Title: MICHAEL THOMAS REED V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2003-SC-000830-MR
State: Kentucky
Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court
Date: November 15, 2004

IMPOR 'ANTNOTICE NOTTO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINIONISDESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDUREPROMULGATEDBY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHEDAND SHALL NOTBE CITED OR USED ASAUTHORITYINANYOTHER CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STATE. upr"Ur (gauti of 2003-SC-0830-MR ` ~ W v _ 0 MICHAEL THOMAS REED APPELLANT APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT V . HONORABLE MARY C . NOBLE, JUDGE 02-CR-01222 RENDERED : OCTOBER 21, 2004 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING Appellant, Michael Thomas Reed, conditionally pled guilty in Fayette Circuit Court to one count each of Burglary First, Assault First and PFO First . He was sentenced to ten years each for burglary and robbery and twenty years for assault, enhanced to twenty-five due to the PFO charge . Each sentence was ordered to run consecutively for a total of forty-five years . Appellant appeals to this court as a matter of right . Ky . Const . § 110(2)(b) . The appellant argues that the trial court erred by finding that the appellant was validly detained and that the evidence later received was not "fruit of the poisonous tree ." This argument is comprised of three basic claims, namely that : 1) Officer Sorenson did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the appellant; 2) even if Officer Sorenson had reason to believe the appellant was armed and dangerous, his actions went far beyond routine detention into seizure; and 3) the evidence seized and the appellant's statements must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree . The pertinent facts are as follows . On October 19, 2002, a black male, wearing a black sweater and blue jeans, about six feet tall with short hair, entered the apartment of Kathryn Vogelsang without invitation . Vogelsang was the student intern at the Catholic Newman Center in Lexington, Kentucky. The man struggled with Volgelsang, cutting her with a knife in the process . The assailant attempted to apply duct tape over Vogelsang's mouth and proceeded to hit her with his fist and a small souvenir baseball bat. The assailant finally found Vogelsang's wallet and fled the apartment. Police arrived at Vogelsang's apartment and broadcast a description of the assailant across the police radio. Lexington Police Officers Kyle Sorenson and Kevin Kidd were driving toward the area of the Catholic Newman Center when they saw the appellant near the corner of Rose Street and High Street . When the appellant saw the unmarked police cruiser, he began to walk more quickly and crossed the street . Noticing this behavior and realizing that the appellant fit the description of the assailant, the officers caught up with him. They asked to see the appellant's hands and the appellant complied . The officers decided to handcuff him while they did a pat down search for weapons. The officers saw blood on the appellant's pants and noticed that he appeared sweaty, as though he had been running . The appellant explained that he had blood on his pants because he had recently fallen . No weapon was found, but while running a search through the NCIC computer, the officers learned that the appellant was wanted for an outstanding warrant . They arrested the appellant pursuant to this warrant . During a search incident to his arrest, the officers found Vogelsang's wallet in the appellant's rear pocket and a crack pipe in his front left pocket . The officers then took the appellant to the hospital to treat his injuries . While at the hospital, the appellant was questioned by Detective Cindy Westbrook . During the interview, the appellant made numerous statements . He explained that he had done "something I shouldn't have done ." The appellant also told officers that he could show them "where the knife was at" and made other statements admitting his involvement . On December 5, 2002, the grand jury of the Fayette Circuit Court indicted the appellant, charging him with (1) burglary in the first degree ; (2) assault in the first degree ; (3) robbery in the first degree; (4) possession of drug paraphernalia ; and (5) PFO in the first degree . The appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to the charges. The evidence in the record was adduced at an earlier suppression hearing conducted to consider the appellant's motion to suppress evidence . The trial judge conducted the hearing and concluded that both the investigatory stop and the subsequent arrest were proper. On appeal, the appellant is arguing that the trial court erred in finding that the appellant was validly detained and that the evidence later received was not fruit of the poisonous tree . The appellant's first claim is that Officer Sorenson did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion upon which to stop him . We disagree . "Pursuant to Terry v. Ohio , 395 U.S . 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), 'where a law enforcement officer lacks probable cause, but possesses a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person has been involved in criminal activity, he may detain the suspect briefly to investigate the suspicious circumstances."' United States v. Foster , 376 F.3d 577, 584 (6th Cir. 2004) . An "investigative detention is permissible when it is based upon 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,' give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the individual is, was, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity . . . . In reviewing a challenged investigative stop, 'the totality of the circumstances--the whole picture--must be taken into account."' Id . at 584-585 (citing United States v. Hurst, 228 F.3d . 751, 757 (6th Cir. 2000)). Officer Sorenson was driving toward the victim's apartment in response to a dispatcher's report when he came upon the appellant, who fit the description of the assailant. The appellant, a black male, about six feet tall, with short hair, wearing a black sweater and blue jeans, was a few blocks from where the criminal activity had occurred only minutes before . The appellant appeared sweaty and was breathing as if he had been running . When the appellant saw the police cruiser, he began walking faster. Considering all these elements, we find that Officer Sorenson had a sufficiently reasonable suspicion to stop the appellant and investigate further. The appellant's next contention is that even if Officer Sorenson had reason to believe the appellant was armed and dangerous, his actions went far beyond routine detention into seizure . Officer Sorenson testified that he knew from the police dispatch that the assailant had used a knife during his assault on the victim . He further testified that he handcuffed the appellant for officer safety reasons . It has routinely been held that, "the use of handcuffs [does not] exceed the bounds of a Ten stop, so long as the circumstances warrant that precaution ." Houston v . Clark County Sheriff Deputy John Does 1-5 , 174 F .3d 809, 815 (6th Cir . 1999) ; United States v. Foster , 376 F .3d 577, 587 (6th Cir . 2004) . Under the facts of this case, it was reasonable for Officer Sorenson to believe the appellant was armed and dangerous, thus justifying the use of handcuffs . The appellant, however, argues that even if the use of handcuffs was reasonable during the pat-down search, it became unreasonable when no weapon was found and the cuffs were left on during the records check . From our review of the record, we find that the detention did not exceed reasonable bounds . As the Foster case explains, "patting down the subject of a Terry stop does not signal the end of the detention, for law enforcement is permitted to investigate the circumstances that led them to stop the individual . A pat-down for weapons is only part of the detention . '[W]hen a law enforcement officer no longer has any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the detained individual is constitutionally free to leave ."' United States v . Foster , 376 F .3d 577, 586 (6th Cir . 2004) (citing United States v . Erwin , 155 F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir . 1998)) . Officer Sorenson knew that the assailant had used a deadly weapon shortly before they detained the appellant . The appellant fit the description of the assailant, was in the general area of the crime, appeared as though he had been running, and had blood on his clothing . We find that Officer Sorenson had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify a brief detention through the records check. Once the officers became aware of the outstanding warrant, they were then allowed to search the appellant incident to his arrest . We find that both the investigatory stop and the subsequent arrest were valid . Resultantly, we affirm the trial judge's denial of the appellant's motion to suppress evidence . All concur . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT : Julia K . Pearson Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 301 Frankfort, KY 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : Gregory D . Stumbo Attorney General Room 118, Capitol Building Frankfort, KY 40601 Perry T . Ryan Assistant Attorney General Office of Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601-8204