Title: City of Lynn v. Murrell
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13193
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 2, 2022

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-13193 
 
CITY OF LYNN1  vs.  ARIANA MURRELL.2 
 
 
 
Essex.     February 2, 2022. - May 2, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Moot Question.  Practice, Civil, Moot case.  Public Health. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
April 23, 2021. 
 
A motion for injunctive relief was heard by Salim Rodriguez 
Tabit, J., and questions of law were reported by him to the 
Appeals Court. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
William E. Gens for the defendant. 
James F. Wellock, Assistant City Solicitor, for the 
plaintiff. 
Kimberly Parr, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
 
1 By and through its board of health. 
 
 
2 Individually and as manager of Liberty Tax Service. 
2 
 
CYPHER, J.  On March 10, 2020, Governor Charles D. Baker, 
Jr. (Governor), according to his authority under the Civil 
Defense Act, St. 1950, c. 639, and G. L. c. 17, § 2A, and in 
response to the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic in the 
Commonwealth, declared a state of emergency.  See Desrosiers v. 
Governor, 486 Mass. 369, 373 (2020).  During this state of 
emergency, which eventually ended on June 15, 2021, the Governor 
issued sixty-nine emergency orders.  See Order Announcing the 
Termination of the March 10, 2020 State of Emergency and 
Rescinding COVID-19 Executive Orders Issued Pursuant to the 
Massachusetts Civil Defense Act, COVID-19 Order No. 69 (May 28, 
2021) (Order 69).  The defendant, Ariana Murrell, individually 
and as manager of Liberty Tax Service (Liberty Tax), challenges 
two of those emergency orders and the Statewide face covering 
requirements associated with them:  (1) Order Authorizing the 
Re-Opening of Phase II Enterprises, COVID-19 Order No. 37 (June 
6, 2020) (Order 37); and (2) Revised Order Requiring Face 
Coverings in Public Places, COVID-19 Order No. 55 (Nov. 2, 2020) 
(Order 55).  As Order 69 revoked Orders 37 and 55 while the 
interlocutory appeal was pending, see Order 69 at 2, we now 
dismiss the case as moot.3 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Commonwealth in support of the city of Lynn. 
3 
 
Background.  1.  The emergency orders.  Order 37, issued on 
June 6, 2020, required the director of the Department of Labor 
Standards (director) and the Commissioner of Public Health to 
issue COVID-19 workplace safety rules.  Order 37 at 4.  In 
addition, Order 37 gave the Department of Labor Standards, in 
consultation with the Department of Public Health (department), 
"general authority to promulgate directives, regulations, and 
guidance to implement and enforce" those safety rules.  Id. at 
5.  A regulation promulgated under this authority required that 
"[a]ll enterprises that are authorized to open and are operating 
brick-and-mortar premises that are open to workers, customers, 
vendors or the public shall . . . [r]equire face coverings or 
masks for all workers."  454 Code Mass. Regs. § 31.03(1)(d) 
(2020). 
Order 55, which went into effect on November 6, 2020, 
required "all persons . . . over the age of 5 years old . . . to 
wear a mask or cloth face covering over their mouth and nose 
when in a public location."  Order 55 at 2, 4.  Order 55 granted 
enforcement power to the department, local boards of health, and 
authorized agents.  Id. at 3.  We refer to the mask requirements 
imposed by regulation under Order 37 and Order 55 together as 
the "Statewide mask mandates." 
2.  Murrell's conduct.  Murrell operates Liberty Tax, a 
business providing tax preparation services in the city of Lynn 
4 
 
(city).  Murrell initially complied with the Statewide mask 
mandates, but after allegedly noticing that face masks were 
causing harm to people's health, Murrell adopted a no-mask 
policy at Liberty Tax.  The policy required that customers and 
staff members not wear masks inside the premises.  The Lynn 
police department received multiple complaints about Murrell's 
no-mask policy.  The Lynn police investigated and corroborated 
these complaints with their own independent and documented 
observations of Murrell's practices at Liberty Tax.  Members of 
the public also contacted the city's board of health (board) to 
notify it of Murrell's no-mask policy. 
The city's health inspector (inspector) issued an initial 
citation to Murrell, dated February 2, 2021, warning her that 
Liberty Tax was in violation of the State's emergency orders.  
The inspector issued another five citations from February to 
April 2021, each fining Murrell $300 for Liberty Tax's 
continuing violation of the Statewide mask mandates, and a cease 
and desist order, dated March 17, 2021.  Murrell unsuccessfully 
appealed the fines and the cease and desist order before the 
board, and sought judicial review in the District Court. 
Murrell's no-mask policy drew the attention of the director 
as well as the Federal Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA).  The director issued a cease and desist 
order, dated February 23, 2021.  Following a visit by an OSHA 
5 
 
compliance officer on March 17, 2021, OSHA issued Murrell a 
citation and notice of penalty, including a $136,532 fine, dated 
April 8, 2021.  Murrell appealed OSHA's citation and notice of 
penalty.4 
About one month after issuing its cease and desist order, 
the city brought an action in Superior Court seeking a temporary 
restraining order and a permanent injunction to prevent Murrell 
from operating Liberty Tax until the Governor ended the state of 
emergency, and requesting a declaratory judgment stating that 
the city had authority to enforce the cease and desist order.  
Alongside its complaint, the city filed an emergency motion for 
a preliminary injunction.  Murrell responded to the motion, 
claiming, among other things, that the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq., 
preempted the Governor's emergency orders and that only OSHA had 
the statutory authority and jurisdiction to seek an injunction 
against her.  After a hearing, a judge of the Superior Court 
concluded that the emergency orders were not preempted and that 
it was in the public interest to grant a preliminary injunction 
 
4 The status of the appeal is not in the record.  The OSHA 
online establishment search indicates that no final order has 
issued and that the matter continued to be "[c]ontested" as of 
April 23, 2021.  See United States Department of Labor, 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Inspection 
Detail, Inspection:  1520204.015 -- Ariana Murrell-Rosario D/B/A 
Liberty Tax Service, https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment 
.inspection_detail?id=1520204.015 [https://perma.cc/DW42-RAAL]. 
6 
 
authorizing the Lynn police to close Liberty Tax if Murrell 
failed to comply with the city's cease and desist order within 
twenty-four hours.  The judge, however, stayed the injunction on 
May 10, 2021, and, pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 111, and Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 64 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1403 (1996), reported the 
following two questions for decision by the Appeals Court:  (1) 
"Did the court err in holding that Order . . . 37 and Order 
. . . 55 are not preempted by the OSH Act?"; and (2) "Did the 
court err in holding that the public interest required an order 
shutting down Liberty [Tax]?"  We transferred the interlocutory 
appeal to this court on our own motion on October 20, 2021.  On 
May 28, 2021, before the transfer, the Governor issued Order 69, 
which lifted most COVID-19 related orders and restrictions, 
including Order 37 and Order 55, the following day.  See Order 
69 at 2. 
 
Discussion.  Murrell argues on appeal that the now-
rescinded Orders 37 and 55, and the directives and regulations 
associated them, were preempted by the OSH Act.  See art. VI, 
cl. 2, of the United States Constitution.  Murrell also argues 
that the judge erred in issuing the preliminary injunction 
because the city did not meet its burden of showing that it was 
in the public interest to do so.  Because Orders 37 and 55 have 
been rescinded, the city no longer seeks to enjoin the operation 
of Liberty Tax, and neither party seeks any other form of 
7 
 
relief.  As a threshold matter, however, we must determine 
whether the issues are moot and, if they are, whether we ought 
to exercise our discretion to decide them anyway. 
1.  Mootness.  "[L]itigation is considered moot when the 
party who claimed to be aggrieved ceases to have a personal 
stake in its outcome."  Blake v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 369 
Mass. 701, 703 (1976).  A party no longer has a personal stake 
in a case "where a court can order 'no further effective 
relief.'"  Branch v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 481 
Mass. 810, 817 (2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 858 (2020), 
quoting Lawyers' Comm. for Civ. Rights & Economic Justice v. 
Court Adm'r of the Trial Court, 478 Mass. 1010, 1011 (2017).  We 
have explained that "generally . . . '[c]ourts decline to hear 
moot cases because (a) only factually concrete disputes are 
capable of resolution through the adversary process, (b) it is 
feared that the parties will not adequately represent positions 
in which they no longer have a personal stake, (c) the 
adjudication of hypothetical disputes would encroach on the 
legislative domain, and (d) judicial economy requires that 
insubstantial controversies not be litigated.'"  Lockhart v. 
Attorney Gen., 390 Mass. 780, 782-783 (1984), quoting Wolf v. 
Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 367 Mass. 293, 298 (1975). 
 
Murrell argues that this case is not moot because there is 
still an ongoing dispute between the parties in the District 
8 
 
Court regarding fines under the challenged emergency orders.  
That dispute, however, is a separate matter concerning Murrell's 
ongoing pecuniary obligations, separate from this interlocutory 
appeal.  In this case, Murrell challenged the validity of the 
emergency orders in response to the city's seeking an injunction 
based on them.  The city, on appeal, concedes that the 
injunction, by its terms, expired when the Governor rescinded 
the emergency orders.  Because Murrell no longer is subject 
either to the emergency orders or to the injunction, a ruling 
from this court on the issues that she raises would offer no 
additional relief and would not alter either party's legal 
position.  See Mullholland v. State Racing Comm'n, 295 Mass. 
286, 289 (1936) ("When . . . the situation is such that the 
relief sought is no longer available . . . and a decision by the 
court will not be applicable to existing rights, . . . [t]he 
questions . . . have become moot").  All that is left is for us 
to invest valuable judicial resources in settling a 
"hypothetical dispute[]."  Wolf, 367 Mass. at 298.  Thus, the 
case is moot. 
2.  Discretion to decide the issues.  Despite the "general 
rule" that we will not decide cases that have become moot, 
Norwood Hosp. v. Munoz, 409 Mass. 116, 121 (1991), mootness 
differs from other doctrines of justiciability in that it is "'a 
factor affecting [the court's] discretion, not its power,' to 
9 
 
decide a case."  Styller v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Lynnfield, 
487 Mass. 588, 595 (2021), quoting Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 
397, 403 (1970).  When determining whether to exercise this 
discretion, we consider whether  
"(1) the issue was fully argued on both sides; (2) the 
question was certain, or at least very likely, to arise 
again in similar factual circumstances; (3) . . . appellate 
review could not be obtained before the recurring question 
would again be moot; and (4) most importantly, the issue 
was of public importance." 
 
Ott v. Boston Edison Co., 413 Mass. 680, 683, (1992), citing 
Lockhart, 390 Mass. at 783.  Murrell advances a number of 
additional arguments that appear to urge us to decide the issues 
notwithstanding their mootness.  We address each in turn. 
a.  Resolution of the parallel District Court case.  
Murrell argues that answering the question of Federal preemption 
ultimately might guide the District Court's decision concerning 
fines in the parallel action.  While that may be, this court's 
"long tradition of not unnecessarily deciding constitutional 
questions" counsels against reaching the merits of a case merely 
to aid in resolving a controversy that may not be decided based 
on the constitutional question raised here.5  Lockhart, 390 Mass. 
 
5 As we observed in Wolf, 367 Mass. at 298, deciding 
"hypothetical disputes . . . encroach[es] on the legislative 
domain."  We are cognizant that an unnecessary preemption ruling 
has the same effect of encroaching on the other branches of 
government.  We previously have stated that "[p]reemption . . . 
is not favored, and State laws should be upheld unless a 
conflict with Federal law is clear" (citation omitted).  Sawash 
10 
 
at 784.  Because "[t]his court 'do[es] not decide constitutional 
questions unless they must necessarily be reached,'" such a 
question concerning preemption under the supremacy clause would 
be better addressed on appeal from the District Court judge's 
decision should the judge decide the case on that ground.  
Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Department of Pub. 
Utils. (No. 1), 461 Mass. 166, 172 (2011), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Paasche, 391 Mass. 18, 21 (1984) (court required that 
preliminary question regarding town's statutory authority to 
issue regulation be answered before addressing defendant's 
multiple constitutional claims, including that regulation 
violated supremacy clause). 
 
b.  Likelihood of repetition.  Murrell argues that we 
should decide the issues because, based on the Governor's 
comments at a press conference on May 29, 2021, and his 
reopening plan announced in May 2020, he could reinstate an 
emergency order like the ones challenged here at any time.  
First, Murrell's assertion that the issues are likely to arise 
again is "speculative and insufficient to confer a stake in the 
outcome of this particular appeal."  Commonwealth v. Delmore D., 
 
v. Suburban Welders Supply Co., 407 Mass. 311, 315, 318 (1990) 
(holding that neither Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 
U.S.C. §§ 1801–1813 [1982 & Supp. III 1985], nor Federal 
regulation 49 C.F.R. § 173.315 [1989] preempted plaintiff's tort 
claims). 
11 
 
480 Mass. 1009, 1009 n.2 (2018).  See Bronstein v. Board of 
Registration in Optometry, 403 Mass. 621, 627 (1988) 
("Speculative fear of future litigation . . . does not save a 
case from being moot").  See also Boston Bit Labs, Inc. v. 
Baker, 11 F.4th 3, 11 (1st Cir. 2021) ("even if . . . COVID-19 
flare-ups occur . . . , it is unrealistically speculative that 
Governor Baker would again declare a state of emergency, again 
close businesses, and again put arcades in a less favorable 
reopening phase than casinos"). 
Second, it overlooks the changes in both the factual and 
legal landscape of the COVID-19 pandemic.  The emergency orders 
were issued to address an earlier variant of COVID-19 at a time 
when the State had a limited number of protective measures at 
its disposal.  See World Health Organization, Tracking SARS-CoV-
2 Variants, https://www.who.int/en/activities/tracking-SARS-CoV-
2-variants [https://perma.cc/K4DS-T6W2].  Measures now available 
include multiple types of COVID-19 tests, vaccines, and COVID-19 
treatments that can be administered at home.  See Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, COVID-19 Testing:  What You Need 
to Know, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/symptoms-
testing/testing.html [https://perma.cc/S6DT-9F6P]; Department of 
Public Health, Find a COVID-19 Test, https://www.mass.gov/info-
details/find-a-covid-19-test [https://perma.cc/X8B3-STVC]; 
Department of Public Health, Massachusetts COVID-19 Vaccination 
12 
 
Data and Updates, https://www.mass.gov/info-details 
/massachusetts-covid-19-vaccination-data-and-updates [https: 
//perma.cc/B4XL-44LX]; National Institutes of Health, 
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Treatment Guidelines, at 122 
(updated Apr. 22, 2022), https://files.covid19treatment 
guidelines.nih.gov/guidelines/covid19treatmentguidelines.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H8KD-KMET].  These changes suggest that the 
"factual underpinnings of the dispute have so changed or are 
likely to so change as to make an appellate decision 'a useless 
and inappropriate exercise.'"  Lockhart, 390 Mass. at 784, 
quoting Reilly v. School Comm. of Boston, 362 Mass. 689, 693–695 
(1972). 
When we have found that an issue is likely to arise again 
and exercised our discretion to decide a moot issue, we often 
have been presented with concrete examples of repetition and not 
mere speculation.  For example, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
District Attorney for the Middle Dist., 439 Mass. 374, 378-379 
(2003), we concluded that, even if the issue were moot, the 
plaintiff's entitlement to certain information within the public 
records statute's ten-day deadline for compliance was an issue 
capable of repetition but evading review.  We observed that the 
plaintiff had brought three successive actions against the 
defendants, and in each action the defendants claimed the same 
defense.  Id.  Cf. Wilson v. Commissioner of Transitional 
13 
 
Assistance, 441 Mass. 846, 850 (2004) (holding that even 
"assuming the case [were] moot, . . . [t]he situation [was] 
likely to arise again in similar circumstances" and observing 
that "this is the second fiscal year in which there has been 
litigation challenging the commissioner's authority").  Murrell 
asks us to conclude that issues surrounding the validity of the 
rescinded mandates, which have not applied to anyone since June 
2021, are capable of repetition.  Contrast Gonzalez v. 
Commissioner of Correction, 407 Mass. 448, 450 (1990) (issues 
around inmate drug testing that apply to "any inmate in any 
Department of Correction institution" are capable of 
repetition).  Simply put, with no definitive evidence that these 
issues are capable of repetition, Murrell's "[s]peculative fear 
of future litigation . . . does not save [this] case from being 
moot."  Bronstein, 403 Mass. at 627. 
 
In addition, the United States Supreme Court recently 
indicated that OSHA's authority to issue COVID-19 regulations 
may be more limited than previously thought.  In National Fed'n 
of Indep. Business v.  Department of Labor, Occupational Safety 
& Health Admin., 142 S. Ct. 661, 662-663 (2022), various 
applicants asked the Court to stay, pending judicial review, an 
OSHA emergency temporary standard that ordered employers with 
more than one hundred employees to require their employees to be 
vaccinated against COVID-19, or to take weekly COVID-19 tests 
14 
 
and wear a mask in the workplace.  The Court granted the stay, 
holding that the "[a]pplicants [were] likely to succeed on the 
merits of their claim that the Secretary [of Labor] lacked 
authority to impose the mandate."  Id. at 664-665.  According to 
the Court, OSHA is not precluded from issuing COVID-19 
regulations for the workplace; however, it is limited when such 
regulations "take[] on the character of a general public health 
measure, rather than an 'occupational safety or health 
standard.'"  Id. at 666, quoting 29 U.S.C. § 655(b).  In light 
of this decision, we cannot say with any degree of certainty 
that our understanding of OSHA's authority to issue general 
COVID-19 regulations, and the interrelated issue of preemption, 
would be the same if the Governor were to issue another 
Statewide mandate.  Any new ruling regarding the scope of OHSA's 
authority would "'significantly alter[] the posture' of this 
case" if a factually similar case were to arise again.  
Bronstein, 403 Mass. at 627, quoting United States Dep't of 
Treasury, Bur. of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Galioto, 477 
U.S. 556, 559 (1986). 
 
c.  Likelihood of evading review.  Even if the issues here 
were capable of repetition, we do not think it likely that 
"appellate review could not be obtained before the recurring 
question would again be moot."  Ott, 413 Mass. at 683.  "An 
issue apt to evade review is one which tends to arise only in 
15 
 
circumstances that create a substantial likelihood of mootness 
prior to completion of the appellate process" (emphasis added).  
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Haufler, 377 Mass. 209, 211 
(1979).  Such issues often arise in "evanescent, time-defined 
actions" like ones related to pregnancy, commitment orders, and 
student suspension.  Aquacultural Research Corp. v. Austin, 88 
Mass. App. Ct. 631, 634 (2015), citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 125 (1973) (access to abortion).  See Doe v. Superintendent 
of Sch. of Worcester, 421 Mass. 117, 123 (1995) (student 
suspension); Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 
374 Mass. 271, 274 (1978) (commitment order to mental health 
facility).  So far, questions related to COVID-19 have not fit 
into this category.  Since its emergence in the United States in 
early 2020, it has been consistently unclear how long COVID-19 
will pose a substantial threat to public health, especially in 
light of occasional spikes and dips in infections, lasting 
varying lengths of time.  Thus, it is impossible to posit 
whether the circumstances that might spur a new Statewide mask 
16 
 
mandate, if they ever should arise, would not last long enough 
to enable appellate review of a challenge to such a mandate.6,7 
Conclusion.  Judgment shall enter dismissing the action as 
moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
6 Furthermore, if it were likely that an emergency order 
similar to the ones challenged here were only to remain in place 
for a matter of weeks or months, "[o]ur appellate system has the 
capacity to move rapidly when circumstances warrant prompt 
resolution of an important issue."  Ott, 413 Mass. at 684.  We 
have demonstrated our ability to resolve pressing issues arising 
from the Commonwealth's response to the COVID-19 pandemic.  See 
Desrosiers, 486 Mass. at 371-372. 
 
7 Murrell presses us to envision a cycle of relaxation and 
reimposition of similar Statewide mask mandates by the Governor 
that perpetually evade review, citing the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 
141 S. Ct. 63, 68-69 (2020) (granting emergency injunctive 
relief, preventing New York governor from enforcing COVID-19 
restrictions against religious institutions despite claim that 
change in restrictions rendered case moot).  As the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit highlighted in 
Boston Bit Labs, Inc., 11 F.4th at 11, unlike the orders 
challenged here, the New York governor's order still was in 
effect when the Court reviewed the case.  Id., citing Roman 
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, supra at 68.  Moreover, the record 
in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn demonstrated the New York 
governor's deliberate attempts to evade judicial review by 
"'regularly chang[ing] the classification of particular areas 
without prior notice,' including three times in the seven days 
before the Supreme Court ruled."  Boston Bit Labs, Inc., supra, 
quoting Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, supra at 68 & n.3.  
In effect, the applicants in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn 
"remain[ed] under a constant threat that the area in question 
[would] be reclassified."  Boston Bit Labs, Inc., supra, quoting 
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, supra at 68.