Title: MOUNTAIN VIEW CEMETERY v GRANGER
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13691
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: January 18, 1978

No. 13691 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 MOUNTAIN VIEW CEMETERY, A Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, DAVID GRANGER and MRS. DAVID GRANGER et al., Defendants and Respondents and Cross Appellants. Appeal from: District court of the Second Judicial District, Honorable Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Corette, Smith and Dean, Butte, Montana Kendrick Smith argued, Butte, Montana For Respondents: Henningsen, Purcell & Genzberaer, Butte, Montana Rex F. Henningsen argued, Butte, Montana Filed: Submitted: October 3, 1977 Decided : JPN : i : 1978 Clerk M r . Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court. Mountain View Cemetery appeals from a judgment entered i n the District Court, Silver B o w County, denying the Cemetery a roadway easement over the adjacent property of defendants Granger and denying an award of treble damages for the Grangers' cutting of two 60 foot blue spruce trees on the Cemetery's property. The Grangers crossappeal from the District Court's findings that the cemetery fence line was the true boundary line between the properties and from the award of $4,000 damages for the wrongful cutting of the cemetery's trees. The Cemetery, a corporation, brought action March 21, 1975, against the Grangers t o establish the Cemetery's right t o an easement by prescription across the southwest edge of Grangers' property near the c i t y of Butte. The Cemetery also alleged damages of $12,000 for the cutting of the two trees just inside the Cemetery's fence line. The Grangers answered and f i l e d a counterclaim against the Cemetery for encroachments upon Grangers' property. Grangers also f i l e d a third party complaint against F.& S. Contracting Company and T i t l e Insurance Company of Minnesota for insuring t i t l e free of the encumbrance of the easement alleged by the Cemetery. The District Court ordered a separate t r i a l on the third party complaint pending outcome of the Cemetery-Granger dispute. The Cemetery property i s adjacent t o and south of the Granger property. For approximately 45 years cemetery personnel, and v i s i t o r s t o the cemetery regularly used, without interference, a s t r i p of land approximately 25 feet wide by 247 f e e t long on the south border of the Granger's land as a second roadway into the cemetery. The road runs from west t o east. The fence line involved i s just t o the south of the roadway. The blue spruce trees were just t o the south of the fence, as was a garage and shed owned and used by the Cemetery. Over a period of 30 years the Cemetery corporation president, Carroll Fabian, had b u i l t up the roadway 2 t o 3 feet, maintained the road a t a l l times, kept it plowed i n winter, and erected a "slow" sign near the road t o direct t r a f f i c coming into the roadway from Harrison Avenue, a major thoroughfare i n Butte which leads south out of Butte. Until the time of the controversy here, the Granger land was open, unenclosed, and unimproved, although a t one time part of the land was used for a sand p i t . The Grangers purchased the land adjacent t o the cemetery i n 1968. In 1973 the Grangers notified the Cemetery by mail t o quit using the road. The Cemetery did not reply and continued t o use the road. Before t h i s letter there had never been contact between Cemetery personnel and the Grangers or t h e i r predecessors in interest concerning the use of the road. The ~ r a n g e r s ' land remained unfenced and unimproved u n t i l 1973, a t which time they began construction of a car dealership on that s i t e . The Cemetery continued t o use the roadway u n t i l the Grangers blocked the roadway by parking large trucks and auto- mobiles i n it. The blockage of the road resulted i n t h i s action f i l e d by the Cemetery against the Grangers seeking t o establish the roadway as an easement. The Cemetery also alleged damages for wrongful cutting of 2 60-foot blue spruce trees just south of the alleged easement and inside the cemetery's fence line. Eb~ding the outcome of l i t i g a t i o n the District Court granted a temporary order allowing the Cemetery t o use a s t r i p 15 feet by 130 feet of the area i n question, for access pending the outcome of the t r i a l . The D i s t r i c t Court denied the easement, finding t h a t a l l elements f o r a prescriptive easement had been established except for adverse o r h o s t i l e use. The court a l s o fixed the cemetery fence l i n e a s the boundary l i n e between the adjoining properties and assessed damages of $2,000 each f o r the 2 blue spruce t r e e s cut by ~ r a n g e r s ' agents. The court did not award t r e b l e damages i n the amount of $12,000 a s requested by the Cemetery f o r the cutting of the t r e e s . The Cemetery contends the t r i a l court should have granted the easement and should have awarded $12,000 a s t r e b l e damages f o r the cutting of the trees. I n t h e i r crossappeal the Grangers contend the t r i a l court erred i n determining t h a t the cemetery fence l i n e is the actual boundary l i n e between the adjacent properties. They further contend the $4,000 damages f o r cutting of the t r e e s was improper because two surveys demonstrate the t r e e s were actually on the ~ r a n g e r s ' property. Cemetery witnesses, including undertakers and f l o r i s t s , as well a s the Cemetery owners, t e s t i f i e d they had regularly used the road without seeking permission and without interference during periods of up t o 45 years. The corporation's president testified t h a t on Memorial Day alone, a s many a s 600 c a r s used the roadway i n the past. Each day a t l e a s t ten automobiles used the roadway t o go t o the cemetery. The Cemetery's evidence there was never permissive use was uncontradicted. Grangers contend i t is not t h e i r duty t o prove they o r t h e i r predecessors i n i n t e r e s t gave permission t o the Cemetery t o use the road. Over objection, the Cemetery introduced i n evidence a 1914 map depicting the boundaries of the cemetery property t o be a s the court found them. It is n o t c l e a r whether nor not the map was based on a previous survey. I n support of the map's accuracy a former S i l v e r Bow County surveyor t e s t i f i e d t h a t during a l l the years he was i n office, the county surveyor and h i s crews relied on the map as their "Bible" when they were working i n the area of the cemetery. Also, Carroll Fabian, the Cemetery's corporation president, t e s t i f i e d that using the map as a guide, he had measured t o the fence line and it conformed t o the dimensions stated i n the-map. The Grangers introduced 2 independent surveys of the land involved, which established the cemetery fence was actually on the Grangers' property and that the trees south of the fence were also on the Grangers' property. There was a s l i g h t dis- crepancy between the 2 surveys. They agreed however, that one of the trees rested midway between the cemetery property and the Grangers' property. One of the surveys was made before the trees were cut, i n conjunction with the purchase of the land by the Grangers, and the other was made a f t e r the trees were cut and a f t e r t h i s controversy started. The Grangers contend the court was bound t o accept the evidence and testimony offered by the 2 surveys. Grangers further contend that even i f it i s ultimately determined the trees were not on t h e i r property, nevertheless, i n cutting the trees they relied i n good f a i t h upon a survey which showed the trees t o be on their property. Under section 93-2507, R;C.M. 1947, a party claiming the existence of an easement by prescription must show open, notorious, exclusive, adverse continuous and uninterrupted use of the easement claimed for the f u l l 5 years. Taylor v. Petranek, (1977), Mont . , 568 P.2d 120, 34 St.Rep. 905,909; Scott v. Weinheimer,(l962), 140 Mont. 554, 560, 374 P.2d 91; White v.> Kamps, (1946), 119 Mont. 102, 114, 1 7 1 P.2d 343. The controversy here is whether the use of the roadway was adverse o r permissive. - 5 - Montana has consistently followed the minority rule with regard to unimproved and unenclosed lands, which holds that open, visible, continous and uninterrupted use of another's land raises a presumption that the use was also adverse. Taylor v. Petranek, supra; Lunceford v. Trenk, (1974), 163 Mont. 504, 508, 518 P.2d 266; O'Connor v. Brodie, (1969), 153 Mont. 129, 139, 454 P.2d 920; Scott v. Weinheimer, supra; TeSelle v. Storey, (1957), 133 Mont. 1, 5, 319 P.2d 218; Glantz v. Gable, (1923), 66 Mont. 134, 141, 212 P. 858. In O'Connor this Court placed the burden upon the owner to show that the use was permissive in order to overcome this presumption. The District Court found the Cemetery's use was open, visible, continuous and uninterrupted, but was not adverse or hostile. It is plain the court did not apply the presumption that the use is presumed hostile where the other elements are established under section 93-2507. Accordingly, it was incum- bent upon the Grangers to establish that the use was initially permissive, and they wholly failed in this burden. They pre- sented no evidence at all on this issue. They rely instead on the general rule that mere use of land for right of way raises a presumption of permissive use, and does not establish the element of adverse or hostile use which ripens into a prescrip- tive easement. See Anno. 4 6 ALR2d 1 1 4 0 . Grangers further con- tend laches bars the Cemetery's right to assert a prescriptive right. Even where the general rule is followed however, exceptions have been created where the circumstances of the claimant's use indicate something more than "mere use." Among these are circumstances where the owner is aware of and has not objected t o -the use and the claimant has never solicited permission, Flener v. Lawrence, (1920), 187 Ky. 384, 220 S.W. 1041; where the claimant has improved the land and the landowner has acquiesced i n the improvement, Gaut v. Farmer,(1963), 215 C.A.2d 278, 30 Cal.Rptr. 94,97; Akers v. Moore, (Ky. 1958), 309 S-W.2d 758; o r where the vacant land was situated i n an urban o r well- # settled area, or otherwise i n such a condition that the owner knew o r should have known of the adverse use, Castillo v. Tabet Lumber Company, (1965), 75 N.M. 492, 406 P.2d 361, 363; Carlson v. Craig, (1953), 264 W i s . 632, 60 N.W.2d 395,398. It cannot be reasonably contended the Grangers and t h e i r predecessors i n interest did not know of the use. The t r i a l court found t h i s a s a fact and the Grangers do not contest that finding. Here, the Cemetery had b u i l t up the road t o a height of almost 3 feet over a 30 year period and had maintained the road for the t r a f f i c of the cemetery. The cemetery fence line was t o the south of the road and any owner of the land involved would have been put on notice a s t o the use made by the cemetery. Traffic on the road varied from as many as 600 on a Memorial Day t o a minimum of 10 on a l l other days. A "slowt' sign directed t r a f f i c on the road. This certainly was evidence of hostile intent. I n OIConnor v. Brodie, (1969), 153 Mont. 129,140, 454 P.2d 920, the Court stated there was a duty of a landowner t o be on inquiry a s t o the physical evidence of use of h i s land by another, and that lack of objection by the landowner under certain c i r - cumstances "implies acquiescence and not a grant of license." Here, the Grangers and t h e i r predecessors i n interest failed t o object t o the use of the road and the a c t i v i t y on the road. Even the general rule a s contended for by the Grangers would not save them under these circumstances. The exceptions carved out of the general rule would also defeat t h e i r claim that the use was i n i t i a l l y permissive. Neither do w e find any merit i n the Grangers' claim that the Cemetery should be barred by laches from enforcing a prescrip- t i v e easement. Over the e n t i r e 45 year period the Cemetery enjoyed the use of the land with complete acquiescence of the true owners. It was not u n t i l large trucks and cars were parked on the roadway that the Cemetery was prevented from enjoying the use of the road. B y t h i s time the Cemetery had already acquired its easement although not yet judicially enforced. When Grangers bought the land, they bought it subject t o the easement. Section 67-1607, R.C.M. 1947. Accordingly, by operation of law the Grangers were put on notice of the easement when they purchased the land. This Court stated i n 0 ' Connor : " * * * Prescriptive t i t l e once established is not divested by the subsequent transfer of the servient estate. The defendants' lack of knowledge, i f any * * * is a matter which must be settled between the defendants and their grantor." 153 Mont. 139. The only clear threat t o the enjoyment of t h i s roadway was when it was blocked by trucks and cars. Laches applies when a party has been negligent i n asserting h i s right, and "* * * where there has been a delay of such duration a s t o render enforcement of the asserted right inequitable." Davis v. Steingruber, (1957), 131 Mont. 468, 470, 311 P.2d 784. The Grangers argue their property investment is devalued because the Cemetery delayed bringing the action u n t i l a f t e r a large investment had been made and construction started. However, w e see no duty imposed on the Cemetery t o take action declaring its easement u n t i l such time as the Grangers threatened the actual enjoyment of the use of the road. The Cemetery had no duty t o seek judicial enforcement of an easement u n t i l the easement's benefits were i n jeopardy. W e note that the only harm which results from upholding the easement arises from the Grangers' precipitous and premature commencement of construction without f i r s t s e t t l i n g the question of the road, From physical evidence of the road i t s e l f , as well as t h e i r own knowledge of the use of the road, they, and t h e i r predecessors i n interest, were on notice long before construction began that the Cemetery was using the property i n dispute as a roadway. Grangers cannot now claim that laches bars the Cemetery's right t o enforce an easement upon that land. The f i n a l issue here concerns the failure of the court t o award treble damages for cutting the trees. The District Court found that the cemetery fence line was the true boundary l i n e between the adjacent properties and awarded actual damages for the value of the trees, $2,000 each. The Cemetery contends the t r i a l court was bound by section 17-503, R.C.M. 1947, t o award treble damages. The Grangers do not question the value of the trees, but contend i n their crossappeal that the t r i a l court was i n error i n fixing the cemetery fence line a s the true boundary line between the adjacent properties. They contend the true boundary l i n e is south of the fence line and even a l i t t l e south of the area where the trees were growing. I f correct, then the fence and the trees would be on the Grangers' property and they would not of course be l i a b l e for damages i n cutting the trees. W e do not agree the t r i a l court was bound to establish the boundaries a s shown by the Grangers' evidence. The Grangers relied on two independent surveys, one before t h i s controversy arose, and the other i n preparation for t h i s controversy. Each survey established the true boundary l i n e as south of the fence l i n e and south of the trees. However, the t r i a l court was not bound t o accept t h e i r testimony. During i t s case the Cemetery introduced over objection, a 1914 map which s e t out the boundaries of the cemetery property. It was not done i n conjunction with a survey nor apparently even i n reliance on a survey. However, the Grangers do not contend on appeal that it was error to admit t h i s evidence. The former Silver B o w County surveyor t e s t i f i e d that while he was i n office he and h i s crews relied on t h i s map extensively as establishing the boundaries of the cemetery. The president of the Cemetery corporation t e s t i f i e d to h i s own measurements which conformed t o the measurements depicted by the map. Neither do the Grangers contend it was error t o admit t h i s testimony. The conflict i n the testimony and the evidence created a question of fact for the t r i a l court and it was, of course, within the province of the t r i a l court to resolve that issue against the Grangers as long as there was substantial evidence Mont . t o support it. Taylor v. Petranek, (1977), - 3 568 P.2d 120, 34 St.Rep. 905,909. There was substantial evidence and accordingly, the t r i a l court was correct i n determining that the cemetery fence line was the true property line between the adjoining properties. W e do not agree with the Cemetery however, that the t r i a l court was bound t o award treble damages against the Grangers for cutting the trees. The Cemetery r e l i e s on section 17-503, R.C.M. 1947, which provides: "For wrongful injuries t o timber, trees, o r underwood upon the land of another, o r removal thereof, the measure of damage i s three times such a sum as would compensate for the actual detriment, except where the trespass was casual and involuntary, or committed under the belief that the land belonged t o the trespasser, or where the wood was taken by the authority of highway officers for the purposes of a highway; i n which cases the damages are a sum equal t o the actual detriment. I t Under section 17-503 treble damages may be allowed except where the trespass was "casual and involuntary, o r committed under the belief that the land belonged t o the trespasser * * *." A t t r i a l it was agreed that t h i s statute controlled a s t o whether or not the Cemetery was entitled t o treble damages. In entering its findings however, the t r i a l court relied on section 93-6103, R.C.M. 1947 (a statute regarding trespass t o property and cutting of trees but not applicable t o t h i s case). Section 93-6103 has been interpreted by t h i s Court t o require that treble damages are only allowed where trees were cut with malice, wantonness, o r e v i l design. The t r i a l court found that there was no malice, wantonness or e v i l design, and accordingly, denied treble damages. Because the same finding i s not required under section 17-503, the Cemetery asserts that it is entitled t o treble damages as a matter of law. O n the other hand, Grangers contend the t r i a l court's decision on treble damages should be upheld, even i f i t was given for the wrong reasons, because there was evidence t o support such a finding. They rely on a survey upon which they acted i n cutting the trees, feeling the trees were on t h e i r property. The rule which the Grangers ask us t o invoke is, one, under certain circumstances a salutary/ I n re Williams' Estate, (1919, 52 Mont. 192, 156 P. 1087; Estate of Maricich, 145 Mont. 146, 400 P.2d 873 (1965); but w e do not agree it should be followed i n t h i s case. The determination of whether treble damages should be awarded under section 17-503, is a factual question. W e cannot s t a t e as a matter of law that treble damages were required. Neither can we s t a t e that under a l l circumstances one can avoid treble damages by relying on a survey indicating the trees were on one's own property. The t r i a l court made no findings a s t o the whether/ treble damages provision of the s t a t u t e was excused under the facts of t h i s case. W e reverse the judgment of the District Court and direct that judgment be entered granting an appropriate easement t o the Cemetery, together with the appropriate dimensions. W e vacate the findings and conclusions of the t r i a l court on the issue of treble damages and direct that findings and conclu- sions be entered guided by the provisions of.section 17-503, R.C.M. 1947. This cause is remanded t o the District Court for further proceedings consistent with t h i s opinion. W e Concur: r - L h i e £ Justice