Title: People v. Ehlert
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 95311
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: May 20, 2004

Docket No. 95311-Agenda 15-September 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 							
ELIZABETH EHLERT, Appellee.
Opinion Filed May 20, 2004.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a bench trial, the circuit court of Cook County convicted
defendant, Elizabeth Ehlert, of the first degree murder of her newborn
child (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)), and sentenced her to 30
years in prison. The appellate court reversed, finding the evidence
insufficient to prove the child was born alive. 335 Ill. App. 3d 467. We
granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). For
the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	On August 21, 1990, defendant gave birth in her bedroom, in the
home she shared with her two sons, her father, and her fiancé, Steven
King. Two days later employees of the Salt Creek Park District
discovered the baby's corpse in a nearby lake. A creek that ran behind
defendant's house fed into the lake. Defendant's conviction for murder
was reversed on appeal because the prosecution presented irrelevant and
highly prejudicial evidence at defendant's jury trial. People v. Ehlert, 274
Ill. App. 3d 1026 (1995).
	On retrial, the prosecution presented several witnesses who testified
that between April and mid-August 1990, defendant repeatedly told them
she was not pregnant. She told the witnesses that she had a cancerous
tumor and she had seen several doctors about it. 
	King, who first met defendant in January 1990, testified that he
moved in with her shortly thereafter. In April 1990, King noticed that
defendant was gaining weight. Defendant told King that she had a growth
or a cyst for which she had seen a doctor. In May 1990, defendant told
King that she was bleeding and had received treatment from a doctor.
They also discussed the need for a dilation and curettage. Defendant twice
scheduled the procedure but was not able to have the surgery done. On
July 18, defendant told King that she had ovarian cancer. Later in July,
defendant told King that she had seen another doctor, and, in that
doctor's opinion, the tumors she had were not cancerous. Appointments
to remove the tumors were cancelled because defendant told King she
was bleeding. Subsequently, on August 17, defendant called King at
work. She was hysterical. When King came home, defendant told King
that tests at the doctor's office showed she was actually six to eight weeks
pregnant but the fetus was dead. She also told King that the doctor gave
her a shot to induce an abortion within 48 hours. 
Around 3 a.m. on August 21, 1990, defendant woke King up and
told him she was in labor. King got out of bed. A few minutes later,
defendant began screaming in pain. Rather than remain at her side and
provide assistance, King left the bedroom because he did not want to see
the miscarriage or the fetus. He did not turn the light on in the bedroom or
the hallway. He did not press the panic alarm buttons on the security
system in the hallway, which could have brought assistance from the police
or paramedics. King further testified that he was hysterical, crying,
frightened. He began pacing the hallway, living room and kitchen, and
ventured into the basement. Twenty to thirty minutes elapsed. King then
told defendant he was calling the paramedics. Defendant told King that her
labor was almost over and asked him to get a plastic bag. He got a brown
and green plastic bag from the cabinet under the kitchen sink. When he
was 15 to 20 steps from the bedroom, he heard a single cry, lasting about
two seconds. He took a few more steps down the hallway and asked
defendant about the noise. Defendant replied he must have heard the
family dog, which was in the bedroom. King did not question defendant
further. Instead, without entering the bedroom, King reached in with the
bag and, from the bed, defendant reached out and took the bag. 
King testified that he next went to the living room area because he
was not doing well emotionally. He did not hear any cries, sounds of
choking or gasping for breath. He observed defendant, in her bathrobe,
exit the bedroom and enter the bathroom. Defendant was not carrying the
bag. She stayed in the bathroom for five minutes. During that time King
did not hear any cries from the bedroom. Defendant returned to the
bedroom. Again, without entering the bedroom, King repeatedly asked
defendant if she was alright. Defendant told him to calm down. He heard
some rustling as she picked up the bag but did not hear any crying or
gasps for breath. He went back to the living room and from there
observed defendant leave the bedroom with the plastic bag, which looked
half full. He did not ask her what she planned to do with the bag but
inquired again if she was alright. Defendant went to the kitchen area and
King heard the back door slam. He went into the kitchen. Defendant was
not there. He did not look to see where defendant went. Defendant
returned two minutes later. When he asked her what she had done with
the bag, she responded that she had thrown it into the creek. Defendant
returned to the bedroom, and King could hear that she was in pain,
screaming. He did not call the paramedics or press the alarm panic
buttons. Defendant asked him to come into the bedroom and he entered
the room for the first time. Defendant, in bed, was in the process of
delivering or had just delivered the afterbirth. King cleaned up by pulling
the towels and sheets from under her, placing them in another plastic bag
and taking the bag to the kitchen for later disposal.
In the morning, King was upset and crying. Defendant contacted
King's mother, Mary Coward, who came over to the house. Coward
asked King why he was upset. He related the whole episode to her and
told her that he heard a baby cry. Later that day, King asked defendant
about the cry he heard. She indicated that he had either heard the dog or
imagined that he heard a cry.
On September 6, 1990, King was questioned at the police station.
In a written statement, he told police that he was in the hallway with hands
folded clenched, during the course of defendant's labor. Defendant asked
him to get a bag from the kitchen. As he returned with the bag, he thought
he heard a baby cry. King then told the police that he would like to see an
attorney and was informed that would not be necessary. At that point,
King did not feel like a suspect. Later that same day, King received a
telephone call from Commander McGregor, who told him that he did not
think it was necessary for King to spend a lot of money on a lawyer. On
cross-examination, King admitted that prior to the police interview, he was
convinced he had either imagined the cry or heard the family dog. Also,
at defendant's first trial, King testified that at the conclusion of the police
interview he believed he was a suspect in the case and hired an attorney.
Mary Coward testified that at approximately 9 a.m. on August 21,
1990, King called to say that defendant had the miscarriage and that he
would call her later. That afternoon, defendant called to say that King was
very upset and defendant asked Coward to come over. Once at the
house, Coward sat next to King on the bed and comforted him. Coward
nowhere testified that King told her he heard a baby cry.
Police officers who spoke with defendant on September 6, 1990,
testified that she told them she had miscarried a fetus 15 weeks old and
flushed it down her toilet. Police told her they had talked to King.
Defendant first said she threw the miscarriage in the garbage, then she said
King threw it in the garbage. When officers said King told them a different
story, defendant said she did not remember what happened, but King's
account was probably true because "he doesn't lie." Police testified
defendant admitted that she lied to King, and she had not seen any
doctors throughout her pregnancy.
Further testimony showed that defendant told police her water broke
two days before the birth, when she fell while trying to retrieve her son's
toy from a tree in her yard. She placed the fetus in a garbage bag and left
the bag by a tree near the bank of the creek out back. When police asked
if she threw the bag into the creek, she said, "No, unless you want me to
say I did it, then I did it." She then asked to have the baby buried next to
defendant's mother. In another interview, defendant told police that her
ex-husband, not King, was the father of the baby. Defendant admitted that
she had sexual relations with her ex-husband frequently in November
1989.
A few days later defendant called the police to say that she could not
live with herself and wanted to tell them the truth. She asked police to
assure her that King would take care of her children if she went to jail.
Later she told police that when she went to the bathroom after delivering
the dead fetus, King went to the bedroom, picked up the bloody towels
and the baby and threw them out.
Dr. Mitra Kalelkar, assistant chief medical examiner for Cook
County, testified at trial that when she completed the autopsy she could
not determine to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the baby
had been born alive. She admitted that she found no unusual cause of
death, so her "suspicion was that the baby drowned." On direct
examination, the prosecutor asked Dr. Kalelkar whether, at the
completion of the autopsy, she "form[ed] an opinion within a reasonable
degree of medical certainty as to whether or not the baby was born alive."
Dr. Kalelkar answered:
"At that time I had a suspicion that this baby was born alive and
that the cause of death would be drowning; and pursuant to that
suspicion, which I related to the police officers, I instructed them
to investigate further."
Dr. Kalelkar later reiterated that after the autopsy she told police she
"could not tell for sure whether it had been born alive."
After police advised Dr. Kalelkar of their investigation, she
concluded in December 1990 that the baby had been born alive and it had
drowned. Dr. Kalelkar relied on evidence that defendant had lied to
several persons about her pregnancy and her visits with doctors, and,
most particularly, she relied on King's statement to police that he thought
he heard a baby cry.
Dr. Kalelkar further testified she saw no evidence in the decomposing
corpse of any natural disease process. She found air in the lungs,
hemorrhage on the skull due to natural causes, and some blood on the
umbilical cord. Dr. Kalelkar admitted that the air she found in the lungs
could have resulted from decomposition rather than breathing. She also
stated that "there is no specific way of telling whether that rip [of the
umbilical cord] was ante mortem or postmortem." Blood may remain in
the umbilical cord after the baby dies. Lastly, while the hemorrhaging
suggested that the baby was alive when the head went through the vaginal
canal, it did not show that the baby survived the birthing process.
On cross-examination, Dr. Kalelkar admitted that a baby could die
due to partial placental abruption. Furthermore, a baby could go into
shock if it lost 60 milliliters of blood in the birthing process.
Two pathologists testified on defendant's behalf. Both pathologists
agreed with Dr. Kalelkar that the autopsy findings could not support a
finding to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the baby was born
alive. Dr. John Pless stated that the hemorrhage on the skull could occur
even if the fetus had already died. Dr. Pless noted that if placental
abruption killed the fetus shortly before delivery, one would expect
findings like those present here. He further stated that a fall from a tree
could cause the placenta to detach from the uterine wall and result in fetal
death. The force of the fall need not be great if the trauma occurred at a
place that maximized impact on the placenta. Dr. Pless testified that the
baby could also have died from blood loss in the birthing process or
obstruction of the airway. Water and bacteria probably would have
eliminated any mucus plugs that might have caused asphyxiation.
Dr. Pless also agreed with Dr. Kalelkar that no marks on the body
showed disease or physical injury. He noted that decomposition probably
would have eliminated any evidence the baby died from infection. He also
agreed with other doctors that a newborn faces a greater risk of death
from asphyxiation or blood loss in an unattended home birth than in a
hospital delivery.
Dr. Robert Kirschner found there was sufficient evidence to conclude
that the baby was alive when labor began. However, he found the
evidence insufficient to show that the baby survived labor. Dr. Kirschner
testified that even if the baby was alive at birth, it may have died from
failure to clear its airways, blood loss or infection. He noted that, if a child
had marked respiratory distress at the time of birth, it might give a feeble
cry, then die. He agreed with the prosecutor that a cry would show live
birth.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court expressly found credible
King's testimony that he heard a baby cry. The court recognized that King
might have adequate motive to lie and to tell the police that he heard a
baby cry. However, had King wanted to minimize his involvement it would
have been better for him to deny that the baby was born alive. The court
found King's testimony, together with the medical testimony, sufficient to
show that the baby was born alive. The court concluded that defendant
was guilty of murder.
As noted by the appellate court, the circuit court did not comment on
the medical testimony that the baby may have died after a live birth from
various noncriminal causes. Also, the circuit court did not make any
findings as to the cause of the baby's death or the criminal acts defendant
committed resulting in the baby's death. The court sentenced defendant
to 30 years in prison.
On appeal, defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to
show that the baby was born alive. Further, defendant maintained that, if
the baby was born alive, the evidence was insufficient to show that
defendant performed any act after birth to cause the death of the baby or
that defendant had the mental state required in a prosecution for murder.
The appellate court agreed that the evidence was insufficient to prove live
birth and reversed defendant's conviction. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 474.
Because of its resolution of the issue of live birth, the court did not address
the additional arguments for reversal.
We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal.

ANALYSIS
In this court, defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to
prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant reprises her
arguments that the State failed to show that the baby was born alive and,
if the baby was born alive, that defendant committed a criminal act
resulting in the death and defendant had the requisite mental state for
murder.
A criminal conviction will not be set aside on appeal unless the
evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that there remains a
reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. People v. Tenney, 205 Ill. 2d 411, 427 (2002). The question on review is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational fact
finder could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v. Brown, 185 Ill. 2d 229, 247 (1998); People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 191 (1989). This standard of review applies in all criminal cases
whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. Tenney, 205 Ill. 2d  at
427; People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 515 (1996).
As noted above, the circuit court convicted defendant of the murder
of her newborn. Proof of an offense requires proof of two concepts: first,
that a crime occurred, or the corpus delicti, and second, that it was
committed by the person charged. People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483,
503 (1993). In a prosecution for murder, the corpus delicti consists of
the fact of death and the fact that death was produced by a criminal
agency. People v. Garrett, 62 Ill. 2d 151, 172 (1975). In addition,
where the State alleges that the defendant has killed her newborn, the
State must prove that the infant was born alive. People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103, 110 (1980); People v. Ryan, 9 Ill. 2d 467, 471 (1956). It is
axiomatic that a defendant cannot be convicted of the murder of a person
who has already died. W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law §14.1, at
419 (2d ed. 2003).
The appellate court believed that the State failed to prove
defendant's baby was born alive. In particular, the appellate court found
insufficient the State's evidence that the baby showed signs of independent
life once expelled from defendant's womb. The appellate court noted
agreement between the prosecution's medical expert and defense experts
that the physical findings alone did not prove live birth to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 471. The appellate court
further noted that in reaching her conclusion that the baby was born alive,
Dr. Kalelkar relied on King's statement to police that he thought he heard
a cry. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 471. And, although Dr. Kalelkar recited
evidence that defendant did not want the child and lied to neighbors about
the pregnancy, she did not explain why an unwanted child would have a
better chance of surviving the birth process or how that evidence in any
way showed live birth. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 471. Lastly, the appellate court
considered, and found wanting as proof of live birth, King's testimony that
he heard a baby cry. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 471. The court found it significant
that King did not see the baby when he heard the cry. 335 Ill. App. 3d at
471. The baby could have cried during the birthing process, and King
could not testify otherwise. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 471.
Because the appellate court found insufficient the State's evidence
that the baby was born alive, the court did not consider defendant's
alternate arguments that the evidence was insufficient to prove either
criminal agency or the requisite mental state for murder. 335 Ill. App. 3d
at 468.
In this court, the State argues the appellate court failed to apply the
proper standard of review, that is, the appellate court failed to consider
the facts in the light most favorable to the State, because the appellate
court did not accept the fact that the baby cried. We disagree with the
State's reading of the appellate court opinion. We believe the appellate
court applied the appropriate standard of review.
The State also urges that we discard the common law requirement
that a baby must be totally expelled from the mother's womb and establish
independent life before it is considered alive. The State asserts that the
common law requirement, necessary because of the lack of medical
knowledge and high infant mortality rates prevalent in the 18th century, is
now antiquated. According to the State, medical advances have eliminated
the need for a presumption of death during childbirth. The State asks us
to adopt the view of the court in People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P.2d 92 (1947), that a viable fetus "in the process of being
born" is a human being within the meaning of the homicide statutes.
In Greer this court held that to be born alive a fetus must be totally
expelled from the mother and show a clear sign of independent vitality. 79 Ill. 2d  at 103. In urging that we adopt the reasoning of Chavez, the State
is thus asking that we reconsider our ruling in Greer. In keeping with the
doctrine of stare decisis, prior decisions should not be overruled absent
good cause or compelling reasons. People v. Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d 461,
463-64 (1999); Moehle v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 93 Ill. 2d 299, 304
(1982). Further, we note that the State has raised arguments in this case
that were considered by the court in Greer. We need not opine on the
merits of the State's arguments, however, because we note an alternate
basis for reversal of defendant's conviction. Defendant argues, and we
agree, that even assuming the baby was born alive, the evidence was
insufficient to show that death resulted from defendant's criminal agency.
The State's theory of the case was that defendant, having hidden her
pregnancy, gave birth to a live baby, placed the baby into a plastic bag,
and either threw the bag into the creek or placed the bag next to the creek
where an animal presumably dragged it into the creek. To prove this
theory, the State presented evidence from King, defendant's paramour.
King's testimony was that, when he was 15 to 20 steps from the
bedroom, he heard a single cry, lasting about two seconds. King
proceeded down the hallway to the bedroom. Without entering the
bedroom, King reached in with the bag and, from the bed, defendant
reached out and took the bag. King testified further that, after he handed
the plastic bag to defendant, he did not hear any cries, sounds of choking
or gasping for breath. Defendant left the baby unattended in the bedroom
for five minutes. During that time, King did not hear any cries from the
bedroom. King saw no signs of motion in the bag when defendant took
the bag from the house.
The State also relied on the testimony of the medical examiner, Dr.
Kalelkar. At the time of the autopsy, Dr. Kalelkar found no unusual cause
of death. No marks on the baby revealed foul play. Dr. Kalelkar testified
on direct examination that, after performing an autopsy, she surmised that
the baby drowned. Dr. Kalelkar distinguished between cause of death and
manner of death: "The manner basically is the circumstances surrounding
death" and could be natural, homicide, suicide, accident, or undetermined.
After Dr. Kalelkar performed the autopsy, she suspected that the baby
was born alive because the body had hemorrhaging on the head, aerated
lungs, antemortem bleeding around the umbilical cord, and no natural
diseases. Dr. Kalelkar then stated both that she did and that she did not
determine the cause of death at the time of the autopsy to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty. On direct examination, Dr. Kalelkar initially
asserted, "At the time when I did the autopsy, *** I did not form an
opinion. I verbalized to the police officers what my suspicions were or
what I thought had happened to this child, and I instructed them to go and
get or to investigate the matter further." When asked by the prosecutor
when she formed her opinion regarding the cause of death, Dr. Kalelkar
responded, "As to the cause of death was [sic] pretty obvious at the time
that I did the autopsy because of the fact that the baby was recovered
from water." The prosecutor clarified that he was addressing the cause of
death, not the manner of death. Dr. Kalelkar then stated:
"In my opinion, and I so verbalized it to the police officers who
were present at the time of the autopsy, that based on the fact
that this body was recovered from water and based on the fact
there was no evidence of any other cause of death, injuries or
natural disease processes, the cause of death would be
drowning."
Thus, Dr. Kalelkar apparently determined the cause of death at the time
of the autopsy, but did not determine the manner of death until she
consulted with the police. Still, on the death certificate, she handwrote
"pending police investigation" in the space for cause of death and left
blank the space for manner of death.
After Dr. Kalelkar advised the police of her suspicions, the police
later advised her of the results from their investigation, which confirmed
her suspicions, including her initial impression that the infant was born
alive. In fact, Dr. Kalelkar observed that a "very significant" part of the
police report was the fact that King "heard a sound which was akin to a
baby crying." Dr. Kalelkar continued: "[H]earing the baby cry is an
indication that a baby is born alive, and my physical findings showed that
there was air in the lungs. Now granted that air in the lungs could have
come from decomposition changes, but given this fact as well as the
physical findings and all the other facts surrounding this case, everything
tied together." Dr. Kalelkar listed the manner of death "based on all the
circumstances" as homicide.
On cross-examination, however, Dr. Kalelkar's account of her
opinions changed. She testified that at the time of the autopsy, she could
establish neither a cause nor a manner of death:
"Q. And at the end of the time that you completed that
autopsy you told those police officers that you could not
determine for sure whether or not this baby was born alive, right?
A. At the time I only had a suspicion. That is correct.
Q. And you told them that you suspected that the cause of
death would be drowning if you could prove that the baby was
born alive, right?
A. I don't recall what I told them exactly, but I do remember
that I suspected that the baby was born alive because it was a
full-term baby and I did not find any natural cause of death, and
that the cause of death was drowning because the baby was
found in water.
Q. Okay. But you told them that you could not tell for sure
whether it had been born alive at that point, right?
A. I agree.
Q. Okay. And you told them that you couldn't establish or
prove at that point what the cause of death was, right?
A. That is correct also.
Q. You didn't tell them I know the cause of death but I can't
give you a manner of death at that point, did you?
A. No, I did not.
Q. And at that point you filled out or shortly after that you
filled out a death certificate in which you put, under cause of
death, pending police investigation, right?
A. That is correct.
* * *
Q. And down a little bit lower on the left part of the certificate
there is a space where you can put the manner of death such as
natural or homicide or whatever, right?
A. That is correct.
Q. Now you didn't put anything in there?
A. No. That was left blank.
* * *
Q. All right. And you later then changed the death certificate
in the sense that you filled in homicide [as the manner of death]
and you put in drowning as the cause of death, right?
A. Correct.
Q. So essentially between the time that you filled out that first
death certificate and the time you filled out the second death
certificate, what you got was information from the police, right?
A. Yes.
Q. It wasn't a matter of you having gotten further information
from your autopsy that caused you to change the death
certificate, was it?
A. There was no change in the death certificate. There was
not, you know-There was no change in the cause of death, yet
the police investigation just confirmed what I had originally
suspected as to the cause of death."
Dr. Kalelkar agreed that the final death certificate was a "sort of
continuation" of what she had done before receiving the police reports.
According to Dr. Kalelkar, this was a generally accepted practice in her
field.
One of the defendant's forensic expert, Dr. Pless, disagreed that it
is a generally accepted practice among forensic pathologists to base cause
of death opinions on information in police reports:
"We are engaged in a scientific discipline in which the opinions
regarding cause of death need to be related to findings in the
examination, specifically in the case of forensic pathology in the
autopsy. And if those findings aren't there, then it's inappropriate
to develop an opinion based on what someone heard or said.
That's completely outside the discipline of science."
But Dr. Kalelkar's drowning surmise is problematic for another
reason. King testified that, after hearing what he thought was a short cry
from outside the bedroom door and down the hall while defendant gave
birth, he did not hear the baby or see her move inside the plastic bag
during the 5 to 10 minutes before defendant disposed of the bag. Further,
Dr. Kalelkar did not find debris in the baby's lungs or in the air passages.
She also did not find evidence of pulmonary edema, indicative of water in
the lungs. Such findings, although not present in all cases, can lend support
to a conclusion that death is by drowning. Justices Thomas and Garman
note that King "would not hear cries or see the baby move if defendant
had already suffocated it." Slip op. at 31 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined
by Garman, J.). In response to a question by the trial judge, Dr. Kalekar
discounted this theory: "It could be suffocation, but the fact is that the
baby was found in water. So automatically because the baby is found in
water, you know, I determined it was drowning."
In addition to the fact that there is no evidence of record to suggest
that defendant suffocated the infant, on cross-examination Dr. Kalelkar
agreed that the infant could have died from natural causes: anoxia from a
displaced placenta, asphyxiation by mucus or other fluids, or loss of blood
and shock. Evidence that defendant placed her already-dead infant's
corpse in a plastic bag, then placed that bag near or into a creek feeding
into a golf course retention pond, shows that defendant is capable of doing
terrible and desperate things. We require more of the State than this in a
murder prosecution.(1)
Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
we are left with a reasonable doubt as to defendant's criminal agency. As
this court emphasized in People v. Martin, 26 Ill. 2d 547, 551 (1963),
the relationship between the defendant's "criminal agency and the cause
of death [may not be] left *** to inference and speculation." This court
may reverse a conviction where the evidence is so unreasonable,
improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the
defendant's guilt. People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 259 (2001).
We note that in analogous circumstances, the courts of sister
jurisdictions reversed convictions for insufficient evidence of the mother's
criminal agency. State v. Doyle, 205 Neb. 234, 238, 287 N.W.2d 59,
62 (1980) ("At best the evidence, almost exclusively circumstantial in
nature, disclosed that a child was born to the defendant and that the child
died. The pathologist was unable to testify as to any cause of death and
could not testify that the cause of death was not from natural causes");
Lane v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 509, 515, 248 S.E.2d 781, 784
(1978) ("We hold that the evidence was insufficient to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that the child's death was caused by a criminal act of the
defendant and that the corpus delicti had not been proved"); Graham v.
State, 6 Ark. App. 376, 642 S.W.2d 342 (1982). See also Taylor v.
State, 108 Miss. 18, 25, 66 So. 321 (1914) ("The examination of the
body of the child by these physicians failed to disclose any evidence of
violence to its person, and their opinion that it died from suffocation seems
to be based upon the fact that their examination also failed to disclose any
reason why the child should have died from a natural cause").
Justices Thomas and Garman clearly disagree with our conclusion in
this matter, and we feel compelled to address several aspects of their
separate opinion as well as comment on the disparaging tone and tenor
they use in the opinion. As an initial matter, we take issue with their
characterization of our holding. Today's opinion does not, in any way,
make it legal in Illinois for a mother to murder her newborn infant. See slip
op. at 19 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Garman, J.). Infanticide
remains a crime in Illinois. What today's opinion does do, however, is
reaffirm this court's commitment to the time-honored notion that, in Illinois,
a conviction for murder will not be allowed to stand in the absence of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the convicted defendant caused the
victim's death.(2) The implication that the justices in the majority clearly
sanction infanticide is unfounded and has no place in proper judicial
discourse.
Justices Thomas and Garman assert:
"The majority seems to base its entire reversal on a curious
critique of the medical examiner's testimony. The bitter irony
here is that what troubles the majority about Dr. Kalelkar's
conclusion is the precise problem with the majority's own
analysis. The majority is actually troubled by the fact that Dr.
Kalelkar considered the known facts of the case in reaching her
conclusion that the baby drowned. Of course, the absence of
such an analysis is the glaring flaw in the majority's own opinion.
The majority focuses solely on the medical testimony involving
the baby and fails to consider all of the other circumstantial
evidence pointing directly to defendant's guilt." Slip op. at 29-30
(Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Garman, J.).
The conclusion that we reach is neither curious nor "bitter[ly] iron[ic]."
We do not say that nothing matters except for the medical testimony. The
State said that, by implication, when it offered nothing else to prove
defendant killed her infant. Certainly, the record is replete with evidence
of what Justices Thomas and Garman characterize as defendant's
"deceit." The flaw in their dissent is their willingness to equate this deceit
with evidence of criminal agency.
Defendant need not disprove her guilt. An accused's right to demand
proof of the State's case beyond a reasonable doubt is a protection of
"surpassing importance." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476,
147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 447, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2355 (2000). This right has
formed the bedrock of constitutional criminal procedure for centuries:
"Although virtually unanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt standard
in common-law jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it as a
requirement of due process, such adherence does 'reflect a profound
judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice
administered.' " In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-62, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368,
374, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1071 (1970), quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491, 499, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 1451 (1968).
Thus, our opinion is not a blueprint for murder, but rather a blueprint
echoing a concept that has well served the Anglo-American criminal
justice system since the Magna Charta was signed in 1215-namely, due
process of law. We are unwilling to redraft that august guarantee.
Simply stated, the fact that defendant is "probably" guilty does not
equate with guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We must point out that in
criminal prosecutions, the standard of proof is not by a preponderance of
the evidence, but rather proof beyond a reasonable doubt.(3) We
acknowledge that on any particular issue conscientious jurists can
respectfully disagree, and it is the prerogative of Justices Thomas and
Garman to take issue with the majority's analysis. However, these justices
should do so in a civil and judicious manner. The dissent Justices Thomas
and Garman filed today borders on demagoguery when the dissenting
justices choose to cross the bounds of collegiality by insisting that the
members of the majority have "irresponsibl[y]" ignored evidence (slip op.
at 20, 47 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Garman, J.) and
"disingenous[ly]" warped the standard of review in order to free a
convicted murderer. Suffice it to say, it is difficult for this court to expect
practitioners to engage in civility in the practice of law when members of
this court are unwilling or unable to engage in respectful legal discourse in
a published opinion.
Finally, the prediction by Justices Thomas and Garman that
murderers will use this opinion as a guide to commit their crimes is
unrealistic. First, it assumes that criminal minded mothers intent on killing
their newborn infants will consult this court's opinions before they act.
Second, and more importantly, it assumes that the State will often have to
proceed to trial against a defendant charged with murdering her newborn
infant armed with only equivocal testimony from the medical examiner
regarding the cause and manner of death based on testimony from the
defendant's boyfriend, who may have heard a short cry, but saw nothing.
The holding in this case is as unique as its facts and is limited to them.

CONCLUSION
Our observations in People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532 (1999),
regarding the burden of proof the prosecution must meet to obtain a
criminal conviction are most appropriate in this case: 
"What is involved here is the standard of proof which is
applicable to all crimes. That is to say, conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt. Whether the crime charged be trespass,
shoplifting, armed robbery, or murder, the test is the same. The
burden of meeting this standard falls solely on the prosecution. If
it fails to meet this burden, a defendant is entitled to a finding of
not guilty. No defendant is required to prove his innocence.
While a not guilty finding is sometimes equated with a finding
of innocence, that conclusion is erroneous. Courts do not find
people guilty or innocent. They find them guilty or not guilty. A
not guilty verdict expresses no view as to a defendant's
innocence. Rather, it indicates simply that the prosecution has
failed to meet its burden of proof. While there are those who
may criticize courts for turning criminals loose, courts have a duty
to ensure that all citizens receive those rights which are
applicable equally to every citizen who may find himself charged
with a crime, whatever the crime and whatever the
circumstances. When the State cannot meet its burden of proof,
the defendant must go free. This case happens to be a murder
case carrying a sentence of death against a defendant where the
State has failed to meet its burden. It is no help to speculate that
the defendant may have killed the victim. No citizen would be
safe from prosecution under such a standard." Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 
at 545-46.
As in Smith, we do not imply that defendant is innocent of the crime
charged. The State's evidence of criminal agency resulting in death was
simply insufficient. This court cannot affirm a conviction based on
speculation and conjecture. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court reversing defendant's conviction of murder.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting:
For all practical purposes, it is now legal in Illinois for a parent to
murder his or her newborn infant. With today's decision, the majority
sends the clear signal that, when a parent is charged with murdering a
newborn baby, this court will not apply the standard of review in the same
manner as we would in any other criminal case. We will draw previously
unheard of inferences and presumptions in favor of the defendant and will
reward the defendant for attempting to cover up the crime. The majority's
opinion is misleading on the facts, incorrect in its application of the
standard of review, and perverse in its implications. I dissent in the
strongest possible terms.
As the majority correctly notes, the standard of review that we must
apply is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational fact finder could have found defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt." Slip op. at 7, citing People v. Brown, 185 Ill. 2d 229, 247 (1998). I will demonstrate below that the majority does
not apply this standard. Indeed, it appears that the standard of review the
majority applies is, "viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
defendant, can we imagine a scenario, no matter how far-fetched, in which
the defendant might be innocent?" The State argues that the defendant is
essentially arguing for this court to revive the long-abandoned "reasonable
hypothesis of innocence" test. Of course, there is no reasonable
hypothesis of innocence on these facts, only an unreasonable one. In my
view, no rational trier of fact could look at the evidence in this case and
fail to be convinced of defendant's guilt. But when we must decide only
whether any rational trier of fact could have found defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, this becomes an easy case. I believe that
Judge Tobin was a rational trier of fact and that her finding of defendant's
guilt must be affirmed.
I first take issue with the majority's irresponsible statement of facts,
which both trivializes and omits evidence favorable to the prosecution
while focusing heavily on evidence favorable to defendant. In a sufficiency
of the evidence appeal, in which we must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, a dissenting justice should never be put
in the position of setting forth for the first time evidence favorable to the
prosecution. If this court is going to reverse a conviction because the
evidence was insufficient, we have an obligation to set forth all of the
evidence favorable to the prosecution so that the reader will know what
this court deems insufficient. The majority's omission of this evidence is
particularly troubling because it criticizes the State for putting on no
evidence of guilt other than the medical examiner's testimony. Slip op. at
18. The State actually did put on quite a bit of evidence of guilt other than
the medical examiner's testimony. Unfortunately, the majority confuses its
own failure to grasp the significance of this testimony with the State's
failure to put on the testimony in the first place. Thus, before getting into
a discussion of why the majority opinion is legally flawed, I will flesh out
some more of the trial testimony, so that the reader will have a true and
fair picture of the evidence admitted against defendant.
The prosecution presented numerous witnesses to show the pattern
of lies and deception defendant engaged in preceding the baby's birth. The
majority sets forth a few of the lies defendant told to Steven King, but
summarizes the testimony of the other witnesses in .two sentences: "On
retrial, the prosecution presented several witnesses who testified that
between April and mid-August 1990, defendant repeatedly told them she
was not pregnant. She told the witnesses that she had a cancerous tumor
and she had seen several doctors about it." Slip op. at 1. In my opinion,
these two sentences do not give the reader a fair view of the extent of
defendant's deceit.
Jo Ann Ripp was defendant's hairdresser, and Ripp's children played
with defendant's children. In April 1990, Ripp noticed that defendant's
stomach was getting larger. Defendant told her that she had a cyst in her
abdomen. When defendant returned in May, Ripp noticed that her
stomach had become much bigger, and Ripp believed that defendant was
pregnant. However, defendant said that she had a cancerous tumor. When
Ripp saw defendant in August, Ripp believed that defendant had a full-term pregnancy. Defendant again told Ripp that it was a cancerous tumor
and that she did not have time to have it taken care of. Ripp spoke to
defendant on the phone later that month, and defendant told her that she
had the tumor removed and was experiencing bleeding, cramping, and
nausea. When Ripp saw defendant on August 29, defendant looked like
a postnatal woman. Ripp had heard reports about the baby that was found
in the water, and she contacted the police. Ripp saw defendant again on
September 10, three weeks after the birth. At this time, defendant claimed
that she was currently pregnant with a "high risk pregnancy." Ripp testified
that she was "floored" by this statement.
Mary Coward, Steven King's mother, saw defendant once or twice
a week during 1990. In April, Coward thought that defendant looked
pregnant and she mentioned this fact to her husband. Coward asked her
son if defendant was pregnant, and King and defendant both denied it. In
May, Coward accompanied defendant to one of defendant's son's
baseball games. Defendant said that she was not feeling well and that she
had just had surgery. She claimed to have tumors and that she was having
them "taken care of." Defendant claimed to have been "packed." Later in
May, defendant asked Coward to baby-sit because she needed to have
surgery for her tumors. However, defendant did not ultimately go to the
hospital because she cut her leg. Around the first of July, several people,
including King and defendant, went to Bob Chinn's Crab House to
celebrate Coward's birthday. Defendant was wearing what appeared to
be a hospital I.D. bracelet.(4) She claimed that she had had preadmission
tests and was scheduled for surgery the following day. However, when the
next day arrived, defendant did not go in for the surgery. Coward was
supposed to babysit on that day, but King called her to say that defendant
was not going in for the surgery because she was hemorrhaging. The
supposed scheduling and cancelling of the operation happened several
times over the next few days. Later in July, defendant told Coward that
she had ovarian cancer. In a subsequent call, defendant told Coward that
she was overjoyed because she found out she did not have cancer after
all.
In early August, Coward was supposed to have taken defendant to
see a Dr. Shaw. On the day of the appointment, King told Coward not to
hurry because defendant had cut herself on a glass and had to get stitches.
Defendant and Coward did not go to see Dr. Shaw. At a housewares
party later that month, Coward saw defendant and thought she looked
"really pregnant." Defendant said that her tumors would be removed in a
few days and that she would then be in good shape. On August 17,
defendant and King went to Coward's house. At this time, defendant told
Coward that she was pregnant with a four-week-old fetus and that the
baby had died. She claimed that a doctor had given her a shot to induce
labor and then sent her home.
On the morning of August 21, King called his mother to say that
defendant had had a miscarriage the night before. Later, defendant called
Coward and told her that King was very upset. She asked Coward to
come over to see if there was anything she could do. When Coward
arrived, she tried to comfort King who was still very upset. Defendant was
sitting in the kitchen drinking coffee, and she did not appear upset.
Coward wanted defendant to see a doctor. Defendant got on the phone
several times and reported that the doctor could not see her because he
was in the operating room. On August 25, Coward took defendant to see
a Dr. Levy. When she came out of the doctor's office, defendant was
upset and told Coward that she had to have a hysterectomy.
June Powers testified that she has been friends with defendant since
1979. In June of 1990, Powers noticed defendant was wearing baggier
clothes than she usually did. She further noticed that defendant's "rear end
was very wide." In mid-August, Powers spoke with defendant on the
telephone. Defendant told Powers that she had seen the doctor and had
been told that she had cancerous uterine tumors and would have to have
a hysterectomy. Defendant said that she was upset because this meant that
she would not be able to have children with King. A week later, Powers
spoke with defendant again. At this time, defendant said that she had
received a second opinion on the tumor situation and that this doctor told
her that it was not tumors, and that she was carrying a 15-week-old fetus.
She said that the doctor had given her an injection that would make her
deliver the baby within 72 hours; she was sent home to do this. A few
days later, defendant contacted Powers and told her that she had
delivered a dead fetus and that it was the most painful experience she had
ever had. Steve had helped her clean up the mess. Over the next several
days, defendant called Powers several times. She complained of bleeding
and being in pain and she was concerned about Steve's attitude towards
her.
On September 6, defendant called Powers to say that she had been
questioned by the police and that she was concerned. Defendant said that
a dead baby had been found in a reservoir. Powers asked why she would
be concerned if she had delivered a dead 15-week-old fetus. Defendant
said that she was concerned because King was speaking to the police and
she did not know what he was telling them because he was not speaking
to her. In a subsequent conversation, defendant began by telling Powers
that she was in "deep shit." The police had questioned her and were going
to connect her to the baby that was found. Powers again asked why she
had anything to worry about if she had delivered a 15-week-old fetus.
Defendant responded that she was concerned because she did not know
what happened on the night of the delivery. The police wanted to know
if the baby had cried. Defendant said, "what if the baby cried and Steve
did do something?" Defendant also said, "what if they test the baby and
it's mine? I'm going to jail." In September, defendant told Powers that "no
matter what happens, the police are going to crucify us." She was
concerned that her family was going to be taken away, and she asked
Powers to take her children if something happened to her.
Janice Singer became friends with defendant in 1990 after their sons
became friends at school. In July of that year, Singer noticed that
defendant's hips were becoming wider and that defendant was developing
a pot belly. Singer made a comment about defendant's pregnancy,
following which defendant laughed and said that she was not pregnant, she
had a cancerous tumor. On several occasions, Singer watched
defendant's kids so that defendant could go to the doctor. She mentioned
several doctors' names, and the one she mentioned most often was Dr.
Tunca. In August, defendant told Singer that the doctors wanted her to
have exploratory surgery for the cancerous tumor, and they even
mentioned the possibility of a hysterectomy. In the middle of August,
defendant told Singer that the exploratory surgery had revealed that she
was pregnant with a 15-week-old fetus that had died in utero. She said
that the doctor was going to give her a drug to induce labor, following
which she was to go home and wait for it to happen. Defendant showed
no emotion, and these conversations were very matter of fact. On August
20, defendant called Singer to tell her that she was in labor and that it was
very painful. The next day, defendant called Singer to tell her that she had
delivered the baby during the night and that it had been difficult and
painful. Singer asked what she did with the baby, because usually the
doctors would want to see the fetus. Defendant said that King put the
baby in a bag and got rid of it. The following day, defendant told Singer
that she was hemorrhaging and bleeding a lot. Singer asked if she had
been to the doctor, and defendant said "no."
In mid-July, defendant called King at work and told him that she had
seen Dr. Elrad, who had diagnosed her with ovarian cancer. This was the
first time that King had heard of the appointment. King wanted her to get
a second appointment, so he got the name of Dr. Gardner from a friend.
From Dr. Gardner, he got the name of Dr. Tunca. In early August,
defendant told King that she had scheduled an appointment with Dr.
Tunca, but that she had to cancel it due to bleeding and reschedule it for
the following day. On that day, however, defendant told King that the
appointment was cancelled because no operating rooms were available
and that it was now rescheduled for the following Saturday. On Friday,
defendant called Steve and she was crying and hysterical. She told him
that she had been to see Dr. Tunca and that he diagnosed her with a six-
to eight-week-old stillborn baby. Defendant told King that Dr. Tunca had
given her an injection to induce labor within 48 hours.
Dr. Josh Tunca testified that he is board certified in obstetrics and
gynecology. His specialty is gynecological oncology, which he explained
as being a gynecology cancer surgeon. He is the only Josh Tunca in
Chicago who practices medicine. Defendant was never his patient, and he
never got a call from defendant regarding a miscarriage. Tunca never gave
a patient medication to induce labor and then sent the patient home.
Dr. Hiam Elrad confirmed that defendant had been his patient in the
past, but that he did not see her in 1989 or 1990. Dr. Elrad further
testified that there was no procedure in 1990 for giving a woman a shot
and sending her home to deliver a fetus. Additionally, he explained that the
term "packing" meant filling the uterine cavity with gauze to stop bleeding,
but this procedure had not been used in the past 15 years. Even when it
was used, a person would not simply have been packed and then sent
home.
The above is not a complete account of all of the prebirth-deception
evidence introduced by the prosecution, but it is sufficient to give the
reader a fair picture of what was going on. Next, I will flesh out a little
more fully the various statements defendant made to the police during their
investigation.
Defendant was first interviewed by the police on September 6, 1990.
Defendant was informed that the police were investigating the death of a
baby found in the Twin Lakes reservoir. The creek behind defendant's
house fed into the reservoir, and the police had received information that
defendant had delivered a baby at home two days prior to the discovery
of the baby. Defendant said that she had miscarried a 15-week-old fetus
and that the baby found in the reservoir was a full-term baby. When asked
how she knew it was 15 weeks old, defendant said that Dr. Gardner told
her this. When the police asked how he could know how old the fetus was
if it no longer existed, defendant replied, "I don't know, ask him." The
police had not told her that the baby found in the reservoir was full-term,
but defendant had read this in the paper. Defendant said that she had
flushed the fetus down the toilet, so the baby could not be hers. When the
police told her they had spoken to King and knew the truth, defendant
then said that she threw the baby in the garbage. One of the officers
responded that King said that she had thrown it into the creek. She then
said that King had thrown it in the garbage. She reiterated that the fetus
had only been "a glob of blood" and could not have been the baby found
in the lake. The police told her that DNA testing could possibly show that
the baby was hers, and defendant responded, "I don't know. I don't
think. I don't remember. I tried to block the whole incident out of my
mind."
The police resumed this interview later in the day, after defendant had
picked up her son from school. This time, defendant said that she needed
to speak with King to find out what he had told the police. Defendant was
informed that King was at his mother's house, so she tried to reach him
there. When she could not get hold of him, she told the officers that
"whatever Steve said is the truth." Defendant still claimed not to remember
much of what happened that night but said that whatever King said was
probably the truth because "he doesn't lie." She told the police that she
had fabricated the story about being given a shot to induce the labor of a
dead fetus. Indeed, she confessed that she had not seen any physicians
prior to the baby's birth. Defendant was asked if she could have been
seen out by the creek that night, and she responded, "I don't think so. I
don't know. I don't remember." Defendant continued to say that the
police should speak to Dr. Gardner, following which she picked up the
phone, dialed a number, and asked for Mike. Defendant explained that
Mike was a lawyer who told her not to talk to the police.
On that same evening, defendant called Sergeant Robert Roszak of
the Palatine police department. Roszak had been friends with defendant
for a couple of years. He had also noticed that she appeared pregnant in
1990, and she told him that she had a cancerous tumor. Defendant asked
Roszak to stop by the house. Defendant told him that two of his
colleagues had questioned her. She said that she had had a miscarriage
that lasted a few minutes, and that she did not remember if it happened in
the bedroom or in the bathroom. When it was over, she asked King to put
the miscarriage in a jar, but he did not want to. He placed the baby in a
garbage-type sack and said that he would throw it away on his way to
work. Further, defendant claimed that she went to visit Dr. Levy in
Arlington Heights the morning after the miscarriage, and he told her she
had delivered a 15-week-old fetus. Then she said that she remembered
that it did happen in the bedroom and that she had given birth only to
"clumps." Defendant wondered aloud if maybe she was psychotic and did
things that she did not know. Finally, she said, "Whatever it was, I did it.
What did Steve say? He is very honest. Whatever he said, I did. It's like
I'm psychotic and I don't know."
Later that night, when Roszak had returned to the station, he got a
phone call from defendant, who wanted to meet him at a restaurant. The
restaurant was closed, so they ended up at a bar. Defendant told Roszak
that the baby was the child of John Stevens, her ex-husband and the father
of one of her children. She had frequent sexual relations with him in the fall
of 1989, especially during November. Defendant described herself as
having multiple personalities. Defendant claimed that she did not know if
the baby was a boy or a girl, but described it as not normal. She said that
it was not what her family would have wanted so she had to get rid of it.
However, she now wanted to bury the baby next to her mother. She
claimed that she was a good person who could do bad things and that she
must be guilty of "dumping or whatever."
Defendant went to the Palatine police station on September 11, with
her attorney, Michael Spievak. Three officers, including Roszak, were
present for the interview. Defendant claimed that she had miscarried a 15-week-old fetus about the size of a navel orange. She discovered that she
was pregnant by taking a home pregnancy test. She had not been to see
any doctors, and she refused to explain why. Defendant claimed that King
was in the room with her when the miscarriage happened. The police
asked her if King wanted to call the paramedics, and defendant at first
said "no," but then said that maybe he did. Defendant was questioned
further about the size of the baby, and she indicated that it was roughly the
size of her Gucci purse. Defendant began to tell her story about Dr. Levy
finding numerous cysts or tumors, and one of the investigators told her that
had spoken to Dr. Levy and that he said defendant was negative for cysts.
Defendant denied that Levy told her this and said that Levy was going to
perform a hysterectomy on her.
Defendant again said that she gave birth in the bedroom. She claimed
that Steve held the plastic bag while she put the baby in it. Defendant
claimed that she took the bag outside and put it next to her son's tree
swing. The tree was rooted into the creek bank behind her house.
Defendant claimed to not know how the bag got into the creek; she did
not hear a splash when she dropped it. Further, defendant did not think
that the bag could have fallen into the creek because Steve saw it there the
next day. Steve had told her that he would throw the bag away on his way
to work, but he did not go to work for the next two days. When asked
why she would put the bag near her children's play area, defendant
responded, "I don't know." When asked if she threw the baby into the
creek, defendant said, "No, but if you want me to say I did, then I did."
Defendant asked if the baby could be buried next to her mother. The
police then asked her why she wanted this if the baby was not hers. She
responded that she had thrown the baby into the creek, but then recanted
and said that she had only placed it next to the swing. Defendant then
stated that she would claim the baby to "end all this," and that she wanted
it buried next to her mother. Defendant told the police that she was going
to tell King that another woman claimed the baby. One of the officers told
her that the lies had to end. Defendant responded, "Whatever I tell him is
my own business." Defendant denied that the baby had cried and claimed
that it was dead, but when asked if King said that he heard the baby cry,
defendant said, "I don't remember." Defendant was asked again if the
baby cried, and she looked down at the table and said "no." Her attorney
terminated the interview at this point.
Later that day, defendant called Roszak and asked to meet him in the
park. Defendant told Roszak that she was not aware that a crime had
occurred but that she must stop covering for Steve. Defendant then said
that she did not hear a baby cry on the night of the delivery, but that
"Steve probably might have heard a cry when he was throwing the bag
away and that's probably why he is going crazy now." She said that when
she came out of the bathroom, the baby was gone, and she never spoke
to Steve about its whereabouts.
On September 12, defendant again contacted Roszak. She told him
that she had just returned from visiting friends in Bloomington. Her friends
had mentioned that it was the second anniversary of her mother's death
so she decided to return home and check on her father. Defendant then
said, "Tomorrow is my day of reasoning [sic]. I always thought I was like
dad, but I'm not. I've got a conscience. It's eating me up. I'm at my
breaking point but I've got to keep this family together."
The next day, defendant asked Sergeants Roszak and Koziol to meet
her at her mother's grave. Defendant said that she could not have her kids
taken away like last time. She offered to tell the police everything if the
police could place her kids. She said that she wanted to clear her
conscience and get everything off her chest. If the kids could be placed
with Steve, defendant would tell the truth. Roszak said that they could not
make such a promise, and the interview ended. Later that same day,
defendant showed up at the Palatine police station claiming that she was
ready to tell the truth. She claimed to have been covering up for Steve and
going along with what he had to say. This time, defendant said that when
she went to the bathroom, Steve cleaned up the bedroom and told her he
was going to put "it" in the Dumpster on his way to work. Steve never
went to work, and defendant did not know what happened to the baby.
Ultimately, the police terminated the conversation, telling her that her story
was filled with more inconsistencies than before and that it was pointless
to continue.
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient for two reasons:
(1) there was insufficient evidence that her baby daughter was born alive,
and (2) even if the girl was born alive, there is no proof that she died as a
result of a criminal act by the mother. Both of these arguments fail, as the
circumstantial evidence was more than sufficient on both points.
Surprisingly, the majority bases its reversal on the second argument, easily
the more preposterous of the two. The majority is willing to assume for the
sake of argument that defendant's daughter was born alive. Thus, the sole
question is whether any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant killed her.
The majority seems to base its entire reversal on a curious critique of
the medical examiner's testimony. The bitter irony here is that what
troubles the majority about Dr. Kalelkar's conclusion is the precise
problem with the majority's own analysis. The majority is actually troubled
by the fact that Dr. Kalelkar considered the known facts of the case in
reaching her conclusion that the baby drowned. Of course, the absence
of such an analysis is the glaring flaw in the majority's own opinion. The
majority focuses solely on the medical testimony involving the baby and
fails to consider all of the other circumstantial evidence pointing directly to
defendant's guilt.
Dr. Kalelkar is board certified in anatomic, clinical and forensic
pathology. She has performed over 5,000 autopsies and has a special
interest in pediatric deaths. She has lectured and published on the topics
of drowning and asphyxia in infants. Dr. Kalelkar explained that when she
issued her final death certificate listing homicide as the manner of death,
she considered every fact found by her or supplied to her from August
through December. Conspicuously absent from the majority opinion is Dr.
Kalelkar's statement that this is standard practice in the field of forensic
pathology and that it is the accepted way of doing things in her field. The
defense tried to cast doubt on this statement through its experts. For
instance, Dr. Pless testified that, with regard to the determination of cause
of death, it is not a generally accepted practice among forensic
pathologists to base their opinions on outside statements such as police
reports. However, when pressed on cross-examination, Dr. Pless stated
that he always takes outside investigation evidence into consideration. He
then explained that the outside information must coincide with what is
found on the body. He also said that the analysis has to be developed
from a scientific examination and not solely from witness testimony. The
defense's other expert, Dr. Kirschner, testified that there is nothing unusual
about waiting until all of the reports are in before making a final forensic
determination. Moreover, he would consider the fact that a witness heard
the baby cry, but that alone would not be a deciding factor. Here, the
scientific evidence on the baby's body was consistent with what Dr.
Kalelkar knew about the case. Thus, even under Dr. Pless' analysis, there
was nothing wrong with Dr. Kalelkar's methods, a fact not taken into
consideration by the majority when it decided to redetermine the witness
credibility and substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact.(5)
The medical evidence in this case was entirely consistent with live
birth and drowning. Moreover, all that the defense was able to establish
with its experts was that there are other ways a baby could die and that
the evidence was also consistent with other causes of death. Of course,
this is why all of the evidence in the case must be considered together. As
I will demonstrate later, the evidence conclusively proved that the baby
died as a result of the criminal agency of defendant. The majority is
troubled by the fact that King did not hear any subsequent cries and did
not see the baby moving in the bag. Of course, he would not hear cries or
see the baby move if defendant had already suffocated it. Importantly, Dr.
Kalelkar testified that her findings were consistent with suffocation or
drowning. She settled on drowning because the baby was found in the
water. When Kalelkar was asked, "If the baby died of suffocation prior
to being placed in the water, would there be any physical difference?" she
responded, "No, there wouldn't be any physical difference." Defendant's
experts agreed that the forensic evidence was also consistent with
suffocation. As the majority notes, the corpus delicti of murder consists
of the fact of death and that the death was produced by criminal agency.
Slip op. at 7. The State does not have to establish the means used to
accomplish the death, and such an allegation in the charging instrument is
formalism. People v. Coleman, 49 Ill. 2d 565, 571 (1971). Thus, given
the overwhelming circumstantial evidence of defendant's guilt, King's
testimony merely suggests that defendant might have killed her daughter
before she took her outside. It does not require reversal of her conviction.
By focusing solely on what it perceives to be problems in the medical
examiner's testimony and ignoring all of the other evidence in the case, the
majority seems to imply that, to establish corpus delicti, a medical
examiner must testify with 100% certainty that a criminal act caused the
victim's death. Obviously, this has never been the rule. As the majority
must know, the State is not even required to produce the victim's body to
prove corpus delicti. Campbell v. People, 159 Ill. 9, 22-23 (1895);
People v. Faulkner, 186 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1026 (1989); People v.
Avery, 88 Ill. App. 3d 771, 777 (1980). Obviously, in cases where the
body is not recovered there can be no certain medical evidence as to the
cause of death. The rule is that proof of corpus delicti in homicide
prosecutions may be by circumstantial evidence. People v. Gendron, 41 Ill. 2d 351, 360 (1968). Further, corpus delicti may be established
despite the inconclusiveness of medical testimony as to the cause of death
(see People v. Milner, 123 Ill. App. 3d 656, 662-63 (1984)), and
corpus delicti does not need to be established by evidence independent
of that which connects the defendant to the crime (People v. Nachowicz,
340 Ill. 480, 495 (1930); People v. Aarhus, 111 Ill. App. 2d 167, 176
(1969)). Thus, the majority is simply incorrect in its wild (and apparently
serious) assertion that upholding defendant's conviction would require it
to redraft the Magna Carta. Quite the contrary: a reinstatement of
defendant's conviction would be compelled if the majority would simply
apply our well-established case law on proof of corpus delicti.
The reason we must have a rule allowing proof of corpus delicti by
circumstantial evidence is obvious. Common sense tells us that murderers,
indeed criminals in general, tend to commit their crimes when no witnesses
are around, and they do whatever they can to cover up the evidence of
their crimes. A rule requiring reversals when the medical evidence cannot
establish the cause of death to the exclusion of all other causes would
simply reward those murderers who do the best job of destroying the
bodies or hiding them until they are sufficiently decomposed to mask the
cause of death. As far back as 1895, this court specifically held that it
would not adopt the rule suggested by the majority opinion and that it
would not let defendants play this game. Campbell v. People, 159 Ill. 9
(1895), is a case the majority would be wise to study.(6) Campbell, like the
present case, was a prosecution for the murder of a newborn baby.
However, the defendant was the baby's father. The baby's body was
never recovered. Ultimately, this court reversed the defendant's conviction
because the evidence showed that the mother had killed the child and was
trying to place the blame on the defendant. What is important about that
case, however, is that this court specifically rejected the defendant's
corpus delicti argument because of its perverse implications. I quote from
the opinion at length because I believe this court needs to reacquaint itself
with these principles.
"We are satisfied that the strict rule contended for by plaintiff
in error has been modified by many authorities, and that the
weight of authority now is that all of the elements of the corpus
delicti may be proved by presumptive or circumstantial
evidence. It was said by Jeremy Bentham, that 'were it not so,
a murderer, to secure himself with impunity, would have no more
to do but to consume or decompose the body by fire, by lime, or
by any other of the known chemical menstrua, or to sink it in an
unfathomable part of the sea.' (3 Smith on Judicial Evidence,
234.) In King v. Burdett, 4 Barn. &amp; Ald. 95 (6 Eng. Com. L.
358,) BEST, J., said, in speaking of circumstantial evidence:
'Until it pleases Providence to give us means, beyond those our
present facilities afford, of knowing things done in secret, we
must act on presumptive proof or leave the worst crimes
unpunished. I admit, where presumption is attempted to be
received as to the corpus delicti, that it ought to be strong and
cogent.' (See, also, Wills on Circumstantial Evidence.) In a
copious note to Rippey v. Miller, 62 Am. Dec. 177, Freeman
says: 'But while it is established that the death of the person
whom it is charged the prisoner has killed may be proved by
circumstantial evidence, it is everywhere held to be necessary to
prove this fact by the most convincing evidence that the nature of
the case will admit of. In Smith v. Commonwealth, 21 Gratt.
809, it was decided that the death of the person charged to have
been murdered must be proved by the most cogent and
irrefutable evidence.' And he there further says: 'To require the
discovery of the body in every case would seriously interfere
with the administration of justice. It is therefore clearly settled
that the fact of death may be inferred from such strong and
unequivocal circumstantial evidence as renders it morally certain
and leaves no room for reasonable doubt.' (Ibid. note to p.
184.) See, also, to the same effect, State v. Williams, 7 Jones'
Law (N.C.) 446, 78 Am. Dec. 248. In an elaborate note to this
case, in which many cases are cited, at page 253 it is said:
'Direct and positive evidence is unnecessary to prove the corpus
delicti. *** It may be proved by circumstantial evidence, if it be
strong and cogent, and leave no room for reasonable doubt. ***
This rule is now clearly established, and it would be unreasonable
to always require direct and positive evidence. Crimes, especially
those of the worst kind, are naturally committed at chosen times,
in darkness and secrecy. Human tribunals must therefore act
upon such indications as the circumstances of the case present or
admit, or society must be broken up. The cases just cited show
that the jury may find a verdict of guilty upon circumstantial
evidence, and that the corpus delicti may be proved by such
evidence, as well as any other part of the case, and that this rule
applies in cases of murder and manslaughter as well as in all
other crimes.' And at page 257 it is further said: 'But of the
various forms of criminal homicide, that of infanticide (by which
is popularly understood the murder of a recently born infant for
the purpose of concealing its birth) perhaps presents the greatest
difficulties in the establishment of the corpus delicti. No universal
and invariable rule can be laid down with respect to it. Each case
must depend upon its own peculiar circumstances, and, as in all
other cases, the corpus delicti must be proved by the best
evidence which is capable of being adduced, and such an amount
and combination of relevant facts, whether direct or
circumstantial, as establish the imputed guilt to a moral certainty,
and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis.'[(7)]
To this general statement of the law we assent. So strict a rule
as contended for by plaintiff in error would, as pointed out by
many authorities, operate, and especially in cases of infanticide,
to completely shield the criminal from punishment for the most
atrocious crimes. The complete destruction of the body of a
newly born infant might not be difficult. To say that in such a
case, while every one would admit that the body could be
completely destroyed by animals, by fire, or other destructive
agencies, circumstantial evidence, though of the most cogent and
convincing character, would not be admissible to show the fact
of death, as well as the criminal agency of the accused in
producing it, would be to say that there is a class of the most
atrocious crimes which, when committed in secret, as most
crimes usually are, and by persons of sufficient capacity and skill
to destroy the body, must go unpunished, because the law has
closed all avenues but one leading to detection, and has
permitted the criminal himself to close that one. We are not
prepared to so hold." Campbell, 159 Ill.  at 22-24.
Today's court appears to have forgotten the wise and sensible rule
established in Campbell. The majority opinion shows that we will now
indeed allow these atrocious crimes to go unpunished if the medical
evidence cannot establish conclusively a death by criminal agency. The
majority is apparently not in the least bit disturbed by the fact that much
of the difficulty in arriving at a conclusive diagnosis in this case was the
direct result of the mother's disposing of the body. This opinion is simply
a blueprint on how to get away with murdering an infant. Suffocate an
infant and throw its body in the water, or simply throw it in the water
without killing it first, deny guilt, and you are home free. By not discussing
any of the other evidence pointing irresistibly to defendant's guilt, the
majority is clearly saying that nothing matters except for the medical
testimony. The majority is thus doing precisely what this court warned
against in Campbell-closing all avenues but one leading to detection, and
allowing the criminal to close that one. Campbell, 159 Ill.  at 24.
Curiously, the majority also seems to rely on the statement that "[n]o
marks on the baby revealed foul play." Slip op. at 9. I am unsure what
significance the majority sees in this fact. A newborn baby found floating
in the water is itself evidence of foul play, and the forensic evidence was
consistent with both suffocation and drowning.
It should be obvious that any uncertainties in the medical examiner's
testimony were merely what is to be expected when a body is found in
water. Our last case in which a body was found partially submerged in
water shows this to be true. In People v. Milka, No. 95740 (March 18,
2004), the murder victim, an 11-year-old-girl, was found on a sandbar in
the Kishwaukee River. As in the present case, the medical testimony was
uncertain. The medical examiner concluded that the cause of death was
homicide by asphyxiation. However, he conceded that he could not rule
out the possibility that the victim had drowned. Milka, slip op. at 4. In
reaching his conclusion of homicide, one of the facts that the examiner
relied upon was that the victim was a young person found far from home
in a secluded area. The defense's expert testified that the evidence was
insufficient for a homicide determination and that the cause of death should
have been listed as undetermined. His opinion was that the victim had
drowned. Milka, slip op. at 4. Although he raised a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, the defendant in Milka did not argue that corpus
delicti had not been proved, nor did he complain about the medical
examiner relying on outside investigation evidence. This is not surprising,
as these arguments would have been clear losers. Although the medical
testimony could not establish with absolute certainty that the victim died
of a homicide, that evidence combined with the circumstantial evidence
was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to reach that conclusion. That is
likewise the case here.(8)
If we rely on the medical examiner's testimony along with all of the
other evidence in the case, instead of in isolation, the defendant's guilt is
clear. The overwhelming circumstantial evidence points directly to the
conclusion that defendant murdered her baby. If we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, we can easily conclude that a
rational trier of fact could have found defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. First, we have the fact that defendant already had two
children. From this, a rational trier of fact could conclude that defendant
would know what it felt like to be pregnant. Thus, we can assume that
defendant knew she was pregnant. Any doubt on this point was cleared
up by defendant's statement that she knew she was pregnant when she
took a home pregnancy test. Further, defendant admitted that she was
pregnant with John Stevens' baby and that she had sex with him in
November of the previous year.
Next, we have defendant's pattern of behavior from April through
August. During this time, defendant told countless lies and ridiculous
stories in an attempt to prevent anyone from knowing that she was
pregnant. Either defendant had a cancerous tumor, or she was carrying a
baby that had already died. She made up doctor's appointments and lied
about what doctors told her. Defendant sought no prenatal care and made
no plans for raising a child. The majority completely ignores this evidence,
apparently believing that it is irrelevant. To see how relevant it is, we need
only imagine if the opposite were true. Assume that defendant was excited
about being pregnant, had sought prenatal care, told everyone she knew
that she was pregnant, decorated a nursery, had a baby shower, and
picked out a name for the child. Do we not know that if this were true that
defendant would be making an argument like the following: "Why in the
world would Elizabeth kill her baby? It makes no sense. The evidence
shows that she was excited about this pregnancy and was telling everyone
about it. She had picked out a name, bought baby furniture, and
decorated a nursery. She never missed a doctor's appointment. And now
the State expects us to believe that she would kill this baby that she was
so excited about and invested so much time in? It just does not fit." The
majority must know that defendant would have made this argument if
those were the facts. And that would have been a perfectly valid and
powerful argument. The opposite is necessarily also true. The absence of
this behavior on defendant's part and her attempt to actively conceal the
pregnancy is strong circumstantial evidence that she did not want anyone
to know about this baby and that she never intended to raise it.
Next we have defendant's behavior on the night of the birth. She
made no plans for a midwife or for any family member to help her. King
left the room when she began to deliver because he thought it was a
miscarriage. Defendant did not ask him to stay. Again, we know from the
evidence that defendant knew she was delivering a full-term baby, not
miscarrying a partially developed fetus. We have to apply common sense
here. What woman chooses to give birth in a room by herself? Women
who choose home birth do not do so in a room with no one around. When
defendant was screaming in pain, King said that he was calling the
paramedics and defendant told him not to. A rational trier of fact could
conclude that defendant chose this path, which is contrary to human
experience, because she was trying to cover something up.
Defendant's behavior after the birth also clearly shows her guilt. As
noted, the evidence clearly showed that defendant knew she was
delivering a full-term baby. The majority is willing to assume for the sake
of argument that the baby was born alive, but claims that there was no
evidence that defendant killed her-a stunning assertion given that
defendant tied her in a plastic bag and placed her either next to or into a
creek. What the majority must be saying under its new unreasonable
hypothesis of innocence test is that perhaps the baby was born alive, and
then immediately just happened to die, following which defendant
immediately disposed of it in a creek. But is there any evidence that this
happened? Again, we just have to apply common sense. What does a
mother do who sees her newborn baby appear to die right in front of her?
Does she shrug her shoulders and think to herself "I guess that's that,"
wrap the baby in a plastic bag, run out of the house in the middle of the
night, throw the baby in a creek, and then lie about it? All while showing
no emotion? Could any rational trier of fact think of a mother they have
ever known who would act in such a way? This is just not normal human
behavior. It defies all common sense that a mother would act like this. A
trier of fact is allowed to consider the evidence in light of his or her own
knowledge and observations in the affairs of life. People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 465 (1998). Doesn't a reasonable mother who sees her baby
appear to die right in front of her try to get help? Doesn't she do
everything in her power to save the child? Here, if defendant's baby was
born alive and just happened to die, defendant did nothing to try to help
her or save her. If we accept that there are two possible explanations of
what happened that night-that the baby just happened to die or that
defendant killed her-which one does the evidence support? The evidence
points irresistibly to defendant's guilt. A rational trier of fact could
conclude that her behavior was that of a mother who killed her baby, not
that of a mother whose baby died in her arms immediately after birth.(9)
Moving on, we now have the defendant's ever-changing lies that she
told the police. Prosecutors typically prove consciousness of guilt by
introducing evidence that the accused: (1) tried to cover up the crime, or
(2) attempted to deflect the investigation. See, e.g., Milka, slip op. at 24
(false exculpatory statements are probative of consciousness of guilt)(10);
People v. Gambony, 402 Ill. 74, 80 (1948); Avery, 88 Ill. App. 3d at
777 ("Defendant also maintains there was no evidence other than the
confession which proved a criminal agency. Defendant's false statements
and actions following Tomika's disappearance could have been intended
by defendant only to divert suspicion or postpone discovery of the crime.
The evidence demonstrates criminal agency as well as the fact of death").
Here, we have both. Defendant tried to conceal the crime by disposing of
the baby's body. She tried to deter the police investigation by telling them
a series of lies. As set forth earlier in this dissent, defendant's stories to the
police changed constantly, and she only gradually accepted some
responsibility when she knew that she was trapped. Several times she tried
to put the blame on King; later she admitted that she was the one who
disposed of the baby. Initially, she denied that the baby was hers. She
claimed that she delivered a 15-week-old fetus, first saying that she
disposed of it in the toilet, other times saying she threw it in the garbage,
and later saying she put it next to the creek. She changed her story from
the birth happening in the bathroom to the birth happening in the bedroom.
At one point the baby was a glob of blood, later it was the size of a naval
orange, and still later it was the size of a Gucci purse. Several times she
claimed that whatever King had said was the truth. Some of her answers
were simply preposterous. For instance, when the police asked her if she
could have been seen by the creek that night, she said, "I don't know."
How does a woman not know if she was outside by a creek shortly after
giving birth? Another time, defendant said that before she could talk to the
police, she needed to speak with King to find out what he told them. Why
would an innocent person need to find out what the police already knew
before she would speak to them?
Further, defendant showed her consciousness of guilt by making
statements that only a guilty person would make. Only one of the
statements that I'm about to discuss appears in the majority opinion, a
matter that I find inexcusable. First, we have defendant's statements to
June Powers. Defendant began a phone call to Powers by telling her that
she was in "deep shit." In the same conversation, defendant said "what if
the baby cried and Steve did do something?" and "what if they test the
baby and the baby's mine? I'm going to jail." These statements are
interesting for two reasons. First, a rational trier of fact could conclude that
the one about the baby crying showed that defendant had some reason to
believe that the baby might have cried and that the baby might have been
alive. No one who knew that the baby was stillborn would say, "What if
the baby cried?" This is totally inconsistent with her other
contemporaneous statements that she had delivered a 15-week-old dead
fetus. Defendant made an even stronger statement in the same regard to
Roszak when she said, "Steve probably might have heard a cry when he
was throwing the bag away and that's probably why he is going crazy
now." Now we have a probability that the baby might have cried-again
a totally inconsistent statement from someone who had been insisting that
the baby was dead. Next, the statements that she was in "deep shit" and
was going to jail would allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that
defendant was concerned that the police would discover that she had
committed a crime. These statements seem to be those of someone who
had done something much more serious than improperly disposing of a
baby who died of natural causes.
In one of her conversations with Sergeant Roszak, defendant said
that the baby was not what her family would have wanted so she had to
get rid of it. What did defendant mean by this? Do any families want dead
babies? Why would someone have to get rid of a dead baby because it
was not what her family would have wanted? This statement implies
something much more sinister. Next we have the following statement to
Roszak which just reeks of guilt: "Tomorrow is my day of reasoning [sic].
I always thought I was like dad, but I'm not. I've got a conscience. It's
eating me up. I'm at my breaking point but I've got to keep this family
together." Is someone who has merely not given a proper burial to a child
that died naturally so eaten up by her conscience that she worries about
losing her family? Does such a person worry about having a day of
reckoning? A rational trier of fact could conclude that this is the statement
of someone who knows she has done something seriously wrong.
Finally, we have possibly defendant's most damning statement in
which she offered to tell the police everything because she wanted to clear
her conscience and get everything off her chest. She said that if her kids
could be placed with King, she would tell the police the truth. The police
could not make that promise, and that particular interview ended. This is
a telling statement for several reasons. First, defendant admits that she has
not been telling the truth. Whatever that truth is, it is weighing on her and
bothering her conscience. Up to this point, defendant had finally told the
police that she delivered a dead baby and placed it by the creek. But the
truth was something else, something that was weighing at her conscience.
Finally, her willingness to tell this truth was contingent on the police
agreeing to place her kids with King. So whatever the truth was, it was
something so serious that defendant knew she would lose her kids over it,
and that King would not be implicated. How does the majority not discuss
this statement? Any one of the above statements that the majority neglects
would be powerful circumstantial evidence of guilt, but taken together they
comprise overwhelming evidence of guilt. A rational trier of fact could
conclude that defendant continually acted like a guilty person and made
statements that only a guilty person would make.
When all of the above evidence is considered with Dr. Kalelkar's
testimony, no reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt remains. The majority
states that this court will reverse a conviction where the evidence is so
unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable
doubt of defendant's guilt. Slip op. at 14. Are my colleagues honestly
saying that the above evidence is so unreasonable, improbable and
unsatisfactory that no rational trier of fact could find defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt? The only things unreasonable, improbable,
or unsatisfactory in this case are defendant's arguments. Interestingly, the
majority is willing to concede that the evidence is sufficient to convince it
that defendant is probably guilty (slip op. at 16), which would seem to
place this case in a strange gray area. On the one hand, the majority states
that the evidence is sufficient to convince it that defendant is probably
guilty. On the other hand, the majority holds that the evidence is so
unreasonable, improbable, and unsatisfactory that no rational trier of fact
could be convinced of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This
would appear to be a classic example of a court reweighing the evidence
and substituting its judgment for that of the trier of fact.
The majority cites People v. Martin, 26 Ill. 2d 547 (1963), for the
proposition that the link between the defendant's criminal agency and the
cause of death cannot be left to inference and speculation. Slip op. at 10.
This is a patently false statement, at least with respect to inferences.
Inferences are the lifeblood of the criminal law. It could not survive without
them. The following passage from Cleary and Graham's Handbook of
Illinois Evidence demonstrates the necessity of inference in the criminal
law:
"Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. [Citation.]
Direct evidence is evidence where the sole inference that must
be made to establish a fact of consequence is the truth of the
matter asserted. Testimony such as 'I saw X shoot B,' is direct
evidence as to a fact of consequence. Circumstantial evidence
involves evidence offered to establish a fact of consequence
where an inference in addition to the truth of the matter stated
needs to be made. [Citations.] Thus evidence that X fled the
scene would be circumstantial evidence of the murderous act.
[Citation.] [C]ircumstantial evidence is proof of certain facts from
which a jury may infer other connected facts that reasonably
follow according to the common experience of mankind. The
inference to be drawn need not be the only conclusion logically
to be drawn; it suffices that the suggested inference may
reasonably be drawn therefrom. [Citation.]" (Emphases added.)
M. Graham, Cleary &amp; Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence
§401.1, at 141-42 (7th ed. 1999).
Thus, all criminal convictions, whether based on direct or circumstantial
evidence, are based on inference. Moreover, as explained earlier in this
dissent, every part of a criminal case, including corpus delicti, may be
established by circumstantial evidence. In other words, every part of a
criminal case may be based on inferences beyond the truth of the matter
asserted. Milka is a recent example of a case in which this court upheld
the defendant's conviction based entirely on inferences. It is simply a
misstatement of the law to say that the link between criminal agency and
cause of death cannot be left to inference. Here, the inferences that can be
drawn from the totality of the evidence in this case are indeed ones that
reasonably follow according to the common experience of mankind and
they are powerful evidence of guilt.
In an article in the Fordham Law Review, authors Christine Fazio and
Jennifer Comito argue that teenage mothers who kill their babies should
receive lesser sentences than other murderers. See C. Fazio &amp; J. Comito,
Rethinking the Tough Sentencing of Teenage Neonaticide Offenders
in The United States, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 3109 (1999). Although I
disagree with this conclusion, I find interesting the authors' description of
the typical fact pattern that is seen when young mothers kill their babies.
The mother does not tell her family she is pregnant, and she does not give
birth in a hospital. She receives no prenatal care and does not plan for the
birth. When the birthing day arrives, the young mother kills the baby either
by suffocation or stabbing, leaves it in a toilet to drown, or abandons the
baby where it dies of exposure. The mother then covers up what she did,
typically by leaving the baby outdoors or in the trash. Rethinking the
Tough Sentencing, 67 Fordham L. Rev. at 3109-10. Thus, the irony of
the majority's opinion is that we have now held that facts showing a
textbook case of infanticide are at the same time so unreasonable,
improbable, and unsatisfactory that they could convince no rational trier
of fact of the defendant's guilt. The majority is simply mistaken when it
states that its holding is "as unique as its facts, and is limited to them." Slip
op. at 18. I believe that these facts are not unique but are typical in
infanticide cases, and the majority's opinion will make it virtually
impossible for the State to obtain convictions in these cases.
Curiously, the majority opinion ends by relying on out-of-state cases.
I am unsure why the majority ignores our own case law and favors out-of-state cases instead. As noted above, the majority opinion fails to apply the
rule we established in Campbell. Further, the majority fails to mention that
one of its cases, State v. Doyle, 205 Neb. 234, 287 N.W.2d 59 (1980),
included a forceful dissent from two justices who criticized the majority for
making the same mistakes as our majority does. Doyle, 205 Neb. at 241-49, 287 N.W.2d  at 64-67 (Clinton, J., dissenting, joined by Boslaugh, J.).
Specifically, the dissenting justices pointed out that the prosecution is
entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence to show that death was a result
of the criminal agency of the defendant. Doyle, 205 Neb. at 245, 287 N.W.2d  at 66 (Clinton, J., dissenting, joined by Boslaugh, J.). In support,
the dissent relied on this court's decision in People v. Ryan, 9 Ill. 2d 467
(1956). To say the least, I find it strange that my colleagues would rely on
the majority opinion in an out-of-state case when the dissent in that case
is premised on the argument that the majority should have followed Illinois
law.
In Ryan, the defendant mother was charged with murder and
manslaughter in the death of her newborn baby. She was convicted of
involuntary manslaughter. The evidence showed that the defendant was
pregnant with a baby out of wedlock. She gave birth to the baby alone in
the bathroom. When the baby was born, the defendant tied off and cut the
umbilical cord. She then baptized the baby with water from the faucet,
wrapped it in the beach towel upon which she had given birth, and then
locked it in an overnight case. She disposed of all of the evidence except
for the overnight case. The next day, she took the baby out of the case
and buried it in a shallow grave. The defendant's position was that the
baby, even if born alive, was dead of natural causes before she wrapped
it in the towel and put it in the overnight case. Defendant argued that
corpus delicti had not been established because the evidence did not
show death by the criminal agency of the defendant. This court rejected
defendant's argument that corpus delicti was not established beyond a
reasonable doubt, noting that corpus delicti may be proved by
circumstantial evidence. Ryan, 9 Ill. 2d  at 471. After concluding that the
circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show that the baby was born
alive, this court took up defendant's argument that the State failed to
prove death by criminal agency:
"In support of her second contention that the State failed to
prove that the child came to its death by other than natural
causes, defendant relies particularly on her own testimony and
the fact that the pathologist did not and was not asked if he was
able to ascertain medically as to what was the cause of death.
The defendant, in testifying in her own behalf, said she made no
effort to ascertain whether the baby was alive or dead, but that
when she wrapped it in the beach towel she believed it was
dead. In her second signed statement she said, 'I made no effort
to keep it alive and was not sure when I wrapped it in the towel
whether it had died or was still breathing.' Yet the defendant
wrapped the infant in the beach towel and placed it in a closed
and locked overnight case.
There is no doubt that the infant was wrapped in a beach
towel, and it is common knowledge that death by suffocation
could have resulted from this act before the child was placed in
the overnight bag. It is likewise common knowledge that the act
of placing the infant in the overnight case and locking it in there
would also be sufficient to cause death." Ryan, 9 Ill. 2d  at 475.
Thus, we have specifically held that in an infanticide case corpus delicti
may be established by the mother's behavior even in the complete
absence of a medical examiner's opinion as to the cause of death. The
majority's decision to ignore this case while relying on out-of-state cases
that follow a different rule is completely inexplicable.
The majority casually dismisses Ryan as an involuntary manslaughter
case. That, however, merely brings up another question, and that is why
the majority never considers reducing defendant's conviction to
involuntary manslaughter before simply affirming the appellate court's
outright reversal. The parties argued the involuntary manslaughter issue to
the trial court, but the court found that defendant was guilty of murder. The
appellate court did not consider the involuntary manslaughter issue
because it reversed on the basis of insufficient evidence to prove live birth.
But the majority is willing to assume that the baby was born alive. If that
is the case, then the majority has to take up the involuntary manslaughter
issue. Section 9-3(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a)
(West 2002)) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
"A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful
justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether
lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to
cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he
performs them recklessly ***."
In Ryan, we stated that, "[r]egardless of defendant's real belief, or
the absence of actual malice, the reckless and wanton disregard for the
welfare, safety and life of her infant daughter constitutes criminal neglect"
which was cognizable as involuntary manslaughter. Ryan, 9 Ill. 2d  at 475.
Here, even if defendant believed that her child died naturally, she had a
duty to make sure that that was in fact the case and she had a duty to
provide her with assistance. Section 4-1 of the Code provides that "[a]
material element of every offense is a voluntary act, which includes an
omission to perform a duty which the law imposes on the offender and
which he is physically capable of performing." 720 ILCS 5/4-1 (West
2002). There is no question that the common law imposed a duty upon
defendant to attempt to aid her child. See 1 W. LaFave, Substantive
Criminal Law §6.2(a)(1), at 437 (2d ed. 2003) ("The common law
imposes affirmative duties upon persons standing in certain personal
relationships to other persons-upon parents to aid their small children,
upon husbands to aid their wives, upon ship captains to aid their crews,
upon masters to aid their servants. Thus a parent may be guilty of criminal
homicide for failure to call a doctor for his sick child"). A parent who sees
her newborn infant in distress is under a duty to provide assistance and
may not immediately wrap up the baby and throw it away. Ryan, 9 Ill. 2d 
at 475. In my opinion, the evidence clearly supports murder not
manslaughter, and I would dissent from a decision reducing defendant's
conviction. Nevertheless, the majority must consider this issue.
The most disingenuous statement in the majority opinion is the quote
from People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 545 (1999), that "[w]hat is
involved here is the standard of proof which is applicable to all crimes."
I have never seen the prosecution held to the standard of proof that the
majority holds the State to in this case, nor have I ever seen a sufficiency-of-the-evidence appeal reviewed in this manner. The majority leaves
crucial evidence out of the opinion, refuses to review the evidence in its
totality, ignores our established case law, creates a new rule for proving
corpus delicti, and rewards defendant for covering up the crime. Is this
really to be the standard applicable to all cases? We know for certain that
it will be for infanticide cases. If the victim is a newborn baby and the
defendant is the baby's mother, we will hold the State to a completely
different standard and will not review the evidence in the way we would
in any other case. There is one standard for mothers who kill their babies
and another one for everyone else. But perhaps my colleagues should
pause and ask why this is so. What is it about the fact that the victim in this
case was a newborn infant that causes them to treat her case with such
casual indifference that they cannot even be bothered to review all of the
evidence? Is it not the least among us who deserves the greatest
protection? Although her life was tragically cut short, this newborn baby
girl is forever a part of the human family, and her life is no less valuable
than that of even the oldest and wisest among us. She was entitled to life,
and she is entitled to justice.
I dissent.
JUSTICE GARMAN joins in this dissent.
JUSTICE KILBRIDE, also dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion. As framed by the
majority, this case presents the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to
affirm defendant's conviction. See slip op. at 6-7, 19. We need only
decide whether any rational trier of fact could have found defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Slip op. at 7, citing People v. Brown, 185 Ill. 2d 229, 247 (1998). After reviewing the evidence presented in the circuit
court, considering the briefs of the parties, and reviewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution (Brown, 185 Ill. 2d at 247), I
do not find the evidence so improbable or unsatisfactory no rational trier
of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v. Tenney, 205 Ill. 2d 411, 427 (2002). Accordingly, I must
respectfully dissent.
 
 
1.                  
          
         
           
             
     Unlike the defendant in People v. Ryan, 9 Ill. 2d 467 (1956), upon which Justices Thomas and Garman rely, 
defendant here was not charged with or convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Moreover, in Ryan, the defendant was a registered nurse 
employed by two doctors and had from time to time assisted in the prenatal care of pregnant women. She told the police that the baby had 
"cried once and that it had moved its little arms." In the present case, defendant was not a nurse by training. Further, defendant never 
admitted hearing the baby cry or seeing any other sign of life in the baby. Where a jury could have found the defendant in Ryan 
guilty of involuntary manslaughter on the facts presented at trial, proof that defendant in the case at bar is guilty of murder is wanting.
2.                
       Justices Thomas and Garman cite Campbell v. People, 159 Ill. 9 (1895), in support and suggest that "the 
majority would be wise to study" the principles set forth therein. See slip op. at 32-33 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Garman, J.). In
Campbell, the prosecutrix testified that her newborn moved and cried just before the defendant, purportedly the baby's father, 
wrapped the newborn in a quilt, carried it out of doors between ten and eleven o'clock at night, and returned about half an hour afterward 
without it. The baby was never seen or heard of again and a jury found the defendant guilty of murder. On appeal, we recognized that 
circumstantial evidence, of the most cogent and convincing character, may be used to show the fact of death as well as the criminal agency 
of the accused in producing it. Campbell, 159 Ill.  at 22. However, we overturned the defendant's conviction because the evidence was 
insufficient. In doing so, we noted: "There is doubtless a possibility of his guilt, but we are constrained to say that the evidence is 
insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We think it would be establishing a precedent fraught with much danger to 
sustain this judgment upon the evidence set out in this record. Upon another trial other facts and circumstances may possibly be shown which 
may tend to dissipate the doubts which must arise in any candid mind upon reading the evidence as now presented." Campbell, 159 Ill. 
at 28. Far from supporting Justices Thomas and Garman, our opinion in Campbell reflects the principle that an accused may not be 
convicted of murder upon evidence that is unsatisfactory and that leaves a reasonable doubt as to the accused's guilt.
3.                
          
             
            
              
             
           
           
  Justices Thomas and Garman suggest that we have adopted a different standard, and, moreover, have applied that 
standard only where the victim is an infant. Slip op. at 19 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Garman, J.). The justices cite our recent 
opinion in People v. Milka, No. 95740 (March 18, 2004), to show that, where the victim is not an infant, a conviction may be 
sustained with proof no more certain than that adduced in the case at bar. We disagree with the characterization of the strength of the 
evidence in these disparate cases. In Milka, the lifeless body of Brittany Martinez, an 11-year-old girl, was discovered on a sandbar 
in the Kishwaukee River, a 30- to 40-minute drive from her home in Elgin. Brittany had been sexually assaulted and a piece of masking tape, 
10 to 12 inches long, ran from her right ear, under her chin, and up toward the left ear. A jury found the defendant guilty of murder based 
on evidence at trial which included the defendant's palm print and Brittany's blood on a McDonald's cup the police recovered from the 
defendant's car. We affirmed the defendant's conviction, noting "the evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the State, allowed the jury to find that (1) defendant was the last person to see Brittany alive, (2) Brittany died between 6 p.m. and 9 
p.m. on May 8, 1997, (3) defendant lied to the police regarding his whereabouts during those hours, (4) the blood in defendant's car was the 
result of vaginal tears suffered by Brittany, and (5) defendant accurately described the location of Brittany's body before her body was 
discovered. This evidence was sufficient for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant caused Brittany's death." Milka, 
slip op. at 26. Today, we remain convinced of the strength of the evidence supporting the defendant's conviction in Milka and of the 
unsatisfactory nature of the evidence the State presented in the case at bar.
4.               
           
           
           
             
        
 The presence of this hospital bracelet was never explained. The evidence was clear that defendant never sought prenatal 
care and that all of her cancer stories were false. In his closing argument, the prosecutor argued that it could possibly explain why 
defendant had not simply sought an abortion. He argued that perhaps she had sought an abortion at this time and was told that it was 
too late.              
           
           
           
             
        
              
           
           
           
             
        

5.               In addition to its unwarranted critique of Dr. Kalelkar's findings, the majority 
appears to be trying to have things both ways. The majority focuses heavily on Dr. Kalelkar's testimony on whether the baby was born alive. 
But the majority concedes this point in the opinion. It cannot have it both ways. The majority has narrowed the issue to whether there was 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of corpus delicti. It cannot bootstrap its conclusion on this issue with testimony on a different 
point that it has conceded to the State.
6.                
               
            
             
           

 The majority asserts that Campbell supports its position because it was a reversal. Slip op. at 15 n.2. But the 
case was reversed for the sole reason that the State had tried and convicted the wrong parent. What is important about Campbell 
is that this court went to great lengths to explain why it would not adopt the very corpus delicti rule that the majority champions 
today.
7.               
        

 Importantly, this court allowed proof of corpus delicti by circumstantial evidence even under the stricter 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence standard.
8.             The majority misses the point 
about Milka's significance. It is cited here merely to show that some uncertainties in the medical examiner's testimony are to be 
expected when a body is found in water.
9.                 
             
           
          
               
         
 The majority puts itself in an interesting position by assuming for the sake of argument that the baby was born alive 
and then just happened to die, because not even defendant agrees with them that this is what happened. Of the many, many different stories 
defendant told about what happened that night, just about the only one she did not tell was the one that the majority invents for the 
sake of reversing her conviction.
10.                   
 The majority ignores this portion of Milka when it holds that it is a "flaw" to equate a defendant's deceit with 
evidence of criminal agency. Slip op. at 16.