Title: Herndon v. State
Citation: 563 So. 2d 1065
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: March 23, 1990

563 So. 2d 1065 (1990)
Ex parte State of Alabama.
Re Richard HERNDON, Jr.
v.
STATE.
89-63.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 23, 1990.
*1066 George H. Jones, Birmingham, for respondent.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Gilda B. Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
MADDOX, Justice.
We granted the writ of certiorari in this case to review a holding by the Court of Criminal Appeals that a defendant charged with first degree robbery was entitled to have the jury instructed on the lesser included offense of third degree robbery because there was evidence that the gun he used in the robbery was not loaded. We disagree, and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to that Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Richard Herndon was convicted of first degree robbery; he appealed and raised the issue of whether the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of third degree robbery. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed his conviction, saying that because the evidence was undisputed that the gun Herndon used was unloaded, he had presented evidence tending to rebut the presumption in Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-8-41(b), and was entitled to the instruction on third degree robbery. 563 So. 2d 1063. The facts are fully set forth in the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, but the one fact that most specifically relates to the issue before this Court is the fact that it is undisputed that the gun Herndon used during the robbery was unloaded.
Section 13A-8-41 reads as follows:
Subsection (b) creates a rebuttable presumption that a person is armed with a deadly weapon if he displays what reasonably appears to be a loaded firearm. See commentary to §§ 13A-8-40 through 13A-8-44. "Deadly weapon" is defined in § 13A-1-2(11) as:
During the robbery, Herndon, without question, had a gun and threatened to shoot one of the victims. In short, the evidence was uncontradicted that Herndon used a "deadly weapon," as that term is defined in § 13A-1-2(11). As he ran from the scene, he dropped the bag in which he had put the gun, and the gun was found to have been unloaded. The Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned that this evidence tended to rebut the presumption that Herndon was armed with a deadly weapon and that it thus entitled him to an instruction on third degree robbery. The court's holding appears to be that the definition of robbery in the first degree, which requires the defendant to be "armed with a deadly weapon," requires that when the weapon is a firearm it must be loaded. The court's holding appears to be in conflict with Lidge v. State, 419 So. 2d 610 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. *1067 denied, 419 So. 2d 616 (Ala.1982), wherein the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly stated:
419 So. 2d  at 612-13.
Because of the apparent conflict in the opinion in this case and the holding in Lidge, we granted the writ of certiorari in order to resolve any potential conflict between Lidge and this case.[1] Of course, in Lidge, the evidence of whether the robber's gun was unloaded was in dispute, and the question regarding the entitlement of the defendant to an instruction was not properly preserved, but we do not believe that can detract from the statement in Lidge that "[t]he great weight of authority holds that an unloaded pistol, not used as a bludgeon, is nevertheless a dangerous or deadly weapon for armed-robbery purposes," and the specific holding that "neither the definition of robbery in the first degree, Section 13A-8-41, nor the definition of a `deadly weapon,' Section 13A-1-2(11), requires that the firearm be loaded." It is undisputed that Herndon dropped the bag with the gun in it immediately outside the door of the store and that the gun was found unloaded, and while this is a factual distinction between Lidge and this case, that factual difference does not answer the policy questions of whether an unloaded gun is, or is not, a deadly weapon under § 13A-8-41, and whether a defendant can use evidence that the gun was not loaded, under the provisions of § 13A-8-41(b), to redefine what constitutes first degree robbery when it is not disputed that a firearm was used, albeit unloaded.
Herndon and the Court of Criminal Appeals put a great deal of emphasis on the commentary to §§ 13A-8-40 through 13A-8-44, wherein it is stated:
Of course, a commentary to a statute, while of some persuasive value, is not binding upon the courts. In any event, even though the commentary does refer to the problem with an "unloaded and inoperative... weapon," and does cite statutes from other States, we do not believe the commentary, in any way, calls for a different construction of § 13A-8-41 than is given it by Lidge, and, as we shall hereinafter show, the statutes in other states are sufficiently different as not to be very useful in construing the Alabama statute.
Herndon calls our specific attention to the New York Penal Law, § 160.15, which states:
(Emphasis added.) Herndon cites a number of New York cases holding that an unloaded gun is not a deadly weapon for the purposes of a first degree robbery charge. However, it is important to note that the New York Penal Code explicitly states that proof that the gun was unloaded is an affirmative defense and defines first degree robbery in terms of the defendant's use of a deadly weapon, not in terms of whether what the defendant uses reasonably appears to any person present to be a deadly weapon. The provisions of the Alabama Code defining first degree robbery are different from the provisions of the New York Penal Code, and the statements in the commentary suggesting that § 13A-8-41 is analogous to the New York Penal Code and to other similar codes do not change the fact that our Legislature did not put in the Alabama statute a provision that would allow as an affirmative defense the fact that the gun was not loaded. Indeed, § 13A-8-41(b) relates to those factual situations where any person present reasonably believes that the robber is using a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, not whether the robber is, in fact, "armed with a deadly weapon."
Although the New York statute is easily distinguishable, the armed robbery statutes in Colorado and Michigan are not as dissimilar. In fact, both do read very much like *1069 Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-8-41. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-4-302 (cum. supp. 1989), states:
Mich.Comp. Laws § 750.529, states:
Although the Colorado statute contains terms relating to the subjective perception of the victim or any other person present, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(e)(I) defines "deadly weapon" as including a "firearm, whether loaded or unloaded." Thus, there is no question that under the Colorado statute, an unloaded gun is considered a "deadly weapon," just as it is in Alabama. Lidge, supra.
The Michigan Court of Appeals has made it clear that while an object may not be a "dangerous weapon" in itself, it may support a conviction for armed robbery because it was used in a manner that caused the victim reasonably to believe that the object was a dangerous weapon. In People v. Schofield, 124 Mich.App. 134, 136, 333 N.W.2d 607, 608, reversed on other grounds, 417 Mich. 988, 334 N.W.2d 376 (1983), the court said, "The use of a toy gun, disguised as a real one, may support a conviction for armed robbery." Also, in People v. Brooks, 135 Mich.App. 193, 353 N.W.2d 118 (1984), a conviction for armed robbery under Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.529 was upheld despite the fact that the robber's gun was inoperable at the time of the crime. The court held in People v. Barkley, 151 Mich.App. 234, 390 N.W.2d 705 (1986), that a toy gun was not a "dangerous weapon" but that it did meet the statute's alternative element of whether the victim reasonably believed that the object was a dangerous weapon. The court stated:
151 Mich.App. at 238 n. 2, 390 N.W.2d  at 707 n. 2. Michigan's statute is very similar to our own in that a conviction can be based upon either the robber's use of a deadly weapon or the robber's use of an object that causes the victim or any other person present reasonably to believe that the object is a deadly weapon.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has stated that a "person committing robbery with a toy gun is subject to conviction for first-degree robbery rather than second-degree robbery because he is armed with a `deadly weapon.'" under N.J.Stat.Ann. 2C:11-1(c), which definition includes both weapons capable of actual injury and objects where the victim would be led reasonably to believe the object to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. State v. Gantt, 101 N.J. 573, 585 n. 5, 503 A.2d 849, 855 n. 5 (1986).
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has also held that an unloaded gun is a "dangerous *1070 weapon" under the Louisiana armed robbery statute, despite the fact that Louisiana's armed robbery statute uses only the term "dangerous weapon" and does not include the element of an object used in such a manner as to cause the victim reasonably to believe that the object is a dangerous weapon. State v. Levi, 259 La. 591, 250 So. 2d 751 (1971). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has given an excellent summary of Louisiana law on this subject:
We agree with the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit and the Louisiana Supreme Court. While we think that the presumption in § 13A-8-41(b) can be rebutted (such as by evidence that the gun was obviously a toy), we think that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that evidence that the gun was unloaded can rebut the presumption that it was a "deadly weapon or dangerous instrument." This Court holds that an unloaded gun qualifies as a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument under § 13A-8-41(b), because that statute's concern *1071 is with whether any person present is led "reasonably to believe it to be a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument."
As the Louisiana Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit explained, the use of a gun, loaded or unloaded, can lead to danger, death, and serious bodily injury from a number of sources other than the gun itself. Furthermore, if we should construe the statute to provide that a defendant would be entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense anytime there was some evidence that the gun used was not loaded, where would the line be drawn? What if the defendant had bullets in his pocket, or a full clip in his other hand or in his pocket? Or what if there was evidence that the defendant had a gun with a full clip in it but had not chambered a round at the time of the robbery? Would that be some evidence that the defendant was not "armed with a deadly weapon"?
We hold that the better rule is that an unloaded gun is a "deadly weapon" for the purposes of § 13A-8-41, and that when the evidence shows, as it does in this case, that the defendant was "armed" with a pistol at the time of the robbery, the showing that it was, in fact, not loaded, is not an affirmative defense, nor is it evidence that will entitle the defendant to a lesser included offense instruction.
For the above stated reasons, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and SHORES, ADAMS, HOUSTON, STEAGALL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
JONES, J., dissents.
JONES, Justice (dissenting).
Respectfully, I dissent. Because I agree with the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, I would quash the writ as improvidently granted.
[1]  The Court of Criminal Appeals has also held in Sumpter v. State, 480 So. 2d 608 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985), that the definition of a deadly weapon under § 13A-1-2 and for purposes of the sentence enhancement statute at § 13A-5-6(a)(4) does not require that the firearm be loaded at the time of the offense.