Title: Commonwealth v. Carter
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11525
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: September 19, 2016

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SJC-11525 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  VERNON T. CARTER. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     April 8, 2016. - September 19, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Duffly, & Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Robbery.  Firearms.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Assault and 
Battery.  Joint Enterprise.  Identification.  Evidence, 
Identification, Joint venturer.  Intoxication.  
Constitutional Law, Right to bear arms.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Duplicative convictions, Witness, 
Assistance of counsel, Argument by prosecutor, Instructions 
to jury, Conduct of judge. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 30, 2009. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Thomas 
F. McGuire, Jr., J., and the cases were tried before Raymond P. 
Veary, Jr., J. 
 
 
 
Russell C. Sobelman for the defendant. 
 
Gail M. McKenna, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Justices Spina and Duffly participated in the deliberation 
on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  In April, 2013, a jury convicted the defendant, 
Vernon T. Carter, of murder in the first degree of Scott 
Monteiro on a theory of felony-murder, based on the predicate 
felony of armed robbery.2  The defendant was also convicted of 
armed robbery, assault and battery of Sheldon Santos, possession 
of a firearm, and possession of ammunition.3  On appeal, the 
defendant asserts error in (1) admission of identifications 
obtained through procedures alleged to be suggestive; (2) 
testimony from a last-minute Commonwealth witness; (3) the 
prosecutor's closing argument; (4) omission of jury instructions 
regarding involuntary manslaughter, "humane practice," and 
intoxication; (5) judicial bias; and (6) firearms-related 
convictions without evidence that he was not licensed.4  The 
                     
 
2 The jury did not find the defendant guilty on the theory 
of deliberate premeditation. 
 
 
3 The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment in the 
State prison without parole on the murder conviction; to from 
nine to twelve years on the armed robbery conviction, to be 
served from and after the murder sentence; and to from three to 
five years on the firearm conviction, to be served from and 
after the armed robbery sentence.  He was also sentenced to a 
house of correction for two years for unlawfully possessing 
ammunition and for two and one-half years for assault and 
battery, to run concurrently with the murder sentence. 
 
 
4 The defendant also claims that trial counsel provided 
constitutionally ineffective assistance.  Because his claim of 
ineffective assistance is based on counsel's failure to act 
appropriately to prevent some of the errors claimed on appeal or 
to preserve the defendant's rights regarding those alleged 
 
3 
 
 
defendant also argues that he is entitled to relief under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  We vacate, as duplicative, the defendant's armed 
robbery conviction, because it was the predicate felony for his 
felony-murder conviction, the only theory on which the jury 
found him guilty of murder in the first degree.  See 
Commonwealth v. Alcequiecz, 465 Mass. 557, 558 (2013).  We 
affirm the defendant's remaining convictions, and we discern no 
other basis to exercise our authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E. 
 
Background.  We summarize the evidence as the jury could 
have found it, reserving certain facts for later discussion.  At 
approximately 10 P.M. on Friday, September 4, 2009, a group of 
twenty to thirty people, in their late teens or early twenties 
and generally from the Wareham area, gathered at a residence in 
Wareham for a "house party."  People were socializing and 
drinking, "[j]ust teenage and adolescent kids having fun."  
Monteiro, who had turned twenty-one years of age approximately 
one month before the party, arrived with three of his friends.  
Santos was there wearing a gold chain. 
 
One of the young women at the party had asked the host if 
she could invite her friend "Justin."  Between 11:30 P.M. and 
midnight, Justin arrived with a group of ten to fifteen people.  
                                                                  
errors, we shall address this claim when we address the other 
claims. 
4 
 
 
They introduced themselves to one or more partygoers as being 
from the "United Front" in New Bedford.  The party became more 
"tense" after the group's arrival, and someone in the group 
started to complain, "This party is whacked. . . .  There's no 
bitches."  A short time later, the majority of the New Bedford 
group left the house.  Within a few minutes, two to five people 
reentered and approached Santos.  Santos had been sitting on a 
sofa with his girl friend, and Monteiro was sitting on a nearby 
chair.  Santos stood up when approached, and a few people from 
the New Bedford group surrounded the sofa area so as to prevent 
anyone from leaving.  The defendant pulled a gun out of his 
pants, pointed it at Santos's head, and said, "Run your chain."  
He reached toward Santos, and Santos dropped to the floor.  
Monteiro then stood up, held his hands out with palms facing up, 
and calmly said, "Chill, we are all just chilling."  The 
defendant fired three shots, and a single bullet hit Monteiro 
above his right eye.  At some point during this altercation, 
Santos suffered a face injury that required sutures; he also 
lost his gold chain. 
 
One of Monteiro's friends attended to him as the remaining 
partygoers dispersed.  The police and emergency medical services 
personnel arrived a few minutes after the shooting.  Monteiro 
was lying on the floor, breathing but unresponsive.  He was 
5 
 
 
transported by ambulance to a nearby hospital.  Monteiro died 
from a gunshot wound to the head. 
 
The police recovered a spent shell casing from the 
ambulance and, during Monteiro's autopsy, recovered three 
fragments of a shell casing from Monteiro's head.  The shell 
casing from the ambulance was from a .22 caliber firearm, and 
the fragments were consistent with being from the same firearm. 
 
The police spoke to witnesses the night of the party, many 
of whom gathered outside of the house after the incident.  At 
least one of the partygoers knew the defendant by name and 
provided that information to police.5  Using that information, 
Wareham police compiled two photographic arrays containing the 
defendant's photograph.  The following morning, the police 
showed the first array containing eight photographs to the 
witness who knew the defendant.  The witness did not identify 
the defendant's photograph in this array.  Less than one hour 
later, the police showed the witness the second array containing 
six photographs.  The witness identified the defendant in the 
second array, explaining that he recognized the defendant in the 
first array but did not identify him because he was "nervous." 
 
Approximately one and one-half hours after the 
identification, Wareham police notified police in New Bedford 
                     
 
5 This witness had seen the defendant approximately five 
times during the prior three years. 
6 
 
 
that the defendant was a suspect in a homicide investigation and 
requested that they question him.  Within one hour of the 
dispatch, New Bedford police officers observed the defendant 
walking and stopped their cruiser to speak to him.  The 
defendant stopped and agreed to accompany them to the police 
station for questioning.  At the police station, the officers 
recorded the interview.  The defendant told them that he had 
been at the party but stayed outside the house.  After 
questioning the defendant for approximately one hour, the police 
released him. 
 
The following morning, the defendant went to the house of a 
woman he had known since he was a child and asked if he could 
stay with her because the police were looking for him in 
connection with an incident at a party in Wareham.  She said, 
"no," because her family was there.  As she hugged him goodbye, 
she felt something "heavy" and "hard" in the defendant's waist. 
 
State police arrested the defendant later that day pursuant 
to a warrant.  He was wearing a black hat displaying the word 
"Invincible."  The State police interrogated the defendant on 
September 6 and 7, 2009.6  The defendant told police that he was 
at the party, he did not have a gun, but he knew that at least 
                     
 
6 In total, police interviewed the defendant four times 
between September 5 and 7, 2009.  All four interviews were 
recorded.  Redacted versions of the first three recordings were 
played for the jury. 
7 
 
 
four people in his group were carrying firearms.  He said that 
Santos and his "squad" had guns and threatened someone in the 
New Bedford group.  He said he saw the shooter "cock" the 
firearm and "pistol whip" Santos, and that he was about five or 
six feet from the shooter when the gun was fired.  The defendant 
also told police that one of the people in his group, "Justin," 
hid a gun after the party, and he directed police to the 
apartment where the gun could be found.  The police seized a .38 
caliber firearm from the apartment, which did not fire the shell 
casing obtained from the ambulance and was not consistent with 
the firearm used as the murder weapon.7 
 
Within forty-eight hours of the shooting, four witnesses 
identified the defendant as the shooter in photographic 
arrays.8,9  They and other witnesses described the shooter as 
                     
 
7 A man who lived in the apartment testified that the 
defendant had asked him to hide the firearm "one or two days" 
before the search on September 7, 2009, and a woman, the man's 
wife, testified that the defendant's visit occurred before the 
date of the party. 
 
 
8 Sheldon Santos testified that the defendant was at the 
party, but "nothing happened" between them.  A State police 
trooper testified that Santos had previously pointed to the 
defendant in a photographic array and said, "he was in the house 
acting cool, then he went outside, then he came back in.  I 
think I might have been fighting him."  Santos, however, became 
uncooperative after police asked him to circle the defendant on 
the array for identification, and he refused to speak further 
with the police. 
 
8 
 
 
between five feet, five inches and five feet, nine inches tall, 
skinny, "light skinned," and wearing a black hat.  One of the 
witnesses testified that the shooter was wearing a hat 
displaying the word "Invincible."  The police showed the 
witnesses an additional photographic array containing other 
people mentioned by the defendant as being at the party.  Except 
for one witness who identified a photograph of Justin as being 
at the party, no other potential suspects were identified. 
 
Discussion.  The defendant challenges a number of issues at 
trial, framing them as errors by the judge, the prosecutor, 
defense counsel, or some combination thereof.  We consider each 
claim to determine "whether there was an error in the course of 
the trial (by defense counsel, the prosecutor, or the judge) 
and, if there was, whether that error was likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion."  Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 
Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014). 
 
1.  Identification evidence.  The defendant filed a motion 
to suppress the four eyewitness identifications of him as the 
shooter, claiming that the photographic arrays were 
unnecessarily suggestive and tainted the remaining 
identifications because the witnesses discussed the incident in 
                                                                  
 
9 One witness identified a photograph as someone who was at 
the party, but the identified photograph depicted someone who 
was incarcerated at the time of the party. 
9 
 
 
person and through social media.  Two witnesses failed to 
identify the defendant in an initial photographic array 
containing eight photographs, but subsequently identified the 
defendant when shown the second array containing six 
photographs.  The defendant was the only person depicted in both 
arrays.  The defendant also argued that the following procedures 
caused the arrays to be unduly suggestive:  the photographs were 
not presented sequentially, the arrays were not blindly 
administered, and all arrays should have contained at least 
eight photographs. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing, the defendant focused on the 
two identifications that were obtained through repetitive 
arrays.  The judge concluded that the repeat arrays were not 
unnecessarily suggestive.  First, the photographs in each array 
were similar to the defendant's photographs.  Next, the second 
array contained a more recent photograph of the defendant with 
shorter hair, which was more similar to his appearance at the 
party, and both witnesses told police that the shooter had 
shorter hair than the individuals depicted in the photographs in 
the first array.  Moreover, the judge found that the witness who 
knew the defendant before the party was not swayed by the 
presence of his photograph in repeat arrays, crediting the 
witness's testimony that he did not identify the defendant in 
the first array out of fear. 
10 
 
 
 
On appeal, the defendant does not claim error in the denial 
of the motion to suppress, but argues that the prejudicial 
effect of the photographic array procedure; the conflicting 
witness testimony; the consumption of alcohol and marijuana by 
eyewitnesses; and a "rumor mill"10 created through witness 
discussion of the incident prior to the identifications, social 
media, and media coverage caused a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  The defendant's argument lacks merit. 
 
The defendant "has a due process right to identification 
procedures meeting a certain basic standard of fairness."  
Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 794 (2009), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Dougan, 377 Mass. 303, 316 (1979).  We 
discourage the use of repeated arrays containing a suspect's 
photograph, see Commonwealth v. Scott, 408 Mass. 811, 826 
(1990), and the use of repeated arrays could make identification 
procedures unnecessarily suggestive if the police do not have 
good cause for the use of such procedure.  In this case, the 
judge implicitly found good cause because the second array was 
given to both eyewitnesses after each commented that the 
                     
 
10 The partygoers gathered outside of the house after the 
shooting for fifteen to twenty minutes without being separated 
and discussed the incident through social media and other 
interactions before being individually questioned by police.  
The defendant claims that these conditions created a "rumor 
mill" that caused the identifications to be based on 
speculation. 
11 
 
 
perpetrator's hair was shorter than was depicted in the 
photographs used in the first array.  Moreover, we recognize 
that police did not follow procedures that we have previously 
recommended:  "double-blind procedure" and "sequential method."  
See Silva-Santiago, supra at 797-800.  However, the absence of 
the recommended procedures goes only to the weight of the 
identifications, not admissibility.11  Id. at 797-799. 
 
Our conclusion that the identifications were not 
"unnecessarily suggestive" does not end the inquiry.  Even if 
otherwise admissible, a judge may suppress identification 
evidence if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice."  Commonwealth v. Johnson, 473 
Mass. 594, 599 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 
Mass. 228, 249 n.27 (2014).  Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2016).  In 
                     
 
11 We also note that a State police trooper administering 
each of the repeat arrays to one witness told the witness during 
her first array, after she failed to make an identification, 
"just to think about it and it's important if she did see 
somebody in there that, you know, she does the right thing, as 
we would expect other people to do so."  Before each of the two 
arrays shown to this witness, the trooper properly notified her 
that the alleged wrongdoer may or may not be in the photographs 
depicted in the array, as required by Commonwealth v. Silva-
Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 798 (2009).  This comment, however, 
detracted from the substance of that notification.  Where the 
officer properly followed the notification protocol expressed in 
Silva-Santiago, we do not conclude that the officer's statement 
caused the identification that the witness made during the 
second array to be inadmissible.  We, again, strongly recommend 
that photographic arrays be performed by law enforcement 
officers who do not know the identity of the suspect in order to 
protect against similar statements being inadvertently made. 
12 
 
 
this analysis, the "probative value of the identification 
depends on the strength of its source independent of the 
suggestive circumstances of the identification."  Johnson, supra 
at 601.  Relevant factors include "the witness's opportunity to 
observe the offender at the time of the crime, the amount of 
time between the crime and the identification, whether the 
witness's earlier description of the perpetrator matches the 
defendant, . . . whether the witness earlier identified another 
person as the perpetrator or failed to identify the defendant as 
the perpetrator," and "the witness's prior familiarity with the 
person identified."  Id. 
 
The record reflects, however, that the defendant would not 
have been able to meet his burden to establish that the 
prejudice resulting from the admission of the identifications 
outweighed their probative value.12  The four eyewitness 
identifications were made within forty-eight hours of the 
shooting, the witnesses observed the shooter from nearby 
locations -- one witness being "a foot away" from the gunman at 
the time -- and their ability to observe and report the incident 
was not impaired by alcohol or drugs. 
                     
 
12 A "defendant must timely file [such a] motion before 
trial, . . . and bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of 
the evidence" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Johnson, 473 
Mass. 594, 599 (2016).  The defendant did not file such a 
motion, but we consider this argument under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
13 
 
 
 
2.  Last-minute witness.  The defendant claims that he was 
unfairly surprised by the testimony of a witness not listed on 
the pretrial witness list and that trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to object to this testimony.  The Commonwealth has 
an affirmative duty to timely disclose proposed witnesses.  See 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A) (iv), (v), as amended, 444 
Mass. 1501 (2005).  A judge has "significant discretion in 
deciding whether late-discovered or late-disclosed witnesses 
should be excluded from testifying" as a remedy for the late 
disclosure.  Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 225 (2007), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Trapp, 423 Mass. 356, 363-364, cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 1045 (1996).  The relevant inquiry is whether 
the defendant has sufficient time to investigate the proposed 
testimony.  Commonwealth v. Lopez, 433 Mass. 406, 413 (2001).  
In that regard, "it is the consequences of the delay that 
matter, not the likely impact of the nondisclosed evidence."  
See Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 385 Mass. 165, 175 (1982), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 381 Mass. 90, 114 (1980). 
 
Here, the prosecutor told the judge on the fifth day of 
trial that he had mistakenly omitted a witness from the list.  
He asked that the witness, a Wareham police officer, be 
permitted to testify and asserted that defense counsel had 
agreed to such the prior day.  The judge granted the request.  
The officer, who was the first at the scene of the shooting, 
14 
 
 
testified that he saw a shell casing from a small caliber 
firearm on the floor near Monteiro's body when he approached to 
provide care.  Police did not find that shell casing or any 
other ballistics evidence at the house. 
 
The defendant has not shown any prejudice from the 
testimony or demonstrated that he could have benefited if 
defense counsel had objected.  The record reflects that defense 
counsel agreed to the prosecutor's request, suggesting that he 
had an adequate opportunity to prepare for the testimony.  
Moreover, he thoroughly cross-examined the witness on matters 
relating to the central issue in the trial -- the credibility of 
the eyewitness identifications.  The officer testified after the 
five eyewitnesses, all of whom had been shown photographic 
arrays.  Defense counsel's cross-examination focused on 
differences between recommended procedures for arrays and those 
used during this investigation.  Defense counsel may have 
strategically decided not to object to this witness so that he 
could challenge the identification techniques at this stage of 
trial.13 
                     
 
13 The defendant raised this and other claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for the first time on appeal, leaving us 
to consider the issues based only on the trial record.  Relief 
on a claim of ineffective assistance based on the trial record 
is the weakest form of such a claim because it is "bereft of any 
explanation by trial counsel for his actions and suggestive of 
strategy contrived by a defendant viewing the case with 
 
15 
 
 
 
3.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant 
challenges the following two portions of the prosecutor's 
closing argument: 
 
"In counsel's closing, experienced and skilled 
counsel, . . . he hit on a number of points.  The problem 
is with his arguments regarding for example social media.  
You heard a lot of questions about it.  There's one problem 
with that argument.  There was no testimony to back up the 
fact that anyone was influenced in their identification by 
social media, by popular media, TV, newspaper. 
 
 
". . .  
 
 
"Did you see anything in these young people . . . that 
would convince you that they would come in here and as the 
argument was made hold someone accountable; that was the 
name that they knew so they want to say that.  They want 
someone to be held accountable for this and so they just 
went with this, this guy over there.  I'll say it was him.  
Do you believe that they would come in and do that?  Did 
you hear anything about those individuals, did you see 
anything in them as you sized them up that would convince 
you that they would come in and do that because someone's 
got to pay.  It might as well be that guy over there.  It's 
ridiculous.  There's no reason to believe that and you 
shouldn't believe that." 
 
"Remarks made during closing arguments are considered in context 
of the whole argument, the evidence admitted at trial, and the 
judge's instructions to the jury."  Commonwealth v. Andrade, 468 
                                                                  
hindsight."  Commonwealth v. Gorham, 472 Mass. 112, 116 n.4 
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Peloquin, 437 Mass. 204, 210 n.5 
(2002).  "[T]he factual basis of the claim [must] appear[] 
indisputably on the trial record."  Commonwealth v. Zinser, 446 
Mass. 807, 811 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Adamides, 37 
Mass. App. Ct. 339, 344 (1994).  The defendant's claim here does 
not appear indisputably on the trial record where defense 
counsel's lack of objection may have been a strategic decision. 
16 
 
 
Mass. 543, 552 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Whitman, 453 
Mass. 331, 343 (2009). 
 
Specifically, the defendant argues that the prosecutor's 
statement regarding social media was not a fair inference from 
the evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Guy, 441 Mass. 96, 110 
(2004), citing Commonwealth v. Stote, 433 Mass. 19, 28 (2000) 
("Prosecutors must limit the scope of their closing arguments to 
facts in evidence and the fair inferences that may be drawn 
therefrom").  We disagree.  Although there was evidence that the 
partygoers discussed the shooting, the eyewitnesses testified 
that they were not influenced by outside sources in making their 
identifications.  Moreover, the only witness who testified that 
she had used social media in an attempt to "look[] for anybody 
else that [she] may have seen at the party" identified an 
individual who was incarcerated at the time, not the defendant. 
 
The defendant also argues that the prosecutor's discussion 
of the eyewitness testimony improperly vouched for credibility.  
"While a prosecutor may not vouch for the truthfulness of a 
witness's testimony, . . . we consistently have held that, where 
the credibility of a witness is an issue, counsel may 'argue 
from the evidence why a witness should be believed'" (citations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Brewer, 472 Mass. 307, 315 (2015).  
During the defendant's closing, counsel challenged the 
credibility of the first identifying witness when he argued that 
17 
 
 
the "police [were] signaling to [him] . . . who they want him to 
pick up, and there's no love lost at this point between [that 
witness] and anybody from New Bedford who was at that party this 
evening."  The prosecutor properly responded by arguing that the 
jury could reject that suggestion by recalling the 
characteristics of the witnesses' testimony. 
 
Because the prosecutor's statements were not improper, 
trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object.  Even 
if there had been an appearance of impropriety in the 
statements, the judge carefully and clearly instructed the jury 
that closing arguments are not evidence and that they alone were 
tasked with determining credibility.  These instructions offset 
any prejudice.14  See Brewer, supra. 
 
4.  Jury instructions.  The defendant challenges the 
omission of three jury instructions:  (a) involuntary 
manslaughter; (b) humane practice; and (c) intoxication.  He 
argues that these omissions created a substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice and that trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to object. 
                     
 
14 Because the defendant did not object, we would review any 
errors to determine whether they created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. 
Cassidy, 470 Mass. 201, 225-226 (2014), citing Commonwealth v. 
Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 140 (2007). 
18 
 
 
 
a.  Involuntary manslaughter.  As here, "where a defendant 
is charged with murder, an instruction on involuntary 
manslaughter is appropriate if any 'reasonable view of the 
evidence would [permit] the jury to find 'wanton [or] reckless' 
conduct rather than actions from which a 'plain and strong 
likelihood' of death would follow.'"  Commonwealth v. Tavares, 
471 Mass. 430, 438 (2015).  After the last witness testified, 
but before the Commonwealth rested, the judge advised the 
parties that the evidence so far did not warrant an instruction 
on "either species of manslaughter."  Trial counsel said that he 
"would ask for [a manslaughter instruction]," but that he was  
"not going to argue" with that ruling. 
 
The judge did not err in concluding that the evidence did 
not support such an instruction.  In Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 
Mass. 316 (2007), we concluded that "intentionally discharging a 
firearm in the direction of another person creates a plain and 
strong likelihood of death."  Id. at 332, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Mack, 423 Mass. 288, 290 (1996).  Here, witnesses testified 
that the defendant pointed a gun at Santos's head, the gun made 
a sound as if it was being cocked, the defendant fired three 
shots in quick succession, and Monteiro was shot from a distance 
of no more than two feet.  Because a manslaughter instruction 
was not warranted, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing 
to object. 
19 
 
 
 
In any event, the jury convicted the defendant of felony-
murder, but they did not find him guilty of deliberate 
premeditation.  "Where the felony-murder rule applies, generally 
the defendant is not entitled to an instruction on 
manslaughter."  Commonwealth v. Evans, 390 Mass. 144, 151 
(1983), citing Commonwealth v. LePage, 352 Mass. 403, 419 
(1967).  Because the killing occurred during the commission or 
attempted commission of an armed robbery, the instruction was 
not warranted.  See Commonwealth v. Neves, 474 Mass. 355, 370-
371 (2016). 
 
b.  Humane practice.  A "humane practice" instruction is 
required where a defendant's statements are offered in evidence 
and the voluntariness of those statements is "a live issue at 
trial."  Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 150, cert. 
denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982), quoting Commonwealth v. Alicea, 
376 Mass. 506, 523 (1978).  The defendant argues that the judge 
erred in failing to give a humane practice instruction and trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to request it because 
evidence suggested that the defendant had been intoxicated and 
consumed marijuana the night of the party and that he had a 
"terrible headache" and was "emotionally upset" during the 
interview the following day. 
 
Counsel did not challenge the voluntariness of any 
statements through pretrial motions or at trial on these 
20 
 
 
grounds.15  Additionally, counsel specifically declined to have a 
humane practice instruction read to the jury.  The defendant's 
theory at trial was mistaken identity -- that he was at the 
party but not involved in the altercation.  The statements that 
the defendant gave to police align with that theory and, where 
the defendant did not testify, produced the only evidence in 
support of his claim.  It "would be anomalous to require the 
judge to inquire into the issue 'where it might be contrary to 
the theory and strategy of the defendant.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Benoit, 410 Mass. 506, 513 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Pratt, 360 Mass. 708, 714 (1972).  There was no error. 
 
c.  Intoxication.  "A jury instruction on voluntary 
intoxication is required only where there is evidence of 
'debilitating intoxication' that could support a reasonable 
doubt as to the defendant's ability to form the requisite 
criminal intent."  Commonwealth v. Lennon, 463 Mass. 520, 523 
(2012).  The defendant argues that the judge erred in failing to 
give an intoxication instruction and trial counsel was 
                     
 
15 Trial counsel challenged the admission of the first 
interview conducted by the New Bedford police, arguing that the 
defendant was illegally stopped and seized prior to the 
interview, that the statement was not voluntary because the 
police impermissibly gave him the impression that he could only 
leave if he cooperated, that the police used trickery, and that 
the interview was recorded without the defendant's consent.  The 
judge denied the defendant's motion to suppress.  During 
pretrial motions and at trial, the defendant only challenged 
specific portions of the interviews. 
21 
 
 
ineffective for failing to request it because there was evidence 
supporting the defendant's intoxication.16 
 
There was no evidence that the defendant's condition at the 
time of the shooting approached the level of "debilitating 
intoxication" required for the instruction.  Lennon, supra.  One 
witness testified that people in the group from New Bedford were 
drinking liquor, but she did not remember everyone in the group 
drinking.   Although the defendant told police during the 
interrogation that he was "drunk out of [his] mind" and "high" 
at the party, these self-serving statements are insufficient to 
warrant an intoxication instruction where there was nothing to 
support the inference that intoxication impaired the defendant's 
ability to form the requisite criminal intent at the time of the 
altercation.  Commonwealth v. Moses, 436 Mass. 598, 603 (2002).  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 469 Mass. 410, 412-413, 422 (2014) 
(error to omit intoxication instruction where evidence showed 
defendant had spent evening drinking, was intoxicated two hours 
before murder, and had "'red, glassy eyes' and smelled of 
alcohol" when police arrived shortly after murder). 
                     
 
16 The judge asked the defendant if he would be requesting 
an intoxication or manslaughter instruction, and counsel 
responded that he "believe[d]" he would be asking for a 
manslaughter instruction.  He did not request an intoxication 
instruction. 
22 
 
 
 
5.  Judicial bias.  The defendant argues that the judge 
prejudiced his case by demonstrating partiality toward the 
Commonwealth.  Specifically, the defendant claims that the judge 
engaged in the following conduct suggestive of such a bias:  (a) 
allowing the prosecutors to ask leading questions of their 
witnesses; (b) allowing the prosecutor to introduce statements 
during trial after asserting pretrial that he did not intend to 
admit them; (c) asking questions of a witness; (d) instructing 
the jury that their memory controlled after counsel conducted 
what the defendant describes as a "very effective cross-
examination" regarding prior testimony;17 and (e) assisting the 
prosecutor to introduce evidence against the defendant. 
 
"The role of the trial judge is that of an impartial 
arbiter and not that of a prosecutor."  Commonwealth v. Sneed, 
376 Mass. 867, 870 (1978).  A judge "is there to see that 
justice is done, or at least to see that the jury have a fair 
chance to do justice . . . a first-rate trial judge will find 
and tread the narrow path that lies between meddlesomeness on 
                     
17 The judge instructed the jury as follows: 
 
 
"Jurors, I think it is perhaps an appropriate time, 
because both sides have referred to what may have been said 
by a witness while on this stand, and perhaps other 
witnesses as well, I am not going to comment upon the 
testimony of any witness in this case, but I do want you to 
remember something that I told you right at the outset.  It 
is your memory of the testimony, your memory of the 
evidence, that controls this case.  No one else's." 
23 
 
 
the one hand and ineffectiveness and impotence on the other."  
Commonwealth v. Brown, 462 Mass. 620, 632 (2012), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Haley, 363 Mass. 513, 519 (1973).  Here, the 
judge performed commendably during this lengthy trial. 
 
The judge sustained defense objections to leading questions 
by the prosecutor, and the defendant did not object to other 
leading questions that are now challenged.  Sua sponte, the 
judge alerted the prosecutor to his leading questions before the 
defendant objected.  These actions conform with the judge's task 
to "see that justice is done."  Brown, 462 Mass. at 632. 
 
Although the judge allowed the Commonwealth to play three 
of the defendant's four recorded statements during trial when it 
originally intended to play only the first recording, the 
defendant was aware of the remaining recordings and had 
submitted his proposed redactions to the judge before trial.  
The judge resolved any issues with redactions in favor of the 
defendant for the remaining recordings when he ruled that the 
Commonwealth would not be allowed to play those interviews 
unless the prosecutor obtained the defendant's agreement 
regarding redactions. 
24 
 
 
 
The judge did not err in questioning a witness.18  A judge 
may properly question a witness, even where to do so may 
"reinforce the Commonwealth's case, so long as the examination 
is not partisan in nature, biased, or a display of belief in the 
defendant's guilt."  Commonwealth v. Festa, 369 Mass. 419, 422 
(1976), and cases cited.  Although defense counsel requested 
that the judge refrain from any further questioning, he stated 
that he did not "have a problem with that question[ing]," and 
that he "was just raising [his] concerns."  We discern no error 
where the defendant has failed to establish that the judge's 
questions were inappropriate on any of these grounds. 
 
Additionally, the judge did not err in instructing the jury 
that their memory controls.  This is a proper statement of the 
law, and a judge has discretion as to the timing of 
instructions.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 24 (b), 378 Mass. 895 
(1979) (no limitation on timing of instructions). 
 
The judge did not impermissibly assist the prosecutor.  The 
defendant challenges a number of rulings and comments made by 
the judge, none of which falls outside a judge's permissible 
                     
 
18 The defendant argues that the judge demonstrated 
partiality by asking questions of a witness.  One such example 
is the judge's questioning of one of the partygoers during 
direct examination to identify on the diagram of the house 
locations where the shooting occurred, the "front door," the 
"back door," the table where the witness was seated, and the 
locations that the witness described as "lit well" and "not lit 
very well and dark." 
25 
 
 
discretion to control court proceedings.  A judge must be "the 
directing and controlling mind at the trial, and not a mere 
functionary to preserve order and lend ceremonial dignity to the 
proceedings."  Wilson, 381 Mass. at 118, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Lewis, 346 Mass. 373, 379 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 933 
(1964). 
 
Our conclusion that the judge did not exceed his authority 
is supported by his instructions to the jury, wherein he 
informed them that if he "somehow conveyed to [them] an 
impression of some opinion [he] may have as to the outcome of 
this trial, [they] should disregard it."  Commonwealth v. 
Keniston, 423 Mass. 304, 311 (1996). 
 
6.  Firearms convictions.  The defendant claims that his 
rights under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution were violated where he was convicted of 
possessing a firearm without a firearm identification card and 
the Commonwealth produced no evidence that he lacked a firearms 
license.  The defendant properly concedes that we have rejected 
this claim in previous cases, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Powell, 
459 Mass. 572, 582 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1739 (2012), 
because the defendant bears the burden to come forward with 
26 
 
 
evidence demonstrating that he was licensed to carry a firearm.  
We discern no reason to revisit this conclusion.19 
 
7.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  In accordance 
with our review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we vacate the 
defendant's armed robbery conviction.  Although we discern no 
other basis on which to grant the defendant relief, we have 
considered in our § 33E review whether the lack of congruence 
between the jury's verdict finding the defendant guilty of 
felony-murder "by means of being in joint venture with the 
person who performed the acts which caused the death of . . . 
Monteiro" and the evidence that the defendant alone shot the 
Monteiro was error.  We conclude that it was not. 
 
The Commonwealth proceeded at trial on the theories of 
deliberate premeditation and felony-murder, with the underlying 
felony being the armed robbery of Santos.  The felony-murder 
theory was supported by evidence that the defendant pointed a 
gun at Santos, robbed Santos of his gold chain, and then shot 
Monteiro when he intervened.  The Commonwealth alleged a joint 
venture with other members of the New Bedford group and 
requested a joint venture instruction.  The judge acquiesced and 
instructed the jury on joint venture during the final 
                     
 
19 The defendant also waived the defense of license by 
failing to file a pretrial notice as required by Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 14 (b) (3), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004).  See 
Commonwealth v. Humphries, 465 Mass. 762, 771 (2013). 
27 
 
 
instructions as he had done in the preliminary instructions to 
the jury.  Trial counsel did not object to the joint venture 
instruction when it was requested or after the conclusion of the 
jury instructions.  The judge, with the parties' agreement, 
prepared a special verdict slip with the following options: 
 
"[1.]  Not Guilty 
"[2.]  Guilty of First-Degree Murder 
"[a.]  By Deliberate Premeditation 
"and/or 
"[b.]  Felony Murder 
"[i.]  By means of performing the acts which 
caused the death of Scott Monteiro while in the 
commission or attempted commission of a life 
felony [i.e. armed robbery] 
 
"or 
 
"[ii.]  By means of being in joint venture with 
the person who performed the acts which caused 
the death of Scott Monteiro while in the 
commission or attempted commission of a life 
felony [i.e. armed robbery]. 
 
"[3.]  Guilty [of] Second-Degree Murder 
 
"[a.]  By means of performing the acts which caused 
the death of Scott Monteiro 
 
"or 
 
"[b.]  By felony murder [i.e. performing the acts 
which caused the death of Scott Monteiro while being 
in unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of 
G. L. c. 269, (§) 10 (a)]." 
 
28 
 
 
The parties agreed to this verdict slip notwithstanding the lack 
of evidence that anyone other than the defendant shot Monteiro.  
The jury found the defendant guilty of felony-murder under the 
second option:  that the defendant was in a "joint venture with 
the person who performed the acts which caused the death" of 
Monteiro. 
 
Although the jury's verdict slip answer does not mesh 
precisely with the evidence that the defendant alone was the 
shooter, the lack of consistency does not vitiate the guilty 
finding.  Where, as here, the verdict is based on joint venture, 
the question we ask is whether the defendant engaged in conduct 
sufficiently culpable to establish his participation in the 
crime as a joint venturer.  Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 
449, 467-468 (2009).  As long as there is "sufficient evidence 
of the defendant's active participation in the crime and that he 
had or shared the necessary intent," it is not necessary that 
the jury "determine specifically whether the defendant 
participated as an accomplice or as a principal."  Commonwealth 
v. Rosa, 468 Mass. 231, 246 (2014).  In this case, where the 
underlying felony was armed robbery, the Commonwealth was also 
required to establish that the defendant knew that at least one 
of the participants possessed a weapon.  Commonwealth v. Garcia, 
470 Mass. 24, 31 (2014). 
29 
 
 
 
In any event, the evidence was more than sufficient to 
establish that the defendant was an "active [participant] in the 
crime" and "shared the necessary intent" to carry out the crime, 
Rosa, supra, and that he knew at least one other participant in 
the crime was armed, Garcia, supra.  The defendant admitted 
through his statements, presented during the Commonwealth's 
case, that he was at the party, that he knew that at least four 
people in his group were carrying firearms, that he understood 
that people in his group "probably were planning on robbing" 
Santos, that he saw the shooter "cock" the firearm and "pistol 
whip" Santos, and that he was about five or six feet from the 
shooter when the gun was fired.  Thus, even if the jury, or at 
least one juror, discredited the Commonwealth's evidence that 
the defendant was the shooter, the jury were warranted in 
finding the defendant guilty of felony-murder as a joint 
venturer on this alternative theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.