Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Jonathan C. Lewis
Citation: 2002 WI 115
Docket Number: 2002AP000870-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: October 2, 2002

2002 WI 115 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-0870-D 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Jonathan C. Lewis, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
Complainant, 
 
v. 
Jonathan C. Lewis,  
 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST LEWIS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
October 2, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
2002 WI 115 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-0870-D  
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Jonathan C. Lewis, Attorney at  
Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Jonathan C. Lewis,  
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
OCT 2, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the stipulation filed by 
Attorney Jonathan C. Lewis and the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR) pursuant to SCR 22.121 setting forth findings of fact and 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.12 provides:  Stipulation.  
(1) The director may file with the complaint a 
stipulation of the director and the respondent to the 
facts, conclusions of law regarding misconduct, and 
discipline to be imposed.   The supreme court may 
consider the complaint and stipulation without the 
appointment of a referee.  
No. 
02-0870-D   
 
2 
 
conclusions of law 
regarding Attorney 
Lewis' 
professional 
misconduct in connection with his representation of two parties 
with conflicting interests.  Attorney Lewis and the OLR 
stipulated to a 60-day suspension of Attorney Lewis' license to 
practice law in Wisconsin.   
¶2 
We approve the stipulation and adopt the stipulated 
facts and conclusions of law.   We agree that Attorney Lewis' 
misconduct warrants the suspension of his license to practice 
law.  We accept the parties' stipulation that 60 days is 
appropriate discipline for this offense.   
¶3 
Attorney Lewis has no previous disciplinary history.  
He is a Minnesota lawyer.  He was admitted to practice in 
Wisconsin in December 1996.  His license to practice law in 
Wisconsin has been under administrative suspension since June 8, 
1999, for non-compliance with CLE requirements.  The parties 
agree that the Wisconsin disciplinary rules apply in this 
matter. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) If the supreme court approves a stipulation, 
it shall adopt the stipulated facts and conclusions of 
law and impose the stipulated discipline.  
(3) If the supreme court rejects the stipulation, 
a referee shall be appointed and the matter shall 
proceed as a complaint filed without a stipulation.  
(4) A stipulation rejected by the supreme court 
has no evidentiary value and is without prejudice to 
the respondent's defense of the proceeding or the 
prosecution of the complaint. 
All subsequent references will be to the current version of 
the supreme court rules unless otherwise noted.   
No. 
02-0870-D   
 
3 
 
¶4 
The 
current 
disciplinary 
proceeding 
stems 
from 
Attorney Lewis' representation of two parties to a complicated 
business 
transaction 
where 
the 
parties 
had 
conflicting 
interests.   
¶5 
The 
facts 
regarding 
the 
underlying 
business 
relationships and transactions, as derived from the parties' 
stipulation, are a necessary backdrop to assessing Attorney 
Lewis' actions.  In 1993 John Strum, a Wisconsin resident, 
incorporated a company called Katusha for the purpose of 
conducting trade deals with a Russian company called SKIF, which 
was owned by a Russian businessman named Vladimir Zhirkov.  
Strum and Zhirkov were acquaintances.   
¶6 
In 1995 James Stephenson and Neale Caflisch entered 
into a contract to purchase all the shares of Katusha (the "Sale 
Agreement").  The Katusha shareholders, who consisted of Strum 
and nine other individuals, received promissory notes totaling 
$200,000, which were to be paid at two future dates.   
¶7 
For purposes of this disciplinary opinion it is 
sufficient to state that the Katusha sale basically meant that 
Stephenson and Caflisch acquired the rights to the business 
relationship with Zhirkov and SKIF.  The Sale Agreement provided 
that Strum would incorporate a new business entity (Katusha II), 
which would assume all the pre-existing contracts with SKIF.  
However, Katusha II was never legally incorporated because Strum 
never paid the filing fee.  Strum did open bank accounts for 
Katusha II and otherwise proceeded as though the new company was 
No. 
02-0870-D   
 
4 
 
a legal entity.  He also continued to consult with the new 
owners of Katusha, but their relationship quickly deteriorated. 
¶8 
It appears that the difficulties giving rise to 
Attorney Lewis' involvement in this matter began when a series 
of sugar deals went wrong, badly straining the relationship 
between the new owners of Katusha and Zhirkov.  The new owners 
believed Strum was actively undermining their relationship with 
Zhirkov.  In addition, Katusha received demand letters for debts 
that allegedly should have been assumed by Katusha II. 
¶9 
Ultimately, the new owners of Katusha refused to pay 
the promissory notes held by Katusha's original shareholders. 
They stated that they were rescinding their purchase of Katusha, 
alleging that the former shareholders had breached the Sale 
Agreement.  About the same time, SKIF/Zhirkov transferred 
$900,000 to an account where it was to be held in trust pending 
a sugar shipment by Katusha to SKIF.  A complex series of 
transactions ensued.  Again, for purposes of this opinion it is 
sufficient to state that the sugar was never delivered to SKIF 
and the $900,000 was deposited into an account located in the 
British Virgin Islands, allegedly owned by a corporation with 
ties to Katusha's new owners. 
¶10 At this point, Strum approached Attorney Lewis and 
asked Attorney Lewis to represent him in an action against 
Stephenson and Caflisch regarding their rescission of the Sale 
Agreement and their failure to pay the promissory notes. 
¶11 Shortly thereafter, at Strum's suggestion, Attorney 
Lewis also agreed to represent Zhirkov and SKIF in an action to 
No. 
02-0870-D   
 
5 
 
try to recover the $900,000.  Herein lies the crux of the 
disciplinary proceeding now before this court.   
¶12 At no time did Attorney Lewis obtain written consent 
from either Zhirkov or Strum regarding the potential or actual 
conflict relating to his representation of both parties.  In his 
capacity as Zhirkov's and SKIF's attorney, Attorney Lewis 
pursued settlement negotiations for Zhirkov.  However, it is 
undisputed that one of the provisions in a proposed settlement 
agreement drafted by Attorney Lewis would have substantially 
benefited Attorney Lewis' other client, Strum.  Attorney Lewis 
also drafted a complaint on behalf of Zhirkov that named 
Katusha, 
Stephenson, 
Caflisch, 
and 
their 
associates, 
as 
defendants.  According to the OLR complaint filed in this 
matter, Attorney Lewis led Zhirkov to believe he had filed the 
complaint when, in fact, it was not filed. 
¶13 Eventually, the nine other shareholders of Katusha 
filed a complaint against Stephenson and Caflisch.  Stephenson 
and Caflisch responded with several counterclaims, including a 
claim that Strum had conspired to damage them by interfering in 
the contract between Katusha and SKIF.  
¶14 In his capacity as Strum's attorney, Attorney Lewis 
filed an Answer and Counterclaim alleging that Stephenson and 
Caflisch owed Strum money for the unpaid promissory notes.  
Lewis also represented Strum at his deposition, where opposing 
counsel twice commented that a conflict of interest existed with 
respect to Lewis' representation of both Zhirkov/SKIF and Strum.   
No. 
02-0870-D   
 
6 
 
¶15 As the litigation involving Strum proceeded, Attorney 
Lewis continued to represent SKIF and Zhirkov in settlement 
negotiations, despite the fact that it was clear that Strum 
would be a potential defendant in any litigation filed by 
Zhirkov/SKIF against Katusha and Katusha II. 
¶16 In addition, both matters involved Stephenson and 
Caflisch, such that obtaining damages on behalf of one client 
would mean less money available for the other client to collect. 
¶17 On March 25, 2002, the OLR filed a complaint against 
Attorney Lewis, alleging five counts of attorney misconduct 
relating to Attorney Lewis' representation of the two parties.  
Specifically, OLR alleged that: 
(1) by simultaneously representing both Strum and 
Zhirkov 
in 
related 
representations 
where 
his 
representation of one client was materially limited by 
his 
representation of 
the other 
client, 
[Lewis] 
violated SCR 20:1.7(b);2  
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.7(b) provides:  
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation 
of that 
client 
may be 
materially 
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another 
client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own 
interests, unless: 
(1) the 
lawyer 
reasonably 
believes 
the 
representation will not be adversely affected; and 
(2) the 
client 
consents 
in 
writing 
after 
consultation.  When representation of multiple clients 
in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation 
shall include explanation of the implications of the 
common representation and the advantages and risks 
involved. 
No. 
02-0870-D   
 
7 
 
(2) by failing to file a lawsuit and pursue 
litigation on behalf of SKIF, [Lewis] failed to act 
with 
reasonable 
diligence 
and 
promptness 
in 
representing a client, in violation of SCR 20:1.3;3  
(3) by failing to keep Zhirkov or other SKIF 
representatives reasonably informed about the status 
of the representation, and by failing to promptly 
comply with the client's reasonable requests for 
information, [Lewis] violated SCR 20:1.4(a);4  
(4) by leading Zhirkov to believe that he had 
filed an action on SKIF's behalf when he had never 
filed the complaint that Zhirkov signed, [Lewis] 
engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c);5 
and  
(5) by failing to provide a written response to 
this 
grievance . . . [Lewis] 
acted 
contrary 
to 
[former] SCR 22.07(2) and [former] SCR 21.03(4);6 and, 
                                                 
3 SCR 20:1.3 provides: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
4 SCR 20:1.4(a) provides: "A lawyer shall keep a client 
reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly 
comply with reasonable requests for information." 
5 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides: "It is professional misconduct for 
a lawyer to: (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
6 Former SCR 22.07(2) provided: 
(2) During the course of an investigation, the 
administrator or a committee may notify the respondent 
of the subject being investigated. The respondent 
shall 
fully 
and 
fairly 
disclose 
all 
facts 
and 
circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct or 
medical incapacity within 20 days of being served by 
ordinary mail a request for response to a grievance. 
The administrator in his or her discretion may allow 
additional 
time 
to 
respond. 
Failure 
to 
provide 
information or misrepresentation in a disclosure is 
misconduct. The administrator or committee may make a 
further investigation before making a recommendation 
to the board.  
No. 
02-0870-D   
 
8 
 
by failing to respond to . . . [OLR's subsequent] 
request for additional information, and by failing to 
provide 
billing 
statements . . . [Lewis] 
has 
violated SCR 22.03(6) . . . .7   
¶18 In April 2002 the OLR and Attorney Lewis executed a 
stipulation pursuant to SCR 22.12.  In addition to stipulating 
to the facts as set forth above, the parties stipulated to 
discipline in the form of a 60-day suspension of Attorney Lewis' 
license to practice law in Wisconsin.  The OLR is not seeking 
imposition of costs in this matter. 
¶19 We have reviewed this matter and now adopt the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in the 
parties' stipulation.  We agree that Attorney Lewis' conduct, as 
set forth in the stipulation and in the OLR complaint, reflects 
a serious breach of professional conduct and warrants suspension 
of Attorney Lewis' license to practice law.  We accept the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Former SCR 21.03(4) provided: "(4) Every attorney shall 
cooperate 
with 
the 
board 
and 
the 
administrator 
in 
the 
investigation, prosecution and disposition of grievances and 
complaints filed with or by the board or administrator." 
7 SCR 
22.03(6) 
provides: 
"In 
the 
course 
of 
the 
investigation, 
the 
respondent's wilful 
failure 
to provide 
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 
in the grievance."   
Initially, Attorney Lewis failed to file a written response 
to SKIF's grievance.  He also failed to respond to OLR's second 
request for a response to the grievance.  After a third request 
from OLR, Attorney Lewis did provide a written response but 
failed to respond to a request for additional information in a 
timely manner.  He also failed to provide OLR with requested 
billing information.  These actions gave rise to the fifth count 
against Lewis. 
No. 
02-0870-D   
 
9 
 
parties' conclusion that a 60-day suspension of his license is 
appropriate discipline for his professional misconduct. 
¶20 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Jonathan C. Lewis to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 60 days, 
effective the date of this order.  The OLR indicates it is not 
seeking imposition of costs in this matter. 
¶21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jonathan C. Lewis comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a 
person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
No. 
02-0870-D   
 
 
 
1