Title: New Jersey v. Dor
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: April 25, 2018

New Jersey v. Dor Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court’s review centered on whether defendant Todd Dorn’s right to a grand jury presentment under the New Jersey Constitution was violated when the trial court permitted the State, on the eve of trial, to increase the charge in count two of defendant’s indictment from a third-degree to a second-degree drug offense. The Court also considered whether it was proper for the trial court to admit into evidence a copy of a map showing that defendant’s home was within 500 feet of public housing, a public park, or public building. The Supreme Court concluded the amendment to count two of defendant’s indictment was a violation of defendant’s right to grand jury presentment under the New Jersey Constitution, and remanded the conviction on count two to the trial court. The Court also found defendant waived his right to object to the map’s authentication. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) State v. Todd Dorn (A-54-16) (078399)Argued January 16, 2018 -- Decided April 25, 2018SOLOMON, J., writing for the Court. The Court is called upon to determine whether defendant Todd Dorn’s right to a grand jury presentment under the New Jersey Constitution was violated when the trial court permitted the State, on the eve of trial, to increase the charge in count two of defendant’s indictment from a third-degree to a second-degree drug offense. The Court also considers whether it was proper for the trial court to admit into evidence a copy of a map showing that defendant’s home was within 500 feet of public housing, a public park, or public building. Following a surveillance, police executed a stop of defendant’s vehicle and arrested defendant for drug distribution. Defendant signed two consent-to-search forms, one permitting police to enter and search defendant’s home and one permitting police to search defendant’s vehicle. Police found nothing during the subsequent vehicle search, but they did find thirty-five glassine baggies in the house that contained “a white powdery substance believed to be heroin.” Police also found 75.01 grams, or 2.65 ounces, of marijuana in defendant’s home. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1(a) provides that the possession of more than one ounce of marijuana with the intent to distribute within 500 feet of public housing, a public park, or public building is a second-degree offense. An Atlantic County Grand Jury indicted defendant for second-degree possession of heroin with the intent to distribute within 500 feet of public housing, a public park, or public building, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (count one); third-degree possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute within 500 feet of public housing, a public park, or public building, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (count two); third-degree distribution of heroin (count three); third-degree possession of heroin with the intent to distribute (count four); third-degree possession of one or more ounces of marijuana with the intent to distribute (count five); and fourth-degree possession of more than fifty grams of marijuana (count six). Defendant rejected the State’s pretrial plea offer and instead chose to proceed to trial. According to defendant, he rejected the State’s plea offer because it was his understanding that his maximum sentencing exposure was twenty years’ imprisonment with a ten-year period of parole ineligibility. One day before trial, the State moved to amend count two of the indictment from third-degree possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute within 500 feet of public housing, a public park, or public building, to a second- degree offense. The trial court granted the State’s motion. During the presentation of the State’s case, the prosecutor offered into evidence, through the testimony of an officer involved in the investigation, a copy of a “zone map for drug[,] DUI[,] and weapon free zones and public housing.” Defense counsel objected to the map’s admission into evidence on the grounds that (1) the map was a copy and (2) the State should have provided a copy of the map with a raised seal. In response, the trial court stated, “I personally don’t think it’s necessary to bring in the city engineer. Having said that, since this is a copy, although I think copies are allowable, if you insist, I’m not going to object to that, I’ll just say, okay, you got to do it.” Defense counsel did not accept the trial court’s offer to require the State to produce the city engineer and merely renewed his objection to the admission of the copy into evidence. The trial court admitted the map under N.J.R.E. 902. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s conviction, finding that count five of the indictment put defendant on notice that he stood accused of possessing more than one ounce of marijuana, a second-degree offense, notwithstanding the “administrative or clerical” error by which count two was designated as a third-degree charge. Thus, the Appellate Division found no error in permitting the amendment to count two. The panel also rejected defendant’s claim that the map’s admission into evidence violated his right to confrontation, noting that the issue was raised for the first time on appeal and that defendant failed to demonstrate that the map’s admission was “clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” 1 The Court granted certification on two issues: whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the map; and whether defendant’s right to a grand jury indictment was violated when the trial court permitted the prosecutor to amend the indictment and expose defendant to greater criminal liability. 229 N.J. 622 (2017).HELD: The amendment to count two of defendant’s indictment was a violation of defendant’s right to grand jury presentment under the New Jersey Constitution. Defendant waived his right to object to the map’s authentication.1. When the State attempted to move the map into evidence at trial, defense counsel objected only on the ground that the map presented in court was a copy of the official map and that the State should have to produce a copy with a raised seal or the original. Defense counsel then failed to accept the trial court’s offer to require that the State produce the city engineer. Defense counsel never objected to the map as testimonial, or claimed its admission without proper authentication violated defendant’s right to confrontation. The objection put forth was based only on admission of a copy rather than the original. The Court does not reach plain error review, however, because defendant waived any objection to the map’s authenticity or to the fact that it is a copy when defense counsel did not accept the trial court’s offer to require the State to bring in the city engineer to testify, and instead proceeded as if the offer had never been made. It is a longstanding principle that litigants may waive objections through inaction. (pp. 10-13)2. The New Jersey Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on the presentment or indictment of a grand jury.” N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 8. That right is satisfied where the indictment informs the defendant of the offense charged against him, so that he may adequately prepare his defense, and is sufficiently specific both to enable the defendant to avoid a subsequent prosecution for the same offense and to preclude the substitution by a trial jury of an offense which the grand jury did not in fact consider or charge. To meet those criteria, an indictment must allege all the essential facts of the crime. Thus, the State must present proof of every element of an offense to the grand jury and specify those elements in the indictment. A “court may amend the indictment . . . to correct an error in form or the description of the crime intended to be charged . . . provided that the amendment does not charge another or different offense from that alleged.” R. 3:7-4. But the court may not do so where an amendment goes to the core of the offense or where it would prejudice a defendant in presenting his or her defense. (pp. 13-16)3. The degree of a crime is an essential element that must be included in the indictment. In State v. Catlow, the defendant was charged with robbery in an indictment that did not provide any degree of offense; over the defendant’s objection, the trial court instructed the jury on first-degree robbery. 206 N.J. Super. 186, 194-95 (App. Div. 1985). The Appellate Division reversed because it “consider[ed] determination of the degree of a crime to be an essential element of the grand jury function” and, even though the State presented evidence that the grand jury heard testimony relating to a first-degree offense, the robbery count of the indictment provided no facts or statutory language demonstrating that the State had provided to the grand jury sufficient evidence of a first-degree charge. Ibid. (pp. 16-18)4. Here, the other counts of the indictment did not put defendant on notice that he would have to defend against a higher-degree offense than the one charged. Although the count five charge apprised defendant that he would defend against allegations of third-degree possession of more than one ounce of marijuana, nothing on the face of that count of the indictment connected that fact to the count two charge. Similarly, while count one refers to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1, it charges second-degree possession with the intent to distribute heroin, not the marijuana charged in count two. Thus, this case is analogous to Catlow. When determining how best to mount a defense, defendants regularly consider whether to accept or reject a plea offer. Defendant was entitled to have that information in hand when deciding whether to accept or reject the State’s plea offer. Therefore, failing formally to apprise defendant of the State’s intent to seek conviction on a second-degree offense in count two until the day before trial began prejudiced defendant. (pp. 18-21)5. The trial court improperly permitted the State to amend count two of the indictment from a third-degree to a second- degree offense because the amendment was substantive and because defendant was prejudiced by the amendment. See R. 3:7-4. For that reason, the conviction as to count two must be amended to reflect that defendant was convicted of the offense on which he was indicted—a third-degree offense—and defendant must be resentenced on that count. (p. 21) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ- VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 54 September Term 2016 078399STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.TODD DORN, Defendant-Appellant. Argued January 16, 2018 – Decided April 25, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Rochelle Watson, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Rochelle Watson, of counsel, and Kevin G. Byrnes, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). Lila B. Leonard, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Lila B. Leonard, of counsel and on the brief). JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court. We are called upon to determine whether defendant ToddDorn’s right to a grand jury presentment under the New JerseyConstitution was violated when the trial court permitted theState, on the eve of trial, to increase the charge in count twoof defendant’s indictment from a third-degree to a second-degree 1 drug offense. We are also asked whether it was proper for thetrial court to admit into evidence a copy of a map showing thatdefendant’s home was within 500 feet of public housing, a publicpark, or public building. Defendant was indicted for various drug-related offenses,including two counts of second-degree possession of a controlleddangerous substance (CDS) with the intent to distribute within500 feet of public housing, a public park, or public building.The first count related to defendant’s possession of heroin, asecond-degree offense, and the second count related todefendant’s possession of seventy-five grams of marijuana,listed in the indictment as a third-degree charge. The daybefore the trial began, the trial court, over defendant’sobjection, permitted the State to amend the second count indefendant’s indictment from a third-degree to a second-degreecharge, citing administrative error. At trial, the State submitted -- and the trial courtadmitted into evidence -- a copy of a map showing thatdefendant’s home was within 500 feet of public housing, a publicpark, or public building. Defendant objected to the admissionof the map on the ground that it was a copy without a raisedseal. We conclude that the amendment to count two of defendant’sindictment was a violation of defendant’s right to grand jury 2 presentment under the New Jersey Constitution, and we remand theconviction on count two to the trial court. We also find thatdefendant waived his right to object to the map’sauthentication. I. The facts contained in the appellate record reveal thatAtlantic City Police Sergeant Richard Andrews was patrolling thearea of 615 Green Street, a public housing complex wheredefendant lived. Andrews saw a Jeep parked in front of the homeand a person, later identified as Jamie Guth, walking toward thefront door. As Andrews drove past the Jeep in his marked policecar, the driver of the Jeep appeared nervous. The driver thendrove around the block and eventually returned to the GreenStreet home where Guth re-entered the Jeep. The Jeep drove off,and Andrews radioed other officers in the area who pulled theJeep over. When Guth exited the Jeep, an officer saw a brick of heroin1protruding from Guth’s bra. Officers arrested Guth and, inaddition to the heroin, found green glassine baggies stampedwith the word “Thriller.” Officers later interviewed Guth whostated that she had purchased the heroin from a man she knew as1 A brick of heroin is fifty bags. 3 “Ty.” Guth identified a photograph of defendant as Ty, the manfrom whom she had purchased the heroin. Thereafter, police began surveillance of the Green Streethome. During the surveillance, police saw defendant and a womanleave the home and drive away. They followed defendant andeventually executed a stop of defendant’s vehicle and arresteddefendant for drug distribution. The arresting officers told defendant that the officerswere in the process of applying for a search warrant for hishome. According to the officer, defendant responded that “therewas no need to do all that, that [defendant] just had a littlein the house and he would take [him] to it.” Defendant signedtwo consent-to-search forms, one permitting police to enter andsearch defendant’s home and one permitting police to searchdefendant’s vehicle. Police found nothing during the subsequentvehicle search, but they did find thirty-five glassine baggiesin the house with “Thriller” stamped on them; the baggiescontained “a white powdery substance believed to be heroin.”Police also found 75.01 grams of marijuana2 in defendant’s home.2 75.01 grams equals 2.65 ounces. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1(a) provides that the possession of more than one ounce of marijuana with the intent to distribute within 500 feet of public housing, a public park, or public building is a second-degree offense, whereas the possession of less than one ounce of marijuana under the same circumstances is a third-degree offense. 4 An Atlantic County Grand Jury indicted defendant forsecond-degree possession of heroin with the intent to distributewithin 500 feet of public housing, a public park, or publicbuilding, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (count one); third-degree possession of marijuana with the intent to distributewithin 500 feet of public housing, a public park, or publicbuilding, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (count two); third-degree distribution of CDS (heroin), contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(3) (count three); third-degree possession ofheroin with the intent to distribute, contrary to N.J.S.A.2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(3) (count four); third-degree possessionof one or more ounces of marijuana with the intent todistribute, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(11)(count five); and fourth-degree possession of more than fiftygrams of marijuana, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3) (countsix).3 Defendant rejected the State’s pretrial plea offer of afive-year term of imprisonment with a two-and-a-half year periodof parole ineligibility and instead chose to proceed to trial.According to defendant, he rejected the State’s plea offer3 The Appellate Division panel noted that, initially, the grand jury had indicted defendant on “various CDS offenses,” but that the grand jury had returned a superseding indictment thereafter. The charges laid out here reflect those included in the superseding indictment. The original indictment does not appear in the record. 5 because it was his understanding that his maximum sentencingexposure was twenty years’ imprisonment with a ten-year periodof parole ineligibility. One day before trial, the State moved under Rule 3:7-4 toamend count two of the indictment from third-degree possessionof marijuana with the intent to distribute within 500 feet ofpublic housing, a public park, or public building, to a second-degree offense. The prosecutor claimed that: if you take it in conjunction with the grand jury transcripts which I have where they talk about the quantity, and additionally count [five] of the indictment where it is clear the marijuana is over one ounce, the defendant is placed on notice, it is a second-degree offense. It is an error in form, not an error in substance.Defense counsel argued that elevating the charge to a second-degree offense was a substantive alteration, not merely analteration in form. The trial court granted the State’s motion and amendedcount two of the indictment from a third-degree offense to asecond-degree offense. The court stated, They are not amending the substance of the charge at all. There is and I am satisfied a typographical error in that it is a second- degree, and while it would have been preferable to include in the body of that count the amount of marijuana. From reading count [five], it’s clear that the grand jury had information that they believed to be credible, so that they returned count [five] 6 which specifically indicates the quantity of over one ounce. During the presentation of the State’s case, the prosecutoroffered into evidence, through the testimony of an officerinvolved in the investigation, a copy of a “zone map for drug[,]DUI[,] and weapon free zones and public housing.” According tothe officer’s testimony, the map “designate[d] 500 square feetaround a public park, a public housing facility, a publicbuilding,” and “recreational sites.” Defense counsel objectedto the map’s admission into evidence on the grounds that (1) themap was a copy and (2) the State should have provided a copy ofthe map with a raised seal. In response, the trial courtstated, “I personally don’t think it’s necessary to bring in thecity engineer. Having said that, since this is a copy, althoughI think copies are allowable, if you insist, I’m not going toobject to that, I’ll just say, okay, you got to do it.” Defensecounsel did not accept the trial court’s offer to require theState to produce the city engineer and merely renewed hisobjection to the admission of the copy into evidence. The trialcourt found that the document was “self-authenticating” andadmitted the map under N.J.R.E. 902. At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, defendant movedto dismiss counts one and two, charging defendant withpossession of heroin and marijuana with the intent to distribute 7 within 500 feet of public housing, a public park, or publicbuilding, arguing that the map should not have been admittedbecause it did not bear a raised seal. The court denied themotion, and the jury convicted defendant on all six counts inthe indictment, including the amended second-degree offense incount two. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s conviction,finding that count five of the indictment put defendant onnotice that he stood accused of possessing more than one ounceof marijuana, a second-degree offense, notwithstanding the“administrative or clerical” error by which count two wasdesignated as a third-degree charge. Thus, the AppellateDivision found no error in permitting the amendment to counttwo. The panel also rejected defendant’s claim that the map’sadmission into evidence violated his right to confrontation,noting that the issue was raised for the first time on appealand that defendant failed to demonstrate that the map’sadmission was “clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” The panel vacated defendant’s sentence on count one andremanded the matter for resentencing and a determination as towhether the sentences under counts one and two should beconcurrent or consecutive. On remand, the court sentenceddefendant to ten years’ imprisonment with a five-year term ofparole ineligibility on count one and a concurrent ten-year term 8 of imprisonment with a five-year ineligibility term for counttwo. The court declined to impose a discretionary extended-termsentence for count one. This Court granted certification on two issues: [(]1) whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a map identifying areas within 500 feet of public parks and buildings; and [(]2) whether defendant’s right to a grand jury indictment was violated when the trial court permitted the prosecutor to amend the indictment and expose defendant to greater criminal liability. [ 229 N.J. 622 (2017).] II. A. As to the admission of the map, defendant asserts that thisCourt’s decision in State v. Wilson, 227 N.J. 534 (2017), shouldapply here and that the State failed to provide anyauthenticating testimony or evidence beyond the certification ofthe map’s engineer, which was insufficient. Regarding the amendment of count two, defendant argues thatthe trial court bypassed the grand jury’s function under the NewJersey Constitution when it permitted the State to amend theindictment to reflect a higher degree of crime without firstconsulting the grand jury. Defendant also contends that thetrial court’s decision in this case violates Rule 3:7-4, whichpermits courts to modify indictments to correct errors in form 9 as long as the defendant has adequate notice of the allegationsand defendant will not be prejudiced by the amendment.Defendant asserts that he was entitled to know the full extentof his penal exposure when he decided to proceed to trial.Defendant therefore asks this Court to remand count two for newproceedings or for entry of an amended judgment of convictionfor third-degree, rather than second-degree, possession with theintent to distribute. B. The State argues that Wilson is not applicable and that theState properly authenticated the map through an investigatingofficer’s testimony under the pre-Wilson rule. The State also claims that the indictment, taken as awhole, put defendant on notice that the third-degree charge incount two was a typographical error. The State reminds theCourt that count five charged defendant with having over twoounces of marijuana in his possession, and count one chargeddefendant with second-degree possession with the intent todistribute under the same statute for the heroin found in hishome. III. We begin our discussion by dispensing with defendant’sassertion, purportedly relying on Wilson, that the State failedto provide any authenticating testimony or evidence beyond the 10 certification of the map’s engineer, which was insufficient. InWilson, the State produced testimony by a detective from theprosecutor’s office who was unable to testify to the map’saccuracy. Id. at 540. The defendant objected, arguing that themap was testimonial hearsay and that its admission violated hisconfrontation rights because the State did not produce a witnesswho had either prepared the map or could testify to itsaccuracy. Id. at 541-42. This Court held that such maps arenot self-authenticating, id. at 553, and explained that“[p]roper authentication of the map require[s] a witness who[can] testify to its authenticity and be cross-examined on themethodology of the map’s creation and its margin of error,”ibid. (citing State v. Simbara, 175 N.J. 37, 47-48 (2002)). Here, defendant failed to timely object to the map’sauthentication. When the State attempted to move the map intoevidence at trial, defense counsel objected only on the groundthat the map presented in court was a copy of the official mapand that the State should have to produce a copy with a raisedseal or the original. In response, the trial court stated thatalthough a copy is permissible, he could require the State toproduce the city engineer to testify. Defense counsel thenfailed to accept the trial court’s offer to require that theState produce the city engineer. Instead, defense counsel 11 merely renewed his objection to the admission of the copy intoevidence. Defense counsel never objected to the map as testimonial,or claimed its admission without proper authentication violateddefendant’s right to confrontation. The objection put forth wasbased only on admission of a copy rather than the original. Weconclude, therefore, that defendant failed to raiseauthentication of the map under Wilson as an issue before thetrial court. Because defense counsel did not object on the sameground on which he challenges the admission of the map beforethis Court, we would ordinarily review the admission of the mapfor plain error. See State v. Nunez, 436 N.J. Super. 70, 76(App. Div. 2014). We do not reach plain error review, however, because wefind that defendant waived any objection to the map’sauthenticity or to the fact that it is a copy when defensecounsel did not accept the trial court’s offer to require theState to bring in the city engineer to testify, and insteadproceeded as if the offer had never been made. It is alongstanding principle that litigants may waive objectionsthrough inaction. See Agnew v. Campbell’s Adm’rs, 17 N.J.L. 291, 298 (Sup. Ct. 1839) (Dayton, J., concurring) (noting thatcounsel could, “by their silence” and failure to call sealingjudge to testify, waive their objection to, and therefore their 12 right to test, authenticity of judicial seal placed on bill ofexceptions); accord State v. T.J.M., 220 N.J. 220, 231 (2015)(finding objection waived where counsel raised “tepid complaint”of prosecutorial misconduct before trial court and then, whentrial court “expressly” discussed issue with counsel, “droppedthe topic and began to argue another issue instead”). Here, counsel’s objection was lacking as to theauthentication of the map, see Wilson, 227 N.J. at 534, and thedefense failed to avail itself of the opportunity to test theauthenticity of the map offered by the trial court. Wetherefore find that counsel waived any objection as to the map’sauthentication. IV. A. We now turn to whether defendant’s right to a grand juryindictment was violated when the trial court permitted theprosecutor to amend count two of the indictment. The New Jersey Constitution provides that [n]o person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on the presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases of impeachment, or in cases now prosecuted without indictment, or arising in the army or navy or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger. [N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 8.] 13 This Court has stated that the right is satisfied where theindictment “inform[s] the defendant of the offense chargedagainst him, so that he may adequately prepare his defense,”State v. LeFurge, 101 N.J. 404, 415 (1986) (quoting State v.Lefante, 12 N.J. 505, 509 (1953)), and is “sufficientlyspecific” both “to enable the defendant to avoid a subsequentprosecution for the same offense” and “'to preclude thesubstitution by a trial jury of an offense which the grand jurydid not in fact consider or charge,’” ibid. (quoting State v.Boratto, 80 N.J. 506, 519 (1979)). To meet those criteria, an “indictment must allege all theessential facts of the crime.” Id. at 418 (quoting State v.LaFera, 35 N.J. 75, 81 (1961)). Thus, “the State must presentproof of every element of an offense to the grand jury andspecify those elements in the indictment.” State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540, 633 (2004). Said another way, in determining thesufficiency of an indictment under the New Jersey Constitution,“[t]he fundamental inquiry is whether the indictmentsubstantially misleads or misinforms the accused as to the crimecharged. The key is intelligibility.” State v. Wein, 80 N.J. 491, 497 (1979). In making that determination, the court looksto whether the indictment is sufficiently specific “to precludethe substitution by a trial jury of an offense which the grand 14 jury did not in fact consider or charge.” LeFurge, 101 N.J. at 415 (quoting Boratto, 80 N.J. at 519). By court rule, [t]he court may amend the indictment . . . to correct an error in form or the description of the crime intended to be charged or to charge a lesser included offense provided that the amendment does not charge another or different offense from that alleged and the defendant will not be prejudiced thereby in his or her defense. [R. 3:7-4.]An error relating to the substance or “essence” of an offensecannot be amended by operation of that rule. See State v.Middleton, 299 N.J. Super. 22, 34 (App. Div. 1997); Pressler &Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 3:7-4 (2018). Courts may generally grant leave to amend a date in anindictment, but the court may not do so where such an amendmentgoes to the core of the offense or where it would prejudice adefendant in presenting his or her defense. See Middleton, 299 N.J. Super. at 34. Likewise, a trial court may amend anindictment charging a defendant with first-degree robbery tochange the type of weapon used because only the presence of aweapon, not the type of weapon, is an essential element offirst-degree robbery. See State v. Lopez, 276 N.J. Super. 296,307 (App. Div. 1994). Similarly, a court may amend anindictment for aggravated sexual assault to change the body part 15 that the defendant is accused of touching because, as with theweapon in Lopez, the particular intimate body part touched isnot an element of aggravated sexual assault. See State v. J.S.,222 N.J. Super. 247, 257-58 (App. Div. 1988). Under the circumstances reviewed in Lopez and J.S., therewas no prejudice to the defendants or lack of notice of thecharges against them. See Lopez, 276 N.J. Super. at 307; J.S.,222 N.J. Super. at 257-58. However, the degree of a crime is anessential element that must be included in the indictment. See,e.g., State v. Catlow, 206 N.J. Super. 186, 194-95 (App. Div.1985). In Catlow, the defendant was charged with robbery in anindictment that did not provide any degree of offense and, overthe defendant’s objection, the trial court instructed the juryon first-degree robbery. Ibid. The Appellate Division reversedbecause it “consider[ed] determination of the degree of a crimeto be an essential element of the grand jury function” and, eventhough the State presented evidence that the grand jury heardtestimony relating to a first-degree offense, the robbery countof the indictment provided no facts or statutory languagedemonstrating that the State had provided to the grand jurysufficient evidence of a first-degree charge. Ibid. The panelwent on to say that 16 [t]he State’s reference to the distinction between first and second-degree robbery as being merely one of grading is to our view unrealistic in light of the importance of such distinction to a defendant. This distinction may be of far greater consequence to an accused than the obtaining of an acquittal on a crime of a lesser degree. [Id. at 195.]See also State v. Smith, 253 N.J. Super. 145, 148 n.2 (App. Div.1992) (noting that factors relating to the degree of offenseshould be treated “as elements of the offense to be decided bythe fact finder”); cf. State v. D’Amato, 218 N.J. Super. 595,605-07 (App. Div. 1987) (recognizing that grading provisions areelements of offense but finding no plain error when indictmentfailed to specify that defendant was charged with third-degreetheft, because he testified that he had sold victim’s jewelryfor an amount that exceeded threshold amount for third-degreeoffense). Similarly, a “trial court may not amend an indictment tocharge a more serious offense,” State v. Orlando, 269 N.J.Super. 116, 138 (App. Div. 1993), because the amendment wouldsubject the defendant to a charge of “an entirely differentcharacter and magnitude,” thereby depriving him of theopportunity to mount a meaningful defense, cf. State v. Koch,161 N.J. Super. 63, 65-67 (App. Div. 1978). For example, theState is required to enumerate the value of stolen goods in a 17 theft charge because that fact impacts the degree of the crimecharged and, therefore, the extent of a defendant’s penalexposure; it is thus an element of the crime. See D’Amato, 218 N.J. Super. at 607. In sum, the analysis as to whether an indictment wassufficient and whether an amendment under Rule 3:7-4 wasappropriate hinges upon whether the defendant was provided withadequate notice of the charges and whether an amendment wouldprejudice defendant in the formulation of a defense. SeeLeFurge, 101 N.J. at 415; Middleton, 299 N.J. Super. at 34;Lopez, 276 N.J. Super. at 307; J.S., 222 N.J. Super. at 257-58;Catlow, 206 N.J. Super. at 194-95; Koch, 161 N.J. Super. at 65-66. B. Applying those principles to the case before us, we firstreiterate that the degree of the charged crime is an essentialelement of the crime that must be included in the indictment.As the Appellate Division noted in Catlow, a change in thedegree of offense charged has the potential to significantlyalter a defendant’s penal exposure. See 206 N.J. Super. at 194-95. Thus, a degree determination is distinct from details suchas the weapon used in a robbery or the particular intimate bodypart touched in an aggravated sexual assault because alterationsin those details do not heighten the liability a defendant 18 faces. See Lopez, 276 N.J. Super. at 307; J.S., 222 N.J. Super.at 257-58; Catlow, 206 N.J. Super. at 194-95. Rather, thedegree determination is analogous to the requirement that theState enumerate the value of stolen goods in a theft charge, afact that impacts the extent of a defendant’s exposure and is,therefore, an element of the crime. See D’Amato, 218 N.J.Super. at 605-07. Here, the trial court and Appellate Division found thatcount five put defendant on notice that he would be charged witha second-degree offense in count two because count fivespecifically charged that defendant possessed more than oneounce of marijuana. According to the trial court and AppellateDivision, that fact -- in conjunction with the citation toN.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 in count two -- put defendant on notice thatcount two should have been a second-degree charge. The Stateadds that count one provided further notice as to the degree ofcount two. We disagree that the other counts of the indictment putdefendant on notice that he would have to defend against ahigher-degree offense than the one charged. Although the countfive charge apprised defendant that he would defend againstallegations of third-degree possession of more than one ounce ofmarijuana, nothing on the face of that count of the indictmentconnected that fact to the count two charge. Similarly, while 19 count one refers to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1, it charges second-degreepossession with the intent to distribute heroin, not themarijuana charged in count two. Thus, this case is analogous toCatlow, where the Appellate Division correctly found that it waserror for the trial court to instruct the jury on a first-degreeoffense because the count in the indictment did not containspecific allegations going to an essential element of theoffense -- the degree. 206 N.J. Super. at 194-95. To be sure, the State submitted evidence of defendant’spossession of more than one ounce of marijuana to the grandjury. However, the indictment makes no mention of the weight ofthe marijuana in count two. Thus, even though the grand juryheard evidence and returned an indictment to that effect incount five, there is nothing in the record demonstrating thatthe grand jury intended to charge defendant with possession ofmore than one ounce of marijuana in count two or for thedefendant to face the heightened criminal liability associatedwith the higher-degree charge. Defendant alleges that he was told -- prior to theamendment -- that he faced a maximum sentence of twenty years’imprisonment, not the thirty years he faced as a result of theeve-of-trial amendment. Defendant further claims that hedeclined the State’s plea offer of five years and proceeded totrial in light of that information. 20 When determining how best to mount a defense against thecharges leveled against them, defendants regularly considerwhether to accept or reject a plea offer. We make nodetermination as to whether defendant would, in fact, haveaccepted the plea offer had he been aware that he would face upto thirty years’ imprisonment. Nevertheless, defendant wasentitled to have that information in hand when deciding whetherto accept or reject the State’s plea offer. Therefore, failingformally to apprise defendant of the State’s intent to seekconviction on a second-degree offense in count two until the daybefore trial began prejudiced defendant. We conclude that the trial court improperly permitted theState to amend count two of the indictment from a third-degreeto a second-degree offense because the amendment was substantiveand because defendant was prejudiced by the amendment. See R.3:7-4. For that reason, the conviction as to count two must beamended to reflect that defendant was convicted of the offenseon which he was indicted –- a third-degree offense -– anddefendant must be resentenced on that count. V. For the reasons set forth above, we affirm in part andreverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Division. Weremand to the trial court for further proceedings consistentwith this opinion. 21 CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. 22