Title: State v. Mercado
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2018AP002419-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 20, 2021

2021 WI 2 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP2419-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Angel Mercado, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 391 Wis. 2d 304,941 N.W.2d 835 
PDC No:2020 WI App 14 - Published  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 20, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 26, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Conen   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court.   
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Scott E. Rosenow, assistant attorney general; with whom 
on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an 
oral argument by Scott E. Rosenow. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Esther Cohen Lee, Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by 
Esther Cohen Lee.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Robert R. Henak, 
Ellen 
Henak, 
and 
Henak 
Law 
Office, 
S.C., 
Milwaukee.
2021 WI 2 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2018AP2419-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2016CF3679) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Angel Mercado, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JAN 20, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court.   
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   We review the court 
of 
appeals' 
decision1 
that 
reversed 
the 
circuit 
court's2 
conviction of Angel Mercado based on its determination that the 
video-recorded forensic interviews of Mercado's victims were 
inadmissible.  On appeal, the State urges us to reverse the 
court of appeals arguing that the victims' video-recorded 
                                                 
1 State v. Mercado, 2020 WI App 14, 391 Wis. 2d 304, 941 
N.W.2d 835. 
2 The Honorable Jeffrey A. Conen of Milwaukee County 
presided. 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
2 
 
forensic interviews were admissible under the normal procedures 
of Wis. Stat. §§ 908.08(1)-(6) (2017-18)3 or under the residual 
hearsay exception found in Wis. Stat. § 908.03(24) by way of 
Wis. Stat. § 908.08(7).  
¶2 
We conclude that Mercado forfeited several of his 
objections to the admissibility of the forensic interviews.  
Specifically, Mercado forfeited his contentions that:  (1) the 
circuit court erred by not watching the victims' forensic 
interviews in their entirety prior to admitting them and (2) the 
circuit court erred by permitting N.G. to testify prior to the 
jury watching her forensic interview.  Additionally, although 
Mercado objected to the admissibility of N.G.'s video-recording 
under Wis. Stat. §§ 908.08(2) and (3), we conclude that her 
video-recording is admissible under § 908.08(7), based on the 
residual hearsay exception found in Wis. Stat. § 908.03(24).  
Therefore, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
did 
not 
erroneously exercise its discretion when it admitted the three 
video-recorded 
forensic 
interviews 
during 
Mercado's 
trial.  
Accordingly, the court of appeals' decision is hereby reversed 
in full and has no precedential value.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Factual Background 
¶3 
Mercado was arrested in August of 2016 for sexually 
assaulting N.G., L.G. and O.G., who were ages four through seven 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
3 
 
at the time of the assaults.  The victims and their mother, 
C.C., lived with Mercado during that time.  C.C. had known 
Mercado since 2011 and she and her children moved in with him so 
that she could assist him with his day-to-day activities (e.g., 
banking, appointments, medication, etc.).  
¶4 
C.C. learned of the assaults on August 11, 2016, while 
she was driving with N.G., her youngest daughter.  After hearing 
a song lyric that went "I want to lick you up and down," N.G. 
said from the backseat "[t]hat's what he does."  C.C. asked N.G. 
who "he" was; N.G. told her "Viejo."  Viejo is Spanish for "old 
man" and is a nickname the victims and others used for Mercado. 
¶5 
When C.C. and N.G. returned home, C.C. asked L.G. if 
anyone had been touching her.  L.G. said yes.  She too told her 
mother that Mercado was the person who touched her.  Finally, 
C.C. waited for O.G., who at the time was out with Mercado, to 
return home.  She asked O.G. "has [Mercado] been touching you?"  
O.G. said that "[y]es he does" and that the last time it 
happened was "[t]he day before yesterday." 
¶6 
C.C. asked N.G. and L.G. where Mercado had touched 
them.  N.G. responded "down there" and pointed to "[h]er private 
area."  L.G. said to C.C. that "he's been touching them in their 
private area and licking them."  According to C.C., "private 
area" or "private part" are terms that the family uses to refer 
to the vagina area. 
¶7 
C.C. took all three girls to the hospital that night.  
The hospital staff did not find any physical evidence of the 
assaults; 
however, 
each 
victim 
individually 
repeated 
her 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
4 
 
allegations to the hospital staff.  For example, N.G., without 
being prompted, said "Viejo keeps licking me on my butt.  I hate 
him."  When asked why she was at the hospital, L.G. responded 
"To see if I'm ok.  Vie[j]o has been touching me everywhere." 
¶8 
On August 16, 2016, C.C. took N.G., L.G. and O.G. to 
the Sojourner Family Peace Center in Milwaukee where they 
underwent forensic interviews with Officers Patricia Klauser and 
Danillo Cardenas.  Before asking about what happened to them, 
the officers took the time to ascertain whether N.G., L.G. and 
O.G. understood the difference between right and wrong or the 
truth and a lie.   
¶9 
N.G. and L.G. initially had difficulty articulating 
that difference.  For example, Officer Cardenas asked N.G. "what 
happens when somebody says something that's wrong and an adult 
finds out about it?"  N.G. said she did not know.  N.G. also 
said it would be both wrong and "not wrong" to call a pillow a 
wall.  Conversely, when asked if she thought it was important to 
tell what is right, N.G. nodded affirmatively.   
¶10 Likewise, L.G. initially told Officer Klauser it would 
be the truth if someone said that Officer Klauser's black pants 
were red.  L.G. also said that she did not know if it was 
important to "tell what really happened."  However, she said it 
would be "wrong" if someone said that Klauser's pants were red 
when they were black.   
¶11 O.G. told Officer Klauser that kids who lie at school 
get "put . . . in time-out."  She also stated that it would be a 
lie to say that Officer Klauser's black pants were red.  
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
5 
 
¶12 During N.G.'s forensic interview, she told Officer 
Cardenas that "[Viejo] . . . always . . . touch[ed] [them]" and 
that Mercado licked her and L.G. "on the butt."  Officer 
Cardenas showed N.G. a body diagram and had her point to where 
Mercado touched her.  She pointed to the buttocks on the 
diagram, and Officer Cardenas circled the spot of the diagram 
that corresponded with N.G.'s response.  
¶13 Officer Klauser interviewed L.G. and O.G.  Similar to 
N.G., L.G. told Officer Klauser that "[Viejo] touched [her] in 
[her] butt and [her] 'pee-pee', and on [her] two 'T-T's[']."  
She 
told 
Officer 
Klauser 
that 
"[Viejo] 
comes 
in 
[her] 
room . . . and then he walked [her] in the basement-then he 
pulled [her] pants down."  Officer Klauser showed L.G. a similar 
body diagram and had L.G. put an 'X' wherever Mercado touched 
her.  L.G. drew an 'X' on the chest, pubic area and buttocks of 
the diagram.  
¶14 Finally, O.G. told Officer Klauser that Mercado "was 
touching [her] everywhere.  And he did [it to] [her] two little 
sisters."  Specifically, O.G. said that Mercado was "touching 
[her] in . . . the private part" and that Mercado's hands were 
"[u]nder [her] clothes."  As with L.G., O.G. told Klauser that 
the assaults happened in the basement of their home.  Officer 
Klauser also had O.G. put an 'X' on the diagram.  She drew an 
'X' on the pubic area of the body diagram. 
¶15 The State filed a criminal complaint against Mercado 
based upon the information obtained during the victims' forensic 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
6 
 
interviews.  After learning of the criminal complaint against 
him, Mercado surrendered to law enforcement. 
B.  Procedural Posture 
¶16 The State charged Mercado with two counts of first 
degree sexual assault of a child, sexual intercourse with a 
child under 12 years old contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(b) 
and one count of first degree sexual assault of a child, sexual 
contact with a child under 16 years old contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(1)(d).4  
¶17 Before trial began, the State, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.08(2)(a), informed Mercado and the circuit court of its 
intent to introduce the video-recordings of the victims' 
forensic interviews into evidence.  In a pretrial hearing 
regarding the video-recordings' admissibility, Mercado objected 
to the introduction of N.G.'s and L.G.'s video-recordings.  
Specifically, Mercado alleged that N.G. "evinces in this 
interview . . . zero ability to be able to tell the examiner the 
difference between truth and a lie."  Mercado raised the same 
objection regarding L.G.  The State disagreed.  It acknowledged 
that "[N.G.] does have some trouble with the examples that she's 
given."  Nonetheless, the State argued that the video-recording 
showed that she understood the importance of telling the truth.  
                                                 
4 While the jury was deliberating, the State moved to amend 
count one to first degree sexual assault of a child, sexual 
contact with a child under 13 years old contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(1)(e). 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
7 
 
Mercado did not object to the introduction of O.G.'s forensic 
interview.  
¶18 The court agreed to watch "the first few minutes of 
each of the videos" to determine whether N.G. and L.G. 
understood the difference between the truth and a lie as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 908.08(3)(c).  The State also cited a 
portion of N.G.'s video-recording wherein N.G. corrects one of 
Officer Cardenas's statements as "important context" for her 
understanding.  The court agreed to watch that portion of the 
video-recording as well.  
¶19 After reviewing the "relevant portions" of the video-
recordings, 
the 
court 
determined 
that 
N.G. 
had 
"some 
acknowledgement of knowing what it means to tell the truth and 
what it means to not tell the truth."  Similarly, the court 
determined that "there's far more in [L.G.'s] interview that 
goes toward the importance of telling the truth."  Therefore, 
the court allowed the State to introduce both video-recordings.  
Mercado again raised an objection to N.G.'s video-recording at 
this juncture; he did not renew his objection to L.G.'s video-
recording.  The court overruled Mercado's objection.  
¶20 Mercado's case continued to trial in January of 2017.5  
There, the State introduced the video-recordings of their 
                                                 
5 The court declared a mistrial in Mercado's initial trial 
because the translators involved would not have been able to 
translate the forensic interviews in real time for Mercado.  The 
court ordered the videos be transcribed before the case moved 
forward. 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
8 
 
forensic interviews which were admitted into evidence.6  The 
State also provided the jury with transcripts of the videos.  
Mercado did not object to either O.G.'s or L.G.'s video-
recordings.  After each video, the State called each victim to 
the stand to testify.   
¶21 L.G. testified consistent with what she told her 
mother, what she told Nurse Susan Kanack at the hospital and 
with what she said during her forensic interview.  Specifically 
she testified that "[Mercado] was pulling our pants down, 
pulling mine down, and then he was doing stuff to our private 
parts."  She clarified that "stuff" meant licking.  When asked 
why she put Xs on the drawing during her interview L.G. 
responded, "Because he was doing nasty stuff."  She testified 
that "he" meant Viejo——Mercado. 
¶22 O.G. had a more difficult time on direct examination; 
she said she was scared.  However, she made it clear that she 
remembered Officer Klauser, made Xs on the drawing, and told 
Klauser the truth when they talked.  On cross-examination O.G. 
reiterated that she was told to tell the truth and that she 
talked to Officer Klauser about Mercado. 
¶23 Finally, and before the State showed N.G.'s video-
recording, the court called N.G. to "get her to speak loudly 
enough and to respond to everyone's questions."  Mercado did not 
object to the order of testimony, but moved to prevent N.G. from 
                                                 
6 The State also introduced each victim's body diagram and 
their medical records without objection. 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
9 
 
testifying "because she's not a competent witness because of the 
truth and lack-of-truth issue."  The court overruled Mercado's 
motion stating that "[t]here's no such thing as competent 
witnesses anymore . . . it's up to the jury."  Thereafter, 
Mercado agreed to "give it a try and see where it goes."  The 
court stated that "[i]f there's some indicia of understanding of 
telling the truth, some, then I think that becomes an issue for 
credibility issues."   
¶24 The court called N.G. to the stand and entered into 
the following colloquy with her: 
THE COURT:  . . . do you know the difference 
between the truth and a lie? 
[N.G.]:  No. 
THE COURT:  Do you know what a lie is?  A lie is 
when you say something that's not right.  Do you 
understand that? 
[N.G.]:  (Nods.) 
THE COURT:  Okay, good.  I'm going to ask you 
just a few questions, and you just help me out with 
what you know, okay?  If I said that I was wearing a 
green robe, is that right or not? 
[N.G.]:  No. 
THE COURT:  It's not right?  Why? 
[N.G.]:  Because it's not. 
. . . .  
THE COURT:  Is it green? 
[N.G.]:  No, black. 
THE COURT:  It's black? 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
10 
 
[N.G.]:  Yeah.  
THE COURT:  Okay.  So that is a lie that this is 
green, right?  Yes or no? 
[N.G.]:  No. 
THE COURT:  Is it true that this is green? 
[N.G.]:  No. 
THE COURT:  Okay, so then it must be a lie, 
right?  Yes? 
[N.G.]:  Yes. 
¶25 The State asked N.G. several similar questions to 
ascertain her ability to comprehend the difference between the 
truth and a lie.  This attempt continued when the trial resumed 
the next morning.  The court entered into a colloquy with N.G. 
that resembled the one it entered into the day before.  This 
time, N.G. answered yes to the court's question "[y]ou have to 
tell us the truth, right?"  She also said yes when asked if she 
promised to tell the truth.  On direct examination, she said 
that she remembered talking to Officer Cardenas and that she had 
seen him before. 
¶26 On cross-examination N.G. answered "no" to most of 
defense counsel's questions regarding whether she remembered 
Officer Cardenas or told him "serious stuff."  Mercado argued 
that this obviated any meaningful opportunity for cross-
examination.  The court disagreed with Mercado noting its 
concern was that N.G. would not answer any questions on the 
stand at all.  The court stated, "Meaningful opportunity for 
cross-examination means ask questions and whatever answers there 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
11 
 
are, those are the answers that everyone's stuck with with that 
particular witness . . . ."  The court told Mercado's trial 
counsel that she would have an opportunity for further cross-
examination after the video was shown to the jury.  The jury 
then heard testimony from Officer Cardenas and watched N.G.'s 
video-recording.  Despite being afforded the opportunity, 
Mercado did not request any further examination of N.G. after 
the jury saw her video.  
¶27 Mercado moved to dismiss the charge related to N.G. 
"based on the statements on the witness stand and the statements 
in the video."  The court denied the motion finding that a prima 
facie case had been made and N.G.'s statements on the stand came 
down to credibility.  The jury returned a guilty verdict on all 
counts. 
¶28 Mercado subsequently moved to vacate his convictions.  
Mercado alleged the circuit court made several errors during 
trial.  He alleged that the circuit court erred by (1) not 
watching the three forensic interviews in their entirety before 
admitting them into evidence; (2) conflating N.G.'s ability to 
testify as a credible witness with the truthfulness requirement 
of Wis. Stat. § 908.08(3)(c); (3) permitting N.G. to testify 
before her forensic interview was played for the jury; and 
(4) admitting the transcripts of the forensic interviews because 
they were not certified.  The State argued that the court met 
the statutory requirements of Wis. Stat. §§ 908.08(2) and (3) 
and, even if it had not, all three videos were admissible under 
Wis. Stat. § 908.08(7) via the residual hearsay exception found 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
12 
 
in Wis. Stat. § 908.03(24).  The State further argued that 
N.G.'s video was admissible as a prior inconsistent statement 
and any error in admitting the transcript was harmless.  The 
court agreed with the State and denied Mercado's motion for 
postconviction relief.  
¶29 Mercado appealed to the court of appeals reprising his 
postconviction arguments.  The court of appeals agreed with 
Mercado.  It held that the circuit court contravened Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.08(2)(b) by not watching the forensic interviews in their 
entirety before admitting them into evidence.  State v. Mercado, 
2020 WI App 14, ¶41, 391 Wis. 2d 304, 941 N.W.2d 835.  It also 
held that N.G. and L.G. did not demonstrate the requisite 
understanding of truthfulness for the court to have satisfied 
§ 908.08(3)(c).  Id., ¶44.  Further, it held that the circuit 
court erred in the order in which it received evidence under 
§ 908.08(5)(a).  Id., ¶57.  It held that the circuit court, 
under State v. James, 2005 WI App 188, 285 Wis. 2d 783, 703 
N.W.2d 727, was not permitted to allow N.G. to testify prior to 
playing her video-recording.  Mercado, 391 Wis. 2d 304, ¶57.  
Finally, the court of appeals held that because the circuit 
court did not comply with §§ 908.08(2) and (3), the video-
recordings were not admissible as residual hearsay and N.G.'s 
video-recording was not a prior inconsistent statement.  Id., 
¶49. 
¶30 The 
State 
contended 
that 
Mercado 
forfeited 
his 
objections related to O.G. and L.G. because he did not timely 
object to the admission of either O.G.'s or L.G.'s video-
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
13 
 
recording.7  In a footnote, the court of appeals chose not to 
apply 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 901.03(1)(a) 
forfeiture 
to 
Mercado's 
objections because it believed the rule to be one of judicial 
administration.  Id., ¶32 n.6. 
¶31 We granted the State's petition for review.  On 
review, we determine:  (1) whether Mercado forfeited all of his 
objections relating to O.G. and L.G. and one argument related to 
N.G. by not raising them at trial, in his postconviction motion 
or 
on 
appeal, 
and 
(2) whether 
N.G.'s 
video-recording 
is 
admissible under the residual hearsay exception.  We also 
determine the proper interpretation of Wis. Stat. §§ 908.08(2) 
and (5).  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶32 Whether a party properly preserved an objection for 
purposes of appeal is a question of law that we review 
independently.  State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, ¶9, 593 
N.W.2d 427 (1999).  Questions of statutory interpretation are 
questions of law that we review independently.  State v. 
Wiskerchen, 2019 WI 1, ¶16, 385 Wis. 2d 120, 921 N.W.2d 730. 
                                                 
7 As it related to Mercado's contention that the circuit 
court did not make the requisite finding of L.G.'s understanding 
of the truth under Wis. Stat. § 908.08(3)(c), the State argued 
on appeal that, although Mercado preserved the issue by 
objecting in the pretrial hearing, he did not raise that issue 
on appeal and therefore conceded the circuit court's finding.  
The dissent agreed that Mercado conceded that point.  See 
Mercado, 391 Wis. 2d 304, ¶94 (Fitzpatrick, J., dissenting).  
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
14 
 
¶33 Whether 
N.G.'s 
video-recording 
is 
admissible 
as 
residual hearsay requires us to apply Wis. Stat. § 908.03(24) to 
undisputed facts; that is a question of law that we review 
independently.  See Warehouse II, LLC v. DOT, 2006 WI 62, ¶4, 
291 Wis. 2d 80, 715 N.W.2d 213.  Further, we "will not reverse a 
lower court decision where that court has exercised its 
discretion based on a mistaken view of the law if the facts and 
their application to the proper legal analysis support the lower 
court's conclusion."  State v. Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d 226, 250, 
421 N.W.2d 77 (1988). 
B.  Forfeiture 
¶34 We first examine whether Mercado forfeited all of his 
objections as they relate to O.G. and L.G. and one objection as 
it relates to N.G. by not objecting at trial, raising an issue 
in his postconviction motion or raising an issue on appeal.  If 
Mercado did forfeit his objections, the State argues that the 
court of appeals erred by directly reviewing and reversing the 
alleged errors to which Mercado did not object.  We conclude 
that, under Wis. Stat. § 901.03(1), Mercado forfeited several of 
his objections by either not raising them during his trial or 
raising an issue on appeal.  First, Mercado did not object to 
the court's showing of O.G.'s video-recording at any stage until 
he moved for postconviction relief.  Additionally, although 
Mercado objected to the admissibility of L.G.'s video-recording 
during a pre-trial hearing, he did not renew his Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.08(3)(c) argument relating to L.G. on appeal to the court 
of appeals.  Finally, Mercado did not object to the court 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
15 
 
permitting 
N.G.'s 
testimony 
prior 
to 
showing 
her 
video-
recording.8 
¶35 Forfeiture occurs when a party fails to raise an 
objection.9  State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶30, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 
761 N.W.2d 612.  We have espoused important reasons why courts 
should abide by the forfeiture rule.  Those rules include, for 
example, allowing circuit courts to correct errors in the first 
instance, providing circuit courts and parties with fair notice 
of an error and an opportunity to object, and preventing 
"attorneys from 'sandbagging' errors" by not raising them during 
trial and alleging reversible error upon review.  State v. 
Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶12, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727. 
¶36 In the context of admitting or denying admission of 
evidence, forfeiture is contemplated by statute.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 901.03(1) provides that, "Error may not be predicated 
upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of a party is affected and . . . [i]n case the 
ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion 
to strike appears of record . . . ."  Two things are required 
                                                 
8 Mercado also failed to object to the admission of the non-
certified transcripts of the victims' forensic interviews.  
However, the court of appeals did not reach a conclusion on that 
argument, Mercado, 391 Wis. 2d 304, ¶59 n.9, and Mercado did not 
renew that argument before us.  Therefore, we do not address the 
transcripts.  
9 Forfeiture, the failure to assert a claimed right, is to 
be distinguished from "waiver," which occurs when a party 
affirmatively relinquishes a right.  State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, 
¶¶31-32, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612. 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
16 
 
before 
an 
appellate 
court 
may 
reverse 
evidentiary 
errors:  (1) the violation of a party's substantial right10 and 
(2) an objection or motion to strike.   
¶37 In this context, reviewing courts generally are 
limited to three exceptions to the forfeiture rule.  First, Wis. 
Stat. § 901.03(4) permits reversal of unobjected-to errors when 
a reviewing court finds plain error.11  Additionally, appellate 
courts may reverse unobjected-to errors in the interest of 
justice or due to ineffective assistance of counsel.12  See Wis. 
                                                 
10 When a circuit court erroneously admits evidence that 
affects a substantial right of a party and the party benefitted 
fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the admitted 
evidence did not contribute to the verdict, reversible error may 
occur.  State v. Monahan, 2018 WI 80, ¶33, 383 Wis. 2d 100, 913 
N.W.2d 894.   
11 Plain errors are those that are "so fundamental that a 
new trial or other relief must be granted."  Virgil v. State, 84 
Wis. 2d 166, 191, 267 N.W.2d 852 (1978) (citation omitted).  
"[T]he plain-error doctrine should be reserved for cases where 
there is the likelihood that the erroneous introduction of 
evidence has denied a defendant a basic constitutional right."  
State v. Sonnenberg, 117 Wis. 2d 159, 178, 344 N.W.2d 95 (1984). 
12 Although provisions relating to forfeiture are codified 
in Wis. Stat. § 901.03, forfeiture, as a doctrine of judicial 
administration, is grounded in common law.  See Village of 
Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶¶15-16, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 
N.W.2d 190.  It is common law that permits appellate review of 
unobjected-to errors in certain circumstances.  See, e.g., State 
v. Counihan, 2020 WI 12, ¶¶28, 32, 390 Wis. 2d 172, 938 N.W.2d 
530 (permitting review of an unobjected-to error due to 
ineffective assistance of counsel).  The legislature must 
explicitly abrogate common-law exceptions in the text of the 
statute if it intends to change the common law.  Waukesha Cnty. 
v. Johnson, 107 Wis. 2d 155, 162, 320 N.W.2d 1 (1982) ("The 
canons of construction provide that a statute does not abrogate 
or change any principle or rule of common law unless it is so 
clearly expressed as to leave no doubt of the legislature's 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
17 
 
Stat. § 752.35 (discretionary reversal when it appears that the 
full controversy has not been fully tried or there is a 
miscarriage of justice); State v. Avery, 2013 WI 13, ¶38, 345 
Wis. 2d 407, 826 N.W.2d 60 ("The supreme court and the court of 
appeals may set aside a conviction through the use of our 
discretionary reversal powers"); see also State v. Erickson, 227 
Wis. 2d 758, 768, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999) (declining to reach a 
forfeited issue but rather "analyz[ing] the [forfeiture] within 
the ineffective assistance of counsel framework").  
¶38 Upon a review of the record, we cannot identify a 
single instance during the trial in which Mercado objected to 
O.G.'s video-recording; he therefore forfeited his objection in 
regard to its admissibility.  In addition, although he objected 
to L.G.'s video-recording during a pretrial hearing, he did not 
renew his objection in his postconviction motion or during 
appellate proceedings.13  Finally, even when Mercado objected to 
                                                                                                                                                             
intent." (footnote omitted)).  
13 Mercado is correct that he properly preserved his 
challenge to L.G.'s video-recording for purposes of appeal by 
objecting 
during 
his 
pre-trial 
hearing. 
 
See 
State 
v. 
Bustamante, 201 Wis. 2d 562, 571, 549 N.W.2d 746 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(holding that a defendant need not renew at trial an objection 
that the defendant lodged against a motion in limine in order to 
properly preserve it for appeal).  However, he did not raise 
that issue in his postconviction motion or before the court of 
appeals.  The State argues that because Mercado did not dispute 
the State's forfeiture argument on appeal, Mercado conceded the 
argument.  In his dissenting opinion, Judge Fitzpatrick agreed.  
We agree as well.  When a party does not respond to an argument, 
we may deem that argument conceded.  Waukesha Cnty. v. S.L.L., 
2019 WI 66, ¶42, 387 Wis. 2d 333, 929 N.W.2d 140. 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
18 
 
the admission of N.G.'s video-recording under Wis. Stat. 
§§ 908.08(2) and (3), he did not contend it was error for N.G. 
to testify before her video until he moved for postconviction 
relief.  Once again, he failed to bring this evidentiary matter 
to the circuit court's attention in a timely manner, thereby 
forfeiting his objection.  We are uncertain why the court of 
appeals chose to ignore the multiple forfeitures in this case.  
To 
the 
extent 
that 
there 
are 
defenses 
related 
to 
the 
admissibility of O.G.'s and L.G.'s video-recordings, we conclude 
Mercado forfeited those arguments and there was therefore no 
error in the circuit court admitting either video-recording. 
¶39 However, having reached the above conclusion, we must 
nevertheless address Wis. Stat. § 908.08 because the court of 
appeals chose to ignore forfeiture and to directly review and 
reverse based on the alleged errors.  In so doing, the court of 
appeals misinterpreted subsections of § 908.08. 
C.  Wisconsin Stat. §§ 908.08(2) and (5) 
¶40 As an out-of-court statement, a child's statement 
during a forensic interview is hearsay if it is offered at trial 
for the truth of the matter asserted.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.01(3).  However, "an out-of-court statement, even though 
hearsay, may be admissible if it fits within a recognized 
exception to the hearsay rule."  Virgil v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 
166, 185, 267 N.W.2d 852 (1978).   
¶41 Video-recordings 
of 
a 
child's 
statements 
are 
admissible if the child is available to testify and the child's 
statements fall into one of the provisions of Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
19 
 
§ 908.08.  The statutory exception serves the important purpose 
of 
"'minimiz[ing] 
the 
mental 
and 
emotional 
strain 
of 
[children's] participation [at trial].'"  State v. Snider, 2003 
WI App 172, ¶13 n.6, 266 Wis. 2d 830, 668 N.W.2d 784 (quoting 
1985 Wis. Act 262, § 1).  In addition, the legislature enacted 
§ 908.08 to "make it easier, not harder, to employ videotaped 
statements of children in criminal trials and [other] related 
hearings."  Id., ¶13.  It is with this background in mind that 
we discuss § 908.08's requirements. 
1.  Viewing Wis. Stat. § 908.08 Video-Recordings 
¶42 When a party introduces a child's statement in a 
video-recording, the offering party and the court must comply 
with the procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 908.08(2)(a) and 
(b).  First, the party intending to introduce a child's recorded 
statement "shall file . . . an offer of proof" that shows 
certain information relating to the video and provide that offer 
of proof to other parties.  § 908.08(2)(a).  Next, the court 
"shall conduct a hearing on the statement's admissibility [and] 
[a]t or before the hearing, the court shall view the statement."  
§ 908.08(2)(b).  Finally, at the hearing, "the court . . . shall 
rule 
on 
objections 
to 
the 
statement's 
admissibility."  
§ 908.08(2)(b).   
¶43 Determining how much of a child's video-recording that 
a circuit court is required to review under Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.08(2)(b) 
requires 
us 
to 
interpret 
§ 908.08(2)(b).14  
                                                 
14 We agree with the State that "statements" would not 
include portions of videos such as a black screen with no audio, 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
20 
 
Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the 
statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  If the plain 
language is clear, we stop the inquiry.  Id., ¶45.  "Statutory 
language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, 
except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are 
given their technical or special definitional meaning."  Id.  
When statutory language is ambiguous, we go beyond the plain 
language.  Id., ¶47.  The court of appeals determined that the 
plain language of § 908.08(2)(b) requires a circuit court to 
review a child victim's recording in its entirety before 
admitting it into evidence.  We disagree.   
¶44 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.08(2)(b) requires a circuit 
court to conduct a hearing on the "statement's admissibility."  
In Wis. Stat. ch. 908, the word "statement" is defined using 
general terms.  A statement is "(a) an oral or written assertion 
or (b) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the 
person as an assertion."  Wis. Stat. § 908.01(1).  This general 
definition does not help us in interpreting the question 
presented, which is whether the circuit court is obligated to 
review everything that is said on a recording or some lesser 
amount.  Instead, to answer that question, we look beyond the 
general definition of "statement" and look to the context in 
                                                                                                                                                             
static, or video of an empty room, but that is not where the 
contest is here. 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
21 
 
which the term "view the statement" is used to determine the 
scope of Wis. Stat. § 908.08(2)(b). 
¶45 The context in which a statutory term appears is 
important to its meaning.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  The 
term, "statement," appears preceding Wis. Stat. § 908.08(3), 
which sets criteria for admitting the recording of what a child 
has said.  Those statutory criteria require the circuit court to 
make specific findings about the child, the verity of the 
recording and the lack of surprise to the opposing party.  
Therefore, we interpret the extent of what a circuit court must 
view in § 908.08(2)(b) in light of the obligations that 
§ 908.08(3) places on the circuit court.  Stated otherwise, the 
scope of the court's review under § 908.08(2)(b) is driven by 
the obligations the court must satisfy in § 908.08(3).  
¶46 Recordings 
of 
children's 
testimonies 
will 
differ 
depending on the facts of the case and the attributes of the 
child.  Therefore, the circuit court will need to exercise its 
discretion in determining how much of each recording it must 
review under Wis. Stat. § 908.08(2)(b) in order to be able to 
make the findings required by § 908.08(3).  Here, the circuit 
court fulfilled its § 908.08(2) obligations because it viewed 
the amount of the video-recordings necessary to make § 908.08(3) 
findings, 
and 
therefore, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
court 
appropriately exercised its discretion in deciding not to review 
the entire recording.    
¶47 Accordingly, we decline to adopt the court of appeals' 
bright-line rule that a circuit court must view a Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
22 
 
§ 908.08 video-recording in its entirety in every case.  Rather, 
the decision on how much of a § 908.08 video-recording a circuit 
court is to review is limited to those portions necessary to 
make the requisite findings under Wis. Stat. § 908.08(3); this 
is a discretionary decision made on a case-by-case basis.  See, 
e.g., State v. Huntington, 216 Wis. 2d 671, ¶18, 575 N.W.2d 268 
(1998) (noting that the excited utterance hearsay exception is 
fact-dependent and declining to create a bright-line rule for 
that exception).   
2.  Child Witnesses Testimony 
¶48 We also determine the appropriate interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 908.08(5) as it relates to the order in which 
circuit courts receive testimony.  Here, the court of appeals 
held that the circuit court erred by permitting N.G. to testify 
before the jury saw her video.  Again, we disagree.  The purpose 
of § 908.08(5)(a) is to direct what happens immediately after a 
child's recorded forensic interview is shown, not what happens 
before that showing.   
¶49 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.08(5)(a) states: 
If the court or hearing examiner admits a recorded 
statement under this section, the party who has 
offered the statement into evidence may nonetheless 
call the child to testify immediately after the 
statement is shown to the trier of fact.  Except as 
provided in par. (b), if that party does not call the 
child, the court or hearing examiner, upon request by 
any other party, shall order that the child be 
produced immediately following the showing of the 
statement to the trier of fact for cross-examination. 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
23 
 
Whether this statute precludes a circuit court from permitting a 
child to testify prior to the showing of the child's video-
recording is a matter of statutory interpretation.   
¶50 We conclude that the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.08(5)(a) relates to what occurs immediately after a 
child's recorded statement is shown.  It does not affect what 
happens 
before 
the 
video-recording 
is 
presented 
because 
§ 908.08(5)(a) says nothing about events preceding the finder of 
fact viewing such a video-recording.  It permits the offering 
party to "call the child to testify immediately after the 
statement is shown to the trier of fact."  Upon the request of 
another party, § 908.08(5)(a) requires that "the court or 
hearing examiner . . . shall order that the child be produced 
immediately following the showing of the statement . . . for 
cross-examination."  Notably absent from either of those 
sentences is any reference to what testimony should or should 
not occur prior to showing the video-recording.  As such, we 
decline to accept the court of appeals' proffered limitation.  
See County of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶33, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 
N.W.2d 571 ("We will not read into the statute a limitation the 
plain language does not evidence.").  As § 908.08(5)(a) does not 
control what occurs prior to the finder of fact viewing a video-
recording of a child's statement, we conclude that permitting 
N.G. to testify beforehand fell under the circuit court's 
general authority to reasonably control the "mode and order 
of . . . presenting evidence" under Wis. Stat. § 906.11. 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
24 
 
¶51 Here, the court of appeals said that it found support 
for its conclusion in its opinion in State v. James.  See 
Mercado, 391 Wis. 2d 304, ¶57.  We are unpersuaded.  In James, 
the court of appeals was not asked whether a child may testify 
before his or her video-recording is shown.  Rather, the court 
was 
tasked 
with 
determining 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it refused to show a 
child's video-recording before the child testified based on the 
circuit court's concern that if the child subsequently refused 
to say anything on the stand a Crawford violation would occur 
thereby requiring the court to declare a mistrial.15  James, 285 
Wis. 2d 783, ¶4.  The court of appeals reversed the circuit 
court and held that the statutory procedure of having a child 
witness available to testify at trial after the video-recording 
is shown was a nondiscretionary obligation.  Id., ¶12.  The 
court of appeals held that the statutory procedure satisfies the 
Confrontation Clause as long as the child testifies.  Id., ¶11.   
¶52 We agree with this interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.08(5)(a).  However, it does not follow that a child is not 
permitted to testify before his or her video-recording simply 
because a child witness is not required to do so.  We agree with 
the court of appeals statement in James that § 908.08(5)(a) 
"does not impermissibly interfere with the functioning of the 
judiciary and constitutes an appropriate exercise of shared 
                                                 
15 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
25 
 
judicial and legislative power," and therefore, the circuit 
court was required to follow § 908.08(5)(a).  Id., ¶¶20, 25.   
¶53 To the extent that James has been interpreted as 
concluding that Wis. Stat. § 908.08(5)(a) precludes circuit 
courts from also calling a child witness before a video-
recording is shown, that interpretation is erroneous.  James did 
not so hold.  Section 908.08(5)(a) is limited to the procedure a 
circuit court must follow after a child's recorded statement is 
shown to the trier of fact. 
D.  The Residual Hearsay Exception 
¶54 Finally, we address the admissibility of N.G.'s video-
recording under the residual hearsay exception, Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.03(24).  We begin by addressing whether N.G.'s video-
recording is admissible under Wis. Stat. § 908.08(7).   
¶55 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.08(7) permits circuit courts to 
admit a child's recorded statement "that is hearsay and is 
admissible under this chapter as an exception to the hearsay 
rule."  When a party introduces a child's video-recording under 
§ 908.08(7), the video-recording's admissibility is not limited 
by the requirements of §§ 908.08(2) and (3).  Snider, 266 
Wis. 2d 830, ¶12.  Here, the applicable hearsay exception is the 
residual hearsay exception found in Wis. Stat. § 908.03(24).  
The residual hearsay exception permits the admission of "[a] 
statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing 
[hearsay] 
exceptions 
but 
having 
comparable 
circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness."  § 908.03(24).   
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
26 
 
¶56 We have set out five factors that courts look to in 
determining whether a video-recording of a child's statement 
meets circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness:  
First, the attributes of the child making the 
statement should be examined, including age, ability 
to communicate verbally, to comprehend the statements 
or questions of others, to know the difference between 
truth and falsehood, and any fear of punishment, 
retribution or other personal interest, such as close 
familial relationship with the defendant, expressed by 
the child which might affect the child's method of 
articulation or motivation to tell the truth.  
Second, the court should examine the person to 
whom the statement was made, focusing on the person's 
relationship to the child, whether that relationship 
might 
have 
an 
impact 
upon 
the 
statement's 
trustworthiness, and any motivation of the recipient 
of the statement to fabricate or distort its contents. 
Third, the court should review the circumstances 
under which the statement was made, including relation 
to the time of the alleged assault, the availability 
of a person in whom the child might confide, and other 
contextual factors which might enhance or detract from 
the statement's trustworthiness. 
Fourth, the content of the statement itself 
should be examined, particularly noting any sign of 
deceit or falsity and whether the statement reveals a 
knowledge of matters not ordinarily attributable to a 
child of similar age.  
Finally, other corroborating evidence, such as 
physical evidence of assault, statements made to 
others, and opportunity or motive of the defendant, 
should be examined for consistency with the assertions 
made in the statement.  
Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d at 245-46.  Courts are to consider the 
facts of each particular case and "no single factor [should] be 
dispositive of a statement's trustworthiness."  Id. at 246. 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
27 
 
¶57 Upon consideration of the Sorenson factors in this 
case, we conclude that N.G.'s statement has circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness such that it is admissible under 
the residual hearsay exception.    
¶58 First, N.G. was four years old at the time of the 
assaults.  As we stated in Sorenson, "a child at such a young 
age is unlikely to review an incident of sexual assault and 
calculate the effect of a statement about it."  Id.  N.G.'s age 
"tend[s] to support the veracity of [her] report of sexual 
abuse" by Mercado.  Id.  Additionally, she had a close 
relationship with Mercado having lived with him and spent time 
with him outside of the house.  See Huntington, 216 Wis. 2d 671, 
¶25 ("[T]he defendant and Jeri maintained essentially a father-
daughter relationship since she was three years old."); see also 
Snider, 266 Wis. 2d 830, ¶18 (noting that the victim "thought of 
Snider as an uncle").  Finally, despite N.G.'s difficulty 
explicitly stating that she understood the difference between 
the truth and a lie, "[c]onfusion and unresponsiveness under 
these circumstances may be accorded less weight . . . unless 
deliberate falsity is otherwise shown."  Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d 
at 247.  So, although she had trouble articulating the 
difference between the truth and a lie, there is simply no 
evidence that N.G. deliberately fabricated her statement.  The 
first Sorenson factor weighs in favor of admitting the video-
recording. 
¶59 Second, N.G. made her statement to a police officer.  
Similar to the social worker in Sorenson to whom the victim made 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
28 
 
her statement, Officer Cardenas had experience conducting these 
types of forensic interviews and did not appear to utilize 
coercive interviewing techniques.16  Id. at 247-48 (noting that 
the social worker "had experience with counseling and child 
sexual abuse cases" and that we perceived no evidence of a 
motive to coerce the victim to inculpate her father).  He 
interviewed her in his official capacity as a police officer.  
See Huntington, 216 Wis. 2d 671, ¶28.  We detect no motive to 
coerce N.G. to implicate Mercado nor any motive to have her 
fabricate her assertions.  Officer Cardenas's relationship with 
N.G. weighs in favor of admitting N.G.'s video-recording.   
¶60 Third, the circumstances under which N.G. made her 
statement support its reliability.  Again, N.G. made her 
statement during a one-on-one interview with a police officer at 
a neutral location.  Additionally, although difficult to 
pinpoint, the timing of the statement in relation to the 
assaults is at least a neutral factor.  The assaults occurred 
between June and August of 2016.  This puts her statement in a 
range of potentially a few days to one or two months after the 
assaults.17  As we noted in Sorenson, "Contemporaneity and 
                                                 
16 Officer Cardenas testified that he has been working for 
the sensitive crimes division of the Milwaukee Police Department 
for "approximately five years" and has conducted "close to 200" 
forensic interviews with children ages 4-12. 
17 O.G. told her mother that the last assault happened "the 
day before yesterday."  This was in August.  N.G.'s medical 
record indicates that the last assault occurred on August 9, 
2016.  However, it does not appear from the record that N.G. 
explicitly indicated a date range wherein the assaults occurred, 
and the State acknowledged that "it seems unclear when exactly 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
29 
 
spontaneity of statements are not as crucial in admitting 
hearsay statement[s] of young sexual assault victims under the 
residual exception."  Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d at 249; see also 
Huntington, 216 Wis. 2d 671, ¶30 (noting that a two-week period 
between the assault and the statement did not detract from its 
trustworthiness).  Accordingly, we conclude that the potential 
several 
week 
delay 
in 
reporting 
does 
not 
undercut 
the 
truthfulness of N.G.'s statement.  
¶61 Fourth, the content of N.G.'s statement further 
supports its trustworthiness.  As we stated in Sorenson, "A 
young child is unlikely to fabricate a graphic account of sexual 
activity because it is beyond the realm of his or her 
experience."  Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d at 249.  N.G. told Officer 
Cardenas that Mercado "licked [her] on [her] butt."  She also 
demonstrated knowledge appropriate for her age, saying for 
example that her butt is used "to pee" and using the term "butt" 
for both her buttocks and genitals.  Based on the manner in 
which she described the assaults, the content of her statement 
appears to be free from adult manipulation.  See Snider, 266 
Wis. 2d 830, ¶18. 
¶62 Fifth, 
there 
is 
circumstantial 
evidence 
that 
corroborates N.G.'s statement to Officer Cardenas.  We note at 
the outset that there was not physical evidence of the assaults, 
which is to be expected given the nature of the assaults.  
                                                                                                                                                             
the 
assaults 
began 
in 
relation 
to 
when 
the 
disclosures 
happened." 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
30 
 
Huntington, 216 Wis. 2d 671, ¶32.  Rather, we conclude there is 
corroborating evidence in the consistency of N.G.'s statements.  
Specifically, N.G. offered nearly identical statements to her 
mother and to Nurse Kanack.  In both circumstances she was 
unprompted and offered these statements voluntarily.  As noted 
in the facts of this case, she told her mother about the assault 
after hearing a song lyric.  Nurse Kanack testified that N.G. 
"blurted . . . out spontaneously" that "Viejo keeps licking me 
on my butt; I hate him."  Additionally, O.G. and L.G. 
acknowledged that Mercado assaulted all three of them.  We 
conclude that these surrounding statements are sufficient to 
corroborate N.G.'s statement to Officer Cardenas. 
¶63 In assessing all five Sorenson factors, we conclude 
that 
there 
are 
sufficient 
circumstantial 
guarantees 
of 
trustworthiness to permit N.G.'s statement to be admitted under 
the residual hearsay exception.18 
¶64 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
otherwise. 
 
It 
determined that factors one and four were fatally missing.  
Mercado, 391 Wis. 2d 304, ¶49.  The court of appeals held the 
first factor was not met because N.G. did not demonstrate that 
she understood the difference between the truth and a lie.  Id.  
                                                 
18 Because we conclude that N.G.'s video-recording is 
admissible under the residual hearsay exception, we need not 
settle whether the circuit court correctly found that N.G. 
understood the importance of telling the truth.  See Maryland 
Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 
786 N.W.2d 15 ("Issues that are not dispositive need not be 
addressed.").  For the same reason, we do not address whether 
N.G.'s video was admissible as a prior inconsistent statement.  
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
31 
 
The court of appeals also held that by not watching the video-
recordings in their entireties, the circuit court could not have 
made a determination that the statements were free from 
indications of falsity contrary to the requirements of the 
fourth factor.  Id. 
¶65 The court of appeals rationale is flawed for at least 
two reasons.  First, the court of appeals combined the 
requirements 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 908.08(2), 
(3) 
and 
(7).  
Specifically, it held that N.G. did not demonstrate the 
requisite level of truthfulness "as required by the first 
factor."  Id.  This conflates the first Sorenson factor with the 
child's understanding of the importance of telling the truth, 
found in § 908.08(3)(c).  As outlined above, veracity of 
reporting is to be considered under the first factor; however, 
circuit courts are to examine other attributes of the child as 
well.  Next, the court of appeals held that "by not reviewing 
the videos in their entirety prior to admitting them, the trial 
court did not fully comply with the fourth . . . factor relating 
to the content of the statement and whether there are 
indications that the information is false."  Id.  Once again, 
this conclusion injects a requirement that is unnecessary in a 
§ 908.08(7) analysis.   
¶66 As the court of appeals previously explained in 
Snider: 
[T]he plain language of Wis. Stat. § 908.08(7) permits 
the admission of a child's videotaped statement under 
any applicable hearsay exception regardless of whether 
the requirements of subsections (2) and (3) have been 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
32 
 
met.  Section 908.08(1) permits the admission of a 
"videotaped oral statement of a child who is available 
to testify, as provided in this section."  The 
remaining subsections of the statute provide two ways 
for the statement to be admitted "as provided in this 
section."  The first is by meeting the various 
requirements set forth in subsections (2) and (3).  If 
these requirements are met, the court "shall admit the 
videotape statement," § 908.08(3), and it need not 
consider any other grounds for admitting a statement.  
Alternatively, a court "may also admit into evidence a 
videotape oral statement of a child that is hearsay 
and is admissible under this chapter as an exception 
[to] the hearsay rule."  Section 908.08(7).  This 
language can only be read to mean that, if a child's 
videotape statement is admissible under one of the 
hearsay exceptions set forth in Wis. Stat. § 908.03, 
the requirements listed in the preceding subsections 
of § 908.08 are inapplicable.   
Snider, 266 Wis. 2d 830, ¶12 (emphasis in original).  We agree 
with Snider's conclusion.  Section 908.08 provides two methods 
by which a party may introduce a child's video-recording.  By 
requiring a video-recording to satisfy subsections (2) and (3) 
despite the plain language of subsection (7), the court of 
appeals read one of the two modes of admission out of the 
statute.  "Statutory language is read where possible to give 
reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  
Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 
633, 
¶46. 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals' 
interpretation violates this principle. 
¶67 The second flaw in the court of appeals' discussion is 
that, assuming arguendo that factors one and four were not met 
here, the court of appeals did not weigh the missing factors 
against the ones it appeared to conclude were present.  Its 
opinion merely makes the conclusory statement that factors one 
and four were not met and the circuit court therefore erred in 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
33 
 
admitting the video-recording as residual hearsay.  Mercado, 391 
Wis. 2d 304, ¶49.  As we explained in Sorenson, no single factor 
is dispositive.  The court of appeals should have considered all 
five factors and made its decision based on the comparative 
weights it gave to all of the Sorenson factors.  Even if some 
portions of some of the factors were missing, there was other 
evidence that overwhelmingly supports admitting the video-
recording.19   
¶68 For all of the above reasons, we conclude that N.G.'s 
video-recording was admissible as residual hearsay and the court 
of 
appeals' 
statutory 
interpretation 
and 
analysis 
were 
incorrect.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶69 We conclude that Mercado forfeited several of his 
objections to the admissibility of the forensic interviews.  
Specifically, Mercado forfeited his contentions that:  (1) the 
circuit court erred by not watching the victims' forensic 
interviews in their entirety prior to admitting them, and 
(2) the circuit court erred by permitting N.G. to testify prior 
to the jury watching her forensic interview.  Additionally, 
although Mercado objected to the admissibility of N.G.'s video-
                                                 
19 As with Sorenson, N.G.'s statement was admitted under a 
different hearsay exception.  However, we "will not reverse a 
lower court decision where that court has exercised its 
discretion based on a mistaken view of the law if the facts and 
their application to the proper legal analysis support the lower 
court's conclusion."  State v. Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d 226, 250, 
421 N.W.2d 77 (1988). 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
34 
 
recording under Wis. Stat. §§ 908.08(2) and (3), we conclude 
that her video-recording is admissible under § 908.08(7) based 
on 
the 
residual 
hearsay 
exception 
found 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 908.03(24).  Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court did 
not erroneously exercise its discretion when it admitted the 
three video-recorded forensic interviews during Mercado's trial.  
Accordingly, the court of appeals' decision is hereby reversed 
in full and has no precedential value. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
No. 
2018AP2419-CR   
 
 
 
1