Title: Pelletier v. Sordoni/Skanska Construction Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC16743, SC16747
State: Connecticut
Issuer: Connecticut Supreme Court
Date: February 11, 2003

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NORMAN PELLETIER ET AL. v. SORDONI/SKANSKA
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
(SC 16743)
(SC 16747)
Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Palmer and Zarella, Js.
Argued September 11, 2002—officially released February 11, 2003
William H. Clendenen, Jr., with whom were Nancy
L. Walker and, on the brief, Kevin C. Shea, for the
appellants in both appeals (plaintiffs).
Joseph B. Burns, with whom was Zisca R. Burkley,
for the appellee in Docket No. SC 16743 (defendant).
Anthony J. Natale, with whom were Michael A. Fusco
and, on the brief, Richard F. Wareing, for the appellee
in Docket No. SC 16747 (defendant Professional Ser-
vices Industries, Inc.).
Opinion
BORDEN, J. In these two consolidated appeals, the
plaintiff, Norman Pelletier, and his wife, Reine Pel-
letier,1 appeal from the summary judgment of the trial
court,2 rendered in favor of the defendants, Sordoni/
Skanska Construction Company (Sordoni) and Profes-
sional Services Industries, Inc. (Professional Services).3
The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly deter-
mined that neither Sordoni nor Professional Services
could be held liable to the plaintiff for alleged negli-
gence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of these appeals. In his complaint, the plain-
tiff alleged negligence as to both Sordoni and Profes-
sional Services, and breach of contract as to Sordoni
alone. Both defendants moved for summary judgment.
Sordoni argued that, pursuant to the rule set forth by
the Appellate Court in Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn. App.
660, 548 A.2d 461, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 822, 551 A.2d
756 (1988), it could not be held liable in negligence to
the employee of its independent subcontractor. Sordoni
also argued that the contract that was alleged in count
two of the plaintiff’s complaint did not exist. Profes-
sional Services argued that it did not owe a duty to the
plaintiff under its subcontract with Sordoni. The trial
court granted both motions for summary judgment and
rendered judgment for the defendants accordingly.
These appeals followed.
The parties presented the following undisputed facts
to the trial court on the motions for summary judgment.
At the time of the incident giving rise to this action,
Sordoni was the general contractor for the ‘‘Pitney
Bowes Project,’’ a building under construction for a
large shipping company, Pitney Bowes, Inc. (Pitney
Bowes). The plaintiff was an employee of Berlin Steel
Construction Company (Berlin Steel), the structural
steel fabrication and erection subcontractor for the
project. Sordoni hired Professional Services to inspect
the work performed by Berlin Steel.
Under its subcontract with Sordoni, Berlin Steel had
the responsibility to provide all of the structural steel
for the Pitney Bowes project, and to ensure its integrity.
This included the duty to weld connections in the struc-
tural steel that would allow for the interconnection of
steel members as a load-bearing, structural frame for
the building. Furthermore, Berlin Steel had the duty to
inspect those welds, ensuring their ability to bear
weight. Under its contract with Berlin Steel, Sordoni
reserved the right to inspect the structural steel, ‘‘solely
for [its own] benefit.’’ The contractual documents
emphasized that Sordoni’s ‘‘[i]nspection and accep-
tance, or failure to inspect, shall in no way relieve [Ber-
lin Steel] from [its] responsibility to furnish satisfactory
material strictly in accordance with the [c]ontract [d]oc-
uments.’’
On June 20, 1994, the plaintiff suffered serious physi-
cal injuries in an accident at the Pitney Bowes construc-
tion site. At the time of the accident, he was working
beneath the building’s large steel frame, which his
employer, Berlin Steel, had been hired to build. The
plaintiff was in the process of installing metal sheet
flooring between two steel columns when several of
his coworkers interrupted his work to install a two ton
crossbeam between the columns. The plaintiff stepped
away while his coworkers bolted the crossbeam to seat
connections, which are steel flanges that enable the
interconnection of large structural members, located
on each of the columns. One of the seat connections, on
column 313, had been only tack welded to the column. A
tack weld is a weak, provisional weld, which is intended
only to hold a piece in place pending a full, load-bearing
weld. The tack weld on column 313 did not immediately
give way under the one ton load of the crossbeam.
After his coworkers secured the crossbeam to the seat
connections on the columns, the plaintiff returned to
work beneath the crossbeam. Within minutes, the seat
connection broke and the corresponding end of the
crossbeam fell, striking him. The plaintiff suffered
severe injuries and is currently recovering workers’
compensation benefits from Berlin Steel for his injuries.
Further facts and procedural history will be set forth
where necessary.
We first set forth the standards of review applicable
to both of these appeals. Each appeal arises from a
judgment of the trial court granting a motion for sum-
mary judgment. ‘‘[T]he standard of review of a trial
court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judg-
ment is well established. Practice Book [§ 17-49] pro-
vides that summary judgment shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof
submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for
summary judgment, the trial court must view the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Elliott v.
Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 391, 715 A.2d 27 (1998). With
this standard of review in mind, we turn to the plaintiff’s
claims on appeal.
I
THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AGAINST SORDONI
In his appeal against Sordoni, the plaintiff claims
that the trial court improperly determined that: (1) the
general contractor nonliability rule set forth in Ray v.
Schneider, supra, 16 Conn. App. 663–65, barred recov-
ery under count one of his complaint, which sounded
in negligence; and (2) neither Sordoni’s contract with
Pitney Bowes nor an orientation and procedures man-
ual that Sordoni had distributed to the plaintiff created
a duty to the plaintiff.4 We disagree.
The plaintiff’s complaint against Sordoni was based
on allegations of both negligence and breach of con-
tract. The plaintiff’s allegations of negligence were
based on a range of legal duties, with statutory and
public policy sources. More specifically, the plaintiff
alleged that Sordoni ‘‘knew or in the exercise of reason-
able care . . . should have known’’ that the job site
was unsafe, and failed to abate the danger of the defec-
tive weld. The plaintiff alleged further that Sordoni had
a duty to inspect the structural steel, including ‘‘all main
stress carrying elements, welding material and bolting
material . . . all steel welds . . . [and] the steel frame
of the column upon which the seat angle connection
collapsed,’’ yet Sordoni failed to do so in violation of
the state building code. Regs., Conn. State Agencies
§ 29-252-1a. In the breach of contract count, the plaintiff
alleged that Sordoni had entered into a contract with
the plaintiff, as evidenced by the orientation and proce-
dures manual that Sordoni had required the plaintiff
to sign prior to commencing work for Berlin Steel on
the project.
In its motion for summary judgment, Sordoni argued
that, as a matter of law, with respect to the negligence
count, Sordoni, as a general contractor, could not be
held liable to the plaintiff, an employee of Sordoni’s
subcontractor, and that this issue was controlled by Ray
v. Schneider, supra, 16 Conn. App. 660. With respect to
the breach of contract claim, Sordoni argued that the
orientation and procedures manual did not create any
contractual obligations to the plaintiff, but served only
as an ‘‘acknowledgement that . . . [the plaintiff] had
reviewed the rules and regulations contained therein,
and that his compliance therewith was required in order
to work on the [p]roject.’’ In opposition, the plaintiff
argued that Ray was not controlling, and that the court
should recognize a duty of Sordoni to the plaintiff as
a matter of public policy. As ‘‘significant’’ to ‘‘evaluating
the imposition of a legal duty upon [Sordoni],’’ the plain-
tiff quoted a provision of the orientation and procedures
manual and several provisions of a contract between
Sordoni and Pitney Bowes, which stated that Sordoni
would manage the project and take ‘‘full responsibility
for all safety measures . . . related to the [w]ork
. . . .’’ The plaintiff did not argue that the state building
code, or any other regulatory or statutory provisions,
provided a basis for holding Sordoni liable in negli-
gence, despite his citation to the building code in his
complaint.5
As to the breach of contract count, the plaintiff
argued that there were two contractual sources of Sor-
doni’s duty to the plaintiff: (1) Sordoni’s contract with
Pitney Bowes; and (2) the orientation and proce-
dures manual.
The trial court ruled that the rule of nonliability estab-
lished in Ray barred the plaintiff’s negligence claim. As
to the plaintiff’s contractual claim, the court ruled that:
(1) Sordoni’s obligations under its contract with Pitney
Bowes were solely for the benefit of Pitney Bowes, and
that the plaintiff was not a third party beneficiary of
that contract; and (2) the orientation and procedures
manual simply set forth general obligations by all
involved in the project to provide a safe workplace,
and that it did not create an exception to the nonliability
rule established in Ray. Accordingly, the trial court
granted Sordoni’s motion for summary judgment. This
appeal followed.
