Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Leslie J. Webster
Citation: 2002 WI 100
Docket Number: 1998AP000677-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 2002

2002 WI 100 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
98-0677-D 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Leslie J. Webster, Attorney at Law. 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, f/k/a Board of 
Attorneys Professional Responsibility,  
 
Complainant, 
 
v. 
Leslie J. Webster,  
 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REINSTATEMENT OF WEBSTER 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
March 11, 2002   
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: WILCOX, J., took no part.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
respondent 
there 
were 
briefs 
by 
Daniel 
W. 
Hildebrand and DeWitt Ross & Stevens S.C., Madison. 
 
For the complainant there was a brief by Frank M. 
Tuerkheimer and LaFollette Godfrey & Kahn, Madison. 
 
 
2002 WI 100 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  98-0677-D  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Leslie J. Webster, Attorney at  
Law. 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, f/k/a Board  
of Attorneys Professional Responsibility,  
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Leslie J. Webster,  
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2002  
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY reinstatement proceeding.  Reinstatement denied. 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Leslie J. Webster appealed from the 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact, 
conclusions 
of 
law, 
and 
recommendation that the petition for reinstatement of his 
license to practice law in this state be denied.  Webster's 
license was suspended on January 21, 1998, for two years 
following his felony conviction in federal court on the charge 
of aiding and abetting the fraudulent concealment of a debtor's 
property from a bankruptcy trustee.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Webster, 217 Wis. 2d 371, 577 N.W.2d 21 
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
2 
 
(1998).  Webster was incarcerated as a result of that conviction 
from December 18, 1997, until January 15, 1999.1 
¶2 
After a public hearing on Webster's reinstatement 
petition the referee issued a report making specific findings of 
fact and conclusions of law.  First, the referee concluded that 
                                                 
1 On December 16, 1999, Webster petitioned for reinstatement 
and that petition, pursuant to the procedure then in effect 
under the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, was 
referred to the District 5 Professional Responsibility Committee 
for a public hearing and report.  On July 12, 2000, that 
committee filed its report concluding that although Webster had 
engaged in the practice of law during the period of his 
suspension and therefore had not demonstrated by clear and 
convincing evidence his full compliance with the terms of the 
suspension order, the committee nevertheless recommended his 
reinstatement because, in its view, to do otherwise would result 
in unjustifiable harshness.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Eisenberg, 96 Wis. 2d 342, 291 N.W.2d 565 (1980).   
Effective 
October 
1, 
2000, 
Wisconsin's 
attorney 
disciplinary process was substantially restructured.  The name 
of the body responsible for investigating and prosecuting cases 
involving attorney misconduct was changed from the Board of 
Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR) to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and the supreme court rules applicable 
to the lawyer regulation system were also revised in part.  
Although this case arose and was processed under the former BAPR 
procedures, 
and 
even 
though 
the 
District 
5 
Professional 
Responsibility Committee had made a favorable recommendation, on 
January 29, 2001, this court, at Webster's request, assigned the 
reinstatement petition to a referee noting that if Webster's 
petition for reinstatement had been filed under the new OLR 
procedural rules, a referee would have been appointed.  SCR 
22.30.  This court further noted that even under the former BAPR 
procedures, reinstatement petitions could be referred to a 
referee.  See [former] SCR 21.11 and In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 96 Wis. 2d 342, 291 N.W.2d 565 
(1980).  This court directed that the referee proceed under the 
new provisions applicable to reinstatement petitions, SCR 22.29 
to 22.33.  The referee held a public hearing and subsequently on 
August 27, 2001, filed her report recommending that Webster's 
petition for reinstatement be denied.   
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
3 
 
Webster 
had 
not 
complied 
with 
the 
requirements 
of 
SCR 
22.26(1)(a)2 in that he failed to notify all clients whose funds 
he held in trust of his suspension; further, the referee 
determined that Webster had not complied with the requirements 
of SCR 22.26(2)3 in that he had practiced law during the term of 
his suspension.  In addition, the referee concluded that Webster 
had not demonstrated by clear, satisfactory, and convincing 
evidence that he had the moral character to practice law in this 
state and that his resumption of the practice of law would not 
be detrimental to the administration of justice or subversive of 
the public interest; and finally, the referee concluded that 
Webster had not demonstrated that he had met the requirements 
                                                 
2 SCR 22.26(1)(a) provides: 
(1) On or before the effective date of license 
suspension or revocation, an attorney whose license is 
suspended or revoked shall do all of the following: 
(a) Notify by certified mail all clients being 
represented in pending matters of the suspension or 
revocation and of the attorney's consequent inability 
to act as an attorney following the effective date of 
the suspension or revocation. 
3 SCR 22.26(2) provides: 
(2) An attorney whose license to practice law is 
suspended or revoked or who is suspended from the 
practice of law may not engage in this state in the 
practice 
of 
law 
or 
in 
any 
law 
work 
activity 
customarily done by law students, law clerks, or other 
paralegal personnel, except that the attorney may 
engage in law related work in this state for a 
commercial employer itself not engaged in the practice 
of law.  
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
4 
 
for reinstatement.  SCR 22.31(1).4  Accordingly, the referee 
recommended that Webster's petition for reinstatement of his 
license to practice law in this state be denied.  The referee 
wrote: 
Considered individually, some of petitioner's 
transgressions are relatively minor and would not lead 
to the recommendation I am making.  However, when 
viewed as a whole, they evince the continuation of a 
long-standing pattern——a pattern demonstrating a lack 
of appreciation for and understanding of basic legal 
principles as well as the rules governing an attorney 
whose license has been suspended.  Put another way, 
petitioner's conduct demonstrates his willingness to 
"play fast and loose" with the rules and to "cut 
corners" when petitioner deems it suitable to his 
purpose.  Moreover, when confronted with claims of 
inappropriate 
conduct, 
petitioner's 
response 
has 
largely been to either blame that conduct on someone 
or something other than himself, or to denominate it 
as a mere, and minor, error of judgment that could be 
made by anyone. 
 . . . . 
If only one or even two of these transgressions was at 
issue, I, like the referee in Eisenberg and the 
District 5 Committee, could very well have a different 
recommendation to submit to the court.  However, this 
is a case where the whole is greater than the sum of 
                                                 
4 SCR 22.31(1) provides: 
(1) The 
petitioner 
has 
the 
burden 
of 
demonstrating by clear, satisfactory and convincing 
evidence that the petitioner has the moral character 
to practice law in Wisconsin, that the petitioner's 
resumption of the practice of law will not be 
detrimental to the 
administration 
of 
justice or 
subversive of the public interest, and that the 
petitioner has complied fully with the terms of the 
order of suspension or revocation and with the 
requirements of SCR 22.26. 
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
5 
 
its parts, and given this whole, I am compelled to 
recommend that reinstatement be denied.   
¶3 
After a review of the record we conclude that the 
referee's factual findings are not clearly erroneous.  In 
addition, we agree with the referee and conclude that Webster 
has not satisfied his burden under SCR 22.31 to demonstrate by 
clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that he has the 
moral character to practice law in this state, that his 
resumption of the practice of law would not be detrimental to 
the administration of justice or subversive of the public 
interest, and that he has complied fully with the terms of his 
suspension and the requirements of SCR 22.26.  We believe that 
Webster's activities during his suspension demonstrate that he 
either failed to comprehend what was expected of him in order to 
obtain reinstatement or that he knew full well what was required 
but chose to, as the referee described it, "'play fast and 
loose' with the rules [and] to 'cut corners' when [he] deem[ed] 
it suitable to his purpose."  The former raises serious question 
about Webster's competence to resume the practice of law in this 
state and the latter raises just as serious question about his 
fitness to practice law.  In either case we conclude that 
Webster has not met his burden under SCR 22.31 and, accordingly, 
we deny his petition for reinstatement. 
¶4 
Because we find that the referee's findings are not 
clearly erroneous and that any one of the findings standing 
alone 
support 
our 
denial 
of 
Webster's 
petition 
for 
reinstatement, we need not discuss in detail all of the 
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
6 
 
referee's extensive findings in this matter.  We focus primarily 
on Webster's activities during the period of his suspension. 
First, based on the referee's findings, we conclude that Webster 
continued to practice law during his suspension when he filed 
and prosecuted in the circuit courts of this state three 
foreclosure actions as trustee of his parents' revocable 
inter vivos trust. 
¶5 
Second, we agree with the referee that the numerous 
occasions when Webster repeatedly deposited or withdrew monies 
from his IOLTA trust account, reflected an attitude that, 
despite his suspension, it was simply "business as usual."  
Although Webster's activities involving his IOLTA trust account 
may not, standing alone, constitute the practice of law, they do 
reveal a certain cynicism or "skating on the edge" style that is 
inconsistent with what is expected from a suspended lawyer who 
wants to be reinstated.   
¶6 
And third, we conclude that Webster's actions of 
listing himself as an attorney in a local phone directory 
published before his two-year suspension period had ended and 
before he had been reinstated, along with his continued use of 
his law office checks during his imprisonment and suspension, 
preclude any finding that he has the moral character to practice 
law and that his reinstatement would not be detrimental to the 
administration of justice or subversive of public interest.  
Again we note that although those actions standing alone may not 
constitute the practice of law, taken in combination they 
demonstrate Webster's failure to meet his burden to show that he 
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
7 
 
is both competent and fit to resume the practice of law in this 
state.  As the referee aptly observed, this is a case "where the 
whole is greater than the sum of its parts," and on the whole we 
are not convinced that Webster should be reinstated at this 
time.   
¶7 
Leslie J. Webster was licensed to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1979 and has practiced in Ellsworth, Wisconsin, 
primarily as a sole practitioner under the firm name of Oltman & 
Webster, Ltd.; Oltman had not been actively engaged in the 
practice during the times material to these proceedings.  
Webster was publicly reprimanded in 1990 for undertaking the 
representation of a client in a matter in which Webster had a 
conflict of interest by virtue of his intimate relationship with 
the client's wife.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Webster, 154 Wis. 2d 110, 452 N.W.2d 374 (1990).   
¶8 
On January 21, 1998, this court suspended Webster's 
license to practice law for two years following his felony 
conviction and two-year prison sentence imposed in federal 
court. 
 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Webster, 
217 Wis. 2d 371, 577 N.W.2d 21 (1998). 
¶9 
Webster petitioned this court on December 16, 1999, 
seeking reinstatement and as noted above, the matter was 
subsequently sent to a referee for a hearing and report.  We 
will discuss certain findings made by the referee that support 
our conclusion that Webster's reinstatement petition must be 
denied.   
 
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
8 
 
FORECLOSURE ACTIONS 
¶10 The referee found that between June 1998 and March 
2000 Webster filed and prosecuted three foreclosure actions5 as a 
trustee of a revocable inter vivos trust of which his parents 
are lifetime beneficiaries and in which he and his sisters are 
residuary beneficiaries.  These foreclosure actions were brought 
in Pierce County, Polk County, and Burnett County Circuit 
Courts.  In all three actions Webster appeared in a fiduciary 
capacity representing the legal interest of the trust and/or the 
trust beneficiaries.  The referee found that in those three 
foreclosure cases Webster subsequently sought and was awarded 
fees and costs for his services as trustee in prosecuting the 
foreclosure actions.  Webster's fees totaled approximately 
$4600, and he was awarded costs in addition to those fees.  
¶11 The referee further determined that although none of 
the circuit court judges in the foreclosure actions questioned 
whether Webster's appearance in a representative or fiduciary 
capacity as a trustee constituted the practice of law, the 
circuit court judge in the Polk County action questioned the fee 
Webster requested calling it " . . . nothing more than a thinly-
veiled attempt to obtain fees at the rate normally charged by an 
attorney practicing this type of law in this area.  To allow 
                                                 
5 There was an additional foreclosure action which Webster 
commenced as a guardian for his children.  The OLR does not now 
contend that that constituted the practice of law; accordingly, 
this opinion does not discuss that action.  
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
9 
 
this would be a sham with regard to the order previously entered 
suspending Mr. Webster's right to practice law."   
¶12 Subsequently the circuit court in the Polk County case 
substantially 
reduced 
the 
fee 
awarded 
Webster 
in 
that 
foreclosure action.  His fees in the other two foreclosure cases 
were awarded in the amount he requested. 
¶13 The referee further found that prior to commencing 
these foreclosure actions Webster had not asked BAPR whether his 
conduct would constitute the practice of law.  However, in 
September 1999 a defendant in one of those foreclosure actions 
contacted the United States attorney's office and Webster's 
federal supervised release officer questioning whether Webster's 
activities on behalf of the trust in that foreclosure action 
constituted practicing law.  After that question was raised 
Webster contacted the district attorney's office in the county 
where that action was pending and secured an opinion from the 
district attorney that Webster's activities on behalf of the 
trust 
in 
the 
foreclosure 
action 
did 
not 
violate 
the 
proscriptions 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 757.30 
(1999-2000) 
against 
practicing law without a license.6 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 757.30(2) provides: 
(2) Every 
person 
who 
appears 
as 
agent, 
representative or attorney, for or on behalf of any 
other person, or any firm, partnership, association or 
corporation in any action or proceeding in or before 
any court of record, court commissioner, or judicial 
tribunal of the United States, or of any state, or who 
otherwise, in or out of court, for compensation or 
pecuniary reward gives professional legal advice not 
incidental to his or her usual or ordinary business, 
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
10 
 
¶14 In addition, the referee determined that it was more 
than 15 months after Webster filed the first of the foreclosure 
actions, and then only after the question was raised by the 
United State's attorney's office, that Webster contacted the 
State Bar's Ethics Hotline seeking advice about whether his 
activities on behalf of the trust constituted practicing law; 
the Hotline declined to give advice about whether Webster's 
activities in the foreclosure cases constituted the practice of 
law.  
¶15 According to the referee, Webster's activities as 
trustee on behalf of the trust in the foreclosure cases 
contravened the holding in Life Science Church v. Shawano 
County, 221 Wis. 2d 331, 585 N.W.2d 625 (Ct. App. 1998).  The 
referee noted that the court of appeals in Life Science Church, 
citing Jadair Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 209 
Wis. 2d 187, 562 N.W.2d 401 (1997), and cases from other 
jurisdictions, held that trustees may appear in Wisconsin courts 
without licensed legal counsel only to represent the trustee's 
own legal interest in his or her individual capacity; a trustee, 
who is not licensed to practice law, may not, however, represent 
                                                                                                                                                             
or renders any legal services for any other person, or 
any firm, partnership, association or corporation, 
shall be deemed to be practicing law within the 
meaning of this section. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version, unless otherwise indicated.   
 
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
11 
 
the legal interests of the trust or trust beneficiaries in a 
representative fiduciary capacity as trustee.  Life Science 
Church, 221 Wis. 2d at 334.  Furthermore, according to the Life 
Science Church court, this court in Jadair recognized that non-
lawyers who attempt to speak for the legal interests of others 
are engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.  Id. at 333.  
The referee determined that despite the "crystal clear" holding 
in Life Science Church, Webster nevertheless prosecuted the 
three 
foreclosure 
actions 
on 
behalf 
of 
the 
trust 
and 
beneficiaries in his representative fiduciary capacity after his 
license to practice law had been suspended.   
¶16 In testimony before the referee Webster acknowledged 
that he had not read the Life Science Church case until the 
spring of 2000——after he had already commenced and prosecuted 
the foreclosure actions.  Webster claimed that he was unaware of 
the Life Science Church decision when he filed the foreclosure 
actions because he had cancelled his subscription to the 
Wisconsin Reports after his license had been suspended and he 
did not have access to that case while in prison.  According to 
Webster, the research he did on the subject of practicing law 
while 
under 
suspension 
only 
revealed 
two 
cases: 
In 
re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 126 Wis. 2d 435, 
446, 337 N.W.2d 160 (1985), and In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Eisenberg, 96 Wis. 2d 342, 291 N.W.2d 565 (1980).  
Webster believed that both of those cases supported his 
understanding that although he could not represent a corporation 
while under suspension, there was nothing barring him from 
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
12 
 
representing 
a 
trust 
in 
which 
he 
was 
the 
trustee 
and 
beneficiary.  Webster noted that Wis. Stat. § 757.30 contains no 
specific reference or prohibition against a fiduciary trustee 
representing a trust.  
¶17 In addition, in his testimony before the referee, 
Webster claimed that he had relied on the district attorney's 
opinion that filing the foreclosure cases in a representative 
capacity as a trustee, did not constitute the practice of law 
without a license.  Webster also observed that none of the 
judges in the foreclosure actions questioned whether his 
appearance constituted the practice of law.  And, finally, 
Webster explained that he had not contacted BAPR to obtain an 
opinion on whether his activities would constitute practicing 
law, because he did not think that BAPR would give him an 
opinion on the subject. 
¶18 Webster's explanations did not persuade the referee 
that he had not been practicing law during his suspension.  In 
the first place, according to the referee, Webster could have 
easily found the Life Science Church decision had he done basic 
legal research on the issue; the referee thought that his 
failure to do so cast doubt on Webster's competence as a lawyer. 
¶19 Moreover, the referee found that Webster's reliance on 
the two Eisenberg disciplinary decisions was misplaced because 
those cases did not address the issue of whether a trustee, who 
does not have a law license, may appear in courts in this state 
on behalf of a trust.  
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
13 
 
¶20 Similarly, the referee said that while Webster may 
have taken some comfort from the district attorney's favorable 
opinion, if Webster had conducted his own research, he would 
have discovered that the district attorney's opinion was clearly 
wrong in light of Life Science Church.  The referee also 
reasoned that Webster should draw little solace from the fact 
that none of the judges before whom he appeared in the 
foreclosure actions questioned whether he was practicing law; 
according to the referee, it was Webster's responsibility, not 
someone else's, to make certain that his conduct during the 
suspension conformed to the rules against practicing law.   
¶21 The referee also found it significant that Webster's 
inquiries into whether his activities on behalf of the trust 
constituted the practice of law, occurred only after the United 
States attorney's 
office 
and Webster's 
federal 
supervised 
release officer questioned whether he was practicing law.  
¶22 On appeal Webster reiterates his argument that by 
prosecuting the three foreclosure matters as a trustee, he was 
not practicing law as that term is used in Wis. Stat. § 757.30 
and SCR 22.26(2).  Webster points out that the words "trust, 
fiduciary, principal or any other reference to legal actions 
taken on behalf of a principal" are conspicuously absent from 
both Wis. Stat. § 757.30 and SCR 22.26(2).  According to 
Webster, had the legislature intended to preclude a trustee from 
commencing and maintaining legal actions on behalf of a trust 
without enlisting the services of an attorney, the legislature 
could have easily so provided in the statute.  
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
14 
 
¶23 Furthermore, Webster maintains on appeal that despite 
the referee's description of the holding in Life Science Church 
as "crystal clear," Webster believed it was not——especially when 
applied to a trustee of an inter vivos trust.  Webster contrasts 
his actions as trustee of the inter vivos trust with the actions 
of the trustees in the Life Science Church case.  Here Webster 
notes that he actually held title to the property, was 
authorized by the trust to prosecute legal actions on behalf of 
the trust, and had been appointed by the settlers of the trust 
to safeguard their asserts and to hold, manage, and distribute 
them.  According to Webster, in bringing the three foreclosure 
actions as trustee on behalf of the trust, he was simply 
fulfilling his duties as trustee; he was not practicing law.  
¶24 We are not convinced.  The distinction Webster 
attempts to draw between a trustee of a church, like that 
involved in Life Science Church case, and a trustee of an 
inter vivos trust, is not as persuasive as Webster would have 
it.  In any event, had Webster simply read the Life Science 
Church case or this court's decision in Jadair——both of which 
were issued before Webster filed the first foreclosure action on 
behalf of the trust——he would have been put on notice that his 
activities on behalf of the trust could be construed as 
practicing law.  
¶25 Recently in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Hyndman, 2002 WI 6, 249 Wis. 2d 650, 638 N.W.2d 293, this court 
discussed the prohibition in SCR 22.26(2) against a suspended or 
revoked attorney practicing law.  Hyndman recognized that if 
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
15 
 
certain acts would not constitute practicing law for a non-
lawyer, then those same acts would not constitute practicing law 
for a person whose license to practice law had been revoked or 
suspended.  In view of the holding in Life Science Church that a 
trustee must appear in Wisconsin courts with licensed legal 
counsel unless the trustee is acting solely in an individual 
capacity, it is apparent that Webster's activities as trustee on 
behalf of the trust in the three foreclosure actions could not 
have been performed by a non-lawyer.  The trustee in Life 
Science Church could not file a notice of appeal on behalf of 
the trust; similarly, Webster as trustee of the inter vivos 
trust could not commence and prosecute the foreclosure actions 
on behalf of the trust and beneficiaries.  When Webster acted on 
behalf of the trust by filing and prosecuting the foreclosure 
actions he was practicing law.  We believe that the referee 
correctly determined that Webster's activities constituted the 
practice of law.  At the very least, he should have checked with 
BAPR before he filed the foreclosure actions.  The referee's 
determination that Webster was practicing law when he commenced 
and prosecuted the foreclosure actions is not clearly erroneous.  
OFFICE CHECKS 
¶26 The referee determined that prior to his suspension, 
Webster had maintained a business checking account at a local 
bank under the name of "Oltman & Webster, Ltd., Attorneys at 
Law."  That account remained open after his suspension and 
between June of 1998 and May of 1999 more than 300 checks were 
drawn on that account. 
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
16 
 
¶27 In his testimony before the district professional 
responsibility committee, and again before the referee, Webster 
asserted that his legal assistant wrote all the office checks.  
He claimed that he was "surprised" that she continued to use 
that 
account 
after 
his 
suspension 
and 
imprisonment.  
Furthermore, he pointed out the "Attorneys at Law" designation 
on the checks was in small print.  And, Webster noted that he 
had derived no benefit from the continued use of these checks 
while under suspension. 
¶28 Again the referee was not persuaded by Webster's 
explanations.  The referee said that Webster should not have 
held himself out as an attorney by using those checks even if he 
derived no legal business from their use; moreover, the referee 
found Webster's willingness to blame his legal assistant for 
this oversight to be unacceptable.  According to the referee, it 
was Webster's responsibility to ensure that he complied with the 
rules governing one whose license had been suspended.  The 
referee recognized that although this infraction, standing 
alone, would not be "terribly serious," it evinced a less than 
scrupulous attitude on Webster's part toward compliance with the 
rules governing reinstatement. 
¶29 On appeal Webster emphasizes the referee's description 
of 
this 
infraction 
as 
not 
being 
"terribly 
serious."  
Furthermore, he disputes the referee's belief that he was 
blaming his assistant.  According to Webster, he had instructed 
his assistant to remove all indicia of law practice including 
scraping the words "Law Office" off the window of his office.  
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
17 
 
He suggests that his assistant might have continued to pay the 
bills with the office checks because it simply escaped her 
notice and did not occur to her to order new office checks.  
Webster insists that he was unaware that the checks were used 
during his suspension and again he points out that he derived no 
legal business from the use of those checks.   
¶30 We too are not persuaded by Webster's arguments.  We 
note that these checks were used not only while Webster was in 
prison, but also after he had been released from prison.  At 
that point, if not earlier, he should have been overseeing the 
use of the checks in his office.   
¶31 Moreover, Wis. Stat. § 757.30(3) provides that every 
person " . . . who in any other manner represents himself or 
herself either verbally or in writing, directly or indirectly, 
as authorized to practice law in this state, shall be deemed to 
be purporting to be licensed to practice law as an attorney 
within the meaning of this section."  We think that using office 
checks with the designation "Attorneys at Law" imprinted on 
them——even if in small print——is a representation to the public 
that the drawer of the check is a lawyer or law office.  The 
referee's findings in this respect are not clearly erroneous.  
These acts by Webster plus his placing the phone directory 
advertisement listing his law office before his suspension ended 
(discussed below) reflect a cynical attitude inconsistent with 
the high ethical standards we expect from those admitted to 
practice law in this state.  Although these actions might not 
constitute practicing law, we conclude they refute any claim by 
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
18 
 
Webster that he has met his burden under SCR 22.21 to obtain 
reinstatement.   
YELLOW PAGES AD 
¶32 The referee determined that in late 1999 Webster 
placed an advertisement for his law office in the Yellow Pages 
of the local telephone book.  That ad appeared in the phonebook 
distributed early in January of 2000 which was several weeks 
before the two-year anniversary date of this court's January 21, 
1998, suspension order.   
¶33 At the hearing before the referee Webster claimed that 
he had assumed that the order suspending his license for a 
period of two years would expire at the end of that two-year 
period on January 21, 2000, and that he would then be 
"automatically reinstated" on that date.  He also said that if a 
potential client had called in response to the ad prior to the 
time of his anticipated "automatic" reinstatement, he would have 
simply referred that person to another attorney. 
¶34 The referee was critical of Webster's failure to 
undertake any research concerning the reinstatement rules.  The 
referee said that by simply reading SCR 22.28(3),7 or by simply 
                                                 
7 Former SCR 22.28(3) provided, in part: 
(3) An 
attorney 
whose 
license 
is 
revoked, 
suspended for 6 months or more for misconduct, or 
suspended for medical incapacity shall not resume 
practice until the license is reinstated by order of 
the supreme court. A petition for reinstatement from a 
suspension for a definite term may be filed at any 
time commencing 3 months prior to the expiration of 
the suspension period. . . .   
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
19 
 
contacting 
BAPR, 
Webster 
would 
have 
discovered 
that 
his 
reinstatement would not be automatic.  According to the referee, 
Webster's explanation that he assumed he would be automatically 
reinstated was either "wholly disingenuous" or, as Webster 
himself termed it, "incredibly stupid."  The referee wrote: 
One would think that a lawyer whose license has been 
suspended and who desires to practice law again would 
have at least a passing familiarity with the rules 
governing reinstatement.  After all, one's livelihood 
as an attorney depends upon it.  Even if one accepts 
petitioner's testimony that he truly thought his 
license would be automatically reinstated, his failure 
to make certain [of that] demonstrates a basic lack of 
competence which does not advance his claim that 
reinstatement would not be detrimental to future 
clients. 
In addition, petitioner's willingness to place an 
ad that he knew would appear in print before January 
21, 
1998 
[sic] 
is 
yet 
another 
example 
of 
his 
willingness to cut corners when it suits his purpose. 
¶35 On appeal Webster concedes that placing the ad was 
"incredibly stupid"; he claims, however, that it resulted from 
his failure to understand the amount of time it would take to 
obtain reinstatement.  Again, Webster notes that he derived no 
legal business from the ad and he accepts the referee's 
criticism that he should have read the reinstatement rules 
before placing the ad. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Current SCR 22.28(3) provides that "(3) The license of an 
attorney that is revoked or suspended for misconduct for six 
months or more shall be reinstated pursuant to the procedures 
set forth in SCR 22.29 to 22.33 and only by order of the supreme 
court." 
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
20 
 
¶36 We believe, as OLR maintains, that there is nothing 
ambiguous about SCR 22.28(3).  Neither the former version nor 
the current version of this reinstatement provision can be read 
to support a reasonable belief that an attorney whose license to 
practice law has been suspended for two years would be 
automatically reinstated at the end of that two-year period.  
Furthermore, as OLR points out in its brief, Webster's ad in the 
Yellow Pages identifying him as an attorney was distributed in 
the January 1, 2000, edition of the Yellow Pages; that was three 
weeks before Webster himself thought his suspension period would 
end and his license would be automatically reinstated.   
¶37 As discussed above, 
Webster's check 
writing and 
placing the telephone ad reflect a cavalier attitude on his part 
toward the standards of behavior needed to gain reinstatement.  
These acts demonstrate that Webster has failed to meet his 
burden of proof under SCR 22.31(1) to obtain reinstatement of 
his license.  Webster's repeated lapses in judgment reflected by 
these actions support our decision to deny his reinstatement 
petition.  
TRUST ACCOUNT ACTIVITIES 
¶38 The referee made specific findings with respect to the 
large number of deposits or withdrawals in Webster's trust 
account during his suspension.  The referee noted that as of 
June 
2000 
Webster's 
IOLTA 
trust 
account 
remained 
open; 
furthermore, between the time of his suspension in January of 
1998 and the end of 1998, eight deposits totaling $97,527.01 had 
been made into that account.  In addition, the referee found 
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
21 
 
that at least 30 checks had been written on that account from 
the time of Webster's suspension to the end of 1998; the balance 
in the account at the end of 1998 was $8751.32.  The referee 
determined that although the deposits and disbursements into the 
account had been made by Webster's legal assistant, she had 
acted under Webster's supervision by telephone while he was in 
prison.  
¶39 In addition, the referee found that after Webster was 
released from prison, he restated the Articles of Incorporation 
for Oltman & Webster to provide that the firm offered accounting 
services rather than legal services.  However, according to the 
referee, Webster maintained his same IOLTA account after that 
corporate restatement.  The referee determined that during 1999, 
deposits into that account totaled $222,549.47 and disbursements 
from the account totaled $214,957.44, leaving a balance in 
Webster's IOLTA account as of June 2000 of $7876.94.   
¶40 In argument before the referee Webster asserted that 
his continued use of his IOLTA trust account during his 
suspension was permissible because there was no specific rule 
requiring an attorney to close his or her trust account during 
periods of suspension.  In addition, Webster asserted that his 
fiduciary duty to his clients required him to maintain the trust 
account to safeguard his clients' funds. 
¶41 Although the referee acknowledged that there was no 
rule mandating that a lawyer must close his or her trust account 
during a period of suspension, the referee noted that SCR 
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
22 
 
22.26(2) explicitly prohibited Webster from practicing law 
during the period of suspension.  The referee wrote: 
Logic, alone, would appear to dictate that depositing 
money into and disbursing monies from a trust account 
is the practice of law.  After all, the money in a 
trust account are [sic] derived from the practice of 
law, and the "movement" of money into and from such an 
account is a necessary part of the practice of law. 
¶42 It was even more significant, according to the 
referee, that the "spirit" of the rule against practicing law 
during a period of suspension, prohibited any activity during 
suspension that a person would have regularly engaged in as a 
licensed practicing attorney.  The referee believed that 
Webster's maintaining and utilizing his trust account was just 
such an activity.  The referee wrote: 
 
This is not a situation in which petitioner 
disbursed or transferred all of the monies in his 
trust accounts after his suspension and simply left 
the accounts open with a balance of $0.  Nor is it a 
situation where the monies in the trust accounts at 
the time of suspension simply remained there with no 
additions or subtractions.  If one of these two 
situations existed herein, my conclusion might be 
different.  In this case, however, petitioner or 
petitioner's 
legal 
assistant 
under 
petitioner's 
supervision, actively moved money into and out of 
these accounts.  Such activity certainly violates the 
intent of the prohibition against practicing law 
during the term of suspension.  
¶43 Nor was the referee persuaded by Webster's other 
proffered explanation for keeping his trust account open——i.e., 
the protection of his clients' funds.  The referee pointed out 
that Webster could have transferred all of the funds in his 
trust account to another attorney's trust account where they 
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
23 
 
would have been equally safe.  Although the referee said that 
would have required the consent of the client and the other 
attorney, in view of the fact that Webster had been able to make 
arrangements to transfer his active client files to other 
attorneys, the referee thought Webster could have made a similar 
arrangement to transfer his trust account funds.  And, even if 
he could not, again, the referee said that Webster should have 
contacted BAPR to ascertain what he should have done with the 
trust account funds. 
¶44 On appeal Webster argues that there is nothing in the 
prohibition in SCR 22.26 against practicing law while under 
suspension that would require a suspended attorney to close his 
or her trust account, nor is there anything in the rule 
requiring the attorney to disburse all the funds held by the 
attorney as a trustee.  Webster points out that there have been 
no allegations that he abused his trust account in any way; 
rather, the only allegation was that the considerable deposit 
and withdrawal activity in his trust account during his period 
of suspension violated the "spirit" of SCR 22.26.  According to 
Webster, simply because an attorney has been suspended, that 
does not relieve that attorney of the fiduciary responsibility 
the attorney accepted when receiving funds for others for 
deposit into the attorney's trust accounts.  In this respect, 
Webster notes that the District 5 Professional Responsibility 
Committee found that it was "appropriate" for him while under 
suspension to maintain his trust account with respect to monies 
that were in dispute on matters involving his former clients and 
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
24 
 
third-party claimants.  According to the committee, it would not 
be "realistic" to expect an attorney's trust account to be 
closed upon suspension. 
¶45 Webster 
also 
asserts 
that 
although 
the 
referee 
acknowledged that there was no explicit requirement that a 
suspended attorney must close his or her trust account, the 
referee incorrectly reasoned that simply maintaining a trust 
account constitutes the practice of law.  Webster complains that 
this "novel proposition" ignores the fact that numerous other 
individuals and entities such as real estate brokers, title 
companies, escrow agents, etc., also utilize trust accounts as a 
regular part of their businesses.  According to Webster, a trust 
account is nothing more than a dedicated bank account into which 
funds belonging to others are deposited. 
¶46 Although Webster concedes that some of the monies he 
held in his trust account at the time of his suspension had been 
derived from his practice of law, he maintains that if the mere 
movement of funds from such an account constituted the practice 
of law as the referee believed, then an attorney's trust account 
would always be frozen at the time of suspension; that would 
mean, 
Webster 
argues, 
that 
the 
suspended 
attorney 
would 
thereafter be unable to disburse any funds from that account 
without violating the rule against practicing law.  Webster 
insists that SCR 22.26 was not intended to prohibit a suspended 
attorney from engaging in all activities he or she would have 
regularly engaged in as a licensed practicing attorney; rather, 
the rule is intended to prohibit a suspended attorney from 
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
25 
 
engaging in activities which require a license to practice law.  
In this respect, he contends SCR 22.26(2) is not intended to 
prohibit a suspended attorney from working as an accountant, tax 
return preparer, real estate broker, title insurance agent, or 
in any other occupation where, as part of that occupation, the 
suspended attorney may do work which is also done by an attorney 
and which may require a trust account.   
¶47 In 
response 
OLR 
argues 
that 
the 
deposits 
and 
withdrawals from Webster's IOLTA account——admittedly all done by 
Webster's 
legal 
assistant 
but 
under 
Webster's 
telephonic 
supervision from prison——were activities that only an attorney 
could engage in and therefore constituted the practice of law.  
Moreover, OLR points out that the referee did not, as Webster 
contends, find that Webster was required to close his account; 
rather, 
the 
referee 
viewed 
the 
numerous 
transactions 
in 
Webster's trust account as demonstrating his attitude that it 
was simply "business as usual" despite his suspension.  
¶48 We agree with Webster that SCR 22.26(2) is not 
intended to prohibit a suspended attorney from engaging in any 
activity he or she could have engaged in as a licensed 
practicing attorney; rather, that rule is simply aimed at 
prohibiting a suspended attorney from engaging in activities 
which require a license to practice law or which are customarily 
done by law-related personnel such as law clerks, law students, 
or paralegals.  As noted above, in Hyndman, this court said that 
if acts would not constitute practicing law for a non-lawyer, 
then those same acts would not constitute practicing law for a 
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
26 
 
lawyer whose license to practice has been revoked or suspended.  
Webster's activities in transferring funds in and out of his 
trust accounts, while undoubtedly a component of practicing law, 
are not necessarily something that could only be done by a 
person who has a license to practice law.  Transferring monies 
into and out of trust accounts would not normally constitute 
practicing law for a non-lawyer and therefore it would not 
constitute practicing law for a suspended lawyer like Webster. 
¶49 However, in this case, Webster's transactions involved 
his IOLTA trust account.  We believe IOLTA accounts are sui 
generis in that only attorneys who are required to participate 
in the program may have an IOLTA account.  See SCR 20:1.15 and 
SCR 13.048   
¶50 Nonetheless, we find it unnecessary in this case to 
determine 
whether 
Webster's 
repeated 
deposits 
into 
and 
disbursals from his IOLTA trust account during his period of 
suspension constituted practicing law within the proscription in 
SCR 22.26(2) because Webster has in any event, not met the heavy 
burden placed on him by SCR 22.31 to obtain reinstatement.  The 
                                                 
8 SCR 20:1.15 provides, in pertinent part: "Safekeeping 
property. (a) A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and third-
persons that is in the lawyer's possession in connection with a 
representation or when acting in a fiduciary capacity . . . ." 
SCR chapter 13 establishes the "Interest on Trust Accounts 
Program" (IOLTA) for lawyers.  SCR 13.04 provides, in pertinent 
part: "Attorney participation in the program. (1) An attorney 
shall 
participate 
in 
the 
program 
as 
provided 
in 
SCR 
20:1.15 . . . ." 
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
27 
 
referee's findings, which are not clearly erroneous, detailing 
Webster's activities during his suspension compel the conclusion 
that he has not met his burden to convince this court to grant 
his reinstatement petition.  
¶51 When Webster filed his petition for reinstatement he 
submitted the required $200 advance deposit for costs of the 
reinstatement proceedings.  See SCR 22.29(5).  The OLR has now 
filed a Statement of Costs seeking a total of $9121.75 in costs 
beyond that $200 advance payment ($7224.10 for the costs 
incurred in the proceedings before the referee and an additional 
$1897.65 for costs incurred on this appeal).  Webster has 
objected to OLR's request asserting that SCR 22.24 does not 
specifically provide for costs in reinstatement proceedings; in 
addition he claims that the imposition of costs in this matter 
would result in hardship and injustice to him.   
¶52 Recently in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Penn, 2002 WI 5, 249 Wis. 2d 667, 638 N.W.2d 287, this court 
rejected the argument that there is no specific provision in SCR 
chapter 
22 
authorizing 
the 
imposition 
of 
costs 
in 
a 
reinstatement proceeding.  In Penn we pointed out that SCR 
22.29(5), as well as the general provision set out for 
disciplinary proceedings in SCR 22.11 through SCR 22.24, permit 
the imposition of costs against a petitioner in a reinstatement 
proceeding.  Despite Webster's claim of inability to pay, under 
the circumstances of this case including the fact that during 
his suspension Webster collected significant fees for his 
representation of the trust in the foreclosure actions, we find 
No. 
98-0677-D   
 
28 
 
it appropriate that Webster pay the full costs (with credit for 
his $200 advance deposit) of these reinstatement proceedings.  
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 122 
Wis. 2d 627, 632, 363 N.W.2d 430 (1985).   
¶53 IT IS ORDERED the petition of Leslie J. Webster 
seeking reinstatement of his license to practice law in this 
state is denied. 
¶54 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within nine months of the 
date of this order, Leslie J. Webster pay to the Office of 
Lawyer 
Regulation 
the 
costs 
of 
this 
proceeding 
totaling 
$9121.75.  If the costs are not paid within the time specified 
and absent a showing to this court of his inability to pay the 
costs within that time, the license of Leslie J. Webster to 
practice law in Wisconsin shall remain suspended until further 
order of the court.  
¶55 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to SCR 22.33(4)9 
Leslie J. Webster may again file a petition for reinstatement 
nine months after the date of this order denying his petition 
for reinstatement.  
¶56 JON P. WILCOX, J., did not participate.  
                                                 
9 SCR 22.33(4) [formerly SCR 22.28(8)] provides that "(4) If 
the supreme court denies a petition for reinstatement, the 
petitioner 
may 
again 
file 
a 
petition 
for 
reinstatement 
commencing nine months after the denial." 
No. 98-0677-D.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶57 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  Part of the 
mission of this court is to protect the public from unethical 
attorneys.  We owe no sympathy to attorneys who steal or 
otherwise betray their clients.  These bad apples hurt people 
who have every right to trust them, and they reflect adversely 
on the integrity and standing of the bar.  I take very seriously 
this court's duty to promote high ethical standards in the legal 
profession. 
¶58 If I thought this case involved injury to the public 
or the legal profession, I would eagerly join the court's 
opinion.  However, I see the case differently.  Never have the 
molehills of unauthorized practice been elevated to such 
heights. 
¶59 Attorney 
Webster's 
license 
to 
practice 
law 
in 
Wisconsin was suspended for two years beginning January 21, 
1998.  Now, almost four-and-a-half years after the onset of his 
suspension, Webster is denied reinstatement.  He is demonized in 
the court's opinion and assessed the whopping sum of $9121.75 in 
costs. 
¶60 A careful reading of the court's opinion will reveal 
the emergence of some potentially troublesome principles of law.  
The court is largely concerned with Webster's unauthorized 
practice of law while he was under suspension.  It points 
indignantly to the use of some old office checks carrying the 
name "Oltman & Webster, Ltd., Attorneys at Law" to pay salaries 
and other bills during Webster's suspension, as well as the 
purchase of an ad in the local telephone book in anticipation of 
No. 98-0677-D.dtp 
 
2 
 
Webster's 
reinstatement. 
 
The 
referee 
relied 
on 
these 
peccadilloes as examples of Webster's unauthorized practice.  
The court writes cautiously that "these actions might not 
constitute practicing law," majority op. at ¶31, yet it condemns 
them as unethical.  What is the court saying?  In the wake of 
these pronouncements, what rights do partners in a small law 
firm have when another partner is suspended?  Do they have to 
remove the partner's name from the firm during the partner's 
period of suspension?  Are they forbidden to advertise the name 
of a firm that includes the name of a suspended partner? 
¶61 A comparison of the court's opinion with the material 
in the record will show that a lot of information favorable to 
Attorney Webster has been left out.  A lot of information that 
puts his errors in context has been left out.  For instance, 
during his suspension, Webster appeared in four foreclosure 
actions in behalf of members of his family, always in a capacity 
other than attorney.  Three of these cases are correctly 
denominated as the unauthorized practice of law based on the 
Life Science decision.  Life Science Church v. Shawano Co., 221 
Wis. 2d 331, 585 N.W.2d 625 (Ct. App. 1998).  One case involving 
his children is disregarded as being different.  It happens to 
be the one case commenced before the decision in the Life 
Science case.   
¶62 More than two years ago, 13 members of the District 5 
Professional 
Responsibility 
Committee 
(Committee) 
met 
in 
La Crosse to review Webster's application for reinstatement.  
Certain problems were identified.  The Committee followed up 
No. 98-0677-D.dtp 
 
3 
 
with a careful investigation and issued a 19-page report.  
Ultimately, the Committee found that, in several respects, 
Webster "technically engaged in the unauthorized practice of law 
during the term of his 
suspension . . . . 
 
He did not 
intentionally violate the terms of his suspension and merely 
appeared as trustee on behalf of a family trust without 
knowledge of the Life Science decision." 
¶63 The Committee's recommendation states in part: 
Based on the conclusion that Mr. Webster was 
engaged 
in 
the 
practice 
of 
law, 
he 
has 
not 
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence full 
compliance with the terms of the suspension order and 
the requirements of SCR 22.26.  Therefore, the 
Committee cannot recommend reinstatement under the 
standard of SCR 22.28(6).  However, like Petition of 
Eisenberg, 
the 
recommendation 
for 
denial 
of 
reinstatement should be modified on the grounds that 
the denial may work an unjustifiably harsh result. 
The Committee is satisfied that Mr. Webster has 
the moral character to practice law within the 
standards expected of the bar and the administration 
of justice. . . .  
Mr. Webster has paid what the Committee considers 
to be a most serious penalty for his misconduct, in 
light of suspensions ordered for misconduct in other 
cases.  As of the present time he has been suspended 
from the practice of law for 30 months.  He will 
remain 
suspended 
until 
the 
Board 
makes 
it[s] 
recommendations to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme 
Court ultimately decides the matter.  By that time Mr. 
Webster's suspension could approach or exceed three 
years and if his petition is denied, he will be 
precluded 
from 
again 
filing 
a 
petition 
for 
reinstatement for at least nine months following the 
denial.  See, SCR 22.28(8). 
In Petition of 
Eisenberg, 
the referee 
felt 
compelled to recommend a denial of reinstatement 
because of the petitioner's unauthorized practice of 
law.  However he recommended that the denial might 
No. 98-0677-D.dtp 
 
4 
 
work [an] "unjustifiably harsh" result by extending 
the term of the suspension for an inordinate period.  
The Supreme Court stated: 
Eisenberg's 
failure 
to 
ascertain 
beforehand the legal effect of an appearance 
before the hearing examiner does not excuse 
his conduct.  We feel, however, that a 
denial of reinstatement of his license to 
practice law . . . would be too severe. 
The Committee recommends that the Board and 
Supreme Court adopt a similar rational[e] in this 
case. . . . The Board and the court should consider 
the harshness of this sanction in concluding that the 
Petition for Reinstatement should be granted. 
¶64 I agree with the recommendation of the District 5 
Professional Responsibility Committee.  In deference to the 
Committee's judgment, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
No. 98-0677-D.dtp 
 
1