Title: Commonwealth v. Wade
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11913
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 29, 2016

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SJC-11913 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROBERT D. WADE. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     January 11, 2016. - July 29, 2016. 
 
Present:  Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
 
Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  Evidence, Scientific test.  Practice, 
Criminal, Postconviction relief, Waiver, Capital case.  
Statute, Construction.  Witness, Privilege.  Attorney at 
Law, Attorney-client relationship.  Homicide.  Felony-
Murder Rule.  Rape. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 6, 1993.  
 
 
Following review by this court, 428 Mass. 147 (1998), and 
467 Mass. 496 (2014), a motion for deoxyribonucleic acid 
testing, which had been filed on March 26, 2012, and which was 
supplemented on April 30, 2014, was heard by Charles J. Hely, J. 
 
 
A request for leave to appeal was allowed by Spina, J., in 
the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. 
 
 
 
Janet H. Pumphrey for the defendant. 
 
Mary Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
                                                 
 
1 Justice Duffly participated in the deliberation on this 
case and authored this opinion prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
Ira L. Gant, Stephanie Roberts Hartung, & David Lewis for 
Committee for Public Counsel Services Innocence Program & 
others. 
 
Michael D. Ricciuti, Kathleen D. Parker, & Patrick C. 
McCooe for Boston Bar Association. 
 
Martin W. Healy for Massachusetts Bar Association. 
 
Stanley L. Donald, pro se. 
 
Matthew M. Burke, Dara A. Reppucci, Hillel Nadler, Shivan 
Sarin, & David Lewis for Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  This case requires us to decide whether the 
petitioner, Robert Wade, who filed a motion in the Superior 
Court seeking postconviction testing of biological material 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278A ("An Act providing access to forensic 
and scientific analysis") (act), see St. 2012, c. 38, has 
satisfied the requirements of the act and therefore is entitled 
to the testing he seeks.  
The Legislature enacted G. L. c. 278A to create a process 
"separate from the trial and any subsequent proceedings 
challenging an underlying conviction, that permits forensic and 
scientific analysis of evidence or biological material, the 
results of which could support a motion for a new trial."  
Commonwealth v. Clark, 472 Mass. 120, 121-122 (2015).  The 
Legislature's stated purpose in enacting G. L. c. 278A was "to 
remedy the injustice of wrongful convictions of factually 
innocent persons by allowing access to analyses of biological 
material with newer forensic and scientific 
techniques . . . [to] provide a more reliable basis for 
3 
 
establishing a factually correct verdict than the evidence 
available at the time of the original conviction."  Commonwealth 
v. Wade, 467 Mass. 496, 504 (2014) (Wade II), quoting 2011 
Senate Doc. No. 753 and 2011 House Doc. No. 2165. 
We conclude that because Wade has demonstrated that "the 
requested analysis had not yet been developed at the time of 
conviction," G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5) (i), he has met the 
requirement of the act to establish one of the five enumerated 
reasons explaining why the requested testing was not previously 
conducted.  See G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5) (i)-(v).  It was 
therefore an abuse of discretion for the Superior Court judge to 
deny Wade's motion for scientific testing on the ground that 
Wade also was required to establish that the enumerated reason 
was the "primary reason" that his trial attorney did not seek 
the requested analysis, and that a reasonably effective attorney 
would have done so.  Accordingly, the order denying Wade's 
motion for scientific testing must be reversed. 
1.  Statutory framework.  The act establishes a two-step 
procedure for obtaining postconviction forensic or scientific 
analysis.  See Wade II, supra at 501.  The first step involves a 
threshold determination whether a motion filed pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278A, § 3 (§ 3 motion), satisfies the criteria set forth in 
that section.  See id. at 503-504.  This step is essentially 
"nonadversarial," and the determination is to be made based 
4 
 
primarily on the moving party's filings.  Id.  At this threshold 
stage, "a moving party is required only to point to the 
existence of specific information that satisfies the statutory 
requirements."  Commonwealth v. Donald, 468 Mass. 37, 41 (2014). 
If the requirements of the first step are satisfied, the 
moving party advances to the second step of the procedure, an 
evidentiary hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 7.  Wade II, 
supra at 501.  See G. L. c. 278A, §§ 6, 7.  At that hearing, the 
moving party must establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
each of the six factors set forth in § 7 (b) (1)-(6).2  See Wade 
                                                 
2 General Laws c. 278A, § 7 (b), provides in full: 
 
"The court shall allow the requested forensic or 
scientific analysis if each of the following has been 
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence: 
 
"(1) that the evidence or biological material exists; 
 
"(2) that the evidence or biological material has been 
subject to a chain of custody that is sufficient to 
establish that it has not deteriorated, been substituted, 
tampered with, replaced, handled or altered such that the 
results of the requested analysis would lack any probative 
value; 
 
"(3) that the evidence or biological material has not 
been subjected to the requested analysis for any of the 
reasons in [G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (5) (i)-(v)]; 
 
"(4) that the requested analysis has the potential to 
result in evidence that is material to the moving party's 
identification as the perpetrator of the crime in the 
underlying case; 
 
"(5) that the purpose of the motion is not the 
obstruction of justice or delay; and 
5 
 
II, supra at 503.  The third factor, § 7 (b) (3), requires a 
moving party to demonstrate that "the evidence or biological 
material has not been subjected to the requested analysis for 
any of the reasons" enumerated in § 3 (b) (5).  Those reasons 
are 
"(i) the requested analysis had not yet been developed at 
the time of the conviction; 
 
"(ii) the results of the requested analysis were not 
admissible in the courts of the commonwealth at the time of 
the conviction; 
 
"(iii) the moving party and the moving party=s attorney were 
not aware of and did not have reason to be aware of the 
existence of the evidence or biological material at the 
time of the underlying case and conviction; 
 
"(iv) the moving party=s attorney in the underlying case was 
aware at the time of the conviction of the existence of the 
evidence or biological material, the results of the 
requested analysis were admissible as evidence in courts of 
the commonwealth, a reasonably effective attorney would 
have sought the analysis and either the moving party=s 
attorney failed to seek the analysis or the judge denied 
the request; or 
 
"(v) the evidence or biological material was otherwise 
unavailable at the time of the conviction" (emphasis 
added). 
 
G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5). 
Where a moving party has established "any of the reasons" 
enumerated in § 3 (b) (5), thereby satisfying § 7 (b) (3), and 
has also satisfied the other five requirements of § 7 (b), 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
"(6) that the results of the particular type of 
analysis being requested have been found to be admissible 
in courts of the commonwealth." 
6 
 
"[t]he court shall allow the requested forensic or scientific 
analysis."  Id. 
2.  Factual and procedural background.  In 1997, a Superior 
Court jury convicted Wade of murder in the first degree on a 
theory of felony-murder, predicated on his conviction of 
aggravated rape.  See Commonwealth v. Wade, 428 Mass. 147, 155 
(1988).  Since 2002, Wade has been seeking postconviction 
testing of physical evidence introduced at his trial.  Wade II, 
467 Mass. at 497.  We previously concluded, in Wade II, supra, 
that Wade had satisfied the requirements of the act's first 
step, § 3.  As a necessary prerequisite of § 3, Wade denied 
having raped the victim, asserted that he was innocent of rape 
and murder, and submitted an affidavit from a forensic expert 
stating that the requested testing would, in his opinion, 
"determine conclusively" whether Wade was a contributor or the 
sole contributor to the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) found on 
samples taken from the victim's vagina and clothing.  Id. at 
507.  We determined that Wade was thus entitled to proceed to 
the second step of the procedure on the question whether his 
motion for DNA testing should be granted, and ordered the matter 
remanded to the Superior Court for an evidentiary hearing 
pursuant to § 7. 
Wade initially filed his § 3 motion seeking DNA testing 
under § 3 (b) (5) (iv), what we will refer to as the "reasonably 
7 
 
effective attorney" prong.  Prior to the hearing, Wade moved to 
supplement his motion by asserting an additional or alternative 
basis for relief under § 3 (b) (5) (i), the "undeveloped 
analysis" prong, which provides that the evidence was not 
subjected to the requested analysis because "the requested 
analysis had not yet been developed at the time of the 
conviction."  G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5) (i).  The motion judge, 
a different judge from the one who had denied Wade's § 3 motion, 
and who also was not the trial judge, allowed the motion to 
supplement.3 
Also prior to the hearing, but after Wade's motion to 
supplement had been allowed, the Commonwealth filed a motion 
seeking leave to summons and examine Wade's trial counsel on the 
question whether a "reasonably effective attorney" would have 
sought the requested testing before trial.  Wade filed a motion 
seeking to preclude such testimony.  The judge allowed the 
Commonwealth's motion, and Wade filed a petition for relief 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county court.  The single 
justice determined that examination of Wade's trial counsel 
could proceed where, "without revealing attorney-client 
communications," the testimony could offer evidence on the 
question whether a "reasonably effective attorney" would have 
                                                 
3 As discussed infra, Wade waived his reliance on the 
reasonably effective attorney prong during the evidentiary 
hearing. 
8 
 
sought the requested DNA analysis before trial. 
During the evidentiary hearing, postconviction counsel 
asserted that Wade was required to establish only one of the 
five reasons under § 3 (b) (5).  When the Commonwealth sought to 
elicit responses from Wade's trial counsel, postconviction 
counsel objected on the ground that the answers were privileged.  
His objections were overruled.  Postconviction counsel then 
orally waived the claim under the reasonably effective attorney 
prong, in order to proceed solely on the undeveloped analysis 
prong.4  The Commonwealth asserted, as it does on appeal, that 
even where a moving party seeks relief solely under the 
undeveloped analysis prong, the act necessarily contemplates 
that trial counsel's testimony may be used to demonstrate both 
the state of counsel's knowledge at the time of trial and 
counsel's trial strategy, in order to determine the actual 
reason that the evidence was not tested.  The Commonwealth then 
                                                 
4 We reject the Commonwealth's argument that G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 15, prohibits a moving party from waiving or withdrawing a 
claim that has been asserted under G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5).  
General Laws c. 278A, § 15, states explicitly that "[t]he right 
to file a motion under this chapter shall not be waived."  By 
its plain language, this provision was intended to protect a 
moving party's right to file a motion seeking scientific 
testing.  Nothing in the statutory language, however, prohibits 
a moving party from withdrawing a claim under one prong of G. L. 
c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5), and choosing to proceed only under one of 
the remaining theories presented in the party's motion, nor does 
any portion of G. L. c. 278A (act) suggest a legislative intent 
to preclude a party from withdrawing or dismissing a claim once 
filed, as generally permitted with any motion for postconviction 
relief. 
9 
 
asked trial counsel what he had been told by Wade about his 
encounter with the victim.  When counsel again declined to 
answer, the judge said, "I order you to answer that question."  
Trial counsel then did so.  Postconviction counsel moved to 
strike the testimony disclosing privileged information.  The 
motion was denied. 
Following the evidentiary hearing, the judge found that the 
requested analysis had not been developed at the time of Wade's 
conviction, thereby finding that Wade had satisfied the 
undeveloped analysis prong, which in turn satisfies § 7 (b) (3).5  
But the judge rejected Wade's assertion that he need only 
satisfy one of the reasons set forth in § 3 (b) (5) in order to 
satisfy § 7 (b) (3).  According to the judge, "the proper 
inquiry under [§] 7 (b) (3) is what [is] the primary 'reason,' 
                                                 
5 The judge also found that Wade had satisfied four of the 
other five requirements of § 7 (b).  The judge did not reach one 
of the requirements, § 7 (b) (5), which requires that a moving 
party establish that "the purpose of the motion is not the 
obstruction of justice or delay."  The sole evidence before the 
judge on this issue was an affidavit by postconviction counsel 
attesting to her efforts, spanning thirteen years, to obtain 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on Wade's behalf through the 
Massachusetts and Federal courts.  The Commonwealth did not 
dispute that Wade had satisfied this requirement.  Where there 
was no live testimony and a factual finding must be made on the 
basis of a documentary record alone, we are "in the same 
position as the motion judge" to resolve the issue.  See 
Commonwealth v. Clark, 472 Mass. 120, 130, 135 (2015).  Having 
carefully reviewed counsel's affidavit, we conclude that the 
purpose of Wade's motion was not to delay or to obstruct justice 
and Wade therefore has satisfied all five of the other 
requirements of § 7 (b). 
10 
 
i.e.[,] the primary cause, why the material was not previously 
subjected to the requested analysis."  In connection with this 
inquiry, the judge relied on the privileged communications 
disclosed by Wade's trial counsel.  Ultimately, the judge denied 
Wade's § 3 motion on the ground that he had not met the 
requirements of the reasonably effective attorney prong because 
a "reasonably effective attorney" would not have sought the 
requested analysis.  Wade then filed a second petition pursuant 
to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, seeking leave to appeal from the denial 
of his § 3 motion for forensic and scientific testing under 
G. L. c. 278A, § 7, and the single justice allowed the appeal to 
proceed before the full court. 
3.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  We review a 
question of statutory interpretation de novo.  Commonwealth v. 
Ventura, 465 Mass. 202, 208 (2013).  "The general and familiar 
rule is that a statute must be interpreted according to the 
intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words 
construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, 
considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the 
mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 
be accomplished."  Commonwealth v. Millican, 449 Mass. 298, 300 
(2007), citing Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447 (1934).  A 
guiding principle of statutory interpretation is "that the 
statutory language should be given effect consistent with its 
11 
 
plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless 
to do so would achieve an illogical result."  Sullivan v. 
Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001), and cases cited. 
b.  Statutory reason testing previously not performed.  We 
address first whether the act permits a judge to consider any of 
the other reasons enumerated in § 3 (b) (5) (i)-(v), once a 
moving party has established one of those reasons, to explain 
why the evidence has not been subjected to the requested 
analysis.  See G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (3).  General Laws 
c. 278A, § 7 (b) (3), mandates that the court "shall allow" the 
requested testing if the moving party establishes, in addition 
to the other required factors under G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b), that 
the testing was not conducted previously "for any of the 
reasons" enumerated in § 3 (b) (5) (i)-(v).  The plain meaning 
of the phrase "for any of the reasons" is that the requirement 
is satisfied when any one of the several enumerated alternatives 
is met.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 90, § 32G ("registrar may suspend 
or revoke a license . . . for any of the following causes"); 
G. L. c. 140, § 131 (e) (State police shall notify State 
firearms licensing authority "whether there is reason to believe 
that the applicant is disqualified for any of the foregoing 
reasons").  Thus, the phrase "for any of the reasons" means that 
a moving party satisfies the requirement of § 7 (b) (3) once the 
party has established any one of the enumerated reasons.  See 
12 
 
Olmstead v. Department of Telecomm. & Cable, 466 Mass. 582, 588 
(2013), quoting Massachusetts Broken Stone Co. v. Weston, 430 
Mass. 637, 640 (2000) ("we give effect to a statute's 'plain and 
ordinary meaning' where the statute's words are clear"). 
Moreover, the use of the word "or" to separate each of the 
enumerated reasons clearly evinces the Legislature's intent that 
a moving party may satisfy this prong by establishing any one of 
the enumerated reasons.  "The word 'or' is given a disjunctive 
meaning unless the context and the main purpose of all the words 
demand otherwise."  Nuclear Metals, Inc. v. Low Level 
Radioactive Waste Mgt. Bd., 421 Mass. 196, 212 (1995), quoting 
Eastern Mass. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 350 
Mass. 340, 343 (1966), and cases cited.  The language of the act 
plainly indicates the Legislature's intent to provide a moving 
party with a choice among several, distinct reasons advanced by 
the moving party to explain why the material had not been 
previously subjected to the requested testing.  Nothing in the 
context or the stated statutory purpose of the act suggests that 
we should interpret the word "or" in § 3 (b) (5) to have 
anything but its ordinary disjunctive meaning. 
Indeed, it would be nonsensical to attribute a conjunctive 
meaning to the word "or" as used in this section, given that at 
least some of the enumerated reasons are mutually exclusive.  
The reasonably effective attorney prong, for instance, presumes 
13 
 
that the requested analysis was developed at the time of 
conviction, that the results of such analysis were admissible at 
trial, and that the moving party or the moving party's trial 
counsel were aware that the evidence existed.  See G. L. 
c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5) (iv).  By contrast, the first three prongs 
require a moving party to establish, respectively, that the 
requested analysis had not been developed, that the results of 
the requested analysis were not admissible at trial, or that 
neither the moving party nor the moving party's attorney was 
aware that the evidence existed.  See G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 3 (b) (5) (i)-(iii).6 
Properly understood, each of these five enumerated reasons 
provides a moving party with alternate pathways to establish 
that he or she is entitled to the requested analysis.  See 
Commonwealth v. Williamson, 462 Mass. 676, 681 (2012), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Fall River Motor Sales, Inc., 409 Mass. 302, 316 
(1991) ("Statutes should be read 'as a whole to produce internal 
consistency").  And the reasonably effective attorney prong 
permits a moving party to obtain the requested analysis even 
where the moving party is unable to satisfy any of the three 
preceding prongs.  See G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5) (iv).  That 
                                                 
6 The fifth prong provides a final path by which a moving 
party may obtain the requested analysis, by establishing that 
the "evidence or biological material was otherwise unavailable 
at the time of conviction."  G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5) (v). 
14 
 
is, even where the moving party or his or her attorney was aware 
of the existence of the evidence, the requested analysis had 
been developed at the time of conviction, and the results of 
such analysis would have been admissible, a moving party 
nonetheless may obtain the requested analysis where the party 
can establish that a "reasonably effective attorney" would have 
requested it, but that his trial counsel did not do so.  Id. 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Legislature 
could not have intended that a moving party must also satisfy 
the reasonably effective attorney prong if the party has already 
satisfied the undeveloped analysis prong.  Accordingly, because 
Wade satisfied the requirement of § 3 (b) (5) (i), the 
undeveloped analysis prong, he was not required to satisfy any 
of the other prongs of § 3 (b) (5). 
 
c.  "Primary" or "actual" reason testing was not conducted.  
We turn to discussion of the judge's determination that Wade was 
required also to establish the "primary reason" why the evidence 
was not tested previously.  The Commonwealth argues that the 
judge's reasoning was correct, and that the statute indeed 
requires a moving party to prove the "actual reason" that the 
testing was conducted.  The Commonwealth maintains further that 
the Legislature intended to preclude a moving party's access to 
postconviction scientific testing if the "actual reason" the 
testing was not conducted was a strategic decision made by "a 
15 
 
reasonably effective attorney." 
The words "primary reason" or "actual reason" do not appear 
in the referenced statutory provisions, or anywhere else in the 
language of the act.  Nor is there anything in the act from 
which it can be gleaned that the Legislature intended to require 
such a finding, or to impose additional burdens on petitioners 
seeking scientific testing beyond the requirements mandated by 
the statutory language.  The act lists five alternative reasons 
on which a party may rely to show why testing was not performed.  
It contains no requirement that a moving party prove "the 
primary reason" among them.  Rather, as discussed, a moving 
party satisfies § 7 (b) upon establishing that "any of the 
reasons" set forth in § 3 (b) (5) are applicable to the facts of 
the party's case.  "We do not read into the [act] a provision 
which the Legislature did not see fit to put there, nor add 
words that the Legislature had an option to, but chose not to 
include."  Commissioner of Correction v. Superior Court Dep't of 
the Trial Court for the County of Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 126 
(2006). 
Moreover, our decision in Wade II, supra, forecloses the 
argument that a moving party may not obtain requested testing if 
a reasonably effective trial counsel did indeed make a strategic 
decision not to have the material tested at the time of trial.  
In that case, we expressly rejected the argument that the 
16 
 
meaning of "a reasonably effective attorney" under 
§ 3 (b) (5) (iv) imports the standard of ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  See Wade II, supra at 511-512.  We concluded that 
the act's inquiry, whether "a reasonably effective attorney" 
would have sought the requested testing, is an objective one.7  
Id. at 512.  In part, we reasoned that, because the act uses the 
language of "a" hypothetical reasonably effective attorney, a 
moving party is not required to explain the tactical or 
strategic reasoning of the party's trial counsel in not seeking 
the requested analysis.8  See Wade II, supra at 511.  See 
Commonwealth v. Coutu, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 686, 703 (2015).  Thus, 
regardless whether a moving party proceeds under the reasonably 
effective attorney prong or any other prong of § 3 (b) (5), 
whether his or her trial counsel made a strategic decision to 
forgo such testing is not relevant to that inquiry. 
                                                 
7 We noted also that the statutory language in 
§ 3 (b) (5) (iv) "contrasts with provisions in statutes in other 
jurisdictions providing for postconviction DNA testing, which 
explicitly incorporate the ineffective assistance of counsel 
standard, or explicitly require that trial counsel not have made 
a strategic or tactical decision in forgoing a request for DNA 
testing." See Wade II, supra at 512 & n.21. 
 
8 In contrast, we observe that the act refers specifically 
to "the moving party's attorney" in several places.  See, e.g., 
G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (iii), (iv).  Because the Legislature 
knew how to reference the moving party's trial counsel when it 
wanted to, its use of the phrase "a reasonably effective 
attorney" was clearly included to distinguish a hypothetical 
"reasonably effective attorney" from the moving party's trial 
counsel.  See Nguyen v. William Joiner Ctr. for the Study of War 
& Social Consequences, 450 Mass. 291, 301 (2007). 
17 
 
This understanding is consistent with § 3 (d), which 
permits testing even where a moving party has pleaded guilty or 
made incriminating statements.  See Wade II, supra at 514 (plain 
language of G. L. c. 278A, § 3 [d], and purpose for which act 
was enacted evinces Legislature's clear intent "to ensure that a 
moving party will be able to meet the requirements of G. L. 
c. 278A, § 3, notwithstanding any incriminating statements the 
party may have made, a guilty plea, or a plea of nolo 
contendere").  As we observed in Commonwealth v. Clark, 472 
Mass. 120, 136 (2015), quoting Wade II, supra at 511, "[g]iven 
its compelling interest in remedying wrongful convictions of 
factually innocent persons, the Legislature intended to permit 
access to DNA testing 'regardless of the presence of 
overwhelming evidence of guilt in the underlying trial.'" 
We conclude that Wade was not required to establish the 
"primary reason" that the evidence was not tested. 
 
d.  Whether requested testing was available at time of 
trial.  The judge found that the DNA analysis requested by Wade 
was not yet developed at the time of Wade's trial in 1997.  We 
do not agree with the Commonwealth's contention that this 
finding is clearly erroneous.  Wade's DNA expert testified that, 
as of September, 1997, it was not possible to test all thirteen 
18 
 
loci of the CODIS STR panel.9  The expert acknowledged that an 
early form of DNA analysis was available in 1997, but stated 
that the "average power of discrimination" for the earlier tests 
was "on the range of one in a few thousand."  By contrast, the 
DNA testing now available has the "discriminating power" of 
"[m]any, many, many orders of magnitude" higher than the earlier 
tests, which is in the "trillions, quadrillions, and so forth."10  
The Commonwealth did not challenge these assertions on cross-
examination, and did not introduce other evidence to the 
contrary. 
The judge's finding that the DNA analysis Wade requested 
was not developed at the time of his trial is thus sufficiently 
supported by evidence in the record.  The record demonstrates 
that the requested analysis has the discriminating power of, at 
a minimum, one in trillions, while the tests available at the 
                                                 
9 Wade requested the DNA analysis that was available at the 
time of his evidentiary hearing in 2014, which included an 
analysis of thirteen short tandem repeat (STR) loci.  "A DNA 
profile for an individual is that combination of alleles, or 
versions of genes, possessed by the individual at the loci 
tested."  Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 443 Mass. 245, 248 n.1 (2005).  
As Wade's expert explained during the evidentiary hearing, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation has "adopted the [thirteen] loci 
of the Profiler Plus and Cofiler tests as the STR loci required 
for participation in the national DNA database known as CODIS, 
or Combined DNA Index System." 
 
10 The DNA expert indicated that, in practice, the ability 
of a particular test to discern contributors to a sample would 
depend on many factors, including, for example, whether the 
sample came from a single source, was a full profile, or was 
part of mixture. 
19 
 
time of Wade's conviction had the discriminating power of one in 
a few thousand.  On these facts, we cannot say that the judge's 
finding was clearly erroneous.  Wade thus has satisfied 
§ 3 (b) (5) (i), which, in turn, satisfies the requirements of 
§ 7 (b) (3). 
e.  Attorney-client privilege and motion to strike.  As 
stated, Wade's postconviction counsel objected to questions 
posed by the Commonwealth at the evidentiary hearing that sought 
to pierce the attorney-client privilege, and his trial counsel 
declined to answer the questions.  The judge concluded that the 
privilege had been waived, and ordered trial counsel to reveal 
privileged communications; he also denied Wade's motion to 
strike those answers.  This was error. 
The Commonwealth contends that the act of filing a motion 
under the act necessarily waives a moving party's attorney-
client privilege, and that a moving party cannot assert the 
privilege to prevent the Commonwealth from proving the "real 
reason" testing was not conducted in a particular case.  
Although a litigant implicitly may waive the attorney-client 
privilege as to matters the litigant has placed at issue, see 
Darius v. Boston, 433 Mass. 274, 277-278 (2001), such a waiver 
is not applicable here, where Wade has not put "at issue" 
privileged attorney-client communications regarding the reasons 
that trial counsel did not seek DNA testing.  See Mass. G. Evid. 
20 
 
§ 523(b)(2) (2016) (privilege waived where person holding 
privilege "introduces privileged communications as an element of 
a claim or defense"). 
Wade maintains that he is entitled to the requested 
analysis because it was not available at the time of his 
conviction, see § 3 (b) (5) (i); this inquiry is objective and 
does not require any information protected by the attorney-
client privilege.  See Clair v. Clair, 464 Mass. 205, 219 
(2013), quoting Darius v. Boston, supra at 284 ("there can be no 
'at issue' waiver unless it is shown that the privileged 
information sought to be discovered is not available from any 
other source").  Moreover, even where a moving party proceeds 
with a claim under § 3 (b) (5) (iv), which requires 
consideration of what "a reasonably effective attorney" would 
have done, that inquiry also is objective, and therefore does 
not require testimony or an affidavit from trial counsel.  See 
Wade II, supra at 511-512. 
We conclude that Wade did not effect an "at issue" waiver 
by filing his petition, and his motion to strike all privileged 
communications disclosed by trial counsel should have been 
allowed. 
4.  Conclusion.  The orders denying the motion for 
scientific testing and denying the motion to strike are 
reversed.  The matter is remanded to the Superior Court, where 
21 
 
an order shall enter that the requested scientific analysis be 
conducted forthwith, and for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.