Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Hazel J. Washington
Citation: 2008 WI 66
Docket Number: 2006AP000578-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 20, 2008

2008 WI 66 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP578-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Hazel J. Washington, Attorney at Law. 
 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Hazel J. Washington, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST WASHINGTON 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 20, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: BUTLER, JR., J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 66
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP578-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Hazel J. Washington, Attorney at Law. 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Hazel J. Washington, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 20, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY reinstatement proceeding.  Reinstatement granted 
upon conditions.   
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM.   We 
review 
a 
referee's 
report 
recommending that Hazel J. Washington's license to practice law 
in Wisconsin be reinstated.  No party has appealed from that 
report and recommendation.  Therefore, the court's review 
proceeds under SCR 22.33(3).1 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.33(3) provides that "[i]f no appeal is timely 
filed, the supreme court shall review the referee's report, 
order 
reinstatement, 
with 
or 
without 
conditions, 
deny 
reinstatement, or order the parties to file briefs in the 
matter." 
No. 
2006AP578-D   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The standards that apply to all petitions seeking 
reinstatement after a disciplinary suspension/revocation are set 
forth in SCR 22.31(1).2  In particular, the petitioning attorney 
must demonstrate by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence 
that he or she has the moral character necessary to practice law 
in this state, that his or her resumption of the practice of law 
will not be detrimental to the administration of justice or 
subversive of the public interest, and that the attorney has 
complied fully with the terms of the suspension order and SCR 
22.26.  In addition, SCR 22.31(1)(c) incorporates the statements 
that a petition for reinstatement must contain pursuant to SCR 
22.29(4)(a)-(4m).3 
 
Thus, 
the 
petitioning 
attorney 
must 
                                                 
2 SCR 22.31(1) states: 
The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating, 
by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence, all 
of the following: 
(a) That he or she has the moral character to 
practice law in Wisconsin. 
(b) That his or her resumption of the practice of 
law will not be detrimental to the administration of 
justice or subversive of the public interest. 
(c) That his or her representations in the 
petition, including the representations required by 
SCR 
22.29(4)(a) 
to 
[(4m)] 
and 
22.29(5), 
are 
substantiated. 
(d) That he or she has complied fully with the 
terms of the order of suspension or revocation and 
with the requirements of SCR 22.26. 
 
3 SCR 22.29(4)(a) through (4m) provides that a petition for 
reinstatement shall show all of the following: 
No. 
2006AP578-D   
 
3 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) 
The 
petitioner 
desires 
to 
have 
the 
petitioner's license reinstated. 
(b) The petitioner has not practiced law during 
the period of suspension or revocation. 
(c) The petitioner has complied fully with the 
terms of the order of suspension or revocation and 
will 
continue 
to 
comply 
with 
them 
until 
the 
petitioner's license is reinstated. 
(d) The petitioner has maintained competence and 
learning in the law by attendance at identified 
educational activities. 
(e) The petitioner's conduct since the suspension 
or revocation has been exemplary and above reproach. 
(f) The petitioner has a proper understanding of 
and attitude toward the standards that are imposed 
upon members of the bar and will act in conformity 
with the standards. 
(g) The petitioner can safely be recommended to 
the legal profession, the courts and the public as a 
person fit to be consulted by others and to represent 
them and otherwise act in matters of trust and 
confidence and in general to aid in the administration 
of justice as a member of the bar and as an officer of 
the courts. 
(h) The petitioner has fully complied with the 
requirements set forth in SCR 22.26. 
(j) The petitioner's proposed use of the license 
if reinstated. 
(k) A full description of all of the petitioner's 
business activities during the period of suspension or 
revocation. 
(4m) The petitioner has made restitution to or 
settled all claims of persons injured or harmed by 
petitioner's misconduct, including reimbursement to 
the Wisconsin lawyers' fund for client protection for 
all payments made from that fund, or, if not, the 
No. 
2006AP578-D   
 
4 
 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
required 
representations 
in 
the 
reinstatement petition are substantiated. 
¶3 
Although the referee's report discussed a number of 
concerns raised by the Office of Lawyer Regulation, the referee 
found that Attorney Washington had satisfied the requirements 
for the reinstatement of her license to practice law in 
Wisconsin.  The referee found generally that Attorney Washington 
had proven that she has the moral character necessary to 
practice law in this state, that her resumption of the practice 
of law would not be detrimental to the administration of 
justice, and that she had complied with the terms of her 
suspension and the requirements that accompany a suspension.   
¶4 
Although we share some of the concerns raised by the 
referee, there is no basis on which to find that the referee's 
factual findings were clearly erroneous.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Carroll, 2004 WI 19, ¶9, 269 Wis. 2d 172, 
675 N.W.2d 792 (referee's factual findings affirmed unless 
clearly erroneous; legal conclusions reviewed on de novo basis).  
We 
agree, 
therefore, 
that 
Attorney 
Washington 
should 
be 
reinstated to the practice of law in this state.  We decide, 
however, that Attorney Washington's reinstatement should be 
conditioned on her providing full trust account records to the 
OLR on a quarterly basis for a period of two years following her 
reinstatement.  Finally, we determine that Attorney Washington 
                                                                                                                                                             
petitioner's explanation of the failure or inability 
to do so. 
No. 
2006AP578-D   
 
5 
 
should be required to pay the full costs of this reinstatement 
proceeding, which were $4,634.04 as of January 10, 2008. 
¶5 
Attorney Washington was admitted to the practice of 
law in Wisconsin in 1988.  Prior to the discipline described 
below, she had practiced law in this state since her admission 
without being the subject of any disciplinary action. 
¶6 
This reinstatement proceeding stems from Attorney 
Washington's 18-month suspension arising out of her conviction 
in federal court for attempting to evade the payment of a large 
portion of her federal income tax due for 1998.  The Internal 
Revenue 
Service 
(IRS) 
initiated 
an 
audit 
of 
Attorney 
Washington's 
federal 
income 
tax 
returns 
while 
she 
was 
negotiating a plan to pay off $70,000 in delinquent employment 
tax obligations.  The IRS's investigation determined that 
Attorney Washington had intentionally failed to report over 
$100,000 in income for 1998 by depositing payments for legal 
services directly into her personal bank account or by directing 
them to her mortgage lender, thereby bypassing her business 
account, 
which 
Attorney 
Washington's 
accountant 
had 
been 
directed to use to prepare her income tax returns.  Attorney 
Washington's hiding of this income caused an income tax loss to 
the federal government in excess of $31,000 for 1998.  Attorney 
Washington also failed to report a similar amount of income in 
1999 and 2000.  
¶7 
The federal authorities chose to charge Attorney 
Washington with only one count of tax evasion for 1998, although 
in her federal plea agreement Attorney Washington admitted that 
No. 
2006AP578-D   
 
6 
 
she had engaged in similar tax evasion for 1999 and 2000.  The 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin accepted her guilty plea to the single count charged.  
The district court ultimately sentenced her to five months of 
imprisonment and two years of supervised release, 150 days of 
which were to be served in home confinement. 
¶8 
After the entry of Attorney Washington's guilty plea, 
this court summarily suspended her license to practice law in 
this state, effective as of February 3, 2006. 
¶9 
The OLR filed a complaint that alleged in a single 
count that Attorney Washington had violated SCR 20:8.4(b).4  The 
OLR and Attorney Washington then entered into a stipulation, in 
which Attorney Washington admitted her professional misconduct.  
The stipulation further stated that the OLR recommended, and 
Attorney Washington agreed, that her license should be suspended 
for a period of one year. 
¶10 After 
issuing 
an 
order 
to 
show 
cause 
why 
the 
suspension should not be for a period of 18 months and after 
considering the responses of the parties, we determined that 
Attorney Washington's professional misconduct required an 18-
month suspension of her license to practice law in Wisconsin, 
retroactive to February 3, 2006, the date of the summary 
suspension.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Washington, 
                                                 
4 SCR 20:8.4(b) states that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "commit a criminal act that reflects adversely 
on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer 
in other respects." 
No. 
2006AP578-D   
 
7 
 
2007 WI 65, 301 Wis. 2d 47, 732 N.W.2d 24.  We also required 
Attorney Washington to pay the full costs of the disciplinary 
proceeding. 
¶11 On June 12, 2007, Attorney Washington filed a petition 
for reinstatement.  Attorney Richard M. Esenberg was appointed 
referee for the reinstatement proceeding. 
¶12 The Board of Bar Examiners filed a memorandum stating 
that on the basis of the materials Attorney Washington had 
submitted concerning her continuing legal education credits, it 
recommended her reinstatement.  The OLR, however, filed a 
memorandum in opposition to reinstatement.  Essentially, it 
asserted that, based on information discovered in the course of 
its reinstatement investigation, Attorney Washington could not 
meet her burden for reinstatement.  The specific objections that 
the OLR raised will be discussed below in the context of the 
referee's report. 
¶13 The referee held a hearing on Attorney Washington's 
reinstatement 
petition 
on 
September 
20, 
2007. 
 
Attorney 
Washington and six other character witnesses testified in 
support of her reinstatement petition.  In addition, the referee 
received into evidence a number of additional letters of support 
for Attorney Washington.  The OLR did not call any witnesses in 
opposition, although it submitted a number of documentary 
exhibits, which were received by stipulation. 
¶14 The referee issued a report and recommendation on 
December 21, 2007.  The referee's report summarized the 
testimony given at the hearing and discussed a number of issues 
No. 
2006AP578-D   
 
8 
 
raised by the OLR's investigation, which were addressed in 
exhibits 
filed 
by 
the 
OLR 
and 
in 
Attorney 
Washington's 
testimony. 
¶15 First, the referee noted that Attorney Washington had 
previously been convicted of two felonies in 1979.  Prior to 
becoming an attorney, Attorney Washington had been a social 
worker and had owned a social services agency.  In connection 
with that agency, Attorney Washington was charged with and 
convicted of two counts of fraud involving overbillings to the 
Medicaid program.  She served 18 months in prison and an 
additional couple of years on probation.  Governor Tommy 
Thompson granted a pardon to Attorney Washington in 1988 
following her graduation from law school and prior to her 
becoming licensed as an attorney in this state. 
¶16 The referee also discussed some concerns with the 
winding up of two cases at the time of Attorney Washington's 
summary suspension.  In both instances, at the time of her 
summary suspension, 
Attorney Washington had completed the 
briefing on separate postconviction motions for each client, 
T.S. and A.A.  Attorney Washington failed to send the required 
written notice of her suspension to the two clients, to opposing 
counsel and to the relevant courts.5  She also failed to 
acknowledge these two cases in her affidavit submitted to the 
OLR to show compliance with her winding up requirements under 
                                                 
5 Attorney Washington did orally inform A.A. that her 
license to practice law was going to be suspended. 
No. 
2006AP578-D   
 
9 
 
SCR 22.26.  Attorney Washington testified at the hearing that 
she did not send written notices of her suspension or identify 
the postconviction motions on her list of pending cases in her 
compliance affidavit because she viewed those representations as 
having been concluded when she had finished preparing and filing 
the motions and supporting materials. 
¶17 Attorney Washington acknowledged at the reinstatement 
hearing that her prior understanding of the status of those 
cases had been incorrect and that, in fact, those cases had 
remained pending at the time of her summary suspension and were 
subject to the notice and identification requirements of SCR 
22.26.  She conceded that although no hearing was expected on 
either of those motions, there had been no decision issued in 
either case at the time of her summary suspension.  Thus, there 
could have been further filings needed in the circuit court or 
on appeal, and, in any event, there would have been a need to 
apprise the clients of the court's decision when issued and to 
discuss how the clients wished to proceed. 
¶18 Ultimately, both motions were denied.  After the 
summary suspension had been imposed, the circuit court denied 
the motion that Attorney Washington had filed on behalf of T.S. 
as untimely under the statutory provisions cited in the motion.  
T.S. received a copy of that decision from a source other than 
Attorney Washington, and he subsequently filed a grievance 
against her.  Attorney Washington entered into a consensual 
public reprimand under SCR 22.09(3) in connection with her 
representation of T.S.  The stipulated reprimand, which was 
No. 
2006AP578-D   
 
10 
 
approved by a referee on May 2, 2007, provided that Attorney 
Washington had violated SCRs 20:1.1, 20:1.16(d), 22.26(1)(a) and 
(b), 22.26(1)(c), 22.26(1)(e)(iii), and 20:8.4(f).   
¶19 As was the case with T.S., the postconviction motion 
that Attorney Washington had filed on behalf of A.A. was also 
denied as time-barred and as improperly brought under Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06.  After receiving a copy of the circuit court's 
decision, A.A. filed a request for reimbursement from the 
Wisconsin Fund for Client Protection (the Fund).  Attorney 
Washington was unaware of this claim and did not contest it 
because she was in a federal prison camp at the time notice of 
the claim by A.A. was mailed to her home.  Ultimately, the Fund 
granted A.A.'s claim and paid him the $2,500 he had requested as 
reimbursement for the fee he had paid to Attorney Washington.  
At the reinstatement hearing, Attorney Washington stated that 
she disagreed with the Fund's payment to A.A. because she had 
met with A.A. on multiple occasions and had in fact done the 
work he had requested her to do. 
¶20 The referee also discussed the OLR's contention that 
Attorney Washington had misrepresented a number of items in her 
responses to the OLR's reinstatement questionnaire.  For 
example, the OLR claimed that Attorney Washington had failed to 
report income from the sale of a piece of real estate in October 
2006, although she had shown a gain from a similar real estate 
transaction 
that 
had 
occurred 
in 
April 
2006. 
 
At 
the 
reinstatement hearing, Attorney Washington explained that she 
had not listed the capital gain from the second sale because the 
No. 
2006AP578-D   
 
11 
 
IRS had immediately seized the funds as partial payment for back 
taxes.  The referee noted that the OLR appeared to be satisfied 
with this explanation. 
¶21 Another alleged misstatement in her reinstatement 
questionnaire responses involved a list of every civil action in 
which Attorney Washington was a party.  Attorney Washington 
listed only one case, in which she had been a defendant and in 
which a judgment had been issued against her and then had been 
satisfied.  She failed to include a substantial number of 
collection actions that had been filed on her behalf.  Attorney 
Washington explained that she had a longstanding arrangement 
with a collection attorney to collect her overdue accounts 
receivable.  The attorney attempted to collect the funds, and if 
unsuccessful, often filed a collection action in circuit court.  
Attorney Washington stated that in most situations she was not 
notified by the attorney when the matter had progressed to the 
point of a formal legal action.  Because of this arrangement and 
her limited involvement in the collection process, Attorney 
Washington stated that she had failed to consider these 
collection actions when responding to the OLR's reinstatement 
questionnaire. 
¶22 Although the items discussed above clearly worked 
against 
Attorney 
Washington's 
reinstatement 
petition, 
the 
referee emphasized 
that Attorney Washington had exhibited 
genuine remorse for her conduct at the reinstatement hearing.  
The referee noted that Attorney Washington had readily conceded 
that she did not suffer from a lack of disposable income during 
No. 
2006AP578-D   
 
12 
 
the years in which she had misrepresented her income on her 
federal income tax returns.  The referee also stated that while 
others may have attempted to excuse her misconduct as a result 
of a lack of business acumen or inadequate clerical support, 
Attorney Washington did not attempt to use any such excuses.  In 
addition 
to 
accepting 
responsibility 
for 
her 
wrongdoing, 
Attorney Washington also convinced the referee that she has a 
genuine intention to repay her outstanding back taxes. 
¶23 When asked to explain why she had failed to report 
substantial amounts of income on her 1998-2000 tax returns, 
Attorney Washington gave the following response: 
You know, as I go back and think, there's no reason 
why I did what I did, I mean, no reason that is good 
enough.  It was wrong what I did, and I can't sit here 
and justify what I did. 
. . . 
And it was wrong to——for example, in '99 when I took 
the personal injury check that should have been 
deposited into the business account and paid expenses, 
personal expenses.  I didn't have to do that.  At that 
time I just wanted a new truck.  I paid $3,000 on a 
new lease, paid out the old lease, gave my children 
some money.  It's all outlined in exhibits what I did 
with the money. 
I mean, I paid $30,000 on old taxes, but it wasn't 
supposed to go that way.  And just to have those few 
little trinkets, God knows it hasn't been worth it.  
What I did was wrong, was so wrong, and I would never 
do nothing like that again.  
¶24 In 
addition 
to 
discussing 
Attorney 
Washington's 
testimony, the referee briefly summarized the testimony given by 
six witnesses who appeared in support of her reinstatement 
No. 
2006AP578-D   
 
13 
 
petition.  While those witnesses included Attorney Washington's 
ex-husband and one of her daughters, they also included a former 
family court commissioner before whom Attorney Washington had 
appeared on many occasions and an attorney who had litigated 
cases against Attorney Washington.  The court commissioner 
testified 
that 
Attorney 
Washington 
had 
consistently 
been 
prepared for proceedings in front of her, had provided competent 
and zealous representation to clients who were often difficult 
and unfamiliar with legal proceedings, and had never attempted 
to mislead the court on behalf of a client.  The opposing 
attorney 
and 
several 
other 
witnesses 
described 
the 
good 
reputation that Attorney Washington enjoyed in her community and 
stressed that Attorney Washington had been willing to take on 
challenging clients and those without substantial financial 
resources. 
¶25 In the end, the referee concluded that Attorney 
Washington had demonstrated the necessary moral character to 
practice law in this state and had shown that her resumption of 
the 
practice 
of 
law 
would 
not 
be 
detrimental 
to 
the 
administration of justice or subversive of the public interest. 
¶26 The referee acknowledged that there were some issues, 
described above, that militate against her reinstatement.  He 
concluded, however, that these problems were explainable and 
technical.  For example, Attorney Washington's failure to list 
the sales proceeds from a second sale of real estate was 
explainable by the fact that Attorney Washington believed that 
the proceeds were not really hers since the IRS immediately 
No. 
2006AP578-D   
 
14 
 
seized them.  Similarly, her failure to list the collection 
actions as pending lawsuits on her reinstatement questionnaire 
responses, while improper, was explainable by the fact that 
under her normal collection arrangement she was usually not made 
aware of the fact that a collection matter had proceeded to the 
litigation stage. 
¶27 The 
referee 
was 
somewhat 
troubled 
by 
Attorney 
Washington's failure to comply with the letter of the trust 
account rules.  Although she did have some records that showed 
where personal injury case proceeds had come into and had gone 
out of her client trust account, she did not maintain the 
general ledger and client ledgers in the form required by the 
rules.  
¶28 Similarly, the referee also expressed concern about 
the two postconviction motions for T.S. and A.A.  The referee 
acknowledged Attorney Washington's belief that her filing of the 
written motions and supporting materials had completed the 
representation.  While it may have been likely that no further 
briefing or argument would be required from the court regarding 
those motions, the referee noted that Attorney Washington should 
have listed those matters on her list of pending cases submitted 
to the OLR at the time of her suspension and should have given 
the required notices to her clients, opposing counsel and the 
courts since those matters were not fully completed at the time 
of her suspension.  The referee did conclude, however, that 
Attorney Washington's failure in this regard was inadvertent.  
No. 
2006AP578-D   
 
15 
 
¶29 Although he acknowledged these various problems, the 
referee did not believe that these issues were serious enough to 
prevent Attorney Washington from resuming the practice of law.  
Especially given Attorney Washington's expressions of genuine 
remorse, the referee concluded that Attorney Washington should 
be given one final opportunity to practice law in this state.  
¶30 We note at the outset of our analysis that the primary 
focus of the court's regulation of the practice of law in this 
state is to ensure the proper functioning of the state's 
judicial system and to protect the public from misconduct by 
attorneys.  See SCR ch. 21 Preamble.6  In the context of 
reinstatement proceedings, this occurs by analyzing whether the 
attorney seeking reinstatement has demonstrated that he/she has 
the necessary good moral character to practice law in this state 
and that his/her resumption of the practice of law will not be 
detrimental to the administration of justice or subversive of 
the public interest.  SCR 22.31(1).  Admittedly, these are not 
quantifiable calculations.  Thus, although this court makes the 
ultimate decision on whether to reinstate the license of any 
attorney, the referee's findings are important to the process 
because the referee is able to view the petitioning attorney and 
other witnesses in person and to assess the petitioner's remorse 
for 
past 
misconduct 
and 
commitment 
to 
avoiding 
further 
                                                 
6 The Preamble to SCR ch. 21 states:  "The lawyer regulation 
system 
is 
established 
to 
carry 
out 
the 
supreme 
court's 
constitutional responsibility to supervise the practice of law 
and protect the public from misconduct by persons practicing law 
in Wisconsin." 
No. 
2006AP578-D   
 
16 
 
misconduct.  In the present case the referee was clearly 
convinced that Attorney Washington is genuinely remorseful for 
her past misconduct and will be loathe to commit future 
misconduct.  This assessment, based upon the referee's firsthand 
view of Attorney Washington's testimony at the reinstatement 
hearing, weighs heavily in favor of Attorney Washington's 
petition. 
¶31 There are, however, some troubling issues connected 
with Attorney Washington's reinstatement petition.  First, this 
is not the first time that Attorney Washington has been 
convicted for criminal conduct.  Her first convictions, however, 
were in 1979, now nearly 30 years ago, prior to her becoming an 
attorney.  Thus, the fact of these 1979 convictions has limited 
relevance to determining her fitness to practice law in 2008.  
Moreover, Attorney Washington was subsequently pardoned for this 
conduct. 
 
While that fact does not eliminate the 1979 
convictions from our consideration, it does lessen to some 
degree the amount that those convictions should weigh against 
Attorney Washington in the present reinstatement proceeding. 
¶32 In a similar vein, it is worthwhile to note that the 
criminal activity that led to this suspension of her license to 
practice law in Wisconsin did not directly involve the practice 
of law.  Rather, it involved a matter in her personal life, her 
obligation to report her income accurately and to pay income 
taxes.  Although criminal convictions about personal matters can 
certainly 
reflect 
adversely 
on 
a 
lawyer's 
honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as an attorney and can merit a 
No. 
2006AP578-D   
 
17 
 
suspension of the lawyer's license, see SCR 20:8.4(b), such 
convictions do not always render an individual permanently unfit 
to practice law.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Meagher, 2004 WI 75, 272 Wis. 2d 247, 681 N.W.2d 145 
(reinstatement granted following six-month suspension due to 
criminal conviction for violating federal wire wagering law); In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Penn, 2002 WI 5, 249 
Wis. 2d 667, 638 N.W.2d 287 (reinstatement granted following 
two-year 
suspension 
due 
to 
criminal 
convictions 
for 
six 
misdemeanor drug offenses).  We think that is the case here, 
especially considering Attorney Washington's lack of prior 
discipline and her remorseful acceptance of responsibility for 
her misconduct. 
¶33 Attorney Washington's failure to list the October 2006 
real 
estate 
proceeds 
as 
income 
and 
to 
identify 
certain 
collection actions as pending litigation on her reinstatement 
questionnaire, while undeniably somewhat careless, do not appear 
to warrant keeping Attorney Washington from resuming the 
practice of law.  As to the real estate proceeds, the referee 
notes that the OLR appeared satisfied with Attorney Washington's 
explanation that the funds were never truly in her possession.  
The OLR has not appealed from the referee's report to dispute 
this statement.   
¶34 Similarly, while Attorney Washington should have been 
more careful to investigate and list all of the pending lawsuits 
in which she was a party, the ones she failed to list were 
collection cases in which she was a plaintiff.  It is difficult 
No. 
2006AP578-D   
 
18 
 
to infer a sinister motive for hiding lawsuits in which Attorney 
Washington was seeking to collect funds owed to her.  The 
referee found that this failure to list the collection actions 
was inadvertent and technical, and due partly to the nature of 
the arrangement between Attorney Washington and the attorney who 
handled the collection matters for her.  The OLR also did not 
challenge this finding by filing an appeal, and we have no 
reason to overturn it. 
¶35 As to the A.A. and T.S. representations, we agree with 
the referee that while Attorney Washington's handling of their 
postconviction motions and her failure to notify them of her 
pending suspension were unacceptable, those matters are not 
sufficient to keep Attorney Washington out of the practice of 
law indefinitely.  The referee also notes that the time period 
within which Attorney Washington was to wind up her practice 
before the summary suspension was relatively short.  While this 
does not excuse Attorney Washington's conduct on the A.A. and 
T.S. matters, it does mitigate the severity of her deficiencies.   
¶36 Against these two relatively minor matters occurring 
during a period of personal stress when facing criminal 
penalties and a pending suspension of her license, we weigh a 
career spanning more than 17 years prior to her summary 
suspension with no previous discipline.  In that balance, the 17 
years of practice without incident provide a greater indication 
of 
Attorney 
Washington's 
ability 
and 
moral 
character 
to 
zealously represent clients in conformance with the Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  
No. 
2006AP578-D   
 
19 
 
¶37 We turn to the issue of Attorney Washington's client 
trust account records.  First, it should be noted that any 
deficiencies in her records relate to the time when she was 
still practicing and not to the period of her suspension.  
Additionally, the OLR has not filed a complaint relating to any 
trust account matters.  Moreover, while Attorney Washington did 
not fully comply with the requirement of maintaining general and 
client ledgers, she did apparently prepare and maintain some 
form of documentation to show the source and disbursement of 
client trust funds.  For example, when a personal injury case 
resolved, Attorney Washington would prepare a settlement summary 
that did show the amount of the total proceeds and how those 
proceeds were distributed.  The proceeds were then disbursed 
immediately. 
¶38 While Attorney Washington again should clearly have 
been more careful in maintaining the detailed records required 
by the client trust account rule, SCR 20:1.15, it is important 
in the context of this reinstatement proceeding to note that 
there 
is 
no 
indication 
that 
Attorney 
Washington 
ever 
misappropriated any client funds.  As the referee noted, nothing 
about the trust account recordkeeping deficiencies suggests 
dishonesty or implies that Attorney Washington placed client 
funds at risk.  Consequently, we agree with the referee's 
conclusion that the client trust account matters, while not 
insignificant, 
do 
not 
require 
the 
denial 
of 
Attorney 
Washington's reinstatement petition.  We also agree with the 
referee, however, that the need for complete and accurate client 
No. 
2006AP578-D   
 
20 
 
trust 
account 
records 
must 
be 
impressed 
upon 
Attorney 
Washington. 
 
Accordingly, 
we 
will 
condition 
Attorney 
Washington's reinstatement on her providing full trust account 
records to the OLR on a quarterly basis for a period of two 
years following her reinstatement.  This will adequately ensure 
that Attorney Washington understands her client trust account 
obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct and acts in 
conformity with those standards.  This will also protect the 
public 
from 
any 
potential 
harm 
arising 
from 
Attorney 
Washington's handling of client funds. 
¶39 Finally, we conclude that Attorney Washington should 
be required to pay the full costs of this reinstatement 
proceeding.  After the OLR filed its statement of costs, 
Attorney Washington requested an itemization of the requested 
costs and stated that she was objecting generally to the amount 
of the costs subject to her review of the itemization.  The OLR 
filed and served the requested itemization, but Attorney 
Washington did not file any further objection.  Her initial 
objection did not explain, with specificity, the reasons for her 
objection and did not state what she considered to be a 
reasonable amount of costs.  See SCR 22.24(2) ("A respondent who 
objects to a statement of costs must explain, with specificity, 
the reasons for the objection and must state what he or she 
considers to be a reasonable amount of costs.").  Because 
Attorney Washington's initial objection is clearly insufficient 
and could even be deemed to have been withdrawn since no 
objection was lodged to the itemized list of costs, we find no 
No. 
2006AP578-D   
 
21 
 
reason to deviate from our general policy to impose the full 
amount of costs on the individual attorney.  See SCR 22.24(1m).7 
¶40 IT IS ORDERED that Hazel J. Washington's license to 
practice law in Wisconsin is reinstated, effective immediately, 
upon the specific condition that she provide to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation on a quarterly basis for the two years 
following her reinstatement complete and accurate client trust 
records in compliance with SCR 20:1.15.  If Attorney Hazel J. 
Washington fails to provide such records as required above, the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation is directed immediately to inform 
this court of that fact and to request further appropriate 
action from this court. 
¶41 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order Hazel J. Washington shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs 
are not paid within the time specified, and absent a showing to 
this court of her inability to pay the costs within that time, 
the license of Hazel J. Washington to practice law in Wisconsin 
shall be suspended until further order of the court. 
¶42 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J., did not participate. 
 
                                                 
7 SCR 22.24(1m) provides, in pertinent part, "The court's 
general policy is that upon a finding of misconduct it is 
appropriate to impose all costs, including the expenses of 
counsel 
for 
the 
office 
of 
lawyer 
regulation, 
upon 
the 
respondent." 
No. 
2006AP578-D   
 
 
 
1