Title: State v. Parkins
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S056356
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: June 25, 2009

FILED: June 25, 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
STEVEN DONALD PARKINS,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC CR0500337; CA
A130219; SC S056356)
En Banc
On review from the
Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted
February 9, 2009.
Daniel J. Casey,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.
Paul L. Smith,
Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner on review.  
With him on the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and Erika L.
Hadlock, Acting Solicitor General.
LINDER, J.
The decision of the
Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The judgment of the
circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Kistler, J., dissented
in part and concurred in part and filed an opinion.
*Appeal from Clackamas
County Circuit Court, Jeffrey S. Jones,
Judge. 220 Or App 314, 185
P3d 1132 (2008).
LINDER, J.
In this criminal case, defendant was
convicted of, among others charges, one count of first-degree kidnapping and six
counts of first-degree sexual abuse.  On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
defendant raised several challenges to his convictions and sentences.  The
Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion.  State v. Parkins, 220 Or App
314, 185 P3d 1132 (2008).  We allowed defendant's petition for review, which
raises two of the issues that defendant presented to the Court of Appeals.  First,
defendant contends that his kidnapping conviction should be overturned because
the evidence failed to show that the victim was "secretly confine[d] * * *
in a place where [she was] not likely to be found."  ORS 163.225(1)(b).(1)
 Second, defendant contends that the trial court should have merged his
separate convictions for first-degree sexual abuse because the six separate
counts of the indictment represented different legal theories for proving three
acts of sexual abuse.  For the reasons we set forth below, we agree with both
of defendant's arguments.  We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals decision
and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Because this appeal arises in part
from the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal,
we state the facts underlying defendant's conviction in the light most
favorable to the state.  State v. Casey, 346 Or 54, 56, 203 P3d 202
(2009).  The incidents alleged in the indictment took place during the summer
of 2003.  The victim, who was 11 years old, lived with her mother, Furlow, and
her older sister, in her mother's home.  Defendant was a friend of Furlow's
then-boyfriend, Olney, and visited the mother's home that summer.
One day during that summer, Furlow
and Olney left defendant alone at the house with the victim and her older
sister.  The victim's sister was on the porch smoking a cigarette, and
defendant was in Furlow's bedroom.  The victim asked her sister where she had
gotten the cigarette, and her sister replied that defendant gave it to her.  The
victim then walked down the hall and passed by her mother's bedroom.  Defendant
offered the victim a cigarette.  The victim went into the bedroom and grabbed a
cigarette from the headboard of the bed.  When the victim turned around to ask
for a lighter, defendant shut and locked the bedroom door.  Defendant pushed
her onto the bed, climbed on top of her, and held her down by putting his knees
on her shoulder.  Defendant kissed the victim.  When the victim screamed,
defendant struck her in the face and threatened to burn her with his
cigarette.  Defendant put his hands under the victim's shirt and touched her
breasts.  At another point, he put his hand down the victim's pants and
inserted his fingers into her vagina.  Defendant also touched victim's
buttocks.  The victim tried to scream and to move, but defendant told her "to
stop screaming because no one would hear [her] and no one would care."  At
some point, the victim's sister rattled the doorknob to the locked bedroom. 
Defendant let the victim up, and she unlocked the door and ran out of the
room.  
Based on those events, defendant was
indicted in 2005 for one count of first-degree unlawful sexual penetration, one
count of second-degree unlawful sexual penetration, six counts of first-degree
sexual abuse, and one count of first-degree kidnapping.  After a bench trial,
the court found defendant guilty on all counts.  The trial court sentenced
defendant to 100 months' imprisonment for first-degree unlawful sexual
penetration, 75 months' imprisonment for second-degree unlawful sexual
penetration, 75 months' imprisonment for each count of first-degree sexual
abuse, and 90 months' imprisonment for first-degree kidnapping, with all
sentences to be served concurrently.  
As noted, defendant appealed to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed without opinion.  Defendant then petitioned
for review, raising two issues:  (1) whether a person is "secretly
confine[d] * * * in a place where the person is not likely to be found," as
required for the kidnapping charge (ORS 163.225(1)(b)), when another person
knew where the victim was located; and (2) whether defendant's six convictions
for first-degree sexual abuse should have been merged into three convictions, when
those convictions were based on different legal theories for proving three acts
of sexual abuse.  We address each issue in turn.
In considering the legal sufficiency
of the evidence on the first-degree kidnapping charge, we first address the
state's contention that defendant did not preserve his challenge to the
first-degree kidnapping charge.  At the close of the state's case, apparently
anticipating that defendant would move for a judgment of acquittal, the state alerted
the trial court to the Court of Appeals opinion in State v. Montgomery,
50 Or App 381, 386-87, 624 P2d 151 (1981).  In doing so, the state described Montgomery
as "an important case with regard to the kidnapping charge," because
that opinion analyzed the "secretly confined" and "place not
likely to be found" elements of ORS 163.225(1)(b).  After the state called
the court's attention to Montgomery, the trial court recessed briefly.   When
the proceedings resumed, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal. 
In moving for a judgment of
acquittal, defendant discussed Montgomery and attempted to distinguish
that case:
"I know [the state] referred, before the
break, to State v. Montgomery, which is a case regarding a person being
secreted.  And although I would factually distinguish the present case from the
Montgomery case in that the individual that this took place  that the
individual who did secret or attempt to secret or hold [the victim], did not
follow the dictates set out I think in Montgomery in that there wasn't
any attempt to secret her in the sense of when somebody rattled the door,
people exited the room apparently.  There were other people  at least one
other person, no matter what version you believe, in the trailer, which was
certainly by all accounts not difficult to hear throughout, and the sister,
being the only one there, her being present in the trailer or at the furthest,
present on the porch, which in some respects may even be closer to physically
to the room that [the victim] claims this took place in, was certainly within
ear shot, and any cry would have been heard and could have been heard, seems to
defeat the secreting aspect that is referred to in Montgomery."
