Title: Phillips v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC12-876
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 17, 2016

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-876 
____________ 
 
TERRANCE TYRONE PHILLIPS,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[November 17, 2016] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from two judgments of conviction of 
first-degree murder and two sentences of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, 
§ 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  Terrance Phillips (Phillips), was convicted in Duval County 
of the murders of Mateo Hernandez-Perez and Reynaldo Antunes-Padilla.  The 
jury also convicted Phillips of one count each of armed burglary, attempted armed 
robbery, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery.  Phillips now pursues the direct 
appeal of his convictions and sentences which are subject to automatic review by 
this Court.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm Phillips’s judgments of 
conviction.  However, because we conclude that Phillips’s death sentences are a 
 
 
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disproportionate penalty in this case, we remand this case to the trial court with 
instructions that each of Phillips’s death sentences be reduced to a sentence of life 
imprisonment.  We first set forth the facts of this case, and we then address 
Phillips’s challenges to his convictions.  We conclude by evaluating the 
proportionality of Phillips’s death sentences. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The evidence introduced at trial revealed that on the afternoon of December 
24, 2009, in Jacksonville, Barbara “Cookie” Anders, Shanise Bing, and Tanequa 
“Kiwi” Dwight walked from the Lighthouse Bay Apartments where Anders lived 
to a nearby convenience store.  Around the same time, three men, Aurelio Salgado, 
Manuel Ton, and Mateo Hernandez-Perez drove to the same store to buy beer.  The 
three men also lived at the Lighthouse Bay Apartments and were roommates. 
 
At the store, Dwight asked the men for change for a $5 bill, and Salgado 
gave her five $1 bills.  Dwight also gave them a cell phone number that belonged 
to Anders.  The men eventually returned to their apartment. 
 
After the women left the convenience store, they rode the bus to another area 
of town.  Later, Anders called her boyfriend, Antonio Baker, to come and get them.  
Baker drove to meet Anders, Bing, and Dwight.  Baker was accompanied by 
Phillips, AKA “Man.”  Anders and Bing got into the car with Baker and Phillips, 
and Dwight got into another car driven by Phillips’s brother.    
 
 
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While in the car, Hernandez-Perez called Anders, with whom he wanted to 
have sex.  Because Hernandez-Perez had a limited ability to speak English, 
Salgado spoke with Anders on his behalf.  Salgado told Anders that Hernandez-
Perez wanted to have sex with her and asked her to come over to their apartment, 
unit number E-44 at the Lighthouse Bay Apartments.   
 
After Anders ended the call, she, Bing, Baker, and Phillips discussed 
robbing the men.  They planned that Anders and Bing would enter the apartment 
pretending to want to have sex with the men, and Baker and Phillips would come 
in and rob them.   
 
Anders, Bing, Baker, and Phillips returned to the apartment complex and 
parked near Anders’s building, building F.  Shortly before 6 p.m., Anders and Bing 
walked to building E and up the stairs to apartment E-44.  At the time, Hernandez-
Perez, Ton, and Salgado were in the apartment and had been joined by their 
downstairs neighbor, Reynaldo Antunes-Padilla.  When Anders and Bing entered 
the apartment, Anders talked with Hernandez-Perez about having sex, and 
Hernandez-Perez offered her money to do so.  Anders was dissatisfied with the 
amount of money offered, and the two never reached an agreement.  Anders made 
a phone call, and shortly thereafter, Baker and Phillips entered the apartment 
through the front door.   
 
 
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Phillips, who was wearing a hoodie and carrying a .9 mm firearm, 
immediately approached Hernandez-Perez and placed a gun against his head.  
Hernandez-Perez moved Phillips’s hand away from his head, and a fight ensued, 
with Salgado and Antunes-Padilla trying to help Hernandez-Perez.  In the 
meantime, Ton fled the scene, and Bing left the apartment.  Anders also left the 
apartment, but she hit one of the men on the head with a bottle before doing so.  
Salgado also testified that the unarmed male intruder (Baker) hit him on the head 
with a bottle.  Salgado ran out of the apartment, and according to Salgado, Baker 
followed behind.   
 
Bing, Anders, and Salgado all heard gunshots after they left the apartment.  
Bing was already downstairs when she heard the gunshots.  Anders and Salgado 
both heard the gunshots while running away from the apartment.  Anders, Bing, 
Baker, and Phillips all met at the car and drove away from the apartment complex.  
Phillips, who returned to the car with the gun, explained that he lost his shoe in the 
apartment, and that the gun fired when he dropped it.   
 
Emergency personnel were dispatched to the crime scene shortly after          
6 p.m., where they located gunshot victims Hernandez-Perez and Antunes-Padilla, 
and Salgado, who sustained a head injury.  Hernandez-Perez was shot twice in the 
left leg, and Antunes-Padilla was shot once in the chest.  Hernandez-Perez and 
 
 
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Antunes-Padilla were transported to the hospital but died from their injuries.  
Salgado was treated at the hospital for his head injury.  
The autopsy of Hernandez-Perez revealed that he sustained two gunshot 
wounds, one in the left hip and the other on the left thigh.  The bullet that entered 
the hip area caused a fatal injury to his iliac blood vessel and, traveling from front 
to back, exited through the left buttock.  Hernandez-Perez was shot at close to 
intermediate range, and stippling on his skin indicated that the firearm was two to 
three feet from his body when he was shot.   
The autopsy of Antunes-Padilla revealed that he was shot at close range 
within a few inches and sustained one fatal gunshot wound.  The gunshot wound 
entered his chest and traveled through his right lung, spine, and aorta before it 
exited his body.   
The murder investigation yielded multiple pieces of physical evidence, 
including a cell phone that was recovered from one of the victims.  Information 
retrieved from this phone was linked to Anders.  Days after the murders, Anders 
and Bing were separately interviewed by law enforcement.  Both women admitted 
their involvement in the incident and also indicated that Phillips and Baker were 
involved.  Later, cell phone records demonstrated that during the minutes before 
and after the shootings, Baker, Phillips, and Anders all made or received phone 
calls in close proximity to the apartment complex.   
 
 
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Multiple witnesses identified Phillips as the gunman.  At trial, Anders 
testified that Phillips entered the apartment with a .9 mm firearm and that he placed 
it against Hernandez-Perez’s head.  Bing also testified that Phillips was armed 
when he entered the apartment.  Salgado testified that the larger of the two men 
was armed and placed a gun against Hernandez-Perez’s head upon entering the 
apartment.  The smaller man was unarmed.1  Anders testified that after the group 
returned to the car, Phillips was still in possession of the gun.  Anders and Bing 
testified that Phillips explained that he lost his shoe in the apartment, and that his 
gun fired in the apartment when he dropped it. 
Consistent with the three gunshots sustained by the victims, three shell 
casings were recovered from the crime scene.  Additionally, bullets were recovered 
from the crime scene and at the hospital after the victims were transported there.  
An analysis of the casings and the bullets revealed that they were consistent with 
having been fired from a .9 mm Luger Hi-Point firearm.   
DNA analysis was conducted on a Nike tennis shoe that was retrieved from 
the crime scene.  The DNA analysis revealed that Phillips’s profile matched or was 
included at all thirteen markers of the DNA mixture found on the shoe, excluding 
99.99 percent of Caucasians, African-Americans, and Southeastern Hispanics.     
                                          
 
 
1.  At the time, Phillips was 5’8” tall and weighed 215 pounds.  Baker was 
5’6” tall and weighed 150 pounds. 
 
 
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Verdict and Penalty Phase 
Phillips was tried by jury for two counts of first-degree murder, and one 
count each of armed burglary, attempted armed robbery, and conspiracy to commit 
armed robbery.  The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts.  On a special 
verdict form, the jury found as to each murder that Phillips was guilty of both 
premeditated murder and felony murder.  The jury also found that Phillips 
committed each murder while engaged in the commission or attempted 
commission of a burglary and/or robbery.    
During the penalty phase, the State presented victim impact testimony from 
relatives of the victims.  The State also presented the testimony of the Florida 
Department of Corrections’s records custodian, who testified regarding the terms 
of a felony probation sentence that Phillips began serving less than two months 
before the murders for illegal possession of a controlled substance.  Prior to the 
custodian’s testimony, the court read a stipulation entered into by the State and the 
defense that Phillips was on felony probation at the time of the subject crimes.   
At the beginning of the defense’s penalty phase case, the court also read a 
stipulation entered into by the State and the defense that Phillips was eighteen 
years old at the time of the subject crimes.  The defense then presented the 
testimony of several of Phillips’s family members and the testimony of a mental 
health expert, Dr. Michael D’Errico.   
 
 
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Dr. D’Errico testified that he conducted an evaluation of Phillips that 
included administering the WAIS-IV standardized intelligence test, on which 
Phillips scored a 76.  Dr. D’Errico also reviewed school records, which disclosed 
Phillips’s involvement in special education classes for specific learning disabilities 
from the first grade until he dropped out of school in the ninth grade.  The records 
also indicated that Phillips participated in speech therapy for a speech impediment 
between grades one and four.   
Dr. D’Errico testified at length regarding Phillips’s intellectual capacity.  He 
testified that Phillips’s IQ score of 76 placed him in the fifth percentile, meaning 
that ninety-five percent of those tested would score higher than Phillips.  
Dr. D’Errico characterized Phillips as having significantly subaverage intelligence 
that placed him in the borderline range of intellectual functioning.  Dr. D’Errico 
observed that the results of the evaluation and testing he conducted were consistent 
with psychometric intelligence testing performed on Phillips while he was in grade 
school.   
Dr. D’Errico also testified that individuals like Phillips who function within 
the borderline range “are typically easily influenced by their peers.”  He described 
people who are enrolled in special education programs as just wanting to be 
normal.  Thus, he opined, if Phillips’s peer group engaged in criminal activity, he 
would be susceptible to participating because he wanted to fit in.  Moreover, 
 
 
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Dr. D’Errico concluded that in addition to Phillips’s limited intellectual 
functioning, Phillips’s speech impediment and his age of eighteen at the time of the 
murders would make him more vulnerable to wanting to fit in with his peers. 
Family members testified that Phillips had a speech impediment since he 
was a baby.  He spoke slowly, had to think about his words before speaking, and 
struggled to pronounce words.  He often had to repeat himself so that others would 
understand what he was saying.   
Phillips’s family described him as helpful, respectful, kindhearted, and 
obedient.  He had a good attitude and respected authority.  Phillips went to church 
and played football on the church football team where he was a team captain.  
Phillips’s cousin testified that Phillips tried to encourage him to do the right thing 
and avoid getting into trouble.        
Phillips’s father was shot and killed when he was very young.  Family 
members observed him as being quiet and withdrawn afterwards.  Phillips 
struggled with the loss of his father and did not receive counseling.  As Phillips 
grew, there were allegations that he was not getting proper supervision.  In 2002, 
Phillips burned himself on the face with a hot iron because he wanted to see if it 
was hot.  This incident led to an investigation of his living environment.  Phillips’s 
godfather was also concerned about the level of supervision Phillips was getting, 
 
 
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and this concern led him to contact the authorities.  When Phillips was a teenager, 
he spent a significant amount of time in a high crime area.   
Sentencing 
At the conclusion of the penalty phase, by a vote of eight to four, the jury 
returned recommendations that Phillips be sentenced to death for each murder.  
The court proceeded to sentencing after conducting a Spencer2 hearing which 
consisted of additional argument.  In its sentencing order, the trial court found the 
following aggravating circumstances as to each murder: (1) prior violent felony 
(based on the contemporaneous murder of the other victim)—great weight;         
(2) capital felony committed while defendant on felony probation (based on a 
conviction for drug possession)—great weight; and (3) capital felony committed 
during the commission of a robbery or burglary—great weight.   
 
The trial court found one statutory mitigating circumstance: age of the 
defendant (eighteen years) at the time of the crime—considerable weight.  The trial 
court also found the following nonstatutory mitigating circumstances:                  
(1) defendant has a borderline IQ (76), a severe speech impediment, and a learning 
disability—moderate weight as to IQ and learning disability and slight weight as to 
the speech impediment; (2) defendant is easily influenced by others—slight 
                                          
 
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).   
 
 
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weight; (3) defendant was impacted by the murder of his father—little weight; (4) 
defendant was a loving and caring family member, steadfast friend, and good 
neighbor—some weight as to each characteristic; (5) defendant was a good 
sportsman—slight weight; (6) defendant grew up in a neighborhood with a high 
crime rate—some weight; (7) defendant was neglected/abused as a child and did 
not receive the professional mental help he needed—some weight as to each; (8) 
defendant was/is reverent and God-fearing—slight weight; and (9) defendant was 
respectful during court proceedings—slight weight.   
 
The trial court also rejected the following mitigation as not proven: the 
defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of 
another person.  Phillips timely appealed his convictions and sentences. 
ANALYSIS 
 
In this appeal, Phillips raises multiple issues challenging his convictions for 
first-degree murder and his sentences of death: (1) whether Phillips’s death 
sentences are disproportionate; (2) whether improper victim impact evidence was 
introduced during the penalty phase; (3) whether sufficient evidence exists to 
support the convictions for first-degree premeditated murder; (4) whether the State 
failed to disclose material and exculpatory evidence and whether the State 
permitted the introduction of false or misleading evidence (Brady/Giglio claims); 
(5) whether Phillips’s death sentences violate the Sixth Amendment; and 
 
 
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(6) whether Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014), requires that Phillips be 
allowed to demonstrate that he is intellectually disabled.   
We first turn to Phillips’s guilt phase challenges.  Because we conclude that 
Phillips’s Brady and Giglio claims are not properly before this Court, we deny 
them without prejudice to be raised in a motion for postconviction relief.  See 
Duest v. State, 855 So. 2d 33, 39-40 (Fla. 2003).  Consequently, as to the guilt 
phase, we address only the sufficiency of the evidence.  We then turn to the penalty 
phase, where, in light of our conclusion that Phillips’s death sentences are 
disproportionate, we address only Phillips’s proportionality claim.  
Guilt Phase 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Phillips argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s 
verdicts convicting him of first-degree premeditated murder.  Although he does not 
expressly challenge his felony murder convictions on sufficiency grounds, this 
Court must independently evaluate each death case for sufficiency of the evidence 
relied upon to convict the defendant.  See Caylor v. State, 78 So. 3d 482, 500 (Fla. 
2011).  “In appeals where the death penalty has been imposed, this Court 
independently reviews the record to confirm that the jury’s verdict is supported by 
competent, substantial evidence.”  Davis v. State, 2 So. 3d 952, 966-67 (Fla. 2008). 
“In conducting this review, [this Court] view[s] the evidence in the light most 
 
 
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favorable to the State to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found 
the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Rodgers v. 
State, 948 So. 2d 655, 674 (Fla. 2006) (citing Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 
(Fla. 2001)).  As we explain, competent, substantial evidence supports his 
convictions for premeditated and felony murder.  We first turn to Phillips’s 
conviction for first-degree premeditated murder.   
Premeditated Murder 
“Premeditation is the essential element which distinguishes first-degree 
murder from second-degree murder.”  Coolen v. State, 696 So. 2d 738, 741 (Fla. 
1997) (citing Wilson v. State, 493 So. 2d 1019, 1021 (Fla. 1986)).  The law does 
not require that the premeditation be formed at a specific time prior to the killing.  
Rather, “[p]remeditation is defined as more than a mere intent to kill; it is a fully 
formed conscious purpose to kill.  This purpose to kill may be formed a moment 
before the act but must also exist for a sufficient length of time to permit reflection 
as to the nature of the act to be committed and the probable result of that act.”  
Bigham v. State, 995 So. 2d 207, 212 (Fla. 2008) (citations omitted).  The State 
relied on circumstantial evidence to prove premeditation.  We have explained:    
Premeditation, like other factual circumstances, may be 
established by circumstantial evidence.  Evidence from which 
premeditation may be inferred includes such matters as the nature of 
the weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate provocation, 
previous difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the 
homicide was committed and the nature and manner of the wounds 
 
 
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inflicted.  It must exist for such time before the homicide as will 
enable the accused to be conscious of the nature of the deed he is 
about to commit and the probable result to flow from it in so far as the 
life of his victim is concerned.   
 
Larry v. State, 104 So. 2d 352, 354 (Fla. 1958).   
“Where the evidence is purely circumstantial, there must be sufficient 
evidence establishing each element of the charged offense which also excludes the 
defendant’s reasonable hypothesis of innocence.”  Kocaker v. State, 119 So. 3d 
1214, 1224 (Fla. 2013).  Phillips’s hypothesis of innocence is that the victims were 
accidentally shot during the brawl.  He also told his codefendants upon returning to 
the car after the shootings that the gun fired when he dropped it on the ground.   
 
The State relied on the following circumstantial evidence of premeditation: 
(1) Phillips brought a gun to the crime scene; (2) Phillips was the only one with a 
gun; (3) Phillips placed the gun against Hernandez-Perez’s head upon entering the 
apartment; (4) before the victims were shot, Phillips’s codefendants left the 
apartment; and (5) after the codefendants left, Hernandez-Perez was shot twice in 
the leg, and Antunes-Padilla was shot once in the chest. 
Phillips maintains that this evidence does not support premeditation.  Rather, 
he argues that the shootings were the haphazard result of a struggle between 
Phillips and the victims.  However, Phillips’s hypothesis of innocence, that the 
shootings were accidental, is inconsistent with three gunshots hitting two separate 
targets.  Three shell casings were recovered at the crime scene, and the victims 
 
 
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sustained a total of three gunshot wounds.  Thus, despite the melee that occurred in 
the apartment, all of the bullets fired from the gun entered the victims’ bodies.  
Given these facts, we conclude that there is competent, substantial evidence of 
premeditation.    
Felony Murder 
 
Moreover, competent, substantial evidence supports Phillips’s conviction for 
felony murder.  The murders occurred during the course of a planned robbery, 
during which Phillips possessed the gun and was seen placing it against the head of 
victim Hernandez-Perez.  Phillips was the only one of the defendants who 
remained in the apartment at the time of the shooting, and the gun was still in his 
possession when he returned to the car to meet his companions.  Anders testified 
that Phillips had a .9 mm weapon, and the firearms expert testified that the 
projectiles and the shell casings retrieved were all consistent with having been 
fired from a .9 mm Luger firearm and were all fired from the same weapon.  
Moreover, the State introduced substantial DNA evidence linking Phillips to a shoe 
that was recovered from the crime scene, and Phillips told Anders and Bing 
moments after the murders that he lost his shoe in the apartment.  Thus, competent, 
substantial evidence supports the felony murder conviction.        
 
 
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Penalty Phase 
As we turn to the penalty phase, we address only Phillips’s proportionality 
claim, as it is dispositive.  “In performing a proportionality review, a reviewing 
court must never lose sight of the fact that the death penalty has long been reserved 
for only the most aggravated and least mitigated of first-degree murders.”  Urbin v. 
State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416 (Fla. 1998) (citing State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 
1973)).  In this case, the trial court found three aggravating circumstances: (1) prior 
violent felony based on the contemporaneous murder of the other victim;             
(2) capital felony committed while defendant was on felony probation; and 
(3) capital felony committed during the commission of a robbery or burglary.  The 
court found as a statutory mitigating circumstance that Phillips was eighteen years 
old at the time of the crimes.  The court also found multiple nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances.  Notably, this nonstatutory mitigation included Phillips’s 
borderline IQ, learning disability, and childhood neglect.   
“Because death is a unique punishment, it is necessary in each case to 
engage in a thoughtful, deliberate proportionality review to consider the totality of 
circumstances in a case, and to compare it with other capital cases.  It is not a 
comparison between the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.”  
Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990) (citation omitted).  This Court’s 
proportionality review involves “a comprehensive analysis in order to determine 
 
 
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whether the crime falls within the category of both the most aggravated and the 
least mitigated of murders, thereby assuring uniformity in the application of the 
sentence.”  Offord v. State, 959 So. 2d 187, 191 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Anderson v. 
State, 841 So. 2d 390, 407-08 (Fla. 2003)).  “This entails ‘a qualitative review . . . 
of the underlying basis for each aggravator and mitigator rather than a quantitative 
analysis.’ ”  Id. (quoting Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 416).  Our qualitative review reveals 
that this case is not among the most aggravated and the least mitigated of first-
degree murder cases because the totality of the circumstances includes substantial 
mitigation that ultimately renders the death penalty a disproportionate punishment.   
During the penalty phase, Dr. D’Errico testified that Phillips, who was 
eighteen years old at the time of the murders, has significantly subaverage 
intelligence.  During his evaluation of Phillips, Dr. D’Errico administered a 
standardized IQ test, on which Phillips scored a 76.  Phillips’s score falls within 
the borderline range of intellectual functioning and places him in the bottom 5% of 
the population.  While in school, Phillips received special services to address a 
learning disability, and he received therapy for a lifelong speech impediment that 
affected his ability to communicate with others.  Dr. D’Errico testified that as a 
result of Phillips’s intellectual limitations, his behavior would be guided by his 
desire to fit in and be normal, and Phillips would be easily influenced by his peers. 
 
 
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We recognize that the statutory mitigating circumstance—Phillips’s age of 
eighteen at the time of the murders—is an extremely significant mitigator.  Indeed, 
eighteen years of age is the bare minimum age at which a person convicted of first-
degree murder can be eligible for the death penalty.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005).   
Further, Phillips functioned with a significantly subaverage intelligence that 
rendered him especially susceptible to the influence of others.  Thus, not only was 
Phillips subject to the vulnerability of his youth, this vulnerability was 
compounded by the unrebutted evidence of his borderline IQ and significantly 
subaverage intelligence.  Phillips’s mental health mitigation, coupled with the fact 
that he was eighteen at the time of the murders, constitutes extremely compelling 
mitigation.  Given the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the 
homicides at issue here are not among the least mitigated of first-degree murders. 
The facts of this case closely parallel those of Cooper v. State, 739 So. 2d 82 
(Fla. 1999), a case where we concluded that the death penalty was a 
disproportionate punishment despite the presence of the prior violent felony 
aggravator.  In Cooper, the eighteen-year-old defendant was convicted of first-
degree murder, armed robbery with a firearm, and armed burglary with a firearm.  
Id. at 83.  The jury recommended by a vote of eight to four that Cooper be 
sentenced to death, and the trial court imposed a death sentence following a finding 
 
 
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of three aggravating circumstances: (1) the defendant had committed a prior capital 
or violent felony; (2) the murder was committed during a robbery and for 
pecuniary gain; and (3) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP).  
Id. at 85.  As statutory mitigation, the trial court found that: (1) the defendant had 
no significant history of prior criminal activity; and (2) the defendant was eighteen 
years old at the time of the crime.  Id. at 84 n.5.  The court found as nonstatutory 
mitigation that Cooper had low intelligence and that he had an abusive childhood.  
Id. at 85.  Cooper was characterized by a mental health expert as “borderline 
retarded.”  Id. at 84.  On direct appeal, emphasizing the substantial mitigation 
presented, this Court concluded that Cooper’s death sentence was disproportionate 
and reduced Cooper’s death sentence to a sentence of life imprisonment. 
Cooper is strikingly similar to the present case in several key respects: 
(1) Cooper was eighteen years old at the time of the murder; (2) the murder was 
also committed during the course of a robbery; (3) Cooper’s prior violent felony 
aggravator was also based on a murder conviction (not a contemporaneous one, but 
one committed days after the murder at issue); and (4) one of Cooper’s mental 
health experts testified that he had low intellectual functioning.  Id. 
In light of these similarities, Cooper informs our conclusion that Phillips’s 
death sentences are disproportionate.  Like defendant Cooper, Phillips was 
eighteen years old at the time of the murders, and he possessed limited intellectual 
 
 
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functioning.  Additionally, the prior violent felony and murder during the course of 
a robbery or burglary aggravators applied in both cases.  However, Phillips’s case 
is actually less aggravated than Cooper.  In Cooper, the third aggravator was CCP, 
which this Court has repeatedly acknowledged as one of the weightiest 
aggravators.  In contrast, the third aggravator in Phillips’s case was that he was on 
felony probation at the time of the murders.  Less than two months prior to the 
murders, Phillips was placed on felony probation; however, he was sentenced to 
probation for drug possession.  Thus, in light of Cooper, we conclude that the death 
penalty is a disproportionate punishment.  Given the totality of the circumstances, 
sentences of life imprisonment are appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
 
We do not take lightly the tragic loss of two lives as a result of Phillips’s 
actions.  The State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Phillips is guilty of first-
degree murder; thus, he must be held accountable.  However, while we affirm 
Phillips’s convictions, because we conclude that the murders in this case are not 
among the most aggravated and least mitigated, the death penalty is a 
disproportionate punishment.  Therefore, we remand this case to the trial court 
with instructions that the court impose life sentences for each of Phillips’s 
convictions for first-degree murder. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
 
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LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result. 
CANADY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
CANADY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
I concur in the affirmance of Phillips’s two first-degree murder convictions. 
I dissent, however, from the majority’s conclusion that Phillips’s death sentences 
are a disproportionate penalty in this case.  I would instead conclude that this 
case—involving two murders by a defendant on probation—is among the most 
aggravated and least mitigated of first-degree murder cases. 
The majority primarily relies on Cooper v. State, 739 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1999), 
to support its conclusion that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment in 
this case.  See majority op. at 18-20.  But Cooper is distinguishable.  The Court in 
Cooper recognized that the case fell within the category of the “most aggravating” 
murders, but concluded that the death sentence was disproportionate because the 
case did not fall in the category of “the least mitigated of murders.”  See Cooper, 
739 So. 2d at 85-86.  Admittedly, there are some similarities between the 
mitigation in Cooper and the mitigation presented by Phillips.  But there are also 
striking differences—differences establishing that Cooper involved significantly 
greater mitigation.  The defendant in Cooper established that he suffered from 
 
 
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“brain damage” and “mental illness (i.e., paranoid schizophrenia).”  Id. at 86.  
Phillips did not establish similar mitigation.  Cooper presented evidence of “brutal” 
mistreatment during his childhood, including being “frequently” threatened with a 
gun and “whipped and beat[en]” by his father.  Id. at 84, 86.  In contrast, Phillips 
simply established “childhood neglect.”  Majority op. at 16.  I would conclude that 
the factors of brain damage, mental illness, and brutal mistreatment during 
childhood—which are absent in Phillips’s case—were sufficient to place Cooper’s 
case outside the category of “least mitigated.”  The mitigation in Phillips’s case is 
similar to other cases in which we have found death sentences to be proportionate.  
See, e.g., Baker v. State, 71 So. 3d 802 (Fla. 2011); Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d 277 
(Fla. 2009); Davis v. State, 2 So. 3d 952 (Fla. 2008). 
I would also conclude that Phillips is not entitled to relief under Hurst v. 
Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).  The existence of the prior violent felony 
aggravator was established by the contemporaneous murder convictions.  The 
existence of the commission of a robbery or burglary aggravator was established 
by the armed robbery conviction and the jury’s unanimous finding that Phillips 
“committed each murder while engaged in the commission or attempted 
commission of a burglary and/or robbery.”  Majority op. at 7.  The existence of the 
felony probation aggravator was conceded by Phillips who entered a stipulation 
“that Phillips was on felony probation at the time of the subject crimes.”  Majority 
 
 
- 23 - 
op. at 7.  So the requirement of Hurst v. Florida that the jury find an aggravator 
was satisfied.  See Hurst v. State, No. SC12-1947, 2016 WL 6036978 (Fla. Oct. 
14, 2016) (Canady, J., dissenting). 
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
Mark Hulsey, III, Judge - Case No. 162010CF000908AXXXMA 
 
Martin J. McClain of McClain & McDermott, P.A., Wilton Manors, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Berdene Bevione Beckles, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee