Title: Micah Louis Nelson v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC00-876
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 3, 2002

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC00-876
____________
MICAH LOUIS NELSON,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[July 10, 2003]
REVISED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and
sentence of the trial court imposing the death penalty upon Micah Louis Nelson. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1), of the Florida
Constitution.  For the reasons expressed below, we affirm Nelson’s convictions
and sentences for first-degree murder, burglary of a dwelling with a battery, grand
theft (motor vehicle), kidnapping, burglary of a conveyance with a battery, and
sexual battery.  
-2-
FACTS
The evidence presented at trial indicated that during the early morning hours
of November 17, 1997, Micah Louis Nelson (Nelson) entered Virginia Brace’s
(Brace) home by removing the screen and climbing through the bathroom window. 
Seventy-eight-year-old Brace had been in bed and her glasses and hearing aid were
on her bedroom dresser.  Nelson sexually assaulted Brace, took her car keys from
her purse, and then placed her in the trunk of her own car.  He drove around with
Brace in the trunk for a period of hours and eventually drove to an orange grove,
where he apparently intended to leave her.  However, the car became stuck in soft
sand and had to be pulled out with the assistance of machinery at about 9:30 a.m.
on November 17, 1997.  
Steven Weir, the heavy equipment operator who pulled the car out of the
sand, felt a thud when he put his hand on the car’s trunk.  Nelson advised him that
there was a dog in the trunk and then proceeded to turn up the car radio.  The
heavy equipment operator observed Nelson to be nervous and pacing, and Nelson
would not look him in the eye when they spoke.  Nelson sped off as soon as the
car was lifted out of the sand and drove to another orange grove where he let Brace
1.  The medical examiner testified that the soles of Brace’s feet were dirty,
indicating that “she probably left standing on her feet,” but that there was also
evidence that she had been dragged on her back.
-3-
out of the trunk and walked her or dragged her 175 feet into the grove.1  With Brace
on the ground, Nelson attempted to strangle her with his bare hands, emptied the
contents of a fire extinguisher into her mouth, and forced a tire iron into her mouth
and through the back of her head.
At 3:30 p.m. on November 17, 1997, Joann Lambert noticed an unfamiliar
car parked on the road behind her house.  The car was still parked in the same
location when it began to get dark that evening so she called the Highlands County
Sheriff’s Department.  When Deputy Vance Pope arrived to investigate the car, he
found Nelson asleep in the back seat.  Deputy Pope also noticed an insurance card
on the floorboard with the name Virginia Brace.  Nelson told Pope that he
borrowed the car from a family friend.  Pope could not verify the vehicle’s
registration because the DMV computer was not working at that time.  Pope would
not allow Nelson to drive because he did not have a driver’s license, so he gave
Nelson a ride to Nelson’s sister’s house.  Later that evening, Pope heard the name
Virginia Brace over the police radio, which prompted him to contact Sergeant
Hofstra regarding his earlier contact with Nelson.  Police recovered the car where
Deputy Pope had last seen it, and it was identified as belonging to Brace.
-4-
At 11 p.m. on November 17, 1997, Deputy Pope returned to the house
where he previously dropped off Nelson.  Nelson agreed to be questioned by the
Avon Park Police.  After a series of interrogations on November 18, 1997, and
November 19, 1997, Nelson showed the police where Brace’s body was located
and he confessed to killing her.  
Nelson told police that some time after midnight, he broke into Brace’s home
through her bathroom window.  He stated that he entered her bedroom and she
woke up and started screaming.  He said that they had a struggle on her bed, after
which he took her car keys and placed her in the trunk of her car.  Nelson stated
that he drove around in the car for hours and that at one point he stopped to get
gas.  He then drove to an orange grove where he was going to kill Brace, but the
car became stuck in the sand and he required help to extricate the car from the
sand.  He then took Brace to another orange grove where he and Brace walked into
the grove.  He stated that he started to choke Brace on the ground, but she did not
pass out, so he sprayed a fire extinguisher into her mouth, which made her cough. 
He stated that he then took the tire iron and stuck it into her mouth until it came
through the back of her neck and into the ground.  He stated that Brace gasped for
air when he pushed the tire iron into her mouth.  Nelson denied having any sexual
contact with Brace.
2.  An emptied fire extinguisher was recovered on the rear floor of the
driver’s seat of Brace’s car.  A yellow powdery substance from the extinguisher’s
contents was located around the hose.  The yellow powder was also found on the
rear floorboard behind the driver’s seat, in the trunk, and on Brace’s face and in
her bronchial tubes.
-5-
At trial, Dr. Melamud, the medical examiner, testified that the condition of
Brace’s body corresponded with her being dead for two days before she was
found.  He testified that Brace’s injuries were consistent with asphyxiation, an
object being forced into her mouth through the back of her neck, such as a tire
iron, and a fire extinguisher being discharged into her mouth.  He stated that she
also suffered a crushed vertebra as a result of the compression of her neck and
spinal cord, and three broken ribs.  He testified that her death could have resulted
from any one of those injuries, or a combination of them.  Although he could not
assign an order in which the injuries occurred, he stated that the medical evidence
indicated that she was alive both when the object was forced into her mouth and
through the back of her neck, and when the fire extinguisher’s contents were
expelled into her mouth.2  He could not say with certainty if she was conscious
when those injuries were inflicted, but he opined that if Brace had been conscious
during the infliction of any of these injuries, she would have experienced severe
pain.
Karen Cooper, a laboratory analyst with the Florida Department of Law
-6-
Enforcement (FDLE), testified that prints made from boots recovered from
Nelson’s bedroom at his sister’s house were consistent with boot prints found at
the orange grove on the ground near Brace’s body.  Stephen Stark, a latent
fingerprint examiner with FDLE, testified that Nelson’s latent prints were found
inside Brace’s bathroom on the towel rack, on tiles under the bathroom window,
on the bathroom tub, and on the bathroom door jamb.  Stark, who also processed
the crime scene at the orange grove, testified that there was a hole in the ground
beneath the back of the victim’s head and that a yellow powdery substance was
found on the ground where the body was located.  He also testified that three prints
found in the interior of the trunk were consistent with Brace’s fingerprints.  Stark
stated that when he processed the car, the trunk liner was moist and smelled of
urine.  Jennifer Garrison, an FDLE crime lab analyst in the serology DNA section,
testified that testing revealed the semen found on Brace’s bedspread was consistent
with Nelson’s DNA profile.  Darrin Esposito, an FDLE crime lab analyst in the
serology DNA section, testified that he tested the vaginal swab taken in this case,
and it was consistent with a mixture of DNA from both Brace and Nelson.  Jeannie
Eberhardt, a serologist with FDLE, testified that the swabbing of the tire iron found
in the trunk of Brace’s car came back positive for indications of blood. 
The jury recommended a death sentence by a vote of nine to three and the
3.  The three statutory mitigating factors addressed by the trial court were:
(1) age of the defendant at the time of the offense (twenty-one years old) (not
proven); (2) the defendant was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance at
the time of the offense (not proven); and (3) his capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
was substantially impaired (not proven).
-7-
trial court sentenced Nelson to death.  The trial court found six statutory
aggravators: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of a felony, was under a
sentence of imprisonment, and was on felony probation, or controlled release, at
the time of the murder; (2) the crime for which the defendant was to be sentenced
was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or flight
after, committing a sexual battery, burglary, or kidnapping; (3) the capital felony
was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest; (4) the
murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel (HAC); (5) the murder was
committed in a cold and calculated and premeditated manner, and without any
pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP); and (6) the victim was particularly
vulnerable due to advanced age or disability.  The trial court found that all six
aggravators were proven beyond a reasonable doubt and assigned five of them
great weight.  The trial court assigned little weight to the sixth aggravator of the
victim being “particularly vulnerable due to age or disability.”  
The trial court addressed and rejected three statutory mitigating factors.3 
-8-
Twenty-one nonstatutory mitigating circumstances were addressed by the trial
court: (1) at the time of the offense the defendant was impulsive and his ability to
exercise good judgment was impaired (not proven); (2) defendant was remorseful
for his conduct (not proven); (3) defendant did not plan to commit the offense in
advance (not proven); (4) defendant demonstrated appropriate courtroom conduct
and behavior (very little weight); (5) defendant is capable of forming loving
relationships with family members and friends (very little weight); (6) any mental
illness of the defendant may have been controlled by medication (little weight); (7) it
is unlikely the defendant will be a danger to others while serving a life sentence in
prison (very little weight); (8) defendant did not resist arrest, cooperated with the
police, and showed the authorities where the body was located (moderate weight);
(9) defendant never knew his father and lost his mother at a young age (moderate
weight); (10) defendant had a troubled and neglected childhood (not proven); (11)
defendant was the victim of inappropriate sexual conduct and abuse as a child (little
weight); (12) defendant has organic brain damage (not proven); (13) defendant
suffered from depression as a result of his conduct and attempted suicide in the jail
(little weight); (14) defendant had diminished educational experience (little weight);
(15) defendant was sexually assaulted while in prison (some weight); (16) defendant
has limited intelligence (some weight); (17) defendant has no prior violent felony
4.  See supra pp. 2-6.
-9-
convictions (little weight); (18) the circumstances which resulted in the homicide are
unlikely to recur since the defendant will be spending the rest of his life in prison
(some weight); (19) defendant has accepted responsibility for his action (not
proven); (20) defendant has never received treatment for his mental or emotional
problems (little weight); and (21) defendant was willing to plead guilty to all charges
for consecutive life sentences without parole (very little weight).  
ANALYSIS
Notwithstanding his challenge to the trial court’s denial of the motion to
suppress, we note that Nelson does not challenge his first-degree murder
conviction.  Despite the lack of challenge, we have examined the record and have
determined that there was sufficient competent and substantial evidence presented
to support the conviction for first-degree murder.  See Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d
274, 277 (Fla. 1998).  As reflected in this opinion, there was a plethora of physical
evidence linking Nelson to Brace’s home, Brace’s car, and the orange grove where
her body was found.  Additionally, the physical evidence discovered in this case
was consistent with Nelson’s final admission to the police about how he committed
the murder.  We have referred to that evidence in some detail above.4
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
5.  See Roman v. State, 475 So. 2d 1228, 1232-33 (Fla. 1985) (characterizing
the “Christian burial technique” as being “a blatantly coercive and deceptive ploy”).
-10-
Nelson claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
statements and admissions.  He maintains that he made incriminating statements as
a result of police coercion because the police prematurely wrote “DNA evidence”
on the board during interrogation, they employed the “Christian burial”5 technique,
and they continued to question him when he was fatigued.  After hearing evidence
at the hearing on the motion, the trial court denied the suppression motion. 
This Court has recently explained the standard of review for orders on
motions to suppress:
[A]ppellate courts should continue to accord a presumption of
correctness to the trial court's rulings on motions to suppress with
regard to the trial court's determination of historical facts, but appellate
courts must independently review mixed questions of law and fact that
ultimately determine constitutional issues arising in the context of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendment and, by extension, article I, section 9 of
the Florida Constitution.
Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 608 (Fla. 2001).  At the trial court level it is
proper to apply a “totality of the circumstances” analysis when determining if a
confession was obtained voluntarily.  See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739
(1969); Thompson v. State, 548 So. 2d 198, 203-04 (Fla. 1989).  
Avon Park Police Sergeant John Wayne Robinson testified that while Nelson
6.  The evidence at trial was that under the “pro” column, the police listed
things such as “being honest” and “cooperation.”  In the “known evidence/con”
column, the police listed things including, “perjury under oath (lied during sworn
statements),” “denied being in victims [sic] home (your finger prints were located
inside  victims [sic] home),” and “failed polygraph.”
-11-
was in a separate room taking a polygraph test, he made a “pro and con” list of
factors for and against Nelson on a wipe-off board.6  Sergeant Robinson listed
“DNA evidence” under the “con” category.  Sergeant Robinson stated that at the
time he and others were developing a strategy for interrogating Nelson with the
board, he had been advised that evidence had been collected for future testing of
DNA.  The evidence thought to contain DNA included the victim’s underwear,
some cigarettes similar to the brand Nelson smoked, and fluids in the trunk. 
Sergeant Robinson stated that he actually had no information regarding any DNA
testing results at that time.  
The trial court considered the “DNA evidence” writing claim in light of all the
evidence in the record, and concluded it was insufficient to establish coercion: 
In the instant case, the police did not fabricate any documents, and the
DNA evidence writing was not emphasized at the interview.  The
police did tell the defendant they had his fingerprint inside the victim’s
home, and this was the truth.  The court finds that the writing of DNA
evidence on the blackboard does not rise to a level that shocks the
conscience and jeopardizes the constitutional rights of the defendant.
As noted above, we must accept the trial court’s factual findings if there is
-12-
evidence to support them, while reviewing the court’s legal conclusions de novo.
Upon review, we find no error in the trial court’s evaluation that the simple listing of
“DNA evidence” on the board was not such a substantial misrepresentation as to
automatically render Nelson’s confession involuntary.  See Escobar v. State, 699
So. 2d 984, 987 (Fla. 1997) (holding that law enforcement tactics that “go too far”
can cause confessions to be suppressed, but that “police misrepresentation alone
does not necessarily render a confession involuntary”), abrogated on other grounds
by Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 607 (Fla. 2001).  
It appears that the DNA listing was inherently ambiguous.  While the DNA
analysis had not yet been done, it was apparent at that point that DNA evidence had
been seized and its analysis would probably play a role in assessing the evidence
against Nelson, along with the evidence that already suggested his involvement. 
The listing did not state that the DNA had been tested and compared to a sample of
Nelson’s DNA.  In fact, it is not clear that a sample of Nelson’s DNA had ever
been secured at that point.  Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied the motion on the basis that “DNA evidence” was written
on the board in the interrogation room, before testing had actually been done for
the presence of DNA.  
Next, Nelson claims that his statements were coerced by improper use of the
-13-
“Christian burial” technique.  While police were questioning Nelson to see if he
would aid in locating Brace’s body, Sergeant Robinson asked Nelson whom he
loved and Nelson answered that he loved his sister, Juldy.  Sergeant Robinson then
asked Nelson if he would be worried if Juldy was missing, and if he would expect
the police to investigate it right and how he would feel if the person who knew what
happened would not tell the police the truth.  Sergeant Robinson asked Nelson to
put himself in the victim’s family’s shoes and imagine how they felt so that the
police could help them and put their minds at ease because they were worried about
her.  Sergeant Robinson testified that he told Nelson, “[I]f she’s dead help us find
her so we can give her a proper burial just like you would expect for [Juldy] if she
was killed.”  This statement apparently had some effect on Nelson because he
began to cry and soon thereafter agreed to take the police to the victim’s body.
In its order denying relief on this claim, the trial court stated, “The court
finds that the detectives [sic] reference to finding the victim’s body so that it could
be buried is insufficient to make an otherwise voluntary statement inadmissible
under Hudson v. State, 538 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1989) and Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d
148 (Fla. 1998).” 
In Hudson, after the defendant stated to police that the victim was dead and
he had seen the body, a police sergeant asked him if he had ever been to a funeral
-14-
and told him that most people do not go to funerals without a body.  See 538 So.
2d at 830.  The sergeant told him that the family needed to put this situation to rest
by seeing the body.  See id.  Upon review, this Court found that this interaction did
not constitute the prohibited “Christian burial” technique that we have previously
addressed, stating: “This Court has characterized the Christian burial technique as a
‘blatantly coercive and deceptive ploy.’ . . . [H]owever, we find the sergeant’s
reference to finding the body so that it could be buried insufficient to make an
otherwise voluntary statement inadmissible.”  Id.  
In Alston, a detective testified at the suppression hearing that he felt the
victim’s mother needed closure because her son was still missing and he mentioned
the fact that Alston had a daughter.  See 723 So. 2d at 155.  The detective
mentioned that if someone took Alston’s daughter and he did not see her again, he
would not get any closure.  See id.  The detective concluded by stating the victim’s
mother could get some closure if Alston took the police to the victim’s body.  See
id.  In rejecting a claim of coercion, this Court cited Hudson, stating: “[W]e do not
find Detective Baxter’s statement that appellant should show them where the body
was located because Ms. Coon needed closure was sufficient to make an otherwise
voluntary statement inadmissible.”  Id. 
Both Hudson and Alston rely heavily on this Court’s earlier analysis and
-15-
decision in Roman v. State, 475 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1985).  In that case, Roman
made an incriminating statement to police after they asked him to tell them where
the body was located for purposes of a Christian burial, although they had already
located the body.  See id. 1230.  This Court stated:
The use of the "Christian burial technique" by law enforcement
personnel is unquestionably a blatantly coercive and deceptive ploy.
The record shows, however, that the use of this tactic did not directly
result in appellant's statement, although we consider it as a factor
among the totality of circumstances surrounding the giving of this
statement.  The record reflects that appellant was a forty-five year old
man of intelligence within the normal range, albeit at the lower end. He
did not appear intoxicated or mentally ill at the time.  He was read
Miranda warnings, was capable of understanding them, and indicated
that he did in fact understand them.  He was offered sustenance and
not promised or threatened.  He was not handcuffed, and despite
vomiting and trembling seemed alert and perceptive.  Under these
circumstances we find that the deception was insufficient to make an
otherwise voluntary statement inadmissible. 
Id. at 1232-33.  We find that the trial court properly evaluated the “Christian burial”
evidence and did not err when it denied this suppression claim.
In the instant case, there was no police deception, nor did the police inject
Christianity or any other religion into the exchange.  As we stated in Johnson v.
State, 660 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1995): “Using sincerely held religious beliefs against a
detainee is quite a distinct issue from a simple noncoercive plea for a defendant to
be candid.”  Id. at 643.  It also appears that the statements did not exacerbate an
-16-
already coercive atmosphere to render Nelson’s confession involuntary.  Although
Sergeant Robinson asked Nelson to put himself in the shoes of the victim’s family
and mentioned the need for a “proper burial,” when those statements are viewed
under the circumstances of the interview it appears that the burial speech was not
patently coercive.  Further, as in Roman, Nelson did not appear intoxicated or
mentally ill at the time he waived his Fifth Amendment rights after being advised of
them pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and he appeared to be
capable of understanding his rights.  He was given breaks and beverages and was
not promised anything or threatened.  Nelson was upset and crying during portions
of interviews, but the police gave him breaks when he was visibly very upset. 
Thus, it appears that the trial court did not err when it denied this suppression claim
on the basis of Hudson and Alston.
Nelson also claims police coercion because the police did not afford him
breaks during interrogation when he was tired.  The First District in Gaspard v.
State, 387 So. 2d 1016, 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), found that the defendant’s
incriminating statements that were made when he was “tired and exhausted” were
properly suppressed because they were the product of four days of repeated and
coercive interrogations.  However, the trial court in the instant case noted that the
record was replete with testimony about the police offering Nelson breaks and
-17-
beverages during the interrogation sessions and found as follows:
The defendant was initially interrogated from late November 17 until
around 8:30 a.m. November 18.  At that time, [the police] suspended
the interrogation until that night at 9 p.m.  The latter interrogation lasted
the majority of the night.  The same detectives interviewed the
defendant throughout the whole process.  Detective Lethridge testified
that the defendant was given three breaks during that latter period. 
The court finds that the defendant endured the same interview
conditions as the inquiring detectives and that he was afforded several
breaks.  During these breaks the defendant was offered coffee or cold
drinks and allowed to use the restroom.  This interview period was not
unreasonable.
A suspect’s statement to police during an interrogation that he is tired does not
necessarily indicate in itself a desire to reassert waived rights.  See Johnson v.
State, 660 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 1995).  Based on the record before us supporting
the trial court’s factual findings, we find that the trial court did not err when it
denied suppression of Nelson’s statements on the basis that he was fatigued.
In conclusion, because the trial court’s factual findings were supported by
the record and its legal conclusions are supported by the law of this state, we affirm
the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. 
AVOID ARREST AGGRAVATOR
Nelson makes a two-part claim regarding the avoid arrest aggravator.  He
alleges that (1) the trial court erred by not informing the jurors that when the victim
is not a police officer, the primary or dominant motive must be to eliminate the
7.  Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992) (finding that the HAC jury
instruction given in that case was impermissibly vague).
-18-
witness or that the State’s proof must be very strong; and (2) the trial court erred
by finding the avoid arrest aggravator.  
As to the avoid arrest aggravator instruction, we agree with the State that
Nelson did not properly preserve this issue for review.  Although the record reflects
that Nelson filed a motion to declare sections 921.141 and 921.141(5)(e), Florida
Statutes (1997), unconstitutional, Nelson did not specifically address the avoid
arrest jury instruction in that motion.  Further, Nelson did not object to the
adequacy of the avoid arrest jury instruction at trial.  This Court has held that the
contemporaneous objection rule applies to Espinosa7 challenges.  See Hodges v.
State, 619 So. 2d 272, 273 (Fla. 1993).  Failure to make an objection at trial about a
jury instruction will render it procedurally barred.  See id.  Because the record
reflects that Nelson did not object to the avoid arrest aggravator jury instruction at
trial, we find this issue procedurally barred.
The trial court found that Nelson’s sole or dominant motive for the murder
(of a victim who was not a law enforcement officer) was for the purpose of
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest.  The trial court found that the aggravator was
proven beyond a reasonable doubt and listed four factors that supported it as being
8.  In Alston, this Court upheld the trial court’s finding of the avoid arrest
aggravator.  723 So. 2d at 160.  The trial court found: 
The defendant and his accomplice took James Coon . . . to a part of
town after taking personal property from him, and thereafter executed
him because the defendant realized that James Coon could identify him
and his accomplice.  The purpose of the killing was to eliminate a
witness to the kidnapping and robbery. 
Id. 
-19-
Nelson’s sole murder motive:
(1)
The Defendant in his confession to the police said he killed the
victim because he was afraid that Virginia Brace could identify
him, “because she saw his face.”
(2)
Once he removed her from her home and placed her in the trunk
of her car, she was no longer a threat to his escape.
(3)
The Defendant placed the victim in the trunk of her car and
drove her around over six hours.  Thus he had ample
opportunity to release the victim or simply leave her in the trunk. 
See Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d 148, 160 (Fla. 1998).8
(4)
The victim was abducted from her home and transported to an
isolated area where she was killed.
We conclude that Nelson’s claim that the trial court erred in finding the avoid arrest
aggravator is refuted by the record, including his own admissions.  
After Brace’s body was found, Nelson agreed to waive his rights and to
speak with police.  When Detective Sergeant Robinson asked why this happened,
Nelson responded that he was mad at the world and mad about his life.  When
-20-
Nelson was describing his encounter with Brace in her bedroom, he related that she
was screaming and when Sergeant Robinson asked, “And you were saying you
didn’t want to leave because of what reason?”  Nelson replied, “(Inaudible) she
would call the police.”  Sergeant Robinson then asked, “So you were worried
about her calling the police if you left?”  Nelson replied, “Yes.”  Sergeant Robinson
asked Nelson, “Why did you put her in the trunk?”  Nelson replied, “So no one
would see.”  Nelson expressly agreed with the police when they asked him if he
killed Brace because he felt like she could identify him.  In fact, when Nelson was
asked how Brace could identify him in the dark, he replied, “From the bathroom
light.”  Later on in the interview, Sergeant Robinson asked Nelson, “So what made
you kill Ms. Brace?”  Nelson answered, “I got scared.”  Thus, the record reflects
that Nelson’s own explanations about why he killed Brace consistently related his
concerns about her identifying him.  See Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381, 390 (Fla.
1994) (stating that the defendant’s argument that the avoid arrest aggravator was
improperly found was without merit “because it is directly refuted by the record
and Walls’ own words”).
Although Nelson’s admissions to police alone support his intentional
elimination of Brace as a witness, other considerations also support the avoid arrest
aggravator in this case.  For example, when evaluating the avoid arrest aggravator,
-21-
this Court has stated that it will look at whether the victims knew and could identify
their killer, but that this fact alone is insufficient to prove the aggravator beyond a
reasonable doubt.  See Farina v. State, 801 So. 2d 44, 54 (Fla. 2001).  We have
held that the following evidence is also pertinent when reviewing this aggravator:
“[W]hether the defendant used gloves, wore a mask, or made any incriminating
statements about witness elimination; whether the victims offered resistance; and
whether the victims were confined or were in a position to pose a threat to the
defendant.”  Id.  The evidence in this case indicates that Nelson probably could
have accomplished the burglary of Brace’s home and sexual battery without killing
her since Brace likely posed little physical resistance to Nelson: she was 78 years
old; she was awakened from her bed in the middle of the night when she was
wearing only a nightgown; and at that time her eyeglasses and hearing aids were on
her night stand.  Further, Nelson easily obtained access to her car.  Therefore, it
appears that once Nelson immobilized Brace by putting her in the trunk, he secured
an uncontested getaway and there was no reason for him to kill her except to
eliminate her as a witness.  See Looney v. State, 803 So. 2d 656, 677-78 (Fla.
2001) (finding that once the defendants immobilized the victims, gained access to
the victims’ property and vehicles, and secured an uncontested getaway, the only
remaining reason to kill the victims was to eliminate them as witnesses), cert.
-22-
denied, 122 S. Ct. 2678 (2002).
Nelson’s act of taking Brace to a remote area to kill her also lends support to
the finding of the avoid arrest aggravator in this case.  The evidence at trial was that
Nelson drove to an isolated orange grove to kill Brace, but his plan was stymied
when the car became stuck in the sand and he needed the assistance of other
people to extricate the car.  Nelson then drove to another orange grove where he
killed Brace.  The record reflects that Nelson’s journey to two different orange
groves was intended to find an isolated place to kill Brace, the sole witness to his
crimes.  See Knight v. State, 746 So. 2d 423, 435 (Fla. 1998); Preston v. State, 607
So. 2d 404, 409 (Fla. 1992); Cave v. State, 476 So. 2d 180, 188 (Fla. 1985); Martin
v. State, 420 So. 2d 583, 585 n.3 (Fla. 1982).
We find no error in the trial court’s finding of the avoid arrest aggravator
because the defendant’s own statements and actions corroborate evidence that the
sole or dominant murder motive in this case was to silence Brace as the sole
witness against him.
COLD, CALCULATED, AND PREMEDITATED AGGRAVATOR
Nelson claims that the trial court’s finding of the cold, calculated, and
premeditated aggravator (CCP) was contrary to the evidence because, he asserts,
the evidence established that he killed Brace in a rage or panic, negating the
9.  The evidence at trial was that Brace was alive as late as 9:30 a.m. on
November 17, 1997, when Steven Weir felt a bump on the trunk of the car.
-23-
elements necessary to prove CCP.  In the sentencing order, the trial court referred
to Nelson’s admission to police that he would have killed Brace at the first orange
grove except that the car became stuck in sand.  The trial court stated that
heightened premeditation was further demonstrated by the evidence that Nelson
drove to another orange grove and walked or dragged Brace to the place where he
killed her and he made two trips back to the car to get weapons.  
We find that regardless of whether Nelson intended to kill Brace at the time
he entered her house, his act of driving around with the victim in the trunk for
several hours and taking her to two remote locations before killing her indicates
that, at the least, he conceived the plan to kill her during that extended period.9  See
Knight v. State, 746 So. 2d 423, 436 (Fla. 1998) (finding that “[e]ven if Knight did
not make the final decision to execute the two victims until sometime during his
lengthy journey to his final destination, that journey provided an abundance of time
for Knight to coldly and calmly decide to kill”); see also Connor v. State, 803 So.
2d 598, 611 (Fla. 2001) (affirming CCP where the trial court’s finding included the
fact that Connor hid victim for one whole day before killing her), cert. denied, 122
S. Ct. 2308 (2002).  
-24-
The mental mitigation evidence Nelson presented did little to impact the
finding of the CCP aggravator.  For example, the defense mental health expert, Dr.
Dee, testified that Nelson told him that he was seeing things on the day of the
murder; however, Nelson did not tell him that he was hearing things on the day of
the murder.  Additionally, Nelson told police that after he kidnapped Brace and it
was still dark outside, he deliberately stopped to get gas.  Similarly, Dr. Dee
testified that Nelson related to him that while driving around with Brace in the trunk,
Nelson stopped and bought himself a cup of coffee.  As evaluated by the trial
court, Dr. Dee’s testimony that Nelson was prone to being impulsive and that he
was angry and scared during the time period of the murder is simply not consistent
with the actions of someone who drove around for hours with a live person in the
trunk, even stopping during that time to get gas and coffee. 
The persistent and somewhat time-consuming manner in which Nelson killed
Brace with makeshift weapons at the orange grove also appears to support a
finding of CCP.  The trial court cited Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1997),
to support its finding that the two trips Nelson made to the car (a distance of 175
feet one way) so that he could obtain additional weapons with which to kill her
10.  In Willacy, this Court supported the trial court’s CCP finding, stating:
After Willacy bludgeoned and bound Sather, he choked and strangled
her.  Because Sather would not die, Willacy moved her into another
room; obtained a can of gasoline from the garage; retrieved a fan from
another room; disabled the three smoke detectors in the house;
doused Sather with gasoline; set her on fire; and trained the fan on her
to feed the flames.
Id. at 696.  
-25-
indicated CCP.10  In the instant case, there was evidence that Nelson used multiple
means to try to kill Brace.  The trial court properly found that the type of repeated
effort to kill Brace supported a finding of CCP.  See Ford v. State, 802 So. 2d
1121, 1133 (Fla. 2001) (holding that CCP was supported by the facts that in the
course of events, Ford had to stop to reload his rifle and that during the course of
the murders, Ford assaulted the victims with three different weapons: a gun, a blunt
instrument such as an ax, and a knife), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2308 (2002).
DOUBLING
We also conclude there was not an improper doubling of aggravators
regarding the trial court’s finding that both the avoid arrest aggravator and CCP
existed.  In the case at bar, the State properly established that Nelson’s motive for
killing Brace was to eliminate her as the sole witness to burglary and sexual battery,
i.e., Nelson admitted that he killed her so that she could not call the police and
-26-
identify him; he subdued her by putting her in the trunk after the initial crimes were
committed; he took her to a remote location to kill her.  Further, the State properly
proved that the manner in which Brace was killed resulted from a heightened
premeditation, i.e., Nelson drove around with the victim in the trunk for several
hours before killing her; when his initial plan was foiled he took her to another
location; it took several attempts before Nelson succeeded in killing her.  Therefore,
the avoid arrest aggravator and CCP were considered as separate aspects of the
crime and were supported by distinct facts in this case.  See Stein v. State, 632 So.
2d 1361, 1366 (Fla. 1994) (holding that a trial court can properly find both the
avoid arrest aggravator and CCP in the same case, “[s]o long as each aggravator is
supported by such distinct facts”); see also Gore v. State, 706 So. 2d 1328, 1334
(Fla. 1997). 
AGE MITIGATOR
Nelson claims that the trial court failed to consider and to properly weigh the
statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances presented during the penalty
phase.  We address each of the claimed mitigators in turn.
The trial court found that the defendant's age at the time of the murder, 21,
was not a mitigating factor.  In the case at bar, the trial court did not make a
qualitative statement that referred to Nelson as “mature” or “independent,” but its
-27-
brief finding of facts and citation to Kokal v. State, 492 So. 2d 1317, 1319 (Fla.
1986) (defendant was 21 years of age and immature), appear to indicate a finding
that Nelson was a capable and self-sufficient adult at the time of the murder.  In the
sentencing order, the trial court stated that the age mitigator was not found because
there was evidence that Nelson had voluntarily dropped out of high school after
ninth grade, spent a year in the Job Corps in Kentucky, served time in prison, and
was living on his own.  
In Shellito v. State, 701 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1997), we held: “[W]henever a
murder is committed by a minor, the mitigating factor of age must be found and
weighed but that the weight can be diminished by other evidence showing unusual
maturity.”  Id. at 843.  However, where the defendant is not a minor, as in the
instant case, "no per se rule exists which pinpoints a particular age as an automatic
factor in mitigation."  Id.  The existence and weight to be given to this mitigator
depends on the evidence presented at trial and the sentencing hearing.  See id.  For
example, this Court has held that age twenty, in and of itself, does not require a
finding of the age mitigator.  See Garcia v. State, 492 So. 2d 360, 367 (Fla. 1986). 
