Title: SCOTT v ROBSON
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 14606
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: July 16, 1979

No. 14606 IN THE SUPREME COUIiT O F THE STATE O F m A N A 1979 DONALD L. m, Plaintiff and Appellant, -VS- GAEiY R O - , Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Fourteenth Judicial District, Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Allen L. W e a r argued, Bozeman, mntana For Respondent: Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole and Dietrich, Billings, Montana L. Randall Bishop argued, Billings, mntana Submitted: M a y 4, 1979 Decided: JUL 1 6 1979 - < . - - r-. 5 -. ;'i : Y r:. - ,', & 4 . Filed: - - M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court . This i s an appeal from a summary judgment i n t h e D i s - t r i c t Court of t h e Fourteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , i n and f o r t h e County of Musselshell. The case involves an a c t i o n t o recover f o r personal i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g f r o m some l o g s f a l l i n g on a workman. Following t h e taking of p l a i n t i f f ' s deposi- t i o n , defendant moved f o r a summary judgment, which motion was eventually granted. P l a i n t i f f moved t o set a s i d e , v a c a t e o r modify t h e summary judgment, which was denied, and p l a i n t i f f appeals. P l a i n t i f f S c o t t was i n j u r e d while working with defen- d a n t Gary Robson and W i l l i a m Yount, Jr., on a logging opera- t i o n . The men w e r e logging a s p e c i f i e d p o r t i o n of timber growing on t h e defendant's ranch. P l a i n t i f f and Yount had been h i r e d by Robson. S c o t t was t o f a l l t h e trees, c u t t h e limbs from them, and saw them i n t o l e n g t h s capable of being hauled t o an a r e a sawmill. Yount's job was t o s t a c k t h e l o g s hauled by S c o t t i n t o decks i n t o which they w e r e t o be loads. The loading and t h e hauling was done exclusively by defendant Robson. Deposition testimony e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f S c o t t ' s p r i n c i p a l occupation f o r some 20 y e a r s had been t h a t of a t i m b e r sawyer. I n t h e l a t e f a l l of 1976 he approached defendant Robson seeking work because t h e l o c a l logging businesses had been closed due t o inclement winter weather. P r i o r t o t h a t t i m e he had been working'at a sawmill operated by M r . Yount, S r . The d e p o s i t i o n testimony i n d i c a t e d t h a t S c o t t would use h i s own judgment i n determining t h e merchant- a b l e l o g s and t h e manner i n which they would be c u t , would u s e h i s own saw and o t h e r equipment, and would purchase t h e g a s o l i n e and o i l f o r t h e saw. I t w a s f u r t h e r agreed t h a t S c o t t would be p a i d s t r i c t l y on a percentage of t h e l o g s c u t , r e c e i v i n g $10 p e r thousand board f e e t . I n a d d i t i o n Yount was t o r e c e i v e $10 p e r thousand board f e e t f o r t h e work he d i d i n skidding and s t a c k i n g t h e l o g s . The deposi- t i o n f u r t h e r i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e r e w a s no withholding of any s o c i a l s e c u r i t y payments o r f e d e r a l income t a x i n t h e checks received by S c o t t . S c o t t determined h i s own working hours. The d e p o s i t i o n i n d i c a t e d t h a t Robson described t h e a r e a t o be logged, l e a v i n g t h e process of l o g s and t h e c o n t r o l of h i s movements e x c l u s i v e l y t o S c o t t . S c o t t i n d i c a t e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e of t h e agreement h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p with Robson was a s " c o n t r a c t o r s " . On March 15, 1977, Yount and S c o t t w e r e nearby a s Robson loaded t h e f i n a l t r u c k of a d a y ' s work. S c o t t had seen a number of l o a d s of l o g s go o u t and t e s t i f i e d t h a t he n o t i c e d nothing unusual about t h i s p a r t i c u l a r load. H e f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he knew two o r t h r e e l o g s had r o l l e d o f f during t h e loading process, b u t d i d n o t f e e l t h i s added t o t h e p o s s i b l e danger of t h e l o g s r o l l i n g o f f a f t e r they had been reloaded and had s e t t l e d some f i v e o r more minutes. According t o S c o t t every i n d i c a t i o n w a s t h a t t h e load w a s a good, t i g h t load of l o g s , no d i f f e r e n t from any o t h e r s which Robson had prepared, and s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t t h e r e w e r e no crooked l o g s o r anything t h a t would have caused t h e load t o have been unstable. H e f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n h i s e x p e r t opinion t h e s e l o g s w e r e loaded i n a customary manner of t h e logging i n d u s t r y . Following t h e loading t h e t r u c k and t h e l o g s sat motion- less f o r a t least f i v e minutes while Robson parked h i s t r a c t o r and prepared t o bind t h e load w i t h c h a i n s used f o r t h a t purpose. After parking and g e t t i n g off t h e t r a c t o r , Robson took t h e chains over t o t h e load and threw one of t h e chains over t h e top. S c o t t stepped o u t of h i s pickup, and without being asked t o do so, walked over t o hook t h e chain on the s i d e of t h e t r a i l e r opposite Robson. A s he bent t o hook t h e chain, some of t h e top logs r o l l e d off t h e truck. Yount, who was nearby, yelled a warning b u t S c o t t was unable t o r e a c t i n time and was h i t by t h e f a l l i n g logs and injured. Following t h e e n t r y of summary judgment, p l a i n t i f f sought t o depose an a d d i t i o n a l witness. Defendant f i l e d a motion t o quash t h e taking of t h e deposition, which w a s denied, and t h e deposition was taken t o perpetuate testimony under Rule 27(b), M.R.Civ.P. I n addition, p l a i n t i f f f i l e d a l e t t e r from H. B. Stevens, Supervisor of t h e Underwriting Division, S t a t e Compensation Insurance Fund, Division of Workers' Compensation, which was dated August 24, 1978, concerning t h e regulations of t h e Department on t h e stacking of logs. While p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t s e t s f o r t h f i v e i s s u e s f o r consideration by t h i s Court, w e f i n d t h a t t h e i s s u e s can be properly r e s t a t e d i n t h e following manner: 1. Whether a p p e l l a n t ' s opening b r i e f relies, i n p a r t , upon materials n o t properly included i n t h e record which should be disregarded i n deciding t h i s appeal. 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court properly granted summary judgment f o r respondent where a p p e l l a n t ' s testimony estab- l i s h e d t h a t respondent d i d not breach any duty owed appellant. 3 . Whether t h e appellant was, a s he believes, an independent contractor while working f o r respondent. The f i r s t i s s u e concerns t h e materials i n s e r t e d i n t o t h e record by a p p e l l a n t a f t e r summary judgment. The o r d e r g r a n t i n g summary judgment on t h e m e r i t s was entered on August 11, 1978. Judgment f o r respondent was e n t e r e d upon t h e o f f i c i a l docket August 16, 1978. On t h e s a m e day, a p p e l l a n t ' s counsel prepared a n o t i c e f o r t h e t a k i n g of t h e d e p o s i t i o n of William Yount, Jr., of Roundup, Montana. This n o t i c e was received by respondent's counsel on August 17, and upon r e c e i v i n g t h i s n o t i c e respondent submitted a motion t o quash along w i t h a n o t i c e of a hearing on t h e motion which was set f o r August 23, 1978. Respondent's motion t o quash argued t h a t , a judgment having been e n t e r e d i n t h e case, f u r t h e r discovery w a s i n a p p r o p r i a t e u n l e s s s p e c i f i c a l l y granted under Rule 2 7 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P., which s t a t e s : " ( b ) PENDING APPEAL. I f an appeal has been taken from a judgment of a d i s t r i c t c o u r t o r before t h e t a k i n g of an appeal i f t h e t i m e t h e r e f o r has n o t expired, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n which t h e judgment was rendered m a y allow t h e t a k i n g of t h e deposi- -- t i o n s of witnesses t o p e r p e t u a t e t h e i r testimony f o r u s e i n t h e e v e n t o f f u r t h e r proceedings i n ---- - t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . I n such c a s e t h e p a r t y who de- sires t o p e r p e t u a t e t h e testimony may make a mo- t i o n i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r l e a v e t o t a k e t h e d e p o s i t i o n s , upon t h e same n o t i c e and s e r v i c e thereof a s i f t h e a c t i o n w a s pending i n t h e d i s - t r i c t c o u r t . The motion s h a l l show (1) names and addresses of persons t o b e examined and t h e sub- s t a n c e of t h e testimony which he expects t o e l i c i t from each; ( 2 ) t h e reasons f o r perpetuating t h e i r testimony. I f t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e perpetua- t i o n of t h e testimony i s proper t o avoid a f a i l u r e o r delay of j u s t i c e , it may make a n o r d e r allowing t h e d e p o s i t i o n s t o b e taken . . . " (Emphasis added. ) Here it i s noted by respondent t h a t t h e only purpose of a n o r d e r g r a n t i n g a l e a v e under Rule 27(b) i s t o preserve testimony which may be l o s t i n t h e e v e n t t h a t t h e r e l i e f re- quested on appeal be granted and t h e case once again heard by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. Recently, i n Ash v. Cort (3rd C i r . (1975), 512 F.2d 909, a case r e v e r s e d on o t h e r grounds, 442 U.S. 66, t h e United S t a t e s Court of Appeals upheld t h e deci- s i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t Court denying a Rule 27 ( b ) motion t o p e r p e t u a t e testimony pending appeal. I n d i s c u s s i n g t h e r u l e , t h e Court s t a t e d : "We r e i t e r a t e t h a t Rule 27 i s n o t a s u b s t i t u t e f o r discovery. I t i s a v a i l a b l e i n s p e c i a l cir- cumstances t o p r e s e r v e testimony which otherwise could be l o s t . . . The Rule s t a t e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t 'may allow t h e t a k i n g of t h e deposi- t i o n s of w i t n e s s e s t o p e r p e t u a t e t h e i r testimony . . . i f t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n of t h e testimony i s proper t o avoid a f a i l u r e o r d e l a y of j u s t i c e . . .' "Without some showing t h a t continued d e l a y i n g r a n t i n g discovery i s l i k e l y t o r e s u l t i n a l o s s of evidence, t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t no discovery has y e t taken p l a c e i s p l a i n l y i r r e l e v a n t t o Rule 27. Appellant makes almost no a t t e m p t t o show why t h e requested testimony must be perpetuated. I n con- c l u s o r y t e r m s , a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f merely s t a t e s : 'There e x i s t s a s u b s t a n t i a l r i s k t h a t t e s t i m o n i a l evidence w i l l become u n a v a i l a b l e i f discovery is f u r t h e r postpone. I t i s probable t h a t t h e o f f i - cers and d i r e c t o r s having f i r s t hand knowledge a r e over f i f t y y e a r s of age. They are a l l s e n i o r o f f i c e r s of a l a r g e i n d u s t r i a l corporation. One d i r e c t o r has a l r e a d y died. Memories may f a d e . ' "Although age may be a r e l e v a n t f a c t o r i n showing t h a t testimony must be perpetuated t o avoid l o s s , w e simply cannot a g r e e t h a t t h e s e conclusory re- marks i n any way show t h a t evidence i s l i k e l y t o be l o s t while t h e appeal i s pending. "Since p l a i n t i f f f a i l e d t o a s s e r t r e a s o n s why it was necessary t o p e r p e t u a t e t h i s testimony, w e f i n d no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of t h e motion." W e f i n d t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s counsel made no a t t e m p t t o comply w i t h Rule 27(b) by r e q u e s t i n g l e a v e of c o u r t t o t a k e t h e d e p o s i t i o n of William Yount, Jr. While t h e motion t o p e r p e t u a t e testimony was l a t e r submitted, no f a c t s w e r e presented a s r e q u i r e d by t h e r u l e t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n of t h e testimony of Yount w a s necessary t o avoid t h e f a i l u r e o r d e l a y of j u s t i c e . S u f f i c i e n t oppor- t u n i t y f o r discovery and examination of witnesses w a s pro- vided t o a p p e l l a n t ' s counsel while respondent's motion f o r summary judgment was pending. Here, a p p e l l a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o do so i n d i c a t e s h i s willingness t o stand on the evidence presented a t t h e summary judgment hearing. W e f i n d appel- l a n t ' s a c t i o n s improper and t h a t he cannot supplement an inadequate record on appeal by way of r e l i a n c e upon t h i s deposition of Yount. Next t o be considered i s t h e l e t t e r of B. H. Stevens which was submitted i n opposition t o respondent's motion f o r summary judgment. This l e t t e r from Stevens of t h e S t a t e Compensation Insurance Fund w a s intended t o show t h a t under workers' compensation law t h e S t a t e of Montana usually considered timber sawyers t o be employees. The l e t t e r w a s improperly included i n a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f f o r several rea- sons: (1) it w a s n o t presented i n t h e proper a f f i d a v i t form a s required by Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P.; ( 2 ) t h e opinion set f o r t h i n t h e letter could e a s i l y have been presented t o t h e c o u r t i n timely fashion i n opposition t o respondent's motion f o r summary judgment, r a t h e r than subsequently i n support of a motion t o set a s i d e t h e v e r d i c t which had been granted on t h e merits; and ( 3 ) t h e l e t t e r s e t s f o r t h a generalized opinion offered without e i t h e r foundation o r regard t o t h e f a c t s of t h e case. W e note t h a t i n a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f he admits t h a t t h e o b j e c t i o n t o t h e Yount deposition i s w e l l taken and f o r a l l i n t e n t s and purposes should not be included. However, he argues t h a t i n t h e case of t h e Stevens letter w e should consider t h e s a m e under t h e Montana Rules of ~ v i d e n c e , ~ u l e 803 ( a ) , which provides: "The following a r e n o t excluded by t h e hearsay r u l e . . . "8. . . . statements o r d a t a compilations i n any form of p u b l i c o f f i c e r s o r agency s e t t i n g f o r t h i t s r e g u l a r l y conducted and r e g u l a r l y recorded a c t i v i - t i e s . . . ' I A s previously noted above, w e f i n d t h a t t h e letter was n o t presented i n proper form and t h e r e f o r e cannot be con- s i d e r e d . The second i s s u e i s whether summary judgment was prop- e r l y granted i n favor of respondent where a p p e l l a n t ' s testi- mony e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t respondent d i d not breach any l e g a l duty owed appellant. Rule 56 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., states i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "The judgment sought should be rendered forthwith i f t h e pleadings, depositions, answers t o i n t e r - r o g a t o r i e s , and admissions on f i l e , together with t h e a f f i d a v i t s , i f any, show t h a t t h e r e is no genu- i n e i s s u e as t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h a t t h e moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o a judgment a s a matter of law. " Under t h i s r u l e it i s c l e a r t h a t summary judgment is appro- p r i a t e only where t h e p r e t r i a l record d i s c l o s e s t h a t (1) t h e r e are no genuine i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t , and (2) t h a t t h e moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o judgment a s a matter of law. Batey Land & Livestock Co. v. Nixon (1977), - Mont. I 560 P.2d 1334, 34 St-Rep. 105; Harland v. Anderson (1976), 169 Mont. 447, 548 P.2d 613. Montana law i s exceedingly c l e a r i n i t s requirement t h a t a p l a i n t i f f i s s u b j e c t t o summary judgment i f he f a i l s i n e s t a b l i s h i n g c e r t a i n m a t e r i a l elements i n a negligence a c t i o n . S t a t e ex rel. Burlington Northern, Inc. v. D i s t r i c t Court (1972), 159 Mont. 295, 301, 496 P.2d 1152, 1156. A s s t a t e d i n P i c k e t t v. Kyger (1968), 151 Mont. 87, 100, 439 "Tt i s hornbook l a w r e q u i r i n g no c i t a t i o n of au- t h o r i t y t h a t t h e m a t e r i a l elements t h a t t h e plain- t i f f must prove i n order t o p r e v a i l i n a damage a c t i o n of t h i s kind are: " ( 1 ) A duty owing from defendant t o p l a i n t i f f ; " ( 2 ) A breach of t h a t duty by defendant; " (3) Constituting proximate cause o f ; " ( 4 ) I n j u r i e s and damages t o p l a i n t i f f . " P l a i n t i f f must introduce evidence proving o r tend- i n g t o prove each of t h e s e m a t e r i a l elements i n o r d e r t o be e n t i t l e d t o have h i s case submitted t o t h e jury. I n t h e i n s t a n t case p l a i n t i f f ' s evidence, viewed most favorably t o p l a i n t i f f , tends t o es- t a b l i s h t h e duty, breach, i n j u r y , and damages. But t h e r e i s a t o t a l absence of any evidence tending t o e s t a b l i s h a proximate causal connection between t h e breached duty and p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r i e s and damages." I n P i c k e t t t h i s Court d i r e c t e d summary judgment i n favor of t h e defendant a s a r e s u l t of t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s f a i l u r e t o e s t a b l i s h a proximate causal connection. I n Flansberg v. Montana Power Company (1969), 154 Mont. 53, 58-60, 460 P.2d 263, t h e r u l e was expressed under c i r - cumstances s i m i l a r t o t h e i n s t a n t case: "The f a c t s appearing i n t h e record r e v e a l a t o t a l absence of negligence on t h e p a r t of defendant o r i t s employees. This alone i s s u f f i c i e n t t o autho- r i z e summary judgment f o r defendant . . . "To s u s t a i n a claim f o r r e l i e f based on a l l e g e d negligence, t h e p l a i n t i f f must prove both negli- gence and proximate cause. [ C i t a t i o n s omitted.] Further, negligence imports such a want of a t t e n - t i o n t o t h e nature and probable consequences of t h e a c t o r omission a s a prudent man o r d i n a r i l y bestows i n a c t i n g i n h i s own concerns . . . Here t h e p l a i n t i f f , having presented h i s evidence on t h e i s s u e of negligence, has f a i l e d t o produce any s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support h i s claim. Whether o r n o t t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence pre- sented by p l a i n t i f f is a question of l a w f o r t h e Court and n o t a question of f a c t f o r t h e jury. [ C i t a t i o n s omitted. I " I f t h e r e -- i s no evidence of any negligent -- a c t o r omission % defendant, a n o n s u i t i s proper1 aranted. [ C i t a t i o n s omTtted. ] T ~ S r u l e iz - - - equally a p p l i c a b l e t o a motion f o r summary judg- ment under t h e circumstances d i s c l o s e d here." Under t h e circumstances of t h e a c c i d e n t here, whether a p p e l l a n t S c o t t w a s a n employee o r a n independent contrac- t o r , t h e duty owed him by respondent was t h a t of a business i n v i t e e . Under t h e case l a w of t h i s state an i n d i v i d u a l has been h e l d t o be a business i n v i t e e i f t h e r e e x i s t s some common i n t e r e s t o r mutual advantage gained by t h e i n v i t o r o r t h e property owner. S t a t e ex rel. Burlington Northern, Inc. v. D i s t r i c t Court (1972), 159 Mont. 295, 304, 496 P.2d 1152, 1157-58. From a p p e l l a n t ' s testimony it appears t h a t a common i n t e r e s t i s shown: "Q. I n a sense, t h e t h r e e of you w e r e r e a l l y work- i n g together toward a common g o a l , i s n ' t t h a t cor- r e c t ? A. W e l l , yes, t r y i n g t o make a d o l l a r , yes. "Q. Trying t o g e t a s many l o g s i n a s you could? A. W e l l , yes. "Q. I n t h e course of pursuing t h a t g o a l would you o c c a s i o n a l l y h e l p each o t h e r a t t a s k s , p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g s ? A. W e l l , I have skidded with t h e c a t a few t i m e s , b u t n o t very much. B i l l d i d most of it. And I have helped Gary boom down i f I happened t o be t h e r e o r something, t o hook a chain o r some- t h i n g s , you know, b u t t h a t w a s it, you know. "Q. This was j u s t a n occasional t h i n g , n o t consis- t e n t ? A. Y e s . That wasn't m y job. H e never t o l d m e t o do it o r anything. I j u s t d i d i t . " The g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t a property owner i s l i a b l e t o a n i n v i t e e f o r i n j u r i e s occasioned by unsafe conditions upon premises encountered i n t h e work which a r e known t o t h e p r o p e r t y owner b u t unknown t o t h e i n j u r e d person. 4 1 Am.Jur.2d Independent Contractors 827, p. 781. This Court has h e l d under t h e g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t t h e duty owed t h e business i n v i t e e i s t o e x e r c i s e ordinary care t o have t h e premises reasonably s a f e o r t o warn t h e i n v i t e e of any hidden o r l u r k i n g dangers; t h e i n v i t o r i s n o t , however, a n i n s u r e r a g a i n s t a l l a c c i d e n t s and i n j u r i e s t o i n v i t e e s . See, Dunham v . Southside National Bank of Missoula (1976), 169 Mont. 466, 548 P.2d 1383; Hackley v. Waldorf Hoerner Paper Co., (1967), 149 Mont. 286, 425 P.2d 712; and Cassaday v. C i t y of B i l l i n g s (1959), 135 Mont. 390, 393, 340 P.2d 509, 510-11. It i s undisputed t h a t a p p e l l a n t s u f f e r e d h i s i n j u r i e s a s a r e s u l t of a n i n c i d e n t which occurred on respondent's ranch. W e must look t o t h e l a w of Montana f o r t h e proper g u i d e l i n e s t o consider t h e f a c t s of t h i s case. I t has been long e s t a b l i s h e d and i s a r u l e i n Montana t h a t "an i n f e r e n c e of negligence cannot be drawn from t h e b a r e f a c t t h a t an i n j u r y occurs." Thompson v. Llewellyn (1959), 136 Mont. The method of determining whether respondent w a s n e g l i - g e n t i n t h i s i n s t a n c e i s described i n Mang v. Eliasson (1969), 153 Mont. 431, 436-38, 458 P.2d 777, 780-81, where t h i s Court s t a t e d : " I t has been w e l l s a i d t h a t a defendant who could n o t f o r e s e e any danger of d i r e c t i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g from h i s conduct o r any r i s k from a n i n t e r v e n i n g f o r c e i s n o t n e g l i g e n t . Taylor v. Chicago, M i l - waukee, S t . Paul and P a c i f i c Ry. Co., 142 Mont. 365, 371, 384 P.2d 759; Lencioni v. Long, 139 Mont. 135, 361 P.2d 455 . . . " F o r e s e e a b i l i t y i s of prime importance i n estab- l i s h i n g t h e element of duty, and t h e q u e s t i o n of d e f e n d a n t ' s negligence, i f any, must of n e c e s s i t y hinge on t h e f i n d i n g of a breach of t h a t duty. I f a reasonably prudent defendant can f o r e s e e n e i t h e r any danger of d i r e c t i n j u r y nor any r i s k f o r an i n t e r v e n i n g cause he i s simply n o t n e g l i g e n t . . . "Harper and James, The Law of T o r t s , [Vol. 21 a t page 1018, state t h e p r e v a i l i n g view. The o b l i - g a t i o n of defendants t u r n s on whether: " ' . . . The offending conduct foreseeably involved unreasonably g r e a t r i s k of harm t o t h e i n t e r e s t of someone o t h e r than t h e a c t o r . . . The o b l i g a t i o n t o r e f r a i n from . . . p a r t i c u l a r conduct i s owed o n l y t o t h o s e who a r e foreseeably endangered by t h e conduct and only with r e s p e c t t o t h o s e r i s k s and hazards whose l i k e l i h o o d made t h e conduct un- reasonably dangerous. Duty, & I o t h e r words i s measured t h e scope --- of t h e r i s k which n e g l z e n t conduct f o r e s e e a b l y e n t a i l s . ' " (Emphasis added. ) See a l s o , Jackson v. William Dingwall Co. (1965), 145 Mont. 127, 135, 399 P.2d 236, 240, where t h i s Court upheld t h e d i s m i s s a l of p l a i n t i f f ' s a c t i o n , s t a t i n g : "Negligence c a r r i e s with it l i a b i l i t y f o r conse- quences which i n l i g h t of a t t e n d a n t circumstances could reasonably have been a n t i c i p a t e d by a pru- d e n t man, b u t n o t f o r c a s u a l t i e s which, though p o s s i b l e , w e r e wholly improbable. [ C i t a t i o n omit- t e d . ] Negligence i s t h e absence of c a r e , accord- i n g t o t h e circumstance. . ." Here, a s i n Jackson, t h e deposition of a p p e l l a n t c l e a r l y shows t h a t respondent d i d not breach any duty owed a p p e l l a n t . The f a c t t h a t a p p e l l a n t had no o b l i g a t i o n t o have anything t o do with t h e loading of t h e truck and binding it down i s f u l l y revealed by h i s testimony. According t o a p p e l l a n t ' s testimony, t h e r e w a s no reason f o r him t o perceive any danger from t h e load of logs; nor was t h e r e any warning t h a t one of them would f a l l o f f t h e truck. The load of l o g s had s e t t l e d f o r a t l e a s t f i v e minutes a s t h e men who w e r e t h e r e could see. I t i s f u r t h e r shown by t h e testimony t h a t respondent gave no o r d e r s t o a p p e l l a n t t o a s s i s t him, nor d i d he have any i n d i c a t i o n t h a t a p p e l l a n t had walked up t o t h e truck t o help him i n binding t h e load. Under t h e s e circumstances t h e r e w a s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e loading of t h e l o g s had c r e a t e d a d d i t i o n a l r i s k of harm o r t h a t a p p e l l a n t w a s endangered by t h e load. W e cannot perceive t h a t respondent breached any duty t o appel- l a n t t o keep t h e premises reasonably s a f e o r t o warn of any hidden o r lurking dangers. Under t h e evidence presented, t h e r e is no showing t h a t respondent was negligent o r t h a t l i a b i l i t y attached. For t h e above reasons, it i s n o t necessary t o consider t h e t h i r d i s s u e presented, t h a t of t h e question of t h e independent c o n t r a c t o r . The order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court g r a n t i n g summary judgment We concur: z-e%wL4 ._ Ch' f Justice T r\ -i '-. Justices