Title: Wanless v. Louisiana Real Estate Board
Citation: 147 So. 2d 395, 243 La. 801
Docket Number: N/A
State: Louisiana
Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court
Date: December 10, 1962

147 So. 2d 395 (1962) 243 La. 801 Eugene V. WANLESS v. LOUISIANA REAL ESTATE BOARD et al. No. 46179. Supreme Court of Louisiana. December 10, 1962. *396 Thomas J. Taylor, Arthur L. Ballin, Sp. Counsel, New Orleans, for defendants-relators. Eugene Stanley, New Orleans, for plaintiff-respondent. HAMLIN, Justice. In the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction (Art. VII, Sec. 11, La.Const. of 1921, LSA) we directed Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, in order that we might review its judgment which reversed, annulled, and set aside a judgment of the trial court and ordered the defendants, the Louisiana Real Estate Board, through Robert A. Holloway, President thereof, Henry W. Couturie, Jr., Secretary, and John Wesley Glover, Director, Department of Occupational Standards, to issue to Eugene V. Wanless a renewal of his license to operate as a real estate broker as of February 8, 1961.[1] The judgment of the Court of Appeal was rendered on March 14, 1962;[2] counsel of record received copies on March 16, 1962, to which was attached the following statement from the Clerk of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, dated March 16, 1962: On March 30, 1962, an application for rehearing was filed in the Court of Appeal by *397 the Louisiana Real Estate Board and the Department of Occupational Standards; they alleged that the judgment of the Court of Appeal rendered on March 16, 1962, reversing the judgment of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, was erroneous and contrary to law and prejudicial to them for certain reasons set forth in detail. Eugene V. Wanless opposed the application for rehearing for the following reasons: On April 23, 1962, the Court of Appeal refused to grant a rehearing, Judge G. Caldwell Herget dissenting. *398 The Louisiana Real Estate Board and the Department of Occupational Standards applied to this Court for Certiorari. Eugene V. Wanless moved to dismiss the application, alleging the same reasons for dismissal as those set forth in his opposition to the application for rehearing in the Court of Appeal, and additionally contending that the judgment of the Court of Appeal was final and had become executory long prior to the application for writ of review. Relators answered the motion, urging that the notice of the Clerk of the Court of Appeal bore the official stamp of March 16, 1962, and that the application for rehearing was placed in the mail on March 29, 1962 and received by the Clerk on March 30, 1962, the 14th day after March 16, 1962, therefore timely and in accordance with Rule XI; they further contended that, "Whether or not the opinion of Court of Appeal, First Circuit was handed down on March 14, and whether or not the copy of said opinion was mailed by Registered mail on March 15, 1962 to the attorney of applicants for rehearing is immaterial. The stamp dated March 16, 1962 is conclusive evidence that the opinion and notice was not mailed prior to that date, but assuming that it was mailed on the 15th, the attorney for applicant for rehearing had every reason to rely on the date stamped on the notice, which is March 16, 1962, and not counting said day, the receipt of the application by the First Circuit Court on March 30th was timely." Having granted Certiorari, it is incumbent upon us to initially determine whether relators timely filed their application for rehearing in the Court of Appeal. The Clerk of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, made an admitted mistake by mailing on March 15, 1962 (See Footnote 3) the opinion rendered on March 14, 1962one day earlier than he anticipated mailing itand stamping the date of March 16, 1962 on the notice attached to the opinion. Relators governed themselves by the date of March 16, 1962 in calculating their time limit for application for rehearing; if such was the correct date, the application was timely filed on March 30, 1962 and in accordance with Rule XI, Section 1, of the Courts of Appeal, supra. If fourteen days were to be counted from March 15, 1962 (but not including)the date upon which the opinion, and the attached notice dated March 16, 1962 were actually deposited in the mailMarch 29, 1962 would have been the last day on which relators could have applied to the Court of Appeal for a rehearing. Rule XI, Section 1, of the Courts of Appeal, which provides that applications for rehearing must be filed on or before the fourteenth calendar day after (but not including) the date of delivery of notice of judgment in person or by deposit in the U. S. mail, was enacted pursuant to Article VII, Section 24, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, which recites: The LSA-Code of Civil Procedure, Article 2166, provides in part that, "In the courts of appeal the delay for applying for a rehearing commences to run the day after notice of the judgment has been given by the court to counsel of record in the case." (Emphasis ours.) LSA-R.S. 13:4446 states that, "B. Applications for rehearing in the courts of appeal must be filed on or before the fourteenth calendar day after notice of judgment has been given, as required by Article VII, Section 24, of the Constitution." (Emphasis ours.) In Thibodeaux v. Kern, La.App., 143 So. 2d 422, (July 5, 1962), the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, interpreted Rule XI, Section 1, as follows: We note that the Constitution (Art. VII, Sec. 24), as well as the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure (Art. 2166) and LSA-R.S. 13:4446, employ the word "given" with respect to notice of judgment; Rule XI, Section 1, Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal, employs the words "delivered" and "delivery". We find that the verbs "give" and "deliver" and their derivatives are synonymous, and that the meaning of one as used in the instant matter can be ascribed to the other.[4] We are constrained to determine whether Rule XI, Section 1, (that part which indirectly provides that deposit in the U. S. mail is delivery of notice of judgment) conforms with the Constitution, the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, and the Revised Statutes, which provide that notice of judgment is to be given. (The rule uses the disjunctive, "delivery in person or by deposit in the U. S. mail.") Despite interpretations of the Rule by the Courts of Appeal, supra, the power to make such a finding is inherent in this Court. Syndics of Brooks v. Weyman, 3 Mart.O.S. 9, 12; LeBreton v. Morgan, 4 Mart. N.S. 138. Cf. Fireside Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 223 La. 583, 66 So. 2d 511. In the case of Selken v. Northland Insurance Company, 299 Iowa 1046, 90 N.W.2d 29, the Supreme Court of Iowa, speaking with respect to a provision in an insurance policy which stated, "The policy may be cancelled by the insurance company by giving *400 five days notice of such cancellation * * *", stated: In Baldwin v. Fidelity Phenix Fire Insurance Co. of N. Y., 6 Cir., 260 F.2d 951, the following pertinent statement is made: In Mid-State Tile Company v. Chaudoir, 228 La. 634, 83 So. 2d 654, this Court considered LSA-R.S. 13:4446 prior to its amendment and Article VII, Section 24, of the Louisiana Constitution prior to its amendment, and found: A study of the Constitution, the Revised Statutes, the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, and the above jurisprudence, impels us to conclude that notice of judgments of the Courts of Appeal must be actually given or delivered and received before the time for applying for a rehearing can commence to run. A deposit in the U. S. mail of notice of judgment, even though registered or certified, must be delivered and received before the time for applying for a rehearing begins to run. Insofar as the provisions of Rule XI, Section 1, of the Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal conflict with this finding, it is unconstitutional; it is also in conflict with the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure and LSA-R.S. 13:4446. "Where there is an express provision of law regulating practice, a rule of court contravening it cannot be enforced and must be abrogated." State ex rel Tebault v. Judges of Fifth Circuit, 37 La.Ann. 596. See, State of Louisiana ex rel. Tooreau v. Posey, 17 La.Ann. 252. Under the above finding, defendants' application for rehearing was timely filed and refused in the Court of Appeal, First Circuit. The motion of respondent Wanless to dismiss relators' application for Certiorari is without merit. In the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction, we now approach the matter on its merits. Eugene V. Wanless brought suit in the district court praying that an alternative writ of mandamus issue, directed to Louisiana Real Estate Board through Honorable Robert A. Holloway, President thereof Henry W. Couturie, Jr., Secretary, and Honorable John Wesley Glover, Director, Department of Occupational Standards, commanding them to renew his license to engage in the business of real estate broker in the State of Louisiana, or show cause to the contrary. He alleged that the following action of the Louisiana Real Estate Board on February 8, 1961 caused him irreparable damage, injury, and loss for which he had no adequate remedy at law: The matter was converted into an ordinary action and heard on the merits. LSA-R.S. 