Title: PETITION OF BURNHAM
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 85-075
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: September 10, 1985

No. 85-75 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1985 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF PAUL J . BURNIIAI", Petitioner. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Fergus, The Honorable Peter L . Rapkoch, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Barbara Claassen, Asst. Atty. General, Helena Craig R . Buehler, Fergus County Attorney, Lewistown, Montana For Respondent : Torger S. Oaas, Lewistown, Montana Submitted on ~riefs: May 30, 1985 Decided: September 10, 1985 SEP I 0 7985 ~ i l e d : M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s i s an appeal by t h e S t a t e o f Montana from an o r d e r of t h e D i s t r i c t Court, Tenth J u d i c i a l District, Fergus County. W e r e v e r s e . The f a c t s a r e a s follows. On November 3 , 1984, r ~ s p o n d e n t Paul. J. Burnham was a r r e s t e d f o r d r i v i n g under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f alcohol. A t t h e t i m e o f h i s a r r e s t he refused t o submit t o a b r e a t h test t o determine t h e l e v e l o f h i s i n t o x i c a t i o n . Upon r e c e i p t o f a sworn r e p o r t by t h e a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r i n d i c a t i n g t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s r e f u s a l , t h e Motor Vehicle Division o f t h e Department of J u s t i c e , i n accordance with S 61-8-403, MCA n o t i f i e d respondent i n a letter dated November 1 4 , 1984, t h a t h i s d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e was suspended pursuant t o S 61-8-407, MCA, Montana's implied consent s t a t u t e . The letter i n d i c a t e d t h a t f o r a f i r s t r e f u s a l t o submit t o a b r e a t h test S 61-8-402 (5) ( a ) , MCA, mandates "a suspension o f 90 days w i t h no p r o v i s i o n f o r a r e s t r i c t e d probationary license.'' Respondent's l i c e n s e was suspended f o r t h e period November 6 , 1984 t o February 3 , 1985. O n November 15, 1984, respondent p l e d g u i l t y t o t h e o f f e n s e o f d r i v i n g under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l o r drugs ( D U I ) , i n v i o l a t i o n o f 5 61-8-401, MCA. S e c t i o n 61-5-208(2), MCA, provides t h a t a person convicted o f a f i r s t o f f e n s e D U I is t o have h i s l i c e n s e suspended f o r s i x months. However, S 61-11-101 ( 2 ) , MCA, provides t h a t , upon t h e recommendation of t h e c o u r t w i t h j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e o f f e n s e , t h e Division of Motor Vehicles " s h a l l i s s u e a r e s t r i c t e d p r o b a t i o n a r y l i c e n s e u n l e s s t h e person otherwise i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o a Montana o p e r a t o r ' s o r c h a u f f e u r ' s l i c e n s e . " Thereafter, on November 26, 1984, Burnham filed a petition pursuant to § 61-8-403, MCA, with the District Court, Fergus County. The purpose of the petition was to procure a probationary license needed for his employment. On December 7, 1984 the District Court issued the following order: The petition in the above entitled matter having come before the court pursuant to proper notice under 61-8-403 M.C.A. and the court being advised that petitioner, in fact, pled guilty to a violation of 61-8-401 M.C.A. within a week of initially refusing to take a breath test; it is hereby ordered under 61-8-401 M.C.A. that petitioner's plea of guilty constitutes a withdrawal of his refusal to take a breath test under 61-8-403 M.C.A. The Motor Vehicle Division filed a motion for rehearing of this matter on December 14, 1984, pursuant to Rule 60(b), M.R.Civ.P., on the basis that the Division should be relieved from the order. The motion was not ruled on and therefore was deemed denied after 45 days from its filing in accordance with Rule 60 (c) , M.R.Civ.P. The Motor Vehicle Division appeals the denial of its motion for rehearing and requests relief from the December 7, 1984, order of the District Court. Before considering the substantive issue of this appeal we direct our attention to several procedural issues raised by Burnham. First, Rurnham argues that because the Motor Vehicle Division failed to file an undertaking for costs on appeal as required by Rule 6, M.R.App.Civ.P., this appeal should be dismissed under Rule 4 M.R.App.Civ.P. He has failed to notice, however, that 25-1-402, MCA, specifically exempts a governmental entity, the Motor Vehicle Division in this case, from t h e requirement t o f i l e an undertaking. Second, he seeks t h e d i s m i s s a l o f t h i s appeal a s n o t being t i m e l y f i l e d . H e argues t h a t t h e time f o r f i l i n g o f n o t i c e of appeal e x p i r e d 30 days a f t e r t h e December 7, 1984, o r d e r was f i l e d . However, w e c o n s i d e r t h i s only a 60(b) motion. The f u l l t i m e f o r appeal then commences t o run upon t h e g r a n t i n g o r denying o f t h e motion t o a l t e r o r amend t h e judgment. It i s t r u e , a s Burnham contends, t h a t t h e S t a t e was n o t a s c a r e f u l a s it should have been i n making its motion o f December 1 4 , 1984. I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e t h e motion was m i s t i t l e d . The S t a t e obviously was making a Rule 6O(b), M.R.Civ.P. motion f o r r e l i e f from t h e o r d e r o f December 7 , 1984, and was asking f o r a r e h e a r i n g t o p r e s e n t i t s argument. The r e q u e s t f o r a r e h e a r i n g was t a n g e n t i a l t o t h e real. purpose o f t h e motion. F u r t h e r , t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o i d e n t i f y t h e s t a t u t o r y b a s i s f o r i t s motion u n t i l i t s n o t i c e o f appeal f i l e d on February 19, 1985. However, d e s p i t e t h e s e d e f e c t s , t h e S t a t e d i d i d e n t i f y w i t h p a r t i c u l a r i t y t h e grounds f o r i t s motion and t h e r e l i e f sought. Therefore t h e S t a t e complied w i t h Rule 7 (b) , M.R.Civ.P. Whatever flaws t h e r e may be i n t h e S t a t e ' s motion a r e n o t grounds f o r d i s m i s s a l o f t h i s appea 1. F i n a l l y , Burnham argues f o r d i s m i s s a l because o f an a l l e g e d f a i l u r e o f t h e S t a t e t o o b j e c t t o t h e December 7 , 1984 o r d e r . Rule 2 , M.R.App.Civ.P., s t a t e s : Upon appeal from a judgment, t h e c o u r t may review t h e v e r d i c t o r d e c i s i o n , and any i n t e r m e d i a t e o r d e r o r d e c i s i o n excepted o r objected t o w i t h i n t h e meaning o f Rule 46 o f t h e Montana Rules o f C i v i l Procedure, which i n v o l v e s t h e m e r i t s , o r n e c e s s a r i l y a f f e c t s t h e judgment, except a d e c i s i o n o r o r d e r from which an appeal might have been taken. Rule 46, M.R.Civ.P., s t a t e s : Formal exceptions to rulings, orders, or findings of the court are unnecessary; but for all purposes it is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to take, or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor; and, if a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice him. The hearing on the petition filed by respondent was held in the judge's chambers. There was no transcript made of the hearing. We know from a minute entry of the court that Burnham and attorneys for the State were present and presumably advanced their respective positions. We do not know if the court made its ruling immediately upon close of arguments so we do not know if the State's counsel had opportunity to make an immediate objection. We presume that if State's counsel had the opportunity to object he did so. Absent that opportunity, as Rule 46 M.R.Civ.P. provides, the State obviously is not prejudiced by failing to object; but in any event the State objected by filing a motion for rehearing in the District Court. The scant record i.n this case does not indicate a violation by the State of the above quoted rules and reveals no basis whatsoever for a dismissal of this appeal. The substantive issue presented is whether the District Court properly ordered that Burnham's plea of guilty to the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs constituted a withdrawal of his refusal to take a breath test under Montana's implied consent statute. Since we find that there is no connection between 5 61-8-401, MCA, (prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs) and $ 61-8-402, MCA, (requiring consent to a chemical test t o determine blood alcohol c o n t e n t ) t h e o r d e r of t h e District Court i s reversed. S e c t i o n 61-8-402 provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t a s follows: (1) Any person who o p e r a t e s a motor v e h i c l e upon ways o f t h i s s t a t e open t o t h e p u b l i c s h a l l be deemed t o have given consent, s u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f 61-8-401, t o a chemical test o f h i s blood, b r e a t h , o r u r i n e f o r t h e purpose of determining t h e a l c o h o l i c c o n t e n t o f h i s blood i f a r r e s t e d by a peace o f f i c e r f o r d r i v i n g o r i n a c t u a l p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l o f a motor v e h i c l e while under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l . The test s h a l l b e administered a t t h e d i r e c t i o n o f a peace o f f i c e r having reasonable grounds t o b e l i e v e t h e person t o have been d r i v i n g o r i n a c t u a l p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l of a motor v e h i c l e upon ways o f t h i s s t a t e open t o t h e p u b l i c while under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l . The a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r may d e s i g n a t e which one o f t h e a f o r e s a i d tests s h a l l be administered. (3) I f a r e s i d e n t d r i v e r under a r r e s t r e f u s e s upon t h e r e q u e s t o f a peace o f f i c e r t o submit t o a chemical t e s t designated by t h e a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r a s provided i n subsection (1) o f t h i s s e c t i o n , none s h a l l be given, b u t t h e o f f i c e r s h a l l , on behalf o f t h e d i v i s i o n , immediately s e i z e h i s d r i v e r ' s license. The peace o f f i c e r s h a l l forward t h e l i c e n s e t o t h e d i v i s i o n , along w i t h a sworn r e p o r t t h a t he had reasonable grounds t o b e l i e v e t h e a r r e s t e d person had been d r i v i n g o r was i n a c t u a l physical c o n t r o l o f a motor v e h i c l e upon ways o f t h i s s t a t e open t o t h e p u b l i c , while under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l and t h a t t h e person had refused t o submit t o t h e test upon t h e r e q u e s t o f t h e peace o f f i c e r . Upon r e c e i p t o f t h e r e p o r t , t h e d i v i s i o n s h a l l suspend t h e l i c e n s e f o r t h e period provided i n s u b s e c t i o n ( 5 ) . (5) The following suspension and revocation p e r i o d s a r e a p p l i c a b l e upon r e f u s a l t o submit t o a chemical test: ( a ) upon a first r e f u s a l , a suspension of 90 days w i t h no p r o v i s i o n f o r a r e s t r i c t e d probationary l i c e n s e ; W e have held on several occasions t h a t t h e revocation o f a d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e is a c i v i l s a n c t i o n , n o t a c r i m i n a l p e n a l t y . S t a t e e x rel. Majerus v. C a r t e r (Mont. 1 9 8 4 ) , 693 P.2d 501, 4 1 St.Rep. 2468; S t a t e e x r e 1 G r i f f i t h v. Brasthern (Mont. 19831, 658 P.2d 410, 40 St.Rep. 194; In re France (1966), 147 Mont. 283, 4 1 1 P.2d 732. T h i s i s e v i d e n t from a reading o f S 61-8-401, MCA, which s t a t e s t h a t t h e punishment f o r d r i v i n g under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l o r drugs i s provided f o r i n S 61-8-714, MCA; S 61-8-714, MCA, makes no provision f o r t h e revocation o f a d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e . This i s t h e b a s i s f o r o u r p a s t f i n d i n g s t h a t t h e purpose o r t h e suspension o f a d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e i s n o t punishment b u t i s t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e p u b l i c . See Brusthern and France, supra. Other c o u r t s have considered implied consent s t a t u t e s s i m i l a r t o o u r s and have d i s t i n g u i s h e d them from c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e s t h a t p r o s c r i b e d r i v i n g under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l o r drugs. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has s t a t e d " t h e w e l l recognized r u l e . . . t h a t t h e a c q u i t t a l of a defendant i n t h e c r i m i n a l m a t t e r on t h e charge o f d r i v i n g under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r i s n o t a b a r t o t h e suspension o f t h e d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e and t h a t such f i n d i n g has no b e a r i n g on t h e c i v i l proceedings revoking h i s d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e under t h e Implied Consent S t a t u t e s . " Marquardt v. Webb (Okla. 1976), 545 P.2d 769, 772. I n an e a r l i e r c a s e t h e same c o u r t s t a t e d : The implied consent law i s n o t a c r i m i n a l proceeding. It i s a c i v i l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e proceeding s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t from t h e criminal a c t i o n on a charge o f d r i v i n g while i n t o x i c a t e d . Each proceeds independently o f t h e o t h e r . . . The f a c t t h a t i n t h e c r i m i n a l proceedings t h e d r i v e r i s n o t proven beyond a reasonable doubt t o have been d r i v i n g while i n t o x i c a t e d has no b e a r i n g on c i v i l proceedings under t h e implied consent statutes revoking his driver's license for refusal to submit to a chemical test. Robertson v. State ex rel. Lester (Okla. 1972), 501 P.2d 1099, 1103. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Minnesota has stated that: [rlevocation under the implied-consent law is essentially civil in nature . . . It is imposed administrative1.y by the commissioner of public safety regardless of the outcome of the criminal proceeding arising out of the same incident and is triggered by the refusal to submit to chemical testing. State Dept. of Public Safety v. Mulvihill (Minn. 1975), 227 N.W.2d 813, 818. Also the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, responding to a series of questions from the Maine legislature, found that it would be proper for that state to adopt a law suspending a person's license for refusing to submit to a chemical test to determine blood alcohol level. The suspension would be valid "whether or not the person is subsequently convicted of the offense charged. " Opinion of the Court (Me. 1969), 255 A.2d 643, 649. ina ally, the Missouri Court of Appeals has stated: The purpose of [the implied consent law], which authorizes license revocation, is to protect the public, not to punish the licensee. [Citation omitted.] For even though a driver may be acquitted of the criminal charge of operation of a vehicle while intoxicated, his license nevertheless may be revoked for failure to submit to the test. The operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated may give rise to two proceedings, one criminal or quasi-criminal [breach of statute or ordinance], and the other civil [revocation of 1 icence] --each proceeding independent of the other. Tolen v. Missouri Department of Revenue (Mo.App. 1978), 564 We agree with our sister jurisdictions that have considered this matter. Respondent's refusal to submit to a chemical test i s an i s s u e s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t from whether o r n o t he was g u i l t y o f DUI. There i s no question t h a t respondent refused t o t a k e t h e b r e a t h test requested by t h e o f f i c e r . S e c t i o n 61-8-402, MCA i s v e r y c l e a r t h a t t h e o f f i c e r was required t o make a sworn r e p o r t and t h e Division was r e q u i r e d t o suspend respondent's l i c e n s e f o r 90 days ( s i n c e it was a f i r s t r e f u s a l ) w i t h no p o s s i b i l i t y o f a probationary l i c e n s e . There i s nothing i n t h i s s e c t i o n , o r any o t h e r s e c t i o n o f t h e code, t h a t allows a withdrawal o f a r e f u s a l t o submit t o a chemical test. The f a c t t h a t Burnham pled g u i l t y t o D U I and faced a p e n a l t y f o r t h a t o f f e n s e i s u n r e l a t e d t o h i s r e f u s a l t o t a k e a chemical test and t h e s a n c t i o n imposed t h e r e f o r . Respondent w r i t e s i n h i s b r i e f : [I] t i s hard t o understand why t h e S t a t e has appea led. Apparently it i s attempting t o o b t a i n a r u l i n g t h a t would, i n e f f e c t , make it p o s s i b l e f o r t h e Department o f J u s t i c e , Motor Vehicle d i v i s i o n t o g e t a suspension o f d r i v e r s [ s i c ] l i c e n s e f o r 90 days p l u s s i x months i f one refused t o t a k e a b r e a t h test and is convicted o f d r i v i n g under t h e i n f l u e n c e . F i r s t , w e assume t h a t t h e S t a t e h a s appealed i n o r d e r t o p r o t e c t t h e i n t e g r i t y o f t h e implied consent s t a t u t e , t h e purpose o f which i s t o a i d i n t h e b a t t l e a g a i n s t drunk d r i v i n g . Second, Burnham has run a f o u l o f two s t a t u t e s , b o t h of which provide f o r t h e suspension o f h i s d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e . Section 61-5-208(2), MCA, provides t h a t a person g u i l t y o f f i r s t o f f e n s e D U I , a s Burnham was i n t h i s c a s e , i s t o have h i s l i c e n s e suspended f o r s i x months b u t c a n , pursuant t o S 61-11-101 (2) , r e c e i v e a r e s t r i c t e d p r o b a t i o n a r y l i c e n s e on t h e recommendation o f t h e sentencing c o u r t . A s noted, r e f u s a l t o g i v e consent under t h e implied consent s t a t u t e s results in a 9 0 day suspension with no provision for a probationary license. A violation of both the DUI statutes and the implied consent statute means that the suspensions run concurrently. In this case Burnham should not have been eligible for a probationary license until the 90 day implied consent suspension had been completed. We hold that the District Court order of December 7, 1 9 8 4 was in error and the suspension of respondent's driver's license is hereby reinstated For the balance of the 90 day period as provided in § 61-8-402, MCA. We concur: A