Title: Alabama Recycling Association, Inc. v. City of Montgomery
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1070670
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 22, 2009

rel: 05/22/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1070670
____________________
Alabama Recycling Association, Inc.
v.
City of Montgomery
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court 
(CV-08-169)
PER CURIAM.
Alabama Recycling Association, Inc., appeals from the
trial court's judgment in favor of the City of Montgomery
("the City") in this action by Alabama Recycling seeking a
judgment declaring the existence of a conflict between a
1070670
2
statute and an ordinance adopted by the City and injunctive
relief.
Facts and Procedural History
On June 14, 2007, the Governor approved Act No. 2007-451,
Ala. Acts 2007, enacted by the Alabama Legislature to regulate
secondary metals recycling and now codified at § 13A-8-30 et
seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the Act").  The Act applies to both
ferrous metals (defined as those metal containing significant
quantities of iron or steel, § 13A-8-30(1)) and nonferrous
metals (defined as metals  not containing significant amounts
of iron or steel, such as copper, § 13A-8-30(2)).  The Act
places restrictions on secondary metals recyclers.  A
secondary metals recycler is defined as a person "who is
engaged ... in the business of paying compensation for ferrous
or nonferrous metals that have served their original economic
purpose."  § 13A-8-30(8).  
The Act requires secondary metals recyclers to maintain
records of "all purchase transactions to which the secondary
metals recycler is a party."  § 13A-8-31(a).  Those records
are to include: (1) the name and address of the secondary
metals recycler; (2) the date of the transaction, (3) the
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amount and a description of the type of metal purchased; (4)
the amount paid for the metal; (5) a signed statement from the
seller stating that he or she is the rightful owner of the
metal or is entitled to sell the metal; (6) the name and
address of the seller; (7) the number from some form of
identification from the seller; and (8) the license tag number
of the vehicle used to deliver the metal to the secondary
metals recycler. 
Section 13A-8-31(b) provides as follows:
"(b)(1) For three years following September 1,
2007 [the effective date of the Act], the secondary
metal[s] recycler shall not enter into any cash
transactions in excess of one hundred dollars ($100)
for copper or in excess of one thousand dollars
($1,000) for all other metals in payment for the
purchase of the metal property.  The check shall be
payable to the name and address of the seller of the
metal and mailed to the recorded address of the
seller or picked up in person by the seller.  At the
end of three years, this subdivision shall be
repealed and subdivision (2) shall apply.
"(2) 
Commencing 
three 
years 
and 
one 
day
following September 1, 2007, the secondary metal[s]
recycler shall not enter into any cash transaction
in excess of one thousand dollars ($1,000) for any
metals in payment for the purchase of the metal
property.  Payment shall be made by check issued to
the seller of the metal.  The check shall be payable
to the name and address of the seller or picked up
in person by the seller [sic]."
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A law-enforcement official may issue a hold notice to a
secondary metals recycler who the law-enforcement official
reasonably believes is in possession of stolen metal property
when the official has an affidavit from the rightful owner
describing the stolen property. § 13A-8-33(a)(1).  If the
secondary metals recycler contests an allegedly rightful
owner's claim to the metal property, the rightful owner may
file an action in the circuit court in the county in which the
secondary metals recycler is located. § 13A-8-34(a).  Certain
classes of sellers are exempt from the Act. § 13A-8-35.  The
Act criminalizes giving false statements regarding ownership
or a false or altered identification or vehicle tag number in
connection with the sale of metal property.  § 13A-8-36.  A
secondary metals recycler who knowingly and intentionally
violates the Act is guilty of a misdemeanor, but if there is
a pattern of such practices by the secondary metals recycler,
then the recycler is guilty of a Class C felony. § 13A-8-
37(b).  The Act provides that in cases where the acts
prohibited by the Act also constitute violations of "any other
provision of law," then the provisions of law that carry the
stricter penalty will be applied. § 13A-8-38.  Section 13A-8-
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39 provides that the Act applies to all businesses regulated
under the Act without regard to the location of the business
within the State and that the Act shall take precedence over
any and all local ordinances to the contrary.
On January 15, 2008, the City enacted Ordinance No. 3-
2008, which was to become effective February 7, 2008 ("the
ordinance").  In enacting the ordinance, the City Council
specifically found "that copper thefts and illegal trade in
stolen copper have had and continue to have a significant
detrimental impact on the citizens and economy of the City of
Montgomery by way of both the increase in illegal activity in
the community and the cost of damages to the victims of copper
theft."  § 1.  The ordinance was enacted "to supplement and
compliment [sic] the state law regarding the theft and
purchase of copper, and the record keeping and reporting
requirements imposed upon purchasers of copper thereby."  § 2.
The ordinance defines a metals recycler as any person or
entity that enters into a transaction to purchase salvaged
copper.  The ordinance identifies "copper" as "the element
listed in the periodic table bearing the atomic number 29 and
classified as a metal," and "salvaged copper," under the
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ordinance, includes "copper tubing, copper wire –- bare and
insulated, all brasses and bronzes, copper solids, auto
radiators, copper and aluminum radiators."    
The ordinance provides, in pertinent part, that each
metals recycler who purchases salvaged copper within the City
shall be required to:
"1) Hold all payments for purchases of Salvaged
Copper for a minimum of twenty-four hours after the
said purchase; payment to be picked up by seller or
mailed to seller.
"2) Pay for all purchases of Salvaged Copper by
check made payable to the seller of copper;
"3) Capture and maintain by electronic means, a
frontal, head and shoulders color photograph of the
person from whom they purchase any quantity of
Salvaged Copper in a form which is capable of
transmission and delivery via computer to the person
or entity designated by the Chief of Police of the
Montgomery 
Police 
Department; 
said 
electronic
photograph shall be maintained by the Metals
Recycler for a period of at least one year from the
date of the purchase of the Salvaged Copper and in
the same manner which those records required to be
kept by Ordinance 45-2006; said photograph and
records shall viewable by any law enforcement
officer upon request and shall be provided to the
Chief's designee by electronic means by request
thereof."
On January 31, 2008, Alabama Recycling, an incorporated
association composed of businesses in the City engaged in the
purchase of ferrous and nonferrous metals, sued the City,
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seeking a judgment declaring that the ordinance conflicts with
the Act.  Alabama Recycling also sought relief in the form of
a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and
a permanent injunction, to prohibit the ordinance from taking
effect on February 7, 2008.  On February 4, 2008, the trial
court held a hearing, following which it refused to enter a
temporary restraining order.  On February 6, 2008, Alabama
Recycling filed a motion to stay the enforcement of the
ordinance to the extent it conflicts with the Act; it also
filed a notice of appeal from the denial of its request for a
temporary restraining order.  On February 8, 2008, the trial
court entered an order stating that, "having considered
complaint for Declaratory an Injunctive Relief, and after
hearing testimony, the submission of documents, and argument
of counsel, and for cause shown it is hereby ordered that
[Alabama Recycling's] relief sought is denied."  The trial
court granted the motion to stay.  On February 22, 2008, the
City filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the order
staying the enforcement of the ordinance.  This Court remanded
the case to the trial court for the sole purpose of
considering the City's motion to alter, amend, or vacate.  On
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February 26, 2008, the trial court denied the City's motion.
On February 29, 2008, Alabama Recycling filed a motion to
reinstate its appeal, which this Court granted.
Standard of Review
The question presented on appeal involves a pure question
of law; thus, our review is de novo.  See Barber v. Jefferson
County Racing Ass'n, 960 So. 2d 599 (Ala. 2006)(holding that
review of a declaratory judgment is ordinarily governed by the
ore tenus standard, but when the facts are undisputed or
uncontroverted and the questions presented are purely legal
ones, the review is de novo). 
Discussion
Alabama Recycling argues that the Act and the ordinance
are inconsistent.   "'"Whether an ordinance is inconsistent
with the general law of the State is to be determined by
whether the municipal law prohibits anything which the State
law specifically permits."'" Gibson v. City of Alexander City,
779 So. 2d 1153, 1155 (Ala. 2000)(quoting Lanier v. City of
Newton, 518 So. 2d 40, 43 (Ala. 1987), quoting in turn Congo
v. State, 409 So. 2d 475, 478  (Ala. Crim. App. 1981)).  In
Lanier v. City of Newton, this Court addressed "inconsistency"
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with regard to a conflict between a statute and an ordinance,
stating: "'Inconsistent' is defined by Black's Law Dictionary
(5th ed. 1979) as 'mutually repugnant or contradictory;
contrary, the one to the other, so that both cannot stand, but
the acceptance or establishment of the one implies the
abrogation or abandonment of the other.'  It implies
'contradiction -- qualities which cannot coexist -- not merely
a lack of uniformity in details.'  City of Montgomery v.
Barefield, 1 Ala. App. 515, 523, 56 So. 260, 262 (1911)."  518
So. 2d at 43.
In Gibson, supra, a café owner brought an action
challenging the city's authority to adopt an ordinance
restricting the sale of alcoholic beverages between midnight
and 7 a.m., where the café owner had a license issued under
the statutory provisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Licensing
Code that allowed him to sell liquor 24 hours a day, 6 days a
week.  This Court held that the City's ordinance merely
enlarged upon the statutory provisions of the Alcoholic
Beverage Licensing Code and that it was not inconsistent with
Alabama statutory law. 
1070670
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In City of Montgomery v. Barefield, 1 Ala. App. 515, 56
So. 260 (1911), the court examined an alleged conflict between
a city ordinance and statutes regarding work on public roads,
which provided that all residents of a municipality over the
age of 45 were exempt from road duty and that the inhabitants
of a municipality were exempt from working on the roads
outside the municipality but could be required to pay a street
tax for maintenance and construction of the streets within the
municipality.   The city passed an ordinance that imposed an
annual street tax on all residents between the ages of 21 and
45 and required those failing to pay the annual street tax  to
work the roads in the city.  The appellate court held that the
ordinance and the statutes were not in conflict, stating:
"The 
ordinance 
in 
question 
strikes 
down 
the
provisions of no general law, is not repugnant to it,
does not infringe its spirit, and is not in
contravention of or in conflict with the operation or
enforcement of the general law relating to the
performance of road duty.  The laws are not
contradictory of nor repugnant to each other; they
may both coexist and be enforced at the same time,
without dependence one upon the other.  Each has a
separate field of operation in which it may be
enforced.  The city law specifies no particular
persons as exempt, and makes a somewhat different
class liable to the payment of street tax than are
liable to the performance of road duty under the
provisions of the law requiring persons to work the
roads, but the constitutional requirement is not for
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conformity in the laws; it is that they shall not be
inconsistent, and inconsistent implies contradiction
-- qualities which cannot coexist -- not merely a
lack of uniformity in details."
 
1 Ala. App. at 523, 56 So. at 263.  In City of Mobile v.
Collins, 24 Ala. App. 41, 130 So. 369 (1930), the appellate
court held that a city ordinance levying a street tax on men
between the ages of 21 and 60 was not inconsistent with the
same statutes at issue in Barefield. 
In Congo v. State, supra, a criminal defendant argued that
a municipal ordinance charging the offense with which he was
charged –- drunkenness on any street or other public place --
was in conflict with a State statute providing that a person
commits the crime of public intoxication if he appears in
public under the influence to the degree that he endangers
himself or another or his boisterous or offensive conduct
annoys another person.  Specifically, the defendant contended
that the city ordinance was in conflict with the statute, and
was therefore unconstitutional, because, he argued, the city
ordinance prohibited merely being in a state of drunkenness
whereas the statute required some manifestation of endangering
or annoying conduct in addition to the intoxication.  The
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Court of Criminal Appeals held that  the city ordinance did
not contravene a State statute and that it did not prohibit
something the State statute affirmatively allowed.
In the present case, Alabama Recycling contends that the
ordinance and the Act are in conflict because the Act permits
cash purchases of copper for up to $100 and up to $1,000 for
other metals and the ordinance prohibits any cash transactions
for copper. The Act prohibits a metals recycler from
purchasing copper with cash if the transaction is over $100,
while the ordinance expands the cash prohibition to all
transactions for the purchase of copper.  The Act does not
"specifically permit" cash purchases of copper at or below
$100 in value.  It simply does not regulate such purchases.
The fact that the Act does not regulate purchases of $100 or
less does not create a conflict with the ordinance, which does
regulate such purchases.  In other words, the Act does not
prohibit payment by check for purchases of copper under $100.
This portion of the ordinance does not conflict with the
statute because the ordinance enlarges upon the provisions of
the Act by adding certain restrictions.  
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Alabama Recycling also argues that a conflict exists
because the Act allows for the immediate delivery of a check
to the seller in a non-cash transaction and the ordinance
requires that a check issued to the seller be withheld for 24
hours.  The ordinance requires a metals recycler to hold a
check paid for the purchase of copper for 24 hours, whereas
the Act does not require a recycler to hold payment for any
period.  In adopting the Act, the legislature did not prohibit
or permit a metals recycler from holding a check.  The
ordinance thus does not prohibit anything the Act expressly
permits or permit anything the Act expressly prohibits.  The
Act is silent on this issue.  Mere differences in detail do
not create a conflict, and we cannot say a conflict exists
merely because the Act is silent where the ordinance speaks.
Alabama Recycling argues that there is a conflict between
the Act and the ordinance because the Act exempts from
regulation metals that have not served their original economic
purpose (i.e., new copper and other metals) whereas the
ordinance regulates purchases of all copper, new or used.  The
ordinance defines the term "salvaged copper" and lists several
items that are made of copper.  The term "salvaged," however,
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is not defined in the ordinance.  Assuming, without deciding,
that "salvaged copper" is copper that has served its original
economic purpose, there would be no conflict between the
ordinance and the Act.  Even if we assume that the ordinance
applies to both new and salvaged copper, the ordinance does
not conflict with the Act because the phrase "metals that have
served their original economic purpose" is part of the
definition of "secondary metals recycler" and references to
whom the provisions of the Act apply and not the definition of
nonferrous metals.  The definition of nonferrous metals in the
Act is any metal not containing significant amounts of iron or
steel, and copper is specifically set out as one of those
metals.  
Alabama Recycling does cite several cases in which Alabama
appellate courts have found  a conflict between a city
ordinance and a statute.  However, those cases involved
ordinances that prohibited conduct that the State statute
expressly allowed.  See Riverbend P'ship v. City of Mobile,
457 So. 2d 371 (Ala. 1984)(holding that there was a conflict
between the city ordinance and a State statute where the city
ordinance denied the Board of Adjustment the power to grant
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variances to zoning laws and the State statute expressly
provided for such power in the enabling legislation); Alabama
Disposal Solutions-Landfill, LLC v. Town of Lowndesboro, 837
So. 2d 292 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002)(holding that a municipal
ordinance prohibiting landfills within the city's corporate
limits and its police jurisdiction conflicted with a State
statute to the extent that the city's ordinance purported to
regulate a solid-waste landfill outside the city's corporate
limits); and Atkins v. City of Tarrant City, 369 So. 2d 322
(Ala. Crim. App. 1979)(holding that city ordinance that made
it illegal to be intoxicated while riding as a passenger in an
automobile conflicted with State statute exempting from
criminal liability for intoxication while traveling along a
public highway persons traveling as a passenger in any public
or private conveyance).  
Lastly, Alabama Recycling argues that the Act was intended
to "limit the requirements for all cases to its own terms"
because § 13A-8-39 states that the Act applies statewide and
that it "shall take precedence over any and all local
ordinances to the contrary."  Had the legislature intended to
occupy the entire field of regulating the sale of used metals,
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the legislature could have easily stated that the Act was to
be exclusive.  See, e.g., § 2-17-25, Ala. Code 1975
(establishing 
the 
jurisdiction 
of 
the 
agricultural
commissioner as "exclusive" and providing that "no county or
municipal board of health or other municipal agency shall have
the power or jurisdiction to regulate the slaughtering" of
certain animals).  Instead, the legislature recognized that
there could be existing or future city ordinances regarding
metals recycling that would not be contrary to the Act.  Also,
§ 13A-8-38 recognizes the coexistence of other criminal laws
regulating the conduct addressed by the Act and recognizes
that the Act was not intended to repeal those criminal laws
and that, as between the two provisions, the harsher penalty
would prevail.  
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Lyons, 
Woodall, 
Stuart, 
Smith, 
Bolin, 
Parker, 
Murdock, 
and
Shaw, JJ., concur.