Title: Seaboard System RR, Inc. v. Keen
Citation: 514 So. 2d 1018
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 2, 1987

514 So. 2d 1018 (1987)
SEABOARD SYSTEM RAILROAD, INC.
v.
J.R. KEEN.
85-838.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 2, 1987.
*1019 L. Vastine Stabler, Jr., Michael C. Quillen, and Terri A. Dobell of Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas &amp; O'Neal, Birmingham, for appellant.
Francis H. Hare, Jr., Scott A. Powell, and James J. Thompson, Jr., of Hare, Wynn, Newell &amp; Newton, Birmingham, for appellee.
ALMON, Justice.
This is an FELA action. The plaintiff, James R. Keen, was employed by the defendant, Seaboard System Railroad, Inc. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Keen for $500,000 and the trial court entered judgment on the verdict. The issues raised here relate only to the admission of certain evidence.
On May 21, 1984, Keen was a passenger in a company van delivering him and several other employees to their work stations in the Tilford Railroad Yard in Atlanta, Georgia. The van hit a large pothole in the road, causing Keen to bounce out of his seat and strike his head on the roof of the van. The blow caused injuries to Keen's neck and back. Keen was seen by a company doctor, who referred him to Dr. Walter Edwards, an orthopedic surgeon in Atlanta. Dr. Edwards treated Keen for approximately one month and then performed surgery in an attempt to correct the problem.
On October 10, 1984, Keen filed suit pursuant to the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1970). About a week before trial, Keen was seen by Dr. Ralph Nichols, an orthopedic surgeon in Birmingham. Keen related what had happened to him and what symptoms he had, after which Dr. Nichols performed an examination of Keen. At trial a deposition taken of Dr. Nichols was read into evidence. Seaboard's attorney objected to the admission of Dr. Nichols's opinion of Keen's condition, claiming that, since Dr. Nichols had based his opinion, in part, on what Keen had told him, it was hearsay and inadmissible.
Seaboard also objected to the admission of the testimony of Dr. Fred Johnson, who testified as to Keen's lost future earnings. Seaboard argued that the method used by Dr. Johnson was based on before-tax earnings instead of after-tax earnings, as required by the FELA.
Seaboard claims that the testimony of Dr. Nichols should have been excluded because his opinion was based on information given to him by Keen and was thus, it says, inadmissible hearsay.
This Court held, in State Realty Co. v. Ligon, 218 Ala. 541, 543-44, 119 So. 672, 674 (1929):
Seaboard asserts that the general hearsay exception does not apply here because Keen did not see Dr. Nichols for treatment but only to prepare him to testify. Seaboard argues that under these circumstances the degree of reliability of Keen's statements to Dr. Nichols is not as high as it would have been if he had been seeking treatment. This argument for different rules for treating and consulting physicians is virtually precluded by the last paragraph quoted above from Ligon, which states that such questions go to the weight of the testimony unless it is incontrovertible that the facts on which the physician based his opinion were false.
Furthermore, such attempts to differentiate and exclude nontreating physicians' testimony have been criticized and largely abandoned. As expressed in a noted treatise:
"§ 293. Statements of Bodily Feelings, Symptoms, and Condition: (c) Statements Made to Physicians Employed Only to Testify.
"12 Rule 803(4) provides a hearsay exception for statements `made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment.' (Emphasis supplied)"
E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence, pp. 841-42 (3d ed. 1984). (Footnotes omitted.)
Therefore, because these objections to the deposition of Dr. Nichols went to its weight and not its admissibility, the trial court did not err in allowing it into evidence.
Seaboard contends that the trial court erred in permitting certain testimony of damages that, it says, was inadmissible. The testimony that Seaboard claims was inadmissible was that of Dr. Fred Johnson, an associate professor of economics at the University of Alabama in Birmingham who has a Ph.D. in economics and a law degree. Dr. Johnson testified as to Keen's lost future wages. Seaboard argues that the figure calculated by Dr. Johnson, $341,888, did not take into consideration the effects of taxation. The United States Supreme Court has held that in determining the lost stream of income, the stream may be "approximated as a series of after-tax payments." Jones &amp; Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 536, 103 S. Ct. 2541, 2550, 76 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1983). Keen asserts that Dr. Johnson did consider taxation in calculating the amount he testified to. During direct examination, Dr. Johnson testified:
It is clear from his testimony that Dr. Johnson did consider the effects of *1022 taxation in formulating his opinion as to the amount of lost future wages. Seaboard was given ample opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Johnson and could have presented evidence of its own as to lost wages to rebut his testimony. The trial court did not err in admitting Dr. Johnson's opinion testimony of lost future wages.
Seaboard's only arguments for reversal regard the admission of these items of evidence. Because the trial court did not commit reversible error in allowing this evidence, the judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
MADDOX, SHORES, BEATTY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.