In Gudinas v. State, 693 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 1997), we held, “Although Gudinas
is certainly correct that he had a troubling past and had always been small for his
age, there was no evidence presented that he was unable to take responsibility for
-28-
his acts and appreciate the consequences thereof at the time of the murders.”  Id. at
967.  In that case, we found that there was substantial, competent evidence in the
record to support the trial court's finding “that Gudinas was mentally and
emotionally mature enough that his age should not be considered as a mitigator.” 
Id.  
The record herein supports the trial court’s rejection of this mitigator
because there was additional evidence of Nelson’s functioning as a mature adult: he
obtained and temporarily held a job; he provided his child’s mother with money to
buy necessities when she was visiting; Nelson did not have a home of his own, but
arranged to stay with Leila Eiland, Juldy Bolton, or Reagis Ishmael; and Nelson did
not have a driver’s license or a car, yet was able to travel places on his own.  See
Hurst v. State, 819 So. 2d 689, 698 (Fla. 2002) (holding that the evidence did not
support a finding that a non-minor suffered from mental and emotional problems
sufficient to warrant age as a mitigator and noting that Hurst owned his own car,
performed adequately in school, and helped with child care within his family).  
The defense mental health expert, Dr. Dee, testified that Nelson had an IQ of
79, that he had memory impairment, and that his higher mental abilities were grossly
affected.  However, there was no additional testimony that Nelson was “immature”
for someone his age, or that his emotional age was less than his chronological age. 
-29-
See, e.g., Mahn v. State, 714 So. 2d 391, 400 (Fla. 1998) (holding that age was a
mitigating circumstance where defendant’s long history of substance abuse, mental
and emotional instability, and passivity in the face of mental and physical abuse
provided the essential link between defendant’s age and immaturity); Campbell v.
State, 679 So. 2d 720, 725-26 (Fla. 1996) (finding that the trial court erred in not
giving requested jury instruction on age as a mitigating circumstance when a
psychological expert testified that although the defendant was 21, his emotional age
was “somewhere in the adolescent range”).
EXTREME DISTURBANCE MITIGATOR
The trial court also concluded that the extreme mental or emotional
disturbance mitigator was not proven.  In the sentencing order, the trial court found
the mental health expert’s testimony on this issue not to be credible, and to be
inconsistent with other, more credible, evidence.   
This Court has defined the circumstances under which a trial court may
reject a mitigator:
Whenever a reasonable quantum of competent, uncontroverted
evidence of mitigation has been presented, the trial court must find that
the mitigating circumstance has been proved.  A trial court may reject
a defendant’s claim that a mitigating circumstance has been proved if
the record contains competent substantial evidence to support the trial
court’s rejection of the mitigating circumstance.
-30-
Spencer v. State, 645 So. 2d 377, 385 (Fla. 1994) (citation omitted). 
We considered the issue of expert opinion testimony in Walls v. State, 641
So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1994), stating:
Walls contends that the trial court improperly rejected expert opinion
testimony that he was suffering extreme emotional disturbance and that
his capacity to conform his conduct to the law's requirements was
substantially impaired.  In Florida as in many states, a distinction exists
between factual evidence or testimony, and opinion testimony. . . . 
. . . Certain kinds of opinion testimony clearly are admissible--and
especially qualified expert opinion testimony--but they are not
necessarily binding even if uncontroverted.  Opinion testimony gains
its greatest force to the degree it is supported by the facts at hand, and
its weight diminishes to the degree such support is lacking.  A
debatable link between fact and opinion relevant to a mitigating factor
usually means, at most, that a question exists for judge and jury to
resolve.
Id. at 390-91 (citations omitted).  Thus, the trial court was entitled to evaluate and
disregard Dr. Dee’s opinion if the trial court felt that the opinion was unsupported
by facts.  The testimony that Nelson was “seeing things” on the day of the murder,
that he suffered from hallucinations, and that he suffered from depression for many
years provided perhaps the most relevant evidence to support this mitigator. 
However, the record reflects that the source of this evidence was largely Nelson’s
self-reports to Dr. Dee, and that the trial court basically rejected Dr. Dee’s
uncontroverted expert opinion.  
-31-
As the trial court stated, several witnesses who encountered Nelson before
and after the murder testified that he was acting normally.  The defendant’s cousin,
Calvin Fogle, testified that on the evening before the murder, Nelson did not appear
unusual.  The defendant’s girlfriend, Reagis Ishmael, testified that on the evening
before the murder, nothing seemed to be unusual or out of the ordinary about
Nelson.  Nelson’s cousin, Andy Eiland, testified that he spent time with Nelson on
the day before the murder from noon until 10:30 p.m.  Eiland stated he observed
Nelson drink one beer that evening, Nelson acted “normal,” and he did not notice
anything out of the ordinary.  Nelson’s sister and brother-in-law, Juldy Bolton and
Willy Bolton, testified that when they spent the evening with Nelson on the same
day the murder occurred (after the murder), everything seemed normal.  Nelson
came over to their house, ate dinner, and played cards with the two of them.  Thus,
the evidence as it unfolded at trial supported the trial court’s analysis and indicated
that the crimes Nelson committed were unexpected and uncharacteristic of his
behavior around that time.
Nelson argues that the trial court made “misstatements” in the sentencing
order regarding the extreme mental or emotional disturbance mitigator.  However,
even if the trial court did misstate some mitigation testimony, we find the
misstatements not so substantial as to undermine the trial court’s conclusion that
11.  We note that the trial court referred to this mitigator in the sentencing
order as “Capacity to appreciate the criminality of his acts and to conform to the
requirements of law.”  Although this phrasing represents a slight misstatement from
the statutory mitigator set forth in section 921.142(7)(e), Florida Statutes  (1997),
we conclude that the trial court’s phrasing of the mitigator is harmless as the
analysis in the sentencing order is equally valid regarding the proper statutory term.
-32-
this mitigator was not established by the greater weight of the evidence.  See Bryant
v. State, 785 So. 2d 422, 431 (Fla. 2001).  The record reflects that there was
competent, substantial evidence refuting the allegation that Nelson was under
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  
OTHER STATUTORY MITIGATION
The trial court also found that the mitigator that Nelson’s capacity to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was substantially impaired was not proven.11  The trial court
referred to Nelson’s calculated but suspicious actions, as observed by witness
Steven Weir, when Nelson got the car stuck in the sand.  The trial court noted that
once the car was extricated, Nelson deliberately drove to another grove and took
the victim 175 feet into the grove before killing her.  The trial court held: “This
indicates that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his act was not
substantially impaired.  He knew that his conduct was criminal and he took logical
steps to conceal his actions from others.”    
12.  In the sentencing order, the trial court questioned whether Dr. Dee’s
testimony met the Frye standard.  See Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
Such a query was not appropriate in light of the fact that there was no Frye
challenge regarding Dr. Dee’s testimony in this case.  See Hadden v. State, 690 So.
2d 573, 580 (Fla. 1997).  However, we treat the trial court’s Frye test statement as
harmless dicta because it appears that the comment was meant as a finding
regarding Dr. Dee’s credibility, not as an actual ruling regarding the Frye standard.   
   Additionally, we note the trial court’s statement in the sentencing order, “Brain
damage is becoming a popular argument in capital cases.”  Though this statement
also represents harmless, superfluous dicta, we admonish trial courts against
injecting this type of opinion comment into capital proceedings.
-33-
Further, there was competent, substantial evidence refuting the allegation that
Nelson lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his acts and to conform
to the requirements of law due to brain damage.  As we discussed previously, the
trial court was entitled to reject Dr. Dee’s opinion that Nelson suffered from brain
damage if it found that the facts in the case did not support the expert opinion.  See
Walls, 641 So. 2d at 390-91.12  Further, there was no documentation that Nelson
actually suffered fetal alcohol syndrome or that he ever incurred a head injury. 
Evidence was presented that Nelson knew his actions were wrong.  In addition to
the examples cited by the trial court (Nelson’s removing the victim from her house
and taking her to an orange grove, concealing her presence in the trunk from the
heavy equipment operator who helped him out of the sand, driving to a second
orange grove, and taking the victim 175 feet into the grove), other evidence was
presented at trial: Nelson replaced the screen on the outside where he climbed into
-34-
Brace’s home; he lied to Deputy Pope and the Avon Park police about the car
being loaned to him by Brace, whom he characterized as a family friend; and he
made up a fake phone number for Brace when the police asked him for her number. 
These purposeful actions are indicative of someone who knew those acts were
wrong and who could conform his conduct to the law if he so desired.  See
Provenzano v. State, 497 So. 2d 1177, 1184 (Fla. 1986) (stating that Provenzano’s
actions on the day of the murder did not support the mitigator that the defendant’s
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of the law was substantially impaired because he concealed the
weapons he carried, he put change in the parking meter, and took his knapsack out
to his car instead of allowing it to be searched because it would have exposed his
illegal possession of weapons).
Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s evaluation and rejection of the three
statutory mitigators discussed above.
NONSTATUTORY MITIGATORS
The trial court found that six of the twenty-one nonstatutory mitigators
claimed by Nelson were not proven.  Several of those mitigators were closely tied
to the statutory mitigators and some of them were closely tied to each other.  They
are: (a) Nelson’s good judgment was impaired (trial court found that brain damage
-35-
evidence had already been rejected and mitigator was contrary to evidence); (b)
Nelson was remorseful for his conduct (trial court found that there was “little in the
record to indicate remorse”); (c) Nelson did not plan to commit the offense in
advance (trial court found this is refuted by CCP aggravator being present); (d)
Nelson had a troubled and neglected childhood (trial court found that “there is
nothing in the record (except for one incident involving sex with his sister) that
would indicate a trouble [sic] or neglected childhood”); (e) Nelson had organic
brain damage (trial court stated that it previously rejected this claim); and (f) Nelson
has accepted responsibility for his action (trial court stated that there was nothing in
the record except Nelson’s cooperation with the police, which was previously
considered, to show this).  
The trial court briefly addressed these mitigators in the sentencing order. 
The trial court determined that these mitigating factors were not supported by the
evidence.  This is a proper threshold determination, according to this Court’s
holding in Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990): “When addressing
mitigating circumstances, the sentencing court must expressly evaluate in its written
order each mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant to determine
whether it is supported by the evidence . . . .”  Id. at 419 (footnote omitted).  In
Bryant v. State, 785 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 2001), this Court upheld the trial court’s
-36-
succinct rejection of mitigating factors in the sentencing order, stating: “The
sentencing order expressly identified this mitigating factor and, while it was
discussed only briefly, it is clear the court found the mitigation was not proven by
the greater weight of the evidence due to the conflicting testimony.”  Id. at 433.  As
in Bryant, the trial court in this case cited to specific record evidence regarding
each mitigator that it found was not supported by the evidence. 
We find no merit in Nelson’s argument that the trial court did not give
enough weight to the remaining fifteen mitigators.  In Trease v. State, 768 So. 2d
1050 (Fla. 2000), we reiterated well-settled law that “[t]he relative weight given each
mitigating factor is within the discretion of the sentencing court.”  Id. at 1055.  The
trial court in this case gave at least “very little weight” to the mitigators that it found
existed.   
Accordingly we affirm the trial court’s findings regarding the nonstatutory
mitigators because the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that
certain mitigators were not proven and when it assigned varying degrees of weight
to the mitigators that were proven.
PROPORTIONALITY
Nelson claims that the imposition of a death sentence in this case is
disproportionate.  Due to the uniqueness and finality of death, this Court addresses
-37-
the propriety of all death sentences in a proportionality review.  See Porter v. State,
564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990).  This Court reviews and considers all the
circumstances in a case relative to other capital cases when deciding whether death
is a proportionate penalty and to ensure uniformity.  See Johnson v. State, 720 So.
2d 232, 238 (Fla. 1998); Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416-17 (Fla. 1998).  The
death penalty is reserved only for those cases where the most aggravating and least
mitigating circumstances exist.  See Kramer v. State, 619 So. 2d 274, 278 (Fla.
1993).
We find that the death penalty was not a disproportionate sentence in this
extremely aggravated case, as compared to other similar cases that this Court has
decided.  Importantly, the trial court found that the HAC and CCP aggravators
were present in this case, and this Court has previously held that they “are two of
the most serious aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme, and, while
their absence is not controlling, it is also not without some relevance to a
proportionality analysis.”  Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999).  
In Bowles v. State, 804 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 2001), this Court affirmed death as
a sentence when the aggravators were: (1) prior conviction of two violent felonies;
(2) defendant was on felony probation when the murder was committed; (3) the
murder was committed during a robbery and for pecuniary gain (merged); (4)
-38-
HAC; and (5) CCP.  See id. at 1175.  The trial court in that case rejected the
statutory mitigators of extreme emotional disturbance and the defendant’s
diminished capacity to appreciate the criminality of his acts at the time of the
murder.  See id. at 1176.  The trial court assigned weight to the following mitigating
factors: (1) abusive childhood (significant weight); (2) defendant’s history of
alcoholism (some weight); (3) defendant’s lack of a father figure (some weight); (4)
defendant’s lack of education (little weight); (5) defendant’s guilty plea and
cooperation with police (little weight); (6) defendant’s use of intoxicants at the time
of the murder (little weight); and (7) the circumstances which caused Bowles to
leave home or his circumstances after he left home (no weight).  See id.  
In Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 2001), this Court affirmed the death
sentence, even in light of the avoid arrest aggravator being stricken.  See id. at 612. 
In that case, the remaining aggravators were: (1) CCP; (2) HAC; (3) murder
committed while engaged in a kidnapping; and (4) previous capital felony.  See id.
at 604.  The trial court did not find any statutory mitigators in that case, but it did
find four nonstatutory mitigators: (1) defendant suffered from a mental illness at the
time of the crime; (2) defendant was a good father; (3) defendant would die in
prison if given a life sentence; and (4) defendant had no disciplinary problems in
prison.  See id.
-39-
Based on the totality of the circumstances in this case considered in light of
this Court’s prior decisions in other capital cases involving similar circumstances,
we find that death is a proportionate penalty in this case. 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY SCHEME
On rehearing, Nelson has asserted that Florida's capital sentencing scheme
violates the United States Constitution under the holding of Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584 (2002).  This Court addressed a similar contention in Bottoson v. Moore,
833 So. 2d 693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 662 (2002), and King v. Moore, 831
So. 2d 143 (Fla.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 657 (2002), and denied relief.  We find
that Nelson is likewise not entitled to relief on this claim.
Accordingly, we affirm Nelson’s convictions and sentences.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., and SHAW, Senior Justice,
concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs specially with an opinion.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., specially concurring.
I concur in the affirmance of Nelson's convictions and death sentence.  I
-40-
write separately because in my view this Court's opinions in Bottoson and King,
which involved successive postconviction claims, do not answer why Nelson's
Ring claim should be rejected in this direct appeal.  
In the guilt phase of trial, the jury found Nelson guilty of sexual battery,
burglary, and kidnapping, in addition to first-degree murder.  These offenses were
charged and tried together with the murder count as "related" offenses.  See Fla. R.
Crim. P. 3.152(a)(2).  The trial court found, in its order sentencing Nelson to death,
that the murder was committed in the course of, or during flight after commission
of, one or more of these additional offenses. 
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), the United States
Supreme Court held that, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."  Referring to its
holding in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), that the failure
to allege prior convictions in an indictment did not preclude sentence enhancement,
the Court in Apprendi stated:
Both the certainty that procedural safeguards attached to any "fact" of
prior conviction, and the reality that Almendarez-Torres did not
challenge the accuracy of that "fact" in his case, mitigated the due
process and Sixth Amendment concerns otherwise implicated in
allowing a judge to determine a "fact" increasing punishment beyond
13.  Because the jury found Nelson guilty of first-degree murder on a general
verdict form and the evidence is sufficient to establish premeditated murder, the
concerns expressed by Justice Anstead as to use of the "murder in the course of a
felony" aggravator in a case in which the defendant is guilty only of felony murder
are not present here.  See Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7, 12-13 (Fla. 1997)
(Anstead, J., specially concurring).
14.  The separate aggravator that Nelson was previously convicted of a
felony and was under a sentence of imprisonment and on felony probation or
controlled release at the time of the killing does not have the same procedural
safeguards.  There is no jury finding of Nelson's incarcerative or probationary
-41-
the maximum of the statutory range.
530 U.S. at 488.  In Ring, the Court extended Apprendi to capital sentencing.
I conclude that the Almendarez-Torres exception to Apprendi and Ring
applies in this case.  Like the enhancing factor of the prior convictions in
Almendarez-Torres, the aggravator of commission of the murder in the course of a
felony in this case has the procedural safeguards of a unanimous verdict of guilt on
the separate offenses of sexual battery, burglary, and kidnapping, and the fact that
the jury found the defendant guilty of these offenses and first-degree murder based
on evidence of a single criminal episode concluding in the victim's death.13 
Additionally, Nelson has not asserted that the murder did not occur in the course
of, or during flight after, commission of one or more of these offenses.  Therefore,
I believe that the Almendarez-Torres exception to Apprendi applies, and Nelson's
sentence does not violate the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.14  
status at the time of the murder, akin to the verdicts of guilt on the separate
offenses tried in the same proceeding as the murder count, which supports the
"murder in the course of a felony" aggravator.  However, the "murder in the course
of a felony" aggravator alone is sufficient to satisfy the Sixth Amendment in this
case, pursuant to Apprendi.
-42-
Further, because a unanimous jury found Nelson guilty of the offenses relied
on for the aggravator of murder in the course of a felony, specifically, sexual
battery, burglary, and kidnapping, I conclude that a death sentence based on a nine-
to-three death recommendation does not violate the requirement of unanimity of
jury verdicts.  See Butler v. State, 842 So. 2d 817, 835 (Fla. 2003) (Pariente, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  In my view, the guilty verdicts on these
separate offenses satisfy the requirement of jury unanimity for any fact necessary to
render a defendant eligible for the death penalty. 
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority opinion in all respects except for its discussion of
the Ring issue.  The majority opinion repeats the assertion that the plurality opinions
in Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d
143 (Fla. 2002), provide a basis to reject Ring claims despite the lack of a clear
majority in either case.  Moreover, for the reasons I expressed in my opinion in
15.  As the majority expressly states, it was the trial court, not the jury, that
found the six statutory aggravators in this case: (1) the defendant was previously
convicted of a felony, was under a sentence of imprisonment, and was on felony
probation, or controlled release, at the time of the murder; (2) the crime for which
the defendant was to be sentenced was committed while the defendant was engaged
in the commission of, or flight after, committing a sexual battery, burglary, or
kidnapping; (3) the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest; (4) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel;
(5) the murder was committed in a cold and calculated and premeditated manner,
and without any pretense of moral or legal justification; and (6) the victim was
particularly vulnerable due to advanced age or disability. 
-43-
Duest v. State, No. SC00-2366 (Fla. June 26, 2003), I cannot agree with the
reasoning in Justice Pariente's separate opinion, which concludes that a Ring claim
may be rejected because one of the six aggravating circumstances that the trial
judge found was that the murder was committed in the course of enumerated
felonies.  Even if we were to view one aggravating circumstance as "exempt" from
the dictates of Ring, four of the five remaining aggravating circumstances that the
judge found alone were given great weight in imposing the death penalty.15  Hence,
such findings and reliance thereon would appear to violate the mandate of Ring that
a death sentence may not be based upon findings made by the trial court alone.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Polk County, J. Michael Hunter, Judge
- Case Nos.  CF97-06806A-XX & CF97-00813A-AP
-44-
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and A. Anne Owens, Assistant Public
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Robert J. Landry, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee