Title: New Jersey v. Carrion
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: December 27, 2021

New Jersey v. Carrion Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Defendant Jose Carrion appealed his conviction by jury on weapons and drug offenses, as well as assault. Specifically he appealed the denial of his motion to suppress a statement that he made to law enforcement and for which he received Miranda warnings, but that he made after an earlier, unwarned statement. At trial, the prosecution sought to admit an affidavit of Brett Bloom of the State Firearms Investigative Unit, asserting that Bloom searched and found no record that Carrion had a firearm permit. The State asked the court to submit the affidavit as a self-authenticating document under N.J.R.E. 902(k) and under the absence-of-a-public-record exception to the hearsay rule, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(10). Defense counsel objected, arguing that there were hearsay and Confrontation Clause issues. The court found the document both reliable and admissible under N.J.R.E. 902(k) and exceptions to the hearsay rule. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. The New Jersey Supreme Court found the State’s reliance on an affidavit by a non-testifying witness to introduce over defendant’s objection the results of the database search violated defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. And, under the totality of the circumstances, Carrion’s second statement should have been suppressed because the Miranda warnings issued to Carrion prior to his second statement to police were insufficient in these circumstances to ensure that his waiver of rights was voluntary and knowing. Because of its holding on the suppression issue, the Court could not conclude that the denial of defendant’s right to confrontation constituted harmless error. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. State v. Jose Carrion (A-14-20) (084390)Argued October 13, 2021 -- Decided December 27, 2021LaVECCHIA, J., writing for a unanimous Court. This appeal, and the companion case of State v. Hedgespeth, ___ N.J. ___ (2021), have in common an issue concerning the right to confrontation in the context of the admission of an affidavit attesting that a search of a State firearm registry revealed no lawful permit for an individual’s possession of a handgun. Defendant Jose Carrion also raises a suppression issue. He appeals the denial of his motion to suppress a statement that he made to law enforcement and for which he received Miranda warnings, but that he made after an earlier, unwarned statement. In June 2012, Newark law enforcement secured a warrant for Carrion’s arrest, based on allegations that Carrion shot a victim in the ankle. Five officers executed the warrant. Carrion’s wife let them into the home, where they placed handcuffs on Carrion who was sleeping on the couch; her fourteen-year-old son, Abel, witnessed the arrest. According to the State’s witnesses, while carrying out the arrest, the officers observed a “black pouch” with narcotics protruding out of it sitting on a table. On spotting the pouch, a detective examined it, saw drugs and a gun inside it, and alerted his fellow officers to the presence of a weapon. The officer testified that Carrion admitted to owning the bag without being asked any questions. Carrion’s wife and her son, however, testified that the officers asked Carrion whether he had anything in the house and told Carrion that if he did not admit ownership of the bag, DYFS would be contacted about taking the children from the home. After his arrest, Carrion was transported to the station. About six hours later, a detective who was not involved in the arrest took a statement from Carrion after informing him of Miranda rights. Carrion stated that he understood those rights and read and signed a waiver form. During his interrogation, Carrion alleged that someone else shot the victim but admitted that the gun was his. Carrion was indicted on weapons and drug offenses, as well as assault. He moved to suppress both statements made to the police. He argued that his first statement made while at his apartment -- admitting ownership of the black pouch containing the gun and drugs -- should be suppressed because it constituted an interrogation and the officers 1 failed to give him Miranda warnings prior to their questioning. As for his later recorded statement at the police station, he argued that too should be suppressed as an unlawful extension of the prior failure to provide Miranda warnings. The court granted Carrion’s motion to suppress the first statement but denied his motion to suppress the second. At trial, the prosecution sought to admit an affidavit of Brett C. Bloom of the State Firearms Investigative Unit, asserting that Bloom searched and found no record that Carrion had a firearm permit. The State asked the court to submit the affidavit as a self- authenticating document under N.J.R.E. 902(k) and under the absence-of-a-public-record exception to the hearsay rule, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(10). Defense counsel objected, arguing that there were hearsay and Confrontation Clause issues. The court found the document both reliable and admissible under N.J.R.E. 902(k) and exceptions to the hearsay rule. Carrion was convicted and sentenced. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the Court granted certification. 244 N.J. 280 (2020); 244 N.J. 503 (2020).HELD: The State’s reliance on an affidavit by a non-testifying witness to introduce over defendant’s objection the results of the database search violated defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. And, under the totality of the circumstances, Carrion’s second statement should have been suppressed because the Miranda warnings issued to Carrion prior to his second statement to police were insufficient in these circumstances to ensure that his waiver of rights was voluntary and knowing. Because of its holding on the suppression issue, the Court cannot conclude that the denial of defendant’s right to confrontation constituted harmless error. For the purposes of future matters, to ensure protection of defendants’ confrontation rights and the orderly production of essential witnesses in judicial proceedings, the Court addresses a method to avoid confrontation violations in these settings.1. The Federal and State Constitutions provide that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. In Crawford v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court announced a three-part test for assessing a violation of the Confrontation Clause. The test asks (1) whether the statement was testimonial, (2) whether the witness was unavailable to testify, (3) and whether there was a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 541 U.S. 36 , 68 (2004). It is the first prong of that test -- whether Bloom’s affidavit attesting to no record of Carrion possessing a gun permit was testimonial -- that is at issue. Crawford identified “formulations of [the] core class of testimonial statements,” including “material such as affidavits . . . that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially” or “at a later trial.” Id. at 51-52. In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court held that affidavits reporting the results of forensic analysis are “testimonial,” rendering the affiants “witnesses” subject to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 557 U.S. 305 , 307, 310 (2009). (pp. 14-17) 2 2. The Court notes that although there is some ambiguity about who must testify about out-of-court data analysis, there is no ambiguity here because no one testified regarding the affidavit. The firearm license database -- raw data, collected for a neutral administrative purpose -- is a non-testimonial “document” for Confrontation Clause purposes. But the creation of a document attesting to an interpretation or search of that data -- for the sole purpose of prosecuting a defendant -- is testimonial. With only the affidavit, and with no opportunity to question the officer knowledgeable about how the search of the database was performed, Carrion could not explore whether the officer used the correct date of birth, name, or other identifying information to generate a correct search of the database, and what information that search produced. Because the affidavit attesting to Bloom’s search of the database is testimonial, and in light of the fact that Bloom did not testify and was not previously subjected to cross-examination, Carrion’s right to confrontation was violated. (pp. 17-20)3. The confrontation error here was not harmless because the absence of a permit is an essential element of the weapons-possession offense with which Carrion was charged: to obtain a conviction, the State would have to prove that the gun belonged to him and that he did not possess the appropriate permit. The constitutional confrontation right entitled defendant, who raised a timely objection, to claim error in his trial. (pp. 20-22)4. Going forward, to help alleviate the administrative concerns of the State, the Court adopts the practice of notice and demand for the presentation of a State witness to testify to the search of the firearm permit database. That process will protect a defendant’s right to confrontation. By not demanding the witness’s testimony, the defendant waives his confrontation right. In many cases, the defendant may conclude the production of the witness is unnecessary. At the same time, a notice requirement will promote administrative and judicial efficiency. The Court has adopted such useful practices before and has seen their benefits in other settings that include Crawford considerations. E.g., State v. Wilson, 227 N.J. 534, 553-54 (2017) (creating a notice and demand procedure for certified survey maps). The Court refers the matter to the Criminal Practice Committee to study the issue generally and propose a court rule. (pp. 22-23)5. Turning to defendant’s suppression motion, the Court notes that one of the most fundamental rights protected by both the Federal Constitution and state law is the right against self-incrimination. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court put safeguards in place to protect the privilege against self-incrimination and respond to the “inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel [an individual subject to custodial interrogation] to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.” 384 U.S. 436 , 467 (1966). Although defendants may waive “effectuation of” their Miranda rights, the waiver must be one that “is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Id. at 444. Here, the Court must decide whether a confession, given after Miranda warnings, can be admissible when the suspect has previously been subjected to unwarned questioning in which he confessed. (pp. 23-25) 3 6. A natural concern in those circumstances is that “after an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed.” United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 , 540-41 (1947). In State v. O’Neill, the Court fashioned a test for determining the admissibility of such statements: to assess how effectively the warnings in the second interrogation functioned, courts should consider all relevant factors, including (1) the extent of questioning and the nature of any admissions made by defendant before being informed of his Miranda rights; (2) the proximity in time and place between the pre- and post-warning questioning; (3) whether the same law enforcement officers conducted both the unwarned and warned interrogations; (4) whether the officers informed defendant that his pre-warning statements could not be used against him; and (5) the degree to which the post-warning questioning is a continuation of the pre-warning questioning. 193 N.J. 148, 180-81 (2007). The O’Neill decision pointed out that factor four, when found to be present, should receive “great weight” because “[p]roviding that information would strongly suggest that the defendant made any post-warning incriminating statements knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.” Id. at 181. But the O’Neill Court took pains to stress that no single factor is determinative. See id. at 181-82. (pp. 25-27)7. Underscoring the Court’s emphasis in O’Neill that it was not creating a bright line, the Court rejects competing arguments by amici in this case that would render factor four conclusive. Applying all of the O’Neill factors in light of the totality of the circumstances, and relying on the trial court’s factual findings, the Court determines that the first factor favors suppression because Carrion faced two sources of psychological pressure not to assert his Miranda rights in his second interview: the fact that he had already let the cat out of the bag in his first statement, and the potential belief that the threat to call DYFS, unless he admitted ownership of the black bag, was still in effect. The Court notes that the first, second, and fifth factors all favor admission of the second statement, but that the fourth factor, like factor one, favors suppression. The Court explains in detail why, when considered qualitatively, factors one and four, in this particular case, outweigh the other factors. (pp. 28-37)8. The Court concludes by noting that it is rare that an unconstitutionally secured confession is deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Admission of Carrion’s second statement was not harmless in this case. (p. 38) REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. 4 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 14 September Term 2020 084390 State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jose Carrion, a/k/a Jose Carrison, Defendant-Appellant. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided October 13, 2021 December 27, 2021John P. Flynn, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; John P. Flynn, of counsel and on the briefs, and Gilbert G. Miller, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).Barbara A. Rosenkrans, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Barbara A. Rosenkrans, of counsel and on the briefs).William J. Munoz argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey 1 (Whipple Azzarello, attorneys; William J. Munoz, on the brief). Amanda G. Schwartz, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Amanda G. Schwartz, of counsel and on the brief). JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal, and the companion case of State v. Hedgespeth, ___ N.J.___ (2021), have in common an issue concerning the right to confrontation inthe context of the admission of an affidavit attesting that a search of a Statefirearm registry revealed no lawful permit for an individual’s possession of ahandgun. See N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (making it an offense to possess a handgunwithout a permit as provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4). In this matter, defendant Jose Carrion contends the trial court erred inadmitting information contained in an affidavit from a non-testifying detectiveof the Firearms Investigation Unit of the Department of Law and Public Safety(DLPS). The admitted evidence showed that the non-testifying detective’ssearch of the database revealed no permit existed authorizing Carrion tolawfully possess a handgun when one was seized by police from his home.Applying the test from decisions interpreting the federal Confrontation Clause,which we have adopted in our state confrontation jurisprudence, we conclude 2 that, while the raw data contained in the database listing issued firearm permitsis not “testimonial” for purposes of a confrontation-right analysis, statementsabout the search of that database for information specific to defendant for usein his prosecution is testimonial. Here, the State’s reliance on an affidavit by anon-testifying witness to introduce over defendant’s objection the results ofthat search violated defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. Carrion also raises a suppression issue. He appeals the denial of hismotion to suppress a statement that he made to law enforcement and for whichhe received Miranda1 warnings, but that he made after an earlier, unwarnedstatement. Specifically, defendant contends that State v. O’Neill, 193 N.J. 148(2007), and its instructions for analyzing the voluntariness of his waiver ofrights was misapplied in the two-step, unwarned-then-warned interrogationsetting that led to his incriminating second statement. Under the totality of thecircumstances, we conclude that his second statement -- in which he acceptedresponsibility for, among other things, the weapon found in his home -- alsoshould have been suppressed. The Miranda warnings issued to Carrion prior tohis second statement to police were insufficient in these circumstances toensure that his waiver of rights was voluntary and knowing.1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 3 Because of our holding on the suppression issue, we cannot concludethat the denial of defendant’s right to confrontation constituted harmless error.For the purposes of future matters, to ensure protection of defendants’confrontation rights and the orderly production of essential witnesses injudicial proceedings, we address a method to avoid confrontation violations inthese settings. I. On June 25, 2012, Newark law enforcement officers secured a warrantfor Carrion’s arrest. The warrant was based on allegations that on June 19,Carrion shot Juan Rivera in the ankle over a $420 debt. For purposes of thisappeal, we focus on the events associated with the execution of Carrion’sarrest, his statements to police, and the confrontation issue that arose at trial. A. 1. The Arrest Pursuant to testimony presented by the State at the suppression hearing,five officers from the Newark Police Department executed the arrest warrantfor Carrion on June 28, 2012. The officers knocked on Carrion’s apartmentdoor, and his wife, Biomaryluz Gonzalez, answered. She told the officers thatCarrion was inside. The officers entered the home and placed handcuffs on 4 Carrion who was sleeping on the couch. Gonzalez’s fourteen-year-old son,Abel Trevino, who is not Carrion’s biological son, witnessed the arrest. According to the State’s witnesses, while carrying out the arrest, theofficers observed a “black pouch” with narcotics protruding out of it sitting ona table. On spotting the pouch, Detective Maldonado examined it, saw drugsand a gun inside it, and alerted his fellow officers to the presence of a weapon.According to Maldonado’s testimony, once the officers found the pouch,Carrion began “shaking” and “owned up to it, he said it was his and he wantedto kiss his son, because, you know, he didn’t want to get handcuffed in thepresence of his child.” Maldonado testified that he did not ask Carrion anyquestions after Carrion admitted to owning the pouch, nor did he make anypromises or threats to Carrion in exchange for Carrion admitting that the pouchwas his. Gonzalez and her son, Abel, also testified at the suppression hearing.Gonzalez explained that at the time of the arrest she was living with Carrionand her three children, the youngest of whom (two years old at the time of thearrest) is Carrion’s biological son. She testified that upon handcuffing Carrion,the officers asked Carrion “if he had something in the house.” And, as she putit, the officers told Carrion that “he had to tell [the officer] because, if not, if 5 he didn’t say, they were going to call DY[FS] 2 and take my children, and also,they were going to get me involved in this case.” Gonzalez testified that theofficers were moving items in the house as they were looking around, andeventually, Carrion “told them that there was something behind the greencouch.” According to Gonzalez, the “black purse,” as she described it, was notfound until the officers moved the couch. Abel testified that he was sleeping upstairs when the officers entered thehome. Upon hearing them, he came downstairs to the first floor and saw theofficers looking around, which ultimately resulted in them finding “a bag.”According to Abel, upon finding the bag, the officers began “trying to forcemy mom, my father, both of them, saying to admit” that the bag was Carrion’s,otherwise the officers would take Abel and his siblings “to DYFS.” 2. The Subsequent Interrogation and Charges The details concerning Carrion’s police station interrogation are derivedfrom the suppression hearing as well as from defendant’s trial, at which thefull interview was admitted into evidence. 2 As of June 29, 2012, the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) was renamed the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP). L. 2012, c. 16, § 20 (codified at N.J.S.A. 9:3A-10(b)). Because at the time of Carrion’s arrest, DCPP was still DYFS (albeit for only one more day), and the witnesses referred to the agency as such, we will do the same. 6 About six hours after Carrion was arrested at his home and transportedto the police station, Detective Lydell James, who was not involved in thearrest, took a statement from him at 11:50 a.m. James began the interview byreading Carrion his Miranda rights. Carrion stated that he understood thoserights; he then read a Miranda form, acknowledged that he understood thewaiver provision of the form, initialed the waiver, and signed the form.Carrion also acknowledged that he has a high school diploma and two years ofcollege, and that he can read, write, and speak English. During his interrogation, Carrion alleged that someone else shot Rivera;however, he admitted that the gun found in his apartment was his, stating thathe bought it from a friend and had not obtained a license for it. Thereafter, an Essex County Grand Jury indicted Carrion for second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); second-degreepossession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); third-degree attempted aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2); second-degreepossession of a firearm while committing a CDS offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a firearm without a permit, N.J.S.A 2C:39-10(a);3 three counts of third-degree possession of CDS (heroin,3 The indictment charged defendant in count five with second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), but the count was later amended to the fourth-degree offense. 7 oxycodone, and 1-phenyl 2-1 pentanone), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); threecounts of third-degree possession of CDS with the intent to distribute, N.J.S.A.2C:35-5(a)(1); and three counts of third-degree possession of CDS within1,000 feet of a school, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. B. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress both statements hemade to the police. He argued that his first statement made while at hisapartment -- admitting ownership of the black pouch containing the gun anddrugs -- should be suppressed because it constituted an interrogation and theofficers failed to give him Miranda warnings prior to their questioning. As forhis later recorded statement at the police station, he argued that too should besuppressed as an unlawful extension of the prior failure to provide Mirandawarnings. After hearing testimony from Detectives James and Maldonado, as wellas Gonzalez and Abel, the trial court found the detectives’ testimony to becredible, Gonzalez’s testimony to be “partially credible,” and Abel’s testimonyto be “minimally credible.” The court first determined that Carrion’s initial statement to police whilein the apartment should be suppressed. The court found that the statement wasthe product of a custodial interrogation and that the officers should have 8 administered Miranda warnings. In making that determination, the court statedit was giving defendant “the benefit of the doubt” that the officers’ reference toDYFS becoming involved -- to which both Gonzalez and Abel testified -- wasa motivating consideration. The court’s suppression of Carrion’s statement atthe apartment is not on appeal here. As to Carrion’s second statement -- the statement taken by DetectiveJames at the police station in which Carrion admitted ownership of the gun andthat the gun was unlicensed -- the court noted that there was no question thatdefendant received his Miranda warnings prior to that custodial interrogation.The court therefore framed the issue as whether defendant knowingly andintelligently waived his rights. Considering the totality of the circumstances,the trial court found Carrion’s waiver to be voluntary. The court identified thefactors it found persuasive in reaching its decision. Factors, again, that I have considered, the defendant’s -- the time of the interrogation, defendant’s education. I will note that the -- the interview was short. It lasted approximately 12 minutes. Mr. Carrion’s age has been considered. He’s 36 years old at the time of the statement. His education has been considered. He has a high school diploma. He also has two years of college, and he said he can read and write English. He told Detective James that he understood him and he understood the Miranda waiver form. Furthermore, it is appropriate for the Court to consider a defendant’s previous encounters with law enforcement in determining the voluntariness of the 9 defendant’s waiving the Miranda. . . . As such, I will note that Mr. Carrion has had previous encounters with law enforcement. He has one prior conviction. The court further noted that defendant told James he was not threatened,coerced, made any promises, or pressured to give the statement and thatCarrion sounded very comfortable and calm throughout the statement. Inaddition, the court noted that the statement was provided at 11:55 a.m., severalhours after the arrest, and thus was a “separate event” from the originalstatement in the apartment. From the totality of those circumstances, the court concluded that theState had met its burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, thatdefendant’s waiver of rights before his second statement was knowing andvoluntary. Accordingly, the court denied defendant’s motion to suppress hissecond statement. C. At trial, during the presentation of the State’s case, the prosecutionsought to admit an affidavit of Brett C. Bloom of the DLPS FirearmsInvestigative Unit, asserting that Bloom searched and found no record thatCarrion had a firearm permit. The State asked the court to submit the affidavitas a self-authenticating document under N.J.R.E. 902(k) and under theabsence-of-a-public-record exception to the hearsay rule, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(10). 10 Defense counsel objected, arguing that there were hearsay andConfrontation Clause issues. The defense emphasized that the document wascreated for the primary purpose of being used in a prosecution and that itrequired authentication by a live witness. Turning aside the objections, thecourt found the document both reliable and admissible under N.J.R.E. 902(k)and exceptions to the hearsay rule. Portions of the document were allowed tobe read into the record; however, it appears that the document itself was notentered into the record. 4 On February 8, 2017, the jury found defendant guilty on all countsexcept for third-degree attempted aggravated assault, for which defendant wasconvicted of the lesser-included offense of fourth-degree aggravated assault,and two of the drug possession charges, for which he was acquitted. The courtsentenced defendant to an aggregate term of eighteen years in prison with tenyears of parole ineligibility. D. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court (1) erred in denyinghis motion to suppress the second statement taken at the police station and (2)violated his confrontation rights in admitting the affidavit of a non-testifying4 The State acknowledged at oral argument that the document was not entered into the record. Therefore, we refer only to the transcript at trial where portions were read aloud. 11 detective who affirmed that no record of a permit for defendant’s handgunexisted. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed. Applyingthis Court’s test for assessing a “two-step interrogation case,” announced inO’Neill, 193 N.J. at 180-81, the Appellate Division held that Carrion’s post-warning statement was admissible. The Appellate Division noted that the post-warning questioning took place six hours after the first unwarned questioningand an officer unconnected with the arrest conducted the subsequent interviewin which Carrion received Miranda warnings and waived them. In theAppellate Division’s view, James’s failure to inform Carrion that his pre-warning statement could not be used against him did not outweigh the otherO’Neill factors. Second, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s evidentiaryruling that the no-permit affidavit was self-authenticating under N.J.R.E.902(k) and admissible under the absence-of-a-public-record hearsay exception,N.J.R.E. 803(c)(10). The court further held that “[e]ven if the affidavit wasadmitted in error, such an error was harmless as defendant admitted hereceived the gun from a friend and never registered the weapon.” Theappellate court did not address defendant’s confrontation right argument. 12 We granted defendant’s petition for certification, initially limited to theMiranda-based suppression issue. 244 N.J. 280 (2020). Thereafter, on amotion for reconsideration, we granted certification on defendant’s claimedconfrontation violation. 244 N.J. 503 (2020). We also granted amicus statusto the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (ACDL) and to the AttorneyGeneral. II. A. We begin by addressing whether defendant’s confrontation rights wereviolated by the State’s admission of an affidavit of a non-testifying witnessattesting to having conducted a search of the State’s firearm registry database-- a search that produced no evidence of a handgun permit issued to defendant. According to defendant, this document is testimonial because it wasproduced in anticipation of the prosecution against him. He argues that anapplication of the principles set forth in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusettssupports his right to confront the preparer of the testimonial document wherethe prosecution seeks to admit a “clerk’s certificate attesting to the fact that theclerk had searched for a particular relevant record and failed to find it.” 557 U.S. 305 , 323 (2009). Defendant’s position is supported by the ACDL. 13 The State, on the other hand, distinguishes Melendez-Diaz, and urgesthis Court to find persuasive out-of-state authority that held that similaraffidavits were non-testimonial for confrontation purposes. The State alsoasserts that if its position is in error, the error here is harmless because Carrionadmitted to possessing the gun without a permit in his second statement topolice. The Attorney General supports the State’s arguments on this issue. B. In essentially identical language, the Sixth Amendment to the UnitedStates Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution“provide that '[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’” State v. Wilson, 227 N.J. 534, 544 (2017) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10).The Confrontation Clause applies to “witnesses against the accused,” or thosewho “bear testimony,” which is a “solemn declaration or affirmation made forthe purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 51 (2004) (quotations omitted). In Crawford, the United StatesSupreme Court announced a three-part test for assessing a violation of theConfrontation Clause. 55 This Court has had multiple occasions to examine Crawford and the series of Supreme Court decisions that followed. Crawford and its progeny altered the earlier jurisprudence that had been based on Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 66 14 The Crawford test asks “whether the statement was testimonial, whetherthe witness was unavailable to testify, and whether there was a prioropportunity for cross-examination.” State v. Michaels, 219 N.J. 1, 17 (2014)(citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68). It is the first prong of that test -- whetherBloom’s affidavit attesting to no record of Carrion possessing a gun permitwas testimonial -- that is at issue. Although Crawford did not define “testimonial statements,” it identified“formulations of [the] core class of testimonial statements,” such as ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent -- that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions; [and] statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.(1980), which previously tied the constitutional confrontation right to an examination of a statement’s reliability. Our earlier cases applying Crawford, beginning with State v. Michaels, 219 N.J. 1 (2014), and State v. Roach, 219 N.J. 58 (2014), explored who must testify when confrontation is demanded concerning results in out-of-court analyses, such as certain laboratory testing, and later in other settings. E.g., State v. Bass, 224 N.J. 285 (2016) (autopsies); Wilson, 227 N.J. 534 (survey maps); see also State v. Williams, 219 N.J. 89, 99 (2014) (explaining that a defendant must demand confrontation or the right will be waived by silence). 15 [Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (emphasis added) (citations and quotations omitted).] In Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court addressed whether affidavitsreporting the results of forensic analysis are “testimonial,” rendering theaffiants “witnesses” subject to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right toconfrontation. 557 U.S. at 307. There, the defendant was arrested, contrabandwas seized from him and his codefendants and submitted to a state laboratoryfor forensic chemical analysis, and certificates showing the results of theforensic analysis were submitted into evidence. Id. at 308. The defendantargued that the certificates were wrongly admitted and that the analysts wererequired to testify in person under the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 309. The Court found that the documents at issue were testimonial, especiallygiven that the Court’s previous “description of [the 'core class of testimonialstatements’] mentions affidavits twice” and the documents were clearly “'madefor the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’” Id. at 310 (emphasisadded) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52). In responding to the dissent’s suggestion that the affidavit at issue wasanalogous to the traditional admission at common law of “a clerk’s certificateauthenticating an official record,” the majority opinion in Melendez-Diazpointed out that “[a] clerk could by affidavit authenticate or provide a copy ofan otherwise admissible record, but could not do what the analysts did here: 16 create a record for the sole purpose of providing evidence against adefendant.” Id. at 322-23. Rather, the majority explained, Far more probative here are those cases in which the prosecution sought to admit into evidence a clerk’s certificate attesting to the fact that the clerk had searched for a particular relevant record and failed to find it. Like the testimony of the analysts in this case, the clerk’s statement would serve as substantive evidence against the defendant whose guilt depended on the nonexistence of the record for which the clerk searched. Although the clerk’s certificate would qualify as an official record under respondent’s definition -- it was prepared by a public officer in the regular course of his official duties -- and although the clerk was certainly not a “conventional witness” under the dissent’s approach, the clerk was nonetheless subject to confrontation. [Id. at 323 (emphasis added).] C. Since Melendez-Diaz, the United States Supreme Court’s ConfrontationClause jurisprudence has become less clear in certain respects. See generallyMichaels, 219 N.J. at 20-31 (citing Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011), and Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012)). That has led states, NewJersey included, to tread carefully, for example, with respect to forensic labevidence and whether one or every analyst involved in a forensic analysis musttestify. See id. at 28-49; see, e.g., Bass, 224 N.J. at 316-19 (taking care, withrespect to testimony involving forensic autopsies, to enable meaningful cross- 17 examination of a witness who is not the original pathologist who performedthe autopsy). At present, our case law permits, as explained succinctly in Bass,a single, or even substitute, witness to testify and explain the results of an out-of-court data analysis, when the individual can “provide the independent'verification of the data and results’ that [were] contemplated in Michaels andRoach.” Bass, 224 N.J. at 319 (quoting Roach, 219 N.J. at 80). That said, here, there is no ambiguity to the analysis required because noone testified regarding the affidavit. As such, the issue is resolved by astraightforward application of the tenets of Melendez-Diaz, where, similarly,“no witness was offered to support and be cross-examined” regarding thechallenged report. Michaels, 219 N.J. at 32 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S.at 308-09). The prosecution sought to admit an affidavit that was created, asMelendez-Diaz put it, “for the sole purpose of providing evidence against adefendant.” 557 U.S. at 322-23; see also Roach, 219 N.J. at 81 (holding that aDNA profile created by a forensic scientist from machine-generated data wastestimonial because it was the scientist’s “independent interpretation” of theraw data that converted the DNA profile “into unmistakably testimonialmaterial subject to the Confrontation Clause”). To be clear, an affidavit attesting to the absence of a license created aftera search of the firearm registry database is distinguishable from a previously 18 existing document that was not created for purposes of an individualdefendant’s prosecution. An example of the latter, as we held in Wilson, is amap created and maintained by a public entity for official purposes other thanprosecution of a specific criminal defendant. See 227 N.J. at 551 (finding thatadmission of a map, created years before the commission of the allegedoffenses and not in response to the criminal event, did not violate theConfrontation Clause). Indeed, another example of a non-testimonial“document,” as readily conceded by Carrion, is the firearm license databaseitself. Such raw data, collected for a neutral administrative purpose, is nottestimonial. Rather, it is the creation of a document attesting to aninterpretation or search of that data -- for the sole purpose of prosecuting adefendant -- that is testimonial. The upshot of all this is that a witness was required to explain theaccuracy of the information entered into the database search for the existenceof a firearm permit issued to Carrion, but no such witness was presented. Withonly the affidavit, and with no opportunity to question the officerknowledgeable about how the search of the database was performed, Carrioncould not explore whether the officer used the correct date of birth, name, orother identifying information such as a social security number in order to 19 generate a correct search of the database, and what information that searchproduced. Because the affidavit attesting to Bloom’s search of the database istestimonial, and in light of the fact that Bloom did not testify and was notpreviously subjected to cross-examination, we conclude that Carrion’s right toconfrontation was violated. 6 The State argues in the alternative that any confrontation error here washarmless because Carrion admitted the gun was his when interrogated at thepolice station. We review the admission of that statement in the ensuingsection, but standing alone, without that later statement, this error was notharmless. Although N.J.S.A. 2C:39-2(b) creates a statutory presumption in favor ofthe State if a defendant fails to present a firearm permit, we have made clearthat “where statutory presumptions are involved, '[t]he jury should beinstructed in terms of inferences which may or may not be drawn from a fact,the jury being at liberty to find the ultimate fact one way or the other.’” Statev. Ingram, 98 N.J. 489, 499 (1985). We have reinforced that the State still6 We find the out-of-state case law advanced by the State and Attorney General unpersuasive. The case law cited either precedes Melendez-Diaz, or, in our view, does not adhere to the principles of Melendez-Diaz as we have enforced them. 20 bears the burden of proof on all elements of an offense. Id. at 500; see alsoState v. Thomas, 132 N.J. 247, 255 (1993) (noting that “to pass constitutionalmuster the presumption must remain permissive in criminal cases”). Here, theabsence of a permit is an essential element of a charged weapons-possessionoffense. If the defendant’s statement at the police station is inadmissible, thenthe State would have to prove without the statement that the gun found in theapartment belonged to defendant and that he did not possess the appropriatepermit. Finally, on this issue, we acknowledge that the State has a validadministrative concern. Requiring in-person testimony by the person whoconducted a search of firearm registry records that yielded no results under adefendant’s name for a gun permit -- in every firearm possession prosecution-- could be burdensome and could lead to administrative inconvenience andwaste of resources. The applicable standard, however, is not whether it isburdensome to call a police officer to testify about his or her findings. SeeMelendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 325 (stating that “[t]he Confrontation Clause maymake the prosecution of criminals more burdensome,” but the Clausenevertheless “is binding, and we may not disregard it at our convenience”).The confrontation right under the Federal and State Constitutions entitled 21 defendant, who raised a timely objection, to claim error in his trial. SeeWilson, 227 N.J. at 543-44. Going forward, however, to help alleviate the administrative concerns ofthe State, we adopt the practice of notice and demand for the presentation of aState witness to testify to the search of the firearm permit database. Adoptionof a notice requirement by which a defendant must inform the court and theState of a demand to have the State produce an appropriate witness will protecta defendant’s right to confrontation. See State v. Williams, 219 N.J. 89, 99(2014). By not demanding the witness’s testimony, the defendant waives hisconfrontation right. See ibid. In many cases, the defendant may conclude thatthe production of the witness is unnecessary. At the same time, a noticerequirement will promote administrative and judicial efficiency. We haveadopted such useful practices before and have seen their benefits in othersettings that include Crawford considerations. E.g., Wilson, 227 N.J. at 553-54 (creating a notice and demand procedure when a State witness is required toidentify, on certified survey maps, the location of seized drugs used in certaindrug prosecutions requiring proof of proximity to certain public places orbuildings).77 The practice was in fact adopted prior to issues arising as a result of Crawford’s change in confrontation law. In State v. Miller, the Court used a similar method to reconcile and avoid potential burden-of-proof issues with 22 We refer the matter to the Criminal Practice Committee to study theissue generally and propose an appropriate court rule. III. We turn next to the appellate issue concerning defendant’s suppressionmotion, which affects whether the confrontation violation that occurred herewas harmless, as well as whether defendant’s otherwise incriminatingstatements should have been allowed to be heard by the jury. A. “One of the most fundamental rights protected by both the FederalConstitution and state law is the right against self-incrimination.” O’Neill, 193 N.J. at 167 (citing U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person . . . shall becompelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”); N.J.S.A.2A:84A-19 (“[E]very natural person has a right to refuse to disclose in anaction or to a police officer or other official any matter that will incriminatehim . . . .”); N.J.R.E. 503 (same)).respect to a legislative enactment intended to reduce the administrative inconvenience of calling State Laboratory analysts as witnesses when a defendant was not contesting the scientific proof and did not have a desire to cross-examine on a particular lab report in a drug prosecution case. 170 N.J. 417, 436-38 (2002) (addressing a refinement in procedure for N.J.S.A. 2C:35- 19(c)). Recognizing that the State nonetheless bore the burden of proof on all elements necessary for the prosecution of charged offenses, the Court superimposed procedural requirements concerning the statute’s implementation. Id. at 436. 23 In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court put safeguards in place toprotect the privilege against self-incrimination and respond to the “inherentlycompelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resistand to compel [an individual subject to custodial interrogation] to speak wherehe would not otherwise do so freely.” 384 U.S. 436 , 467 (1966) (requiring thatan “accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and theexercise of those rights must be fully honored”). Enforcement of th osesafeguards is a job of the courts. “A confession or incriminating statementobtained during a custodial interrogation may not be admitted in evidenceunless a defendant has been advised of his or her constitutional rights.” Statev. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 265 (2015) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492). Although defendants may waive “effectuation of” their Miranda rights,the waiver must be one that “is made voluntarily, knowingly, andintelligently.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. As expressed in this State, thestandard is that the prosecution “must 'prove beyond a reasonable doubt thatthe suspect’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in light of all thecircumstances.’” State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 316 (2019) (quoting State v.Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000)). The issue in this appeal concerns a homegrown area of jurisprudenceregarding Miranda rights. We must decide whether a confession, given after 24 Miranda warnings, can be admissible when the suspect has previously beensubjected to unwarned questioning in which he confessed. A natural concernin those circumstances is that “after an accused has once let the cat out of thebag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter freeof the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed.” UnitedStates v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 , 540-41 (1947). Due to the uncertainty underfederal law on how to address that concern, see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), and Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), this Court fashioned itsown test for determining the admissibility of such statements, O’Neill, 193 N.J. at 180-81. In O’Neill, we expressed our view that the key concern is whether thewarnings provided in the second interrogation “function[] effectively,” so as tolimit the potential psychological burdens that the previous confession mayhave placed on the defendant and that could otherwise affect the voluntarinessof the defendant’s waiver. Ibid. We stated that, to assess how effectively thewarnings in the second interrogation functioned, courts should consider all relevant factors, including: (1) the extent of questioning and the nature of any admissions made by defendant before being informed of his Miranda rights; (2) the proximity in time and place between the pre- and post-warning questioning; (3) whether the same law enforcement officers conducted both the unwarned and warned interrogations; (4) whether the officers informed 25 defendant that his pre-warning statements could not be used against him; and (5) the degree to which the post- warning questioning is a continuation of the pre- warning questioning. The factual circumstances in each case will determine the appropriate weight to be accorded to any factor or group of factors. [Ibid.] The O’Neill decision then provided more guidance for courts to usewhen considering the non-exclusive list of factors identified above. First, wepointed out that factor four, when found to be present, should receive “greatweight” because “[p]roviding that information would strongly suggest that thedefendant made any post-warning incriminating statements knowingly,voluntarily, and intelligently.” Id. at 181. Yet we took pains to stress that no single factor is determinative: We emphasize that we are not pronouncing a bright-line rule. For example, if the officers’ pre-warning questioning is brief and the defendant’s admissions are not incriminating or are barely incriminating and if there is a substantial break in time and circumstances between the pre- and post-warning interrogations, then those factors would militate against suppression of the defendant’s statements. Another circumstance that may be considered is the defendant’s prior experience with the criminal justice system. In a two-step interrogation case, courts must view the totality of the circumstances in light of the relevant factors and then determine whether the unwarned questioning and admissions rendered the Miranda warnings ineffective in providing a defendant the opportunity to exercise the privilege. [Id. at 181-82.] 26 The fundaments to the O’Neill Court’s guidance are three-fold:insistence on consideration of the totality of circumstances; guidance on theweight that should be given to some of the named factors when certainfactfinding can be made; and judicial humility to recognize that the five factorsidentified to assist courts are non-exhaustive. B. Against that legal backdrop, defendant argues that the AppellateDivision misapplied the O’Neill factors when considering the circumstancesthat connected his first, unwarned statement to his second, warned statement.Hewing to O’Neill’s five-factor test for considering the totality ofcircumstances, defendant emphasizes that the psychological impact of what hehad already let out of the bag was exacerbated by the continuing coerciveimpact of being told earlier by the arresting officers that if he did not acceptresponsibility for the gun and other contents of the black pouch, his childrenwould be subjected to DYFS control. The ACDL again supports defendant’s position, but its argument goesfurther. It urges the Court to elevate the impact of one O’Neill factor: factorfour, which asks whether the State told defendant that his unwarned statementcould not be used against him. When that warning is not given, the ACDLurges us to give heavy, indeed determinative, weight to it and find that the 27 resultant waiver cannot be viewed as voluntary. Here, because Carrion was notinformed that his first statement could not be used against him, the ACDLmaintains that Carrion’s waiver of rights was necessarily involuntary. The State argues that defendant was not subjected to a traditional two-step interrogation, but even if viewed as such, it urges us to adhere to a totalityapproach that assesses the voluntariness of the waiver in Carrion’s secondstatement using the O’Neill factors. The State argues that the circumstanceswere correctly assessed in their totality by the trial and appellate courts whendenying defendant’s suppression motion. The State and the Attorney Generalstrongly urge against making O’Neill’s fourth factor a controllingconsideration. The Attorney General goes further and contends that factor fouris not even relevant in the weighing process when the factual finding does notfavor the State. C. 1. In this matter, we are called on to assess the weighing process engagedin by the trial court, as approved by the Appellate Division. In doing so, wedispense first with the competing arguments of the amici that, on the one hand,would render factor four conclusive if favorable to defendant (the ACDL’s 28 position), or on the other hand, would render factor four irrelevant if it doesnot help the State (the Attorney General’s position). The arguments by both amici are extreme. The Attorney General wouldessentially do away with the fourth factor, again unless it helps the State. ThisCourt, however, already gives “great weight” to that factor when a finding ismade that law enforcement did inform a suspect -- before the suspect waivedMiranda rights and provided a second statement -- that a prior unwarnedstatement could not be used against the suspect. The ACDL on the other handasks for the creation of a bright-line rule that no waiver can pass muster iffactor four is not met, despite this Court’s emphasis in O’Neill that it was notcreating a bright line. The parties themselves work within the O’Neill factors. We shall do thesame -- and not simply because ordinarily “an amicus must take the case onappeal as they find it.” State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 191 (2010).Importantly, the amici’s arguments tip the otherwise thoughtfully balancedO’Neill factors in an unduly State-friendly or defendant-friendly way. Neitheris called for, notwithstanding that this matter presents a close, fact-sensitiveapplication of O’Neill. We turn to consider the factors, noting that theresolution of this matter requires particularly careful attention as to (1) which 29 side factor one should favor and (2) whether the totality of the factors favorsadmission or suppression of the post-warned statement. 2. As we consider how the legal standards we have set forth apply to thefacts of this matter, we are mindful of the applicable standard of appellatereview. “[A]n appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress must uphold thefactual findings underlying the trial court’s decision so long as those findingsare supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.” State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007) (quotation omitted). That said, the interpretation oflaw “and the consequences that flow from established facts” are not entitled todeference and are reviewed de novo. Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 263. The first O’Neill factor considers “the extent of questioning and thenature of any admissions made by defendant before being informed of hisMiranda rights.” 193 N.J. at 181. In O’Neill, the defendant was interrogatedwithout warning for ninety-five minutes, he was in a jail cell and in the policecommander’s office, and he “admitted to playing a role in a scheme to lure acab driver into a robbery trap.” Id. at 182. Although we did not explicitly sayso, factor one as analyzed under the facts in O’Neill presented an almostquintessential example that favored suppression. The questioning wasextensive, intimidating, and the defendant essentially admitted to the crime. 30 Application of the first factor in this appeal, however, is not as clear cut.First, the initial questioning did not occur in a prison or police station, as it didin O’Neill; that said, the trial court did find that the first questioning was partof a custodial interrogation for purposes of suppressing Carrion’s firststatement where Miranda warnings were not provided. And, unlike thedefendant in O’Neill, Carrion did not implicate himself in Rivera’s shooting inhis first statement. Using O’Neill as a point of comparison, the questioninghere could be viewed as shorter in duration and less extensive, and Carrion didnot admit to the most serious crime with which he was charged. However, during the questioning Carrion admitted to possession of anillegal gun and drugs, which led to serious charges for which Carrion was laterconvicted. Additionally, it is significant that five police officers enteredCarrion’s home for the purpose of arresting him pursuant to a warrant andpromptly handcuffed him as he was awakening, giving rise to a pressuredsituation in which he ultimately admitted that the black bag was his. Adding to the mix is whether the officers made known to Carrion that hefaced the consequence of a call being made to DYFS which would lead toCarrion’s children being taken away from his wife unless he tookresponsibility for the black pouch or purse and its contents. At the suppressionhearing, Carrion’s wife and stepson both testified that statements to that effect 31 were audibly made in their presence. The testifying officer who executedCarrion’s arrest denied making any threat or similar coercive statement. Onthis point, the trial court’s finding, which deserves our deference, is critical toour analysis. In the context of determining whether the arresting officerssubjected Carrion to an interrogation, the trial court found as follows: Detective Maldonado again testified that he did not recall anyone hearing anything about DYFS. That is his recollection. However, Ms. Gonzalez and Mr. Trevino testified differently about the specifics. They did testify consistently that they overheard -- that they heard officers indicate that they would need to call DYFS . . . if Carrion did not own up to the contraband. Now, and I will note that would have been a truthful statement as they would have had a duty to call DCPP. However, that inquiry or any such inquiry would have -- would have been an -- an inquiry that would have triggered Miranda protection. . . . So, then it follows if Mr. Carrion was given any Miranda warning before any such inquiry. And as to whether there was any such inquiry, I am going to give the defendant the benefit of the doubt having had two witnesses who testified that they -- they did hear some inquiry. Although the trial court’s factual finding was made under a differentlegal analysis -- whether there was an “interrogation” for Miranda purposes --the court ultimately premised its finding that there was an “inquiry” ontestimony that the arresting officers told Carrion that they would have to callDYFS unless he admitted to possessing the gun and drugs. We recognize that 32 the point was contested by the parties, but there is a factual finding by the trialcourt of a statement evidencing a threat, although it was not called such, aboutcontacting DYFS. The trial court gave Carrion the benefit of the doubt as tothe fact of the utterance and accepted the reference to DYFS as having beenmade. We defer to that finding. And although the trial court’s finding was not used as part of an O’Neillanalysis, we view that factual finding as probative in our consideration of thefirst O’Neill factor. Carrion was not merely subjected to the “inherentlycompelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist”and which accompany any custodial interrogation, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467;rather, those conditions were augmented by apparent statements that theagency of government known to take children from their families and intoState care would be contacted unless Carrion took responsibility for the gunand contraband. Although not precisely on point, the Supreme Court hasrecognized the strongly coercive nature of threats to remove a suspect’schildren unless he or she confesses. Cf. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 , 534(1963) (holding that a confession was involuntary under the Due ProcessClause where the defendant’s “oral confession was made only after the policehad told her that state financial aid for her infant children would be cut off, andher children taken from her, if she did not 'cooperate’”). We accordingly hold 33 that those comments, found by the trial court to have been made, added to thecoercive effect of the officers’ efforts to secure an admission from Carrion. Placing that factual finding under the lens of the first O’Neill factor, it isevident that Carrion faced two sources of psychological pressure not to asserthis Miranda rights in his second interview: the fact that he had already let thecat out of the bag in his first statement, and the potential belief that the threatto call DYFS, unless he admitted ownership of the black bag, was still ineffect. Given that there is no evidence that the possibility of a call to DYFSwas ever revoked or further explained to Carrion, it stands to reason that,during his second interview, he still feared that the police would call DYFSand remove his children from their mother unless he continued to acceptresponsibility for the gun and contraband in the black pouch found in hishome. Viewed as such, the first factor favors suppression of Carrion’s secondstatement. With that significantly different view of the application of facts to law(from that of the Appellate Division) with respect to factor one, we considernext the totality of the circumstances. 3. The key inquiry when viewing the totality of the O’Neill factors iswhether the second set of Miranda “warnings functioned effectively in 34 providing the defendant the ability to exercise his state law privilege againstself-incrimination.” O’Neill, 193 N.J. at 180-81. Under the circumstances ofCarrion’s two confessions, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt thathe knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights when providing hissecond statement. See Tillery, 238 N.J. at 316. We address first factors two, three, and five. The second factorconsiders whether there was a clear and substantial break in time and place“between the pre- and post-warning questioning.” O’Neill, 193 N.J. at 181.The second interview here took place in a different location six hours after thearrest and initial confession. While we do not view a separation of six hours intime as a bright line when considering this factor, we accept the AppellateDivision’s assessment that this factor weighs in favor of admission. Next,under the third factor, the detective who conducted the second interrogation --Detective James -- was not the officer who conducted the first interrogation.Based on the record presented, Detective James apparently had no involvementin Carrion’s case other than the one interview he conducted, and there is nodispute that he was uninvolved in Carrion’s arrest. Factor three thus alsofavors admission. And, for similar reasons as those present for factors two and 35 three, under the fifth factor, the post-warning questioning was not “acontinuation of the pre-warning questioning.” 8 Ibid. On the other hand, like factor one, factor four favors suppression.Specifically, under factor four, Detective James plainly did not inform Carrion“that his pre-warning statements could not be used against him.” Ibid. This appeal thus comes down to a weighing of factors two, three, andfive against factors one and four. An additional consideration weighing againstCarrion is his “prior experience with the criminal justice system.” Ibid.Considered qualitatively, we hold that factors one and four, in this particularcase, outweigh the other factors. As discussed, Carrion was not only burdened with a cat-out-of-the-bagmentality when he went in for his second interview, but he also could very wellhave remained under the looming fear that the police would call DYFS if hedid not continue to admit to ownership of the drugs and gun. Thus, he mayhave been constrained from invoking his Miranda rights out of continued fearthat if he did so, his children would be taken away from his wife and placedinto DYFS care.8 Still, simply because the second questioning was not, formally speaking, a continuation of the first does not mean that the impact of the DYFS threat on defendant did not continue into the interview with Detective James. 36 The standard of proof that the State must meet requires a showing thatCarrion’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary beyond reasonabledoubt. We are unconvinced that the break in time, use of a different detective,and separation between the first and second interrogations neutralized the dualpsychological burden faced by Carrion. Even assuming the efficacy of thosefactors in counterbalancing a typical cat-out-of-the-bag mentality, they areinadequate to offset -- to a degree that would allow a finding of voluntarinessbeyond a reasonable doubt -- defendant’s likely fear that he needed to maintainhis admission to avoid his children’s removal. It bears repeating that in thesecond interview, Carrion admitted only to possession of the gun and not to theshooting of Rivera. That choice by Carrion -- to admit only to the crime hepreviously confessed to -- supports that he was indeed afflicted by somecombination of the cat-out-of-the-bag mentality and the DYFS threat, which,again, was directed at him only in the context of establishing ownership of theblack pouch or purse. Accordingly, we hold that that fear of intervention byDYFS, in combination with his lack of knowledge that his first confessioncould not be used against him, pushes the totality of circumstances in Carrion’sfavor. 37 D. In closing, we note that it is rare that an unconstitutionally securedconfession is deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, for we haverecognized “that inculpatory remarks by a defendant have a tendency toresolve jurors’ doubts about a defendant’s guilt to his detriment.” State v.McCloskey, 90 N.J. 18, 31 (1982) (holding that courts should apply the“harmless error doctrine sparingly,” in cases “[w]here the State has violatedthe defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination”); see also Tillery, 238 N.J.at 334 n.3 (Albin, J., dissenting) (collecting cases rejecting harmless errorclaims). Such is the case in this appeal. Carrion admitted to Detective Jamesthat he was at the shooting, he owns a gun without a permit, and he was inpossession of drugs. It was not harmless to admit those statements. E. Defendant is entitled to a new trial where his second statement shall no tbe admissible. Moreover, in light of our holding suppressing his secondstatement, we further hold that the violation of defendant’s confrontation right,as set forth in Section II of this opinion, is not harmless. 38 IV. For the reasons expressed, the judgment of the Appellate Division isreversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent withthis opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. 39