Title: Commonwealth v. Traylor
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11788
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: July 22, 2015

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SJC-11788 
 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MATTHEW TRAYLOR. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 3, 2015. - July 22, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Lenk, 
JJ. 
 
 
Child Abuse.  Assault and Battery.  Reckless Endangerment of a 
Child.  Constitutional Law, Double jeopardy.  Practice, 
Criminal, Double jeopardy. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 12, 2008. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Elizabeth M. Fahey, J., and a 
motion to stay execution of sentence was heard in the Appeals 
Court by Francis R. Fecteau, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
David Hirsch for the defendant. 
 
Kevin J. Curtin, Assistant District Attorney (Elizabeth A. 
Dunigan, Assistant District Attorney with him) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  After trial by jury, the defendant was convicted 
in the Superior Court of seven indictments charging offenses 
2 
 
under G. L. c. 265, § 13J (b).  That statute, in relevant part, 
imposes criminal penalties on a person who, "having care and 
custody of a child, wantonly or recklessly permits bodily injury 
[or substantial bodily injury] to such child or wantonly or 
recklessly permits another to commit an assault and battery upon 
such child, which assault and battery causes bodily injury [or 
substantial bodily injury]."  Id.  The seven separate 
indictments did not allege seven different instances on which 
the defendant wantonly or recklessly permitted bodily injury to 
a child, or seven different victims who were harmed as a result 
of the defendant's conduct.  Instead, the seven different 
indictments were each based on a distinct injury or set of 
injuries to the victim, Rory,1 the defendant's son, who was then 
approximately four months old. 
 
The defendant appealed, contending, inter alia, that the 
indictments were duplicative.  Commonwealth v. Traylor, 86 Mass. 
App. Ct. 84, 86 (2014).  The Appeals Court affirmed, id., and we 
granted the defendant's application for further appellate 
review.  We hold that, to establish multiple violations of G. L. 
c. 265, § 13J (b), the Commonwealth must prove either that the 
defendant engaged in separate and discrete instances of criminal 
                                                 
 
1 A pseudonym. 
 
3 
 
conduct, or that multiple victims were harmed as a result of the 
defendant's criminal conduct.  The Commonwealth may not 
establish multiple convictions solely by showing multiple 
injuries to a single child.  Accordingly, we reverse all but one 
of the defendant's convictions. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts at trial.  Rory was born in May, 
2007.  For approximately the first two months of his life, Rory 
lived with his mother and the defendant at the defendant's 
parents' house in East Bridgewater.  The mother then moved to a 
house in Woburn, where she lived with Rory; his grandfather; his 
aunt; and his approximately seventeen month old sister, Sara, 
also the defendant's child.2  The defendant continued to live 
with his parents in East Bridgewater, and sometimes stayed at a 
cousin's house in Boston.  He was engaged to the mother, 
however, and maintained regular contact with her and the two 
children. 
 
Rory was taken to routine medical appointments on August 7, 
2007, and August 15, 2007.  At neither appointment did medical 
providers notice bruising or any other sign of injury.  Shortly 
thereafter, the mother, who had been Rory's primary caregiver, 
returned to work.  The defendant, who was at the time 
                                                 
 
2 Another pseudonym. 
4 
 
unemployed, began to care for Rory most of the time on weekdays 
while the mother was at work.  He would arrive in the morning 
before she left for work, and watch the child until she arrived 
home again in the evening.  Meanwhile, although Rory's 
grandmother was separated from the grandfather and lived 
elsewhere, she sometimes came to the house in Woburn to help 
care for Sara. 
 
On September 13, 2007, the mother, accompanied by Rory and 
the grandmother, went to an appointment at the North Suburban 
Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program in Woburn.  Both of 
the WIC employees who saw Rory testified that he was crying 
unusually at the appointment.  The director of the WIC program 
indicated that ordinary appointments involve a weight check of 
the child, and such weight checks typically were performed with 
the child wearing minimal clothing.  Both employees testified, 
however, that they did not see Rory without his clothes on.  
Neither employee observed anything amiss with the child's face.  
One employee testified that, when asked about the child's 
crying, the mother responded by saying that something in the 
office must have been bothering him, and that he was fine until 
they came in. 
 
The mother testified to two accidents involving Rory that 
occurred after she returned to work.  First, she indicated that 
5 
 
the defendant called her at work one afternoon to tell her that, 
while he was giving Rory and Sara a bath, Rory slipped out of 
his hands, and the defendant had to grab Rory by the hand.  When 
she returned home that evening, she looked at the baby and did 
not see any injuries. 
 
Second, on Saturday, September 15, 2007, the mother 
attended a birthday party for her cousin.  She testified that, 
as she was doing her hair in preparation for the party, Rory, 
who had been placed in his car seat on the bed, fell off the 
bed; Sara may have been rocking the car seat when Rory fell out.  
When the mother rushed to pick him up from the floor, he was 
crying, and she noticed a red spot on his head.  She was able to 
soothe him, and continued on to the party.  At the party, 
various people saw and held Rory.  Aside from a bruise on his 
head, no one who attended the party saw anything amiss with 
Rory. 
 
The mother testified that she did not begin to fear that 
something was wrong with the baby until a day or so later.  She 
noticed that Rory was crying, and that, although he usually had 
a big appetite, he did not want his bottle.  On Monday morning, 
September 17, 2007, the mother and the defendant took Rory to a 
local hospital.  The receiving nurse observed "a slight red[] 
spot on the side of the [child's] forehead, like a little rub 
6 
 
mark."  The mother told the nurse that he had fallen off a bed. 
 
An X-ray taken at the hospital revealed numerous fractures.  
Some fractures were "acute," meaning that they had occurred 
within the last seven days.  Other fractures showed "callus," a 
material that forms as new bone is laid down around the line of 
the fracture.  Because callus typically does not appear in 
infants until at least seven days after an injury, a radiologist 
concluded that the injuries were "of differing ages," with some 
happening "very close to the time of the [X-ray] film," while 
others were "more remote." 
 
Based on the results of the X-ray, Rory was transferred 
that day to a hospital in Boston.  There, a pediatrician, a 
social worker with the then Department of Social Services (DSS) 
(now the Department of Children and Families, see St. 2008, 
c. 176), and police officers all observed numerous bruises on 
the child.  Rory had two bruises on his face, above his eye, and 
bruising on the chest and abdomen, including one very large 
bruise that reached almost around to his back.  One bruise 
"almost looked like a hand print." 
 
Two DSS social workers spoke with the defendant and the 
mother for approximately forty-five minutes while they were at 
the Boston hospital.  During that interview, the defendant 
indicated that he had noticed a few days earlier that Rory was 
7 
 
not moving his shoulder very much, and had observed swelling to 
the baby's shoulder earlier that morning, when Rory woke up 
crying.  Based on the nature of the injuries, the social workers 
decided to take custody of Rory and Sara.  Sara was examined 
later at the local hospital where Rory had first been taken; 
doctors observed no injuries or signs of abuse. 
 
While they were at the Boston hospital, the mother and the 
defendant were approached by officers of the Woburn police 
department.  During that encounter, the defendant appeared upset 
and agitated.  Asked for an interview, he responded that "he had 
told his story fifty times and that it must be written down 
somewhere," and stated that he wanted to leave. 
 
Later that day, however, the defendant appeared at the 
Woburn police station and spoke with one of the officers.  At 
that interview, which was recorded and played for the jury, the 
defendant indicated that he had been watching Rory during the 
day for the past three or four weeks, since the mother returned 
to work.  He related both his account of the baby's fall in the 
tub, which he said had happened on Monday or Tuesday of the 
preceding week, and the mother's account of Rory's fall off the 
bed that Saturday.  He also admitted that he had seen bruises on 
Rory before, indicating that he had mentioned to the child's 
pediatrician that Rory seemed to bruise easily.  He denied ever 
8 
 
having lost his temper with the child, and insisted that the 
bruises the officers had observed were not present when he, the 
mother, and Rory first arrived at the hospital. 
 
A pediatrician who had reviewed Rory's medical records 
testified as an expert witness for the Commonwealth.  The expert 
detailed various injuries from which Rory suffered, and 
indicated that none of the injuries could have resulted from an 
accident or clumsy handling.  Rory had ten rib fractures on the 
right side of his chest, seven of which were sufficiently old 
that callus had begun to form, and seven rib fractures on the 
left side of his chest, three of which showed callus.  Such 
injuries, the expert indicated, would have resulted from 
"violent squeezing or crushing injuries, such as stepping on an 
infant or sitting on an infant."  Rory had a fracture of the 
tibia, the lower bone in the leg.  That injury similarly would 
have required a "violent twisting of that leg and bending it 
forcefully up."  He had a fracture to the iliac crest, the 
pelvis bone.  That injury was a "very unusual fracture," and 
would have required a "tremendous amount of violence and force," 
akin to a motor vehicle accident.  Rory had an injury to his 
humerus near his right shoulder, in which the bone and the 
cartilage had been separated.  That injury would have required 
"a jerking force, or swinging the child by the arm."  He also 
9 
 
had lacerations to his spleen and liver.  Those injuries too 
could not have resulted from "household falls" or "clumsy 
handling."  Finally, the expert testified that the extensive 
bruising on Rory's body was unusual for an infant of three 
months, because "[a]n infant who's not rolling, or walking, or 
running around, does not have occasion to get bruised." 
 
The expert stated that Rory had no weakness in his bones, 
and no blood problem that would cause him to bruise easily.  The 
expert indicated that Rory could have gotten "maybe two bruises 
and two broken bones at the most" from the bathtub fall that the 
defendant and the mother described, but that such a fall could 
not have caused the lacerations of the spleen and liver.  
Similarly, the fall from the car seat could have caused the 
fracture to the tibia, but could not have caused the shoulder 
injury, and would be unlikely as the cause of the rib injury.  
The expert stated that a child of approximately Sara's age would 
not have had the strength or hand size to cause the injuries. 
 
The expert testified that the injuries would have caused 
Rory distress that would have been obvious to anyone caring for 
him.  The fractures to the ribs, tibia, and iliac crest would 
have been very painful, and he would have cried and fussed 
whenever he was held or changed.  The laceration to the liver 
would have been similarly painful, and would have resulted in 
10 
 
"some distension of the[] abdomen" and "irritability and very 
likely poor feeding and vomiting." 
 
Nonetheless, none of the individuals who lived in the house 
in Woburn with Rory testified that he displayed any such 
behavior until the weekend before he was taken to the hospital.  
The aunt, who was the mother's sister and was twenty-three years 
old at the time, testified that she saw Rory at the party that 
Saturday night, and, although she saw a bruise on his forehead, 
the child was laughing when she interacted with him.  The 
grandfather similarly testified that Rory looked "okay" at the 
party and was not crying, that he had never seen bruising on 
Rory, and that he could not believe it when the social workers 
described the injuries Rory had suffered because the baby 
"didn't cry like something like that had happened to him."  The 
grandmother testified that she never saw bruises on Rory and 
never saw anyone hurt him. 
 
Finally, the mother, who testified pursuant to a grant of 
immunity and whose relationship with the defendant had ended by 
the time of her testimony, indicated that she had never seen 
bruises on Rory's stomach before he was taken to the hospital in 
Boston.  She stated that the defendant "was a great father in 
[her] eyes."  She said, "[W]hen I found out this happened to my 
child, . . . I was just wondering how I could have missed it, 
11 
 
how I had no idea, you know, all these things happened to my 
child."  She asserted that she believed that her child had "a 
bone disease problem," even though he had not suffered any 
additional fractures after September, 2007. 
 
b.  Proceedings.  The defendant was indicted in September, 
2008, on seven different charges of violating G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13J.  That statute provides, in relevant part: 
 
"Whoever commits an assault and battery upon a child 
and by such assault and battery causes substantial bodily 
injury shall be punished by imprisonment in the state 
prison for not more than five years or imprisonment in the 
house of correction for not more than two and one-half 
years. 
 
 
". . . 
 
 
"Whoever, having care and custody of a child, wantonly 
or recklessly permits bodily injury to such child or 
wantonly or recklessly permits another to commit an assault 
and battery upon such child, which assault and battery 
causes bodily injury, shall be punished by imprisonment for 
not more than two and one-half years in the house of 
correction. 
 
 
"Whoever, having care and custody of a child, wantonly 
or recklessly permits substantial body injury to such child 
or wantonly or recklessly permits another to commit an 
assault and battery upon such child, which assault and 
battery causes substantial bodily injury, shall be punished 
by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five 
years, or by imprisonment in a jail or house of correction 
for not more than two and one-half years." 
 
G. L. c. 265, § 13J (b). 
 
 
The first and third indictments charged violations of the 
statute resulting in substantial bodily injury.  These 
12 
 
indictments were based on the lacerated liver and the lacerated 
spleen.  The remaining five indictments charged violations of 
the statute resulting in bodily injury.  These were based on the 
fractured humerus, the fractured tibia, the fracture to the 
iliac crest, the seventeen fractures of the ribs, and the 
bruises on much of Rory's body.  At no point during the 
proceedings in the Superior Court did defense counsel object to 
this method of charging the defendant. 
 
The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all seven 
indictments.  For each indictment, the jury answered special 
verdict questions in which they chose between three possible 
theories for each count.  The first theory was that the 
defendant committed an assault and battery, resulting in bodily 
injury or substantial bodily injury; the second was that the 
defendant, having care and custody of the child, wantonly or 
recklessly permitted bodily injury or substantial bodily injury; 
the third was that the defendant, having care and custody of the 
child, wantonly or recklessly permitted another to commit an 
assault and battery upon a child, resulting in bodily injury or 
substantial bodily injury.  For each indictment, the jury found 
the defendant guilty on the final two theories, and not on the 
first theory. 
 
As to the first and third indictments, based on the 
13 
 
substantial bodily injury involved in the lacerated liver and 
the bodily injury involved in the fractured humerus, the judge 
sentenced the defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment of 
from two years to two years and one day for the first 
indictment, and two and one-half years for the third indictment.  
As to the remaining indictments, the judge sentenced the 
defendant to five four-year concurrent terms of probation. 
 
The defendant appealed.  He argued, for the first time on 
appeal, that his multiple convictions based on distinct injuries 
or sets of injuries violated the double jeopardy clause of the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that the 
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction on any of the 
charges.  The Appeals Court affirmed the convictions.  See 
Commonwealth v. Traylor, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 84, 86 (2014).  As to 
the double jeopardy challenge, the Appeals Court held "that 
G. L. c. 265, § 13J (b), reflects a clear legislative intent 
that the unit of prosecution may be predicated upon, and 
indictments may be brought . . . , for discrete and 
particularized injuries to a child occurring while the child is 
with a caretaker who commits or recklessly and wantonly permits 
the infliction of such injuries upon the child being cared for."  
Id. at 88.  We granted the defendant's petition for further 
appellate review, limited to the double jeopardy claim. 
14 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "Our case law 
provides that unpreserved claims of error" are to "be reviewed 
to determine if a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice 
occurred."  Commonwealth v. LaChance, 469 Mass. 854, 857 (2014).  
See Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 787, 799 (2012).  Even if 
the issue was unpreserved, we will reverse a duplicative 
conviction.  See Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 700 
(2015); Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 405 Mass. 369, 382 (1989).  
Accordingly, we proceed to the merits of the defendant's double 
jeopardy claim. 
 
b.  Double jeopardy.  The Fifth Amendment provides that no 
person "shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb."  The double jeopardy clause 
"protects against three distinct abuses:  a second prosecution 
for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for 
the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for 
the same offense."  Commonwealth v. Crawford, 430 Mass. 683, 699 
(2000), quoting Mahoney v. Commonwealth, 415 Mass. 270, 283 
(1993).  This case implicates the third category of protection. 
 
In evaluating claims of double jeopardy violations, we also 
distinguish between two situations.  Where a claimed double 
jeopardy violation arises from multiple "prosecutions for 
different crimes, under different statutes, arising out of the 
15 
 
same criminal episode[,] . . . we are required to determine 
whether either crime charged is a lesser-included offense of the 
other."  Commonwealth v. Donovan, 395 Mass. 20, 28 (1985) 
(citations and quotation omitted).  A different set of issues 
arises where, as here, "a single statute is involved and the 
issue is whether two [or more] discrete offenses were proved 
under that statute rather than a single continuing offense" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Id.  Then our inquiry 
requires statutory interpretation.  We ask "what 'unit of 
prosecution' was intended by the Legislature as the punishable 
act."  Commonwealth v. Botev, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 281, 286 (2011), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Antonmarchi, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 463, 466 
(2007).  To determine the appropriate "unit of prosecution," we 
"look to the language and purpose of the statute[], to see 
whether [it] speak[s] directly to the issue of the appropriate 
unit of prosecution."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Antonmarchi, 
supra. 
 
In ascertaining the unit of prosecution, our case law 
distinguishes between two broad categories of statutes.  On the 
one hand, certain criminal statutes are "focused upon the 
prevention of violence or physical injury to others."  Id.  With 
respect to that category of offenses, we have held that, 
"[w]henever a single criminal transaction gives rise to crimes 
16 
 
of violence which are committed against several victims, then 
multiple indictments (and punishments)" for the crime against 
each victim "are appropriate."  Commonwealth v. Donovan, 395 
Mass. at 31.  See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 430 Mass. at 685-688 
(upholding multiple convictions of involuntary manslaughter 
based on firing single shot that killed both defendant's girl 
friend and her unborn fetus); Commonwealth v. Levia, 385 Mass. 
345, 346, 350-351 (1982) (upholding multiple convictions of 
masked armed robbery where defendant robbed convenience store at 
gunpoint and took money from two different employees); 
Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 401 (1944) (upholding 
multiple convictions of manslaughter for deaths resulting from 
fire at night club owned by defendant); Commonwealth v. Meehan, 
14 Mass. App. Ct. 1028, 1028-1029 (1982) (upholding multiple 
convictions based on two deaths resulting from vehicular 
homicide, because offense "falls within the general category of 
homicide offenses" and "[t]hose offenses traditionally have 
permitted punishment for each death caused by a defendant's 
criminal conduct"). 
 
Another broad category of statutes is directed at 
"punishing the defendant for conduct offensive to society, as 
distinct from punishing the defendant for the effect of that 
conduct on particular victims."  Commonwealth v. Botev, 79 Mass. 
17 
 
App. Ct. at 287.  With respect to that category of offenses, a 
single instance of unlawful conduct can support only a single 
conviction, even if it affected several victims.  Id. at 289.  
In Commonwealth v. Constantino, 443 Mass. 521, 524 (2005), for 
instance, we held that the offense of leaving the scene of an 
accident resulting in death, see G. L. c. 90, § 24, was conduct-
focused.  Consequently, even where multiple victims died as a 
result of a single instance of proscribed conduct, we concluded 
that the defendant could be convicted only of one offense under 
the statute.  See id. at 524.  Other statutes that we have 
placed in this category are statutes criminalizing possession of 
child pornography, see Commonwealth v. Rollins, 470 Mass. 66, 73 
(2014); statutes criminalizing the possession of proscribed 
drugs, see Commonwealth v. Rabb, 431 Mass. 123, 129-132 (2000); 
and statutes criminalizing open and gross lewdness, see 
Commonwealth v. Botev, supra at 281-282. 
 
Importantly, with respect to either category, to sustain 
multiple convictions of the same offense, the Commonwealth 
generally must establish that the convictions are "premised on 
. . . distinct criminal act[s]."  Commonwealth v. Vick, 454 
Mass. 418, 435 (2009).  The logic underlying decisions holding 
that multiple indictments and multiple punishments are 
appropriate where a single criminal transaction harms multiple 
18 
 
victims, for instance, is that the single transaction gives rise 
to "separate and distinct" crimes of violence as to each victim.  
Commonwealth v. Levia, supra at 351.  By contrast, where 
"multiple convictions and sentences" are not based on distinct 
criminal acts, the convictions are permissible only where "the 
Legislature has explicitly authorized cumulative punishments."  
Commonwealth v. Vick, supra at 435.  That rule accords with the 
rule of lenity, which demands that we construe criminal statutes 
"strictly against the Commonwealth," and that any "ambiguity 
concerning the [statute's] ambit . . . [is] resolved in favor of 
lenity" (quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Donovan, supra at 29. 
 
With these principles in mind, we turn to the language of 
the statute.  We agree with the Appeals Court that the statute 
falls within the general category of offenses directed against 
the prevention of violence and injury to others.  The statute 
appears under "Crimes Against the Person" within the General 
Laws, and it specifically references "assault and battery," a 
classic crime of violence.  Compare Commonwealth v. Meehan, 14 
Mass. App. Ct. at 1029. 
 
We see no indication in the language of the statute, 
however, to suggest -- much less "explicitly authorize[]," 
Commonwealth v. Vick, 454 Mass. at 435 -- cumulative convictions 
19 
 
and punishments for a single criminal act against a single 
victim, simply because the act results in multiple injuries.  
Like other criminal laws, the statute is directed at a 
particular form of conduct.  The first paragraph of the statute 
addresses an act of commission ("[w]hoever commits an assault 
and battery upon a child"); the next two paragraphs address acts 
of omission ("wantonly or recklessly permit[ting] bodily injury 
[or substantial bodily injury] to [a] child" or "wantonly or 
recklessly permit[ting] another to commit an assault and battery 
upon such child").  Nothing in the language of the statute 
indicates a legislative intent to make the resulting injuries, 
rather than distinct instances of proscribed conduct or distinct 
victims, the unit of prosecution. 
 
The Commonwealth contends that, because the proscribed act 
of "permit[ting]" must cause either a "bodily injury" or a 
"substantial bodily injury," the Legislature intended that the 
injury itself constitute the unit of prosecution.  It is not 
unusual, however, for a particular form of criminal conduct to 
be defined in part by reference to its results.  The common-law 
offense of "reckless assault and battery," for instance, "is 
committed when an individual engages in reckless conduct that 
results in a touching producing physical injury to another 
person."  Commonwealth v. Porro, 458 Mass. 526, 529 (2010).  Yet 
20 
 
we are aware of no instances in which a defendant has been 
charged with multiple indictments for reckless assault and 
battery simply because the criminal act caused multiple injuries 
to the victim.  Indeed, when pressed at oral argument, the 
Commonwealth was unable to identify any other crime for which 
the unit of prosecution is a distinct injury to the victim, 
rather than a separate and distinct criminal act. 
 
The Appeals Court determined that the unit of prosecution 
under G. L. c. 265, § 13J (b), is "codified" in the statute's 
definitions of "bodily injury" and "substantial bodily injury."  
Under these definitions, a "bodily injury" is a "substantial 
impairment of the physical condition including any burn, 
fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma, injury to any internal 
organ, any injury which occurs as the result of repeated harm to 
any bodily function or organ including human skin or any 
physical condition which substantially imperils a child's health 
or welfare."  G. L. c. 265, § 13J (a).  A substantial bodily 
injury is a "bodily injury which creates a permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of a function of a 
body member, limb or organ, or substantial risk of death."  Id. 
 
Again, however, it is common for a criminal statute to 
define such terms specifically, and to condition the severity of 
the penalty on the degree of injury suffered by the victim.  A 
21 
 
defendant who commits an assault and battery with a dangerous 
weapon, for instance, is subject to heightened penalties where 
the offense "causes serious bodily injury."  G. L. c. 265, 
§ 15A (c) (i).  Similarly, a defendant who strangles or 
suffocates a victim is subject to heightened penalties where 
"such strangulation or suffocation causes serious bodily 
injury."  G. L. c. 265, § 15D, inserted by St. 2014, c. 260, 
§ 24.  Each of these statutes expressly defines "serious bodily 
injury," in terms that resemble the definition of "substantial 
bodily injury" in the statute at issue here.  Compare G. L. 
c. 265, § 13J (a), with G. L. c. 265, § 15A (d) (defining 
"serious bodily injury" as "bodily injury which results in a 
permanent disfigurement, loss or impairment of a bodily 
function, limb or organ, or a substantial risk of death").  See 
also G. L. c. 265, § 15D (a).  Yet, we have never held that 
multiple convictions under either statute may be based on 
multiple injuries to a single victim, unless the Commonwealth 
proves that each injury resulted from a distinct criminal act. 
 
The Appeals Court's determination was based also on its 
view that G. L. c. 265, § 13J (b), was intended to "prevent 
violence perpetrated upon children who are ever so vulnerable in 
the caretaking setting."  Commonwealth v. Traylor, 86 Mass. App. 
Ct. 84, 89 (2014).  Plainly, the intent underlying the statute 
22 
 
is to protect children against violence and injury.  The 
enactment of the statute was prompted by a decision of this 
court holding that a parent could not be convicted as an 
accessory before the fact for failing to take reasonable steps 
to prevent sexual attacks on a minor child.  Commonwealth v. 
Raposo, 413 Mass. 182, 188-89 (1992); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 47 
Mass. App. Ct. 419, 419-420 (1999).  To that end, as noted, the 
statute criminalizes acts of omission in addition to acts of 
commission, Commonwealth v. Garcia, supra at 422-423, and a 
defendant may be convicted under the statute even in the absence 
of proof regarding precisely how the injuries to the child 
occurred.  See Commonwealth v. Rodriques, 462 Mass. 415, 422-424 
(2012).  It does not follow, however, that, because the 
Legislature limited the elements that the Commonwealth must 
prove to establish a violation under the statute, the 
Legislature also must have intended to allow the Commonwealth to 
prove multiple violations without establishing more than a 
single instance of criminal conduct directed at a single victim.  
Indeed, because the proof offered to establish a violation of 
the statute often consists merely of evidence that a child was 
"left in the custody of an identified adult" and then 
"suffer[ed] injuries of a type that are inconsistent with the 
explanation given by the custodian and not attributable in the 
23 
 
circumstances to ordinary accidental causes," the consequences 
of defining the particular injury as the unit of prosecution 
would be especially severe.  See Commonwealth v. Roman, 43 Mass. 
App. Ct. 733, 735 (1997), S.C., 427 Mass. 1006 (1998).  Because 
the statute does not expressly so define the unit of 
prosecution, the rule of lenity demands that we construe the 
statute strictly in favor of the defendant, by requiring the 
Commonwealth to establish separate and discrete acts of 
"permit[ting]," or multiple victims harmed by the proscribed 
conduct, in order to sustain multiple convictions under the 
second and third paragraphs of G. L. c. 265, § 13J (b). 
Finally, the Appeals Court determined that its 
interpretation of the appropriate "unit of prosecution" was 
consistent with the statute's "staircasing of . . . penalties," 
whereby "harsher penalties" were imposed "for acts and omissions 
that lead to substantial bodily injury versus less serious 
bodily injury."  Commonwealth v. Traylor, 86 Mass. App. Ct. at 
91.  Again, however, linking a harsher penalty with a showing 
that the proscribed conduct resulted in more severe injury is 
hardly unusual, yet it has not led us previously to conclude 
that the appropriate "unit of prosecution" for a crime is a 
distinct injury.  Additionally, the interpretation urged by the 
Commonwealth, and embraced by the Appeals Court, might well 
24 
 
subvert the "staircasing of . . . penalties" articulated in the 
statute.  Under G. L. c. 265, § 13J (b), the maximum sentence 
for conduct that results in substantial bodily injury is twice 
as long as the maximum sentence for conduct that results in 
bodily injury.  Under the interpretation urged by the 
Commonwealth, however, multiple minor bodily injuries such as 
bruises could, even if they were all the result of a single 
instance of proscribed conduct, result in a sentence many times 
longer than the sentence for a similar criminal act that results 
in "substantial bodily injury." 
We are sensitive to the need to protect children against 
violence and injury in the caretaking setting.  As noted 
earlier, the statute already provides this protection in various 
ways, by criminalizing acts of omission in addition to acts of 
commission, by not requiring the Commonwealth to prove precisely 
how the injuries occurred, and by imposing stricter penalties 
where a defendant's conduct results in a substantial bodily 
injury as opposed to a bodily injury.  Because the double 
jeopardy clause imposes "few, if any, limitations . . . on the 
legislative power to define offenses," Commonwealth v. Levia, 
385 Mass. 345, 347 (1982), moreover, the Legislature could, if 
it wished, amend the statute expressly to define separate and 
discrete injuries to a child as the appropriate unit of 
25 
 
prosecution.  Absent any textual support to indicate that the 
Legislature has adopted each discrete injury as the unit of 
prosecution, however, and in light of the extreme novelty of 
that theory and the severity of its consequences for defendants, 
we reject that theory.  Instead, we hold that, to sustain 
multiple convictions under the statute, the Commonwealth must 
establish either separate and discrete instances in which a 
defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct, or that multiple 
victims were harmed as a result of a defendant's conduct. 
c.  Consequences of the double jeopardy determination.  
Having determined that the multiple indictments under G. L. 
c. 265, § 13J (b), violated the defendant's rights under the 
double jeopardy clause, we must ascertain the consequences of 
that determination.  On appeal, the defendant argues that all 
but two of his convictions must be reversed.  He notes that the 
Commonwealth's expert testified that the injuries charged 
occurred on "at least two occasions," and that it consequently 
would "be speculative to assume that there were more than two 
occasions" on which the defendant engaged in the proscribed 
conduct.  The Commonwealth, on the other hand, contends that, 
even if we accept the defendant's double jeopardy argument, five 
of the seven convictions should stand.  The Commonwealth's 
argument is essentially that the evidence supported a 
26 
 
determination of "five separate instances of abuse."  The 
Commonwealth acknowledges that "there was no evidence that the 
injury to the liver and the injury to the spleen . . . occurred 
at different times"; assumes for the sake of argument that the 
fractured tibia and the fractured iliac crest "could have 
happened at the same time"; and accepts that "it is conceivable 
that the 'finger-like' bruises to the abdomen might have 
occurred at or near the time of the more recent rib fractures on 
the left side of [Rory's] body."  The Commonwealth asserts, 
however, that the evidence supported the conclusion that other 
rib fractures and the fractured humerus resulted from distinct 
acts of abuse, leading to a total of "five separate instances of 
abuse." 
In our view, both parties' arguments miss the mark.  As an 
initial matter, the conduct proscribed by G. L. c. 265, § 13J, 
as relevant to this case, is the act of "wantonly or recklessly 
permit[ting] bodily injury to [a] child or wantonly or 
recklessly permit[ting] another to commit an assault and battery 
upon a child."  To sustain multiple convictions under those 
provisions for injuries inflicted on a single victim, therefore, 
the Commonwealth must establish multiple instances on which the 
defendant engaged in the proscribed act of "permit[ting]."  The 
Commonwealth may not sustain multiple convictions, as its 
27 
 
argument suggests, simply by showing that the injuries were the 
result of discrete acts of abuse, without showing that each of 
these acts of abuse was in turn enabled by a discrete act of 
"permit[ting]." 
Furthermore, in discussing which of the potentially 
duplicative convictions must be vacated, both parties focus on 
the question whether the evidence presented to the jury was 
sufficient to support a finding of a certain number of separate 
and discrete instances of proscribed conduct by the defendant.  
In instructing the jury on the second and the third theories, 
however, the judge did not state that the jury had to find 
separate and distinct instances of proscribed conduct.  Instead, 
the instructions suggested -- consistent with the indictments at 
issue -- that the jury needed only to find separate injuries in 
order to return verdicts of guilt on seven indictments.  The 
judge stated: 
 
"You may find [the defendant] guilty only if you are 
unanimously agreed that the Commonwealth has proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] committed the 
offense on at least one specific occasion during the time 
period alleged in the indictment.  It is not necessary for 
the Commonwealth to prove or for you to agree that the 
offense was also committed on more than one occasion.  
However, you must unanimous[ly] agree that the Commonwealth 
has proven that [the defendant] committed the offense on at 
least one occasion during the time period alleged in the 
indictment." 
 
We have held that, "[w]here . . . the judge does not 
28 
 
clearly instruct the jury that they must find that the defendant 
committed separate and distinct criminal acts to convict on" 
multiple charges, the resulting convictions "must be vacated as 
duplicative, even in the absence of an objection, if there is 
any significant possibility that the jury may have based [the] 
convictions . . . on the same act or series of acts (emphasis 
added)."  Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 700 (2015).  In 
Commonwealth v. Kelly, supra at 698-702, for instance, a 
defendant was convicted of two counts of assault and battery.  
Both charges stemmed from a series of events beginning at a 
house party, during which the defendant allegedly pushed, 
tackled, punched, and kicked the victim, another partygoer.  Id. 
at 699.  Although these distinct acts could have supported 
multiple convictions of assault and battery, the judge had 
failed either "to instruct on separate and distinct acts[] 
or . . . to make clear to the jury which alleged acts 
corresponded to which charges."  Id.  Accordingly, even though 
the defendant had not objected to the jury instructions at 
trial, we reversed one of the two assault and battery 
convictions, concluding that there was a significant possibility 
that the convictions were based on the same criminal act.  Id. 
at 699, 702. 
Here, likewise, the jury were not instructed properly that 
29 
 
they had to find multiple acts of "permit[ting]" to sustain 
multiple convictions; instead, they were told explicitly that 
they needed only to find a single act of "permit[ting]."  And 
while the Commonwealth offered evidence to suggest that five of 
the victim's seven injuries or sets of injuries resulted from 
distinct acts of abuse, the Commonwealth did not offer evidence 
to show that each of these acts of abuse was enabled by a 
discrete act of "permit[ting]" by the defendant. 
It cannot be said, therefore, that there is no significant 
possibility that the defendant's convictions rested on a single, 
undivided act of proscribed "permit[ting]."  True, the 
Commonwealth offered some evidence that the injuries occurred on 
"at least two occasions."  But even that evidence was severely 
limited, consisting solely of testimony from the hospital's 
radiologist and the Commonwealth's expert that certain rib 
fractures showed "callus," while the other fractures did not, 
and that callus requires at least seven days to emerge.  Defense 
counsel aggressively challenged that testimony on cross-
examination.  Even if the jury did believe that certain rib 
fractures originated on an earlier date than the other injuries, 
moreover, that does not mean that the jury also would have found 
that the defendant was criminally responsible for "permit[ting]" 
those earlier injuries.  All of the rib fractures -- both old 
30 
 
and new -- were charged together in a single indictment.  The 
jury could have believed that the earlier fractures were the 
result of a noncriminal accident (the fall in the bathtub that 
the defendant and the mother described, for instance), while 
believing that the other rib fractures and the remaining 
injuries were the result of a criminal act of "permit[ting]."  
The jury could have disbelieved the expert's testimony that the 
earlier rib fractures would have resulted in obvious signs of 
distress, and instead credited the testimony of the multiple 
witnesses who testified that they did not see any sign that Rory 
was in distress until a few days before he was taken to the 
hospital. 
Finally, while the defendant asks only that this court 
reverse five (rather than six) of his seven convictions, this 
request is predicated on the assumption that potentially 
duplicative convictions must be reversed unless there was 
sufficient evidence from which a properly instructed jury could 
have convicted the defendant of multiple counts.  As noted 
above, however, that is not the proper framework of analysis.  
Because the limitation on the relief that the defendant requests 
is premised on a mistaken apprehension of the law, we do not 
treat it as a waiver.  Although waiver ordinarily would preclude 
this court from considering issues, claims, or grounds for 
31 
 
relief that are not raised by the parties, where, as here, a 
valid constitutional claim is properly before this court, the 
doctrine does not compel us to replicate the parties' legal 
errors in ordering an appropriate remedy. 
In Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1978), the 
United States Supreme Court held that, where an appellate court 
determines that the evidence presented at a trial against a 
defendant was legally insufficient, the only proper remedy is 
the direction of a judgment of acquittal.  The Court further 
observed:  "In our view it makes no difference that a defendant 
has sought a new trial as one of his remedies, or even as the 
sole remedy," explaining that "[i]t cannot be meaningfully said 
that a person 'waives' his right to a judgment of acquittal by 
moving for a new trial."  Id. at 17.  The Court concluded:  
"Since we hold today that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a 
second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence 
legally insufficient, the only 'just' remedy available for that 
court is the direction of a judgment of acquittal."  Id. at 18. 
Here, similarly, it makes no difference for our analysis 
that the defendant concedes that there was sufficient evidence 
from which a properly instructed jury could have found two 
distinct violations of G. L. c. 265, § 13J.  The jury were not 
properly instructed, and the test in such circumstances is not 
32 
 
whether there was sufficient evidence to support multiple 
convictions, but whether there is any significant possibility 
that the multiple convictions were based on the same act.  
Because we hold that there was a significant possibility that 
all of the defendant's convictions were based on a jury finding 
of a single violation of the statute, the only just remedy is 
for the court to reverse all but one conviction. 
3.  Conclusion.  Because the verdict indicates that the 
jury found at least one occasion of criminal "permit[ting]" 
under the statute, and that the act of "permit[ting]" resulted 
in "substantial bodily injury" as defined by the statute, one 
conviction of a violation of the statute resulting in 
substantial bodily injury may stand.  There is a significant 
possibility, however, that the remaining six convictions -- one 
of a violation resulting in substantial bodily injury, and five 
of violations resulting in bodily injury -- rest on the same act 
of "permit[ting]."  Accordingly, those convictions must be 
reversed.  The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for 
entry of orders consistent with this decision, and for 
resentencing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.