Immediately after that statement, defendant continued, "However,
as the Court knows from the entire case from opening statement to now, that's
not our issue.  Our issue is not a nit-picking argument regarding specific
elements and specific crimes."  (Emphasis added.)  Defendant explained
that he was "simply saying that there's insufficient evidence, as a whole"
to conclude that defendant committed any criminal acts as charged.  That was
consistent with defendant's overall theory of the case, which was that the
abuse either had not occurred at all or that the perpetrator had been someone
else who sometimes visited the family, and who better matched the victim's
description of the perpetrator. The trial court thereafter denied defendant's
motion for judgment of acquittal.  In doing so, the trial court specifically stated:
"I do believe that there's sufficient evidence on the
Kidnapping count to support the allegations set forth in the Indictment,
particularly the evidence that was brought up by the State, that there were
attempts by [the victim] to seek help and to scream, but that the Defendant
told her that nobody would hear and nobody would care.  And, in light of that
evidence, I believe that that charge is legally sound in this case."
(Emphasis added.)
In arguing that defendant did not
preserve the argument that he now makes, the state points to defendant's
statements after his discussion of Montgomery and asserts that those
statements steered the trial court away from the legal issue of whether the
alleged conduct constituted "secret confine[ment] * * * in a place where
the person is not likely to be found," as that phrase is used in ORS
163.225(1)(b).  According to the state, defendant urged the trial court to
focus instead on whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that any
crime occurred and, if one had occurred, whether defendant was the person who had
committed it.  In the state's view, the trial court did not have an adequate opportunity
to consider the argument that defendant now presses.  
The general rule is that claims of
error that have not been raised in the trial court will not be considered on
appeal.  State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 341, 15 P3d 22 (2000); ORAP 5.45.  
"The purpose of the preservation rule is the practical
one of requiring a defendant to provide an explanation of his or her position 'specific
enough to ensure that the [trial] court can identify its alleged error with
enough clarity to permit it to consider and correct the error immediately, if
correction is warranted.'"  
State v. Amaya, 336 Or 616, 629, 89 P3d 1163 (2004)
(quoting Wyatt, 331 Or at 343).
The state relies on State v.
Chavez, 335 Or 44, 48, 56 P3d 923 (2002), as a case arising on analogous
facts in which this court held that defendant had failed to preserve the issue
that he sought to have this court resolve.  In Chavez, the defendant
argued on appeal that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR)
required the trial court to suppress his incriminating statements to the
police.  Id. at 46-47.  The defendant had made that argument to the
trial court in a written memorandum in support of a motion to suppress.  Id.
at 47.  At the hearing on the motion, the trial court stated that it agreed
with the state's position that the VCCR did not create individual rights, but told
the defendant's lawyer that he could attempt to convince the court otherwise.  Id. 
The defendant's counsel declined the invitation and, instead, orally argued only
that the defendant's statements should be suppressed under Miranda,
which he thought posed the same considerations as did compliance with the VCCR. 
Id. This court held that the defendant's argument for suppression under
the VCCR was not preserved because the defendant "expressly told the trial
court that he was not trying to argue that the VCCR created individual rights
beyond those that Miranda confers" and "affirmatively asked
the trial court not to consider the argument that he seeks to advance in this
court."  Id. at 48.  The state contends that, as in Chavez,
defendant here directed the trial court away from the issue that he presses on
appeal and, therefore, did not preserve the argument.
We disagree that Chavez and
this case bear sufficient similarities to compel the same conclusion that the
court reached in Chavez.  To be sure, defendant in this case did not
offer the trial court a lengthy and detailed argument about why the state's
evidence did not satisfy the element of "secretly confin[ing] the person
in a place where the person is not likely to be found," ORS
163.225(1)(b).  Unlike the defendant in Chavez, however, defendant in
this case actually did discuss relevant precedent (Montgomery) and did present
some argument to the trial court as to how his case differed from that
precedent.  Defendant's subsequent statement to the court, "that's not our
issue," could have been a segué to a different argument, as defendant now
urges.  It also could have been, as the state urges, an abandonment of any Montgomery-type
challenge to the kidnapping charge.  We can conceive of a third possibility as
well:  Defendant may have been confident of his likely success on his theory
that, because he did not match the victim's description of the person who had abused
her, the evidence was insufficient to prove that defendant had committed any
criminal acts.  Success on that point would have resulted in an acquittal on
all charges, not just on the kidnapping charge.  Defendant may have cast his
argument as he did to convey the strength of that confidence to the trial
court.  In all events, the trial court, in our view, appears to have understood
the Montgomery issue to be in play.  In denying the motion for judgment
of acquittal, the court specifically stated that the kidnapping charge "is
legally sound in this case" and highlighted, not the evidence of
defendant's identity as the perpetrator, but the evidence that satisfied the
confinement element of the crime.
This court recently reaffirmed the
important policies behind the preservation rule  -- e.g., procedural
fairness to the parties and the trial court, judicial economy, and full
development of the record.  See Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or 209, 219-221,
191 P3d 637 (2008) (discussing and reaffirming the importance of the preservation
rule).  But the preservation rule also can come at a cost.  It may prevent a
reviewing court from correcting prejudicial error, at least when the error is not
one that the court can reach as error apparent on the face of the record
(so-called "plain error").  See State v. Steen, 346 Or 143, 145,
206 P3d 614 (2009) (discussing plain error exception to preservation
requirement generally); ORAP 5.45(1) (appellate courts will not consider
unpreserved issues unless they qualify as errors apparent on the record).  The
preservation rule also may inhibit needed development or clarification of the
law.  Consequently, as this court has cautioned, "problems may arise if
the preservation onion in sliced too thinly."  Amaya, 336 Or at
629.   Ultimately, the preservation rule is a practical one, and close calls --
like this one -- inevitably will turn on whether, given the particular record
of a case, the court concludes that the policies underlying the rule have been
sufficiently served.
Here, those policies are sufficiently
served.  The statutory issue that defendant raises was presented to the trial
court, even if defendant addressed it ambivalently.  And not only did the state
have a meaningful opportunity to address the issue, it was the state that
raised Montgomery before the trial court.  Finally, the trial court had an
opportunity to resolve the issue, and the record suggests that the trial court
in fact did so.   To be sure, the issue could have been better preserved, but
it was, we conclude, adequately preserved.
