Title: Melvin Trotter v. State Of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC03-735
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 25, 2006

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-735 
____________ 
 
MELVIN TROTTER, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-1967 
____________ 
 
 
MELVIN TROTTER, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JAMES R. MCDONOUGH, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[May 25, 2006] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Melvin Trotter appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion for 
postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and an order 
 
 
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concluding that he is not mentally retarded.  He also petitions the Court for a writ 
of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  As 
explained below, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Trotter’s postconviction 
motion and the order on mental retardation, and we deny Trotter’s habeas petition. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
In 1986, Trotter, in the course of robbing a store, murdered the seventy-year-
old shop owner.  She died from the seven stab wounds he inflicted, one of which 
disemboweled her.  Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 1990).  Upon his 
conviction for robbery and first-degree murder, the court imposed a death sentence.  
On appeal, we affirmed Trotter’s convictions but vacated the sentence and 
remanded for a new penalty phase because the trial court erred in treating his 
violation of community control as an aggravating factor.  Id. at 694.1 
 
Following the new penalty phase, eleven jurors recommended death, and the 
court imposed that sentence after finding four aggravating factors and two 
statutory, and several nonstatutory, mitigating factors.  Trotter v. State, 690 So. 2d 
                                          
 
 
1.  Trotter raised eight issues on appeal: that the trial court erred by (1) 
refusing to grant an additional peremptory challenge; (2) failing to investigate 
alleged extraneous influences on the jury; (3) refusing to disqualify the prosecutor 
who previously represented Trotter on an unrelated matter; (4) failing to remove a 
juror for cause; (5) using Trotter’s community control violation as a sentence 
aggravator; (6) refusing to admit Trotter’s drawings as mitigation; (7) using a 
constitutionally vague heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) jury instruction; and (8) 
determining that the murder was HAC. 
 
 
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1234, 1236 (Fla. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 876 (1997).2  On appeal, Trotter 
raised ten issues, including a contention that the trial court again erred in using his 
community control status as an aggravator.  Id. at 1237.3  We affirmed the 
sentence, finding that subsequent statutory changes permitting use of such status as 
an aggravator constituted a “refinement” of the law that applied retroactively.  Id.  
Without discussion, we found all other issues meritless.  Id.   
 
Subsequently, Trotter filed a motion for postconviction relief under rule 
3.850.4 The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on four claims, following which 
it issued an order denying all claims. 
                                          
 
 
2.  The court found the following aggravators: Trotter was on community 
control at the time of the murder; he had a prior violent felony conviction; he 
committed the murder in the course of a robbery and for pecuniary gain (merged); 
and the murder was “especially wicked, evil, atrocious, and cruel.”  690 So. 2d at 
1236 n.5.  The court found two statutory mitigators—extreme mental and 
emotional disturbance and capacity substantially impaired (cocaine addiction)—
and nonstatutory mitigation, including  below-average IQ, family and 
developmental problems, disadvantaged background, possible frontal lobe brain 
disorder, Trotter’s remorse, and “other nonstatutory factors.”  Id. at 1236 & nn.6-7. 
 
3.  Trotter raised the following issues: (1) that the trial court erred in using 
community control as an aggravating circumstance; (2) that victim impact 
evidence is generally inadmissible and (3) that admission of such evidence in his 
case was improper; (4) that he should have been permitted to challenge the validity 
of his 1985 prior robbery conviction; (5) that the trial court failed to investigate his 
racial bias claim; (6) that the trial court erred in denying his cause challenges and  
(7) in denying a specific cause challenge; (8) that the trial court erroneously 
admitted evidence of a nonstatutory aggravator; (9) that the prosecutor made 
improper comments; and (10) that the sentencing order was deficient.  Id. at 1236 
n.8.   
 
4.  In his postconviction motion Trotter alleged that counsel was ineffective 
for (1) failing to timely challenge the validity of his prior violent felony conviction 
 
 
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Trotter filed this appeal and petitioned for writ of habeas corpus.  Following 
this Court’s promulgation of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203, providing 
a procedure for determining mental retardation in death penalty cases, we granted 
Trotter’s motion to relinquish jurisdiction.  Pursuant to that rule, Trotter filed a 
successive postconviction motion in the circuit court for determination of mental 
retardation and waived an evidentiary hearing.  The attorneys filed written reports 
and closing arguments in lieu of live proceedings, and the parties stipulated to the 
court taking judicial notice of the testimony presented at Trotter’s 2002 
postconviction hearing.  The court also took judicial notice of Trotter’s trial and 
resentencing proceedings.  The court determined that Trotter was not mentally 
retarded.  In his supplemental brief, Trotter appeals that order as well.  We now 
address the issues Trotter raises in his initial and supplemental briefs. 
II.  THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
Trotter raises issues regarding his claim that he is mentally retarded.  He also 
raises several claims on appeal from the denial of his postconviction motion.  
                                                                                                                                        
and failing to present evidence regarding the circumstances of that prior crime; (2) 
not having the assistance of a competent mental health expert; (3) failing to 
provide mental health experts with available information necessary to their 
diagnoses of Trotter; and (4) conceding guilt during the guilt phase closing 
argument.  He further alleged that (5) execution by lethal injection or electrocution 
is unconstitutional; (6) Florida’s death penalty sentencing statute is 
unconstitutional on its face and as applied; (7) the penalty phase jury instructions 
unconstitutionally shifted the burden to Trotter; and (8) cumulative errors were not 
harmless. 
 
 
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Below we address two issues regarding mental retardation.  We then address three 
issues from his original appeal. 
A.  Mental Retardation Claims 
 
We first address two issues Trotter raised in his supplemental brief regarding 
his claim of mental retardation: (1) that the circuit court erred in determining 
Trotter was not mentally retarded; and (2) that his death sentence is not 
proportional.5  We address these issues in turn.  
1.  Whether Trotter is Mentally Retarded 
 
To establish mental retardation, a defendant must demonstrate all three of 
the following:  (1) significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning; (2) 
concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) manifestation of the condition 
before age eighteen.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.203(b).6  In the proceedings held on 
                                          
 
 
5.  Trotter also argues that the clear and convincing evidence standard of 
section 921.137(4), Florida Statutes (2001) (prohibiting imposition of death 
sentence on a mentally retarded defendant), is unconstitutional.  We need not 
address this claim, however, because the trial court concluded that Trotter was not 
mentally retarded either under the clear and convincing evidence standard or the 
preponderance of the evidence standard.  See Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551, 
552 (Fla.1975) (stating that “courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of 
statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on 
other grounds”). 
6.  Rule 3.203 defines mental retardation as follows: 
As used in this rule, the term “mental retardation” means significantly 
subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with 
deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from 
 
 
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remand, the circuit court considered the testimony or reports of six mental health 
experts: Drs. Calvin Pinkard, Harry Krop, Bill Mosman, Sidney Merin, Antolin 
Llorente, and Michael Gamache.  The circuit court concluded that Trotter did not 
meet any of the three prongs for determining mental retardation by either the 
preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence.  Trotter 
contends this is error.  We disagree and find that competent, substantial evidence 
supports the court’s determination. 
 
First, no expert who tested Trotter’s IQ as an adult, including those who also 
examined his adaptive skills, found that Trotter meets the definition for mental 
retardation.  They reported IQ scores ranging from 72 to 91.  The court found that 
variances in Trotter’s IQ subtest scores were inconsistent with mental retardation.  
Trotter’s scores on some subtests were normal, and score variances were explained 
by his not starting school until age nine and the deficient environment in which he 
                                                                                                                                        
conception to age 18. The term “significantly subaverage general 
intellectual functioning,” for the purpose of this rule, means 
performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean 
score on a standardized intelligence test authorized by the Department 
of Children and Family Services in rule 65B-4.032 of the Florida 
Administrative Code. The term “adaptive behavior,” for the purpose 
of this rule, means the effectiveness or degree with which an 
individual meets the standards of personal independence and social 
responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and 
community. 
(Emphasis added.)  Section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes (2005), provides an 
identical definition, but the statute “does not apply to a defendant who was 
sentenced to death prior to” its effective date.  Id. § 921.137(8). 
 
 
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grew up.  The testimony and reports of several doctors directly supported this 
conclusion, including Dr. Krop, who examined and tested Trotter and reviewed 
numerous records.  These same doctors found that Trotter was not deficient in 
adaptive skills.  In addition, Dr. Mosman, a defense expert, did not assess adaptive 
skills because Trotter’s IQ excluded Trotter from the mental retardation category. 
 
