Title: Black Warrior Electric Membership Corporation v. McCarter
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1110745
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 19, 2012

REL: 10/19/12
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013
_________________________
1110745
_________________________
Black Warrior Electric Membership Corporation 
v.
Ronald McCarter
Appeal from Greene Circuit Court
(CV-07-28)
WOODALL, Justice.
Black Warrior Electric Membership Corporation ("Black
Warrior") appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict
for Ronald McCarter in McCarter's action seeking compensation
1110745
for injuries he sustained when he contacted a power line owned
and operated by Black Warrior.  We reverse and remand.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
This case arose out of an accident that occurred
September 14, 2006, on State Highway 14 ("the highway")
approximately one mile south of the intersection of the
highway and State Highway 60 near Sawyerville ("the
intersection").  The highway runs north and south at the
accident site, but makes a 90-degree turn at the intersection
and then runs east and west.  Alabama Power Company owns and
operates the electrical-transmission lines running along the
highway west of the intersection to a bridge across the Black
Warrior River ("the west leg"), while the power lines running
along the highway  south of the intersection toward
Sawyerville ("the south leg") are owned and operated by Black
Warrior.
On the day of the accident, McCarter was a member of a
crew employed by APAC Southeast, Inc. ("the crew"), to replace
asphalt on the highway.  For the preceding two or three weeks, 
the crew had been engaged in paving the west leg.  On
September 14, 2006, at approximately 7:00 a.m., the crew began
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paving the south leg, beginning at the intersection.  McCarter
was operating a "Roadtec SB-2500B Material Transfer Vehicle,"
which throughout this litigation has been referred to as a
"shuttle buggy."  In its operating position, the shuttle buggy
travels between, and in tandem with, a dump truck loaded with
hot asphalt and an asphalt spreader.  The operator drives the
shuttle buggy from a seating compartment located near the rear
of the machine.
At approximately 2:00 p.m., the crew arrived at a point
on the highway where Black Warrior had installed a "service
tap" across the highway to provide electrical service for a
residence on the east side of the highway.  The service tap
consisted of two lines.  The lower of the two was a "neutral"
line, which carries no electricity.  Positioned a few feet
above the neutral line was a "primary" line, which carried
7,600 volts of electricity.  The height of the lines above the
roadway is subject to the specifications of the National
Electric Safety Code ("the NESC").  The specifications
required 15'6" of clearance for the neutral line and 18'6" of
clearance for the primary line.  The shuttle buggy measures
14'8" at its highest point.
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As the shuttle buggy began to pass under the power lines, 
McCarter attempted to raise one of the lines using an 8' metal
pole.  In the process of lifting the line, he was electrocuted
and received serious injuries to his arm and hand.
McCarter sued Black Warrior, alleging, in pertinent part,
that Black Warrior negligently installed and maintained the
power line by which he was injured.  The case was tried to a
jury on the theory that Black Warrior had maintained its lines
at a height below that required by the NESC.  More
specifically, 
during 
opening 
statements to 
the 
jury,
McCarter's counsel stated, in pertinent part:
"Power companies have duties to the public.  Those
duties are to avoid exposing the public to any
needless dangers.  Now, that includes adhering to
the safety codes that are set out by the [NESC]. 
Did a power company fail to live up to this
obligation, then they are responsible for whatever
harms might occur because of that failure.
"....
"Now, the paving crew that's going down the
highway is working for a company called APAC.  They
are paving southbound on Highway 14, rocking and
rolling, going along.  All of a sudden one of the
pavers looks up and sees this one low power line
leading to that red, brick house and its just about
to contact the paving machine that he's on ....
"Now, 
in 
that split 
second, 
Mr. 
Ronald 
McCarter,
the paver who's sitting on that shuttle buggy on top
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of it operating that machine at the time made a
decision to pick up what's called a lute.  It's
about an eight to ten foot metal pole.  ... He
decides to pick that lute up and reach out and try
to prevent that wire from contacting that particular
machine.
"Well, he does that successfully.  Picks up the
lute, lifts it over, and contacts the wire.  Well,
at that instant, rather than Mr. McCarter picking
... up and moving a telephone wire that hangs down
pretty low or a cable wire that crosses the road and
hangs down pretty low -- or even a Black Warrior
neutral line that has no electricity through it -- 
Mr. McCarter figures out that, you know what? 
That's a power line.  It's got 7,600 volts of
electricity in it.  He figured it out because he got
electrocuted when he tried to move it to try to
prevent it from contacting that machine.
"....
"Now, we've sued Black Warrior for one reason. 
That reason is right here.  In this trial, you're
going to hear about the [NESC].  It's a big, old
book of standards that electric companies adhere to. 
At the bottom of this piece of paper, bottom [of]
this posterboard here is one of the tables that
tells the standards that electric companies are
supposed to adhere to and it tells you how high
these lines are supposed to be, and depending on
where they are and how much electricity is running
through them.  We're going to get into that in great
detail throughout the week.
"I want you to remember this, it's got to be 18
and a half feet tall.  It's got a lot of electricity
running through it.  If it's the neutral, it's gotta
be 16 feet tall.  We're going to talk a lot about
that.  The reason we sued them is because of this
particular code, because they failed to live up to
that standard."
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(Emphasis added.)
Black Warrior moved for a judgment as a matter of law
("JML") at the close of all the evidence.  Following the
denial of that motion, the trial court charged the jury on the
duty owed by Black Warrior as it relates to notice: 
"Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, [Black
Warrior] is not an insurer of the safety of the
plaintiff nor is it under obligation to safeguard
its wires that by no possibility can injury result
therefrom. [Black Warrior] only had a duty to take
precautions or remedy defects with respect to its
power lines if it had actual or constructive notice
of the defect or actual or constructive knowledge of
facts that would give it reason to anticipate that
a person might come in contact with a power line.
"If you find that [Black Warrior] did not have
actual or constructive notice of a defect in this
power line that would give it reason to anticipate
a person might come in contact with the power line,
you must find for [Black Warrior]."
The jury returned a verdict for McCarter.  Black Warrior's
postjudgment motion for a JML was overruled, and Black Warrior
appealed.  
Black Warrior contended in its JML motions, as it does on
appeal, that there was no evidence, let alone substantial
evidence, indicating "that Black Warrior had actual or
constructive notice that the height of the power line was
defectively low so as to give Black Warrior reason to
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anticipate that a person, such as [McCarter], might come in
contact with the power line."  Although Black Warrior argues
on appeal both that evidence of its liability was insufficient
to present a jury question and that the verdict was against
the weight and preponderance of the evidence, the resolution
of this case turns on the sufficiency of the evidence.
II. Discussion
"'[T]he de novo "standard by which we review a ruling on
a motion for a JML is '"materially indistinguishable from the
standard by which we review a summary judgment."'"'"  McGee v.
McGee, 91 So. 3d 659, 663-64 (Ala. 2012) (quoting Glass v.
Birmingham Southern R.R., 982 So. 2d 504, 506 (Ala. 2007),
quoting in turn Bailey v. Faulkner, 940 So. 2d 247, 249 (Ala. 
2006)).  "'When the movant makes a prima facie showing that
there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts
to the nonmovant to present substantial evidence 
creating 
such
an issue.'"  Pittman v. United Toll Sys., LLC, 882 So. 2d 842,
844 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Hobson v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 690 So. 2d 341, 344 (Ala. 1997)). "'"Substantial
evidence" is "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-
minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can
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reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be
proved."'"  Long v. Wade, 980 So. 2d 378, 383 (Ala. 2007)
(quoting Kmart Corp. v. Bassett, 769 So. 2d 282, 284 (Ala.
2000), quoting in turn West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of
Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989)).  "Further, this
Court has stated that '"[e]vidence supporting nothing more
than speculation, conjecture, or a guess does not rise to the
level of substantial evidence."'"  State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.
v. Shady Grove Baptist Church, 838 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (Ala.
2002) (quoting McGinnis v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 800 So. 2d
140, 145 (Ala. 2001), quoting in turn Brushwitz v. Ezell, 757
So. 2d 423, 432 (Ala. 2000)). 
"While this Court has long held that companies
engaged in the distribution of electricity are not
subject to strict liability it has held:
"'"The duty of an electric company, in
conveying a current of high potential, to
exercise 
commensurate 
care 
under 
the
circumstances, requires it to insulate its
wires, and to use reasonable care to keep
the same insulated, wherever it may
reasonably be anticipated that persons,
pursuing business or pleasure, may come in
contact therewith. ..."'
"Curtis on Law of Electricity, § 510 (as quoted in
Alabama Power Co. v. Mosley, 294 Ala. 394, 400, 318
So. 2d 260, 264 (1975)); see Alabama Power Co. v.
Alexander, 370 So. 2d 252, 254 (Ala. 1979). ..."
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Cherokee Elec. Coop. v. Cochran, 706 So. 2d 1188, 1192 (Ala.
1997) (emphasis added).  "The obligation of the electric
company to insulate is not absolute, but alternative, in its
nature. 'Either the wire must be insulated, or it must be so
located as to be, comparatively speaking, harmless.'"  Dwight
Mfg. Co. v. Word, 200 Ala. 221, 224, 75 So. 979, 982
(1917)(quoting Curtis on Law of Electricity § 511 (emphasis
added)).
Ordinarily, the existence of a duty is a question of law,
and a trial court's ruling on a question of law is reviewed de
novo.  Ex parte Farmers Exch. Bank, 783 So. 2d 24, 27 (Ala.
2000).  However, "'[w]here the facts, upon which the existence
of a duty depends, are disputed, the factual dispute is for
resolution by the jury.'"  Bush v. Alabama Power Co., 457 So.
2d 350, 354 (Ala. 1984) (quoting Alabama Power Co. v.
Alexander, 370 So. 2d 252, 254 (Ala. 1979)).   
Whether Black Warrior's lines were, in fact, "defectively
low" was sharply disputed at trial.  Witnesses for Black
Warrior testified that measurements were taken of Black
Warrior's lines immediately after the accident and that the
lowest wire was found to be 16'2" above the roadway. 
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McCarter, on the other hand, 
presented witnesses who 
testified
that the neutral line would not have cleared the shuttle buggy
at 14'8".  However, Black Warrior argues that, even assuming
the accuracy of McCarter's witnesses, McCarter failed to
present 
substantial 
evidence 
that 
Black 
Warrior 
had
constructive notice  of the defect so as to fasten liability
1
on Black Warrior for McCarter's contact with its power line. 
We agree with Black Warrior.
As evidence of notice, McCarter relied on testimony
presented by Black Warrior.  Specifically, Earnest Bryant, a
representative of Black Warrior, testified that he had
traveled underneath the power lines at the accident site on
his way to work at approximately 6:30 a.m. on the day of the
accident.  Although Bryant testified that the lines were at
the proper height at 6:30 a.m., McCarter contends that
Bryant's testimony presents substantial evidence that Black
Warrior had constructive knowledge that the lines were not at
the proper height.  According to McCarter, the jury was free
to ignore Bryant's testimony to the extent it tended to
establish the compliance of the lines but, nevertheless, to
McCarter concedes that Black Warrior did not have actual
1
notice of any defect.
10
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conclude that Bryant saw, or that he should have seen, that
the lines were not in compliance with NESC standards.  In
particular, McCarter states that, "given that Black Warrior's
corporate representative testified that the lines were
inspected that morning, Black Warrior should have known the
lines were too low."  McCarter's brief, at 33.  In response to
this argument, Black Warrior contends that such a conclusion
can be reached only by improperly stacking inferences.  We
agree with Black Warrior.
"An 'inference' is a reasonable deduction of
fact, unknown or unproved, from a fact that is known
or proved.  See, Malone Freight Lines, Inc. v.
McCardle, 277 Ala. 100, 167 So. 2d 274 (1964). 
'[A]n inference cannot be derived from another
inference.'  Malone, 277 Ala. at 107, 167 So. 2d at
281.  An inference must be based on a known or
proved fact.  Id."
Khirieh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 594 So. 2d 1220,
1224 (Ala. 1992) (emphasis added).
McCarter infers Black Warrior's knowledge of a defect in
the lines from the fact that Bryant failed to notice such a
defect on the morning of the accident.  However, that
inference depends, in turn, on whether the lines were -- in
fact -- below NESC standards at 6:30 a.m.  McCarter infers
that the lines were low at 6:30 a.m., apparently only because
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they were allegedly low that afternoon when the accident
occurred.  However, the state of the lines at 6:30 a.m. is a
matter in hot dispute, rather than a "known or proven fact." 
In that connection, Black Warrior presented the testimony
of its safety and fleet-maintenance director, Robert 
Tutt, 
who
investigated the scene immediately after the accident. 
According to his uncontroverted testimony, he discovered 
a 
gap
of 5" to 8" at the base of the pole bearing the power lines,
indicating that the pole had recently been forced over in the
direction of the highway.  This condition, he stated, caused
the top of the pole to lean toward the highway by 12" or more,
resulting in a lowering of the lines over the roadway. 
According to Tutt, there was "no trash or debris" in the gap,
which indicated that the pole had been "freshly moved."  He
opined that the pole shift was most likely caused by a "large
piece of equipment" getting into the lines.  Indeed, Bryant,
himself, was called to the accident scene and allegedly found
the lines "noticeably lower" than they had been at 6:30 a.m. 
No inference of knowledge of inadequate clearance can,
therefore, be derived from Bryant's traveling underneath the
lines at 6:30 a.m. on the day of the accident.  
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In support of his position on the notice issue, McCarter
relies on a number of cases from this Court, namely, Central
Alabama Electric Cooperative v. Tapley, 546 So. 2d 371 (Ala.
1989) (disapproved of on unrelated grounds by Robbins v.
Sanders, 927 So. 2d 777 (Ala. 2005)); Alabama Power Co. v.
Capps, 519 So. 2d 1328 (Ala. 1988); Alabama Power Co. v.
Cantrell, 507 So. 2d 1295 (Ala. 1986); Alabama Power Co. v.
Brooks, 479 So. 2d 1169 (Ala. 1985); and Bush v. Alabama Power
Co., 457 So. 2d 350 (Ala. 1984).  However, these cases are
distinguishable.
In Tapley, Wendall M. Tapley, "a truck driver employed by
Diversified Support Services to haul asphalt and related
materials to and from an asphalt plant, was killed when he
raised the 'trailer dump' of his tractor-trailer rig into an
uninsulated electric distribution line ... owned by CAEC
[Central Alabama Electric Cooperative]."  546 So. 2d at 373. 
The accident happened on the premises of the asphalt plant
less than a week after CAEC had installed the line.  Id.  At
the time the line was installed, CAEC knew that it could not
install its line across areas of the plant where "dumping was
obviously taking place," because of the height of unloading
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dump 
trucks. 
546 
So. 
2d 
at 
374 
(emphasis 
added). 
Consequently, CAEC's officials decided to string the "line
across the roadway to the asphalt plant" where the accident
occurred, id., at an elevation "well below the height to which
the truck beds were raised," despite "knowing that truck beds
were raised in several locations on the premises."  546 So. 2d
at 380 (emphasis added).  Under such facts, this Court held
that a jury question was presented as to foreseeability and
notice.  546 So. 2d at 379.
The facts in Capps were similar.  That case involved a
dump-truck operator who was fatally electrocuted on the
premises of a "sand and gravel mining operation," 519 So. 2d
at 1329, when he raised the bed of his truck into a power line
owned and operated by Alabama Power Company ("APCo"). 
Rejecting APCo's argument that the jury verdict in favor of
the administratrix of the operator's estate was contrary to
the weight and preponderance of the evidence, this Court
stated:
"[APCo] undisputedly knew that the large items of
equipment were present in the vicinity of the lines. 
These lines were installed specifically to serve
this mining operation.  Indeed, a large piece of
equipment had torn down the lines about 200 yards
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from the site of this particular occurrence less
than two months earlier."
519 So. 2d at 1329 (emphasis added).
Brooks also involved a jury verdict against APCo in an
action by an equipment operator who was injured when he raised
the equipment he was operating into APCo's power line.  The
plaintiff was George Brooks, who was operating a "mobile
drilling rig" on the premises of a mining company in
connection with his employment.  479 So. 2d at 1171.  The
accident occurred on a part of a driveway running to the shop
area of the premises.  Id. at 1174.  Some years before the
accident, "APCo [had] raised an adjacent span of lines to
allow adequate clearance for large trucks traveling on this
driveway to and from the [mining] pit."  479 So. 2d at 1174
(emphasis added).  The line on which Brooks was injured had
not been raised, although the driveway that ran under it was
part of the driveway running underneath the adjacent lines
that had been raised.  Under these facts, the Court concluded
that "reasonable men could differ as to whether APCo had
sufficient notice so as to have anticipated that employees ...
might operate, service, refuel, or repair their mining
equipment, including the subject drilling rig, in the shop
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area within close proximity to the uninsulated line."  Id. at
1174-75.
In Cantrell, a fatal electrocution occurred during the
decedent's attempt to remove a 30' television antenna from the
roof of an apartment building, which was located within 9' of
APCo's power line.  507 So. 2d at 1296.   Applying the then
2
applicable "scintilla rule," this Court held that a jury
question as to APCo's duty to insulate the power line was
presented by the following facts:
"[A]n aluminum antenna, set up on an apartment
building and near an uninsulated power line might be
reasonably foreseeable as an object which could be
energized if it touched the power line; this
apartment was on the main street of Springville,
Alabama, and both the power line and the antenna
could be clearly viewed from the street; there are
two electric meters, owned by APCo, on the side of
the building a few feet from where the antenna was
located, and the jury could have found that to
examine the meters it would be necessary for anyone
walking from the street to pass by the antenna;
testimony was given that APCo meter readers had been
seen in the neighborhood; and that the antenna had
been in place about two years."
507 So. 2d at 1297-98.
Finally, in Bush, this Court reversed a summary judgment
in favor of APCo in an action against it for injuries
The power line was approximately 25' above the ground. 
2
507 So. 2d at 1296.
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sustained by two workers at the Country Club of Mobile ("the
Club") in connection with an operation to replace bulbs in the
lights over the outdoor tennis court.  The operation had
occasioned the construction of a metal scaffold 33'3" high for
the purpose of reaching the bulbs, which were situated "at
various spots around the tennis courts."  457 So. 2d at 354.
The workers were electrocuted when the scaffold they were
pushing 
contacted 
APCo's 
power 
line, 
located 
"approximately 
30
feet above the level of the tennis court."  457 So. 2d at 352. 
On the issue whether "it was foreseeable that persons would
come into contact with the electrical wires which stretched
across the tennis court," this Court stated:
"It is undisputed that the tennis courts and the
lights for the courts had been in place since the
1960's.  It is also undisputed that the power
company had been out to the site to work on the
switch into which this system of wires is attached.
The switch is located on a pole in one corner of the
tennis courts, and, from the switch and this pole,
it is possible to see the tennis court layout, the
lights, and the system of wires.  Additionally, the
power company had been on the site to do extensive
repairs to this system after Hurricane Frederic came
through in September 1979.  This accident occurred
less than seven months later.
"... The record shows that the wires crossed
over the tennis court area, and that there were
lights at various spots around the tennis courts.
The lights were atop poles 25 to 35 feet in height.
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Whether the power company, under these facts, should
have foreseen that someone would come in contact
with its uninsulated wires while repairing the
lights is purely a question of fact."
457 So. 2d at 354 (emphasis added).
None of these cases involved an issue, as does this one,
of displacement of a power line by an unknown agency
independent of the power company before the accident in
question.  Thus, they are not controlling here.  
Black Warrior presented prima facie evidence that it had
no knowledge of the alleged defect in its lines before the
accident.  Consequently, the burden then shifted to McCarter
to present substantial evidence creating an issue as to such
notice.  Pittman, 882 So. 2d at 844.  However, the only
evidence presented as to when the lines allegedly came to be
below NESC standards amounted to speculation and conjecture. 
McCarter presented no 
substantial 
evidence from which it could
be inferred that the lines were defectively low when Bryant
passed under them at 6:30 a.m. or at any time of sufficient
duration to give Black Warrior notice of the alleged defect. 
The trial court erred, therefore, in denying Black Warrior's
motion for a JML.   
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For the first time on appeal, McCarter attempts to invoke
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to support the jury's
verdict.  He now proposes that it was the neutral line that he
touched, which had, for unknown reasons, become charged with
electricity, resulting in his injuries.  Relying on George v.
Alabama Power Co., 13 So. 3d 360 (Ala. 2008), he now asserts
that he was not required to prove notice as discussed above,
because, he says, the jury could properly have concluded that
the facts of this case gave rise to a presumption of
negligence, which Black Warrior failed to rebut.  However,
McCarter cannot now rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
To be sure, this Court did hold in George that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable in an
electrocution 
accident 
 
involving 
the 
apparent 
energization 
of
a neutral line through some agency unknown to the plaintiff. 
More specifically, it held that the doctrine applied to
preclude a summary judgment for APCo on the plaintiff's
negligence claim.  George, however, is inapposite for a number
of reasons.
In George, for example, the plaintiff's theory of the
case was that he touched a neutral line and was injured
19
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because 
the electrical system was not functioning properly 
for
a reason, or reasons, upon which there had been no proof.  By
contrast, McCarter's theory of the case in the trial court --
as well illustrated in his opening argument -- was merely that
he touched a primary line because the lines were lower than
the NESC required.  In George, it was "undisputed that, in a
properly functioning electrical-distribution system in which
the neutral wire is properly grounded, the neutral wire cannot
become energized and, thus, one who touches it will not be
injured."  13 So. 3d at 360.  In short, this case was not
tried on the theory that McCarter was injured by touching the
neutral line. 
"[I]t is a well-settled rule that parties are restricted
to the theory on which a cause is prosecuted or defended in
the court below.  Where both parties adopt a particular theory
they will not be permitted to depart therefrom when the case
is brought up for appellate review."  Inter-Ocean Ins. Co. v.
Banks, 268 Ala. 25, 27, 104 So. 2d 836, 837 (1958).
Additionally, the jury in this case was not instructed on
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, no evidence was presented
on which such an instruction could have been predicated, and
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McCarter has not undertaken to challenge the manner in which
the jury was instructed.  It is a familiar principle that
"[u]nchallenged 
jury instructions become the law of the 
case,"
and "[t]he jury is bound to follow such instructions, even if
they are erroneous."  Clark v. Black, 630 So. 2d 1012, 1017
(Ala. 1993).  Additionally, "juries are presumed to have
followed the trial court's instructions."  Ex parte Loggins,
771 So. 2d 1093, 1108 (Ala. 2000).  Thus, as instructed in
this case, the jury could not have based its verdict on the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and it
cannot be presumed that it did so.  The doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur does not apply to relieve McCarter of the burden of
proving notice.
III. Conclusion
In conclusion, McCarter failed to present substantial
evidence that Black Warrior had constructive knowledge of the
alleged defect in its lines before the time of the accident. 
The trial court erred, therefore, in denying Black Warrior's
motion for a JML.  The judgment is reversed and the case is
remanded for the entry of an order consistent with this
opinion.
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REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Malone, C.J., and Bolin, Murdock, and Main, JJ., concur.
22