Title: Moro v. Oregon
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S061452
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: December 10, 2015

No. 52	
December 10, 2015	
375
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF OREGON
Everice MORO; 
Terri Domenigoni; Charles Custer; 
John Hawkins; Michael Arken; Eugene Ditter; 
John O’Kief; Michael Smith; Lane Johnson; 
Greg Clouser; Brandon Silence; 
Alison Vickery; and Jin Voek, 
Petitioners,
v.
STATE OF OREGON; 
State of Oregon, by and through  
the Department of Corrections; 
Linn County; City of Portland; City of Salem; 
Tualatin Valley Fire & Rescue; Estacada School District; 
Oregon City School District; Ontario School District; 
Beaverton School District; West Linn School District; 
Bend School District; and 
Public Employees Retirement Board, 
Respondents,
and
LEAGUE OF OREGON CITIES; 
Oregon School Boards Association; 
and Association of Oregon Counties, 
Intervenors,
and
CENTRAL OREGON IRRIGATION DISTRICT, 
Intervenor below.
(S061452 (Control))
Wayne Stanley JONES, 
Petitioner,
v.
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT BOARD; 
Ellen Rosenblum, Attorney General; 
and Kate Brown, Governor, 
Respondents.
(S061431)
376	
Moro v. State of Oregon
Michael D. REYNOLDS, 
Petitioner,
v.
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT BOARD, 
State of Oregon; and 
Kate Brown, Governor, 
State of Oregon, 
Respondents.
(S061454)
George A. RIEMER, 
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF OREGON; 
Oregon Governor Kate Brown; 
Oregon Attorney General Ellen Rosenblum; 
Oregon Public Employees Retirement Board; 
and Oregon Public Employees Retirement System, 
Respondents.
(S061475)
George A. RIEMER, 
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF OREGON, 
Oregon Governor Kate Brown, 
Oregon Attorney General Ellen Rosenblum, 
Public Employees Retirement Board, 
and Public Employees Retirement System, 
Respondents.
(S061860)
On petitions for attorney fees and costs filed May 15, 
June 9, and June 11, 2015; considered and under advise-
ment on August 18, 2015.
Gregory A. Hartman, Bennett, Hartman, Morris & 
Kaplan, LLP, Portland, filed the petition for petitioners 
Everice Moro, Terri Domenigoni, Charles Custer, John 
Hawkins, Michael Arken, Eugene Ditter, John O’Kief, 
Michael Smith, Lane Johnson, Greg Clouser, Brandon 
Cite as 358 Or 375 (2015)	
377
Silence, Alison Vickery, and Jin Voek. With him on the peti-
tion was Aruna A. Masih.
George A. Reimer, Sun City West, Arizona, filed the peti-
tion on behalf of himself.
Michael D. Reynolds, Seattle, Washington, filed the peti-
tion on behalf of himself.
Wayne Stanley Jones, North Salt Lake, Utah, filed the 
petition on behalf of himself.
Keith L. Kutler, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 
filed the response to the petitions on behalf of the State of 
Oregon. With him on the response were Ellen F. Rosenblum, 
Attorney General, Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General, and 
Matthew J. Merritt, Assistant Attorney General.
William F. Gary, Harrang Long Gary Rudnick P.C., 
Eugene, filed the response to the petitions on behalf of 
respondents Linn County, Estacada School District, Oregon 
City School District, Ontario School District, West Linn 
School District, Beaverton School District, and Bend School 
District and intervenors Oregon School Board Association 
and Association of Oregon Counties.
Robert F. Blackmore, Innova Legal Advisors PC, Lake 
Oswego, filed the response to the petitions on behalf of 
Tualatin Valley Fire and Rescue. With him on the response 
was Heidi W. Mason.
Before Balmer, Chief Justice, Kistler, Walters, Linder, 
Brewer, and Baldwin, Justices, and Haselton, Justice pro 
tempore.*
BALMER, C. J.
Petitions referred to special master.
______________
	
*  Landau, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this 
matter.
378	
Moro v. State of Oregon
Case Summary: Moro v. State of Oregon, 357 Or 167, 351 P3d 1 (2015) affirmed 
in part and denied in part challenges brought by petitioners to legislative amend-
ments aimed at reducing the costs of the Public Employee Retirement System 
(PERS). Claimants, who are pro se petitioners and attorneys representing other 
petitioners, seek their fees and costs for their efforts achieving that result.
The petitions for fees and costs are referred to a special master for recom-
mended findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Cite as 358 Or 375 (2015)	
379
	
BALMER, C. J.
	
This matter is before us on petitions for awards of 
attorney fees and costs. For the reasons that follow, we refer 
the petitions to Judge Stephen Bushong, sitting as a special 
master, for recommended findings of fact and conclusions of 
law.
	
In Moro v. State of Oregon, 357 Or 167, 351 P3d 1 
(2015), this court considered challenges to legislative amend-
ments aimed at reducing the costs of the Public Employee 
Retirement System (PERS). Those challenges were brought 
by petitioners, who are active and retired members of PERS. 
This court rejected petitioners’ challenge to the elimination 
of income tax offset benefits for nonresident retirees but 
agreed in part with petitioners’ claim that modifications 
to the PERS cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) formula 
impaired petitioners’ contractual rights and therefore vio-
lated the state Contract Clause, Article I, section 21, of the 
Oregon Constitution. Although petitioners had argued that 
the state could not change the COLA formula for any cur-
rent PERS member, we held that the COLA amendments 
impaired the PERS contract only insofar as the amend-
ments applied retrospectively to benefits earned before the 
effective dates of the amendments.
	
Claimants, who are pro se petitioners and attor-
neys representing the Moro petitioners, now seek their fees 
and costs. “ 
‘Generally, a party cannot recover attorney 
fees unless there is a statute or a contract that authorizes 
recovery of those fees.’ 
” Montara Owners Assn. v. La Noue 
Development, LLC, 357 Or 333, 360, 353 P3d 563 (2015) 
(quoting Peace River Seed Co-Op v. Proseeds Marketing, 
355 Or 44, 65, 322 P3d 531 (2014)). There is no statutory 
or contractual authority for fees in this case. That general 
rule, however, is subject to exceptions, including limited 
circumstances where fees may be awarded based on equi-
table principles. We applied equitable principles to award 
attorney fees and costs in an earlier action that success-
fully challenged amendments enacted in 2003 to the PERS 
statutes. See Strunk v. PERB, 338 Or 145, 108 P3d 1058 
(2005) (holding that certain PERS amendments impaired 
contractual rights); Strunk v. PERB, 341 Or 175, 139 P3d 
380	
Moro v. State of Oregon
956 (2006) (Strunk II) (recognizing right to receive fees and 
costs); Strunk v. PERB, 343 Or 226, 169 P3d 1242 (2007) 
(Strunk III) (awarding fees and costs).
	
In Strunk II, the claimants first sought fees and 
costs under Deras v. Myers, 272 Or 47, 535 P2d 541 (1975), 
which allows courts to award fees to prevailing parties who 
have “vindicated an important constitutional right applying 
to all citizens” rather than “gain[ing] something peculiar to 
themselves.” Lehman v. Bradbury, 334 Or 579, 583, 54 P3d 
591 (2002); see also Swett v. Bradbury, 335 Or 378, 389, 67 
P3d 391 (2003) (discussing the standards for awarding fees 
under Deras). The court in Strunk II, however, declined to 
award fees based on Deras. 341 Or at 181.
	
The claimants additionally sought fees and costs 
based on the common-fund theory, under which “plaintiffs 
whose legal efforts create, discover, increase or preserve 
a fund of money to which others also have a claim[ 
] may 
recover the costs of their litigation, including their attor-
ney’s fees, from the created or preserved fund.” Id. at 181. 
An award for those litigation costs is justified as restitution 
to “ 
‘recaptur[e] unjust enrichment’ 
” that would otherwise 
flow to the nonlitigant beneficiaries as a result of the judg-
ment. Id. at 181 (quotation omitted); see also Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §  29 (2011) 
(discussing common-fund recoveries at length). This court 
in Strunk II and Strunk III held that the claimants were 
entitled to attorney fees and costs under the common-fund 
theory. Strunk II, 341 Or at 185 (holding that the petition-
ers could recover attorney fees); Strunk III, 343 Or at 247 
(awarding costs).
	
In this case, claimants seek in the aggregate 
approximately $2.3 million in fees and $66,000 in costs. To 
justify that award, they argue that their litigation efforts 
preserved over $4 billion for PERS members and designated 
beneficiaries. The grounds that claimants assert for their 
fees and costs are not always the same. As to fees, petitioner 
Reynolds and the attorneys representing the Moro peti-
tioners rely on only the common-fund theory, but petitioner 
Riemer seeks fees under both Deras and the common-fund 
theory. As to costs, the attorneys representing the Moro 
Cite as 358 Or 375 (2015)	
381
petitioners rely only on the common-fund theory, petitioner 
Jones (who is not seeking fees) and petitioner Reynolds rely 
only on ORAP 13.05 (governing costs and disbursements for 
prevailing parties in appellate courts), and petitioner Riemer 
relies on both. Respondents, who are governmental entities 
involved or interested in the administration of PERS but do 
not represent the nonparty PERS members and designated 
beneficiaries directly, object to claimants’ requests for fees 
and costs.
	
Claimants’ requests and respondents’ objections 
raise numerous factual and legal disputes, which we do not 
resolve now. Instead, we refer the petitions to Judge Stephen 
Bushong, sitting as a special master, with instructions to 
recommend to this court a reasonable award of fees and 
costs. The special master should conduct such proceedings 
as he deems appropriate and make recommended findings 
of fact and conclusions of law necessary to resolve the fac-
tual and legal disputes fairly raised by the parties’ filings to 
this court or otherwise necessary to determine an award of 
reasonable fees and costs.
	
Although the special master has broad discretion 
over its proceedings and recommendations, and without 
prejudice to the parties’ ability to raise other issues before 
the special master, we highlight two disputes relating to the 
scope of our decision in Strunk III. First, respondents con-
tend that claimants should not be awarded fees and costs 
for duplicated efforts on successful claims or efforts directed 
at unsuccessful claims. In Strunk III, the record created by 
the parties before the special master did not allow this court 
to determine the extent to which those attorneys had dupli-
cated their efforts or directed their efforts toward unsuc-
cessful claims. 343 Or at 239-40. As a result, this court did 
not decide whether those factors should affect a reasonable 
award of fees and costs. Without deciding that issue here, 
we instruct the special master to make findings of fact, if 
possible, on the extent to which the attorneys duplicated 
their efforts or directed their efforts toward unsuccessful 
claims.
	
Second, the parties dispute the size of any pre-
served fund and the manner in which the award of fees 
382	
Moro v. State of Oregon
and costs should be allocated among the beneficiaries of 
the litigation.1 In Strunk III, the parties stipulated to those 
issues. Id. at 233. Although this court accepted those stip-
ulations, id. at 247, it did so without the benefit of opposing 
arguments and without a developed factual record. For that 
reason, the special master should rely on the court’s con-
clusions in Strunk III accepting those stipulations only to 
the extent that those conclusions are otherwise supported 
by the factual record in this case—including any consider-
ation of administrative burdens for allocating the fees and 
costs—and the law justifying an award.
	
Within 14 days of the filing of the special master’s 
recommendations with this court, any party may file briefs 
supporting or objecting to those recommendations, including 
citations to relevant authorities and portions of the record. 
This court thereafter shall proceed to award reasonable 
attorney fees and costs.
	
Petitions referred to special master.
	
1  They also dispute whether, and the extent to which, the size of any pre-
served fund justifies applying a multiplier to the hourly rates that claimants have 
used to calculate their requested awards—that is, the parties dispute whether 
the reasonable value of the claimants’ services depends on the size of the pre-
served fund.