Title: James Eugene Hunter v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC07-161
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: September 25, 2008

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-161 
____________ 
 
JAMES EUGENE HUNTER,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[September 25, 2008] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
James Eugene Hunter appeals an order denying his successive motion for 
postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons explained 
below, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Hunter’s postconviction motion. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Hunter was convicted of one count of first-degree murder, three counts of 
attempted first-degree murder, one count of attempted armed robbery, and three 
counts of armed robbery.  Hunter v. State (Hunter I), 660 So. 2d 244, 247 (Fla. 
1995).  The facts in this case are summarized in our opinion in Hunter’s direct 
appeal: 
The following facts were established at trial.  On September 16, 
1992, James Hunter (a.k.a. Michael Miller), Tammie Cowan, Cathy 
Woodward, Charles Anderson, [Bruce Pope (a.k.a. Andre Smith)], 
and Eric Boyd [(a.k.a. Lee Lewis)] traveled by car from St. Augustine 
to DeLand.  Tammie Cowan testified that there were two black BB 
guns and one silver handgun in the car.  Boyd and Anderson had the 
BB guns and Hunter had the handgun. In DeLand they stopped briefly 
to see Andre Smith's mother.  Thereafter, at approximately 11:44 
p.m., Cowan stopped the car and Anderson, Boyd, Smith, and Hunter 
exited.  Hunter then confronted and robbed a man on the street, using 
the silver handgun.  Hunter and his companions then departed for 
Daytona Beach.  Shortly afterwards, a “be on the lookout” (BOLO) 
alert for the DeLand robbers was transmitted by the police throughout 
the Volusia County area.  The BOLO described a gray four-door 
sedan occupied by at least five black individuals, two of whom were 
females, who were suspects. 
After the robbery, Hunter directed Cowan to drive to Daytona 
Beach and the vicinity of Bethune-Cookman College where four 
young men were standing outside the “Munch Shop.”  Hunter 
instructed Cowan to stop the vehicle, and Hunter, Lewis, Anderson, 
and Smith exited and approached the four men.  Hunter was armed 
with the silver handgun. 
Hunter approached the men and ordered them to “give it up.”  
Hunter and his companions then robbed the men at gunpoint.  
Thereafter, while the men were lying face down on the sidewalk, 
Hunter shot each of them in turn.  Wayne Simpson was the last victim 
to be shot in this process, and he subsequently died.  Hunter and his 
colleagues then fled with the victims' clothing, jewelry, and other 
miscellaneous items of personal property.  When Hunter returned to 
the car, he ordered Cowan to leave, and told her that he had fired the 
gun because a victim had tried to run.  Shortly thereafter, at 12:40 
a.m., Deputy Richard Graves observed a vehicle in Ormond Beach 
matching the DeLand BOLO.  Graves stopped the automobile, and 
Cowan told Graves that she and the others had come from DeLand.  
While the car was stopped, the DeLand robbery victim was brought to 
the scene where he identified Hunter as his robber and also identified 
 
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the car.  Cowan consented to a search of the car which yielded two 
BB guns and personal property belonging to the victims of both the 
DeLand and Daytona Beach robberies.  The gun used by Hunter was 
never found. 
 
Id. at 246-47.  The jury recommended that Hunter receive the death penalty for 
Simpson’s murder, and the trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and 
sentenced Hunter to death.  Id.  We affirmed Hunter’s convictions and sentence of 
death on direct appeal.  Id. at 246.  
Hunter then filed an initial postconviction motion in March 1997.  Hunter v. 
State (Hunter II), 817 So. 2d 786, 790 (Fla. 2002).  He subsequently filed two 
amended postconviction motions, raising thirteen claims with multiple subparts.  
Id.  The trial court ordered an evidentiary hearing on four of Hunter’s claims and 
summarily denied the remainder of the claims.  Id. at 790-91.  After holding an 
evidentiary hearing on April 5, 2000, the trial court denied all relief.  Id. at 791.  
This Court affirmed the trial court’s order denying postconviction relief and denied 
Hunter’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.  Id. at 789.  Hunter subsequently filed a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, the denial of which was 
affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.  Hunter v. 
Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr. (Hunter III), 395 F.3d 1196, 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2005).   
On October 3, 2005, Hunter filed a successive motion for postconviction 
relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  After the circuit court 
issued an order striking the 3.851 motion, Hunter filed an amended 3.851 motion 
 
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on January 11, 2006.  Hunter’s amended motion contained the same claims as the 
original motion but added information to the motion.  The trial court held a Huff1 
hearing on Hunter’s amended postconviction motion on November 14, 2006.  On 
December 22, 2006, the circuit court denied Hunter’s postconviction motion 
without holding an evidentiary hearing on any of the claims.  This appeal followed. 
ANALYSIS 
Hunter challenges the summary denial of each of the four claims raised in 
his successive postconviction motion:  (1) another codefendant was the shooter; (2) 
defense counsel had an actual conflict of interest in representing Hunter and a State 
witness; (3) a State witness was incompetent to testify at trial; and (4) violations of 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 
(1972), occurred through the State’s failure to disclose threats and promises to a 
State witness.  We will discuss each of these issues in turn, but first we will explain 
the requirements for a rule 3.851 motion and the standard of review. 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 governs the timeliness of 
postconviction motions in capital cases.  Rule 3.851(d)(1) prohibits the filing of a 
postconviction motion more than one year after the judgment and sentence become 
final.  An exception to the rule permits otherwise untimely motions if the movant 
alleges that “the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the 
                                          
 
 
1.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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movant or the movant’s attorney and could not have been ascertained by the 
exercise of due diligence.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A). 
Rule 3.851 also sets outs certain pleading requirements for initial and 
successive postconviction motions.  Among other requirements, the motion must 
state the nature of the relief sought and must include “a detailed allegation of the 
factual basis for any claim for which an evidentiary hearing is sought.”  Fla. R. 
Crim. P. 3.851(e)(1)(C), (e)(1)(D), (e)(2)(A).  A successive motion based upon 
newly discovered evidence, Brady, or Giglio must also include 
(i) the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of all 
witnesses supporting the claim; 
(ii) a statement that the witness will be available, should an 
evidentiary hearing be scheduled, to testify under oath to the facts 
alleged in the motion or affidavit; 
(iii) if evidentiary support is in the form of documents, copies 
of all documents shall be attached, including any affidavits obtained; 
and  
(iv) as to any witness or document listed in the motion or 
attachment to the motion, a statement of the reason why the witness or 
document was not previously available. 
 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2)(C). 
 
Rule 3.851(f)(5)(B) permits the denial of a successive postconviction motion 
without an evidentiary hearing “[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case 
conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.”  Because a court’s 
decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.851 motion is 
ultimately based on written materials before the court, its ruling is tantamount to a 
 
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pure question of law, subject to de novo review.  See State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 
120, 137 (Fla. 2003) (holding that “pure questions of law” that are discernable 
from the record “are subject to de novo review”).  In reviewing a trial court’s 
summary denial of postconviction relief, this Court must accept the defendant’s 
allegations as true to the extent that they are not conclusively refuted by the record.  
Rutherford v. State, 926 So. 2d 1100, 1108 (Fla. 2006) (citing Hodges v. State, 885 
So. 2d 338, 355 (Fla. 2004)).  The summary denial of a newly discovered evidence 
claim will be upheld if the motion is legally insufficient or its allegations are 
conclusively refuted by the record.  McLin v. State, 827 So. 2d 948, 954 (Fla. 
2002) (citing Foster v. State, 810 So. 2d 910, 914 (Fla. 2002)).   
IDENTITY OF THE SHOOTER 
 
Hunter asserts that the circuit court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing 
on his claim of newly discovered evidence of codefendant Eric Boyd’s recent 
confession to shooting Taurus Cooley, one of the surviving victims, in a dispute 
over drugs.2  Hunter alleged in his postconviction motion that the testimony of 
                                          
 
 
2.  Hunter and Boyd were tried together.  Neither Hunter nor Boyd testified 
at trial.  The jury found Hunter guilty of all counts as charged in the indictment and 
recommended that he be sentenced to death.  The jury found Boyd guilty of all 
counts as charged in the indictment, except the jury found Boyd guilty of the lesser 
included offense of attempted second-degree murder of Cooley.  The jury 
recommended a life sentence for Boyd.   
 
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Boyd, Bruce Pope,3 and Charles Anderson4 would verify that “the reason for the 
trip to Daytona Beach was for Mr. Boyd (who was armed with a pearl handled 
pistol) to obtain the drugs or money from Mr. Cooley.”  Hunter alleged that the 
newly discovered evidence would establish that Hunter “was not involved in the 
shooting and that, in fact, he was not in the immediate area when the shooting took 
place.”  The circuit court denied this claim, finding that it failed to satisfy the first 
prong of Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1998), and that the allegations were 
facially insufficient to establish that Hunter would probably be acquitted of the 
murder of Wayne Simpson.   
 
To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must 
meet two requirements.  Jones, 709 So. 2d at 521.  First, the evidence must not 
have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel, and it must appear that 
the defendant or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of due 
diligence.  Id. (citing Torres-Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So. 2d 1321, 1324-25 (Fla. 
1994)).  Second, the evidence “must be of such nature that it would probably 
produce an acquittal on retrial.”  Id. (citing Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 
                                          
 
 
3.  Pope pleaded nolo contendere to each of the offenses for which Hunter 
was convicted.  Pope testified at Hunter’s trial.  In exchange for Pope’s plea and 
testimony, the State agreed to recommend concurrent life sentences.  
 
 
4.  Anderson awaited trial on the charges at the time of Hunter’s trial.  He 
did not testify at Hunter’s trial.   
 
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(Fla. 1991)).  Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the Jones 
test if it “weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable 
doubt as to his culpability.”  Id. at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 309, 315 
(Fla. 1996)).   
 
In denying Hunter’s claim, the circuit court concluded that Hunter failed to 
satisfy the first prong of Jones because “the fact concerning the reason Defendant 
and his co-defendants came to Daytona Beach, and the sequence of events at the 
crime scene, are within Defendant’s knowledge.”  While the court’s observation 
may be correct in the sense that those specific facts were within Hunter’s 
knowledge, the circuit court erred in finding that Hunter’s entire claim failed to 
meet the first prong of Jones.  The bulk of Hunter’s claim was based on his 
assertion that codefendant Boyd recently confessed to shooting Cooley in a dispute 
over drugs and that his testimony and the testimony of codefendants Pope and 
Anderson would corroborate that the reason for the trip to Daytona Beach was for 
Boyd to obtain the drugs or money from Cooley.  Moreover, Hunter alleged that 
Boyd previously refused to give a statement because he was promised by 
prosecutors that they would clear the matter up and that he should keep quiet.  
Hunter also alleged that Pope and Anderson remained silent because of promises 
from the State that they would receive leniency from their sentences.   
 
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In similar circumstances, Florida courts have found post-trial confessions 
from codefendants to qualify as newly discovered in the sense that the evidence 
was not known at the time of trial and could not have been known by the use of 
due diligence.  See Brantley v. State, 912 So. 2d 342, 342-43 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) 
(remanding for an evidentiary hearing based on the affidavit of a codefendant 
which stated the defendant was not present and was not involved in the shooting 
and based on the postconviction motion which alleged that defense counsel tried to 
obtain the codefendant’s cooperation but was refused); Roundtree v. State, 884 So. 
2d 322, 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that the defendant’s allegations that his 
codefendant admitted that the defendant had no role in the robbery and that the 
codefendant had not testified on the defendant’s behalf because he had been 
coerced by the State were sufficient to state a prima facie claim of newly 
discovered evidence); Kendrick v. State, 708 So. 2d 1011, 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1998) (stating that a codefendant’s sworn post-trial testimony that he lied to police 
and that he was told by police to say he got the cocaine from the defendant in order 
to keep his own prison time to a minimum qualified as newly discovered evidence 
because it was unknown, the codefendant was unwilling to give the testimony 
previously, and the testimony could not have been secured through due diligence); 
State v. Gomez, 363 So. 2d 624, 626-28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (treating as newly 
 
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discovered evidence the post-trial affidavit of a codefendant confessing to having 
committed the robbery without the defendant’s assistance).   
Nevertheless, we do not find that the circuit court erred in summarily 
denying this claim.  In denying Hunter’s claim, the circuit court concluded that 
Hunter’s allegations were facially insufficient to establish that Hunter would 
probably be acquitted of the murder of Wayne Simpson and noted that Hunter’s 
motion did not allege that Boyd claimed to have murdered Simpson.   
Hunter’s allegations are indeed insufficient to support his claim of innocence 
of first-degree murder.  Hunter was convicted of multiple charges against multiple 
victims: the first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery of Simpson, the 
attempted first-degree murder and armed robbery of Cooley, the attempted first-
degree murder and armed robbery of Theodore Troutman, and the attempted first-
degree murder and armed robbery of Michael Howard.  However, Hunter’s motion 
only specifically alleged that codefendant Boyd confessed to shooting one victim:  
Cooley.  Although Hunter’s motion repeatedly referred to another codefendant 
having confessed to being “the shooter” and stated that the evidence would 
establish that Hunter was not present during “the shooting” or involved in “the 
shooting,” the only shooting specifically identified in the motion was the shooting 
of Cooley.  Although Hunter contends on appeal that Boyd’s confession leads to 
the logical conclusion that Boyd shot the four victims, this was never alleged in the 
 
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motion.  At the Huff hearing on the motion, postconviction counsel even conceded 
that he was not prepared to say that Boyd had confessed to killing Simpson.   
Unlike the cases discussed above in which the courts remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing based on the post-trial confession of a codefendant, the 
confession in this case does not concern the only crime for which the defendant 
was convicted.  Cf. Brantley, 912 So. 2d at 342-43 (noting that the defendant was 
convicted of the first-degree murder of one victim and that the codefendant’s 
affidavit alleged that the defendant was not present during the victim’s shooting); 
Roundtree, 884 So. 2d at 323 (observing that the defendant was convicted of armed 
robbery and that the codefendant admitted that the defendant had no role in the 
robbery); Kendrick, 708 So. 2d at 1012 (noting that the defendant was found guilty 
of trafficking in cocaine and that the codefendant confessed that the cocaine was 
not the defendant’s); Gomez, 363 So. 2d at 625-26 (discussing the defendant’s 
conviction for robbery and the codefendant’s post-trial confession to having 
committed the robbery without the defendant’s assistance).  The confession in this 
case only addresses one of several crimes and does not address the crime for which 
Hunter claimed innocence in his motion.   
Moreover, apart from the specific allegation regarding Boyd’s confession 
and the reason for the trip to Daytona Beach, the motion was otherwise vague.  
Although it alleged that the newly discovered evidence would establish that Hunter 
 
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was not present or involved, it contained no factual allegations to support this 
statement.  Thus, Hunter’s motion insufficiently alleged the facts supporting this 
claim, in contravention of rule 3.851(e)(1)(D).   
Even if we were to find Hunter’s claim to be facially sufficient, Hunter has 
not satisfied the second prong of Jones.  The newly discovered evidence is not of 
such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.5  As explained 
below, evidence was presented at trial through the testimony of multiple witnesses 
on each of the matters alleged in Hunter’s successive motion.   
First, each of the surviving victims testified at trial.  Michael Howard 
testified that he was with Wayne Simpson, Theodore Troutman, and Taurus 
Cooley shortly after midnight on September 17, 1992, at the Munch Shop near 
Bethune-Cookman College.  He testified that they were approached by four black 
males that he had never seen before and told to “give it up.”  Howard identified 
Hunter in court as the one who told them to “give it up.”  Howard testified that 
Hunter had a chrome gun.  Howard said that Hunter ordered Cooley to take off his 
shirt and that Hunter then shot Cooley in the chest with the chrome gun.  Howard 
testified that he then saw the gun wave toward him and that he turned around and 
                                          
 
 
5.  In his postconviction motion, Hunter only contended that the newly 
discovered evidence would likely produce an acquittal on retrial.  Thus, to the 
extent that Hunter argues on appeal that the newly discovered evidence would 
probably produce a less severe sentence, this argument is not properly before this 
Court.  
 
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heard three more shots.  Howard said he noticed that he had been shot after he 
started running away and there was blood running down his back.   
Troutman testified that he was with Simpson, Howard, and Cooley at the 
Munch Shop during the late evening hours of September 16, 1992, until just after 
midnight on September 17, 1992.  Troutman testified that he and his friends were 
approached by several men and that he heard one of them say to “give it up.”  
Troutman stated that he saw multiple guns, including a long, black gun that had 
been put to his neck and a silver handgun.  Troutman identified Hunter as one of 
the men that night.  Troutman testified that he saw Hunter with the silver gun.  
Troutman testified that he saw Cooley taking off his shirt and that Troutman then 
heard gunfire.  Troutman testified that he himself was later shot.   
Cooley testified that he was with Simpson, Troutman, and Howard at the 
Munch Shop on the night of September 16, 1992, when they were approached by 
four men.  Cooley testified that he had never seen any of the four men prior to that 
night.  However, Cooley identified both Hunter and Boyd in court.  Cooley 
testified that three of the men had guns and that Hunter told them to give up their 
possessions and money and that Boyd told them to lie down.  Cooley testified that 
Boyd put a long gun to Troutman’s neck and that Hunter put a gun on Cooley.  
Cooley testified that Hunter had a small chrome handgun, “like a .25.”  Cooley 
testified that Hunter pointed the gun at Cooley and told him to take off his shirt.  
 
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Cooley said that he took off his shirt and had it in his hand when Hunter shot him 
in the chest.  Cooley testified that Hunter shot Simpson, Troutman, and Howard a 
couple of seconds later.   
Second, two of Hunter’s companions on the night in question also testified at 
trial.  Tammie Cowan testified that she was with James Hunter, Charles Anderson, 
Bruce Pope, Eric Boyd, and Cathy Woodward on September 16, 1992, and 
traveled with them from St. Augustine to DeLand and then to Daytona in a friend’s 
car that she was driving.  She testified that Hunter told her that he wanted to go to 
Daytona and gave her directions from DeLand to Daytona.  Cowan said that 
Hunter said he wanted to go by a girl’s house to get marijuana.  She testified that 
after they went to the girl’s house, she drove a couple of blocks and that Hunter 
told her to stop.  Cowan stated that she had seen a few black men and that Hunter 
told her to stop the car about three blocks from the men they had seen.  Cowan 
testified that the four men in the car got out with the guns.  Cowan testified that 
Hunter had the silver gun and that Boyd had a gun.  Cowan testified that the men 
walked behind the car and across the street.  She said that while she and 
Woodward were sitting in the car, she heard a sound like a backfire of a car.  
Cowan testified that she heard one shot and then three more from the direction that 
the men walked in.  Cowan stated that the four men came back to the car and that 
Hunter told her to drive off and that Hunter said one of the men tried to run so he 
 
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shot at him.  Cowan also testified that Hunter had the silver gun when he got back 
in the car and that Boyd and Anderson had the BB guns with them.   
Pope testified that on September 16, 1992, he traveled with Hunter, Cowan, 
Woodward, Boyd, and Anderson to DeLand from St. Augustine to visit Pope’s 
mother.  He testified that Hunter had a .25 automatic chrome gun with a white 
pearl handle and that Anderson and Boyd had BB guns.  He testified that after 
leaving DeLand, they went to Daytona.  He said that it was Hunter’s idea and that 
Hunter gave Cowan directions.  Pope testified that they stopped at a girl’s house in 
Daytona to get marijuana and that Hunter got out of the car.  Pope stated that after 
Hunter got back in the car, they drove around with Hunter telling Cowan how to 
get where they wanted to go.  Pope testified that near the Bethune-Cookman 
College area they saw four guys sitting down and that Hunter told Cowan to stop 
the car.  He testified that he got out of the car with Hunter, Boyd, and Anderson 
and that Anderson and Boyd had the BB guns and that Hunter had the silver gun.  
Pope testified that they went to where the men were sitting.  Pope testified that 
Hunter pointed a gun at the chest of one of the men and that the man took off his 
shirt.  Pope said that he was turned around and that then he heard a gunshot and 
saw a flash from Hunter’s gun.  Pope testified that at the time that the man was 
shot taking off his shirt, Boyd was standing with his gun over three of the men who 
were lying on the ground.  Pope said that after he saw the flash from Hunter’s gun, 
 
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Pope ran back to the car and heard three more gunshots.  Pope stated that he saw 
Hunter with the silver gun on his way back to the car.   
In sum, every part of Hunter’s newly discovered evidence claim was 
addressed through the testimony of multiple witnesses at trial.  Multiple witnesses 
testified that it was Hunter’s idea to go to Daytona Beach to obtain marijuana from 
a girl.  Multiple witnesses, both victims and perpetrators, testified that Hunter was 
armed with a chrome handgun and was present at the scene of the robberies and 
shootings.  Moreover, multiple witnesses testified that Hunter shot Cooley (and the 
other victims), or they gave testimony implying as much.  This is not a situation 
where the State’s case was based on the testimony of one key witness and there 
was no other evidence tying the defendant to the crimes.  Cf. Johnson v. 
Singletary, 647 So. 2d 106, 111 (Fla. 1994) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing 
where the State’s case was based almost entirely on one person’s eyewitness 
testimony and there was no other evidence tying the defendant to the crime and 
where several affidavits stated that another person confessed to committing the 
crime).  Furthermore, even if Pope is now recanting his trial testimony as Hunter’s 
motion implied and would testify at a new trial, he could still be impeached at a 
new trial with his prior inconsistent statements given at Hunter’s original trial.  See 
§ 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. (2007).  In light of the strong testimonial evidence 
 
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establishing Hunter’s guilt, we conclude that the newly discovered evidence would 
not probably produce an acquittal on retrial.   
Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in denying an 
evidentiary hearing on Hunter’s claim of newly discovered evidence that another 
codefendant was the shooter.   
CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
 
Hunter asserts that the circuit court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing 
on his claim of newly discovered evidence of trial counsel’s actual conflict of 
interest.  Hunter claims that newly discovered evidence establishes that defense 
counsel George Burden had an actual conflict of interest because he was a member 
of the same public defender’s office that had represented witness and victim 
Taurus Cooley.  The circuit court denied this claim, concluding that the claim was 
untimely and that the evidence could have been discovered prior to the initial 
postconviction evidentiary hearing through the exercise of due diligence.   
 
In light of Hunter’s failure to sufficiently allege his diligence and timeliness 
in pursuing this claim in accordance with the requirements of rule 3.851, we find 
that the circuit court correctly denied this claim.  In Hunter’s initial postconviction 
motion filed in 1999, Hunter raised a claim alleging that trial counsel Burden had 
an actual conflict of interest during his representation of Hunter because the public 
defender’s office also represented Cooley when he was a witness against Hunter.  
 
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The postconviction trial court held an evidentiary hearing on this claim at which 
Cooley, Hunter, Burden, and trial prosecutor Elizabeth Blackburn-Gardner 
testified.  Through the testimony and evidence introduced at the hearing, Hunter 
demonstrated that other members of the same public defender’s office had 
represented Cooley in a number of unrelated criminal charges within the year 
preceding Hunter’s trial.  However, Burden and Blackburn-Gardner testified that 
they were either unaware of or could not recall that Cooley had a criminal history 
and was represented by the public defender’s office.  The trial court ultimately 
denied relief, and this court affirmed the denial.  Hunter II, 817 So. 2d at 793.6  
Thus, the issue of Burden’s alleged conflict of interest was previously raised and 
decided in Hunter’s first postconviction proceedings.   
Claims raised in prior postconviction proceedings cannot be relitigated in a 
subsequent postconviction motion unless the movant can demonstrate that the 
                                          
 
 
6.  This Court specifically held that while Hunter articulated a potential 
conflict of interest, the trial court did not err in concluding that Hunter failed to 
demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest existed that affected his attorney’s 
performance under the circumstances in the case.  Hunter II, 817 So. 2d at 793.  
This Court also held that even if an actual conflict of interest existed within the 
public defender’s office, Hunter failed to demonstrate that the conflict adversely 
affected his attorney’s representation.  Id.  This Court noted that trial counsel’s 
testimony at the evidentiary hearing that he was not aware of Cooley’s criminal 
background or the public defender’s prior representation of Cooley refuted 
Hunter’s contention that the conflict prevented adequate cross-examination of 
Cooley about his recent and impending criminal charges in an attempt to impeach 
Cooley’s credibility.  Id.  The federal district court and the Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals likewise denied relief on this claim.  See Hunter III, 395 F.3d at 1200, 
1202. 
 
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grounds for relief were not known and could not have been known at the time of 
the earlier proceeding.  See Wright v. State, 857 So. 2d 861, 868 (Fla. 2003).  Rule 
3.851 requires motions filed beyond the time limitations to specifically allege that 
the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown or could not have been 
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A).  
Furthermore, the rule requires successive motions to articulate the reasons why a 
claim was not raised previously and why the evidence used in support of the claim 
was not previously available.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2)(B), (e)(2)(C)(iv).  
Hunter’s motion does not satisfy any of these requirements.   
Hunter presented the following allegations.  He alleged that an NCIC/FCIC 
(National Crime Information Center/Florida Crime Information Center) report 
detailing Cooley’s criminal background was obtained by Blackburn-Gardner and 
delivered to Burden before Hunter’s trial.  He alleged that this evidence was 
discovered within one year of the filing of the motion.  Hunter further alleged that 
postconviction counsel was deceived by the testimony of Blackburn-Gardner and 
Burden at the time of the previous evidentiary hearing as to their alleged lack of 
knowledge of Cooley’s criminal background and the conflict of interest.  When 
asked at the Huff hearing about the timeliness of this claim, Hunter’s current 
postconviction counsel stated that the previous postconviction counsel who had 
filed the motion on behalf of Hunter would be available to testify as to the facts 
 
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and circumstances of the discovery of the NCIC/FCIC report and the diligence he 
exercised.  However, no facts or circumstances were ever alleged in the motion.  
The motion did not assert that the report could not have been discovered 
previously, and it did not give a reason why it was not previously available.   In 
sum, apart from cursorily stating that the evidence was discovered within a year of 
the filing of the motion and that the testimony at the previous evidentiary hearing 
deceived counsel, Hunter did not make any allegations concerning the timeliness 
of this claim or the diligence used to pursue it. 
In light of Hunter’s deficient allegations regarding the timeliness of the 
claim and the diligence used to pursue it, we hold that the circuit court correctly 
denied Hunter’s claim as untimely.   
WITNESS’S COMPETENCY TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL 
 
Hunter contends that the circuit court erred in denying an evidentiary 
hearing on his claim of newly discovered evidence of witness Taurus Cooley’s 
incompetence to testify at Hunter’s trial.  Hunter argues that Cooley’s adjudication 
of not guilty by reason of insanity in proceedings that occurred in 2001, years after 
Hunter’s trial in 1993, established that Cooley was incompetent to testify at 
Hunter’s trial.  The circuit court denied this claim, concluding that the evidence 
could not be considered newly discovered evidence and noting that Hunter did not 
allege that Cooley was also incompetent to testify at the prior postconviction 
 
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proceedings in which Hunter called Cooley as a witness.  The circuit court also 
held that the claim was facially insufficient in numerous respects, observing that 
Hunter failed to provide the relevant details about proposed expert witnesses as 
required by rule 3.851, failed to allege that Cooley was consenting to submit to a 
mental status examination, and failed to allege any facts showing how Cooley’s  
2001 post-trial adjudication would have any relevance to his competence to testify 
at Hunter’s trial in 1993.   
On appeal, Hunter contends that the evidence may be properly considered 
newly discovered evidence, citing this Court’s decisions in State v. Mills, 788 So. 
2d 249 (Fla. 2001), and Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1992).  The State 
disagrees, citing among other cases this Court’s decisions in Porter v. State, 653 
So. 2d 374 (Fla. 1995), and Kearse v. State, 969 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 2007).  Because 
we conclude that the circuit court correctly determined that Hunter’s claim was 
facially insufficient in several respects, we need not decide whether the evidence 
qualifies as newly discovered evidence.  As explained below, we conclude that the 
circuit court’s summary denial of this claim was proper. 
Hunter claimed that Cooley was incompetent to testify at Hunter’s trial.  
Hunter alleged that Cooley was declared legally insane and not guilty by reason of 
insanity on several felony charges in proceedings that occurred after Hunter’s trial.  
While Hunter asserted that the adjudication occurred after the original 
 
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postconviction proceedings, Hunter provided no other facts in support of this 
claim, including any facts demonstrating Cooley’s incompetence in 1993.  Further, 
he did not identify when or where the adjudication occurred.  Although the circuit 
court’s order denying postconviction relief noted that the adjudication occurred in 
2001 in Volusia County, Hunter failed to allege these facts in his motion.  Thus, 
Hunter failed to provide detailed allegations of the factual basis for this claim as 
required by rule 3.851(e)(1)(D).  Furthermore, while Hunter asserted in his motion 
that evidence to support the claim included court documents of Cooley’s 
proceedings, no documents from Cooley’s proceedings were attached to the motion 
in the record that this Court has on appeal.  Thus, it appears that Hunter failed to 
attach the documents he relied upon, in contravention of rule 3.851(e)(2)(C)(iii).  
In support of his claim, Hunter asserted that he “may also produce expert witness 
testimony as to the nature and extent of Mr. Cooley’s longstanding disorder and its 
impact on Mr. Cooley’s competence to have testified against Mr. Hunter.”  
However, as the circuit court acknowledged, Hunter failed to provide the name, 
address, and telephone number of the expert witness supporting the claim, contrary 
to the requirements of rule 3.851(e)(2)(C)(i).   
In sum, as the circuit court found, Hunter failed to sufficiently allege facts to 
show how Cooley’s post-trial adjudication of not guilty by reason of insanity in 
 
- 22 -
2001 would have any relevance to Cooley’s competence to testify at Hunter’s trial  
in 1993, and also failed to meet several pleading requirements of rule 3.851.7  
Even if we were to find that Hunter sufficiently alleged his claim and that 
the evidence properly qualifies as newly discovered evidence, Hunter has not 
satisfied the second prong of Jones.  The evidence alleged by Hunter is not of such 
a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.  The record 
demonstrates that other witnesses testified as to the same matters to which Cooley 
testified.  The other surviving victims, Howard and Troutman, and two of Hunter’s 
companions, Cowan and Pope, testified that Hunter was armed with a chrome 
handgun and was present at the scene of the robberies and shootings.  Moreover, 
Howard testified that Hunter shot Cooley, and Pope gave testimony clearly 
implying as much.  While no other witness apart from Cooley explicitly testified 
that he or she saw Hunter shoot the other victims, the testimony of Cowan and 
Pope suggested that Hunter retained possession of the gun after all four victims 
were shot.   In light of the strong testimonial evidence establishing Hunter’s guilt, 
                                          
 
 
7.  Moreover, we question Hunter’s diligence and timeliness in presenting a 
claim challenging Cooley’s competency to testify at trial.  During Hunter’s prior 
postconviction proceedings in 2000, the father of victim Wayne Simpson informed 
the court that when he confronted Cooley about Cooley’s demeanor and actions at 
the postconviction proceedings, Cooley described himself as a “mental case,” who 
was “not supposed to be here.”  Thus, the record demonstrates that as early as 
2000, Hunter was informed of a possible issue concerning Cooley’s mental 
competency.   
 
- 23 -
we conclude that the evidence of Cooley’s alleged incompetence would not 
probably produce an acquittal on retrial as required by Jones.   
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying an 
evidentiary hearing on Hunter’s claim of newly discovered evidence that Cooley 
was incompetent to testify at Hunter’s trial.   
BRADY AND GIGLIO  
 
Hunter asserts that the circuit court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing 
on his claim that the State withheld favorable evidence in violation of Brady and 
presented misleading evidence in violation of Giglio.  Specifically, Hunter claims 
that the State threatened witness Tammie Cowan with a life sentence if she did not 
testify against Hunter and that this threat was not disclosed to the defense.  The 
circuit court denied this claim, noting that Giglio was inapplicable because the 
motion failed to allege that any aspect of Cowan’s testimony was false and that the 
proposed testimony would not satisfy the materiality prong of Brady.  The circuit 
court also concluded that Hunter’s claim failed to meet the requirements for relief 
based on a claim of newly discovered evidence because it could have been 
discovered through due diligence.   
In light of Hunter’s specific allegations concerning his diligence, we find 
that the circuit court improperly found that Hunter’s claim was procedurally barred 
because the evidence could have been discovered previously through the exercise 
 
- 24 -
of due diligence.8 Hunter’s motion satisfies the pleading requirements of rule 3.851 
with respect to timeliness and diligence.  Hunter alleged that Cowan could not be 
located during the pendency of the initial postconviction proceedings, despite due 
diligence.  He specifically asserted that “Ms. Cowan had been incarcerated during 
that period of time and, prior to her incarceration, had not maintained a consistent 
residence where she could have been located to obtain a statement.”  While the 
State may contest Hunter’s diligence, Hunter sufficiently alleged the reason why 
this claim was not presented previously.  Moreover, because the circuit court 
summarily denied Hunter’s claim, this Court must accept Hunter’s allegations as 
true to the extent that they are not conclusively refuted by the record.  See 
Rutherford, 926 So. 2d at 1108.  As nothing in the record conclusively refutes 
Hunter’s allegations, we must accept Hunter’s allegations regarding his diligence 
as true.  Accordingly, we find that the circuit court erred in denying Hunter’s claim 
on this ground.   
Nevertheless, we do not find that the circuit court erred in summarily 
denying this claim.  Hunter’s allegations for his Giglio and Brady claim are 
insufficient and conclusively refuted by the record. 
                                          
 
 
8.  Based on the arguments presented by the State in its response to Hunter’s 
motion and at the Huff hearing, it appears that the contested diligence aspect 
concerned Hunter’s failure to present this claim in the prior postconviction 
proceedings, not his failure to use diligence at the time of trial.   
 
- 25 -
A Giglio claim alleges that a prosecutor knowingly presented false 
testimony against the defendant.  See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153.  “To establish a 
Giglio violation, it must be shown that: (1) the testimony given was false; (2) the 
prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the statement was material.”  
Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 505 (Fla. 2003) (citing Ventura v. State, 794 So. 
2d 553, 562 (Fla. 2001)).  “Under Giglio, where the prosecutor knowingly uses 
perjured testimony, or fails to correct what the prosecutor later learns is false 
testimony, the false evidence is material ‘if there is any reasonable likelihood that 
the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.’ ” Guzman, 868 
So. 2d at 506 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).  Under 
this standard, the State has the burden to prove that false testimony was not 
material by demonstrating that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id.; see 
also Mordenti v. State, 894 So. 2d 161, 175 (Fla. 2004).  Thus, the standard applied 
under the third prong of the Giglio test is more defense-friendly than the test set 
out in Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999), which is applied to a 
violation under Brady.  See Guzman, 868 So. 2d at 507. 
Brady requires the State to disclose material information within its 
possession or control that is favorable to the defense.  Mordenti, 894 So. 2d at 168.  
To establish a Brady violation, the defendant has the burden to show (1) that 
favorable evidence—either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or 
 
- 26 -
inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, 
the defendant was prejudiced.  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82; see also Way v. State, 
760 So. 2d 903, 910 (Fla. 2000).  To meet the materiality prong, the defendant 
must demonstrate a reasonable probability that had the suppressed evidence been 
disclosed the jury would have reached a different verdict.  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 
289.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 
in the outcome.  Way, 760 So. 2d at 913; see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290.  The 
remedy of retrial for the State’s suppression of evidence favorable to the defense is 
available when “the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole 
case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”  Strickler, 
527 U.S. at 290 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)).  When 
determining materiality, the cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence must be 
considered.  Lightbourne v. State, 841 So. 2d 431, 437 (Fla. 2003).  Furthermore, 
the impeachment value of the undisclosed evidence must be analyzed in 
determining whether prejudice ensued.  Mordenti, 894 So. 2d at 170.   
The circuit court found that Giglio was inapplicable because Hunter did not 
claim that any aspect of Cowan’s trial testimony was false.  The circuit court 
correctly concluded that Hunter’s allegations failed to state a claim under Giglio.  
Although Hunter argues on appeal that “it is clear that the crux of Mr. Hunter’s 
claim is that Cowan’s damaging testimony was false and was the direct result of 
 
- 27 -
the threats and promises made to her by the State,” Hunter’s motion contained no 
clear allegation that Cowan’s testimony was false.  While Hunter vaguely asserted 
that because the State’s threat to Cowan was not disclosed to the defense, it 
constituted a violation of the duties established in Giglio “forbidding the 
presentation of false or misleading evidence,” Hunter failed to present any specific 
allegations in support of his Giglio claim.  Hunter failed to allege that Cowan gave 
false testimony, he failed to allege that the prosecutor knew that Cowan’s 
testimony was false, and he failed to allege that Cowan’s testimony was material.  
In sum, Hunter failed to allege any of the elements of a Giglio claim.  Given the 
significant pleading deficiencies of Hunter’s Giglio claim, the circuit court’s 
summary denial of Hunter’s Giglio claim was proper.  See Rodriguez v. State, 919 
So. 2d 1252, 1269-70 (Fla. 2005) (affirming the summary denial of a Giglio claim 
that failed to show that the testimony was false or that the prosecutor had 
knowledge of the allegedly false testimony).   
Hunter’s Brady claim also is quite conclusory, although it may contain 
sufficient allegations to establish the first two prongs of Brady.  Nevertheless, we 
do not find that the circuit court erred in summarily denying this claim.  The circuit 
court properly found that Hunter’s allegations would not satisfy the materiality 
 
- 28 -
prong of Brady.  There is no reasonable probability that had the evidence been 
disclosed the jury would have reached a different verdict.9   
At trial, Cowan’s credibility was impeached in several respects, including 
her motive for testifying.  Cowan testified that she was charged with accessory 
after the fact to armed robbery and accessory after the fact to murder for her role in 
the crimes with which Hunter was charged.  Cowan testified that she entered a plea 
to the charges.  She testified that she was serving a sentence of 364 days and five 
years’ probation as a result of entering pleas to the two charges.  She also testified 
that one of the crimes she pleaded to was a first-degree felony, punishable by up to 
life imprisonment.  Cowan further testified that she had been worried about being 
charged with the murder.  Cowan testified that she received five years probation, 
“if [she] would cooperate.”  When asked if that included testifying at trial, Cowan 
testified both affirmatively and negatively and said that she was confused.  Cowan 
also testified that she was mad at Hunter for having caused the car Cowan had 
borrowed to be impounded and for failing to bond her out as he had promised.  In 
sum, although Cowan was otherwise impeached at trial, evidence that the State had 
threatened her with a life sentence if she did not testify against Hunter was not 
                                          
 
9.  Although Hunter argues on appeal that the evidence was material to 
Hunter’s punishment, Hunter failed to allege the materiality as to punishment in his 
postconviction motion, and his postconviction motion described the relief sought 
as exoneration or a new trial.  Thus, Hunter’s argument regarding the materiality as 
to punishment is not properly before this Court.  
 
- 29 -
presented.  However, even though it was not presented, the impeachment value is 
limited in light of the fact that Cowan was otherwise impeached in several 
respects. 
Furthermore, much of Cowan’s testimony was corroborated through the 
testimony of Bruce Pope, one of Hunter’s codefendants.  Pope and Cowan gave 
similar testimony about the sequence of events leading up to the shooting in 
Daytona.  Both Pope and Cowan testified that Hunter had the chrome gun when he 
exited the car with Pope, Boyd, and Anderson, and both testified that Hunter had 
the gun after the shootings.   
The record also contains extensive evidence of Hunter’s guilt.  Pope and the 
three surviving victims not only testified that Hunter was armed with a chrome 
handgun and was present at the scene of the robberies and shootings but also 
testified that Hunter shot the four victims, or they gave testimony implying as 
much.  In light of the extensive evidence of Hunter’s guilt and Cowan’s 
impeachment at trial, there is no reasonable probability that had the information 
been disclosed to Hunter the result of the proceeding would have been different.   
Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying an 
evidentiary hearing on Hunter’s claim that the State withheld favorable evidence in 
violation of Brady and presented misleading evidence in violation of Giglio. 
CONCLUSION 
 
- 30 -
 
- 31 -
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Hunter’s 
successive rule 3.851 motion for postconviction relief. 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and BELL, JJ., and 
CANTERO, Senior Justice, concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County,  
Julianne Piggotte, Judge – Case No. 92-34170CFAES 
 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Paul E. Kalil, Assistant CCR 
Counsel, and Anna-Liisa Nixon, Staff Attorney, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Kenneth S. Nunnelley, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee