Title: Com. v. Kingsley
Citation: 391 A.2d 1027, 480 Pa. 560
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: October 5, 1978

480 Pa. 560 (1978) 391 A.2d 1027 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Gilbert L. KINGSLEY, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued March 13, 1978. Decided October 5, 1978. *561 *562 *563 *564 Harry R. Ruprecht, Louise Porac, Pittsburgh, for appellant. Robert E. Colville, Dist. Atty., Robert L. Eberhardt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Leo M. Dillon, Pittsburgh, for appellee. Before O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ. O'BRIEN, Justice. Appellant, Gilbert L. Kingsley, was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter. Post-verdict motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to thirty days' imprisonment and ten years' probation, with the additional requirement that he undergo alcoholic evaluation and counseling. Shortly after appellant was originally sentenced, the trial court reduced the probationary term to twenty-three and one-half months. This direct appeal followed. Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, alleging two defects in the case presented at trial. The facts are as follows. *565 On May 28, 1976, Benjamin Crowther, age forty-six, the victim, returned home from his job to find appellant, age forty, assisting the victim's wife, Ruth Crowther, in the preparation of Workmen's Compensation papers. An argument eventually broke out between appellant and the victim. Mr. Crowther called appellant several names and when appellant told the victim "you can't back it up," Mr. Crowther attempted to attack appellant. Appellant sidestepped Crowther, grabbing him around the neck and turning him around. Appellant then punched Crowther in the face, knocking him to the floor. According to appellant's confession, he then "stomped" on Crowther's face. At trial, appellant testified that he placed his foot on the victim's throat in an attempt to restrain him. When Mrs. Crowther saw her husband bleeding from the nose and mouth, she called the police. When the police and paramedics arrived at the Crowther house, Mr. Crowther refused medical attention. Appellant then left the Crowther residence at approximately 1:00 p.m. Mrs. Crowther left shortly thereafter, joining appellant in a neighborhood tavern. Mrs. Crowther talked to her husband on the phone at 8:30 p.m. and he seemed normal. When Mrs. Crowther returned home at 10:00 p.m., she found her husband dead. In Commonwealth v. Rose, 463 Pa. 264, 267-68, 344 A.2d 824, 825 (1975), we stated: Appellant first argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he caused the victim's death. We do not agree. *566 Dr. Howard Reidbord, a forensic pathologist from the Allegheny County Coroner's Office, performed the autopsy on Mr. Crowther. Dr. Reidbord testified that he conducted both an external and an internal examination. Dr. Reidbord testified as follows about the external examination. When discussing the internal examination, Dr. Reidbord testified: Dr. Reidbord was then asked: Dr. Reidbord was next asked the cause of the victim's injuries and he stated: When asked to give the cause of the victim's death, Dr. Reidbord gave the following responses: Finally, on cross-examination, the following exchange occurred: Appellant called his own expert pathologist, Dr. Sanford Edberg. Based on his own review of Dr. Reidbord's findings, Dr. Edberg testified that he believed the external wounds were simply too superficial to cause death. Dr. Edberg believed that the victim died from a combination of severe heart disease and acute and chronic alcoholism. As in all criminal prosecutions, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the crime charged. As we stated in Commonwealth v. Hicks, 466 Pa. 499, 504, 353 A.2d 803, 805 (1976): *570 As in Hicks,[1] we find here that the Commonwealth has presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant's actions were the cause of the victim's death. Appellant next claims that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he specifically intended to kill the victim. We disagree. Detective Charles Moffatt interviewed appellant the day after the incident in question. Moffatt testified at trial that appellant told him he had stomped the victim three or four times while Mr. Crowther was on the ground. Gerald Waldo, the Crowthers' landlord, testified that he heard loud voices coming from the Crowthers' apartment followed by five consecutive thumps. At trial, appellant denied stomping the victim in the head. Specific intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the victim's body. Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa. 224, 352 A.2d 30 (1976). In Commonwealth v. Conner, 445 Pa. 36, 282 A.2d 23 (1971), we held that a jury could infer the specific intent to kill from the defendant's repeated kicks to the victim's head. We thus believe the Commonwealth has presented sufficient evidence to prove the required specific intent to kill. Appellant next raises three issues concerning the voir dire examination of prospective jurors. Appellant first argues that the court erred in refusing the following questions on the credibility: We believe the court properly refused Question # 27, since it did allow the following question to be asked: Since Question # 24 covered any possible bias in favor of police officers, the trial court properly refused Question # 27. Appellant also argues that it was error to refuse Question # 25. Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Futch, 469 Pa. 422, 366 A.2d 246 (1976) in support of his argument. We believe, however, that appellant's reliance on Futch is misplaced: In Futch, the trial court refused the two following questions: *572 In that case, we recognized the likelihood that a bias against prison inmates existed, and thus it was error to refuse questions 1 and 3 to be asked on voir dire. We believe that the reasoning in Futch concerning prisoners is simply inapposite when talking about forensic pathologists. Because we do not believe Futch to be controlling, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to allow Question # 25. Appellant next complains that the court erred in refusing to allow the following questions to be asked during voir dire: We can find no error in the court's refusal, as we have held voir dire questions concerning legal principles to be improper questions. Commonwealth v. Lopinson, 427 Pa. 284, 234 A.2d 552 (1967). Appellant next believes the court erred in allowing prospective jurors to be asked if they had any conscientious objections to bringing back a verdict which would require imposition of a life sentence. Appellant argues that he was unduly prejudiced by this question, since the Commonwealth had no evidence of murder of the first degree. Appellant believes this to be so, since a demurrer was sustained to murder of the first degree. At the time of voir dire, however, the Commonwealth believed that its evidence could support a finding of murder of the first degree. Under these circumstances, we can find no reversible error in allowing the question concerning the imposition of a life sentence. Appellant next argues that his confession was improperly admitted. Appellant believes that the suppression court erred in refusing to suppress the statement on grounds of voluntariness. The facts are as follows. After the body of Mr. Crowther was discovered, police sought to question appellant. He was questioned by Detective Charles Moffatt, who testified that he twice informed appellant of his constitutional rights. Appellant told Detective Moffatt that he understood his rights, but was willing to waive them and talk to police. In an interview that lasted less than forty-five minutes, Moffatt noticed nothing unusual about appellant's appearance. Moffatt also testified that he did not smell alcohol on appellant's breath. It is the substance of this forty-five minute interview that appellant sought to have suppressed because, in his version, he did not voluntarily waive his constitutional rights. We, however, do not agree. In Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 279-81, 361 A.2d 282, 290 (1976), we stated: In the instant case, we find sufficient evidence to establish a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver by appellant of his constitutional rights. Appellant next claims that the court erred in admitting the entire interview into evidence. During the interview with Moffatt, appellant told police that he had lived with Mrs. Crowther before her marriage to the victim and was still seeing her on a semi-regular basis. Appellant further told police that the victim had been aware of the relationship. Appellant now argues that this information was not relevant and thus inadmissible. At trial, however, appellant never challenged the questioned evidence's relevency *575 and the issue is waived. Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974). Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting appellant's confession before the corpus delicti of the homicide was established. We do not agree. As we stated in Commonwealth v. Ware, 459 Pa. 334, 365, 329 A.2d 258, 274 (1974); In the instant case, there is no question that the victim was dead. Further, Dr. Reidbord's testimony established that the victim's death was the result of a beating to the face. As the corpus delicti was established prior to the admission of appellant's confession, we find no merit in appellant's argument. Appellant next argues that the court erred in refusing his motion for a mistrial. The facts are as follows. As previously mentioned, Dr. Howard Reidbord testified for the Commonwealth concerning the cause of the victim's *576 death. During a lengthy and extensive cross-examination, the following exchange occurred: Appellant then made a motion for a mistrial, which was denied. We believe the court below was correct in refusing the motion for a mistrial for two reasons: First, and most important, the response of Dr. Reidbord was elicited by appellant's own counsel on cross-examination. Because of this, appellant cannot now complain. Commonwealth v. Brown, 462 Pa. 578, 342 A.2d 84 (1975). Second, *577 the trial court offered to instruct the jury to disregard any mention of Dr. Wecht's opinion. Counsel refused the offer, stating that such an instruction would only draw attention to the comment. Appellant's claim that this remark entitles him to a new trial is meritless. Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in improperly questioning appellant during the Commonwealth's cross-examination of appellant. Our review of the record shows no questioning of appellant by the court; thus appellant's contention is meritless. Appellant next argues that the court below improperly summarized the testimony of Gerald Waldo, the victim's landlord who testified that he heard five thumps coming from the victim's apartment. We find no merit in appellant's argument. The trial court summarized the testimony of every witness who testified at trial, thus negating appellant's claim that the court was emphasizing Waldo's testimony. Further, our review indicates that the court's summary of the testimony was fair and in no way prejudicial. Appellant's claim is thus meritless. Appellant next complains that the trial court erred in its charge to the jury. The questioned portion of the charge relates to the cause of death. Twice during the charge, the court told the jury that in order to convict appellant of either murder of the third degree or voluntary manslaughter, they must find that the death of the victim would not have occurred but for appellant's act. Appellant believes this charge entitles him to a new trial. We disagree. In Commonwealth v. Massart, 469 Pa. 572, 577, 366 A.2d 1229, 1232 (1975), we stated: *578 The two questioned portions of the charge on causation are thus incorrect. Nonetheless, we do not believe appellant is entitled to a new trial, as we can find no prejudicial error in the charge. In Commonwealth v. Stafford, 451 Pa. 95, 98, 301 A.2d 600, 602 (1973), we stated: Similarly, in this case the jury was told appellant's acts must have been the direct cause of the victim's death. The jury was also told that the Commonwealth had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements, including causation, of the crimes charged. Reading the charge as a whole, we believe the jury was properly instructed on the issue of causation. See also, Commonwealth v. Jennings, 446 Pa. 294, 285 A.2d 143 (1971). Appellant next complains that the court erred in allowing the autopsy report to go out with the jury. Pa.R. Crim.P. 1114 provides: As the report was received into evidence without objection, we can find no error in allowing the jury to have a copy during its deliberations. *579 Appellant finally argues that the court erred in allowing the jury to deliberate too long before permitting them to retire for the night. The facts are as follows. The jury was originally sent out to deliberate before lunch on October 20, 1976. At 6:30 p.m., the jury had sent out a series of questions which the court answered. The court then sent the jury to dinner and asked if anyone had any objections to continuing deliberations after dinner. No objections were entered. At 11:20 p.m., the jury came back with more questions. After being reinstructed, the court asked the jury if they wished to continue deliberating or would they rather retire for the night. The jury indicated they would rather retire and the judge acceded to their wishes. The jury began deliberating the next day at 9:30 a. m. and brought back its verdict at 11:10 a.m. In Commonwealth v. Ford, 451 Pa. 81, 85, 301 A.2d 856, 858 (1973), quoting Commonwealth v. Campbell, 445 Pa. 488, 495-96, 284 A.2d 798, 801 (1971), we stated: In this case, defense counsel entered no objection to the jury's continuation of deliberations after dinner. Further, we can find no abuse of the trial court's discretion. Appellant's claim is thus without merit. Judgment of sentence affirmed. MANDERINO, J., files a dissenting opinion. EAGEN, C.J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MANDERINO, Justice, dissenting. I dissent. The majority justifies the voir dire question indicating murder of the first degree by concluding that before the grant of the demurrer, the prosecution "still believed that its evidence could support a finding of murder *580 of the first degree." This conclusion is unwarranted from the record. The prosecution had no facts justifying a belief that it could support first degree murder. The voir dire questioning injected an unwarranted element and tone that were prejudicial. [1] In Commonwealth v. Hicks, supra, the victim had emphysema and arteriosclerosis. The prosecution's expert testified that the blows struck therein complicated a pre-existing heart condition, causing death.