Title: C.S. v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 19S-JV-136, 19S-JV-137
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: October 1, 2019

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 19S-JV-136 
C.S., Jr., 
Appellant (Defendant), 
–v– 
State of Indiana, 
Appellee (Plaintiff). 
Supreme Court Case No. 19S-JV-137 
Z.T., 
Appellant (Defendant), 
–v– 
State of Indiana, 
Appellee (Plaintiff). 
Argued: April 25, 2019 | Decided: October 1, 2019 
Appeals from the Elkhart Circuit Court,  
Nos. 20C01-1712-JD-612, 20C01-1710-JD-540 
The Honorable Michael A. Christofeno, Judge 
The Honorable Deborah A. Domine, Magistrate 
On Petitions to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals,  
Nos. 18A-JV-862, 18A-JV-1656 
Opinion by Justice Goff 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa and Slaughter concur. 
Justice David concurs in part, dissents in part with separate opinion. 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Oct 01 2019, 11:33 am
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 19S-JV-136, 19S-JV-137 | October 1, 2019 
Page 2 of 15 
Goff, Justice. 
 
In separate proceedings, two teenagers were sent to the Indiana 
Department of Correction after a hearing where they appeared by video 
rather than in person.  Although the main characters differ, everything 
else about the teenagers’ stories, from the start of the hearing to this point, 
is nearly identical.  The teenagers each appeared by Skype at a hearing to 
decide whether their juvenile dispositional decrees should be modified to 
make them wards of the Department of Correction.  Although the 
teenagers did not object to participating via Skype, nothing in the record 
indicates that they agreed to do so or that the trial court found good cause 
for their remote participation.  At the end of the hearings, both teenagers 
were made wards of the Department of Correction.  They separately 
appealed, arguing primarily that their remote participation in their 
hearings did not comply with Indiana Administrative Rule 14.  We find 
that Rule 14 generally governs the use of telephones and audiovisual 
telecommunication tools in our trial courts, including in juvenile cases, 
and Rule 14(B) applies to the types of hearings involved here.  But we 
ultimately conclude that the teenagers have failed to show that their 
remote participation resulted in fundamental error.  Therefore, they 
cannot gain the relief they seek, and we affirm the trial court.  However, 
we close this opinion with guidance to courts and attorneys so that this 
procedural story is not repeated. 
Factual and Procedural History 
Although different underlying circumstances and separate juvenile 
proceedings led them to the Department of Correction (DOC), the 
juveniles involved in both cases, C.S., Jr. and Z.T. (or, the Juveniles), 
experienced nearly identical procedures along the way.1  The same trial 
court judge separately adjudicated both C.S., Jr. and Z.T. delinquents in 
 
1 Because of the similarities of the procedure and arguments in both cases, we held a 
combined oral argument and choose to issue a single opinion addressing both cases. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 19S-JV-136, 19S-JV-137 | October 1, 2019 
Page 3 of 15 
late 2017.  The Juveniles were physically present at these hearings.  The 
same judge held separate disposition-modification hearings in 2018 where 
the State requested that the Juveniles be made wards of the DOC.2  Both 
C.S., Jr. and Z.T. participated in these disposition-modification hearings 
via the videoconferencing application Skype.  Neither C.S., Jr. nor Z.T. 
objected on the record to appearing via Skype, but there is also no 
indication in the record that the parties agreed to this type of remote 
participation or that the trial court found good cause for this procedure.  
During these hearings, testimony from multiple people—including C.S., 
Jr. and Z.T.—was noted as “indiscernible to [the court] reporter.”  See, e.g., 
C.S., Jr. Tr. Vol. II, p. 43; Z.T. Tr. Vol. II, p. 47.  At the conclusion of both 
disposition-modification hearings, the trial court granted the State’s 
request and made each juvenile a ward of the DOC.  C.S., Jr. and Z.T. both 
indicated their intent to appeal, and the trial court appointed a new 
attorney to represent both juveniles in their separate appeals.   
Before the Court of Appeals, C.S., Jr. brought a two-pronged attack.  
First, C.S., Jr. argued that the trial court abused its discretion in granting 
wardship to the DOC.  Second, relying on Indiana Administrative Rule 14 
and this Court’s interpretation of Rule 14 in the context of criminal 
sentencing, C.S., Jr. argued that he had a right to be physically present at 
the modification hearing and the trial court erred when it went forward 
with the hearing despite his Skype participation.  The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court in a published decision.  C.S., Jr. v. State, 110 
N.E.3d 433, 437 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).  In concluding that C.S., Jr.’s Skype 
participation was acceptable, the panel differentiated criminal defendants 
from juveniles and found that C.S., Jr. was given all that was required by 
statute: notice of the modification hearing and an opportunity to be heard.  
Id. at 436–437 (discussing Hawkins v. State, 982 N.E.2d 997, 1002–03 (Ind. 
2013), and Ind. Code § 31-37-18-1.3 (2007)).  C.S., Jr. sought rehearing, 
arguing that the Court of Appeals did not adequately address his 
 
2 At both hearings, the same deputy prosecutor represented the State, and the same attorney 
represented both C.S., Jr. and Z.T. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 19S-JV-136, 19S-JV-137 | October 1, 2019 
Page 4 of 15 
arguments based on Administrative Rule 14, but the Court of Appeals 
denied the petition.  
Z.T. brought a similar two-pronged attack, contending that the trial 
court erred in granting wardship to the DOC and in conducting the 
hearing with Z.T. participating via Skype.  However, Z.T. built on C.S., 
Jr.’s argument and specifically argued that the trial court’s holding of a 
hearing at which Z.T. was not physically present contravened 
Administrative Rule 14 and thereby denied him due process.  In a 
memorandum decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.  Z.T. 
v. State, No. 18A-JV-1656, 2018 WL 6332469, *4 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2018).  
Relying in part on C.S., Jr. to conclude that Z.T.’s Skype participation was 
adequate, Z.T.’s panel likewise distinguished criminal defendants from 
juveniles and found that Z.T. had notice of the modification hearing and 
an opportunity to be heard at it.  Id. at *3.  The panel then went a step 
further and concluded that Rule 14 did not apply to the juvenile 
modification hearing in which Z.T. participated.  Id.   
C.S., Jr. and Z.T. separately sought transfer and made nearly identical 
arguments centered on the propriety of their remote participation in the 
modification hearings below.  Additionally, the Indiana Public Defender 
Council, Juvenile Defense Project appeared as amicus curiae aligned with 
the Juveniles in both cases.  We granted C.S., Jr.’s and Z.T.’s petitions to 
transfer to address the issue of their Skype participation at their 
modification hearings, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinions.  
See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).  We summarily affirm both Court of 
Appeals panels below on the issue of whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in granting wardship of C.S., Jr. and Z.T. to the DOC.  See App. 
R. 58(A)(2). 
Standard of Review 
This case involves a question of the scope and applicability of Indiana 
Administrative Rule 14, and we interpret our administrative rules de 
novo.  See Hawkins, 982 N.E.2d at 1002–03 (interpreting Ind. 
Administrative Rule 14 de novo). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 19S-JV-136, 19S-JV-137 | October 1, 2019 
Page 5 of 15 
However, before the trial court, neither C.S., Jr. nor Z.T. objected to 
appearing at their modification hearings by video, so they must show that 
the alleged error was fundamental to gain relief.  Kelly v. State, 122 N.E.3d 
803, 805 (Ind. 2019) (“Fundamental error is an exception to the general 
rule that a party’s failure to object at trial results in a waiver of the issue 
on appeal.”).  “An error is fundamental, and thus reviewable on appeal, if 
it ‘made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly blatant violation of 
basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable 
and substantial potential for harm.’”  Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 
(Ind. 2018) (quoting Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1281 (Ind. 2014)).  
“[F]undamental error is a daunting standard that applies ‘only in 
egregious circumstances’” where the trial judge should have corrected the 
situation sua sponte.  Knapp, 9 N.E.3d at 1281 (citation omitted).   
Discussion and Decision 
C.S., Jr. and Z.T. challenge the process by which the trial court modified 
their juvenile dispositional decrees and made them wards of the DOC.  
They argue that the trial court violated Administrative Rule 14 and 
thereby denied them due process when it had them participate in their 
disposition-modification hearings by Skype without their express 
agreement or a finding of good cause.  We proceed in four parts.  First, we 
consider the scope and applicability of Rule 14, determining if the rule 
applies in these situations.  Second, we determine if the trial court 
followed Rule 14 here.  Third, we assess whether the alleged error in 
having C.S., Jr. and Z.T. participate in their hearings remotely resulted in 
fundamental error entitling them to relief.  Fourth, we offer guidance to 
courts and parties faced with these situations going forward. 
I. Administrative Rule 14 applies to juvenile 
disposition-modification hearings. 
Administrative Rule 14 governs the use of telephones and audiovisual 
telecommunication tools in both criminal and civil matters in our trial 
courts.  See generally Admin. R. 14.  Sections A and B of the rule explain 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 19S-JV-136, 19S-JV-137 | October 1, 2019 
Page 6 of 15 
when these modes of remote participation can be used in various 
situations.  Section C then details the minimum technical requirements for 
telephones or audiovisual telecommunication devices under Rule 14.  The 
parties agree that Rule 14 can apply in juvenile cases generally, but they 
disagree as to how the various sections of the rule might apply to the 
hearings conducted below.   
A. Rule 14(B) governs the use of telephones and 
audiovisual telecommunication devices in juvenile 
disposition-modification hearings. 
Section A of Rule 14 provides specific conferences, hearings, and 
proceedings where remote participation under the rule is permissible.  
Admin. R. 14(A).  These specific proceedings include pre-trial conferences, 
certain initial hearings in criminal cases, and misdemeanor guilty plea 
hearings.  Admin. R. 14(A)(1)(a), (A)(2)(a), (A)(2)(b).  The only juvenile 
delinquency hearings listed in Rule 14(A) are “detention hearing[s] 
pursuant to IC 31-37-6 or . . . periodic review hearing[s] pursuant to IC 31-
37-20-2.”  Admin. R. 14(A)(2)(g).  Because the disposition-modification 
hearings held in C.S., Jr.’s and Z.T.’s cases were neither detention hearings 
nor periodic review hearings, Rule 14(A) does not apply.  Compare I.C. ch. 
31-37-22 (2017) (disposition-modification hearings) with I.C. ch. 31-37-6 
(detention hearings) and I.C. § 31-37-20-2 (periodic review hearings).   
Section B of Rule 14 then acts as a broad, catch-all provision, governing 
remote participation in “other proceedings.”  Admin. R. 14(B).  
Specifically, Rule 14(B) applies to “any conference, hearing or proceeding 
not specifically enumerated in Section (A) of this rule, with the exception 
of criminal proceedings involving the right of confrontation or the right to 
be present.”  Id.  In situations falling within this broad scope, remote 
participation tools can be used if either (1) all the parties consent in 
writing and that consent is entered on the Chronological Case Summary 
or (2) the trial court, on its own motion or that of a party, finds good cause 
for remote participation based on factors provided in the rule.  Admin. R. 
14(B)(1)–(2).  As provided by the plain language of Rule 14(B), the only 
exceptions to its broad scope are situations listed in Rule 14(A) and certain 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 19S-JV-136, 19S-JV-137 | October 1, 2019 
Page 7 of 15 
criminal proceedings.  Otherwise, Rule 14(B) governs the use of remote 
participation tools in all conferences, hearings, and proceedings. 
Juvenile disposition-modification hearings fall within the broad scope 
of Rule 14(B) because neither of the exceptions to the rule’s scope apply.  
First, as noted above, the only juvenile delinquency proceedings listed in 
Rule 14(A) are detention hearings and periodic review hearings, and the 
disposition-modification hearings at issue here are different.  Second, 
juvenile proceedings are not criminal matters.  E.g., D.M. v. State, 949 
N.E.2d 327, 333 n.6 (Ind. 2011).  Thus, because juvenile disposition-
modification hearings are not listed in Rule 14(A) and are not criminal 
matters, Rule 14(B) applies and should have been complied with here. 
B. The State’s arguments against Rule 14(B)’s applicability 
are misplaced. 
The State argues that Rule 14(B) does not govern C.S., Jr.’s or Z.T.’s 
remote appearance in these cases because it addresses “the lack of the 
personal presence of a testifying witness, not of a party to the 
proceeding.”  C.S., Jr. State’s Response to Pet. to Transfer, p. 7; Z.T. State’s 
Response to Pet. to Transfer, p. 7.  In support of this argument, the State 
contends that the factors provided in the rule for determining whether 
good cause exists and the notice requirements for a motion to use remote 
communication tools relate to the presence of a witness.  This focus, the 
State concludes, limits the scope of Rule 14(B) to non-party witnesses.  
Although Rule 14(B) uses witness-focused language in some parts, its 
applicability is not limited to situations when a non-party witness seeks to 
testify remotely for three reasons.   
First, the State’s argument ignores the broad statement of Rule 14(B)’s 
scope and would necessarily require us to read language into the rule that 
is not there.  Rule 14(B) expressly applies to “any conference, hearing or 
proceeding not specifically enumerated in Section (A) of this rule, with the 
exception of criminal proceedings involving the right of confrontation or 
the right to be present.”  Admin. R. 14(B).  The State’s interpretation of the 
rule would add an additional limitation to that scope whereby the rule 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 19S-JV-136, 19S-JV-137 | October 1, 2019 
Page 8 of 15 
would apply only to situations when a non-party witness seeks to testify 
remotely, but that limitation is not found in the plain language of the rule.   
Second, the good-cause factors do not uniformly or exclusively refer to 
out-of-court non-party witnesses.  Rule 14(B) provides the following 
factors that must be considered by the court in its good-cause 
determination:  
(a) Whether, after due diligence, the party has been unable to 
procure the physical presence of the witness; 
(b) Whether effective cross-examination of the witness is 
possible, considering the availability of documents and 
exhibits to counsel and the witness; 
(c) The complexity of the proceedings and the importance of 
the offered testimony in relation to the convenience to the 
party and the proposed witness; 
(d) The importance of presenting the testimony of the witness 
in open court, where the fact finder may observe the 
demeanor of the witness and impress upon the witness the 
duty to testify truthfully; 
(e) Whether undue surprise or unfair prejudice would result; 
and 
(f) Any other factors a trial court may determine to be relevant 
in an individual case. 
Admin. R. 14(B)(2)(a)–(f).  Reviewing this list, we see that only two of the 
six factors—(a) and (d)—necessarily refer to an out-of-court witness.  
Neither factor (e) nor factor (f) refers to witnesses at all.  And both factor 
(b) and factor (c) can apply to situations involving an out-of-court party 
and an in-court witness.  For example, in relation to factor (b), there may 
be real concerns about an out-of-court party’s ability to effectively cross-
examine an in-court witness by video conference.   
Third, Rule 14(C), which provides the minimum technical requirements 
for remote participation, shows that out-of-court parties are contemplated 
by Rule 14.  Rule 14(C) applies “to any hearing or proceeding conducted 
under this rule” and requires the court to assure that “[t]he facility and 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 19S-JV-136, 19S-JV-137 | October 1, 2019 
Page 9 of 15 
equipment provide counsel with the ability to confer privately with an out 
of court party.”  Admin. R. 14(C)(1).  If Rule 14(B) applies only when a 
witness might testify remotely, this part of Rule 14(C) expressly referring 
to out-of-court parties would be rendered meaningless for proceedings 
that fall under Rule 14(B).  Thus, the scope of Rule 14(B) is not limited to 
situations involving non-party witnesses seeking to testify remotely, and 
the rule applies here. 
II. The trial court did not follow Rule 14(B) in holding 
the hearings with the Juveniles participating 
remotely. 
Having concluded that Rule 14(B) applies here, we consider whether 
the trial court followed its requirements.  The rule allows remote, 
electronic participation only when (1) all parties consent and that consent 
is reflected in the Chronological Case Summary or (2) the court finds good 
cause.  Admin. R. 14(B)(1)–(2).  The entries in the Chronological Case 
Summaries for these hearings do not indicate that the parties agreed to the 
Juveniles participating via Skype.  See C.S., Jr. App. Vol 2, p. 6; Z.T. App. 
Vol. II, p. 7.  And the State acknowledges that the trial court did not make 
findings of good cause.  C.S., Jr. State’s Response in Opposition to 
Transfer, p. 9; Z.T. State’s Response in Opposition to Transfer, pp. 7–8.  
Without an agreement on the issue or a finding of good cause on the 
record, the trial court erred when it allowed C.S., Jr. and Z.T. to appear 
and participate in the hearings via Skype.  Because the Juveniles did not 
object to their remote appearance, however, this conclusion does not 
resolve these appeals. 
III. The error in allowing C.S., Jr.’s and Z.T.’s remote 
participation was not fundamental. 
Although the trial court did not follow Rule 14 here, neither C.S., Jr. nor 
Z.T. has shown that the trial court’s noncompliance with the rule “made a 
fair trial [or, in this case, a fair hearing] impossible” or “present[ed] an 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 19S-JV-136, 19S-JV-137 | October 1, 2019 
Page 10 of 15 
undeniable and substantial potential for harm.”  Durden, 99 N.E.3d at 652 
(citation omitted).  As a result, the Juveniles have failed to satisfy the 
daunting standard of fundamental error and are not entitled to relief. 
A. The Juveniles’ general arguments do not show 
fundamental error occurred. 
In addressing the fairness of the hearings and the potential for harm in 
appearing remotely, C.S., Jr. and Z.T. make several high-level arguments 
generally applicable to all juveniles in similar situations.  They argue that 
remote participation tools make it harder for a juvenile to participate in 
the delinquency process, lessen the reformative impact of contact with the 
juvenile court, and “undermine trust in the justice system.”  C.S., Jr. Pet. to 
Transfer, p. 11; Z.T. Pet. to Transfer, p. 12.  Referencing the parens patriae 
role of a juvenile court, C.S., Jr. and Z.T. try to drive home their point by 
saying, “Parents talk face-to-face with children when disciplining them.  
They communicate directly, rather than indirectly through equipment, 
when disciplining their children.  And a court should be expected to do 
the same unless the juvenile consents to not being personally present.”  
C.S., Jr. Pet. to Transfer, p. 12; Z.T. Pet. to Transfer, p. 14.  While some 
nuances may be lost during the course of some video-conference hearings, 
we cannot agree that a properly conducted juvenile hearing with remote 
participants necessarily results in the harms the Juveniles predict.  In some 
cases, a juvenile may benefit more from sticking closely to a routine built 
for rehabilitation and appearing at a hearing remotely rather than by 
being taken out of his or her rehabilitative setting and routine to be 
transported to a hearing.  And as parents traveling away from their 
children for military deployments, work trips, or other reasons know, 
under the right circumstances, a person can still effectively parent and 
discipline a child from a distance.   
In another general argument, the Juveniles contend that a substantial 
potential for harm exists because a juvenile could eventually become a 
criminal as an adult.  Combined Oral Argument at 8:21–10:08, 38:33–38:45.  
But the risk that the juvenile justice system fails to set a child on the right 
path, resulting in the child later entering the criminal justice system as an 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 19S-JV-136, 19S-JV-137 | October 1, 2019 
Page 11 of 15 
adult, exists in every juvenile case.  We cannot agree with the Juveniles’ 
argument that this risk is necessarily increased by a trial court’s decision 
to conduct a hearing by video.  Ultimately, the risk of unfairness and 
potential harms discussed in these general arguments are too speculative 
and too far removed from the error here to lead us to find fundamental 
error. 
B. The Juveniles’ arguments based on the specific facts of 
their cases do not show that fundamental error occurred. 
In addition to their general arguments, C.S., Jr. and Z.T. also advance 
an argument regarding fundamental error based on the specific facts here.  
They contend that their remote participation in the hearings made a fair 
hearing impossible and presented a substantial potential for harm because 
portions of their statements were noted by the court reporter as 
indiscernible.  “Indiscernible testimony,” the Juveniles offer, “is likely the 
result of poor or inadequate equipment or equipment failures.”  C.S., Jr. 
Pet. to Transfer, p. 12; Z.T. Pet. to Transfer, p. 13.  We cannot agree.  While 
notations in the transcript of indiscernible statements could indicate 
technical problems with the equipment used by the trial court, two aspects 
of these cases show that it is unlikely that technical issues impacted the 
hearings.   
First, in both hearings, statements from people who appear to have 
been in the courtroom were noted as indiscernible.  C.S., Jr.’s mother 
participated in the modification hearing, and the court reporter noted 
some of her statements as indiscernible.  C.S., Jr. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 42–43.  But 
C.S., Jr.’s mother was in the courtroom.  C.S., Jr. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, 
p. 71.  In Z.T.’s case, portions of the probation officer’s and defense 
counsel’s statements were noted as indiscernible, Z.T. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 40, 
59, but they appear to have been in the courtroom, see Z.T. Appellant’s 
App. Vol. II, pp. 7, 78 (showing no indication of their remote participation 
in the Chronological Case Summary or in the trial court’s order).  Thus, 
the testimony noted as indiscernible in the transcripts was not tied 
exclusively to the remote participants.   
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 19S-JV-136, 19S-JV-137 | October 1, 2019 
Page 12 of 15 
Second, if the video feed at the hearing cut out or there was some other 
issue that rendered the Juveniles’ statements unintelligible, we would 
expect to see another participant—the trial court judge, defense counsel, 
the prosecutor, the probation officer, or one of C.S., Jr.’s or Z.T.’s family 
members—speak up and ask for clarification.  But that did not happen.  In 
fact, the trial judge seemed to have no problem understanding at least one 
statement from C.S., Jr.’s mother marked as indiscernible.  See C.S., Jr. Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 42 (“THE MOTHER: (Indiscernible to reporter) … what I have to 
say.  THE COURT: Well, it always makes a differen[ce] what a parent has 
to say, but we don’t know if it’s going to be persuasive until you say it.”).  
And during Z.T.’s hearing, the trial court specifically asked Z.T., “[C]an 
you hear what’s going on?” to which Z.T. replied, “Yeah.”  Z.T. Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 40.  Based on our review of the transcript, the clarity of someone’s 
statement at the hearing did not depend on whether that person was in 
the courtroom or appeared by video, and the participants in the hearing 
likely understood the statements noted in the transcript as indiscernible.  
Thus, notations that some of C.S., Jr.’s and Z.T.’s statements at their 
hearings were indiscernible to the court reporter do not show that their 
remote participation in the hearings resulted in fundamental error. 3 
Neither the Juveniles’ general arguments nor their specific arguments 
have shown that the trial court fundamentally erred in having them 
participate in their hearings remotely.  By failing to object at trial and 
failing to demonstrate fundamental error on appeal, C.S., Jr. and Z.T. have 
waived the issue and are not entitled to relief.  “Going forward, though, 
we would expect to see what our rules require reflected in the record, and 
would urge trial courts to be cautious of using procedures—however 
efficient they may be—without following all of the steps required to 
implement those procedures . . . .”  Hawkins, 982 N.E.2d at 1003. 
 
3 Z.T. also mentions that there were questions as to whether he could see his mother during 
the hearing.  Z.T. Pet. to Transfer, p. 13.  However, Z.T. admits (and the record reflects) that 
the issue was resolved during the hearing after an adjustment was made.  Z.T. Appellant’s 
Br., p. 24; Z.T. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 32–33.  Since the issue was resolved, this does not support a 
finding of fundamental error. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 19S-JV-136, 19S-JV-137 | October 1, 2019 
Page 13 of 15 
IV. Guidance for the Future 
Having resolved the question before us, we pause now to offer advice 
to courts and parties faced with similar situations in the future.  First, we 
give guidance to trial courts deciding whether they can hold a proceeding 
with remote participants pursuant to Rule 14(B).  Then, we share advice 
regarding trial counsel’s best course of action when faced with a situation 
similar to what occurred below.   
If a trial court holds a hearing with remote participants based on a 
finding of good cause pursuant to Rule 14(B), it must base its good-cause 
determination on the factors listed in the rule and issue a written order 
complying with the rule’s deadlines.  Admin. R. 14(B)(2)(a)–(f), (B)(3).  
While the trial court here did not follow this requirement, the records 
contain facts that likely would have been relevant to the good-cause 
determinations.  See Admin. R. 14(B)(2)(f) (directing courts to consider 
“[a]ny other factors a trial court may determine to be relevant in an 
individual case”).  In a prior hearing in Z.T.’s case, the trial court noted 
that it did not have transportation available every day of the week.  Z.T. 
Tr. Vol. II, p. 3.  And both Juveniles had exhibited highly disruptive 
behavior.  Id. at pp. 37–38; C.S., Jr. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 34–37.  Neither this 
opinion nor Rule 14 aims to provide a complete list of the factors relevant 
to a Rule 14(B)(2) good-cause determination, but these facts likely would 
have been relevant to a finding of good cause here. 
Further, in making a Rule 14(B)(2) good-cause determination in a 
juvenile case, a trial court will necessarily need to consider the unique 
aspects of the juvenile justice system.  This system “is founded on the 
notion of parens patriae, which allows the court the power to step into the 
shoes of the parents.”  In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ind. 2004).  
Consistent with this foundation, juvenile courts are generally concerned 
with acting in the child’s best interests.  Id. at 636 (quoting Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)) (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed 
that the state maintains ‘a parens patriae interest in preserving and 
promoting the welfare of the child.’”); N.L. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re 
N.E.), 919 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2010) (“The resolution of a juvenile 
proceeding focuses on the best interests of the child . . . .”).  This concern 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 19S-JV-136, 19S-JV-137 | October 1, 2019 
Page 14 of 15 
about the child’s best interests can extend to the way the juvenile court 
addresses and interacts with the child.  Thus, the child’s best interests will 
generally constitute a relevant factor under Rule 14(B)(2)(f) in a juvenile 
court’s good-cause determination. 
Finally, when a party is confronted with potential noncompliance with 
an applicable rule, the party should object.  Because neither C.S, Jr. nor 
Z.T. objected to participating remotely in their hearings, they faced the 
daunting burden of showing fundamental error, which they ultimately 
failed to do.  A properly placed objection would have preserved the issue 
for appeal.  However, the practical effect of an objection is likely more 
important to an attorney’s client.  A “trial court can often correct an error 
if it is called to the court’s attention.  This can result in enormous savings 
in time, effort and expense to the parties and the court, including avoiding 
an appeal and retrial.”  Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678 (Ind. 2013) 
(quoting State v. Daniels, 680 N.E.2d 829, 835 (Ind. 1997)).  While objections 
might not have changed the outcome of the hearings or the appeals, they 
would have allowed the trial court to address C.S., Jr.’s and Z.T.’s 
concerns right away. 
Conclusion 
Administrative Rule 14 controls when telephones and audiovisual 
telecommunication tools can be used in both criminal and civil matters in 
our trial courts.  Different sections of Rule 14 dictate when these remote 
participation tools may be used in different types of conferences, hearings, 
and proceedings, and here we conclude that Rule 14(B) governs the use of 
telephones and audiovisual telecommunication tools in juvenile 
disposition-modification hearings.  However, because C.S., Jr. and Z.T. 
failed to object to the trial court’s noncompliance with Rule 14(B) and 
failed to demonstrate fundamental error, they have waived the issue.  
Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s orders. 
Rush, C.J., and Massa and Slaughter, JJ., concur. 
David, J., concurs in part, dissents in part with separate opinion. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 19S-JV-136, 19S-JV-137 | October 1, 2019 
Page 15 of 15 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLA N TS 
Nancy A. McCaslin 
McCaslin & McCaslin 
Elkhart, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L E E 
Curtis T. Hill, Jr.  
Attorney General of Indiana 
Andrew Kobe 
Laura R. Anderson 
Lyubov Gore 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A MI CU S CU R IAE  I N D IA NA  PUB LI C D EF EN D E R  
C O U NC IL , J UV EN ILE  DE FE NS E P R OJ ECT  
Joel C. Wieneke 
Indiana Public Defender Council, Juvenile Defense Project 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
David, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part. 
I fully concur with Part I and Part II of the majority opinion.  I also join 
Part IV of the opinion and wish to praise the guidance given to our trial 
judges by my colleague.  I respectfully dissent from Part III of the majority 
opinion, however, and would find that the failure of the trial court to 
follow Administrative Rule 14(B) resulted in fundamental error.  
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand this case for further 
proceedings.