Title: Catherine M. Doyle v. Ward Engelke
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP000680
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 24, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-0680 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Catherine M. Doyle and Karl Rohlich, 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
Ward Engelke, Missionaries to the Preborn Youth 
for America-National, Youth for America-
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Joseph L. Foreman, Matthew 
Trewhella, Kelly Dykema, Timothy L. Ruchti, Kurt 
L. Sonnenburg, Bryan Longworth and Advocates for 
Life Ministries,  
 
Defendants, 
Wisconsin Voice of Christian Youth, Inc. and Vic 
Eliason, 
 
Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Employers Insurance of Wausau, a mutual company, 
 
Intervenor-Defendant-Co-Appellant- 
 
Petitioner, 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company,  
 
Intervenor-Defendant-Respondent, 
Matthew Trewhella, 
 
Defendant-Counter-Plaintiff-Third-Party 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc., Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., 
Milwaukee Clinic Protection Coalition, Severa 
Austin, Linda Mellowes, John Does and Jane Does,  
 
Third-Party Defendants. 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  209 Wis. 2d 600, 568 N.W.2d 38 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-UNPUBLISHED) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 24, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
February 18, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
William D. Gardner 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Steinmetz, J., concurs (Opinion filed) 
 
 
  Wilcox, J., joins 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: Abrahamson, C.J., and Geske, J., did not 
 
 
 participate 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners there 
were briefs by Terry E. Johnson, Timothy J. Pike and Jeff M. 
Blessinger, and Peterson, Johnson & Murray, S.C., Milwaukee and 
oral argument by Terry E. Johnson. 
 
 
For the intervenor-defendant-co-appellant-
petitioner there were briefs by J. Ric Gass, John J. Laffey, 
Michael D. Rosenberg, and Kravit, Gass & Weber, S.C., Milwaukee 
and oral argument by J. Ric Gass. 
 
 
For the intervenor-defendant-respondent there was 
a brief by Arnold P. Anderson and Mohr & Anderson, S.C., Madison 
and oral argument by Arnold P. Anderson. 
 
No.  96-0680 
 
1
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-0680 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
No.  96-0680 
 
2
 
Catherine M. Doyle and Karl Rohlich,  
 
          Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Ward Engelke, Missionaries to the Preborn  
Youth for America-National, Youth for  
America-Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Joseph L.  
Foreman, Matthew Trewhella, Kelly Dykema,  
Timothy L. Ruchti, Kurt L. Sonnenburg,  
Bryan Longworth and Advocates for Life  
Ministries,  
 
          Defendants, 
 
Wisconsin Voice of Christian Youth, Inc.  
and Vic Eliason,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
Employers Insurance of Wausau, a mutual  
company,  
 
          Intervenor-Defendant-Co- 
          Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company,  
 
 
          Intervenor-Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Matthew Trewhella,  
 
          Defendant-Counter-Plaintiff- 
          Third-Party Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc.,  
Planned Parenthood Federation of America,  
Inc., Milwaukee Clinic Protection  
Coalition, Severa Austin, Linda Mellowes,  
John Does and Jane Does,  
 
          Third-Party Defendants.  
FILED 
 
JUN 24, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
No.  96-0680 
 
3
part and reversed in part. 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioners, Wisconsin 
Voice of Christian Youth, Inc. and Vic Eliason (collectively 
"WVCY") 
and 
Intervenor 
Employers 
Insurance 
of 
Wausau 
("Employers") seek review of an unpublished decision of the 
court of appeals which affirmed a circuit court grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Intervenor St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance 
Company ("St. Paul") determining that it was not obligated to 
defend or provide coverage under its policy.1  The petitioners 
contend that the circuit court erred in concluding that St. 
Paul's policy with WVCY (the "Policy") did not cover the slander 
of title, third-party negligent supervision, and invasion of 
privacy claims against WVCY. 
¶2 
We determine that while St. Paul's Policy excuses it 
from indemnifying WVCY on slander of title claims, the Policy 
does 
not 
excuse 
St. 
Paul 
from 
defending 
the 
negligent 
supervision claim.  Because Employers and WVCY have not 
preserved the invasion of privacy coverage claim on appeal, we 
do not reach it.  Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in 
part the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶3 
This case derives from an anti-abortion demonstration 
outside a clinic near Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  Shortly after the 
demonstration, the defendant, Ward Engelke, alleged that the 
                     
1 Doyle v. Engelke, No. 96-0680, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Mar. 25, 1997)(affirming judgment of Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County, William D. Gardner, Judge).   
No.  96-0680 
 
4
plaintiff, Catherine Doyle, had cursed at and kicked his 
daughter, Ekaterina Engelke, in the face while she was praying 
outside of the clinic.  Engelke's allegations were covered 
extensively in the print media and in broadcasts by a radio 
station owned by WVCY.  Subsequently, two employees of WVCY, 
David Kanz and Louis Schierbeck, filed a false security 
agreement with the Secretary of State, thereby encumbering the 
assets of Doyle.  They also served a false subpoena at Doyle's 
residence. 
¶4 
Based on these incidents, Doyle filed suit against 
Engelke, WVCY, and eleven other related defendants.  Doyle's 
Third Amended Complaint, the complaint currently before us, 
alleges eleven different causes of action arising from the 
actions of Engelke, WVCY, and WVCY's employees.  Based on an 
insurance policy covering defamation actions against WVCY, 
Employers has defended WVCY against Doyle's defamation and other 
claims. 
¶5 
St. Paul also insures WVCY and its employees under a 
number of policies, including a comprehensive general liability 
policy which covers "bodily injuries" caused by WVCY or its 
employees.  During the pendency of this suit before the circuit 
court, St. Paul intervened as a defendant pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.09 (1993-94).2  St. Paul then filed a motion for summary 
judgment asking the circuit court to determine that pursuant to 
                     
2 Unless otherwise noted, all future statutory references to 
the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1993-94 volumes.  
No.  96-0680 
 
5
the terms of its Policy with WVCY, St. Paul was not obligated to 
defend WVCY or provide coverage in the event of a judgment 
adverse to WVCY.  Employers also intervened as a party for 
purposes of contesting the scope of St. Paul's duty to defend 
WVCY.  The circuit granted summary judgment and determined that 
St. Paul was not obligated to defend or indemnify WVCY on any of 
Doyle's claims. 
¶6 
WVCY and Employers appealed. On appeal all of the 
parties concede that eight of Doyle's eleven claims are not 
covered by the Policy.  Employers and WVCY contend, however, 
that Doyle's negligent supervision, slander of title, and 
invasion of privacy claims are covered by the Policy.   
¶7 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
grant of summary judgment.  The appellate court determined that 
St. Paul was not required to provide coverage for or defend 
Doyle's claim for negligent supervision since the Policy's 
intentional act exclusion applied to the actions of WVCY's 
employees; that Doyle's property based slander of title action 
was not covered by the Policy provision covering the more common 
slander to personal reputation cause of action; and that WVCY's 
claim for coverage of Doyle's invasion of privacy claim failed 
due to a specific broadcast exclusion within the Policy. 
I. 
¶8 
We review a grant of summary judgment independently, 
applying the same methodology as the circuit court.  See State 
ex rel. Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 200 Wis. 2d 585, 591-92, 
547 N.W.2d 587 (1996).  Where no material facts remain in 
No.  96-0680 
 
6
dispute, we must determine whether the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  See id. at 592.   
¶9 
This case requires us to interpret an insurance policy 
to determine if coverage exists and whether the insurer is 
subject to a duty to defend.  The interpretation of words or 
clauses in an insurance policy and the existence of coverage 
under that policy are questions of law which we review de novo. 
 See Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis. 2d 737, 744, 456 
N.W.2d 570 (1990); Smith v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 155 Wis. 2d 
808, 810, 456 N.W.2d 597 (1990).   
¶10 In determining an insurer's duty to defend, we apply 
the factual allegations present in the complaint to the terms of 
the disputed insurance policy.  See Professional Office Bldgs., 
Inc. v. Royal Indem. Co., 145 Wis. 2d 573, 580, 427 N.W.2d 427 
(Ct. App. 1988).  We liberally construe those allegations and 
assume all reasonable inferences.3  See Atlantic Ins. Co. v. 
                     
3  Employers would have this court adopt the language of the 
decade old court of appeals decision, Berg v. Fall, 138 Wis. 2d 
115, 405 N.W.2d 701 (Ct. App. 1987), indicating that courts may 
be allowed to go beyond the four corners of a complaint when 
determining whether coverage exists.  The language in Berg is, 
however, contrary to a long line of cases in this state which 
indicate that courts are to make conclusions on coverage issues 
based solely on the allegations within the complaint.  See City 
of Edgerton v. General Cas. Co., 184 Wis. 2d 750, 765, 517 
N.W.2d 463 (1994); Elliott v. Donahue, 169 Wis. 2d 310, 320-21, 
485 N.W.2d 403 (1992); Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Badger Med. 
Supply Co., 191 Wis. 2d 229, 236, 241, 528 N.W.2d 486 (Ct. App. 
1995)(rejecting 
use 
of 
extrinsic 
aids 
in 
coverage 
determinations).  Accordingly, we reject Employer's proffered 
frame of analysis and confine our analysis to the four corners 
of the complaint. 
No.  96-0680 
 
7
Badger Med. Supply Co., 191 Wis. 2d 229, 241-42, 528 N.W.2d 486 
(Ct. App. 1995); see also Kenefick v. Hitchcock, 187 Wis. 2d 
218, 224, 522 N.W.2d 261 (Ct. App. 1994).  An insurer has a duty 
to defend a suit where the complaint alleges facts which, if 
proven at trial, would give rise to the insurer's liability 
under the terms of the policy.  See Professional Office Bldgs., 
145 Wis. 2d at 580.  
II. 
¶11 As a threshold matter we note that St. Paul challenges 
Employer's standing in this matter.  St. Paul claims that 
because no contractual relationship exists between St. Paul and 
Employers, St. Paul owes no duty to Employers under the terms of 
Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982) and 
Teigen v. Jelco of Wisconsin, Inc., 124 Wis. 2d 1, 367 N.W.2d 
806 (1985), and no standing exists. 
¶12 We find Loy and Teigen inapposite to the present 
situation.  In those cases this court determined that a primary 
insurer who settled with the plaintiff and obtained a release 
for itself and its insured was appropriately dismissed from the 
underlying suit, leaving a secondary tortfeasor to defend the 
plaintiff's remaining claims 
beyond 
the primary 
insurer's 
limits.  
¶13 In this case we acknowledge that St. Paul owes no 
contractual duty to Employers.  However, the disputed issue in 
this summary judgment motion is whether St. Paul's Policy 
requires St. Paul to defend WVCY on claims which Employers, as 
No.  96-0680 
 
8
another policy provider, has already begun to defend.4  It was on 
this basis that the circuit court granted Employer's oral motion 
to intervene when the court also granted St. Paul's motion to 
intervene for purposes of determining coverage.  As Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.09 indicates: 
 
Intervention. (1) Upon timely motion anyone shall be 
permitted to intervene in an action when the movant 
claims an interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action and the 
movant is so situated that the disposition of the 
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the 
movant's ability to protect that interest, unless the 
movant's 
interest 
is 
adequately 
represented 
by 
existing parties. 
¶14 In this case the circuit court's resolution of St. 
Paul's 
coverage 
of 
WVCY 
directly 
affects 
Employers' 
participation in the suit under the terms of its policy.  Thus, 
Employers has an "interest" in the "transaction which is the 
subject of the action" and Employers has standing before the 
court. 
III.  Negligent Supervision 
¶15 The first substantive issue we are asked to address is 
whether St. Paul's Policy requires St. Paul to defend WVCY 
against Doyle's claim that WVCY was negligent in its supervision 
of its employees, Kanz and Schierbeck.  The circuit court 
concluded that St. Paul was not required to defend WVCY on this 
                     
4 Where an insurer's policy provides coverage for even one 
claim made part of a lawsuit, that insurer is obligated to 
defend the entire suit.  See School Dist. of Shorewood v. Wausau 
Ins. Co., 170 Wis. 2d 347, 366, 488 N.W.2d 82 (1992); Atlantic 
Mutual, 191 Wis. 2d at 242.    
No.  96-0680 
 
9
claim because Doyle's allegations against WVCY evidenced neither 
a "bodily injury" nor an "event," as defined in the Policy, and 
because coverage was otherwise barred by the intentional acts 
exclusion of the Policy.  The court of appeals disagreed in 
part, determining that the complaint alleged a "bodily injury" 
and an "event," but still concluded that the intentional acts 
exclusion clause released St. Paul from any duty to defend.  We 
reach a different result. 
¶16 St. Paul's Policy provides coverage for "[b]odily 
injury and property damage liability."  The Policy indicates 
that: 
 
We'll pay amounts any protected person is legally 
required 
to 
pay 
as 
damages 
for 
covered 
bodily 
injury . . . that: 
•happens while this agreement is in effect; and 
•is caused by an event. 
. . . 
 
Bodily injury is then defined to mean: 
 
any physical harm, including sickness or disease, to 
the physical health of other persons.  It includes any 
of the following that results at any time from such 
physical harm, sickness or disease. 
•Mental anguish, injury or illness. 
•Emotional distress. 
•Care, loss of services, or death. 
¶17 This court has recently recognized that a tort of 
negligent supervision exists in the State of Wisconsin.  See 
Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, No. 96-2529 (S. Ct. June 24, 1998).  
In this case Doyle's complaint alleges that WVCY failed to 
exercise 
reasonable 
care 
in 
the 
supervision 
of 
its 
two 
No.  96-0680 
 
10 
employees.  It alleges that such negligence is responsible for 
the employees intentionally causing Doyle severe emotional 
distress and disabling injuries through their filing of a false 
security agreement against her assets.  Doyle's complaint 
comports 
with 
the 
negligent 
supervision 
cause 
of 
action 
requirements as set forth in Wal-Mart. 
¶18 The question then becomes whether St. Paul's Policy 
covers such a claim.  St. Paul argues that Doyle's complaint 
does not allege any bodily injury, as required by the Policy.  
It asserts that reliance by the court of appeals on Tara N. v. 
Economy Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 197 Wis. 2d 77, 540 N.W.2d 26 
(Ct. App. 1995), was inappropriate since that case interpreted a 
"bodily injury" insurance clause in a context where both 
physical and psychological injuries were alleged. 
¶19 Resolution of this issue requires us to determine 
whether Doyle has alleged a "bodily injury" sufficient to invoke 
coverage under the Policy.  Like the court of appeals, we 
believe she has made such an allegation.  The complaint alleges 
not only that Doyle suffered "harm" by virtue of WVCY's 
supervision of its employees, but also that she suffered 
"emotional distress" which was "disabling" as a result of the 
employee's wrongful actions.  As the court of appeals noted in 
Tara N., a "reasonable insured would understand [mental, 
emotional or psychological] conditions to be included within the 
concepts of 'sickness or disease' which the policy uses to 
define 'bodily injury.'"  See Tara N., 197 Wis. 2d at 87.   
No.  96-0680 
 
11 
¶20 While St. Paul claims that these allegations are 
insufficient in light of the inclusion of the "physical harm" 
language in the definition of "bodily injury" set out above, we 
are not dissuaded from our result.  As another court has noted, 
"[w]e are unable to separate a person's nerves and tensions from 
his [or her] body.  It is common knowledge that worry and 
anxiety can and often do have a direct effect on other bodily 
functions."  Levy v. Duclaux, 324 So. 2d 1, 10 (La. Ct. App. 
1975).  Because we assume the existence of all facts alleged in 
the complaint, and construe those allegations liberally in favor 
of coverage, it appears that bodily injury constituting physical 
harm is sufficiently alleged and Doyle's claim comports with the 
initial requirement of the Policy provision. 
¶21 In addition, St. Paul attempts to distinguish Tara N. 
on the grounds that in that case "the issue was whether 
emotional 
distress, 
in 
addition 
to 
physical 
injury, 
was 
covered."  St. Paul brief at 35.  St. Paul's factual assertion 
is accurate—Tara did claim both physical and psychological 
injuries in the circuit court.  However, on appeal the Tara N. 
court determined that Tara's psychological damage claim by 
itself fell within the policy coverage of "bodily injury" since 
it included sickness or disease.  See Tara N., 197 Wis. 2d at 
90.  Thus, while we acknowledge that the policy language in Tara 
N. is not directly dispositive of the dispute in this case, we 
find the parallel reasoning persuasive. 
¶22 Next 
we 
must 
ascertain 
whether WVCY's 
negligent 
supervision of its employees constitutes an "event" for coverage 
No.  96-0680 
 
12 
purposes.  The Policy defines "Event" to mean "an accident, 
including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the 
same general harmful conditions."   
¶23 Upon review, we adopt the conclusion of the court of 
appeals that Doyle has alleged that the occurrence of an "event" 
led to her damages.  While the term "accident" is not defined 
further by the Policy, we must give words used in an insurance 
contract their common, everyday meaning.  See Schmidt v. 
Luchterhand, 62 Wis. 2d 125, 133, 214 N.W.2d 393 (1974).  
Turning then to the common definition, we discover that 
"accident" is defined as "[a]n unexpected, undesirable event" or 
"an unforeseen incident" which is characterized by a "lack of 
intention."  The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 11 (3rd ed. 1992).  Similarly, "negligence" is defined 
as "failure to exercise the degree of care considered reasonable 
under the circumstances, resulting in an unintended injury to 
another party."  Id. at 1209. 
¶24 It is significant that both definitions center on an 
unintentional occurrence leading to undesirable results.  As we 
have recognized in the past, comprehensive general liability 
policies are "designed to protect an insured against liability 
for negligent acts resulting in damage to third-parties."  
General Cas. Co. of Wisconsin v. Hills, 209 Wis. 2d 167, 183-84, 
561 N.W.2d 718 (1997)(quoting Arnold P. Anderson, Wisconsin 
Insurance Law § 5.14, at 136 (3rd ed. 1990 & Supp. 1997)).  
Accordingly, we have little trouble concluding that a reasonable 
No.  96-0680 
 
13 
insured would expect the Policy provision defining "event" to 
include negligent acts. 
¶25 Having concluded 
that the 
allegations 
present a 
"bodily injury" occurring as part of a covered "event," we 
consequently must resolve the parties' dispute over application 
of the intentional acts exclusion to the negligent supervision 
claim.  That provision indicates that St. Paul "won't cover 
bodily injury or property damage that's expected or intended by 
the protected person."  Under the policy's definition of "[w]ho 
is protected under this agreement," both WVCY and its individual 
employees are protected persons.   
¶26 St. Paul argues, and the circuit court and court of 
appeals agreed, that the policy exclusion bars coverage for 
intentional acts of employees acting within their employment.  
Under 
that 
interpretation 
WVCY 
is 
not 
covered 
for 
the 
intentional acts of the employees since they are also protected 
persons. 
¶27 We disagree with the form of the analysis offered by 
the court of appeals.  It is significant in this case that the 
coverage disputed by the parties is not St. Paul's obligation to 
defend WVCY's employees individually for their intentional acts 
against Doyle.  Rather, the coverage we are addressing is WVCY's 
individual coverage as a protected person under the Policy. 
¶28 Restating the intentional act exclusion once again, it 
indicates that St. Paul "won't cover bodily injury . . . 
that's . . . intended 
by 
the 
protected 
person." 
 
Doyle's 
negligent supervision claim alleges no acts causing bodily harm 
No.  96-0680 
 
14 
which were intended by WVCY as the protected person under the 
Policy.5  Instead, Doyle's supervision claim focuses on WVCY's 
negligence in supervising its employees—whether or not the 
employees committed the underlying wrong intentionally.6  This 
interpretation is strengthened by the "separation of protected 
persons" clause in the Policy.7  Since a bodily injury is alleged 
to have occurred as part of an event, and the intentional act 
exclusion cannot apply to WVCY's negligent conduct, the circuit 
                     
5 St. Paul's reliance upon allegations in other counts 
alleging intentional conduct by WVCY is inapposite, as parties 
are permitted to plead in the alternative.  
6 St. Paul's reliance upon Berg v. Schultz, 190 Wis. 2d 170, 
526 N.W.2d 781 (Ct. App. 1994) for the proposition that an 
employer cannot be held liable for the intentional acts of its 
employees is unworkable.  In Berg, the court was confronted with 
an 
insurance 
exclusion 
which, 
unlike 
the 
clause 
here, 
specifically excluded coverage for claims "arising out of" and 
employee's commission of an assault and battery.  See Berg, 190 
Wis. 2d at 174. 
Moreover, St. Paul's objection to responsibility to defend 
WVCY 
against 
a 
negligent 
supervision 
claim 
on 
vicarious 
liability grounds fails to recognize that it is not a claim in 
vicarious liability.  While negligent supervision does require 
an underlying wrong to be committed by the employee as an 
element, the tort actually focuses on the tortious, i.e. 
negligent, conduct of the employer.  
7 The clause provides: 
Separation of protected persons.  We'll apply this 
agreement: 
•to each protected person named in the Introduction as 
if that protected person was the only one named there; 
and 
•separately to each other protected person. (emphasis 
added) 
  
No.  96-0680 
 
15 
court and court of appeals erred in concluding that St. Paul was 
under no duty to defend WVCY on the negligent supervision claim.8 
IV.  Slander of Title 
¶29 Next, we address the petitioners' claim that the 
Policy also includes coverage for the slander of title action 
against WVCY.  The petitioners base their claim for coverage on 
the personal injury clause of the Policy which defines personal 
injury to include "libel or slander."   
¶30 Libel and slander are otherwise undefined terms in the 
Policy.  The petitioners accordingly contend that the bald use 
of the term slander renders the insurance clause ambiguous and 
that the reasonable insured would believe coverage for slander 
of title exists.  We disagree. 
¶31 As the court of appeals noted, "slander is an offense 
against the person which damages a person's reputation [while] 
[s]lander of title is a claim against property which involves 
damage to property."  Doyle v. WVCY, No. 96-0680, unpublished 
slip op. at 4 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 1997)(citing Towne Realty 
v. Zurich Ins. Co., 193 Wis. 2d 544, 555, 534 N.W.2d 886 (Ct. 
App. 1995) and Kensington Dev. Corp. v. Israel, 142 Wis. 2d 894, 
419 N.W.2d 241 (1988)).  Slander of title is a completely 
different breed of claim than slander of a person's reputation. 
¶32 Despite this substantive distinction, the petitioners 
contend that the reasonable person could read the naked 
                     
8 Because we reach this conclusion, we need not consider 
Employer's argument that the exception to the exclusion for use 
of reasonable force to protect others applies to the unborn.  
No.  96-0680 
 
16 
reference to slander to include slander of title and that any 
ambiguity must be construed in favor of coverage.  However, we 
note that the petitioners' position is contrary to their later 
acknowledgment that "the term 'slander of title' has, by common 
use, become a well-known and recognized phrase of the law."  
Employer's brief at 37 (quoting 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander 
§ 204 (citations omitted)).  Since the petitioners concede that 
the property-based slander of title terminology is a commonly 
used term of legal art, we fail to see how a reference to 
slander without more can give rise to any ambiguity subject to 
misinterpretation by the reasonable insured. 
¶33 Moreover, the structure and placement of the slander 
clause also alleviates any potential for ambiguity.  Slander is 
listed under the terms of coverage provided by St. Paul for 
personal injury, not under the terms of coverage for property 
damage.  In addition, the slander clause is part of a 
conjunctive clause which includes coverage for libel—another 
injury to personal reputation cause of action.  Accordingly, we 
do not believe that the policy can be interpreted to cover 
slander of title actions. 
V. Invasion of Privacy 
¶34 Finally, the petitioners also allege that the circuit 
court erred in concluding that St. Paul was not obligated to 
defend Doyle's claim against WVCY for invasion of privacy.  The 
court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's determination on 
this claim. 
No.  96-0680 
 
17 
¶35 As St. Paul noted at oral argument on this issue, the 
petitions for review filed by Employers and WVCY did not raise 
the invasion of privacy issue on appeal to this court.  
Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(6) indicates:  
 
The supreme court may grant the petition upon such 
conditions as it considers appropriate, including the 
filing of additional briefs.  If the petition is 
granted, the petitioner cannot raise or argue issues 
not set forth in the petition unless ordered otherwise 
by the supreme court.  The supreme court may limit the 
issues to be considered on review. 
¶36 Our order granting the petitioners' petitions for 
review indicated only that the "petitions for review are 
granted," followed by an explicit citation to Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.62.  Because the invasion of privacy claim was not 
raised on petition to this court, WVCY and Employers have waived 
this court's consideration of whether the Policy covers that 
claim.  While this court retains the inherent power to consider 
issues beyond those raised in the petitions, see Cynthia E. v. 
La Crosse County Human Services Dept., 172 Wis. 2d 218, 232, 493 
N.W.2d 56 (1992)("In re Jamie L."), we decline to do so in this 
matter.  Accordingly, the court of appeals' rejection of 
coverage for the invasion of privacy claim stands. 
VI. 
¶37 We conclude that Employers has standing in this suit 
and that the proper determination of insurance coverage is based 
solely on the policy as applied to the allegations within the 
plaintiff's complaint.  Exercising this standard, we determine  
No.  96-0680 
 
18 
that while St. Paul is under no duty to defend WVCY against 
Doyle's slander of title or invasion of privacy claims, the 
circuit court inappropriately granted summary judgment to St. 
Paul based on Doyle's negligent supervision claim.  Accordingly, 
we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the court 
of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
¶38 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE and JANINE P. 
GESKE, J. did not participate.   
No. 96-0680.dws 
 
1 
¶39 DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.    (Concurring).   I agree 
with the majority opinion.  I write separately to point out the 
difference between this case and Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, No. 
96-2529 (S. Ct. June 24, 1998).  In this case, the plaintiff has 
alleged that WVCY's employees intentionally caused the plaintiff 
severe emotional distress and disability injuries.  No such 
underlying tort existed in Wal-Mart.  This case, rather than 
Wal-Mart, provides a proper application of the tort of negligent 
hiring, training, and supervision.  For the reasons I stated in 
my dissent in Wal-Mart, I continue to believe that an underlying 
tort is a necessary element of the tort of negligent hiring, 
training, and supervision.   
¶40 I am authorized to state that Justice Jon P. Wilcox 
joins this concurring opinion.