Title: Smyth v. Jenkins
Citation: 208 Or. 92, 299 P.2d 819
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 1956

Affirmed July 11, 1956.
*93 Pat H. Donegan, Burns, argued the cause and filed briefs for appellants.
James M. Burns, Burns, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
Before WARNER, Chief Justice, and TOOZE, LUSK, BRAND and PERRY, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
TOOZE, J.
This is an appeal by D.H. Smyth and E.H. Smyth from a portion of a decree of the circuit court for Harney county involving certain water rights. The case originated in the office of the state engineer pursuant to the provisions of the Water Code of this state, and an appeal was taken to the circuit court from the order of the state engineer. The circuit court affirmed the order.
Upon the hearing before the state engineer, as well as on the trial in the circuit court, D.H. Smyth and E.H. Smyth were designated as the protestants, and Thomas E. Jenkins and Richard J. Jenkins were designated as the protestees, but we shall hereafter refer to them as the plaintiffs and defendants, respectively.
Plaintiffs D.H. Smyth and E.H. Smyth own lands in Harney county, Oregon, located on Smyth *94 creek, a tributary of Riddle creek. In 1953 they filed an application with the state engineer for the right to construct a reservoir to impound 160 acre feet of the waters of Smyth creek for irrigation purposes. Defendants Thomas E. Jenkins and Richard J. Jenkins own lands located on Riddle creek and in 1941 they were issued a permit by the state engineer authorizing them to build a reservoir for waters of Riddle creek with a storage capacity of 7,500 acre feet for irrigation purposes.
Defendants protested plaintiffs' application, and plaintiffs in turn objected to the issuance of a water right certificate to the defendants on their permit. The protests were consolidated for hearing which was held before the state engineer at Burns in October, 1953. Both protests were overruled by the state engineer, and he made his order approving plaintiffs' application to construct their reservoir and a further order that a certificate of water right be issued to defendants to store 7,500 acre feet of water under their permit, and a further certificate of water right to use of the waters thereof for irrigation purposes. This appeal is from the decree of the circuit court affirming that part of the order directing the issuance of a certificate of water right to defendants under their permit.
The substance of the objections which plaintiffs made before the state engineer to the issuance of a water right certificate to defendants to store 7,500 acre feet of water under their permit is as follows:
The transcript of testimony taken on the hearing before the state engineer consists of 383 typewritten pages, and that taken on the appeal to and hearing by the circuit court consists of 457 typewritten pages, in addition to a number of exhibits. Substantially the same evidence appears in both transcripts, although upon the hearing in the circuit court considerable more testimony was offered on the subject of evaporation of the waters of defendants' storage area.
Three dams are involved in defendants' application for a permit to construct and maintain a reservoir for the storage of 7,500 acre feet of water for irrigation purposes. On the hearings these dams were referred to by number as follows: dam No. 1 being the defendants' main storage dam; dam No. 2 being a diversion dam to place water into the reservoir; and dam No. 3 being designed to assist in the control of the stored waters.
Defendants constructed their storage dam (dam No. 1) on Riddle creek in 1929. They utilized an old lake bed for a reservoir. Through an honest mistake, they constructed this dam at that time and stored water in the reservoir without first having obtained a permit from the state engineer as required by statute. *96 By the use of the waters impounded in the reservoir, defendants were able to and did reclaim in excess of 600 acres of wasteland for beneficial use and also irrigated their other productive lands. They have made continual use of the reservoir and the waters impounded therein for irrigation purposes since the original construction in 1929. No other owners of lands located below the lands owned by defendants are in any manner affected by the dam and reservoir, for Riddle creek in its original state terminated on defendants' lands, with much of the water going to waste. Defendants' dam and reservoir lie below the confluence of Smyth creek and Riddle creek, and it is noteworthy that plaintiffs suffer no special injury or damage from the use defendants have made and are making of the waters of Riddle creek. It is indeed difficult to understand why they should be contesting defendants' rights as established by the state engineer on this appeal.
Learning in 1941 that they held no permit for their dam and reservoir nor a right to appropriate waters from the reservoir for irrigation purposes, and being advised by the county watermaster (an appointee and serving at the will of the state engineer: ORS 540.020) of the necessity therefor, and with his assistance, the defendants in August of that year filed with the state engineer formal application for a permit to construct a reservoir and to store for beneficial use unappropriated waters out of Riddle creek, and also an application for a permit to appropriate the waters of Riddle creek for irrigation purposes, to be taken out of Riddle creek and the reservoir. Both permits were granted by the state engineer under date of October 30, 1941. Although he was not a registered engineer, the county watermaster prepared the necessary *97 maps and drawings to be, and which were, filed in connection with defendants' applications.
The application for the construction of a reservoir stated specifically that the amount of water to be stored is 7,500 acre feet, and that the reservoir was not to be constructed in the channel of Riddle creek. It also stated that the reservoir, location of which was given, was to be filled by a feeder canal, using a diversion dam for the purpose (dam No. 2). It gave the location of the principal dam (dam No. 1) and stated that it would be 8 feet 3 inches in height, having a length on top of 800 feet, on the bottom of 788 feet, and being 12 feet wide on top. It appeared from the evidence that the estimated height of the dam was measured from the ground level rather than from the bed of the stream. Describing the proposed dam No. 3, the application read: "Dam No. 3 will hold all water in reservoir which will be concrete same as Dam No. 1." In answering the question on the application as to when construction work would begin, the applicants stated as follows: "Most complete." They also stated that the work would be completed on or before December 1, 1942.
After the permits were granted, defendants performed additional construction work on dam No. 1, completing that work in 1942. Because of war conditions existing at the time, they did not construct dam No. 2 until 1945, and they never completed dam No. 3, it having developed that dam No. 3 was unnecessary. In 1943 defendants notified the state engineer that their construction work had been completed, although at that time neither dam No. 2 nor dam No. 3 had been constructed. Defendants at no time applied to the state engineer for an extension of time in which to complete the work of construction.
*98 Plaintiffs' contentions in this case are based almost entirely upon the fact that the height of the main dam was 16 feet rather than 8 feet 3 inches as stated in the application, and upon defendants' failure to construct dams Nos. 2 and 3 within the time set forth in the application and permit, without having secured an extension of time from the state engineer.
ORS 537.230 provides:
Upon the completion of construction for which permit has been issued, the applicant is entitled to a water right certificate issued by the state engineer. ORS 537.250 provides:
It is to the issuance of the foregoing certificate that plaintiffs object. ORS 537.260 provides:
1, 2. It will be observed that under this statute the state engineer is vested with a wide discretion. It is manifest from the several provisions of the Water Code that the legislature intended to place upon the shoulders of the state engineer the primary responsibility for a proper distribution of the waters of the state for beneficial use; in some instances, however, his acts being governed by mandatory provisions of the law. It is seldom, if ever, that a court will interfere with discretionary action of the state engineer upon matters involving the administration of the water laws of the state and substitute its judgment for his. Judges are not super engineers. Broughton's Est. v. Central Or. Irr. Dist., 165 Or 435, 462, 101 P2d 425, 108 P2d 276.
It is obvious from the record that the gist of defendants' application for a permit to construct a reservoir was to construct one that would store 7,500 acre feet of water. The height of the dam, as stated in the application, is not the material thing. Manifestly, the dam would have to be high enough to provide in the reservoir the necessary amount of water. *101 The diversionary dam and canal designed for the purpose of aiding in filling the reservoir are mere incidents to the ultimate end in view. Certainly the state engineer would not require the construction of dam No. 3 as mentioned in the application when it was made to appear that it was unnecessary. We do not condone the action of defendants in 1943 in giving notice to the state engineer that all construction was completed, when in fact dam No. 2 had not been built, nor the failure of defendants to request an extension of time for such construction; nevertheless, we are unable to discover from the record where anyone has been harmed by defendants' derelictions. Certainly the state engineer and his appointee, the county water-master, were not misled. If the state engineer could have granted the extension of time, as, of course, he could, then he had the authority to waive failure to request such extension, which he did, as evidenced by his order directing the issuance of a certificate to defendants.
3. It must be kept in mind that the primary interest of the state is in the amount of running water that is going to be used for beneficial purposes, not in the methods to be employed to make that use possible, so long as the methods used do not endanger life or property, create a nuisance, or injure the vested right of some other person. Whether the methods used are proper is a question peculiarly within the discretion of the state engineer to decide. If improper, the statute vests him with ample authority and it is his duty to have them corrected so as to obviate the objections thereto.
We must not overlook the fact that when defendants filed their application to construct the reservoir in 1941, it had long before been substantially completed *102 and was in actual use. The reservoir actually stored 7,500 acre feet of water, and no more, and the water available was being put to a highly beneficial use. On their application for a permit under the head of "remarks," defendants stated:
Thus, at the outset the state engineer was fully advised that there would be but little construction work upon the main dam and reservoir; it was then in use. We have not overlooked plaintiffs' contentions respecting evaporation of the waters in the reservoir and their claim that that amounts to a waste thereof within the meaning of the Water Code. However, under the facts and circumstances of this case, and in particular, in the light of the type of country in which the reservoir is located, and in the light of the further fact that before the reservoir was constructed the waters of Riddle creek were largely lost for beneficial use, we do not deem plaintiffs' contentions to be meritorious.
On the hearing before the state engineer at Burns he personally visited and viewed all the premises involved in this litigation, including the dams and reservoir. The trial judge also viewed the premises. Unquestionably, both were impressed with what they *103 observed on the ground. We cannot read their minds so as to know just what part their personal inspections played in connection with their final conclusions. However, we have always given greater weight to the findings of a trial judge when he has personally viewed the premises. Becker v. Tillamook Bay Lbr. Co. et al., 194 Or 134, 137, 240 P2d 237.
4. Upon the conclusion of the hearing in the circuit court, the trial judge read his memorandum opinion deciding the issues between the parties. That opinion contains so much of merit that we include a portion of it herein as a part of this opinion. The trial judge said:
The decree is affirmed. Defendants to recover costs.