Title: Commonwealth v. Vigiani
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13087
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 20, 2021

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SJC-13087 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ELI VIGIANI. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 7, 2021. - July 20, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Parent and Child, Testimony by parent against child.  Witness, 
Competency.  Statute, Construction.  Practice, Criminal, 
Motion to suppress.  Moot Question. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on February 4, 2021. 
 
 
The case was reported by Georges, J. 
 
 
 
Ian MacLean, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Michelle Menken for the defendant. 
 
Robert F. Hennessy & Merritt Schnipper, for youth advocacy 
division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, 
amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  General Laws c. 233, § 20 (§ 20), limits who may 
give what sort of testimony in various civil and criminal 
proceedings.  One set of limitations is found in § 20, Fourth, 
2 
 
which applies to the testimony of a parent or minor child1 
against the other in criminal, delinquency, and youthful 
offender proceedings where the victim is not a family member and 
does not reside in the household.  The central issue in this 
case is whether § 20, Fourth, disqualifies parents from being 
called to testify in their child's defense at an evidentiary 
hearing for a motion to suppress.  We conclude that while § 20, 
Fourth, prevents the prosecution from calling the child's 
parents to testify for the Commonwealth in such proceedings, it 
allows the child to call his or her parents as witnesses for the 
defense and then the Commonwealth to cross-examine them.2 
 
Background.  Three days after the sixteen year old juvenile 
in this case was allegedly involved in a shooting incident, he 
and his mother arrived at Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority (MBTA) transit police headquarters to be questioned.  
Both were informed of the juvenile's Miranda rights.  In an 
affidavit filed with the juvenile's subsequent motion to 
suppress, the juvenile's mother alleges that the juvenile then 
 
 
1 General Laws c. 233, § 20, Fourth, specifically applies to 
minor children.  However, to avoid repetition and because the 
juvenile in this case is a minor, we use "children" or "child" 
throughout when referring to the statutory terms.  We refer to 
the juvenile here as "the juvenile." 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief from the youth advocacy 
division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services and 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
3 
 
invoked his right to counsel.  At this point, the juvenile's 
mother claims that a detective spoke with her privately and 
encouraged her to convince the juvenile to speak with the 
police, promising that if he did, he would be permitted to leave 
and that the police would speak to the prosecutor on his behalf.  
The juvenile spoke with his mother for approximately fifteen 
minutes and then agreed to speak with police.  During this 
conversation with police, the juvenile made incriminating 
statements.  The juvenile was later indicted as a youthful 
offender, G. L. c. 119, § 54, on the charge of carrying a 
firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). 
 
Before trial in the Juvenile Court, the juvenile moved to 
suppress his statements at MBTA police headquarters.  To support 
his motion, the juvenile sought to call his mother to testify at 
the evidentiary hearing about her conversation with officers.  
In response, the Commonwealth moved to reserve and report the 
question whether § 20, Fourth, disqualified the juvenile's 
mother from testifying.  Alternatively, the Commonwealth moved 
to prohibit the juvenile's mother from testifying based on § 20, 
Fourth.  The judge denied both motions, and the Commonwealth 
filed a G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition in the county court.  A 
single justice reserved and reported the case. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Mootness.  Before turning to the statutory 
matter, we resolve a threshold issue.  The Commonwealth argued 
4 
 
in the Juvenile Court that § 20, Fourth, disqualified the 
juvenile's mother from testifying at the evidentiary hearing for 
his motion to suppress.  By oral argument, the Commonwealth's 
position had changed, and it claimed that § 20, Fourth, does not 
apply to evidentiary hearings on motions to suppress at all.  As 
a result, because the proceeding at issue was an evidentiary 
hearing on a motion to suppress, the Commonwealth has conceded 
that the mother could be called by the juvenile to testify.  Due 
to the parties agreeing on this issue, the matter is moot.  See 
Metros v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 156, 159 
(1985) ("It is the general rule that courts decide only actual 
controversies"). 
 
Mootness does not, however, necessarily prevent us from 
hearing a case.  "We may choose to express our opinion on moot 
questions because of the public interest involved and the 
uncertainty and confusion that exist."  Metros, supra.  Whether 
§ 20, Fourth, prevents a child from calling his or her parent to 
testify for the defense in applicable proceedings is a matter of 
importance and has been fully briefed.  Thus, as we have in 
similar cases, see, e.g., Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 447 
Mass. 88, 89 (2006); Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 443 
Mass. 20, 21 (2004), we exercise our discretion to decide the 
issue before us. 
5 
 
 
2.  Section 20, Fourth.  Because whether § 20, Fourth, 
prevents parents from testifying in their child's defense is a 
matter of statutory interpretation, we review de novo.  
Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 480 Mass. 683, 685 (2018). 
 
a.  Legal backdrop.  "When construing a statute, we look 
first and foremost to the language of the statute as a whole," 
Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 447 Mass. at 90, and strive to 
"give effect to each word."  Ropes & Gray LLP v. Jalbert, 454 
Mass. 407, 412 (2009).  "A fundamental tenet of statutory 
interpretation is that statutory language should be given effect 
consistent with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the 
Legislature unless to do so would achieve an illogical result."  
Rahim v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 486 Mass. 544, 
547 (2020), quoting Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 
(2001).  Because legislative intent controls our interpretation 
of statutes, "[w]e derive the words' usual and accepted meaning 
from sources presumably known to the statute's enactors, such as 
their use in other legal contexts and dictionary definitions."  
Commonwealth v. Montarvo, 486 Mass. 535, 536 (2020), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Garvey, 477 Mass. 59, 61-62 (2017). 
 
Generally, individuals have a duty to testify when 
subpoenaed because of "the fundamental principle that the public 
. . . has a right to every [person's] evidence" (quotation 
omitted).  See Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 443 Mass. 
6 
 
at 24, quoting Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, 
359 (1983), cert. denied sub nom. Keefe v. Massachusetts, 465 
U.S. 1068 (1984).  Privileges and disqualifications are both 
exceptions to this rule, though they each operate differently.  
See generally M.S. Brodin & M. Avery, Handbook of Massachusetts 
Evidence § 5.1 (2016). 
Drawing examples from the statute at issue to demonstrate 
the point, § 20, Second, creates a privilege known as the 
spousal privilege.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 504(a) (2021).  Under 
§ 20, Second, a witness-spouse has a right not to be compelled 
to testify in a criminal proceeding against his or her spouse.3  
See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 476 Mass. 822, 826 (2017).  This 
privilege belongs to the testifying spouse who may choose 
whether to testify or not.  See id.  By contrast, 
disqualifications are nonwaivable.  See id.  This is illustrated 
by § 20, First, otherwise known as the spousal communications 
disqualification.4  See Mass. G. Evid. § 504(b).  Specifically, 
 
 
3 General Laws c. 233, § 20, Second, provides: 
 
"Except as otherwise provided in [G. L. c. 273, § 7,] and 
except in any proceeding relating to child abuse, including 
incest, neither husband nor wife shall be compelled to 
testify in the trial of an indictment, complaint or other 
criminal proceeding against the other." 
 
 
4 General Laws c. 233, § 20, First, provides: 
 
 
7 
 
§ 20, First, disqualifies spouses "from testifying to private 
marital conversations, absent certain statutory exceptions . . . 
even when both spouses wish for the conversation to be 
considered in evidence."  Garcia, supra. 
 
As the spousal privilege and spousal communication 
disqualification suggest, the Legislature may, within 
constitutional bounds, craft privileges and disqualifications 
that limit testimony to various degrees.  See Commonwealth v. 
Maillet, 400 Mass. 572, 575-577 (1987) (tracing legislative 
evolution of spousal disqualification from "absolute prohibition 
against testimony where one spouse was a party" to current 
spousal privilege and spousal communication disqualification).  
In determining the ways in which testimony will be limited, the 
Legislature must balance multiple policy considerations.  See 
Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 430 Mass. 590, 597-599 (2000) 
 
"Except in a proceeding arising out of or involving a 
contract made by a married woman with her husband, a 
proceeding under [G. L. c. 209D] and in a prosecution begun 
under [G. L. c. 273, §§ 1-10], any criminal proceeding in 
which one spouse is a defendant alleged to have committed a 
crime against the other spouse or to have violated a 
temporary or permanent vacate, restraining, or no-contact 
order or judgment issued pursuant to [G. L. c. 208, § 18, 
34B, or 34C; G. L. c. 209, § 32; G. L. c. 209A, § 3, 3B, 
3C, 4, or 5; or G. L. c. 209C, § 15 or 20], or a similar 
protection order issued by another jurisdiction, obtained 
by the other spouse, and except in a proceeding involving 
abuse of a person under the age of eighteen, including 
incest, neither husband nor wife shall testify as to 
private conversations with the other." 
8 
 
(noting policy considerations in context of creating possible 
parent-child privilege); Gallagher v. Goldstein, 402 Mass. 457, 
460-461 (1988) (same for spousal communication privilege).  Once 
that balance is struck, we construe the resulting limitation 
narrowly due to the overarching duty to provide evidence.  See 
Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 443 Mass. at 23-24.  This 
discussion sets the stage for our interpretation of § 20, 
Fourth. 
 
b.  Scope of disqualification.  To start, the text of § 20, 
Fourth, provides: 
"A parent shall not testify against the parent's minor 
child and a minor child shall not testify against the 
child's parent in a proceeding before an inquest, grand 
jury, trial of an indictment or complaint or any other 
criminal, delinquency or youthful offender proceeding in 
which the victim in the proceeding is not a family member 
and does not reside in the family household; provided, 
however, that for the purposes of this clause, 'parent' 
shall mean the biological or adoptive parent, stepparent, 
legal guardian or other person who has the right to act in 
loco parentis for the child; provided further, that in a 
case in which the victim is a family member and resides in 
the family household, the parent shall not testify as to 
any communication with the minor child that was for the 
purpose of seeking advice regarding the child's legal 
rights" (emphasis added). 
 
In proceedings where § 20, Fourth, applies, the Legislature 
clearly intended to disqualify the testimony of parents and 
9 
 
their children in some manner.  The Commonwealth and the 
juvenile agree on this point.5 
 
The parties do dispute, however, the scope of this 
disqualification.  The Commonwealth maintains that § 20, Fourth, 
is a total disqualification:  when the proceeding is against the 
child, neither the Commonwealth nor, absent overriding 
constitutional considerations, the child may call the parent to 
testify.  The juvenile, on the other hand, contends that the 
Legislature intended § 20, Fourth, to create a partial 
disqualification:  the child may call the parent to testify for 
his or her defense, but the Commonwealth may not call the parent 
to testify against the child.  The plain language of § 20, 
 
 
5 Although both parties agree that § 20, Fourth, is a 
disqualification, the judge and amici considered § 20, Fourth, 
to be a privilege.  The surrounding provisions and legislative 
history show that § 20, Fourth, is a disqualification.  As we 
have repeatedly noted, inclusion of the word "compelled" in 
§ 20, Second, creates a privilege.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Garcia, 476 Mass. 822, 826 & n.7 (2017); Commonwealth v. 
Szerlong, 457 Mass. 858, 859 n.3 (2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 
1230 (2011).  Unlike that provision, § 20, Fourth, does not use 
the word "compelled."  Instead, the language of § 20, Fourth, 
resembles § 20, First, which also does not use the word 
"compelled" and is a disqualification.  If the Legislature had 
wanted to create a privilege in § 20, Fourth, then it would have 
modelled the provision more closely after § 20, Second, not 
§ 20, First.  Furthermore, on two occasions the Legislature 
rejected amendments to § 20, Fourth, that would have inserted 
the phrase "be compelled" into it.  See 2018 House Doc. 4426, 
§ 20; 2017 Senate J., Uncorrected Proof (Oct. 26, 2017) at 40-
41. 
10 
 
Fourth, its neighboring provisions, and its purpose all support 
the juvenile's interpretation. 
 
i.  Plain language of § 20, Fourth.  We begin with the 
plain language.  See Rahim, 486 Mass. at 547, quoting Plymouth 
Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 483 Mass. 
600, 604 (2019) ("When conducting statutory interpretation, this 
court strives 'to effectuate' the Legislature's intent by 
looking first to the statute's plain language").  In common 
parlance, "against" means "in opposition or hostility to."  
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 39 (1993).  Like 
most words, "against" rarely stands alone and is often used as 
the antonym to the preposition "for," which means "one who takes 
the affirmative side."  Id. at 886.  See Webster's Dictionary of 
Synonyms 33 (1942) ("for" is antonym of "against"). 
 
This dichotomy of "for" and "against" has a long and 
familiar pedigree.  See Bartlett's Familiar Quotations 42 (J. 
Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992), quoting Romans 8:31 ("If God be for 
us, who can be against us?").  That usage persists in the common 
legal phrases "testify for" and "testify against."  When a 
witness is called by a defendant, judges and lawyers ordinarily 
say that the witness will "testify for the defense" or "testify 
for the defendant."  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 
141, 146 (2014) (witness who agreed to be called by defense said 
to have "agreed to testify for the defendant"); Commonwealth v. 
11 
 
Girouard, 436 Mass. 657, 668 (2002) (expert retained by 
defendant said "to testify for the defense" and to have 
"testified for the defendant").  Conversely, when a witness is 
called by the prosecution, that witness will "testify for the 
Commonwealth" or, synonymously, "testify against the defendant."  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Morales, 483 Mass. 676, 679 (2019) 
(prosecution's witness said "to testify for the Commonwealth"); 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 473 Mass. 798, 800 (2016) (witnesses who 
agreed to testify for Commonwealth said "to testify against the 
defendant"); Commonwealth v. Garvin, 456 Mass. 778, 795 (2010) 
(witness called by Commonwealth said "to testify against the 
defendant"). 
 
With these ordinary usages in mind, the mandate of 
§ 20, Fourth, that a "parent shall not testify against the 
parent's minor child" most reasonably is interpreted to mean 
that a parent cannot be called by the Commonwealth to testify 
against the child.  This does not mean, however, that the child 
is similarly prevented from calling his or her parents.  Rather, 
the plain language of § 20, Fourth, leaves that possibility 
open.  See Gallagher, 402 Mass. at 460-461, quoting Rambert v. 
Commonwealth, 389 Mass. 771, 773 (1983) ("The language of a 
statute is not to be enlarged or limited by construction unless 
its object and plain meaning require it").  Thus, § 20, Fourth, 
is sensibly construed to allow a child to call his or her 
12 
 
parents to testify but prevents the Commonwealth from calling 
the parents.6  The rest of the statute and the purpose of § 20, 
Fourth, further support this reading. 
 
ii.  Neighboring provisions of § 20, Fourth.  "Even clear 
statutory language is not read in isolation."  Plymouth 
Retirement Bd., 483 Mass. at 605.  As already noted supra, the 
Legislature created a disqualification in § 20, First, for 
spousal communications.  That provision states, in relevant 
part:  "neither husband nor wife shall testify as to private 
conversations with the other."  G. L. c. 233, § 20, First.  
Because of the emphatic language of § 20, First ("neither 
husband nor wife shall testify"), the spousal communication 
disqualification prevents applicable testimony either for or 
against the defendant from being admitted over an objection.  
See Gallagher, 402 Mass. at 460 (§ 20, First, prohibits 
"testimony as to a marital conversation [even] when both parties 
to the conversation want disclosure"). 
 
"[A]wareness of a possible construction is indicative of 
. . . legislative intent."  Montarvo, 486 Mass. at 539 n.5.  Had 
the Legislature intended to create a similarly all-encompassing 
 
 
6 Because § 20, Fourth, is a disqualification, not a 
privilege, the parent would not be able to refuse to testify 
once called by the child unless a privilege applies, such as the 
privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution against self-incrimination. 
13 
 
disqualification in § 20, Fourth, it could have emulated the 
language of the spousal communication disqualification.  In 
particular, the Legislature could have used similarly broad 
language as that found in § 20, First, rather than modifying the 
phrase "shall not testify" with the word "against" as it did in 
§ 20, Fourth.  For example, the Legislature might have written:  
"neither parent nor child shall testify in a proceeding before 
an inquest, grand jury, trial of an indictment or complaint or 
any other criminal, delinquency or youthful offender proceeding 
against the other." 
 
Such unqualified language would have made clear that 
parents were disqualified from testifying, regardless of whether 
the child or Commonwealth called them.  That the Legislature 
chose different words speaks to a different intent.  See Simmons 
v. Clerk-Magistrate of the Boston Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 
448 Mass. 57, 65 (2006) ("where the Legislature has employed 
specific language in one portion of a statute, but not in 
another, the language will not be implied where it is absent").  
Consequently, § 20, Fourth, is most naturally read as preventing 
parents from being called to testify by the Commonwealth -- that 
is, parents cannot " testify against" their child -- but allowing 
the child to call his or her parents to "testify for" the 
defense. 
14 
 
 
iii.  Purpose of § 20, Fourth.  Along with these textual 
indications, the purpose of § 20, Fourth, is salient.  See 
Montarvo, 486 Mass. at 536, quoting Garvey, 477 Mass. at 61 
(statutory language "considered in connection with the cause of 
its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and 
the main object to be accomplished"). 
 
Section 20, Fourth, is aimed at the well-recognized goal of 
protecting the parent-child relationship.7  See Matter of a Grand 
Jury Subpoena, 430 Mass. at 599 (collecting statutes that 
"indicate a Legislative acknowledgment that families serve a 
special role in society and deserve unique protections").  With 
this end in mind, forcing a parent in possession of evidence 
favorable to his or her child to keep silent as the child is 
subjected to criminal prosecution would be an absurd result.  
See Three Juveniles, 390 Mass. at 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) 
("The State should not make unrealistic demands on its 
 
 
7 Legislative history confirms that protecting the parent-
child relationship is the purpose the Legislature had in mind 
when it last amended § 20, Fourth, in 2018.  See St. 2018, 
c. 69, § 111; Miller, Mass. Legislature Reveals Final Criminal 
Justice Package, Boston Globe, Mar. 23, 2018 (quoting House 
Majority Leader as stating, in reference to amended § 20, 
Fourth, "You start pitting family members against each other, no 
matter how dysfunctional the family, I think you've ruined that 
family forever"); Brownsberger, Criminal Justice Reform at a 
Glance (May 6, 2018), https://willbrownsberger.com/criminal-
justice-package-at-a-glance/ [https://perma.cc/3BRK-TQYJ] 
(noting that amended § 20, Fourth, will "[p]rotect the parent-
child relationship by disqualifying parents and children from 
being called to testify against each other in court"). 
15 
 
citizens").  A more logical way to achieve the Legislature's 
goal would be to prevent the Commonwealth from calling parents 
to testify against their child but allow parents to testify for 
their child's defense -- exactly what the text of § 20, Fourth, 
does. 
 
Finally, the Commonwealth notes that by being called to 
testify in their child's defense, parents may be subject to 
uncomfortable questions on cross-examination.  This is true.  
Such is the nature of our adversarial process.  Undoubtedly, the 
decision to call a parent to testify will at times be a 
difficult one to make because of what may come out during the 
rigors of cross-examination.  Yet families must make countless 
trying choices over the course of a lifetime.  In enacting § 20, 
Fourth, the Legislature recognized the ability of families -- 
presumably with the aid of counsel -- to make one more. 
 
Conclusion.  The order of the Juvenile Court denying the 
Commonwealth's motion to prohibit the defendant's mother from 
testifying is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.