Title: State v. Reed
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2016AP001609-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: December 7, 2018

2018 WI 109 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP1609-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Faith N. Reed, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 375 Wis. 2d 328, 897 N.W.2d 68  
(2017 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 7, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 7, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Monroe 
 
JUDGE: 
J. David Rice 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs. 
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed and an oral argument by Joseph Ehmann, state public 
defender.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Clayton P. Kawski, assistant attorney general, Scott E. Rosenow, 
assistant attorney general, and Brad D. Schimel, attorney 
general.  There was an oral argument by Clayton Kawski. 
 
 
2018 WI 109
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2016AP1609-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CM545) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Faith N. Reed, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 7, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming a 
judgment of conviction of the Circuit Court for Monroe County, 
David Rice, Judge.1  The case was decided by one judge, Judge 
Brian Blanchard, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(f) (2015-
                                                 
1 State v. Reed, No. 2016AP1609-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2017). 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
2 
 
16).2  Faith Reed, the defendant, was convicted of possession of 
a 
controlled 
substance 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g)(b) and bail jumping in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.49(1)(a), both misdemeanors. 
¶2 
In the circuit court, Reed claimed that the officer's 
warrantless entry into her apartment, sometimes referred to here 
as Unit 206, violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Reed argued that the warrantless entry 
into her apartment was not justified under any of the well-
recognized 
exceptions 
to 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment's 
warrant 
requirement.  Specifically, Reed contended that the officer did 
not have consent to enter her apartment and that exigent 
circumstances 
did 
not 
exist 
justifying 
entrance 
to 
her 
apartment.  Consequently, she argued that the evidence obtained 
during the searches of her apartment and her person should be 
suppressed.   
¶3 
The circuit court denied Reed's motion to suppress the 
evidence.  The circuit court concluded that the law enforcement 
officer had consent to enter Reed's apartment, that the consent 
was never revoked, and that exigent circumstances justified the 
officer's pushing open the apartment door.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court's denial of Reed's motion to 
suppress.  The court of appeals agreed with the circuit court 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
3 
 
that the officer had consent to enter Reed's apartment and that 
the consent was never revoked.  The court of appeals did not 
address the issue of exigent circumstances. 
¶4 
The instant case presents the following issues:  (1) 
whether the officer had consent to enter Reed's apartment; (2) 
if consent was initially given to the officer, whether that 
consent was revoked before the officer's entry into Reed's 
apartment; and (3) whether exigent circumstances justified the 
officer's pushing open Reed's apartment door.  
¶5 
We conclude as follows:  (1) the law enforcement 
officer did not have consent to enter Reed's apartment; (2) even 
if the officer had initially been given consent to enter the 
apartment, 
which 
he 
was 
not, 
consent 
would 
have 
been 
unequivocally revoked before the officer's entry into the 
apartment; and (3) exigent circumstances did not justify the 
officer's opening Reed's apartment door. 
¶6 
The following principles of law apply in the instant 
case. 
¶7 
A warrantless search does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article I, 
Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution if the search is 
conducted 
with 
consent3 
or 
is 
justified 
by 
exigent 
circumstances.4   
                                                 
3 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State 
v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶16, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729 N.W.2d 182. 
4 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980); State v. 
Dalton, 2018 WI 85, ¶39, 383 Wis. 2d 147, 914 N.W.2d 120. 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
4 
 
¶8 
Consent to search must be unequivocal and specific,5 
and it must be freely and voluntarily given.6  Consent is not 
freely and voluntarily given if it is the result of mere 
"acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority."7  Once given, 
consent may be revoked.  Revocation of consent need not be 
communicated through particular "magic words," but intent to 
revoke consent must be made by unequivocal acts or statements.8 
¶9 
In the instant case, the law enforcement officer 
neither 
requested 
nor 
obtained 
consent 
to 
enter 
Reed's 
apartment.  Kirk Sullivan, who was staying with Reed at her 
apartment and led the officer to Reed's apartment, never told 
the officer that the officer was allowed to enter the apartment.  
In leading the officer to the threshold of Reed's apartment, 
Sullivan was merely following the directives and commands of the 
officer.  Sullivan's conduct falls far short of unequivocal and 
specific consent that was freely and voluntarily given.   
                                                 
5 Andrews v. Hickman Cty., 700 F.3d 845, 854 (6th Cir. 
2012); United States v. Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d 1324, 1328 (9th 
Cir. 1997); Gautreaux v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 489, 492, 190 
N.W.2d 542 (1971). 
6 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 549 (1968); State 
v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶16, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729 N.W.2d 182. 
7 Bumper, 
391 
U.S. 
at 
549; 
see 
also 
Johnson, 
299 
Wis. 2d 675, ¶16. 
8 United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 
2005); State v. Wantland, 2014 WI 58, ¶33, 355 Wis. 2d 135, 848 
N.W.2d 810. 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
5 
 
¶10 Moreover, even if Sullivan had initially given the 
officer consent to enter Reed's apartment (which, we emphasize, 
he did not), consent would have been unequivocally revoked when 
Sullivan opened the apartment door just enough to allow himself 
entry and attempted to shut the door behind him to prohibit the 
officer from entering the apartment.   
¶11 Additionally, 
a 
warrantless 
search 
may 
also 
be 
justified by exigent circumstances.9  "The objective test for 
determining whether exigent circumstances exist is whether a 
police officer, under the facts as they were known at the time, 
would reasonably believe that delay in procuring a search 
warrant would gravely endanger life . . . or greatly enhance the 
likelihood of the suspect's escape."10 
¶12 We conclude that no exigent circumstances justified 
the officer's pushing open Reed's apartment door.  Under the 
circumstances known to the officer at the time he pushed the 
door open, there were no facts upon which to base a reasonable 
belief that the delay in procuring a search warrant would 
gravely endanger life or greatly enhance the likelihood of the 
suspect's escape.  
¶13 Accordingly, we conclude that the searches at issue 
violated the United States and Wisconsin constitutions.  We 
                                                 
9 Payton, 445 U.S. at 590; Dalton, 383 Wis. 2d 147, ¶39. 
10 State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶24, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 
N.W.2d 621; see also Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 
(1990). 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
6 
 
therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand the cause to the circuit court with instructions to 
suppress the challenged evidence and vacate Reed's convictions. 
I 
¶14 The following facts are drawn primarily from the body 
camera footage of Officer Steven Keller of the Tomah Police 
Department. 
¶15 On December 13, 2015, at 1:20 p.m., Officer Keller was 
dispatched to 308 Murdock Street in Tomah, Wisconsin.  Officer 
Keller was responding to a report of an altercation between two 
individuals that had taken place in the street.  When Officer 
Keller arrived at the scene, he encountered two men later 
identified as Daniel Cannon and Kirk Sullivan.  Officer Keller 
asked Cannon and Sullivan what was going on, and Cannon 
responded, "They were fighting over stupid shit."11  Officer 
Keller asked, "Where are they?" Cannon pointed ahead, saying 
"One of them went back the house that way——"  Cannon then turned 
around, but before he could say anything else, Officer Keller 
asked 
Cannon 
if 
he 
and 
Sullivan 
were 
involved 
in 
the 
altercation.  Cannon responded, "We were trying to stop it."   
¶16 Cannon then explained that "homeboy," referring to the 
other individual involved in the altercation, "went back to his 
                                                 
11 As the officer later learned, "they" were brothers, 
Brandon and Jerome Harris, and the "stupid shit" they were 
fighting about was a pair of Air Jordan basketball shoes. 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
7 
 
house just to cool off."  By "his" house, Cannon was referring 
to Sullivan. 
¶17 Officer Keller asked Cannon, "Which apartment they 
in?"  Cannon said that "they" were in number 11.  Dispatch12 
could be heard saying that as the parties to the altercation 
were leaving, a female and male in a white T-shirt went to 
"apartment number 11."  Cannon was heard off-screen chuckling 
and saying, "Yep, they're in number 11." 
¶18 Referring 
to 
the 
individual 
who 
went 
back 
to 
Sullivan's apartment to cool off, Cannon reappeared on screen 
and began talking to Officer Keller again, stating, "And he's——"   
¶19 At this time, Officer Keller noticed that Sullivan, 
now a short distance away, was walking away towards his 
apartment building. 
¶20 Officer Keller said loudly to Sullivan, "Hey, why 
don't you come back here.  Don't just leave."  Sullivan turned 
around and walked back towards Officer Keller with his hands in 
his pockets as Cannon reiterated that the other individual went 
back to Sullivan's apartment to cool off.  After a few seconds, 
Officer Keller told Sullivan to "[k]eep your hands out of your 
pockets for me, OK?"  Sullivan removed his hands from his 
pockets and showed his open palms to Officer Keller. 
                                                 
12 For the sake of clarity, the instant opinion refers to 
voices heard over Officer Keller's radio as "Dispatch" unless 
otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
8 
 
¶21 Cannon again reiterated that he and Sullivan were 
trying to defuse the situation when Sullivan, speaking for the 
first time, said "Yep."  Cannon then explained to Officer Keller 
that the altercation was related to shoes.  Cannon says "that 
was pretty much the whole argument," and that "they" were 
supposed to "sit there and watch football." 
¶22 Officer Keller then asked Sullivan, "So you were 
involved with this?"  Sullivan responded, "I was just trying to 
break it up.  That's it." 
¶23 Officer Keller then asked Cannon and Sullivan for 
identification.  Describing Cannon and Sullivan as "witnesses," 
Officer Keller radioed their names to Dispatch for a warrant 
check.  While waiting to hear back from Dispatch, Officer Keller 
confirmed with Cannon and Sullivan that the altercation was a 
verbal argument about shoes that never got physical. 
¶24 As Cannon and Sullivan were describing the altercation 
in greater detail, another male officer could be heard on 
Officer Keller's radio speaking with a female officer.  The male 
officer said that he and "Andy" were "not having any luck" at 
apartment number 11.  The female officer responded, "I have a 
Jerome Harris at that location.  Contact with him on November 
11th.  Reference: a warrant."  As to Sullivan, the female 
officer commented, "Reference: a commitment."  The male officer 
asked the female officer to "run Jerome" and "look for a 
Brandon——maybe same last name." 
¶25 Officer Keller then asked Cannon and Sullivan, "Can 
you guys stick around this area for a moment?"  Sullivan asked, 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
9 
 
"You mean stand outside?"  Officer Keller pointed to a nearby 
building and responded, "Well, do you want to hang out in this 
building?"  In response, Sullivan laughed and said, "I was going 
to watch the game, I guess."  Gesturing with his hands, Officer 
Keller responded, "Until we can get everything straightened 
out." 
¶26 At this time, Cannon turned to Sullivan and said, 
"Well, cause he went to your house, he's at your apartment."  
Sullivan responded, "Yeah, he supposed to go to my——my apartment 
to watch football."  Cannon then said to Officer Keller, "So, I 
mean, if you want to go with him and I can stand by where I 
live——"  Officer Keller then asked Sullivan, "Who's at your 
house right now, one of the guys involved?"  Cannon responded, 
"Yes."  Sullivan said, "Yeah he's supposed to——he was supposed 
to come to my house.  He's supposed to." 
 ¶27 Officer Keller asked Sullivan, "All right, and he's 
over there right now?"  Sullivan responded, "I——I don't know he 
was supposed to go."  Cannon said that he saw Jerome head 
towards Sullivan's apartment building after the argument ended 
and that Jerome "might be there already." 
¶28 Dispatch could be heard telling Officer Keller that 
Sullivan was on probation for battery, strangulation, and 
suffocation.  Dispatch also told Officer Keller that Sullivan 
had contact restrictions with the defendant, Faith Reed.   
¶29 Officer Keller asked Sullivan if "that" is where he 
was, referring to Reed's apartment.  Sullivan said, "Mm-hm."  
Officer Keller asked, "Is she there?"  Sullivan answered, "Yeah, 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
10 
 
she's there."  There was then some confusion among Sullivan, 
Officer Keller, and Dispatch about the specifics of Sullivan's 
contact 
restrictions 
with 
Reed, 
but 
eventually, 
it 
was 
established that Sullivan was not prohibited from in-person 
contact with Reed.13 
¶30 Officer Keller asked Sullivan, "Who's over at your 
house right now that was involved with this?  What's his name?"  
Sullivan responded, "Ah, Jerome. He was supposed to——he was 
supposed to go over there.  I stood out here and me and him was 
talking about it." 
¶31 The same male officer from before could again be heard 
stating over the radio that nobody was answering the door at 
apartment number 11.  This male officer asked if they thought 
Jerome was in number 11 and Brandon took off.  Officer Keller 
responded into his radio, "Kirk's advising that Jerome might be 
at his residence over here and the others in number 11 there."  
Officer Keller then asked, "Is it Brandon that was involved?"  
It is not clear to whom this question was directed, and nobody 
responded to it. 
¶32 Officer 
Keller 
again 
confirmed 
with 
Cannon 
and 
Sullivan that the argument was verbal and not physical.  Officer 
Keller then communicated that information into his radio.  Over 
the radio, a male officer can be heard saying, "We're looking 
                                                 
13 Sullivan's phone contact with Reed was restricted, not 
his in-person contact with Reed. 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
11 
 
for Brandon Harris and Jerome Harris.  You can run both of them—
—make sure they're not wanted——could be helpful." 
¶33 Officer Keller then gestured towards an apartment 
building and said to Sullivan, "All right, let's go——ah——let's 
go look over——see if he's over there.  If anything we could just 
talk to him."  Officer Keller told Cannon that he was "good to 
go." 
¶34 Officer Keller and Sullivan began walking towards 
Reed's apartment building with Sullivan walking to Officer 
Keller's left.  As they walked, Dispatch could be heard saying 
that Jerome had two "body only" warrants, one of which was 
related to "operating while revoked."  After about 30 seconds, 
Officer Keller told Sullivan, "Hey, do you want to step over 
here with me.  I'm going to see if this other party's here."  
Sullivan then began to walk in front of Keller such that he was 
clearly visible in the body camera footage.   
¶35 With Sullivan in front of Officer Keller, the two 
entered an unlocked entryway to a stairwell in the apartment 
building.  They climbed a set of stairs to the second story of 
the building.  At the top of the stairs was another unlocked 
door.  Sullivan opened the door, exited the stairwell, and 
looked back while holding the door open for Officer Keller.  
Sullivan then led Officer Keller to Reed's apartment, Unit 206, 
about halfway down the hallway on the left.  Just as they 
reached the threshold of Reed's apartment, Officer Keller stated 
into his radio, "Andy, I'll be in apartment number 206." 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
12 
 
¶36 Sullivan briefly knocked on the door, opened the door 
just wide enough to facilitate his own entry into the apartment, 
began to shut the door behind him, and called out for Jerome.14  
The door to Unit 206 was inches away from shutting when Officer 
Keller pushed open the door, stating, "Hey, don't just walk in 
there."15  Sullivan, another man later identified as Jerome 
Harris, and a woman later identified as the defendant, Faith 
Reed, could be seen inside the apartment after Officer Keller 
pushed open the door but before he entered the apartment.  
Sullivan could be seen trying to conceal something that was on 
the kitchen counter.  Officer Keller entered the apartment and 
subsequently discovered marijuana on the counter. 
¶37 Reed was arrested for possession of marijuana.  During 
the booking process, a single Adderall pill was found in Reed's 
sock.  Reed was charged with one count each of possession of an 
illegally obtained prescription drug in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 450.11(7)(h), 
possession 
of 
dextroamphetamine 
sulfate 
(Adderall) 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g)(b), 
                                                 
14 The circuit court found that it was ambiguous whether 
Sullivan was shutting the apartment door or if it was another 
occupant of the apartment.  This finding is clearly erroneous.  
Officer Keller's body camera clearly shows that it was Sullivan 
who was attempting to shut the apartment door behind him. 
15 The court of appeals stated that Jerome said "Hey, don't 
just walk in like that."  This finding is also clearly 
erroneous.  In the body camera footage, Officer Keller, not 
Jerome, could clearly be heard saying, "Hey, don't just walk in 
there" as Sullivan entered the apartment and began shutting the 
door behind him. 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
13 
 
possession of THC as a party to a crime in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 961.41(3g)(e), and bail jumping in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 946.49(1)(a). 
¶38 On February 9, 2016, Reed filed a motion to suppress 
the evidence on the basis that the warrantless searches violated 
her rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  A hearing was held on March 15, 2016, at which 
Officer Keller testified and the prosecutor played relevant 
portions of Officer Keller's body camera footage. 
¶39 At the hearing, Officer Keller admitted that Sullivan 
had not given him permission to go into Unit 206.  Officer 
Keller testified that Sullivan "did not tell me that I had to 
stay out of the apartment nor did he tell me to just come right 
in, either."  Officer Keller testified that "[a]t no point did 
[Sullivan] tell me I could not follow him into the residence."  
Officer Keller further testified that he pushed opened the door 
to the apartment in part out of concern for his own safety. 
¶40 The circuit court denied Reed's motion to suppress.  
The circuit court concluded that "by his conduct Mr. Sullivan 
freely and voluntarily implied that the officer could follow him 
to [Unit 206] and that he was going to locate and identify Mr. 
Harris who was one of the suspects in connection with this 
altercation so that the officer could talk with him."  The 
circuit court found that it was not clear who closed the door 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
14 
 
(i.e., 
either 
Sullivan 
or 
another 
occupant 
of 
Reed's 
apartment),16 and that from Officer Keller's perspective, it 
would have been "ambiguous" why the door was shutting.  The 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
"there 
was 
nothing 
about 
[Sullivan's] entry into the room that revoked——revoked that 
consent that the officer follow him."  The circuit court also 
concluded that "under the circumstances that the officer was in 
an isolated location without anyone else there to back him up 
dealing with individuals one of whom was on probation, had a 
warrant for his arrest who had just been in an altercation, I 
think it was reasonable for him to push the door partially open 
to make sure he knew who was in front of him and what was going 
on." 
¶41 After the motion to suppress was denied, Reed pleaded 
no contest to possession of a controlled substance in violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(b) and bail jumping in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 946.49(1)(a).  Reed appealed her convictions to the 
court of appeals, arguing that the circuit court erroneously 
denied her motion to suppress. 
¶42 The court of appeals, Judge Brian Blanchard sitting 
alone pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(f), affirmed the 
circuit court's denial of Reed's motion to suppress.  With 
regard to whether Sullivan provided consent for Officer Keller 
                                                 
16 This finding is clearly erroneous. 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
15 
 
to enter Unit 206, the court of appeals concluded that Sullivan 
provided consent: 
[T]o a typical, reasonable person, both of the 
following 
were 
unequivocally 
and 
specifically 
expressed: (1) Keller's request that Sullivan permit 
Keller to talk to Jerome in Unit 206, including 
proposing that "we could just talk to him," and (2) 
Sullivan's consent, expressed through an extended 
course of conduct, that Keller enter Unit 206.17 
¶43 The court of appeals disagreed with the circuit 
court's finding that it was ambiguous who closed the door.  The 
court of appeals stated that "[i]t is clear that neither Jerome 
nor Reed pushed on the door from the inside," such that "the 
only logical deduction from the video is that as Sullivan 
entered Unit 206 he applied slight to moderate pressure to the 
make [sic] the door slowly swing toward the closed position."18 
¶44 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
characterized 
Sullivan's 
attempted closing of the door as "a nuanced attempt to 
momentarily delay Keller's entrance, by slipping into the 
apartment and giving the door a soft backward push."19  The court 
of appeals acknowledged that Sullivan's "last-second, soft 
backwards push on the door . . . suggests the possibility that 
Sullivan had last-second concern about agreeing to allow Keller 
to enter Unit 206[,]" but ultimately, the court of appeals 
                                                 
17 Reed, No. 2016AP1609-CR, ¶25. 
18 Id., ¶12 n.3. 
19 Id., ¶13. 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
16 
 
concluded that "[t]his nuanced possible delaying tactic was an 
equivocal act."20 
¶45 Reed petitioned this court for review in April 2017.  
The State did not file a formal response.  After being ordered 
to do so by this court, the State filed a response in August 
2017.  In its response, the State agreed with Reed that Sullivan 
did not give unequivocal and specific consent for Officer Keller 
to enter the apartment.  Rather, according to the State, 
Sullivan merely acquiesced to Officer Keller's request to broker 
a meeting with Jerome, and Sullivan did so by leading Officer 
Keller through areas that Officer Keller did not need consent to 
enter:  a parking lot, the unlocked exterior door to a multi-
unit apartment building, a set of stairs, and an unlocked 
hallway.  The State wrote in its response that when they reached 
the apartment door, Sullivan "did nothing to suggest that entry 
was permitted.  He did the opposite.  Sullivan knocked, opened 
the door only wide enough to enter, slipped in, and attempted to 
push the door close[d]——indicating that he did not want Officer 
Keller to follow him." 
¶46 The State agreed with Reed that the court of appeals' 
decision should be reversed, recommending that this court 
summarily reverse and remand the cause to the circuit court with 
an instruction to suppress the challenged evidence.   
                                                 
20 Id., ¶30. 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
17 
 
¶47 In October 2017, this court granted Reed's petition 
for review of the court of appeals' decision and remanded the 
cause to the court of appeals "for reconsideration in light of 
the State's concession in its response to Ms. Reed's petition 
for review."  Chief Justice Roggensack dissented joined by 
Justice Ziegler and Justice Gableman, writing that the State's 
concession appeared to be factually unwarranted and inconsistent 
with its position in the circuit court and court of appeals.   
¶48 Nine days after we remanded the cause to the court of 
appeals for reconsideration, the court of appeals, Judge 
Blanchard 
again 
sitting 
alone 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 752.31(2)(f), issued an order refusing to reconsider the case.  
The court of appeals' order reads in full as follows: 
Following the supreme court's October 10, 2017 order, 
I asked the parties to inform me whether new or 
supplemental briefing is necessary for purposes of 
resolving the reconsideration issue or instead whether 
I may rely on their submissions in the supreme court.  
They inform me that no new submissions are necessary. 
I am not persuaded by the State's new legal argument 
on appeal and therefore do not accept the State's new 
concession. 
IT IS ORDERED that reconsideration is denied. 
¶49 In November 2017, Reed again petitioned this court for 
review, "reviv[ing] the issues raised in her initial petition 
for review."  As it did in response to Reed's first petition for 
review, the State responded to Reed's second petition by 
agreeing that Sullivan did not give express or implied consent 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
18 
 
to enter Reed's apartment and that reversal of the court of 
appeals' decision was necessary. 
II 
¶50 We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of 
review of the court of appeals' decision affirming the circuit 
court's denial of Reed's motion to suppress evidence. 
¶51 Whether evidence should be suppressed is a question of 
constitutional fact.21  When presented with a question of 
constitutional fact, this court engages in a two-step inquiry.  
First, we review the circuit court's findings of historical fact 
under the clearly erroneous standard.22  Second, we independently 
apply constitutional principles to these historical facts.23   
III 
                                                 
21 Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, ¶13; State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 
127, ¶19, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899. 
22 Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, ¶13. 
The parties disagree about whether to apply the clearly 
erroneous standard or the de novo standard to the circuit 
court's findings of historical fact, given that the circuit 
court's findings were based on Officer Keller's body camera 
footage.  See State v. Jimmie R.R., 2000 WI App 5, ¶39, 232 
Wis. 2d 138, 606 N.W.2d 196 (1999) (when the only evidence on a 
factual question is reflected in a video recording, the court of 
appeals is in the same position as the circuit court to 
determine a question of law based on the recording). 
We decline to address this disagreement because doing so is 
unnecessary in the instant case.  As we explained above, even 
under the more deferential clearly erroneous standard, we reject 
the circuit court's finding with respect to who closed the 
apartment door. 
23 Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, ¶13. 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
19 
 
¶52 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
prohibiting 
unreasonable 
searches 
and 
seizures 
guide 
our 
analysis.24  In particular, the "physical entry of the home" has 
been described by the United States Supreme Court as "the chief 
evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
directed."25   
¶53 In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886), 
the United States Supreme Court issued the following guidance: 
"It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional 
rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments 
thereon."26   
¶54 Because "the warrant procedure minimizes the danger of 
needless intrusions" by the government, "[i]t is a 'basic 
principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures 
                                                 
24 U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wis. Const. art. I, § 11; State v. 
Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶16, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625 
(recognizing the protections under both the United States and 
Wisconsin constitutions).   
25 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 
297, 313 (1972); see also Payton, 445 U.S. at 585; State v. 
Douglas, 123 Wis. 2d 13, 17-18, 365 N.W.2d 580 (1985) ("The 
courts, including this one, have scrutinized with the greatest 
care claims by the state to the use of evidence seized in 
warrantless searches of one's home").   
26 See also Douglas, 123 Wis. 2d at 21 ("That principle 
[announced in Boyd] is no less true today than it was a century 
ago.  The fourth amendment has been liberally construed to 
protect the security of person and property when exceptions to 
the warrant requirement are sought."). 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
20 
 
inside 
a 
home 
without 
a 
warrant 
are 
presumptively 
unreasonable."27    However, both the United States and Wisconsin 
constitutions have "jealously and carefully drawn" exceptions to 
their warrant requirements.28   
¶55 The instant case presents issues related to two of 
those well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement: 
consent29 and exigent circumstances.30   
A 
¶56 We now address whether Officer Keller obtained consent 
to enter Reed's apartment. 
¶57 Consent to search need not be expressed by words.  
Consent may be given or inferred through gestures or conduct.31  
Whether consent is verbal or inferred from one's actions, 
                                                 
