Title: Maddox v. State
Citation: 102 N.E.2d 225, 230 Ind. 92
Docket Number: 28,752
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: December 4, 1951

230 Ind. 92 (1951)
102 N.E.2d 225
MADDOX
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 28,752.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed December 4, 1951.
*95 Jones &amp; Cook, of Kokomo, for appellant.
J. Emmett McManamon, Attorney General; John Ready O'Connor and George W. Hand, Deputy Attorneys General, for appellee.
JASPER, J.
Appellant was charged by second amended affidavit with vehicle taking, under § 10-3010, Burns' 1942 Replacement. He entered a plea of not guilty and served notice of an alibi. Later a special answer setting out that appellant was being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense was filed. The cause was tried by jury, a verdict of guilty of vehicle taking was returned, judgment was entered, and sentence followed.
Appellant, under his assignment of errors, contends that he has been placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense.
The record reveals the following:
Appellee then filed a verified written motion to withdraw the submission of the cause from the jury, "for the sole and only purpose of determining the qualifications of the said juror to serve, and no other."
The record further reveals:
Appellant then filed a verified written affirmative answer of double jeopardy, to which verified answer appellee filed a verified reply setting out substantially the same facts as above set out. The prosecuting attorney then completed his opening statement.
The question is properly presented as to whether or not appellant was put twice in jeopardy.[1]
Under the facts as above set out in this case, we must therefore decide when jeopardy attached. This court has decided on numerous occasions that when a person is properly charged with a crime, has been arraigned and pleaded to such charge, has been put upon his trial before a tribunal properly organized and competent to try him for the offense charged, and a jury has been impaneled from persons competent to sit on the trial and duly sworn, then jeopardy attaches. Armentrout v. State (1938), 214 Ind. 273, 275, 15 N.E.2d 363; Gillespie v. State (1907), 168 Ind. 298, 80 N.E. 829; Adams v. State (1884), 99 Ind. 244. The court, in State v. Reed (1907), 168 Ind. 588, 589, 590, 81 N.E. 571, said:
It has also been decided by this court, in State v. Wamire (1861), 16 Ind. 357, that:
In Adams v. State, supra, this court said (page 245 of 99 Ind.):
Jeopardy attached in the case at bar when the jury was first sworn.
The proper procedure for a defendant in objecting to a juror, after the jury had been impaneled and sworn, was decided by this court in Kurtz v. State (1896), 145 Ind. 119, 42 N.E. 1102. In that case, after the jury had been impaneled and sworn to try the cause, a juror approached the judge and, in substance, stated that, since listening to the opening statement, he thought he might have talked about the case. The defendant then moved the court to examine the juror. The prosecuting attorney objected, stating that the proper motion was to set aside the submission. The court allowed the examination of the juror. After examination, the defendant challenged the juror for cause, which the court overruled. The defendant then peremptorily challenged the juror, which the court also overruled. The defendant claimed that it was error to overrule his peremptory challenge. On appeal, this court said (page 122 of 145 Ind., page 1103 of 42 N.E.):
In the case at bar, appellant's objection to the juror was improper. The proper procedure, as above set out, required appellant to object, and request the withdrawal of submission.[1a] His failure to request such withdrawal would waive his objection. Kurtz v. State, supra. Did appellant expressly or impliedly consent to the withdrawal of submission, or was there such legal necessity for the court to withdraw the submission without the consent of appellant?
In the case of Gillespie v. State (1907), 168 Ind. 298, 80 N.E. 829, supra, in which the facts were similar to the case at bar, the prosecuting attorney filed a motion to withdraw the submission for the purpose of reexamining a juror as to his relationship to one of the defendants, and the court, over the objection of the defendants, granted the motion to withdraw the submission, whereupon the State proceeded to question the juror. After the questioning, the State peremptorily challenged the juror. The juror was then removed from the jury. The defendants objected to the peremptory challenge and to the withdrawal of the juror. A written *102 motion was made by the defendants to be discharged and acquitted. Another juror was then placed in the jury box and the jury resworn. This court, among other things, said (pages 319, 320 of 168 Ind., pages 836, 837, of 80 N.E.):
In the case at bar appellant did not ask for the withdrawal of the submission, and, further, objected to the court's ruling withdrawing the submission. The withdrawal of the submission to examine the juror was not only done without the consent of appellant, but over his objection. The record, as above set out, further shows that neither appellee nor appellant examined the juror after the withdrawal of submission. Appellee (State of Indiana), who had made the motion for withdrawal of submission, immediately accepted the jury and the juror without further questions. This, in itself, showed that there was no legal necessity for the withdrawal of submission. Armentrout v. State (1938), 214 Ind. 273, 15 N.E.2d 363, supra.
If appellant had consented to the withdrawal of submission, then he could not be heard to complain, nor could he complain on appeal where he objected[2] only, but does not ask for withdrawal of submission. Where the court withdraws the submission without the express or implied consent of the defendant, then there must be shown a legal necessity *104 for the withdrawal of submission.[3] From the objection of appellant to the withdrawal of submission, we must find that he did not expressly or impliedly consent to the withdrawal. Although the United States Supreme Court, in Wade v. Hunter (1949), 336 U.S. 684, 69 S. Ct. 834, 93 L. Ed. 974, has held that it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine the necessity of discontinuance of trial, there still must exist a legal necessity for withdrawal of the submission without the consent of the defendant. State v. Leunig (1873), 42 Ind. 541. In the case at bar, the State, and not appellant, made the motion for withdrawal. The trial court should have determined the question of whether there existed a legal necessity before granting appellee's motion to withdraw the submission, and the facts constituting the legal necessity should have been shown of record. State v. Leunig, supra; State v. Nelson (1866), 26 Ind. 366.
It was error for the trial court to withdraw the submission from the jury without either the consent of appellant or the existence of a legal necessity. Appellant has been placed twice in jeopardy.
Judgment reversed, with instructions to the trial court to enter judgment that appellant be discharged from further prosecution on the charge.
Draper, J., dissents.
DRAPER, J.
Given regularity up to that point, when a jury has been duly impaneled and sworn to try a criminal case, the accused is in jeopardy. If, thereafter, the jury is discharged without the consent of the accused, *105 and in the absence of any legal necessity for so doing, the accused cannot again be placed in jeopardy for the same offense.
This is not that kind of a case.
Boiled down to its essentials, the rule of all the cases is that an accused is entitled to have a trial completed and a verdict returned by the jury first impaneled and sworn to try him, and a verdict at their hands is valid and binding so far as former jeopardy is concerned. See Kingen v. The State (1874), 46 Ind. 132; Gillespie v. State (1907), 168 Ind. 298, 80 N.E. 829; Baker v. Commonwealth (1939), 280 Ky. 165, 132 S.W.2d 766, 125 A.L.R. 691.
The first and only jury impaneled and sworn to try this case did try the case. It was never discharged and never even separated until it was discharged in due course after it had returned a verdict. Here there was one charge, one plea, one trial and one verdict returned by the one and only jury ever impaneled and sworn to try the case. I have seen no decision holding that under such circumstances a case of double jeopardy is presented. The majority opinion cites none and I take it none can be found. The closest case on its facts that I have been able to find is that of Lovato v. New Mexico (1916), 242 U.S. 199, 37 S. Ct. 107, 61 L. Ed. 244. There Lovato on November 9, 1910 pleaded not guilty to an indictment for murder. On April 24, 1911, without withdrawing the plea, he demurred to the indictment on the ground it charged no offense. The demurrer was overruled and the jury was impaneled and sworn to try the case. The witnesses were also sworn. It thereupon appearing to the district attorney that Lovato had not been arraigned and had not pleaded since the overruling of the demurrer, the court upon motion dismissed the jury and directed that the defendant be arraigned and plead. The accused was *106 accordingly again at once arraigned. He entered a plea of not guilty, and, both sides announcing themselves ready for trial, the same jury previously impaneled was again sworn and the trial proceeded. The defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that he had been formerly placed in jeopardy for the same offense, claiming that in the same case a jury had been impaneled and sworn and thereafter had been dismissed from a consideration of the case. In an opinion by the Chief Justice the Supreme Court held that the contention that the accused was twice put in jeopardy was wholly without merit. The court said there was at best a mere irregularity of procedure which deprived the defendant of no right. It called attention to the fact that the confusion was brought about by an over cautious purpose on the part of the court to protect the rights of the accused, and whether under the circumstances it was a necessary formality to dismiss the jury in order to enable the accused to be again arraigned and plead, the action was clearly within the bounds of judicial discretion. It would thus appear that where a jury is impaneled and sworn to hear and decide a cause, and it does hear and decide it, a mere irregularity of procedure which deprives the accused of no right cannot be translated into double jeopardy. To me that case is persuasive authority.
Moreover, I can find no fault with the procedure followed by the trial court in this case. It seems to be indicated by the opinions of this court. In Gillespie v. State, supra, the submission was set aside on the state's motion and a juror was further examined on his voir dire. The examination of this juror disclosed no legal necessity for discharging him, but he was peremptorily challenged by the state. Another juror was thereupon selected to complete the panel. The court says at page 319:
It seems apparent from the foregoing language that the setting aside of the submission would not operate as a discharge of the jury, for the court in effect says that had the trial proceeded before the jury originally impaneled to try the case, no question of double jeopardy would have arisen. It is clear that the court did not find double jeopardy in the fact that the submission was set aside. It found double jeopardy in the removal of a juror who was not shown to be disqualified. And that seems to be the rule of all the cases.
The court clearly indicates in Kurtz v. The State (1896), 145 Ind. 119, 42 N.E. 1102, that the proper procedure when a situation like the present arises is to set aside the submission and ascertain the facts. The majority opinion says the court should determine the question of the existence of legal necessity, when the question is raised by the state, before the granting of a motion to withdraw the submission. It would seem to me that a juror could be questioned in order to arrive at the facts, but just how a juror may be examined on his voir dire after he has been sworn to try the case, without first setting aside the submission, is not made clear in the majority opinion.
*108 The cases talk about the "discharge" of the jury. The majority opinion seems to be based on the premise that the setting aside of the submission is the same as, or is equivalent to, the discharging of the jury. Such is not the case. When a jury is discharged it is relieved of all further duties. Its connection with the case is severed. It is all through. The effect of setting aside the submission is, as explained in Kurtz v. The State, supra, merely to put the jury in the condition in which they were before they were sworn. It cannot be that setting aside the submission is tantamount to discharging the jury, for in the majority opinion and in the earlier cases it is said that after the submission is set aside the jury may be further examined on its voir dire. I do not know how such an examination could be conducted after the jury was discharged.
The majority opinion seems to hold that if the defendant wishes to examine a juror further, he must first move to withdraw the submission, but if the state wishes to show a legal necessity for discharging the juror, it must be shown, or as the majority opinion says, determined, before moving to withdraw the submission. How it could be shown or determined is not suggested, and the case cited to the proposition does not seem to point it out. I can find nothing in the cases which sustains the proposition that the parties should be bound by different rules. I can think of no reason for it  and none is given.
The court on its own motion could and should question a juror further if the ends of justice seem to require it. 50 C.J.S., Juries, § 249, p. 1005. Whether the court should question a juror on its own motion before or after the submission is withdrawn is not suggested in the majority opinion, and perhaps should not be, since the question was not presented. However, in the *109 light of the present holding it presents a problem which is interesting to me and may prove most puzzling to trial courts in the future. It seems to me the cases indicate that before a juror is questioned further by either party or by the court for the purposes under consideration, the submission should first be withdrawn so that the juror may be questioned further on his voir dire. If, as a result, a legal necessity to do so appears, the juror should be discharged. If not, the trial should proceed before the same jury. In neither case could the defendant be prejudiced, and out of neither alternative could double jeopardy arise.
However, the important thing in this case, it seems to me, is that the appellant was in fact tried by the jury which he freely accepted and which was sworn to try the case, and by no other. Jeopardy attached once and once only. It terminated when the jury was discharged after the verdict. If there was an error in procedure, and I do not believe there was, it was an irregularity merely which deprived the appellant of no substantial right. Lovato v. New Mexico, supra.
There is no right to immunity from one trial. The right to immunity from a second prosecution for the same offense is a fundamental right which is firmly embedded both in the common law and in our constitution. I would not adulterate it. But neither would I extend it away beyond both the letter and the spirit of the constitutional provision.
I would affirm.
NOTE.  Reported in 102 N.E.2d 225.
[1]  See 38 A.L.R., p. 706, Annotation. Plea of former jeopardy where jury discharged because of misconduct or disqualification of one or more of their number.
[1a]  See "Jury discharged," Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 269, p. 643; § 9-1814, Burns' 1942 Replacement.
[2]  For waiver of objection, see Henning v. State (1886), 106 Ind. 386, 6 N.E. 803, 7 N.E. 4.
[3]  See 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1384, p. 1061.