Title: Anders v. Anders
Citation: 285 S.C. 512, 331 S.E.2d 340
Docket Number: 22333
State: south-carolina
Issuer: south-carolina Supreme Court
Date: May 28, 1985

285 S.C. 512 (1985) 331 S.E.2d 340 Jeffrey Hiram ANDERS, Respondent, v. Victoria Labell Watt ANDERS, Appellant. 22333 Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard April 10, 1985. Decided May 28, 1985. *513 Adam Fisher, Jr., and Rex Carter, Greenville, for appellant. William B. Long, Jr., and Kathryn Williams, of Foster, Covington &amp; Patrick, Greenville, for respondent. Heard April 10, 1985. Decided May 28, 1985. Per Curiam: In this appeal, as in the trial in the Family Court, two cases have been consolidated. Jeffrey Hiram Anders, husband, is suing his wife, Victoria Labell Watt Anders, for a divorce on the ground of adultery. The wife is suing the husband for a divorce on the ground of physical cruelty. The Family Court Judge granted a divorce to the husband, denied a divorce to the wife, granted custody of the children *514 born to the marriage to the husband and ordered equitable distribution of the marital assets. The wife has appealed. We affirm. In her brief the wife frames four questions for determination by this Court: (1) Did the trial judge err in granting the husband a divorce on the ground of adultery? (2) Did the lower court err in failing to grant a divorce to the wife on the ground of physical cruelty? (3) Did the judge err in failing to give custody of the children to the wife? and (4) Did the lower court err in granting the wife only a 25% equitable interest in the marital residence? The first two questions relate to proof of which of the parties, if either, is entitled to a divorce. When the evidence is in conflict and susceptible of different inferences, as was the case here, it becomes the duty of the trial judge to determine not only the law of the case but the facts as well. He had the benefit of observing the witnesses and attaching to each one's testimony such credence as was due. He obviously found the husband's witnesses and evidence more credible. The evidence as relates to the charge of physical cruelty against the husband at most shows that on one occasion, at the end of a quarrel, he pushed the wife. In Gill v. Gill, 269 S.C. 337, 237 S.E. (2d) 382 (1977), this Court said: The judge correctly applied these propositions of law. As relates to the husband's proof of the wife's adultery with Hussein, he said: Counsel argues that the husband has not met the burden of proof concerning the charge of adultery. We disagree. In this case, as is usual, where adultery is charged, the evidence is basically circumstantial. Adultery may be proved by circumstantial evidence, or by direct evidence, or a combination of the two; and circumstantial evidence is just as good as direct evidence if it is equally convincing. Brown v. Brown, 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E. (2d) 330 (1949); Odom v. Odom, 248 S.C. 144, 149 S.E. (2d) 353 (1966); Lee v. Lee, 237 S.C. 532, 118 S.E. (2d) 171 (1961). By appropriate exceptions, the wife submits that the trial judge erred in (1) failing to grant to her a divorce on the ground of physical cruelty, (2) in failing to award custody of the children to her and (3) in granting to her only a twenty-five *516 percent equitable interest in the marital abode. Having found herein that the judge did not err in granting to the husband a divorce on the ground of adultery, it follows that there was no error in refusing her petition for a divorce. As relates to the contention that the judge erred in awarding custody of the children to the husband and in failing to make a more abundant award of the property subject to equitable distribution, a review of the record reveals that the judge was well within his discretionary authority and we find no error. Affirmed. GREGORY, Justice (dissenting): The evidence is grossly insufficient to support a finding of adultery. After the parties separated, appellant was seen on several occasions in local nightclubs and once at another's apartment. The record reflects others may have been present on this single occasion. Such evidence utterly fails to meet the requisite clear and convincing standard to prove adultery by circumstantial evidence. See Odom v. Odom, 248 S.C. 144, 149 S.E. (2d) 353 (1966). I would reverse the order granting the divorce on the ground of adultery. Since the erroneous finding of adultery was an important factor in awarding child custody and equitable distribution, I would reverse both awards and remand for a proper determination of those issues.