Title: Commonwealth v. Lopes
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11587
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: January 10, 2018

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SJC-11587 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CRISOSTOMO LOPES. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 8, 2017. - January 10, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Budd, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Jury and Jurors.  Evidence, Relevancy and 
materiality, Prior misconduct, Cross-examination.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Challenge to jurors, 
Argument by prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 1, 2010. 
 
 
The case was heard by Patrick F. Brady, J. 
 
 
 
Alan Jay Black for the defendant. 
 
Janis DiLoreto Smith, Assistant District Attorney (Patrick 
M. Haggan, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The defendant, Crisostomo Lopes, pulled the 
fourteen year old victim off a motorized scooter and held him, 
while the codefendant, a juvenile, shot him multiple times at 
close range.  The victim succumbed to a gunshot wound to his 
chest shortly thereafter.  After a jury trial, both the 
2 
 
defendant and his codefendant were convicted of murder in the 
first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.1 
In his appeal, the defendant claims that reversal of his 
conviction is required because the judge erred by:  (1) failing 
to find that the Commonwealth's peremptory challenges of 
prospective jurors were improper; (2) allowing evidence of the 
defendant's gang affiliation and the victim's brother's 
knowledge of neighborhood gang activity; (3) precluding the 
defendant from cross-examining a police officer witness on prior 
misconduct; and (4) allowing the prosecutor to make improper and 
prejudicial statements during the Commonwealth's closing 
argument.  For the reasons stated below, we conclude that there 
has been no reversible error, and after a thorough review of the 
record, we decline to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, to reduce or set aside the verdict of murder in the first 
degree.  Therefore, we affirm the defendant's conviction. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts that the jury could 
have found, reserving certain details for discussion of the 
legal issues. 
 
The victim was fourteen years old and lived on Norton 
Street in the Dorchester section of Boston.  On May 30, 2010, 
                                                 
1 At the time of oral argument, the codefendant had not yet 
filed his brief with this court. 
3 
 
the victim had been riding a scooter around Dorchester that was 
being driven by his fifteen year old brother.  Each was wearing 
a helmet, but different styles.  They were riding the scooter on 
Inwood Street, approaching Olney Street, when the brother almost 
hit the defendant, who was on a bicycle.  The brother stopped 
the scooter and lifted his helmet.2  No words were exchanged, and 
the defendant continued moving. 
 
Sometime after the encounter, the victim asked his brother 
if he could ride the scooter by himself.  The brother agreed, 
and the victim put on his brother's helmet because it was the 
better of the two.  The brother saw the victim drive away from 
their home heading toward Ridgefield Street. 
 
Boston police Officer Anthony Williams, a member of the 
local youth violence strike force, had left work at 
approximately 7:45 P.M. and was driving home.  As Officer 
Williams drove toward the intersection of Bowdoin Street and 
Norton Street, he observed the defendant and his codefendant.  
They appeared to be "on a mission," proceeding hurriedly and 
rapidly.  Officer Williams turned his automobile around to 
further observe them as they approached Bowdoin Street.  He 
pulled his automobile to the side of the road within close 
                                                 
2 The victim's brother testified that it was a neighborhood 
rule to lift up one's helmet to prevent being mistaken for 
someone else. 
4 
 
proximity to the defendant and his codefendant.  From his 
vantage point, Officer Williams testified that he had a clear 
view of the individuals through his rear passenger and driver's 
side windows. 
 
At this time, the defendant was riding a bicycle and his 
codefendant was, at one point, on the back.  After they 
dismounted the bicycle, Officer Williams observed that the 
codefendant kept his hand stiffly inside his right pocket.  Both 
defendants were looking out toward Olney Street in a crouched 
position. 
 
As the victim drove the scooter down Olney Street toward 
Bowdoin Street, Officer Williams observed the defendant dart out 
into the street, grab the victim's shoulder, and motion to his 
codefendant.  As the defendant held the victim, his codefendant 
removed a gun from his pocket, ran out into the street, and from 
approximately one foot away fired shots into the victim's chest.  
The codefendant fled on foot and the defendant picked up his 
bicycle and rode away.3 
 
Officer Williams got back in his vehicle and notified 
Boston police operations.  Officer Williams then continued his 
pursuit of the codefendant and observed that he kept his hand in 
                                                 
3 Another eyewitness also observed the shooting and the 
arrest of the two defendants.  The eyewitness testified that the 
two males he saw arrested were the same two individuals involved 
in the shooting. 
5 
 
his right pocket throughout the pursuit.  While the chase was 
ongoing, two other officers arrived, including Officer Joseph 
Singletary, who saw the codefendant reach into his pocket and 
pull out a gun with his right hand.  As the codefendant crossed 
Stonehurst Street, he bent down near a Toyota Camry automobile 
and a pickup truck.  After the codefendant bent down, his hand 
was no longer in his pocket. 
 
As the officers were securing the codefendant, Officer 
Williams saw the defendant, who had returned to the scene.  He 
drew his firearm and ordered the defendant to get onto the 
ground.  The defendant said, "What are you going to do, shoot 
me? . . . You can catch one, too."  As the defendant was placed 
into custody, Officer Williams heard him yell, "Homes Ave., 
motherfuckers."  An officer who was another member of the youth 
violence strike force and who had responded to the scene 
testified that as he placed the defendant into a transport 
vehicle, the defendant also twice screamed, "That's right, 
bitches, Homes Ave. on the block." 
 
Officer Singletary recovered a firearm underneath the tire 
of the Toyota Camry where he had seen the codedendant bend down.  
That firearm, an Armi Tanfoglio .25 caliber semiautomatic 
pistol, was found to match all of the ballistic evidence 
recovered from the scene and from the victim's body.  Swabs 
later taken from the codefendant's hands and the defendant's 
6 
 
shirt revealed the presence of gunshot residue. 
 
The defendant and his codefendant were brought to the 
police station for booking following their arrest.  The booking 
officer was a Cape Verdean Creole speaker.  He placed the 
defendant in a cell close to him, and the codefendant in the 
cell that was further away.  On at least three occasions, the 
booking officer heard the defendant yell to his codefendant in 
Cape Verdean Creole, "Take the fault" and "Can you hear me?" 
 
An autopsy revealed that the victim suffered a gunshot 
wound to his chest, near his left armpit, and another to his 
right thigh.  The bullet to the victim's chest pierced through 
his heart and both lungs, ultimately causing his death minutes 
later. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Peremptory challenges of prospective 
jurors.  The defendant contends that the trial judge abused his 
discretion by failing to determine that the Commonwealth's 
peremptory challenges were improper.  See Commonwealth v. Jones, 
477 Mass. 307, 322 (2017).  Although the defendant's particular 
objections to the jury selection process are not always clear, 
we understand him to assert that the Commonwealth improperly 
used race to challenge jurors and that the judge erred in not 
asking for an explanation earlier in the process and then 
accepting the Commonwealth's explanations as adequate and 
genuine when given.  We conclude that there was no error.  As 
7 
 
explained below, the Commonwealth's challenges were consistently 
based on potential jurors' youth, which was not improper.  The 
judge did not therefore abuse his discretion in not requiring 
explanations for certain earlier peremptory challenges.  Nor did 
the judge abuse his discretion in determining that the 
prosecutor's race-neutral explanation -- based on a juror's 
youth and volunteer service for a youth organization -- was both 
adequate and genuine. 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights prohibit 
a party from exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of 
race or gender.  See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 128-129 
(1994); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986); Commonwealth 
v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979) 
(referencing prohibitions against challenges based on sex, race, 
color, creed, or national origin).  Peremptory challenges have 
not, however, been prohibited based on age, under either the 
United States or Massachusetts Constitution.  Commonwealth v. 
Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 545 (2017). 
 
Accordingly, we have held that young adults are not 
considered a discrete protected group for the purposes of 
Batson-Soares peremptory challenges and may be excluded.  
Oberle, 476 Mass. at 545 ("age is not a discrete grouping 
defined in the constitution, and therefore a peremptory 
8 
 
challenge [of young women] may permissibly be based on age"); 
Commonwealth v. Samuel, 398 Mass. 93, 95 (1986) ("There is no 
constitutional basis for challenging the exclusion of young 
persons"); Commonwealth v. Bastarache, 382 Mass. 86, 90, 100 
(1980) (in case involving the claimed underrepresentation of 
jurors between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four, 
"classifications based on age alone do not involve identifiable 
or distinctive groups").  Although the United States Supreme 
Court has not yet opined on the question, every United States 
Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has rejected the 
argument that young adults are a protected group for peremptory 
challenges.  See United States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d 538, 544-545 
(1st Cir. 1987) (prosecutor's systematic challenge of potential 
jurors aged eighteen to thirty-four did not violate equal 
protection); United States v. Bryce, 208 F.3d 346, 350 n.3 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (peremptory strike based on youth of juror, where 
other young jurors were also struck, was permissible race-
neutral justification); United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 
748-749 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835 (1988) (Batson did 
not "handcuff a prosecutor's legitimate exercise of peremptory 
strikes," which included striking "young . . . panel members"); 
Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399, 408 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 843 (1998) (challenge of young juror proper 
where "age is an acceptable race-neutral factor" [citation 
9 
 
omitted]); United States v. Clemons, 941 F.2d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 
1991) (age was legitimate race-neutral reason for peremptorily 
striking juror similar in age to twenty-two year old defendant); 
United States v. Maxwell, 160 F.3d 1071, 1075–1076 (6th Cir. 
1998) (declining to recognize young adults or college students 
as distinctive groups for Batson purposes); United States v. 
Jackson, 983 F.2d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 1993) (in excluding "young 
adults" from jury, "no court has found a Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection violation based on the exclusion of a certain 
age group from the jury"); United States v. Feemster, 98 F.3d 
1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 1996) ("relative youth" qualified as 
"potential race-neutral factor justifying the exercise of 
'peremptory' challenges"); United States v. Pichay, 986 F.2d 
1259, 1260 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) ("young adults do not 
constitute a cognizable group for purposes of an equal 
protection challenge to the composition of a petit jury"); 
United States v. Helmstetter, 479 F.3d 750, 754 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(youth acceptable race-neutral justification for exercising 
peremptory strike); Willis v. Kemp, 838 F.2d 1510, 1518 (11th 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Willis v. Zant, 489 U.S. 1059 
(1989) ("petitioner failed to establish that young adults aged 
eighteen to twenty-nine constituted a cognizable group"); United 
States v. Greene, 489 F.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974) ("'young persons' is not a 
10 
 
cognizable class"). 
 
As a general matter, "[w]e presume that peremptory 
challenges are properly made, but this presumption can be 
rebutted by a prima facie showing of either a pattern of 
challenges of members of the same discrete group, . . . or, in 
certain circumstances, challenge of a single prospective juror 
within a protected class, . . . where there is a likelihood that 
[a prospective juror is] being excluded from the jury solely on 
the basis of . . . group membership" (quotations and citations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Issa, 466 Mass. 1, 8 (2013).  A trial 
judge is strongly encouraged to ask for an explanation as 
questions are raised regarding the appropriateness of the 
challenges.  See id. at 11 n.14.  A judge has the broad 
discretion to do so "without having to make the determination 
that a pattern of improper exclusion exists."  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Scott, 463 Mass. 561, 571 (2012). 
 
In determining whether a pattern exists, a judge is to 
consider all of the relevant facts and circumstances.  Jones, 
477 Mass. at 322.  Such factors to consider in determining a 
pattern's existence may include (1) "the number and percentage 
of group members who have been excluded"; (2) "the possibility 
of an objective group-neutral explanation for the strike"; (3) 
"any similarities between excluded jurors and those, not members 
of the allegedly targeted group, who have been struck"; (4) 
11 
 
"differences among the various members of the allegedly targeted 
group who were struck"; (5) "whether those excluded are members 
of the same protected group as the defendant or the victim"; and 
(6) "the composition of the jurors already seated."  Id.  See 
Sanchez v. Roden, 753 F.3d 279, 302 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 
"Once . . . a pattern is found, the burden shifts to the 
party exercising the challenge to provide a 'group-neutral' 
explanation for it."  Oberle, 476 Mass. at 545, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460, 463 (2003).  "The 
judge must then determine whether the explanation is both 
'adequate' and 'genuine.'"  Oberle, supra, quoting Maldonado, 
supra at 464.  We review the judge's decisions on the peremptory 
challenges for abuse of discretion.  Jones, 477 Mass. at 320. 
 
a.  Jury empanelment generally.  On appeal, the defendant 
argues that jurors nos. 73, 104, 127, and 129 were improperly 
struck by the Commonwealth.  To provide context for addressing 
this claim, we begin by summarizing the jury selection process, 
including the defendant's objections to challenges to other 
jurors.  Overall, it was clear that the Commonwealth was 
exercising its challenges on younger, college-aged jurors.  The 
Commonwealth used twenty-six of its thirty-two peremptory 
challenges on jurors under the age of thirty years.  The judge 
noted the defendant's (and his codefendant's) age-based 
objections but ruled that age and status as a college student 
12 
 
were not protected classes. 
 
The defendant first raised a race-based Soares challenge 
when he objected to the Commonwealth's third peremptory strike, 
targeting an eighteen year old female Asian student.4  The judge 
found no pattern and did not require an explanation.  He also 
pointed out that one of the three excluded was a white male.  
All three of the Commonwealth's peremptory challenges at that 
point had been exercised on jurors under the age of thirty.  
Additionally, the Commonwealth had not objected to the first 
juror seated, a black female. 
 
Next, the defendant objected to the Commonwealth's eighth 
peremptory strike, a challenge of a twenty-one year old female 
Hispanic student.  Again, the judge found no Soares pattern and 
did not require a race-neutral reason for the challenge from the 
prosecutor.5  At the time of the defendant's challenge, the 
                                                 
4 A document showing the race, gender, and age of each 
challenged juror was admitted at trial for identification 
purposes. 
 
5 Defense counsel again contended that the Commonwealth was 
striking minority jurors.  The judge raised a question whether 
such a general objection, "lumping" together different 
minorities, was appropriate or whether the objection needed to 
be targeted to a particular group.  The Commonwealth stated its 
opinion that challenges needed to be specific to a particular 
protected group, but also contested the factual underpinnings of 
the objection.  The Commonwealth stated: 
 
"[T]he Commonwealth skip[ped] a female African-American 
juror, finding her indifferent and being content.  Then you 
 
13 
 
Commonwealth had exercised seven of eight peremptory strikes on 
jurors under the age of thirty. 
 
b.  Jurors nos. 73, 127, and 129.  The defendant asserted 
his next race-based Soares challenge to the Commonwealth's 
nineteenth peremptory strike, juror no. 73, who was a twenty 
year old black male college student.  Defense counsel described 
juror no. 73 as the first young black male found impartial.  The 
judge declined to find a Soares pattern.  The judge indicated 
that this was another young juror but saw no pattern as to race 
and required no explanation from the Commonwealth.6  Including 
juror no. 73, at that point, the Commonwealth had used fifteen 
of its nineteen peremptory strikes on jurors under the age of 
                                                                                                                                                             
have a strike of one black female, one white male, one 
Asian female, one white female, one Asian female, two more 
white females and a Hispanic female.  I don't see how that 
is, you know, with all due respect, anywhere near a 
pattern." 
 
We note that "[t]he test in Soares and Batson does not apply to 
challenges to members of all minority ethnic or racial groups 
lumped together, but instead applies to challenges to 
'particular, defined groupings in the community.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Prunty, 462 Mass. 295, 307 n.17 (2012), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486 (1979). See Gray v. Brady, 592 
F.3d 296, 305-306 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1015 (2010) 
("minorities," African-American, and Hispanic jurors are not 
part of same "cognizable group" for Batson purposes). 
 
6 As explained above, it would have been well within the 
judge's discretion to require an explanation, even without 
finding a pattern.  Such questioning could have facilitated our 
task on appeal, but the judge was not required to do so given 
the obvious and consistent pattern of the prosecutor challenging 
young people. 
14 
 
thirty.  There was no discernable pattern as to race.  The 
Commonwealth exercised challenges on young jurors irrespective 
of their race.  Of the fifteen jurors under thirty years old 
struck, ten were white, two were black, two were Hispanic, and 
one was Asian.  We discern no error on the judge's part.  The 
issue on appeal is not whether the judge was permitted to find 
that the presumption of properly-made peremptory challenges had 
been rebutted, but whether the judge was required to have so 
found.  Issa, 466 Mass. at 10.  He was not so required for juror 
no. 73. 
 
The race-neutral explanations for the Commonwealth's 
subsequent challenges of jurors nos. 127 and 129 are also 
evident from the record.  Juror no. 127, the second black male 
challenged, who was over thirty years old, disclosed that his 
cousin had been prosecuted by the Suffolk district attorney's 
office and had been convicted of murder.  The defendant did not 
object to the Commonwealth's challenge to juror no. 127. 
 
Juror no. 129, the third black male challenged, also was 
over thirty years old and disclosed that his brother had been 
prosecuted by the Suffolk district attorney's office and, at the 
time, was incarcerated for the conviction.  Further, juror no. 
129 stated that, two years prior, he had been arrested in 
another State and had received a probation sentence for 
possession of cocaine.  The defendant did not object.  The judge 
15 
 
did not err in determining that there was no pattern and in 
requiring no race-neutral reason; juror no. 129's two 
significant experiences with the law provided a sufficient and 
obvious basis for the prosecutor's peremptory challenge. 
 
c.  Juror no. 104.  The judge did not find a prima facie 
pattern until the third day of empanelment, when the 
Commonwealth exercised a challenge to juror no. 104, another 
twenty year old black male college student.  Defense counsel 
claimed that this was the fourth black male out of six jurors in 
the venire that had been challenged.  At that point, the judge 
required the prosecutor to provide an adequate and genuine race-
neutral reason for the decision to strike. 
 
The prosecutor provided two explanations.  First, the 
prospective juror was twenty years old.  The Commonwealth 
further explained that individuals of that age have 
"difficulties in deciding what classes to take, never mind 
whether or not somebody is guilty of first-degree murder."  
Second, the prosecutor stated that this individual should be 
challenged because, as counsel for the codefendant "point[ed] 
out, [the juror] works with intercity youth who are 
underprivileged."  Although recognizing that the potential juror 
was engaged in "absolutely honorable" work, the prosecutor was 
concerned that the juror would be overly sympathetic to the 
16 
 
codefendant's counsel's juvenile brain development argument7 and 
consequently "not follow the law but instead . . . follow his 
heart."  The prosecutor compared the potential juror to a "white 
woman psychologist" who was rejected earlier for opining that 
"[sixteen] year olds make impulsive decisions."  See 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Mass. at 322 (one factor to consider 
in determining whether prima facie case of discrimination has 
been made is "similarities between excluded jurors and those, 
not members of the allegedly targeted group, who have been 
struck").  This argument was responsive to defense counsel's 
motions to suppress and motion in limine, all of which had 
argued that juvenile brain development was a mitigating factor.  
The judge accepted the two reasons given by the prosecutor as 
separately both adequate and genuine and denied the defendant's 
request to disallow the Commonwealth's challenge. 
 
We conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in 
determining that the prosecutor's reasons for challenging juror 
no. 104 were adequate and genuine.  See Maldonado, 439 Mass. at 
464-466.  Although the judge deemed it a close call, and we 
                                                 
7 The prosecutor contended that counsel for the codefendant 
would be presenting evidence supporting the argument that 
"because of [the codefendant's] extreme youth, him being only 
[sixteen] years of age, that in some way . . . mitigates his 
conduct and that he should be found guilty perhaps of something 
less than first degree murder, or perhaps even an outright 
acquittal based upon some belief that his mind is not formed 
enough." 
17 
 
agree that it was a close question given the number and 
percentage of qualified black jurors excluded, we discern no 
abuse of discretion.  See generally, Jones, 477 Mass. at 319-
320.  First, the Commonwealth made no secret of the fact that it 
was exercising its challenges on younger, college-aged jurors 
irrespective of race, and it did so consistently.  See id. at 
322.  Second, the prospective juror's work with youth, given the 
defense's expected emphasis on the age of the codefendant as an 
exculpatory factor, provided an additional permissible objective 
group-neutral explanation.  See id.  Others, including a juror 
who worked with high school students and another who worked with 
"juvenile delinquents" outside the targeted group, had been 
excluded by the judge on this ground.  Third, at the time of the 
challenge to juror no. 104, the record reflects that five of the 
fourteen jurors already seated were black (three black women and 
two black men).  See id. 
 
