Title: STATE v JONES
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12127
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: January 8, 1973

No. 12127 I N T H E SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1972 THE STATE OF M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, RONALD L. JONES, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth ~ u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Paul G. Hatfield, ~ u d g e presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: John C. Hall argued, Great F a l l s , Montana, For Respondent : Hon. Robert L, Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana. Jonathan B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana. J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great F a l l s , Montana. James R. Walsh, Deputy County Attorney, argued, Great F a l l s , Montana. -- Submitted: November 27, 1972 Decided: J A N 8 - '1973 Filed: iAP4 2 l Y i 3 M r . Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. Defendant was convicted of the crime of second degree assault following a jury trial in the district court of Cascade County and sentenced to one year in the state prison by the Hon. Paul G. Hatfield, district judge. Defendant now appeals from the judgment of conviction. Defendant Ronald Leslie Jones was a passenger in a Volkswagen van that overturned about 6:00 p.m. on March 23, 1971, in Parkdale, a housing development in Great Falls, Montana. A t the time of the accident, Mike McCrea was driving the Volkswagen and Patrick McCrea and defendant were passengers. Officer Clifford Ayers of the Great Falls police department was dispatched to investigate. Upon his arrival a t the accident scene, he found the Volks- wagen van laying on i t s side and several people standing around, including the driver and passengers of the Volkswagen van who identified themselves. After ascertaining that there were no serious injuries, Officer Ayers took the driver, Mike McCrea, into the police car and began filling out an acci- dent report form. Patrick McCrea and defendant remained near the overturned vehicle. In the meantime Officer Eugene Bernardi of the Great Falls pol ice had been sent to the accident scene to assist in the investigation by the police dispatcher who informed him that possibly some beer belonging to the occupants of the Vol kswagen van might be involved. W h e n Officer Bernardi arrived a t the accident scene he ascertained from Officer Ayers that no one had been injured in the accident and that the two m e n standing near the overturned vehicle had been involved in the accident. Officer Bernardi walked over to a nearby parking area, found some beer between two cars, and placed i t in Officer Ayers' police car. H e then walked over to Patrick McCrea and defendant. From this point the testimony is largely conflicting. The State's evidence indicated that Officer Bernardi asked Patrick McCrea and defendant whether i t was their beer and defendant rep1 ied, "Yes, you f----- pig. W e saved this for you to drink and that l i t t l e bastard standing next to you," referring to a small child standing nearby. Officer Bernardi told defendant to watch his language--that there werea,lot of young children around. De- fendant then turned t o Patrick McCrea and said "Did you hear that?" Patrick McCrea answered "Yes. Don't say that f----- pig again." A t this point Officer Bernardi warned him the second time and told him the next time i t happened he was going to p u t him under arrest. Defendant then said, "Did you hear what the f----- pig said?" Officer Bernardi then attempted to grab defendant by his right arm and left shoulder, but his attempted arm- lock failed. A struggle ensued between Officer Bernardi and defendant dur- ing which Patrick McCrea kicked Officer Bernardi in the head. Eventually defendant was subdued, handcuffed, placed in Bernardi 's patrol car, driven to the pol ice station and booked. Thereafter Officer Bernardi , who had received a nose injury, facial injuries, lacerations on both knees, and a broken hand, was taken to Deaconess Hospital. Defendant's evidence, on the other hand, indicated that Officer Bernardi came over to Patrick McCrea and defendant, asked them for identifi- cation, and the identification was furnished. Officer Bernardi, in a hostile manner, then asked who hid the beer-- McCrea or defendant. Defendant answered that he didn't hide any f----- beer. Officer Bernardi said "Watch your language", whereupon defendant turned t o Patrick McCrea and said "These f----- pigs never leave a guy alone." Patrick McCrea said "Don't call him that--a f ----- pig." Officer Bernardi said "Don't call m e a f----- pig" and defend- ant said 'If--- you." A t this point Officer Bernardi struck defendant in the face, knocking his glasses off. A scuffle ensued and several blows were struck by Officer Bernardi and defendant. During the scuffle Patrick McCrea kicked Officer Bernardi in the head. According t o defendant, Officer Bernardi never told him he was under arrest prior to striking him and a t all times Officer Bernardi was the aggressor, defendant only trying to protect himself. Defendant was eventually handcuffed and driven to the police station by Officer Bernardi i n his patrol car, dragged by his collar into the police station, knocked to the ground, kicked into unconsciousness, and thrown into the "drunk tank". - 3 - Defendant was charged by direct information w i t h second degree assault to which he plead "not guilty*. H e was tried by jury, convicted, and sentenced to one year i n the state prison. H e now appeals from the judgment of conviction . Defendant raises two issues for review upon appeal: (1) Did the d i s t r i c t court err i n instructing the jury on elements of the second degree assault statute not embraced i n the charge against defendant? ( 2 ) Did the d i s t r i c t court e r r i n refusing defendant's offered instructions on self -defense? The f i r s t issue is the principal issue upon appeal. The charge against defendant s e t forth i n the information accuses the defendant of the crime of assault i n the second degree committed as follows: "That a t the County of Cascade, State of Montana, on or about the 23 day of March, A.D. 1971, and before the filing of this Information, the said defendant[s] then and there being, did then and there wilfully, wrongfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault a human being, who was an officer of the Great Falls City Police Department, to w i t : Eugene Bernardi, w i t h the intent then and there i n [him] , the said defendant [s] to prevent or resist the lawful apprehension or detention of a human being, i n violation of Section 94-602, R.C.M. 1947 as amended * * *." This clearly charges a second degree assault under section 94-602, R.C.M. 1947, which provides: "Every person who, under circumstances not amounting t o [ f i r s t degree assault] : "(5) Assaults another w i t h intent to commit a felony, or t o prevent or resist the execution of any lawful process or mandate of any court or officer, or the lawful apprehension or detention of himself, or any other person, ?s guilty of an assault i n the second degree * * *." (Bracketed materi a1 paraphrased; emphasis added. ) Defendant contends that the jury was instructed, i n effect, that he could be convicted of second degree assault under subdivision 3 of section 94-602, R.C.M. 1947, wherein one is guilty of second degree assault i f he: "(3) Wilfully or wrongfully wounds or inflicts grievous - 4 - bodily harm upon another, either w i t h or without a weapon." i Defendant argues that he could not be convicted of second degree assault i dnder subdivision 3 because that charge is not contained in the information ,!* filed against him. / Specifically the defendant assigns court's instructions No. 2, No. 10, and No. 11 as error. Instruction No. 2 reads: "An assault is defined as an unlawful attempt t o in- f l i c t injury upon the person of another, coupled w i t h the present ability to i n f l i c t such injury. "Assault i n the Second Degree is defined: "A. Every person who wilfully or wrongfully wounds or inflicts grievous bodily harm upon another, either w i t h or without a weapon; or, "B. Assaults another to prevent or resist the execution of any lawful process or mandate of any court or officer, or the lawful apprehension or detention of himself , or of any other person ." Defendant's objection t o this instruction was i n the following 1 anguage : "Object to that, Your Honor, i n that i t does not define the assault charged i n the Information which i s 94-602-605 (sic), but includes other sections, other subsections of that section, which are not charged i n the information." Court's instruction No. 10 provided: "With regard to the charge that the defendant committed an assault i n the second degree i n that he wilfully and wrongful ly assaulted Officer Bernardi i n a manner 1 i kely to produce grievous bodily harm, specific intent is not an element of the charge. The law presumes a ma1 icious and guilty intent from the deliberate commis- sion of an unlawful act for the purpose of injuring another. This is a conclusive presumption which means i t cannot be controverted or rebutted by other evidence. "Therefore, i f you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, though he did not intend to resist or prevent his 1 awful apprehension or detention, he never- theless struck Officer Bernardi forbthe purpose of injuring him, the law presumes that he acted w i t h a malicious and guilty intent, and the defendant i s not entitled to rebut the presumption, for i f you have found that the defendant's act was.unlawfu1 and was for the purpose of injuring you Mve necessarily found unlawful intent." A 1 though i t does not appear in the record w i t h clarit:~, w e shall assume that the following objection by defendant was directed a t court's I instruction No. 10. "I object to i t for the reason that i t should state the kind of second degree assault. Further reason the kind of crime referred to i n the Information i s the kind of assault w i t h intent to prevent or resist arrest." Court's instruction No. 11 said: "You are instructed that grievous bodily harm would include any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with health or comfort of the person injured; i t need not be necessarily an injury of a permanent character. B y grievous is meant atrocious, aggravated, harmful , painful , hard to bear, serious in nature." Defendant objected t o this instruction i n the following manner: "I object to that on the ground that the Information charges assault w i t h intent to prevent or r e s i s t arrest. In this charge, this instruction does not conform t o the information a t a l l , and the crime of assault, 1 i kely t o produce grjeoous bodily harm i s not included i n the infor- mation a t all . " Defendant Is objections t o a1 1 three instructions were overruled and the instructions were given to the jury. The thrust of defendant's contention is that these three instruc- tions permit conviction of a kind of assault not charged in the information, specifically assault by wilfully inflicting grievous bodily harm on another i n violation of section 94-602(3), R.C.M. 1947. Defendant further argues that this type of assault requires only a general intent to commit the act constituting the assault whereas the assault charged i n the information re- quires a specific intent. Defendant concludes that as i t i s impossible to t e l l which type of assault the defendant was convicted of, the instructions i n question constitute prejudicial and reversible error. A t the outset, i t is clear t o us that defendant was charged in the information w i t h but one kind of second degree assault, viz: assault w i t h intent to prevent or resist his lawful apprehension or detention i n violation of section 94-602(5). The charge specifically charges an assault "with the intent then and there i n [him], the said defendantks], to prevent or resist the lawful apprehension or detention of a human being." The charge does not contain language referring t o an assault involving the wilful1 or wrongful wounding or i nfl i c t i ng grievous bodily harm upon another. Therefore court's instructions No. 2 , No. 10 and No. 11 should not have been given. The only remaining question then i s whether this error was prejudicial and reversible. Section 95-2412, R.C.M. 1947 specifically provides in pertinent part: " * * * N o cause shall be reversed by reason of any error committed by the trial court against the appel- lant, unless the record shows that the error was prejudicial. " Section 95-2425, R.C.M. 1947, expresses the converse of this rule in the following language: "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. * * *I1 Thus the test in Montana of reversible versus harmless error i s whether the error affects the substantial rights of the party against w h o m the error was committed or not. Under the circumstances of this case, w e hold the error harmless. The jury's verdict of conviction demonstrates i t s rejection of defendant's evidence that he acted in self-defense. Absent this evidence, only one conclusion i s possible under the remaining evidence, viz; that defendant assaulted Officer Bernardi to prevent or resist his lawful apprehension or detention. Defendant admitted that he repeatedly used profane and obscene language in the presence of women and small children. The evidence is un- rebutted that this constitutes a crime under the ordinances of the City of Great Falls. I t i s undisputed that this offense was committed in the presence of Officer Bernardi who warned defendant against the use of such 1 anguage . Absent defendant's evidence tending to prove self-defense and that Officer Bernardi struck h i m f i r s t , which the jury demonstrably rejected, the only remaining evidence indicated that Officer Bernardi attempted to apply an armhold on defendant for the purpose of apprehending and detain- ing him. Defendant admits a struggle w i t h Officer Bernardi, admits that he struck Officer Bernardi , and admits that he was eventually handcuffed and placed in the police car. The evidence permits but a single conclusion-- that defendant assaulted Officer Bernardi with the specific intent to pre- vent his lawful apprehension and detention. The evidence i s not only over- whelming, i t demonstrates conclusively defendant's gui 1 t of the crime charged. - 7 - Under such circumstances, defendant's guilt or innocence of a type of assault not charged is immaterial and cannot affect the verdict. Accord- ingly, the errors i n the three jury instructions constitute harmless error. Directing our attention to the second issue for review, defendant contends that reversible error occurred when the court refused his foll owing offered jury instructions: " I t is lawful for a person who is being assaulted, and who has reasonable ground for believing that bodily injury is about to be inflicted upon him, to stand his ground and defend himself from such attack, and i n doing so he may use a1 1 force and means which he be1 ieves to be reasonably necessary and which would appear to a reasonable person, i n the same or similar circumstances, t o be necessary to prevent the injury which appears t o be imminent . " "A person who has been attacked and who i s exercising his right of lawful self-defense is not required to retreat, and he not only may stand his ground and defend himself against the attack but may also pursue his assailant until he has secured himself from danger i f that course appears to him, and would appear to a reasonable person in the same situation, t o be reason- ably and apparently necessary; and this is his right even though he might more easily have gained safety by withdrawing from the scene. " The'gist of defendant's complaint is that the "reasonable man" standard enabl ing defendant to act on appearances in sel f -defense as provided i n the above instructions is the law in Montana and was n o t covered anywhere i n the court's instructions to the jury. Defendant cites State v. Totten, 65 Mont. 203, 210 P. 1061 and State v. Daw, 99 Mont. 232, 43 P.2d 240, i n support of the offered instructions. The giving or refusal of a particular instruction i n a given case must be determined in the light of the evidence and issues in that case, and therefore a given instruction may be proper i n one case and improper i n another. W e have no quarrel w i t h the offered instructions here as correct statements of the law; however, w e hold their refusal by the t r i a l court correct because the evidence did not support such instructions. In the instant case appearances and actualities are identical; there is simply no evidence from which the jury could infer that the defendant i n exercising his right of self-defense acted on appearances as a reasonable m a n rather than in light of the actual situation t h a t presented itself. The judgment of the district court i s affirmed. 2!A r R & . @ d ------ --- -- Associate Justice I