Title: Willner v. Vertical Reality, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 15, 2018

Willner v. Vertical Reality, Inc. Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Plaintiff Josh Willner was injured while climbing a rock wall owned by his employer, Ivy League Day Camp. Willner sued the camp and the manufacturers of the wall and parts contained in the wall, Vertical Reality, Inc. (Vertical Reality), and ASCO Numatics (Numatics), respectively, alleging strict products liability claims and negligence. Throughout trial, evidence was submitted regarding Numatics’ conduct both before and after the incident. Prior to summation, the court dismissed the design defect and failure to warn claims, allowing Willner to proceed only on his strict liability claim of manufacturing defect against Numatics. Vertical Reality’s counsel underscored Numatics’ alleged malfeasance. Numatics objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion, but instructed the jury to disregard counsel’s comments concerning Numatics’ conduct. Numatics thereafter requested an instruction to the jury regarding the applicability of Numatics’ conduct in the context of Willner’s manufacturing defect claim. The judge denied that proposal and instead provided an instruction that substantially mirrored Model Jury Charges (Civil), 5.40B, “Manufacturing Defect” (2009). The jury found: Vertical Reality’s rock wall was designed defectively; Vertical Reality provided inadequate warnings; and Numatics’ product was manufactured defectively, all proximate causes of Willner’s fall. The jury awarded Willner monetary damages, allocating seventy and thirty percent liability to Vertical Reality and Numatics, respectively. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's jury instruction under a different standard of review than was used by the Appellate Division: the judge’s actions were harmless error. The Court reversed the imposition of sanctions, holding it would have been unfair to impose sanctions "in a case where the only means for a party to avoid sanctions would be to pay an amount greater than the jury’s verdict against that party, without advance notice of that consequence." Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.) Josh Willner v. Vertical Reality, Inc. (A-9-17) (079626)Argued April 24, 2018 -- Decided August 15, 2018FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for the Court. In this products liability case, the Court reviews both a trial judge’s jury instruction related to evidence of a defendant manufacturer’s conduct and the New Jersey rule governing offers of judgment in cases in which a single plaintiff pursues joint and several liability against multiple defendants. Plaintiff Josh Willner was injured while climbing a rock wall owned by his employer, Ivy League Day Camp. Willner sued the camp and the manufacturers of the wall and parts contained in the wall, Vertical Reality, Inc. (Vertical Reality), and ASCO Numatics (Numatics), respectively, alleging strict products liability claims and negligence. Before trial, Willner made a single offer of judgment to the defendants in accordance with Rule 4:58 in the amount of $125,000. No defendant accepted the offer or counteroffered. The claims against Vertical Reality and Numatics proceeded to a jury trial. Willner’s strict liability claims against defendants were based on theories of design defect, manufacturing defect, and failure to warn. Throughout trial, evidence was submitted regarding Numatics’ conduct both before and after the incident. Prior to summation, the court dismissed the design defect and failure to warn claims, allowing Willner to proceed only on his strict liability claim of manufacturing defect against Numatics. Although any need for evidence of Numatics’ conduct was thereby obviated, during summation, Vertical Reality’s counsel again underscored Numatics’ alleged malfeasance. Numatics objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the mistrial motion, but instructed the jury to disregard counsel’s comments concerning Numatics’ conduct, explaining that evidence of Numatics’ actions was not relevant to the remaining issues in the case. Following summations, Numatics requested an instruction to the jury regarding the applicability of Numatics’ conduct in the context of Willner’s manufacturing defect claim. The judge denied that proposal and instead provided an instruction that substantially mirrored Model Jury Charges (Civil), 5.40B, “Manufacturing Defect” (2009). Numatics’ attorney requested a meeting with the judge at sidebar during the judge’s reading of that charge, which the judge granted. Counsel asked, “I assume, Judge, that if you made the request in writing and you did not instruct it, there’s no way to reiterate it? . . . There’s no need to address it any further at this point? You’ve ruled?” The Court replied, “I think I . . . ruled on everything this morning?” No formal objections were made to the instruction. 1 The jury found that: Vertical Reality’s rock wall was designed defectively and was a proximate cause of Willner’s fall; Vertical Reality provided inadequate warnings, which were a proximate cause of Willner’s fall; and Numatics’ product was manufactured defectively and was a proximate cause of Willner’s fall. The jury awarded Willner a total of $358,000, allocating seventy and thirty percent liability to Vertical Reality and Numatics, respectively. Following a hearing, the trial court awarded attorney fees of $62,963.00, costs of $12,160.83, and prejudgment interest of $115,727.70 as requested pursuant to Rule 4:58. Numatics appealed to the Appellate Division, contesting the failure to instruct the jury regarding the trial evidence related to its conduct and the award of attorney fees and costs. With respect to the latter issue, Numatics argued that the trial court erred in granting Willner’s motion for sanctions because its molded share of the total verdict ($107,400) did not exceed 120% of Willner’s $125,000 offer of judgment. The appellate panel affirmed, concluding that the trial judge’s “pre- and post-deliberation instructions were proper and appropriate and did not constitute error, let alone plain error.” The panel found that case law “does not compel the use of molded judgments in determining” whether sanctions should be awarded under Rule 4:58. Rather, the panel found that the appropriate figure to compare with the amount of the offer is “the amount of the jury’s verdict.” Accordingly, the panel found that because the jury verdict of $358,000 was greater than 120% of the $125,000 offer of judgment, the trial court’s award of fees and costs was appropriate. Numatics filed a petition for certification with this Court, challenging: (1) the standard that the Appellate Division employed in its review of the trial judge’s jury instructions; (2) the trial court’s instructions; and (3) the award of sanctions under Rule 4:58. The Court granted certification. 231 N.J. 197 (2017).HELD: The Court affirms the panel’s approval of the judge’s jury instruction, albeit under a different standard of review, finding that the judge’s actions were harmless error. The Court reverses the imposition of sanctions. It would be unfair to impose sanctions in a case where the only means for a party to avoid sanctions would be to pay an amount greater than the jury’s verdict against that party, without advance notice of that consequence.1. Strict products liability claims are governed by N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-2, which provides that claims can be brought under three theories of liability: manufacturing defect, failure to warn, or design defect. A successful showing of the latter two theories necessarily implicates the manufacturer’s conduct. Conduct evidence, however, is never relevant to a claim of manufacturing defect. A factfinder’s sole responsibility in those cases is to evaluate (1) the manufacturer’s design specifications and (2) the actual condition of the product that allegedly caused the claimant harm, and compare the two. (pp. 15-16)2. Pursuant to Rule 1:7-2, in order to preserve an issue for appeal, “a party . . . shall make known to the court specifically the action which the party desires the court to take.” Such an objection may be offered “in open court, in the absence of the jury.” R. 1:7-2. Without an objection at the time a jury instruction is given, there is a presumption that the charge was not error and was unlikely to prejudice the defendant’s case. Therefore, the failure to object 2 to a jury instruction requires review under the plain error standard. When a party has brought an alleged error to the attention of the trial court, though, the error will not be grounds for reversal on appeal if it was harmless. An error cannot be harmless if there is some degree of possibility that the error led to an unjust result. (pp. 16-18)3. Although offering a jury instruction alone is not adequate to preserve an issue for appeal under Rule 1:7-2, Numatics’ counsel did more than suggest a charge. Counsel also requested a sidebar with the judge to confirm the judge’s decision not to adopt counsel’s preferred charge and to confirm that no further objection was necessary. Such a colloquy is sufficient to preserve Numatics’ right to contest the charge on appeal pursuant to our rules. The standard of review for Numatics’ challenge is thus harmless error. (pp. 18-20)4. Here, the judge’s actions, if error, were harmless. The Court agrees with the Appellate Division that a limiting instruction would have been appropriate. However, in the absence of such an instruction, the judge acted appropriately to direct the jury’s attention away from any newly irrelevant evidence of Numatics’ negligence, and the judge’s adoption of the model charge for Willner’s remaining manufacturing defect claim effectively informed the jury of the only evidence necessary for its decision. Consequently, there was no genuine possibility that the judge’s actions led the jury to reach a verdict it otherwise would not have reached. The Court accordingly affirms the Appellate Division’s ruling on the trial judge’s instruction. (pp. 20-21)5. The offer of judgment rule, R. 4:58, was designed as a mechanism to encourage, promote, and stimulate early out-of-court settlement of claims. The rule imposes financial consequences on a party who rejects a settlement offer that turns out to be more favorable than the ultimate judgment by a certain amount, but leaves unclear the circumstances triggering the imposition of sanctions on an individual defendant when a single plaintiff makes a global offer to multiple defendants. Comparing the jury’s full award of damages to a plaintiff to a single plaintiff’s offer of judgment is uncomplicated. Doing the same in the joint and several liability setting is not. Forcing plaintiffs to negotiate individually with defendants in settlement negotiations would create an unfair risk of settling with defendants that are ultimately found by juries to be significantly liable, for a smaller amount than the percentage of fault allocated to those defendants. By the same token, mandating that individual defendants contemplate global offers from a single plaintiff would force defendants who are likely less liable than their co-defendants to consider settling for an amount greater than their individual liabilities, simply to avoid significant sanctions. This case illustrates the problem. The offer of judgment rule must balance the competing interests of plaintiffs and defendants. If the sanction of fee shifting is to be awarded, there must be advance notice of that consequence. Here, that did not happen. Consequently, it would be improper to shift fees and costs in this circumstance. (pp. 21-26) AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 9 September Term 2017 079626JOSH WILLNER, An Infant by his Guardian ad Litem, LESTER WILLNER, LESTER WILLNER, Individually, and AMY WILLNER, Individually, Plaintiff-Respondents, v.VERTICAL REALITY, INC., An Entity Doing Business in the State of New Jersey, and VERTICAL REALITY MANUFACTURING, INC., An Entity Doing Business in the State of New Jersey, Defendant-Respondents. andIVY LEAGUE CAMP, An Entity Doing Business in the State of New Jersey, Defendant, andASCO NUMATICS, improperly pled as NUMATICS, INC., Defendant-Appellant. Argued April 24, 2018 – Decided August 15, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. 1 Joseph DiRienzo argued the cause for appellants (DiRienzo, DiRienzo & Dulinski, attorneys; Joseph DiRienzo, on the briefs). Cynthia A. Walters argued the cause for respondents (Budd Larner, attorneys; Cynthia A. Walters and Terrence John Hull, on the brief). Michael Ferrara argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (The Ferrara Law Firm and Lomurro, Munson, Comer, Brown & Schottland, attorneys; Michael Ferrara, of counsel, and Christina Vassiliou Harvey, of counsel and on the brief). JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA delivered the opinion of the Court. In this products liability case, we review both a trialjudge’s jury instruction related to evidence of a defendantmanufacturer’s conduct and our rule governing offers of judgmentin cases in which a single plaintiff pursues joint and severalliability against multiple defendants. Plaintiff Josh Willner was injured while climbing a rockwall owned by his employer, Ivy League Day Camp (Ivy League).Willner sued the camp and the manufacturers of the wall andparts contained in the wall, Vertical Reality, Inc. (VerticalReality), and ASCO Numatics (Numatics), respectively, allegingstrict products liability claims and negligence. Before trial,Willner made a single offer of judgment to the defendants inaccordance with Rule 4:58 in the amount of $125,000. Nodefendant accepted the offer or counteroffered. 2 By the end of the ensuing trial, the only count remainingagainst Numatics alleged a manufacturing defect. Because adefendant’s conduct is not relevant to adjudicating such aclaim, at the conclusion of the parties’ cases, Numaticsrequested a jury instruction that advised the jurors not toconsider evidence of its conduct or negligence. The judgedenied the request and instead provided an instruction trackingthe model jury charge for manufacturing defect claims. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Willner, awardinghim $358,000 and apportioning Numatics thirty percent of theliability and Vertical Reality seventy percent. The judge thengranted Willner’s motion for attorney fees and costs pursuant tothe offer of judgement rule, Rule 4:58. Numatics appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed.The panel found that the trial judge’s jury instruction did notconstitute plain error because he correctly advised the jury onthe only evidence relevant to the manufacturing defect claim.The panel further held the judge’s award of attorney fees andcosts was proper because the jury’s verdict was sufficientlygreater than Willner’s offer to trigger sanctions pursuant toRule 4:58. We affirm the panel’s approval of the judge’s juryinstruction, albeit under a different standard of review,finding that the judge’s actions were harmless error. We 3 disagree with the panel, and reverse the imposition of sanctionson Numatics under the offer of judgment rule. It would beunfair to impose sanctions in a case where the only means for aparty to avoid sanctions would be to pay an amount greater thanthe jury’s verdict against that party, without advance notice ofthat consequence. I. A. In the summer of 2006, Willner was employed as a juniorcounselor at Ivy League in Manalapan. The camp offered a rockclimbing wall for its campers to use. The wall was manufacturedby Vertical Reality and contained parts produced by Numatics.Willner’s only responsibility in his role as junior counselorwith regard to the rock wall was to assist campers as they puton harnesses and helmets; the camp employed specialists toassist with climbing. On July 19, 2006, Willner was supervising a group ofcampers at the rock wall. After his group finished, he wasinvited by a specialist to climb as well. He strapped on aharness and helmet. His harness was inspected by thespecialist, and attached by a rope to an auto-belay system thatwas assembled by Vertical Reality and contained partsmanufactured by Numatics. 4 Willner ascended approximately fifteen feet up the wallbefore deciding to come down. When he pushed off the wall todescend, the rope initially supported his weight, but suddenlyand rapidly lost all of its tension after he heard a loud noise.Willner fell to the ground, fracturing his ankle. B. Willner, who was sixteen at the time of the incident, andhis parents filed a complaint against Ivy League, VerticalReality, and Numatics, alleging strict products liability,negligence, and per quod claims. After a period of discovery,Ivy League was granted summary judgment and dismissed from thecase. The remaining parties entered settlement negotiations andWillner made an offer of judgment to the defendants in theamount of $125,000, which he filed pursuant to Rule 4:58.Neither party responded to Willner’s offer. The claims against Vertical Reality and Numatics proceededto a jury trial. Willner’s strict liability claims againstdefendants were based on theories of design defect,manufacturing defect, and failure to warn. At trial, Willner presented an expert in safetyengineering, who testified that Vertical Reality’s design of theauto-belay system was inadequate for use on Ivy League’s rockwall. According to the expert, the system should have supported 5 the weight of a 250-pound person -- Willner’s approximate weightat the time of his accident. The expert testified that thecylinders specified in the designs of the auto-belay systemsupported 250 pounds per square inch. The expert furthertestified that, because the fall of a 250-pound person wouldcreate far more force than 250 pounds per square inch, the auto-belay system was inadequately designed. Willner’s expert also opined that Numatics’ cylinders weredefectively manufactured, containing “void”-filled retainers.Numatics produced an expert who testified that, despite thevoids found in the cylinders’ retainers, the retainers were“manufactured in a manner that was reasonably fit, suitable, andsafe for [their] ordinary and reasonably foreseeable purposes on[a] 250 PSI rated cylinder.” Throughout trial, evidence was submitted regardingNumatics’ conduct both before and after the incident. Thatevidence related to Numatics’ knowledge of its cylinders’deficiency, its failure to evaluate the safety of its products,and its failure to repair deficient cylinders already in use. Prior to summation, the court dismissed the design defectand failure to warn claims, allowing Willner to proceed only onhis strict liability claim of manufacturing defect againstNumatics. Although any need for evidence of Numatics’ conductwas thereby obviated, during summation, Vertical Reality’s 6 counsel again underscored Numatics’ alleged malfeasance in usingsubstandard parts in the construction of its cylinders “because[they were] cheaper.” Numatics objected and moved for amistrial. The trial court denied the mistrial motion, butinstructed the jury to disregard counsel’s comments concerningNumatics’ conduct, explaining that evidence of Numatics’ actionswas not relevant to the remaining issues in the case. Following summations, Numatics requested that the trialcourt give the following instruction to the jury regarding theapplicability of Numatics’ conduct in the context of Willner’smanufacturing defect claim: In a products liability case such as this one, negligence is not an issue for your consideration. You are not to focus on the conduct of the parties. Rather, the issue for your determination is on the condition of the products that have been alleged to be defective. . . . Likewise, if you find that a product is not defective, then you must find that in favor of that defendant as to plaintiff’s claim, regardless of that defendant’s conduct.The judge denied that proposal and instead provided aninstruction that substantially mirrored Model Jury Charges(Civil), 5.40B, “Manufacturing Defect” (2009): Plaintiff has made a manufacturing defect allegation against the Defendant, Numatics, alleging that the cast retainer that was on the cylinder at the time of the accident contained a void and was weaker and therefore rendered it defective. Numatics denies this claim. 7 Let me give you some applicable concepts when dealing with the claim of a manufacturing defect, and then I’ll explain what the Plaintiff must prove to establish a defect in manufacturing. So, a manufacturing defect may be established by proof that as a result of a defect or flaw, which happened during the production, or while in Defendant’s control, the product was unsafe and that unsafe aspect of the product was a substantial factor in causing the Plaintiff’s accident. To establish this claim for a manufacturing defect, the Plaintiff must prove the following elements by a preponderance of the credible evidence: that the cylinder contained a manufacturing defect, which made the product not reasonably safe. To determine if the cylinder had a manufacturing defect, you must decide what the condition of the cylinder as planned should have been according to Numatics’ design specifications or performance standards and what its condition was as it was made. If you find there’s no difference between these two conditions, then there’s no manufacturing defect. If there was a difference you must decide if that difference made the cylinder not reasonably safe for its intended or reasonably foreseeable uses. If the answer is yes, then you found the cylinder to be defective. Plaintiff need not prove that Numatics knew of the defect, nor that Numatics caused the defect to occur. Numatics’ attorney requested a meeting with the judge atsidebar for clarification during the judge’s reading of thatcharge, which the judge granted. The following conversationoccurred: 8 Counsel: I assume, Judge, that if you made the request in writing and you did not instruct it, there’s no way to reiterate it? . . . . Counsel: If we made a request in writing that was omitted, for example, the negligence language. There’s no need to address it any further at this point? You’ve ruled? The Court: I think I -- I thought I ruled on everything this morning? Counsel: Exactly. I just wanted to make sure. Thank you, Judge.No formal objections were made to the judge’s jury instructionas given. During jury deliberations, the judge rejected the jury’srequest for a written copy of the judge’s instructions, but re-read back his instruction related to the manufacturing defectclaim. The jury then sent a note to the judge, asking if it couldstill assign percentages of fault to both defendants if it foundthat Numatics’ cylinder was not manufactured defectively.Numatics’ counsel expressed concern, asserting that the jury’snote cast doubt on the jury’s “understanding of the law and itsapplication.” The judge answered the jury’s question in thenegative, instructing the jury that if it found that there wasno manufacturing defect in Numatics’ cylinder, it could not thenallocate any fault to Numatics. 9 The jury found that: Vertical Reality’s rock wall wasdesigned defectively and was a proximate cause of Willner’sfall; Vertical Reality provided inadequate warnings, which werea proximate cause of Willner’s fall; and Numatics’ product wasmanufactured defectively and was a proximate cause of Willner’sfall. The jury awarded Willner a total of $358,000, allocatingseventy and thirty percent liability to Vertical Reality andNumatics, respectively. Willner filed a notice of motion for attorney fees andcosts, pursuant to Rule 4:58, which Numatics opposed. Followinga hearing, the trial court awarded attorney fees of $62,963.00,costs of $12,160.83, and prejudgment interest of $115,727.70 asrequested pursuant to Rule 4:58. C. Numatics appealed to the Appellate Division, contesting thetrial judge’s failure to instruct the jury regarding the trialevidence related to its conduct and the award of attorney feesand costs under Rule 4:58. With respect to the latter issue,Numatics argued that the trial court erred in granting Willner’smotion for sanctions because its molded share of the totalverdict ($107,400) did not exceed 120% of Willner’s $125,000offer of judgment. The appellate panel affirmed in an unpublished per curiamopinion. 10 Concerning the part played by evidence of Numatics’ conductin the jury’s deliberations, the panel found that becauseNumatics did not request a limiting instruction at trial, thetrial court’s decision not to provide one should be reviewed forplain error. Employing that standard, the panel found that thetrial judge “provided the jury with a succinct and accurateinstruction” in response to the jury’s question regarding theinterplay between manufacturing defect and fault. The panelconcluded that the trial judge’s “pre- and post-deliberationinstructions were proper and appropriate and did not constituteerror, let alone plain error.” Finally, the panel found that our case law “does not compelthe use of molded judgments in determining” whether sanctionsshould be awarded under Rule 4:58. Rather, the panel relied onGonzalez v. Safe & Sound Security Corp., 185 N.J. 100, 124(2005), and found that the appropriate figure to compare withthe amount of the offer is “the amount of the jury’s verdict.”Accordingly, the panel found that because the jury verdict of$358,000 was greater than 120% of the $125,000 offer ofjudgment, the trial court’s award of fees and costs wasappropriate. Numatics filed a petition for certification with thisCourt, challenging: (1) the standard that the AppellateDivision employed in its review of the trial judge’s jury 11 instructions; (2) the trial court’s instructions; and (3) theaward of sanctions under Rule 4:58. We granted certification,231 N.J. 197 (2017), and amicus curiae status to the New JerseyAssociation for Justice (NJAJ). II. A. Numatics contests the Appellate Division’s plain errorreview of the trial court’s jury instruction. In doing so,Numatics rejects the Appellate Division’s finding that it “didnot object to the absence of a jury instruction as to thetreatment of conduct evidence in the jury charge, which it nowclaims requires a new trial.” Numatics believes that itscounsel’s jury charge request was sufficient to preserve theissue for appeal pursuant to Rule 1:7-2. Therefore, relying onPanko v. Flintkote Co., 7 N.J. 55 (1951), and Brown v. KennedyMemorial Hospital-University Medical Center, 312 N.J. Super. 579(App. Div. 1998), Numatics asserts that the Appellate Divisionshould have evaluated the trial court’s actions for “whether[they] created the potential for improper influences . . . onthe jury’s verdict[,] thereby requiring a new trial.” Numatics argues that this failure to deliver the requestedjury instruction led to confusion -- evidenced by the jury’squestion during deliberation -- and, ultimately, to a wrongfulverdict against it. According to Numatics, the proper inquiry 12 in a manufacturing defect claim focuses solely on the safety ofthe product, rather than the reasonableness of themanufacturer’s conduct. Thus, while Numatics concedes that“evidence of [its] conduct was conditionally relevant andthereby admissible at trial,” it stresses that, once the designdefect and failure to warn claims against it were dismissed, “itbecame incumbent upon the trial court and the parties to ensurethat the jury’s use of this information was limited to the scopeof this information’s relevance.” Finally, Numatics disputes the Appellate Division’s awardof attorney fees and costs under Rule 4:58. Numatics arguesthat under this Court’s decision in Wadeer v. New JerseyManufacturers Insurance Co., 220 N.J. 591 (2015), for thepurposes of offer of judgment sanctions, plaintiffs’ offersshould be compared to defendants’ actual, proportionateliability -- not the jury verdict in total. Numatics impressesthat “[a]ny other result would be incongruous, as it wouldsubject individual defendants to sanctions based on thecollective liability of all defendants, including those withdifferent legal and financial interests.” Therefore, Numaticscontends that because the jury’s verdict apportioned thirtypercent of the liability to Numatics, its share of the verdictwas $107,400 -- less than the $125,000 offer of judgment itself,let alone 120% greater than the same. 13 B. Willner urges the Court to affirm the Appellate Division’sopinion, first agreeing that plain error was the correctstandard to apply in reviewing the trial court’s juryinstructions regarding conduct evidence because Numatics’“counsel never objected to the [trial judge’s] instruction orrequested a limiting instruction.” Willner avers that becauseconduct evidence was, in fact, relevant to all facets of hisclaims at trial, the trial court’s instructions did not amountto reversible, plain error. Willner also notes that Wadeer was narrowly decided in theuninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) setting and thatNumatics mistakenly attempts to broaden the reach of thatdecision. Willner emphasizes that Gonzalez clearly dictatesthat the criteria for sanctions under Rule 4:58 compare thetotal jury verdict to the plaintiff’s total offer. Thus,Willner urges this Court to affirm the trial court’s impositionof attorney fees and costs. C. NJAJ supports Willner’s argument that the trial court andAppellate Division properly interpreted Rule 4:58 in imposingsanctions on Numatics. NJAJ highlights the plain language ofthe rule, which expressly compares “a monetary judgment” to theoffer. (quoting R. 4:58-1). NJAJ advises that “[i]f the Rule 14 was to apply to the judgment based upon fault, the plainlanguage should reflect that requirement.” NJAJ therefore urgesthis Court to adhere to our decision in Gonzalez, where we heldthat the amount of an offer is to be related to the jury’s fullverdict, rather than the amount of each defendant’s respectiveliability. NJAJ argues that, if we decide that a money judgment shouldbe allocated by the molded verdict’s percentage of fault, weshould similarly allocate the original offer by that percentageas well. NJAJ explains that Numatics would still be liable forsanctions under that framework because the portion of damagesfor which the jury found it liable ($107,400) exceeded 120% ofits thirty percent proportion of Willner’s offer ($45,000).Consequently, NJAJ recommends that we affirm the trial court’saward of attorney fees and costs. III. A. We address first the issue of the trial judge’s juryinstruction regarding evidence of Numatics’ conduct that wasadduced at trial. Strict products liability claims are governed by N.J.S.A.2A:58C-2, which provides that [a] manufacturer . . . shall be liable . . . if the claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that [a] product causing the harm 15 was not reasonably fit, suitable or safe for its intended purpose because it . . . deviated from the design specifications . . . of the manufacturer . . . or . . . failed to contain adequate warnings . . . or . . . was designed in a defective manner.Thus, strict liability claims can be brought by claimants underthree theories of liability: manufacturing defect, failure towarn, or design defect. A successful showing of the latter two theories necessarilyimplicates the defendant manufacturer’s conduct. Feldman v.Lederle Labs, 97 N.J. 429, 451 (1984) (“When the strictliability defect consists of an improper design or warning,reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct is a factor indetermining liability.”). Conduct evidence, however, is never relevant to a claim ofmanufacturing defect. Under that theory of strict productsliability, the only inquiry for the factfinder to make iswhether the product in question was assembled “in a substandardcondition based on the manufacturer’s own standards or identicalunits that were made in accordance with the manufacturingspecifications.” Myrlak v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 157 N.J. 84, 98 (1999). A factfinder’s sole responsibility in thosecases is to evaluate (1) the manufacturer’s designspecifications and (2) the actual condition of the product thatallegedly caused the claimant harm, and compare the two. 16 Numatics therefore argues that once the failure-to-warn anddesign-defect claims against it were dismissed at trial, thejudge should have issued a limiting instruction, explaining tothe jury that any evidence of Numatics’ conduct that wasproffered at trial was not relevant to the remaining claims.Numatics contends that the judge’s eventual jury instruction wasinsufficient and constituted reversible error because it causedjury confusion, as evidenced by the question posed duringdeliberation. Pursuant to Rule 1:7-2, in order to preserve an issue forappeal, “a party . . . shall make known to the courtspecifically the action which the party desires the court totake or the party’s objection to the action taken and thegrounds therefor.” Such an objection may be offered “in opencourt, in the absence of the jury.” R. 1:7-2. “Without an objection at the time a jury instruction isgiven, 'there is a presumption that the charge was not error andwas unlikely to prejudice the defendant’s case.’” State v.Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300, 320 (2017) (quoting State v. Singleton,211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012)). Therefore, “the failure to object toa jury instruction requires review under the plain errorstandard.” State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 473 (2007) (citingState v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534, 541 (2004)). Under that standard,“[a]ny error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate 17 court unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearlycapable of producing an unjust result.” R. 2:10-2. We haveheld that merely suggesting a jury instruction to the trialjudge is not sufficient to preserve an issue for appeal or topreclude plain error review -- the appealing party must haveobjected to the instruction as given to do so. Dynasty, Inc. v.Princeton Ins. Co., 165 N.J. 1, 17-18 (2000). When a party has brought an alleged error to the attentionof the trial court, though, the error “will not be grounds forreversal [on appeal] if it was 'harmless.’” State v. J.R., 227 N.J. 393, 417 (2017) (quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 338(1971)). An error cannot be harmless if there is “some degreeof possibility that [the error] led to an unjust result.” Statev. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 26 (2012) (alteration in original) (quotingState v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 330 (2005)). For an error to bereversible under the harmless error standard, “[t]he possibilitymust be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as towhether [the error] led the jury to a verdict it otherwise mightnot have reached.” Ibid. (quoting R.B., 183 N.J. at 330). B. With those principles in mind, we affirm the opinion of theAppellate Division with respect to the jury instruction issue. 18 Regarding the applicable standard of review, we disagreewith the appellate court and also reject Numatics’ request toadopt a standard unfounded in our case law. Numatics urges us to apply the holdings of Panko and Brownto review the trial judge’s instruction for whether itimproperly influenced the jury, resulting in jury confusion.But such an argument misconstrues the thrust of those cases. Inboth, the alleged impact on the jury’s verdict was created byextraneous sources. See Panko, 7 N.J. at 60 (granting new trialafter non-party placed telephone call to juror to obtain“information which would have a bearing on the verdict in thepending case”); Brown, 312 N.J. Super. at 589-91 (affirminggrant of new trial after exhibits not meant for jury were leftin jury room and viewed by jurors). As no such outsideinterference has been alleged here, that line of cases providesno guidance to our analysis in the instant appeal. The proper standards of review of jury instructions arewell-settled: if the party contesting the instruction fails toobject to it at trial, the standard on appeal is one of plainerror; if the party objects, the review is for harmless error. Although offering a jury instruction alone is not adequateto preserve an issue for appeal under Rule 1:7-2, Dynasty, 165 N.J. at 17-18, Numatics’ counsel did more than suggest a charge.Counsel also requested a sidebar with the judge after the jury 19 was instructed to confirm the judge’s decision not to adoptcounsel’s preferred charge and to confirm that no furtherobjection was necessary. We find that such a post-instructioncolloquy is sufficient to preserve Numatics’ right to contestthe charge on appeal pursuant to our rules. See R. 1:7-2. Thestandard of review for Numatics’ challenge is thus harmlesserror. Assessing Numatics’ argument through that lens, we holdthat the judge’s actions, if error, were harmless. It is clearthat while evidence of Numatics’ conduct was certainly germaneto Willner’s failure to warn and defective design claims, it wasrendered irrelevant by the dismissal of those causes of action.We agree with the Appellate Division that a limiting instructionwould have been appropriate at that time. However, in theabsence of such an instruction, the judge acted appropriately todirect the jury’s attention away from any newly irrelevantevidence of Numatics’ negligence. When Vertical Reality’scounsel highlighted Numatics’ misconduct in summation, the judgequickly instructed the jury that such evidence was not to beconsidered. Further, the judge’s adoption of the model chargefor Willner’s remaining manufacturing defect claim effectivelyinformed the jury of the only evidence necessary for itsdecision. Consequently, there was no genuine possibility that 20 the judge’s actions led the jury to reach a verdict it otherwisewould not have reached. We accordingly affirm the Appellate Division’s ruling onthe trial judge’s instruction. IV. We turn now to the trial court’s award of attorney fees andcosts. The offer of judgment rule, R. 4:58, was “designed . . . asa mechanism to encourage, promote, and stimulate early out-of-court settlement of . . . claims that in justice and reasonought to be settled without trial.” Schettino v. Roizman Dev.,Inc., 158 N.J. 476, 482 (1999) (quoting Crudup v. Marrero, 57 N.J. 353, 361 (1971)). To incentivize such pre-trialsettlement, “the rule imposes financial consequences on a partywho rejects a settlement offer that turns out to be morefavorable than the ultimate judgment” by a certain amount.Ibid. To invoke the rule, “any party may, at any time more than20 days before the actual trial date, serve on any adverseparty, without prejudice, and file with the court, an offer totake a monetary judgment in the offeror’s favor . . . for a sumstated therein.” R. 4:58-1(a). Generally, when a suit involves one plaintiff and onedefendant, “if the offer of a [plaintiff] is not accepted and 21 the [plaintiff] obtains a money judgment, in an amount that is120% of the offer or more,” the plaintiff shall be awardedsanctions, consisting of attorney fees, expenses, and costs ofsuit, including prejudgment interest, from the defendant fromthe time of the offer. R. 4:58-2(a). Conversely, in singleplaintiff-single defendant cases, when the defendant makes theoffer of judgment in accordance with Rule 4:58-1, if theplaintiff obtains a money judgment that is “favorable to the[defendant] as defined by this rule,” the defendant is awardedsanctions. R. 4:58-3(a). “A favorable determination . . .under this rule is a money judgment . . . in an amount . . .that is 80% of [defendant’s] offer or less.” R. 4:58-3(b). Rule 4:58-4(b) attempts to outline the respective sanctionsframework for offers of judgment made by plaintiffs in casesinvolving a single plaintiff seeking a joint and severaljudgment from multiple defendants. It deals particularly withthe role of counteroffers. Pursuant to that rule, if theplaintiff makes a global offer of judgment to all defendants anda single defendant makes a counteroffer of less than his prorata share of the plaintiff’s offer, calculated by dividing theamount of the plaintiff’s offer by the number of defendants inthe case, the defendant’s counteroffer cannot be deemed anacceptance of the plaintiff’s offer. R. 4:58-4(b). However, ifa single defendant makes a counteroffer “that is no less than” 22 80% of its share of an eventual jury verdict -- as determined bythe percentage of fault allocated by the jury -- it would be“inequitable” to impose sanctions on the counterofferingdefendant. Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt.6.1 on R. 4:58 (Pressler, cmt. 6.1); see also R. 4:58-4. The rule leaves unclear the circumstances triggering theimposition of sanctions on an individual defendant when a singleplaintiff makes a global offer to multiple defendants, there isno acceptance of the offer, and no counteroffer is made inresponse. Each of the parties in this case argues that either Wadeeror Gonzalez should govern our decision here because therationales guiding those decisions are applicable here. Butboth of those cases were decided in explicitly limitedcircumstances not present here. In Wadeer, we determined that comparing the amount of areduced verdict with an offer amount in the UM/UIM context wasinappropriate because the lessening of the verdict was performedby the judge to conform to the plaintiff’s insurance policy’slimit, not to “reflect allocation of liability.” 220 N.J. at 611. We held that any other outcome would contravene the aimsof Rule 4:58 because insurance carriers would have no incentiveto settle the case for an amount reasonably beneficial toplaintiffs, knowing that the amount measured against the offer 23 can only be as high as the policy limit. Ibid. Our reasoningwas similar in Gonzalez: in our Rule 4:58 sanctions inquiry, wedeclined to use a verdict that was artificially lowered by adecree of a bankruptcy court because doing so would disregardthe rule’s purpose of incentivizing settlement. 185 N.J. at 124-25. Here, Willner’s verdict was molded only by the jury’sapportioning of fault. Our analyses in Wadeer and Gonzalez aretherefore irrelevant. Moreover, neither of those cases directly addresses therequirements of Rule 4:58-4. They rely solely on the languageof Rule 4:58-2. See Wadeer, 220 N.J. at 611-12; Gonzalez, 185 N.J. at 124-25. Rule 4:58-2 provides for the award of fees andcosts to a plaintiff when the jury’s verdict is greater than120% of its offer to a defendant. Comparing the jury’s fullaward of damages to a plaintiff to a single plaintiff’s offer ofjudgment is uncomplicated. Doing the same in the joint andseveral liability setting is not. We have found that, in offering judgment to multipledefendants, “plaintiffs are permitted to act in respect of thetotal judgment.” Schettino, 158 N.J. at 483; Pressler, cmt. 6.1(“[T]he intention of R. 4:58-4 is to permit the [plaintiff] todeal exclusively in terms of the total judgment rather than torequire him to accept pro rata shares from individualdefendants.”). Forcing plaintiffs to negotiate individually 24 with defendants in settlement negotiations would create anunfair risk of settling with defendants that are ultimatelyfound by juries to be significantly liable, for a smaller amountthan the percentage of fault allocated to those defendants. Theonus of that risk would “shift to plaintiffs, when evaluatingthe fairness of a settlement offer, the burden of determining asingle defendant’s share of liability.” Schettino, 158 N.J. at 484. Thus, we have held that “plaintiffs need consider only anoffer to settle the entire liability on behalf of alldefendants.” Ibid. By the same token, mandating that individual defendantscontemplate global offers from a single plaintiff, as advancedby Willner, is problematic as well. Such a requirement wouldforce defendants who are likely less liable than their co-defendants to consider settling for an amount greater than theirindividual liabilities, simply to avoid significant sanctions. This case illustrates the problem. The jury awardedWillner a total of $358,000 and found Numatics thirty percentresponsible for those damages. Numatics’ molded share ofliability was therefore $107,400. Willner’s offer of judgmentwas for $125,000, presented to all defendants. Under Willner’sview, because the total verdict was greater than 120% of hisoffer, Numatics is liable for sanctions. This interpretationwould dictate that the only way Numatics could have escaped an 25 award of sanctions would have been to accept Willner’s globaloffer -- for an amount greater than the amount that Numatics wasultimately determined to be at fault. We find such an outcometo be unfair. Our offer of judgment rule must balance the competinginterests of plaintiffs and defendants. The effect of the offer of judgment rule and how it shouldoperate in this case is unclear. If the sanction of feeshifting is to be awarded, there must be advance notice of thatconsequence. Here, that did not happen. Consequently, it wouldbe improper to shift fees and costs in this circumstance. V. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the AppellateDivision with respect to the jury instruction, but reverse withrespect to the award of attorney fees and costs. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion. 26