Title: Rory Enrique Conde v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC06-1998
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: February 11, 2010

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-1998 
____________ 
 
RORY ENRIQUE CONDE,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[February 11, 2010] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from an order denying Rory E. 
Conde‟s first motion to vacate his first-degree murder conviction and sentence of 
death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851after an evidentiary hearing.  
Because the order concerns postconviction relief from a capital conviction for 
which a sentence of death was imposed, this Court has jurisdiction.  See Art. V, § 
3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  We affirm the postconviction court‟s order denying relief. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The facts of the underlying crime are set out in this Court‟s opinion on 
Conde‟s direct appeal, Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 2003).  We summarize 
 
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them here only briefly.  On January 13, 1995, Conde picked up Rhonda Dunn, a 
prostitute, and took her to his apartment.  After engaging in sexual relations, Conde 
followed her out of the room and strangled her to death.  Conde then drove to 
another location and left her body on the side of the road.  Conde had done the 
same on five prior occasions to five other prostitutes.  This series of murders was 
preceded by the breakup of Conde‟s marriage, which occurred when his wife 
discovered that Conde was using the services of prostitutes.  Conde was arrested in 
June 1995, after fire rescue personnel discovered a woman, naked and bound in 
duct tape, trapped in his apartment.  Conde later confessed to all six murders and 
stated that after each murder, he knelt over the deceased body and verbally blamed 
the victim for his marital problems.   
Conde was charged with the first-degree murder of all six victims.  The 
counts were severed and his first trial, held in October 1999, was for Dunn‟s 
murder.  The trial court permitted the State to introduce Williams1 rule evidence of 
the other five murders.  The jury found Conde guilty of first-degree murder and 
recommended the death penalty by a nine-to-three vote.  The trial court imposed a 
                                          
 
 
1.  Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959) (permitting introduction of 
evidence of other crimes in particular circumstances). 
 
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sentence of death, finding three aggravating circumstances,2 one statutory 
mitigating circumstance,3 and five nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.4  Conde, 
860 So. 2d at 937-38.  On direct appeal, Conde raised thirteen claims.5  This Court 
affirmed.  See id. at 959.  Conde then filed the present rule 3.851 motion, wherein 
                                          
 
 
2.  The trial court found the following aggravators: (1) heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel (HAC); (2) cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP); (3) and prior violent 
felony.   
 
3.  The trial court found the following statutory mitigator: Conde had no 
significant history of prior criminal activity (moderate weight). 
 
4.  The nonstatutory mitigation was as follows: (1) Conde‟s positive 
influence on family despite adversity (moderate weight); (2) his good employment 
background (moderate weight); (3) his relationship with his children (given 
moderate weight); (4) Conde‟s mental and emotional problems (given little 
weight); and  (5) his status as model inmate (little weight). 
 
5.  Conde alleged error in the guilt phase, arguing that the trial court erred 
when it (1) denied his cause challenges to prospective jurors; (2) granted the 
State‟s motion to strike a prospective juror for cause; (3) denied Conde‟s motion 
for judgment of acquittal; (4) admitted Williams rule evidence of the other five 
murders; (5) admitted certain testimony concerning other crimes, a police officer‟s 
warning to the victim about “the Tamiami strangler,” and Conde‟s alleged flight at 
the time of his arrest; (6) failed to limit certain prosecutorial comments during the 
guilt-phase opening and closing arguments; and (7) denied Conde‟s motion to 
suppress his confession.   
Conde also alleged error in the penalty phase, claiming that the trial court 
erred by (8) finding the CCP and HAC aggravators; (9) rejecting certain mitigating 
circumstances; (10) allowing the admission of details regarding Conde‟s prior 
violent felony and allowing prosecutorial arguments regarding collateral crimes; 
(11) excluding mitigation testimony from a jail chaplain on the basis of a discovery 
violation; (12) imposing a disproportionate death sentence; and (13) not 
recognizing Florida‟s capital sentencing scheme as unconstitutional. 
 
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he raised seven claims.6  The postconviction court conducted a Huff7 hearing and 
then held an evidentiary hearing.8  The postconviction court ultimately denied 
relief on all grounds and this appeal followed, wherein Conde raises five claims.9   
                                          
 
 
6.  Conde argued that (1) certain public records were withheld from him; (2) 
application of rule 3.851 violated his rights because he could not file shell motions; 
(3) his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prosecutorial comments in 
closing arguments; (4) his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate 
mitigating evidence involving Dan Bazaro, a chaplain at the jail where Conde was 
held after his arrest, and for failing to sufficiently prepare and use family members 
in Colombia, and Conde‟s rights under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), 
were violated; (5) counsel was ineffective for failing to sufficiently address the 
witness disinterest that resulted from the retracted plea agreement; (6) Florida‟s 
death penalty is unconstitutional; and (7) lethal injection and electrocution are 
cruel and unusual punishments and Conde is entitled to the protection of 
international treaties.   
 
 
7.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993) (requiring a hearing in 
postconviction cases “for the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary 
hearing is required and to hear legal argument relating to the motion.”). 
 
8.  During the Huff hearing, Conde withdrew claim 1 (public records).  The 
postconviction court summarily denied claim 2 (3.851 shell motions), part of claim 
4 (ineffectiveness in investigating mitigation), claim 5 (plea offer fallout), and 
claims 6 and 7 (death penalty and methods of execution unconstitutional).  
However, Conde presented extensive testimony during the evidentiary hearings 
that addressed some of the summarily denied claims, including claim 4 
(ineffectiveness of counsel regarding Chaplain Bazaro) and claim 5 (witness 
disinterest resulting from the retracted plea offer), because they were interrelated.   
9.  Conde argues that the postconviction court erred in denying the  
following five claims: (1) counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the record 
on appeal and object to certain prosecutorial comments made at trial; (2) the 
postconviction court erred in denying Conde‟s use of an expert‟s testimony as to 
counsel‟s ineffectiveness; (3) counsel was ineffective for failing to discover 
Chaplain Bazaro; (4) counsel was ineffective for failing to properly address the 
negative impact on possible mitigation that resulted from the plea agreement 
 
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II. 
APPLICABLE STANDARDS 
Pursuant to the United States Supreme Court‟s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), we have held that for ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied:  
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards. 
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.   
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986).  This requires that the 
defendant show that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the „counsel‟ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  Next, the reviewing court must determine whether 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for the deficiency, the result would have 
been different.  Id. at 694.  “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id.   
Under the Strickland standard, the Court employs a mixed standard of 
review, deferring to the postconviction court‟s factual findings that are supported 
                                                                                                                                        
retraction; and (5) Florida‟s death penalty sentencing procedures are 
unconstitutional.  We deny relief on all of the claims.    
 
 
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by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing legal conclusions de novo.  
Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004).     
III. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
First, Conde contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object 
to several allegedly improper prosecutorial statements made during closing 
arguments.   The postconviction court summarily denied this claim, stating that the 
“[d]efendant cannot show prejudice pursuant to Strickland, supra.”  We find that 
the prosecutor‟s comments were insufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome as required under the Strickland prejudice standard.  See Maxwell, 490 
So. 2d at 932; see also Hitchcock v. State, 755 So. 2d 638, 643 (Fla. 2000) (“Any 
error in prosecutorial comments is harmless if there is no reasonable probability 
that those comments affected the verdict.” ) (citing King v. State, 623 So. 2d 486, 
487 (Fla.1993)).  “Failure to make the required showing of either deficient 
performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim.”  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 700.  Having reviewed this claim, we find that Conde has failed to 
demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland .  Accordingly, we 
affirm the postconviction court‟s denial of relief. 
 
In his second claim, Conde argues that the postconviction judge 
erred by not allowing Conde‟s expert to testify to the prevailing norms of effective 
representation in capital cases relevant to Conde‟s proceeding.  Because we resolve 
 
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the ineffectiveness issues in this case based on the prejudice prong of Strickland, 
we decline to address this issue.  Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim. 
In his third claim, Conde argues that his trial counsel was deficient in failing 
to timely discover and introduce the testimony of Chaplain Bazaro.  Bazaro 
allegedly would have testified that Conde confided to him that Conde had been 
sexually abused as a child.  Conde alleges that this testimony would have refuted 
the State‟s claim that he recently fabricated his claims of abuse.  We affirm the 
postconviction court‟s denial of relief.  This Court has already considered this 
claim in another form.  In Conde‟s direct appeal, he alleged that the trial court 
erred by excluding Chaplain Bazaro‟s testimony.  He raised the same substantive 
reasons there that he raises now in the guise of an ineffective assistance claim.  
This Court denied relief on direct appeal, explaining that “even if the trial court 
erred in excluding the chaplain‟s testimony, the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt under the standard set forth in State v. DiGuilio.”  Conde, 860 
So. 2d at 958.  Because this Court has already held that the exclusion of Bazaro‟s 
testimony was harmless error, Conde cannot establish prejudice in his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.  See, e.g., Cox v. State, 966 So. 2d 337, 347-48 (Fla. 
2007).  Accordingly, this claim is meritless.   
 
 
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Conde next alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to convey 
the negative impact on possible mitigation which resulted from a retracted plea 
offer of life imprisonment and for failing to seek enforcement of the plea offer.  
The postconviction court denied this claim.  We affirm that denial.  Though the 
postconviction court originally denied an evidentiary hearing on this issue at the 
Huff hearing, the court nevertheless received evidence at the evidentiary hearing 
over the State‟s objection.  The postconviction court noted the testimony from the 
evidentiary hearing claiming generally that once the plea offer was revoked, other 
potential witnesses in the case lost interest and stopped volunteering to help the 
defense team.  Id.  The postconviction court then denied relief because Conde had 
not alleged which witnesses lost interest and failed to testify or allege what their 
testimony would have been.  The court further held that the claim was refuted by 
the record since coworkers as well as neighbors testified at trial on Conde‟s behalf.  
Id.   
In making an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Conde was required to 
“identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the 
broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional 
standards.”  Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 932.   Further, he had to show that some 
deficiency “so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that 
confidence in the outcome is undermined.”  Id.  Conde has not done either.  He has 
 
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not established what, if any, negative result occurred.  He has not established who 
the additional witnesses were, what they would have testified to, or otherwise 
established how any disinterest resulting from the retracted plea agreement 
prejudiced him.  He has also failed to explain what information the additional 
witnesses or additional evidence would have provided that was not already given 
by the witnesses who did testify in his defense.   
By failing to demonstrate that additional witnesses would have testified and 
what those witnesses would have said, failing to explain how that testimony would 
improve on the testimony that was given in his case, and failing to explain how the 
additional testimony would interact with the other evidence and circumstances of 
his case, Conde has also failed to establish that he suffered any prejudice from 
counsel‟s alleged deficiencies.  These burdens of proof and of pleading were 
Conde‟s to carry.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Chavez v. State, 12 So. 
3d 199, 213 (Fla. 2009) (“The defendant has the burden of affirmatively 
establishing each prong of the Strickland standard.”).  Accordingly, because Conde 
failed to establish prejudice under Strickland, we affirm the postconviction court‟s 
denial of relief. 
In Conde‟s final claim, he argues that the postconviction court improperly 
denied his Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), claim.  This claim is procedurally 
barred as it was raised and rejected in Conde‟s direct appeal.  See Conde, 860 So. 
 
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2d at 959 (“Conde asserts that Florida‟s capital sentencing scheme violates the 
United States Constitution under the holding of  Ring v. Arizona . . . . We find that 
Conde is . . . not entitled to relief on this claim.”).  Even if this claim were not 
barred, this Court has consistently rejected Ring claims similar to those Conde 
raises.  See, e.g., Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 963 (Fla. 2003).  Finally, 
Conde‟s case involved the prior violent felony aggravator.  This Court has held 
that this aggravator satisfies the requirements of Ring.  See, e.g., Rodgers v. State, 
948 So. 2d 655, 673 (Fla. 2006).  Thus, we affirm the postconviction court‟s 
rejection of this claim. 
Conde has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any of the alleged 
deficiencies below and is not entitled to the requested relief.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the postconviction court‟s order denying Conde‟s 3.851 motion. 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Dade County,  
Jerald Bagley, Judge – Case No. F95-019816 
 
Gustavo J. Garcia-Montes, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
 
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Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Sandra S. Jaggard and 
Lisa A. Davis, Assistant Attorneys General, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee