Title: Bermel v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 224, 2012
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 12, 2012

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
BRUCE BERMEL and PAMELA 
§ 
JURGA, husband and wife, 
 
§  No. 224, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiffs Below,  
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
Appellants,  
 
 
§ of the State of Delaware, 
 
 
 
 
 
§ in and for Kent County 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ C.A. No. K10C-06-011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE 
 
§ 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  October 24, 2012 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  December 12, 2012 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices, and 
GLASSCOCK, Vice Chancellor,1 constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  Affirmed. 
 
 
Keith E. Donovan, Esquire (argued) and Allyson Britton DiRocco, 
Esquire, Morris, James, LLP, Dover, Delaware, for appellants. 
 
 
Nancy Chrissinger Cobb, Esquire, Chrissinger & Baumberger, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
                                          
 
1 Sitting by designation pursuant to Del. Const. art. IV, § 12 and Supr. Ct. R. 2 and 4. 
2 
 
The plaintiff-appellants, Bruce Bermel (“Bermel”) and Pamela Jurga 
(“Jurga”), as husband and wife,2 appeal from the final judgment of the 
Superior Court granting the motion for summary judgment of the defendant-
appellee, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (“Liberty”).  The 
appellants contend that the Superior Court erred by granting summary 
judgment in favor of Liberty.  Bermel was injured in an automobile accident 
when his personally-owned and insured motorcycle was struck head-on by 
another driver.  Bermel, then an employee of the Siemens Corporation 
(“Siemens”), contends that the business policy issued to Siemens by Liberty 
(the “Liberty Policy”), on a company car that was assigned for his business 
and personal use, provided him with $100,000 in underinsured motorist 
coverage even when he was operating a non-work vehicle in circumstances 
unrelated to his employment.   
Bermel brought this action for underinsured benefits (“UIM”) against 
Liberty.  First, Bermel argues that the Liberty Policy covering the company 
car he used was personal to him, even though Siemens was the named 
insured.  According to Bermel, excluding coverage based on the vehicle 
being occupied at the time of the accident is tantamount to an impermissible 
                                          
 
2 Jurga’s claim is for the loss of consortium.  Any claim Jurga has to access the 
underinsured motorist benefits contained in the Liberty Mutual Insurance Company 
policy at issue are contingent upon Bermel first receiving benefits under the same policy. 
3 
 
“other motor vehicle” exclusion.  Second, Bermel argues that he is entitled 
to personally access the Liberty Policy because Siemens automatically 
deducted a nominal fee from his paycheck for his personal use of the vehicle 
assigned to him that was insured by the Liberty Policy.  Finally, Bermel 
argues that the Liberty Policy is ambiguously drafted and should be 
construed in his favor. 
We have concluded that the Superior Court correctly found Siemens, 
and not Bermel, to be the named insured on the Liberty Policy.  We have 
also concluded the Superior Court properly ruled that the nominal fee 
charged to Bermel by Siemens for the use of the car did not make Bermel a 
named insured under the Liberty Policy.  Finally, we have concluded that the 
Liberty Policy is unambiguous.  Therefore, the judgments of the Superior 
Court must be affirmed. 
Facts 
 
On June 8, 2008, Bermel, a resident of Delaware, was injured when 
his personally-owned and insured 2001 Harley Davidson motorcycle was 
struck by another vehicle in the Town of Deerpark in Orange County, New 
York.  There is no dispute that for purposes of this appeal, the other driver 
(“the tortfeasor”) was at fault.  As a result of his injuries, Bermel remained 
4 
 
an in-patient at the Westchester Medical Center until July 14, 2008,3  and his 
medical expenses exceeded $800,000.  
The tortfeasor was insured by Progressive Preferred Insurance 
Company (“Progressive”) with bodily injury liability limits of $25,000.  
Progressive paid Bermel the $25,000 liability policy limits.  Three other 
vehicles were identified as potentially having underinsured motorist 
coverage to further compensate Bermel for his injuries:  a Chrysler 300 
(insured under the Liberty Policy), Bermel’s motorcycle (insured by 
Foremost Insurance Company (“Foremost”)), and Jurga’s Honda Accord 
(insured by Amica Mutual Insurance Company (“Amica”)).   
Amica paid its UIM policy limits of $300,000.  Foremost paid its UIM 
policy limits of $15,000.  Liberty denied coverage to Bermel on the ground 
that Bermel was not a covered insured under the Liberty Policy when he was 
operating a personally-owned motorcycle unrelated to the course or scope of 
his employment with Siemens. 
The Liberty Policy 
 
At the time of the accident, Bermel was employed by Siemens.  
Bermel’s employment with Siemens began in 1978.  In 1978, Bermel was 
                                          
 
3 According to Bermel, his injuries included multiple fractures, a tibial artery laceration, a 
closed head injury, acute respiratory failure, and pulmonary edema requiring a 
tracheostomy tube.   
5 
 
employed by DuPont’s medical diagnostics division.  In 1996, that division 
was sold by DuPont to Dade International.  A year later, Dade International 
merged with Behring Diagnostics, resulting in a company called Dade 
Behring.  In 2007, Dade Behring was purchased by Siemens.  Because the 
transactions were a series of corporate acquisitions, Bermel can be 
considered an employee of Siemens for the entire period. 
 
Beginning in the mid-1980s, Bermel’s compensation package 
provided for a company car.  Those cars included the Chrysler 300 Bermel 
had access to at the time of the accident.  Bermel was permitted to use the 
Chrysler 300 for business and personal use.  The record reflects that until his 
retirement from Siemens, Bermel never owned a separate personal car.  
Siemens deducted a minimal amount of money from Bermel’s paycheck to 
cover the personal use of the Chrysler 300.   
The Chrysler 300 was part of a Siemens fleet of cars and was insured 
on a Business Auto Policy issued by Liberty.  The named insured on that 
Business Auto Policy was “Siemens Corporation, Advanced Burner 
Technologies, Bridges Electric, and Siemens IT Solutions & Services.”  
Bermel was not personally named on the Liberty Policy issued to Siemens, 
nor did he pay any portion of the insurance premiums. 
6 
 
The parties agree that at the time of the accident, Bermel was not 
acting in the course or scope of his employment.  It is also undisputed that 
Bermel’s 2001 Harley Davidson motorcycle was not a replacement vehicle 
for the Chrysler 300, which was operational at the time of the accident. 
The Superior Court Action 
 
In a letter dated October 15, 2009, Liberty denied UIM coverage to 
Bermel.  On June 8, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against Liberty in 
the Superior Court, alleging that they were entitled to $100,000 in UIM 
benefits under the Liberty Policy.  In response, Liberty simultaneously filed 
an answer and a motion for summary judgment, on July 27, 2011.  The 
plaintiffs filed their opposition to that motion on October 3, 2011.  The 
Superior Court heard oral argument on October 7, 2011, and requested 
supplemental submissions from the parties on December 15, 2011. 
 
On March 29, 2012, the Superior Court granted Liberty’s motion for 
summary judgment.  The Superior Court determined that the exclusionary 
language of the policy was consistent with our decision in Frank v. Horizon 
Assurance Co.4  The Superior Court further determined that Bermel was not 
a named insured under the terms of the Liberty Policy, that the nominal fee 
deduction did not convert Bermel into a named insured, and that the policy 
                                          
 
4 Frank v. Horizon Assurance Co., 553 A.2d 1199 (Del. 1989). 
7 
 
was unambiguously drafted.  Therefore, the Superior Court held that the 
plaintiffs could not access the UIM coverage under the Liberty Policy and 
granted summary judgment in favor of Liberty.  Bermel and Jurga filed a 
timely direct appeal with this Court. 
Standard of Review 
 
We review a trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment, and 
questions of law, de novo.5  To the extent that this Court reviews the judicial 
construction of a statute, our review is also de novo to determine whether the 
Superior Court “erred in formulating or applying legal precepts.”6 
Underinsured Motorist Statute 
 
Underinsured motorist vehicle coverage is treated the same as 
uninsured (“UM”) coverage under title 18, section 3902(a) of the Delaware 
Code (“Section 3902”),7 which provides as follows: 
No policy insuring against liability arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or 
issued for delivery in this State with respect to any such vehicle 
registered or principally garaged in this State unless coverage is 
provided therein or supplemental thereto for the protection of 
persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover 
damages from owners or operators of uninsured or hit-and-run 
vehicles for bodily injury, sickness, disease, including death, or 
personal property damage resulting from the ownership, 
                                          
 
5 LeVan v. Independence Mall, Inc., 940 A.2d 929, 932 (Del. 2007); Phillips Home 
Builders, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 700 A.2d 127, 129 (Del. 1997). 
6 White v. Liberty Ins. Corp., 975 A.2d 786, 788 (Del. 2009) (internal citations omitted). 
7 Castillo v. Clearwater Ins. Co., 8 A.3d 1177, 1180 (Del. 2010). 
8 
 
maintenance or use of such uninsured or hit-and-run motor 
vehicle. (emphasis added). 
 
Section 3902 requires UM/UIM coverage to be provided to a named insured 
unless it is affirmatively waived.8  However, a claimant may recover under 
the statute only if they fall within the class of persons protected by the 
statute.9 
Frank v. Horizon Assurance Co. 
 
This Court has held previously that other motor vehicle (“OMV”) 
exclusions, which bar uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits to named 
insureds for claims involving owned vehicles not insured under that policy, 
are void under the Delaware Underinsured Motorist Statute.10   
 
In Frank v. Horizon Assurance Co., Julie Frank (“Frank”) sought 
recovery from Horizon Assurance Company (“Horizon”) for uninsured 
motorist benefits arising from an accident that occurred while she was in a 
family-owned 1978 Toyota, which was insured by the Hartford Insurance 
Company.11  At the time of the accident, Frank and her husband jointly 
owned two other automobiles: a 1970 Ford and a 1979 Chevrolet.  These 
vehicles were insured under a Horizon policy that contained an OMV 
                                          
 
8 Id. 
9 White v. Liberty Ins. Corp., 975 A.2d at 788. 
10 Frank v. Horizon Assurance Co., 553 A.2d at 1205 (Del. 1989). 
11 Id. at 1200. 
9 
 
exclusion—that is, the exclusion explicitly disclaimed UM/UIM coverage 
arising from an accident occurring in a vehicle that was owned by Frank, but 
was not listed under that Horizon policy.12 
 
In Frank, we held that OMV exclusions were incompatible with 
statutorily created uninsured motorist insurance, because uninsured motorist 
coverage was personal to the insured and public policy prohibited the 
limiting of coverage based on the manner the insured was injured.13  In 
support of our holding, we stated that “Frank seeks only coverage for which 
she, or her husband with whom she shares co-insured identity, has paid a 
premium. . . . Once uninsured motorist coverage is purchased, the insurance 
consumer is entitled to secure the full extent of the benefit which the law 
requires to be offered.”14 
Bermel Is Not A Named Insured Under the Liberty Policy 
 
Central to our holding in Frank is the requirement that the plaintiff be 
a named insured to have an expectation of benefits (including UM/UIM 
                                          
 
12 Id. at 1201. 
13 Id. at 1202.   
14 Id. at 1205.  We have since affirmed Frank, first in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Washington, 641 A.2d 449 (Del. 1994), and later in Hurst v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 
652 A.2d 10 (Del. 1995).  In Hurst, we again stated that “[u]ninsured motorist coverage 
is personal to the insured” and that it is “inimicable to the purpose of Section 3902 to 
make recovery of supplemental uninsured coverage contingent upon the manner in which 
the claimant is injured.” Hurst, 652 A.2d at 14. We again affirmed this principle recently 
in Castillo v. Clearwater Ins. Co., 8 A.3d at 1181 (“UM/UIM is personal to the insured 
and not dependent on the vehicle the insured was occupying when he or she was 
in[j]ured.”). 
10 
 
coverage) under a relevant policy.  Bermel is not a named insured and has 
not paid any insurance premium for the Liberty Policy.  Under these 
circumstances, Bermel cannot claim any expectation of insurance coverage. 
 
Section 3902 limits UM/UIM coverage to the “protection of persons 
insured.”  Our holdings since Frank have all comported with this 
interpretation of the statute.  When an insured pays a premium for UIM 
coverage, he expects that bargained-for coverage to provide UIM coverage 
even in other motor vehicles.   
Bermel had no such expectation.  He was not a named insured on the 
Liberty Policy issued to and paid-for by Siemens.  Instead, the named 
insured was “Siemens Corporation, Advanced Burner Technologies, Bridges 
Electric, and Siemens IT Solutions & Services.”  Bermel was not named 
anywhere in the Liberty Policy, nor was he acting in his capacity as a 
covered employee when he was injured in New York.   
Bermel was not operating the Chrysler 300 or operating a substitute 
motor vehicle in place of the Chrysler 300.  Because Bermel was not a 
named insured and otherwise had no connection to the Liberty Policy or the 
Chrysler 300 (a covered automobile) on the date of the accident, he cannot 
claim any expectation reliance on the Liberty Policy UIM coverage.  
11 
 
Therefore, Liberty’s denial of that coverage does not violate the public 
policies advanced by Section 3902. 
Bermel also asserts that because the Liberty Policy limits coverage to 
“[a]nyone ‘occupying’ a covered ‘auto’” that this language is tantamount to 
an impermissible OMV exclusion because the coverage only applies when 
one (Bermel) is occupying a Siemens fleet automobile.  We agree that 
coverage under this business policy only applies when an individual is 
occupying a fleet automobile or a replacement vehicle.  We disagree, 
however, that this is tantamount to an OMV exclusion. 
Bermel is not the insurance consumer and did not purchase the 
Liberty insurance.  As explained below, his biweekly paycheck deduction 
was for his use of the automobile and was not a contribution to insurance 
premiums.  Because Bermel was not a named insured and has no expectation 
that the Liberty Policy extended to his personal use of other, privately-
insured motor vehicles, the language of the Liberty Policy cannot be read as 
an impermissible other motor vehicle exclusion. 
Consideration Paid By Bermel 
 
Bermel next asserts that because Siemens automatically deducted a 
nominal fee from his paycheck as consideration for personal use of the 
Chrysler 300, he should be entitled to coverage under the Liberty Policy.  In 
12 
 
support of this argument, Bermel relies on State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Nalbone15 and Adams v. Delmarva Power & Light Co.16   
 
In Nalbone, we concluded that an employee (Brenda Nalbone) who 
received benefits under a wage continuation plan could not also recover for 
those lost wages under the No-Fault policy issued to her by State Farm.17  
Important to our holding was that because Brenda Nalbone did not 
contribute to the wage continuation plan, she had no expectation of a double 
recovery: 
If the insured has paid consideration for recovery from a 
collateral source, then recovery should be allowed.  If the 
collateral payments are received gratis, then their receipt should 
bar recovery under the no-fault policy.  In the latter instance, 
the insured has lost nothing, neither wages nor consideration 
paid to 
a collateral source 
for 
wage compensation.  
Accordingly, the insured has no loss for which his insurer 
should provide compensation.18 
 
 
In Adams, the question was whether an employer’s workers’ 
compensation insurer was entitled to a set-off for payments made to the 
employee by the employer’s own underinsured motorist insurer.19  We held 
that because the employee had paid consideration for the insurance 
                                          
 
15 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nalbone, 569 A.2d 71 (Del. 1989). 
16 Adams v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 575 A.2d 1103 (Del. 1990). 
17 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nalbone, 569 A.2d at 71. 
18 Id. at 75. 
19 Adams v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 575 A.2d at 1104. 
13 
 
coverage, the set-off was against public policy because the employee had 
sought, by contract, to provide additional protection for himself.20 
 
These cases are inapplicable to the case sub judice.  In both Nalbone 
and Adams, the issue turned on the individual’s contribution to an insurance 
plan.  Here, we have to determine whether Siemens’ nominal charge to 
Bermel for personal use of the Chrysler 300 is relevant to his claim of rights 
under the Liberty Policy.  No facts in the record suggest that the nominal 
personal use fee established that Bermel “purchased” insurance on the 
Chrysler 300 or that the use fee converted him into a named insured under 
the Liberty Policy.  There is no claim or evidence that the personal use fee 
was ever applied to cover insurance premiums for the Liberty Policy.  
The issue presented by Bermel raises a question of first impression in 
Delaware.  On that issue, the opinion in Frost v. Dep’t of Labor and Indus. 
of the State of Washington,21 from the Washington Court of Appeals, is 
instructive.  In Frost, the issue was whether the injured employee, Yvonne 
Frost (“Frost”), or the employer, Ticor Title Insurance Company (“Ticor”), 
                                          
 
20 Id. at 1107. 
21 Frost v. Dep’t of Labor and Indus. of the State of Washington, 954 P.2d 1340 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1998). 
14 
 
owned the automobile insurance policy.22  Frost was injured while driving a 
company car assigned to her.23   
Ticor’s insurance policy for its fleet of 541 automobiles listed Ticor as 
the “named insured” and provided that “[a]nyone else ‘occupying’ a covered 
‘auto’” was an insured.24  Ticor deducted $45.25 biweekly from Frost’s 
paycheck, but the parties disputed whether the purpose of this deduction was 
to cover insurance premiums or only to cover Frost’s personal use of the 
car.25  The Washington Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence was 
insufficient to find that the deductions were for insurance premiums.26   
Had the court concluded the payments were to defray insurance 
premium costs, Frost would have been the owner of the policy (and Ticor 
would have lost the right to seek reimbursement).  Instead, the court 
determined that Frost, in reimbursing Ticor for the value of the personal use 
of the company car, was in a position similar to that of a customer renting a 
                                          
 
22 Id. at 1341. 
23 The narrow issue in that appeal was whether the Department of Labor and Industries 
could properly seek reimbursement for benefits it had paid to Frost.  Because Frost was 
involved in an automobile accident in a company car, there is no dispute that the policy 
applied.  Instead, the issue was one of policy ownership. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 1343. 
26 Id. at 1344-45. 
15 
 
car.27  As such, she did not own the insurance policy issued to Ticor, but was 
merely a potential beneficiary of the insurance coverage provided to Ticor. 
In this case, there is no dispute that the deductions from Bermel’s 
paychecks were only to defray the costs associated with his personal use of 
the Chrysler 300.  In fact, Bermel admits that “Siemens systematically 
deducted money from [my] pay to cover the personal use of the vehicle.”  
The record supports the Superior Court’s determination that the deduction 
from Bermel’s pay by Siemens was not used to defray costs of insurance 
premiums associated with the Liberty Policy.  Accordingly, Bermel was 
properly determined not to be a de facto named insured under the Liberty 
Policy.28  
 
There is no rational basis to impute coverage for Bermel under the 
Liberty Policy solely because of generic payments to Siemens for personal 
use of the company car by Bermel that were unknown to Liberty.  If Bermel 
wanted personal coverage under Siemens’ Liberty Policy, he should have 
sought to be added as an additional named insured.  That request (if granted) 
                                          
 
27 Id. 
28 We do not address whether this case would have been different if Bermel could have 
proven that his biweekly car payments were made as contributions to Siemens’ insurance 
premiums.  To the extent that the court in Frost concluded that such payments made to 
the employer necessarily bind the insurance company, that conclusion is not adopted 
here. 
16 
 
would have provided Bermel with coverage and given Liberty the 
opportunity to charge an additional premium for that increased risk. 
 
The Liberty Policy Is Unambiguous 
 
Bermel next argues that the Liberty Policy is ambiguous because the 
named insured (Siemens) is a corporation that cannot sustain bodily injury or 
have family members.  Ambiguity exists in insurance contracts where the 
language is reasonably susceptible to at least two different meanings.29  
When ambiguity exists, language is typically construed against the drafter 
and in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured.30  
However, where the language in insurance contracts is unambiguous, the 
language is given its plain and ordinary meaning.31  
 
Because the named insured in this case is a corporation, the issue is 
whether the insuring clauses and their related definitions are ambiguous.   
The Liberty Policy delineates who is a named insured: 
 
B.  
Who is an Insured 
 
If the Named Insured is designated in the Declarations as: 
 
 
1. 
An individual, then the following are “insured”: 
                                          
 
29 Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chems. Co. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1196 
(Del. 1992). 
30 Hallowell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925, 926 (Del. 1982). 
31 O’Brien v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 785 A.2d 281, 288 (Del. 2001). 
17 
 
 
a. 
The Named “Insured” and any “Family 
Members”. 
 
b. 
Anyone else “occupying” a covered “auto” 
or a temporary substitute for a covered “auto.” The 
covered “auto” must be out of service because of 
its breakdown, repair, servicing, “loss” or 
destruction. 
 
c. 
Anyone for damages he or she is entitled to 
recover because of “bodily injury” sustained by 
another “insured”. 
 
2. 
A 
partnership, 
limited 
liability 
company, 
corporation or any other form of organization, then the 
following are “insureds”: 
 
a. 
Anyone else “occupying” a covered “auto” 
or a temporary substitute for a covered “auto.” The 
covered “auto” must be out of service because of 
its breakdown, repair, servicing, “loss” or 
destruction. 
 
b. 
Anyone for damages he or she is entitled to 
recover because of “bodily injury” sustained by 
another “insured”. 
 
c. 
The Named Insured for “property damage” 
only. 
 
 
We have previously determined that a corporation can neither have 
“family members” nor suffer “bodily injury,” and that such policy language 
is ambiguous.32 In this case, however, the Liberty Policy states that if the 
                                          
 
32 Fisher v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 1997 WL 817893, at *3 (Del. Super. 
Ct. Dec. 11, 1997), aff’d, 719 A.2d 490 (Del. 1998). 
18 
 
named insured is a corporation, as is the case here, then an “insured” is 
anyone occupying a covered automobile, or a replacement for a covered 
automobile, at the time of the accident.  This language unambiguously 
describes the parameters of who is covered by the Liberty Policy.  The lone 
reference to bodily injury in section B.2(b) does not render the Liberty 
Policy unambiguous.33   
Further, the Liberty Policy is clear that family members are included 
as insureds only when the “named insured” is an individual.  Therefore, 
Bermel’s assertion that the Liberty Policy is ambiguous because the term 
“family member” is defined in a later section of the policy is unavailing.  
The fact that the Liberty Policy includes a subsequent superfluous reference 
to familial relationships, which is clearly inapplicable here, does not render 
the policy ambiguous.  
Alternatively, and in any event, even if the references to “bodily 
injury” and “family member” rendered the Liberty Policy ambiguous, 
Bermel still would not have a right to recover UM/UIM benefits.  A 
determination that the Liberty Policy was ambiguous would require this 
Court to undertake a “reasonable expectations” analysis, under which 
Bermel could not prevail: 
                                          
 
33 See Del Collo v. Houston, 1986 WL 5841, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. May 7, 1986) (“A 
reasonable person would know that a corporation cannot sustain bodily injury . . . .”). 
19 
 
[T]he Court will look to the reasonable expectations of the 
insured at the time when he entered into the contract if the 
terms thereof are ambiguous or conflicting, or if the policy 
contains a hidden trap or pitfall, or if the fine print takes away 
that which has been given by the large print. But the doctrine is 
not a rule granting substantive rights to an insured when there is 
no doubt as to the meaning of policy language.34 
 
 
In a few cases, the Superior Court has found business automobile 
insurance policies to be ambiguous.  Those decisions concluded that 
UM/UIM coverage was warranted when the plaintiffs were listed as 
designated drivers and/or had sustained injuries in furtherance of their 
employment.35  In those circumstances, the court held, the plaintiffs had a 
reasonable expectation that the business automobile insurance policies, 
including the relevant UM/UIM coverage, would cover them. 
 
Conversely, in Ruggiero v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co.,36 even though 
that policy was also determined to be ambiguous, the Superior Court 
determined that the injured employee had no reasonable expectation of 
coverage because she was not working for her employer or driving a 
company-owned vehicle at the time of the accident.37  As that court stated, it 
was “not reasonable to believe that [the employer] intended [the employee] 
                                          
 
34 Hallowell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 A.2d at 927. 
35 See, e.g., Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grzbowski, 2002 WL 1859193, at *2 (Del. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 9, 2002); Fisher v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 1997 WL 
817893, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 11, 1997), aff’d, 719 A.2d 490 (Del. 1998). 
36 Ruggiero v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 WL 1543234 (Del. Super. Ct. June 28, 
2004). 
37 Id. 
20 
 
to be covered under the policy while she was engaged in personal activities 
and driving her own vehicle.”38  In Bermel’s case, the Superior Court found 
this analysis from Ruggiero to be persuasive.  We agree and reach the same 
conclusion in Bermel’s case. 
Conclusion 
The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed. 
                                          
 
38 Id. at *3.