Title: Steadfast Insurance Co. v. Greenwich Insurance Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2016AP001631
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: January 25, 2019

2019 WI 6 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP1631 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Steadfast Insurance Company, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Greenwich Insurance Company, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 380 Wis. 2d 184, 908 N.W.2d 502  
PDC No:  2018 WI App 11 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 25, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 29, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Glenn H. Yamahiro 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. concurs and dissents, joined by 
DALLET, J. (opinion filed). 
R.G. BRADLEY, J. concurs and dissents (opinion 
filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Pamela J. Tillman, Esq., Michael J. Cohen, Esq., and 
Meissner Tierney Fisher & Nichols S.C., Milwaukee; with whom on 
the briefs were Thomas G. Drennan, Esq., and Dinsmore & Shohl 
LLP, Chicago, Illinois.  There was an oral argument by Michael 
J. Cohen.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Monte E. Weiss, Charles W. Kramer, and Weiss Law Office, S.C., 
Mequon. 
 
There 
was 
an 
oral 
argument 
by 
Monte 
Weiss. 
 
 
2019 WI 6
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2016AP1631 
(L.C. No. 
2013CV1685) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Steadfast Insurance Company, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Greenwich Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 25, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   We review a decision of the court of 
appeals1 affirming the circuit court's2 grant of summary judgment to Steadfast Insurance 
Company (Steadfast).  Summary judgment granted Steadfast the right to recover from 
Greenwich Insurance Company (Greenwich) based on Steadfast's and Greenwich's relationships 
                                                 
1 Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 2018 WI App 11, 
380 Wis. 2d 184, 908 N.W.2d 502. 
2 The Honorable Glenn H. Yamahiro of Milwaukee County 
presided. 
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
2 
 
with Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District (MMSD), who was sued for alleged negligent 
inspection, maintenance, repair, and operation of Milwaukee's sewerage system.  
¶2 
MMSD tendered its defense to both Steadfast and Greenwich.  Steadfast accepted 
the tender; Greenwich did not, claiming that its policy was excess to Steadfast's based on its 
"other insurance" clause.  Steadfast disagreed and sued Greenwich to recover the defense costs it 
paid to MMSD and the attorney fees incurred in suing Greenwich to reimburse it for those 
defense costs.  
¶3 
First, we conclude that Greenwich, who insured the risk that United Water 
Services Milwaukee, LLC (United Water) would negligently perform services for MMSD, 
thereby causing damage, and Steadfast, who for a different period of time insured the risk that 
Veolia Water Milwaukee, LLC (Veolia) would negligently perform services for MMSD, thereby 
causing damage, were both primary and successive insurers in regard to MMSD, their common 
additional insured.3   
¶4 
Second, we conclude that Greenwich breached its contractual duty to defend 
MMSD.  Third, we conclude that Steadfast's contractual subrogation claim against Greenwich 
was timely filed as it comes within the six-year statute of limitations for contract actions.   
¶5 
Fourth, we conclude Steadfast had a contractual duty to defend MMSD that was 
not abrogated by Greenwich's breach of its contractual duty to defend MMSD.  Therefore, we 
apply a pro-rata allocation of defense costs Steadfast paid to MMSD based on Steadfast's and 
Greenwich's respective policy limits of $30 million and $20 million.  Fifth, and finally, we 
                                                 
3 Veolia Water North American Central, LLC, d/b/a Veolia 
Water Milwaukee, LLC, is a wholly owned subsidiary of WASCO LLC, 
who is the actual named insured on the Steadfast policy.  Veolia 
and United Water were sued for sewage backups as well as MMSD.  
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
3 
 
conclude that Steadfast is entitled to recover attorney fees from Greenwich due to Steadfast's 
stepping into the shoes of MMSD through contractual subrogation to force Greenwich to pay 
defense costs.    
¶6 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals in part and reverse it 
in part. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶7 
This dispute arises out of historic rains that occurred in Milwaukee in June 2008.  
Those heavy rains overwhelmed MMSD's sewerage system, which resulted in raw sewage 
backing up into more than 8,000 homes.  Lawsuits were filed against United Water, Veolia and 
MMSD because of sewage backups, alleging negligence in the repair, maintenance, and 
operation of the sewerage system both before and during the heavy rains.4   
¶8 
Beginning in 1998, MMSD entered into Operating Agreements with private 
companies to operate and maintain its sewerage system.  United Water provided operational 
services for many years.  MMSD's Operating Agreement with United Water required United 
Water to maintain comprehensive liability insurance, naming MMSD as an additional insured.  
United Water contracted with Greenwich for liability insurance with the last contract of 
insurance beginning July 24, 2007 and ending July 24 2008; it named MMSD as an additional 
insured.  The Greenwich policy limits were $20 million.  United Water maintains that it last 
provided services under an Operating Agreement with MMSD on February 29, 2008.    
                                                 
4 Banicki, et al. v. Veolia, et al., Milwaukee Cty. Case 
No. 09-CV-1860; Westmoreland v. Veolia, et al., Milwaukee Cty. 
Case No. 09-CV-6121; FM Global v. Veolia, et al., Milwaukee Cty. 
Case No. 09-CV-7594; Reep, et al. v. City of Milwaukee, et al., 
Milwaukee Cty. Case No. 09-CV-3483.  FM Global and Westmoreland 
were eventually consolidated into Banicki.  
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
4 
 
¶9 
Beginning on March 1, 2008, and continuing through the June 2008 heavy rains, 
MMSD contracted with Veolia to operate and maintain its sewerage system.  Their Operating 
Agreement similarly required Veolia to maintain comprehensive liability insurance, naming 
MMSD as an additional insured.  Steadfast provided the required insurance to Veolia, with 
policy limits of $30 million.  
¶10 The Greenwich policy obligated it to defend any claim 
against its insureds, United Water and MMSD, as well as to 
provide indemnification:   
With respect to the insurance afforded by this Policy, 
the Company shall defend any CLAIM against the INSURED 
seeking DAMAGES to which this insurance applies, even 
if any of the allegations are groundless, false or 
fraudulent.  Defense counsel may be designated by the 
Company or designated by the INSURED . . . . 
¶11 In a similar fashion, the Steadfast policy gave 
Steadfast "the right and duty to assume the adjustment, defense 
and settlement of any 'claim' to which this insurance applies."  
Steadfast's 
policy, 
which 
insured 
Veolia 
and 
MMSD, 
also 
contained a subrogation clause, which stated in relevant part: 
In the event of any payment under this policy, we 
shall be subrogated to all an "insured's" rights of 
recovery against any person or organization.  An 
"insured" shall execute and deliver instruments and 
papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure 
such rights.  An "insured" shall do nothing to 
prejudice such rights.  
¶12 After MMSD tendered its defense to both Steadfast and 
Greenwich, it opted to hire its own counsel.  The lawsuits were 
settled 
without 
MMSD 
paying 
plaintiffs' 
claimed 
damages.  
Steadfast participated in MMSD's defense by reimbursing MMSD for 
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
5 
 
$1.55 million in defense costs.  However, when MMSD tendered its 
defense to Greenwich and Steadfast, there was no way of knowing 
that settlement would be achieved without paying something 
toward claimed damages.   
¶13 Greenwich, who had refused MMSD's tender, had sent 
MMSD a letter explaining that "we fail to see how [United Water] 
could be liable for causing a sewage backup in June 2008 when 
its services for MMSD terminated in February 2008."  Greenwich 
further argued that "there is ample evidence that when [United 
Water] turned over operational responsibilities to Veolia and 
MMSD in February 2008, all systems, equipment, and machinery at 
the subject sewage overflow diversion chamber were functioning 
according to operational protocols."  
¶14 One year later, MMSD renewed its tender to Greenwich.  
It informed Greenwich that United Water had been named as a 
defendant in lawsuits that resulted from the 2008 sewage 
backups.  Greenwich responded five months later, acknowledging 
that "there may be a potential for coverage" and requesting 
"additional information in order to 
determine Greenwich's 
current coverage obligations."  After receiving the requested 
information, including confirmation that MMSD had satisfied its 
$250,000 self-insured retention amount, Greenwich continued to 
refuse the tender of MMSD's defense.  Instead, it unilaterally 
determined based on its "other insurance" clause that its policy 
was excess to Steadfast's $30 million liability limit.   
¶15 After the conclusion of the lawsuits that resulted 
from the sewage backups, Steadfast sued Greenwich to recover the 
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
6 
 
$1.55 million in defense costs that it had paid to MMSD.  The 
circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Steadfast, 
awarding it the entire amount Steadfast paid MMSD, as well as 
$325,000 in attorney fees that Steadfast incurred bringing this 
lawsuit. 
¶16 The court of appeals affirmed.  Steadfast Ins. Co. v. 
Greenwich Ins. Co., 2018 WI App 11, ¶4, 380 Wis. 2d 184, 908 
N.W.2d 502.  The court of appeals based its decision on the 
following conclusions:  
(1) Greenwich's policy provided primary, not excess, 
coverage 
for 
claims 
against 
MMSD; 
(2) MMSD 
has 
established that it met the $250,000 risk retention 
amount by incurring $594,302.23 in defense costs; 
(3) Steadfast's equitable subrogation claim is timely 
because the six-year statute of limitations in Wis. 
Stat. § 893.43 applicable to contract claims applies 
to Steadfast's claim, which is premised on Greenwich's 
breach of the duty to defend MMSD; (4) under the facts 
of this case, because Greenwich breached its duty to 
defend MMSD, Greenwich is not equitably entitled to an 
allocation of MMSD's defense costs; and (5) under the 
facts of this case, Steadfast is equitably entitled to 
recover attorney fees in this lawsuit. 
 
Id.  We granted Greenwich's petition for review, and now affirm 
in part and reverse in part.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶17 We review summary judgment decisions independently, 
applying the same methodology as the circuit court and the court 
of appeals, while benefitting from their discussions.  Dufour v. 
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
7 
 
Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 2016 WI 59, ¶12, 370 Wis. 2d 313, 
881 N.W.2d 678.  
¶18 We 
also 
review 
insurance 
contract 
clauses 
independently of decisions of the circuit court and court of 
appeals, 
while 
again 
benefitting 
from 
their 
discussions. 
Wadzinski v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 WI 75, ¶10, 342 Wis. 2d 
311, 818 N.W.2d 819.  Therefore, whether a party is entitled to 
attorney fees based on contractual subrogation is a question of 
law for our independent review.  Estate of Kriefall v. Sizzler 
USA, 2012 WI 70, ¶16, 342 Wis. 2d 29, 816 N.W.2d 853.  
¶19 Determining which statute of limitations applies to 
contract issues involves a question of law that we also decide 
independently.  Zastrow v. Journal Commc'ns, Inc., 2006 WI 72, 
¶12, 291 Wis. 2d 426, 718 N.W.2d 51.  And finally, the proper 
measure of damages for an insurer's breach of a contractual duty 
to defend is likewise a question of law that we review 
independently.  Newhouse v. Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 176 
Wis. 2d 824, 837, 501 N.W.2d 1 (1993).   
B.  Contract Interpretation 
¶20 The issues in this case all stem from Greenwich's 
insurance contract with United Water and Steadfast's insurance 
contract with Veolia.  Each policy listed MMSD as an additional 
insured.  Therefore, the following general principles of 
contract 
interpretation 
guide 
our 
initial 
discussion.  
Wadzinski, 342 Wis. 2d 311, ¶11.   
¶21 Our general task in contract interpretation is to 
determine and carry out the parties' intentions.  Preisler v. 
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
8 
 
Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 135, ¶18, 360 Wis. 2d 129, 857 
N.W.2d 136.  The parties' intentions are presumed to be 
expressed in the language of the contract.  Wadzinski, 342 
Wis. 2d 311, ¶11.  Where the language of a contract is 
unambiguous and the parties' intentions can be ascertained from 
the face of the contract, we give effect to the words they 
employed.  Estate of Kriefall, 342 Wis. 2d 29, ¶21.  However, if 
the policy terms are ambiguous, we construe the policy from the 
perspective of a reasonable insured.  Wadzinski, 342 Wis. 2d 
311, ¶11.  
1.  Risk and Loss 
¶22 Greenwich and Steadfast issued comprehensive liability 
insurance policies, which their Operating Agreements with MMSD 
required.  As a general matter, liability policies insure risks 
that are dependent on various circumstances that cause insureds 
to obtain insurance coverage.  Couch on Insurance § 101:3 (3rd 
ed. 1999).  Stated otherwise, risk is the "type of liability the 
insurer agreed to provide coverage for under the terms of the 
policy."  Id.  There is a causal connection between risk and 
loss.5  Id.  That is, when the insured-for risk occurs, the 
insurer indemnifies for the resulting-loss (damages) in accord 
                                                 
5 The Illinois Supreme Court recently provided a useful 
distinction between risk and loss in the insurance context. 
Courts analyze risk by looking prospectively at what the parties 
set out to cover.  Home Ins. Co. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 821 
N.E.2d 269, 281 (Ill. 2004).  Loss, in contrast, is analyzed 
retrospectively by looking at the injury or damages actually 
sustained in a particular case.  Id.  
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
9 
 
with the policy provisions.  Id.  Insurance policy clauses "may 
come into conflict" when two or more policies cover the same 
risk for the same period of time.  Id., § 219:2.   
¶23 In the context presented herein, Greenwich's policy 
insured the risk that United Water's conduct in managing the 
Milwaukee sewerage system during the policy period would be 
negligent, thereby causing damage to a third party.6  As an 
"additional insured" under the Greenwich policy, MMSD's risk was 
that it would be responsible in money damages for a third 
party's damage caused by United Water's negligence.   
¶24 Steadfast's policy insured the risk that Veolia would 
negligently manage the Milwaukee sewerage system during the 
policy period, causing damage to a third party.7  As an 
                                                 
6 The Greenwich policy provides in relevant part:  Coverage 
B – CONTRACTOR'S POLLUTION LEGAL LIABILITY 
To pay on behalf of the INSURED all LOSS, in excess of the 
Retention 
amount . . . which 
the 
INSURED 
becomes 
legally 
obligated to pay as a result of an OCCURRENCE which arises out 
of CONTRACTING SERVICES and which first commenced during the 
POLICY PERIOD.   
. . . . 
G.  INSURED means the NAMED INSURED and: 
. . . . 
7. 
Solely as respects Coverage B – Contractor's Pollution 
Legal Liability, the client for whom the NAMED INSURED 
performs 
or 
performed 
covered 
CONTRACTING 
SERVICES . . . . 
7 The 
Steadfast 
policy 
provides 
in 
relevant 
part:  
CONTRACTOR'S POLLUTION LIABILITY  . . . . 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
10 
 
"additional insured" of Steadfast, MMSD's risk was that it would 
be responsible in money damages for a third party's damage 
caused by Veolia's negligence.  The plain language of both the 
Greenwich policy and the Steadfast policy obligated insurers to 
indemnify and defend their named insureds and MMSD against 
claims of damage caused by the negligence of their named 
insureds.  To clarify further, while United Water was not 
providing services at the time of the flooding, it was alleged 
that its services during an earlier time when it was managing 
the MMSD system were a cause of the resulting damage.    
¶25 "Other insurance" clauses may be raised in disputes 
between two insurance companies about whose policy is primary 
and therefore must pay first and whose policy is excess, also 
referred to as successive insurance, and pays subsequent to the 
primary payment.  Plastics Eng'g Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
                                                                                                                                                             
We will pay on behalf of an "insured" any "loss" an "insured" is 
legally obligated to pay as a result of a "claim" caused by a 
"pollution 
event" 
resulting 
from 
"covered 
operations" 
or 
"completed operations" of the "covered operations" and provided 
that the "covered operations" must commence on or after the 
"retroactive date" and before the end of the "policy period" and 
the "claim" is first made against the "insured" during the 
"policy period" . . . .   
. . . . 
L.  "Insured" means: 
1. You or your; . . .  
4. Any other person or organization endorsed onto this 
policy 
as 
an 
"insured." 
 
(Milwaukee 
Metropolitan 
Sewerage District is an endorsee.) 
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
11 
 
2009 WI 13, ¶48, 315 Wis. 2d 556, 759 N.W.2d 613.  To explain 
further, policies may be concurrent, i.e., cover the same time 
period and risk, or successive, i.e., cover different time 
periods and risks.  However, "other insurance" clauses do not 
apply unless two policies are concurrent.  Id.  "The accepted 
meaning of 'other insurance' provisions does not include 
application to successive insurance policies."  Id.  If the 
"other insurance" clauses cannot be used to establish a primary 
and an excess insurer, then "neither insurer is given priority 
over the other and each contributes toward the loss pro rata."  
Oelhafen v. Tower Ins. Co., 171 Wis. 2d 532, 536-37, 492 N.W.2d 
321 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Schoenecker v. Haines, 88 Wis. 2d 
665, 672, 277 N.W.2d 782 (1979)). 
¶26 As we have explained, concurrent insurance is required 
before "other insurance" clauses are triggered.  Two insurance 
policies cannot be concurrent unless they insured "the same 
risk, and the same interest, for the benefit of the same person, 
during the same period."  Plastics Eng'g, 315 Wis. 2d 556, ¶48 
(quoting Douglas R. Richmond, Issues and Problems in "Other 
Insurance," Multiple Insurance, and Self-Insurance, 22 Pepp. L. 
Rev. 1373, 1376-82 (1995)).   
¶27 The Greenwich and Steadfast policies were primary with 
regard to each company's respective insurance of United Water 
and Veolia.  The policies were primary and successive in regard 
to insuring MMSD's risk of damage because each policy relied on 
the negligence of a different insured, whose alleged negligence 
occurred during a different period of time, i.e., while that 
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
12 
 
primary insured was maintaining the sewerage system.  Stated 
otherwise, Greenwich would owe MMSD only if the negligence of 
United Water caused damages for which MMSD was held responsible 
and Steadfast would owe MMSD only if the negligence of Veolia 
caused 
damages 
for 
which 
MMSD 
was 
held 
responsible.  
Accordingly, we do not interpret the terms of the "other 
insurance" clauses because under the undisputed facts as set out 
above, Greenwich's "other insurance" clause provided successive 
insurance to MMSD.   
¶28 In addition, the duty to defend is broader than the 
duty to indemnify.  Acuity v. Bagadia, 2008 WI 62, ¶52, 310 
Wis. 2d 197, 750 N.W.2d 817 (explaining that the duty to defend 
arises from allegations in the complaint, while the duty to 
indemnify is dependent on fully developed facts).  Furthermore, 
when an insurance policy provides potential coverage for one 
claim alleged in a lawsuit, the insurer must defend the entire 
suit, even when the claims are groundless.  Fireman's Fund Ins. 
Co. of Wis. v. Bradley Corp., 2003 WI 33, ¶21, 261 Wis. 2d 4, 
660 N.W.2d 666.  Accordingly, two insurance policies that insure 
separate and distinct risks may nevertheless become implicated 
in the same lawsuit, causing the two insurers to defend the same 
loss in the form of their mutual insured's alleged liability for 
damages and defense costs.   
2.  Greenwich Breached Its Duty To Defend 
¶29 We have established a procedure for an insurance 
company to follow when it disputes coverage.  Wis. Pharmacal 
Co., LLC v. Neb. Cultures of Cal., Inc., 2016 WI 14, ¶18, 367 
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
13 
 
Wis. 2d 221, 876 N.W.2d 72 (explaining that an insurer may avoid 
breaching its duty to defend by requesting a bifurcated trial on 
the issues of coverage and liability, with liability determined 
after coverage has been established); Newhouse, 176 Wis. 2d at 
836 (stating that the insurer should request a bifurcated trial 
on the issues of coverage and liability when coverage is 
disputed).  An insurer who fails to follow this procedure risks 
breaching its duty to defend if its coverage determination was 
wrong.  Id. at 837. 
¶30 Alternatively, an insurer may choose to reject the 
insured's tender of defense based on its determination that the 
claim is not covered under the policy.  However, it does so at 
its own risk.  Marks v. Houston Cas. Co., 2016 WI 53, ¶41 n.21, 
369 Wis. 2d 547, 881 N.W.2d 309.  If the insurer is wrong about 
its potential coverage obligation, it "is guilty of a breach of 
contract which renders it liable to the insured for all damages 
that naturally flow from the breach."  Id. (citing Newhouse, 176 
Wis. 2d at 837).  Finally, as mentioned earlier, an insurer has 
a duty to defend the entire lawsuit "when an insurance policy 
provides [potential] coverage for even one claim made in a 
lawsuit."  Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 261 Wis. 2d 4, ¶21. 
¶31 In this case, Greenwich did not seek a judicial 
determination of its coverage obligations, nor did it pay any 
amount toward MMSD's defense costs.  Instead, it chose to rely 
on its own unilateral determination that its policy was excess 
to Steadfast's.  As we have explained, Greenwich's unilateral 
determination 
was 
erroneous; 
Greenwich's 
policy 
provided 
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
14 
 
potential coverage for a claim made in lawsuits based on sewage 
backups.  Therefore, Greenwich breached its duty to defend, and 
it is responsible for all damages that naturally flow from the 
breach.  Marks, 369 Wis. 2d 547, ¶41 n.21. 
3.  Steadfast's Contractual Subrogation Claim 
¶32 Steadfast 
asserts 
that 
it 
has 
a 
contractual 
subrogation claim against Greenwich due to its payment of $1.55 
million in defense costs and Greenwich's failure to provide a 
defense.  Greenwich asserts that if Steadfast has a claim, it 
sounds in contribution, not subrogation.  Greenwich further 
asserts that the time has passed in which to bring a 
contribution claim.   
¶33 Subrogation is the "substitution of one party for 
another whose debt the party pays, entitling the paying party to 
rights, remedies, or securities that would otherwise belong to 
the debtor."  Dufour, 370 Wis. 2d 313, ¶15.  "The doctrine of 
subrogation enables an insurer that has paid an insured's 
loss . . . to recoup that payment from the party responsible for 
the loss."  Id. (citations omitted).  The insurer "steps into 
the shoes" of its insured and pursues the legal rights or claims 
to which the insured would have been entitled.  Wilmot v. Racine 
Cty., 136 Wis. 2d 57, 63, 400 N.W.2d 917 (1987). 
¶34 Contribution claims sometimes occur between joint 
tortfeasors, or in other circumstances, where one person has 
paid more than that person's share of a joint obligation.  Kafka 
v. Pope, 194 Wis. 2d 234, 241, 533 N.W.2d 491 (1995) (concluding 
that "[w]hether the common obligation be imposed by contract or 
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
15 
 
grows out of a tort, the thing that gives rise to the right of 
contribution is that one of the common obligors has discharged 
more than his fair equitable share of the common liability.").    
¶35 Subrogation 
may arise in 
three different forms: 
contractual, statutory, and equitable subrogation.  Estate of 
Kriefall, 342 Wis. 2d 29, ¶37.  In a subrogation claim, the 
subrogee seeks payment based on rights the subrogee acquired 
from another.  Millers Nat'l Ins. Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 184 
Wis. 2d 155, 168, 516 N.W.2d 376 (1994).  The "purpose of 
subrogation is to place the loss ultimately on the wrongdoers."  
Cunningham v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 437, 444, 360 
N.W.2d 33 (1985).  When express contractual subrogation is 
claimed, we examine the policy's provisions.  Id. at 449.  We 
have given effect to express subrogation clauses contained in 
insurance contracts.  Id. at 446.   
¶36 Here, 
Steadfast's 
policy 
expressly 
provided 
for 
subrogation: 
In the event of any payment under this policy, we 
shall be subrogated to all an "insured's" rights of 
recovery against any person or organization.  
MMSD's right of recovery against Greenwich to which Steadfast is 
contractually subrogated arises from Greenwich's breach of its 
contractual obligation to defend MMSD.  Accordingly, we examine 
Steadfast's alleged right of recovery against Greenwich as an 
express contractual subrogation right that arose from MMSD's 
right to a defense from Greenwich.   
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
16 
 
¶37 Subrogation does not change the type of claim for 
relief that was held by the subrogor.  Wilmot, 136 Wis. 2d at 63 
(explaining that "the identity of a cause of action is not 
changed by the subrogation, and no new cause of action is 
created thereby.").  Because "[t]he original right of the 
plaintiff measures the extent of the subrogated party's right," 
the statute of limitations for a subrogated claim is the same as 
the statute of limitations that would apply to the claim if it 
had not been subrogated.  Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. 
Schoendorf & Sorgi, 202 Wis. 2d 98, 109, 549 N.W.2d 429 (1996). 
Wisconsin has a six-year statute of limitations for breach of 
contract claims.  Wis. Stat. § 893.43(1) (2015-16).8  Steadfast 
was subrogated to MMSD's contract claim that Greenwich breached 
its duty to defend. 
¶38 Steadfast paid MMSD's debt for defense costs, which 
included what Greenwich was obligated to provide as well as 
Steadfast's own portion of MMSD's defense costs, when it paid 
MMSD $1.55 million.  Because subrogation does not change the 
identity of the cause of action, Steadfast's claim against 
Greenwich is also for breach of contract.  Claims for breach of 
contract have a six-year statute of limitations.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.43(1).  Steadfast's action was filed less than six years 
after Greenwich's breach occurred, therefore, it was timely 
filed. 
                                                 
8 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
17 
 
4.  Allocation of Defense Costs 
¶39 Steadfast and Greenwich each had a contractual duty to 
defend MMSD.  Because MMSD chose to pay for its own defense, it 
incurred $1.55 million in stipulated defense costs.  Steadfast 
paid $1.55 million to MMSD; however, part of that payment was 
attributable 
to 
the 
defense 
that 
Steadfast, 
itself, 
was 
obligated to provide.   
¶40 The circuit court and the court of appeals ignored the 
financial import of Steadfast's own duty to defend MMSD.  
Instead, both courts focused on Greenwich's failure to defend 
and adjudged the full amount of MMSD's defense costs as being 
due from Greenwich to Steadfast.9  In so doing, they relieved 
Steadfast of its contractual obligation for defense costs, 
without recognition of the windfall that Steadfast received from 
what amounted to a judicial forgiveness of Steadfast's duty to 
defend MMSD.  This placed Steadfast (as subrogee) in a better 
position than MMSD (the subrogor) from whom Steadfast obtained 
the contractual right of subrogation.  To explain further, MMSD 
litigated the defense through attorneys of its own choosing, but 
it received no windfall when it was repaid $1.55 million in 
litigation costs it actually incurred.  Here, Steadfast obtained 
                                                 
9 The circuit court concluded that Greenwich waived the 
right to raise coverage defenses by its breach of the duty to 
defend.  The court of appeals concluded that because Greenwich 
breached its duty to defend MMSD, it was not equitably entitled 
to an allocation of a portion of MMSD's defense costs to 
Steadfast.  Steadfast Ins. Co., 380 Wis. 2d 184, ¶4. 
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
18 
 
litigation costs beyond what it incurred in satisfying its duty 
to defend.    
¶41 We conclude that both Steadfast and Greenwich had a 
duty to provide a defense to MMSD.  Accordingly, the financial 
sanction of an insurer who fails in its duty to defend does not 
include judicial forgiveness of another insurer's financial 
obligation for defense costs.  Therefore, we conclude that the 
$1.55 million in defense costs that Steadfast paid should be 
allocated between Steadfast and Greenwich.  
¶42 We have not directly addressed the proper formula for 
allocating defense costs when two insurers have a duty to defend 
the same insured.  See Burgraff v. Menard, Inc., 2016 WI 11, 
¶111, 367 Wis. 2d 50, 875 N.W.2d 596 (Roggensack, C.J., 
dissenting).  However, in a well-reasoned opinion, the Utah 
Supreme Court addressed the question of allocation of defense 
costs between insurers, each of whom had a duty to defend.  Ohio 
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Ins. Co., 268 P.3d 180, 185-86 (Utah 
2012).  In Ohio Cas., the court noted the obligation of each 
insurer to participate in defense costs and under the facts of 
Ohio Cas., which involved a long term exposure, the court chose 
the 
time-on-risk 
method 
of 
defense 
cost 
apportionment.10  
                                                 
10 Time-on-risk method of apportionment weights the defense 
costs by the time that each policy was at risk for actions of 
its insured that could require coverage.  Sharon Steel Corp. v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 140 (Utah 1997) (explaining 
that damages based on the relative period of time for which 
coverage was provided under each policy is an equitable method 
of apportionment of defense costs).   
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
19 
 
Apportionment also may be done on an equal division among 
insurers, and it has been ordered based on respective policy 
limits.  Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 
127, 140 (Utah 1997).  In discussions of apportionment, there 
has been a uniform recognition of the obligation for defense 
costs that both insurers faced.   
¶43 In equal apportionment, defense costs are distributed 
equally among any insurers with a duty to defend, for example 
with two insurers each would pay one-half, with three insurers 
each would pay one-third.  See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Ace Am. 
Ins. Co., 784 N.W.2d 341 (Minn. 2010).  This method is easy to 
apply; however, it could lead to unfairness and upset the 
parties' reasonable expectations if one insurer insures for 
lesser policy limits and charges a lower premium.  See, e.g., 
Sharon Steel Corp., 931 P.2d at 140 (pointing out that "insurers 
do not stand on an equal footing where there are significantly 
different liability limits."). 
¶44 The third option is to apportion defense costs pro 
rata, based on the parties' policy limits.  For example, if 
insurer A's policy limit is $1 million, and insurer B's policy 
limit is $2 million, insurer A will be responsible for one-third 
of defense costs.  We have suggested that this is the preferred 
approach.  See Schoenecker, 88 Wis. 2d at 671; Oelhafen, 171 
Wis. 2d at 537 ("The proportion [each insurer contributes toward 
the insured's loss] usually is based on their respective policy 
limits."). 
 
This 
approach 
better 
reflects 
the 
insurance 
companies' respective bargains.  See, e.g., Armstrong World 
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
20 
 
Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 707 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996) 
(explaining 
that 
apportioning 
damage 
reflects that higher premiums generally are paid for higher per 
person or per liability limits).  Accordingly, we conclude that 
pro rata allocation based on insurers' policy limits is the best 
method for apportionment of defense costs in the matter before 
us.     
¶45 Here, Steadfast paid $1.55 million for MMSD's defense 
costs.  Greenwich and Steadfast have stipulated that this was 
the 
"reasonable 
and 
necessary" 
cost 
of 
MMSD's 
defense. 
Greenwich's policy limit was $20 million.  Steadfast's policy 
limit was $30 million.  Therefore, Greenwich owed two-fifths of 
$1.55 million in defense costs and Steadfast was responsible for 
three-fifths of those costs.  Accordingly, Steadfast is entitled 
to recover from Greenwich $620,000, plus interest accruing on 
that amount from the date of entry of the circuit court's 
judgment.  Wis. Stat. § 815.05(8).11   
5.  Attorney Fees 
¶46 We conclude that Steadfast also is entitled to recover 
attorney fees from Greenwich under principles of contractual 
subrogation.  We have held that when an insurer breaches its 
duty to defend, it may be liable for attorney fees incurred by 
its insured in successfully establishing coverage.  Elliott v. 
                                                 
11 We do not address whether Wis. Stat. § 628.46 applies to 
claims made within Steadfast's contractual subrogation clause 
because neither party addressed § 628.46.    
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
21 
 
Donahue, 169 Wis. 2d 310, 324-25, 485 N.W.2d 403 (1992).  See 
also 
Newhouse, 
176 
Wis. 2d 
at 
837 
("[W]here 
an 
insurer 
wrongfully refuses to defend on the grounds that the claim 
against the insured is not within the coverage of the policy, 
the insurer is guilty of a breach of contract which renders it 
liable to the insured for all damages that naturally flow from 
the breach.").   
¶47 As we have explained above, Steadfast had rights of 
contractual 
subrogation 
based 
on 
its 
payment 
to 
MMSD.  
Therefore, Steadfast asserted rights that MMSD had against 
Greenwich for failing to defend.  Stated otherwise, if MMSD were 
to sue Greenwich to recover defense costs, it would have been 
entitled to the attorney fees and costs incurred in such 
litigation.  Id. at 838.  Here, by virtue of its express 
subrogation rights, Steadfast stands in MMSD's shoes and seeks 
attorney fees incurred in obtaining a judgment against Greenwich 
for payment of defense costs just as MMSD could have recovered 
were it to have brought this lawsuit.    
¶48 Although 
Wisconsin 
courts 
have 
not 
yet 
awarded 
attorney fees for breach of a duty to defend to an insurer who 
was subrogated to an insured's rights, neither the principles of 
contractual subrogation, nor the rationale behind attorney fee 
awards for breach of a duty to defend, foreclose this result. 
However, other states have approached this question.  The 
decisions of the Supreme Court of California and of Florida have 
provided helpful discussions. 
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
22 
 
¶49 In Emp'rs Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Tutor-Saliba Corp., 
951 P.2d 420 (Cal. 1998), a subcontractor's employee was injured 
on 
the 
job. 
 
The 
subcontractor's 
insurer 
paid 
worker's 
compensation, which made it "subrogated to all of the rights and 
liabilities" of the subcontractor.  Id. at 424.  The underlying 
contract between the subcontractor and general contractor stated 
that in any dispute between the two, the prevailing party was 
entitled to attorney fees.  Id. at 422.  The subrogated insurer 
unsuccessfully sued the general contractor to recover its 
worker's compensation payment.  Id.  The California Supreme 
Court held that as the prevailing party, the general contractor 
would be entitled to recover attorney fees from the subrogated 
insurer:  "the insurer should likewise be subrogated to——i.e., 
both benefited and bound by——any contract providing for attorney 
fees to a prevailing party that the employer and the third party 
have executed."  Id. at 424.  While this involved an award of 
attorney fees against the subrogee, the court held that the 
subrogee was "both benefited and bound by" the attorney fee 
provision.  Id. 
¶50 Florida's supreme court appears to have followed suit. 
In Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Ryan Inc. E., 974 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 2008), 
it held that a subrogee surety could not pursue attorney fees 
against the principal's insurer, but only because the principal 
still had the right to pursue attorney fees.  Id. at 377.  If 
the principal had assigned all its rights to the surety via 
contractual subrogation, the surety would have been able to 
recover attorney fees.  Id.  
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
23 
 
¶51 Their reasoning is persuasive.  We conclude that a 
contractual subrogee's right to recovery may include an award of 
attorney fees the subrogor would have been entitled to receive 
had it brought the lawsuit.  We have long recognized that 
contractual subrogation "entitl[es] the paying party to rights, 
remedies, or securities that would otherwise belong to the 
debtor."  Dufour, 370 Wis. 2d 313, ¶15; see also Wilmot, 136 
Wis. 2d at 63.  We decline to create an exception to this 
longstanding rule by excluding attorney fees from the bundle of 
contractual subrogation rights that arise from a specific 
subrogation clause upon payment by the subrogee.   
¶52 In this case, Greenwich breached its duty to defend, 
so MMSD had the right to request attorney fees for successfully 
establishing Greenwich's obligation to defend.  Steadfast's 
contract with Veolia and MMSD stated in relevant part:  "In the 
event of any payment under this policy, we shall be subrogated 
to all an 'insured's' rights of recovery against any person or 
organization."  Because MMSD's "rights of recovery" against 
Greenwich would include attorney fees incurred in successfully 
establishing coverage, Steadfast is entitled to recover $325,000 
in attorney fees from Greenwich as MMSD's subrogee, plus 
interest accruing on that amount from the date of entry of the 
circuit court's judgment.  Wis. Stat. § 815.05(8).  Furthermore, 
nothing in this opinion prevents Steadfast from moving the 
circuit court for an award of attorney fees incurred in 
litigating the appeal and our review herein. 
No. 
2016AP1631   
 
24 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶53 First, we conclude that Greenwich, who insured the 
risk that United Water would negligently perform services for 
MMSD, thereby causing damage, and Steadfast, who for a different 
period of time insured the risk that Veolia would negligently 
perform services for MMSD, thereby causing damage, were both 
primary and successive insurers in regard to MMSD, their common 
additional insured.   
¶54 Second, we 
conclude that Greenwich breached its 
contractual duty to defend MMSD.  Third, we conclude that 
Steadfast's contractual subrogation claim against Greenwich was 
timely filed as it comes within the six-year statute of 
limitations for contract actions.   
¶55 Fourth, we apply a pro-rata allocation of defense 
costs 
Steadfast 
paid 
to 
MMSD 
based 
on 
Steadfast's 
and 
Greenwich's respective policy limits of $30 million and $20 
million.  Fifth, and finally, we conclude that Steadfast is 
entitled to recover attorney fees from Greenwich due to 
Steadfast's stepping into the shoes of MMSD through contractual 
subrogation to force Greenwich to pay defense costs.    
¶56 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals in part and reverse it in part. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
No.  2016AP1631.awb 
 
1 
 
¶57 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (concurring 
in 
part, 
dissenting in part).  I agree with the majority that the "other 
insurance" provisions are not triggered.  Additionally, I agree 
that Greenwich breached its duty to defend, and that Steadfast's 
claim sounds in subrogation and not contribution.1 
¶58 I write separately, however, because the majority errs 
in two ways.  First, it allocates defense costs between 
Steadfast and Greenwich, allowing Greenwich to breach its duty 
to defend with impunity.  Second, it awards attorney fees to 
Steadfast in derogation of the longstanding American Rule. 
¶59 An insurer that breaches the duty to defend should not 
be able to escape liability for the consequences of its 
behavior.  Our case law is clear that an insurer who refuses to 
defend its insured proceeds at its own peril.  Olson v. Farrar, 
2012 WI 3, ¶30, 338 Wis. 2d 215, 809 N.W.2d 1. 
¶60 Yet, the majority extinguishes the peril, allowing a 
breaching insurer to refuse to uphold its duty to defend with 
the security that it will suffer no financial consequence.  In 
doing so, it encourages a game of chicken between insurers that 
may leave the insured as the only loser. 
¶61 Further, our case law dictates that exceptions to the 
American Rule be limited and narrow.  Nevertheless, the majority 
goes where no court has previously ventured. 
¶62 In expanding the exception to the American Rule by 
awarding attorney fees from one insurance company to another, 
                                                 
1 I join parts II.B.1, II.B.2, and II.B.3 of the majority 
opinion. 
No.  2016AP1631.awb 
 
2 
 
one wonders what is next.  The majority's determination crafts a 
new exception to the American Rule that is unsupported by case 
law and that chips away at the vitality of the Rule.  I fear 
that "once the camel's nose is in the tent, the rest will likely 
follow." 
¶63 Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part.2 
I 
¶64 The majority errs first in its determination that 
Greenwich is not liable for the entirety of MMSD's defense 
costs.  Instead, it pro-rates costs, turning the purpose of this 
court's coverage framework on its head and creating a perverse 
incentive for insurers to fail to uphold their duty to defend. 
¶65 As the majority recognizes, this court has established 
a preferred framework for an insurance company to follow when it 
disputes coverage.  Majority op., ¶29 (citing Wis. Pharmacal 
Co., LLC v. Neb. Cultures of Cal., Inc., 2016 WI 14, ¶18, 367 
Wis. 2d 221, 876 N.W.2d 72).  Pursuant to such a framework, "the 
proper procedure for an insurance company to follow when 
coverage is disputed is to request a bifurcated trial on the 
issues of coverage and liability and move to stay any 
proceedings on liability until the issue of coverage is 
resolved."  Newhouse by Skow v. Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 176 
Wis. 2d 824, 836, 501 N.W.2d 1 (1993) (citing Elliott v. 
Donahue, 169 Wis. 2d 310, 318, 485 N.W.2d 403 (1992)).  When an 
                                                 
2 I dissent from parts II.B.4 and II.B.5 of the majority 
opinion. 
No.  2016AP1631.awb 
 
3 
 
insurer follows this procedure, the insurer runs no risk of 
breaching its duty to defend.  Id. 
¶66 An insurer who unilaterally refuses to defend does so 
at its own peril.  Olson, 338 Wis. 2d 215, ¶30.  Accordingly, 
the "general rule is that where an insurer wrongfully refuses to 
defend on the grounds that the claim against the insured is not 
within the coverage of the policy, the insurer is guilty of a 
breach of contract which renders it liable to the insured for 
all damages that naturally flow from the breach."  Newhouse, 176 
Wis. 2d at 837. 
¶67 Indeed, this court in Water Well Solutions Serv. 
Group, Inc. v. Consolidated Ins. Co. recently warned that "an 
insurer opens itself up to a myriad of adverse consequences if 
its unilateral duty to defend determination turns out to be 
wrong."  2016 WI 54, ¶28, 369 Wis. 2d 607, 881 N.W.2d 285.  An 
insurer's liability "may potentially be greater than what the 
insurer would have paid had it defended its insured in the first 
instance . . . ."  Id. 
¶68 Our 
established 
framework 
encourages 
insurers 
to 
fulfill their duty to defend and thereby avoids negative 
outcomes for both insurers and insureds.  "A unilateral refusal 
to defend without first attempting to seek judicial support for 
that refusal can result in otherwise avoidable expenses and 
efforts to litigants and courts, deprive insureds of their 
contracted-for protections, and estop insurers from being able 
to further challenge coverage."  Liebovich v. Minnesota Ins. 
Co., 2008 WI 75, ¶55, 310 Wis. 2d 751, 751 N.W.2d 764. 
No.  2016AP1631.awb 
 
4 
 
¶69 The 
majority 
effectively 
rewards 
Greenwich 
for 
ignoring this court's established framework and allows Greenwich 
to escape the consequences of its willful breach of the duty to 
defend.  By allowing Greenwich to pay pro-rated costs, the 
majority lessens the impact of the insurer's breach of the duty 
to defend.  It further encourages future insurers to follow a 
similar course rather than seeking a bifurcated coverage trial 
as this court has recommended numerous times. 
¶70 According to the majority, Greenwich should suffer no 
consequence at all for breaching the duty to defend.  It pays 
merely what it would have paid anyway if it had lived up to its 
duty to defend in the first instance. 
¶71 The 
result 
of 
the 
majority 
opinion 
is 
the 
proliferation of a game of chicken between insurers.  See 
Southeast Wis. Prof'l Baseball Park Dist. v. Mitsubishi Heavy 
Indus. Am., Inc., 2007 WI App 185, ¶64, 304 Wis. 2d 637, 738 
N.W.2d 87.  When there are two or more insurers from whom 
coverage is sought, what incentive is there to provide coverage 
if an insurer can simply refuse to defend the case and end up 
paying the exact same amount later in the event it is sued?  
Each insurer would simply hold out and hope that someone else 
takes on the defense. 
¶72 Rather than encouraging insurers to live up to their 
contractual obligations, the majority opinion allows insurers to 
rest comfortably in their decisions to deny a defense with the 
knowledge that if a breach is later found, no financial 
consequence will be forthcoming.  The only loser in this game is 
No.  2016AP1631.awb 
 
5 
 
the insured, who may be forced to expend resources for a defense 
that should have been covered by insurance from the beginning. 
¶73 Unlike the majority, I conclude that there must be 
some element of penalty and deterrence to encourage insurance 
companies to defend when they are obligated.  See Water Well, 
369 Wis. 2d 607, ¶28.  I thus determine that Greenwich is liable 
for the full cost of MMSD's defense. 
¶74 My conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that 
Greenwich's insurance policy does not contain a pro-ration 
clause.  Where a policy contains no pro-ration language, this 
court is not to rewrite the policy to include it.  Plastics 
Eng'g Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI 13, ¶59, 315 
Wis. 2d 556, 759 N.W.2d 613.  Yet by pro-rating defense costs, 
the majority gives Greenwich the benefit of a bargain it did not 
make. 
¶75 Accordingly, I dissent from part II.B.4 of the 
majority opinion, which effectively eliminates any incentives 
for insurance companies to promptly defend lawsuits and fails to 
encourage insurers to follow this court's preferred framework 
for determining insurance coverage. 
II 
¶76 The majority errs further in its determination that 
Steadfast is entitled to attorney fees incurred in litigating 
this case.  It fails to heed this court's warning that 
exceptions to the American Rule are to be limited and narrow.  
Instead, it opens up a new exception that is contrary to clear 
precedent that arrives at a directly opposite outcome. 
No.  2016AP1631.awb 
 
6 
 
¶77 Generally, we adhere to the American Rule, which 
provides that parties to litigation are responsible for their 
own attorney fees unless recovery is expressly allowed by either 
contract or statute, or when recovery results from third-party 
litigation.  DeChant v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 200 Wis. 2d 559, 
571, 547 N.W.2d 592 (1996).  Absent statutory authority or a 
contractual provision to the contrary, Wisconsin courts strictly 
follow this rule.  Id. 
¶78 In 
the 
insurance 
coverage 
context, 
analysis 
of 
entitlement to attorney fees begins with Elliott v. Donahue, 169 
Wis. 2d 310.  The Elliott court determined that Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.04(8), "which recognizes the principles of equity, permits 
the recovery of reasonable attorney fees incurred by the insured 
in successfully establishing coverage."  Id. at 314.  It 
concluded that attorney fees were appropriate under the specific 
facts that were present: 
The insurer that denies coverage and forces the 
insured to retain counsel and expend additional money 
to establish coverage for a claim that falls within 
the ambit of the insurance policy deprives the insured 
the benefit that was bargained for and paid for with 
the 
periodic 
premium 
payments. 
 
Therefore, 
the 
principles of equity call for the insurer to be liable 
to the insured for expenses, including reasonable 
attorney fees, incurred by the insured in successfully 
establishing coverage. 
Id. at 322. 
¶79 Subsequent case law has limited the application of 
Elliott to its facts.  Specifically, in Riccobono v. Seven Star, 
Inc., the court of appeals denied a claim for attorney fees by 
one insurer against a second insurer.  2000 WI App 74, 234 
No.  2016AP1631.awb 
 
7 
 
Wis. 2d 374, 610 N.W.2d 501.  The Riccobono court reasoned:  "In 
defining the dispute in Elliott, the supreme court stated:  'The 
sole issue on review concerns whether an insured may recover 
attorney fees incurred in successfully defending coverage under 
an insurance policy.'"  Id., ¶22.  It then distinguished the 
facts present in Riccobono from those in Elliott, writing that 
"Society is not an insured and, thus, does not appear to fall 
within the holding of the supreme court."  Id., ¶22. 
¶80 The Riccobono court found it dispositive that the 
identity of the party seeking attorney fees was an insurer and 
not an insured.  On this issue, Riccobono is on all fours with 
this case.  Curiously, the majority fails to even mention 
Riccobono. 
¶81 Despite the majority's silence, Riccobono instructs 
that attorney fees are not available to Steadfast because it is 
an insurer, and not an insured.  Even with such an instruction 
in hand, an additional step is required in the analysis due to 
No.  2016AP1631.awb 
 
8 
 
the fact that Steadfast's claim is one for subrogation, i.e., it 
steps into the shoes of its insured.3 
¶82 Finding the nature of Steadfast's subrogation claim 
dispositive, the majority turns to the case law of other 
jurisdictions in support of its result.  Majority op., ¶¶48-51.  
Because MMSD would have been entitled to attorney fees, the 
majority reasons, so is Steadfast.  Id., ¶47.  I do not find 
this approach persuasive. 
¶83 The court of appeals in Riccobono was clear that 
Elliott "does not encompass the payment of attorney fees and 
costs from one insurer to another . . . ."  234 Wis. 2d 374, ¶2.  
The driving factor behind the Elliott decision was that the 
insured retained independent counsel who established that 
coverage existed.  See Gorton v. Hostak, Henzl & Bichler, S.C., 
217 Wis. 2d 493, ¶¶32-33, 577 N.W.2d 617 (1998). 
                                                 
3 Although the insurer requesting attorney fees in Riccobono 
sought such fees pursuant to a theory of subrogation, the court 
of appeals did not address this argument because it determined 
that the insurer was not entitled to subrogation under the 
language of the policy.  Riccobono v. Seven Star, Inc., 2000 WI 
App 74, ¶28, 234 Wis. 2d 374, 610 N.W.2d 501.   As the court 
stated, "the conditions under which Society might have been 
subrogated to Seven Star's right to attorney fees and costs 
never came into fruition."  Id., ¶28.  Nevertheless, the 
Riccobono court's declaration that attorney fees are not 
available under Elliott when one insurer seeks attorney fees 
from another insurer is consistent with this court's previous 
reluctance to extend Elliott beyond its particular facts and 
circumstances regardless of whether the insurer is a subrogated 
party.  See DeChant v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 200 Wis. 2d 559, 
569, 547 N.W.2d 592 (1996); Elliott v. Donahue, 169 Wis. 2d 310, 
485 N.W.2d 403 (1992). 
No.  2016AP1631.awb 
 
9 
 
¶84 This court has expressly declined to extend Elliott 
beyond its particular facts and circumstances.  Id., ¶33 (citing 
DeChant, 200 Wis. 2d at 569); see also Reid v. Benz, 2001 WI 
106, ¶13, 245 Wis. 2d 658, 629 N.W.2d 262 ("The facts and 
circumstances that gave rise to our decision in Elliott are 
particularly significant, because our reasoning therein is 
inextricably connected to those facts and circumstances.").  
Instead, we have adhered to the maxim that exceptions to the 
American Rule should be "limited and narrow."  Gorton, 217 
Wis. 2d 493, ¶33; Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Stafsholt, 2018 WI 
21, ¶27, 380 Wis. 2d 284, 908 N.W.2d 784.  "Awarding attorney 
fees, as we did in Elliott, should not be the usual result."  
Reid, 245 Wis. 2d 658, ¶27. 
¶85 Although generally Steadfast steps into MMSD's shoes 
when pursuing a subrogation claim, to do so here flies in the 
face of clear precedent.  To allow such subrogated status to one 
insurer seeking to recover attorney fees from another insurer 
extends far beyond the "particular facts and circumstances" of 
Elliott.  See DeChant, 200 Wis. 2d at 569.  Unlike the majority, 
I would follow our case law indicating that such exceptions to 
the American Rule must be narrowly circumscribed. 
¶86 Accordingly, I dissent from part II.B.5 of the 
majority opinion because it allows an insurer to recover 
attorney fees from another insurer, contravening the long-
established American Rule. 
¶87 In 
sum, 
for 
the 
reasons 
set 
forth 
above, 
I 
respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. 
No.  2016AP1631.awb 
 
10 
 
¶88 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA FRANK 
DALLET joins this concurrence/dissent. 
No.  2016AP1631.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶89 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  I agree with the majority that an 
insured's defense costs should be allocated between insurers who 
share a contractual, overlapping duty to defend the insured.  I 
also agree that the allocation between insurers should be pro 
rata, based upon each insurer's policy limits.  Accordingly, I 
join part II.B.4 of the majority opinion to the extent it adopts 
these legal principles.  However, I disagree with the majority's 
conclusion that Greenwich is responsible for any portion of 
defense costs paid on behalf of MMSD.  Vis-à-vis Steadfast's 
policy of insurance covering MMSD, Greenwich's policy was excess 
over Steadfast's, relieving Greenwich of any obligation to 
contribute to MMSD's defense, which Steadfast was already 
providing.  
The majority erroneously concludes otherwise, 
deeming both Steadfast and Greenwich to be primary insurers, 
each with a duty to defend MMSD in the consolidated lawsuits 
stemming from the 2008 rain event.  In reaching this result, the 
majority declines to apply clear and unambiguous policy language 
dictating a different priority of insurance, instead applying an 
offhanded statement in a case involving an unrelated issue with 
no application here.  The majority errs.  I would reverse the 
judgment against Greenwich in its entirety.1   
                                                 
1 Because I conclude that Greenwich had no duty to defend, I 
do not address the remaining issues resolved by the majority 
because they are moot unless Greenwich had a duty to defend.  I 
do agree with Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's dissent to the extent 
it would deny recovery of attorney fees by one insurer against 
another. 
No.  2016AP1631.rgb 
 
2 
 
I 
¶90 Insurance policies are contracts.  Wadzinski v. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co., 2012 WI 75, ¶11, 342 Wis. 2d 311, 818 
N.W.2d 819.  When interpreting contracts, we presume the 
parties' intentions are expressed in the language they chose.  
Id.  Accordingly, when construing policy terms and conditions, 
we begin with their plain language.  See Johnson Controls, Inc. 
v. London Mkt., 2010 WI 52, ¶59, 325 Wis. 2d 176, 784 N.W.2d 579 
("Wisconsin case law instructs that the language of the policy 
should be our initial focus."); see also BV/B1, LLC v. 
InvestorsBank, 2010 WI App 152, ¶25, 330 Wis. 2d 462, 792 
N.W.2d 622 ("When interpreting a contract clause, we begin with 
the plain language of the clause.").  "When the language of [an 
insurance] contract is unambiguous, we apply its literal 
meaning."  Wisconsin Label Corp. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. 
Co., 
2000 
WI 
26, 
¶23, 
233 
Wis. 2d 314, 
607 
N.W.2d 276.  
Interpretation of policy language is a question of law we review 
de novo.  Wadzinski, 342 Wis. 2d 311, ¶10. 
¶91 As a general rule, a primary insurer "has the primary 
duty to defend a claim" while an excess insurer is not required 
to contribute to the defense as long as "the primary insurer is 
required to defend."  Johnson Controls, Inc., 325 Wis. 2d 176, 
¶57 (quoted source omitted).  "Whenever two policies apply to 
the same insured at the same time, the issue of which policy 
must pay first——or which is primary and which is excess——is 
dealt with by other insurance clauses."  Burgraff v. Menard, 
Inc., 2016 WI 11, ¶27, 367 Wis. 2d 50, 875 N.W.2d 596 (quotation 
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marks and quoted source omitted).  In such situations, the 
insurers may, by the terms of their policies, "define the extent 
to which each is primary and each excess[.]"  Wis. Stat. 
§ 631.43(1); see also Burgraff, 367 Wis. 2d 50, ¶27.2  Regardless 
of its status as primary or excess, whether an insurer has a 
duty to defend "depends on the language of the policies."  
Johnson Controls, Inc., 325 Wis. 2d 176, ¶58 (emphasis added).   
II 
¶92 While Steadfast and Greenwich issued their respective 
policies to two different primary insureds, neither party 
disputes that both policies cover the same additional insured:  
MMSD.  It is MMSD's losses——namely, defense costs——that are at 
issue in this case.  Therefore, the focus should be on MMSD as 
the insured, not United Water or Veolia.  Instead, the majority 
views coverage from the standpoint of the primary insureds——
United Water and Veolia——who are entirely removed from this 
coverage litigation:  "Greenwich's policy insured the risk that 
United Water's conduct in managing the Milwaukee sewerage system 
during the policy period would be negligent . . . Steadfast's 
policy insured the risk that Veolia would negligently manage the 
Milwaukee sewerage system during the policy period[.]"  Majority 
op., ¶¶23, 24.  The negligence of United Water and Veolia are 
irrelevant for purposes of determining the respective insurers' 
                                                 
2 This holds true unless "the policies contain inconsistent 
terms on that point," in which case "the insurers shall be 
jointly and severally liable to the insured on any coverage 
where the terms are inconsistent[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1). 
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duty to defend MMSD, a different insured altogether.  By framing 
the issue incorrectly, the majority's analysis collapses at the 
outset. 
¶93 The language of Greenwich's and Steadfast's insurance 
contracts determines whether Greenwich and Steadfast provide 
primary or excess coverage to MMSD.  Under the "PROFESSIONAL 
LIABILITY" section of its policy, Greenwich agreed "[t]o pay on 
behalf of the INSURED all LOSS in excess of the Retention 
amount . . . as a result of CLAIMS first made against the 
INSURED . . . during the POLICY PERIOD . . . by reason of any 
act, 
error 
or 
omission 
in 
PROFESSIONAL 
SERVICES 
rendered . . . by the INSURED or by any person whose acts, 
errors or omissions the INSURED is legally responsible."3  Under 
the separate "CONTRACTOR'S POLLUTION LEGAL LIABILITY" section of 
its policy, Greenwich agreed "[t]o pay on behalf of the INSURED 
all LOSS, in excess of the Retention amount . . . as a result of 
an OCCURRENCE which arises out of CONTRACTING SERVICES and which 
first commenced during the POLICY PERIOD."  Under the policy, 
"LOSS"——what Greenwich is contractually obligated to pay to or 
on behalf of MMSD——means not only "DAMAGES [i.e., a "monetary 
judgment, award or settlement of compensatory damages"] which 
the INSURED shall become legally obligated to pay as a result of 
a CLAIM" but also "CLAIMS EXPENSE."  Under the policy, "CLAIMS 
EXPENSE" includes "all other fees, costs . . . and expenses 
resulting 
from 
the . . . defense 
. . . of 
such 
CLAIM, 
if 
                                                 
3  Capitalization appears in Greenwich's policy to signify 
defined terms.   
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incurred . . . with the written consent of the Company, by the 
INSURED."  In simpler terms, Greenwich insured MMSD not only for 
"DAMAGES" MMSD would become legally obligated to pay as a result 
of a covered claim (here there were none) but also "CLAIMS 
EXPENSE," which includes attorney fees incurred by MMSD in 
defending against such a claim, regardless of whether MMSD 
became legally obligated to pay damages to a third party.  
Despite the fact that only "CLAIMS EXPENSE" and not "DAMAGES" 
are at issue in this case, the majority ignores in its analysis 
of Greenwich's duty to defend the fact that "CLAIMS EXPENSE" 
constitutes MMSD's exclusive "LOSS." 
¶94 Steadfast's policy similarly promises to "pay on 
behalf of an 'insured' any 'loss' an 'insured' is legally 
obligated to pay as a result of a 'claim[.]'"  Steadfast's 
policy defines "Loss" to mean both (1) "Compensatory damages or 
legal obligations arising from 'Bodily injury'" or "Property 
damage" and (2) "Related 'claim expense.'"  Under Steadfast's 
policy, "Claim expenses" include attorney fees and "[a]ll other 
fees, costs and expenses resulting from the defense . . . of a 
'claim' if incurred by" Steadfast or MMSD with Steadfast's 
consent.   
¶95 In the underlying rain event litigation, no damages 
were awarded or paid to the plaintiffs for their claims against 
MMSD.  MMSD sustained no "loss" under the first prong of that 
definition in either Greenwich's or Steadfast's policies.  
Instead, MMSD's "loss" as defined in each policy was limited to 
attorney fees incurred in defending against the rain event 
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claims, included under the second prong of "loss" in each policy 
and denominated as "CLAIMS EXPENSE" under Greenwich's policy and 
as "Claim expenses" under Steadfast's policy.  Although MMSD was 
never found liable in the rain event litigation, nor did it 
agree to pay damages in settlement of that litigation, MMSD did 
incur an insurable loss under the policies, in the form of 
attorney fees incurred in its defense. 
¶96 At this step in the analysis, I conclude that both 
Greenwich and Steadfast contractually agreed to pay MMSD's 
attorney fees in defending the rain event litigation.  The 
analysis does not end there, however, because of course MMSD is 
not entitled to recover double its attorney fees, nor was MMSD 
entitled to duplicative defenses against the rain event claims.  
If multiple policies cover the same insured during the same 
period, 
then 
the 
policies' 
respective 
"other 
insurance" 
provisions determine which insurer is primary and which is 
excess.   
¶97 Greenwich's "other insurance" clause in its policy 
insuring MMSD provides in pertinent part:  "this insurance shall 
be in excess of the Retention amount . . . and any other valid 
and collectible insurance available to the INSURED . . . unless 
such other insurance is written only as a specific excess 
insurance over the Limits of Liability provided in this policy."  
(Emphasis added.)  While Greenwich contractually declares its 
insurance to be excess if other valid and collectible insurance 
is available to MMSD, Steadfast's "other insurance" provision is 
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7 
 
markedly different.  Steadfast designates its insurance as 
primary unless other primary insurance is available to MMSD:   
L. OTHER INSURANCE 
1. The insurance provided under this policy is primary 
insurance, except when: 
a. Stated in the Declarations or by endorsement to 
apply in excess of or contingent upon the absence of 
other insurance; or 
b. Any other primary insurance is available covering 
liability for any "claim" or "loss" . . . . 
When this insurance is primary and the "insured" has 
other insurance which is stated to be applicable to 
the "claim" or "loss" on an excess basis, the amount 
of our liability under this policy shall not be 
reduced by the existence of such excess insurance. 
(Emphasis added.)  Both Greenwich and Steadfast agreed to pay 
MMSD's "loss" in the form of attorney fees incurred in defending 
the rain event litigation.  Because Steadfast's policy provided 
valid and collectible insurance to MMSD for this particular 
loss, Greenwich's insurance covering this loss——attorney fees——
is excess.  Steadfast's own policy declares its coverage to be 
primary unless (1) otherwise stated in the declarations or an 
endorsement, or (2) any other primary insurance is available.  
Neither condition exists under these facts. 
¶98 No one disputes Steadfast had a duty to defend MMSD 
against the entire litigation, even though not all claims 
implicated Veolia, Steadfast's primary insured.  See Fireman's 
Fund Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Bradley Corp., 2003 WI 33, ¶21, 261 
Wis. 2d 4, 660 N.W.2d 666 ("[W]hen an insurance policy provides 
coverage for even one claim made in a lawsuit, the insurer is 
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obligated to defend the entire suit.")  Steadfast's "other 
insurance" provision states that its policy provides primary 
coverage.  Greenwich also promised coverage for MMSD's defense 
costs, 
but 
its 
"other 
insurance" 
provision 
states 
that 
Greenwich's 
coverage 
is 
excess 
to 
any 
other 
valid 
and 
collectible insurance.  Steadfast's contractual obligation to 
pay 
MMSD's 
defense 
costs 
constitutes 
"other 
valid 
and 
collectible insurance," rendering Greenwich an excess insurer as 
to that loss.   
¶99 Despite this straightforward and unambiguous policy 
language, 
the 
majority 
declines 
to 
interpret 
the 
"other 
insurance" clauses, inexplicably stating that "we do not 
interpret the terms of the 'other insurance' clauses because 
under the undisputed facts . . . Greenwich's 'other insurance' 
clause provided successive insurance to MMSD."  Majority op., 
¶27.  The majority does not explain how an "other insurance" 
clause grants any coverage to an insured.  Although the majority 
contradictorily appears to have engaged in some interpretation 
of Greenwich's "other insurance" clause (but not Steadfast's), 
it does not include its analysis of that provision in the 
opinion.  Instead, the majority examines only the "damages" 
aspect of "loss" despite the absence of any "damages" incurred 
by MMSD.  Based solely on the "damages" for which MMSD could 
have been held liable (but was not), the majority holds that 
both insurers provided primary coverage "in regard to insuring 
MMSD's risk of damage[,]" majority op., ¶27, and therefore both 
had a duty to defend.  Majority op., ¶39.  The majority's 
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disregard for the actual and only "loss" incurred by MMSD——
attorney fees——generates its analytical error. 
¶100 The majority concludes that "concurrent insurance is 
required before 'other insurance' clauses are triggered."  
Majority op., ¶26.  But the majority ignores the concurrent 
coverage of the claim expense "loss" incurred by MMSD——attorney 
fees——during overlapping policy periods.  No one disputes that 
both policies covered the 2008 rain event; therefore, the 
majority's conclusion that the policies were successive is 
logically impossible.  The majority then quotes Plastics 
Engineering4 for the proposition that "[t]wo insurance policies 
cannot be concurrent unless they insured 'the same risk, and the 
same interest, for the benefit of the same person, during the 
same period.'"  Majority op., ¶26.  Relying upon the different 
contractors insured by each policy rather than the common 
insured (MMSD), the majority concludes that the policies were 
successive, not concurrent.  This contradicts the actual 
language of the policies, which should have been the focus of 
analysis in this case.   
¶101 The majority's reliance on Plastics Engineering is 
misplaced.  The case did not, as the majority maintains, hold 
that "[t]wo insurance policies cannot be concurrent unless they 
insured 'the same risk, and the same interest, for the benefit 
of the same person, during the same period.'"  Majority op., 
¶26.  Rather, the case addressed whether Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1) 
                                                 
4 Plastics Eng'g Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI 13,  
¶48, 315 Wis. 2d 556, 759 N.W.2d 613. 
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10 
 
applies to successive policies; it did not address "other 
insurance" clauses at all.  Plastics Eng'g Co. v. Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2009 WI 13, ¶44, 315 Wis. 2d 556, 759 N.W.2d 613.  The 
language the majority quotes from Plastics Engineering was 
lifted from an explanatory parenthetical in a citation to a law 
review article.  Id., ¶48 (quoting Douglas R. Richmond, Issues 
and Problems in "Other Insurance," Multiple Insurance, and Self-
Insurance, 22 Pepp. L. Rev. 1373, 1376-82 (1995)).5  Nothing in 
Plastics Engineering should be read as supplanting the actual 
policy language, which forms the contract between insurer and 
insured, with a mechanical analysis of whether the policies 
cover "the same risk, and the same interest, for the benefit of 
the same person, during the same period."  Significantly, 
Greenwich's "other insurance" clause does not limit its excess 
position to only those policies insuring "the same risk, and the 
same interest, for the benefit of the same person, during the 
same period."  Instead, Greenwich's insurance is excess if there 
is other valid and collectible insurance for the insured's loss—
—here, MMSD's attorney fees.  
¶102 The majority effectively discards the policy language 
in favor of loose generalizations from our case law.  Whether 
Greenwich's policy was primary or excess (and whether Greenwich 
violated its contractual obligations) should be resolved by the 
                                                 
5 In context, this statement appears to reflect a general 
description of how "other insurance" clauses operate.  But a 
general description of how courts have dealt with "other 
insurance" clauses cannot rewrite the policy language the court 
is supposed to interpret and apply.      
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actual language of the insurance contracts that govern our 
analysis.  See Johnson Controls, Inc., 325 Wis. 2d 176, ¶58 
(whether a duty to defend exists depends on the language of the 
policies).  Instead, the majority centers its holding on a stray 
citation to a law review article, resulting in a misguided 
fixation on the claims made in the rain event litigation rather 
than MMSD's actual "loss."      
¶103 It is true that Greenwich had a duty to indemnify MMSD 
for "damages" MMSD may have been liable to pay as a result of 
the acts or omissions of United Water, while Steadfast had a 
duty to indemnify MMSD for damages MMSD may have been liable to 
pay as a result of the acts or omissions of Veolia.  However, 
indemnification for such damages is not the issue here.  MMSD 
did not incur any loss based on the acts or omissions of its 
contractors.  Instead, the issue is which insurer was primary as 
to claim expenses, not damages.  Both Greenwich and Steadfast 
insured the same "loss," namely, MMSD's defense of the rain 
event 
litigation, 
and 
both 
policies 
were 
in 
effect 
for 
overlapping periods of time.6  Because Steadfast provided other 
valid and collectible insurance for the attorney fees necessary 
to defend against the rain event litigation, Greenwich's policy 
                                                 
6 Greenwich's pollution policy period was July 24, 2007 to 
July 24, 2008, and Steadfast's claims-made policy period was 
July 1, 2008 to July 1, 2009, with retroactive dates varying by 
coverage type and ranging from March 1, 1998 to June 11, 2008. 
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12 
 
provided excess coverage.  Notably, MMSD did collect its defense 
costs from Steadfast.7   
¶104 Nothing 
prohibits 
an 
insurer 
from 
denying 
its 
insured's tender of defense and stating the grounds for this 
denial.  See Water Well Sols. Serv. Grp. Inc. v. Consolidated 
Ins. Co., 2016 WI 54, ¶28, 369 Wis. 2d 607, 881 N.W.2d 285.  
While the insurer takes the risk that its coverage position will 
later be found incorrect, see id., there is nothing improper 
about taking this course of action, as Greenwich did.  Based on 
its policy language and the existence of other valid and 
collectible insurance, Greenwich correctly determined that any 
coverage under its policy for MMSD's claim expenses necessary to 
defend the rain event litigation was excess to Steadfast's.  It 
is irrelevant that Greenwich might ultimately have been liable 
to indemnify MMSD for any damages awarded against MMSD as a 
result of United Water's services; Steadfast was obligated to 
pay all the claim expenses necessary to resolve the entire 
litigation, and in fact Steadfast did so.  An "insurer breaches 
the duty to defend by requiring the insured to incur attorney 
fees to defend . . . on the issue of liability and to litigate 
coverage simultaneously."  Reid v. Benz, 2001 WI 106, ¶3, 245 
                                                 
7 Steadfast maintains that Greenwich's "other insurance" 
clause does not apply because Steadfast's policy was not 
collectible, arguing that "MMSD will never be able to 'collect' 
on the Steadfast policy for any liability due to the vicarious 
liability of United Water."  Steadfast commits the same error as 
the majority by focusing exclusively on the claims for damages 
instead of the common loss insured by both Greenwich and 
Steadfast:  defense costs.  
No.  2016AP1631.rgb 
 
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Wis. 2d 658, 629 N.W.2d 262.  In this case, Steadfast paid 
MMSD's attorney fees incurred to defend against the rain event 
litigation; MMSD was not forced to bear the expense.  And 
Steadfast——not 
MMSD——litigated 
coverage 
for 
defense 
costs.  
Accordingly, Greenwich did not breach any duty to defend MMSD; 
as an excess insurer with respect to defense costs, Greenwich 
had no obligation to provide a defense that MMSD was already 
receiving from its primary insurer. 
¶105 The majority disregards applicable policy language, 
upsets the insurers' contractual allocation of risk, and binds 
Greenwich to a risk for which it did not bargain.  I would apply 
the "other insurance" provisions of each contract and therefore 
reverse the judgment against Greenwich in its entirety, holding 
Greenwich had no duty to defend MMSD because its policy provided 
only excess coverage for MMSD's defense costs.  Other than the 
principles of law regarding the pro rata allocation of defense 
costs between insurers set forth in part II.B.4 of the majority 
opinion, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
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