Title: People v. Ruiz
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 87204
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: October 26, 2000

Docket No. 87204-Agenda 7-May 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 								LUIS RUIZ, Appellee.
Opinion filed October 26, 2000.
	JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
	This appeal is brought by the State from an order of the circuit
court of Cook County granting a motion by the defendant, Luis
Ruiz, to preclude the State from seeking the death penalty in the
present case. The matter was before the circuit court for a new
sentencing hearing, ordered as post-conviction relief. The trial
judge concluded that sentencing the defendant to death would be
disproportionate to the sentences of natural life imprisonment
received by a codefendant, Placido LaBoy, for the same set of
offenses. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the order of the
circuit court and remand the cause for further proceedings.
	The present case has a lengthy procedural history, but the
major features require only brief recitation. The defendant was
originally convicted in a jury trial in 1980 of three counts of
murder, three counts of armed violence, and three counts of
unlawful restraint for his role in the deaths of three youths who
were members of a rival street gang. The defendant waived a jury
for purposes of a capital sentencing hearing, and, following a
hearing, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to death for the
murder convictions. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the
defendant's convictions and death sentence. People v. Ruiz, 94 Ill. 2d 245 (1982).
	In our initial opinion in this case, the court rejected the
defendant's contention that he could not be sentenced to death
because he was guilty of these offenses only under an
accountability theory. The court explained:
			"It was Ruiz who first deceived the three victims by
telling them that he was a Latin Eagle when they bragged
to him that they had participated in a 'hit' on some Latin
Queens. It was Ruiz who directed that they all get into the
victims' car and drive to the first alley. Ruiz took Michael
[Salcido] down the alley and participated in beating him
to the ground. Ruiz told the assistant State's Attorney that
his companions said that they would have to kill the three
boys. After learning this, when they stopped in the second
alley, Ruiz did not depart but stayed while each of the
three was systematically and ruthlessly executed. Arthur
Salcido was stabbed a total of eight times in the chest, and
his throat was cut completely across, severing his
windpipe, as well as the major arteries on either side of
his neck. Frank Mussa was stabbed a total of 21 times:
three times in the neck, three times in the chest and 15
times in the back. Michael Salcido was stabbed a total of
18 times: 10 times in the face and neck, five times in the
abdomen and three times in the back. Ruiz never told
either Lopez or the assistant State's Attorney that he
protested while all of these blows were being struck. In
fact, nothing in the record shows what he was doing
during the considerable time that it took to perform these
acts, which must have been accomplished in the face of
extreme effort on the part of the victims to preserve
themselves and through greater efforts on the parts of the
participants to overcome the victims' defenses. In any
event, when all was finished, Ruiz assisted the others in
wiping the car free of fingerprints and then walked away
from the scene with his companions." Ruiz, 94 Ill. 2d  at
264-65.
	After this court affirmed the defendant's convictions and
death sentence, the United States Supreme Court denied the
defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. Ruiz v. Illinois, 462 U.S. 1112, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1341, 103 S. Ct. 2465 (1983). The
defendant then commenced post-conviction proceedings, and the
case was assigned to the same judge who had presided at trial. The
judge dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. On
appeal, this court held that section 122-8 of the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 122-8)
required that the cause, as a post-conviction matter, be assigned to
a judge other than the defendant's trial judge. People v. Ruiz, 107 Ill. 2d 19 (1985). On remand, the case was reassigned to a
different judge, who later denied post-conviction relief without an
evidentiary hearing. The defendant appealed from that ruling, and
this court affirmed in part and reversed in part, ordering an
evidentiary hearing on allegations in the petition challenging
counsel's effectiveness at the capital sentencing hearing. People
v. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d 1 (1989). The United States Supreme Court
later denied the defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. Ruiz
v. Illinois, 496 U.S. 931, 110 L. Ed. 2d 652, 110 S. Ct. 2632
(1990). Following an evidentiary hearing on the allegations of
ineffective assistance, the circuit court granted relief to the
defendant on that portion of the post-conviction petition and
vacated the defendant's death sentence, finding that trial counsel
had rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing. The
State appealed from that judgment, and this court affirmed the
order granting the defendant a new sentencing hearing. People v.
Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368 (1997). The cause was then remanded to the
circuit court for resentencing.
	The present appeal arises from an order entered by the circuit
court after the latest remand. Prior to the holding of a new
sentencing hearing, the defendant moved to bar entry of the death
penalty in this case. The defendant argued, among other things,
that sentencing him to death would be disproportionate to the three
consecutive sentences of natural life imprisonment imposed on a
codefendant, Placido LaBoy, for the same offenses. LaBoy had
received those sentences after a jury was unable to agree to impose
the death penalty in his case. See People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (1997). We note here the sentences given to the two other
offenders involved in these crimes. A second codefendant, Juan
Caballero, received the death penalty for these offenses.
Caballero's case is currently before the circuit court for an
evidentiary hearing on a claim similar to the one involved here,
but raised in the context of a post-conviction proceeding, that his
death sentence is disproportionate to LaBoy's natural life
sentences. A third codefendant, Nelson Aviles, reached a plea
agreement with the State under which Aviles testified against
LaBoy at LaBoy's trial, pleaded guilty to these offenses, and
received concurrent sentences of 40 years' imprisonment for the
three murders.
	In the proceedings below, the trial judge granted the
defendant's motion to preclude a death penalty hearing,
concluding that the death penalty should not be a possible sentence
in this case because it would be disproportionate to LaBoy's
sentences. In reaching this result, the judge found that the
defendant was less culpable than LaBoy in these offenses and that
the defendant's prospects for rehabilitation were as good as or
better than LaBoy's. The State brings the present appeal from that
ruling.
	We are met at the outset with a challenge to our jurisdiction.
The defendant has moved to dismiss the present appeal, and we
ordered the motion taken with the case. The defendant argues that
nothing in our rules on appeals in criminal cases authorizes the
State to bring the present appeal, and he believes that the present
appeal must therefore be dismissed. The State, in response, asserts
that the order entered by the circuit court in this case is similar to
one that halts a criminal proceeding in the defendant's favor on
grounds that prevent the State from prosecuting the defendant. The
State thus contends believes that it should be allowed to proceed
with the appeal under Supreme Court Rules 603 and 604(a)(1)
(134 Ill. 2d R. 603; 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)).
	We agree with the defendant that the present appeal does not
readily fit within the range of State appeals authorized by our
rules. No rule expressly permits the State to bring an appeal from
an order like the one entered here. Nonetheless, we believe that it
is appropriate to consider the present appeal on its merits. We note
that the State could have attempted to obtain review of the
challenged order through a motion for a supervisory order,
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 383 (155 Ill. 2d R. 383), invoking
our general supervisory authority over the courts of the state (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. VI, §16). Contrary to the view expressed by
Chief Justice Harrison in his dissent, this court has previously
allowed supervisory relief in a number of criminal cases.  People
ex rel. Baricevic v. Wharton, 136 Ill. 2d 423 (1990); People ex rel.
Daley v. Suria, 112 Ill. 2d 26 (1986); People ex rel. Ward v.
Moran, 54 Ill. 2d 552 (1973); see also Doherty v. Caisley, 104 Ill. 2d 72 (1984) (supervisory order entered directing circuit judge to
vacate orders appointing public defender of different county to
represent two inmates in civil actions relating to computation of
sentence and denial of parole). And when supervisory orders have
been denied, the court has done so without suggesting that
supervisory relief is never available in criminal cases. People ex
rel. Daley v. Joyce, 126 Ill. 2d 209 (1988); People ex rel. Daley v.
Fitzgerald, 123 Ill. 2d 175 (1988); People ex rel. Foreman v.
Nash, 118 Ill. 2d 90 (1987). Given the general importance of the
issue presented to the development of our law, we consider it
appropriate to exercise our supervisory authority in this case and
address the merits of the State's appeal. Notably, dismissing the
appeal would effectively bar the State from ever seeking the death
penalty against the defendant for these offenses, for the State could
not later appeal the entry of a noncapital sentence. We now turn to
a consideration of the merits of the question presented here.
	The State argues that the trial court erred in granting the
defendant's motion to preclude a death sentence here. We agree.
We believe that the trial court acted prematurely in attempting to
determine whether a sentence of death imposed in this case would
be disproportionate to the noncapital sentences imposed on a
codefendant.
	Our cases have consistently held that evidence of a
codefendant's sentence is irrelevant and thus inadmissible at a
capital sentencing hearing. In People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436
(2000), this court recently considered whether a defendant was
entitled to present, at the second stage of a capital sentencing
hearing, evidence of a codefendant's sentence. This court
concluded that the trial judge in that case acted properly in barring
introduction to the evidence. The court explained:
			"It is well established by the precedent of this court that
a defendant does not have a right to present evidence of a
codefendant's sentence at the aggravation-mitigation
stage of sentencing. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 54 (1998). As we explained in People v. Page, 156 Ill. 2d 258, 271-72 (1993), evidence of a codefendant's
sentence is not a relevant mitigating factor at the
aggravation-mitigation stage, where the focus is on the
defendant's character and participation in the offense.
'[R]equiring the sentencer to examine and compare the
relative culpability of the defendants and the
circumstances in aggravation and mitigation applicable to
each would unnecessarily complicate an already difficult
task.' Page, 156 Ill. 2d  at 272. Thus, while a reviewing
court may consider whether a defendant's sentence is
disparate when compared to a codefendant's sentence, a
defendant does not have a right to present the sentencing
jury with evidence of a codefendant's sentence. Jackson,
182 Ill. 2d  at 92. Based on this authority, we hold that the
circuit court did not err in excluding evidence of
Jackson's sentence." Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d  at 501.
	In People v. Page, 156 Ill. 2d 258 (1993), this court declined
to follow a Florida case that permitted capital sentencers to
consider sentences given to codefendants. In addition to the
concerns mentioned by the court in Emerson, the Page court
explained:
		"As this court stated in [People v. Perez, 108 Ill. 2d 70
(1985)], 'the fact that a separate jury found there were
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of
the death penalty as to [a codefendant] does not mean that
we must set aside the jury's determination in the present
case that as to [defendant] there was no mitigating factor
or factors sufficient to preclude its imposition. Perez, 108 Ill. 2d  at 93." Page, 156 Ill. 2d  at 272.
	We believe that the considerations discussed above are
applicable in the present case and lead to the conclusion that the
circuit court erred in considering the defendant's sentencing-disparity motion. Just as evidence of a codefendant's sentence is
irrelevant at a capital sentencing hearing and may not be
introduced at that stage in the proceedings, that evidence is equally
irrelevant prior to the sentencing hearing. If, in fact, a sentence of
death is excessive or disproportionate, this court on direct review,
or this court or the circuit court in a post-conviction proceeding,
may consider that issue. Although comparative proportionality
review is not required by the United States Constitution and is not
a feature of the Illinois death penalty statute, this court will
consider claims that a sentence of death in a particular case is
disproportionate to the sentence imposed on a codefendant. See,
e.g., People v. Erickson, 117 Ill. 2d 271, 302-03 (1987).
	Opposing this result, the defendant argues that preventing the
trial judge from considering the merits of his sentencing-disparity
motion would place him in a worse position with regard to this
issue than he would occupy if he had not obtained post-conviction
relief. The defendant observes that if he had not been awarded a
new sentencing hearing, he could raise the sentencing-disparity
issue as a post-conviction claim, as his codefendant Caballero has
done. See People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205 (1997). To refuse
to consider the same issue at this juncture, the defendant believes,
means that he would have been better off, at least with respect to
this issue, by not winning a new sentencing hearing. We do not
agree. Unlike Caballero, the defendant is not now facing a death
penalty. If the sentencer at the new hearing decides to impose the
death penalty against the defendant, the defendant may then pursue
the sentencing-disparity claim that he wants to present now.
	The defendant also contends that allowing a trial judge to
consider the merits of a sentencing-disparity claim prior to a
capital sentencing hearing is the more efficient procedure and can
only save time and resources. We believe, however, that the
suggested procedure could also lead to needless duplication in
many cases. Allowing a judge to consider a claim like the
defendant's prior to any capital sentencing hearing would require
the parties to engage in two similar proceedings, at least in those
cases in which the motion proved to be unsuccessful: first, a full-blown evidentiary hearing, complete with testimony about the
defendant's culpability and rehabilitative prospects, and second,
a capital sentencing hearing, at which the same evidence about the
defendant would be introduced. Rather than save time and
resources, the defendant's suggested procedure would, in many
cases, cause the parties to present their evidence twice.
	Nor do we believe that this court's decision in a codefendant's
case, People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205 (1997), compels a
different result here. The defendant argues that Caballero
authorizes the circuit courts to entertain motions that seek to bar
imposition of the death penalty on the ground that a sentence of
death would be disproportionate to a noncapital sentence imposed
on a codefendant. We do not agree. Caballero determined only
that it is within the competence of a circuit court to consider
whether the death sentence imposed on a post-conviction
petitioner is disproportionate to the noncapital sentence received
by a codefendant for the same offense. The court in that case
rejected the State's argument that a sentencing-disparity issue may
be decided only by a reviewing court. Caballero did not
determine, however, that such issues may properly be decided by
the circuit court prior to the holding of a capital sentencing
hearing, which is the context in which the question arises here.
The court in Caballero found distinguishable this court's earlier
decisions in People v. Page, 156 Ill. 2d 258 (1993), and People v.
Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d 201 (1993), which had held that evidence of
a codefendant's sentence is irrelevant and inadmissible at a capital
sentencing hearing. Caballero explained:
			"Neither Page nor Edgeston dealt with the sentence
disparity issue in the context of a petition for post-conviction relief, nor did they hold that a circuit court
could not consider such an issue raised under the [Post-Conviction Hearing] Act. Disparity of sentence is
cognizable under the Act in noncapital cases (see People
v. Wren, 223 Ill. App. 3d 722, 729 (1992)), and where
circuit courts routinely handle post-conviction petitions in
capital cases, we see no reason to preclude examination of
this issue. Thus, we agree with defendant that the circuit
court erroneously believed the issue was 'a matter for
appellate review' only." Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d  at 215.
We do not believe that Caballero altered the long-standing rule
prohibiting introduction, at a capital sentencing hearing, of
evidence of a codefendant's sentence. Emerson, decided after
Caballero, reaffirmed the earlier case law and demonstrates that
the rule expressed in those opinions is still valid.
	Finally, we note that we do not decide here whether or not a
sentence of death in this case would be disproportionate to any of
the sentences imposed on the defendant's codefendants. We
determine only that the trial judge should not foreclose a sentence
of death against the defendant at this time. As the defendant has
not yet been resentenced for these offenses, it would be premature
to compare a sentence of death in his case with the sentences
received by LaBoy. The defendant's original capital sentencing
hearing was conducted in 1980. The defendant has not yet been
resentenced, so we cannot be fully aware of what additional
evidence might now be presented in aggravation and mitigation.
In support of the motion to bar a capital sentence in this case, the
defendant argues that he has been a model prisoner and that his
adjustment to prison life demonstrates his excellent prospects for
rehabilitation. These are fact-based questions, however, and we
believe that it would be premature to attempt to address them at
this point in the proceedings, notwithstanding the defendant's
offer of evidence on these matters.
	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of
Cook County is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court
for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
	This appeal is unlawful and should be dismissed. Contrary to
the majority's suggestion, the State could not have obtained
review of the circuit court's order by means of a supervisory order.
Under article VI, section 16, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.
1970, art. VI, §16), this court's supervisory authority must be
excercised "in accordance with [the court's] rules." This is a
criminal case, and our rules specifically provide that the only
method of review in a criminal case is by appeal. 134 Ill. 2d R.
602.
	Whether the State may appeal a nonfinal order entered by the
circuit court in a criminal case is determined exclusively by Rule
604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)). People v. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d 148, 151 (1997). Under Rule 604(a)(1), the circumstances under
which the State may prosecute an appeal are narrowly
circumscribed. The rule clearly provides:
			"In criminal cases the State may appeal only from an
order or judgment the substantial effect of which results
in dismissing a charge for any of the grounds enumerated
in section 114-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1963; arresting judgment because of a defective
indictment, information or complaint; quashing an arrest
or search warrant; or suppressing evidence." (Emphasis
added.) 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1).
There is no dispute that the order at issue in this case, which
merely precludes the State from seeking a particular sentence, does
not fall within any of these categories. Where, as here, an appeal
by the State does not fall within any of the provisions of our Rule
604(a)(1), the State has no right to appeal the order to this or any
court of review. The State's appeal must therefore be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. People v. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d  at 153.
	The authorities cited on page 4 of the majority's opinion do
not alter this conclusion. Unlike the present case, People ex rel.
Ward v. Moran, 54 Ill. 2d 552 (1973), did not involve an appeal by
the State from the circuit court's judgment. It involved a challenge
to a judgment entered by the appellate court following an appeal
by the defendant. People ex rel. Daley v. Suria, 112 Ill. 2d 26, 37-38 (1986), stated that our court may exercise its supervisory
authority to intervene in a case where the circuit court has
exceeded its authority and impermissibly exercised powers
belonging to the executive branch, but those circumstances are not
present here. Doherty v. Caisley, 104 Ill. 2d 72, 79 (1984), was not
a criminal case. At issue there was whether the circuit court of one
county exceeded its authority when it appointed the public
defender of another county to represent two inmates confined in a
state penal institution in civil actions the inmates had brought.
Although People ex rel. Baricevic v. Wharton, 136 Ill. 2d 423
(1990), did arise from criminal proceedings, it was not a direct
appeal by the State. It was an original action brought in our court
to challenge the way in which a circuit court judge had been
interpreting and applying the substitution of judge provisions in
section 114-5(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 114-5(c)). The propriety of our
jurisdiction to rule on that matter was not raised by the parties or
addressed by this court. 
	Even if we had jurisdiction to consider the State's appeal,
which we do not, I still could not join in the result reached by the
majority. There are no circumstances in which the State should be
allowed to seek the death penalty. For the reasons set forth in my
partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S.
Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). It is therefore void and
unenforceable.
	 
	JUSTICE HEIPLE, also dissenting:
	I fully agree with Chief Justice Harrison that this court has no
jurisdiction to hear this appeal and therefore join in that portion of
his dissent which addresses this issue.