Title: STATE, EX REL. v. City of Kansas City
Citation: 169 Kan. 702, 222 P.2d 714
Docket Number: 37,748
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: October 7, 1950

169 Kan. 702 (1950)
222 P.2d 714
STATE OF KANSAS ex rel. HAROLD R. FATZER, Attorney General of the State of Kansas, and HAROLD H. HARDING, County Attorney of Wyandotte County, Kansas, Plaintiff,
v.
THE CITY OF KANSAS CITY, KANSAS, a Municipal Corporation; CLARK E. TUCKER, Mayor Commissioner; EDWARD W. BECKER, Commissioner of Finance, Health and Public Property; and FRANCIS W. BLAKE, Commissioner of Boulevards, Parks and Streets, Defendants.
No. 37,748

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed October 7, 1950.
Harold R. Fatzer, attorney general, of Topeka, submitted the cause for the plaintiff, and Charles Hobart, of Topeka, assistant attorney general, Harold H. Harding, of Kansas City, county attorney of Wyandotte county, and T.F. Railsback, of Kansas City, special assistant to the attorney general for the purpose of this case, were with him on the briefs for the plaintiff.
James H. Barnes, deputy city attorney, and Edw. M. Boddington, both of Kansas City, argued the cause, and Alton H. Skinner, city attorney of Kansas City, was with them on the briefs for the defendant.
Edw. M. Boddington, J.O. Emerson, and Edw. M. Boddington, Jr., all of Kansas City, were on the briefs for The Kansas City Industrial Protective Association, amici curiae.
*703 Donald H. Corson, of Kansas City, and LeRoy Bradfield, of Bonner Springs, were on the briefs for Quindaro Township, amici curiae.
Leonard O. Thomas, of Kansas City, was on the briefs for rural high-school districts of Wyandotte county.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARVEY, C.J.:
This is an original proceedings in quo warranto, brought by the state on the relation of the attorney general and the county attorney of Wyandotte county, which questions the validity of Ordinance No. 35,841 of the city of Kansas City, the county seat of Wyandotte county. By that ordinance the city undertook to enlarge the boundaries of the city so as to include about 960 acres of land, being a part of the about 2,300 acres of what is commonly referred to as the Fairfax Industrial District situated between the northeast boundary line of the city, as previously located, and the Missouri river, the center of which, at all points here involved, is the boundary line between the states of Kansas and Missouri. Plaintiff attached as an exhibit to the petition a map, conceded by defendant to be substantially correct, showing the Fairfax Industrial District, the near-by portions of the city to the south and west thereof, and the area sought to be annexed to the city by defendant's Ordinance No. 35,841. To visualize the situation more clearly we have prepared from this map, omitting nonessential details, a drawing which shows the relative location of the area attempted to be annexed to the city by its Ordinance No. 35,841 to Fairfax Industrial District and to the parts of the city adjoining it on the south and west, which drawing is as follows:
We need not detail the pleadings since the pertinent portions thereof are hereinafter fully considered and the questions raised therein are determined. After the pleadings were filed plaintiff filed a motion for the appointment of a commissioner. Considering this motion the court appointed the Honorable George Templar of Arkansas City, a member of the bar of this court, as its commissioner, with directions and authority to hear the evidence and to make suggested findings of fact and conclusions of law and report them to the court. After an extended hearing in which the parties were permitted to present all pertinent evidence they desired, the commissioner made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and filed them with our clerk, as follows:
*704 
Following the announcement of the commissioner's report defendant filed a motion for judgment on the findings of fact, exceptions to the commissioner's findings of fact and conclusions of law, and a motion to modify the same in various particulars, and for additional findings, and also filed a motion for a new trial. The commissioner had a hearing on these motions, considered them and overruled them.
The commissioner filed his report with this court, together with exhibits introduced before him, and a transcript of the oral testimony. Whereupon, defendant refiled the motions which had been filed before the commissioner and plaintiff filed a motion for this court to approve the report of the commissioner and to render judgment for plaintiff thereon. The case was regularly set for hearing in this court and was heard upon the briefs and oral arguments of the parties.
In this court plaintiff points out that the question before the court is the authority of the city to extend its boundaries so as to include the real property sought to be included by the ordinance in question, and that the case does not involve the authority of the *717 city to include within its boundaries any other adjacent property. We concur in that view. Plaintiff argues that the property sought to be taken into the city by the ordinance in question is not so situated and of such character as the city is authorized by statute to take into or annex to the city by ordinance, and discusses the various subdivisions of our statute (G.S. 1935, 13-1602). Upon this point we are in general accord with the analysis made of the statute and of the ordinance in question as it relates to the statute in our commissioner's fifth conclusion of law.
It is first argued on behalf of defendant that the court should deny in its discretion the writ of quo warranto on the ground of its being inequitable and unjust. It is true the court has a measure of discretion in quo warranto proceedings. (See, State, ex rel., v. Allen County Comm'rs, 143 Kan. 898, 57 P.2d 450, syl. 3, and the cases collected at page 902; also, Gas Service Co. v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 145 Kan. 423, 65 P.2d 584; State, ex rel., v. Grenola Rural High School Dist., 157 Kan. 614, 142 P.2d 695, and cases collected in the American Digest System, Quo Warranto, Key No. 6.) This is a judicial discretion. It is not to be used without reason and does not authorize a court to ignore a valid applicable statute which has been promptly invoked.
It is next argued that annexation statutes should be liberally construed in favor of the city's power. We are in general agreement with this thought, but perhaps it would be more accurately stated that an ordinance of a city, like a statute of the legislature, is presumed to be valid. This, of course, does not prevent a judicial inquiry into its validity.
Defendant next argues that Fairfax Industrial District is a proper subject of annexation and that it lies within or mostly within the city. The contention is not important here. The ordinance in question did not attempt to annex Fairfax Industrial District to the city. It attempted to annex only a part of Fairfax Industrial District, the part specifically described in the ordinance. While there was much evidence received by our commissioner pertaining to the Fairfax Industrial District as a whole its only purpose was to show the general situation and the history of the development of the district. These are the only purposes for which such evidence can be considered here. We must necessarily limit our decision to the authority of the city to annex the particular property described in the ordinance, in view of our statute (G.S. 1935, 13-1602) under which the city acted.
*718 Defendant argues the city may annex one part of the area under one provision of G.S. 1935, 13-1602, and another under another provision of the same law by one ordinance. The point is well taken. This court so ruled in State, ex rel., v. Kansas City, 122 Kan. 311, at pages 322 and 323, 252 Pac. 714, but we do not see the applicability of this principle of law in this case.
Defendant argues the Fairfax airport, containing 925 acres, was by G.S. 1947 Supp. 3-123, fully made a part of the city before the ordinance in question was passed. The point is not well taken. The statute reads as follows:
This is one section of our statute (ch. 3, art. 1, 1947 Supp.) pertaining to municipal airports and fields. It authorizes the governing body of the city to acquire an airfield "within or without the city limits" by purchase, lease, or otherwise, and to equip, improve, operate and maintain such an airfield, and by section 3-118 a city of the first class may acquire an additional airport "within or without the city limits." Other sections provide for joint ownership of an airport by a city and county, or by two or more municipalities. We see nothing in any provision of the statute in question which brings within the corporate limits of a city an airport which it has acquired and which is situated outside of the corporate limits of the city. This contention of defendant appears to be an afterthought. Certainly at the time the ordinance in question was adopted by the city the 925 acres of the airport were not regarded as being or within the corporate limits of the city. Had it been so considered there would have been no purpose of including it within the ordinance.
Defendant argues that a declaratory judgment is not proper to be considered in this case. That point is well taken. The points upon which plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment are interpretations of statutes or other legal principles as they apply to this ordinance in question. Similar questions are presented in practically every case and do not call for invoking the provisions of our declaratory judgment statutes (G.S. 1935, 60-3127 to 60-3132).
Lastly, defendant argues that its motion for judgment on findings of fact should be sustained; that exceptions of defendant to certain *719 findings and conclusions are well taken, and that defendant's request for further findings are well taken. These contentions require an examination of all the testimony and exhibits and the argument of counsel thereon. We have taken the time to read the transcript of testimony, examine all the exhibits, and have considered all of the arguments of counsel. To restate our findings and conclusions thereon would be to state what our commissioner has already done, perhaps in somewhat different phraseology. It is sufficient to say that we are satisfied with the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by our commissioner and approve the same in every respect except in one minor detail, namely the last sentence of conclusion of law No. 6, which reads:
We delete that for two reasons: First, our decision must be limited to the authority of the city to pass the ordinance in question, which described only a portion of "the entire Fairfax Industrial area." Second, the statute referred to by our commissioner (G.S. 1935, 12-501 to 12-502b) outlines an entirely different procedure from that followed by defendant in this case. We prefer to decide questions pertaining to the annexation of the entire Fairfax industrial area under the statute referred to if and when such a case is presented to us.
By leave of court counsel for Quindaro township, in which the Fairfax Industrial District is situated, filed a brief amici curiae in support of plaintiff's petition for quo warranto, upon the ground that if the ordinance in question is sustained the township will lose a substantial amount of taxes needed for the maintenance of township roads and other purposes. Under similar procedure counsel for the four rural high schools of Wyandotte county filed a similar brief upon the ground that the schools would lose money now raised by taxes upon the property the Fairfax Industrial District needed for the maintenance of the schools. In that part of the Fairfax Industrial District south and east of the property described in Ordinance No. 35,841 and in that part of the district to the west of such property there are situated a number of valuable industrial properties, while in the area described by the ordinance there is but a small part of privately owned property subject to taxation. In computing their loss of taxes counsel in both briefs *720 computed the taxes as now collected from all of the privately owned property in the Fairfax Industrial District. If any taxes should be considered here it should be only that portion collected from the privately owned property situated within the boundaries of the ordinance in question. Passing that thought, the statute (G.S. 1935, 13-1602), under which defendent proceeded, makes no specific reference to further consideration of taxes which might be assessed and collected by townships and school districts upon property which may be added to a city. The statute does require the governing body of the city, before it approved the ordinance, to notify the county clerk and the county superintendent in writing at least ten days before approval of the ordinance. Our commissioner found that was done. That provision of the statute was intended to give the county clerk and the county superintendent an opportunity to present to the governing body of the city any information they thought proper and any objections they desired to make because of the effect the ordinance would have upon local taxing districts. These are matters which go to the prudence and advisability of the approval of the ordinance of the governing body of the city. In addition to these reasons it may be said to be fundamental that the enlargement of the boundaries of the city will have some effect upon taxes of the township and of school districts, and possibly on the local governmental divisions, and the law appears to be well settled that, except as knowledge and consideration of those matters should be considered by the governing body of the city in determining whether the ordinance should be approved, they do not constitute legal objections to the annexation. That changes of boundaries may result in changes in burdens of taxation does not make the proceeding one for taking private property of the inhabitants. The proceeding is not one for the direct imposition of taxes, but is political; the matter of taxes is merely an incident that follows, as it is in much that is done legislatively.
Counsel for plaintiff and counsel amici curiae criticize defendant for having proceeded "ex parte" under G.S. 1935, 13-1602. The criticism is not justified. To the extent this statute authorized an ex parte procedure it is sufficient to say the legislature provided it.
It is well settled that the creation of municipal corporations and the fixing or modification of their boundaries are legislative functions to be performed by the legislative branch of the government. In the absence of a constitutional provision limiting the authority *721 of the legislature in that respect the legislature has the authority to create municipal corporations, modify their boundaries by increasing or decreasing them, or disorganize the municipalities, as the legislature may deem beneficial. Where there are constitutional limitations upon the legislature in those respects those limitations must be complied with.
The pertinent portions of our constitution (art. 12, § 1) read: "The legislature shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers...." and § 5: "Provision shall be made by general law for the organization of cities, towns and villages." Early in the history of our state it was held that these provisions of our constitution apply to municipal corporations. (See, Atchison v. Bartholow, 4 Kan. 124, 141 to 148; City of Wyandotte v. Wood, 5 Kan. 603.) These decisions have been followed.
G.S. 1935, 13-1601 in part reads:
A section tantamount to this pertaining to cities of the first class has been in our statutes since 1868. (See ch. 18, sec. 3, Gen. Stat. 1868.) So, in order to extend its boundaries the defendant city had to find authority in the statutes. It seeks to justify the ordinance here in question by the next succeeding section of the statute (13-1602).
The evidence and the report of our commissioner have taken a wide range and much more might be written. But when we limit our decision, as we must, to the validity of Ordinance No. 35,841, we think it clear that the defendant city had no authority under our statute (G.S. 1935, 13-1602) to enact the ordinance.
The result is judgment must be rendered for plaintiff that the ordinance is invalid.
It is so ordered.