Title: Sean Cameron Comer v. Michael W. Moore
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC00-1341
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: March 14, 2002

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-1341
____________
SEAN CAMERON COMER,
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL W. MOORE, etc.,
Respondent.
[March 14, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
Sean Cameron Comer petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons set forth
below, we deny the petition.
FACTS
As relevant to the instant inquiry, Comer is serving a sentence which totals 
nine years in connection with a number of crimes he committed in March and April
of 1996.  Since Comer committed these crimes after October 1, 1995, he may not
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be awarded more than ten days of incentive gain time per month and the total of his
gain time may not exceed 15% of his sentence.  See § 944.275(4)(b)3, Fla. Stat.
(2001); ch. 95-294, § 2, Laws of Fla.  In other words, he must actually serve a
minimum of 85% of his sentence incarcerated.
Based on this Court’s decisions in Thompson v. State, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla.
1999); Heggs v. State , 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000); Salters v. State, 758 So. 2d 667
(Fla. 2000); and Trapp v. State, 760 So.2d 924 (Fla. 2000), Comer argues that the
85% minimum service provision of section 944.275 is invalid and therefore he is
entitled to additional gain time.
ANALYSIS
Contrary to Comer’s assertion, nothing in Heggs or Thompson indicates or
holds that chapter 95-294 is invalid under a single subject analysis.  In Thompson
v. State, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999), this Court concluded that chapter 95-182,
Laws of Florida, violated the single subject requirement of Florida’s Constitution
and held it to be invalid in its entirety.  This required the resentencing of a certain
group of inmates.  Section 2 of the invalidated law would have only amended
section 775.084 to provide that the newly created category of offenders
denominated “violent career criminals” would be required to serve 85% of their
sentences.  In Salters v. State, 758 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 2000), this Court defined the
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window period for those affected by Thompson.
In Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000), this Court concluded that
chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida also violated the single subject requirement and
held it to be invalid.  In a similar manner, section 26 of the invalid law only amended
the principal gain time statute (section 944.275) to generally clarify which version of
the gain time statutes should apply if an inmate had multiple sentences from
different years.  Section 26 did not, however, require that offenders serve 85% of
their sentences.  In Trapp v. State, 760 So.2d 924 (Fla. 2000), this Court defined
the window period for application of Heggs.
While the provision relating to serving 85% of sentences imposed for violent
career criminals created by chapter 95-182 is clearly null and void after Thompson,
Comer is not a violent career criminal, and therefore that isolated section has no
application to him.  Further, even if he were a career criminal, neither chapter 95-
182 nor chapter 95-184 was the law that created the general requirement that 85%
of all sentences be actually served.  The general provision that created the
requirement for serving 85% of the sentence imposed was enacted by chapter 95-
294, section 2 (the Stop Turning Out Prisoners Act).  It amended section 944.275
to provide that all inmates, not just career criminals, with offense dates on or after
October 1, 1995, must serve 85% of their sentences (i.e., no more than 15% of gain
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time is allowed).  
Comer asserts that the unconstitutionality of chapter 95-184 taints the validity
of chapter 95-294 simply because it was enacted in the same session and addressed
the same statute.  The provisions affecting gain time created by chapter 95-184
were directed to only one aspect of gain time.  Chapter 95-294, however,
encompassed gain time for all offenders who committed their offenses on or after
October 1, 1995.  As we noted in Bradley v. State, 631 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1994), 
pursuant to section 1.04, Florida Statutes (2001) (“Statutory Construction”),
enactments adopted in the same legislative session and amending the same statutory
provision should be given full effect, be read in pari materia, and be construed in
harmony to the extent possible.  Reading statutory provisions in pari materia does
not, as Comer urges, produce the result that a provision is also constitutionally
infirm simply because it may affect the same statute as another act which was found
to be unconstitutional.  Although chapter 95-184, which included some gain time
provisions, was held unconstitutional, such determination does not mean that the
provisions of chapter 95-294, which provide for reduced gain time for all
offenders, must also automatically fail.  Chapter 95-184 was an extensive act that
attempted to amend many different statutes and was determined to have violated the
single subject rule.  Chapter 95-294, which was entitled the “Stop Turning Out
1.  The single subject requirement provides:
Every law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly
connected therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the
title. No law shall be revised or amended by reference to its title only.
Laws to revise or amend shall set out in full the revised or amended
act, section, subsection or paragraph of a subsection. The enacting
clause of every law shall read: "Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the
State of Florida:".
Art. III, § 6, Fla. Const.
2.  Our decision today is in accord with a number of district court decisions. 
See, e.g., Williams v. State, 801 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (law imposing
general 85% service provision was not invalidated by Heggs); Nelson v. Moore,
802 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (same); Rivera v. State, 790 So. 2d 584 (Fla.
3d DCA 2001) (same).
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Prisoners Act,” is a very short act affecting very few gain time statutes, and it
generally reduces inmates’ options for early release.  It  clearly only relates to the
one subject embraced in its title and, thus, it survives the single subject test.  See
art. III, § 6, Fla. Const.1  Accordingly, the petition is hereby denied.2
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
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Sean Cameron Comer, pro se, Gainesville, Florida,
for Petitioner
Susan A. Maher, Deputy General Counsel, Judy Bone, Assistant General Counsel, and
Carolyn J. Mosley, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Corrections,
Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent