Title: State v. Jeffrey B. Haines
Citation: 2003 WI 39
Docket Number: 2001AP001311-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 13, 2003

2003 WI 39 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-1311-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Jeffrey B. Haines,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 139 
Reported at:  256 Wis. 2d 226, 647 N.W.2d 311 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 13, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 13, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Vernon   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. Rosborough   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Mark A. Huesmann, Sonja Davig Huesmann, and Huesmann Law 
Office, Holmen, and oral argument by Mark A. Huesmann. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by William 
L. Gansner, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2003 WI 39 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-1311-CR   
(L.C. No. 
00-CF-61) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Jeffrey B. Haines,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 13, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   "[I]t is one thing to revive 
a prosecution already dead, and another to give it a longer 
lease of life."  Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420, 425-26 
(2d Cir. 1928).   
¶2 
At issue in this case is whether an extension of the 
time limit for prosecuting a child sexual assault violates the 
ex post facto clause of the Wisconsin Constitution when the 
statute of limitations is extended before the prior time 
No.  01-1311-CR   
 
2 
 
limitation for prosecution has expired.  We agree with the court 
of appeals1 and hold that it does not.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶3 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  On July 24, 2000, 
Jeffrey Haines (Haines) was charged with second-degree sexual 
assault of a child under the age of 16, in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) (1989-90).  According to the complaint, 
when Haines was 33 years old, he touched the breasts and vaginal 
area of his 14-year-old cousin, Nicole H., when the two were 
together during a hunting trip in 1992.  The complaint also 
alleged that Haines twice admitted the sexual contact to two 
police officers in 1993 and 2000.      
¶4 
At the time of the alleged child sexual assault, the 
applicable statute of limitations provided that a prosecution 
had to commence before the victim reached 21 years of age.  
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c) (1989-90).2  In 1994, about five years 
before 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations 
would 
have 
run, 
the 
legislature amended the limitations period under § 939.74(2)(c) 
(1989-90) and extended the time in which a prosecution could be 
commenced for a child sexual assault.  1993 Wis. Act 219, § 6.3  
                                                 
1 State v. Haines, 2002 WI App 139, 256 Wis. 2d 226, 647 
N.W.2d 311.   
2 Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c) 
(1989-90) 
provided: 
"A 
prosecution for violation of s. 948.02, 948.03, 948.04, 948.05, 
948.06, 948.07 or 948.08 may be commenced within the time period 
specified in sub. (1) or by the time the victim reaches the age 
of 21 years, whichever is later."   
3 1993 Wisconsin Act 219 provided:  
No.  01-1311-CR   
 
3 
 
The amended § 939.74(2)(c) (1993-94) provided that a child 
sexual assault must be prosecuted before a victim reaches 26 
years old.4  When Haines was charged in 2000, Nicole H. was 22 
years old.  Thus, Nicole H. was over 21, but under 26 when the 
prosecution was commenced.   
¶5 
In October 2000, Haines moved for dismissal, claiming 
that the prosecution was time-barred under the age 21 limitation 
that was in effect at the time of the alleged assault.  Haines 
also claimed that if the amended age 26 limitation applied, then 
it violated the ex post facto clause of Article 1, Section 12 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.5  The Circuit Court for Vernon 
County, Judge Michael J. Rosborough, found that the amended age 
26 statute of limitations, instead of the age 21 limitation, 
                                                                                                                                                             
The people of the state of Wisconsin, represented in 
senate and assembly, do enact as follows: 
 
SECTION 6.  939.74(2)(c) of the statutes is 
amended to read: 
939.74(2)(c)  A prosecution for violation of s. 
948.02, 948.03, 948.04, 948.05, 948.06, 948.07 or 
948.08 may shall be commenced within the time period 
specified in sub. (1) or by the time before the victim 
reaches the age of 21 26 years, whichever is later or 
be barred.   
4 Section 939.74(2)(c) was amended again in 1998 and 
currently provides that a prosecution under Wis. Stat. § 948.02 
must commence before a victim reaches the age of 31.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c) (2001-02).   
5 Article 1, Section 12 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
states: "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law 
impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed, and 
no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of 
estate."  
No.  01-1311-CR   
 
4 
 
applied to Haines.  Nevertheless, the circuit court granted 
Haines's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the amended 
statute of limitations violated the ex post facto clause of the 
Wisconsin Constitution when applied to Haines. 
¶6 
The State appealed, and the court of appeals reversed 
the circuit court's decision and order.  The court of appeals 
held that the circuit court was correct that the amended age 26 
statute of limitations applied to Haines, but held that applying 
the amended limitations period to Haines does not violate the ex 
post facto clause of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Haines 
petitioned this court for review of whether application of the 
amended 
age 
26 
statute 
of 
limitations 
under  
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c) (1993-94) violates the ex post facto 
clause of the Wisconsin Constitution.6  This court granted 
Haines's petition on September 26, 2002.                 
ANALYSIS 
¶7 
Analyzing whether application of an amended statute of 
limitations violates the ex post facto clause of the Wisconsin 
Constitution presents a question of law that this court reviews 
de novo.  Bd. of Regents v. Wis. Pers. Comm'n, 103 Wis. 2d 545, 
551, 309 N.W.2d 366 (Ct. App. 1981).   
¶8 
We first note, as did the court of appeals, that the 
proper limitations period to apply to Haines is the amended age 
                                                 
6 We note that Haines's challenge to the amended statute of 
limitations 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c) 
(1993-94) 
only 
pertains to whether it violates the ex post facto clause of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, not whether it violates the ex post 
facto clause of the United States Constitution.   
No.  01-1311-CR   
 
5 
 
26 statute of limitations, based on the language in 1993 Wis. 
Act 219, § 7 and Wis. Stat. § 990.06 (1999-2000).  Section 
990.06, which is entitled "Repeal or change of law limiting time 
for bringing actions," provides:  
In any case when a limitation or period of time 
prescribed in any act which shall be repealed for the 
acquiring of any right, or barring of any remedy, or 
for any other purpose shall have begun to run before 
such repeal and the repealing act shall provide any 
limitation or period of time for such purpose, such 
latter limitation or period shall apply only to such 
rights or remedies as shall accrue subsequently to the 
time when the repealing act shall take effect, and the 
act repealed shall be held to continue in force and be 
operative 
to 
determine 
all such 
limitations and 
periods of time which shall have previously begun to 
run 
unless 
such 
repealing 
act 
shall 
otherwise 
expressly provide. 
Wis. Stat. § 990.06 (1999-2000) (emphasis added) ("repeal" in 
this section includes "amendment," Poquette v. Cmty. State Bank, 
631 F. Supp. 1480 (W.D. Wis. 1986)).  In accordance with 
§ 990.06 (1999-2000), the legislature expressly provided that 
"section 939.74(2)(c) of the statutes first applies to offenses 
not barred from prosecution on the effective date of this 
subsection."  1993 Wis. Act 219, § 7.  The statute of 
limitations had not yet run for Haines as of the effective date 
of 
the 
amendment 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c) 
(1989-90).  
Accordingly, the amended age 26 limitations period applies to 
Haines, not the prior age 21 limitation.   
 
¶9 
We now turn to Haines's argument that application of 
the amended age 26 statute of limitations violates the ex post 
No.  01-1311-CR   
 
6 
 
facto clause.  An ex post facto law has been described as any 
law:  
"[1] which punishes as a crime an act previously 
committed, which was innocent when done; [2] which 
makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, 
after its commission; or [3] which deprives one 
charged with [a] crime of any defense available 
according to law at the time when the act was 
committed . . . ." 
State v. Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 695, 703, 524 N.W.2d 641 (1994) 
(quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990)); see 
also State v. Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d 502, 512-513, 509 N.W.2d 712 
(1994).  
¶10 Only the third consideration is at issue in this case; 
namely, whether the amended limitations period removed a defense 
that was available to Haines at the time the alleged child 
sexual assault was committed.     
¶11 Haines contends 
that 
application 
of 
the amended 
limitations period violates the ex post facto clause because 
statutes of limitation provide a "complete defense."  In support 
of his argument, Haines relies on State v. Pohlhammer, 78 
Wis. 2d 516, 254 N.W.2d 478 (1977).  However, as the court of 
appeals 
correctly 
determined, 
Pohlhammer 
is 
in 
apposite.  
Pohlhammer did not involve either an amended statute of 
limitations or an ex post facto analysis, but instead held that 
since the statute of limitations for one of the crimes charged 
had already run, the statute of limitations was a "complete 
defense" to that crime.  Id. at 524.  The fact that a 
prosecution 
is 
barred 
after 
the 
applicable 
statute 
of 
No.  01-1311-CR   
 
7 
 
limitations has run is neither contested nor at issue in this 
case.  Judge Learned Hand artfully described the relevant 
distinction as follows: 
[I]t is one thing to revive a prosecution already 
dead, and another to give it a longer lease of life.  
The question turns upon how much violence is done to 
our instinctive feelings of justice and fair play.  
For the state to assure a man that he had become safe 
from its pursuit, and thereafter to withdraw its 
assurance, seems to most of us unfair and dishonest.  
But, while the chase is on, it does not shock us to 
have it extended beyond the time first set . . . .  
Falter, 23 F.2d at 425-26.   
¶12 Haines also argues that under Wisconsin law, statutes 
of limitation are substantive as opposed to procedural, and 
therefore cannot be applied retroactively.  Haines is correct 
that this court "views statutes of limitation as substantive 
statutes because they create and destroy rights."  Betthauser v. 
Med. Protective Co., 172 Wis. 2d 141, 149, 493 N.W.2d 40 (1992).  
However, Haines is mistaken that only procedural statutes may be 
applied retroactively.  In Betthauser, this court declined to 
retroactively apply a statute of limitations due to the lack of 
any legislative intent to apply the statute retroactively, not 
because the statute was characterized as substantive instead of 
procedural.  A statute may be applied retroactively if (1) by 
express 
language 
or 
necessary 
implication, 
the 
statutory 
language reveals legislative intent for retroactive application; 
or (2) the statute is remedial or procedural rather than 
substantive.  Snopek v. Lakeland Med. Ctr., 223 Wis. 2d 288, 
294, 588 N.W.2d 19 (1999).  Thus, even a substantive statute may 
No.  01-1311-CR   
 
8 
 
be applied retroactively if there is express language to that 
effect.  As discussed previously, 1993 Wis. Act 219, § 7 clearly 
stated that the legislature intended that the amended statute of 
limitations apply retroactively to those cases where the prior 
statute of limitations had not yet run.                
 
¶13 In addition, this court has also discussed the point 
at which a statute of limitations, as a substantive statute, 
provides a defense.  We have concluded that "once a statute of 
limitations has run, the party relying on the statute has a 
vested property right in the statute-of-limitations defense, and 
new law which changes the period of limitations cannot be 
applied retroactively to extinguish that right."  Borello v. 
U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 416, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986) 
(citing Pulchinski v. Strnad, 88 Wis. 2d 423, 276 N.W.2d 781 
(1979); Lak v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 100 Wis. 2d 641, 302 
N.W.2d 483 (1981)).  However, we have also concluded that a 
"defendant only acquired such a right when the statute had run, 
[therefore,] where a new extended period of limitations was 
provided by statute in the interim between the accrual of the 
cause of action and the running of the original period of 
limitations, the new period would apply."  Borello, 130 
Wis. 2d at 416.  Thus, "[t]he right which is subject to 
constitutional protection is that which vests at the time the 
statute runs, not before."  Ortman v. Jensen & Johnson, Inc., 66 
Wis. 2d 508, 522, 225 N.W.2d 635 (1975) (emphasis added). 
¶14 The court of appeals also noted that several federal 
circuit courts and state courts have similarly concluded that 
No.  01-1311-CR   
 
9 
 
retroactive application of an amended statute of limitations, 
which is enacted at a time when the prior limitations period has 
not yet run, does not violate the ex post facto clause.7  
According to the Eleventh Circuit, "all of the circuits that 
have addressed the issue under other statutes have uniformly 
held that extending a limitations period before the prosecution 
is barred does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause."  United 
States v. Grimes, 142 F.3d 1342, 1351 (11th Cir. 1998).    
¶15 In sum, the court of appeals succinctly and correctly 
reasoned that: 
[T]he 1994 amendment to Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c) did 
not remove a defense that was available to Haines in 
1992.  At the time of the alleged assault, Haines had 
no statute of limitations defense.  Indeed such 
"defense" would not have been available until 1999, 
when the former statute of limitations would have run.  
Accordingly, there is no ex post fact violation under 
the third consideration set forth in Kurzawa. 
State v. Haines, 2002 WI App 139, ¶7, 256 Wis. 2d 226, 647 
N.W.2d 311.  We cannot improve upon the court of appeals' 
analysis and reasoning.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., United States v. Grimes, 142 F.3d 1342, 1350-51 
(11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Brechtel, 997 F.2d 1108, 
1112-13 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Taliaferro, 979 F.2d 
1399, 1402-03 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Madia, 955 F.2d 
538, 539-40 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Knipp, 963 F.2d 
839, 842-44 (6th Cir. 1992); United States ex rel. Massarella v. 
Elrod, 682 F.2d 688, 689 (7th Cir. 1982); State v. O'Neill, 796 
P.2d 
121, 
123-24 
(Idaho 
1990); 
State 
v. 
Schultzen, 
522 
N.W.2d 833, 835 (Iowa 1994); Commonwealth v. Bargeron, 524 
N.E.2d 829, 830 (Mass. 1988); People v. Russo, 487 N.W.2d 698, 
700-03 (Mich. 1992); State v. Burns, 524 N.W.2d 516, 519-20 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Hirsch, 511 N.W.2d 69, 76-78 
(Neb. 1994).   
No.  01-1311-CR   
 
10 
 
the court of appeals that applying the amended age 26 statute of 
limitations under Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(c) (1993-94) to Haines 
does not violate the ex post facto clause of the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
No.  01-1311-CR   
 
 
 
1