Title: Alexander v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 49S04-1308-CR-534
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: March 13, 2014

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Victoria L. Bailey 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Andrew Falk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aaron J. Spolarich 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputies Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S04-1308-CR-534 
 
 
BOBBY ALEXANDER, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court 
No. 49G04-1103-FA-015328 
The Honorable Lisa Borges, Judge 
  
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A04-1207-CR-351 
_________________________________ 
 
March 13, 2014 
 
Per Curiam. 
 
We granted transfer to address whether this appeal, taken after a prison sentence was 
imposed but before the question of restitution was decided, should have been dismissed as  
premature.  Given the particular circumstances, as explained below, we have concluded that this 
Mar 13 2014, 10:12 am
2 
 
appeal should not be dismissed and should be remanded to the Court of Appeals for resolution on 
the merits.    
 
Following a jury trial, Bobby Alexander was found guilty of two counts of aggravated 
battery,1 and at a hearing on June 20, 2012, he was sentenced to a term of years in the 
Department of Correction.  The State also sought restitution for medical expenses incurred by an 
uninsured victim totaling some $96,000, and defense counsel requested time to investigate 
whether some of the bills had been discounted.  The trial court indicated a desire to resolve the 
matter of restitution “fairly quickly” and told the parties that a restitution hearing would be 
scheduled “in a couple weeks.”  (Tr. p. 636-37.)   
 
The trial court then informed Alexander that if he intended to appeal, he had to file a 
Notice of Appeal within thirty days.  (Tr. p. 638.)  The Abstract of Judgment was issued and 
filed that day,2 and Alexander was ordered committed to the Department of Correction.  The trial 
court appointed appellate counsel a few days later on June 25.  The State filed a motion 
requesting a hearing on restitution, and the trial court set a hearing for July 16.  Meanwhile, on 
July 11, twenty-one days after the trial court had announced the prison sentence, Alexander filed 
a Notice of Appeal.  Apparently, the question of restitution was not resolved at the July 16 
hearing, and another hearing was set for August 7, but by then, the Court of Appeals had 
obtained jurisdiction over the case.3  The final chronological case summary entry supplied to us 
                                                 
1 See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.5. 
 
2 Marion County historically has not issued the “judgment of conviction and sentence” referred to in I.C. 
§ 35-38-3-2, but the “abstract of judgment,” a form designed by the Department of Correction, has on 
occasion been treated as a substitute for it.  See, e.g., Neff v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1249, 1251 (Ind. 2008). 
 
3 Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 8, the Court of Appeals obtained jurisdiction over the case when the  
Notice of Completion of the Clerk’s Record was filed on July 26, 2012. 
3 
 
on the subject of restitution is dated August 7 and states that the “court will set hearing at a later 
date.”  
 
After Alexander filed his appellant’s brief, the State moved to dismiss the appeal on 
grounds the appeal was premature.  The State asserted that because there had been no resolution 
of whether (or how much) restitution would be ordered, there had been no “final judgment”4 and, 
therefore, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to decide the appeal.  The Court of Appeals 
motions panel denied the motion, but the State raised the issue again in its appellee’s brief, and 
the Court of Appeals writing panel dismissed the appeal as premature.   Alexander v. State, 987 
N.E.2d 182 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), vacated. We granted Alexander’s petition to transfer 
jurisdiction to this Court, 992 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 2013) (table), and heard oral argument.   
 
As matters stand now, close to two years after having been convicted and placed in DOC 
custody, Alexander’s appeal has not been considered on the merits, and no order on whether he 
will be required to pay restitution has been entered.    
 
The State’s position is that Alexander caused the delay by requesting time to investigate 
the medical bills and initiating this appeal before the trial court had ruled on the State’s request 
for a restitution order.  In arguing for dismissal of a premature appeal, the State relies primarily 
on Haste v. State, 967 N.E.2d 576 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. not sought, where the trial court’s 
sentencing order stated that restitution was being taken under advisement, but Haste  initiated the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
4 Appellate Rule 2(H) specifies that a “judgment is a final judgment if it disposes of all claims as to all 
parties.”  Criminal Rule 19 says that a Notice of Appeal must be filed within thirty days “after the date of 
sentencing.”  Case law generally says that an order of restitution, like a fine or other penalty, is a part of a 
criminal sentence.  See, e.g., Miller v. State, 502 N.E.2d 92, 95-96 (Ind. 1986) (discussing restitution 
ordered as a condition of probation); Kotsopoulos v. State, 654 N.E.2d 44, 46 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. 
denied. 
4 
 
appeal before restitution was determined.  The Court of Appeals decided that because the trial 
court’s order had specifically stated restitution was under advisement, the order did not 
completely dispose of all the sentencing issues, and there was no final, appealable judgment.  Id. 
at 577.  The Haste appeal was dismissed as premature. 
 
However, unlike the reported facts in Haste, here the trial court advised Alexander that 
any Notice of Appeal had to be filed within thirty days of the June 20 hearing and the trial court 
appointed appellate counsel a few days later.  That advisement sufficiently put matters in a state 
of confusion about Alexander’s appeal deadline, we think, such that he is entitled to have his 
appeal decided on the merits now.  See Berry v. Huffman, 643 N.E.2d 327, 328-29 (Ind. 1994) 
(one goal of rules governing appeals is to avoid leaving litigants uncertain whether to initiate an 
appeal that might be dismissed as premature or risk losing a right to appeal altogether).    Further, 
given the unusual procedural history of this case, a future order of restitution once jurisdiction 
returns to the trial court will not be precluded.5   
 
As indicated, given the confusion about appellate deadlines that may have resulted from 
the trial court’s advisement and in view of the delay already in the case, Alexander’s appeal 
should be addressed on the merits even though the issue of restitution remains unresolved at this 
juncture.  Accordingly, transfer having been granted, this case is remanded to the Court of 
Appeals for consideration of the points raised in Alexander’s appellant’s brief.   
Dickson, C.J., and Rucker, David, Massa, and Rush, JJ., concur.  
                                                 
5 Compare Denning v. State, 991 N.E.2d 160, 163 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. not sought, which   
suggests the trial court might not have the authority to order restitution after the appeal of the conviction 
had been decided.