Title: State v. Sisco
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC93785
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: March 10, 2015

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
No.  SC93785 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
SYLVESTER R. SISCO, II, 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
  ) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY 
The Honorable Sandra Midkiff, Judge  
 
Opinion issued March 10, 2015 
 
Sylvester R. Sisco appeals his convictions after a jury trial for murder in the first 
degree, assault in the first degree, and two counts of armed criminal action.  On appeal, 
Mr. Sisco asserts that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss and in not 
designating the state’s nolle prosequi as a dismissal with prejudice because those rulings 
violated his right to a speedy trial under section 545.780, RSMo 2000, article I, sections 
10 and 18 of the Missouri Constitution, and the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments to the 
United States Constitution.  The trial court did not err in not designating the state’s nolle 
prosequi as a dismissal with prejudice because the court did not have authority to do so.  
The trial court also did not err in overruling Mr. Sisco’s motion to dismiss on the basis of 
a speedy trial violation because the length of delay in this case is outweighed by the 
2 
 
reasons for the delay, Mr. Sisco initially acquiesced to the delay, and no prejudice 
resulted from the delay.  Accordingly, this Court affirms the trial court’s judgment. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
In the early morning hours of October 16, 2006, Mr. Sisco and his brother, 
Anthony Sisco, shot and killed Jacob Higgs and seriously wounded Reno Dillard at a bar 
in Kansas City, Missouri.  The bar was owned by Mr. Dillard and his parents and 
brothers, and the men had access to the bar in the early morning hours after it closed.  
Still photographs taken from surveillance video at the bar were released to the media.  
Erin Bridges and Lucretia Neal had been at the bar with the men before the shooting, and 
they contacted police to identify Mr. Sisco and his brother as the individuals in the 
photographs.  
A felony complaint was filed against Mr. Sisco on October 19, 2006, and          
Mr. Sisco was arrested and taken into custody the next day.  On October 27, 2006,       
Mr. Sisco was charged by indictment with one count of murder in the first degree, one 
count of assault in the first degree, and two counts of armed criminal action.  The case 
was assigned to division 10 of the Jackson County circuit court and trial was 
subsequently scheduled for August 20, 2007.  On January 23, 2007, Mr. Sisco posted a 
bond with the condition that he would be on house arrest. 
 
On August 14, 2007, the state requested and was granted a continuance until 
December 10, 2007, because the lead prosecutor had health issues.  The court 
subsequently continued the case to March 24, 2008, due to docket constraints.  After the 
judge in division 10 was placed on special assignment to handle a domestic docket, the 
3 
 
case was transferred to division 18 by agreement of the parties.  Trial was reset for June 
30, 2008. 
On June 30, 2008, when the case was called for pretrial proceedings, Mr. Sisco 
announced he was ready for trial and informed the court that he had filed a motion 
requesting a speedy trial on that date.  At the pretrial proceedings, the trial court was 
advised that Ms. Neal, one of the state’s witnesses, had appeared under subpoena with an 
attorney and indicated that she planned to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination if called to testify.  The state argued that Ms. Neal was an important 
witness because she had given a written statement to the police two days after the 
shootings that she was present in the bar with the victims, Mr. Sisco, his brother, 
Anthony, and Anthony’s girlfriend, Erin Bridges, a short time before the shootings.     
Ms. Neal was granted immunity and ordered to testify at trial. 
Because the state had concerns whether Ms. Neal would testify even with the grant 
of immunity, the state requested and was granted, over Mr. Sisco’s objection, a 
continuance to have DNA testing performed on a swab from a Bluetooth device 
recovered at the crime scene.  Although the state indicated it needed only a 30-day 
continuance, the court was not available in 30 days.  Because defense counsel did not 
have his calendar, the attorneys agreed to consult with the judge later regarding a new 
trial date.  The trial court then issued an order directing Mr. Sisco to provide a buccal 
swab so that his DNA could be compared with DNA from the Bluetooth device.  On the 
following day, Mr. Sisco filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its order, and the 
court withdrew the order upon agreement of the parties. 
4 
 
On August 4, 2008, the case was transferred to division 15 by agreement of the 
parties after the judge in division 18 was assigned an exclusively domestic docket.  On 
September 18, 2008, the state filed a new motion to compel Mr. Sisco to provide a buccal 
swab.  A hearing on the motion was scheduled for October 3, but, on October 2,           
Mr. Sisco requested additional time to respond to the motion.  Mr. Sisco filed his 
response opposing the state’s motion on November 24, and a hearing was held the next 
day.  On December 9, the trial court issued an order directing Mr. Sisco to provide a 
buccal swab.  Trial then was scheduled for April 27, 2009. 
Five days before trial, on April 22, 2009, the state provided Mr. Sisco with 113 
pages of discovery and 14 DVDs containing enhanced surveillance footage.  Included in 
the 113 pages of discovery was a report from a new fingerprint expert who recently had 
been asked to review the prints recovered from the crime scene.  In the report, the expert, 
for the first time, identified a latent print from the crime scene as belonging to Mr. Sisco.1  
Previous discovery disclosed to Mr. Sisco included a report from a different fingerprint 
expert stating that none of the fingerprints found at the scene matched Mr. Sisco.  The 
state informed Mr. Sisco that the original fingerprint expert had retired, was out-of-state, 
and would be unavailable to testify at trial. 
On April 24, 2009, Mr. Sisco filed a motion in limine to exclude the fingerprint 
evidence because of the state’s late disclosure of this evidence.  A hearing was held the 
                                              
1 The state also discovered and disclosed fingerprints belonging to Mr. Dillard, one of the 
victims, and another individual. 
5 
 
same day, and the trial court sustained Mr. Sisco’s motion.2  The state then requested a 
continuance, which the court denied.  Mr. Sisco’s attorney stated that the state was 
considering dismissing the case and recharging Mr. Sisco at a later time if the fingerprints 
were excluded and asked whether that was still being considered.  The state responded 
that it had not yet made a decision. 
On April 27, 2009, the day of trial, Mr. Sisco announced that he was ready for 
trial.  After the trial court denied the state’s request to reconsider granting a continuance, 
the state dismissed the case nolle prosqui.  Later that day, the state filed a new complaint 
with the same charges against Mr. Sisco.  An information was filed against Mr. Sisco on 
May 4.  Following an arraignment on that day, the case was assigned to division 13 and 
set for trial for July 6, 2009.  Mr. Sisco filed a second motion for a speedy trial on May 6. 
On June 29, 2009, Mr. Sisco filed a motion to dismiss the case with prejudice 
based on a violation of his right to a speedy trial.  He amended the motion on July 1 to 
include a claim that the new information was invalid because Mr. Sisco had not waived 
his right to a preliminary hearing.3  Trial was canceled for the court to adjudicate         
Mr. Sisco’s motion.  Following a hearing, the court determined that a preliminary hearing 
should be conducted because Mr. Sisco had not waived his right to one.  The court held 
                                              
2 In his motion, Mr. Sisco also sought to exclude the DVDs containing the enhanced 
surveillance footage and documents relating to the surveillance footage.  The court 
overruled Mr. Sisco’s motion to exclude the surveillance footage and accompanying 
documents. 
3In its order overruling Mr. Sisco’s motion to dismiss, the trial court stated the motion 
was filed on July 2, 2009, but the docket sheet reflects that this motion was filed on     
July 1.  This Court cannot resolve this discrepancy by looking at the file stamp on the 
motion because the motion is not a part of the legal file in this Court. 
6 
 
the motion in abeyance and ordered the parties to reconvene on July 10.  Before the 
parties reconvened, however, the state charged Mr. Sisco by indictment, thereby 
eliminating any need for a preliminary hearing. 
On July 10, 2009, Mr. Sisco moved for a change of judge.  His motion was 
sustained on July 13, and the case was assigned to division 12.  On July 13, Mr. Sisco 
filed a request for discovery, a motion to dismiss with prejudice, a motion in limine to 
exclude the fingerprint evidence and surveillance footage disclosed by the state on April 
22, and a request for sanctions due to discovery violations.  Despite venirepersons present 
and ready for jury selection on July 13, the trial court continued the case so that the state 
could respond to Mr. Sisco’s motions.  A hearing on the motions was held on July 15.  
On August 4, 2009, the trial court overruled the motion to dismiss after finding Mr. Sisco 
failed to prove a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial or actual prejudice.  
The court rescheduled trial for October 5. 
Mr. Sisco’s trial began on October 5, 2009.4  During trial and in a motion for a 
new trial, Mr. Sisco again claimed that his right to a speedy trial had been violated.  The 
jury returned verdicts finding Mr. Sisco guilty of all charges.  The trial court sentenced 
Mr. Sisco to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on the murder 
count, to be served concurrently with a term of thirty years on the associated armed 
                                              
4At trial, Ms. Neal invoked the Fifth Amendment when called to testify.  She had to be 
questioned outside the presence of the jury, where she was repeatedly ordered to answer 
the state’s questions.  Ms. Bridges also invoked the Fifth Amendment and was granted 
immunity.  Ms. Bridges was jailed for contempt for refusing to respond to the state’s 
questions and was recalled to testify only after she decided to purge herself of contempt 
by testifying. 
7 
 
criminal action count.  The court sentenced Mr. Sisco to 30-year terms of imprisonment 
on the assault and remaining armed criminal action counts, to be served concurrently with 
each other and consecutively with the other sentences.   
Mr. Sisco appeals.  After an opinion by the court of appeals, the case was 
transferred to this Court.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10. 
No Error in Not Designating  
Nolle Prosequi as Dismissal with Prejudice 
 
 
On appeal, Mr. Sisco contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to 
dismiss and in not converting the state’s nolle prosequi to a dismissal with prejudice 
because the state violated his right to a speedy trial.  This Court will first address          
Mr. Sisco’s argument that the trial court should have converted the nolle prosequi to a 
dismissal with prejudice because the state used the procedure to avoid the court’s 
unfavorable ruling excluding the fingerprint evidence.    
“A nolle prosequi is a prosecutor’s formal entry on the record indicating that he or 
she will no longer prosecute a pending criminal charge.”  State v. Clinch, 335 S.W.3d 
579, 583 (Mo. App. 2011) (internal quotation omitted).  This Court has long recognized a 
prosecutor’s broad discretion in determining whether to proceed with a prosecution.  See 
State v. Honeycutt, 96 S.W.3d 85, 88 (Mo. banc 2003); State ex rel. Griffin v. Smith, 258 
S.W.2d 590, 593 (Mo. banc 1953), overruled on other grounds by Honeycutt, 96 S.W.3d 
at 89.  This discretion has been codified in section 56.087,5 which provides that the 
prosecutor “has the power, in his or her discretion, to dismiss a complaint, information, or 
                                              
5 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2013. 
8 
 
indictment, or any count or counts thereof” without the consent of the court.  Unless 
double jeopardy has attached, a dismissal by the prosecutor will be without prejudice, 
meaning the prosecutor “has complete discretion to refile the case, as long as it is refiled 
within the time specified by the applicable statute of limitations.”  Id.  “Once a prosecutor 
dismisses a case without prejudice, a court . . . has no authority to convert the dismissal to 
one with prejudice or to force the prosecutor to trial.”  Honeycutt, 96 S.W.3d at 89.  The 
prosecutor’s broad discretion allows the prosecutor to file a nolle prosequi following an 
unfavorable evidentiary ruling and then refile the charges.  Clinch, 335 S.W.3d at 583-84; 
State v. Pippenger, 741 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Mo. App. 1987). 
The prosecutor’s dismissal of Mr. Sisco’s case came after the trial court sustained 
Mr. Sisco’s motion to exclude the state’s new fingerprint evidence and denied the state’s 
subsequent request for a continuance based on that ruling.  Because double jeopardy had 
not attached,6 the dismissal was without prejudice, and the prosecutor could refile the 
charges against Mr. Sisco.  See section 56.087.  The trial court did not have authority to 
convert the dismissal to one with prejudice.  See Honeycutt, 96 S.W.3d at 89. 
Mr. Sisco, nevertheless, argues that, under State ex rel. St. Charles County v. 
Cunningham, 401 S.W.3d 493 (Mo. banc 2013), a nolle prosequi cannot be used to avoid 
an unfavorable ruling.  In Cunningham, this Court ruled that a plaintiff could not 
voluntarily dismiss a civil action on remand after this Court reversed the trial court’s 
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.  Id. at 496-97.  The Court concluded that 
                                              
6 Section 56.087.4 prescribes that, for purposes of the statute, double jeopardy attaches 
when the jury has been empaneled and sworn in a jury trial and when the court begins to 
hear evidence in a court-tried case. 
9 
 
Rule 67.02(a)(2), which permits a plaintiff to dismiss a civil action in a court-tried case 
without order of the court prior to the introduction of evidence at trial, did not allow a 
plaintiff to dismiss the action after evidence was presented at hearing on a motion for 
summary judgment.  Id. at 496.   
Mr. Sisco’s reliance on Cunningham is misplaced.  Unlike Cunningham, this case 
is criminal, and the dismissal was pursuant to section 56.087, not Rule 67.02.  
Additionally, Cunningham involved an attempt to dismiss a case after a “trial” and an 
appellate court decision, which are not the circumstances of this case. 
Lastly, Mr. Sisco asserts that allowing a prosecutor to dismiss a case without 
prejudice violates the Sixth Amendment under Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 
(1967), because it would allow a case to go on indefinitely.  In Klopfer, the United States 
Supreme Court found North Carolina’s nolle prosequi procedure to violate a defendant’s 
right to a speedy trial when the indictment against the defendant remained pending 
indefinitely.7  Id. at 221-22.  While he raised a speedy trial claim in the trial court based 
on the particular facts of his case, Mr. Sisco never argued to the trial court that Missouri’s 
nolle prosequi procedure under section 56.087 is unconstitutional.  This new argument is 
distinct from the argument Mr. Sisco raised to the trial court and, therefore, is not 
preserved for review.  See State v. Liberty, 370 S.W.3d 537, 546 (Mo. banc 2012).  
                                              
7 Courts have distinguished Missouri’s nolle prosequi procedure from the one in Klopfer 
because, in Missouri, the indictment is dismissed and not indefinitely pending.  See State 
v. Morton, 444 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Mo. 1969); State v. Ferdinand, 371 S.W.3d 844, 852 
(Mo. App. 2012). 
10 
 
Under section 56.087, the nolle prosequi in this case was designated a dismissal 
without prejudice properly because double jeopardy had not attached.  The trial court did 
not err in not converting it to a dismissal with prejudice because the court had no 
authority to do so.  Honeycutt, 96 S.W.3d at 89. 
Constitutional Right to Speedy Trial Not Violated 
Mr. Sisco further asserts that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to 
dismiss on the basis of a violation of his right to a speedy trial.  He maintains that the 
three-year delay in bringing his case to trial was a result of the state’s repeated 
continuances made in bad faith despite his assertion of his right to a speedy trial.          
Mr. Sisco argues that the length of his delay, along with the state’s deliberate attempt to 
delay trial, creates a presumption of prejudice. 
This Court has not explicitly articulated the standard of review for a trial court’s 
ruling on a motion to dismiss based on a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.  
The state urges this Court to review the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion.  
Support for the state’s position comes from decisions of the court of appeals that stated, 
“Appellate courts review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for abuse of 
discretion.”  State v. Ferdinand, 371 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Mo. App. 2012) (internal 
quotation omitted).  See also State v. Mason, 428 S.W.3d 746, 749 (Mo. App. 2014); 
State v. Simino, 397 S.W.3d 11, 19 (Mo. App. 2013); State v. Scott, 348 S.W.3d 788, 794 
(Mo. App. 2011); State v. Loewe, 756 S.W.2d 177, (Mo. App. 1988).  Authority for this 
statement, however, can be traced to State v. Collins, 669 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Mo. banc 
1984). 
11 
 
Collins involved an alleged violation of the statutory right to a speedy trial under 
section 545.780, RSMo 1978, which set time limits for bringing a defendant to 
arraignment and trial.  See id.  Section 545.780.5, RSMo 1978, also provided: 
If the defendant is not brought to arraignment or trial within the time limit 
required by this section, the trial judge may dismiss the information or 
indictment upon motion by the defendant and a showing by defendant that 
the failure to have the trial commence within time limits specified herein 
was occasioned by the state. The case may be dismissed with or without 
prejudice at the discretion of the court. In determining whether to dismiss 
the case, the court shall consider, among others, each of the following 
factors: The seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the 
case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the 
administration of this section and on the administration of justice. 
 
(Emphasis added).  According to the express provisions in section 545.780.5, RSMo 
1978, a motion to dismiss based on a violation of the statutory right to a speedy trial was 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion in Collins, 669 S.W.2d at 935.   
The statute, however, was amended in 1986 to state: 
1. If defendant announces that he is ready for trial and files a request for a 
speedy trial, then the court shall set the case for trial as soon as reasonably 
possible thereafter. 
 
2. The provisions of this section shall be enforceable by mandamus.  
Neither the failure to comply with this section nor the state’s failure to 
prosecute shall be grounds for the dismissal of the indictment or 
information unless the court also finds that the defendant has been denied 
his constitutional right to a speedy trial.8 
 
Section 545.780, RSMo 2000.  The amended statute does not set time limits or provide 
the trial court with discretion to dismiss a case.  See id.  Instead, it limits dismissal for 
                                              
8 Section 545.780 was also amended in 1984.  The 1984 version of the statute stated only 
that a court must set the case for trial as soon as reasonably possible if a defendant 
announces he is ready for trial and files a speedy trial request.  Section 545.780, RSMo 
Supp. 1984. 
12 
 
violation of the statute to cases when there is a constitutional violation.9  Id.  If there is a 
violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, the case then must be 
dismissed.  See State ex rel. McKee v. Riley, 240 S.W.3d 720, 732 (Mo. banc 2007).  
Therefore, while an abuse of discretion standard was used to review a court’s ruling on a 
motion to dismiss based on the statutory right prior to 1986, it does not necessarily follow 
that such standard should be utilized today when the motion to dismiss is based on a 
defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.   
While this Court defers to the trial court’s factual findings and credibility 
determinations, it reviews questions of law de novo.  State v. Werner, 9 S.W.3d 590, 595 
(Mo. banc 2000).  This Court reviews de novo whether other constitutional rights have 
been violated.  State v. Schroeder, 330 S.W.3d 468, 472 (Mo. banc 2011) (“Whether 
conduct violates the Fourth Amendment is an issue of law that this Court reviews de 
novo.”); Lewellen v. Franklin, 441 S.W.3d 136, 145 (Mo. banc 2014) (reviewing de novo 
a due process claim); see also State v. Washington, 9 S.W.3d 671, 676 (Mo. App. 1999) 
(reviewing de novo whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was 
violated).  Further, a de novo review is supported by this Court’s speedy trial analyses in 
other cases in which the Court did not indicate a deferential standard of review and made 
its own conclusions with regard to whether a violation occurred.  See State v. Taylor, 298 
S.W.3d 482, 504 (Mo. banc 2009); Owsley, 959 S.W.2d at 793-94; State v. Edwards, 750 
                                              
9 In addition to his constitutional claim, Mr. Sisco asserts the trial court erred in not 
dismissing his case because his right to a speedy trial under section 545.780, RSMo 2000, 
was violated.  Because section 545.780, RSMo 2000, authorizes a court to dismiss only if 
there is a constitutional violation, the statute’s application here is contingent on finding a 
constitutional violation.  See State v. Owsley, 959 S.W.2d 789, 794 (Mo. banc 1997). 
13 
 
S.W.2d 438, 441-42 (Mo. banc 1988); State v. Bolin, 643 S.W.2d 806, 813-16 (Mo. banc 
1983), overruled on other grounds by McKee, 240 S.W.3d at 727 n.10.  Accordingly, 
while the trial court’s factual findings are subject to deferential review, this Court will 
review de novo whether Mr. Sisco’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was 
violated. 
The right to a speedy trial is provided by the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution.  Taylor, 298 
S.W.3d at 504.  The federal and Missouri constitutions “provide equivalent protection for 
a defendant's right to a speedy trial.”  Id.  Determining whether a defendant’s right to a 
speedy trial has been violated requires a balancing of four factors: (1) the length of delay; 
(2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4) the 
prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay.  Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 
(1972); State ex rel. Garcia v. Goldman, 316 S.W.3d 907, 911 (Mo. banc 2010).  The 
existence of any one of these factors is neither necessary nor sufficient to finding a 
deprivation of the right to a speedy trial.  Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.  Rather, “courts must   
. . . engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.”  Id.  
Length of Delay 
The first factor serves two functions.  Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-
52 (1992).  First, the length of the delay is a triggering mechanism because, “[u]ntil there 
is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the 
other factors.”  Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.  Missouri courts have found a delay of greater 
than eight months is “presumptively prejudicial.”  McKee, 240 S.W.3d at 729.  If a delay 
14 
 
was for a period of time that is presumptively prejudicial, courts then consider “the extent 
to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger juridical 
examination.”  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652.  
The delay in bringing a defendant to trial is measured from the time of a formal 
indictment or information or when actual restraints are imposed by an arrest.  Garcia, 316 
S.W.3d at 911.  Mr. Sisco was arrested and charged on October 20, 2006.  His trial began 
nearly three years later on October 5, 2009.  This delay is presumptively prejudicial.  
Therefore, the Court must consider whether a delay extending 27 and one-half months 
beyond the presumptively prejudicial threshold violated Mr. Sisco’s right to a speedy trial 
in light of the other factors. 
Reason for Delay 
Different weights are assigned to the different reasons the state provides to justify 
the delay.  Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.  The United States Supreme Court has provided 
guidance on how to weigh different reasons for a delay: 
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should 
be weighted heavily against the government.   A more neutral reason such 
as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but 
nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such 
circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the 
defendant.  Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve 
to justify appropriate delay.   
 
Id.  On the other hand, “[d]elays attributable to the defendant weigh heavily against the 
defendant.”  State v. Greenlee, 327 S.W.3d 602, 612 (Mo. App. 2010) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
15 
 
 
Based on the schedules of all parties, Mr. Sisco’s trial initially was set for August 
20, 2007 – 10 months after his arrest.  The state was granted its first continuance from 
that date to December 10, 2007, due to the prosecutor’s health.10  The case was 
subsequently continued by the court to March 24, 2008, due to docket constraints.  It then 
was transferred to division 18 because the judge in division 10 was placed on special 
assignment.  Division 18 set trial for June 30, 2008.  The 10-month delay caused by these 
continuances is weighed against the state but not heavily because it was due to neutral 
reasons.  See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; see also State v. Bell, 66 S.W.3d 157, 164 (Mo. 
App. 2001).11 
 
On June 30, 2008, the state requested and was granted its second continuance to 
perform DNA testing after Ms. Neal, a key witness for the state, appeared before trial 
began with counsel and indicated her intent to invoke her Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination.  While the state requested only a one-month continuance, the trial 
court indicated that it was not available in a month and that a trial date would be set after 
the parties conferred with their schedules.  Before a new trial date was set, the case was 
                                              
10 Mr. Sisco argues that this continuance was an improper tactical delay because “it 
occurred on a date when the State was not prepared to make a submissible case.”  Yet, 
Mr. Sisco admits that the continuance “may have been for the medical condition of 
State’s counsel,” and nothing in the record shows that the state requested this continuance 
for anything other than medical reasons.  The lead prosecutor stated that the continuance 
was due to a degenerative disc in his back.  
11 The Court examines the reason for each delay separately but it does not consider each 
period discretely as earlier delays may affect later ones.  See Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 
81, 94 (2009).  The mere fact that an earlier delay may have an effect on later ones does 
not, however, require this Court to attribute to the state all delays subsequent to the 
state’s first continuance.  Such a rule would be contrary to the Supreme Court’s flexible 
approach requiring consideration of all relevant circumstances.  See id. at 89-90. 
16 
 
transferred to division 15 by agreement of the parties because the judge in division 18 
was assigned an exclusive domestic docket.  Upon Mr. Sisco’s request to set a trial date, 
the court set trial for April 27, 2009. 
Delay resulting from the state’s performance of DNA analysis is weighed against 
the state but not heavily.  State v. Davis, 903 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Mo. App. 1995).  
Similarly, delay caused by uncooperative witnesses is weighed against the state only 
slightly.  State v. Atchison, 258 S.W.3d 914, 919-20 (Mo. App. 2008).  Mr. Sisco argues 
that the delay should weigh more heavily against the state because the state was negligent 
in not contacting Ms. Neal sooner and in not ordering the DNA testing sooner.  The 
record reflects that the state talked to Ms. Neal over the telephone a week before the June 
30th trial date and that, at that time, she gave no indication that she would not testify.  
Further, because the state was relying on Ms. Neal to place Mr. Sisco at the scene of the 
crime, it chose not to perform DNA testing until it was clear that such testing would be 
necessary.12  The trial court found the state did not act negligently or in bad faith, and this 
Court gives this finding considerable deference.  See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652.  
Accordingly, the delay resulting from the June 30th continuance is weighed slightly 
against the state. 
Some of the delay during this time, however, was caused by Mr. Sisco’s 
opposition to the state’s motion for a buccal swab from Mr. Sisco.  The state moved to 
                                              
12 The state had also sought to identify Mr. Sisco with Ms. Bridge’s testimony.  At the 
time of the June 30th trial date, however, the state had been unable to serve her with a 
subpoena.  The state represented to the court that it believed Ms. Bridges, who has two 
children with Anthony Sisco, intentionally was avoiding being served. 
17 
 
compel production of a buccal swab on September 18, 2009, and Mr. Sisco requested and 
received additional time to respond to the motion.  A hearing was not held on the motion 
until November 25, 2009, and Mr. Sisco did not provide a buccal swab for DNA testing 
until December 12, 2009.  Mr. Sisco had a right to oppose the state’s motion, but this 
Court will consider how his opposition contributed to the delay.  See Owsley, 959 S.W.2d 
at 794. 
The third delay caused by the state occurred when the state filed a nolle prosequi 
on April 27, 2009, to avoid the trial court’s unfavorable ruling excluding fingerprint 
evidence and its refiling of the case on the same date.  As discussed above, the prosecutor 
was within his authority to file a nolle prosequi and refile the charges to avoid the 
unfavorable ruling.  Clinch, 335 S.W.3d at 583-84.  Nevertheless, the dismissal of       
Mr. Sisco’s charges delayed his case further, and this Court will consider that period of 
delay and the reason for it in examining Mr. Sisco’s speedy trial claim.  See Garcia, 316 
S.W.3d at 911.  The state’s conduct in dismissing and refiling the case to circumvent the 
trial court’s exclusion of the fingerprint evidence and denial of a continuance was 
designed to delay trial.  Because the state deliberately delayed trial to avoid an adverse 
ruling, the delay resulting from the state’s nolle prosequi must be weighed heavily 
against the state.  It should be noted, however, that this is not the type of case discussed 
in Doggett, in which the state “intentionally [holds] back in its prosecution . . . to gain 
18 
 
some impermissible advantage at trial” because that state had authority to dismiss and 
refile the case to avoid an unfavorable ruling.13  See 505 U.S. at 656 (emphasis added). 
After the new case against Mr. Sisco was assigned to division 13, trial was set for 
July 6, 2009, but that trial date was rescheduled after Mr. Sisco filed an amended motion 
to dismiss on July 2, 2009, alleging that the information filed against him was invalid 
because he had not waived his right to a preliminary hearing.  On July 10, the state 
corrected any deficiency by filing an indictment.  Also on July 10, Mr. Sisco filed a 
motion for a change of judge, which was granted, and, on July 13, he filed a request for 
discovery, a motion to dismiss and quash the information, a motion in limine, and a 
request for sanctions.  Once again, while this Court does not deny Mr. Sisco’s legal right 
to file these motions and have them adjudicated, the resulting delay is attributable to    
Mr. Sisco.  See Owsley, 959 S.W.2d at 794. 
The time between Mr. Sisco’s arrest and his actual trial date is approximately three 
years.  His trial initially was not scheduled to begin until 10 months after his arrest, and 
Mr. Sisco made no objection to that date.  The next 10 months of delay was caused by the 
                                              
13 Mr. Sisco argues the state acted in bad faith and relies heavily on statements made by 
the trial court during the hearing on the motion in limine.  The trial court stated, “I can’t 
get over the fact that we’re sitting here two days before trial and just now getting reports 
and indications that there is now a match of a fingerprint on a piece of evidence at the 
location of this homicide. . . .  I’m extremely, extremely troubled by this new evidence 
related to the fingerprint.  It just doesn’t pass the smell test.”  A complete reading of the 
transcript reveals that the trial court was more concerned about the lack of time Mr. Sisco 
would have to counter the evidence than about any wrongdoing on the part of the state.  
The court went on to state, “And I don’t mean to cast dispersions [sic] on anybody.  It’s 
just this coming to light essentially two days before trial of this cause concerns me a great 
deal, because I think it precludes . . . Mr. Sisco from in any way being able to challenge 
that . . ..  And, again, I don’t think that it is – of course, it isn’t a case of non-disclosure, 
but a case more of the timing of disclosure of the evidence.”   
19 
 
prosecutor’s health issues and the court’s docket and is weighed slightly against the state.  
Next, a 10-month delay followed the prosecutor’s requested continuance so that it could 
conduct DNA testing when Ms. Neal appeared at trial with her counsel and asserted her 
Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate herself.  Though most of this delay is weighed 
slightly against the state, some of it was caused by Mr. Sisco’s refusal to provide a buccal 
swab and by his request for additional time to respond to the state’s motion to compel 
production.   
The case then was delayed for 70 days due to the state’s filing of a nolle prosequi 
and refiling of the charges, which is weighed heavily against the state.  The remaining 
three months of delay, however, are attributed to Mr. Sisco.14 
Assertion of Right to Trial 
The third factor to be considered is whether and how the defendant asserted his 
right to a speedy trial.  Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.  There is no rigid requirement regarding 
                                              
14 Mr. Sisco argues that all of this delay should weigh heavily against the state.  He 
contends the state’s waiting nearly two years after the crime to perform DNA testing was 
an improper strategic decision.  In hindsight, it may have been more expeditious to 
perform DNA testing earlier, but this Court does not find any bad faith in the state’s 
failure to do so until it discovered the witness who had identified Mr. Sisco as being at 
the scene of the crime indicated her intent to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege.     
Mr. Sisco also accuses the state of withholding exculpatory evidence and violating 
discovery rules by not responding to discovery requests.  Yet Mr. Sisco raises no claim 
on appeal that the trial court erred in not assessing discovery sanctions against the state or 
show that any information was not available to Mr. Sisco by the time of trial.  Further, it 
does not appear any of the alleged withholding of evidence resulted in prejudice.  For 
example, he argues the state waited until five days before the April 17, 2009 trial date to 
disclose 150 hours of surveillance footage, which he claims shows the victims threatened 
him with assault rifles on the night of the crime.  Despite having the surveillance footage 
nearly six months before his actual trial, Mr. Sisco asserted a misidentification defense, 
rather than a self-defense defense. 
20 
 
when a defendant must assert his right to a speedy trial.  Id. at 527-28.  Instead, courts 
will weigh the timeliness of the assertion and the frequency and force of a defendant’s 
objections.  Id. at 529. 
Mr. Sisco first asserted his right to a speedy trial on June 30, 2008, 20 months 
after he was arrested and charged, when the state requested a continuance to perform 
DNA testing after Ms. Neal asserted her Fifth Amendment rights.  Before the state 
dismissed the case on April 27, 2009, Mr. Sisco objected to the state’s requested 
continuance because he was ready for trial and had a right to a speedy trial.  He again 
asserted his right to a speedy trial through oral and written requests for a speedy trial in 
May 2009 and in motions to dismiss based on a violation of his right to a speedy trial 
filed in June and July of 2009.  Mr. Sisco renewed his motion to dismiss during trial and 
in his motion for a new trial.  Though Mr. Sisco waited almost two years, he asserted his 
right to a speedy trial several times, which weighs in favor of finding a violation of that 
right. 
Prejudice to the Defendant 
 
The final factor that must be considered is the prejudice suffered by the defendant 
as a result of the delay.  Garcia, 316 S.W.3d at 912.  Whether a delay prejudiced the 
defendant is evaluated in light of three concerns: “(1) prevention of oppressive pretrial 
incarceration; (2) minimization of anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limitation 
of the possibility that the defense will be impaired.”  Id.  Courts view the third 
consideration as the most serious.  Id. 
21 
 
Mr. Sisco was incarcerated for only the first 3 months after his arrest.  He was then 
released on bond.  While on bond, Mr. Sisco was electronically monitored and under 
house arrest.  Despite being on house arrest, Mr. Sisco was allowed to go to work.  While 
the restriction on freedom that comes with being electronically monitored and under 
house arrest with the exception of work gives rise to actual prejudice, it is less prejudicial 
than if Mr. Sisco had been incarcerated.  Mr. Sisco asserts he experienced anxiety and 
concern facing the possibility of a first-degree murder conviction.  “Undoubtedly, anxiety 
and concern exist in every criminal case, but that alone does not establish prejudice 
where, as here, the defendant neither asserts nor shows that the delay weighed 
particularly heavily on him in specific instances.”  Bolin, 643 S.W.2d at 815 (internal 
quotations omitted). 
As to the third concern, the record does not show that Mr. Sisco’s defense was 
impaired significantly by the delay.  He does not identify any witnesses who disappeared 
or otherwise became unavailable because of the delay, nor does he allege that any 
evidence was lost.  He argues that less delay should be tolerated because his case 
included eyewitness testimony.  The delay may have, in fact, benefitted him because the 
eyewitnesses who gave statements placing him at the crime scene became less 
cooperative with the passage of time. 
Mr. Sisco also argues that continuing a case multiple times increases the cost of 
defense because attorneys must prepare for the newly scheduled trials, but he does not 
allege the continuances in his case caused an increased cost to him.  He also contends that 
the delays enabled the state to bolster its case against him.  Mr. Sisco focuses on the 
22 
 
state’s continuance to perform DNA testing on a Bluetooth device and on the state’s nolle 
prosequi to avoid the ruling excluding fingerprint evidence.  This evidence was not used 
against Mr. Sisco at trial because DNA testing on the Bluetooth device did not positively 
identify Mr. Sisco and the fingerprint evidence was excluded again after the state refiled 
the charges.  The only actual prejudice in this case is the restriction on Mr. Sisco’s 
freedom that comes with being electronically monitored and under house arrest, and that 
prejudice is lessened by the fact that Mr. Sisco was able to maintain employment during 
that time.   
Mr. Sisco argues that he is entitled to relief because the length of his delay gives 
rise to a presumption of prejudice that the state did not rebut by affirmatively proving that 
he was not prejudiced.  While this Court already determined the length of Mr. Sisco’s 
delay was presumptively prejudicial, this determination was for purposes of triggering 
judicial review.  See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-52.  When there is a delay of sufficient 
length to be presumptively prejudicial, courts then will engage in a balancing of factors, 
one of which is prejudice.  Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.  Determining a delay is long enough 
to trigger consideration of other factors does not negate the need for this Court to 
consider actual prejudice.   
Nevertheless, the presumption of prejudice “intensifies over time,” and its 
importance among the other factors increases with the length of the delay.  Doggett, 505 
U.S. at 652, 656.  Additionally, no one factor, including actual prejudice, is necessary to 
find a speedy trial violation.  Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.  Accordingly, courts recognize that 
“‘affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial 
23 
 
claim,’ as ‘excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of trial in ways that 
neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify.’”  Garcia, 316 S.W.3d at 913 
(quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655).  In Doggett, the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen the 
Government’s negligence . . . causes delay six times as long as that generally sufficient to 
trigger judicial review and when the presumption of prejudice, albeit unspecified, is 
neither extenuated, as by the defendant’s acquiescence, nor persuasively rebutted, the 
defendant is entitled to relief.”  505 U.S. at 658 (internal citations omitted).  This Court 
relied on Doggett to find that a seven-year delay between an indictment and arrest caused 
by the government’s negligence violated the defendant’s right to speedy trial when four 
witnesses to the crime had disappeared during that time and the state had not proven 
affirmatively that the delay left the defendant’s ability to defend himself unimpaired.  
Garcia, 316 S.W.3d at 913. 
Doggett and Garcia both involved a lengthy delay between the indictment and 
arrest, a time period during which delay is particularly likely to result in prejudice that an 
accused may be unable to prove or identify because the accused may be unaware of the 
charges.  See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652; Garcia, 316 S.W.3d at 914.  The three-year delay 
between Mr. Sisco’s arrest and trial does not rise to the same level of seriousness as the 
delays in those cases.  Further, the presumption of prejudice in this case was attenuated 
by Mr. Sisco’s acquiescence in the delay until June 30, 2008, and by the time spent 
adjudicating the numerous motions Mr. Sisco filed in July 2009.  The only delay caused 
by the state and to which Mr. Sisco did not acquiesce was from June 30, 2008, to July 6, 
2009.  Part of this delay, however, can be attributed to the case being transferred to 
24 
 
division 15 by agreement of the parties and by Mr. Sisco’s request for additional time to 
respond to the state’s motion to compel.  Accordingly, Mr. Sisco is not entitled to relief 
by merely relying on the presumption of prejudice.   
The length of the delay in this case, as well as the state’s use of a nolle prosequi to 
avoid an adverse ruling, is concerning.  Nevertheless, the state requested only three 
continuances during the three-year delay, two of which were granted by the trial court 
and one it obtained by filing the nolle prosequi.  Importantly, the delay caused by the 
nolle prosequi that weighed heavily against the state was only 70 days.  Most of the 
three-year delay was caused by neutral reasons, and Mr. Sisco waited 20 months to assert 
his right to a speedy trial.  Moreover, the actual prejudice Mr. Sisco suffered by the delay 
was minimal.  When balancing all the factors, the presumption of prejudice in this case is 
outweighed.  Therefore, this Court finds Mr. Sisco’s right to a speedy trial was not 
violated. 
Conclusion 
 
The trial court did not err in not designating the state’s nolle prosequi as a 
dismissal with prejudice because the court did not have authority to do so.  Additionally, 
because Mr. Sisco’s right to a speedy trial was not violated, the trial court did not err in 
overruling his motion to dismiss.  The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE 
 
Russell, C.J., Fischer, Draper, 
Wilson, and Teitelman, JJ., concur. 
Stith, J., dissents.