Title: State v. Martin
Citation: 2012 WI 96
Docket Number: 2010AP000505-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 13, 2012

2012 WI 96 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP505-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Randy L. Martin, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 334 Wis. 2d 807, 800 N.W.2d 957 
(Ct. App. 2011 - Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 13, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 18, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Kevin E. Martens 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (Opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (Opinion filed).    
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Byron C. Lichstein and Frank J. Remington Center, 
Madison, and oral argument by Byron C. Lichstein. 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Daniel J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
2012 WI 96
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2010AP505-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2008CF5903) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Randy L. Martin, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 13, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   We review an unpublished 
decision of the court of appeals1 affirming the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court's judgment of conviction against Randy L. Martin 
("Martin").2  The State charged him with one count of possession 
of a firearm by a felon in violation of Wisconsin Statutes 
                                                 
1 State v. Martin, No. 2010AP505-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. May 3, 2011). 
2 The Honorable Kevin E. Martens presiding. 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
2 
 
section 941.29(2),3 and one count of carrying a concealed weapon 
in violation of § 941.23.4  At trial, a jury found Martin guilty 
on both counts.   
¶2 
Two issues are presented for our consideration: 1) 
whether Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) required the 
suppression of Martin's statements taken at the scene, and 2) if 
it did require suppression, whether the erroneous admission of 
these statements was harmless.   
¶3 
Because Martin made incriminating statements while in 
police custody and while being subjected to interrogation by 
police officers, we conclude that he had a Fifth Amendment right 
to receive Miranda warnings.  Accordingly, we hold that it was 
error to admit the incriminating statements at trial.  Further, 
we hold that because the State has not met its burden of proving 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated.  Wisconsin 
Statutes section 941.29(2) provides, in relevant part: 
A person specified in sub. (1) is guilty of a Class G 
felony if he or she possesses a firearm under any of 
the following circumstances: 
(a) The person possesses a firearm subsequent to the 
conviction for the felony or other crime, as specified 
in sub. (1) (a) or (b). 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 941.23 provides: 
Any person except a peace officer who goes armed with 
a concealed and dangerous weapon is guilty of a Class 
A misdemeanor.  Notwithstanding s. 939.22 (22), for 
purposes of this section, peace officer does not 
include a commission warden who is not a state-
certified commission warden. 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
3 
 
that it is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury 
would have found the defendant guilty absent the error," State 
v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶49, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 
(quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)), the 
error was not harmless.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals and remand the cause for a new trial. 
I. 
FACTS 
¶4 
On November 14, 2008, Milwaukee Police Sergeant James 
Fidler ("Fidler")5 was traveling eastbound on West North Avenue 
in the City of Milwaukee, approaching a red light at the 
intersection of West North Avenue and North 49th Street.    
While Fidler was in the process of stopping, he observed a 2004 
Hyundai Santa Fe sport utility vehicle (the "SUV") with tinted 
rear windows directly in front of his squad car, as well as 
another vehicle (the "car") in front of the SUV.  Fidler 
observed Martin exit the SUV from the driver's side door, walk 
forward toward the car, and shout at the driver of the car.  
From his vantage point, Fidler could also see the driver of the 
car, who was shouting back at Martin through an open window of 
                                                 
5 At trial, the State called Fidler, Milwaukee Police 
Officers Hollis Smith and Andrew Moutry, Milwaukee Police 
Department Identification Technician Robbie Lloyd, and State 
Crime Lab Forensic Scientist Chiara Weunsch.  Martin called 
Marie Krentz, the co-owner of the vehicle Martin was driving and 
Martin's girlfriend, and Lee Roy Henry, the passenger in the 
vehicle.  Martin did not testify. 
Fidler, Smith, Moutry, and Henry testified at a pre-trial 
suppression hearing, and their testimony from that hearing is 
consistent with that which they provided at trial. 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
4 
 
the car.  As Martin moved toward the car, the other driver 
alighted from his vehicle, presumably to confront Martin. 
¶5 
As soon as the driver of the car exited his vehicle, 
he noticed Fidler, and chose to remain at the door of the car.  
Martin, however, who apparently did not see Fidler, continued to 
proceed toward the car.  As Martin approached the car, Fidler 
observed Martin retrieve an object from his jacket pocket and 
point it at the driver of the car, and heard Martin say to the 
driver of the car "I have something, I've got something for 
you."  Fidler could not see the object Martin had retrieved from 
his jacket; however, when Martin produced that item from his 
pocket, the driver of the car motioned toward Fidler.  As Fidler 
approached both drivers, Martin placed the item back in his 
pocket, and began to return to the SUV.  Fidler immediately 
called Martin toward him, and placed him in handcuffs. 
¶6 
After placing Martin in handcuffs,6 Fidler searched 
Martin and found an expandable baton in his pocket.  That baton 
was approximately six inches in length when collapsed, but was 
capable of expanding to a length of over 15 inches. 
¶7 
As Fidler was completing his search of Martin, 
Officers Hollis Smith ("Smith") and Andrew Moutry ("Moutry") 
approached the scene, heading westbound on West North Avenue in 
a second marked squad car.  They noticed Fidler engaged with 
                                                 
6 Fidler testified at trial that he initially arrested 
Martin for disorderly conduct. 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
5 
 
Martin, and stopped to assist Fidler.7  When Smith and Moutry 
approached Fidler to see if he needed assistance, he instructed 
them to search Martin's SUV. 
¶8 
At 
that 
point, 
Smith 
discovered 
Lee 
Roy 
Henry 
("Henry"), a close childhood friend of Martin's,8 seated in the 
passenger seat of the SUV.  After Henry exited the vehicle,9 
Smith searched the SUV.  While conducting that search, Smith 
discovered a loaded "High Standard" .22 caliber revolver (the 
"revolver") concealed in a small pull-out tray under the 
passenger seat.  Smith, who was not wearing gloves at the time 
of the search, removed the entire tray from the SUV with the 
revolver still inside, but did not touch the revolver.  Smith 
described the revolver as unusual for two reasons: it was larger 
                                                 
7 There is no evidence in the record that Fidler ever 
contacted Smith and Moutry to assist him with Martin.  However, 
it is not unusual that these two officers were in the area given 
that the events incident to this case took place roughly 150 
yards from the Milwaukee Police Department District No. 3's 
building, located on North 49th Street. 
8 The record indicates that Henry had maintained a close 
relationship with Martin for many years; in fact, their 
relationship was so close that Martin referred to Henry as his 
"uncle," even though they are of no relation. 
9 One of the contested points at trial was the amount of 
time that Henry was in the vehicle before he was asked by Smith 
to exit the vehicle.  Fidler alluded to the fact that as little 
as one or two minutes elapsed between the time the incident 
started and when Smith and Moutry arrived on scene.  Smith 
stated that he searched the SUV "a few minutes" after arriving 
on the scene, but Moutry stated that Smith began the search of 
the SUV "[w]ithin 20 minutes" of arriving on the scene.  Henry 
stated that "[a]bout maybe five minutes" elapsed between 
Fidler's initial interaction with Martin and Smith's request 
that Henry exit the SUV. 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
6 
 
than most .22 calibers with which he was familiar, and it was 
capable of holding nine cartridges in its cylinder.10 
¶9 
The witnesses' versions of events begins to differ at 
the point where they recount Smith removing the tray from the 
SUV.  The police officers' version of the events is as follows.11 
¶10 Smith testified that he carried the tray containing 
the revolver over to Martin and Henry and showed them the 
revolver.  He then asked Martin and Henry, neither of whom had 
been provided with Miranda warnings,12 who the owner of the 
revolver was.  Both Martin and Henry denied ownership of the 
revolver.  Smith testified at trial that he then "told Mr. 
Henry, who was the passenger, and [was] sitting basically on top 
of this weapon, that I was placing him under arrest for carrying 
[a] concealed weapon."   
¶11 Smith testified that as he prepared to place Henry 
under arrest, Martin asked Smith and Fidler why Henry was being 
arrested.  Smith replied that he was placing Henry under arrest 
for carrying a concealed weapon.  Martin then asked the police 
officers whether they would let Henry go if he (Martin) admitted 
                                                 
10 Moutry provided testimony that authenticated the revolver 
shown to the jury at trial. 
11 Fidler provided limited testimony on these events, none 
of which controverts Smith's testimony.  Because Smith was 
directly engaged with Henry, our recitation of the facts roughly 
tracks his testimony. 
12 The parties agree that Martin and Henry were not provided 
with warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966). 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
7 
 
the revolver belonged to him.  In response to this question, 
Smith told Martin that he did not want Martin to say it was his 
revolver if it was not, but he should be a "stand-up guy" and 
admit the revolver was his if it was.  Martin responded by 
telling Smith that the revolver belonged to him, and that he 
should let Henry go.   
¶12 Even though Martin stated that the revolver belonged 
to him, Smith asked Martin to describe it.  Martin responded 
that it was a black .22 caliber handgun, which Smith testified 
at trial would have been difficult to determine through just a 
visual examination.  Based on Martin's admission that the 
revolver belonged to him, the police arrested Martin, and chose 
not to arrest Henry. 
¶13 Henry's version of the events was slightly different.13  
He testified that Smith did not show the tray to him, and he was 
unsure if Smith showed the tray to Martin.  Smith then asked 
both Martin and Henry who owned the revolver, and both denied 
ownership.  Henry stated that the officer thought the revolver 
belonged to him because it was under the passenger seat, where 
Henry was seated.  Henry testified that Smith then asked Martin 
whether he was "gonna [sic] be a stand-up guy and let your uncle 
go to jail for this gun being in the vehicle, or are you gonna 
[sic] man up."  Martin then asked Smith what type of gun it was, 
and, according to Henry, Smith responded that Martin "should 
                                                 
13 Martin did not testify at the trial; therefore, the only 
defense witness at trial who was present at the scene of the 
alleged crime was Henry. 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
8 
 
know what type of gun it was" if it belonged to him.  As to the 
events that took place after this point, Henry admitted that his 
memory was not clear as to the chronology, but was certain that 
Martin made two statements.  First, he testified that Martin 
described 
the 
revolver to an officer, but that in his 
description Martin did not mention its caliber or color.  
Second, Henry testified that Martin told an officer that if he 
let his uncle (Henry) go, he (Martin) would say the revolver was 
his. 
II. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶14 The State charged Martin with one count of possession 
of a firearm by a felon in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2), 
and one count of carrying a concealed weapon in violation of 
§ 941.23.14  At the preliminary hearing, Martin pleaded not 
guilty to both charges, and the case was set for trial soon 
thereafter. 
¶15 Before trial, Martin brought a suppression motion that 
sought to preclude the introduction at trial of his statements 
to the police.15  At the hearing on this motion, the court heard 
testimony from Fidler, Smith, and Henry regarding the events 
                                                 
14 This charge relates to the baton found by Fidler on 
Martin's person.  The parties have advanced no arguments 
relating to this charge. 
15 Martin's motion also argued that the search of the 
vehicle was improper, and that the discovery of the revolver 
should have been similarly suppressed.  Martin made this 
argument to the court of appeals as well, but did not include it 
in his briefs to this court.  Therefore, we decline to address 
the issue. 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
9 
 
incident to the case.  Martin's counsel argued that one of the 
officers should have Mirandized Martin before engaging in 
custodial questioning, and therefore any statement of Martin's 
that followed the improper questioning was properly suppressed.   
¶16 The circuit court, after hearing the testimony and 
argument, decided that because 1) Martin's response to the first 
question was exculpatory,16 rather than inculpatory,17 and 2) 
Martin's question regarding why the officers were taking Henry 
into custody was not in response to a question, there was "no 
violation of Miranda."  Accordingly, the circuit court denied 
Martin's motion to suppress the statements. 
¶17 Martin's two-day jury trial began on April 6, 2009.18  
The State and Martin presented their theories of the case to the 
jury in both opening statements and closing arguments.  During 
its opening statement, the State made the following comments 
regarding the felon in possession charge: 
[O]fficers 
who 
came to assist Sergeant Fidler[] 
searched the vehicle of [Martin], a vehicle which he 
purchased -- excuse me -- a vehicle which he co-owned 
                                                 
16 Exculpatory answers are those that do not implicate an 
individual in a crime.  Black's Law Dictionary 836 (9th ed. 
2009) (stating that "exculpate" means "[t]o free from blame or 
accusation"). 
17 Inculpatory 
answers 
are 
those 
that 
implicate 
an 
individual in a crime.  Black's 648 (stating that "inculpate" 
means "[t]o implicate (oneself or another) in a crime or other 
wrongdoing"). 
18 Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that Martin was a 
convicted felon.  Therefore, the State was required to prove 
only that Martin had knowing control over the revolver. 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
10 
 
with another individual.  In that vehicle, you will 
hear, a .22 caliber revolver was found under the seat 
of the vehicle.  You will hear questions were asked 
about that weapon.  As a matter of fact, the defendant 
admitted that it was his gun.  He even described the 
weapon when asked the type of weapon it was. 
(emphasis added).   
¶18 Martin presented a three-fold theory in his opening 
statement: first, that because he had purchased the SUV only a 
few months prior to the incident, he did not know that the 
revolver was in the tray under the seat; second, that he did not 
adequately describe the revolver, but instead confessed to 
possessing the revolver to protect Henry; and third, that Henry 
was in the vehicle for a considerable amount of time before the 
police asked him to exit the vehicle, arguing by inference that 
Henry placed the revolver in the tray under the seat. 
¶19 In addition to the testimony provided by those present 
at 
the 
scene, 
Milwaukee 
Police 
Department 
Identification 
Technician Robbie Lloyd ("Lloyd") testified at trial that he 
tested 
the 
revolver 
and 
cartridges 
in 
the 
revolver 
for 
fingerprints, but was unable to recover anything of evidentiary 
value.  He also testified that it is rare to recover 
fingerprints from a firearm or cartridges, but that the revolver 
was a better than average candidate to produce fingerprints 
because it is large and contains a significant number of flat 
surfaces.  Lloyd explained that the reason it is difficult to 
recover fingerprints from a firearm is that they can be easily 
wiped away by contact with the firearm.  Finally, Lloyd 
testified 
that 
although 
he 
did 
not 
test 
the 
tray 
for 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
11 
 
fingerprints, it is far more likely that the tray—specifically 
the smooth surfaces on the interior of the tray—would have 
produced fingerprints. 
¶20 State Crime Lab Forensic Scientist Chiara Weunsch 
("Weunsch") testified that she tested swabbings taken from the 
revolver for DNA evidence.  Although she was unable to recover 
any DNA evidence from the swabs, she, like Lloyd, testified that 
it is unusual to find DNA evidence on a firearm.  Weunsch, like 
Lloyd, explained that the reason it is difficult to recover DNA 
evidence from a firearm is that it can easily be wiped away by 
handling or concealing of the firearm. 
¶21 Marie Krentz ("Krentz"), co-owner of the SUV and 
Martin's girlfriend, testified at trial that she and Martin had 
purchased the used SUV from a Russ Darrow dealership on 
September 18, 2008, slightly less than two months before the 
events described above.  Krentz testified that although she had 
test-driven the SUV before purchase and had regularly driven the 
vehicle since then, Martin was the primary driver of the 
vehicle, and she had never noticed the tray that contained the 
revolver.  She further testified that the revolver did not 
belong to her. 
¶22 At closing, the State reminded the jury of the 
uncontroverted facts regarding Smith's retrieval of the revolver 
and characterized the events that followed: 
You heard at that point that the police had to make a 
decision what to do.  They had the two individuals: 
They had Mr. Henry and they had the defendant.  They 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
12 
 
asked these individuals is this your gun, whose gun is 
this? 
You heard that both of them said "not mine" at which 
point it was determined that Mr. Henry would also be 
arrested and he was the passenger in the vehicle and 
the gun was found underneath his seat.  At that point, 
not in response to a direct question at that point, 
but Mr. Martin stepped up.  You heard the officer say 
something to the effect of step up or be -- be the 
right person, do the right thing here, in essence, at 
which point the defendant said, "That's my gun." 
He didn't just say that; he described the weapon.  He 
described it as black.  Obviously apparent to the eye, 
obviously a black gun.  No question about that. 
He 
also 
described 
it 
as 
a 
.22-caliber 
weapon.  
Remember, I actually asked the officer about that, is 
this -- obviously a .22-caliber weapon -- if you just 
saw this?  In fact, the officer said no, it actually 
appears to be a bigger one; it appears to be a .380 or 
some other type of weapon not a .22-caliber. 
¶23 The State concluded its closing argument by asking the 
jury to look at "the circumstantial evidence in this case" as 
well as the direct evidence.  Here, the State argued: 1) Martin 
was the co-owner of the vehicle, but the revolver did not belong 
to Krentz, the other co-owner; 2) although Henry was in the 
vehicle, he testified that the revolver did not belong to him; 
and 3) Martin had owned the vehicle for nearly two months. 
¶24 Although Martin reiterated his theory of the case in 
his closing argument, he added a few additional arguments.  He 
argued that his theory was bolstered by the fact that no 
fingerprints were found on the revolver, and that the tray was 
never tested for fingerprints.  Additionally, he argued that the 
officers had not been consistent in their testimony about the 
incident. 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
13 
 
¶25 After 
closing 
arguments, 
the 
jury 
retired 
to 
deliberate over the case.  According to the trial transcript, 
"[w]ithin two minutes after going back, the jury buzzed and 
passed a note out."  The court described the note in the 
following exchange: 
The next thing written on the note is this: "Could we 
get the exact response -- response from uncle [sic] 
when asked how Randy responded to officer's question, 
'Is this your gun?'" 
And then there's written just below that, "Response 
from officer when Randy was asked []'Is this your 
gun?'"19 
¶26 The court, after consulting counsel for both the State 
and Martin, responded to the jury's question by reiterating that 
the jury would not be provided with a transcript of the trial 
testimony.20  After approximately 30 minutes of deliberation, the 
jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts.21  The circuit 
court sentenced Martin to four years initial confinement and 
three years extended supervision for the felon in possession of 
a firearm count, and nine months on the concealed weapon count, 
to run concurrent with time served on the first count. 
                                                 
19 The jury also requested, in the same note, that certain 
exhibits from the trial be provided. 
20 The jury was instructed prior to the commencement of the 
prosecution's case in chief.  At that point, the jury was 
provided with Wis JI——Criminal 58, which instructed the jury 
that transcripts of the trial testimony would not be available 
during its deliberation.  
21 After the conclusion of the trial and before sentencing, 
Martin moved the circuit court to reconsider his arguments made 
at the suppression hearing regarding the admissibility of the 
revolver.  This question is not before the court. 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
14 
 
¶27 Martin appealed, alleging that the circuit court erred 
in determining that his statements were admissible and not taken 
in violation of Miranda.  Martin argued that his "statements 
were the product of a [custodial] 'interrogation' and thus 
subject to Miranda."  The court of appeals disagreed, and found 
that "Smith's comments to Martin at both points during this 
encounter were not 'designed' with the aim of eliciting 
incriminating testimony," State v. Martin, No. 2010AP505-CR, 
unpublished slip op. ¶19 (Wis. Ct. App. May 3, 2011), and 
therefore no Miranda violation occurred.  Martin appealed, and 
we granted review. 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶28 We apply a two-step standard of review when reviewing 
a motion to suppress.  State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶9, 245 
Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625.  First, we review the circuit 
court's findings of fact, and uphold them unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, ¶23, 236 
Wis. 2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 72.  Second, we review de novo the 
application of constitutional principles to those facts.  Eason, 
245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶9. 
IV. 
DISCUSSION 
¶29 We first consider whether a Miranda violation occurred 
and conclude that one did.  We then take up the question of 
whether the error was harmless and answer that it was not.  As a 
result, we reverse the court of appeals and remand for a new 
trial.    
A. 
There Was a Miranda Violation 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
15 
 
¶30 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself."22  The Fifth 
Amendment has been incorporated to apply to the States through 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 
(1964). 
¶31 In the seminal case of Miranda v. Arizona, the United 
States Supreme Court decided that the right protected by the 
Fifth Amendment requires that the government "may not use 
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from 
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates 
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the 
privilege against self-incrimination."  384 U.S. at 444.  
Pursuant to that rule, a suspect cannot be subject to custodial 
interrogation until he is "warned that he has a right to remain 
                                                 
22 Wisconsin affords suspects the same right in its state 
constitution.  Wis. Const. Art. I, § 8 ("No person . . . may be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself 
or herself").  Martin does not cite this provision in his briefs 
so we refer only to the Fifth Amendment.  Regardless, we 
generally construe the state provision consistently with the 
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal 
right.  State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶39, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 
N.W.2d 142 ("Where the language of the provision in the state 
constitution is virtually identical to that of the federal 
provision or where no difference in intent is discernible, 
Wisconsin courts have normally construed the state constitution 
consistent with the United States Supreme Court's construction 
of 
the federal constitution.") (internal quotation marks, 
citation, 
and 
elipses 
omitted); 
id., 
¶40 
("The 
state 
constitutional right against compulsory self-incrimination is 
textually 
almost 
identical 
to 
its 
federal 
counterpart.") 
(footnote omitted).   
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
16 
 
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence 
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an 
attorney, either retained or appointed."  Id.   
¶32 It is undisputed that Martin was never advised of his 
Miranda rights.  What is disputed is whether he was subject to 
custodial interrogation at the time he made the incriminating 
statements, and thus whether police were compelled to so advise 
him.  We hold that Martin was subject to custodial interrogation 
during 
his 
exchange 
with 
law 
enforcement, 
and 
that 
the 
Constitution therefore compelled the officers to issue the 
warnings.   
1. Martin Was in Custody for Miranda Purposes 
¶33 The first question is whether Martin was in custody 
for Miranda purposes during his exchange with Smith.  Law 
enforcement has custody over a suspect within the meaning of 
Miranda where a reasonable person would not feel free to 
terminate the interview and leave the scene.  Thompson v. 
Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).   
¶34 We recognize that the use of handcuffs does not in all 
cases render a suspect in custody for Miranda purposes.  
Reasoning from that fact, the State submits that Martin was not 
in custody when he made the inculpatory statements but rather 
subject to a "temporary roadside detention."  While it is true 
that Miranda warnings are not required during certain types of 
traffic stops, this was not such a circumstance.  On the 
contrary, Fidler testified that when he placed handcuffs on 
Martin he was arresting him for disorderly conduct.  Because 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
17 
 
"the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon 
as the suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a degree 
associated with formal arrest," Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 
U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted), and because Martin had been placed under arrest, and 
was in handcuffs23 and being questioned by the police (but not as 
part of an investigative stop or for officer safety reasons), 
his freedom was so curtailed.  See, e.g., State v. Eli, 273 P.3d 
1196, 1208 (Hawai'i 2012) ("Defendant had been placed under 
arrest, and therefore was deprived of his freedom in a 
significant way" and thus in custody); State v. Glass, 136 
S.W.3d 
496, 
508-09 
(Mo. 
2004) 
(en 
banc) 
("A 
custodial 
interrogation occurs only when the suspect is formally arrested 
or is subject to arrest-like restraints.") (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted); United States v. Lemon, 550 F.2d 467, 471 
(9th Cir. 1977) ("Appellant clearly was in custody from the time 
he was placed under arrest . . . .") (emphasis added); United 
                                                 
23 See United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (4th 
Cir. 1995) ("[D]rawing weapons, handcuffing a suspect, placing a 
suspect in a patrol car for questioning, or using or threatening 
to use force does not necessarily elevate a lawful stop into a 
custodial arrest for Miranda purposes") (citations omitted).  We 
do not understand the concurrence's confusion over "whether the 
[Leshuk] court was applying Fourth Amendment standards relating 
to arrest or Fifth Amendment standards relating to custody."  
Concurrence, ¶74 n.4.  By its plain and unambiguous language, 
the Fourth Circuit indicated that it was applying the latter, 
given that it explicitly stated that it was considering whether 
the 
suspect 
was 
in 
custody 
"for 
Miranda 
purposes," 
and 
therefore, by its terms, was applying Fifth Amendment standards.  
Leshuk, 65 F.3d at 1109-10 (emphasis added).   
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
18 
 
States v. Cartier, 543 F.3d 442, 448 (8th Cir. 2008) ("In 
assessing whether Cartier was 'in custody' for Miranda purposes, 
we make a two-part inquiry: (1) was he formally placed under 
arrest or (2) was his freedom of movement restrained to the 
degree associated with a formal arrest.") (emphasis added). 
Consequently, this was not a "temporary roadside detention" and 
Martin was in custody for purposes of Miranda. 
¶35 Lastly, we note that courts often apply a "totality of 
the circumstances" test to determine whether a suspect was in 
custody within the meaning of Miranda.  See State v. Mosher, 221 
Wis. 2d 203, 210-11, 584 N.W.2d 553 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. 
Gruen, 218 Wis. 2d 581, 594-95, 582 N.W.2d 728 (Ct. App. 1998).  
Under such a test, courts consider "such factors as: the 
defendant's freedom to leave; the purpose, place, and length of 
the interrogation; and the degree of restraint."  State v. 
Morgan, 2002 WI App 124, ¶12, 254 Wis. 2d 602, 648 N.W.2d 23.  
However, because Martin was placed under arrest, handcuffed and 
questioned by the police (but not as part of an investigative 
stop or for officer safety reasons), he was in custody within 
the meaning of Miranda and there is no need to examine the other 
factors in the test.  See cases cited supra ¶34.   
2. Martin Was Interrogated for Miranda Purposes 
¶36 We turn to the question of whether Martin was 
subjected to interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.  
Interrogation in this context occurs when the police ask a 
question of a suspect that is "reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response."  Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
19 
 
600 
(1990) 
(discussing 
"the 
functional 
equivalent 
of 
questioning"); cf. United States v. Knope, 655 F.3d 647, 652 
(7th Cir. 2011) ("[T]he test for whether Knope was subject to 
interrogation [for Miranda purposes] is whether a reasonable 
objective observer would have believed that the question claimed 
by the defendant to have been unlawful interrogation was in fact 
reasonably 
likely 
to 
elicit 
an 
incriminating 
response.") 
(internal quotation marks, brackets, elipses, and citations 
omitted) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 565 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 
1060 (2012); United States v. Hogan, 539 F.3d 916, 922 (8th Cir. 
2008) ("These questions were reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response from" the suspect and thus constituted 
interrogation under Miranda) (emphasis added).  The exchange at 
issue here began when Smith presented Martin with the revolver 
discovered in the vehicle and asked whether it belonged to him.  
Such a query is "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response;" indeed, it is a prototypical example of police 
interrogation.  See, e.g., United States v. Morales, 611 
F. Supp. 242, 244-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that an officer 
engaged in custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda 
when he showed a suspect drugs and asked "[w]hose are these?"), 
rev'd in part on other grounds, 788 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1986); 
United States v. Hood, 551 F. Supp. 2d 766, 771 (W.D. Ark. 2008) 
(holding that a detective engaged in custodial interrogation 
under Miranda when he asked three suspects who owned a rifle 
found during a protective sweep of an apartment). 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
20 
 
¶37 The State contends that the initial question posed by 
Smith to the two suspects as to the revolver's ownership was not 
interrogation, but rather "general on-the-scene" questioning 
that did not need to be preceded by Miranda warnings.  We 
disagree.  The "on-the-scene" exception to Miranda's requirement 
applies only when the person being questioned is not in custody, 
Britton v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 109, 113, 170 N.W.2d 785 (1969) 
(dealing with an individual questioned by a single officer 
trying to determine how to proceed in the aftermath of a murder 
when no suspects had been identified or handcuffed), or when law 
enforcement urgently needs information to attend to a potential 
emergency, State v. Kraimer, 99 Wis. 2d 306, 330, 298 N.W.2d 568 
(1980) (dealing with an individual questioned by an officer 
concerning the whereabouts of his wife where there was reason to 
believe she might be in danger).  Neither circumstance was 
present in this case.  Martin was in custody, and there is no 
evidence that there was any emergency.  On the contrary, both 
suspects were secure and the revolver was in the possession of 
the police.  As a result, the "on-the-scene" exception to 
Miranda has no bearing here and Martin was subjected to 
custodial interrogation.24 
                                                 
24 The State also suggests that Martin was not subject to 
interrogation because he was merely presented with evidence.  
See State v. Hambly, 2008 WI 10, ¶¶56-58, 307 Wis. 2d 98, 745 
N.W.2d 48 (holding that police are entitled to show a suspect 
evidence without Mirandizing him in advance).  Nevertheless, our 
inquiry focuses not on the fact that Martin was presented with 
the revolver, but on the fact that he was simultaneously asked 
whether it was his.  Were we to conclude that officers can 
ignore Miranda's dictate so long as they confront suspects with 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
21 
 
¶38 The court of appeals concluded that Martin was not 
interrogated because "the particular comments at issue here do 
not include Smith's initial confronting of Martin and Henry with 
the gun and do not include the first time when Smith asked them 
who owned the gun."  Martin, No. 2010AP505-CR, ¶19.  "Rather," 
the court of appeals continued, "at issue are Smith's comments 
after Martin asked the officers if they would let Henry go if 
Martin said the gun was his . . . ."  Id.  We respectfully 
disagree. 
¶39 The court of appeals cited no authority for the 
proposition that an incriminating statement offered by a suspect 
who has not been Mirandized during the course of a custodial 
interrogation is admissible simply because that particular 
statement, viewed in complete isolation, appears "voluntary."  
Such authority does not exist for good reason.  Miranda set 
forth a prophylactic rule.  See Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. __, 
132 S. Ct. 1181, 1188 (2012) ("Miranda adopted a set of 
prophylactic measures designed to ward off the inherently 
compelling pressures of custodial interrogation.") (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  The prophylactic power 
of the rule loses almost all force if a suspect can simply 
volunteer incriminating information during the course of a 
custodial interrogation without adverse consequences to the 
state.  At that point, it is not a prophylactic rule at all, 
                                                                                                                                                             
evidence while doing so, we would be stripping the United States 
Supreme Court's binding decision of any real force.  We 
therefore decline to adopt the rule proposed by the State. 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
22 
 
because it is entirely focused on the specific inculpatory 
statement, not on the fact that police officers are required to 
issue Miranda warnings whenever they ask a question "reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response."  Muniz, 496 U.S. at 
600.  Consequently, it is of no moment to our Miranda analysis 
that Martin's admission, viewed in a vacuum, appears to have 
been made voluntarily. 
¶40 At oral argument, the State proposed that Smith's 
second set of questions to Martin——those leading to the 
incriminating responses——were insulated from the Miranda error 
that infected the first question by an alleged gap between the 
two exchanges.  It is true that there are situations in which a 
suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation without being 
Mirandized and then, at a later time, voluntarily offers 
inculpatory information free from the taint of the earlier 
Miranda violation.  But in such cases there must be a break 
between the two exchanges, evidenced by factors like a lapse in 
time, change in personnel, change in location, or change in the 
content of the questions and answers.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Pettigrew, 468 F.3d 626 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Abdulla, 294 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2002); Medeiros v. Shimoda, 889 
F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1989).  Here, none of those factors militate 
in favor of finding a sufficient break.  No significant amount 
of time elapsed between Smith violating Miranda and Martin 
"volunteering" the inculpatory statements; in fact, both Fidler 
and Smith testified that the inculpatory statements were offered 
during the same exchange in which Smith asked the question in 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
23 
 
violation of Miranda, i.e., when he asked Martin whether the 
revolver was his.  Furthermore, there was no change in 
personnel, no change in location, and no change in the subject-
matter of the questions and answers.  In short, there are no 
grounds to say that a break of any kind occurred between the 
Miranda violation and the inculpatory statements, let alone a 
break sufficient to dissipate the taint of the constitutional 
wrong.  Cf. People v. Chapple, 341 N.E.2d 243, 245 (N.Y. 1975) 
(requiring "a definite, pronounced break" between a question 
asked in violation of Miranda and an inculpatory statement in 
order to render the latter admissible).25 
¶41 Accordingly, we conclude that Martin was in custody 
when asked whether the revolver belonged to him, and that the 
question constituted interrogation.  Therefore, the officers 
were required to advise him of his Miranda rights prior to 
                                                 
25 In support of its conclusion that Martin was not 
subjected to interrogation, the court of appeals cited the 
alleged fact that Smith asked the second set of questions——those 
leading to the incriminating responses——to "prevent[] a false 
confession" rather 
than to elicit incriminating evidence.  
Martin, No. 2010AP505-CR, ¶19.  Because we determine that only 
one exchange took place for Miranda purposes, not two, it is not 
necessary for us to consider the separate import, if any, of 
Smith's remarks later in the exchange.  Nevertheless, we note 
that there is no "false confession" exception to Miranda's 
requirements. 
 
Indeed, 
as 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
rightly 
recognized, 
a 
Miranda 
analysis 
"is 
not 
directed 
at 
the 
subjective intent of the police officer."  State v. Cunningham, 
144 Wis. 2d 272, 280, 423 N.W.2d 862 (1988) (emphasis added).  
Rather, the inquiry considers what police "should know" and on 
what is "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response 
from the suspect," not on what the officer intends or does not 
intend.  See Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 526-27 (1987) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).   
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
24 
 
posing the question, and their failure to do so violated the 
Fifth Amendment.  It follows as a matter of course that Martin's 
statements taken in violation of Miranda were inadmissible, and 
that it was error to admit testimony regarding those statements 
at trial.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 494. 
B. 
Harmless Error 
¶42 We have concluded that the circuit court erred in 
admitting Martin's statements taken in violation of Miranda, and 
that Martin's constitutional rights were violated.  However, 
that does not end our analysis, for we must now determine 
whether that constitutional error warrants automatic reversal, 
or should be subject to a harmless error analysis. 
¶43 The United States Supreme Court held in Neder that 
"most constitutional errors can be harmless."  527 U.S. at 8 
(quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991)).  
However, some constitutional errors are "'structural,' and thus 
subject to automatic reversal, but only in a 'very limited class 
of cases.'"  Id. accord Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶37.  These 
structural errors are "defect[s] affecting the framework within 
which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the 
trial process itself."  Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310; see Neder 
527 U.S. at 8.  In other words, a structural error is one that 
affects a criminal trial in such a profound manner that the 
"trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for 
determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment 
may be regarded as fundamentally fair."  Id. (quoting Rose v. 
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)). 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
25 
 
¶44 However, a constitutional error may be harmless where 
it affects not the framework of the trial, but only the trial 
proceeding itself.  Neder 527 U.S. at 8.  Put differently, 
harmless errors are described as those "which occurred during 
the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may 
therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other 
evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."  Fulminante, 499 U.S. 
at 307.  The majority of constitutional errors fall into this 
category, see id. at 306-07, and we have previously decided that 
the kind of error that occurred in this case——the admission of 
statements taken in violation of Miranda——is one of those 
errors.  Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 492, 219 N.W.2d 286 
(1974). 
¶45 This court recently set forth the parameters for 
harmless error analysis in Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶46.  There, 
we held that in order for an error to be deemed harmless, the 
party who benefited from the error must show that "it is clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found 
the defendant guilty absent the error."  Id., ¶49 (quoting 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 18) (emphasis added, internal quotation marks 
omitted).  As the party benefitted by the error, the State bears 
the burden of showing the error was harmless.  State v. LaCount, 
2008 WI 59, ¶85, 310 Wis. 2d 85, 750 N.W.2d 780.  Framed a 
different way, an "error is harmless if the beneficiary of the 
error 
proves 
'beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt 
that 
the 
error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'"  
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
26 
 
State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶47, 301 Wis. 2d 642, 734 N.W.2d 115 
(quoting State v. Anderson, 2006 WI 77, ¶114, 291 Wis. 2d 673, 
717 N.W.2d 74) (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. 
Stuart, 2005 WI 47, ¶40, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 695 N.W.2d 259.  
Therefore, this court must be satisfied, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, not that the jury could have convicted the defendant 
(i.e., sufficient evidence existed to convict the defendant), 
State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶28, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485, 
but rather that the jury would have arrived at the same verdict 
had the error not occurred.  See Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶46 
(quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 18). 
¶46 Several factors assist this court's analysis of 
whether an error is harmless: the frequency of the error; the 
importance of the erroneously admitted evidence; the presence or 
absence 
of 
evidence 
corroborating 
or 
contradicting 
the 
erroneously admitted evidence; whether the erroneously admitted 
evidence duplicates untainted evidence; the nature of the 
defense; the nature of the State's case; and the overall 
strength of the State's case.  See Mayo, 301 Wis. 2d 642, ¶48; 
accord State v. Jorgensen, 2008 WI 60, ¶23, 310 Wis. 2d 138, 754 
N.W.2d 77.  Although non-exhaustive, these factors aid the court 
in our review of whether the error complained of in this case——
the introduction of Martin's statements taken in violation of 
Miranda——was harmless.  We review each in turn. 
1. 
The Frequency of the Error 
¶47 The first factor we evaluate is whether the error in 
this 
case 
occurred 
often, 
or 
whether 
it 
occurred 
but 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
27 
 
infrequently.  The record in this case could not be clearer: the 
use of Martin's improperly admitted statements by the State at 
trial was pervasive.  Martin's statements were discussed at 
length in both the State's opening statement and closing 
argument, and Fidler, Smith, and Henry were each questioned 
extensively 
regarding 
Martin's 
statements. 
 
In 
fact, 
a 
significant portion, if not a majority, of Smith's testimony 
revolved around Martin's un-Mirandized statements.  Henry's 
testimony, likewise, centered on those statements.  Given these 
facts, as evident out in the record, it is clear that the error 
complained of here was frequent, so frequent that it became the 
backbone of the State's argument. 
2. The Importance of the Erroneously Admitted Evidence 
¶48 It 
is 
difficult 
to 
determine 
what 
weight, 
and 
therefore what importance, the jury placed on the erroneously 
admitted evidence regarding Martin's statements.  However, it 
appears that that evidence was important for three reasons.   
¶49 First, we can be certain, based on the record and 
confirmed by the prosecutor's statements at closing argument, 
that without Martin's statements, the State's case was lacking 
in direct evidence.  To be clear, if we disregard Martin's 
statements, the best argument the State available to the State 
to establish that Martin had knowing control over the revolver, 
as required by Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2), would have been entirely 
circumstantial: that the revolver was in Martin's vehicle, and 
that both Krentz (the co-owner) and Henry (the passenger) denied 
ownership.   
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
28 
 
¶50 Second, the State thought that the improperly admitted 
evidence, Martin's statements, was important enough to the case 
that it highlighted them in both its opening statement and 
closing argument.  The State could have chosen to include 
arguments that did not rely upon Martin's statements; however, 
it based its case on Martin's admissions. 
¶51 Finally, while the court cannot "conduct a subjective 
enquiry into the jurors' minds," Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 
404 (1991), disapproved on other grounds by Estelle v. McGuire, 
502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4 (1991), we can be relatively certain that 
this jury did in fact rely on the erroneously admitted evidence.  
This is so because the record reflects that no less than two 
minutes after the jury retired to deliberate on Martin's case, 
it sent written questions to the court asking for the exact 
language of both Smith's questions of Martin, and Martin's 
responses.  It is safe to say that if the jury felt that 
Martin's 
statements 
were 
significant 
enough 
to 
request 
additional clarification, it placed a high importance on them.  
See Stuart, 279 Wis. 2d 659, ¶52-53 (listing a jury's question 
regarding testimony at trial as one indication that the jury 
relied upon that testimony). 
¶52 Accordingly, while it is possible that the erroneously 
admitted evidence was not important to the State's case or to 
the jury's determination, the record establishes that it is far 
more likely that it was important to both, playing heavily into 
the jury's determination of Martin's guilt. 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
29 
 
3. The Presence or Absence of Evidence Corroborating or 
Contradicting the Erroneously Admitted Evidence 
¶53 The record reflects that there was very little 
evidence to corroborate or contradict Martin's statements.  No 
other 
evidence 
introduced 
at 
trial 
corroborates 
Martin's 
admission that the revolver belonged to him; the best evidence 
the State could provide was that Krentz (the co-owner) and Henry 
(the passenger) denied ownership of the revolver.  In fact, no 
witness at the trial was able to testify that the revolver 
belonged to Martin, or even that Martin knew about the revolver.  
Additionally, the State was unable to provide DNA or fingerprint 
evidence linking Martin——or any other person——to the revolver. 
¶54 While 
there 
is 
little 
to 
corroborate 
Martin's 
statements, there is a significant amount of evidence that 
contradicts his claim of ownership of the revolver.  Smith 
testified that he initially began to arrest Henry, not Martin, 
for possession of the revolver, because he believed that the 
revolver belonged to Henry.  Smith's testimony indicated that he 
began to arrest Henry because he was "sitting basically on top 
of this weapon."  Smith was dissuaded from arresting Henry only 
when Martin interrupted the arrest to admit ownership of the 
revolver.  The only reasonable inference that may be drawn from 
this testimony is that Smith initially believed that Henry, not 
Martin, was responsible for control of the firearm. 
¶55 Further, the testimony of Krentz, a co-owner and 
frequent user of the SUV, and Henry, the passenger who had 
ridden in the SUV multiple times, indicated that neither of them 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
30 
 
had ever seen the tray before the events incident to Martin's 
arrest.  Additionally, both Fidler and Smith testified that the 
tray, while visible, was difficult to see.  Therefore, it would 
not be unreasonable for the jury to have found, absent Martin's 
admission, that no one——Krentz, Henry, or Martin——knew of the 
revolver's existence before the arrest. 
¶56 Accordingly, our review of the record reveals that 
there is little, if any, evidence that corroborates Martin's 
inadmissible testimony, but a significant amount of evidence 
that contradicts his statements. 
4. Whether the Erroneously Admitted Evidence Duplicates 
Untainted Evidence 
¶57 The erroneously admitted evidence does not duplicate 
untainted 
evidence. 
 
In 
short, 
while 
there 
is 
some 
circumstantial evidence that might suggest that the revolver 
belonged to Martin, the record reflects no direct evidence 
introduced at trial to establish that Martin owned the revolver, 
knew the revolver was in the vehicle, or had ever even seen the 
revolver.  The record does not reflect whether Martin admitted 
to possession of the revolver at any other time, and in any 
event, no such evidence was presented to the jury.  Therefore, 
the silence of the record makes it clear that the erroneously 
admitted evidence does not duplicate untainted evidence. 
5. The Nature of the Defense 
¶58 Martin's defense at trial was that he and Krentz had 
purchased the SUV less than two months before the events 
incident to his arrest, and that he had never seen the tray 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
31 
 
before those events.  Therefore, Martin argued, the revolver 
must have been in the tray when he purchased the vehicle, 
unbeknownst to him. 
¶59 The State argued at closing that Martin's argument did 
not make "common sense."  It may or may not be difficult to 
believe that an individual who owns a used SUV for two months 
would be unaware of the presence of contraband located under the 
front passenger seat of the vehicle.  However, absent Martin's 
statements, the State presented no evidence that directly 
contradicted Martin's theory, or that made his theory less 
likely.  In short, most of the admissible evidence is consistent 
with Martin's theory of the case. 
6. The Nature of the State's Case 
¶60 The State's case, as presented to the jury, centered 
on 
Martin's statements.  It is best summarized by the 
prosecutor's 
opening 
statements 
regarding 
the 
felon 
in 
possession charge, where he stated:  
[O]fficers . . . searched the vehicle of [Martin], 
. . . a vehicle which he co-owned with another 
individual.  In that vehicle, you will hear, a .22 
caliber revolver was found under the seat of the 
vehicle.  You will hear questions were asked about 
that weapon.  As a matter of fact, the defendant 
admitted that it was his gun.  He even described the 
weapon when asked the type of weapon it was. 
Clearly, the State's case was focused on Martin's statements. 
¶61 Notably, the State did not present a constructive 
possession argument to the jury at any point.  Instead, the 
State argued that: 1) Martin knew that the revolver was in the 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
32 
 
vehicle, as established by his statements, and 2) the revolver 
belonged to Martin, as established by his statements, and as 
verified by his statements describing the revolver.  Therefore, 
Martin's inadmissible statements comprised the central component 
of the State's case, and the only proof that Martin had knowing 
control over the revolver. 
7. The Overall Strength of the State's Case 
¶62 The strength of the State's case is inextricably tied 
to Martin's statements.  If Martin's statements had been 
properly admitted, the State would have had a strong case that 
established that Martin had knowing control over the revolver, 
and was therefore guilty of the felon in possession of a firearm 
charge. 
¶63 However, absent Martin's statements, the strength of 
the State's case erodes significantly.  Without Martin's 
statements, the State would have had the unenviable task of 
attempting to prove——with no direct evidence——that Martin had 
knowing control of the revolver.  The State could provide no 
other testimony establishing that the revolver belonged to 
Martin, or provide physical evidence (fingerprints or DNA) 
linking the revolver to him.  Therefore, outside of Martin's 
statements, the State's case would be based entirely on the 
circumstantial inferences drawn from Krentz and Henry's denials 
of ownership of the revolver. 
¶64 Essentially, the State would be left arguing that 
because Krentz and Henry both stated that the revolver did not 
belong to them, the revolver must have belonged to Martin.  Yet, 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
33 
 
the State would have to rebut——with little supporting evidence——
the argument that the revolver was in the SUV when Martin 
purchased it, and he simply did not know it was there.  
Therefore, it is apparent that without Martin's statements, the 
State's 
case 
is 
not 
strong 
and 
entirely 
reliant 
on 
circumstantial evidence. 
¶65 To summarize, all of the factors that aid in our 
harmless error analysis direct that the error complained of in 
this case was not harmless.  First, Martin's statements were 
repeatedly used throughout trial.  Second, the State and the 
jury clearly found Martin's statements important; so much so 
that the State based its entire theory of the case on these 
inadmissible statements, and the jury sought clarification on 
them.  Third, there was little evidence that corroborated 
Martin's admission that the revolver was his, but a significant 
amount of evidence contradicted his statement.  Fourth, the 
content of Martin's statements——his admission of guilt——did not 
duplicate otherwise admissible evidence.  Fifth, the nature of 
Martin's defense, while perhaps improbable, was at least 
plausible, and was consistent with most of the admissible 
evidence.  Sixth, the nature of the State's case focused 
entirely on Martin's statements.  Finally, the overall strength 
of the State's case is significantly weaker absent Martin's 
improperly admitted statements. 
¶66 The State contends that these concerns can all be 
overcome 
because 
it 
needed 
to 
prove 
only 
that 
Martin 
constructively possessed the firearm——meaning that he exercised 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
34 
 
knowing control over the revolver——and that it need not prove 
that the revolver belonged to him.  The State argues that it is 
clear that Martin had constructive possession of the revolver 
because Martin was the primary driver of the vehicle and both 
Krentz and Henry denied that the revolver belonged to either of 
them.  Even if the revolver belonged to Henry, the State 
submits, 
Martin 
could 
share 
constructive 
possession 
and 
therefore knowingly control the revolver. 
¶67 While we agree generally with the State's argument 
that it would have needed to prove only constructive possession, 
its argument fails in the context of this case.  For the State 
did not argue constructive possession at trial; it chose to rely 
on 
Martin's 
inadmissible 
statements. 
 
While 
the 
State 
undoubtedly made a tactical decision to rely on Martin's 
statements 
rather 
than 
pursue 
a 
constructive 
possession 
argument, our review is limited to whether it is clear "beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute 
to the verdict obtained."  Anderson, 291 Wis. 2d 673, ¶114; see 
Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶49.  Accordingly, we must evaluate the 
record at trial, absent the testimony regarding Martin's 
improperly admitted statements, to determine whether it is clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted 
Martin.  
¶68 At trial, the State attempted to establish that Martin 
had actual possession of the revolver by proving that he owned 
it.  The State now asks us to evaluate an entirely different 
argument——a constructive possession argument that it did not 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
35 
 
make at trial——to determine whether the jury could have 
convicted Martin.  However, a proper harmless error analysis 
does not extend to whether it is possible, had the State offered 
a different argument on the same facts, that the jury would have 
convicted the defendant.  Instead, the analysis is cabined to 
whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury, 
based on what it heard and saw at trial, would have convicted 
Martin absent the error.  This is so because all seven factors 
that we have evaluated to determine whether an error is harmless 
relate to what was actually presented at trial, not what the 
parties could have presented at trial.  Accordingly, we cannot 
decide that harmless error did not occur based on an argument 
not presented to the jury. 
¶69 In summary, the record "underscore[s] the importance 
of the admitted evidence."  Stuart, 279 Wis. 2d 659, ¶57.  In 
light of the foregoing, there is reason to doubt whether the 
jury, hearing only the evidence at trial absent the error, would 
have convicted Martin on the felon in possession of a firearm 
count.  Therefore, the State has not met its burden of 
demonstrating that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the jury would have convicted on the felon in possession charge 
Martin absent the error.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
error in this case——the admission of Martin's statements taken 
No. 
2010AP505-CR   
 
36 
 
in violation of Miranda——is not harmless as it relates to the 
felon in possession charge.26 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
¶70 Because Martin made incriminating statements while in 
police custody and while being subjected to interrogation by 
police officers, we conclude that he had a Fifth Amendment right 
to receive Miranda warnings.  Accordingly, we hold that it was 
error to admit the incriminating statements at trial.  Further, 
we hold that because the State has not met its burden of proving 
that it is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury 
would have found the defendant guilty absent the error," Harvey, 
254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶49 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 18), the error 
was not harmless.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals and remand the cause for a new trial. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for a 
new trial. 
 
                                                 
26 However, the error was harmless with respect to the 
concealed weapons charge because all of the evidence relating to 
that charge remains admissible.  Further, neither party has 
argued the validity of that conviction. 
No.  2010AP505-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶71 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the majority's conclusions that there was a Miranda 
violation in the present case and that the error in failing to 
suppress the defendant's statements taken in violation of 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was not harmless. 
¶72 I write separately to briefly elaborate on the 
majority's discussion of "custody" for purposes of Miranda and 
to make a couple of cautionary points.  See majority op., ¶¶33-
35.1 
¶73 Whether a suspect is "in custody" for purposes of 
Miranda is a fact-specific inquiry that depends on a variety of 
factors.2  The overarching question, as the majority notes at 
¶33, is whether "a reasonable person would not feel free to 
terminate the interview and leave the scene." 
¶74 Despite 
the 
overarching 
question, 
it 
is 
well 
established that police may conduct brief stops of individuals, 
such as traffic stops, during which a reasonable suspect would 
not feel free to leave, but which do not require Miranda 
                                                 
1 The majority's holding in ¶¶33-35 is simply that when an 
officer arrests a suspect, the suspect is necessarily "in 
custody" for purposes of Miranda. 
2 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 6.6(c) (3d ed. 2000) 
("[A] determination of whether the situation was 'custodial' for 
Miranda purposes will often require a careful examination of all 
the circumstances of the particular case."). 
No.  2010AP505-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
warnings.3  If, however, "other factors indicate the presence of 
a coercive atmosphere," the suspect is considered to be "in 
custody" for purposes of Miranda.4   
¶75 Each case must be decided on its own unique facts.  
Law enforcement officers may decide to use handcuffs to protect 
themselves and maintain order during some brief detentions.  In 
such cases, courts should consider the use of handcuffs as a 
factor in determining the coerciveness of the atmosphere and in 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).  See 
also Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 6.6(c) (3d ed. 2000) 
("Under Berkemer, the question is not whether a reasonable 
person would believe he was not free to leave, but rather 
whether such a person would believe he was in police custody of 
the degree associated with formal arrest.").  
4 See The Georgetown Law Journal's Thirty-Sixth Annual 
Review of Criminal Procedure 173-74 (2007). 
The majority at ¶34 n.23 provides the following quote from 
a Fourth Circuit case:  "[D]rawing weapons, handcuffing a 
suspect, placing a suspect in a patrol car for questioning, or 
using or threatening to use force does not necessarily elevate a 
lawful stop into a custodial arrest for Miranda purposes."  
United States. v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (4th Cir. 1995). 
Leshuk was not describing a single case in which all of 
those factors were present and yet the suspect was not "in 
custody" for purposes of Miranda.  Rather, Leshuk compiled the 
fact situations and holdings from a number of prior cases.  In 
Leshuk itself, the officers did not draw their weapons, did not 
handcuff the suspects, did not place the suspect in a patrol 
car, and did not use or threaten to use force.  The Leshuk court 
concluded that the officers' conduct was "neither coercive nor 
intimidating."  Leshuk, 65 F.3d at 1110.   
Additionally, Leshuk's reference to "custodial arrest for 
Miranda purposes" makes it somewhat unclear whether the court 
was applying Fourth Amendment standards relating to arrest or 
Fifth Amendment standards relating to custody.  
No.  2010AP505-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
determining whether the brief detention should be considered 
"custody" for purposes of Miranda and the Fifth Amendment.  
¶76 Complicating 
matters, 
these 
brief 
detentions 
may 
implicate Fourth Amendment requirements regarding arrests as 
well as Miranda's Fifth Amendment rule.  The Fourth Amendment 
"arrest" standard and the Fifth Amendment "in custody" standard 
are related, but not identical.  Although a suspect who is 
arrested is necessarily "in custody" for purposes of Miranda, 
the converse is not always true.  It is possible for a suspect 
to be "in custody" for purposes of Miranda without being 
arrested.  See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 
907, 909 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding, on the one hand, that "the 
cuffing did not convert the Terry stop into an arrest" and 
holding, on the other hand, that "we find [the defendant] was in 
custody at the time he was handcuffed"). 
¶77 It is possible that some past cases have cited Fourth 
Amendment cases while deciding Fifth Amendment issues or cited 
Fifth Amendment cases while deciding Fourth Amendment issues.5  
Going forward, this court should be cautious to avoid conflating 
closely related constitutional standards and analyses. 
¶78 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
                                                 
5 For example, United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1236 
(9th Cir. 1981) held that "[h]andcuffing a suspect does not 
necessarily dictate a finding of custody" (emphasis added).  
Yet, for that proposition, Booth cited United States v. Purry, 
545 F.2d 217, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1976), which was a case asking 
whether a suspect was arrested without probable cause.  Purry 
did not cite Miranda once or discuss the meaning of "in custody" 
for purposes of Miranda. 
No.  2010AP505-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶79 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority 
opinion 
with 
the 
exception 
of 
footnote 
23.  
Unfortunately, that footnote detracts from what is otherwise a 
very good opinion.    
 
No.  2010AP505-CR.awb 
 
1