In sum, the judge reasonably could have found that the 
common denominator for the Commonwealth's peremptory challenges 
was not race, but age.  During three days of empanelment, the 
judge carefully observed the composition of the jury, the 
composition of the jury venire, and the prosecutor's consistent 
use of peremptory challenges to exclude young jurors, 
particularly college students.  The judge determined that there 
had not been a prohibited pattern of excluding black jurors from 
18 
 
the jury, and we discern no abuse of discretion in any of his 
decisions on the defendant's objections to the Commonwealth's 
peremptory challenges. 
 
2.  Gang evidence.  The defendant contends that the judge 
erred in admitting evidence concerning his purported affiliation 
with the "Homes Ave." gang.  The defendant objected to the 
admission of this evidence, and we review for prejudicial error.  
Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 23 (1999).  We conclude 
that there was no error.  The defendant's own statements at the 
scene of the crime placed the meaning and significance of Homes 
Avenue at issue.  The defendant yelled out:  "Homes Ave., 
motherfuckers," and twice screamed, "That's right, bitches, 
Homes Ave. on the block".  Testimony from a police officer and 
the victim's brother provided necessary context and explanation. 
 
The background testimony was provided by Officer Anthony J. 
Serra, a member of the youth violence strike force, who was 
responsible for monitoring potential gang involvement in 
Dorchester from 2008 through 2010, and who occasionally 
patrolled Homes Avenue.  Serra testified that, in 2008, "[W]e 
were at the beginning stages of gathering intelligence . . . 
about this group that seemed to be emerging in the Homes Ave., 
Topliff Street area . . .[and] seemed to be identifying 
themselves with this street, Homes Ave.," and who were wearing 
clothes with an insignia beginning with the letter "H."  
19 
 
Relatedly, Serra also testified that, in 2008, he saw the 
defendant wearing a Harvard University athletic jacket.8 
 
The victim's brother also was permitted to testify about 
his own interactions and firsthand knowledge of a group that had 
formed on Norton Street.  He testified, based on his knowledge 
from the neighborhood, that there was a long-standing and 
ongoing dispute between the Norton Street group and two 
neighboring groups, Homes Ave. and the Cape Verde Outlaws.  
Additionally, the victim's brother testified that, approximately 
one year before the murder, in 2009, he had had an altercation 
with some individuals whom he had previously seen in the 
                                                 
8 Officer Anthony Serra also testified that he had a 
conversation with the defendant on January 16, 2008, while the 
defendant was being held for a burglary charge.  On a couple of 
occasions during the conversation, the defendant referred to 
himself as "Homes Ave." and said that his "boys" were also Homes 
Ave.  The defendant contends that the judge erred in denying his 
motion to suppress these statements because he was not issued 
his Miranda warnings and was not afforded prompt arraignment as 
required by Commonwealth v. Rosario, 422 Mass. 48, 56-57 (1996).  
The Commonwealth contends that Miranda warnings were not 
required and the Rosario requirements were satisfied.  As the 
2008 statements about his gang membership are clearly 
duplicative of other evidence, we need not resolve these issues.  
Even if admitted in error, the statements were harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Dagraca, 447 Mass. 546, 
552-553 (2006).  As explained here, the Commonwealth introduced 
substantial evidence at trial independent of the January 16, 
2008, interview that demonstrated the defendant's gang 
affiliation.  That evidence included the specific statements 
made by the defendant at the scene of the murder, the testimony 
that the defendant wore clothing with the "Homes Ave." insignia, 
and the background information about gangs in the neighborhood, 
including the Homes Ave. gang. 
20 
 
Dorchester neighborhood of Fields Corner and on Homes Avenue.  
The individuals attempted to rob him but were unsuccessful.  
During the altercation, the individuals asked the brother, "Are 
you from Norton?," to which he responded, "No, I live on 
Norton," to indicate that he was not affiliated with the group 
from Norton Street. 
 
