Title: State Ex Rel. Haskett v. MARION CR. CT., ROOM ONE
Citation: 234 N.E.2d 636, 250 Ind. 229
Docket Number: 1067S102
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 1968

250 Ind. 229 (1968)
234 N.E.2d 636
STATE EX REL. HASKETT
v.
MARION COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT, ROOM ONE, DAVIS, JUDGE.
No. 1067S102.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed February 28, 1968.
Rehearing denied April 9, 1968.
*230 Ferdinand Samper, of Indianapolis, for relator.
Noble R. Pearcy, Prosecuting Attorney, and Stanley B. Miller, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents.
ARTERBURN, J.
This is an original action to compel the respondent court to expunge and strike from its record an order made on September 20, 1966, against the relator "to answer all questions put to him by physicians and each of them pursuant to statute." This order results from proceedings to have the relator determined to be a sexual psychopathic person under the Acts of 1949, ch. 124, as amended by the Acts of 1959, ch. 356, being Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. § 9-3401, et seq. The court had previously appointed two qualified physicians to examine the relator. The relator had previously been charged by affidavit with the criminal offense of "peeping in house."
The relator, by his petition, seeks to challenge the constitutionality of the Indiana law providing for the determination *231 and declaration of a person charged with a sexual offense of being a sexual psychopathic person.
The specific section involved herein is Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. § 9-3404 [1967 Cum. Supp.] which reads as follows:
There is no dispute between the parties that the procedural steps were followed in order to invoke the authority of the court to act pursuant to the statute.
It is the contention of the relator that although the respondent was acting pursuant to the language of the appropriate statute, such language is unconstitutional and void and constitutes a violation of his privilege against self-incrimination and the information he will be required to give to the physicians will be used against him in a subsequent hearing where his alleged criminal sexual psychopathy is to be determined.
*233 In support of this assertion relators call the attention of this court to two United States Supreme Court cases: Miranda v. Arizona (1936), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.C. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694; Application of Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527.
In Miranda v. Arizona, supra, we understand this case to emphasize the new rule for police interrogations was founded upon the privilege of an accused under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself. Under said rule there were four essential requirements: (1) the right to remain silent; (2) the effect of making a statement; (3) the right to an attorney; and (4) the right to an appointed attorney.
The facts in the Miranda case, by way of summary, were these: Miranda was taken into custody and after two hours of interrogation he executed a signed statement. He had not been advised that he had a right to have an attorney present during the questioning, but an introductory paragraph at the beginning of his written confession stated that he had made the confession voluntarily and with full knowledge of his legal rights, with the understanding that the statement could be used against him. The written confession was admitted into evidence over the objection of defense counsel. The Supreme Court reversed because Miranda was not in any way apprised of his right to consultation with an attorney and to have one present during the interrogation.
In the Gault case, a fifteen-year-old boy was arrested for making lewd and indecent remarks to a woman neighbor. He was held in a detention home until the following day, at which time a petition was filed against him indicating that he was under the age of eighteen and was a delinquent minor. The boy's mother was present at the hearing, but the complaining neighbor was not. No one was sworn at the hearing and no transcript or record was made. The mother of the juvenile indicated that the juvenile had said he dialed the number, but that a friend with him had made the lewd remarks. *234 The hearing was concluded and the juvenile was released. The mother of the juvenile received a plain letter from the probation officer indicating a hearing was set for a specific date and at that time the juvenile was in the company of his mother and father. At this hearing a request by the mother to have the complaining witnesses present was denied by the court. The juvenile was committed for the period of his minority to the State Industrial School. Since no appeal was permitted by Arizona law, the juvenile filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the state court, which was denied. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed. Gault, supra.
In the case of People of the State of Illinois v. Forest G. English (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 301, 201 N.E.2d 455, the Illinois Supreme Court examined a similar question presented by the relator's petition. In this case a defendant was ordered to appear before two qualified psychiatrists for examination pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 38, pars. 105-1.01 to 105-12). The defendant appeared before the psychiatrist and informed that he felt the compulsory examination was a violation of his constitutional rights. The court proceeded to hold the defendant in contempt of court and he appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Illinois. The court then extensively reviewed the authorities relating to this question:
It is to be noted in the Illinois case that the act did not specifically protect the defendant against self-incrimination. However, the Indiana statute that we have under consideration specifically provides that the information or admissions obtained in the medical examination "shall not be deemed to be competent evidence in any other proceeding brought against the accused...." It therefore follows that there can be no violation of the constitutional provision *237 against self-incrimination under the Indiana statute, since the testimony or evidence given is by statute no longer incrimination. (Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. § 9-3403(d) [1967 Supp.])
Under the Indiana statute, and in this particular case, the relator has at all times been represented by counsel, has the right to be confronted by witness, is protected by the immunity clause of the statute and has a specific right of appeal. See Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. § 9-3404, supra; also Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno., § 9-3406 [1956 Repl.].
