Title: Howell v. Willamette Urology, P. C.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S055099
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: February 14, 2008

FILED: February 14, 2008
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
LAUNA HOWELL,
RODNEY HOWELL, and JACOB L. HOWELL,
Co-Personal Representatives for the Estate of Cody W. Howell,
Plaintiffs-Relators,
v.
WILLAMETTE UROLOGY, P.C.,
and DAVID ELMGREN, M.D.,
Defendants-Adverse Parties.
(CC 0701-01084; SC S055099)
En Banc
Original proceeding in mandamus.*
Argued and submitted January 3, 2008.
Kathryn H. Clarke, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for Plaintiffs-Relators. 
With her on the brief was Tina Stupasky, Eugene.
Lindsey H. Hughes, of Keating Jones Hughes, P.C., Portland, argued the cause and filed
the brief for Defendants-Adverse Parties.  With her on the brief was Peter O. Tuenge.
GILLETTE, J.
The alternative writ of mandamus is dismissed.
*On petition for a writ of mandamus from an order of Multnomah County Circuit
Court, Jean Kerr Maurer, Judge.
GILLETTE, J.
This mandamus proceeding arises out of a dispute over the proper venue for
a wrongful death action.  Venue for a wrongful death action is governed by ORS 14.080,
which provides, in part:
"(1) All other actions [including actions for wrongful death] shall be
commenced in the county in which the defendants, or one of them, reside at
the commencement of the action or in the county where the cause of
action (1) arose.  A party resident of more than one county shall be
deemed a resident of each such county.  If none of the defendants reside in
this state the action may be commenced in any county.
"(2) For purposes of this section, a corporation incorporated under
the laws of this state, a limited partnership or a foreign corporation
authorized to do business in this state shall be deemed to be a resident of
any county where the corporation or limited partnership conducts regular,
sustained business activity or has an office for the transaction of business * * *."
The parties' dispute in the case arises because the negligence that allegedly
caused decedent's death occurred in one county, but decedent died in another county.  The
resolution of that dispute lies in the proper interpretation of the phrase, "in the county
where the cause of action arose," in section (1) of ORS 14.080.  The trial court concluded
that the relevant county for purposes of that phrase was the county where the negligence
that caused decedent's death allegedly occurred.  As we shall explain, we also conclude
that the "county where the cause of action [for wrongful death] arose" is the county in
which the negligence that caused the wrongful death occurred.  Accordingly, we dismiss
the alternative writ of mandamus issued in this case.
There is no disagreement between the parties as to the pertinent facts.  The
parties agree that the alleged negligence that caused the death of the decedent occurred in
Marion County.  The parties also agree that the defendants to the wrongful death action, a
physician and the professional corporation that employed him, reside only in Marion
County.  Finally, the parties agree that the decedent died in Multnomah County.  
Plaintiffs initiated their claim by filing their cause of action in Multnomah
County.  Defendants responded by moving for a change of venue to Marion County on
two grounds: (1) Marion County, not Multnomah County, is the proper venue, and (2)
Marion County is a more convenient county in which to try the case than is Multnomah
County.  See ORS 14.110(1)(a) (allowing trial court to change venue when the action has
not been commenced in proper county); ORS 14.110(1)(c) (allowing trial court to change
venue when another county would be more convenient place for trial for witnesses and
the parties).  The trial court granted the motion on the former ground (proper venue) and
denied it on the latter ground (convenience).  Plaintiffs then petitioned this court for an
alternative writ of mandamus ordering the trial court either to vacate its order changing
venue to Marion County or to show cause for not doing so.  See Mack Trucks, Inc. v.
Taylor, 227 Or 376, 382, 362 P2d  364 (1961) (mandamus appropriate remedy for venue
issues).  This court allowed the petition and issued the alternative writ of mandamus; the
trial court declined to change its ruling.  The matter is now before us for decision.
Because both defendants reside in Marion County, the only way that venue
properly can be placed in Multnomah County under ORS 14.080(1) is if plaintiffs' "cause
of action arose" in Multnomah County.  ORS 30.020 defines the relevant cause of action,
wrongful death.  It states, in part:
"When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or
omission of another, the personal representative of the decedent * * * may
maintain an action against the wrongdoer, if the decedent might have
maintained an action, had the decedent lived, against the wrongdoer for an
injury done by the same act or omission."
Plaintiffs assert that what makes a wrongful death action unique is the nature of the
ultimate harm: death.  And, they reason, because ORS 30.020 is inoperative until the
decedent's death, that death is the triggering event, and the place where that death
occurred therefore is the place where the claim arose.  Defendants respond that, properly
read, ORS 14.080(1) focuses not on the ultimate outcome of a wrongdoer's acts (here,
death) but, instead, on the wrongful conduct itself.  Put slightly differently, defendants are
arguing that decedent's death, standing alone, is no occasion for judicial relief.  Instead, in
defendants' view, it is the injurious act or acts with which the statute is concerned, i.e., the
injurious act or acts for which "the decedent might have maintained an action, had the
decedent lived," that place venue in Marion County. (2)
The case is one of first impression, and involves statutory interpretation. 
