Title: Langstraat v. MIDWEST MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
Citation: 217 N.W.2d 570
Docket Number: 2-56365
State: Iowa
Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court
Date: April 24, 1974

217 N.W.2d 570 (1974) Terry LANGSTRAAT and Timothy Langstraat, Minors, by Richard P. Langstraat, Their Father, Appellants, v. MIDWEST MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. No. 2-56365. Supreme Court of Iowa. April 24, 1974. Joe P. Crookham, Oskaloosa, for appellants. Joseph A. Billings, Des Moines, for appellee. Heard before MOORE, C. J. and MASON, LeGRAND, REYNOLDSON and HARRIS, JJ. LeGRAND, Justice. This case presents for the first time the question whether a minor may avoid his written rejection of uninsured motorist coverage because of his minority. Upon defendant's application for summary judgment, this issue was resolved against plaintiffs. We affirm that judgment. Since 1967, our law has required that every policy of automobile or motor vehicle liability insurance include coverage for the protection of the purchaser of such insurance for "bodily injury, sickness or disease, *571 including death" resulting from the negligence of the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle or a hit-and-run motor vehicle. (§ 516 A. 1, The Code.) The same code section permits the insured to refuse such coverage in the following manner: In the instant case, this matter is here on the pleadings only. None of the procedures available under rule 237, Rules of Civil Procedure, were utilized for the production of additional information. The parties apparently agree summary judgment is a proper remedy and that it disposes of the entire case. The petition was filed by Richard P. Langstraat as father of his two minor sons, Terry Langstraat, 17 years of age, and Timothy Langstraat, 13 years of age. For convenience we refer to Terry Langstraat as though he were the sole plaintiff. Plaintiff owned a motorcycle which he insured against liability with defendant insurance company. In connection with this insurance, plaintiff signed what is designated as "Notice of Rejection of Uninsured Motorist Coverage." The rejection is here set out in full: This notice was on a separate sheet of paper and was signed by plaintiff, as required by § 516 A. 1, The Code. While this policy of insurance was in force, plaintiff was involved in an accident with another motorcycle owned and operated by Jack Welch, who was uninsured. Both plaintiff and his young brother sustained personal injuries for which they seek recovery from defendant company under the uninsured motorist clause which plaintiff says was part of the policy he purchased. The issue is clearly drawn. Defendant admits it issued a policy of insurance covering plaintiff's motorcycle. Plaintiff admits he signed the notice of rejection heretofore set out. In reply to defendant's answer setting up the affirmative defense that plaintiff had rejected uninsured motorist coverage, plaintiff alleged his rejection was not a valid rejection under § 516 A. 1 because of his minority. This is not a case in which a minor seeks to disaffirm a contract. He may, of course, do so under § 599.2, The Code. See also Martin v. Stewart Motor Sales, 247 Iowa 204, 207, 73 N.W.2d 1, 3 (1955). Such a course, however, would leave plaintiff with no insurance. What he seeks here, by whatever name it is called, is to retain the benefits of the policy but to avoid the one provision which has become burdensome. There is no rule permitting such a selective choice. Disaffirmance, if asserted, goes to the whole contract. Arnold v. Life Insurance Company of Georgia, 226 S.C. 60, 83 S.E.2d 553 (1954); Dickert v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 176 S.C. 476, 180 S.E. 462, 465 (1935); Putman v. Deinhamer, 270 Wis. 157, 70 N.W.2d 652 (1955). See also 43 C.J.S. Infants § 73, page 164 (1945); 42 Am.Jur.2d Infants § 93, page 92 (1969). Our conclusion that the trial court was right in finding for defendant is limited to the circumstances of this case. As *572 already mentioned, plaintiff relied solely on his minority to avoid the notice of rejection. He did not assert failure to understand what he signed; he did not claim defendant had a duty to explain uninsured motorist coverage to him; he did not allege fraud, misrepresentation, deceit or other artifice. The extent to which any of these circumstances might affect a rejection of the coverage offered under the statutewhether to infant or adultis not now considered because it is not now here. We decide only that a written rejection of uninsured motorist coverage is not invalid on the sole ground the assured is a minor. Plaintiff submits no authority which supports his view. Closely in point is the case of Lamb v. Midwest Mutual Insurance Company, 296 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Ark.1969), aff'd, 421 F.2d 179 (8th Cir. 1970). In that case the court considered the identical problem which now faces us. In an opinion later adopted by the 8th Circuit on appeal, the district court said: A similar result was reached in Holland v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Company, 270 Cal. App. 2d 417, 75 Cal. Rptr. 669, 671, 672 (1969). The court said at page 671: At page 672 of that opinion this appears: As bearing on this problem generally, although not decided directly on the issue here involved, see Lopez v. Midwest Mutual Insurance Company (Fla.App.1969), 223 So. 2d 550, 552. Of general interest, too, is an annotation at 55 A.L.R.3d 216 (1974). We believe plaintiff's present claim is controlled by the above authorities and the rationale used by the courts in those cases. The trial court correctly held plaintiff's written rejection of uninsured motorist coverage was not invalid because of his minority. Affirmed.