Title: Glen D. Hocking v. City of Dodgeville
Citation: 2010 WI 59
Docket Number: 2008AP002812
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 2010

2010 WI 59 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP2812 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Glen D. Hocking and Louann Hocking, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
City of Dodgeville, 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
Charles C. O'Rourke, Joan R. O'Rourke, American 
Family Mutual Insurance Company, Amy Crubaugh-
Schrank, Shaun Sersch, Wendy Sersch and 
Germantown Mutual Insurance Company, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 108 
Reported at: 320 Wis. 2d 519, 770 N.W.2d 761 
(Ct. App. 2009-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 2, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 3, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Iowa   
 
JUDGE: 
Edward E. Leineweber   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Sheila Stuart Kelley, Christopher D. Stombaugh, Tyler T. 
Kieler, and Kopp, McKichan, Geyer, Skemp & Stombaugh, LLP, 
Platteville, and oral argument by Christopher D. Stombaugh. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Peggy E. 
Van Horn and the Law Offices of Thomas P. Stilp, Brookfield, and 
oral argument by Peggy E. Van Horn. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 59
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP2812  
(L.C. No. 
2006CV120) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Glen D. Hocking and Louann Hocking, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Dodgeville, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Charles C. O'Rourke, Joan R. O'Rourke, American 
Family Mutual Insurance Company, Amy Crubaugh-
Schrank, Shaun Sersch, Wendy Sersch and 
Germantown Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This case comes before us on 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals1 affirming 
the circuit court's order of summary judgment in favor of the 
City of Dodgeville in a lawsuit against it by Glen and Louann 
                                                 
1 Hocking v. City of Dodgeville, 2009 WI App 108, 320 Wis. 
2d 519, 770 N.W.2d 761. 
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
2 
 
Hocking ("Hockings") for damage to their property.  The Hockings 
claimed that the City was negligent in the design, plotting, 
approval, and development of a subdivision adjacent to their 
property and that negligence caused significant water damage to 
their property.  The City asserted that the suit was barred 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.89 (2007-08),2 which imposes a ten-year 
statute 
of 
repose 
on 
actions 
for 
injury 
resulting 
from 
improvements to real property.  Both the circuit court and court 
of appeals agreed with the City that the statute of repose 
applied. 
¶2 
The specific issue before us is whether either of two 
exceptions contained in § 893.89 apply and therefore allow the 
Hockings' suit to proceed.3  First, the Hockings allege that the 
City expressly warranted or guaranteed the improvement to real 
property under § 893.89(4)(b).  The Hockings also assert that 
the City was negligent in the maintenance, operation, or 
inspection 
of 
the 
improvement 
to 
real 
property 
under 
§ 893.89(4)(c).  If either of these two exceptions applies, the 
ten-year statute of repose would not bar the Hockings' suit. 
¶3 
We 
conclude 
that 
neither 
§ 893.89(4)(b) 
nor 
§ 893.89(4)(c) applies, and the Hockings' suit is therefore 
barred by the ten-year statute of repose in Wis. Stat. § 893.89.  
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 The Hockings do not assert that the exception to the 
statute of repose outlined in Wis. Stat. § 893.89(4)(d), which 
allows suits beyond the ten-year statute of repose if damages 
were sustained before April 29, 1994, is applicable. 
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
3 
 
Section 893.89(4)(b) does not apply because the Hockings have 
not shown that the City of Dodgeville itself made any express 
warranty or guarantee regarding the improvements.  Section 
893.89(4)(c) does not apply because the City has not been 
negligent 
in 
maintaining, 
operating, 
or 
inspecting 
the 
improvements.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and 
hold that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment 
for the City, thereby dismissing the Hockings' suit. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶4 
The following facts are undisputed for the purposes of 
this appeal. 
¶5 
In 1978, Glen and Louann Hocking purchased a home 
situated on a small parcel of land at 216 Swayne Street in 
Dodgeville, Wisconsin.  At the time of purchase, the nearest 
residence to the Hocking property was a farm house 200 or 300 
feet away. 
¶6 
In 1989, Wallace Rogers purchased property adjacent to 
the Hockings' land, which at the time was largely undeveloped 
and covered with trees.  Rogers planned to develop the property 
into a subdivision with multiple lots.  In order to complete 
this project, he hired professional engineer Lawrence E. Schmit 
to design the subdivision.  The City of Dodgeville also 
contracted with Schmit to design and install streets and sewers; 
this involved laying out the roadways, curbs, and street gutters 
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
4 
 
for the proposed development.4  Rogers named the completed 
development the "Lorraine Subdivision." 
¶7 
The terrain of the proposed subdivision was uneven, 
and Schmit had to bring in large amounts of landfill to level 
the land and build up the places where the homes would sit.  
This landscaping created a steep slope that ran downhill to the 
Hockings' property. 
¶8 
Prior to the development of the subdivision, Glen 
Hocking spoke with Corny James, a member of the City of 
Dodgeville Common Council.  Hocking informed James that he was 
concerned about the steep gradation that he anticipated would 
result from building the subdivision.  Despite the Hockings' 
concerns, the City approved the plans for the development on 
July 16, 1991.  Throughout the construction of the Lorraine 
Subdivision, Mr. Hocking continued to informally speak with the 
city engineer and various common council members who assured him 
that if a problem arose, it would be addressed by the City. 
¶9 
On September 12, 1992, the Lorraine subdivision was 
completed, and the owners of the individual lots were allowed to 
occupy their property.  Schmit's final contact with the 
subdivision was on June 3, 1993, when the final coat of blacktop 
was laid over the asphalt on Roelli Lane, one of the 
subdivision's main streets. 
                                                 
4 In his deposition, Schmit said he was not a contractor, 
but rather a "consultant" for the City. He stated that he was 
the only engineer in town and thus people considered and 
referred to him as the city engineer, though he was never an 
actual employee of the City. 
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
5 
 
¶10 The Lorraine Subdivision significantly impacted the 
physical condition of the Hockings' property.  Before its 
development, the Hockings experienced no flooding problems in 
their yard or basement.  But around 1992 or 1993, they began to 
notice water in their yard, and over time storm water run-off 
began 
to 
collect 
both 
inside 
and 
outside 
the 
Hockings' 
residence, causing damage to their home and erosion of their 
land.  They had to install a sump pump in order to capture the 
water, but even that only partially mitigated the problem.  In 
1995, the Hockings' basement completely flooded.  Moreover, 
water damage throughout the 1990's caused mold to develop inside 
their home. 
¶11 From 
the 
early-1990's 
until 
2003, 
Mr. 
Hocking 
frequently spoke with elected officials and employees of the 
City (collectively "city officials") who continued to assure him 
the problem would be resolved.  Several city officials, 
including members of the common council, even visited the 
Hockings' home to inspect the damage.  The council members 
assured the Hockings that the problem would be addressed.  At 
one point, the City considered installing a drainage system or a 
moat, either of which Mr. Hocking readily approved, but no 
action was taken to follow through on installing either.  At 
some point in 2003 the city engineer5 and the city assessor 
                                                 
5 The record reflects that Lawrence Schmit was sometimes 
called the city engineer but was never an actual employee of the 
City (see supra note 4).  It appears that in 2003 the City 
employed Mike Risbach in that capacity. 
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
6 
 
advised Mr. Hocking that the City could not resolve the flooding 
issue. 
¶12 The Hockings brought this action against the City, 
Rogers, and Schmit on August 22, 2006, in the Circuit Court for 
Iowa County, Edward E. Leineweber, Judge.  The Hockings asserted 
claims of negligence, and negligent and intentional creation and 
maintenance of a nuisance. 
¶13 The three defendants moved for summary judgment on the 
ground that Wis. Stat. § 893.89 bars this action because it was 
filed more than ten years after the substantial completion of 
the subdivision.  The Hockings argued that they received express 
guarantees from the City that it would resolve the situation, 
and therefore, pursuant to § 893.89(4)(b), the statutory bar did 
not apply.  They also contended that the suit could move forward 
pursuant to § 893.89(4)(c) because the City owned and controlled 
the subdivision streets and was negligent in maintaining a 
nuisance. 
¶14 The circuit court rejected the Hockings' arguments and 
concluded that the statutory bar did apply.  With respect to 
Wis. Stat. § 893.89(4)(b), the court found that there was no 
evidence of an express warranty or guarantee approved by the 
City of Dodgeville Common Council; therefore, that exception did 
not apply.  In analyzing § 893.89(4)(c), the court assumed that 
the City was negligent in its approval of the design and 
construction of the subdivision, but it rejected the Hockings' 
argument that the City's failure to redesign or reconstruct the 
improvement constituted "negligence in the maintenance . . . of 
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
7 
 
[the] improvement" within the meaning of that subsection.  
Accordingly, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the City, Rogers, and Schmit, and dismissed the complaint. 
¶15 The Hockings appealed only the dismissal of the City.  
In a published decision, the court of appeals affirmed.  Hocking 
v. City of Dodgeville, 2009 WI App 108, 320 Wis. 2d 519, 770 
N.W.2d 761.  It agreed with the circuit court that the city 
officials' statements to the Hockings did not constitute an 
express warranty or guarantee by the City and therefore did not 
fall under the exception in § 893.89(4)(b).  Id., ¶¶13-19.  
Assuming the City's actions negligently created and maintained a 
nuisance, the court of appeals likewise concluded that the 
City's 
conduct 
did 
not 
constitute 
"negligence 
in 
the 
maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement to real 
property" under § 893.89(4)(c).  Id., ¶¶20-25. 
¶16 The Hockings then petitioned this court for review, 
which we granted. 
II. DISCUSSION 
¶17 This case requires us to construe Wis. Stat. § 893.89.  
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we 
review de novo.  Rechsteiner v. Hazelden, 2008 WI 97, ¶26, 313 
Wis. 2d 542, 753 N.W.2d 496. 
¶18 When interpreting a statute, we begin with the 
language of the statute, because it is the language that 
expresses the legislature's intent.  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶44-45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  "Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, 
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
8 
 
and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined 
words 
or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning."  Id., ¶45.  We attempt, whenever 
possible, to give reasonable effect to every word, avoiding both 
surplusage and absurd or unreasonable results.  Id., ¶46. 
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
9 
 
¶19 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.896 constitutes a statute of 
repose in actions for injury resulting from improvements to real 
property.  Like a statute of limitations, a statute of repose 
limits the time period in which an action may be brought, but 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.89 provides in relevant part: 
893.89 Action for injury resulting from improvements 
to real property. 
(1) In this section, "exposure period" means the 10 
years immediately following the date of substantial 
completion of the improvement to real property. 
(2) Except as provided in sub. (3), no cause of action 
may accrue and no action may be commenced, including 
an action for contribution or indemnity, against the 
owner or occupier of the property or against any 
person involved in the improvement to real property 
after the end of the exposure period, to recover 
damages for any injury to property, for any injury to 
the person, or for wrongful death, arising out of any 
deficiency or defect in the design, land surveying, 
planning, supervision or observation of construction 
of, 
the 
construction 
of, 
or 
the 
furnishing 
of 
materials for, the improvement to real property. This 
subsection does not affect the rights of any person 
injured as the result of any defect in any material 
used in an improvement to real property to commence an 
action 
for 
damages 
against 
the 
manufacturer 
or 
producer of the material. 
 . . .  
(4) This section does not apply to any of the 
following . . .  
(b) A person who expressly warrants or guarantees the 
improvement to real property, for the period of that 
warranty or guarantee. 
(c) An owner or occupier of real property for damages 
resulting 
from 
negligence 
in 
the 
maintenance, 
operation or inspection of an improvement to real 
property. . . .  
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
10 
 
begins to run at a different time.  Landis v. Physicians Ins. 
Co., 2001 WI 86, ¶29, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893.  A statute 
of limitations begins to run when a cause of action accrues (for 
example, when an injury is discovered).  Id.  A statute of 
repose begins to run when a defendant acts in some way.  Id.  
Here, the act that triggered the statute of repose was the 
substantial completion of an improvement to real property.  Wis. 
Stat. § 893.89(1).  A statute of repose may "bar an action 
before the injury is discovered or before the injury even 
occurs."  Kohn v. Darlington Cmty. Schs., 2005 WI 99, ¶38, 283 
Wis. 2d 1, 698 N.W.2d 794. 
¶20 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.89(2) provides in relevant part: 
[N]o cause of action may accrue and no action may be 
commenced . . . against the owner or occupier of the 
property or against any person involved in the 
improvement to real property after the end of the 
exposure period . . . arising out of any deficiency or 
defect in 
the 
design, land surveying, planning, 
supervision or observation of construction of, the 
construction of, or the furnishing of materials for, 
the improvement to real property. 
¶21 Subsection (1) defines the "exposure period"——the 
period of time in which a suit may be filed——as "10 years 
immediately following the date of substantial completion of the 
improvement to real property." 
¶22 The parties agree that the general ten-year statute of 
repose in Wis. Stat. § 893.89 applies to this action.  That is, 
the Hockings' suit is an action arising from an improvement to 
real property, and the Hockings brought their suit after the 
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
11 
 
ten-year exposure period.7  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.89(4)(a)-(d) 
creates four exceptions to which the statute of repose "does not 
apply."  The only question before us today is whether the two 
exceptions outlined in § 893.89(4)(b) and (c) exempt the 
Hockings' suit from the ten-year limitation and allow the suit 
to proceed.  If neither exception applies, the Hockings' suit is 
precluded by the statute and must be dismissed. 
¶23 In Part A, we take up the exception contained in 
§ 893.89(4)(b).  In Part B, we evaluate whether the exception 
outlined in § 893.89(4)(c) allows the Hockings' suit to go 
forward.  Because this case comes before us on summary judgment, 
we assume the Hockings' allegations to be true for our purposes 
here.  See Bank One, NA v. Ofojebe, 2005 WI App 151, ¶7, 284 
Wis. 2d 510, 702 N.W.2d 456.  We ultimately conclude that 
neither exception applies, and that the Hockings' suit was 
properly dismissed by the circuit court. 
A. Wis. Stat. § 893.89(4)(b) 
¶24 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.89(4)(b) states that an action 
normally precluded by the ten-year statute of repose may 
nonetheless be brought against "[a] person who expressly 
warrants or guarantees the improvement to real property, for the 
period of that warranty or guarantee." 
                                                 
7 The work on the subdivision was substantially completed in 
1992, meaning the exposure period——the period of time when a 
suit could be filed——expired in 2002, four years before the 2006 
filing of this lawsuit. 
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
12 
 
¶25 Because the Hockings have sued the City of Dodgeville, 
the City is the "person" here.8  The improvement to real property 
in this instance is the design and installation of roads, curbs, 
and 
street 
gutters 
during 
the 
early 
development 
of 
the 
subdivision.  Thus, the question is whether the City of 
Dodgeville expressly warranted or guaranteed its installation of 
the 
roads, 
curbs, 
and 
street 
gutters 
in 
the 
Lorraine 
Subdivision. 
¶26 The Hockings argue that the numerous statements and 
assurances 
made by 
various city officials——statements and 
assurances which for the purposes of this appeal we assume were 
actually made——created an express warranty or guarantee that the 
water problems would be fixed.  They also suggest——though the 
precise contours of their argument are unclear——that they 
reasonably relied on these statements to their detriment and 
that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should apply.  The City 
asserts that it never made any warranty or guarantee, and that 
it cannot be held liable for the unauthorized assurances of its 
elected officials and employees as further discussed herein. 
¶27 The Hockings' legal argument falls short for two 
reasons.  First, the Hockings have not demonstrated that they 
received an express warranty or guarantee.  Second, even if an 
express warranty or guarantee was made, the Hockings have not 
                                                 
8 Case law suggests the "person" in this statute can be a 
governmental entity like a municipality.  See Kohn v. Darlington 
Cmty. Schs., 2005 WI 99, 283 Wis. 2d 1, 698 N.W.2d 794 (applying 
§ 893.89(4)(b) to a school district). 
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
13 
 
demonstrated that it came from a representative of the City 
authorized to bind the City. 
¶28 Though its precise meaning can vary by context, a 
warranty is generally defined as "an assurance by one party to a 
contract of the existence of a fact upon which the other party 
may rely."  Dittman v. Nagel, 43 Wis. 2d 155, 160, 168 
N.W.2d 190 (1969); Woodward Commc'ns, Inc. v. Schockley Commc'ns 
Corp., 2001 WI App 30, ¶14, 240 Wis. 2d 492, 622 N.W.2d 756.  A 
warranty "is intended to relieve the promisee of any duty to 
ascertain the fact for himself, and amounts to a promise to 
indemnify the promisee for any loss if the fact warranted proves 
untrue."  Dittman, 43 Wis. 2d at 160; Woodward Commc'ns, Inc., 
240 Wis. 2d 492, ¶14.  Most cases discussing express warranties 
involve sales of goods, but express warranties can also be made 
in connection with real property.  See Dittman, 43 Wis. 2d at 
160 (considering an express warranty of real property); see also 
Wis. Stat. ch. 411 (containing various provisions relating to 
express warranties in leases).  The principles applicable to 
warranties of personal property are equally applicable to 
warranties of real property.  Dittman, 43 Wis. 2d 160. 
¶29 The warranty specified in Wis. Stat. § 893.89(4)(b) is 
an express warranty; this means an implied warranty is not 
enough.  An express warranty relating to the sale of goods is 
created by an "affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller 
to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the 
basis of the bargain," or by "[a]ny description of the goods 
which is made part of the basis of the bargain."  Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
14 
 
§ 402.313(1)(a), (b).9  An express warranty, then, generally 
requires some affirmation of fact or description regarding the 
goods or services that becomes a basis for a bargain between the 
parties and has the natural tendency to induce the buyer to 
purchase the goods or services.  See Ewers v. Eisenzopf, 88 
Wis. 2d 482, 489, 276 N.W.2d 802 (1979); Brown v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 355 F.2d 814, 818 (4th Cir. 1966).  Though formal words 
like "warranty" or "guarantee" are not required to create an 
express warranty, the burden is on buyers (in the sale of goods 
or services) to prove their purchase was made based on the 
factual representations.  Ewers, 88 Wis. 2d 487-89. 
¶30 A "guarantee" can have multiple meanings depending on 
the context.  Sometimes "guarantee" is used synonymously with 
"warranty."  See Consol. Papers, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 153 
Wis. 2d 589, 595 n.4, 451 N.W.2d 456 (Ct. App. 1989) (analyzing 
an express warranty that describes itself as a "warranty or 
guarantee"); Frantl Ind., Inc. v. Maier Constr., Inc., 68 
Wis. 2d 590, 
595-96, 
229 
N.W.2d 610 
(1975) 
(alternately 
describing 
the 
claim 
at 
issue 
as 
a 
"warranty" 
and 
a 
"guarantee").  Black's Law Dictionary defines "guarantee" as 
"[t]he assurance that a contract or legal act will be duly 
carried out."  Black's Law Dictionary 772 (9th ed. 2009).  A 
guarantee is usually seen "in the context of consumer warranties 
or other assurances of quality or performance."  Id. 
                                                 
9 Providing a sample or model that is made part of the 
bargain can also create an express warranty under the UCC.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 402.313(1)(c). 
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
15 
 
¶31 In this case, even if the statements alleged by the 
Hockings were in fact made, we do not see evidence of an express 
warranty or guarantee.  These concepts sound in contract, and 
there was never any contractual or other relationship between 
the City and the Hockings.  The Hockings' interest stemmed from 
the possible effects of the subdivision, not from any direct 
stake in it. 
¶32 Additionally, because there was no written contract 
between the Hockings and the City, an express warranty could be 
created only if the Hockings were induced to rely on the 
promises such that the express warranty was a basis for a 
bargain.  See Selzer v. Brunsell Bros., Ltd., 2002 WI App 232, 
¶¶13-14, 257 Wis. 2d 809, 652 N.W.2d 806.  There simply was no 
bargain here.  While the Hockings may have deferred legal action 
based 
upon 
the 
informal 
representations 
of 
various 
city 
officials, the representations did not induce the Hockings to 
come to an agreement with the City on anything. 
¶33 In the context of § 893.89(4)(b), the express warranty 
or guarantee is clearly referring to an assurance of quality by 
the one designing or constructing the improvement, likely for a 
defined period of time.  Hence, the statute allows an express 
warranty or guarantee to outlive the statute of repose "for the 
period of that warranty or guarantee."  § 893.89(4)(b).  Such an 
express warranty or guarantee is not present here. 
¶34 The second problem with the Hockings' argument is that 
none of the purported statements alleged by the Hockings came 
from a representative of the City of Dodgeville authorized to 
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
16 
 
bind the City.  Accordingly, even if we assume these statements 
constituted an express warranty or guarantee, the Hockings 
simply cannot show that the express warranties or guarantees 
were binding upon the City of Dodgeville. 
¶35 In order to decide this case, we need not determine 
the precise boundaries of when a municipality can be said to 
have acted in its official capacity.  However, given the facts 
in the present case, it is clear that the City of Dodgeville did 
not act at all. 
¶36 Municipal entities such as the City of Dodgeville are 
created 
by 
and 
derive 
their 
authority 
from 
the 
state 
legislature.  Holzbauer v. Safway Steel Prods., Inc., 2005 WI 
App 240, ¶18, 288 Wis. 2d 250, 708 N.W.2d 36.  The burden of 
proving that the City acted in a particular manner is on the 
Hockings.  See id., ¶20.  Moreover, the power to act on behalf 
of the City is reserved to the City itself, unless that power 
has been specifically delegated.  Id., ¶22 ("Unless the power to 
bind 
the 
municipality 
financially 
has 
been 
specifically 
delegated, the only entity with the statutory authority to 
contract is the municipality."). 
¶37 In Probst v. Menasha, the City of Menasha entered into 
a contract with the plaintiff to build new sidewalks and repair 
old ones.  245 Wis. 90, 91-92, 13 N.W.2d 504 (1944).  During the 
work, the plaintiff was instructed by the city engineer and a 
special committee of the common council to use additional sand 
as fill under the sidewalks.  Id. at 92.  The city engineer 
assured the plaintiff that he would be reimbursed by the city 
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
17 
 
for the excess sand.  Id. at 92-93.  Later, the City of Menasha 
refused to pay on the grounds that the contract specified that 
the plaintiff was to furnish sufficient filling as necessary.  
Id. at 93. 
¶38 We agreed with the City of Menasha that the original 
contract was not modified by the engineer's promise: "We are 
cited to no statute and we know of none that confers authority 
upon the city engineer or the street committee of the common 
council to modify the terms of a contract entered into by a city 
in the manner prescribed by statute."  Id. at 94.  Thus, even 
though the plaintiff was following the direction and instruction 
of the city engineer, we found that the City of Menasha could 
not be held liable for the representations of the city engineer 
and special committee of the common council when, in these 
matters, the City of Menasha could only act through means 
prescribed by statute.  Id.  "[A] city," we held, "cannot become 
liable except in some manner authorized by law."  Id. 
¶39 Thus, city officials, such as employees and individual 
members of the common council, cannot, through representations 
that problems will be solved, bind the City to resolve those 
problems unless they act or make their representations with the 
authority to bind the City. 
¶40 The Hockings counter that official action by the City 
is not necessary for the City to be deemed to have acted.  They 
assert that the statute contains no such requirement for 
official action, and that the Hockings should not be penalized 
for relying to their detriment on the empty promises of city 
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
18 
 
officials.  Just because the warranty or guarantee is not 
enforceable, the Hockings argue, does not mean it was not made. 
¶41 The Hockings really appear to be arguing that the 
exception 
for 
express 
warranties 
and 
guarantees 
in 
§ 893.89(4)(b) functions as a sort of equitable estoppel.10  
Equitable estoppel is established when one party demonstrates 
that it was induced by some action or non-action of another 
party, and reasonably relied to its detriment.  Kamps v. DOR, 
2003 WI App 106, ¶20, 264 Wis. 2d 794, 663 N.W.2d 306. 
¶42 The equitable estoppel argument falls short on at 
least two grounds.  First, for the reasons stated above, the 
statute's exception for only express warranties and guarantees 
makes clear that it is not intending to create an equitable 
estoppel-like catch–all provision.  Second, the City took no 
action or non-action in this case that could have induced 
reliance.  Any inducement reasonably relied on by the Hockings 
was made by those who did not and could not act or make 
representations on behalf of the City.  For these reasons, the 
Hockings' equitable estoppel argument fails. 
¶43 In sum, the Hockings have not met their burden of 
proving that the City of Dodgeville made an express warranty or 
                                                 
10 The Hockings' equitable estoppel argument is confusing.  
They admit that § 893.89(4)(b) is not drafted to function like 
equitable estoppel, and they assert that they are not claiming 
equitable estoppel.  Nonetheless, they argue that they satisfy 
the requirements of an equitable estoppel claim.  In addition, 
their argument for the applicability of § 893.89(4)(b) seems to 
rest 
largely 
on 
an 
interpretation 
that 
is 
materially 
indistinguishable from equitable estoppel. 
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
19 
 
guarantee to the Hockings regarding its construction of the 
roads, curbs, and street gutters in the Lorraine Subdivision.  
Therefore, the Hockings' suit does not meet the exception to the 
statute of repose found in Wis. Stat. § 893.89(4)(b). 
B. Wis. Stat. § 893.89(4)(c) 
¶44 The second exception at issue in this case is outlined 
in § 893.89(4)(c).  It states that the ten-year statute of 
repose does not apply to actions for damages "resulting from 
negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of an 
improvement to real property" by the "owner or occupier of real 
property." 
¶45 Here, the "owner or occupier of real property" is the 
City.11  As already discussed, the "improvement to real property" 
is the building of the roads, curbs, and street gutters in the 
Lorraine Subdivision.  In order for this exception to apply, the 
City would need to be negligent "in the maintenance, operation 
or inspection" of the roads, curbs, and street gutters. 
¶46 The dispute regarding § 893.89(4)(c) boils down to 
what it means to maintain the roadways, which we assume for our 
purposes here do constitute a nuisance.  The Hockings argue that 
the roadways constitute a nuisance due to the water damage they 
caused and continue to cause to their property.  Thus, they 
assert that the City created and is now maintaining a nuisance.  
                                                 
11 The 
parties 
did not address whether the City of 
Dodgeville is an "owner or occupier" of the roads, curbs, and 
street gutters within the meaning of § 893.89(4)(c).  We assume 
here, but do not decide, that the City is such an owner or 
occupier. 
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
20 
 
The City argues that maintaining the improvement means keeping 
the improvement in good repair and operation, which the City has 
done. 
¶47 The text of the statute distinguishes between suits 
arising from "design" or "planning" defects, which explicitly 
fall within the statute of repose,12 and suits arising from 
negligent maintenance of the property under § 893.89(4)(c).  If 
the improvement causes damage due to poor design, a plaintiff 
has ten years to assert his or her rights.  Construing the 
phrase "maintenance, operation or inspection of an improvement 
to real property" to mean maintenance or operation of a nuisance 
would create an exception that swallows the rule.  This is so 
because every improvement that is negligently designed could be 
considered an ongoing nuisance that the owner or operator 
negligently maintains by failing to correct. 
¶48 Our interpretation also accords with the generally 
understood meaning of "maintenance."  The American Heritage 
Dictionary defines "maintenance" as "[t]he work of keeping 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.89(2) states in relevant part: 
[N]o cause of action may accrue and no action may be 
commenced . . . against the owner or occupier of the 
property . . . after 
the 
end 
of 
the 
exposure 
period . . . arising out of any deficiency or defect 
in the design, land surveying, planning, supervision 
or observation of construction of, the construction 
of, 
or 
the 
furnishing 
of 
materials 
for, 
the 
improvement to real property. (Emphasis added.) 
 
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
21 
 
something in proper condition; upkeep."  American Heritage 
Dictionary 1084 (3rd ed. 1992). 
¶49 Thus, when an improvement to real property creates a 
nuisance, a party has ten years from the substantial completion 
of that improvement to bring suit.  Section 893.89(4)(c) 
applies, however, when an improvement to real property is 
completed, but the owner or occupier is negligent in the 
maintenance, operation, or inspection of it, thus causing 
damage.  It does not apply to proper maintenance of an 
improvement when it is the improvement itself that causes 
injury. 
¶50 We conclude that the alleged negligence was in the 
planning and design of the roadways.  There is no evidence that 
the City has been negligent in maintaining the roadways 
following their construction.  In short, the facts alleged by 
the Hockings do not place their suit within the exception 
contained in § 893.89(4)(c). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶51 Unfortunately, this case bears out the common law 
warning that one who deals with a municipality does so at his or 
her own risk.  Holzbauer, 288 Wis. 2d 250, ¶19.  But these 
assertions do not bring the Hockings' suit in this case within 
the exceptions to the ten-year statute of repose.  In creating 
this statute, the legislature made a policy choice that 
legitimate injuries would be without a remedy at law ten years 
after the substantial completion of an improvement to real 
property, regardless of when the injuries were suffered or the 
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
22 
 
defect discovered.  Though statutes of limitation and repose 
have important benefits, they do have their costs. 
¶52 We 
conclude 
that 
neither 
§ 893.89(4)(b) 
nor 
§ 893.89(4)(c) applies, and the Hockings' suit is barred by the 
ten-year statute of repose in Wis. Stat. § 893.89.  Section 
893.89(4)(b) does not apply because the Hockings have not shown 
that the City of Dodgeville itself made any express warranty or 
guarantee regarding the improvements.  Section 893.89(4)(c) does 
not 
apply 
because 
the 
City 
has 
not 
been 
negligent 
in 
maintaining, 
operating, 
or 
inspecting 
the 
improvements.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and hold that the 
circuit court properly granted summary judgment for the City, 
thereby dismissing the Hockings' suit. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 
2008AP2812   
 
 
 
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