Title: Hyundai Construction Equipment Americas, Inc.v. Southern Lift Trucks, LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC-2023-0109
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 2023

Rel: November 3, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0109 
_________________________ 
 
Hyundai Construction Equipment Americas, Inc., and Hyundai 
Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.  
 
v.  
 
Southern Lift Trucks, LLC 
 
 
 
Appeal from Washington Circuit Court 
(CV-22-900029) 
 
COOK, Justice. 
 
This is an appeal of a contempt order.  The underlying action arose 
SC-2023-0109 
2 
 
out of a complex commercial dispute. Southern Lift Trucks, LLC 
("Southern"), is a Mobile-based, heavy-equipment dealer for Hyundai 
Construction Equipment Americas, Inc. ("Hyundai Construction"). In 
May 2022, it filed suit against Hyundai Construction and its alleged 
parent company, Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. (collectively 
referred to as "Hyundai"), in the Washington Circuit Court asserting 
various claims.  It also sought a preliminary injunction to prevent 
Hyundai from, among other things, unlawfully allowing Hyundai's 
dealers to sell certain equipment in Southern's designated territories or 
advertising that other dealers are authorized to sell that equipment in 
Southern's territories. Following a hearing, the circuit court entered an 
order granting Southern's request for a preliminary injunction.  
 
After the circuit court issued its injunction order, Southern learned 
that another Hyundai dealer had allegedly sold some equipment in one 
of Southern's territories. As a result, Southern filed a petition seeking a 
finding of contempt and sanctions against Hyundai. Following a hearing, 
the circuit court entered an order granting Southern's contempt petition.  
Hyundai now appeals from that contempt order on the basis that it 
was denied due process. Because Hyundai was not given adequate notice 
SC-2023-0109 
3 
 
of all the contempt allegations asserted against it before the hearing on 
those allegations (as required by Rule 70A, Ala. R. Civ. P.), we reverse 
the contempt order and remand the case for further proceedings.  
Facts and Procedural History 
This is the second time these parties have been before us. In 
Hyundai Construction Equipment Americas, Inc. v. Southern Lift 
Trucks, LLC, [Ms. SC-2022-0675, May 12, 2023] ____ So. 3d ____ (Ala. 
2023), this Court reviewed the circuit court's decision to grant the 
preliminary injunction sought by Southern and its decision refusing to 
compel arbitration. Because the action underlying the present appeal 
involves allegations that Hyundai engaged in conduct in violation of that 
injunction, we deem it necessary to briefly relate some of the facts from 
the actions underlying the previous appeal that are relevant to the 
present appeal. 
In 2019, Southern entered into a dealer agreement with Hyundai 
Construction in which it agreed to serve as a lift-truck dealer for the 
company ("the forklift agreement"). A year later, in 2020, it entered into 
a second dealer agreement with Hyundai Construction in which it agreed 
to serve as a construction-equipment dealer for the company ("the 
SC-2023-0109 
4 
 
construction-equipment agreement").  
Among other things, the forklift agreement covered the sales, 
service, and distribution of forklifts and other "lift trucks." The 
construction-equipment agreement covered the sales, service, and rental 
of, the provision of parts for, and warranties regarding earth-moving 
equipment used in the construction industry, such as excavators, wheel 
loaders, rollers, and breakers. 
The territories covered by the two dealer agreements overlapped 
but were not identical.   Specifically, the territory covered under the 
forklift agreement ("Southern's forklift territory") included Washington, 
Clarke, Choctaw, Sumter, Marengo, Wilcox, Baldwin, Conecuh, 
Escambia, Mobile, and Monroe Counties in Alabama, as well as certain 
counties in Mississippi and Florida. The territory covered under the 
construction-equipment agreement included only Washington, Choctaw, 
Clarke, Baldwin, Conecuh, Escambia, Mobile, and Monroe Counties in 
Alabama.   
When the parties entered into the dealer agreements, Southern was 
the only dealer of lift trucks and construction equipment for Hyundai 
Construction within the above-listed territories. However, neither 
SC-2023-0109 
5 
 
agreement was exclusive by its terms.   
Immediately after Southern entered into the construction- 
equipment agreement in 2020, Southern sold four pieces of construction 
equipment but made no sales of construction equipment in 2021 or in 
2022. On March 2, 2022, Hyundai Construction notified Southern of its 
intent to terminate the construction-equipment agreement because 
Southern had been unable to meet its expectations for market growth.  
Hyundai Construction's actions were not limited to the construction 
agreement. About a month later, Hyundai Construction sent a second 
correspondence to Southern notifying Southern that it intended to assign 
an additional dealer -- Thompson Tractor Company -- to serve as a lift-
truck dealer in the Alabama territory covered by Southern under the 
forklift agreement (but it did not terminate that agreement). Unlike its 
construction-equipment sales, Southern's lift-truck sales had been 
significant during the previous two years. Nevertheless, Hyundai 
Construction alleged that Southern was not fulfilling its duties as a lift-
truck dealer because Southern did not have the infrastructure to service 
the equipment sold. Southern vigorously disputed those assertions. 
Shortly after receiving the notice regarding the addition of 
SC-2023-0109 
6 
 
Thompson Tractor Company to Hyundai's dealership network, Southern 
became aware that some of its customers had already been contacted by 
Thompson Tractor Company and provided quotes and/or had been 
informed that Thompson Tractor Company was the new lift-truck dealer 
for Hyundai Construction in the Alabama potions of Southern's forklift 
territory.    
As a result, on May 26, 2022, Southern filed suit against Hyundai, 
alleging claims under multiple provisions of the Alabama Heavy 
Equipment Dealer Act ("the AHEDA"), § 8-21B-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, 
a breach-of-contract claim, multiple tort claims, and a claim of 
conspiracy. Among other things, Southern also moved to preliminarily 
enjoin Hyundai from (1) terminating either of the dealer agreements with 
Southern and (2) permitting other dealers to market or sell construction 
equipment or lift trucks in Southern's territories.  
That same day, the circuit court entered a temporary restraining 
order ("TRO") against Hyundai. That TRO specifically prohibited 
Hyundai from (1) terminating the dealer agreements with Southern; (2) 
"entering into agreements or otherwise permitting other dealers to sell 
Hyundai Construction's Construction Equipment or Forklift Equipment" 
SC-2023-0109 
7 
 
in Southern's territories; and (3) "advertising or marketing (via website 
or otherwise) that other dealers are authorized to sell" the equipment at 
issue in Southern's territories. It also ordered Hyundai to  
"make an account to the Court and [Southern] … in the form 
of a sworn affidavit setting forth: (a) the nature and extent of 
any other dealer agreements that [Hyundai has] entered into 
with any other dealers for the Product Lines in [Southern's] 
Territories, including the effective dates and terms/conditions 
of same …; and (b) the nature, extent, and pricing of any units 
of the Product Lines sold to or by other dealers in [Southern's] 
Territories in the past year." 
 
Several days after entering the TRO, the circuit court held a 
hearing on Southern's motion for a preliminary injunction. Following 
that hearing, on June 10, 2022, the circuit court granted Southern's 
motion and issued an order that stated, in relevant part: 
"1. That [Hyundai], and others in active concert and 
participation with [it] who receive actual notice of this Order, 
are hereby ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from terminating 
the Dealer Agreements between [Southern] and [Hyundai]; 
 
"2. That [Hyundai], and others in active concert and 
participation with [it] who receive actual notice of this Order, 
are hereby ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from entering into 
agreements or otherwise permitting other dealers to sell 
Hyundai's Construction Equipment or Forklift Equipment 
('the Product Lines') in [Southern's] 'Territories' (including, 
for the Forklift Equipment: Washington, Clarke, Choctaw, 
Sumter, Marengo, Wilcox, Baldwin, Conecuh, Escambia, 
Mobile, and Monroe counties in Alabama);  
 
SC-2023-0109 
8 
 
"3. That [Hyundai], and others in active concert and 
participation with [it] who receive actual notice of this Order, 
are hereby ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from advertising 
or marketing (via website or otherwise) that other dealers 
were authorized to sell the Product Lines in [Southern's] 
Territories; 
 
"4. This Order shall be deemed effective immediately 
and remain in effect until such time as a trial on the merits 
can be conducted on this matter…" 
 
Hyundai appealed that decision to this Court. See Hyundai Constr. 
Equip. Americas, supra. 
 
While that appeal was pending in this Court, Southern became 
aware that Hyundai lift trucks were still being offloaded and distributed 
at a dealership operated by Thompson Lift Truck, a division of Thompson 
Tractor Company, in Baldwin County. As a result, on November 15, 2022, 
Southern filed a petition seeking a finding of contempt and sanctions 
against Hyundai.  
In its contempt petition, Southern alleged that Hyundai had 
violated the circuit court's TRO and preliminary injunction by failing to 
provide a timely accounting of (1) the nature and extent of any other 
dealer agreements that Hyundai had entered into with any other dealers 
for the "Product Lines in [Southern's] Territories"  and (2) "the nature, 
extent, and pricing of any units of the Product Lines sold to or by other 
SC-2023-0109 
9 
 
dealers in [Southern's] Territories in the past year."  
Southern further alleged that Hyundai had violated the circuit 
court's TRO and preliminary injunction by repeatedly permitting other 
dealers to market and sell Hyundai lift trucks in Southern's designated 
forklift territory. According to Southern, Hyundai lift trucks were being 
offloaded and distributed at the Thompson Lift Truck dealership in 
Baldwin County and that activity was "ongoing."  
 
In support of its contempt petition, Southern attached, among other 
things, a screenshot taken from Thompson Lift Truck's website, which 
appeared to show that Thompson Lift Truck was a dealer for Hyundai lift 
trucks in Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, and Florida. Southern also 
attached photographs that, it said, showed five Hyundai lift trucks and a 
yard truck being offloaded at the Thompson Lift Truck dealership in 
Baldwin County. Southern also submitted an affidavit of a customer who 
observed new Hyundai equipment at the Thompson Lift Truck dealership 
in Baldwin County and an affidavit from Southern's president regarding 
the identification of that equipment.  
In its response to Southern's contempt petition, Hyundai first 
disputed Southern's contention that it had failed to provide a timely 
SC-2023-0109 
10 
 
accounting of the items listed above. According to Hyundai, the TRO had 
previously been dissolved and was ultimately superseded by the 
preliminary injunction, which, Hyundai noted, did not require it to 
provide the accounting submissions listed in the TRO. Nevertheless, 
Hyundai alleged that it had provided an accounting "in a gesture of good 
faith" and that that accounting "included the original addendum to 
[Thompson Tractor Company's] lift truck Dealer Agreement with 
[Hyundai] [indicating that] [Thompson Tractor Company's] territory 
included an overlay with Southern in Southern's territories." According 
to Hyundai, "Southern did not respond to … [the] accounting submission, 
did not ask for clarification or additional documentation, and raised no 
issues regarding [Hyundai's] accounting submission with the Court." 
Hyundai attached an email to its response that purported to show that it 
had provided an accounting to Southern in July 2022. 
Next, Hyundai disputed that Thompson Lift Truck's advertising or 
marketing materials indicated that Thompson Lift Truck -- or any other 
Hyundai dealer -- was authorized to sell Hyundai's lift trucks in 
Southern's forklift territory. According to Hyundai, at most, the 
screenshot taken from Thompson Lift Truck's website that Southern 
SC-2023-0109 
11 
 
submitted in support of its contempt petition showed that it "carries 
various product lines, including [Hyundai] lift trucks, and has locations 
in Alabama and other states" and did not specifically indicate that 
Thompson Lift Truck sells Hyundai's lift trucks in Southern's forklift 
territory. Because the circuit court's injunction order did not "enjoin 
[Thompson Lift Truck] from (1) advertising its Alabama locations, or (2) 
advertising that [Thompson Lift Truck] is authorized to sell [Hyundai] 
lift trucks in the state," Hyundai contended that it could not be held in 
contempt on this basis. (Emphasis added.) In support of its contentions, 
Hyundai attached to its response various screenshots taken from 
Thompson Lift Truck's website, which showed that Thompson Lift Truck 
is a dealer for Hyundai lift trucks in Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, and 
Florida.  
Finally, with regard to Southern's contention that Hyundai had 
violated the circuit court's injunction order by allowing other dealers to 
sell its lift trucks in Southern's forklift territory, Hyundai argued that 
photographs merely showing the presence of Hyundai's lift trucks at 
Thompson Lift Truck's dealership in Baldwin County was not proof that 
Hyundai was permitting its dealers to sell lift trucks -- or any of its 
SC-2023-0109 
12 
 
equipment -- in Southern's territories. According to Hyundai, "the 
equipment seen on the lot at the [Thompson Lift Truck] dealership … 
could well be equipment designated for use in [Thompson Lift Truck's] 
rental fleet or could be [Thompson Lift Truck's] yard truck, or could have 
simply been seen while traveling through the area, destined for a 
different location outside of Southern's territory." In other words, 
Hyundai argued, the mere presence of its lift trucks at Thompson Lift 
Truck's dealership in Baldwin County was not evidence indicating that 
it had entered into an agreement with or had otherwise permitted 
Thompson Lift Truck to sell lift trucks in Southern's forklift territory in 
violation of the circuit court's injunction order.  
In support of its contentions, Hyundai attached to its response the 
affidavit of Lewis Byers, the executive vice president and chief operating 
officer of Hyundai Handling Forklift, a division of Hyundai Construction, 
in which he stated that he had reviewed the photographs submitted by 
Southern and disputed that the equipment shown was the type of 
equipment that Hyundai was prohibited from allowing other dealers to 
sell in Southern's territories.  He also indicated his belief that the 
equipment shown in the photographs was rental equipment and was not 
SC-2023-0109 
13 
 
for sale. Hyundai also submitted the affidavit of Matt Serotsky, the vice 
president of Power Systems and Lift Truck, a division of Thompson 
Tractor Company, in which he stated that the Hyundai equipment 
photographed at Thompson Lift Truck's Baldwin County dealership was 
something that was "not offered for customer purchase or rental but [was] 
used by [Thompson Lift Truck] for internal needs." 
After Hyundai filed its response to Southern's contempt petition, 
the circuit court issued an order scheduling a hearing on Southern's 
contempt petition for January 4, 2023, at 1:00 p.m.  
 
On December 19, 2022, Hyundai's counsel reached out to 
Southern's counsel to notify Southern that Hyundai had recently become 
aware that a few lift trucks had been sold by one of its dealers -- 
Thompson Lift Trucks -- to various businesses in Escambia and Mobile 
Counties, both of which were located in Southern's forklift territory. 
Although Hyundai was unable to confirm the exact equipment that was 
sold to those businesses, it told Southern that a representative from 
Thompson Lift Truck would be providing that information to Southern at 
a later date. 
According to Southern, a representative from Thompson Lift Truck 
SC-2023-0109 
14 
 
did in fact contact it to confirm that four lift trucks had been sold to four 
separate 
businesses 
in 
Escambia 
and 
Mobile Counties. That 
representative also provided Southern documentation confirming that 
those sales had taken place in Southern's forklift territory. 
Approximately 27 minutes before the contempt hearing began on 
January 4, 2023, Southern filed what it styled as its "reply" to Hyundai's 
response. According to Hyundai, the notice of that filing from Alacourt, 
the judicial electronic-filing system, did not actually arrive until eight 
minutes before the hearing.  Southern does not dispute this assertion.  
Additionally, one of the exhibits to the "reply" was filed under seal.   
 Southern's "reply" alleged, among other things, that it had been 
contacted by Hyundai's counsel and by a representative from Thompson 
Lift Truck regarding the sale of four lift trucks in Escambia and Mobile 
Counties -- both of which were part of Southern's forklift territory. 
Southern alleged that those sales constituted additional violations of the 
circuit court's preliminary injunction and were thus an additional basis 
upon which to hold Hyundai in contempt and to issue sanctions against 
it.  Southern's "reply" stated: "This was in addition to previous[] sales …." 
In support of its "reply," Southern attached a series of email 
SC-2023-0109 
15 
 
correspondences between its counsel, Hyundai's counsel, and the 
representative from Thompson Lift Truck that, it said, proved that these 
sales had taken place in violation of the circuit court's preliminary 
injunction. It also attached (under seal) an affidavit from Barkley 
Lindsey, the sole shareholder of Large Lift Rentals, Inc., a managing 
member of Southern, in which he stated that the equipment models 
referenced in the email correspondences are "typically sold by Southern 
on the retail market for approximately $32,000, and Southern's profit 
margin is customarily at least $8,000 on each such machine." He also 
stated that two of the businesses listed in the emails that allegedly 
purchased the equipment at issue from Thompson Lift Truck in violation 
of the circuit court's preliminary injunction were either former or 
prospective customers of Southern. 
During the hearing on Southern's contempt petition, Southern 
explained to the circuit court that it had initially filed its contempt 
petition in November 2022 because it "had started seeing Hyundai 
forklifts appearing at a competitor dealership in Baldwin County." It 
then began describing the circumstances that led to the additional 
contempt allegations that it had made in its "reply," at which point, 
SC-2023-0109 
16 
 
Hyundai objected.  
In support of its objection, Hyundai explained: 
"[Hyundai's counsel:] Rule 70 is unequivocal about what 
is required in a motion or petition for contempt in a hearing 
on contempt. And what is required is that they lay out the 
essential facts. That's Rule 70A(c)(1). And the last language 
says the petition shall provide … notice of the essential facts 
constituting the alleged contemptuous conduct. And that's 
what we're prepared to go on here, which is what they filed in 
their petition a month and a half ago. 
 
"They have filed something maybe 30 minutes ago based 
on information that I provided in good will. It really doesn't 
prove a violation. But he is attempting now, even in opening 
arguments, to go beyond and talk about other issues other 
than what they allege in their petition was contemptuous. 
Anything that goes beyond the essential facts in the petition 
is not something that is properly before you today in this 
hearing and should not be something that they should be able 
to present evidence on. 
 
"The Alabama Supreme Court has recognized that any 
contempt proceeding requires due process. And just an 
example, in State versus Thomas, 550 So. 2d 1072 through 73 
-- and that's Alabama Supreme Court 1989 -- the Court said, 
where an individual is charged with indirect or constructive 
contempt due process requires he be given notice of the 
charges and a reasonable opportunity to meet them, the right 
to call witnesses and confront his accuser and the right to give 
testimony relevant either to complete the exculpation or 
extenuation of the offense in evidence and mitigation of the 
penalty to be imposed." 
 
(Emphasis added). 
In response to Hyundai's objection, Southern asserted that one of 
SC-2023-0109 
17 
 
the allegations on which its contempt petition had initially been based 
was that Hyundai had been violating the circuit court's preliminary 
injunction by allowing lift trucks to be sold by other dealers in Southern's 
forklift territory. According to Southern, those allegations "haven't really 
changed" and all it did in its "reply" was provide additional information 
to supplement those allegations.  
Despite Hyundai's objection and the fact that it had admittedly not 
yet seen Southern's "reply," the circuit court allowed the hearing to 
proceed. At the hearing, Southern presented arguments concerning not 
only the allegations that it had made in its contempt petition regarding 
the sale of Hyundai lift trucks in Baldwin County but also the new factual 
allegations it had made in its "reply" regarding the lift trucks that had 
been sold in Escambia and Mobile Counties.  
Following the contempt hearing, Hyundai moved to strike 
Southern's "reply." In its motion, Hyundai argued that Southern's 
allegations that Thompson Lift Truck had sold four lift trucks to various 
businesses in Southern's forklift territory were new allegations that had 
not been made in its contempt petition. Because Southern raised those 
additional allegations for the first time less than 30 minutes before the 
SC-2023-0109 
18 
 
hearing on Southern's contempt petition was scheduled to be held, 
Hyundai argued, its due-process rights had been violated and it should 
have been given an opportunity to review and respond to those new 
allegations and to prepare possible witnesses and exhibits before being 
forced to defend against Southern's new allegations in court.  
Hyundai further argued that, even if it had been given proper notice 
of those allegations, those allegations were in no way a basis to hold it in 
contempt because the four lift trucks at issue were nothing more than 
"ship ins," and, according to Hyundai, "ship ins" were never covered by 
the circuit court's preliminary injunction.1 In support of its contention, 
Hyundai cited a portion of the circuit court's injunction order that 
acknowledged that "ship-ins" are "not an unusual occurrence" and 
recognized Southern's practice of selling "ship ins" outside its forklift 
 
1According to Hyundai, "ship in" is "an industry term used to refer 
to new units that are sold and delivered by one dealer into another 
dealer's designated territory or area of responsibility." In its affidavits, 
Hyundai explains that "it is the delivering dealer's obligation to contact 
the affected dealer and arrange to pay a ship in fee."  They also assert 
that "Southern has shipped approximately 30% of its total sales outside" 
of its forklift territory.   
 
SC-2023-0109 
19 
 
territory.2   
On January 11, 2023, the circuit court, without ruling on Hyundai's 
motion to strike, issued an order in which it granted Southern's contempt 
petition in part, finding in relevant part: 
"This Court previously entered a Preliminary Injunction 
Order that provided, among other things, that [Hyundai was] 
enjoined and restrained from permitting other dealers to sell 
Hyundai forklift or construction equipment in [Southern's] 
Territories. … 
 
"[Southern] presented evidence to the Court that, 
despite the Court's order, multiple sales of Hyundai forklifts 
have occurred in [Southern's] territories after the entry of the 
Order. It is clear to the Court that [Hyundai has] willfully 
failed to take appropriate steps to keep other dealers from 
selling Hyundai forklifts in [Southern's] Territories, and the 
Court hereby finds [Hyundai] liable for civil contempt. 
 
"The Court, having considered the evidence presented 
and arguments of counsel, finds it appropriate to enter a 
compensatory sanction and judgment in the amount of 
$150,000 against [Hyundai] and in favor of [Southern], for 
which execution may issue. The Court further finds it 
appropriate to award the attorney's fees and expenses 
incurred by [Southern] in bringing the petition. [Southern] is 
ORDERED, within two days of entry of this Order, to submit 
 
2Southern vigorously disputes this and argues that "ship-ins" were 
barred by the plain language of the circuit court's preliminary injunction. 
Southern also argues that the four lift trucks at issue could not be "ship-
ins" (even if "ship ins" were allowed under the preliminary injunction) 
because Thompson Lift Truck has a physical location within Southern's 
forklift territory.  Given our resolution of the present appeal, however, 
we need not address this issue at this time.  
SC-2023-0109 
20 
 
to the Court an affidavit of its attorney's fees, for which a 
separate order will be entered. 
 
"[Hyundai is] further ORDERED to take such other 
further steps as necessary to ensure that there are no other 
improper sales by other dealers in [Southern's] Territories 
while the Preliminary Injunction remains in place, and 
[Hyundai] must ensure that all Hyundai dealers with physical 
locations in Alabama are provided notice (and a copy) of the 
Court's 
Preliminary 
Injunction 
Order. 
[Hyundai 
is] 
ORDERED, within two days of this Order, to file an affidavit 
confirming that such notice has been provided." 
 
(Capitalization in original; emphasis added). The circuit court denied 
Southern's petition insofar as it alleged that Hyundai had willfully 
violated portions of the TRO on the basis that "the TRO was ultimately 
superseded by the Preliminary Injunction." Hyundai appeals. 
Standard of Review 
 
"'"The issue whether to hold a party in 
contempt is solely within the discretion of the trial 
court, and a trial court's contempt determination 
will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing 
that the trial court acted outside its discretion or 
that its judgment is not supported by the 
evidence."' 
 
"J.S.S. v. D.P.S., 281 So. 3d [434] at 437-38 [(Ala. Civ. App. 
2019)] (quoting Poh v. Poh, 64 So. 3d 49, 61 (Ala. Civ. App. 
2010))." 
 
Ex parte SE Prop. Holdings, LLC, 353 So. 3d 533, 537 (Ala. 2021). 
Discussion 
SC-2023-0109 
21 
 
Hyundai contends that the circuit court's contempt order should be 
reversed because it was not afforded due process below. Specifically, 
Hyundai argues, just as it did during the contempt hearing and in its 
motion to strike below, that Southern's allegations in its "reply" that 
Thompson Lift Truck had sold four lift trucks to various businesses in 
Southern's forklift territory were new, additional, material allegations 
that had not been made in its contempt petition. Because Southern raised 
those additional factual allegations for the first time less than 30 minutes 
before the hearing on Southern's contempt petition was scheduled to be 
held, Hyundai argues, it was not given sufficient prior notice of those 
allegations and was not given an opportunity to respond to and collect 
evidence refuting those allegations before having to defend against those 
allegations during the contempt hearing.   
Southern disputes that its allegations concerning the sale of the 
four lift trucks by Thompson Lift Truck in Escambia and Mobile Counties 
were "new allegations." According to Southern, Hyundai's counsel was 
the reason Southern found out about those allegedly improper sales in 
the first place and, thus, should have known that Southern would raise 
that additional allegedly contemptuous conduct both in its "reply" and 
SC-2023-0109 
22 
 
during the contempt hearing. Even if Hyundai could somehow claim that 
it was unaware that those sales would be made part of Southern's 
contempt allegations against it, Southern argues, Hyundai should have 
foreseen that it would make such additional allegations because 
Southern had previously alleged in its contempt petition that Hyundai's 
violations of the circuit court's preliminary injunction were "ongoing." 
Therefore, Southern contends, Hyundai was afforded due process below 
and the circuit court's contempt order should not be reversed. 
Rule 70A, Ala. R. Civ. P., defines the various types of contempt and 
provides the scope of and the dispositions and punishments available in 
contempt actions in civil cases in Alabama. The rule defines and 
distinguishes the different kinds of contempt and separates them into 
two categories: "direct contempt" and "constructive contempt." This 
Court has previously described the difference between "direct contempt" 
and "constructive contempt" as follows: 
"Direct contempts are those committed in the 'presence' of the 
judge, where all of the essential elements of the misconduct 
are under the eye of the court, and are actually observed by 
the court. If some of the essential elements are not personally 
observed by the judge it is [a constructive or] an indirect 
contempt." 
 
Charles Mfg. Co. v. United Furniture Workers, 361 So. 2d 1033, 1036 
SC-2023-0109 
23 
 
(Ala. 1978).  
 
"Constructive contempt" is divided into two categories: "criminal 
contempt" and "civil contempt." Rule 70A defines "criminal contempt" as 
either: 
"(i) Misconduct of any person that obstructs the 
administration of justice and that is committed either in the 
court's presence or so near thereto as to interrupt, disturb, or 
hinder its proceedings, or 
 
"(ii) Willful disobedience or resistance of any person to a 
court's lawful writ, subpoena, process, order, rule, or 
command, where the dominant purpose of the finding of 
contempt is to punish the contemnor." 
 
Rule 70A(a)(2)(C).  
Under Rule 70A(a)(2)(D) "civil contempt" is defined as "[a] willful, 
continuing failure or refusal of any person to comply with a court's lawful 
writ, subpoena, process, order, rule, or command that by its nature is still 
capable of being complied with." None of the parties dispute that the 
circuit court found Hyundai to be liable for civil constructive contempt.  
Rule 70A(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part: 
"A proceeding based on constructive contempt, whether 
criminal or civil, shall be subject to the rules of civil procedure. 
The proceeding shall be initiated by the filing of a petition 
seeking a finding of contempt …. The petition shall provide 
the alleged contemnor with notice of the essential facts 
constituting the alleged contemptuous conduct." 
SC-2023-0109 
24 
 
 
(Emphasis added.) Such notice of the "essential facts constituting the 
alleged contemptuous conduct," this Court has said, is critical for due-
process considerations in a constructive-contempt proceeding:   
"Where an individual is charged with indirect or constructive 
contempt, due process requires that he be given notice of the 
charges and a reasonable opportunity to meet them, the right 
to call witnesses and confront his accuser, and the right to 
give testimony relevant either to complete exculpation or to 
extenuation of the offense and evidence in mitigation of the 
penalty to be imposed. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S. Ct. 
499, 92 L. Ed. 682 (1948); International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers, Local 136 v. Davis Constructors & 
Engineers, Inc., 334 So. 2d 892 (Ala. 1976)." 
 
State v. Thomas, 550 So. 2d 1067, 1073 (Ala. 1989) (emphasis added). It 
is for this reason that a contempt petition should be treated in an 
analogous way to a pleading.3  
 
 
3To illustrate this point, we note that in Shackelford v. Shackelford, 
[Ms. 2210201, Aug. 5, 2022] ____ So. 3d ____ (Ala. Civ. App. 2022), the 
father in a child-custody proceeding petitioned to have the mother held 
in contempt for interfering with his relationship with the child. A trial 
was held during which the father attempted to introduce evidence 
indicating that the mother had interfered with his relationship with the 
child after he had filed his contempt petition in August 2021. The trial 
court did not allow that evidence.  Following the trial, the trial court 
found that the father had failed to meet his burden of proof.  
 
 
On appeal, the father argued that the trial court had erred by 
excluding evidence of allegedly contemptuous conduct that had occurred 
after the filing of his August 2021 petition. The Court of Civil Appeals 
SC-2023-0109 
25 
 
 
affirmed, explaining:   
 
"Rule 8(a)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] provides, in part: 'A pleading 
which sets forth a claim for relief ... shall contain (1) a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief 
the pleader seeks.' Rule 70A(c)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in 
pertinent part: 
 
"'A proceeding based on constructive contempt, 
whether criminal or civil, shall be subject to the 
rules of civil procedure. The proceeding shall be 
initiated by the filing of a petition seeking a 
finding of contempt .... The petition shall provide 
the alleged contemnor with notice of the essential 
facts constituting the alleged contemptuous 
conduct.' 
 
 
"Rule 15(d), Ala. R. Civ. P., however, provides, in 
pertinent part: 
 
"'Upon motion of a party the court may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, 
permit the party to serve a supplemental pleading 
setting forth transactions or occurrences or events 
which have happened since the date of the 
pleading sought to be supplemented.'" 
 
____ So. 3d at ____. That court then held: 
 
 
"In the present case, even assuming that the father's 
initial pleading, i.e., his August 2021 petition, complied with 
Rule 8 and Rule 70A, the father sought to hold the mother in 
contempt for 'occurrences or events which ... happened since 
the date of the [filing of the petition],' and, therefore, he was 
required to file a supplemental pleading pursuant to Rule 
15(d). In Gardner v. Hokenson, No. 2019-410, Feb. 5, 2021 (Vt. 
SC-2023-0109 
26 
 
 
In Charles Manufacturing, supra, a labor dispute arose between 
Charles Manufacturing Company and the United Furniture Workers of 
America, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 361, and others ("the defendants"). 
The trial court issued an order preliminarily enjoining the defendants 
from engaging in violence, mass picketing, threats, coercion, obstruction 
of the public roads, and interfering with the ingress and egress from 
Charles Manufacturing's plant or facilities in Dothan. In total, the 
defendants were enjoined from engaging in 11 separate acts. 
 
A couple of months later, Charles Manufacturing petitioned to hold 
the defendants in contempt on the basis that they had violated the 
injunction. That petition averred only that the defendants had "willfully 
 
2021) (not reported in Atlantic Reporter), a three-justice panel 
of the Supreme Court of Vermont stated that, even 
considering Vermont's 'liberal pleading standard requiring 
only short and concise averments giving fair notice of the 
grounds upon which the complaint is based,' the trial court in 
that case had acted within its discretion in excluding evidence 
of the defendants' actions that had occurred after the filing of 
the amended complaint. Similarly, in the present case, given 
the father's failure to comply with Rule 15(d), we conclude 
that the trial court acted within its discretion when it declined 
to admit evidence allegedly indicating that instances of 
contempt had occurred after the filing of the father's August 
2021 petition." 
 
____ So. 3d at ____ (emphasis added).  
SC-2023-0109 
27 
 
failed and refused to obey said preliminary injunction as ordered by this 
Honorable Court." 361 So. 2d at 1035. It provided no other details of the 
defendants' alleged contemptuous conduct.  
 
The trial court ordered the defendants to appear before it and to 
show cause, if any, as to why they should not be punished for contempt 
of court. A copy of Charles Manufacturing's contempt petition, a copy of 
the preliminary injunction, and the show-cause order were mailed to the 
defendants' attorney of record. 
 
In response, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the contempt 
petition on the basis that both it and the trial court's show-cause order 
failed to specify how they had violated the preliminary injunction. Two 
days later, the trial court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss.  
 
After the defendants filed their answer to Charles Manufacturing's 
contempt petition, the trial court held a hearing on that petition. 
Following that hearing, the trial court entered an order in which it found 
that the defendants had engaged in 23 separate acts of contemptuous 
behavior. The defendants appealed. 
 
On appeal, the defendants argued that adequate notice of the 
contempt charges had not been given to them and that, as a result, their 
SC-2023-0109 
28 
 
due-process rights had been violated. This Court agreed and held: 
 
"The complaint for contempt in this case simply stated 
that: 
 
 
"'Plaintiff avers that the Defendants have 
willfully 
failed 
and 
refused 
to 
obey 
said 
preliminary 
injunction 
as 
ordered 
by 
this 
Honorable Court.' 
 
"The preliminary injunction listed eleven acts prohibited to be 
engaged in by [the defendants]. Neither the complaint for 
contempt nor the order to show cause issued by the circuit 
court, and served upon [the defendants], contained an 
'accusation' or 'charge' setting forth any facts which notified 
the defendants of what they were to defend. We hold this 
complaint and order did not satisfy due process requirements 
because adequate notice of the nature and character of the 
charges against them was not given [the defendants]. 
 
 
"We also hold [the defendants] were denied adequate 
opportunity to prepare their defense. The specific charges for 
which [the defendants] were convicted were not known to 
them until trial began. The plaintiff rested its case at the end 
of the first day of trial. [The defendants] had been charged 
with about twenty acts of contempt, as disclosed by plaintiffs' 
evidence. Counsel for [the defendants] then requested a 
continuance in order to prepare a defense. On the next day of 
trial, counsel for [the defendants] again requested a 
continuance to prepare a defense. It was denied. This was 
error." 
 
361 So. 2d at 1037. Based on the foregoing, this Court reversed the trial 
court's contempt order. 
 
In the present case, it is undisputed by the parties that the circuit 
SC-2023-0109 
29 
 
court's preliminary injunction expressly prohibited Hyundai from, among 
other things, (1) "entering into agreements or otherwise permitting other 
dealers to sell Hyundai Construction's Construction Equipment or 
Forklift Equipment" in Southern's territories and (2) "advertising or 
marketing (via website or otherwise) that other dealers are authorized to 
sell" such equipment in Southern's territories. Here, Southern filed the 
contempt petition on November 15, 2022, after it had become aware that 
Hyundai lift trucks were being offloaded and distributed at a Thompson 
Lift Truck dealership in Baldwin County.  
 
It is undisputed that, after Southern filed the contempt petition and 
after Hyundai filed its response, Hyundai's counsel reached out to 
Southern's counsel in December 2022 to notify Southern that it had 
become aware that a few lift trucks had been sold by one of its dealers -- 
Thompson Lift Truck -- to various businesses in Escambia and Mobile 
Counties, both of which were located in Southern's forklift territory. This 
information was later confirmed to Southern by a representative from 
Thompson Lift Truck. 
Despite receiving this information nearly two weeks before the 
previously scheduled contempt hearing, Southern waited until less than 
SC-2023-0109 
30 
 
30 minutes before that hearing to assert those additional violations as a 
separate basis on which to hold Hyundai in contempt and to issue 
sanctions against it.  
 
Southern contends that the timing of its allegations and submission 
of evidence in support of those allegations is not problematic given that 
Hyundai's counsel was the very source from which it initially learned 
about these additional sales and that it had alleged in its contempt 
petition that Hyundai's violations of the injunction in this regard were 
"ongoing." However, a review of Southern's allegations in its "reply," 
along with the attachments to that "reply," show that those allegations 
were new, material factual allegations involving sales of (1) different 
equipment models than those identified in the contempt petition (2) to 
different businesses than those identified in the contempt petition (3) in 
different counties in Southern's forklift territory than those identified in 
the contempt petition and (4) that took place after the contempt petition 
had been filed. Moreover, nowhere in its contempt order did the circuit 
court suggest that it was limiting its contempt findings to only the 
allegations that Southern had made in its contempt petition. Thus, like 
the defendants in Charles Manufacturing, supra, Hyundai arguably was 
SC-2023-0109 
31 
 
unaware of the specific charges against it until the contempt hearing was 
held. 
Allowing the contempt hearing to move forward based, at least in 
part, on the new, material allegations less than 30 minutes after they 
had been asserted prevented Hyundai from being able to gather 
additional witnesses and documentary evidence to refute those 
allegations. Further, Southern relied exclusively on affidavits and 
documentary evidence and did not bring any witnesses to the contempt 
hearing.  Because the new allegations were supported exclusively by 
affidavit testimony and documentary evidence during the contempt 
hearing, Hyundai lost both the opportunity to depose Southern's 
witnesses and the opportunity to cross-examine them at the contempt 
hearing.  Hyundai also lost the opportunity to subpoena witnesses to 
attend the contempt hearing.   
In addition, Southern's new allegations required the presentation 
of new defenses by Hyundai. For example, the record before us indicates 
that Hyundai's defense to the allegations in Southern's contempt petition 
was that the equipment found in Baldwin County was not sold by 
Thompson Lift Truck to businesses in Southern's forklift territory but, 
SC-2023-0109 
32 
 
instead, was either rental equipment or equipment used by Thompson 
Lift Truck for its own purposes. In contrast, Hyundai's response to the 
new allegations was that the equipment was "ship in" equipment that 
was not covered by the circuit court's injunction order. This was a new 
issue requiring new evidence and testimony.  Thus, like the defendants 
in Charles Manufacturing, Hyundai was denied the ability to prepare a 
proper defense to the new allegations asserted at the last minute. 
Allegations of contemptuous behavior are serious. Following our 
procedural rules is especially important when addressing contempt 
claims.  Accordingly, it is important that the procedures in Rule 70A and 
our caselaw addressing the due-process requirements for contempt 
proceedings be followed. Southern argues that Hyundai was allowed to 
submit evidence two days after the contempt hearing, thus solving any 
problems arising from the lack of notice regarding the new allegations, 
the new theory, and the new evidence. Our caselaw makes clear, 
however, that due process required that Hyundai be given "notice of the 
charges and a reasonable opportunity to meet them, the right to call 
witnesses and confront [its] accuser, and the right to give testimony 
relevant either to the issue of complete exculpation or extenuation of the 
SC-2023-0109 
33 
 
offense and in mitigation of the penalty imposed."  Charles Mfg., 361 So. 
2d at 1037 (emphasis added).  Thus, Hyundai was entitled to sufficient 
notice allowing it to assemble and present its evidence before the 
contempt hearing, including being able to take depositions of witnesses 
and to serve subpoenas to potential live witnesses.   
Because the circumstances before us indicate that Hyundai should 
have been, but was not, given sufficient notice of Southern's new 
allegations and was ultimately denied an opportunity to "call witnesses 
and … give testimony" before the circuit court held it in contempt and 
issued sanctions against it, id., we hold that Hyundai was not afforded 
due process, and the circuit court's contempt order is, therefore, due to be 
reversed.4  
 
4We note that Hyundai argues that Southern's "reply" violated the 
provisions of Rule 6(d), Ala. R. Civ. P. That rule provides, in relevant 
part: 
 
"A written motion … and notice of the hearing thereof shall 
be served not later than five (5) days before the time specified 
for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules 
or by order of the court. … When a motion is supported by 
affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, 
except as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c),[Ala. R. Civ. P.,] 
opposing affidavits may be served not later than one (1) day 
before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served 
at some other time." 
SC-2023-0109 
34 
 
Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the circuit court's contempt 
order and remand the cause for the circuit court to hold a contempt 
hearing consistent with the due-process requirements discussed in this 
opinion. We pretermit discussion of the remaining issues raised on 
appeal. 
 
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Sellers, Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ., 
concur.  
 
Bryan and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result. 
 
 
(Emphasis added.) According to Hyundai, neither Southern's "motion" -- 
i.e., its "reply" -- nor the affidavit that it submitted in support of that 
"motion" -- i.e., the affidavit of Barkley Lindsey -- were served within the 
periods provided in the above-quoted rule.  In response, Southern does 
not dispute those requirements. It does argue, however, that the rule 
allows the trial court to "permit" at least the accompanying affidavit to 
be "served at some other time."  
 
Southern does not argue that it requested leave to serve its "reply" 
containing the new allegations (or the affidavit/evidence in support 
thereof) less than 30 minutes before the contempt hearing,  and it does 
not argue that the circuit court granted such leave "by order of the court." 
Therefore, we do not need to reach the questions whether granting such 
a request would be an abuse of discretion or would support an additional 
due-process argument by Hyundai.