Title: PEOPLE OF MI V MARLON BELL
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 125375
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 21, 2005

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
JULY 21, 2005 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 125375 
MARLON BELL, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CORRIGAN, J.  
In this case, we consider whether the trial court 
failed to follow the three-step process of Batson v 
Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986), 
when it prohibited defendant from exercising his right to 
two peremptory challenges and, if so, whether that error is 
structural and, thus, requires automatic reversal. 
In 
Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
peremptory challenge to strike a juror may not be exercised 
on the basis of race. Id. at 89, 96-98. The Court set forth 
a three-step process for determining whether a challenger 
has improperly exercised peremptory challenges. First, the 
 
 
 
 
opponent of the challenge must make a prima facie showing 
of discrimination based on race. Id. at 94-97. Next, once 
the prima facie showing is made, the burden then shifts to 
the challenging party to come forward with a neutral 
explanation for the challenge. 
Id. at 97. 
Finally, the 
trial court must decide whether the opponent of the 
challenge has proven purposeful discrimination. 
Id. at 
100. 
In this case, a prima facie showing was made that two 
of defendant’s peremptory challenges were based on race. 
The trial court initially erred in failing to allow 
defendant 
to 
provide 
race-neutral 
reasons 
for 
the 
challenges. 
The trial court subsequently cured this error 
by 
allowing 
defendant 
to 
provide 
reasons 
for 
the 
challenges. Defendant’s reasons were race-conscious rather 
than race-neutral. Accordingly, the trial court disallowed 
the challenges. 
Because the trial court’s initial error 
was subsequently cured and because defendant’s reasons were 
race-conscious, we conclude that the trial court did not 
fail to follow the three-step Batson procedure and did not 
err in disallowing the challenges in question. 
We further 
conclude that the trial judge’s initial error does not 
require automatic reversal. 
We thus reverse the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals. 
2  
 
 
 
I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On July 29, 1999, defendant robbed and shot Chanel 
Roberts and Amanda Hodges, killing both victims. Following 
a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of 
first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316; two counts of 
armed robbery, MCL 750.529; and one count of conspiracy to 
commit armed robbery, MCL 750.529 and MCL 750.157a. 
Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of mandatory 
life imprisonment without parole for the first-degree 
felony murder convictions and life imprisonment for the 
armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery 
convictions. 
Defendant is African-American and the two victims were 
Caucasian. During jury selection, defense counsel attempted 
to exercise a peremptory challenge to strike potential 
juror number ten, who is Caucasian. 
Juror ten stated 
during voir dire that three of his friends were high­
ranking police officers, but that he “wouldn’t think” that 
this fact would affect his ability to be fair and 
impartial. 
When defense counsel attempted to excuse this 
juror 
peremptorily, 
the 
trial 
court 
disallowed 
the 
challenge, concluding that counsel had exercised the 
challenge on the basis of race. 
The trial court initially 
refused to allow defense counsel to make a record, but 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
reconsidered 
after 
defense 
counsel 
expressed 
dissatisfaction with the trial court’s refusal.  Defense 
counsel then furnished a race-conscious, rather than race­
neutral, reason for the challenge and the trial court 
continued to disallow the challenge. 
Jury selection continued. After several more defense 
peremptory challenges, the prosecutor objected when defense 
counsel attempted to excuse juror number five. 
The 
prosecutor claimed that defense counsel was attempting to 
strike juror five on the basis of race, contrary to Batson. 
The trial court excused the jury in order to make a record 
regarding the challenge. 
The prosecutor noted that the 
current challenge was defense counsel’s third consecutive 
strike on a Caucasian male and that defense counsel was 
attempting to exclude Caucasian males from the jury. 
Defense counsel replied that the prosecution’s argument 
would have some merit if no other Caucasian males remained 
on the jury. 
Defense counsel also noted that the majority 
of the remaining jurors was Caucasian. 
Defense counsel 
offered no other explanation for his challenge. 
The trial 
court found defense counsel’s explanation race-conscious 
and disallowed the challenge. 
Consequently, both jurors 
five and ten sat on the jury that convicted defendant. 
4  
 
 
  
  
 
                                                 
On appeal, defendant raised several claims of error, 
including the claim that the trial court failed to follow 
the three-step procedure mandated in Batson in disallowing 
his peremptory challenges of jurors five and ten. 
The 
Court of Appeals, in a split decision, agreed that the 
trial court failed to follow the Batson procedure, but, 
nevertheless, upheld defendant’s convictions.1  Judges Zahra 
and Wilder concluded that the trial court’s Batson error 
was not of constitutional dimension and was subject to 
harmless error analysis, while Judge Fitzgerald would have 
held that the error was structural and required automatic 
reversal. 
Defendant sought reconsideration. The Court of Appeals 
granted defendant’s motion and vacated its prior opinion.2 
On reconsideration, the Court held that a denial of the 
statutory right to a peremptory challenge is error per se.3 
Judges Zahra and Wilder concurred, stating that they were 
“duty-bound” to follow the holdings in People v Miller, 411 
1 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 2,
2003 (Docket No. 233234). 
2 Unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered
October 30, 2003 (Docket No. 233234). 
3 (On Reconsideration), 259 Mich App 583; 675 NW2d 894
(2003). 
5  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Mich 321; 307 NW2d 335 (1981), and People v Schmitz, 231 
Mich App 521; 586 NW2d 766 (1998). 
The prosecutor applied for leave to appeal, contending 
that the alleged denial of defendant’s statutory right to 
remove prospective jurors peremptorily was not error 
requiring automatic reversal. 
We granted the prosecution’s application for leave to 
appeal.4  The prosecution contends that the trial court did 
not err in failing to follow the procedures set forth in 
Batson. Alternatively, the prosecution argues that even if 
the trial court erred in failing to follow the Batson 
procedures, the error was harmless. 
Defendant argues that the trial court denied him his 
right to exercise two peremptory challenges by arbitrarily 
disallowing the challenges without following the mandated 
Batson procedures. 
Defendant further argues that the 
denial of this right requires automatic reversal. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case requires us to determine whether the trial 
court failed to follow the procedures set forth in Batson 
in disallowing two of defendant’s peremptory challenges. We 
review de novo issues regarding a trial court’s proper 
4 470 Mich 870 (2004). 
6  
 
 
application of the law. 
People v Goldston, 470 Mich 523, 
528; 682 NW2d 479 (2004). 
We review for clear error a 
trial 
court’s 
decision 
on 
the 
ultimate 
question 
of 
discriminatory intent under Batson. 
Hernandez v New York, 
500 US 352, 364-365; 111 S Ct 1859; 114 L Ed 2d 395 (1991); 
United States v Hill, 146 F3d 337, 341 (CA 6, 1998). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Batson Rule 
In Batson, the United States Supreme Court made it 
clear that a peremptory challenge to strike a juror may not 
be exercised on the basis of race. Batson, supra at 89, 96­
98. The prosecution in Batson attempted to exclude African-
American jurors solely on the basis of their race. Id. at 
82-83. The Court determined that the prosecution’s actions 
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 
It set forth a 
three-step process for determining an improper exercise of 
peremptory challenges. 
First, there must be a prima facie 
showing of discrimination based on race. Id. at 94-97. To 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on 
race, the opponent of the challenge must show that: (1) the 
defendant is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) 
peremptory challenges are being exercised to exclude 
members of a certain racial group from the jury pool; and 
(3) the circumstances raise an inference that the exclusion 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
was based on race. 
Id. at 96. 
The Batson Court directed 
trial courts to consider all relevant circumstances in 
deciding whether a prima facie showing has been made. Id. 
Once the opponent of the challenge makes a prima facie 
showing, the burden shifts to the challenging party to come 
forward with a neutral explanation for the challenge. 
Id. 
at 97. 
The neutral explanation must be related to the 
particular case being tried and must provide more than a 
general assertion in order to rebut the prima facie 
showing. 
Id. at 97-98. 
If the challenging party fails to 
come forward with a neutral explanation, the challenge will 
be denied. Id. at 100. 
Finally, the trial court must decide whether the 
nonchallenging party has carried the burden of establishing 
purposeful discrimination. 
Id. at 98. 
Since Batson, the 
Supreme Court has commented that the establishment of 
purposeful discrimination “comes down to whether the trial 
court finds the . . . race-neutral explanations to be 
credible.” 
Miller-El v Cockrell, 537 US 322, 339; 123 S 
Ct 1029; 154 L Ed 2d 931 (2003). The Court further stated, 
“Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the 
. . . [challenger’s] demeanor; by how reasonable, or how 
improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the 
proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial 
8  
 
 
 
   
 
    
                                                 
strategy.” 
Id. at 339. If the trial court finds that the 
reasons proffered were a pretext, the peremptory challenge 
will be denied. 
Batson, supra at 100. 
B. 
Application of Batson to the Facts in this Case 
In Michigan, the right to exercise a peremptory 
challenge is provided by court rule and statute. According 
to MCR 6.412(E)(1), a defendant is entitled to five 
peremptory 
challenges 
unless 
an 
offense 
charged 
is 
punishable by life imprisonment, in which case a defendant 
being 
tried 
alone 
is 
entitled 
to 
twelve 
peremptory 
challenges. 
Further, under MCL 768.13, “[a]ny person who 
is put on trial for an offense punishable by death or 
imprisonment for life, shall be allowed to challenge 
peremptorily twenty of the persons drawn to serve as 
jurors, and no more . . . .”5 
The trial court followed the court rule, which 
entitled defendant to twelve peremptory challenges because 
he was on trial for an offense punishable by life 
imprisonment. 
Defendant claims that the trial court 
violated his right to two of the peremptory challenges by 
5 MCR 6.412(E) departs from the statute by reducing the
number of peremptory challenges to which a defendant is
entitled. 
We need not resolve the discrepancy between the
statute and the court rule because this issue is not before 
us. 
9  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
failing to follow the three-step procedure mandated in 
Batson in disallowing the challenges. 
Applying the above rules to the facts in this case, we 
conclude that no such error occurred.6 
1. Prima Facie Showing of Discrimination Based on Race 
Here, defense counsel had already exercised several 
peremptory challenges and was attempting to challenge juror 
ten when the trial court interrupted and requested that 
counsel for both parties proceed to chambers. 
While in 
chambers, the trial court stated that it was going to 
disallow the challenge because defense counsel had based 
his challenges on the race of the juror. 
The trial court 
reached 
this 
conclusion 
because 
defense 
counsel 
had 
established a pattern of excusing Caucasian males.7 
After defense counsel’s peremptory challenge of juror 
five, the prosecution objected, reasoning that juror five 
6 In Georgia v McCollum, 505 US 42, 59; 112 S Ct 2348;
120 L Ed 2d 33 (1992), on remand 262 Ga 554; 422 SE2d 866
(1992), the United States Supreme Court extended the Batson 
rule to govern the conduct of criminal defendants (“the
Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging
in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the
exercise of peremptory challenges”). 
7 The challenge to juror ten was defense counsel’s
ninth challenge. 
Of the nine challenges, defense counsel
exercised seven against Caucasian males and two against
females whose race could not be determined from the record. 
10  
 
 
 
was Caucasian and the two previous challenges by defense 
counsel were of Caucasian males. 
The trial court agreed 
and disallowed the challenge. 
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred 
by raising Batson sua sponte to question defense counsel’s 
reasons for peremptorily challenging juror number ten. 
Defendant further maintained that neither the trial court 
nor the prosecution established a prima facie showing of 
discrimination based on race for either challenge. 
The Court of Appeals held that a trial court may raise 
a Batson issue sua sponte, noting that virtually all state 
courts have concluded that a trial court may raise a Batson 
issue sua sponte. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded 
that 
because 
the 
record 
did 
not 
reveal 
the 
racial 
identities 
of 
the 
prospective 
jurors, 
it 
could 
not 
determine whether a prima facie case of discrimination had 
been established. 
We have not previously addressed the question whether 
a trial court may raise a Batson issue sua sponte. The 
rationale underlying Batson and its progeny, however, 
supports the Court of Appeals position that the trial court 
may make an inquiry sua sponte after observing a prima 
facie case of purposeful discrimination through the use of 
11  
 
 
 
                                                 
peremptory challenges. 
Batson and its progeny8 make clear 
that a trial court has the authority to raise sua sponte 
such an issue to ensure the equal protection rights of 
individual jurors. 
See Batson, supra at 99 (“In view of 
the heterogeneous population of our Nation, public respect 
for our criminal justice system and the rule of law will be 
strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified 
from jury service because of his race.”); Georgia v 
McCollum, 505 US 42, 49-50; 112 S Ct 2348; 120 L Ed 2d 33 
(1992), quoting State v Alvarado, 221 NJ Super 324, 328; 
534 A2d 440 (1987) (“‘Be it at the hands of the State or 
the defense,’ if a court allows jurors to be excluded 
because of group bias, ‘[it] is [a] willing participant in 
a scheme that could only undermine the very foundation of 
our system of justice--our citizens’ confidence in it.’”). 
The United States Supreme Court, in Powers v Ohio, 499 
US 400, 416; 111 S Ct 1364; 113 L Ed 2d 411 (1991), held 
8 The Court of Appeals correctly noted that the 
following cases have held that a trial court may raise a
Batson issue sua sponte to protect the rights secured by
the Equal Protection Clause: State v Evans, 100 Wash App
757, 765-767; 998 P2d 373 (2000); Commonwealth v Carson,
559 Pa 460, 476-479; 741 A2d 686 (1999); Brogden v State,
102 Md App 423, 430-432; 649 A2d 1196 (1994); Lemley v
State, 599 So 2d 64, 69 (Ala App, 1992). 
12  
 
 
  
 
 
that a criminal defendant has standing to object to a 
prosecutor’s peremptory challenges. It reasoned: 
The barriers to a suit by an excluded juror
are daunting. Potential jurors are not parties to
the 
jury 
selection 
process 
and 
have 
no 
opportunity to be heard at the time of their
exclusion. Nor can excluded jurors easily obtain
declaratory 
or 
injunctive 
relief 
when 
discrimination 
occurs 
through 
an 
individual 
prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges.
Unlike a challenge to systematic practices of the
jury 
clerk 
and 
commissioners 
such 
as 
we 
considered in Carter [v Jury Comm of Greene Co,
396 US 320; 90 S Ct 518; 24 L Ed 2d 549 (1970)],
it would be difficult for an individual juror to
show a likelihood that discrimination against him
at the voir dire stage will recur. And, there
exist considerable practical barriers to suit by
the excluded juror because of the small financial
stake involved and the economic burdens of 
litigation. The reality is that a juror dismissed
because of race probably will leave the courtroom
possessing little incentive to set in motion the
arduous process needed to vindicate his own 
rights. [Id. at 414-415 (citations omitted).] 
The Powers Court further stated: 
The statutory prohibition on discrimination
in the selection of jurors, enacted pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enabling Clause, makes
race neutrality in jury selection a visible, and
inevitable, measure of the judicial system’s own
commitment to the commands of the Constitution. 
The courts are under an affirmative duty to 
enforce the strong statutory and constitutional
policies embodied in that prohibition.
 [Id. at 
416 (citation omitted).] 
The Supreme Court’s rationale for allowing a defendant 
to raise a Batson issue supports our conclusion that a 
13  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
trial court may sua sponte raise a Batson issue. 
Trial 
courts are in the best position to enforce the statutory 
and 
constitutional 
policies 
prohibiting 
racial 
discrimination. 
Further, wrongly excluded jurors have 
little incentive to vindicate their own rights. 
We thus 
conclude, for the foregoing reasons, that a trial court may 
sua sponte raise a Batson issue. 
We reject the Court of Appeals assertion that it could 
not establish whether a prima facie case of discrimination 
had been made regarding the challenges because of the 
inadequacy of the record. 
It is undisputed that defendant 
is an African-American male. 
While the challenged jurors 
were not of defendant’s racial group, it is equally harmful 
to challenge only members outside a defendant’s racial 
group. 
Powers, supra at 415-416. 
The trial court 
specifically stated that it was disallowing the challenges 
because defense counsel, for the better part of the day, 
had only excused Caucasian male jurors.9
 Defense counsel 
did not dispute that he had only excused Caucasian males. 
9 We recognize that the trial court’s statement is not
entirely accurate because defense counsel peremptorily
challenged two females. 
We conclude, however, that this
fact does not diminish defense counsel’s pattern of 
peremptorily challenging Caucasian males. 
14  
 
 
 
Instead, he pointed to the racial make-up of the remaining 
jurors to justify his challenges. 
The trial court rejected defense counsel’s challenge 
of juror ten because defense counsel had exercised seven of 
nine peremptory challenges against Caucasian males. The 
prosecution objected to defense counsel’s challenge of 
juror five because defense counsel consecutively excused 
three Caucasian male jurors. 
In both instances, defense 
counsel’s challenges created a pattern of strikes against 
Caucasian males. 
This pattern was sufficient to raise an 
inference 
that 
defense 
counsel 
was 
indeed 
excluding 
potential jurors on the basis of their race. 
See Batson, 
supra at 97 (a pattern of strikes against jurors of a 
specific 
race 
may 
give 
rise 
to 
an 
inference 
of 
discrimination). 
We thus conclude that the Court of 
Appeals erred in failing to find a prima facie showing of 
discrimination based on race. 
2. Neutral Explanation for the Challenge 
Once a prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts 
to the challenger to provide a neutral explanation for the 
challenge. 
Upon the trial court’s finding that defense 
counsel’s challenge of juror ten was based on race, defense 
counsel requested an opportunity to make a record. The 
trial court initially denied defense counsel’s request, but 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
reconsidered upon defense counsel’s objection. 
Defense 
counsel stated: 
I would bring to the Court’s attention that
the number of white males on that panel still
exceeds the number of the minorities on that 
panel. Why don’t you talk about the whole racial
composition of that panel? There’s still a vast
majority of white members on that panel than it
is [sic] black members on that panel. 
The trial court responded by stating that defense 
counsel’s reason supported its prima facie finding that 
counsel had exercised the challenge on the basis of race 
and upheld its disallowance of the challenge. 
After the prosecutor objected to defense counsel’s 
peremptory challenge of juror five, the trial court 
disallowed the challenge “for the same reasons as asserted 
before.” 
Defense counsel objected and attempted to make a 
record, but the trial court interrupted him. 
The trial 
court then allowed defense counsel to make a record, but 
only after the prosecutor asked to approach the bench. The 
prosecutor stated that defense counsel’s three previous 
peremptory challenges, including juror five, were of 
Caucasian males. Defense counsel responded by giving race­
neutral reasons for two of the challenges. The trial court 
noted that it was only concerned with defense counsel’s 
reasons 
for 
challenging 
juror 
five. 
Defense 
counsel 
replied: 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge, again, if there were no other white
males on that jury, or white males were a 
minority on that jury, then there may be some
persuasive force to [the assistant prosecutor’s]
argument about a Battson [sic] challenge. 
That 
simply 
is 
not 
the 
case. 
The 
demographics of that jury do not hold up to that
kind of a challenge. 
And I think I don’t have to have a reason 
for exercising a peremptory challenge. 
Defense 
counsel 
gave 
no 
other 
reason 
for 
his 
challenge. 
The 
trial 
court 
stated 
that 
peremptory 
challenges could not be based on race and found that 
defense counsel's peremptory challenge of juror five had 
been based on gender and race. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that even if a prima 
facie case had been established, the trial court failed to 
comply with steps two and three of the Batson process. 
It 
found that the trial court erred by denying defense counsel 
the opportunity to make a record before disallowing the 
peremptory challenge of juror ten. 
It further found that 
the trial court failed to inquire whether defense counsel 
had a race-neutral reason for striking juror five. 
We agree that the trial court initially erred in 
denying defense counsel the opportunity to provide race­
neutral reasons for his challenges. We conclude, however, 
that these errors were cured when the trial court, almost 
17  
 
 
 
immediately after each challenge, permitted defense counsel 
to make a record. It then based its ultimate conclusion to 
disallow 
the 
challenges 
on 
defendant’s 
race-conscious 
reasons. Because the trial court did perform the steps 
required by Batson, albeit somewhat belatedly, it did not 
improperly deny defendant the right to exercise two of his 
statutorily prescribed peremptory challenges. 
We reject the claim that the trial court failed to 
inquire whether defense counsel had a race-neutral reason 
for striking juror five because the record shows otherwise. 
Defense 
counsel 
provided 
only 
one 
reason 
for 
his 
challenges, which was not race-neutral and did not refute 
the prima facie showing that his challenges were based on 
race. 
Just as a challenger may not exclude a prospective 
juror on the basis of race, it is equally improper for a 
challenger to engineer the composition of a jury to reflect 
the race of the defendant. 
Finally, defendant claims on appeal that his responses 
were not given as race-neutral reasons for his challenges, 
but, rather, as attempts to disprove the trial court’s and 
the 
prosecution’s 
prima 
facie 
showings 
of 
racial 
discrimination. We are not persuaded by this argument. 
Defense counsel never contended that the trial court and 
the prosecution had not made a prima facie case of racial 
18  
 
 
 
                                                 
discrimination. 
If he was merely attempting to disprove 
the prima facie showings, defense counsel would not have 
stopped there, but would have also provided race-neutral 
reasons for the challenges in the event that the trial 
court refused to accept his argument. 
Additionally, the 
record indicates that defense counsel understood that he 
was to provide race-neutral reasons. 
The prosecution 
objected to the challenge of juror five because defense 
counsel’s three previous peremptory challenges, including 
juror five, were of Caucasian males. 
Defense counsel then 
furnished race-neutral reasons for two of the challenges. 
But with respect to juror five, defense counsel merely 
stated that the prosecution’s argument failed because 
Caucasian males still remained on the jury. 
Defendant 
clearly demonstrated his understanding and ability to 
provide race-neutral reasons when needed. In juror five’s 
case, he failed to do so.10  While defense counsel may not 
10 Defense counsel’s failure to provide race-neutral
reasons for his challenges, especially after demonstrating
his ability to do so, provide additional support for the
inference of discrimination. See Johnson v California,___
US ___; 125 S Ct 2410; 162 L Ed 2d 129 (2005), in which the 
United States Supreme Court stated: 
In the unlikely hypothetical in which the
prosecutor declines to respond to a trial judge's
inquiry regarding his justification for making a
Footnotes continued on following page. 
19  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
have effectively used his opportunity to provide race­
neutral reasons for his challenges, he had the opportunity. 
Defendant cannot complain now that the opportunity was 
insufficient. 
3. Trial Court’s Decision Regarding Purposeful
Discrimination 
Finally, the trial court must determine whether the 
opponent of the challenge has carried the burden of 
establishing purposeful discrimination. 
This decision may 
strike, the evidence before the judge would 
consist not only of the original facts from which
the prima facie case was established, but also 
the prosecutor's refusal to justify his strike in
light of the court’s request. Such a refusal
would 
provide 
additional 
support 
for 
the 
inference 
of 
discrimination 
raised 
by 
a 
defendant's prima facie case. 
[Id., ___ US ___
n 6; 125 S Ct ___ n 6; 162 L Ed 2d 140 n 6.] 
Justice Kelly claims that defendant did not provide 
race-neutral reasons for his challenges because he was
never asked for his reasons. 
The trial transcript,
however, indicates that defendant did provide reasons,
which the trial court found to be race-conscious. 
After 
the prosecutor’s objection to the exclusion of prospective
juror 
five, 
defense 
counsel 
volunteered 
race-neutral 
reasons for excluding the two prospective jurors preceding
prospective juror five. 
The trial court then stated,
“That’s not an issue. 
The issue is the last juror.”
Defense counsel responded, “Judge, again, if there were no
other white males on the jury, or white males were a
minority on that jury, then there may be some persuasive
force to [the prosecutor’s] argument about a Battson [sic]
challenge.” 
The trial court then indicated, “[b]ut you
cannot use a racial basis or a gender basis for excusing
jurors.” 
Defense counsel responded, “And I’ve given my
reasons on the record, and . . . none of them were related
to race or gender.” 
20  
 
 
hinge on the credibility of the challenger’s race-neutral 
explanations, but only if the challenger provided race­
neutral explanations. Here, defense counsel provided race­
conscious, rather than race-neutral, reasons for his 
challenges. 
This reinforces the prima facie showings that 
the challenges were based on race. Consequently, the trial 
court 
did 
not 
clearly 
err 
in 
finding 
purposeful 
discrimination. 
IV.  STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR DENIALS OF PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGES 
In light of our conclusion that the trial court’s 
initial error was cured, we need not address whether a 
denial of a peremptory challenge is subject to automatic 
reversal. 
Had we concluded, however, as do our dissenting 
colleagues, that defendant’s peremptory challenges had been 
improperly denied, we would have applied a harmless error 
standard to the error, because People v Miller, 411 Mich 
321; 307 NW2d 335 (1981), and People v Schmitz, 231 Mich 
App 521; 586 NW2d 766 (1998), are no longer binding, in 
light of our current harmless error jurisprudence, to the 
extent that they hold that a violation of the right to a 
peremptory challenge requires automatic reversal. 
We arrive at this conclusion by recognizing the 
distinction between a Batson error and a denial of a 
peremptory challenge. 
A Batson error occurs when a juror 
21  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
is actually dismissed on the basis of race or gender.11  It 
is undisputed that this type of error is of constitutional 
dimension and is subject to automatic reversal.12
 In 
contrast, a denial of a peremptory challenge on other 
grounds amounts to the denial of a statutory or court-rule­
based right to exclude a certain number of jurors. 
An 
improper denial of such a peremptory challenge is not of 
constitutional dimension.13 
In Miller, this Court held that “a defendant is 
entitled to have the jury selected as provided by the rule. 
Where, as here, a selection procedure is challenged before 
the process begins, the failure to follow the procedure 
prescribed in the rule requires reversal.14  In Schmitz, the 
Court of Appeals relied on Miller to hold that a denial of 
11 Batson, supra. 
12 See 
Johnson v United States, 520 US 461, 468-469;
117 S Ct 1544; 137 L Ed 2d 718 (1997); J E B v Alabama ex 
rel T B, 511 US 127, 142 n 13; 114 S Ct 1419; 128 L Ed 2d 
89 (1994). 
13 United States v Martinez-Salazar, 528 US 304, 311;
120 S Ct 774; 145 L Ed 2d 792 (2000); Ross v Oklahoma, 487 
US 81, 88; 108 S Ct 2273; 101 L Ed 2d 80 (1988)(the United 
States Supreme Court recognized that peremptory challenges
are not of constitutional dimension and are merely a means
to achieve the end of an impartial jury). 
14 Miller, supra at 326. 
22  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a 
peremptory 
challenge 
requires 
automatic 
reversal.15 
Following Miller and Schmitz, however, our harmless error 
jurisprudence has evolved a great deal, as has that of the 
United States Supreme Court. 
See People v Carines, 460 
Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).16
 Under Carines, a 
nonconstitutional 
error 
does 
not 
require 
automatic 
reversal. 
Id.
 Rather, if the error is preserved, it is 
subject to reversal only for a miscarriage of justice under 
the Lukity17 “more probable than not” standard. 
Id.
 See 
15 Schmitz, supra at 530-532. 
16 See, also, Martinez-Salazar, supra at 317 n 4, in
which the Supreme Court recognized that the rule of 
automatic reversal for an erroneous denial of peremptory 
challenges makes little sense in light of its recent 
harmless error jurisprudence. It stated: 
Relying on language in Swain v Alabama . . . 
Martinez-Salazar urges the Court to adopt a 
remedy 
of 
automatic 
reversal 
whenever 
a 
defendant’s 
right 
to 
a 
certain 
number 
of 
peremptory challenges is substantially impaired.
. . . 
Because we find no impairment, we do not
decide in this case what the appropriate remedy
for a substantial impairment would be. 
We note,
however, that the oft-quoted language in Swain 
was not only unnecessary to the decision in that
case—because Swain did not address any claim that
a 
defendant 
had 
been 
denied 
a 
peremptory
challenge—but was founded on a series of our
early cases decided long before the adoption of
harmless-error review. 
17 People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607
(1999). 
23  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
also MCL 769.26. 
If the error is forfeited, it may be 
reviewed only for plain error affecting substantial rights. 
Carines, supra. 
Because the right to a peremptory challenge in 
Michigan is not provided by the Michigan Constitution but, 
rather, by statute and court rule, we conclude, as did the 
United States Supreme Court, that the right is of non­
constitutional dimension.18  Thus, under our jurisprudence, 
18 Although courts in other jurisdictions have reached 
contrary 
conclusions, 
we 
believe 
their 
analyses 
are 
unpersuasive. 
In United States v McFerron, for example,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the erroneous
denial of a peremptory challenge is a structural error.
163 F3d 952, 956 (CA 6, 1998). 
But McFerron predated
Martinez-Salazar and is therefore of questionable weight. 
The Washington Supreme Court also held that the denial
of a peremptory challenge in a so-called “reverse-Batson” 
context is structural error. State v Vreen, 143 Wash 2d
923; 26 P3d 236 (2001). While Vreen acknowledges Martinez-
Salazar, the court dismisses that case with a cursory and,
in our view, unpersuasive analysis. 
Indeed, all the cases
cited by the Vreen court for its assertion that “the vast 
majority [of courts] have found harmless error doctrine
simply 
inappropriate 
in 
such 
circumstances” 
predate
Martinez-Salazar. See id. at 929. 
We agree with the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit that Martinez-Salazar marked a significant shift in
the standard of review applicable to the erroneous denial
of a peremptory challenge. United States v Harbin, 250 F3d 
532, 546 (CA 7, 2001), citing United States v Patterson,
215 F3d 776 (CA 7, 2000), vacated in part by Patterson v 
United States, 531 US 1033 (2000). 
In Harbin, the Seventh
Circuit noted that it had been “[f]reed from the Swain 
language by the Court’s footnote in 
Martinez-Salazar 
Footnotes continued on following page. 
24  
 
 
    
 
                                                 
 
 
a violation of the right is reviewed for a miscarriage of 
justice if the error is preserved and for plain error 
affecting substantial rights if the error is forfeited.19 
V. 
RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT 
Justice Kelly’s dissent asserts that the trial court’s 
failure to follow the three-step Batson procedures was 
. . . .” 
Harbin, supra at 546 (holding, however, that the
prosecution’s mid-trial use of a peremptory challenge was a
structural error). 
United States v Jackson, 2001 US Dist 
LEXIS 4900, *7 n 1 (SD Ind, 2001) (“The bottom line is that
[the] discussion of the need for a clear understanding of
the peremptory challenge [in United States v Underwood, 122 
F3d 389, 392 (CA 7, 1997)] process remains good law, but
the automatic reversal standard is no longer applicable.”) 
Given the standard of harmless error review that now 
prevails in both the United States Supreme Court and this
Court, we believe that the erroneous denial of a peremptory
challenge is not subject to automatic reversal. 
19 Justice Kelly inaccurately states that we are 
departing from the trend set by most other courts that have
considered 
harmless 
error 
application 
to 
denials 
of 
peremptory challenges. 
We do not depart from that trend,
however, because the trend leans toward application of
harmless error analysis to improper denials of peremptory
challenges. 
Justice Kelly further states that we rely on Martinez-
Salazar to support our alleged departure. 
We, however,
rely on current Michigan harmless error jurisprudence to 
support our conclusion that an improper denial of a 
peremptory challenge is subject to harmless error analysis.
We discuss Martinez-Salazar to merely show that the United
States Supreme Court’s harmless error jurisprudence is 
evolving, which strongly indicates that in the federal
system nonconstitutional errors, such as an improper denial
of peremptory challenges, would be subject to harmless
error analysis. 
25  
 
 
incurable and requires automatic reversal. She states that 
the trial court failed to complete a single step of the 
three-step Batson procedures and collapsed all three steps 
into one. 
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Kelly 
states that the trial court failed to scrutinize carefully 
whether a prima facie case had been made. 
Even if the trial court’s prima facie findings were 
inadequate, 
that 
inadequacy 
would 
not 
be 
outcome 
determinative because defendant subsequently offered an 
explanation for his challenges. 
Further, the trial court 
ruled 
on 
the 
ultimate 
question 
of 
intentional 
discrimination. See Hernandez v New York, 500 US 352, 359; 
111 S Ct 1859; 114 L Ed 2d 395 (1991) (“Once a prosecutor 
has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory 
challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate 
question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary 
issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie 
showing becomes moot.”); see also Saiz v Ortiz, 392 F3d 
1166, 1179 n 8 (CA 10, 2004) (the existence or absence of a 
prima facie case is moot where the trial court refused to 
make a finding regarding whether a prima facie case had 
been established, but proceeded to hear the prosecution’s 
explanation for the challenge). Justice Kelly states that 
our reliance on Hernandez is misplaced. 
She notes that 
26  
 
 
 
 
 
Hernandez observes that a defendant may concede the first 
Batson step by moving to the second step.  We agree and 
suggest that is exactly what occurred in this case. 
Both 
the trial court and the prosecutor objected to defense 
counsel’s use of peremptory challenges, claiming that he 
was using them to exclude African-American veniremembers. 
While the trial court did not initially allow defense 
counsel to provide race-neutral reasons for his challenges, 
it almost immediately recanted its refusal and allowed 
defense counsel to provide reasons, which were race­
conscious. 
The trial court ultimately denied defense 
counsel’s challenges, finding that defense counsel’s race­
conscious reasons supported the initial allegations that he 
had been excluding veniremembers on the basis of race. The 
trial court’s initial refusal to allow defense counsel to 
provide race-neutral reasons for his challenges does not 
amount to a collapsing of the Batson steps. 
Rather, if 
anything, it amounted to imperfect compliance with the 
Batson procedures. 
The trial court, however, ultimately 
conducted each Batson step and made a ruling on the basis 
of defense counsel’s race-conscious reasons. 
Thus, any 
error that may have occurred in the trial court’s Batson 
application was subsequently cured. 
27  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
  
Justice 
Kelly 
incorrectly 
assumes 
that 
strict 
adherence to the Batson procedures is constitutionally 
mandated. 
To the contrary, the purpose of the Batson test 
is to ensure adherence to the “principle that the ultimate 
burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests 
with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” 
Purkett v Elem, 514 US 765, 768; 115 S Ct 1769; 131 L Ed 2d 
834 (1995).20  Our research reflects that trial courts have 
failed to comply perfectly with Batson in the past. 
See 
United States v Castorena-Jaime, 285 F3d 916, 929 (CA 10, 
2002) (“Notwithstanding the district court’s failure to 
make express findings on the record [regarding the Batson 
steps] in the present case, the district court’s ultimate 
conclusion 
on 
discriminatory 
intent 
was 
not 
clearly 
erroneous.”); Saiz, supra (the United States Court of 
20 See, also, Johnson, supra, ___ US ___ n 7; 125 S Ct
___ n 7; 162 L Ed 2d 140 n 7, in which the United States
Supreme Court compared the Batson burden-shifting framework
to the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp v 
Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973).
The Johnson Court cited St Mary’s Honor Ctr v Hicks, 509 US
502; 113 S Ct 2742; 125 L Ed 2d 407 (1993), for the
proposition that the “burden-shifting framework [set forth
in Batson and McDonnell Douglas] triggered by a defendant’s
prima face case is essentially just ‘a means of “arranging
the presentation of evidence.”’” Johnson, supra, ___ US ___
n 7; 125 S Ct ___ n 7; 162 L Ed 2d 140 n 7, quoting St 
Mary’s, supra, 509-510, quoting Watson v Fort Worth Bank & 
Trust, 487 US 977, 986; 108 S Ct 2777; 101 L Ed 2d 827
(1988). 
28  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Appeals inferred from the record that the trial court did 
not find a prima facie case of discrimination).21
 Their 
failure to do so, however, is not error as long as trial 
courts do not shift the burden of persuasion onto the 
challenger. 
Justice Kelly contends that the trial court, by 
collapsing the three Batson steps into one, placed the 
burden on defense counsel to counter the trial court’s 
finding of purposeful discrimination. 
The record does not 
support this contention. 
Both the trial court and the 
prosecution made a prima facie showing that defense counsel 
had excluded jurors on the basis of race. 
The trial court 
initially refused to allow defense counsel to provide race­
neutral reasons, but almost immediately reconsidered and 
allowed defense counsel to make a record. 
Defense counsel 
gave race-conscious reasons regarding both challenges. 
Thus, he failed to meet the burden of coming forward with 
race-neutral explanations. 
Defense counsel’s proffer of 
race-conscious reasons did not rebut the trial court’s and 
the prosecution’s prima facie showings of discrimination. 
Thus, the trial court neither erred in finding purposeful 
21 See, also, United States v Perez, 35 F3d 632, 636
(CA 1, 1994). 
29  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
discrimination nor erred in rejecting defense counsel’s 
challenges. 
Justice Kelly further asserts that our discussion 
regarding 
Miller 
and 
Schmitz 
is 
inappropriate. 
We 
recognize that Miller and Schmitz need not be addressed, 
because we have concluded that the trial court did not err 
in denying defense counsel’s peremptory challenges. 
We 
disagree, however, that our discussion regarding Miller and 
Schmitz is inappropriate and has no legal value.  Rather, 
such discussion is in direct response to the arguments of 
the dissent, and without such discussion our response would 
be incomplete. 
That a response to a dissent may encompass 
discussion that is dictum does not render it inappropriate 
or of no legal value; otherwise, only dissenting opinions 
would be able to opine upon decisions such as Miller and 
Schmitz.22  As stated above, in light of our current 
harmless error jurisprudence, Miller and Schmitz are no 
longer precedentially binding. 
We thus disagree with 
22 
Although 
the 
dissent 
labors 
hard 
to 
avoid 
referencing Miller and Schmitz, it is puzzling why it would
do this with regard to two decisions that are so obviously
helpful to its conclusion, except that to reference these
decisions would only make obvious the asymmetry of the
dissent’s position, namely, that the dissent, but not the
majority, should be able to analyze Miller and Schmitz. 
30  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Justice Kelly’s conclusion that our Miller and Schmitz 
discussion is inappropriate. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We hold that the trial court’s initial failure to 
follow the three-step process set forth in Batson was 
subsequently cured. 
Despite our ultimate conclusion that 
the trial court complied with the requirements of Batson, 
trial courts are well advised to articulate and thoroughly 
analyze each of the three steps set forth in Batson, see pp 
7-9 of this opinion, in determining whether peremptory 
challenges were improperly exercised. 
In doing so, trial 
courts should clearly state the Batson step that they are 
addressing and should articulate their findings regarding 
that step.23 
23 Federal courts have encountered similar problems
regarding appellate review of a trial court’s inadequate 
Batson findings. See Castorena-Jaime, supra at 929: 
Although we affirm the district court’s 
ruling, we encourage district courts to make 
explicit factual findings on the record when 
ruling on Batson challenges. 
“Specifically, . .
. a district court should state whether it finds 
the proffered reason for a challenged strike to
be 
facially 
race 
neutral 
or 
inherently
discriminatory and why it chooses to credit or 
discredit the given explanation.” 
A district 
court’s clearly articulated findings assist our
appellate review of the court’s Batson ruling,
and “ensure[] that the trial court has indeed
Footnotes continued on following page. 
31  
 
 
                                                 
 
We further hold that the trial court did not commit 
clear error in finding as a matter of fact that defense 
counsel exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of the 
race of the prospective jurors. 
Accordingly, we reverse 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
made the crucial credibility determination that
is afforded such great respect on appeal.”
[Quoting Perez, supra at 636 (citation omitted).] 
32  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 125375 
MARLON BELL, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
WEAVER, J. (concurring). 
I concur in the result of the lead opinion and join 
parts I to III of the opinion. 
As the lead opinion has 
explained, the record reflects that any initial error by 
the trial court was cured when the trial court allowed 
defendant to provide reasons for the peremptory challenges 
and that the reasons proffered by defendant for the 
challenges were race-conscious. 
I do not join part IV of the lead opinion, which 
addresses whether the violation of a right to a peremptory 
challenge requires automatic reversal, nor do I join the 
last paragraph of part V, which concludes that it is proper 
to address the issue because it is in response to the 
dissent. 
Ante at 21-25, 30-31. 
In my opinion, such 
discussion is unnecessary to the opinion and therefore is 
 
 
 
dicta. 
I would wait until the issue is squarely before us 
before determining whether the improper denial of a 
peremptory 
challenge 
is 
subject 
to 
structural 
error 
analysis. 
Therefore, I do not join part IV or the last 
paragraph of part V. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 125375 
MARLON BELL, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
TAYLOR, C.J. (dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
I 
respectfully 
dissent 
from 
the 
lead 
opinion’s 
conclusion that defense counsel provided race-conscious 
reasons for the two peremptory challenges the trial court 
refused to allow him to exercise. 
Rather, I agree with 
Justice Kelly’s dissent that defense counsel’s comments 
were intended only to challenge the idea that a prima facie 
showing of discrimination had been made. 
Thus, defense 
counsel’s comments were legitimate and directed only at 
Batson’s first step. 
Thereafter the trial court did not 
follow the Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 
L Ed 2d 69 (1986), requirement that it allow defendant the 
opportunity to articulate a race-neutral explanation for 
the challenges. 
Accordingly, I conclude that the trial 
 
 
 
court 
erroneously 
deprived 
defendant 
of 
two 
of 
his 
peremptory challenges. 
As noted by the lead opinion, peremptory challenges 
are granted to a defendant by statute and by court rule-not 
by 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution 
or 
the 
Michigan 
Constitution. 
Denial of the statutory right requires 
reversal of a conviction only if it resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice. 
MCL 769.26. 
Thus, I concur with 
the lead opinion that the denial of a statutory peremptory 
challenge is subject to harmless error review and that 
People v Schmitz, 231 Mich App 521; 586 NW2d 766 (1998), 
must be repudiated to the extent that it held to the 
contrary. 
Applying this standard, I find defendant is not 
entitled to a new trial. 
I specifically join footnote 18 
of the lead opinion because I am persuaded that foreign 
cases that have concluded that the denial of a statutory 
right to a peremptory challenge requires automatic reversal 
were wrongly decided. 
An automatic reversal should not be 
required for the mere violation of a statutory right just 
because the trial court misperceived defense counsel’s 
2  
 
 
 
  
 
  
                                                 
 
 
effort to peremptorily strike two prospective jurors as a 
constitutional Batson violation.1 
To the extent that the error is considered to have 
violated our court rule, the denial is not grounds for 
granting a new trial unless refusal to grant a new trial is 
inconsistent with substantial justice. 
MCR 2.613(A). 
Applying this standard, I find defendant is not entitled to 
a new trial. 
I also join the lead opinion in questioning the 
continuing viability of People v Miller, 411 Mich 321; 307 
NW2d 335 (1981). 
1 I do, however, recognize that if a statutory right is
denied in a manner that violates equal protection or due
process guarantees that such denial may warrant a new
trial. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Evitts 
v Lucey, 469 US 387, 401; 105 S Ct 830; 83 L Ed 2d 821 
(1985): 
[A]lthough a State may choose whether it
will institute any given welfare program, it must
operate 
whatever 
programs 
it 
does 
establish 
subject to the protections of the Due Process
Clause. 
Similarly, a State has great discretion
in setting policies governing parole decisions,
but it must nonetheless make those decisions in 
accord with the Due Process Clause. 
In short,
when a State opts to act in a field where its
action has significant discretionary elements, it
must nonetheless act in accord with the dictates 
of the Constitution -- and, in particular, in
accord with the Due Process Clause. 
[Citations
omitted.] 
3  
 
 
 
Because I find that the error here was harmless, under 
both MCL 769.26 and MCR 2.613(A), I agree with the lead 
opinion that the Court of Appeals decision must be reversed 
and defendant’s convictions should be reinstated. 
Clifford W. Taylor 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 125375 
MARLON BELL, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
I dissent from the lead opinion for two reasons. 
First, the trial judge erred by failing to follow the 
procedures required by Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106 S 
Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986). Despite the lead opinion’s 
contention 
to 
the 
contrary, 
the 
Batson 
errors 
were 
incurable. 
Second, the lead opinion’s dictum regarding 
Miller1 is inappropriate, and, as dictum, has no legal 
effect or precedential value. 
There is no legal basis to 
overrule Miller. 
I. THE BATSON RULE 
The United States Supreme Court ruled in Batson that, 
when selecting a jury, a prosecutor may not use a 
peremptory challenge to remove a juror because of the 
1 People v Miller, 411 Mich 321; 307 NW2d 335 (1981). 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
juror’s race. Batson, supra at 89. The Supreme Court gave 
trial judges a specific three-step procedure to determine 
whether a peremptory challenge has an improper racial 
basis. 
First, the objecting party must make a prima facie 
showing, 
based 
on 
the 
totality 
of 
all 
relevant 
circumstances, that the other party discriminated in 
removing the juror. 
Id. at 93-94. 
Second, the party 
exercising the peremptory challenge must give a neutral 
explanation for the removal, showing that it was not based 
on race. 
Id. at 94, 97. 
Third, the trial judge must 
determine if the objecting party established purposeful 
discrimination. Id. at 98. 
Although Batson dealt with a prosecutor’s exercise of 
peremptory challenges, the Supreme Court extended the rule 
in later cases. 
For example, in Georgia v McCollum,2 it 
stated that the United States Constitution prohibits a 
criminal 
defendant 
from 
engaging 
in 
purposeful 
discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. 
A. THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
In this case, each party had made several peremptory 
challenges before defense counsel challenged Juror No. 10. 
2 505 US 42, 59; 112 S Ct 2348; 120 L Ed 2d 33 (1992). 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
During voir dire, Juror No. 10 stated that he was a close 
friend of several police officers, including a “chief.” He 
stated that he “wouldn’t think” that his friendships would 
make a difference in his ability to make a fair decision. 
He also responded, when asked if he would feel obliged to 
apologize should he vote to acquit defendant, that he 
“hope[d] not.” 
When defense counsel peremptorily challenged Juror No. 
10, the trial judge disallowed the challenge because, he 
said, it and previous defense challenges were based on 
race. 
Defense counsel asked to comment, but the judge 
refused him the opportunity. 
Counsel then boisterously 
objected to the refusal, stating that it was “garbage.” 
The judge then relented and allowed a statement. 
Defense counsel argued that he had not attempted to 
eliminate Juror No. 10, a Caucasian male, because of his 
race. 
He pointed out that the Caucasians on the jury 
outnumbered and exceeded the minorities on the panel. 
The 
judge then allowed the prosecution to respond, refused to 
hear more from defense counsel, and ruled that Juror No. 10 
would remain on the jury. 
Jury selection continued, and the attorneys made more 
peremptory challenges. 
When Juror No. 5 was called, 
neither side objected for cause, and the prosecution did 
3  
 
 
 
 
not exercise a peremptory challenge. 
Without asking for 
defense counsel’s input, the judge stated, “We have a 
jury.” 
Defense counsel approached the bench and an off-the­
record discussion ensued. 
When the proceeding resumed on 
the record, defense counsel asked to excuse Juror No. 5. 
The prosecution objected, stating that it was making a 
Batson objection to the defense’s peremptory challenge of 
Juror No. 5. 
Without discussion or input from the parties, the 
judge disallowed the peremptory challenge for the same 
reasons he had given regarding Juror No. 10. 
Again, 
defense counsel sought to comment on the ruling but was 
refused. 
After the prosecution evidenced some discomfort 
with the lack of a record, the judge allowed counsel to 
make a record outside the presence of the jury. 
The prosecutor then observed that the two jurors 
excused between Juror No. 10 and Juror No. 5 were both 
Caucasian males. She also indicated that Juror No. 5 was a 
Caucasian male. 
She offered no additional basis for her 
objection to the peremptory challenge of Juror No. 5. 
Defense counsel pointed out that there had been no 
discriminatory pattern to his challenges. 
He stated that 
at least as many white males as minority males remained on 
4  
 
 
 
  
 
 
the jury. 
He insisted that there were valid reasons to 
remove the intervening jurors who were excused. 
One had 
expressed bias towards police officers. 
The other, years 
before, had resided on the street where the crime was 
alleged to have occurred, and his home had been broken 
into. 
The juror expressed concern about the influence the 
break-in would have on his decision in this case. 
The judge stated that defense counsel’s argument was 
unpersuasive. 
Without making further rulings, he brought 
back the jury, and the trial continued. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE BATSON PROCEDURES 
The judge failed to follow the three-step procedure 
required by Batson. 
In fact, he failed to complete a 
single step of the procedure. 
He did not make a finding 
regarding whether there had been a prima facie showing of 
purposeful discrimination. 
Instead, it appears that he 
lumped all three steps into one and made his ruling without 
further regard to Batson. 
Trial judges are not at liberty to disregard the 
Batson procedure. 
Batson is United States Supreme Court 
precedent that is binding on state courts. 
Moreover, the 
courts may neither ignore one step nor combine the three 
steps of Batson. Purkett v Elem, 514 US 765, 768; 115 S Ct 
1769; 131 L Ed 2d 834 (1995). Instead, they must carefully 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
and individually consider each. 
The Batson procedure was 
designed 
to 
carefully 
balance 
the 
free 
exercise 
of 
peremptory 
challenges 
and 
the 
evils 
of 
racial 
discrimination in the selection of jurors. 
Batson, supra 
at 98-99. 
It was crafted specifically to enforce the 
mandate of equal protection as well as to further the ends 
of justice. Id. at 99. 
In this case, when the trial judge allowed defense 
counsel to speak, he erroneously placed the burden on 
counsel to show that the peremptory challenge should not be 
disallowed. 
Although Batson provides a burden-shifting 
procedure, the party objecting to a peremptory challenge, 
in this case the prosecutor, has the ultimate burden of 
proving purposeful discrimination. 
Purkett, supra at 768. 
Improperly shifting the burden “violates the principle that 
the 
ultimate 
burden 
of 
persuasion 
regarding 
racial 
motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent 
of the strike.” 
Id. 
Therefore, the trial court erred 
twice in disallowing the peremptory challenges to Jurors 
No. 5 and No. 10. 
The trial court was required to make a ruling on the 
first step. 
The court’s failure to arrive at a clear 
conclusion and articulate its findings amounted to error in 
and of itself. 
Only if, and when, a trial court concludes 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
that a prima facie case exists does the burden shift to the 
party exercising the peremptory challenge. 
Then the trial 
court must allow that party to articulate race-neutral 
reasons for the challenge. 
In this case, the trial court glossed over the first 
step, skipped the second step, and jumped to the third. At 
the third step, the court impermissibly placed on defendant 
the burden to rebut presumed racial prejudice. 
These 
multiple and repeated errors are patently inconsistent with 
the established Batson precedent. 
They cannot remain 
uncorrected. 
Those on the lead opinion state that their “research”3 
reflects that trial courts often fail to comply with 
Batson. 
They appear to believe that, because there is a 
supposed generalized failure of compliance, the seriousness 
of the trial court’s Batson errors here is diminished. But 
an error often repeated is no less an error. In fact, what 
we should draw from their research is that we must more 
scrupulously hold our courts responsible for following 
Batson.  The United States Supreme Court has carefully laid 
3 The lead opinion makes no mention of what the
“research” consisted of, and I have no knowledge of what it
might be. 
I know of no research project on this subject
conducted by this Court. 
7  
 
 
 
 
  
 
out the steps necessary for determining if a Batson error 
exists. It is for us to see that they are followed. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CURE THE ERRORS 
The lead opinion concludes that the trial court cured 
its errors by allowing defense counsel to respond to its 
ruling. Those on the lead opinion attempt to fit the facts 
of this case into Batson, rather than apply Batson to the 
facts. They conclude that defense counsel should have used 
his opportunity to respond to offer race-neutral reasons 
for the peremptory challenges. The record does not support 
this conclusion. 
The trial court never articulated that a prima facie 
case of discrimination had been made. 
Therefore, when it 
allowed defense counsel to speak, counsel dwelt on the 
first Batson element. 
He denied the existence of a 
discriminatory pattern in his peremptory challenges. 
It 
appears that he was encouraging the 
court to refocus and 
follow the Batson procedure. 
Given that the court had not 
completed 
the 
first 
step 
of 
Batson, 
it 
was 
wholly 
reasonable for defense counsel to direct his comments to 
that step. And he did just that. 
The lead opinion concludes that defense counsel should 
have surmised that the judge was ignoring Batson and 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
tailored his answers accordingly.4
 This unfairly holds 
defendant responsible for alleviating the court’s error. 
Trial courts have a clear map to follow in Batson cases. 
Given the magnitude of the error when they fail in that 
endeavor, it is imperative that we hold courts responsible 
for correctly applying the Batson test. 
Batson, supra at 
99; Purkett, supra at 768. 
The lead opinion concludes that defense counsel should 
have supplied a race-neutral reason for the challenges. 
However, a good reason exists why he did not respond. 
The 
court never asked for a response and never gave counsel an 
opportunity to offer one. 
Instead, after concluding 
discussion on what should have been the first step of 
Batson, the judge stopped counsel and overruled his 
challenges. 
This was clearly erroneous. 
The judge was 
required to ask specifically for race-neutral responses 
4 The lead opinion also quotes Johnson v California,
545 US __; 125 S Ct 2410; 162 L Ed 2d 129 (2005), to
contend that defendant’s failure to give race-neutral 
reasons 
should 
show 
support 
for 
an 
inference 
of 
discrimination. 
But defendant did not refuse to provide
race-neutral reasons for his challenge. He was never asked 
for his reasons. Therefore, there was no refusal to answer
and the quoted material from Johnson is inapplicable to
this case. 
Id., 545 US ___ n 6; 125 S Ct 2418 n 6; 162 L 
Ed 2d 140 n 6. 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
pursuant to the second Batson step. 
Batson, supra at 94, 
97. 
Instead of that, the judge combined all the Batson 
steps into one and placed the burden on defendant to 
counter his erroneous ruling. It is impermissible to shift 
the burden in this manner. 
Purkett, supra at 768. 
Given 
that shifting the burden is error in itself, it cannot 
constitute a cure for the judge’s other errors as the lead 
opinion concludes. 
The lead opinion states, “Even if the trial court’s 
prima facie findings were inadequate, that inadequacy would 
not be outcome determinative because defendant subsequently 
offered an explanation for his challenges.” 
Ante at 26. 
As noted above, this simply did not happen. 
Defense 
counsel’s comments were directed to the first Batson step. 
Being that a prima facie case was never established, the 
burden never shifted to defendant, and he was not required 
to offer race-neutral reasons. 
Hence, the court’s failure 
must have been outcome determinative. 
The lead opinion attempts to support its position by 
quoting Hernandez v New York, 500 US 352, 359; 111 S Ct 
1859; 114 L Ed 2d 395 (1991). 
But this reliance is 
misplaced. 
First, the quotation is drawn from a plurality 
opinion that, under the doctrine of stare decisis, is not 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
binding. 
Negri v Slotkin, 397 Mich 105, 109; 244 NW2d 98 
(1976). 
Second, the quotation is taken out of context. 
One 
has only to read the sentence above it to understand the 
Supreme Court’s true meaning. 
It quotes a Title VII civil 
rights case: 
“‘[W]here the defendant has done everything 
that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly 
made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really 
did so is no longer relevant.’” 
Hernandez, supra at 359, 
quoting United States Postal Service Bd of Governors v 
Aikens, 460 US 711, 715; 103 S Ct 1478; 75 L Ed 2d 403 
(1983). 
The Supreme Court plurality in no place states 
that, as long as a court rules on Batson’s third step, the 
first step can be ignored. 
Rather, it observes that a 
defendant may concede the first Batson step by moving the 
discussion to the second step. This is a far cry from what 
the lead opinion claims Hernandez stands for. 
But even if this section of Hernandez were controlling 
precedent, it would not apply to this case. 
Here, 
defendant did not concede the first Batson step. 
Instead, 
counsel’s comments were specifically directed at rebutting 
the claim of a prima facie case. It was not defendant who 
moved the process beyond the first step. 
It was the trial 
court that improperly passed over the first and second 
11  
 
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
 
steps of Batson. 
Given this situation, the Hernandez 
plurality opinion simply does not apply. 
II. A BATSON ERROR IS STRUCTURAL 
The lead opinion concedes that Batson errors are 
subject to automatic reversal, but I find it important to 
explain why nearly every court that has considered the 
issue reached the same conclusion.5
 This includes the 
United States Supreme Court, because Batson itself ordered 
an automatic reversal. Batson, supra at 100. 
The Supreme Court gave this reasoning for requiring 
automatic reversal: “[W]hen a petit jury has been selected 
upon improper criteria or has been exposed to prejudicial 
publicity, we have required reversal of the conviction 
because the effect of the violation cannot be ascertained.” 
Vasquez v Hillery, 474 US 254, 263; 106 S Ct 617; 88 L Ed 
2d 598 (1986). 
This is in line with the appropriate 
handling of all structural errors. 
The Supreme Court articulated the difference between 
trial error and structural error in Arizona v Fulminante, 
499 US 279; 111 S Ct 1246; 113 L Ed 2d 302 (1991). A trial 
5 See United States v McFerron, 163 F3d 952, 955-956
(CA 6, 1998), United States v Hall, 152 F3d 381, 408 (CA 5,
1998), Tankleff v Senkowski, 135 F3d 235, 249-250 (CA 2,
1998), United States v Underwood, 122 F3d 389, 392 (CA 7,
1997), and Ford v Norris, 67 F3d 162, 170-171 (CA 8, 1995). 
12  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
error occurs during the presentation of the case to the 
jury. 
It can be quantitatively assessed in the context of 
other evidence for the purpose of determining whether it 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 307-308. 
A structural error, on the other hand, affects the 
framework of the trial proceeding. 
It is more than a mere 
error in presenting the proofs of guilt. 
Id. at 310. 
When a structural error occurs, a criminal trial cannot 
serve as a reliable vehicle for the determination of guilt. 
No criminal punishment could be fair if structural error 
existed in the framework of the trial. Id. 
Although 
no 
constitutional 
guarantee 
exists 
with 
regard to them, Batson errors resulting in a denial of the 
use of peremptory challenges must be structural. 
They 
attack the fundamental framework of the trial proceeding. 
They change the very makeup of the jury. 
And they do not 
occur during the presentation of evidence. Given that they 
do not involve evidence, they cannot be quantitatively 
assessed in the context of other evidence. 
This fact is a 
further indicator that they are not in the nature of trial 
errors. Id. 
Structural errors require automatic reversal. 
Id. at 
309-310; People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 363 ns 16-17; 646 
NW2d 127 (2002). Therefore, once we conclude that a Batson 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
error existed, we must automatically reverse a conviction. 
Because this is exactly what the Court of Appeals did, I 
would affirm its decision. 
Automatic reversal leaves no room for error on the 
part of trial courts. 
But, as the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated, referring to Batson: 
It is true that trial courts bear a heavy
burden in enforcing Batson's anti-discrimination 
principle, given that the erroneous denial of a
party's peremptory challenge has traditionally
warranted 
automatic 
reversal. 
However, 
this 
concern was alleviated by a recent Supreme Court
decision offering guidance to trial courts faced
with deciding whether a particular peremptory 
challenge has a discriminatory motive. 
[United 
States v Annigoni, 96 F3d 1132, 1142 (CA 9,
1996), citing Purkett, supra at 767-768.] 
The Supreme Court has carefully laid out the procedure 
required to satisfy Batson. 
We must insist that trial 
courts adhere to it. 
III. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND AUTOMATIC REVERSAL 
Had no Batson errors occurred here and were the errors 
under scrutiny no more than the wrongful denial of a 
peremptory challenge,6 we should nonetheless issue an 
6 Of course, I disagree with this assumption because I
believe that Batson errors occurred. 
But I also question
the 
assumption 
for 
the 
reason 
that 
the 
judge 
was 
considering Batson when deciding to deny the challenges. 
This means that, in denying defendant’s challenges, the
judge specifically left certain individuals on the jury
Footnotes continued on following page. 
14  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
automatic reversal. 
The lead opinion’s attempt to apply 
harmless error review is contrary to the decisions of most 
other courts that have reviewed the issue. 
Moreover, 
harmless error review is simply unworkable and cannot 
logically apply to rulings on peremptory challenges. 
The lead opinion departs from the trend set by most 
other courts that have considered the application of a 
harmless error analysis to peremptory challenges. It cites 
United States v Martinez-Salazar,7 to demonstrate that a 
harmless error analysis is appropriate here. 
Use of this 
authority illustrates the dangers in relying on dictum.8 
It is undeniable that the cited language is dictum 
given that the Supreme Court concedes that it need not have 
reached the issue of an appropriate remedy for the claimed 
error. “Because we find no impairment, we do not decide in 
this case what the appropriate remedy for a substantial 
because of their race. 
If the judge erred in denying the
peremptory challenges, he erroneously empanelled jurors 
because of their race under the belief that defendant was 
targeting members of the jurors’ race. The issue before us 
does not involve the typical denial of a peremptory
challenge. The lead opinion has not made this distinction. 
7 528 US 304; 120 S Ct 774; 145 L Ed 2d 792 (2000). 
8 There is unavoidable irony in the lead opinion’s
reliance on this footnote. 
The footnote’s purpose is to
criticize the existence of dicta in Swain v Alabama, 380 US
202; 85 S Ct 824; 13 L Ed 2d 759 (1965). Martinez-Salazar, 
supra at 317 n 4. 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
impairment would be.” Id. at 317 n 4. I disagree with the 
lead opinion’s assertion that the dictum of this footnote 
can constitute “a significant shift” in the law. 
The lead opinion’s reliance on Martinez-Salazar is 
further misplaced given that the case dealt with an issue 
distinct 
from 
the 
denial 
of 
the 
use 
of 
peremptory 
challenges. 
In 
Martinez-Salazar, 
the 
trial 
court 
erroneously refused to remove a juror for cause. 
The 
defendant then used a peremptory challenge to remove the 
juror. 
Id. at 307. 
The defendant was not denied the use 
of his peremptory challenges. In fact, he exercised one so 
that the objectionable juror did not sit in judgment of 
him. 
Therefore, Martinez-Salazar did not deal with the 
denial of a peremptory challenge, and its dictum should not 
be read as a comment on the issue before us. 
The distinction between peremptory denial cases and 
Martinez-Salazar makes a real difference when we consider 
whether harmless error review applies. 
In Martinez-
Salazar, the only existing error was the trial court’s 
error in denying a challenge for cause. 
It was cured when 
the defendant used a peremptory challenge to remove the 
juror. 
Consequently, the juror took no part in the trial 
proceedings. 
The error arose and was cured before the 
trial began. 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
On the other hand, when a peremptory challenge is 
denied, the challenged juror stays on the jury and sits in 
judgment of the defendant. 
His or her presence permeates 
the trial, and the error infects the entire case.9 
The all-encompassing penetration of the error explains 
why a harmless error analysis is out of place in the review 
of the wrongful denial of a peremptory challenge. 
To 
accurately make a harmless error analysis, the court would 
have to determine the effect that the challenged juror had 
on the verdict. 
In a case directly on point, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressed the 
problem in these words: 
“To subject the denial of a 
peremptory 
challenge 
to 
harmless-error 
analysis 
would 
require appellate courts to do the impossible: 
to 
reconstruct what went on in jury deliberations through 
nothing 
more 
than 
post-trial 
hearings 
and 
sheer 
speculation.” Annigoni, supra at 1145. 
Appellate courts have no record of what is said in 
jury rooms and no record of what potentially subtle 
influences one juror had on the others. 
Therefore, no 
9 See State v Vreen, 143 Wash 2d 923; 26 P3d 236
(2001), People v Lefebre, 5 P3d 295 (Colo, 2000). 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
device exists with which to plumb the magnitude of the 
error. 
Unlike the typical error subject to harmless error 
review 
discussed 
in 
Fulminante, 
errors 
in 
leaving 
individuals on a jury cannot be quantitatively assessed in 
the context of the evidence presented. 
Fulminante, supra 
at 308. 
Without a means of comparison or measurement, 
meaningful harmless error analysis is impossible. For this 
reason, it is illogical to rule as the majority does. 
It 
ignores the plight of courts in future cases that attempt 
to follow its ruling. 
Chief Justice Taylor demonstrates in his opinion 
dissenting in part and concurring in part the difficulty 
faced in trying to apply the harmless error standard. 
Although he finds the error harmless, he offers no analysis 
for his conclusion. 
Likely, this is because there is no 
legitimate analysis, beyond mere speculation, that can be 
applied. 
In fact, the Chief Justice has demonstrated that 
the rule now created by the majority is a rule of automatic 
affirmance. It defies fair appellate scrutiny. 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The lead opinion implies that a rule requiring 
automatic reversal would contradict MCL 769.26.10
 This is 
inaccurate. Allowing a peremptory challenge error to stand 
would always amount to a miscarriage of justice. 
A 
miscarriage of justice exists if it affirmatively appears 
that the error undermines the reliability of the verdict. 
People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). 
Given that an error in denying a peremptory challenge 
changes the makeup of the jury, it potentially changes the 
verdict. 
It alters the jury deliberation and interaction 
process. 
The point of a peremptory challenge is to remove 
someone who appears biased but who might not be removed for 
cause. 
Rejecting the peremptory challenge leaves this 
potentially biased or prejudiced juror on the jury, 
undermining the validity of the verdict. 
10 MCL 769.26 provides: 
No judgment or verdict shall be set aside or
reversed or a new trial be granted by any court
of this state in any criminal case, on the ground
of misdirection of the jury, or the improper
admission or rejection of evidence, or for error
as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless
in the opinion of the court, after an examination
of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively
appear that the error complained of has resulted
in a miscarriage of justice. 
19  
 
 
 
 
Requiring automatic reversal for peremptory challenge 
errors is consistent with the plain error standard of 
review articulated by this Court in People v Carines, 460 
Mich 750; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 
Carines gave three 
requirements for plain error: 
the error (1) must have 
occurred, (2) must be clear or obvious, and (3) must affect 
substantial rights. 
Id. at 763. 
Peremptory challenge 
errors would always meet this standard. 
A peremptory challenge error becomes obvious after the 
trial court rules on an objection to it. The error is that 
either a juror who should not be on a jury remains or one 
who should remain does not. 
These errors affect substantial rights because they 
shape the jury. 
Peremptory challenges are a means of 
eliminating extreme beliefs or partiality from a jury. 
Batson, supra at 91. 
The right to a peremptory challenge 
enables the parties to strike jurors who, although not 
necessarily excusable for cause, appear biased or hostile 
in some way. 
Therefore, the right implicates defendant’s 
right to a fair and impartial trial. 
Those plain errors require reversal because they 
“‘“seriously [affect] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings” . . . .’” 
Carines, 
supra at 763, quoting United States v Olano, 507 US 725, 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
736; 113 S Ct 1770; 123 L Ed 2d 508 (1993), quoting United 
States v Atkinson, 297 US 157, 160; 56 S Ct 391; 80 L Ed 
555 (1936).
 Given the fundamental nature of the jury 
process, having an unfairly chosen jury raises serious 
questions regarding the integrity and public reputation of 
the judicial proceedings.11
 Therefore, the errors require 
automatic reversal. Id. 
Because we have no tools to gauge the effect of errors 
in denying peremptory challenges, a harmless error analysis 
of them is simply unworkable. 
Therefore, such errors must 
result in automatic reversal. 
IV. PRIMA FACIE CASE OF DISCRIMINATION 
The trial court erred in failing to follow Batson’s 
three-step process, and the error is subject to automatic 
reversal. 
Hence, the issue whether a prima facie case of 
discrimination actually existed is technically irrelevant 
to my dissent. 
But I feel that it is appropriate to 
respond to the majority’s conclusion that a prima facie 
case existed. 
11 The lead opinion itself concedes that the exclusion
of even one juror undermines public confidence in the
fairness of the system. 
Ante at 21-22, citing J E B v 
Alabama ex rel T B, 511 US 127, 142 n 13; 114 S Ct 1419; 
128 L Ed 2d 89 (1994). 
Therefore, it has conceded the
necessity of automatic reversal. 
21  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
To reach the majority’s conclusion requires not only a 
strained reading of the existing law regarding Batson, but 
also a strained reading of the factual record in this case. 
The members of the majority attempt to save the trial 
judge’s ruling by using twenty-twenty hindsight to fit his 
actions into the Batson procedure. 
Initially, they 
conclude that, despite the fact that the judge never ruled 
that prima facie discrimination had occurred, his comments 
equated to such a ruling. 
The 
trial 
judge 
stated 
that 
he 
disallowed 
the 
peremptory challenges because defense counsel was using his 
challenges for the purpose of excluding white males. 
The 
record does not support his conclusion. 
First, at least 
two of the jurors that defense counsel challenged were 
female. 
Second, the race of each challenged juror is not 
in the record. 
Therefore, we do not know how many of the 
challenged male jurors were Caucasian.12
 Third, we know 
from defense counsel’s comments regarding the jurors 
12 The lead opinion bases its contention that the race
of the excused jurors is determinable on the judge’s
statement that defense counsel had repeatedly excused 
Caucasian male jurors. 
Obviously, this statement is 
unclear. 
It is well established that at least two of the 
challenged jurors were female. 
Hence, the statement is
simply too inexact to determine the race of the challenged
jurors, and it is inappropriate for the lead opinion to
rely heavily on it. 
22  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
challenged between Jurors No. 10 and No. 5 that valid 
reasons existed to challenge some of the Caucasian male 
jurors. 
Finally, we can tell from the record that the 
number of Caucasian males left on the jury was either equal 
to or exceeded the number of minorities on the jury. 
Considering all these facts, a prima facie case of 
discrimination did not exist. 
Batson requires a court to 
carefully examine all relevant factors as well as the 
totality of the circumstances in making its decision. 
Batson, supra at 93-94, 96-97. 
The record indicates that 
the judge here failed to exercise that careful scrutiny. 
Instead, he rushed to a conclusion before hearing a 
thorough 
discussion 
and 
without 
making 
an 
adequate 
investigation. 
It is true that a pattern of strikes against one 
racial group in jury selection might support an inference 
of discrimination. 
Id. at 97. 
But defendant countered 
this alleged pattern when finally allowed to respond.13  He 
indicated that his intervening peremptory challenges fit no 
13 The lead opinion contends that the trial judge
“almost immediately” allowed defense counsel to respond.
Ante at 17-18. 
The record does not support this. 
Defense 
counsel and the prosecution had to demand that the judge
allow them to make a record. 
The judge only belatedly and
reluctantly allowed defense counsel to speak. 
23  
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
                                                 
 
pattern. 
The fact that a large number of Caucasian males 
remained on the jury, he argued, demonstrates that he was 
not targeting such jurors. 
Our courts have held that a 
showing that the challenged racial group continued to have 
a strong representation on the jury is significant evidence 
that no discriminatory intent existed. People v Eccles, 260 
Mich App 379, 387-388; 677 NW2d 76 (2004); People v 
Williams, 174 Mich App 132, 137; 435 NW2d 469 (1989).14 
Given the weak evidence of a pattern and the fact that 
Caucasian males constituted a significant portion of the 
jury, the prosecution failed to make a prima facie case of 
discrimination. Therefore, defense counsel did not need to 
offer race-neutral reasons for his peremptory challenges. 
The burden never shifted to him. 
The trial judge never 
concluded the first Batson step. 
Hence, he erred in 
allowing Jurors No. 10 and No. 5 to remain on the jury. 
V. THE LEAD OPINION’S DICTUM REGARDING MILLER 
Part IV of Justice Corrigan’s opinion concerns our 
decision in Miller, supra, and the Court of Appeals 
14 See also United States v Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F2d
1501, 1521-1522 (CA 6, 1988), United States v Grandison,
885 F2d 143, 147 (CA 4, 1989), Commonwealth v Clark, 551 Pa
258, 280; 710 A2d 31 (1998), and Valdez v People, 966 P2d
587, 594 (Colo, 1998). 
24  
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
     
decision in People v Schmitz, 231 Mich App 521; 586 NW2d 
766 (1998). 
As Justice Weaver points out, the entire 
section is dictum. 
In Miller, the trial court diluted the defendant’s 
peremptory challenge rights by using the struck jury 
method.15 
Miller, supra at 323. 
The case before us does 
not deal with the dilution of a defendant’s right to 
peremptory challenges. 
It deals with the denial of his 
peremptory challenges. 
For this reason, Miller is clearly 
distinguishable from this case. 
The lead opinion concedes that its discussion of 
Miller is dictum by stating that “we have concluded that 
the trial court did not err in denying defense counsel’s 
peremptory challenges.” 
Ante at 30. 
Because it concludes 
that Miller does not apply to its decision, any discussion 
of Miller must be obiter dictum. 
Part IV lacks the force 
of an adjudication and is not binding under the principles 
of stare decisis. People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 
286 n 4; 597 NW2d 1 (1999). Therefore, it is of no value. 
15 Under the struck jury method, all members of the
jury array are called into the courtroom at once. They are
questioned collectively, not individually. 
After the 
parties exhaust their preemptory challenges, the judge
assembles the jury using the remaining members of the
array, starting with the lowest numbers. Miller, supra at 
323-324. 
25  
 
 
 
 
 
The issue raised in Miller is not before us, and the lead 
opinion has offered no legal basis to overrule this 
precedent or to support a conclusion that some former case 
overruled this precedent. 
Oddly enough, the lead opinion claims that I “labor[]” 
to avoid reference to Miller and Schmitz. Ante at 30 n 22. 
Nothing can be further from the truth. 
Even a cursory 
reading of this section of my dissent indicates that I find 
Miller irrelevant. Miller deals with a struck-jury method, 
which is inapplicable to this case. 
Nor do I labor to 
avoid referencing Schmitz. 
I simply found other and more 
persuasive authority. 
Those on the lead opinion state that they may reach 
Miller because I reference it. 
As stated above, I would 
not reference either Miller or Schmitz if the lead opinion 
had not attempted to overrule them. 
Contrary to the lead opinion’s statement, nothing in 
my opinion would prohibit the Court from revisiting Miller 
in the future. 
If a case actually raising a struck-jury 
method should come before the Court, the issue in Miller 
could be relevant and the Court could address it. There is 
nothing 
novel 
in 
my 
legal 
conclusion 
that 
it 
is 
inappropriate 
to 
overrule 
precedent 
in 
a 
case 
that 
addresses issues irrelevant to the precedent. 
But it is 
26  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
inappropriate, as a plurality of the Court does here, to 
attempt to signal the future demise of the precedent in 
dictum. 
No case has ever explicitly overruled Miller. And the 
lead opinion’s attempt today amounts to nothing more than 
dictum. Therefore, Miller should remain valid law. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The trial judge erred by failing to follow the Batson 
steps and by shifting the burden to defendant to disprove a 
presumption of discrimination. He also erred by concluding 
that a prima facie case of discrimination existed. 
He did 
not cure these errors. Batson errors and erroneous denials 
of peremptory challenges are subject to automatic reversal. 
Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the Court of 
Appeals, reverse defendant’s conviction, and remand the 
case for retrial. 
Also, no legal basis exists to overrule this Court’s 
decision in the Miller case. Any comment here on Miller is 
mere dictum without precedential value. 
I would leave 
Miller unmolested. 
Marilyn Kelly 
27  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 125375 
MARLON BELL, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
I dissent from the majority’s decision and I agree 
with the result reached in Justice Kelly’s dissent. 
I 
would likewise conclude that the trial court erred by 
collapsing the three steps of Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 
106 S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986), into one. See, e.g., 
Purkett v Elem, 514 US 765, 768; 115 S Ct 1769; 131 L Ed 2d 
834 (1995). 
Further, the trial court erred when it failed 
to allow defendant an opportunity to articulate race­
neutral explanations for the challenges. 
When defense 
counsel was finally allowed an opportunity to speak, I 
agree with Justice Kelly and Chief Justice Taylor that 
defense counsel’s comments were directed at Batson’s first 
step. 
Thus, I would conclude that the trial court’s 
failure to follow Batson was error and defendant was 
 
 
 
 
 
improperly denied the use of his peremptory challenges 
because the trial court misapplied that decision. 
Because 
the 
trial 
court 
erroneously 
denied 
the 
peremptory challenges on Batson grounds, and Batson error 
is subject to automatic reversal and not amenable to 
harmless error review, I would conclude that defendant is 
entitled to a new trial. 
See, e.g., United States v 
McFerron, 163 F3d 952, 956 (CA 6, 1998) (“[W]e find that 
harmless error analysis is not applicable to the district 
court’s erroneous application of the three-step Batson test 
and the improper denial of [the defendant’s] peremptory 
challenges.”). 
Further, I agree with Justices Weaver and Kelly that 
the majority’s dicta regarding People v Miller, 411 Mich 
321; 307 NW2d 335 (1981), and People v Schmitz, 231 Mich 
App 521; 586 NW2d 766 (1998), is inappropriate given the 
majority’s conclusion that the trial court ultimately did 
not err. 
For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent from 
the majority’s decision. 
Accordingly, I would affirm the 
decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
2