Trotter’s arguments on appeal rest almost completely on the testimony of 
Dr. Calvin Pinkard.  In 1974, Dr. Pinkard tested and interviewed Trotter (then age 
fifteen) to determine whether he was mentally retarded.  Without examining prior 
school records and IQ testing or adaptive functioning, Pinkard concluded that 
Trotter was not mentally retarded.  Pinkard determined Trotter had an IQ of 88, 
was normal and mature for his age, was able to follow complex verbal directions, 
and was capable of being trained in a variety of trades.  He diagnosed Trotter with 
“mild” “inadequate personality disorder” based on Trotter’s shyness, negative self-
image, and “not making it” in school, but found no treatment was needed.   
 
In 2002, however, Pinkard reversed himself.  He opined that Trotter was at 
age fifteen, and is as an adult, mentally retarded.  He testified that Trotter’s 1976 
IQ score of 88 was artificially inflated by eight points, and having read Dr. 
Mosman’s affidavit, Pinkard testified that Trotter had deficits in adaptive 
functioning.  Pinkard did not examine or conduct any new testing on Trotter.  
 
 
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Because Dr. Pinkard is the only expert who examined Trotter in his youth, 
Trotter contends his testimony should be essentially determinative and afforded 
great weight.  We disagree.  First, the question of evidentiary weight is reserved to 
the circuit court, and this Court does not reweigh the evidence.  Tibbs v. State, 397 
So. 2d 1120, 1123 (Fla. 1981) (“Legal sufficiency alone, as opposed to evidentiary 
weight, is the appropriate concern of an appellate tribunal.”), aff’d, 457 U.S. 31 
(1982).  Second, the circuit court found Dr. Pinkard’s testimony unreliable.  The 
determination of the credibility of witnesses also is reserved to the trial court.  
Windom v. State, 886 So. 2d 915, 927 (Fla. 2004) (“This Court has held that it will 
not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact, and 
likewise on the credibility of witnesses and the weight given to the evidence so 
long as the trial court's findings are supported by competent, substantial 
evidence.”). 
 
When Trotter was fifteen, Pinkard concluded that Trotter was not mentally 
retarded.  As the circuit court found, even if the IQ score of 88 were adjusted down 
to 80, the IQ would still be above the mental retardation level, a fact Pinkard 
admitted.  Importantly, Pinkard’s revised opinion does not rest on his own new 
examination or testing of Trotter; he did none.  In fact, there is no basis in his own 
testimony to support his new opinion.  His opinion is contradicted by the testimony 
 
 
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of all of the other experts who did examine Trotter.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
trial court’s determination that Trotter is not mentally retarded. 
2.  Proportionality Claim 
 
Trotter next contends that the 1993 resentencing order is deficient and that 
the death sentence is not proportional.  These arguments were not preserved below 
and are procedurally barred because we considered them on direct appeal from 
Trotter’s resentencing.  See Trotter, 690 So. 2d at 1236 n.8, 1237 (denying without 
discussion Trotter’s claim that resentencing order was deficient as meritless).  
Further, this Court considers the question of proportionality in each death penalty 
case on direct review of the sentence, even when we do not directly address the 
issue in the written opinion.  See Patton v. State, 878 So. 2d 368, 380 (Fla. 2004)  
(“[P]roportionality review is inherent in this Court's direct appellate review and the 
issue is considered regardless of whether it is discussed in the opinion or raised by 
a party. . . .”); see also Anderson v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 407 (Fla. 2003) (“Due to 
the uniqueness of the penalty, this Court addresses the propriety of all death 
sentences in a proportionality review.”); Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(6) (“In death 
penalty cases, whether or not insufficiency of the evidence or proportionality is an 
issue presented for review, the court shall review these issues and, if necessary, 
remand for the appropriate relief.”).  
 
 
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B.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 
 
Trotter raises three claims on appeal from the denial of his postconviction 
motion: (1) that Trotter’s mental health expert did not provide competent and 
effective assistance under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74, 84 (1985) (holding 
where sanity at the time of crime is at issue and in capital penalty proceedings 
where expert assistance is needed, due process requires that an indigent defendant 
have psychiatric expert assistance); (2) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to investigate Trotter’s background and develop available mitigation; and (3) that 
trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a timely motion to 
vacate a prior conviction.7 
 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court established a 
two-pronged standard for determining whether counsel provided legally ineffective 
assistance.  First, a defendant must point to specific acts or omissions of counsel 
that are “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed 
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”  Id. at 687.  Second, the defendant must 
establish prejudice by “show[ing] that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
                                          
 
 
7.  In his original brief, Trotter raises one issue—that section 921.137, 
Florida Statutes (2001), is unconstitutional because it does not provide for 
retrospective application of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding 
that it is unconstitutional to execute a “mentally retarded offender”)—that our 
remand rendered moot.  Another issue, that Trotter is mentally retarded, is 
redundant and thus merged with the first issue raised in the supplemental brief. 
 
 
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different.”  Id. at 694.  A reasonable probability is a “probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id.  Claims of ineffective assistance 
present mixed questions of law and fact.  Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 
1045 (Fla. 2000).  This Court independently reviews the trial court's legal 
conclusions and defers to the trial court's findings of fact.  As explained below, we 
affirm the denial of each of Trotter’s claims. 
1.  Mental Health Expert Assistance 
 
In his postconviction motion, Trotter alleged that counsel was ineffective 
because Trotter did not have the assistance of a competent and effective mental 
health expert in Dr. Krop.8   On appeal, however, Trotter presents a different claim: 
that Krop did not provide competent and effective assistance as required by Ake.  
Accordingly, this claim was not preserved for appellate review.  As explained 
below, it is also meritless. 
 
In Ake, the United States Supreme Court held, with regard to the sentencing 
phase of capital trials, that “due process requires access to a psychiatric 
examination on relevant issues, to the testimony of the psychiatrist, and to 
assistance in preparation at the sentencing phase.”  470 U.S. at 84.  This 
                                          
 
 
8.  Trotter claimed that Dr. Krop’s alleged testing errors, inadequate 
research, and erroneous diagnoses all resulted in misleading and preventing 
counsel from adequately or effectively defending Trotter at both the guilt and 
sentencing phases.   
 
 
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requirement of access to, and assistance from, a mental health expert was met here.  
At Trotter’s resentencing, three experts testified for him: Dr. Harry Krop, Dr. 
Frank Wood, and Dr. Michael Maher.  Dr. Krop administered various tests, met 
with Trotter several times, reviewed numerous documents and records regarding 
Trotter’s background, and interviewed several witnesses who knew Trotter.  Based 
in large part on his testimony, the trial court found two statutory mitigating factors: 
that Trotter was under the influence of extreme mental and emotional disturbance 
and his capacity was substantially impaired.  Trotter, 690 So. 2d at 1236 n.6.  The 
resentencing court also found the following nonstatutory mitigators: Trotter’s 
below-average IQ, family and developmental problems, disadvantaged 
background, possible frontal lobe brain disorder, and remorse, and other 
nonstatutory factors presented by the defense.  Id. at 1236 n.7.  Accordingly, 
Trotter has failed to demonstrate either an error of counsel or the inadequacy of the 
defense’s mental health expert.  See, e.g.,  Elledge v. State, 911 So. 2d 57, 72 (Fla. 
2005) (“[T]he record does not support the contention that Elledge was denied an 
adequate mental evaluation as required by Ake.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1173 
(2006); Hodges v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 353 (Fla. 2004) (holding that the 
defendant failed to establish an Ake violation because he “had access to multiple 
mental health experts prior to trial, and the experts performed all of the essential 
tasks required by Ake”). 
 
 
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Moreover, Trotter’s allegations both below and on appeal are based on the 
testimony of Trotter’s more recently hired mental health expert.  As we have 
previously stated, mental health investigation and testimony are not rendered 
incompetent “merely because the defendant has now secured the testimony of a 
more favorable mental health expert.”  Gaskin v. State, 822 So. 2d 1243, 1250 
(Fla. 2002) (quoting Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d 974, 986 (Fla. 2000)).  Accordingly, 
Trotter is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
2.  Investigation into Mitigation 
 
Trotter contends that resentencing counsel was ineffective for failing either 
to present Trotter’s two nieces as penalty phase mitigation witnesses or to provide 
them to Dr. Krop for interviews.  The trial court found their testimony both 
irrelevant and cumulative.  We affirm. 
 
The two nieces were Gladys Casimir and Marshanette Polite.  Gladys was 
four years old when Trotter was placed in foster care, and Trotter lived with 
Marshanette’s family for a time when she was five or six years old, and she had no 
more contact with him until they were both adults.  They testified, for example, 
that Trotter married a drug-using prostitute, cared for her children, and was “slow.”  
In contrast, Dr. Krop, who testified for Trotter at both sentencing and resentencing, 
interviewed Trotter six times; reviewed numerous documents, including school 
records, psychological testing, and prison records; interviewed several people, 
 
 
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including Trotter’s mother, foster mother, sister, and one of Trotter’s friends, a 
former foster child who lived with Trotter’s foster family, and a correctional 
officer who knew Trotter; and consulted a pharmacologist, a psychiatrist, and a 
neuropsychologist.  As stated previously, the testimony presented at resentencing 
established two statutory and several nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  
Accordingly, Trotter failed to meet either of Strickland’s requirements. 
3.  Trotter’s Prior Conviction 
 
Trotter’s final argument on appeal is that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to file a timely motion to vacate a prior conviction.  In September 1985, 
Trotter pled no contest to charges of robbery and burglary, and the court sentenced 
Trotter to two years of community control.  Then in June 1986, Trotter committed 
the murder for which he now stands sentenced to death.  At both penalty phases, 
the first in 1987 and the resentencing in 1993, the 1985 robbery conviction and 
sentence served as the basis for two aggravators: “prior violent felony” and “on 
community control at the time of the murder.”9  In November 1992, Trotter’s 
defense counsel filed motions to withdraw Trotter’s plea in the 1985 case and to 
vacate that conviction, which the trial court denied. 
                                          
 
 
9.  The resentencing court found four aggravators.  The other two were that 
the murder was committed in the course of a robbery and that the murder was 
“especially wicked, evil, atrocious, and cruel.”  Trotter, 690 So. 2d at 1236 n.5. 
 
 
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Trotter contends that the circuit court erred in denying his 3.850 motion to 
vacate the 1985 conviction.  He also claims that defense counsel was ineffective 
for not filing a motion to vacate the 1985 conviction at the time of his first murder 
trial and sentencing.  We address each claim in turn. 
 
First, on direct appeal from resentencing, Trotter argued that the trial court 
erred in denying his motion challenging the validity of his 1985 conviction.  See 
Trotter, 690 So. 2d at 1236 n.8.  Without discussion, we affirmed denial of the 
issue as meritless.  Id. at 1237.   Accordingly, not only could Trotter have raised a 
claim on direct appeal, but he did so, and is thus procedurally barred from raising 
any claim regarding the 1985 plea and conviction. 
 
Trotter also claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing timely to 
file a motion attacking the 1985 conviction.  Assuming this issue is not moot in 
light of our prior remand for a new penalty phase, we find the claim lacks merit.  
The trial court in 1992 denied the motions to withdraw the plea and to vacate the 
conviction as procedurally barred because they were filed beyond the two-year 
limit of rule 3.850.  The trial court, however, also denied the motions on the merits 
because the evidence presented was legally insufficient.  In denying this ineffective 
assistance claim, the postconviction court held that because the trial court 
previously also denied the motions on the merits, Trotter failed to establish 
 
 
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prejudice for counsel’s untimely filing of the motions.  We agree that Trotter has 
failed to establish prejudice and affirm denial of relief on this claim. 
III.  THE HABEAS PETITION 
 
Trotter also petitions us for a writ of habeas corpus, raising two claims, one 
of which he admits is not yet cognizable for review.  We deny both claims as 
explained below. 
 
Trotter first contends that his death sentence is unconstitutional under 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002).  This Court previously has held that neither Apprendi nor Ring applies 
retroactively.  See Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837, 838 (2005) (holding that 
Apprendi does not apply retroactively); Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 412 (Fla. 
2005) (holding that Ring does not apply retroactively).  Accordingly, we deny this 
claim. 
 
In his second habeas issue, Trotter argues that he may be incompetent at the 
time of execution.  He admits, however, that his claim is not ripe for review. 
Trotter is correct, and we deny this claim as well.  See Hall v. Moore, 792 So. 2d 
447, 450 (Fla. 2001) (stating that consideration of death-sentenced defendant’s 
claim of incompetency or insanity to be executed is premature if death warrant has 
not been signed); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.811(c)-(d) (stating that court may not 
consider motion to stay execution on grounds of incompetence or insanity to be 
 
 
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executed until governor has signed death warrant and, following statutory 
proceedings, has determined the prisoner is sane).   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Having considered the briefs and the supplemental briefs filed following 
remand and having reviewed the petition for writ of habeas corpus and heard oral 
argument in this cause, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief and the order 
determining Trotter is not mentally retarded, and we deny Trotter’s habeas petition. 
 
It is so ordered.  
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
QUINCE, J., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Two Cases Consolidated: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Manatee County,  
Andrew D. Owens, Jr., Judge - Case No. 86-1225-F 
 
John W. Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Peter J. Cannon and Carol 
C. Rodriguez, Assistant CCR Counsels, Middle Region, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Robert J. Landry, 
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent