Title: In re Estate of Poole
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 93872
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 17, 2003

Docket No. 93872-Agenda 9-March 2003.
In re ESTATE OF MADISON RAE POOLE (Randy L. Poole, 							Appellee, v. Debra Jean Clausen, Adm'r, Appellant).
Opinion filed October 17, 2003.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	This appeal arises from a decision of the circuit court of Putnam
County denying petitioner Randy L. Poole's petition to revoke letters
of administration issued to respondent, Debra Jean Clausen. The
appellate court reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the
cause for a hearing. 328 Ill. App. 3d 964. We granted Clausen's
petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now affirm the
judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	In 1997, Poole began living with Christina Kay Clausen, the
daughter of respondent Clausen. Poole and Christina subsequently
moved to Virginia, where they maintained a conjugal relationship. In
October 1997, Christina became pregnant. During the early months of
the pregnancy, the couple returned to Illinois, where they continued
to live together. The couple did not marry.
	On May 26, 1998, when Christina was approximately eight
months pregnant, she was involved in an automobile accident and
sustained fatal injuries.(1) Doctors later performed a Caesarean section
operation and delivered a stillborn fetus, who was named Madison
Rae Poole. There is no dispute in this case that the fetus did survive
Christina.
	On September 11, 1998, Clausen filed a petition for letters of
administration in the circuit court of Putnam County for the estate of
Madison Rae Poole. The court issued letters of administration to
Clausen on October 1, 1998. On that same date, the circuit court also
entered an order declaring heirship, identifying as Madison's heirs
Clausen (maternal grandmother), Jon Robert Clausen (maternal
grandfather), Elizabeth Clausen (maternal aunt), and Theresa Clausen
(maternal aunt). The court later amended the order to show that the
only heirs at law were the maternal grandparents.
	At some point during the administration of the estate, and the
record is unclear on this point, a claim for uninsured-motorist benefits
was registered with the insurer of the car Christina was driving at the
time of the accident, Country Companies Mutual Insurance
Company.(2) The matter apparently was settled without resort to
litigation. On November 8, 1999, Clausen sought court approval to
execute the settlement and to distribute the proceeds to the heirs at
law. The proceeds of the settlement were listed as $66,975.50.
	Poole thereafter filed a "Petition to Revoke Letters of
Administration" on November 19, 1999. In the petition, Poole
asserted that he was Madison Rae Poole's natural father and, as such,
was entitled to priority in the granting of letters of administration.
Poole requested that the court revoke the letters of administration
previously granted to Clausen. Poole attached to the petition an
"affidavit of parenthood" in which he swore that he and Christina had
lived together since August 17, 1997, and that Christina became
pregnant with his child in October 1997. Poole also averred that at all
times after the conception, he acknowledged that he was the father of
Christina's unborn child and that he "contributed to the support,
maintenance, and comfort" of Christina. He swore that the couple
lived together as a family unit and that the couple's friends and family
acknowledged that the couple were expecting a child. Poole noted
that the May 26, 1998, automobile accident claimed the life of
Christina and resulted in the death of his unborn child. On June 29,
1998, a "certificate of fetal death" was issued by the local registrar, in
which Poole was listed as the father of the stillborn fetus, whose name
was listed as Madison Rae Poole. A copy of the certificate was also
attached to Poole's petition.
	The circuit court subsequently dismissed Poole's petition with
leave to amend due to lack of standing. Poole later filed an amended
petition. In this petition, Poole reasserted the factual allegations from
his previous pleading, but added that he was, pursuant to section 2-2
of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/2-2 (West 1998)), the sole
surviving "eligible parent" of Madison Rae Poole and that, as such, he
had standing in the matter and was entitled to priority over Clausen in
the granting of letters of administration. Poole requested that
Clausen's letters of administration be revoked and that he be
appointed the administrator of the estate.
	The circuit court denied Poole's petition, ruling that Poole failed
to satisfy the statutory requirements of an eligible parent under section
2-2 of the Probate Act. Because he lacked standing in the matter, the
court denied Poole's petition to revoke the letters of administration of
Clausen and to appoint Poole as administrator. Poole thereafter filed
a motion challenging the constitutionality of section 2-2. The circuit
court denied the motion, upholding the statute's constitutionality, and
Poole appealed.
	The appellate court reversed the circuit court's order and
remanded the cause for a hearing. The appellate court noted that
under the plain language of section 9-3 of the Probate Act, a
biological parent has precedence over a grandparent for letters of
administration. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 969. Based on this statutory
language, the appellate court stated that "it certainly appears that
[Poole's] petition for revocation of the letters of administration should
have been granted." 328 Ill. App. 3d at 969. However, the appellate
court noted that Clausen had argued that Poole was not an eligible
parent under section 2-2 of the Probate Act. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 969.
She objected that Poole lacked standing to object to her appointment
as administrator because he is not a "parent" as that term is used in the
statute. The court disagreed with Clausen's contentions for two
reasons. The court first observed that "the language [of section 2-2]
limits the definition of 'eligible parent' to the particular section of the
Act." 328 Ill. App. 3d at 970. The court then pointed out that section
2-2 had been recently redrafted by the legislature to make it gender-neutral in accordance with this court's decision in In re Estate of
Hicks, 174 Ill. 2d 433 (1996). The appellate court reasoned that if a
mother can qualify as an "eligible parent" under the statute, then so
too should a biological father even if he is not married to the mother.
328 Ill. App. 3d at 970. After reviewing the plain language of the
statute, its legislative history and the facts of the case, the appellate
court concluded that "it appears that [Poole] could qualify as an
eligible parent" under the Probate Act. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 970.
	The appellate court also pointed out that it believed that the
Wrongful Death Act was pertinent to the issues in this case. 328 Ill.
App. 3d at 971. The court noted that in Illinois, under the Wrongful
Death Act, an unborn fetus is recognized as a person to the extent that
a rebuttable presumption for loss of society existed for the parents of
a stillborn child. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 971. The court acknowledged that
no such wrongful-death action was filed in this case, but nevertheless
concluded that Poole could have brought such a claim for the death
of Madison. Moreover, "[i]f [Poole] had a legitimate wrongful death
claim, it would appear that he, rather than the grandmother, would
have priority for letters of administration for any estate created by
advancing that claim." 328 Ill. App. 3d at 971. Recognizing that the
legitimacy of such a claim is dependent upon Poole's ability to prove
that he was Madison's biological father, the court remanded the
matter to the circuit court for a hearing. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 971. In so
holding, the appellate court noted that section 2-2 of the Probate Act
was constitutional in that it was gender-neutral. 328 Ill. App. 3d at
971-72.
ANALYSIS
	As an initial matter, we note that our resolution of this case has
been hampered by the state of the record. At times, it appears
Christina was involved in a single-car accident. At other times, the
record suggests that the accident involved multiple vehicles. Although
it appears reasonably clear that an insurance settlement was reached
between the Clausens and the insurer pursuant to an uninsured-motorist policy, the current status of these funds is not readily
ascertainable. The settlement apparently was reached without resort
to the filing of any wrongful-death actions and, as a result, no estates
for either Christina or Madison were created under our Wrongful
Death Act. See 740 ILCS 180/2 (West 1998). We questioned both
parties at oral argument regarding the origin of these funds. No
satisfactory answer has been provided by either counsel. All we can be
certain of is the fact that a check was issued from the insurer with
respect to the death of Madison Rae Poole. Moreover, we note that
this same lack of information concerned the appellate court, which
ordered the parties to brief the issue of whether a viable fetus has the
ability to have a probate estate. The appellate court, however, did not
address this issue in its opinion, but rather, as we have pointed out,
noted the applicability of the Wrongful Death Act to the facts of the
case.
	 We conclude, from the limited record in this matter, that the
probate estate at issue in this case was opened as a means to distribute
the proceeds from the insurance payout following the accident.
Moreover, it appears to us that the insurance proceeds paid out in this
matter were in the nature of wrongful-death proceeds. We therefore
believe it was correct for a probate estate to be created under these
circumstances. Illinois law allows for "damages where the nearly full-term child dies before birth" under the Wrongful Death Act. Seef v.
Sutkus, 145 Ill. 2d 336, 339 (1991). Not all wrongful-death cases,
however, result in a filing of an action under the Wrongful Death Act,
and not all claims need be pursued by an administrator appointed
solely under that act. See 740 ILCS 180/2.1 (West 1998) (stating that
if the only asset in a deceased's estate is a cause of action for wrongful
death "and no petition for letters of office for his or her estate has
been filed," the court upon motion of any person who would be
entitled to a recovery under the Wrongful Death Act "without opening
of an estate" may appoint a special administrator for the deceased
party). However, once a probate estate has been opened, a special
administrator may not be appointed under the Wrongful Death Act.
See Kubian v. Alexian Brothers Medical Center, 272 Ill. App. 3d 246
(1995). The circuit court, under the Probate Act, then has the power
to approve the distribution of any settlement that becomes an asset of
the decedent's estate. See In re Estate of Redeker, 210 Ill. App. 3d
769 (1991).
	The circuit court here appointed Clausen administrator, under the
Probate Act, for purposes of distribution of the proceeds of the
settlement in October 1998. At that time, the estate contained over
$60,000 in proceeds. Pursuant to the Probate Act, Clausen gave
notice to all potential claimants to Madison's estate. One year later,
Poole appeared in the action to contest the issuance of letters to
Clausen and to have himself declared Madison's sole heir at law. We,
therefore, will look to the Probate Act in order to resolve the issues
before us.(3)
	The question we must answer in this case, and the sole question
that was raised by Poole in his petition for revocation of letters, is
relatively a straightforward one: Who has legal precedence to act as
the administrator in this estate? Because this question involves the
construction of statutes, we review the circuit court's determination
de novo. Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 516 (1998).
	Section 9-3 of the Probate Act provides a list of persons entitled
to preference in obtaining letters. 755 ILCS 5/9-3 (West 1998). The
Probate Act follows the general rule that prefers surviving spouses
and descendants over anteceding relatives. Madison, of course, has no
surviving spouse or descendants. If, as in this case, no surviving
spouse or descendants exist, subsection (e) provides that "the parents"
shall act as administrator. 755 ILCS 5/9-3(e) (West 1998). Subsection
(f) then lists brothers and sisters (755 ILCS 5/9-3(f) (West 1998)),
and subsection (g) lists "nearest kindred" in descending order of
preference (755 ILCS 5/9-3(g) (West 1998)).
	Clausen maintains that she, as grandmother, has preference over
Poole because Poole cannot establish paternity under Illinois law.
Moreover, the parties disagree over how the term "parent" as used in
section 9-3 should be defined. Poole points to section 2-2 of the
Probate Act, which controls the distribution of an intestate
illegitimate's estate and argues the statute allows parents to inherit
from an illegitimate person, just as parents may inherit from a
legitimate person, if the illegitimate's parents are "eligible." 755 ILCS
5/2-2 (West 1998). Section 2-2 states:
		"As used in this Section, 'eligible parent' means a parent of
the decedent who, during the decedent's lifetime,
acknowledged the decedent as the parent's child, established
a parental relationship with the decedent, and supported the
decedent as the parent's child." 755 ILCS 5/2-2 (West
1998).
According to Poole, he can also serve as administrator under section
9-3 because he satisfies the definition of an "eligible parent" for
purposes of inheritance under section 2-2.
	The problems with Poole's argument, however, are twofold.
First, it is not at all clear that the term "parent," as it is used in section
9-3, is interchangeable with the term "eligible parent," as it is used in
section 2-2. In interpreting statutes, this court must ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the legislature when it enacted the statute. We
have long recognized that it is the language of the statute itself which
provides the best indication of the drafter's intent. Kirwan v. Welch,
133 Ill. 2d 163, 165 (1989). It is important to stress that the General
Assembly limited the term "eligible parent" to section 2-2 alone. If the
legislature would have intended the term "eligible parent" to be used
throughout the Probate Act, it would have included it within the
definition sections of the Act. See 755 ILCS 5/1-2 through 1-2.24
(West 1998) (defining terms used in the Probate Act). We know of no
rule of construction that allows a court to declare that the legislature
did not mean what the plain language of a statute imports. See
Cardwell v. Rockford Memorial Hospital, 136 Ill. 2d 271, 278
(1990). In our view, there is simply no indication that the legislature
intended for the term "eligible parent" to be used outside of section
2-2. For that reason, the use of the term is limited to establishing
whether the parents of an illegitimate child can inherit from that child
upon his or her death. We will not presume another use for the term
in the absence of legislative intention. Therefore, section 2-2 is of no
relevance in determining whether Poole is a "parent" within the
meaning of section 9-3 such that he takes precedence over Clausen
for purposes of administering the estate of Madison Rae Poole.
	Second and more importantly, the term "eligible parent"
presupposes parental relationship between the child and the parent. In
other words, one must be a parent in the first instance in order to
prove oneself an "eligible parent." Only "parents" can be "eligible
parents." By claiming he is an "eligible parent," Poole is assuming that
he is a "parent." In our view, both section 2-2 and section 9-3 share
a requirement that one must be a "parent." We note that the Probate
Act does not define the term "parents." The Illinois Parentage Act of
1984, however, provides us with guidance in this area. By its terms,
the Parentage Act applies to "any civil action *** if parentage is at
issue." 750 ILCS 45/9 (West 1998). As the appellate court has
recognized,
		" '[P]arentage is at issue' whenever a parent and child
relationship is the basis for some 'right, privilege, duty or
obligation' [citation], but such a relationship has not been
established (or presumed) as provided for in the Parentage
Act. Simply because no party disputes biological parentage
is not a sufficient basis for concluding that a case is not one
where 'parentage is at issue.' " Kapp v. Alexander, 218 Ill.
App. 3d 412, 416 (1991).
Section 2 of the Parentage Act states that "[a]s used in this Act,
'parent and child relationship' means the legal relationship existing
between a child and his natural or adoptive parents incident to which
the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations.
It includes *** the father and child relationship." 750 ILCS 45/2
(West 1998). Our appellate court has held that the legislature "used
the expressions 'parent and child relationship,' *** and 'father and
child relationship' as terms of art" throughout the Parentage Act as a
whole in order to "refer to something more than simply biological
relationships and are meant to include the legal relationships." Kapp,
218 Ill. App. 3d at 416. The right of a parent to serve as an
administrator of his or her child's estate (and inherit from the child)
derives from the parent and child relationship. We therefore believe
that the question regarding the order of preference for the
administration of this estate presents as an issue the parentage of
Madison and that the Parentage Act is the statutory mechanism that
serves to legally establish parent and child relationships in Illinois.
	Section 4 of the Parentage Act states:
			"How Parent and Child Relationship Established. The
parent and child relationship between a child and
			***
			*** the natural father may be established under this
Act[.]" 750 ILCS 45/4 (West 1998).
Paternity can be established by a number of means under the
Parentage Act. For example, section 5 of the Parentage Act contains
a list of circumstances under which fatherhood may be presumed. See
750 ILCS 45/5 (West 1998). However, none of those circumstances
exist in this case, so Poole cannot be presumed by law to be
Madison's natural father. Therefore, it must be judicially determined
that Poole was Madison's father if he is to be appointed administrator
over Clausen.
	 Poole acknowledges the relevance of the Paternity Act and
argues that he has presented evidence which establishes his parentage
of Madison under the Act. Poole maintains that he signed an affidavit
in which he acknowledges that he was the father of Christina's child.
He points to the certificate of fetal death, which lists him as the natural
father, and argues that these facts are undisputed. Indeed, much of
Poole's argument in this court is based on statements like the
following: "It is clear that Randy Poole was the biological father of
Madison Rae Poole, that he established a parental relationship with
the child, and that as the biological father he is the sole surviving
parent." However, while all of this may be true, Poole is not, as of
now, recognized as such in the legal sense. Poole claims he
established a parent/child relationship by consent pursuant to section
6 of the Parentage Act because he signed "a voluntary
acknowledgment of parentage in accordance with section [12] of the
Vital Records Act," i.e., the fetal death certificate. Poole maintains
that he also complied with the requirements of section 6 by filing an
affidavit of parentage in this probate action. We disagree.
	Section 6 of the Parentage Act refers to section 12 of the Vital
Records Act. See 750 ILCS 45/6(a) (West 1998). Section 12 of that
act pertains only to live births and the certificates that attend to such
events. 410 ILCS 535/12 (West 1998). It does not include fetal death
certificates. Moreover, section 12 does not speak of affidavits of
parentage such as what was filed in this case. 410 ILCS 535/12 (West
1998). We therefore conclude that none of Poole's unilateral actions
alone satisfy the statutory criteria to establishing paternity by consent
under section 6 of the Parentage Act.
	In our view, it is section 7 of the Parentage Act that is applicable
to this case. Section 7 allows for a man "alleging himself to be the
father of the child or expected child" to bring an action by verified
complaint. 750 ILCS 45/7 (West 1998). Under this section, a hearing
is held and a finding of the court is entered as to paternity. Like the
appellate court, we believe that this case must be remanded for a
hearing in which Poole may establish his paternity of Madison
pursuant to section 7 of the Parentage Act.
	Clausen, however, maintains that such a hearing would be
inappropriate because the Parentage Act only serves to establish
paternity in cases where a living, illegitimate child has been born: "The
only method to establish parentage of an illegitimate is following
birth." In support of this statement, she points to subsection (e) of
section 7, which states that if an action is brought under section 7
"before the birth of the child, all proceedings shall be stayed until after
the birth, except for service or process, the taking of depositions to
perpetuate testimony, and the ordering of blood tests under
appropriate circumstances." 750 ILCS 45/7(e) (West 1998). We do
not read this language as preventing a determination of parentage in
cases such as this. The Paternity Act does not contain a definition of
the word "birth." In such cases, when interpreting statutes, this court
gives undefined words their plain and ordinary meaning. See Granite
City Division of National Steel Co. v. Illinois Pollution Control
Board, 155 Ill. 2d 149, 181 (1993). Webster's Dictionary defines
"birth" as "the act of coming forth from the womb" (Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 221 (1986)) and defines "stillbirth" as
the "birth of a dead fetus." Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 2243 (1986). With respect to the word "stillbirth,"
Webster's urges the reader to compare it with "live birth," which it
defines as a "birth in such a state that acts of life are manifested after
the extrusion of the whole body."  Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1324 (1986). Accordingly, a stillbirth is by definition a
"birth." In our view, subsection (e) refers only to staying proceedings
while the fetus remains in utero.
	In light of the above, we agree with the appellate court, albeit for
different reasons, that a hearing to determine whether Poole was
Madison's natural father is appropriate in this case. At such a hearing,
Poole is free to adduce the evidence he has presented here to establish
his paternity. We also note that the record makes clear that DNA
testing in this case is readily available because tissue samples have
been preserved. If it is determined that Poole is Madison's parent, i.e.,
father, he would, pursuant to section 9-3, take precedence over
Clausen for the administering of letters of the estate, which was the
procedural question raised by the petition filed by Poole in the circuit
court. Moreover, by requiring Poole to establish his parentage under
the Parentage Act, we have guarded, to an extent, against the danger
of fraudulent claims of paternity being asserted in cases such as this.
	We caution that our resolution of this matter is not meant to
answer the question of whether Poole was an "eligible parent" under
section 2-2 of the Probate Act, for purposes of inheriting from
Madison. Although we do not determine whether Poole is an "eligible
parent" as defined in section 2-2 because that question is not
technically before us, we will comment on the issue briefly so as to
provide guidance to the lower courts. Clausen has maintained
throughout the course of this litigation that under the plain language
of section 2-2, Poole does not qualify as an eligible parent because
Madison never lived. Thus, according to Clausen, Poole could not
have met any of the statute's requirements "during the decedent's
lifetime." We reject this argument. Illinois law allows parents to
recover for the wrongful death of a fetus. See Seef, 145 Ill. 2d 336. In
Seef, we recognized that the parents of a stillborn baby are presumed
to have suffered a loss of the child's society. In so doing, we rejected
the argument that a parent and child relationship cannot be realized
during gestation. We have previously noted that, under the Wrongful
Death Act, "next of kin" determinations for purposes of damages
distributions are guided by the rules of intestacy as set forth in the
Probate Act. To interpret section 2-2 as Clausen suggests would deny
illegitimate fathers the means to recover for the wrongful death of
their stillborn children. We will not construe section 2-2 in such a
manner. Section 2-2 evinces our General Assembly's intent to allow
only the parents of illegitimate children who have demonstrated an
interest in their illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession,
which is a legitimate state interest. See In re Estate of Hicks, 174 Ill. 2d  at 440-41. As our appellate court has aptly noted,
		"While section 2-2 of the Probate Act governs the rules of
inheritance, we understand that the 'eligibility' requirements
of section 2-2 may overlap with those factors considered by
the trial court when determining the degree of dependency
under the Wrongful Death Act. Both the eligibility
requirements of section 2-2 of the Probate Act and the
determination of the degree-of-dependancy requirement of
section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act address similar policy
concerns, namely, preventing absentee parents from obtaining
more than the share to which they are entitled." Johnson, 334
Ill. App. 3d at 593.
We therefore reject Clausen's contention that, because stillborn
fetuses never live, illegitimate fathers of stillborns cannot establish
themselves as "eligible parents" under section 2-2. We do not believe
that the legislature intended section 2-2 to have the blanket effect of
debarring all illegitimate fathers from recovering for the wrongful
deaths of their stillborn children. We read section 2-2 simply as a
method of insuring that such fathers must prove that they are parents
in more than the genetic sense, i.e., that they are "eligible," before
they can take under the line of intestate distribution. We note that our
conclusion as to this matter avoids Poole's suggestion that Clausen's
position renders section 2-2 unconstitutional in that it discriminates
against the fathers of illegitimate stillborns. See People v. Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d 441, 448 (1998) (holding that court has a duty to construe a
statute in a manner that upholds its validity and constitutionality if it
can reasonably do so).
CONCLUSION
	In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the appellate court,
reversing the order of the circuit court, is affirmed, and the cause is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consonant with
this opinion.
Appellate court judgment affirmed;
cause remanded.
1.   The record is unclear as to the details surrounding this accident. At various points,
	the accident is described as having been a single-car accident. Clausen, in her appellate brief submitted to this court, refers to
	Christina being involved in an automobile accident "by an uninsured automobile driver." This is consistent with her statement
	of facts contained in the supplemental brief she filed in the appellate court pursuant to that court's order. In that brief, Clausen
	referred to a "Joshua Bird" as being the other driver involved in Christina's accident and gave a citation to a page in the
	record in support of that fact. However, there is no reference to "Joshua Bird" or any other vehicle at the page in the record
	identified by Clausen. Poole's statement of facts does not contain any details of the accident whatsoever.           
 

2.   The record makes clear that no wrongful-death action was ever filed with respect to the
	automobile accident at issue in this case. It appears from the record that Christina was driving an automobile insured by her father,
	Jon Clausen. At various hearings held in the circuit court, the insurer's representative identified himself as Jon Clausen's
	insurer. However, in the statement of facts contained in her supplemental appellate court brief, Clausen stated that the car was owned
	and insured by Christina. The statements of fact contained in the briefs submitted in this court do not refer to the car's owner in
	any way. The pleadings filed by the parties in the circuit court do not provide illumination on this point. On the current state of the
	record, all we can say with certainty is that the insurer made two payments consistent with the limits of liability contained in the
	policy covering the car. One payment was made with respect to Christina, and the second was made with respect to Christina's child.
3.
	 We point out, that even if this case had proceeded under the Wrongful Death Act, the Probate Act would necessarily
	have been implicated. The Wrongful Death Act awards compensation to the "next of kin" of a decedent. "Next of kin"
	are those blood relatives of the decedent who are in existence at the time of the decedent's death who take the decedent's property
	if the decedent had died intestate. See Johnson v. Provena St. Therese Medical Center, 334 Ill. App. 3d 581, 591 (2002). The
	rules of intestate succession are governed by our Probate Act. See 755 ILCS 5/21 (West 1998). The acts therefore share a mutuality of
	purpose that we take into account in deciding this matter.