Title: People v. Every
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 84909
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: November 19, 1998

People v. Every, No 84909 (Ill. 
S.Ct.)
Docket No. 84909-Agenda 13-September 
1998.
Opinion filed November 19, 1998.
JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the 
court:
The State brings this appeal, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 
603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 603), from a decision by the circuit court of Jo Daviess 
County declaring unconstitutional a provision in section 11-501.1(a) of the 
Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(a) (West 1996)).
The facts of this case are not in dispute and require only 
brief recitation here. The defendant, David L. Every, was involved in a one-car 
accident on Council Hill Road in Jo Daviess County on May 28, 1997. Deputy 
Kieffer of the Jo Daviess County sheriff's office arrived on the scene and found 
the defendant there. The defendant had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, 
his eyes were glassy, and his balance was unsteady. The defendant failed a field 
sobriety test, and a field breathalyzer test revealed a blood-alcohol 
concentration of 0.174. The defendant was transported by ambulance to Finley 
Hospital in Dubuque, Iowa. At the hospital, Deputy Kieffer issued the defendant 
a citation for a violation of section 11-501(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code 
(625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 1996)) read to the defendant the warning 
statement required by statute and obtained the defendant's consent to have a 
blood sample taken. The sample, when it was tested, revealed a blood-alcohol 
concentration of 0.177.
The defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated, 
and a statutory summary suspension of his driving privileges in Illinois was 
entered. The defendant, who is a Wisconsin resident, moved to suppress the 
evidence taken from him at the Iowa hospital and to rescind the statutory 
summary suspension. The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the 
provision in the implied consent statute, section 11-501.1(a) of the Illinois 
Vehicle Code, that authorizes law enforcement officers to obtain blood samples 
in other states for incidents occurring in Illinois. In the motion, the 
defendant contended that Deputy Kieffer had no authority to obtain a blood 
sample from him while they were in Iowa. Following a hearing, the trial judge 
ruled in the defendant's favor. The judge concluded that the provision in 
section 11-501.1(a) authorizing the deputy to obtain a blood sample from the 
defendant in Iowa "was violative of fundamental principles of sovereign and 
legislative jurisdiction, and due process." The judge believed that the statute 
could not validly grant law officers the authority to collect evidence outside 
their home state. The judge also believed that the defendant had not validly 
consented to the collection of blood in this case. The trial judge accordingly 
suppressed the evidence of the defendant's blood-alcohol level that was based on 
the sample taken in the Iowa hospital. In addition, the judge rescinded the 
statutory summary suspension of the defendant's driving privileges in Illinois. 
The prosecutor filed a certificate of impairment from the trial judge's ruling. 
145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). Because the trial judge found the provision in 
question unconstitutional, the State's appeal lies directly to this court. 134 
Ill. 2d R. 603.
The challenged portion of section 11-501.1(a) of the 
Illinois Vehicle Code provides:
Statutes enjoy a presumption of 
constitutionality, and a defendant challenging a statute has the burden of 
establishing that the provision is unconstitutional. Fink v. Ryan, 174 Ill. 2d 302, 308 (1996); People v. Adams, 149 Ill. 2d 331, 338 (1992); 
People v. Wade, 131 Ill. 2d 370, 379-80 (1989).
In support of the trial judge's ruling in this case, the 
defendant contends that Illinois cannot enforce its laws in other states. The 
defendant argues that a statute has no extraterritorial force and operates only 
on persons or things within the jurisdiction. Wimmer v. Koenigseder, 
108 Ill. 2d 435, 440-41 (1985). In declaring the challenged provision in section 
11-501.1(a) unconstitutional, the trial judge concluded that the legislature did 
not have the power to give an Illinois law enforcement officer authority beyond 
the borders of the state, and the defendant correctly observes that a police 
officer outside his jurisdiction has no more authority than a private citizen. 
People v. Fenton, 125 Ill. 2d 343, 346 (1988) ("[U]pon leaving 
Illinois, the Illinois officer had only the status of a private citizen"). The 
defendant argues that Deputy Kieffer could not, as a private citizen, have 
traveled to Iowa with the traffic citation and warning to compel the defendant's 
submission to the test, for those are powers of office unavailable to a private 
citizen. The defendant concludes that Deputy Kieffer, acting as a private 
citizen in Iowa, had no authority to attempt to enforce Illinois law in the 
other jurisdiction.
In the present case, the alleged violation of the drunk 
driving statute occurred in Illinois. The question before us concerns the 
validity of the provision in the implied consent statute that authorized the 
deputy to travel to Iowa to obtain the defendant's blood sample in that state. 
Under the defendant's view, the deputy's collection of the blood sample in Iowa 
was an invalid extraterritorial exercise of authority not warranted by the laws 
of either Illinois or Iowa.
We do not believe that Deputy Kieffer was disabled from 
obtaining a blood sample from the defendant in the Iowa hospital, where the 
defendant had been taken, and, contrary to the defendant's argument, we find no 
violation of due process or intrusion on state sovereignty here. The officer's 
actions in this case do not involve an exercise of his official powers in 
another state, but rather depend on the defendant's implied consent to the 
evidence-gathering procedure set out in the Illinois Vehicle Code. An officer is 
not precluded from collecting evidence outside his jurisdiction, and an officer 
may go to another state to seek evidence. People v. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d 379, 394 (1992) (Heiple, J., dissenting). The defendant contends, however, that 
the deputy could not attempt to enforce this aspect of the Illinois law in Iowa 
because the officer had no law enforcement powers while he was outside Illinois. 
We believe that the defendant's argument misapprehends the scope and purpose of 
the implied consent law.
Under the statute, drivers in Illinois impliedly consent to 
the chemical testing of their blood, breath, and urine; if they refuse, they may 
suffer the loss of driving privileges in Illinois. This court has previously 
found this procedure to be constitutional. People v. Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d 418 (1992); People v. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d 491 (1988); 
People v. Rolfingsmeyer, 101 Ill. 2d 137 (1984). In the present case, 
the Illinois implied consent statute explicitly authorized Deputy Kieffer to 
obtain a blood sample from the defendant "in an adjoining state" for an accident 
occurring in Illinois. The defendant's consent to a blood test may be found in 
section 11-501.1, which provides:
We believe that this same provision may 
have effect in Iowa.
It is clear that the purpose of the measure challenged here 
is to permit law enforcement officers to obtain blood samples from drivers who, 
for medical reasons, have been taken to an adjoining state. We do not believe 
that the present statute is an invalid extension of the implied consent concept. 
The defendant should not be released from the statutory consequences of his 
actions merely because he was taken to an adjoining state for treatment of his 
injuries. The challenged provision reflects a balance struck between the injured 
driver's interest in obtaining prompt medical treatment and the State's interest 
in securing reliable evidence before it vanishes. We cannot say that the 
solution devised by the legislature denies the defendant due process or intrudes 
on the sovereignty of another state.
Case law from other states supports our decision here. Under 
a number of theories, other courts have upheld the taking of blood samples from 
drivers who have committed driving offenses in one state or jurisdiction and who 
have then traveled or been transported to a neighboring state or jurisdiction. 
See State v. Stevens, 224 Conn. 730, 620 A.2d 789 (1993); 
Piotrowski v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 453 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 
1990); State v. Steinbrunn, 54 Wash. App. 506, 774 P.2d 55 (1989); see 
also State v. Locke, 418 A.2d 843 (R.I. 1980); In re 
Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 744 P.2d 92 (1987). Notably, the Supreme Court of 
Iowa reached the same result in a factually similar case, State v. 
Wagner, 359 N.W.2d 487 (Iowa 1984), which has not been cited by the 
parties. The defendant in Wagner was injured in an automobile accident 
in Iowa and was taken to a hospital in Wisconsin for treatment. An Iowa state 
trooper followed the driver to the out-of-state hospital and obtained there a 
blood sample from the defendant pursuant to Iowa's implied consent law; like the 
statute challenged here, the Iowa provision invoked in Wagner did not 
require that the defendant have been placed under arrest. The defendant in 
Wagner argued that the same considerations that limit an officer's 
authority to make an arrest in another state likewise limit an officer's 
authority to enforce the chemical testing procedures of the Iowa consent law in 
another jurisdiction. Rejecting this argument, the court explained:
The court in Wagner believed that 
the trooper was simply functioning as an agent of the state in carrying out the 
Iowa implied consent procedure in Wisconsin, and the court did not believe that 
"a state agency if precluded from taking action outside of its own state to 
carry out its statutory mission if such action does not intrude on the 
sovereignty of another state." Wagner, 359 N.W.2d  at 490. The 
Wagner court concluded that the trooper's actions in taking the blood 
sample from the defendant "may be properly characterized as the type of evidence 
gathering activities which do not depend on a grant of authority from a 
sovereign body." Wagner, 359 N.W.2d  at 490.
We believe that a similar analysis is applicable here. 
Contrary to the defendant's view, Illinois is not seeking to enforce its own 
laws in another state. Although the deputy does not have official powers beyond 
the state's borders, he is still an agent of the state, and we believe that he 
continued to possess the authority to collect evidence from the defendant, even 
in another state. The defendant had impliedly consented to this procedure, and 
we do not believe that the defendant should be relieved of the consequences of 
his actions in Illinois simply because he has been transported to another state 
for medical treatment. See People v. Caruso, 119 Ill. 2d 376 (1987). 
The defendant drove in Illinois, had an accident in this state, and was 
allegedly intoxicated at the time. Under the terms of the Illinois implied 
consent statute, the defendant, as a motorist in Illinois, agreed either to 
submit to chemical testing of his blood, breath, or urine or, upon his refusal 
to do so, to suffer the automatic suspension of his driving privileges in this 
state. That the option of providing a blood sample or incurring the automatic 
suspension was later presented to the defendant while he was in another 
jurisdiction receiving medical treatment for his injuries does not amount to a 
denial of due process or offend principles of state sovereignty. As the 
appellate court noted in People v. Preston, 205 Ill. App. 3d 35, 42 
(1990), a factually similar case, "The transport of defendant across State lines 
[from Illinois to Iowa] was merely fortuitous and should not work to clear 
defendant of the charges."
Moreover, enforcement of the implied consent statute in 
these circumstances does not conflict with Iowa public policy, as the defendant 
fears it does. As we have noted, the Supreme Court of Iowa, in analogous 
circumstances, has upheld the taking of a blood sample from a motorist who was 
involved in an accident in Iowa but was receiving medical treatment in Wisconsin 
at the time the sample was taken. State v. Wagner, 359 N.W.2d 487 (Iowa 
1984). Accordingly, our result in this case, enforcing the similar provisions of 
the Illinois implied consent law, cannot offend the law or public policy of 
Iowa.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of 
Jo Daviess County is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court for 
further proceedings.
Reversed and 
remanded.