Title: Richard Lindquist v. City of Jersey City Fire Department
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-84-01
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: February 11, 2003

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Argued September 23, 2002 -- Decided February 11, 2003 COLEMAN, J., writing for a unanimous Court. The issue on appeal is whether Richard Lindquist s employment as a fireman for approximately twenty-three years caused or contributed to his development of pulmonary emphysema within the meaning of the occupational disease provisions of the Workers Compensation Act (the Act). Lindquist was employed as a full-time fireman with the City of Jersey City Fire Department (JCFD) from July 1972 until his retirement in January 1995. He was promoted to the rank of captain in 1979. During the first ten years of his employment, Lindquist responded to about 30 to 60 large fires per year, small one-room fires, car fires, and dump fires. Lindquist was given a self-contained breathing apparatus that he did not use very often. During larger fires, Lindquist was exposed to heavy smoke for up to forty-five minutes and was also exposed to fires involving burning chemicals, plastics, household cleaners, and propane. In 1982, JCFD provided all firefighters with the Scott mask, which provided oxygen or purified air to the user. Lindquist testified that the Scott mask did a good job of preventing fumes from entering the breathing passages, although he still inhaled smoke that seeped into the mask. He also frequently had to remove the mask either to give orders or to clear away moisture. From 1986 through 1992, Lindquist supervised the Hazardous Materials Unit, responding to both residential and industrial fires. Prior to beginning his job with JCFD, Lindquist had not suffered from any breathing, eyes, nose, or throat problems. He testified that while a firefighter with JCFD, he was taken to the hospital for smoke inhalation numerous times and, on other occasions, was given oxygen at the scene of a fire. Lindquist retired in 1995 at the age of forty-seven, due in part to an early buy-out offer and in part to health considerations. At the time of his retirement, Lindquist was less able to perform his responsibilities as a firefighter, particularly as captain, because his energy and normal breathing capacity had gradually diminished. He suffered from constant post-nasal drip and cough, shortness of breath, dry eyes, heart palpitations, and decreased breathing capacity. Lindquist began seeing a doctor in 1995 and was successfully treated with a bronchodilator twice or three times a week. Lindquist had smoked about three quarters of a pack of cigarettes per day for about twenty-two years until he quit smoking in either 1992 or 1994. Lindquist filed claims in the Division of Workers Compensation against JCFD, alleging occupational exposure to respiratory irritants while employed as a firefighter since 1972. Dr. Bernard Eisenstein, a heart and lung specialist who is Board Certified in internal medicine, testified at trial on Lindquist s behalf. On January 16, 1995, Dr. Eisenstein performed a complete physical examination on Lindquist, including chest x-rays and pulmonary function tests. Based on the results of the examination and tests, Dr. Eisenstein concluded that Lindquist suffered from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) in the form of emphysema. The doctor attributed Lindquist s condition primarily to occupational exposure as a firefighter to fire, smoke, hazardous waste, combustion, and secondarily to cigarette smoking, but was unable to allocate exact percentages to each cause. Dr. Eisenstein concluded that, based on a reasonable degree of medical probability, Lindquist suffered thirty percent partial total permanent disability. On cross-examination, Dr. Eisenstein admitted that he could not cite to any studies in which non-smoking firefighters developed emphysema. Dr. Douglas Hutt, a physician Board Certified in internal, pulmonary, and critical care medicine testified on behalf of the fire department. At Lindquist s physical examination on December 19, 1996, he told Dr. Hutt that he could do all of his normal activities although there was a subtle difference, and that his grandfather had died from emphysema. Dr. Hutt performed a complete physical examination, including a chest x-ray and pulmonary function tests. Based on his findings, Dr. Hutt concluded that Lindquist suffers from emphysema caused by cigarette smoking. Dr. Hutt was unable to testify with 100% certainty that some of the exposure as a firefighter could not in some way have contributed to the development of lung disease. The Judge of Compensation found that Lindquist s occupational exposure materially contributed to the development of emphysema and awarded Lindquist a disability of thirty percent for emphysema. The Appellate Division reversed on appeal, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to establish medical causation between the employment and the emphysema. The Supreme Court granted certification. HELD: Richard Lindquist s employment as a fireman with the City of Jersey City Fire Department caused or contributed to his development of pulmonary emphysema within the meaning of the occupational disease provisions of the Workers Compensation Act. 1. Occupational disease coverage under the Act has evolved from providing no coverage at all to the current statutory approach of providing a general definition of compensable occupational diseases, suggesting that there are numerous diseases that may be covered. The Act involves a trade-off whereby employees give up their rights to pursue common-law remedies in exchange for automatic entitlement to specific benefits whenever they suffer a compensable injury. Courts should use this trade-off rationale, as well as the science of the workplace, in its efforts to determine whether a disease is related to occupational exposure. Moreover, the Act is to be liberally construed; the Rules of Evidence to not apply in compensation proceedings; and the petitioner must prove both legal and medical causation. In New Jersey, it is enough to prove that the exposure to a risk or danger in the workplace was in fact a contributing cause of the injury. (Pp. 12-20) 2. The Rubanick standard governing the admissibility and reliability of medical causation evidence should be applied in workers compensation cases. Under that standard, when a scientific theory of causation has not yet reached general acceptance, it may be found to be sufficiently reliable if it is based on a sound, adequately-founded scientific methodology involving data and information of the type reasonably relied on by experts in the field. (Pp. 20-21) 3. In workers compensation cases, the appropriate standard for appellate review requires substantial deference be given to administrative determinations. The scope of appellate review is limited to whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence presented in the record, considering the proofs as a whole, with due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge their credibility. The petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his environmental exposure was a substantial contributing cause of his occupational disease. (Pp. 22-23) 4. The standard articulated in Fiore for deciding occupational heart attack cases, whereby a petitioner must prove that his work exposure exceeded the exposure caused by personal factors such as cigarette smoking, is not applicable to non-heart cases. Rather, the controlling test is whether the exposure substantially contributed to the development or aggravation of the disease. Thus, Lindquist has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his environmental exposure while fighting fires was a substantial contributing cause or aggravation of his emphysema. (Pp. 23-25) 5. The firefighters presumption provision of the Act provides that any condition or impairment of health of any member of a volunteer fire department caused by disease of the respiratory system shall be presumed to be an occupational disease unless rebutted by satisfactory proof. The Court can find no plausible reason why the Legislature would have intended to treat differently voluntary and paid firefighters who sustain the same pulmonary conditions after fighting the same fires. Therefore, the rebuttable statutory presumption of compensability also applies to paid firefighters. Numerous states provide a similar presumption. (Pp. 25-29) 6. The Court takes judicial notice of studies it reviewed that bolster the proposition that exposure to industrial pollutants at work can cause emphysema and that, although cigarette smoking is the most important risk factor for COPD, other risk factors, including environmental exposure, can cause emphysema. Moreover, other studies present strong scientific support for the theory that firefighting is a significant cause of lung disease. Thus, there is enough scientific data in support of Lindquist s case to allow a Judge of Compensation to find in Lindquist s favor. Given the current level of scientific knowledge about emphysema, Dr. Eisenstein s testimony was not a subjective guess. There was sufficient credible evidence to support the Judge of Compensation s decision granting Lindquist disability benefits. Lindquist sustained his burden of proof and the presumption in favor of compensability has not been rebutted. (Pp. 29-51) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the judgment of the Division of Workers Compensation is REINSTATED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI and ALBIN join in JUSTICE COLEMAN S opinion. Petitioner-Appellant, v. CITY OF JERSEY CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT, Respondent-Respondent. Argued September 23, 2002 Decided February 11, 2003 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Thomas W. Polaski argued the cause for appellant (Gary P. Sarlo, attorney). John H. Geaney argued the cause for respondent (Capehart &amp; Scatchard, attorneys). [Reinhart v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 147 N.J. 156, 163-64 (1996).] Because the Rules of Evidence do not apply to these workers compensation proceedings, respondent did not seek a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing to challenge the admissibility of petitioner s expert s testimony with respect to medical causation. The Judge of Compensation found that expert s testimony to be credible and found petitioner s emphysema to be causally related to his employment exposure. Respondent has not waived its right to assert that the determination of the Judge of Compensation went so wide off the mark that a mistake must have been made that is correctable through appellate review. In workers compensation proceedings, as in the area of toxic tort litigation involving multiple causations or long-term exposure to toxic substances, it may not be possible scientifically for an injured person to prove decisively the medical cause of the injury. Faced with the need to accommodate the goals of our tort system when the scientific community was in disagreement, this Court adopted a less restrictive standard in Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 125 N.J. 421 (1991), for the admissibility of scientific evidence. That same standard is to be used in weighing the credibility of opinion evidence presented by experts. Given that the only significant distinctions between Rubanick and the present case are the forum and the quantum of damages recoverable, the Rubanick standard governing the admissibility and reliability of medical causation evidence should be applied in workers compensation cases as well. See, e.g., Kemp ex rel. Wright v. State, 174 N.J. 412 (2002) (applying Rubanick in non-toxic tort case). Rubanick, supra, dealt with occupational exposure to PCBs during the course of the plaintiff s employment with the defendant. 125 N.J. at 425. The Court acknowledged that our Rules of Evidence governing the admissibility of expert evidence, formerly N.J.R.E. 19 and N.J.R.E. 56(2), now N.J.R.E. 702 and N.J.R.E. 703, are the starting point for determining whether the conventional general acceptance test of reliability should be the standard for the admissibility of expert testimony relating to new or developing theories of causation in toxic-tort litigation. Rubanick, supra, 125 N.J. at 432. Because scientific knowledge [was] not at a state of the art such that an expert s testimony could be sufficiently reliable, the Court fashion[ed] a broader standard for assessing the reliability of such evidence in [toxic-tort] litigation. Id. at 432-33 (quoting State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208 (1984)). The Court recognized that the need for a broader standard was due in part to the extraordinary and unique burdens facing plaintiffs who seek to prove causation in toxic-tort litigation and to the extremely high level of proof required before scientists will accept a new theory. Id. at 433. Consequently, in adopting a less restrictive standard, the Court held that in toxic-tort litigation, a scientific theory of causation that has not yet reached general acceptance may be found to be sufficiently reliable if it is based on a sound, adequately-founded scientific methodology involving data and information of the type reasonably relied on by experts in the scientific field. The evidence of such scientific knowledge must be proffered by an expert who is sufficiently qualified by education, knowledge, training, and experience in the specific field of science. The expert must possess a demonstrated professional capability to assess the scientific significance of underlying data and information, to apply the scientific methodology, and to explain the bases for the opinion reached. [Id. at 449.] Finally, we turn to the appropriate standard of appellate review of determinations made in workers compensation cases. Courts generally give substantial deference to administrative determinations. Earl v. Johnson &amp; Johnson, 158 N.J. 155, 161 (1999) (quoting R &amp; R Marketing, L.L.C. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 158 N.J. 170, 175 (1999)). In workers compensation cases, the scope of appellate review is limited to whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record, considering the proofs as a whole, with due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge of their credibility. Close, supra, 44 N.J. at 599 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Deference must be accorded the factual findings and legal determinations made by the Judge of Compensation unless they are manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with competent relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. Perez v. Monmouth Cable Vision, 278 N.J. Super. 275, 282 (App. Div. 1994) (quoting Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)), certif. denied, 140 N.J. 277 (1995). The petitioner has the burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her environmental exposure while fighting fires was a substantial contributing cause of his or her occupational disease. Such a petitioner is not required to prove that the nexus between the disease and the place of employment is certain. Magaw v. Middletown Bd. of Educ., 323 N.J. Super. 1, 11 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 485 (1999); Laffey v. Jersey City, 289 N.J. Super. 292, 303 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 146 N.J. 500 (1996). (a) Such disease develops or first manifests itself during a period while such member is an active member of such department; and (b) Said member, upon entering said volunteer fire service, has or shall have undergone a medical examination, which examination failed or fails to disclose the presence of such disease or diseases; and (c) Such disease develops or first manifests itself within 90 days from the event medically determined to be the cause thereof. Any present member who did not undergo a medical examination upon entering said volunteer fire service, may undergo such examination within 180 days after the effective date of this act and in the event such examination does not disclose the presence of such disease or diseases, he shall thereafter be entitled to the benefits of this act. [Ibid.] There is no legislative history indicating the Legislature s intent when enacting the statute in 1964. Members of volunteer fire companies were already, at the time, covered by workers compensation laws. N.J.S.A. 34:15-43. Paid firefighters as public employees were also covered by the Act. Ibid. Because we can find no plausible reason the Legislature would have intended a difference when voluntary and paid firefighters sustained the same pulmonary conditions after fighting the same fire together, we hold that the presumption applies to paid firefighters as well. Further support for concluding that the presumption should not be restricted to volunteer firefighters is the fact that in 1987, the Legislature enacted a rebuttable presumption that cardiovascular and cerebrovascular injury or death to paid and volunteer firefighters sustained while performing fire suppression or medical emergency functions are compensable. L. 1987, c. 382, codified as N.J.S.A. 34:15-7.3. As will be shown later, at least thirty states have some form of a presumption for firefighters. If we have misperceived the Legislature s intent, we invite the Legislature to reconsider this matter. The record does not fully inform us whether the statutory preconditions for the presumption have been met in this case. Assuming, however, that the presumption applies to this case and that subsections (a), (b) and (c) can be satisfied, the existence of such a rebuttable presumption is not dispositive of this appeal. To rebut the presumption, respondent presented evidence that petitioner smoked and had a family history of emphysema. Because the determination of whether respondent rebutted the presumption is intertwined with whether petitioner sustained his burden of proof on causation, we resolve both issues in petitioner s favor in section VI of this opinion. Other jurisdictions have addressed the issue of statutory presumptions in favor of the firefighter in one form or another. For example, when Oregon adopted a disputable (rebuttable) presumption that firefighters heart and pulmonary conditions are related to the employment, the legislature intended to give relief to firefighters because statistical studies indicated firefighters were much more likely to suffer from heart and lung diseases due to exposure to smoke and gases under strenuous conditions. Wright v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 613 P.2d 755, 758 (Or. 1980). Similarly, when the State of Washington created a presumption, it recognized that fire fighters as a class have a higher rate of respiratory disease than the general public. Wash. Rev. Code 51.32.185 Legislative Findings, 1987 c. 515. As noted in the Appendix to this opinion, our research discloses that thirty states have adopted a presumption that a firefighter s pulmonary disease or condition is work related, generally following more than five years of such employment. Many states also require firefighters to have passed a medical examination at the beginning of their employment finding them free of pulmonary disease if they wish to invoke the presumption. Seventeen of those states presumptions relate to pension, special disability funds, and retirements. Thirteen states, including New Jersey, have presumptions covering workers compensation claims. At least one state legislature has been motivated by statistical studies indicating that firefighters are much more likely to suffer from heart and lung diseases due to exposure to smoke and gases under strenuous conditions. Other legislatures have reached the same result without reference to studies, stating that firefighters are required to work in the midst of and are subject to heavy smoke fumes, and carcinogenic, poisonous, toxic or chemical gases from fires. 40 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/4-110.1. The fact that so many states have created various forms of presumptions of compensability for specified occupational conditions, suggests (1) that a generalized causative link exists between the injury or disease and the workplace and (2) that such a causative link will be difficult to prove. See Solomon, supra, at 1174 n.105 (quoting Joseph La Dou, M.D., et al., Cumulative Injury or Disease Claims: An Attempt to Define Employers Liability for Workers Compensation, 6 Am. J.L. &amp; Med. 1, 21 (1980)). Because so many state legislatures have enacted various presumptions respecting the connection between firefighting and pulmonary and heart conditions, almost a national consensus emerges regarding the reliability of that proposition. Hamilton Amusement Ctr. v. Verniero, 156 N.J. 254, 270 (1998). The destruction of elastin that occurs in emphysema is believed to result from an imbalance between two proteins in the lung an enzyme called elastase which breaks down elastin, and AAT which inhibits elastase. In the normal individual, there is enough AAT to protect elastin so that abnormal elastin destruction does not occur. However, when there is a genetic deficiency of AAT, the activity of the elastase is not inhibited and elastin degradation occurs unchecked. If individuals with a severe genetic deficiency of alpha-1-protease inhibitor smoke, they usually have symptoms of COPD by the time they reach early middle age. Deficiency of alpha-1-protease inhibitor can be detected by blood tests available through hospital laboratories. People from families in which relatives have developed emphysema in their thirties and forties should be tested for AAT deficiency. If a deficiency is found, it is critical for these people not to smoke. Some scientists believe that nonfamilial emphysema, usually called smoker s emphysema, also results from an imbalance between elastin-degrading enzymes and their inhibitors. The elastase-AAT imbalance is thought to be a result of the effects of smoking, rather than inherited as in familial emphysema. Some evidence for this theory comes from studies on the effect of tobacco smoke on lung cells. These studies showed that tobacco smoke stimulates excess release of elastase from cells normally found in the lung. The inhaled smoke also stimulates more elastase-producing cells to migrate to the lung which in turn causes the release of even more elastase. To make matters worse, oxidants found in cigarette smoke inactivate a significant portion of the elastase inhibitors that are present, thereby decreasing the amount of active antielastase available for protecting the lung and further upsetting the elastase-antielastase balance. Scientists believe that, in addition to smoking-related processes, there must be other factors that cause emphysema in the general population since only 15 to 20 percent of smokers develop emphysema. The nature and role of these other factors in smokers emphysema are not yet clear. [Id. at 2-4 (emphasis omitted).] Although [c]igarette smoking is the most important risk factor for COPD . . . [o]ther risk factors include age, heredity, exposure to air pollution at work and in the environment . . . . Id. at 1 (emphasis added). That means the National Institutes of Health has recognized that exposure to air pollutants at work can cause both chronic bronchitis and emphysema. Furthermore, [s]cientists believe that, in addition to smoke-related processes, there must be other factors that cause emphysema in the general population since only 15 to 20 percent of smokers develop emphysema. Id. at 4. Not only is it well known that industrial pollutants at work can cause or contribute to the development of emphysema, courts in New Jersey have awarded workers compensation for emphysema since the current general definition of occupational diseases became effective January 1, 1950. The first set of such cases was Masko v. Barnett Foundry &amp; Mach. Co., 53 N.J. Super. 414, 423 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 29 N.J. 464 (1959), and Bucuk v. Edward A. Zusi Brass Foundry, 49 N.J. Super. 187, 193 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 27 N.J. 398 (1958), awarding compensation for emphysema and silicosis caused by pulmonary irritants. That same trend was continued into the next three decades. In Ort v. Taylor-Wharton Co., 47 N.J. 198, 201 (1966), the petitioner was awarded thirty percent of total permanent disability for pneumoconiosis and emphysema caused by exposure to foundry dust. Thereafter, he returned to work for the same employer in the same industrial environment that caused the pneumoconiosis to render him totally and permanently disabled. Id. at 202. In Taylor by Taylor v. Engelhard Indus., 230 N.J. Super. 245, 247 (App. Div. 1989), Solomon Taylor was awarded [fifty-five percent] of total permanent disability for chronic bronchitis and pulmonary emphysema. Those conditions were caused by the petitioner s expos[ure] to smoke, dust, fumes and other pulmonary irritants. Ibid. In Gierman v. M &amp; H Mach. Co., 213 N.J. Super. 105, 107 (App. Div. 1986), Howard Gierman was awarded total and permanent compensation as the result of his occupational exposure to pulmonary irritants while working for respondent. The disability was characterized as chronic, obstructive pulmonary disease including emphysema. Ibid. In Brooks v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 66 N.J. Super. 135, 137 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 36 N.J. 29 (1961), compensation was awarded based on the petitioner s exposure to smoke and fumes caused by his job as a burner-welder at the steel yard. Finally, another case finding emphysema related to an undescribed employment is Vohta v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. Super. 169, 172 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 32 N.J. 353 (1960). Although none of those cases involved firefighters, there are good reasons to infer that many of the workers in those cases were smokers. In Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 99-100 (1990), we noted that tobacco manufacturers have been highly successful in getting people to smoke and that their advertisements have targeted certain groups such as minorities. A United States National Health Survey in 1970 revealed that [r]egardless of industry, smoking is most prevalent among those jobs which are also likely to be most exposed to irritating and toxic dusts and fumes. T. Sterling and J. Weinkam, The Confounding of Occupation and Smoking and Its Consequences, 30 Soc. Sci. &amp; Med. 457, 459 (1990). The point to be made is that some smokers have been awarded workers compensation in New Jersey for emphysema based on their occupational exposure. Dr. Hutt also testified that although he has read many unspecified studies on lung diseases that included firefighters, none dealt with firefighting and emphysema. He stated that although many of the studies have indicated that firefighters can get lung scarring and lung restriction from firefighting, I haven t seen [studies] that specifically mention emphysema as an increased risk when you factor out cigarette smoking in firefighters. He was aware that postmortem and pathologic studies have shown that cigarette smoke is by far the most common cause of the development of emphysema. He testified that it is the frequent inhalation of smoke that affects certain enzymes, which causes emphysema. He was unaware of any studies linking emphysema to any smoke except cigarette smoke. Dr. Hutt admitted that he was aware of many studies which show that firefighters have worse airflow obstruction and chronic bronchitis . . . [and] may be at somewhat higher risk. He concluded that, absent any studies that show that firefighters exposure on the job can develop emphysema, and in view of the fact that petitioner smoked and his grandfather had died of emphysema, petitioner s emphysema is related to smoking. (C) States with presumption for pension, retirement or disability plan only: Alabama: Ala. Code 11-43-144 (municipal corp. law, medical exam, three years service). Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 31-30.5-705 (firefighter s pension fund; cities over 100,000 population only, five years service, old hires only). (For smaller cities, must show causation: Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 31-30.5-703). Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. 47-7-102 (firefighter s pension fund; requires 5 years fund membership and total and permanent disability resulting in firefighter s leaving employment, more stringent criteria for volunteers). Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. 88-79(b) (public employees retirement plan; medical exam). Iowa: Iowa Code 411.6(5)(c) (firefighters retirement system; requires medical exam). Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. 74-4952 (firemen s retirement plan, generally requires five years uninterrupted service). Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 79.080(7) (local gov t. employees benefit plan, requires medical exam and five years service). Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 94A (civil service retirement; medical exam). Missouri: Mo. Ann. Stat. 87.005, 87.006 (firemen s retirement and relief system; medical exam, five years service; workers compensation statute requires proof of direct causal relationship , Mo. Ann. Stat. 287.067). Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. 18-1723 (pension and retirement; five years service). New York: N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law 207-q; N.Y. Retire. &amp; Soc. Sec. Law 363-f (retirement and municipal laws; medical exam, enacted 2002, effective Sept. 11, 2001 through June 30, 2004). Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 742.38(D)(3) (medical exam); workers compensation statute requires causation and total disability, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 4123.68(W)). Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws 45-19-16 (firefighters relief law; allows towns to create presumption, medical exam, excludes partial disability). South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws 9-16-45 (city retirement systems; medical exam). Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. 7-51-201(b)(1) (local government employee compensation, medical exam). Texas: Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 6243e.2(1), 6243e.3 (city pensions; six years service, slightly different rules for different sized cities). Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. Ann. 40.65(2); 891.45 (applies to public employee s trust fund and firefighter s pension; requires five years service and medical exam). (D) States whose presumption requires firefighter to show causation: Idaho: Idaho Code 72-438 (workers compensation; requires lung disease to result from firefighting, allows presumption for cancer). Illinois: 40 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/4-110.1 (firefighters pension fund for cities under 500,000 population; requires 5 years service, medical exam for hires after 1971); 40 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/6-112, 5/6-151.1 (firemen s annuity &amp; benefit fund for cities over 500,000 population; requires medical exam and ten years service, disease must arise solely [from] employment ). Pennsylvania: 77 Pa. Stat. Ann. 27.1(c), 1208 (workers compensation, four years service). Utah: Utah Code Ann. 49-16-102(6)(a) (firefighters retirement act, no cases interpreting statute, appears to require causation and five years service). (E) States without any statutory presumption regarding COPD-type disease: Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Connecticut Delaware Florida Indiana Minnesota Mississippi Montana (Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-119: causation-based presumption eliminated in 1987). New Mexico North Carolina Vermont West Virginia Wyoming NO. A-84 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court RICHARD LINDQUIST, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CITY OF JERSEY CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT, Respondent-Respondent. DECIDED February 11, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Coleman CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY