Title: State v. Trivitt
Citation: 548 P.2d 442
Docket Number: 10159
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: February 17, 1976

548 P.2d 442 (1976) STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Enos Larry TRIVITT, Defendant-Appellant. No. 10159. Supreme Court of New Mexico. February 17, 1976. *443 Chester H. Walter, Jr., Chief Public Defender, Bruce L. Herr, App. Defender, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant. Toney Anaya, Atty. Gen., Warren O.F. Harris, Deputy Atty. Gen., F. Scott MacGillivray, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee. McMANUS, Justice. This is a direct appeal from defendant's conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death. The case was tried to a jury in the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, in Colfax County, on a change of venue from Union County, New Mexico. Generally, the facts reflect that on the morning of September 5, 1973 the body of James L. Graves was discovered slain in the storeroom of his service station located approximately one mile southeast of Clayton, New Mexico. Shortly thereafter, as the result of a police radio dispatch, the defendant, Enos Larry Trivitt, and his traveling companion, Mary Alice Brown, were stopped as they drove through Dalhart, Texas. Both were arrested for the murder of Graves. Trivitt waived extradition and was turned over to Union County officials and returned to Clayton that morning. A two-count indictment was returned by the grand jury of Union County on September 20, 1973. The trial of Trivitt was severed from that of his companion without objection. A motion for change of venue was also granted and the case was transferred to Colfax County as previously stated. The two counts of the indictment read as follows: On January 3, 1974 the second count was dismissed and the trial began on January 7, 1974. The trial was completed on January 10, 1974 and, on January 11, 1974, the defendant was sentenced to be executed on May 19, 1974. This appeal followed, during which time defendant's execution has been stayed. We reverse and remand for a new trial. The defendant alleges ten [10] points as error in the trial proceedings. The points covered will be set out as they appear in appellant's brief. Since this case will be reversed and remanded on other grounds we will not make a decision on the constitutionality of the death penalty at this time. It is true, as the defendant points out, that the court in Witherspoon stated: However, in a footnote to the first sentence quoted above, the court went on to say: The voir dire of the three jurors referred to contained the following questions and answers, the first by a Mrs. Cook: Another prospective juror remarked as follows: A. Yes. A. Yes, sir. Q. You would have difficulty doing that? A. Yes, sir. A. Any way, yes, sir. The testimony reflected above does not violate the philosophy of Witherspoon, supra, and we hereby hold that the exclusion of the three veniremen (Cook, Lopez and Jack) did not constitute reversible error. The defendant had a constitutional right to a jury which might include those who voice general objections to the death penalty or have conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. The defendant had no constitutional right to a jury which included anyone who felt so strongly about the death penalty that he or she would automatically vote not guilty without weighing the evidence and testimony impartially. In fact, the sixth amendment to the U.S. Constitution expressly states that: The defendant enjoyed a trial by a jury representative of those in the community who could impartially weigh the evidence, despite any reservations which they might have about the death penalty. Section 40A-29-2, N.M.S.A. 1953 (1973 Supp.) provides, in part: Appellant contends that this section violates art. IV, § 18 of the New Mexico Constitution, which reads in part: Appellant claims that the statute under consideration is an example of "blind" legislation for the reason that the legislature could not possibly know what capital felonies the death penalty would cover. First, the legislature is presumed to know the laws in existence. State v. State Highway Commission, 38 N.M. 482, 35 P.2d *447 308 (1934); State v. Trujillo, 85 N.M. 208, 510 P.2d 1079 (Ct.App. 1973), and others. It is a relatively simple matter to determine that the offense of first degree murder is the only offense to which § 40A-29-2, supra, applies. We have held many times that legislation will not be declared unconstitutional unless the court is satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that the legislature has gone outside the constitution in enacting it. Board of Trustees of Town of Las Vegas v. Montano, 82 N.M. 340, 481 P.2d 702 (1971); State v. Pacheco, 81 N.M. 97, 463 P.2d 521 (Ct.App. 1969). We are convinced that the act in question is constitutional despite the fact that it refers to a "capital felony." Finally, it should be pointed out that the title of the act reinstating the death penalty expressly indicated that it was "* * * MAKING THE DEATH PENALTY MANDATORY FOR PERSONS CONVICTED OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER; * * *." Vol. 1, ch. 109 [1973] Laws of N.M. 342-43. In City of Albuquerque v. Garcia, 84 N.M. 776, 508 P.2d 585 (1973), we said: We conclude that § 40A-29-2, supra, does not violate the principles set down in N.M.Const. art. IV, § 16. Defendant contends that § 40A-2-1(A)(3), supra, violates N.M.Const. art. IV, § 18, because it defines murder in the first degree as all murder perpetrated in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony. According to the defendant, the problem with that statute is that, "in order to know the effect of the felony-murder statute it was passing, * * * the legislature had to be presumed to know every felony contained in the laws of New Mexico." We repeat that the legislature is presumed to know the laws in existence, including those defining "felony." We also again stress that we will not declare legislation unconstitutional unless we are satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that *448 the legislature has gone beyond the constitution in enacting it. See Point III, supra. The New Mexico Supreme Court in State v. Armstrong, 31 N.M. 220, 260, 243 P. 333, 349 (1924), upon which defendant heavily relies, reasoned that: We conclude that the reference in § 40A-2-1(A)(3), supra, to "any felony" gives sufficient notice of the true import of the statute and of the substantial rights being invested or divested. To require the legislature to enumerate each and every felony would unreasonably and unnecessarily hamper it in its work. Appellant asserts that the attorney who represented him at trial did not provide him with his constitutionally guaranteed right to effective assistance of counsel, in violation of the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution and N.M.Const. art. II, §§ 14 and 18. Appellant also urges abandonment of the "sham, farce, or mockery of justice" standard for determining effective assistance of counsel. Justice Oman, writing in State v. Garcia, 85 N.M. 460, 513 P.2d 394 (1973) stated: While other jurisdictions have seen fit to change standards on this subject, we in New Mexico are not so disposed. It is relatively easy for different counsel on an appealed case to differ on trial tactics used during the trial of a cause. Hindsight is not always better than foresight in the course of litigation from beginning to end. We see no showing whatsoever that trial counsel did not use a "normal and customary degree of skill" under the circumstances of this case. The trial in our opinion did not result in a "sham, farce or mockery of justice." The indictment charged the defendant with "felony murder and robbery, contrary to Sections 40A-2-1(A)(3) and 40A-16-1, New Mexico Criminal Code." The defendant was charged by count I of the indictment only with felony murder. The indictment did not charge the defendant with a "willful, deliberate and premeditated killing" under subsection (A)(1) of § 40A-2-1, N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6, 1972), nor did it charge him with any other type of first degree murder. Furthermore, a "willful, deliberate and premeditated killing" is not a lesser included offense of "felony murder." Nevertheless, the trial court instructed the jury that they could find the defendant guilty of first degree murder if they found that the murder was perpetrated (1) by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing; or (2) in the *449 commission of the felony of robbery. This instruction by the court constitutes reversible error. The United States Supreme Court in Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S. Ct. 270 4 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1960), held that "a court cannot permit a defendant to be tried on charges that are not made in the indictment against him." In support of this rule they took the following quote from the earlier Supreme Court case of Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 10, 7 S. Ct. 781, 30 L. Ed. 849 (1887): In line with this reasoning we held in State v. Crump, 82 N.M. 487, 491, 484 P.2d 329, 333 (1971): It is clear then that the trial court's error leaves us no choice but to reverse and remand. Since the case will be reversed based upon the argument which the appellant made in Point VIII of his brief, it will not be necessary to consider at this time the arguments presented in appellant's Points VII, IX and X. The cause is reversed and remanded to the district court for a new trial consistent with this opinion It is so ordered. OMAN, C.J., and STEPHENSON, J., concur.