Title: Rodriguez v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC17-805
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: July 12, 2018

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-805 
____________ 
 
FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[July 12, 2018] 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
 
We have for review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in 
Rodriguez v. State, 215 So. 3d 194 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017), which expressly and 
directly conflicts with our decision in State v. Lee, 531 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1988), on 
the harmless error standard of review.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), 
Fla. Const. 
 
In State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986), this Court set out the test 
to be applied in determining whether an error is harmless: 
The test is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence, a correct result, a not 
clearly wrong, a substantial evidence, a more probable than not, a 
clear and convincing, or even an overwhelming evidence test. 
Harmless error is not a device for the appellate court to substitute 
 
 
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itself for the trier-of-fact by simply weighing the evidence.  The focus 
is on the effect of the error on the trier-of-fact.  The question is 
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the 
verdict.  The burden to show the error was harmless must remain on 
the state.  If the appellate court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error did not affect the verdict, then the error is by definition 
harmful. 
 
Id. at 1139.   
 
In the conflict case, State v. Lee, this Court addressed the following question 
of great public importance: 
DOES THE ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF 
COLLATERAL CRIMES REQUIRE REVERSAL OF 
APPELLANT’S CONVICTION WHERE THE ERROR HAS NOT 
RESULTED IN A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE BUT THE STATE 
HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT THAT THERE IS NO REASONABLE POSSIBILITY 
THAT THE ERROR AFFECTED THE JURY VERDICT? 
 
531 So. 2d at 134.  Answering the question in the affirmative, this Court declined 
to modify the DiGuilio test in favor of the “miscarriage of justice” test codified by 
the Legislature in section 59.041, Florida Statutes (2017).  Lee, 531 So. 2d at 136. 
We have since reaffirmed this harmless error standard numerous times.  See, 
e.g., Ventura v. State, 29 So. 3d 1086, 1088 (Fla. 2010) (holding that the Third 
District “improperly utilized an ‘overwhelming evidence’ test” when considering 
whether the error was harmless); Williams v. State, 863 So. 2d 1189, 1190 (Fla. 
2003) (quashing in part the Third District’s decision because it determined that the 
error “did not deprive[] [defendant] of a fair trial” rather than considering whether 
 
 
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the error was harmless under the standard set forth in DiGuilio); Knowles v. State, 
848 So. 2d 1055, 1058-59 (Fla. 2003) (“[T]he DiGuilio standard remains the 
benchmark of harmless error analysis.”); Goodwin v. State, 751 So. 2d 537, 546 
(Fla. 1999) (“[T]he DiGuilio standard of harmless error remains the applicable 
analysis to be employed in determining whether the error requires a reversal on 
direct appeal.”). 
 
In this case the Third District departed from the DiGuilio standard, 
concluding: 
Any error by the trial court in admitting the hearsay statements 
at issue was, at best, harmless.  See § 59.041, Fla. Stat. (2015) (“No 
judgment shall be set aside or reversed . . . on the ground of . . . the 
improper admission or rejection of evidence . . . unless in the opinion 
of the court to which application is made, after an examination of the 
entire case it shall appear that the error complained of has resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice.”)  
 
Rodriguez, 215 So. 3d at 195.  Consistent with our precedent, we quash the Third 
District’s decision in this case and remand for reconsideration under the correct 
harmless error standard.  We decline to address the additional issue raised by 
Rodriguez that is beyond the scope of the conflict issue.  See Williams, 863 So. 2d 
at 1190. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, QUINCE, and LABARGA, JJ., concur.  
POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANADY, C.J., and 
LAWSON, J., concur. 
 
 
 
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
POLSTON, J., dissenting. 
 
 
The Third District’s decision in its entirety states the following:   
Any error by the trial court in admitting the hearsay statements 
at issue was, at best, harmless.  See § 59.041, Fla. Stat. (2015) (“No 
judgment shall be set aside or reversed . . . on the ground of . . . the 
improper admission or rejection of evidence . . . unless in the opinion 
of the court to which application is made, after an examination of the 
entire case it shall appear that the error complained of has resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice.”). 
Affirmed. 
 
Rodriguez v. State, 215 So. 3d 194, 195 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).     
Because there are insufficient facts and analysis in the Third District’s 
decision, I would decline to exercise jurisdiction in this case.  Therefore, I 
respectfully dissent.      
CANADY, C.J., and LAWSON, J., concur. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D15-2339 
 
 
(Miami-Dade County) 
 
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Natasha Baker-Bradley, Assistant Public 
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
 
 
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Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Michael Mervine, 
Acting Bureau Chief, and Nikole Hiciano, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, 
Florida,  
  
 
for Respondent