Title: Smallwood v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 154, 2002
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 26, 2002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DERRICK SMALLWOOD, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 154, 2002 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
 
)  Cr.ID. No. 0103019016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  November 19, 2002 
Decided:  December 26, 2002 
 
Before WALSH, HOLLAND and STEELE, Justice. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 26th day of December 2002, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties, it appears to the Court as follows: 
 
(1) 
A Superior Court jury convicted appellant, Derrick Smallwood, of 
Resisting Arrest, 11 Del. C. § 1257, two counts of Attempted Murder, 11 Del. C. § 
531, and two counts of Possession of a Firearm during the Commission of a 
Felony, 11 Del. C. § 1447A.  In this appeal, Smallwood asserts two grounds of 
error: (i) that the police took his post-arrest statement in violation of his Miranda 
rights; and (ii) the trial judge abused his discretion when he denied Smallwood’s 
Motion for a New Trial based on alleged juror misconduct.  We conclude that the 
 
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trial judge did not err in its various rulings and that the conviction should be 
affirmed. 
 
(2) 
With respect to Smallwood’s Miranda claim, we conclude that the 
trial judge correctly denied Smallwood’s motion to suppress his statements to the 
police.  At the time of the statement, Smallwood was hospitalized at the Christiana 
Medical Center after being shot in the chest and foot the previous evening.  A 
Dover Police Department Officer testified that he was previously acquainted with 
Smallwood’s brother and that the Police Department assigned him to guard 
Smallwood at the hospital.  The officer then testified that while he was in the 
hallway guarding Smallwood’s room, Smallwood motioned for him to enter the 
hospital room.  The officer then testified that Smallwood made an incriminating 
statement that he would probably receive a life sentence or the death penalty for 
shooting a police officer.   
(3) 
Miranda warnings are required when police interrogate a suspect in a 
custodial setting.1  We conclude that Smallwood, not the officer, initiated 
conversation about the alleged crimes and that the officer did not interrogate or 
engage in the “functional equivalent” of interrogation with Smallwood.2  We 
further conclude that because no interrogation occurred, the police were not 
                                          
 
1 DeJesus v. State, 655 A.2d 1180, 1190 (Del. 1995). 
2 Interrogation under Miranda need not amount to actual question and may instead be the 
“functional equivalent” of questioning.  Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
 
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required to Mirandize Smallwood.  In addition, because Miranda warnings were 
not required, we need not conduct an analysis of whether Smallwood knowingly 
waived his Miranda rights.  Accordingly, the trial judge properly denied 
Smallwood’s motion to suppress his statements to the police. 
(4) 
We find no merit to the claim that the trial judge abused his discretion 
when he denied Smallwood’s Motion for a New Trial based on alleged juror 
misconduct.  Smallwood claims that a juror’s failure to answer in the affirmative to 
the voir dire question of whether a family member had been charged with crimes 
of violence entitles him to a new trial because a possibility existed that the juror 
was biased. 
(5) 
Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution guarantee a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.3  To establish reversible 
error in cases involving inadvertent nondisclosure, a defendant must demonstrate 
that “a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire,” and that “a 
correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.”4  
The impartial administration of justice is severely compromised when the juror’s 
nondisclosure of material information during voir dire is deliberate.  However, we 
                                          
 
3 Banther v. State, 783 A.2d 1287, 1289 (Del. 2001); Flonnory v. State, 778 A.2d 1044, 1051-52 
(2001); see Turner v. Louisiana 379 U.S. 466, 471-72 (1965); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). 
4 Banther v. State, 783 at 1290-91 (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 446 
U.S. 556 (1984) (plurality opinion)). 
 
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have favorably cited the proposition that a juror’s inaccurate response to a voir dire 
question based on a factual inaccuracy rather than dishonesty did not warrant a 
new trial.5  The United States Supreme Court has held that an honest yet mistaken 
answer to a voir dire question rarely amounts to a federal constitutional violation.6  
We have also stated that the record must support a conclusion that the juror’s 
incorrect answer to the voir dire question was simply inadvertently inaccurate and 
not purposefully untrue.7 
(6) 
Although the juror incorrectly answer a material voir dire question, a 
correct response would not have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.  
She would not be disqualified from jury service simply because she has relatives 
with a criminal record.  The trial judge conducted an in camera evidentiary hearing 
to question the juror in detail about her failure to respond accurately to the voir 
dire question.  The trial judge clearly met the requirement that the record reflect 
the juror’s reason for inaccuracy.  The trial judge concluded, and the record 
adequately supports his conclusion, that the juror was confused by the question and 
that the juror did not intentionally conceal information from the Court or the 
parties.  The trial judge also concluded that the juror believed she honestly 
                                          
 
5 Banther, 783 A.2d at 1291 (citing Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 362-63 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(juror’s interpretation of voir dire question did not indicate dishonesty but rather factual 
inaccuracy); United States v. Edmond, 43 F.3d 472, 473-74 (9th Cir. 1994) (simple forgetfulness 
of juror did not indicate lack of impartiality); Amirault v. Fair, 968 F.2d 1404, 1405-06 (1st Cir. 
1992) (juror’s genuine blocking of incident from memory did not indicate dishonest response)).  
6 Greenwood, 446 U.S. at 555-56. 
7 Banther, 783 A.2d at 1291-92. 
 
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answered the question, had no special desire to get on the jury, and had no bias or 
prejudice for or against the State or the defendant.  Accordingly, the trial judge 
properly denied the Smallwood’s Motion for a New Trial.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_/s/ Myron T. Steele_________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice