Title: State ex rel. Commons v. Lake Superior Court
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 45S00-1303-OR-209
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: May 17, 2013

ATTORNEY FOR THE RELATORS 
R. Cordell Funk 
Crown Point, IN 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF INDIANA 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Stephen R. Creason 
Chief Counsel 
 
Thomas M. Fisher 
Solicitor General 
 
Kyle Hunter 
Deputy Attorney General  
Indianapolis, IN  
ATTORNEYS FOR THE LAKE SUPERIOR COURT 
RESPONDENTS  
Karl L. Mulvaney 
Nana Quay-Smith 
Briana L. Clark 
Indianapolis, IN  
 
ATTORNEY FOR THE LAKE CIRCUIT COURT  
RESPONDENTS  
Bruce A. Kotzan 
Indianapolis, IN   
 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 45S00-1303-OR-209 
 
STATE OF INDIANA EX REL. GLENN D. COMMONS, ET AL.,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relators,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
      v. 
 
THE HON. JOHN R. PERA, AS CHIEF JUDGE OF THE LAKE SUPERIOR 
COURT, ET AL.,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondents. 
_________________________________ 
 
Original Action  
_________________________________ 
 
 
May 17, 2013 
 
Per Curiam. 
 
This Court has exclusive, original jurisdiction to supervise the exercise of jurisdiction of 
lower state courts.  See Ind. Const. art. 7, § 4; Ind. Original Action Rule 1.  Relators have filed 
this proceeding under the Indiana Original Action Rules, seeking a writ of mandamus and 
May 17 2013, 9:15 am
2 
 
prohibition regarding the filling of the vacancy on the bench of the Lake Superior Court’s 
Juvenile Division.   For reasons explained below, we grant in part and deny in part the relief 
sought by Relators.       
 
Background 
 
Relators Glenn D. Commons, Jeffrey Miller, and Charlotte Ann Peller are magistrates in 
the Lake Superior Court, Juvenile Division.  This opinion refers to them collectively as “the 
Magistrates.”  Respondents are the Lake Circuit Court, the Lake Superior Court, and the Judges 
thereof.  See Orig. Act. R. 1(C).   Respondents are referred to collectively here as “the Judges.”   
 
There is no underlying case from which this original action arises, but the relevant facts 
are undisputed.  The Magistrates complain about a decision made by the Judges at their meeting 
on February 12, 2013.  At that meeting, a majority voted to allow Judge Nicholas J. Schiralli to 
be reassigned from the Lake Superior Court’s County Division to its Juvenile Division, upon the 
then-upcoming resignation of Judge Mary Beth Bonaventura, who had been presiding over the 
Superior Court’s Juvenile Division.  (Relators’ Record at 1-5.)  The Magistrates characterize the 
decision made by this vote as an en banc ruling or order sufficient to authorize them to seek re-
lief through an original action in the Supreme Court.1   
 
The Magistrates filed this original action on March 20, 2013, seeking both an emergency 
writ and a permanent writ of mandamus and prohibition.   On March 21, this Court issued an 
emergency writ, which (1) stayed any proceedings by the Judges concerning the transfer of 
Judge Schiralli to the Juvenile Division; (2) announced that this Court would appoint a judge pro 
tempore to preside in the Juvenile Division until this Court could rule upon the request for a 
permanent writ2; and (3) gave the Judges until April 8 to file a brief opposing issuance of the 
permanent writ.3   
                                                 
1 Despite the procedural irregularity of this original action, the Judges agree with the Magistrates that this 
Court should “exercise its original jurisdiction and resolve the issues presented.”  (Br. in Opp. at 1 n.1.) 
   
2 On March 22, this Court appointed Senior Judge Thomas W. Webber, Sr., to serve as judge pro tempore 
in the Juvenile Division, effective March 25. 
3 
 
On April 5, the Lake Superior Court and its Judges filed a brief opposing issuance of the 
permanent writ, and the Lake Circuit Court and its Judge soon joined in that brief.  With leave of 
this Court, the Magistrates filed a reply brief on April 16, the Indiana Attorney General (repre-
senting the State) filed a brief on April 18, and the Judges filed a reply brief on April 23.    
 
Discussion 
 
The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, equitable in nature and viewed with 
disfavor.   State ex rel. Woodford v. Marion Super. Ct., 655 N.E.2d 63, 65 (Ind. 1995).  Writs of 
mandamus and prohibition will not be issued unless the relator can show a clear and obvious 
emergency where the failure of this Court to act will result in substantial injustice.  State ex rel. 
City of New Haven v. Allen Super. Ct., 699 N.E.2d 1134, 1136 (Ind. 1998).  Writs of mandamus 
and prohibition will be issued only where the trial court has an absolute duty to act or refrain 
from acting.   Id.    
 
The Magistrates request a permanent writ of mandamus and prohibition (1) declaring that 
Judge Schiralli cannot be reassigned from the County Division to the Juvenile Division; and (2) 
ruling that no current Judge of the Superior Court is eligible for transfer to the Juvenile Division 
and that the only way the judgeship of the Juvenile Division can be filled is by using the statuto-
ry merit-selection process.   
 
I. 
The Magistrates’ primary argument is that a transfer of Judge Schiralli to the Juvenile 
Division would violate Indiana Code section 33-33-45-21(e), which applies only to the Lake Su-
perior Court.   The statute provides, in its entirety,   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
3 On April 1, this Court issued an order requiring mediation and appointing the Hon. Frank Sullivan, Jr. 
(Ret.) as mediator.   The mediator filed a report on May 7, stating that mediation was held and the issues 
between the Magistrates and the Judges were not settled.  The Court expresses its gratitude for the media-
tor’s service. 
4 
 
(a) The [Lake Superior] court is divided into civil (including probate), criminal, 
county, and juvenile divisions. The work of the court shall be divided among the 
divisions by the rules of the court. 
(b) Seven (7) judges comprise the civil division. Four (4) judges comprise the 
criminal division. Four (4) judges comprise the county division. One (1) judge 
comprises the juvenile division.[4]  However, the court by rule may alter the num-
ber of judges assigned to a division of the court if the court determines that the 
change is necessary for the efficient operation of the court. 
(c) The court by rule may reassign a judge of the court from one (1) division to 
another if the court determines that the change is necessary for the efficient opera-
tion of the court. The court by rule may establish a rotation schedule providing for 
the rotation of judges through the various divisions. The rotation schedule may be 
used if the court determines that an emergency exists. However, a senior judge of 
any division may not be reassigned or rotated to another division under this sub-
section. 
(d) The chief judge of the court may assign a judge in one (1) division of the court 
to hear a case originating in another division of the court, and may reassign cases 
from one (1) judge to another, if the chief judge determines that the change is 
necessary for the efficient operation of the court. 
(e) A judge of a division of the court who has not been appointed to the court un-
der section 38 of this chapter is not eligible to be reassigned, rotated, or trans-
ferred to the other divisions of the court. However, a judge of a division of the 
court who has not been appointed to the court under section 38 of this chapter 
may apply to fill a vacancy in another division of the court through appointment 
as provided under this chapter. 
 
Ind. Code § 33-33-45-21 (emphasis added).  The italicized language in subsection 21(e) was 
added to the statute two years ago in Public Law 201-2011, effective July 1, 2011.  Section 38, in 
turn, provides, “A vacancy occurring on the court shall be filled by appointment of the governor 
from a list of three (3) nominees presented to the governor by the judicial nominating commis-
sion.”  I.C. § 33-33-45-38(a).  
  
The Magistrates argue that because Judge Schiralli was not appointed to the Lake Superi-
or Court under the merit-selection process described in section 38, Indiana Code section 33-33-
45-21(e) prohibits his transfer from the County Division to the Juvenile Division.   The Judges 
contend that Judge Schiralli was elected in 1976 to a four-year term on the County Court of Lake 
County and was later elected to the Lake Superior Court, once the County Division became part 
                                                 
4 “The superior court of Lake County consists of sixteen (16) judges plus the Lake circuit court judge if 
the circuit court judge chooses to sit on the superior court of Lake County.”  I.C. § 33-33-45-26.  
 
5 
 
of the Lake Superior Court.  (See Br. in Opp. at 4, 16-18.)  In other words, the Judges implicitly 
acknowledge that he was not appointed through the merit-selection process.      
  
The Judges respond that the prohibition on transfer in Indiana Code section 33-33-45-
21(e) cannot be enforced because it conflicts with the Lake County courts’ “transfer rule.”   The 
genesis of this transfer rule is an “Administrative Order Adopting A Plan For The Allocation Of 
Judicial Resources For Calendar Year 2000,” adopted by the Lake Circuit and Superior Courts in 
December 1999, which reads, in part:  
 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, AND DECREED…. 
9.  Selection of Judge to Transfer Court.  In the event a new court is created or a 
court is vacated in the Superior Court, a sitting judge of the Superior Court may 
elect to serve in the new or vacated court.  Should more than one judge wish to 
serve in a court under this provision, the judge with the most seniority shall pre-
vail.  In the event two or more judges with equal seniority wish to serve in a court, 
the decision will be made by lot.  
 
(Relators’ Record at 14, 17.)   On January 6, 2000, this Court issued an “Order Approving Dis-
trict Caseload Plan,” which found that the plan submitted by the Lake County courts should be 
adopted and approved it.  (Id. at 6-7.)   
 
On several subsequent occasions, the Lake County courts requested that this Court ap-
prove amendments to their caseload allocation plan that did not affect the transfer rule, and this 
Court approved those amendments.   In fact, since the transfer rule’s inclusion in the 2000 case-
load allocation plan order, the Lake Superior Court has continued to recognize, recite, and apply 
the transfer rule, including when certain merit-selected judges were transferred to different court-
rooms within the Civil Division in 2007 and 2012 when a vacancy arose.  (See Reply to the 
Briefs of the Attorney General and the Relators, Exhibits A & B.)  It is this transfer rule that the 
Judges cited when voting in February 2013 to approve Judge Schiralli’s transfer from the County 
Division to the Juvenile Division.   (Relators’ Record at 1-5.) 
 
6 
 
The Judges acknowledge Indiana Code section 33-33-45-21(e)’s prohibition on transfer 
and reassignment of a non-eligible judge, but they contend the prohibition cannot be enforced 
because it conflicts with the local transfer rule.  The Judges cite Indiana Code section 34-8-1-3, 
which provides:  
 
The supreme court has authority to adopt, amend, and rescind rules of court that 
govern and control practice and procedure in all the courts of Indiana.  These 
rules must be promulgated and take effect under the rules adopted by the supreme 
court, and thereafter all laws in conflict with the supreme court’s rules have no 
further force or effect. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  From this, the Judges concluded that “even the legislature has recognized 
that this Court’s approval of the Lake County Superior Court Transfer Rule must therefore be 
given effect to the extent that the addition of Section (e) of I.C. § 33-33-45-21(e) is found to con-
flict with the Transfer Rule.”  (Br. in Opp. at 21-22.)    
 
The primacy of this Court’s rules of practice and procedure, recognized in Indiana Code 
section 34-8-1-3 (“thereafter all laws in conflict with the supreme court’s rules have no further 
force or effect”) does not apply to the transfer rule because the transfer rule is not a rule of this 
Court.  The Lake County courts adopted the transfer rule as part of their “Administrative Order 
Adopting A Plan For The Allocation Of Judicial Resources For Calendar Year 2000,” in re-
sponse to an order issued by this Court on July 16, 1999, requiring the development of local 
caseload plans; this Court reviewed and approved that plan, noting the Court intended to require 
periodic revision of the local plan.  (Relators’ Record at 6.)   But our order approving the Lake 
County courts’ plan was not a rule of this Court governing practice and procedure “promulgated 
and tak[ing] effect under the rules adopted by the supreme court,” and, so, the transfer rule is not 
a rule of this Court as contemplated in Indiana Code section 34-8-1-3.5  Moreover, while trial 
courts may establish local rules for their own governance, those local rules may not conflict with 
the rules established by this Court or by statute.  Gill v. Evansville Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 970 
                                                 
5 Cf. State v. Holtsclaw, 977 N.E.2d 348, 350 (Ind. 2012) (citing I.C. § 34-8-1-3 and holding that where 
there was a conflict between I.C. § 35-38-4-2 and Indiana Appellate Rule 9 (a rule promulgated by this 
Court under the rule-making procedure set out in Trial Rule 80) regarding the amount of time the State 
has to initiate an appeal in a criminal case, “the former must give way to the latter.”). 
7 
 
N.E.2d 633, 645-46 (Ind. 2012) (citing I.C. § 34-8-1-4).  Consequently, we disagree with the 
Judges’ assertion that the local transfer rule trumps, by operation of Indiana Code section 34-8-1-
3, the prohibition on transfer of a non-eligible judge in Indiana Code section 33-33-45-21(e).  
 
To the extent the Judges suggest Indiana Code section 33-33-45-21(e) is unconstitutional, 
again we disagree.  A statute is presumed constitutional; a party challenging its constitutionality 
must rebut that presumption.  McManus v. State, 814 N.E.2d 253, 255 (Ind. 2004).  The pre-
sumption of constitutionality has not been overcome.    
  
The Indiana Constitution divides the functions of the government into three departments 
(the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial) and provides that “no person, charged with offi-
cial duties under one of these departments, shall exercise any of the functions of another, except 
as in this Constitution expressly provided.”  Ind. Const. art. 3, § 1.  Generally, this provision rec-
ognizes “that each branch of the government has specific duties and powers that may not be 
usurped or infringed upon by the other branches of government.”  State v. Monfort, 723 N.E.2d 
407, 411 (Ind. 2000).  
  
The Indiana Constitution gives the Legislature the power to create superior courts.  
Monford, 723 N.E.2d at 410; see Ind. Const. art. 7, § 1 (“The judicial power of the State shall be 
vested in one Supreme Court, one Court of Appeals, Circuit Courts, and such other courts as the 
General Assembly may establish.”).  The Judges identify no authority precluding the Legislature 
from also providing a method for selection of the judges for the courts it creates.   See In re Pub-
lic Law No. 305 and Public Law No. 309 of Indiana Acts of 1975, 263 Ind. 506, 334 N.E.2d 659, 
671-72 (1975) (holding that new legislation providing for non-partisan elections as the method 
for filling future vacancies that would occur in three new judgeship positions created for the 
Vanderburgh Superior Court was “a decision of the legislature which is within their power to 
make.”).  Moreover, the prohibition on transfer in Indiana Code section 33-33-45-21(e) is not 
unique; it is only one example of legislative limitation on a superior court’s transfer of judges 
from one division to another division.  See, e.g., I.C. § 33-33-2-39(a) (providing that in Allen 
8 
 
Superior Court, a judge may transfer divisions but only once); I.C. § 33-33-45-21(c) (providing 
that in Lake Superior Court, “a senior judge of any division may not be reassigned or rotated to 
another division under this subsection.”). 
   
All of this leads us to conclude that Indiana Code section 33-33-45-21(e) is constitution-
al, applies here, and precludes the Judges from transferring, rotating, or reassigning Judge 
Schiralli from the County Division to the Juvenile Division.  This prohibition, however, does not 
preclude Judge Schiralli from applying to be appointed, under the merit-selection process in In-
diana Code section 33-33-45-38, to fill a vacancy in the other divisions of the court.  See I.C. § 
33-33-45-21(e). 
 
II. 
Although we grant part of the relief the Magistrates seek, we decline the Magistrates’ 
broader argument that no Judge may be reassigned to the Juvenile Division because “there is no 
legal basis to permit the transfer of any Judge in the Superior Court of Lake County from one 
division to another.”  (Relators’ Br. at 12 (emphasis added).) 
   
The Lake Superior Court “may make and adopt rules and regulations for conducting the 
business of the court….”  I.C. § 33-33-45-8(a).  And it “by rule may reassign a judge of the court 
from one (1) division to another if the court determines that the change is necessary for the effi-
cient operation of the court.”  I.C. § 33-33-45-21(c).  
  
The Magistrates contend the Superior Court has no rule in effect allowing for such a 
transfer.  Although the Magistrates and the Attorney General argue that the Superior Court’s 
transfer rule expired or was superseded, those arguments are unavailing.  The record shows that 
the Judges adopted the transfer rule as part of a case management plan for the efficient operation 
of the Superior Court more than a decade ago, received Supreme Court approval of that plan, and 
have continually relied on their transfer rule since then.  For purposes of this original action, we 
conclude that the Lake Superior Court follows a rule — the transfer rule — for efficiently operat-
9 
 
ing and conducting its business.  Therefore, we deny the Magistrates’ request for a permanent 
writ that would declare that no Judge may be transferred or reassigned to the Juvenile Division.    
 
Conclusion 
 
Indiana Code section 33-33-45-21(e) prevents the Judges from reassigning, transferring, 
or rotating Judge Schiralli from the County Division to the Juvenile Division.  However, this 
prohibition does not preclude him from applying to be appointed, under the merit-selection 
process in Indiana Code section 33-33-45-38, to fill a vacancy in the other divisions of the court.  
The Court denies the Magistrates’ request for a permanent writ that would more broadly prohibit 
any current Judge from being transferred or reassigned to the Juvenile Division.   
 
This opinion is final.  No petitions for rehearing or motions to reconsider shall be filed.  
Orig. Act. R. 5(C).  The Clerk is directed to certify this opinion as final and to send a certified 
copy to each of the Respondent Judges and to all counsel of record.   
 
    
Dickson, C.J., and Rucker, David, Massa, and Rush, JJ., concur.