Title: V.K.E., Etc. v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC05-1176
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 6, 2006

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-1176 
____________ 
 
V.K.E., etc.,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[July 6, 2006] 
 
ANSTEAD, J. 
 
In this case, we consider whether the Legislature intended for certain 
criminal statutory fees and surcharges to apply to juveniles in juvenile delinquency 
proceedings.  In the decision below, the Fifth District Court of Appeal, noting that 
it was bound by its prior decision in S.S.M. v. State, 898 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2004), upheld the imposition of such surcharges in juvenile delinquency 
proceedings.  V.K.E. v. State, 902 So. 2d 343, 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).  The court 
certified the issue to us as one of great public importance:  “Does a trial judge have 
the power and authority to impose on juveniles in a juvenile delinquency 
 
 
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proceeding, the mandatory surcharges set forth in sections 938.08 and 93[8].085?”  
Id. at 344.1  We have discretionary jurisdiction and granted review.  See art. V, § 
3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the reasons that follow, we answer “no” to the certified 
question and approve of the views and analysis set out in the concurring opinion of 
Judge Sharp.  We therefore quash the district court’s decision in V.K.E. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Petitioner V.K.E., an eleventh grade high school student and a juvenile, was 
involved in an altercation with another student and entered a plea of nolo 
contendere to a delinquency petition asserting the commission of a simple battery 
under the provisions of section 784.03, Florida Statutes (2001), a misdemeanor.  
The trial court withheld adjudication of delinquency, placed V.K.E. on probation, 
and ordered her, among other things, to pay $852.66 in restitution, $140 in 
attorneys fees, and two surcharges—$201 in domestic violence costs and $151 to 
the rape crisis fund—within sixty days.  V.K.E. appealed the imposition of the 
surcharges.  The district court affirmed, relying on its prior decision in S.S.M., and 
certified the question quoted above.  V.K.E., 902 So. 2d at 344. 
ANALYSIS 
                                          
 
1.  To date, the Second and Fifth District Courts of Appeal have certified the 
same question in a combined eleven cases.  We have stayed the remaining cases 
pending our disposition of this one. 
 
 
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We find the analysis set out in Judge Sharp’s separate opinion below 
provides a reliable guide to legislative intent and the correct answer to the certified 
question.2  We further conclude that the overriding indications of legislative intent 
discussed by Judge Sharp should control the outcome here: first, the Legislature 
has created a juvenile justice system as a totally separate and distinct rehabilitative 
alternative to the punitive criminal justice system, and not as a subset of that 
system with all of its attendant punitive measures and costs;3 second, the 
Legislature has expressly provided in certain instances for the taxation of criminal 
justice costs and surcharges against delinquents but has not done so here;4 and 
third, the Legislature has actually spoken on the issue before us by expressly 
providing that court fees and costs should not ordinarily be imposed in juvenile 
proceedings.  Moreover, we conclude that a contrary holding would open the door 
                                          
 
 
2.  A frank response to the question before us may be that we do not really 
know with certainty the precise answer to the question posed concerning what the 
Legislature intended because the Legislature has treated the issue of the assessment 
of costs and surcharges in a wide variety of ways, sometimes expressly providing 
for assessment in juvenile proceedings and sometimes not.  However, because the 
question must be resolved in order to review the juvenile court’s assessment of 
costs, we must do our best to provide an answer. 
 
 
3.  The most serious sanctions provided by the Legislature for the violation 
of the criminal statutes in question are punitive sanctions such as imprisonment in 
the state prison system, sanctions wholly inapplicable to juvenile proceedings. 
 
 
4.  Of course, if the Legislature had expressly provided for an assessment in 
juvenile proceedings, as it has done in other instances, we would have no issue to 
resolve.  The plain meaning of such a provision would control. 
 
 
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to the assessment in juvenile proceedings of the unrelated costs, fees, and 
surcharges provided for in the adult criminal system without a clear legislative 
mandate to do so.  This in turn would impair the ability of the juvenile system to 
focus on and serve its legislatively mandated rehabilitative function.  
 
Because Judge Sharp has fully and cogently articulated these principles of 
legislative intent, we adopt her analysis as our own and set it out in full: 
 
I am bound by this court’s opinion in S.S.M. v. State, 898 So. 
2d 84 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), but were that not the case I would have 
resolved this issue differently.  In this special concurring opinion, I 
write to explain my reasons for disagreeing with S.S.M.   
 
In S.S.M., a child was assessed a $201.00 surcharge pursuant to 
section 938.08, Florida Statutes.  She pled guilty to two counts of 
battery, first degree misdemeanors.  In this case, V.K.E. pled guilty to 
a charge of simple battery, a first degree misdemeanor, and was 
surcharged $201.00 pursuant to section 938.08, Florida Statutes and 
$151.00 pursuant to section 938.085, Florida Statutes.   
 
Sections 938.08 and 938.085 are part of the “general” adult 
criminal statutes contained in Chapter 938.  They belong to Part II of 
that Chapter entitled “Mandatory Costs in Specific Types of Cases.”  
That Part imposes various charges, sometimes described as “costs” or 
“surcharges” on persons who have violated specific criminal statutes.  
Funds raised from these surcharges or costs are designated to go to 
various state and local programs; i.e., the Emergency Medical 
Services Trust Fund; the Criminal Justice Standards and Training 
Trust Fund; the Brain and Spinal Cord Injury Rehabilitation Trust 
Fund; and the County Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Trust Fund; and 
the Department of Children and Family Services Child Advocacy 
Trust Fund for the Florida Network of Children’s Advocacy Centers, 
Inc. 
 
In the case of section 938.08, $85.00 of the surcharge goes to 
the Domestic Violence Trust Fund, $1.00 to the Clerk of the Court as 
a service charge, and the balance to the county to defray costs of 
incarcerating persons sentenced under section 741.238 (minimum 
term of imprisonment for domestic violence).  In the case of section 
 
 
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938.085, the surcharge goes to the Rape Crisis Program Trust Fund, 
and $1.00 to the Clerk of Court as a service charge. 
 
In both this case and S.S.M., the juveniles against whom the 
surcharges were assessed are young females.  Neither case involved 
domestic violence or rape.  Incongruously, they appear to be persons 
in the “victim” category for the general benefit of whom these 
surcharges are being imposed. 
 
In addition to Part II, Chapter 938 contains Part I, Mandatory 
Costs in All Cases.  For a violation of a state criminal statute or 
municipal or county ordinance (to benefit the Additional Cost 
Clearing Trust Fund), section 938.01 imposes a $3.00 court cost and 
section 938.03 imposes $50.00 as an additional cost for the violation 
of any criminal law, for the benefit of the Crimes Compensation 
[T]rust Fund.  However, this statute specifically was revisited by the 
Legislature and made expressly applicable to delinquency 
proceedings.  It reads: 
Any person pleading guilty or nolo contendere to, or 
being convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for, any 
felony, misdemeanor, delinquent act, or criminal traffic 
offense under the laws of this state, or the violation of 
any municipal or county ordinance . . . . (emphasis 
added) 
 
Part I also contains two other sections requiring the imposition 
of court costs.  For the violation of any criminal offense, section 
938.05 imposes from $50.00 to $200.00, for the benefit of the Fine 
and Forfeiture Fund, and section 938.06 imposes, as a court cost, a 
$20.00 surcharge on any fine, for the benefit of the Crime Stoppers 
Trust Fund. 
 
In addition, Part IV provides for discretionary assessment of 
costs in specific types of cases to benefit alcohol and drug abuse 
programs, the Operating Trust Fund of the Department of Law 
Enforcement, and costs of prosecution upon conviction including 
investigative costs and attorneys fees for public defenders.  Chapter 
939 also contains additional cost assessment statutes, applicable if a 
person violates any kind of criminal statute or ordinance of this state.  
The “court costs” of $65.00 must be used to fund innovations to 
supplement state funding for the elements of the state courts system, 
to assist counties to provide legal aid programs, to fund public law 
 
 
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libraries, and to support teen court programs, juvenile assessment 
centers, and other juvenile alternative programs. 
 
The rationale used in S.S.M., to justify imposition of the 
surcharge pursuant to section 938.05, was that the statute assesses this 
surcharge for a violation of section 784.03 (battery statute), and 
section 985.03(58) defines “violation of law” or a “delinquent act” as 
a “violation of any law of this state.” [n.1]  
 
 
 
[n.1] Section 985.03(58) provides: 
 
‘Violation of law’ or ‘delinquent act’ means a violation 
of any law of this state, the United States, or any other 
state which is a misdemeanor or a felony or a violation of 
a county or municipal ordinance which would be 
punishable by incarceration if the violation were 
committed by an adult. 
This definition comes from Chapter 985, the Chapter which deals with 
juvenile delinquency.  In my view, it has no relevancy to Chapter 938.  
Indeed, the statute expressly provides that the Chapter 985 definitions 
apply only “when used in this Chapter;” i.e., Chapter 985. 
 
Section 985.228(6), Florida Statutes, provides further: 
An adjudication of delinquency by a court with respect to 
any child who has committed a delinquent act or 
violation of law shall not be deemed a conviction; nor 
shall the child be deemed to have been found guilty or to 
be a criminal by reason of that adjudication; nor shall that 
adjudication operate to impose upon the child any of the 
civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by or resulting from 
conviction to disqualify or prejudice the child in any civil 
service application or appointment, with the exception of 
use of records of proceedings under this part as provided 
in s. 985.05(a). 
Section 985.233(5)(b) also provides the court must impose either an 
adult sanction or a juvenile sanction, but not a combination. 
 
If, however, the rationale of S.S.M. is accepted, there is no 
logical limit to assessing juveniles being prosecuted under Chapter 
985, with not only the surcharges under sections 938.08 and 938.085, 
but all, if not many, of the surcharges or court costs set forth in 
 
 
- 7 -
Chapter 938, outlined above, because all of those statutes impose 
“court costs” or surcharges for funding state and local law 
enforcement programs based on the fact that a person has violated a 
state criminal law or municipal ordinance or criminal traffic offense.  
If sections 938.08 and 938.085 are applicable to juvenile delinquency 
cases, then all of the costs and assessments provided for in Chapter 
938, for the adult penal system, are logically applicable to juveniles. 
 
I do not think that this is what the Legislature intended.  The 
statutory scheme sets up a separate procedure and system for handling 
juveniles who violate the state/county/city criminal laws, different and 
apart from the adult system.  The stated public policy underlying 
Chapter 985 is to protect children involved in the juvenile justice 
system, and to insure their care, safety, treatment, education and 
rehabilitation. [n.2] 
 
 
 
[n.2] For example, section 985.02(1) provides: 
985.02.  Legislative intent for the juvenile justice system. 
(1) General protections for children.  It is a purpose of the Legislature 
that the children of this state be provided with the following 
protections: 
 
(a) Protection from abuse, neglect, and exploitation. 
(b) A permanent and stable home. 
(c) A safe and nurturing environment which will preserve 
a sense of personal dignity and integrity. 
(d) Adequate nutrition, shelter, and clothing. 
(e) Effective treatment to address physical, social, and 
emotional needs, regardless of geographical location. 
(f) Equal opportunity and access to quality and effective 
education, which will meet the individual needs of each 
child, and to recreation and other community resources to 
develop individual abilities. 
(g) Access to preventive services. 
(h) An independent, trained advocate when intervention 
is necessary, and a skilled guardian or caretaker in a safe 
environment when alternative placement is necessary. 
(i) Gender-specific programming and gender-specific 
program models and services that comprehensively 
address the needs of a targeted gender group. 
 
 
 
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It should not follow, without a solid basis, that adult criminal 
sanctions be imposed on juvenile offenders. 
 
Chapter 985 disfavors detention and limits harsher sanctions if 
other alternatives are available.  Yet, sections 938.08 and 938.085 
make the payment of substantial funds by the juvenile a condition of 
not being placed in detention.  Most children are not wage earners nor 
are they expected to be.  If a child needs large sums of money to avoid 
detention, the burden will fall on the child’s parents or guardians. 
 
Although parents and guardians have been tasked with payment 
of costs or expenses for delinquent children, as well as payment of 
restitution in certain situations under chapter 985, those instances have 
been specifically provided for and defined by the Legislature, in 
Chapter 985.  See § 985.231(9), Fla. Stat.  They are quite different 
than the scheme devised in Chapter 938.  For example, sections 
985.215 and 985.231(10) allow the court to impose a fee of $5.00 per 
day payable to the Department of Juvenile Justice to offset the cost of 
care, support, and maintenance of the child against the parents or 
guardians, unless they are indigent.  Section 985.231 requires the 
court to devise a penalty component such as restitution in money or 
kind for an adjudicated delinquent child.  Restitution ordered may not 
exceed an amount the child and the parent or guardian reasonably can 
be expected to make or pay.  And, parents or guardians who are not 
indigent can be ordered to pay for attorney’s costs, as provided for in 
section 938.29.  See § 985.203, Fla. Stat. 
 
In the past, this court has adhered to the theory that unless the 
Legislature expressly makes a cost or surcharge imposed by Chapter 
38 [sic] applicable to juvenile delinquency cases, such costs or 
surcharges are not applicable to juveniles.  See P.P. v. State, 671 So. 
2d 894 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).  That case held that additional “costs” of 
$50.00 for the benefit of the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund should 
be assessed against all persons, including delinquents, based on the 
express language used in the statute, section 960.20(1) [renumbered 
938.03], which made it clear the Legislature intended them to be 
assessed in juvenile cases.[n.3] 
 
 
 
[n.3] As noted above, that statute provides: 
 
Any person pleading guilty or nolo contendere to, or 
being convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for, any 
felony, misdemeanor, delinquent act, or criminal traffic 
 
 
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offense under the laws of this state, or the violation of 
any municipal or county ordinance which adopts by 
reference any misdemeanor under state laws, shall pay as 
an additional cost in the case, in addition and prior to any 
other cost required to be imposed by law, the sum of 
$50.00 . . . (emphasis added) 
 
Both P.P. and J.A. v. State, 633 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1994), noted that section 985.221, a statute passed prior to section 
938.03, provides that in proceedings under Chapter 985, “court fees 
shall not be charged against nor witness fees allowed to, any party to a 
delinquency petition or any parent or legal guardian.”  However, the 
courts held that the older statute had been partially overturned by 
section 938.03 because of the express language used in the newer 
statute. 
 
One could make a semantical argument that court “fees” are not 
“court costs” or “surcharges” and thus section 985.221 never 
prohibited the imposition of surcharges or court costs under Chapter 
938.  None of these terms is defined in Chapter 985 and Chapter 938 
uses the terms interchangeably.  In my view, that leads to the same 
logical dilemma left by S.S.M.  Are all or most of the costs and 
surcharges, including those specified in 938.08 and 938.085, provided 
for in Chapter 938 applicable in juvenile delinquency cases simply 
because they involve violations of state, county, or municipal law? 
 
Because the two penal systems for handling adults and 
juveniles are so different and guided by such different philosophies 
and goals, I believe the better answer is that unless the Legislature 
expressly makes an adult sanction, cost or surcharge expressly 
applicable to the juvenile system, it should not be applicable.  
Sections 938.08 and 938.085 make no reference to delinquency 
proceedings.  Thus I would have concluded that the trial court erred in 
this juvenile case, in imposing the surcharges against V.K.E., pursuant 
to sections 938.05 and 938.085. 
V.K.E., 902 So. 2d at 344-47 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (Sharp, J., concurring 
specially). 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
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In sum, we agree with the reasoning of Judge Sharp and her conclusion that 
the Legislature has demonstrated its awareness of its broad authority to provide for 
the taxation of costs, fees, and surcharges in both adult and juvenile delinquency 
proceedings, but has not provided for the assessment of costs under sections 
938.05 and 938.085 in juvenile delinquency proceedings.  Accordingly, we answer 
the certified question in the negative, quash the decision of the district court, and 
remand for further proceedings consistent herewith. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and PARIENTE, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., specially concurring with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J., 
concurs. 
CANTERO, J., dissents with an opinion, in which WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur. 
BELL, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
PARIENTE, J., specially concurring. 
 
An eleventh grade female high school student punched another student in the 
face and broke the student’s nose, then pled no contest to simple battery.  The trial 
court withheld adjudication of delinquency and placed V.K.E. on juvenile 
probation.  She was ordered to pay restitution of $852.66 and two statutory 
surcharges for domestic violence programs and rape crisis centers.  The issue is 
whether the Legislature intended juveniles to be subject to these surcharges 
 
 
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applicable to adult offenders.  Because I do not discern a clear expression of 
legislative intent for the adult surcharges to apply to juveniles, I agree with the 
majority that these statutory surcharges are not authorized.  The majority has 
reached the correct result as a matter of statutory interpretation and has acted in 
accord with the purposes of juvenile sentencing as set forth by the Legislature. 
 
Unlike the $50 in costs for the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund authorized 
by section 938.03(1), Florida Statutes, sections 938.08 and 938.085 do not 
expressly authorize the $201 and $151 surcharges for domestic violence programs 
and rape crisis centers in juvenile delinquency cases.  The costs in section 
938.03(1) apply to “[a]ny person pleading guilty or nolo contendere to, or being 
convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for, any felony, misdemeanor, delinquent 
act, or criminal traffic offense,” and to “[a]ny person whose adjudication is 
withheld.”  (Emphasis supplied.)  In contrast, nothing in sections 938.08 and 
938.085 clearly evinces legislative intent to extend the surcharges to juvenile 
delinquency proceedings, apart from the fact that juveniles as well as adults can 
“plead[] guilty or nolo contendere to, or [be] found guilty of” one of the 
enumerated offenses.  I cannot presume from the sparse statutory language in these 
provisions, set against the more complete expression of legislative intent in section 
938.03(1), that the Legislature intended to place the burden of funding domestic 
 
 
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violence programs and rape crisis centers on juvenile delinquents, some of whom 
may have committed offenses unrelated to either domestic violence or rape. 
 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Cantero views the reliance on the 
difference in statutory language as an incorrect application of the principle, 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.  Neither the majority here nor Judge Sharp in 
her concurring opinion below, which the majority adopts, explicitly rely on 
expressio unius.  I believe they are instead applying an in pari materia construction 
by construing these related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.  
“The doctrine of in pari materia requires that statutes relating to the same subject 
or object be construed together to harmonize the statutes and to give effect to the 
Legislature’s intent.”  Zold v. Zold, 911 So. 2d 1222, 1229 (Fla. 2005).  The use of 
language explicitly encompassing juvenile delinquents in section 938.03(1) and the 
absence of similar language in sections 938.08 and 938.085 suggest that the 
Legislature intended a distinction.  Courts frequently look to other provisions to 
conclude that the Legislature “knows how to” accomplish what it has omitted in 
the enactment in question.  See e.g., Costarell v. Florida Unemployment Appeals 
Comm’n, 916 So. 2d 778, 783 (Fla. 2005). 
 
At the very least, the difference in the statutory language indicates 
ambiguity, which under the rules of statutory construction we should resolve by 
seeking other indications of legislative intent.  See Blanton v. City of Pinellas Park, 
 
 
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887 So. 2d 1224, 1230 (Fla. 2004) (stating that only when statutory language is 
ambiguous will the Court resort to rules of statutory construction to discern 
legislative intent).  These other indications appear in statutory provisions 
articulating the purposes of the juvenile delinquency system and in section 
985.221, Florida Statutes, which prohibits court fees in delinquency proceedings.  
 
Both the majority and the dissent construe the surcharges as a form of 
punishment, but disagree on whether punishment of this nature serves the purposes 
of the juvenile justice system.  The majority looks to the system’s rehabilitative 
purposes, while Justice Cantero focuses on provisions authorizing punishment of 
juvenile delinquents.  The resolution lies somewhere in the middle.  Chapter 985, 
Florida Statutes, which governs juvenile delinquency proceedings, does have a 
punitive component, but one which must be individually tailored to the needs of 
the child, consistent with a second important purpose of the juvenile justice 
system, which is to rehabilitate the child.  See J.A.S. v. State, 705 So. 2d 1381, 
1386 (Fla. 1998) (noting that juvenile offenders are not held to be criminals and are 
considered rehabilitatable) (quoting In re C.J.W., 377 So. 2d 22, 24 (Fla. 1979)). 
 
Section 985.01 provides that the purposes of the chapter are, inter alia: 
 
(c)  To ensure the protection of society, by providing for a 
comprehensive standardized assessment of the child’s needs so that 
the most appropriate control, discipline, punishment, and treatment 
can be administered consistent with the seriousness of the act 
committed, the community’s long-term need for public safety, the 
prior record of the child, and the specific rehabilitation needs of the 
 
 
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child, while also providing whenever possible restitution to the victim 
of the offense.  
 
. . . . 
 
(e)1.  To assure that the adjudication and disposition of a child 
alleged or found to have committed a violation of Florida law be 
exercised with appropriate discretion and in keeping with the 
seriousness of the offense and the need for treatment services, and that 
all findings made under this chapter be based upon facts presented at a 
hearing that meets the constitutional standards of fundamental fairness 
and due process. 
 
This language looks to punishment not as an end in itself, but as a means to protect 
society.  And the sanction imposed should be geared to the “specific rehabilitation 
needs of the child, while also providing whenever possible restitution to the victim 
of the offense.”  Legislative intent that punishment be individualized is also 
evident in section 985.228(4), which authorizes as a penalty component of juvenile 
probation “nonresidential punishment appropriate to the offense.”  The goals of 
individualized treatment, rehabilitation, and punishment are entirely unrelated to 
the funding of domestic violence programs and rape crisis centers, which broadly 
focus on addressing the prevention of violence and its harmful consequences 
throughout the state. 
 
The word that appears perhaps most often in the provisions of chapter 985 
setting out the chapter’s purposes and the court’s disposition options is 
“appropriate.”  Imposing surcharges that fund domestic violence programs and 
rape crisis centers is not appropriate punishment, in the sense of proportionate or 
commensurate with the offense, for a high school student who has committed 
 
 
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simple battery in a school fight.  It certainly does not directly foster the goal of 
rehabilitation. 
 
Finally, I agree that section 985.221, which prohibits court fees from being 
imposed in juvenile delinquency proceedings, supports the majority.  In his 
dissenting opinion, Justice Cantero discerns from precedent and dictionary 
definitions that a surcharge or cost can be distinguished from a fee.  However, the 
Legislature has not defined the terms so that we can be sure that it intended this 
distinction to be applied to sections 938.08, 938.085, and 985.221.  In the absence 
of express language authorizing the “surcharge” in section 938.08 and 938.085 in 
delinquency proceedings, section 985.221 is an additional indication that 
imposition of the surcharge on juvenile delinquents is contrary to legislative intent. 
 
It is my hope that when the Legislature acts in the area of juvenile justice, it 
seeks to further the goals of the juvenile delinquency system that promote 
rehabilitation and personal responsibility.  If the majority has misconstrued 
legislative intent, the Legislature can clarify its intent regarding imposition of these 
surcharges on juveniles by amending the statutes.  In the interim, I join the 
majority in concluding that, consistent with the emphasis on individualized 
treatment in chapter 985, these surcharges were not intended to be imposed on 
juveniles.   
ANSTEAD, J., concurs. 
 
 
 
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CANTERO, J., dissenting. 
 
I would apply the plain meaning of the statutes and answer “yes” to the 
certified question.  I would therefore approve the district court’s decision in this 
case, see V.K.E. v. State, 902 So. 2d 343, 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), as well as 
other courts that have upheld imposition of statutory surcharges in delinquency 
proceedings.  See, e.g., State v. J.C., 916 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); S.L.G. v. 
State, 912 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); S.S.M. v. State, 898 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2004).  As these courts consistently have found, the statutes at issue are 
unambiguous and therefore must be applied as written. 
 
The majority instead concludes that sections 938.08 and 938.085, Florida 
Statutes (2001, 2003), do not apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings.  Majority 
op. at 10.  It relies on “the overriding indications of legislative intent discussed by 
Judge Sharp” in her specially concurring opinion in V.K.E.  Majority op. at 3.  The 
legislative intent is far from clear, however, and certainly is insufficient to trump 
the plain language of the statutes.  Therefore, I must dissent.       
 
In the following discussion, I will (A) analyze the plain meaning of the 
statutes and conclude that they apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings; and (B) 
address the majority’s arguments for a contrary interpretation.        
 
 
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A.  The Plain Meaning of the Statutes 
The surcharges at issue were mandated under sections 938.08 and 938.085, 
Florida Statutes (2001, 2003), which state in relevant part:   
938.08  Additional cost to fund programs in domestic 
violence.—In addition to any sanction imposed for a violation of . . . 
s. 784.03, . . . the court shall impose a surcharge of $201.  Payment of 
the surcharge shall be a condition of probation, community control, or 
any other court-ordered supervision. . . . 
 
938.085  Additional cost to fund rape crisis centers.—In 
addition to any sanction imposed when a person pleads guilty or nolo 
contendere to, or is found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, a 
violation of . . . s. 784.03, . . . the court shall impose a surcharge of 
$151.  Payment of the surcharge shall be a condition of probation, 
community control, or any other court-ordered supervision.  
 
 
The issue is whether sections 938.08 and 938.085 apply in juvenile 
delinquency proceedings.  This issue is purely one of statutory interpretation.  
Although legislative intent guides our analysis, see Knowles v. Beverly Enters.-
Fla., Inc., 898 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 2004), to determine that intent we look first to the 
statute’s plain meaning.  State v. Dugan, 685 So. 2d 1210, 1212 (Fla. 1996).  “The 
cardinal rule of statutory construction is ‘that a statute should be construed so as to 
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the 
statute.’”  City of Tampa v. Thatcher Glass Corp., 445 So. 2d 578, 579 (Fla. 1984) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Deltona Corp. v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 220 So. 2d 
905, 907 (Fla. 1969)).  “[W]hen the language of the statute is clear and 
unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for 
 
 
- 18 -
resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction . . . .”  Holly v. 
Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 
137 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1931)).  “[T]he legislative intent must be derived from the 
words used without involving incidental rules of construction or engaging in 
speculation as to what the judges might think that the legislators intended or should 
have intended.”  Tropical Coach Line, Inc. v. Carter, 121 So. 2d 779, 782 (Fla. 
1960).  “[T]he statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.”  Holly, 450 
So. 2d at 219 (quoting McRainey, 137 So. at 159).  Thus, the statute’s text is the 
most reliable and authoritative expression of the Legislature’s intent. 
Under the plain language of the statutes in question, sections 938.08 and 
938.085, they apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings.  Section 938.08 states, 
without exception, that “[i]n addition to any sanction imposed for a violation of . . . 
s. 784.03, . . . the court shall impose a surcharge of $201.”  (Emphasis added.)  The 
statute thus requires the trial court to impose this surcharge on anyone, juvenile or 
otherwise, who violates section 784.03 (or any of the other statutes enumerated in 
section 938.08).  This language is clear, definite, and unambiguous.  Juveniles, as 
well as adults, can violate the law.  Because V.K.E. pled nolo contendere to simple 
battery under section 784.03, under section 938.08 she committed a “violation of 
. . . s. 784.03.” 
 
 
- 19 -
That the court withheld adjudication of delinquency does not change the 
analysis.  As one court has said, “[i]n a juvenile proceeding, a finding that the child 
has committed a delinquent act or violation of law occurs when the court withholds 
adjudication of delinquency and when the court adjudicates [a] child delinquent.”  
State v. Menuto, 912 So. 2d 603, 606 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (emphasis added) (citing 
§ 985.228(4), Fla. Stat. (2002)).  Therefore, notwithstanding the trial court’s 
withholding of adjudication in this case, V.K.E. committed a “violation of law.”   
 
Section 938.085 contains similar language.  It provides that “[i]n addition to 
any sanction imposed when a person pleads . . . nolo contendere to . . . a violation 
of . . . s. 784.03, . . . the court shall impose a surcharge of $151.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  In this case, the State originally charged V.K.E. with felony battery under 
section 784.041, Florida Statutes (2002).  However, the State and V.K.E. later 
agreed to a plea bargain.  To avoid a possible conviction of felony battery, she pled 
nolo contendere to a violation of section 784.03—simple battery.  This plea placed 
her within the ambit of section 938.085 because she pled “nolo contendere to . . . a 
violation of . . . s. 784.03.”  The statute requires the trial court to impose this $151 
surcharge on anyone who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a violation of section 
784.03 (or any of the other statutes enumerated in section 938.08).  The statute 
contains no exceptions for juveniles. 
 
 
- 20 -
 
In addition, sections 938.08 and 938.085 explicitly state that “[p]ayment of 
the surcharge shall be a condition of probation . . . or any other court-ordered 
supervision.”  (Emphasis added.)  The trial court’s disposition order did impose the 
surcharges as a condition of probation.  The order includes, among the twenty-
three conditions of V.K.E.’s probation, payment of the surcharges.5  The order 
reflects the language in sections 938.08 and 938.085 that “[p]ayment of the 
surcharge shall be a condition of probation.” 
Because the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the analysis must 
end there.  The plain meaning of sections 938.08 and 938.085 controls.  As a 
majority of this Court recently noted, “[w]hile this may seem simplistic, it is 
nevertheless what is required.”  Knowles, 898 So. 2d at 11-12 (Cantero, J., 
concurring, with three other justices joining).  The majority relies heavily on 
legislative intent, see majority op. at 3, yet “the legislature is assumed to have 
                                          
 
 
5.  The order states in relevant part: 
 
[V.K.E.] is hereby placed on PROBATION under the 
supervision of the Department of Juvenile Justice with the 
conditions specified in this order. 
It is FURTHER ORDERED that [V.K.E.] shall comply with the 
following sanctions. 
. . . 
17. 
Pay $201.00 Domestic Violence costs within sixty (60) 
days from the date of this order. 
18. 
Pay $151.00 to the rape crisis fund within sixty (60) days 
from the date of this order. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
 
- 21 -
expressed its intent through the words found in a statute.”  Zuckerman v. Alter, 615 
So. 2d 661, 663 (Fla. 1993).  When that “language . . . is clear and unambiguous, 
the legislative intent must be derived from the words used without involving rules 
of construction or speculating as to what the legislature intended.”  Id. (emphasis 
added).  Thus, I conclude that a trial judge has the authority to impose the 
surcharges set forth in sections 938.08 and 938.085 on juveniles in delinquency 
proceedings. 
B.  Arguments for Disregarding the Plain Language 
In adopting Judge Sharp’s opinion as its own, the majority offers several 
grounds for disregarding the plain language of the statutes in question: (1) the 
Legislature created a separate juvenile justice system as a distinct rehabilitative 
alternative to the criminal justice system; (2) sections 938.08 and 938.085 do not 
specifically include delinquency proceedings; and (3) section 985.221, Florida 
Statutes (2004), prohibits the imposition of court fees in delinquency cases.  I 
address each argument in turn below, and ultimately conclude that none justifies 
deviating from the plain language. 
1. Juvenile System Separate from Criminal System 
The majority endorses Judge Sharp’s argument that the Legislature “set[] up 
a separate procedure and system for handling juveniles . . . different and apart from 
the adult system.”  Majority op. at 7 (quoting V.K.E., 902 So. 2d at 346 (Sharp, J., 
 
 
- 22 -
concurring specially)).  In this juvenile system (Chapter 985), Judge Sharp argues, 
the “stated public policy . . . is to protect children . . . and to insure their care, 
safety, treatment, education, and rehabilitation.”  Id.  However, such “vague 
notions of a statute’s ‘basic purpose’ are . . . inadequate to overcome the words of 
its text regarding the specific issue under consideration.”  Great-West Life & 
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 220 (2002) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261 (1993)). 
The majority cannot reconcile this characterization of “public policy” with 
section 985.228(4), Florida Statutes (2001), which demonstrates that the purposes 
of the juvenile justice system go beyond “care, safety, treatment, education, and 
rehabilitation” to include punishment as well.  The statute authorizes a judge to 
“enter an order stating the facts upon which its finding is based but withholding 
adjudication of delinquency and placing [the juvenile] in a probation program 
under the supervision of the department.”  Id. (emphasis added).  It outlines the 
court’s authority over juveniles, such as V.K.E., who are not adjudicated 
delinquent: “The court may, as a condition of the [probation] program, impose as a 
penalty component restitution in money or in kind, community service, a curfew 
. . . or other nonresidential punishment appropriate to the offense.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  This list is not exhaustive and leaves other sanctions within the court’s 
discretion. 
 
 
- 23 -
Moreover, whatever purposes one may infer from Chapter 985, they are 
“inadequate to overcome the words of its text.”  Knudson, 534 U.S. at 220.  
Section 985.228(4) does not preclude a court from imposing penalties on juveniles.  
Despite the “public policy underlying Chapter 985,” majority op. at 7 (quoting 
V.K.E., 902 So. 2d at 346 (Sharp, J., concurring specially)), section 985.228(4) 
does not preclude a judge from imposing on juveniles the surcharges in sections 
938.08 and 938.085. 
Nevertheless, the majority, again quoting Judge Sharp, advances two 
additional policy arguments against the imposition of the surcharges.  First, it 
claims that the surcharges bear no rational relationship to the delinquent act in this 
case.  Second, it assumes that in future cases they could be counterproductive.  
Neither of these claims is sufficient to override the plain language of the statutes. 
The majority first argues that these surcharges, which fund domestic 
violence and rape crisis programs, bear no rational relationship to the offense in 
this case—simple battery.  See majority op. at 4 (quoting V.K.E., 902 So. 2d at 345 
(Sharp, J., concurring specially)).  This rationale implies that a surcharge that funds 
a program, such as one for domestic violence, cannot be imposed unless the 
offense triggering the surcharge relates to that program.  No law supports this 
view, and such an interpretation would render several parts of sections 938.08 and 
938.085 inapplicable even to adult offenses.  Cf. Unruh v. State, 669 So. 2d 242, 
 
 
- 24 -
245 (Fla. 1996) (“[C]ourts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute 
meaningless.”).  Many of the offenses triggering the surcharges, enumerated in 
sections 938.08 and 938.085, are unrelated to rape, sexual assault, or domestic 
violence.  See § 784.011, Fla. Stat. (2005) (assault); § 784.021, Fla. Stat. (2005) 
(aggravated assault); § 784.03, Fla. Stat. (2005) (battery); § 784.041, Fla. Stat. 
(2005) (felony battery).  Several are inconsistent with the concept of domestic 
violence, see § 784.082, Fla. Stat. (2005) (assault or battery by person who is being 
detained in a prison, jail, etc.); § 784.048, Fla. Stat. (2005) (stalking), or the 
concept of rape, see § 784.085, Fla. Stat. (2005) (battery of a child by throwing, 
tossing, projecting, or expelling certain fluids or materials).  Accepting Judge 
Sharp’s—now the majority’s—view would require us to prohibit the imposition of 
any surcharges, either upon a juvenile or an adult, when the offense is not directly 
related to the programs being funded.  Yet sections 938.08 and 938.085 require 
that a court “shall impose” the surcharges at issue when they apply.  This 
obligatory language indicates that the Legislature has deemed the surcharges 
appropriate even when the offense charged is unrelated to rape, sexual assault, or 
domestic violence. 
The majority also adopts Judge Sharp’s argument that, “[i]f sections 938.08 
and 938.085 are applicable to juvenile delinquency cases, then all of the costs and 
assessments . . . in Chapter 938 . . . are logically applicable to juveniles.”  Majority 
 
 
- 25 -
op. at 7 (quoting V.K.E., 902 So. 2d at 346 (Sharp, J., concurring specially)).  The 
majority also asserts that because most children are not wage earners, it is the 
parents who will often have to pay these surcharges.  This contention resembles a 
claim that such a result would be unreasonable or ridiculous.   
We will deviate from a statute’s plain language when necessary to avoid an 
absurd result.  “[N]o literal interpretation should be given that lends to an 
unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion . . . .”  State v. Sullivan, 116 So. 255, 261 
(Fla. 1928).  But this exception to the plain meaning rule is intended to be narrow.  
The United States Supreme Court, for example, “rarely invokes such a test to 
override unambiguous legislation.”  Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 
459 (2002).  The fact that the surcharges are imposed on juveniles, who often are 
not wage earners, cannot be considered unreasonable or ridiculous.  A court may 
reasonably contemplate that a juvenile’s parent or guardian can assist her in 
complying with an order to pay surcharges.  Moreover, juveniles such as V.K.E. 
are not incapable of raising these funds themselves.  In this case, the surcharges 
total $352, less than half of the $852.66 of restitution the court ordered (with which 
the majority apparently finds no problem).  Thus, the imposition of the surcharges 
cannot be considered unreasonable or absurd. 
 
 
- 26 -
2. Absence of Express Application to Delinquency Proceedings 
The majority next claims that, unlike certain instances where the Legislature 
has expressly provided for the taxation of costs and surcharges against juveniles, 
sections 938.08 and 938.085 do not specify that they apply to delinquency 
proceedings.  See majority op. at 3.  In particular, the majority relies on Judge 
Sharp’s discussion of section 938.03, Florida Statutes (2003).  See id. at 5, 8 (citing 
V.K.E., 902 So. 2d at 345, 347 (Sharp, J., concurring specially)).  Section 938.03 
states in relevant part: 
Crimes Compensation Trust Fund.— 
(1) Any person pleading guilty or nolo contendere to, or being 
convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for, any felony, misdemeanor, 
delinquent act, or criminal traffic offense under the laws of this state 
or the violation of any municipal or county ordinance which adopts by 
reference any misdemeanor under state law, shall pay as an additional 
cost in the case, in addition and prior to any other cost required to be 
imposed by law, the sum of $50.  Any person whose adjudication is 
withheld shall also be assessed such cost. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  According to the majority, had the Legislature wanted the 
surcharges in sections 938.08 and 938.085 to apply to juveniles, it would have 
explicitly said so.  See majority op. at 3. 
This argument alludes to a principle of statutory construction known as 
“expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the mention of one thing implies the 
exclusion of another.”  Rotemi Realty, Inc. v. Act Realty Co., 911 So. 2d 1181, 
1187 (Fla. 2005) (citing Grenitz v. Tomlian, 858 So. 2d 999, 1002 (Fla. 2003)).  
 
 
- 27 -
The Second District has concluded that the principle does not apply in this context.  
See State v. J.C., 916 So. 2d 847, 849 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (rejecting the juveniles’ 
argument that, because the Legislature did not expressly include juveniles in the 
surcharge statutes, it meant to exclude them).  I agree.   
We use principles of statutory construction to interpret statutes only when 
they are ambiguous.  “[T]he rules of statutory construction are the means by which 
courts seek to determine legislative intent only when that intent is not plain and 
obvious enough to be conclusive.”  Knowles, 898 So. 2d at 10 (emphasis added).  
“If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the legislative intent must 
be derived from the words used without involving rules of construction or 
speculating as to what the legislature intended.”  Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at 663.  
As I have noted above, the language of sections 938.08 and 938.085 is clear and 
unambiguous, and its plain meaning controls. 
Even if we were free to use the canons of statutory construction, the 
principle of expressio unius applies to the mention of things within the same 
statute, and usually within the same sentence.  It does not apply where something 
is mentioned in one statute but not in another.  One cannot infer from the 
Legislature’s explicit application of section 938.03 to juvenile proceedings that the 
absence of such language in sections 938.08 and 938.085 reflects an intent not to 
apply those statutes to juvenile proceedings.  Section 938.03 applies to certain 
 
 
- 28 -
specified areas: “any felony, misdemeanor, delinquent act, or criminal traffic 
offense.”  The principle of expressio unius permits the inference that it does not 
apply to categories not mentioned in that sentence.  On the other hand, the 
language of sections 938.08 and 938.085 does not indicate that the statutes apply 
only to adults, or only in specified proceedings.  Nor does either one specify that, 
for purposes of the statute, only adults can violate any of the enumerated 
provisions.  Instead, they require, without special language, the imposition of these 
surcharges “for a violation of” or “when a person pleads guilty or nolo contendere 
to, or is found guilty of . . . a violation of” any of the enumerated offenses.  See §§ 
938.08, 938.085.  This broad language contains no references to adults that would 
permit the inference that juveniles were intended to be excluded. 
Justice Pariente argues that the majority and Judge Sharp are not applying 
the principle of expressio unius, but “are instead applying an ‘in pari materia’ 
construction by construing these related statutory provisions in harmony with one 
another.”  Specially concurring op. at 12.  But as I noted above, we use canons of 
statutory construction only when statutes are ambiguous.  See Knowles, 898 So. 2d 
at 10; Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at 663.  The language of sections 938.08 and 
938.085 is clear.  Justice Pariente uses the principle of in pari materia not to 
resolve an ambiguity, but to create one.  See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 
561, 586 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s application of 
 
 
- 29 -
the maxim noscitur a sociis to section 2(10) of the Securities Act of 1933 creates 
doubt, instead of reducing it, and arguing that the canon applies only in cases of 
ambiguity).  As the argument goes, because section 938.03 refers to juveniles and 
sections 938.08 and 938.085 do not, it is now unclear (although it was not before) 
whether these statutes apply to juveniles.  Then, by applying an in pari materia 
construction (or, as the majority does, the principle of expressio unius), this newly 
created ambiguity is resolved by using the same language that created it.  I do not 
agree that the canons of construction can be used in the same breath to first create, 
and then resolve, an ambiguity. 
3. Prohibition of Court Fees in Delinquency Cases 
Finally, the majority claims that “the Legislature . . . expressly provid[ed] 
that court fees and costs should not ordinarily be imposed in juvenile proceedings.”  
Majority op. at 3.  It endorses Judge Sharp’s argument that section 985.221, 
Florida Statutes (2004), which prohibits imposition of “court fees” in juvenile 
delinquency cases, applies to the surcharges as well.  Majority op. at 3, 9 (citing 
V.K.E., 902 So. 2d at 347 (Sharp, J., concurring specially)).  The statute provides 
in relevant part: 
Court and witness fees.—In any proceeding under this chapter, court 
fees shall not be charged against, nor witness fees allowed to, any 
party to a delinquency petition or any parent or legal guardian or 
custodian or child named in a summons.  
 
 
 
- 30 -
(Emphasis added.)  The State, however, argues that section 985.221 specifically 
prohibits only fees, not surcharges.  See also S.L.G., 912 So. 2d at 614 (concluding 
that “section 985.221 . . . prohibits only the imposition of court fees in juvenile 
proceedings”). 
The question, then, is whether a “surcharge” is a “court fee” or something 
else.  Neither section 985.221 in particular nor chapter 985 in general defines the 
term “court fees.”  Justice Pariente believes that, because the Legislature failed to 
define these terms, we cannot be sure that their usual meanings and distinctions 
should be applied to sections 938.08, 938.085, and 985.221.  Specially concurring 
op. at 15.  However, both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have 
established that, when the Legislature has not defined a word or term in a statute, 
we should construe it according to its ordinary and common meaning.  Smith v. 
United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229 (1993) (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 
37, 42 (1979)); see also Montgomery v. State, 897 So. 2d 1282, 1285 (Fla. 2005) 
(“[O]ne of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we 
give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless words are defined in 
the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature.”) (quoting Seagrave v. State, 802 
So. 2d 281, 286 (Fla. 2001)).  The plain and ordinary meaning of words can be 
ascertained by reference to a dictionary.  Nehme v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical 
Labs., Inc., 863 So. 2d 201, 205 (Fla. 2003).  
 
 
- 31 -
A dictionary defines the term “fee” as “a charge fixed by law or by an 
institution . . . for certain privileges or services” and “a charge fixed by law for the 
services of a public officer.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 833 
(3d ed. 1993).  The Fifth District has held that, in legal terms, “‘[f]ees’ . . . are 
charges fixed by law for the services of public officers or for the use of some 
privilege under control of the government.”  S.L.G., 912 So. 2d at 614 (citing 
Crawford v. Bradford, 2 So. 782 (Fla. 1887); 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs § 1 (2004)).  It 
distinguishes “fees” from “costs,” which “are statutory allowances recoverable by 
the prevailing party to reimburse the prevailing party for expenses incurred in 
prosecuting or defending the proceeding.”  Id. (citing Golub v. Golub, 336 So. 2d 
693, 694 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)).  No other court in Florida has defined the term 
“court fees.”  The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that, in the 
context of lawsuits, “‘[f]ees’ are generally those amounts paid to a public official, 
such as the clerk of the court, by a party for particular charges typically delineated 
by statute.”  United States v. Idaho ex rel. Dir., Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 508 
U.S. 1, 8 (1993) (citing 10 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay 
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2666 (2d. ed. 1983)).  “Most commonly 
these include such items as docket fees, clerk’s and marshal’s charges, and 
witness’ fees.”  Wright, Miller, & Kane, supra.       
 
 
- 32 -
Section 985.03(14) defines “court” as “the circuit court assigned to exercise 
jurisdiction under this chapter.”  When used with the word “court,” the phrase 
“court fee” connotes a sum fixed by law that is paid or charged for a court’s 
services, particularly those of the marshal or clerk of court.  On the other hand, the 
term “surcharge” is defined as “a charge in excess of the usual or normal amount; 
an additional tax, cost, or impost” and “an additional and usu[ally] excessive 
charge.”  Webster’s at 2299.  In addition, a “fee” is distinguishable from a “cost,” 
which is defined as “the amount or equivalent paid or given or charged or engaged 
to be paid or given for anything bought or taken in barter or for service rendered.”  
Id. at 515.  The plural form “costs” refers to “expenses incurred in litigation . . . 
those payable to the attorney or counsel by his client esp. when fixed by law . . . 
[and] . . . those given by the law or the court to the prevailing against the losing 
party in equity and frequently by statute.”  Id.   
Based on these definitions, the term “court fees” does not include 
surcharges.  While the term “cost,” which generally connotes an amount paid for 
something bought or for services rendered, may include “fees,” which connotes a 
similar amount paid for a service rendered, particularly that of a public officer, a 
“surcharge” refers to an additional or excessive charge, which may be punitive in 
nature.  Based on the ordinary meanings of the terms “fee” and “surcharge,” I 
conclude that section 985.221’s prohibition against charging “court fees” does not 
 
 
- 33 -
prohibit the surcharges set forth in sections 938.05 and 938.085.  To the contrary, 
section 985.228(4), Florida Statutes (2001), which, as I noted earlier, allows a 
court to impose as a penalty component “restitution in money or in kind, 
community service, a curfew . . . or other nonresidential punishment appropriate to 
the offense,” at least implicitly authorizes imposition of surcharges. 
Even assuming that section 985.221 conflicts with sections 938.08 and 
938.085, the latter statutes govern because they were enacted after section 985.221.  
“[I]f statutes are inconsistent or conflict, the last expression of legislative intent, in 
point of time or order, prevails.”  S.S.M., 898 So. 2d at 85 (citing Askew v. 
Schuster, 331 So. 2d 297, 298 (Fla. 1976), and Sharer v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 144 
So. 2d 813, 816-17 (Fla. 1962)) (other citation omitted).  “The last expression of 
the Legislature prevails due to the general presumption that later statutes are 
passed by the Legislature with the knowledge of prior existing laws.”  Id. (citing 
Oldham v. Rooks, 361 So. 2d 140, 143 (Fla. 1978), and J.A. v. State, 633 So. 2d 
108, 110 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)).  Here, sections 938.08 and 938.085 were enacted in 
2001 and 2003, respectively.  Ch. 2001-50, § 5, at 320, Laws of Fla.; ch. 2003-114, 
§ 3, at 729, Laws of Fla.  Section 985.221 (formerly section 39.073) has been in 
effect since 1990, ch. 90-208, § 5, at 1150, Laws of Fla., and was last updated in 
1997.  S.S.M., 898 So. 2d at 85.  The Legislature presumably was aware of section 
985.221 when passing sections 938.08 and 938.085.  See id.  Therefore, sections 
 
 
- 34 -
938.08 and 938.085 represent the last expression of legislative intent and should 
prevail. 
C.  CONCLUSION 
 
I find that the language of the statutes is clear and unambiguous.  I agree 
with the Fifth District’s analysis in this case.  A trial judge has the authority to 
impose the mandatory surcharges provided in sections 938.08 and 938.085 in 
juvenile delinquency proceedings.  Accordingly, I would answer the certified 
question in the affirmative and approve the Fifth District’s decision. 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
 
 
 
BELL, J. dissenting.  
 
 
While I personally prefer the policy-based interpretation advanced by Judge 
Sharp, and now the majority, I believe the plain language of the statute leads to the 
conclusion reached by Justice Cantero.  Absent an argument that this “plain 
language” reading of the statute somehow leads to an absurd result contrary to 
legislative intent, we are limited to that conclusion.  This is especially true in a case 
like this where even the majority acknowledges that we do not really know what 
 
 
- 35 -
the Legislature intended in regard to the question posed.  See majority op. at 3 note 
2. 
As Justice Cantero explains, the plain language of sections 938.08 and 
938.085, Florida Statutes (2001, 2003), should lead us to answer “yes” to the 
certified question.  Neither section 938.083 nor section 938.085 exempts juvenile 
delinquencies from the convictions triggering the mandatory fines imposed in these 
statutes.  The Legislature mandated that section 938.08, Florida Statutes (2005),  
apply “[i]n addition to any sanction imposed for a violation of [the listed statutes]” 
and that section 938.085, Florida Statutes (2005), apply “in addition to any 
sanction imposed when a person pleads guilty or nolo contendere, or is found 
guilty of, regardless of adjudication a violation of [the listed statutes.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  While I agree with the majority’s argument that “the two penal systems 
for handling adults and juveniles are so different and guided by different 
philosophies and goals,” I cannot overlook the fact that the Legislature knew these 
differences when it wrote these statutes, yet chose language encompassing both 
systems. 
Therefore, I join Justice Cantero in his dissent and encourage the Legislature 
to clarify its intent on this significant issue.   
 
 
 
 
- 36 -
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D04-1977 
 
 
(Marion County) 
 
James S. Purdy, Public Defender and Marvin F. Clegg, Assistant Public Defender, 
Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Kristen L. Davenport 
and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent