Title: Ronald W. Cottrell and Ivy Williams v. National Collegiate Athletic Association et al.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1041858
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: June 1, 2007

REL: 06/01/2007 - Cottrell and Williams v. NCAA and Culpepper
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
____________________
1041858 and 1050436
____________________
Ronald W. Cottrell and Ivy Williams
v.
National Collegiate Athletic Association et al.
____________________
1050437
____________________
Tom Culpepper
v.
Ronald W. Cottrell
Appeals from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court 
(CV-03-810)
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
2
STUART, Justice.
Ronald W. ("Ronnie") Cottrell and Ivy Williams sued the
National Collegiate Athletic Association ("the NCAA"), Tom
Culpepper, 
and 
others 
alleging 
defamation, 
false-light
invasion of privacy, negligence, wantonness, and civil
conspiracy.   The only claim that was presented to the jury
was Cottrell's defamation claim against Culpepper.  The jury
returned a verdict for Cottrell in the amount of $6 million in
compensatory damages and $24 million in punitive damages.
Culpepper then filed a renewed motion for a judgment as a
matter of law and a motion for a new trial.  The trial court
granted Culpepper's motion for a new trial.  Cottrell and
Williams appeal; Culpepper cross-appeals. 
Facts
Cottrell and Williams are former assistant football
coaches at The University of Alabama ("The University").  The
University 
is 
a 
member 
of 
the 
NCAA, 
a 
nonprofit,
unincorporated association whose members include "virtually
all public and private universities and 4-year colleges
conducting major athletic programs in the United States."
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183 (1988).  The NCAA is
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
3
governed by its member institutions, and one of its main goals
is
"'to 
maintain 
intercollegiate athletics as an
integral part of the educational program and the
athlete as an integral part of the student body, and
by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation
between college athletics and professional sports.'"
488 U.S. at 183.  The bylaws of the NCAA provide rules for the
operation of a member institution's athletic programs,
including recruitment and eligibility of prospective student-
athletes and student-athletes, the salaries and the benefits
of coaches and athletic staff, and the conduct and level of
interaction between alumni and "athletic representatives"
(better known as "boosters") of a member institution, on the
one hand, and prospective student-athletes and enrolled
student-athletes, on the other.  As a member of the NCAA, the
institution and its employees, student-athletes, alumni, and
athletic representatives agree to comply with the NCAA rules
and to submit to the NCAA's rule-enforcement process.  If the
NCAA investigates an alleged rule violation by a member
institution, the member institution and its employees,
student-athletes, alumni, and athletic representatives are
required 
by 
NCAA 
rules 
to 
cooperate 
fully 
with 
the
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
The enforcement staff consists of full-time employees of
1
the NCAA. 
The COI consists of individuals who are not "employees"
2
of the NCAA, but who serve on a voluntary basis.  Members of
the COI include law professors, state or federal judges,
attorneys, athletic directors, athletic-conference directors,
and faculty athletic representatives.
4
investigation into and the resolution of the alleged rule
violation.  Gene Marsh, the faculty athletic representative at
The University from 1996 to 2003, explained the role of the
institution and its representatives in the NCAA investigative
process, stating: "[F]ull cooperation [with the NCAA rule-
enforcement process] is not a strategy, but a duty if [an
institution] chooses to remain a member of the NCAA."
The NCAA has two groups that are responsible for
resolving 
an 
alleged 
rule 
violation 
committed 
by 
an
institution.  The enforcement staff  investigates the alleged
1
rule violation, charges a member institution with a specific
rule violation, and essentially prosecutes the case before the
committee on infractions ("COI").   The COI conducts a hearing
2
to adjudicate the charge, and it imposes a penalty if it finds
that a rule violation occurred.
When an alleged rule violation is reported to the NCAA,
the 
enforcement 
staff 
investigates. 
 
Initially, 
the
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
5
enforcement staff sends an investigator to the member
institution to determine if the alleged rule violation can be
substantiated.  The investigator interviews the individual who
has alleged the rule violation and any other persons who may
have 
knowledge 
of 
the 
alleged 
rule 
violation. 
 
The
investigator then reports his or her discoveries, which may
support charges of additional rule violations by the member
institution, to the enforcement staff, which determines
whether the information adequately establishes that the member
institution has violated a NCAA rule or rules.  If the
enforcement 
staff 
believes 
that 
the 
findings 
of 
the
investigator support a charge of a rule violation or
violations by the member institution, the enforcement staff
sends a letter of preliminary inquiry to the member
institution.  This letter notifies the member institution that
a preliminary investigation of alleged rule violation will be
conducted.  This phase of the rule-enforcement process
involves extensive interviewing by the enforcement-staff
investigator of employees of the institution, student-
athletes, and any other individuals who may have knowledge of
the alleged rule violation.  If this inquiry indicates that
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
6
the allegations may be meritorious, a letter of official
inquiry ("LOI") issues to the member institution, detailing
the facts surrounding the alleged rule violation and the
specific rule or rules the enforcement staff believes the
institution, 
its 
staff, 
alumni 
and/or 
athletic 
representatives
have violated.  A LOI may also be sent to various employees or
athletic representatives of the institution who are alleged to
have involvement in the rule violation.  The institution and
other recipients of a LOI file a response with the NCAA,
explaining their positions on each alleged rule violation.  
After the recipients of the LOIs have responded, the
enforcement staff meets with them.  This conference provides
an opportunity for all parties to explain their positions on
each violation.  If the enforcement staff determines that a
party's response adequately establishes that an alleged rule
violation did not occur or that there is insufficient evidence
to pursue the alleged rule violation, the enforcement staff
can dismiss the charge.  After the conference, the enforcement
staff prepares a case summary, which sets forth the charged
rule violation and the positions of the enforcement staff, the
institution, and other recipients of LOIs with regard to each
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
7
charged rule violation.  The case summary is then submitted to
the COI in preparation for the hearing.  Essentially, this
case 
summary 
details 
the 
alleged 
rule 
violation 
the
enforcement staff charges against the member institution, its
staff, and/or its athletic representatives. 
The COI conducts a hearing at which all parties present
their positions.  Opening statements are made by each party.
The enforcement staff then presents each charge and its
evidence.  The institution and any affected employee, staff
member, or representative of the institution then presents
evidence as to why the charge lacks merit.  Members of the COI
ask questions of the parties involved at the hearing to
develop the evidence.  After each charge is fully addressed,
each party presents a closing argument to the COI.  The COI
adjourns the hearing, deliberates, and returns with findings
of fact with regard to each charged rule violation and a
determination of the penalty to be imposed.
NCAA rules require that the investigation of alleged rule
violations by the enforcement staff and the proceedings of the
COI be conducted with confidentiality.  The NCAA investigator,
the 
member 
institution, 
and 
others 
involved 
in 
the
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
8
investigation 
are 
required 
to 
maintain 
confidentiality
throughout the entire process.  Bylaw 32.1.4 of the NCAA
Division I Manual, provides:
"The cooperative principle imposes an affirmative
obligation on each member institution to assist the
NCAA 
enforcement 
staff 
in 
developing 
full
information 
to 
determine 
whether 
a 
possible
violation of NCAA legislation has occurred and the
details thereof.  An important element of the
cooperative principle requires that all individuals
who are subject to NCAA rules protect the integrity
of an investigation.  A failure to do so may be a
violation of the principles of ethical conduct.  The
NCAA 
enforcement 
staff 
will 
usually 
share
information 
with 
the 
institution 
during 
any
investigation; however, it is understood the staff,
to protect the integrity of the investigation, may
not in all instances be able to share information
with the institution."
(Emphasis added.)
When the COI issues its findings of fact and penalty
determinations, it announces the decision via a press release
and a published  "Infractions Report."  The press release and
the report identify the member institution, but do not include
the names of any staff members or athletic representatives who
have been found to have violated a rule.  The release and
report may, however, refer to an individual by his or her
position, such as "recruiting coordinator."  The ruling of the
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
9
COI may be appealed by any party to an appeals committee.  The
decision of the appeals committee is final.
The evidence submitted at trial indicated that The
University had been investigated by the NCAA, charged with
rule violations, and penalized on two prior occasions before
2000.  In 1995, the NCAA had investigated allegations that a
prospective student-athlete had received money in exchange for
signing a scholarship to play football at The University and
that after the student-athlete enrolled at The University he
had received special treatment in securing a loan from a bank
at which an athletic representative was an officer.  The NCAA
investigation did not substantiate the allegation that the
prospective student-athlete had received money during his
recruitment.  The investigation did reveal that the enrolled
student-athlete had secured loans to pay for disability
insurance 
without 
making proper arrangements with 
The
University.  
During the 1995 investigation, the NCAA also focused on
an allegation that The University had allowed a student-
athlete to participate in football practices and games after
he had signed a contract with a sports agent to represent him.
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
10
NCAA rules provide that a student-athlete is ineligible to
participate in collegiate athletics if the student-athlete has
indicated, by signing a contract with a sports agent, that he
wants to pursue a career in professional sports.  The contract
between the student-athlete and the agent was written on a
napkin and stated that the agent agreed to represent the
student-athlete for $400.  The investigation revealed that the
student-athlete had informed The University that he had signed
up to be drafted to play professional football but had removed
his name from the list of potential draftees and had taken no
additional steps toward a professional football career.  The
student-athlete, however, did not inform The University that
he had signed a contract with an agent.
The NCAA concluded as a result of the 1995 investigation
that The University had violated NCAA rules with regard to the
student-athlete's securing the loan and by allowing a student-
athlete who had entered into a contract with a sports agent to
participate in football practices and to play in college
football games. The NCAA found that The University's athletic
department's compliance office, i.e., the office responsible
for ensuring compliance with the NCAA rules, was not well
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
11
organized and should have been more diligent in informing
student-athletes about how to secure loans without violating
NCAA rules.  Additionally, the NCAA criticized The University
for failing to conduct a more thorough in-house investigation
of 
the 
circumstances 
surrounding 
the 
student-athlete's 
signing
with an agent and for failing to self-enforce NCAA rules.  The
University recognized that it had violated NCAA rules, and it
self-imposed penalties, including the disassociation of the
two athletic representatives involved in the loans and a
reduction in the number of potential scholarships in its
football program by four for one year.  The COI, however,
increased the penalties to include public reprimand and
censure, a three-year probationary period, a one-year loss of
participation in postseason competition by the football team,
and the loss of an additional 22 scholarships for prospective
student-athletes in football. 
Newspaper and Internet articles admitted into evidence
establish that the public was outraged by the harshness of the
penalties and voiced its lack of understanding as to why the
NCAA chose to impose such stiff penalties on The University.
The discussion indicated that the public did not believe that
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
12
the penalties issued against The University were equitable and
fair, compared to penalties the NCAA had imposed on other
member institutions for similar violations.  Much of the
discussion focused on the fact that The University recognized
that it was not innocent of the violations, but that the
punishment did not fit the offense, in light of The
University's self-imposed penalty of disassociation of the
boosters and loss of scholarships and The University's
aggressive restructuring of its compliance department.
In 1998, The University was investigated after The
University reported to the NCAA that it had violated certain
rules when an assistant basketball coach contacted two
athletic representatives and attempted to solicit money from
them to pay high school coaches to "steer" their players to
Alabama.  When The University learned of the potential rule
violations, 
The 
University 
initiated 
an 
internal
investigation, a step The University had been criticized for
not taking in the 1995 case; verified that violations had
occurred; fired the coach, and, in compliance with NCAA
procedures, which require an institution to notify the NCAA of
rule violations, reported the violations to the NCAA.  The
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
13
NCAA praised The University's compliance team, placed a show-
cause order on the fired coach for four years, and extended
The University's probationary period.  
Once again, public discussion was generated about the
NCAA's treatment of The University.  The public was dismayed
that, although The University did exactly what the NCAA and
its rules required, complied with the rule-enforcement process
by self-reporting the violation to the NCAA, and imposed an
appropriate 
self-punishment, 
the 
COI 
extended 
the 
probationary
period. The public voiced frustration that despite The
University's compliance with the enforcement process, The
University was not rewarded for its efforts.  Public debate
focused on whether  The University should self-report rule
violations and actively comply with the enforcement process
when there appeared to be no benefit to The University in
doing so.
  
In 
February 
2000, 
the 
enforcement staff began
investigating 
various 
alleged 
rule 
violations 
by 
The
University's football program, its staff, and its athletic
representatives. 
 
