Title: State v. Metcalfe
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S44828
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: February 26, 1999

FILED: February 26, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

		Plaintiff-Relator,

	v.

ERIC RAMON METCALFE, aka

Eric Ramone Metcalfe,

	Defendant-Adverse Party.

(CC 97-09-37310; SC S44828)

	En Banc

	Original proceeding in mandamus.

	Argued and submitted November 9, 1998.

	Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for plaintiff-relator.  With her on
the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.

	Matthew J. Rizzo, Metropolitan Public Defenders, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the brief for defendant-adverse party.

	LEESON, J.

	Peremptory writ to issue.  

	LEESON, J.

	The issue in this original proceeding in mandamus is
whether the trial court had authority to grant defendant-adverse
party's (defendant's) motion for judgment of acquittal after the
jury had found him guilty of Escape in the Second Degree and to
find him guilty of Attempted Escape in the Second Degree.  For
the reasons that follow, we conclude that the trial court lacked
authority to grant defendant's post-verdict motion.  Accordingly,
we direct that a peremptory writ of mandamus shall issue.

	Defendant was indicted on a single count of Escape in
the Second Degree, ORS 162.155(1)(a), based on events that
transpired while he was on trial for other charges.  During that
trial, a deputy escorted defendant to the courtroom and
instructed him to sit in a chair at counsel table and to remain
there, unless he was testifying.  Defendant ran from the
courtroom.  After a brief scuffle, deputies subdued defendant
outside the courtroom doors.  Defendant was tried by a jury on
the charge of Escape in the Second Degree based on those facts.

	At the close of the state's evidence, defendant moved
for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that, at most, the state had
proved Attempted Escape in the Second Degree.  The trial court
denied the motion, stating that it would "submit the case [to the
jury] under the best instructions that we can devise * * *."  The
court instructed the jury on Escape in the Second Degree and the
lesser-included offenses of Attempted Escape in the Second
Degree, Escape in the Third Degree, and Attempted Escape in the
Third Degree.

	The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the charge of
Escape in the Second Degree.  The trial court accepted the
verdict and excused the jury.  Defendant renewed his motion for a
judgment of acquittal, which the trial court granted.  The court
then vacated the jury's verdict, found defendant guilty of the
lesser-included offense of Attempted Escape in the Second Degree,
entered "temporary" and final judgments on Attempted Escape in
the Second Degree, and sentenced defendant on that conviction. 
This mandamus proceeding followed.

	Relator State of Oregon (the state) contends that the
trial court lacked authority to acquit defendant of Escape in the
Second Degree and to find him guilty of the lesser-included
offense after the jury had returned its verdict.  The state
relies on State ex rel Penn v. Norblad, in which this court held
that motions in arrest of judgment and motions for a new trial
are the only post-verdict motions authorized by the legislature
in criminal cases.  323 Or 464, 469-70, 918 P2d 426 (1996). 
Defendant responds that Norblad is inapposite, because the trial
court in that case entered a post-verdict dismissal in reliance
on ORS 135.755,(1) and this court's opinion in that case addressed
only that statute.  Defendant argues that the plain language of
ORS 136.445, the relevant statute in this case, neither bars a
post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal nor prohibits a
trial court from ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal
after a jury has returned its verdict.

	ORS 136.445 is part of the criminal procedure code
enacted in 1973 to govern the conduct of criminal trials.  See
Norblad, 323 Or at 468 (explaining history of adoption of
criminal code).  That statute provides:

		"In any criminal action the defendant may, after
close of the state's evidence or of all the evidence,
move the court for a judgment of acquittal.  The court
shall grant the motion if the evidence introduced
theretofore is such as would not support a verdict
against the defendant.  The acquittal shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense." 

		In order to address defendant's argument, we must
construe ORS 136.445.  We do so according to the familiar
methodology of PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606,
610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  We first analyze the text and
context of the statute.  Statutory context includes other
provisions of the same statute and other related statutes,
Norblad, 323 Or at 467, as well as relevant judicial
constructions of those statutes, Fox v. Country Mutual Ins. Co.,
327 Or 500, 506, 964 P2d 997 (1998).

		By its plain language, ORS 136.445 permits, but does
not require, a defendant in a criminal proceeding to make a
motion at two points in the proceeding, namely, after close of
the state's evidence or after all the evidence.  The decision
whether to make a motion for a judgment of acquittal is a
defendant's.  The statute also provides that the trial court
shall grant the motion "if the evidence introduced theretofore is
such as would not support a verdict against the defendant."

		Defendant would have us interpret ORS 136.445 to allow
a criminal defendant to move for a judgment of acquittal after a
jury returned its verdict if, in hindsight, the evidence did not
support the verdict.  Even assuming that the words "theretofore"
and the phrase "would not" in the statute might support such an
interpretation, consideration of the statutory context reveals
that defendant's argument is implausible.  We turn to that
context.

		The code of criminal procedure provides for two post-verdict motions in a criminal proceeding that are closely related
to our inquiry regarding a trial court's authority under ORS
136.445:  ORS 136.500 (motion in arrest of judgment)(2) and ORS
136.535 (motion for a new trial).(3)

  As closely associated parts
of the criminal code, they are relevant context for determining
the legislature's intent regarding ORS 136.445.  See State v.
Chakerian, 325 Or 370, 379, 938 P2d 756 (1997) (related statutes
in criminal code are relevant context).

		A motion in arrest of judgment may be made only on the
grounds specified in ORS 135.630(1) and (4), namely, that the
grand jury lacked authority to inquire into the crime charged or
that the facts stated do not constitute an offense.  ORS 136.500. 
A motion for a new trial, by contrast, is governed by ORS 19.430
and ORCP 64 A, B, and D through G, with the exception that "a new
trial shall not be granted on application of the state." ORS
136.535(4).  ORCP 64 B(5) provides that "[i]nsufficiency of the
evidence to justify the verdict or other decision" is a ground
for moving for a new trial.  This court has held that ORS 136.500
and ORS 136.535 declare the legislature's "completed thought"
with respect to post-verdict motions in criminal proceedings. 
Norblad, 323 Or at 469-70; see also State ex rel Haas v. Schwabe,
276 Or 853, 856, 556 P2d 1367 (1976) ("the only post-verdict
motions authorized by statute in criminal cases are motions for a
new trial and motions in arrest of judgment").  Defendant would
have this court recognize a second procedural device for
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence after the verdict. 
We find no basis for attributing to the legislature the intent to
create duplicative motions in this context.

		Moreover, ORS 136.445 provides that, if the trial court
grants a criminal defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal,
the acquittal bars another prosecution for the same offense.  See
State v. McKenzie, 307 Or 554, 558-59, 771 P2d 264 (1989)
(explaining double jeopardy as well as statutory bar to retrial
after grant of motion for a judgment of acquittal).  By contrast,
the trial court's grant of a defense motion for a new trial does
not bar another prosecution for the same offense.  Defendant's
proposed construction of ORS 136.445 would create an anomaly
between that statute and ORS 136.535 regarding the state's
authority to prosecute for the same offense.  Neither the text
nor the context of the relevant statutes indicates that the
legislature intended such a result.  See ORS 174.010 (in
construing a statute, court to adopt construction that will give
effect to all provisions if possible).  Based on its text and
context, we conclude that ORS 136.445 does not authorize a trial
court to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury
verdict.

		Nonetheless, defendant contends that nothing in ORS
136.445 prohibits a criminal defendant from moving for a judgment
of acquittal post-verdict, from which he concludes that nothing
prevents a trial court from granting a post-verdict motion for a
judgment of acquittal.  For the reasons explained above, we
conclude that the motion must be made before the verdict. 
Furthermore, granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after
the return of a guilty verdict, and then setting aside that
verdict, would be the equivalent of entering a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, which is not available in criminal
proceedings.  Schwabe, 276 Or at 857; see also State ex rel
Redden v. Davis, 288 Or 283, 291, 604 P2d 879 (1980) (there is no
authority either at common law or under Oregon statutes for entry
of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in a criminal case).

		Even assuming that the trial court lacked authority to
grant defendant's post-verdict motion for a judgment of
acquittal, defendant makes three arguments why this court should
decline to issue a peremptory writ of mandamus.  First, he
argues, a writ compelling the trial court to enter judgment of
conviction and sentence on Escape in the Second Degree would
violate his right to due process of law, because the evidence
does not support a conviction for that offense.  The state
responds that it is premature for this court to consider the
sufficiency of the evidence in this proceeding, because defendant
may raise his sufficiency of the evidence claim in a motion for a
new trial or on appeal.  We agree with the state.  Once the trial
court files a judgment on the verdict in this case, defendant may
move for a new trial within five days, ORS 136.535(1), or he may
appeal from that judgment and challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence.  See ORS 138.040 (defendant may appeal any decision of
the court in a proceeding).  Accordingly, it would be premature
for this court to resolve any issue regarding the sufficiency of
the evidence in this mandamus proceeding.

		Next, defendant argues that ordering the trial court to
reinstate the verdict would violate double jeopardy protections
afforded him by the United States Constitution.  According to
defendant, the state is asking this court "to undertake a review
that has been barred by the U.S. Supreme Court" in Smalis v.
Pennsylvania, 476 US 140, 106 S Ct 1745, 90 L Ed 2d 116 (1986). 
The state responds that it does not seek to put defendant in
jeopardy again, "but only to have the trial court enter judgment
based on the jury's verdict."

		In Smalis, the defendants were charged with various
crimes in connection with a fire in a building that they owned. 
At the close of the prosecution's case, the defendants demurred
to the charges, and the trial court sustained the demurrer.  The
Commonwealth sought review.  The Superior Court of Pennsylvania
concluded that reversal of the trial court's grant of the
defendants' demurrer would necessitate further trial proceedings
and quashed the appeal on double jeopardy grounds.  Id. at 141-42.  The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that

	"the Double Jeopardy Clause bars an appeal by the
prosecution not only when it might result in a second
trial, but also if reversal would translate into
further proceedings devoted to the resolution of
factual issues going to the elements of the offense
charged."  Id. at 142.

		Smalis does not assist defendant here.  As explained
above, the trial court in this case lacked authority to enter a
judgment of acquittal on defendant's motion after the verdict.  A
peremptory writ ordering the trial court to vacate the
"temporary" and final judgments on Attempted Escape in the Second
Degree and to enter judgment consistent with the jury's verdict
does not require any further proceedings devoted to factual
determinations.  Defendant's double jeopardy argument lacks
merit.

		Finally, defendant argues that Article VII (Amended),
section 3, of the Oregon Constitution, prohibits this court from
requiring the trial court to reinstate the jury's verdict.  That
section provides, in part:

	"* * * [N]othing in this section shall be construed to
authorize the supreme court to find the defendant in a
criminal case guilty of an offense for which a greater
penalty is provided than that of which the accused was
convicted in the lower court."

According to defendant, the trial court convicted defendant of
Attempted Escape in the Second Degree.  If this court requires
the trial court to reinstate the jury's verdict, "defendant would
in effect be found guilty of a greater offense than that for
which he was convicted."  The state responds that it is not
asking this court to find defendant guilty of any offense; it
merely is asking this court to order the trial court to enter
judgment based on the jury's verdict.

	Defendant's Article VII (Amended), section 3 argument
proceeds from the false premise that this court has made findings
regarding his guilt on the charge of Escape in the Second Degree. 
The jury's fact-finding in this case remains undisturbed.  We
have determined only that the trial court lacked authority to
grant defendant's post-verdict motion for a judgment of acquittal
on the charge of Escape in the Second Degree.

	For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court
lacked authority, on the basis of defendant's post-verdict motion
for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of Escape in the Second
Degree, to enter a judgment of acquittal on that charge and to
enter a finding of guilty on the lesser-included offense of
Attempted Escape in the Second Degree.  Accordingly, we direct
that a peremptory writ of mandamus shall issue directing the
trial court to vacate the order granting defendant's motion for
judgment of acquittal on the charge of Escape in the Second
Degree and entering a finding of guilty on the lesser-include
offense of Attempted Escape in the Second Degree, to vacate the
"temporary" and final judgments on the offense of Attempted
Escape in the Second Degree, to enter judgment on the verdict,
and to sentence defendant accordingly.

	Peremptory writ to issue.

1. 	ORS 135.755 provides:

		"The court may, either of its own motion or upon
the application of the district attorney, and in
furtherance of justice, order the proceedings to be
dismissed.  The reasons for the dismissal shall be set
forth in the order, which shall be entered in the
register."	

2. 	ORS 136.500 provides:

		"A motion in arrest of judgment is an application on
the part of the defendant that no judgment be rendered on a
plea or verdict of guilty.  It may be founded on either or
both of the grounds specified in ORS 135.630(1) and (4), and
not otherwise.  The motion must be made within the time
allowed to file a motion for a new trial, and both such
motions may be made and heard as the court directs."

3. 	ORS 136.535 provides, in part:

		"(1)  A motion in arrest of a judgment or a motion for
a new trial, with the affidavits, if any, in support thereof
shall be filed within five days after the filing of the
judgment sought to be set aside, or such further time as the
court may allow.

		"* * * * *

		"(4)  Except as otherwise provided in this section, ORS
19.430 and ORCP 64 A, B and D through G shall apply to and
regulate new trials in criminal actions, except that a new
trial shall not be granted on application of the state."