Title: Bowers v. P. Wile's, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11923
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 28, 2016

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SJC-11923 
 
LINDA S. BOWERS  vs.  P. WILE'S, INC.1 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     January 7, 2016. - July 28, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ.2 
 
 
Negligence, Retailer.  Practice, Civil, Summary judgment. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
February 24, 2012. 
 
 
The case was heard by Paul D. Wilson, J. on a motion for 
summary judgment, and a motion to vacate judgment was also heard 
by him. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.  
 
 
 
Joseph T. Black for the defendant. 
 
David McCormack for the plaintiff. 
 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
William P. Mekrut for Massachusetts Defense Lawyers' 
Association. 
 
Carol A. Kelly for Property Casualty Insurers Association 
                                                 
1 Doing business as Agway of Cape Cod. 
 
 
2 Justice Duffly participated in the deliberation on this 
case and authored this opinion prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
of America. 
 
Annette Gonthier Kiely, Michael C. Najjar, Tomas R. Murphy, 
& Elizabeth N. Mulvey for Massachusetts Academy of Trial 
Attorneys. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  In this case we are called upon to determine 
whether the "mode of operation" approach to premises liability,  
see Sarkisian v. Concept Restaurants, Inc., 471 Mass. 679, 683 
(2015) (Sarkisian), and Sheehan v. Roche Bros. Supermkts., Inc., 
448 Mass. 780, 788 (2007) (Sheehan), is applicable with respect 
to the operation of a garden store.  The plaintiff, Linda 
Bowers, suffered a displaced fracture of her right hip after she 
slipped and fell on a walkway leading into a Cape Cod garden 
store owned by the defendant, P. Wile's, Inc., doing business as 
Agway of Cape Cod (Agway).  Agway maintains what the parties 
refer to as a "gravel area" near the concrete walkway leading 
into the store, where landscaping items are displayed for sale.  
Customers may enter the gravel area, which consists of small 
stones less than one inch in diameter,3 and shop for products 
displayed there without assistance from any Agway employee. 
After she fell on Agway's premises, Bowers filed a 
complaint in the Superior Court asserting that she tripped on a 
stone that had migrated from the gravel area to the walkway, and 
that Agway knew that the movement of the stones from the gravel 
                                                 
3 The parties stipulate that these stones are "river 
stones," and are roughly three-fourths of an inch in size; 
"river stone" is not otherwise described. 
3 
 
area created a risk of tripping on the walkway, but failed to 
take reasonable steps to mitigate that risk.  Agway moved for 
summary judgment, arguing that, under the traditional theory of 
premises liability, where a foreign object is temporarily on a 
defendant's premises, Bowers would be required to prove Agway's 
actual or constructive notice of the presence of the stone on 
the walkway, which she concedes she is unable to do, because she 
does not know how the stone came to be on the walkway, nor how 
long it had been there when she tripped and fell.  See Sheehan, 
448 Mass. at 782-783, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 
(1965). 
Bowers argued that, notwithstanding an inability to prevail 
under a traditional theory of premises liability, she could 
prevail by applying a mode of operation analysis.  Bowers 
contends that, under this approach, she could establish that 
Agway had notice that the stone was present because Agway uses a 
self-service gravel area as part of its daily operation, and was 
aware that customers walking in the area to pick up items for 
purchase might dislodge stones onto the walkway.4  See Sheehan, 
supra. 
Concluding that the mode of operation approach is not 
                                                 
4 A self-service operation is one characterized by customers 
being permitted to take products for sale from displays without 
employee assistance.  See Sarkisian v. Concept Restaurants, 
Inc., 471 Mass. 679, 682 (2015) (Sarkisian); Sheehan v. Roche 
Bros. Supermkts., Inc., 448 Mass. 780, 784-786 (2007) (Sheehan). 
4 
 
applicable in these circumstances, a Superior Court judge 
granted Agway's motion for summary judgment.  In a divided 
opinion, the Appeals Court reversed.  See Bowers v. P. Wile's, 
Inc., 87 Mass. App. Ct. 362, 363 (2015).  We allowed Agway's 
motion for further appellate review, and conclude that the mode 
of operation analysis is applicable in the circumstances here.5 
1.  Background.  We recite the undisputed facts from the 
summary judgment record, viewed in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party.  See LeBlanc v. Logan Hilton Joint Venture, 
463 Mass. 316, 318 (2012); Mammone v. President & Fellows of 
Harvard College, 446 Mass. 657, 659-660 (2006).  On a December 
afternoon in 2011, Bowers went to one of Agway's garden stores 
on Cape Cod to shop.  She approached the store on a walkway that 
runs between the parking lot and the store.  The six-foot wide 
gravel area, made up of "river stones," is adjacent to this 
walkway.  Agway displays landscaping merchandise for sale in 
this area, and customers may help themselves to products there.6  
                                                 
5 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, the Property Casualty 
Insurers Association of America, and the Massachusetts Defense 
Lawyers' Association. 
 
6 The dissent describes the gravel area as a walkway that 
customers may use "to enter the self-service area of the store," 
and concludes that "customers' ability to help themselves to 
goods . . . did not factor into the condition at issue here."  
Post at    .  But, as Agway concedes, and as the judge found, 
the gravel area is not a walkway leading to a separate self-
service area.  Rather, as deposition testimony and photographic 
5 
 
While walking on the walkway adjacent to the gravel area, Bowers 
tripped on one of the stones that apparently had migrated onto 
the walkway; she did not see the stone before she fell.  As a 
result of the fall, Bowers suffered a displaced fracture of her 
right hip that required two surgical repairs.  Immediately after 
Bowers fell, an Agway employee, who had come outside to assist 
her, kicked several stones from the walkway into the gravel 
area. 
Agway had installed the gravel area as part of its 
installation of a porch addition to the front of the garden 
store.  Although Agway considered planting grass in this area, 
it instead chose to use gravel.  The gravel area had been in 
place for fifteen years without any previous complaints of a 
customer having fallen due to the presence of the stones.  
Nonetheless, prior to Bowers' fall, Agway was aware that stones 
could be dislodged by people walking in the gravel area, and 
could end up on the walkway, creating a potential tripping 
hazard.7  As a result, Agway had developed a practice of having 
                                                                                                                                                             
exhibits establish, the gravel area is in fact a self-service 
area in which Agway displays items for sale, and which customers 
may enter to select items for purchase without employee 
assistance.  The items that Agway displays in the gravel area 
include pottery, shovels, rakes, soil, and mulch, as well as 
plants in small containers. 
 
7 A store manager testified during her deposition that there 
was a "general consensus" to keep an eye on the gravel area in 
part because the stones could "create a tripping hazard." 
6 
 
employees inspect the walkway to make sure that it was free of 
stones.  The practice was informal, and there was no set 
schedule under which employees were to check the walkway.  
Rather, employees would check the walkway throughout the day, as 
they went outside to assist customers, or for other reasons 
during the course of their work. 
2.  Discussion.  We review a decision on a motion for 
summary judgment de novo.  See LeBlanc v. Logan Hilton Joint 
Venture, 463 Mass. at 318.  Summary judgment for the defendant 
is not appropriate if "anywhere in the evidence, from whatever 
source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found 
from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the 
plaintiff [as the nonmoving party]" (citation omitted).  Mullins 
v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 56 (1983).  Ordinarily, 
questions of negligence are for the trier of fact; only when no 
rational view of the evidence would warrant a finding of 
negligence is the question appropriate for summary judgment.  
See Petrell v. Shaw, 453 Mass. 377, 381 (2009). 
A business owes a "duty to a paying patron to use 
reasonable care to prevent injury to him by third persons," 
Sweenor v. 162 State St., Inc., 361 Mass. 524, 526 (1972), and 
"to keep [its] premises in a reasonably safe condition for [its] 
visitors' use."  Jaillet v. Godfried Home Bakeries, Inc., 354 
Mass. 267, 268 (1968), quoting LeBlanc v. Atlantic Bldg. & 
7 
 
Supply Co., 323 Mass. 702, 705 (1949).  To find a retail store 
liable for a plaintiff's injuries incurred as a result of a 
dangerous condition on the premises not caused or created by the 
store, a jury must find that the store (1) knew of, or, by 
exercise of reasonable care would have discovered, the dangerous 
condition; (2) the condition created an unreasonable risk of 
harm; (3) the store could not have expected the plaintiff to 
discover or protect herself against the potential harm; and (4) 
the store failed to exercise reasonable care to protect the 
plaintiff.  See Deagle v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 343 Mass. 
263, 264-265 (1961). 
Here, it is undisputed that Agway owns the walkway on which 
Bowers fell, and owed her a duty of "reasonable care" with 
respect to its condition.  See Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 457 
Mass. 368, 372 (2010).  This case revolves around the extent to 
which Agway had notice of a potentially hazardous, temporary 
condition created by a stone that had migrated to the walkway.  
See Sarkisian, 471 Mass. at 684. 
Under the traditional approach to premises liability, a 
plaintiff can establish that a business had actual or 
constructive notice of a temporary hazard.  Constructive notice 
can be established by evidence indicating the length of time the 
hazard was on the walkway.  See Oliveri v. Massachusetts Bay 
Transp. Auth., 363 Mass. 165, 166 (1973).  Using this analysis, 
8 
 
Bowers would be required to establish notice by showing that 
Agway (1) put the stone on the walkway, (2) knew it was on the 
walkway, or (3) had constructive knowledge that the stone was on 
the walkway because such notice could be established where, 
based on the length of time the stone had been on the walkway, 
Agway should have discovered it.  See id. 
Bowers does not assert that Agway placed the stone on the 
walkway.  She also does not suggest that she has any knowledge 
of how long the stone was on the walkway.  Accordingly, under 
the traditional theory of premises liability, Bowers cannot 
establish Agway's actual or constructive knowledge of the 
presence of the stone on the walkway, because she cannot show 
that Agway had sufficient time to become aware of and remedy the 
condition.  See Gallagher v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 332 Mass. 560, 
563 (1955).  Bowers argues, however, that her claim should be 
viewed under the mode of operation approach, and that, under 
such an approach, summary judgment should not have been granted. 
a.  Scope of mode of operation approach.  The mode of 
operation approach recognizes that a proprietor's manner of 
operation can create foreseeable hazards that might arise 
through the actions of third parties, thus obligating the 
proprietor to take all reasonable precautions necessary to 
9 
 
protect against those foreseeable hazards.8  Sheehan, 448 Mass. 
at 786.  Under this analysis, a plaintiff may survive a motion 
for summary judgment by establishing that a business reasonably 
should have anticipated that "its chosen method of operation 
[would] regularly invite third-party interference resulting in 
the creation of unsafe conditions," and that the plaintiff was 
injured "after encountering the condition so created."  
Sarkisian, 471 Mass. at 684, citing Sheehan, supra at 791.  
Whether an entity's mode of operation makes a dangerous 
condition reasonably foreseeable ordinarily is a question for 
the finder of fact.  See Massachusetts Superior Court Civil 
Practice Jury Instructions § 2.3.8 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 3d 
ed. 2014). 
The mode of operation approach "removes the burden on the 
victim of a slip and fall to prove that the owner or the owner's 
employees had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous 
condition or to prove the exact failure that caused the 
accident."  Sheehan, supra at 790.  Instead, a "plaintiff 
satisfies the notice requirement if he establishes that an 
injury was attributable to a reasonably foreseeable dangerous 
                                                 
8 See Hetzel v. Jewel Cos., 457 F.2d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 
1972), cited in Sheehan, 448 Mass. at 789 ("We believe that 
proof of constructive notice to a possessor of land of the 
existence of a dangerous condition is properly accomplished 
where it is shown that the specific condition at issue, though 
transitory, is a part of a known and continuing or recurrent 
condition"). 
10 
 
condition on the owner's premises that is related to the 
owner's . . . mode of operation."  Id. at 786.  Cf. Jackson v. 
K-Mart Corp., 251 Kan. 700, 702, 709 (1992) (mode of operation 
approach "looks to a business's choice of a particular mode of 
operation and not events surrounding the plaintiff's accident," 
and permits customer to recover for injuries "due to a condition 
inherent in the way the store is operated" [citation omitted]).  
The approach developed as a means of addressing cases in which 
an entity's manner of operating its business makes the regular 
occurrence of dangerous conditions caused by customer action 
reasonably foreseeable, but where an injured customer often 
would be unable to obtain relief for an injury stemming from 
such foreseeable conditions under traditional premises 
liability, which requires "notice of the specific dangerous 
condition itself and not . . . general notice of conditions 
producing the dangerous condition."  See Chiara v. Fry's Food 
Stores of Ariz. Inc., 152 Ariz. 398, 400 (1987) ("person injured 
in a supermarket will rarely be able to trace the origins of the 
accident"). 
The mode of operation approach is based on the theory that 
customers interacting with products for sale, without the 
assistance of store employees, 
"generally may not be as careful and vigilant as a store 
owner because customers are not focused on the owner's 
concern of keeping items off the floor to avoid potential 
11 
 
foreseeable risks of harm to other patrons. . . .  [I]t 
[would be] 'unjust to saddle the plaintiff with the burden 
of isolating the precise failure' that caused an injury, 
particularly where a plaintiff's injury results from a 
foreseeable risk of harm stemming from an owner's mode of 
operation." 
 
Sheehan, 448 Mass. at 784-785, 788.  In such circumstances, a 
store "owner has scarce incentive to act reasonably, because the 
injured patron will seldom be able to discern the origin of the 
unsafe condition and, thus, satisfy the notice requirement under 
the traditional approach to premises liability."  Sarkisian, 471 
Mass. at 686.  See Golba v. Kohl's Dep't Store, Inc., 585 N.E.2d 
14, 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).  Therefore, where the manner of 
operation of a business creates a reasonably foreseeable risk of 
a hazardous condition, the approach permits a plaintiff to 
recover for injuries resulting from such conditions if the 
plaintiff establishes that the business did not take all 
"adequate steps" reasonably necessary under the circumstances to 
protect patrons against that risk.  Sheehan, supra at 790.  See 
Sarkisian, supra at 687.  Cf. Jackson v. K-Mart Corp., 251 Kan. 
at 710-711. 
We have emphasized that the mode of operation approach 
"does not make the owner of a self-service . . . store an 
insurer against all accidents."  See Sheehan, 448 Mass. at 790.  
The approach does not eliminate the other elements of premises 
liability; a plaintiff is "still required to prove that the 
12 
 
defendant failed to take reasonable measures commensurate with 
the risks involved . . . to prevent injury" and "that the 
defendant acted unreasonably" in the circumstances.  Id. at 786-
787.  Indeed, "nearly every business enterprise produces some 
risk of customer interference," and, in the absence of limiting 
principles, "[a] plaintiff could get to the jury in most cases 
simply by presenting proof that a store's customer could have 
conceivabl[y] produced the hazardous condition."  Chiara v. 
Fry's Food Stores of Ariz., Inc., 152 Ariz. at 400-401. 
Accordingly, we have required a plaintiff to establish a 
"particular" mode of operation that makes the hazardous 
condition foreseeable,9 and a "recurring feature of the mode of 
operation," rather than one where the risk only "conceivabl[y]" 
could arise from the mode of operation.  See Sarkisian, 471 
Mass. at 684, 687.  See also Chiara v. Fry's Food Stores of 
Ariz., 152 Ariz. at 401; Jackson v. K-Mart Corp., 251 Kan. at 
710 (mode of operation approach applies only if commercial 
entity "could reasonably foresee that the dangerous condition 
                                                 
9 Cf. Jasko v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 177 Colo. 418, 420 (1972) 
("practice of extensive selling of slices of pizza on waxed 
paper to customers who consume it while standing creates the 
reasonable probability that food will drop to the floor"); 
Fisher v. Big Y Foods, Inc., 298 Conn. 414, 426-427 (2010) 
(approach triggered by "showing that a more specific method of 
operation within a self-service retail environment gave rise" to 
hazardous condition); Pimentel v. Roundup Co., 100 Wash. 2d 39, 
49-50 (1983) (approach applies "if the particular self-service 
operation of the defendant is shown to be such that the 
existence of unsafe conditions is reasonably foreseeable"). 
13 
 
would regularly occur").  In addition, as noted, even where a 
plaintiff is able to prove notice through a defendant's mode of 
operation that a dangerous condition was reasonably foreseeable, 
that alone does not establish liability.  A plaintiff still must 
establish that the steps the defendant took to protect customers 
from the condition that resulted in the injury were unreasonable 
in the circumstances.  See Sarkisian, supra at 683-684. 
b.  Bowers's mode of operations claim.  To succeed in her 
mode of operation claim, Bowers has the burden to establish that 
(1) the risk that customers would dislodge stones from the 
gravel area onto the walkway was reasonably foreseeable; (2) it 
was reasonably foreseeable that stones lying on the walkway 
would present a tripping hazard to customers walking on the 
walkway adjacent to the gravel area; and (3) the steps Agway 
took to protect customers from the potential hazard of tripping 
on the stones were unreasonable.  Viewed in the light most 
favorable to Bowers, she has established a genuine question of 
material fact with respect to each of these issues. 
Based on the summary judgment record, there is a disputed 
question of fact whether Agway's choice of gravel rather than 
another, nonmobile surface, such as the grass it had considered 
for its self-service area, which is adjacent to the walkway 
leading to the main entrance to the store, represents a 
"particular" mode of operation of the self-service area that 
14 
 
makes the reoccurring hazard of stones on the walkway, after 
customers have walked through the self-service area, 
foreseeable.10  The store manager testified at deposition that 
Agway maintained an informal policy of having employees check 
the walkway whenever an employee was outside assisting a 
customer in the gravel area, or performing other work, 
approximately every fifteen minutes, at least in part due to 
concerns that stones might come to rest on the walkway as a 
result of customers walking in and around the gravel area.11  
Thus, there is a genuine question of material fact whether the 
risk of dislodged stones from customers walking in the gravel 
area in order to look at and select items for purchase was not 
just a "conceivable" risk, but, rather, a recurring risk created 
by Agway's mode of operation.  See Sarkisian, 471 Mass. at 684, 
687 (deposition testimony of nightclub manager that "spills on 
the dance floor are part of the business").  Cf. Chiara v. Fry's 
                                                 
10 In a case in which a customer in a home improvement store 
was injured by a paint can that fell onto her foot from a 
display of stacked paint cans, for instance, the Washington 
State Supreme Court concluded that a mode of operation analysis 
was applicable, because the stacked paint cans overhung the 
display shelf, and the plaintiff's expert testified at 
deposition that the manner in which the can that fell on the 
plaintiff's foot had been stacked would have made it "extremely 
unstable" to the point where "the slightest vibration might 
overbalance it."  See Pimentel v. Roundup Co., 100 Wash. 2d at 
41, 49-50. 
 
11 As noted, it is undisputed that an Agway employee 
observed several stones on the walkway when he went to Bowers' 
aid after she fell. 
15 
 
Food Stores of Ariz., Inc., supra at 401; Fisher v. Big Y Foods, 
Inc., 298 Conn. 414, 426-427 (2010). 
If a jury were to conclude that Agway's maintenance of the 
gravel area was a mode of operation that created a foreseeable 
risk that customers would dislodge stones onto the walkway, 
which, according to its manager, Agway viewed as a potential 
tripping hazard, there would be a further question of material 
fact whether Agway's efforts to protect customers from the 
presence of stones on the walkway were reasonable in the 
circumstances.  The jury then would have to determine whether 
Agway's policy of informal but periodic inspection of the 
walkway by employees, approximately every fifteen minutes, was a 
reasonable means by which to protect customers from the risk 
created by the migrating stones.12  See G.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Falmouth Marine, Inc., 410 Mass. 262, 272 (1991). 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgment in favor of the defendant is 
vacated and set aside, and the matter is remanded to the 
Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                 
12 Bowers asserts also that, even if the periodic inspection 
was reasonable, the record would support a conclusion that the 
policy was not followed on the day of her injury.  If so, that 
question would be for the fact finder on remand. 
 
CORDY, J. (dissenting).  I disagree with what I believe is 
an overly broad expansion of the heretofore narrowly applicable 
mode of operation approach to premises liability.  Because the 
defendant's chosen method of operation -- a "gravel area" located 
adjacent to an outdoor self-service portico1 -- does not 
regularly invite third-party interference in any way previously 
recognized by this court as an exception to traditional premises 
liability, and because I agree with the court that the 
plaintiff's claim fails under the traditional approach, ante 
at    , I respectfully dissent.  In my opinion, the order 
allowing the motion for summary judgment should be affirmed. 
 
Massachusetts has "[h]istorically . . . followed the 
traditional approach governing premises liability."  Sheehan v. 
Roche Bros. Supermkts., Inc., 448 Mass. 780, 783 (2007).  Under 
that approach, a store owner is required to maintain his or her 
property "in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the 
circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the 
seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk" 
(citation omitted).  Id. at 783-784.  "[T]he law has afforded 
                                                 
 
1 What items were for sale at the self-service section of 
the portico on the day on which the defendant fell is not clear 
from the record.  The plaintiff testified that, before her fall, 
she was distracted by a bird bath.  The photograph that is part 
of the record displays large stone and clay bird baths.  While 
not necessary to my conclusion, I note only that heavy objects 
such as bird baths, though seemingly part of a self-service 
operation, are not properly characterized as self-service items 
if employer assistance is required in their purchase. 
2 
 
store owners a reasonable opportunity to discover and correct any 
hazards before liability attaches."  Id. at 784.  We have thus 
held that, unless an exception to the general rule applies, 
"premises liability attaches only if a store owner has actual or 
constructive notice of the existence of the dangerous condition, 
sufficient to allow time for the owner to remedy the condition."  
Id. 
 
In Sheehan, we adopted one such exception, the "mode of 
operation" approach to premises liability, id. at 788, 
subsequently expanded in Sarkisian v. Concept Restaurants, Inc., 
471 Mass. 679, 684-685 (2015), applicable "to situations where a 
business should reasonably anticipate that its chosen method of 
operation will regularly invite third-party interference 
resulting in the creation of unsafe conditions, and a visitor 
suffers an injury after encountering the condition so created."  
Rather than supplanting the traditional approach entirely, the 
mode of operation approach was adopted to "refine[] the 
Restatement's notice requirement in a narrow subset of premises 
liability cases," only applying under "circumstances in which 
strict application of the traditional approach's notice 
requirement [would] produce unjust results."  Id. at 682-683. 
 
The exception was intended to be narrow because, as we have 
observed in the past, "'nearly every business enterprise produces 
some risk of customer interference,' and, in the absence of 
3 
 
limiting principles, '[a] plaintiff could get to the jury in most 
cases simply by presenting proof that a store's customer could 
have conceivably produced the hazardous condition."  Id. at 684, 
quoting Chiara v. Fry's Food Stores of Ariz., Inc., 152 Ariz. 
398, 400-401 (1987).  As a result, Massachusetts courts have 
routinely applied two limiting principles in considering whether 
to subject a given case to the mode of operation approach, both 
of which dictate a dismissal in the present case. 
 
First, Massachusetts courts have, until now, applied the 
mode of operation approach exclusively in "spillage and breakage" 
cases, and those in which a customer is injured by a product or 
item either for sale on the premises or contemplated to be 
carried around the business.  See, e.g., Sarkisian, 471 Mass. at 
682 (spilled drinks); Sheehan, 448 Mass. at 781-782 (spilled 
grape).  The hallmark of our mode of operation approach is that 
customers interacting with products for sale "may not be as 
careful and vigilant as a store owner."  Sheehan, supra at 784-
785.  Implicit in that concept is the assumption that business 
owners, by virtue of their method of operation, should be liable 
when their customers are negligent in relation to the products 
that were traditionally only handled by store owners and store 
employees.  See id. at 784 (store owners are "thus require[d] 
. . . to use a degree of care commensurate with the risks 
involved").  This distinction is a practical one; an employer 
4 
 
should not be expected reasonably to detect or protect against 
the spillage of products not for sale or intended to be picked up 
and carried by third parties. 
 
Indeed, all of the cases cited by the court (as well as 
those on which we relied in adopting the mode of operation 
approach in Sheehan) concern injuries that stemmed from items 
that the purveyor invited and intended third parties to pick up 
and carry around the establishment, resulting in an injury when 
third parties caused such items to spill or break.  Such a 
limitation ensures, as we have emphasized, that the mode of 
operation approach, otherwise allowing the substitution of 
reasonable anticipation in lieu of traditional premises 
liability's notice requirement, "does not make the owner of a 
self-service . . . store an insurer against all accidents."  Id. 
at 790.  In contrast to those cases, the object on which the 
plaintiff was injured in the present case was not offered for 
sale by the defendant, nor could it have rationally been 
contemplated as something that would be carried around by third 
parties. 
 
Second, an injured plaintiff is required to demonstrate a 
causal nexus between the defendant's method of operation and the 
dangerous condition that allegedly led to his or her injury.  
See, e.g., Sarkisian, 471 Mass. at 684, 687; Sheehan, 448 Mass. 
at 781-782, 786 (mode of operations approach's application 
5 
 
limited to "reasonably foreseeable dangerous condition[s] on the 
owner's premise that [are] related to the owner's self-service 
mode of operation" [emphasis added]).  See also Curet v. 
Walgreens Co., 85 Mass. App. Ct. 1119 (2014).  The object causing 
the injury must not only be one that the business owner invited 
the customer to carry around the store, but also be on the 
premises because of the business owner's self-service operation. 
 
The fact that the defendant's customers were allowed to use 
the gravel strip in question to enter the self-service area of 
the store does not turn this case into a mode of operation 
inquiry akin to anything any appellate court in Massachusetts, or 
anywhere else in the country, has deemed appropriate for a mode 
of operation inquiry.  The customers' ability to help themselves 
to goods, as opposed to being assisted by store employees, did 
not factor into the condition at issue here.  See Tavernese v. 
Shaw's Supermkts., Inc., 72 Mass. App. Ct. 1107 (2008).  Indeed, 
"there was simply no evidence that the presence of [the river 
stone] on the [sidewalk] was in any way connected to [the 
defendant's] self-service mode of operation."  Curet, supra. 
 
My concern is that the court's expansion of the mode of 
operation approach to include claims like that in the present 
case unnecessarily widens the scope of liability for business 
owners without any reasonable opportunity to discover and correct 
potentially dangerous conditions.  The defendant was not inviting 
6 
 
third parties to interact with the gravel area in question in any 
way other than as a potential ingress and egress to and from the 
portico.  Put another way, had the exterior design of the 
defendant's store been the exact same, absent any products 
displayed outside, an injury caused by a meandering river stone 
absolutely would be considered under our traditional premises 
liability jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Oliveri v. Massachusetts Bay 
Transp. Auth., 363 Mass. 165, 166 (1973). 
 
The court's holding ostensibly opens up any architectural 
decision made by self-service retail store owners to an 
application of the mode of operation approach:  If a customer is 
injured in the parking lot of a self-service establishment, was 
the type of cement used part of the property owner's method of 
operation?  If a customer of a supermarket trips on exposed 
linoleum flooring, is the surface part of the property owner's 
method of operation?  In my opinion, the traditional premises 
liability test remains the accepted jurisprudence for determining 
such disputes, even for self-service retailers, except under 
narrow circumstances not present in this case.  See, e.g., Jasko 
v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 177 Colo. 418, 420 (1972) (approach not 
triggered by self-service alone, but by specific "method of 
sale":  "practice of extensive selling of slices of pizza on 
waxed paper to customers who consume it while standing creates 
the reasonable probability that food will drop to the floor"); 
7 
 
Fisher v. Big Y Foods, Inc., 298 Conn. 414, 426-427 (2010) 
(concluding that mode of operations approach is not triggered by 
self-service alone but rather by "[an] additional showing that a 
more specific method of operation within a self-service retail 
environment gave rise" to dangerous condition); Pimentel v. 
Roundup Co., 100 Wash. 2d 39, 49-50 (1983) (declining to adopt 
rule that notice requirement is eliminated as matter of law for 
self-service establishments, while concluding approach applies 
only "if the particular self-service operation of the defendant 
is shown to be such that the existence of unsafe conditions is 
reasonably foreseeable").  The court's holding substantially and 
unrecognizably expands our limited exception from traditional 
premises liability, such that the exception threatens to swallow 
the rule entirely. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the grant of 
summary judgment to the defendant here was warranted.  See 
Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 56 (1983).