Title: Nibler v. Dept. of Transportation
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S50351
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: February 3, 2005

FILED:  February 3, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
CURT NIBLER,
as Personal Representative of the Estate of Laura Nibler,
Plaintiff-Adverse Party,
v.
OREGON DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
and OREGON DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE,
Departments of the State of Oregon,
Defendants-Relators.
(CC 0212-12262; SC S50351)
En Banc
Original proceeding in mandamus.*
Argued and submitted September 9, 2004.
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for defendants-relators.  With her on the brief were
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor
General.
Jonathan M. Friedman, Portland, argued the cause and filed
the brief for the plaintiff-adverse party.
Maureen Leonard, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus
curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
CARSON, C.J.
Peremptory writ of mandamus to issue.
*On petition for writ of mandamus from an order of Multnomah
County Circuit Court, Nely L. Johnson, Judge.
CARSON, C.J.
The issue in this original mandamus proceeding is
whether defendants-relators, the Oregon Department of
Transportation and the Oregon Department of State Police
(defendants), are entitled to a peremptory writ of mandamus
requiring the trial court to change venue in the underlying
negligence action from Multnomah County to Washington County.  We
conclude that defendants are entitled to that relief and,
accordingly, direct the issuance of a peremptory writ.
The relevant facts are few and undisputed.  Plaintiff-adverse party (plaintiff) and his wife were involved in an
automobile accident in Washington County that resulted in his
wife's death.  As personal representative of his wife's estate,
plaintiff filed an action against defendants in Multnomah County,
alleging negligence in a number of respects.  Defendants
responded with a motion that, for our purposes here, argued that
ORS 14.060, set out post, required venue in Washington County,
where the accident had occurred. (1)  The trial court denied
the motion to change venue, and we allowed defendants' mandamus
petition challenging that ruling and issued an alternative writ.
ORS 14.060, the statute upon which defendants rely,
provides:
"Any suit against any department, official,
officer, commissioner, commission or board of the
state, as such, or in [sic] virtue of such status,
other than a suit for the causes enumerated in ORS
14.040, may be brought in the county wherein the cause
of suit, or some part thereof, arose." (2) 
The parties dispute the meaning of ORS 14.060 and, particularly,
the effect of the legislature's use of the ordinarily permissive
word "may" in that statute.  Before addressing those arguments,
however, we first consider whether ORS 14.060 applies to
plaintiff's action at all.
By its plain terms, ORS 14.060 applies to "any suit"
that falls within the scope of that statute.  In legal parlance,
the word "suit" most specifically is used to refer to proceedings
in equity, which plaintiff's action is not.  See, e.g., Giant
Powder Co. v. Oregon W. Ry. Co., 54 Or 325, 327, 101 P 209, 103 P
501 (1909) ("An 'action' is a proceeding at law to enforce a
private right or to redress a private wrong * * *; but in equity
the compulsion for that purpose is known as a 'suit[.]'"
(internal citations omitted)).  The legal usage of that word,
however, is by no means always that specific.  See, e.g., Thorp
v. Rutherford, 150 Or 157, 163, 43 P2d 907 (1935) ("Text[-]writers and courts sometimes use the word[s] 'suit' and 'action'
as synonymous.").  Thus, the question here is:  what meaning did
the legislature intend by using the word "suit" in ORS 14.060?
A casual reading of the venue statutes in ORS chapter
14 suggests a legislative intent for the more specific usage. 
Compare ORS 14.050 and ORS 14.080 (referring to "actions") with
ORS 14.060 (referring to "suits") and ORS 14.030 and ORS 14.040
(referring to "any cause of action or suit" and "actions and
suits," respectively).  The evolution of ORS 14.060 over time
supports that view as well.  See Krieger v. Just, 319 Or 328,
336, 876 P2d 754 (1994) ("[W]ording changes adopted from session
to session are a part of context of the present version of the
statute being construed.").  As originally enacted in 1939, ORS
14.060 began with the phrase "[a]ny suit in equity * * *."  Or
Laws 1939, ch 284, § 1, codified as OCLA § 9-109 (1940). 
Although the legislature condensed that introductory phrase to
its present form by eliminating the words "in equity" when it
enacted the Oregon Revised Statutes in 1953, compare OCLA § 9-109
(1940), with ORS 14.060 (1953), the legislature, as a general
matter, did not intend to make any substantive changes in the law
when it created Oregon's present statutory scheme.  See ORS
174.550 (so providing).
The foregoing contextual review, standing alone,
strongly suggests that the legislature intended ORS 14.060 to
apply to only suits in equity and not also to actions at law,
such as plaintiff's case.  There is, however, more.  In 1979, as
part of its adoption of the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure, the
legislature, through ORCP 2, largely abolished the procedural
distinctions between law and equity practice.  ORCP 2 provides:
"There shall be one form of action known as a
civil action.  All procedural distinctions between
actions at law and suits in equity are hereby
abolished, except for those distinctions specifically
provided for by these rules, by statute, or by the
Constitution of this state."
Additionally, and more importantly for our purposes, the
legislature also enacted ORS 174.590 that same year, providing: 
"References in the statute laws of this state,
including provisions of law deemed to be rules of court
as provided in ORS 1.745, in effect on or after January
1, 1980, to actions, actions at law, proceedings at
law, suits, suits in equity, proceedings in equity,
judgments or decrees are not intended and shall not be
construed to retain procedural distinctions between
actions at law and suits in equity abolished by ORCP
2." 
Or Laws 1979, ch 284, § 5.  This court long has held that
statutory venue provisions are procedural in nature.  See, e.g.,
Mutzig v. Hope, 176 Or 368, 385, 158 P2d 110 (1945) ("By the
overwhelming weight of authority, statutes relating to venue are
held to be procedural merely, and not jurisdictional in the
strict sense.").  The question that remains, however, is whether,
by retaining the words "suits" and "actions" in the venue
statutes in ORS chapter 14, the legislature intended to signal a
specific intent to provide for a distinction between law and
equity in those statutes under the exception to ORCP 2.  See ORCP
2 (abolishing procedural distinctions between actions at law and
suits in equity, except for "those distinctions specifically
provided for by these rules, by statute, or by the Constitution
of this state").  As explained below, we conclude that it did
not.
Because the legislature has directed both (1) that
statutory references to "actions" and "suits" are not intended to
retain procedural distinctions between actions at law and suits
in equity abolished by ORCP 2, see ORS 174.590 (so providing),
and (2) that those distinctions remain where "specifically
provided for * * * by statute," see ORCP 2 (so providing), the
statutory context of references to "actions" and "suits" has
particular importance in discerning the legislature's intent in
using those terms.  In Ben Rybke Co. v. Royal Globe Insurance
Co., 293 Or 513, 520, 520 n 5, 651 P2d 138 (1982), for example,
this court concluded that ORCP 2 did not abolish the distinction
between actions at law and suits in equity under former ORS
19.125 (1981), renumbered as ORS 19.415 (1997), (3) which
provided for the application of de novo review only in appeals
from "a decree in a suit in equity."  In that case, despite the
direction in ORS 174.590, it was clear that the legislature had
intended for the statutory reference to "suit in equity" to
retain its specific legal meaning because a contrary reading
would lead to the absurd result that that statute had provided
for two standards of appellate review without providing any basis
for determining which of those standards applies in a particular
instance.  
The application of ORS 174.590 to the venue statutes in
ORS chapter 14, by contrast, yields no such absurdity and,
indeed, completes those statutes.  As discussed in more detail
below, __ Or at __ (slip op at 9), the "catch-all" venue statute,
ORS 14.080(1), refers to only "actions."  See ORS 14.080(1) (so
providing).  Thus, if the statutory references to "suits" and
"actions" in the venue statutes in ORS chapter 14 were construed
to retain their specific legal meanings, then ORS 14.080(1) would
apply to only actions at law, and a gap would exist for suits in
equity not fitting within the specific categories of the other
venue statutes. 
Based upon that context, the impact of ORS 174.590 on
ORS 14.060 appears clear to us: by its enactment of ORS 174.590
in 1979, the legislature directed courts to read the words "suit"
and "cause of suit" in ORS 14.060 so as to not draw precisely the
distinction between legal and equitable proceedings that the
legislature in 1939 had contemplated.  Effectively, then, we must
replace those words with the "one form of action" that ORCP 2
does provide, namely, a "civil action."  So construed, ORS 14.060
applies to plaintiff's negligence action against defendants.
Having determined the applicability of ORS 14.060, we
next proceed to consider whether that statute requires -- or,
instead, simply permits -- plaintiff to maintain his action
against defendants "in the county wherein the [civil action], or
some part thereof, arose."  The parties offer competing
interpretations of the legislature's use of the word "may" in ORS
14.060.  See ORS 14.060 ("Any suit * * * may be brought * * *."). 
Defendants argue that, when considered in historical context,
concerns over the implicit waiver of sovereign immunity explain
the legislature's use of the word "may."  Specifically,
defendants contend:
"If [ORS 14.060] had used 'shall,' and had provided
that any suit against a state department, official,
officer, agency, or board 'shall be brought in the
county wherein the cause of suit, or some part thereof,
arose,' there would have been a serious risk that
'shall' might have been taken as a signal that the
state was impliedly waiving its sovereign immunity. 
Using 'may' instead was only prudent, given the tenor
of the times [which defendants describe as an 'era of
scholarly and judicial hostility to the concept of
state sovereign immunity']."
According to defendants, viewed in that light, the word "may"
indicates only that, if a civil action against the state and its
subdivisions can be brought at all, then it may be brought in the
county in which the cause of action arose.
Although ably advanced, defendants' sovereign immunity
theory is subtle to the point that we do not think it a plausible
explanation for the legislature's choice of wording.  We,
therefore, turn to consideration of plaintiff's theory.
Aided by amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association, plaintiff contends that, by applying the principles
of statutory construction announced in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), this court should
assign the word "may" in ORS 14.060 its ordinary permissive
meaning.  See id. at 611 ("[W]ords of common usage typically
should be given their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning."). 
According to plaintiff, if the word "may" is construed in that
manner, then ORS 14.060 grants plaintiff the discretion either to
file the action in the county where the claim arose or to elect,
instead, to proceed under ORS 14.080(1), the "catch-all" venue
statute.  ORS 14.080(1) provides, in part:
"All other actions shall be commenced in the
county in which the defendants, or one of them, reside
at the commencement of the action or in the county
where the cause of action arose.  A party resident of
more than one county shall be deemed a resident of each
such county.  If none of the defendants reside in this
state the action may be commenced in any county."
(Emphasis added.)  Because, in plaintiff's view, the state
resides in every county, the county of venue is his to choose.
We begin by observing that the word "may" ordinarily
denotes permission or the authority to do something.  See
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1396 (unabridged ed 2002)
(defining the word "may" as meaning, in part, to "have permission
to * * *: have liberty to"); see also, e.g., Martin v. City of
Tigard, 335 Or 444, 452, 72 P3d 619 (2003) ("The ordinary meaning
of the word 'may' is 'have liberty to.'" (internal citation
omitted)).  Applying that definition here, we agree with
plaintiff that ORS 14.060 grants him statutory authority to file
his action in the county where his claim arose.
That conclusion, however, does not mean that ORS 14.060
also grants plaintiff authority to elect to proceed under a
different statute. This court's decision in Hubner v. Hubner, 67
Or 557, 136 P 667 (1913), illustrates that point.  In that case,
the husband had brought a dissolution of marriage proceeding
against his wife in Clackamas County, despite the fact that both
parties resided in Multnomah County.  The venue statutes at that
time were, in many respects, the same as they are today, see id.
at 559-60, with specific provision having been made for venue in
marital dissolution cases:  "[I]n any suit for the dissolution of
the marriage contract the same may be commenced and tried in any
county of this state in which either party to the suit resides." 
Id. at 560 (referring to Lord's Oregon Laws, title VI, ch I, §
396 (1910) (emphasis added)).  In construing that quoted wording,
the court held that, because the statute conferred the right to
commence a marriage dissolution proceeding only in a county where
one of the parties resides, it followed that "a person has no
right to commence a suit for divorce in a county in which neither
party resides."  Id.
So it is, we conclude, with respect to the
legislature's use of "may" in ORS 14.060.  ORS 14.060, and no
other statute, grants a plaintiff statutory authority to file an
action against the state and its subdivisions in a particular
county. (4)  Although ORS 14.080(1) applies to "[a]ll other
actions[,]" an action subject to ORS 14.060 necessarily is not an
"other" action.  The trial court, therefore, erred in denying
defendants' motion to change venue from Multnomah County to
Washington County.  A writ directing the trial court to vacate
that order and to enter an order granting the motion shall issue.
Peremptory writ of mandamus to issue.
1. Defendants' legal theory has evolved somewhat over the
course of the proceedings.  That variation, however, does not
impede our ability to decide the questions of statutory
construction that this case presents.  See Newport Church of the
Nazarene v. Hensley, 335 Or 1, 16, 56 P3d 386 (2002) (once issue
of construction of statute properly is presented, meaning is for
court to decide).
2. ORS 14.040, to which ORS 14.060 refers, provides:
"Actions and suits for the following causes shall
be commenced and tried in the county in which the
subject of the action or suit, or some part thereof, is
situated:
"(1)  Actions for the recovery of real property,
or an estate or interest therein, or for injuries to
real property.
"(2)  Actions for the recovery of any personal
property distrained for any cause.
"(3)  Suits for the partition of real
property.
"(4)  Suits for the foreclosure of a lien or
mortgage upon real property.
"(5)  Suits for the determination of an adverse
claim, estate, or interest in real property, or the
specific performance of an agreement in relation
thereto."
No party asserts that ORS 14.040 applies to the facts of this
case, and we agree that it does not.
3. Former ORS 19.125 (1981), renumbered as ORS 19.415(3)
(1997), provided:
"(1) Upon an appeal from a judgment in an action
at law, the scope of review shall be as provided in
section 3, Article VII (Amended) of the Oregon
Constitution.
"(2) No judgment shall be reversed or modified
except for error substantially affecting the rights of
a party.
"(3) Upon an appeal from a decree in a suit in
equity, the Court of Appeals shall try the cause anew
upon the record.
"(4) When the Court of Appeals has tried a cause
anew upon the record, the Supreme Court may limit its
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals to
questions of law."
4. We note that a different statute governs venue for
actions against public officers and those specially
appointed to execute the duties of a public officer or who
act at the command or in aid of a public officer.  ORS
14.050(2) provides that such actions "shall be commenced and
tried in the county where the cause, or some part thereof,
arose."