Title: Susanne Moye Daniel et al. v. C. Michael Moye and Barbara Moye
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1140819
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 10, 2016

Rel:11/10/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2016-2017
____________________
1140819
____________________
Susanne Moye Daniel et al.
v.
C. Michael Moye and Barbara Moye
____________________
1140820
____________________
Susanne Moye Daniel et al.
v.
C. Michael Moye and Barbara Moye
Appeals from Escambia Circuit Court
(CV-12-57; CV-12-74)
1140819, 1140820
BOLIN, Justice.
The heirs of Bessie Mae Turner and Claude Wilbur Moye
appeal from the Escambia Circuit Court's dismissal of their
claims in these separate but almost identical actions
contesting, respectively, the validity of Turner's and Moye's
wills.  We have consolidated these cases for the purpose of
writing one opinion.
Facts and Procedural History
I. The Wills
Bessie Mae Turner was born on July 17, 1914, and resided
in Escambia County.  Bessie was a widower and had no children. 
On June 3, 1994, Bessie executed a will leaving her entire
estate to a nephew, Claude Wilbur Moye. On May 17, 2010,
Bessie executed a new will and revoked all former wills.  In
the May 2010 will, Bessie left her entire estate to Claude
Michael Moye and his wife, Barbara.  She also named Michael as
the executor of the May 2010 will.  Michael was Claude's son
and Bessie's grandnephew.  Michael testified in his affidavit
that Bessie changed her will because Claude, who was 75 years
old at the time, was having some health problems and
difficulty managing his finances.  Claude was also going
2
1140819, 1140820
through a divorce.  Michael testified that Bessie owned a
certificate of deposit ("CD") in which Claude had an interest
and that Bessie did not want her interest in the CD, or any of
her property, to become entangled in Claude's divorce. 
Michael further testified that Bessie knew that Claude had his
own estate and did not need any of hers.  
Bessie died on January 17, 2012, leaving the following
individuals, in addition to Claude, as her heirs at law:
1. Ronald Higdon, a nephew;
2. Karen Higdon Krienke, a niece;
3. Kathy Higdon St. Clair, a niece;
4. Gertrude Moye Smith, a niece;
5. Gladys Moye Stanton, a niece;
6. Willanette Moye Troutman, a niece;
7. Alan Helton, a grandnephew;
8. Linda Helton Farr, a grandniece; and 
9. Roger Helton, a grandnephew.
Claude was a resident of Escambia County and had been
married several times. Those marriages produced four children
in addition to Michael: Susanne Moye Daniel, Mishalene Moye
Coker, Garry Duff Moye, and Sherrin Moye Thomas.  Michael and
3
1140819, 1140820
Barbara lived in a mobile home located in Claude's backyard. 
Michael testified that he and Barbara visited with Claude on
a daily basis and talked to him several times a day. Michael
stated that Claude was "hardly ever out of [their] sight" and
that none of his siblings had ever enjoyed as close of a
relationship with Claude as he had.
On March 10, 2010, Claude executed his will.  Although
Claude made provisions in the will for all of his children,
the will substantially favored Michael.  Claude also named
Michael the executor of the will.  On February 9, 2012, Claude
fell critically ill and subsequently died on February 26,
2012. 
On February 11, 2012, Michael petitioned the Probate
Court of Escambia County to admit Bessie's will to probate. 
Despite the existence of numerous other heirs at law of
Bessie's, Michael represented in the verified petition to
admit the will to probate that he and his wife Barbara were
Bessie's only heirs and next of kin. Both Michael and Barbara
signed a waiver of notice of the petition to probate the will. 
On February 14, 2012, the probate court entered an order
4
1140819, 1140820
admitting the will to probate and issued Michael letters
testamentary.
On March 28, 2012, Michael petitioned the probate court
to admit Claude's will to probate and to issue letters
testamentary.  On June 26, 2012, the probate court entered an
order admitting Claude's will to probate and issuing letters
testamentary to Michael.    
II. The Challenges to the Wills
A. Claude's Will (Case No. 1140819)
On June 26, 2012, the same date the probate court
admitted Claude's will to probate and issued letters
testamentary, Susanne Moye Daniel, a daughter of Claude's and
an heir and distributee under the will, filed in the probate
court pursuant to § 12-11-41, Ala. Code 1975, a document
entitled "Petition for Removal to Circuit Court," alleging
that Claude's estate could be better administered in the
circuit court in light of her belief that Claude lacked the
requisite testamentary capacity at the time he executed his
March 10, 2010, will and/or that Claude was under the undue
influence of Michael, thereby rendering the will void and
unenforceable.  The petition seeking removal of Claude's
5
1140819, 1140820
estate from the probate court to the circuit court was
designated as a "Petition for Removal to Circuit Court"; was
captioned and designated as being "In the Probate Court for
Escambia County, Alabama"; stated the title of the case as
"Estate of Claude Wilbur Moye, deceased"; and set forth the
case number as 1712.  The petition seeking removal of Claude's
estate from the probate court to the circuit court also
provided that the filing fee payable to the "Circuit Court of
Escambia County" was being submitted with the document.  The
probate court did not enter any order with regard to this
petition.  
On that same day, an identical copy of the same petition
seeking removal of Claude's estate from the probate court to
the circuit court, along with the contents of the probate
court's file, was subsequently stamped filed and scanned into
the circuit court clerk's office files.   The circuit clerk
1
assigned the matter case no. CV-2012-57. 
Michael states that a member of the probate court's staff
1
simply walked the "Petition for Removal to Circuit Court,"
along with the contents of the probate court's file, to the
circuit court clerk's office, where the petition and the
contents of the probate court's file were stamped filed and
scanned into the circuit court clerk's office files.   
6
1140819, 1140820
On June 29, 2012, Michael responded to the petition to
remove Claude's estate to the circuit court, admitting that
Claude's estate could be better administered in the circuit
court; denying that Claude lacked the requisite testamentary
capacity when he executed his March 10, 2010, will; and
denying that he had exerted any undue influence upon Claude in
making the will.  Michael's response to the petition for
removal of Claude's estate to the circuit court was stamped
filed in both the probate court and the circuit court and was
designated as being "In the Probate Court of Escambia County,
Alabama." Michael stated that he filed the response to the
petition for removal in the probate court because that is
where the petition for removal to the circuit court was
originally filed.  Michael contends that, without his consent
or the consent of his attorneys and without notice to him or
his attorneys, a member of the probate court's staff walked
his response to the petition for removal to the circuit court
clerk's office, where it was stamped filed. Although the
circuit court never entered an order removing Claude's estate
to that court, the parties and the matter moved forward in
that court.
7
1140819, 1140820
On August 7, 2012, Susanne, Mishalene, Garry, and Sherrin
(hereinafter sometimes collectively referred to as "the
contestants of Claude's will") filed in the circuit court a
petition contesting the validity of Claude's will.  The
petition was styled "In Re: The Estate of Claude Wilbur Moye,
Deceased" and provided:
"Come now Susanne Moye Daniel, Mishalene Moye
Coker, Garry Duff and Sherrin Moye Thomas, each an
heir at law and next of kin of decedent herein, by
and through counsel, and set forth within the
Petition contesting the validity of the purported
Last Will and Testament of Claude Wilbur Moye,
deceased, on the basis that decedent lacked the
requisite testamentary capacity on the date of his
purported execution thereof on March 10, 2010,
and/or that decedent was under the undue influence
of Claude Michael Moye and/or Barbara Moye, thereby
rendering said Will void and unenforceable, pursuant
to Ala. Code [1975,] § 43-8-190, et seq.  It is
hereby further set forth as follows:
"1. Upon information and belief, decedent 
was of unsound mind as of March 10, 2010,
as he had for a period of time prior
thereto suffered from dementia, and/or a
cerebral vascular accident (i.e., stroke)
and/or traumatic head injury, all of which
negatively affected his rational thought
processes.  Accordingly, decedent lacked
sufficient testamentary capacity under
Alabama law.
"2. In addition, upon information and
belief, Claude Michael Moye and/or his
wife, 
Barbara 
Moye, 
exerted 
undue 
influence
and/or coercion upon the decedent and/or
8
1140819, 1140820
misled him in the course of the subject
Will's 
preparation 
and/or 
execution. 
Accordingly, such Will is due to be
invalidated under applicable Alabama law.
"Wherefore, Petitioners pray that the within
matter be placed on the jury docket of this
Honorable Court; they further pray that the
aforesaid Will be declared invalid; and they pray
for such other, further, and different relief to
which they [may] be entitled."
  
The petition contesting Claude's will was served upon the
attorney of record for Michael. 
On August 9, 2012, Michael and Barbara (hereinafter
sometimes collectively referred to as "the proponents of
Claude's will") filed their answer to the petition contesting
the validity of Claude's will, admitting that the will had
been admitted to probate in the probate court, denying that
Claude lacked testamentary capacity at the time he executed
the will, and further denying that they had exerted undue
influence over Claude.
On August 9, 2012, the contestants of Claude's will
amended their petition contesting the validity of Claude's 
will to delete Sherrin as a petitioner, noting that she
"wishes to remain a party ... as an interested and/or
necessary and/or indispensable party ... pursuant to Rule 19,
9
1140819, 1140820
Ala. R. Civ. P., but does not wish to join her other three
siblings ... as a contestant with respect to the validity" of
Claude's will or with respect to any other adversarial
allegations against Michael and Barbara.  The contestants of
Claude's will  also added a claim alleging that Michael and
2
Barbara, through undue influence, had "availed themselves of
certain assets of decedent during his life to the exclusion
and/or financial detriment of his other four adult children." 
Among the relief requested by the contestants of Claude's will
in their amended petition, they asked "that the Letters
Testamentary issued unto Claude Michael Moye be rescinded and
a successor Personal Representative be duly appointed" and
that an accounting be ordered with respect to the inter vivos
transfers from Claude to Michael and Barbara as the result of
the alleged undue influence. Service of process was requested
in the amended petition to be made upon Barbara but not
Michael.  
The proponents of Claude's will answered the amended
petition contesting the validity of Claude's will admitting
that the will had been admitted to probate,  generally denying
From this point on, the term "the contestants of Claude's
2
will" refers to Susanne, Mishalene, and Garry.
10
1140819, 1140820
the substantive allegations that Claude lacked testamentary
capacity and that they had exercised undue influence over him
and stating that the petition contesting the validity of
Claude's will failed to state a cause of action upon which
relief could be granted. For approximately the next 18 months
the parties engaged in extensive and contentious 
discovery and
litigation.
On February 24, 2014, the contestants of Claude's will
petitioned the circuit court pursuant to § 43-2-293, Ala. Code
1975, seeking again to remove Michael from his position as the
personal representative of Claude's estate and alleging that
Michael had shown by his conduct that he was not a suitable
person to have charge and control of Claude's estate. 
Specifically, the contestants of Claude's will alleged that
Michael had taken action that was openly hostile to Claude's
beneficiaries and/or heirs at law in a separate will contest
involving Bessie's will.   The contestants of Claude's will
3
stated that Michael and Barbara had attempted to deprive
Claude's heirs of property they may be rightfully entitled to
The will contest involving Bessie's will is discussed in
3
detail in Part II.B. of the "Discussion" section of this
opinion, infra.
11
1140819, 1140820
inherit.  Claude was an heir at law to Bessie's estate because
he was living at the time of Bessie's death. Thus, the
contestants to Claude's will stand potentially to 
benefit 
from
Bessie's estate if her will of May 17, 2010, in which she left
her entire estate to Michael and Barbara, is invalidated. The
contestants of Claude's will contended that because Michael
and Barbara were the sole beneficiaries under Bessie's May 17,
2010, will, Michael and Barbara had moved to dismiss the
action challenging the validity of Bessie's May 17, 2010,
will.  Therefore, the contestants of Claude's will contended
that Michael is not a suitable person to have charge and
control of Claude's estate.
On March 21, 2014, Michael filed a response in opposition
to the petition to remove him as the personal representative
of Claude's estate, arguing, among other things, that no valid
will contest was pending with regard to Claude's estate; that
he was a suitable person to have charge and control of
Claude's estate; that Bessie's will was valid and his refusal
to pursue a contest of that will does not constitute
misconduct; that the contestants of Claude's will were not
heirs and next of kin of Bessie's, nor were they named in her
12
1140819, 1140820
will; and that, if the contestants of Claude's will were
dismissed as contestants of Bessie's will, their dismissal
would not effect the contest of Bessie's will, which was also
brought by others who are the real parties in interest.
On May 20, 2014, the proponents of Claude's will moved
the circuit court to strike all pleadings purporting to
initiate or be part of a "will contest" and to dismiss the
will contest, stating that no proper will contest was pending
in the circuit court and that the circuit court had no
jurisdiction over a will contest in this case.  The proponents
of Claude's will argued in their brief in support of their
petition to dismiss the will contest that the petition and the
amended petition challenging the validity of Claude's will
failed to satisfy pleading requirements for a will contest in
that they contained no instructions or information 
with regard
to service of process and failed to name adverse parties upon
whom service of process could have been made. O n  J u n e  2 3 ,
2014, the contestants of Claude's will filed a motion in
opposition to the motion to strike all pleadings purporting to
initiate a "will contest" and a motion to dismiss arguing,
among other things,  that the motion to strike was untimely;
13
1140819, 1140820
that the proponents of Claude's will had waived any
jurisdictional challenge or insufficiency of process by
failing to raise the issue in their first responsive pleading;
and that the petition and the amended petition challenging the
validity of Claude's will adequately asserted a claim
contesting Claude's will.
Following a hearing on the motion filed by the proponents
of Claude's will to strike all pleadings purporting to
initiate a "will contest" and to dismiss the will contest for
lack of jurisdiction, the circuit court, on April 1, 2015,
entered a lengthy and detailed order in which it  made
findings of fact and conclusions of law and determined that it
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the challenge to the
validity of Claude's will.  The circuit court stated, in part:
"This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over the Contestants' purported will contest.  There
was no valid transfer of a will contest from probate 
court to the circuit court under §§ 43-8-190  and 
-198[, Ala. Code 1975,] and there was no valid
complaint contesting the validity of Claude Wilbur
Moye's Last Will and Testament filed in this Court. 
This Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction
under § 43-8-198 via transfer.  This Court does not
have subject matter jurisdiction under § 12-11-41[,
Ala. Code 1975,] because no petition for removal of
administration was filed in this Court and no order
of removal has been entered by this Court.  This
Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction
14
1140819, 1140820
under § 43-8-199[, Ala. Code 1975,] because no valid
complaint contesting the validity of the Last Will
and Testament of Claude Wilbur Moye was filed in
this Court according to the requirements listed and
identified by the Alabama Supreme Court in Simpson
[v. Jones, 460 So. 2d 1282 (Ala. 1984)]."
The contestants of Claude's will appeal.
B. Bessie's Will (Case No. 1140820)
On August 1, 2012, Bessie's heirs at law and the 
contestants of Claude’s will petitioned the probate court to
revoke the letters 
testamentary 
issued by that court, alleging
that the issuance of letters testamentary and the admission of
Bessie’s will to probate were invalid. Specifically, the
petitioners alleged that the probate court had not been
accurately informed as to the correct number and identity of
Bessie's heirs at law and that, therefore, proper notice of
the proceedings had not been provided to Bessie's heirs and
next of kin as required by § 43-8-164, Ala. Code 1975. The
petition also asserted that Michael, who had offered Bessie’s
will to probate and who had represented that he and his wife,
Barbara, were the "heirs and next of kin" of Bessie's, was
himself not a proper heir at law of Bessie's.   
4
On February 11, 2012, Michael petitioned the probate
4
court to admit Bessie’s will to probate representing that he
and Barbara were Bessie’s "heirs and next of kin." Claude,
15
1140819, 1140820
On August 9, 2012, the contestants of Claude's will
(Susanne Daniel, Mishalene Coker, and Garry Duff Moye), along
with Bessie's heirs at law and next of kin Gertrude Moye
Smith, Gladys Moye Stanton, Willanette Moye Troutman, Ronald
Higdon, Karen Higdon Krienke, and Kathy Higdon St. Clair
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "the contestants of
Bessie's will"), filed in the probate court a "Petition for
Removal to Circuit Court and Contest of Validity of Will." The
petition was captioned and designated as being "In the Probate
Court for Escambia County, Alabama"; stated the title of the
case as "In Re: The Estate of Bessie Mae Turner, Deceased";
and set forth the case number as 9695.  The "Petition for
Removal to Circuit Court and Contest of Validity of Will"
alleged:
"Comes now [the contestants of Bessie’s will],
each an heir at law and next of kin of decedent
herein ...  and set forth within the Petition for
Removal of this matter unto the Escambia County,
Alabama Circuit Court, pursuant to Ala. Code [1975],
Section 12-11-141, as amended, and submit that in
the collective opinion of the Petitioners ... the
Estate of Bessie Mae Turner, deceased, can be better
administered in said Circuit Court, particularly in
Bessie’s nephew and heir at law and Michael’s father, was
still living at the time Bessie’s will was offered and
admitted to probate; he did not die until February 26, 2012. 
 
16
1140819, 1140820
light of Petitioners' belief that decedent lacked
the requisite testamentary capacity on the date of
her purported execution of the Last Will and
Testament proffered herein by Claude Michael Moye
dated May 17, 2010, and/or that decedent was under
the undue influence of Claude Michael Moye and/or
Barbara Moye, thereby rendering said Will void and
unenforceable, pursuant to Ala. Code [1975], § 43-8-
190, et seq. It is hereby further set forth as
follows:
"1. Upon information and belief, decedent
was of unsound mind as of May 17, 2010, as
she had for a period of time prior thereto
suffered from dementia, which negatively
affected her rational thought processes.
"2. In addition, upon information and
belief, Claude Michael Moye and/or his
wife, 
Barbara 
Moye, 
exerted 
undue 
influence
and/or 
coercion 
upon 
decedent 
and/or 
misled
her in the course of the subject Will’s
preparation 
and/or 
execution. 
 
Accordingly,
such Will is due to be invalidated under
applicable Alabama law.
"Wherefore, Petitioners pray that this cause be
removed unto the Circuit Court of Escambia County,
Alabama, the base filing fee of $379 payable unto
'Circuit Court of Escambia County' being submitted
herewith; they further pray that the aforesaid Will
be declared invalid; and they pray for such other,
further and different relief to which they be
entitled."
It is important to note that the probate court, properly, did
not enter any order on the petition for removal and to contest
Bessie's will.   
17
1140819, 1140820
On August 10, 2012, a duplicate copy of the  "Petition
for Removal to Circuit Court and Contest of Validity of Will"
filed in the probate court was stamped filed in the circuit
court clerk's office.  The evidence suggests that the
5
appropriate circuit court filing fee was paid at the time the
petition was filed and that the contents of the probate
court's file were scanned into the circuit court clerk's
files. The circuit clerk assigned the matter case no. CV-2012-
74.  Later, on that same date, the contestants of Bessie's
will filed electronically in the circuit court an amended and
restated petition contesting Bessie's will. The amended
petition contesting the validity of Bessie's will was
designated as being in the "Circuit Court for Escambia County,
Alabama"  and was styled as "In Re: The Estate of Bessie Mae
Turner, Deceased."  The amended petition alleged that Bessie
lacked testamentary capacity, that Michael and Barbara had
exerted undue influence and/or coercion upon Bessie 
during 
the
course of the preparation of the will, and that the will was
Michael again states that the probate court erroneously
5
transferred the "Petition for Removal to Circuit Court and
Contest of Validity of Will," along with the contents of the
probate court's file, to the circuit court by "walking" the
petition and file to the circuit court clerk's office.       
18
1140819, 1140820
void and unenforceable pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 43-8-199
et seq.  Additionally, the amended petition asserted an
additional claim alleging that Michael and Barbara, through
undue influence, had "availed themselves of certain assets of
decedent during her life to the exclusion and/or financial
detriment of her other heirs at law and next of kin";
requested that Bessie's will be declared invalid; requested
that the letters testamentary issued to Michael be revoked and
a successor personal representative appointed; requested that
Barbara be joined as a party pursuant to Rule 19, Ala. R. Civ.
P.; and sought the recovery of assets along with a full
accounting.  Finally, service of process was requested in the
amended petition to be made upon Barbara; the amended petition
was silent as to service upon Michael.  
On August 13, 2012, Michael and Barbara (hereinafter
sometimes collectively referred to as "the proponents of
Bessie's will") filed in the circuit court a response to the
petition for removal and contest of Bessie's will, admitting
that Bessie's estate could be better administered in the
circuit court; denying that the circuit court had proper
jurisdiction of a contest of Bessie's will; denying that
19
1140819, 1140820
Bessie lacked testamentary capacity at the time she executed
the will; denying that they had exerted undue influence over
Bessie; and further stating that the petition failed to state
a cause of action for a will contest. 
On August 18, 2012, the proponents of Bessie's will filed
in the circuit court a response to the petition to rescind the
letters testamentary that had been issued to Michael,
asserting, among other things, that the proponents 
of 
Bessie's
will believed that Bessie's "heirs at law and next of kin"
were those entitled to Bessie's estate; that the proponents of
Bessie's will were the sole beneficiaries named in Bessie's
will; that the letters testamentary that had been issued to
Michael were valid and the lack of notice, if any, was a mere
irregularity and did not void the letters testamentary; that
the contestants of Claude's will, i.e., his children, were not
entitled to notice of probate of Bessie's will because they
were not Bessie's heirs at law at the time of her death; and
that Claude had had actual and/or constructive notice of the
admission of Bessie’s will to probate. 
On August 24, 2012, the proponents of Bessie's will
answered the amended and restated petition contesting the
20
1140819, 1140820
validity of Bessie's will, generally denying the allegations
in the petition and stating that the amended petition fails to
state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted.
The circuit court did not enter an order removing the
administration of Bessie's estate to that court. 
On February 5, 2014, the proponents of Bessie's will
moved the circuit court to dismiss the claims of Claude's
children challenging the validity of Bessie's will, alleging
that they lacked the standing to challenge Bessie's will.  The
proponents of Bessie's will contended that the right to
contest Bessie's will belonged to Claude, who was still living
at the time of Bessie's death, and not to his children, and
that the right to contest Bessie's will did not succeed to his
children upon his death.  
On February 24, 2014, the contestants of Bessie's will
filed their response in opposition to the motion to dismiss
their will-contest claims and amended petition to rescind the 
probate of Bessie's will, arguing that the probate of Bessie's
will was defective because Claude, along with Bessie's other
heirs at law, was denied notice of the probate of Bessie's
will as required by § 43-8-164, Ala. Code 1975.  The
21
1140819, 1140820
contestants of Bessie's will contend that the admission of
Bessie's will to probate is due to be set aside and that her
will should be reoffered for probate in compliance with the
notice provisions of § 43-8-164.  The contestants of Bessie's
will further alleged:
"Upon such vacation, Claude's heirs become
proper parties to contest Bessie's Last Will and
Testament because they are 'interested therein'
within the meaning of Ala. Code [1975,] §§ 43-8-190
and -199 (1991 Repl. Vol.), which give the right to
contest to 'any person interested therein, or by any
person, who, if the testator had died intestate,
would have been an heir or distributee of his
estate.'  Ala. Code [1975,] § 43-8-190.  Any person
interested therein includes 'any person who has an
interest in the estate disposed of, which would be
conserved by defeating the probate of the will.' 
Allen v. Pugh, [206 Ala. 10,] 89 So. 470 (Ala.
1921). The motion to dismiss accurately states that
'interested persons' are determined at the time the
will is admitted to probate, Allen v. Pugh, [206
Ala. 10, 12,] 89 So. 470, 472 (Ala. 1921), and
therefore, Claude's children would not have standing
to contest Bessie's will if it were properly
admitted to probate during Claude's lifetime. 
However, because Claude is now deceased and the will
at issue has not yet been properly probated, his
heirs at law hold an interest in that portion of
Bessie's estate which would pass to Claude by
intestate succession should Bessie's purported will
be declared invalid.  Thus, said children, indeed
would have standing to contest."
22
1140819, 1140820
The contestants of Bessie's will also alleged that the
petition contesting the validity of Bessie's will should 
remain pending regardless of the status of Claude's children,
because the remaining contestants were undisputedly Bessie's
heirs at law at the time of the defective probate of Bessie's
will. 
On April 8, 2014, the circuit court entered an order
denying the motion to dismiss the claims of Claude's children
challenging the validity of Bessie's will, stating, in part:
"Bessie Mae Turner died on January 17, 2012.  The
proponents executed a petition for probate of Will
on February 11, 2012.  The proponents were
erroneously listed as the only heirs at law and next
of kin of Bessie Mae Turner.  No notice of probate
was given to the remaining heirs at law and next of
kin of Bessie Mae Turner.  Barbara M. Moye and
Claude Michael Moye filed waivers of probate of
Will; however, no other heirs at law and next of kin
filed a waiver.  An order was entered by the Probate
Court of Escambia County on February 14, 2012,
admitting the Will of Bessie Mae Turner to probate. 
Claude Moye was never given notice of probate of the
will and he died on February 26, 2012.  Claude
Michael Moye, one of the proponents, was an heir at
law and next of kin of Claude Moye as were the
contestants Susanne Moye Daniel, Mishalene Moye
Coker, Garry Duff Moye, and Sherrin Moye Thomas. 
The proponents seek to dismiss the claims of these
contestants due to the fact that Claude Moye did not
predecease Bessie Mae Turner and that his right to
contest the Will died with him and did not succeed
to his sons and daughters. However, this argument
overlooks the fact that notice of the probate of the
23
1140819, 1140820
Will of Bessie Mae Turner was never provided to
Claude Moye prior to his death as required by
statute.  The order admitting the Will to probate
based solely on the waivers filed by the proponents 
Barbara A. Moye and Claude Michael Moye was entered
on February 14, 2012, without proper notice being
given to all of the heirs at law and next of kin. 
Since Claude Moye and the other heirs at law and
next of kin were never given notice of the probate
of the Will of Bessie Mae Turner and thereby
deprived of the opportunity to contest the Will
prior to the order admitting the Will to probate,
the proponents should not benefit from their failure
to give notice as required by statute."6
On May 21, 2014, the proponents of Bessie's will moved
the circuit court to alter, amend, or vacate its order denying
their motion to dismiss the claims of Claude's children
challenging the validity of Bessie's will.  In support of the
motion, the proponents of Bessie's will presented the
affidavit of Michael in which he testified that Claude had
actual notice of the submission of Bessie's will to probate.
That affidavit did not address the lack of notice to Bessie's
other heirs and next of kin, who were entitled to notice
pursuant to § 43-8-164 and who also are contesting Bessie's
will.  The contestants of Bessie's will filed a motion in
The circuit court made no ruling in its interlocutory
6
order on the request to revoke the letters testamentary and
set aside the probate of Bessie's will sought by the
contestants of Bessie's will.  
24
1140819, 1140820
opposition to the motion for reconsideration of the April 8,
2014, order denying the motion to dismiss, arguing that the
proponents of Bessie's will had committed fraud upon the
probate court by withholding the identity of Bessie's true
heirs at law; that there is no authority for oral notice under
§ 43-8-164; and that Claude was not competent to waive his
right to contest Bessie's will even if he had received such
notice.  It does not appear that the circuit court ruled on
that motion. 
On June 19, 2014, the proponents of Bessie's will again
moved the circuit court to dismiss the petition challenging
the validity of Bessie's will and to strike all pleadings
purporting to initiate a will contest, arguing that the
circuit 
court 
lacked 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction. 
The
proponents of Bessie's will argued that the contestants of
Bessie's will had failed to file a valid will contest in the
probate court that could be transferred to the circuit court
because the petition contesting the validity of Bessie's will
was filed after Bessie's will had been admitted to probate
and, thus, did not meet the requirements of § 43-8-190, Ala.
Code 1975; that there was no petition for removal filed in the
25
1140819, 1140820
circuit court and no order entered by that court removing the
administration of Bessie's estate to the circuit court
pursuant to § 12-11-41;  that the contestants of Bessie's will
had failed to satisfy the pleading requirements necessary to
assert a claim contesting a will pursuant to § 43-8-199; and
that the contestants of Bessie's will alleged claim of lack of
notice of the admission of Bessie's will to probate does not
render void ab initio the judgment of the probate court
admitting Bessie's will to  probate. 
The contestants of Bessie's will filed a response in
opposition to the motion to dismiss the petition contesting
the validity of Bessie's will, arguing, among other things,
that the filing of the will-contest pleadings in the circuit
court clerk's office on August 10, 2012, was in compliance
with the requirements of § 43-8-199 and conveyed subject-
matter jurisdiction upon the circuit court.   
On June 20, 2014, the contestants of Bessie's will filed
in the circuit court an amended petition to remove the
administration of Bessie's estate to the circuit court.  The
contestants of Bessie's will alleged that Bessie's estate
26
1140819, 1140820
could be better administered in the circuit court and alleged
further:
"7. That at the time the Petition for Removal to
Circuit Court and Contest of Validity of Will was
filed in the Circuit Court, there was pending in the
Probate Court a Petition to Rescind Letters
Testamentary for Lack of Notice Unto Heirs of Law
and Next of Kin of Decedent Pursuant to Applicable
Alabama Law ....  Said petition was never ruled upon
by the Probate Court.
"8. That it appears from the Court record that
although there was no order of removal entered by
the Circuit Court, the Probate Court delivered the
Estate case file to the Circuit Court and took no
further action thereupon.
"9. That this amended petition is submitted to
secure an order of removal to vest in the Circuit
Court jurisdiction over the administration of the
Estate, which is separate and distinct from the
jurisdiction of the pending Will contest.
"10. That removal may be granted at any time
prior to final settlement of the Estate.  Code of
Alabama § 12-11-41 (1975, as amended).
"11. That there has been no final settlement of
the Estate of Bessie Mae Turner, Deceased, in the
Probate Court of Escambia County, Alabama."
The proponents of Bessie's will filed a response in opposition
to the amended petition for removal filed by the contestants
of Bessie's will, arguing that it was too late to remove the
administration of the estate from the probate court because
the probate court had "for all practical purposes ...
27
1140819, 1140820
undert[aken] steps toward a final settlement in admitting the
will to probate and granting letters." 
Following a hearing on the motion to dismiss filed by the
proponents of Bessie's will, the circuit court, on April 1,
2015, entered an order almost identical to the order entered
by the circuit court dismissing the petition contesting the
validity of Claude's will.  The circuit court determined that
it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the will contest,
finding that there had been no valid transfer of a will
contest from the probate court to the circuit court under §§
43-8-190 and -198, Ala. Code 1975; that no petition for
removal of administration had been filed in the circuit court
and no order of removal entered by the circuit court removing
the administration to that court pursuant to § 12-11-41; and
that no valid complaint contesting the validity of the
Bessie's will had been filed in the circuit court pursuant to
§ 43-8-199.
The contestants of Bessie's will appeal.
Standard of Review
28
1140819, 1140820
This Court has stated the standard of review of a ruling
on a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction as follows:
"A ruling on a motion to dismiss is reviewed
without a presumption of correctness. Nance v.
Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993). This
Court must accept the allegations of the complaint
as true. Creola Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke
Housing, L.L.C., 828 So. 2d 285, 288 (Ala. 2002).
Furthermore, in reviewing a ruling on a motion to
dismiss we will not consider whether the pleader
will ultimately prevail but whether the pleader may
possibly prevail. Nance, 622 So. 2d at 299."
Newman v. Savas, 878 So. 2d 1147, 1148-49 (Ala. 2003). We
construe all doubts 
regarding the sufficiency of the complaint
in favor of the plaintiff. Drummond Co. v. Alabama Dep't of
Transp., 937 So. 2d 56, 58 (Ala. 2006).
Discussion
  I. Claude's Will (Case No. 1140819)
A. Removal of the Administration of Claude’s Estate
The contestants of Claude's will argue that the circuit
court erred in refusing to enter an order removing the
administration of Claude's estate from the probate court to
the circuit court.  The probate court has both original and
general 
jurisdiction 
over 
matters 
relating 
to 
the
administration of an estate. § 12-13-1, Ala. Code 1975.  The
29
1140819, 1140820
circuit 
court 
may 
acquire 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction 
over 
the
administration of an estate if the administration of the
estate is properly removed from the probate court to the
circuit court pursuant to § 12-11-41.  Section 12-11-41
provides:
"The administration of 
any 
estate 
may 
be 
removed
from the probate court to the circuit court at any
time before a final settlement thereof, by any heir,
devisee, 
legatee, 
distributee, 
executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed
of any such estate, without assigning any special
equity; and an order of removal must be made by the
court, upon the filing of a sworn petition by any
such heir, devisee, legatee, distributee, executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed
of any such estate, reciting that the petitioner is
such heir, devisee, legatee, distributee, executor,
administrator or administrator with the will annexed
and that, in the opinion of the petitioner, such
estate can be better administered in the circuit
court than in the probate court." 
In order to effect the removal of an administration of an
estate from the probate court to the circuit court pursuant to
§ 12-11-41, the party seeking to remove the administration of
the estate must file in the circuit court –- after the estate
has been admitted to probate and letters testamentary or
letters of administration issued by the probate court but
before final settlement thereof -- a petition asserting that
the petitioner is "such heir, devisee, legatee, distributee,
30
1140819, 1140820
executor, 
administrator 
or 
administrator 
with 
the 
will 
annexed
and that, in the opinion of the petitioner, such estate can be
better administered in the circuit court than in the probate
court." § 12-11-41; Taylor v. Estate of Harper, 164 So. 3d 542
(Ala. 2014); Dubose v. Weaver, 68 So. 3d 814 (Ala. 2011); Ex
parte Terry, 957 So. 2d 455 (Ala. 2006); and Ex parte
McLendon, 824 So. 2d 700 (Ala. 2001).    Once a party seeking
7
to remove the administration of an estate from the probate
court to the circuit court has satisfied the pleading
requirements of § 12-11-41, the circuit court must enter an
order removing the administration of the estate from the
probate court to the circuit court.  Ex parte McLendon, supra.
The circuit court determined in its order that it lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction to enter an order of removal
pursuant to § 12-11-41 because there had been no petition for
removal filed in the circuit court and no order entered by the
circuit court removing the administration of the estate to
that court.  The circuit court stated:
This situation is not to be confused with the situation
7
in which an order of transfer of a will contest is required to
be issued by the probate court pursuant to § 43-8-198, Ala.
Code 1975, when a pending will contest is sought to be
transferred from the probate court to the circuit court.  
31
1140819, 1140820
"After the will was admitted to probate and on
the same date, June 26, 2012, Susanne filed her
Petition for Removal to Circuit Court in the Probate
Court for Escambia County, Alabama, alleging that
the estate can be better administered in the circuit
court.
"The Petition for Removal to Circuit Court also
contains a 'filed' stamp of the circuit court clerk
dated June 26, 2012.
"Contestants' original attorney in this matter
was forced to withdraw due to serious health
problem.
"Neither 
Contestants 
nor 
their 
current 
attorneys
have explained why the Petition for Removal to
Circuit Court, which states 'In the Probate Court of
Escambia County, Alabama' across the top, contains
the stamps of both the probate court and the circuit
court.  At the hearing, Contestants' counsel
represented to this Court that Contestants' original
attorney either had no memory of or could not
explain how said petition made its way to the
circuit court clerk's office.
"No order of removal has been entered by this
Court.  The plain language of § 12-11-41 states in
pertinent part that 'an order of removal must be
made by the Court.'
"....
"In this case, there was no petition for removal
filed in the circuit court and this Court has not
entered an order of removal.  More likely than not,
the probate court treated Contestants' Petition for
Removal to Circuit Court as a matter for 'transfer'
under § 43-8-198.  This Court has no subject matter
jurisdiction over the administration of an estate in
the absence of a petition filed in this Court
invoking this Court's subject matter jurisdiction. 
32
1140819, 1140820
Therefore, 
this 
Court 
lacks 
subject 
matter
jurisdiction to enter an order of removal under §
12-11-41."
The record indicates that after Claude's estate had been
opened for probate and letters testamentary issued by the
probate court, Susanne Moye Daniel, a daughter of Claude's and
both an heir and a beneficiary under Claude's will, initially
filed in the probate court the petition to remove the
administration of Claude's estate from the probate court to
the circuit court. Susanne alleged in the petition that she
was both an heir and a beneficiary under Claude's will and
that, in her opinion, Claude's estate could be better
administered in the circuit court than in the probate court.
The filing in the probate court of the petition to remove
the administration of Claude's estate from the probate court
to the circuit court was a nullity and ineffectual to invoke
the circuit court's jurisdiction over the administration of
Claude's 
estate, 
because 
§ 
12-11-41 
specifically 
requires 
that
the petition for removal of the administration of an estate
from the probate court to the circuit court be filed in the
circuit court.  See also Dubose, supra. 
33
1140819, 1140820
However, as noted above, the same petition for removal of
the administration of Claude's estate that was filed in the
probate court was also filed in the circuit court.  Although
it may not be entirely clear from the record as to how the
petition to remove the administration of Claude's estate to
the circuit court subsequently came to be filed in the circuit
court clerk's office, there is no question that the petition
to remove Claude's estate from the probate court to the
circuit court was stamped filed in that office.  The question
becomes whether the filing in the circuit court of the same
petition to remove Claude's estate from the probate court to
the circuit court that had previously been filed in the
probate court was sufficient to invoke the circuit court's
subject-matter jurisdiction over the administration of
Claude's estate.    
In Ex parte Barrows, 892 So. 2d 914 (Ala. 2004), the 
personal representative of a decedent's will petitioned the
probate court to probate the will and to issue letters
testamentary to her. The probate court admitted the will to
probate and issued the letters testamentary.  A will contest
was then filed in the probate court.  After the will-contest
34
1140819, 1140820
complaint was filed in the probate court, the contestant filed
a copy of the will-contest complaint in the circuit court. 
The word "probate" had been marked through and the word
"circuit" inserted in its place in the style of the complaint. 
The circuit court cover sheet was submitted with the
complaint.  The circuit court docket fee for filing the
complaint was submitted approximately a week later. The
personal representative moved 
the circuit court to 
dismiss 
the
will contest; the circuit court denied the motion. The
personal representative then petitioned this Court for a writ
of mandamus. 
In denying the personal representative's petition for a
writ of mandamus, this Court held that the filing in the
circuit court of the copy of the  will-contest complaint
previously filed in the probate court properly invoked the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the circuit court to determine
the will contest.  This Court explained that, "[w]hile the
complaint appears to be a xeroxed copy of the complaint
originally filed in the probate court, the complaint properly
contains the name of the court, the title of the action, the
file number, and the designation that it is a 'complaint
35
1140819, 1140820
contesting will.' See Rule 10, Ala. R. Civ. P."  Ex parte
Barrows, 892 So. 2d at 918.  This Court additionally noted
that the signature of the contestant's attorney, although not
original, properly certified the allegations in the complaint
pursuant to Rule 11, Ala. R. Civ. P.; that a cover sheet was
properly filed pursuant to Rule 3(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.; and,
lastly, that the docket fee was timely filed.  Ex parte
Barrows, 892 So. 2d at 918.  
Here, the petition seeking the removal of Claude's estate
from the probate court to the circuit court that was filed in
the circuit court after first being filed in the probate court
contains the title of the action, the case number, and was 
designated as a "Petition for Removal to Circuit Court."  The
petition further contains the signature of Daniel's attorney,
and the record indicates that the circuit court docket fee was
paid.  
Although the petition first contained the reference to
the probate court rather than the circuit court at the time it
was filed in the circuit court, this misstatement is not fatal
to the invocation of the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
circuit court. The petition cited § 12-11-41 as the basis for
36
1140819, 1140820
removal, clearly designated that it was a "Petition for
Removal to Circuit Court," and contained the requisite
language to effect a removal of the administration of the
estate to the circuit court.  The petition, along with the
contents of the probate court's file, was stamped filed, was
assigned a case number, and was scanned into the circuit court
clerk's files.  Although it is always better practice to
include the name of the proper court on a pleading as required
by Rule 10(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., the contents of the pleading
here made it clear that the circuit court was the proper court
in which to file the pleading, and the circuit court clerk
managed to establish a file for the administration of Claude’s
estate based on what was filed. See generally Ex parte
Higgins, 423 So. 2d 227 (Ala. 1982).  See also Noe v. Noe, 679
So. 2d 1057 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995)(holding that the
jurisdiction of the circuit court was invoked by filing a copy
of a complaint for a will contest that had been previously
filed in the probate court). 
Assuming that the petition was simply "walked" over to
the circuit court clerk's office, as the proponents of
Claude's will contend, nothing prevented a member of the
37
1140819, 1140820
probate court clerk's staff from delivering the pleading to
the circuit court as a courtesy to the contestants of Claude's
will, and, because the document included the attorney's
signature and was accompanied by the requisite filing fee,
doing so did not make the filing of the petition in the
circuit court any less effective, because the filing of a
pleading is deemed completed when that pleading is received by
the clerk of the court. See Rule 5(e), Ala. R. Civ. P. ("The
filing of papers with the court as required by these rules
shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the court
...."); Rubin v. Department of Indus. Relations, 469 So. 2d
657, 658 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) ("'[A] pleading or other paper
may be said to have been duly filed when it is delivered to
the proper filing officer.'" (quoting Covington Bros. Motor
Co. v. Robinson, 239 Ala. 226, 229, 194 So. 663, 666 (1940))).
Based on the forgoing, we conclude that a petition
seeking the removal of Claude’s estate was filed in the
circuit court clerk’s office and that the petition satisfied
the pleading requirements of § 12-11-41. Once a party has
satisfied the pleading requirements of § 12-11-41, the 
circuit
court 
is 
required 
to 
enter 
an 
order 
removing 
the
38
1140819, 1140820
administration of the estate from the probate court to the
circuit court, and the circuit court erred in failing to do
so.  Ex parte McLendon, supra.  Therefore, we order the
circuit court on remand to enter an order removing the
administration of Claude's estate from the probate court to
the circuit court.  Once the circuit court enters an order
removing the administration of Claude's estate from the
probate court to the circuit court, the circuit court will
obtain proper jurisdiction over the general administration of
Claude's estate.
B. The Will Contest
The contestants of Claude’s will next argue that the
circuit court erred in dismissing their complaint contesting
the validity of Claude’s will based on its conclusion that it
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the will contest.8
The circuit court couched its conclusions in terms
8
indicating 
that 
it 
lacked 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction 
over 
the
will contest in this case.  Section 43-8-199 clearly grants
the circuit courts of this state subject-matter jurisdiction
over certain will contests.  As a point of clarity, the
dispositive question presented is whether the pleading
requirements were sufficiently met to invoke the subject-
matter jurisdiction of the circuit court.  "[T]he prospect of
failure of a claim on such grounds certainly does not deprive
the circuit court 
of 
the subject-matter jurisdiction to decide
whether a claim properly presented to it does in fact find
support in the law and in the facts."  Ex parte Scottsdale
39
1140819, 1140820
Jurisdiction to entertain a will contest in Alabama is
conferred upon both the probate court and the circuit court by
statute. Forrester v. Putnam, 409 So. 2d 773 (Ala. 1982). "'In
Alabama, a will may be contested in two ways: (1) under §
43-8-190, Ala. Code 1975, before probate, the contest may be
instituted in the probate court or (2) under § 43-8-199, Ala.
Code 1975, after probate and within six months thereof, a
contest may be instituted by filing a complaint in the circuit
court of the county in which the will was probated.'"  Bond v.
Pylant, 3 So. 3d 852, 854 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Stevens v.
Gary, 565 So. 2d 73, 74 (Ala. 1990)(emphasis added)). In the
present case, the contestants of Claude’s will did not contest
Claude’s will in the probate court before the will was
admitted to probate. Rather, they filed their petition
contesting the validity of Claude’s will in the circuit court
after the will had been admitted to probate.  Thus, §
43-8-199, Ala. Code 1975, is applicable to this case. See
Bond, supra.
Section 43-8-199 provides:
Ins. Co., 180 So. 3d 1, 1 (Ala. 2015) (Murdock, J., concurring
specially).
40
1140819, 1140820
"Any person interested in any will who has not
contested the same under the provisions of this
article, may, at any time within the six months
after the admission of such will to probate in this
state, contest the validity of the same by filing a
complaint in the circuit court in the county in
which such will was probated."  
9
As mentioned above, the circuit court dismissed the petition
contesting the validity of Claude’s will after 
concluding 
that
it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction of the will
contest under § 43-8-199, because no valid complaint
contesting the validity of Claude’s will had been filed in
accordance with the terms set forth by the Court in Simpson v.
Jones, 460 So. 2d 1282 (Ala. 1984).  The circuit court set
forth the following conclusions in its order: 
"The second way in which a will contest may make
its way to the circuit court is by the filing of a
complaint in the circuit court after a will has been
admitted to probate pursuant to § 43-8-199.
"'§ 43-8-199. Contest in circuit court
after admission to probate – Generally
See the special writing in Byrd v. Bentley, [Ms. 1150495,
9
August 26, 2015] __ So. 3d __, __ (Ala. 2016) (Bolin, J.,
concurring specially), noting that there are currently four
counties in Alabama -- Mobile, Jefferson, Shelby, and Pickens
-- in which the probate courts have been vested with
concurrent equitable estate jurisdiction with the circuit
court to try will contests after a will has been admitted to
probate.  
41
1140819, 1140820
"'Any person interested in any will
who has not contested the same under the
provisions of this article, may, at any
time within the six months after the
admission of such will to probate in this
state, contest the validity of the same by
filing a complaint in the circuit court in
the 
county 
in 
which 
such 
will 
was
probated.'
"Because the right to contest a will is
conferred 
by 
statute, 
strict 
compliance 
is
mandatory.
"'Because will contest jurisdiction is
statutorily conferred, proceedings under §
43–8–190 and § 43–8–199 must comply exactly
with the terms of the applicable statute.
"It is familiar law in Alabama, the only
way to quicken into exercise a statutory
and limited jurisdiction is by pursuing the
mode prescribed by the statute." Ex parte
Pearson, 241 Ala. 467, 469, 3 So. 2d 5, 6
(1941). Section 43–8–199 mandates that, in
order to commence a valid contest of a will
already admitted to probate, a person with
an interest in the will file a complaint in
circuit court and "quicken" that court's
jurisdiction of the contest.'
"Simpson v. Jones, 460 So. 2d 1282, 1284 (Ala.
1984).  See also, Kelley v. English, 439 So. 2d 26
(Ala. 1983); Bond v. Pylant, 3 So. 3d 852 (Ala.
2008); Ex part Barrows, 892 So. 2d 914 (Ala. 2004);
Ex parte Floyd, 105 So. 3d 1193 (Ala. 2012).
"Proponents argue that Contestants' Petition
Contesting Validity of Will and the amended petition 
do not meet the requirements for a complaint
contesting the validity of a will under § 43-8-199.
42
1140819, 1140820
"Section 43-8-199 prescribes the requirements
for a complaint contesting the validity of a will in
the circuit court.  Obviously, the complaint must be
filed in the circuit court within six months after
the will is admitted to probate.  Contestants'
Petition Contesting Validity of Will and the
amendment were filed in this Court within six months
after the Last Will and Testament of Claude Wilbur
Moye was admitted to probate.  Proponents do not
argue that the Petition Contesting Validity of Will
and the amendment were filed too late, but rather
they argue that these pleadings do not meet the
statutory 
requirements 
for 
a 
valid 
complaint
contesting a will. 
"....
"The elements of a complaint contesting a will
pursuant to § 43-8-199 have been identified and
listed by the Alabama Supreme Court.
"'Commencement of an action under §
43–8–199, then, is the commencement of a
statutory, 
adversarial 
proceeding.
Simpson's pleading did not comply with the
requirements of § 43–8–199, nor did it
initiate a contest in an adversarial
posture. Therefore, the filing of that
document, first with the probate court and
then with the circuit court, did not
operate to toll the running of the
six-months statute of limitations.
"'While defects in the form of a
pleading may be remedied by amendment, the
deficiencies 
in 
Simpson's 
"contest"
document go beyond mere form. Nowhere in
Simpson's initial pleading do we find
allegations of the substantive material
required by § 43–8–199; i.e., that Simpson
had an interest in Miss Simpson's will;
that Simpson had not theretofore contested
43
1140819, 1140820
the will under other provisions of the
article; that Miss Simpson's will had been
previously admitted to probate in Alabama;
or that Simpson's pleading was a complaint
filed within six months of the probate of
the will to be contested.
"'Further, in his "contest" pleading,
Simpson failed to name adverse parties --
either actual or fictitious -– upon whom
service could have been made, informing
them of the action pending against them.
This is tantamount to an express direction
to the clerk of the circuit court to
withhold service of process, which, we have
held, is an indication of the absence of a
bona fide intention of immediate service,
without which there could not have been the
valid filing of Simpson's pleading. Hence,
the statute of limitations was not tolled. 
Ward v. Saben Appliance Co., 391 So. 2d
1030 (Ala. 1980).'
"Simpson, 460 So. 2d at 1285.
"Proponents argue that Contestants' Petition
Contesting Validity of Will and the amendment do not
initiate an adversarial proceeding.  It is apparent
from Contestants' probate filings that they waited
until the invalid transfer of the probate file to
the circuit court to obtain a circuit court case
number prior to filing their Petition Contesting
Validity of Will and the amendment.  Contestants did
not change the style of their cause from their
probate 
filings 
to 
reflect 
an 
adversarial
proceeding.  No plaintiffs are named and no
defendants are named in the style.  Based on the
passage from Simpson quoted above, a valid will
contest 
initiates 
an 
adversarial 
proceeding. 
Whether an adversarial proceeding is initiated can
usually be determined by simply reading the style of
the 
case 
in 
which 
plaintiffs/petitioners/contestants
44
1140819, 1140820
and 
defendants/respondents/proponents 
are
identified.  The style of Contestants' Petition
Contesting Validity of Will and the amendment does
not provide such information; thus, it does not
initiate and provide notice of an adversarial
proceeding.
"Contestants' Petition Contesting Validity of
Will and amendment do allege that Contestants have
an interest in the will of Claude Wilbur Moye. 
Contestants assert that 'each [is] an heir at law
and next of kin of decedent.'  This type of
allegation is tantamount to alleging an 'interest in
the will.'
"The next item in the Simpson list is an
allegation that contestants have 'not theretofore
contested the will under other provisions of the
article.' 
 
There 
is 
no 
such 
allegation 
in
Contestants' Petition Contesting Validity of Will
and the amendment.  Whether the will has been
contested beforehand is a jurisdictional fact. If
the will has been contested in the probate court,
then, as explained above, the contest can come into
the circuit court only via the transfer statute. 
"The Simpson list next requires an allegation
that the 'will had been previously admitted to
probate in Alabama.'  If a will has not been
admitted to probate, then the only way the circuit
court can obtain jurisdiction of a will contest is
via a transfer pursuant to § 43-8-198 of a will
contest initiated in the probate court prior to
admission to probate pursuant to § 43-8-190.  A will
may be contested in the probate court prior to its
admission to probate.  After a will's admission to
probate, a contest must be filed in the circuit
court.  The existence or non-existence of a prior
will contest in the probate court and the admission
of the will to probate are important jurisdictional
facts which do not appear in Contestants' Petition
Contesting Validity of Will and the amendment.
45
1140819, 1140820
"Next, the Simpson list requires an allegation
that the pleading is 'a complaint filed within six
months of the probate of the will to be contested.' 
Contestants' Petition Contesting Validity of Will
and amendment do not look like complaints and do not
inform the Court or anyone else that it is filed
within six months of the probate of Claude Wilbur
Moye's Last Will and Testament.  Again, the latter
is a jurisdictional fact that is lacking.
"The Simpson court further addresses the
adversarial posture of a will contest by determining
whether the pleading at issue names adverse parties. 
Although Proponents Mike and Barbara Moye are
identified in the body of the Contestants' Petition
Contesting Validity of Will and amendment, as
discussed above, the style of the case does not
identify them as defendants or proponents. 
"Moreover, as the Simpson court emphasized,
service on adverse parties is required.  In
Contestants' Petition Contesting Validity of Will,
Contestants provide no information for service on
anyone.  In Contestants' Amended Petition Contesting
Validity of Will, Contestants identify Barbara Moye
and ask the court to serve her at page 4.  The
Circuit Court Clerk's office obliged and served
Barbara Moye with Contestants' Amended Petition
Contesting Validity of Will.  A return on service on
Barbara Moye is included in the court file.
"However, Mike Moye was not served because the
identities of defendants or proponents 'upon whom
service could have been made' are not readily
determined from the style of the pleadings and
Contestants did not direct the clerk's office to
serve Mike as they did with respect to Barbara. 
Mike has never been served with any pleading
purporting to be a will contest filed pursuant to §
43-8-199.  This is the antithesis of a complaint
filed against him.
46
1140819, 1140820
"....
"This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over the Contestants' purported will contest.  There
was no valid transfer of a will contest from probate 
court to the circuit court under §§ 43-8-190 and -198
and there was no valid complaint contesting the
validity of Claude Wilbur Moye's Last Will and
Testament filed in this Court.  This Court does not
have subject matter jurisdiction under § 43-8-198 via
transfer.  This Court does not have subject matter
jurisdiction 
under 
§ 12-11-141 because no 
petition 
for
removal of administration was filed in this Court and
no order of removal has been entered by this Court. 
This Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction
under 
§ 
43-8-199 
because 
no valid complaint contesting
the validity of the Last Will and Testament of Claude
Wilbur Moye was filed in this Court according to the
requirements listed and identified by the Alabama
Supreme Court in Simpson."
The contestants of Claude’s will argue that they satisfied
all 
the statutory requirements 
of 
§ 
43-8-199 
in 
their 
pleadings. 
The proponents of Claude’s will adopt on appeal the analysis and
conclusions of the circuit court.  This Court has stated:
"Because 
will 
contest 
jurisdiction 
is 
statutorily
conferred, proceedings under ... § 43–8–199 must
comply exactly with the terms of the applicable
statute. 'It is familiar law in Alabama, the only way
to quicken into exercise a statutory and limited
jurisdiction is by pursuing the mode prescribed by the
statute.' Ex parte Pearson, 241 Ala. 467, 469, 3 So.
2d 5, 6 (1941). Section 43–8–199 mandates that, in
order to commence a valid contest of a will already
admitted to probate, a person with an interest in the
will file a complaint in circuit court and 'quicken'
that court's jurisdiction of the contest.
47
1140819, 1140820
"We recognize that § 43–8–199 was enacted to
provide an additional opportunity for contesting a
will already admitted to probate.  Carter v. Davis,
275 Ala. 250, 154 So. 2d 9 (1963). Furthermore, the
dismissal of a complaint is not proper if the pleading
contains 'even a generalized statement of facts which
will support a claim for relief under [Ala. R. Civ.
P.] 8' (Dunson v. Friedlander Realty, 369 So. 2d 792,
796 (Ala. 1979)), because '[t]he purpose of the
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure is to effect justice
upon the merits of the claim and to renounce the
technicality 
of 
procedure.'  Crawford v. 
Crawford, 
349
So. 2d 65, 66 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977). See, also,
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 121, 85 S. Ct.
234, 244, 13 L. Ed.2d 152 (1964).
"We cannot, however, ignore the ultimate goal of
pleadings under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure:
to provide fair notice to adverse parties of the claim
against them and the grounds upon which it rests.
Dempsey v. Denman, 442 So. 2d 63 (Ala. 1983); Carter
v. Calhoun County Board of Education, 345 So. 2d 1351
(Ala. 1977). The liberality with which the Rules are
construed, then, must be balanced against the
requisites of fair notice to adverse parties and
strict 
adherence 
to 
statutorily 
prescribed
procedures." 
Simpson, 460 So. 2d at 1284-85.
In Simpson, supra, the case primarily relied on by the
circuit court and the proponents of Claude's will, the will and
two codicils of Miss Martha Simpson were admitted to probate on
November 10, 1982. The contestant of Miss Simpson’s will and
codicils filed with the probate court on May 9, 1983, a document
entitled "Contest of Will of Martha Simpson ... and First
48
1140819, 1140820
Codicil ... and Second Codicil." The heading of the document
indicated that it was filed "In the Probate Court," and, as
relief, the document sought to have the probate of the contested
will denied and further sought to have the purported post-
admission will contest "transferred" from the probate court to
the circuit court.  Initially, and importantly, we note that,
just as in the proceeding herein, the Simpson will and codicils
had been admitted to probate without a challenge. Section 43-8-
190 provides for a contest before a will is admitted to probate,
and § 43-8-198, Ala. Code 1975, which must be read in tandem
therewith, provides for the "transfer" of a pre-admission
contest, properly ordered by the probate court, to the circuit
court. However, the Simpson matter concerned the attempted
transfer of a post-admission contest to the circuit court -– a
procedure not provided for under Alabama probate law and not
authorized as relief available from the probate court and
different from the factual scenario herein; additionally, the
Simpson case did not involve the attempted removal of the
"administration of the estate" to circuit court. The contestant
alleged as grounds for relief that the decedent suffered from
"mental 
incompetence, 
physical 
weakness, 
and 
lack 
of
49
1140819, 1140820
testamentary capacity, and that coercion, undue influence, and
restraint had been exerted on Miss Simpson to procure her will
and the codicils."  460 So. 2d at 1284.  The document failed to
name, or otherwise to identify the respondents, nor did the
document 
state, 
or 
otherwise 
identify, 
the 
contestant's 
interest
in the will.  After the document and a copy of it were stamped
"filed" 
in 
the probate court, the 
contestant's 
attorney 
took 
the
original document and filed it with the circuit court. Simpson,
supra.
On May 16, 1983, the contestant filed with the circuit
court a document entitled "Removal of Contest of Will from
Probate Court to Circuit Court in the Contest of the Will of
Martha Simpson ... 
and 
First 
Codicil 
... 
and 
Second Codicil...." 
460 So. 2d at 1284.  The contestant purported to amend the
original document by (1) alleging his entitlement to a share of
the estate by virtue of his being a great-nephew of Miss
Simpson, and (2) demanding that the will "be declared void, and
that said [post-admission] contest be transferred from the
Probate Court ... to the Circuit Court...."  460 So. 2d at 1284 
(bracketed 
language 
and 
emphasis added). On October 
5, 
1983, 
the
contestant provided the circuit court with the names and
50
1140819, 1140820
addresses of those parties upon whom service of a summons and
the alleged "complaint" was to be made. Service was perfected
on all specified respondents.  The circuit court entered a final
order granting the motion to dismiss and to strike the pleadings
filed by the proponents of the will finding  that "the defects
in the [original] document cannot be cured by amendment ... and
ordered that the documents be returned to the probate court." 
Simpson, supra.
In 
affirming 
the 
circuit court's dismissal of 
the 
purported
contest action, this Court stated:
"Commencement of an action under § 43–8–199 ...
is the commencement of a statutory, adversarial
proceeding. 
[The 
contestant's] 
pleading 
did 
not 
comply
with the requirements of § 43–8–199, nor did it
initiate a contest in an adversarial posture.
Therefore, the filing of that document, first with the
probate court and then with the circuit court, did not
operate to toll the running of the six-month[] statute
of limitations.
"While defects in the form of a pleading may be
remedied by amendment, the deficiencies in [the
contestant's] 'contest' document go beyond mere form.
Nowhere in Simpson's initial pleading do we find
allegations of the substantive material required by §
43–8–199; i.e., that [the contestant] had an interest
in Miss Simpson's will; that [the contestant] had not
theretofore contested the will under other provisions
of the article; that Miss Simpson's will had been
previously admitted to probate in Alabama; or that
[the contestant's] pleading was a complaint filed
51
1140819, 1140820
within six months of the probate of the will to be
contested.
"Further, in his 'contest' pleading, [the
contestant] failed to name adverse parties –- either
actual or fictitious -- upon whom service could have
been made, informing them of the action pending
against them. This is tantamount to an express
direction to the clerk of the circuit court to
withhold service of process, which, we have held, is
an indication of the absence of a bona fide intention
of immediate service, without which there could not
have been the valid filing of [the contestant's]
pleading. Hence, the statute of limitations was not
tolled.  Ward v. Saben Appliance Co., 391 So. 2d 1030
(Ala. 1980).
"[The contestant] argues that, under [Ala.] R.
Civ. P. 3, the filing of a complaint alone constitutes
commencement of the action. We disagree. Assuming,
arguendo, that Simpson's pleading had been a properly
drafted complaint, the filing of that pleading is not
the sole factor to consider in determining whether
there has been the commencement of an action under the
rules. In Freer v. Potter, 413 So. 2d 1079 (Ala.
1982), the plaintiff argued that the filing of the
complaint constituted initiation of the action. There
the court held:
"'While this is generally the case, such
filing calls for an implied demand for
immediate service. When, as here, the
plaintiff 
intentionally 
interferes 
with 
this
service 
by 
ordering 
that 
service 
be
withheld, 
then 
the 
filing 
will 
not
constitute the commencement of the action,
since there is no intent to prosecute the
claim at that time.' 413 So. 2d 1081.
"The reasoning behind our holding in the instant
case was well stated by Justice Maddox in Ward v.
Saben, supra. There, the Court found that the
52
1140819, 1140820
complaint had been filed without intention of
immediate service and, therefore, that the action had
not been commenced. The Court stated:
"'To hold otherwise would permit a party to
extend 
unilaterally 
the 
period 
of
limitations by an oral request that actual 
service be withheld, thereby giving that
party an additional period of time within
which he could conduct an investigation to
determine whether, in fact, he had a claim.
To permit this would violate the fundamental
concept of repose found within every statute
of limitations.' 391 So. 2d 1035."
460 So. 2d at 1285-86 (bracketed language added).
In addition to the distinctions noted above, the factual
circumstances presented by the case presently before this Court
differ from those presented in Simpson in several aspects. 
