Title: State v. Stephan I. Roberson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2017AP001894-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 3, 2019

2019 WI 102 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP1894-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Stephan I. Roberson, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 384 Wis. 2d 632,922 N.W.2d 317 
(2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 3, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 6, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Wood 
 
JUDGE: 
Nicholas J. Brazeau Jr. 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
R.G. BRADLEY, J. concurs (except for ¶¶41-42), 
joined by KELLY, J. (opinion filed) 
HAGEDORN, J. concurs. (opinion filed) 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: DALLET, J. dissents, joined by A.W. BRADLEY, J. 
(opinion filed)    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Suzanne Edwards and the Law Office of Suzanne Edwards, 
Dodgeville. There was an oral argument by Suzanne Edwards. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Donald V. Latorraca, assistant attorney generals, with whom on 
the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by Donald V. Latorraca. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of The Innocence 
Project, Inc., and the Wisconsin Innocence Project by Keith A. 
 
 
2 
Findley and Wisconsin Innocence Project; with whom on the brief 
is Sarah K. Grossnickle and Whitney Wester, Houston, Texas, and 
Alyssa Musante, Los Angeles, California. 
 
 
2019 WI 102
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2017AP1894-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2017CF76) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant,   
 
 
v. 
 
Stephan I. Roberson,   
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 3, 2019 
 
Sheila Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.   Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
C.J.   We 
review 
an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 reversing the 
circuit court's2 suppression of the victim's identification of 
Stephan I. Roberson because the identification began with law 
enforcement showing a single Facebook photo to the victim.  
                                                 
1 State v. Roberson, No. 2017AP1894-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2018) (per curiam). 
2 The Honorable Nicholas J. Brazeau, Jr. of Wood County 
presided. 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Roberson argues that the circuit court correctly 
granted his motion to suppress the identification evidence on 
the ground that the police utilized an unnecessarily suggestive 
procedure, which violated his due process rights under Article 
I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution as explained in State 
v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582.   
¶3 
The State urges us to overturn Dubose, and return to 
our past practice of following decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court in regard to criteria that are necessary to accord 
due process in eyewitness identifications.  We agree with the 
State.  Dubose was unsound in principle.  Therefore, we overturn 
Dubose 
and 
return 
to 
"reliability 
[a]s 
the 
linchpin 
in 
determining the admissibility of identification testimony."  
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977); see also Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).  Due process does not require 
the 
suppression 
of 
evidence 
with 
sufficient 
"indicia 
of 
reliability."  Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 232 (2012). 
¶4 
Accordingly, "a criminal defendant bears the initial 
burden 
of 
demonstrating 
that 
a 
showup 
was 
impermissibly 
suggestive."  State v. Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d 234, 264, 533 
N.W.2d 167 (1995) (citing State v. Mosley, 102 Wis. 2d 636, 652 
307 N.W.2d 200 (1981) and Powell v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 51, 65, 
271 N.W.2d 610 (1978)).  If a defendant meets this burden, the 
State must prove that "under the 'totality of the circumstances' 
the identification was reliable even though the confrontation 
procedure was suggestive."  Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 264 
(quoting Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 106 and citing Biggers, 409 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
3 
 
U.S. at 199).  We conclude that the State has satisfied its 
burden here. 
¶5 
Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals and remand 
to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶6 
The State charged Roberson with first-degree reckless 
injury, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.23(1)(a) (2017–18).3  The 
charge stemmed from an incident where Roberson, allegedly, shot 
C.A.S. over a drug deal that went wrong. 
¶7 
C.A.S., a Caucasian male, claims to have met an 
African American male at a Walmart toward the end of January in 
2017.  At that time, C.A.S. knew him only as "P."  P tapped 
C.A.S. on the shoulder and asked C.A.S. if he "smoked."  After 
C.A.S. responded "yeah," P asked C.A.S. to obtain a "bag" of 
marijuana for him.  C.A.S. indicated he could.  The two drove to 
get marijuana and then drove back to Walmart and exchanged 
numbers.  This first encounter lasted approximately a half an 
hour. 
¶8 
The following day, C.A.S. was supposed to bring P more 
marijuana.  For whatever reason, C.A.S. was unable to secure 
any, and C.A.S. contacted P explaining his failure. 
¶9 
The next day, C.A.S. texted P to tell him he could get 
marijuana.  The two arranged for P to pick up C.A.S. after P 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
4 
 
finished work.  Sometime after 7:00 p.m., P picked up C.A.S. and 
C.A.S.'s brother and sister, and the four drove to secure the 
marijuana.  The group then drove back to C.A.S.'s residence.  P 
came inside the house, where he asked C.A.S. to sell the 
marijuana for him.  C.A.S. agreed.  This second encounter lasted 
approximately a half an hour. 
¶10 P 
instructed 
C.A.S. 
to 
sell 
the 
marijuana 
in 
"eighths," meaning an eighth of an ounce at a time.  However, 
C.A.S. had a potential buyer, who was interested in a half an 
ounce, worth approximately $180.  C.A.S. went to sell the half 
an ounce, and the potential buyer robbed him at gunpoint.  
C.A.S. texted P, explaining what happened.  A few minutes later, 
P picked up C.A.S., who had been walking on the road. 
¶11 The two drove to a dog park where the situation 
escalated.  P took out a gun and fired a shot past C.A.S.'s 
head.  C.A.S. punched P in the face, and then P pointed his gun 
at C.A.S. and shot him in his leg.  P yelled, "Why'd you make me 
shoot you?"  P then asked C.A.S. if he was going to tell anyone.  
C.A.S. said no and asked P to drive him home.  P drove C.A.S. to 
the residence of D.D., a friend of C.A.S.  When C.A.S. got 
there, he used two belts to create a makeshift tourniquet.  He 
then "got high."  This third encounter lasted between an hour 
and a half and two hours.  C.A.S. did not contact law 
enforcement because he was subject to an outstanding warrant. 
¶12 C.A.S. spent between two and a half to three hours 
with P over a short period of time.  The evidence does not 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
5 
 
indicate that at any point during the encounters C.A.S.'s mental 
state was impaired by drugs or alcohol. 
¶13 Investigator Nathan Reblin learned that C.A.S. had 
been injured and was cared for at D.D.'s residence.  He began 
trying to locate C.A.S.  A confidential citizen witness gave 
Reblin a cell phone that P had given to C.A.S., apparently so 
the two could communicate.  C.A.S. was logged into the cell 
phone's Facebook app.  The cell phone had text messages between 
C.A.S. and a person identified in the messages as "P."  Reblin 
noted the phone number of the contact and searched for it on 
Facebook.  The search yielded one result:  a profile for 
Roberson. 
¶14 Law enforcement obtained a warrant to search D.D.'s 
residence.  They found what they believed to be blood on some 
boxer shorts.  They also found a chair in the basement and a 
quilt that both appeared to have blood stains.  They did not 
find C.A.S. 
¶15 Later, C.A.S. was taken into custody on a probation 
hold.  However, before he was taken to the Wood County jail, he 
was taken to a hospital for what appeared to be an old gunshot 
wound to his leg. 
¶16 About two weeks after the shooting, Reblin and his 
partner interviewed C.A.S. at the jail.  The interview was 
videotaped, and the circuit court admitted a DVD of the 
interview into evidence.   
¶17 C.A.S. told Reblin and his partner what transpired.  
Reblin asked C.A.S. if he would be able to identify P from a 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
6 
 
photograph.  He responded, "Possibly, I mean, I don't know, 
black people kinda" and made a shaking movement with his right 
hand that indicated uncertainty.  Reblin's partner brought up a 
photograph of Roberson from Facebook on his phone, which he 
showed to C.A.S. who immediately began nodding his head up and 
down.  After the non-verbal indication that the photograph was 
P, Reblin asked, "That's him?"  C.A.S. responded, "yup."  Reblin 
then asked, "100%?"  C.A.S. replied, "100% yeah." 
¶18 Subsequently, Roberson moved to suppress C.A.S.'s out-
of-court identification on the ground that the investigators 
used a single photograph as opposed to a photograph array.  At 
the suppression hearing, C.A.S. testified that P looked similar 
on all three occasions.  He had either "dreadlocks" or 
"cornrows" and had on a sweatshirt with work pants. 
¶19 The circuit court generally noted the same historical 
facts as are set out above.  In particular, the circuit court 
said: 
[C.A.S.] is clearly unsure of the characteristics of 
African Americans.  He states the same.  Objectively, 
it is hard to convince ones self that [C.A.S.] 
wouldn't have identified any picture of an African 
American male as "P" if Reblin indicated that it was a 
picture of "P."  The process is shaky, and the victim 
making the identification is likewise shaky, so the 
[c]ourt lacks confidence that the identification of 
"P" by [C.A.S.] is not a result of showing the single 
photo to him.  As such, [C.A.S.]'s identification of 
the defendant's photo and his later identification in 
court, tainted by his exposure to that photo, are 
suppressed. 
¶20 Although 
C.A.S. 
made 
a 
comment 
and 
a 
gesture 
indicating that he was unsure about identifying African American 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
7 
 
people, the circuit court noted that, "The chances that a 
misidentification occurred are unclear."  The circuit court also 
said, "This [c]ourt believes [C.A.S.] has a sufficient basis to 
identify 'P' from those meetings."   
¶21 Nevertheless, the circuit court granted Roberson's 
motion to suppress and also held that C.A.S. could not identify 
Roberson in court because the initial identification tainted any 
subsequent identification. 
¶22 The State filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing the 
circuit 
court 
improperly 
suppressed 
the 
out-of-court 
identification and that even if the out-of-court identification 
was improper, the circuit court erroneously used that as a basis 
for excluding a subsequent in-court identification.  The court 
of appeals reversed the circuit court.  State v. Roberson, 
No. 2017AP1894-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 
2018) (per curiam).  The court of appeals reasoned that a single 
photograph is not a showup and that any decision to extend 
Dubose must be left to this court.  Id., ¶¶10–17.  
¶23 We granted Roberson's petition for review and now 
affirm the court of appeals, albeit on different grounds. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Identification Due Process 
¶24 We are asked to return to our pre-Dubose standards for 
pretrial identifications.  Accordingly, a review of our pre-
Dubose identification decisions may be helpful to the reader 
before we begin to discuss Dubose. 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
8 
 
¶25 Generally, the admissibility of evidence in state 
court trials is governed by the rules of evidence.  See, e.g., 
Wis. Stat. § 904.03.  Once admitted, the jury determines which 
evidence is credible and what weight to ascribe to it.  State v. 
Hibl, 2006 WI 52, ¶31, 290 Wis. 2d 595, 714 N.W.2d 194; see also 
State v. Johnson, 2004 WI 94, ¶20, 273 Wis. 2d 626, 681 N.W.2d 
901 (instructing that it is for the jury to assess the 
credibility of witnesses).  
¶26 However, due process also may restrict admission of 
eyewitness testimony:  "identification [evidence] infected by 
improper police influence" may be excluded when "there is 'a 
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification'" 
unless, "the indicia of reliability are strong enough to 
outweigh the corrupting effect of the police-arranged suggestive 
circumstances."  Perry, 565 U.S. at 232.   
¶27 Under its due process analysis, the United States 
Supreme Court places the burden first on the defendant to show 
that the method law enforcement chose to employ to identify a 
suspect as the perpetrator was "an unnecessarily suggestive 
identification 
procedure," 
such 
that 
there 
was 
a 
very 
substantial likelihood of misidentification.4  Id. at 232 n.1, 
                                                 
4 We note that this first step is not controversial.  
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, in dissent with her colleagues in 
Perry, explained, "the defendant has the burden of showing that 
the eyewitness identification was derived through 'impermissibly 
suggestive' means."  Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 253-
54 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Simmons v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)). 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
9 
 
235.  Only after a court concludes that the defendant has met 
his or her burden in this regard will the court extend a 
pretrial screening for reliability; otherwise, reliability of 
admissible evidence is for the jury to determine in the first 
instance.5  Id. at 232 & n.1.   
¶28 Perry's discussion of "unnecessarily" is focused on 
police conduct that is claimed to have "manufactured" a 
challenged identification procedure when identification may have 
been obtained by a less suggestive means.  Id. at 235.  Perry 
explains that "due process concerns arise only when law 
enforcement officers use an identification procedure that is 
both suggestive and unnecessary."  Id. at 238-39 (citing 
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 107, 109).  Under the federal standard, 
as Justice Sonia Sotomayor explained in her dissent, "[m]ost 
identifications will be admissible."  Perry, 565 U.S. at 254 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  That is so because reliability is 
the decisive issue under the federal due process standard.   
¶29 Due 
process 
focuses 
on 
ensuring 
reliable 
identification 
evidence. 
 
Accordingly, 
when 
unnecessarily 
                                                                                                                                                             
Unnecessarily suggestive and impermissibly suggestive seem 
to be used interchangeably by the United States Supreme Court at 
times.  See Perry, 565 U.S. at 254 n.3 (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 197-98 (1972). 
5 Dubose placed the burden on the State of proving the 
necessity of the procedure chosen.  Therefore, under Dubose, if 
the State cannot prove the chosen procedure was necessary, the 
entire analysis stops, and the court never considers whether the 
evidence is reliable.  It is simply excluded.  State v. Dubose, 
2005 WI 126, ¶33, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582.   
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
10 
 
suggestive state action occurs, the State bears the burden to 
provide a factual foundation that supports the reliability of 
the evidence.  Necessity can become a factor when identification 
is 
challenged; 
however, 
if 
a 
suggestive 
law 
enforcement 
procedure was necessary, the state action that resulted in an 
identification will not implicate due process concerns.  Id. at 
242 (majority opinion).  As Perry explained, "The fallibility of 
eyewitness evidence does not, without the taint of improper 
state conduct, warrant a due process rule requiring a trial 
court to screen such evidence for reliability before allowing 
the jury to assess its creditworthiness."  Id. at 245. 
¶30 Even before Perry, we followed a similar two-step due 
process analysis.  Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 264.  Perry assists 
in sharpening that analysis today.   
¶31 In Wolverton, the defendant moved to suppress his 
pretrial identification that resulted from two showups.  Id. at 
243.  The showups occurred when Wolverton was sitting alone in 
the back seat of a squad car.  Id. at 249.  Upon Wolverton's 
motion 
to 
suppress 
his 
identification, 
we 
reviewed 
the 
requirements 
of 
due 
process 
in 
regard 
to 
identification 
evidence.  Id. at 264.  We explained that a "pretrial police 
procedure that is 'so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise 
to 
a 
very 
substantial 
likelihood 
of 
irreparable 
misidentification'" violates due process.  Id. (quoting Simmons 
v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)).   
¶32 We 
concluded 
that 
showups 
were 
"not 
per 
se 
impermissibly suggestive."  Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 264 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
11 
 
(citing State v. Streich, 87 Wis. 2d 209, 214, 274 N.W.2d 635 
(1979) and State v. Isham, 70 Wis. 2d 718, 725, 235 N.W.2d 506 
(1975)).  We said that "a criminal defendant bears the initial 
burden 
of 
demonstrating 
that 
a 
showup 
was 
impermissibly 
suggestive."  Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 264 (citing Mosley, 102 
Wis. 2d at 652 and Powell, 86 Wis. 2d at 65).  If a defendant 
meets this burden, then the State must prove that "under the 
'totality of the circumstances' the identification was reliable 
even 
though 
the 
confrontation 
procedure 
was 
suggestive."  
Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 264 (quoting Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 
106).   
¶33 Wolverton cites the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of 
the United States Constitution when addressing the right to 
counsel and due process.  Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 251 n.6, 7.  
We did not specify the source of the due process right that 
protects a defendant from unreliable identifications.  However, 
the cases upon which we relied in that regard are grounded in 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  E.g., Streich, 87 Wis. 2d at 214-15; 
Brathwaite 432 U.S. at 99.  Furthermore, in Mosley, while 
recognizing that we could go beyond the guarantees of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, we specifically declined to do so.  
Mosley, 102 Wis. 2d at 667-68 (explaining that "we decline the 
defendant's invitation to go beyond the federal constitutional 
holding and reach a contrary result based on independent state 
constitutional grounds.").   
¶34 Until our decision in Dubose, we continued to use this 
two-step process when evaluating motions to suppress pretrial 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
12 
 
identifications.  First, the defendant must meet an initial 
burden of showing that the identification procedure employed by 
law enforcement was impermissibly suggestive such that there was 
a very substantial likelihood of misidentification.  Perry, 565 
U.S. at 232; Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 264. 
¶35 Second, if the defendant meets that burden and the 
burden shifts to the State, the State must prove that "under the 
'totality of the circumstances' the identification was reliable 
even 
though 
the 
confrontation 
procedure 
was 
suggestive."  
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 106 (quoting Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199).  
A nonexclusive list of reliability factors includes:  (1) the 
opportunity of the witness to view the suspect at the time of 
the crime, (2) the witness' degree of attention, (3) the 
accuracy of his prior description of the suspect, (4) the level 
of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and (5) the time 
between the crime and the confrontation.  Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 
at 114. 
¶36 An additional factor that may be considered is the 
extent to which the procedure was documented, such as by video 
recording.  See Howard B. Eisenberg & Bruce G. Feustal, Criminal 
Law:  Pretrial 
Identification:  An 
Attempt 
to 
Articulate 
Constitutional Criteria, 58 Marq. L. Rev. 659, 683 (1975) 
(recommending videotaping lineups).   
¶37 Dubose departed from the Brathwaite/Biggers analysis, 
and instead, it fashioned a rule based on social science 
research.  However, social science research cannot be used to 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
13 
 
define the meaning of a constitutional provision.  As Justice 
Antonin Scalia famously stated: 
The principal theoretical defect of nonoriginalism, in 
my 
view, 
is 
its 
incompatibility 
with 
the 
very 
principle 
that 
legitimizes 
judicial 
review 
of 
constitutionality. . . . [T]he Constitution, though it 
has an effect superior to other laws, is in its nature 
the sort of "law" that is the business of the courts——
an enactment that has a fixed meaning ascertainable 
through the usual devices familiar to those learned in 
the law.  If the Constitution were not that sort of a 
"law," but a novel invitation to apply current 
societal values, what reason would there be to believe 
that the invitation was addressed to the courts rather 
than to the legislature?  One simply cannot say, 
regarding that sort of novel enactment, that "[i]t is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department" to determine its content.  Quite to the 
contrary, the legislature would seem a much more 
appropriate expositor of social values, and 
its 
determination that a statute is compatible with the 
Constitution should, as in England, prevail. 
Antonin Scalia, 
Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. 
L. Rev. 849, 854 (1989).   
¶38 As Justice Scalia explained, the judiciary is not in a 
good position to judge social values or social science.  When 
social science is disputed, the institutional parameters of the 
judiciary are amplified.  It is the legislature that is 
structured to assess the merits of competing policies and ever-
changing social science assertions. 
¶39 It is no surprise that, with mounds of research 
available, the State in the dispute now before us has identified 
social science that supports its position.  E.g., John Wixted & 
Gary Wells, The Relationship Between Eyewitness Confidence and 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
14 
 
Identification Accuracy:  A New Synthesis, 18 Psychol. Sci. in 
the Pub. Int. 10 (2017). 
¶40 Furthermore, categorical rules of exclusion, based on 
social science, are the antithesis of justice because "one of 
the major tenets in the administration of justice" is "the 
presentation of reliable, relevant evidence at trial."  Dubose, 
285 Wis. 2d 143, ¶86 (Roggensack, J., dissenting) (citing 
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112). 
¶41 Historically, there have been times when social 
science has been used by courts as an excuse to justify 
disturbing decisions.  Indeed, entire law review articles and 
book chapters have been dedicated to analyzing how Plessy v. 
Ferguson and the line of cases that followed Plessy grounded 
their decisions in social science of the time.  E.g., Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 
Duke L.J. 624.  As explained: 
[P]olicy-based adjudication was as prevalent in the 
race cases of the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era 
as in any area of law during the time.  However, the 
policies were different from those espoused by liberal 
social scientists after the New Deal.  According to 
the prevailing social science of the 1910's and 
1920's, the social value created by a comprehensive, 
state-enforced plan of racial separation was far 
greater 
than 
any 
costs 
imposed 
on 
its 
victims. . . . [T]he law of race relations during this 
period was a product of the period's social science, 
just as the law of race relations developed by the 
Warren Court during the Brown era was a product of the 
social science of that period. 
Id. at 627. 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
15 
 
¶42 The United States Supreme Court cited social science 
in Brown, but it did so as a response to social science employed 
at the time of Plessy.  Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 
494 n.11 (1954).  The research at the time of Brown showed: 
Segregation of white and colored children in public 
schools 
has 
a 
detrimental 
effect 
upon 
colored 
children.  The impact is greater when it has the 
sanction of the law for the policy of separating the 
races 
is 
usually 
interpreted 
as 
denoting 
the 
inferiority of the negro group. 
Id. at 494.  The Court stated, "[w]hatever may have been the 
extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. 
Ferguson, this finding [of negative psychological impact] is 
amply supported by modern authority."  Id. 
¶43 Social science often embodies the subjective beliefs 
of 
the 
time. 
 
When 
these 
beliefs 
become 
enshrined 
as 
constitutional law, they have a long-lasting impact even if 
proved incorrect at a later date.  The contrast between Plessy 
and Brown is a telling example.  Plessy embodied abhorrent 
social beliefs regarding the superiority and inferiority of 
people based on race.  This belief then became law through 
United States Supreme Court decision-making that was purporting 
to interpret the United States Constitution.  It took more than 
half a century to correct course because it is difficult to 
overturn constitutional precedent. 
¶44 Social science cannot change the original meaning of 
the Wisconsin Constitution, any more than it can change the 
meaning of the United States Constitution.  Article I, Section 8 
of the Wisconsin Constitution protects a defendant's right to 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
16 
 
due process, just as the federal constitution's Fourteenth 
Amendment does.  Due process requires that evidence infected by 
improper police conduct from which there is a substantial 
likelihood of misidentification will be excluded unless the 
State proves that under the totality of circumstances bearing on 
the identification, it is nonetheless reliable.  Perry, 565 U.S. 
at 232.  Due process does not require that all showups be 
excluded.  Id.  Rather, the question is whether the particular 
showup under consideration is reliable.  Id.  We note that the 
United States Supreme Court agrees, as the Court has explicitly 
held, reliability must be determined on a "case-by-case" basis.  
Id. at 239 (citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 201). 
¶45 Wisconsin court procedure used to evaluate showup 
identifications changed substantially under Dubose.  As we are 
asked to overturn Dubose, we now turn our attention to that 
decision and the rationales that supported or opposed it. 
B.  Dubose 
¶46 We begin by noting that in order to reach its 
conclusion 
that 
suppressing 
out-of-court 
identifications 
obtained by law enforcement through an unnecessary procedure was 
required, Dubose overruled Wisconsin appellate precedent that 
had stood for at least 26 years.  Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143, ¶33 
n.9 withdrawing language from Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 258, 
Streich, 87 Wis. 2d 209 and State v. Kaelin, 196 Wis. 2d 1, 538 
N.W.2d 538 (Ct. App. 1995)). As we explain below, Dubose is 
unsound in principle as it was based on misunderstanding the 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
17 
 
United States Supreme Court's decisions in regard to out-of-
court identifications and on topical social science.   
¶47 Dubose defined a showup as "an out-of-court pretrial 
identification procedure in which a suspect is presented singly 
to a witness for identification purposes."  Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 
143, ¶1 n.1 (quoting Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 263 n.21).  We 
have no quarrel with that definition.  Here, the suspect, 
Roberson, was presented via a single photograph as opposed to 
being presented singly in person as the suspect was in Dubose.   
¶48 We conclude that the State action that caused a showup 
to be subject to constitutional scrutiny in Dubose may be 
equally applicable to the use of a single Facebook photo for an 
out-of-court 
identification. 
 
Therefore, 
we 
address 
the 
continued validity of Dubose, even though the identification 
employed here was not a single person showup. 
¶49 We are respectful of the doctrine of stare decisis.  
State v. Luedtke, 2015 WI 42, ¶40, 362 Wis. 2d 1, 863 N.W.2d 
592.  As we have previously explained: 
[Adhering to precedent] ensures that existing law will 
not be abandoned lightly.  When existing law is open 
to revision in every case, deciding cases becomes a 
mere exercise of judicial will, with arbitrary and 
unpredictable results.  Consequently, this court has 
held that any departure from the doctrine of stare 
decisis demands special justification. 
Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, ¶37, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 N.W.2d 
266 (citations and quotations omitted).  On the other hand, we 
acknowledge that "[w]e do more damage to the rule of law by 
obstinately refusing to admit errors, thereby perpetuating 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
18 
 
injustice, than by overturning an erroneous decision."  Johnson 
Controls, Inc. v. Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶100, 264 
Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257. 
¶50 When we are requested to overturn precedent, we 
consider whether one or more of the following circumstances is 
present: 
(1) Changes or developments in the law have undermined 
the rationale behind a decision; (2) there is a need 
to make a decision correspond to newly ascertained 
facts; (3) there is a showing that the precedent has 
become detrimental to coherence and consistency in the 
law; (4) the prior decision is "unsound in principle;" 
or (5) the prior decision is "unworkable in practice." 
Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund & Compcare Health Servs. 
Ins. Corp., 2006 WI 91, ¶33, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216.  We 
also may consider "whether [our past decision] has produced a 
settled body of law."  Id., ¶34 (quoting Johnson Controls, 264 
Wis. 2d 60, ¶99). 
¶51 A decision is unsound in principle when it relies on 
an erroneous understanding of United States Supreme Court 
decisions or misapplies the Wisconsin Constitution because the 
misunderstanding and faulty application "risk[] perpetuating 
erroneous declarations of the law."  See Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. 
DOR, 2018 WI 75, ¶83, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21 (quoting 
Operton v. LIRC, 2017 WI 46, 274 Wis. 2d 1, ¶73, 894 N.W.2d 426 
(R. Bradley, J., concurring).  Dubose misunderstood United 
States Supreme Court decisions and misapplied Article I, Section 
8 of the Wisconsin Constitution when it concluded that evidence 
obtained from an out-of-court showup "will not be admissible 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
19 
 
unless, based on the totality of the circumstances, the 
procedure was necessary."  Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143, ¶¶33, 45.  
¶52 That Dubose misunderstood United State Supreme Court's 
decisions is apparent from Dubose's discussion of Stovall v. 
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) where Dubose reasoned:  
[W]e adopt standards for the admissibility of out-of-
court identification evidence similar to those set 
forth in the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Stovall.  We hold that evidence obtained from such a 
showup will not be admissible unless, based on the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, 
the 
showup 
was 
necessary. 
Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143, ¶45; (see also ¶33, for a similar 
statement).   
¶53 Stovall arose upon the United States Supreme Court's 
consideration of whether to retroactively apply a Supreme Court 
holding that required "exclusion of identification evidence 
which is tainted by exhibiting the accused to identifying 
witnesses before trial in the absence of his counsel."  Stovall, 
388 U.S. at 294.  Stovall never concluded that identification 
evidence must be excluded unless the showup "was necessary."  
Instead, it held, "a claimed violation of due process of law in 
the conduct of a confrontation depends on the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding it."  Id. at 302.  Reliability of the 
factfinding process remained the dispositive criterion for 
admissibility of in-person identifications in Stovall.  Id. at 
298.  
¶54 In addition, there was no need, and Dubose provided no 
logical rationale, for departing from our past reliance on the 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
20 
 
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of due process 
requirements under the federal constitution when out-of-court 
identifications are challenged in Wisconsin courts.6  Simos v. 
State, 83 Wis. 2d 251, 258, 265 N.W.2d 278 (1978), which relied 
on United States Supreme Court precedent to conclude that under 
the totality of circumstances the identification was reliable, 
and Streich, 87 Wis. 2d at 214-15, which followed the United 
States Supreme Court's lead on due process with regard to 
avoiding misidentification in a showup, are but two examples.   
¶55 As Justice Jon P. Wilcox explained:  
Today 
the 
majority 
alters 
course 
and 
abandons . . . [a] 
long 
line 
of 
well-established 
precedent, contending that the Due Process Clause of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
now 
affords 
greater 
protections than its federal counterpart. . . . 
Given the nearly identical language in the two 
provisions and this court's historic practice of 
interpreting the two provisions in the same fashion, 
the majority simply has no support for its conclusion 
that 
the 
language 
in 
Article 
I, 
Section 
8 
"necessitates" a rejection of . . . [United States 
Supreme Court decisions]." 
Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143, ¶¶61–62 (Wilcox, J., dissenting). 
                                                 
6 United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
precedent 
relative 
to 
allegedly 
unfair 
pretrial 
identifications 
relies 
on 
the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Perry, 565 U.S. at 237 (citing Napue v. 
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)).   
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part, "nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 
§ 1. 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
21 
 
¶56 Certainly, states have the power to afford greater 
protection to citizens under their constitutions than the 
federal constitution does.  Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 
(1945) (explaining that federal courts will refuse to review a 
state court decision if the decision is based on an "adequate 
and independent state ground[]").  However, the question for a 
state court is whether its state constitution actually affords 
greater protection.  A state court does not have the power to 
write into its state constitution additional protection that is 
not supported by its text or historical meaning.   
¶57 As Justice David T. Prosser cautioned, "While the 
court may exercise this power, the court should pay more 
attention to whether it should exercise this power."  Dubose, 
285 Wis. 2d 143, ¶75 (Prosser, J., dissenting).  In particular, 
we must recognize that "[b]y sheer volume of cases, the [United 
States] Supreme Court has developed substantial experience 
interpreting constitutional provisions."  Id., ¶76.   
¶58 Furthermore, Dubose explicitly relied on case law from 
Massachusetts and New York when interpreting due process 
guarantees 
under 
Article 
I, 
Section 
8 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.7  
Id., ¶¶38, 42 
(majority opinion) 
(citing 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1262, 1265 (Mass. 
1995) (which rejected the reliability test for admissibility and 
                                                 
7 Article I, Section 8 provides in relevant part, "No person 
may be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process 
of law."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 8. 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
22 
 
required per se exclusion for showup identifications based on 
due process protections of the Massachusetts Constitution); 
State v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 383 (N.Y. 1981) (which relied on 
the 
New 
York 
Constitution 
to 
conclude 
that 
excluding 
identification evidence from a showup does not deprive the 
prosecutor of reliable evidence)).   
¶59 There is no logical nexus between how Massachusetts 
and New York courts interpret their individual constitutions, 
which contain constitutional provisions not found in Wisconsin's 
Constitution, 
and 
how 
we 
should 
interpret 
Wisconsin's 
Constitution.  And, of equal importance, Dubose provides no 
explanation on why the Wisconsin Constitution has a different 
due process guarantee than its federal counterpart.   
¶60 Dubose crafted a rule of constitutional law, largely 
based on social science reports that it found persuasive.  
However, by defining a constitutional provision according to 
social science reports, Dubose created the capacity to prevent 
identifications of perpetrators of crimes when under the 
totality of circumstances surrounding the identifications, they 
were reliable.   
¶61 Furthermore, Dubose has not created a substantial body 
of settled law.8  Rather, it created a specific rule that has not 
                                                 
8 We are aware of states that mention Dubose, but none have 
decided to follow it.  For example, State v. Washington, 189 
A.3d 43, 55–57 (R.I. 2018); State v. Herrera, 902 A.2d 177, 181 
(N.J. 2006), overruled on other grounds by State v. Henderson, 
27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011); State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290 (Conn. 
2005) overruled on other grounds by State v. Harris, 191 A.3d 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
23 
 
been followed by appellate courts of other jurisdictions.  And 
finally, 
Dubose 
has 
been 
treated 
negatively 
by 
several 
subsequent Wisconsin appellate opinions.   
¶62 For example, in 2006, shortly after Dubose was 
decided, "[w]e determine[d] that Dubose does not directly 
control cases involving identification evidence derived from 
'accidental' 
confrontations 
resulting 
in 
'spontaneous' 
identifications."  Hibl, 290 Wis. 2d 595, ¶3.  We then remanded 
to the circuit court to apply the rules of evidence to the 
identification.  Id.  We noted that those rules allow circuit 
courts to use their discretion to exclude evidence when its 
"probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.03; Hibl, 290 Wis. 2d 595, ¶3.  
¶63 In 2007, the court of appeals "conclude[d] that Dubose 
did not alter the standard for determining whether admission of 
an out-of-court identification from a photo array violates due 
                                                                                                                                                             
119 (Conn. 2018).  Though some state courts have permitted 
defendants more protection than afforded by the United States 
Constitution's guarantee of due process, and some have cited 
Dubose in so doing, none have conditioned admission of the out-
of-court identification on whether the procedure that law 
enforcement employed was necessary.  For example in Henderson, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted a reliability standard it 
believed was more accurate.  Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919-20.  In 
Harris, the Connecticut Supreme Court adopted the standard 
designed in Henderson.  Harris, 191 A.3d at 143.   
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
24 
 
process."  State v. Drew, 2007 WI App 213, ¶2, 305 Wis. 2d 641, 
740 N.W.2d 404. 
¶64 In 2012, we held Dubose was inapplicable to an in-
court, mugshot identification.  State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, 
¶¶81–82, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238.  We said that we saw 
"no reason to apply Dubose," and the defendant could point to 
none.  Id., ¶82. 
¶65 In 2015, we confirmed the limited reach of Dubose in 
Luedtke, 362 Wis. 2d 1, where we stated: 
[P]ost-Dubose, we have held that the decision did not 
create a precedential sea change with respect to the 
recognition of a broader due process protection under 
the Wisconsin Constitution than under the United 
States Constitution.  In State v. Drew, the court of 
appeals held that Dubose did not alter precedent with 
respect to lineups and photo arrays, explaining that 
Dubose recognized those identification procedures are 
preferable to a showup.  In State v. Hibl, we held 
that Dubose did not directly control spontaneous or 
accidental identifications of a defendant by a victim 
lacking police involvement.  Finally, in State v. 
Ziegler, 
we 
distinguished 
a 
showup 
from 
an 
identification made in court through the showing of a 
single mug shot. 
The State correctly notes, even within the 
specific context of eyewitness identification, post-
Dubose jurisprudence confirms the limited reach of its 
actual holding:  that due process under the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
provides 
greater 
protection 
in 
one 
identification procedure, the showup. 
Id., ¶¶49–50 (citations omitted).  Given that Dubose has not 
created a substantial body of law, overturning it will have 
minimal impact.  With the above review in mind, we conclude that 
stare decisis is not offended by overturning Dubose, and we now 
do so.   
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
25 
 
C.  Standard of Review 
¶66 We employ a two-step standard of review when analyzing 
a motion to suppress.  State v. Blatterman, 2015 WI 46, ¶16, 362 
Wis. 2d 138, 864 N.W.2d 26.  We first review the circuit court's 
findings of historical fact, which we uphold unless they are 
clearly 
erroneous. 
 
Id. 
 
Next, 
we 
independently 
apply 
constitutional principles to the facts found, which presents a 
question of law.  Id. 
D.  C.A.S.'s Identification 
¶67 We note that not all showings of a single photo are 
infected by improper police influence causing a very substantial 
likelihood of misidentification.  Each identification must be 
evaluated based on its own facts.  Perry, 565 U.S. at 239, 245 
n.5.  C.A.S.'s identification began with the display of a color 
photo of Roberson's Facebook photo.   
¶68 The first step in our evaluation is whether Roberson 
can prove that the method chosen by law enforcement was 
impermissibly suggestive.  While it is true that it would have 
been better practice for law enforcement to show Facebook photos 
of more than one African American male, the officer never asked 
if the picture was the man C.A.S. knew as P, even though he had 
asked if C.A.S. thought he could identify P.  Only after C.A.S. 
gave a nonverbal indication that he recognized the man in the 
Facebook photo, did Reblin ask "That's him?"  However, we will 
assume without deciding, that Roberson met his burden of proving 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
26 
 
an impermissibly suggestive mode of identification, as did the 
court of appeals.9  Roberson, No. 2017AP1894-CR, ¶18.   
¶69 The burden now shifts to the State to prove that under 
the totality of the circumstances the identification was 
reliable.  Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199.  Applying the reliability 
assessment factors from Biggers, which were confirmed in 
Brathwaite 432 U.S. at 106-07, 114, to the facts herein, we note 
that C.A.S. had ample opportunity to view P.  At a minimum, 
C.A.S. spent two and a half hours with P, on three separate 
occasions, over a short period of time.  C.A.S. spent five times 
more time with P than the victim in Biggers did with her 
assailant, which the United States Supreme Court held was a 
"considerable period of time."  Id. at 200.  Nothing in the 
record suggests C.A.S. had an altered mental state or was 
otherwise cognitively impaired.  Additionally, while P never 
                                                 
9 The State has articulated a few reasons why the procedure 
might not have been impermissibly suggestive.  First, it points 
out that the investigator used a photograph from Facebook as 
opposed to a mugshot.  It argues, "[u]nlike a mugshot, which 
carries with it the implicit prejudicial suggestion that the 
person 
depicted 
has 
been 
arrested 
or 
convicted 
of 
a 
crime, . . . [the photograph in this case] does not convey this 
type of suggestibility."  Resp. br. at 26.  Second, the State 
relies heavily on a theory that "the protagonists are known to 
one another."  Resp. br. at 27 (quoting People v. Gissendanner, 
399 N.E.2d 924, 930 (N.Y. 1979)).  Apparently, some support 
exists for the proposition that when two people are well-
acquainted, an identification procedure cannot be suggestive.  
Resp. br. at 26-27.   
 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
27 
 
provided his name, we note he made no substantial effort to 
conceal his identity. 
¶70 The degree of attention favors reliability.  C.A.S. 
agreed to participate in a drug-dealer relationship with P.  P 
gave C.A.S. a phone, presumably so they could forward their 
plans.  Their interactions show they were contemplating an 
ongoing relationship where it could be expected they would know 
each other's faces under circumstances similar to those present 
here.  We also note that P came into C.A.S.'s residence, 
something generally personal in nature.   
¶71 During the third encounter, C.A.S. may have been 
paying more attention to the situation than to P.  However, the 
United States Supreme Court suggested in Biggers that a victim 
of a violent crime remembers more.  Id. ("She was no casual 
observer, but rather the victim of one of the most personally 
humiliating of all crimes."). 
¶72 The 
first 
two 
factors 
appear 
to 
question 
identifications where a witness briefly sees a stranger, perhaps 
out of a window, under poor conditions.  C.A.S.'s identification 
presents on facts that are completely opposite.  As the State 
put it, "the shooting itself was not the product of a brief, 
momentary encounter between two strangers."10 
¶73 Law enforcement did not obtain a detailed prior 
description of P from C.A.S. before showing C.A.S. the Facebook 
                                                 
10 Resp. br. at 30. 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
28 
 
photo.  We note that the court of appeals "assume[d] for 
purposes of . . . [its] opinion only that the absence of a 
description weighs somewhat against reliability."  Roberson, 
No. 2017AP1894-CR, ¶38.  However, the State has the burden to 
prove 
that 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances 
the 
identification is reliable, and under the Bigger's factors, 
collecting evidence prior to displaying the Facebook photo of 
Roberson was the State's responsibility.    
¶74 The circuit court seemed to place a lot of weight on 
C.A.S. not knowing the difference between dreadlocks and 
cornrows when he described P.  However, there is no reason the 
jury cannot weigh this testimony as well as the circuit court.  
Most evidence can be called into question in some way; however, 
that does not give the circuit court the ability to preclude 
admission.  We have cross-examination for a reason; evidence 
often is tested in that way. 
¶75 The level of C.A.S.'s certainty favors reliability.  
Immediately upon seeing the photograph, C.A.S. nodded his head 
up and down.  He did not wait for Reblin to ask him a question 
before indicating that the photo was P.  Then when he was asked 
if his identification was "100%," he said that it was.   
¶76 Approximately 
two 
weeks 
passed 
between 
C.A.S.'s 
shooting and the identification.  We have no reason to conclude 
that two weeks is such a significant passage of time as to call 
into question the identification.  This is particularly true 
when we consider the amount of time the two spent together on 
three different days. 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
29 
 
¶77 We further note that the identification was extremely 
well-documented in this case.  It was videotaped in its 
entirety.  If a picture is worth a thousand words, a video is a 
thousand pictures.  The jury can watch the video, and it can 
hear and see C.A.S.'s comment and gestures in regard to his 
ability to identify African Americans.  It can hear what C.A.S. 
said and see the accompanying hand gesture.  The jury also can 
see the certainty on C.A.S.'s face when he is shown the Facebook 
photo. 
¶78 Upon 
consideration 
of 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances bearing on the identification of Roberson, we 
conclude 
that 
there 
is 
not 
a 
substantial 
likelihood 
of 
misidentification by an unreliable identification.  Therefore, 
the jury should decide whether Roberson was correctly identified 
as P. 
¶79 Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and remand 
to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶80 In conclusion, Roberson argued that the circuit court 
correctly granted his motion to suppress the identification 
evidence on the ground that the police utilized an unnecessarily 
suggestive procedure, which violated his due process rights 
under Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution as 
explained in Dubose.   
¶81 The State urges us to overturn Dubose, and return to 
our past practice of following decisions of the United States 
No. 
2017AP1894-CR   
 
30 
 
Supreme Court in regard to criteria that are necessary to accord 
due process in eyewitness identifications.  We agree with the 
State.  Dubose was unsound in principle.  Therefore, we overturn 
Dubose 
and 
return 
to 
"reliability 
[a]s 
the 
linchpin 
in 
determining the admissibility of identification testimony."  
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114; see also Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199.  
Due process does not require the suppression of evidence with 
sufficient "indicia of reliability."  Perry, 565 U.S. at 232. 
¶82 Accordingly, "a criminal defendant bears the initial 
burden 
of 
demonstrating 
that 
a 
showup 
was 
impermissibly 
suggestive."  Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 264 (citing Mosley, 102 
Wis. 2d at 652 and Powell, 86 Wis. 2d at 65).  If a defendant 
meets this burden, then the State must prove that "under the 
'totality of the circumstances' the identification was reliable 
even 
though 
the 
confrontation 
procedure 
was 
suggestive."  
Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 264 (quoting Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 
106 and citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199).  We conclude that the 
State has satisfied its burden here. 
¶83 Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals and remand 
to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.    
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.
No.  2017AP1894-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶84 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion in full, except to the extent paragraphs 41-42  
suggest that courts may consult social science research to 
interpret the Constitution.  See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 
70, 114, 119-20 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing the 
majority for relying on "questionable social science research 
rather 
than 
constitutional 
principle" 
and 
noting 
that 
assumptions and social science research "cannot form the basis 
upon which we decide matters of constitutional principle").  
Historically, when courts contaminate constitutional analysis 
with then-prevailing notions of what is "good" for society, the 
rights of the people otherwise guaranteed by the text of the 
Constitution may be trampled.  Departures from constitutional 
text have oppressed people under all manner of pernicious 
pretexts: 
[T]he notion of "social harm" supporting the police 
power was completely untethered from constitutional text 
and ripe for misuse in the hands of a Justice such as 
Holmes, who believed that the Constitution could be reduced 
to ad hoc balancing.  Eugenics was built upon the notion of 
harm; indeed, it thrived on a sense of imminent doom: that 
society was degenerating because of what were called its 
"weaklings" and "discards." The idea that society was being 
swamped by incompetents was a common trope for eugenicists: 
the unfit were a "menace." . . . Like the great popular 
eugenicists of the day, Holmes wrote in Buck that eugenics 
would prevent society from being "swamped" by incompetents, 
that fewer criminals would be executed, and that fewer 
imbeciles would starve.  
Victoria Nourse, Buck v. Bell: A Constitutional Tragedy from a 
Lost World, 39 Pepp. L. Rev. 101, 114-15 (2011) (emphasis added; 
footnotes omitted).  
No.  2017AP1894-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
¶85 In rebuking his colleagues for upholding segregation, 
Justice John Marshall Harlan rightly relied solely upon the 
Constitution: 
But in view of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, 
dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind, 
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all 
citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law 
regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his 
civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.  
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
¶86 Deplorable decisions such as Plessy v. Ferguson and 
Buck v. Bell1 were rooted in evil concepts supported by social 
science and elitist mores antithetical to the Constitution.  
Ascertaining and faithfully applying the original meaning of the 
Constitution's words precludes appalling social science-based 
notions of the day from infecting constitutional analysis.  Only 
the Constitution can serve as a reliable bulwark of the rights 
and liberty of the people. In order to emphasize that social 
science has no role to play in constitutional analysis, I 
respectfully concur.  
¶87 I am authorized to state that Justice DANIEL KELLY 
joins this concurrence.  
 
                                                 
1 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
No.  2017AP1894-CR.bh 
 
1 
 
 
¶88 BRIAN 
HAGEDORN, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
I 
join 
the 
majority opinion, but write separately to make three points. 
¶89 First, while the dissent bemoans the policy outcome of 
today's decision, the practical effect need not be the full-
throttled return of the showup evidence Dubose frowned upon.  
State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582.  
The majority is correct that courts should not allow social 
science to define new categories of constitutional protection 
divorced from the text of our constitution.  That said, the 
latest social science research is a normal and welcome part of 
fact-finding, and can play a proper role in applying the facts 
to the law in these types of cases. 
¶90 Going forward, I see nothing improper with circuit 
courts allowing vigorous cross-examination of showup evidence, 
or admitting expert testimony regarding the very social science 
research presented in this case.  Law enforcement can continue 
to follow the same rules, and the legislature could choose to 
enact related policies into law.  Nothing in the court's opinion 
today quibbles with best practices, police policies, and 
adversarial lawyering designed to ensure defendants have a fair 
shake. 
¶91 It may be that the policy decision announced in Dubose 
is a good one.  But that's not the legal question before us.  
The question here is whether our constitution requires the 
exclusion of this and similar types of evidence. 
No.  2017AP1894-CR.bh 
 
2 
 
¶92 Second, one of the great civics failures of our time 
is the prevalence of the notion that everything that's bad is 
unconstitutional.  Not so.  Policy and law are and must be 
different if the judicial task is to mean anything.  And the 
governing law when facing a constitutional question is not 
established by a public policy assessment or a social science 
research paper; it is established by the written constitution 
itself. 
¶93 This case involves the constitutional right to due 
process of law.  Wis. Const. art. I, § 8.  Historically, "due 
process" meant having a basic process grounded in the pillars of 
notice and an opportunity to be heard.  Thus, as a general 
matter, the original public meaning of "due process" was a 
guaranteed process, and did not encompass a broad swath of 
substantive rights.  Modern attempts to constitutionalize every 
lamentable aspect of our criminal justice system by creating new 
substantive due process rights should be treated with immense 
skepticism.  Courts and litigants are far too eager to address 
the latest social cause célèbre by turning the constitution's 
weathered parchment into a weapon of policy warfare. 
¶94 As Justice Clarence Thomas has noted, the whole line 
of cases on eyewitness identification evidence "is premised on a 
'substantive due process' right to 'fundamental fairness.'"  
Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 249 (2012) (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  I agree with Justice Thomas that due process "is 
not a 'secret repository of substantive guarantees against 
"unfairness."'"  Id. (quoted source omitted).  When "fundamental 
No.  2017AP1894-CR.bh 
 
3 
 
fairness" 
becomes 
synonymous 
with 
"unconstitutional," 
opportunities for judicial policy-making, and therefore judicial 
mischief, are plentiful.1  Dubose is just one example.  Instead 
of letting the crucible of cross-examination be the refining 
fire it has always been——and due process requires little more——
Dubose 
short-circuited 
the 
process 
and 
designed 
a 
new 
substantive right in the court's own image.  Dubose was an 
effort to constitutionalize the policy choices of the court's 
majority without any real effort to ground those choices in the 
original 
public 
meaning 
of 
the 
constitutional 
text.  
Faithfulness to the law requires overturning Dubose. 
¶95 Finally, it is with some irony that the dissent 
criticizes us for overruling Dubose.  Fidelity to the principles 
of stare decisis, we are told, ensures "cases are grounded in 
the law, not in the will of individual members of the court."  
Dissent, ¶97.  But as the majority notes, Dubose itself burned a 
decades-long line of precedent to the ground.  We should surely 
be mindful and deferential toward precedent, but predictability 
                                                 
1 Justice Hugo Black recognized this very threat in his 
dissent in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), the decision 
that gave rise to this entire line of due process jurisprudence.  
There, Justice Black described the Supreme Court's "concept of 
due process" as its own judgment of whether the totality of the 
circumstances of a particular case comport with its own 
conceptions of decency, fairness, and fundamental justice.  
Id. at 305 (Black, J., dissenting).  The problem with this 
"constitutional formula," as Justice Black rightly explained, is 
that it substitutes the reviewing court's "judgment of what is 
right for what the Constitution declares shall be the supreme 
law of the land."  Id.  Put differently, the court becomes "not 
a 
Constitution-interpreter, 
but 
a 
day-to-day 
Constitution-
maker."  Id. 
No.  2017AP1894-CR.bh 
 
4 
 
and stability are not served by clinging to the creative, 
atextual judicial inventions of yesteryear.  It is Dubose that 
departed from precedent.  It is Dubose that was the product of 
"the will of individual members of the court."  Dubose was an 
outlier and a reflection of judicial policy-making, not faithful 
constitutional interpretation.  Today, the court rights the 
ship. 
No.  2017AP1894-CR.rfd 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶96 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  In Dubose, 
this court declared Wisconsin's approach to admission of showup 
evidence1 upon a finding of reliability unsound and in violation 
of Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution.2  State v. 
Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582.  Today, 
the majority departs from the doctrine of stare decisis and 
overrules Dubose, despite extensive research establishing the 
prevalence and danger of mistaken eyewitness identification.  
Ultimately the majority erodes the due process protection 
afforded by the Wisconsin Constitution and places jurors in the 
impossible position of separating the taint of a suggestive 
single photo identification from its reliability.  For these 
reasons, I dissent.   
A.  The doctrine of stare decisis ensures cases are grounded in 
the law, not in the will of individual members of the court. 
¶97 The doctrine of stare decisis ensures the integrity of 
the 
judicial 
system 
by 
developing 
consistency 
in 
legal 
principles and establishing that cases are grounded in the law, 
                                                 
1 A showup is "an out-of-court pretrial identification 
procedure in which a suspect is presented singly to a witness 
for 
identification 
purposes." 
 
State 
v. 
Wolverton, 
193 
Wis. 2d 234, 263 n.21, 533 N.W.2d 167 (1995).   
2 Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution reads:  
"[n]o person may be held to answer for a criminal offense 
without due process of law, and no person for the same offense 
may be put twice in jeopardy of punishment, nor may be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself or 
herself." 
No.  2017AP1894-CR.rfd 
 
2 
 
not in the will of individual members of the court.  See Johnson 
Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶95, 
264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257.  "When existing law 'is open to 
revision in every case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise 
of judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable results.'"  
Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, ¶37, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 
N.W.2d 266 (quoted source omitted).  The outcome of a case 
should not turn on whether the current members of the court find 
one legal argument more persuasive but, rather, on "'whether 
today's 
[majority] 
has 
come 
forward 
with 
the 
type 
of 
extraordinary showing that this court has historically demanded 
before overruling one of its precedents.'"  State v. Lynch, 2016 
WI 66, ¶101, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89 (Abrahamson, J., 
concurring in part; dissenting in part) (quoting Payne v. 
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 848 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).   
¶98 The type of extraordinary showing this court relies 
upon to overturn precedent includes circumstances where: 
(1) Changes or developments in the law have undermined 
the rationale behind a decision; (2) there is a need 
to make a decision correspond to newly ascertained 
facts; (3) there is a showing that the precedent has 
become detrimental to coherence and consistency in the 
law; (4) the prior decision is "unsound in principle"; 
or (5) the prior decision is "unworkable in practice." 
Bartholomew v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, ¶33, 
293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216 (quoted source omitted).  The 
majority hangs its hat on the fourth circumstance and declares 
that Dubose is now "unsound in principle."  Majority op., ¶¶3, 
No.  2017AP1894-CR.rfd 
 
3 
 
81.3   To the contrary, I will show that Dubose remains sound in 
principle and that it is only the composition of this court that 
has changed.4   
B.  This court has afforded greater protection of citizens' 
liberties under the Wisconsin Constitution.   
¶99 The majority claims that Dubose is unsound because it 
"misapplied" Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
in providing greater due process protection in the showup 
procedure than is mandated by the United States Supreme Court.  
Majority op., ¶51.5  Yet, this court has historically refused to 
                                                 
3 The majority opinion favorably cites to the arguments made 
in the dissenting opinions in State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 
Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582, signaling that a change in the 
composition of the court is the real reason Dubose has become 
unsound.  See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶55, 57:  "As Justice Jon P. 
Wilcox explained"; "As Justice David T. Prosser cautioned."   
4 Justice Hagedorn's concurrence incorrectly claims that 
"Dubose itself burned a decades-long line of precedent to the 
ground."  Justice Hagedorn's concurrence, ¶95.  Instead, Dubose 
simply withdrew language from Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d 234; State 
v. Streich, 87 Wis. 2d 209, 274 N.W.2d 635 (1979); and State v. 
Kaelin, 196 Wis. 2d 1, 538 N.W.2d 538 (Ct. App. 1995), that 
"might 
be 
interpreted 
as 
being 
based 
on 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution."  Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143, ¶33 n.9.  Moreover, 
post-Dubose, we have confirmed the "limited reach of [Dubose's] 
actual holding" and recognized that it did not "create a 
precedential sea change . . . ."  State v. Luedtke, 2015 WI 42, 
¶¶49-50, 362 Wis. 2d 1, 863 N.W.2d 592.   
5 The majority also claims that Dubose is unsound because it 
"misunderstood 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
decisions" 
by 
adopting standards "similar" to those in Stovall v. Denno, 388 
U.S. 293 (1967).  Majority op., ¶¶51-52.  In Stovall, the United 
States Supreme Court upheld what it recognized as the "widely 
condemned" practice of show-ups because it was "imperative" that 
the police immediately conduct a showup for a dying eyewitness.  
Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302.  This court's conclusion in Dubose 
that a showup is impermissibly suggestive absent necessity was 
(continued) 
No.  2017AP1894-CR.rfd 
 
4 
 
be bound by the minimum protections set by the Supreme Court.  
"This court has demonstrated that it will not be bound by the 
minimums which are imposed by the Supreme Court . . . [if] the 
Constitution of Wisconsin and the laws of this state require 
that greater protection of citizens' liberties ought to be 
afforded."  State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 172, 254 N.W.2d 210 
(1977).  Two significant examples described by the Doe court 
include:  (1) granting the right to counsel at the state's 
expense one hundred years prior to the United States Supreme 
Court's pronouncement of this right in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963); and (2) excluding evidence recovered through 
unlawful searches and seizures forty years before Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643 (1961).  See Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 274 
(1859); Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923); see 
also State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998) 
(holding that Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
guarantees a right to a 12-person jury in all criminal cases 
notwithstanding 
that 
the 
right 
to 
a 
12-person 
jury 
in 
misdemeanor cases is not guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution).     
¶100  This court has particularly described the rights 
defined in Article I, Section 8 as "so sacred, and the pressure 
so great towards their relaxation in case[s] where suspicion of 
guilt is strong and evidence obscure, that it is the duty of the 
courts to liberally construe the prohibition [against self-
                                                                                                                                                             
appropriately 
guided 
by 
the 
"imperativeness" 
justification 
relied upon in Stovall. 
No.  2017AP1894-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
incrimination] in favor of private rights."  Thornton v. State, 
117 Wis. 338, 341, 93 N.W. 1107 (1903).  The Thornton court 
reminds us that courts must be vigilant "to refuse to permit 
those first and doubtful steps which may invade [Article I, 
Section 8] in any respect."  Id.  Just as in Thornton where we 
construed Article I, Section 8 to afford greater protection of a 
defendant's right against self-incrimination, in Dubose we 
applied the same constitutional provision to afford greater 
protection of a defendant's right to due process.   
¶101 The majority opinion claims that because the wording 
of Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution is nearly 
identical to the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution, the Wisconsin Constitution does not provide any 
additional protection.  Majority op., ¶¶55-56.  In Knapp, this 
court warned against this "lock-step" theory of interpreting the 
Wisconsin Constitution no broader than its federal counterpart:   
[w]hile textual similarity or identity is important 
when 
determining 
when 
to 
depart 
from 
federal 
constitutional jurisprudence, it cannot be conclusive, 
lest this court forfeit its power to interpret its own 
constitution to the federal judiciary. The people of 
this state shaped our constitution, and it is our 
solemn responsibility to interpret it. 
State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶60, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 
899; see also State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶59, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 
604 N.W.2d 517 ("[I]t would be a sad irony for this court 
to . . . act as mere rubber stamps ourselves when interpreting 
our Wisconsin Constitution.").  In now limiting a protection 
previously afforded under Article I, Section 8, the majority 
No.  2017AP1894-CR.rfd 
 
6 
 
ignores the warning from Knapp and shirks this court's solemn 
responsibility to interpret the Wisconsin Constitution.    
C.  Extensive social science research establishing the 
prevalence and danger of mistaken eyewitness identification is a 
proper consideration to support a shift in constitutional law. 
¶102 The majority insinuates that the extensive social 
science research relied upon in Dubose is irrelevant and 
unreliable.  The majority ignores the body of United States 
Supreme Court precedent that considered social science research 
in 
cases 
premised 
on 
constitutional 
interpretation 
and 
application.  Social science research has formed the basis for 
the United States Supreme Court to overturn notable decisions 
including:  criminalization of consensual same sex intimate 
conduct in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and 
imposition of the death penalty on the mentally ill and 
juveniles in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and Roper 
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  
¶103 Additionally, the majority discounts the seminal case 
of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), where the 
United States Supreme Court held that "separate but equal" 
education of children of color, as the doctrine was mandated by 
Plessy 
v. 
Ferguson, 
163 
U.S. 
537 
(1896), 
violated 
the 
Constitution based upon comprehensive studies demonstrating the 
fallacy of that concept in practice.  In Dubose, this court 
"follow[ed] the lead of Brown" and determined that current 
social science research demanded a "much-needed change to our 
jurisprudence" 
in 
the 
area 
of 
eyewitness 
identification.  
Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143, ¶44.  
No.  2017AP1894-CR.rfd 
 
7 
 
¶104 There is no support for the notion that the social 
science research relied upon in Dubose has become unreliable.  
There is no dispute that social science research establishes the 
prevalence and danger of mistaken eyewitness identification 
where inherently suggestive identification procedures like a 
showup are used.  The lone study cited by the majority 
recognizes the danger of suggestive identification procedures 
and only reports an increase in the accuracy of identification 
when procedures include safeguards, like those imposed in the 
wake of Dubose.  See majority op., ¶39 (citing John Wixted & 
Gary Wells, The Relationship Between Eyewitness Confidence and 
Identification Accuracy:  A New Synthesis, 18 Psychol. Sci. in 
the Pub. Int. 10, 2017.6 
¶105 Mistaken 
eyewitness 
identification 
is 
still 
the 
leading cause of wrongful convictions in the United States.  
According to the Innocence Project, sixty-nine percent of DNA 
exoneration cases in the United States involved convictions 
based on eyewitness misidentifications.  See https: //www. 
innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united states; see 
also Michael D. Cicchini, Joseph G. Easton, Reforming the Law on 
Show-Up Identifications, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 381, 390 
(2010) ("[o]ne study revealed that 'when the identification was 
                                                 
6 The study evaluated the level of confidence in lineups 
done under "pristine conditions," which included the use of 
multiple fillers, double-blind testing, cautionary statements to 
eyewitnesses and a confidence statement made at the time of the 
lineup.  John Wixted & Gary Wells, The Relationship Between 
Eyewitness Confidence and Identification Accuracy:  A New 
Synthesis, 18 Psychol. Sci. in the Pub. Int. 12-17, 2017.   
No.  2017AP1894-CR.rfd 
 
8 
 
conducted twenty-four hours afterwards, fourteen percent of 
those who viewed a lineup made a mistaken identification, 
whereas fifty-three percent of those who viewed a show-up made a 
mistaken identification.'")  The risk of mistaken eyewitness 
identification is even greater when the identification involves 
a suspect of a different race.  See, e.g., Cunningham v. Peters, 
941 F.2d 535, 541 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J. dissenting) 
("All eyewitness testimony is problematic, given the frailties of 
human memory.  Identification by members of other races is 
especially so.") (citing Sheri Lynn Johnson, 
Cross-Racial 
Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 934 
(1984)).  As was the case when Dubose was decided, current 
social science research establishes the frequency and danger of 
mistaken eyewitness identification and is therefore "impossible 
for us to ignore."  Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143, ¶29. 
D.   Dubose had a crucial impact in deterring the use of 
suggestive identification procedures and excluding 
inherently unreliable showup evidence. 
¶106 The majority claims that overruling Dubose will have 
"minimal impact."  Majority op., ¶65.  The majority overlooks 
Dubose's influence on the implementation of statewide policies, 
exaggerates "negative treatment" of Dubose, and ignores the fact 
that many states have provided more due process protection for 
showup procedures post-Dubose.  Most significantly, the majority 
fails to recognize the inherent unreliability of suggestive 
identification procedures like showups.  
¶107 Dubose led to the implementation of statewide policies 
to reduce the frequency of mistaken eyewitness identifications 
No.  2017AP1894-CR.rfd 
 
9 
 
above and beyond the showup.  Five months after Dubose was 
decided, the legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 175.50, requiring 
law enforcement agencies to adopt model policies to minimize the 
possibility 
of 
mistaken 
eyewitness 
identifications. 
 
In 
formulating these policies, law enforcement agencies are to 
consider practices that "[t]o the extent feasible, show[] 
individuals 
or 
representations 
sequentially 
rather 
than 
simultaneously to an eyewitness" and "[m]inimiz[e] factors that 
influence an eyewitness to identify a suspect."  §§ 175.50(5)(b) 
& (c).  Accordingly, in 2010, the Wisconsin Department of 
Justice published its Model Policy and Procedures for Eyewitness 
Identifications recommending that law enforcement officials 
"conduct double-blind, sequential photo arrays and lineups with 
non-suspect fillers chosen to minimize suggestiveness, nonbiased 
instructions to eyewitnesses, and assessments of confidence 
immediately after identifications."  Wis. Dep't of Justice, 
Model Policy and Procedure for Eyewitness Identification at 1 
(Apr. 1, 2010).  In adopting these policies, the Department of 
Justice recognized that suggestive law enforcement procedures 
could 
increase 
the 
likelihood 
of 
mistaken 
eyewitness 
identification, as this court emphasized in Dubose. 
¶108 The majority claims that overruling Dubose will have 
little impact because it has "not created a substantial body of 
settled law" and because it "has been treated negatively by 
several subsequent Wisconsin appellate opinions."  Majority op., 
¶61.  While it is true that subsequent decisions from this court 
have not extended Dubose's safeguards beyond that of a showup, a 
No.  2017AP1894-CR.rfd 
 
10 
 
decision not to extend Dubose is not equivalent to negative 
treatment.  Just four years ago in Luedtke, we reaffirmed that 
"due process under the Wisconsin Constitution provides greater 
protection in one identification procedure, the showup."  State 
v. Luedtke, 2015 WI 42, ¶50, 362 Wis. 2d 1, 863 N.W.2d 592.  
Moreover, there is no published Wisconsin appellate decision 
that treats Dubose negatively.   
¶109 The majority attempts to paint Dubose as an anomaly 
and criticizes it for "explicitly rel[ying] on case law from 
Massachusetts and New York."  Majority op., ¶58.  Yet, the 
majority fails to discuss the increase in nationwide recognition 
of the danger of suggestive identification procedures post-
Dubose.  Seven states have significantly diverged from the 
federal doctrine, and in doing so have acknowledged the risk of 
suggestive identification procedures.7  See J.P. Christian Milde, 
                                                 
7 The majority disputes the extent to which earlier case law 
from two of these states has been overruled:  State v. 
Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290 (Conn. 2005) and State v. Herrera, 902 
A.2d 177, 181 (N.J. 2006).  See majority op., ¶61 n.8.  
Ledbetter was explicitly overruled by the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut in State v. Harris, 191 A.3d 119 (Conn. 2018).  The 
Harris court concluded "we agree with the defendant that the 
Biggers 
framework 
is 
insufficiently 
protective 
of 
the 
defendant's due process rights under the state constitution. We 
therefore overrule our conclusion to the contrary in Ledbetter."  
Harris, 191 A.3d at 143 (emphasis added).  Similarly, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 
2011), 
abandoned 
its 
previous 
application 
of 
the 
Brathwaite/Biggers reliability factors, in cases like Herrera, 
and provided more protection pursuant to the New Jersey 
constitution.  See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 892 ("As we noted in 
Herrera, '[u]ntil we are convinced that a different approach is 
required after a proper record has been made in the trial court, 
we continue to follow the [Braithwaite] approach.' . . . That 
record is now before us.")  In overruling Ledbetter and Herrera, 
(continued) 
No.  2017AP1894-CR.rfd 
 
11 
 
Bare Necessity:  Simplifying the Standard for Admitting Showup 
Identifications, 60 B.C. L. Rev. 1771, 1789-1806 (2019).  
Additionally, five states have adhered to the federal standard 
but 
have 
developed 
additions, 
modifications, 
or 
semantic 
distinctions providing additional protections.  Id. at 1806-12. 
¶110 Most importantly, the majority and concurring opinions 
overlook the inherent unreliability of identification evidence 
from showups and other suggestive procedures.  The burden will 
now be placed on jurors to separate the taint of a suggestive 
identification 
procedure 
from 
the 
reliability 
of 
the 
identification.  As this court in Dubose recognized, this is an 
impossible task:  "[b]ecause a witness can be influenced by the 
suggestive procedure itself, a court cannot know exactly how 
reliable 
the 
identification 
would 
have 
been 
without 
the 
suggestiveness." 
 
Dubose, 
285 
Wis. 2d 143, 
¶31. 
 
The 
suggestibility of an identification procedure can affect what a 
witness remembers and their confidence in that memory, rendering 
a subsequent reliability determination by a juror meaningless.  
See Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Eyewitness Testimony: Civil and 
Criminal 69 (4th ed. 2007) ("[h]uman recollection can be 
supplemented, partly restructured, and even completely altered 
by 
postevent 
inputs."); 
see 
also 
Benjamin 
E. 
Rosenberg, 
Rethinking the Right to Due Process in Connection With Pretrial 
Identification Procedures: An Analysis and a Proposal, 79 Ky. 
                                                                                                                                                             
these states have followed Dubose's lead in providing more 
protection to defendants, as opposed to the standard that the 
majority reverts to today. 
No.  2017AP1894-CR.rfd 
 
12 
 
L.J. 
259, 
291 
(1991) 
("[A]n 
unnecessarily 
suggestive 
identification procedure simply creates unreliable evidence 
where reliable evidence could have been gathered.") 
¶111 The adversarial process does not protect against the 
admission into evidence of mistaken eyewitness identification.  
"When 
an 
unconscious 
and 
innocent 
mistake 
causes 
the 
misidentification, cross-examination becomes a less useful tool 
because it only causes the witness to reassert confidence."  
Susan M. Campers, Time to Blow Up the Showup: Who Are Witnesses 
Really Identifying?, 48 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 845, 848–49 (2015).  
Further, 
"this 
exaggerated 
witness 
confidence 
produces 
a 
tendency in jurors to 'almost unquestionably accept eyewitness 
testimony."  Id. at 849 (quoted source omitted).  The majority 
and concurring opinions condone the return to inherently 
unreliable and suggestive identification procedures like the 
showup, and thus increase the risk of wrongful convictions 
caused by mistaken eyewitness identification.   
 
E.  A defendant's right to due process is implicated when 
a single photo eyewitness identification procedure is not 
purely confirmatory. 
¶112 Since I conclude that the foundation of Dubose is 
sound, I turn to the question presented in this case:  under 
what conditions, if any, does a single photo identification 
procedure implicate a defendant's right to due process under 
Article I, Section 8?  We have defined a showup as:  "'an out-
of-court pretrial identification procedure in which a suspect is 
presented singly to a witness for identification purposes.'"  
No.  2017AP1894-CR.rfd 
 
13 
 
Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143, ¶1 n.1 (quoting State v. Wolverton, 193 
Wis. 2d 234, 263 n.21, 533 N.W.2d 167 (1995)).  While not a one-
on-one confrontation, a single photo identification procedure 
involving an unknown suspect presents the same risk of mistaken 
identification as a showup.8  The Dubose court determined that a 
subsequent single photo identification procedure, showing the 
victim a mug shot of Dubose, "was also unnecessarily suggestive 
and 
that 
out-of-court 
identification 
should 
have 
been 
suppressed."  Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143, ¶37.  Whether an unknown 
suspect is presented singly to a witness in person or in a 
photograph, there is no material difference:  law enforcement 
only suggests one suspect to the witness for identification.  
Therefore, the constitutional scrutiny this court applied in 
Dubose should also apply to a single photo identification that 
is not purely confirmatory.9   
¶113 A purely confirmatory single photo identification does 
not carry with it the same risk of mistaken eyewitness 
identification as that of an unknown suspect, and therefore is 
not inherently suggestive.  See State v. Greene, 201 A.3d 43, 52 
(2019) 
("[A] 
mere 
'confirmatory 
identification' 
does 
not 
generate the myriad risks of misidentification that frequently 
                                                 
8 Without any analysis, the majority declares "[w]e conclude 
that the State action that caused a showup to be subject to 
constitutional scrutiny in Dubose may be equally applicable to 
the use of a single Facebook photo for an out-of-court 
identification."  Majority op., ¶48 (emphasis added). 
9 Dubose did not address the use of a showup procedure for a 
suspect that was known to the eyewitness.  
No.  2017AP1894-CR.rfd 
 
14 
 
attend 
a 
selective 
identification 
made 
under 
suggestive 
circumstances.")  A purely confirmatory identification is used 
by law enforcement when a witness knows or is acquainted with a 
suspect but cannot identify that person by name.  See, e.g., 
National Research Council of the National Academies, Identifying 
the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification 22, 28 (2014) 
("Police typically limit [displaying a single photograph] to 
situations in which the perpetrator is previously known to or 
acquainted 
with 
the 
witness."); 
Sides 
v. 
Senkowski, 
281 
F.Supp.2d 649, 654 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (describing an identification 
as merely confirmatory when the "parties knew each other 
previously").  Due to the relationship or familiarity between 
the people involved, a purely confirmatory identification 
procedure minimizes the risk that law enforcement's suggestion 
of a single suspect would lead to a mistaken eyewitness 
identification.   
¶114 Accordingly, 
I 
would 
remand 
the 
case 
for 
an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether C.A.S.'s identification 
of Roberson was purely confirmatory.  If the identification was 
not purely confirmatory, it was suggestive and the State must 
prove the necessity of the procedure, just as in Dubose.   
¶115 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.   
¶116 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2017AP1894-CR.rfd 
 
1