Title: PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES E WHITTAKER
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 115917
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: November 21, 2001

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED NOVEMBER 21, 2001  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 115917  
JAMES ELBERT WHITTAKER, 
also known as  
JAMES EDWARD WHITTAKER,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
PER CURIAM  
The defendant was found guilty by a jury of possession of  
cocaine with intent to deliver.  However, the Court of Appeals  
reversed and remanded for a new trial. It found an abuse of  
discretion in the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of  
defendant’s prior delivery of cocaine and that the error more  
probably 
than not affected the jury’s verdict.  
We conclude  
that even if the evidence was improperly admitted, the  
defendant did not meet his burden of demonstrating that the  
error undermined the reliability of the verdict. We therefore  
 
reverse, and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for  
consideration of other issues.  
I  
On about November 5, 1996, a confidential informant  
bought cocaine from Mack Whittaker, defendant’s cousin, at  
defendant’s residence.  On the bases of this purchase and  
other information Officer McLaughlin received, he sought and  
obtained a search warrant for defendant’s residence.  The  
search warrant was executed on November 7, 1996.  
Officer McLaughlin searched the back yard and the base of  
the outside of the house.  He saw some protruding vinyl  
siding.  Because the siding was protruding, and because he had  
received information that the cocaine was being stored in the  
house’s siding, he investigated and found a bag that contained  
thirty-two plastic Baggies containing rock cocaine.  He  
estimated that the value of the cocaine was $6,000.  
Considering the amount and the way the cocaine was packaged,  
he concluded that the cocaine was intended for delivery,  
rather than personal use.  
Defendant and a child were the only persons in the house  
at the time of the search.  The only mail in the house was  
addressed to defendant. The police found $725 in cash under  
the fitted sheet on the bed where defendant had been sitting.  
After the evidence had been seized, an officer read  
2  
 
 
defendant his Miranda1 rights. Defendant said that he wanted  
a lawyer.  After defendant’s girlfriend arrived, defendant  
told the officer repeatedly that she had nothing to do with  
the drugs.  Defendant asked what would happen and was told  
that they would both be arrested.  The defendant then admitted  
that the drugs belonged to him.  
Over 
defense 
objection, a police officer was permitted to  
testify regarding a drug sale by the defendant in 1992 that  
led to the defendant’s conviction of a drug offense.  
The defendant testified at trial, denying that the drugs  
were his, that he was selling drugs from the house, or that he  
knew the drugs were there. The jury found him guilty of the  
charged offense of possession of between 50 and 225 grams of  
cocaine with intent to deliver, and he was sentenced to ten to  
forty years in prison.2  
II  
The 
defendant 
appealed, 
raising 
several 
issues, 
including  
a challenge to the admission of the evidence regarding his  
prior drug activity.  The Court of Appeals found admission of  
that evidence to be error under People v Crawford, 458 Mich  
376; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).3  It concluded that, as in Crawford,  
1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d  
694 (1966).  
2 
 The maximum sentence for the offense was increased  
because 
of 
the 
defendant’s prior conviction.  MCL 333.7413(3).  
3  Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued November 9, 
1999 (Docket No. 208360).  
3  
the evidence regarding defendant’s 1992 offense was not  
probative of anything other than his propensity to commit the  
crime.  
The Court of Appeals also rejected the prosecutor’s  
argument that the error was not prejudicial.  After noting the  
harmless error standard for a preserved nonconstitutional  
error established in People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 496; 596  
NW2d 607 (1999), the Court concluded that it was more probable  
than not that the error was outcome determinative. 
It  
explained:  
There was no direct evidence linking defendant  
to the cocaine, which was found underneath the 
vinyl siding of the back of defendant’s house. 
Defendant testified that the cocaine was not his, 
and he only went into his backyard to mow the lawn 
or take out the garbage. 
Although defendant 
confessed, he presented evidence that he did so 
because the police threatened to arrest his  
fiancée.
 Thus, defendant’s credibility was at 
issue, and the jury’s assessment of his testimony 
was more probably than not influenced by the 
evidence of his prior conviction. [Slip op, p 2.]  
The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial.  
The Court also said that the trial court should have  
conducted an in camera hearing to determine whether the  
informant could have provided testimony that was relevant or  
helpful to the defense or essential to a fair determination of  
the defendant’s guilt.  It directed that such a hearing be  
held on remand.  
The prosecutor has filed an application for leave to  
appeal.  The defendant has cross-appealed regarding an  
4  
 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which the Court of  
Appeals did not reach because of its reversal on the  
evidentiary issue.  
III  
The 
appropriate 
standard 
of 
harmless 
error 
review 
depends  
on 
whether 
the 
error 
is constitutional or nonconstitutional in  
nature, and whether the appellant preserved the issue. People  
v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). The error  
found by the Court of Appeals, erroneous admission of  
evidence, is nonconstitutional, and the defendant objected to  
the admission of the evidence.  Thus, the standard is that for  
preserved nonconstitutional errors. The standard is derived  
from MCL 769.26, which provides, in part:  
No judgment or verdict shall be . . . reversed 
. . . in any criminal case, on the ground of . . . 
the improper admission . . . of evidence, . . . 
unless in the opinion of the court, after an 
examination 
of 
the 
entire 
cause, 
it 
shall  
affirmatively appear that the error complained of 
has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.  
In Lukity, we said:  
[MCL 769.26], with its rebuttable presumption, 
clearly places the burden on the defendant to 
demonstrate that a preserved, nonconstitutional 
error resulted in a miscarriage of justice.  
* * *  
[T]he bottom line is that [MCL 769.26] 
presumes that a preserved, nonconstitutional error 
is not a ground for reversal unless “after an 
examination 
of 
the 
entire 
cause, 
it 
shall  
affirmatively appear” that it is more probable than 
not that the error was outcome determinative.  [460 
Mich 493-496].  
5  
 
 
 
Since Lukity, we have several times applied these  
principles.  See People v Snyder, 462 Mich 38, 44-46; 609 NW2d  
831 (2000); People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 296-302; 613 NW2d 694  
(2000); People v Rodriguez, 463 Mich 466, 473-474; 620 NW2d 13  
(2000); People v Elston, 462 Mich 751, 766; 614 NW2d 595  
(2000). As we said in Elston:  
In order to overcome the presumption that a 
preserved nonconstitutional error is harmless, a 
defendant must persuade the reviewing court that it 
is more probable than not that the error in 
question was outcome determinative. 
People v  
Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).  
An 
error 
is 
deemed 
to 
have 
been 
“outcome  
determinative” if it undermined the reliability of 
the verdict.  See People v Snyder, 462 Mich 38, 45; 
605 NW2d 831 (2000), citing Lukity, supra at 495­
496.  In making this determination, the reviewing 
court should focus on the nature of the error in  
light of the weight and strength of the untainted 
evidence.
 See Lukity, supra at 495; People v  
Mateo, 453 Mich 203, 215; 551 NW2d 891 (1996). 
[462 Mich 766.]  
IV  
In this case, even if the evidence regarding the  
defendant’s prior drug activity was improperly admitted, the  
defendant has not carried his burden of establishing that it  
was more probable than not that the alleged error affected the  
outcome of the trial.  The evidence that the Court of Appeals  
found to have been improperly admitted was that the defendant  
had previously sold drugs.  However, the circumstances of the  
prior sale were quite different from the charged offense,  
reducing the degree to which the jury might conclude that the  
defendant was guilty of the instant offense because it showed  
6  
 
a pattern with his 
prior conduct. 
Further, in closing  
argument, the use the prosecutor made of the defendant’s prior  
crime was to attack his credibility.  The defendant was  
properly impeached with three theft-related convictions,  
minimizing the effect of the evidence of a prior drug offense.  
Conversely, there was strong evidence of the defendant’s  
guilt.  Most significantly, the defendant admitted to the  
police that the drugs belonged to him.  While defendant  
claimed that he made this confession only because the police  
threatened to arrest his fiancée, there was evidence that,  
even before the police made this “threat,” defendant  
repeatedly told a police officer that his girlfriend had  
nothing to do with the drugs.  By making that assertion,  
defendant implicitly suggested that he had been aware of the  
drugs.  In addition, a substantial quantity of cocaine,  
clearly packaged for sale, was under the siding of the house  
in which the defendant admitted that he lived.  He was the  
only adult in the house at the time of the raid.  Although  
unemployed, he was literally sitting on a substantial amount  
of cash hidden under a bed sheet.  
While the defendant attempted to offer explanations for  
a number of the items of evidence, the net effect of the  
testimony was to present a convincing case of the defendant’s  
guilt.  In light of the strength of the prosecution’s case, it  
cannot be said that the alleged error more probably than not  
affected the jury’s verdict.  Accordingly, we reverse the  
7  
 
 
 
 
Court of Appeals decision ordering a new trial.4  
V  
The Court of Appeals directed that at the new trial the  
circuit judge conduct an in camera inquiry regarding the  
defendant’s request that the informant be produced.  It is  
unclear from the Court of Appeals opinion whether the Court  
would have so directed but for the reversal on the evidentiary  
issue.  In addition, the Court of Appeals did not reach the  
ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised by the  
defendant.  We, therefore, remand the case to the Court of  
Appeals for consideration of those questions.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred.  
4 
 Because we conclude that the alleged error does not 
require reversal under Lukity, we decline to address whether 
the evidence was properly admitted.  
8  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 115917  
JAMES ELBERT WHITTAKER, 
also known as  
JAMES EDWARD WHITTAKER,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
I dissent and would affirm the decision of the Court of  
Appeals.  The trial court improperly admitted evidence of  
defendant’s 1992 drug conviction.  The Court of Appeals  
correctly stated that the evidence “was not probative of  
anything other than defendant’s propensity to commit the  
crime.”1  Further, even if there were any probative value, it  
was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair  
prejudice.  
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued November 9, 
1999 (Docket No. 208360). Slip op, p 2.  
1
The majority fails to analyze whether the admission was  
error, reasoning that even if it was, it was harmless because  
of the “strength of the prosecution’s case.”  Slip op, p 7.  
I disagree because I do not think the prosecution’s case was  
so strong that the admission of defendant’s prior drug  
conviction was harmless.  There was evidence that other people  
regularly visited the house.  Because the drugs were hidden  
outside the house, it is possible that one of the visitors hid  
the drugs there. Why would defendant hide drugs outside his  
own house, possibly exposing the drugs to theft or the  
elements, when he could hide them inside his house?  
Additionally, defendant’s cousin, not defendant, was the  
subject 
of 
the 
investigation 
for 
the 
earlier 
sale.  
Defendant’s cousin made the initial sale to an informant  
outside 
defendant’s 
residence, which is why the search warrant  
was for defendant’s residence. Moreover, other people lived  
in the house.  
More importantly, I do think it is likely that the  
admission of the prior drug offense was, more probably than  
not, outcome determinative.  I disagree with the majority that  
because the prosecution referenced three larceny convictions  
to attack defendant’s credibility, the reference to the drug  
offense 
(also 
to 
attack 
defendant’s 
credibility) 
was 
harmless.  
The jury probably did not use the prior drug offense to  
2  
determine defendant’s credibility.  Rather, the jury likely  
considered it as evidence that defendant sold drugs in the  
past and probably still sold them and, therefore, the drugs at  
issue were his.2  
Because I would hold that admitting evidence of the prior  
conviction was error and would further hold that the error was  
not harmless, I would affirm the decision of the Court of  
Appeals.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
2 Defendant did confess to the police officers that the 
drugs were his, however, I agree with the Court of Appeals 
that defendant presented evidence that he did so only because 
the police officers threatened to arrest his fiancée.  
3