Title: CHARLES L STOZICKI V ALLIED PAPER INC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 117242
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: June 12, 2001

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 12, 2001  
CHARLES L. STOZICKI,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 117242  
ALLIED PAPER COMPANY, INC, and 
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
PER CURIAM  
The issue in this case concerns the relationship between  
two provisions of the Worker’s Compensation Disability Act,  
§ 354,1 which permits coordination of benefits with certain  
other payments, and the “age 65 reduction” provision of  
§ 357.2  Relying on the Court of Appeals decision in Saraski  
v Dexter Davison Kosher Meat & Poultry, 206 Mich App 347; 520  
NW2d 
383 
(1994), the 
Worker’s 
Compensation 
Appellate  
1 MCL 418.354.  
2 MCL 418.357.  
 
 
Commission decided that once having reduced benefits under  
§ 357, an employer cannot then switch to coordination of  
benefits under § 354. We conclude that Saraski misinterpreted  
the controlling statutory language, and reverse.  
I  
The plaintiff worked for Allied Paper from 1953 to 1988.  
On January 15, 1988, he suffered a work-related injury and  
sought worker’s compensation benefits.  The parties entered  
into a voluntary payment agreement, and the employer has paid  
benefits in varying amounts since then.  The plaintiff reached  
age sixty-five on July 18, 1995, and began receiving social  
security old age benefits and an employer-provided pension.  
The employer did not immediately make any changes in the  
benefits being paid.  However, on February 18, 1997, it began  
reducing the plaintiff’s benefits by five percent under § 357,  
and did so until March 18, 1997.  At that time it stopped the  
§ 357 reduction and began coordinating plaintiff’s benefits  
with the social security and pension payments under § 354.  
The 
parties 
disagreed 
over 
the 
appropriate 
benefit 
amount  
and submitted the dispute for decision by a magistrate.  He  
concluded, among other things, that pursuant to Saraski, the  
employer was prohibited from utilizing the § 354 reduction  
because it had already taken the age sixty-five reductions for  
a time.  
The employer appealed to the WCAC, arguing that Saraski  
was wrongly decided and, in any event, that the case was  
2  
 
distinguishable. The WCAC affirmed on the basis of Saraski.  
The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal, and the  
employer has filed an application for leave to appeal to this  
Court.  
II  
Subsection 354(1) of the WDCA provides for coordination  
of 
worker’s 
compensation 
benefits 
with 
certain 
other 
payments.  
It provides, in part:  
Except as otherwise provided in this section, 
the employer’s obligation to pay or cause to be 
paid weekly benefits other than specific loss 
benefits under section 361(2) and (3) shall be 
reduced by these amounts:  
(a)  Fifty percent of the amount of the old­
age insurance benefits received or being received 
under the social security act.  
* * *  
(d)  The after-tax amount of the pension or 
retirement payments received or being received 
pursuant to a plan or program established or 
maintained by the same employer from whom benefits 
under section 351, 361, or 835 are received, if the 
employee did not contribute directly to the pension 
or retirement plan or program.[3]  
The other relevant provision is § 357, which contains the  
age sixty-five reduction:  
(1) When an employee who is receiving weekly 
payments or is entitled to weekly payments reaches 
or has reached or passed the age of 65, the weekly  
3 
 Other subsections provide for coordination with  
payments under a self-insurance plan, a wage-continuation 
plan, or a disability insurance policy provided by the 
employer.  Where the employee has contributed to the plan,  
program, 
or 
policy, 
the 
amount 
of 
coordination 
is  
proportionately adjusted.  
3  
 
  
payments for each year following his or her sixty­
fifth birthday, shall be reduced by 5% of the 
weekly payment paid or payable at age 65, but not 
to less than 50% of the weekly benefit paid or 
payable at age 65, so that on his or her  
seventy-fifth birthday the weekly payments shall 
have been reduced by 50%; after which there shall 
not be a further reduction for the duration of the  
employee’s life.  Weekly payments shall not be  
reduced below the minimum weekly benefit as  
provided in this act.  
The critical provision for the purpose of this appeal is  
the language of subsection (2):  
(2) 
Subsection (1) shall not apply to a  
person 65 years of age or over otherwise eligible 
and receiving weekly payments who is not eligible 
for benefits under the social security act, 42 
U.S.C. 301 to 1397f, or to a person whose payments  
under this act are coordinated under section 354.  
[Emphasis added.]  
The Court of Appeals construed that language in Saraski.  
Plaintiff Saraski was injured at work, and the employer began  
paying general disability benefits.  Because Saraski was  
sixty-five years of age, it took the reduction under § 357.  
Shortly after our decision in Franks v White Pine Cooper  
Division, 422 Mich 636; 375 NW2d 715 (1985),4 the employer  
restored Saraski to his weekly rate before the § 357  
reductions and began coordinating benefits with social  
security payments under § 354.  Saraski then filed a petition  
alleging total and permanent disability under MCL 418.361(3).  
He was granted an open award of total and permanent disability  
benefits, which are not subject to coordination under § 354.  
4  
Franks 
has 
been 
superseded 
by 
statute.  
MCL 418.354(17).  
4  
 
Thus, 
the 
employer 
again began adjusting weekly benefits under  
the age reduction provision of § 357.  The magistrate held  
that the employer must abide by its initial election between  
coordination under § 354 or reduction under § 357. However,  
the WCAC reversed, concluding that the employer is not  
prohibited by the language of subsection 357(2) from serially  
switching between the benefit reductions of the two sections,  
but was merely prohibited from reducing benefits under both  
simultaneously.  
The 
Court 
of 
Appeals analyzed the employer election issue  
in Saraski, at 352, as follows:  
Previously, 
our 
Court 
considered 
the  
employer’s right to serially select between § 357 
and § 354 to reduce a disabled employee’s benefits. 
In Krueger v Simplicity Pattern Co,2 we held that, 
once an employer elected to coordinate benefits, it 
could not reverse the coordination when the  
employee’s pension benefits expired.  Krueger, 
p 217.  Our Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of  
Krueger on stipulation of the parties after  
plaintiff died.  It also vacated the judgment of 
our 
Court, 
without 
instruction 
or 
comment.  
Consequently, we again address the questions 
presented 
as 
matters 
ungoverned 
by 
existing 
precedent.  
We conclude, for the  reasons set out below, 
that the WCAC’s decision that Dexter Davison was  
not bound by its election to coordinate benefits 
under § 354 was not error. In doing so, we do not 
adopt the WCAC’s rule that serial selection between 
§ 354 and § 357 at the employer’s discretion, with 
whatever frequency the employer chooses, is always 
permissible. Rather, we adopt the general rule of  
Krueger that once an employer makes an initial  
election between § 354 and § 357, § 357(2)  
prohibits the employer from serially switching the  
selection.  However, as with all general rules, 
specific circumstances may require a different 
result in order to prevent injustice. We find such  
5  
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circumstances here.[5]  
2 
 196 Mich App 212; 492 NW2d 790 (1992), 
vacated 442 Mich 912 (1993).  [Emphasis added.]  
III  
This 
case 
involves 
a 
question 
of 
statutory  
interpretation, which we review de novo.  Brown v Michigan  
Health Care Corp, 463 Mich 368, 374; 617 NW2d 301 (2000);  
Sands Appliance Services, Inc v Wilson, 463 Mich 231, 238; 615  
NW2d 241 (2000).  The starting point for determining the  
Legislature’s intent is the language of the statute itself.  
In re MCI Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596  
NW2d 164 (1999).  Statutes should be interpreted consistently  
with their plain and unambiguous meanings. Northern Concrete  
Pipe, Inc v Sinacola Companies-Midwest, Inc, 461 Mich 316,  
320; 603 NW2d 257 (1999); Hatch v Grand Haven Charter Twp, 461  
Mich 457, 464; 606 NW2d 633 (2000).  
We believe the Saraski Court misconstrued subsection  
357(2). That section says that the age sixty-five reduction  
may not be taken where worker’s compensation payments “are  
coordinated under § 354.” The plain meaning of that statute  
is that an employer may not simultaneously take advantage of  
5 On the facts of the Saraski case, the Court found an 
exception allowing the employer to switch back to a § 357 
reduction. It based this conclusion on the injured worker’s 
having 
sought 
an 
altered disability status, which affected the 
employer’s ability to coordinate under § 354.  206 Mich App 
353-354.  
6  
 
 
 
 
coordination under § 354 and the age reduction under § 357.  
If the Legislature had meant to make an employer’s initial  
decision to use a particular benefit reduction provision  
irrevocable, it could have used language to that effect. As  
the Legislature did not create such a requirement, that  
limitation cannot be read into the WDCA  
Thus, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Saraski 
improperly 
interpreted 
the  
statute.
 Accordingly, the decision of the Worker’s  
Compensation Appellate Commission is reversed.  We remand the  
case to the commission for any further proceedings as  
necessary.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and  
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.  
7  
 
 
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
CHARLES L. STOZICKI,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 117242  
ALLIED PAPER COMPANY, INC. and 
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
KELLY, J. (concurring).  
I concur in the result reached in the per curiam opinion,  
but disagree with its unnecessary exercise of interpreting a  
statutory provision that does not govern the outcome of the  
case. In its haste to overturn the precedent of Saraski v  
Dexter Davison Kosher Meat & Poultry,1 the per curiam opinion  
purports to rely on the plain-meaning doctrine, but, instead,  
generates dictum.2  
1  206 Mich App 347; 520 NW2d 383 (1994).  
2  Black's Law Dictionary defines "dictum" as an opinion 
of a judge that does not embody the resolution or  
(continued...)  
 
In this case, defendant coordinated plaintiff's benefits  
under § 354 of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act,3  
after first using the over sixty-five reduction scheme  
provided by § 357.  Section 357(2), the subsection interpreted  
by today's opinion, provides:  
Subsection (1) shall not apply to a person 65 
years of age or over otherwise eligible and  
receiving weekly payments who is not eligible for 
benefits under the social security act, 42 USC 301 
to 1397f, or to a person whose payments under this  
act are coordinated under section 354. [Emphasis 
added.]  
Section 357(2) does not address employers who switch, as  
the defendant has done, from a § 357 reduction scheme to a  
coordination of benefits under § 354. The majority's  
discussion of it is unnecessary to the disposition of this  
case.  Hence, it is dictum, a mere expression of the author's  
opinion going beyond the facts of this case, not binding in  
subsequent cases as legal precedent.  
The "plain meaning" interpretation advanced by today's  
majority suggests that employers possess free reign to reduce  
their former employees' benefits by opting for whichever  
2 (...continued) 
determination of the specific case before the court. It is an 
expression in a court's opinion that goes beyond the facts 
before the court and therefore represents individual views of 
the author of the opinion and is not binding in subsequent 
cases as legal precedent.  
3  MCL 418.101 et seq.  
2  
 
statutory scheme saves them the most money at any given time.  
Disabled former employees can be anticipated to experience  
debt and financial planning difficulties due to the  
uncertainty created by today's majority decision. I question  
whether this embodies the intention of the Legislature when it  
enacted the WDCA.  
It is worth noting that today's opinion attempts to  
overturn a rule of law that has existed since 1994 without  
alteration by the Legislature. This Court recently decided  
that 
legislative 
acquiescence 
"is 
a 
highly 
disfavored 
doctrine  
of statutory construction . . . ."  Donajokowski v Alpena  
Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 261; 596 NW2d 574 (1999).  Although  
seven years of legislative silence may not signal agreement  
with Saraski, it should not go unnoticed that no statutory  
change has been made to § 357(2) since Saraski was decided.  
Regarding the appeal of Allied Paper Company, the issue  
presently before this Court, no rule or principle of law  
exists to preclude an employer from switching from § 357 to §  
354. Since that is all defendant did here, we need say nothing  
more to dispense with this case.  
3