Title: Emmanuel Worship Center v. City of Petersburg
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 201322
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 6, 2022

PRESENT:  All the Justices1 
 
EMMANUEL WORSHIP CENTER, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 201322 
JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
 
JANUARY 6, 2022 
CITY OF PETERSBURG 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG 
Joseph M. Teefey, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court properly dismissed a bill of review, 
after holding that the underlying matter was an action at law and there was no legal error in its 
decision to issue a decree of sale. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
In August 2018, the City of Petersburg (“the City”) brought a complaint against the 
Emmanuel Worship Center and its trustees (collectively “EWC”) for delinquent taxes, seeking a 
decree of sale and appointment of a special commissioner pursuant to Code §§ 58.1-3965 and 
58.1-3969.  On May 20, 2019, the circuit court found that, as of April 15, 2019, EWC owed the 
City $29,288.95 for delinquent real estate taxes due through June 30, 2015, and penalties and 
interest thereon through April 15, 2019.  The court further found that EWC could not challenge 
this tax delinquency because the three-year statutory period to challenge an erroneous assessment 
pursuant to Code § 58.1-3984 had expired.  The court then issued a decree of sale, ordering 
EWC’s property be sold to pay the delinquent taxes, penalties, interest, and costs. 
 
EWC did not appeal the circuit court’s ruling.  Instead, on August 22, 2019, EWC paid, 
under protest, the accumulated taxes, penalties, interest, and fees in the amount of $114,059.10 
 
 
1 Chief Justice Lemons presided and participated in the hearing and decision of this case 
prior to the effective date of his retirement as Chief Justice on December 31, 2021.  Justice 
Goodwyn was sworn in as Chief Justice effective January 1, 2022. 
 
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for redemption of its property.  On November 15, 2019, within six months of entry of the decree 
of sale, EWC filed a bill of review in the circuit court pursuant to Code § 8.01-623.  EWC asked 
the circuit court to review its May 20, 2019 decree of sale and to reverse, modify, or nullify it, 
and award it the amounts paid to the City to redeem its property, including attorneys’ fees. 
 
EWC argued it was exempt from paying real estate taxes under Article X, Section 6(a)(2) 
of the Constitution of Virginia because the property at issue was owned and used exclusively for 
religious purposes.  EWC asserted that this tax exemption was self-executing, and because the 
City did not have an ordinance in place to monitor exempted property, EWC had not been 
required to apply for an exemption.  Lastly, EWC argued that the three-year statute of limitations 
under Code § 58.1-3984 was not applicable. 
 
The City filed a motion to dismiss the bill of review.  It argued that a bill of review was 
not a valid pleading in this matter because that mechanism is a procedure used to reopen suits in 
equity, and this case involved an action at law.  According to the City, the applicable statute to 
challenge the City’s assessment of real property is Code § 58.1-3984, which states “all 
proceedings pursuant to this section shall be conducted as an action at law.”  Additionally, the 
City argued that EWC had failed to obtain leave of court before filing the bill of review, and that 
a bill of review was not appropriate because there was no error of law apparent from the face of 
the record and no newly discovered evidence.  The City asked the court to dismiss the bill of 
review as frivolous. 
 
EWC opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing it had presented a proper case for a bill of 
review because the error of law was apparent from the record and, therefore, leave of court was 
not required.  EWC asserted the property was exempt from real estate taxation pursuant to a self-
 
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executing exemption.  EWC did not respond to the City’s assertion that the underlying matter 
involved an action at law instead of equity. 
 
The circuit court held a hearing on July 6, 2020.  Counsel for EWC admitted they sought 
a bill of review because they failed “to properly perfect [their] appeal.”  EWC agreed that a bill 
of review is not frequently used, but nevertheless argued it was “a [procedural] mechanism that 
is still recognized and still on the books.”  EWC asserted that there was a legal error in the decree 
of sale because the property in question was exempt from taxation, and that the applicable 
exemption was self-executing. 
 
The City responded that the circuit court had heard these arguments in the previous 
matter, and contended that a bill of review was not appropriate because this was not an equity 
case.  Rather, the City asserted that this was a challenge to an erroneous assessment under Code 
§ 58.1-3984, which is an action at law.  EWC replied that a final decree is “issued through an 
operation of equity,” and “selling a person’s property is an equitable action … not a legal 
remedy.” 
 
The circuit court entered a final order on July 31, 2020, denying the bill of review.  The 
court held the bill of review was not properly before it because the underlying action “was an 
action at law and such a bill is utilized solely to review suits in equity.”  The court further held 
there was no error of law in the underlying matter.  This appeal ensued. 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
EWC challenges the circuit court’s holdings that the underlying matter was an action at 
law and that there was no error in its decision to issue the decree of sale. 
 
 
 
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A. Standard of Review 
 
This appeal involves issues of statutory interpretation, which are questions of law we 
review de novo.  CVAS 2, LLC v. City of Fredericksburg, 289 Va. 100, 108 (2015). 
B. Bill of Review 
 
“A bill of review is a well established procedure that is used to reopen a suit in equity 
after the final decree has been rendered.”  W. Hamilton Bryson, Bryson on Virginia Civil 
Procedure § 12.05[4], at 12-24 (5th ed. 2017).  While the bill of review is still an available 
procedural device, we have noted that it is “limited in scope,” “rarely utilized in Virginia 
procedure,” and “discouraged” in modern proceedings “wherein most litigants have a statutory 
right to appeal from judgments of trial courts.”  Blunt v. Lentz, 241 Va. 547, 550 (1991).  Code 
§ 8.01-623 states that “[i]n no case shall such a bill [of review] be filed without the leave of court 
first obtained, unless it be for error of law apparent upon the face of the record.” 
 
In its final order, the circuit court held the bill of review was not properly before it 
because the underlying matter “was an action at law.”  However, the record demonstrates the 
underlying action was filed by the City pursuant to Code § 58.1-3965 to sell EWC’s property to 
collect delinquent real estate taxes.  Code § 58.1-3965 is located in Chapter 39, Article 4, which 
is titled, “Bill in Equity for Sale of Delinquent Tax Lands.”  In relevant part, it provides: 
When any taxes on any real estate in a locality are delinquent on 
December 31 following the second anniversary of the day on 
which such taxes have become due …, such real estate may be sold 
for the purpose of collecting all delinquent taxes on such property. 
 
Code § 58.1-3965(A).  Code § 58.1-3967 sets forth how these proceedings are instituted, who the 
necessary parties are, and what should be done with any surplus.  Code § 58.1-3967 states, 
“[p]roceedings under this article for the appointment of a special commissioner under § 58.1-
 
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3970.1 or the sale of real estate on which county, city, or town taxes are delinquent shall be by 
bill in equity.”  Code § 58.1-3967 (emphasis added). 
 
In addition to the plain language of Code §§ 58.1-3965 and 3967, we recently confirmed 
that this type of action is an equitable one.  In CVAS 2, LLC v. City of Fredericksburg, we held 
that an appeal from a decree of sale issued by a circuit court for delinquent real estate taxes under 
Code § 58.1-3965 was “an equitable claim, even though that claim is statutory in nature.”  289 
Va. at 109.  We noted that the General Assembly “has the power to define the statutory rights it 
creates to be of a legal or equitable nature,” and had determined that “the sale of real estate on 
which county, city, or town taxes are delinquent shall be by bill in equity.”  Id. 
 
The City’s underlying action was brought by a bill in equity.  Therefore, the circuit court 
erred in holding that the underlying action was a matter at law and that a bill of review was 
inappropriate.  Accordingly, we will reverse this ruling by the circuit court. 
C. Decree of Sale 
 
In denying the Bill of Review, the circuit court also held that after reviewing the record, it 
found no error of law in the underlying action where it issued the Decree of Sale.  On appeal, 
EWC argues there were two legal errors apparent upon the face of the record below.  First, EWC 
argues the circuit court erred when it concluded EWC’s property was subject to taxation by the 
City.  Second, EWC argues the circuit court erred when it held EWC could not challenge the 
delinquent real estate taxes because the statute of limitations to do so had expired. 
Tax Exempt Status 
 
EWC argues the circuit court erred when it concluded EWC’s property was subject to 
taxation during the years in question.  EWC contends its property is exempt from taxation 
pursuant to Article X, Section 6(a)(2) of the Constitution of Virginia, and that this exemption is 
 
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self-executing.  The City responds that the circuit court properly denied the bill of review on this 
point because the property was not “automatically exempted” from taxation.  Rather, the City 
contends that EWC was required to apply to the City Assessor for a determination whether it was 
entitled to an exemption. 
 
Article X, Section 6(a)(2) of the Constitution of Virginia provides that “property owned 
and exclusively occupied or used by churches or religious bodies for religious worship” shall be 
exempt from state or local taxation.  Code § 58.1-3606 states the General Assembly’s 
interpretation of the term “religious worship” in the Constitution and does so expansively, as set 
forth below: 
A. Pursuant to the authority granted in Article X, Section 6 (a)(6) 
of the Constitution of Virginia to exempt property from taxation by 
classification, the following classes of real and personal property 
shall be exempt from taxation: 
. . . . 
2. Real property and personal property owned by churches or 
religious bodies, including (i) an incorporated church or religious 
body and (ii) a corporation mentioned in § 57-16.1, and 
exclusively occupied or used for religious worship or for the 
residence of the minister of any church or religious body, and such 
additional adjacent land reasonably necessary for the convenient 
use of any such property.  Real property exclusively used for 
religious worship shall also include the following: (a) property 
used for outdoor worship activities; (b) property used for ancillary 
and accessory purposes as allowed under the local zoning 
ordinance, the dominant purpose of which is to support or augment 
the principal religious worship use; and (c) property used as 
required by federal, state, or local law. 
 
 
 
EWC is correct that we have referred to this exemption as “self-executing.”  In Warwick 
County v. Newport News, 153 Va. 789, 806 (1930), we construed the former constitutional 
provision for tax-exempt property and held that all property is liable to taxation, “unless 
exempted by the self-executing provisions of the Constitution, section 183.”  Id.  The Attorney 
General has also issued two opinions referring to this exemption as “self-executing” or 
 
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“automatic.”  The first is a detailed opinion from 1984 discussing various tax exemptions and the 
impact of the 1971 revisions to the Constitution on those exemptions.  1984 Op. Atty. Gen. 353, 
1984 WL 184387 (Feb. 14, 1984).  In that opinion, the Attorney General stated: 
The exemptions authorized in the 1971 Constitution, Art. X,        
§§ 6(a)(1) through 6(a)(4) for publicly owned property, church 
property, nonprofit cemeteries, public libraries and nonprofit 
institutions of learning are: 
1. Self-executing; 
2. Do not depend upon §§ 58-12(1) through 58-12(4); and 
3. Must be strictly construed, even as to the property of governments 
and churches. 
 
Id. at *11 (emphasis added).  The second opinion, issued in 1993, addressed whether a city’s 
delay in recognizing the tax-exempt status of property acquired by a religious organization was 
legally proper.  1993 Op. Atty. Gen. 244, 1993 WL 494573 (Oct. 20, 1993).   The Attorney 
General opined that Section 6(a)(2) provided for an “automatic exemption of ‘real estate and 
personal property owned and exclusively occupied or used by churches or religious bodies for 
religious worship or for the residences of their ministers.’”  Id. at *1 (emphasis added). 
 
Although property owned by a religious organization for worship is exempt from taxation 
by localities, localities are required to maintain an inventory of all tax-exempt property and keep 
a record of such information, along with the fair market value of such property.  Code § 58.1-
3604.  Further, Code § 58.1-3605 authorizes localities to “require by local ordinance any entity, 
except the Commonwealth, any political subdivision of the Commonwealth, or the United States, 
which owns real and personal property exempt pursuant to this chapter to file triennially an 
application with the appropriate assessing officer as a requirement for retention of the exempt 
status of the property.” 
 
These authorities establish that the tax exemption for property owned by religious 
organizations is “automatic” or “self-executing,” unless a locality chooses to exercise its 
 
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authority under Code § 58.1-3605 to pass an ordinance requiring such entities to file an 
application every three years to retain the property’s exempt status.  During the years in question, 
however, the City did not have such an ordinance.*  Therefore, the self-executing provision of 
Article X, Section 6(a)(2) of the Constitution of Virginia governed.  Any properties used for 
“religious worship” in the City that qualified for tax-exempt status under Article X, Section 
6(a)(2), as defined by Code § 58.1-3606, were automatically exempt from taxation during the 
years in question. 
 
EWC asserts that its property, which it refers to as a “learning annex,” qualified for this 
automatic exemption.  During oral argument the City disagreed, arguing the exemption only 
applies to property used for “worship and housing.”  We disagree with the City’s narrow 
interpretation of the exemption.  As explained above, Code § 58.1-3606 contains an expansive 
definition of religious worship that, in addition to “worship and housing” includes “property used 
for outdoor worship activities,” “property used for ancillary and accessory purposes” that 
“support[s] or augment[s] the principal religious worship use”, and “property used as required by 
federal, state, or local law.”  Code § 58.1-3606(A)(2). 
 
Based upon the record before us, we are unable to determine whether EWC’s property in 
question would qualify for this exemption.  We note that it appears EWC attempted to proffer 
evidence of its use that would qualify for tax-exempt status, but the circuit court never gave 
EWC an opportunity to present that evidence.  Instead, the circuit court agreed with the City’s 
 
 
* In 2019, the Petersburg City Code was amended to include a new ordinance that 
requires “[a]ny organization that claims exemption for a real estate parcel pursuant to Article X, 
Section 6 of the Virginia Constitution . . . shall make their request on forms provided by the city 
assessor” and that “[s]uch applications for exemption shall be reviewed by the city assessor to 
determine if the organization qualifies for an exemption.”  See Petersburg City Code § 106-
138(i) (November 15, 2019). 
 
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argument that even if EWC’s property was exempt from taxation, EWC failed to challenge the 
tax assessment within the three-year limitations period provided by Code § 58-3984, and 
therefore the assessments for the years in question were beyond review by the court. 
Statute of Limitations 
 
In the decree of sale, the circuit court held that the amount due on the delinquent real 
estate taxes through June 30, 2015 was “not subject to challenge by Defendants, the statutory 
period for challenge pursuant to Virginia Code § 58.1-3984 having expired.”  Code § 58.1-
3984(A) provides that any person aggrieved by a local tax assessment may, “within three years 
from the last day of the tax year for which any such assessment is made, . . . apply for relief to 
the circuit court of the county or city wherein such assessment was made.”  In these proceedings, 
“the burden of proof shall be upon the taxpayer to show that the property in question is valued at 
more than its fair market value or that the assessment is not uniform in its application, or that the 
assessment is otherwise invalid or illegal.” Id. 
 
EWC does not dispute that more than three years have passed since the assessments in 
question were issued.  Under Code § 58.1-3984, EWC would be barred by the three-year statute 
of limitations from bringing an action against the City to challenge the validity of the 
assessments.  However, EWC’s inability to initiate a legal challenge under this statute does not 
end the inquiry.  Despite the City’s argument to the contrary, just because EWC can no longer 
initiate a lawsuit against the City does not mean EWC cannot raise the self-executing tax 
exemption as a defense to the City’s attempt to sell the property in a tax sale. 
 
Code § 58.1-3940 gives localities the right to enforce real property taxes by sale under 
Article 4 (Code § 58.1-3965 et seq.) for twenty years after the assessments were due.  However, 
before a circuit court may issue a decree of sale under Code § 58.1-3965, the court must find the 
 
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taxes are “delinquent.”  Code § 58.1-3965.  That requires a determination whether the taxes were 
even owed in the first place.  If the locality was never entitled to tax the property, there would be 
no “delinquent” taxes.  In this case, however, the court refused to consider EWC’s defense, 
holding that EWC was barred by the statute of limitations under Code § 58.1-3984 from raising 
this defense. 
 
If the City’s interpretation of Code § 58.1-3984 were correct, a locality could issue an 
assessment against any tax-exempt property – including churches, public libraries, non-profit 
cemeteries, or any other property exempt from taxation under Article X, Section 6 of the 
Constitution of Virginia.  If that entity did not proactively respond by initiating a legal challenge 
under Code § 58.1-3984 within three years, a locality would then be able to seek a tax sale of 
that otherwise tax-exempt property for up to twenty years after the assessment because that entity 
could no longer raise its tax-exempt status as a defense to a tax sale. 
 
When interpreting statutes, courts “ascertain and give effect to the intention of the 
legislature.”  Chase v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 266 Va. 544, 547 (2003).  That intent is usually 
self-evident from the words used in the statute.  Id.  Consequently, courts apply the plain 
language of a statute unless the terms are ambiguous, Tiller v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 418, 420, 
(1952), or unless applying the plain language would lead to an absurd result.  Cummings v. 
Fulghum, 261 Va. 73, 77 (2001).  A statute’s plain language leads to “absurd results” when it 
produces illogical or anomalous results.  See, e.g., Colby v. Boyden, 241 Va. 125, 132 (1991) 
(adopting a litigant’s preferred construction of a statute “is illogical and not required” where it 
leads to an “anomalous result); Diehl v. Butts, 255 Va. 482, 488 (1998) (refusing to apply statute 
according to litigant’s preferred interpretation because the procedure it called for would be 
“illogical”).  The City’s argument that the three-year limitations period in Code § 58.1-3984 
 
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means a property owner can no longer even raise a defense to a delinquent tax charge after three 
years would clearly lead to absurd results, since localities can bring these suits for up to twenty 
years.  Therefore, we hold the circuit court erred in ruling that EWC could not assert a defense to 
the City’s allegation of delinquent taxes. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, we conclude the circuit court erred when it dismissed the bill of review.  
First, the court erred when it held the underlying action was an action at law.  Second, the court 
erred when it held that because more than three years had passed since these taxes were assessed, 
they were beyond review and EWC could not raise any defenses to the assessments.  We will 
remand this matter to the circuit court for a determination whether the property in question was 
used for religious worship as defined in Code § 58.1-3606, and consequently whether EWC 
owed any delinquent taxes for the property. 
Reversed and remanded.