mountin, What is Ignatian Pedagogy?, Marquette 
University 
Explore 
Series, 
http://www.marquette.edu/mission/IgnatianPedagogy.php 
(last 
visited June 25, 2018). 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
7 
 
implicate the first of these "essential freedoms":  who may 
teach.  Although also relevant to public universities, this 
concern is especially germane in the context of private 
universities. 
¶154 In determining who may teach at its university, 
Marquette has academic freedom to uphold its values and 
principles.  It has academic freedom to provide an educational 
environment that is consistent with its mission as a university. 
¶155 McAdams' appeal focuses on his individual rights, and 
the majority follows suit.  However, McAdams' rights to academic 
freedom are not the only rights at issue.5  An educational 
institution, here a private, Catholic, Jesuit institution, 
possesses the academic freedom to operate in accordance with its 
principles as long as it does not violate governing laws.6  Such 
a right should be given some consideration, rather than the 
silent treatment the majority offers. 
                                                 
5 See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom:  A "Special Concern 
of the First Amendment", 99 Yale L.J. 251 (1989) (explaining 
that institutional autonomy is a key facet of academic freedom); 
David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and 
"Institutional" Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 
Law 
& 
Contemp. 
Probs. 
227, 
256 
(1990), 
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=405
7&context=lcp; Donna R. Euben, Academic Freedom of Individual 
Professors and Higher Education Institutions:  The Current Legal 
Landscape, American Association of University Professors 6 (May 
2002), 
https://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/files/Academic%20Freedo
m%20-%20Whose%20Right%20(WEBSITE%20COPY)_6-26-02.pdf. 
6 See, e.g., Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1154 
(2d Cir. 1978) (explaining that institutional academic freedom 
does not embrace the freedom to discriminate). 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
8 
 
II 
¶156 Within the concept of academic freedom lies the right 
of faculty to participate in the governance of the institution 
in academic-related matters.  The majority errs next in 
jettisoning the shared governance of colleges and universities 
that has been forged over decades to address the specific issues 
that arise in this unique workplace.  In the majority's view, 
the work of the faculty hearing committee (FHC) is of no import.  
It instead serves as a mere "distraction":  "all of the time, 
energy, and resources that went into the Discipline Procedure 
and the richly-detailed Report are distractions from the 
necessary focus of our analysis."  Majority op., ¶46. 
¶157 Further, the majority doubles down on this assertion, 
overtly stating that the FHC's work represents nothing of 
substance:  "As far as the Faculty Statutes and Faculty Handbook 
are concerned, the president may proceed as if the Report said 
nothing 
but 
that 
the 
FHC 
had 
completed 
the 
Discipline 
Procedure."  Id., ¶49.  It deems the work of the FHC not 
relevant and even raises the specter that perhaps the university 
need not have convened the FHC at all.  See id., ¶47 n.16.  Each 
of these conclusions ignores the context in which this dispute 
arises.  Such analysis renders the concept of shared governance 
merely illusory and completely removes faculty input from these 
important decisions. 
¶158 As observed above, the university has a strong 
interest in its own academic freedom to make autonomous 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
9 
 
decisions.  It exercises that academic freedom through the 
manifestation of the framework of shared governance.7 
¶159 "Shared governance" allows university faculty to play 
a role in decisions that affect the academic mission of the 
university.  The American Association of University Professors 
(AAUP) has extensively considered and set forth principles of 
shared governance in guidance documents.  In 1940, it issued a 
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, and in 
the decades that followed, it further refined the foundational 
principles therein.8  The principles adduced by the AAUP are well 
recognized and have been widely adopted throughout higher 
education.9 
¶160 Faculty 
participation 
in 
decisions 
regarding 
curriculum, tenure, and other academic-related matters is 
                                                 
7 See Emergency Coal. to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep't 
of the Treasury, 545 F.3d 4, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Edwards, J., 
concurring); Judith Areen, Government as Educator:  A New 
Understanding of First Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom 
and Governance, 97 Geo. L.J. 945, 953-66 (2009). 
8 The 1940 Statement had its genesis much earlier, in 1915, 
when the AAUP's Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic 
Tenure formulated a "Declaration of Principles."  In 1970, 
"interpretive comments" were added to the 1940 Statement 
clarifying certain statements and illuminating the intent of 
others. 
9 See Aaron Nisenson, Faculty Rights in the Classroom, 
Academe, 
Sept.-Oct. 
2017, 
at 
10, 
https://www.aaup.org/article/faculty-rights-
classroom#.WykylGrwZhE ("[M]any colleges and universities have 
adopted, either in whole or in substantial part, AAUP policies 
on 
academic 
freedom, 
tenure, 
and 
governance 
in 
faculty 
handbooks, 
faculty 
contracts, 
or 
collective 
bargaining 
agreements."). 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
10 
 
essential to the operation of the university.  As the Marquette 
Academic Senate put it in its amicus brief to this court, 
"[s]hared governance includes, as a necessary component, prior 
faculty review of any attempt by the University administration 
to override the protections of tenure and dismiss or suspend a 
tenured faculty member." 
¶161 AAUP's 
guidance 
documents 
include 
recommended 
procedural protections for faculty members.  These procedural 
protections require that any proposed suspension or dismissal of 
a tenured faculty member come before an independent faculty 
committee for review prior to any adverse employment action.  
Marquette adopted a statutory procedure consistent with the 
AAUP's recommended methodology, which sets forth procedures for 
contested suspensions or terminations.10   
¶162 The independent committee called for in the AAUP's 
guidance documents manifest in Marquette's case as the FHC.  It 
is made up of tenured faculty members elected to serve three-
year terms. In accordance with the adopted procedure, the FHC 
serves as an advisory body tasked with scheduling a hearing, 
determining the existence of cause, and making findings of fact 
and conclusions.   
                                                 
10 See Marquette University Statutes on Faculty Appointment, 
Promotion 
and 
Tenure 
§ 307.07, 
http://www.marquette.edu/provost/_includes/documents/Facultyhand
booklastupdatedMay82018numbered.pdf.; 
compare 
American 
Association of University Professors, Recommended Institutional 
Regulations 
on 
Academic 
Freedom 
and 
Tenure 
79, 
83-84, 
https://www.aaup.org/file/RIR%202014.pdf (last visited June 25, 
2018). 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
11 
 
¶163 Under the majority's analysis, the FHC proceedings are 
rendered completely unnecessary.11  It is the President who makes 
the decision as to discipline, the majority states, so there is 
no product of the FHC to which a court can defer.  This 
treatment of the FHC ignores its role within the shared 
governance structure of the university.12 
¶164 The FHC is a mutually agreed-upon dispute resolution 
mechanism.  It is composed of Marquette faculty members who 
signed contracts similar to McAdams' and whose employment 
relationships are governed by the same faculty statutes.  In 
other words, the members of the FHC live and breathe academic 
freedom and are in a position to say what the intent of the 
                                                 
11 The majority accuses this dissent of proffering a 
"formless notion of what shared governance ought to be" rather 
than grounding its interpretation in the language of the Faculty 
Statutes.  See majority op., ¶58.  I acknowledge that the 
Faculty Statutes define the FHC as an "advisory" board.  Faculty 
Statute § 307.07(1).  However, the faculty statutes also include 
the bargained-for procedural safeguards giving the faculty the 
imperative to weigh in prior to any adverse employment action.  
See Faculty Statute § 307.07.  The "form" of shared governance 
is provided by these procedural safeguards, which the majority 
discards as a "distraction."  
12 The majority exhorts that this dissent would end the 
University's "carefully balanced shared governance" by "turning 
a cooperative relationship into an adversarial contest."  See 
majority op., ¶89.  But the facts of this case fail to bear this 
out.  Indeed, in this case the faculty, who the majority 
indicates "tries to expand its own sphere of academic freedom at 
the expense of the other," unanimously determined that McAdams' 
conduct was unprotected.  Id. 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
12 
 
parties was in signing a contract guaranteeing "academic 
freedom."13 
¶165 Indeed here, the FHC was composed of seven tenured 
members of the faculty, chaired by a law professor, and was 
observed by a representative of the AAUP.  After receiving 
evidence over the course of four days, the FHC unanimously found 
that there was clear and convincing evidence that Marquette had 
"discretionary cause" to impose discipline.14  Accordingly, the 
FHC recommended that Marquette University President Michael 
Lovell impose a paid suspension of up to two semesters.  
Consistent with the FHC's recommendation, President Lovell 
imposed upon McAdams a two-semester suspension. 
                                                 
13 I also observe that professors like those who make up the 
FHC are likely to support a robust academic freedom doctrine.  
The members of the FHC are not only sitting in judgment of a 
colleague, but interpreting the rules that govern themselves.  
It is telling that this group of people unanimously arrived at 
the conclusion that McAdams' conduct crossed the line. 
14 Marquette University Statute on Faculty Appointment, 
Promotion and Tenure § 306.03 defines "discretionary cause" as 
inclusive of: 
[T]hose circumstances, exclusive of absolute cause, 
which arise from a faculty member's conduct and which 
clearly and substantially fail to meet the standard of 
personal and professional excellence which generally 
characterizes 
University 
faculties, 
but 
only 
if 
through this conduct a faculty member's value will 
probably be substantially impaired.  Examples of 
conduct that substantially impair the value or utility 
of a faculty member are:  serious instances of 
illegal, 
immoral, 
dishonorable, 
irresponsible, 
or 
incompetent conduct.  In no case, however, shall 
discretionary cause be interpreted so as to impair the 
full and free enjoyment of legitimate personal or 
academic freedoms of thought, doctrine, discourse, 
association, advocacy, or action. 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
13 
 
¶166 The United States Supreme Court has directed that 
"[w]hen judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely 
academic decision, . . . they should show great respect for the 
faculty's professional judgment."  Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225.  It 
made this pronouncement with respect to a faculty decision that 
it characterized as "made conscientiously and with careful 
deliberation."  Id.  We can realize the Supreme Court's command 
by affording the respect due to the FHC's expertise and 
specialized knowledge. 
¶167 With regard to the FHC's factual findings, "great 
respect" is surely appropriate.  The FHC heard four days of 
evidence and produced a detailed 123-page report that was 
clearly "made conscientiously and with careful deliberation."  
See id. 
¶168 It is the FHC, and not this court, that observed the 
demeanor 
of 
witnesses 
and 
is 
in 
a 
position 
to 
assess 
credibility.  Deference to circuit courts' factual findings is 
appropriate in similar circumstances.  Welytok v. Ziolkowski, 
2008 WI App 67, ¶28, 312 Wis. 2d 435, 752 N.W.2d 359 (citation 
omitted) (explaining that "such deference is appropriate because 
the court has the opportunity to observe firsthand the demeanor 
of 
the 
witnesses 
and 
gauge 
the 
persuasiveness 
of 
their 
testimony"). 
¶169 Other jurisdictions have echoed this approach, and 
realize the Supreme Court's exhortation of "great respect" by 
affording deference to the conclusions of faculty hearing 
committees.  For example, in Yackshaw v. John Carroll University 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
14 
 
Board of Trustees, 624 N.E.2d 225, 225-27 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993), 
the Ohio court of appeals reviewed a similar breach of contract 
case involving a private university's hearing committee.  The 
Yackshaw court found "rationale and guidance from the standard 
of review adopted by administrative agencies, especially when 
the involved parties have bound themselves contractually."  Id. 
at 228. 
¶170 Such "great respect" makes particular sense in the 
context of a private, Catholic, Jesuit institution with a 
distinct mission like Marquette.  Indeed, in Murphy v. Duquesne 
University of the Holy Ghost, 777 A.2d 418, 433 (Pa. 2001), the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court further explained the rationale for 
its determination that a faculty hearing procedure like that at 
issue here was an exclusive procedure.  The Murphy court 
observed that Duquesne, like Marquette, is a private, Catholic 
university with a particular mission: 
The University is an ecumenically-based institution 
dedicated to promoting through the members of its 
tenured faculty the ethical and religious values of 
the 
"Judaeo–Christian 
tradition 
in 
its 
Catholic 
dimension."  It comes as no surprise that the 
University and its faculty agreed not to cede to any 
lay outsider or secular institution the right to 
define and determine what behavior on the part of a 
faculty member was so antithetical to its mission that 
he could not remain a member of the University's 
community, and instead, concurred that the process set 
out in the Contract would finally decide whether a 
faculty member's actions rose to the level of serious 
misconduct and whether forfeiture was in order. 
Id. at 433. 
¶171 Here, it is also the faculty that is in the best 
position to determine "what behavior on the part of a faculty 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
15 
 
member [is] so antithetical to its mission that he could not 
remain a member of the University's community."  See id.  The 
faculty unanimously determined that McAdams exhibited such 
behavior that violates the norms of the academic profession so 
as to call into question his fitness as a member of the 
university community.  As President Lovell observed in his 
letter to McAdams, a unanimous decision in the context of 
academia is no small feat:  "Getting a diverse group of faculty 
to unanimously agree on any topic can be difficult, so to have 
seven of your peers uniformly condemn and characterize your 
actions as egregious sends a strong message to my office and to 
the broader Marquette community." 
¶172 By refusing to afford "great respect" to President 
Lovell's reliance on the unanimous faculty determination, the 
court as the third branch of government inserts itself into the 
fray.  Such an exercise is antithetical to the freedom of the 
academic institution to pursue its ends without interference 
from the government. 
¶173 Rather than properly according the respect due to 
President 
Lovell's 
reliance 
on 
the 
FHC's 
findings 
and 
conclusions, the majority opinion renders meaningless a key part 
of shared governance, reducing the faculty's role in this 
decisionmaking to nothing.  It disregards the FHC's expertise, 
throwing aside a process that is mutually agreed-upon and time-
honored. 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
16 
 
III 
¶174 The majority errs third by disregarding significant 
facts in its analysis.  It concludes that McAdams' blog post 
cannot be the basis for discipline because the posting was a 
legitimate exercise of McAdams' academic freedom.  Majority op., 
¶84.  In the majority's view, "the blog post has nothing 
relevant to say about Dr. McAdams' fitness as a professor."  
Id., ¶73.  It further determines that "[j]ust because vile 
commentary followed the blog post does not mean the blog post 
instigated or invited the vileness."  Id., ¶76.  The majority 
misframes the issue. 
¶175 In his letter to McAdams informing him of the 
disciplinary action taken, President Lovell is clear that it was 
not the views expressed in the blog post that led to discipline:  
"I think it is important to state that the sanctions being 
brought against you are solely based on your ACTIONS as a 
tenured faculty member at Marquette University, and have nothing 
to do with the political or ideological views expressed in your 
blog" (capitalization in original).  President Lovell's letter 
thus makes clear that McAdams was disciplined for his actions, 
and not the blog post's viewpoint.  Thus, the question is not 
"whether [the blog post's] contents remove the doctrine's 
protections."  Id., ¶64.  It is whether McAdams' actions are 
worthy of protection. 
¶176 The majority recognizes that in engaging in extramural 
activities, a professor "occupies a 'special position in the 
civil community,' one that comes with 'special obligations.'"  
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
17 
 
Majority op., ¶65.  Included in these "special obligations" is 
the duty to "exercise appropriate restraint."  Id. 
¶177 McAdams did not exercise any restraint at all, let 
alone appropriate restraint.  I agree with the FHC that "where 
substantial harm is foreseeable, easily avoidable, and not 
justifiable, it violates a professor's obligations to fellow 
members of the Marquette community to proceed anyway, heedless 
of the consequences." 
¶178 McAdams' actions were well summarized in President 
Lovell's discipline letter, where he approvingly quoted from the 
FHC report:  "[McAdams'] use of a surreptitious recording, along 
with Ms. Abbate's name and contact information, to hold Ms. 
Abbate up for public contempt on his blog, recklessly exposed 
her to the foreseeable harm that she suffered due to Dr. 
McAdams's actions." 
¶179 The majority unpersuasively asserts that the vile 
commentary immediately following the blog post "does not mean 
the blog post instigated or invited the vileness."  Majority 
op., ¶76.  The only way the majority can reach this conclusion 
is by ignoring significant facts in the record.15 
                                                 
15 The record reflects that at the time of the events at 
issue in this case, Abbate was a graduate student in the 
philosophy department at Marquette.  In addition to working on 
her dissertation, in the fall of 2014 Abbate taught two sections 
of Theory of Ethics, a philosophy class for undergraduates. I 
observe that throughout its opinion, the majority cherry-picks 
facts when it refers to Abbate as an "instructor" and not a 
"student."  See, e.g., majority op., ¶1.  In doing so, it colors 
the facts, disregarding the realities of the power dynamics at 
play here between a tenured professor and a graduate student. 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
18 
 
¶180 First, McAdams knew the effect his blog post would 
have on Abbate.  Among the FHC's factual findings that go 
unmentioned by the majority is that Dr. McAdams wrote in a blog 
post that "[w]hen one does something that gets national 
publicity, some jerks are going to say nasty things," indicating 
he was well aware of this modern media phenomenon.  Indeed, that 
is exactly what happened here. 
¶181 Shortly after the post's publication, Abbate began to 
receive hateful emails.  The negative communications multiplied 
over the next several days, particularly after the incident 
received coverage on Fox News.  She was forced to shut down her 
email account and remove her email address from Marquette's 
graduate student website. 
¶182 Several 
of 
the 
communications 
Abbate 
received 
expressed violent and profane thoughts.  She feared for her 
physical safety and experienced significant detrimental effects 
on her mental and physical health.  A public safety officer was 
even posted outside Abbate's classes for two weeks. 
¶183 Abbate 
ultimately 
withdrew 
from 
her 
dissertation 
proposal defense and transferred to another university.  This 
transfer requires that she repeat three semesters of course 
work. 
¶184 The majority further fails to mention that "Dr. 
McAdams purposefully omitted the name of a supporter of his blog 
from a comment he posted because 'the person was afraid of 
blowback or harassment.'"  Why would McAdams do this if he was 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
19 
 
blissfully unaware of the consequences of publishing a student's 
name, as the majority asserts? 
¶185 Additionally, the FHC report demonstrates that McAdams 
has "on at least three occasions used the prospect of a mention 
on his blog as a threat."  It indicates that McAdams threatened 
a Marquette student, the vice president for student affairs, a 
university provost, and a Dean that he would "raise hell" on his 
blog if they acted in a manner inconsistent with McAdams' 
wishes.  McAdams pointedly told a Dean to "be careful" because 
"you don't want to be on my blog."  Why would McAdams make such 
threats if he did not know what would happen to those whose 
names were published? 
¶186 Also conveniently omitted from the majority opinion 
are any facts related to McAdams' active promotion of the blog 
post to local and national media outlets.  After he made the 
blog post, McAdams actively promoted the story by distributing 
copies of the audio recording to interested journalists and 
bloggers, posting follow-up stories linking back to the post, 
creating a category of posts linked to Abbate by name, and 
arranging to appear on radio and television interviews about the 
story and subsequent controversy.  He provided copies of the 
surreptitious recording to representatives of Fox News, Inside 
Higher Ed, and a local Fox television affiliate. 
¶187 These omitted facts indicate that McAdams indeed did 
"instigate" or "invite" the vileness that followed his blog 
post.  He knew what would happen, and he actively ensured that 
it would happen. 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
20 
 
¶188 McAdams' actions certainly have something "relevant to 
say about Dr. McAdams' fitness as a professor."  See majority 
op., ¶72.  McAdams knew what he was doing, and, unfortunately 
for Abbate, the blog post had its intended effect.  The 
revealing of a student's contact information for the purpose of 
holding that student up for public ridicule and harassment is 
not a protected act of academic freedom.16 
IV 
¶189 Because I determine that academic freedom does not 
save McAdams from the consequences of his actions, I also must 
address his argument that the First Amendment provides such 
salvation.  I begin my examination of McAdams' argument by 
defining the parameters of the First Amendment protections to 
which McAdams is entitled. 
¶190 "The 
[F]irst 
[A]mendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution limits the actions of the federal and state 
governments.  It provides no protection against action by 
private persons."  Harman v. La Crosse Tribune, 117 Wis. 2d 448, 
452, 344 N.W.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1984) (citation omitted); see also 
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) ("It is, of course, a 
commonplace that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is 
                                                 
16 I also observe the potential effects of the majority 
opinion on the uninhibited exchange of ideas between faculty and 
students at Marquette.  The direct effect of the majority's 
decision is to condone or acquiesce in professors' publicly 
subjecting students to ridicule and harassment.  But it also 
sends an indirect message that may chill the exchange between 
faculty and students, lest they find themselves in the same 
position as Abbate. 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
21 
 
a guarantee only against abridgement by government, federal or 
state.") (citation omitted). 
¶191 Thus, as a private institution, Marquette's actions 
are not limited by the First Amendment.  The First Amendment 
does not, without more, protect McAdams from discipline in his 
capacity as a professor at a private university.17 
¶192 However, 
Marquette 
Faculty 
Statute 
§ 307.07(2) 
provides that "[d]ismissal will not be used to restrain faculty 
members in their exercise of academic freedom or other rights 
guaranteed them by the United States Constitution."  McAdams 
contends that this language grants him a contractual right to 
free speech that "is coextensive with his right to freedom of 
expression under the First Amendment as a private citizen."18 
                                                 
17 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides 
in 
relevant 
part: 
 
"Congress 
shall 
make 
no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . ."  Over the 
years, "Congress" has been defined as any government actor.  
See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 
(2017) ("The First Amendment prohibits Congress and other 
government entities and actors from 'abridging the freedom of 
speech'"). 
18 In his argument before the FHC, McAdams advanced a 
different interpretation of this language.  He maintained that 
the provision was intended to give Marquette faculty members the 
same right vis-à-vis Marquette that government employees have 
under the First Amendment to their employers.  Although neither 
party argues ambiguity here, it appears that such an argument 
could be made given the varied interpretation advanced by 
McAdams.  The First Amendment rights of a private citizen are 
not coterminous with the First Amendment rights of an employee 
of a government employer.  See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Ed. 
of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Illinois, 391 U.S. 563, 
568 (1968). 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
22 
 
¶193 Of note in this discussion is the difference between 
the Marquette Faculty Statute and the AAUP's recommended 
institutional regulation on this subject.  McAdams relies on 
language that is nonexistent, having been specifically removed 
from the Marquette Faculty Statute.   
¶194 The AAUP recommends for inclusion in faculty contracts 
language stating that:  "Dismissal will not be used to restrain 
faculty members in the exercise of academic freedom or other 
rights of American citizens."19  Marquette's choice not to adopt 
the recommended "American citizens" language likely explains why 
McAdams' arguments before the FHC asserted rights not as a 
citizen but rather rights tantamount to those of an employee of 
a government employer.   
¶195 He now changes course before this court, appearing to 
realize that the First Amendment rights of an employee of a 
government employer have been recognized as less than those 
afforded an American citizen.  See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of 
Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Illinois, 391 U.S. 
563, 568 (1968).  Marquette's choice not to adopt the language 
also supports the argument that it did not intend that Faculty 
Statute § 307.07 afford to McAdams the contractual right to the 
full-throated First Amendment protections of a citizen. 
                                                 
19 American 
Association 
of 
University 
Professors, 
Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure 79, 83, https://www.aaup.org/file/RIR%202014.pdf (last 
visited June 25, 2018). 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
23 
 
¶196 Further, I agree with the FHC, the circuit court, and 
Marquette that McAdams' proffered interpretation leads to absurd 
results.  See Star Direct, Inc. v. Dal Pra, 2009 WI 76, ¶62, 319 
Wis. 2d 274, 767 N.W.2d 898 (explaining that contracts are 
construed to avoid absurd results).  If it is indeed the case 
that the protections granted by Marquette Faculty Statute 
§ 307.07 are "coextensive" with the rights afforded to private 
citizens under the First Amendment, McAdams would be free to 
teach virtually anything or nothing at all in his classes.  
Marquette would be unable to discipline McAdams unless his 
speech fell into one of the few, narrow categories of speech 
that is not afforded First Amendment protections.20 
¶197 McAdams asserts that this conclusion does not follow 
because conduct within the classroom is governed by the 
provisions on absolute cause set forth in his contract, and 
conduct amounting to absolute cause is not protected by the 
First Amendment.  But that is not what Faculty Statute § 307.07 
says.  By its plain language, Faculty Statute § 307.07, applies 
equally to dismissals based on absolute or discretionary cause.21 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) 
(speech intended and likely to incite imminent lawless action); 
Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (fighting 
words). 
21 Marquette 
Faculty 
Statute 
§ 307.07(2) 
provides 
in 
relevant part: 
A faculty member who has been awarded tenure at 
Marquette University may only be dismissed upon a 
showing of absolute or discretionary cause, as these 
terms are defined by the Handbook for Full-Time 
Faculty (hereinafter University Statutes), Section 
(continued) 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
24 
 
¶198 In fact, McAdams' interpretation of Faculty Statute 
§ 307.07 would render Marquette's standards for absolute and 
discretionary cause meaningless.  See Maryland Arms Ltd. P'ship 
v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶45, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 
("When possible, contract language should be construed to give 
meaning to every word, 'avoiding constructions which render 
portions of a contract meaningless, inexplicable or mere 
surplusage.'").  Under McAdams' misreading, so long as some form 
of protected speech was involved, he could not be punished 
despite failing the tests for absolute or discretionary cause.   
¶199 Accordingly, I conclude that neither academic freedom 
nor the First Amendment saves McAdams from the consequences of 
his reckless actions. 
¶200 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶201 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
306.02 
(absolute 
cause) 
or 
306.03 
(discretionary 
cause).  Dismissal will not be used to restrain 
faculty members in their exercise of academic freedom 
or other rights guaranteed them by the United States 
Constitution. 
No.  2017AP1240.awb 
 
1