Title: Koe v. Commissioner of Probation
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12160
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 27, 2017

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SJC-12160 
 
KRISTI KOE1  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF PROBATION & another.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 1, 2017. - September 27, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, &  
Cypher, JJ.3 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Practice, Criminal, Record.  Due Process of Law, 
Sex offender, Retroactive application of statute.  Statute, 
Retroactive application. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on March 18, 2016. 
 
 
The case was reported by Hines, J. 
 
 
 
Beth Eisenberg (Catherine J. Hinton also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Susanne G. Reardon, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendants. 
 
 
                     
 
1 A pseudonym. 
 
 
2 Acting director of the Department of Department of 
Criminal Justice Information Services. 
 
 
3 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  In this case, we confront part of a statute 
that retroactively prohibits the plaintiff from ever sealing the 
record of her sex offenses because she was once classified as a 
level two sex offender, even though the Sex Offender Registry 
Board (SORB) has determined that the plaintiff no longer poses 
any cognizable degree of dangerousness or risk of reoffending, 
no longer believes that she should be classified as a level two 
sex offender, and has relieved her of the obligation to register 
as a sex offender.  The plaintiff argues that, as a applied to 
her, the retroactive statutory prohibition on sealing sex 
offenses violates her due process rights under the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  Because we agree with the plaintiff that 
the challenged portion of this statute, as applied to her, is 
retroactive and unreasonable, we conclude that it cannot be 
enforced against her. 
 
Background.  We summarize the following facts from findings 
made by a Superior Court judge and by a SORB hearing panel, as 
well as from other record materials. 
 
1.  Underlying offense and classification.  In 1995, Kristi 
Koe was found guilty by a Superior Court jury of one count of 
rape and abuse of a child, G. L. c. 265, § 23, and one count of 
indecent assault and battery on a child under age fourteen, 
G. L. c. 265, § 13B.  The offenses occurred in 1990, when Koe 
was twenty-two years old.  The victim was a twelve year old girl 
3 
 
 
who was then living with Koe and Koe's sister.  Over a ten-day 
period, Koe engaged in various sexual acts with the victim. 
 
As a result of her convictions, SORB recommended, and Koe 
accepted, a classification as a level two sex offender, pursuant 
to G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q, and applicable regulations.  Her 
obligation to register as such commenced in 2003.4 
 
2.  Reclassification hearing.  In 2013, Koe petitioned a 
SORB hearing panel for reclassification and relief from the 
obligation to register.  In its decision, the hearing panel 
considered the following evidence, which is incorporated into 
the record before this court. 
 
Koe herself was sexually abused as a child.  At the time of 
her offenses in 1990, Koe suffered from drug and alcohol 
addiction, along with untreated head injuries and mental health 
issues.  However, the 2003 death of her mother was a turning 
point for Koe.  She promised her mother "she would turn her life 
around." 
 
Koe accepted responsibility for her sex offenses and 
expressed remorse over the harm that she had inflicted upon the 
victim.  The events in 1990 were her only instance of sexual 
                     
 
4 The sex offender registry law, first enacted in 1996, see 
St. 1996, c. 239, § 1, and rewritten in 1999, see St. 1999, 
c. 74, § 2, may apply to persons convicted before its enactment.  
See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 450 Mass. 780, 785 (2008) (Doe No. 8725).  But see 
discussion at note 5, infra. 
4 
 
 
misconduct.  Koe attended sex offender therapy in 1998 and again 
from 2010 to 2012, and completed a relapse prevention plan.  One 
psychologist opined that Koe has "no deviant interests in 
children of any age" and does not otherwise fit the 
psychological profile of someone likely to reoffend.  The 
hearing panel credited research showing an "extremely low" 
reoffense rate among female sex offenders. 
 
Koe has been sober since 2009, having completed several 
addiction and recovery programs.  She has received "extensive 
services" from mental health and vocational rehabilitation 
providers.  She has participated in various support group 
programs, has a stable residence at a women's shelter, and has 
positive social supports. 
 
Ultimately, the hearing panel concluded that Koe 
"present[ed] no cognizable risk to reoffend and no cognizable 
degree of dangerousness."  However, the panel determined that, 
because Koe had been convicted of a "sexually violent offense," 
G. L. c. 6, § 178C, she was not eligible, as a matter of law, 
for relief from the obligation to register, see G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K (2) (d).  Accordingly, it ordered her to register as a 
level one sex offender. 
 
3.  Superior Court proceedings.  Koe appealed from the 
hearing panel's order to register to the Superior Court pursuant 
to G. L. c. 30A.  In April, 2014, Koe obtained a preliminary 
5 
 
 
injunction ordering SORB to remove her from the sex offender 
registry and enjoining SORB from requiring her to register.  In 
April, 2015, a Superior Court judge accepted SORB's conclusions 
regarding Koe's lack of dangerousness and entered an order 
granting Koe permanent relief.5  SORB did not appeal from that 
ruling, and we take no position on it. 
 
4.  Petition to seal.  Soon after being relieved of the 
obligation to register as a sex offender, Koe filed a petition 
with the Commissioner of Probation (commissioner) to seal her 
criminal record, pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 100A, and related 
provisions.  Section 100A contains a particular subsection that 
governs the sealing of sex offenses.  It provides: 
 
"Sex offenses, as defined in [G. L. c. 6, § 178C], 
shall not be eligible for sealing for [fifteen] years 
following their disposition, including termination of 
supervision, probation or any period of incarceration, or 
for so long as the offender is under a duty to register in 
the commonwealth or in any other state where the offender 
                     
 
5 The Superior Court judge based his decision on this 
court's opinion in Doe No. 8725.  In that case, we examined 
whether the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) could 
retroactively apply the 1999 amendments to the sex offender 
registry law to subject the petitioner to mandatory lifetime 
registration based on the petitioner's preenactment (1979) 
conviction.  Doe No. 8725, 450 Mass. at 781, 785-786.  We held 
that such a retroactive application of the law was unreasonable, 
and therefore did not comport with due process, absent a hearing 
to assess the petitioner's level of dangerousness and risk of 
reoffense.  Id. at 793.  Based on that holding, the judge in 
Koe's case concluded that because SORB had already determined 
that Koe presented no level of dangerousness and no risk of 
reoffense, SORB could not, within the bounds of due process, 
impose the mandatory lifetime registration requirement upon her 
based upon a retroactive application of the registry law. 
6 
 
 
resides or would be under such a duty if residing in the 
commonwealth, whichever is longer; provided, however, that 
any sex offender who has at any time been classified as a 
level [two] or level [three] sex offender, pursuant to 
[G. L. c.  6, § 178K], shall not be eligible for sealing of 
sex offenses" (emphases added). 
 
G. L. c. 276, § 100A (6).  Under the criteria of this 
subsection, Koe's sex offenses would be eligible for sealing 
were it not for the final clause, which prohibits the sealing of 
sex offenses by someone who has ever been classified as a level 
two or level three sex offender.  See id.  Accordingly, in 
September, 2015, the commissioner responded that Koe was 
ineligible to seal her sex offenses because she was once 
classified as a level two sex offender. 
 
5.  Procedural history.  Koe challenged the commissioner's 
response in March, 2016, by way of a complaint in the county 
court seeking declaratory, injunctive, and extraordinary relief.  
Without decision, the single justice reserved and reported the 
case to the full court. 
 
Discussion.  Koe argues that § 100A, as applied to her, is 
retroactive and unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional.6  
The defendants dispute that § 100A applies retroactively and 
argue that, even if it does, it is constitutionally reasonable 
                     
 
6 She also argues that G. L. c. 276, § 100A, as applied to 
her, violates her substantive due process, procedural due 
process, and equal protection rights under the Federal and 
Massachusetts constitutions.  Because our resolution of her 
retroactivity argument renders these claims moot, we do not 
reach them. 
7 
 
 
within the bounds of due process.  Therefore, we must decide 
whether § 100A applies retroactively to Koe and, if so, whether 
its application to her is reasonable. 
 
1.  Retroactivity.  Generally, a statute operates 
retroactively when it "attaches new legal consequences to events 
completed before its enactment."  Moe v. Sex Offender Registry 
Bd., 467 Mass. 598, 607 (2014), quoting Landgraf v. USI Film 
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994).  The defendants argue that 
§ 100A (6) did not attach a new legal consequence to Koe's 
classification as a level two offender because she was not 
eligible to seal her sex offenses at the time it became 
effective.  This argument misunderstands our cases applying the 
"new legal consequences" test. 
 
For example, in the Moe case, we held that amendments to 
the sex offender registration law were retroactive because they 
attached a new legal consequence (Internet publication of a sex 
offender's registry information) to events completed before the 
date of enactment (SORB's final determination that the offender 
should be given a level two classification).  Moe, 467 Mass. at 
609.  Similarly, we held that earlier amendments to the 
registration law were retroactive because they imposed mandatory 
lifetime registration with SORB based on the petitioner's 
preamendment conviction.  Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 
8 
 
 
8725 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 450 Mass. 780, 787 (2008) 
(Doe No. 8725). 
 
Section 100A (6) functions in a similar fashion with 
respect to Koe.  As applied to her, it attached a new legal 
consequence (a permanent prohibition against the sealing of sex 
offenses, effective in 2012) to an event that occurred nearly a 
decade earlier (SORB's classification of her, in 2003, as a 
level two sex offender).  This consequence did not exist at the 
time of Koe's classification in 2003.  See G. L. c. 276, § 100A, 
as amended through St. 1974, c. 525, and note 9, infra.  The 
defendants are correct that a prohibition against sealing is a 
different consequence from the registration-related consequences 
at issue in Moe and Doe No. 8725.  But such a difference does 
not change the fact that, in Moe, Doe No. 8725, and here, the 
consequences at issue arise only from a retroactive application 
of the statute to the petitioner. 
 
The defendants' core argument -- that § 100A is not 
retroactive as applied to Koe because, at the time it was 
enacted, she was not yet eligible to seal her sex offenses -- 
amounts to an argument that we should apply the "vested 
substantive rights" test for retroactivity rather than the "new 
legal consequences" test.  See Moe, 467 Mass. at 607-608.  The 
"vested substantive rights" test examines "the rights and 
obligations of the parties as they existed immediately before 
9 
 
 
and after the effective date" of the challenged statute, and 
deems the statute retroactive "only where vested substantive 
rights of the parties have been adversely affected."  Id., 
quoting McCarthy v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 366 Mass. 779, 
781 (1975).  However, in Moe, supra at 609, we specifically 
rejected this test as "conclusory."  We remarked that "[t]he 
impairment of a vested substantive right certainly qualifies as 
a new legal consequence that would render a statute retroactive, 
but it is not the only new legal consequence that would do so."  
Id. at 608. 
 
We see no reason now to reconsider our adoption of the "new 
legal consequences" test.  Accordingly, we conclude that § 100A 
applies retroactively to Koe.7 
 
2.  Reasonableness.  Having determined that § 100A, as 
applied to Koe, operates retroactively, she bears the burden of 
making a factual showing that the statute is unreasonable in its 
application to her.8  See Doe No. 8725, 450 Mass. at 788.  The 
                     
 
7 Although not expressly argued by the parties, there can be 
little doubt that the Legislature intended for the challenged 
portion of § 100A to apply retroactively, as it prohibits 
sealing by "any sex offender who has at any time been classified 
as a level [two] or level [three] sex offender" (emphasis 
added).  G. L. c. 276, § 100A (6).  See Moe v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 467 Mass. 598, 609-610 (2014) (discussing 
legislative intent and retroactivity). 
 
 
8 The challenged portion of § 100A explicitly incorporates 
components of the sex offender registration scheme, which we 
have said previously is "generally regulatory rather than 
10 
 
 
"principal inquiry" as to reasonableness asks "whether it is 
equitable to apply the retroactive statute against the 
plaintiff[]."  Id., quoting American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Commissioner of Ins., 374 Mass. 181, 191 (1978).  See Moe, 467 
Mass. at 611 (discussing "special risks" posed by retroactive 
legislation and noting that justifications that satisfy due 
process for prospective legislation may not do so for 
retroactive legislation).  To decide the question of 
reasonableness, we consider three factors:  (1) the nature of 
the public interest which motivated the Legislature to enact the 
statute; (2) the nature of the rights affected; and (3) the 
extent or scope of the statutory effect or impact.  Doe No. 
8725, 450 Mass. at 788, quoting American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 
supra.  Because Koe brings only an as-applied challenge to 
§ 100A (6), we limit our review of the statute to the facts and 
circumstances of her case. 
 
With respect to the first factor, two major public 
interests undergird § 100A:  protecting public safety and 
facilitating the rehabilitation of ex-offenders by enhancing 
their employment prospects.  See, e.g., Governor Patrick Signs 
Strong Anti-Crime Package To Protect Public Safety, Expand Job 
                                                                  
punitive."  Doe No. 8725, 450 Mass. at 787-788 (discussing 
different standards for retroactive punitive laws as opposed to 
retroactive regulatory laws).  The parties do not challenge 
this. 
11 
 
 
Opportunities, Press Release, Aug. 6, 2010 (collecting 
statements of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Senate president, 
and House speaker).  Subsection (6) of § 100A was adopted in 
2010 as part of a broad overhaul of the Commonwealth's system 
for regulating availability of criminal records.  See generally 
St. 2010, c. 256, §§ 128-130.  This overhaul "recalibrate[d] the 
balance between protecting public safety and facilitating the 
reintegration of criminal defendants by removing barriers to 
housing and employment."  Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296, 
307 (2014).  The 2010 revisions expanded access to official 
criminal records for employers, housing providers, and licensing 
authorities.  Id. at 303-304.  This recognized, in part, that 
such entities "have legitimate business reason[s] for wanting to 
know prospective employees' or recipients' criminal histories" 
(quotations omitted).  Id. at 304.  To facilitate the goal of 
reintegration, however, the revisions contain certain procedural 
protections for defendants seeking employment, while also 
changing the automatic sealing provisions of § 100A and 
expanding discretionary sealing under § 100C.  Id. at 305-306.  
These changes "strongly indicate[d] that the Legislature was 
concerned with the collateral consequences of criminal records 
and sought to make sealing broadly available to individuals 
whose criminal histories or records no longer presented concerns 
of recidivism."  Id. at 306. 
12 
 
 
 
Regarding the second factor, the nature of the rights 
affected, the "recalibration" of § 100A affected important 
rights on both sides of the equation.  There can be little doubt 
that access to accurate criminal record information serves 
"important policy needs [of] employers, housing providers, and 
licensing authorities."  Pon, 469 Mass. at 304.  On the other 
side, the stakes are high for Koe as well.  We need not 
recognize a fundamental right to seal a criminal record in order 
to appreciate "what has been articulated widely in criminal 
justice research:  that gainful employment is crucial to 
preventing recidivism, and that criminal records have a 
deleterious effect on access to employment."  Id. at 307.  
Sealing, in turn, "is a central means by which to alleviate the 
potential adverse consequences" that flow from the availability 
of such records.  See id. 
 
The record in this case substantiates the general principle 
we acknowledged in Pon.  As a practical matter, the exposure of 
Koe's criminal record is virtually certain to damage her 
prospects for employment and housing.  In that way, the 
prohibition against sealing is likely to constitute a major 
barrier to her efforts to reestablish herself as a productive 
member of society -- a barrier that is not connected to any 
substantiated concern about Koe's present dangerousness or risk 
of reoffense.  Compare Doe No. 8725, 450 Mass. at 790 
13 
 
 
(recognizing that rights affected by lifetime registration 
requirement, "while not fundamental, are nevertheless 
substantial").  Again the defendants attempt to distinguish Doe 
No. 8725 by pointing out that the prohibition against sealing is 
a less-severe consequence than mandatory lifetime registration 
with SORB.  Even so, that distinction does not diminish the 
potential quantum of harm that the bar to sealing will cause for 
Koe. 
 
The third factor, the extent or scope of the impact of 
§ 100A (6) upon Koe, primarily concerns the damage wrought to 
Koe's reliance interest at the time of her classification in 
2002 and 2003.  At that juncture, when Koe accepted SORB's 
recommended classification as a level two sex offender, the 
then-existing scheme generally permitted the sealing of felony 
offenses after a period of fifteen years, regardless of a sex 
offender's historic classification level.9  See G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100A, as amended through St. 1974, c. 525.  Koe was entitled 
to reasonably rely on this state of the law.  See Leibovich v. 
Antonellis, 410 Mass. 568, 578-579 (1991) (discussing reasonable 
reliance on previous state of law in context of retroactivity 
challenge).  Indeed, she had no way of anticipating that, in 
                     
 
9 At the time of Koe's classification in 2003, G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178G, as amended through St. 1999, c. 74, § 2, prohibited 
relief under § 100A for so long as a sex offender had a duty to 
register with SORB.  Because Koe has been relieved of that duty, 
§ 178G is not at issue in this case. 
14 
 
 
2012, the Legislature would decide to use her 2003 
classification as a reason to permanently prohibit her from 
sealing her sex offenses.  Cf. Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 
272-275 (2012) (rejecting notion that presumption against 
retroactivity requires showing of detrimental reliance).  Had 
Koe known of this consequence, she very well might have sought 
instead to be classified as a level one sex offender.  See Moe, 
467 Mass. at 614–615 (discussing "inequity" of retroactively 
requiring Internet publication of registry information for 
offenders who did not challenge level two classification based 
on accurate understanding that such classification, at the time, 
did not carry that consequence). 
 
In examining this third factor, we also have weighed both 
"[1] the duration of the burden imposed by the retroactive 
statute and [2 'whether the scope of the statute is narrowly 
drawn to treat the problem perceived by the Legislature.'"  See 
Sliney v. Previte, 473 Mass. 283, 294 (2015), quoting Doe No. 
8725, 450 Mass. at 793. 
 
The burden imposed by § 100A (6) is plainly "of infinite 
duration."  Doe No. 8725, 450 Mass. at 792.  It forever 
prohibits sealing based on a classification "at any time" as a 
level two or level three sex offender.  G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100A (6). 
15 
 
 
 
The question whether the statute is narrowly drawn to treat 
the problem perceived by the Legislature also raises concerns 
about its reasonableness as applied to Koe.  We begin by 
reiterating that § 100A (6) was part of a package of legislation 
aimed at expanding access to reliable criminal record 
information for employers, housing providers, and others, in 
exchange for making "sealing broadly available to individuals 
whose criminal histories or records no longer present[] concerns 
of recidivism" and providing certain procedural protections 
governing the use of criminal records (emphasis added).  See 
Pon, 469 Mass. at 306.  The defendants argue that these 
procedural protections make § 100A (6) sufficiently narrowly 
drawn to survive a retroactivity challenge. 
 
As applied to Koe, however, the core legislative bargain 
behind § 100A breaks down.  Any "legitimate business reasons" 
(citation omitted), Pon, 469 Mass. at 304, that employers or 
housing providers may have for wanting to know about Koe's sex 
offenses are tempered, if not extinguished, by the 
administrative and judicial findings that she poses no 
cognizable degree of dangerousness and no risk of reoffense, and 
has been relieved of the obligation to register as a sex 
offender.  These developments allow Koe to credibly demonstrate 
that she "no longer present[s] concerns of recidivism," id. at 
306, in a way that many former offenders cannot and that § 100A 
16 
 
 
does not typically require.  Cf. Doe No. 8725, 450 Mass. at 793, 
quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 117 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (weighing burden imposed when former sex offender is 
required to register despite "the clearest demonstration of 
rehabilitation" or "[h]owever plain it may be that [she] 
currently poses no threat of recidivism").  At least in the 
unique circumstances of this case, where Koe has been relieved 
of the obligation to register with SORB, has been determined (by 
SORB) to pose no cognizable degree of dangerousness and no risk 
of reoffense, and otherwise meets the statutory criteria for 
sealing, it is difficult to discern how retroactively 
prohibiting her from sealing her sex offenses furthers the 
regulatory legislative goals of protecting public safety and 
rehabilitating former offenders.10 
 
Balancing all of these factors, we conclude that § 100A (6) 
is unreasonable as applied to Koe, and therefore violates her 
constitutional right to due process of law. 
 
Conclusion.  Because § 100A (6) is both retroactive and 
unreasonable as applied to Koe, State constitutional due process 
precludes us from enforcing it against her.  The case is 
remanded to the single justice for entry of an order in favor of 
the plaintiff. 
                     
 
10 Any potential punitive legislative goals are not properly 
part of this analysis.  See note 8, supra. 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.