Title: Continental Insurance Company v. Wolford
Citation: 526 S.W.2d 539
Docket Number: B-4957
State: Texas
Issuer: Texas Supreme Court
Date: July 23, 1975

526 S.W.2d 539 (1975) CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Pat WOLFORD, Respondent. No. B-4957. Supreme Court of Texas. July 23, 1975. *540 Vinson, Elkins, Searls, Connally &amp; Smith, Knox D. Nunnally, Houston, for petitioner. Robert C. Barnett and Kenneth L. Smith, Houston, for respondent. GREENHILL, Chief Justice. This is a workmen's compensation case in which the controlling issue is whether Pat Wolford, our Respondent, was an employee or an independent contractor. Trial was to a jury which found that he was an employee. Judgment was entered upon the verdict for Wolford. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. 515 S.W.2d 364. We find no evidence to support the jury's finding that Wolford was an employee; and accordingly, we must reverse the judgments of the courts below. The solution to the question presented here is reached through the application of the test of right of control. Anchor Casualty Co. v. Hartsfield, 390 S.W.2d 469 (Tex.1965); Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582 (Tex.1964); Elder v. Aetna Casualty &amp; Surety Co., 149 Tex. 620, 236 S.W.2d 611 (1951); Standard Insurance Co. v. McKee, 146 Tex. 183, 205 S.W.2d 362 (1947). The evidence in this regard is this: Wolford was an experienced bricklayer. His practice was to do particular jobs usually lasting one or two weeks. He entered into an oral agreement with Tiffany Homes to lay bricks at the site of a single townhouse being constructed. The terms of the oral contract, as testified to by Wolford were that he would be paid seven cents for each brick laid, and he estimated that the job would take about a week and a half. He was not paid by the hour, and he came to work "pretty much when he wanted to." It was within his discretion as to how much he worked and what hours he worked. He could take a break whenever he desired. He furnished his own helper, and he paid the helper by the hour. Asked if he considered himself a contractor, he replied, "a subcontractor." He could subcontract the work to others with the consent of the superintendent. No social security or income tax was withheld from Wolford's pay. The mortar and sand used by Wolford were furnished by Tiffany Homes, but their cost was deducted from the amount due Wolford. He furnished all his own tools and equipment, his own wheelbarrow, and his own scaffolding. *541 He and his assistant put up the scaffold. While he was at work, a part of the scaffold broke. He fell and was injured. There was no "pusher" (supervisor) to tell Wolford what to do or when to do it. He could have begun at the north or the south end of the job. There was no evidence of any exercise of control over him, or over any of the details of his work. Wolford's counsel emphasizes much of the following testimony which he elicited on direct examination: On cross-examination by Continental's attorney: On re-direct examination by Wolford's attorney: The testimony merely reflects the view that if the supervisor from Tiffany Homes was dissatisfied with Wolford's work product, Wolford could be discharged. It is not, in our opinion, evidence that details of his work were being controlled or were subject to Tiffany's control. As far as this problem is concerned, the right to stop the work exists regardless of whether Wolford was an employee or independent contractor; and, therefore, such a right can afford no basis for determining Wolford's status. As stated in Anchor Casualty Co. v. Hartsfield, 390 S.W.2d 469 (Tex.1965): The minimal degree of control found in our case is even less than that found in Hartsfield, wherein the claimant testified that he would follow any instructions given to him by the subcontractor. We hold, therefore, that Pat Wolford was an independent contractor as a matter of law at the time of his injury. Consequently, there was no evidence to support the finding of the jury that Wolford was an employee of Tiffany Homes. The judgments of the courts below are reversed, and judgment is here rendered that plaintiff take nothing.