Title: Church of Holy Spirit of Wayland v. Heinrich
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-13326
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: March 14, 2023

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SJC-13326 
 
CHURCH OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF WAYLAND & others1  vs.  MARILYN J. 
HEINRICH & others2 (and a companion case3). 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     December 5, 2022. - March 14, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Church.  Cemetery.  Contract, Church, Construction of contract. 
Common Law. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Middlesex Division of the 
Probate and Family Court Department on August 29, 2017. 
 
The case was heard by Camille F. Sarrouf, Jr., J., sitting 
under statutory authority, on motions for summary judgment. 
 
 
1 The Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts and Saint 
Philopateer Mercurius & Saint Mina Coptic Orthodox Church, Inc. 
 
2 John Doe Heinrich No. 1, John Doe Heinrich No. 2, Mary 
Wilson, John Doe Wilson, John Doe Hodgins, Christopher Woodcock, 
John Doe Woodcock No. 1, John Doe Woodcock No. 2, Carolyn J. 
Kiradjieff, John Doe Jobes No. 1, John Doe Jobes No. 2, Mary Ann 
Montague, John Doe Turner No. 1, John Doe Turner No. 2, Judy 
Mosedale, John Doe Mosedale No. 1, John Doe Mosedale No. 2, 
Stephanie P. Edwards, John Doe Edwards No. 1, and John Doe 
Edwards No. 2. 
 
3 Mary J. Wilson & others  vs.  Church of the Holy Spirit of 
Wayland & others. 
2 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
June 28, 2019. 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Camille F. Sarrouf, Jr., 
J. 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
William F. Gramer (Nicholas K. Holmes also present) for 
Marilyn J. Heinrich & others. 
Jennifer Grace Miller for Church of the Holy Spirit of 
Wayland & another. 
Audrey Y. Botros for Saint Philopateer Mercurius & Saint 
Mina Coptic Orthodox Church, Inc. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  This case concerns the scope of rights conveyed 
by a set of burial certificates, as sold by a church to its 
parishioners.  After dwindling membership compelled the Church 
of the Holy Spirit of Wayland (Church of the Holy Spirit, or 
church) to close and sell its property, do the certificates 
permit the church to disinter and relocate the cremated remains 
buried on that property despite the objections of the decedents' 
families? 
Although we acknowledge the sensitive -- even sacred -- 
nature of the subject matter of this dispute, we conclude that 
the burial certificates' unambiguous language permits the 
disinterment and that no common-law right held by the families 
prevents it.  We therefore affirm. 
 
Background.  The material facts are undisputed.  The Church 
of the Holy Spirit was established in 1961 as a parish of the 
3 
 
Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts.  In the late 1960s, the 
church set aside a portion of its land for use as a "Memorial 
Garden," also referred to as a "Churchyard."  Parishioners could 
arrange for cremated remains (cremains) to be interred in the 
Churchyard by purchasing a certificate from the church.  Between 
1969 and 2008, a number of such certificates were sold.  The 
one-page certificates each granted the purchaser a right to one 
or more interments that were "subject to the regulations of the 
Churchyard now or hereafter in force." 
The referenced regulations were wide ranging.  They 
covered, among other things, the Churchyard's operations and 
layout, groundskeeping restrictions, permitted styles of 
memorial plaques, and procedures for interment.  The regulations 
also contemplated disinterment of cremains, specifying that 
disinterment was forbidden "without the consent of [the Church 
of the Holy Spirit]."  And, consistent with the certificates, 
the regulations further provided that they were subject to "be 
amended or revised from time to time" by the church. 
Beginning in 2000, the church's membership began to wane.  
As the years passed, its financial difficulties mounted, and in 
March of 2015, the congregation concluded that it was "unable to 
function as a viable church" and voted to close.  The church 
subsequently entered into negotiations with St. Mark Coptic 
Orthodox Church of Boston (St. Mark) for sale of its property, 
4 
 
including the Churchyard.  Although St. Mark agreed to meet the 
asking price, it objected to taking ownership of the Churchyard 
as it was, largely because the Coptic Church's religious beliefs 
do not permit cremation.  The church ultimately agreed to 
disinter and relocate the cremains as a condition of the sale.4  
St. Mark took the deed to the Wayland property in 2016, and 
shortly thereafter it resold the property and assigned its 
rights under the purchase and sale agreement to Saint 
Philopateer Mercurius & Saint Mina Coptic Orthodox Church, Inc. 
(St. Philopateer).  For the same religious reasons, St. 
Philopateer shared St. Mark's objections to the cremains 
remaining on the property. 
At the time of the sale of the land to St. Mark, the 
cremains of at least forty-nine individuals were interred in the 
Churchyard.  The church contacted the families of the deceased 
and requested their consent for relocation and reinterment of 
the cremains, to be undertaken at the church's expense.  
Although most consented, family members representing the 
cremains of twelve individuals (hereinafter, families) did not.5 
 
4 The purchase and sale agreement memorializing that term 
further specified that the church's obligation to remove the 
cremains would survive the sale's closing. 
 
5 The next of kin for certain interred individuals could not 
be located. 
5 
 
At an impasse, the church subsequently amended the 
Churchyard regulations.  The newly enacted provisions 
specifically authorized the church to shutter the Churchyard and 
relocate the cremains: 
"If the Church of the Holy Spirit ceases operations or 
ceases operations at the property where the Churchyard 
Memorial Garden is located, then the Vestry or Executive 
Committee, as the case may be, may cause the Churchyard 
Memorial Garden to be discontinued or moved to an alternate 
location, and/or cause all cremated remains located in the 
Churchyard Memorial Garden to be disinterred and relocated 
to one or more other locations within the Diocese of 
Massachusetts or returned to the families of the cremains." 
 
The church and St. Philopateer then filed a complaint in 
the Probate and Family Court seeking a declaration that the 
regulations, as amended, permitted removal of the cremains.  
Certain members of the families who had objected to the proposed 
disinterment asserted counterclaims for breach of contract, 
tortious interference with contractual relations, and violations 
of G. L. c. 93A.  As those counterclaims lay beyond the court's 
jurisdiction, they were dismissed and refiled in the Superior 
Court, with an additional claim for violation of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing.  The presiding Superior Court judge 
was then specially assigned to sit as a Probate and Family Court 
judge so that the two related actions could be consolidated. 
Upon cross motions for summary judgment in the Probate and 
Family Court case, the judge entered judgment dismissing the 
families' claims and declaring that the church had the right to 
6 
 
disinter and relocate the cremains in the Churchyard.6  The judge 
reasoned that the regulations entitled the church to close the 
Churchyard, thereby extinguishing any common-law rights the 
families may have in the burial plots, which could exist only 
"so long as the place continues as a burial ground."  Trefry v. 
Younger, 226 Mass. 5, 9 (1917).  The families filed a timely 
appeal, and in a published opinion, the Appeals Court reversed.  
See Church of the Holy Spirit of Wayland v. Heinrich, 101 Mass. 
App. Ct. 32, 53 (2022).  We granted the church's petition for 
further appellate review. 
Discussion.  "Summary judgment is appropriate where there 
is no material issue of fact in dispute and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Our review of a 
decision on a motion for summary judgment is de novo" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Le Fort Enters., Inc. v. Lantern 18, 
LLC, 491 Mass. 144, 148–149 (2023). 
1.  The certificates.  The rights and responsibilities of 
the parties are governed by the language of the certificates, 
which are indisputably contracts.  See McAndrew v. Quirk, 329 
Mass. 423, 425 (1952) (burial rights are "subject to whatever 
conditions were contained in the instrument [granting the] 
interest in the lot"); Green v. Danahy, 223 Mass. 1, 4 (1916) 
 
6 The judge also granted a parallel motion to dismiss the 
claims in the Superior Court case. 
7 
 
(applying contract principles to dispute over obligations under 
burial certificate).  "When the words of a contract are clear, 
they must be construed in their usual and ordinary sense 
. . . ."  General Convention of the New Jerusalem in the U.S. of 
Am., Inc. v. MacKenzie, 449 Mass. 832, 835 (2007).  Such 
language, "plainly and intelligibly stated[,] . . . is the best 
possible evidence of the intent and meaning of those who are 
bound by the contract, and of those who are to receive the 
benefit of it."  Stackpole v. Arnold, 11 Mass. 27, 31 (1814). 
The certificates are exceedingly straightforward.  They 
grant "right[s] of . . . interments" and state that any such 
right conveyed is subject to regulation by the church.7  
Importantly, they further provide that the church may amend the 
regulations after the contract is executed, a right that is 
reiterated in the regulations themselves.  Such terms are not 
unique in burial contracts.  See McAndrew, 329 Mass. at 425; 
 
7 The certificates and regulations lack any language 
associated with property rights or covenants that run with the 
land.  Compare Trefry, 226 Mass. at 8 (burial rights conveyed 
"under seal and in the form of a grant" and "run to the grantee 
'and his heirs forever'").  Cf. Feeley v. Andrews, 191 Mass. 
313, 315-316 (1906) (burial easement "can be created only by 
grant under seal").  Although the regulations contain a 
reference to "perpetual care," that term is explicitly defined 
as "simple maintenance of the Churchyard, keeping individual 
lots and the Memorial Grounds free of fallen branches and trees, 
trimming of trees when necessary, and maintaining a path through 
the Churchyard."  This language evinces no intent to convey a 
permanent property right. 
8 
 
Green, 223 Mass. at 4 (certificate for burial in Catholic 
cemetery stated right was "subject always to the following 
regulations, or such others as may be from time to time 
prescribed"). 
Neither the certificates nor the regulations themselves 
place any limits on the nature and extent of permissible 
regulation of the Churchyard, and accordingly, the regulations 
reach a wide range of matters related to the Churchyard, 
including disinterment.  Not only do the regulations contemplate 
disinterment, but by requiring the church's consent to disinter, 
they do so in a manner that makes clear that the church 
exercises control over the prospect.  Further, the certificates 
put no constraints on the church's ability to amend the 
regulations as it sees fit. 
In sum, there is nothing in the plain language of the 
certificates and attendant regulations that prohibits 
disinterment by the church.  It was permitted under the 
certificates to regulate the Churchyard and amend the 
regulations, and it did so.  Its planned course of action 
pursuant to the amended regulations therefore is, as a simple 
matter of contract law, permissible.  See Green, 223 Mass. at 4 
(applying contract law to conclude that, where party to burial 
certificate committed breach of contract, disinterment was 
permitted).  Cf. Feeley v. Andrews, 191 Mass. 313, 316–317 
9 
 
(1906) (licensee could not maintain action for damages over 
disinterred remains). 
2.  Burial law.  The families respond that the church's 
contractual authority under the certificates and regulations are 
circumscribed by our common law.  They urge us to recognize that 
certain trust-like property rights are held by all families of 
those interred, rights that the church may not regulate out of 
existence by contract. 
Although entanglement with State action prevents it from 
being squarely on point, Sohier v. Trinity Church, 109 Mass. 1 
(1871), is nevertheless our most apposite case.  Sohier 
concerned the plan of Trinity Church (Trinity) to sell its land 
in Boston and relocate to a new location in the city.  Id. at 
16-17.  The prevailing law at the time compelled Trinity to 
obtain legislative authorization for the sale.  Id. at 17. 
Under Trinity's buildings were dozens of tombs, and the 
"representatives" of four of those tombs -- presumably family 
members of the deceased -- brought suit to enjoin the sale and 
prevent disinterment of the tombs' remains.  Id. at 2, 6-9.  
Resolution of the matter required us to consider both the extent 
of the power available to Trinity, as authorized by the 
Legislature, and the nature of the rights held by the 
plaintiffs.  As to Trinity, we concluded that authorization of 
the sale and removal of the remains was constitutional under the 
10 
 
Legislature's police powers, given that the Legislature had 
determined that leaving the remains in place would be a danger 
to public health.  Id. at 21-22.  As to the families, we noted 
that burial rights are "peculiar . . . and are not very 
dissimilar to rights in pews," that is, "qualified and 
usufructuary right[s], being a right to occupy under certain 
restrictions."  Id. at 20-21. 
Weighing those qualified rights against the Legislature's 
empowerment of Trinity to consummate the sale, we concluded that 
Trinity was "justified in removing the bodies and remains 
interred under their church."8  Id. at 22.  We further observed 
that there were many such situations where the need of a church 
to close and sell its property would permit, or even require, 
any remains on that property to be relocated: 
"There are other causes which are obviously sufficient to 
authorize the removal of bodies and tombs placed under a 
church.  The edifice may be consumed by fire, or otherwise 
destroyed; or it may decay; or the place may become 
unsuitable for such a building; or for various other 
reasons it may be proper to abandon or sell it.  And in 
such cases it would be improper to leave the tombs and the 
remains deposited in them; obvious propriety would require 
 
8 In so concluding, we cited with approval several cases 
from other jurisdictions that authorized disinterment under 
similar circumstances.  See Sohier, 109 Mass. at 21-22, citing, 
e.g., Windt v. German Reformed Church, 4 Sand. Ch. 471 (N.Y. 
1847) ("it was held that the sepulture of friends and relatives 
in a cemetery belonging to a religious society confers no right 
or title upon the survivors, and they cannot prevent a sale of 
such cemetery by the corporation and the removal of the interred 
remains, when such removal is in all respects conducted 
according to law"). 
11 
 
that the remains should be removed to some suitable place; 
and . . . the owners of the tombs and the friends of the 
deceased have no title to the lands, but only an interest 
in the structures and in their proper use . . . ."9 
 
Id. at 22-23. 
While we realize that there is no State action or 
authorization by the Legislature here, the same principles 
discussed in Sohier apply.  Sohier does address the nature of 
the rights of decedents' families, and whatever common-law 
property rights the families have here can be no more extensive 
than those analyzed there.  Applying Sohier's principles, we 
conclude that the failing membership and financial unviability 
of the Church of the Holy Spirit -- both facts that are 
undisputed on the summary judgment record -- make it "proper to 
. . . sell" the church's land and permit it to relocate the 
cremains as a necessary condition of that sale.  Id. at 23. 
This conclusion is further supported by our cases regarding 
pew rights, which, as Sohier pointed out, are analogues to 
burial rights.  Pew owners are holders of "qualified, subsidiary 
and dependent" rights, and our law has consistently held that if 
a church closes "not wantonly or unreasonably or with intent to 
 
9 Presumably because of takings concerns, in this paragraph 
we also noted that, in relocating the remains, "the public 
authorities do not violate [the plaintiffs'] rights of property, 
if proper provision is made for compensation or substitution."  
As the Church of the Holy Spirit is a private actor, no similar 
issue arises here. 
12 
 
injure the pew holders . . . , the pew owner is without remedy."  
Massachusetts Baptist Missionary Soc'y v. Bowdoin Sq. Baptist 
Soc'y, 212 Mass. 198, 200–201 (1912) (collecting cases).  
Indeed, we have held this to be true in cases of church closure 
due to failing membership: 
"Now as every member of a religious society may at any time 
dissolve his membership at his pleasure, it may often 
happen that the members of a religious society may withdraw 
therefrom in such numbers as to disable the society to 
maintain public worship; and when a religious society or 
parish is thus disabled, it is clear that the pewholders 
would have no cause of complaint if the society or parish 
should abandon their meetinghouse, and wholly cease to 
occupy it as a place of public worship." 
 
Fassett v. First Parish in Boylston, 19 Pick. 361, 363 (1837). 
Review of our limited cases addressing burial rights 
reveals no common-law rights of the kind asserted by the 
families.10  Given this lack of Massachusetts authority, the 
families urge us to adopt the reasoning of Hines v. State, 126 
Tenn. 1 (1911).  In Hines, the Tennessee Supreme Court examined 
 
10 The next closest case we can identify is Messina v. 
LaRosa, 337 Mass. 438 (1958), where a decedent's second wife 
scrubbed the deceased first wife's dates of birth and death off 
of the family tombstone and relocated it to a new plot for her 
own use.  Id. at 440.  The second wife changed the dates on the 
tombstone, and not the name, because -- improbably -- both women 
were named Josephine LaRosa.  Id. at 438-440.  We acknowledged 
that the first wife's sister had standing to sue for restoration 
of the tombstone based on the sensational facts of the case, 
tellingly disclaiming reliance on any generally applicable 
common-law rights:  "This [holding] is not an application of any 
rule of property law, but is a recognition of principles of 
ethics, propriety, and common decency which equity is peculiarly 
qualified to enforce."  Id. at 442. 
13 
 
the rights of family members in a family burial plot on land 
that had passed from family ownership to strangers.  It held 
that the family had the right to access and maintain the plot, 
proclaiming the existence of trust-like rights: 
"When land has been definitely appropriated to burial 
purposes, it cannot be conveyed or devised as other 
property, so as to interfere with the use and purposes to 
which it has been devoted.  When once dedicated to burial 
purposes, and interments have there been made, the then 
owner holds the title to some extent in trust for the 
benefit of those entitled to burial in it, and the heir at 
law, devisee, or vendee takes the property subject to this 
trust." 
 
Id. at 4-5. 
Even if we were to put aside that the certificate and 
regulations control, and Sohier's teaching that no common-law 
rights preclude disinterment here, we would still think that 
Hines is a poor fit for the case at bar.11  The land at issue 
there was a small family burial plot, those interred there were 
buried when an individual in the family was its fee owner, and 
the context of the discussion was a criminal prosecution.  The 
dispute was not between a church and parishioners over burial in 
a churchyard, and there was no governing contract or 
 
11 Hines was considered by the Appeals Court in Sanford v. 
Vinal, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 476 (1990), on facts that were much 
more similar than those of this case.  The Sanford court never 
reached the issue whether Massachusetts should adopt Hines, 
however, because the family burial plot in question had been so 
long abandoned that it could not be located.  See id. at 486-
487. 
14 
 
certificate, nor any regulations authorized by such a contract.  
Moreover, Hines no longer even governs burial ground closures 
and disinterment in its home State, having been superseded by 
statute.12  See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 46-4-101 et seq. (establishing 
statutory scheme for closing burial grounds and relocating 
remains). 
We see no need to adopt Hines here, where we may 
comfortably decide the case by applying Massachusetts law.  
Nowhere does our law forbid the Church of the Holy Spirit from 
disinterring the cremains in the Churchyard.  Rather, the 
closest analogues in our case law provide that this is the type 
of situation where relocation of the cremains is proper.13  See 
Sohier, 109 Mass. at 22-23. 
 
12 In a concurrence in an earlier case, Chief Justice John 
Shields, the author of Hines, opined that burial grounds' 
"sacred character" rendered them "forever withdrawn from all the 
incidents to which other real estate may be liable," including 
eminent domain.  See Memphis State Line R.R. v. Forest Hill 
Cemetery Co., 116 Tenn. 400, 422 (1906).  Chief Justice Shields 
was buried in a family plot on his estate in 1934, and just a 
few years after his passing, his remains were disinterred and 
relocated when the Tennessee Valley Authority built the Cherokee 
Dam and flooded the area.  See Paine, Cemetery Law:  Moving 
Chief Justice Shields, 49 Tenn. B.J. 35 (Sept. 2013). 
 
13 In light of this conclusion, we also reject the families' 
argument that the church's amendment of the Churchyard 
regulations violated the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.  Cf. T.W. Nickerson, Inc. v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 456 
Mass. 562, 573 (2010). 
15 
 
In other circumstances, a different result might obtain.  
As with past disputes over burial rights, future disputes will 
turn on the particulars of each case, including the language of 
the instrument granting the rights, see Feeley, 191 Mass. at 
316–317 (documents in evidence established, at best, revocable 
license to be buried); the relationship between the parties, see 
G. L. c. 114, § 32 (establishing statutory right to burial "in 
any burial lot or tomb of which [one's] spouse was seized at any 
time during marriage"); the status of the burial ground, see 
Sohier, 109 Mass. at 21-23; and any other relevant equitable 
considerations, see Messina v. LaRosa, 337 Mass. 438, 442 
(1958).  On the particulars of the case before us, summary 
judgment was properly granted.14 
Conclusion.  Although we resolve this case by applying 
long-standing legal principles, we, of course, recognize the 
human element involved.  We also reiterate that in other 
circumstances a different result might obtain.  Disinterring the 
remains of one's ancestors will forever be a sensitive, 
difficult prospect.  To repeat our words from Antoniewicz v. Del 
Prete, 340 Mass. 742, 743 (1960): 
 
14 As we decide the case on nonconstitutional grounds, we 
need not consider the argument that a declaration that the 
cremains may stay in place would violate the church's or St. 
Philopateer's constitutional right to the free exercise of 
religion. 
16 
 
"The court is fully aware that a decent respect for the 
memory of those who have been buried requires that there be 
no disturbance of the remains of one deceased unless the 
law as applied to the particular circumstances compels such 
a conclusion.  Here, with considerable reluctance, that 
conclusion seems necessary to the court." 
The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
15 The Superior Court's declaration included certain 
deadlines for compliance.  Should the parties believe that the 
terms of the declaration require modification owing to the 
interval between its initial entry and entry of the rescript 
from this court, they may move for modification in the Superior 
Court.