Title: Ex parte Jeffrey Varoff.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1210235
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: December 2, 2022

Rel: December 2, 2022 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
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errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023 
 
_________________________ 
 
1210235 
_________________________ 
 
Ex parte Jeffrey Varoff 
 
  PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
 
(In re: Clifford Bufford 
 
v. 
 
 Ed Bledsoe et al.) 
 
(Lee Circuit Court, CV-19-900125) 
 
 
 
 
1210235 
2 
 
MITCHELL, Justice. 
 
After Clifford Bufford, an employee of Borbet Alabama, Inc., injured 
his left arm in a workplace accident, he sued seven of his co-employees 
claiming that his injury was the result of their willful conduct.  The co-
employees sought summary judgment, arguing that they were immune 
from suit under Alabama's Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"), § 25-
5-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, because, they said, there was no evidence to 
support Bufford's claims.  Bufford voluntarily dismissed his claims 
against all the defendants except the petitioner, maintenance supervisor 
Jeffrey Varoff.  The Lee Circuit Court then denied Varoff's motion for 
summary judgment.  He now asks this Court for a writ of mandamus 
directing the trial court to enter judgment in his favor on the basis of the 
immunity afforded by the Act.  We grant the petition and issue the writ. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
Bufford worked as a maintenance technician at the Borbet wheel-
manufacturing facility in Auburn for about 12 years.  One of his duties 
was servicing the recycling system that transformed metal chips and 
shavings created during manufacturing back into usable material.  As 
part of that recycling process, scrap metal was deposited into the 
1210235 
3 
 
recycling system, where it was cleaned and sorted before entering the 
VSS300, a large box-shaped machine with an auger at the bottom.  The 
auger and a vacuum then pulled the scrap metal through the VSS300 as 
the metal continued on toward the foundry, where it was melted down 
and purified. 
 
The VSS300 stopped working with some regularity; Bufford says 
that he typically had to service it two or three times a week.  A common 
problem for the VSS300 was a clog causing a loss of suction around the 
auger.  Employees remedied this by turning off the power to the system 
at the main panel, then removing the lid of the VSS300 and manually 
removing the scrap metal and any foreign objects that might be creating 
the clog.  The employee then turned the power to the system back on at 
the main panel and returned to the VSS300 to verify whether the system 
now had suction.  If suction was restored, the employee then turned off 
the power again and replaced the VSS300's lid before powering the 
system on a final time and placing the recycling system back online. 
 
On the day of his accident, Bufford was notified by radio that the 
VSS300 needed servicing.  When he went to the machine, he recognized 
that it was clogged.  He therefore shut off the power at the main panel 
1210235 
4 
 
and began removing material from the machine.1  Once he was done, he 
turned the power back on and returned to the VSS300 to determine if 
suction had been restored.  While looking into the machine, he rested his 
left arm on the edge so that he could peer in and listen for the vacuum.  
Somehow, Bufford's sleeve was caught by the auger's tip and his arm was 
pulled into the machine, where it was twisted and cut by the auger.  
Bufford suffered injuries to his hand and forearm that have since 
required multiple surgeries. 
 
Bufford filed a claim against Borbet for workers' compensation 
benefits; that claim was ultimately settled.  Those benefits are generally 
an employee's only remedy for an on-the-job injury, see § 25-5-53, Ala. 
Code 1975, but Bufford later sued seven of his co-employees under § 25-
5-11(b), Ala. Code 1975, which provides an exception to that rule when 
an employee's injuries are caused by a co-employee's "willful conduct."  
Bufford specifically alleged that his co-employees had committed willful 
conduct "by removing and/or altering the safety guards and devices on 
the VSS300 machine and knowingly requiring [him] to perform his job 
 
1The lid was already off the VSS300 when Bufford arrived; the 
materials before us do not indicate who removed it. 
1210235 
5 
 
duties without this equipment."  See § 25-5-11(c)(2), Ala. Code 1975 
(defining "willful conduct" to include "[t]he willful and intentional 
removal from a machine of a safety guard or safety device provided by 
the manufacturer of the machine with knowledge that injury or death 
would likely or probably result from the removal").  The safety guard that 
was allegedly removed was the VSS300's lid.  
 
After extensive discovery, the co-employees moved the trial court to 
enter summary judgment in their favor, arguing among other things that 
Bufford's claim of willful conduct was not supported by the evidence and 
that, "[a]bsent such willful conduct, the co-employees have complete 
immunity from civil liability from all causes of action."  Motion for 
summary judgment, p. 6 (citing Powell v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 
646 So. 2d 637, 638 (Ala. 1994)).2  They first argued that there was no 
evidence indicating that any of them had removed the lid to the VSS300.  
 
2The dissent states that "Varoff did not argue below that Bufford's 
claim is barred by the immunity provisions of the Act," ___ So. 3d at ___.  
That would certainly come as a surprise to the trial court, which, in its 
order denying summary judgment, expressly recognized that Varoff was 
making an immunity argument, stating:  "Varoff argues that Bufford 
cannot establish willful conduct as required by § 25-5-11(c)(2) and that, 
absent willful conduct, he is immune under the Alabama Workers' 
Compensation Act."  (Emphasis added.)  
1210235 
6 
 
And, second, they argued that removal of the VSS300's lid had been done 
for the purpose of repairing the machine and that the removal therefore 
could not constitute willful conduct under § 25-5-11(c)(2), which expressly 
precludes a finding of willful conduct when a safety device or guard was 
removed "for the purpose of repair of the machine." 
Before filing a response, Bufford dismissed his claims against all 
his co-employees except Varoff.  Bufford then filed a response 
maintaining his position that Varoff's knowledge of the allegedly unsafe 
procedure for servicing the VSS300 rendered him liable under § 25-5-
11(b).  See, e.g., Harris v. Gill, 585 So. 2d 831, 837 (Ala. 1991) (explaining 
that a supervisor could be liable under § 25-5-11 when he or she has 
knowledge that a safety guard has been bypassed because "to hold 
otherwise would contravene public policy; it would allow supervisory 
employees to instruct their employees to perform a certain operation 
after a safety device related to that operation had been removed"). 
Bufford further argued that simply unclogging the VSS300 was not a 
"repair" for § 25-5-11(c)(2) purposes and that, in any event, he had 
already removed the clog and completed any "repair" at the time he was 
injured.   
1210235 
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Following a hearing, the trial court denied Varoff's summary-
judgment motion, holding that there were material questions of fact 
about "whether Bufford's actions constitute 'maintenance,' 'repair,' or 
simply 'unclogging/unjamming'; whether that activity had been 
completed when he was injured; [and] Varoff's knowledge (or lack 
thereof) of various practices as to the running of the machine …."  Varoff 
now petitions this Court for mandamus review. 
Standard of Review 
 
This Court typically does not conduct mandamus review of a trial 
court's denial of a motion for summary judgment.  Ex parte Simpson, 36 
So. 3d 15, 22 (Ala. 2009).  But an exception exists when summary 
judgment has been sought on immunity grounds.  Id.  Here, the Act 
expressly immunizes employees from suits by their co-employees 
stemming from on-the-job accidents unless there is some evidence of the 
defendant employee's willful conduct.  See § 25-5-53 (explaining that the 
rights and remedies granted injured employees by the Act generally 
"exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee" and that 
"immunity from civil liability for all causes of action except those based 
upon willful conduct shall also extend … to an … employee of the same 
1210235 
8 
 
employer" (emphasis added)); see also Powell v. United States Fid. & 
Guar. Co., 646 So. 2d at 638 ("In 1985 … the legislature passed Act 85-
41, Ala. Acts 1985, which extensively amended [the Act] and added to it 
a qualified immunity for all co-employees.").  Mandamus review is 
therefore appropriate to the extent Varoff argues he was entitled to 
summary judgment based on the immunity afforded by the Act.  See also 
Ex parte Salvation Army, 72 So. 3d 1224, 1227-28 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) 
(reviewing this Court's precedent and rejecting the contention "that the 
denial of a summary-judgment motion grounded on a claim of immunity 
under the exclusive-remedy provisions [of the Act], as opposed to some 
other types of immunity, is not reviewable by mandamus petition"). 
 
Accordingly, Varoff bears the burden of establishing (1) a clear legal 
right to immunity under the Act; (2) that the trial court has refused to 
enter a judgment in his favor on that basis; (3) the lack of another 
adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of this Court.  
Ex parte KKE, LLC, 295 So. 3d 26, 29 (Ala. 2019) (setting forth the 
mandamus standard).  The only disputed issue before us is whether 
Varoff is entitled to immunity under the Act or whether Bufford's claim 
1210235 
9 
 
against him falls within the willful-conduct exception to that immunity.3  
We therefore focus our inquiry on that issue. 
Analysis 
 
Employees injured in on-the-job accidents are generally limited to 
recovering workers' compensation benefits from their employer in 
accordance with the Act.  See Richardson v. PSB Armor, Inc., 682 So. 2d 
438, 440 (Ala. 1996) ("The [Act] provides an exclusive remedy for the 
employee injured in a workplace accident ….").  But § 25-5-11(b) provides 
that "[i]f personal injury … to any employee results from the willful 
conduct … of any … employee of the same employer …, the employee 
 
3Bufford has argued that Varoff waived his right to claim immunity 
under the Act because he did not assert immunity as an affirmative 
defense in his answer to Bufford's complaint.  But while an employer's 
immunity under the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Act is generally 
an affirmative defense, see, e.g., Ex parte Drury Hotels Co., 303 So. 3d 
1188, 1193 (Ala. 2020), Varoff's claim to immunity here is not.  Varoff is 
not saying that he is entitled to relief under § 25-5-11(c)(2) even if 
everything Bufford has alleged is true; rather, he is arguing that he is 
entitled to relief because Bufford cannot support his allegation of willful 
conduct.  Thus, properly viewed, Varoff's immunity claim is a "negative 
defense" as opposed to an "affirmative defense."  See Ex parte Gadsden 
Country Club, 14 So. 3d 830, 834 (Ala. 2009) ("An affirmative defense is 
distinguishable from a negative defense in that an affirmative defense 
raises new matters that, assuming the allegations in the complaint to be 
true, constitute a defense to the action and have the effect of defeating 
the plaintiff's claims on the merits while a negative defense simply seeks 
to refute an essential allegation of the plaintiff's complaint.").   
1210235 
10 
 
shall have a cause of action against the person …." (Emphasis added.)  
Section 25-5-11(c) defines what constitutes "willful conduct" for purposes 
of this exception.  Among other things, it includes "[t]he willful and 
intentional removal from a machine of a safety guard or safety device 
provided by the manufacturer of the machine with knowledge that injury 
or death would likely or probably result from the removal."  § 25-5-
11(c)(2).  But "removal of a guard or device shall not be willful conduct 
unless the removal did, in fact, increase the danger in the use of the 
machine and was not done for the purpose of repair of the machine."  Id. 
(emphasis added).   
Varoff says that it is undisputed that the lid was removed from the 
VSS300 "for the purpose of repair" when Bufford was injured and that 
the removal therefore cannot be the basis for a willful-conduct claim 
under § 25-5-11(b).  Bufford disputes this but argues that, in any event, 
whether his servicing of the VSS300 constituted a "repair" and, if so, 
whether he had completed that "repair" at the time of his injury are 
factual questions that can be resolved only by a jury.  These outstanding 
factual issues, he argues, make summary judgment inappropriate.  The 
trial court agreed.  We do not. 
1210235 
11 
 
This Court's decision in Ex parte Coleman, 145 So. 3d 751, 759 (Ala. 
2013), is instructive.  Coleman involved the application of § 32-5A-7, Ala. 
Code 1975, which permits the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle 
to disregard traffic regulations under certain circumstances, but only 
when the driver of the vehicle "is making use of an audible signal."  § 32-
5A-7(c).  The parties in Coleman disputed whether a court or a jury 
should decide "whether a single 'yelp' of a siren constitutes 'making use 
of an audible signal' under § 32-5A-7."  145 So. 3d at 759.  This Court 
concluded that the underlying inquiry was essentially a question of 
statutory interpretation:  What does the phrase "making use of an 
audible signal" mean?  Id.  Accordingly, that question was for a court to 
decide, not a jury.  Id.; see also Ex parte Quick, 23 So. 3d 67, 70 (Ala. 
2009) ("The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law …."). 
Here we are confronted with the question of what it means for a 
safety device to be removed "for the purpose of repair."  Like the inquiry 
in Coleman, this is fundamentally a question of statutory interpretation.  
It is therefore a question of law for a court to decide, not a jury.  Quick, 
23 So. 3d at 70.  Because this is a legal inquiry -- not a factual inquiry -- 
1210235 
12 
 
the trial court erred by concluding that there was a material question of 
fact that rendered the entry of a summary judgment inappropriate.   
We thus turn to the meaning of the phrase "for the purpose of 
repair" in § 25-5-11(c)(2).  Varoff states that when the VSS300 became 
clogged and stopped working, there was no way to get it working again 
without removing the lid.  Therefore, he argues, the lid was clearly 
removed "for the purpose of repair" when Bufford was injured.  Bufford 
acknowledged in his deposition that there was no way to unclog the 
VSS300 with the lid on the machine.  But he also explained that he did 
not consider simply unclogging the VSS300 to be a repair; rather, in his 
view, "[a] repair is something when the machine has got something broke 
in it."   
"Words used in a statute must be given their natural, plain, 
ordinary, and commonly understood meaning …."  IMED Corp. v. 
Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992). Varoff 
argues that the natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood 
meaning of the word "repair" clearly encompasses the activity in which 
Bufford was engaged when he was injured.  As support for his argument, 
Varoff quotes Pritchett v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 
1210235 
13 
 
834 So. 2d 785, 791 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), in which the Court of Civil 
Appeals referenced three sources discussing the plain meaning of the 
term "repair."   First, the Pritchett court quoted Black's Law Dictionary 
1298 (6th ed. 1990), which defines the term repair as meaning "[t]o mend, 
remedy, restore, renovate.  To restore to a sound or good state after decay, 
injury, dilapidation, or partial destruction."  Second, the Pritchett court 
quoted Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 988 (10th ed. 1999), 
which similarly defines repair to mean "to restore by replacing a part or 
putting together what is torn or broken: Fix."  And, finally, the Pritchett 
court quoted the Supreme Court of Delaware, which explained in O'Brien 
v. Progressive Northern Insurance Co., 785 A.2d 281, 290 (Del. 2001), 
that, "[i]n the common usage, the word 'repair' means to fix by replacing 
or putting together what is broken, or, as the court in Carlton v. Trinity 
Universal Ins. Co., [32 S.W.3d 454, 464 (Tex. App. 2000)], stated, 'to bring 
back to good or useable condition.'"   
For his part, Bufford does not cite any sources to support his stated 
understanding of the term "repair."  Rather, he cites two cases in which 
employees sued co-employees after they were injured performing work 
tasks that he says were similar to unclogging; he notes that in neither of 
1210235 
14 
 
those cases was there any discussion of whether those activities 
constituted a repair.  See Bailey v. Hogg, 547 So. 2d 498, 499 (Ala. 1989) 
(employee sued co-employee after the employee was injured while 
cleaning out a silo); and Haddock v. Multivac, Inc., 703 So. 2d 969, 970 
(Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (employee sued co-employee after the employee was 
injured while "attempting to clear a jam" in a sausage-biscuit-packaging 
machine).  Thus, Bufford appears to be arguing that our courts have 
implicitly recognized a distinction between unclogging/cleaning and 
making a repair.  
Bufford reads too much into Bailey and Haddock.  He is correct that 
there is no discussion in either of those cases about whether removal of 
the relevant safety guards was done for the purpose of repair.  But that 
absence is not because those courts had implicitly concluded that 
unclogging or cleaning can never constitute a repair for § 25-5-11(c)(2) 
purposes.  Rather, it is attributable to the fact that the defendant co-
employees never argued that those safety guards had been removed for 
the purpose of repair.4  Accordingly, the Bailey and Haddock courts had 
 
4This is likely because the facts of those cases would not have 
supported such an argument -- the safety guard in Bailey was never 
1210235 
15 
 
no reason to discuss whether the injured employees in those cases were 
engaged in a "repair" when they were injured. 
While Bailey and Hogg do not support Bufford's position, the 
burden is still on Varoff to establish a clear legal right to the relief he 
seeks.  We must therefore determine whether as a matter of law Bufford's 
work unclogging the VSS300 constituted a repair.  The essential facts are 
undisputed.  Bufford acknowledged in his deposition that he was 
"[g]etting the machine back in operation" when he was unclogging the 
VSS300.  And he recognized that while the VSS300 was not working 
before he unclogged it, it appeared to be working properly after he 
removed the clog.  It is therefore undisputed that, by unclogging the 
VSS300, Bufford fixed it and restored it back to a good and usable 
condition.  In light of the plain meaning of the term "repair" as discussed 
in Pritchett, we think it clear that Bufford's unclogging of the VSS300 did 
in fact constitute a repair for § 25-5-11(c)(2) purposes. 
Foreseeing that we might reach this conclusion, Bufford argues in 
the alternative that he was already done repairing the VSS300 when he 
 
installed, 547 So. 2d at 499, while the safety guard in Haddock was 
permanently bypassed, 703 So. 2d at 972. 
1210235 
16 
 
was injured -- which means, according to him, that Varoff cannot rely on 
§ 25-5-11(c)(2).  We are not convinced by this argument.  Section 25-5-
11(c)(2) provides that the removal of a safety guard does not constitute 
willful conduct if the safety guard is removed "for the purpose of repair 
of the machine."  Even if we accepted Bufford's argument that he was no 
longer repairing the VSS300 when he was injured, the fact remains that 
the lid was off the machine "for the purpose of repair" when he was 
injured.  Thus, the removal of that lid does not constitute willful conduct 
and cannot serve as the basis of a claim against a co-employee under § 
25-5-11(c). 
Conclusion 
 
After Bufford was injured in a workplace accident, he sued his co-
employee Varoff under § 25-5-11(b), alleging that the accident was caused 
by Varoff's willful conduct.  But because there is no evidence that would 
support a finding that Varoff had engaged in willful conduct as that term 
is described in § 25-5-11(c), Varoff is immune from liability under § 25-5-
53.  Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying Varoff's motion for 
summary judgment.  His petition is therefore granted, and the trial court 
1210235 
17 
 
is directed to vacate its order denying Varoff's motion and to enter an 
order granting the same. 
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, and Sellers, JJ., concur. 
 
Mendheim, J., dissents, with opinion, which Wise, Bryan, and 
Stewart, JJ., join. 
 
 
1210235 
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MENDHEIM, Justice (dissenting). 
 
I respectfully dissent because this case does not present an issue 
appropriate for mandamus review.  The main opinion asserts that this 
case is one in which "summary judgment has been sought on immunity 
grounds," ___ So. 3d at ___, thereby allowing this Court to review the 
denial of Jeffrey Varoff's summary-judgment motion on a petition for the 
writ of mandamus.  See Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala. 
2000)("While the general rule is that the denial of a motion for summary 
judgment is not reviewable, the exception is that the denial of a motion 
for summary judgment grounded on a claim of immunity is reviewable 
by petition for writ of mandamus.").  I disagree with the main opinion's 
assessment that Varoff, a defendant below, sought summary judgment 
on immunity grounds.  As will be demonstrated below, there is no 
question of immunity presented in this case. 
 
The sole issue presented in this case is whether the plaintiff Clifford 
Bufford presented substantial evidence to support each element of the 
claim he asserted against Varoff under § 25-5-11(b), Ala. Code 1975, a 
part of the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"), § 25-5-1 et 
seq., Ala. Code 1975.  In proving his § 25-5-11(b) claim, Bufford is not 
1210235 
19 
 
required to present substantial evidence concerning an issue of 
immunity; this case does not involve the immunity provisions of the Act 
(§§ 25-5-52 and 25-5-53, Ala. Code 1975).  I do not believe that it is 
necessary or wise to expand the scope of this Court's mandamus review 
to include what amounts to a run-of-the-mill denial of a motion for a 
summary judgment. 
 
Bufford, an employee of Borbet Alabama, Inc. ("Borbet"), suffered a 
workplace injury.  Bufford filed a claim against Borbet seeking workers' 
compensation benefits, which Borbet ultimately paid Bufford pursuant 
to a settlement agreement.  Of course, the settlement of Bufford's claim 
for workers' compensation benefits triggered application of the immunity 
provisions in the Act, but a careful reading of the relevant provision 
demonstrates that immunity is not at issue in the case that is presently 
before this Court. 
 
Section 25-5-53 provides, in pertinent part: 
 
"The rights and remedies granted in [the Act] to an 
employee shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the 
employee … at common law, by statute, or otherwise on 
account of injury, loss of services, or death. Except as provided 
in [the Act], no employer shall be held civilly liable for 
personal injury to or death of the employer's employee, for 
purposes of [the Act], whose injury or death is due to an 
accident or to an occupational disease while engaged in the 
1210235 
20 
 
service or business of the employer, the cause of which 
accident 
or 
occupational 
disease 
originates 
in 
the 
employment. In addition, immunity from civil liability for all 
causes of action except those based upon willful conduct shall 
also extend … to an … employee of the same employer." 
 
(Emphasis added.)  In reading the plain language of § 25-5-53, it is clear 
that Borbet is entitled to immunity from any action brought against it by 
Bufford.  Borbet is not, however, a party in this case.  The plain language 
of § 25-5-53 also makes clear that the immunity from civil liability 
afforded to Borbet also extends to Borbet's employees.  However, § 25-5-
53 clearly excepts causes of action against Borbet's employees that are 
based upon willful conduct.  In other words, § 25-5-53 does not provide to 
Borbet's employees immunity from causes of action that are based on 
willful conduct.  A clear reading of the plain language of § 25-5-53 
indicates that the immunity afforded in § 25-5-53 does not apply to 
Bufford's claim against Varoff because Bufford has alleged and, according 
to the trial court, has presented substantial evidence indicating that 
Varoff's willful conduct caused his workplace injury. 
 
In fact, § 25-5-11(b) expressly allows Bufford's cause of action 
against Varoff.  Section 25-5-11(b) provides: "If personal injury … to any 
employee results from the willful conduct … of any … employee of the 
1210235 
21 
 
same employer …, the employee shall have a cause of action against the 
person …."  Under the plain language of § 25-5-11(b), Bufford must 
present substantial evidence indicating that (1) he suffered a personal 
injury (2) that was caused by the willful conduct (3) of one of his co-
employees.  Those elements do not require Bufford to provide substantial 
evidence concerning an issue of immunity, and the legislature expressly 
excepted claims brought under § 25-5-11 from the immunity provisions 
of the Act. 
 
This Court's decision in Padgett v. Neptune Water Meter Co., 585 
So. 2d 900 (Ala. 1991), demonstrates that a claim brought under § 25-5-
11 does not involve the immunity provisions of the Act.  In Padgett, an 
employee suffered a workplace injury and commenced an action against 
his employer seeking workers' compensation benefits.  The employee also 
commenced a second action against his employer and against one of his 
co-employees.  In the second action, the employee asserted a § 25-5-11 
claim against his co-employee, alleging that the co-employee's willful 
conduct had caused his workplace injury, and alleged that the employer 
was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.  The trial court 
entered summary judgments in favor of the co-employee and the 
1210235 
22 
 
employer and made those judgments final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. 
Civ. P.  The employee appealed. 
 
On appeal, this Court first considered the employee's claim of 
respondeat superior against the employer.  The employer argued that the 
employee's claim against it was barred by the immunity provisions of the 
Act.  This Court agreed, stating: 
 
"In the recent case of Johnson v. Asphalt Hot Mix, 565 
So. 2d 219 (Ala. 1990), this Court stated that § 25-5-11, Ala. 
Code 1975, does not provide an action against an employer. 
Section 25-5-11(a) provides that actions may be maintained 
against those parties that may be jointly liable with the 
employer, provided that if the other party is a coemployee, 
then his actions, in order to give rise to liability, must be 
willful. Section 25-5-11 does not affect the immunity provided 
by §§ 25-5-52 and 25-5-53." 
 
Padgett, 585 So. 2d at 901 (emphasis added).  This Court concluded that 
the immunity provisions of the Act barred the employee's second action 
against the employer and affirmed the trial court's summary judgment 
in favor of the employer.  Significantly, this Court expressly stated that 
§ 25-5-11 does not affect the immunity provisions of the Act. 
 
This Court then considered the employee's § 25-5-11 claim against 
the co-employee.  This Court provided the following framework for its 
analysis of the employee's § 25-5-11 claim: 
1210235 
23 
 
 
"The trial court also entered a summary judgment in 
favor of [the employee's co-employee]. [The employee] argues 
that he has shown evidence sufficient to defeat [the co-
employee's] motion for summary judgment. 
 
 
"Summary judgment is appropriate upon a showing that 
no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, 
A[la]. R. Civ. P. In reviewing a trial court's entry of a summary 
judgment, this Court will view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the nonmovant and will resolve all reasonable 
doubts against the movant. Fincher v. Robinson Brothers 
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 583 So. 2d 256 (Ala. 1991). The present 
action was filed in October 1987; therefore, the applicable 
standard of review is the 'substantial evidence' rule. See § 12-
21-12, Ala. Code 1975. '[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence of 
such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the 
exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the 
existence of the fact sought to be proved.' West v. Founders 
Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989). 
 
 
"Section 25-5-11 provides that an employee who receives 
benefits under the Alabama Workmen's Compensation Act 
can recover against an 'officer, director, agent, servant or 
employee of the same employer' only 'for [actions of] willful 
conduct which [result] in or proximately [cause] the injury or 
death.' Therefore, we must determine whether there is 
substantial evidence that [the employee] was injured as a 
result of [the co-employee's] 'willful conduct.'" 
 
585 So. 2d at 901-02.  This Court analyzed the evidence in the record and 
concluded that the employee had failed to present substantial evidence 
to support the "willful conduct" element of his § 25-5-11 claim.  In 
analyzing the employee's § 25-5-11 claim against the co-employee, this 
1210235 
24 
 
Court did not consider the immunity provisions of the Act; immunity has 
no application to § 25-5-11 claims.  Instead, this Court considered only 
whether the employee had presented substantial evidence in support of 
each element of his claim. 
 
The analysis set forth in Padgett makes clear that the immunity 
provisions of the Act do not apply to § 25-5-11 claims.  The issue at the 
summary-judgment stage of the proceedings in a case in which a § 25-5-
11(b) claim has been asserted is to determine whether the plaintiff has 
presented substantial evidence in support of each element of the claim, 
none of which involve immunity.  In fact, that is the exact argument made 
by Varoff in his motion for a summary judgment.  Varoff asserted the 
following argument in his summary-judgment motion: 
 
"Clifford Bufford … claims that … Jeffrey Varoff … [is] 
responsible for [Bufford's] injuries. In this brief, [Varoff] will 
explain why a trial is unnecessary because [Bufford's] claims 
against [Varoff] fail as a matter of law. [Bufford] attempts to 
proceed on a theory of co-employee liability pursuant to Ala. 
Code § 25-5-11. However, [Bufford] fails to establish a prima 
facie claim under [§ 25-5-11(b)] because there was no willful 
conduct by [Varoff] as contemplated by the statute. 
Accordingly, [Varoff is] due a full and final summary 
judgment dismissing [Bufford's] complaint." 
 
Varoff did not argue below that Bufford's claim is barred by the immunity 
provisions of the Act; instead, Varoff properly argued that Bufford had 
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25 
 
failed to present substantial evidence in support of his claim, thereby, 
Varoff argued, entitling him to a summary judgment in his favor.5 
 
Additionally, the trial court did not base its denial of Varoff's 
summary-judgment motion on the immunity provisions of the Act.  As 
noted by the main opinion, the trial court denied Varoff's summary-
judgment motion by "holding that there were material questions of fact 
about 'whether Bufford's actions constitute "maintenance," "repair," or 
simply "unclogging/unjamming"; whether that activity had been 
completed when he was injured; [and] Varoff's knowledge (or lack 
thereof) of various practices as to the running of the machine ….'"  ___ 
So. 3d at ___.  The parties did not address immunity, and the trial court 
 
 
5The main opinion notes that Varoff did make a general 
statement in his summary-judgment motion that, "[a]bsent such willful 
conduct, [Varoff has] complete immunity from civil liability from all 
causes of action."  See ___ So. 3d at ___.  That statement is true, but it 
does not indicate that Varoff is arguing immunity as a defense to 
Bufford's § 25-5-11(b) claim in the present case.  As explained above, 
immunity is not a defense to a claim asserted against a co-employee 
under § 25-5-11(b); such claims are expressly excepted from the 
immunity provisions of the Act.  Accordingly, immunity is not at issue in 
this case.  But Varoff is correct in stating that, if Bufford cannot prove 
his § 25-5-11(b) claim, the immunity provisions of the Act do immunize 
him from any other civil liability related to Bufford's workplace injury.  
Varoff did not argue below that he is immune from Bufford's § 25-5-11(b) 
claim based on the immunity provisions of the Act. 
 
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26 
 
did not base its judgment on immunity.  Instead, the issue was simply 
whether Bufford had presented substantial evidence supporting each 
element of his § 25-5-11(b) claim. 
 
A sentence in the main opinion's conclusion demonstrates its 
fundamental misunderstanding of this area of the law.  The main opinion 
concludes that, "because there is no evidence that would support a 
finding that Varoff engaged in willful conduct …, Varoff is immune from 
liability under § 25-5-53."  ___ So. 3d at ___.  However, the immunity set 
forth in § 25-5-53 is not a defense to a claim brought under § 25-5-11; 
those claims are expressly excepted from such immunity.  Contrary to 
what the main opinion states, Varoff is not immune from liability under 
§ 25-5-53 because Bufford failed to present substantial evidence 
indicating that Varoff acted with willful conduct.  Rather, the immunity 
from civil liability afforded to Varoff under § 25-5-53 is unrelated to 
Bufford's § 25-5-11 claim against Varoff, and if Varoff is not liable to 
Bufford, it is because Bufford failed to prove his § 25-5-11 claim.  But that 
issue -- whether Bufford has presented substantial evidence in support 
of his § 25-5-11 claim -- does not involve immunity and is not one 
appropriate for mandamus review. 
1210235 
27 
 
 
The main opinion's misinterpretation of the relevant portions of the 
Act has led it to incorrectly frame the dispositive issue in this case as 
whether Varoff is entitled to immunity from Bufford's § 25-5-11(b) claim.  
As thoroughly explained above, the immunity provisions of the Act do not 
bar claims brought under § 25-5-11(b).  The main opinion's improper 
insertion of the issue of immunity into this case will certainly be 
problematic down the road because, essentially, every case in which a § 
25-5-11(b) claim survives summary judgment will now be subject to 
review by mandamus petition rather than on appeal.  No good argument 
has been presented to expand the scope of our mandamus review by 
creating another exception.  The general rule that the denial of a motion 
for summary judgment is not reviewable by a petition for a writ of 
mandamus should apply in this case.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent 
and would deny Varoff's petition for a writ of mandamus.  The issue 
presented by Varoff does not involve immunity. 
 
Wise, Bryan, and Stewart, JJ., concur.