Title: Com. v. Thompson
Citation: 377 Pa. Super. 506, 547 A.2d 800
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: September 15, 1988

377 Pa. Superior Ct. 506 (1988) 547 A.2d 800 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Daniel Jordan THOMPSON, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted June 9, 1988. Filed September 15, 1988. *507 John P. Liekar, Public Defender, Canonsburg, for appellant. Almon S. Burke, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, Washington, for Com. Before CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY and KELLY, JJ. KELLY, Judge: Appellant, Daniel Jordan Thompson, seeks to appeal from judgment of sentence entered following his conviction of third degree murder. We deny allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of sentence. On August 4, 1986, appellant, David Reynier and Fred Bazzoli, consumed a case of beer while painting a home in Taylorstown, Pennsylvania. After work, they purchased a second case of beer and decided to drive to an isolated location and practice target shooting. Appellant had a .22 magnum rifle and Fred Bazzoli had a 30.06 rifle. Appellant asked Fred to set up some targets in the field on a tree stump. As Fred walked toward the stump, the gun in appellant's hands discharged; appellant claimed the gun discharged accidentally. Fred was startled but he was not hit. Appellant then challenged David Reynier to take a shot at Fred. David's shot struck Fred in the arm. Both went to see Fred's injury. David told Fred to lay still and that he would go get help. As David walked back to the car, he heard a gun shot. He turned and saw appellant standing with his rifle levelled at Fred. Fred died from the gun shot wounds. Appellant and David then fled in the victim's girlfriend's car which the victim had borrowed on the day of his death. They eventually turned themselves in to police in Kansas City, Kansas. Though they initially claimed that they had shot Fred in self-defense when he shot at them, David later admitted the foregoing facts. On February 20, 1987, appellant entered a general plea of guilty to criminal homicide and theft. Because of the evidence of intoxication, the trial court convicted appellant of third degree murder rather than first degree murder. On April 27, 1987, the trial court sentenced appellant to ten (10) to twenty (20) years imprisonment for the murder conviction and a concurrent term of two (2) to four (4) years for the theft conviction. A timely motion to reconsider the sentence was denied, and this timely appeal followed. On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by: sentencing him to the statutory maximum despite the absence of aggravating factors; failing to adequately *509 consider mitigating factors; and, failing to make an adequate statement of the reasons for the sentence imposed on the record. These contentions are addressed to the discretionary aspects of sentence. Appellant offered the following statement in purported compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f): (Appellant's Brief at 8). This statement is inadequate to raise a substantial question as to the appropriateness of sentence so as to permit grant of allowance of appeal. In Commonwealth v. Felix, 372 Pa.Super. 145, 539 A.2d 371 (1988), this Court stated: 539 A.2d at 377-78. The statement criticized but found adequate in Commonwealth v. Felix, supra, is materially distinguishable from that presented by appellant in the instant case. The statement in Felix contained specific factual assertions. The Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in the instant case consists wholly of incantations of statutory provisions and pronouncements of conclusions of law, and fails entirely to articulate the facts upon which the claim is predicated. "It is only where a party can articulate reasons why a particular sentence raises doubts that this scheme as a whole has been compromised that the appellate court should review the manner in which the trial court exercised its discretion." Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, supra, 522 A.2d at 20; Commonwealth v. Felix, supra, 539 A.2d at 380. Allowance of appeal from discretionary aspects of sentence is denied.[*] CAVANAUGH and ROWLEY, JJ., concur in the result. [*] We note that the record clearly indicates that the trial court reviewed the pre-sentence investigation report, entertained arguments of counsel, considered the applicable guidelines, and then concluded that a maximum sentence was appropriate in this case based upon the fact that, had appellant not exhibited diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication, a first degree murder conviction would have been appropriate and that the third degree murder conviction was in that sense aggravated. The trial court also noted that the pre-sentence investigation report demonstrated problems in appellant's criminal, social, employment and educational history which were caused or exacerbated by appellant's alcohol abuse. The weight to be given to the sentencing factors was exclusively the province of the sentencing court to determine. See Commonwealth v. Moran, 369 Pa.Super. 109, 110, 534 A.2d 1103, 1104 (1987). Though brief, the statement of reasons for the sentence imposed was plainly sufficient. See Commonwealth v. Devers, ___ Pa. ___, 546 A.2d 12 (1988); cf. Commonwealth v. Graham, 372 Pa.Super. 365, 368 n. 2, 539 A.2d 838, 839 n. 2 (1988); Commonwealth v. Darden, 366 Pa.Super. 597, 604, 531 A.2d 1144, 1148 (1987); Commonwealth v. Osborn, 364 Pa.Super. 505, 520, 528 A.2d 623, 631 (1987).