Title: Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kistler
Citation: 347 Pa. Super. 222, 500 A.2d 487
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: November 15, 1985

347 Pa. Superior Ct. 222 (1985) 500 A.2d 487 The SHELBY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Mark W. KISTLER and as Interested Parties: Mayme Reichard, Executrix of the Estate of Howard E. Reichard; Leon W. Mazurie and Clark M. Benfield, Individually and T/A Benfield Insurance Agency, Appellees. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued June 6, 1985. Filed November 15, 1985. *223 Mark H. Scoblionko, Allentown, for appellant. W. Hamlin Neely, Allentown, for Kistler, appellees. Before SPAETH, President Judge, and McEWEN and BECK, JJ. McEWEN, Judge: Appellant instituted a declaratory judgment action to determine whether it was obligated to provide insurance coverage or to afford a defense to appellee in litigation arising from a motor vehicle accident in which a vehicle driven by appellee allegedly struck and killed a pedestrian. The Chancellor, in this case of first impression, determined that the contract between appellant and appellee provided for automatic coverage during the relevant notice period. We affirm. The pertinent facts are not disputed and reveal that appellee purchased a 1969 Lincoln Continental automobile on October 9, 1981, at which time he also owned a 1973 Ford pick-up truck which was the subject of a motor vehicle insurance policy written by appellant. Seven days thereafter, on October 16, 1981, appellee was operating the newly purchased 1969 Lincoln Continental when his vehicle struck and killed a pedestrian. On November 14, 1981, *224 appellee provided for an agent of appellant to add liability coverage for the 1969 Lincoln Continental to the policy issued by appellant upon the 1973 Ford pick-up truck. The pertinent policy provision states: `Your covered auto' means: This provision applies only if you: The sole question presented by this appeal is: The distinguished Judge James N. Diefenderfer has, in his able opinion, clearly expressed the contentions of the parties, accurately stated the issue for determination and quite perceptively addressed as well as correctly ruled upon that question in the following portion of his able opinion: See, e.g., Republic Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 527 F.2d 1002, 1003 (4th Cir.W.Va., 1975); Inland Mutual Insurance Co. v. Stallings, 263 F.2d 852 (4th Cir.Md. 1959); Hall v. State *226 Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 268 F. Supp. 995, (D.C. S.C. 1966) aff'd 378 F.2d 371 (4th Cir.S.C. 1967); Brown v. Security Fire &amp; Indemnity Co., 244 F. Supp. 299 (W.D.Va. 1965); Canal Insurance Co. v. CIT Financial Services Corp., 357 So. 2d 308, 312 (Miss., 1978); Grant v. Emmco Services Corp., 295 N.C. 39, 52, 243 S.E.2d 894, 903 (1978); State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Carpenter, 116 N.H. 783, 784, 367 A.2d 609, 610 (1976); Baker v. Unigard Insurance Co., 269 Or. 204, 207, 523 P.2d 1257, 1259 (1974); Central National Insurance Co. v. Le Mars Mutual Insurance Co. of Iowa, 294 F. Supp. 1396, 1401 (S.D.Iowa, 1968); Consumers United Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 26 Wash. App. 795, 797, 614 P.2d 657, 659 (1980); Knotts v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 272 So. 2d 788, 790 (La. App., 1973); McCarty v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co., 27 Ohio App.2d 181, 183, 273 N.E.2d 345, 347 (1971); Pride v. State Farm Fire &amp; Casualty Insurance Co., 434 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Tex.Civ.App. 1968); Sheffield v. Aetna Casualty &amp; Surety, 57 Misc.2d 559, 293 N.Y.S.2d 213, 218 (1968); Patrick v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 90 N.J.Super. 442, 450, 217 A.2d 909, 914 (1966); National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Falciani, 87 N.J.Super. 157, 168, 208 A.2d 422, 430 (1965); Anno., Construction and Application of Automatic Insurance Clause or Substitution Provision of Automobile Liability or Indemnity Policy, 34 A.L.R.2d 936 (1954). Order affirmed. BECK, J., files a concurring statement. BECK, Judge, concurring: I join in the thoughtful opinion of the majority and write separately only to clarify one point. The majority, adopting the language of the well-reasoned trial court opinion, states: "The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law for the court. . . ." At 225. This statement is entirely proper in the context of the present case. However, for all purposes, it is too broad a proposition of law. J.D. Calamari &amp; J.M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts 124 (1977); see also Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Insurance Co., 503 Pa. 300, 469 A.2d 563, 566 (1983). I find the majority's opinion does not state a correct proposition of law inasmuch as it implies that the interpretation of the terms of an insurance policy is a question of law for the court in all circumstances. In all other respects however, I join the fine opinion of the majority.