Title: Binaird v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 272, 2010
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 1, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANDRE BINAIRD, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 272, 2010 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0709033236 
§   
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 20, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
November 1, 2010 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 1st day of November 2010, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief, the State’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears 
to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
In March 2008, a Superior Court jury convicted the defendant-
appellant, Andre Binaird, of second degree assault, possession of a deadly 
weapon during the commission of a felony, first degree criminal trespass (as 
a lesser included offense to the indicted charge of second degree burglary), 
criminal mischief, and noncompliance with the conditions of bond. The 
Superior Court found Binaird to be a habitual offender and sentenced him on 
the second degree assault charge to eight years at Level V incarceration.  On 
 
2 
the remaining convictions, the Superior Court sentenced him to a total 
period of eight years and sixty days at Level V incarceration to be suspended 
after serving seven years for probation.  This Court affirmed Binaird’s 
conviction on direct appeal.1 Thereafter, Binaird filed a petition for 
postconviction relief, which the Superior Court denied.  This appeal ensued.   
(2) 
In his opening brief on appeal, Binaird raises multiple claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  He contends that his trial counsel was 
ineffective because he failed to: (i) conduct a DNA analysis of blood found 
on a knife used during the assault on the victim; (ii) object to the prejudicial 
joinder of Binaird’s criminal offenses; (iii) object to the prosecutor’s contact 
with one of the jurors; (iv) object to the State’s interjection of race as an 
issue in the case; (v)  object to the State’ failure to preserve evidence; and 
(vi) object to the trial court’s submission of a second degree burglary charge 
to the jury.  He also alleges that his counsel was ineffective on appeal for 
failing to argue that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction 
for second degree assault.  Finally, Binaird asserts that the trial court abused 
its discretion in failing to act on his pro se motion for a judgment of 
acquittal.  With respect to this last issue, we note that Binaird’s argument is 
factually incorrect.  The Superior Court, in fact, denied his pro se motion for 
                                                 
1 Binaird v. State, 967 A.2d 1256 (Del. 2009). 
 
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judgment of acquittal on April 30, 2008.  Accordingly, we find no merit to 
his claim. 
(3) 
With respect to his remaining claims alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel, in order to establish such a claim, Binaird must show 
that: (a) his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness; and (b) there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have 
been different.2  There is a strong presumption that counsel’s representation 
was professionally reasonable.3 
(4) 
Having carefully considered the parties= briefs and the record on 
appeal, we find it manifest that the judgment below should be affirmed on 
the basis of the Superior Court=s well-reasoned decision dated April 26, 
2010.  The record reflects that the Superior Court carefully reviewed each of 
Binaird’s claims concerning his counsel’s allegedly deficient performance.  
We find no error in the Superior Court’s conclusion that Binaird’s claims of 
ineffective assistance were unsupported by the record and, thus, legally 
insufficient to establish that his counsel’s performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and was prejudicial.4   
                                                 
2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
3 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753-54 (Del. 1990). 
4 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Justice