Title: Hughes v. Denny's Restaurant
Citation: 328 So. 2d 830
Docket Number: 46638
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 21, 1976

328 So. 2d 830 (1976)
Helen Ruth HUGHES, Petitioner,
v.
DENNY'S RESTAURANT et al., Respondents.
No. 46638.

Supreme Court of Florida.
January 21, 1976.
Rehearing Denied April 13, 1976.
*832 Paul R. Stern of Stern &amp; Bernardini, Daytona Beach, for petitioner.
E.J. Gierach of Gierach &amp; Ewald, Orlando, for respondents.
BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to the Florida Industrial Relations Commission. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.
The claimant, petitioner herein, seeks review of an Order of the Industrial Relations Commission dated December 10, 1974, which reversed an earlier Order of the Judge of Industrial Claims holding that petitioner had a 75% permanent partial disability. The facts of the case are as follows.
Petitioner originally sustained an industrial slip-and-fall accident on May 30, 1970; subsequently, an injury was discovered with damage between the C-5 and C-6 interspaces of the spine, as well as some problems in the low back area which do not concern us sub judice. The case was pending before the original Judge of Industrial Claims for a lengthy period of time, during which the principal treating physician, through new diagnostic techniques, identified a condition located at C-4 and C-5 of which he had not been previously aware. This is an entirely different condition from the condition at C-5 and C-6 which had been identified and treated previously. The doctor retracted his former opinions as to cause and origin, as well as his former opinions as to the believability of the patient. That original Judge of Industrial Claims then ruled the claim to be compensable, a ruling reversed by the Industrial Relations Commission on the ground that Rule 3 (presently Rule 8) had been violated in that testimony had been taken more than 90 days after the first hearing. The Respondent-Commission directed a new Judge of Industrial Claims to enter an order based solely upon testimony taken in the first 90 days. The new Judge complied in what is referred to by the Respondent-Commission as "the first order," wherein petitioner's claim was dismissed because the claimant's cervical pathology at C-5-6 could not be causally related to the industrial accident. Thereafter, the claimant filed her petition to modify in accordance with the principles outlined in Sauder v. Coast Cities Coaches, Inc.[1] Once again the principal treating physician appeared and testified (1) that there are two different problems in the cervical area of petitioner's spine, one of which he had previously identified at C-5 and C-6; (2) that on the basis of a newly discovered diagnostic technique he was able to identify a problem at C-4 and C-5 which he did not originally believe existed; and (3) that, now, he could establish a causal relationship with the condition at C-4 and C-5 and the industrial accident on the basis of the history related by claimant, which history at that point became logical in light of the newly discovered diagnostic technique. The new Judge of Industrial Claims then entered what the Respondent-Commission refers to as "the second order," which was an order on a petition to modify and which held the claim to be compensable. In this "second order" the Judge of Industrial Claims specifically found as follows:
Based on these findings the Judge of Industrial Claims granted petitioner's requested modification with certain exclusions.
The Respondent-Commission reversed the "second order," holding that the "first order," which held that there was no causal relationship between these injuries and the industrial accident, established the law of the case and that, therefore, it was unnecessary to consider the merits of the claim. It is from this order of reversal that this petition for certiorari is brought.
Section 440.28, Florida Statutes, reads in pertinent part as follows:
We recognize that it has been held that the "mistake of fact" contemplated by this section is one made by either the deputy commissioner or by the Respondent-Commission.[2] Nevertheless, it is our view that, where the state of the medical art advances to the point that new evidence becomes available which was not and could not have been previously known, then, in that limited situation, the Judge of Industrial Claims is justified in concluding that she had made a mistake of fact and in granting a modification where such is supported by the evidence. An analogous situation to the instant one was present in Orme v. M.R. Harrison Construction Co.[3] In that case a claimant fell in 1956 and sustained an injury to his right knee; within a relatively short period of time he had incurred two other accidents affecting his legs and/or knees. In the original 1957 hearing the deputy commissioner found both the first and second industrial employers liable to furnish remedial surgery and hospital care as required to alleviate the disability to claimant's right knee. Thereafter, in 1959 claimant applied for modification of the compensation order under Section 440.28, Florida Statutes, supra, the basis being a mistake in determination of fact in that claimant's left knee was in need of surgery. The deputy modified his earlier order and held the original employer solely liable to claimant for the injury to his left knee, which injury occurred as a result of the original industrial accident. On appeal, the full commission reversed the deputy's order, holding that there was no competent and substantial evidence to support it. This Court reversed the commission's order and reinstated and affirmed the holding of the deputy, stating that there was ample evidence to support the deputy's finding as to his mistake of fact (in that he was ignorant of any injury to the left knee at the initial hearing). In the instant case, the record clearly shows that, because of new medical diagnostic techniques, the injury caused by the petitioner's industrial accident was eventually identified and treated. The testimony to this effect is as follows.
On direct examination the following was elicited:
*836 On cross-examination the following testimony developed:
On redirect examination the following was disclosed:
On recross examination the following colloquy occurred:
On redirect examination the following was brought out:
Clearly, the evidence adduced at the modification hearing was not merely cumulative nor did it simply controvert evidence taken at the original hearing, which would be contrary to the principles enunciated in Beaty v. M &amp; S Maintenance Co.,[4]Hall v. Seaborad Maritime Corp.,[5] and Power v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc.[6] To the contrary, the doctor's original testimony related to the injury found at C-5 and C-6, while his later testimony on petition for modification pertained to the injury found at C-4 and C-5, a completely different area of injury. Furthermore, the doctor makes clear in his testimony that his original diagnosis was not mistaken but that he now had new information about a different injury, thereby distinguishing this case from Power, supra. Obviously, there is presently evidence of an injury which was lacking before and which the Commission did not examine before because it was not then known.[7] In our view, the petitioner seeking *838 modification on ground of mistake of fact carried her burden of proof.[8]
Contrary to Respondent's position, this is not a relitigation of identical issues, nor is it merely "cumulative evidence" seeking to abrogate the previous final finding. The order of January 31, 1974, determined that there was no causal relationship between the industrial accident and the cervical condition then known of at C-5 and C-6. Can that ruling be held to be the "law of the case," "res judicata" and "estoppel by judgment" in regard to the issue of whether there exists a causal relationship between the industrial accident sustained by petitioner and the injury she suffers at C-4 and C-5? We think not. Furthermore, it is our view that the concept of modification is so inherently a part of workmen's compensation law, unlike tort litigation, that under the circumstances sub judice we do not find the doctrines of "res judicata," "law of the case" or "estoppel by judgment" to be applicable here.
It is well argued that the views expressed herein could result in an interminable series of litigation if taken to its ultimate extreme. Therefore, to prevent such interpretation, we expressly limit this holding to include only those injuries which may be discovered within the immediate time frame after the original testimony, which injuries could not have been discovered by use of medical technology available to the treating physician at the time of the original examination. In no event should this time period exceed the two-year limitation imposed by Section 440.28, Florida Statutes; we feel this conforms to the legislative intent.
Accordingly, the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, the order of the Industrial Relations Commission is quashed, and the cause remanded with directions to reinstate the May 24, 1974, order of the Judge of the Industrial Claims awarding petitioner-claimant temporary total disability and medical expenses.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C.J., and ROBERTS, OVERTON and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.
ENGLAND and SUNDBERG, JJ., dissent.
[1]  156 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 1963).
[2]  Steele v. A.D.H. Bldg. Contractors, Inc., 174 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1965); Hall v. Seaboard Maritime Corp., 104 So. 2d 384 (Fla.App. 1958).
[3]  127 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1961).
[4]  124 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1960).
[5]  Supra, Note 2.
[6]  120 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1960).
[7]  Hall, supra, Note 2.
[8]  Sauder, supra, Note 1.