Title: Boyer v. Boyer
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 534, 2009, 615, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: May 25, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CINDY LAURA BOYER,1 
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
CLIFF V. BOYER, 
 
Respondent Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  Nos. 534, 2009 and 615, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  File No. CS04-01253 
§  Petition Nos. 08-26081; 09-00844; 
§  09-03894; 09-09787; 09-12333 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: March 12, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
May 18, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Corrected: May 25, 20102 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 25th day of May 2010, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs 
and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Cindy Boyer (“Mother”), filed the appeal in No. 
534, 2009 from a judgment of the Family Court, dated August 18, 2009.  
The Family Court’s order denied three separate rule to show cause petitions 
and also denied Mother’s petition to modify custody.  Mother filed a second 
                                                 
1 The Court assigned pseudonyms to the parties pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
2 The Court’s Order dated May 18, 2010 affirmed the Family Court’s judgment below in 
appeal No. 534, 2009 but failed to address Mother’s appeal in No. 615, 2009 challenging 
the Family Court judge’s denial of her motion to recuse.  This Court’s May 18, 2010 
Order has been corrected to address that issue. 
 
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appeal, in No. 615, 2009, from the Family Court’s denial of her motion to 
recuse. Having reviewed the parties’ respective contentions and the record 
below, we find no error in the Family Court’s findings and conclusions.  
Accordingly, the Family Court’s judgments shall be affirmed. 
 
(2) 
The parties were divorced in August 2009.  They have three 
children, a daughter and two sons,3 who were eleven, eight, and three at the 
time of the Family Court hearing.  The record reflects that the parties entered 
into an agreement regarding custody and visitation on June 6, 2008.  The 
agreement, which became a Family Court judgment, provided the parties 
with joint custody and shared residential placement.  The placement 
schedule was crafted around the parties’ respective work schedules.  In 
February 2009, the Family Court entered an order redefining the shared 
placement schedule to alternate the children between Mother’s and Father’s 
home every other week.  In January 2009, Mother filed a petition to modify 
custody, requesting that the Family Court grant her primary residential 
placement of the children.  The Family Court held a hearing on Mother’s 
                                                 
3 It is undisputed that Father is not the biological father of the parties’ older son, although 
the child was born during the course of the parties’ marriage. 
 
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petition to modify custody on August 18, 2009.4  At the end of the hearing, 
the judge announced his decision denying Mother’s petition. 
(3) 
While Mother enumerates five issues in her opening brief on 
appeal in No. 534, 2009,5 all of her arguments relate to Father’s credibility 
and the Family Court’s refusal to weigh certain evidence and testimony in 
her favor.  Our standard of review of a decision of the Family Court extends 
to a review of the facts and law, as well as inferences and deductions made 
by the trial judge.6  We have the duty to review the sufficiency of the 
evidence and to test the propriety of the findings.7  Findings of fact will not 
be disturbed on appeal unless they are determined to be clearly erroneous.8  
We will not substitute our opinion for the inferences and deductions of the 
trial judge if those inferences are supported by the record.9 
                                                 
4 The Family Court also considered, and denied, the parties’ respective rule to show 
cause petitions at the August 2009 hearing.  While Mother mentions this fact in her 
opening brief, she raises no argument and requests no relief with respect to these rulings.  
Accordingly, the Court deems any issues regarding those petitions to be waived.  See 
Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1151 (Del. 1993) (failure to raise legal issue in the text 
of the opening brief generally constitutes a waiver of the claim on appeal). 
5 Mother’s enumerated arguments are as follows: (i) Father continues to refuse to abide 
by court orders; (ii) Father committed perjury; (iii) the Family Court refuses to 
acknowledge Father’s “drug use and sale;” (iv) the judge’s decision shows no concern 
about Mother’s and Mother’s witnesses’ testimony about Father’s actions; and (v) “the 
timing in which [Father’s] documents were filed.” 
6 Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983). 
7 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 
8 Mundy v. Devon, 906 A.2d 750, 752 (Del. 2006). 
9 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d at 1204. 
 
4 
 
(4) 
Under Delaware law, the Family Court is required to determine 
legal custody and residential arrangements for a child in accordance with the 
best interests of the child.  The criteria for determining the best interests of 
the child are set forth in Section 722 of Title 13 of the Delaware Code.10  
The criteria in Section 722 must be balanced in accordance with the factual 
circumstances presented to the Family Court in each case.  As this Court has 
noted, the weight given to one factor or combination of factors will be 
different in any given proceeding.11   
(5) 
In this case, the Family Court enumerated all of the factors set 
forth in Section 722 and recounted testimony from the hearing relative to 
each factor.  The trial judge found both parties to be suitable parents with 
                                                 
10 Section 722(a) provides: 
The Court shall determine the legal custody and residential arrangements for a child in 
accordance with the best interests of the child.  In determining the best interests of the 
child, the Court shall consider all relevant factors including: 
(1)  The wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his or her custody and residential 
arrangements; 
(2)  The wishes of the child as to his or her custodians(s) and residential arrangements; 
(3)  The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parents, 
grandparents, siblings, persons cohabitating in the relationship of husband and wife with 
a parent of the child, any other residents of the household or persons who may 
significantly affect the child’s best interests; 
(4)  The child’s adjustment to his or her home, school and community; 
(5)  The mental and physical health of all individuals involved; 
(6)  Past and present compliance by both parents with their rights and responsibilities to 
their child under § 701 of this title; and 
(7)  Evidence of domestic violence as provided for in Chapter 7A of this title. 
11   Fisher v. Fisher, 691 A.2d 619, 623 (Del. 1997). 
 
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suitable homes.  The Family Court noted that both parties had received 
counseling in the past, both had consent protection from abuse orders 
entered against them, and neither had any significant criminal history.  Thus, 
the Family Court did not find these factors to weigh in favor of either party.  
The factors that the Family Court found to weigh in favor of maintaining 
shared residential placement were the children’s adjustment to their schedule 
and their homes, the relationship with their parents and others living in their 
respective households, and the expressed wishes of the children.   
(6) 
Specifically, the trial judge noted that he had interviewed the 
two older children and both expressed a desire to continue sharing their time 
between Mother’s and Father’s households.  The Family Court also found 
that the children enjoyed very close relationships with the children of 
Father’s tenant, who rented the top floor of the house where Father lived 
with the children.  Moreover, granting Mother primary residential placement 
would require the parties’ older son to change schools and also would 
require the children to live full-time in a three bedroom apartment shared by 
six people.  Father, on the other hand, continues to share the former marital 
home with the children, and the children have the opportunity there to spend 
time with their friends and play outdoors. 
 
6 
(7) 
The factual findings of the trial judge are amply supported by 
the record, and we find no basis to disturb those findings on appeal.  
Moreover, the Family Court properly applied the law to the facts in 
concluding that modifying residential placement was not in the children’s 
best interests. 
(8) 
On Mother’s appeal in No. 615, 2009 from the Family Court’s 
denial of her motion to recuse, this Court must determine “whether, as a 
matter of subjective belief, the judge was satisfied that he or she could 
proceed to hear the case free of bias or prejudice concerning a party.”12 In 
addition, the Court must determine whether objectively there was “an 
appearance of bias” that warranted the judge's disqualification.13 The 
standard of review is abuse of discretion.14 
(9) 
The basis for Mother’s recusal motion was that the Family 
Court exhibited bias against her by failing to credit certain witness testimony 
favoring her position and by denying her petitions and requests.  This Court 
has held, however, that bias is not established simply because a judge has 
made adverse rulings against a party.15  In this case, the Family Court ruled, 
                                                 
12 Los v. Los, 595 A.2d 381, 384-85 (Del. 1991). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 In re Wittrock, 649 A.2d 1053, 1054 (Del. 1994). 
 
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as a matter of subjective belief, that he could decide the parties’ case fairly 
because he had no prior information about, and no bias against, either party.  
Moreover, this Court finds no objective grounds upon which the judge’s 
impartiality could have reasonably been questioned.  Therefore, we find no 
abuse of the trial judge’s discretion in denying Mother’s motion to recuse. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the 
Family Court are AFFIRMED.   
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
Justice