Title: BOYER v KARAGACIN
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13507
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: July 10, 1978

No. 13507 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978 JOHN BOYER and LAURA LU BOYER, Plaintiffs and Respondents, ANTHONY L. KARAGACIN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Third Judicial District, Honorable Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Robb and Botsford, Missoula, Montana Archie J. Robb argued, Missoula, Montana McCaffery and Peterson, Butte, Montana For Respondents: Knight, Dahood, MacKay and McLean, Anaconda, Montana Conde MacKay argued and Bernard J. Everett argued, Anaconda, Montana Submitted: June 15, 1978 Decided : Filed: JUL 1 0 1976 Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This appeal is from the issuance of a temporary re- straining order and the denial of a motion to quash by the Honorable Arnold Olsen, District Court, Silver Bow County. Courts become involved in all types of fights--dog fights, fence fights, church fights, school fights and street fights. This case arose because defendant parked his car in such a manner as to cut off traffic going into a drive-in. It can be classed as a street fight. By the time it reached this Court nearly four years had passed since the plaintiffs filed this cause seeking a permanent injunction preventing defendant from parking his car in such manner as to block proper ingress to plaintiffs' place of business; for damages for loss of business; and, for exemplary damages for the alleged malicious character of defendant's actions. The action was filed September 14, 1974. A temporary restraining order was issued by the Honorable Robert J. Boyd. Thereafter, Judge Boyd disquali- fied himself and between September 25, 1974 and October 1975, four additional judges were disqualified. Also, new counsel for defendant came into the case. Hearings were set on mo- tions but it was not until May 3, 1976 that Judge Olsen heard defendant's motion to quash. Plaintiffs operate a drive-in restaurant in the 1100 block of East Park Avenue in Anaconda, Montana. Defendant owns a triangular shaped piece of property on the Northeast corner of the 1000 block of East Park Avenue. East Park is a one-way street, running in an easterly direction, and is classified and regulated as a state highway. Lying between the properties of the respective parties and intersecting East Park is a short, oil covered gravel drive, known as Jefferson Street. P l a i n t i f f s a l l e g e t h a t beginning i n 1974 defendant parked h i s v e h i c l e a t t h e Southwest corner of Park and Jefferson (see diagram) i n such a manner a s t o prevent t o u r i s t s and o t h e r s not f a m i l i a r with t h e l o c a t i o n of p l a i n t i f f s ' business from seeing p l a i n t i f f s ' business, and from making proper e n t r y i n t o t h e business. I t is alleged t h a t such parking w a s done maliciously, t o vex and harass p l a i n t i f f s . Defendant contends he was l e g a l l y parked i n f r o n t of h i s own property, within t h e parking boundaries established by t h e Montana Department of Highways and, a s such, cannot be con- sidered a "nuisance". Defendant t e s t i f i e d he parked h i s v e h i c l e i n t h a t l o c a t i o n f o r years without complaint from p l a i n t i f f s ' predecessor i n t i t l e . Defendant f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t o t h e r s parked i n t h e location a s w e l l . I n J u l y 1974 defendant w a s issued a ticked f o r i l l e g a l parking by t h e Anaconda City Police because he parked i n t h e disputed area. The t i c k e t was subsequently dismissed by t h e c i t y judge. A t t h e May 3 , 1976, hearing on t h e motion t o quash, defendant attempted t o introduce evidence concerning t h e issuance and dismissal of t h e t i c k e t . However, t h e testi- mony was excluded upon p l a i n t i f f s ' objection. Defendant raises three issues: 1. Is the July 26, 1976 order of the District Court, continuing in effect its temporary restraining order, an appealable order under Rule 1, M.R.App.Civ.P.? 2 . Did the District Court abuse its discretion in initially issuing and subsequently refusing to quash the temporary restraining order? 3 . Did the District Court err in excluding evidence offered by defendant at the hearing on the motion to quash concerning the issuance and dismissal of the parking ticket? Defendant first argues that the order of the District Court continuing in effect the temporary restraining order and denying the motion to quash is an appealable order. Under Rule l(b), M.R.App.Civ.P., an aggrieved party may appeal from an order granting or refusing an injunction. Generally, this Court has determined the appealability of injunctive orders by distinguishing between those which are temporary or permanent in substance, without regard to form. Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, (1959), 134 Mont. 526, 335 P.2d 310; State ex rel. Public Service Commission v. District Court, (1936), 103 Mont. 563, 63 P.2d 1032. In Labbitt v. Bunston, (1927), 80 Mont. 293, 260 P. 727, it was stated: "Where the matter is heard upon an order to show cause, the right to a temporary injunction is 'adjudicated' by the decision rendered after the hearing * * * so here as the motion to dissolve presented the ques- tion of plaintiff's right to the restraining order, and the decision on the motion was equivalent to a decision on the hearing on the order to show cause and rendered such a hearing needless, the order of September 24, was an 'adjudication' of the plaintiff's right to an injunction pendente lite and an order refusing to dissolve an injunction, from which an appeal lies * * *." 80 Mont. 302. See, S t a t e ex rel. Keast v. Krieg, (1965), 145 Mont. 521, 432 P.2d 405. Here, t h e order continuing t h e temporary r e s t r a i n i n g order appears appealable because it has t h e e f f e c t of a per- manent injunction. The record r e v e a l s t h a t Judge Olsen regarded t h e i s s u e as whether o r n o t a permanent i n j u n c t i o n should be granted: "THE COURT: Very well, when t h i s m a t t e r is submitted t o t h e Court then it is submitted on t h e question of t h e Motion t o Quash and - o r t h e f i n a l question i n t h e case as t o -- ----- whether o r n o t t h e r e be a permanent injunction. -- - - "MR. MACKAY: Y e s , i f it p l e a s e t h e Court. "THE COURT: I f t h e r e i s no o t h e r evidence t o be o f f e r e d on t h e question of t h e permanent -- -- injunction, t h i s case w i l l be concluded." (Emphasis supplied.) I n substance, by continuing i n e f f e c t t h e temporary restrai.ning order, Judge Olsen granted an i n j u n c t i o n of a permanent nature, appealable a s such. I n h i s second i s s u e , defendant contends t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused its d i s c r e t i o n i n i n i t i a l l y i s s u i n g and subse- quently r e f u s i n g t o quash t h e temporary r e s t r a i n i n g order. Under Montana s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 93-4204(1)(2), R.C.M. 1947, an i n j u n c t i v e order may be granted: "1. When it s h a l l appear by t h e complaint t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d t o t h e r e l i e f de- manded, and such r e l i e f , o r any p a r t t h e r e o f , c o n s i s t s i n r e s t r a i n i n g t h e commission o r con- tinuance of t h e a c t complained o f , e i t h e r f o r a limited period o r perpetually; " 2 . When it s h a l l appear by t h e complaint of a f f i d a v i t t h a t t h e commission or continuance of some a c t during t h e l i t i g a t i o n would pro- duce a g r e a t o r i r r e p a r a b l e i n j u r y t o t h e p l a i n t i f f . " This Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y held t o o b t a i n a temporary r e s t r a i n i n g order t h e complaint must contain a statement of m a t e r i a l f a c t s e s t a b l i s h i n g i r r e p a r a b l e i n j u r y o r p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t t o t h e r e l i e f sought t h e r e i n . Emery v. Emery, (1949), 122 Mont. 201, 200 P.2d 251. However, equity will not interfere by way of injunc- tion where the law can furnish all the relief to which the complaining party is entitled, as by monetary damages. State ex rel. Keast v. Krieg, supra. Defendant contends plaintiffs' complaint failed to establish the irreparable nature of the injury caused by defendant's parking, as the complaint specifies monetary damages compensable as such under the law without resort to equity. Plaintiffs, however, appear to be correct in responding that a plaintiff in a nuisance action can seek judgment that the nuisance be enjoined, as well as damages recovered. Section 93-6101, R.C.M. 1947; Thrasher v. Hodge, (1929), 86 Mont. 218, 283 P. 219. Further, plaintiffs contend precise monetary damages for loss of business due to defendant's actions are not precisely ascertainable because of the peculiar nature of the allegedly harmful activity, in rela- tion to the asserted harm. Defendant further argues the impropriety of the initial grant of injunctive relief on the ground that the effect of the temporary restraining order is a change in the status quo, contrary to Montana case authority. Plaintiffs do not respond to this argument. It is well settled that the purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo until a hearing can be held to determine whether an injunction pendente lite should be granted. State ex rel. ~ c ~ e n z i e v. District Court, (1941), 111 Mont. 241, 107 ~ . 2 d 885; State ex rel. Cook v. District Court, (1937), 105 Mont. 72, 69 P.2d 746. The Washington Supreme Court i n S t a t e v. Sutton, (1940), 2 Wash.2d 523, 98 P.2d 680, s t a t e d t h a t t h e " s t a t u s quo" which t h e i n j u n c t i o n i s t o preserve, c o n s i s t s o f : I! I * * * t h e l a s t a c t u a l peaceable, noncon- t e s t e d s t a t u s which preceded t h e pending controversy. Ordinarily where t h e issuance of a preliminary injunction would have t h e e f f e c t of granting a l l t h e r e l i e f t h a t could be obtained by a f i n a l decree and would p r a c t i c a l l y dispose of t h e whole case, it w i l l not be granted.'" 98 P.2d 684. However, t h i s argument appears without m e r i t a s Montana c o u r t s s i t t i n g i n equity have t h e power t o r e s t r a i n o r e n j o i n t h e continuance of an e x i s t i n g nuisance a s w e l l as a contem- p l a t e d o r threatened nuisance. S t a t e ex rel. Dussault v. Fox Missoula Theatre Corp., (1940), 110 Mont. 4 4 1 , 101 P.2d 1065; P u r c e l l v. Davis, (1935), 100 Mont. 480, 50 ~ . 2 d 255. Defendant a l s o argues t h a t because h i s a c t of parking was n o t shown t o be o t h e r than l e g a l , it could not be enjoined, temporarily o r otherwise. However, it i s c l e a r t h a t an a c t , while t e c h n i c a l l y l e g a l , may be enjoined a s a nuisance. 66 C. J. S. NUISANCES, ~ l l l . ( c ) . , - 874,875. A s a general r u l e , t h e granting of a temporary re- s t r a i n i n g order rests within t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l court. Atkinson v. Roosevelt County, (1923), 66 Mont. 4 1 1 , 214 P. 74; Rea Bros. Sheep Co. v. Rudi, (1912), 46 Mont. 149, 127 P. 85. Unless it appears on appeal t h a t such d i s - c r e t i o n was abused, t h e order of t h e t r i a l c o u r t w i l l be affirmed. P o s t a l Telegraph-Cable Co. of America v. Nolan, ( 1 9 1 6 ) , 53 Mont. 1 2 9 , 162 P. 169. The same a n a l y s i s is applicable t o a continuance of an i n j u n c t i o n , upon hearing, pending f i n a l determination of t h e cause on t h e m e r i t s . Atkinson v. Roosevelt County, supra; Lowery v. Cole, (1913), 47 Mont. 64, 130 P. 140. This Court i n Atkinson s t a t e d : " I * * * And t h e c o u r t should be inclined t o i s s u e a temporary injunction applied f o r where the p l a i n t i f f has made o u t a prima f a c i e case, o r i f , upon t h e showing made, it is l e f t doubt- f u l whether o r n o t t h e p l a i n t i f f w i l l s u f f e r i r r e p a r a b l e i n j u r y before h i s r i g h t s can be f u l l y investigated and determined; it is n o t necessary t h a t a case be made which would e n t i t l e him t o r e l i e f a t a l l events on f i n a l hearing. * * * " I * * * It i s not necessary t h a t t h e c o u r t be s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f w i l l c e r t a i n l y p r e v a i l on t h e f i n a l hearing; "a probable r i g h t , and a probable danger t h a t such r i g h t w i l l be defeated, without t h e s p e c i a l i n t e r - p o s i t i o n of t h e court," is a l l t h a t need be shown.' (Sec, 1685, Pomeroy's Equity J u r i s - prudence, 4th ed.)." 66 Mont. 422. Here, p l a i n t i f f s offered proof t h a t they had suffered and would continue t o s u f f e r a l o s s of business unless defendant was r e s t r a i n e d from parking i n such mannger a s t o prevent v i s i b i l i t y of and proper ingress t o p l a i n t i f f s ' business. P l a i n t i f f s contend, and it appears reasonable t o conclude, t h a t t h i s showing alone is s u f f i c i e n t a s t h e r e i s no means of determining t h e precise number of p o t e n t i a l patrons who passed by t h e drive-in due t o defendant's vehicle, nor how much each would have spent upon entering. Defendant's f i n a l i s s u e argues t h e order continuing t h e temporary r e s t r a i n i n g order was void f o r lapse of time. I n other words, defendant a s s e r t s t h e temporary r e s t r a i n i n g order expired a f t e r a reasonable time without n o t i c e and hearing, such t h a t t h e District Court w a s without jurisdic- t i o n t o order t h e continuance of it. I n S t a t e ex rel. Cook v. D i s t r i c t Court, supra, it i s s t a t e d : "* * * It i s t h e duty of t h e c o u r t upon granting a temporary r e s t r a i n i n g order with- o u t notice, t o s e t t h e matter f o r hearing f o r an injunction pendente l i t e a t a very e a r l y date, t o t h e end t h a t a 'temporary expedient may not, i n f a c t , become an injunc- t i o n . ' * * * And s i x weeks has been held an unreasonable time t o r e s t r a i n without n o t i c e and a hearing." 105 Mont. 75, 76. Here, while the temporary restraining order was ini- tially granted on September 11, 1974, it had gone without a hearing until May 1976, a period of over one and one-half years. A temporary injunction is a procedural device, interlocutory or provisional in nature granted at the com- mencement of an action before there can be a determination of the rights of the parties to preserve the subject in controversy in its existing condition pending a determina- tion. It does not determine the merits of a case or decide controverted facts. It preserves the status quo pending an adjudication on the merits. It seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm until the rights of the parties are adjusted. 43 C.J.S. INJUNCTIONS, 55; Montana Power Co. v. Environmental Protec- tion Agency, (1977), 429 F.Supp. 683; Sheridan County Elec- tric Co-op v. Ferguson, (1951), 124 Mont. 543, 222 P.2d 597; Kansen v . Galiger, (1949), 123 Mont. 101, 208 P.2d 1049. Recognizing that this was raised by defendant in his motion to quash, we find no merit due to the delays of defendant in changing counsel and disqualifying the judges called in. Defendant contends the District Court erred in ex- cluding upon objection on the grounds that it was irrelevant and hearsay, the evidence offered concerning the issuance and dismissal of the parking ticket. It is maintained that evidence is not hearsay when offered, as here, in proof of the fact that a statement was made, and not the truth thereof and that, in any event, the evidence was admissible under the "transaction rule". Sec- tion 93-401-7, R.C.M. 1947; Stayg v. Stagg, (1934), 96 Mont. 573, 32 P.2d 856; Sullivan v. ~etropolitan ~ i f e Ins. Co., (1934), 96 Mont. 254, 29 P.2d 1046; Welch v. A l l Persons, (1929), 85 Mont. 1 1 4 , 278 P. 110; Burns v. Smith, (1898), 21 Mont. 251, 53 P. 742. F i n a l l y d e f e n d a n t urges t h e t i c k e t is r e l e v a n t a s tending t o e s t a b l i s h o r make probable a d i s p u t e d f a c t ( i . e . , t h e l e g a l i t y of d e f e n d a n t ' s parking and h i s i n t e n t i n s o d o i n g ) . A s defendant, on t h i s appeal, r e q u e s t s t h a t t h e o r d e r continuing i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f be quashed, t h i s i s s u e appears t o have l i t t l e bearing on t h i s C o u r t ' s u l t i m a t e d e c i s i o n . The order of t h e c o u r t continuing t h e temporary re- s t r a i n i n g o r d e r is upheld. The cause i s remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court with d i r e c t i o n s t o e x p e d i t e t h e t r i a l of t h e cause f o r damages. J u s ticeL--- W e Concur: u - )& :JdLcL/~;j J u s t i c e s I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE OF MONTANA N o . 13507 JOHN BOYER and L A U R A L U BOYER, F P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents, A N T H O N Y L. KARAGACIN, Defendant and Appellant. CLm?s& c : ? SUPi'iE@iE COURT ."TE OF MBN'iANA O R D E R PER CURIAM: A n e r r o r having been discovered i n t h e Opinion issued i n t h e above e n t i t l e d cause where t h e diagram on Page 3 of t h a t Opinion i s i n c o r r e c t , I T IS ORDERED t h a t t h e Page 3 attached hereto be s u b s t i t u t e d f o r Page 3 of t h e o r i g i n a l Opinion.. DATED t h i s day of September, 1978. i e f J u s t i c . ?