There is no question that there are many problems arising with psychiatric examinations. In a recent publication, Psychiatry for Lawyers Handbook by Dr. Melvin L. Selzer, published by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, University of Michigan, there is reprinted an article "Psychiatric Examination of the Sexual Psychopath" published in the journal of Northwestern School of Law, Vol. 56, No. 1, p. 27, which states:
*238 We believe that the Indiana statute has been designed to cope with this difficult situation and is equitable. It also supplies the constitutional protection needed. The statute in question was examined in State ex rel. Savery etc. v. Marion Cr. C., etc. (1955), 234 Ind. 632, 130 N.E.2d 128. In that case the relator sought to compel a lower court ruling to proceed under the statute although the proceedings were not requested by the prosecuting attorney for the court. The court held that the proceedings under the statute were civil in nature although they may have been instituted as the result of criminal proceedings. The purpose of the law was described as follows: (234 Ind. 632, 637.)
In the same opinion this court reviewed such cases from other jurisdictions which supported the court's conclusion that the proceedings under the statute are civil in nature rather than criminal although originating in a criminal proceeding.
Laws providing compulsory medical treatment for the mentally ill, drug addicts and other similar persons have as their purpose the treatment of individuals regardless of criminal guilt and with emphasis on rehabilitation for the individual involved.
*239 It is likewise true in regard to due process of law. 24 A.L.R.2d 350, 362. In Noelke v. State of Indiana (1938), 214 Ind. 427, 15 N.E.2d 950, this court held that our statute authorizing the court to appoint physicians to examine a defendant who has pleaded insanity and to testify as to their conclusions in the criminal trial was not unconstitutional as compelling defendant to incriminate himself. Attacks on the constitutionality of statutes authorizing courts to appoint impartial examiners to determine the mental condition of a defendant have generally been unsuccessful and particularly on the theory of self-incrimination. See 32 A.L.R.2d 434, p. 445. Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, South Carolina and Wisconsin have held similar statutes constitutional.
There is still another reason why the relator cannot prevail in this case, namely, the statute specifically gives the defendant in the proceedings in question the right to appeal. It states: "An appeal may be taken from any final order or judgment of court in the manner provided by law for appeals in criminal cases." (Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. § 9-3406.)
Rule 2-35 of this Court further provides: "Writs will be granted only where extreme hardship would otherwise result if not granted." It is fundamental that extraordinary writs may not be used as a short-cut for an appeal. State ex rel. Wireman v. City of Lafayette (1967), 249 Ind. 490, 230 N.E.2d 776.
The temporary writ heretofore issued is dissolved, and the permanent writ is denied.
Lewis, C.J. concurs.
Mote, J. concurs with opinion.
Jackson, J. dissents with opinion, in which Hunter, J. concurs.
NOTE.  Reported in 234 N.E.2d 636.
MOTE, J.
I concur in the opinion and the conclusion of Judge Arterburn. In doing so, it appears appropriate to express my views upon the general subject before us, as presented by a Petition for Writ of Mandate and Prohibition and the Response thereto.
The factual situation already is clearly presented. There is involved, however, an overall philosophy to which I wish to address myself.
In these times of abrupt and almost complete reversal of attitudes regarding constitutional government, it seems to me that too often we have been compelled by enigmatic forces to adjust our solutions to perplexing moral, philosophical and economic problems for the benefit of the thorough non-conformist at the expense of conformity, that is, an ordered society with reasonable rules and regulations for our guidance. For one, I do not read the provisions of our Bill of Rights, the various amendments to our Federal Constitution, to have the import so often thereto attributed in high places.
It has been said that a prerequisite to the favorable acceptance of the proposed Constitution of the United States was the prompt adoption thereafter of our Bill of Rights. Careful study of the times, the reasons, the sense and feeling of the early colonists reasonably should induce the objective conclusion that those residing in the early colonies were solicitous of their own local rights and powers in relation to the central government. Little did they expect or contemplate that what they sought and were granted, much in mysterious and deceiving ways, eventually would operate as a sword instead of a shield.
While we do not here criticize the often-cited and relied upon Escobedo and Miranda Cases, we must remark that the pitfall in to which they have lead us produces a good example of the "adjustment" referred to above when, in order to prevent *241 an avalanche of court proceedings for freedom, a "cutoff" date had to be employed.
The field of mental health long has been the subject of much consideration. Full enlightenment surely has not yet been achieved; however, our society appears to have made great strides in the field of treatment and in the protection and attempt to help those poor unfortunates who, through no fault of their own, are unable to fully participate and to compete in citizenship.
It is my considered opinion that Relator herein has been accorded the fullest protection under our statutes and that he has not been harmed by the order of the trial court, Respondent herein, which carefully has followed the provisions of the governing statutes. Nor will the Relator be harmed by the questions likely to be propounded and answered by him.
First, he may be heard in the trial forum before admission of the questions and his answers. Second, being civil in nature, his answers may not be used against him in any proceeding, criminal or otherwise, but the one designed to determine whether he is a sexual psychopathic person under the provisions of § 9-3401, et seq., Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. Third, as above stated, Relator has not yet been harmed, nor will he be, in light of the protective measures afforded him, to-wit: appropriate if not availing objections at the trial on the issues of whether he is a sexual psychopathic person and his right of appeal, wherein this Court will have before it the full and complete record for review.
In my opinion, the authorities in Indiana and elsewhere, cited by Judge Arterburn, amply support his conclusion to deny the Petition and I therefore concur with him.
JACKSON, J.
I am unable to agree with the conclusions reached in the majority opinion and dissent thereto.
*242 Criminal proceedings were instituted against the relator on November 27, 1961, when an affidavit was filed in the respondent court charging him with being a "Peeping Tom."
On November 30, 1961, the State of Indiana filed a petition to determine whether the relator was a criminal sexual psychopath pursuant to the Criminal Sexual Psychopathic Persons Act, Acts 1949, ch. 124, p. 328, as amended, being § 9-3401, et seq. Burns'. On April 4, 1962, after two qualified physicians filed their reports, the respondent court found relator to be a criminal sexual psychopath and ordered him committed to the Division of Mental Health of the State of Indiana. Subsequently the relator filed a belated motion for new trial which was sustained by the respondent court on July 20, 1967. On July 28, 1967, the prosecuting attorney filed a motion for the appointment of physicians to examine relator. On September 20, 1967, the respondent court ordered the relator to be re-examined by two qualified physicians. By the terms of the order the relator was required to answer all questions propounded to him by the physicians. Relator filed a motion to strike the words "and to answer all questions put to him by said physicians and each of them" from the order. The motion to strike was overruled. The relator now seeks this Court to mandate the respondent court to sustain the motion to strike.
The language of the statute and the order of the respondent court violates the relator's right against self-incrimination as guaranteed by the 5th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The majority holds that the statute does not constitute a violation of relator's privilege against self-incrimination because "the proceedings under the statute are civil in nature rather than criminal although originating in a criminal proceeding." It is of little significance that the proceedings are civil in nature. A person found to be a sexual psychopath under the Act is deprived of his liberty as a consequence, and must be accorded the protections of due process. Neither sound logic nor fundamental *243 justice dictates that the constitutional protectives may be ignored in civil proceedings and must be followed in criminal proceedings. The end result under the Act is incarceration for an indeterminate period of time against one's will. An individual exposed to a procedure that can result in his incarceration is entitled to his privilege against self-incrimination regardless of the euphemistic characterization of that procedure.
The very title of the Act negates the argument that the proceedings are civil rather than criminal. The determination, if and when made, is that "such person is ... a criminal sexual psychopath." Acts 1949, ch. 124, § 4, p. 328, as amended, being § 9-3404 Burns'. The Act also provides for appeals "in the manner provided by law for appeals in criminal cases." Acts 1949, ch. 124, § 6, p. 328, being § 9-3406 Burns'.
Section 3 of the Act, § 9-3403 Burns', provides:
If the purpose of the statute is to protect society against sexual psychopaths and to provide medical treatment for them, regardless of criminal guilt, the above section is an arbitrary classification of the group to be covered by the statute. It is well known that many murders are committed as a result of a criminal sexual psychopathic mind. Certainly a large number of statutory rapes are committed by persons who are suffering from mental abnormalities. If the statute is to apply to some sexual deviates, it must apply to all.
*244 The above section is further defective because of vagueness. The statute is silent as to whom "it shall appear that such person is a criminal sexual psychopathic person."
The unconstitutionality of the Act has been further pointed out by Judge Emmert in his concurring opinion in State ex rel. Savery v. Marion Criminal Court (1955), 234 Ind. 632, 643, 130 N.E.2d 128.
The Act is unconstitutional for several other reasons. It violates Article I, Sec. 19 of the Constitution of Indiana which guarantees a criminal defendant the right to have a jury determine the law and the facts. The Act also flies in the face of Article I, Sec. 13 of the Indiana Constitution which provides that a criminal defendant has the right to know definitely the charge he is compelled to meet and the right to have a trial by an impartial jury. In Indiana all crimes are statutory, and the defendant's guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet under the terms of this Act it is possible, even probable, that the accused can be involuntarily incarcerated for life by commitment to the Indiana Council for Mental Health without ever having committed any crime nor having been convicted of committing any crime.
This Court, here sitting in equity, should grant relator not only the relief prayed for in his petition but the complete relief to which he is entitled, viz: a finding and judgment that the entire Act, Acts 1949, ch. 124 as amended by Acts 1959, ch. 356, is unconstitutional and void. A permanent writ should be granted prohibiting the respondent from enforcing or attempting to enforce any of the provisions of the Act.
*247 Hunter, J. concurs.
NOTE.  Reported in 234 N.E.2d 636.