Following our familiar paradigm, we focus first on the wording of the pertinent statutes,
considering the statutory text in the context in which it is found.  We therefore turn to the
text of ORS 14.080(1) and, in particular, to the statute's use of the word "arose" (which is,
of course, simply the past tense of the verb "arise").
We do not require the assistance of a dictionary here.  "Arise," as lawyers
understand, means to come into being so that a legal consequence -- here, an action at law
-- may commence.  It is, in that sense, the equivalent of an equally familiar concept,
"accrue."  Unfortunately, that understanding does not complete our inquiry.  The true
struggle in this case is over what it is that must arise.  That is, plaintiffs assert that what
"arose" was decedent's death.  Defendants, on the other hand, assert that what must have
arisen, in order for a wrongful death action to be maintained, was injurious conduct for
which the decedent, had he lived, could have maintained an action.  Both readings of the
statute are defensible when the words in question are read in isolation; nothing in the
ordinary understanding of "arise" helps us select the correct one.
Context, however, does help.  First, the description of a wrongful death
action in ORS 30.020(1) describes that claim as one that "the decedent might have
maintained * * *, had the decedent lived, against the wrongdoer for an injury done by the
same act or omission [that is, the alleged negligence or other wrong that is the basis of the
wrongful death action]."  In other words, the action is one that might have been
maintained by the decedent at a date earlier than the date of decedent's death.  Indeed, the
purpose of a wrongful death action is to remove death as a bar to bringing the claim, not
to make death the central event of the action.  That reading of the statutory wording is
confirmed by a later sentence in the same section, which provides that such an action
"shall be commenced within three years after the injury causing the death of the decedent
is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered by the decedent, by the personal
representative or by a person for whose benefit the [wrongful death] action may be
brought under this section * * *."  (Emphasis added.)  The section goes on to provide that,
with respect to claims like the present one that are grounded in professional negligence,
"[i]n no case" shall the wrongful death action be commenced later than "[t]hree years
after the death of the decedent."  ORS 30.020(1)(a).  (Emphasis added.)
Those contextual clues all point in the same direction.  First, they recognize
that the claim may come into existence (i.e., may "arise") while the decedent is still alive,
as long as the decedent discovers or in the exercise of reasonable care should discover the
fact of the wrongful conduct and resulting harm to the decedent.  See also ORS 30.075
(recognizing that action may have been instituted by decedent before he or she died, and
providing that death does not abate the action, which in such circumstances may be
"continued by the personal representative."  And, if an action for harm caused to the
decedent could have been commenced before the decedent died -- as the statute
recognizes that it could -- then the place where the decedent ultimately might die would
be irrelevant:  The decedent would not be dead yet, and no wrongful death action
concerning the wrongs that the decedent had suffered would even be possible.  It follows
that "the county where the cause of action arose" (emphasis added) necessarily would be
determined in wrongful death cases by reference to the place where the decedent might
have brought the action while still alive, not by reference to the place where the decedent
died.  And, because the authorization to bring the wrongful death action places venue in
the county where the claim arose, it also follows that that county has to be the place where
the harm was done.  That means that, in this case, venue could not have been in
Multnomah County, because that county's only arguable relationship to the case did not
come into existence until decedent died there. (3)  Plaintiff's arguments to the contrary
are not well taken.
We note, in passing, that cases discussing issues analogous to the present
one, although not on point, support the foregoing conclusion.  See, e.g., State ex rel
Kleinsorge et al v. Reid, 221 Or 558, 560, 352 P2d 466 (1960) (action against public
officers for personal injury sustained in swimming pool at Oregon State College; action
therefore "arose" under ORS 14.050 in Benton County, where college was located); State
ex rel Ind. Sup. Co. v. Goldstein et al, 221 Or 309, 311, 351 P2d 39 (1960) (action against
domestic corporation buyer for price of goods sold and delivered; buyer could be sued
under ORS 15.080 in county in which claim "arose," as well as in county in which buyer
had its principal place of business). 
We hold that, based on the wording of the statute in question, venue for the
purposes of a wrongful death action lies either in the county where at least one of the
defendants resides or in the county in which the wrongful act or acts that ultimately
resulted in decedent's death occurred.  In the present case, that means that the proper
venue for plaintiffs' cause of action was in Marion County, as the trial court ruled.
The alternative writ of mandamus is dismissed.
1. Or, as we presently call it, the "claim."
2. The place where a claim arises may vary, depending on the specific claim at
issue.  As our rephrasing of the defendants' argument demonstrates, our focus here is on
where a wrongful death action arises.
3. Logic points in the same direction.  The county where the injurious acts
occurred ordinarily will also be one in which many witnesses may be expected to reside,
and where at least one defendant may reside.  On the other hand, the place where the
decedent died may be the result of happenstance.  The legislature thus would have little
reason to place venue in the county where the decedent happened to die.