Title: New Jersey v. Twiggs
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: June 19, 2018

New Jersey v. Twiggs Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary In 2009, a detective responded to a robbery call and met with S.T. (the victim) and defendant Gary Twiggs, who stated they had been robbed by a white male wearing a mask, later identified as Dillon Tracy. A police officer took the mask for DNA analysis. In July 2014, police collected DNA from Tracy. His DNA matched the sample found on the mask. Tracy later confessed, implicating Twiggs. Based on Tracy’s testimony, police arrested Twiggs for conspiracy and the robbery, and a grand jury returned an indictment. Twiggs moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the claim was barred by the general criminal statute of limitations. The State responded that the DNA exception within N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) tolled the statute of limitations. The trial court found the DNA-tolling provision inapplicable and dismissed the indictment. A divided panel of the Appellate Division affirmed. In 2002, ten-year-old Iyonna Jones found a note from her mother, Elisha Jones -- intended for Iyonna’s aunt, Likisha Jones -- explaining that Iyonna’s nine-year-old sister, Jon-Niece Jones, had stopped breathing and that Elisha went to “tak[e] care of it.” Likisha called her brother, James Jones, telling him that there was a family emergency. James and Iyonna’s uncle, Godfrey Gibson, traveled to Elisha’s home. James, Gibson, and Elisha drove to a wooded area in Upper Freehold, New Jersey. Elisha took the bin into the woods. Nearly four months later, Elisha died. Years later, in March 2005, a hunter found a child’s skeletal remains. In July 2012, Iyonna provided information relating to the disappearance of Jon-Niece. Law enforcement compared Iyonna’s DNA and the DNA of Jon-Niece’s father to the DNA generated from the skeletal remains. In January 2013, a grand jury returned an indictment, charging James, Likisha, and Gibson with third-degree conspiracy, as well as substantive tampering, obstruction, and hindering charges. James and Likisha moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed the denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss the tampering, obstruction, and hindering charges; affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the conspiracy charge; and remanded for resentencing on the conspiracy charge. The Court granted the State’s petition and defendants’ cross-petitions for certification. Both cases implicated the DNA-tolling exception. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined the exception applied only when the State obtained DNA evidence that directly matched the defendant to physical evidence of a crime. Because the DNA identifications at issue in these cases did not directly link defendants to the relevant offenses, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal of the indictments against defendant Gary Twiggs in its entirety and against defendants James and Likisha Jones in relevant part. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.) State v. Gary Twiggs (A-51-16) (077686) State v. James E. Jones & Likisha Jones (A-63/64/65-16) (077964)Argued January 29, 2018 -- Decided June 19, 2018TIMPONE, J., writing for the Court. The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice (the Code) contains a tolling provision that delays the start of the clock on the statute of limitations “when the prosecution is supported by physical evidence that identifies the actor by means of DNA testing . . . until the State is in possession of both the physical evidence and the DNA . . . evidence necessary to establish the identification of the actor by means of comparison to the physical evidence.” N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c). These consolidated appeals hinge on whether the provision applies when a DNA identification does not directly identify the defendant but rather begins an investigative chain that leads to the defendant. A separate issue in State v. Jones is whether the indictment on the conspiracy count survives under a “continuing course of conduct” analysis. State v. Twiggs: On June 16, 2009, a detective responded to a robbery call and met with S.T. (the victim) and defendant Gary Twiggs, who stated they had been robbed by a white male wearing a mask, later identified as Dillon Tracy. A police officer took the mask for DNA analysis. In July 2014, police collected DNA from Tracy. His DNA matched the sample found on the mask. Tracy later confessed, implicating Twiggs. Based on Tracy’s testimony, police arrested Twiggs for conspiracy and the robbery, and a grand jury returned an indictment. Twiggs moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the claim was barred by the general criminal statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(b)(1). The State responded that the DNA exception within N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) tolled the statute of limitations. The trial court found the DNA-tolling provision inapplicable and dismissed the indictment. A divided panel of the Appellate Division affirmed. 445 N.J. Super. 23, 36 (App. Div. 2016). The State filed a notice of appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 2:2-1(a)(2). State v. Jones: On August 15, 2002, ten-year-old Iyonna Jones found a note from her mother, Elisha Jones -- intended for Iyonna’s aunt, Likisha Jones -- explaining that Iyonna’s nine-year-old sister, Jon-Niece Jones, had stopped breathing and that Elisha went to “tak[e] care of it.” Likisha called her brother, James Jones, telling him that there was a family emergency. James and Iyonna’s uncle, Godfrey Gibson, traveled to Elisha’s home. Upon their arrival, Elisha packed a plastic bin and garbage bag in the rear of Gibson’s car. James, Gibson, and Elisha drove to a wooded area in Upper Freehold, New Jersey. Elisha took the bin into the woods. A few days later at a family meeting, everyone present made a compact to keep the incident secret and to answer any inquiries as to Jon-Niece’s whereabouts with 1 “she’s with her father.” Nearly four months later, Elisha died. Years later, in March 2005, a hunter found a child’s skeletal remains. In July 2012, Iyonna provided information relating to the disappearance of Jon-Niece. Law enforcement compared Iyonna’s DNA and the DNA of Jon-Niece’s father, Jamal Kerse, to the DNA generated from the skeletal remains. In January 2013, a grand jury returned an indictment, charging James, Likisha, and Gibson with third-degree conspiracy, as well as substantive tampering, obstruction, and hindering charges. James and Likisha moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed the denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss the tampering, obstruction, and hindering charges; affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the conspiracy charge; and remanded for resentencing on the conspiracy charge. 445 N.J. Super. 555, 560 (App. Div. 2016). The Court granted the State’s petition and defendants’ cross-petitions for certification. 230 N.J. 361 (2017); 230 N.J. 374 (2017); 230 N.J. 375 (2017).HELD: The DNA-tolling exception applies only when the State obtains DNA evidence that directly matches the defendant to physical evidence of a crime. In Jones, the State presented sufficient evidence of a continuing course of conduct to survive the motion to dismiss.1. If the State does not file charges against an individual within the relevant statutory timeframe, the statute of limitations serves as an absolute bar to the prosecution of the offense. The DNA-tolling exception tolls the statute of limitations if the State’s prosecution of an individual, “the actor,” is “supported by” DNA evidence that matches, or “identifies,” the actor to physical evidence within its possession. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c). Because of its unique nature, DNA testing has become a widespread and standard practice in identifying criminal perpetrators that courts have accepted as scientifically reliable and admissible in criminal trials against defendants to whom the DNA matched. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) permits tolling when identification is achieved directly by DNA evidence rather than DNA evidence in addition to other means. It is apparent that the Legislature intended the provision to apply to the sole actor whom the DNA distinctly identifies. (pp. 22-25)2. Nothing in the legislative history of the tolling statute calls into question the plain-language reading identified above. Under the State’s interpretation, the tolling provision would apply even when the primary evidence used to support its prosecution of a defendant is not the DNA evidence but rather a statement by a third party. Such evidence is the very kind of stale evidence the criminal statutes of limitations operate to guard against. The statute of limitations is not intended to assist the State in its investigations; it is intended to protect a defendant’s ability to sustain his or her defense. Unlike other forms of evidence, DNA evidence can never become stale. For the DNA-tolling provision to apply, the State must have DNA evidence that establishes a direct link between physical evidence already within its possession and the defendant it seeks to prosecute. (pp. 26-31)3. The DNA evidence obtained from the physical evidence in Jones -- the remains -- established no link beyond a familial connection to Iyonna and Kerse. That evidence certainly did not directly implicate defendants as perpetrators of the substantive crimes 2 charged. The implication came only through third-party testimony, which N.J.S.A. 2C:1- 6(c) does not operate to preserve. Without the exception, the statute of limitations expired. The judgment of the Appellate Division reversing the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment on the substantive charges is affirmed. (pp. 31-32)4. In Twiggs, a grand jury indicted Twiggs based primarily on Tracy’s confession and his subsequent implication of Twiggs as a co-conspirator in the armed robbery. There exists no direct link between the DNA extracted from the physical evidence and Twiggs. Unless DNA evidence establishes a direct identification to the defendant charged, the mere existence of DNA evidence in a case cannot work to toll general statutes of limitations. The State argues that the reading of the term “defendant” to include principals and accomplices for purposes of the No Early Release Act (NERA) in State v. Rumblin, 166 N.J. 550 (2001), should apply to the DNA-tolling context. NERA uses the term “actor” in a wholly distinct framework to achieve underlying policy goals separate from those of the DNA-tolling provision. NERA is not influenced by stale-evidence concerns because it is triggered only after a defendant’s trial or guilty plea. In contrast, the DNA-tolling provision creates an exception at the front end of the judicial process by permitting criminal prosecutions outside of the generally prescribed statute of limitations. The discussion of “actor” in Rumblin to include principals and accomplices under NERA is simply inapplicable to the DNA-tolling provision. In Twiggs, the DNA-tolling exception does not apply. The judgment of the Appellate Division affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the indictment against Twiggs is affirmed. (pp. 33-36)5. As to the motions to dismiss the conspiracy count of the indictment in Jones, “[c]onspiracy is a continuing course of conduct” that terminates, for statute of limitations purposes, when (1) “the crime or crimes which are its object are committed,” or (2) “the agreement that they be committed is abandoned by the defendant and by those with whom he conspired.” N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(f)(1). In Grunewald v. United States, the Supreme Court stressed a “vital distinction” “between acts of concealment done in furtherance of the main criminal objectives of the conspiracy,” which extend the conspiracy and toll the statute of limitations, and “acts of concealment done after these central objectives have been attained, for the purpose only of covering up after the crime.” 353 U.S. 391 , 405 (1957). Here, the State presented sufficient evidence to survive defendants’ motions to dismiss. The co- conspirators exhibited a continuing course of conduct beginning before and extending beyond Elisha’s death. The potential exists that those actions were not merely intended to protect Elisha, but also to insulate from discovery the co-conspirators’ roles. Defendants are entitled to challenge the evidence advanced by the State. And, if this case proceeds to trial, defendants would be entitled to a jury charge explaining Grunewald’s application. The judgment of the Appellate Division affirming the denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment on the conspiracy charge in Jones is affirmed. (pp. 36-40) AFFIRMED.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 51 September Term 2016 A-63/64/ 65 September Term 2016 077686 and 077964STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.GARY TWIGGS, Defendant-Respondent.STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant- Cross-Respondent, v.JAMES E. JONES and LIKISHA JONES, Defendants-Respondents- Cross-Appellants, andGODFREY J. GIBSON, Defendant. Argued January 29, 2018 – Decided June 19, 2018 State of New Jersey v. Gary Twiggs (A-51- 16): On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 445 N.J. Super. 23 (App. Div. 2016). State of New Jersey v. James E. Jones and Likisha Jones (A-63/64/65-16): On certification to the Superior Court, 1 Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 445 N.J. Super. 555 (App. Div. 2016). Sarah Lichter, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant in State of New Jersey v. Gary Twiggs (A-51-16) (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Joseph A. Glyn, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief). Vincent P. Sarubbi argued the cause for respondent in State of New Jersey v. Gary Twiggs (A-51-16) (Archer & Greiner, attorneys; Vincent P. Sarubbi and Bailey E. Axe, on the brief). Sarah Lichter, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant in State of New Jersey v. James E. Jones and Likisha Jones (A-63/64/65-16) (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Sarah Lichter and Joseph A. Glyn, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the briefs). Daniel V. Gautieri, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent James E. Jones in State of New Jersey v. James E. Jones and Likisha Jones (A- 63/64/65-16) (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Daniel V. Gautieri, of counsel and on the briefs). Christopher T. Campbell argued the cause for respondent Likisha Jones in State of New Jersey v. James E. Jones and Likisha Jones A-63/64/65-16) (Law Offices of Christopher T. Campbell, attorneys; Christopher T. Campbell, of counsel and on the briefs). JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court. The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice (the Code) containsa tolling provision that delays the start of the clock on the 2 statute of limitations “when the prosecution is supported byphysical evidence that identifies the actor by means of DNAtesting . . . until the State is in possession of both thephysical evidence and the DNA . . . evidence necessary toestablish the identification of the actor by means of comparisonto the physical evidence.” N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c). Theseconsolidated appeals hinge on the meaning of the term “actor”within that provision and require us to determine whether theprovision applies when a DNA identification does not directlyidentify the defendant but rather begins an investigative chainthat leads to the defendant. Because of the common issues inthis opinion, we are consolidating these appeals. Based on the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) and thepolicy rationale underlying the criminal statute of limitations,we conclude that the DNA-tolling exception applies only when theState obtains DNA evidence that directly matches the defendantto physical evidence of a crime. Because the DNAidentifications at issue in these cases did not directly linkdefendants to the relevant offenses, we affirm the AppellateDivision’s affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal of theindictments against defendant Gary Twiggs in its entirety andagainst defendants James and Likisha Jones in relevant part. A separate issue in State v. Jones is whether theindictment on the conspiracy count survives under a “continuing 3 course of conduct” analysis that would toll the applicablestatute of limitations under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c). We agree thatthe State presented sufficient evidence of a continuing courseof conduct to survive the motion to dismiss the indictment, sowe also affirm the Appellate Division on that count. I. A. We derive the facts in State v. Twiggs from pretrial motionpractice. On June 16, 2009, a detective from the Wildwood CrestPolice Department responded to a robbery call. At the scene,the detective met with S.T. (the victim) and defendant GaryTwiggs, who stated they had been robbed of their money and cellphones by a white male wearing a black hoodie, jeans, and ablack mask, later identified as Dillon Tracy. S.T. told thedetective that after Twiggs pulled up in his vehicle, Tracyapproached S.T. from behind, placed a gun in his side, andordered him into the passenger seat of Twiggs’s vehicle. Tracythen demanded their cell phones and money and escaped into ablack SUV after both Twiggs and S.T. complied. Police laterfound a black mask where S.T. said the black SUV had beenparked. A police officer took the mask for DNA analysis andlater entered the extracted DNA into the Combined DNAInformation System (CODIS). 