Title: Newton v. Fairfax County Police Dept.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 991124
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 2000

PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Stephenson, Senior Justice 
 
ROBERT RUSSELL NEWTON (DECEASED), ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY  
v.  Record No. 991124 
SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
 
 
 
April 21, 2000 
FAIRFAX COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT/ 
  FAIRFAX COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we determine whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in holding that the statutory beneficiaries of a deceased 
claimant are not entitled to an award of indemnity benefits 
under the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, Code § 65.2-100 et 
seq. (the Act). 
I 
 
On July 23, 1996, the statutory beneficiaries of Robert R. 
Newton (the Claimants) filed with the Workers' Compensation 
Commission (the Commission) a claim for benefits against the 
Fairfax County Police Department and the Fairfax County Board of 
Supervisors (the Employer).  The Claimants sought compensation 
and medical and funeral expenses pursuant to Code § 65.2-512 as 
a result of Newton's death caused by an occupational disease.  
The Employer accepted the claim as compensable and paid the 
medical and funeral expenses.  The Employer, however, denied the 
claim for weekly indemnity benefits. 
 
A deputy commissioner and, thereafter, the full commission 
decided that the Claimants were not entitled to indemnity 
benefits because Newton had not received any wages in the 52 
weeks preceding both his death and the date of the communication 
of the diagnosis of the disease. 
 
On April 27, 1999, in an unpublished opinion, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the Commission's decision.1  We awarded this 
appeal, finding that the case has significant precedential 
value.  Code § 17.1-410 (formerly Code § 17-116.07). 
II 
 
The facts are undisputed.  Newton had worked for the 
Fairfax County Police Department for 21 years when, on December 
11, 1993, he voluntarily retired.  On May 23, 1996, Newton had 
received a communication of the diagnosis of heart disease, an 
occupational disease, and, on June 9, 1996, he suffered a fatal 
heart attack. 
 
Newton had not sought employment during the 52-week periods 
preceding both the date of the communication of his diagnosis 
and the date of his death, and he had received no earnings from 
employment during those 52-week periods.  During his retirement, 
Newton had received a monthly benefit of $2,459.44.  Upon 
Newton's death, the monthly benefit payable to his wife 
                     
1 Robert Russell Newton, et al. v. Fairfax County Police 
Department/Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, Record No. 1672-
98-4. 
 
 
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decreased to $1,329.17.  Each minor child received a monthly 
benefit of $531.66. 
III 
 
Code § 65.2-512(A) of the Act provides, in pertinent part,  
that, "[i]f death results from [an] accident within nine years, 
the employer shall pay . . . compensation in weekly payments 
equal to 66 2/3 percent of the employee's average weekly wages."  
Code § 65.2-101 defines "average weekly wage" to mean, in 
relevant part, "[t]he earnings of the injured employee in the 
employment in which he was working at the time of the injury 
during the period of fifty-two weeks immediately preceding the 
date of the injury, divided by fifty-two."  With respect to 
claims based upon occupational disease, Code § 65.2-403(A) 
provides that the date of the "first communication of the 
diagnosis of an occupational disease to the employee or death of 
the employee resulting from an occupational disease . . . shall 
be treated as the happening of an injury by accident." 
 
In denying the Claimants indemnity benefits, the Court of 
Appeals relied upon its holding in Arlington County Fire Dept. 
v. Stebbins, 21 Va. App. 570, 466 S.E.2d 124 (1996).  In 
Stebbins, the Court of Appeals held that a firefighter, who was 
disabled from heart disease, was not entitled to compensation 
for lost wages because he had earned no wages during the 52 
 
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weeks preceding his total incapacity.  The Court explained that 
the average weekly wage is calculated in order to approximate 
the economic loss sustained by an employee suffering from a 
work-related injury or by his statutory beneficiaries in the 
case of his work-related death.  Thus, the Court stated, 
"[c]ompensation is ultimately dependent upon and determined on 
the loss of wages."  Id. at 573, 466 S.E.2d at 126. 
 
The Court of Appeals found the present case to be 
indistinguishable from Stebbins.  The Court concluded that, 
"[w]hether the employee became totally disabled due to an 
occupational disease after voluntary retirement, as in Stebbins, 
or whether the employee died due to an occupational disease 
after voluntary retirement, as in this case, does not alter the 
outcome."  In either event, the Court concluded, "the 
determination of the amount of any indemnity benefits due the 
employee or his . . . statutory beneficiaries would be based 
upon the employee's average weekly wage for the fifty-two weeks 
preceding the communication of the diagnosis of his occupational 
disease or his death as a result of that disease."  We agree. 
 
Newton had voluntarily removed himself from employment more 
than two years before his death, and he was not even looking for 
work at the time of his death.  As with the employee in 
Stebbins, Newton had earned no wages during the 52 weeks 
preceding the date of the communication of the diagnosis of his 
 
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occupational disease, and, therefore, there was no economic 
loss. 
 
The Claimants contend, however, that the Court of Appeals' 
holdings in Stebbins and the present case are "in clear conflict 
with the intent of the Workers' Compensation Act."  They assert 
that, with respect to an occupational disease, the General 
Assembly intended the average-weekly-wage award to be based upon 
the wages received from the employment in which the employee was 
last exposed to the harmful element.  Thus, according to the 
Claimants, their indemnity award should be based on the wages 
earned by Newton in the 52 weeks preceding the date he retired 
from the police department.  In support of their contention, the 
Claimants rely upon Roller v. Basic Construction Co., 238 Va. 
321, 384 S.E.2d 323 (1989), and C & P Telephone Co. v. Williams, 
10 Va. App. 516, 392 S.E.2d 846 (1990). 
 
Roller is inapposite.  There, we did not consider the issue 
that is before us in the present case.  The sole issue in Roller 
was whether a claimant's right to benefits was barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
 
Williams is distinguishable in that, in Williams, the 
employee earned wages during the 52-week period prior to the 
date of the communication to him of the diagnosis of his 
occupational disease.  Therefore, the employee had sustained an 
economic loss at the time of the termination of his employment, 
 
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which occurred shortly before his diagnosis.  Moreover, the sole 
issue considered by the Court of Appeals was whether the 
Commission erred in the computation of the employee's average 
weekly wage; the employer did not challenge the employee's 
entitlement to benefits.2
 
We hold, therefore, that the Claimants are not entitled to 
weekly indemnity benefits because Newton did not receive any 
earnings from employment during the 52 weeks preceding the date 
of the communication of the diagnosis of his occupational 
disease.  Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals will 
be affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
                     
2 We express no opinion whether, in Williams, the Court of 
Appeals was correct in holding that the Commission did not err 
in its calculation. 
 
 
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