Title: McDurmont v. Crenshaw
Citation: 489 So. 2d 550
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 25, 1986

489 So. 2d 550 (1986)
James McDURMONT, as Administrator of the Estate of Roy McDurmont, Deceased
v.
Voncile CRENSHAW, Maudrine Russell, et al.
84-965.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 25, 1986.
Mark Vaughan of Cannon &amp; Vaughan, Elba, for appellant.
G.A. Lindsey, Elba, for appellees.
BEATTY, Justice.
This is an appeal by plaintiff Roy McDurmont from the denial of his motion for new trial in an action seeking the sale of 80 acres of land for division of the proceeds. During the pendency of this appeal, the death of Roy McDurmont was suggested on the record, and notice was filed that the appeal would be continued in the name of *551 James McDurmont, as administrator of the estate of Roy McDurmont, deceased.
Plaintiff filed this action for sale for division on January 19, 1984, naming as defendants his sisters, Voncile M. Crenshaw, Maudrine M. Russell, Delores M. Moody, and the unknown heirs and next of kin of his deceased brother, Otis McDurmont. By his complaint, the plaintiff sought the sale of an 80-acre tract of land situated in Coffee County, Alabama, for a division of the proceeds, claiming an undivided one-fifth fee simple interest in the property. By their answer, defendants Voncile Crenshaw and Maudrine Russell denied plaintiff's title and demanded a trial by jury. On the authority of Freeney v. Stallworth, 344 So. 2d 752 (Ala.1977), the trial court denied plaintiff's motion to strike defendants' jury demand, and, in due course, the case proceeded to trial.
At trial, plaintiff testified that his father, G.B. McDurmont, "owned" the 80 acres at his death in 1929; however, at the time of his death, the Brundidge Banking Company held an unpaid mortgage on the property executed by McDurmont and his wife, Maudie McDurmont, as mortgagors. G.B. McDurmont died intestate, and there was never any administration or other proceedings concerning his estate.
On September 15, 1941, some 12 years after G.B. McDurmont's death, the Brundidge Banking Company foreclosed on its mortgage and bought the property at the foreclosure sale. Three months later, McDurmont's widow, Maudie, purchased the property from the Brundidge Banking Company and obtained a warranty deed in her name as sole owner. Plaintiff further testified that he was beyond the age of majority in 1941, when he claims to have given his mother the funds with which to buy back the property. He also contends that her purchase constituted a statutory redemption, although there is no indication on the face of the deed to Mrs. McDurmont that she was exercising any statutory right of redemption, or that she was in fact redeeming the property. The defendants maintain that Maudie McDurmont did not "redeem" the property when she purchased it.
In 1960, Maudie McDurmont, by warranty deed, conveyed the 80 acres to her daughters Voncile M. Crenshaw and Maudrine M. Russell. This deed was duly recorded and has been held by the two sisters since that date. Maudie McDurmont died in 1965.
At trial, plaintiff testified that he had farmed the property for the 30 years prior to 1984, paying one of his sisters, Voncile Crenshaw, $80 annual rent. He ceased farming the property in 1984, when he learned of the 1960 deed from his mother to his two sisters, and filed this lawsuit.
At the close of plaintiff's case, the defendants moved for a directed verdict, which was granted by the trial court. Plaintiff's motion for new trial was denied, and this appeal followed.
Our task is to examine the record to determine if there is a scintilla of evidence to support plaintiff's complaint. Ralls v. First Federal Savings &amp; Loan of Andalusia, 422 So. 2d 764 (Ala.1982). A directed verdict is proper only where there is a complete absence of proof on a material issue, or where there is no controverted question of fact on which reasonable persons could differ. Deaton, Inc. v. Burroughs, 456 So. 2d 771 (Ala.1984).
On appeal, plaintiff essentially claims that, prior to the foreclosure in 1941, the widow and children (heirs) of G.B. McDurmont were co-tenants in the property, which plaintiff contends they inherited from McDurmont when he died intestate. Relying on Braly v. Polhill, 231 Ala. 633, 166 So. 419 (1936), and the recent case of Dominex, Inc. v. Key, 456 So. 2d 1047 (Ala. 1984), plaintiff asserts that a redemption by his mother inured to the benefit of all other co-tenants, who may rehabilitate their interests by contributing, within a reasonable time, their proportionate share of the purchase price.
Alternatively, the plaintiff contends that under Code of 1923, § 7365, he and his siblings inherited the real estate of his father *552 in equal parts, subject only to his mother's dower. Section 7365 provided, in part:
Plaintiff argues that, because dower is an estate for the life of the widow in a certain portion of her husband's realty, his mother's conveyance to his two sisters would have conveyed only a life estate in the property, which would have expired at their mother's death.
Notwithstanding plaintiff's arguments, we conclude that the trial court properly directed a verdict for the defendants because plaintiff's claim is barred, as a matter of law, by the 20-year rule of repose or prescription. The principle of prescription is a "strict rule of law in this State" based on a strict application of the 20-year period. Merrill v. Merrill, 260 Ala. 408, 409, 71 So. 2d 44, 45 (1954). In Boshell v. Keith, 418 So. 2d 89, 91-92 (Ala. 1982), this Court explained, at length, the 20-year rule of repose, and applied it:
In the present case, the plaintiff waited some 43 years after the alleged redemption by his mother, and some 25 years after she conveyed the property to two of plaintiff's sisters, to assert his claim to the property. Furthermore, at trial plaintiff adduced no evidence proving that his mother or the two sisters, Voncile and Maudrine, ever recognized that the plaintiff had any ownership interest in the subject 80 acres.
Nor can the plaintiff, by alleging that his mother had only a dower interest, and, therefore, only a life estate in the property, assume the position of a remainderman, and thereby benefit from this Court's refusal in Duncan v. Johnson, 338 So. 2d 1243 (Ala.1976), to apply the 20-year bar against remaindermen. There was no evidence submitted to show that Mrs. McDurmont's dower was ever set aside. In Leddon v. Strickland, 218 Ala. 436, 118 So. 651 (1928), where the decedent held the legal title to the property in question, which, during his life, he did not occupy or use as his homestead, the Court held that the property passed to his heirs subject to the homestead and dower rights of his widow, when duly asserted. In that case, just as in the present, the evidence failed to show such due assertion of right by the widow within ten years of the death of the husband, and, therefore, such rights were barred under Code of 1923, § 7450.
Thus, by failing to assert a claim to the property for 43 years, i.e., from 1941 to 1984, after plaintiff knew his mother had obtained a deed in her own name, plaintiff is now barred by the rule of repose from asserting such a claim. Compare Finley v. Bailey, 440 So. 2d 1019 (Ala.1983), where the plaintiffs advanced a cotenancy theory of ownership, relying on their claim to a constructive trust to suffice as their "contribution" toward the purchase of an outstanding interest in the subject property. Notwithstanding plaintiffs' argument in Finley that, because of the facts giving rise to a constructive trust, they were under no obligation to contribute toward the purchase of the outstanding interest, this Court held in Finley that "the principle of Gilb [v. O'Neill, 225 Ala. 92, 142 So. 397 (1932)], holds that the cotenants must elect to avail themselves of the benefit [of the purchase of the outstanding interest] within a reasonable time." (Emphasis added.) 440 So. 2d  at 1022. In Finley, this Court went on to hold that equity and good conscience required the plaintiffs "to establish their claim to a constructive trust within a reasonable time, rather than thirty-five years later." Id. The same principle applies here.
Based on the foregoing, the judgment below is due to be, and it hereby is, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON and HOUSTON, JJ., concur.