Title: State v. McGill
Citation: 119 Ariz. 329, 580 P.2d 1183
Docket Number: 4139
State: Arizona
Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court
Date: June 22, 1978

119 Ariz. 329 (1978) 580 P.2d 1183 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Harry S. McGILL, Appellant. No. 4139. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. June 22, 1978. *330 Bruce E. Babbitt, Former Atty. Gen., John A. LaSota, Jr., Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer, III, and Georgia B. Ellexson, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Callahan, Cathcart &amp; Gorman by Edwin F. Cathcart, Jr., Tempe, for appellant. CAMERON, Chief Justice. This is an appeal from a jury verdict and judgment of guilt as to two counts of sale of narcotic drug, a felony, A.R.S. §§ 36-1001, 36-1002.02, as amended 1974, and §§ 13-138, 139, 140, with a sentence thereon of not less than five nor more than fifteen years in the State Prison on each count to run concurrently. We must answer three questions on appeal: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. At about 9:55 a.m. on 27 May 1976, three Phoenix undercover police officers, Joseph J. Hauer, Daniel DeLeon and Robert Hernandez, were in a parked, unmarked police vehicle in the area of 13th Avenue and Yuma in Phoenix, Arizona. They were approached by a suspect who identified himself *331 as "John." "John" asked if they wanted to "score" and indicated he could get them "some real good stuff." After the undercover agents showed interest, "John" came back to the officers' location with a female known as "Pearl." After a short period of negotiation, Officer DeLeon purchased two balloons of heroin for $40. Pearl's method of operation was to keep the heroin in balloons in her mouth. When she made a sale, she took the required number of balloons out of her mouth and exchanged them for money. About one half hour later in the same area, undercover police officers Ronald Little and Tony R. Garcia observed a male and female walking eastbound. The officers pulled over near the pair and engaged them in a brief conversation during which the male asked the officers if they were "looking to cop." The officers indicated they were looking to purchase heroin. The male called out to the female subject and asked her to approach them. The male then introduced the female as "Pearl" and himself as "Tony." "Tony" asked the officers how much they wanted. After negotiations, Pearl produced from her mouth two balloons for which the officers gave her $40 in return. Pearl and defendant "Tony" or "John" were later arrested for the two sales of heroin. After a trial to a jury and verdicts and judgments of guilty, the defendant appeals. JOINDER OF THE TWO DEFENDANTS The charges against Pearl Belcher and defendant were consolidated for trial. Defendant made a timely motion to sever his trial from the trial of codefendant Belcher. This motion was denied. Defendant contends on appeal that this was error. Rule 13.3 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: And Rule 13.4 provides: Defendant points out that he does not contest the fact that the sale took place, but merely contends that he, defendant McGill, was not one of the participants. Defendant indicates that the evidence of identification against Pearl was stronger than against defendant and that the jury would convict Pearl and then automatically convict the defendant. Because of this it is contended that trying both defendants at the same time was highly prejudicial to the defendant McGill. We are aware that frequently there are problems involved in trying two defendants at the same time. That there are problems in joint trials of two or more defendants does not mean that in every case the court must ignore judicial economy and grant a severance if demanded by one of the defendants. It is only when the defendant can clearly show that a severance is necessary for a fair trial that the trial court must grant a severance: In the instant case, the two crimes alleged to have been committed by the defendant were the same two crimes allegedly committed by the codefendant Pearl Belcher. They were committed at the same time and in the same place. The proof that convicted the defendant at the same time convicted the codefendant. In other words, the crimes of the two defendants were so closely intertwined that it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to separate proof of defendant's crime from that of his codefendant. Under these circumstances, it was not only proper to join the trials of the two defendants, Rule 13.3(b), but there was no prejudice to defendant in being tried with the codefendant. The defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a severance of the parties. Rule 13.4, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure; State v. Williams, 108 Ariz. 382, 499 P.2d 97 (1972). We find no error. SEVERING THE COUNTS Defendant further contends that it was error to deny defendant's motion to sever the two counts because he was entitled to a severance of the counts as a matter of right pursuant to Rule 13.4(b), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 13.3(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides: Rule 13.4(b) provides: It is defendant's contention that these matters were joined pursuant to Rule 13.3(a)(1) solely because they were of similar character. Were this the only reason for joining the two counts in one trial, the defendant would, as a matter of right, be entitled to severance pursuant to Rule 13.4(b). However, it is apparent from the nature of the crimes charged that they were not joined "only by virtue" of the fact that they were "of the same or similar character," but also based on the "same conduct" or were "otherwise connected together in their commission" and were also "part of a common scheme or plan." Therefore, they were also joined pursuant to rule 13.3(a)(2) and (3). Defendant is not then entitled to severance of the counts as a matter of right, but only if it is "necessary to promote a fair determination of [his] guilt or innocence." As we have stated: We find no error. PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION The defendant contends that the pretrial identification was unduly suggestive *333 and thus tainted the in-court identification, requiring suppression of the in-court identification. The facts concerning the pretrial identification are as follows. Detective Little, who had made the purchase of the two balloons at the 10:35 (second) sale, testified that some three weeks after the sale he described "Tony" to a detective John Dee in an attempt to ascertain his full identity. Detective Dee indicated that the description sounded familiar to him and they went through a group of photographs in the "M" section of an alphabetical photo file which contained defendant's picture. During the hearing on the motion to suppress, Detective Little testified: We find no error in the identification of the defendant for the 10:35 sale. State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 453 P.2d 951 (1969). As to the 9:55 (first) sale, after Detective Little had identified the picture of the defendant in Detective Dee's file, Detective Little then took the defendant's photograph over to Detective DeLeon who had made the 9:55 purchase. Detective Little asked, "Does this guy look familiar to you?" DeLeon recognized the photograph of the defendant as "John" who made the sale to him. Defendant contends that this was improper identification and that the in-court identification was tainted by this impermissible photo identification. Even assuming that this second photo identification is unduly suggestive, we still do not need to *334 reverse on appeal. The United States Supreme Court has stated: We have stated: In the instant case, Detective DeLeon testified at the suppression hearing: Detective DeLeon's identification did not waiver during cross-examination. We have stated: We believe, in the instant case, that the in-court identification by Detective DeLeon was based not upon the photo identification, but upon the view of the defendant at the time of the crime. It has not been shown that the identification of the defendant at trial was tainted by any questionable pretrial identification. Judgments affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and HAYS, HOLOHAN and GORDON, JJ., concur.