Initially, the contestants of Claude's will expressly state in
their petition that they are "each an heir at law and next of
kin of [the] decedent herein."  In order to satisfy the "any
person interested in any will"  requirement 
of § 43-8-199, "'[a]
contestant of a will must have some direct legal or equitable
interest in the decedent's estate, in privity with him, whether
as heir, purchaser, or beneficiary under another will, which
would be destroyed or injuriously affected by the establishment
of the contested will.'" Evans v. Waddell, 689 So. 2d 23, 27
(Ala. 1997)(quoting  Braasch v. Worthington, 191 Ala. 210, 213,
53
1140819, 1140820
67 So. 1003, 1004 (1915)).  See also Queen v. Harden, 924 So.
2d 712, 715 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005)(holding that will-contest
complaint containing an allegation that contestant was an "heir
at law" of the decedent satisfied the "any person interested in
any will" pleading  requirement of § 43-8-199).  Accordingly,
we conclude that the contestants of Claude's will satisfied the
statutory "any person interested in any will" requirement of §
43-8-199 by alleging in their petition that they each were an
heir at law of Claude's.
Second, as for the "no previous contest of the will" 
requirement under § 43-8-199, neither the original petition nor
the amended petition contesting the validity of Claude's will
expressly alleged that the contestants had not previously
contested the will.  However, we note that the circuit court had
before it the entire contents of the probate court's file, which
had previously been stamped filed and scanned into the circuit
court clerk's files, from which it is discernible that the
contestants of Claude's will had not previously filed an action
contesting the will.   See Stone v. Parish, 70 So. 3d  420, 424
10
This Court has concluded that the circuit court is
10
required 
on 
remand 
to 
enter 
an 
order 
removing 
the
administration of Claude's probate case from the 
probate 
court
to the circuit court.  
54
1140819, 1140820
(Ala. Civ. App. 2011)(holding that the circuit court had
subject-matter jurisdiction of a will contest where the
complaint contained no specific allegation that no previous
will-contest actions had been filed and the record lacked
evidence indicating that a previous will contest had been
filed). Therefore, because there was nothing in the record
indicating that either the contestants of Claude's will, or
anyone, had previously filed a will contest contesting Claude's
will, the absence of an express statement of that fact in the
complaint would not render the complaint invalid and impede the
circuit court from obtaining jurisdiction of the will contest
under § 43-8-199. 
Third, as for the statutory requirement under § 43-8-199,
that the "will had been previously admitted to probate in
Alabama," the contestants of Claude's will did not expressly
aver that the will had been previously admitted to probate.  As
noted above, however, the circuit court had before it the
contents of 
the 
probate 
court's 
file 
that 
clearly indicated that
the will had been admitted to probate in Escambia County.  Also,
the contestants of Claude's will requested in their amended
petition contesting the validity of Claude's will "that the
55
1140819, 1140820
Letters Testamentary issued unto Claude Michael Moye be
rescinded and a successor Personal Representative be duly
appointed."  Implicit in this requested prayer for relief is the 
fact that Claude's will had previously been admitted to probate
and an estate opened by the probate court.  Additionally, we
note that the proponents of Claude's will filed answers to both
the petition and the amended petition acknowledging that
Claude's will had been admitted to probate.  Accordingly, we
conclude that the statutory requirement under § 43-8-199 that
the "will had been previously admitted to probate in Alabama"
was satisfied.  
 Fourth, as for the requirement in § 43-8-199 that the will
contest be filed within six months of the admission of the will
to probate and in the same county in which the will was admitted
to probate, we note that the contestants of Claude's will failed
to expressly aver that the complaint contesting Claude's will
was filed within six months and in the same county in which the
will was admitted to probate.  Claude's will was admitted to
probate in Escambia County on June 26, 2012.  The contestants
of Claude's will filed their petition and amended petition
contesting 
the validity of Claude's 
will 
in 
the 
Escambia 
Circuit
56
1140819, 1140820
Court on August 7, 2012, and August 9, 2012, respectively, well
within the six-month period for filing a contest under § 43-8-
199.  As with the "no previous contest of the will" requirement
discussed above, the 
fact 
that 
the 
petition 
and 
amended petition
contesting the validity of Claude's will were filed in the
Escambia Circuit Court within the six-month period provided by
§ 43-8-199 is easily discernible from the record before the
court.  Stone, supra. Accordingly, we conclude the statutory
requirement that the will contest be filed in the same county
in which the will was admitted to probate and within six months
of the will being admitted to probate is satisfied. 
Finally, the contestants of Claude's will expressly
identified "Claude Michael 
Moye 
and/or 
Barbara 
Moye" 
in 
both the
original and amended petitions contesting the validity of
Claude's will and allege that they "exerted undue influence
and/or coercion upon the decedent and/or misled him" in the
making of his will and 
further alleged that they, "through undue
influence, had availed themselves of certain assets of decedent
during his life to the exclusion and/or financial detriment of
his 
other four adult children."  Although service of process was
not requested for either Michael or Barbara in the original
57
1140819, 1140820
petition contesting the validity of Claude's will filed on
August 7, 2012, service of process for Barbara was requested in
the amended petition contesting the validity of Claude's will
filed on August 9, 2012.  Both the original and amended
petitions contesting the validity of Claude's will were served
upon Michael and Barbara's attorney of record.  We further note
that Michael and Barbara answered both the original and amended
petitions contesting the validity of Claude's will without
raising an objection based on insufficiency of service of
process.  See Kingvision Pay-Per-View, Ltd. v. Ayers, 886 So.
2d 45 (Ala. 2003) (objection to insufficiency of service of
process waived where not raised initially in a Rule 12(b), Ala.
R. Civ. P., motion, an answer, or an amended answer).
Accordingly, we conclude that both the original and amended
petitions contesting the validity of Claude's will adequately
named 
Michael 
and Barbara as actual 
adverse 
parties 
and 
informed
them of the pending action against them.  
11
The proponents of Claude's will also argue that the
11
contestants of Claude's will failed to adequately plead with
particularity the circumstance upon which they alleged undue
influence.  It appears this argument is being raised for the
first time on appeal.  This Court will not consider arguments
raised for the first time on appeal.  Andrews v. Merritt Oil
Co., 612 So. 2d 409 (Ala. 1992).  The proponents of Claude's
will also argue that the contestants of Claude's will did not
58
1140819, 1140820
As stated above, the goal of pleadings under the Alabama
Rules of Civil Procedure is to provide fair notice to adverse
parties of the claims against them and the grounds upon which
those claims rest.  Simpson, supra.   The liberality with which
the pleadings are to be construed must also be balanced against
the requirement of fair notice to adverse parties and strict
adherence 
to 
statutorily 
prescribed 
procedures. 
 
Simpson, 
supra.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the contestants of
Claude's will satisfied the pleading requirements of § 43-8-199
and that the circuit erred in dismissing the will contest filed
by the contestants of Claude's will.
submit the correct filing fee when they filed their complaint
contesting the validity of Claude's will and, therefore, that
they did not satisfy a jurisdictional prerequisite to
commencing an action. De-Gas, Inc. v. Midland Res., 470 So. 2d
1218 (Ala. 1985).  Although this issue is being raised for the
first time on appeal, we address it because subject-matter
jurisdiction may not be waived and can be raised at anytime. 
Ex parte Smith, 438 So. 2d 766 (Ala. 1983); Krouse v.
Youngblood, 171 So. 3d 49 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015).  In Midland
Resources, supra, no filing fee was paid when the complaint
was filed.  Here, the contestants of Claude's will argue that,
to the extent the filing fee was miscalculated -- which claim
they do not concede -- they paid the filing fee required by
the circuit court clerk at the time the complaint was filed.
The payment of a filing fee in an incorrect amount does not
necessarily deprive the circuit court of subject-matter
jurisdiction when the party pays the requested filing fee. 
See Burgett v. Porter, 180 So. 3d 20 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015).
Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court was not
deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction in this case.
59
1140819, 1140820
C. The Inter Vivos Transfers
The contestants of Claude's will asserted in their amended
petition contesting the validity of Claude's will a claim
alleging that the proponents of Claude's will, through undue
influence, 
had 
"availed 
themselves 
of 
certain 
assets 
of 
decedent
during his life to the exclusion and/or financial detriment of
his other four adult children."  The contestants of Claude's
will sought an accounting 
of 
these 
alleged 
inter 
vivos 
transfers
from Claude to the proponents of Claude's will.  The claims
challenging the inter vivos transfers and requesting an
accounting appear to have been  considered by the circuit court
as a mere incident to the petition contesting the validity of
Claude's will and were, therefore,  also dismissed.  
An accounting is equitable in nature.  See Ex parte Holt, 
599 So. 2d 12 (Ala. 1992). Probate courts are "court[s] of law
and, therefore, generally do[] not possess jurisdiction to
determine equitable issues." Lappan v. Lovette, 577 So. 2d 893,
896 (Ala. 1991).  Alabama's circuit courts, however, do have
12
The legislature has conferred, either by statutes or
12
local constitutional amendments, upon a few probate courts
equitable jurisdiction with regard to certain proceedings,
see, e.g., Regions Bank v. Reed, 60 So. 3d 868, 878 & n. 8
(Ala. 2010); Jett v. Carter, 758 So. 2d 526, 529 & 530 n. 5
(Ala. 1999). The Escambia County Probate Court is not one of
60
1140819, 1140820
jurisdiction over matters equitable in nature.  Section
12–11–31(1), Ala. Code 1975, provides that the jurisdiction of
the circuit courts as to equitable matters extends "to all civil
actions in which a plain and adequate remedy is not provided in
the other judicial tribunals." "[C]ircuit courts are 'better
able 
to 
deal 
justly, 
adequately, 
and completely with 
all 
matters
and questions involved' in the administration of estates." 
Byars v. Mixon, 292 Ala. 657, 661, 299 So. 2d 259, 261
(1974)(quoting Bynum v. Brewer, 217 Ala. 52, 55, 114 So. 577,
579 (1927)).  The equitable claim for an accounting in the
administration of an estate is a matter best left to the circuit
court. See Garrison v. Kelly, 257 Ala. 105, 57 So. 2d 345
(1952).  An equitable accounting claim is not proper in a will
contest brought under § 43-8-199 because the "sole and only
appropriate purpose" of a proceeding brought under that section
is the contest and possible revocation of a will already
admitted to probate.  Kelley v. Sutliff, 262 Ala. 622, 627, 80
So. 2d 636, 640 (1955). Accordingly, the circuit court would
have subject-matter jurisdiction over properly pleaded claims
those courts.  
61
1140819, 1140820
for an accounting and alleging improper inter vivos transfers
from Claude to Michael and Barbara as part of the general
administration of Claude’s estate once the circuit court
properly 
enters 
the 
order 
transferring 
the 
administration 
of 
the
estate to circuit court. 
However, any such equitable claim for an accounting or
asset recovery is premature at this point in the proceedings
because there is currently no administration of Claude’s estate
pending in the circuit court.  As noted above, the circuit court
has 
yet 
to 
obtain 
jurisdiction 
of the 
administration of 
Claude’s
estate because it has yet to enter  an order removing Claude’s
estate from the probate court to the circuit court pursuant to
§ 12-11-41.  Subsequent to the circuit court’s entry of an order
on remand pursuant to § 12-11-41, removing the administration
of Claude’s estate from the probate court to the circuit court,
the 
circuit 
court 
would 
obtain 
jurisdiction 
over 
Claude’s 
estate
to freely administer the estate in all respects, including the
potential appointment of an administrator ad colligendum13
pending the disposition of the will contest.  
II. Bessie's Will (Case No. 1140820)
 Section 43-2-47(a) and (d), Ala. Code 1975. 
13
62
1140819, 1140820
A. Removal of the Administration of Bessie's Estate
The contestants of Bessie's will initially argue that the
circuit court erred in refusing to enter an order removing the
administration of Bessie's estate from the probate court to the
circuit court.  The circuit court found that there had been no
petition for removal filed in the circuit court and that the
circuit court had not entered an order removing the
administration of Bessie's estate from the probate court to the
circuit court.  Thus, the circuit court concluded that it lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction over the administration of Bessie's
estate. Bessie's case differs slightly from Claude's in that,
in Bessie's case, the petition for removal from the probate
court to the circuit court and the complaint for a will contest
are contained in the same document.  We will first analyze the
document in the context of its status as a petition for removal
of Bessie's estate from the probate court to the circuit court.
As stated earlier, § 12-11-41 provides:
"The administration of any estate may be removed
from the probate court to the circuit court at any
time before a final settlement thereof, by any heir,
devisee, 
legatee, 
distributee, 
executor, 
administrator
or administrator with the will annexed of any such
estate, without assigning any special equity; and an
order of removal must be made by the court, upon the
filing of a sworn petition by any such heir, devisee,
63
1140819, 1140820
legatee, distributee, executor, administrator or
administrator with the will annexed of any such
estate, reciting that the petitioner is such heir,
devisee, 
legatee, 
distributee, 
executor, 
administrator
or administrator with the will annexed and that, in
the opinion of the petitioner, such estate can be
better administered in the circuit court than in the
probate court." 
On August 9, 2012, after Bessie's will had been admitted to
probate, the contestants of Bessie's will  filed in the probate
14
court a "Petition for Removal to Circuit Court and Contest of
Validity of Will." The "Petition for Removal to Circuit Court
and Contest of Validity of Will" was captioned and designated
as being filed "In the Probate Court for Escambia County,
Alabama," stated the title of the case as "In Re: The Estate of
Bessie Mae Turner, Deceased," and set forth the case number as
9695.   The contestants of Bessie's will alleged in the petition
that they were the heirs and next of kin of Bessie's and that
they were seeking the removal of Bessie's estate from the
probate court to the circuit court pursuant to § 12-11-41,
because it was their collective opinion that Bessie's estate
There is no question as to circuit court's jurisdiction
14
over the administration of the estate given the fact that the
'contestants to Bessie's will' included Bessie's heirs, who
are expressly authorized to remove the administration under §
12-11-41. 
64
1140819, 1140820
could be better administered in the circuit court. As was the
case with Claude, the filing in the probate court of the
petition to remove Bessie's estate from the 
probate court to the
circuit court was a nullity and did not invoke the circuit
court's 
jurisdiction 
over 
the 
general 
administration 
of 
Bessie's
estate, because § 12-11-41 requires that the petition for the
removal of the administration of a decedent’s estate be filed
in the circuit court.  Dubose, supra.
However, also like Claude's case, a duplicate copy of the
"Petition for Removal to Circuit Court and Contest of Validity
of Will" was stamped filed in the circuit court clerk's office
on August 10, 2012.  The copy of the petition filed in the
circuit court seeking the removal of Bessie's estate from the
probate court to the circuit court contained the title of the
action, the case number, and was designated as a  "Petition for
Removal to Circuit Court."  The petition was signed by the
attorney representing the contestants of Bessie's will, and it
appears from the record that the filing fee was paid in the
circuit court.  The contestants of Bessie's will asserted in the
petition that they were the heirs and next of kin of Bessie's,
cited § 12-11-41 as the basis of the removal of the
65
1140819, 1140820
administration of Bessie's estate, and set forth the requisite
language necessary to effect a removal of the administration of
the estate from the probate court to the circuit court.  The
petition, along with the contents of the probate court's file,
was stamped filed, assigned a circuit court case number, and
scanned in the circuit court clerk's files. 
We conclude that a petition seeking the removal of Bessie's
estate from the probate court to the circuit court was filed in
the 
circuit 
court 
clerk's 
office 
and 
that 
the petition satisfied
the pleading requirements of § 12-11-41 for the same reasons
that we concluded in Part I.A. of this "Discussion" section that
a valid petition seeking the removal of Claude's estate from the
probate court had been filed in the circuit court. Because the
pleading requirements of § 12-11-41 were satisfied, the circuit
court 
was 
required 
to 
enter an 
order 
removing 
the 
administration
of Bessie's estate from the probate court to the circuit court,
and it erred in failing to do so.  Ex parte McLendon, supra. 
As in Claude's case, once the circuit court enters on remand an
order removing the administration of Bessie's estate from the
probate court to the circuit court, the circuit court will
66
1140819, 1140820
obtain jurisdiction over the general administration of Bessie's
estate. 
The contestants of Bessie's will next argue that the
probate of Bessie's will was defective and that, upon removal
of the administration of Bessie's estate to the circuit court,
the order probating the will is due to be vacated by the circuit
court for failure to comply with the requirements of § 43-8-164,
Ala. Code 1975 (Notice to surviving spouse and next of kin -–
Generally). The contestants of Bessie's will state that the
purpose of § 43-8-164 is to ensure that the heirs at law and
next of kin of the deceased have the opportunity to come into
probate court and contest a will before its admission to probate
if they so choose.  The contestants of Bessie's will argue that
they 
were 
denied 
the 
opportunity 
to 
contest Bessie's will before
it was admitted to probate because they did not receive the
required notice pursuant to § 43-8-164.  The contestants of
Bessie's will rely upon Sowell v. Sowell's Administrator, 40
Ala. 243, 245 (1866), which states: "[W]hen a will is admitted
to probate, without notice having been given to those who are
entitled to notice, the probate will be set aside on proper
67
1140819, 1140820
application."   
We pretermit a determination as to this
15
issue, because any such determination by this Court at this
point of the proceedings would be premature in that the circuit
court has not 
yet 
 
obtained 
jurisdiction 
over 
the administration
of Bessie's estate and, thus, has no authority at this point to
determine this issue.  
See Generally Robinson v. Benton, 842 So.
2d 631 (Ala. 2002) (holding that this Court's review is limited
to issues ruled upon by the circuit court).  
B. The Will Contest
We now analyze the latter portion of the "Petition for
Removal to Circuit Court and Contest of Validity of Will" filed
by the contestants of Bessie's will, in the context of its
status as a complaint contesting the validity of Bessie's will. 
The circuit court concluded that it had no subject-matter
jurisdiction over the will contest in Bessie's case because, it
The failure of an heir or next of kin to receive the
15
mandatory notice required by § 43-8-164 does not render the
order establishing probate void.  Rather, the failure of a
party to receive notice pursuant to § 43-8-164 is considered
to be a mere irregularity rendering the order of probate
voidable upon proper application.  Sowell, supra; Hall v.
Hall, 47 Ala. 290 (1872); Dickey v. Vann, 81 Ala. 425, 8 So.
195 (1886); Knox v. Paull, 95 Ala. 505, 11 So. 156 (1892); and
Hawkins v. Sanders, 260 Ala. 585, 72 So. 2d 81 (1954).  The
application or continued validity of these cases is not
challenged in this appeal, because we have not been asked to
overrule this line of cases. 
68
1140819, 1140820
said, no valid will-contest complaint had been filed in the
circuit court.   The contestants 
of 
Bessie's 
will argue that the
16
circuit court erred in dismissing their action contesting the
validity of Bessie's will on the ground that no valid complaint
contesting the validity of Bessie's will had been filed in the
circuit court pursuant to § 43-8-199, Ala. Code 1975 (Contest
in circuit court after admission to probate –- Generally).  
As discussed above in Part I.B. of this "Discussion"
section, a will may be contested in one of two ways in Alabama:
(1) under § 43-8-190, Ala. Code 1975, before probate, the
contest may be instituted in the probate court or (2) under §
43-8-199, Ala. Code 1975, after probate and within six months
thereof, a contest may be instituted by filing a complaint in
the circuit court of the county in which the will was probated. 
The contestants of Bessie's will state that, because they were
not properly provided notice of the submission of Bessie's will
for 
probate, a post-admission 
contest 
pursuant 
to 
§ 
43-8-199 
was
Again, as noted in note 8, supra, the circuit court has 
16
couched its conclusions 
in 
terms that it lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over the will contest in this case.  There is no
question 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
has 
subject-matter
jurisdiction over this will contest pursuant to § 43-8-199.
The proper issue is whether the pleading requirements were
sufficiently met in order to invoke the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the circuit court.  
69
1140819, 1140820
the only contest remedy available to them.  Again, we note that
§ 43-8-199, Ala. Code 1975, provides:
"Any person interested in any will who has not
contested the same under the provisions of this
article, may, at any time within the six months after
the admission of such will to probate in this state,
contest the validity of the same by filing a complaint
in the circuit court in the county in which such will
was probated."
Here, the contestants of Bessie's will initially filed in
the probate court their "Petition for Removal to Circuit Court
and Contest of Validity of Will."  This petition was captioned
and 
designated as being filed "In the Probate Court for Escambia
County, Alabama," stated the title of the case as "In Re: The
Estate of Bessie Mae Turner, Deceased," and set forth the case
number as 9695.   The contestants of Bessie's will alleged in
the petition that they were the heirs and next of kin of
Bessie's and that Bessie "lacked the requisite testamentary
capacity" at the time 
she purportedly executed her will and that
at that time Bessie was "under the undue influence of Claude
Michael Moye and/or Barbara Moye," thereby rendering the will
unenforceable.
A copy of the "Petition for Removal to Circuit Court and
Contest of Validity of Will" filed in the probate court was
70
1140819, 1140820
subsequently stamped filed in the circuit court clerk's office.
A filing fee was paid when the petition was filed in the circuit
court clerk's office, the matter was assigned a circuit court
case number, and the contents of the probate court's file were
scanned into the circuit court clerk's files. Later, on that
same day, the contestants of Bessie's will electronically filed
in the circuit court an amended petition contesting Bessie's
will. The amended petition 
was 
captioned 
and 
designated 
as 
being
filed in the "Circuit Court for Escambia County, Alabama"  and
styled as "In Re: The Estate of Bessie Mae Turner, Deceased." 
The amended petition alleged that Bessie lacked testamentary
capacity, that Michael and Barbara had exerted undue influence
over and/or coerced Bessie during the course of the will's
preparation, and that the will was void under § 43-8-199.
The proponents of Bessie's will contend that the "Petition
for Removal to Circuit Court and Contest of Validity of Will"
was erroneously filed in the probate court and then improperly
transferred by the probate court to the circuit court.  Relying
on Bond, supra, the circuit court concluded that "the probate
court's physical transfer of the probate file to the circuit
court clerk's office [was] ineffectual and [was] not sufficient
71
1140819, 1140820
to invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction when the purported
will contest was filed in the probate court after the will was
admitted to probate."  In Bond, supra, the probate court
admitted the will of a decedent to probate on November 29, 2005. 
On April 26, 2006, a will contestant filed in the probate court
a complaint contesting the decedent's will.  Later, on that same
date the contestant of the will filed in the probate court a
motion seeking to transfer the will contest to the circuit
court.  The probate court entered an order purporting to
transfer the will contest to the circuit court and had the
probate court's file delivered to the circuit court.  On June
9, 2006, the will contestant filed in the circuit court a
complaint contesting the will.  The circuit court entered an
order dismissing the will-contest complaint because the will
contestant had failed to file the will contest in the circuit
court within six months after the will had been admitted to
probate as required by § 43-8-199. 
In affirming the judgment of the circuit court on appeal, 
this Court noted that § 43-8-190 precluded the will contestant
from filing the will contest in the probate court after the will
had been admitted to probate and that, in order to timely
72
1140819, 1140820
contest the will after it had been admitted to probate, the
contestant had to file the will contest in the circuit court
within six months of the admission of the will to probate
pursuant to § 43-8-199.  Thus, this Court held that the "will
contest filed in the probate court was a nullity as it was filed
after the will had been admitted to probate, and the probate
court's order purporting to transfer the file to the circuit
court could not and did not confer jurisdiction on the circuit
court." 3 So. 3d at 855 (emphasis added).
In deciding Bond, this Court cited Kelley v. English, 439
So. 2d 26 (Ala. 1983), in which the decedent's will was admitted
to probate on May 6, 1981.  On October 16, 1981, the will
contestant filed a will contest in the probate court, along with
a request for relief that the will contest be transferred to
circuit court.  On that same date the probate court entered an
order purporting to transfer the will contest to the circuit
court.  The probate court's file was subsequently transferred
to the circuit court on October 20, 1981.
On June 4, 1982, the proponents of the will filed a motion
to dismiss the will contest, arguing that the circuit court had
no jurisdiction over the matter.  The proponents of the will
73
1140819, 1140820
stated that § 43-8-190 authorized a contest before the will was
admitted to probate and § 43-8-199 authorized a will contest
after probate by filing a complaint in the circuit court within
six months after the admission of the will to probate. The
proponents of the will stated that the will contestant had taken
neither action and that, therefore, the circuit court had no
jurisdiction over the matter.  The circuit court entered an
order dismissing the will-contest complaint.  Subsequently, the
will contestant filed an amendment to the complaint purporting
to contest the will in the circuit court pursuant to § 43-8-199. 
The proponents of the will filed a motion to strike the
amendment because, they said, there was no valid complaint to
which the amendment could attach.  The circuit court granted the
motion to strike.
The will contestant argued on appeal that the circuit clerk
docketed the will contest, assigned it a case number, issued
summonses, and otherwise treated 
the 
will 
contest 
as 
having 
been
properly filed.  The will contestant also presented evidence
indicating that the will contest was delivered to and filed in
the circuit court clerk's office.  The proponents of the will
pointed out, however, that the will-contest pleading bore the
74
1140819, 1140820
caption "In The Probate Court" and had in fact first been filed
in the probate court, requesting relief not available from the
probate court.
In affirming the dismissal of the complaint, this Court
held that, for all that appears from the record, the will-
contest complaint reached the circuit court only as part of the
order purporting to transfer the probate court's file and that
the "circuit clerk's treatment of the case could have resulted
from an assumption that the contest was properly transferred
from probate court and so cannot serve to contradict the face
of the pleadings which show that the action was filed in probate
court."  439 So. 2d at 28. The Kelley decision, decided over a
year prior to 
Simpson, 
supra, 
although 
not 
mentioned 
in Simpson,
reached the opposite result in correctly concluding that the
probate court lacked jurisdiction to transfer a post-admission
contest to circuit court.  
To the extent that the proponents of Bessie's will rely on
the above cases to argue that the transfer of a will contest
from the probate court to the circuit court is ineffectual when
the will contest is first filed in the probate court after the
will has been admitted to probate, such reliance is misplaced,
75
1140819, 1140820
because the facts of those cases are distinguishable from the
facts of this case.  In those cases, unlike this one, the
probate court, acting upon a request for relief by means of a
transfer to the circuit court, transferred the will contest to
the circuit court pursuant to an order that the probate court
did not have the authority or jurisdiction to enter.  Section
43-8-199 clearly and unambiguously requires that a will contest
brought under that Code section be filed in the circuit court,
rather than the probate court, after a will has been admitted
to probate.  Thus, any order entered by the probate court
purporting to transfer the will contest from the probate court
to the circuit court is a nullity. It follows that the circuit
court's jurisdiction cannot be properly invoked upon the entry
of a void order by the probate court purporting to transfer the
will contest from the probate court to the circuit court. 
Therefore, this Court concluded in  both Bond, supra, and
Kelley, supra, that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over
the will contest.
However, the probate court here did not transfer the will
contest to the circuit court by means of a void order.  Rather,
it appears that a member of the probate court clerk's staff
76
1140819, 1140820
simply walked, without any purported order having been entered
by the probate court, the petition for a will contest, which
included the attorney's signature and was accompanied by the
requisite filing fee, over to the circuit court clerk's office
where it was stamped filed.  Again, we can think of nothing, and
the proponents of Bessie's will have presented this Court with
nothing, that indicates 
that 
the 
probate 
court 
is 
prevented from
delivering the pleading to the circuit court as a courtesy to
the contestants of Bessie's will.  The filing of a pleading is
deemed completed when that pleading is received by the clerk of
the court.  See Rule 5(e), Ala. R. Civ. P. ("The filing of
papers with the court as required by these rules shall be made
by filing them with the clerk of the court ...."); Rubin, 469
So. 2d at 658 ("'[A] pleading or other paper may be said to have
been duly filed when it is delivered to the proper filing
officer.'" (quoting Covington Bros. Motor Co., 239 Ala. at 226,
194 So. at 663)).   
We further note that as discussed in Part I.A. above,  a
timely filed copy of a complaint asserting a will contest in the
circuit court that had been originally filed in the probate
court after a decedent's will had been admitted to probate is
77
1140819, 1140820
sufficient to invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction over a
will contest where the appropriate docket fee was paid; a
circuit court cover sheet was included; and the complaint
contained the name of the court, the title of the action, a file
number, its designation as a will contest, and a copy of the
attorney's signature certifying the allegations in the
complaint.  Ex parte Barrows, supra. 
The copy of the petition asserting a will contest that was
filed in the circuit court after being first filed in the
probate court contained the title of the action and a case
number and was clearly designated as a will contest.  Although
the petition still contained a reference to the probate court,
the substantive allegations in the petition clearly indicate
that the contestants of Bessie's will were seeking to contest
the will in the circuit court. The copy of the petition
contained the signature of the attorney representing the
contestants of Bessie's will certifying the allegations
contained in the complaint.  The docket fee was paid, and the
matter was assigned a circuit court case number.  The amended
petition filed electronically in the circuit court was properly
captioned and designated as being filed in the "Circuit Court
78
1140819, 1140820
for Escambia County, Alabama." The amended petition asserted
that the will was void 
and unenforceable pursuant to § 43-8-199,
because, it asserted, Bessie lacked testamentary capacity and
the will was a product of undue influence and/or coercion
exerted upon Bessie by Michael and Barbara.
Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction over the will contest because it was
first improperly filed in the probate court and subsequently
filed in the circuit court.
The contestants of Bessie's will next argue that they
satisfied their burden of pleading the statutory requirements
of § 43-8-199 and that the jurisdiction of the circuit court was
properly invoked by the petition for a will contest filed in the
circuit court. See Simpson, supra.
We note that the contestants of Bessie's will expressly
state 
in 
their petition contesting the 
validity 
of 
Bessie's 
will
that they are "each an heir at law and next of kin" of Bessie's. 
A complaint 
asserting 
a 
will 
contest 
that 
contains an allegation
by the will contestant that the contestant was an "heir at law"
of the decedent satisfies the "any person interested in any
will" requirement of § 43-8-199. Evans, supra; Queen, supra. 
79
1140819, 1140820
Thus, we conclude that the contestants of Bessie's will
satisfied the "any person interested in any will" requirement
of § 43-8-199 by alleging in their petition that they were each
an heir at law and next of kin of Bessie's. 
Second, with regard to the "no previous contest of the
will" requirement under § 43-8-199, neither the original
petition nor the amended petition contesting the validity of
Bessie's will expressly alleged that Bessie's will had not
previously been contested.  However, as was the case in Claude's
will contest, the circuit court had before it the contents of
the probate court's file, which had previously been stamped
filed and scanned into the circuit court clerk's files.
Assuming, without deciding, 
that 
the 
requirement 
is 
not 
a matter
of proof rather than a jurisdictional pleading requirement, it
is discernible from those materials that the contestants of
Bessie's will had not previously filed an action contesting the
will.   Stone, supra. Therefore, because nothing in the record
17
indicates that the contestants of Bessie's will had previously
filed a will contest contesting Bessie's will, the absence of
This Court has above concluded that the circuit court is
17
required to enter an order on remand removing Bessie's probate
case from the probate court to the circuit court.  
80
1140819, 1140820
an express statement of that fact in the complaint would not
render the complaint invalid and impede the circuit court from
obtaining jurisdiction of the will contest pursuant to § 43-8-
199. 
Third, as for the requirement under § 43-8-199 that the
"will had been previously admitted to probate in Alabama," the
contestants of Bessie's will did not expressly aver that the
will had been previously admitted to probate.  However, again
the circuit court had before it the probate court's file that
clearly indicated that Bessie's will had been previously
admitted to probate.  Also, the contestants of Bessie's will
requested in their amended petition contesting the validity of
Bessie's will that the letters testamentary issued to Michael
be rescinded and that a successor personal representative be
duly appointed.  Implicit in this requested prayer for relief
is the fact that Bessie's will had previously been admitted to
probate, that letters testamentary had been issued to the
personal representative, and that thereby a decedent’s estate
had been opened by the probate court.  We further note that the
proponents of Bessie's will filed answers to both the petition
and the amended petition, acknowledging that Bessie's will had
81
1140819, 1140820
been admitted to probate.  Accordingly, we conclude that the
requirement 
under 
§ 
43-8-199, that the "will 
had 
been 
previously
admitted to probate in Alabama," was satisfied by the
contestants.   
 Fourth, as for any requirement under § 43-8-199 that the
will contest be filed within six months of the  will being
admitted to probate and in the same county in which the will was
admitted to probate, we note that the contestants of Bessie's
will failed to expressly aver that the complaint contesting
Bessie's will was filed within six months and in the same county
in which the will was admitted to probate.  
Bessie's will was admitted to probate in the Escambia
County Probate Court on February 14, 2012.  The contestants of
Bessie's will filed their petition and amended petition
contesting 
the 
validity 
of 
Bessie's will in the 
Escambia 
Circuit
Court on August 10, 2012, which was within the six-month period
for filing a contest under § 43-8-199.  Again, the fact that the
petition and amended petition contesting the validity of
Bessie's will were filed in the Escambia Circuit Court within
the six-month period provided by § 43-8-199 is easily
discernible from the record before the circuit court.  Stone,
82
1140819, 1140820
supra. Accordingly, we conclude the requirement that the will
contest be filed in the same county in which the will was
admitted to probate and within six months of the admission of
the will to probate is satisfied. 
Finally, the contestants of Bessie's will expressly
identified 
"Claude 
Michael 
Moye 
and/or Barbara Moye" in 
both 
the
original and amended petitions contesting the validity of
Bessie's will and alleged that Bessie "lacked the requisite
testamentary capacity on the date of her purported execution of
the Last Will and Testament ... and/or that [Bessie] was under
the undue influence of Claude Michael Moye and/or Barbara Moye,
thereby rendering said Will void and unenforceable."  The
contestants of Bessie's will also alleged that Bessie was of
"unsound mind as of May 17, 2010, as she had for a period of
time prior thereto suffered from dementia, which negatively
affected her rational thought processes ... [and that] Claude
Michael Moye and/or his wife, Barbara Moye, exerted undue
influence and/or 
coercion 
upon 
decedent 
and/or 
misled 
her in the
course of the subject Will's preparation and/or execution." 
Although 
service 
of 
process was not requested 
for 
either 
Michael
or Barbara in the original petition contesting the validity of
83
1140819, 1140820
Bessie's will filed on August 10, 2012, service of process for
Barbara was requested in the amended petition contesting the
validity of Bessie's will filed later that same day. Both the
original and amended petitions contesting the validity of
Bessie's will were served upon Michael and Barbara's attorney
of record.  We also note that Michael and Barbara answered both
the original and amended petitions contesting the validity of
Bessie's will, without raising an objection as to any
insufficiency of service of process.  Thus, any objection that
Michael and Barbara had with regard to the insufficiency of
service 
was 
waived. 
Kingvision 
Pay-Per-View, 
supra. 
Accordingly, we conclude that both the original and amended
petitions contesting the validity of Bessie's will adequately
named 
Michael 
and 
Barbara 
as 
actual 
adverse parties and informed
them of the pending action against them. 
We note once again that the goal of pleadings under the
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure is to provide fair notice to
adverse parties of the claims against them and the grounds upon
which those claims rests.  Simpson, supra.  In striking a
balance between the liberality with which we must construe the
pleadings and the requirement of fair notice and the strict
84
1140819, 1140820
adherence to the statutorily prescribed procedures, we conclude
that the contestants of Bessie's will satisfied the pleading
requirements of § 43-8-199 and that the circuit court erred in
dismissing the will 
contest 
filed 
by 
the 
contestants 
of Bessie's
will.
C. The Inter Vivos Transfer
Like the contestants of Claude's will, the contestants of
Bessie's will asserted in their amended petition for a will
contest that Michael and Barbara had, through undue influence,
availed 
themselves 
of 
certain 
of 
Bessie's assets during her 
life
to the exclusion of her other heirs and next of kin. The
contestants of Bessie's will sought an accounting of those
alleged inter vivos transfers.  However, as discussed in Part
I.C. of the "Discussion" section of this opinion, any equitable
claim for an accounting or asset recovery is premature at this
point, because there is currently no administration of Bessie's
estate pending in the circuit court.  Once the circuit court
enters an order on remand removing the administration of
Bessie's estate from the probate court to the circuit court, the
circuit court will obtain jurisdiction over Bessie's estate to
administer the estate in all respects, including the issue of
85
1140819, 1140820
the validity of any alleged inter vivos transfers and the
necessity for an accounting.
Conclusion
We remand case no. 1140819 to the circuit court for the
entry 
of 
an 
order 
removing 
the 
administration of Claude's estate
from the probate court to the circuit court.  We further reverse
the circuit court's judgment in case no. 1140819 dismissing the
will contest filed by the contestants of Claude's will.  We
remand case no. 1140820 to the circuit court for the entry of
an 
order 
removing 
the 
administration 
of Bessie's estate from 
the
probate court to the circuit court.  We also reverse the circuit
court's 
judgment in case no. 
1140820 
dismissing 
the 
will 
contest
filed by the contestants of Bessie's will. 
  
1140819 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1140820 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
Stuart, Parker, Murdock, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur. 
86