27 Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 (quoting Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477-78 (1971)); Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); see also Douglas, 123 Wis. 2d 
at 18. 
28 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); 
Douglas, 123 Wis. 2d at 22.   
29 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219; Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 
¶16. 
30 Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011); Dalton, 383 
Wis. 2d 147, ¶39.  
31 United States v. Castellanos, 518 F.3d 965, 970 (8th Cir. 
2008); State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 197, 577 N.W.2d 794 
(1998).   
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
21 
 
consent must be unequivocal and specific.32  Consent to a search 
should not, however, be lightly inferred.33   
¶58 Consent must be freely and voluntarily given; it is 
not enough to show mere "acquiescence to a claim of lawful 
authority."34  The State bears the burden of proving consent by 
clear and convincing evidence.35   
¶59 In the instant case, the State failed to meet its 
burden.   
¶60 Simply put, Sullivan's conduct throughout the entire 
interaction between him and Officer Keller, including leading 
Officer Keller to the threshold of the apartment and entering 
the apartment, does not imply that Sullivan granted Officer 
Keller consent to enter Unit 206.  Sullivan unequivocally 
demonstrated that he did not consent to Officer Keller entering 
Reed's apartment when Sullivan attempted to prohibit Officer 
Keller's entry by shutting the apartment door behind him.   
¶61 Sullivan's conduct is more properly characterized as 
"mere acquiescence" to Officer Keller's show of authority than 
                                                 
32 Andrews v. Hickman County, 700 F.3d 845, 854 (6th Cir. 
2012); Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d at 1328; Gautreaux, 52 Wis. 2d at 
492. 
33 United States v. Como, 340 F.2d 891, 893 (2nd Cir. 1965); 
State v. Rodgers, 119 Wis. 2d 102, 107, 349 N.W.2d 453 (1984); 
Kelly v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 303, 316, 249 N.W.2d 800 (1977). 
34 Bumper, 391 U.S. at 549; Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, ¶16. 
35 United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 77 (2nd Cir. 1973); 
State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, ¶21, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 648 
N.W.2d 367. 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
22 
 
as free and voluntary actions evincing consent.36  Throughout the 
entire interaction, Sullivan was simply following Officer 
Keller's orders. 
¶62 It is noteworthy that at the very beginning of the 
interaction, Sullivan tried to leave without talking to Officer 
Keller.  In fact, Sullivan had gotten several yards away before 
Officer Keller noticed that Sullivan was leaving, prompting him 
to loudly tell Sullivan, "Hey, why don't you come back here.  
Don't just leave."  Without a word, Sullivan complied with 
Officer's Keller's directive.  As Sullivan was returning, 
Officer Keller said to Sullivan, "Keep your hands out of your 
pockets for me, OK?"  Again, without a word, Sullivan complied 
with Officer Keller's directive and showed Officer Keller his 
palms.   
¶63 After learning that Jerome might be at Unit 206, 
Officer Keller said to Sullivan, "All right, let's go——ah——let's 
go look over, see if he's over there.  If anything we could all 
just kind of talk to him."   
¶64 Given Sullivan's pattern of complying with Officer 
Keller's previous commands, it is unsurprising that Sullivan did 
not verbally respond to Officer Keller's statement and instead 
simply departed towards the apartment building with Officer 
Keller in tow. 
                                                 
36 See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548; Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 
¶16 & n.6. 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
23 
 
¶65 None of this conduct, viewed together or in isolation, 
implies that Officer Keller had Sullivan's consent to enter Unit 
206.  After reaching the second floor of the apartment building, 
Sullivan held the door between the stairwell and the hallway 
open behind him, implying that Officer Keller was to follow 
Sullivan into the hallway.  However, Sullivan unequivocally 
implied that Officer Keller did not have his consent to enter 
the apartment when Sullivan attempted to prohibit Officer 
Keller's entry by attempting to shut the apartment door in 
Officer Keller's face. 
¶66 Moreover, we observe that Officer's Keller's statement 
was not an unequivocal request to enter Unit 206.  There is 
nothing about Officer Keller's statement that suggests that he 
meant to physically enter Unit 206——the statement could just as 
readily imply that Officer Keller intended to follow Sullivan to 
the threshold of Unit 206 while Sullivan entered to see if 
Jerome was present in the apartment.   
¶67 We further observe that Officer Keller's statement was 
not a request at all.  Officer Keller was not asking a question 
or asking for Sullivan's permission to accompany him into Unit 
206.37  There is no reasonable way to interpret Officer Keller's 
statement other than as a directive to Sullivan to lead Officer 
Keller to Unit 206, a directive with which Sullivan complied as 
he had complied with Officer Keller's previous commands. 
                                                 
37 See Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, ¶19 ("As the record 
indicates, neither [Officer] Stillman nor [Officer] Dummer asked 
for Johnson's permission to search the car."). 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
24 
 
¶68 In light of all of the facts and circumstances 
presented in the instant case, we conclude that Officer Keller 
did not have consent to enter Reed's apartment. 
B 
¶69 We could end our consent analysis here, having 
concluded that consent to enter Reed's apartment was never 
given.  However, in light of both the circuit court and court of 
appeals' conclusions with regard to the revocation of consent, 
we address whether consent would have been revoked had Sullivan 
initially given consent (which, we emphasize, he did not). 
¶70 We conclude that Sullivan would have unequivocally 
withdrawn consent, had he initially given it, by attempting to 
shut the door to the apartment, prohibiting Officer Keller's 
entry. 
¶71 Once given, consent to search may be withdrawn.  
"Withdrawal 
of 
consent 
need 
not 
be 
effectuated 
through 
particular 'magic words,' but an intent to withdraw consent must 
be made by unequivocal act or statement."38    "The standard for 
measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth 
Amendment is that of 'objective' reasonableness——what would the 
typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange 
between the officer and the suspect?"39   
                                                 
38 United States v. Gray, 369 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir. 
2004); State v. Wantland, 2014 WI 58, ¶33, 355 Wis. 2d 135, 848 
N.W.2d 810. 
39 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991); Wantland, 
355 Wis. 2d 135, ¶33.   
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
25 
 
¶72 Examples of unequivocal acts or statements sufficient 
to constitute withdrawal of consent have included slamming shut 
the trunk of a car during a search40 and grabbing back the item 
to be searched from the officer.41   
¶73 In the instant case, although Sullivan never provided 
consent for Officer Keller to enter Unit 206, Sullivan would 
have unequivocally revoked consent, had it initially been given, 
by attempting to shut the door to the apartment before Officer 
Keller pushed it open.   
¶74 Immediately prior to arriving at the threshold of Unit 
206, Sullivan led Officer Keller out of a stairwell and into the 
hallway of the apartment building.  In doing so, Sullivan looked 
back and held the door between the stairwell and the hallway 
open behind him, as one does when he or she anticipates someone 
will be following him or her through the doorway. 
¶75 Sullivan's actions between the stairwell and the 
hallway are in stark contrast to Sullivan's actions after 
arriving at the threshold of Unit 206.  Upon arriving at Unit 
206, Sullivan briefly knocked on the door, opened the door just 
enough to facilitate his own entry into the apartment, began to 
close the door behind him with Officer Keller still in the 
hallway, and called out for Jerome.  The door was within inches 
                                                 
40 See United States v. Flores, 48 F.3d 467, 468 (10th Cir. 
1995). 
41 See United States v. Ho, 94 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 
1996); see also Wantland, 355 Wis. 2d 135, ¶34 (citing Flores 
and Ho). 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
26 
 
of being fully closed when Officer Keller pushed the door open, 
stating, "Hey, don't just walk in there."   
¶76 The body camera footage is unambiguous and conclusive.  
There is perhaps no action that could more clearly communicate 
"Do Not Enter" than attempting to shut a door in someone's face.  
Shutting the door is akin to slamming shut the trunk of a car 
during a search or grabbing back the item to be searched by the 
officer, actions that courts have recognized as unequivocal 
revocations of consent to search.42   
C 
¶77 We 
conclude 
by 
addressing 
whether 
exigent 
circumstances existed that justify Officer Keller's pushing open 
of Reed's apartment door. 
¶78 Both this court and the United States Supreme Court 
have 
identified 
several 
exigencies 
that 
may 
justify 
a 
warrantless search of a home.  We have explained that "[t]he 
objective test for determining whether exigent circumstances 
exist is whether a police officer, under the facts as they were 
known at the time, would reasonably believe that delay in 
procuring a search warrant would gravely endanger life, risk 
destruction of evidence, or greatly enhance the likelihood of 
the suspect's escape."43   
                                                 
42 See Wantland, 355 Wis. 2d 135, ¶34. 
43 Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280, ¶24; see also Olson, 495 U.S. at 
100; Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 478; Dalton, 383 Wis. 2d 147, ¶39.   
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
27 
 
¶79 It is the State's burden to prove that the warrantless 
search at issue was justified by exigent circumstances.44   
¶80 The State argues that Officer Keller's pushing open 
Reed's apartment door without a warrant was justified because 
(1) Officer Keller reasonably believed that Sullivan and Jerome 
were dangerous; and (2) Officer Keller could reasonably have 
thought that Jerome would likely try to escape.   
¶81 The totality of the circumstances known to Officer 
Keller at the time he pushed open door to Reed's apartment does 
not establish exigent circumstances.  Officer Keller was 
repeatedly told that the altercation that he was investigating 
had been verbal, not physical, in nature.  Officer Keller knew 
that the altercation was over.  He knew that Brandon and Jerome 
Harris left in opposite directions, i.e., that they were no 
longer together, and that Jerome had been "cooling off" in 
Sullivan's apartment.   
¶82 Furthermore, Sullivan was cooperating with Officer 
Keller throughout Officer Keller's investigation.  Sullivan 
returned to Officer Keller and removed his hands from his 
pockets when directed to do so by Officer Keller.  He answered 
all of Officer Keller's questions.  Although the State points 
out that Sullivan was on probation for violent crimes, it fails 
to connect that fact with its assertion that it was objectively 
reasonable for Officer Keller to believe that Sullivan had a 
                                                 
44 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 474-75; State v. Richter, 2000 WI 
58, ¶26, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29.    
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
28 
 
weapon or would suddenly become violent.  Indeed, such a broad 
assertion 
would 
appear 
to 
create 
a 
categorical 
exigent 
circumstances exception.45   
¶83 Likewise, there was no objective, reasonable basis for 
believing that Jerome had a weapon or would become violent.  
Although Jerome had two outstanding body warrants, Officer 
Keller knew that at least one of those warrants stemmed from a 
non-violent crime, and there was no indication that Jerome posed 
any greater risk of attempting to evade arrest than any other 
individual with an outstanding warrant.   
¶84 An outstanding warrant for a suspect's arrest, by 
itself, does not give rise to exigent circumstances justifying 
the warrantless entry into someone else's home in which the 
suspect does not reside.46 
¶85 The State relies on State v. Kirby, 2014 WI App 74, 
355 Wis. 2d 423, 851 N.W.2d 796, for its assertion that exigent 
circumstances justified Officer Keller's pushing open the door 
to Unit 206. 
                                                 
45 See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 152-58 (2013) 
(rejecting categorical exigency rule in drunk driving cases 
premised on the dissipation of alcohol in the suspect's blood).   
46 See Payton, 445 U.S. at 603 ("[F]or Fourth Amendment 
purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly 
carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in 
which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the 
suspect is within.") (emphasis added); State v. Delap, 2018 WI 
64, ¶29-32, 382 Wis. 2d 92, 913 N.W.2d 175. 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
29 
 
¶86 In Kirby, two police officers went to an apartment to 
question young men who had reportedly been fighting outside.47  
One officer had learned prior to arriving at the apartment that 
"the main aggressor" in the fight had threatened "to come back 
to the area with a gun."48  The door to the apartment unit was 
open, and five men were inside.49  When the officers were about 
to leave after speaking with the men, one officer received a 
phone call and learned that an informant had told police that if 
there was a black backpack in the apartment, it had a handgun 
and sawed-off shotgun inside.50  The officer then noticed a black 
backpack, opened it, and found a sawed-off shotgun.51  The court 
of appeals held that the possible threat to officer safety 
justified the officer's search of the backpack, and that "even 
had the officer been outside the threshold of the apartment," 
the officer would have been justified in entering it to look for 
the backpack.52   
¶87 The State also argues that State v. Ayala, 2011 WI App 
6, 331 Wis. 2d 171, 793 N.W.2d 511, supports its position that 
                                                 
47 State v. Kirby, 2014 WI App 74, ¶¶4-5, 355 Wis. 2d 423, 
851 N.W.2d 796.   
48 Id., ¶3.   
49 Id., ¶6.   
50 Id., ¶9.   
51 Id., ¶12.   
52 Id., ¶¶18-19. 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
30 
 
exigent circumstances justified Officer Keller's pushing open 
Reed's apartment door. 
¶88 In 
Ayala, 
police 
officers 
lawfully 
entered 
the 
defendant's bedroom without a warrant because of the chance that 
he could try to escape or violently resist arrest.53  Noting that 
"the risk of danger, the gravity of the crime[,] and the 
likelihood 
that 
the 
suspect 
is 
armed" 
are 
all 
proper 
considerations in determining whether exigent circumstances 
existed, the court of appeals summarized what was known to the 
officers when they entered the defendant's bedroom without a 
warrant: 
(1) 
[T]here 
had 
been 
what 
appeared 
to 
be 
an 
intentional homicide using a gun; (2) officers had 
information 
from 
the 
other 
robbery/homicide 
participants that Ayala was the shooter; (3) Ayala was 
believed by officers to be a Latin Kings gang member; 
(4) the weapon used in the homicide had not been 
recovered, leading officers to believe Ayala might 
still have the gun in his possession; (5) the gun 
might be evidence of a crime; (6) if Ayala possessed 
the missing gun, it put the officers at risk of being 
shot by Ayala if they announced themselves or asked 
Ayala for consent to enter the bedroom; (7) the tavern 
below the apartment was frequented by Latin King 
members; (8) [a resident of the apartment] operated 
the tavern below the apartment; and (9) because there 
were civilians in the apartment as well as the tavern 
below, all were at risk if Ayala began shooting while 
police procured a warrant.54 
                                                 
53 State v. Ayala, 2011 WI App 6, ¶¶18-19, 331 Wis. 2d 171, 
793 N.W.2d 511.   
54 Ayala, 331 Wis. 2d 171, ¶¶16-18. 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
31 
 
¶89 In the instant case, Officer Keller never received 
information suggesting that either Sullivan or Jerome was armed 
or dangerous.  There was nothing to suggest that Officer Keller 
was being led to a known gang hangout or that gangs were in any 
way 
involved 
in 
his 
investigation. 
 
Officer 
Keller 
was 
investigating a verbal argument in the street between two 
brothers about shoes, not an intentional homicide using a gun.  
In sum, neither Kirby nor Ayala presents factual circumstances 
remotely similar to those in the instant case.  The State's 
reliance on these cases is, therefore, misplaced. 
¶90 The State points out that Officer Keller found it 
suspicious that Sullivan would knock on the door to his own 
apartment, and that in doing so, Sullivan may have been 
attempting to alert those inside the apartment that he was 
accompanied by a police officer.  The most succinct response to 
the State's argument is, so what if Sullivan was attempting to 
alert those inside that he was accompanied by a police officer?  
Police officers frequently knock on doors and announce their 
presence and identities.   
¶91 Indeed, the police are generally required to announce 
their presence and their intent to search before entering closed 
premises, and this obligation only "gives way when officers 
'have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their 
presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous 
or futile, or . . . would inhibit the effective investigation of 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
32 
 
the 
crime 
by, 
for 
example, 
allowing 
the 
destruction 
of 
evidence."55     
¶92 Simply put, there were no circumstances known to 
Officer Keller at the time he pushed open the apartment door 
that would give rise to a reasonable belief that he was in 
danger.  Law enforcement is an inherently dangerous profession.  
In the course of investigating a crime, any individual might 
have a weapon, and any individual could attempt to flee.  
                                                 
55 United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003) (quoting 
Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997)); see also 
Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-32 (1995). 
The Supreme Court recently summarized the privacy rights 
enjoyed by individuals in their homes: 
When law enforcement officers who are not armed with a 
warrant knock on a door, they do no more than any 
private citizen might do.  And whether the person who 
knocks on the door and requests the opportunity to 
speak is a police officer or a private citizen, the 
occupant has no obligation to open the door or to 
speak.  When the police knock on a door but the 
occupants choose not to respond or to speak, "the 
investigation will have reached a conspicuously low 
point," and the occupants "will have the kind of 
warning that even the most elaborate security system 
cannot provide."  And even if an occupant chooses to 
open the door and speak with the officers, the 
occupant need not allow the officers to enter the 
premises and may refuse to answer any questions at any 
time. 
King, 563 U.S. at 469-70. 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
33 
 
However, these generalized concerns for safety and risk of 
flight are not enough to give rise to exigent circumstances.56   
¶93 The test is whether there are objective facts known to 
the officer that would reasonably lead him to believe that the 
delay caused by obtaining a warrant would gravely endanger life 
or greatly enhance the likelihood of the subject's escape.57  
Finding the existence of exigent circumstances in the instant 
case would allow the exigent circumstances exception to swallow 
the warrant requirements of the United States and Wisconsin 
constitutions.  
IV 
¶94 We conclude that the law enforcement officer in the 
instant case did not have consent justifying his warrantless 
entry into Reed's apartment.  Even if consent had initially been 
given, which it was not, consent would have been unequivocally 
revoked before the officer breached the threshold of the 
apartment.  Finally, we conclude that no exigent circumstances 
justified the officer's warrantless searches. 
                                                 
56 The consequence of the State's reasoning appears to 
result in categorical exigencies.  For example, if the subject 
has an outstanding arrest warrant, exigent circumstances would 
exist because the subject might try to violently resist arrest 
or flee.  Additionally, if the subject has ever been convicted 
of a violent crime, exigent circumstances would exist because he 
might become violent towards the police officer.  "[T]he Fourth 
Amendment will not tolerate adoption of an overly broad 
categorical approach that would dilute the warrant requirement 
in a context where significant privacy interests are at stake."  
McNeely, 569 U.S. at 158. 
57 Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280, ¶24. 
No. 
2016AP1609-CR   
 
34 
 
¶95 Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and 
remand the cause to the circuit court with instructions to 
suppress the challenged evidence and vacate Reed's convictions. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.  
No.  2016AP1609-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶96 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the result the majority reaches.  I concur and write 
separately because I disagree with the majority's assertion that 
consent to a search "must be unequivocal and specific."  
Majority op., ¶¶8, 57 (relying on Gautreaux v. State, 52 
Wis. 2d 489, 492-93, 190 N.W.2d 542 (1971)).  What the majority 
does not make clear is that Gautreaux has been "explained" by 
this court in State v. Rodgers, 119 Wis. 2d 102, 114, 349 
N.W.2d 453 (1984).  In Rodgers this court noted that Gautreaux 
was decided a year and a half before the United States Supreme 
Court precedent set by Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 
(1973).  Id.  We then adopted the test from Schneckloth.  See 
State v. Wantland, 2014 WI 58, ¶¶20, 23-24, 355 Wis. 2d 135, 848 
N.W.2d 810; see also State v. Brar, 2017 WI 73, ¶26, 376 
Wis. 2d 685, 898 N.W.2d 499.  Schneckloth does not use the 
phrase "unequivocal and specific."  Instead, in Schneckloth the 
Supreme Court made clear that for consent to operate as a valid 
exception to the warrant requirement, two conditions must be 
satisfied: consent must be (1) freely and voluntarily given, (2) 
by an individual having either actual or apparent authority over 
the place to be searched.  412 U.S. at 219, 222.  In the 
interest of clarity and consistency we should use the language 
from Schneckloth.  
¶97 Moreover, the majority opinion's use of "unequivocal 
and specific" is not explained, interpreted, or analyzed.  
Perhaps this is because it is used incidentally and is entirely 
unnecessary to this case.  The majority opinion correctly 
No.  2016AP1609-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
states, "Sullivan's conduct is more properly characterized as 
'mere acquiescence' to Officer Keller's show of authority than 
as free and voluntary actions evincing consent."  Majority op., 
¶61.  In other words, the majority is correct to state that 
consent was not freely and voluntarily given under the test of 
Schneckloth.  Neither Sullivan's words nor his actions establish 
free and voluntary consent.  As is apparent from this and other 
cases that use the phrase "unequivocal or specific," the test 
continues to be whether consent was freely and voluntarily given 
by one with the authority to so consent.  Here, no such consent 
was given in the first instance.  In short, the additional 
language is unnecessary to the Schneckloth analysis we are to 
apply.  I would not use it. 
¶98 More specifically, the majority opinion largely and 
inexplicably relies on Gautreaux for the proposition that 
consent must be "unequivocal and specific."  Gautreaux, 52 
Wis. 2d at 492.  To be clear, Gautreaux is distinguishable from 
the case now before the court.  In Gautreaux there was no 
dispute that the consent was unequivocal and specific.  Rather, 
the focus in Gautreaux was whether consent was voluntary.  
Gautreaux is not particularly instructive concerning the issue 
before our court, which is, in my view, whether consent was 
given in the first instance.  In my view, it was not. 
¶99 Furthermore, our court has distanced itself from the 
"unequivocal and specific" language noting that in Gautreaux, 
the court was without the benefit of knowing what test the 
United States Supreme Court would provide in Schneckloth.  
No.  2016AP1609-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
Rodgers, 119 Wis. 2d at 114 ("The words used in Gautreaux do not 
differ in meaning from a voluntary consent as defined in 
Schneckloth.  There is nothing in sec. 968.07, Stats., nor Art. 
I, secs. 8 and 11 that requires the definition of consent for 
entry into the home to be any different than the definition for 
consent under the fourth amendment of the United States 
Constitution as stated in Schneckloth.  In this case, since the 
state relied upon consent for the entry, it had the burden of 
proving that the consent was freely and voluntarily given.").  
The Rodgers court could have chosen to continue with the 
Gautreaux language, but it did not.  Despite strong advocacy in 
a dissent arguing in favor of remaining with the Gautreaux 
verbage, the Rodgers court nonetheless chose the language and 
the test of Schneckloth.  Id. at 115-16. 
¶100 One might think that our clarification in Rodgers and 
our more recent precedent would cause the court to pause when 
using subsequently exacted language of Gautreaux.  In our more 
recent cases analyzing the consent exception to the warrant 
requirement, we have not used the "unequivocal and specific" 
language.  Notably, the court does not now overrule Rodgers, the 
test as stated in State v. Wantland and State v. Brar, or any 
host of other cases, wherein, consistent with Schneckloth, we 
again confirmed that consent to a search has two requirements.  
"First, the consent must [be] 'freely and voluntarily given.'  
Second, the consent must be given by an individual having either 
actual or apparent authority over the place to be searched."  
Wantland, 355 Wis. 2d 135, ¶23 (citation omitted); see Brar, 376 
No.  2016AP1609-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
Wis. 2d 685, ¶26.  Presumably then, the court today means no 
change be made to that test, unlike Rodgers wherein the court 
specifically "explained" the language of Gautreaux. 
¶101 Other 
recent 
cases 
have 
similarly 
eschewed 
the 
"unequivocal and specific" language. They remain precedent.  
See, e.g., State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶32, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 786 
N.W.2d 430 ("The State bears the burden of proving that consent 
was given freely and voluntarily."); State v. Blackman, 2017 WI 
77, ¶4, 377 Wis. 2d 339, 898 N.W.2d 774 ("When the legality of a 
warrantless search is based on the consent of the defendant, 
that consent must be freely and voluntarily given.").   
¶102 Our court has the ability to engage in new federalism 
if it so chooses.  See Diane Sykes, "Reflections on the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court," Marquette Lawyer, Summer/Fall 2006, at 
52-63, 
https://law.marquette.edu/assets/marquette-lawyers/pdf/ 
marquette-lawyer/2006-summer/Summer06pp52-63.pdf. 
 
If 
the 
majority 
now 
wished 
to 
invoke 
additional 
constitutional 
protections under our State constitution, as advocated by the 
majority opinion writer's then-dissent in Rodgers, it would 
plainly do so.  See Rodgers, 119 Wis. 2d at 125 (Abrahamson, J., 
dissenting) ("Although the majority concludes that Article I, 
section 11, is substantially the same as the fourth amendment, 
it errs in analyzing the consent issue under the state 
constitution by guessing what the United States Supreme Court 
might 
hold 
under 
the 
fourth 
amendment."); 
id. 
at 
128 
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting) ("In light of the frequent use of 
consent to justify noncompliance with the warrant requirement, 
No.  2016AP1609-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
diluting the meaning of consent dilutes the impact of the state 
constitutional guarantee of the sanctity of the home.  This 
court should avoid facilitating the erosion of the state 
constitutional guarantee of privacy.  The solution to the 
problem presented by this case is not to reduce the requirements 
for consent but to prevent the problem from arising by 
encouraging officers to obtain warrants.").  Since the court has 
neither disavowed the Schneckloth test nor has it overruled our 
precedent, it ought not provoke confusion by using language that 
could be interpreted to the contrary. 
¶103 And so I write to question why, despite the court's 
clarification in Rodgers and our adoption of the Schneckloth 
test, the majority opinion nonetheless chooses the language from 
Gautreaux.  In addition, instead of turning to our own 
precedent, United States Supreme Court precedent, or even 
precedent from the Seventh Circuit, our court now reaches for 
distinguishable cases from the Sixth and Ninth Circuits in 
support of the terms "unequivocal and specific."  See Andrews v. 
Hickman Cty., 700 F.3d 845, 854 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that 
officer's alleged warrantless entry into parents' home after 
being told to wait outside cannot be justified on the basis of 
consent); United States v. Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d 1324 (9th Cir. 
1997) (concluding that defendant's failure to respond verbally 
to officer's request to search his truck supports the argument 
that defendant did not voluntarily consent the search).  If the 
majority intended to adopt a specificity requirement in addition 
to the established Schneckloth test, it should so indicate.  It 
No.  2016AP1609-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
does not.  Courts, like ours, which use "unequivocal and 
specific" leave to the imagination what, if anything, that 
phrase might mean.  In fact, the courts that have used this 
language nonetheless continue to analyze the issue in terms of 
whether consent was freely and voluntarily given by one with the 
authority to do so.   
¶104 Courts which have used "unequivocal and specific," 
nonetheless leave that phrase undefined and unexamined.  The 
legal analysis and conclusions employed do not analyze the 
"unequivocal and specific" requirement but instead continue to 
rest on whether consent was given in terms of being free and 
voluntary.  See, e.g., United States v. Salas, 756 F.3d 1196, 
1203 (10th Cir. 2014) (reciting language from a prior case 
requiring consent to be "unequivocal and specific," yet deciding 
that consent was voluntarily given without subsequently using 
the words "unequivocal" or "specific"); Andrews, 700 F.3d at 854 
(stating 
that 
consent 
must 
be 
"voluntary, 
unequivocal, 
specific," and then concluding that there was actually no 
consent at all).  I am unaware of any case wherein the 
Schneckloth test is met, but consent was nonetheless deemed 
insufficient because it was too equivocal or lacked sufficient 
specificity.  Thus, even when the suspect phrase has been used, 
the analysis of Schneckloth seems to be the test.  We should 
strive to clarify legal standards, rather than sow seeds of 
confusion. 
¶105 To be sure, Article 1, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution is substantively identical to the Fourth Amendment 
No.  2016AP1609-CR.akz 
 
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to the United States Constitution, which requires in relevant 
part that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated."1  U.S. Const. 
amend. IV; see also Wis. Const. art. I, § 11.  A search 
conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se 
unreasonable, subject to only a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219; State 
v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, ¶24, 255 Wis. 2d 98, 648 N.W.2d 385.  
One such exception is consent——a warrantless search does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
nor Article 1, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, if the 
search is conducted with consent.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219; 
Krajewski, 255 Wis. 2d 98, ¶24.  
¶106 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that consent must be "freely and voluntarily given" by someone 
with authority in order to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's 
reasonableness requirement.  See, e.g., Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 
222, 248 ("We hold only that when the subject of a search is not 
in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the 
basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
                                                 
1 Neither the Wisconsin Constitution nor the United States 
Constitution require, by their terms, unequivocal and specific 
consent.  We interpret Article 1, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution coextensively with the United States Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.  State v. Floyd, 
2017 WI 78, ¶19, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560; State v. 
Dumstrey, 2016 WI 3, ¶14, 366 Wis. 2d 64, 873 N.W.2d 502.  Thus, 
we follow Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), in our 
interpretation of consent to search. 
No.  2016AP1609-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact 
voluntarily given."); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) 
("[It is not] disputed that where the validity of a search rests 
on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the 
necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and 
voluntarily given.").  However, as stated in our plurality 
opinion in Brar this, along with the individual having actual or 
apparent authority over the place to be searched, is the extent 
of the constitutional requirement for consent.  See Brar, 376 
Wis. 2d 685, ¶¶26-27 ("Contrary to Supreme Court precedent, 
decisions from the court of appeals have required the State to 
prove consent was given knowingly and intelligently.  The 
Supreme 
Court 
in 
Schneckloth 
rejected 
precisely 
this 
requirement.  As we interpret our constitution consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment, we withdraw any language from these cases 
that requires that consent to a search be given knowingly or 
intelligently." (citations omitted)); see also Schneckloth, 412 
U.S. at 235 ("Our cases do not reflect an uncritical demand for 
a knowing and intelligent waiver in every situation where a 
person has failed to invoke a constitutional protection.").  The 
Supreme Court has never held that consent must be "unequivocal 
and specific."  
¶107 Further, any requirement that consent to search be 
"unequivocal and specific" appears to be at odds with other 
United States Supreme Court precedent.  In Florida v. Jimeno, 
500 U.S. 248 (1991), a suspect gave the police officer consent 
to search his car.  Id. at 249-50.  Without receiving consent to 
No.  2016AP1609-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
do so, the officer opened a container inside the car and found a 
kilogram of cocaine inside it.  Id. at 250.  The defendant 
challenged the search arguing that he did not "specifically" 
give the officer permission to search the container.  The Court 
held that this search did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
concluding that the test for consent is an objective one: "what 
would the typical reasonable person have understood by the 
exchange between the officer and the suspect?"  Id. at 251-52; 
id. at 252 ("Respondents argue . . . that if the police wish to 
search closed containers within a car they must separately 
request permission to search each container.  But we see no 
basis for adding this sort of superstructure to the Fourth 
Amendment's basic test of objective reasonableness.").  In 
Jimeno the Court concluded that it was objectively reasonable 
for an officer to expect that general consent to search the car 
included consent to search a container inside the car, even 
though it was argued that such consent to search the container 
was not specifically given.  Id. at 251.  
¶108 Following the United States Supreme Court's lead, many 
jurisdictions, including the Seventh Circuit, have concluded 
that consent be as required in Schneckloth.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Sabo, 724 F.3d 891, 893-94 (7th Cir. 2013) (concluding 
that consent to search is implied where officer requested to 
enter residence and defendant stepped back and to side to allow 
entry; further, that "[c]onsent can come in many forms, but it 
must always be given voluntarily"); United States v. Jones, 701 
F.3d 1300, 1317, 1320-21 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating that 
No.  2016AP1609-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
"'[v]oluntary consent' consists of two parts: (1) the law 
enforcement officers must receive either express or implied 
consent, and (2) that consent must be freely and voluntarily 
given" and then concluding that defendant can be deemed to have 
impliedly consented to officers' entry into his residence if 
defendant said or did something which permitted the officers to 
form 
a 
reasonable 
belief 
they 
were 
authorized 
to 
enter 
residence); see also United States v. Reynolds, 646 F.3d 63, 73 
(1st Cir. 2011) (holding that consent to search headboard is 
implied when defendant gestured to headboard while answering 
"yes" to officer's question of whether defendant had weapons, 
because 
gesture 
demonstrated 
defendant 
understood 
officer 
intended not only to learn of existence of weapons but also to 
find them); United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 231, 233 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (following Schneckloth and requiring only that 
consent to a search be voluntarily given by a person having 
authority to give it); United States v. Sanchez, 156 F.3d 875, 
878 (8th Cir. 1998) ("[W]hether or not the suspect has actually 
consented to a search, the Fourth Amendment requires only that 
the police reasonably believe the search to be consensual."). 
¶109 When considered in the broader context of the United 
States 
Supreme 
Court's 
jurisprudence 
surrounding 
consent 
searches, it makes sense that courts consider the circumstances 
which concern whether consent was freely and voluntarily given.  
"As with other factual determinations bearing upon search and 
seizure, determination of consent to enter must be 'judged 
against an objective reasonable person standard.'"  Illinois v. 
No.  2016AP1609-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990); Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.  
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that this 
objective standard protects citizens from police overreach, as 
"[a]nything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally 
guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than 
inarticulate hunches."  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).  
Because we interpret our constitution's provisions governing 
searches and seizures coextensively with the United States 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, Floyd, 
377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶19, I would not fuel confusion by using this 
additional, undefined, unanalyzed phrase. 
¶110 As a result, I respectfully concur. 
 
No.  2016AP1609-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶111 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (dissenting).  The 
circuit court found as an historic fact that Kirk Sullivan 
consented to Officer Steven Keller's entry into the apartment he 
shared with Faith Reed.  This finding is not clearly erroneous.  
Furthermore, under the totality of circumstances, Sullivan's 
consent 
was 
voluntarily 
given 
and 
was 
not 
unequivocally 
withdrawn.  Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals, 
and I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶112 Officer Steven Keller of the Tomah Police Department 
responded to a call that two men were causing a disturbance.  
When he arrived, the altercation had stopped.  He met two men, 
neither of whom was involved in the altercation.  One of the men 
was Kirk Sullivan who said that the disturbance involved two 
brothers.  Sullivan said that he thought that one of the 
brothers, Jerome Harris, was in Sullivan's apartment watching a 
football game.   
¶113 Officer 
Keller, 
in 
a 
very 
conversational 
tone 
according to the record produced by the audio-video camera he 
was wearing, asked Sullivan if they could go to his apartment to 
talk with Harris.  Sullivan did not verbally respond, but began 
walking toward an apartment building.  Keller did not know in 
which apartment Sullivan lived; therefore, in response to 
Keller's request, Sullivan led the way to his apartment. 
¶114 Sullivan opened the ground floor door of a nearby 
apartment building, and Keller followed him into the building.  
Sullivan led the way up the stairs to the second floor.  Keller 
No.  2016AP1609-CR.pdr 
 
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followed.  Sullivan opened the door into the second floor 
hallway, held the door open for Keller, and Keller followed 
Sullivan into the second floor hallway.  Sullivan led Keller to 
apartment 206 where he lived with Reed.   
¶115 Sullivan knocked on his apartment door and then 
immediately opened it.  Sullivan stepped inside and partially 
closed the door behind him.  Keller then pushed the partially 
open door, saw Reed and Jerome Harris, and entered the 
apartment.  Keller saw Sullivan sticking something into his 
pocket.  He told Sullivan to put the object he had stuck in his 
pocket on the counter.   
¶116 The object was marijuana.  More marijuana was found, 
and Reed, who was also in the apartment, and Harris were 
arrested.  Reed moved to suppress the marijuana based on the 
allegation that Keller did not have consent to enter the 
apartment that she shared with Sullivan.   
¶117 The circuit court found that by his conduct of 
"leading 
the 
way 
to 
the 
apartment" 
Sullivan 
freely 
and 
voluntarily consented to Keller's entry into his apartment and 
that his partial closing of the apartment door was not an 
unequivocal withdrawal of consent.  Accordingly, the circuit 
court denied Reed's motion to suppress.  The court of appeals 
affirmed.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶118 Determining whether consent was given involves a 
question of constitutional fact to which we apply a two-step 
No.  2016AP1609-CR.pdr 
 
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analysis.  State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶8, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 
N.W.2d 634.  First, we examine whether consent was given as a 
question of historic fact based on what was said and what 
actions and gestures occurred.  State v. Brar, 2017 WI 73, ¶13, 
376 Wis. 2d 685, 898 N.W.2d 499.  We uphold a circuit court's 
finding of historic fact unless it is clearly erroneous.  Id.  
Stated otherwise, "[w]e uphold a finding of consent in fact if 
it is not contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance 
of the evidence."  State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶30, 327 Wis. 2d 
392, 786 N.W.2d 430.  Second, we apply the facts found to 
constitutional principles to determine whether consent was 
voluntarily given.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
222-23 (1973).   
B.  Consent 
¶119 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution protect 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.  Ordinarily, they 
are construed coextensively when we consider the question of 
consent.  State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶20, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 
729 N.W.2d 182.  Although warrantless searches are presumed to 
be unconstitutional, consent to search is an exception to the 
warrant requirement.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219; State v. 
Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 196, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998).   
¶120 The majority opinion inserts a new test for consent 
saying that consent must be "specific."1  Asserting that consent 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶¶8, 58, 60.   
No.  2016AP1609-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
must be "specific" is not required by a United States Supreme 
Court opinion, but rather, it is cobbled together from cases 
where defendants were either under arrest or compelled to 
consent by some means.  The audio-video recording does not 
support a conclusion that Sullivan was arrested or compelled to 
take Keller to his apartment to speak with Harris.  Sullivan was 
never commanded or ordered to do so.  Here, the majority uses 
the requirement that consent be "specific" to overturn the 
historic fact of consent by conduct that the circuit court 
found, saying that Keller never asked to enter Reed's apartment.2  
Separation of the historic facts from whether consent was 
voluntarily given assists in applying the correct standard to 
questions 
of 
constitutional 
fact. 
 
The 
majority 
opinion 
conflates the two standards.   
1.  Circuit court finding 
¶121 As I review the circuit court's decision, the first 
consideration is whether consent was given, as an historic fact.  
Consent may be given orally or through gestures or conduct.  
Brar, 376 Wis. 2d 685, ¶17.  As we have explained, consent need 
not be granted explicitly but may be granted by implication 
after considering the totality of circumstances.  Id.  The 
context in which consent is said to have been given is an 
important part of our assessment of a circuit court's finding of 
consent in fact.  Id., ¶22.   
                                                 
2 Majority op., ¶9.   
No.  2016AP1609-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
¶122 Here, the circuit court found that Sullivan consented 
to Keller's entry into his apartment.  The court based this 
finding on Sullivan's statement that Harris, the man to whom 
Officer Keller wanted to speak "was probably in the apartment 
that Mr. Sullivan described as my apartment," combined with 
Sullivan and Keller walking to Sullivan's apartment when 
"Sullivan was in the lead."      
¶123 As I examine the circuit court's findings of historic 
fact, they are not clearly erroneous.  The audio-visual 
recording from the body camera that Officer Keller wore shows he 
asked Sullivan if they could go and talk with Harris.  Sullivan 
had said that Harris was in his apartment watching a football 
game.  Although Sullivan did not verbally respond to Keller's 
request, he began leading the way to his apartment.  The audio-
visual recording clearly shows Sullivan leading the way.  That 
he did so is logical because Keller did not know where Sullivan 
lived.   
¶124 As they approached apartment 206, Officer Keller can 
be heard telling dispatch that he will be in apartment 206.  
Sullivan then knocked on the door of his own apartment.  It 
appears Sullivan did so because he was bringing Keller into the 
apartment, otherwise there would have been no reason for 
Sullivan to knock on the door of his own apartment before 
entering.  Therefore, in this context, where Keller wanted to 
talk to Harris combined with Sullivan's statement that Harris 
was in his apartment and Sullivan's knock on the door before 
entry, the circuit court's finding that Sullivan consented to 
No.  2016AP1609-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
Keller's entry into his apartment is not against the great 
weight and clear preponderance of the evidence presented to the 
circuit court.     
2.  Voluntariness 
¶125 When consent as a matter of historic fact has been 
found, we then consider whether consent was given freely and 
voluntarily.  The State bears the burden of proving by clear and 
convincing 
evidence 
that 
consent 
was 
given 
freely 
and 
voluntarily.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222; Phillips, 218 
Wis. 2d at 197.  To make this determination, we again consider 
the totality of circumstances surrounding the alleged consent.  
Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶33.  The circumstances are examined 
using multiple non-exclusive factors such as:   
(1) whether the police used deception, trickery, or 
misrepresentation in their dialogue with the defendant 
to persuade him to consent; (2) whether the police 
threatened or physically intimidated the defendant or 
"punished" him by the deprivation of something like 
food or sleep; (3) whether the conditions attending 
the request to search were congenial, non-threatening, 
and 
cooperative, 
or 
the 
opposite; 
(4) 
how 
the 
defendant responded to the request to search; (5) what 
characteristics 
the 
defendant 
had 
as 
to 
age, 
intelligence, 
education, 
physical 
and 
emotional 
condition, and prior experience with the police; and 
(6) whether the police informed the defendant that he 
could refuse consent. 
Id.   
¶126 In 
regard 
to 
whether 
Sullivan's 
consent 
was 
voluntarily given, I agree with the circuit court's conclusion.  
Keller did not order or command Sullivan to take him to his 
apartment so he could talk with Harris.  Rather, he asked 
Sullivan if they could go to his apartment to talk to Harris.  
No.  2016AP1609-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
The tone of Keller's voice on the audio-video recording is very 
conversational.  He never ordered or commanded Sullivan to take 
him to his apartment.  No tricks, threats or punishments were 
used to obtain Sullivan's consent to enter his apartment.   
3.  Withdrawal of consent 
¶127 Consent lawfully given may be withdrawn.  United 
States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2005).  
Withdrawal of consent must be made by an unequivocal act or 
statement.  State v. Wantland, 2014 WI 58, ¶33, 355 Wis. 2d 135, 
848 N.W.2d 810.     
¶128 Accordingly, 
I 
must 
determine 
whether 
Sullivan's 
partially closing the door to his apartment after he knocked to 
announce their entry and did not ask Officer Keller to remain in 
the hallway unequivocally constituted withdrawal of Sullivan's 
consent to Keller to enter his apartment.  I conclude that under 
the totality of circumstances Sullivan's consent was not 
unequivocally withdrawn.   
¶129 First, Sullivan knocked on the door to announce their 
entry.  Second, he said nothing to Keller about waiting in the 
hall, and third, he did not close the door completely, but left 
it partially open.   
¶130 Sullivan brought Keller to his apartment to talk with 
Harris.  If Sullivan wanted Keller to wait in the hall, he could 
have said, "wait here" or he could have closed the door 
completely.  He did neither.  Therefore, it was reasonable for 
Keller to push on the door and follow Sullivan into his 
apartment to talk to Harris, as that was the reason for which 
No.  2016AP1609-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
Sullivan brought Keller to the apartment he shared with Reed.  
Sullivan did not unequivocally withdraw consent to come into his 
apartment to talk with Harris.    
¶131 The majority opinion asserts that Sullivan "attempted 
to shut the door behind him to prohibit the officer from 
entering the apartment."3  That asserted reason is pure fiction.  
The record contains no statement about why Sullivan partially 
closed the door.  Sullivan did not testify nor did he state on 
the audio-visual recording why he partially closed the door.  We 
do not know why he did it. 
¶132 One could easily postulate that Sullivan partially 
closed the door because as he entered his apartment, he saw 
marijuana lying on the counter and he wanted to give himself a 
moment to stuff it into his pocket before Keller entered the 
apartment.  Certainly, that hypothesis fits the audio-visual 
recording that shows Sullivan stuffing something into his pocket 
as he entered the apartment.  The audio-visual recording was 
presented to the circuit court, and the "something" Sullivan 
stuffed into his pocket was marijuana.   
¶133 I agree with the circuit court.  Sullivan's partial 
closing of the apartment door was not an unequivocal withdrawal 
of his consent for Keller to enter.    
                                                 
3 Majority op., ¶¶10, 60. 
No.  2016AP1609-CR.pdr 
 
9 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶134 The circuit court found as an historic fact that 
Sullivan consented to Keller's entry into the apartment he 
shared with Reed.  This finding is not clearly erroneous.  
Furthermore, under the totality of circumstances, Sullivan's 
consent 
was 
voluntarily 
given 
and 
was 
not 
unequivocally 
withdrawn.  Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals, 
and I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. 
No.  2016AP1609-CR.pdr 
 
1