37:1456. The trial court found that plaintiff had made a false statement in answering "None" to the question, "Have you had any suits over real estate filed against you during the past year?" on his application for renewal of his Real Estate Broker's License Certificate for the year 1961. The trial judge was of the opinion that the suit pending against plaintiff at the time he filed his application involved him in his capacity as a real estate broker; he concluded, "In the light of the decision in the Zerlin case [158 La. 111, 103 So. 528] it is my opinion that the Board was justified in its revocation of plaintiff's license on the grounds above considered. Being of this opinion the additional grounds on which it based the revocation are not considered." The Court of Appeal found that plaintiff was entitled to the relief prayed for, and stated, "It is felt, after a careful review of the entire record presented, that Wanless gave a reasonable explanation for having answered that portion of the application in the negative. In the first place, the suit entitled Samuel S. Dalton v. Jefferson Parish Real Estate Board, Inc., et als, No. 57121 on the docket of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court in and for the Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana, was political in nature. Wanless understood that he was designated as a defendant either in his capacity as president of the Jefferson Parish Real Estate Board Inc. or as appraiser for the same Board. * * *" 140 So. 2d 429, 433. It further found that Wanless did not attempt to procure a license for himself by fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit. LSA-R.S. 37:1454(12) (3) (10), under which the Louisiana Real Estate Board charged plaintiff, provides: In his original petition, Eugene V. Wanless alleged: The record reflects that Samuel S. Dalton, a taxpayer in propria persona, filed a suit on June 28, 1960 against twenty-six defendants, including Eugene V. Wanless and the Jefferson Parish Real Estate Board, Inc., through Eugene V. Wanless. Pertinent allegations of an amended and supplemental petition with respect to Wanless are: The prayer of Dalton's petition is to the effect that there be judgment against the defendants, including Eugene V. Wanless, in the sum of $200,000.00, and that the contract of sale between the Jefferson Parish School Board and certain defendants, not including Wanless, be declared null and void. Wanless testified before the Louisiana Real Estate Board that he acted in good faith when he answered "None" to the question propounded on the application; that the connection he had with the School Board was that as a member of one of three of the Jefferson Parish Real Estate Board; that all appraisers who appraised are not licensed real estate brokers; that he was not interested in the transaction as a broker, his only interest being that of an appraiser; that the property was roughly composed of twenty-five acres, and it was appraised for *404 $200.00 an acre less than paid for it; that he had no knowledge of the buying and selling negotiations involved in the transaction; that he was employed directly by the Jefferson Parish Real Estate Board and that the Jefferson Parish Real Estate Board received its employment from the School Board; that the Jefferson Parish Real Estate Board collected the appraisal fee and paid him his proportion; that the fee was a percentage fee based on the price. We find that the suit instituted by Dalton was a suit "over real estate"; it involved a real estate transaction. In addition to asking for a money judgment, the prayer requested that an act of sale of real estate be set aside. Wanless was named as a defendant, and no disposition of the suit had been made as to him at the time he completed his undated application for renewal of his Real Estate Broker's License Certificate for 1961; his application was received by the Department of Occupational Standards on December 14, 1960, and the suit was dismissed on February 7, 1961. As of December, 1960the month during which he applied for his 1961 licenseplaintiff was well aware of the fact that the suit had been filed and that it had not been dismissed as to him. Although dismissed as to several other defendants, it was still pending against him. There was no restriction in the question, "Have you had any suits over real estate filed against you during the past year?" The question did not mention appraiser, broker, vendor, or vendee; it was addressed generally to suits "over real estate," and it is clear and free from ambiguity. We do not find that plaintiff's explanation absolves him of having answered "None" to the question; his answer was a concealment and suppression of a fact and, therefore, a misrepresentation of a fact which the Louisiana Real Estate Board had a right to know. In the case of Zerlin v. Louisiana Real Estate Board, 158 La. 111, 103 So. 528, this Court affirmed the trial court, which sustained the action of the Louisiana Real Estate Board in annulling and rescinding the license of George Zerlin. Zerlin answered "No" to the question, "Have you ever been convicted of any criminal offense, or is there any criminal charge pending against you, * * *?" At the time the answer was given, there was pending against Zerlin an information charging him with grand larceny. Zerlin attempted to justify his answer by stating that he had been informed or was under the impression that the charge against him had been withdrawn or dropped. This Court found that, "The answer which Zerlin gave to the question was palpably and knowingly false. It was both a deliberate misrepresentation as to facts and a concealment of facts which the real estate board had a right to know." We further stated, "The failure of plaintiff to give all the facts with reference to the charge, whether he believed the charge had been withdrawn or not, was plainly misleading and amounted to a concealment." See, 56 A.L.R.2d, Note, p. 576. We conclude that plaintiff herein attempted to procure a renewal of his Real Estate Broker's License Certificate for 1961 by misrepresentation, in violation of LSA-R.S. 37:1454(12). The Louisiana Real Estate Board was justified in its action revoking plaintiff's license as a real estate broker and refusing to grant a renewal thereof. Because of our conclusion with respect to plaintiff's violation of LSA-R.S. 37:1454 (12), we find no need for discussing his alleged violation of LSA-R.S. 37:1454 (3) (10). For the reasons assigned, the motion of Eugene V. Wanless to dismiss relators' application for Certiorari is denied; the judgment of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, is reversed and set aside; and, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs to be paid by respondent, Eugene V. Wanless. [1] La.App., 140 So. 2d 429. [2] The printed copy of the Court of Appeal Decision (140 So.2d 429) bears the date March 14, 1962. The Minutes of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, reflect that on March 14, 1962, "The Court of Appeal, First Circuit, met this day, with Judges Ellis, Herget and Miller sitting, and rendered decisions in the following cases: "By Ellis, J. * * * * * * "No. 5576. Eugene V. Wanless v. Louisiana Real Estate Board, et al. Parish of East Baton Rouge. Reversed * * *". The Clerk of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, certified to this Court that the date of rendition of the opinion by the Court of Appeal was not stamped directly on the opinion by or for the court. In the record, however, there appears a copy of the opinion by the Court of Appeal; it is stamped, "A True Copy, Court of Appeal, First Circuit, State of Louisiana, Filed, March 14th, 1962, Karl Leche, Clerk." [3] "March 30, 1962 "Dear Mr. Stanley: "Responding to your telephonic request, the following certification is made: "I certify that this Court handed down a decision in the captioned case on March 14, 1962, and copies of this decision were mailed by registered mail, return rereceipt requested, on March 15, 1962, to the attorneys of record in the case, * * * "I further certify an Application for Rehearing on behalf of Louisiana Real Estate Board and the Department of Occupational Standards, by Thomas J. Taylor, Cigali Building, New Orleans, Louisiana, was received in this office and filed on March 30, 1962." There appears in the record a memorandum dated April 5, 1962 from John E. Miller, Deputy Clerk of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, which recites: "Re: Eugene V. Wanless "Vs. No 5576 "Louisiana Real Estate Board Et Al "It was certified to Mr. Eugene Stanley that the decision in this case was mailed to counsel of record on March 15, 1962, which they were. However, the decisions were dated and scheduled for mailing on March 16, but were mailed on the fifteenth by mistake. Judge Miller stated he was of the opinion that the Court should consider the mailing as of the sixteenth for the purpose of considering the timeliness of the application for rehearing." (Emphasis ours.) [4] "Words and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. Technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning." LSA-R.S. 1:3. Webster's New World Dictionary, College Edition, defines "deliver" as "to give up; give or hand over; transfer (with to); to give out; distribute; as deliver the mail." [5] The above was a motion made, duly seconded, unanimously carried, and adopted at a meeting of the Louisiana Real Estate Board held in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, February 8, 1961.