Title: Florida Pub. Co. v. Fletcher
Citation: 340 So. 2d 914
Docket Number: 48372
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: October 7, 1976

340 So. 2d 914 (1976)
FLORIDA Publishing Company, a Florida Corporation, Petitioner (Defendant),
v.
Klenna Ann Fletcher, Etc., Respondent (Plaintiffs).
No. 48372.

Supreme Court of Florida.
October 7, 1976.
Rehearing Denied January 10, 1977.
Harold B. Wahl, of Wahl &amp; Gabel, Jacksonville, for petitioner.
*915 Ellis E. Neder, Jr., and Rudolph J. Inman, Jr., Jacksonville, for respondent.
George D. Gabel, Jr., of Wahl &amp; Gabel, Jacksonville, and Richard N. Winfield and Betty B. Robbins, of Rogers &amp; Wells, New York City, for Associated Press.
Charles S. Isler, Jr., and George P. Daniels, of Isler, Higby, Brown &amp; Smoak, Panama City, for Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc.
William C. Ballard, of Baynard, Lang &amp; Ballard, St. Petersburg, for Times Publishing Co.
Ted R. Manry, III, of MacFarlane, Ferguson, Alison &amp; Kelly, Clearwater, for The Tribune Co.
J. Laurent Scharff, of Pierson, Ball &amp; Dowd, Washington, D.C., and George D. Gabel, Jr., of Wahl &amp; Gabel, Jacksonville, for Radio Television News Directors Association.
George D. Gabel, Jr., of Wahl &amp; Gabel, Jacksonville, for The Greater Jacksonville Chapter of the Society of Professional Journalists/Sigma Delta Chi.
William G. Mateer, of Mateer, Harbert, Bechtel &amp; Phalin, Orlando, and John W. Fleming and Rex Conrad, of Fleming, O'Bryan &amp; Fleming, Fort Lauderdale, for Gore Newspapers Co. and Sentinel Star Co.
Dan Paul and Sanford L. Bohrer, of Paul &amp; Thomson, Miami, for The Miami Herald Publishing Co., The New York Times Company and Gannett Company, Inc.
DuBose Ausley and C. Gary Williams, of Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Carothers &amp; Proctor, Tallahassee, for The Tallahassee Democrat and Florida Society of Newspaper Editors.
James D. Whisenand, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Sharyn L. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., State of Florida, amici curiae.
ROBERTS, Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Fletcher v. Florida Publishing Co., reported at 319 So. 2d 100 (Fla.App. 1, 1975), which directly conflicts with Jacova v. Southern Radio and Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955), thereby vesting jurisdiction in this Court pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.
The facts supported by the record are succinctly stated in the summary final judgment of the trial judge who determined that there was no real dispute as to the material facts. Respondent, Mrs. Fletcher, left Jacksonville for New York on September 15, 1972, to visit a friend. She left in Jacksonville her three young daughters, including seventeen-year-old Cindy. A "baby sitter" was to spend the nights with the children, but there was no one with them in the home during the daytime except a young man who had a room in the house and whom Mrs. Fletcher described as Cindy's "boy friend." On the afternoon of September 15, 1972, while Cindy was alone in the house, a fire of undetermined origin did large damage to the home, and Cindy died.
The fire and police departments were called by a neighbor who discovered the fire, but too late to save the child. A large group of firemen, news media representatives, and onlookers gathered at the scene and on Mrs. Fletcher's property.
When the Fire Marshal and Police Sergeant Short entered the house to make their official investigation, they invited the news media to accompany them, as they deposed was their standard practice. The media representatives entered through the open door; there was no objection to their entry; they entered quietly and peaceably; they did no damage to the property; and their entry was for the purpose of their news coverage of this fire and death.
The Fire Marshal desired a clear picture of the "silhouette" left on the floor after the removal of Cindy's body. He and Sergeant Short in their depositions explained that the picture was important for their respective investigations to show that the body was already on the floor before the heat of the fire did any damage in the room. The Fire Marshal took one polaroid *916 picture of the silhouette, but it was not too clear, he had no further film, and he requested photographer Cranford to take the "silhouette" picture which was made a part of the official investigation file of both the Fire and Police.
This picture was not only a part of the investigation but News Photographer Cranford turned it and his other pictures over to the defendant newspaper. It and several other pictures appeared in the news story of The Florida Times-Union on September 16, 1972.
Respondent first learned of the facts surrounding the death of her daughter by reading the newspaper story and viewing the published photographs.
Respondent filed an amended complaint against petitioner alleging (1) trespass and invasion of privacy, (2) invasion of privacy, (3) wrong intentional infliction of emotional distress  seeking punitive damages.
The trial court dismissed Count II and granted final summary judgment for petitioner as to Counts I and III. Relative to the granting of summary judgment for Petitioner as to Count I, the trial judge cogently explicated:
On appeal, the District Court of Appeal reversed as to the granting of summary judgment on Count I, stating:
Although recognizing that consent is an absolute defense to an action for trespass and that the defense of custom and usage is but another way of expressing consent by implication  that is consent may be implied from custom, usage or conduct  the District Court commented that the emergency of the fire was over and that there was no contention that petitioner's employees entered the premises to render assistance, explained that respondent did not either impliedly or expressly invite petitioner's employees into her home, and concluded that the proofs before the court were not sufficient to show that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether implied consent by custom and usage authorized entry into the premises without invitation by appellant.
As to the other points on appeal, the District Court of Appeal, First District, determined that although punitive damages are recoverable in a proper case for trespass resulting in invasion of privacy, the trial judge did not err in granting summary judgment for petitioner on issue of punitive damages, held that the trial court correctly dismissed Count II with prejudice, and correctly granted summary judgment for petitioner as to Count III.
The District Court erred in reversing summary judgment for petitioners as to Count I. The trial court properly determined from the record before it that there was no genuine issue of material fact insofar *918 as the entry into respondent's home by petitioner's employees became lawful and non-actionable pursuant to the doctrine of common custom, usage, and practice and since it had been shown that it was common usage, custom and practice for news media to enter private premises and homes under the circumstances present here.
Judge McCord in his dissenting opinion could not agree with the majority that the news photographer who entered the burned out home was a trespasser or that the photograph published by petitioner and the news story resulting from the entry were an actionable invasion of privacy. We agree with and approve the following well-reasoned explication by Judge McCord in his dissenting opinion:
Accordingly, that portion of the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, reversing summary judgment for petitioner as to Count I is quashed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.
SUNDBERG, J., dissents with an opinion.
ENGLAND, J., did not participate in this decision.
SUNDBERG, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent from the majority opinion. I dissent not because of the decision reached on merits, but because I cannot conscientiously conclude, as does the majority, that there is direct conflict between the decision of the District Court of Appeal in the instant case and Jacova v. Southern Radio &amp; Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955). Jacova dealt altogether with the issue of whether a communications medium has a qualified privilege to publish the name or photo of a person who has become an "actor" in a newsworthy event. No element of trespass was presented in that case as it is here. In Jacova the plaintiff was photographed by television camera during a police "raid" at a cigar shop located in a hotel.
As explicated by the majority, the issue sub judice is whether the trial court erred in entering summary judgment on the count of the amended complaint which alleged trespass and invasion of privacy. The District Court of Appeal concluded that the proofs were insufficient to determine on summary judgment that there was no trespass based on the affidavits of "custom and usage" utilized to supply the implied consent to the entry found by the trial judge. The opinion below expressly recognized the principle of Jacova with respect to the privilege to publish matters of legitimate, general public interest without being subject to a claim of invasion of privacy:
It might be asserted that there is conflict on the issue of trespass with the decision of this Court in Prior v. White, 132 Fla. 1, 180 So. 347 (1938). The Prior case dealt with the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance declaring solicitation "in and upon private residences" a nuisance. As pointed out by the majority below, the opinion discussed the principle of implied consent supplied by custom and usage but in the context of the city's exercise of its police power to declare certain conduct a nuisance. The District Court of Appeal opinion carefully discussed and distinguished the Prior decision as not being determinative of the trespass issue sub judice. Fletcher v. Fla. Publishing Co., supra, at 105.
Judge McCord in dissenting from the majority opinion below recognized that this is a case of first impression when he stated, "The question of implied consent to news media personnel to enter premises in a circumstance *920 such as this appears to be one of first impression not only in this jurisdiction but elsewhere." 319 So. 2d 100, 113 at 114.
There is little doubt in my mind that this case is one of great public interest which would justify consideration by this Court. Nonetheless, our jurisdiction is circumscribed by Article V of the Constitution, and it is the function under our constitutional scheme of the district courts of appeal to initiate review by this Court of questions of great public interest through certification. See Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.
As so aptly stated by Justice Drew in Fla. Power &amp; Light Co. v. Bell, 113 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 1959):
Finding no decisional conflict and the absence of certification of the question to this Court by the District Court of Appeal, First District, I would discharge the writ for lack of jurisdiction.
Rehearing denied; OVERTON, C.J., ADKINS, BOYD and HATCHETT, JJ., and ROBERTS, RET. J., concur.
SUNDBERG J., dissents.