4 Twiggs and S.T. submitted to multiple interviews withpolice. During one interview, S.T. admitted that he met Twiggson the night of the robbery to sell Twiggs Percocet tablets.S.T. said he believed Twiggs and Tracy were friends and hadarranged the robbery. In a later interview, Twiggs claimed hewas a victim of the robbery. In July 2014, police collected DNA from Tracy after heentered a guilty plea in drug court. His DNA matched the samplefound on the mask. Tracy later confessed, implicating Twiggs inthe 2009 robbery. In September 2014, based on Tracy’stestimony, police arrested Twiggs for conspiracy and therobbery. In December 2014, a Cape May Grand Jury returned anindictment, charging Twiggs and Tracy with conspiracy to commitrobbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a), and robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a).Twiggs moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the claimwas barred by the general criminal statute of limitations,N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(b)(1). The State responded that the DNAexception within N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) tolled the statute oflimitations. The trial court found the DNA-tolling provisioninapplicable because the DNA evidence recovered in connectionwith the offense did not identify Twiggs, but rather Tracy, whoin turn implicated Twiggs as an alleged co-conspirator. The 5 court consequently dismissed the indictment, and the Stateappealed. A divided panel of the Appellate Division affirmed. Statev. Twiggs, 445 N.J. Super. 23, 36 (App. Div. 2016). Themajority held that “the actor” in the DNA-tolling provision“refers to the individual whose DNA is analyzed. It does notapply to a third party identified by that individual.” Id. at25-26. The majority determined that the plain language of thestatute “only applies to persons whose DNA directly identifiesthem as criminal actors, and does not apply to those who arelater named by those same criminal actors.” Id. at 30. Becausethe physical evidence recovered and the DNA evidence laterobtained did not directly, by itself, implicate Twiggs, thepanel found the DNA-tolling provision inapplicable for aprosecution against him. Id. at 31 (“[T]he only evidence thatthe State derived from the DNA evidence was Tracy’s identity,and, subsequently, his confession that he and defendantconspired to commit robbery.”). The majority considered the DNA-tolling exception’slegislative history and rejected the State’s argument that ourdecision in State v. Rumblin, 166 N.J. 550 (2001), supports abroader definition of the term “actor.” Id. at 33-34. TheRumblin Court concluded that the term “actor” was synonymouswith “principal” and “accomplice” for purposes of the No Early 6 Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. 166 N.J. at 555-56.The majority in Twiggs distinguished N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c)’s use ofthe term “actor” as different “both syntactically andlexicologically” from NERA’s use of the word. 445 N.J. Super.at 35. Focusing, therefore, on the text of the tollingprovision, the panel concluded that its “syntactical use of theword 'actor’ . . . is more specific than the use of the term inNERA and Rumblin.” Id. at 35-36. According to the dissent, the “majority opinion’s reasoning[cannot square] with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of theterm 'the actor’ in State v. Rumblin.” Id. at 37 (Leone, J.,dissenting). Judge Leone’s primary concern was to avoid aninterpretation that “would enable the leaders of conspiracies toevade prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) by having the crimecommitted by minions, who alone could be prosecuted when theminion’s DNA is matched.” Id. at 46. On May 4, 2016, the State filed a notice of appeal as ofright pursuant to Rule 2:2-1(a)(2). B. We glean the following facts from the grand juryproceedings in State v. Jones. On August 14, 2002, ten-year-old Iyonna Jones left summerschool and went to her aunt Likisha Jones’s Manhattan apartment.After she arrived, Iyonna fed her nine-year-old sister, Jon- 7 Niece Jones. Jon-Niece1 became ill after eating and fell over.When Iyonna picked her up, Jon-Niece made Iyonna promise shewould not let her die. Jon-Niece then closed her eyes, andIyonna carried her to bed. In the early morning hours of the next day, Iyonna’s andJon-Niece’s mother, Elisha Jones, woke Iyonna and instructed herto get a large garbage bag. Elisha took the garbage bag intoJon-Niece’s room while Iyonna went back to sleep. The nextmorning, Iyonna found a note from Elisha -- intended for Likisha-- explaining that Jon-Niece had stopped breathing and thatElisha went to her Staten Island home to “tak[e] care of it.” In the meantime, Likisha called her brother, James Jones,telling him that there was a family emergency and instructinghim to go immediately to the Manhattan apartment. About two days later, Iyonna overheard a phone conversationbetween Likisha and Elisha, during which Elisha said “she wasscared and didn’t know what to do” because Jon-Niece was “deadat [her] apartment . . . sitting in a bucket [and] bag, alongwith cement and gasoline,” and Elisha was contemplating“burn[ing] the apartment down.” Likisha told Elisha to hold offand that help was on the way to Elisha in Staten Island.1 We refer to members of the Jones family by their first names for the sake of clarity. 8 James and Iyonna’s uncle, Godfrey Gibson, traveled toElisha’s home. Likisha left the Manhattan apartment butstressed she did not accompany the men to Staten Island. Upontheir arrival, Elisha packed a plastic bin and garbage bag inthe rear of Gibson’s car. James, Gibson, and Elisha drove to awooded area in Upper Freehold, New Jersey. Elisha took the bininto the woods. When she returned, James recalled smellinggasoline and seeing a large fire coming from the area from whichElisha was returning. A few days later at a family meeting, everyone present madea compact to keep the incident secret and to answer anyinquiries as to Jon-Niece’s whereabouts with “she’s with herfather.” Likisha denied the meeting occurred. Nearly fourmonths later, on December 26, 2002, Elisha died, leaving behinda note that took the form of an apology. It conveyed thatElisha did not want anyone to get in trouble and that when Jon-Niece got hurt she did not know what to do. Elisha ended thenote by writing that “only God” can judge her. Years later, in March 2005, a hunter found a child’sskeletal remains in Upper Freehold, New Jersey. The MonmouthCounty Medical Examiner’s Office declared the death to be ahomicide based on the charred remains containing two healed ribfractures in the skeleton. The surrounding brush area was alsocharred. The investigation continued. The University of North 9 Texas generated a DNA profile from the remains, but no new leadsemerged. On television, “America’s Most Wanted” aired a segmenton the skeletal remains, dubbing it the “Baby Bones case.”Still, none of the tips generated by the show revived the verycold case. The issue was never far from the surface among theparticipants. In 2006, during an argument with Likisha, Iyonnathreatened to “tell everyone what happened” to Jon-Niece.Likisha struck Iyonna, telling her that if she told anyone,Iyonna would also go to jail. In 2010, some eight years after Jon-Niece’s demise, Iyonnalearned from James the details of the concealment of Jon-Niece’scorpse: how Jon-Niece’s body was placed in a bucket filled withwater, gasoline, and cement and set ablaze in a dark areasomewhere in New Jersey. In July 2012, during an interview with the New York CityAdministration of Children’s Services (Children’s Services),Iyonna provided information relating to the disappearance ofJon-Niece. Iyonna recounted to Children’s Services the gruesomedetails of the exchange she had with James about the burning ofJon-Niece’s remains somewhere in New Jersey. This exchangecontributed to the discovery of Jon-Niece’s birth certificate,social security card, and medical card, with her documentationtrail ending in 2002. After her interview with Children’s 10 Services, Iyonna received a phone call from Gibson whothreatened to kill her if he discovered that she talked to thepolice about Jon-Niece’s death. As Iyonna’s information came to light, law enforcementcompared Iyonna’s DNA to the DNA generated from the skeletalremains. It confirmed Iyonna as a relative of the skeletalremains on the maternal side. Law enforcement also compared theskeletal DNA to the DNA of Jon-Niece’s father, Jamal Kerse. Itmatched on the paternal side. The Medical Examiner receivedcopies of those DNA studies in September 2012. The MedicalExaminer issued a death certificate for Jon-Niece, listing thecause of death as homicidal violence including physical abuseand neglect. In January 2013, a Monmouth County Grand Jury returned anindictment, charging James, Likisha, and Gibson with third-degree conspiracy to commit the crimes of tampering withphysical evidence, obstructing the administration of law, and/orhindering the apprehension of another, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2; fourth-degree tampering with physical evidence, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1);fourth-degree obstructing the administration of law, N.J.S.A.2C:29-1; and third-degree hindering the apprehension of another,N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a). The indictment separately charged Gibsonwith second-degree hindering the apprehension of another,11 N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(5); and second-degree hindering theapprehension of himself, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(3). Defendants James and Likisha moved to dismiss theindictment, arguing expiration of the applicable statute oflimitations. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that thestatute of limitations tolled under the DNA-tolling provision,N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c). The court reasoned that the provisionapplied to the State’s case against defendants because the casewas “supported by” physical evidence that identified the actors-- defendants -- by means of DNA testing. The court held thatJon-Niece’s physical remains and the DNA evidence did not needto identify defendants directly as the “alleged wrongdoers” aslong as it supported the prosecution, and that Iyonna’scorroborating statements to police could serve as the primaryevidence against defendants. The trial court reset the statuteof limitations on the theory that the statute did not start torun until 2012 -- when law enforcement came into possession ofthe DNA of Iyonna and Kerse. Defendants James and Likisha entered into conditional pleaagreements, with each pleading to third-degree conspiracy tohinder apprehension and/or obstruct the administration of law,N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, and third-degree hindering apprehension,N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a). The court sentenced defendants to 12 concurrent probationary terms of two years in accordance withthe plea agreements. Defendants appealed. The Appellate Division reversed the denial of defendants’motion to dismiss the tampering, obstruction, and hinderingcharges; affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss theconspiracy charge; and remanded for resentencing on theconspiracy charge. State v. Jones, 445 N.J. Super. 555, 560(App. Div. 2016). The appellate panel highlighted the tampering, obstruction,and hindering charges as discrete offenses subject to thestandard five-year statute-of-limitation period. Id. at 569-70.In assessing the applicability of the DNA-tolling provision tothe statute of limitations on those charges, the panelunderscored the overarching inquiry as “whether the DNA evidenceitself identifies the perpetrator.” Id. at 566 (emphasisadded). Although the DNA evidence identified Jon-Niece,corroborating Iyonna’s statements, the panel held that the DNA-tolling provision is inapplicable where DNA evidence is used “toidentify persons other than the actor, even if the match mayultimately lead investigators to the perpetrator of the crime.”Ibid. Crucially, because the DNA results did not identify “theperpetrators whose conduct led to the child’s death, or thedestruction of her remains,” ibid., the panel noted that “only 13 non-DNA, purely circumstantial evidence establishes the identityof the perpetrators,” id. at 567. The panel observed thatpermitting the State to circumvent general statute-of-limitationlaw by applying the DNA-tolling provision to individuals notdirectly identified through DNA “would eliminate in one strokethe protection found in the statute of limitations.” Id. at568. The panel resolved that defendants’ motion to dismiss thetampering, obstruction, and hindering charges should have beengranted. Id. at 573-74. The panel reached a differentconclusion as to the conspiracy charge. Id. at 573. The appellate panel classified defendants’ conspiratorialconduct as a “continuing offense” rather than a “discreteoffense,” thereby affirming the trial court’s denial of themotion to dismiss the conspiracy charge. Id. at 568-73. Thepanel noted that “[a] continuing offense involves conductspanning an extended period of time and generates harm thatcontinues uninterrupted until the course of conduct ceases.”Id. at 568 (quoting State v. Diorio, 216 N.J. 598, 614 (2014)).The panel addressed defendants’ initial conspiracy to concealtheir criminal involvement in 2002 and identified overt actstaken by defendants in furtherance of the conspiracy to concealfrom that time through 2012. Id. at 572 (indicating Likisha’s2006 threats, James’s 2010 discussion with Iyonna, and Gibson’s2012 threats). Finding that defendants’ continued reaffirmation 14 of the conspiracy through the years rendered that conspiracy a“continuing offense,” the panel held that the conspiracy chargewas not barred by the five-year statute of limitations and didnot compel dismissal of that charge. Id. at 573. We granted the State’s petition for certification anddefendants’ cross-petitions for certification. 230 N.J. 361(2017); 230 N.J. 374 (2017); 230 N.J. 375 (2017). II. A. The State urges us to adopt a broad definition of “actor”under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c), arguing that DNA evidence matching oneindividual can support prosecutions of multiple defendants whoseidentities and involvement “[are] not known to law enforcement”until that DNA evidence is obtained. The State asserts that thedefinition of “actor” under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(g) applies to allprovisions in the Code “unless a different meaning is plainlyrequired.” According to the State, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c), unlikeother areas of the Code, “contains no other definition of'actor,’” and so the term must refer to “any natural person” asdefined in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(g). Pivoting off that definition,the State argues that the statute of limitations should havebeen tolled because its prosecutions of defendants in each casewere supported by DNA evidence that identified a natural person:the victim in Jones and the co-conspirator in Twiggs. 15 The State maintains that its interpretation is consistentwith the legislative intent behind the exception as supported by(1) the Legislature’s decision to modify its initial narrowlytailored term from “the person who commits a crime” to thebroader term “the actor”; and (2) the Legislature’s failure touse the term “the defendant,” which would reflect Rumblin’sdefinition for “actor.” The State argues that a narrowerdefinition “would lead to anomalous results,” like foreclosingprosecution of “more culpable” parties to a crime simply becausethe State obtained DNA from less culpable accomplices. Turning to the conspiracy charge in Jones, the State arguesthat the appellate panel correctly determined “that defendants’conspiracy was a continuing course of conduct that fell withinthe five year statute of limitations.” The State asserts thatthe scope of the conspiracy was not to protect Elisha fromprosecution, but rather “to conceal all the crimes committedagainst [the victim]” and to prevent police from everinvestigating those crimes. The State distinguishes this casefrom that in Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957),claiming that “defendants’ acts of concealment were part of thecharged conspiracy, not a subsidiary conspiracy to conceal afterthe central criminal purposes of the conspiracy was attained,”and highlighting four overt acts by defendants to support thatargument. 16 Finally, the State asserts that courts at the motion-to-dismiss stage are bound to the language in the indictment todetermine whether it is facially valid. Here, according to theState, the indictment’s plain language “alleged a conspiracythat 'necessitates concealment’” despite its failure to allegeall the overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. (quotingGrunewald, 353 U.S. at 405). The State insists that defendants’conspiracy prevented police from identifying the victim andprosecuting defendants earlier. For that reason, the Statesubmits, it would be “abhorrent” for the statute of limitationsto bar defendants’ conspiracy charge as defendants would “reapan unjust windfall for so thoroughly destroying Jon-Niece’s bodyand intimidating Iyonna to prevent her from revealing thecrimes.” B. Defendants Likisha, James, and Twiggs (collectively,“defendants”) rely primarily on the same arguments to assertthat the term “actor” under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) refers to acriminal offender who is directly identified by DNA evidence.Likisha and James distinguish the “generally accepteddefinition” of actor -- “one who acts” -- from that of “victim”-- one who “has been acted upon.” In a similar vein, Twiggsargues that the statute does not explicitly include phrases thatextend the exception to anyone connected to the crime. 17 Defendants stress that N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(g)’s definition ofactor “provide[s] the broadest possible interpretation of theword” and is not intended “to be the one and only definition ofthe word” in the Code. To that end, defendants maintain thatthe Legislature “clearly intended that the term 'actor’ besynonymous with 'suspect’” for purposes of the DNA exception, asdemonstrated by a Sponsors’ Statement that “used the words'suspect’ and 'actor’ interchangeably.” Defendants emphasizethe enhanced reliability of DNA evidence to identifyperpetrators and the statute of limitations’ purpose to protectagainst overly stale charges based on equally stale evidence.For those reasons, defendants assert that “it makes sense” forthe DNA exception to relax the statute of limitations only “foran actor whose DNA is later implicated as evidence of thecrime.” Applying that definition, defendants argue that third-partystatements, not the DNA obtained by the State, identified themas “suspects” in the respective crimes. Defendants urge us toreject a broader definition that will allow any person whose DNAis matched to “come forward after the statute of limitations hasexpired [and] unreliably identify to law enforcement [any otherindividuals] alleged to have been involved in the commission ofa crime.” 18 Considering the State’s conspiracy charge, defendantsLikisha and James argue that the central aim of their conspiracywas to protect Elisha from prosecution. Likisha and James arguethat the appellate panel’s decision conflicts with Grunewaldbecause the indictment here “fails to state that the conspiracyincluded an express agreement” between Likisha and James toconceal the crime to avoid their own -- not Elisha’s --prosecution. In short, Likisha and James maintain they achieved“the central goal of the conspiracy” “[o]nce Elisha died inDecember 2002,” and “the statute of limitations commenced torun” at that moment. According to Likisha and James, any overtacts taken afterward could not extend the life of an alreadyextinguished conspiracy. In the alternative, Likisha and Jamesassert that the conspiracy was abandoned because they did notcommit any overt act within the five-year timeframe. Undereither scenario, Likisha and James claim the statute oflimitations bars prosecution for conspiracy. III. The question common to both appeals before us and theconspiracy question unique to Jones requires review of thedismissal of an indictment. We have stressed that a courtshould dismiss an indictment “'only on the clearest and plainestground,’ and only when the indictment is manifestly deficient or 19 palpably defective.” State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216, 228-29(1996) (quoting State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 168 (1991)). We generally review a trial court’s decision to dismiss anindictment under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.Id. at 229. When the decision to dismiss relies on a purelylegal question, however, we review that determination de novo.See State v. Cagno, 211 N.J. 488 505-06 (2012) (notingappropriateness of plenary review of dismissal of indictment asuntimely under N.J.S.A 2C:1-6(b)(1)). So, we review thequestions of law presented in this case de novo and need notdefer to the trial court or appellate panel’s interpretations.State v. S.B., 230 N.J. 62, 67 (2017) (relying on State v.Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 329 (2015)). The Legislature’s intent guides us in deciding the meaningof a statute. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005). Todetermine the Legislature’s intent, as always, we begin ouranalysis with the statute’s plain language. S.B., 230 N.J. at 68 (citing DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492). We are bound byclearly defined statutory terms. Febbi v. Bd. of Review, Div.Emp. Sec., 35 N.J. 601, 606 (1961). Where a specific definitionis absent, “[w]e must presume that the Legislature intended thewords it chose and the plain and ordinary meaning ascribed tothose words.” Paff v. Galloway Township, 229 N.J. 340, 353(2017). 20 Statutory language is, “generally, the best indicator” oflegislative intent, DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492, but our reviewis not limited to the words in a challenged provision. “[W]ecan also draw inferences based on the statute’s overallstructure and composition,” S.B., 230 N.J. at 68, and mayconsider “the entire legislative scheme of which [the statute]is a part,” Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 108 N.J. 123,129 (1987). After all, courts must make “every effort . . . toavoid rendering any part of the statute superfluous.” State inInterest of K.O., 217 N.J. 83, 91 (2014). “We do not view[statutory] words and phrases in isolation but rather in theirproper context and in relationship to other parts of [the]statute, so that meaning can be given to the whole of [the]enactment.” State v. Rangel, 213 N.J. 500, 509 (2013). When the statutory language is ambiguous and “leads to morethan one plausible interpretation,” courts may resort toextrinsic sources, like legislative history and committeereports. DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492-93. We “may also turn toextrinsic evidence 'if a literal reading of the statute wouldyield an absurd result, particularly one at odds with theoverall statutory scheme.’” In re N.B., 222 N.J. 87, 98-99(2015) (quoting Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City,209 N.J. 558, 572 (2012)). And we must be careful not to“rewrite a statute or add language that the Legislature 21 omitted.” State v. Munafo, 222 N.J. 480, 488 (2015). Afterconsidering extrinsic aids, we resolve any remaining ambiguitiesin defendants’ favor “given our strict construction of penalstatutes.” State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 586 (2014); Statev. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475, 482 (2008). IV. We begin with the question common to both appeals: whetherthe statute of limitations was tolled as to defendants’ chargesunder N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c). A. The public has an undeniable interest in having criminaloffenders “charged, tried, and sanctioned.” Diorio, 216 N.J. at 612. But the State’s power to further that interest is notunlimited. Our law recognizes a criminal defendant’s right “toa prompt prosecution,” stemming from the potential prejudicelikely to result “when the basic facts have become obscured bytime.” Ibid. Criminal statutes of limitations operate to protectdefendants from that prejudice. Ibid. They are “the primaryguarantee against . . . overly stale criminal charges,” UnitedStates v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 , 122 (1966), that are based on“acts in the far-distant past,” Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 , 114-15 (1970). “These statutes provide predictabilityby specifying a limit beyond which there is an irrebuttable 22 presumption that a defendant’s right to a fair trial would beprejudiced.” United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 322 (1971);accord State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 487 (2006). The Code includes statute-of-limitations periods forcriminal offenses. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6. The Legislature modeledN.J.S.A. 2C:1-6 after section 1.06 of the Model Penal Code.Cannel, N.J. Criminal Code Annotated, cmt. 1 on N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(2017). If the State does not file charges against anindividual within the relevant statutory timeframe, the statuteof limitations serves as “an absolute bar to the prosecution ofthe offense.” State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47, 55 (1993). Courts are bound to the statute of limitations and “cannotunilaterally nullify [its] protection.” Ibid. The Legislaturehas lifted the bar on only a small number of “heinous” offensesthat may be charged at any time. Diorio, 216 N.J. at 612-13(citing N.J.S.A 2C:11-3 (murder); N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(manslaughter); and N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2 (sexual assault)). TheLegislature also provided an exception for cases involving DNAtesting evidence. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c). As an exception to the general rules governing statutes oflimitations, the DNA-tolling provision is interpreted narrowly.See, e.g., In re Expungement Application of P.A.F., 176 N.J. 218, 223 (2003) (noting exceptions to general rule “are to beconstrued narrowly”); see also Prado v. State, 186 N.J. 413, 426 23 (2006) (“[E]xceptions in a legislative enactment are to bestrictly but reasonably construed, consistent with the manifestreason and purpose of the law.” (quoting Serv. Armament Co. v.Hyland, 70 N.J. 550, 558-59 (1976))). The DNA-tolling exception that lies at the center of theseconsolidated appeals provides that [a]n offense is committed either when every element occurs or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of conduct or the defendant’s complicity therein is terminated. Time starts to run on the day after the offense is committed, except that when the prosecution is supported by physical evidence that identifies the actor by means of DNA testing . . . time does not start to run until the State is in possession of both the physical evidence and the DNA . . . evidence necessary to establish the identification of the actor by means of comparison to the physical evidence. [ N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) (emphasis added).]Read narrowly, the exception tolls the statute of limitations ifthe State’s prosecution of an individual, “the actor,” is“supported by” DNA evidence that matches, or “identifies,” theactor to physical evidence within its possession. N.J.S.A.2C:1-6(c). The very nature of DNA evidence makes it clear thatthe statute should be read that way. The word “identifies,” undefined within the statute, iscommonly defined as “to establish the identity of.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 616 (11th ed. 2004); see also 24 Black’s Law Dictionary 813 (9th ed. 2009). “Identity,” in thiscontext, means “the distinguishing character or personality ofan individual.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 616(11th ed. 2004). And here, identity must be established “bymeans of” DNA evidence. Aside from identical twins, DNA evidence is unique to eachindividual. State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 157 (1997); PassaicCty. Bd. of Soc. Servs. ex rel. T.M. v. A.S., 442 N.J. Super. 59, 64 (Ch. Div. 2015) (quoting National Research Council, DNATechnology in Forensic Science 3 (1992)). Because of its uniquenature, DNA testing has become a “widespread and standardpractice” in identifying criminal perpetrators. A.S., 442 N.J.Super. at 64. We have accepted DNA evidence as scientificallyreliable and admissible in criminal trials against defendants towhom the DNA matched. See, e.g., State v. Sterling, 215 N.J. 65, 102-05 (2013) (observing DNA evidence’s “'unparalleledaccuracy’ . . . in linking defendants to crimes at which theirDNA is found” (quoting Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 436, 451(2013))); Harvey, 151 N.J. 117.N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) permits tolling when identification isachieved directly by DNA evidence rather than DNA evidence inaddition to other means. Accordingly, it is apparent that theLegislature intended the DNA-tolling provision to apply to thesole actor whom the DNA distinctly identifies. 25 Although we need not resort to extrinsic sources toascertain the Legislature’s intent here, the legislative historyof N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) leads us to the same conclusion. In 2002, the Senate and General Assembly amended N.J.S.A.2C:1-6 to include the DNA exception. L. 2001, c. 308, § 1(c)(effective Jan. 3, 2002). During its drafting phase, theinitial bill used the phrases “the person who commits a crime”and “the person who committed the crime” instead of “the actor.”S. 1516/A. 2658 (2000). The Sponsors’ Statement accompanyingthat draft stated: “[t]his bill would remove the timelimitations on the prosecution of crimes when the person whocommitted the crime is unknown at the time, but DNA evidencecollected at the crime scene can be used to identify the personat a later date.” Sponsors’ Statement to S. 1516 (Sept. 14,2000); Sponsors’ Statement to A. 2658 (June 29, 2000). TheLegislature noted the purpose behind the criminal statutes oflimitations is “to protect defendants from the use of 'stale’evidence against them,” but pointedly distinguished “properlycollected[,] . . . handled and stored” DNA evidence because it“can reliably identify defendants many years after a crime hasbeen committed.” Ibid. The final-adopted bill’s Sponsors’ Statement provides thatthe DNA exception “would toll the applicable statute oflimitations for the commission of a crime in certain cases until 26 the State is in possession of DNA evidence taken from thesuspect.” Sponsors’ Statement to S. 1516 (Jan. 3, 2002)(emphasis added). In the final bill’s legislative fiscalanalysis, the Legislature further explained: “[p]resently,certain guilty persons may avoid standing trial in cases whereDNA . . . evidence is received that would establish theiridentities after the statute of limitations for a particularcrime has expired.” Legis. Fiscal Estimate to S. 1516 (Jan. 22,2002) (emphasis added). The Legislature’s persistent use of words and phrases like“persons who committed the crime,” “suspect,” and “guiltypersons” is evidence that it intended for the word “actor” tomean “defendant.” Nothing in the legislative history of thetolling statute calls into question the plain-language readingidentified above or suggests that “actor” should be construedaccording to the expansive definition proposed by the State. The State urges a broader reading of the term “actor” inkeeping with the definition set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(g).We reject the State’s argument that the statutory definition for“actor” is unambiguous in the Code. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14 is a“general definitions” section that lists key words that appearthroughout the Code. The statute includes two subsections thatoffer potentially relevant guidance as to the term “actor”:subsection (e) (“'Actor’ includes, where relevant, a person 27 guilty of an omission”), and subsection (g) (“'Person,’ 'he,’and 'actor’ include any natural person and, where relevant, acorporation or an unincorporated association”). Neither of those definitions, however, is automaticallybinding. Rather, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14 begins with the disclaimerthat its subsections apply throughout the Code “unless adifferent meaning plainly is required,” in which case thatplainly required meaning controls. The clearest way for a different meaning to be plainlyrequired is, of course, for a statute specifically to define oneof the terms that appear in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14. For example,N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1, relating to sexual offenses, defines “actor”as “a person accused of an offense proscribed under this act.”Because Section 14-1 attaches its own meaning to the word“actor,” neither definition of that word in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14applies to sexual offense charges. See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14. It is not necessary for a statute to specifically define aterm from N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14 for that statute to plainly require adifferent meaning in a particular context. In Rumblin, forexample, we declined to ascribe either statutory definitionlisted in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14 to the word “actor” for purposes ofNERA, despite NERA’s failure to define the term itself. 