Title: Commonwealth v. Smith, W., Aplt. v. (Concurring Opinion)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 436 CAP
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: May 27, 2010

[J-224-2004] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. WAYNE SMITH, Appellant : : : : : : : : : : : No. 436 CAP Appeal from the Order entered on December 31, 2003 denying the PCRA petition in the Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division of Delaware County at No. 4586-1994 SUBMITTED: December 28, 2004 CONCURRING OPINION MR. JUSTICE BAER DECIDED: May 27, 2010 I join the Majority Opinion, but write separately to address two points raised by my distinguished colleague Mr. Justice Saylor in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, to elaborate on his thoughts, and to ensure the clarity of my positions on these important matters. First, as to the suppression issue, I agree with the Majority that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress the inculpatory statement he made following his illegal arrest, and, further, that counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue this issue on appeal. The exclusionary rule does not preclude admission of Appellant’s statement when the police had independent probable cause to make a warrantless arrest of Appellant at the time the invalid arrest warrant was executed, and, [J-224-2004] - 2 as recognized by the Majority, the connection between the illegal arrest and the subsequent confession was so attenuated as to dissipate any taint arising therefrom. While not disputing the Majority’s general application of state and federal law in this regard, the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Saylor raises the salient point that in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1994), we held that the policies underlying the exclusionary rule are substantially broader under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution than under federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Rather than solely to deter police misconduct, we have held that "the exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania has consistently served to bolster the twin aims of Article I, Section 8; to-wit, the safeguarding of privacy and the fundamental requirement that warrants shall only be issued upon probable cause." Id. at 889. Although not dispositive of this appeal, I agree with Justice Saylor’s recitation of this Court’s state constitutional jurisprudence. Justice Saylor proceeds to offer his personal opinion that, “”[l]eft to my own devices, however, I would prefer a more open acknowledgement of the growing unwillingness at the federal and state levels to apply the exclusionary rule in the absence of intentional or, at least grossly negligent, police conduct.” Concurring and Dissenting Opinion at 3. Contrary to openly acknowledging an “unwillingness” to apply the exclusionary rule in certain contexts, I would prefer that we zealously guard the exclusionary rule to protect against the erosion of one of our society's most cherished of freedoms -- the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Appreciative of Justice Saylor’s scholarly concerns, and cognizant that the instant case does not implicate an erosion of Pennsylvanians’ constitutionally protected right to privacy, I write separately only to emphasize that I do not view the instant decision as restricting the application of the exclusionary rule in the proper case. As said, I am opposed to any [J-224-2004] - 3 erosion of the use of this invaluable remedial tool, when appropriate, to preserve our citizens’ right to be free from coercive state interference into their lives and affairs. Secondly, I write to comment on Justice Saylor’s thoughtful remarks on the Majority’s disposition of Appellant’s challenges to Dr. Cohn’s testimony as false and contrary to generally accepted scientific principles. Dr. Cohn testified that Appellant was not suffering from cocaine-induced psychosis because such disorder is dose- related, and chronic users, such as Appellant, develop a tolerance, requiring a large dose to induce psychosis. Recognizing that trial counsel rigorously cross-examined Dr. Cohn, the Majority rejects Appellant’s claim, finding that “[w]hile Dr. Cohn’s opinions regarding the relationship between dose level and psychosis may have been questionable, it cannot be said that his methodology was contrary to generally accepted scientific principles.” Slip. Op. at 22 (citing Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038 (Pa. 2003) and Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that scientific evidence is admissible if its underlying methodology has general acceptance in the relevant scientific community)). In response, Justice Saylor opined in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion that “if the Court is going to interpret Frye so narrowly as to justify the admission of speculative opinions, or opinions falsely couched in scientific literature, I believe the time has come for Pennsylvania to move to the Daubert[1] standard.” Concurring and Dissenting Opinion at 6. My personal view on this particular issue is somewhat nuanced. While I recognize the cogency of Justice Saylor’s position, consistent with my prior pronouncements in this area, I join the Majority in concluding that, in the instant case, 1 Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 59 U.S. 579 (1993) (overruling Frye as superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence, and requiring federal judges to make a preliminary assessment of whether the testimony’s underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid and can be applied properly to the facts at issue). [J-224-2004] - 4 as in most cases, it is the role of the jury to determine whether the expert, Dr. Cohn, was credible and reliable. The fact that Dr. Cohn’s opinion may not have been consistent with the majority of scientific authority can be brought to the jury’s attention through cross-examination. However, like Justice Saylor, I can also envision a case in which a conclusion rendered by an expert is so completely unsupportable in the scientific community that the trial court should be provided the discretion to preclude its admission. Thus, while I believe the Frye test should remain the law in Pennsylvania, I await a case in which this Court may consider whether Frye should be extended to apply to unscientific conclusions reached by experts, in addition to the current application of Frye to unscientific methodologies employed by experts in reaching those conclusions. Junk science should be no more admissible through experts’ conclusions than it is through experts’ methodologies.