Title: State of Florida v. Jorge Olivo
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC94-097
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 6, 2000

Supreme Court of Florida
  
____________
No. SC94097
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
vs.
JORGE OLIVO,
Respondent.
[April 6, 2000]
QUINCE, J.
We have for review the decision in State v. Olivo, 717 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1998), which certified conflict with the decisions in Parr v. State, 415 So. 2d
1353 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), and Bell v. State, 479 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). 
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the reasons expressed
below, we approve Parr and Bell, disapprove State v. Perez, 400 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1981), and quash the Third District’s decision in State v. Olivo.
Respondent Jorge Olivo (Olivo) was arrested on October 13, 1995, for
1   The arrest affidavit indicates the date of birth as August 17, 1978; however, the
information indicates the date of birth as August 17, 1979.
2    Effective October 1, 1995, section 39.0587 was amended and renumbered as section
39.052(3).  Both statutes enable state attorneys to prosecute juveniles as adults under limited
circumstances.  
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driving under the influence with serious bodily injury in violation of section
316.193(3)(c)(2), Florida Statutes (1995).  Olivo’s blood and urine samples,
obtained pursuant to an arrest warrant the day following the accident, indicated a
blood alcohol level of .16% and yielded positive results for cocaine and other drugs. 
At the time of his arrest, Olivo was either sixteen or seventeen years old and,
therefore, the case was initially assigned to the juvenile unit.1 
On November 15, 1995, the State announced it was considering whether to
charge Olivo as an adult pursuant to section 39.0587(1)-(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.
1994),2 and asked the trial court to set a hearing within twenty-one days.  At the
hearing on November 29, 1995, the trial court entered an order acknowledging the
State’s intention to determine whether to direct file in the criminal division. 
Although the trial court found probable cause, it released Olivo to the custody of his
parent pending a hearing on December 20, 1995.  At the December hearing, the trial
court granted the State’s request for a two-week postponement.  Subsequently, the
trial court granted several other requests for postponement made by the State.  On
3   The 175th day for trial elapsed on April 5, 1996.  
4   The 90th day for an adjudicatory hearing would have been January 11, 1996.
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March 19, 1996, the State filed an information charging Olivo as an adult, and it
later filed an  “Announcement of Direct File” on March 27, 1996.  Thereafter, the
case proceeded in the criminal division of the circuit court.   
On February 10, 1997, Olivo filed a motion to dismiss in the criminal division
of the circuit court.  A hearing on the motion was held the same day.  The parties
disagreed on whether the juvenile or adult speedy trial rule governed the
proceedings.  At the hearing, the State acknowledged Perez, but cited contrary
authority on the same issue.  In addition, the State argued that it filed an information
before the adult speedy trial rule for felonies expired.3  The circuit court, however,
concluded:  “It appears clearly that at this time, in this district, State v. Perez is still
the law.”  Accordingly, the court dismissed the case based upon the State’s failure
to bring Olivo to an adjudicatory hearing within ninety days pursuant to the juvenile
speedy trial rule.4  The Third District affirmed the circuit court’s decision and
certified conflict with Bell v. State and Parr v. State.  
The district courts have grappled with the extent to which juvenile procedural
rules should govern cases that were direct filed in the adult division.  In Perez, the
Third District held that the State could not circumvent the juvenile speedy trial rule
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by filing an information in the adult division after the juvenile speedy trial period
lapsed.  See Perez, 400 So. 2d at 93.  The court reasoned that because the juvenile
division retained jurisdiction until the State filed an information, the juvenile speedy
trial rights vested on the ninety-first day.  Therefore, the State’s filing of an
information after that time could not “deprive the defendants of their previously
vested rights under the Juvenile Speedy Trial Rule.”  Id.   
The Fourth and Second Districts, however, adopted a contrary approach.  In
Parr v. State, 415 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), the State, without filing a
petition for delinquency, filed an information after both the juvenile speedy trial
period and the period for filing a petition had expired.  The court, recognizing that
the Legislature entrusted the decision to either file a petition for delinquency or
direct file in the adult division to the state attorney, concluded that “a child who is
subject to adult proceedings and sanctions cannot rely upon the special treatment
established for juvenile proceedings.”  Id. at 1355.  The district court reasoned that
by specifically referring to petitions and adjudicatory hearings the Legislature and
the Florida Supreme Court restricted the juvenile rules’ application to those cases
involving petitions for delinquency and adjudicatory hearings, i.e., those cases
pending before the juvenile court.  
Similarly, the Second District in Bell v. State, 479 So. 2d 308, 309 (Fla. 2d
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DCA 1985), concluded that neither the statute nor court rules suggest that the time
limitations applicable to juvenile proceedings were intended to apply to adult
criminal proceedings.  The Bell court, in reaching its conclusion, also relied on
D.C.W. v. State, 445 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1984), in which this Court said the expiration
of the period for filing a delinquency petition did not bar the State from charging the
juvenile as an adult.      
Although the circuit court applied Perez to the instant case, the plain meaning
of both the juvenile rules and statutes indicates that Parr and Bell are more
consistent with the legislative scheme.  Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure  8.090,
the speedy trial rule applicable in juvenile cases, provides, in pertinent part: 
If a petition has been filed alleging a child to have committed a
delinquent act, the child shall be brought to an adjudicatory hearing
without demand within 90 days of the earlier of the following:  
(1) The date the child was taken into custody [or] 
(2) The date the petition was filed.
Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.090(a) (emphasis added).  By contrast, Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.191, the speedy trial rule applicable in adult cases, provides, in
pertinent part:  “[E]very person charged with a crime by indictment or information
shall be brought to trial . . . within 175 days if the crime charged is a felony.”  The
Perez court, while recognizing the State’s power to direct file in the adult division,
held this authority must be exercised within the time period prescribed by the
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juvenile speedy trial rule.  However, the Perez court’s rationale--that the juvenile
speedy trial rights vest on the ninety-first day--is less persuasive when considered in
context with the provisions of the rules.  As the State correctly observes, rule 8.090
refers exclusively to the filing of a petition.  Properly construed, rule 8.090(a)
provides that the ninety day period is triggered only upon the filing of a petition for
delinquency.  Therefore, the logical conclusion is that since the State did not file a
petition for delinquency, rule 8.090 and its attendant ninety-day time restriction
were not triggered.  This construction is consistent with the Parr court’s conclusion
that the juvenile speedy trial rule, by definition, applies to those cases pending
before the juvenile court.  Moreover, the Bell court was correct in its conclusion that
neither the statute nor rules evince an intent to maintain juvenile speedy trial
requirements once a case has been direct filed in the adult division.  On the contrary,
the statutes consistently provide that state attorneys are entitled to make
independent assessments without having their discretion curtailed by the juvenile
system.  
The state attorney’s independent assessment of these cases is supported by
other statutory provisions.  For example, section 39.047(4)(a), Florida Statutes
(Supp. 1994), provides that the intake counselor’s recommendation is not a
prerequisite for any action taken by the state attorney, and section 39.047(4)(e),
5   This statute, among others (including section 39.0587), was subsequently repealed when
chapter 39, Florida Statutes, was reorganized.  Most statutes pertaining to juvenile justice are now
contained in chapter 985, Florida Statutes.  Section 39.047(4)(a) provides that the intake counselor
may “recommend that the state attorney file a petition of delinquency or an information or seek an
indictment by the grand jury.  However, such a recommendation is not a prerequisite for any action
taken by the state attorney.”  § 39.047(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1994).  Similarly, section 39.047(4)(e)
states that “[t]he state attorney may in all cases take action independent of the action or lack of action
of the intake counselor or case manager, and shall determine the action which is in the best interest
of the public and the child.”  § 39.047(4)(e), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1994).
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Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), further provides that the state attorney may at all
times take action independent of the intake counselor.   See § 39.047(4), Fla. Stat.
(Supp. 1994).5   Moreover, the State may file an information rather than a petition
for delinquency without first obtaining a transfer of jurisdiction from the juvenile
court.  See Washington v. State, 642 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); State v.
Everett, 624 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (holding that “the state attorney is not
precluded from direct-filing an information despite initially filing a delinquency
petition” and noting that a transfer of jurisdiction was not required).  Furthermore,
section 39.0587, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), allows  prosecutors to charge
juveniles as adults when in their “judgment and discretion the public interest
requires that adult sanctions be considered or imposed.”  § 39.0587(1)(e)2.a., Fla.
Stat. (Supp. 1994).  
Certainly, it would be anomalous for the Legislature to identify exigent
circumstances warranting the imposition of adult penalties, yet concomitantly allow
6   Because we hold that the adult speedy trial rule governs when the State direct files in the
adult division, we need not address the State’s contention that it was entitled to a window of
recapture period before outright dismissal pursuant to the juvenile speedy trial rule.  
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juvenile defendants to maintain special privileges.   In enacting the foregoing
statutes, the Legislature not only granted state attorneys broad discretion in
exercising their executive functions, but it also endeavored to prevent the juvenile
system from impeding the exercise of this discretion.  In short, applying the juvenile
speedy trial rule to cases directly filed in the adult division would frustrate both the
letter and spirit of the statutes and procedural rules.  Therefore, we approve both
Parr and Bell, and disapprove Perez, which the circuit court followed in this case.6
Olivo also contends that independent of the juvenile speedy trial requirements
the State has failed to comply with rule 3.191, the adult speedy trial rule.  He asserts
the State’s decision to file an information for a felony charge effectively nol prossed
the juvenile charge.  When the State discontinues prosecution, argues Olivo, a
defendant is legally released from the obligation to appear before the juvenile court,
and no obligation to appear before the court on the felony charge arises until the
defendant’s rearrest.  We do not reach this issue because Olivo did not make this
argument in the lower courts; thus, the issue has not been preserved for review in
this Court.
Accordingly, we hold that the adult speedy trial rule, not the juvenile speedy
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trial rule, governs when the State direct files in the adult division.  In so doing, we
approve Parr and Bell, disapprove Perez, and quash the Third District’s decision in
this case.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ.,
concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Direct Conflict of Decisions
Third District - Case No. 3D97-588
(Dade County)
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Sylvie Perez-Posner, Assistant Attorney
General, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
for Petitioner
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Bruce A. Rosenthal, Assistant Public
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida,
for Respondent