Title: Rexroad v. City of Springfield
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 94374
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: August 21, 2003

Docket No. 94374-Agenda 13-March 2003.
MATTHEW REXROAD et al., Appellants, v. THE CITY OF 
 								SPRINGFIELD et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed August 21, 2003.
	 
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	Plaintiffs, Matthew Rexroad and Harold Rexroad, filed a
negligence complaint against defendants, the City of Springfield
and the Board of Education of Springfield School District No. 186.
Plaintiffs sought to recover damages for injuries Matthew suffered
when he fell in an area under excavation in a parking lot located
adjacent to a high school football field. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the City and the school board,
finding that the immunity of section 3-106 of the Local
Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act
(Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/3-106 (West 1994)) precluded
liability. The appellate court affirmed, with one justice dissenting.
331 Ill. App. 3d 545. We subsequently allowed plaintiffs' petition
for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). We have also allowed
the Illinois Association of School Boards, the Illinois
Governmental Association of Pools, the Park District Risk
Management Agency, and the Board of Education of the City of
Chicago, to file an amicus curiae brief in support of defendants.

BACKGROUND
	On August 12, 1995, Matthew was working as a manager for
the Springfield Lanphier High School football team during its
preseason summer practice sessions. At some point during
practice, a coach told Matthew to leave the practice field to get a
helmet from the locker room for one of the players. The locker
room was in the gymnasium to the north of the practice field. 
Matthew exited the practice field using the north gate, "gate B." 
This was the most direct route to the locker room and did not lead
near to the vicinity of the hole.. After retrieving the helmet,
however, Matthew found that "gate B" had been locked, so he
headed through the parking lot toward the west gate, "gate A." He
was focusing his attention on the player who needed the helmet,
when he stepped into a hole in the parking lot between gates A and
B and broke his ankle. Matthew had noticed the hole in the
parking lot earlier that day. The parking lot was located north and
west of the practice field, between the gym and practice field.  The
parking lot served the entire school complex, with the freshman-sophomore doors located west of the lot.
	The hole Matthew fell in was about 64 square feet in size, 4
inches deep, and was filled with sand. It was created by the
removal of a fire hydrant. City workers placed barricades and an
orange ribbon around the hole following the excavation, and the
barricades were to remain in place until the City filled the hole and
paved it to make it level with the parking lot. However, the
barricades were not in place at the time of Matthew's fall; instead,
they were lined up against a fence behind the hole.
	Shirley Laurik testified in her deposition that she went to all
of the Springfield Lanphier High School football practices in 1995
because her son, Russell Laurik, was a manager for the team.
Matthew testified in his deposition that Shirley always watched the
team practice and that when he fell on the day in question, she was
seated in a chair near the hole in the parking lot, but did not see
him fall.
	Plaintiffs filed a negligence suit against the City and the
school board. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment,
contending that the site of Matthew's injury was "intended or
permitted to be used for recreational purposes" under section
3-106 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/3-106 (West
1994)) and defendants were therefore immune from an ordinary
negligence claim. Defendants' summary judgment motion further
alleged that they owed no duty to Matthew because the hole was
an open and obvious condition on the premises. The trial court
granted summary judgment for defendants, finding that they were
immune from suit under section 3-106 of the Act. The trial court
did not address the question of whether the hole was open and
obvious.
	The appellate court affirmed, relying primarily on this court's
decision in Sylvester v. Chicago Park District, 179 Ill. 2d 500
(1997) (section 3-106 immunity applied where plaintiff was
injured in a public parking lot across the street from Soldier Field).
331 Ill. App. 3d at 549-53. The appellate court noted that the
locker room and the practice field are recreational facilities. It then
found that, "[l]ooking at the property as a whole, the parking lot
is integral to the football recreational facility because it connects
the locker room and football practice field. Accordingly, the
parking lot increases the usefulness of the football practice field
that is permitted to be used for recreational purposes ***." 331 Ill.
App. 3d at 552.

ANALYSIS
	Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, affidavits,
depositions, admissions, and exhibits on file, viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant, demonstrate that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000);
Sollami v. Eaton, 201 Ill. 2d 1, 6 (2002). The purpose of summary
judgment is not to try a question of fact, but is instead to determine
whether one exists. Golla v. General Motors Corp., 167 Ill. 2d 353, 358 (1995). We review de novo an order granting summary
judgment. Harrison v. Hardin County Community Unit School
District No. 1, 197 Ill. 2d 466, 470-71 (2001).
	The first issue presented on appeal is whether section 3-106
of the Tort Immunity Act is applicable to the school parking lot
where plaintiff was injured, thereby immunizing defendants from
liability. Section 3-106 of the Act provides as follows:
			"Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is
liable for an injury where the liability is based on the
existence of a condition of any public property intended
or permitted to be used for recreational purposes,
including but not limited to parks, playgrounds, open
areas, buildings or other enclosed recreational facilities,
unless such local entity or public employee is guilty of
willful and wanton conduct proximately causing such
injury." (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/3-106 (West
1994).
	Section 3-106 provides a public entity with an affirmative
defense, which, if properly raised and proved, bars a plaintiff's
right to recovery.  Bubb v. Springfield School District 186, 167 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1995).  By providing immunity in section 3-106, the
legislature sought to prevent the diversion of public funds from
their intended purpose to the payment of damage claims. Bubb,
167 Ill. 2d  at 378. In 1986, the legislature expanded the scope of
immunity because local public entities began facing difficulty in
affording liability insurance. Sylvester, 179 Ill. 2d  at 509.  Prior to
its amendment in 1986, section 3-106 applied only to public
property "intended or permitted to be used as a park, playground
or open area for recreational purposes." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 85,
par. 3-106.  The General Assembly amended the statute to its
current language, applying to "any public property intended or
permitted to be used for recreational purposes, including but not
limited to parks, playgrounds, open areas, buildings or other
enclosed recreational facilities." Pub. Act 84-1431, art. 1, §2, eff.
November 25, 1986 (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 85, par.
3-106); see 745 ILCS 10/3-106 (West 2000).  Section 3-106
immunity was expanded to cover any recreational property, similar
in nature to the kinds of properties listed in the statute.  Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d  at 378.
	This court has had two prior opportunities to examine the
language of section 3-106 of the Act. In Bubb v. Springfield
School District 186, 167 Ill. 2d 372, 384 (1995), we found that
section 3-106 "applies if public property is intended or permitted
to be used for recreational purposes, regardless of the primary
purpose of the property." More recently, in Sylvester, we found
that section 3-106 might apply to facilities or structures that
increase the usefulness of public property intended or permitted to
be used for recreational purposes, even though the facilities or
structures themselves may not be recreational in character.
Sylvester, 179 Ill. 2d  at 508.
	Plaintiffs argue that the character of school property as a
whole is educational, not recreational. Therefore, they contend,
this case is distinguishable from Sylvester. They claim that
because the parking lot was not within the bounded area of the
practice field, the independent character of the parking lot must
control over any increased usefulness it may have added to the
practice field. To support their position, plaintiffs rely upon
Adamczyk v. Township High School District 214, 324 Ill. App. 3d
920 (2001), Capps v. Belleville School District No. 201, 313 Ill.
App. 3d 710 (2000), and Batson v. Pinckneyville Elementary
School District No. 50, 294 Ill. App. 3d 832 (1998).  In response,
defendants urge this court to read Sylvester as granting immunity
for nonrecreational pathways on school property that provide
access to recreational facilities because such paths increase the
usefulness of the facilities.
	We find plaintiffs' arguments more persuasive, as defendants'
interpretation would be too expansive and would swallow the
common law duty of due care codified by section 3-102(a) of the
Act (745 ILCS 10/3-102(a) (West 1994) (a local public entity has
a duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain its property in a
reasonably safe condition)).
	Sylvester is distinguishable from the present case.  There, the
plaintiff parked at McCormick Place and walked toward Soldier
Field for a Bears football game. As she was traversing the south
parking lot of Soldier Field, she tripped on a misplaced, concrete
car stop. This court found that section 3-106 immunity applied,
stating as follows:
			"[S]ection 3-106 may apply to facilities or structures
that increase the usefulness of public property intended or
permitted to be used for recreational purposes. These
facilities or structures need not be recreational in character
for section 3-106 to apply. [Citation.] Although the
walkways and parking lots adjacent to Soldier Field may
not be primarily recreational, Soldier Field itself is
certainly recreational and these facilities increase its
usefulness. Taken as a whole, we find that Soldier Field
and its adjacent walkways and parking lots are intended or
permitted to be used for recreational purposes." Sylvester,
179 Ill. 2d  at 508.
	We find Slyvester to be distinguishable because Soldier
Field's adjacent parking lots and walkways served  to benefit
Soldier Field only and thus increased the usefulness of the
stadium.  Here, in contrast, the high school parking lot provided
access to several different areas of the school not used for
recreational purposes.  The parking lot in question is different
from the parking lot in Sylvester and a different analysis applies.
	The cases that have addressed section 3-106 immunity in
connection with school property have found immunity only for
gymnasiums, playgrounds and sidewalks intended to be used for
recreational purposes within school grounds.  See Adamczyk, 324
Ill. App. 3d at 926 (and cases cited therein).  The cases that have
dealt with school parking lots and nonrecreational areas  that serve
the entire school, however, have found that section 3-106
immunity does not apply. Adamczyk v. Township High School
District 214, 324 Ill. App. 3d 920 (2001) (immunity did not apply
where plaintiff fell in hole in parking lot located 30 feet from gym
entrance, where lot also provided access to front entrance of
school, distinguishing Sylvester on the basis that, unlike the
school, Soldier Field's "overall and regular purpose" was clearly
recreational); Capps v. Belleville School District No. 201, 313 Ill.
App. 3d 710 (2000) (immunity did not apply where plaintiff fell
off accessibility ramp as she left school gym); Batson v.
Pinckneyville Elementary School District No. 50, 294 Ill. App. 3d
832 (1998) (immunity did not apply where plaintiff was injured on
sidewalk outside door exiting school gym).
	Because the parking lot in this case served the entire school,
we find that Bubb is more instructive for purposes of our present
analysis than Sylvester.  In Bubb, the plaintiff was injured when
she rode her bicycle off the edge of a school sidewalk and onto a
grass playground. To facilitate the playing of a game known as
four-square, the school had painted yellow lines on the sidewalk
near where the plaintiff had been injured.  In affirming summary
judgment for the school, we found that the school intended
children to use the area as part of the playground.  We cautioned,
however, that section 3-106 should not be taken to provide
immunity to any public area where recreation might occur.  Bubb,
167 Ill. 2d  at 381.  We recognized that the use of public property
for recreation "may be so incidental that section 3-106 does not
apply."  Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d  at 382.  Therefore, courts should make
a case-by-case determination, looking to the nature of the property
and its past use.  Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d  at 384.
	Applying the analysis of Bubb, we hold that any recreational
use of the parking lot in question was so incidental that section
3-106 does not apply. The parking lot served the entire school and
only incidentally the football practice field.  Moreover, the record
does not indicate that the lot had been used for recreation prior to
the date of the incident or that recreation had ever been
encouraged there.  That Matthew was traversing the lot at the time
of the injury to further the recreational pursuits underway at the
football practice field is not important, as immunity depends on
the character of the property in question, not the activity performed
at any given time (Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d at 379).
	Here, the character of the parking lot was not recreational. If
we were to accept defendants' argument, we would be effectively
immunizing large amounts of otherwise nonrecreational school
property simply because it is located near recreational school
property. Defendants, then, would owe no duty of reasonable care
to students parking their vehicles and walking through such
parking lots to their classes. We do not believe that this was the
intent of the General Assembly when it immunized public property
"intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes,"
qualifying it with a list of examples of the kinds of public property
it had in mind-parks, playgrounds, open areas, buildings and other
recreational facilities. Accordingly, we conclude that the appellate
court erred in affirming summary judgment for defendants based
on section 3-106 of the Act.
	Our resolution of the immunity issue in favor of plaintiffs
leaves us to consider defendants' additional argument in support
of their motion for summary judgment.  Defendants contend that
the unpaved site of the injury was an open and obvious condition,
precluding any duty to remedy it.  We disagree.
	Section 3-102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act provides as
follows:
			"Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a local
public entity has the duty to exercise ordinary care to
maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition for the
use in the exercise of ordinary care of people whom the
entity intended and permitted to use the property in a
manner in which and at such times as it was reasonably
foreseeable that it would be used, and shall not be liable
for injury unless it is proven that it has actual or
constructive notice of the existence of such a condition
that is not reasonably safe in reasonably adequate time
prior to an injury to have taken measures to remedy or
protect against such condition."  745 ILCS 10/3-102(a)
(West 1994).
Factors relevant to the question of whether a duty exists are (1) the
reasonable foreseeability of injury to another, (2) the reasonable
likelihood of injury, (3) the magnitude of the burden that guarding
against the injury places on the defendant, and (4) the
consequences of placing that burden on the defendant.  Bucheleres
v. Chicago Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 435, 456 (1996).
	Generally, a party who owns or controls land is not required
to foresee and protect against an injury if the potentially dangerous
condition is open and obvious.  Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d  at 447-48
(diving from a seawall into lake water of an unknown depth
presents an open and obvious risk). The existence of an open and
obvious condition, however, is not a per se bar to a finding of a
legal duty on the part of the premises owner or occupier.  Sollami
v. Eaton, 201 Ill. 2d 1, 15 (2002).  There are two limited
exceptions to the rule that a defendant has no duty to protect a
plaintiff from an open and obvious condition. See Bonner v. City
of Chicago, 334 Ill. App. 3d 481, 484 (2002), citing Ward v.
K mart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 147 (1990).  Pertinent to our inquiry
here is the distraction exception: a property owner owes a duty of
due care if there is reason to expect that the invitee's attention may
be distracted, so that he will not discover what is obvious, or will
forget what he has discovered or will fail to protect himself against
it.  Sollami, 201 Ill. 2d at 15-16; Ward, 136 Ill. 2d at 149-50;
Restatement (Second) of Torts §343A, Comment f, at 220 (1965).
	In Ward, the plaintiff walked into a concrete post located
immediately outside of a K Mart store and was injured.  Plaintiff
had noticed the post when he entered the store, but was distracted
upon exiting due to the large mirror he was carrying out.  This
court upheld the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, finding that
despite the open and obvious nature of the post, it was reasonably
foreseeable to the store owner that customers might momentarily
forget the post when exiting or might become distracted carrying
large items.  Ward, 136 Ill. 2d  at 153.
	Although the question of whether a duty exists in a particular
case is one of law to be determined by the court (Ward, 136 Ill. 2d
at 140), the question of whether defendant breached an existing
duty is a question of fact to be determined by the jury (Deibert v.
Bauer Brothers Construction Co., 141 Ill. 2d 430, 441 (1990)).  If
a duty exists, the jury must decide whether the defendant failed to
exercise reasonable care in protecting the plaintiff from harm and
whether such failure was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injury. Deibert, 141 Ill. 2d  at 441 (if the jury finds that the
possessor of land exercised reasonable care, the possessor will not
be liable to the invitee despite his duty); see also Ward, 136 Ill. 2d 
at 156 ("Whether in fact the condition itself served as adequate
notice of its presence or whether additional precautions were
required to satisfy the defendant's duty are questions properly left
to the trier of fact").
	We find the present case to be similar to Ward.  It was
reasonably foreseeable that students may fail to avoid the risk
posed by the hole by becoming distracted or momentarily
forgetful.  The record contains some evidence that this was in fact
the case.  Matthew testified he was distracted from the hole
because of his focus on carrying a football helmet to the player
who needed it.  We further find that the broken ankle suffered by
Matthew is the kind of injury likely to result from unexpectedly
stepping into a hole.  Moreover, the magnitude of the burden to
exercise reasonable care to protect persons from the risk of falling
in the hole was slight.  The location had been barricaded earlier,
indicating that defendants may not have considered the hole to be
open and obvious, but the barricades had been unexplainably
removed by the time of the injury.  Defendants could have guarded
against the injury simply by leaving the barricades in place.  Under
these circumstances, we find that summary judgment in favor of
defendants based on the alleged open and obvious nature of the
condition on the premises would be inappropriate.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgments of the
appellate and circuit courts.  The cause is remanded to the circuit
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.



Reversed and remanded.