166 N.J. at 556. We observed that the Code “uses the word 'actor’in at least eighty-seven subsections and in at least seventy 28 additional subparts.” Id. at 555; see also id. at 555 n.1(listing those Code provisions that use “actor”). Afterreviewing the statutory definitions and “viewing the term in itsproper syntax,” we concluded that the word “actor” is synonymouswith “defendant” in NERA and includes both principals andaccomplices. Ibid. Just as we found that NERA, by its own use of the term,compelled a particular definition of “actor,” so we find thatthe tolling statute uses “actor” to denote the defendant, theobject of prosecution. Indeed, we find that adopting theState’s interpretation and applying the “any natural person”language set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(g) would undermine thepurpose and policy goals of the criminal statutes oflimitations. Under the State’s expansive reading, “actor” in the tollingstatute could be read to mean “victim” -- in Jones, for example,the identified DNA was that of Jon-Niece. But such a readingconflicts with the ordinary definition of the terms “actor” and“victim.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word “actor” as“[o]ne who acts; a person whose conduct is in question,” Black’sLaw Dictionary 40 (9th ed. 2009), and the word “victim” as “[a]person harmed by a crime, tort or other wrong,” id. at 1703.Clearly, those two definitions have distinct and contrasting 29 meanings: the actor is one who acts, and the victim is one whois acted upon. The State’s position would require courts to take multipleleaps in the investigative chain to find that the tollingprovision applies. Under the State’s interpretation, thetolling provision would apply even when the primary evidenceused to support its prosecution of a defendant is not the DNAevidence but rather a statement by a third party. In Twiggs,for example, the DNA evidence connected a co-defendant to thecrime who then implicated defendant Twiggs. Such evidence isthe very kind of stale evidence the criminal statutes oflimitations operate to guard against. See, e.g., Jones, 445 N.J. Super. at 567 (“Unlike when a perpetrator is identified byDNA evidence, a prosecution based solely on the word of anotherwho is identified by DNA raises the precise jeopardy the statuteis intended to avoid: the difficulties in mounting a defense'when the basic facts have become obscured by time.’” (quotingDiorio, 216 N.J. at 612)). The statute of limitations is not intended to assist theState in its investigations; it is intended to protect adefendant’s ability to sustain his or her defense. Outside ofthe limitations period, a defendant faces a diminished abilityto find alibi witnesses and evidence to defend against “basicfacts [that] have become obscured by time.” Diorio, 216 N.J. at 30 612; see Marion, 404 U.S. at 322. Unlike other forms ofevidence, DNA evidence can never become stale. DNA evidence hasproven to be a reliable source of evidence linking a perpetratorto a crime. See Sterling, 215 N.J. at 102-03. It logicallyflows that the DNA-tolling provision only tolls the statute oflimitations when the State is in possession of the defendant’sDNA. We conclude that, for the DNA-tolling provision to apply,the State must have DNA evidence that establishes a direct linkbetween physical evidence already within its possession and thedefendant it seeks to prosecute. B. 1. We now apply our analysis to the facts of these cases. InJones, police obtained a DNA profile from skeletal remains thatwere unidentified until 2012. That year, based on Iyonna’sstatements identifying Likisha and James as participants in hersister’s disappearance, police obtained and tested DNA samplesfrom Iyonna and Kerse. Comparing Iyonna’s and Kerse’s DNA tothe then-unidentified DNA profile, police established familiallinks with Jon-Niece’s remains. None of defendants’ DNA wasfound on the remains. With Iyonna’s corroborating statementsand the familial link between and among the DNA profiles, agrand jury in 2013 returned an indictment charging defendants 31 with substantive and conspiratorial offenses long after theexpiration of the five-year statute of limitations. The State attempts to salvage its case by applying the DNA-tolling exception through the uncovering of the victim Jon-Niece’s DNA from her remains and its indirect link todefendants. That is, according to the State, the DNA-tollingprovision should apply because the State did not possess anylink to Jon-Niece’s remains until 2012 when it acquired Iyonna’sand Kerse’s DNA. As explained above, the DNA-tolling exception tolls thestatute of limitations only when the State possesses DNAextracted from physical evidence that directly identifies thedefendant. The DNA evidence obtained from the physical evidencein Jones -- the remains -- established no link beyond a familialconnection to Iyonna and Kerse. That evidence certainly did notdirectly implicate defendants as perpetrators of the substantivecrimes charged. The implication came only through third-partytestimony, which N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) does not operate topreserve. We find the DNA-tolling exception inapplicable to theState’s substantive charges against Likisha and James. Withoutthe exception, the statute of limitations expired, and theindictment as to those charges should have been dismissed. 32 2. In Twiggs, a grand jury indicted Twiggs based primarily onTracy’s confession and his subsequent implication of Twiggs as aco-conspirator in the armed robbery. The DNA extracted from thephysical evidence -- the hair from the mask -- identified Tracy,who, in turn, identified Twiggs. The State contends that although the DNA evidence did notdirectly identify Twiggs, it began an investigative chain thatlater assisted in identifying him. The State suggests that thefive-year statute of limitations for armed robbery tolled untilthe State possessed Tracy’s matching DNA sample, taken after hisadmission into drug court. Twiggs counters that the DNA-tollingprovision is inapplicable because the DNA did not directlyidentify him -- Tracy did. In the same way that DNA evidence in Jones is insufficientto identify the alleged wrongdoer and trigger the DNA-tollingprovision, DNA evidence of a co-defendant is likewiseinsufficient. There exists no direct link between the DNAextracted from the physical evidence and Twiggs. The State’scase against Twiggs is based primarily on Tracy’s statementsimplicating Twiggs and other circumstantial proof. Tracy’sstatements in Twiggs are no different than Iyonna’s statementsin Jones. Such statements are exactly the type of staleevidence the statute of limitations is designed to guard 33 against. Diorio, 216 N.J. at 612. So, unless DNA evidenceestablishes a direct identification to the defendant charged,the mere existence of DNA evidence in a case cannot work to tollgeneral statutes of limitations. The State argues that our reading of the term “defendant”to include principals and accomplices for NERA purposes inRumblin should apply to the DNA-tolling context. We decline toadopt a similarly expansive reading under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c).Rumblin’s NERA-sentencing analysis is inapplicable to the DNA-tolling statute. NERA uses the term “actor” in a wholly distinct frameworkto achieve underlying policy goals separate from those of theDNA-tolling provision. As the Appellate Division in Rumblinobserved, it is apparent that “actor” includes both principalsand accomplices in the NERA context because “the Legislaturewould not have intended that the mastermind of an armed robberycould avoid the consequences of [NERA] sentencing by having aconfederate carry out the crime.” 326 N.J. Super. 296, 302(App. Div. 1999). Within NERA, an “actor” plainly encompassesboth principals and accomplices as both are co-defendants, and aco-defendant cannot escape sentencing liability simply byoperating as an accomplice. See, e.g., State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 223 (1996) (noting defendant may be found guilty whetherprincipal, accomplice, or co-conspirator). For NERA purposes, 34 then, “actor” includes accomplices because any narrower readingwould undercut the State’s ability to sentence equally culpabledefendants. NERA’s use of “actor” peacefully coexists with statutes oflimitations because it is not triggered until the sentencingphase of criminal proceedings, at the back end of the judicialprocess. For NERA purposes, the State has already initiatedcriminal proceedings within the applicable statute oflimitations. NERA is not influenced by stale-evidence concernsbecause it is triggered only after a defendant’s trial or guiltyplea. In contrast, the DNA-tolling provision creates an exceptionat the front end of the judicial process by permitting criminalprosecutions outside of the generally prescribed statute oflimitations. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c). Public policy supports suchbelated prosecutions because the reliability of the DNAconnection to a specific individual has led the Legislature todecide that the general statute of limitations must give way. The hallmark of a statute of limitations is that it avoidsunfairly forcing a criminally accused individual to defendagainst stale evidence. See Diorio, 216 N.J. at 612. DNAevidence works to implicate a single individual. After that,all the usual issues of stale evidence resurface when the DNA-identified individual begins implicating others. 35 For that reason, this Court’s discussion of “actor” inRumblin to include principals and accomplices under NERA issimply inapplicable to the DNA-tolling provision. In Twiggs, the DNA-tolling exception does not apply. TheState’s DNA evidence only tangentially connected Twiggs to thecharged crime; its primary evidence against Twiggs was Tracy’stestimony. The statute of limitations tolled only against Tracyand expired on Twiggs’s charges. We find that the trial courtcorrectly dismissed the indictment in Twiggs. V. We now consider whether the Appellate Division properlyaffirmed the trial court’s denial of defendants James’s andLikisha’s motions to dismiss the conspiracy count of theindictment in Jones. A. A defendant “is guilty of conspiracy . . . to commit acrime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating itscommission” he or she “[a]grees with such other person orpersons that they or one or more of them will engage in conductwhich constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation tocommit such crime.” N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1). “Conspiracy is acontinuing course of conduct” that terminates, for statute oflimitations purposes, when (1) “the crime or crimes which areits object are committed,” or (2) “the agreement that they be 36 committed is abandoned by the defendant and by those with whomhe conspired.” N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(f)(1). To convict a defendantof “conspiracy to commit a crime other than a crime of the firstor second degree,” “an overt act in pursuance of suchconspiracy” must be proven “to have been done by him or by aperson with whom he conspired.” N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(d). The Stateis not confined to overt acts alleged in the indictment and maylater prove additional overt acts. State v. LeFurge, 101 N.J. 404, 412-13 (1986) (discussing how the Code “did not adopt the[Model Penal Code’s] requirement that the overt act be allegedin the indictment”). In Grunewald, the United States Supreme Court concludedthat prosecutors cannot “extend the life of a conspiracyindefinitely” by inferring a conspiracy to conceal “from mereovert acts of concealment.” 353 U.S. at 402. Specifically, theSupreme Court held that after the central criminal purposes of a conspiracy have been attained, a subsidiary conspiracy to conceal may not be implied from circumstantial evidence showing merely that the conspiracy was kept a secret and that the conspirators took care to cover up their crime in order to escape detection and punishment. [Id. at 401–02.]The Supreme Court stressed a “vital distinction” “between actsof concealment done in furtherance of the main criminalobjectives of the conspiracy,” which extend the conspiracy and 37 toll the statute of limitations, and “acts of concealment doneafter these central objectives have been attained, for thepurpose only of covering up after the crime.” Id. at 405. InGrunewald, the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the defendants’convictions for conspiracy to defraud the United States becausethe Government failed to “show anything like an express originalagreement among the conspirators to continue to act in concertin order to cover up, for their own self-protection, traces ofthe crime after its commission.” Id. at 404, 424. B. On a motion to dismiss a criminal indictment, a court“view[s] the evidence and the rational inferences drawn fromthat evidence in the light most favorable to the State.” Statev. Saavedra, 222 N.J. 39, 56-57 (2015). A criminal indictmentis proper if the State presented the grand jury with at least“'some evidence’ as to each element of a prima facie case.”State v. Bennett, 194 N.J. Super. 231, 234 (App. Div. 1984)(quoting State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 483 (1943)). A trialcourt’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment is reviewedfor abuse of discretion. Saavedra, 222 N.J. at 55 (citing Statev. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216, 229 (1996)). Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the State,we find the State presented sufficient evidence to survivedefendants James’s and Likisha’s motions to dismiss their 38 indictments’ conspiracy counts. The co-conspirators hereexhibited a continuing course of conduct beginning well beforeand extending far beyond Elisha’s death in 2002. Their actsallegedly included (1) the family meeting in 2002 at which allentered into a compact to keep the incidents leading to Jon-Niece’s death a secret and to lie about her whereabouts with noapparent dissent; (2) Likisha’s threatening of Iyonna in 2006when Iyonna considered imperiling the conspiracy by exposing it;(3) James’s explicit discussion with Iyonna in 2010 concerningthe details of the burning of Jon-Niece’s body; and (4) Gibson’sthreat in 2012 to kill Iyonna if he were to discover that shedisclosed the conspiracy to the police. The potential existsthat those actions were not merely intended to protect Elishafrom prosecution, as they postdated her death, but also toinsulate from discovery the co-conspirators’ roles in hinderingand in the destruction of evidence. Their corresponding actions, the early stages of theproceedings, and the low evidentiary bar necessary to overcomedefendants’ motion, combine to provide sufficient evidence of acontinuing course of conduct for the State to survivedefendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment. Whether at trial or at further hearings, defendants areentitled to challenge the evidence advanced by the State. And, 39 if this case proceeds to trial, defendants would be entitled toa jury charge explaining Grunewald’s application. Finally, the State’s concession before the trial court thatthe “continuing course of conduct” exception to the statute oflimitations was inapplicable is not binding on our analysis.State v. Josey, 290 N.J. Super. 17, 32 (App. Div. 1996) (“[A]position by the prosecutor favorable to a defendant should begiven great weight but is not binding on a court.” (discussingYoung v. United States, 315 U.S. 257 , 258 (1942))). We findthat there may have been a continuing course of conduct, fortolling purposes, which will be determined by a jury uponremand. VI. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division affirmingthe trial court’s dismissal of the indictment against defendantin Twiggs. We also affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division inJones, reversing the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motionto dismiss the indictment on the substantive tampering,obstruction, and hindering charges and affirming the denial ofdefendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment on the conspiracycharge. The cases are remanded to the respective trial courts forproceedings consistent with this opinion. 40 CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion. 41