Title: New Jersey v. Medina
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: June 9, 2020

New Jersey v. Medina Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Defendant Jose Medina was tried and convicted for offenses related to a non-fatal slashing that occurred outside of a bar in the Township of Belleville, New Jersey. Although no physical evidence linked defendant to the crime, surveillance footage captured the incident, and the victim selected defendant’s picture from a photo array. A woman who witnessed the attack identified defendant as the attacker to police but was unwilling to give a formal statement or testify. At defendant’s trial, the prosecutor referenced the anonymous woman, after which an officer testified that, based on the “evidence . . . collected,” he included defendant’s picture in the photo array. Relying on New Jersey v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263 (1973), New Jersey v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427 (1989), and New Jersey v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338 (2005), the Appellate Division found that this testimony violated the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause by suggesting that the anonymous woman -- a non-testifying witness -- implicated defendant in the crime. Viewing the trial record in its entirety, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the officer’s testimony did not generate such an inference. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Appellate Division. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here .(NOTE: The status of this decision is .) SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. Jose Medina (A-67-18) (081926)Argued March 16, 2020 – Decided June 9, 2020Timpone, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether, under the circumstances of this case, a detective’s testimony that he had included defendant Jose Medina’s picture in a photo array based on the “evidence . . . collected” violated the hearsay rule or defendant’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. In December 2013, Anthony Rivera was slashed across the face as he exited a bar. Police spoke with Rivera, who described his attacker and indicated that he could identify the attacker if he saw him again. His friend Tommy Rafferty also described, but could not identify, the attacker. Officers spoke with a woman at the scene who wished to remain anonymous. She identified the attacker as defendant and showed the police one of defendant’s Instagram pictures and his username. Detective Anthony Abate prepared a photo array that included defendant’s picture. Looking at the array, Rivera identified defendant as the attacker. Rivera also identified defendant as his attacker at trial. Abate also testified and confirmed, over defendant’s objection, that officers at the scene “spoke with one female who didn’t want to get involved.” Abate further confirmed Rafferty “was the only one who was willing to come in and give a statement.” Abate testified he obtained surveillance footage, which the State played for the jury. Abate told the jury that Rivera provided a description of the attacker and said that he could identify the attacker if he saw him again. At that point, the prosecutor asked, “based on . . . the evidence that you collected, did you have a suspect?” Abate stated that defendant was the suspect. Abate further testified that he generated a photo array. The prosecutor asked whether Abate was “going based in any way on [his] viewing of the surveillance footage” when he made the array; Abate replied affirmatively. On redirect, Abate confirmed that the responding officers at the scene “managed to speak with one person, a female, who wished to remain anonymous, didn’t want to give a statement.” He explained that the officers attempted to question other people at the scene, but that “nobody else . . . volunteered to give any statements.” 1 The jury convicted defendant of aggravated assault and weapons offenses, and defendant appealed. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a new trial. The appellate court found it problematic that the investigating officer relied on unverifiable hearsay statements to create a photo array and also took issue with Abate’s testimony. The Court granted the State’s petition for certification. 237 N.J. 419 (2019).HELD: Viewing the trial record in its entirety, the detective’s testimony, in context, did not compel the inference that he had superior knowledge incriminating defendant from a non-testifying witness. The testimony therefore did not violate defendant’s confrontation right or the hearsay rule. Although there was no abuse of discretion in the admission of the testimony here, the Court cautions against using the phrase “based on the evidence collected” in this context and provides guidance as to curative instructions.1. In State v. Bankston, the Court noted that the use of neutral explanatory phrases, such as the officer approached a suspect “upon information received,” are admissible to show “the officer was not acting in an arbitrary manner.” 63 N.J. 263, 268 (1973). The Court stressed, however, that when the officer repeats “what some other person told him concerning a crime by the accused,” the testimony violates both the hearsay rule and the defendant’s confrontation right. Id. at 268-69. And even where the officer does not reiterate what he learned from a third party, “[w]hen the logical implication to be drawn from the testimony leads the jury to believe that a non-testifying witness has given the police evidence of the accused’s guilt, the testimony should be disallowed as hearsay.” Id. at 271. In Bankston, although the detective never repeated what he learned from the informer, the “inescapable inference” from his testimony was that the “unidentified informer, who was not present in court and not subjected to cross-examination, had told the officers that defendant was committing a crime.” Ibid.; accord State v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427 (1989). The Court held that the testimony should not have been admitted. Bankston, 63 N.J. at 271, 273. Hearsay may not be used to imply that a testifying officer possesses superior knowledge than what is presented to the jury and, hence, his testimony is worthy of greater weight. (pp. 20-25)2. Here, it is undisputed that Abate never repeated to the jury what the anonymous woman said, so his testimony would only conflict with the above principles if his references to her created an “inescapable inference” that she incriminated defendant. Yet, Abate did not imply that the woman gave police any information at all. Based on the record, the jury likely considered the anonymous woman to be a “dead-end witness.” Abate’s testimony did not create the “inescapable inference” that he had superior information about defendant’s guilt from the anonymous woman, and it did not violate defendant’s confrontation right or the hearsay rule under Bankston. (pp. 25-27)3. In State v. Branch, the Court considered the use of neutral phrases in the particular context of photographic identifications and “disapprove[d] of a police officer testifying that he placed a defendant’s picture in a photographic array 'upon information received,’” 2 noting that such “language, by inference, has the capacity to sweep in inadmissible hearsay” by implying the “officer has information suggestive of the defendant’s guilt from some unknown source.” 182 N.J. 338, 352 (2005). Accordingly, the Court limited the use of “based on information received” to “contexts other than a photographic identification,” and “only if necessary to rebut a suggestion that [the officer] acted arbitrarily and only if the use of that phrase does not create an inference that the defendant has been implicated in a crime by some unknown person.” Ibid. (pp. 27-29)4. Whether Branch’s embargo of the phrase “based on information received” extends to other, broader phrases depends on context. The circumstances here are significantly different than in Branch. Notably, “information received” suggests the existence of an informant, whereas “evidence . . . collected” is a broader phrase that could encompass other types of evidence. Perhaps most importantly, Abate repeatedly told the jury that no one other than Rafferty and Rivera came forward to give a statement. Viewed in that light, “the logical implication” of Abate’s testimony was that “the evidence that [he] collected” referred to evidence other than hearsay. Given the other evidence in the record, the Court finds Abate’s testimony did not compel the inference that he had superior knowledge incriminating defendant from a non-testifying witness. (pp. 30-31)5. The Court provides the following guidance. Although the admission of Abate’s testimony here was not an abuse of discretion, the Court cautions against using the phrase “based on the evidence collected” in this context. Such language can potentially sweep in inadmissible hearsay. When the State improperly lays the foundation for an officer’s testimony about a photo identification, the trial court should promptly give a curative instruction to direct the jury’s attention away from evidence outside of the record. Finally, information gathered during police investigations that leads to the development of a suspect is not subject to the hearsay rule. To the extent the Appellate Division decision created limitations on photo arrays, the Court does not adopt them. (pp. 32-33) REVERSED and REMANDED to the Appellate Division. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting, expresses the view that defendant was denied a fair trial. In Justice Albin’s view, nothing in the admissible evidence before the jury suggested that, at the time the officer constructed the array, he had a reasonable basis to consider Medina a suspect. The jury, therefore, was left to infer that the officer had superior knowledge from outside the record that targeted Medina as a suspect. Justice Albin explains that Abate’s impermissible testimony that Medina “was a suspect in the eyes of the police [based on the evidence collected] may have tipped the scales.” See Branch, 182 N.J. at 354. Justice Albin would affirm and remand for a new trial.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 67 September Term 2018 081926 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jose Medina, Defendant-Respondent. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided March 16, 2020 June 9, 2020Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Frank J. Ducoat and Tiffany M. Russo, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs).Robert Carter Pierce argued the cause for respondent (Robert Carter Pierce, on the briefs).Adam D. Klein, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Adam D. Klein, of counsel and on the brief). 1 Stefan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for amicus curiae Public Defender of New Jersey (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Stefan Van Jura, of counsel and on the brief). JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court. Defendant Jose Medina was tried and convicted for offenses related to anon-fatal slashing that occurred outside of a bar in the Township of Belleville.Although no physical evidence linked defendant to the crime, surveillancefootage captured the incident, and the victim selected defendant’s picture froma photo array. A woman who witnessed the attack identified defendant as theattacker to police but was unwilling to give a formal statement or testify. At defendant’s trial, the prosecutor referenced the anonymous woman,after which an officer testified that, based on the “evidence . . . collected,” heincluded defendant’s picture in the photo array. Relying on State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263 (1973), State v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427 (1989), and State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338 (2005), the Appellate Division found that this testimony violatedthe hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause by suggesting that theanonymous woman -- a non-testifying witness -- implicated defendant in thecrime. Viewing the trial record in its entirety, however, we find that the 2 officer’s testimony did not generate such an inference. Accordingly, wereverse the judgment of the Appellate Division. I. We discern the following facts from the pretrial hearing on the State’smotion in limine and the trial record. A. On the night of December 27, 2013, Anthony Rivera and four friends,including Tommy Rafferty, went to Speakeasy’s, a bar in the Township ofBelleville. After two or three beers, Rivera and Rafferty stepped outside for acigarette. On their way out, Rivera held the door to let two women into thebar. As soon as he stepped through the doorway, a man slashed him across theface with a box cutter and said, “[D]o you remember me[?]” The attackerapproached again but another man intervened and the attacker fled. Police arrived a short while later and spoke with Rivera. Rivera statedthat his attacker was about thirty years old, five foot seven, 180 pounds, andwore a gray sweatshirt. Rivera said the man was Hispanic and either bald orhad short hair. Rivera also indicated that he did not know his attacker butcould identify him if he saw him again. Police noted that Rivera did not seemintoxicated at the time, and escorted him to the hospital where he receivedforty-one stitches for the thirteen-centimeter laceration on his left cheek. 3 Meanwhile, officers spoke with a woman at the scene who wished toremain anonymous. She identified the attacker as defendant Jose Medina andshowed the police one of defendant’s Instagram pictures and his username. Inaddition, Rafferty went with police to the Belleville Police Station to give aformal videotaped statement. Like Rivera, he described, but could notidentify, the attacker. The next day, the responding officers apprised Belleville DetectiveAnthony Abate of what they learned at Speakeasy’s. Abate also viewedsurveillance footage from the bar, which depicted Rivera holding the door forthe women and the slashing. The assailant’s face was not visible on the tape.Abate also ran a background check and found that defendant’s picture matchedRivera’s and Rafferty’s descriptions, as well as the Instagram photo shown topolice by the anonymous woman. Abate then prepared a photo array thatincluded defendant’s picture. Later that afternoon, Rivera went to the police station to give a formalvideotaped statement. With the shock of the attack having worn off, Riveragave Abate a more specific description of his assailant: light-skinned Hispanicmale wearing jeans and a gray hooded-sweatshirt with a yellow stripe, stockybuild, no tattoos, a “real, real thin” beard, and “real-short,” “low-cut” hair.Rivera repeated that he could make an identification if given the opportunity. 4 This time, however, Rivera added that he thought he recognized his attackerfrom a recent brawl at Yesterday’s Bar and Grille (Yesterday’s) in Clifton, buthe could not be certain. In Rivera’s view, that explained why the attacker said“do you remember me.” Rivera and defendant were, in fact, involved in a group fight atYesterday’s roughly six weeks before the night of the attack. Unbeknownst tothe participants, an unidentified individual posted a video of the fight onYouTube. Of the two men, defendant is the only one depicted because Riveradid not participate in the recorded portion of the fight. Nevertheless, Riveralater testified that he hit someone over the head with a bottle during the fight atYesterday’s and that both he and defendant “threw some punches,” but thatRivera could not be sure if they made contact with one another. For his part,defendant told an officer who responded to Yesterday’s that he was struck onthe head with what he thought was a bottle. After Rivera gave his second statement, Sergeant Edward Zimmermanserved as a blind administrator to conduct the photo array. Looking at thepictures prepared by Abate, Rivera identified defendant as the attacker.Zimmerman later testified that Rivera “was confident” in his selection and didnot need to see any pictures a second time. No further leads developed, and 5 Abate obtained a warrant for defendant’s arrest. Defendant subsequentlyturned himself in to the Belleville Police Department. B. On September 24, 2014, an Essex County grand jury indicted defendantfor second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); fourth-degreeunlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d); third-degree possessionof a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); and third-degreeaggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2). Before trial, the State filed an in limine motion seeking a number of pre-trial evidentiary rulings. As part of this motion, the State sought leave toadmit the YouTube video of the brawl at Yesterday’s, arguing it wasadmissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b) in order to establish defendant’s identity andmotive to assault Rivera. Separately, the State recognized that relaying theanonymous woman’s identification to the jury could violate the hearsay ruleand defendant’s confrontation right under the State and Federal Constitutions.Therefore, the State also requested permission for Abate to testify that hecompiled the photo array “based on information received,” which would givethe jury enough context to understand that there was a fulsome investigationleading to defendant’s arrest without actually disclosing the anonymouswoman’s statements. 6 Defendant filed a letter brief in opposition challenging the introductionof the YouTube video. Defendant further disputed the State’s suggested use ofthe phrase “based on information received” because it would violate theprecepts of Branch. The trial judge conducted an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing at which fourwitnesses testified. The judge found the YouTube video was “inadmissibleunder [N.J.R.E.] 404(b), but yet [was] admissible predicated upon [N.J.R.E]803(a) and . . . prior identification of a person as analyzed in State v.Henderson, 208 [N.J.] 208, 261[] (2011).” The judge did not rule on the issueof Abate’s testimony on the record. At trial, Rivera identified defendant as his attacker. The State alsocalled Abate to testify. During Abate’s direct examination, the prosecutorpaused and asked the judge for a sidebar to discuss the photo array. The judgeadvised the prosecutor that Abate “can’t speak as to what information [theanonymous woman] gave him, it’s hearsay.” The prosecutor then resumedquestioning: Q: Detective, after speaking with the officers who had done the crime scene, did they tell you that they had spoken with some witnesses? A: Yes. Q: Including one -- 7 [Defense counsel]: Judge, at this point -- this is like double hearsay.The Court: He’s just gonna say whether he talked to them, not what they said but whether he talked to them.Q: I’m not asking what they said but they spoke, for example, with one female who didn’t want to get involved --The Court: Overruled. Go ahead.Q: They spoke with one female who didn’t want to get involved. Correct?A: Correct.Q: Don’t tell me what they said.A: Correct.Q: Okay. They spoke with another individual by the name of Tom Rafferty. Correct?A: Correct.Q: And they intended to speak with other people, as well, to no avail. Correct?A: Correct.Q: Now, when -- were any witnesses -- or, specifically, of the witnesses -- Mr. Rafferty was the only one who was willing to come in and give a statement. Correct?A: Correct. 8 Q: Did you take a statement from him?A: Yes.Q: And aside from taking his statement, did you take anyone else’s statement in the case?A: In the whole entire case?Q: In the case, yes?A: Ah, yes, I did.Q: And who was that?A: The victim.....Q: Now, what other investigative steps did you take to try to uncover any evidence of what had happened?A: Ah, additional things were -- we a -- we were able to obtain surveillance footage from the --....Q: And so you did actually obtain a copy of the surveillance footage. Correct?A: Yes.[(emphases added).] 9 The judge then adjourned the trial for a break, after which the Stateplayed the surveillance footage for the jury. Next, Abate explained that bothRivera and Rafferty came to the police station to give formal videotapedstatements. Abate also told the jury that Rivera provided a description of theattacker and said that he could identify the attacker if he saw him again. Atthat point, the prosecutor asked, Q: And based on -- at this point the evidence that you collected, did you have a suspect? A: Yes. Q: And who was that suspect? A: Jose Medina. Q: Now, what was -- once he told you he could make an identification, what was the next step that you took with that information? A: Generated a photo lineup. [(emphasis added).] Later, the prosecutor asked Abate, “when [he] put together this array,”whether he was “going based in any way on [his] viewing of the surveillancefootage,” to which Abate replied affirmatively. In addition, Abate indicatedthat he only obtained formal statements from Rivera and Rafferty because“there was nobody else that wanted to come forward umm to give a statement, 10 any witnesses or anything like that. And that -- that’s really who -- who theother people that we would take statements from.” During cross-examination, defense counsel elicited from Abate thatRivera could not definitively say whether he saw defendant before the attack.Defense counsel then continued: Q: So, was any physical evidence recovered? A knife? A: No. Q: No knife was recovered. Correct? A: Correct. .... Q: No physical -- from the slashing. No physical evidence was recovered. Is that correct? A: Correct. Q: No forensic evidence. Is that correct? A: Correct. Q: No fingerprints, no DNA, no weapon. Correct? A: Correct. Q: And the person you spoke to regarding the incident, or the people, specifically were Thomas Rafferty. Is that correct? A: Correct. 11 Q: And Mr. Rivera. Is that correct? A: Correct. Q: Now, when Thomas Rafferty gave you the statement, he couldn’t make an identification. Is that correct?Defense counsel then presented the jury with Rafferty’s statement, in which hedescribed the attacker but said, “I never saw the kid before in my life.” On redirect, the prosecutor sought to clarify the scope of the policeinvestigation for the jury: Q: Now, you testified earlier that you also spoke with -- or not you, but officers at the scene did manage -- and don’t tell me what anyone said at the scene -- but they managed to speak with one person, a female, who wished to remain anonymous, didn’t want to give a statement. Correct? A: Correct. Q: They also spoke, obviously, with Mr. Rafferty who was willing to come in, give a formal statement. Correct? A: Correct. Q: And, again, I think you answered this but why didn’t you take formal statements from anyone else? A: Because nobody else ah, volunteered to give any statements. 12 Q: Okay. But to your knowledge, did the other officers question other people at the scene and attempt to speak with other people? A: I believe so, yes. [(emphases added).] The final reference to the anonymous woman occurred during theprosecutor’s summation, in which he emphasized the challenges posed byeyewitnesses who decline to assist the police: Now, let’s also talk about the investigation, itself, very briefly. The investigation, itself, we had the witness, Mr. Rivera. The officers can’t control who stays at the scene, who doesn’t stay at the scene. They’re coming there after the fact. The officers not only can’t control who stays at the scene, they can’t control who talks to them, who doesn’t. Who’s willing to give a truthful and honest account of what happened, and who doesn’t. We know from . . . Detective Abate[] that officers attempted to speak with everyone at the scene, and anyone who’s willing to provide information, they took information from. [Rafferty], unfortunately, didn’t actually witness the incident. He was willing to give a statement, which you’d expect. He was the victim’s friend, so he’s willing to at least go in and give a statement. Officers attempted to speak with other people. You heard testimony that they spoke even with some anonymous female that didn’t want to give a statement, and wouldn’t even give her name when she spoke with the officers. 13 People didn’t want to get involved. Officers can’t control that. You don’t fault the investigation on the fact that people don’t want to cooperate, they disappear, they don’t want to talk. [(emphasis added).] The jury convicted defendant on all charges and the judge sentenced himto seven years’ imprisonment with an eighty-five-percent period of paroleineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. C. Defendant appealed his convictions, and the Appellate Division reversedand remanded for a new trial because “the misapplication of the rules ofevidence permitted the introduction of materially incompetent evidence thatirreparably tainted the reliability of the jury’s verdict.” According to the court,“[t]he first serious error occurred when the investigating officer relied onunverifiable hearsay statements from an unidentified woman to create thephoto[ ]array.” The court found that investigatory practice problematicbecause Rivera’s identification of defendant “was the principal legal issue attrial and the only evidence directly linking him to the assault.” And, absentthe photo array based on “unverifiable information from an anonymous non-testifying individual,” Rivera would have been unable to identify defendant. 14 The Appellate Division also took issue with Abate’s testimony. In thecourt’s view, telling the jury that police spoke with the anonymous woman andthereafter generated a photo array constituted reversible error. Relying onBankston, Irving, and Branch, the court explained that, when an officerconveys incriminating information from a non-testifying witness, the Stateviolates the hearsay rule and defendant’s confrontation right. As the court putit, “[a]lthough the precise information this unidentified individual relayed tothe police was not revealed at trial, Detective Abate’s testimony provided asufficient basis from which the jury could infer it supported the State’s caseagainst defendant.” In light of the “magnitude” of those errors, the courtreversed and remanded without consideration of defendant’s four remainingarguments. This Court granted the State’s petition for certification. 237 N.J. 419(2019). We further granted leave to the Attorney General of New Jersey andthe New Jersey Office of the Public Defender to appear as amici curiae. II. A. The State asserts that the Appellate Division erroneously reverseddefendant’s convictions based on a misapplication of our case law to the factsof this case. Stressing that Abate’s references to the anonymous woman were 15 brief, inconsequential, and detached in time, the State argues that thosereferences did not create an “inescapable inference” that she incriminateddefendant to police, as Bankston requires. (quoting Bankston, 63 N.J. at 271).The State also distinguishes Irving on the ground that, here, Abate and theprosecutor did not allude to information contained in impermissible hearsay,but rather limited their commentary to the lack of witness cooperation. Andthe State faults the Appellate Division’s reliance on Branch, in which therewas no trial testimony or evidence that could have steered police toward thedefendant, leaving the jury to speculate that the detective had superiorknowledge of the defendant’s guilt via hearsay. Here, the State contends, therewere other sources of information that the jury could assume were used tocreate the photo array. Finally, the State argues that the Appellate Divisionconflated Medina’s rights under Bankston and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment with permissible methods used by law enforcement to createa photo array, and asks that we clarify that the hearsay rule and ConfrontationClause apply at trial, not during an investigation. The Attorney General agrees with the State that the jury had no reason toassume that the anonymous woman implicated defendant to police. Instead,the Attorney General suggests the only logical implications to be drawn fromAbate’s testimony were that (1) the anonymous woman was a “dead-end 16 witness” whose interaction with police “was of no moment at all,” and (2)Abate “created the photo array using Rivera’s description, the footage, and hislaw-enforcement expertise and resources.” The Attorney General cautions that the Appellate Division’s decisionneedlessly expands Bankston’s restrictions and would preclude the State fromdemonstrating that police conducted a complete investigation -- an importantfacet of the prosecution’s presentation in a criminal case -- by asking officersabout their attempts to speak with witnesses. Finally, the Attorney General argues that plain error review appliesbecause defendant never objected to Abate’s testimony about the photo arrayand the trial judge never ruled on the issue of Abate’s testimony at the Rule104 hearing. And the conduct at issue here did not rise to the level of plainerror, the Attorney General contends, in light of the other evidence adduced attrial. B. In response, defendant argues that the State’s testimony about theanonymous woman and ensuing use of the phrase “based on . . . the evidencethat you collected” violated defendant’s confrontation right and the hearsayrule by impermissibly creating the sort of “inescapable inference” prohibitedunder Bankston and its progeny. Defendant also asserts that the State’s 17 testimony violated Branch, which forestalls any explanation as to why thepolice included a suspect’s picture in a photo array -- beyond evidence that thepolice fairly assembled the photo array and that the process led to a reliableidentification -- in the absence of alleged police misconduct. Defendant additionally suggests we apply the abuse of discretionstandard rather than review for plain error, noting defense counsel’s objectionto the first reference to the anonymous woman at trial and opposition to theState’s motion in limine. Defendant alternatively argues that, regardless of thestandard of review, reversal is warranted here considering the impermissibleinference created through reference to the anonymous woman. In support of defendant’s position, the Public Defender adds threepoints. First, phrases such as “upon information received” or “based on . . .the evidence that you collected” are just as suggestive that the testifyingofficer has superior, extra-record knowledge about a defendant’s guilt as adirect quote from the non-testifying witness. Second, the scope of Branchshould be extended by prohibiting any reference to evidence from outside therecord in an identification case. Third, by eliciting information about theanonymous woman while simultaneously trying to avoid introducing hearsay,the State misrepresented the real reason why police identified Medina as a 18 suspect and put his picture in the photo array, in potential violation of Rule ofProfessional Conduct 3.4(e). III. As a preliminary matter, we note that the parties disagree about whichstandard of review applies: plain error or abuse of discretion. Becausedefendant did, in fact, object to Abate’s use of the phrase “based oninformation received” before trial, cf. State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 404(2019) (noting plain error review applies in the absence of an objection), wewill employ the abuse of discretion standard as we do for all evidentiaryrulings, see State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 580 (2018). Under that deferential standard, we review a trial court’s evidentiaryruling only for a “clear error in judgment.” State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 479(2017) (quoting State v. Perry, 225 N.J. 222, 233 (2016)). We do notsubstitute our own judgment for the trial court’s unless its “ruling 'was so wideof the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.’” State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001) (quoting State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 484 (1997)). IV. Turning to the merits of the case, we first apply the legal principles thatgovern references to non-testifying witnesses and then consider limits ontestimony specific to photo arrays. 19 A. 1. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee a criminal defendantthe right to confront “the witnesses against him.” That right is “an essentialattribute of the right to a fair trial,” Branch, 182 N.J. at 348, and secures for adefendant the “fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations,”State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147, 169 (2003) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 , 294 (1973)). “For that reason, the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation 'expressesa preference for the in-court testimony of a witness, whose veracity can betested by the rigors of cross-examination.’” State v. Basil, 202 N.J. 570, 591(2010) (quoting State in Interest of J.A., 195 N.J. 324, 342 (2008)). Indeed,“[o]ur legal system has long recognized that cross-examination is the 'greatestlegal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.’” Ibid. (quotingCalifornia v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 , 158 (1970)). And, in light of the value itplaces on cross-examination, the Confrontation Clause prohibits theintroduction of testimonial hearsay that does not meet “[a]n established andrecognized exception to the hearsay rule,” Branch, 182 N.J. at 349, and cannot 20 be challenged by a defendant through cross-examination, Basil, 202 N.J. at 591; accord Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 53-59 (2004). Beginning with our decision in Bankston, we have applied the aboveprinciples to protect criminal defendants “from the incriminating statements ofa faceless accuser who remains in the shadows and avoids the light of court.”Branch, 182 N.J. at 348. In Bankston, police entered a tavern and foundheroin on the bar under a pair of gloves near where the defendant had beensitting. 63 N.J. at 265. Police arrested him and, at his trial, a detectivetestified that the defendant fit an informer’s description of a person withnarcotics in the tavern. Id. at 266. The prosecutor also emphasized thesignificance of this testimony in his summation, bolstering the State’s case.Id. at 267. In evaluating the detective’s testimony, we first noted that the use ofneutral phrases to explain an officer’s conduct, such as the officer approacheda suspect “upon information received,” does not violate the hearsay rulebecause they are admissible to show “the officer was not acting in an arbitrarymanner or to explain his subsequent conduct.” Id. at 268. We stressed,however, that, “when the officer becomes more specific by repeating whatsome other person told him concerning a crime by the accused,” the testimonyviolates both the hearsay rule and the defendant’s confrontation right. Id. at 21 268-69. We added that, even where the officer does not reiterate what helearned from a third party, “[w]hen the logical implication to be drawn fromthe testimony leads the jury to believe that a non-testifying witness has giventhe police evidence of the accused’s guilt, the testimony should be disallowedas hearsay.” Id. at 271. Applying those principles, we found that, although the detective neverrepeated what he learned from the informer, the “inescapable inference” fromhis testimony was that the “unidentified informer, who was not present in courtand not subjected to cross-examination, had told the officers that defendantwas committing a crime.” Ibid. Yet “there was no need for any reference toan informer” because “[t]here was no allegation that the police were actingarbitrarily.” Id. at 272. Accordingly, we held that “[t]he testimony wasclearly hearsay” and its prejudicial effect -- further augmented by theprosecutor -- required reversal. Id. at 271, 273. Later, in Irving, we considered a detective’s testimony in connectionwith the investigation of an armed robbery. 114 N.J. at 431, 445. In that case,the detective stated that, after the crime, he “canvassed the neighborhood,basically put the word out of what happened and if anybody had anyinformation to call [him] at the robbery squad.” Id. at 445. The detective thenreplied affirmatively when asked whether, before the date of the defendant’s 22 arrest, he “receive[d] some information.” Ibid. He explained to the jury thathe “followed up on the information [he] received, [then] obtained from thegallery [a] photo [based on the] information received and made a photo array”that included the defendant’s picture. Ibid. As in Bankston, the prosecutor’ssummation “emphasiz[ed] the value of the information received” by thedetective. Ibid. We repeated our instructions from Bankston that neutral phrasings suchas “upon information received” are permissible to show an officer was notacting arbitrarily, whereas repeating incriminating information from a non-testifying witness violates the hearsay rule, as well as our admonition that the“specific hearsay statement” need not be repeated to create an impermissibleinference of guilt if “the logical implication to be drawn from the testimony” isthat the informant incriminated the defendant. Id. at 446 (quoting Bankston, 63 N.J. at 271). Indeed, “the creation of the inference, not the specificity ofthe statements made, was the critical factor in determining whether [the]hearsay [rule] was violated.” Id. at 447. Ultimately, we found the detective’s testimony was improper, reasoningthat he created an “inescapable inference, although never specificallystated, . . . that an informant had told [him] that [the] defendant committed thecrime.” Id. at 446-47. We attributed significance to the detective’s testimony 23 that, after canvassing the neighborhood and asking for leads, he placed thedefendant’s picture in the array. Id. at 446. We found the circumstancessimilar to Bankston, namely, that (1) “there was no need for any reference toan informer” absent an allegation the detective acted arbitrarily and (2) theprosecutor’s summation bolstered the detective’s testimony. Id. at 447. Still, defense counsel in Irving failed to timely object to the impropertestimony. Ibid. We affirmed the defendant’s convictions based on the otherevidence adduced at trial, holding that the detective’s testimony did notconstitute plain error. Id. at 448; see also State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 224-26(1996) (relying on Bankston and Irving to find that an officer’s testimony --that information from co-defendants and a jailhouse informant made thedefendant a suspect -- was improper even though the officer did not repeatwhat he learned, but also finding the error harmless). Under Bankston and Irving, an officer may not disclose incriminatinginformation obtained from a non-testifying witness. Even when an officerdoes not specifically repeat that information, the officer may not create an“inescapable inference” that an unavailable source has implicated thedefendant. Bankston, 63 N.J. at 271. Either method of relaying hearsaygenerates “[t]he vice Bankston and its progeny seek to eradicate”: “theimplication that a testifying police officer somehow is in possession o f 24 superior knowledge than what is presented to the jury and, hence, histestimony is worthy of greater weight.” State v. Kemp, 195 N.J. 136, 155(2008). 2. Here, it is undisputed that Abate never repeated to the jury what theanonymous woman told officers. Therefore, his testimony would only conflictwith the principles derived from Bankston and Irving if his references to herotherwise created an “inescapable inference” that she incriminated defendantto police. Bankston, 63 N.J. at 271. Yet, Abate did not imply that the woman gave police any information atall. He referenced the anonymous woman twice: once on direct examinationand again on redirect examination. In the first instance, he agreed with theprosecutor that she “didn’t want to get involved,” and in the second, he agreedthat she “didn’t want to give a statement.” Abate also explained that heobtained formal statements only from Rivera and Rafferty because “there wasnobody else that wanted to come forward . . . to give a statement, anywitnesses or anything like that.” Moreover, unlike the prosecutors in Bankstonand Irving who emphasized the importance of the non-testifying witness’sincriminating information, the prosecutor’s summation here highlighted that 25 police tried to speak with witnesses at the scene -- including the anonymouswoman -- but none wanted to get involved. The record substantiates the Attorney General’s contention that the jurylikely considered the anonymous woman to be a “dead-end witness.” TheState not only was careful not to repeat what she told police, but also went togreat lengths to suggest that she was not forthcoming. Additionally, thereferences to the anonymous woman would have seemed less significant thanthe other relevant evidence in the record. Both Rivera and Rafferty gavedescriptions of the attacker that matched defendant’s picture; the surveillancevideo captured the incident; and Rivera unwaveringly identified defendantboth at trial and in the array. In sum, we find that the references to theanonymous woman did not create an “inescapable inference” that sheimplicated defendant in the attack to the police. Bankston, 63 N.J. at 271. We further agree with the State that the Appellate Divisioninappropriately expanded Bankston’s requirements by finding Abate’stestimony improper because the jury “could infer it supported the State’s caseagainst defendant.” In Bankston, we expressly noted that we wereunconcerned “with mere possible inferences” to be drawn from an officer’stestimony. Ibid. What matters is that Abate’s testimony did not create the“inescapable inference” that he had superior information about defendant’s 26 guilt from the anonymous woman. Ibid. With that in mind, we hold thatAbate’s testimony did not violate defendant’s confrontation right or thehearsay rule under Bankston. We turn next to defendant’s contention that Abate’s testimony violatedthe guidelines particular to officer testimony about photo arrays set forth inBranch. B. 1. In Branch, Kathleen O’Nieal was talking with a family friend, JosephGannon, when she heard screams from upstairs where her twin children weresleeping. 182 N.J. at 343. An intruder sucking on a lollipop came down thestairs, ran past the two adults, and tried to escape through the back door in thekitchen. Ibid. The door handle jammed, but after a brief delay in which hefended off Gannon, the intruder opened the rear door and fled. Ibid. Police were unable to develop any physical evidence from the scene, butthey did take descriptions of the suspect from the four witnesses. Id. at 344.Two days later, Gannon met with a police sketch artist to prepare a sketch ofthe suspect. Id. at 345. The detective assigned to the case then prepared aphoto array. Ibid. However, O’Nieal and Gannon were unable to identify thesuspect from the array. Ibid. The next day, the detective prepared a second 27 array, and both O’Nieal and Gannon independently selected the defendant’spicture. Ibid. They also identified the defendant at trial. Ibid. Importantly,the defendant’s appearance both in his picture and at trial differed markedlyfrom the witnesses’ descriptions and the sketch. Ibid. At trial, the prosecutor asked the detective, “[B]ased on informationreceived did you develop a suspect in this case?” Id. at 347 (emphasisomitted). The detective replied affirmatively and, when asked who that was,named the defendant. Ibid. On appeal, we considered whether that testimony violated thedefendant’s confrontation right and the hearsay rule. Id. at 348-53. ReviewingBankston, Irving, and a relevant decision from the Appellate Division, State v.Tilghman, 345 N.J. Super. 571 (App. Div. 2001), we explained that “[t]hecommon thread that runs through [those cases] is that a police officer may notimply to the jury that he possesses superior knowledge, outside the record, thatincriminates the defendant.” Branch, 182 N.J. at 351. Yet, in the context of photo identifications, we retreated from our earlierapproval in Bankston and Irving of the use of neutral phrases -- such as that anofficer developed a photo array or identified a suspect “based on informationreceived” -- to explain an officer’s conduct. Id. at 352. We observed that [w]hen a police officer testifies concerning an identification made by a witness, such as in this case, 28 what counts is whether the officer fairly arranged and displayed the photographic array and whether the witness made a reliable identification. Why the officer placed the defendant’s photograph in the array is of no relevance to the identification process and is highly prejudicial. For that reason, we disapprove of a police officer testifying that he placed a defendant’s picture in a photographic array “upon information received.” Even such seemingly neutral language, by inference, has the capacity to sweep in inadmissible hearsay. It implies that the police officer has information suggestive of the defendant’s guilt from some unknown source. [Ibid. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).] Accordingly, we limited the use of the phrase “based on informationreceived” to “contexts other than a photographic identification,” and “only ifnecessary to rebut a suggestion that [the officer] acted arbitrarily and only ifthe use of that phrase does not create an inference that the defendant has beenimplicated in a crime by some unknown person.” Ibid. As applied in Branch, the detective’s use of that phrase was “notrelevant and . . . highly prejudicial,” because it “implied that he hadinformation from an out-of-court source, known only to him, implicating [the]defendant in the burglary.” Id. at 352-53; see also, e.g., State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 15, 21-22 (2012) (finding Branch error where a detective’s testimony that heplaced the defendant’s picture in a photo array “because of his similarities tothe victim’s description” unfairly bolstered the witness’s identification). 29 2. Here, Abate testified that he placed defendant’s picture in the arraybecause defendant was a suspect “based on . . . the evidence that [Abate]collected.” The question this case presents is whether Branch’s embargo ofthe phrase “based on information received” extends to other, broaderexplanatory phrases. The answer, we find, depends on the context of thetestimony. That is, whether a jury would likely be compelled by a lack ofrecord evidence to infer from the officer’s use of the phrase that the officer“possesses superior knowledge, outside the record, that incriminates thedefendant.” Branch, 182 N.J. at 351. In Branch, we were troubled not by the inherently inflammatory natureof the phrase “based on information received,” but the use of that languagegiven the lack of physical evidence in the case and the fact that the sketch andthe witnesses’ descriptions of the defendant resembled neither his appearanceon the day of his arrest nor the picture of him in the array. Id. at 345-47. Inthe absence of anything else tying the defendant to the crime, the jury couldeasily have inferred that the “information received” by the detective was froma non-testifying witness. Id. at 352-53. The circumstances here are significantly different. Notably,“information received” suggests the existence of an informant, whereas 30 “evidence . . . collected” is a broader phrase that could encompass other typesof evidence. Abate used that phrase after (1) he explained that Rafferty andRivera gave formal statements, (2) the jury watched the surveillance footagetaken at Speakeasy’s, and (3) he read Rivera’s description of the attacker.Abate also later clarified during his testimony that he had personally watchedthe surveillance footage before assembling the photo array. Abate furtherexplained that Rivera told him that the fight at Yesterday’s likely involved theculprit in the slashing before Rivera identified defendant’s picture in the array.And, perhaps most importantly, Abate repeatedly told the jury that no oneother than Rafferty and Rivera came forward to give a statement. Viewed inthat light, “the logical implication” of Abate’s testimony was that “theevidence that [he] collected” referred to evidence other than hearsay: thesurveillance footage and Rivera’s and Rafferty’s formal statements anddescriptions of the attacker. Bankston, 63 N.J. at 271. Despite our dissenting colleague’s suggestion to the contrary, see post at___ (slip op. at 6-7), we find it reasonable that the jury believed the recordevidence led Abate to place defendant’s picture in the array. Given the otherevidence in the trial record, then, we find that Abate’s testimony did notcompel the inference that he had superior knowledge incriminating defendantfrom a non-testifying witness. 31 3. Notwithstanding our ruling that the admission of Abate’s testimony wasnot an abuse of discretion, we reiterate that the best practice is to avoidexplaining that a defendant’s picture was placed in a photo array because he orshe was a suspect or “based on information received.” See Branch, 182 N.J. at 352 (“Why the officer placed the defendant’s photograph in the array is of norelevance to the identification process and is highly prejudicial.”). We alsocaution against using the phrase “based on the evidence collected” in thiscontext. As in Branch, such language can potentially sweep in inadmissiblehearsay by producing the “inescapable inference” that the officer obtainedincriminating information about the defendant beyond the scope of the record.Bankston, 63 N.J. at 271. For instance, if Abate had simply testified thatofficers spoke with the anonymous woman and, “based on . . . the evidencethat [he] collected,” he placed defendant’s picture in the array -- withoutreference to any other forms of evidence -- then the “logical implication” fromAbate’s testimony would have been that the anonymous woman implicateddefendant to police. Ibid. C. Fundamentally, we find the admission of Abate’s testimony was not anabuse of discretion considering the entirety of the record before us, and we 32 therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division. We neverthelesscaution that, going forward, when the State improperly lays the foundation foran officer’s testimony about a photo identification, the trial court shouldpromptly give a curative instruction to direct the jury’s attention away fromevidence outside of the record. V. Finally, we briefly address the portion of the Appellate Division’sdecision suggesting the police should not use hearsay information to assemblea photo array. Information gathered during police investigations that leads to thedevelopment of a suspect is manifestly different from admissible informationthat the State may present in court. Only the latter is subject to the hearsayrule. See N.J.R.E. 801(c) (defining hearsay as “a statement, other than onemade by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered inevidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted” (emphasis added)). Limitson the State’s ability to generate a reliable photo array stem from a number ofour decisions. See, e.g., State v. Green, 239 N.J. 88, 98-100, 105-08 (2019);Henderson, 208 N.J. at 251-52; State v. Delgado, 188 N.J. 48, 63 (2006). Tothe extent the Appellate Division created additional limitations, we do notadopt them. 33 VI. The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the matter isremanded to the Appellate Division to consider the four arguments that remainfrom defendant’s brief to that court. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent. 34 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jose Medina, Defendant-Respondent. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting. I part with the majority because, I believe, defendant was denied a fairtrial based on this Court’s jurisprudence, which is intended to ensure that adefendant is not wrongfully convicted based on a misidentification. In State v. Branch, this Court made a simple yet constitutionallysignificant pronouncement to protect the confrontation and fair-trial rights of adefendant when the State presents testimony of an identification made from aphotographic array. 182 N.J. 338 (2005). We instructed that a police officershould not testify that he placed the defendant’s photograph in the arraybecause the defendant was a suspect based “upon information received.” Id. at342, 352. We barred such testimony because it might “imply to the jury that[the officer] possesses superior knowledge, outside the record, thatincriminates the defendant” and because the officer’s “reasons for including[the] defendant’s photograph in the array [are] not relevant and [are] highly 1 prejudicial.” Id. at 351, 352; see also State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 22 (2012)(holding that the detective’s explanation for placing the defendant’s photo inan array was irrelevant and violated the dictates of Branch).1 We also notedthat such testimony has the capacity to improperly bolster the witness’sidentification and thus invade the jury’s role. See Branch, 182 N.J. at 350-51. Despite that clear warning in Branch, the prosecutor in this caseproceeded to do precisely what this Court forbade -- the prosecutor elicitedthat the investigating officer placed defendant Jose Medina’s photograph in thephotographic array because Medina was “a suspect” based on evidence theofficer had collected. But nothing in the admissible evidence before the jurysuggested that, at the time the officer constructed the array, he had areasonable basis to consider Medina a suspect. The jury, therefore, was left toinfer that the officer had superior knowledge from outside the record thattargeted Medina as a suspect. The truth is that the officer placed Medina’s photograph in the array as asuspect because an unnamed woman at the scene of the assault told the police1 In Lazo, the detective testified that he placed the defendant’s photograph in the array “[b]ecause of his similarities to the suspects that were described by the victim.” 209 N.J. at 19. We concluded the detective’s testimony not only violated Branch, but also constituted “improper lay opinion testimony” that “enhanced the victim’s credibility and intruded on the jury’s role.” Id. at 21- 22. 2 that Medina was the assailant and showed the police his Instagram profile.Because the police did not hold the woman as a material witness and becauseshe was not subject to direct or cross-examination, we do not know whethershe actually witnessed the assault, whether she had the ability to observe theevents, or whether she had questionable motives. For those reasons, theinformation was inadmissible hearsay and not presented to the jury. The Appellate Division cannot be faulted for overturning Medina’sconviction by faithfully applying the law developed by this Court -- byhonoring Medina’s confrontation rights and fair-trial rights. In reversing theAppellate Division and reinstating Medina’s conviction, the majority does notadhere to the principles laid out in Branch. I therefore respectfully dissent. I. A. In Branch, the defendant was convicted of burglarizing a home androbbing its residents. 182 N.J. at 346. Without any corroborating forensicevidence tying the defendant to the crimes, the State’s case rested primarily onthe victims’ photographic identifications of the defendant. Id. at 346-47, 353.In response to the prosecutor’s questioning, the investigating detective gavehis reasons for including the defendant’s picture in the photographic array: 3 [Prosecutor]: Now, after that day, after April 22nd, 1998, based on information received did you develop a suspect in this case? [Detective]: Yes, I did. [Prosecutor]: And who was that person? [Detective]: Mr. Alexander Branch. [Prosecutor]: And did you obtain a photo array containing Alexander Branch’s photograph? [Detective]: Yes, ma’am. [Id. at 347.] Though no objection was raised to this line of questioning, we reversedthe defendant’s convictions on the basis of plain error. Id. at 353-54. We didso because the detective’s “hearsay testimony violated [the] defendant’sfederal and state rights to confrontation as well as our rules of evidence.” Id.at 348. In Branch, like here, “there was no trial testimony or evidence, otherthan [the] identifications, that could have led [the detective] to focus on [the]defendant as a suspect,” and therefore “the jury was left to speculate that thedetective had superior knowledge through hearsay information implicating[the] defendant in the crime.” Id. at 347-48. We held that “[t]here was nolegitimate need or reason for [the detective] to tell the jury why he placed [the]defendant’s picture in the photographic array” and that “[t]he only relevantevidence was the identification itself.” Id. at 348. 4 B. In this case, when Detective Abate arranged the photographic array fordisplay to the victim, no admissible evidence pointed to Medina as a suspect.The victim, Anthony Rivera, did not know who attacked him, though hebelieved he would be able to identify him. Rivera had given a genericdescription of his assailant, a Hispanic male of a size and weight (and ofvarying hair styles) that fit the profile of hundreds of such males in this State. 2Moreover, Rivera’s friend, Thomas Rafferty, could provide the police withonly generic, physical characteristics of the assailant. Rafferty had told thepolice that he could not make an identification and therefore was not shown aphotographic array. The surveillance video at Speakeasy’s, the establishment where Rivera’sface was slashed, recorded the incident but “[t]he assailant’s face was notvisible on the tape.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 4). Rivera was involved in abrawl six weeks earlier at Yesterday’s Bar and Grille, where Medina waspresent as well. The grainy surveillance video at Yesterday’s that was posted2 Rivera gave two descriptions of his attacker. Immediately following the incident, Rivera described his assailant as a Hispanic male, either bald or with short hair, about thirty years old, five foot seven and 180 pounds, wearing a gray sweatshirt. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 3). Later that day, he described his assailant as a “light-skinned Hispanic male wearing jeans and a gray hooded- sweatshirt with a yellow stripe, stocky build, no tattoos, a 'real, real thin’ beard, and 'real-short,’ 'low-cut’ hair.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 4). 5 on YouTube, however, did not show Rivera, much less Rivera engaged in analtercation with Medina. Medina appeared on the video with at least a dozenother individuals, but not in a conflict with Rivera. Significantly, DetectiveAbate had no forensic evidence tying Medina to the aggravated assault ofRivera. Shortly before Detective Abate’s testimony about the identificationprocedure, the detective told the jury that the police had spoken with ananonymous woman at the scene who did not want to get involved. Despite thelack of evidence before the jury linking Medina to the crime, the prosecutorpursued the same colloquy that we condemned in Branch: [Prosecutor]: And based on -- at this point the evidence that you collected, did you have a suspect? [Detective Abate]: Yes. [Prosecutor]: And who was that suspect? [Detective Abate]: Jose Medina. [Prosecutor]: Now, what was -- once he told you he could make an identification, what was the next step that you took with that information? [Detective Abate]: Generated a photo lineup. [(emphases added).] Unlike in Branch, in this case, defense counsel, in a pretrial motion,objected to the line of questioning the prosecutor pursued. See 182 N.J. at 6 353. The record before the jury provided no indication how Detective Abatecould have pinpointed Medina as a suspect based on the generic descriptionsof the assailant provided by Rivera and Rafferty, the Speakeasy’s surveillancevideo that did not reveal a view of the assailant’s face, or the Yesterday’sYouTube video that did not show an interaction between Medina and Rivera.In short, Detective Abate’s testimony identified Medina as a suspect based onunidentified “collected” evidence. None of the “collected” evidence put beforethe jury -- before the showing of the photographic array -- pointed to Medinaas a suspect, thus leaving the jury with the clear impression that Abatepossessed “information suggestive of [Medina’s] guilt from some unknownsource.” See id. at 352. There is no meaningful distinction between the detective’s reference inBranch to information received or Detective Abate’s reference here toevidence collected. In both cases, the reference suggested that the detectivewas privy to information not available to the jury -- that the detective hadsuperior knowledge implicating the defendant. II. We did not set forth the principles in Branch or in Lazo as a “bestpractice” to be followed by the State. See ante at ___ (slip op. at 32). Thoseprinciples are constitutional imperatives that the State must honor. To repeat, 7 “[w]hen a police officer testifies concerning an identification made by awitness . . . what counts is whether the officer fairly arranged and displayedthe photographic array and whether the witness made a reliable identification.”Branch, 182 N.J. at 352. The colloquy between the prosecutor and DetectiveAbate about the evidence collected that led to the targeting of Medina as asuspect had the real potential to “to sweep in inadmissible hearsay,” implyingthat Detective Abate had “information from an out-of-court source, knownonly to him, implicating [Medina] in the [crime].” See id. at 352-53. Detective Abate’s testimony explaining that Medina was a suspect basedon evidence “collected” -- evidence never disclosed to the jury -- and givingthat explanation as the reason for placing Medina’s photograph in the array“[was] of no relevance to the identification process and [was] highlyprejudicial.” See id. at 352 (emphases added). In labeling Medina as asuspect, moreover, Detective Abate presented “improper lay opiniontestimony” that inappropriately buttressed Rivera’s identification andcredibility, thus intruding on the jury’s exclusive role as factfinder. See Lazo, 209 N.J. at 22; see also Branch, 182 N.J. at 350-51. Medina’s conviction rested almost wholly on Rivera’s identification.There was no corroborating forensic evidence. Detective Abate’simpermissible testimony that Medina “was a suspect in the eyes of the police 8 [based on the evidence collected] may have tipped the scales.” See Branch, 182 N.J. at 354. That error had the clear capacity to cause an unjust result. 3See ibid. III. Because Medina’s conviction rests on constitutionally infirmidentification testimony, I would affirm the Appellate Division and remandthis case for a new trial. I therefore respectfully dissent.3 I agree with Part V of the majority decision that it is permissible for the police to rely on hearsay information as a basis for arranging a photographic array, provided the hearsay information is not elicited before the jury. See ante at ___ (slip op. at 33). 9