Title: Commonwealth v. Chicas
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-10986
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 30, 2019

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SJC-10986 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  FREDYS ALEXANDER CHICAS. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 9, 2018. - January 30, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Confrontation of witnesses.  
Evidence, Cross-examination.  Due Process of Law, 
Interpreter.  Practice, Criminal, Confrontation of 
witnesses, Interpreter, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 28, 2006. 
 
 
The case was tried before Margaret R. Hinkle, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on May 15, 2015, was considered by 
Christine M. Roach, J. 
 
 
 
Janet H. Pumphrey for the defendant. 
 
Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Fredys 
Alexander Chicas, of murder in the first degree by extreme 
atrocity or cruelty as a joint venturer for the killing of the 
victim.  We consolidated the defendant's direct appeal with his 
2 
 
appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial.  On 
appeal, the defendant contends that (1) he was denied his 
constitutional right to confront witnesses when the judge 
prohibited him from cross-examining several of the 
Commonwealth's witnesses on their citizenship statuses; and (2) 
the use of multiple interpreters by the judge violated his 
constitutional right to due process. 
 
For the reasons stated infra, we affirm the defendant's 
conviction and the denial of the defendant's motion for a new 
trial.  After a thorough review of the record, we also decline 
to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant a 
new trial or to reduce the verdict of murder in the first 
degree. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts that the jury could 
have found, reserving pertinent facts for the discussion of the 
defendant's arguments.  On Christmas Eve in 2005, the victim and 
the defendant attended a party at Jose Castillo's house in 
Chelsea.  At some point in the evening, the victim, who was 
intoxicated, made inappropriate comments to the defendant's girl 
friend, Catea Travassas, and her sister, Lisette Santos.  The 
victim also touched Travassas's buttocks.  The defendant 
3 
 
intervened and implored the victim not to disrespect Travassas.1  
Eventually, tempers boiled over and the defendant punched the 
victim in the face.  The fight escalated and other partygoers 
got involved, including the defendant's coventurer, Jesus 
Villanueva.  The men brought the victim outside the house, where 
they hit him with bottles of beer. 
After the fight, the victim ran away.  He returned a short 
time later looking for his cellular telephone.  He was not 
allowed back into the house, and a few men, including the 
defendant, went outside and began to kick the victim.  As a 
result, the victim left and returned again.  He started smashing 
Castillo's vehicle with rocks, a bottle, and a stick.  The 
defendant and Villanueva confronted the victim.  The defendant 
was armed with a baseball bat.  The defendant beat the victim 
with the bat, and Villanueva kicked him.  The victim ran away, 
but the defendant and Villanueva pursued him.  The men caught 
the victim in a parking lot that was one and one-half blocks 
away.  The defendant and Villanueva beat him with the bat and a 
stick then "left [him] . . . [a]ll bloodied on the ground." 
 
Approximately ten to fifteen minutes later, the defendant 
and Villanueva returned to the party with blood on their 
                     
 
1 There was evidence that the victim and the defendant were 
arguing because the victim owed the defendant money or stole 
forty dollars from him. 
4 
 
clothing.  Castillo gave the defendant clean clothes and told 
him to change.  The defendant stated:  "I killed him"; "[w]e 
killed [him]"; and "don't talk about this."  When Santos started 
crying, the defendant responded, "You don't have to be crying 
for that mother fucker." 
 
After he changed his clothes, the defendant, Villanueva, 
the sisters, and another partygoer, Ricardo Mendoza, left the 
party.  On the way to Mendoza's house, the defendant stopped his 
vehicle underneath a nearby bridge to retrieve the baseball bat 
used against the victim.  The defendant was concerned that his 
fingerprints were on the bat.  The defendant gave the bat to 
Mendoza and told him to hide it at his residence.  The defendant 
threatened Santos, telling her that he would run her over if she 
told the police what had happened. 
The defendant and Villanueva then returned to the parking 
lot.  Upon arriving, the men realized that the victim was alive.  
The victim was speaking and moving.  For the next ten minutes, 
the defendant hit the victim on the back and Villanueva hit him 
on the head.  The defendant later told Santos that, "We [had] to 
kill him so he [would] not say anything." 
The next morning, Santos witnessed Villanueva burning a 
wooden stick.  Villanueva claimed that the stick had blood on 
it.  Villanueva packed a bag of his belongings, and the 
defendant picked him up and took him to the bus station.  
5 
 
Villanueva said that he was going to San Francisco and then 
returning to his native El Salvador.  Although Villanueva was 
indicted for murder, he has not been seen since he left for San 
Francisco. 
A few days later, the defendant, Travassas, Santos, and her 
boyfriend fled to New Jersey.  During the trip, the defendant 
reiterated his threat to the group that no one should talk to 
the police or the same thing that happened to the victim would 
happen to them. 
Two weeks later, the defendant turned himself in to the 
police.  He told the others that he would tell the police that 
Villanueva killed the victim. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Confrontation rights.  In his direct 
appeal, the defendant contends that the judge violated his right 
to confrontation by limiting the cross-examination of several of 
the Commonwealth's witnesses.  He argues that because a 
defendant is entitled to a reasonable cross-examination of a 
prosecution witness for the purpose of showing bias, the judge 
abused her discretion by precluding him from inquiring about the 
citizenship or immigration status of certain witnesses.  The 
Commonwealth asserts that the judge properly exercised her 
discretion in limiting cross-examination because the citizenship 
or immigration status of the witnesses was not relevant.  We 
review the judge's decision to limit the defendant's cross-
6 
 
examination for an abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth v. 
McGhee, 472 Mass. 405, 426 (2015). 
 
The Commonwealth anticipated that six or seven of its 
witnesses would be undocumented immigrants.  The Commonwealth 
disclosed that during trial preparation, a detective told one of 
those witnesses that the detective would be willing to write him 
a letter if he decided to apply for United States citizenship in 
the future.  At trial, the defendant sought to ask all of the 
Commonwealth's witnesses whether they were citizens of the 
United States in an attempt to put forth the inference that they 
were undocumented and, because they were undocumented, they may 
be inclined to cooperate with the Commonwealth.  When defense 
counsel began to cross-examine the first such witness, he asked 
whether the witness was a citizen of the United States.  The 
Commonwealth objected, and the judge sustained the objection.  
During a sidebar discussion, the judge ruled that she would 
permit the defendant to probe a witness's citizenship status "in 
any instance where [he knew or had a good faith basis in 
believing that] there ha[d] been any discussion with any member 
of law enforcement about [the witness's] citizenship status."  
The judge allowed the defendant to explore "any conceivable 
bias" by asking whether a witness had "ever had any discussion 
with any of the police officers or the prosecutors in this case 
about [his or] her citizenship status."  If the witness answered 
7 
 
yes, and established a foundation for further inquiry, the judge 
would decide how much further the defendant would be permitted 
to explore. 
 
The judge noted that the defendant did not have any legal 
authority to support his position that he should be allowed to 
question whether a witness was an undocumented immigrant on 
cross-examination.  She concluded: 
"[T]his is not a case where there is any evidence at all 
that any of these witnesses are testifying voluntarily for 
the Commonwealth.  In other words, there is no potential 
hint here of an effort to curry favor from the 
Commonwealth; to the contrary.  The record reflects, based 
on what I know pretrial, that there was an unwillingness -- 
I don't want to overstate this, but that there was an 
unwillingness on the part of the illegal aliens to 
cooperate with the government and testify, which seems to 
me to be logical. . . .  So, again, my decision is grounded 
on the fact there is no controlling authority at the 
appellate level in the Commonwealth and the fact that in my 
view, the relevance, in terms of bias, is only tenuous; 
it's marginal, and that permitting that inquiry would be 
outweighed by the potentially harassing nature of this in 
terms of the witnesses." 
 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights entitle a 
defendant to cross-examine prosecution witnesses for bias or 
prejudice.  Commonwealth v. Avalos, 454 Mass. 1, 6–7 (2009), 
citing Commonwealth v. Allison, 434 Mass. 670, 681 (2001).  A 
judge may not "bar all inquiry into the subject" if the 
defendant demonstrates "a possibility" of bias.  Commonwealth v. 
Magadini, 474 Mass. 593, 604 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Tam 
8 
 
Bui, 419 Mass. 392, 400, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 861 (1995).  The 
right to cross-examination, however, "is not without limits, and 
it 'must be accommodated to other legitimate interests.'"  
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 431 Mass. 535, 540 (2000), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Clifford, 374 Mass. 293, 305 (1978).  Those 
limits are "based on concerns about . . . harassment, prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, the witness's safety, or interrogation 
that is repetitive or only marginally relevant" (citation 
omitted).  Johnson, supra.  Moreover, a judge has discretion to 
limit questions that involve collateral issues and questions 
where the connection to the evidence of bias is too speculative.  
Avalos, supra at 7.  "A defendant must make a 'plausible 
showing' of alleged bias, with a factual basis for support"; 
otherwise, the judge may restrict or entirely exclude the 
inquiry.  Commonwealth v. Sealy, 467 Mass. 617, 624 (2014), 
quoting Tam Bui, supra at 401.  The judge has broad discretion 
to determine the scope and extent of cross-examination.  See 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 478 Mass. 65, 73 (2017); Commonwealth v. 
Meas, 467 Mass. 434, 450, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 150 (2014). 
 
The defendant asks this court to hold that a witness's 
status as an undocumented immigrant impugns that witness's 
credibility -- even without the specifically articulated 
expectation of favorable treatment with respect to his or her 
citizenship status.  The defendant contends that he should be 
9 
 
able to draw out a witness's citizenship status on cross-
examination to explore bias.  We conclude that this argument 
depends on a showing that the witness was testifying in order to 
curry favor with the Commonwealth.  See Meas, 467 Mass. at 450.  
Here, the judge permitted the defendant to ask whether each 
witness discussed his or her citizenship status with the police 
or the prosecution.  If the witness had not, the defendant was 
not permitted to inquire further.  Once the witness testified 
that he or she had not conversed with the Commonwealth or 
curried any favor, there was no longer a "plausible connection" 
between the witness's citizenship status and potential bias 
(citation omitted).  See Sealy, 467 Mass. at 624.  Put another 
way, after the witnesses testified that they had not talked 
about their citizenship status with the Commonwealth, their 
status became irrelevant as a motive to lie.  Id. at 624-625.  
See Johnson, 431 Mass. at 538 (affirming exclusion of cross-
examination where "the import of the question was too attenuated 
to create a remote possibility of . . . bias"). 
 
In one instance, a detective told a witness for the 
Commonwealth that he would be willing to write that witness a 
letter if the witness decided to apply for citizenship.  At that 
point, that witness's citizenship status was relevant to a 
potential bias in his testimony.  The judge expressed her 
willingness to allow the defendant to explore this bias in 
10 
 
cross-examination.  We agree with the defendant that the fact 
the Commonwealth had the appearance of a quid pro quo with one 
of its witnesses suggests that inducements may have been made to 
other witnesses.  Contrary to the defendant's position, however, 
the judge did not foreclose the potential bias line of 
questioning with other witnesses.  Instead, she permitted the 
defendant to lay the foundation for potential bias by inquiring 
if the witnesses had spoken with police or prosecutors about 
their citizenship status.  It was a necessary preliminary 
question that needed to be answered in the affirmative to 
demonstrate a possibility of bias before the judge would allow 
the defendant to further explore bias.  See Magadini, 474 Mass. 
at 603-605.  The defendant's claims that other witnesses were 
biased are "grounded only in speculation."  Meas, 467 Mass. at 
451. 
 
In addition, the judge was permitted to limit the 
defendant's cross-examination of the witnesses to prevent 
embarrassment and harassment.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 611(a)(3) 
(2018).  There is no reason to believe that the fact that the 
witnesses may not have been legal residents of the United States 
was evidence of their ability to be truthful.  In reality, a 
witness's status as an undocumented immigrant, for a variety of 
reasons, would make the witness less likely to cooperate with 
the government.  See Commonwealth v. Morgan, 449 Mass. 343, 364 
11 
 
n.17 (2007) (fact that witness was aware that he might be 
subject to prosecution for illegal entry into country "adds 
nothing" to discussion of bias). 
 
The judge's well-reasoned balancing of the defendant's 
rights with the interests of the Commonwealth and its witnesses 
was commendable.  The judge did not abuse her discretion in 
limiting the defendant's cross-examination of the Commonwealth's 
witnesses. 
 
b.  Use of interpreters.  In his appeal from the denial of 
his motion for a new trial, the defendant argues that the 
procedure suggested by the trial judge, and approved by defense 
counsel, of using two interpreters, one for the non-English 
speaking witnesses and one for the defendant at counsel's table, 
violated his constitutional right to due process of law.  He 
suggests that he was not allowed to hear actual witness 
testimony, but rather testimony that went through two 
translators -- Spanish translated into English for the jury, 
which was then translated back into Spanish for the defendant.  
"Where the appeal from the denial of a motion for a new trial is 
considered with the direct appeal from a conviction of a capital 
crime, we review the denial of that motion to determine if the 
judge committed an abuse of discretion or other error of law 
and, if so, whether such error created a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. Chatman, 466 
12 
 
Mass. 327, 333 (2013), citing Commonwealth v. Leng, 463 Mass. 
779, 781 (2012). 
 
Neither the defendant nor defense counsel filed an 
affidavit in support of the motion for a new trial.  The only 
affidavit submitted was from one of the interpreters at trial, 
who, as the motion judge noted, had been dismissed by the trial 
judge.  The motion judge did not credit the interpreter's 
affidavit and held that it was "based exclusively on [her] own 
unsubstantiated and unsettled personal opinions and pure 
speculation of what may have been going on in the mind of the 
defendant who was represented by experienced trial counsel who 
agreed to the procedure used."  This uncredited affidavit is the 
sole support for the defendant's argument on appeal. 
 
Adopting the uncredited affiant's assertions, the defendant 
argues that he was forced to wear a "double auricular headset" 
that prevented him from hearing actual witness testimony.  
Moreover, he contends that the microphones at the witness stand 
were muted, which forced him to rely specifically on his 
interpreter's translation of the translation of the witnesses' 
interpreter. 
Our review of the record, however, tells a different story.  
On the first day of jury empanelment, the trial judge discussed 
with the Commonwealth and defense counsel how they would like to 
use interpreters for the trial.  The judge stated: 
13 
 
"I think we need two interpreters for the time that we have 
a Spanish-speaking witness.  And the reason for this is 
that the defendant, in my view, needs to hear what the 
translation is, not to hear it in Spanish.  I have had 
experience with discrepancies not involving any of the 
interpreters here but with issues of discrepancies over the 
years sufficient for me to believe that to ensure, 
particularly in a first-degree murder case, to ensure that 
the defendant knows exactly what the interaction is because 
[defense counsel] is not Spanish speaking, that we should 
have two interpreters at all times. . . .  I think that we 
need that. . . .  I mean, correct me, counsel, if you feel 
to the contrary." 
 
In response, defense counsel stated:  "No.  I absolutely think I 
need an interpreter with me at counsel table with the 
defendant."  During jury selection, the judge instructed 
potential jurors that there would be multiple 
"interpreters . . . throughout the trial" and that they were 
required to "follow what the interpreter says in English as the 
response or the question even if [they] believe, based on 
[their] understanding of Spanish or Portuguese, that the 
interpreter is not accurate."  Later, while questioning a 
potential juror who was concerned because he was hard of 
hearing, the judge assured the juror that "the interpreter 
[would] be speaking into a microphone." 
 
After reviewing the transcript, we discern no abuse of 
discretion.  First, the judge conferred with defense counsel 
before implementing this procedure.  Defense counsel agreed with 
the procedure and did not object to its practice at any point 
during trial.  See Commonwealth v. Festa, 369 Mass. 419, 428 
14 
 
(1976); Commonwealth v. Boiselle, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 393, 399 
(1983), citing Festa, supra. ("A barren record does not create a 
presumption of prejudice in the defendant's favor"). 
 
Second, the use of multiple interpreters complied with the 
governing interpreter procedures in the Trial Court.  See 
Standards and Procedures of the Office of Court Interpreter 
Services, 973 Mass. Reg. 3 (Apr. 18, 2003), promulgated pursuant 
to G. L. c. 221C, § 7.  Section 14.03, which covers the 
simultaneous use of multiple interpreters, states in part: 
"(A) When there are multiple [limited English proficiency] 
parties, an interpreter or team of interpreters, using 
appropriate equipment, may interpret simultaneously for all 
of the parties. 
 
"(B) When a witness requires an interpreter, however, a 
separate interpreter must be assigned to the witness to 
allow parties to communicate with counsel as necessary in a 
timely manner." 
 
The judge's procedure mirrored the guidance given by the 
Standards and Procedures of the Office of Court Interpreter 
Services. 
 
Finally, the judge correctly instructed the jury that it 
was the translation of the witnesses' testimony that was to be 
considered as evidence.  Commonwealth v. Portillo, 462 Mass. 
324, 328 (2012) (when witness testifies in foreign language, 
English translation is only evidence, not testimony in original 
language).  Even if the defendant could not hear the Spanish 
testimony, it was the translation of the testimony that was 
15 
 
considered by the jury, and the defendant received a Spanish 
translation of the English translation provided to the jury. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For these reasons, we affirm the 
defendant's conviction and the denial of his motion for a new 
trial.  Furthermore, we have reviewed the record in its entirety 
and see no basis to grant extraordinary relief under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E. 
So ordered.