Initially, 
The 
University's 
football 
program
was suspected of violating various rules with regard to the
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
14
recruitment of prospective student-athlete Albert Means from
Memphis, Tennessee, who in February 2000 had signed a
scholarship to play football at The University.  The evidence
indicates that in 1999 the NCAA and the Southeastern
Conference ("the SEC"), of which The University is also a
member, had been notified that Means's high school coach was
attempting 
to 
solicit 
money 
from 
coaches 
at 
various
universities and colleges in exchange for granting the coaches
the opportunity to recruit Means to play football at their
university or college.  The evidence further indicates that
although the NCAA and the SEC were aware that The University
was recruiting Means, they did not notify The University or
its compliance staff about the potential rule violations with
regard to this solicitation of money. The investigation
expanded to include other alleged rule violations with regard
to recruiting that occurred in 1997 and rule violations
involving 
enrolled 
student-athletes 
by 
athletic
representatives and a coach.
During the course of the investigation, Phillip Fulmer,
the head football coach for the University of Tennessee,
informed Richard A. Johanningmeier, the enforcement-staff
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
15
investigator assigned to The University's case, that he
believed Tom Culpepper, an independent recruiting scout and
sportswriter, had information about the role that Logan Young,
an athletic representative of The University, had played in
recruiting Means to sign a scholarship to play football for
The University.
In August 2000, Johanningmeier telephoned Culpepper to
request an interview.  After Johanningmeier agreed that any
information Culpepper provided during the interview would be
confidential, Culpepper agreed to be interviewed.   During the
interview, Culpepper stated that in January 2000 he drove
Young from The University's postseason football game in Miami,
Florida, to Young's residence in Memphis, Tennessee.  During
the drive, Culpepper and Young discussed football recruiting
at The University.  According to Culpepper, Young stated that
he was going to pay Means's coach and others to secure Means's
commitment to sign a scholarship to play football for The
University.  During this interview, Culpepper also stated that
Young informed him that he had recruited Cottrell to be the
recruiting coordinator for The University's football team,
that Young had given Cottrell money to purchase his house in
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
16
Tuscaloosa, that Cottrell had abandoned his wife and children
in Tallahassee, Florida, that Young had paid one of Cottrell's
gambling debts, and that Cottrell had arranged at least one
fraudulent American College Test ("ACT") score for a
prospective 
student-athlete. 
Lastly, 
Culpepper 
told
Johanningmeier that although Young did not mention that
Williams was involved in violations of NCAA rules, Culpepper
believed that he was.
It also appears that during the period the NCAA was
investigating 
these 
alleged 
rule 
violations 
and/or 
immediately
thereafter, Culpepper made statements about Cottrell to
"friends" who were members of the media.  Culpepper told
"friends" that Cottrell was a liar "without a job, and he's
going to have a damn hard time finding one.  And that's all
there is to it," and that Cottrell had tried to ruin him,
explaining "[Cottrell] slapped me, I slapped [him] back
harder."  He also made references to the coaches at The
University as being "cheaters –- recruiting cheaters" and to
Williams as being a person who "funneled money" from Young to
Means.  These "friends" published the information Culpepper
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
Shaun Alexander was a running back at The University of
3
Alabama.  He currently plays professional football. 
17
communicated about Cottrell and Williams in various media
forums.
In October 2000, Cottrell became so concerned about the
number and frequency of Culpepper's statements about him that
he met with Culpepper in the presence of others in an attempt
to resolve Culpepper's animosity toward him and to end
Culpepper's verbal attack on his character and reputation.
The evidence indicated, however, that Culpepper continued to
make statements about Cottrell and that, sometime after
December 2000, he told Terry Harrington and Bruce Parrish,
both members of the media, that Cottrell had abandoned his
family in Tallahassee; that Cottrell and his assistant had
stolen videotapes from The University's athletic department;
and that Cottrell had stolen funds from the Shaun Alexander
Foundation.  
3
In November 2000, Johanningmeier began conducting on-
campus interviews at The University.  Typically, during these
interviews, in addition to Johanningmeier, Gene Marsh, Marie
Robbins, the compliance director for The University's athletic
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
18
department, and counsel for The University were present.
Cottrell and Williams were both interviewed.
The evidence indicated that Cottrell was hired by The
University's athletic department in 1997 as an assistant coach
and recruiting coordinator for the football program.  As part
of his responsibilities as an assistant coach, Cottrell spoke
to "Red Elephant Clubs" and individual chapters of The
University's National Alumni Association and played in charity
golf tournaments.  Cottrell stated that he was frequently
interviewed by sports writers and radio broadcasters about
recruiting at The University.  Indeed, Cottrell admitted that
he was well known among the sports media and that he was
regarded as a recruiting specialist.  Additionally, the
evidence established that before the 2000 NCAA investigation
began, Cottrell had committed "minor" violations of NCAA rules
and had been suspended from participating in recruitment for
at least a month.  In November 2000, following a season where
the record was 3-8, Cottrell and the rest of the football
coaching staff were fired.  Nothing in the record indicates
that Cottrell's firing was related to the violation of any
NCAA rule. 
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
19
The NCAA investigation established that although Cottrell
had little involvement in recruiting Means, he did have a
relationship with Young.  The investigation also revealed
information that Cottrell had violated several NCAA rules,
including improperly accepting two loans from Young and
improperly interacting with prospective student-athletes and
enrolled student-athletes.  
Johanningmeier also interviewed Williams, who was hired
in 1994 as an assistant coach to coach running backs for The
University's football team.  In addition to coaching running
backs, Williams, like other assistant coaches on The
University's football staff, had recruiting duties.  Williams
was 
responsible 
for 
recruiting 
prospective 
student-athletes 
in
the Memphis, Tennessee, area.  Also, like Cottrell, Williams
spoke to Red Elephant Clubs and individual chapters of The
University's National Alumni Association, played in charity
golf tournaments, and answered media questions, providing team
and individual-player information.  
Over 200 copies of articles published from 1994 to 2000
were submitted in evidence containing statements and comments
made by Williams about various players, the team’s preparation
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
The record also contains copies of articles about the
4
federal prosecution of Young, who was convicted of bribing a
public official -– Means's high school football coach.  This
prosecution evolved from Young's involvement in recruiting
Means to sign a scholarship to play football for The
University and his alleged payment of over $100,000 to Means's
20
for games, the performance of football players during games,
and the recruitment of prospective student-athletes.  Like
Cottrell, Williams was fired in November 2000, and nothing in
the record indicates a relationship between his termination
and any NCAA rule violations. 
When Johanningmeier interviewed Williams, he questioned
Williams about recruiting in general and specifically about
Means.  
He also questioned Williams about Williams's
relationship with Young.  The enforcement staff concluded from
the investigation that Williams had had an inappropriate
relationship with Young and had violated NCAA rules with
regard to his recruitment of prospective student-athletes in
the Memphis area and, in particular, Means. 
Throughout the NCAA investigation that began in 2000, the
media published detailed reports about the investigation on
the radio and in the newspapers.  The record contains copies
of over 100 articles detailing information about the
investigation and certain interviews.   Even though the
4
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
coach to guarantee that Means would commit to The University.
The articles indicate that one of the witnesses in that trial
testified that Williams assisted Young in paying Means's coach
to secure Means's commitment to play football at The
University.
However, in their third amended complaint, Cottrell and
5
Williams 
alleged 
"that 
a 
newspaper 
article 
revealing
information contained in [Cottrell's] first interview was
published which, based on Marsh's own statements, had to come
from him or someone connected to him."
21
investigation and the interviews conducted by Johanningmeier
were supposed to be confidential, the evidence at trial
established that the media were continually informed of the
status of the investigation and the contents of some of the
interviews.  Indeed, testimony indicated that journalists
often were aware of upcoming interviews and immediately
following an interview would publish an article detailing the
contents of the interview, including speculation about the
impact the information revealed in the interview would have on
the investigation.  Cottrell and Williams testified that they
were astounded by the specificity of the information reported
by the media; neither Cottrell nor Williams, however,
identified any specific source of the information they allege
was "leaked" to the media.5
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
22
Johanningmeier reported the results of his investigation
to the enforcement-staff team assigned to The University's
case.  The director then consulted with other enforcement-
staff directors, and they determined, based on the information
gleaned in the investigation, the specific charges to be made
against 
The 
University, 
its 
staff, 
and 
its 
athletic
representatives.  
On February 2, 2001, the NCAA issued a preliminary LOI to
The University.  In September 2001, official LOIs  were sent
to The University, Cottrell, Williams, and others, listing
various alleged rule violations and requesting a response to
each alleged violation.  The alleged rule violations occurred
from 1997 through 2000 and included improper "offers and
inducements" to prospective student-athletes and enrolled
student-athletes by athletic representatives, "potential
academic impropriety with student-athletes prior to their
enrollment," and possible "unethical conduct" by coaches who
either knew of or participated in the rule violations.  
The LOI to The University charged the institution with
various rule violations.  On November 17, 2001, the COI
conducted a hearing on the alleged rule violations against The
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
23
University.  The University defended the allegations.  On
February 1, 2002, the COI issued its infractions report,
finding that The University had committed numerous rule
violations and imposed several penalties, including a ban from
postseason game appearances for two years, the loss of 21
scholarships over a three-year period, and placement on a
five-year probationary period.  The penalties severely
affected The University's ability to compete in football, the
amount of revenue The University generated from football, and
the amount of revenue The University received in its general
scholarship fund from the football division of its athletic
department.
Thomas Yeager, the chairman of the COI, during the
teleconference announcing the penalties, stated that The
University football program was "staring down the barrel of a
gun" at a "death penalty" –- a punishment that would terminate
The University's football program.  Classifying the violations
as some of the worst that have ever been presented to the
NCAA, Yeager stated that the determination of the penalty to
impose for the violations was complicated by the fact that The
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
24
University was a repeat offender and was on probation at the
time of the misconduct.
In finding that The University had violated various NCAA
rules, the  COI focused mainly on the conduct of a "rogue"
football athletic representative and some of "the largest
money amounts" alleged in any NCAA rule-violation case
involving the recruitment of a prospective student-athlete.
The infractions report stated:
"While several serious allegations in this case
involved the provision of extra-benefits to enrolled
football student-athletes, at the heart of the case
were football recruiting violations involving some
of the largest money amounts alleged in any
infractions case in the NCAA's history.  ...
"....
"...  Because of the university's repeat-
violator history, including its experience with
athletics representative misconduct, the number and
seriousness of the violations, the visibility,
prominence, and known predilections of the athletics
representatives at the center of the violations, the
committee seriously considered whether a finding of
failure of institutional control might be warranted.
The violations charged and the evidence presented by
the 
enforcement 
staff 
cited 
athletics
representatives 
as primarily culpable for the
violations, not members of the university's current
or prior staffs.  The committee noted that it was
limited by the scope and contours of the case as
presented.  Under the circumstances, the committee
concluded that information in the case as presented
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
25
was too tenuous and insufficient to form the basis
of a lack of institutional control."
(Emphasis added.)  Despite the COI's scathing public censure
and the imposition of severe penalties, it complimented The
University and the efforts of its compliance team to
investigate the rule violations.  Yeager stated in the
teleconference that he "did not see what else [The University]
could have done" to prevent the violations by the athletic
representatives.
Cottrell and Williams were the only two coaches on the
coaching staff to receive LOIs.  Williams's LOI charged that
he had committed rule violations when he allegedly knew that
Means’s high school coach had requested money and a vehicle
from Young to encourage Means to sign a scholarship to play
football for The University and did not report the recruiting
misconduct to The University, the SEC, or the NCAA; when he
allegedly provided false and misleading information to
Johanningmeier about the recruitment of Means; and when he
allegedly exceeded the number of permitted visits to high
schools in the Memphis area during the fall football-scouting
evaluation period for 1999-2000.  Before the COI hearing, the
enforcement staff dismissed the charge against Williams with
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
These secondary rule violations had been self-reported
6
to the NCAA by The University.
26
regard to the recruitment of Means and the charge that
Williams failed to fully cooperate with Johanningmeier.
Williams, however, admitted to exceeding the number of
permitted visits to the Memphis area.  The COI, recognizing
the violation as one committed by The University, did not
impose a penalty against Williams.
Cottrell's LOI alleged the following three major rule
violations:
1.  That Cottrell's receipt of  two loans from Young
for $1,600 and $55,000, respectively, violated the
rule against unauthorized salary enhancements; 
2.  That Cottrell had engaged in unethical conduct
by 
"knowingly 
providing 
misleading 
information
regarding the loans" to Johanningmeier; and 
3. That Cottrell had failed to report academic fraud
in connection with a prospective student-athlete's
ACT score.
Cottrell's LOI also charged three secondary rule violations:6
1.  That Cottrell improperly allowed a prospective
student-athlete to make long-distance telephone
calls from his office;
2.  That Cottrell improperly intervened with state
police on behalf of a student-athlete to have a
speeding ticket dismissed; and
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
27
3.  That Cottrell had improperly made arrangements
for an athletic department's staff member to drive
a prospective student-athlete to Cottrell's home to
rest after the student-athlete had received over-
the-counter 
medications 
from 
The 
University's
training room.
In his response to his LOI and/or during the prehearing
conference between Cottrell and the enforcement staff,
Cottrell admitted to receiving the loans from Young, denied
knowingly misleading the enforcement staff about the loans,
denied committing academic fraud with regard to a prospective
student-athlete's ACT score, admitted that he had allowed a
prospective student-athlete to make long-distance telephone
calls from his office, admitted assisting a student-athlete
with a speeding ticket, and admitted assisting a prospective
student-athlete when he was ill.  Cottrell also admitted that
he had arranged two free football tickets for a high school
guidance counselor and that he had sold four postseason
football game tickets to a student-athlete.  These two latter
violations were not charged in Cottrell's LOI. 
At the prehearing conference, the enforcement staff
dismissed the charge against Cottrell alleging that he had
committed academic fraud with regard to a prospective student-
athlete's ACT score but decided to pursue the rest of the
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
28
alleged violations against Cottrell.  After the hearing, the
COI found that Cottrell did accept an improper salary
enhancement when he accepted the loans from Young and that he
had failed to fully and completely disclose information during
his interview with Johanningmeier.  The COI did not impose a
penalty against Cottrell for these violations.  However, in
its "news release," the NCAA stated: 
"[T]he committee considered imposing a show cause
order on one of the former Alabama assistant coaches
but decided not to do so because he was terminated
by the university at the conclusion of the 2000
season and since that time has been out of college
coaching, under what the committee considered to be
a de facto show cause order."
The COI also found that Cottrell was not guilty of
unethical conduct with regard to his failure to disclose the
loans.  The COI did not find the other alleged rule violations
against Cottrell to be specific violations by Cottrell, but
did find that the violations occurred, and they were
considered violations committed by The University.  No
individual penalties, however, were assessed against Cottrell
for the violations. 
Cottrell appealed the COI's finding that he failed to
provide complete disclosure of the loans to Johanningmeier
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
29
during his investigation.  The appeals committee affirmed the
COI's decision.
The COI's findings and a penalty-summary report with
regard to The University's case were published on the NCAA's
Web site on February 1, 2002.  Even though the COI had not
imposed any penalties against Cottrell, the published penalty-
summary 
report 
stated 
that 
an 
eight-year 
show-cause
restriction was imposed against the "recruiting coordinator."
Additionally, the penalty-summary report indicated via a
checkbox that a show-cause restriction had been placed on
employees.  These false statements were not corrected when the
Web site penalty summary was updated to indicate that the
COI's decision had been affirmed, and they remained on the
NCAA Web site for nearly two years until Cottrell and Williams
brought the false statements to the NCAA's attention.   
The NCAA admitted that the information contained in the
published penalty-summary report was false but maintained that
its publication of the false information was a clerical
mistake.  It is without dispute that the statements were false
because 
"The 
University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa Public
Infractions Report" issued by the COI did not indicate that a
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
Indeed, when Cottrell and Williams made their second
7
request that the Web site information be corrected, the NCAA
made the correction and included the following explanation on
its Web site:
"The NCAA's web site contains a searchable database
of major infraction reports and contains summaries
of those reports.  The penalty summary relating to
the February 1, 2002, Public Infractions Report
regarding The University of Alabama-Tuscaloosa,
erroneously stated the recruiting coordinator had
received an eight-year show cause requirement.  This
erroneous information was placed on the major
infractions database through clerical error and has
been corrected.  The error appears to have been due
to a sentence being transposed from the University
of Kentucky's Public Infractions Report, whose
recruiting coordinator did receive an eight-year
show 
cause 
provision. 
 
The 
Alabama 
Public
Infractions 
Report and the accompanying press
release both correctly reflect that the former
assistant coach did not receive a show cause
requirement.  The error was in the summary only.
Although the former Alabama assistant coach also had
the 
collateral 
responsibilities 
of 
recruiting
coordinator, he was never identified as 'the
recruiting coordinator' in either the Alabama Public
Infractions Report or the press release.  The NCAA
regrets the error."
30
show-cause provision had been imposed upon the recruiting
coordinator or that a show-cause provision had been placed on
"employees."7
Testimony at trial established that Cheryl DeWees, the
administrative assistant for the director of the committee on
infractions, created the penalty-summary report from the COI
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
31
infractions report in The University's case and entered it
onto the NCAA's Web site on the same day she created and
entered on the Web site the penalty-summary report for the
University 
of 
Kentucky 
case. 
 
She 
stated 
that 
she
inadvertently typed the false statement regarding the show-
cause provision for the recruiting coordinator from the
University of Kentucky report into The University's report.
She also stated that this mistake resulted in a default box
being checked inadvertently, which indicated that a show-cause
provision 
had 
been 
imposed 
against 
employees 
at 
The
University.  
Speculation about a pending NCAA investigation, the
investigation 
of 
the 
alleged 
rule 
violations 
by 
The
University, its staff, and its athletic representatives, and
the findings of the COI and the penalties imposed received
substantial media coverage.  For example, the parties
submitted over 100 published newspaper and/or Internet
articles from across the State discussing the alleged rule
violations 
by 
The 
University, 
particularly 
the 
facts
surrounding 
Means's 
recruitment, 
the 
NCAA's 
investigation 
into
the alleged rule violations, and the penalties imposed.  The
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
32
articles discussed not only facts surrounding the alleged
violations, investigation, and penalties, but also the NCAA's
past treatment of The University with regard to rule
violations and its present treatment of The University
throughout the process.  In light of the NCAA's past criticism
that The University did not adequately enforce institutional
control or investigate alleged violations, many of the
articles published before the infractions report issued
specifically focused on whether the NCAA would consider as
mitigation 
The 
University's 
self-reporting 
of 
numerous
violations, 
its 
self-imposition of penalties, and its
aggressive 
internal 
investigation of the alleged rule
violations in an effort to show compliance with the rules and
the NCAA enforcement process.
The severity of the penalties imposed in the 2000 case
rekindled the public debate as to whether the NCAA treated The
University unfairly.  Discussion focused on the fact that the
NCAA and the SEC knew of the Means recruiting situation, but
did not warn The University.  Additionally, the public
questioned the equity of the NCAA's treatment in light of the
fact that The University was on probation for the self-
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
33
reported 1998 NCAA rule violation and had received a harsh
penalty in that case, despite the fact that The University had
self-reported.  Consequently, public debate focused on the
propriety of the involvement of The University's compliance
staff in the investigation, the benefit of self-reporting rule
violations to the NCAA, and the NCAA's past and present
treatment of The University. 
Additionally, discussion focused on the NCAA's level of
accountability 
with 
regard 
to 
the 
fairness 
of 
the
investigative process and whether the penalties fit the
violations.  Specifically, the public debated the fairness of
the NCAA’s failure to inform The University of known
information regarding potential recruiting-rule violations
involving Means to allow The University an opportunity to
prevent any improper conduct by its athletic representatives
before it occurred.  As in the 1998 debate, the public
recognized that The University had violated NCAA rules, but it
questioned the NCAA's treatment of The University in light of
The University's proactive efforts to comply and to enforce
the rules and the treatment of The University as compared to
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
Cottrell 
and 
Williams 
sued 
other 
individuals 
and 
entities
8
and pleaded numerous claims in their complaint and amended
complaints.  Only the claims mentioned and the defendants that
are before us will be discussed in this opinion.
34
the treatment of other universities that had been found guilty
of NCAA rule violations.
In late 2002, Cottrell and Williams sued the NCAA,
Culpepper, and others, alleging against the NCAA and Culpepper
claims of claims of defamation, civil conspiracy, false-light
invasion of privacy, negligence, and wantonness.  These claims
evolved from the NCAA investigation into The University's
football program.   
8
With regard to the claim of defamation, Cottrell and
Williams alleged that the NCAA and Culpepper published false
statements that Cottrell and Williams were "involved in
payoffs to a college football player and involved in various
criminal activities."  They further alleged that the NCAA made
false statements to various media sources to the effect that
Cottrell and Williams had been involved in illegal recruiting
practices, such as giving football tickets to and paying
prospective student-athletes.  Additionally, Cottrell and
Williams alleged that the NCAA published false statements on
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
35
its Web site that a show-cause provision had been imposed
against them. 
With regard to the false-light invasion-of-privacy claim,
Cottrell and Williams alleged that the NCAA, Culpepper, and
others by their false statements placed them in a false light
before the public.  Specifically, they alleged that the NCAA
placed them in a false light before the public by publishing
on its Web site for over two years false statements that a
show-cause provision had been imposed against them.  The
negligence and wantonness claims against the NCAA also
addressed the publication of the statements on the Web site.
Lastly, Cottrell and Williams alleged that the NCAA,
Culpepper, and others entered into a conspiracy to destroy
their coaching careers and personal reputations by making them
the 
"scapegoats" 
in 
the 
investigation 
and 
sanctions.
Specifically, they alleged that the NCAA, Culpepper, and
others entered into a conspiracy that "caused and participated
in actions to cause [false] statements [about them] to be
published in the statewide news media and sent to various
people in college football programs," which destroyed their
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
36
reputations and ended their careers as college football
coaches.    
In May 2005, the NCAA and Culpepper moved for summary
judgments.  In their motions, they argued, among other things,
that because Cottrell and Williams were limited-purpose public
figures and they could not produce substantial evidence
indicating that the NCAA or Culpepper had acted with actual
malice in publishing the allegedly false statements, they were
entitled to summary judgments.  In June 2005, the trial court
conducted a hearing on the summary-judgment motions and on
July 7, 2005, the trial court entered an order stating:
"The plaintiffs bring five (5) counts in their
complaints.  The claims are as follows:
"1.  Libel and slander [defamation claims].
"2.  Invasion of privacy.
"3.  Negligence.
"4.  Wantonness.
"5.  Civil conspiracy.
"Prior to addressing the claims, however, there
are some questions of law that must be addressed by
the court.
"First, if the plaintiffs are public figures,
the plaintiffs must prove actual malice by the
defendants on the defamation claims.  The parties
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
37
are all in agreement as to the legal standard to be
applied to determine if the plaintiffs are public
figures.  The dispute arises in applying the
proffered facts to the law.
"As one court stated: 'Defining a public figure
is like trying to nail a jelly fish to the wall.'
(Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises Inc., 411 F. Supp
440 [(D.C. Ga. 1976)]).  A public figure can be a
general-purpose public figure, or a limited purpose
public figure.  This court can say as a matter of
law, without going into a lot of detail, that the
plaintiffs do not satisfy the criteria of a general-
purpose public figure.  This would require the
plaintiffs to have general fame or notoriety in the
community, and pervasive involvement in ordering the
affairs of society (Gertz v Welch[, 418 U.S. 323,]
94 S.Ct. 2997 [(1974)]).
"A limited purpose public figure is determined
by reference to the individual's participation in
the particular controversy giving rise to the
defamation (Gertz, infra).  A person may become a
limited purpose public figure in a matter of general
public concern in one of four ways.  By virtue of
his position, by purposeful activity in thrusting
[himself] into the public controversy, his close
involvement with the resolution of matters of public
concern, or by being drawn into the controversy.  It
is undisputed that the controversy regarding the
charges against the University of Alabama was a
matter of public concern.
"The court will then examine the four factors in
reverse order.  Since the Supreme Court decided
Gertz, it has never again mentioned the 'drawn into
the controversy' factor again. This court has also
not been able to find any other significant case
whereby public figure status has been determined on
that factor.  Many legal experts feel that the
Supreme Court has abandoned this factor (quote in
Dombey v Phoenix Newspapers Inc.[, 150 Ariz. 476,]
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
38
724 P.2d 562 [(1986)]). Since there exists no
guidance or recent authority on this factor, this
court is not going to bestow public figure status on
the plaintiffs' based on the plaintiffs' being
involuntarily drawn into the controversy.
"The third factor involves whether or not the
plaintiffs have had a close involvement with the
resolution of the controversy.  The plaintiffs'
names were mentioned early in the controversy, but
they had little involvement with the resolution of
the controversy other than giving their statements,
and testifying at the infractions committee hearing.
"Factor two involves any purposeful activity in
thrusting themselves into the controversy. The
plaintiffs were under a gag order by the University
of Alabama and the NCAA. They made no comments to
the media, and quietly sat back during the NCAA
investigation.
"The final factor involves looking at the
individuals position with respect to matters of
public concern, i.e., do the plaintiffs' positions
give them regular access to the media on a regular
and continuing basis.  The defendants have presented
evidence that from time to time the plaintiffs spoke
to Red Elephant Clubs and quarterback clubs.
Further, from time to time articles [were written in
which they are cited or quoted], and interviews were
given by them. There is also evidence that the head
coach at The University of Alabama retains the duty
to have regular access to the media, and to comment
on the team status in all areas, and all areas of
publicity.  The assistant coaches [do] not.  From
this point the evidence stops as to plaintiff Ivy
Williams.  The court finds that as to plaintiff Ivy
Williams, the facts of this case are similar to the
Kentucky Supreme Court case of Warford v. Lexington
Herald Leader[,] 789 S.W. 2d 758 [(Ky. 1990)].
Under 
the 
facts 
of 
that 
case 
the 
assistant
basketball coach was found not to be a public
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
39
figure. Likewise, this court finds that plaintiff
Ivy Williams's position was neither in such a
position of public prominence that he was in a
position to influence others, or the outcome of the
controversy, nor did he enjoy regular and continuing
access to the media.
"Plaintiff Ronnie Cottrell, on the other hand,
was the recruiting coordinator at The University of
Alabama.  He was prominent enough that he was asked
to have a charity golf tournament named after him.
SEC Commissioner Roy Kramer stated in his deposition
at page 256: 'I told him since he got a lot of
publicity, which he did for the good recruiting job
he did at Alabama, he would always be under the
scrutiny of other coaches, and other schools.  We
talked about that was a burden you pay as a
publicized recruiting coordinator at a high profile
school such as The U of A.' ...  In Alabama,
football recruiting is a matter of intense public
concern, 
and 
invited 
public 
attention. 
 
The
recruiting coordinator position at Alabama is a high
profile position through which the plaintiff Ronnie
Cottrell could be expected to assume a role of
public prominence, as pointed out by Commissioner
Kramer.  As such, plaintiff Cottrell would have
access to the media, and a potential to influence
the outcome of the controversy that a private person
would not have.  Based on the facts, and caselaw
presented the court finds, as a matter of law,
plaintiff Ronnie Cottrell was a limited purpose
public figure.
"... The plaintiffs' defamation, false light,
and conspiracy claims arise out of statements made
during and after the investigative process.
"The 
third 
issue is 
whether or not the
affirmative defense of the two (2) year statute of
limitations 
defeats 
recovery 
for 
any 
of 
the
plaintiffs' claims. The Alabama case of Poff v
Hayes, 763 So. 2d 234 (Ala. 2000), as cited by the
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
40
defendants, stands for the proposition that in
defamation cases, the two (2) year statute of
limitations runs from the date of the publication.
That date is the date the injury to reputation
occurs.  This lawsuit was filed on 12/20/02;
therefore any defamatory statements made prior to
12/20/00 are barred by the two (2) year statute of
limitations.  Likewise, any other claims arising
before 12/20/00 are time-barred.
"The fourth issue arises out of the defendants'
affirmative defense of qualified privilege.  The
qualified privilege may apply where one acts in good
faith in complying with a request for information
from a third party (see Clark v. America's First
Credit Union, 585 So. 2d 1367 (Ala. 1991)).  It also
applies if it is prompted by a duty owed either to
the public or a third party, or the communication is
one in which the party has an interest and is made
to another having a corresponding interest, if made
in good faith, and without actual malice.  The
conditional, or qualified privilege would apply to
the plaintiffs' claims arising out of the NCAA's
letter of inquiry (LOI).  It would also apply to the
statements made by Tom Culpepper to defendant
Richard Johanningmeier during the course of the
investigation, and in the January and April 2001
conferences.  The privilege can be overcome by proof
that certain statements were not relevant to the
investigation, were made in bad faith, or with
actual malice.  There is evidence before the court
from which the jury could find that the privilege
does not apply to some statements of defendant Tom
Culpepper.  There is no legally admissible evidence
to overcome the privilege defense to the statements
in the NCAA's LOI.
"These legal issues being decided, the court
will now turn to the summary judgment motion.  As a
preliminary matter, this court was struck by the
detailed time consuming, and thorough reconstruction
of the NCAA investigation by the plaintiffs'
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
41
attorneys.  One cannot help but conclude that Dr.
Marsh and Ms. Robbins are good and law-abiding
individuals who strove to run a clean program.  If
the NCAA and SEC had made them privy to what Logan
Young was doing, he would have been disassociated,
Albert Means not signed, and the penalties against
the University would have been less severe.  There
were two other major violations not involving the
plaintiffs, which would have still resulted in
severe sanctions against the U of A.  However, after
saying 
all 
this, 
The 
University 
of 
Alabama
investigation is only peripherally related to this
case.  The conspiracy that is relevant is a
conspiracy 
by 
the 
defendants 
to 
defame 
the
plaintiffs, and make them 'the fall guys.'
"....
"The court will next examine plaintiff Ivy
Williams's claims against the remaining defendants.
Plaintiff's claims are limited to events that took
place on, or after 12/20/00.  Considering the
evidence most favorably to said plaintiff, there is
substantial evidence supporting a defamation claim
of 
libel 
and 
slander 
against 
defendant 
Tom
Culpepper.  There is also substantial evidence
supporting plaintiff's defamation, and invasion of
privacy (false light) claims against the NCAA as a
result of the publication on the NCAA web site.  The
negligence and, wantonness claims are subsumed
within plaintiff's defamation claims, because that
culpability is an element of the defamation claims.
"There being no dispute of a material fact, and
remaining defendants being entitled to judgment as
a matter of law on all other claims, summary
judgment is granted in favor of the remaining
defendants on all other claims.
"As to the claims of plaintiff Ronnie Cottrell
against the NCAA, there is insufficient legally
admissible evidence to support this plaintiff's
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
42
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence,
actual malice, to support any defamation claims. The
plaintiff's negligence and wantonness claims must
also fail, because these degrees of culpability will
not support a cause of action arising out of
defamatory acts against a public figure.  The
admissible 
facts 
do 
not 
support 
a 
separate
negligence 
or 
wantonness 
claim. 
 
Therefore,
defendant NCAA being entitled to judgment, as a
matter of law, on all plaintiff's claims against
defendant NCAA, summary judgment is granted in favor
of defendant NCAA, and against plaintiff Ronnie
Cottrell.
"As to plaintiff Cottrell's claims against
Thomas Culpepper, there is substantial evidence, if
believed by a jury, supporting actual malice on said
defendant's part, and defamatory statements which
defendant Culpepper, either knew were false, or
which were published with reckless indifference to
their truth or falsity.  As to the invasion of
privacy claim, there was no substantial evidence,
that the defendant made a publication to the public
at large after 12/20/00. Further, there was no clear
and convincing evidence of a conspiracy, to defame
plaintiff Cottrell, specifically after 12/20/00 in
support of a civil conspiracy claim.  Further, there
was no substantial legally admissible evidence that
defendant Culpepper conspired with anyone to defame
either plaintiff.  Therefore, summary judgment is
granted in favor of defendant Tom Culpepper, and
against the plaintiff Ronald W. Cottrell on the
civil conspiracy, and invasion of privacy claims.
Summary judgment is denied as to the defamation and
slander claim.
"As a footnote on the damage issue, there is a
great deal of evidence that plaintiffs' damage, or
injury to reputation was attributable to factors,
other than the defendants' actions, such as: Milton
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
Kirk was an assistant high school football coach at the
9
school Means attended in Memphis.
43
Kirk's
 
revelations, 
statements 
by 
the 
U.S.
[9]
Attorney in Memphis, media articles, comments, and
rumors proliferated by sports talk shows, and
internet 
web 
sites. 
 
The 
degree 
of 
damage
attributable to the defendants will, however, be a
question for the jury to determine from all the
evidence."
On July 12, 2005, the trial began governed by the trial
court's pretrial determination that Cottrell was a limited-
purpose public figure and Williams was a private person.
Cottrell presented evidence indicating that in October 2000 he
had met with Culpepper in the presence of others to discuss
Culpepper's attack on his reputation and character.   The
testimony indicated, however, that after December 2000,
Culpepper had made statements to individuals, who subsequently
published the statements, to the effect that Cottrell had
abandoned his family in Tallahassee, Florida; that Cottrell
had stolen funds from the Shaun Alexander Foundation; and that
Cottrell 
and 
his 
assistant 
had 
stolen 
videotapes 
of
prospective student-athletes from The University's athletic
department.  Cottrell presented evidence indicating that these
statements by Culpepper were not true.  Additionally, the
evidence indicated that Culpepper made statements creating the
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
44
inference that Williams was unethical in recruiting and that
he had assisted Young in funneling money to Means.  According
to the testimony, Culpepper made these statements about
Cottrell and Williams in an angry, belligerent, vindictive
tone.  With regard to Cottrell,  the evidence indicated that
Culpepper had hostile feelings about Cottrell and wanted
Cottrell out of college coaching. 
The evidence tended to establish that Cottrell had
suffered mental and emotional injury.  Cottrell testified that
he had been unable to obtain a job in college coaching and
that he had been told that he needed to find a career outside
college coaching.  Cottrell, however, was not able to identify
any potential employer who had relied on Culpepper's
statements in  refusing to offer Cottrell a college coaching
job.  He further explained that because he had been unable to
obtain a job, he had been unable to provide financially for
his family and had had to seek financial assistance from his
parents, his brother, and his wife's mother. He testified that
he has had to take prescribed medications to manage the stress
and emotional upset.  Cottrell's wife testified that Cottrell
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
45
has trouble sleeping at night and that their personal finances
and their marriage has suffered.    
Williams testified that he had suffered mental and
emotional injury.  He too has been unable to find a steady job
in college coaching.  Williams stated that although he had had
an offer to coach football at Miles College, the offer was
rescinded when the Miles College athletic director learned of
the NCAA investigation.  Williams, however, admitted that he
could not identify any potential employer who had relied upon
the false statement in the NCAA penalty-summary report or the
statements made by Culpepper as a reason not to hire him.
Williams explained that he had suffered stress over financial
issues and that he and his wife had had to sell their home and
move into an apartment.  The testimony indicated that as a
consequence of what he considered to be an attack on
Williams's 
reputation, 
Williams 
became 
disheartened,
depressed, and lifeless.  
At the close of Cottrell and Williams's case-in-chief, the
trial court reconsidered Williams's status as a private person
and held that Williams was a limited-purpose public figure.
Additionally, the trial court held that because none of the
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
Evidence of special damages is evidence that the untrue
10
statements resulted in a "'"material loss capable of being
measured in money."'" Butler v. Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 19 (Ala.
2003)(quoting Shook v. St. Bede School, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1172,
1180 (M.D. Ala.1999), quoting in turn Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 575 cmt. b. (1977)).
46
evidence established that any of the alleged defamatory
statements were actionable per quod, i.e., that the statements
resulted in special damages,
 only the alleged defamatory
10
statements that were actionable per se, i.e., that involved a
crime of infamy or moral turpitude, would be submitted to the
jury.  The trial court then entered a judgment as a matter of
law for the NCAA and for Culpepper on Williams's defamation
claims.  The trial court entered a judgment as a matter of law
for the NCAA because Williams had not produced clear and
convincing evidence that the NCAA acted with actual malice in
publishing the defamatory statements on its Web site.  With
regard to Williams's defamation claim against Culpepper, the
trial court found that the alleged defamatory statements were
not actionable because Culpepper's statement that Williams
funneled money to Means was not slander per se and Culpepper's
other statement that Williams engaged in unethical recruiting
was not actionable because it was a statement of opinion.  
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
47
Culpepper, the sole remaining defendant, then presented
his defense to the claims of Cottrell, the sole remaining
plaintiff in the case.  Culpepper's defense focused on whether
Culpepper knew that the statements he made were false or
whether he acted with reckless disregard as to whether they
were true or not.  He testified that the statements he made
about Cottrell were based on information he had received from
various present or former employees of The University's
athletic department and that he had assumed that the
statements were true.  He admitted that he did not exercise
good judgment when making the statements.
At the close of all the evidence, the trial court
reconsidered Cottrell’s status as a limited-purpose public
figure with regard to the statements made by Culpepper to the
effect that Cottrell had abandoned his family, had stolen
funds from the Shaun Alexander Foundation, and had stolen
videotapes from The University's athletic department.  The
trial court  determined, based on all the evidence presented,
that Cottrell was a private figure with regard to these
statements.  The trial court, therefore, instructed the jury
that Cottrell had to prove by only a preponderance of the
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
Culpepper and the NCAA entered into an agreement
11
pursuant to which the NCAA agreed to pay Culpepper’s expenses
in litigation resulting from his being a confidential witness
for the NCAA. (This statement is a general description of the
agreement and is not a finding as a matter of law.)
48
evidence that Culpepper negligently made the statements.  The
trial court did instruct the jury that to award punitive
damages Cottrell had to establish that Culpepper made the
statements with malice.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Cottrell;
Culpepper filed a motion for a new trial.  Additionally,
Cottrell filed a motion asking the trial court to address the
applicability of an agreement between the NCAA and Culpepper
to a determination of Culpepper's ability to pay damages.
  On
11
November 15, 2005, the trial court issued an order granting
Culpepper a new trial, holding that Culpepper was prejudiced
when the court changed Cottrell's status from a limited-
purpose public figure to a private person at the close of the
evidence.  Specifically, the trial court held that if it had
determined earlier in the proceedings that Cottrell was a
private figure, Culpepper would have defended the case
differently.  The trial court further held that Cottrell's
request regarding the applicability of the agreement between
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
49
the NCAA and Culpepper to Culpepper's ability to pay damages
was moot in light of its ordering a new trial.
Cottrell and Williams appeal; Culpepper cross-appeals.
Standard of Review
This Court conducts a de novo review of rulings on a
motion for a summary judgment and on a motion for a judgment
as a matter of law.  Bailey v. Faulkner,  940 So. 2d 247, 249
(Ala. 2006).  In Butler v. Town of Argo,  871 So. 2d 1, 11-12
(Ala. 2003), we recognized:
"'"[T]his Court uses the same standard the
trial court used initially in granting or
denying a [judgment as a matter of law].
Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Crawford, 689
So. 2d 3 (Ala. 1997).  Regarding questions
of fact, the ultimate question is whether
the nonmovant has presented sufficient
evidence to allow the case or the issue to
be submitted to the jury for a factual
resolution.  Carter v. Henderson, 598 So.
2d 1350 (Ala. 1992).  For actions filed
after June 11, 1987, the nonmovant must
present 'substantial evidence' in order to
withstand a motion for a [judgment as a
matter of law]. See § 12-21-12, Ala. Code
1975; West v. Founders Life Assurance Co.
of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala.
1989).  A reviewing court must determine
whether the party who bears the burden of
proof has produced substantial evidence
creating 
a 
factual 
dispute 
requiring
resolution by the jury.  Carter, 598 So. 2d
at 1353.  In reviewing a ruling on a motion
for a [judgment as a matter of law], this
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
50
Court views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant and entertains
such reasonable inferences as the jury
would have been free to draw.  Motion
Industries, Inc. v. Pate, 678 So. 2d 724
(Ala. 1996).  Regarding a question of law,
however, this Court indulges no presumption
of correctness as to the trial court's
ruling.  Ricwil, Inc. v. S.L. Pappas & Co.,
599 So. 2d 1126 (Ala. 1992).
"'....'
"I.C.U. Investigations, Inc. v. Jones, 780 So. 2d
685, 688 (Ala. 2000)."
With regard to review of a trial court's ruling on a
motion for a new trial, this Court has stated:
"'It is well established that a ruling on a
motion for a new trial rests within the
sound discretion of the trial judge. The
exercise of that discretion carries with it
a presumption of correctness, which will
not be disturbed by this Court unless some
legal right is abused and the record
plainly and palpably shows the trial judge
to be in error.'"
Curtis v. Faulkner Univ., 575 So. 2d 1064, 1066 (Ala. 1991)
(quoting Kane v. Edward J. Woerner & Sons, Inc., 543 So. 2d
693, 694 (Ala. 1989)).
Discussion
I.  Whether the trial court erred in its determinations
with regard to the defamation claims.
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
51
A.  Cottrell's and Williams's classifications in
the context of their defamation claims.  
Because many of the allegations of error hinge upon the
classification of Cottrell and Williams as either public or
private 
figures, 
the 
Court 
will 
first 
address 
the
classification of Cottrell and Williams in the context of
their defamation claims.    
1.  General law regarding a claim of defamation. 
A court must determine as a matter of law a plaintiff's
classification in the context of a defamation claim.  White v.
Mobile Press Register, Inc., 514 So. 2d 902 (Ala. 1987).  This
determination will establish the plaintiff's burden of proof.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  In
defamation actions, a plaintiff is either a private person, a
public official, or a public figure, either in general or for
the limited purpose of a particular public controversy.   Mead
Corp. v. Hicks, 448 So. 2d 308 (Ala. 1984).  If a plaintiff is
determined to be a public official, public figure, or limited-
purpose public figure, then the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the
defamatory statement was made with "'actual malice' –- that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
52
disregard of whether it was false or not."  New York Times,
376 U.S. at 280; Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130
(1967); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); and
White, 514 So. 2d at 904.  If it is determined that the
plaintiff is a private figure, then the plaintiff has the
burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant negligently published the defamatory statement.
Mead Corp., 448 So. 2d at 312 (holding that "defendants who
made false defamatory statements about private figures may be
held liable if their conduct created an unreasonable risk of
harm to the plaintiff").  Whether an individual is a public
figure, limited-purpose public figure, or private figure is a
question of law to be determined by the court.  Mobile Press
Register, Inc. v. Faulkner, 372 So. 2d 1282 (Ala. 1979).  This
determination must be made by the trial court before the jury
is charged so that the court can properly instruct the jury.
Faulkner, 372 So. 2d at 1285.
A public figure is one who either has gained notoriety
from his achievements or seeks public attention through vigor
and success.  New York Times, supra.  In Gertz, the United
States Supreme Court reduced the "public-figure question to a
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
53
more meaningful context by looking to the nature and extent of
an individual's participation in the particular controversy
giving rise to the defamation."  418 U.S. at 352.  Thus, the
Court recognized a limited-purpose public figure as "an
individual [who] voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into
a particular public controversy."  418 U.S. at 351.   
In this case, the NCAA and Culpepper agree that neither
Cottrell nor Williams is a public official or a general-
purpose public figure.  The NCAA and Culpepper, however,
maintain that the evidence established that both Cottrell and
Williams are limited-purpose public figures; Cottrell and
Williams disagree, claiming that the evidence established that
they are private figures.  Therefore, we must determine
whether the NCAA and Culpepper established that Cottrell and
Williams were limited-purpose public figures.  
2.  The test for determining whether a plaintiff
is 
a 
limited-purpose 
public 
figure 
and 
its
application to the facts of this case.
In Gertz, the United States Supreme Court provided that
it is the "nature and extent" of an individual's involvement
in a public controversy, i.e., the extent to which the
individual's participation is voluntary, the extent to which
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
54
the individual has access to the media to counteract the false
statements, and the prominence of the individual's role in the
public controversy, that determines whether an individual is
a limited-purpose public figure.  418 U.S. at 344-45.  In
Little v. Breland, 93 F.3d 755, 757  (11th Cir. 1996), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
recognized that in Silvester v. American Broadcasting Co., 839
F.2d 1491 (11th Cir. 1988), it adopted the three-pronged test
from Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287
(D.C. Cir. 1980), to determine whether a plaintiff in a
defamation action is a limited-purpose public figure with
regard to a public controversy.  Under the test, a court
determining whether a plaintiff is a limited-purpose public
figure must "'(1) isolate the public controversy, (2) examine
the plaintiff's involvement in the controversy, and (3)
determine whether the alleged defamation [was] germane to the
plaintiff's participation in the controversy.'"  In Hutchinson
v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), and Wolston v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979), the United States Supreme
Court unequivocally established that it is the plaintiff's
role in the controversy, not the controversy itself, that
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
55
determines whether a person is a limited-purpose public figure
with regard to the alleged defamatory statements.  The three-
pronged test applied in Little provides a workable means of
determining whether a plaintiff in a defamation action is a
limited-purpose public figure because of his role in a public
controversy; this Court adopts it and will now apply it to the
facts of this case.  
a.  Isolation of the public controversy.
In Waldbaum, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia provided the following discussion on how
to address the first prong of this test, stating:
"As the first step in its inquiry, the court
must isolate the public controversy.  A public
controversy is not simply a matter of interest to the
public; it must be a real dispute, the outcome of
which affects the general public or some segment of
it in an appreciable way. ... [A] public controversy
is a dispute that in fact has received public
attention because its ramifications will be felt by
persons who are not direct participants.
"To determine whether a controversy indeed
existed and, if so, to define its contours, the judge
must examine whether persons actually were discussing
some specific question.  A general concern or
interest will not suffice. [Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
443 U.S. 111 (1979)].  The court can see if the press
was covering the debate, reporting what people were
saying and uncovering facts and theories to help the
public formulate some judgment.  It should ask
whether a reasonable person would have expected
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
56
persons beyond the immediate participants in the
dispute to feel the impact of its resolution.  If the
issue was being debated publicly and if it had
foreseeable 
and 
substantial 
ramifications 
for
nonparticipants, it was a public controversy."
627 F.2d 1296-98 (footnotes omitted).  
Several factors lead to the conclusion that a public
controversy existed before, during, and after the NCAA
investigated the alleged rule violations by The University in
2000 and imposed the severe penalties against The University
in 2002.  In 2000, The University and the public learned about
the 
NCAA's 
investigation 
into 
Young's 
involvement 
in
recruiting Means and the federal charges that had developed.
In light of The University's being on probation and in light
of the efforts in 1998 by The University to comply with the
enforcement rules and the NCAA's apparent disregard for that
effort, 
a 
public 
debate 
developed 
about 
the 
2000
investigation, including speculation on the propriety of the
involvement of The University's compliance staff in the
investigation, the benefit, if any, of The University's self-
reporting NCAA rule violations, and the NCAA's treatment of
The University.  Additionally, discussion focused on the
fairness of the investigation process itself and on the NCAA's
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
57
accountability with regard to fitting the penalty imposed to
the offense.  Consequently, widespread local and statewide
media coverage was generated for over three years as the media
sought to unravel precisely what had happened that resulted in
The University's being charged and found guilty of several
rule violations.  
The public concern for The University and its football
program was evidenced by the number of articles written and
the detail of the information provided from the first
allegations of a recruiting scandal in Memphis, the revelation
of a "secret witness" assisting the NCAA in establishing the
rule violations by The University, the statements made by
Yeager that "The University of Alabama football program was
staring down the barrel of a gun," the harshness of the
penalties imposed, and the apparent inequity of the penalty in
light of The University's efforts in compliance with the
enforcement process.  
Moreover, the citizens of Alabama had a legitimate
interest in the controversy because The University is a public
institution that receives State funds.  The football program
provides revenue for The University and, in light of the
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
58
football program's tradition and history, is a source of pride
for many of its graduates and the citizens of this State.
Therefore, when "The University of Alabama football program
was staring down the barrel of a gun" –- facing potential
termination of its football program –- public discussion of
all the circumstances creating the risk that the program could
be terminated was rampant; a public controversy existed.
We reject Culpepper's argument that the public controversy
included debate concerning the character, integrity, and
fitness of Cottrell and Williams to coach and work for The
University.  Culpepper relies on the reasoning of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California
in Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1984), in
defining the public controversy in that defamation case.  In
Barry, Barry, a former head coach for the basketball team at
the University of San Francisco ("USF") sued one of his former
basketball players, alleging that the player had defamed him
when the player accused him of assisting an athletic
representative of the basketball team in making improper cash
payments to the player in violation of NCAA rules.  In
determining whether Barry was a limited-purpose public figure,
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
59
the district court held that a public controversy existed
involving "the alleged recruiting violations at USF before
Barry's acceptance of the position of head basketball coach."
584 F. Supp. at 1116.  The district court noted that USF had
twice been the subject of NCAA investigations involving USF's
basketball program, that one of those investigations had led
to the resignation of one head basketball coach and the other
had led to the firing of the head coach who had preceded
Barry, and that USF had been trying to solve the problems of
its basketball program for many years.  Additionally, the
court noted that the president of USF, when he appointed Barry
as head coach, "insisted upon a 'clean' program."  584 F.
Supp. at 1116.  The court concluded that a public controversy
existed because the reputation of USF was at stake and there
was "a dispute as to what the University should do about
allegations of recruiting violations."  Id.
Culpepper argues that the public controversy surrounding
the investigation into alleged NCAA rule violations by The
University is analogous.  He reasons that because The
University, like USF, was a repeat offender, intense scrutiny
and substantial discourse regarding the rule violations
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
60
developed.  He further argues that because Cottrell and
Williams were named in various articles as the coaches who
were involved in the controversy, because they were closely
associated with Young, and because they had been interviewed
by the NCAA, a public debate developed about their character,
integrity, and fitness.  Culpepper, however, fails to
recognize that although The University, like USF, was a repeat
offender of NCAA rules, the public controversy did not focus
on the actions of the coaching staff.  Allegations of
violations of NCAA rules by The University and by Cottrell and
Williams did not lead to the resignation or firing of any of
the football coaches.  Indeed, none of the articles submitted
impugned the character of Cottrell or Williams.  Additionally,
the articles did not suggest that the major violation of the
NCAA rules was an ongoing problem involving football coaches
or that The University had an "ongoing" problem that it had
been trying to solve for years.  Indeed, the evidence
established that The University was making every effort to run
a clean program and that, if the NCAA or the SEC had informed
The University of the situation in Memphis, of which they were
aware, actions would have been taken to prevent the egregious
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
61
violation by the athletic representative who was the focus of
the investigation.  Unlike the public debate at USF, the
public debate in this case did not question the reputation of
The University or the integrity of its coaches; rather, the
public debate concerned how the NCAA would view the efforts of
The University to run a clean program and to engage in self-
enforcement of NCAA rules.  Therefore, evidence established
that the focus of the public controversy surrounding The
University was different from the public controversy involving
USF.  Based on the content, context, and forum of the
controversy surrounding The University as presented in the
record, we refuse to conclude that the public controversy
involved the character, integrity, and fitness of Cottrell and
Williams to coach and to work for The University.
In conclusion, a public controversy existed; therefore,
we must now focus on the roles of Cottrell and Williams in the
controversy.  
b.  The plaintiff's involvement in the controversy.
Consideration of this prong involves the plaintiff's
prominence in the public controversy, the plaintiff's access
to channels of effective communication to counteract false
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
62
statements, and whether the plaintiff voluntarily thrust
himself or was drawn into the forefront of the public
controversy. Gertz, 419 U.S. at 344-45.  The court in Waldbaum
stated:
"Once the court has defined the controversy, it
must analyze the plaintiff's role in it.  Trivial or
tangential participation is not enough.  The language
of Gertz is clear that plaintiffs must have 'thrust
themselves to the forefront' of the controversies so
as to become factors in their ultimate resolution.
... They must have achieved a 'special prominence' in
the debate. ... The plaintiff either must have been
purposely trying to influence the outcome or could
realistically have been expected, because of his
position in the controversy, to have an impact on its
resolution.  In undertaking this analysis, a court
can look to the plaintiff's past conduct, the extent
of the press coverage, and the public reaction to his
conduct and statements."
627 F.2d at 1297 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
The evidence does not support a conclusion that Cottrell
and Williams tried to purposely influence the outcome of the
public controversy; therefore, we must determine whether
Cottrell and Williams realistically could have been expected,
because of their positions in the controversy, to have an
impact on its resolution.  Thus, this factor rests upon their
prominence in the public controversy, their access to channels
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
63
of communication, and the "voluntary" injection of themselves
into the public controversy.
i. The prominence of the plaintiff in the public
controversy. 
This inquiry involves evaluating whether the plaintiff's
actions have resulted in his being "embroiled" in the public
controversy.  See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (holding that the
limited-purpose public figures have "thrust themselves to the
forefront of particular public controversies").  Perhaps the
main question presented is would a reasonable person have
expected Cottrell and Williams to play a significant role in
determining the "outcome of the controversy."  In this case,
the "outcome of the controversy" relates to whether the NCAA
would find that The University and its football program fully
cooperated with the NCAA's investigation into the alleged rule
violations and engaged in adequate self-policing and self-
enforcement so as to avoid the "death penalty."
Cottrell and Williams argue that they did not play a
prominent role in the controversy because, they say, the
major focus of the investigation involved Young and his
improper conduct in recruiting Means and did not focus on
their alleged violations of NCAA rules.  They assert that
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
64
because they were minor participants in the investigation,
they should not be considered as having any influence on the
outcome of the controversy.  
The evidence, however, established that Cottrell and
Williams did play a prominent role in the public controversy.
Newspaper articles focused on their conduct, their interviews
with Johanningmeier, the violations alleged against them, and
how their conduct would impact the COI's view of The
University.  Both Cottrell and Williams were charged with not
providing full disclosure of information during an interview.
Although the enforcement staff dropped the charge against
Williams, it  pursued the charge against Cottrell.  The COI
found that Cottrell had not complied with the rules in this
regard.  Therefore, the conduct of Cottrell and Williams did
influence the way the NCAA viewed The University's compliance
with the rules.  
Additionally, the record established that Cottrell and
Williams both associated with Young, who was the major focus
of the NCAA investigation and the main reason for the severity
of the penalties imposed.  Both Cottrell and Williams admitted
violating certain NCAA rules, and, although no penalty was
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
65
imposed against either Cottrell or Williams, The University
was penalized for Cottrell's and Williams's violations of
various NCAA rules. 
Although the evidence indicated that Cottrell and Williams
were "caught up in the controversy against [their] will," the
evidence adequately established that they had  assumed by
their actions and their association with Young a "prominent
position in its outcome."  Breland, 93 F.3d at 758. 
ii.  The plaintiff's "access to channels of
effective communication."
In 
determining 
a 
plaintiff's 
involvement 
in 
the
controversy, consideration must also be given to the extent to
which the plaintiff had access to channels of effective
communication to counteract any false statements.  Gertz, 418
U.S. at 344-45.
The NCAA and Culpepper argue that Cottrell and Williams
had adequate access to the media to effectively rebut the
alleged defamatory statements.  The NCAA and Culpepper
submitted over 200 newspaper and Internet articles published
over several years containing comments by Cottrell and
Williams 
throughout 
their 
careers 
at 
The 
University.
Additionally, the NCAA points out that at the time it
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
66
published the false statements in the penalty-summary report
neither Cottrell nor Williams were prohibited from talking
with the press.  
Cottrell and Williams argue that although they did enjoy
limited access to the press as assistant coaches who were
questioned about various prospective student-athletes and
enrolled student-athletes, the NCAA rules prohibited them from
discussing the NCAA investigation with the press and prevented
them from being able to defend their reputations in the press.
They maintain that this "gag order" prevented them from having
access to the media and precluded a finding as a matter of law
that they were limited-purpose public figures.
In Price v. Chaffinch, (No. 04-956, May 12, 2006)(D. Del.
2006)(not reported in F. Supp. 2d), the United States District
Court addressed whether a "gag order" imposed by the
defendant, which prevented the plaintiff from responding in
the media to the defamatory statements made by the defendant,
precluded a finding that the plaintiff was a limited-purpose
public figure.  In Price, the  plaintiff’s media access was
nonexistent, in light of the defendant’s imposition of a "gag
order."  The federal district court held that although this
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
67
fact "cut against" a finding that the plaintiff was a public
figure, the plaintiff was aware that a public controversy
existed, yet he voluntarily assumed a position in the
controversy.  The court balanced the gag order against the
plaintiff’s voluntary assumption of risk in the controversy
and concluded that the plaintiff was a "significant player in
a controversy with high public interest."  Consequently, the
court held that the "gag order" imposed on the plaintiff was
a factor to consider, but did not preclude a finding that the
plaintiff was a limited-purpose public figure. 
A similar circumstance was also addressed in  Sculimbrene
v. Reno, 158 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2001), in which a former
FBI agent sued a media commentator, alleging that the
commentator conspired with others to defame him.  The
commentator attacked the agent's credibility with regard to
statements he had made to various congressional bodies.  The
agent was unable to respond in the media to the attack because
the FBI refused to allow him access to the media.  The court,
when addressing whether the agent was a limited-purpose public
figure who had been drawn into a public controversy, focused
on the agent's role in the controversy.  In conducting the
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
68
analysis pursuant to the Waldbaum test, the court noted that
the agent's "access to the press, both prior to the relevant
controversy and during the relevant controversy, was at all
times, circumscribed by his employment by the FBI," and his
employer prevented him from talking with the media.  158 F.
Supp. 2d at 23.  Nevertheless, the court held that the agent
was a limited-purpose public figure because his actions
required 
the 
conclusion 
that 
the 
agent 
had 
played 
a
significant 
role 
in 
the 
outcome 
of 
the 
controversy.
Therefore, although the "gag order" prevented the agent from
having access to the media, this fact did not outweigh the
evidence indicating that the agent had played a prominent role
in the controversy or preclude a finding that the agent was a
limited-purpose public figure.
We agree with the federal district courts that the
imposition of a "gag order" does not necessitate a finding
that an individual is not a limited-purpose public figure.  It
deserves weight in making the determination, but it does not
prevent such a finding.  
Here, the "gag order" prevented Cottrell and Williams from
discussing their role in the NCAA investigation with the
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
69
press.  However, the evidence that Cottrell and Williams
played 
a 
prominent 
role 
in 
the 
public 
controversy
significantly outweighs the effect of the "gag order."  
iii.  The conduct of the plaintiff either
voluntarily injecting himself into a particular
public controversy or being drawn into the public
controversy.
(a) A plaintiff's voluntary injection into the
public controversy.
"A private individual, however, is not automatically
transformed into a public figure just by becoming involved in
or associated with a matter that attracts public attention."
Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167.  "In general, to be a limited
purpose public figure, the plaintiff must voluntarily thrust
himself into the vortex of the dispute.  From the voluntary
act is derived the notion of assumption of the risk and the
consequent fairness in labelling the person a public figure."
Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072,
1083 (3d Cir. 1985).  In Waldbaum, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia elaborated on a
plaintiff's voluntary injection into a particular public
controversy, noting that a person becomes a limited-purpose
public figure if he is attempts "to have, or realistically can
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
70
be expected to have, a major impact on the resolution" of the
public controversy.  627 F.2d at 1292.  A person who
voluntarily 
injects 
himself 
into 
a 
particular 
public
controversy "invites" attention and comment.  See Hunter v.
Hartman, 545 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)(holding that a
team doctor for a college football program was a limited-
purpose public figure because he voluntarily commented in a
book and on national television about the public controversy
over a former head coach's coaching style); Daubenmire v.
Sommers, 156 Ohio App. 3d 322, 805 N.E.2d 571 (2004)(holding
that a coach voluntarily injected himself into a controversy
by injecting religion into public schools); Chevalier v.
Animal Rehab. Ctr., 839 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Tex. 1993)(holding
that 
a 
zoologist 
voluntarily 
injected 
himself 
into 
a
controversy by appearing on television, giving interviews, and
attempting to orchestrate a counter letter-writing campaign);
James v. Gannett Co., 40 N.Y.2d 415, 353 N.E.2d 834, 386
N.Y.S.2d 871 (1976)(holding that a belly dancer voluntarily
injected herself into controversy by taking affirmative steps
in the press to attract attention); and Oaks v. City of
Fairhope, 515 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Ala. 1981)(holding that a
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
71
librarian voluntarily injected herself into controversy by
presenting her case in press).
Additionally, a person can voluntarily inject himself into
a public controversy by choosing a position that thrusts the
person into the public controversy.  In White v. Mobile Press
Register, Inc., supra, this Court held that John C. White was
a public figure because of "his choice of career as a high
level executive in an industry that is the subject of much
public interest and concern."  514 So. 2d at 904.  The Court
reasoned that his choice of career exhibited "a voluntary
decision to place himself in a situation where there was a
likelihood of public controversy."  Id.   
In Fiacco v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity, [Ms. 1:05-CV-
145, April 5, 2007] ___ F. Supp. 2d ___ (D.Me. 2007), the
district court held that David Fiacco, the director of
judicial affairs at the University of Maine, was a limited-
purpose public figure.  With regard to the "voluntariness"
factor of the determination, the court held that Fiacco, in
light of his position, voluntarily injected himself into the
public controversy.  The court determined that newspaper
articles in the record established that a public controversy
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
72
existed concerning the student-disciplinary process at the
University of Maine.  The court observed that as director of
judicial affairs, "Fiacco had the capacity to investigate
allegations of student misconduct, adjudicate cases, conduct
hearings himself and proscribe sanctions or refer a case to a
committee for its action." ___ F. Supp. 2d at ___.  The court
reasoned that "[t]he nature of the position thrust Fiacco into
the public controversy surrounding the student disciplinary
process."  ___ F. Supp. 2d at ___.  The court concluded that
because Fiacco voluntarily accepted the position of director
of judicial affairs and that position placed him at the center
of a public controversy, he had injected himself into the
public controversy.
We conclude that Cottrell and Williams also injected
themselves into the public controversy.  When Williams
accepted his coaching position in 1994 and Cottrell accepted
his position in 1997, both men knew that The University was a
member of the NCAA, that they were expected to comply with
NCAA rules in a highly competitive environment, and that
their actions would come under close scrutiny.  Cottrell and
Williams were both responsible for recruiting prospective
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
We recognize that the Kentucky Supreme Court in Warford
12
v. Lexington Herald-Leader Co., 789 S.W.2d 758 (Ky. 1990),
held that Warford, a former assistant basketball coach for the
University of Pittsburgh basketball program, did not "thrust
himself into a public concern surrounding recruiting."  789
S.W. 2d at 770.  The court's holding rested in part on the
fact that at the time Warford was hired, the University of
Pittsburgh had an unexceptional basketball program and
73
student-athletes to sign scholarships to play football for The
University.  Both coaches were expected to abide by NCAA rules
when recruiting prospective student-athletes.  The nature of
their positions at The University and the responsibilities of
their positions thrust them into the public controversy
concerning The University's compliance with NCAA rules.  Like
White and Fiacco, Cottrell and Williams made career choices
that thrust them into positions involving much public interest
and 
concern. 
 
The 
public 
controversy 
surrounding 
The
University's compliance with NCAA rules began in 1995.  Thus,
by accepting their coaching positions, Cottrell and Williams
"show[ed] a voluntary decision to place [themselves] in a
situation where there was a likelihood of public controversy."
Therefore, because Cottrell and Williams voluntarily accepted
positions with The University's football program under such
circumstances, we conclude that they injected themselves into
the public controversy.12
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
competed in a conference that received little recognition.
Here, Cottrell and Williams were hired as coaches for a
football program that had won 12 NCAA championships and is a
member of a highly competitive conference whose members
consistently compete for the national championship.  Thus, the
facts surrounding the nature of Warford's position at the
University of Pittsburgh and the nature of Cottrell's and
Williams's 
positions 
at 
The 
University 
are 
easily
distinguishable. 
74
(b)  Whether the plaintiff was drawn into public
controversy.
 A plaintiff is drawn into a public controversy when his
actions invite comment and attention, despite the fact that
the plaintiff does not actively try or even want to attract
the public's attention.  See, e.g., Rosanova v. Playboy
Enters., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 580
F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978)(holding that Rosanova was a limited-
purpose public figure because he consistently associated with
underworld contacts and voluntarily engaged in a course of
activity that was bound to invite attention and comment).
Therefore, a person can be drawn into a public controversy
based on his status, position, or association to the public
controversy.  See Swate v. Schiffers, 975 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App.
1998)(holding that a doctor was drawn into public controversy
about the quality of his medical practice in light of the 24
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
75
articles written over 10 years describing the atrociousness of
the doctor’s medical practice).  
The NCAA and Culpepper argue that Cottrell and Williams
were drawn into the controversy because they played a role in
the conduct that resulted in The University's being charged
with various NCAA rule violations, they participated in the
NCAA's investigation into those alleged rule violations, and
they were the subject of numerous newspaper articles about the
alleged rule violations.  According to the NCAA and Culpepper,
this evidence established that Cottrell and Williams were in
positions that "invite[d] attention and comment" with respect
to their participation in the controversy.   
The evidence unequivocally established that by their
actions Cottrell and Williams invited public scrutiny and
should have expected public and media attention with regard to
their conduct and involvement in the NCAA investigation of
alleged 
rule 
violations 
and 
the 
surrounding 
public
controversy.  Articles detailed Cottrell's and Williams's
conduct throughout the controversy, including their close
association with Young, their interviews with Johanningmeier,
the alleged rule violations made against them and their
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
76
responses, and the penalties, or lack thereof, imposed against
them.  Additionally, the evidence established that Cottrell
and Williams proactively engaged in the conduct that was the
subject of alleged  rule violations and admitted certain
violations.  Furthermore, their close association with Young,
who was the central focus of the investigation, indicated that
their conduct "invited public attention and comment."  Without
question, the evidence established that Cottrell and Williams
engaged 
in 
a 
course 
of 
conduct 
with 
respect 
to 
the
investigation and the surrounding controversy that was bound
to invite attention and comment; therefore, Cottrell and
Williams were drawn into the public controversy.
Indeed, it appears that there are similarities between
Cottrell 
and 
Williams's 
being 
drawn 
into 
the 
public
controversy 
by 
virtue 
of 
their 
alleged 
commission 
of
violations of various NCAA rules and a defendant who has been
drawn into a public controversy by virtue of being accused of
a crime.  In Wolston, the United States Supreme Court held
that a person who engages in criminal conduct does not
automatically become a public figure.  The Court noted that
the status of the criminal defendant should be determined by
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
77
focusing on the "'nature and extent of an individual's
participation in the controversy giving rise to the [alleged]
defamation.'"  443 U.S. at 167 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at
352). 
In Ruebke v. Globe Communications Corp., 241 Kan. 595,
600-03, 738 P.2d 1246, 1251-53 (1987), the Kansas Supreme
Court held that Ruebke, a criminal defendant, was a limited-
purpose public figure because of the intense media coverage of
the investigation into the triple murders Ruebke had been
charged with; Ruebke's voluntary act of turning himself in to
the police to seek protective custody; and his arrest and
indictment for the three murders.  The court held that
although no one factor standing alone would be sufficient to
convey limited-purpose public-figure status on Ruebke, the
factors considered as a whole sufficiently established that
Ruebke was drawn into a situation that invited comment.  The
court stated: 
"Individuals who do not seek publicity or consent to
it, but through their own conduct or otherwise become
a subject of public interest, may become limited
public figures.  Those who commit crime or are
accused of it may wish to avoid publicity, but are
nevertheless persons of public interest, concerning
whom 
the 
public 
is 
entitled 
to 
be 
informed.
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
78
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D, comment f
(1976)."
241 Kan. at 600, 738 P.2d at 1251.
Although Cottrell's and Williams's conduct did not involve
criminal activity, it did involve violations of NCAA rules,
which impacted The University, its alumni, and the citizens of
this State.  Given the public nature of the conduct at issue
here and the widespread media attention given the controversy,
we hold that the evidence established that Cottrell and
Williams were drawn into the public controversy. 
c.  Whether the alleged defamatory statements
were germane to the plaintiff's participation in the
controversy.
The NCAA and Culpepper contend that the alleged defamatory
statements 
were 
germane 
to 
Cottrell's 
and 
Williams's
participation in the public controversy.  Black's Law
Dictionary 708 (8th ed. 2004) defines "germane" as "relevant;
pertinent."
i.  The false statements made by the NCAA in the
penalty-summary report posted on the NCAA Web site.
The statements made by the NCAA in the penalty-summary
report involved the imposition of penalties for violations of
NCAA rules by employees of The University. The statements
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
79
indicated that a show-cause provision had been imposed against
the recruiting coordinator and other employees of The
University.  These false statements were germane to the public
controversy because a central issue of the public dispute was
the nature of the  penalties imposed by the NCAA against The
University, its employees, and its representatives.  As the
NCAA stated, "the statements made by the NCAA during the
infractions process and in the erroneous penalty summary all
were related to the NCAA investigation."  Therefore, the
NCAA's statements about Cottrell and Williams in the penalty-
summary report published on the NCAA Web site were germane to
the public controversy.
ii.  The false statements made by Culpepper
about Cottrell.
Cottrell contends that the statements made by Culpepper
to the effect that Cottrell stole funds from the Shaun
Alexander Foundation, that he and his assistant stole
videotapes from The University's athletic department, and that
he had abandoned his family in Tallahassee were not germane to
the public controversy.  In support of his contention,
Cottrell emphasizes that these statements were not used by the
NCAA or The University to substantiate any of the rule
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
80
violations he allegedly committed.  Cottrell reasons that
because they were not relied upon in the investigation, the
statements were not germane to the public controversy.  
The record establishes that the statements made by
Culpepper were not relevant to the public controversy.  The
public controversy did not focus on Cottrell's character or
his fitness to coach, but on the investigative process and the
NCAA's treatment of The University.  Although one can argue
that the public controversy implicitly involved Cottrell's
character or his fitness to coach, the wealth of articles
presented to this Court defining the public controversy do not
lend themselves to such a conclusion.  Therefore, we conclude
that the statements made by Culpepper about Cottrell were not
germane to the public controversy.
iii.  The allegedly false statements made by
Culpepper about Williams.
Culpepper made statements to the effect that Williams was
a "recruiting cheater" and that he had funneled money from
Young to Means. These statements described rule violations
the NCAA was investigating and, therefore, were germane to the
public controversy. 
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
81
iv.  The allegedly false statements made by the
NCAA and Culpepper in furtherance of their conspiracy
to leak information to the media and to ruin
Cottrell's and Williams's reputations.
Like the statements made by the NCAA in the penalty-
summary report, these statements were germane to the public
controversy because they were allegedly made during the NCAA
investigation 
and 
involved 
information 
about 
various
interviews and evidence relied upon by the NCAA in developing
its charges of rule violations against The University and
against Cottrell and Williams.  Indeed, Cottrell and Williams
do not refute the argument that these alleged defamatory
statements were germane to the public controversy.
3.  Conclusion
Because the evidence established that a public controversy
existed, that Cottrell and Williams played a prominent role in
the public controversy, and that the statements made by the
NCAA in the penalty-summary report were germane to the public
controversy, Cottrell and Williams were limited-purpose public
figures with regard to the statements made by the NCAA in the
penalty-summary report.  Cottrell and Williams were also
limited-purpose public figures with regard to the conspiracy
claim against the NCAA and Culpepper alleging media leaks.
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
82
With regard to the statements made by Culpepper about
Williams, the evidence established that Williams was a
limited-purpose 
public 
figure. 
 
Finally, 
the 
evidence
established that Cottrell was a private person with regard to
the statements made by Culpepper that Cottrell had abandoned
his family and had stolen funds from the Shaun Alexander
Foundation and videotapes from The University's athletic
department.
The trial court did not err in its rulings concerning the
classifications of Cottrell and Williams in their defamation
claims.
B.  Determination as a matter of law as to
whether the defamatory statements involved a matter
of public concern.
Culpepper contends that the trial court erred in denying
his motion for a judgment as a matter of law because, he says,
his statements about Cottrell involved matters of public
concern and Cottrell did not present clear and convincing
evidence of actual malice to establish a prima facie case of
defamation.
"[W]here it is determined that a private individual is
alleging defamation, there must be a determination of whether
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
83
the defamatory speech involves a matter of public concern."
Ex parte Rudder, 507 So. 2d 411, 416 (Ala. 1987).  If the
matter is of public concern, then the defamed private
individual must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the statements were made with actual malice, that is, "with
knowledge that [the statements were] false or with reckless
disregard of whether [they] were false or not."  Nelson v.
Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534 So. 2d 1085, 1095 (Ala. 1988).  
The jury held that the following statements by Culpepper
about Cottrell were defamatory:
1.  That Cottrell stole funds from the Shaun
Alexander Foundation;
2.  That Cottrell and his assistant stole video tapes
from The University's athletic department; and
3.  That Cottrell had abandoned his family in
Tallahassee.
With regard to Culpepper’s statement that Cottrell stole
funds from the Shaun Alexander Foundation, we conclude that
this statement does not involve a matter of public concern.
In Nelson, 534 So. 2d at 1096, this Court held that a theft by
an employee from a private company was not a matter of public
concern.  Similarly, we conclude that a theft by an individual
from a foundation is not a matter of public concern.  Theft of
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
This holding is limited to the facts and evidence in the
13
record before us.   We can envision instances when a party
could establish that a theft from a charitable organization
constitutes a matter of public concern.  However, this record
does not contain any information about the Shaun Alexander
Foundation,  its organizational classification, its purpose,
or its funding.  Additionally, the record does not contain
information regarding the source of the funds that were
allegedly stolen.   Because the record does not support a
finding that the alleged theft from the Shaun Alexander
Foundation involved a theft of money donated by the public or
involved an abuse of public trust, we cannot conclude that the
statement regarding the theft in this case involves a matter
of public concern.
84
property from a private company or foundation does not involve
a threat to public safety, a theft of public funds, or an
abuse of public trust; therefore, statements made about thefts
from private entities are not matters of public concern.  Cf.
Ex parte Rudder (holding abusive prescription-drug practices
involved matter of public concern); Silvester (holding jai
alai industry a matter of public concern); Rosanova (holding
organized crime matter of public concern).  Thus, because
Culpepper's statement that Cottrell stole funds from the Shaun
Alexander Foundation did not involve a threat to public safety
or a misuse of public property or trust, the trial court did
not err in denying Culpepper's motion for a judgment as a
matter of law with regard to that statement.13
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
We find the statement that Cottrell had abandoned his
14
family to be distinguishable from the defamatory statements at
issue in Forrester v. WVTM TV, Inc., 709 So. 2d 23 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1997), a libel action against a television station,  in
which 
the 
Alabama 
Court 
of 
Civil 
Appeals 
held 
that
disciplining a child in a public place is a matter of public
concern.  Here, we have a general statement that Cottrell
abandoned his family with no further information.  Such a
general statement without more specificity and factual support
does not support a conclusion that the statement involves a
matter of public concern.
85
Likewise, the trial court did not err in denying
Culpepper’s motion for a judgment as a matter of law with
regard to Culpepper’s contention that his statement that
Cottrell had abandoned his family involved a matter of public
concern.  This general statement does not suggest a threat to
public safety, public funding, or public trust; therefore, the
statement does not involve a matter of public concern.14
Finally, the trial court did not err in denying
Culpepper's motion for a judgment as a matter of law with
regard to his statement that Cottrell stole videotapes from
The University's athletic department.  Culpepper argues that
the trial court erred in holding that his statement that
Cottrell stole videotapes from The University's athletic
department did not involve a matter of public concern.  We
agree.  Cottrell was an employee of The University's athletic
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
86
department.  The videotapes were the property of The
University's athletic department.  The athletic department is
a department within The University.  The University is a
public institution, governed by a board of trustees appointed
by the Governor of Alabama and approved by the legislature,
and funded by the citizens of Alabama.  Because this statement
involved a theft from a public institution by an employee of
the institution, this statement involved a matter of public
concern.  Thus, the trial court erred in holding that the
statement was not a matter of public concern. 
Because 
Culpepper's 
statement 
that 
Cottrell 
stole
videotapes from The University's athletic department involved
a matter of public concern, Cottrell must present clear and
convincing evidence of actual malice to satisfy his burden of
proof for his defamation claim based on that statement to be
submitted to the jury.  Culpepper contends that the trial
court erred in denying his motion for a judgment as a matter
of law because, he says, Cottrell did not present clear and
convincing evidence of actual malice with regard to this
statement.  According to Culpepper, Cottrell’s evidence did
not establish that he made the statement with "reckless
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
87
disregard" as to whether the statement was false or not.  The
evidence, however, established that in October 2000, Cottrell,
in the presence of others, met with Culpepper and asked him to
stop 
making 
statements 
that 
impacted 
his 
reputation.
Culpepper made the statement at issue after December 2000.
Viewed in a light most favorable to Cottrell, the evidence
created a jury question as to Culpepper's state of mind when
he made the false statements.  Therefore, the trial court did
not err in  denying Culpepper’s motion for a judgment as a
matter of law in this regard.
C.  Determination as a matter of law as to
whether Culpepper's statement that Cottrell had
abandoned his family is actionable.
Culpepper contends that the trial court erred in denying
his motion for a judgment as a matter of law because, he says,
his statement that Cottrell had abandoned his family in
Tallahassee is not slander per se.
"[I]t is clear from our decisions that in a
slander action, to constitute slander actionable per
se, the alleged slander must impute an indictable
offense involving infamy or moral turpitude.  Marion
v. Davis, 217 Ala. 16, 114 So. 357, 55 A.L.R. 171
(1927), 
quoted 
with 
approval 
in 
Tonsmeire 
v.
Tonsmeire, 281 Ala. 102, 199 So. 2d 645 (1967).  We
do not think the alleged slander here is actionable
per se.  We do not believe that being 'fired and
rehired' imputes an indictable offense involving
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
88
infamy or moral turpitude; nor does 'committing
assault and battery' (assuming it is a part of the
defamation charged).  Dudley v. Horn, 21 Ala. 379
[(1852)]; Gillman v. State, 165 Ala. 135, 136, 51 So.
722 [(1910)]. 'Infamy' is defined by Black's Law
Dictionary, Fourth Edition, as:
"'INFAMY.  A qualification of a man's
legal status produced by his conviction of
an infamous crime and the consequent loss
of honor and credit, which, at common law,
rendered him incompetent as a witness, and
by statute in some jurisdictions entails
other disabilities.  State v. Clark, 60
Kan. 450, 56 P. 767.'
"'Moral turpitude signifies an inherent quality of
baseness, vileness, depravity.' Gillman v. State,
supra.
"However, as the court pointed out in Marion v.
Davis, supra, viz:
"'This distinction, however, does not
deny the right to maintain an action for
slander 
founded 
on 
oral 
malicious
defamation subjecting the plaintiff to
disgrace, ridicule, odium, or contempt,
though it falls short of imputing the
commission of such crime or misdemeanor. In
such case the law pronounces the words
actionable per quod only, and the plaintiff
must allege and prove special damages as an
element of the cause of action.' ...
[Emphasis supplied]
"'Per 
quod' 
is 
defined 
in 
Black's 
Law
Dictionary, Fourth Ed., at p. 1293:
"'PER QUOD. Lat. Whereby. When the
declaration in an action of tort, after
stating the acts complained of, goes on to
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
89
allege the consequences of those acts as a
ground of special damage to the plaintiff,
the 
recital 
of 
such 
consequences 
is
prefaced 
by 
these 
words, 
"per 
quod,"
whereby; and sometimes the phrase is used
as 
the 
name 
of 
that 
clause 
of 
the
declaration.
 
"'Words 
"actionable per quod" are those
not actionable per se upon their face, but
are only actionable in consequence of
extrinsic facts showing circumstances under
which 
they 
were 
said 
or 
the 
damages
resulting to slandered party therefrom.
Smith v. Mustain, 210 Ky. 445, 276 S.W.
154, 155, 44 A.L.R. 386.'
"It seems clear that since no allegation of
special damages is made in the complaint, the
demurrers were properly sustained by the trial
court."
Brown v. W.R.M.A. Broad. Co., 286 Ala. 186, 188, 238 So. 2d
540, 541-42 (1970)(footnote omitted).  A decision whether a
statement is reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning is a
question of law.  Harris v. School Annual Publ’g Co., 466 So.
2d 963. 964 (Ala. 1985).
At the close of the evidence, the trial court held that
Culpepper did not establish special damages; therefore, the
statements were not actionable as slander per quod.  Cottrell
does not contest this ruling; therefore we will not review it.
Thus, for Culpepper's statement that Cottrell had abandoned
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
90
his family to be actionable, he must establish that the
statement is slander per se, i.e., the statement imputed an
indictable offense involving infamy or moral turpitude.
"When 
determining 
whether 
a 
statement 
is
actionable as slander per se, a court must give the
language used 'that meaning that would be ascribed to
the language by a reader or listener of "average or
ordinary intelligence, or by a common mind."'  Camp
v. Yeager, 601 So. 2d 924, 927 (Ala. 1992), quoting
Loveless v. Graddick, 295 Ala. 142, 148, 325 So. 2d
137, 142 (1975). ... [T]he alleged slanderous
statement must be construed in connection with the
other parts of the conversation, in order to
determine the context in which the statement was
made."
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Daugherty, 840 So. 2d 152, 157-
58 (Ala. 2002).
Cottrell contends that Culpepper's statement that he
abandoned his family described a violation of § 13A-13-5,
Ala. Code 1975, which states, in pertinent part:
"A man or woman commits the crime of abandonment of
a child when, being a parent, guardian or other
person legally charged with the care or custody of a
child less than 18 years old, he or she deserts such
child in a place with intent wholly to abandon it."
Cottrell contends the statement also describes a violation of
§ 13A-13-4, Ala. Code 1975, which provides, in part:
"A man or woman commits the crime of nonsupport if he
or she intentionally fails to provide support which
that person is able to provide and which that person
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
91
knows he or she is legally obligated to provide to a
dependent spouse or child less than 19 years of age."
We, however, cannot conclude that the statement that
Cottrell had abandoned his family imputed the above indictable
offenses.  
In Blevins v. W.F. Barnes Corp., 768 So. 2d 386 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1999), the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals held that a
statement that the plaintiff "tried to extort money out of me
because I refused to pay his demands" was not slander per se.
The Court of Civil Appeals reasoned that because the word
"extort" had at least two meanings, the statement at issue was
not slander per se. 
Like the word "extort," the word "abandon" is not limited
in meaning to that defined by the criminal statutes.
"Abandon" is defined as:
"1a: to give up to the control or influence of
another person or agent b:  to give up with the
intent of never again claiming a right or interest in
... 2:  to withdraw from often in the face of danger
or encroachment ... 3:  to withdraw protection,
support, or help from ... 4:  to give (oneself) over
unrestrainedly 
5a: 
to 
cease 
from 
maintaining;
practicing, or using ... b:  to cease intending or
attempting to perform."
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1-2 (11th ed. 2003).
The term "abandon" has too many meanings to necessarily
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
92
suggest the indictable criminal offenses.  Additionally, the
record does not contain  portions of Culpepper's conversation
discussing Cottrell's alleged abandonment of his family to
establish the context of the statement.  Because the word
"abandon" has more than one meaning and because we have no
facts to establish the context in which the statement was
made, we cannot conclude that Culpepper's statement that
Cottrell had abandoned his family charged an indictable
offense.  Therefore, the statement is not slander per se.
Because the statement is not slander per quod and because
Cottrell did not establish that the statement that he had
abandoned his family was slander per se, the trial court erred
in denying Culpepper a judgment as a matter of law on this
claim of defamation.
D.  Williams's claim of defamation against Culpepper.
Williams appears to inartfully challenge the trial court’s
rulings with regard to Culpepper's statements about him.
Culpepper contends that the trial court properly entered a
judgment as a matter of law for him with regard to Williams's
claims of defamation because, he says, the trial court
properly concluded that the statements were not actionable. 
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
93
The trial court held that the evidence did not establish
that Culpepper's statements were slander per quod and Williams
does not challenge this holding.  Therefore, Williams had to
establish that Culpepper's statement were slander per se.
Neither the statement that Williams was a "recruiting cheater"
nor the statement that he funneled money from Young to Means
imputed a crime of infamy or moral turpitude.  Therefore,
these statements were not slander per se.
Because Williams did not establish that Culpepper's
statements were actionable, the trial court properly entered
a judgment as a matter of law for Culpepper in this regard.
II.  Whether the trial court erred in its rulings
involving the defamatory statements made by the NCAA in the
penalty-summary report posted on the Web site, including the
claim of invasion of privacy, which also stemmed from the
statements made in the penalty-summary report. 
In Butler, this Court defined the elements of the tort of
invasion of privacy, stating:
"'"This Court defines the tort of invasion
of privacy as the intentional wrongful
intrusion into one's private activities in
such a manner as to outrage or cause mental
suffering, shame, or humiliation to a
person of ordinary sensibilities."' ...
"....
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
94
"... [T]his Court has adopted the following
definition for 'false light' invasion of privacy:
"'"One who gives publicity to a matter
concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light is
subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if
"'"(a) the false light in
which the other was placed would
be 
highly 
offensive 
to 
a
reasonable person, and
"'"(b) 
the 
actor 
had
knowledge of or acted in reckless
disregard as to the falsity of the
publicized matter and the false
light in which the other would be
placed."'
"Schifano v. Greene County Greyhound Park, Inc., 624
So. 2d 178, 180 (Ala. 1993)(emphasis omitted)(quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977)).  A
false-light 
claim 
does 
not 
require 
that 
the
information made public be private; instead, the
information 
made 
public 
must 
be 
false. 
 
See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E cmt. A. (1977)."
871 So. 2d at 12.
Cottrell and Williams contend that they presented clear
and convincing evidence that the NCAA made the false
statements in the penalty-summary report with actual malice,
creating, they say, a question for the jury to resolve.
Specifically, they argue that the evidence established that
the NCAA knew that the statements made in the penalty-summary
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
95
report were false and that the NCAA exhibited a reckless
disregard for the veracity of the statements when they
published the penalty-summary report without proofreading the
report for accuracy. Therefore, with regard to this claim
Cottrell argues that the trial court erred in entering a
summary judgment for the NCAA, and Williams argues that the
trial court erred in entering a judgment as a matter of law
for the NCAA.
"'In a [defamation] action brought by a public
figure, summary judgment for the defendant is
appropriate unless the plaintiff produces the clear
and convincing evidence that a reasonable jury would
need in order to find that the defendant published
the 
defamatory 
material 
with 
actual 
malice.'
McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., 91 F.3d
1501, 1508 (C.A.D.C. 1996); see Finebaum v. Coulter,
854 So. 2d 1120, 1128-29 (Ala. 2003).  '[T]here is no
genuine issue [of material fact] if the evidence
presented 
in 
the 
opposing 
affidavits 
is 
of
insufficient caliber or quantity to allow a rational
finder of fact to find actual malice by clear and
convincing evidence.'  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d
202 (1986); see also Pemberton v. Birmingham News
Co., 482 So. 2d 257, 259-60 (Ala. 1985).
"This standard is satisfied by proof that a
false statement was made '"with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not."'  Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v.
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 659, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105
L.Ed.2d 
562 
(1989)(quoting 
New 
York 
Times 
v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. [254] at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710
[(1964)]). 
 
A 
defendant 
acts 
with 
'reckless
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
96
disregard' if, at the time of publication, the
defendant '"entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of [its] publication" or acted "with a high
degree of awareness of ... [its] probable falsity."'
McFarlane, 91 F.3d at 1508 (quoting St. Amant [v.
Thompson], 390 U.S. [727] at 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323
[(1968)])(emphasis added).  'The actual malice
standard is subjective; the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant actually entertained a serious doubt.'
Id. (emphasis added).  See Sanders v. Smitherman, 776
So. 2d 68, 71 (Ala. 2000);  Finebaum, 854 So. 2d at
1124; see also Revell v. Hoffman, 309 F.3d 1228, 1233
(10th Cir. 2002); Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118,
1131 (9th Cir. 2002); Chafoulias v. Peterson, 668
N.W.2d 642, 654 (Minn. 2003).
"Malice can be shown by circumstantial evidence
showing, for example, 'that the story was (1)
"fabricated," (2) "so inherently improbable that only
a reckless man would have put [it] in circulation,"
or (3) "based wholly on" a source that the defendant
had 
"obvious 
reasons 
to 
doubt," 
such 
as 
"an
unverified anonymous telephone call."'  McFarlane, 91
F.3d at 1512-13 (quoting St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732,
88 S.Ct. 1323). However, malice cannot be 'measured
by whether a reasonably prudent man would have
published, 
or 
would 
have 
investigated 
before
publishing.'  St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731, 88 S.Ct.
1323 (emphasis added).  Indeed, the failure to
investigate does not constitute malice, unless the
failure evidences '"purposeful avoidance,"' that is,
'an intent to avoid the truth.'  Sweeney v.
Prisoners' Legal Servs., 84 N.Y .2d 786, 793, 647
N.E. 2d 101, 104, 622 N.Y.S.2d 896, 899 (1995)
(quoting Connaughton, 491 U.S. at 693, 109 S.Ct.
2678); see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
332, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974)."
Smith v. Huntsville Times Co., 888 So. 2d 492, 499-500 (Ala.
2004).
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
97
Viewed in a light most favorable to Cottrell and Williams,
the evidence indicates that DeWees, the creator of the
penalty-summary report, made a clerical error when she was
posting the report on the NCAA’s Web site and does not
indicate actual malice.  Her deposition testimony and her
testimony at trial clearly indicates that she was unaware that
the statements were false and that the  error was at most
negligence.  "A mistake is clearly insufficient to support a
finding of actual malice."  Medure v. Vindicator Printing Co.,
273 F. Supp. 2d 588, 598 (W.D. Pa. 2002); Gulf Publ'g Co. v.
Lee, 434 So. 2d 687 (Miss. 1983); Long v. Arcell, 618 F.2d
1145, 1148 (5th Cir. 1980)(a defendant "who merely is careless
may not be held liable for defaming a public figure").
Additionally, the evidence does not support a finding "of
highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure
from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily
adhered to by responsible publishers."  Curtis Publishing, 388
U.S. at 158 (holding that such evidence of "extreme departure"
from reasonable publishing standards can indicate actual
malice).  The trial court properly entered a summary judgment
for the NCAA on Cottrell's claims of defamation and invasion
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
98
of privacy involving the posting of the false statements on
the NCAA Web site.  Likewise, the trial court properly entered
a judgment as a matter of law for the NCAA with regard to
Williams’s claims involving the Web site.
Williams contends that because the trial court changed his
classification to a limited-purpose public figure at the close
of his case-in-chief  and thereby elevated his burden of proof
to require that he present evidence of actual malice to
establish a prima facie case of defamation, he was prejudiced
and should be granted a new trial.  When the trial court
reevaluated Williams’s classification at the close of his
case-in-chief and determined that he was a limited-purpose
public figure, the trial court permitted Williams to reopen
his case to present evidence of actual malice with regard to
the penalty-summary report.  Williams presented DeWees's
testimony.  Williams did not argue that he had additional
evidence of actual malice that he had been prevented from
presenting.  Additionally, he did not argue that the timing of
the trial court’s ruling impacted his trial strategy to his
detriment or prevented him from presenting evidence.  There is
no evidence in the record that lends itself to a conclusion
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
99
that Williams was prejudiced by the reclassification, and
Williams did not, in his briefs to this Court or during oral
argument, direct this Court to any evidence of prejudice.
Therefore, any error in the trial court’s changing Williams's
burden of proof at the close of the evidence, in light of the
trial court's allowing Williams to reopen his case and present
additional evidence, was at most harmless.  Rule 45, Ala. R.
App. P.
Cottrell further maintains that the trial court erred in
entering a summary judgment for the NCAA on his claims of
defamation and invasion of privacy with regard to the false
statements in the penalty-summary report because, he says, the
trial court erred in not considering the deposition of Shepard
C. Cooper, the director for the COI, before making its
determination. This issue, however, is not preserved for our
review.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the summary-
judgment motions on June 23, 2005; the order was issued on
July 7, 2005; Cottrell deposed Cooper on July 8, 2005, and the
trial began on July 12, 2005.  At the June 23 hearing, the
trial court stated that Cottrell could supplement his motion
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
100
in opposition to summary judgment with the deposition
testimony of DeWees and Cooper.  Cottrell, however, was unable
to depose Cooper until July 8, 2005, the day after the trial
court issued its order.  This Court recognizes that the
transcription of Cooper’s deposition required time; however,
the record does not contain any request by Cottrell after the
trial court issued its order for leave to file Cooper's
deposition or a request that the trial court reconsider its
summary-judgment decision in light of Cooper's testimony.
"The purpose of requiring a specific objection to preserve an
issue for appellate review is to put the trial judge on notice
of the alleged error, giving an opportunity to correct it
before the case is submitted to the jury."  Ex parte Works,
640 So. 2d 1056, 1058 (Ala. 1994).  Moreover,  "[t]his Court
cannot consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal;
rather, our review is restricted to the evidence and arguments
considered by the trial court."  Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co.,
612 So. 2d 409, 410 (Ala. 1992); Shiver v. Butler County Bd.
of Educ., 797 So. 2d 1086, 1089 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000)(holding
that an appellate court will not consider an issue on which
the trial court was not given the opportunity to rule).
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
101
III.  Whether the trial court erred in entering a  summary
judgment for the NCAA and Culpepper on the claims involving
"conspiracy media leaks."
Cottrell and Williams contend that the trial court erred
in entering summary judgments for the NCAA and Culpepper with
regard to their claim of defamation involving "conspiracy
media leaks" because, they say, they presented substantial
evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the NCAA and Culpepper conspired to defame them.  
It appears that during the NCAA investigation, information
about the NCAA's interviews conducted with Cottrell and
Williams was published in various newspapers, sometimes the
day after the interview.  Cottrell and Williams maintained
that the NCAA, specifically Johanningmeier, and Culpepper,
leaked information to the media to make them the "scapegoats"
of the investigation, to ruin their coaching careers, and to
cast them in a bad light.  Cottrell and Williams argue that
the leak of the information was particularly objectionable in
light of their efforts to cooperate with the NCAA and their
refusal to discuss any part of the investigation with the
press in accordance with the NCAA confidentiality rule.
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
102
Cottrell and Williams maintain that although they abided by
the confidentiality agreement, the NCAA did not.
In support of their argument, Cottrell and Williams  cite
evidence indicating that Johanningmeier spoke with media
persons, including Culpepper and an investigative reporter for
the American Broadcasting Company in Memphis, Tennessee, and
that Culpepper and the investigative reporter published
confidential information.
 
The news articles that Cottrell and Williams cite,
however, referred to their sources as "sources close to the
NCAA probe" and "sources close to the investigation."  None of
the articles cited by Cottrell and Williams stated that "the
information contained therein emanated from conversations with
NCAA personnel."  The evidence established that several
individuals were present during the interviews conducted by
the NCAA.  In addition to  the person being interviewed and
Johanningmeier, the evidence indicates that Marsh, Robbins,
counsel for The University, and others attended and asked
questions.  Cottrell and Williams even stated in their
complaint that some of the information came from Marsh.
Additionally, 
Cottrell 
and 
Williams 
conceded 
in 
their
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
103
depositions that they had no facts or evidence indicating that
anyone at the NCAA leaked information to the press during the
investigation.  Finally, Cottrell and Williams did not present
substantial evidence indicating that Culpepper made the
statements allegedly leaked to the media.  Therefore, based on
this evidence, only speculation and conjecture support a
conclusion that the NCAA or Culpepper conspired to ruin
Cottrell and Williams and in furtherance of that conspiracy
made these statements. 
  
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Cottrell
and Williams, we conclude that substantial evidence was not
presented that the NCAA or Culpepper were the sources of the
leaked information or that they conspired to leak information
to the media and to make Cottrell and Williams the scapegoats
of the NCAA investigation. 
IV.  Whether the trial court properly ordered a new trial.
Cottrell maintains that the trial court erred when it
concluded that Culpepper was unduly prejudiced by its decision
at 
the 
close 
of 
the 
evidence 
changing 
Cottrell’s
classification from a limited-purpose public figure to a
private figure with regard to the defamatory statements made
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
104
by Culpepper. Culpepper argued in his motion for a new trial
that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s ruling because
during his cross-examination of Cottrell’s witnesses and
during the presentation of his defense, he elicited evidence
to show that Cottrell’s evidence did not establish actual
malice.  He further argued that if the law from the beginning
of the case had been that Cottrell was a private person with
regard to the statements made by him, he would have focused on
defending against the lesser standard of common-law malice and
he would have cross-examined Cottrell's witnesses to establish
Cottrell's attitude about rule violations and the reasons why
Culpepper disliked Cottrell.  Culpepper's counsel further
maintained that he would not have asked Culpepper questions
such as, "[D]id you use good judgment at times with regard to
saying things among your friends about Ronnie Cottrell?"
Culpepper states that questions like these lend themselves to
establishing common-law malice, not to defending against it.
He 
further 
states 
that 
he 
would 
have 
"presented
additional/different evidence and possibly called other
witnesses."
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
105
We have thoroughly reviewed the record, and we conclude
that Culpepper was prejudiced by the trial court’s changing
Cottrell's classification from a limited-purpose public figure
to a private figure at the close of all the evidence.  It is
clear that Culpepper’s strategy throughout the trial focused
on establishing that Culpepper did not make the statements
with actual malice and not on defending against a finding that
he had made the statements negligently.  Therefore, the trial
court did not exceed the scope of its discretion when it
ordered a new trial.  Hayden v. Elam, 739 So. 2d 1088, 1093
(Ala. 1999)("[T]his Court will reverse an order granting a new
trial when some legal right is denied and the record clearly
shows that the trial court abused its discretion.").
V.  Whether the trial court erred in denying Culpepper's
motion for a judgment as a matter of law.
Culpepper contends that the trial court erred in denying
his motion for a judgment as a matter of law because, he says,
Cottrell did not present clear and convincing evidence that
Culpepper made the statements with actual malice.  Because we
have concluded that Cottrell is a private person with regard
to the statements made by Culpepper and did not have to
present evidence of actual malice to establish a prima face
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
106
case of defamation, this issue is moot.  To the extent that
Culpepper argues that the evidence does not support an award
of punitive damages, we conclude that Cottrell presented
sufficient evidence to create a jury question as to whether
Culpepper made the statements with actual malice. 
Although a failure to investigate alone does not indicate
actual malice, evidence indicating the "purposeful avoidance
of the truth" is sufficient to meet the standard of
constitutional malice.  Connaughton, 491 U.S. at 692.
Culpepper admitted that he made the statements with no
knowledge of whether the statements were true.  Additionally,
the evidence established that even though Cottrell had met
with Culpepper in October 2000 to discourage Culpepper from
making statements about him, Culpepper made these statements
after December 2000.  Therefore, viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to Cottrell, we conclude that he
presented sufficient evidence to present a jury question as to
whether Culpepper made the statements with actual malice.  
VI.  Whether the trial court erred in its rulings
involving the relevance of agreement between Culpepper and the
NCAA and Cottrell's request for a Hammond hearing.
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374 (Ala. 1986).
15
107
Cottrell and Williams contend that the trial court erred
in its rulings with regard to the admissibility into evidence
of an agreement between Culpepper and the NCAA because, they
say, the evidence is relevant to Culpepper’s ability to pay
damages.  Additionally, they argue that the trial court erred
in ordering a new trial because, they say, a Hammond
 hearing
15
would remedy any impropriety with regard to the award of
punitive damages.  Because we conclude that the trial court's
grant of a new trial was proper, these issues are moot. 
VII.  Whether the trial judge erred in refusing to
permanently recuse himself.
Finally, Cottrell and Williams contend that this Court
must order Judge Thomas S. Wilson, the trial judge who
presided over his trial, to permanently recuse himself from
this case.  The record contains a letter from Judge Wilson to
the Presiding Judge of the Tuscaloosa Circuit, dated August 7,
2006, stating:
"This 
letter 
is 
to 
put 
in 
writing 
our
conversation of last week regarding the [Cottrell v.
NCAA and Culpepper] case.  As I informed you there
has been a motion to supplement the record on appeal.
There is also currently pending in the Supreme Court
a motion to have the Supreme Court order me to recuse
myself from further proceedings in the Cottrell case.
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
108
There is also pending before the Judicial Inquiry
Commission a motion by [Cottrell and Williams's
counsel] 
to 
have 
them 
reconsider 
their 
order
dismissing [Cottrell's and Williams’s counsel's]
complaint against me.  Finally, there is pending
before the Montgomery Bar Association Disciplinary
Committee, 
a 
complaint 
filed 
by 
me 
against
[Cottrell's and Williams's counsel].  Based on all
these matters I feel that it is best that I
temporarily recuse myself from hearing any matters in
the case till the above matters are resolved.
Depending on the final disposition of the above
matters, I may have to permanently recuse myself.
However, for the time being, I am asking you to
reassign the case to another judge to handle any
matters that might arise till further notice."
The presiding judge reassigned the case.
Cottrell and Williams argue that the trial judge exceeded
the scope of his discretion by not permanently recusing
himself from the case.  Specifically, Cottrell and Williams
argue: 
"Judge Wilson's reasoning, however, is faulty,
because the resolution of those matters, no matter
how decided, cannot undo the appearance of bias nor
erase the question of whether he can be impartial
that was created by his bar complaint against
[plaintiffs' counsel]."
In Ex parte George, [Ms. 1051568, December 15, 2006] ___
So. 2d ___ (Ala. 2006), this Court stated:
"A trial judge's ruling on a motion to recuse is
reviewed to determine whether the judge exceeded his
or her discretion. See Borders v. City of Huntsville,
875 So. 2d 1168, 1176 (Ala.2003). The necessity for
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
109
recusal is evaluated by the 'totality of the facts'
and circumstances in each case.  [Ex parte City of]
Dothan Pers. Bd., 831 So. 2d [1] at 2 [(Ala. 2002)].
The test is whether '"facts are shown which make it
reasonable for members of the public or a party, or
counsel opposed to question the impartiality of the
judge."'  In re Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350, 355-56
(Ala. 1984)(quoting Acromag-Viking v. Blalock, 420
So. 2d 60, 61 (Ala. 1982))."
___ So. 2d at ___.
The documents properly before this Court establish that
Judge Wilson temporarily recused himself from this case and
that he will consider permanent recusal, if circumstances
require.  Therefore, we cannot conclude based on the record
before us that Judge Wilson exceeded the scope of his
discretion.  We recognize that Cottrell and Williams have
attached exhibits to their briefs appearing to support their
contention.  However, an exhibit attached to a brief is not
proper evidence for this Court’s consideration.  See Green v.
Standard Fire Ins. Co. of Alabama, 398 So .2d 671, 673 (Ala.
1981) (the record on appeal cannot be changed or altered by
statements made in appellate briefs or evidence not appearing
in the record).
To the extent that Cottrell and Williams contend that this
Court errs in refusing to consider the issue of Judge Wilson's
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
110
recusal as a request for mandamus relief, we conclude that
they have not established a clear legal right to the relief
they request.  
"Mandamus is 'proper to compel a court to
perform 
ministerial 
duties 
and 
to 
entertain
jurisdiction,' State v. Cannon, 369 So. 2d 32, 33
(Ala. 1979); it is also the proper method by which to
review whether recusal is required. Ex parte Melof,
553 So. 2d 554 (Ala. 1989).
"We have often stated the standard for issuing
a writ of mandamus:
"'A 
writ 
of 
mandamus 
is 
an
extraordinary remedy, and it "will be
issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal
right in the petitioner to the order
sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a
refusal to do so; 3) the lack of another
adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court."  Ex parte
United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d
501, 503 (Ala.1993).'
"Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 176 (Ala. 2000)."
Ex parte Little, 837 So. 2d 822, 824 (Ala. 2002).
The information before us indicates that Judge Wilson has
recused himself from this case; therefore, Cottrell and
Williams have not established that Judge Wilson has refused to
recuse himself and that they have been denied a clear legal
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
111
right to the relief requested.  Mandamus relief based on the
information before us is not proper.  
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court
ordering a new trial for Culpepper is affirmed; the judgment
denying Culpepper's motion for a judgment as a matter of law
with regard to his statement that Cottrell had abandoned his
family is reversed; the judgment denying Culpepper's motion
for judgments as a matter of law with regard to his statements
that Cottrell stole funds from the Shaun Alexander Foundation
and that Cottrell stole videotapes from The University's
athletic department is affirmed; the judgment as a matter of
law for Culpepper with regard to Williams's defamation claim
is affirmed; the summary judgment for the NCAA with regard to
Cottrell's claims of defamation and invasion of privacy is
affirmed; the summary judgment for the NCAA with regard to
Cottrell and Williams's claim of "conspiracy media leaks" is
affirmed; the judgment as a matter of law for the NCAA with
regard to Williams's claims of defamation and invasion of
privacy is affirmed; and this case is remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
112
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Lyons, Woodall, Smith, Bolin, and
Parker, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.
See, J., files statement of nonrecusal (issued on April
25, 2007).
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
113
SEE, Justice (statement of nonrecusal).
Ronald W. Cottrell and Ivy Williams have filed a motion
seeking my recusal in these appeals because I was a "fellow
law professor and personal friend" of Gene Marsh, facts which,
they assert, would cause a reasonable person to question my
impartiality.  I decline to recuse myself.
Canon 3.C.(1) of the Canons of Judicial Ethics states: 
"(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a
proceeding in which his disqualification is required
by law or his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, including but not limited to instances
where: 
"(a) 
He 
has 
a 
personal 
bias 
or
prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding."
As I explained in my statement of nonrecusal in Dunlop Tire
Corp. v. Allen, 725 So. 2d 960, 976 (Ala. 1998), "[t]he
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of
Alabama of 1901 impose on judges the duty to decide cases."
See also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) ("It is a
judge's duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction
...."); Federated Guar. Life Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 393 So. 2d
1386, 1389 (Ala. 1981) ("'[I]t is the duty of the judge to
adjudicate the decisive issues involved in the controversy ...
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
114
and to make binding declarations concerning such issues, thus
putting the controversy to rest ....'" (quoting 26 C.J.S.
Declaratory Judgments § 161 (1956), pp. 374-75)).  At the same
time, "[t]he Due Process Clauses of the Constitution of the
United States and of the Alabama Constitution require that a
judge be a neutral decision-maker.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §
1 ('No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ....')."  Dunlop Tire,
725 So. 2d at 976 (See, J., statement of nonrecusal); see also
Concrete Pipe & Prods. of California, Inc. v. Construction
Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602,
617 (1993) ("[D]ue process requires a 'neutral and detached
judge....'" (quoting Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S.
57, 61-62 (1972))).
Therefore, Canon 3.C.(1) must be applied in a way that
balances the underlying policies of the judicial duty to
decide cases and the need to preserve judicial impartiality.
To serve the policy of preserving impartiality, courts require
recusal not only for actual bias, but also for the appearance
of bias.  See Ex parte Monsanto Co., 862 So. 2d 595, 605 (Ala.
2003) ("'"The question is not whether the judge was impartial
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
115
in fact, but whether another person, knowing all the
circumstances, 
might 
reasonably 
question 
the 
judge's
impartiality 
-- 
whether 
there 
is 
an 
appearance 
of
impropriety."'" (quoting Ex parte City of Dothan Pers. Bd.,
831 So. 2d 1, 5-6 (Ala. 2002), quoting in turn Ex parte
Duncan, 638 So. 2d 1332, 1334 (Ala. 1994) (citations
omitted))).  In Ex parte City of Dothan Personnel Board, this
Court stated:
"The test that remains applicable at all times, the
answer to which always depends upon the 'totality of
circumstances' of each case, is whether a person of
ordinary prudence in the judge's position, knowing
all of the facts known to the judge, would find that
there is a reasonable basis for questioning the
judge's impartiality." 
831 So. 2d at 11.
We presume that a judge is unbiased.  Ex parte Balogun,
516 So. 2d 606, 609 (Ala. 1987) ("'For the law will not
suppose a possibility of bias or favor in a judge who is
already sworn to administer impartial justice and whose
authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.'"
(quoting Fulton v. Longshore, 156 Ala. 611, 613, 46 So. 989,
990 (1908))).  "'"The burden of proof is on the party seeking
recusal."'"  Monsanto, 862 So. 2d at 605 (quoting City of
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
116
Dothan Pers. Bd., 831 So. 2d at 9, quoting in turn Ex parte
Cotton, 638 So. 2d 870, 872 (Ala. 1994)); see also Reeves v.
State, 580 So. 2d 49, 51 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) ("'The general
rule in Alabama is that there is a presumption that a judge is
qualified and unbiased and a person who alleges otherwise has
the 
burden 
of 
proving 
that 
grounds 
[exist] 
for 
his
allegations.'" (quoting McMurphy v. State, 455 So. 2d 924, 929
(Ala. Crim. App. 1984))). 
I have no personal bias or prejudice concerning any party
to these appeals, nor do I have any personal knowledge of the
facts of the case underlying these appeals.  See Canon
3.C.(1), Canons of Judicial Ethics ("A judge should disqualify
himself in a proceeding in which ... [h]e has a personal bias
or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding ....").
Cottrell and Williams argue, however, that I should recuse
myself from this case because during my time as a professor of
law at the University of Alabama, "Dr. Gene Marsh, based upon
information and belief, was a fellow law professor and
personal friend of Justice See."  Motion to recuse at 4.
Professor Gene Marsh did join the law faculty while I was a
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
117
member of that faculty, and I considered him and all the other
members of that faculty friends.  I would add to the "totality
of circumstances" that it has been over 10 years since I left
the law faculty at the University of Alabama.  To the best of
my recollection, during that 10 years I have spoken with
Professor Marsh only once or twice, when I was at the law
school in my capacity as a Justice of the Supreme Court.  I
have not spoken to Professor Marsh about this case, and, to
the best of my recollection, he did not mention it when I saw
him.  
Cottrell and Williams argue that my relationship with
Professor Marsh would lead a reasonable person to doubt my
impartiality because Professor Marsh was formerly a defendant
in this action and, they say, "has great disdain for [Cottrell
and Williams]," Motion to recuse at 4–5; also, Professor Marsh
is, they report, currently working with one of the appellees
in this appeal -- the National Collegiate Athlete Association.
These allegations, however, do not overcome the presumption of
impartiality.  See Reeves, 580 So. 2d at 51 ("'The fact that
one of the parties before the court is known to and thought
well of by the judge is not sufficient to show bias.'"
1041858, 1050436, 1050437
118
(quoting McMurphy, 455 So. 2d at 929, citing in turn Duncan v.
Sherrill, 341 So. 2d 946 (Ala. 1977))); Ex parte Hill, 508 So.
2d 269, 272 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987) ("[I]t is an inescapable
fact of life that judges serving throughout the state will
necessarily have had associations and friendships with parties
coming before their courts.  A judge should not be subject to
disqualification for such ordinary relations with his fellow
citizens."). 
 
Thus, 
considering 
the 
"totality 
of
circumstances," I conclude that, "knowing all of the facts
known to the [me]," there is not a "reasonable basis for
questioning [my] impartiality."  City of Dothan Pers. Bd., 831
So. 2d at 11.
Because Cottrell and Williams's motion seeking my recusal
does not establish actual partiality or demonstrate an
appearance of partiality that would overcome the presumption
of judicial impartiality, it is my constitutional duty to
decide these appeals.  See Ala. Const. 1901, § 279 ("'I will
support the Constitution of the United States, and the
Constitution of the State of Alabama ... and ... I will
faithfully and honestly discharge the duties of the office
....'").  Therefore, I decline to recuse myself.