Title: State v. Swafford
Citation: 237 N.E.2d 580, 250 Ind. 541
Docket Number: 168S8
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: June 18, 1968

250 Ind. 541 (1968)
237 N.E.2d 580
STATE OF INDIANA
v.
SWAFFORD.
No. 168S8.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed June 18, 1968.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and John F. Davis, Deputy Attorney General, for appellant.
Donald R. Metz, and Plummer, Tiede, Magley and Metz, of Wabash, for appellee.
LEWIS, C.J.
The State of Indiana appeals from an order sustaining appellee's motion to quash an amended affidavit charging perjury. The amended affidavit, omitting the formal parts thereof, reads as follows:
The motion to quash, omitting the formal parts thereof, reads as follows:
Appellant argues that the affidavit as filed is supported by specific statutory authority, that the statute was a constitutionally permissible exercise of legislative authority under the State Constitution, and that the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States does not compel an indictment procedure in criminal matters, with due process being afforded under the Indiana affidavit procedure.
Appellee has filed with this Court a motion to dismiss or affirm, alleging a waiver by the State of its right to appeal the order because of its failure to formally resist the motion or to object to the order in any timely or appropriate manner. The appellee, however, has failed to cite to this Court in his brief any legal support for a "waiver" of appeal on an order to quash an affidavit. Nor has this Court discovered any precedent sustaining appellee's position. More directly in point is the statutory provision for this direct appeal, which provision was not cited in the briefs. It reads as follows:
The statute sets forth no condition precedent, nor does any Rule of this Court or case law, to the bringing of this appeal. Therefore, while in good practice a brief on the motion to quash should have been filed and objection to the order made, the failure on the part of the State to do so was not fatal to the right of appeal.
The question then is whether the order sustaining the motion to quash should be affirmed on the basis that perjury *545 must be charged by indictment and not affidavit. As the Trial Court recognized in its order, there is statutory authority for the use of an affidavit to charge the crime of perjury. Burns' Indiana Statutes, Anno., (1956 Repl.), § 9-908, reads as follows:
Burns' Indiana Statutes, Anno., (1956 Repl.), § 9-1116, confirms this legislative authorization as to the specific crime of perjury:
Both of these statutes are legislatively permissible under the Indiana Constitution. Art. 7, § 17 provides:
In accord with Article 7, § 17, this Court has held the right to a grand jury indictment to be legislative and not constitutional. Lee v. State (1922), 192 Ind. 13, 134 N.E. 866; Sisk v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 214, 110 N.E.2d 627.
We must conclude then, that the affidavit brought here was permissible and not subject to an order quashing it because of a lack of state legal authorization.
The Trial Court, however, apparently thought state authorization was superceded by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution which reads as follows:
The Trial Court's ruling was erroneous. First, the Trial Court was correct in its conclusion that perjury is an "infamous crime" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Any offense punishable for a term of years in the penitentiary qualifies. Mackin v. U.S. (1886), 117 U.S. 348; Crampton v. O'Mara (1923), 193 Ind. 551, 139 N.E. 360. Perjury is so punishable. Burns' Indiana Statutes, Anno., (1956 Repl.), § 10-3801.
However, the Fifth Amendment is not directly applicable to the States. Barron v. Baltimore (1833), 7 Pet. 242, 8 L. Ed. 672. Portions of the Bill of Rights and the Fifth Amendment have been "incorporated" into the due process clause of the 14th Amendment, which is directly applicable. However, the Fifth Amendment's Grand Jury Indictment privilege has been ruled in a wide and numerous number of cases not to be applicable to the States through the 14th Amendment. Beck v. Washington (1962), 369 U.S. 541, 545, 82 S. Ct. 955, 8 L. Ed. 2d 98, states:
*547 The ruling of the Trial Court sustaining the motion to quash the amended affidavit (set out supra) is in error. This cause is reversed and remanded to the Wabash Circuit Court with instructions to reinstate the affidavit for further and appropriate proceedings.
Arterburn, Hunter and Jackson, JJ., concur; Mote, J., not participating.
NOTE.  Reported in 237 N.E.2d 580.