Title: State v. Wilson
Citation: 2015 WI 48
Docket Number: 2011AP001803-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 12, 2015

2015 WI 48 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1803-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
General Grant Wilson, 
          Defendant-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(No cite) 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 12, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 4, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Victor Manian 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J., ROGGENSACK, C.J., concur(Opinion 
Filed.) 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, BRADLEY, JJ., dissent (Opinion 
Filed.) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Maguerite Moeller, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, the cause was argued by Anne 
Berleman Kearney, with whom on the brief was Joseph D. Kearney 
and Appellate Consulting Group, Milwaukee.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Carrie Sperling, John 
A. Pray, and the Frank J. Remington Center, on behalf of the 
University of Wisconsin Law School. 
 
 
 
2015 WI 48
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2011AP1803-CR   
(L.C. No. 
1993CF931541) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
General Grant Wilson, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 12, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.    This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, reversing a 
judgment of conviction for a Milwaukee County homicide as well 
as a subsequent order denying postconviction relief. 
¶2 
The case requires us to determine whether, in 1993, 
the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Victor Manian, Judge, erred 
by excluding evidence proffered by the defendant, General Grant 
Wilson (Wilson), that a third party committed the homicide for 
which Wilson was being tried.   
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
2 
 
¶3 
The law is well established that a defendant has due 
process 
rights 
under 
the 
United 
States 
and 
Wisconsin 
Constitutions to present a theory of defense to the jury.  
However, a defendant's ability to present specific evidence to 
support a defense at trial may be subject to conditions or 
limitations.  When a defendant seeks to present evidence that a 
third party committed the crime for which the defendant is being 
tried, the defendant must show "a legitimate tendency" that the 
third party committed the crime; in other words, that the third 
party had motive, opportunity, and a direct connection to the 
crime.  State v. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 357 N.W.2d 12 (Ct. App. 
1984). 
¶4 
In this case, the State accused Wilson of killing 
Evania (Eva) Maric (Maric) in the early-morning hours of April 
21, 1993.  Before the shooting, Maric had been sitting in her 
car with Willie Friend (Friend), a man with whom she was 
romantically involved.  They were parked outside an illegal 
after-hours club operated by Friend's brother.   
¶5 
According to Friend, General Grant Wilson pulled up in 
his gold Lincoln Continental, got out, approached Maric's car, 
and began firing a large-caliber handgun.  Friend fled, narrowly 
avoiding bullets fired in his direction.  An eyewitness, Carol 
Kidd-Edwards, saw Friend flee and saw a shooter fire an 
additional five to seven shots into the driver's side of Maric's 
car with a smaller-caliber handgun.  Kidd-Edwards watched the 
shooter walk toward the passenger side of the gold Lincoln 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
3 
 
before leaving her line of sight.  She then heard a car door 
close and saw the car speed away. 
¶6 
At trial, Wilson blamed Friend for Maric's murder.  
Wilson theorized that Friend had lured Maric to her car and kept 
her talking until an unknown assassin or assassins could kill 
her and frame Wilson for the crime.   
¶7 
To support this theory, Wilson attempted to introduce 
the testimony of two witnesses: Mary Lee Larson and Barbara 
Lange.  Both Larson and Lange indicated they would testify that 
Friend had slapped and threatened Maric about two weeks before 
her murder.  The circuit court ruled that the testimony was 
inadmissible because the issue was not who killed Maric, but 
rather, whether Wilson killed Maric.  After a seven-day trial, 
the jury found Wilson guilty of first-degree intentional 
homicide (Maric) and attempted first-degree intentional homicide 
(Friend).  On October 4, 1993, the court sentenced Wilson to 
life imprisonment for the homicide plus 20 years of imprisonment 
for the attempted homicide. 
¶8 
In June of 1996, Wilson filed a postconviction motion 
seeking a new trial based on the court's decision to exclude 
Wilson's proffered testimony from Larson and Lange.  The court 
denied the motion, and Wilson's attorney failed to file an 
appeal.  In September of 2010, the court of appeals reinstated 
Wilson's direct appeal due to his counsel's error.  In January 
of 2011, Wilson filed another motion with the circuit court 
seeking a new trial.  The circuit court denied the motion, and 
Wilson appealed. 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
4 
 
¶9 
The court of appeals summarily reversed Wilson's 
conviction and the circuit court's order denying postconviction 
relief.  The court determined that Friend had the opportunity to 
kill Maric and that the State failed to show that the circuit 
court's alleged error in not admitting Wilson's proffered 
evidence was harmless.  State v. Wilson, No. 2011AP1803-CR, 
unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2013).  The court 
reasoned that Friend's involvement could have been direct (i.e., 
Friend could have been the shooter himself) or indirect (i.e., 
Friend could have engaged a gunman or gunmen to kill Maric); and 
given the conflicting evidence, the State could not meet its 
burden of showing that there was no reasonable possibility that 
the circuit court's error contributed to the guilty verdict.  
The State appealed, and we granted review. 
¶10 We reaffirm the Denny test as the appropriate test for 
circuit courts to use to determine the admissibility of third-
party perpetrator evidence.  However, we conclude that, for a 
defendant to show that a third party had the "opportunity" to 
commit a crime by employing a gunman or gunmen to kill the 
victim, the defendant must provide some evidence that the third 
party had the realistic ability to engineer such a scenario.  
Here, Wilson has failed to show that Friend had the opportunity 
to kill Maric, directly or indirectly; consequently, it was not 
error for the circuit court to exclude Wilson's proffered 
evidence.  Accordingly, we reverse. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
5 
 
¶11 Maric was shot to death in the 3200 block of North 9th 
Street in Milwaukee at about 5:00 a.m. on April 21, 1993.  Two 
weapons were used in the shooting: a .44 caliber gun and a .25 
caliber gun.  Maric was shot seven times in total: once in the 
chest and once in the back with the .44, and five times in the 
left front and side of her torso with the .25.  Willie Friend 
was present at the shooting and was the principal witness 
against Wilson. 
¶12 When police conducted an investigation at the crime 
scene, they recovered several bullets and bullet fragments: one 
.44 caliber jacketed bullet was found in the grassy area between 
the curb and sidewalk, a .44 caliber lead bullet was found 
nearby in the ground, another .44 caliber lead bullet was found 
in the front yard of an adjacent house on North 9th Street; four 
.25 caliber brass casings were found in Maric's car, one in the 
front seat area and three in the back. 
¶13 The police investigation quickly focused on Wilson 
based on Friend's statement, shortly after the shooting, that 
Wilson was the shooter.  Later that morning, Lieutenant Michael 
LaPointe of the Milwaukee Police Department, along with two 
detectives and other officers, went to Wilson's place of 
employment. 
 
LaPointe 
informed 
Wilson 
that 
they 
were 
investigating a shooting, that he was a suspect, and that he was 
under arrest.  Wilson gave the officers permission to search his 
two lockers at work as well as his car.  The officers recovered 
pictures of the victim from one of the lockers and a .38 caliber 
revolver from the trunk of his car.  Later, LaPointe and other 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
6 
 
officers searched Wilson's house and recovered a .357 caliber 
revolver from Wilson's bed.  LaPointe also recovered two boxes 
that formerly contained .25 caliber handguns.  Additionally, 
LaPointe recovered two .25 caliber cartridges from Wilson's 
home. 
¶14 Detective Michael Young interviewed Wilson on April 
22.  Detective Young asked Wilson if he owned any .25 caliber 
handguns, and Wilson answered that he owned three .25 caliber 
Raven1 semiautomatic pistols: police had custody of one, his 
mother had the second, and his brother had the third.  None of 
the five weapons cited above was one of the murder weapons. 
¶15 Detective Young also asked Wilson if he owned a .44 
magnum revolver; Wilson answered that he did not.  When 
Detective Young subsequently asked Wilson if he had ever owned a 
.44 magnum revolver, Wilson replied that he had not. 
¶16 After Wilson denied owning a .44, police questioned 
Terry Jean Bethly, a friend of Wilson.  Bethly informed the 
police that on April 3, 1993, she and Wilson went to a shooting 
range and Wilson brought a .44 with him.  Bethly stated that she 
bought ammunition for Wilson's .44 that day.  Bethly also said 
                                                 
1 Transcripts in the record describe this gun as a "Ravin," 
which is probably a misspelling by the court reporter.  Raven 
Arms was a weapons manufacturer founded in 1970 that specialized 
in low-cost handguns.  See Nicholas Freudenberg, Lethal but 
Legal: Corporations, Consumption, and Protecting Public Health 
48 (2014).  The Raven Arms MP25 was one of the guns most used in 
crimes in the 1990s.  Peter Harry Brown and Daniel G. Abel, 
Outgunned: Up Against the NRA 157 (2010). 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
7 
 
that she had seen Wilson with the .44 on another occasion.  
Police also questioned Wilson's brother, who confirmed Wilson's 
possession of a .44.  After learning this, Detective Michael 
Dubis questioned Wilson again regarding his ownership of a .44, 
but Wilson continued to deny ever owning or possessing one. 
¶17 On April 26, the State charged Wilson with First-
Degree Intentional Homicide While Possessing a Dangerous Weapon 
and Attempted First-Degree Intentional Homicide While Possessing 
a Dangerous Weapon.2  He was bound over for trial after a 
preliminary examination.  The State filed an information with 
the same charges on May 5, to which Wilson pled not guilty.  
Trial was scheduled for June 28, 1993.  After pretrial motions, 
jury selection, and opening statements, testimony began on June 
30.  Below are highlights of the trial testimony. 
A. Willie Friend's Testimony 
¶18 At trial, Willie Friend testified that he entered into 
an intimate relationship with Maric in 1992, after having known 
her for about 12 years.  On April 20, 1993, Friend asked Maric 
to pick him up at the Milwaukee County Courthouse after a child 
support hearing.3  The time was around 4:00 or 5:00 p.m.  The two 
drove to Maric's home in South Milwaukee after picking up some 
medication for Maric's mother.  Friend left after Maric lent him 
                                                 
2 Contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 940.01(1), 
939.32, 
and 
939.63(1)(a)2.  All subsequent references to the Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 1991-92 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Friend testified that he had four children, three of whom 
were under the age of 18. 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
8 
 
her car and he returned about 11:00 p.m.  They briefly drove 
around the area, then headed to the north side of Milwaukee, 
stopping at a tavern "on 3rd and Center between Center and 
Hadley, I believe."  They remained at the tavern, for "a few 
drinks," for "an hour or two." 
¶19 Upon leaving the tavern, they drove west on Center 
Street and observed a gold Lincoln parked near another tavern.  
Friend said that Maric remarked that "there go General's car."  
Friend said he noted that the gold Lincoln had a license plate 
with "G-Ball" on it.  When the prosecutor showed Friend a 
picture of Wilson's car, Friend identified Wilson's car as the 
car he had seen that night.4 
¶20 Friend and Maric kept driving on Center Street to 
17th, where they turned right to stop "at this chicken place" to 
get something to eat.  They then drove to Friend's mother's 
house located at 3859 North 9th Street.  They parked in front of 
the house to eat their chicken. 
¶21 Soon Wilson pulled up in the same gold Lincoln that 
Friend had seen earlier.  It had "the inside dash lights on."  
Wilson was driving with an unknown person in the front seat.  
Friend said he saw Wilson and identified him, although he had 
never seen him before except in a "picture photo" that Maric had 
shown him.  After eyeing Maric's car, Wilson drove away.  Three 
                                                 
4 Wilson's sister, Sandra Wilson, later testified that she 
located five other Lincolns in the community to discount the 
uniqueness of Wilson's car. 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
9 
 
or four minutes later Wilson drove by again, which caused Maric 
to have, as Friend described it, a "hyper-reaction." 
¶22 Friend testified that he and Maric remained at his 
mother's house for an hour or so before Maric left in her car to 
return home.  It was around 2:00 a.m.  He testified that while 
they were at his mother's house, Maric expressed concerns about 
Wilson, with whom she was trying to end a relationship. 
¶23 Afterwards, Friend walked south to the house of his 
brother, Larnell "Jabo" Friend, located at 3288 North 9th 
Street.  Friend admitted under pressure that Jabo's house could 
be characterized as an "after hours place."  About the time that 
Friend reached the house, Maric arrived and told Friend that 
Wilson had tried to run her off the road.  She explained that 
Wilson walked up to her car holding a revolver and told her that 
if he saw her with Friend again, he would kill them both. 
¶24 Maric and Friend stayed at Jabo's house for a while.  
Then, about 4:30 a.m., Friend walked Maric to her car.  Maric's 
car was parked on the corner of 9th and Concordia, facing north, 
on the same side of the street as Jabo's house.  After some time 
sitting in the car, Friend saw Wilson's car approach from the 
north and pull up directly across from Maric's car.  Friend 
testified that he knew the car was Wilson's and was the same car 
he had seen earlier that night because of the color and fresh 
paint job, and because the car was "clean."  Friend got out of 
Maric's car as Wilson's car approached, believing that Wilson 
wanted to talk to him about the situation.  Friend testified 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
10 
 
that the only person he saw in the car was Wilson but that he 
could not say whether someone else was in the car. 
¶25 Instead of talking, Wilson got out of the driver's 
side of the Lincoln and approached the driver's side of Maric's 
car with a "blue steel large revolver" in his left hand.  Wilson 
started shooting, and Friend ducked down beside Maric's car, 
with the passenger door open between him and Wilson, then began 
running.  A bullet went through the door, and bullets hit the 
concrete around Friend, causing dirt to fly up and hit him as he 
ran to a passageway between two houses.5  Friend ran through the 
passageway and around a house, and heard about three or four 
gunshots in rapid succession from a smaller gun before hearing a 
car door slam and the fast acceleration of an engine. 
¶26 When Friend returned to the street Wilson's car was 
gone.  He found Maric lying across the seat sideways, facing the 
passenger side.  After raising her up, Friend saw a large, 
bloody wound on Maric's chest.  He then went to Jabo's house to 
tell him that Maric had been shot.  A neighbor called for 
medical assistance, which arrived shortly thereafter. 
¶27 Friend identified Wilson as the shooter at the crime 
scene.  Later, at the police station, he identified Wilson in a 
photo lineup as the person who shot at him when he was next to 
                                                 
5 Detective Dennis Kuchenreuther later corroborated the 
existence of bullets and scattered dirt in this area when he 
testified to the location of bullets in the ground, the presence 
of abrasions on the sidewalk, a gouge in the dirt, and scattered 
dirt on the sidewalk. 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
11 
 
Maric's car.  Friend also told the police that Wilson was stocky 
and was wearing gold-rimmed glasses. 
B. Carol Kidd-Edwards' Testimony 
¶28 On the morning of April 21, 1993, Carol Kidd-Edwards, 
who lived at 3291 North 9th Street, was awake in her bedroom, 
putting on her shoes to take her husband to work.  At about 5:00 
a.m. she heard about five very loud, consecutive gun shots.  
When the shots began, she dove to the floor.  When they stopped, 
she ran to the window to see what was happening.  She saw a man 
with a brown leather jacket, whom she later identified as 
Friend, running away from a car, which she later identified as 
Maric's car, parked on the corner across the street from her 
house.  She then saw Friend "take[] refuge on the side between 
two houses, of a house directly across the street from [hers]."  
Kidd-Edwards testified that she did not see any objects in 
Friend's hand. 
¶29 Kidd-Edwards' house was the third from the corner on 
the west side of 9th Street.  She said she could see everything 
to the corner across the street but had an obstructed view of 
the street and sidewalk on her side of the street.  She 
testified that she saw a "gold toned Continental, a mark version 
of the Continental" near the corner on her side of the street.  
When shown a picture of Wilson's car, Kidd-Edwards stated that 
his car appeared to be like the car she saw.  In giving her 
description, she demonstrated considerable knowledge of Lincoln 
automobiles. 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
12 
 
¶30 Kidd-Edwards testified that as Friend was running from 
Maric's car, she saw a man walking from the passenger side of 
the Lincoln, which was in a blind spot from her bedroom window.  
Kidd-Edwards described the man as "a brown toned color black 
man," "roughly six feet," with a "top fade" hairstyle.  Kidd-
Edwards stated that she did not remember whether the man was 
wearing glasses.  She was unable to get a good view of the man's 
face. 
¶31 As the man was walking towards Maric's car, Kidd-
Edwards saw him "top load[] a gun" and pull back the top of the 
gun.  The man approached the driver's side of Maric's car and 
fired five to seven shots into the car.  They were not as loud 
as the previous shots, suggesting a smaller gun.  Afterwards, 
the man walked back towards the Lincoln into her blind spot.  
Although she did not see the man get into the car, she heard the 
door shut and saw the car quickly pull off and drive south, past 
her house.  Kidd-Edwards testified that she could not see 
whether the man got into the passenger side of Wilson's car, but 
she could see the driver's side and did not see anyone get into 
that side of the car. 
¶32 Kidd-Edwards stated that she did not see anyone other 
than the man firing the shots and Friend.  After the Continental 
drove away, Kidd-Edwards heard Friend pound on her door and 
called 911 after Friend yelled repeatedly, "call 911, call 911."  
Kidd-Edwards stated that upon seeing the victim up close, she 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
13 
 
appeared to be pregnant.  She later asked Friend whether the 
victim was pregnant, and he told her that she was.6 
C. General Grant Wilson's Testimony 
¶33 Wilson testified that he met Maric on June 18, 1988 
and had maintained some sort of relationship with her until the 
time of her death.  When asked whether he had ever been near 
Jabo's house on 9th Street, Wilson testified that Maric had 
driven by when he was in the car, pointed out the house to him, 
and 
said 
that 
if 
"something 
ever 
happened 
to 
her 
that . . . would be the place." 
¶34 One of Wilson's defenses was that he was at home when 
the shootings occurred.  Wilson relied on an alibi witness, 
Rosanne Potrikus, to support his story that he did not shoot 
Maric.  Wilson testified that on the night of the murder, he 
went to see Potrikus at a bar where she worked.  He called the 
bar Throttle Twisters.7  After Potrikus closed the bar, she and 
Wilson went to another bar in his car.  After learning that that 
bar was closed, Wilson and Potrikus drove to a Kentucky Fried 
Chicken on Capitol Drive.  Afterwards, Wilson testified that the 
                                                 
6 Dr. Jeffrey Jentzen, the forensic pathologist assigned to 
the case, performed a complete autopsy on Maric and testified 
that she was not pregnant. 
7 In 1993 the Twisters bar was located at 508 West Center 
Street, Milwaukee. 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
14 
 
two drove around Capitol Drive and then around 8th and 9th 
Streets.8 
¶35 After Wilson dropped Potrikus off at her car, they 
drove west on Center Street toward the freeway.  Wilson exited 
the freeway on Silver Spring Drive and drove to his home on 74th 
and Carmen, arriving sometime between 3:30 a.m. and 4:00 a.m.9  
He parked his car in the front of his house.  Wilson stated that 
his roommate, Pedro Smith, was not home at that time.  Wilson 
went to sleep on the couch and woke up around 5:15 a.m., and 
eventually got ready for work, which started at 7:00 a.m.10 
¶36 Finally, when Wilson was questioned about whether the 
.44 he brought to the shooting range with Terry Bethly was his, 
he admitted to owning a .44 at that time.  He said it was a 
Smith and Wesson Magnum, not a Sturm Ruger (which apparently was 
the type of .44 used in the shooting).  Wilson stated that he 
did not tell the truth to the police when they questioned him 
                                                 
8 This testimony corroborated earlier testimony by Potrikus 
about her activities with Wilson that evening. 
9 Wilson's testimony about his movements coincides with 
Friend's testimony about where he and Maric saw Wilson's car 
that evening. Wilson, of course, did not admit that he drove by 
Jabo's house on North 9th Street at approximately 5:00 a.m. 
10 Detective Brian O'Keefe testified that Wilson told him he 
arrived at his home at 3:00 a.m.  Pedro Smith testified that he 
woke up around 3:35 a.m. on April 21, 1993 to go to work but did 
not see or hear Wilson anywhere in the house, including on the 
couch, and still did not see Wilson when he left for work at 
about 3:55 a.m.  Smith also testified that he did not see 
Wilson's car in front of the house when he left for work. 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
15 
 
about ever owning a .44 because he did not have it in his 
possession at that time.  Wilson testified that he brought the 
gun with him on his recent vacation to Florida, and on his way 
back to Wisconsin he stopped in Alabama and exchanged it for 
certain "illicit pleasures" from "drug dealers and pimps."11 
D. Attempts to Introduce Third-Party Perpetrator Evidence 
¶37 Mary Lee Larson testified that she knew Maric, Wilson, 
and Friend.  When asked whether she noticed Maric act in any way 
that indicated she was afraid of Wilson, Larson stated, "No.  
Not recently."  When Wilson's defense counsel, Peter Kovac, 
attempted to ask Larson whether Maric was afraid of Friend, the 
State objected and the court sustained the objection.  The court 
allowed Attorney Kovac to make an offer of proof, during which 
Kovac asked Larson whether she heard Friend threaten Maric at 
any time during the two weeks leading up to her death.  Larson 
responded, stating that one time, when Friend and Maric were at 
her house in her kitchen, Friend told Larson that "he had to 
keep Eva in check," and further, that "if she wouldn't be in 
check, he'd kill her, and she knew it."  Then, Maric responded 
that "yes, he would."  Additionally, when Attorney Kovac asked 
Larson whether she ever observed any physical contact between 
Maric and Friend, Larson stated that she saw Friend slap Maric 
at a motel room. 
                                                 
11 Neither of the weapons used in the murder was ever 
located. 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
16 
 
¶38 At the end of his offer of proof, Kovac stated that 
"Our theory is that it's Willie who did it."  In response, the 
court stated, "The issue is really not who did it.  The issue is 
whether the defendant did it."  The court added, "The statement 
by this witness [Larson] about what happened sometime previous 
is, I believe, hearsay."  The court reasoned that allowing 
Larson 
to 
testify 
would 
"cause 
the 
jury 
to 
speculate."  
Accordingly, the court sustained the State's objection to 
Larson's testimony.  The court similarly excluded Barbara 
Lange's 
proffered 
testimony 
about 
Friend 
and 
Maric's 
relationship and the threat Friend made to Maric in Larson's 
kitchen. 
¶39 In closing arguments, Kovac stated that "Willie Friend 
should be a suspect."  Kovac continued: 
Now, 
I'll 
tell 
you, 
right 
from 
the 
beginning . . . Willie did not fire the shots.  There 
were two people who came by in that car, at least two 
people.  There was somebody in the driver's area seat.  
There was somebody in the passenger seat.  Those two 
people shot and killed Eva.  I don't know who those 
people are . . . .  But I think when you look at 
what's going on here, it's reasonable to me that 
Willie was involved.  Willie had her there at this 
location knowing that these guys were going to come 
by. 
To support his theory, Kovac suggested that Friend thought Maric 
was pregnant with his child and that he wanted to avoid another 
child support case.  Kovac also suggested that the shots fired 
at Friend were for show, to make it look as though he was in 
harm's way when he was not. 
E. Jury Verdict and Postconviction Proceedings 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
17 
 
¶40 On July 8, 1993, the jury found Wilson guilty of both 
counts.  At the sentencing hearing on October 4, 1993, the court 
sentenced Wilson to life in prison with parole eligibility after 
thirty years for the first count, and to a maximum of twenty 
years, consecutive to his first sentence, for the second count. 
¶41 On June 3, 1996——almost three years later——Wilson 
filed a postconviction motion requesting a new trial.  Wilson 
alleged that the trial was fundamentally unfair and denied him 
his right to present a complete defense.  He also claimed newly 
discovered 
evidence 
not 
available 
at 
the 
time 
of 
trial 
substantiated his theory of defense and undermined the theory of 
the prosecution.  The court denied this motion without a 
hearing.  The court concluded that the reasons set forth on the 
record sufficed for not allowing Wilson to introduce the 
proffered evidence to support his theory that Friend was 
involved in Maric's murder.  The court further determined that 
Wilson did not provide any evidence to support his claim of new 
evidence. 
¶42 Wilson did not file an appeal of the circuit court's 
ruling on his postconviction motion.  However, in a 2010 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Wilson alleged that his 
counsel performed deficiently and abandoned Wilson by failing to 
pursue appellate review of the court's denial of Wilson's 
motion.12  On September 14, 2010, the Court of Appeals granted 
                                                 
12 The Office of Lawyer Regulation publicly reprimanded 
Attorney 
Kovac 
in 
2008 
for 
violating 
multiple 
rules 
of 
professional conduct while representing Wilson. 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
18 
 
Wilson's 
petition 
and 
reinstated 
his 
postconviction 
and 
appellate 
rights, 
concluding 
that 
Attorney 
Kovac 
provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel to Wilson. 
¶43 On January 24, 2011, Wilson filed another motion for 
postconviction relief, requesting a new trial.  In this motion, 
Wilson alleged that his constitutional rights were violated 
through ineffective assistance of counsel and judicial error.  
Wilson argued that, under the standard adopted in Denny, 
"Willie . . . had the opportunity——in time and place——to have 
participated in Eva's killing" and that Willie had a motive to 
kill her.  Wilson grounded one of his ineffective assistance of 
counsel 
claims 
on 
counsel's 
alleged 
failure 
to 
make 
a 
comprehensive offer of proof before trial and to show the court 
why available evidence satisfied the Denny standard so as to 
make Mary Lee Larson's and Barbara Lange's testimony regarding 
Friend's relationship with Maric admissible. 
¶44 Once again, the court denied Wilson's motion for 
postconviction relief.13  The court determined that Wilson's 
trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to proffer certain 
evidence that third parties might have committed the offense and 
for failing to explain why that evidence was admissible.  The 
court concluded that it was not reasonably probable that the 
trial judge would have admitted the proffered evidence, as it 
would have been deemed either insufficient to satisfy Denny or 
inadmissible hearsay. 
                                                 
13 Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Jeffrey Conen presided. 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
19 
 
¶45 Wilson 
appealed, 
arguing 
that 
he 
was 
denied 
a 
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense during his 
criminal trial because the court would not allow him to 
introduce third party perpetrator evidence.  The court of 
appeals recognized the importance of Denny, stating, 
Evidence that a person other than the defendant 
committed the charged crime is relevant to the issues 
being tried, and thus admissible, "as long as motive 
and opportunity have been shown and as long as there 
is also some evidence to directly connect a third 
person to the crime charged which is not remote in 
time, place or circumstances." 
State v. Wilson, No. 2011AP1803-CR, unpublished order, at 3 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2013) (quoting Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 
624). 
¶46 The court of appeals then noted that the State 
conceded that Wilson's offer of proof was arguably sufficient to 
establish that Friend had a motive to kill Maric and that 
Friend's presence at the scene of the crime established that 
Friend had a direct connection to the crime.  Id. at 6.  
However, the court rejected the State's position that Friend did 
not have the opportunity to commit this crime.  Id. at 7.  The 
court concluded that a "review of the evidence shows that Friend 
had the opportunity to commit this crime, either directly by 
firing the first weapon or in conjunction with others by luring 
Maric to the place where she was killed."  Id.  The court stated 
that "[u]nder Denny, Wilson should have been allowed to 
introduce evidence that Friend was involved in Maric's murder."  
Id.  The court ultimately reversed Wilson's conviction and the 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
20 
 
circuit 
court's 
order 
denying 
postconviction 
relief, 
and 
remanded the case for further proceedings.  Id. at 11.  The 
State sought review, and this court granted review on November 
5, 2013. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶47 This court reviews a circuit court's decision to admit 
or refuse to admit evidence for an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  Weborg v. Jenny, 2012 WI 67, ¶41, 341 Wis. 2d 668, 
816 N.W.2d 191.  When the circuit court's denial of admission of 
the proffered evidence implicates a defendant's constitutional 
right to present a defense, however, the decision not to admit 
the evidence is a question of constitutional fact that this 
court reviews de novo.  State v. Knapp, 2003 WI 121, ¶173, 265 
Wis. 2d 278, 666 N.W.2d 881, vacated and remanded, 542 U.S. 952 
(2004), reinstated in material part, 2005 WI 127, ¶2 n.3, 285 
Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶48 Although a circuit court generally has the discretion 
to deny the admission of evidence, that discretion is subject to 
constitutional limitations; a circuit court may not refuse to 
admit evidence if doing so would deny the defendant's right to a 
fair trial.  Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689-90 (1986).  
Nevertheless, evidence offered by a defendant in his own defense 
must be relevant.  Milenkovic v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 272, 286-87, 
272 N.W.2d 320 (Ct. App. 1978).  It is this tension between the 
defendant's rights and the relevancy requirement that the court 
of appeals addressed in Denny. 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
21 
 
¶49 Denny involved the conviction of Kent A. Denny for the 
murder of Christopher Mohr.  Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 617.  Denny 
and his brother were accused of stabbing Mohr 57 times.  Id.  At 
trial, Denny attempted to introduce evidence that he had no 
motive to kill Mohr, but others did.  Id. at 621.  The circuit 
court refused to allow Denny to present the evidence, ruling it 
was irrelevant.  Id.  Denny appealed, claiming that the court's 
refusal to allow him to introduce the evidence was a violation 
of his constitutional right to present a defense.  Id. at 621-
22. 
¶50 The court of appeals stated that it was a "general 
rule . . . that evidence of motive of one other than the 
defendant to commit the crime can be excluded when there is no 
other proof directly connecting that person with the offense 
charged."  Id. at 622.  The court looked to the California case 
of People v. Green, 609 P.2d 468 (Cal. 1980), to support its 
position.  It agreed with the California Supreme Court that the 
purpose of limitations on the admission of evidence as to the 
possible motive of a third party is to "place reasonable limits 
on the trial of collateral issues . . . and to avoid undue 
prejudice to the People from unsupported jury speculation as to 
the guilt of other suspects . . . ."  Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 622 
(quoting Green, 609 P.2d at 480) (alterations in original).  The 
Denny court disagreed, however, with California's requirement 
that evidence connecting a third party to the crime be 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
22 
 
"substantial," 
holding 
that 
standard 
to 
be 
unfair 
to 
defendants.14  Id. at 623. 
¶51 The court of appeals instead turned to Alexander v. 
United States, 138 U.S. 353, 356 (1891), and the "legitimate 
tendency" 
test 
created 
in 
that 
case. 
 
To 
support 
the 
introduction 
of 
third-party 
perpetrator 
evidence 
under 
Alexander, the court of appeals explained, "there must be a 
'legitimate tendency' that the third person could have committed 
the crime."  Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 623 (citing Alexander, 138 
U.S. at 356-57).  The court noted that the defendant need not 
establish the guilt of the third party to the level that would 
be necessary to sustain a conviction.  Id.  However, "evidence 
that simply affords a possible ground of suspicion against 
another person should not be admissible."  Id.  The Denny court 
thus created a "bright line standard requiring that three 
factors be present, i.e., motive, opportunity, and direct 
connection" for a defendant to introduce third-party perpetrator 
evidence.  Id. at 625. 
¶52 We ratified the Denny test in Knapp, 265 Wis. 2d 278, 
¶¶175-183, 
noting 
the 
constitutional 
underpinnings 
of 
the 
                                                 
14 Two years after State v. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 357 
N.W.2d 12 
(Ct. 
App. 
1984), 
the 
California 
Supreme 
Court 
backtracked 
on 
the 
substantiality 
requirement: 
"To 
be 
admissible, the third party evidence need not show 'substantial 
proof of a probability' that the third person committed the act; 
it need only be capable of raising a reasonable doubt of 
defendant's guilt."  People v. Hall, 718 P.2d 99, 104 (Cal. 
1986) (en banc). 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
23 
 
standard in United States Supreme Court precedent.  Id., ¶178 
(citing Alexander, 138 U.S. 353).  Indeed, since Knapp, the 
Supreme Court has gone on to cite the Denny case with approval.  
See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 327-28 n.* (2006).  
We now reaffirm that the Denny test is the correct and 
constitutionally proper test for circuit courts to apply when 
determining 
the 
admissibility 
of 
third-party 
perpetrator 
evidence. 
¶53 We pause to note that each piece of a defendant's 
proffered evidence need not individually satisfy all three 
prongs of the Denny test.  Some evidence provides the foundation 
for other evidence.  "[F]acts give meaning to other facts," and 
certain pieces of evidence become significant only in the 
aggregate, upon the proffer of other evidence.  State v. 
Vollbrecht, 2012 WI App 90, ¶26, 344 Wis. 2d 69, 820 N.W.2d 443.    
"This is precisely why Denny requires that all three be shown 
before evidence of a third-party perpetrator is admitted at 
trial."  Id. 
¶54 Although the Denny case is sound in principle, it does 
not provide complete clarity as to the meaning and contours of 
two of its prongs.  This ambiguity is understandable in light of 
the multitude of fact situations in which the Denny test may be 
employed.  Denny is firm, however, that three factors be 
present, implying that "opportunity" and "direct connection" 
have distinct meaning.  Thus, the fact that a person with a 
motive to commit the crime is present at the crime scene is not 
enough to satisfy both "opportunity" and "direct connection." 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
24 
 
¶55 In theory, many people may qualify as having the 
opportunity to commit a crime by virtue of their presence at the 
crime scene or their presence (at the time of the crime) in the 
vicinity of the crime scene.  But presence does not necessarily 
create either motive or direct connection; and presence does not 
necessarily move the defendant's theory beyond speculation, even 
when other evidence does not eliminate a third-party as having 
the opportunity to commit the crime. 
¶56 Essentially, 
the 
Denny 
legitimate 
tendency 
test 
requires a court to answer three questions. 
¶57 First, did the alleged third-party perpetrator have a 
plausible reason to commit the crime?  This is the motive prong. 
¶58 Second, could the alleged third-party perpetrator have 
committed the crime, directly or indirectly?  In other words, 
does the evidence create a practical possibility that the third 
party committed the crime?  This is the opportunity prong. 
¶59 Third, is there evidence that the alleged third-party 
perpetrator 
actually 
committed 
the 
crime, 
directly 
or 
indirectly?  This is the direct connection prong.  Logically, 
direct connection evidence should firm up the defendant's theory 
of the crime and take it beyond mere speculation.  It is the 
defendant's responsibility to show a legitimate tendency that 
the alleged third-party perpetrator committed the crime. 
¶60 A person's presence at the crime scene may be analyzed 
under "opportunity" but the opportunity prong may be eliminated 
during this analysis because of additional information.  A 
person's presence at the crime scene also may be analyzed under 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
25 
 
the third prong, direct connection.  What must be stressed is 
that "presence" alone will normally not satisfy both of these 
distinct prongs. 
¶61 To provide additional guidance, we will discuss the 
three 
prongs 
one 
by 
one, 
keeping 
in 
mind 
that 
it 
is 
unconstitutional to refuse to allow a defendant to present a 
defense simply because the evidence against him is overwhelming. 
A. Motive 
¶62 Circuit courts often encounter the question of motive 
in homicide cases.  A defendant's motive to commit a homicide is 
widely considered to be relevant.  See D.E. Buckner, Necessity 
That Trial Court Charge Upon Motive in Homicide Case, 71 
A.L.R.2d 1025 (1960).  "'Motive' refers to a person's reason for 
doing something . . . .  Evidence of motive does not by itself 
establish guilt."  Wis JI——Criminal 175.  Motive is not an 
element of any crime; rather, motive "may be shown as a 
circumstance to aid in establishing" a particular person's 
guilt.  Id. 
¶63 The admissibility of evidence of a third party's 
motive to commit the crime charged against the defendant is 
similar to what it would be if that third party were on trial 
himself.  Because motive is not an element of any crime, the 
State never needs to prove motive; relevant evidence of motive 
is generally admissible regardless of weight.  See State v. 
Berby, 81 Wis. 2d 677, 686, 260 N.W.2d 798 (1977).  The same 
applies to evidence of a third party's motive——the defendant is 
not required to establish motive with substantial certainty.  
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
26 
 
Evidence of motive that would be admissible against a third 
party 
were 
that 
third 
party 
the 
defendant 
is 
therefore 
admissible when offered by a defendant in conjunction with 
evidence 
of 
that 
third 
party's 
opportunity 
and 
direct 
connection. 
¶64 It may be that the strength and proof of a third 
party's motive to commit the crime is so strong that it will 
affect the evaluation of the other prongs.  Nonetheless, the 
Denny test is a three-prong test; it never becomes a one- or 
two-prong test. 
B. Opportunity 
¶65 The second prong of the "legitimate tendency" test 
asks whether the alleged third-party perpetrator could have 
committed the crime in question.  This often, but not always, 
amounts to a showing that the defendant was at the crime scene 
or known to be in the vicinity when the crime was committed. 
¶66 As a legal concept, "opportunity" appears in the 
Wisconsin Statutes in the context of "other acts" evidence.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2): 
(2) 
OTHER 
CRIMES, 
WRONGS, 
OR 
ACTS. . . . [E]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that the person acted in 
conformity 
therewith. 
 
This 
subsection 
does 
not 
exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, 
such 
as 
proof 
of 
motive, 
opportunity, 
intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
(Emphasis added.) 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
27 
 
¶67 The analysis of other acts evidence to demonstrate 
opportunity applies to third-party perpetrator evidence: 
The case law as well as § 904.04(2) permits the 
introduction of other act evidence to show a person's 
(whether a party or third person) "opportunity" to 
engage in certain conduct.  "Opportunity" is a broad 
term . . . ; proof of opportunity may be relevant to 
place the person at the scene of the offense (time and 
proximity) or to prove whether one had the requisite 
skills, 
capacity, 
or 
ability 
to 
carry 
out 
an 
act. . . .  It is incumbent on the proponent, however, 
to show the relevance of the "opportunity" evidence. 
7 Wis. Prac., Wis. Evidence § 404.7 (3d ed.) (footnotes 
omitted). 
¶68 The defense theory of a third party's involvement will 
guide the relevance analysis of opportunity evidence in a Denny 
case.  If the third party is to be implicated personally as the 
shooter, then opportunity might be shown by the party's presence 
at the crime scene.  See People v. Primo, 753 N.E.2d 164, 168–69 
(N.Y. 2001) (evidence that the third party was at crime scene 
admissible in conjunction with ballistics linking third party to 
the weapon used).  If the defense theory is that a third party 
framed the defendant, then the defense might show opportunity by 
demonstrating the third party's access to the items supposedly 
used in the frame-up.  Cf. Krider v. Conover, 497 Fed. Appx. 
818, 821 (10th Cir. 2012) (third party's access to defendant's 
blood and hair samples only speculative evidence of opportunity 
without connecting third party to crime).  In all but the rarest 
of cases, however, a defendant will need to show more than an 
unaccounted-for period of time to implicate a third party.  Cf. 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
28 
 
Vollbrecht, 344 Wis. 2d 69 (a third party's unaccounted-for 
period of time enough to show opportunity in murder with 
extremely distinctive characteristics that also were present in 
a case in which the third party was convicted). 
¶69 Overwhelming evidence against the defendant may not 
serve as the basis for excluding evidence of a third party's 
opportunity (or direct connection to the crime): "by evaluating 
the strength of only one party's evidence, no logical conclusion 
can be reached regarding the strength of contrary evidence 
offered by the other side to rebut or cast doubt."  Holmes, 547 
U.S. at 331.  However, this holding does not govern situations 
in which overwhelming evidence demonstrates that the proposed 
third party could not have committed the crime.  Courts are not 
evaluating the strength of only one party's evidence in such 
cases; they are in fact weighing the strength of the defendant's 
evidence (that a third party committed the crime) directly 
against the strength of the State's evidence (that the third 
party did not commit the crime). 
¶70 Courts may permissibly find——as a matter of law——that 
no reasonable jury could determine that the third party 
perpetrated the crime in light of overwhelming evidence that he 
or she did not.  Cf. People v. Pouncey, 471 N.W.2d 346, 350 
(Mich. 1991) ("When, as a matter of law, no reasonable jury 
could find that the provocation was adequate [to form the basis 
of a defense to the charge], the judge may exclude evidence of 
the provocation.").  In sum: 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
29 
 
While 
the 
Constitution . . . prohibits 
the 
exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve 
no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to 
the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-
established rules of evidence permit trial judges to 
exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed 
by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the 
jury. 
Holmes, 547 U.S. at 326. 
C. Direct Connection 
¶71 "The 'legitimate tendency' test asks whether the 
proffered evidence is so remote in time, place or circumstances 
that a direct connection cannot be made between the third person 
and the crime."  Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 624 (citation omitted).  
No bright lines can be drawn as to what constitutes a third 
party's direct connection to a crime.  Rather, circuit courts 
must assess the proffered evidence in conjunction with all other 
evidence to determine whether, under the totality of the 
circumstances, 
the 
evidence 
suggests 
that 
a 
third-party 
perpetrator actually committed the crime.  See, e.g., Shields v. 
State, 166 S.W.3d 28 (Ark. 2004); State v. Oliver, 821 P.2d 250, 
252 (Az. Ct. App. 1991) ("The defendant must show that the 
evidence has an inherent tendency to connect the other person 
with the actual commission of the crime.") (citation omitted); 
People v. Hall, 718 P.2d 99 (Cal. 1986).  In sum, courts are not 
to look merely for a connection between the third party and the 
crime, they are to look for some direct connection between the 
third party and the perpetration of the crime. 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
30 
 
¶72 As with opportunity, there are myriad possibilities 
how a defendant might demonstrate a third party's direct 
connection to the commission of a crime.  For example, a third 
party's self-incriminating statement may be used to establish 
direct connection.  See Erwin v. State, 729 S.W.2d 709, 714-17 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1987).  Exclusive control of the weapon used 
may also establish a direct connection.  Primo, 753 N.E.2d at 
168–69.  Mere presence at the crime scene or acquaintance with 
the victim, however, is not normally enough to establish 
direction connection.  See, e.g., State v. Eagles, 812 A.2d 124 
(Conn. App. 2002). 
D. Whether Wilson Satisfied the Denny Standard 
¶73 The State conceded in its briefing to this court that 
Wilson satisfied the motive and direct connection prongs of the 
Denny test.  We regret the State's concession of direct 
connection inasmuch as it has necessitated discussion of factors 
under the heading of opportunity that arguably belong under 
direct connection——and vice versa. 
¶74 Friend's supposed motive was his belief that Maric was 
pregnant, that he was responsible for her pregnancy, and that he 
wanted to avoid future child support.  The alleged direct 
connection was his relationship to Maric and his presence at the 
crime scene (in front of his brother's house) at the time of her 
death.  Friend's presence at the crime scene might better have 
been analyzed under opportunity, raising the possibility that he 
could have committed the crime as a conspirator and leaving his 
tenuous connection to the perpetration of the crime to be 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
31 
 
analyzed under direct connection.  Because Friend's presence at 
the crime scene is not in dispute and because it has been 
consistently analyzed in this case as the direct connection, we 
assume without deciding that these two prongs have been 
satisfied. 
¶75 This brings us to opportunity, which here must mean 
more than presence.  If the opportunity prong has not been met, 
it was not error for the circuit court to refuse to admit the 
proffered evidence and we need go no further.  See Denny, 120 
Wis. 2d 614. 
¶76 The State contends that "Wilson failed to show that 
Willie Friend had the opportunity to kill [Maric], either as the 
direct shooter or in conjunction with unknown persons he knew 
were planning to murder her."   
¶77 The State argues first that Friend himself could not 
have been the shooter.  It contends that the ballistics evidence 
on where the .44 bullets hit and were found, combined with the 
consistent testimonial evidence of Kidd-Edwards and Friend about 
the timing of the shots fired, shows it was "impossible" that 
Friend could have shot Maric with the .44, then have that gun 
shot at him by another, as he was running away.  Both witnesses 
testified that the louder shots from the .44 were fired first 
and in rapid succession——"one right behind the other."  Friend's 
hands were swabbed at the crime scene for gun shot residue, and 
the tests were negative.  Shells were found in the area of 
Friend's observed flight. 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
32 
 
¶78 Wilson 
counters 
that 
Friend 
could 
have 
been 
a 
"shooter" himself.  He contends that ballistics evidence can be 
misinterpreted, that Friend and Maric were in the car for a long 
time before the shooting such that his position in the car at 
the time of the shooting was unknown, and that Kidd-Edwards did 
not see the first shots fired.  Wilson therefore concludes that 
any question as to whether the State's evidence showed Friend 
not to be the shooter goes to the weight of Wilson's evidence, 
not the admissibility of it. 
¶79 We note that Wilson's theory throughout the trial was 
that 
Friend's 
involvement 
was 
indirect——that 
Friend 
hired 
Maric's killer or killers as a result of his motive to kill 
Maric to avoid child support or some other concern.  Wilson did 
not suggest that Friend pulled the trigger himself.  "Willie did 
not fire the shots," his counsel told the jury.  The proffered 
evidence that the circuit court refused to admit did not support 
a direct shooter theory, in part, because it was logically 
inconsistent with Wilson's favored theory that Friend hired 
someone else to be the shooter.  We see no reason to belabor the 
point. 
¶80 The State also argues that Wilson has failed to show 
"how Friend had the opportunity to arrange for two unnamed 
gunmen . . . to murder Eva [Maric]."  The State relies on two 
points to support this argument.  First, the "assailants" were 
driving the same type of car as Wilson.  Second, the ballistics 
evidence and eyewitness testimony demonstrated that Friend was 
in real danger during the shooting; there was enough of a risk 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
33 
 
of harm to Friend that it is implausible that he hired someone 
to make him look like a victim in that manner. 
¶81 Wilson counters that nothing in the evidence excluded 
the possibility that Friend hired one or more hit men to kill 
Maric, make Friend look like a victim, and frame Wilson for the 
murder.  In support of this theory, Wilson points to the 
substantial period of time——allegedly one to two hours——that 
Friend and Maric were in the car together prior to the shooting.  
Wilson claims this is evidence that Friend kept her there as a 
target for the shooters.  Wilson also notes that Friend had time 
in his brother's house to arrange a hit on Maric.  Here, Wilson 
relies on Vollbrecht, suggesting that Friend had a "limited but 
sufficient opportunity" under the Denny test to arrange for the 
murder. 
¶82 Wilson argues that, for purposes of his defense, 
opportunity and direct connection are virtually the same thing; 
Friend's direct connection to the crime——his presence at the 
crime scene——also was his opportunity to commit the crime.  As 
support, Wilson relies on Vollbrecht, where the court of appeals 
explained that "facts give meaning to other facts and . . . the 
significance of [the third party's] opportunity to commit the 
crime depends on his alleged motive and direct connection."  
Vollbrecht, 344 Wis. 2d 69, ¶26. 
¶83 We are unpersuaded that Wilson has demonstrated a 
"legitimate tendency" that Friend committed the crime for which 
Wilson was convicted by hiring one or more persons to kill 
Maric.  Denny's "legitimate tendency" test requires more than 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
34 
 
mere possibility.  Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 623 ("evidence that 
simply affords a possible ground of suspicion against another 
person should not be admissible").  Wilson in 1993 and Wilson 
now have failed to proffer any evidence that would elevate the 
theory of Friend's involvement in an assassination conspiracy 
from a mere possibility to a legitimate tendency. 
¶84 Friend and Wilson testified at trial.  Their accounts 
are reported in some detail in this opinion.  Wilson was able to 
challenge Friend's credibility as a witness based on Friend's 
eight prior criminal convictions, his inconsistent testimony 
about the nature of his brother's business, and an overheard 
statement before the preliminary hearing in which he said to his 
mother that he "had to get his story together."  Wilson 
challenged the accuracy of Friend's testimony about the shooter 
being 
left-handed 
and 
wearing 
gold-rimmed 
glasses.  
Nevertheless, the jury must have believed Friend.  Wilson did 
not have much success in poking serious holes in Friend's 
account of the series of events on the evening of April 20 and 
early morning of April 21.  In fact, Wilson's testimony 
confirmed 
Friend's 
testimony 
at 
several 
points——Friend's 
observation of Wilson's car at Throttle Twisters and Friend's 
testimony that Wilson drove by Maric's vehicle twice as it was 
parked in front of 3859 North 9th Street about 2:00 a.m. on 
April 21.  Friend changed his story about the length of time 
that he and Maric sat in Maric's car before the shooting, from 
several hours to the period from about 4:30 a.m. until the 
shooting, after Friend reluctantly admitted that he and Maric 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
35 
 
spent most of that time in Jabo's house——the illegal after-hours 
club operated by his brother. 
¶85 Against this background, Wilson has proffered no 
evidence demonstrating that Friend had the opportunity to 
arrange a hit on Maric during the relatively short time they 
were in Maric's car——no evidence that Friend had the contacts, 
influence, and finances to quickly hire or engage a shooter or 
shooters to gun down a woman on a public street.  He has not 
shown that Friend or his alleged unnamed associates had access 
to a gold Lincoln Continental similar to Wilson's.  He has not 
proffered 
any 
telephone 
records 
from 
Friend 
or 
Friend's 
brother's house that could have set up the time and place of the 
hit on short notice.  He has not proffered any evidence of the 
ownership by Friend or his family of .44 and .25 caliber 
weapons.  He has not identified any individuals as being the 
shooter or shooters possibly employed by Friend.  In short, he 
has not offered any evidence whatsoever indicating that Friend 
had the means or access or ability to hire assassins to kill 
Maric at a particular place within a relatively short time 
frame. 
¶86 Wilson's 
reliance 
on 
Vollbrecht 
is 
misplaced.  
Vollbrecht involved two separate murders that shared extremely 
distinctive characteristics, reducing the need for a showing of 
opportunity to more than the third party's unaccounted-for time.  
Wilson has failed to show any similarity to a previous crime 
committed by Friend, his brother, or any associate of Friend's, 
distinguishing this case from Vollbrecht.  Wilson was not 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
36 
 
excused from making an offer of proof as to opportunity beyond 
an unaccounted-for block of Friend's time.  Because Wilson 
failed to make an adequate offer of proof as to Friend's 
opportunity, it was not error for the circuit court to refuse to 
admit Wilson's proffered evidence to avoid speculation that 
might confuse the jury.15 
¶87 Because we determine there was no error in the circuit 
court's decision, we need not reach the question of whether any 
error was harmless. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
                                                 
15 At the court of appeals, Wilson also contended that the 
circuit court should have permitted him to introduce evidence 
implicating Larnell "Jabo" Friend in Maric's murder.  The court 
of appeals did not reach this issue, basing its ruling instead 
on the proffered evidence about Willie Friend.  State v. Wilson, 
No. 2011AP1803-CR, unpublished order, at 7 n.4 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Oct. 22, 2013).  In cases where this court reverses the court of 
appeals and the court of appeals did not reach an issue, we will 
often remand the case for consideration of the issue not 
reached.  See, e.g., State v. Sarfraz, 2014 WI 78, 356 
Wis. 2d 460, 851 N.W.2d 235.  However, "[o]nce [a] case is 
before us, it is within our discretion to review any substantial 
and compelling issue which the case presents."  Univest Corp. v. 
General Split Corp., 148 Wis. 2d 29, 32, 435 N.W.2d 234 (1989). 
Because the issue involving Jabo is so similar to the issue 
involving Willie (i.e., whether third-party perpetrator evidence 
should have been admitted), we see no need to remand to the 
court of appeals.  At trial, Wilson's offer of proof regarding 
Jabo was that Maric "had been working as a prostitute, that her 
pimp was Jabo, [and] that she was trying to get out."  Although 
this offer of proof suggested a possible motive, it described no 
opportunity or direct connection for Jabo to have perpetrated 
the crime.  In short, Wilson's proffered evidence about Jabo 
offered little more than "a possible ground of suspicion"; 
accordingly, we hold that it was not error for the circuit court 
to exclude it.  See Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 623. 
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
37 
 
¶88 On trial for murder, General Grant Wilson developed a 
theory that someone else fired the shots that killed Evania 
Maric on April 21, 1993.  The details of this theory fit within 
the contours of the known facts of the case in a way that could 
not be readily disproved.  However, even though the law does not 
require Wilson to prove that someone else committed the crime 
for which he was on trial, it does require more than a theory 
"that simply affords a possible ground of suspicion . . . ."  
Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 623. 
¶89 The "legitimate tendency" test ensures that proffered 
evidence meets the necessary evidentiary threshold before it is 
admitted while, at the same time, guarding the constitutional 
rights of defendants.  The test requires a showing of the third 
party's motive, opportunity, and direct connection to the crime.  
Although proffered evidence should be understood in the context 
of other evidence, the three prongs of the "legitimate tendency" 
test are distinct from one another.  Only in rare cases will the 
context dictate that a showing on one or two prongs is strong 
enough to lower the threshold for the showing on the third 
prong.  This is not one of those cases. 
¶90 We reaffirm that the Denny test is the appropriate 
test for circuit courts to use to determine the admissibility of 
third-party perpetrator evidence.  However, we conclude that, 
for a defendant to show that a third party had the "opportunity" 
to commit a crime by employing a gunman or gunmen to kill the 
victim, the defendant must provide some evidence that the third 
party had the realistic ability to engineer such a scenario.  
No. 
  2011AP1803-CR 
 
38 
 
Here, Wilson has failed to show that Friend had the opportunity 
to kill Maric, directly or indirectly; consequently, it was not 
error for the circuit court to exclude Wilson's proffered 
evidence.  Accordingly, we reverse. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶91 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion because it "reaffirm[s] the Denny test as 
the appropriate test for circuit courts to use to determine the 
admissibility of third-party perpetrator evidence."  Majority 
op., ¶10. The majority opinion reaffirms that "the Denny test is 
a three-prong test; it never becomes a one- or two-prong test." 
Majority op., ¶64.  I would not join the majority opinion if it 
were interpreted as doing anything other than reaffirming the 
longstanding application of the test from State v. Denny, 120 
Wis. 2d 614, 357 N.W.2d 12 (Ct. App. 1984).  
¶92 I write separately to clarify that the majority 
opinion is intended to reaffirm the Denny test and that certain 
passages in the majority opinion should not be misconstrued.  In 
particular, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
should 
not 
be 
read 
as 
suggesting that a defendant may sometimes introduce Denny 
evidence without satisfying all three prongs of the Denny test.  
Further, it should not be read as suggesting that a third 
party's presence at a crime scene can alone satisfy multiple 
prongs of this test, or that a third party's unknown whereabouts 
during a crime can alone establish that the third party had an 
opportunity to commit the crime.   
¶93 I also write separately to explain the Denny test's 
requirements, purposes, and constitutional basis.  A criminal 
defendant is constitutionally endowed with the right to present 
a defense.  The Denny test attempts to balance a meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense, namely that a third 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
party perpetrated the crime, with the requirement that such 
evidence meet established standards for admissibility.  Simply 
stated, the Denny test requires that proffered evidence create a 
legitimate tendency that someone other than the defendant 
committed the crime charged.  Evidence is deemed inadmissible 
under Denny if it merely raises possible grounds for suspicion. 
The Denny test, like the test for all admissible evidence, 
requires that in order for third-party perpetrator evidence to 
be admitted, it must have the requisite indicia of reliability, 
be relevant, and not be unfairly prejudicial.  The Denny test 
requires a defendant to demonstrate that the third-party 
perpetrator had: (1) the motive to commit the crime; (2) the 
opportunity to commit the crime; and (3) a direct connection to 
the crime.   
¶94 Finally, I write separately to explain that evidence 
of an unknown third-party perpetrator is generally deemed 
inadmissible when the defendant cannot meet the Denny test.  
Most typically, if such evidence is admissible, it is because 
the evidence is deemed admissible as other acts evidence.  In 
the present case, General Grant Wilson did not proceed under the 
theory that his proffered evidence was other acts evidence.  
Instead, Wilson sought to introduce evidence that Willie Friend 
hired someone to shoot Evania Maric.  Wilson's defense was that, 
although it was not Friend who shot Maric, Friend hired someone 
unknown to Wilson to shoot Maric.  Wilson's proffer was that, in 
the past, Friend, who was romantically involved with Maric, had 
exhibited violent behavior toward her and that she was pregnant.  
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
The defense theory was that Friend wanted Maric dead because he 
did not want to be responsible for the baby.  Wilson sought to 
introduce witnesses who would testify that Friend slapped Maric 
at least once and threatened to kill her.  Wilson wished to 
argue, based on this proffered evidence, that Friend hired 
someone to murder Maric.  However, Wilson's proffer failed to 
demonstrate that these alleged assassins were anything but 
purely hypothetical people.  While Friend's motive possibly 
could have been demonstrated, opportunity and direct connection 
were missing.  Wilson's proffered evidence was speculative, at 
best, and the circuit court did not err in excluding it.  Simply 
stated, the proffered third-party perpetrator evidence was not 
admissible because it did not meet the long-standing Denny test.   
I.  THE MAJORITY OPINION REAFFIRMS THE DENNY TEST 
¶95 While a majority of the court intends that this case 
reiterate the Denny test, I write separately because the 
majority opinion may need some clarification.  For example, it 
states that "[o]nly in rare cases will the context dictate that 
a showing on one or two prongs is strong enough to lower the 
threshold for the showing on the third prong."  Majority op., 
¶89.  That statement should not be read as eliminating a 
defendant's need to prevail on all three prongs of the Denny 
test under any circumstances.  To introduce evidence that a 
third party may have committed the crime charged, a defendant 
always must satisfy all three prongs of the Denny test: motive, 
opportunity, and direct connection to the commission of the 
crime.  Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 625; see also State v. Avery, 2011 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
WI App 124, ¶43, 337 Wis. 2d 351, 804 N.W.2d 216.  The majority 
opinion correctly recognizes that "the Denny test is a three-
prong test; it never becomes a one- or two-prong test." Majority 
op., ¶64.  To be admissible, a defendant's evidence of a third-
party perpetrator must establish a "legitimate tendency" that 
the third party committed the crime charged.  Denny, 120 
Wis. 2d at 623-24.  A "mere possibility" that a third party 
committed the crime charged is insufficient.  See id. at 623 
(holding that "evidence that simply affords a possible ground of 
suspicion against another person should not be admissible").  
Evidence of a mere possibility that a third party may have 
committed the crime charged is deemed inadmissible because it 
calls for speculation, creates a trial within a trial, and lacks 
the sufficient indicia of reliability or probative value so to 
qualify as admissible evidence.   
¶96 The majority opinion also states: "What must be 
stressed is that 'presence' alone will normally not satisfy both 
of these distinct prongs [opportunity and direct connection]."  
Majority op., ¶60.  That sentence should not be read as 
suggesting that a third party's presence at a crime scene will 
automatically satisfy any one prong of the Denny test, let alone 
more than one prong.  The majority opinion correctly recognizes 
that "the fact that a person with a motive to commit the crime 
is present at the crime scene is not enough to satisfy both 
'opportunity' and 'direct connection.'" Majority op., ¶54.  The 
majority opinion also correctly notes that presence at a crime 
scene does "not normally . . . establish" a third party's direct 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
connection to the commission of the crime.  Majority op., ¶72 
(citing State v. Eagles, 812 A.2d 124 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002)). 
Similarly, a third party's presence at a crime scene does not 
necessarily establish that he or she had an opportunity or a 
motive to commit the crime.  See Wiley v. State, 74 S.W.3d 399, 
406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding that an alleged third-party 
perpetrator had no opportunity to commit an arson because, 
although present at the crime scene, he lacked the mental 
competence to commit the crime).  Accordingly, a third party's 
presence at a crime scene, by itself, will not automatically 
satisfy any one of the three prongs of the Denny test, and it 
will not satisfy all three prongs.   
¶97 I 
also 
wish 
to 
clarify 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
statement that "[i]n all but the rarest of cases, . . . a 
defendant will need to show more than an unaccounted-for period 
of time to implicate a third party."  Majority op., ¶68 (citing 
State v. Vollbrecht, 2012 WI App 90, 344 Wis. 2d 69, 820 
N.W.2d 443).  A third party's unaccounted-for period of time 
will never, in and of itself, satisfy the Denny test or even a 
single 
prong 
of 
this 
test. 
 
The 
majority 
opinion 
was 
interpreting Vollbrecht as holding that the defendant in that 
case satisfied the opportunity prong of the Denny test by 
showing that (1) a third party's whereabouts during a murder was 
unaccounted for; and (2) the third party was convicted of 
committing a very similar murder in the same area around the 
same time.  See majority op., ¶¶68, 86.  The majority opinion 
should have clarified its discussion of Vollbrecht and how 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
opportunity fit within the legal theories forwarded in that 
case. As explained earlier, the majority opinion correctly 
recognizes that the Denny test is always a three-prong test and 
that a third party's whereabouts will not satisfy multiple 
prongs of this test. 
¶98 In sum, the majority opinion should not be read as 
changing the Denny test.  A defendant always is required to 
prevail on all three prongs of the Denny test in order to 
introduce evidence of an alleged third-party perpetrator.  The 
defendant's proffer must demonstrate a legitimate tendency that 
the third party committed the crime charged, not merely a 
speculative ground of suspicion in that regard.  A third party's 
presence at a crime scene, by itself, will not necessarily 
satisfy any prong of the Denny test and will not satisfy 
multiple prongs.  Similarly, a third party's unaccounted-for 
whereabouts during the commission of a crime will not alone 
satisfy any prong of the Denny test. 
II.  THE DENNY TEST 
¶99 I turn now to the Denny test requirements, purposes, 
and constitutional basis.  The court of appeals in Denny created 
"a bright line standard requiring that three factors be present, 
i.e., motive, opportunity and direct connection," before a 
defendant may introduce evidence that a third party committed 
the crime charged.  Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 625.  Specifically,  
[t]hird-party defense evidence may be admissible under 
the legitimate tendency [e.g., Denny] test if the 
defendant can show that the third party had (1) the 
motive and (2) the opportunity to commit the charged 
crime, and (3) can provide some evidence to directly 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
connect the third person to the crime charged which is 
not remote in time, place or circumstance.   
State v. Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d 285, 296, 595 N.W.2d 661 (1999) 
(citing Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 623-24).  The trial court remains 
the gatekeeper in determining what evidence is admissible and 
why. 
¶100 Under the Denny test, "there must be a 'legitimate 
tendency' that the third person could have committed the crime."  
Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 623 (quoting Alexander v. United States, 
138 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1891)).  Thus, "evidence that simply 
affords a possible ground of suspicion against another person 
should 
not 
be 
admissible. 
Otherwise, 
a 
defendant 
could 
conceivably produce evidence tending to show that hundreds of 
other persons had some motive or animus against the deceased——
degenerating the proceedings into a trial of collateral issues."  
Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 623-24.   
¶101 States use a wide variety of terminology for their 
Denny-type tests, such as "directly links," "substantially 
connects," or "points directly."  See 22 Charles Alan Wright & 
Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5180.2 
(2d ed. 2012).  However, despite that variation in language, 
many states ultimately require a defendant to establish motive, 
opportunity, and direct connection.  See 41 C.J.S. Homicide 
§ 328.  A few jurisdictions eschew the language of a Denny-type 
test in favor of conventional evidentiary principles, such as 
relevancy and balancing probative value against prejudice.  See 
David McCord, "But Perry Mason Made It Look So Easy!": The 
Admissibility of Evidence Offered by a Criminal Defendant to 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
Suggest That Someone Else Is Guilty, 63 Tenn. L. Rev. 917, 937-
38 (1996); People v. Primo, 753 N.E.2d 164, 167-69 (N.Y. 2001).   
¶102 The purpose of the Denny test is to allow a defendant 
to exercise his or her constitutional right to present a defense 
but also to ensure that third-party perpetrator evidence meets 
certain criteria for admissibility.1  See Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 
622-23; Avery, 337 Wis. 2d 351, ¶50 (The Denny test is "a 
mechanism of balancing the accused's right to present a defense 
against the State's interest in excluding evidence that . . . is 
no more than marginally relevant, of extremely limited probative 
value, and likely to confuse the jury and waste the jury's 
time.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Primo, 753 N.E.2d at 
168 (noting that a Denny-type test is "shorthand for weighing 
probative value against prejudice in the context of third-party 
culpability evidence"); John H. Blume et al., Every Juror Wants 
A Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party Guilt and the Right to 
Present A Defense, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1069, 1080-85 (2007) 
(same); see also Ellen Yankiver Suni, Who Stole the Cookie from 
the Cookie Jar?: The Law and Ethics of Shifting Blame in 
                                                 
1 The court of appeals in Denny seemed to view this test as 
a means of excluding evidence that is either irrelevant or, if 
relevant, unfairly prejudicial.  See State v. Denny, 120 
Wis. 2d 614, 622, 623-24, 357 N.W.2d 12 (Ct. App. 1984).  See 
also 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 904.02 
(rendering 
irrelevant 
evidence 
inadmissible); Wis. Stat. § 904.03 ("Although relevant, evidence 
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.").  
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
Criminal Cases, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1643, 1680-81 (2000) (noting 
that, although some courts view a Denny-type test as a means of 
excluding irrelevant evidence, most courts view it as a 
balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect).   
¶103 The United States Supreme Court placed its imprimatur 
on what Wisconsin calls the Denny test.  See Holmes v. S. 
Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 327 & n.* (2006).  The Supreme Court 
concluded that "well-established rules of evidence permit trial 
judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed 
by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or potential to mislead the jury."  Id. at 326 
(citations 
omitted). 
 
By 
excluding 
unfairly 
prejudicial 
evidence, the Denny test prevents "unsupported jury speculation 
as to the guilt of other suspects . . . ."  Denny, 120 
Wis. 2d at 622 (quoting People v. Green, 609 P.2d 468, 480 (Cal. 
1980)).  Hence, evidence that raises only a speculative doubt 
will fail the Denny test.  See People v. Hall, 718 P.2d 99, 104 
(Cal. 1986).  A defendant has no constitutional right to present 
speculative, unreliable evidence in an effort to create doubt.  
See Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d at 303-04; Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 622. 
¶104 In Denny the defendant appealed his judgment of 
conviction for murder, arguing that the circuit court erred by 
excluding evidence that a third party committed the murder.  
Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 617.  The court of appeals held that the 
circuit court did not err in excluding that evidence.  Id. at 
625.  Denny sought to introduce testimony that the victim "'may 
have gotten into trouble with . . . a big drug dealer.'"  Id.  
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
That testimony failed to show that the drug dealer had a motive 
or an opportunity to commit the crime or a direct connection to 
the crime.  Id.  Denny also sought to introduce testimony that 
the victim owed money to another man.  Id.  Assuming that the 
man had a motive to commit the murder, the court of appeals held 
that Denny failed to show the man's opportunity or direct 
connection.  Id.  Finally, Denny sought to introduce testimony 
that the victim angered another man by purchasing a shotgun from 
him and later selling it.  Id.  The court of appeals held that 
this testimony established motive but failed to establish 
opportunity or direct connection.  Id.   
¶105 Courts have subsequently upheld the exclusion of 
third-party perpetrator evidence under Denny.  For example, in 
State v. Jackson, the defendant was convicted of robbing a 
liquor store at gunpoint.  State v. Jackson, 188 Wis. 2d 187, 
194, 525 N.W.2d 739 (Ct. App. 1994).  At trial, a liquor store 
employee testified that "he was 'probably about 80 percent 
sure'" that Jackson was the perpetrator.  Id. at 191.  "At the 
conclusion of the employee's testimony and outside of the jury's 
presence, Jackson requested that because of the employee's 
uncertainty, the employee view a photo of another man that 
Jackson allegedly had learned was the gunman."  Id. at 192.  The 
employee viewed photographs of six people, one of whom was the 
alleged third-party perpetrator, who went by the alias "Rat."  
Id.  The employee was certain that five of the people were not 
the perpetrator, but he said that "Rat" could have been the 
perpetrator.  Id. at 192-93.  Based on Denny, the circuit court 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
denied Jackson's request to recall the employee to testify that 
"Rat" could have been the perpetrator.  Id. at 193.  The court 
of appeals held that the circuit court did not err in excluding 
that evidence because it "provided nothing more than grounds for 
suspicion . . . ."  Id. at 196.  The court of appeals noted that 
the circuit court allowed Jackson to identify "Rat" as the 
perpetrator and to publish the photograph of "Rat" to the jury.  
Id.  "Thus, the trial court did not impermissibly interfere with 
Jackson's constitutional right to present a defense."  Id. 
 
III.  EVIDENCE OF AN UNKNOWN THIRD-PARTY PERPETRATOR  
IS GENERALLY DEEMED INADMISSIBLE 
¶106 Evidence of an unknown third party, who is alleged to 
have committed the crime charged, is most often deemed too 
speculative to be admissible.  In the present case, the 
proffered evidence, as it relates to unknown, alleged hit men, 
is inadmissible under Denny.2  General Grant Wilson's defense 
theory may be viewed in one of two ways.  It may be viewed as an 
unknown third-party perpetrator theory because the alleged 
actual shooter is unknown.  On the other hand, the defense 
theory could be viewed as a known third-party perpetrator theory 
because Willie Friend allegedly hired the shooter.  Either way, 
the circuit court was correct to exclude the evidence because it 
was speculative at best and did not meet the Denny criteria.  
A.  Unknown Third-Party Perpetrators 
                                                 
2 Because 
this 
section 
discusses 
unknown 
third-party 
perpetrators, I do not discuss General Grant Wilson's proffered 
evidence as it relates to his theory that Willie Friend was the 
shooter. 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
12 
 
¶107 In some, but not all, cases in which a defendant seeks 
to introduce evidence of an unknown third-party perpetrator, the 
defendant relies on other acts evidence.  The present case does 
not involve any other acts evidence.  "[O]ften times the defense 
must rely on other act evidence to raise a circumstantial 
inference that the third party carried out the crime."  7 
Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series: Wisconsin Evidence 
§ 404.7, at 215 (3d ed. 2008).  However, evidence of an unknown 
third-party perpetrator is often inadmissible even when it 
relies on other acts evidence.  
¶108 In Scheidell we held that the Denny test does not 
apply to other acts evidence of a similar crime committed by an 
unknown third party who, according to the defendant, committed 
the crime charged.  Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d at 297.  We reasoned 
that, "[i]n a situation where the perpetrator of the allegedly 
similar crime is unknown, it would be virtually impossible for 
the defendant to satisfy the motive or the opportunity prongs of 
the legitimate tendency test of Denny."  Scheidell, 227 
Wis. 2d at 296.  Instead, evidence of a similar crime committed 
by an unknown third party is governed by the test for 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
13 
 
determining the admissibility of other acts evidence.3  Id. at 
287-88.   
¶109 The defendant in Scheidell appealed his judgment of 
conviction for armed burglary and attempted first-degree sexual 
assault.  Id. at 287.  He entered a woman's apartment during the 
night, while armed with a knife and wearing a mask, and 
attempted to sexually assault her.  Id. at 288-90.  At trial, he 
sought to introduce evidence that, five weeks after that 
burglary, an unknown assailant burglarized a woman's home at 
night and sexually assaulted her.  Id. at 290-91.  Scheidell was 
in jail during the second burglary, which occurred four blocks 
away from the previous burglary.  Id.  Scheidell wanted to argue 
that this unknown assailant committed the burglary for which he 
was charged.  Id.  We held that the circuit court "properly 
excluded" this other acts evidence because it was not relevant.  
Id. at 310.  Specifically, due to several factual distinctions 
                                                 
3 To determine whether other acts evidence is admissible, a 
court uses "a three-step analysis."  State v. Jackson, 2014 WI 
4, ¶55, 352 Wis. 2d 249, 841 N.W.2d 791.  First, the evidence 
must be offered for an acceptable purpose under Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2), 
including 
"'motive, 
opportunity, 
intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.'"  Id. (quoting State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 
772, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998)).  Second, the evidence must be 
relevant, which means that it must tend to make a fact of 
consequence more or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence.  Id. (quoting Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772).  Third 
and finally, the probative value of the evidence must not be 
"'substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion 
of 
the 
issues 
or 
misleading 
the 
jury, 
or 
by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.'"  Id. (quoting Sullivan, 
216 Wis. 2d at 772-73). 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
14 
 
between the two burglaries, this other acts evidence was not 
probative of Scheidell's identity as the assailant in the first 
burglary.  Id. at 309-10.  In subsequent cases, Wisconsin courts 
have rarely held that other acts evidence of an unknown third-
party perpetrator is admissible.4 
                                                 
4 In State v. Wright the court of appeals upheld the 
exclusion of other acts evidence of an unknown third-party 
perpetrator under Scheidell.  State v. Wright, 2003 WI App 252, 
¶45, 268 Wis. 2d 694, 673 N.W.2d 386.  Wright was convicted of 
eight counts of armed robbery and one count of attempted armed 
robbery.  Id., ¶1.  On appeal, he argued that the circuit court 
erred by excluding testimony of a man who identified Wright at a 
lineup as the perpetrator of a different robbery, but who was 
unable to identify Wright at a preliminary hearing.  Id., ¶3.  
Wright argued that this proffered testimony was admissible other 
acts evidence because it suggested that whoever committed that 
other robbery could have committed all of the robberies for 
which Wright was tried and convicted.  Id.  The court of appeals 
held that, under Scheidell, the circuit court did not err in 
excluding that evidence.  Id., ¶45.  The court of appeals held 
"that the mere inability of a victim to identify the defendant 
as the perpetrator of a similar uncharged crime perforce takes 
the jury into the realm of conjecture or speculation."  Id.  The 
court of appeals noted that the proffered evidence was even more 
speculative 
than 
the 
inadmissible 
evidence 
proffered 
in 
Scheidell.  See id.  In Scheidell the defendant proffered 
evidence of a similar crime that he could not have committed 
because he was incarcerated at the time.  Id.  By contrast, 
Wright's "proffered testimony does not demonstrate that Wright 
was incapable of committing the similar crime."  Id.  "At the 
most, [the] proffered testimony merely shows that [the witness] 
could not identify Wright as the robber; it does not demonstrate 
that Wright could not have committed the offense."  Id.       
(continued) 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
15 
 
¶110 In other jurisdictions, evidence of an unknown third-
party perpetrator is most often deemed too speculative to be 
admissible.  See, e.g., Wheeler v. United States, 977 A.2d 973 
(D.C. 2009); Gethers v. United States, 684 A.2d 1266 (D.C. 
1996); Neal v. State, 436 S.E.2d 574 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); People 
v. Armstrong, 704 P.2d 877 (Colo. App. 1985); State v. Eagles, 
812 A.2d 124 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).  These cases involved 
traditional Denny evidence, not other acts evidence of a third-
party perpetrator.   
¶111 In Wheeler the defendant appealed his judgment of 
conviction for murder, arguing that the trial court erred by 
excluding his evidence that someone else committed the crime.  
Wheeler, 977 A.2d at 976-77.  The defendant sought to introduce 
                                                                                                                                                             
In contrast, other acts evidence of an unknown third-party 
perpetrator was erroneously excluded in State v. Davis.  In that 
case, the defendant was charged with five counts of burglary and 
one count of armed robbery.  State v. Davis, 2006 WI App 23, 
¶¶2-7, 289 Wis. 2d 398, 710 N.W.2d 514.  One count of burglary 
was 
dismissed 
when 
the 
State 
discovered 
that 
Davis 
was 
incarcerated when that burglary occurred.  Id., ¶8.  The victim 
of that burglary had twice misidentified Davis as the burglar.  
Id., ¶¶3, 8-9.  The circuit court denied Davis' motion to call 
that victim to testify that he had misidentified Davis as the 
burglar.  Id., ¶9.  Davis believed that this other acts evidence 
would establish that someone who looked like him committed that 
burglary and thus could have committed all of the burglaries for 
which he was on trial.  Id., ¶10.  The court of appeals held 
that this other acts evidence was erroneously excluded.  Id., 
¶30.  The court of appeals reasoned that "[t]his is not a 
situation where someone accused of a crime makes a general claim 
that someone else must have done it."  Id., ¶28.  "Rather, here 
we have a burglary victim who twice misidentified Davis as the 
person he saw in his apartment."  Id.  "This fact provided Davis 
with the opportunity to attempt to prove that someone else, 
someone who looks a great deal like Davis, was burglarizing and 
robbing homes within the same general time frame."  Id. 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
16 
 
evidence that the murder victim had cocaine in his system at the 
time of death and, therefore, "had a 'dangerous lifestyle' and 
was at a 'high risk of violent death' from '[r]ival drug 
dealers, dissatisfied customers, or frustrated robbers.'"  Id. 
at 990.  The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the 
trial court properly excluded that evidence because it "fail[ed] 
to provide anything more than 'a hypothetical, unidentified 
person who may have had a motive' to commit the murder."  Id. 
(quoting Gethers, 684 A.2d at 1271).   
¶112 In 
Gethers 
two 
defendants 
appealed 
from 
their 
convictions for burglarizing an apartment together and shooting 
a man who lived in the apartment.  Gethers, 684 A.2d at 1268.  
On appeal, they argued that the trial court erred by excluding 
evidence that someone besides them committed the burglary and 
shooting.  Id.  The proffered evidence was that the victim was a 
drug dealer and thus might have been shot by a disgruntled 
customer.  Id. at 1270, 1272.  The District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals held that the trial court did not err in excluding that 
evidence.  Id. at 1272.  The proffer of that evidence "made no 
showing" that a disgruntled customer, "if he or she actually 
existed, was connected in any way to the shooting."  Id.  
Defense "counsel was merely trying to 'throw something out there 
for the jury to speculate about.'"  Id.   
¶113 In Neal the defendant appealed his judgment of 
conviction for aggravated child molestation, arguing that the 
trial court erred by excluding evidence that someone else 
committed the crime.  Neal, 436 S.E.2d at 575.  The evidence in 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
17 
 
question was that "the mother of the victim was a cocaine addict 
and had casual relationships with numerous men in the family 
home.  This testimony was offered in support of Neal's 
contention that one of these unidentified men . . . may have 
molested the victim."  Id.  The Georgia Court of Appeals held 
that the trial court did not err by excluding that evidence.  
Id.  Evidence of a third-party perpetrator is inadmissible 
"where no specific individual is accused and the defendant 
merely speculates that a person or persons unknown may have had 
the opportunity to commit the crime."  Id. at 576 (citation 
omitted).  The defendant "has not presented anything other than 
his own speculation that unknown alleged drug users frequenting 
[the victim's] residence may have had the opportunity to molest 
the victim."  Id.  Because the defendant failed to show a direct 
connection between one of those unknown men and the crime, his 
proffered evidence was inadmissible.  Id.   
¶114 In Armstrong the defendant appealed his judgment of 
conviction for robbing a cafeteria with another African-American 
male.  Armstrong, 704 P.2d at 878.  The defendant argued that 
the trial court erred by excluding evidence that, 50 minutes 
prior to the robbery, a cafeteria employee saw "two unidentified 
black men" in the cafeteria parking lot.  Id. at 879.  The 
defendant wanted to argue during trial that those unidentified 
men committed the robbery.  Id.  The Colorado Court of Appeals 
held that the trial court did not err by excluding that 
evidence, because that evidence failed to establish a "direct 
connection" between the unidentified men and the robbery.  Id.   
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
18 
 
¶115 In Eagles the defendant appealed a judgment of 
conviction for robbing and shooting a man.  Eagles, 812 A.2d at 
125-26.  On appeal the defendant argued that the trial court 
erred in excluding his proffered evidence that someone else 
committed the robbery and shooting.  Id. at 126.  The proffered 
evidence was testimony from two witnesses who saw three 
unidentified men, none of whom was the defendant, running from 
the vicinity of the crime shortly after the gunshots.  Id. at 
127.  The Connecticut Appellate Court held that the trial court 
did not err in excluding the evidence.  Id. at 128.  The 
appellate court reasoned that the defendant failed to present a 
"direct connection" between any of the three men and the crime.  
Id.  Further, the defendant offered "no evidence of motive on 
the part of any of the three men to commit the crime."  Id.  
¶116 Consistent with the foregoing cases, General Grant 
Wilson's proffered evidence was inadmissible under Denny.  See 
Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d at 296.  Further, Wilson did not attempt 
to introduce any other acts evidence, so his proffered evidence 
was inadmissible under Scheidell.  Wilson attempted to introduce 
testimony that Willie Friend had slapped and threatened an 
allegedly pregnant Evania Maric, in order to argue that Friend 
hired assassins to kill Maric.  This evidence was not other acts 
evidence and it fell far short of satisfying the Denny three-
prong test.  Wilson did not identify any possible assassins or 
introduce any evidence indicating that Friend arranged for Maric 
to be killed.  In fact, Wilson "has not presented anything other 
than his own speculation that unknown alleged" hit men murdered 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
19 
 
Maric.  See Neal, 436 S.E.2d at 576.  He "fail[ed] to provide 
anything more than 'a hypothetical, unidentified'" hit man or 
hit men.  See Wheeler, 977 A.2d at 990 (quoting Gethers, 684 
A.2d at 1271).  Moreover, Wilson "made no showing" that the 
alleged hit men, if they "actually existed, [were] connected in 
any way to the shooting."  See Gethers, 684 A.2d at 1272.  It 
would require a great deal of speculation to conclude that 
Friend hired assassins to kill the allegedly pregnant Maric 
based on testimony that he slapped and threatened her once or 
twice.  Thus, Wilson "was merely trying to 'throw something out 
there for the jury to speculate about.'"  See Gethers, 684 A.2d 
at 1272.  This kind of speculative evidence about unknown, 
alleged perpetrators is not admissible.   
¶117 In sum, if Wilson's defense theory is viewed as an 
unknown third-party perpetrator theory because the alleged 
shooters are unknown, his proffered evidence is inadmissible 
under Denny, Scheidell, and many non-Wisconsin cases. 
 
B.  Evidence that a Known Third Party Allegedly  
Hired Unknown Persons to Commit the Crime Charged 
¶118 Few 
third-party 
perpetrator 
cases 
involve 
an 
allegation that a known third party arranged for unknown persons 
to commit the crime at issue.  One such case is Freeland v. 
United States, 631 A.2d 1186 (D.C. 1993).  In that case Larry 
Freeland was charged with the murder of his wife.  Freeland, 631 
A.2d at 1187.  The trial court excluded his proffered evidence 
that a man named William Hawthorne hired people to commit the 
murder.  Id.  Prior to the murder of Freeland's wife, Freeland 
and Hawthorne were fellow prison inmates.  Id. at 1188.  
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
20 
 
Freeland witnessed Hawthorne stab another inmate to death.  Id.  
Freeland testified against Hawthorne in his grand jury trial 
regarding the stabbing death.  Id.   
¶119 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that 
the proffered evidence should have been admitted as Denny-type 
evidence.  Id. at 1190.  Hawthorne had a motive to hire 
assassins to kill Freeland's wife in order to retaliate against 
Freeland for his grand jury testimony and to intimidate him into 
not testifying against Hawthorne at trial.  See id. at 1189-90.  
Freeland's evidence demonstrated that Hawthorne had a "clear[] 
link" to the murder and a "present ability to carry out the 
threats through others."  Id. at 1189-90.  Specifically, 
Hawthorne's associates confronted Freeland on the street several 
times and "repeatedly made threats to [Freeland] and his family 
in order to intimidate [Freeland] and to retaliate for his grand 
jury testimony . . . ."  Id.   In addition, Freeland introduced 
evidence showing that Hawthorne was being prosecuted for 
threatening other witnesses.  Id.     
¶120 Freeland stands in stark contrast to the present case.  
In Freeland the defendant introduced a substantial amount of 
other acts evidence showing that the alleged third-party 
perpetrator, William Hawthorne, was capable of having his 
associates carry out the murder with which the defendant was 
charged.  Hawthorne's associates confronted Freeland in person 
several 
times 
and 
"repeatedly" 
intimidated 
and 
threatened 
Freeland and his family because Freeland was an eyewitness in 
Hawthorne's 
murder 
trial. 
 
By 
contrast, 
Wilson 
has 
not 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
21 
 
introduced any evidence indicating that Willie Friend or his 
associates had previously murdered anyone.  In fact, Wilson 
introduced no evidence showing that Friend had ever used his 
associates to commit any crime on his behalf.  In Freeland 
Hawthorne's associates were real people whom Freeland saw and 
spoke to several times.  By contrast, Wilson did not even 
introduce evidence indicating that Friend had associates who 
were willing and able to murder Maric.  Wilson's proffered 
evidence is pure speculation about unidentified, hypothetical 
hit men.  In Freeland the defendant also introduced evidence 
showing that Hawthorne was being prosecuted for threatening 
other witnesses.  By contrast, Wilson proffered no other acts 
evidence at all.  "[O]ften times the defense must rely on other 
act evidence to raise a circumstantial inference that the third 
party carried out the crime."  Blinka, supra, at 215.    
¶121 In Freeland the defendant's "hit man" theory of 
defense 
could 
be 
reasonably 
inferred 
from 
his 
proffered 
evidence.  Simply stated, a jury need not speculate in order to 
conclude 
that, 
because 
Hawthorne's 
associates 
"repeatedly" 
threatened Freeland's family, those associates might have killed 
Freeland's wife.  In the present case, Wilson's "hit man" theory 
of defense had no foundation in his proffered evidence.  A jury 
would necessarily have to speculate in order to conclude that, 
because Friend slapped and threatened Maric once or twice, he 
hired assassins to kill her.  Unlike Freeland's proffered 
evidence, Wilson's proffered evidence had nothing whatsoever to 
do with possible hit men.  Falling far short of the proffer made 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.akz 
 
22 
 
in Freeland, Wilson's proffered evidence was pure speculation.  
This kind of evidence is inadmissible. 
¶122 In sum, Wilson's proffer was entirely speculative and 
fell short of establishing a legitimate tendency that Friend 
arranged for hit men to kill Maric.  The circuit court did not 
err in excluding that proffered evidence.   
¶123 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶124 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶125 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with the court of appeals that the defendant's third-party 
perpetrator evidence should have been admitted as a matter of 
constitutional law.1  Like the court of appeals, I would grant 
the defendant a new trial. 
¶126 The instant case revolves around the circuit court's 
exclusion of evidence at the defendant's trial nearly 20 years 
ago. 
¶127 The defendant sought to introduce evidence at trial to 
support his contention that a third party committed the crimes 
alleged in the State's complaint.  Such evidence is sometimes 
referred to as "third-party perpetrator evidence."  The circuit 
court excluded the defendant's third-party perpetrator evidence 
and the defendant was convicted. 
¶128 By excluding the defendant's third-party perpetrator 
evidence, 
the 
circuit 
court 
denied 
the 
defendant 
his 
constitutional right to present a complete defense.2  Thus, the 
                                                 
1 State v. Wilson, No. 2011AP1803-CR, unpublished slip op., 
at 7 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2013). 
2 Majority op., ¶¶61, 70; Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 
319, 
324 
(2006) 
("[T]he 
Constitution 
guarantees 
criminal 
defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete 
defense'" (quoted source omitted).). 
(continued) 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
instant case presents a question of constitutional law this 
court decides independently but benefiting from the analyses of 
the circuit court and the court of appeals.3 
¶129 I begin with a brief review of the relevant facts. 
¶130 Evania Maric, the victim in the present case, was shot 
to death while seated in a parked car with Willie Friend, whom 
she was dating.  Willie Friend fled and was not injured.  Willie 
Friend thereafter reported to the police that the defendant was 
the shooter, which the defendant adamantly denied.  The 
defendant was eventually charged with first-degree intentional 
homicide for killing the victim and attempted first-degree 
intentional homicide for shooting at Willie Friend. 
¶131 At 
trial, 
the 
defendant's 
attorney 
attempted 
to 
persuade the jury that the defendant was innocent and that 
Willie Friend was not.  To establish this defense, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also State v. Anthony, 2015 WI 20, ¶¶119, 125, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 
___ 
N.W.2d ___ 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting) 
(linking the rights to testify and to present a complete defense 
by arguing that the circuit court unconstitutionally deprived 
the defendant of his right to testify to relevant testimony 
regarding self-defense and thereby prevented the defendant from 
presenting any defense at all); State v. Nelson, 2014 WI 70, 
¶68, 
355 
Wis. 2d 722, 
849 
N.W.2d 317 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
dissenting) (explaining that the defendant's constitutional 
right to testify is embedded in the constitutional right to 
present a defense). 
3 The majority opinion acknowledges that the instant case 
presents a constitutional issue.  Majority op. ¶¶47, 61.  See 
also Anthony, 2015 WI 20, ¶43 (stating that "[w]hether an 
individual is denied a constitutional right is a question of 
constitutional fact that this court reviews independently as a 
question of law" (quoted source & internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
defendant's attorney sought to present testimony from two of the 
victim's friends, Mary Lee Larson and Barbara Lange, to 
implicate Willie Friend in the murder. 
¶132 In an offer of proof, Larson stated that she had heard 
Willie Friend threaten to kill Maric and had observed Willie 
Friend slapping Maric.  The defendant's attorney informed the 
circuit court that Lange would provide similar testimony.  The 
testimony of Larson and Lange comprised the defendant's third-
party perpetrator evidence.  The circuit court ruled both 
witnesses' testimony inadmissible. 
¶133 This was not an easy case for the jury.  During 
deliberations, the jury informed the circuit court that it had 
reached an impasse.  Later the next day, the jury found the 
defendant guilty of both charges. 
¶134 The issue presented is whether the circuit court erred 
as a matter of law in excluding the defendant's third-party 
perpetrator evidence. 
¶135 The circuit court cannot bar the defendant's third-
party perpetrator evidence "simply because the evidence against 
the 
[defendant] 
is 
overwhelming."4 
 
Rather, 
third-party 
perpetrator evidence is admissible so long as the defendant 
shows "a 'legitimate tendency' that the third person could have 
committed the crime."5 
                                                 
4 Majority op., ¶¶61, 70. 
5 State v. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 623, 357 N.W.2d 12 (Ct. 
App. 1984). 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶136 State v. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 624, 357 N.W.2d 12 
(Ct. App. 1984), established that a defendant fulfills the 
legitimate tendency test "as long as motive and opportunity have 
been shown and as long as there is also some evidence to 
directly connect [the] third person to the crime charged which 
is not remote in time, place or circumstances . . . ."  In other 
words, the defendant in the instant case was required to fulfill 
the three-prong test set forth in Denny (1) by showing that 
Willie Friend had a motive to commit the crime; (2) by showing 
that Willie Friend had an opportunity to commit the crime; and 
(3) by presenting evidence of a direct connection between Willie 
Friend and the crime.6 
¶137 The majority opinion struggles to clarify the Denny 
test and in doing so changes the test.  Under any reasonable 
interpretation of Denny, the defendant in the instant case 
prevails. 
¶138 The State concedes that the defendant has fulfilled 
the motive and direct connection prongs.  The majority opinion 
assumes without deciding that the defendant has fulfilled the 
motive and direct connection prongs.  Both the State and the 
majority opinion conclude that the defendant has not fulfilled 
the opportunity prong. 
¶139 I review the three prongs of the Denny test in turn. 
¶140 First, the defendant presented evidence that Willie 
Friend's "motive was his belief that Maric [the victim] was 
                                                 
6 Majority op., ¶3. 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
pregnant, 
that 
[Willie 
Friend] 
was 
responsible 
for 
her 
pregnancy, and that he wanted to avoid future child support."7  
Because the defendant provided a "plausible reason" for Willie 
Friend to commit the crime, I conclude that the defendant has 
fulfilled the motive prong.8 
¶141 Second, the defendant argued that Willie Friend's 
undisputed "presence at the crime scene" constituted evidence of 
a direct connection between Willie Friend and the crime.  Based 
on the totality of the evidence presented (including evidence of 
Willie Friend's relationship with the victim, evidence that 
Willie Friend had previously hit and threatened to kill the 
victim, evidence that Willie Friend brought the victim to the 
location where she was murdered, and the undisputed fact that 
Willie Friend was present when the victim was shot), I conclude 
that the defendant has fulfilled the direct connection prong. 
¶142 Third, the defendant argued that Willie Friend had the 
opportunity to hire the victim's killer(s) and set up the 
victim's murder.9  In assessing this argument, the court of 
appeals explained that evidence presented at trial "places 
[Willie] Friend at the scene when the first round of shots was 
fired, and is consistent with [the defendant's] contention that 
                                                 
7 Id., ¶74. 
8 See id., ¶57. 
9 Id., ¶81. 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
[Willie] Friend was involved in the murder by luring [the 
victim] to a place where she would be ambushed."10 
¶143 The court of appeals concluded that Willie Friend "had 
the opportunity to commit this crime, either directly by firing 
the first weapon or in conjunction with others by luring [the 
victim] to the place where she was killed."11 
¶144 I agree with the court of appeals.  I conclude, along 
with the court of appeals, that the defendant has met all three 
prongs of the Denny test for the admissibility of third-party 
perpetrator evidence.  The defendant was therefore entitled to 
introduce the testimony of Larson and Lange to implicate Willie 
Friend in the victim's murder. 
¶145 In my opinion, the circuit court's exclusion of the 
defendant's third-party perpetrator evidence constituted an 
error of law that denied the defendant his constitutional right 
to present a complete defense. 
¶146 The court of appeals applied harmless error review to 
this error of law and concluded that the error was not 
harmless.12  Willie Friend was the State's primary witness.  With 
the 
admission 
of 
the 
defendant's 
third-party 
perpetrator 
evidence, the jury may not have considered Willie Friend a 
credible witness.  The jury may instead have believed the 
defendant.  Accordingly, I agree with the court of appeals that 
                                                 
10 Wilson, No. 2011AP1803-CR, unpublished slip op., at 7. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 10. 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
if harmless error review applies to the circuit court's 
exclusion of the defendant's third-party perpetrator evidence 
(and I do not think it does),13 the error was not harmless. 
¶147 For the reasons set forth, I dissent.  I, like the 
court of appeals, would reverse the circuit court's judgment of 
conviction and order denying postconviction relief and would 
remand the cause for further proceedings. 
¶148 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
                                                 
13 The court determined that harmless error review applies 
to the denial of a defendant's constitutional right to testify 
in Anthony, 2015 WI 20, ¶¶11, 96, 101, and Nelson, 355 
Wis. 2d 722, ¶43.  I dissented in both cases, concluding that 
harmless error review does not apply when a defendant is 
unconstitutionally deprived of the fundamental right to testify.  
See Anthony, 2015 WI 20, ¶140 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting); 
Nelson, 355 Wis. 2d 722, ¶79 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  
The 
constitutional 
right 
to 
testify 
is 
embedded 
in 
the 
constitutional right to present a defense.  See Nelson, 355 
Wis. 2d 722, ¶68 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  Accordingly, I 
conclude that an unconstitutional deprivation of the defendant's 
right to present a defense is not amenable to harmless error 
review. 
No.  2011AP1803-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1