Title: State v. Pachmayr
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S055206
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: May 8, 2008

FILED: May 8, 2008
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner
on Review,
v.
NATHAN DONOVAN PACHMAYR,
Respondent on
Review.
(CC C032969CR;
CA A126620; SC S055206)
En Banc
On review from the Court of
Appeals.*
Argued and submitted January
8, 2008.
David B. Thompson, Assistant
Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner
on review.  With him on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary
H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Bronson D. James, Chief
Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for
respondent on review.  With him on the briefs was Peter Gartlan, Chief
Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, Legal Services Division.
WALTERS, J.
The decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
*Appeal from Washington
County Circuit Court, Nancy W. Campbell, Judge. 213 Or App 665, 162 P3d 347
(2007).
WALTERS, J.
This is a criminal case in which the
trial court allowed the district attorney to amend an indictment at the close
of the state's case-in-chief.  On appeal from that decision, the Court of
Appeals held that Article VII (Amended), section 5, of the Oregon Constitution
mandated that the grand jury, rather than the district attorney, make that
amendment.  We conclude that the indictment was defective in form only, and
that the trial court correctly permitted the district attorney to amend it.  We
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm defendant's conviction.

Defendant drove a car over a highway
median and into another car, injuring the two occupants of the other car as
well as a passenger in his car.  Based on that incident, the grand jury charged
defendant with, among other things, three counts of assault in the second
degree -- one count for each victim.  ORS 163.175(1)(c) defines the relevant
crime:
"A person commits the crime of assault in
the second degree if the person:
"* * * * * 
"(c) Recklessly causes serious physical
injury to another by means of a deadly or dangerous weapon under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life."  
(Emphasis added.)
Counts 1 and 3 of the indictment
alleged that defendant had committed assault in the second degree by means of a
"dangerous weapon."  Count 2 alleged that defendant had committed assault
in the second degree by means of a "deadly weapon."  All three counts
described the pertinent weapon as "to wit:  an automobile."
At trial, the state presented
evidence that defendant drove the car recklessly and thereby caused physical
injury to all three victims.  At the close of the state's case-in-chief,
defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on Count 2, arguing that the state
had failed to present evidence from which the jury could find that he had used
a deadly weapon.  A deadly weapon is distinguished from a dangerous weapon by
ORS 161.015:
"(1) 'Dangerous weapon' means any weapon,
device, instrument, material or substance which under the circumstances in
which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used, is readily
capable of causing death or serious physical injury.
"(2) 'Deadly weapon' means any instrument,
article or substance specifically designed for and presently capable of causing
death or serious physical injury." 
The state acknowledged that it had not adduced evidence that
the car was a deadly weapon, but argued that the use of the term "deadly
weapon" in Count 2 was merely a "scrivener's error."  The state
sought permission of the trial court to amend Count 2 to match Counts 1 and 3
and allege that the car was a dangerous weapon.  The trial court allowed the
amendment, and the jury convicted defendant on all three counts.
Defendant appealed his conviction on Count
2, arguing that the amendment was not merely a matter of form because it had
materially altered the indictment, and that the Oregon Constitution requires
that the grand jury make such amendments.  The Court of Appeals held that the
amendment was one of substance, not form, and reversed.  State v. Pachmayr,
213 Or App 665, 162 P3d 347 (2007).  We allowed the state's petition for
review. 
Article VII (Amended), section 5, of
the Oregon Constitution provides, in part:
"(3) Except as provided in subsections (4)
and (5) of this section, a person shall be charged in a circuit court with
the commission of any crime punishable as a felony only on indictment by a
grand jury.
"(4) The district attorney may charge a
person on an information filed in circuit court of a crime punishable as a
felony if the person appears before the judge of the circuit court and
knowingly waives indictment.
"* * * * *
"(6) An information shall be substantially
in the form provided by law for an indictment.  The district attorney may
file an amended indictment or information whenever, by ruling of the
court, an indictment or information is held to be defective in form." 
(Emphases added.)
To determine whether the district
attorney was permitted to make the amendment in this case, we must determine
whether the indictment was defective in "form."  We begin with an
examination of the text and history ofthe constitutional
provision permitting district attorneys to amend indictments and the case law
concerning that provision.  Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 415-16, 840
P2d 65 (1992).
The constitutional text provides that
only the grand jury may indict a defendant for a crime punishable as a felony,
unless the defendant waives indictment, in which case the district attorney may
bring the charge on information.  Or Const, Art VII (Amended) § 5(3) and (4). 
The trial court may permit the district attorney to amend either an indictment
or an information, but only if it is defective in "form."  Id. at
§ 5(6).  
The current version of Article VII
(Amended),section 5, of the Oregon Constitution was adopted in
1974.  It is substantially similar to former Article VII (Original), section
18, of the Oregon Constitution, which was amended in 1908 to permitthe
district attorney to amend indictments held to be defective in
"form." (1) 
Neither the 1974 nor the 1908 version defines the terms "defective in
form" or "form."  However, the Oregon statutes that were in
place at the time that the 1908 provision was enacted did use substantially
similar terms.  Those statutesdistinguished between the
allegations inan indictment that were necessary to make the
indictment sufficient to chargea crime and other defects or
imperfections that did not affect the sufficiency of the indictment.  Those
statutes referred to the latter as "matters of form." 
 Section 1314of the statutes that
were in effect in 1908provided the requirements for a sufficient
indictment: 
"The indictment is sufficient if it can be
understood therefrom:
"1. That it is entitled in a court having authority to
receive it, though the name ofthe court be not accurately
stated;
"2. That it was found by a grand jury of the county in
which the court was held;
"3. That the defendant is named, or if his name can not
be discovered, that he is described by a fictitious name, with the statement
that his real name is to the jury unknown;
"4. That the crime was committed within the
jurisdiction of the court, except where, as provided by law, the act, though
done without the county in which the court is held, is triable therein; 
"5. That the crime was committed at some time prior to
the finding of the indictment, and within the time limited by law for the
commencement of an action therefor; 
"6. That the act of omission charged as the crime is
clearly and distinctly set forth, in ordinary and concise language, without
repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding
to know what is intended;
"7. That the act or omission charged as the crime is
stated with such a degree of certainty as to enable the court to pronounce
judgment, upon a conviction, according to the right of the case."
The Codes and Statutes of Oregon, title XVIII, ch
VIII, § 1314 (Bellinger &amp; Cotton 1901).
Section 1315 of those statutes
provided that an indictment was not insufficient if it was defective in form:
"No indictment is insufficient, nor can the trial,
judgment, or other proceedings thereon be affected by reason of a defect or
imperfection in matter of form which does not tend to the prejudice of the
substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits."
Thus, those statutes drew a
distinction between the substantive aspects of an indictment that were required
to render the indictment sufficientand the formalaspects
of an indictment, and provided that defects in the formal aspects of an
indictment were defects that did not prejudice the defendant or affect the
sufficiency of the indictment.  The 1891 Black's Law Dictionary, which
was in general use in 1908, recognized the same distinction in defining the
word "form," and explained as follows:
"The distinction between 'form' and 'substance' is
often important in reference to the validity or amendment of pleadings.  If the
matter of the plea is bad or insufficient, irrespective of the manner of
setting it forth, the defect is one of substance.  If the matter of the plea is
good and sufficient, but is inartificially or defectively pleaded, the defect
is one of form."
Black's Law Dictionary 510 (1st ed 1891).  
The 1908 constitution also used the
words "defective in form," and we have no reason to believe that it
used those words in a different sense than that in which they were used in
common parlance and contemporaneous statutes.  Therefore, the constitution
prohibited the district attorney from amending an indictment that was
insufficient to charge the crime -- an indictment that was defective in
substance -- in order to make it sufficient, but allowed the district attorney
to correct other defects -- defects in form.
The first case to consider the
district attorney's authority to amend indictments after the constitution was
amended in 1908 confirms that interpretation.  In State v. Moyer, 76
Or 396, 149 P 84 (1915), the defendant demurred to an indictment that alleged
that he had set fire to a stable, but did not allege that the stable was the
property of another -- an allegation necessary to state the crime.  The trial
court sustained the demurrer, but permitted the district attorney to amend. 
The Supreme Court reversed defendant's conviction, and drew a distinction
between matters of substance that are "essential to the charge" and
matters of form:
"Our Constitution contains the only
provision which authorizes such an amendment, but only as to form; and there
seems to be a well-recognized distinction between matters that are purely
matters of form and matters that go to the substance of the indictment, namely,
formal matters which are not essential to the charge and merely clerical
errors, such as where the defendant cannot be misled to his prejudice by the amendment,
would be the only cases which are permissible under our Constitution."
Id. at 399. 
Since Moyer, the court has
continued to consider the allegations of an indictment that are essential to
the charge to be matters of substance.  See, e.g., State v. Wimber,
315 Or 103, 114, 843 P2d 424 (1992) ("A matter that is essential to show
that an offense has been committed is a matter of substance.").  Other nonessential
allegations are matters of form, and defects in those allegations may be
corrected by district attorney amendment.
A defect in an indictment may or may
not be apparent from the face of the indictment.  On the surface, an indictment
may appear to be both sufficient and accurate, but extrinsic facts may
demonstrate insufficiency or inaccuracy.  For example, in State v. Woodson,
315 Or 314, 845 P2d 203 (1993), the indictment alleged that the defendant
committed rape.  At trial, the state offered evidence to prove only attempted
rape.  The indictment was sufficient on its face, but defective because the
allegations in the original indictment did not match the proof at trial.  The
court held that the constitution permitted amendment because the crime of rape
includes the crime of attempted rape.  ORS 136.460(1); Woodson, 315 Or
at 319-20.  As the court explained, "the interlineation effected no
change in the indictment; the indictment already charged defendant with,
and he could have been convicted of, attempted rape."  Id. at 319
(first emphasis in original; second emphasis added).  Therefore, the defect in
the indictment pointed up by the variance in proof was one of form, and the
district attorney was permitted to amend the indictment to cure that defect.  See
also State v. Long, 320 Or 361, 885 P2d 696 (1994) (indictment facially
sufficient, but alleged time period of offense was incorrect;
district attorney permitted to amend).
The defect in the indictment in this
case also did not appear onthe face of the indictment.  The
proof presented at trial revealed the defect and we turn now to whether that
defect was one of substance or form.  In Wimber, the court set out
four questions for consideration in that analysis:
"(1) D[oes] the amendment alter the
essential nature of the indictment against defendant, alter the availability to
him of defenses or evidence, or add a theory, element, or crime? * * * 
"(2) D[oes] the amendment prejudice
defendant's right to notice of the charges against him and to protection
against double jeopardy? * * *
"(3) [I]s the amendment itself sufficiently
definite and certain? * * *
[And, if the amendment deletes allegations, we ask a fourth
question:]
"(4) D[o] the remaining allegations in the
indictment state the essential elements of the offenses?"
315 Or at 114-15.  Those questions are tailored to the
"constitutional purposes of requiring an indictment by a grand jury,"
which are:
"(1) to inform the accused of the nature and character
of the criminal offense with which he is charged with sufficient particularity
to enable him to make his defense, (2) to identify the offense so as to enable
the accused to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal thereof in the
event that he should be prosecuted further for the same cause, and (3) to
inform the court of the facts charged so that it may determine whether or not
they are sufficient to support a conviction."
Id. at 115 (quoting State v. Smith, 182
Or 497, 500-01, 188 P2d 998 (1948)).  Wimber phrased the questions a
court should ask as questions about the nature of the proposed amendment and
not as questions about the indictment itself.  That is sensible because, as we
have noted, the defect in an indictment may not be apparent on the faceof
that document.  We often must examine the proposed amendment and its effect on
the indictment to understand the nature of the defect it seeks to remedy.
In considering the first Wimber
question -- whether the amendment changes the essential nature of the charge
against the defendant -- Woodson is particularly instructive.  Here,
assault with a dangerous weapon is not a statutory "lesser included
offense" of assault with a deadly weapon, but the principle of Woodson compels
us to examine whether, by charging defendant with assault with a deadly weapon,
the state "already charged" him with assault with a dangerous
weapon.  Woodson, 315 Or at 319.  Count 2 of the original indictment
charged defendant with assault with a "deadly weapon."  Importing the
definition of "deadly weapon" into the indictment, the indictment
alleged that defendant recklessly cause[d] serious physical injury to another by
means of any instrument, article or substance specifically designed for and
presently capable of causing death or serious physical injury under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.
See ORS 163.175(1)(c); ORS 161.015(2).  Importing,
instead, the definition of "dangerous weapon" into the indictment,
the indictment alleged that defendant recklessly cause[d] serious physical injury to another by
means of any weapon, device, instrument, material or substance which under the
circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be
used, is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.
See ORS 163.175(1)(c); ORS 161.015(1).  
Defendant argues that the two charges
are qualitatively different.  First, hecontends, there is a
meaningful distinction between the objects (2) that constitute deadly
and dangerous weapons.  A deadly weapon isan "instrument,
article or substance," whereas a dangerous weapon is a "weapon,
device, instrument, material or substance."  Compare ORS 161.015(1) with
ORS 161.015(2).  Both definitions use the term "instrument," and
defendant does not argue that a car is not an "instrument."  Thus,
the car is an object that could qualify as either a deadly or a
dangerous weapon.  In our view, the objects listed in the two definitions are
not meaningfully distinguishable, at least for purposes of this case.
The second difference that defendant
points out between assault with a deadly weapon and assault with a dangerous
weapon is the quality of the object -- the car -- that makes it deadly or
dangerous in nature.  Defendant argues that a deadly weapon must be designed to
be capable of causing serious injury, while a dangerous weapon must be used
under circumstances that make it so.  ORS 161.015(2).  
A weapon is "deadly" if it
is "specifically designed for and presently capable of causing death or
serious physical injury."  ORS 161.015(2).  A weapon is
"dangerous" if "under the circumstances in which it is
used," it is "readily capable of causing death or serious physical
injury."  ORS 161.015(1).  The second clauses of the two definitions are
substantially similar and defendant does not contend otherwise.  It is the
first clause of each definition to which defendant directs our attention.  He
argues that the deadly weapon focus on "design" makes that definition
different in its essential nature from the dangerous weapon focus on
"circumstances of use."
The dichotomy that defendant sees
disappears, however, upon close inspection of this particular indictment and
the definition of "deadly weapon."  The original indictment alleged
not only that the car was designed to be capable of use in a seriously
injurious fashion, but also that the circumstances of its use made it capable
of causing such injury.  The original indictment alleged that defendant drove
the car "recklessly."  A car that is not designed to be capable of
causing serious injury and that is, therefore, not a deadly weapon, nonetheless
may be a dangerous one if it is used "recklessly."  State v. Hill,
298 Or 270, 276-77, 692 P2d 100 (1984).  Before it was amended, the indictment
also alleged that defendant caused serious injury to another "under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life"
-- the precise circumstances of use that make an object dangerous.  Therefore,
although the original indictment did not use the phrase "dangerous
weapon," it contained all of the allegations that were necessary to make
out a charge under that theory:  that defendant drove a car, and did so under
circumstances that made it capable of causing death or serious physical
injury.  
The original indictment was defective
because it included a "design" allegation when the car was not
designed to be capable of causing serious injury.  But like the allegation in Woodson,
that additional allegation, although inaccurate, did not render the
indictment insufficient.  Including that extra allegation was not, therefore, a
defect of substance.  See also State v. Jewett, 48 Or 577,
586, 85 P 994 (1906) ("If the necessary averments appear in any f[orm] or
may by fair construction be found anywhere within the text of the indictment,
it is sufficient.") (citing US v. Howard, 132 F 325, 334 (Tenn
1904));State v. Humphreys, 43 Or 44, 48, 70 P 824 (1902)
(allegation which is "not necessarily descriptive of the offense may
be regarded as surplusage and rejected, without vitiating the pleading"); State
v. Horne, 20 Or 485, 486, 26 P 665 (1891) ("mere surplusage" does
not render indictment insufficient).  Because the original indictment alleged
that defendant used the car under circumstances that rendered it capable of
causing injury, it already charged the crime of assault with a dangerous
weapon.  The amended indictment did not require defendant to defend against any
allegations that were not already included in the original indictment.
Defendant urges a different result, citing
State v. Russell, 231 Or 317, 372 P2d 770 (1962), for his argument that
the defect in the indictment was not one of form.  In that case, the state
charged the defendant with stealing "'a certain yearling Hereford
heifer,'" but proved that defendant stole a "'steer calf.'"  Id.
at 318.  The court reversed the defendant's conviction, holding that the
difference was material because the word "heifer" was the "only
statutory word descriptive of livestock to be found in the indictment."  Id.
at 320.  The dissent disagreed, calling attention to the fact that the state's
allegation that the animal was a yearling Hereford brought it within the terms
of the statute, which forbade the theft of any calf, whether male or female.  Id.
at 323-24.  A yearling Hereford is a calf with a white face and red body.  Webster's
Third New Int'l Dictionary 1059 (unabridged ed 1961).  We agree with the
dissent that the state's specification that the calf was a female, rather than
a male, was an unnecessary, additional recitation, and immaterial to the charge
of stealing livestock.
Although the principle stated in Russell,
that "a defendant cannot be tried for one crime and convicted of
another[,]" 231 Or at 321, is certainly correct, it is also true that when
an indictment alleges facts that are unnecessary surplusage, those facts are
not essential to the crime and do not define it.  The result in Russell
is inconsistent with the latter principle, and we overrule it.
Having determined that the amendment
to the original indictment in this case did not alter its essential nature, we
proceed to consider the second Wimber question, which is whether the
amendment prejudiced defendant's right to notice of the charges against him to
protect against double jeopardy.  The state argues that defendant could not
have been misled or prejudiced by the "scrivener's error" in Count 2,
because Counts 1 and 3 put him on notice that the state was charging that the
car he drove was "dangerous" as well as "deadly."  We do
not look to the other counts in the indictment for the necessary notice.  The
allegations in Count 2 of the indictment apprised the defendant of the
allegations against which he ultimately was required to defend.       
The amendment also did not prejudice
defendant by depriving him of a defense, contrary to the conclusion reached by
the Court of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals wrote:
"Although the amendment did not alter the essential
nature of the indictment against defendant, it did alter the availability to
him of a defense.  Count 2 charged defendant with committing assault in the
second degree by means of a deadly weapon. * * * Defendant attempted to defend
against that charge by arguing that the motor vehicle he was driving did not
meet the statutory definition of a deadly.  When the trial court amended Count
2 of the indictment to allege assault by means of a dangerous weapon, defendant
could no longer avail himself of the defense, nor effectively present evidence,
that his car was not a deadly weapon."
State v. Pachmayr, 213 Or App 665, 669-70, 162 P3d 347
(2007) (footnote omitted).  That reasoning is flawed.  A defendant is not
necessarily "deprived of a defense," as that phrase is used in Wimber,
when that defense is merely that the state failed to prove all of the
allegations of the original indictment.  If that were the case, any amendment
to an indictment that deleted or changed an allegation would eliminate a
defense.  Indeed, Woodson illustrates that principle.  In that case, the
indictment charged a completed rape and the district attorney amended it to
charge only an attempted rape.  Under the Court of Appeals' rationale in the
current case, that amendment would have deprived the defendant of a defense,
namely, that he did not commit a completed rape.  However, the court in Woodson
discerned no such deprivation, and upheld the amendment.  If an amendment
eliminates an independent defense, such as self-defense, that was available to
defend againstthe original indictment, but becomes unavailable
when the indictment is amended, thatamendment prejudices a
defendant within the meaning of the second Wimber question.  But
such prejudice does not result when the defendant is precluded only from arguing
that the state failed to prove allegations that were deleted by the amendment. (3)
We are satisfied that, in this case,
the grand jury, not the prosecutor, determined the charge to be brought and
found the facts on which the charge was based.  State v. Long, 320 Or
361, 370-71, 885 P2d 696 (1994) (addressing those concerns in deciding whether
Article VII (Amended), section 5, was violated); Wimber, 315 Or at 117
(Unis, J., dissenting, expressing those concerns).  The grand jury's role in
the criminal process is independent of the district attorney's role, and serves
a critical function in protecting individual liberties.  State v. Burleson,
342 Or 697, 703, 160 P3d 624 (2007).  We do not make assumptions from Counts 1
and 3 about what the grand jury "actually" intended to charge with
regard to Count 2.  In this case we know -- without speculating -- that the
grand jury, by signing the indictment on Count 2, certified that it found
sufficient evidence to charge defendant with driving a car -- an instrument
capable of causing death or serious injury -- recklessly, "under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life."  In so doing, the grand jury necessarily certified that it found
sufficient evidence to charge defendant with assault with a dangerous weapon on
Count 2.  
Count 2 of the original indictment in
this case contained the allegations necessary to charge defendant with assault
with a dangerous weapon.  The defect in the indictment was a defect in form
only, and the trial court did not err by allowing the district attorney to
amend it.  
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
1. In
1908, Article VII (Original), section 18, provided, in part:  

"No person shall be charged in any circuit
court with the commission of any crime or misdemeanor defined or made
punishable by any of the laws of this state, except upon indictment found by a
grand jury; provided, however, that any district attorney may file an
amended indictment whenever an indictment has, by a ruling of the court, been
held to be defective in form."
2. Although
the word "object" is not used in the definition of either a deadly or
dangerous weapon, we use it here for the sake of simplicity to encompass all of
the items in the statutory lists.
3. The
third and fourth Wimber questions address matters that are not of
concern in this case or that we have already discussed.  They do not require further
analysis.