Title: Walworth County DH&HS v. Andrea L. O.
Citation: 2008 WI 46
Docket Number: 2007AP000008
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 28, 2008

2008 WI 46 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP8 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to Lyle 
D. E., Jr., a person under the age of 18: 
 
Walworth County Department of Health & Human 
Services, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Andrea L. O., 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 28, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 11, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert J. Kennedy   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs and oral 
argument 
by 
Suzanne 
L. 
Hagopian, 
assistant 
state 
public 
defender. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Michelle M. Snead, assistant corporation counsel. 
 
A guardian ad litem brief was filed by James P. Martin and 
James P. Martin, S.C., Lake Geneva, and there was oral argument 
by James P. Martin. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Timothy Baxter, John T. 
Chisholm, Elisabeth Mueller, and Christine M. Quinn on behalf of 
the Wisconsin District Attorneys’ Association. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 46
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP8  
(L.C. No. 
2005TP29) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
Lyle D. E., Jr., a person under the age of 18: 
 
 
 
Walworth County Department of Health & Human 
Services, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Andrea L. O., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 28, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Walworth 
County, Robert J. Kennedy, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 809.61 (2005-06).1 Andrea L.O. appeals a circuit court 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-
06 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2007AP8   
 
2 
 
order terminating her parental rights to her son Lyle E., Jr. 
(Junior) on the ground that he was in continuing need of 
protection or services. 
¶2 
The parties agreed to stipulate to the first element 
of the ground, that is, that Junior had been adjudged a child in 
need of protection or services (CHIPS) and placed outside the 
home for a cumulative total period of six months or longer 
pursuant to one or more court orders containing the termination 
of parental rights notice required by law. Andrea maintains such 
a stipulation constitutes an invalid withdrawal of her demand 
for a jury trial on that element. She argues that it is invalid 
because the circuit court erred in failing to engage her in a 
personal colloquy in order to determine that the withdrawal was 
knowing and voluntary.   
¶3 
We determine that Andrea received a jury trial on the 
element regardless of the stipulation. The stipulation in this 
case does not constitute a withdrawal of the demand for a jury 
trial on an element. Despite the fact that the parties agreed to 
enter a stipulation regarding the first element of the ground 
for termination, the jury was presented with ample evidence of 
the element, was instructed on the element, and answered a 
verdict question on that element.  
¶4 
We further determine that there would be no error here 
even if the circuit court rather than the jury had decided the 
                                                                                                                                                             
The appeal is from an order of the Circuit Court for 
Walworth County, Robert J. Kennedy, Judge. 
No. 
2007AP8   
 
3 
 
first element. Under the circumstances of this case, the circuit 
court was not required to engage in a personal colloquy in order 
to ascertain that a withdrawal was knowing and voluntary.  
Andrea agreed to the stipulation in open court. The stipulation 
addressed a single, undisputed, "paper" element2 where another 
element was the focus of the controversy at issue. Additionally, 
there 
was 
ample 
uncontroverted 
evidence 
to 
support 
the 
stipulated element. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the 
circuit court terminating the parental rights.  
I 
¶5 
Junior is the child of Andrea and Lyle E. ("Lyle").  
When Junior was two, the Walworth County Department of Health 
and Human Services ("County") filed a petition seeking to 
terminate the parental rights of both Andrea and Lyle. The 
ground for termination alleged in the petition was that Junior 
was in continuing need of protection or services.  
¶6 
There 
are 
four 
elements 
to 
this 
ground 
for 
termination. First, the child must have been placed out of the 
home for a cumulative total of more than six months pursuant to 
court orders containing the termination of parental rights 
notice. Second, the County Department of Social Services must 
have made a reasonable effort to provide services ordered by the 
court. Third, the parent must fail to meet the conditions 
                                                 
2 We have used the term "paper grounds" in the context of a 
termination of parental rights proceeding to describe grounds 
for unfitness which may be proven by official documentary 
evidence such as court orders or judgments of conviction. Steven 
V. v. Kelly H., 2004 WI 47, ¶37, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856. 
No. 
2007AP8   
 
4 
 
established in the order for the safe return of the child to the 
parent's home. Fourth, there must be a substantial likelihood 
that the parent will not meet the conditions of safe return of 
the child within the 12-month period following the conclusion of 
the termination hearing.3 
¶7 
Andrea and Lyle denied the allegations in the petition 
and the matter was set for a jury trial. The County submitted 
requests for admissions prior to trial. It requested, among 
other things, that Andrea admit that Junior "has been placed out 
of his home for more than 6 months, pursuant to one or more 
court orders containing the TPR warnings." An answer signed by 
Andrea's attorney replied to that request with an admission.  
¶8 
On the morning of the first day of trial, the County 
sought a stipulation to the first element "just to possibly 
avoid needing a clerk to testify." The County articulated the 
first element as requiring the County to prove:  
that the child has been adjudged in need of protection 
and services and placed outside the home for a 
cumulative total period of six months or longer 
pursuant to one or more of the court orders containing 
the termination of parental rights notice required by 
law.  
¶9 
In response, Andrea's attorney stated that "we're 
willing to stipulate that the answer to question number one 
should be 'yes.'" Andrea's attorney then asked her whether she 
understood the issue and whether she was willing stipulate that 
                                                 
3 Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2); Door County Department of Health & 
Family Services v. Scott S., 230 Wis. 2d 460, 464 n.3, 602 
N.W.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1999); Wis JI-Children 324. 
No. 
2007AP8   
 
5 
 
the statement was true. She responded affirmatively. The 
transcript of her attorney's communication provides as follows:  
Andrea, do you understand that issue and are you 
willing to stipulate that those things are true; that 
[Junior] was adjudicated in need of protection or 
services, that he was placed out of your home and out 
of [Lyle's] home for a total cumulative period of six 
months? The answer was yes. 
Lyle also agreed to the stipulation through his attorney. The 
parties prepared a written version of the stipulation, which was 
signed by the parties' attorneys. 
¶10 During opening statements, the County's attorney read 
the first element of the ground for termination and stated 
"[t]hat one's already decided." Similarly, Andrea's attorney 
indicated that whether Junior had been adjudged in need of 
protection or services and had been placed out of Andrea's home 
for a total cumulative period of six months "is not seriously in 
dispute." Rather, he stated that "most of our focus" is on the 
fourth element——whether there is a substantial likelihood that 
Andrea will not meet the conditions for return within a year.  
¶11 The social worker who handled Junior's case testified 
at trial. A copy of a prior court order determining that Junior 
was a child in need of protection or services and which 
contained the termination of parental rights notice was marked 
and received as an exhibit. The social worker testified that 
Junior had been out of Andrea's home pursuant to court order for 
a cumulative total of 24 months. 
¶12 Andrea also testified. During her testimony, she 
admitted that there was a CHIPS order regarding Junior that had 
No. 
2007AP8   
 
6 
 
been entered about two years before and that she had not 
contested the order. No evidence was introduced at trial to 
controvert the stipulation. 
¶13 Despite the stipulation, the circuit court instructed 
the jury on all four elements of the ground for termination. It 
explained that the jury was to consider the evidence for each 
ground separately: 
You must consider the evidence against each parent 
separately and consider the evidence as to each ground 
separately. Each parent is entitled to separate 
consideration. Your verdict as to each ground should 
be based solely upon the evidence or lack of evidence 
as to that ground . . . . 
¶14 The court stated that the County had to prove that 
Junior had been adjudged to be in need of protection or services 
and placed outside the home for a cumulative total period of 
greater than six months, and stated that there was no dispute as 
to the question based on the parties' stipulation.  
[Junior] was adjudged to be a child in need of 
protection or services and placed or continued in 
placement outside the home of Andrea [L.O.] for a 
cumulative total period of 6 months or longer pursuant 
to one or more court orders containing the termination 
of parental rights notice required by law. 
Because there is no dispute in the evidence to this 
question, I've answered this question. Now, actually, 
the parties, again, have stipulated to this question. 
My answer or—— For that matter, the stipulation has no 
bearing whatsoever on what your answer should be to 
the other questions in the special verdict form.  
The court asked whether there was "[a]ny objection to me reading 
it or saying it that way?" The parties did not object.  
No. 
2007AP8   
 
7 
 
¶15 During closing arguments, the County told the jury 
that question one (regarding the first element) had already been 
answered, and that it did not need to worry about that question. 
The jury was provided with a copy of the court dispositional 
order adjudging Junior to be in need of protection or services 
which contained the termination of parental rights notice 
required by law.  
¶16 When the jury was presented with a special verdict 
form, however, none of the questions had been answered. Instead, 
it was the jury that answered the verdict question addressing 
the first element.4 It responded "yes" to the question asking 
whether Junior had been adjudged in need of protection or 
services and placed outside the home for a cumulative total 
period of six months or longer pursuant to one or more court 
orders containing the termination of parental rights notice 
required by law. After a dispositional hearing, the circuit 
court entered an order terminating the parental rights of both 
Andrea and Lyle.  
¶17 Andrea appealed. The court of appeals certified the 
appeal to this court.  
II 
¶18 In this case we address whether a stipulation to an 
element of the ground for termination in a termination of 
                                                 
4 At oral argument the parties agreed that it was the jury 
that answered question one on the special verdict form, despite 
the circuit court's statement that "I've answered this question. 
Now, actually, the parties, again, have stipulated to this 
question." 
No. 
2007AP8   
 
8 
 
parental rights (TPR) case constitutes a withdrawal of the 
demand for a jury trial on that element. We also examine whether 
a circuit court erred in failing to personally engage a parent 
in a colloquy to determine whether a withdrawal of the demand 
for jury trial on an element was knowing and voluntary. These 
are questions of law that this court reviews independently of 
the decision rendered by the circuit court. Steven V. v. Kelly 
H., 2004 WI 47, ¶19, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856; State v. 
Benoit, 229 Wis. 2d 630, 600 N.W.2d 193 (Ct. App. 1999). 
¶19 Initially we address the effect of the stipulation. 
Next we examine Andrea's arguments that the circuit court erred 
in failing to personally engage her in a colloquy to determine 
that the withdrawal was knowing and voluntary. She bases her 
arguments on (1) cases involving statutory rights to a jury 
trial; (2) criminal cases involving stipulations; and (3) due 
process.  
III 
¶20 Under chapter 48 of the Wisconsin Statutes, a parent 
in a termination proceeding may demand a jury trial. Wis. Stat. 
§§ 48.422(4), 48.31(2), 48.424(2) (intro.). There is no dispute 
that Andrea made such a demand in this case.  
¶21 Andrea asserts that by entering into a stipulation 
regarding the first element of the ground for termination, she 
withdrew her demand for a jury trial on that element. She 
maintains, however, that the stipulation here constitutes an 
invalid withdrawal of her demand for a jury trial. We examine 
first the effect of the stipulation. Although Andrea entered 
No. 
2007AP8   
 
9 
 
into a stipulation on the first element, that element was in 
fact decided by the jury. 
¶22 The court of appeals addressed a similar situation in 
the criminal context in Benoit, 229 Wis. 2d 630. The defendant 
in that case was charged with being party to a burglary, one 
element of which is lack of consent from the person in lawful 
possession of the building entered. Id. at 634. To avoid having 
the building owners testify, the defendant stipulated to the 
nonconsent element. Id. The court instructed the jury on the 
nonconsent element, and then informed the jury that the 
defendant and the district attorney had stipulated to certain 
facts which the jury should accept as conclusively proved, 
including that the owners of the building did not give consent 
to entry. Id. at 635. 
¶23 After being convicted, the defendant argued that he 
should have been provided a colloquy to ensure that his waiver 
of a jury trial on the element of nonconsent was knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent. The court of appeals determined that 
the stipulation did not constitute a waiver of his right to a 
jury trial on the element of nonconsent. Id. at 638. Rather, the 
element had merely been conceded by Benoit. Id. The court 
further determined that because the jury had been instructed on 
all of the elements of the crime, the defendant received a jury 
trial on all of the elements, regardless of the existence of the 
stipulation. Id. Thus, the court concluded that there was no 
requirement to make an express personal waiver in order for the 
stipulation to be valid. Id.  
No. 
2007AP8   
 
10 
 
¶24 This case is similar. As in Benoit, the parties agreed 
to stipulate to a single element. In each case, despite the 
stipulation, the court presented the jury with a question on the 
element, and in each case the court instructed the jury that the 
parties had entered the stipulation. In Benoit, the court 
instructed the jury that the stipulated element was conclusively 
proved. Similarly, in this case the court stated that "I've 
answered this question. Now, actually, the parties, again, have 
stipulated to this question." In both cases, the parties 
stipulated to avoid having to call a witness to testify to the 
element.  
¶25 Moreover, the jury had sufficient evidence before it 
to render its decision on the first element. It was given the 
CHIPS order showing that Junior had been adjudged in need of 
protection or services, indicating that he had been placed 
outside Andrea's home for a cumulative period of six months or 
longer pursuant to the order, and containing the termination of 
parental rights notice required by law. The record indicates 
that Andrea admitted to the element. Further, the social worker 
and Andrea testified regarding the order during trial. 
¶26 As in Benoit, we determine that the jury decided the 
element that was the subject of the stipulation. Because the 
jury decided the element, this is not a case in which a 
stipulation constitutes a withdrawal of a demand for a jury 
trial. 
 
 
No. 
2007AP8   
 
11 
 
IV 
¶27 We turn next to Andrea's argument that the circuit 
court erred in failing to personally engage her in a colloquy to 
determine that a withdrawal of her demand for a jury trial on an 
element was knowing and voluntary. Her initial argument relies 
on the rationale and holding of N.E. v. Wisconsin Dept. of 
Health & Social Servs., 122 Wis. 2d 198, 361 N.W.2d 693 (1985). 
That case also is the focus of the certified question presented 
by the court of appeals. The certified question is as follows:  
Does the rationale and holding of N.E. v. DHSS, a 
juvenile case arising out of Wis. Stat. ch. 48 (2003-
04), govern a termination of parental rights (TPR) 
case such that a parent must personally withdraw his 
or her prior demand for a jury trial? 
(Internal citation omitted.)  
 
¶28 Here, we determine that the stipulation does not 
constitute a withdrawal of the demand for a jury trial. Because 
the facts of the case do not present the certified question, we 
decline to address this broad question posed by the court of 
appeals. In order to provide guidance to courts and litigants, 
however, we do address the effect of N.E., along with Andrea's 
other arguments, on the more narrow circumstances presented in 
this case. For the purposes of this section, we presume that the 
stipulation constituted a withdrawal of the demand for a jury 
trial on an element. 
¶29 The right to a jury trial in a termination case is 
statutory, not constitutional. Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶4. 
Under Wis. Stat. § 48.422(4), if a parent in a termination 
No. 
2007AP8   
 
12 
 
proceeding requests a jury trial prior to the end of the initial 
hearing, that request "shall be granted." In a fact-finding 
hearing in a termination proceeding, the parent may exercise the 
"right to a jury trial by demanding a jury trial at any time 
before or during the plea hearing." Wis. Stat. § 48.31(2); see 
§ 48.424(2) (intro.) (providing § 48.31 jury trial right for 
termination proceedings). 
¶30 Chapter 
48 
does 
not 
provide 
a 
procedure 
for 
withdrawing a demand for a jury trial or stipulating to an 
element of the ground for termination in a TPR case, and this 
court has not addressed the procedures for waiving the right to 
a jury trial by stipulation in a termination proceeding. Andrea 
maintains, however, that other cases concerning statutory rights 
to a jury trial do provide such a procedure. She argues that 
under N.E. and S.B. v. Racine County, 138 Wis. 2d 409, 406 
N.W.2d 408 (1987), a valid withdrawal of a demand for a jury 
trial requires that the court address the party personally in a 
colloquy to determine that the withdrawal is knowing and 
voluntary. Thus, she contends that the stipulation in this case 
is an invalid withdrawal of the demand for a jury trial on an 
element.  
¶31 In N.E., a juvenile demanded a jury trial in a hearing 
to determine his delinquency, pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 48.30(2) 
and 48.31(1)(1983-84).5 122 Wis. 2d at 200. Later, N.E.'s counsel 
                                                 
5 The statutes were subsequently amended such that juveniles 
are not entitled to demand a jury trial in a delinquency 
hearing. See Wis. Stat. § 938.31(2); State v. Hezzie R., 219 
Wis. 2d 848, 858, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998). 
No. 
2007AP8   
 
13 
 
appeared without N.E. to withdraw the jury demand and set the 
case for trial to the court. Id. at 201.  
¶32 We determined that once the juvenile has demanded the 
right to a jury trial, that right must be withdrawn personally, 
knowingly, and voluntarily.  
[W]e hold, in the interest of judicial administration, 
that once a juvenile invokes his or her statutory 
right to a jury trial, this right must be withdrawn 
personally by the juvenile, either in writing or on 
the record in open court. The court must then 
determine that the juvenile's withdrawal was knowing 
and voluntary.  
Id. at 201-02.  
¶33 In S.B. we addressed withdrawal of a demand for a jury 
trial in a chapter 51 involuntary civil commitment case. After 
S.B. demanded a jury trial pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11(a), 
her attorney withdrew the demand without S.B.'s knowledge or 
consent. S.B., 138 Wis. 2d at 411. As in the present case, the 
statute was silent as to the requirements for withdrawing a 
demand for a jury trial. However, we determined that because the 
statute required the individual be involved with the decision to 
demand a jury trial, it also required that the individual be 
involved with the decision to withdraw the demand.  
[I]t seems obvious that the demand for a jury trial 
and the withdrawal of that demand are really one and 
the same decision, namely, whether to have a jury hear 
the case. When the statute requires the individual to 
be personally involved in making a demand for a jury, 
it follows that the individual must be personally 
involved in withdrawing a demand. 
Id. at 414. 
No. 
2007AP8   
 
14 
 
¶34 Although N.E. and S.B. concern withdrawal of the 
demand for a jury trial, they are distinguishable from the facts 
presented here. In each of those cases, a party's attorney 
withdrew a prior demand for a jury trial while the defendant was 
not present. In N.E., the attorney did not consult with the 
juvenile before withdrawing the demand, and in S.B., the 
attorney withdrew the demand without S.B.'s knowledge or 
consent. Here, however, the stipulation between the parties took 
place in Andrea's presence. Moreover, Andrea's attorney asked 
her in open court whether she understood the issue and whether 
she was willing to stipulate that Junior was adjudged in need of 
protection or services and that he had been placed out of her 
home for six months or more. Andrea answered yes.  
¶35 A second important difference between the present case 
and N.E. and S.B. is that this case does not involve a complete 
withdrawal of the demand for a jury trial. The parties agreed to 
stipulate to one element of the ground for termination, but the 
demand for a jury trial on the other three elements was 
unaffected. Importantly, Andrea's focus in the case was not on 
the first element. Her attorney admitted that the first element 
was "not seriously in dispute." Rather, he explained that the 
focus was on the fourth element, that is, whether there was a 
substantial likelihood that Andrea would not meet the conditions 
for return within a year. In contrast, N.E. and S.B. involved 
the withdrawal of the demand for a jury trial on all elements, 
rather than a stipulation regarding a single element that was 
not in dispute. 
No. 
2007AP8   
 
15 
 
¶36 Door County DHFS v. Scott S., 230 Wis. 2d 460, 602 
N.W.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1999), provides further guidance on this 
point. As in the present case, the circuit court terminated 
Scott's parental rights on the ground that his daughter was in 
continuing 
need 
of 
protection 
or 
services 
pursuant 
to 
§ 48.415(2). The circuit court directed the verdict on the 
question of whether the child had been adjudged to be in need of 
protection or services and placed outside the home pursuant to 
one or more court orders. Id. at 464. The court of appeals 
determined that the circuit court had not erred in directing the 
verdict. It reasoned that the verdict was directed "as to only 
one undisputed element" and that because Scott had ample 
opportunity to introduce evidence, the directed verdict was 
appropriate. Id. at 467. 
¶37 The present case does not involve a directed verdict 
on the first element. However, the reasoning from Scott S. 
applies. Andrea has not disputed the first element and no 
evidence has been introduced controverting that element. Rather, 
there was sufficient evidence introduced supporting the first 
element. 
The 
record 
indicates 
that 
Andrea 
responded 
affirmatively to a request for admission that Junior had been 
"placed out of his home for more than 6 months, pursuant to one 
or more court orders containing the TPR warnings." The social 
worker in the case testified that Junior had been out of 
Andrea's home pursuant to CHIPS orders for a cumulative total of 
24 months. Andrea testified that there was a CHIPS order entered 
regarding Junior about two years prior. The order was admitted 
No. 
2007AP8   
 
16 
 
as an exhibit and given to the jury to consider in its 
deliberations. 
¶38 Further, the element to which the parties stipulated 
was an uncontested element, based on an official document which 
could have been proven by the testimony of a clerk of court. 
Indeed, the reason the parties entered the stipulation was to 
avoid having the clerk of court testify. In this respect, the 
case is similar to this court's decision in Steven V., 271 
Wis. 2d 1. 
¶39 In Steven V., the circuit court granted a guardian ad 
litem's motion for summary judgment in the unfitness phase of a 
termination of parental rights case based on the undisputed fact 
that Kelly H. had been denied placement and visitation by a 
court order that had been in place, unmodified, for more than 
two years. Id., ¶2. We determined that partial summary judgment 
was appropriate, and did not violate the parent's statutory 
right to a jury trial.  
¶40 The 
basis 
for 
our 
determination 
was 
that 
some 
statutory grounds for unfitness are "paper grounds," which is to 
say 
they 
are 
expressly 
provable 
by 
official 
documentary 
evidence, such as court orders or judgments of conviction. Id., 
¶37. We explained that the risk of error in applying partial 
summary judgment on such grounds is extremely low when the 
grounds are uncontested. Id., ¶42.  
¶41 This case does not involve partial summary judgment on 
a paper ground. Nonetheless, the reasoning of Steven V. is 
applicable.  The element of the ground to which the parties 
No. 
2007AP8   
 
17 
 
stipulated is a paper element. It is expressly provable by the 
official 
documentary 
evidence 
of 
a 
copy 
of 
the 
court 
dispositional order adjudging Junior to be in need of protection 
or services. Moreover, the element is uncontested. Thus, similar 
to Steven V., the risk of error in stipulating to the element in 
this case is extremely low. Id.6 
¶42 In addition to her argument based on N.E. and S.B., 
Andrea argues that criminal cases involving stipulations support 
the conclusion that a circuit court must personally engage a 
parent in a colloquy to ensure that a stipulation to an element 
of the ground for termination is knowing and voluntary. Her 
argument is based on the court of appeals decisions in State v. 
Villareal, 153 Wis. 2d 323, 450 N.W.2d 519 (Ct. App. 1989), and 
State v. Hauk, 2002 WI App 226, ¶4, 257 Wis. 2d 579, 652 N.W.2d 
393. 
¶43 The defendant in State v. Villareal was charged with 
first-degree murder by use of a dangerous weapon. 153 Wis. 2d at 
                                                 
6 The concurrence maintains that we are "extending the 
[Steven V.] decision by giving circuit judges the authority to 
decide 'paper' elements in cases that do go to a jury, 
irrespective of whether there is a stipulation by or on behalf 
of the parent." Concurrence, ¶64 (emphasis in original). As we 
make clear in the text, the issue in the case is whether the 
circuit court is required to engage in a personal colloquy to 
ascertain whether a stipulation withdrawing the demand for jury 
trial is knowing and voluntary——not whether a circuit court may 
decide 
issues 
even 
where 
there 
is 
no 
stipulation. 
The 
stipulation, and the fact that it occurred in open court, are 
important to our holding. The concurrence's claim that the case 
allows circuit courts to decide paper elements that go to a jury 
independent of a stipulation is thus incorrect. 
No. 
2007AP8   
 
18 
 
325. At the jury instruction conference, her attorney agreed 
that there was no dispute that the defendant had used a 
dangerous weapon and stipulated that the question regarding the 
dangerous weapon element would not be submitted to the jury. Id. 
The court of appeals determined that use of a dangerous weapon 
was an element of the charged offense, that the defendant had 
the constitutional right to have the jury decide each element, 
and that waiver of that right by stipulation must be personal, 
knowing, and voluntary. Id. at 326.  
¶44 The defendant in Hauk solicited murder while free on 
bond. 257 Wis. 2d 579, ¶4. The State charged her with bail 
jumping on the ground that she intentionally did not comply with 
the requirement of her bond not to commit crimes or engage in 
criminal activity. Id., ¶7. Hauk's attorney agreed to stipulate 
to some of the elements of bail jumping. Id., ¶8. The circuit 
court asked Hauk if she understood the stipulation, to which she 
responded "[y]es, your honor." Id., ¶35. As a result of the 
stipulation, the jury did not decide whether Hauk had been 
charged previously with a felony or misdemeanor, whether she had 
been released from custody on bond, or whether she had 
intentionally failed to comply with terms of the bond. Id., ¶31. 
Rather, the jury determined only that Hauk had committed the 
crime of solicitation. Id. 
¶45 Citing Villareal, the court of appeals determined that 
the right to a jury trial in a criminal case "includes the right 
to have a jury determine each element of the crime." Id., ¶32 
(emphasis in original). Because the jury did not determine three 
No. 
2007AP8   
 
19 
 
elements of the crime of bail jumping, and because Hauk's 
statement to the court did not indicate her willingness to waive 
a jury trial on those elements, the court of appeals determined 
that she did not waive her right to a jury trial. Id., ¶36. 
¶46 We are not persuaded that Villareal and Hauk support 
the conclusion that the circuit court erred in failing to 
personally engage Andrea in a colloquy to determine whether the 
withdrawal was knowing and voluntary. Both are distinguished 
from the facts presented here. To begin, the stipulation in the 
present case concerned a paper element. This contrasts with 
Villareal and Hauk, where the stipulations concerned whether a 
weapon 
was 
dangerous 
and 
whether 
criminal 
conduct 
was 
intentional. Further, as discussed above, there was ample 
evidence concerning the element introduced in the present case. 
There is no indication in Villareal and Hauk that there was 
evidence introduced regarding the stipulated elements. 
¶47 We also note that TPR proceedings are civil in nature, 
not criminal. M.W. v. Monroe County Dep't of Human Servs., 116 
Wis. 2d 432, 442, 342 N.W.2d 410 (1984). Thus, the right to a 
jury 
trial 
in 
a 
TPR 
case 
is 
statutory 
rather 
than 
constitutional. Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶4. In Steven V. we 
stated that the statutory right to a jury trial is not the 
equivalent of the right to a jury trial in criminal cases. Id., 
¶39 n. 5. 
¶48 Finally, even in criminal cases, removing an element 
from the jury's consideration may be subject to harmless error 
analysis. In State v. Harvey, for example, the defendant was 
No. 
2007AP8   
 
20 
 
charged with the crime of possession of cocaine with intent to 
deliver with a penalty enhancer for committing the crime within 
1000 feet of a city park. 2002 WI 93, ¶2, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 
N.W.2d 189. The circuit court took judicial notice that the park 
was a city park, an element of the enhancer, and instructed the 
jury to accept that fact as true. Id., ¶3.  
¶49 Because the defendant had the right to have each 
element decided by a jury, we determined that the instruction 
was constitutional error. Id., ¶29. Following the U.S. Supreme 
Court's decision in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), 
we concluded that the error was subject to the harmless error 
rule. Id., ¶45. Applying the rule, we reasoned that the error 
was harmless on the ground that the element of the enhancer was 
"undisputed and indisputable." Id., ¶48. 
¶50 Thus, even in criminal cases, removing an element from 
jury consideration will not alone require a new trial where the 
element is undisputed and indisputable, as is the case here. We 
are therefore not persuaded that criminal cases such as 
Villareal and Hauk support Andrea's contention that the circuit 
court's failure to personally engage her in a colloquy to ensure 
that her withdrawal was knowing and voluntary is an error 
warranting a new TPR proceeding.  
¶51 We do not decide, however, the effect of Villareal and 
Hauk beyond the facts presented here. Thus, we do not address 
how courts should use criminal cases involving stipulations to 
shape decisions concerning stipulations in TPR proceedings.  
No. 
2007AP8   
 
21 
 
¶52 Likewise, we do not address how future cases with 
different facts will deal with the broader due process arguments 
that Andrea advances. She argues that due process requires that 
a circuit court personally engage a parent in a colloquy to 
determine whether a stipulation to an element of the ground for 
termination is knowing and voluntary. Her argument is not fully 
developed, but it seems to be that once a jury trial has been 
demanded, it is fundamentally unfair to remove an element from 
jury consideration by stipulation absent such a colloquy and 
therefore contrary to due process. 
¶53 In Steven V. we determined that a jury trial in TPR 
cases is not required by due process and that summary judgment 
in TPR cases is compatible with due process. 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶44. 
As noted, that case involved a partial summary judgment in which 
a parent did not receive a jury determination on the ground for 
termination in a TPR case. This case, however, is unlike Steven 
V. in that the jury actually made a determination on each 
element of the ground for termination in this case. In other 
words, Andrea received the process due in a TPR case.  
¶54 Thus, neither cases involving statutory rights to a 
jury trial, criminal cases involving stipulations, nor due 
process support Andrea's argument that the circuit court erred 
in failing to personally engage her in a colloquy to determine 
that the withdrawal was knowing and voluntary. Rather, we 
determine that the circuit court did not err in failing to 
engage in a personal colloquy. Andrea agreed to the stipulation 
in open court. It was to a single, undisputed, paper element 
No. 
2007AP8   
 
22 
 
where another element was the focus of the controversy at issue, 
and there was ample uncontroverted evidence to support the 
stipulated element.  
¶55 Nonetheless, while we do not require it, we urge that 
circuit courts in TPR proceedings consider personally engaging 
the parent in a colloquy explaining that a stipulation to an 
element withdraws that element from the jury's consideration and 
determining that the withdrawal of that element from the jury is 
knowing and voluntary. Although no personal colloquy is required 
here because Andrea received a jury trial, we have not addressed 
whether it would be required in other contexts.  
¶56 Termination of parental rights proceedings are "among 
the most severe forms of state action" that involve the 
"'awesome authority of the State to destroy permanently all 
legal recognition.'"  Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, 
¶20, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768 (quoting M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 
519 U.S. 102, 127-28 (1996). We have previously determined that 
such 
proceedings may "require heightened legal safeguards 
against erroneous decisions." Oneida County Dep't of Soc. Servs. 
v. Nicole W., 2007 WI 30, ¶32, 299 Wis. 2d 637, 728 N.W.2d 652  
(quoting Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶21)).  
V 
¶57 In sum, we determine that Andrea received a jury trial 
on the element regardless of the stipulation. The stipulation in 
this case does not constitute a withdrawal of the demand for a 
jury trial on an element. Despite the fact that the parties 
agreed to enter a stipulation regarding the first element of the 
No. 
2007AP8   
 
23 
 
ground for termination, the jury was presented with ample 
evidence of the element, was instructed on the element, and 
answered a verdict question on that element. 
¶58 We further determine that there would be no error here 
even if the circuit court rather than the jury had decided the 
first element. Under the circumstances of this case, the circuit 
court was not required to engage in a personal colloquy in order 
to ascertain that a withdrawal was knowing and voluntary.  
Andrea agreed to the stipulation in open court. The stipulation 
addressed a single, undisputed, paper element where another 
element was the focus of the controversy at issue. Additionally, 
there 
was 
ample 
uncontroverted 
evidence 
to 
support 
the 
stipulated element. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the 
circuit court terminating the parental rights. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2007AP8.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
¶59 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  The Walworth 
County Department of Health and Human Services (County) filed a 
petition under Wis. Stat. § 48.42(1) to terminate the parental 
rights of Andrea L.O. (Andrea). 
¶60 The County alleged that Andrea was an unfit parent 
because her son was in continuing need of protection or 
services.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2).   
¶61 Andrea demanded a jury trial;1 and she received a jury 
trial that lasted four days.2  On August 3, 2006, a 12-person 
jury found that the County had established the statutory ground 
alleged in the termination of parental rights (TPR) petition.   
¶62 In this appeal, Andrea contends that she is entitled 
to a new trial.  She claims that a stipulation signed by her 
attorney, conceding one of the four elements of the ground that 
the County was required to prove, deprived her of a jury 
determination on that element, inasmuch as the court accepted 
the stipulation without engaging in a probing colloquy to 
determine whether Andrea personally, knowingly, and voluntarily 
waived her right to a jury trial on that element. 
¶63 I concur in the majority's conclusion that the 
termination of Andrea's parental rights should be affirmed.  I 
disagree, however, with some of the majority's analysis.  There 
is a sound factual basis to support the conclusion that Andrea 
                                                 
1 See Wis. Stat. § 48.31(2). 
2 Andrea's jury trial included a petition against the father 
of the child. 
No.  2007AP8.dtp 
 
2 
 
was accorded her full right to a jury trial.  However the 
majority does not rest its decision solely on the facts.  It 
relies on principles in Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, 271 
Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856, a case that explicitly approves the 
use of summary judgments in terminations of parental rights. 
¶64 I am unable to reconcile the court's handwringing 
about whether a parent, represented by counsel, can agree to 
give up her right to have a jury determine an element that the 
County must prove at trial when the same court has vested 
circuit judges with the power to enter summary judgment against 
the parent in a termination case, thereby wiping out the 
parent's jury right entirely.  In the majority's view, it makes 
no difference that the parent has demanded her right of jury 
trial and objected strenuously to summary judgment.  In 
addition, I am disturbed that the court is extending the Kelley 
H. decision by giving circuit judges the authority to decide 
"paper" elements in cases that do go to a jury, irrespective of 
whether there is a stipulation by or on behalf of the parent.  
Majority op., ¶¶4, 41, 58.   
¶65 My views on a parent's right to a jury trial in 
termination of parental rights cases were initially expressed in 
my Kelley H. dissent.  Kelley H., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶63-100 
(Prosser, J., dissenting).   
¶66 The majority in Kelley H. declared that any right to 
trial by jury in the fact-finding phase of a termination case is 
statutory, not constitutional.  Id., ¶¶41, 44.  That conclusion 
is reasserted here.  Majority op., ¶29.  Yet there has never 
No.  2007AP8.dtp 
 
3 
 
been a serious analysis whether Article I, Section 5 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution affords this right in termination cases.  
Moreover, the way the majority analyzes the law, it would appear 
to make no difference whether the right is constitutional or 
statutory because the summary judgment provisions of Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08 are applied regularly in civil cases in which the right 
of trial by jury under the state constitution is beyond dispute. 
¶67 Scholarship on this subject is urgently needed,3 
because Kelley H. and this case provide a chilling picture of 
future trends. 
A. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 802.08(1) provides that "A party 
may . . . move for summary judgment on any claim . . . which is 
asserted by . . . the party."  (Emphasis added.) 
B. 
"The jury trial right . . . is entirely statutory, not 
mandated by constitutional due process, and is therefore 
generally subject to the provisions of the civil procedure code, 
including the summary judgment statute, Wis. Stat. § 802.08, 
unless the TPR statutes provide otherwise.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.01(2).  The TPR statutes do not provide otherwise, either 
explicitly or implicitly."  Kelley H., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶4.   
C. 
The Kelley H. majority held that  
partial summary judgment in the unfitness phase of a 
TPR case is available where the requirements of the 
summary judgment statute and the applicable legal 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is 
Unconstitutional, 93 Va. L. Rev. 139 (2007) (citing numerous 
recent law review articles); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush 
to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," 
and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial 
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 982, 1074-1132 (2003).  
No.  2007AP8.dtp 
 
4 
 
standards in Wis. Stat. §§ 48.415 and 48.31 have been 
met. . . .   
Accordingly, partial summary judgment may be 
granted in the unfitness phase of a TPR case where the 
moving party establishes that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact regarding the asserted 
grounds for unfitness.   
Id., ¶¶5-6. 
D. 
The Kelley H. majority gave examples: 
Some statutory grounds for unfitness . . . are 
expressly provable by official documentary evidence, 
such as court orders or judgments of conviction.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(1m) (relinquishment, provable by 
court order); Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4) (continuing 
denial of periods of physical placement or visitation, 
provable by court order); Wis. Stat. § 48.415(8) 
(homicide 
or 
solicitation to commit homicide of 
parent, provable by judgment of conviction); Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(9) (parenthood as a result of sexual 
assault, provable by judgment of conviction); Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(9m) (commission of serious felony 
against one of the person's children, provable by 
judgment of conviction); Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10) 
(prior involuntary termination of parental rights to 
another child, provable by court order).   
Kelley H., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶37. 
E. 
"[I]n some cases, child abuse under § 48.415(5) and 
incestuous parenthood under § 48.415(7) may also be proved by 
documentary evidence."  Kelley H., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶89 (Prosser, 
J., dissenting). 
F. 
The 
Kelley 
H. 
court 
overruled 
Walworth 
County 
Department of Human Services v. Elizabeth W., 189 Wis. 2d 432, 
525 N.W.2d 384 (Ct. App. 1994), a case in which the circuit 
court entered summary judgment under abandonment, Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(1), and continuing need of protection or services, Wis. 
No.  2007AP8.dtp 
 
5 
 
Stat. § 48.415(2).  The latter was the very ground at issue in 
this case. 
G. 
The majority now gives the circuit court authority to 
decide at least one element of § 48.415(2) without a jury. 
H. 
There are apparently no defenses to certain statutory 
grounds of unfitness.  Kelley H., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶25; id., ¶56 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
I. 
Consequently, we see evidence of summary judgments or 
other 
judicial 
fact-finding 
in 
place 
of 
requested 
jury 
determinations in at least 10 of the 12 grounds for termination 
of parental rights. 
¶68 This court has not produced evidence that these 
developments were intended by the Wisconsin Legislature.  The 
court has uncovered several constitutional problems with the 
legislature's TPR statutes, but I attribute some of these 
problems to this court's repeated refusal to apply the statutes.  
Accordingly, I concur. 
 
 
 
No.  2007AP8.dtp 
 
 
 
1