Title: Samek v. Sanders
Citation: 788 So. 2d 872
Docket Number: 1982179
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 17, 2000

788 So. 2d 872 (2000)
Daniel B. SAMEK and Harold W. Schultze
v.
Terrill W. SANDERS, as administrator of the Estate of Earl Chamblee, deceased; et al.
1982179.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 17, 2000.
Rehearing Denied January 5, 2001.
J. Sanford Mullins III, Alton B. Parker, Jr., Peter M. Wright, and Myla Calhoun Choy of Spain &amp; Gillon, L.L.C., Birmingham, for appellants.
Kay L. Cason and Donna Eich Brooks of Gorham &amp; Waldrep, P.C., Birmingham, for appellees.
ENGLAND, Justice.
Earl Chamblee died intestate on May 30, 1998, in Jefferson County. Daniel B. Samek and Harold W. Schultze, his stepsons, filed a complaint seeking a determination of heirship. Their complaint asked the Jefferson Probate Court to declare that they had been "equitably adopted" by Chamblee and thus were heirs to his $2.5million *873 estate. The probate court rejected their claim. They appealed. We affirm.
Probate Judge George R. Reynolds tried the case, and the trial lasted four days. Judge Reynolds entered an order that reads as follows:
As previously stated, Earl Chamblee's estate included assets worth $2.5 million. The plaintiffs claim a right to inherit Chamblee's estate under the doctrine of equitable adoption or adoption by estoppel.
The plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in ruling that a finding of equitable adoption is appropriate only when the plaintiff has clearly proved a definite contract not only to adopt, but to adopt so as to allow the adoptee to inherit, and for which specific performance could be enforced. We disagree.
Adoption is purely statutory; it was never recognized by the rules of the common law. Hanks v. Hanks, 281 Ala. 92, 99, 199 So. 2d 169, 176 (1967). "Equitable adoption is rarely recognized in Alabama and generally requires a finding of an intent to adopt." J.N.H. v. N.T.H., 705 So. 2d 448, 452 (Ala.Civ.App.1997), citing C.H.H. v. R.H., 696 So. 2d 1076 (Ala.Civ. App.1996); and see Hebert v. Stephenson, 574 So. 2d 835 (Ala.Civ.App.1990). On those rare occasions when this Court or the Court of Civil Appeals has recognized an equitable adoption, it has recognized it only when a definite contract was clearly proven, not only to adopt, but to adopt so as to permit the adoptee to inherit, and the contract was one for which specific performance could be enforced. C.H.H. v. R.H., supra., at 1078, citing Prince v. Prince, 194 Ala. 455, 69 So. 906 (1915).
The plaintiffs argue that the probate judge erred in requiring that the plaintiffs prove a contract either between Earl Chamblee and the plaintiffs or between Earl and Genevieve. Samek testified it was after 1992 that he discussed adoption with Earl. According to Samek, Earl asked, "Is it too late to adopt you?" As the trial judge's order states, the Alabama statutes allowing adoption of adults, §§ 43-4-1 through -4, Ala.Code 1975, were repealed effective January 1, 1991. In order to be equitably adopted, one must be capable of being legally adoptedand Samek and Schultze could not have been adopted by Earl in 1992.
As to a possible contract between Earl and Genevieve, Samek testified that his mother told him "that she and Earl had agreed that Harold and I were the children of the marriage and that we were to be adopted." As the trial judge stated, the parties presented no evidence indicating that Earl was present when this statement was made and there was no evidence that he ever ratified any such statement made by his wife. A close reading of the trial court's order shows that the trial court looked for evidence of a contract, but found no evidence that would support a *876 finding of a contract that would be subject to an order of specific performance. Samek and Schultze produced no evidence of a contract to adopt, and certainly no evidence of a specifically enforceable contract by Earl to adopt them so that they could inherit from him. See Luker v. Hyde, 260 Ala. 248, 69 So. 2d 421 (1953).
The plaintiffs' claim of equitable adoption was presented to the court on ore tenus evidence. The judgment of a trial court based on ore tenus evidence is presumed correct, and its findings on such evidence "will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are palpably wrong, manifestly unjust, or without supporting evidence." McCoy v. McCoy, 549 So. 2d 53, 57 (Ala. 1989). See also McCrary v. Butler, 540 So. 2d 736 (Ala.1989); Jones v. Jones, 470 So. 2d 1207 (Ala.1985); Clark v. Albertville Nursing Home, Inc., 545 So. 2d 9, 12-13 (Ala.1989). We cannot say the trial court committed plain and palpable error in refusing to find that Chamblee had equitably adopted his stepsons.
Finally, the plaintiffs take issue with this wording in the trial judge's order:
The wording the judge was quoting actually comes from Samek's testimony in a deposition that was attached to Samek and Schultze's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by resting its judgment on evidence that was not offered at trial. However, if this was error, the error was harmless. See Rule 45, Ala.R.App.P. Samek testified to the substance of this conversation several times during the trial. Samek's testimony at trial concerning what his mother told him upon her return from Seattle was as follows:
Later, Samek testified:
The trial court's use of the quoted words from the deposition was harmless error in that those words fairly summarize the substance of the testimony; simply removing the quotation marks would cure any error. We will not reverse a judgment unless "the error complained of has probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the parties." Rule 45, Ala.R.App.P.
The trial judge heard ore tenus evidence, and it properly applied the law to that evidence. Its judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HOOPER, C.J., and HOUSTON, SEE, and BROWN, JJ., concur.