Title: Joel Diaz v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC01-278
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 11, 2003

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC01-278
____________
JOEL DIAZ, 
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[September 11, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
We review a judgment and sentence of death after the conviction of first-
degree murder of Joel Diaz.  We have jurisdiction.  See Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.
Const.  For the reasons expressed below, we affirm Diaz's conviction and sentence
of death.
I.
Diaz and Lissa Shaw dated for about two years.  During the second year of
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their relationship, they lived in Diaz's home with Lissa's young daughter.  The
relationship proved “rocky,” however, and around August 1997 Lissa moved in
with her parents, Charles and Barbara Shaw.  After she moved out, Diaz tried to
see her, but she refused all contact.  The two last spoke to each other in September
1997. 
On October 6, Diaz purchased a Rossi .38 special revolver from a local
pawn shop.  He was eager to buy the gun, but because of a mandatory three-day
waiting period, could not take it with him.  Three days later, Diaz returned to the
pawn shop to retrieve the gun, but it could not be released to him because his
background check remained pending.  Diaz was irritated, and continued to call the
shop nearly every day until he was cleared.  On October 16, Diaz finally was
allowed to take the gun.
On October 27, Diaz asked his brother Jose, who was living with him at the
time, for a ride to a friend's house the next morning.  Sometime that night or early
the next morning, Diaz wrote a letter to his brother, which the police later
discovered in his bedroom.  It reads:
Jose [f]irst I want to apologize for using you or to lieing to you to take
me where you did I felt so bad but there was no other way.  Theres no
way to explain what I have to do but I have to confront the woman
who betrayed me and ask her why because not knowing is literly [sic]
killing me.  What happens then is up to her.
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If what happen is what I predict than I want you to tell our
family that I love them so much.  Believe me I regret having to do this
and dieing knowing I broke my moms heart and my makes it even
harder but I cant go on like this it’s to much pain.  Well I guess that all
theres to say I love you all.  
Joel
P.S. Someone let my dad know just because we werent close
doesn’t mean I don’t love him because I do.
At 5:30 a.m. on October 28, Diaz’s brother and his brother's girlfriend drove
him to the entrance of the Cross Creek Estates subdivision, where the Shaws lived. 
Diaz carried his new gun, which was loaded, and replacement ammunition in his
pocket.  Diaz walked to the Shaws’ house and waited outside for about ten
minutes.
At 6:30 a.m., Lissa Shaw left for work.  She entered her car, which was
parked in the garage, started the engine, and remotely opened the garage door.  She
saw someone slip under the garage door, and when she turned, Diaz stood at her
window, pointing the gun at her head.  He told her to get out of the car.  She
pleaded with him not to hurt her.  When she saw that “the situation was not going
anywhere,” she told him, “Okay, okay, hold on a second, let me get my stuff,” and
leaned down as if retrieving personal items.  She then shoved the gear into reverse
and stepped on the gas pedal.  Diaz started shooting.  Lissa heard three shots, but
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did not realize she had been hit.  As she continued backing out, the car struck an
island behind the driveway.  She then put the car into forward drive.  As she drove
away, she saw Diaz in the front yard pointing the gun at her father, Charles Shaw. 
Charles was about five feet from Diaz, pointing and walking toward him.  Lissa
drove herself to the hospital where it was discovered she had been shot in the neck
and shoulder.
Charles and Diaz then had some sort of confrontation in the front yard and
an altercation in the garage, resulting in Diaz chasing Charles into the master
bedroom where Barbara was lying in bed.  A quadriplegic, Barbara could not move
from the bed.
As the two men moved through the house, Barbara heard Charles saying,
“Calm down, put it down, come on, calm down, take it easy.”  Barbara was able to
roll back to see Diaz standing in the bedroom with a gun.  He was standing on one
side of a chest of drawers, closer to the door, while Charles was standing on the
other side of the chest, closer to the bathroom.  Charles talked to Diaz, telling him
to calm down and put down the gun.  Diaz held the gun with two hands, pointing it
straight at Charles, about six to eight inches from Charles's chest.  Diaz pulled the
trigger, but the gun, out of ammunition, only clicked.  Charles visibly relaxed, but
Diaz reloaded the gun.  When Charles realized Diaz was reloading, he ran into the
1.  At some point during the incident, a neighbor walked up to the Shaws'
house.  When he approached, both the garage door and the door leading from the
garage to the inside of the house were open.  The man saw an individual pacing
back and forth inside the home, and as he entered the garage, he called out for
Charles.  Diaz then stepped into the garage, pointed the gun at the man, and said,
"Get the f- - - out of here."  The neighbor returned to his house and called police.
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bathroom.  Diaz followed.  As Charles turned to face him, Diaz fired three shots. 
Charles's knees buckled, and he grabbed his midsection and fell face first to the
floor. 
Diaz went back into the bedroom and stood beside Barbara, holding the gun. 
Barbara screamed, “Why did you do this?”  Diaz answered that Charles deserved
to die.  He stood in the bedroom from 30 seconds to a minute, then returned to the
bathroom, bent over Charles's body, extended his right arm, and shot Charles
again.  He then moved his arm left, which Barbara judged to be toward Charles's
head, and shot again.  Diaz returned to the bedroom and, according to Barbara,
said, “If that bitch of a daughter of yours, if I could have got her, I wouldn't have
had to kill your husband.”  
Diaz remained in the house between 45 minutes and an hour.  He spent some
of this time talking to Barbara in the bedroom, where he passed the gun from hand
to hand and unloaded and loaded the gun about three or four times.  He remained in
the house until the police arrived and arrested him.1 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
3.  The aggravating factors were: (1) the capital felony was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (great weight); (2) the capital felony was
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of
moral or legal justification (CCP) (great weight); and (3) the defendant was
previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving use or threat
of violence to the person (great weight).
4.  The mitigating factors were: (1) the defendant had no significant history of
prior criminal activity (very little weight); (2) the murder was committed while the
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance
(moderate weight); (3) the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially
impaired (very little weight); (4) the age of the defendant at the time of the crime
(moderate weight); and (5) the existence of any other factors in the defendant's
background that would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty: (a) the
defendant was remorseful (very little weight); and (b) the defendant's family history
of violence (moderate weight).
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The jury found Diaz guilty of the first-degree murder of Charles Shaw, the
attempted first-degree murder of Lissa Shaw, and aggravated assault with a firearm
on the neighbor.  After penalty phase proceedings, the jury recommended a
sentence of death by a vote of nine to three.  After a Spencer2 hearing, the trial
court found three aggravating circumstances3 and five statutory mitigating
circumstances,4 and sentenced Diaz to death.
Diaz raises three issues on appeal:  (1) whether the trial court erred in finding
and instructing the jury on the HAC aggravating factor; (2) whether the trial court
erred in finding and instructing the jury on the CCP aggravating factor; and (3)
5.  Diaz also argues that circumstantial evidence corroborates his testimony
that he lost control after Charles Shaw struck him in the face in the garage. 
However, because Diaz's claim is essentially that this circumstantial evidence
negates a finding of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) and cold, calculated,
and premeditated (CCP) aggravating factors and therefore affects the
proportionality of his death sentence, we address this claim in the remaining issues. 
Also, as explained below, we note that whether an altercation in the garage furnishes
circumstantial evidence that the victim struck Diaz in the face is ultimately irrelevant
given the substantial evidence surrounding Diaz's intent to go to the Shaw's house
on the morning of October 28 to commit murder.  
6.  We reject Diaz's claim that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on
this aggravator.  A court may give a requested jury instruction on an aggravating
circumstance if the evidence adduced at trial is legally sufficient to support a finding
of that circumstance.  Ford v. State, 802 So. 2d 1121, 1133 (Fla. 2001), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 1103 (2002).  Instead, we review whether substantial competent
evidence supports this finding.  
-7-
whether the death sentence is disproportionate.5  Although Diaz does not contest
the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction of first-degree murder, we must
nevertheless independently determine whether the evidence is sufficient.  
See Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1998); Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(h). 
Based on our review, we find that there is competent, substantial evidence to
support the verdict.  We have outlined that evidence in detail above.  
II.
Diaz first argues that the trial court erred in finding and instructing the jury on
the HAC aggravating factor.6  When evaluating claims alleging error in the
application of aggravating factors, this Court does not reweigh the evidence to
-8-
determine whether the State proved each factor beyond a reasonable doubt.  See
Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d 148, 160 (Fla. 1998).  Rather, we must “determine
whether the trial court applied the right rule of law for each aggravating
circumstance and, if so, whether competent substantial evidence supports its
finding.”  Id. (quoting Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997)).
In determining the circumstances in which the HAC aggravating factor is
intended to apply, we must remember the genesis for this statutory aggravating
factor, as well as all other aggravating factors found in Florida’s death penalty
statute.  See § 921.141(5), Fla. Stat. (2001).  In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), and subsequent decisions, the United States Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional the death penalty statutes existing in most states, including Florida. 
The Supreme Court held that the death penalty in those states, by leaving too much
discretion to the individual judge in deciding whether to impose the death penalty,
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 239-
40.  In reaction, many states, including Florida, amended their statutes to include
certain “aggravating factors” that would distinguish between routine murders (if any
murder may be called routine) and those exhibiting a heightened sense of depravity,
for which a sentence of death would be appropriate.  
The statutory provision listing the HAC aggravating factor provides that for
7.  Perhaps because of our practice of using the acronym “HAC” for this
aggravator, we have not consistently recognized that the capital felony must be
“especially” heinous, atrocious, or cruel, as section 921.141(5)(h) explicitly
provides.  See, e.g., Bowles v. State, 804 So. 2d 1173, 1176 (Fla. 2001)
(discussing aggravator but not mentioning the word “especially”), cert. denied, 536
U.S. 930 (2002); Rogers v. State, 783 So. 2d 980, 994 (Fla. 2001) (same). 
“Especially” or “especial” is defined as “of special note or importance, unusually
great or significant.”  Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 396 (10th ed. 1994).  A more
proper acronym for this aggravator may be “EHAC.”  
-9-
this factor to apply, the capital felony must be “especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel.”  § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1997) (emphasis added).  See also Amoros v.
State, 531 So. 2d 1256, 1260 (Fla. 1988) (“First-degree murder is a heinous crime;
however, this statutory aggravating circumstance requires the incident to be
'especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel [sic].'”); Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908,
910 (Fla. 1975) (“It is apparent that all killings are atrocious . . . . Still, we believe
that the Legislature intended something 'especially' heinous, atrocious, or cruel
when it authorized the death penalty for first degree murder.”).7  Recognizing that
all murders, by their very nature, are in some way either heinous, or atrocious, or
cruel, this provision is designed to identify those murders that, because of their
heightened depravity, deserve imposition of a death sentence.  See Tuilaepa v.
California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994) (explaining that the aggravating circumstance
“may not apply to every defendant convicted of a murder; it must apply only to a
subclass of defendants convicted of murder”).  As we stated in State v. Dixon, 283
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So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973), just months after the Florida Legislature amended the death
penalty statute to conform with Furman and its progeny:
It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or
shockingly evil; that atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile;
and, that cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with
utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others.
What is intended to be included are those capital crimes where the
actual commission of the capital felony was accompanied by such
additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital
felonies--the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily
torturous to the victim.
We therefore have held that for this factor to apply, the murder must be
conscienceless or pitiless and unnecessarily torturous to the victim.  Buckner v.
State, 714 So. 2d 384, 390 (Fla. 1998); Hartley v. State, 686 So. 2d 1316, 1323
(Fla. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 825 (1997).
We have consistently held that instantaneous or near instantaneous deaths by
gunshot, unaccompanied by additional acts to mentally or physically torture the
victim, are not especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  See Rimmer v. State, 825
So. 2d 304, 327-28 (Fla. 2002) (finding that evidence did not support HAC where
the record did not reveal that the defendant tortured the victims or subjected them
to pain and suffering), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 567 (2002); Donaldson v. State, 722
So. 2d 177, 186-87 (Fla. 1998) (striking HAC where the defendant forced the
victims into a house at gunpoint and, along with accomplices, interrogated them for
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several hours before handing the gun to an accomplice to shoot the victims); Ferrell
v. State, 686 So. 2d 1324, 1330 (Fla. 1996) (“Execution-style killings are not
generally HAC unless the state has presented other evidence to show some physical
or mental torture of the victim.”); Robinson v. State, 574 So. 2d 108, 112 (Fla.
1991) (holding that the trial court erred in finding HAC because the fatal shot to the
victim “was not accompanied by additional acts setting it apart from the norm of
capital felonies, and there was no evidence that it was committed 'to cause the
victim unnecessary and prolonged suffering'”).  In other words, “a murder by
shooting, when it is ordinary in the sense that it is not set apart from the norm of
premeditated murders, is as a matter of law not [especially] heinous, atrocious, or
cruel.”  Lewis v. State, 398 So. 2d 432, 438 (Fla. 1981).
In this case, competent substantial evidence does not support a finding that
this factor applies.  We first note that portions of the sentencing order finding HAC
are not supported by competent substantial evidence.  The sentencing order
repeatedly states that Diaz “slowly reloaded” the revolver as the victim retreated
into the bathroom.  The trial testimony, however, indicated simply that Diaz
reloaded the gun while the victim ran into the bathroom, not that he did so
“slowly.”
More problematic is the trial court's characterization of the medical
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examiner's testimony.  The trial court found that the “first three shots to the
abdomen and calf were not immediately fatal and were survivable,” and the medical
examiner “stated that the final two shots at Mr. Shaw were to the upper chest and
the back of the head.”  These findings are not supported in the record.  The
medical examiner, Dr. Huser, described five gunshot wounds, but could not
determine their sequence.  Dr. Huser did not state that the first three shots were to
the abdomen and calf, or that the final two shots were to the upper chest and the
back of the head.
This Court has struck the HAC aggravator in substantially similar cases
where no evidence showed that the defendant intended to cause the victim
unnecessary and prolonged suffering.  For example, in Bonifay v. State, 626 So. 2d
1310 (Fla. 1993), the defendant and another man each shot the victim once in the
body from outside the store where the victim was working.  The defendant and his
accomplice then entered the store and broke open cash boxes.  During this time the
victim was lying on the floor begging for his life and talking about his wife and
children.  The defendant told the victim to shut up and fatally shot him twice in the
head.  We found that these facts did not support the HAC aggravator, noting that
“[t]he fact that the victim begged for his life or that there were multiple gunshots is
an inadequate basis to find [HAC] absent evidence that Bonifay intended to cause
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the victim unnecessary and prolonged suffering.”  Id. at 1313.  See also Buckner,
714 So. 2d at 390 (concluding that the trial court erred in finding HAC because the
entire episode took only a few minutes and no evidence reflected that the defendant
intended to subject the victim to any prolonged or torturous suffering); Hartley, 686
So. 2d at 1323 (rejecting a finding of HAC where the medical examiner could not
determine the order in which the shots had been fired, no evidence showed that the
defendant deliberately shot the victim to cause him unnecessary suffering, and the
evidence reflected that the murder was carried out quickly); Kearse v. State, 662
So. 2d 677, 686 (Fla. 1995) (rejecting HAC where the victim sustained extensive
injuries from numerous gunshot wounds because no evidence showed that the
defendant intended to cause the victim unnecessary and prolonged suffering);
Wickham v. State, 593 So. 2d 191, 192 (Fla. 1991) (finding that the facts did not
support HAC where the defendant shot the victim in the chest, the victim pled for
his life, and the defendant then shot victim twice in the head).  We have also held
that the mere act of reloading a gun does not justify a finding of HAC.  See
Hamilton v. State, 678 So. 2d 1228, 1232 (Fla. 1996) (noting the fact that the gun
was reloaded does not, without more, establish an intent to inflict a high degree of
pain or otherwise torture the victim); Clark v. State, 609 So. 2d 513, 514 (Fla.
1992) (“The fact that it took more than one shot to kill this victim does not set this
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crime apart from the norm of capital felonies, and there is no indication that the
crime was committed in such a manner as to cause unnecessary and prolonged
suffering to the victim.”).  
Here, the murder was carried out quickly, the medical examiner could not
determine the order in which the shots had been fired, and the fact that the gun was
reloaded does not, without more, establish an intent to inflict a high degree of pain
or otherwise torture the victim.  Therefore, we conclude that under the particular
circumstances of this case the trial court erred in finding the HAC aggravating
factor.  We find this error harmless, however, after consideration of the two
remaining aggravating circumstances and the five mitigating circumstances in this
case.  See Hill v. State, 643 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1994) (“When this court
strikes one or more aggravating circumstances relied upon by a trial judge in
sentencing a defendant to death, we may conduct a harmless error analysis based
on what the sentencer actually found in determining whether the sentence of death is
still appropriate.”).
III.
Diaz next argues that the trial court erred in finding and instructing the jury on
8.  We reject Diaz's claim that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on
this factor.  As noted above, a trial court may give a requested jury instruction on
an aggravating circumstance if the evidence adduced at trial is legally sufficient to
support a finding of that circumstance.  Ford, 802 So. 2d at 1133.  Instead, we
review whether substantial competent evidence supports this finding.
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the CCP aggravating factor.8  Again, we note that when evaluating claims alleging
error in the application of aggravators, this Court does not reweigh evidence to
determine whether the State proved each factor beyond a reasonable doubt.  See
Alston, 723 So. 2d at 160.  Rather, our function simply is “to determine whether
the trial court applied the right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance and, if
so, whether competent substantial evidence supports its finding.”  Id. (quoting
Willacy, 696 So. 2d at 695).
To establish CCP, the evidence must show “that the killing was the product
of cool and calm reflection and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or
a fit of rage (cold), . . . that the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design
to commit murder before the fatal incident (calculated), . . . that the defendant
exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated), and that the defendant had no
pretense of moral or legal justification.”  Jackson v. State, 648 So. 2d 85, 89 (Fla.
1994) (citations omitted).  Diaz concedes the fourth prong.  
A.
Diaz first argues the trial court applied the wrong rule of law by using, and by
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allowing the jury to use, the theory of transferred intent to support this aggravator. 
We disagree.  We addressed a similar issue in Provenzano v. State, 497 So. 2d
1177 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987).  In Provenzano, the
defendant planned to kill two police officers who had arrested him for disorderly
conduct.  Armed with three loaded guns, Provenzano went to the courthouse for
his trial.  A bailiff was instructed to search him, but when Provenzano reached into
his pocket, the bailiff started to grab him and Provenzano shot the bailiff in the
face.  Provenzano then chased and fired at least two shots at a corrections officer. 
Hearing the shooting, a bailiff from an adjacent courtroom heard the shots and ran
into the hallway.  Provenzano shot and killed him.  Id. at 1180.  On appeal,
Provenzano contended that the CCP factor did not apply because proof that he
planned to kill the police officers who had arrested him was irrelevant to finding
enhanced premeditation to kill the bailiff.  We disagreed, finding that the heightened
premeditation necessary for this circumstance “does not have to be directed
toward the specific victim.  Rather, as the statute indicates, if the murder was
committed in a manner that was cold and calculated, the aggravating circumstance
of heightened premeditation is applicable.”  Id. at 1183.
Similarly, in Sweet v. State, 624 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 1993), the defendant
argued that the trial court erred in finding CCP where the victim was not the subject
-17-
of the planning.  In affirming the trial court’s finding, we noted that “the key to this
factor is the level of preparation, not the success or failure of the plan, and we
therefore reject Sweet's argument that because there were survivors of the shooting
this aggravator is not applicable.”  Id. at 1142.  See also Howell v. State, 707 So.
2d 674, 682 (Fla. 1998) (rejecting the defendant's challenge to the CCP aggravator
because the heightened premeditation necessary for CCP need not be directed
toward the specific victim); Bell v. State, 699 So. 2d 674, 677-78 (Fla. 1997)
(finding CCP valid although the victims were not the subjects of the planning
because the heightened premeditation necessary for a CCP finding does not have to
be directed toward the specific victim).  Because it is clear that the heightened
premeditation necessary to find the CCP factor need not be directed toward the
specific victim, we find that the trial court did not err by using the theory of
transferred intent in this case.  
B.
Diaz also argues the trial court erred in finding the murder to be cold and
calculated.  We find that competent substantial evidence supports the trial court's
finding.
To satisfy the “cold” prong of CCP, the killing must be the product of cool
and calm reflection and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of
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rage.  Jackson, 648 So. 2d at 89 (citing Richardson v. State, 604 So. 2d 1107, 1109
(Fla. 1992)).  This element generally has been found absent only for “heated”
murders of passion, in which the loss of emotional control is evident from the
facts.  See Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381, 387-88 (Fla. 1994).  The “calculated”
prong requires “that the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design to
commit murder before the fatal incident.”  Jackson, 648 So. 2d at 89.
The events that ended in Mr. Shaw's murder demonstrate both the cold and
calculated prongs of CCP.  We disagree with Diaz’s argument that this incident
was a heated murder of passion committed by a young man under intense
emotional pressure.  The murder occurred more than one month after Diaz had last
spoken with Lissa.  The attenuation between this contact and the murder shows that
Diaz's decision to confront Lissa on October 28 was not prompted by a sudden,
emotional reaction to the status of their relationship.  Also, Diaz purchased and
took possession of a firearm with ammunition several days before the murder.  He
outlined his plan in a letter to his brother the previous night, stating that he had to
“confront the woman who betrayed me and ask her why because not knowing is
literaly [sic] killing me.”  He then took his gun and several rounds of replacement
ammunition to the Shaws’ house.  These facts show that Diaz calculated his actions
long before the morning of October 28.  They also demonstrate why we disagree
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with Diaz's assertion that the altercation with the victim in the garage negates CCP. 
Circumstantial evidence of an altercation between Diaz and the victim is simply not
enough to vitiate CCP in light of the ample evidence of Diaz's calculated planning
on the days preceding the murder.
Moreover, Diaz was aware of Lissa's schedule.  Knowing that she left her
parents' house at 6:30 a.m. for work, he asked his brother for a ride to a friend's
house at 5:30 that morning.  He then waited outside the house until the garage door
opened, slipped under the door as it was going up, and confronted Lissa as she sat
in her car.  Finally, Diaz's statement to Barbara Shaw that “if that bitch of a
daughter of yours, if I could have got her, I wouldn't have had to kill your
husband” is evidence of a calculated plan to kill Lissa Shaw.  Taken together, this
evidence shows a careful plan or prearranged design to commit murder.  See, e.g.,
Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100 (1989)
(CCP murder can be indicated by the circumstances showing such facts as
advance procurement of a weapon, lack of resistance or provocation, and the
appearance of a killing carried out as a matter of course).
Our decision in Amoros v. State, 531 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 1988), on which
Diaz relies, is distinguishable.  In Amoros, we found insufficient evidence to
establish CCP because the defendant did not know the victim and shot him within
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two minutes after entering the premises for the purpose of confronting and
probably shooting his former girlfriend.  Id. at 1260.  This Court found that the
only evidence of a plan was Amoros's threat to his former girlfriend, and no
evidence established that Amoros knew the victim when he entered the apartment or
was aware that the victim was residing with his former girlfriend.  Id.  Here, there
was ample evidence of Diaz's plan and evidence that Diaz knew the victim resided
in the house.  
IV.
Finally, Diaz argues that his death sentence is disproportionate.  Due to the
uniqueness and finality of death, this Court addresses the propriety of all death
sentences in a proportionality review.  See Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064
(Fla. 1990).  In deciding whether death is a proportionate penalty and to ensure
uniformity in the imposition of the death sentence, this Court reviews and considers
all the circumstances in a case in relation to other capital cases.  See Johnson v.
State, 720 So. 2d 232, 238 (Fla. 1998); Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416-17 (Fla.
1998).  The death penalty is reserved for cases where the most aggravating and the
least mitigating circumstances exist.  See Kramer v. State, 619 So. 2d 274, 278
(Fla. 1993).  When compared to other decisions of this Court, the death sentence in
this case is proportionate.
9.  We note that “this Court has never approved a 'domestic dispute'
exception to the imposition of the death penalty.”  Spencer v. State, 691 So. 2d
1062, 1065 (Fla. 1996).  
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Although we have rejected the trial court's finding of HAC, two valid
aggravators remain: (1) the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification; and (2) the
defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony
involving use or threat of violence to the person.  As we noted in Dixon, “When
one or more of the aggravating circumstances is found, death is presumed to be the
proper sentence unless it or they are overridden by one or more of the mitigating
circumstances . . . .”  283 So. 2d at 9.  CCP is one of the “most serious
aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme.”  Larkins v. State, 739 So.
2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999). The trial court also found five statutory mitigating
circumstances.  See supra note 4.
Diaz argues that this Court has consistently found death sentences
disproportionate when the heated and emotional nature of the case negates cold
calculation.  Diaz cites cases holding that, in some circumstances, “the fact that the
. . . killing arose from a domestic dispute tends to negate cold, calculated
premeditation.”  Santos v. State, 591 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. 1991).9  We already
have found, however, that this murder was cold and calculated.  This case is not
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properly characterized as a “heated, domestic confrontation,” or even as an
incident resulting from a domestic dispute.  At the time of the murder, Diaz and
Lissa Shaw no longer lived together, were not involved in a relationship, and in fact,
had not spoken for over a month.  Moreover, Diaz planned to murder Lissa with no
purported domestic provocation, such as a new love interest in Lissa's life.  Simply
because Diaz and Lissa Shaw once had a domestic relationship does not transform
this case into a “domestic dispute.”
Even if this case were properly characterized as a domestic dispute, we have
upheld the imposition of the death penalty in such circumstances.  See, e.g., Pope
v. State, 679 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1996) (finding defendant's death sentence
proportionate for beating and stabbing death of girlfriend where there were two
aggravators, both statutory mental mitigators, and several nonstatutory mitigators).
After thoroughly reviewing the circumstances in this case and comparing
them to other cases, we find Diaz's death sentence proportionate.  See, e.g.,
Shellito v. State, 701 So. 2d 837, 845 (Fla. 1997) (concluding death sentence
proportional in a shooting death where trial court properly found two aggravators –
prior violent felony conviction and pecuniary gain/commission during a robbery –
and nonstatutory mitigation consisting of alcohol abuse, a mildly abusive
childhood, difficulty reading, and a learning disability); Hudson v. State, 538 So. 2d
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829, 831 (Fla. 1989) (upholding death sentence where defendant entered his ex-
girlfriend's house two months after breaking up with her and killed her roommate,
and the trial court properly found two aggravators – previous conviction of a
violent felony and murder committed during an armed burglary – and three
statutory mitigators).
V.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Diaz's conviction for the first-degree
murder of Charles Shaw and the imposition of a sentence of death.  
It is so ordered.
WELLS, QUINCE, and CANTERO, JJ., concur.
LEWIS, J., concurs as to the conviction and concurs in result only as to the
sentence.
PARIENTE, J., concurs as to the conviction and dissents as to the sentence with
an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, C.J., and SHAW, Senior Justice, concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., concurring as to the conviction and dissenting as to the sentence. 
I concur in the affirmance of the conviction.  I also agree that the HAC
aggravator should be stricken, and thus concur in Part II of the majority opinion. 
However, I dissent from the affirmance of the death sentence for two reasons. 
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First, I cannot conclude that the trial court's reliance on the invalid HAC aggravator
is harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.  Second, I disagree with the Court's
determination in Part III of the majority opinion that competent, substantial
evidence supports the CCP aggravator under the theory of transferred intent.
HAC AND HARMFUL ERROR
I do not agree that after striking the HAC aggravator, on which the jury was
instructed and which the trial court found, this Court can state beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error did not contribute to the imposition of the death penalty. 
Under Hill v. State, 643 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1994), which is cited by the
majority, error in finding an impermissible aggravator can only be harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt if there is "no reasonable possibility" that the evidence
presented in mitigation is sufficient to outweigh the remaining aggravators.  
In this case, there was a nine-to-three vote on the advisory sentence and 
substantial mitigation, including the finding that the murder was committed while the
defendant was under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, the age of the
defendant at the time of the offense, and the defendant's lack of a significant history
of prior criminal activity.  Thus, the erroneous submission of the weighty
10.  One of the remaining aggravators, prior violent felony convictions,
carries less weight when, as in this case, it is not based on a significant history of
violent crimes.  See Hess v. State, 794 So. 2d 1249, 1266 (Fla. 2001). 
-25-
aggravator of HAC10 to the jury and the trial court's reliance on HAC in the
sentencing order cannot be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in their effect on
the jury recommendation and imposition of the death penalty.  Consequently, I
believe that striking the HAC aggravator alone requires that we reverse Diaz's
sentence and remand for a new penalty phase.
CCP AND TRANSFERRED INTENT
I would also strike the CCP aggravator because the doctrine of transferred
intent, relied on by the majority, is not applicable in this case.  Diaz clearly acted
with heightened premeditation in planning the killing of his former girlfriend, Lissa
Shaw, and seriously wounded her in committing attempted murder as she fled from
Diaz when he confronted her at her parents' home.  The murder of her father,
Charles Shaw, occurred some minutes later, after a confrontation that began in the
yard and then moved to the garage and a bedroom of the Shaw home.  
Diaz did not shoot Charles Shaw in the course of the attempted murder of
Lissa.  Diaz's first attempt to shoot Charles failed because his gun was out of
ammunition.  Diaz reloaded his weapon, followed Charles into the bathroom of the
house, and shot him three times.  These actions provide ample evidence of a killing
-26-
upon reflection that establishes the element of premeditation in the first-degree
murder of Charles Shaw independently from the heightened premeditation
supporting the attempted murder of Lissa Shaw.  In other words, there is no need
in this case to rely on Diaz's premeditated intent to kill Lissa as a basis for finding a
premeditated intent to kill Charles.
In my view, the statutory provision defining CCP and the standard jury
instruction thereon require that the heightened premeditation supporting CCP arise
from the element of "premeditated design" supporting the conviction of first-degree
murder under section 782.04(1)(a)1, Florida Statutes (1997).  Section 921.141(5)(I),
Florida Statutes (1997), defines the CCP aggravator as follows:
The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold,
calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or 
legal justification.
The standard jury instruction on CCP, given in this case, provides:
[As I have previously defined for you] a killing is "premeditated" if it
occurs after the defendant consciously decides to kill.  The decision
must be present in the mind at the time of the killing.  The law does not
fix the exact period of time that must pass between the formation of
the premeditated intent to kill and the killing.  The period of time must
be long enough to allow reflection by the defendant.  The premeditated
intent to kill must be formed before the killing.
However, in order for this aggravating circumstance to apply, a
heightened level of premeditation, demonstrated by a substantial
period of reflection, is required.
-27-
Fla. Std. Jury Inst. (Crim.) 7.11.  Under both the statutory provision and the jury
instruction, the premeditated intent supporting the CCP aggravator is the same
premeditation underlying the murder conviction, raised to a higher level.  
In my view, the murder of Charles Shaw does not meet the definition of CCP
because it arose from a separate premeditated intent fueled by the defendant's failed
attempt to either reconcile with or kill Lissa Shaw, rather than the heightened
premeditation that would have supported CCP had Diaz succeeded in killing Lissa. 
Precedent in which we have approved a CCP finding based on transferred intent is
consistent with this view.  
In Provenzano v. State, 497 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1986), the defendant killed a
bailiff in a shooting spree when another bailiff attempted to stop Provenzano from
reaching into his pocket for a weapon he had brought into a courtroom to
effectuate his plan to kill the officers who had arrested him.  This Court recognized
that the facts did not fit the usual scenario for transferred intent, such as "when a
defendant aims and shoots at A intending to kill him but instead misses and kills B."
Id. at 1180.  However, we held that the transferred intent doctrine supported the
first-degree murder conviction because the premeditated design to kill the two
officers "directly resulted in the death of another human being." Id. at 1811.  In
approving the finding of CCP based on the same evidence, we stated:
-28-
Heightened premeditation necessary for this circumstance does not
have to be directed toward the specific victim. Rather, as the statute
indicates, if the murder was committed in a manner  that was cold and
calculated, the aggravating circumstance of heightened premeditation is
applicable. (Emphasis supplied.) The facts herein indicate that the
manner in which Provenzano effectuated his design of death was cold,
calculated and premeditated beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 1183.  In contrast, in this case the murder of Charles Shaw resulted indirectly
from the premeditated design to kill Lissa, and was not committed in a calculated
manner.  
Other cases in which we have approved a CCP finding are similarly 
distinguishable in that they involved a single act or course of conduct directly
harming an unintended victim.  In Sweet v. State, 624 So. 2d 1138, 1142 (Fla.
1993), the defendant shot and wounded Cofer, his intended victim, and killed a
neighbor while both were trying to escape an apartment Sweet was attempting to
enter.  This Court rejected Sweet's challenge to the CCP aggravator on grounds
that the person he killed was not the subject of his planning, and stated:  "Sweet
was probably surprised by the presence of Cofer's neighbors, and planning is not
the equivalent of shooting skill."  Id. at 1142.  In Howell v. State, 707 So. 2d 674
(Fla. 1998), this Court approved a CCP finding on evidence showing that a bomb
contained in a microwave oven, which was intended for a different victim, killed a
Florida Highway Patrol trooper during a roadside investigation.  Finally, Bell v.
11.  I note that the statement in Provenzano, "if the murder was committed in
a manner that was cold and calculated, the aggravating circumstance of heightened
premeditation is applicable," is inconsistent with section 921.141(5)(i), which
provides that CCP applies if the murder "was committed in a cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner."  (Emphasis supplied.)  Under the statute, heightened
premeditation must exist independently of whether the murder was committed in a
cold and calculated manner.
-29-
State, 699 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1997), involved a retribution killing of the wrong person
in a case of mistaken identity.  
Unlike these cases, the original murderous intent in this case did not directly
result in the death of another human being.  As reflected in the majority opinion,
after Diaz and Charles Shaw confronted one another in the yard and garage, Diaz
chased Charles into the master bedroom, pointed the gun at him and pulled the
trigger, reloaded the gun after it did not fire, followed Charles into the bathroom,
shot him three times, and then, after pausing thirty seconds to a minute, shot him
twice more, including once in the head.  See majority op. at 4-5.  These facts
demonstrate a premeditated intent that was separate from the failed attempt to kill
Lissa Shaw, and that did not reach the level of heightened premeditation.  Nor,
contrary to the conclusion in the majority opinion, was the killing committed in a
manner that can be deemed calculated.11  By his own statement to the victim's wife
at the time of the murder, Diaz decided to kill Charles Shaw only because his
attempt to murder Shaw's daughter failed.  See majority op. at 5. While Diaz may
-30-
have calculated the murder of Lissa, there is no evidence that he calculated the
murder of Charles.  Cf. Amoros v. State, 531 So. 2d 1256, 1261 (Fla. 1988)
(finding insufficient evidence that the defendant's plan to kill his former girlfriend
encompassed her housemate). 
Consistent with our precedent, the CCP finding should comport with the
purpose of the transferred intent rule: "to hold a defendant criminally liable to the
full extent of his or her criminal culpability."  State v. Fekete, 901 P.2d 708, 714
(N.M. 1995).  However, in this case the CCP determination holds Diaz fully
responsible in his killing of Charles for his heightened premeditation in the
attempted murder of Lissa, beyond the full extent of his criminal culpability.  As
stated in Mordica v. State, 618 So. 2d 301, 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), "[t]he
doctrine of transferred intent, by definition, operates to transfer the defendant's
intent as to the intended victim to the unintended victim, and nothing more."  In this
case, intent transfers as to the aggravator but not as to the element of premeditation
supporting the conviction of first-degree murder.  In my view, Diaz's conviction for
the murder of Charles rests on legally sufficient evidence of premeditation in the
confrontation between the two men after Lissa left the scene, whereas the
heightened premeditation necessary to establish CCP requires reliance on evidence
of a premeditated design to kill Lissa, which culminated in her attempted murder. 
-31-
In approving, for purposes of sentence aggravation, the transfer of an intent that
was unnecessary to prove the underlying crime, the majority employs the
transferred intent doctrine in a manner inconsistent with its purpose.  Therefore, I
would strike the CCP aggravator.
Invalidation of the HAC and CCP aggravating factors in this case leaves only
the single aggravating factor of a prior violent felony conviction, resting on the
attempted murder of Lissa and the burglary of the Shaws' home.  In light of the
substantial mitigation found by the trial court, I cannot conclude that the death
penalty is proportionate to other single-aggravator cases in which we have affirmed
sentences of death.  As a general rule, this Court affirms death sentences based on
a single aggravator either where there is little or nothing in mitigation, or where a
prior murder was involved.  See Almeida v. State, 748 So. 2d 922, 933 (Fla. 1999);
Jones v. State, 705 So. 2d 1364, 1366 (Fla. 1998).  Diaz was not previously
involved in a murder, and the trial court found six mitigators, including three
statutory mitigators, and gave three mitigators "moderate weight," including the
mitigator of commission of the capital crime under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance.  I would reduce Diaz's sentence to life imprisonment.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and SHAW, Senior Justice, concur.
-32-
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Lee County, 
Thomas S. Reese, Judge - Case No. 97-3305CF
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Steven L. Bolotin, Assistant Public
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida,
for Appellant
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Stephen D. Ake, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee