Title: Mungin v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC09-2018
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 27, 2011

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-2018 
____________ 
 
ANTHONY MUNGIN,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[October 27, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Anthony Mungin was convicted of the 1990 murder of a convenience store 
clerk, Betty Jean Woods, and sentenced to death.  See Mungin v. State (Mungin I), 
689 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1995).  Mungin appeals the postconviction court’s order 
summarily denying his successive motion for postconviction relief, filed pursuant 
to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, which challenged his conviction on 
the basis that a newly discovered witness significantly impeaches the testimony of 
Ronald Kirkland, the only witness who identified Mungin as leaving the crime 
scene immediately after the murder.1  The new witness, George Brown, asserts he 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
- 2 - 
was the first person on the scene after the murder and that no other person was 
present in the store.  He states that he told this to police the night of the murder and 
that the police report is false.  In the current proceeding, Mungin alleges that he 
was denied adequate adversarial testing because the newly discovered evidence 
from Brown impeaches Kirkland and shows that the State violated Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).2  
For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand the Giglio and Brady 
claims to the postconviction court for an evidentiary hearing, but deny the newly 
discovered evidence claim.   
The pertinent facts of this case are set forth in this Court’s opinion on direct 
appeal as follows:  
Betty Jean Woods, a convenience store clerk in Jacksonville, 
was shot once in the head on September 16, 1990, and died four days 
later.  There were no eyewitnesses to the shooting, but shortly after 
Woods was shot a customer [Kirkland] entering the store passed a 
man leaving the store hurriedly with a paper bag.  The customer, who 
found the injured clerk, later identified the man as Mungin.  After the 
shooting, a store supervisor found a $59.05 discrepancy in cash at the 
store. 
 Mungin was arrested on September 18, 1990, in Kingsland, 
Georgia.  Police found a .25-caliber semiautomatic pistol, bullets, and 
                                          
 
 
2.  Mungin also alleges that existing procedures utilized by Florida in 
carrying out executions by lethal injection violate the Eighth Amendment; 
however, he provides no additional factual allegations that would alter our 
previous decisions.  See Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 550 (Fla. 2010); 
Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1081 (Fla. 2008); Lightbourne v. McCollum, 
969 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2007).  We deny this claim without further discussion.  
 
- 3 - 
Mungin’s Georgia identification when they searched his house.  An 
analysis showed that the bullet recovered from Woods had been fired 
from the pistol found at Mungin’s house. 
 Jurors also heard Williams[3] rule evidence of two other 
crimes.  They were instructed to consider this evidence only for the 
limited purpose of proving Mungin’s identity. 
 First, William Rudd testified that Mungin came to the 
convenience store where he worked on the morning of September 14, 
1990, and asked for cigarettes.  When Rudd turned to get the 
cigarettes, Mungin shot him in the back.  He also took money from a 
cash box and a cash register.  Authorities determined that an expended 
shell recovered from the store came from the gun seized in Kingsland. 
 Second, Thomas Barlow testified that he saw Meihua Wang 
Tsai screaming in a Tallahassee shopping center on the afternoon of 
September 14, 1990.  Tsai had been shot while working at a store in 
the shopping center.  A bullet that went through Tsai’s hand and hit 
her in the head had been fired from the gun recovered in Kingsland. 
 
Mungin I, 689 So. 2d at 1028 (footnote omitted).  
In his first motion for postconviction relief, Mungin raised several claims 
regarding Kirkland, specifically that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
cross-examine Kirkland regarding Kirkland’s criminal cases; trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to effectively examine Kirkland regarding his identification 
of Mungin and for failing to elicit testimony from Detective Christie Conn that 
would have destroyed Kirkland’s credibility; and newly discovered evidence cast 
further doubt on Kirkland’s veracity.  On appeal from the denial of postconviction 
relief, Mungin raised as an issue that the circuit court erred in denying his claims 
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the guilt phase after an evidentiary 
                                          
 
 
3.  Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959). 
 
 
- 4 - 
hearing, including his claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately 
impeach Kirkland’s testimony.  Mungin v. State (Mungin II), 932 So. 2d 986, 998 
(Fla. 2006).  This Court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief and denied 
Mungin’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Id. at 1004.  In denying relief, this 
Court engaged in a significant discussion of the claims involving whether counsel 
was ineffective in failing to properly impeach Kirkland based on the failure to 
discover and use Kirkland’s probationary status as impeachment and the failure to 
call Detective Conn regarding statements that Kirkland made that called Kirkland’s 
identification of Mungin into question.  See id. at 998-99.  This Court denied relief, 
holding that even if counsel was deficient, Mungin did not establish prejudice 
because counsel had attacked Kirkland’s identification of Mungin on cross-
examination of Kirkland and during his cross-examination of other witnesses who 
asserted that, days before the crime, Mungin had short hair.  During closing, 
counsel stressed these inconsistencies.  Id. at 999. 
In the current proceeding, Mungin filed a successive motion for 
postconviction relief, asserting that the newly discovered evidence from Brown 
impeaches Kirkland and shows that the State violated Brady and Giglio.  In 
support of this claim, Mungin presented the following affidavit, which potentially 
calls Kirkland’s testimony into question: 
AFFIDAVIT OF GEORGE BROWN 
 
- 5 - 
1. 
My name is George Brown. . . .  I hereby state the following 
and will attest to same in any official proceeding.    
2. 
On Sunday, September 16, 1990, at approximately 1355 hours, 
at the Little Champ Store on the corner of Chaffee Road and Crystal 
Springs Road, I was an eyewitness to the following events.  I 
remember these event [sic] because I go past this location everyday 
since that date sixteen years ago.   
 
3. 
I went into the store that day because it was hot outside.  The 
lady was usually at the counter and was always there–she always 
made you feel that you were going to steal something–and she was 
always there.  I went into the store and got a drink and went to the 
counter and she was not there.  So, I waited there for a few minutes 
and then I thought something was wrong.  I went to the bathroom and 
yelled for her and nothing happened.  I went back up front and still 
she didn’t come.  At the end of the counter there was a door open, so I 
hollered in there and nothing happened and she didn’t come.  So, I 
looked down and there she was.  I called 911.   
 
4. 
There was no one in the store during this whole time.  I was in 
there all alone.  There was no one in the parking lot.  There was no 
one at the gas pumps.  There was no one out there.  There was 
someone who came out of the store, brushed up against me when I 
was coming in but I could not tell who it was, whether the person was 
a male or female, white or black.  I could never give a description of 
the person who was coming out of the store.   
 
5. 
After I called 911, someone (a male) came into the store and 
asked what was happening.  I was on the phone with 911 and told him 
that she was having a seizure and told him to roll her over on her side 
and then we heard this gurgling sound and the lady told us to roll her 
back on her back and we did.    
6. 
The police officer came in at that time and he went over there 
and looked at her and decided to call the Life Flight.  There was a 
cash drawer open on the register and the police officer told me that it 
was a Lottery drawer and it was always open.  There was a glass of 
water next to the lady and a pill stuck to her lip–that is why I thought 
she was having a seizure and fell down.   
 
 
- 6 - 
7. 
I never noticed that there was any type of struggle in the store.    
8. 
The police officer took over the situation and he asked me who 
found the lady and I told him that I had.  He was really busy getting 
the Life Flight together.  The guy that came in took over and 
pretended that he had been there the whole time.  The man was not 
there when I got there and he did not find the lady.  I told the police 
officer that I could not describe or ever identify the person that 
brushed past me, I just did not pay attention.  The other guy was so 
busy talking and acting like he was there.  I told the police officer if 
they didn’t need me any more, I was leaving.   
 
9. 
There has never been any law enforcement officer, state 
attorney, investigator, defense lawyer, or anyone else come to talk 
with me since that day.  I had no idea that anyone was identified or 
arrested or convicted for this crime.    
10. 
I have reviewed a police report authored by K.D. Gilbreath, 
#5182,  dated November 5, 1990, which contained statements 
purportedly made by me at the only time I was ever spoken to by 
anyone about this case.  The version of events as stated in the report is 
false.   
 
10. 
[sic]  On page 7 of the 14-page report in the last paragraph, Mr. 
Kirkland did not go into the store first.  There was no one in the store 
when I came in.  Mr. Kirkland came into the store after I called 911.  
Mr. Kirkland did not find the victim–it was me.  Mr. Kirkland says in 
the report that he saw a black guy coming out of the store.  This is not 
true because when I went into the store, someone was coming out and 
I could not identify anyone and no one was in the store when I was 
there.   
 
11. 
On page 8 of the report, in the first paragraph, I remember the 
detective talking to me, but like I have said, Mr. Kirkland stepped up 
and tried to take over.  I told the detective that I checked all the 
bathrooms to see where she was, and I checked everywhere because 
she was always in the front.  I went over to where the counter was and 
there was a door open in the back–a little storage room.  I turned 
around and saw her there and heard gurgling noises and that is when I 
called 911.    
 
- 7 - 
12. 
I looked over and saw the drawer open but I did not touch 
anything.  The officer is incorrect to report that I checked the drawer 
of the cash register and then shut the drawer.  That never happened.    
13. 
I did not know the victim had been shot because I thought she 
had had a seizure because of the pill stuck to her lip and the water that 
was spilled next to her.    
14. 
I told the officer that I was the only one in the store and Mr. 
Kirkland did not come into the store until after I called 911.  There is 
no way he saw anyone in the store because the person who brushed by 
me I could not identify, so there is no way that Mr. Kirkland could 
identify anyone, he was not in the store.  I could not tell you what the 
person looked like and I was standing in the store a long time trying to 
find the lady.   
 
15. 
I have always been available to testify at any proceedings and I 
am willing to testify as to what I observed on that particular day and 
to the falsehoods stated in the police report.   
 
Mungin also presented the following affidavit from his original trial counsel, 
Charles Cofer, who discussed why he did not discover this information prior to 
trial: 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES G. COFER 
1. 
My name is Charles G. Cofer, and I am presently a sitting 
county court judge in the Fourth Judicial Circuit in and for Duval 
County, Florida.  I have previously been subpoenaed to give 
testimony in post-conviction proceedings in the case of State of 
Florida v. Anthony Mungin, and this affidavit is given in connection 
with further post-conviction proceedings.    
2. 
Prior to taking the bench, I served as an Assistant Public 
Defender for the Fourth Judicial Circuit.  During that time, I 
represented Anthony Mungin at the trial court level in the first-degree 
capital murder prosecution relating to the death of Betty Jean Woods.  
As lead counsel for Mr. Mungin, I had primary responsibility for all 
 
- 8 - 
aspects of the case, and was familiar with the pre-trial discovery 
provided by the State of Florida.   
 
3. 
I have recently been provided with an affidavit executed by an 
individual named George Brown, which states Mr. Brown’s 
knowledge concerning the death of Betty Jean Woods.  I have also 
reviewed the homicide investigation report authored by Detective 
Gilbreath dated November 5, 1990.  Detective Gilbreath was the lead 
law enforcement officer in charge of the investigation into Ms. 
Woods’ murder.    
4. 
Mr. Brown’s affidavit contradicts the version of events as 
testified to at trial by the State’s key witness, Ronald Kirkland, in 
many significant ways.  Ronald Kirkland was the primary prosecution 
witness based upon his assertion that he was the first and only person 
in the Lil’ Champ store, and that he was the one who discovered Ms. 
Woods after she was shot.  Mr. Kirkland testified at trial that he 
observed a man coming out of the Lil’ Champ Store carrying a brown 
bag as he entered the store.  Kirkland later identified this man as 
Anthony Mungin.  Because there were no eyewitnesses to the murder, 
Kirkland’s identification of Mr. Mungin was extremely important 
evidence.  Although I attempted to undermine Kirkland’s testimony 
during cross-examination, any evidence that was available that I could 
have used to further undermine his credibility (especially his 
purported identification of Anthony Mungin) would have been useful 
and would have been presented.  I would also expect, under the 
State’s obligation under Brady v. Maryland, that the prosecution 
would disclose to me any favorable evidence which could have been 
used to impeach Kirkland or otherwise undermine his testimony and 
identification of Mr. Mungin.    
5. 
Prior to trial, the State provided me with a copy of Detective 
Gilbreath’s homicide report, in which there is brief mention made of 
George Brown and the information he supposedly told Detective 
Conn when he was interviewed on the day Ms. Woods was shot.  I 
relied on this police report as being an accurate and truthful account of 
what Mr. Brown told the police.  The version of Mr. Brown’s 
statement contained in the homicide report generally supported the 
version of facts provided by Mr. Kirkland, and provided no suggestion 
that Mr. Brown had information that would be useful to impeach Mr. 
Kirkland’s version of the events.   
 
 
- 9 - 
7. 
[sic] Because the information contained in the police report 
appeared to be of much less importance than the information provided 
by Kirkland, and due to the fact that Kirkland became the chief 
prosecution identification witness, our efforts focused on attempting 
to undermine Kirkland’s testimony at trial.  Because I relied on the 
veracity of the police report, apparently no one from the defense team 
contacted or spoke with Mr. Brown prior to trial.    
8. 
Mr.  Brown’s affidavit contradicts Mr. Kirkland’s version of 
events, and demonstrates that the police report was inaccurate in terms 
of explaining the information that Mr. Brown provided to law 
enforcement.  When handling criminal cases, I expected the State to 
provide me with an accurate recitation of what witnesses told the 
police, but I was never provided with the information contained in Mr. 
Brown’s affidavit.  Had the State provided me with an accurate report 
containing the true version of events that Mr. Brown witnessed, this 
would have made a tremendous difference in terms of the presentation 
of Mr. Mungin’s case.  Every effort would have been made to 
interview Mr. Brown and to present his conflicting testimony, given 
that it contradicts and impeaches Kirkland’s version of events and his 
identification of Anthony Mungin.   
 
9. 
It is my understanding that Mr. Brown is an unbiased witness 
with no prior criminal background, in contrast to Mr. Kirkland, who 
had an extensive criminal history and whose credibility was already in 
question.  It would have been helpful to have a disinterested witness 
with no criminal background who would have been able to testify and 
contradict Kirkland’s testimony.  However, the State never provided 
me with an accurate and truthful account of Mr. Brown’s involvement 
in the case.    
Based on the affidavits of Brown and Cofer, Mungin asserts that he is 
entitled to relief under Brady, Giglio, or newly discovered evidence.  The trial 
court held a Huff4 hearing to determine whether an evidentiary hearing was needed 
and then denied relief, finding that Mungin failed to demonstrate prejudice.  
                                          
 
 
4.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).  
 
- 10 - 
Determining whether the trial court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing on a 
successive rule 3.851 motion is a question of law subject to de novo review.  
Darling v. State, 45 So. 3d 444, 447 (Fla. 2010).  Because the circuit court denied 
Mungin’s motion without an evidentiary hearing, this Court must accept all factual 
allegations in the motion as true to the extent they are not conclusively refuted by 
the record.  Id.  The Court will affirm the ruling ―[i]f the motion, files, and records 
in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.‖  Id.; see also 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B) (providing that a successive postconviction motion 
in a capital case may be denied without an evidentiary hearing if ―the motion, files, 
and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief‖).  
The Court will uphold the postconviction court’s summary denial ―if the motion is 
legally insufficient or its allegations are conclusively refuted by the record.‖  
Darling, 45 So. 3d at 447 (quoting Ventura v. State, 2 So. 3d 194, 198 (Fla. 2009)). 
Here, Mungin has raised three claims pertaining to the Brown affidavit: 
(1) the State violated Brady in failing to disclose the favorable evidence pertaining 
to Brown; (2) the State violated Giglio by knowingly presenting false evidence; 
and (3) Brown’s affidavit constitutes newly discovered evidence that mandates a 
new trial.  In looking at the three different claims raised regarding Brown’s 
testimony, we review the different legal standards involved, starting with Mungin’s 
Brady claim.   
 
- 11 - 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
require a prosecutor to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if 
suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial.  United States v. Bagley, 
473 U.S. 667 (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  In order to establish 
a Brady violation, the defendant must demonstrate that (1) favorable evidence, 
either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by 
the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.  
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 
910 (Fla. 2000).  To meet the materiality prong, the defendant must demonstrate ―a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.‖  Way, 760 So. 2d at 913 
(quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682).  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine this Court’s confidence in the outcome.  Id.; see also 
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290.  However, in making this determination, a court cannot 
―simply discount[] the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence 
and determin[e] if the remaining evidence is sufficient.‖  Franqui v. State, 59 So. 
3d 82, 102 (Fla. 2011).  ―It is the net effect of the evidence that must be assessed.‖  
Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998).   
In denying relief on the Brady claim, the postconviction court concluded that 
Mungin failed to show that the evidence was material.  In its order, the 
 
- 12 - 
postconviction court noted that there were three differences between what Brown 
alleged in his affidavit that he told the police officer at the scene of the crime and 
what was stated in the arrest report, concluding that none of these were material or 
would undermine confidence in the outcome.  Specifically, the court found as 
follows: 
There appear to be three differences between what Mr. Brown 
alleges in his affidavit that he told the officer on the date of the 
murder, and what the arrest report indicates Brown told the officer.  
First, Brown alleges that he told the detective that Kirkland arrived 
after he, Brown, had discovered Ms. Woods and called 911, whereas 
the report indicated that Brown and Kirkland ―entered the store at the 
same time.‖  Second, Brown alleges that he did not touch the cash 
register, whereas the report indicates that he ―checked the registers.‖  
Third, Brown alleges that someone had come out of the store as he 
was entering, but that he told the police that he could not describe the 
person, whereas the report indicates that he did not ―notice‖ anyone 
leaving the store as he entered.  None of Brown’s other allegations 
that conflict with Kirkland’s testimony is alleged to have been shared 
with police. 
   
Even if it were assumed that the State erroneously withheld this 
information, Defendant suffered no prejudice from the failure to 
disclose.  First, most of the allegedly withheld statements are not 
particularly material.  The second and third discrepancies noted above 
constitute minor differences in the characterization of events.  The 
only material discrepancy was Mr. Brown’s allegation that he told the 
officer that he was the only person in the store and that Kirkland did 
not come into the store until after Brown called 911.  While this 
discrepancy might have been used to impeach Kirkland’s testimony, it 
does not create a reasonable probability of a different outcome given 
the importance of Kirkland’s testimony compared to other trial 
evidence. 
 
It is critical to recognize that the undersigned presided over 
Defendant’s trial, and has a very vivid recollection of the trial 
evidence, which was overwhelming even without Kirkland’s 
 
- 13 - 
testimony.[5]  Uncontroverted ballistics evidence was presented 
directly tying Defendant to the shooting of Ms. Woods.  When 
Defendant was arrested, police found a .25-caliber semiautomatic 
pistol, bullets, and Defendant’s Georgia identification when they 
searched his house.  An analysis showed that the bullet recovered 
from Woods had been fired from the pistol found at Defendant’s 
house.  Moreover, the robbery/murder in this case was the third in a 
series of robberies and shootings, all of which were committed with 
the same gun, the gun found in Defendant’s bedroom.  Furthermore, 
Defendant was positively identified as the person who had committed 
the first two robbery/shootings, and the car he used in the first two 
robberies had been stolen from near his home and then abandoned not 
far from the scene of the instant robbery/murder.  Another car stolen 
from that area ended up next to Defendant’s home with two expended 
shells from the murder weapon in it.  In short, Defendant used the 
murder weapon in two robbery/shootings not long before the instant 
robbery/murder, had possession of the murder weapon following the 
instant robbery/murder, and was directly connected to the two cars 
used in the three robbery/shootings. 
 
George Brown’s affidavit does not allege that a person other 
than Defendant robbed and killed Ms. Woods, or that Defendant could 
not have been the killer.  Brown’s allegation could only provide[] 
further impeachment of details of Kirkland’s testimony and his 
identification of Defendant as the person he saw leaving the store.  
Even if Defendant’s motion demonstrated that the State improperly 
withheld information from the defense, that information does not 
establish a reasonable probability of a different outcome sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.  Evaluation of the 
[sic] all of the evidence introduced at trial demonstrates that it was 
overwhelming even if Kirkland’s identification could have been called 
into doubt by Brown’s testimony.  As such, Defendant’s claim of a 
Brady violation is conclusively refuted by the record. 
                                          
 
5.  We caution that trial courts must decide these postconviction matters on 
an objective basis.  See, e.g., Guzman v. State, 941 So. 2d 1045, 1051 n.4 (Fla. 
2006) (recognizing that trial courts are to make an objective determination as to the 
effect of a Giglio error; it cannot be a subjective assessment).  In this case, because 
the motion was denied without an evidentiary hearing, we must accept Mungin’s 
allegations as true and determine prejudice by reviewing whether our confidence in 
the outcome is undermined.  
 
- 14 - 
   
In reviewing this claim, we examine Kirkland’s trial testimony in even more 
detail.  At trial, Kirkland testified that he was the first person to arrive at the 
location of the shooting.  On his way to his girlfriend’s house, he stopped by the 
Lil’ Champ convenience store to pick up a diet coke and breath savers.  As he was 
going into the store, a man who was carrying a brown paper bag almost knocked 
him down on his way out of the store.  He described the man as being shorter than 
five feet, six inches and weighing about 130 pounds.  Kirkland went into the store, 
picked up his items, and waited for the clerk, finally noticing that she was lying on 
the floor.  He thought she might have had a seizure so he attempted CPR, and 
while he was performing CPR, another customer came in and called 911.  Kirkland 
alleged that the other customer looked at the cash register and pulled the drawer 
open.  An officer later came to his home and showed him six or seven pictures.  
Kirkland identified a picture of Mungin as the man who he saw leaving the store.  
He further identified Mungin in court as the man who he saw.   
 
On cross-examination, defense counsel confronted Kirkland on a number of 
inconsistencies.  For example, although Kirkland was able to identify Mungin as 
the person he met, he stated he had only a glimpse of him before they bumped into 
each other, and since Mungin was then traveling in a different direction away from 
him, Kirkland saw only the back of his head.  However, Kirkland was unable to 
recall if Mungin wore a hat and could not describe whether he was wearing a light 
 
- 15 - 
or dark shirt.  Further, Kirkland stated that Mungin had long hair that appeared to 
be in a Jheri-curl style and had a ―good bit‖ of beard growth on him—a description 
that differed from Mungin’s appearance at the time of the crime.  When the police 
first asked Kirkland to identify the person leaving the crime scene, Kirkland stated 
that he was not sure if he could recognize the person again, but he would try.  
When he was shown the pictures, Kirkland reviewed the photographs for 
approximately fifteen minutes before he picked Mungin’s photo as the person that 
he saw.   
During closing argument, defense counsel stressed the following 
inconsistencies: at the time that Kirkland noticed the person rushing out of the 
convenience store, he did not realize it was a murder scene but was thinking about 
his upcoming date; Kirkland admitted that he saw only the back of the person’s 
head and not his face; Kirkland admitted he saw only a glimpse as the person 
rushed away; Kirkland was unable to identify any of the clothing that the person 
was wearing; and most importantly, Kirkland described the person he saw as 
having a beard and hair that was ―kind of long‖ even though other eyewitnesses to 
the Tallahassee shooting (which occurred two days earlier) stated that Mungin’s 
hair was so short that it looked like he was in the military.  Thus, defense counsel 
asserted that Kirkland’s testimony supported that the person he saw leaving the 
 
- 16 - 
store could not have been Mungin because a person would be unable to make hair 
grow significantly in only two days.   
During prior postconviction proceedings, this Court discussed the value of 
Kirkland’s testimony as follows: 
Mungin’s first subclaim is that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to sufficiently impeach the testimony of Ronald Kirkland.  
Specifically, Mungin argues that Cofer should have made the jury 
aware that Kirkland was on probation at the time of the trial and that 
warrants had been issued for Kirkland’s arrest on violation of 
probation and subsequently recalled.  
Even if Cofer’s performance was deficient because he failed to 
discover and use Kirkland’s probationary status as impeachment 
evidence, Mungin has failed to establish prejudice.  Cofer attacked 
Kirkland’s identification of Mungin on cross-examination of 
Kirkland, and by his cross-examination of the victim of the 
Monticello shooting and the eyewitness to the Tallahassee shooting, 
whose descriptions of the perpetrator were different from Kirkland’s.  
In closing argument, Cofer argued extensively that due to these 
inconsistencies, Kirkland’s identification could not be believed 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Moreover, Kirkland testified that he did 
not tell anyone from the State Attorney’s Office that he was on 
probation and that he did not have any deals with the State in 
exchange for his testimony at Mungin’s trial.  Mungin does not allege 
that any deals were made.  As for trial counsel’s failure to inform the 
jury of the recalled warrants for Kirkland’s arrest, because the 
warrants were not recalled until after the trial it cannot be said that 
counsel’s performance was deficient. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
Even assuming that counsel’s performance was deficient in this 
regard, we conclude that Mungin has failed to establish prejudice.  As 
noted above, trial counsel attacked Kirkland’s identification of 
Mungin on cross-examination by bringing out the limited time he had 
to actually view the perpetrator and the fact that it took him fifteen to 
twenty minutes to pick Mungin out of the photo lineup.  Cofer also 
brought Kirkland’s identification into question by his cross-
examination of the victim of the Monticello shooting and the 
 
- 17 - 
eyewitness to the Tallahassee shooting, who gave different 
descriptions of the perpetrator than did Kirkland.   
 
Mungin II, 932 So. 2d at 998-99 (footnote omitted).  We concluded that Mungin 
was not entitled to relief because our confidence in the outcome of Mungin’s trial 
was not undermined. 
 
However, Brown’s testimony completely contradicts Kirkland on a material 
detail: whether Kirkland could have seen Mungin leaving the convenience store 
right after the murder.  Kirkland, who testified at trial, claimed that he was the first 
person on the scene and identified Mungin as leaving the murder scene.  Brown, in 
direct contradiction, asserts that he was first on the scene and that no other 
witnesses were present during the entire time he was searching for the missing 
clerk.  Brown alleges that he found the victim and called 911.  In referring to 
Kirkland, Brown swears in his affidavit that Kirkland came in and ―pretended that 
he had been there the whole time.  The man was not there when I got there and he 
did not find the lady.‖  If, in fact, the trial judge upon remand determines Brown is 
being truthful, this would clearly mean that Kirkland was untruthful at trial, which 
might have been critical testimony for the jury.  We are troubled by the possibility 
that a false police report was submitted and then relied on by defense counsel.  
Without an evidentiary hearing to explore this issue, we are left with mere 
speculation as to what in fact occurred, what the police knew, what the prosecutor 
knew, and whether Kirkland, a witness with an extensive criminal history, was 
 
- 18 - 
lying when he testified at trial.  In reviewing the Brady claim presented, accepting 
all allegations in the motion as true to the extent they are not conclusively refuted 
by the record, we cannot agree that the record at this point conclusively shows that 
the evidence was not material (i.e., that there was not ―a reasonable probability 
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different‖).  Way, 760 So. 2d at 913 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 
682).  Accordingly, we reverse and remand this claim to the postconviction court 
for an evidentiary hearing pertaining to Brown and the allegation that the police 
report was false. 
Mungin also asserts that this evidence establishes a Giglio violation.  Under 
Giglio, ―a defendant must show that: (1) the prosecutor presented or failed to 
correct false testimony; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) 
the false evidence was material.‖  Rhodes v. State, 986 So. 2d 501, 508-09 (Fla. 
2008).  As to the knowledge prong, in Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 
2003), we have clarified that Giglio is satisfied where the lead detective testifies 
falsely at trial because the ―knowledge of the detective . . . is imputed to the 
prosecutor who tried the case.‖  Id. at 505.   
 The materiality prong of Giglio is more defense-friendly than in a Brady 
claim.  See Davis v. State, 26 So. 3d 519, 532 (Fla. 2009) (―[T]he standard applied 
under the third prong of the Giglio test is more defense friendly than the test . . . 
 
- 19 - 
applied to a violation under Brady.‖), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3509 (2010).  While 
under Brady, evidence is material if a defendant can show ―a reasonable 
probability that . . . the result . . . would have been different,‖  Way, 760 So. 2d at 
913 (emphasis added), under Giglio, the evidence is considered material simply ―if 
there is any reasonable possibility that it could have affected the jury’s verdict.‖  
Rhodes, 986 So. 2d at 509 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, for the reasons 
addressed above, we likewise hold that after reviewing the Giglio claim presented 
and accepting all allegations in the motion as true to the extent they are not 
conclusively refuted by the record, we cannot agree that the record at this point 
conclusively shows that the evidence pertaining to Brown would not affect the 
jury’s verdict.  Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing is needed on this claim as well. 
Our analysis is different, however, in considering Mungin’s claim that based 
on this newly discovered evidence, he is entitled to relief under Jones v. State, 709 
So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1998).  In order to be considered newly discovered: (1) ―the 
evidence must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at 
the time of trial, and it must appear that defendant or his counsel could not have 
known [of it] by the use of diligence‖; and (2) the evidence ―must be of such 
nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.‖  Jones, 709 So. 2d at 
521 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  In making this determination, 
a trial court must ―consider all newly discovered evidence which would be 
 
- 20 - 
admissible at trial and then evaluate the weight of both the newly discovered 
evidence and the evidence which was introduced at the trial.‖  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  We deny this claim because the information provided 
by Brown is not of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on 
retrial.  The jury heard significant evidence during the trial that established Mungin 
as the killer, including testimony that Mungin stole a red Escort and was engaged 
in similar shootings a few days before the murder, the stolen car was later 
discovered in Jacksonville, and the shell casing and bullet left at the scene of the 
murder were identified as matching the gun found at Mungin’s home. 
For the reasons addressed above, we reverse and remand the Brady and 
Giglio claims to the postconviction court for an evidentiary hearing pertaining to 
Brown and the allegation that the police report was false.  We express no opinion 
on the merits of these claims.  The parties shall proceed in an expedited manner, 
and an evidentiary hearing on this claim shall be held and an order entered within 
120 days of the remand. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
CANADY, C.J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
- 21 - 
 
POLSTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s summary 
denial of Mungin’s newly discovered evidence claim.  However, unlike the 
majority, I would also affirm the summary denial of Mungin’s Brady and Giglio 
claims because Mungin cannot demonstrate materiality under either Brady or 
Giglio.   
 
Although Brown’s affidavit calls into question whether Kirkland could have 
seen Mungin leaving the store shortly after the shooting, Kirkland’s testimony was 
already called into question based on other significant inconsistencies, which were 
pointed out during the trial and stressed during closing arguments.  For example, 
Kirkland’s testimony conflicted with other testimony that Mungin had very short 
hair at the time of the murder.  In fact, defense counsel made a convincing 
argument that Kirkland’s testimony actually supported that Mungin could not be 
the person leaving the store.  Based on a review of Kirkland’s testimony and the 
problems with it, it is unclear whether the jury put any weight in it or whether it 
was even incriminating.   
 
In contrast to the questionable strength of Kirkland’s testimony, the jury was 
presented with significant evidence that Mungin committed the murder.  
Specifically, the jury was presented with evidence that the murder weapon was 
found at Mungin’s home days after the murder, that Mungin used this same gun to 
 
- 22 - 
shoot two other store clerks just days before the murder, and that Mungin was 
linked to the stolen vehicles involved in the crime spree.  Brown’s affidavit does 
not call any of this evidence into question and does not provide any support that 
Mungin was not involved.  Therefore, materiality cannot be established under 
either Brady or Giglio.  See Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 913 (Fla. 2000) 
(explaining that the materiality prong under Brady is met if the defendant 
demonstrates ―a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different‖) (quoting United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (plurality opinion)); Rhodes v. State, 
986 So. 2d 501, 509 (Fla. 2008) (explaining that evidence is material under Giglio 
―if there is any reasonable possibility that it could have affected the jury’s 
verdict‖). 
 
Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. 
CANADY, C.J., concurs. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
John Southwood, Judge - Case No. 92-3179CF 
 
Todd G. Scher, Miami Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Thomas D. Winokur, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee