Title: Bazaldua v. Hanrahan
Citation: 592 P.2d 512, 92 N.M. 596
Docket Number: 12143
State: new-mexico
Issuer: new-mexico Supreme Court
Date: March 26, 1979

592 P.2d 512 (1979) 92 N.M. 596 Ruben BAZALDUA, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Michael HANRAHAN, Respondent-Appellant. No. 12143. Supreme Court of New Mexico. March 26, 1979. Jeff Bingaman, Atty. Gen., Michael Kauffman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, Ira S. Robinson, Dist. Atty., Jon A. Feder, Asst. Dist. Atty., Albuquerque, for respondent-appellant. John B. Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Gregory Chase, Asst. Public Defender, Mark H. Shapiro, Asst. Appellate Defender, Albuquerque, Reginald J. Storment, Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for petitioner-appellee. FEDERICI, Justice. Appellee Bazaldua was indicted by a Texas Grand Jury for aggravated robbery. The Governor of Texas issued a requisition for the extradition of appellee from the State of New Mexico to the State of Texas to stand trial for the crime, alleged by the Texas Governor to have been committed in Texas. Appellee was arrested in Albuquerque, New Mexico, on a warrant issued in Dallas County, Texas, and was subsequently arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by New Mexico Governor directing his rendition to the State of Texas. Appellee filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was not a fugitive from justice because he was not present in the State of Texas at the time the alleged offense was committed. The district court held a hearing on the writ. Five witnesses testified under oath to the effect that appellee could not have been in the State of Texas at the time the alleged offense was committed. The five witnesses were related to, or friends of, appellee. After hearing testimony from the witnesses, the trial court granted the writ and released appellee to the custody of *513 his brother. But, the court allowed the State fifteen days within which to produce Eduardo Sanchez, the victim of the alleged crime, to testify in court. The State did not produce Sanchez or any other evidence. The court, by final order and judgment, sustained the writ of habeas corpus and ordered appellee discharged from custody. The State argues that it proved its prima facie case after it presented the extradition documents, including an affidavit from the victim of the crime. Further, the State argues that appellee has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not in Texas and therefore not a fugitive at the time the alleged crime was committed. The documents produced from the demanding state made out a prima facie case and this was not overcome by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. On the subject of extradition, Article IV, § 2, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution provides: Congress has implemented the constitutional provision. The relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3182 reads: New Mexico has adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, §§ 31-4-1 through 31-4-30, N.M.S.A. 1978 (formerly §§ 41-19-1 through 41-19-30, N.M.S.A. 1953). Section 31-4-2 of the New Mexico Act provides: In Michigan v. Doran, ___ U.S. ___, 99 S. Ct. 530, 58 L. Ed. 2d 521, decided by the United States Supreme Court on December 18, 1978, the respondent had been arrested in Michigan and charged with a crime. Michigan had notified Arizona and Arizona charged respondent with theft. An Arizona justice of the peace issued an arrest warrant which recited that there was "probable cause" to believe that respondent had committed the crime. The Governor of Arizona issued a requisition for extradition accompanied by an arrest warrant, supporting affidavits and the original complaint. The Governor of Michigan issued an arrest warrant and ordered extradition. Upon arraignment on the Michigan warrant, respondent petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the extradition warrant was invalid because it did not comply with the Michigan Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. After reviewing the constitutional provision, the Act of Congress and Michigan's Uniform Extradition Act, the Court, through Chief Justice Burger, set out the intent and purpose of the extradition clause of the Constitution: ___ U.S. at ___, 99 S. Ct. at 534-536. The Court concluded: ___ U.S. at ___, 99 S. Ct. at 536. The Court placed a limitation upon the power of a court in the asylum state to review the requisition for extradition: ___ U.S. at ___, 99 S. Ct. at 535. A governor's grant of extradition is prima facie evidence that the constitutional and statutory requirements have been met. Thereafter, the burden shifts to the respondent (appellee here) to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in the asylum state that he is not a fugitive from the demanding state. South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412, 53 S. Ct. 667, 77 L. Ed. 1292 (1933). In South Carolina, the Court said: 289 U.S. at 417, 419-22, 53 S. Ct. at 669-671. We adopt the rules announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Michigan v. Doran, supra, and South Carolina v. Bailey, supra. After the hearing on the writ and after the State failed to produce any further evidence showing that appellee was in the State of Texas at the time the alleged crime occurred, the trial court entered a final order which reads: Although the trial court's findings and conclusions favorable to appellee are entitled to great weight, appellee did not overcome the State's prima facie case by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden upon appellee of overcoming the prima facie case is heavy. Conflicting evidence is not sufficient. The evidence adduced by appellee went not only to his contention that he was not in Texas, but also to the question of alibi. Habeas corpus is not the proper proceeding in which to try the latter question. South Carolina v. Bailey, supra. The order and judgment of the trial court is reversed. IT IS SO ORDERED. SOSA, C.J., and EASLEY, J., concur.