We therefore turn to the merits of
defendant's kidnapping argument.  Defendant was convicted of first-degree
kidnapping.  ORS 163.235(1) defines that crime:
"A person commits the crime of kidnapping
in the first degree if the person violates ORS 163.225 with any of the
following purposes:
"(a) To compel any person to pay or deliver
money or property as ransom;
"(b) To hold the victim as a shield or
hostage;
"(c) To cause physical injury to the
victim; or
"(d) To terrorize the victim or another
person."
ORS 163.225(1) provides, in part:
"A person commits the crime of kidnapping
in the second degree if, with intent to interfere substantially with another's
personal liberty, and without consent or legal authority, the person: * * *
"(b) Secretly confines the person in a
place where the person is not likely to be found."
As noted, defendant focuses his argument on the meaning of the
phrase "secretly confines the person in a place where the person is not
likely to be found."  ORS 163.225(1)(b).  
In interpreting statutes, the
appropriate first step in determining the legislature's intent is to examine
the statutory text and context.  State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171, 206
P3d 1042 (2009).  ORS 163.225(1)(b) does not define the phrase at issue.  We therefore
look to the "plain, natural, and ordinary meaning" of that phrase.  PGE
v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  "Secretly
confine[d] * * * in a place where the person is not likely to be found," ORS
163.225(1)(b), means that a person is held or restrained in a place where it is
not probable that the person will be located, either accidentally or through
searching.  Both the words and their meaning are straightforward.(2)
Because this court has no cases
applying that phrase from ORS 163.225(1)(b), both parties discuss the sole
Court of Appeals decision on this issue, Montgomery, 50 Or App at
386-87.  In that case, the court analyzed both whether the victim had been "secretly
confine[d]" and whether the confinement had been in a "place where
the person is not likely to be found."  Id.  The defendant and his
brother had dragged the victim into the victim's bedroom.  Id. at 383.  When
the police arrived at the victim's apartment, the defendant and his brother
pulled the victim into the bathroom, where defendant held a knife to the victim's
throat while the defendant's brother went to speak with the police.  Id. 
The defendant's brother told the defendant to cut the victim's throat if the
victim made a sound.  Id.  
The Court of Appeals had little
difficulty concluding that the victim in Montgomery had been "secretly
confine[d]":
"Defendant clearly confined the victim by keeping him
in the bathroom. And, using the ordinary definition of 'secretly' as keeping
something from knowledge or view, defendant and his brother made the place
secret by locking the door, closing the curtains, holding the victim at
knifepoint so that he was not able to respond to the officer's knocks, and
telling the officers that the victim was not at home."
Id. at 386.  The "place where the person
is not likely to be found" component of the kidnapping charge gave the
court more trouble, but the court ultimately concluded that, under the
circumstances of the case, the bathroom in the victim's own apartment was such
a place:
"[A]lthough a victim's own bathroom is not ordinarily a
place where that person is not likely to be found, the room can be made into
such a place by the efforts of the kidnapper.  Here, defendant and his brother
made a calculated effort to insure that the police would not find the victim in
his own apartment and they succeeded.  Under these circumstances the jury was
entitled to find that defendant confined the victim in a place where he was not
likely to be found."
Id. at 386-87.  
The facts in Montgomery are
not before us, and our task is not to decide that case.  We do agree with the
Court of Appeals, however, that determining whether a person was secretly
confined in a place where the person is not likely to be found must take into
account the circumstances of the place, the victim, and the defendant's actions. 
Here, it is beyond dispute that the victim was confined in her mother's bedroom
-- defendant locked the door to the bedroom, pinned the victim on the bed, and
threatened to burn her with a cigarette if she continued to scream.  From those
same actions, a trier of fact could find that defendant "secretly"
confined the victim -- defendant concealed the victim's confinement by taking
steps to ensure that the victim not reveal that she was locked in the bedroom
with defendant. 
No reasonable finder of fact could
conclude, however, that the confinement was in a place where the victim was not
likely to be found.  The victim's older sister was on the porch of the home at
the time of the incident.  Her sister suggested that the victim go to their
mother's bedroom and ask defendant for a cigarette, and the victim left the
porch and went inside in response to that suggestion.  The sister thus either knew
that the victim had gone to their mother's bedroom, or at least would have
thought that she had done so.  That fact is confirmed by the sister's actions. 
When the sister entered the house to look for the victim, she went to the door into
her mother's bedroom and jiggled the door handle.  Because the sister thought that
the victim had gone to her mother's bedroom to see defendant, it also was probable,
and thus likely, that that the sister would have found the victim
through searching.(3) 
Under the circumstances of this case, therefore, defendant cannot be said to
have secretly confined the victim in a place where she was "not likely to
be found," within the meaning of ORS 163.225(1)(b).(4)
 We therefore must reverse defendant's conviction for kidnapping in the first
degree.
We turn to the second issue raised by
defendant.  Defendant contends that the trial court erred in not merging his
six sexual abuse convictions into three convictions.  Before we proceed to the
merits of defendant's merger argument, however, we again must address the state's
contention that this issue was not properly preserved in the trial court.  
Defendant filed a sentencing
memorandum in the trial court that cited the anti-merger statute, ORS 161.067: 

"Defendant has recorded his objection to any sentence
imposed under ORS 137.700.  If the court does sentence the defendant under that
sentencing scheme[,] the court's power to impose sentences consecutive to one
another is limited.  ORS 161.067; [State]
v. McCloud, 177 Or App 511 (2001).  These references apply specifically
to the issue of merger.  Clearly defendant's convictions for sexual
abuse in the present case should be merged for purposes of conviction."(5)
(Emphasis added.)  In that memorandum, defendant also stated
that, "[i]n the present situation[,] the court has found the defendant
guilty of charges that are not separately punishable offences [sic]
under ORS 161.067."  Defendant's sentencing memorandum discussed both
merger of the counts on which defendant had been found guilty as well as
consecutive sentencing and appeared at times to conflate those concepts.  
At the sentencing hearing, defendant
again raised ORS 161.067 and McCloud.  There, the context was an
argument concerning consecutive sentencing:
"In addition, Your Honor, [State v.
McCloud], which I referred to in the memorandum, as well [as ORS 161.067]
seems they set out that the Court would have to make certain findings in any
consecutive sentencing, especially as the Court pointed out, that this was a
single incident, short time span, not allowing the Defendant to pause, I think
is one of the words used in the case law for purposes of contemplation further
that the harm caused by the Defendant was greater than the qualitative different
loss to the victim in similar cases.
"I think that -- I think that given the
background of [defendant] -- uh -- that consecutive sentences in this case would
be overkill, quite frankly."
The state discussed ORS 161.067 in greater detail than did
defendant, although the state similarly focused primarily on the consecutive
sentencing issue:
"[ORS] 161.067 talks about determining punishable
offenses for violation of multiple statutory provisions and/or multiple victims
or repeated violations.  Subsection 1 is the one that applies in this case.  It
says when the same conduct or criminal episode violates two or more statutory
provisions, and each provision requires proof of an element that the others do
not, there are as many separately punishable offenses as there [are] separate
statutory violations.  And we have that in this case.  And that's why you
can issue consecutive sentences if you'd like."(6)
(Emphasis added.)  The trial court's ruling at the sentencing
hearing did not address merger.  Instead, the trial court sentenced defendant
to 100 months on the first-degree unlawful sexual penetration count and ordered
that the sentence for all remaining counts run concurrently to that sentence.  
In arguing that the merger issue is
not adequately preserved, the state urges that the trial court did not have the
opportunity to address the merger issue that defendant raises on appeal.  The
state acknowledges that defendant cited the relevant statute (ORS 161.067) and
a relevant case (McCloud) both in his sentencing memorandum and at the
hearing.  The state asserts, however, that defendant's sentencing memorandum
was ambiguous and that defendant's statements at the hearing, which omitted any
discussion of merger, led the trial court to conclude that defendant's argument
focused only on concurrent sentencing.   Consequently, according to the state,
defendant's citation of those sources was not enough to preserve the specific
claim of error that defendant seeks to raise on appeal.
As was true of the preservation issue
on the kidnapping charge, the preservation of the merger issue is a close one. 
But, we again conclude that the issue was adequately preserved.  Defendant
discussed the relevant statute and a relevant decision, both in his sentencing
memorandum and at the sentencing hearing.  In his sentencing memorandum,
defendant stated,  "Clearly defendant's convictions for sexual abuse in
the present case should be merged for purposes of conviction."  Although
his argument at the hearing was not as explicit -- he appeared to conflate the
issues of merger and of consecutive sentences -- he did not abandon or withdraw
the issue.  The state mentioned merger, and both the state and defendant
discussed the relevant statute and decision.  The state had an opportunity to meet
defendant's merger argument, and the trial court had an opportunity to decide
the issue.  In short, the issue appears to have been sufficiently
well-preserved to serve the policies that underlie the preservation requirement. 

We therefore move on to address the
merits of defendant's argument that the trial court should have merged his
sexual abuse convictions.  Defendant was charged with and convicted of six
counts of sexual abuse in the first degree.  ORS 163.427 defines first-degree
sexual abuse:
"(1) A person commits the crime of sexual
abuse in the first degree when that person:
"(a) Subjects another person to sexual
contact and:
"(A) The victim is less than 14 years of
age; 
"(B) The victim is subjected to forcible
compulsion by the actor; or
"(C) The victim is incapable of consent by
reason of being mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically
helpless; or
"(b) Intentionally causes a person under 18
years of age to touch or contact the mouth, anus or sex organs of an animal for
the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of a person.
"(2) Sexual abuse in the first
degree is a Class B felony."
"Sexual contact," for purposes of first-degree
sexual abuse, is defined as 
"any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of
a person or causing such person to touch the sexual or other intimate parts of
the actor for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either
party." 
ORS 163.305(6).
In defendant's case, the six charges
of first-degree abuse were based on three acts of sexual contact.  Specifically,
counts three and four both alleged sexual contact by touching the victim's
breast; counts five and six alleged sexual contact by touching the victim's
vagina; and counts seven and eight alleged sexual contact by touching the
victim's buttocks.  Although there was only a single act of touching as to each
prohibited body part, the conduct resulted in two charges per act, because, for
each pair of counts, the victim was alleged to have been under the age of 14
years and the sexual contact was alleged to have been committed using forcible
compulsion.  
In arguing that the guilty verdicts
on each of the paired counts should merge into a single guilty verdict,
defendant relies on the so-called "anti-merger" statute, ORS 161.067(1),
which provides:
"When the same conduct or criminal episode
violates two or more statutory provisions and each provision requires proof of
an element that the others do not, there are as many separately punishable offenses
as there are separate statutory violations."
Under that statute, for a single criminal act or criminal
episode to give rise to more than one statutory violation, three requirements
must be satisfied:  (1) defendant must have engaged in acts that are "the
same criminal conduct or episode"; (2) defendant's acts must have violated
two or more "statutory provisions"; and (3) each "statutory
provision" must require "proof of an element that the others do not." 
State v. Crotsley, 308 Or 272, 278, 779 P2d 600 (1989) (quoting former
ORS 161.062(1) (1985)), the nearly identical precursor to ORS 161.067(1)).  In
this case, neither the first nor the third requirements are in dispute.  That
is, the parties agree that each set of charges involved the same conduct or
criminal episode.  They also agree that each charge required proof of an
element that the paired charge did not.  They disagree only on whether
defendant's conduct violated two or more "statutory provisions." 
To resolve that issue, we begin with
our recent decision in  State v. White, 346 Or 275, ___ P3d ___ (June
18, 2009), in which we synthesized this court's prior merger cases discussing the
phrase "statutory provisions" and analyzed how that phrase applied to
multiple convictions of second-degree robbery.  The analysis in White is
particularly instructive in this case.
In White, this court
reaffirmed that, to determine whether a single act violates two or more "statutory
provisions," a court must determine whether the legislature intended to
create a single crime or two or more crimes.  White, ___ Or at ___ (slip
op at 4) (citing cases).  That inquiry does not depend -- at least not entirely
-- on the structural form that a criminal statute takes, although the use of a
single section is one indication that the legislature intended to define a
single crime.  Id. (slip op at 4-5) (citing State v. Barrett, 331
Or 27, 35, 10 P3d 901 (2000)).  Neither does the inquiry turn entirely on
whether two or more charges are based on one or more statutes that address
"separate and distinct legislative concerns."  Id. at ___
(slip op at 9).   That is so because, as this court observed in White,
"every statutory section that 'requires proof of an element that the
others do not,' ORS 161.067(1), necessarily involves a distinct legislative
concern -- otherwise there would be no need for the additional element."  Id. 
This court therefore clarified in White: 
"[W]e view the statute as a whole, looking to the text,
context, and legislative history of the statute.  That analysis includes
consideration of whether the sections, although addressing different concerns,
may also address, on a more general level, one unified objective."
Id. at ___ (slip op at 9)
In applying that analysis, White
began with the statute defining second-degree robbery and its context more
generally.  As the court in White explained, second-degree robbery is set
out in a single statutory section and is part of a scheme that incrementally
grades robbery into three levels of crimes -- third-degree robbery,
second-degree robbery, and first-degree robbery.  See White, 346 Or at
___ (slip op at 10-12 n 9, 11, 12) (quoting text of pertinent statutes).  The
base crime is third-degree robbery.  Id. at ___ (slip op at 12).  Second-
and first degree robbery consist of committing the base crime (third-degree
robbery) under any of several circumstances that elevate the crime to one of
the higher degrees.  Id. at ___ (slip op at 12-13).  For both second-
and first-degree robbery, the elevating elements are set out in separate
paragraphs in the statutory section that defines that degree of the crime.  Id.
at ___ (slip op at 10 n 9, 12 n 12).  For second-degree robbery, the elevating elements
are either that the robber represents that he or she is armed with something
that purports to be a dangerous or deadly weapon (ORS 164.405(1)(a)) or the
robber is aided by another person actually present (ORS 164.405(1)(b)).  
White observed that the fact
that the elevating elements were set out in different paragraphs of the single
section defining the single crime of second-degree robbery was at least a
possible indication that the legislature intended to define two separate crimes
-- i.e., robbery when aided with a person actually present, and robbery
when armed with something that purports to be a weapon.  Id. at ___
(slip op at 13-14).  On the other hand, the fact that the two crimes were given
the single designation of robbery in the second degree, and were set out in a
single section of the criminal code, suggested the opposite -- that is, it
suggested that the legislature intended to describe only the single crime of
robbery in the second degree, with multiple ways that the crime could be
elevated from third-degree to second-degree robbery.  Id. at ___ (slip
op at 14).  To determine which understanding was correct, the court turned to
legislative history.  Id.  at ___ (slip op at 14).  The court concluded
that the robbery statutes represented an incremental scheme in which the
elements that enhanced third-degree robbery to higher degrees of robbery
reflected a common legislative concern (the potential for violence).  Id.
at ___ (slip op at 15).  As a result, the court also concluded that the
enhancing elements for committing second-degree reflected the legislature's
intent to define a single crime of second-degree robbery, not several separate
crimes.  Id.  at ___ (slip op at 18-19).
The first-degree sexual abuse
statute at issue here is part of an incrementally graded scheme that is
analogous to the robbery statutes in White.  ORS 163.427, by its terms,
defines a single crime -- first-degree sexual abuse.  Subsection (1) of ORS
163.427 lists four ways in which a person may commit the crime of sexual abuse
in the first degree.  The first paragraph, ORS 163.427(1)(a), lists three
alternatives in three subparagraphs: (A) the defendant uses forcible compulsion
to have sexual contact with the victim; (B) the defendant has sexual contact
with a victim who is less than 14 years of age; or (C) the defendant has sexual
contact with a victim who is incapable of consent.  The fact that the legislature
included three alternative elements for first-degree sexual abuse in paragraph
(a) of that one section indicates that the legislature intended to define one
single crime.  But, the legislature's decision to list those different elements
in separate subparagraphs at least clouds somewhat the legislative intent that
can be discerned from the structure of the statute.  As in White, we
therefore look to the legislative history for guidance.
In 1970, the Criminal Law Revision
Commission proposed two statutory sections that defined two degrees of sexual
abuse.  First-degree sexual abuse was defined as follows:
"(1) A person commits the crime of sexual
abuse in the first degree when he subjects another person to sexual contact;
and
"(a) The victim is less than 12 years of
age; or
"(b) The victim is subjected to forcible compulsion
by the actor."
Commentary to Criminal Law Revision
Commission Proposed Oregon Criminal Code § 116(1), 122 (Jul 1970).  The proposed
statute governing second-degree sexual abuse provided, in part:
"(1) A person commits the crime of sexual
abuse in the second degree if he subjects another person to sexual contact; and
"(a) The victim does not consent to the
sexual contact; or
"(b) The victim is incapable of consent by
reason of being mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically
helpless."
Id. § 115(1), 121.  The legislature codified those
sections as ORS 163.435 (first-degree sexual abuse) and ORS 163.415
(second-degree sexual abuse) in 1971.(7)
The Commission described the proposed statutes:  
"The offense of sexual abuse is divided
into two ascending degrees.  Section 115 defines the basic offense. * * *
"The offense is raised a degree if either
of the following factors is present:  (1)  The victim is under 12 years of age;
or (2) The victim was subjected to forcible compulsion by the actor."
Criminal
Law Revision Commission Commentary at 122-23.  That description indicates that
the Commission intended to create a basic offense -- second-degree sexual abuse
-- and that the basic offense could be raised to first-degree sexual abuse if
either of two facts were present.  The "basic offense" of
second-degree sexual abuse, as proposed by the Commission, occurs in either of
two circumstances:  sexual contact without consent or sexual contact with a
person incapable of consent.  That basic offense is elevated to first-degree
sexual abuse in two parallel circumstances:  sexual contact through forcible
compulsion and sexual contact with a person under 12 years of age.
The
offense of sexual abuse as proposed and described by the Commission is thus similar
to the robbery statutes at issue in White (i.e., the degree of
the robbery increases with an increase in the potential for violence, and each
degree sets out multiple ways in which that increased potential for violence is
present).  The offense of sexual abuse is also similar to this court's
description of the aggravated murder statute in State v. Barrett, 331
Or 27, 36, 10 P3d 901 (2000):
"The wording of the statute that we just have reviewed
shows that the harm that the legislature intended to address by [the aggravated
murder statute] was the intentional, aggravated killing of another human being.
The aggravating factors constitute no more than different theories under which
murder becomes subject to the enhanced penalties for aggravated murder."
Similarly,
the alternatives set out in the first paragraph of the first-degree sexual
abuse statute, ORS 163.427(1)(a)(A) - (C) constitute no more than different
theories under which the "basic offense" of second-degree sexual
abuse (which, as noted, since has been amended and redesignated as third-degree
sexual abuse) becomes the more serious offense of first-degree sexual abuse;
they are not separately punishable offenses.
The
state, however, argues that Crotsley compels a different conclusion in
this case.  In Crotsley, the defendant threatened a 14-year old
girl with a knife and forced her to engage in sexual acts.  308 Or at 275.  The
defendant was charged with first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy because he
used forcible compulsion.  Id. The defendant also was charged with
third-degree rape and third-degree sodomy because his victim was less than 16
years of age.  Id.  The defendant argued that his third-degree
convictions should have merged with his first-degree convictions because the
first- and third-degree charges were merely alternative charges for the same
criminal acts.  Id.  The state argued that former ORS 161.062 (1985)
(the precursor to ORS 161.067) authorized separate convictions and sentences
for the first-degree and third-degree crimes.  Id. at 276.  This court
agreed with the state.
In concluding that merger was not
required, the court in Crotsley explained that the proponents of former
ORS 161.062 (1985) 
"clearly intended that criminal records accurately
reflect all crimes actually committed and that a person who commits multiple
crimes by the same conduct or during the same criminal episode should have a
criminal record reflecting each crime committed rather than only a single
conviction which would not accurately portray the nature and extent of that
person's conduct."
Id. at 276-77.  The court analyzed the rape statutes at
issue in that case, ORS 163.375(8) (defining first-degree rape) and ORS 163.355(9) (defining third-degree rape).  Id. at 278-80. 
ORS 163.375(1)(a), the court explained, was a "clear statutory prohibition
against forcing sex on any female."  Id. at 279.  On the other
hand, the third-degree rape statute, ORS 163.355, as well as the other
variations of first-degree and second-degree rape, "are similar to each other in that they accord special
protection to specified groups of females by making sexual intercourse with one
of them a crime even with 'consent.'"  Id.  Therefore, the
court held that the first- and third-degree rape statutes addressed a
"separate and distinct legislative concern, and each alternative is a
separate statutory 'provision' for purposes of ORS 161.062(1)."  Id. 
The court applied the same reasoning to the first- and third-degree sodomy
statutes, ORS 163.405 and 163.385.  Id. at 280.  The court therefore
concluded that the defendant had violated four separate statutory provisions
and that the anti-merger statute applied.  Id.  
The
state argues that the rape and sodomy statutes at issue in Crotsley are
indistinguishable from the sexual abuse statute in this case and, therefore, Crotsley
controls the outcome here.  We disagree.  Crotsley involved two
different rape statutes that defined two different degrees of crime.  Likewise,
it involved two different sodomy statutes that defined two different degrees of
crime.  It is difficult to see how, when the legislature sets out the offenses
in separate sections, defines them as different degrees of an incrementally
graded offense, and assigns them different punishments, those can be anything
other than separate provisions for purposes of the anti-merger statute.(10) 
See White, 346 Or at ___ (slip op at 4) (Kistler, J., concurring).  But
that is not what the legislature did here.  This case involves only a single
statute and a single first-degree crime.  That structural aspect of the statute
alone distinguishes Crotsley and renders it  not controlling in this
case.  And, as we already have described, the structure of the sexual abuse
statute, together with what the legislative history tells us about whether each
degree of the offense was perceived as describing multiple offenses or multiple
ways of committing a single offense, convinces us that the subparagraphs of the
first-degree sexual abuse statute, ORS 163.427(1)(a)(A) - (C), are not separate
provisions within the meaning of the anti-merger statute.
We
conclude, therefore, that the legislature intended to create the single crime
of first-degree sexual abuse.  The presence of more than one of the elements
that convert a lower degree of sexual abuse to first-degree sexual abuse does
not convert defendant's single act into separate crimes.  We agree with
defendant that his six convictions should merge into three convictions:  one
conviction related to his touching of the victim's breast; a second conviction
related to his touching of the victim's vagina; and a third conviction for his
touching of the victim's buttocks.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the circuit
court for further proceedings.
KISTLER,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part.
The
trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, convicted defendant of kidnapping an
11-year-old girl and sexually abusing her.  On review, the majority holds that
the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal
because the evidence was not legally sufficient to prove one element of
kidnapping.  In moving for judgment of acquittal, however, defense counsel
expressly gave up the issue on which the majority now relies to reverse his
conviction.  He told the trial court that, as the court knew, "that's not
our issue."  He explained that he was not arguing about specific crimes or
their elements.  And, consistently with that position, defendant moved for a
judgment of acquittal on all the charges (not just kidnapping) because no
reasonable juror could find that he was the perpetrator.  I would hold that
defense counsel gave up the issue that he now raises on review and would affirm
defendant's kidnapping conviction.  I respectfully dissent from that part of
the majority's decision.(11)
In
moving for a judgment of acquittal, defendant referred to and incorporated
arguments that he had made in his opening statement.  It is helpful, in my
view, to describe those arguments briefly to put his motion for judgment of
acquittal in context.  The state charged defendant with kidnapping the victim,
sexually abusing her, and unlawful sexual penetration.  Throughout the trial,
defendant raised one defense to all those charges:  He was not the person who
had committed those offenses.  As defense counsel told the trial court in
opening statement, the victim had told the police that the person who locked
her in the room and assaulted her "was six-foot tall, really skinny, dark
brown, almost black curly hair -- long enough to pull it into a pony tail --
big bones that stuck out -- cheek bones and chin, and had brown eyes." 
Defense counsel explained in opening statement that not one of his client's
physical attributes matched that description and that a photograph of his
client at the time of the alleged events would confirm that defendant was not
and could not have been the person whom the victim had described to the police.

At
the close of the state's case-in-chief, the prosecutor gave the trial court,
who was sitting as the trier of fact, the citation to a Court of Appeals case
that bore on the kidnapping charge.  The prosecutor explained that
"there's only one case in the State of Oregon with regard to Secreting
Somebody in a Place Not Likely to be Found, and that is [State v.] Montgomery[,
50 Or App 381, 624 P2d 151 (1980), rev den, 290 Or 727 (1981)]." 
The court then recessed for lunch.
When
court resumed, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal.  Counsel
began by noting that the prosecutor had referred, before lunch, to Montgomery. 
Defense counsel told the trial court that, "although [he] would factually
distinguish the present case from the Montgomery case" and
explained his reasons for doing so, he was basing the motion for a judgment of
acquittal on a different ground.  Specifically, after discussing the issue in Montgomery,
defense counsel told the trial court:
"However, as the Court knows from the
entire case from Opening Statement to now, that's not our issue.  Our issue is
not a nit-picking argument regarding specific elements and specific crimes. 
We're not arguing about venue.  We're not arguing about intent.  We're simply
saying that there's insufficient evidence, as a whole , to -- as a tr[i]er of
fact -- even in the light most favorable to the State, to believe that a
tr[i]er of fact could beyond a reasonable doubt find that my client, Mr.
Parkins, had anything to do with the alleged molestation that took place of [the
victim], and I believe that even Detective Green, in his last answer before
leaving the stand, said that the physical descriptions he received from [the
victim], from [the victim's sister], and from a friend of Mr. Parkins, Nick
Olney, did not match Mr. Parkins.
"The Court has heard more than once from
more than one source, the physical description of the alleged person that
committed this crime, and they do not match Mr. Parkins, and we provided a
photograph of Mr. Parkins that was near in time, at least, to the time that the
State is now alleging that this took place.  And by no means does that match
him in any respect, I would argue."
Defense
counsel then raised a question regarding the victim's credibility and
concluded, "[W]e are asking the Court to make a finding for Judgment of
Acquittal."
The
trial court ruled:
"That motion will be denied, and I do believe that
there's sufficient evidence on the Kidnapping Count to support the allegations
set forth in the Indictment, particularly the evidence that was brought up by
the State, that there were attempts by [the victim] to seek help and to scream,
but that the Defendant told her that nobody would hear and nobody would care. 
And, in light of that evidence, I believe that that charge is legally sound in
this case."
The
preservation issue in this case arises in somewhat of an unusual posture, and
it is important to be clear about both the scope of defendant's motion for
judgment of acquittal and the basis for that motion.  Defendant did not limit
his motion for judgment of acquittal to the kidnapping charge.  Rather, as
defense counsel told the trial court, "Our issue is not a nit-picking
argument regarding * * * specific crimes."  Consistently with that
position, the sole basis that defense counsel advanced in support of the motion
for judgment of acquittal was that no reasonable trier of fact could find that
defendant was the person whom the victim had described to the police.  That
argument, if correct, would have entitled defendant to an acquittal on all the
charges against him.
The
trial court denied defendant's motion, presumably because the court concluded
that there was sufficient evidence to find that defendant was the perpetrator. 
The court then went on to address an issue that defendant had explicitly given
up -- whether the evidence was sufficient for a trier of fact to find that the
state had proved the elements of one of the crimes, kidnapping, with which
defendant was charged.  
On
review, defendant abandons the issue that he raised in the trial court.  He
does not argue on review that the trial court should have entered a judgment of
acquittal on all the charges because no reasonable trier of fact could find
that he was the person whom the victim described as the perpetrator.  Rather, he
argues that that no reasonable trier of fact could find that the state proved
the element of kidnapping that the Court of Appeals had discussed in Montgomery.
Defense
counsel, however, expressly gave up that issue in the trial court.  After
discussing the issue in Montgomery, defense counsel told the trial court
"that's not our issue."  If that statement were not clear enough,
defense counsel added, "Our issue is not a nit-picking argument regarding
specific elements and specific crimes."  In my view, the only reasonable
interpretation of those statements is that defendant was not directing his
motion for a judgment of acquittal at kidnapping, nor was he arguing that the
evidence was insufficient to prove the elements of kidnapping (or of any of the
other charges for that matter).  Rather, as defense counsel explained, his
argument was directed to all the charges and was "simply" that no
reasonable trier of fact could find that defendant matched the victim's
description of the perpetrator.
Defendant
argues on review that the issue regarding the kidnapping charge is preserved
because the trial court was aware of that issue when it ruled on his motion for
judgment of acquittal.  Defendant notes that the prosecutor had provided the
trial court with a citation to Montgomery before defendant moved for
judgment of acquittal, that defense counsel later moved for a judgment of
acquittal and distinguished Montgomery, and that the trial court
expressly considered whether the evidence supported the elements of the
kidnapping charge in denying his motion.
While
true, defendant's argument on review fails to come to terms with a larger
principle:  A party may not expressly disclaim reliance on an issue before the
trial court and then seek on appeal to reverse the trial court's ruling on the
very issue that the party just disclaimed.  This court has long recognized
that, when a party "indicates" to the trial court that an issue or
ruling is acceptable, that party may not challenge the ruling on appeal.  Clay/Luttrell
v. Pay Less Drug Stores, 276 Or 673, 676-77, 556 P2d 125 (1976).  That is
true even when the trial court has considered the ruling, as in this case.  See
id.(12) 
Accordingly, I would hold that defendant's challenge to his kidnapping
conviction is not properly before us and would affirm that conviction. 
Defendant's remedy on that issue should lie, if at all, in post-conviction.
As noted, for the reasons stated in the concurring opinion in State v. White, 346 Or ___, ___ P3d ___ (2009), I agree with the majority that the trial court
erred in holding that the six counts of sexual abuse gave rise to six
separately punishable offenses, and I join that part of its decision.  Accordingly,
I dissent in part and concur in part in the majority's decision.
1. ORS
163.225(1) provides, in part:
"A person commits the crime of kidnapping
in the second degree if, with intent to interfere substantially with another's
personal liberty, and without consent or legal authority, the person: * * *
"(b) Secretly confines the person in a
place where the person is not likely to be found."
2. We
generally resort to dictionary definitions for the common meaning given to
statutory terms.  See State v. Murray, 340 Or 599, 604, 136 P3d 10
(2006) (so observing).  For particularly straightforward terms -- like the
statutory terms at issue in this case -- dictionary definitions tend to offer
us little more than equally straightforward synonyms.  "Confine," for
example, means, among other things, "to hold within bounds" and
"to keep in narrow quarters."  Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary 476 (unabridged ed 2002).  Here, the key words in the phrase at
issue are "secretly," "likely," and "found."  The
dictionary defines "secret" as "kept from knowledge or
view" and "concealed."  Id. at 2052.  "Likely"
means probable or "having a better chance of existing or occurring than
not."  Id. at 1310.  "Found" is the past tense of
"find," which means "to come upon accidentally" and
"to come upon * * * by searching or effort."  Id. at 851. 
3. The
state contends that the sister's presence should not affect the analysis
because she was outside on the porch smoking a cigarette and she also had been
drinking on the day in question.  There is no evidence, however, that either
fact prevented the sister from knowing the victim's location.
4. We
emphasize that our decision is limited to the particular factual circumstances
of this case.  We do not hold here that a room in one's own home can
never be a "place where the person is not likely to be found" when
another person is present in the home for purposes of ORS 163.225(1)(b). 
Neither do we hold that secret confinement in a "place * * * not likely to
be found" cannot include places where the victim is actually -- if
accidently -- found. 
5. In
State v. McCloud, 177 Or App 511, 34 P3d 699 (2001), vacated, 334
Or 491, 52 P3d 1056 (2002), the Court of Appeals analyzed the difference
between the merger of a defendant's convictions and whether the sentences for
those convictions should be served concurrently or consecutively.  
6. Additionally,
earlier in the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor summarized, "As you
know, there are nine counts in the Indictment, and the Defendant was found guilty
of all nine counts, and they're all Ballot Measure 11 Counts.  I believe
that none of the charges legally merge for sentencing purposes.  They're
all separate convictions."  (Emphasis added.)
7. The
legislature amended sexual abuse statutes in 1991.  Or Laws 1991, ch 830. First-degree
sexual abuse was renumbered to ORS 163.427.  Third-degree sexual abuse was
added to the statutes.  Second-degree sexual abuse is now set forth in ORS
163.425:
"(1) A person commits the crime of sexual
abuse in the second degree when that person subjects another person to sexual
intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or, except as provided in ORS 163.412,
penetration of the vagina, anus or penis with any object other than the penis
or mouth of the actor and the victim does not consent thereto.
"(2) Sexual abuse in the second degree is a
Class C felony."
Third-degree sexual abuse is now defined in ORS 163.415:
"(1) A person commits the crime of sexual
abuse in the third degree if the person subjects another person to sexual
contact and:
"(a) The victim does not consent to the
sexual contact; or
"(b) The victim is incapable of consent by
reason of being under 18 years of age.
"(2) Sexual abuse in the third degree is a
Class A misdemeanor."
8. When
Crotsely was decided, ORS 163.375 (1985) provided:  
"(1) A person who has sexual intercourse
with a female commits the crime of rape in the first degree if:
"(a) The female is subjected to forcible
compulsion by the male; or
"(b) The female is under 12 years of age;
or
"(c) The
female is under 16 years of age and is the male's sister, of the whole or half
blood, his daughter or his wife's daughter.
"(2) Rape in the first degree is a Class A
felony."
9. When
Crotsley was decided, ORS 163.355 (1985)  provided:
"(1) A male commits the crime of rape in
the third degree if he has sexual intercourse with a female under 16 years of
age.
"(2)
Rape in the third degree is a Class C felony."
10. We
acknowledge that Crotsley contains an observation suggesting that the
alternatives contained solely within the first-degree rape statute constituted
"separate statutory provisions" under what is now ORS 160.067(1). 
After noting those alternative ways of committing first-degree rape, the court
stated, "[E]ach statutory alternative addresses a separate and distinct
legislative concern, and each alternative is a separate statutory 'provision'
for purposes of ORS 161.062(1)."  Crotsley, 308 Or at 279.  Because
the facts in Crotsley did not present an issue involving the alternative
ways of committing first degree rape, that discussion was not germane to the
issue presented and is not binding.
11. The
majority also holds that defendant's six convictions for sexual abuse gave rise
to only three punishable offenses.  I agree with the majority on that point for
the reasons stated in State v. White, ___ Or ___, ___ P3d ___ (June 18,
2009) (Kistler, J., concurring).
12. In
Clay/Luttrell, the trial court told the parties that it was changing one
of the instructions that it had planned to give, 276 Or at 675-76, which
presumably means that the trial court had considered the change and determined
that it was legally correct.  One of the lawyers for the plaintiffs
"'indicated that the instruction, as changed was acceptable,'" but
the plaintiffs later appealed challenging the instruction.  Id. at 676. 
This court declined to consider the issue, describing it as invited error.  Id.
at 677.