Title: Biggers v. Fox
Citation: 456 So. 2d 761
Docket Number: 54404
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: September 26, 1984

456 So. 2d 761 (1984) Marc A. BIGGERS v. John H. FOX, III. No. 54404. Supreme Court of Mississippi. September 26, 1984. Heber A. Ladner, Jr., Thomas Y. Page, Upshaw &amp; Ladner, Jackson, for appellant. James W. Newman, III, Jackson, for appellee. Before BOWLING, HAWKINS and SULLIVAN, JJ. *762 HAWKINS, Justice, for the Court: Attorney Marc Biggers appeals from a summary judgment in favor of John H. Fox, III in the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County. We find there are unresolved questions of law and of fact, and that the chancellor was premature in rendering summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse. In 1979 Biggers was an attorney employed in the law firm of Fox. They reduced to writing their agreement on the division of a fee payable unto Fox under a contract with a client. Thereafter, a partnership was formed between the two of them, which was later dissolved. On March 24, 1981, Biggers wrote the following agreement: Fox paid Biggers the $5,000 in four monthly installments. No payment was made on the 1979 agreement after 1981. *763 On June 22, 1982, Biggers filed suit against Fox for specific performance and an injunction to compel him to pay the sums due under the 1979 agreement. On July 27, 1981, Fox answered, and also filed a motion for summary judgment. Attached to his motion were the above agreements, copies of four cancelled checks for $1,250 each, and the following affidavit: Hearing on the motion was set for August 10, 1982. On that date Biggers for the first time filed a counter-affidavit. The chancellor ruled that Rule 56(c) required the opposing affidavit to be filed prior to the day of the hearing,[1] and excluded Biggers' affidavit from consideration on the motion. The chancellor then held that there was no genuine issue of any material fact and Fox was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. While not intimating their ultimate meaning or effect, we find the two agreements contradictory and ambiguous. The affidavit of Fox, concluding that payment of $5,000 was an accord and satisfaction, failed to give of his own personal knowledge all the essential facts necessary to constitute an accord and satisfaction. See: Lovorn v. Iron Woods Products Corp., 362 So. 2d 196 (Miss. 1978). All issues can be resolved in a trial. There is no necessity to address whether the chancellor erred in refusing to consider the counter-affidavit. We will say this: when an attorney is aware that affidavits are needed by a court to reach a decision, it is neither fair to the court nor opposing counsel to wait until the hearing date to file the affidavit. We will not be kindly disposed to an attorney who charges error on the part of a judge who refused to consider such an affidavit, especially if it contains affirmative allegations. We reverse and remand for hearing on the merits.[2] REVERSED AND REMANDED. WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., and BOWLING, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON and SULLIVAN, JJ., concur. PATTERSON, C.J., not participating. [1] Rule 56(c) is as follows: Motions and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of the hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone, although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. [2] Neither have we been called upon to address the appropriateness of a Chancery Court for this lawsuit.