Title: Matter of Shockley
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 182, 2005
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: August 16, 2005

State v. Shockley, Del. Super., Cr.A. No. K97-11-0262I, Terry, J. (June 16, 1998);
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State v. Shockley, Del. Super., Cr.A. No. VK97-11-0262I, Ridgely, P.J. (March 30, 1999);
State v. Shockley, Del. Super., Cr.A. No. VK97-11-0262-02, Ridgely, P.J. (May 12, 2000);
State v. Shockley, Del. Super., Cr.A. No. VK97-11-0262-03, Witham, J. (Oct. 13, 2000);
State v. Shockley, Del. Super., Cr.A. No. VK97-11-0262-03, Witham, J. (Dec. 14, 2000).
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
§
PETITION OF  RICHARD 
§
No. 182, 2005
SHOCKLEY FOR A WRIT OF
§
MANDAMUS.
§
Def. ID No. 0203023972
Submitted: July 1, 2005
Decided:
August 16, 2005
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices.
O R D E R
This 16  day of August 2005, upon consideration of the petition for a
th
writ of mandamus filed by Richard Shockley, the answer and motion to dismiss
filed by the State of Delaware, Shockley’s letter dated May 19, 2005 and his
letter filed on July 1, 2005, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
In June 1998, Shockley pleaded guilty to Theft of a Senior and was
sentenced to two years at Level V suspended for one year at Level IV  followed
by one year at Level III (“the 1998 case”).  The sentence in the 1998 case was
reimposed in 1999 and again in 2000 when Shockley was found guilty of
violation of probation; the sentence  was also modified.   In 2001, Shockley
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was discharged as unimproved.
Shockley v. State, 2004 WL 1790198 (Del. Supr.).
2
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(2)
In March 2003, a Superior Court jury convicted Shockley of
Attempted Burglary in the Third Degree, Possession of Burglar Tools and
Criminal Mischief (“the 2003 case”).  Shockley was sentenced as a habitual
criminal to five years at Level V for Attempted Burglary in the Third Degree
plus a total of two and one-half years at Level V suspended after one year at
Level IV followed by eighteen months of probation.  On direct appeal,
Shockley’s convictions were affirmed.2
(3)
During the latter half of January 2005, Shockley filed a total of
seven motions to compel in the 2003 case.   It appears from the limited record
in this Court that Shockley sought to compel individuals from Probation and
Parole, Presentence, and the Treatment Access Services Center (TASC) to
provide him with information arising from the 1998 sentence, as reimposed and
modified, with respect  to matters considered by the Superior Court when
sentencing Shockley in the 2003 case.  Also, Shockley sought to compel
individuals from the Department of Justice to provide him with information
stemming from alleged plea offers in the 2003 case.  Shockley stated that he
needed the information to prepare a motion for postconviction relief under
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61").
State v. Shockley, Del. Super., Cr. ID No. 0203023972, Witham, J. (May 19, 2005).
3
In re Bordley, 545 A.2d 619, 620 (Del. 1988).
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(4)
On March 4, 2005, the Superior Court issued a letter requesting
that Shockley’s former defense counsel (“defense counsel”) respond to the
motions to compel.  Defense counsel filed her response on March 8, 2005.  
(5)
On May 3, 2005, Shockley filed his petition for a writ of
mandamus in this Court.  Shockley asked that the Court issue a writ of
mandamus directing the Superior Court to rule on his motions to compel.  
(6)
By order dated May 18, 2005, the Superior Court denied
Shockley’s motions to compel.   In its answer and motion to dismiss filed on
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May 20, 2005, the State contends that Shockley’s mandamus petition is moot
as a result of the Superior Court’s May 18 order.  The State’s position is well-
taken.
(7)
This Court will issue a writ of mandamus to a trial court only when
the petitioner can show that there is a clear right to the performance of a duty
at the time of the petition, no other adequate remedy is available, and the trial
court has failed or refused to perform its duty.   “[T]his Court will not issue a
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writ of mandamus to compel a trial court to perform a particular judicial
Id.
5
See 
Supr. Ct. R. 43(b)(vii) (providing that additional submissions by the petitioner
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will not be accepted without leave of the Court).
In re Hitchens, 600 A.2d 37, 38 (Del. 1991).
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function, to decide a matter in a particular way, or to dictate the control of its
docket.”       
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(8)
By letter dated May 19, 2005, Shockley  asks the Court to review
the Superior Court’s May 18 order denying his motions to compel.  In a letter
filed on July 1, 2005, Shockley requests permission to supplement his
mandamus petition with a copy of defense counsel’s response to the motions
to compel and with copies of a letter and a motion to compel discovery that
defense counsel filed in the 2003 case.  Shockley contends that defense
counsel’s documents establish that the Department of Justice in Kent County
has engaged in “a pattern of preventing [Shockley] from receiving information
pertinent to his case and defense.”  Shockley also requests that the Court issue
a writ of mandamus to the attorney general.
(9)
The Court rejects Shockley’s May 19 and July 1 letters.   The
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Court’s jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus “is limited to instances when
the respondent is a trial court or a judge thereof.”   The attorney general is not
7
In re Watson, 2003 WL 22416060 (Del. Supr).
8
In re Middlebrook, 2000 WL 975060 (Del. Supr.) (citing Norman v. State ex rel.
9
Bove, 177 A.2d 347, 349 (Del. 1962)).
Id. (citing Gottlieb v. State, 697 A.2d 400, 401-02 (Del. 1997)); Reynolds v. State,
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2004 WL 1656964 (Del. Supr.).
In re Middlebrook, 2000 WL 975060 (Del. Supr.).
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See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(g) (providing for expansion of record under certain
12
circumstances and at the discretion of the judge).
In re Middlebrook, 2000 WL 975060 (Del. Supr.) (citing In re Hyson, 649 A.2d
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807, 808 (Del. 1994)).
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a judicial officer.   Moreover, “[m]andamus may not be used under any
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circumstances . . . to review interlocutory orders in criminal cases.”   In this
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case, the Superior Court’s May 18 order denying Shockley’s motions to compel
is an interlocutory order that is not subject to review in this Court.   ( 1 0 )
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Finally, mandamus relief is not warranted because Shockley has an
adequate remedy at law, namely a motion for postconviction relief under Rule
61.   As part of a motion for postconviction relief, Shockley may request
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expansion of the record to include information that he alleges is relevant to the
determination of the motion.   If the postconviction motion is unsuccessful on
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the merits, Shockley may then appeal to this Court for a review of his claims,
including any claim relating to his request to expand the record.13
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to
dismiss is GRANTED.  Shockley’s petition for a writ of mandamus is
DISMISSED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Myron T. Steele
Chief Justice