A
The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly
determined that the general contractor nonliability rule
set forth in Ray v. Schneider, supra, 16 Conn. App.
663–65, barred recovery under count one of his com-
plaint, which sounded in negligence. We conclude that
the reasoning of the Appellate Court in Ray is sound,
and bars the plaintiff’s negligence count against Sordoni
in the present case because the plaintiff was the
employee of Sordoni’s independent subcontractor,
which was primarily responsible for the safety of
steel fabrication.
As a general rule, ‘‘an employer is not liable for the
negligence of its independent contractors. Douglass v.
Peck & Lines Co., 89 Conn. 622, 627, 95 A. 22 (1915);
W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed. 1984) § 71,
p. 509; 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Independent Contractors § 29
(1995).’’ Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 256–57, 765
A.2d 505 (2001); Alexander v. R.A. Sherman’s Sons Co.,
86 Conn. 292, 299, 85 A. 514 (1912); 2 Restatement
(Second), Torts § 409, p. 370 (1965). ‘‘The explanation
for [this rule] most commonly given is that, since the
employer has no power of control over the manner in
which the work is to be done by the contractor, it is
to be regarded as the contractor’s own enterprise, and
[the contractor], rather than the employer, is the proper
party to be charged with the responsibility of preventing
the risk, and bearing and distributing it.’’ 2 Restatement
(Second), supra, § 409, comment (b).
This same rule applies, as a general matter, to general
contractors, as employers of independent subcontrac-
tors: a general contractor is not liable for the torts of
its independent subcontractors. There are, however,
certain exceptions to this rule. For example, where the
general contractor, itself, breaches a duty of care, such
as a duty ‘‘to exercise reasonable care in inspecting the
work after it is done or, in certain cases, during its
progress, in order to see that the work is so done as
to secure the safety of others’’ the general contractor
may be liable in negligence, notwithstanding the general
rule of nonliability. Id., § 409, introductory note, p. 371;
see id., § 412; see generally id., § 410 et seq.6 Such excep-
tions to the nonliability rule apply in the case of inno-
cent third parties. The question presented by the
present case is whether the exceptions to the general
rule of nonliability of a general contractor for the torts
of its independent contractor inure to the benefit of an
employee of the independent contractor, such as the
plaintiff here. We conclude that those exceptions do
not inure to the plaintiff’s benefit.
We first consider the significance of Ray v. Schneider,
supra, 16 Conn. App. 660, which the trial court found
dispositive in rendering summary judgment for Sordoni.
In Ray, the Appellate Court faced a similar fact pattern.
The plaintiff in Ray was also an employee of a subcon-
tractor for a large building construction project. Id.,
662. The defendants in Ray had hired the subcontractor
‘‘to excavate a trench and to install sewer, water and
gas utility pipelines . . . .’’ Id. The plaintiff alleged that
the trench collapsed around him and severely injured
him as a result of the subcontractor’s negligence, and
sought to hold the defendants, who were owners, les-
sees or developers of the project, liable under two theo-
ries: (1) that they should be held vicariously liable, i.e.,
liable despite an absence of fault on their own part;
Alvarez v. New Haven Register, Inc., 249 Conn. 709,
720, 735 A.2d 306 (1999);7 for the negligence of the
subcontractor; Ray v. Schneider, supra, 663–64; and (2)
that they should be held directly liable for negligently
hiring the subcontractor. Id., 671–72.
The court in Ray rejected both claims. The court in
Ray first gave its reasoning in support of the denial of
liability under the vicarious liability claim; id., 663–70;
and then also rejected the claim of direct liability for
negligent hiring for essentially the same reasons as
given for rejecting the vicarious liability theory. Id., 672.
Although in the present case the claim of direct liability
for the failure to inspect properly the work of the sub-
contractor is a different form of negligence than that
asserted in Ray, we see no reason to distinguish the
results based on the type of negligence asserted. Thus,
the issue in the present case is the same as that pre-
sented in Ray: whether the plaintiff, who was an
employee of Berlin Steel, which was the independent
subcontractor employed by Sordoni, may recover in a
direct action against Sordoni based on allegations of
direct negligence by Sordoni. The reasoning of Ray
persuades us that he may not.
First, the law, in the form of the workers’ compensa-
tion statutes, already provides the plaintiff with a level
of compensation for his injuries. Therefore, there is
not the same social need to compensate him from a
different source of liability that there is in the case of
the ordinary third party, such as an innocent bystander.
Id., 667–68. Bystanders have no stake in the construc-
tion operation, nor any means of recovery through
workers’ compensation. An employee of the subcon-
tractor, by contrast, has access to workers’ compensa-
tion benefits and ‘‘has specifically contracted to
perform such work knowing the risks involved . . . .’’
Id., 667.
Second, as the Appellate Court indicated in Ray, the
weight of authority is against the plaintiff’s claim here.8
Third, as Ray points out, the economic relation
between the general contractor and its subcontractor
is generally such that the contract price indirectly
reflects the cost of the workers’ compensation insur-
ance paid by the subcontractor, and imposing liability
on the general contractor would be, in effect, charging
it twice for the same injury. In the words of the court
in Ray: ‘‘It is to be expected that the cost of workers’
compensation insurance will be included by the con-
tractor in his contract price for undertaking to perform
the inherently dangerous work and, therefore, will ulti-
mately be financed by the employer who hires the inde-
pendent contractor. . . . The employer thus already
furnishes funds, at least in part, to pay the insurance
premiums of the independent contractor for workers’
compensation. To hold the employer of the contractor
liable . . . to the employee of the contractor would
effectively make the employer pay twice for a contrac-
tor’s employee’s work-related injury.’’ (Citation omit-
ted.) Id., 668.
Fourth, recognizing the plaintiff’s negligence claim
against Sordoni would impose a greater liability against
it than if it had undertaken to do the steel fabrication
itself, and would thereby create a disincentive to gen-
eral contractors to employ more expert subcontractors.
As the court in Ray noted, ‘‘public policy encourages
real estate developers and other employers to hire inde-
pendent contractors where work is inherently danger-
ous because of their expertise, skill and ability to
understand the dangers and to best take safety precau-
tions against them.’’ Id., 670. The imposition of ‘‘more
liability than if [the general contractor] undertook the
work [itself], can only discourage an employer from
seeking qualified contractors to perform dangerous
work.’’ Id.
Fifth, in the present case, the contract documents
make unmistakably clear that the plaintiff’s employer,
Berlin Steel, was primarily responsible for proper steel
fabrication and inspection. Thus, if there was a failure,
it was primarily that of Berlin Steel, which is paying
the plaintiff workers’ compensation benefits, and only
secondarily, if at all, that of Sordoni. If the plaintiff
were able to recover against Sordoni, Berlin Steel would
be entitled to intervene in the plaintiff’s action and
recoup from the plaintiff’s recovery all of its workers’
compensation payments. See General Statutes § 31-293.
Thus, affording the plaintiff a right to recover in the
present case would, in effect, shift the loss from Berlin
Steel, the party primarily responsible for the plaintiff’s
injuries, to Sordoni, the party only secondarily responsi-
ble therefor. That would not be a wise and reasonable
public policy.
B
The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly
determined that neither Sordoni’s contract with Pitney
Bowes nor the orientation and procedures manual cre-
ated a duty of Sordoni to the plaintiff. We conclude
that the trial court properly found that the plaintiff was
not a third party beneficiary of Sordoni’s contract with
Pitney Bowes, and, thus, that Sordoni did not owe the
plaintiff a duty by virtue of that contract. We further
conclude that the orientation and procedures manual
did not represent a contract between Sordoni and
the plaintiff.
First, the plaintiff argues that Sordoni’s contract with
Pitney Bowes created a duty of Sordoni to the plaintiff.
Specifically, the plaintiff argues that certain provisions
of that contract ‘‘charged Sordoni with . . . safety and
inspection responsibilities for the . . . purpose of pre-
venting the type of harm suffered by [the plaintiff].’’ The
plaintiff was not a contracting party of this agreement.
Thus, his claim that the contract provides a legal duty
proceeds under a third party beneficiary theory.9 We
agree with the trial court that this contract did not
create third party beneficiary rights in the plaintiff.
‘‘[T]he ultimate test to be applied [in determining
whether a person has a right of action as a third party
beneficiary] is whether the [mutual] intent of the parties
to the contract was that the promisor should assume
a direct obligation to the third party [beneficiary] and
. . . that intent is to be determined from the terms
of the contract read in the light of the circumstances
attending its making . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Grigerik v. Sharpe, 247 Conn. 293, 311–12,
721 A.2d 526 (1998). All of the evidence relevant to
the contracting parties’ mutual intent indicates that the
‘‘safety and inspection’’ obligations referenced by the
plaintiff were intended only to benefit Pitney Bowes.
Throughout the written agreement, the parties articu-
lated their intent that Sordoni be able to delegate duties,
including safety and inspection duties, to subcontrac-
tors, such as the plaintiff’s employer. The sole concern
of these ‘‘safety and inspection’’ provisions was that,
between Sordoni and Pitney Bowes, Sordoni would be
the responsible party and ‘‘hold harmless the [o]wner
with respect to [such responsibilities].’’ The common-
sense interpretation of these provisions is that the par-
ties were not concerned with creating legal duties of
Sordoni
to
subcontractors
and
their
employees.
Although, as the plaintiff argues, employees of a subcon-
tractor working on the project site are foreseeable bene-
ficiaries of any safety measures Sordoni might adopt
in performing the contract, foreseeability alone is insuf-
ficient to create third party beneficiary rights. Gazo v.
Stamford, supra, 255 Conn. 267.
The plaintiff argues that ‘‘the trial court essentially
ignored the [orientation and] procedures manual, a con-
tract in which Sordoni expressly promised to provide
a safe workplace and be responsible for the well-being
of all subcontractors’ employees, including [the plain-
tiff].’’ As summarized previously, the trial court did not
ignore the plaintiff’s claim that the orientation and pro-
cedures manual represented a contract between Sor-
doni and the plaintiff. The trial court addressed this
claim in its memorandum of decision, stating: ‘‘The
[plaintiff’s] contractual claim . . . relies on the force
and effect of the manual, the provisions of which cannot
be distinguished from the general obligation by all
involved in the project to provide and maintain a safe
workplace on the owner’s property.’’ Thus, the court did
address this claim, and resolved it against the plaintiff.
After reviewing the purported contractual document
in light of the undisputed facts of the case, we agree with
the trial court that Sordoni was entitled to judgment
on this count. There is nothing in the orientation and
procedures manual, or in the entire record, to suggest
that the manual represented a contract by which Sor-
doni assumed legal duties to employees of Berlin Steel,
such as the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s argument to the
contrary is not a reasonable interpretation of the man-
ual. The undisputed surrounding circumstances, and
the manual itself, indicate that the manual was an infor-
mational tool designed to educate the plaintiff in the
protocols for the job site, not a legally binding contract.
The plaintiff was required to read the manual and verify
by signature that he understood its principles prior to
his admission onto the work site. The language of the
manual quoted by the plaintiff itself, even taken out
of context, is informational rather than promissory in
nature. It provides in relevant part: ‘‘[Sordoni] has been
charged with the responsibility of constructing this proj-
ect in a safe, efficient and timely manner. . . .’’ This
language alludes to a preexisting duty ‘‘charged’’ by
another party; it does not suggest a new undertaking
by virtue of the manual itself. ‘‘The law does not make a
contract when the parties intend none . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) New Haven Tile & Floor
Covering Co. v. Roman, 137 Conn. 462, 464, 78 A.2d
336 (1951). Sordoni was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law that the orientation and procedures manual did
not create the contractual duties alleged.
II
THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM AGAINST
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
In his appeal from the trial court’s judgment in favor
of Professional Services, the plaintiff claims that the
court improperly concluded that no issue of material
fact remained as to whether Professional Services was
negligent in performing its contractual duty to inspect
the welds on the project.10 We disagree.
Preliminarily, we note that the plaintiff, relying on
the state building code, also raises the following claims.
First, Professional Services breached the duty it owed
to the plaintiff, under the code, to inspect 100 percent
of all welds on the project. Second, certain general
provisions of Professional Services’ subcontract obli-
gated it, regardless of any conflicting specific provisions
in the subcontract, to follow the state building code.
Therefore, the state building code, which, under the
plaintiff’s interpretation required Professional Services
to inspect all welds, negated any provisions in the sub-
contract that imposed on Professional Services a duty
to perform only periodic, random inspections of welds.
Third, Professional Services failed, as required by the
state building code, to review Berlin Steel’s quality con-
trol manual and its records of inspections. Finally, the
structural steel specifications in Professional Services’
subcontract violated public policy because, through
them, it attempted to shield itself from the obligations
imposed by the state building code. None of these
claims, however, was presented to the trial court on
the summary judgment motion. Therefore, we decline
to address them.
The plaintiff argues that his claims relying on the
state building code have been preserved because he
stated in his memorandum in opposition to summary
judgment that ‘‘[Professional Services’] obligations
were governed by the 1984 edition of [American Weld-
ing Society (AWS) standards] D1.1 . . . .’’11 Further-
more, the plaintiff relies on the deposition testimony
of his expert, Albert J. Moore, Jr., which made repeated
references to the BOCA National Building Code of 1987,
as supplemented in 1988 (BOCA),12 and § 6 of AWS D1.1,
both of which have been adopted by § 29-252-1a of the
Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies as part of
the state building code. None of the allegations in the
operative complaint, however, claim that the violation
of any provision of the state building code by Profes-
sional Services constituted negligence under the con-
tract. Moreover, the trial court, in its memorandum of
decision on reconsideration of Professional Services’
motion for summary judgment, did not address the issue
of whether the contract created a duty in Professional
Services to adhere to the state building code. Indeed, the
trial court’s memorandum of decision did not mention
either BOCA or AWS D1.1 at all.
Instead, the trial court understood the plaintiff to be
making the following four claims on summary judg-
ment: (1) Professional Services breached its duty to
inspect 100 percent of all welds as required by drawing
S9, note 21, of the structural steel notes, which was
incorporated into the contract by reference; (2) Profes-
sional Services failed to review welder qualifications
of Berlin Steel employees, as required by the structural
steel specifications of the contract; (3) under the state-
ment of special inspections, filed by Professional Ser-
vices with the local municipal authority, Professional
Services assumed a duty to inspect 100 percent of all
welds, which it failed to do;13 and (4) Professional Ser-
vices breached the duty of care it owed to the plaintiff
under Gazo v. Stamford, supra, 255 Conn. 245.14 The
trial court considered each of these claims in turn and
rejected them. If the plaintiff believed that the trial court
failed to address one or more of the arguments he
had advanced in opposition to summary judgment, the
plaintiff could have filed a motion for articulation pursu-
ant to Practice Book § 66-5, but he did not. Because
the plaintiff failed to move for articulation, we must
take the trial court’s decision as properly defining the
scope of the plaintiff’s claims presented to the trial
court. Thus, the record does not support the contention
that the plaintiff had raised in the trial court any claims
relying on BOCA and AWS D1.1.15
The plaintiff’s only remaining claim on appeal, then,
is that Professional Services’ failure to perform its duty
to inspect under the contract constituted negligence.
Specifically, the plaintiff argues that, even if Profes-
sional Services were obligated to perform only periodic,
random inspections of welds under the contract, it was
negligent in performing that duty. We are not persuaded.
Section 05120 of the structural steel specifications,
which were incorporated as schedule A of the subcon-
tract between Professional Services and Sordoni,
clearly stated that the contract did not create a duty
owed to anyone other than the owner, Pitney Bowes.
Specifically, § 05120 provides as follows in § 2..4 (B):
‘‘Inspection and testing which may be provided by the
Owner’s independent Inspection and Testing Agency
. . . is solely for Owner’s benefit. If Contractor wishes
to utilize inspection and testing reports of shop and
field [work], he may do so at his own responsibility
. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Subsection (C) of § 2..4 of
§ 05120, further provides that the ‘‘Inspection and Test-
ing Agency engaged by Owner shall not incur any
responsibility for shop or field work as outlined herein-
below since they are checking on behalf of the Owner.
Contractor is fully responsible for inspection and test-
ing herein required . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) The pur-
pose of these provisions was clear—to allow Pitney
Bowes to retain its own inspection and testing agency
without incurring liability or relieving Berlin Steel from
the responsibility for inspection and testing. Therefore,
regardless of the scope of any contractual duty to
inspect owed by Professional Services, such a duty
would have been owed to Pitney Bowes, not to the
plaintiff. Thus, it is immaterial whether Professional
Services owed a duty to inspect all welds or merely
a duty to perform periodic, random inspections. The
subcontract simply did not create any duty in Profes-
sional Services, owed to the plaintiff, to inspect any
welds on the project.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
1 The claims of Reine Pelletier are solely for loss of consortium. Because
those claims are derivative of the claims of Norman Pelletier, we refer to
Norman Pelletier as the plaintiff.
2 The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate
Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General
Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
3 The plaintiff’s action originally was brought against Sordoni. Thereafter,
the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion to cite in Professional Services
as a party defendant.
4 Although the plaintiff also argues on appeal that the trial court improperly
determined disputed issues of causation in his case against Sordoni, there
is no support in the record for this argument. The plaintiff focuses on one
phrase in the trial court’s memorandum of decision, which reads as follows:
‘‘The undisputed facts indicate that the direct cause of the accident in this
case was the combined failure of the plaintiff’s employer, Berlin Steel, to
provide the structural steel framework called for by the contract drawings
and specifications, in addition to its failure to inspect its work in the manner
required by the Sordoni-Berlin Steel subcontract.’’ That phrase is not a
‘‘tacit’’ determination, as the plaintiff suggests, of disputed factual issues
with respect to the element of proximate cause. The trial court was simply
stating, as we discuss further in this opinion, that the party primarily respon-
sible, as a matter of public policy, was Berlin Steel, thus counseling toward
recognition of the applicability of the nonliability rule in Ray. The sur-
rounding context of the phrase in question is devoted to that argument, not
disputed issues of proximate causation.
In the present appeal, the plaintiff also relies on Sordoni’s contract with
Berlin Steel as a source of a contractual duty to the plaintiff. As we indicate
later in this opinion, however, in the summary judgment proceedings in
the trial court, the plaintiff did not rely on that contract. We confine our
consideration, therefore, to those contractual sources presented to the trial
court, namely, the Pitney Bowes contract and the orientation and proce-
dures manual.
5 We ordinarily decide an appeal on the basis on which the case was
litigated in the trial court. Imperial Casualty & Indemnity Co. v. State, 246
Conn. 313, 320, 714 A.2d 1230 (1998). Therefore, we do not consider the
plaintiff’s claims on appeal that the state building code, or any other statutory
or regulatory source, provides a basis for a legal duty of Sordoni. We consider
only the alleged sources of a legal duty that were litigated before the trial
court, namely, common-law negligence and the alleged contractual sources.
6 We do not give an exhaustive list of the possible duties of care that
may provide an exception to the rule of nonliability, leading to a general
contractor’s liability. The Restatement (Second) of Torts gives, inter alia,
the following additional examples. A general contractor might also be held
liable, notwithstanding the general rule of nonliability, where the work in
question poses ‘‘a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm to others
unless special precautions are taken’’ and the general contractor ‘‘fails to
provide in the contract that the contractor shall take such precautions’’ or
‘‘fails to exercise reasonable care’’ itself. 2 Restatement (Second), supra,
§ 413. Also, a general contractor that retains control of the work performed
by the subcontractor might be liable for a ‘‘failure to exercise [that] control
with reasonable care.’’ Id., § 414.
7 ‘‘Vicarious liability is based on a relationship between the parties, irre-
spective of participation, either by act or omission, of the one vicariously
liable, under which it has been determined as a matter of policy that one
person should be liable for the act of [another]. Its true basis is largely
one of public or social policy under which it has been determined that,
irrespective of fault, a party should be held to respond for the acts of
another.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Alvarez v.
New Haven Register, Inc., supra, 249 Conn. 720. Thus, an allegation of
vicarious liability does not involve the breach of any duty by the party
vicariously liable.
8 ‘‘See, e.g., Scofi v. McKeon Construction Co., 666 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1982);
Evans v. Transportacion Maritime Mexicana, 639 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1981);
Vagle v. Pickands Mather & Co., 611 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1033, 100 S. Ct. 704, 62 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1980) (applying Minnesota
law); Bramer v. United States, 595 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1979); Chavis v.
Finnlines Ltd., O/Y, 576 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1978); Jones v. United States,
399 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1968); Lipka v. United States, 369 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 935, 87 S. Ct. 2061, 18 L. Ed. 2d 997 (1967);
Galbraith v. United States, 296 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1961); Wallach v. United
States, 291 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 935, 82 S. Ct. 373, 7 L.
Ed. 2d 197 (1961); Hurst v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 251 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.
1958); Ackerman v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 555 F. Sup. 93 (D.N.D. 1982)
(applying North Dakota law); Sloane v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 552 P.2d 157
(Alaska 1976); Welker v. Kennecott Copper Co., 1 Ariz. App. 395, 403 P.2d
330 (1965); Jackson v. Petit Jean Electric Corporation, 270 Ark. 506, 606
S.W.2d 66 (1980); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Price, 170 So. 2d 293 (Fla.
1964); Pearson v. Harris, 449 So. 2d 339 (Fla. App. 1984); Peone v. Regulus
Stud Mills, Inc., 113 Idaho 374, 744 P.2d 102 (1987); Texas Eastern Transmis-
sion Corporation v. Seymour National Bank, 451 N.E.2d 698 (Ind. App.
1983); Johns v. New York Blower Co., 442 N.E.2d 382 (Ind. App. 1982); King
v. Shelby Rural Electric Co-Op Corporation, 502 S.W.2d 659 (Ky.), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 932, 94 S. Ct. 2644, 41 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1974); Vertentes v.
Barletta Co., 392 Mass. 165, 466 N.E.2d 500 (1984); Sierra Pacific Power
Co. v. Rinehart, 99 Nev. 557, 665 P.2d 270 (1983); Cooper v. Metropolitan
Government, 628 S.W.2d 30 (Tenn. App. 1981); Humphreys v. Texas Power &
Light Co., 427 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. App. 1968); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v.
Bell, 180 S.W.2d 970 (Tex. App. 1944); Epperly v. Seattle, 65 Wash. 2d 777,
399 P.2d 591 (1965); Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890 (Wyo. 1986);
see also annot., 34 A.L.R.4th 914, 934–48, and cases cited therein; note,
‘Liability to Employees of Independent Contractors Engaged in Inherently
Dangerous Work: A Workable Workers’ Compensation Proposal,’ 48 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 1165 (1980); contra Rooney v. United States, 634 F.2d 1238 (9th
Cir. 1980) (applying California law); Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, 68 Cal. 2d
245, 437 P.2d 508, 66 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1968).’’ Ray v. Schneider, supra, 16 Conn.
App. 665–66.
9 The plaintiff also argued that Sordoni owed a duty ‘‘to perform its . . .
contractual obligations with due care’’ as a matter of ‘‘foreseeability and
public policy.’’ This specific argument is controlled by the general contractor
nonliability rule, discussed previously, which is applicable to all of the
plaintiff’s allegations that a duty of Sordoni should be recognized as a matter
of public policy.
10 Additionally, the plaintiff relies on the Appellate Court’s decision in
Gould v. Mellick & Sexton, 66 Conn. App. 542, 555, 785 A.2d 265, cert.
granted, 259 Conn. 902, 789 A.2d 990 (2001), to argue that summary judgment
is ‘‘an inappropriate way to conclude complex litigation.’’ The plaintiff,
however, made no such argument to the trial court. The parties presented
the summary judgment motion to the trial court, which decided it. We see
no reason in the present appeal to depart from our usual practice of deciding
appeals on the basis on which the case was litigated in the trial court.
Furthermore, we note that we have, in Gould, certified for further review
the question of whether ‘‘the Appellate Court properly conclude[d] that the
trial court lacked authority to render summary judgment because . . . the
case was complex . . . ?’’ Gould v. Mellick & Sexton, supra, 259 Conn. 902.
Finally, although this case was on the trial court’s complex litigation docket,
neither the facts nor the law applicable to the present case were so complex
that, even if the doctrine purportedly announced by the Appellate Court in
Gould represents our law, it would apply to the present case.
11 AWS D1.1 is issued by the American Welding Society, Inc., and estab-
lishes standards relating to welding.
12 BOCA is a national building code that is issued by the Building Officials
and Code Administrators International, Inc.
13 Although the plaintiff relies on the statement of special inspections on
appeal, he has changed the nature of this claim, so that it now depends on
his interpretation of the state building code. It is not, therefore, preserved
for review. Before the trial court, the plaintiff argued that, through the
statement of special inspections, a report prepared and filed by Thomas A.
Torrenti, the special inspector for the project, on behalf of Professional
Services, Professional Services represented that it had inspected 100 percent
of all welds on the project. On appeal, the plaintiff now argues that, through
the statement of special inspections, which lists the applicable BOCA sec-
tions next to each listed task, Professional Services represented that it had
complied with the state building code.
14 As with the plaintiff’s argument regarding the statement of special
inspections, the plaintiff has recast this claim in the context of his interpreta-
tion of the state building code. This issue, therefore, is not properly preserved
because the plaintiff now argues that it was Professional Services’ status
as a special inspector under the state building code that created a duty in
it owed to all who were likely to be injured by any failure of it to perform
its duties under the code.
15 The plaintiff also had claimed that Professional Services’ failure to act
in accordance with BOCA and AWS D1.1 constituted negligence per se, but
has since conceded that he failed to preserve this claim and has withdrawn it.