Title: Maltby v. Security Networks, LLC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 576, 2009
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: November 17, 2009

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
PETER MALTBY, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 576, 2009 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Court of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Chancery of the State of 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Delaware 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
SECURITY NETWORKS, LLC, 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
C.A. No. 2939 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: November 2, 2009 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
November 17, 2009 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 17th day of November 2009, upon consideration of the Clerk’s 
notice to show cause, the appellant’s response to the notice and the 
appellee’s answer to the appellant’s response, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
In this appeal from an action in the Court of Chancery, the 
defendant-appellant, Peter Maltby, has appealed a master’s order granting a 
default judgment in favor of the plaintiff-appellee, Security Networks, LLC.  
By notice dated October 2, 2009, the Clerk directed that Maltby show cause 
 
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why the appeal should not be dismissed for this Court’s lack of jurisdiction 
to consider an appeal from an order entered by a master.1 
 
(2) 
Maltby contends that the master’s order in this case is 
appealable.  According to Maltby, the order ripened into an appealable 
judgment by operation of Court of Chancery Rule 144(a)(2).  Court of 
Chancery Rule 144(a)(2) provides that an unopposed master’s order is 
“deemed final” and “shall have the same effect as though ordered by a 
Chancellor or Vice Chancellor” upon the expiration of the time periods for 
taking an exception to the order.   
 
 
(3) 
Maltby is mistaken.  The provision under Court of Chancery 
Rule 144 for adopting an unopposed master’s order is not sufficient to 
confer appellate jurisdiction of a matter upon this Court.2  The appellate 
jurisdiction of this Court is limited to orders, rulings, decisions or judgment 
of judges.3  A master’s report or order that has not been subject to 
“meaningful judicial review, including approval or disapproval with the 
reasons therefore,” is not deemed a final judgment for the purpose of appeal 
to this Court.4 
                                          
 
1 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 29(b). 
2 Redden v. McGill, 549 A.2d 695 (Del. 1988).  
3 DiGiacobbe v. Sestak, 743 A.2d 180 (Del. 1999). 
4 Redden v. McGill, 549 A.2d at 698. 
 
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(4) 
Judicial review of a master’s order is by a judge of the Court of 
Chancery.5  A party seeking judicial review of a master’s order must “take 
exception” to the order in accordance with Court of Chancery Rule 
144(a)(1).  A party that does not file a notice of exception “shall be deemed 
to have waived the right to review.”6 
 
(5) 
In this case, Maltby did not take exception to the master’s order 
granting a default judgment to Security Networks.  Having failed to seek 
judicial review of the master’s order by a judge in the Court of Chancery, 
Maltby is precluded from seeking appellate review in this Court.7 
 
(6) 
Security Networks requests that, in the event of dismissal, the 
Court remand this matter to the Court of Chancery for entry of “a default 
judgment directly from the Vice Chancellor.”  There is no basis,however, to 
remand this matter for further proceedings.  The master’s order became final 
                                          
 
5 DiGiacobbe v. Sestak, 743 A.2d 180.  Accord Div. of Child Support Enforcem./Smith v. 
Neal, 687 A.2d 1324, 1325 (Del. 1997) (noting that a request for review de novo is the 
“sole remedy of any party with respect to a Master’s written order”).  
6 Del. Ct. Chan. R. 144(a)(1). 
7 DiGiacobbe v. Sestak, 743 A.2d 180.  Accord Johnson v. State, 884 A.2d 475, 478 (Del. 
2005) (providing that “this Court has held that our appellate jurisdiction is limited to 
reviewing orders entered by judges”); Div. of Child Support Enforce./Smith v. Neal, 687 
A.2d at 1325 (providing that “[a] judgment derived from a Master’s written order shall 
have the same force and effect as any other judgment of the Court, except that it shall not 
be subject to appeal”); Church v. State, 2008 WL 2691018 (Del. Supr.); Carr v. Div. of 
Family Serv. 2007 WL 2677435 (Del. Supr.); Waples v. Div. of Child Support Enforcem., 
2005 WL 1653768 (Del. Supr.); Richmond v. Div. of Family Serv., 1999 WL 734725 
(Del. Supr.). 
 
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and enforceable as a judgment in the Court of Chancery upon the expiration 
of the time periods set forth in Court of Chancery Rule 144(a)(2).8 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to 
Supreme Court Rule 29(b), that the appeal is DISMISSED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    Justice 
                                          
 
8 Del. Ct. Chan. R. 144(a)(2).  Accord Div. of Child Support Enforce./Smith v. Neal, 687 
A.2d at 1325 (providing that “[a] Master’s written order shall become an enforceable 
judgment of the Court  . . . after the time for requesting a review de novo has expired 
without any such request”).