Title: Arizona State Board of Medical Examiners v. Clark
Citation: 398 P.2d 908, 97 Ariz. 205
Docket Number: 7239
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: February 3, 1965

97 Ariz. 205 (1965) 398 P.2d 908 ARIZONA STATE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, Appellant, v. Clarence Laurence CLARK, Appellee. No. 7239. Supreme Court of Arizona. En Banc. February 3, 1965. *206 Wade Church, Former Atty. Gen., Robert W. Pickrell, Atty. Gen., by Charles T. Stevens, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant. Johnson, Darrow, D'Antonio, Hayes &amp; Morales, Tucson, for appellee. BERNSTEIN, Justice. Dr. Clarence L. Clark, the appellee, filed an application for a license to practice medicine and surgery in the State of Arizona with the State Board of Medical Examiners on December 3, 1958. On June 22, 1959, the Board cited Dr. Clark pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-1452A[1] to show cause why his application should not be denied. Dr. Clark filed a sworn answer and thereafter a hearing was held at which Dr. Clark was the only witness. After the hearing the Board secured a deposition in support of one of the Specifications, at the taking of which Dr. Clark was represented by counsel. On October 16, 1959, the Board entered an order denying Dr. Clark's application. Dr. Clark then filed a Petition for Review in Maricopa County Superior Court, under the provisions of A.R.S. § 32-1453B. After reviewing the entire record of the hearings before the Board, including the deposition of Dr. George M. Cowan of Duluth, Minnesota and letters submitted by Dr. Clark, hearing arguments of counsel, and considering the briefs, as required by the statute, the trial judge set aside the order of the Board, and directed it to issue the appropriate license. The Board of Medical Examiners has appealed to this court pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-1453H. Dr. Clark was graduated in 1940 with an M.D. degree from the St. Louis University School of Medicine in Missouri. *207 At the time of the filing of the application he was, and now is, licensed to practice medicine in the States of Missouri, Michigan and Minnesota. In 1948 Dr. Clark accepted employment with the Arrowhead Clinic in Duluth, Minnesota, and moved his family from St. Louis, Missouri to Duluth. At the time he accepted employment with the Arrowhead Clinic, he had no knowledge that the Arrowhead Clinic was not in good standing with the St. Louis (Minn.) County Medical Society, because of certain contracts which it had with labor unions that the Society believed interfered with the free practice of medicine. To avoid confusion it should be pointed out that Duluth is located in St. Louis County, Minnesota. There are no complaints about any act of Dr. Clark in Missouri or Michigan. About three months after moving to Duluth, Dr. Clark became aware of the strained relation between the St. Louis County Medical Society and the Arrowhead Clinic when the Medical Society refused his application for membership. At some later date he was admitted to membership in that Society, and suspended on January 17, 1959, after the Arizona application was filed. At the time this complaint was filed, the grounds for refusal by the Board of a license to practice medicine under A.R.S. § 32-1452A were: Dr. Clark may be refused a license only if he has been guilty of unprofessional conduct and charges have been proven by competent evidence after notice and hearing. He cannot be denied a license to practice in Arizona merely because accusations have been made against him by an out of state medical society. See In re Abbatangelo's Petition, Nev., 397 P.2d 182. "Unprofessional conduct" is defined in A.R.S. § 32-1401. The only part of that definition relevant to this case is subsection 2(l) which reads: *208 The complaint, although inartfully drawn, was legally sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Board to hear and determine the matter. Some of the Specifications include charges that are barred by the two year statute of limitations provided in A.R.S. § 32-1452C. See also, Eastman v. Southworth, 87 Ariz. 394, 351 P.2d 992. The Board in reaching the decision which it now asks us to affirm concedes that it erred in considering barred matters which were abandoned for the first time on this appeal. The statute governing the review in this case, A.R.S. § 32-1453, was adopted in 1952, after the adoption of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.[2] Prior to that time review of the actions of the Arizona Board of Medical Examiners had been by the common law writ of certiorari. DuVall v. Board of Medical Examiners, 49 Ariz. 329, 66 P.2d 1026. Under A.R.S. § 32-1453 the trial judge must review the entire record. A.R.S. § 32-1453G provides: This section of the statute, with minor changes not material to the problem involved here, is taken from the judicial review section of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 12(7), 9C Uniform Laws Annotated page 184. This act was suggested for general adoption by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to apply the principles of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. In the Report of the Committee on Tentative Draft of Uniform Act on Administrative Procedure to the 1943 Conference *209 of Commissions on Uniform State Laws, with regard to the judicial review section which uses the language of A.R.S. § 32-1453G, the Committee stated: This legislative history contradicts the Board's contention that its denial of a license to Dr. Clark must be upheld by the Superior Court if there is any evidence in the record to sustain its decision. That rule no longer applies under A.R.S. § 32-1453G. The significance of the reference to the "entire record" was explained by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 481, 71 S. Ct. 456, 460, 95 L. Ed. 456 as follows: "Entire record" as used in the State Act, and "whole record", as used in the Federal Act, are synonymous. When the legislature adopted A.R.S. § 32-1453G it had knowledge of the extensive research into the problem of judicial review of administrative decisions by Congress and the committees which reported to it. Where the legislature adopts the provisions of a Uniform or Model Act, this court will presume that the legislature acted with knowledge of the construction placed upon the proposed act by its draftsmen, and intended to adopt it. Salt River Val. etc. Assn. v. Peoria Ginning Co., 27 Ariz. 145, 231 P. 415; Arnett v. Clack, 22 Ariz. 409, 417, 198 P. 127, 129; Maestro Music, Inc. v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Company, 88 Ariz. 222, 232, 354 P.2d 266, 273. The Board furnished the court below with the entire record. The Board, in its brief, in this court, quotes excerpts from that record which it believes support its position. These are the texts of the 4th, 5th and 6th Specifications from the St. Louis County Society's charges, together with summaries of Dr. Clark's testimony with regard to these charges, and a summary of Dr. Cowan's deposition, with regard to Specification 6. The Board urges that the rule of Davis v. Arizona State Dental Board, 57 Ariz. 255, 112 P.2d 877 limiting review to jurisdictional questions is applicable. The statute regulating the practice of dentistry at the time Davis was decided specifically provided for judicial review in the Superior Court only in the case of the revocation of a license, and then by a writ of certiorari. A.R.S. § 32-1264. Since 1954, however, judicial review of administrative action in the Superior Court, in the absence of special provisions, has been governed by the Administrative Review Act. A.R.S. § 12-901 et seq. The limitations on judicial review in the Superior Court set forth in Davis have been nullified by statute A.R.S. § 12-901 et seq. The restrictions upon judicial review urged by the Board also disregard the respect we owe to the determination of the learned trial judge. In Webster v. Board of Dental Examiners, 17 Cal. 2d 534, 539, 110 P.2d 992, 995, a case in which the revocation of a dentist's license was affirmed, the court said: See also Universal Camera, supra, 340 U.S. at 490, 71 S. Ct. 456 and National Labor Relations Board v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 340 U.S. 498, 71 S. Ct. 453, 95 L. Ed. 479. This court has applied this standard of review of actions of trial judges in the Superior Courts in many other situations and it is applicable to our review of the actions of the trial court under statutes providing for the review of administrative agencies. In Cantlay &amp; Tanzola, Inc. v. Senner, 92 Ariz. 63, 66, 373 P.2d 370, 372, a case involving the review of a Corporation Commission order, we said: The Board considered 10 Specifications. On this appeal an attempt is made to justify only three of these. In examining those portions of the record which have been brought before us, we find evidence was offered to support the Board's decision only with regard to Specification 6. This evidence is Dr. Cowan's deposition. The Specification charges "unethical conduct of a minor degree." It brings three separate charges of seeing the patients of Dr. Cowan without his permission and makes a fourth charge of giving a patient inadequate care. With regard to the charge in Specification 6(a), Dr. Cowan testified in his deposition that he did not give Dr. Clark permission to see this patient. Dr. Clark testified that he had been told by the floor nurse that Dr. Cowan had given his permission. Dr. McNally, a member of the Arizona Board, asked Dr. Clark: We cannot say the trial judge erred in his evaluation of the evidence in finding that this portion of the record does not show guilt of unprofessional conduct. Specification 6(b) charges Dr. Clark with having told the wife of one of Dr. Cowan's patients not to consent to electric shock treatment for her husband. Dr. Clark categorically denied this charge. Dr. Cowan testified in his deposition that a nurse had told him that the wife of the patient said Dr. Clark told her not to sign the authorization. In its brief in this court the Board does not rely on this incident. Specification 6(c) was barred by the Statute of Limitations. Specification 6(d) charges Dr. Clark with giving a patient inadequate care. Dr. Cowan testified: Dr. Clark testified that this charge was a "complete falsehood". Dr. Clark said: Specification 4 charged Dr. Clark with performing certain operations for which he did not have hospital privileges. He did perform the operations. Dr. Clark testified he was never notified that he could not perform these operations. The testimony was: The testimony does not show what hospital privileges Dr. Clark had, who granted these privileges, or what inference of lack of competence might be drawn from the lack of these privileges, if in fact he did lack them. The trial judge did not find this testimony to be substantial evidence to support the charge of professional misconduct and we cannot say that he was in error. The patient involved in Specification 5 died. She was an emergency patient Dr. Clark had attended on previous occasions. After the patient's death, Dr. Clark filled out certain forms and reports on the basis of the charts and information received from interns. It is not contended that any of the information put on these forms was incorrect. The Board's argument is that only the physician who actually examined and attended the patient should fill out these forms. Dr. Clark testified: At most, the trial judge had before him a difference of opinion with regard to hospital record keeping. The testimony was undisputed that everything that could be done for the patient was done by the members of the hospital staff who were present when she was brought in and who were in touch with Dr. Clark by telephone. The records were not falsified by Dr. Clark in any way and there was no showing that the signing of the form was unlawful. In all three Specifications now relied on by the Board, the unprofessional conduct charged relates to alleged violations of the rules of the St. Louis County Medical Society, or a Duluth Hospital, or the Principles *214 of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association, particularly Sections 3, 5 and 10[3] thereof, which are quoted in the Board's brief. The evidence submitted to us does not show any clear violation of these sections of the Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association. More important, as applied in the licensing and revocation cases "unprofessional conduct" has been construed to include serious offense, such as intentional violations of law or recognized professional standards. In Aiton v. Board of Medical Examiners, 13 Ariz. 354, 114 P. 962 (1911), the first Arizona case upholding a statute regulating the practice of medicine, the court gave "unprofessional conduct" a restricted meaning in order to avoid the contention that the phrase was unconstitutionally vague. The definition in Aiton has been superseded by the statutory definition in A.R.S. § 32-1401 quoted above. Fitzpatrick v. Board of Medical Examiners, 96 Ariz. 309, 394 P.2d 423. "Unprofessional conduct" cannot be given any definition which would make it subject to constitutional attack on grounds of vagueness. State Board of Technical Registration v. McDaniel, 84 Ariz. 223, 232, 326 P.2d 348, 352; State v. Gee, 73 Ariz. 47, 54, 236 P.2d 1029, 1034. In Fitzpatrick we quoted with approval from State ex rel. Williams v. Whitman, 116 Fla. 196, 150 So. 136, 156 So. 705, 95 A.L.R. 1416, where the court said that there must be a "conscious and culpable act amounting to a willful design to do that which is denounced as an unlawful professional practice." In Aiton we said, quoting from State ex rel. Hathaway v. State Board of Health, 103 Mo. 22, 15 S.W. 322, 323: Still less has the St. Louis County (Minn.) Medical Society any right to prescribe a code of ethics for the state. *215 It is apparent to us that the evidence is not sufficient under A.R.S. § 32-1452G to support the charge of unprofessional conduct made by these Specifications, and the trial judge was correct in so finding. As Senator Taft said in explaining the section of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act which is comparable to the Arizona statute imposing the duty of judicial review of decisions of the Board of Medical Examiners upon the Superior Court: The trial judge here properly applied the standards of modern judicial review to reverse an unjust decision of the Board. Affirmed. LOCKWOOD, C.J., STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and UDALL and McFARLAND, JJ., concur. [1] The present statute regulating the practice of medicine is Laws 1964, Ch. 27. It is a complete revision of the prior statute, and nothing said herein necessarily applies to the present law. Quotations and section references herein are from the law as it was at the time relevant to this case. [2] Prior to 1946, statutory provisions relating to judicial review generally provided for as limited a judicial review as was thought to be constitutionally permissible. The growth of federal administrative agencies led to a search for fairer standards of judicial review. The most important study was that of the Attorney-General's Committee of Administrative Procedure, which led to the passage of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq., in 1946. The states, including Arizona, took advantage of these studies, and generally revised their provisions for the judicial review of administrative decisions. [3] "Section 3. A physician should practice a method of healing founded on a scientific basis; and he should not voluntarily associate professionally with anyone who violates this principle." "Section 5. A physician may choose whom he will serve. In an emergency, however, he should render service to the best of his ability. Having undertaken the care of a patient, he may not neglect him; and unless he has been discharged he may discontinue his services only after giving adequate notice. He should not solicit patients." "Section 10. The honored ideals of the medical profession imply that the responsibilities of the physician extend not only to the individual, but also to society where these responsibilities deserve his interest and participation in activities which have the purpose of improving both the health and the well-being of the individual and the community." [4] Quoted with approval in Universal Camera, supra, 340 U.S. at page 485, 71 S.Ct. at page 463.