Title: Dickens v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 472, 2008
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: July 23, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KEVIN DICKENS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 472, 2008 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0708003661 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: May 24, 2010 
  Decided: July 23, 2010 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS, and RIDGELY Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 23rd day of July 2010, upon consideration of the appellant's 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, the 
State's response thereto, and the State’s supplemental response,                          
it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
A grand jury indicted the defendant, Kevin Dickens, on 
multiple assault charges in September 2007.  Prior to his trial, Dickens was 
permitted to discharge his court-appointed counsel and to represent himself 
at trial.  On May 29, 2008, following a six-day trial, a Superior Court jury 
found Dickens guilty of four counts of assault in a detention facility and one 
count of second degree assault.  The Superior Court sentenced Dickens to a 
 
2 
total period of thirty-one years at Level V incarceration, to be suspended 
after serving nine years (with the first six being minimum mandatory) for 
decreasing levels of supervision.  After Dickens filed his opening brief on 
appeal pro se, the case was remanded to the Superior Court to prepare 
necessary transcripts and to determine whether Dickens had knowingly 
waived his right to counsel on direct appeal.  Following remand, counsel 
was appointed to represent Dickens in this appeal. 
(2) 
Dickens’ counsel on appeal now has filed a brief and a motion 
to withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  Dickens’ counsel asserts that, based 
upon a complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably 
appealable issues.  By letter, Dickens’ attorney informed him of the 
provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided Dickens with a copy of the motion to 
withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Dickens also was informed of his 
right to supplement his attorney's presentation.  Dickens failed to respond to 
his counsel’s motion and brief.  The State has responded to the position 
taken by Dickens’ counsel and also has responded to the issues raised in the 
pro se opening brief that Dickens filed on March 16, 2009, prior to defense 
counsel’s appointment.  The State has moved to affirm the Superior Court's 
judgment. 
 
3 
(3) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable 
claims; and (b) this Court must conduct its own review of the record and 
determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably 
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.1 
(4) 
The record reflects that Dickens’ charges arose from a series of 
incidents that occurred between July 25, 2007 and August 1, 2007 while 
Dickens was incarcerated at the Vaughn Correctional Center in Smyrna, 
Delaware.  The State’s evidence at trial established that, on July 25, 2007, 
Dickens threw a mixture of hot water, urine, and feces at Correctional 
Officer (“CO”) Lingenfelter as the officer was handing out clean laundry on 
Dickens’ tier in the secured housing unit (SHU) of the facility.  Shortly 
thereafter, while a quick response team (QRT) was attempting to extract 
Dickens from his cell, Dickens threw a similar hot mixture at CO 
McCreanor, which caused first degree burns.  Two days later, Dickens threw 
a mixture of urine, feces and hot water at CO Jordan while he was collecting 
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
 
4 
dinner trays from inmates.  When the QRT responded to Dickens’ cell, 
Dickens, who had covered his arms in feces, put CO Behney in a headlock.  
As a result of these incidents, the procedures for feeding Dickens were 
changed so that Dickens was moved into an interview room monitored by 
three officers and a supervisor in order to be fed his meals.  On August 1, 
2007, after he was moved to the interview room for dinner, CO Jordan 
entered the room to serve Dickens his food tray.  Dickens rushed at CO 
Jordan.  Sergeant Newman attempted to stop Dickens and re-sprained his 
shoulder, which had been injured on July 27 during the QRT cell extraction 
of Dickens.  Newman offered medical reports regarding the July 27 injury 
but not for the August 1 re-injury.  All of the correctional officers involved 
testified at Dickens’ trial.   
(5) 
Dickens presented several witnesses and also testified in his 
own defense.  Dickens admitted throwing hot water, urine, and feces on the 
correctional officers but offered explanations for why he did so.  The gist of 
Dickens’ testimony was that his behavior started as a protest to the officers’ 
mistreatment of him and, thereafter, his actions were taken as defensive 
measures to prevent the QRT from assaulting him.  The jury convicted him 
of all charges. 
 
5 
(6) 
In the pro se opening brief he filed before counsel was 
appointed, Dickens raised the following ten claims: (i) the trial court erred 
by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of disorderly 
conduct, offensive touching, and third degree assault; (ii) the trial court erred 
by failing to instruct the jury on the law of self-defense; (iii) the trial erred 
by failing to acquit Dickens of second degree assault for insufficient 
evidence and for instructing the jury on causation; (iv) the trial court erred 
by failing to dismiss Juror No. 3 after she disclosed that she had an uncle 
who was a correctional officer; (v) the trial court erred by failing to grant a 
mistrial after a defense witness informed the jury that Juror No. 3 was 
related to a correctional officer; (vi) the trial court erred failing to strike the 
jury for Batson violations; (vii) the assault in a detention facility statute, 11 
Del. C. § 1254, is unconstitutional because it violates the Equal Protection 
Clause; (viii) the trial court erred by denying Dickens’ request for transcript 
at State expense;2 (ix) the trial court erred by modifying his sentence, sua 
sponte, to eliminate the requirement that Dickens serve his sentence at the 
Sussex Correctional Institute; and (x) the trial court erred by sentencing him 
for assault in a detention facility without first determining whether the jury 
                                                 
2 This issue was resolved when this Court remanded the appeal to Superior Court for 
preparation of the trial transcripts.  Accordingly, this issue is moot. 
 
6 
found him guilty under 11 Del. C. § 1254(a) or § 1254(c).3  We address 
these claims seriatim. 
(7) 
Dickens first argues that the Superior Court erred in denying his 
request to instruct the jury on disorderly conduct,4 offensive touching5 and 
third degree assault6 as lesser included offenses to assault in a detention 
facility.7  We review this claim de novo.8  A trial judge must grant a request 
for an instruction on a lesser included offense if the following four 
requirements are met:  (1) the defendant makes a proper request; (2) the 
lesser included offense contains some but not all of the elements of the 
charged offense; (3) the elements differentiating the two offenses are in 
                                                 
3 The reindictment, filed on May 12, 2008, charged alternatively that Dickens “did 
intentionally cause physical injury and/or did intentionally strike with urine, feces, or 
other bodily fluid” four correctional officers.  See 11 Del. C. §§ 1254(a), (c). 
4 11 Del. C. § 1301(1)(f), among other things, provides that a person is guilty of 
disorderly conduct when the person intentionally causes alarm to any other person by 
creating a “hazardous or physically offensive condition which serves no legitimate 
purpose.” 
5 11 Del. C. § 601(a)(2) provides that a person is guilty of offensive touching when the 
person “[i]ntentionally strikes another person with saliva, urine, feces or any other bodily 
fluid, knowing that the person is thereby likely to cause offense or alarm to such other 
person.” 
6 11 Del. C. § 611(a) provides that a person is guilty of third degree assault when the 
person “intentionally or recklessly causes physical injury to another person.” 
7 11 Del. C. § 1254 provides, among other things, that any inmate confined in a detention 
facility is guilty of assault in a detention facility if the inmate “intentionally causes 
physical injury” or “intentionally strikes with urine or feces or other bodily fluid” a 
correctional officer or other State employee of a detention facility acting in the lawful 
performance of duties.” See 11 Del. C. §§ 1254(a), (c). 
8 Weber v. State, 971 A.2d 135, 141 (Del. 2009). 
 
7 
dispute; and (4) there is some evidence that would allow the jury rationally 
to acquit the defendant on the greater charge and convict on the lesser 
charge.9  
(8) 
In this case, the State concedes that Dickens’ proposed lesser 
included offenses all have elements included within the charged offense of 
assault in a detention facility.  The State contends, however, that the only 
element differentiating the offenses is the requirement that the assault occur 
in a detention facility.  The State argues that because the location of the 
assaults was not in dispute, Dickens was not entitled to the lesser included 
offense instructions. 
(9) 
Dickens argues, however, that the element differentiating the 
offenses is the requirement that the assault take place in a correctional 
facility upon a correctional officer or other State employee “acting in the 
lawful performance of duties.”10  Dickens contends that he was entitled to 
the lesser included offense instructions because the issue of whether the 
guards were acting in the lawful performance of their duties was a fact in 
dispute and the jury rationally could have found in his favor.  We disagree.  
While Dickens may not have liked the way the correctional officers were 
                                                 
9 Hignutt v. State, 958 A.2d 863, 869 (Del. 2008). 
10 11 Del. C. § 1254(c). 
 
8 
performing their duties, the testimony at trial was undisputed that Dickens’ 
assaultive behavior occurred while the officers were performing lawful 
duties, such as handing out laundry, removing him from his cell, and feeding 
him.  There was no rational basis for the jury to acquit Dickens of assault in 
a detention facility and convict him of a lesser included offense.11 
(10) Similarly, we find no error in the Superior Court’s refusal to 
instruct the jury on self-defense.  As this Court previously has noted, the use 
of force in self-defense is only justified “when the defendant believes that 
such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting the 
defendant against the use of unlawful force by the other [person] on the 
present occasion.”12  Dickens’ own testimony established that his assault on 
CO Lingenfelter and his assault and attempted assault on CO Jordan were 
unprovoked by any threat of force by either man.  Moreover, as the Superior 
Court noted in denying Dickens’ request for the justification instruction, his 
assaults on the QRT members were merely preemptive strikes designed to 
                                                 
11 11 Del. C. § 206(c). 
12 Dickens v. State, 2008 WL 880162, at 2 (Del. Apr. 2, 2008) (quoting 11 Del. C. § 
464(a)). 
 
9 
stop what were otherwise lawful actions by correctional officials.13  The 
Superior Court’s conclusion is supported by the record.   
(11) Dickens next argues that the Superior Court erred in instructing 
the jury on the issue of causation and in failing to grant an acquittal on the 
charge of second degree assault.  With respect to the charge of second 
degree assault, the trial judge instructed the jury that it must find that 
Dickens intended to cause physical injury.  The trial court further instructed 
that the element of intent “is not established if the actual result is outside the 
intention of the defendant unless: the actual result differed from the intended 
result only in the respect that a different person was injured or affected[; or, 
two] the actual result involved the same kind of injury or harm as the 
probable result.”14 Dickens does not deny that he intended to assault CO 
Jordan.  He asserts, however, that it was not his intent to harm CO Jordan’s 
shoulder, therefore, he was not the “cause” of the injury that occurred to CO 
Newman’s shoulder when he tried to stop Dickens from assaulting CO 
Jordan.  The trial judge, however, correctly instructed the jury on the law 
and we find the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law for the jury to 
convict Dickens for second degree assault for causing injury to CO 
                                                 
13 The use of force by correctional officials is legally permitted to enforce the lawful 
rules or procedures of an institution.  11 Del. C. § 468(5)(a). 
14 The trial court’s jury instruction was based upon language found in 11 Del. C. § 262. 
 
10 
Newman’s shoulder when he attempted to prevent Dickens’ assault on CO 
Jordan.15   
(12) Dickens next argues that the Superior Court erred in failing to 
dismiss Juror #3 after she disclosed that she saw her husband’s uncle, CO 
Smith, working in the courtroom as a correctional officer.  The juror’s 
revelation came on the second day of trial when CO Smith, who had 
transportation duties that day, walked into the courtroom.  The juror told the 
trial judge that she had not previously disclosed information about her 
husband’s uncle’s occupation because she believed that he had retired and 
because he was not a close relative.  The trial judge asked the juror if her 
relationship would impair her ability to render a fair verdict.  The juror 
replied that she only saw her husband’s uncle once every year and that her 
relationship would not impact her impartiality.  The Superior Court allowed 
her to remain on the jury over Dickens’ objection.  
(13) The determination of a juror's impartiality is the responsibility 
of the trial judge who has an opportunity to question the juror, observe the 
juror's demeanor, and evaluate the juror's ability to render a fair verdict.16  A 
trial judge's determination not to discharge a juror, following voir dire, will 
                                                 
15 See Raymond v. State, 2007 WL 666778 (Del. Mar. 6, 2007) (holding that a victim’s 
testimony is sufficient to prove physical injury for purposes of second degree assault). 
16 Morrissey v. State, 620 A.2d 207, 214 (Del. 1993). 
 
11 
not be overturned by this Court in the absence of a demonstration of a 
“prejudicial abuse” of discretion.17  In this case, the juror came forward 
when she saw her husband’s uncle step into the courtroom.  During voir dire, 
she indicated that her relationship with her husband’s uncle was not close, 
which is why she had not previously disclosed it.  She further stated that she 
had not mentioned her relationship to CO Smith to any other juror and that 
her relationship would not affect her ability to render an impartial verdict.  
Under the circumstances, we do not find any prejudicial abuse of discretion 
by the trial court in refusing to discharge the juror. 
(14) Dickens next argues that the Superior Court erred in failing to 
grant a mistrial after Dickens’ own witness remarked to the jury during his 
testimony that Juror #3 was related to CO Smith.  A trial judge, however, is 
only required to grant a mistrial when there is “no meaningful or practical” 
alternative to that remedy.18  This Court articulated a four-part analysis to 
determine whether a witness’ unsolicited, prejudicial comments require a 
mistrial: (i) the nature and frequency of the comments; (ii) the likelihood of 
resulting prejudice; (iii) the closeness of the case; and (iv) the sufficiency of 
                                                 
17 Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1120 (Del. 1990). 
18 Dawson v. State, 637 A.2d 57, 62 (Del. 1994). 
 
12 
the trial judge’s efforts to mitigate any prejudice.19  In this case, there was a 
single isolated remark by Dickens’ own witness, the likelihood of prejudice 
was minimal, the case was not close, and the trial court gave a prompt 
curative instruction.  Under the circumstances, there was no “manifest 
injustice” requiring a mistrial.20 
(15) Dickens next contends that the trial court erred by failing to 
strike the jury because neither the jury venire nor the petit jury represented a 
fair cross section of the community.21  He asserts that, of the fifty to sixty 
members of the jury venire, only five or six were African-American, which 
is twice as low as the percentage of African-Americans living in New Castle 
County.  Only two African-Americans were called by the clerk, and one of 
those individuals was struck by the State for cause.  Dickens specifically 
argues that the court clerk’s process for selecting individual jurors from the 
venire to sit on the petit jury was not random.22 
                                                 
19 Pena v. State, 856 A.2d 548, 550-51 (Del. 2004). 
20 Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998). 
21 Dickens raises no argument with respect to the composition of the jury venire in the 
body of his opening brief on appeal.  Accordingly, we consider that claim waived and 
only address his argument challenging the composition of the petit jury.  Murphy v. State, 
632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993). 
22 In response to Dickens’ allegations about the petit jury selection process, the Court 
directed the State to supplement the record documenting the process used in this case. 
 
13 
(16) To establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross section 
requirement, a defendant must show that: (i) the group alleged to be 
excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (ii) the representation of 
this group in the venire is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of 
such persons in the community; and (iii) the under-representation is due to 
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.23   
(17) In his opening brief, Dickens asserts that, in previous trials, 
petit jurors names were selected by the clerk who randomly picked the 
names from a box.  In the present case, Dickens asserts that the court clerk 
examined a list before calling the names of petit jurors forward and that the 
clerk then would look at Dickens with a “mocking smirk,” which indicated 
to Dickens that the court clerk was selecting jurors based on their race.  
When Dickens complained to the trial judge that the court clerk was 
examining the jurors’ race on the juror profile list before selection, the trial 
court rejected Dickens’ complaint as mere speculation.   
(18) The State responds that, while the process of selecting names 
from a box previously had been the usual practice in the Superior Court, that 
                                                 
23 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). 
 
14 
particular selection method is not statutorily required24 and is no longer 
used.  The State asserts that, while the parties received an alphabetized list of 
the members of the jury venire, the court clerk’s list was a computer-
generated, randomized list.  The State asserts that, after jurors were struck 
for cause, 38 of the original 60 members of the jury venire remained.  Of 
those 38, 11 were white men (29%), 20 were white women (53%), 3 were 
black men (8%), 2 were black women (5%), 1 was a Hispanic man (2.5%), 
and 1 was an Asian or Hispanic woman (2.5%).  The initial 12 jurors seated 
were 4 white men, 7 white women, and 1 black woman.  The remaining jury 
pool thus consisted of 7 white men, 13 white women, 3 black men, 1 black 
woman, 1 Hispanic man, and 1 Asian or Hispanic woman.  Dickens used his 
peremptory challenges to remove 2 white men and 5 white women.  The 
State used its peremptory challenges to remove 2 white men and 1 black 
man.  As jurors were stricken, the court clerk called, in order: 3 white 
women, 1 black man, 3 white women, 1 white man, and 1 Hispanic man.  
The jury ultimately consisted of 3 white men (25%), 7 white women (58%), 
1 black woman (8%), 1 Hispanic man (8%).  
                                                 
24 See Gattis v. State, 637 A.2d 808, 814 (Del. 1994) (noting that, although randomness 
in the selection of petit jury members is necessary, the particular practice of selecting 
names from a box is no longer statutorily required). 
 
15 
(19) Given the composition of the venire and the ultimate 
composition of the jury, we find no support for Dickens’ assertion that the 
court clerk manipulated the petit jury selection process to exclude African-
Americans from his jury.  In the absence of a showing that the jury selection 
method resulted in the systematic exclusion of a cognizable group, there is 
no violation of the Sixth Amendment.25  Accordingly, we find no merit to 
Dickens’ claim on appeal. 
(20) Dickens next argues that the assault in a detention facility 
statute, 11 Del. C. § 1254, is unconstitutional because it violates equal 
protection principles.  Specifically, Dickens argues that because the statute 
treats prisoners differently than non-prisoners, it violates equal protection.  
For statutory discrimination to be unconstitutional, the distinction drawn 
must be “patently arbitrary and bear no rational relationship to a legitimate 
governmental interest.”26  We find the distinction here to be rationally 
related to a legitimate state purpose.  Punishing convicted felons more 
seriously than those who have not been convicted of a crime is rationally 
related to the legitimate purpose of protecting correctional officers and other 
employees working in detention facilities from the inmates with whom they 
                                                 
25 Gattis v. State, 637 A.2d 808, 817 n.5 (Del. 1994) (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 
357, 364 (1979)). 
26 Hughes v. State, 653 A.2d 241, 247 (Del. 1994). 
 
16 
interact on an almost daily basis.  We find Dickens’ argument entirely 
without merit. 
(21)  Dickens’ next two arguments relate to his sentencing.  First, he 
argues that the Superior Court violated his due process rights when it 
modified its original sentencing order to eliminate the requirement that 
Dickens serve his sentence at the Sussex Correctional Institute. At his 
sentencing on August 25, 2008, Dickens appeared pro se with his stand-by 
counsel present.  The Superior Court judge indicated that it would include in 
its sentencing order a provision that Dickens serve his Level V sentence at 
the Sussex Correctional Institute.  The sentencing judge informed Dickens, 
however, that the provision was subject to the Department of Correction 
informing the judge if any portion of the sentence could not be carried out.  
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the judge asked Dickens if he 
intended to represent himself on appeal.  Dickens stated that was his 
intention.  The Superior Court therefore relieved stand-by counsel of any 
further responsibilities in the case without any objection from Dickens. 
(22) Thereafter, the Department of Correction informed the Superior 
Court that Dickens could not be housed at any institution other than the 
Vaughn Correctional Center.  The Superior Court held a hearing on the issue 
on October 24, 2008, which resulted in the trial court modifying its 
 
17 
sentencing order to eliminate the housing provision.  Dickens did not request 
the appointment of counsel or stand-by counsel for the hearing or otherwise 
renounce his assertion of his right to self-representation.  Moreover, because 
the only modification to Dickens’ sentence was the elimination of the 
housing provision, which is a matter within the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Correction,27 Dickens cannot establish any prejudice from the 
Superior Court’s failure, sua sponte, to appoint counsel for Dickens. 
(23) Finally, Dickens argues that the Superior Court erred in 
sentencing him on the charges of assault in a detention facility without first 
ascertaining whether the jury found him guilty under 1254(a) (for 
intentionally causing physical injury) or 1254(c) (for intentionally striking 
with urine, feces, or other bodily fluid) because the minimum mandatory 
terms of incarceration are different for each subsection.  Section 1254(a) has 
a two-year minimum mandatory term of incarceration, while Section 
1254(c) has only a one-year minimum mandatory term. 
(24) The record reflects that Counts I and II of the reindictment 
against Dickens charged him in the alternative under Sections 1254(a) and 
(c) with respect to the incidents involving CO Lingenfelter and CO 
McCreanor.  Counts III and IV charged Dickens only under section 1254(c) 
                                                 
27 See 11 Del. C. §§6504(8), 6527(b). 
 
18 
for intentionally striking CO Jordan and CO Behney with bodily fluids.  The 
record further reflects that when the Superior Court instructed the jury on the 
elements of Assault in a Detention Facility, it only instructed the jury on the 
elements of 1254(c).  Nonetheless, the Superior Court sentenced Dickens on 
Counts I and II as if he had been convicted pursuant to the terms of 1254(a) 
because the sentencing order provided that the first two years of each 
sentence was a minimum mandatory term of incarceration.   
(25) The State concedes this was error.  Accordingly, the State 
asserts that Dickens’ case must be remanded to the Superior Court for the 
sole purpose of correcting the sentencing order to reduce the minimum 
mandatory term of incarceration from two years to one year for each of the 
first two counts of assault in a detention facility.  We agree. 
(26) Accordingly, this matter shall be remanded to the Superior 
Court for the sole purpose of correcting Dickens’ sentence in accordance 
with this Order.  In all other respects, the judgment of the Superior Court 
shall be affirmed. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  This matter shall be REMANDED to the Superior 
Court for correction of its sentencing order. In all other respects, the 
 
19 
judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to withdraw is 
moot.  Jurisdiction is not retained. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Justice