Title: Beasley v. Poellnitz
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1110353
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 30, 2014

Following appellate mediation, this case was assigned to
1
Justice Main on July 24, 2013.
Rel: 05/30/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
_________________________
1110353
_________________________
Mary Leila Beasley Schaeffer and the Estate of Emma Glass
Beasley
v.
William M. Poellnitz, as administrator of the Estate of
Edwin G. Young, deceased, et al.
Appeal from Perry Circuit Court
(CV-05-40)
MAIN, Justice.1
Mary Leila Beasley Schaeffer and the estate of Emma Glass
Beasley (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Beasley
1110353
Emma and Lyle had a brother who was killed in World War
2
II.  At the time of his death, he was not married and did not
have any children.
2
branch") appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict,
awarding 
compensatory 
damages and punitive 
damages on
mismanagement-of-trust and conversion claims in an action by
William M. Poellnitz, as administrator of the estate of Edwin
Glass Young, deceased, Adele Young Sommers, and Willard P.
Young (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Young
branch").  We affirm in part and we reverse in part and
render a judgment for the Beasley branch on certain of the
Young branch's claims.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
This case involves the management of a family trust, the
Westwood Management Trust ("the Trust"); the disposition of
personal property after the death of a family member, Edwin
Glass Young ("Eddie"); and claims of moneys owed between
family members.  The corpus of the Trust consists of family
farmland, called Westwood ("Westwood"), located in Uniontown,
Perry County, comprising 541 acres, and an antebellum house
situated on Westwood.  Two sisters, Emma Glass Beasley
("Emma") and Lyle Glass Young ("Lyle"),  inherited Westwood,
2
1110353
Mary Leila Beasley Schaeffer had one son, Kurt, who died
3
in an automobile accident in June 2008.  Kurt had one child,
a daughter, Juliet Alexandra Schaeffer, who was six years old
at the time of trial and who was living with her mother in
Kansas.
Emma's husband, James Samuel Beasley, Jr., died around
4
1950.
3
including the house, as well as two adjoining properties
called Shields, consisting of 329 acres ("the Shields
property"), and Davidson, consisting of 598 acres ("the
Davidson property"), from their parents, Julius Franklin Glass
and Adele Davidson Ellis Glass, who died in 1964 and 1988,
respectively.  Emma had two daughters, Ellis Beasley Long
("Ellis") and Mary Leila Beasley Schaeffer ("Mary").   Lyle
3
had three children, Eddie, who died in 2005, Willard P. Young
("Billy"), and Adele Young Sommers ("Adele").
Members of the Beasley branch and the Young branch have
resided at Westwood sporadically throughout the years.  In
particular, in the 1940s, Emma, along with her two daughters,
Ellis and Mary, and Emma's sister, Lyle, along with her
children, Eddie, Billy, and Adele, lived at Westwood.  In
1951, Emma, Ellis, and Mary moved to Houston, Texas, while
various members of the Young branch continued to reside at
Westwood.   
4
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4
In August 1964, Billy left Westwood to enter college, and
he never returned to live at Westwood.  In the mid 1960s, Mary
and Ellis returned to Westwood and managed the family farms,
the primary product of which was cotton, and ran the cotton
gin on the property while their mother, Emma, remained in
Texas to care for her mother and her sister, Lyle, who both
had moved to Texas to live with her.  Eddie assisted his
cousins, Mary and Ellis, in running the cotton gin in 1969 and
1970 before he married and moved to Louisiana.  Adele moved
from Westwood around 1970 and did not return.  
Lyle, who had moved to Texas to live with Emma in 1968,
developed substantial medical problems while there that
prevented her from working.  Emma cared for Lyle while she
lived with her.  Lyle's children did not assist with their
mother's care.
Lyle's children visited her infrequently while she was
living in Texas with Emma.  During the time Lyle lived in
Texas -- from 1968 until her death in 1996 -- Eddie lived in
Louisiana until 1993, when he returned to Alabama; Billy lived
in California, where he had resided since 1972; and, Adele,
after leaving Westwood around 1970, lived in Texas for a brief
1110353
5
period, where she completed high school and some college, and
subsequently moved to Florida.
In December 1995, Emma employed an attorney in Texas to
draft the Trust.  The primary purpose of the Trust was to
protect, maintain, and provide for Emma and Lyle during their
lifetimes.  The Trust instrument provided that Emma's and
Lyle's children held a beneficiary interest in the corpus of
the Trust, contingent upon the death of both Emma and Lyle.
Emma's and Lyle's children would receive distributions,
following the deaths of both Emma and Lyle, only if there was
sufficient net income each fiscal year to make proper
distributions.  Emma was named the trustee of the Trust.  On
December 21, 1995, Emma and Lyle executed the Trust
instrument.  That same day, Emma and Lyle deeded Westwood,
including the house, to the Trust.  Lyle died in June 1996.
Lyle's will provided that all of her assets were devised to
her 3 children -- Eddie, Billy, and Adele. 
In May 1996, before Lyle's death, Billy initiated a
partition-of-land lawsuit in Marengo County concerning the
Shields property and the Davidson property.  In January 1998,
the Beasley branch and the Young branch entered into a
1110353
6
mediated settlement agreement.  The Shields property and the
Davidson property were reapportioned and both the Beasley
branch and the Young branch received 433 acres of land.  At
that time, the Young branch agreed to reimburse the Beasley
branch $28,000 incurred for the caretaking of their mother,
Lyle, upon the sale of their portion of the land.
Eddie, who had returned to Uniontown from Louisiana
around 1993, lived at the Westwood house for a short period in
1995 before moving to the cotton-gin office, where he remained
until he died there on February 3, 2005.  While Eddie was
living in Uniontown from 1993 until his death in 2005, he did
not pay rent but performed various tasks on and for Westwood.
Eddie's body was removed from the cotton-gin office on
February 5, 2005.  Because the cotton-gin office had been
burglarized on several occasions, Mary locked the cotton-gin
office after Eddie's body was removed.  
The day after Eddie's body was removed, Mary, who had
moved back into the Westwood house in 1999 with her mother,
Emma, inventoried the items in the cotton-gin office and took
them to Westwood.  That same day, Mary made arrangements for
Eddie's funeral and paid the initial $3,000.  Eddie's funeral
1110353
7
expenses totaled $8,966.  Although Adele agreed to be
responsible for the costs of Eddie's funeral, Adele never paid
any portion of those costs.  Mary and Emma paid the remaining
funeral expenses, and the funeral home assigned to Mary its
claim against Eddie's estate for those expenses.
 
In May 2005, Poellnitz informed Mary that he had been
appointed administrator of Eddie's estate, and he requested a
time when he could take possession of Eddie's personal items.
Mary delivered the items to Poellnitz's office.  When
Poellnitz filed the complaint in this matter, he claimed that
several guns, numerous tools, furniture, china, sterling
silver, antique fly-fishing rods, and a gas grill belonging to
Eddie remained in Mary's possession.  The complaint alleged
that the items had an approximate value of $25,000.
Mary responded in detail regarding the items Poellnitz
claimed belonged to Eddie.  Mary stated, in the alternative,
that the items were not at Westwood; that they had been paid
for by, and belonged to, Westwood; or that the items had
previously been stolen from the cotton-gin office.  At trial,
Mary testified that, after this action was filed in May 2005,
she had been instructed by her attorney not to return any of
1110353
8
the items still in her possession until the issues could be
resolved in the litigation.
In addition to the items that Emma and Mary had removed
from the cotton-gin office, Eddie had furniture at the
Westwood house that had been left there by him. After Eddie
died, according to Mary, Poellnitz agreed that the Beasley
branch could purchase the furniture for an agreed-upon price
of $1,000.  Because Eddie's estate owed the Beasley branch
quite a bit of money, Mary agreed to give a $1,000 credit
against the debt owed in exchange for the furniture.
On May 13, 2005, the Young branch sued Emma, individually
and as trustee, and Mary, individually, alleging conversion of
Eddie's personal property and demanding an accounting of the
Trust.  The Beasley branch answered the complaint and denied
the allegations.  The Beasley branch filed a counterclaim
seeking recovery on assorted debts totaling $79,395 allegedly
owed by the Young branch to the Beasley branch and attaching
various 
documents 
evidencing 
those 
debts. 
 
In 
its
counterclaim, the Beasley branch also named Veronica Young,
Billy's wife, as a counterclaim defendant, alleging that
1110353
Ellis filed a motion for substitution after she was
5
appointed personal representative.  The trial court entered an
order granting Ellis's motion for substitution.
9
certain sums were owed to the Beasley branch and the Trust by
both Billy and Veronica.
The Young branch then amended its complaint, alleging, in
addition to another claim not relevant to this appeal,
mismanagement of the Trust by the trustee, Emma, and seeking
a one-half interest in the furnishings and other family
heirlooms 
in 
the 
Westwood 
house, 
and 
answered 
the
counterclaim, generally denying the allegations and asserting
affirmative defenses. The Young branch filed a second amended
complaint, 
seeking, 
among 
other 
things, 
an 
award 
of
compensatory and punitive damages under theories of conversion
and mismanagement of the Trust.  The Beasley branch filed a
motion to dismiss, which was denied.
 Ellis returned to Westwood in September 2008, while the
litigation was pending.  Emma, the trustee, died on June 12,
2010.  Ellis was named personal representative of Emma's
estate.   Mary and Adele became cotrustees of the Trust
5
pursuant to the Trust instrument.  
1110353
The Beasley 
branch's 
counterclaim 
alleged 
a 
claim 
against
6
Billy's wife, Veronica, for money loaned.
10
The case was eventually tried before a jury from May 25
to June 2, 2011, on the Young branch's mismanagement-of-trust
and conversion claims, as well as their claims for an
accounting and for an award of a one-half interest in the
furnishings and other heirlooms in the Westwood house.  The
jury also considered the Beasley branch's counterclaims
against the Young branch for various money loaned to the Young
branch.  The jury jointly awarded the Young branch $63,915.18
against Emma's estate and Mary on the claim alleging
mismanagement of the Trust.  The jury awarded the Young branch
$3,645 on its claim of conversion of Eddie's property.  The
jury jointly awarded the Young branch one-half of the
furnishings and heirlooms in the Westwood house, which the
jury valued at $172,000 in total.  On the counterclaims the
jury exonerated Adele and Eddie's estate but awarded jointly
to Emma's estate and Mary $8,043.48 against Billy and an
additional $8,043.48 against his wife, Veronica.   The jury
6
also returned a verdict in favor of the Young branch on their
claims for punitive damages, awarding $200,000 to each of
1110353
The Beasley branch filed a motion to vacate the trial
7
court's appointment of Mackey as trustee, arguing that the
Trust expressly listed Emma's daughter, Ellis, as successor
trustee in a scenario such as this one.  The trial court later
granted the motion to vacate in light of an agreement of the
parties, following a temporary remand by this Court for the
purpose of giving the trial court jurisdiction.
11
Eddie's estate, Billy, and Adele and assessing those amounts
collectively against the Beasley branch.
On June 5, 2011, the trial court removed Mary and Adele
as cotrustees of the Trust and removed Poellnitz as the
administrator of Eddie's estate.  On June 14, 2011, the trial
court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict.  The Beasley
branch filed postjudgment motions.  On August 22, 2011, the
trial court appointed William Mackey as both administrator of
Eddie's estate and trustee of the Trust.   On September 7,
7
2011, the Beasley branch filed motions for a judgment as a
matter of law ("JML"), a new trial, or a remittitur, which the
trial court denied.  In its November 23, 2011, postjudgment
order, however, the trial court amended the jury's punitive-
damages award to assess $100,000 on behalf of each of Eddie's
estate, Billy, and Adele against Emma's estate, and $100,000
on behalf of each of Eddie's estate, Billy, and Adele against
Mary.  The Beasley branch appealed. 
1110353
12
II. Standards of Review
A. Motion for a JML
"When reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML,
this Court uses the same standard the trial court 
used initially in deciding whether to grant or deny
the motion for a JML.  Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v.
Crawford, 689 So. 2d 3 (Ala. 1997).  Regarding
questions of fact, the ultimate question is whether
the nonmovant has presented sufficient evidence to
allow the case to be submitted to the jury for a
factual resolution.  Carter v. Henderson, 598 So. 2d
1350 (Ala. 1992).  The nonmovant must have presented
substantial evidence in order to withstand a motion
for a JML.  See § 12-21-12, Ala. Code 1975; West v.
Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d
870, 871 (Ala. 1989).  A reviewing court must
determine whether the party who bears the burden of
proof has produced substantial evidence creating a
factual dispute requiring resolution by the jury.
Carter, 598 So. 2d at 1353.  In reviewing a ruling
on a motion for a JML, this Court views the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and
entertains such reasonable inferences as the jury
would have been free to draw.  Id.  Regarding a
question of law, however, this Court indulges no
presumption of correctness as to the trial court's
ruling.  Ricwil, Inc. v. S.L. Pappas & Co., 599 So.
2d 1126 (Ala. 1992)."  
Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors Life Ins. Co., 875
So. 2d 1143, 1152 (Ala. 2003).
B. Motion for a New Trial
"'"It is well established that a
ruling on a motion for a new
trial rests within the sound
discretion of the trial judge.
1110353
13
The exercise of that discretion
carries with it a presumption of
correctness, which will not be
disturbed by this Court unless
some legal right is abused and
the record plainly and palpably
shows the trial judge to be in
error."'
"Curtis v. Faulkner Univ., 575 So. 2d 1064, 1065-66
(Ala. 1991) (quoting Kane v. Edward J. Woerner &
Sons, Inc., 543 So. 2d 693, 694 (Ala. 1989), quoting
in turn Hill v. Sherwood, 488 So. 2d 1357, 1359
(1986))."
Baptist Med. Ctr. Montclair v. Whitfield, 950 So. 2d 1121,
1125-26 (Ala. 2006). 
C.  Punitive Damages
 This Court "review[s] the trial court's award of
punitive damages de novo, with no presumption of correctness."
Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 867 So. 2d 307, 309 (Ala.
2003) (citing Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Brown, 832 So. 2d 1, 24
(Ala. 2001)). See also § 6–11–23, Ala. Code 1975 ("No
presumption of correctness shall apply as to the amount of
punitive damages awarded by the trier of the fact.").
III.  Analysis
The Beasley branch essentially presents five issues on
appeal.  First, the Beasley branch argues that it is entitled
to a JML on the mismanagement-of-trust claim.  Second, the
1110353
14
Beasley branch argues that it is entitled to a JML on the
conversion claim.  Third, as to the punitive damages, the
Beasley branch argues that punitive damages were not
warranted.  Alternatively, the Beasley branch argues that the
trial court improperly apportioned the punitive damages.
Regardless, it says, the punitive damages are excessive and
the award must be vacated or remitted.  Fourth, the Beasley
branch argues that it is entitled to a JML on the Young
branch's claim to a one-half ownership interest in the
furnishings and heirlooms at Westwood or to a reduction of the
value of those furnishings and heirlooms.  Last, the Beasley
branch argues that it was entitled to a JML on all of its
counterclaims for moneys loaned to the Young branch.  As part
of its argument on its counterclaims, the Beasley branch
complains that the trial court cannot undo the Marengo County
judgment in the amount of $28,000.  We consider these in turn.
A.  Mismanagement of the Trust
Typically, a mismanagement-of-trust claim requires the
beneficiaries to produce evidence "showing what [the trustee]
should have done, how [the trustee] failed to do so, and how
any such failure proximately caused damage to the trust and in
1110353
The parties agree that Texas trust law was applicable to
8
the issues in this matter relating to the Trust.
15
what amount."  See Regions Bank v. Lowery, 101 So. 3d 210,
213-14 (Ala. 2012).  However, in this case, the Trust
instrument, which provides that it is governed by Texas law,8
directed that "[t]he Trustee be saved harmless from any
liability for any action which such Trustee may take, or for
the failure of such Trustee to take any action, if done in
good faith and without gross negligence."  Consequently, the
Young branch had to prove gross negligence on the part of the
trustee.  Gross negligence was defined at trial as "the
intentional failure to perform a manifested duty in reckless
disregard of the consequences as affecting the life and
property of another."  See, e.g., U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v.
Waldrip, 380 S.W. 2d 118, 137-38 (Tex. 2012); Merchants' Bank
of Mobile v. Zadek, 84 So. 715, 717 (Ala. 1919).
Emma's estate and Mary first argue that the trial court
erred when it denied their motions for a JML because, they
say, the Young branch failed to prove gross negligence.  The
Young branch had alleged that it did not receive substantial
distributions from the Trust or accountings and that those
failures represented gross negligence.  The Young branch had
1110353
16
also criticized trust-related payments shown in the Trust's
financial statements and had alleged that the trustee
improperly commingled funds.
The evidence showed that Emma served as trustee until her
death in June 2010.  Mary served as the bookkeeper for the
Trust at Emma's direction.  Mary subsequently served as
cotrustee with Adele after Emma died and until she and Adele
were removed as cotrustees by the trial court.  
As to the mismanagement-of-trust claim against Mary,
based on the record before us, we conclude that there is no
evidence of mismanagement of the Trust by Mary for the limited
time she served as cotrustee with Adele.  All the evidence at
trial concerned the time Emma served as the trustee.
Consequently, we conclude that, as a matter of law, the Young
branch's mismanagement-of-trust claim against Mary should not
have been submitted to the jury.  Mary was entitled to a JML
as to that claim. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's
judgment against Mary on the mismanagement-of-trust claim and
render a judgment in her favor on that claim.
 
Next, we turn to the mismanagement-of-trust claim against
Emma.  First, regarding distributions from the Trust, the
1110353
17
Trust instrument directed Emma to distribute income from
Lyle's share, after Lyle's death in 1996, yearly to Eddie,
Billy, and Adele in equal thirds.  However, the Trust
explicitly provided that the distributions depended upon
whether there was any income remaining in that particular year
after payment of trust-related expenses.  The evidence failed
to demonstrate that there was any income left to distribute to
the beneficiaries of the Trust after the expenses were paid.
Instead, 
the 
evidence 
showed 
that 
Emma 
actually 
put
substantial amounts of her own money into the Trust to keep
Westwood operational.  Accordingly, there was no evidence
indicating that Emma acted with gross negligence in declining
to make any distributions from the Trust to the Young branch.
Second, as to accountings, the evidence showed that
yearly accounting statements showing income and expenses of
the Trust were prepared every year and were sent to the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") with the yearly tax returns
for the Trust.  In addition, Eddie, Billy, and Adele were
provided with annual statements from the Trust to use in
preparing their personal tax returns.  The evidence also
indicated that the Young branch never requested additional
1110353
18
accountings.  We cannot conclude, on the record before us,
that there was any evidence of gross negligence with regard to
the yearly accountings that Emma provided the Young branch.
Third, 
regarding 
improper 
non-trust-related 
expenses, 
the
Young branch again failed to provide evidence supporting its
claim.  The accounting records do not demonstrate that money
from the Trust was spent for improper, non-trust-related
purposes.  Instead, Mary's testimony indicated that she kept
detailed records, and she explained every expense.
Similarly, as to the allegations of commingling, although
Emma used one business account for both the Trust and her
personal business activities, that same account was used
before the Trust was established to manage both Emma's
personal property and the family properties.  There was no
evidence indicating that this practice in any way harmed the
Trust or diminished the corpus of the Trust.  Instead, the
Trust funds were always accounted for separately and were
traceable in the Trust record books.  Accordingly, there is no
evidence indicating that Emma acted with gross negligence in
continuing this long-standing family practice of using one
account for various properties.
1110353
19
We conclude that the Young branch failed to present
sufficient evidence showing that Emma mismanaged the Trust.
Because 
the 
evidence 
does 
not 
support 
a 
finding 
of
mismanagement of the Trust, the trial court erred in denying
the motion for a JML filed by Emma's estate as to the Young
branch's mismanagement-of-trust claim.  Therefore, that claim
should not have been submitted to the jury, and the trial
court's order denying Emma's estate's motion for a JML is due
to be reversed.  We reverse the trial court's judgment on the
mismanagement-of-trust claim and render a judgment in favor of
Emma's estate. 
B.  Conversion
For a conversion claim to stand, 
"'there must be a wrongful taking or a wrongful
detention or interference, an illegal assumption of
ownership, or an illegal use or misuse of another's
property.  Covington v. Exxon Co. U.S.A., 551 So. 2d
935, 938 (Ala. 1989).  "The gist of the action is
the wrongful exercise of dominion over property in
exclusion or defiance of a plaintiff's rights, where
said plaintiff has general or special title to the
property or the immediate right to possession."  Ott
v. Fox, 362 So. 2d 836 (Ala. 1978) (emphasis
added).'"
Horne v. TGM Assocs., L.P., 56 So. 3d 615, 628 (Ala. 2010)
(quoting Baxter v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, 584 So. 2d 801,
1110353
20
804–05 (Ala. 1991)).  See Ex parte Anderson, 867 So. 2d 1125,
1129 (Ala. 2003).  Further, "[a] plaintiff must establish that
the defendant converted specific personal property to his own
use and beneficial enjoyment or that the defendant destroyed
or exercised dominion over property to which, at the time of
the conversion, the plaintiff had a general or specific title
and of which the plaintiff was in actual possession or to
which he was entitled to immediate possession."  Rice v.
Birmingham Coal & Coke Co., 608 So. 2d 713, 714 (Ala. 1992).
The conversion claim was brought on behalf of Eddie's
estate concerning Eddie's personal property located at the
cotton-gin office, where he lived before he died, and some
furniture located in the Westwood house.  The jury returned a
verdict against the Beasley branch, both Emma's estate and
Mary, for $3,645 in compensatory damages.  Initially, based on
the record before us, we must conclude that there was no
evidence indicating that Emma converted Eddie's personal
property.  Instead, the evidence showed that only Mary was
involved in the disposition of Eddie's personal property.
Consequently, the Young branch failed to present evidence from
which a jury could find that Emma had converted Eddie's
1110353
21
property.  Because the evidence does not support a finding of
conversion against Emma, the trial court erred in denying the
motion for a JML filed by Emma's estate as to the conversion
claim against her.  Therefore, the conversion claim against
Emma's estate should not have been submitted to the jury, and
the trial court's order denying the motion for a JML as to
Emma's estate is due to be reversed.  We therefore render a
judgment in favor of Emma's estate on the conversion claim.
We, however, must consider the conversion claim as to
Mary.  Mary argues that the trial court erred in denying a JML
on the conversion claim as to her because, she says, her
refusal to surrender Eddie's personal property was reasonable
and qualified.  Whether there is a reasonable qualified
refusal to surrender personal property presents a jury
question.  White v. Drivas, 954 So. 2d 1119, 1124 (Ala. Civ.
App 2006).  See Gabrielson v. Healthcorp of Eufaula, Inc., 628
So. 2d 411, 414 (Ala. 1993).  In this case, there was
sufficient evidence from which a jury could have found that
Mary had converted Eddie's personal property.  Thus, the trial
court properly submitted the conversion claim as to Mary to
the jury.  The jury rejected the qualified-refusal argument
1110353
22
and returned a verdict in the amount of $3,645.  Because the
compensatory-damages award was joint and several in nature and
because there is sufficient evidence indicating that Mary
converted Eddie's personal property to support the jury
verdict, we affirm the judgment on the conversion claim
against Mary.
C. Punitive Damages
Because we conclude that the trial court erred in denying
the Beasley branch's motions for a JML on the mismanagement-
of-trust claim, we reverse the award of punitive damages on
that claim.  Thus, we need only consider whether the punitive
damages can stand against Mary on the conversion claim.  We
conclude that we must reverse the punitive-damages award
against Mary on the conversion claim. 
"Conversion is an intentional tort."  Johnson v.
Northpointe Apartments, 744 So. 2d 899, 904 (Ala. 1999).
"Intentional torts ordinarily carry punitive damages, if the
jury chooses to award them."  Tillis Trucking Co. v. Moses,
748 So. 2d 874, 887 n. 12 (Ala. 1999).  "Punitive damages are
recoverable in a conversion case when the evidence shows legal
malice, 
willfulness, 
insult, 
or 
other 
aggravating
1110353
23
circumstances."  Schwertfeger v. Moorehouse, 569 So. 2d 322,
324 (Ala. 1990).  See Ex parte Norwood Hodges Motor Co., 680
So. 2d 245, 249 (Ala. 1996).
To warrant punitive damages under the conversion claim,
the Young branch must present clear and convincing evidence
indicating that Mary "consciously or deliberately engaged in
oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard" to the
Young branch, § 6–11–20(b)(1), Ala. Code 1975. There is no
clear and convincing evidence indicating that Mary possessed
such intent or knowledge.  Therefore, there was no basis for
an award of punitive damages on the conversion claim.  We,
therefore, reverse the judgment awarding punitive damages to
the Young branch on the mismanagement-of-trust claim and the
conversion claim.
D.  Furnishings and Heirlooms in Westwood House
The Beasley branch argues that the Westwood furnishings
and heirlooms were a part of the Trust, as was the house
itself, and, it says, it was entitled to a JML on the Young
branch's claim to one-half of the furnishings and heirlooms in
the Westwood house.  The Beasley branch also argues that the
1110353
24
jury's assessment of the value of the furnishings and
heirlooms based upon an appraisal was in error. 
Our review of the record indicates that all evidence as
to ownership of the furnishings and heirlooms in the Westwood
house proved that the Young branch -- Eddie's estate, Billy,
and Adele -- had an undivided one-half interest in the
furnishings and heirlooms at Westwood.  The record does not
show that the furnishings and heirlooms of Westwood were part
of the Trust.  Instead, the Young branch received, under
Lyle's will, a one-half undivided interest in the furniture,
furnishings, and personal property in the Westwood house.
Regardless, assuming without deciding that the furnishings and
heirlooms were a part of the Trust, the Young branch was
entitled to a distribution of their share upon the death of
the remaining trust beneficiary, Emma, in June 2010.
In this case, the jury determined that the Young branch
had a one-half interest in the furniture, furnishings, jewels,
portraits, and personal items.  The jury also determined that
the total value of the personal property at Westwood was
$172,000.  The jury heard testimony from a number of experts
concerning the value and uniqueness of the personal property
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25
and received into evidence an appraisal.  Therefore, we affirm
the trial court's judgment on the jury's verdict in that
regard.
E.  Counterclaims for Money Loaned
The Beasley branch presented counterclaims against
Eddie's estate, Billy, and Adele, as well as a claim against
Veronica, Billy's wife.  At trial, the Beasley branch
submitted documents and exhibits to support its claims.
Specifically, the Beasley branch claimed that Eddie's estate
owed 
the 
Beasley 
branch 
$28,304.06, 
that 
Billy 
owed
$67,331.92, and that Adele owed $5,317.97.  The Beasley branch
claimed that Veronica owed a portion of the amount owed by her
husband, Billy.  The Beasley branch argued that these amounts
included the judgment in the amount of $28,000 resulting from
the 1998 suit for partition filed by Billy in Marengo County.
The jury reviewed and considered the documents submitted by
the Beasley branch and entered a $0 verdict on the
counterclaims against Eddie's estate and Adele.  On the
counterclaims against Billy and Veronica, the jury entered a
verdict of $8,043.48 against Billy and $8,043.48 against
Veronica. 
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26
The Beasley branch argues that the jury's verdict on its
counterclaims did not nullify the $28,000 Marengo County
judgment against the Young branch.  The Beasley branch also
argues that it was entitled to a JML in its favor on its
counterclaims for money loaned to the Young branch.
The Beasley branch's argument, however, ignores the fact
that the jury had before it documents and exhibits supporting
its claims, including the Marengo County judgment in the
amount of $28,000.  The Beasley branch cannot now complain
that it was error for the jury to consider the $28,000
judgment.  "A jury's verdict is presumed correct, and that
presumption is strengthened by the trial court's denial of a
motion for a new trial. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Goodman, 789
So. 2d 166 (Ala. 2000)."  Cochran v. Ward, 935 So. 2d 1169,
1176 (Ala. 2006).  Further, our review of the record
indicates that the jury considered in detail the counterclaims
for money loaned.  Consequently, we affirm the trial court's
judgment on the jury verdict on the Beasley branch's
counterclaims.
IV.  Conclusion
The trial court erred in denying the Beasley branch's
motions for a JML as to the mismanagement-of-trust claim.  We,
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27
therefore, reverse the judgment as to the mismanagement-of-
trust claim and render a judgment in favor of Emma's estate
and Mary on that claim.  Because the trial court should have
granted the Beasley branch's motions for a JML on the
mismanagement-of-trust claim, we reverse that portion of the
judgment awarding punitive damages on the jury's finding of
mismanagement of trust.
The trial court also erred in denying the motion for a
JML filed by Emma's estate as to the conversion claim.  We,
therefore, reverse the judgment as to the conversion claim
against Emma's estate and render a judgment in favor of Emma's
estate on that claim.  We affirm the judgment as to the
conversion claim against Mary, including the amount of the
compensatory damages awarded the Young branch on that claim.
However, because there is no clear and convincing evidence
that Mary "consciously and deliberately engaged in oppression,
fraud, wantonness, or malice," we reverse the trial court's
judgment insofar as it awarded punitive damages on the
conversion claim against Mary, as well as against Emma's
estate.  We affirm the judgment as to the Young branch's one-
half interest in the furnishings and heirlooms in the Westwood
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28
house and on the Beasley branch's counterclaims for money
loaned.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND JUDGMENT
RENDERED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur.  
Moore, C.J., and Murdock, J., concur specially.
1110353
29
MOORE, Chief Justice (concurring specially).
I concur fully with the main opinion. I write specially
to point out that even were the plaintiffs -- the Young branch
-- entitled to a judgment in their favor on the mismanagement-
of-trust claim, the punitive-damages award would still be
subject to reversal. 
I. The jury's failure to apportion punitive damages
Because an appellate court reviews a punitive-damages
award de novo, no deference is given to a judgment imposing
such an award. 
"(a) On appeal, no presumption of correctness
shall apply to the amount of punitive damages
awarded.
"(b) The appellate court shall independently
reassess the nature, extent and economic impact of
such an award and reduce or increase the award if
appropriate in light of all the evidence."
§ 6-11-24, Ala. Code 1975. See also § 6-11-21(i), Ala. Code
1975 (noting the duty of the appellate courts "to scrutinize
all punitive damage awards, ensure that all punitive damage
awards comply with applicable procedural, evidentiary, and
constitutional requirements, and to order remittitur where
appropriate"). Further, "no defendant shall be liable for any
punitive damages unless that defendant has been expressly
1110353
30
found by the trier of fact to have engaged in conduct ...
warranting punitive damages, and such defendant shall be
liable only for punitive damages commensurate with that
defendant's own conduct." § 6-11-21(e), Ala. Code 1975.
Citing § 6-11-21(e), a leading treatise on damages
states: "The jury must apportion punitive damages against the
defendants based on culpability of conduct." Jenelle Mims
Marsh, Alabama Law of Damages § 4.3 (6th ed. 2012) (emphasis
added). Elaborating on § 6-11-21(e), the treatise further
states: "Joint tortfeasors are not jointly and severally
liable for an award of punitive damages. By statute, a
defendant is liable 'only for punitive damages commensurate
with the defendant's own conduct.' Thus, the trial court fact
finder must apportion punitive damages among the joint
tortfeasors." Id. § 4.7 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
This Court has stated the principle as follows: "Under the
pertinent provisions of the Alabama Code, as amended in 1999,
a defendant is liable 'only for punitive damages commensurate
with that defendant's own conduct' -- that is, joint
tortfeasors are not jointly and severally liable for an award
of punitive damages." Boles v. Parris, 952 So. 2d 364, 366
(Ala. 2006) (citing § 6-11-21(e)).  See also BMW of North
1110353
Wrongful-death actions are the sole exception. Boles v.
9
Parris, 952 So. 2d at 366-69.
31
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) ("Perhaps the
most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive
damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct." (emphasis added)).
Under the common principle stated in statute, caselaw,
and the relevant treatise quoted above, a judgment awarding
punitive damages that does not apportion those damages
individually against each defendant must be vacated as
contrary to law.  In this case the jury awarded $200,000 in
9
punitive damages to each member of the Young branch but did
not apportion those awards against the defendants -- the
Beasley branch -- individually. Because the jury did  not
expressly allocate the award of punitive damages according to
the particular degree of liability of each member of the
Beasley branch, the punitive-damages verdict was contrary to
law.
II. The trial court's improper rewriting of the verdict
In its postjudgment order, the trial court, styling its
action a remittitur, apportioned the punitive-damages verdict
to assess $300,000 to each defendant: "The Court hereby
1110353
A remittitur may be made only in the context of
10
considering a motion for a new trial. "The court may, on
motion for new trial, require a remittitur as a condition to
the overruling of the motion for new trial ...." Rule 59(f),
Ala. R. Civ. P. In its postjudgment order the court does not
mention the term "new trial," nor does it state that the Young
branch must accept the "remittitur" or face a new trial. 
32
modifies or clarifies said Judgment resulting in a remittitur
or diminution in the punitive damages arguably assessed
against each Defendant ...." The Court further explained that
its recharacterization of the verdict would make each
defendant liable for only $300,000 rather than the entire
$600,00 under the jury's unapportioned verdict. "By this
modification or remittitur, each Defendant owes One Hundred
Thousand and No/100s ($100,000.00) Dollars in punitive damages
to each Plaintiff, and is liable for only a total of Three
Hundred Thousand and No/100s ($300,000.00) Dollars in punitive
damages." The court, though styling its action a remittitur,
did not actually reduce the punitive-damages verdict, which
still remained at $600,000. Thus, its action was not a
remittitur 
of 
the 
punitive-damages 
award,
 
only 
a
10
reapportionment of the verdict to eliminate joint and several
liability.
A trial court may not rewrite a verdict to change its
substance. 
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33
"It has long been settled that a court's right
to amend a jury verdict after discharge of the jury
is limited to matters of form or clerical errors
which are apparent by the record and does not extend
to matters of substance required to be passed upon
by the jury."
Alexiou v. Christu, 285 Ala. 346, 349, 232 So. 2d 595, 597
(1970). "If the court should aid the verdict of the jury which
is faulty as to substance, without the consent and concurrence
of the jury, it would then become not the verdict of the jury,
but of the court." W.T. Rawleigh Co. v. Hannon, 32 Ala. App.
147, 149, 22 So. 2d 603, 604 (1945).
Although Rule 60(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., permits a trial
court to correct clerical errors, "the Rule 60(a) motion can
only be used to make the judgment or record speak the truth
and cannot be used to make it say something other than what
was originally pronounced." Committee Comments to Rule 60(a).
By changing the jury's pronouncement from joint and several
liability to individual liability, the trial court, even if
presumed to have acted sua sponte under Rule 60(a), exceeded
its authority. By calling its rewriting of the verdict a
remittitur, the trial court admitted that it was changing the
verdict. However, because its change was not in fact a
remittitur, the alteration of the verdict "extend[ed] to
1110353
Again, wrongful-death actions are an exception. § 6-5-
11
462, Ala. Code 1975.
34
matters of substance required to be passed upon by a jury."
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Sealy, 374 So. 2d 877, 883 (Ala.
1979). Because, "[u]pon demand of a jury trial, the plaintiff
was entitled to have his cause adjudicated by a jury verdict,"
Hood v. Ham, 342 So. 2d 1317, 1318 (Ala. 1977), the trial
court had no power "to render a different decree." Great Atl.
& Pac. Tea Co., 374 So. 2d at 883. 
III. Effect of Emma's death on the punitive-damages verdict
Emma died in June 2010; judgment was rendered a year
later in June 2011. "In almost all jurisdictions, it is held
that punitive damages may not be awarded against the estate of
a wrongdoer who has died prior to the entry of judgment."
Alabama Law of Damages § 4:7. Because the dead can be neither
punished nor deterred, assessing punitive damages against a
deceased person seems problematical.
 See Green Oil Co. v.
11
Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 222 (Ala. 1989) (noting that "the
purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate the plaintiff
but to punish the wrongdoer and to deter the wrongdoer and
others from committing similar wrongs in the future"). A
century ago, this Court stated that, "when the wrongdoer dies
1110353
35
before the action is brought to trial, and the action survives
against 
his 
personal 
representative, 
only 
compensatory 
damages
may be recovered." Meighan v. Birmingham Terminal Co., 165
Ala. 591, 599, 51 So. 775, 778 (1910). Although a federal case
cited by the plaintiffs distinguished this holding, Ellis v.
Zuck, 546 F.2d 643, 644 (5th Cir. 1977), its rationale was
that the principle applied in wrongful-death cases should be
extended to all punitive-damages cases. However, as noted,
wrongful-death cases are sui generis. This Court has held more
recently that a bank placed in receivership is not subject to
punitive damages because the purposes of punishment and
deterrence could not be accomplished against a defunct entity.
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Mooney, 592 So. 2d 186, 190 (Ala.
1991). Thus, punitive damages were not available against
Emma's estate.
IV. Conclusion
Even if the jury verdict on the mismanagement-of-trust
claim were correct, the award of punitive damages would still
have to be set aside.
Murdock, J., concurs.