Title: State v. Dhosi J. Ndina
Citation: 2009 WI 21
Docket Number: 2007AP000005-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: February 26, 2009

2009 WI 21 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP5-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Dhosi J. Ndina, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
2007 WI App 268 
Reported at: 306 Wis. 2d 706, 743 N.W.2d 722 
(Ct. App. 2007-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 26, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 8, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis P. Moroney   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ZIEGLER and GABLEMAN, JJ., join the concurrence.  
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Richard L. Kaiser and the Law Offices of Richard L. Kaiser, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Richard L. Kaiser. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by Daniel 
J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 21
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.  2007AP005-CR 
   
(L.C. No. 
2002CF006623) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant,   
 
 
v. 
 
Dhosi J. Ndina,   
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
FEB 26, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   The defendant, Dhosi J. 
Ndina, seeks review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals reversing an order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County, Dennis P. Moroney, Judge.1  At the hearing on the 
defendant's postconviction motion for a new trial, the circuit 
court reversed a judgment of conviction against the defendant 
and granted the defendant's postconviction motion for a new 
                                                 
1 State v. Ndina, 2007 WI App 268, 306 Wis. 2d 706, 743 
N.W.2d 722. 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
2 
 
trial.2  The circuit court (Judge Moroney) concluded that the 
circuit court (Mary M. Kuhnmuench, Circuit Court Judge for 
Milwaukee County), had violated the defendant's right to a 
public trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution by excluding the defendant's family from three days 
of the trial proceedings.   
¶2 
Three issues are presented on review to determine 
whether the circuit court erred in granting the defendant's 
postconviction motion for a new trial: 
I. Did the defendant waive or forfeit his right to argue in 
an appellate court that the circuit court violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial?  Did the State waive or 
forfeit its right to argue in an appellate court that the 
defendant waived or forfeited his right to argue that the 
circuit court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public 
trial?  
II. Did the circuit court's order excluding family members 
from three days of trial proceedings violate the defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial?   
III. If the circuit court did not violate the defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, what remedy, if any, 
does the defendant have?  
¶3 
On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that by 
failing to object timely to the circuit court's order excluding 
                                                 
2 The defendant was convicted of first-degree recklessly 
endangering safety while using a dangerous weapon contrary to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 941.30(1) and 939.63 (2001-02). 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
3 
 
his family from the trial proceedings, the defendant had waived 
or forfeited his right to argue the Sixth Amendment issue in his 
postconviction motion and on appeal.  The court of appeals then 
evaluated the defendant's public trial argument in the context 
of determining whether the defendant had received ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel.  The court of appeals concluded 
that the defendant's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 
failed because the defendant had not demonstrated that his trial 
counsel's failure to object to the exclusion of his family 
prejudiced him.  The court of appeals reversed the order 
granting the defendant a new trial. 
¶4 
Because both parties failed to bring arguments to the 
circuit court 
in 
a timely manner and have briefed the 
substantive issue whether the circuit court's order excluding 
family members violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
a public trial, this court has decided to reach the merits of 
the issue presented, rather than to assess comparative blame and 
address the effect of the defendant's failure at trial to raise 
the Sixth Amendment issue and the State's failure at the 
postconviction 
hearing 
to 
raise 
the 
defendant's 
waiver/forfeiture at trial of the Sixth Amendment issue.  We 
conclude that the exclusion of family members from three days of 
the trial implicated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a 
public trial but did not, under the circumstances of the instant 
case, violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment constitutional 
right.   
No.  2007AP5-CR 
4 
 
 
¶5 
We do not address whether the defendant is entitled to 
a new trial on any basis unrelated to the Sixth Amendment right 
to a public trial.  We agree with the court of appeals that the 
matter is to be remanded to the circuit court for any additional 
postconviction proceedings required by law. 
¶6 
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals decision, 
although on different grounds, reversing the postconviction 
order granting the defendant a new trial, reinstating the 
judgment rendered by the jury, and remanding the matter to the 
circuit 
court 
for 
any 
additional 
postconviction 
remedies 
required by law.  We remand the matter, as did the court of 
appeals, to the circuit court for additional postconviction 
proceedings required by law.       
I 
¶7 
We briefly summarize the facts relating to the circuit 
court's order excluding members of the defendant's family from 
the courtroom for parts of the trial.   
¶8 
The State charged the defendant with attempted first-
degree intentional homicide while using a dangerous weapon.  The 
victim, the nephew of the defendant, was stabbed twice in the 
back with a knife during a family gathering.  The case was tried 
to a jury. 
¶9 
Because the victim is related to the defendant and was 
injured during a family gathering, many witnesses for both the 
State and the defendant were members of the defendant's family.  
Defense counsel's initial witness list included the names of 13 
individuals whom the record shows either to be related to the 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
5 
 
defendant or at least to bear the same surname as a confirmed 
relative of the defendant.  The State included seven of the 
defendant's relatives on its initial witness list, including 
three individuals who also appeared on defense counsel's witness 
list.  Nine family members eventually testified either for or 
against the defendant.    
¶10 The defendant and his family are fairly recent 
immigrants from Albania.  The defendant relied upon an Albanian-
English interpreter during the course of his trial.  The record 
also shows that many, and possibly all, members of the 
defendant's family who served as witnesses testified in Albanian 
with an Albanian-English interpreter.  Four police officers 
testified in English.    
¶11 Early in the trial, the circuit court issued a 
sequestration order applying to all potential witnesses except 
the defendant and a law enforcement officer testifying for the 
State.  The circuit court ordered all persons subject to the 
order to "remain outside the courtroom until called in to 
testify."  The circuit court further ordered such persons "not 
to discuss their testimony with each other or with anyone until 
directed to do so or unless directed to do so by [the] Court." 
¶12 The circuit court specifically instructed both the 
prosecutor and defense counsel to communicate its sequestration 
order to potential witnesses.  The circuit court also reminded 
defense counsel that he would need to utilize the services of an 
English-Albanian interpreter so that family members potentially 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
6 
 
testifying on the defendant's behalf could understand the 
circuit court's order.   
¶13 On the trial's third day, the circuit court received 
testimony from the victim's father, who told the jury that he 
had witnessed the defendant stab his son.  A disturbance 
occurred in the courtroom during this testimony.  The circuit 
court 
observed 
that 
"individual 
family 
members 
in 
the 
gallery . . . were engaging in a level of conversation that not 
only 
the 
Court could hear" but that the circuit court 
"feared . . . the jury could hear as well."  The circuit court 
stopped the proceedings and directed the bailiff and the court 
interpreter "to communicate to . . . those family members in the 
gallery that they must remain silent and not talk among each 
other while they are in the courtroom."  The circuit court later 
observed that it had "not seen or heard anything from those 
family members in the gallery since that directive was made."   
¶14 Near the end of the following day, the fourth day of 
trial, a second disturbance occurred as the victim's father 
continued to testify.  The circuit court observed that there 
were people entering and leaving the courtroom and expressed 
concern about the sanctity of the circuit court's sequestration 
order.  The prosecutor informed the circuit court that the 
victim's family had expressed concern that the persons entering 
and leaving the courtroom had been violating the order by 
conveying information to prospective witnesses.  The circuit 
court asked defense counsel to identify three particular 
individuals in the gallery.  Defense counsel identified these 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
7 
 
individuals as the defendant's mother and two of the defendant's 
sisters-in-law, at least one of whom was married to a person on 
defense counsel's witness list.     
¶15 The circuit court issued an order "ban[ning] all 
family members from [the] court based on what [the court] 
believe[d] to be improper activities."  The circuit court 
explained that its order was designed to "protect[] the 
integrity of [the] proceedings" and expressed particular concern 
about "those spouses who are married to potential witnesses in 
this case."    
¶16 As an exception to its order, the circuit court 
permitted the defendant's mother to remain in the courtroom.  
The defendant swore in an affidavit that he filed with the 
circuit court that his mother does not speak English and 
therefore was unable to understand any of the witnesses who 
testified in English during his trial.  The affidavit was not 
contradicted.    
¶17 In 
excluding 
family 
members 
from 
the 
trial 
proceedings, the circuit court did not attempt to distinguish 
between those members of the defendant's family who were more 
closely related to the defendant and those who were more closely 
related to the victim.  The circuit court expressly stated that 
its order would apply to family members on "both sides," with 
the single exception made for the defendant's mother.  The 
circuit court also did not distinguish between those members of 
the defendant's family who were in the courtroom when the 
disturbances occurred and those members of the defendant's 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
8 
 
family who were not present.  The order apparently applied as it 
was literally worded, that is, to "all family members."   
¶18 The circuit court recounted the circumstances that led 
the circuit court to issue its order excluding family members 
from the courtroom.  The circuit court observed that the 
defendant's mother "had already demonstrated a willingness to 
talk about the case to someone sitting next to her while she was 
in [the] gallery" on the day before.  The circuit court further 
observed that "[t]here have been other family members that have 
been coming in and out and sitting and engaging in chitchat with 
each other while the trial is going on."  The circuit court 
again expressed "serious concerns" that the "spirit" of its 
sequestration order was being violated. 
¶19 The next day, the circuit court again explained the 
basis of its order excluding family members from the courtroom.  
The circuit court stated that it could not "allow what [it] 
believe[d] to be a violation of [its] earlier ruling [imposing 
the sequestration order] to go unchecked."  The circuit court 
stated that it had observed "the mother of the defendant, as 
well 
as 
other 
family 
members, 
both 
male 
and 
female . . . discussing matters as witnesses were on the stand, 
oftentimes in a very animated and elevated fashion."  The 
circuit court further stated that family members in the audience 
had been "nodding in approval or disapproval of witnesses' 
testimony, in full view of the jury" and were "loud, loud enough 
such that other members of my staff, as well as the parties, 
could hear it."  
No.  2007AP5-CR 
9 
 
¶20 Defense counsel did not object to the circuit court's 
order excluding family members from the courtroom.  Neither the 
circuit court nor counsel for either side explicitly raised the 
possibility that the circuit court's order might implicate the 
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.    
¶21 The circuit court permitted family members to return 
to the courtroom at the beginning of the trial's eighth day to 
hear the jury instructions and the closing arguments of counsel.  
Altogether, family members were excluded from the courtroom for 
approximately three days (the trial's fifth, sixth, and seventh 
days) of witness testimony.3   
                                                 
3 Three members of the defendant's family stated in 
affidavits attached to the defendant's motion for postconviction 
relief that the circuit court's order had prevented them from 
attending portions of the defendant's trial.  The defendant's 
brother and the defendant's sister's father-in-law each attested 
that "[i]f [he] had not been informed of the court's order, [he] 
would have attended at least a part of [the defendant's] trial."  
The defendant's sister-in-law (the same sister-in-law whom 
defense counsel identified at trial as the spouse of a person on 
defense counsel's witness list) attested that the circuit court 
had directly ordered her to leave the courtroom and that "[i]f 
[she] had not been ordered to leave, [she] would have remained 
that day and attended other days of the trial as well." 
The defendant's postconviction counsel filed an affidavit 
stating that four additional members of the defendant's family 
indicated to counsel that the circuit court's order had 
prevented them from attending portions of the defendant's trial.  
Counsel listed an additional sister-in-law of the defendant, a 
father-in-law of one of the defendant's sisters, a person 
"related to the defendant by marriage," and an individual whose 
relation to the defendant was not specified in counsel's 
affidavit.  Counsel did not state whether these family members 
were in the courtroom when the disturbances occurred that 
prompted the circuit court to exclude family members from the 
courtroom. 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
10 
 
¶22 After his conviction, the defendant moved the circuit 
court to order a new trial.  The defendant argued in principal 
part that the circuit court violated the defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial when it excluded family 
members from the courtroom.  The State did not argue at the 
postconviction hearing that the defendant had waived (or 
forfeited) his right to assert a violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial.   
¶23 The defendant also asserted in his postconviction 
motion that the circuit court had erred in admitting certain 
witness testimony; that his counsel was ineffective for failing 
to object to the exclusion of family members from the trial, for 
failing to move for a mistrial, and for failing to object to 
certain portions of the State's closing arguments; and that a 
new trial should be granted on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence.4    
                                                 
4 At the hearing on the postconviction motion, the circuit 
court did not reach these other issues raised in the defendant's 
motion for postconviction relief.  The circuit court's order for 
a new trial on Sixth Amendment grounds obviated the need for the 
circuit court to address these additional issues. 
Although the court of appeals addressed the defendant's 
argument that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to the exclusion of family members from the trial, the 
court of appeals did not address the other issues and remanded 
them to the circuit court.   
The court of appeals concluded that trial counsel was not 
ineffective because the defendant had failed to show prejudice.  
In light of our holding that the defendant was not denied his 
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, trial counsel's failure 
to object to the exclusion of witnesses does not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
11 
 
¶24 The court of appeals reinstated the judgment of 
conviction against the defendant and remanded the cause to the 
circuit court for any additional postconviction proceedings 
required by law.   
II 
¶25 The first issue presented is waiver, that is, waiver 
by both the defendant and the State with regard to the claim 
that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was 
violated.   
¶26 It is undisputed that defense counsel failed to object 
when the circuit court excluded family members from the 
courtroom.  The State argues that because defense counsel never 
objected to the circuit court's order excluding family members 
from the trial, the defendant waived or forfeited his right to 
argue that the circuit court violated the defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial.  The defendant vehemently 
disagrees with the State's position. 
¶27 It is also undisputed that the State failed to argue 
in the postconviction hearing that the defendant had waived or 
forfeited the Sixth Amendment public trial issue.  For his part, 
the defendant argues that because the State never raised in the 
postconviction hearing the issue of the defendant's waiver or 
forfeiture of his right to argue the violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial, the State waived or forfeited 
its right to assert in this court that the defendant waived or 
forfeited his right to argue that the circuit court violated his 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
12 
 
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.  As might be expected, 
the State vehemently disagrees with the defendant's argument.   
¶28 The case law is rife with confusion about the words 
"waiver" and "forfeiture."  Indeed, this court repeatedly has 
acknowledged its own imprecise use of these words.  See Rao v. 
WMA Securities, Inc., 2008 WI 73, ¶24, 310 Wis. 2d 623, 752 
N.W.2d 220 (acknowledging that "waiver" of the right of trial by 
jury under Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
sometimes "is more akin to 'forfeiture' than to 'waiver' in its 
strictest sense as an intentional relinquishment of a known 
right"); State v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, ¶18 n.11, 294 Wis. 2d 62, 
716 N.W.2d 886 (acknowledging that the "guilty-plea-waiver" rule 
could more accurately be called "the 'guilty-plea-forfeiture' 
rule, or something to that effect"); State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 
59, ¶11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (acknowledging that 
the rule of judicial administration known as the "waiver" rule 
might better be labeled "the 'forfeiture rule,' because it 
refers to the forfeiture of a right by silence rather than the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right.").   
¶29 Although cases sometimes use the words "forfeiture" 
and 
"waiver" 
interchangeably, 
the 
two 
words 
embody 
very 
different legal concepts.  "Whereas forfeiture is the failure to 
make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right."  United States 
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
13 
 
¶30 In other words, some rights are forfeited when they 
are not claimed at trial; a mere failure to object constitutes a 
forfeiture of the right on appellate review.  The purpose of the 
"forfeiture" rule is to enable the circuit court to avoid or 
correct any error with minimal disruption of the judicial 
process, eliminating the need for appeal.5  The forfeiture rule 
also gives both parties and the circuit court notice of the 
issue 
and 
a 
fair 
opportunity 
to 
address 
the 
objection; 
encourages attorneys to diligently prepare for and conduct 
trials; and prevents attorneys from "sandbagging" opposing 
counsel by failing to object to an error for strategic reasons 
and later claiming that the error is grounds for reversal.6  
¶31 In contrast, some rights are not lost by a counsel's 
or a litigant's mere failure to register an objection at trial.  
These rights are so important to a fair trial that courts have 
stated that the right is not lost unless the defendant knowingly 
relinquishes the right.  As the court explained in  State v. 
Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶14, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727, "a 
criminal defendant has certain fundamental constitutional rights 
that may only be waived personally and expressly," including 
"the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to refrain 
from self-incrimination, and the right to have a trial by 
                                                 
5 See State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶11, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 
611 N.W.2d 727. 
6 See id., ¶¶11-12. 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
14 
 
jury. . . . Such rights cannot be forfeited by mere failure to 
object."  
¶32 Similarly, the United States Supreme Court warned that 
"[a] strict standard of waiver has been applied to those rights 
guaranteed to a criminal defendant to insure that he will be 
accorded the greatest possible opportunity to utilize every 
facet 
of 
the 
constitutional 
model 
of 
a 
fair 
criminal 
trial. . . . The Constitution requires that every effort be made 
to see to it that a defendant in a criminal case has not 
unknowingly relinquished the basic protections that the Framers 
thought indispensable to a fair trial."  Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241, 242 (1973) (footnote omitted). 
¶33 The court of appeals decision can be interpreted as 
concluding either that the defendant "waived" or that he 
"forfeited" his right to raise the merits of the alleged 
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial because 
he failed to object when the circuit court ordered his family 
members excluded.7  Counsel for the State astutely pointed out 
                                                 
7 Ndina, 306 Wis. 2d 706, ¶¶11-12 & n.1.  The court of 
appeals stated that the defendant "waived" the right to assert 
his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial on appeal, citing 
Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 619 (1960), for this 
proposition.  The court of appeals' parenthetical description of 
Levine 
states 
that 
"constitutional 
rights 
are 
waived 
or 
forfeited by a defendant's or attorney's failure to object when 
the constitutional violation occurred."  Ndina, 306 Wis. 2d 706, 
¶11.   
No.  2007AP5-CR 
15 
 
during oral argument to this court, however, that the substance 
of the court of appeals' holding was that the defendant had 
"forfeited" rather than "waived" his Sixth Amendment right to a 
public trial.  Consistent with the definition of "forfeiture," 
the court of appeals concluded that the defendant had no right 
to assert his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial in his 
postconviction motion or on appeal because the defendant had 
failed to assert this right timely at trial.8 
¶34 Thus the court of appeals decision leaves open the 
question whether the defendant's failure to object at trial to 
closure on the ground of a violation of the Sixth Amendment 
constitutional right to public trial should be analyzed as a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Levine involved criminal contempt proceedings.  See Levine, 
362 U.S. at 611.  The Levine Court stated that "[p]rocedural 
safeguards for criminal contempts do not derive from the Sixth 
Amendment" because "[c]riminal contempt proceedings are not 
within 
'all 
criminal 
prosecutions' 
to 
which 
[the 
Sixth] 
Amendment applies."  Id. at 616.  The Levine Court construed and 
applied the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, concluding that 
"[t]he continuing exclusion of the public in this case is not to 
be deemed contrary to the requirements of the Due Process Clause 
without a request having been made to the trial judge to open 
the courtroom at the final stage of the proceeding . . . ."  Id. 
at 619.  Neither "waive" nor "forfeit" (or any derivative of 
these words) appears in the Levine Court's opinion, although the 
concept of "waiver" is addressed in the dissent.  See id. at 626 
(Brennan, J., dissenting).  
8 The court of appeals relied on Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 
U.S. 365, 375 (1986), for the general proposition that an 
unobjected-to 
error 
must 
be 
analyzed 
under 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel standards, even when an error is of 
constitutional dimension.  The court of appeals' reliance on 
Kimmelman is misplaced in the instant case.  Kimmelman is more 
accurately 
described 
as 
applying 
specifically 
to 
Fourth 
Amendment errors on federal habeas review. 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
16 
 
"waiver" or as a "forfeiture" of the defendant's right to raise 
the issue on appellate review. 
¶35 The defendant and State dispute whether a "waiver" or 
"forfeiture" standard applies to a defendant's assertion of a 
violation of the right to a public trial.  The case law is 
divided regarding whether a defendant's failure to object timely 
to a trial court's alleged violation of the right to a public 
trial should be analyzed under the waiver or forfeiture 
standard.  Some cases conclude that before a defendant is held 
to have waived the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, 
there must be an intelligent relinquishment of the known right.9  
Other cases conclude that a defendant loses (forfeits) the Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial when the defendant or defense 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 
2004), ("[L]ike other fundamental trial rights, a right to a 
public trial may be relinquished only upon a showing that the 
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived such a right."); 
Hutchins v. Garrison, 724 F.2d 1425, 1431 (4th Cir. 1983) ("A 
criminal defendant can waive his right to an open trial.  Of 
course, a waiver of a constitutional right is effective only if 
it is an intentional relinquishment of a known right or 
privilege.") 
(quotations 
marks, 
citations, 
and 
footnote 
omitted); Martineau v. Perrin, 601 F.2d 1196, 1200 (1st Cir. 
1979) ("It is . . . firmly established that a criminal defendant 
can waive his constitutional right to a public trial.  We agree 
with petitioner that, since a constitutional right is involved, 
there had to be an intentional and knowing waiver.") (quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  
No.  2007AP5-CR 
17 
 
counsel fails to assert a timely objection at trial to the 
court's order of closure.10 
¶36 The defendant and State also dispute whether the State 
may assert, as a matter of right, that the defendant has waived 
or forfeited his right to claim a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment.  In other words, the parties disagree about whether 
the State has waived or forfeited its claim that the defendant 
waived or forfeited the Sixth Amendment argument.     
¶37 The parties' statements of the deleterious effects of 
each other's alleged errors make sense.  The State's brief 
explains that had the defendant objected timely before the 
circuit court to the exclusion of family members, the circuit 
court could have made a better record explaining its decision, 
could have narrowed its order, and could have considered 
alternative orders.  The defendant's brief explains that had the 
State objected timely at the postconviction hearing that the 
defendant waived or forfeited his right to argue the violation 
of his right to a public trial, a better record would have been 
made in the circuit court, and multiple trips (as is now 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 155 (5th 
Cir. 2006) ("Where a defendant, with knowledge of the closure of 
the courtroom, fails to object, that defendant waives his right 
to a public trial."); State v. Drummond, 854 N.E.2d 1038, 1055 
(Ohio 2006) (concluding that a defense "counsel's failure to 
object to the closing of the courtroom constitutes a waiver of 
the [Sixth Amendment] right to a public trial . . ."); State v. 
Butterfield, 784 P.2d 153, 157 (Utah 1989) (concluding that "the 
failure of a defendant and his or her counsel to object to a 
closure order constitutes waiver of the defendant's right to a 
public trial under . . . the sixth amendment to the United 
States Constitution . . . ."). 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
18 
 
happening) between the circuit court, the court of appeals, and 
the supreme court could have been avoided. 
¶38 Although 
two 
wrongs 
do 
not 
make 
a 
right, 
the 
circumstances in the present case make clear that this court 
should not spend time deciding this case either on the 
defendant's failure at trial to object timely to the exclusion 
of the family members or on the State's failure during the 
postconviction hearing to object to the defendant's lapse.  The 
values protected by the forfeiture and waiver rules would not be 
protected in the instant case by applying a forfeiture or waiver 
rule to either the defendant or the State.  Here both parties 
failed to make objections in a timely manner, but they have 
fully briefed the important substantive issue.  This court 
should, under these circumstances, reach the merits of the issue 
presented, namely whether the circuit court's order violated the 
defendant's right to a public trial, rather than address whether 
either or both of the parties waived or forfeited their right to 
make certain arguments on review.   
¶39 We therefore turn to the second issue, namely whether 
the circuit court's order excluding family members from several 
days of the trial violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
to a public trial.   
III 
¶40 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees that a criminal defendant shall enjoy the right to a 
public trial.  The Sixth Amendment provides in full as follows:   
No.  2007AP5-CR 
19 
 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense (emphasis added). 
 
¶41 The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is 
applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.11 
                                                 
11 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) 
("[M]any of the rights guaranteed by the first eight Amendments 
to the Constitution have been held to be protected against state 
action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
That clause now protects . . . the Sixth Amendment rights to 
counsel, [and] to a speedy and public trial . . . .") (footnotes 
omitted). 
See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) ("In view 
of this nation's historic distrust of secret proceedings, their 
inherent dangers to freedom, and the universal requirement of 
our federal and state governments that criminal trials be 
public, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no one shall 
be deprived of his liberty without due process of law means at 
least that an accused cannot be thus sentenced to prison.").   
The Wisconsin Constitution also provides an independent 
guarantee of the right to a public trial.  See Wis. Const. art. 
I, § 7 ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to a speedy public trial . . . .").  The 
defendant in the present case, however, relies upon the Sixth 
Amendment.   
Wisconsin Stat. § 757.14 (2005-06) provides that "[t]he 
sittings of every court shall be public and every citizen may 
freely attend the same, except if otherwise expressly provided 
by law . . . ."  This case is a Sixth Amendment case, not a 
statutory case. 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
20 
 
¶42 The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is an 
important constitutional safeguard of a fair criminal trial.  
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial "'has always been recognized 
as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as 
instruments of persecution'" and that "'[t]he knowledge that 
every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the 
forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on the 
possible abuse of judicial power.'"12  The Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of a public criminal trial "'is for the protection of 
all persons accused of crime——the innocently accused, that they 
may not become the victim of an unjust prosecution, as well as 
the guilty, that they may be awarded a fair trial . . . .'"13  
                                                                                                                                                             
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
12 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979) 
(quoting Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270). 
13 Id. (quoting Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270 & n.25).   
No.  2007AP5-CR 
21 
 
The public trial is premised on "[t]he principle that justice 
cannot survive behind walls of silence . . . ."14 
¶43 If a defendant's right to a public trial is determined 
to have been violated, the defendant need not show prejudice; 
the doctrine of harmless error does not apply to structural 
errors.15   
                                                                                                                                                             
See also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) 
(identifying the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial as one 
of the "basic protections" without which "a criminal trial 
cannot 
reliably 
serve 
its 
function 
as 
a 
vehicle 
for 
determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment 
may be regarded as fundamentally fair"); State v. Vanness, 2007 
WI App 195, ¶8, 304 Wis. 2d 692, 738 N.W.2d 154 ("The right to a 
public trial is a basic tenet of our judicial system . . . . 
[T]he 
public 
trial 
is 
'the 
most 
effectual 
safeguard 
of 
testimony, and of the decisions depending on it; it is the soul 
of justice; it ought to be extended to every part of the 
procedure, and to all causes.'") (quoting Gannett Co., 443 U.S. 
at 422 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
14 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349 (1966).   
15 See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (listing 
"denial of [a] public trial" among errors deemed "to be 
'structural,' and thus subject to automatic reversal"); Johnson 
v. 
United 
States, 
520 
U.S. 
461, 
468-69 
(1997) 
(same); 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310 (same); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 
39, 49-50 & n.9 (1984) (agreeing that "the defendant should not 
be required to prove specific prejudice in order to obtain 
relief for a violation of the public-trial guarantee because 
such a requirement "would in most cases deprive [the defendant] 
of the [public-trial] guarantee, for it would be difficult to 
envisage a case in which he would have evidence available of 
specific injury.") (alterations in original; quoted source 
omitted). 
See also State v. Ford, 2007 WI 138, ¶43 and n.4, 306 
Wis. 2d 1, 742 N.W.2d 61 (citing cases; characterizing the right 
to a public trial as a structural error subject to automatic 
reversal). 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
22 
 
¶44 A "presumption of openness" exists.16  The right to a 
public trial is not, however, absolute.  Despite a vast number 
of cases involving a myriad of fact situations exploring the 
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, determining the 
contours of the right in a particular fact situation remains 
difficult.17    
¶45 The parties' briefs do not clearly and directly set 
forth the standard of review an appellate court should use in 
reviewing a circuit court's decision regarding whether the 
defendant is entitled to a new trial because the defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial has been violated.  We 
apply the standard of review set forth in State v. Vanness, 2007 
WI App 195, ¶6, 304 Wis. 2d 692, 738 N.W.2d 154.  In Vanness, 
the court of appeals concluded that the issue whether the Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial was violated presents the 
                                                                                                                                                             
The question whether a constitutional error is susceptible 
to harmless-error analysis or rather is structural, requiring 
automatic reversal, should not be conflated with the question 
whether a constitutional right may be forfeited by timely 
failure to assert it or rather must be waived knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently.  The two inquiries, although 
related, are distinct. 
16 Waller, 467 U.S. at 45 (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)). 
17 Braun v. Powell, 227 F.3d 908, 917 (7th Cir. 2000) 
("Determining with any precision the contours of [the Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial] is a difficult task.  
Existing case law, although setting the outer boundaries, gives 
comparatively little guidance with respect to 'gray areas.'"). 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
23 
 
application of constitutional principles to historical facts.18  
An appellate court upholds the circuit court's findings of 
evidentiary or historical fact unless those findings are clearly 
erroneous.19  The appellate court determines the application of 
constitutional principles to those evidentiary or historical 
facts independently of the circuit court and court of appeals 
but benefiting from those courts' analyses.20 
                                                 
18 Vanness, 304 Wis. 2d 692, ¶6 ("The only issue raised on 
appeal is whether . . . [the circuit court] violated Vanness's 
constitutional right to a public trial.  This case requires us 
to apply the constitution to undisputed facts."). 
19 State v. Sanders, 2008 WI 85, ¶25, 311 Wis. 2d 257, 752 
N.W.2d 713.   
20 Vanness, 304 Wis. 2d 692, ¶6 ("The application of 
constitutional principles to historical facts is a question of 
law reviewed without deference to the trial court.").  
Although "it is within the discretion of a trial court in 
its inherent power to close a courtroom," State ex rel. La 
Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Court for La Crosse County, 115 
Wis. 2d 220, 236, 340 N.W.2d 460 (1983) (not a Sixth Amendment 
case), according to the Vanness decision a circuit court errs as 
a matter of law if its closure order does not comport with the 
Sixth Amendment given the circuit court's supportable findings 
of historical fact.    
The parties do not challenge the circuit court's authority 
to enter sequestration orders or to impose sanctions for the 
violation of such orders.  The statutes recognize that a circuit 
court may exercise its discretion in deciding whether to enter a 
sequestration order or to impose sanctions for the violation of 
its orders.  See Wis. Stat. § 906.15 and § 785.02.   
Wisconsin Stat. § 906.15 provides in full as follows: 
(1) At the request of a party, the judge or a circuit 
court commissioner shall order witnesses excluded so 
that 
they 
cannot 
hear 
the 
testimony 
of 
other 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
24 
 
¶46 An appellate court applies a two-step analysis to 
determine the question of law whether a defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial has been violated.  The 
appellate court first determines whether the closure at issue 
implicates the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.  If the 
                                                                                                                                                             
witnesses. The judge or circuit court commissioner may 
also make the order of his or her own motion. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not authorize exclusion of any 
of the following: 
(a) A party who is a natural person. 
(b) An officer or employee of a party which is not a 
natural person designated as its representative by its 
attorney. 
(c) A person whose presence is shown by a party to be 
essential to the presentation of the party's cause. 
(d) A victim, as defined in s. 950.02 (4), in a 
criminal case or a victim, as defined in s. 938.02 
(20m), in a delinquency proceeding under ch. 938, 
unless the judge or circuit court commissioner finds 
that exclusion of the victim is necessary to provide a 
fair trial for the defendant or a fair fact-finding 
hearing for the juvenile. The presence of a victim 
during the testimony of other witnesses may not by 
itself be a basis for a finding that exclusion of the 
victim is necessary to provide a fair trial for the 
defendant or a fair fact-finding hearing for the 
juvenile. 
(3) The judge or circuit court commissioner may direct 
that all excluded and non-excluded witnesses be kept 
separate until called and may prevent them from 
communicating with one another until they have been 
examined or the hearing is ended. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 785.02 provides in full that "[a] court 
of record may imposed a remedial or punitive sanction for 
contempt of court under [chapter 785]."  
No.  2007AP5-CR 
25 
 
closure does not implicate the Sixth Amendment right to a public 
trial, the appellate court need not reach the second step of the 
analysis.  If a closure implicates the Sixth Amendment right to 
a public trial, the appellate court then must determine whether 
the closure was justified under the circumstances of the case.  
This type of analysis has been used in some federal cases.21    
¶47 In performing these two analytical steps in resolving 
the present case, we conclude (A) that the circuit court's order 
excluding family members from the courtroom implicates the Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial, and (B) that the circuit 
court's order excluding family members was justified under the 
circumstances of the instant case.     
A 
¶48 Although the "exclusion of any spectator runs the risk 
of violating the Sixth Amendment and, accordingly, of requiring 
a new trial,"22 some courts have recognized that "[e]ven an 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885, 888-91 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that the closure did not implicate the 
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial; not reaching the second 
step in the analysis); Carson v. Fischer, 421 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 
2005) (same); United States v. Ivester, 316 F.3d 955, 959-60 
(9th Cir. 2003) (same); Braun v. Powell, 227 F.3d 908, 917-20 
(7th Cir. 2000) (same); Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (determining that the unjustified closure did not 
implicate the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial). 
22 Braun, 227 F.3d at 920. 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
26 
 
unjustified closure may, in some circumstances, be so trivial as 
not to implicate the right to a public trial."23   
¶49 These courts conclude that a closure is trivial and 
does not implicate the Sixth Amendment if the closure "does not 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also State ex rel. Stevens v. Circuit Court for 
Manitowoc County, 141 Wis. 2d 239, 250-51, 414 N.W.2d 832 (1987) 
(excluding public during testimony of complaining witness in 
sexual assault case violated Sixth Amendment).   
23 Carson, 421 F.3d at 92.    
See also Vanness, 304 Wis. 2d 692, ¶9 ("[w]here an 
unjustified closure is trivial, there is . . . no constitutional 
violation."); Perry, 479 F.3d at 890 (stating that "there are 
certain instances in which an exclusion cannot be characterized 
properly as implicating the constitutional guarantee" of a 
public trial) (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted); 
Ivester, 316 F.3d at 960 (stating that a closure may be "too 
trivial to implicate the Sixth Amendment guarantee" of a public 
trial); Braun, 227 F.3d at 918 ("[O]ur colleagues in the other 
circuits . . . have recognized that there are certain instances 
in which the exclusion cannot be characterized properly as 
implicating the constitutional guarantee [of a public trial]."); 
Peterson, 85 F.3d at 40 ("[E]ven an unjustified closure may, on 
its facts, be so trivial as not to violate the [Sixth 
Amendment].") 
The State objects to the use of the word "trivial," 
contending that "if the defendant proves he was denied his 
fundamental right to a public trial, that is no 'trivial' 
matter."  Brief and Appendix of Plaintiff-Appellant [State] at 
25.  The cases, however, do not hold that a violation of the 
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial may be viewed as 
trivial.  The cases instead hold that a closure may be viewed as 
trivial and that, under some circumstances, a closure may be so 
trivial as not to violate the Sixth Amendment even if the 
closure is unjustified.  We agree with the State that a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial cannot 
be characterized as a trivial matter.  
No.  2007AP5-CR 
27 
 
implicate the values served by the Sixth Amendment."24  The 
Supreme Court has described four values furthered by the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of a public trial: "(1) to ensure a fair 
trial; (2) to remind the prosecutor and judge of their 
responsibility to the accused and the importance of their 
functions; (3) to encourage witnesses to come forward; and (4) 
to discourage perjury."25 
¶50 The State contends that the circuit court's order 
excluding family members from the courtroom for three days of 
witness testimony does not implicate the values served by the 
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.  The State reasons that 
the trial remained open to all members of the public other than 
the defendant's family members; that the defendant's mother was 
permitted to remain in the courtroom gallery; that other family 
members were present when they took the witness stand to testify 
for or against the defendant; that the integrity of the witness 
sequestration 
order 
was 
preserved; 
that 
the 
trial 
was 
                                                 
24 Perry, 479 F.3d at 890 (quotation marks and citation 
omitted).   
25 Peterson, 85 F.3d at 43 (citing Waller, 467 U.S. at 46-
47).   
No.  2007AP5-CR 
28 
 
transcribed for review by the public and by appellate courts; 
and that a jury of twelve citizens and court personnel attended 
the trial.26  According to the State, the presence of the other 
members of the public sufficed to ensure that the four values 
served by the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial were 
protected. 
¶51 Although the United States Supreme Court has stated 
that pursuant to the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, 
"an accused is at the very least entitled to have his friends, 
relatives and counsel present,"27  federal appellate courts have 
                                                                                                                                                             
These 
four 
values 
do 
not 
necessarily 
represent 
an 
exhaustive list of the values served by the Sixth Amendment 
right to a public trial.  See Peterson, 85 F.3d at 43 n.5 ("This 
list is not exhaustive.").  See also Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: 
Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 Geo. L.J. 641, 671-81 
(discussing the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial and the 
purposes served by this constitutional guarantee). 
26 Brief and Appendix of Plaintiff-Appellant [State] at 29-
30.   
27 Oliver, 333 U.S. at 272.  
No.  2007AP5-CR 
29 
 
recognized that "the exclusion of a family member or friend may, 
in rare circumstances . . . , not implicate the Sixth Amendment 
public trial guarantee."28   
                                                                                                                                                             
Accord Perry, 479 F.3d at 890 ("[T]he Supreme Court has 
suggested, albeit in dicta, that the right to a public trial 
entitles a criminal defendant 'at the very least . . . to have 
his friends, relatives and counsel present . . . .'") (quoting 
Oliver, 333 U.S. at 272); Braun, 227 F.3d at 917 ("Typically, 
when habeas relief was granted or a new trial required, the 
courtroom was totally closed to the general public at some 
critical juncture in the proceedings; or, in other cases, the 
court excluded a friend or relative of the defendant, in 
contravention of the Supreme Court's requirement, announced in 
In 
re Oliver, that such individuals be allowed in the 
courtroom.") (citation omitted); Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 
69 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[T]he Supreme Court has specifically noted a 
special concern for assuring the attendance of family members of 
the accused."). 
See also English v. Artuz, 164 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) 
("The unwarranted exclusion of a defendant's family members 
justifies granting habeas corpus relief . . . .").  
In Rodriguez v. Miller, 537 F.3d 102, 107-110 (2d Cir. 
2008), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
concluded that the Oliver Court's expression of particular 
concern for the accused's right to have relatives present at 
trial constitutes dicta and that this statement in the Oliver 
opinion therefore 
does not represent "clearly established 
federal law" for purposes of deciding a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.  See id. at 108-110.  See also id. at 106-07 
("'Clearly established federal law' refers only to the holdings 
of the Supreme Court.  No principle of constitutional law 
grounded solely in the holdings of the various courts of appeals 
or even in the dicta of the Supreme Court can provide the basis 
for habeas relief.").  The Rodriguez decision, however, is 
inapposite to the instant case, which does not involve a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  
28 Perry, 479 F.3d at 890 (quoting Carson, 421 F.3d at 94) 
(emphasis added; ellipsis in Perry). 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
30 
 
¶52 Such "rare circumstances" are not present in the 
instant case.  The circuit court's exclusion of every family 
member except the defendant's mother (who did not understand 
English) plainly implicates the values served by the Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial.  A criminal defendant's 
family may play a critical role in verifying that the defendant 
"is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned"; in keeping 
the defendant's "triers keenly alive to a sense of their 
responsibility and to the importance of their functions"; and in 
"encourag[ing] witnesses to come forward and discourag[ing] 
perjury," particularly in a case in which many of the witnesses 
for either side are themselves members of the defendant's 
family.29   
¶53 The facts of the instant case contrast sharply with 
the facts of cases in which courts have concluded that a closure 
was so trivial as not to implicate the Sixth Amendment right to 
a public trial.  Cases holding that a closure is trivial are 
typically characterized by the exclusion of an extremely small 
                                                 
29 Waller, 467 U.S. at 46 (quoted source omitted).  
No.  2007AP5-CR 
31 
 
number of persons from the courtroom30 or, alternatively, by a 
more general exclusion in effect for an extremely short period 
of time.31   
¶54 In the instant case, the circuit court excluded the 
defendant's entire family, with the sole exception of the 
                                                 
30 See, e.g., Perry, 479 F.3d at 890-91 (exclusion of the 
defendant's eight-year-old son did not implicate the Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial where the defendant's "trial 
remained 
open 
to 
the 
public——and 
specifically 
to 
[the 
defendant's] wife——throughout"); Carson, 421 F.3d at 94 ("[W]e 
cannot conclude that the exclusion of Carson's ex-mother-in-law 
during 
a 
single 
witness's 
testimony, 
when 
four 
of 
the 
defendant's closest family members, as well as others, were 
present, rendered unconstitutional a closure . . . ."); Braun, 
227 F.3d at 919 (holding that "exclusion of a sole individual 
without any significant connection to the case or to the 
parties . . . does not implicate the policy concerns that inform 
the Sixth Amendment's right to an open trial"). 
31 See, e.g., Ivester, 316 F.3d at 960 (holding that "the 
district court's exclusion of the spectators during the brief 
mid-trial questioning of the jurors to determine if they were 
concerned for their safety was so trivial as to not implicate 
Ivester's Sixth Amendment rights"); Peterson, 85 F.3d at 41 
(holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was 
not implicated when "a trial judge inadvertently left a 
courtroom closed for twenty minutes during which the defendant 
testified"); United States v. Al-Smadi, 15 F.3d 153, 154-55 
(10th Cir. 1994) (holding that when court security officers 
closed the courthouse to the public at 4:30 p.m. and the 
defendant's trial did not adjourn for the evening until 4:50 
p.m., this "brief and inadvertent closing of the courthouse and 
hence 
the 
courtroom, 
unnoticed 
 by 
any 
of 
the 
trial 
participants, did not violate the Sixth Amendment."); Snyder v. 
Coiner, 510 F.2d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that when "a 
bailiff refused to allow persons to enter or leave the 
courtroom" for a short time but when "[s]uch condition existed 
for but a short time and was quickly changed by the Court, when 
advised of the action of the bailiff," the bailiff's actions 
were "entirely too trivial to amount to a constitutional 
deprivation" of the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial."). 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
32 
 
defendant's mother, for three full days of witness testimony.  
The closure encompassed several people, and it was not brief or 
inadvertent.  The closure implicated the values of the right to 
a public trial.  The closure implicated the values of (1) 
ensuring a fair trial; (2) reminding the prosecutor and judge of 
their responsibility to the accused and the importance of their 
functions; (3) encouraging witnesses to come forward; and (4) 
discouraging perjury.   
¶55 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial is implicated under the 
circumstances of the instant case.  Unless properly justified, 
the circuit court's order excluding family members from the 
courtroom would constitute a violation of the defendant's right 
to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment.   
B 
 
¶56 Closure of a criminal trial is justified when four 
conditions are met: "(1) the party who wishes to close the 
proceedings must show an overriding interest which is likely to 
be prejudiced by a public trial, (2) the closure must be 
narrowly tailored to protect that interest, (3) alternatives to 
closure must be considered by the trial court, and (4) the court 
must make findings sufficient to support the closure."32  The 
                                                 
32 Vanness, 304 Wis. 2d 692, ¶9 n.3, (citing Walton v. 
Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 433 (7th Cir. 2004)).  
No.  2007AP5-CR 
33 
 
case law typically refers to this four-part test as the "Waller 
test," referring to the United States Supreme Court's decision 
in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).33 
¶57 We consider each of the four applicable requirements 
separately 
in 
determining 
whether 
the 
defendant's 
Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial was violated.  We conclude 
that each condition was met under the circumstances of the 
present case. 
(1) 
¶58 The circuit court justified its order as necessary to 
ensure that family members attending the trial were not 
contributing to violations of the court's sequestration order.  
                                                 
33 The 
test 
has 
its 
origins 
in 
First 
Amendment 
jurisprudence.  See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of 
California, 464 U.S. 501, 509-10 (1984) ("The circumstances 
under which the press and public can be barred from a criminal 
trial are limited . . . . The presumption of openness may be 
overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that 
closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be 
articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing 
court can determine whether the closure order was properly 
entered.") (quoted source omitted).  See also Waller, 467 U.S. 
at 44-46 (stating that the analysis in Press-Enterprise Co. and 
several predecessor cases "proceeded largely under the First 
Amendment").   
In comparing the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial 
with its analogue in First Amendment, the Supreme Court has 
stated that "the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused 
is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First 
Amendment right of the press and public."  Waller, 467 U.S. at 
46. 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
34 
 
Although disruptions within the courtroom may be viewed as a 
justification for a trial court's order excluding family members 
from the trial, the circuit court in the instant case did not 
justify its order as necessary to prevent such disruptions or to 
maintain the dignity, order, and decorum of the courtroom.   
¶59 The circuit court stated that it issued its order to 
"protect[] the integrity of [the] proceedings" and that the 
circuit court could not "allow what [it] believe[d] to be a 
violation of [its] earlier ruling [imposing the sequestration 
order] to go unchecked."  The circuit court was persuaded that 
family members in the courtroom gallery were violating the 
"spirit" of the court's sequestration order by conveying the 
contents of witness testimony to potential witnesses outside the 
courtroom.     
¶60 Sequestration orders serve the important interest of 
promoting truthfulness in witness testimony.  A sequestration 
order "exercises a restraint on witnesses 'tailoring' their 
testimony to that of earlier witnesses"; "aids in detecting 
testimony that is less than candid"; and, when testimony is 
interrupted by a recess, also may "prevent[] improper attempts 
to influence [prospective] testimony in light of the testimony 
already given."34     
                                                 
34 Geders 
v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976) 
(citations omitted).   
No.  2007AP5-CR 
35 
 
¶61 The 
circuit court reasonably concluded that the 
overriding interest of promoting truthfulness served by its 
sequestration order was imperiled by the conduct of the 
defendant's family members.  The circuit court's determination 
that family members were contributing to violations of the 
sequestration order is supported by the following information 
that appears in the record: (1) the circuit court witnessed 
family members entering and leaving the courtroom; (2) members 
of the victim's family went to the prosecutor with concerns that 
the persons entering and leaving the courtroom had been 
conveying information to potential witnesses; and (3) the 
circuit court witnessed family members in the courtroom gallery 
talking loudly as witnesses were testifying and even "nodding in 
approval or disapproval of witnesses' testimony, in full view of 
the jury."   
¶62 The 
defendant contends that the circuit court's 
findings are insufficient to show that the interests served by 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, ¶40, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 
646 N.W.2d 298 (stating that sequestration orders "are issued to 
keep witnesses from hearing other witnesses [sic] testimony, 
which may lead to prejudice to the defendant") (citations 
omitted); id., ¶48 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) ("The aim of 
exclusion and separation orders is to exercise restraint on 
witnesses 
tailoring 
their 
testimony 
to 
that 
of 
earlier 
witnesses; to detect testimony that is less than candid; and, 
when a witness's testimony is interrupted by a recess, to 
prevent improper attempts to influence the testimony in light of 
the testimony already given.") (footnote omitted).   
No.  2007AP5-CR 
36 
 
the circuit court's sequestration order were likely to be 
prejudiced by allowing the family members to remain.  The 
defendant argues that the circuit court failed to confirm that 
any persons in the courtroom actually had contributed to a 
violation of its sequestration order.  The defendant concludes 
that the circuit court's order excluding family members from the 
courtroom was based on "mere speculation" that the sequestration 
order had been or would be violated, not on a demonstrated 
threat to the order.35   
¶63 We agree with Professor LaFave that "[g]enerally, the 
best course of action is for the trial judge to hold an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of closure" when an order of 
the trial court implicates the Sixth Amendment right to a public 
trial.36  We acknowledge that the circuit court could have taken 
testimony to justify its conclusion that family members in the 
courtroom were contributing to violations of its sequestration 
                                                 
35 See English v. Artuz, 164 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. N.Y. 
1998) ("[T]he state's obligation to show an overriding interest 
cannot be met by a proffer of mere speculation."). 
See also State ex rel. Newspapers, Inc. v. Circuit Court 
for Milwaukee County, 124 Wis. 2d 499, 508, 370 N.W.2d 209 
(1985) (stating, in a First Amendment case, that "[t]he 
conclusion that factors weighing in favor of closure are present 
must be based on articulable facts known to the court rather 
than unsupported hypotheses or conjecture."). 
36 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 24.1(b), 
at 304 (3d ed. 2007). 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
37 
 
order by conveying the contents of witness testimony to 
potential witnesses outside the courtroom.  
¶64 We do not agree, however, with the defendant's 
characterization of the record.  The record shows that the 
overriding truth-seeking interests served by the circuit court's 
sequestration order would be prejudiced by allowing family 
members to attend the trial.  We therefore conclude that the 
State has met the Waller test's first requirement of an 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
38 
 
overriding interest likely to be prejudiced by a public trial.37  
                                                 
37 Six federal appellate courts have held that the Waller 
test's 
first 
requirement 
is 
relaxed 
when 
a 
trial 
court 
effectuates only a partial closure of the trial.  These courts 
hold that a party seeking a partial closure is required to show 
only a "substantial reason" for the closure, rather than an 
overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced by a public 
trial.  See Douglas v. Wainwright, 739 F.2d 531, 533 (11th Cir. 
1984) (holding that when a partial closure is involved, only a 
"substantial reason" for the closure is necessary); United 
States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1357 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(accepting the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Douglas, 739 F.2d 
531); Nieto v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743, 753 (10th Cir. 1989) 
("[T]he Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have applied a less 
stringent test of a 'substantial reason' where partial closures 
are held necessary.  We are persuaded that we should apply the 
less stringent 'substantial reason' test . . . .") (internal 
citations omitted); Woods v. Kuhnmann, 977 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 
1992) ("[T]he Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits . . . have 
concluded that when a trial judge orders a partial, as opposed 
to a total, closure of a court proceeding at the request of one 
party, a 'substantial reason' rather than Waller's 'overriding 
interest' will justify the closure. . . .  We agree."); United 
States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 98-99 (5th Cir. 1995) ("The 
Second, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all 
found that Waller's stringent standard does not apply to partial 
closures, and have adopted a less demanding test requiring the 
party seeking the partial closure to show only a 'substantial 
reason' for the closure. . . .  We agree."); Garcia v. Bertsch, 
470 F.3d 748, 753 (8th Cir. 2006) ("In cases where a trial judge 
orders a partial closure at the request of one party, courts 
have required only a 'substantial reason' for the partial 
closure, instead of the more stringent 'overriding interest' 
required by Waller.") (citations omitted). 
At least one court has rejected the federal appellate 
courts' rule requiring only a "substantial reason" when a 
closure is partial.  See People v. Jones, 750 N.E.2d 524, 529 
(N.Y. 2001) ("We are aware that some courts have recognized that 
a less demanding standard can be applied to limited closure 
requests . . . .  We disagree.  We believe that there is no need 
to adopt such an articulation of the Waller standard since 
Waller already contemplates a balancing of competing interests 
in closure decisions.").   
No.  2007AP5-CR 
39 
 
Although it would have been better practice for the circuit 
court to make inquiry about the conduct of the defendant's 
family members and make findings of fact, the circuit court's 
concerns about the sequestration order were based on the facts 
the circuit court observed and reasonable inferences from the 
facts and not on "mere speculation," as the defendant contends.  
(2) 
¶65 The defendant contends that the circuit court's order 
was overbroad because it applied to the defendant's entire 
family (except the defendant's mother), even to family members 
not then present in the courtroom, and not to specific 
individuals shown to pose a threat to the circuit court's 
sequestration order.  
 
¶66 We conclude, however, that under the circumstances of 
the present case the circuit court was justified in applying its 
order to all family members except for the defendant's mother.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Professor LaFave also apparently is skeptical of the 
"substantial reason" rule.  See 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., 
Criminal 
Procedure 
§ 24.1(b), 
at 
305-06 
(3d 
ed. 
2007) 
(characterizing the rule as an "effort to narrow the class of 
cases subject to the strict requirements of Waller" that is "not 
surprising given the inability of appellate courts to employ 
harmless error analysis to avoid retrial in such cases").   
We need not, and do not, address whether a partial closure 
may be supported by a "substantial reason" for the closure 
instead of an "overriding interest" likely to be prejudiced by a 
public trial.  The State satisfies the Waller test's "overriding 
interest" requirement.  
No.  2007AP5-CR 
40 
 
The prosecution and defense counsel collectively designated much 
of the defendant's family——apparently 17 individuals altogether—
—as potential witnesses at trial.  Under these circumstances, it 
would have been difficult if not impossible for the circuit 
court to determine which family members were likely to convey 
the contents of witness testimony to any of the numerous family 
members slated to testify.  Although some family members 
presumably were more closely related to potential witnesses than 
others, it is difficult to say where the line between family 
members could have been drawn.  Every person excluded from the 
courtroom 
had 
a 
significant 
degree 
of 
kinship 
with 
the 
defendant, the victim, and the majority of the potential 
witnesses in the case. 
 
¶67 Moreover, the circuit court lifted its exclusion order 
once all the witnesses had finished testifying and any threat to 
the circuit court's sequestration order had been extinguished.  
Family members were permitted to return to the courtroom to hear 
the jury instructions and the closing arguments of counsel.  
 
¶68 We acknowledge again that the better course of action 
for the circuit court would have been to determine with more 
certainty 
how 
individual 
family 
members 
may 
have 
been 
contributing to violations of the court's sequestration order 
and to make more specific findings about the likelihood of 
violations.  Under the circumstances of the present case, 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
41 
 
however, we cannot say that the circuit court's procedure 
rendered the circuit court's order broader than necessary to 
protect the overriding interests served by the circuit court's 
sequestration order.   
¶69 The defendant cites three cases in support of his 
position that the circuit court's order was overbroad: English 
v. Artuz, 164 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 1998); State v. Ortiz, 981 P.2d 
1127 (Haw. 1999); and State v. Clifford, 733 N.E.2d 621 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1999).  Each case, however, is distinguishable from the 
one at bar.    
 
¶70 In English v. Artuz, 164 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 1998), 
English was accused of committing murder at the request of a 
drug dealer.  The circuit court closed the courtroom to all 
members of the public, including English's family, in the 
interest of protecting a prosecution witness from the threat of 
harm.   
¶71 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held that the district court had erred in excluding 
English's family from the courtroom.38  The court of appeals 
stated 
that 
the 
prosecution's 
witness 
had 
testified 
unequivocally that he did not fear English's family and that the 
district court easily could have identified the members of 
                                                 
38 English, 164 F.3d at 109.   
No.  2007AP5-CR 
42 
 
English's family.39  The court of appeals therefore concluded 
that the closure was not narrowly tailored to protect the 
prosecution's witness against threat of harm.40  
 
¶72 English is not instructive in the present case.  The 
circuit court in the present case, unlike the district court in 
English, 
reasonably 
concluded that the defendant's family 
members posed a threat to the overriding interests served by the 
circuit 
court's 
sequestration 
order. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
determined that members of the defendant's family, not other 
persons, were acting in a manner contrary to the circuit court's 
sequestration order forbidding communication between potential 
witnesses about the contents of their testimony.  In contrast, 
the district court in English drew no connection between the 
exclusion of English's family members and the goal of protecting 
the prosecution's witness from the threat of harm posed by 
others.   
 
¶73 The present case is additionally distinguishable from 
English because the district court in English could have 
fulfilled the request to narrow the court's closure order much 
more easily than the circuit court could have narrowed its order 
in the instant case.  As we have already stated, it would have 
                                                 
39 Id.   
40 Id.   
No.  2007AP5-CR 
43 
 
been difficult if not impossible for the circuit court in the 
instant case to determine which of the defendant's family 
members were likely to convey the contents of witness testimony 
to any of the numerous family members listed as potential 
witnesses in the trial.  The district court in English, however, 
could have reasonably narrowed its closure order by making the 
simple determination of which persons were related to English 
and which were not.   
 
¶74 In State v. Ortiz, 981 P.2d 1127 (Haw. 1999), the 
prosecutor moved to exclude Ortiz's family from the courtroom on 
the basis of "an ongoing investigation, involving at least some 
of 
Ortiz's 
family 
members, 
into 
jury 
tampering, 
witness 
tampering, intimidating a witness, and possible retaliation 
against a witness."41  The prosecutor made allegations against 
Ortiz's sister, mother, and brother-in-law but not against any 
other member of Ortiz's family.42  The trial court granted the 
prosecutor's motion over defense counsel's objection.  The trial 
court also kept its exclusionary order in place after it had 
questioned members of the jury about possible jury tampering and 
apparently concluded that no tampering had occurred.43 
                                                 
41 State v. Ortiz, 981 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Haw. 1999).   
42 Id. at 1132 n.8.   
43 Id. at 1132.   
No.  2007AP5-CR 
44 
 
 
¶75 The Supreme Court of Hawaii held that the trial 
court's order was broader than necessary to protect the 
prosecutor's interest in preventing jury tampering, witness 
tampering, or the intimidation of or retaliation against 
witnesses.44  The Hawaii supreme court first determined that the 
trial court had erred in excluding Ortiz's entire family when 
the prosecution had limited its allegations to Ortiz's sister, 
mother, and brother-in-law.45  The Hawaii supreme court also 
concluded that the trial court had further erred in leaving its 
exclusion order in place even after conducting a voir dire of 
all the jurors and satisfying itself that no jury tampering had 
taken place.46    
 
¶76 The present case is distinguishable from Ortiz in each 
critical respect.  The circuit court in the instant case 
reasonably concluded that the defendant's family members posed a 
threat to the court's sequestration order given that family 
members dominated the witness lists.  The trial court in Ortiz 
had no basis on which to conclude that members of Ortiz's family 
other than Ortiz's sister, mother, and brother-in-law were 
contributing to any risk of jury tampering, witness tampering, 
or the intimidation of or retaliation against witnesses.  In 
                                                 
44 Id. at 1138.   
45 Id.   
No.  2007AP5-CR 
45 
 
addition, the circuit court in the instant case narrowly 
tailored the temporal scope of its order by permitting the 
defendant's family members back in the courtroom once witness 
testimony had come to an end.  The Ortiz trial court, in 
contrast, left its order in place even after questioning the 
jury and discovering no evidence supporting the prosecutor's 
allegations of jury tampering.   
 
¶77 In State v. Clifford, 733 N.E.2d 621 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1999), the trial court cleared one part of the courtroom of all 
spectators, apparently due to a disturbance that the record did 
not explain or describe.47  The trial court also rejected defense 
counsel's request to permit Clifford's mother and grandmother to 
remain in the courtroom.  
                                                                                                                                                             
46 Id. 
47 The record in Clifford revealed the following exchange: 
[The Prosecutor]: Judge before we go any further, a 
couple of times there are people in the back and I 
could - 
The Court: All right. All you folks in the back, get 
out of the courtroom now.  Everybody out of the back 
there.  Everybody out of the courtroom and wait 
outside and don't laugh or I will have you arrested. 
[Defense Counsel]: Could the grandfather and mother 
stay in? 
The Court: Everybody on that side, get out.  All of 
you.  Get out.  Everybody out.  Take the children with 
you please. 
State v. Clifford, 733 N.E.2d 621, 624 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999). 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
46 
 
 
¶78 The Ohio Court of Appeals concluded that the trial 
court had erred, in part because the trial court's order was 
broader than necessary.48  The court of appeals determined that 
the trial court was unjustified in removing Clifford's mother 
and grandmother because "there was no evidence concerning their 
involvement in any disturbance" in the courtroom.49   
 
¶79 Clifford is distinguishable because in that case, the 
audience members' misconduct and threatened future misconduct 
all were within the view and control of the trial court.  It 
would have been a simple matter for the trial court to determine 
who among the audience had been involved in a disturbance and to 
exclude such persons without excluding those audience members 
who were innocent of misconduct.  Furthermore, if any persons 
not involved in the initial disturbance became involved in 
future 
disturbances, 
the 
trial 
court 
easily 
could 
have 
identified these individuals and added their names to the list 
of excluded persons.   
 
¶80 In the present case, however, the defendant's family 
members posed a threat to the circuit court's sequestration 
order that the circuit court could not observe or control.  It 
would have been difficult if not impossible for the circuit 
                                                 
48 Clifford, 733 N.E.2d at 626. 
49 Id. 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
47 
 
court to determine which family members were likely to convey 
the contents of witness testimony to any of the numerous other 
family members listed as potential witnesses.  The present case 
thus is unlike Clifford, in which the trial court easily could 
have distinguished between individual members of Clifford's 
family in excluding disruptive persons from Clifford's trial.   
(3) 
 
 
¶81 The defendant asserts that the circuit court failed to 
consider any reasonable alternatives to its order excluding the 
defendant's family members from the courtroom.  The defendant 
suggests that the circuit court should have considered the 
alternatives of "limit[ing] its exclusionary rule to those 
members of the public married to or living with anticipated 
witnesses" or of making inquiries "prior to the testimony of the 
various family members to determine whether they had received 
any information concerning courtroom proceedings in violation of 
the [sequestration] order."50 
 
¶82 These alternatives were not suggested to the circuit 
court.  The cases reasonably hold that "a trial judge need not 
consider alternatives to a limited closure sua sponte."51  
                                                 
50 Brief of Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner at 14.   
51 Carson, 421 F.3d at 90. 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
48 
 
Although we agree with the New York Court of Appeals that "it is 
surely the better practice for trial courts to explore the 
feasibility of possible alternatives to closing the courtroom 
with counsel on the record, even where it is not mandated,"52 we 
cannot conclude under the circumstances of the present case that 
the alternatives suggested by the defendant are reasonable or 
that the circuit court erred in failing to consider alternatives 
that no party asked it to consider. 
¶83 Under the circumstances of the present case, where the 
circuit court's order was not overbroad and where the circuit 
court attempted to get compliance with the sequestration order, 
we conclude that in ordering the defendant's family members to 
remain outside the courtroom during the witnesses' testimony, 
the circuit court implicitly determined that no less restrictive 
alternative would protect its interest in ensuring the sanctity 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also People v. Ramos, 685 N.E.2d 492, 500 (N.Y. 1997) 
("[W]here the factual record permits closure and the closure is 
not facially overbroad, the party opposed to closing the 
proceeding must alert the court to any alternative procedures 
that allegedly would equally preserve the interest.") (citation 
omitted).  
52 Ramos, 685 N.E.2d at 501 (quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  
No.  2007AP5-CR 
49 
 
of its sequestration order.53  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
circuit 
court 
satisfied 
the 
requirement 
of 
considering 
reasonable alternatives to its closure order. 
(4) 
¶84 The 
defendant 
correctly 
notes 
that 
the 
fourth 
requirement of the Waller test is closely interrelated with the 
other three requirements.54  The gist of the fourth requirement 
is that the trial court's compliance with the first three 
requirements must be apparent from the trial court's findings in 
the record.  In other words, the purpose of the fourth 
requirement "is simply to allow a reviewing court to determine 
whether the closure order was properly entered."55  
¶85 We have stated that the circuit court could have done 
a better job in the instant case of explaining and justifying 
its order on the record.  When the State or the circuit court 
seeks a nontrivial closure of the courtroom implicating the 
                                                 
53 Compare Ramos, 685 N.E.2d at 500 ("We conclude that, 
under the circumstances now presented, it can be implied that 
the trial court, in ordering closure, determined that no lesser 
alternative would protect the articulated interest.") (citation 
omitted). 
54 See 
Brief 
of 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner 
at 
10 
("Because the first Waller factor, requiring the court to 
identify an interest that would be jeopardized without a closure 
order, and the fourth, requiring findings of fact supporting the 
closure, are interrelated, they will be dealt with jointly in 
this section.").   
No.  2007AP5-CR 
50 
 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, the circuit 
court should ensure that it makes findings of fact on the 
record, that it applies the Waller test, and that the record 
demonstrates due regard for the defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to a public trial.  Both the prosecutor and defense 
counsel should bring the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial 
to the circuit court's attention and should assist the circuit 
court in crafting a closure order consistent with the Sixth 
Amendment's "basic tenet of our judicial system."56 
¶86 Although we acknowledge that the circuit court's 
findings on the record are limited and no hearing was held, we 
nevertheless conclude that the record is sufficient to support 
the closure order.  The closure was narrowly tailored to serve 
an overriding interest likely to be prejudiced unless the family 
members were excluded.   
¶87 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
circuit court did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to a public trial.   
III 
¶88 The defendant asserted in his postconviction motion 
that he is entitled to a new trial on several bases unrelated to 
                                                                                                                                                             
55 Carson, 421 F.3d at 90 (quotation marks, brackets, and 
citation omitted). 
56 Vanness, 304 Wis. 2d 692, ¶8. 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
51 
 
the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.  The defendant 
asserted that the circuit court had erred in admitting certain 
witness testimony; that his counsel was ineffective for failing 
to move for a mistrial and for failing to object to certain 
portions of the State's closing arguments; and that a new trial 
should be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence.   
¶89 At the hearing on the defendant's postconviction 
motion, the circuit court did not reach these other issues 
raised in the defendant's motion.  We also do not address these 
issues but instead remand the cause to the circuit court for any 
additional postconviction proceedings required by law. 
¶90 Our decision, however, precludes the defendant from 
arguing on remand, as he did in his briefs to this court, that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
exclusion of family members from his trial.  The defendant's 
argument essentially is that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to secure a public trial for the defendant.  This 
argument is inconsistent with our holding that, regardless of 
defense counsel's performance at trial, the defendant received a 
public trial consistent with the guarantee in the Sixth 
Amendment of a public trial.   
* * * * 
¶91 Because both parties failed to bring arguments to the 
circuit court 
in 
a timely manner and have briefed the 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
52 
 
substantive issue whether the circuit court's order excluding 
family members violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
a public trial, this court has decided to reach the merits of 
the issue presented, rather than to assess comparative blame and 
address the effect of the defendant's failure at trial to raise 
the Sixth Amendment issue and the State's failure at the 
postconviction 
hearing 
to 
raise 
the 
defendant's 
waiver/forfeiture at trial of the Sixth Amendment issue.  We 
conclude that the exclusion of family members from three days of 
the trial implicated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a 
public trial but did not, under the circumstances of the instant 
case, violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment constitutional 
right.   
¶92 We do not address whether the defendant is entitled to 
a new trial on any basis unrelated to the Sixth Amendment right 
to a public trial.  We agree with the court of appeals that the 
matter is to be remanded to the circuit court for any additional 
postconviction proceedings required by law. 
¶93 Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals decision, 
although on different grounds, reversing the postconviction 
order granting the defendant a new trial, reinstating the 
judgment rendered by the jury, and remanding the matter to the 
circuit 
court 
for 
any 
additional 
postconviction 
remedies 
required by law.  We remand the matter, as did the court of 
No.  2007AP5-CR 
53 
 
appeals, to the circuit court for additional postconviction 
proceedings required by law.   
¶94 By the Court.—The decision of the Court of Appeals is 
affirmed and the cause remanded to the circuit court.   
No.  2007AP5-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
¶95 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  The majority 
opinion is scholarly, but it fails to recite a number of key 
facts that provide context and perspective to the constitutional 
issues before the court.  This concurrence will set out those 
additional facts and then explain why the defendant forfeited 
the right to assert a violation of his public trial right long 
after his conviction and sentence. 
I 
¶96 On Saturday, November 23, 2002, approximately 50 
persons of Albanian descent gathered at the Albanian Community 
Center in South Milwaukee to celebrate the birthday of a young 
child.  Most, if not all, of the persons in attendance were 
related to each other by blood or marriage.  The child's 
birthday presented the opportunity for a family party.  The 
party was held several days before the annual celebration of 
Albania's independence (November 28) and shortly before the 
defendant, Dhosi Ndina——one of the five sons of Stefani Ndina 
(the family matriarch)——was scheduled to fly back to Albania.  
The party was festive, with music, dancing, and ample food and 
drink, including alcoholic beverages.1 
                                                 
1  
Albanian family bonds are especially strong.  It 
is not uncommon for generations of a family to work 
together in a family-run business.  Many extended 
families live together and care for each other.  Often 
adult children live with their parents, or several 
generations live under the same roof. . . .   
Family 
events, 
such 
as 
engagement 
parties 
and 
weddings, are important social events in the Albanian 
community. . . .   
No.  2007AP5-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
¶97 Sometime after midnight, a dispute broke out among the 
children of Ilia Ndina and Robert Janko.  This skirmish prompted 
an argument between the two fathers. 
¶98 Erjon Dhembi, then 22, knew the two men well.  One, 
Ilia Ndina, was his uncle.  Ilia was the brother of Erjon's 
mother, Konstandina.  She, in turn, was a daughter of Stefani 
Ndina.  The other father, Robert Janko, was Erjon's cousin.  As 
the argument proceeded, Erjon got up from the table where he had 
been seated for dinner and urged the two men to calm down and 
respect the atmosphere of the family gathering.  With peace 
apparently restored, the three men returned to their seats. 
¶99 Ilia Ndina was seated at a table on one side of the 
community center near his brother Dhosi, who was visiting from 
Albania.  Moments later, the two men approached Erjon Dhembi 
from behind.  Ilia Ndina "tapped" Erjon on the right shoulder 
and threatened to kill him.  Immediately thereafter, Dhosi Ndina 
stabbed Erjon in the neck with a steak knife and then stabbed 
him again in the back.  Bleeding heavily, Erjon stood up and 
began walking to seek medical attention, but he quickly stumbled 
and then fell.  He was assisted by his father, Spiro Dhembi, two 
uncles, Ardian and Llazi Ndina, and his sister Eglantina Dhembi.  
His family rushed Erjon to St. Luke's South Shore Hospital in 
                                                                                                                                                             
Preparing and sharing food are central to Albanian 
family life. 
Megan Brody, Albania and Albanians in the United States (2003), 
http://www2.bc.edu/~brisk/albania.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 
2009) (emphasis added). 
No.  2007AP5-CR.dtp 
 
3 
 
Cudahy.  He was then transported by helicopter to Froedtert 
Memorial Lutheran Hospital where he underwent emergency surgery.2 
¶100 Erjon's father, Spiro, was incensed by the attack on 
his son.  He and Eglantina went to the South Milwaukee Police 
Department to report the incident before they learned that 
Erjon's condition required that he be transferred to another 
hospital. 
¶101 Acting on the information the Dhembis had supplied to 
the South Milwaukee police, the Milwaukee County District 
Attorney's office issued a criminal complaint against Dhosi 
Ndina and obtained a warrant for his arrest.  The complaint was 
filed and the warrant obtained on Sunday, the 24th of November.  
Authorities acted quickly in an effort to arrest Dhosi before he 
could catch a scheduled flight to Albania. 
¶102 Although he spoke little or no English, Dhosi was 
somehow able to elude capture and fly home.  He was apprehended 
in Albania months later, on August 13, 2003, and remained in 
custody there until he was extradited to the United States on 
April 21, 2004. 
¶103 When Dhosi was returned to Milwaukee, his family hired 
a prominent criminal lawyer, James E. Kachelski, to represent 
him on a charge of attempted intentional homicide.  Sixteen 
members of the family attended the preliminary hearing.  When 
                                                 
2 The victim's sister, Eglantina, testified that after the 
stabbing she "actually" put her finger in the back of Erjon's 
neck trying to stop the bleeding.  The victim himself testified: 
"I lost a quarter of my lungs . . . and part of my rib."  In 
all, Erjon Dhembi suffered a severed artery and a collapsed lung 
and was hospitalized for a week.  
No.  2007AP5-CR.dtp 
 
4 
 
Kachelski later persuaded the court to reduce Dhosi's bond from 
$100,000 to $50,000, Dhosi's family pooled their resources to 
put up the cash.  Dhosi was then placed on in-house monitoring 
and required to live with his mother who is also the victim's 
grandmother.  Other members of the Ndina family lived in the 
same duplex. 
¶104 The fact that the defendant was confined to the home 
of the victim's grandmother undermined the court's release 
condition that the defendant have no contact with the victim's 
family.  In effect, the victim's family and the defendant's 
family so overlapped that they were not readily distinguishable. 
¶105 On April 29, 2005, Attorney Kachelski filed the 
defendant's witness list for trial.  It contained the names of 
13 family members.  The State's witness list included four 
additional family members.   
¶106 On May 5, Kachelski filed motions on sequestration of 
witnesses and introduction of witnesses.  The sequestration 
motion asked that "all witnesses for the prosecution or the 
defense be excluded from the courtroom, including during voir 
dire, and that all witnesses be admonished not to discuss their 
proposed testimony or completed testimony with any other witness 
during the pendency of this trial."  Another motion requested 
that "no distinction be drawn during voir dire between possible 
prosecution and defense witnesses, and that the court introduce 
all witnesses as possible witnesses, and not as prosecution or 
defense 
witnesses." 
 
The 
court 
ultimately 
entered 
a 
sequestration order that effectively barred 17 family members, 
No.  2007AP5-CR.dtp 
 
5 
 
including the victim, from the courtroom except when they were 
testifying. 
¶107 In his opening statement, Attorney Kachelski told the 
jury that "there's going to be quite a few witnesses, and these 
witnesses have different vantage points, different biases, 
different family alliances . . . .  I think it would be 
unnatural if family members didn't talk about this incident.  
And memories can start to fade over time . . . ."  (Emphasis 
added.)  Attorney Kachelski continued, "[T]hings will become 
important when you analyze what the witnesses say, analyze their 
vantage point, their motives, consider what they're saying, 
their biases, their family allegiances."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶108 Kachelski's 
statements, 
whatever 
their 
intent, 
revealed the divisions and conflicting loyalties that had 
developed in the family as a result of Erjon's stabbing and 
Dhosi's prosecution.  These divisions were frequently confirmed 
in subsequent testimony. 
¶109 Dhosi's trial began on May 9, 2005, with voir dire and 
the selection of a jury.  On May 11, during testimony of the 
State's third witness, Spiro Dhembi, the court briefly stopped 
the proceeding.  The transcript reads as follows: 
Q 
So let me be clear.  You're saying that Ilia got 
up, walked over and punched Erjon? 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
And then it was minutes later that Dhosi came up 
and stabbed him? 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
And -- 
No.  2007AP5-CR.dtp 
 
6 
 
 
 
THE COURT:  One moment.  One moment. 
BY MR. ZIER: 
Q 
How was it you were able to see -- 
 
 
THE COURT:  One moment.  Tim? 
 
 
THE BAILIFF:  I hope they speak English. 
 
THE COURT:  Ms. Hysi, I'm going to have you 
go out with my deputy. 
 
 
(Discussion off the record.) 
 
 
THE COURT:  You may continue. 
¶110 After the jury was released for the evening, the court 
made the following record of what had transpired: 
 
I was also, from my point of observation up here 
on the bench which is higher than all of the other 
places in the courtroom, able to see individual family 
members in the gallery who were also engaging in a 
level of conversation that not only the Court could 
hear, but I feared that the jury could hear as well. 
We stopped the proceedings or I stopped the 
proceedings 
and 
directed 
my 
deputy 
along 
with 
interpreter Vera Hysi to communicate to those members 
in the gallery -- those family members in the gallery 
that they must remain silent and not talk among each 
other while they are in the courtroom. 
 
I observed my deputy and Miss Hysi go into the 
gallery and communicate that order and directive from 
the Court.  Thereafter it appears that the -- my order 
has been followed.  I have not seen or heard anything 
from those family members in the gallery since that 
directive was made. 
 
In addition, however, the Court noted that as Mr. 
Spiro Dhembi was becoming more emotional, agitated on 
the witness stand, the Court also observed the 
defendant begin to respond.  Both of them were 
speaking in their native tongue, Albanian.  The Court 
did not know what they were saying although they were 
speaking, and it was clear to the Court that it wasn't 
No.  2007AP5-CR.dtp 
 
7 
 
in response to any particular question that had been 
put to the witness. 
 
I directed both the witness, Mr. Dhembi, and the 
defendant, Mr. Ndina[,] that they are not to talk or 
converse unless a question has been put to them 
directly.  
¶111 The facts above were known to the court and to counsel 
before the incident the following day in which the court 
excluded 
family 
members 
(except 
Stefani 
Ndina) 
from 
the 
courtroom.  See majority op., ¶¶13-14.  These facts presented 
extraordinary circumstances to the circuit court——circumstances 
that cannot be separated from the legal issues now under review. 
II 
¶112 Dhosi Ndina's trial lasted 10 days.  The jury returned 
its verdict at 10:15 a.m. on May 20, the tenth day. 
¶113 The majority opinion describes, in ¶¶14-17, the events 
near the end of the fourth day of trial when the court issued 
its order excluding all family members from the courtroom.   
¶114 "As an exception to its order, the circuit court 
permitted the defendant's mother to remain in the courtroom."  
Majority op., ¶16.  The defendant attacks the significance of 
this exception, contending that his mother did not speak English 
at the time of the trial.  This may be true, but the record 
reveals that Stefani Ndina was a naturalized U.S. citizen whose 
father had been a U.S. citizen. 
¶115 In any event, the courtroom was closed to other 
members of the family on Friday, May 13; Monday, May 16; and 
Tuesday, May 17.  Excluded persons missed part of the lengthy 
testimony of Spiro Dhembi; the testimony of State witnesses 
No.  2007AP5-CR.dtp 
 
8 
 
Francis Rotter, David Hoeppner, Brian Fleming, and Peter Jaske, 
all South Milwaukee police officers; the testimony of defense 
witnesses Ardian Ndina, Bledian Ndina, Mimoza Ikonomi, Vasilika 
Proko, Kastriot Fekollari, and Egriselda Fekollari; and the 
testimony of rebuttal witnesses Spiro Dhembi, Eglantina Dhembi, 
and Francis Rotter.  Family members returned to the courtroom on 
May 18 through May 20 for jury instructions, closing arguments, 
jury deliberations, and the verdict. 
¶116 In sum, a few persons not otherwise excluded because 
of their status as listed potential witnesses missed three days 
of the trial because of the court's order.  They missed the 
testimony of four police officers, none of whom witnessed the 
crime; six defense witnesses; some testimony from Spiro Dhembi; 
and rebuttal testimony from Spiro and Eglantina Dhembi, most of 
whose testimony had been fully open, and Francis Rotter. 
¶117 Attorney Richard Kaiser, who skillfully represented 
Dhosi Ndina in post-sentencing proceedings, produced sworn 
affidavits from Vladimir Ndina, Lola Ndina, and Femi Ikonomi, 
indicating that they would have attended the trial, or more of 
the trial, had they not been excluded by the court's order.  In 
his own affidavit, Attorney Kaiser added that three other 
persons, Bule Spathiu, Mosko Proko, and Maksut Spathiu, had 
wanted to attend the trial and that Enkeleda Ndina had been 
removed from the courtroom. 
¶118 These seven persons require analysis.  First, the 
defendant filed three affidavits, not seven.3  Second, all seven 
                                                 
3 The fact is that Attorney Kaiser prepared eight affidavits 
to support his motion, but only three of them were filed. 
No.  2007AP5-CR.dtp 
 
9 
 
persons may have been present at the Albanian Community Center 
on November 23-24, 2002, and if they were, they could have been 
listed as witnesses or called as rebuttal witnesses.  Third, 
Vladimir 
Ndina, the defendant's brother, was indisputably 
present at the Albanian Community Center.  Lola Ndina is married 
to one of Dhosi's brothers (not Ilia) and was very likely at the 
Albanian Community Center, as Ardian, Llazi, and Vladimir Ndina, 
the remaining brothers, were all present.  Femi Ikonomi is the 
father-in-law of Mimoza Ikonomi, the defendant's sister and a 
defense witness.  Mosko Proko is the father-in-law of Vasilika 
Proko, another of the defendant's sisters and a defense witness.  
Like Lola Ndina, Enkeleda Ndina was married to one of the 
defendant's brothers (not Ilia, who was married to Flora).  
Maksut and Bule Spathiu are apparently related to the defendant 
by marriage.  Even under the most ideal circumstances, the court 
would have been hard pressed to draw meaningful distinctions 
among these people, a number of whom were not present when the 
ruling was made. 
¶119 In addition, the court did not prohibit friends of the 
defendant who were not family members from attending the trial.  
Moreover, the court never closed the courtroom to news media or 
the public at large,4 and it acted explicitly to protect a 
sequestration order requested by the defendant. 
¶120 Thus, it is beyond belief to suppose that the circuit 
court's decision on May 12, 2005, to temporarily exclude family 
                                                 
4 The court noted the presence of a school group in the 
courtroom early in the trial. 
No.  2007AP5-CR.dtp 
 
10 
 
members from the courtroom, amounted to the kind of "structural 
error" in the judicial process that would warrant a new trial, 
especially in the absence of even a murmur of protest from the 
defendant or the defendant's counsel. 
III 
¶121 Although I agree with the majority's affirmation of 
the court of appeals' decision, I am troubled by the majority's 
unwillingness to make a forfeiture determination one way or the 
other, thereby necessitating an elaborate, not always persuasive 
analysis of whether the circuit court's order excluding family 
members from three days of trial violated the defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial.  In my view, the defendant 
forfeited the right to assert a violation of his public trial 
right when he failed to make a timely objection——an objection 
that would have permitted the court to modify its order if 
needed and address any legitimate concerns. 
¶122 As a general rule, a constitutional error does not 
automatically require reversal of a conviction.  Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991) (opinion of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).  
However, "there are some constitutional rights so basic to a 
fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as 
harmless error."  Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23, n.8 (citing Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Payne v. 
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confessions); and Tumey 
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (right to an impartial judge)). 
No.  2007AP5-CR.dtp 
 
11 
 
¶123 In Fulminante, the Supreme Court explained that the 
"common thread" connecting cases in which a harmless error 
analysis may be applied is that "each involved a 'trial error'——
error which occurred during the prosecution of the case to the 
jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the 
context of other evidence presented in order to determine 
whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."  
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08.  The Court thereupon changed the 
rule on admission of an involuntary confession——"a classic 
'trial error'"——because it deemed admission of this evidence as 
"markedly 
different 
from 
the 
other 
two 
constitutional 
violations" referred to in Chapman, e.g., total deprivation of 
the right to counsel and trial before "a judge who was not 
impartial."  Id. at 309.  "These," the court stated, "are 
structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, 
which defy analysis by 'harmless-error' standards."  Id. 
(emphasis added).  "The entire conduct of the trial from 
beginning to end is obviously affected by the absence of counsel 
for a criminal defendant, just as it is by the presence on the 
bench of a judge who is not impartial."  Id. at 309-10. 
¶124 The Court then noted that "other cases [since Chapman] 
have added to the category of constitutional errors which are 
not subject to harmless error."  Id. at 310 (citing Vasquez v. 
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (the unlawful exclusion of members 
of the defendant's race from a grand jury); Waller v. Georgia, 
467 U.S. 39 (1984) (the "right to public trial"); and McKaskle 
v. 
Wiggins, 
465 
U.S. 
168 
(1984) 
(the 
right 
to 
self-
No.  2007AP5-CR.dtp 
 
12 
 
representation at trial)).  "Each of these constitutional 
deprivations is a similar structural defect affecting the 
framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an 
error in the trial process itself."  Id. (emphasis added).5 
¶125 In Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), the 
Court observed that "we have found an error to be 'structural,' 
and thus subject to automatic reversal, only in a 'very limited 
class of cases.'"  Id. at 8 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 
520 U.S. 461, 468-69 (1997)). 
¶126 The Court has said that structural errors "infect the 
entire trial process," Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630 
(1993), and "necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair," 
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986).  These errors deprive 
defendants of basic protections without which "a criminal trial 
cannot 
reliably 
serve 
its 
function 
as 
a 
vehicle 
for 
determination of guilt or innocence."  Id. at 577-78. 
¶127 The 
Court 
also 
has 
said, 
however, 
that 
the 
determination 
of 
a 
structural 
error 
may 
rest 
"upon 
the 
difficulty of assessing the effect of the error."  United States 
v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 n.4 (2006).  Writing for a 
majority of the Court, Justice Scalia said that fundamental 
                                                 
5 Other cases can be added to the list of constitutional 
errors not subject to harmless error analysis: United States v. 
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006) (erroneous denial of 
the right to counsel of choice); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 
275, 277-82 (1993) (deficient reasonable doubt instruction); 
Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 876 (1989) (voir dire and 
jury selection before a magistrate who lacks jurisdiction); and 
Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331 (1970) (second prosecution 
for the same offense after conviction of lesser-included offense 
is reversed). 
No.  2007AP5-CR.dtp 
 
13 
 
fairness is not the sole criterion of structural error.  Id.  He 
pointed to Waller as an example of a case in which "difficulty 
of 
assessment" 
heavily 
influenced 
the 
"structural 
error" 
categorization by the Court.  Id. 
¶128 The Gonzalez-Lopez decision appears to signal a shift 
in the Court's rationale for structural error, from an error 
that is so clear and fundamental that evaluation is unnecessary 
to an error for which evaluation is speculative or impossible.  
¶129 In any event, the inclusion of Waller in the list of 
cases exposing "structural error" is problematic.  It is true 
that 
"the 
benefits 
of 
the 
public 
trial 
are 
frequently 
intangible, difficult to prove, or a matter of chance."  Waller, 
467 U.S. at 49 n.9.  Hence, violation of the right satisfies 
some of the rationale for setting aside the harmless error 
standard. 
¶130 However, Waller itself stated that "the Court has made 
clear that the right to an open trial may give way in certain 
cases to other rights or interests, such as the defendant's 
right to a fair trial or the government's interest in inhibiting 
disclosure of sensitive information."  Id. at 45.  In other 
words, there are certain cases in which a court is able to 
justify closing a trial to the public.  Cf. Walton v. Briley, 
361 F.3d 431, 433 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[W]hile criminal trials that 
are not open to the public are strongly disfavored, they are not 
forbidden."). 
¶131 The indefinite nature of the public trial right is 
further complicated by the broad array of situations in which a 
No.  2007AP5-CR.dtp 
 
14 
 
criminal trial may be temporarily closed, or closed to some 
people but not all people. 
¶132 The difficulty in assessing whether a defendant's 
public trial right has been violated counters the difficulty in 
assessing the effect of a violation upon the defendant.  This is 
surely one reason why Waller indicated that violation of the 
right to a public trial is not subject to "automatic reversal" 
in the same way as violation of certain other rights.  Waller's 
case was remanded to the trial court for a suppression hearing 
after the Court determined that a violation had occurred.  
Waller, 467 U.S. at 49-50. 
¶133 The Waller Court agreed with the proposition that "the 
defendant should not be required to prove specific prejudice in 
order to obtain relief for a violation of the public-trial 
guarantee."  Id.  However, it asserted that the relief "should 
be appropriate to the violation."  Id. at 50.  The Court did not 
refer to "structural error" in the opinion, because that term 
did not come along until later.  Although it quoted from a 
dissenting opinion of Justice William Brennan, Levine v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 610, 627 n.* (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
("[T]he settled rule of the federal courts [is] that a showing 
of prejudice is not necessary for reversal of a conviction not 
had in public proceedings."), the unanimous Waller Court did not 
adopt a rule of "automatic reversal" of conviction for every 
violation of the public trial right. 
¶134 To sum up, Waller does not fit well into the 
structural error category if "structural defects always lead to 
No.  2007AP5-CR.dtp 
 
15 
 
automatic reversal."  Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 159 (Alito, 
J., dissenting) (citing Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306-10); cf. 
Sullivan 
v. 
Louisiana, 
508 
U.S. 
275, 
279 
(1993) 
("Some 
[constitutional 
errors] 
will 
always 
invalidate 
the 
conviction."). 
¶135 Categorizing the violation of the Sixth Amendment 
right to a public trial as structural error does not relieve a 
defendant of the obligation to enter a timely objection to a 
violation of the right unless the defendant is not in a position 
to do so. 
¶136 Normally, 
a 
defendant 
asserting 
violation 
of 
a 
constitutional right must object at the time of the violation or 
forfeit the right to raise the issue later.  In United States v. 
Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), the Court declared that "'No 
procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a 
constitutional right . . . may be forfeited in criminal as well 
as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the 
right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.'"  
Id. at 731 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 
(1944)). 
¶137 The court of appeals relied upon this principle to 
avoid a full-blown analysis of Dhosi Ndina's constitutional 
right to a public trial, and it turned instead to the question 
of whether the defendant had been denied effective assistance of 
counsel.  Our challenge is to determine whether the court of 
appeals made the correct call. 
No.  2007AP5-CR.dtp 
 
16 
 
¶138 It must be noted that defendant Waller objected to 
closing the suppression hearing that was held prior to his 
trial.  Waller, 467 U.S. at 40.  This objection unquestionably 
helped his case.  The Court said: "[W]e hold that under the 
Sixth Amendment any closure of a suppression hearing [to the 
public] over the objections of the accused must meet the tests 
set 
out 
in 
Press-Enterprise 
[Co. 
v. 
Superior 
Court 
of 
California, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984),] and its predecessors."  
Id. at 47 (emphasis added).6  The Court also distinguished 
Waller's position from that of another defendant, Cole, stating: 
Counsel for petitioners Waller, Thompson, Eula Burke, 
and W.B. Burke lodged an objection to closing the 
hearing.  Counsel for petitioner Cole concurred in the 
prosecutor's motion to close the suppression hearing.  
Respondent argues that Cole is [now] precluded from 
challenging the closure . . . .  Cole's claims in this 
Court are identical to those of the others.  Since the 
cases must be remanded, we remand Cole's case as well.  
The state courts may determine on remand whether Cole 
is procedurally barred from seeking relief as a matter 
of state law. 
Id. at 42 n.2 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
¶139 The "matter of state law" to which the Court referred 
is the state law on forfeiture.   
                                                 
6 The presumption of openness may be overcome only by 
an overriding interest based on findings that closure 
is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest.  The interest is to 
be articulated along with findings specific enough 
that a reviewing court can determine whether the 
closure order was properly entered.   
Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 
510 (1984). 
No.  2007AP5-CR.dtp 
 
17 
 
¶140 No doubt there are situations in which the forfeiture 
rule does not apply because the defendant is not in a position 
to make a timely objection.  For instance, in Walton, the 
prosecution's entire case against Walton was held in the late 
evening hours after the courthouse had been closed and locked 
for the night.  Walton, 361 F.3d at 432.  Walton did not object, 
but he may not have realized at the time that the courthouse had 
been locked.  Id.  Likewise, in State v. Vanness, 2007 WI App 
195, 304 Wis. 2d 692, 738 N.W.2d 154, the defendant did not 
object to closing the courthouse during his trial because the 
doors were locked before he realized what had happened.  Id., 
¶¶2-3.  Vanness did promptly move for a mistrial when he learned 
what had happened.  Id., ¶3. 
¶141 The line of cases in which a defendant is not in a 
position to make an objection to a closed or partially closed 
trial does not apply here.  To my mind, it would be difficult to 
concoct a clearer example of forfeiture than this defendant's 
failure to register a timely objection to the court's order.  
The defendant was fully aware of the circumstances: he was 
forewarned of the court's concerns on May 11; he observed first-
hand the court's decision to exclude family members on May 12; 
and he was present when the court revisited the issue on May 13.  
The only plausible explanation for the defendant's silence is 
the manifest reasonableness of the court's order under the 
circumstances.   
¶142 In most of the Supreme Court cases identifying or 
discussing structural error, the defendant, like Waller, timely 
No.  2007AP5-CR.dtp 
 
18 
 
asserted his rights or timely lodged an objection.  See 
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 140; Neder, 527 U.S. at 6; Brecht, 
507 U.S. at 625; Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 283; Vasquez, 474 U.S. 
at 256; McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 168; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337; 
Payne, 356 U.S. at 561.  In some cases, the presence or absence 
of a timely objection was not discussed.  See Sullivan, 508 U.S. 
at 275; Rose, 478 U.S. at 570.  The Supreme Court has not become 
indifferent to the importance of making timely objections. 
IV 
¶143 This case presents the challenge of reconciling the 
protection of an important Sixth Amendment right with the 
necessity of requiring the key players in a criminal proceeding 
to conduct themselves in a manner that promotes and preserves 
the orderly administration of justice.  Timely objections are 
vital to the orderly administration of justice.  A party's 
failure to make a timely objection ought to entail a cost to the 
party unless the failure is justified by the circumstances, or 
the judiciary is required to vindicate a higher value.  If a 
deficient party is rewarded for its lack of diligence, it will 
not be diligent. 
¶144 This defendant was required to object to the exclusion 
of family members from the courtroom at the time they were 
excluded inasmuch as he (and his experienced counsel) knew 
exactly what was happening and why.  He was not entitled to 
remain silent in the face of the court's order and then raise a 
constitutional objection many months after he was convicted and 
sentenced. 
No.  2007AP5-CR.dtp 
 
19 
 
¶145 A defendant who fails to object still may argue that 
his counsel provided ineffective assistance.  A defendant also 
may invoke the plain error doctrine that was discussed last term 
in State v. Jorgensen, 2008 WI 60, ¶23, 310 Wis. 2d 138, 754 
N.W.2d 77 ("If the defendant shows that his unobjected to error 
is fundamental, obvious, and substantial, the burden then shifts 
to the State to show the error was harmless.").  Cf.  Johnson, 
520 U.S. at 461; Olano, 507 U.S. at 725; State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 
78, 301 Wis. 2d 642, 734 N.W.2d 115.  Both options put the 
initial burden on the defendant so that he is not rewarded for 
failing to make a timely objection. 
¶146 For the reasons stated, I respectfully concur. 
¶147 I 
am 
authorized 
to 
state 
that 
Justice 
ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this 
concurrence. 
 
 
 
No.  2007AP5-CR.dtp 
 
 
 
1