Title: Fisher v. Reilly
Citation: 207 Or. 7, 294 P.2d 615
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: March 7, 1956

Reversed March 7, 1956.
*8 Herbert M. Schwab, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Dusenbery, Teiser, Martin &amp; Schwab, of Portland, and W.C. Schwenn, Hillsboro.
Francis E. Sturgis, Hillsboro, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Before WARNER, Chief Justice, and TOOZE, BRAND and PERRY, Justices.
REVERSED.
BRAND, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, arising out of a collision between plaintiff's *9 pickup truck and defendant's sedan. The collision occurred on the afternoon of July 31, 1951, a short distance north of the Tualatin River bridge on Highway 99W between Newberg and Portland. The plaintiff Fisher was driving his pickup truck in a southerly direction in the west lane of the highway. The defendant Reilly was driving his sedan in a northerly direction in the east lane of the highway. The plaintiff made a left turn across the highway in front of the oncoming car of the defendant, intending to enter the private driveway on plaintiff's property. The right front of defendant's car struck the right rear side of plaintiff's pickup. The police officer who arrived at the scene a few minutes after the collision located the point of impact near the center of the north-bound lane where he found dirt and debris. He testified that at the point of impact the skid marks made by defendant's car were in the north-bound lane. Plaintiff testified, however, that the collision occurred east of the paved portion of the highway. The two cars came to rest about a foot apart. The plaintiff's car was then east of the pavement and defendant's car was still on the pavement. There was no street intersection at the point where plaintiff turned left.
The plaintiff testified that he shifted from high into second gear about 75 feet north of the private driveway and before he saw the defendant's car. He first saw the defendant's sedan 350 to 400 feet away when he was still in the south-bound lane, but was starting to turn left to enter his driveway. He testified that he estimated the defendant's speed at 70 to 75 miles per hour, but he added that he thought the defendant would slow down and let him complete his turn into the driveway. Plaintiff gave a left-turn signal. There is some corroborating evidence concerning the *10 speed of the defendant. A witness who was driving north at about 50 miles an hour testified that defendant passed him on the bridge which was about three-tenths of a mile south of the point of impact, and the witness estimated that defendant was driving 70 miles per hour. The defendant testified to a speed of "approximately" 50 miles an hour, but he also testified as follows:
If we accept the plaintiff's testimony the defendant's car was 350 to 400 feet away when plaintiff, in second gear, started his left turn, but he was aware of a speed of 70 to 75 miles an hour at which defendant was approaching. If we accept the defendant's testimony the north-bound car was moving at a somewhat *11 lesser speed but was within 100 to 150 feet of the plaintiff's car when plaintiff turned to the left in front of the oncoming traffic. In either event the left-hand turn was fraught with danger.
Error is assigned by reason of the refusal of the court to grant a directed verdict for defendant.
1. The defendant cites Black v. Stith, 164 Or 117, 100 P2d 485, as supporting his claim that the driver who made the left-hand turn was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. In that case, as in the one at bar, the south-bound driver turned left in front of oncoming traffic at a point where there was no intersection. The south-bound driver said he was traveling about 25 miles an hour. After he started to make the left turn he first saw the north-bound car traveling between 60 and 70 miles an hour about 300 feet distant. The driver of the north-bound car testified that he was driving between 40 and 45 miles an hour. The north-bound driver saw the south-bound car 100 to 150 feet away. "The next thing I knew it was right in front of me." Thus far the facts are strikingly like those in the pending case. The legal situation, however, is quite different. In Black v. Stith the plaintiff was the north-bound driver. In the pending case the plaintiff was the south-bound driver. The verdict in Black v. Stith was in favor of the north-bound driver and against the one who turned left. We affirmed. The case establishes the rule that the north-bound driver had the common-law right-of-way as against the one who turned left in front of him. Concerning the south-bound driver we said that he
The Stith case is important here. It demonstrates that the defendant Reilly had the right-of-way and the plaintiff was chargeable with knowledge thereof. He therefore had no right to assume that the north-bound defendant would slow down and yield the right-of-way. Yet his own testimony shows that the plaintiff Fisher was relying on the idea that defendant would slow down and yield the right-of-way. He testified:
In the Stith case the trial court gave some erroneous instructions and this court invoked Article VII, § 3 of the Oregon Constitution and being of "opinion, after consideration of all the matters thus submitted, that the judgment * * * was such as should have been rendered" we affirmed the judgment for the north-bound driver. The case establishes the fact that, in agreement with the jury we found the driver who *13 made the left turn was negligent and to that extent the decision is persuasive in the pending case in which the facts are strikingly similar. We said:
In affirming the case we arrived at the result after consideration of all of the evidence. We did not hold nor under the constitutional provision did we need to hold that the driver making the left-hand turn was negligent as a matter of law.
2. In the pending case the jury found for the plaintiff who made the left-hand turn. We can overthrow that verdict only if the plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law.
The next Oregon case cited by defendant is Blaylock v. Westlund, 197 Or 536, 254 P2d 203. In that case as in the one at bar the plaintiff was south bound and made a left turn. The facts were similar to those in the pending case. There were the same discrepancies in the testimony as to speed and distance when the left turn was made. The turn was not at an intersection. We held that the trial court properly granted a new trial because of its failure to give an instruction to the effect that the north-bound defendant had the right-of-way. The opinion followed and emphasized the rule of Black v. Stith but it did not hold that the plaintiff who made the left turn was guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
In Casto v. Hansen et al., 123 Or 20, 261 P 428, plaintiff was riding easterly on a motorcycle. As he *14 approached an intersection he reduced speed to about five miles an hour and when within 30 or 40 feet of it he looked to the right and saw no automobile. He drove into the intersection, keeping to the right and around the center thereof and proceeded north. He was struck by defendant's northbound car just after clearing the intersection. Defendant appealed from a judgment for plaintiff, contending that plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. This court said that it could not say as a matter of law that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence. It is true that the defendant had the right-of-way, but this was an intersection case. The rule was well-stated in a quotation from Huddy on Automobiles, 7th ed, § 311, as follows:
We think this case is not controlling here. Circumstances at an intersection where persons may be expected to make left turns and commonly make them may be such as to authorize one approaching the intersection to proceed in compliance with the rule as quoted but might not authorize a left turn into a private driveway. In the latter case the peril is obviously greater, especially when cars are approaching from opposite directions.
Defendant relies upon Ramp v. Osborne, 115 Or 672, 239 P 112. In that case plaintiff was driving east and the defendant north. This court rendered judgment for the defendant because of plaintiff's "contributory *15 negligence in disobeying the statute requiring him to look to the right and give the right-of-way to a car approaching the crossing in such a manner that if they both continued on the course a collision would ensue." While the language of the court suggests some support for the defendant here, we cannot consider the decision controlling and the facts are distinguishable. The court in Ramp v. Osborne announced a stricter rule as to right-of-way than is now recognized. See Casto v. Hansen et al., supra. It may be that plaintiff Ramp was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law under the rule as currently applied by this court, but the facts were that he failed to look to the right at a point where he could have seen the approach of defendant. In the pending case plaintiff looked and saw the defendant's car. The Ramp case does, however, approve a rule which is applicable here. Following the ruling in St. Mary's Academy v. Newhagen, 77 Colo 471, 238 P 21, the court said:
We find no Oregon case which is directly in point, and therefore turn to the decisions in other jurisdictions.
We will first consider the judicial attitude toward the practice of making left-hand turns between intersections. In Onkels v. Stogsdill, 151 Wash 194, 275 P 692, the plaintiff who was driving northerly made a left turn to a private drive, in front of the southbound car of the defendant. Plaintiff had verdict and judgment *16 which was affirmed on appeal. The case differs from the one at bar in two respects: There was no evidence that plaintiff was aware of any excessive speed and in truth there was no excessive speed on the part of the defendant. The court stated the rule of law as follows:
In Phoenix Baking Co. v. Vaught, 62 Ariz 222, 156 P2d 725, plaintiff collided with the rear of defendant's car when defendant stopped preparatory to a left turn to a private entrance. The trial court read to the jury the statute which is almost identical to ORS 483.126 which provides that the driver, before turning, "shall first see that such movement can be made in safety." It also gave the following instruction:
On appeal the court held that no error was committed in giving the later instruction. We quote:
In Shirley v. Caldwell Bros. &amp; Hart, La App, 183 So 581, the plaintiff was driving north and the defendant south. Defendant made a sharp left turn and a collision resulted. There was evidence that defendant had stopped before the collision in order to let the plaintiff pass. This, the court said, was the vital point in the case. The facts are unlike those in the pending case, but the court said:
In Petersen v. Schneider, 153 Neb 815, 46 NW2d 355, plaintiff and defendant were driving in an easterly direction, the defendant being in the lead. Plaintiff increased his speed and was in the process of passing when defendant turned sharply to the left, intending to enter a private driveway on the north side of the road. The court said:
3, 4. In the light of these decisions we are justified in taking judicial notice of the dangers, inherent and extreme, which are involved in the conduct of drivers who turn left between intersections on our modern and congested highways, and in applying that knowledge in determining the issues here. We do not, of course, mean to imply that such drivers are insurers of the safety of others, even under these circumstances.
5. The general duty of one making a left turn in order to enter private premises is stated in 2 Blashfield, Cyclopedea of Automobile Law and Practice, § 1170, as follows:
We now turn to cases which deal more closely with the question of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
In Kerr v. Augustine Const. Co., 158 Pa Super 576, 45 A2d 913, the plaintiff was driving northerly and the defendant southerly. Plaintiff was driving about four miles per hour and attempted to make a left turn in front of defendant's car. Before turning he saw defendant's car at a distance of about 420 feet and at an "undeterminable speed." Defendant was going 55 to 60 miles an hour. Verdict was for plaintiff. Judgment n.o.v. was entered for defendant and on appeal the judgment was affirmed. The court said:
In Faber v. Herdliska, 194 Minn 321, 260 NW 500, plaintiff was driving easterly. When he arrived at a *20 point near a private driveway leading north to his home he gave a signal, turned left, and collided with defendant's car which was approaching from the east. Plaintiff had an unobstructed view to the east. The cars were in full sight of each other when they were three blocks apart. Defendant was going twice as fast as plaintiff. On appeal the court held that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. It said:
In Burton v. Billingsly, Tex Civ App, 129 SW2d 439, the plaintiff, eastbound, made a left-hand turn in front of an oncoming westbound car at a point in the middle of the block. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant which was affirmed on appeal. It was held that the question of the negligence of defendant was not material "except upon the question of discovered peril." Plaintiff first observed defendant's car when it was 276 yards distant and was going at a very high rate of speed. On reaching the point where he intended to make a sharp left turn he again observed defendant approaching at a distance of 130 *21 to 150 feet. Plaintiff said defendant had not reduced his speed but was still traveling at a "terrific rate of speed." Plaintiff glanced in his rear-view mirror and then "paid no further attention" to defendant's car "because, he said, he though Cook [the defendant] surely would reduce his rate of speed before reaching him." The appellate court said:
In Lardeau v. Johnson, 203 Wis 509, 234 NW 710, plaintiff was driving in an easterly and the defendant in a westerly direction. Plaintiff turned to the left to *22 go into a private yard. Each driver was aware of the other's approach. The plaintiff stopped on his right side of the road. He judged defendant's car to be about a block away and started to make the left turn when he was hit. Defendant saw no indication that plaintiff was going to turn into his pathway until he was ten or fifteen feet away. Verdict and judgment were for plaintiff, and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court said:
Hoenig v. Kohl, 182 Wash 245, 46 P2d 728, was an intersection case but the rule stated applies with greater force in cases involving a left turn into a private driveway. There was a verdict for plaintiff; judgment n.o.v. for defendant, and on appeal the judgment was affirmed. Plaintiff was driving west and defendant was driving south, both approaching the intersection. Defendant had the right-of-way. The court said:
6. We have cited cases indicating judicial knowledge of the dangers of left turns between intersections and holding that drivers making such turns must exercise "extraordinary precautions," "more than due care," a "high degree of care" and the like. In so doing it is not our intention to establish additional degrees of care as rules of law for the guidance of juries. When in Black v. Stith, supra, we said that such a driver is obliged to exercise "a high degree of care" we also said that the test is "what would an ordinarily prudent person have done under the circumstances?" This does not mean that the pronouncements quoted from the cases are to be ignored. Reasonable care means care commensurate with the apparent danger, Peck v. Gerber, 154 Or 126, 59 P2d 675, and the courts know that in these left turns into private property driveways the danger is great. We apply this knowledge in determining whether in the individual case the negligence of the driver should be determined as a matter of law or left to the decision of a jury.
7, 8. The case at bar lies near the borderline between *24 the class of cases in which the question of negligence is for the jury and the lesser class in which it is for the court to determine the issue as a matter of law. We find plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, based upon his own testimony. Whether the plaintiff was or was not negligent is to be determined by applying the test of the reasonable man in like circumstances. Having the knowledge, and opportunity of knowledge, which the plaintiff had, the question is whether such reasonable man would have acted as plaintiff acted. The question cannot be decided by considering facts which were unknown to plaintiff unless they should have been known. In other words, the question is to be decided from the standpoint of the reasonable man if in the shoes of the plaintiff.
Here the plaintiff was charged with knowledge that the defendant had the right-of-way. He knew that he was turning left where there was no intersection, and should have known that the peril was greater by reason of that fact. He knew he was driving slowly in second gear, and in view of other testimony concerning defendant's speed he reasonably believed defendant's speed to be 70 or 75 miles an hour. He saw defendant when they were 350 to 400 feet apart. He advanced across the street in reliance upon the belief or hope that defendant who had the right-of-way would slow down. His idea drawn from his testimony quoted supra seems to have been that defendant could have dodged him by turning into the left-hand or westerly lane of travel which he said was unoccupied by any car coming from the north. The conclusion is unavoidable that he violated the mandate of the statute which provides that "The driver of any vehicle * * * before * * * turning from a direct line shall first see that such *25 movement can be made in safety." ORS 483.126. If the plaintiff gave a signal for a left turn the testimony of both himself and his wife indicates that the arm signal was given as he was turning into his left-hand lane. In that event the signal would be plainly visible to cars, if any, behind him, but would be of doubtful visibility to a driver approaching from the south. The fact that the defendant was driving at a high, and even negligent, speed, did not excuse plaintiff, who knew and appreciated that fact, and proceeded in spite of it.
Judgment for plaintiff is reversed.