Title: Langbell v. Industrial Commission
Citation: 111 Ariz. 328, 529 P.2d 227
Docket Number: 11658-PR
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: December 9, 1974

111 Ariz. 328 (1974) 529 P.2d 227 Arnie A. LANGBELL, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, Respondent, Arizona Highway Department, Respondent Employer, State Compensation Fund, Respondent Carrier. No. 11658-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. December 9, 1974. Rehearing Denied January 21, 1975. *329 Langerman, Begam &amp; Lewis by Noel Fidel, Phoenix, for petitioner. R.E. Taylor, Legal Counsel, The Industrial Commission of Ariz., Phoenix, for respondent. Don A. Fendon, Phoenix, for respondents Employer and Carrier. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. We granted a petition for review of a memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One, Department A, which affirmed an award of the Industrial Commission of Arizona, finding that the claimant had no permanent physical disability or loss of function for work. We must answer the following questions: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. Arnie Langbell was employed for forty years as a carpenter and a construction supervisor. In 1969 while employed by the State Highway Department, Langbell was struck in the forehead by a timber which caused the retina of his left eye to detach. Langbell was treated by two ophthalmologists and underwent three major eye operations in an effort to remedy the detachment. After the operations and treatment which reattached the retina, the workman's condition stabilized such that there was at most only a slight loss of vision necessitating a prescription for eyeglasses. His doctors, however, forbade him from returning to heavy construction work because another facial blow or severe jarring could very likely cause the retina in the left eye to again detach. At the hearing before the Industrial Commission hearing officer, two ophthalmologists, Sheldon Davidson, M.D. and Louis Rosenbaum, M.D., testified. Dr. Davidson testified on cross-examination: And Dr. Rosenbaum testified: And: It was admitted by all concerned that there was no loss of vision of the eye. Because of the doctors' advice, however, the claimant was unable to find work in positions such as work foreman or supervisor even though it is agreed that the claimant made a diligent effort to find work. Claimant testified that a foreman or supervisor is expected to "pitch in" when lifting is required and that "they are not just going to pay you to stand around and look around." The Fund found that the claimant had a 15% loss of vision in the left eye entitling him to scheduled permanent disability award in the amount of $337.50 a month for three and three-fourths months. The hearing officer however found no loss of vision and further found that: Claimant filed a request for review and the Commission affirmed the award of the hearing officer. The Court of Appeals on 2 April 1974, affirmed the award of the Commission and we granted claimant's petition for review. WAS CLAIMANT DISABLED? It has been held that before a claimant can receive an award for loss of earning capacity, there must be a previous finding of general physical functional disability. State Compensation Fund v. Garcia, 12 Ariz. App. 9, 467 P.2d 84 (1970); Sims v. Industrial Commission, 10 Ariz. *331 App. 574, 460 P.2d 1003 (1969); Rutt v. Industrial Commission, 17 Ariz. App. 142, 495 P.2d 1349 (1972). It has also been held that the Commission is "not required to prospectively rule on speculative future disability that may or may not actually result, and which, if it does result may or may not prove to have some causal relationship to petitioner's industrial injury." Spacone v. Industrial Commission, 14 Ariz. App. 351, 352, 483 P.2d 583, 584 (1971). It does not follow, however, that a claimant must unreasonably risk further injury before he is entitled to compensation: In the instant case the claimant was precluded from gainful employment as a direct result of the industrially related injury to the left eye. After 40 years in carpentry and construction, he is no longer employable. He can no longer sell his services on the open labor market, even though, as all parties agree, he has made a conscientious effort to do so. The claimant is just as precluded from gainful employment as if a specific disability had been found. As Judge Cardozo has stated: In claimant's case we are not concerned with "speculative future disability" that may or may not "have some causal relationship to petitioner's industrial injury." Spacone, supra. We are concerned with his present injury-related physical condition which prohibits him from being employed without risk to his health. We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court under admittedly different statutes: We cannot, as respondent suggested at that hearing, hold that the petitioner must risk a future detachment before he is allowed further compensation. We hold that when a workman suffers an industrial injury and as a direct result of that injury he is unable to perform his normal work activities without incurring a substantial risk of reinjury, then he does in fact have a permanent physical disability or loss of function within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. UNSCHEDULED Section 23-1044 A.R.S. concerning "scheduled disabilities" states in part as follows: Subparagraphs C and D of § 23-1044 A.R.S. concern "unscheduled" disabilities and provides compensation in those cases not listed as "scheduled" in subparagraph B. Unlike compensation awards for certain scheduled injuries such as loss of limb or organ which are made with or without a loss of earning power, Williams v. Industrial Commission, 73 Ariz. 57, 237 P.2d 471 (1951), the State Compensation Fund makes awards for unscheduled injuries only if there is a disability for work which results in loss of earning power. Matlock v. Industrial Commission, 70 Ariz. 25, 215 P.2d 612 (1950); Estrada v. Industrial Commission, 10 Ariz. App. 580, 461 P.2d 88, corrected opinion 11 Ariz. App. 386, 464 P.2d 973 (1969). We are not concerned herein with a loss of vision. Here we are concerned with a permanent physical disability or loss of function because of the risk to the eye. Admitting that if the claimant went back to heavy construction the resulting reinjury to the eye might mean only a further scheduled disability, it does not follow that a scheduled disability award for loss of eye is the limit of his recovery. The risk to the eye by heavy work is in effect an impairment of the whole function of the body preventing the claimant from seeking and holding gainful employment. We believe that the loss of function should be classified as unscheduled under subparagraphs C and D rather than scheduled under subparagraphs A and B. Award set aside. HAYS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur. HOLOHAN, Justice (dissenting). The established law in this state prior to the present case was correctly followed by the Industrial Commission and the Court of Appeals. I dissent from the view taken by the majority. If the legislature wishes to rewrite the statute to conform to the majority position this is, of course, their constitutional right, but I dislike amending statutes by changes in judicial interpretation.