Title: MS Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Donald P. Fox Family Trust
Citation: 2015 WI 49
Docket Number: 2013AP000679
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 15, 2015

2015 WI 49 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP679    
COMPLETE TITLE: 
MS Real Estate Holdings, LLC, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Donald P. Fox Family Trust, Jean A. Fox 
Revocable Living  
Trust, Jean A. Fox, Michael J. Fox, Thomas P. 
Fox, Karen  
L. Brazee, Carol L. Brewer, Ellen J. Fox and Amy 
J. Alaniz, 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 356 Wis. 2d 307, 853 N.W.2d 627) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No: 2014 WI App 84 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 15, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 3, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Outagamie 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael W. Gage 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs by Charles D. Koehler, Michael C. Menghini, and Herrling 
Clark Law Firm, Ltd., Appleton. Oral argument by Charles D. 
Koehler. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief by Jordan J. 
Hemaidan, Michael P. Screnock, and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, 
Madison. Oral argument by Jordan Hemaidan. 
 
 
 
2
 
There was an amicus curiae brief by Cori Moore Lamont and 
Wisconsin Realtors Association, Madison, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Realtors Association. 
 
 
2015 WI 49
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2013AP679 
(L.C. No. 
2012CV214) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
MS Real Estate Holdings, LLC, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Donald P. Fox Family Trust, Jean A. Fox 
Revocable Living  
 
Trust, Jean A. Fox, Michael J. Fox, Thomas P. 
Fox, Karen  
 
L. Brazee, Carol L. Brewer, Ellen J. Fox and 
Amy J. Alaniz, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 15, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL 
J. 
GABLEMAN, 
J.   We 
review 
a 
published 
decision of the court of appeals1 reversing the Outagamie County 
                                                 
1 MS Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Donald P. Fox Family 
Trust, 2014 WI App 84, 356 Wis. 2d 307, 853 N.W.2d 627. 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
2 
 
circuit court's order2 granting summary judgment in favor of 
Donald P. Fox Family Trust, Jean A. Fox Revocable Living Trust, 
Jean A. Fox, Michael J. Fox, Thomas P. Fox, Karen L. Brazee, 
Carol L. Brewer, Ellen J. Fox, and Amy J. Alniz ("the Foxes").  
The Foxes moved for summary judgment, arguing that the right of 
first refusal contract between the Foxes and MS Real Estate 
Holdings, LLC ("MS Real Estate")3 was (1) indefinite and (2) 
terminable at will.  The circuit court concluded that the right 
of first refusal contract was indefinite and subject to 
termination at will, by either party, after a reasonable period 
of time.  This was so, the circuit court reasoned, because the 
right of first refusal contract identified neither a specific 
duration for the contract, nor an event terminating the contract 
that was certain to occur. 
¶2 
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the 
right of first refusal contract is not indefinite.  MS Real 
Estate Holdings, LLC v. Donald P. Fox Family Trust, 2014 WI App 
84, ¶23, 356 Wis. 2d 307, 853 N.W.2d 627.  The court of appeals 
concluded that the right of first refusal contract is not 
indefinite because in the event MS Real Estate fails to exercise 
the right of first refusal to purchase, such failure would 
necessarily constitute a waiver of the right to lease.  Id.  
Therefore, the court of appeals concluded the entire right of 
                                                 
2 The Honorable Michael W. Gage, presiding. 
3 Formerly known as Tidy View Dairy, Inc. 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
3 
 
first refusal contract (that is, both the purchase and lease 
provisions) expires only when MS Real Estate either exercises, 
or declines to exercise, its right to purchase.  Id., ¶¶29-31. 
¶3 
The sole issue presented for our consideration is 
whether a triggering event uncertain to occur renders a right of 
first refusal contract indefinite, thereby allowing a party to 
terminate the contract at will after a reasonable period of 
time.  
¶4 
We hold that a right of first refusal contract is 
definite as to duration when it specifies an event that triggers 
the right and requires the right holder to either exercise or 
waive the right within a specified period of time thereafter, 
even 
if 
the 
triggering 
event 
is 
not 
certain 
to 
occur.  
Therefore, the right of first refusal contract at issue here is 
not terminable at will after a reasonable period of time.  
Rather, by the terms of the contract, the right of first refusal 
continues until there is a sale of the property, either to MS 
Real Estate or to a third party in the event that MS Real Estate 
declines to exercise its right of first refusal to purchase, 
thereby waiving its right.  Accordingly, the decision of the 
court of appeals is affirmed. 
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶5 
MS Real Estate operates a dairy farm that adjoins 
approximately 450 acres of farmland in the Town of Freedom in 
Outagamie County, Wisconsin, owned by the Foxes ("the Fox 
Land").  On January 16, 1998, MS Real Estate, as Tidy View 
Dairy, Inc., contracted with Donald P. Fox and Jean A. Fox for a 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
4 
 
right of first refusal to purchase or lease the Fox Land.  MS 
Real Estate paid Donald and Jean Fox $4,0004 for the right of 
first refusal to purchase the Fox Land and the right of first 
refusal to lease the Fox Land.  
¶6 
The purchase provision of the right of first refusal 
contract states: 
Section 1: Right of First Refusal to Purchase 
Fox grants and conveys to Tidy-View a first right to 
purchase the Property, or any part thereof, for the 
same price and on the same terms which Fox is willing 
to transfer such Property to another party.  Prior to 
such transfer, Fox shall deliver to Tidy-View a 
written copy of the Offer, which Fox is willing to 
accept.  Tidy-View shall then have 15 (fifteen) days 
in which to accept or reject the Offer according to 
its price, terms and conditions.  If the Offer is 
accepted, the transfer shall be closed in accordance 
with the Offer with Tidy-View as purchaser.  If the 
Offer is rejected, Fox may complete the sale in strict 
compliance with the Offer.  If the sale is not closed, 
this first right of refusal shall again take effect. 
¶7 
Under 
the 
Right 
of 
First 
Refusal 
to 
Purchase 
provision, should the Foxes receive an acceptable offer to 
purchase, they must submit the offer to MS Real Estate—the 
successor to Tidy-View, see supra n.3.  MS Real Estate would 
then have 15 days to accept or reject the offer.  If MS Real 
Estate rejects the offer, the Foxes may complete the sale with 
the third-party that made the initial offer, but only on the 
                                                 
4 There is some dispute in the record as to whether MS Real 
Estate paid $4,000 or $4,500 for the right of first refusal.  In 
either event, the consideration paid by MS Real Estate is not a 
factor in our analysis. 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
5 
 
terms of the initial offer accepted by the Foxes.  The contract 
also provides that the right of first refusal to purchase 
reattaches if the third-party sale does not close.  
¶8 
The Right to Lease provision states: 
Section 2: Right to Lease 
2.1 Leasing Rights.  Fox grants and conveys to Tidy-
View a first right to lease the Property, or any part 
thereof, for the same price and on the same terms 
which Fox is wiling to Lease such Property to another 
party.  Prior to execution of any Lease, Fox shall 
deliver to Tidy-View a written copy of the Lease, 
which Fox is willing to accept.  Tidy-View shall then 
have 15 (fifteen) days in which to accept or reject 
the 
Lease 
according 
to 
its 
price, 
terms 
and 
conditions.  If the Lease is accepted, Tidy-View shall 
be obligated to make all payments in accordance with 
the Lease with Tidy-View as Lessee.  If the Lease is 
rejected, Fox may execute the Lease as Lessor with the 
other party as Lessee.  If the Lease is not executed, 
the first right to lease shall again take effect.   
¶9 
The Right to Lease provision provides that MS Real 
Estate has a first right to lease the Fox Land which operates in 
a manner similar to the Right of First Refusal to Purchase 
provision.  If the Foxes receive a lease offer they would 
accept, they must forward the offer to MS Real Estate.  MS Real 
Estate must either accept or reject the lease offer within 15 
days.  If MS Real Estate rejects the lease, the Foxes may 
execute the lease with the third-party.  If the Foxes do not 
execute the lease, then MS Real Estate's first right to lease 
reattaches.   
¶10 The lease provision also includes a Continuing Rights 
provision under Section 2.2, which states that the right to 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
6 
 
lease "shall continue for any subsequent renewal of a Lease with 
another party or upon entering into a new Lease with any other 
party.  It is specifically intended that this leasing right 
shall not extinguish unless waived by [MS Real Estate]." 
¶11 The right of first refusal contract also contains a 
Binding Effect provision under Section 4, which states that 
"[t]his Agreement shall be binding upon the respective parties, 
their heirs, personal representatives, successors in interest 
and assigns." 
¶12 The Foxes leased the Fox Land to MS Real Estate in 
2001.  On October 4, 2006, Donald Fox sent MS Real Estate a 
commercial offer to purchase 37.4 acres of the Fox Land, putting 
MS Real Estate on notice that it had 15 days to accept or reject 
the offer.  MS Real Estate declined to exercise its right to 
purchase the 37.4 acres.  MS Real Estate notified the Foxes by 
letter and attached an agreement entitled "Release of Parcel 
From Right of First Refusal."  The letter stated that the 
attached agreement constituted waiver of the right of first 
refusal as to the 37.4 acres in question and reasserted MS Real 
Estate's right to the remainder of the Fox Land.  However, the 
sale did not close, and, under the terms of the right of first 
refusal contract, the right of first refusal to purchase 
reattached. 
¶13 On January 11, 2007, the parties executed a five-year 
land use agreement, which expired on January 11, 2012.  The 
agreement contained a handwritten provision that stated MS Real 
Estate had the right of first refusal to purchase the land and 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
7 
 
that if the Foxes sold any portion of the Fox Land, the rent 
would be adjusted accordingly. 
¶14 On July 29, 2011, the Foxes sent a notice to MS Real 
Estate which noted that their lease agreement would expire in 
January.  In that notice, the Foxes invited MS Real Estate to 
submit a bid to lease the property beginning in 2012.  The Foxes 
sent a second notice on October 26, 2011, which again requested 
that MS Real Estate present a bid on a 2012 lease of the Fox 
land.  The notice also acknowledged MS Real Estate's right to 
first lease and that the Foxes would follow the procedure for 
allowing MS Real Estate to exercise its right should they 
receive other bids to lease the property. 
¶15 MS Real Estate responded on November 8, 2011, by 
proposing two leases for the Foxes to choose between: a one-year 
lease and a three-year lease.  The lease proposals also 
referenced MS Real Estate's right of first refusal and its 
intent to abide by the contract's provisions. 
¶16 On December 1, 2011, the Foxes notified MS Real Estate 
that it was soliciting alternate lease proposals.  On December 
5, 2011, the Foxes sent MS Real Estate a proposal from Tinedale 
Cropping to lease the property from January 1, 2012, to December 
31, 2016, at an initial price of $200 per acre ("the Tinedale 
Proposal").  MS Real Estate, believing that the Tinedale 
Proposal was acceptable to the Foxes, attempted to exercise its 
right of first lease on December 16, 2011, by notifying the 
Foxes that it accepted the terms of the Tinedale Proposal.  MS 
Real Estate included a signed lease agreement for the Fox Land 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
8 
 
under the terms of the Tinedale Proposal.  The Foxes refused to 
execute the lease. 
¶17 On February 8, 2012, the Foxes delivered a second 
lease to MS Real Estate pursuant to the right of first refusal 
contract which Kavanaugh Farms and the Foxes had executed on 
February 6, 2012 ("the Kavanaugh Lease").  The Kavanaugh Lease 
ran from 2012 through 2016 and provided for a rent of $225 per 
acre in the first year, with a two percent annual increase in 
the cost per acre.  The Foxes did not provide MS Real Estate 
with a copy of the Kavanaugh Lease prior to its execution, but 
communicated to MS Real Estate that it retained the right of 
first lease and could accept the terms of the Kavanaugh Lease. 
¶18 On February 12, 2012, MS Real Estate filed suit in 
Outagamie County circuit court seeking declaratory judgment that 
the Tinedale Proposal constituted an offer to lease which had 
been accepted by MS Real Estate under the right of first refusal 
contract, and seeking damages for breach of contract.  In 
response, the Foxes sent a letter to MS Real Estate on March 6, 
2012, purportedly terminating the right of first refusal 
contract.  The Foxes' letter indicated that the right of first 
refusal contract failed to specify the duration of the contract 
and did not expressly state that it was intended to be 
perpetual.  Thus, according to the Foxes, either party could 
terminate the contract after a reasonable time. 
¶19 On April 5, 2012, the parties resolved their dispute 
regarding whether it was the Tinedale Proposal or the Kavanaugh 
Lease which constituted an acceptable offer subject to MS Real 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
9 
 
Estate's right to first lease.  They did so by entering into a 
lease under the terms of the Kavanaugh Lease.  The Foxes moved 
for summary judgment on their remaining counterclaim, arguing 
that the March 6 revocation of the right of first refusal 
contract was valid because the contract was indefinite and 
lacked the express language needed to indicate an intent it 
should endure in perpetuity.  The circuit court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Foxes, concluding that the right of 
first refusal contract was indefinite as to duration and that 
the revocation by the Foxes was reasonable. 
¶20  The court of appeals reversed, concluding that "a 
right of first refusal to purchase . . . is not amenable to the 
general rule of indefiniteness applied by the circuit court."  
MS Real Estate Holdings, 356 Wis. 2d 307, ¶13.  The court of 
appeals also determined MS Real Estate's failure to exercise the 
right of first refusal to purchase would constitute a waiver of 
the right of first lease under the contract.  Id., ¶¶30-31.  
Thus, the court concluded that the duration of the right of 
first refusal contract is not indefinite because the contract 
terminates, in its entirety, upon the sale of the Fox Land.  
Id., ¶32. 
¶21 The Foxes petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on November 13, 2014. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶22 This case requires us to review a grant of summary 
judgment.  "'We review the grant of a motion for summary 
judgment de novo, and apply the methodology specified in Wis. 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
10 
 
Stat. § 802.08.  That is, we determine whether there is any 
genuine issue as to any material fact, and if not, which party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'"  E-Z Roll Off, LLC 
v. Cnty. of Oneida, 2011 WI 71, ¶15, 335 Wis. 2d 720, 800 
N.W.2d 421 (citation omitted). 
¶23 In doing so, we must interpret the right of first 
refusal contract between the Foxes and MS Real Estate and 
determine whether it is ambiguous as to its duration.  "Whether 
a contract is ambiguous is . . . a question of law which we 
review de novo."  Mitchell Bank v. Schanke, 2004 WI 13, ¶46, 268 
Wis. 2d 571, 676 N.W.2d 849 (quoting Schmitz v. Grudzinski, 141 
Wis. 2d 867, 871, 416 N.W.2d 639 (Ct. App. 1987)). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Rights of First Refusal Defined 
¶24 A right of first refusal is a contractual right to be 
first in line should the opportunity to purchase or lease a 
property arise.  "The right of first refusal 'remains in an 
unripened or suspended state, awaiting the energizing spark 
provided when the condition precedent of intent and offer is 
met.'"  Wilber Lime Prods., Inc. v. Ahrndt, 2003 WI App 259, 
¶10, 268 Wis. 2d 650, 673 N.W.2d 339 (quoting Chapman v. Mut. 
Life Ins. Co, 800 P.2d 1147, 1152 (Wyo. 1990)).  It is 
"essentially a conditional option dependent upon the decision or 
the desire of the landlord to sell [or lease]."  Last v. 
Puehler, 19 Wis. 2d 291, 297, 120 N.W.2d 120 (1963).  Like an 
option contract, a right of first refusal must be supported by 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
11 
 
consideration.  3 E.M. Holmes, Corbin on Contracts § 11.3 (rev. 
ed. 1996) (hereinafter Corbin).   
¶25 However, a right of first refusal is not an option 
contract.  A right of first refusal is 
a right to buy before or ahead of others, thus, a pre-
emptive right contract is an agreement containing all 
the essential elements of a contract, the provisions 
of which give to the prospective purchaser the right 
to buy upon specified terms, but, and this is the 
important point, only if the seller decides to sell.  
It does not give the pre-emptioner the power to compel 
an 
unwilling 
owner 
to 
sell, 
and 
therefore 
is 
distinguishable from an ordinary option. 
Edlin v. Soderstrom, 83 Wis. 2d 58, 68, 264 N.W.2d 275 (1978) 
(citing J.A. Bryant, Jr, Annotation, Pre-emptive Rights to 
Realty as Violation of Rule Against Perpetuities or Rule 
Concerning Restraints on Alienation, 40 A.L.R. 3d, 920, 924 
(1971)).  "The holder of an option can compel a sale by an 
unwilling owner.  The holder of a right of first refusal on a 
piece of land only has the right to receive an offer to buy the 
land."  Corbin, supra, § 11.3. 
¶26 Further, a right of first refusal to purchase or lease 
land may be a servitude.5  A servitude is "a legal device that 
creates a right or obligation that runs either with land or with 
an interest in land."  Nature Conservancy of Wis., Inc. v. 
Altnau, 2008 WI App 115, ¶7, 313 Wis. 2d 382, 756 N.W.2d 641 
                                                 
5 While it is unnecessary for the outcome of this case to 
determine whether the right of first refusal contract between 
the Foxes and MS Real Estate is a servitude, we nonetheless find 
the rules governing servitudes useful to our analysis. 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
12 
 
(citing 
Restatement 
(Third) 
of 
Prop.: 
Servitudes 
§ 1.1(1) 
(2000)).  Servitudes are subject to the rules against restraints 
on alienation.  Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 3.3. 
¶27 A restraint on alienation occurs when a property owner 
contracts not to sell the property for a specified amount of 
time.  Corbin, supra, § 11.3.  Generally, a right of first 
refusal is not a restraint on alienation if the procedure for 
exercising the right is reasonable.  Id.  To determine whether a 
right of first refusal imposes a restraint on alienation, one 
must look to the provisions governing the exercise of the right.  
Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 3.4 cmt. f. 
Lack of clarity may cause substantial harm by making 
it 
difficult 
to 
obtain 
financing 
and 
exposing 
potential buyers to threats of litigation.  Lengthy 
periods for exercise of rights of first refusal will 
also 
substantially 
affect 
alienability 
of 
the 
property.  Potential buyers will be deterred by the 
possibility that they may not know for a lengthy 
period of time whether they will obtain the property 
or be obligated to pay the price.  The risks of change 
in their needs and in financial markets will be 
greater than most buyers will be willing to accept. 
Id.  However, where the right of first refusal provides for 
purchase on the same terms and conditions as the owner receives 
from a third party, the procedure for exercising the right is 
clear, and the time for exercising the right when it arises is 
reasonably short, its practical effect on alienation is de 
minimis.  Id.  Thus, to determine whether the time for 
exercising the right of first refusal is reasonable, one must 
look to when the right is triggered.  A right of first refusal 
is triggered when "the energizing spark" of "intent and offer is 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
13 
 
met," not when the contract is first created.  Wilber Lime 
Prods., 268 Wis. 2d 650, ¶10 (citation and quotation omitted). 
¶28 When a right of first refusal provides for purchase on 
the same terms and conditions as an acceptable offer, provides a 
clear procedure for exercising the right, and provides a 
reasonable time for exercising the right, it does not operate to 
prohibit or restrain the sale of property.  Rather, the right of 
first refusal contract bestows on the holder the right to 
preempt a third party’s purchase when that third party has made 
an offer the owner will accept.  Corbin, supra, § 11.3.  Where 
the procedure is clear and the time to exercise the right is 
reasonable, a right of first refusal "provides a possible buyer 
who is constantly available."  Bruns v. Rennebohm Drug Stores, 
Inc., 151 Wis. 2d 88, 99, 442 N.W.2d 591 (Ct. App. 1989).   
¶29 If the property owner receives an acceptable offer, 
the owner "has the power to create a privilege to sell by merely 
offering to sell to [the holder of the right of first refusal]."  
Corbin, supra, § 11.3.  If the holder accepts, he purchases the 
property.  If the holder declines, the owner may accept the 
buyer’s 
offer. 
 
Accordingly, 
"a 
transaction 
exclusively 
contractual in character, such as a right of first refusal," 
cannot realistically be said to encumber specific property.  10 
Powell on Real Property § 72.07 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 
LexisNexis Matthew Bender).  This discussion makes clear that, 
under a right of first refusal contract, landowners such as the 
Foxes remain free to do with their property as they wish.  The 
holder of a right of first refusal cannot force landowners to 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
14 
 
sell or lease their property unless they freely choose to do so.  
Even then, landowners may condition such sale or lease on terms 
that are acceptable to them.  In other words, landowners such as 
the Foxes remain in total control of their property and cannot 
be forced to act against their will under a right of first 
refusal contract. 
B. Right of First Refusal Contracts That Use a Triggering Event 
That is Uncertain to Occur Are Not Indefinite as to Duration. 
¶30 By their nature, right of first refusal contracts 
often contemplate a level of uncertainty because such contracts 
rely on triggering events——usually a landowner’s decision to 
sell——which may or may not occur.  See Wilber Lime Prods., 268 
Wis. 2d 650, ¶10.  The use of an event to determine the duration 
of a right of first refusal contract renders the duration of the 
contract sufficiently definite under Wisconsin law.  Schneider 
v. Schneider, 132 Wis. 2d 171, 176, 389 N.W.2d 835 (Ct. App. 
1986).  The Foxes do not argue that the procedures for MS Real 
Estate to exercise its rights are unreasonable, but rather that 
the duration of the entire contract is indefinite.  Thus, the 
question here is whether the uncertainty of when—or even if—the 
triggering 
event 
will 
occur 
offends 
Wisconsin’s 
policy 
disfavoring perpetual contracts.  It does not. 
¶31 We begin our analysis, as we must, by noting that 
Wisconsin courts do not favor perpetual contracts.  We are 
"reluctant to interpret a contract as providing for a perpetual 
contractual right unless the intention of the contracting 
parties to provide for the same is clearly stated."  Capital 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
15 
 
Invs., Inc. v. Whitehall Packing Co., 91 Wis. 2d 178, 193, 280 
N.W.2d 254 (1979).  When the time that a contract is to endure 
is indefinite, this court will imply a reasonable time for the 
duration of the contract.  Farley v. Salow, 67 Wis. 2d 393, 402, 
227 N.W.2d 76 (1975).  However, we do not require parties to 
express 
duration 
in 
temporal 
terms 
in 
order 
to 
avoid 
indefiniteness.  Rather, parties are free to identify triggering 
events that give rise to termination of the contract in one form 
or another.  Schneider, 132 Wis. 2d at 176. 
¶32 The Foxes argue that the uncertainty of a triggering 
event, in this case the sale of the Fox Land, renders the 
duration for which the right of first refusal contract is to 
endure indefinite, and therefore violates Wisconsin’s policy 
disfavoring perpetual contracts.  The Foxes assert that (a) 
because the duration of the contract is indefinite, and (b) it 
contains no express language stating that it is intended to be 
perpetual, we should imply a reasonable time for performance, 
after which, the contract is terminable at will by either party.  
Accordingly, in the Foxes view, the court of appeals exceeded 
its authority by concluding the contract terminated upon sale. 
¶33 We disagree.  A specified triggering event, though 
uncertain to occur, may render a right of first refusal contract 
sufficiently definite and establish the duration of the right.  
Id.  In Schneider, the court of appeals considered whether an 
agreement between two brothers that restricted the sale of 
property held by them as tenants in common was indefinite as to 
duration because it contained no express amount of time it was 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
16 
 
to endure, thereby violating the restriction on partition 
agreements 
that 
exceed 
thirty 
years 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 842.02(1).  Id. at 175.  The court concluded that the 
agreement was not indefinite because either of two events——the 
death of one of the brothers or operation of a right of first 
refusal provision in the agreement——would allow the land to be 
partitioned.  Id. at 176. 
¶34 The Foxes argue that, in Schneider, it is the first 
event the court listed, death, that made the duration of the 
contract definite because death is an event certain to occur.  
The Foxes' reading of Schneider does not persuade us.  The court 
in Schneider provided two independent reasons for concluding 
that the duration of the contract was sufficiently definite.  
Schneider, 132 Wis. 2d at 176.  The first, death, was certain to 
occur, though impossible to predict.  Id.  The second, the 
exercise of the right of first refusal, though uncertain to 
occur, depended on one of the brothers seeking to sell his 
interest in the land.  Id.  The brothers had signed an agreement 
that required the sibling who wished to sell his interest in the 
land to offer it to his brother first.  Id.  Through the 
operation of the right of first refusal agreement, either 
brother could sell his interest in the property at any time.  
Id.  Thus, either death or the sale of the property was 
sufficient to establish the definiteness of the contract. 
¶35 The court’s conclusion in Schneider is consistent with 
the form and function of rights of first refusal.  As we 
explained above, a right of first refusal contract operates in a 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
17 
 
manner similar to a conditional option contract, though it is 
not an option contract.  See Last, 19 Wis. 2d at 297; Nature 
Conservancy of Wis., 313 Wis. 2d 382, ¶7; Corbin, supra, § 11.3.  
Under a right of first refusal contract, the right to purchase 
property lies dormant until it is awakened by the occurrence of 
a 
specified 
triggering 
event. 
 
Wilber 
Lime 
Prods., 
268 
Wis. 2d 650, ¶10.  Unless otherwise specified by the parties, a 
right of first refusal expires when the triggering event occurs 
and the holder chooses to either exercise or waive the right.  
See Cipriano v. Glen Cove Lodge #1458, B.P.O.E., 801 N.E.2d 388, 
392 (N.Y. 2003) ("The holder of a right of first refusal must be 
given the opportunity to exercise the preemptive right, but the 
right is extinguished when the contract with the third party 
expires or is abandoned."); Corbin, supra, § 11.3.  Accordingly, 
so long as the right of first refusal clearly identifies a 
triggering event, whether certain or uncertain to occur, it is 
definite as to duration. 
¶36 Because we hold that a right of first refusal contract 
is definite as to duration when it specifies an event that 
triggers the right, even when the triggering event is not 
certain to occur, we must now interpret the right of first 
refusal contract between the Foxes and MS Real Estate to 
determine the triggering event. 
C. The Right of First Refusal Contract Terminates Upon Sale of 
the Fox Land. 
¶37 To determine whether the right of first refusal 
contract between the Foxes and MS Real Estate is indefinite, we 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
18 
 
must interpret the document.  Our goal in interpreting contracts 
is to determine and carry out the parties' intentions.  See 
Wilson Mut. Ins. Co. v. Falk, 2014 WI 136, ¶23, 360 Wis. 2d 67, 
857 N.W.2d 156.  "Contract language is construed according to 
its plain or ordinary meaning, . . . consistent with 'what a 
reasonable person would understand the words to mean under the 
circumstances.'"  Tufail v. Midwest Hospitality, LLC, 2013 WI 
62, ¶28, 348 Wis. 2d 631, 833 N.W.2d 586 (internal citations 
omitted).  If the terms of a contract are plain and unambiguous, 
we construe it as it stands.  Gottsacker v. Monnier, 2005 WI 69, 
¶22, 
281 
Wis. 2d 361, 
697 
N.W.2d 436. 
 
"However, 
where 
contractual language is reasonably susceptible to more than one 
meaning, that language is ambiguous."  Nature Conservancy of 
Wis., 313 Wis. 2d 382, ¶6.   
¶38 "The general rule as to construction of contracts is 
that the meaning of particular provisions in the contract is to 
be ascertained with reference to the contract as a whole."  
Tempelis v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 169 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 485 
N.W.2d 217 (1992).  "When interpreting an ambiguous contract 
provision, we must reject a construction that renders an unfair 
or unreasonable result."  Gottsacker, 281 Wis. 2d 361, ¶24.  We 
"interpret contracts to give them 'common sense' and 'realistic' 
meaning."  Betz v. Diamond Jim's Auto Sales, 2014 WI 66, ¶68, 
355 Wis. 2d 301, 849 N.W.2d 292 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  
"[A]mbiguities are resolved against the drafter."  Marlowe v. 
IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 2013 WI 29, ¶48, 346 Wis. 2d 450, 828 
N.W.2d 812.   
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
19 
 
¶39 Read in isolation, the two right of first refusal 
provisions in the contract between the Foxes and MS Real Estate 
are not ambiguous.  Section one of the contract, which contains 
the Right of First Refusal to Purchase provision, states:  
Fox grants and conveys to Tidy-View a first right to 
purchase the Property, or any part thereof, for the 
same price and on the same terms which Fox is willing 
to transfer such Property to another party.  Prior to 
transfer, Fox shall deliver to Tidy-View a written 
copy of the Offer, which Fox is willing to accept.  
Tidy-View shall then have 15 (fifteen) days in which 
to accept or reject the Offer according to its price, 
terms and conditions.  If the Offer is accepted, the 
transfer shall be closed in accordance with the Offer 
with Tidy-View as purchaser.  If the Offer is 
rejected, 
Fox 
may 
complete 
the 
sale 
in 
strict 
compliance with the Offer.  If the sale is not closed, 
this first right of refusal shall again take effect.   
(Emphasis added). 
¶40 By its terms, this provision terminates upon the sale 
of the Fox Land.  There is no other reasonable interpretation.  
If the Fox Land is sold to MS Real Estate, then there is no 
longer a need for the provision.  If the Fox Land is sold to a 
third-party, the right of first refusal to purchase does not 
reattach.  MS Real Estate would waive its right of first refusal 
to purchase if and when the Fox Land is sold to a third-party, 
thus extinguishing the right. 
¶41 Similarly, the Right of First Lease provision is 
unambiguous when read in isolation.  The section contains two 
provisions, which read: 
2.1 Leasing Rights.  Fox grants and conveys to Tidy-
View a first right to lease the Property or any part 
thereof, for the same price and on the same terms 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
20 
 
which Fox is willing to Lease such Property to another 
party.  Prior to execution of any Lease, Fox shall 
deliver to Tidy-View a written copy of the Lease, 
which Fox is willing to accept.  Tidy-View shall then 
have 15 (fifteen) days in which to accept or reject 
the 
Lease 
according 
to 
its 
price, 
terms 
and 
conditions. If the Lease is accepted, Tidy-View shall 
be obligated to make all payments in accordance with 
the Lease with Tidy-View as Lessee.  If the Lease is 
rejected, Fox may execute the Lease as Lessor with the 
other party as Lessee.  If the Lease is not executed, 
the first right to lease shall again take effect. 
2.2 Continuing Rights.  This section 2 right shall 
continue for any subsequent renewal of a Lease with 
another party or upon the entering into of a new Lease 
with any other party.  It is specifically intended 
that this leasing right shall not extinguish unless 
waived by Tidy-View. 
¶42 Standing alone, the plain language of the right of 
first lease is amenable to only one reasonable interpretation: 
if the Foxes desire to lease their land, MS Real Estate must be 
given the first opportunity.  Further, this right is expressly 
intended to continue beyond the provisions of any single lease 
term and terminates only upon waiver by MS Real Estate.  
¶43 The fact that the right of first refusal provisions of 
the contract are unambiguous when read in isolation does not end 
the inquiry.  Contractual provisions must be interpreted within 
the context of the contract as a whole.  Tempelis, 169 
Wis. 2d at 9.  As we have noted within the context of insurance 
policies, provisions that are unambiguous standing alone may be 
ambiguous in the context of the whole contract.  See Md. Arms 
Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶39, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 
N.W.2d 15.  Here, the fourth section of the contract, titled 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
21 
 
Binding Effect, creates ambiguity as to the duration of the 
contract. 
¶44 The Binding Effect provision states that the agreement 
"shall be binding upon the respective parties, their heirs, 
personal representatives, successors in interest and assigns."  
This section creates at least two reasonable interpretations 
regarding the duration of the contract.  The first is that the 
contract is intended to be perpetual.  The second is that a sale 
under 
the 
Right 
of 
First 
Refusal 
to 
Purchase 
provision 
constitutes waiver under the Right of First Lease provision, 
thus terminating the contract. 
¶45 We are reluctant to find a perpetual contractual right 
unless the contract language evidences that the parties clearly 
intended the contract to be perpetual.  Capital Investments, 91 
Wis. 2d at 193.  However, the intent to create a perpetual 
contract does not require the parties to use magic words.  If 
the contract language indicates that they intend the contract to 
be continual, a court may find a perpetual contract.  Here, the 
Binding Effect provision can be read to create a perpetual 
contract.  The use of the term "successors in interest" suggests 
that the parties intended the contract to be perpetual.  This is 
so because if the right of first refusal contract is binding on 
all of the Foxes' successors in interest, then it would be 
binding on any third-party who purchased the Fox Land.  Such an 
interpretation would give MS Real Estate a permanent right of 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
22 
 
first refusal to lease regardless of who owns the Fox Land.6  
Thus, MS Real Estate would have a right of first lease to the 
Fox Land that is enforceable against future owners of the 
property, assuming it did not exercise its right of first 
refusal to purchase under section one and did not separately 
waive its right of first lease under section two. 
¶46 This is not the only reasonable interpretation of the 
contract, however.  The contract can also be read to terminate 
upon the sale of the Fox Land to a third-party.  Under this 
reading, the extent of the Binding Effect provision is limited 
by the terms of the right of first refusal provisions.  As we 
have explained, under the Right of First Refusal to Purchase 
provision, MS Real Estate's right to purchase terminates upon 
sale of the Fox Land, whether the sale is to MS Real Estate or a 
third-party.  In addition, according to Section 2.2 of the Right 
of First Lease provision, MS Real Estate's lease rights "shall 
not extinguish unless waived."  The contract does not define 
what constitutes waiver, and because waiver is not defined 
within the contract, we give the term is its plain or ordinary 
meaning.  Tufail, 348 Wis. 2d 631, ¶28. 
¶47 Waiver is defined as "the voluntary relinquishment or 
abandonment——express or implied——of a legal right or advantage."  
                                                 
6 This interpretation would not create a perpetual right of 
first refusal to purchase, however.  This is because that 
provision in the contract clearly states that the "first right 
of refusal shall again take effect" only in the event a sale to 
a third-party does not close. 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
23 
 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1717 (9th ed. 2009).  Thus, the terms of 
the contract provide that the right of first lease is waived 
when MS Real Estate abandons a legal right or advantage under 
the contract.  In this case, that can mean only abandonment of 
the right to purchase.  As the court of appeals correctly noted, 
if waiver applied solely to the right to lease, then the Right 
of First Lease provision would be internally inconsistent.  MS 
Real Estate Holdings, 356 Wis. 2d 307, ¶30.  This is so because 
Section 2.2 explicitly states that the right of first lease 
continues for any subsequent lease, whether entered into by MS 
Real Estate or a third-party.  For such a situation to occur, MS 
Real Estate would have declined, or "voluntarily relinquished," 
its first right to lease under Section 2.1.  Thus, waiver must 
mean the relinquishment of a different right under the contract, 
and the only other right granted to MS Real Estate is the first 
right to purchase.  Accordingly, Section 2.2, read in the 
context of the contract as a whole, indicates that waiver occurs 
when MS Real Estate refuses to exercise its right to purchase 
the Fox Land and allows a third-party to purchase the property.7   
                                                 
7 Another reason that "waiver" in Section 2.2 cannot refer 
to the first right to lease is that it would be redundant.  It 
is well-settled that "[a] construction which gives reasonable 
meaning to every provision of a contract is preferable to one 
leaving part of the language useless or meaningless."  Maas by 
Grant v. Ziegler, 172 Wis. 2d 70, 79, 492 N.W.2d 621 (1992).  
The first sentence of Section 2.2 states that the first right to 
lease "shall continue for any subsequent renewal of a Lease with 
another party or upon the entering into of a new Lease with any 
other party."  The plain meaning of this provision is that the 
first right to lease is recurring, unlike the first right to 
purchase.  In essence, MS Real Estate can waive its first right 
(continued) 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
24 
 
¶48 We conclude that the second "waiver interpretation" is 
the more reasonable and commonsense reading of the document as a 
whole.  See Betz, 355 Wis. 2d 301, ¶68.  By concluding that 
waiver under the Right of First Lease provision occurs when MS 
Real Estate declines to exercise the right of first refusal to 
purchase, the waiver interpretation gives full effect to each 
provision of the contract.  Under this waiver interpretation, 
the right of first refusal to purchase remains in effect until 
the consummation of a sale of the Fox Land.  Further, the right 
of first lease continues, arising each time a lease expires, 
until it is waived by MS Real Estate's choice not to exercise 
its right of first refusal to purchase.  Finally, under the 
waiver interpretation, the Binding Effect provision remains 
enforceable, binding subsequent generations of the Fox family 
that will inherit the Fox Land until the property is sold. 
¶49 The parties' actions also indicate that the waiver 
interpretation is consistent with their intent.  When a contract 
is ambiguous, the court may look beyond the four corners of the 
document and consider extrinsic evidence that demonstrates the 
parties' intent.  Betz, 355 Wis. 2d 301, ¶39.  Here, the 
parties' behavior under the contract provides additional support 
                                                                                                                                                             
to lease for every lease as long as the contract is in force.  
There is no need for MS Real Estate to affirmatively waive this 
right because it will not suffer any ill-effects for failure to 
do so.  Thus, if we were to read the waiver provision in Section 
2.2 as applying only to the right of first lease, the waiver 
provision would be superfluous.   
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
25 
 
for this waiver interpretation.  When the Foxes sent MS Real 
Estate notice that it had received an offer to purchase 37.4 
acres of the Fox Land on October 4, 2006, MS Real Estate 
notified the Foxes by letter that it did not wish to purchase 
the land.  Enclosed with the letter was an agreement entitled 
"Release of Parcel From Right of First Refusal."  MS Real Estate 
indicated that the enclosed agreement was a waiver of all its 
rights to the 37.4 acres under the right of first refusal 
contract.  The following January, when executing a new five year 
lease, the parties indicated, by hand written addendum, that if 
any part of the Fox Land was sold during the lease term, the 
rent would be adjusted accordingly.  This addendum also 
demonstrates that the parties intended a sale executed under the 
Right of First Refusal to Purchase provision to constitute 
waiver under the Right of First Lease provision. 
¶50 The waiver interpretation also satisfies the rule that 
we construe any ambiguities in the document against the drafting 
party. 
 
Marlowe, 
346 
Wis. 2d 450, 
¶48. 
 
A 
perpetual 
interpretation of the contract would give MS Real Estate a right 
of first lease that ran with the land.  Under the perpetual 
interpretation, MS Real Estate, the drafter of the document, 
would benefit from a perpetual right of first lease.  If we 
adopted such a reading, it would place MS Real Estate first in 
line anytime the land would be leased, giving it a clear 
advantage over any other interested third-party.  Construing the 
contract against MS Real Estate requires us to adopt the waiver 
interpretation. 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
26 
 
¶51 Finally, the right of first refusal contract at issue 
here is not a restraint on the Foxes' ability to alienate the 
property.  A restraint on alienation occurs when a property 
owner contracts not to sell the property for a specified amount 
of time.  Corbin, supra, § 11.3; see also Wis. Stat. § 700.16(2) 
(2014-15) ("The power of alienation is suspended when there are 
no persons in being who, alone or in combination with others, 
can convey an absolute fee in possession of land, or full 
ownership of personalty.").  As discussed above, where the right 
of first refusal provides for purchase on the same terms and 
conditions as the owner receives from a third party, the 
procedure for exercising the right is clear, and the time for 
exercising the option when it arises is reasonably short, its 
practical effect on alienation is de minimis.  Corbin, supra, 
§ 11.3.  If MS Real Estate desires to purchase the Fox Land, it 
must be willing to meet the terms and conditions of an offer the 
Foxes deem acceptable.  The procedure for exercising the first 
right to purchase is clear under the contract.  If the Foxes 
receive an offer they will accept, they must deliver a written 
copy of the offer to MS Real Estate.  MS Real Estate then has 15 
days to determine whether to purchase the property on those same 
terms.  We conclude that 15 days is reasonably short such that 
potential buyers will not be deterred by the possibility that 
they may not know for a lengthy period whether they will obtain 
the property. 
¶52 MS Real Estate's opportunity to exercise its right of 
first refusal is completely dependent upon the actions of the 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
27 
 
Foxes.  The Foxes hold all the cards because they are not 
required to sell or lease their land, and they may use their 
land however they wish.  They could entertain a thousand offers 
to sell or lease the Fox Land, and cast each one aside without 
consequence under the contract.  In the event an offer for sale 
or lease is made that they are willing to accept, all that is 
required is that they give MS Real Estate the opportunity to 
accept or reject the terms of the offer that they find 
acceptable.  MS Real Estate may not negotiate for more favorable 
terms.  The Foxes alone determine what offer is or is not 
acceptable.  Thus, the right of first refusal contract is not a 
restriction on alienation and continues to be enforceable. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶53 We hold that a right of first refusal contract is 
definite as to duration when it specifies an event that triggers 
the right and requires the right holder to either exercise or 
waive the right within a specified period of time thereafter, 
even 
if 
the 
triggering 
event 
is 
not 
certain 
to 
occur.  
Therefore, the right of first refusal contract at issue here is 
not terminable at will after a reasonable period of time.  
Rather, by the terms of the contract, the right of first refusal 
continues until there is a sale of the property, either to MS 
Real Estate or to a third party in the event that MS Real Estate 
declines to exercise its right of first refusal, thereby waiving 
the right.  Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
28 
 
By the Court.-The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No. 2013AP679 
   
 
 
 
1