Title: Doyle v. McBee
Citation: 420 P.2d 247
Docket Number: 21175
State: Colorado
Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court
Date: November 21, 1966

420 P.2d 247 (1966) Leo P. DOYLE and Agnes M. Doyle, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Howard S. McBEE, Virginia L. McBee, LeRoy S. Larson, Viola L. Larson and South Arapahoe Sanitation District, a Colorado corporation, Defendants in Error. No. 21175. Supreme Court of Colorado, In Department. November 21, 1966. Gilbert L. McDonough, Samuel J. Eaton, Denver, for plaintiffs in error. David Berger, Commerce City, for defendants in error. MOORE, Justice. Plaintiffs in error will be referred to as the Doyles, and defendants in error as the McBees, the Larsons, or the district. The Doyles brought the action against the McBees, the Larsons, and the district, asserting three claims: one for rescission of a contract for the purchase of property; one for damages flowing from a breach of covenant of seisin; and a third claim against the district for damages allegedly sustained because of the failure of the district to place of record the instrument by which it acquired an easement over the property described in the contract for the purchase of real estate. Upon being required to elect as between the claim for rescission of the contract and that based upon the alleged breach of covenant, the Doyles relied upon the claims for damages. In requiring this election we hold that the trial court ruled properly and we accordingly give no further consideration to the claim for rescission. The property involved in this dispute consists of Lots 15, 16 and 17, Block 1, Carroll Addition in Arapahoe county. The Doyles acquired their title through a warranty deed executed by the McBees, and this deed contains, inter alia, the following: The McBees acquired their title from the Larsons who had granted an easement of a right-of-way for a sanitary sewer line across the south twenty feet of Lot 17. The deed creating this easement contained the following: At the time the Doyles purchased the property, the deed creating the above-mentioned easement had not been placed of record. The district filed an answer in which it denied that the Doyles had no notice of their easement, and denied that plaintiffs purchased the property free and clear of the burden thereof. Affirmatively, the district alleged that the Doyles had purchased the real estate "with knowledge, actual, constructive or implied notice of the easement." The McBees by answer alleged that the Doyles had actual notice of the existence of the easement through conversations which took place prior to the consummation of the sale, and by personal inspection of the premises. The Larsons by answer admitted that they gave a deed to McBees which did not except from the warranties therein contained the easement which they had granted to the district, and generally denied any liability to the Doyles. Trial was had to the court. At the conclusion of the trial, findings of fact, conclusions of law, judgment and decree were entered, wherein it was adjudged in substance that the Larsons had created the easement on April 26, 1961; that the district had installed a sewer trunk line across the right-of-way which was in full operation at the time the Doyles purchased the property; and that the Larsons had deeded the property to the McBees who had thereafter deeded the same to the Doyles. Neither of these deeds made mention of the existence of the easement. The findings additionally provided the following: "It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: The only evidence offered by the Doyles concerning the amount of damages allegedly sustained by them was that supplied by Mr. Doyle who testified as follows: "A. Well, in dividing the property I believe it would be four-fifteenths. "Q. Four-fifteenths of the purchase price? "A. Of the purchase price, approximately $13,000.00. "A. Yes." He computed the total square feet within the three lots purchased by him and deducted therefrom the number of square feet contained within the land subjected to the easement. This area, he said, was 4/15ths of the total within the three lots. He claimed 4/15ths of the total purchase price named in his contract of purchase notwithstanding *250 that all improvements were erected upon lots outside the easement area, and that the contract called for the purchase of all personal property and furnishings located within the several apartments of the motel. No evidence was offered tending in any way to separate the value of personalty from the realty. We hold that the 4/15ths measure of damages insisted upon by counsel for the Doyles was an erroneous concept. The applicable rule of law is properly stated in 14 Am.Jur. Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions § 186, as follows: Stated more succinctly, the rule is again set forth in 14 Am.Jur. 581, as follows: The trial court, during the trial, indicated that the foregoing rule was applicable to the instant controversy, subject to the Colorado rule that the agreed purchase price for the real estate controls the value of the land free of the easement. The decrease in value (as of the date of the sale) brought about by the existence of the easement would be the sum to which the Doyles would be entitled as damages. They offered no testimony tending in any manner to establish damage under this applicable rule. Their attorneys strenuously objected to the attempt made by counsel for some of the defendants to present evidence bearing upon this true measure of damages. Defendants' counsel, after much debate, withdrew his expert witness with the comment that under the circumstances if he went forward with further evidence on the subject it would put the defendants "in the position of proving plaintiffs' case, which we object to." Under such circumstances, the burden of proof being upon the Doyles, the trial court correctly awarded nominal damages only. The general rule in this connection is aptly discussed in Rockhill Iron &amp; Coal Co. v. City of Taunton, 1 Cir., 273 F. 96. Accordingly, we hold that in an action for breach of contract, only nominal damages can be recovered, if there is no evidence produced from which the facts necessary to determine the damages under the proper rule can be determined. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. SUTTON, C. J., and FRANTZ, J., concur.