Title: Tammy S. Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., et als.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-5-99
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: June 1, 2000

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). O'HERN , J., writing for a unanimous Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether an employer has a duty to prevent defamatory statements made by its employees on an on-line computer bulletin board that are intended or likely to injure a co-employee, and whether those employees should reasonably expect to be subject to the jurisdiction of New Jersey. In December 1989, Tammy S. Blakey became Continental's first female captain to fly an Airbus or A300 Aircraft. She was one of five qualified A300 pilots in the service of Continental. Shortly after qualifying to be a captain on the A300, Blakey complained of sexual harassment and a hostile working environment based on conduct and comments directed at her by male co-employees. In February 1991, Blakey began to file systematic complaints with various representatives of Continental concerning pornographic photographs and vulgar gender-based comments directed at her that appeared in the workplace, specifically in her plane's cockpit and other work areas. In February 1993, Blakey filed a charge of sexual discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1991 against Continental with the Equal Opportunity Commission in Seattle, Washington, her home state. She simultaneously filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court in Seattle against Continental for its failure to remedy the hostile work environment. That action was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey on Continental's motion. At that point, Blakey was based in Newark. In the midst of the federal litigation, Blakey's fellow pilots continued to publish a series of what Blakey viewed as harassing gender-based messages, some of which she alleged were false and defamatory. From February to July 1995, a number of Continental's male pilots posted derogatory and insulting remarks about Blakey on the pilots' on-line computer bulletin board called the Crew Members Forum ( Forum ). For the most part, the messages criticized Blakey for filing litigation and commented negatively on her professional abilities, among other things. Continental pilots and crew members were required to learn their schedules and flight assignments by accessing CMS. Continental employees could access CMS in three ways, one of which was through an Internet service provider (ISP). CompuServe was the ISP approved by Continental to provide pilot and crew access to the CMS. As part of the package provided to pilots and crew personnel, CompuServe made the Forum available. When Continental employees access CompuServe, one of the menu selections listed in the Continental Airlines Home Access program includes an option called Continental Forum. In essence, the Forum serves as a virtual community for the crew members for the exchange of ideas and information. The Forum is like a bulletin board where employees can post messages or threads for each other. CompuServe charged crew members a monthly fee for Internet access. Blakey alleged that the offending Continental employees used the Forum to publish the defamatory and false messages about and to her. In December 1995, after an unsuccessful attempt to amend her federal complaint, Blakey filed suit in Superior Court in New Jersey against Continental and the pilots exchanging the information on the Forum, alleging defamation, sexual harassment/hostile work environment, business libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Law Division subsequently granted Continental's motion to dismiss the claims against it. The Law Division also granted the motions of the individual defendants (pilots) for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Almost all of those pilots did not live in and were not based out of New Jersey. Blakey appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the individual pilots, and that Continental was not vicariously liable for defamatory statements made by the pilots. In respect of jurisdiction, the Appellate Division specifically found that personal jurisdiction over the non-resident pilots could be had solely on the basis of their electronic communications only when they specifically direct their activities at [New Jersey], the plaintiff (Blakey) is a resident of [New Jersey], and the brunt of the injury is felt in [New Jersey]. In respect of Continental's liability, the Appellate Division noted that Continental did not require its pilots and crew members to utilize the Forum and that regardless of whether the messages were defamatory, Blakey had established no basis for Continental's liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. HELD: An employer who has notice that its co-employees are engaged on a work-related forum in a pattern of retaliatory harassment directed at a co-employee has a duty to remedy that harassment; defendants who publish defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant's efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State's jurisdiction. 1. Harassment by a supervisor that takes place outside of the workplace can be actionable. (pp. 20-22) 2. An employer who fails to prevent and promptly correct offending behavior in a workplace may be directly liable for harassment suffered by its employee at the hand of another employee, and also may be liable for the co-employee's harassment under an agency theory. (pp. 22-24) 3. Severe or pervasive harassment in a work-related setting that continues a pattern of harassment on the job is sufficiently related to the workplace that an informed employer who takes no effective measures to stop it sends the harassed employee the message that the harassment is acceptable and that the management supports the harasser. (pp. 24-25) 4. On remand, the trial court should determine whether Continental derived a substantial workplace benefit from the overall relationship among CompuServe, the Forum, and Continental, and whether the Forum should be considered sufficiently integrated with the workplace to require intervention by Continental. (pp. 26-29) 5. Although employers do not have a duty to monitor private communications of their employees, employers do have a duty to take effective measures to stop co-employee harassment when the employer knows or has reason to know that such harassment is part of a pattern of harassment that is taking place in the workplace and in settings that are related to the workplace. (pp. 29 30) 6. Although there is a body of developing law in the area of personal jurisdiction in the context of electronic commerce, the traditional test for due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction when he or she is not present within the territory of the forum state, he or she must have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. (pp. 32-36) 7. An intentional act calculated to create an actionable event in a forum state will give that state jurisdiction over the actor, and the fact that the actions causing an effect in New Jersey were performed outside the State does not prevent the State from asserting jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of those effects. (pp. 36-38) 8. If defendants' statements are capable of a defamatory meaning and were published with knowledge or purpose of causing harm to Blakey in the pursuit of her civil rights within New Jersey, those intentional contacts within the forum would satisfy the minimum contacts requirements, regardless of their form. (pp. 38-40) 9. Because defamation was alleged to be part of the harassing conduct that took place on the Forum, it would be fair to posit jurisdiction where the effects of the harassment were expected or intended to be felt. (pp. 40-41) 10. In order to determine the factual basis for her claims of jurisdiction, Blakey should be permitted to take discovery by written interrogatories or by deposition, after which the trial court should determine whether triable issues are presented concerning whether those who published defamatory statements did so with the knowledge or purpose of hindering Blakey in the pursuit of her civil rights in New Jersey. (pp. 42-44) 11. In respect of statements viewed to be harassing, the trial court must determine if triable issues of fact are presented concerning (1) whether the Forum was sufficiently integrated with Continental's operations so as to provide a benefit to it; (2) the employer had notice of the conduct; and (3) the conduct complained of was severe or pervasive enough to make a reasonable person believes that the conditions of employment are altered and the working environment is hostile. A demonstrated promptness to correct harassment on Continental's part may leave no triable issue of fact on its liability. (pp. 44-45) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, and LaVECCHIA join in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion. TAMMY S. BLAKEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC., a Foreign Corporation, KAYE V. RIGGS, JOE VACCA, MARK J. FARROW, DONALD JENSEN, DAVE OROZCO and THOMAS N. STIVALA, Defendants-Respondents, and ABC CORPORATIONS (1-100), STEVE ABDU and JOHN DOES (1-100), Defendants. Argued February 2, 2000-- Decided June 1, 2000 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported 322 N.J. Super. 187 (1999). Linda B. Kenney argued the cause for appellant (Kenney Schaer &amp; Martin, attorneys; Ms. Kenney and Nancy S. Martin, of counsel and on the brief). Robert H. Bernstein argued the cause for respondent Continental Airlines, Inc., (Epstein Becker &amp; Green, attorneys; Michael D. Markey, on the brief). Ellen M. Boyle argued the cause for respondents Joe Vacca, Mark J. Farrow, Kaye V. Riggs, Dave Orozco and Thomas N. Stivala (Satterlee Stephens Burke &amp; Burke, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by O'HERN, J. According to a venerable principle of disputation, the power to frame the question includes also the power to control the answer. Des Moines Register &amp; Tribune Co. v. Dwyer, 542 N.W.2d 491, 503 (Iowa 1996)(Harris, J., dissenting). In this employment discrimination case against Continental Airlines and certain of its employees, one way of framing the issues is whether: 1. If an employer provides an [I]nternet 'forum' _ an electronic bulletin board _ for employees' use, does it have a duty to monitor e-mail postings to ensure that employees are not harassing one another? See footnote 11 2. May a Continental pilot living in Seattle, based out of Houston, [file a complaint in a New Jersey court] about electronic statements on the employee network because Continental was headquartered in New Jersey? See footnote 22 The answers to those questions are easy. The answers are not quite so easy when the questions are stated as follows: 2. Should employees of Continental Airlines reasonably expect to be subject to the personal jurisdiction of New Jersey when (a) they have published in that forum defamatory statements that are intended or are foreseeably likely to injure the co-employee in the exercise of her protected rights to be free from discrimination, and (b) they have done so in retaliation for a co-employee having sought in that forum, where her work activities were centered, the protection of the forum's laws against discrimination? It seems to us that if the facts are stated thus the answers to the questions should be yes. Because the facts may be somewhere in between, we cannot provide categorical answers to the questions. The case appears to have proceeded on the thesis that there could be no liability if the harassment by co-employees did not take place within the workplace setting at a place under the physical control of the employer. Although the electronic bulletin board may not have a physical location within a terminal, hangar or aircraft, it may nonetheless have been so closely related to the workplace environment and beneficial to Continental that a continuation of harassment on the forum should be regarded as part of the workplace. As applied to this hostile environment workplace claim, we find that if the employer had notice that co-employees were engaged on such a work-related forum in a pattern of retaliatory harassment directed at a co employee, the employer would have a duty to remedy that harassment. We find that the record is inadequate to determine whether the relationship between the bulletin board and the employer establishes a connection with the workplace sufficient to impose such liability on the employer. We remand that aspect of the matter to the Law Division for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Concerning the issue of personal jurisdiction, we find that defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant's efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State's jurisdiction. Although advances in electronic and Internet technology have created new ways to communicate, the sources of personal jurisdiction remain constant. Specific jurisdiction may be exercised over non-resident defendants by applying traditional principles of jurisdictional analysis irrespective of the medium through which the injury was inflicted. Because the record is inadequate to determine the jurisdictional facts, we remand the jurisdictional issues for further consideration. On that same day, two other messages were also posted. Defendant Mark Farrow wrote, I strongly believe that [Blakey and another female pilot who had filed suit against Continental] are looking to justify their past records by blaming this pilot group, and holding this company liable for not tipping the scales in their favor . . . . I don't support harassment of any kind, but do you think these pilots got their reputations just because they are women? I don't! Do you think the company can actually police the thoughts and writings on the walls of a few individuals? I don't! Defendant Thomas Stivala wrote that Tammy has problems not because she is a woman but because she doesn't possess the skills to interact with crew members effectively. On February 25, 1995, Defendant Mark Farrow discussed Blakey and another female pilot who had apparently filed a suit against Continental. He described them as opportunists who choose to blame everyone else for there [sic] inabilities to perform to standards. Such is the case with both of these individuals. They are weak pilots by reputation, and have alienated themselves from their peers with their boorish behavior. They seek to justify their inadequacies with lawsuits that blame you and I for their shortcomings; as well they seek a windfall at all of our expense! In March 1995, Defendant Joe Vacca stated that he was curious if Ms. Blakey will reimburse [Continental] for the: 1) Engine she overtemped and destroyed. 2) The $250,000 in hail damage done when she flew through the TRW, with the F/O trying to tell her not to go through the WX [weather] etc. etc. In the same thread, he also said that I am personally and professionally disgusted with [ ] individuals crying the blues through the legal system, chisling [sic] money out of all of our pockets in the long run, and using this issue for personal financial gains . . . . [I]f the porn bothers you, don't look. I am just as offended with all the religious material that is showing up lately on the B737. But I don't go crying to the CPO. I leave it for what it's worth. On July 15, 1995, Vacca sent another message to a female Continental pilot named Nancy Novaes. In that communication, he stated [t]he closest I have ever come to wetting my pants in an airplane was when [Blakey] was in a window seat. I'm sure that my recollections of this wonderful trip will then be gender biased . . . . Now don't start your feminazi routine with me (remember awhile back you did say you were my favorite feminazi). I don't have a gender problem here. In fact if the PERSON involved was named Tommy Blakey I would be just as scathing. I think what she is doing is reprehensible, cheap and is another example of how warped the justice system has become. On July 21, 1995, Vacca transmitted the following message: Lawsuit, lawsuits lawsuits. That is all we hear about Tammy Blakey. You need to prey on a legal system that does not stand up to people who are vexatious and try to get even for their own lack of interpersonal skills. In my opinion, you are a wart (really bad choice of words with your ALLEGED problem) on the judicial system. I have zero respect for you and your kind. Ten days later, Vacca again communicated with Nancy Novaes. He stated [p]erhaps Kaye [Riggs] and I are the only ones with the balls (really bad choice of words huh Nancy?) to stand up and disagree with the feminazis among us. A few days later, Riggs communicated to Blakey directly about the engine(s) on the A-300 you burned up by overtemping? He asked if this was [a]nother male lie? In another thread, Riggs stated . . . I also heard you crashed your floatplane . . . is this a damned lie too? I only have second-hand word of this but, since you might like to sue this person, too. I'm afraid I can't reveal my sources . . . Also, is your lawsuit against me in the works? Just checking . . . Blakey later certified that she has never crashed a floatplane, . . . never took training 'far in excess of the syllabus in order to pass her PC's, and never 'burned up' an engine and caused $250,000 in damage when [she] flew with TRW. [Id. at 205.] Concerning Continental's liability, the Appellate Division reasoned that [Id. at 213.] We granted plaintiff's petition for certification. 162 N.J. 126 (1999). II. A. We do not purport to be experts on the complexities of the Internet or other forms of electronic communication, whether wired or wireless. We have made every effort, however, to describe the relationship between the Crew Members Forum and Continental Airlines in the language of those who do not possess a sophisticated knowledge of current computer technology. To put the issue in perspective, we need to shrink the context a bit. There was a television series a few years ago called Wings. Wings (NBC television broadcast, April 1990 through May 1997). The program concerned a small, regional airline, its pilots, ground crew and maintenance people. If there were at that small airport a lounge used exclusively by the pilots and crew of that airline and a bulletin board in that lounge contained the same or similar comments and asides by the pilots and crew, there would be little doubt that if management had notice of messages that met the required substantive criteria of being sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and to create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment, Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 592 (1993), a cause of action for hostile work environment sexual harassment could be asserted. And if there had been a nearby place frequented by senior management, pilots and crew where one of the crew was regularly subjected to sexually offensive insults and if that harassing conduct was a continuation of a pattern of harassment in the workplace, an employer that had notice of the pattern of severe and pervasive harassment in and out of the workplace, would not be entirely free to disregard the conduct. The question in this more complex case is whether the Crew Members Forum is the equivalent of a bulletin board in the pilots' lounge or a work-related place in which pilots and crew members continue a pattern of harassment. The trial court correctly perceived the role of the Forum when it asked: So what's the difference? What's the critical difference now we've taken it off this wood and whatever it is, cork material, that a bulletin board is made out of, and now we've electronically put it on the Internet. Now, what are the critical differences that now take it out of something that Continental could be responsible for as a workplace, or work-related item. B. This Court has recognized that harassment by a supervisor that takes place outside of the workplace can be actionable. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. L-C-A Sales Co., 155 N.J. 29, 42 (1998). In American Motorists, the Court note[d] that whether specific acts of harassment or discrimination took place outside of the workplace, such as harassing telephone calls . . . , is of no consequence because such conduct nevertheless would have arisen out of the employment relationship between [the plaintiff and the defendant corporation]. Ibid. Thus, standing alone, the fact that the electronic bulletin board may be located outside of the workplace (although not as closely affiliated with the workplace as was the cockpit in which similar harassing conduct occurred), does not mean that an employer may have no duty to correct off-site harassment by co employees. Conduct that takes place outside of the workplace has a tendency to permeate the workplace. See Schwapp v. Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that [t]he mere fact that [the plaintiff] was not present when a racially derogatory comment was made will not render that comment irrelevant to his hostile work environment claim. ). A worker need not actually hear the harassing words outside the workplace so long as the harassment contributes to the hostile work environment. Ibid. See also Young, Conaway, Stargatt &amp; Taylor, Six Sexual Harassment Myths Shattered, 2 No. 4 Del. Employment L. Letter 1 (April 1997)(observing that [i]t is clear today that the fact that the harassment occurred away from the workplace will carry little weight with the courts. ). In a case involving harassment that occurred in a tavern outside of the workplace, the New Hampshire federal court refused to dismiss any evidence of harassment related to activities at the tavern on the basis that the conduct was irrelevant. (There had been harassment taking place in the workplace.) The court observed that [a]n employer's liability for a hostile environment caused by lower-level supervisory employees or plaintiff's co-workers exists, 'if an official representing the institution knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known, of the harassments occurrence, unless that official can show that he or she took appropriate steps to halt it.' McGuinn-Rowe v. Foster's Daily Democrat, 1 997 WL 669965, *4 (D.N.H. 1997) quoting Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir. 1988). Given that [the] plaintiff experienced harassment at the work site and the incident at the bar may have formed part of a pattern of such harassment, the bar incident may well be relevant to the issue of whether [the] plaintiff experienced a hostile environment at her place of work. Id. at *3. [(citations omitted).] The Second, Sixth and Tenth Circuits have held that an employer can be liable for co-workers' retaliatory harassment. Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Richardson v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Service, 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2nd Cir. 1999)( an employer [can] be held accountable for allowing retaliatory co-worker harassment to occur if it knows about that harassment but fails to act to stop it. ); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College, 152 F.3d 1253, 1265 (10th Cir. 1998)( an employer can [] be liable for co-workers' retaliatory harassment where its supervisory or management personnel . . . know about the harassment and acquiesce in it in such a manner as to condone and encourage the co-workers' actions. ); Knox v. State of Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996)( Nothing indicates why a different form of retaliation--namely, retaliating against a complainant by permitting [his or] her fellow employees to punish [him or] her for invoking [his or] her rights under Title VII--does not fall within the statute. ). [Developments in the Law--The Law of Cyberspace--The Domain Name System: A Case Study of the Significance of Norms to Internet Governance, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1657 (May 1999)(internal footnotes omitted.] [Todd D. Leitstein, A Solution for Personal Jurisdiction on the Internet, 59 La. L. Rev. 565, 569 (Winter 1999).] A body of law is developing in this area. See, e.g., John Rothchild, Protecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of Cyberspace Utopianism, 74 Ind. L.J. 893, 979, n.341 (Summer 1999)(noting that [c]ourts that have found personal jurisdiction based on the maintenance of a Web site have usually relied upon additional factors tending to a finding that the defendant purposely availed itself of the privilege of doing business within the forum state ). The Supreme Court formerly resorted to various fictions, such as implied consent in order to sustain personal jurisdiction. E.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927). Eventually, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Court cast those fictions aside and held that a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction does not violate the Due Process Clause if the defendant has certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S. Ct. 339, 343, 85 L. Ed. 278, 283 (1940)). The concomitant understanding of legislative jurisdiction was similarly modified: Until recently, it was unclear whether the due process limitation upon a state's extraterritorial application of law mirrored the due process analysis for determining the limits of a state court's judicial jurisdiction. The concepts are closely linked, and commentators have suggested that essentially the same principle should be applied with reference to both situations. [McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 649 F.2d 578, 581 (8th Cir.), aff'd, 454 U.S. 1071, 102 S. Ct. 624, 70 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1981).] In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13, 101 S. Ct. 633, 640, 66 L. Ed. 2d 521, 531 (1981), the Court said that for a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. Thus, a state may regulate conduct occurring outside its borders. In the criminal context, [t]he common law adopts as the principal basis of jurisdiction a territorial theory of jurisdiction over crimes: a state has power to make conduct or the result of conduct a crime if the conduct takes place or the result happens within its territorial limits. 1 Wayne R. LaFave &amp; Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law 2.9(a), at 180 (1986) (footnotes omitted). The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice reflects that understanding of a state's jurisdiction. A person may be convicted under the laws of this State of an offense if [e]ither the conduct which is an element of the offense or the result which is such an element occurs within this State. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3a(1). To repeat, the test for due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he [or she] be not present within the territory of the forum, he [or she] have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S. Ct. at 158, 90 L. Ed. at 102 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S. Ct. 339, 343, 85 L. Ed. 278, 283 (1940)). Those unchanging commands of due process govern every foray into the realm of long-arm jurisdiction over non-residents. Jacobs v. Walt Disney World, Co., 309 N.J. Super. 443, 452 (App. Div. 1998) (citing Avdel Corp. v. Mecure, 58 N.J. 264, 268 (1971)). [Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317, 323-24 (1989).] An intentional act calculated to create an actionable event in a forum state will give that state jurisdiction over the actor. Waste Management, supra, 138 N.J. at 126 (citing Calder v. Jones, supra, 465 U.S. at 791, 104 S. Ct. at 1488, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 813 (holding that California could properly impose personal jurisdiction over non-resident tabloid writers because their intentional conduct in Florida [was] calculated to cause injury to respondent in California. ). In this case, the question is whether the harassment was expected or intended to cause injury in New Jersey. The fact that the actions causing the effects in [New Jersey] were performed outside the State did not prevent the State from asserting jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of those effects. Calder, supra, 465 U.S. at 787, 104 S. Ct. at 1485, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 810. If this case had arisen just a few years ago and the offending communications had been placed in The New York Times or U.S.A. Today, with the expectation or intent that the publications would affect the pursuit of Blakey's LAD claims in New Jersey, we would have little difficulty in exercising jurisdiction over the defamatory statements. The messages would have been published in New Jersey, albeit in print versus electronic form. A claimant who was in the process of vindicating her rights in a forum in New Jersey would surely feel the effect here. It would be a paradox if electronic communications, with their instantaneous messaging, would lessen the jurisdictional power of a state. In the past, this Court has concluded that the means by which a message is communicated is not as important as the quality of the contact. Thus, the critical factor is not the transmittal of messages by mail or telephone within the state, it is the nature of the contact. Baron &amp; Co. v. Bank of N.J., 497 F. Supp. 534, 538 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (noting fact that defendant had made phone calls, mailed checks, and sent correspondence to plaintiff in Pennsylvania was not sufficient to draw defendant into Pennsylvania for purposes of personal jurisdiction); Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co. v. Township of Gloucester, 493 F. Supp. 1047, 1049 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that Pennsylvania insurer could not sue foreign municipality in forum state despite two complaint letters sent to insurer in forum state). On the other hand, when a merchant uses the instrumentalities of commerce to tap an interstate market for its product, such wire and mail communications are relevant contacts to be considered. United Coal Co. v. Land Use Corp., 575 F. Supp. 1148, 1157 (W.D. Va. 1983) (observing that [t]elephone conversations, telexes and letters traveled to and from the state, establishing an agreement considered as part of the contacts sustaining jurisdiction of the forum); Hoster v. Monongahela Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (concluding that defendants who made several telephone calls to plaintiff, corresponded twice with plaintiff, and sent agent to negotiate with plaintiff held to have sufficient contacts to establish jurisdiction in plaintiff's state). We are satisfied that if defendants' statements are capable of a defamatory meaning and were published with knowledge or purpose of causing harm to plaintiff in the pursuit of her civil rights within New Jersey, those intentional contacts within the forum would satisfy the minimum contacts requirement of International Shoe. NO. A-5 TAMMY S. BLAKEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC., etc., et al., Defendants-Respondents, and ABC CORPORATIONS (1-100), et al., Defendants. DECIDED June 1, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz [whatis?com (visited March 30, 2000) .]