Title: State v. Eddington
Citation: 386 P.2d 20, 95 Ariz. 10
Docket Number: 1308
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: October 23, 1963

95 Ariz. 10 (1963) 386 P.2d 20 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. E.D. EDDINGTON, Appellant. No. 1308. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division. October 23, 1963. *11 Robert W. Pickrell, Atty. Gen., Merton E. Marks, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Charles N. Ronan, Maricopa County Atty., for appellee. R. Kelly Hocker, Tempe, for appellant. UDALL, Vice Chief Justice. Appellant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and of obstructing justice by using force and violence against a policeman in violation of A.R.S. § 13-541. The facts must be viewed in the light most strongly in favor of upholding the jury verdict, State v. Barker, 94 Ariz. 383, 385 P.2d 516 (October 10, 1963). Viewed in that light the evidence is as follows: The defendant and the victim were both drinking in a tavern. The victim had recently taken a girl away from the defendant and wished to warn the defendant to stop "picking" at the girl. He asked the defendant to talk with him outside the tavern as the noise inside made it difficult to hear. The defendant and the victim went outside. The victim was carrying a knife in his pocket and testified he moved toward the defendant. The defendant drew a pistol out of his pocket and shot the victim in the head, wounding him. The defendant testified the victim had pulled a knife on him but the victim denied doing so. There was testimony that the victim had been convicted of several felonies and had a poor reputation for peacefulness but there was no testimony that the defendant knew of the convictions or of the reputation prior to the assault. The shot that hit the victim was heard by a police captain in a cruising police car. He stopped, saw the defendant waving the gun at the victim and ordered the defendant to drop the gun. At a second order the defendant ran and the police captain gave chase but was not able to catch the defendant. An alarm was broadcast and a police officer who heard it stopped a car in which the defendant by *12 now was riding. The defendant gave a wrong name when asked to identify himself but was identified by his wallet which was lying on the front seat of the car. The defendant bolted and the officer gave chase. The officer chased the defendant into a back yard, lost track of him and headed for an open gate leading out of the yard. He testified that when he was a few feet from the gate he was hit in the back. As he was falling he fired at the defendant and hit him in the back. The defendant testified he ran into the fence in the dark, bounced off it, and then ran through the gate as he was shot. There was testimony that when asked why he had tackled the officer the defendant answered, "I don't know why I did it." Defendant makes several assignments of error two of which complain of the instruction on self-defense given by the trial judge and the refusal of the trial judge to give a requested instruction on self-defense. The complaint as to the instruction given is based on a bowdlerized version of the instruction the trial judge actually gave. The instruction given is set forth in its entirety with the part complained of italicized: Defendant contends that the italicized part of the instruction applies an "objective" reasonable man test and is therefore in conflict with our decision in Caston v. State, 24 Ariz. 593, 211 P. 866 and Everett v. State, 88 Ariz. 293, 356 P.2d 394, because defendant's right to defend himself is predicated upon what the jurors would have done or felt it was necessary to do in self-defense. In Caston we said: The "Subjective Test" of an apprehension of danger contended for by defendant was specifically rejected in Caston. In Everett we relied upon Caston and said: The use of the reasonable man test has been reaffirmed by this court in the recent case of State v. Barker, supra, in which we said: The charge of self-defense when read in its entirety is in complete harmony with Caston, Everett and Barker, and applies the reasonable man test. Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give the following instruction: *14 There was no evidence that the defendant knew of the "turbulent and dangerous character" of the victim at the time of the shooting. While reasonable men may well act on the basis of ignorance it is unreasonable to think that the action of anyone is affirmatively based on facts of which he is unaware. Knowledge prior to the assault by the defendant of the character of the victim is a condition precedent to the giving of the requested charge. Mendez v. State, 27 Ariz. 82, 229 P. 1032. Defendant next assigns as error questioning by the prosecution as to a previous felony conviction when the prosecutor was not prepared to prove the conviction when he received a negative answer. The testimony was as follows: As we said in State v. Stago, 82 Ariz. 285, 287, 312 P.2d 160, 161: The reason for the rule is to keep the state from impeaching the defendant by false insinuations. If the state has shown the court that it is prepared to prove that the defendant had been convicted of a felony it need not actually do so when the defendant gives a negative answer to the question. State v. Hilliard, 89 Ariz. 129, 359 P.2d 66. The distinction is that in the first instance it must be presumed that the insinuation was false while in the second the state has already made a record of the fact that the insinuation is true. It will be noted that defendant did not move for a mistrial when the state failed to follow up its insinuation with proof. However, when error is so prejudicial that it cannot be cured by instructions, State v. Stago, supra, it must be considered fundamental error which this court will consider in a criminal appeal. State v. Hunt, 91 Ariz. 145, 370 P.2d 640. Our decision in this case makes it unnecessary to consider defendant's other assignment of error. Reversed and remanded with instructions to grant a new trial. BERNSTEIN, C.J., and LOCKWOOD, J., concur.