Evidence of gang affiliation may be admissible to show 
motive.  Commonwealth v. Swafford, 441 Mass. 329, 332 (2004).  
We have, however, urged caution in admitting gang-related 
evidence because of the risk of suggesting that the defendant 
may have a propensity for criminality or violence.  Commonwealth 
v. Akara, 465 Mass. 245, 267 (2013). 
 
In this case, the gang evidence was properly admitted 
because it was relevant to the defendant's motive and intent, 
particularly in light of the "Homes Ave." statements the 
defendant made at the time of his arrest for the killing in 
2010.  See Swafford, 441 Mass. at 332 (testimony about gang 
affiliation allowed to establish defendants' retributive 
motive); Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 429 Mass, 502, 504-505 
(1999) (allowing evidence of gang affiliation relevant to 
defendant's motive and state of mind).  Here, the Commonwealth's 
theory was that the defendant and his codefendant engaged in a 
joint venture and killed the victim because they believed that 
the victim was his older brother, an alleged member of a group 
21 
 
from Norton Street, who earlier had almost hit the defendant 
with his scooter.  Thus, the brother's testimony regarding the 
ongoing feud between Homes Ave. and the Norton Street group and 
Officer Serra's testimony that the defendant had been seen 
wearing clothing that bore an "H" (signifying Homes Ave. gang 
membership) was relevant in proving the defendant's motive. 
 
The judge took proper steps to minimize any potentially 
unfair prejudicial impact of the testimony.  Akara, 465 Mass. at 
268-269.  During voir dire, he asked whether evidence of gang 
membership would affect potential jurors' impartiality.9  Id. at 
268; Commonwealth v. Correa, 437 Mass. 197, 201 (2002).  
Additionally, the judge instructed the jury that evidence of 
gang affiliation could not be considered as evidence of the 
defendant's character or propensity to commit the crimes 
charged.10  Id. 
                                                 
9 The judge asked members of the venire: 
 
"There may be evidence in this case that some of the 
people involved were or may have been involved or 
affiliated with a gang or gangs.  Whether such evidence is 
introduced and, of course, if it is, the credibility of 
such evidence and the importance of any such evidence is 
completely up to the jury to decide.  But there may be some 
evidence of that subject.  Would such evidence interfere 
with your ability to fairly and impartially judge this 
case?" 
 
10 The judge instructed the jury: 
 
 
22 
 
 
We therefore conclude that the judge did not abuse his 
discretion in admitting evidence of the defendant's gang 
affiliation because the gang evidence admitted was limited and 
properly went to the issue of motive.  See Swafford, 441 Mass. 
at 332.  Further, the gang evidence admitted explained the 
defendant's statements about "Homes Ave." at the scene of the 
crime.  Finally, the risk of unfair prejudice did not outweigh 
the probative value of this evidence given the judge's limiting 
instruction.  See id. 
 
3.  Cross-examination of police witness.  The defendant 
contends that the judge erred in not allowing the defense to 
cross-examine Officer Williams, one of the prosecution's key 
eyewitnesses, about an internal affairs investigation.  
                                                                                                                                                             
"There was evidence in the case that [the defendant] 
was affiliated with a gang or a group known as Homes 
Avenue.  Like all evidence, it's up to you to determine if 
it is true, and if it is, how much weight to give it in 
your deliberations on the charges in this case.  But you 
should keep in mind the following.  [The defendant] is not 
on trial for being a member of the Homes Avenue group or 
gang.  He is on trial for the murder of [the victim] on May 
30, 2010.  The evidence concerning his possible affiliation 
with the Homes Avenue gang or group may provide you with 
background information relevant to a possible motive in the 
case, but it would be improper for you to conclude that 
[the defendant] committed the crime for which he is charged 
. . . merely because he was a member of Homes Avenue.  You 
may consider the evidence of [the defendant's] possible 
gang affiliation as bearing upon the motive for the murder 
of [the victim], but you may not consider it for the 
purpose of showing [that the defendant] is or was a bad 
person or has a propensity for criminality or violence." 
23 
 
Specifically, the defendant sought to impeach Williams with 
information that the Boston police department had suspended him 
five years earlier for, among other things, lying in an internal 
affairs investigation on a personal matter.  We conclude that 
there was no error, as the judge was well within his discretion 
to exclude this five-year-old evidence of lying. 
"In general, specific instances of misconduct showing the 
witness to be untruthful are not admissible for the purpose of 
attacking . . . the witness's credibility."  Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 608(b) (2017).  See Commonwealth v. Hightower, 400 Mass. 267, 
271 (1987), and cases cited.11  Here, Officer Williams's alleged 
conduct from an internal affairs investigation five years before 
the murder was not material to the May 30, 2010, homicide 
investigation.  That investigation did not result in a criminal 
conviction or even a criminal charge.  It was also not related 
to how he conducted police investigations.  Thus, it was well 
within the judge's discretion to conclude that any probative 
weight of such five-year-old evidence was far outweighed by the 
risk of distracting the jury with the details of an unrelated 
                                                 
11 We have carved out narrow exceptions, allowing evidence 
of prior false accusations of rape to impeach a witness's 
credibility in rape and sexual assault cases.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. LaVelle, 414 Mass. 146, 151–152 (1993), 
discussing Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94–96 (1978), 
S.C., 385 Mass. 733 (1982). 
 
24 
 
incident.12  Accordingly, we discern no error in the judge's 
exclusion of this evidence. 
 
4.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  Last, the defendant 
contends that the prosecutor made improper remarks during the 
Commonwealth's closing arguments.  Specifically, the defendant 
claims that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's 
characterization of the version of events set forth by 
codefendant's counsel as an "insult to your intelligence," a 
"farce of a defense," and a "distraction." 
 
Prosecutors are "entitled to argue forcefully for the 
defendant's conviction" based on the evidence.  See Commonwealth 
v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 350 (1998).  "[E]nthusiastic rhetoric, 
strong advocacy, and excusable hyperbole are not grounds for 
reversal" (quotations and citation omitted).  Id.  To determine 
whether an improper argument was made, the prosecutor's remarks 
are "considered in the context of the whole argument, the 
evidence admitted at trial, and the judge's instructions to the 
jury" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Nelson, 468 Mass. 1, 
                                                 
12 The judge also properly allowed wide-ranging cross-
examination of Officer Williams to demonstrate bias or lying on 
his part.  LaVelle, 414 Mass. at 153 ("in contrast to prior bad 
acts, evidence of bias is almost never a collateral matter").  
In this case, the record demonstrates that, at trial, defense 
counsel extensively cross-examined Officer Williams on his trial 
and grand jury testimonies, contemporary reports, and the 
forensic evidence.  Further, defense counsel repeatedly asserted 
during closing arguments that Officer Williams was lying.  The 
defendant's confrontation rights were not violated. 
25 
 
10 (2014). 
 
In the Commonwealth's closing argument, the prosecutor 
critiqued the theory of counsel for the codefendant that there 
was a third party who was the actual killer.  The prosecutor 
urged the jury to disbelieve the notion that, if there was 
further investigation, the evidence may have been different.  
During closing argument, the prosecutor properly marshaled the 
evidence admitted at trial, including statements of witnesses, 
surveillance videotape, and forensic evidence.  It was in this 
context that the prosecutor, over defendant's objection, used 
the words "insult," "farce," and "distraction."  As a specific 
curative instruction, the judge reiterated to the jury that 
arguments were not evidence and admonished the jury not to get 
"carried away by words like 'insult' or 'distraction' or 'farce' 
or anything like that . . . [and to] treat that as rhetoric." 
 
Placed in context, the prosecutor's statements constituted 
an overly aggressive response to the argument by the 
codefendant's counsel but not grounds for reversal.  Even when 
understandably provoked, a prosecutor must not "fight fire with 
fire."  Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. 387, 402 (2010).  Most 
importantly, the judge's curative instruction specifically and 
appropriately eliminated any concern of prejudice.  Commonwealth 
v. Kater, 432 Mass. 404, 424 (2000).  Accordingly, we conclude 
that there was no reversible error arising from the prosecutor's 
26 
 
closing argument. 
 
5.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
record in accordance with G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and discern no 
basis to set aside or reduce the verdict of murder in the first 
degree or to order a new trial.  Accordingly, we decline to 
exercise our authority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.