Title: Corbin v. State
Citation: 585 So. 2d 713
Docket Number: 89-KA-1204
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: August 21, 1991

585 So. 2d 713 (1991) Walter CORBIN v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 89-KA-1204. Supreme Court of Mississippi. August 21, 1991. *714 Irene Mikell Buckley, Boyd Buckley &amp; Bateman, Greenville, for appellant. Mike C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Deirdre McCrory, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. En Banc. PITTMAN, Justice, for the Court: Walter Corbin was convicted in the Circuit Court of Washington County for the burglary of M &amp; M Grocery in Greenville, Mississippi. He was sentenced to a term of seven (7) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Aggrieved by his conviction, Corbin appeals to this Court. Finding error in the lower court, we reverse and render. During the evening hours of September 9, 1988, M &amp; M Grocery in Greenville, Mississippi, was burglarized. The crime was discovered at approximately 5:40 a.m. on September 10, 1988, by Sgt. Lon Pepper of the Greenville Police Department. Entry into the local business had been forced. Before discovering the M &amp; M Grocery burglary, Officer T.C. Meyers of the Greenville Police Department was on patrol when he noticed a black male walking along Hughes Street. As Officer Meyers approached this person, the man dropped the various items that he was carrying and ran away from the approaching officer. This person was never identified. The items thrown down by this person, however, were identified as the goods that had been stolen from M &amp; M Grocery that same night. These items included several cartons of cigarettes, a coin box, a bag of quarters and a glove. Upon recovery of the above goods, they were immediately processed for fingerprints by detectives from the Greenville Police Department. The stolen merchandise was found within two blocks of M &amp; M Grocery. Although the suspect was observed by two police officers, no witness was able to identify the person that dropped the stolen goods and ran. The proprietor of M &amp; M Grocery, Mr. Major Norman of Greenville, testified that he had indeed been burglarized on September 10, 1988. He stated that entry had been gained through the back door of his building by prying open both an iron door and an inner wooden door. Mr. Norman testified that he was able to determine that several items of merchandise had been stolen from his store, including several cartons of cigarettes, change from the video machine and a small change box. The stolen items, according to Norman, totalled around $150.00 in merchandise and cash. Officer Ken Winter of the Greenville Police Department, a certified fingerprint examiner, testified that on October 7, 1988, he matched four latent fingerprints taken from the cartons of cigarettes stolen from M &amp; M Grocery with the known fingerprints of Walter L. Corbin. At trial, Captain Winter testified that Walter Corbin, "at some point in time", touched the three cigarette cartons from which the fingerprints were lifted. *715 Based upon the evidence above, Walter Corbin was convicted in the Circuit Court of Washington County for the burglary of M &amp; M Grocery. Aggrieved by that conviction, he appeals to this Court. Walter Corbin argues on appeal that the lower court was in error when it did not sustain his motions for Directed Verdict and Judgment of Acquittal Notwithstanding the Verdict. These motions, according to appellant, challenged the sufficiency of the State's proof concerning the elements of the crime of burglary. Those elements, under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-33 (Supp. 1989), are the unlawful breaking and entering of any structure with the intent to steal or commit a felony therein. Appellant argues that the State wholly failed to prove these elements in the case sub judice. We agree. When one argues on appeal concerning the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, the standard is as follows: Guilbeau v. State, 502 So. 2d 639, 641 (Miss. 1987). Parker v. State, 484 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (Miss. 1986). Butler v. State, 544 So. 2d 816, 819 (Miss. 1989). Walter Corbin maintains that under the facts of this case, and the standards enumerated above, that his conviction cannot stand. The facts of the case at bar reveal the following: (1) that M &amp; M Grocery was burglarized sometime between closing hours September 9, 1988, and 4:50 a.m. September 10, 1988; (2) that an unidentified black male was seen dropping the items stolen from M &amp; M Grocery and running from a police officer at 4:50 a.m. on September 10, 1988; (3) that the fingerprints of Walter Corbin were found on three of the six cartons of cigarettes recovered by the Greenville Police Department; and (4) that these cartons were generally inaccessible to the public during business hours at M &amp; M Grocery. These facts, standing alone, do not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Walter Corbin was the person who unlawfully entered M &amp; M Grocery with the intent to steal merchandise in that business. No fingerprints were recovered at M &amp; M Grocery to place him at the scene of the crime. In fact, the State did not present any evidence placing Walter Corbin at the business at any time. The State will not be required to disprove every hypothesis in a criminal trial. The State here, however, did nothing to focus the possibilities of the *716 fingerprints being concurrent with the robbery. A decision similar to the case sub judice is McLain v. State, 198 Miss. 831, 24 So. 2d 15 (1945). In McLain, the defendant was charged and convicted of the larceny of an automobile on the sole basis of his thumb-print being found on the rear-view mirror of the car. This Court, in ruling that appellant's fingerprint, without more, was not sufficient to uphold the conviction, stated: McLain, 198 Miss. at 836-37, 24 So. 2d at 16 (emphasis added). In affirming our earlier decision in McLain, we again announce that a fingerprint as the sole and only proof of guilt is insufficient. Fingerprint evidence must be coupled with some other evidence, especially so when the fingerprint was not found at the crime scene but on some object away from the scene. The State must corroborate this physical evidence with other proof of guilt. Here the State failed in this regard. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court will be reversed, and appellant discharged. REVERSED AND RENDERED PRATHER and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur. SULLIVAN, J., concurs in result only. BANKS, J., concurs by separate written opinion, joined by DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER and SULLIVAN, JJ. HAWKINS, P.J., dissents by separate written opinion joined by ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and McRAE, J. BANKS, Justice, concurring: I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately only to disassociate myself from any implication that the state need disprove less than all reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence in any case. The state is required to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter of federal constitutional law, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979) and the law of this state. Edwards v. State, 469 So. 2d 68 (Miss. 1985). That task requires that the evidence produced be such that we can conclude that a rational, fair-minded jury could find the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Put another way the evidence must be such that a rational jury could exclude all inferences consistent with innocence. I agree with the majority that evidence that Walter Corbin, at some point, handled the cartons of cigarettes included in the contraband is insufficient, standing alone, to conclude that he committed the burglary in question. The question whether the inference to be drawn from the possession of recently stolen property is sufficient to support a conviction of the criminal act by which the property was removed from its rightful owner has received no little attention from the federal courts. See, Cosby v. Jones, 682 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir.1982) and cases cited therein. The Cosby court noted that "there is widespread agreement that the bare inference of theft from possession is insufficient for conviction without corroborating circumstances or evidence." Id. at 1380. *717 In Cosby, the court reversed a conviction based solely on the fact that the defendant, who lived in the same apartment complex as the burglary victim, was pawning goods taken in the burglary within a day or two of the burglary. The defendant offered an explanation that he had purchased the camera and lens from another person and an alibi for the time of the burglary. Noting that the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the state, the court refused to rely on this explanation, crediting the convicting jury as having disbelieved it. Nevertheless, the court found the evidence insufficient to allow a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Cosby had committed the burglary. In a case more similar to the one at bar, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has had an opportunity to speak to this issue. Clark v. Procunier, 755 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.1985), involved a burglary wherein a safe was pulled halfway out the door of the burgled premises and several inspection stickers were stolen. A month later, Clark's wallet was found on the streets of a town seventy-five miles away and the wallet contained two of the stickers. Clark offered testimony that his wallet had been lost sometime earlier, but after the date of the burglary. More importantly, for present purposes, a palm print was found on the part of the safe sticking outside the door of the burgled premises, and that print was identified by two experts as matching Clark's. The court reversed the conviction reasoning as follows: Id. at 396. Here Corbin could have picked up the goods after they were dropped by the burglar and before they were dropped by the individual seen by the officer; the burglar or some other person may have offered them to Corbin for sale or had him handle them for some other reason; or Corbin's prints may have gotten on the cartons of cigarettes even before they were delivered to the store. The state asks that we draw an inference from the fingerprints, first that Corbin had possession after the burglary and then, from that inference, that he broke into the store. That inference upon an inference is too tenuous to rise to the level of certainty necessary to convict one of a crime. DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER and SULLIVAN, JJ., join this opinion. HAWKINS, Presiding Justice, dissenting: Because there was sufficient evidence to support Corbin's conviction, I would affirm, and respectfully dissent. Under settled case law in a circumstantial evidence case, the accused is always entitled to an instruction that the jury must acquit unless they are convinced of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis than that of guilt. Where there is circumstantial evidence of guilt, however, it is the function of the jury, not the trial judge or the appellate court, to determine whether or not there is a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. This is peculiarly within the province of the jury. When there is strong circumstantial evidence of guilt, the Court does not look *718 over the jury's shoulder to try and ascertain whether there is some hypothesis of innocence when the jury has found none. This Court stated in Johnson v. State, 23 So. 2d 499, 500 (Miss. 1945): Also, Burrill v. State, 328 So. 2d 334 (Miss. 1976). Mississippi follows the general law. State v. Donckers, 200 Wash. 45, 93 P.2d 355, 357 (1939): Buenoano v. State, 478 So. 2d 387, 390 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 1985): State v. Allen, 335 So. 2d 823, 826 (Fla. 1976): Also, Whaley v. U.S., 141 F.2d 1010, (5th Cir.1944), cert. den. 323 U.S. 742, 65 S. Ct. 46, 89 L. Ed. 595 (1944); Payne v. State, 424 So. 2d 722 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Coleman v. State, 394 So. 2d 82 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981); Mauldin v. State, 376 So. 2d 788 (Ala.Cr. App. 1979); People v. Muhly, 15 Cal. App. 416, 114 P. 1017 (1911); Creech v. Commonwealth, 270 Ky. 662, 110 S.W.2d 269 (1937). The above citations are just a smattering of the general law which can be found in the West Digests under "Criminal Law," Key No. 741(6). When there have been sufficient facts introduced into evidence from which a jury can reasonably conclude the accused guilty, he is nevertheless entitled to have that jury also told that they must acquit unless in their own minds they can exclude every reasonable hypotheses except that of guilt. But he is not entitled to have the trial judge or this Court make the same inquiry.[1] Whether, under those circumstances, there exists some reasonable hypothesis of innocence is within the province of the jury. The record is undisputed on the following facts: There can be no real argument as to the following facts: Surely, there can be no argument but that a jury was entitled to conclude from this evidence that the man seen carrying the stolen loot was in fact the burglar. If a jury does not have the right to conclude that a man in possession of freshly stolen loot who, when he sees a law enforcement officer, drops it and runs, was in fact the thief, that this does not make a jury issue on guilt, then we have departed the world of common sense. The only question is the identity of this man. Therefore, the core question in this case is whether or not a jury issue was made on the fleeing man's identity. *720 This brings us to the next evidence in the record. There is no dispute in the record but that: Three separate cartons of these cigarettes had his fingerprints, all different. These were the only fingerprints lifted off the recovered property. And whose fingerprints were these? Corbin's. Why, then, was not a Washington County jury entitled to conclude that the man carrying the loot was Corbin? If this did not make a circumstantial case calling for some kind of defense, what would? Suppose Officer Myers had testified, "Yes, I recognized the man who dropped the merchandise and ran. It was Corbin."? Could it then be maintained that at least a jury issue was not made on whether or not Corbin was indeed the man? Of course not. Well, what about those fingerprints on three separate, loose cartons being carried by Mr. X by hand? No other person's fingerprints were found on the cartons or other merchandise. To me this is stronger evidence than eyewitness identification. An eyewitness may be mistaken. There is no mistake about those being Corbin's fingerprints on the three cartons. Fingerprints constitute the "strongest kind of evidence." Stoppelli v. U.S., 183 F.2d 391, 394 (9th Cir.1950), rt denied, Stoppelli v. U.S., 340 U.S. 864, 71 S. Ct. 88, 95 L. Ed. 631 (1950); the "use of fingerprints is an infallible means of identifications." Murphy v. State, 184 Md. 70, 40 A.2d 239, 246 (1944). If somebody else burglarized the store and stole the merchandise, why weren't the other fingerprints on the cartons? If some other person than Corbin was carrying the loot, why weren't his fingerprints on the loot? If there were in fact some innocent explanation, if Corbin's fingerprints got on those cartons in some manner other than his breaking in the store and stealing them, he is the one person who can give it. Put slightly differently, if there is an innocent explanation for Corbin's fingerprints on the cigarette cartons, the only person in the entire world we absolutely know could give it is Corbin. The State should not be required to rule out some other explanation of innocence when Corbin is the only person we know who can furnish it. And that's not the law. The State presented a strong case based upon circumstantial evidence. An accused has a constitutional right not to take the stand in his own behalf. He is presumed innocent until proof is offered to the contrary. But, there is not a thing in the world wrong with a rule of law which says that when certain facts are proved, which only the defendant can explain, it is up to him to offer some explanation. Otherwise, the jury has the right to find him guilty. We do that in murder prosecutions. A and B go into a room together. A shot is fired, and A is seen walking out with a smoking pistol. B is dead, a bullet through his head. The law presumes A murdered B unless he offers some rational explanation. Malice is presumed from a killing with a deadly weapon. Blanks v. State, 547 So. 2d 29, 33 (Miss. 1989); Russel v. State, 497 So. 2d 75, 76 (Miss. 1986); Stokes v. State, 240 Miss. 453, 477, 128 So. 2d 341, 350 (Miss. 1961); Hughes v. State, 207 Miss. 594, 42 So. 2d 805, 807 (1949); Smith v. State, 205 Miss. 283, 294, 38 So. 2d 725, 726 (1949); see cases cited "Homicide," West Key No. 146. In Tuttle v. State, 252 Miss. 733, 737, 174 So. 2d 345, 346-47 (1965), this Court stated: See also: McGilvery v. State, 497 So. 2d 67, 68 (Miss. 1986); Rush v. State, 301 So. 2d 297, 300 (Miss. 1974). In U.S. v. Cotter, 425 F.2d 450, 452 (1st Cir.1970), the First Circuit Court of Appeals held: In U.S. v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 437 (2nd Cir.1974), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated: In People v. McClindon, 54 Ill. 2d 546, 301 N.E.2d 290, 293 (1973), cert. denied, McClindon v. Illinois, 415 U.S. 992, 94 S. Ct. 1593 (1974), the Supreme Court of Illinois held: The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v. Clark, 776 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, Clark v. United States, 470 U.S. 1006, 105 S. Ct. 1363, 84 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1985), stated: "But, the privilege of self-incrimination does not preclude the trier of the facts from drawing an adverse inference if justified by the facts." Also, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 1232, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1965): "What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing." (And entirely different from the court or prosecution commenting upon it.) "It is equally clear that an accused cannot avoid the natural and reasonable inferences deducible from proved facts merely by remaining silent or by declining to become a witness." 22 A C.J.S. Criminal Laws, § 593, p. 355. In Moore v. U.S., 271 F.2d 564, 568 (4th Cir.1959), the Court held: Also, State v. Clay, 29 Ohio App.2d 206, 280 N.E.2d 385, 388 (1972): In United States v. Ragland, 306 F.2d 732, 736 (4th Cir.1962), cert. denied, Ragland v. United States, 371 U.S. 949, 83 S. Ct. 504, 9 L. Ed. 2d 498 (1963), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in citing and quoting from Moore, observed: In Walker v. United States, 301 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir.1962), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, citing Acuna v. United States, 74 F.2d 359, 360 (5th Cir.1934), with approval, noted that a presumption "merely places the burden upon him (the defendant) as to matters peculiarly within his knowledge." [Emphasis added][3] The significance the majority attaches to Corbin's fingerprints is reminiscent of an episode in Mark Twain's book, A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court, where the hero, Hank, must fight two heavily armored knights in a tournament. Rather than encumber himself or his nimble horse in heavy metal, Hank dons his "long handles" and readies himself for the fray. He initially plans to lasso his opponents as they lope past and do them no serious harm, but Merlin steals his rope. Hank has prepared himself for this eventuality, however. He has two .45 caliber revolvers in good working order. As each knight approaches, he whips out a revolver and fires. Wham! A knight is on the ground. Stone dead. The curious onlookers cannot understand his being dead. They see nothing of any significance about the dead knight. Well, there is a little hole in the chain metal on his chest, but that is meaningless. The majority attaches the same importance to these three little sets of Corbin's fingerprints. *723 I apprehend my esteemed colleagues have done the State an injustice. I would affirm. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and McRAE, J., join this opinion. [1] Which is precisely what the robust imagination of the concurring opinion, p. 717, does. [2] Lon Pepper of the Greenville Police Department, who first located the burglarized store, testified: A. As I stated, the point of entry was on the east side of the building with the iron door pried open. It's a gate-type door. And, the rear door interior or going into the interior of the store had been pried open. That enters a back room of the store. Once I got inside the store I observed there was some disarray of the cigarettes behind the counter, some paperwork from the store was on the floor. It was obvious that a person had broken into the building and had possibly taken some object, at which time we tried to notify the owner. (R.44) [3] This is a burden which the concurring opinion generously removes.