Title: Sandlin v. CR. JUST. STANDARDS & TR. COM'N
Citation: 531 So. 2d 1344
Docket Number: 71104
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 13, 1988

531 So. 2d 1344 (1988)
Benjamin U. SANDLIN, Petitioner,
v.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS &amp; TRAINING COMMISSION, Respondent.
No. 71104.

Supreme Court of Florida.
October 13, 1988.
Elizabeth L. White and Wm. J. Sheppard of Sheppard and White, P.A., Jacksonville, for petitioner.
Joseph S. White, Asst. General Counsel, Florida Dept. of Law Enforcement, Tallahassee, for respondent.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Clark R. Jennings, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, amicus curiae.
McDONALD, Justice.
A district court of appeal has certified the following question as being of great public importance:
Sandlin v. Criminal Justice Standards &amp; Training Commission, 518 So. 2d 1292, 1297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. With the caveats that a pardoned felon must demonstrate rehabilitation and good moral character and fitness to the commission's satisfaction and that the commission may decline to certify an applicant because of a character flaw as evidenced by the prior felony conviction, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and quash Sandlin.
In the early 1960s, and while still a very young man, Sandlin was convicted of robbery, escape, and assault. After being paroled in 1965, he received a full pardon from the governor in 1968. Sandlin is employed by the Jacksonville sheriff's office and, since 1971, has been a circuit court bailiff. In 1985 the sheriff's office asked the commission to certify Sandlin as a police officer. To support this request Sandlin submitted numerous letters from judges and attorneys averring his fitness to be a law enforcement officer. In discussing Sandlin's case various members of the commission noted Sandlin's rehabilitation and his moral and general fitness and qualifications. Based on its interpretation of section 943.13, Florida Statutes (1985), and subsection 112.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), however, the commission refused the certification. The district court affirmed and certified the question set out above, stating that
518 So. 2d  at 1297.
Section 943.13 provides that any law enforcement officer shall:
Moreover, subsection 112.011(1)(b) provides:
Sandlin argues that these statutes are an unconstitutional legislative incursion into the executive's power over pardons and that they should either be struck down or else be interpreted so that an unconstitutional result does not occur.
A pardon is an act of grace, and the pardoning power is a function exclusive to the executive, derived from the state constitution. Art. IV, § 8(a), Fla. Const.; Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 312 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878, 98 S. Ct. 232, 54 L. Ed. 2d 159 (1977); In re Advisory Opinion of the Governor, 334 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1976); Singleton v. State, 38 Fla. 297, 21 So. 21 (1896). A full pardon removes all disabilities resulting from a crime. In re *1346 Florida Board of Bar Examiners, 183 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1966); Page v. Watson, 140 Fla. 536, 192 So. 205 (1938); Singleton v. State, Neither the legislature nor the judiciary may infringe upon the executive's authority to grant pardons. E.g., In re Advisory Opinion (the administrative procedures act is not applicable to clemency proceedings); Fields v. State, 85 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1956) (fully and unconditionally pardoned felony conviction cannot be used as a prior conviction under the habitual offender statute); Singleton (legislature does not have power to grant a pardon). Persons seeking to practice certain professions or employments, however, can be required to demonstrate their good moral character, even though they may have been fully pardoned for previous crimes. E.g., Page v. Watson; In re Bar Examiners; Lee v. Department of Health &amp; Rehabilitative Services, 518 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). See also Calhoun v. Department of Health &amp; Rehabilitative Services, 500 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
Subsection 943.13(7) provides, as one of the minimum requirements for becoming a law enforcement officer, that an applicant must have a "good moral character as determined by a background investigation." The prohibition against certifying pardoned felons (subsection 943.13(4)) has been applied absolutely, creating a nonrebuttable presumption that pardoned felons are not of good character. Sandlin. See also 1970 Op.Att'y Gen.Fla. 070-157 (Oct. 30, 1970). This legislative disqualification, as interpreted by the commission and the district court, diminishes the effect of a pardon and imposes a legal disability. Such literal reading of subsection 943.13(4) creates a head-on confrontation between the legislature's power to enact laws to protect the public and the executive's power to pardon convicted felons. Contrary to the district court, we do not find that this statute should be held to override the executive's pardon power.
The legislature will be presumed to have intended a constitutional result. Marsh v. Garwood, 65 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1953). Moreover, courts will avoid declaring a statute unconstitutional if such statute can be fairly construed in a constitutional manner. Industrial Fire &amp; Casualty Insurance Co. v. Kwechin, 447 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 1983). Such a construction is possible in this case.
We thus approach the question of whether or not section 943.13 and the concept of pardons can coexist. We believe they can, but in doing so we must select one of contrary views on the effect of a pardon on an eligibility statute for employment.
Annotation, Eligibility for Public Office After Pardon, 58 A.L.R.3d 1191, 1195 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
In Page v. Watson this Court adopted the middle ground, i.e., that a pardon removes punishment, but not moral guilt. 140 Fla. at 543-49, 192 So.  at 208-10. Massachusetts also adopted this view in Commissioner of Metropolitan District *1347 Commission v. Director of Civil Service, 348 Mass. 184, 203 N.E.2d 95 (1964), which is factually similar to this case. The Massachusetts court stated:
Id. at 196, 203 N.E.2d  at 103. See also Slater v. Olson, 230 Iowa 1005, 299 N.W. 879 (1941). The court continued and held that, although the applicant had ceased to be ineligible under the statute, it was open, and remained open, for the commission to refuse to appoint him as a police officer because of the serious character of the criminal conduct underlying his conviction. We approve this reasoning and find that it should be applied in Florida. It is imperative that law enforcement officers be of good character. Thus, it is entirely appropriate and necessary to review closely a pardoned felon's character.
Therefore, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and conclude, as did the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, that the commission has the broad discretion to certify Sandlin for appointment as a law enforcement officer, but may refuse to do so if it deems him to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or an otherwise unfit appointee. In determining whether to certify Sandlin the commission may take into account and rely upon the facts of Sandlin's pardoned convictions and may give weight to the general policy expressed in section 943.13. We direct the district court to instruct the commission to reconsider Sandlin's request for certification consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, BARKETT and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
KOGAN, J., concurs in result only.