Title: State v. Wilson
Citation: 444 P.2d 141, 74 Wash. 2d 243
Docket Number: 39760
State: Washington
Issuer: Washington Supreme Court
Date: July 25, 1968

74 Wn.2d 243 (1968) 444 P.2d 141 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. DAVIE F. WILSON, Appellant.[*] No. 39760. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. July 25, 1968. Koenigsberg, Brown &amp; Sinsheimer, W. John Sinsheimer, and Ronald J. Meltzer, for appellant. Charles O. Carroll and Robert G. Maslan, for respondent. DONWORTH, J.[] Appellant and one Hedges were charged with the crime of burglary in the second degree committed as follows: After having pleaded not guilty, appellant was tried alone on the foregoing information. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and appellant was sentenced to imprisonment in *244 a state penal institution for a maximum term of 15 years. He has appealed to this court. In the trial court appellant was represented by counsel other than the attorneys who are representing him on this appeal. Appellant's sole assignment of error is: "The court erred in not granting appellant's motion to dismiss." In the trial court the basis for his motion to dismiss (made when the state rested) was that the state had presented no evidence that appellant had broken into the Harmony Apparel Shop "with an intent to commit a crime there." In order to understand the legal problem presented, it is necessary to describe the physical arrangement of the apparel shop and Saladay Standard Drugstore which occupy adjoining space in the same store building and also to have in mind the substance of the state's evidence relating to appellant's activities with respect thereto. In his brief appellant states the substance of the state's evidence as follows: The state accepts the foregoing statement as being correct except for the following additions: State's exhibit 1 is a map which shows the portions of the building occupied by the apparel shop and the drugstore, respectively. There is no door or other means of going from one store to the other without going out of the building. Appellant's argument in the trial court and in this court is that the charge against him should have been dismissed because there was no evidence that, assuming that he broke into the apparel shop, he intended to commit a crime therein. He contended that the only evidence presented by the state in this respect tended to show that he broke into the apparel shop with intent to commit a crime in the drugstore, to wit, steal narcotics. RCW 9.19.020 defines the crime of burglary in the second degree as follows: The state having presented evidence tending to show that appellant had broken into and entered the apparel shop, the burden was upon appellant to produce evidence *246 which convinced the jury that his entry was not made with intent to commit a crime therein. This burden is cast upon him by RCW 9.19.030 which reads as follows: The first matter to be considered is the state's contention that by failing to stand on his motion to dismiss made and denied when the state rested its case at the trial and by thereafter testifying in his own behalf, appellant waived his motion to dismiss. The state in support of its position cites the recent case of State v. Mudge, 69 Wn.2d 861, 862, 420 P.2d 863 (1966) in which this court stated the applicable rule[1] as follows: In his reply brief appellant argues that he did not waive his motion to dismiss by testifying in his own defense. In support of his position he relies upon State v. Brown, 178 Wash. 588, 35 P.2d 99 (1934) in which this court recognized the existence of the rule but held that it did not *247 apply where the evidence produced by the defendant had no bearing on the merits of the case.[2] Appellant contends that his own testimony had no bearing on the merits of the case, and, therefore, the rule referred to in the above-cited case is not applicable to this case. We do not agree. He testified that he had been drinking at various taverns and bars since about 6 or 7 a.m. on January 23. Late that night he telephoned his ex-wife and asked her to come and get him. She said: "No, take the bus." Appellant then testified on direct examination: On cross-examination appellant stated that after the telephone call to his ex-wife he was waiting for the bus. He wasn't certain which bus (the police officers testified that they arrived at the location about 11:30 p.m.). He went into the front of the apparel shop. He heard noises that sounded like a banging in the rear of the store but he did not want to go back and cause any trouble. He was positive that he *248 did not go to the back of the store. He then testified as follows: Appellant was never asked about the little red Scotch plaid bag which was admitted in evidence as exhibit 5 (and a photograph thereof as exhibit 6). The police officers testified that this bag was found against the wall in the lavatory area in the apparel shop. It contained a flashlight (which was turned on), gauze bandages, an inch-wide pry bar, tape, a hatchet, sneakers, vice grips, some keys and a can of Right Guard. These two exhibits were available to the jury in their deliberations. They were also available to the trial court in drawing proper inferences (unfavorable to the moving party) in passing on the motion to dismiss made by appellant when the state first rested. [1] We have referred to the evidence in some detail because appellant's sole claim of error (to wit, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss made at the close of the state's case and not renewed thereafter) is based on an exception to the general rule that such a motion was waived by his subsequent introduction of evidence. This exception is recognized where the evidence introduced has no bearing on the merits of the cause. It is quite apparent that appellant's testimony in this case did have a bearing on the merits of the cause in several material respects. Therefore, the exception to the general rule of waiver does not apply to this case. The general rule of waiver which has been applied in 10 of our decisions cited (supra) is applicable here and thus we are precluded *249 from passing[3] upon appellant's assignment of error because it has been waived. The judgment and sentence is hereby affirmed. FINLEY, C.J., HILL, HAMILTON, and NEILL, JJ., concur. November 15, 1968. Petition for rehearing denied. [*] Reported in 444 P.2d 141. [] Judge Donworth is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution. [1] Other recent decisions bearing on this problem are Seattle v. Ruffin ante p. 16, 442 P.2d 619 (1968); State v. Nelson, 63 Wn.2d 188, 386 P.2d 142 (1963); State v. Brubaker, 62 Wn.2d 964, 385 P.2d 318 (1963); State v. Goldstein, 58 Wn.2d 155, 361 P.2d 639 (1961); State v. Thomas, 52 Wn.2d 255, 324 P.2d 821 (1958); State v. Bates, 52 Wn.2d 207, 324 P.2d 810 (1958); State v. Emerson, 43 Wn.2d 5, 259 P.2d 406 (1953); State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wn.2d 799, 259 P.2d 845 (1953); State v. Dildine, 41 Wn.2d 614, 250 P.2d 951 (1952). See also P. Trautman, Motions Testing The Sufficiency Of Evidence, 42 Wash. L. Rev. 787, 795 (1967), which indicates that State v. Mudge, 69 Wn.2d 861, 862, 420 P.2d 863 (1966) correctly states the present rule. [2] See also State v. Emerson, 43 Wn.2d 5, 259 P.2d 406 (1953) dissenting opinion. [3] Even if we were able to pass upon the assignment of error the result would be the same. The state had made a prima facie case of breaking and entering, and this, when coupled with the statutory presumption supplied by RCW 9.19.030 was sufficient to warrant the denial of appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.