Title: Langlade County v. D.J.W.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2018AP000145-FT
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 24, 2020

2020 WI 41 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP145-FT 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the matter of the mental commitment of D. J. 
W.: 
 
Langlade County, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
D. J. W., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 382 Wis. 2d 833,917 N.W.2d 234 
(2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 24, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 25, 2019   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Langlade  
 
JUDGE: 
Gregory E. Grau   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which ZIEGLER, KELLY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN, JJ., 
joined.  ROGGENSACK, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion. REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Jeremy A. Newman, assistant state public defender. There 
was an oral argument by Jeremy A. Newman. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Robin James Stowe, corporation counsel. There was an oral argument 
by Robin James Stowe. 
 
 
 
2020 WI 41
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP145-FT 
(L.C. No. 
2016ME75) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of the mental commitment of     
D. J. W.: 
 
 
 
Langlade County, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
D. J. W., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
APR 24, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, 
in which ZIEGLER, KELLY, DALLET, and HAGEGORN, JJ., joined.  
ROGGENSACK, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion. REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.  
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, D.J.W., seeks 
review of an unpublished, authored decision of the court of appeals 
affirming the circuit court's order extending his involuntary 
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
2 
 
commitment.1  The court also continued his involuntary medication 
and treatment on an inpatient basis.  D.J.W. contends that Langlade 
County (the County) did not present sufficient evidence of his 
dangerousness to sustain an extension of his involuntary 
commitment. 
¶2 
At the recommitment hearing, the County's expert witness 
testified that D.J.W. had lost a job, relied on his parents for 
housing, and received disability benefits due to schizophrenia and 
delusions.  D.J.W. takes issue with the County's reliance on this 
information in demonstrating that he is "dangerous" to himself 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.  In response, the County 
asserts that taken as a whole the testimony is sufficient to 
determine that D.J.W. would be a proper subject for commitment if 
treatment were withdrawn under § 51.20(1)(am).   
¶3 
We determine that going forward circuit courts in 
recommitment proceedings are to make specific factual findings 
with reference to the subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based.  Further, we 
conclude that the evidence introduced at the recommitment hearing 
was insufficient to support a conclusion that D.J.W. is "dangerous" 
pursuant to either §§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c. or 2.d. and 51.20(1)(am).   
                                                 
1 Langlade Cty. v. D.J.W. (D.J.W. II), No. 2018AP145-FT, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 1, 2018) (affirming order 
of the circuit court for Langlade County, Gregory E. Grau, Reserve 
Judge).  The appeal was decided by one judge, Judge Mark Seidl, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(d) (2017-18). 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
3 
 
¶4 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
¶5 
On January 30, 2017, the circuit court for Langlade 
County2 entered an order committing D.J.W. to the custody and care 
of the County for a period of six months.  The circuit court 
determined D.J.W. to be mentally ill, dangerous, and a proper 
subject for treatment.  Further, the circuit court ordered 
involuntary medication and treatment.3 
¶6 
As the expiration of D.J.W.'s initial commitment 
approached, the County petitioned the circuit court to extend 
D.J.W.'s commitment for one year.  The circuit court appointed Dr. 
John T. Coates to examine D.J.W. 
¶7 
At the recommitment hearing, the County called a single 
witness, Dr. Coates.4  D.J.W. testified on his own behalf and did 
not call any other witnesses. 
¶8 
Dr. Coates testified that he had diagnosed D.J.W. with 
schizophrenia.  He further observed that D.J.W. had "a history of 
                                                 
2 The Honorable John B. Rhode presided at the initial 
commitment hearing, and the Honorable Gregory E. Grau presided at 
the recommitment proceedings. 
3 D.J.W. appealed his initial commitment, and the court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court's order.  Langlade Cty. v. 
D.J.W. (D.J.W. I), No. 2017AP1313-FT, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2017).   
4 Dr. Coates testified that he produced a report after his 
examination of D.J.W., but the report was never admitted into 
evidence at the recommitment hearing.  Accordingly, the evidence 
presented by the County at the recommitment hearing consisted 
solely of Dr. Coates's testimony.  
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
4 
 
auditory and visual hallucinations" and that "[h]is thought 
process is illogical and again some grandiose illusions."   
¶9 
According to Dr. Coates's testimony, D.J.W. "did admit 
that he has had kind of the same hallucinations for about three 
years.  He told me that about four months ago he saw the devil and 
that two months ago he was hearing voices."  The doctor described 
D.J.W.'s illness as "treatable with psychotropic medications." 
¶10 On direct examination, the attorney for the County asked 
Dr. Coates, "Do you have an opinion as to whether or not [D.J.W.], 
as a result of his current condition, is a risk of danger to 
himself or to others?"  Dr. Coates responded: 
Well, the main danger is risk to himself if he should go 
off treatment.  He's apt to have exacerbation of his 
illness. 
 
He's 
apt 
to 
experience, 
you 
know, 
hallucinations to a greater degree.  Become delusional.  
In the past, he has had some problems with aggressive 
behavior and property damage.  But I think the greater 
risk is just his inability to properly care for himself 
and to properly socialize if he goes untreated. 
¶11 As examples of D.J.W.'s inability to properly care for 
himself in the event treatment were withdrawn, Dr. Coates 
testified: 
[H]e's living with his parents now.  He quit his job 
because he, you know, was delusional.  He has obtained 
disability.  That disability points to the fact that 
he's not able to independently care for himself at this 
point.  And he would be homeless I think if he wasn't 
able to live with his parents. . . . His judgment is 
currently still impaired.  He feels that he can manage 
his 
illness 
in 
the 
presence 
of 
hallucinations. . . . [H]e 
feels 
that 
you 
know, 
hallucinations really aren't a problem for him. . . . He 
feels the medication is actually the problem, not his 
illness. 
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
5 
 
¶12 Dr. Coates further testified that D.J.W. was not 
necessarily homicidal or suicidal:  "I don't know if he's highly 
suicidal or highly homicidal.  I can say that people when they're 
acutely psychotic are unpredictable and their actions are 
unpredictable."  The "major danger," as Dr. Coates saw it, was as 
follows: 
[I]f he goes off his medications, he will be delusional.  
He will be hallucinating.  He will not be able to 
interact appropriately with others.  Like I said, at the 
beginning of the year he quit a job because he thought 
he was the Messiah.  So the major danger is to himself.  
I don't think he's necessarily a violent man that's going 
to go out and harm others. 
¶13 In summation, Dr. Coates recommended that D.J.W. stay on 
his medication.  He concluded that D.J.W. is "incapable of refusing 
medication or incompetent to refuse medication based on his 
inability to apply the understanding of the advantages and 
disadvantages and the alternatives in treating his illness." 
¶14 On cross examination, Dr. Coates again emphasized that 
D.J.W. "harmed himself by quitting his job because he thought he 
was the Messiah."  When asked by D.J.W.'s counsel how that is 
"dangerous to himself or somebody else[,]" Dr. Coates responded 
that "[h]e lost employment.  He can't take care of himself.  He 
can't provide for his basic needs because he can't maintain 
employment because he's the Messiah."  Dr. Coates also reiterated 
on cross examination that D.J.W. had moved in with his parents and 
"would be homeless if it wasn't for others."   However, Dr. Coates 
was unaware of any point at which D.J.W. had actually been 
homeless. 
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
6 
 
¶15 Testifying again on cross examination that D.J.W. does 
well while under treatment, Dr. Coates stated: 
[W]hen he goes off treatment we've seen the results of 
that he can't care for himself, he can't maintain a job.  
He needs to rely on his parents for housing.  He has 
received disability so he's been found disabled.  You 
know, you can't have it both.  You can't be disabled and 
say I'm fine to do whatever I want to do. 
¶16  As he did on direct examination, Dr. Coates again 
emphasized on cross examination his view that D.J.W. was dangerous 
to himself but not necessarily to others: 
Again, you know like I say, he quit a job in January 
because he was the Messiah.  That is danger to himself.  
He, you know, lost employment because of his illness.  
Again, he's unable to independently care for himself.  
He proved that by obtaining disability.  Danger in my 
opinion is not suicidal and homicidal ideations.  
Although those are possibilities. 
¶17 D.J.W. also took the stand and testified.  He 
acknowledged that he hears voices, sees things that other people 
cannot, and believes that he is the Messiah with a mission of 
"invent[ing] a way out of" global warming.  Further, D.J.W. 
confirmed that he received help from his family, stated that he 
had a job on a farm, and had applied for and obtained disability 
benefits.  He additionally expressed a dislike for his medication. 
¶18 At the close of the recommitment hearing, the circuit 
court rendered a decision and recommitted D.J.W. for a period of 
one year.  It determined first that D.J.W. suffers from a mental 
illness.  Second, it concluded that his mental illness is 
treatable, as evidenced by the testimony that his hallucinations 
and delusions decreased while he had been subject to treatment. 
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
7 
 
¶19 The circuit court concluded next that D.J.W. would be a 
proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn.  On 
this point, it found that "given the degree of those hallucinations 
and delusions ultimately that course would put his judgment and 
perception in such a place that he would be a significant danger 
to himself."  Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that the 
County met its burden under Wis. Stat. § 51.20 to recommit D.J.W. 
¶20 Further, the circuit court determined that D.J.W. was 
"substantially incapable of applying and understanding the 
advantages, disadvantages and alternatives to his mental illness 
to the point where he can't make an informed choice as to whether 
to accept or refuse medication or treatment."  As a result, the 
circuit court ordered that he be involuntarily medicated. 
¶21 D.J.W. appealed, arguing that the County presented 
insufficient evidence of his dangerousness under Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2. and (1)(am).  The court of appeals affirmed, 
concluding that "the circuit court's finding of D.J.W.'s 
dangerousness under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am) was not clearly 
erroneous."  Langlade Cty. v. D.J.W. (D.J.W. II), No. 2018AP145-
FT, unpublished slip op., ¶10 (Wis. Ct. App. May 1, 2018). 
¶22 Specifically, the court of appeals observed the circuit 
court's findings that (1) D.J.W. experienced significant symptoms 
due to his schizophrenia; (2) if treatment were withdrawn, D.J.W.'s 
hallucinations and delusions would "take their course" and make 
him a significant danger to himself; and (3) D.J.W. was incapable 
of understanding the advantages and disadvantages of treatment.  
Id.  In the court of appeals' view, "[t]hese findings satisfy the 
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
8 
 
standard of dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(am), namely that there 
was a substantial likelihood D.J.W. would become a proper subject 
for commitment if treatment were withdrawn."  Id. 
II 
¶23 We 
are 
asked 
to 
review 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
determination that the circuit court correctly concluded the 
County presented sufficient evidence that D.J.W. is dangerous 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 51.20(1)(a)2. and 51.20(1)(am).  In a 
recommitment proceeding, the burden is on the County to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence all required facts.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(13)(e); Winnebago Cty. v. J.M., 2018 WI 37, ¶59, 381 
Wis. 2d 28, 911 N.W.2d 41.  
¶24 Whether the County has met its burden is a mixed question 
of law and fact.  Waukesha Cty. v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, ¶15, 375 
Wis. 2d 542, 895 N.W.2d 783.  First, we will uphold a circuit 
court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is against the great 
weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.  Metro. Assocs. v. 
City of Milwaukee, 2018 WI 4, ¶62, 379 Wis. 2d 141, 905 N.W.2d 784.   
¶25 Second, we review whether the facts satisfy the 
statutory standard.  J.W.J., 375 Wis. 2d 542, ¶15.  In our review, 
we 
interpret 
and 
apply 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20. 
 
Statutory 
interpretation and application are questions of law that we review 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit court 
and court of appeals.  Metro Assocs., 379 Wis. 2d 141, ¶24. 
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
9 
 
III 
¶26 For context, we begin by setting forth the statutory 
background and requirements for recommitments pursuant to chapter 
51 of the Wisconsin Statutes, particularly as they pertain to the 
standard for "dangerousness."  Next, we clarify the statutory 
underpinnings of this case.  Subsequently, we examine the 
sufficiency of the evidence presented at the recommitment hearing.5 
                                                 
5 Following this court's decision in Portage Cty. v. J.W.K., 
2019 WI 54, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509, and before we had 
granted the petition for review in this case, we asked the parties 
to address the impact of that decision on the issues presented in 
D.J.W.'s petition for review.  Specifically, the court in J.W.K. 
determined that J.W.K.'s appeal of his recommitment order was moot 
because he was no longer subject to the commitment order he was 
appealing.  Id., ¶31. 
In response to our inquiry, the parties agreed that D.J.W.'s 
sufficiency challenge was moot for the same reason.  D.J.W. asked 
this court to accept the petition for review pursuant to one of 
the mootness exceptions.  See Outagamie Cty. v. Melanie L., 2013 
WI 67, ¶80, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607 (explaining that the 
court may decide an otherwise moot issue if the issue "(1) is of 
great public importance; (2) occurs so frequently that a definitive 
decision is necessary to guide circuit courts; (3) is likely to 
arise again and decision of the court would alleviate uncertainty; 
or (4) will likely be repeated, but evades appellate review because 
the appellate review process cannot be completed or even undertaken 
in time to have a practical effect on the parties").  The County 
urged us to deny the petition for review.  We accepted the petition 
for review.   
Neither party raised any collateral consequences that would 
affect our analysis.  See Marathon Cty. v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶¶22-
25, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901.  However, the question of the 
necessary evidence to support an involuntary commitment is of great 
importance yet often evades appellate review.  Our decision on 
this case will give necessary guidance to circuit courts conducting 
involuntary commitment proceedings.  Thus, we reach the merits of 
the parties' arguments. 
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
10 
 
A 
¶27 The legislatively stated purpose of chapter 51 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes is "to assure the provision of a full range of 
treatment and rehabilitation services in the state for all mental 
disorders and developmental disabilities and for mental illness, 
alcoholism and other drug abuse."  Wis. Stat. § 51.001(1).  Such 
treatment should be given to those in need by way of "the least 
restrictive 
treatment 
alternative 
appropriate 
to 
their 
needs . . . ."  Id.   
¶28 "Because 
of 
the 
liberty 
interests 
affected 
by 
involuntary commitment, public policy favors outpatient treatment 
whenever possible . . . ."  J.W.J., 375 Wis. 2d 542, ¶19.  This 
policy is clearly set forth in the statutes:  "To protect personal 
liberties, no person who can be treated adequately outside of a 
                                                 
After this court heard oral argument, but before we issued 
this decision, D.J.W. passed away.  This intervening fact does not 
dictate a contrary result.  In the criminal context, we have 
previously determined that "when a defendant dies while pursuing 
postconviction relief,  . . . the defendant's right to bring an 
appeal continues."  State v. McDonald, 144 Wis. 2d 531, 532, 424 
N.W.2d 411 (1988).  The right to appeal, which arises from both 
the constitution and statutory law, "is an integral part of a 
defendant's right to a final determination of the merits of the 
case.  It serves as a safeguard to protect a defendant against 
errors in the criminal proceedings.  A defendant who dies pending 
appeal . . . is no less entitled to those safeguards."  Id. at 
536-37.  
Given the significant liberty interests at stake in a ch. 51 
involuntary commitment proceeding, the same considerations are 
attendant here.  We thus issue this opinion despite the 
petitioner's passing. 
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
11 
 
hospital, institution or other inpatient facility may be 
involuntarily treated in such a facility."  Wis. Stat. § 51.001(2).  
¶29 For a person to be subject to a chapter 51 involuntary 
commitment, three elements must be fulfilled:  the subject 
individual must be (1) mentally ill; (2) a proper subject for 
treatment; and (3) dangerous to themselves or others.  Fond du Lac 
Cty. v. Helen E.F., 2012 WI 50, ¶20, 340 Wis. 2d 500, 814 
N.W.2d 179; Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)1.-2.  Each of these required 
elements must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.  Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(13)(e); J.W.J., 375 Wis. 2d 542, ¶19. 
¶30 In an initial commitment proceeding, Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2. provides five different means of demonstrating 
that a person is "dangerous."  State v. Dennis H., 2002 WI 104, 
¶14, 
255 
Wis. 2d 359, 
647 
N.W.2d 851. 
 
Pursuant 
to 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2., an individual is "dangerous" if any of the 
following is fulfilled: 
(1) Evidences a substantial probability of physical harm 
to himself or herself as manifested by evidence of recent 
threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm.  
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.a. 
(2) Evidences a substantial probability of physical harm 
to other individuals as manifested by evidence of recent 
homicidal or other violent behavior, or by evidence that 
others are placed in reasonable fear of violent behavior 
and serious physical harm to them, as evidenced by a 
recent overt act, attempt or threat to do serious 
physical harm.  § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. 
(3) Evidences such impaired judgment, manifested by 
evidence of a pattern of recent acts or omissions, that 
there 
is 
a 
substantial 
probability 
of 
physical 
impairment or injury to himself or herself or other 
individuals.  § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. 
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
12 
 
(4) Evidences behavior manifested by recent acts or 
omissions that, due to mental illness, he or she is 
unable to satisfy basic needs for nourishment, medical 
care, shelter or safety without prompt and adequate 
treatment so that a substantial probability exists that 
death, 
serious 
physical 
injury, 
serious 
physical 
debilitation, 
or 
serious 
physical 
disease 
will 
imminently ensue unless the individual receives prompt 
and adequate treatment for this mental illness.  
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.d. 
(5) For an individual, other than an individual who is 
alleged to be drug dependent or developmentally 
disabled, after the advantages and disadvantages of and 
alternatives to accepting a particular medication or 
treatment have been explained to him or her and because 
of mental illness, evidences either incapability of 
expressing an understanding of the advantages and 
disadvantages of accepting medication or treatment and 
the 
alternatives, 
or 
substantial 
incapability 
of 
applying 
an 
understanding 
of 
the 
advantages, 
disadvantages, and alternatives to his or her mental 
illness in order to make an informed choice as to whether 
to accept or refuse medication or treatment; and 
evidences a substantial probability, as demonstrated by 
both the individual's treatment history and his or her 
recent acts or omissions, that the individual needs care 
or 
treatment 
to 
prevent 
further 
disability 
or 
deterioration and a substantial probability that he or 
she will, if left untreated, lack services necessary for 
his or her health or safety and suffer severe mental, 
emotional, or physical harm that will result in the loss 
of the individual's ability to function independently in 
the community or the loss of cognitive or volitional 
control 
over 
his 
or 
her 
thoughts 
or 
actions.  
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.e. 
¶31 Upon the impending expiration of an initial six-month 
commitment, a county may seek an extension of the commitment for 
a period not to exceed one year.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)1., 
(13)(g)3.; Portage Cty. v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶¶17-18, 386 
Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509.  To prevail in a recommitment 
proceeding, the County must prove the same elements necessary for 
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
13 
 
the initial commitment by clear and convincing evidence——that the 
patient is (1) mentally ill; (2) a proper subject for treatment; 
and (3) dangerous to themselves or others.  J.W.J., 375 
Wis. 2d 542, ¶20; J.M., 381 Wis. 2d 28, ¶59 (citing Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a), (13)(e)). 
¶32 In a recommitment proceeding, however, there is an 
additional manner of proving dangerousness provided by Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(am).  "Because an individual's behavior might change 
while receiving treatment, Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am) provides a 
different avenue for proving dangerousness if the individual has 
been the subject of treatment for mental illness immediately prior 
to commencement of the extension proceedings . . . ."  J.W.K., 386 
Wis. 2d 672, ¶19.  Pursuant to § 51.20(1)(am),  
If the individual has been the subject of inpatient 
treatment for mental illness . . . immediately prior to 
commencement of the proceedings as a result of . . . a 
commitment or protective placement ordered by a court 
under this section . . . the requirements of a recent 
overt act, attempt or threat to act under par. (a)2.a. 
or b., pattern of recent acts or omissions under par. 
(a)2.c. or e., or recent behavior under par. (a)2.d. may 
be satisfied by a showing that there is a substantial 
likelihood, based on the subject individual's treatment 
record, that the individual would be a proper subject 
for commitment if treatment were withdrawn. 
¶33 Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(1)(am) "recognizes that an 
individual receiving treatment may not have exhibited any recent 
overt acts or omissions demonstrating dangerousness because the 
treatment ameliorated such behavior, but if treatment were 
withdrawn, there may be a substantial likelihood such behavior 
would recur."  J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶19.  "However, 
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
14 
 
dangerousness remains an element to be proven to support both the 
initial commitment and any extension."  Id. 
¶34 Indeed, "[t]he County must prove the individual 'is 
dangerous.'"  Id., ¶24 (citing Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. and 
(13)(g)3.).  It is not enough that the individual was at one point 
dangerous.  Thus, "[e]ach extension hearing requires proof of 
current dangerousness."  Id.  The evidentiary pathway set forth by 
sub. (1)(am) "acknowledges that an individual may still be 
dangerous despite the absence of recent acts, omissions, or 
behaviors exhibiting dangerousness outlined in § 51.20(1)(a)2.a-
e." but it "does not change the elements or quantum of proof 
required."  Id. 
B 
¶35 With the above background in hand, we next clarify the 
statutory underpinnings of this case. 
¶36 The statutory basis for D.J.W.'s commitment in this case 
has been somewhat of a moving target.  It was not clear at either 
the initial commitment hearing or the extension hearing on which 
subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. the commitment 
was based.   
¶37 After D.J.W. was initially committed, he appealed that 
commitment.  In affirming the initial commitment, the court of 
appeals specifically determined that the subdivision paragraph of 
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. under which commitment was appropriate 
was § 51.20(1)(a)2.d.  Langlade Cty. v. D.J.W. (D.J.W. I), No. 
2017AP1313-FT, unpublished slip op., ¶14 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
15 
 
2017).  That is, it determined that D.J.W. met the following 
standard of dangerousness: 
Evidences behavior manifested by recent acts or 
omissions that, due to mental illness, he or she is 
unable to satisfy basic needs for nourishment, medical 
care, shelter or safety without prompt and adequate 
treatment so that a substantial probability exists that 
death, 
serious 
physical 
injury, 
serious 
physical 
debilitation, 
or 
serious 
physical 
disease 
will 
imminently ensue unless the individual receives prompt 
and adequate treatment for this mental illness.   
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.d. 
¶38 In the court of appeals in the present appeal, the 
County's brief did not cite any specific subdivision paragraph of 
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. under which it argued that D.J.W. was 
dangerous. 
 
Accordingly, 
D.J.W. 
reasonably 
followed 
the 
formulation of the court of appeals with regard to the initial 
commitment, and at the outset of his oral argument before this 
court 
set 
forth 
the 
relevant 
statutory 
provisions 
as 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.d. and (1)(am). 
¶39 However, in its oral argument before this court, the 
County apparently took a new tack and asserted that D.J.W. would 
be a proper subject for commitment in the event treatment were 
discontinued not under subd. para. 2.d., but under 2.c.  Pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c., one is a proper subject for 
commitment if that person "[e]vidences such impaired judgment 
manifested by evidence of a pattern of recent acts or omissions, 
that there is a substantial probability of physical impairment or 
injury to himself or herself or other individuals."   
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
16 
 
¶40 The record in this case is therefore quite unhelpful in 
guiding this court's analysis.  We have received conflicting 
messages from the County and the court of appeals regarding the 
statutory basis for this commitment.  In order to avoid this 
problem in the future, we determine that going forward circuit 
courts in recommitment proceedings are to make specific factual 
findings 
with 
reference 
to 
the 
subdivision 
paragraph 
of 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based.6   
¶41 Such a requirement is manifest in the language of Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(1)(am), which references the dangerousness pathways 
of § 51.20(1)(a)2.  Specifically, pursuant to § 51.20(1)(am),  
                                                 
6 Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's dissent asserts that the 
guidance we offer in this opinion is redundant to that provided in 
D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50.  Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's Dissent, 
¶124.  It contends that we should simply dismiss this case as moot 
and not decide the substantive issues before us.  Id., ¶116. 
However, D.K. mandated no such rule as we do in the present 
case.  The majority/lead opinion indicated only that the circuit 
court "could have made more detailed and thorough factual findings 
and clarified its legal conclusions."  D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶55 
(Ziegler, J., joined by Roggensack, C.J., and Hagedorn, J.) 
(emphasis added).  Such a determination creates no clear 
requirement such as that contained in this opinion.   
Likewise, the concurrence in D.K. indicated that "[b]ecause 
circuit courts bear the responsibility of determining whether the 
evidence satisfies the statutory standard, circuit courts must 
expressly make independent factual findings on the record, 
separate from any legal conclusions."  Id., ¶68 n.4 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J., concurring, joined by Kelly, J.).  Even if this 
language can be read as a directive to circuit courts, it sets 
forth the position of two justices only and does not create any 
binding holding.  Rather than leaving circuit courts to discern a 
mandatory rule from the suggestive language contained in separate 
opinions in D.K., our conclusion in the present case aims to 
provide clarity for circuit courts going forward. 
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
17 
 
the requirements of a recent overt act, attempt or threat 
to act under par. (a)2.a. or b., pattern of recent acts 
or omissions under par. (a)2.c. or e., or recent behavior 
under par. (a)2.d. may be satisfied by a showing that 
there is a substantial likelihood, based on the subject 
individual's treatment record, that the individual would 
be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were 
withdrawn.  (Emphasis added). 
Para. (1)(am) thus mandates that circuit courts ground their 
conclusions in the subdivision paragraphs of subd. 2. 
¶42 Further, the purpose of making specific factual findings 
with reference to a subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2. is twofold.  First, it provides clarity and extra 
protection to patients regarding the underlying basis for a 
recommitment.  The United States Supreme Court "repeatedly has 
recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a 
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process 
protection."  Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).  
"Freedom from physical restraint is a fundamental right that 'has 
always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause from arbitrary governmental action.'"  State v. Post, 197 
Wis. 2d 279, 302, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995) (quoting Foucha v. 
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). 
¶43 With such an important liberty interest at stake, the 
accompanying protections should mirror the serious nature of the 
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
18 
 
proceeding.7  Requiring circuit courts to provide specific factual 
findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based provides 
increased protection to patients to ensure that recommitments are 
based on sufficient evidence.   
¶44 Second, a requirement of specific factual findings with 
reference to a subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. 
will clarify issues raised on appeal of recommitment orders and 
ensure the soundness of judicial decision making, specifically 
with regard to challenges based on the sufficiency of the evidence.  
See Klinger v. Oneida Cty., 149 Wis. 2d 838, 846-47, 440 N.W.2d 348 
(1989) ("[A]s this court has stated many times, the circuit court 
must make a record of its reasoning to ensure the soundness of its 
own decision making and to facilitate judicial review.").  A more 
substantial record will better equip appellate courts to do their 
job, further ensuring meaningful appellate review of the evidence 
presented in recommitment proceedings. 
¶45 In this case, in the absence of explicit factual findings 
with reference to any subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
7 The stakes of a recommitment proceeding are further 
heightened 
when 
involuntary 
medication 
is 
a 
possibility.  
Administration of psychotropic drugs is no small matter.  See 
K.N.K. v. Buhler (Matter of Guardianship of K.N.K.), 139 
Wis. 2d 190, 207 n.3, 407 N.W.2d 281 (Ct. App. 1987); In re 
Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 53 (Mass. 1981) (explaining 
that antipsychotic medication "[is] powerful enough to immobilize 
mind and body[,]" has a "profound effect . . . on the thought 
processes of an individual[,]" and has a "well-established 
likelihood 
of 
severe 
and 
irreversible 
adverse 
side 
effects . . . .").  
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
19 
 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2., we will address the arguments made in this case 
as they relate to § 51.20(1)(a)2.d., on which the court of appeals 
determined 
the 
initial 
commitment 
was 
based, 
and 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c., on which the County relied at oral argument.8  
In the future, such guesswork will be avoided by our newly 
instituted requirement for specific factual findings with 
reference to a subdivision paragraph of § 51.20(1)(a)2.9 
IV 
¶46 We now turn to examine the sufficiency of the evidence 
presented at the recommitment hearing in this case to support a 
determination of dangerousness. 
¶47 At the outset of our examination of this question, we 
observe that the court of appeals in this case applied a clearly 
erroneous standard of review to a determination of dangerousness.  
D.J.W. II, No. 2018AP145-FT, unpublished slip op., ¶10.  A 
determination of dangerousness is not a factual determination, but 
a legal one based on underlying facts.  The court of appeals thus 
erred by applying the standard of review for findings of fact to 
                                                 
8 Chief 
Justice 
Roggensack's 
dissent 
would 
justify 
recommitment pursuant to the "fifth standard" set forth by Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e.  Chief Justice Roggensack's Dissent, ¶61.  
Neither party raised this argument.  At oral argument, the County 
conceded that it relies on subd. para. 2.c. only and counsel for 
D.J.W. indicated that "this case has never been a fifth standard 
case.  It wasn't alleged by the County either in the original 
commitment or in this extension as a fifth standard case." 
9 We recognize that there may be cases where a person 
satisfies the criteria contained in several statutory subdivision 
paragraphs.  In such a case, we encourage circuit courts to state 
each subdivision paragraph that is fulfilled. 
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
20 
 
a legal determination of dangerousness.  See Metro. Assocs., 379 
Wis. 2d 141, ¶25 ("Factual findings made by the circuit court will 
not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.").  Whether 
facts 
satisfy 
the 
statutory 
standard 
must 
be 
reviewed 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit court 
and court of appeals.  J.W.J., 375 Wis. 2d 542, ¶15. 
¶48 D.J.W. contends that Dr. Coates's testimony was 
insufficient to support the extension of his commitment because it 
does not establish that he is dangerous as is required.  He 
characterizes Dr. Coates's testimony as establishing only that as 
a result of his mental illness he lost his job, sought and received 
disability benefits, and would be homeless were it not for his 
family.  In D.J.W.'s view, none of these propositions provides any 
evidence that he is "dangerous" under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.d. 
¶49 The County, on the other hand, argues that Dr. Coates's 
testimony is sufficient to establish that D.J.W. is dangerous to 
himself.  It focuses its argument on Dr. Coates's testimony that 
D.J.W. suffers from impaired judgment and delusions that would be 
exacerbated if he were to discontinue treatment. 
¶50 We agree with D.J.W. that the evidence presented at the 
recommitment hearing is insufficient to support a conclusion that 
he is "dangerous" within the meaning of the commitment statute.  
First, we focus on whether the introduced testimony meets the 
standard for dangerousness set by Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.d., as 
viewed through the lens of § 51.20(1)(am).  That is, the testimony 
must provide sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that 
D.J.W. would be "unable to satisfy basic needs for nourishment, 
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
21 
 
medical care, shelter or safety without prompt and adequate 
treatment so that a substantial probability exists that death, 
serious physical injury, serious physical debilitation, or serious 
physical disease will imminently ensue[,]" § 51.20(1)(a)2.d., if 
treatment were withdrawn.  § 51.20(1)(am). 
¶51 Dr. Coates's testimony provided no evidence that "death, 
serious physical injury, serious physical debilitation, or serious 
physical disease" would ensue if treatment were withdrawn.  
Instead, Dr. Coates testified only that if treatment is withdrawn, 
D.J.W. "can't care for himself" in various ways, including being 
unable to maintain a job, having to rely on disability for income, 
and living with family.   
¶52 The 
doctor's 
testimony 
further 
indicated 
that 
discontinuing treatment would exacerbate D.J.W.'s illness and that 
as a result he would "experience . . . hallucinations to a greater 
degree."  Dr. Coates stated that "the greater risk is just his 
inability to properly care for himself and to properly socialize 
if he goes untreated."   
¶53 Inability to care for oneself does not equate with a 
"substantial probability" that "death, serious physical injury, 
serious physical debilitation, or serious physical disease" would 
ensue if treatment were withdrawn.  Nothing in Dr. Coates's 
testimony even hints at a serious physical consequence to D.J.W. 
if treatment were to be discontinued.  His testimony on this 
subject relied only on generalized propositions with regard to 
people with schizophrenia, not anything specific to D.J.W.  For 
example, Dr. Coates indicated that "[d]anger in my opinion is not 
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
22 
 
suicidal 
and 
homicidal 
ideations. 
 
Although 
those 
are 
possibilities.  There is an increased risk of suicide in people 
with schizophrenia.  That's just a statistical fact." 
¶54 Further, the County's argument is at odds with United 
States Supreme Court precedent.  Specifically, in O'Connor v. 
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975), the Court determined that "a 
State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous 
individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself 
or with the help of willing and responsible family members or 
friends."   
¶55 Again, Dr. Coates's testimony established only that if 
treatment were withdrawn, D.J.W. would be unable to maintain a 
job, would have to rely on disability for income, and would have 
to live with family.  As detailed above, the testimony does not 
support a determination that D.J.W. was dangerous.  Without more, 
and given that D.J.W.'s family demonstrated willingness to help, 
recommitment based on this record would run afoul of O'Connor. 
¶56 We now turn to an examination of Dr. Coates's testimony 
through the lens of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.  Subd. para. 2.c., 
in combination with para. (1)(am), provides that "dangerousness" 
in a recommitment can be shown if a person would "[e]vidence[] 
such impaired judgment . . . that there is a substantial 
probability of physical impairment or injury to himself or herself 
or other individuals" if treatment were withdrawn.  
¶57 The County's argument fares no better under subd. para. 
2.c. than it does under 2.d.  Again, no testimony was offered at 
the recommitment hearing that would support a determination of any 
No. 
2018AP145-FT   
 
23 
 
"substantial probability of physical impairment or injury" that 
may inure to D.J.W. specifically in the event treatment were 
withdrawn.  A diagnosis of schizophrenia, by itself, does not 
demonstrate the requisite "substantial probability of physical 
impairment."  If it did, the statutory elements of mental illness 
and dangerousness would be merely redundant.         
¶58 Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence introduced at 
the recommitment hearing was insufficient to support a conclusion 
that D.J.W. is "dangerous" pursuant to either Wis. Stat. 
§§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c. or 2.d. and 51.20(1)(am).   
V 
¶59 In sum, we determine that going forward circuit courts 
in recommitment proceedings are to make specific factual findings 
with reference to the subdivision paragraph of § 51.20(1)(a)2. on 
which the recommitment is based.  Further, we conclude that the 
evidence introduced at the recommitment hearing was insufficient 
to support a conclusion that D.J.W. is "dangerous" pursuant to 
either Wis. Stat. §§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c. or 2.d. and 51.20(1)(am).   
¶60 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No.  2018AP145-FT.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶61 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (dissenting).  The 
majority 
opinion 
concludes 
that 
D.J.W.'s 
commitment 
was 
erroneously extended under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am) by the 
circuit court and that the court of appeals erred by affirming.  
The majority reverses because it concludes that "the evidence 
introduced at the recommitment hearing was insufficient to support 
a conclusion that D.J.W. is 'dangerous' pursuant to either 
§§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c. or 2.d. and 51.20(1)(am)."1  Although I 
understand why the majority chose to evaluate the evidence that 
was presented under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. and 2.d., the majority errs 
because the evidence fully satisfies the "fifth criterion" for 
dangerousness found in § 51.20(1)(a)2.e., which we carefully 
explained in State v. Dennis H., 2002 WI 104, 255 Wis. 2d 359, 647 
N.W.2d 851.   
¶62 I write in dissent not only because the majority errs 
but also because it is important for this court, and all Wisconsin 
courts who adjudicate civil commitments and recommitments under 
Wis. Stat. ch. 51, to recognize that there is a category of 
seriously mentally ill individuals whose symptoms are described in 
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e.  They are dangerous to themselves 
because their illness prevents them from understanding the 
advantages and disadvantages of treatment and, as demonstrated by 
their treatment history, they need care or treatment to prevent 
further disability or deterioration and they have a substantial 
probability, if left untreated, of losing the ability to function 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶3. 
No.  2018AP145-FT.pdr 
 
2 
 
independently in the community or of losing cognitive or volitional 
control over their thoughts or actions.   
¶63 These seriously, mentally ill individuals often are very 
fragile, and when they do not receive the care they need, they are 
a significant danger to themselves even when not overtly suicidal.2  
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.e.'s 
fifth 
criterion 
of 
dangerousness forms an appropriate basis for evaluation of these 
individuals.  The majority should have so employed it to evaluate 
the evidence presented in regard to D.J.W., which evidence fully 
satisfies 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.e.'s 
criterion 
for 
dangerousness.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶64 D.J.W. had a long history of mental illness that began 
to be recorded in October of 2016 with his emergency detention.  
The Statement of Emergency Detention relayed that D.J.W. had 
"somatic delusions" and believed that he had parasites in his 
intestines.  It was reported that D.J.W. was vomiting his food 
because he believed that medicine was being placed in it; that he 
was paranoid; that he "believes that the devil had tap[p]ed him on 
the shoulder;" that due to his "current altered state he is not 
able to care for himself;" and that his mother reported that she 
is concerned for her safety because D.J.W. was standing outside of 
her bedroom door with a knife in his hand.  
¶65 D.J.W.'s medical records reveal that in October of 2016, 
he reported hearing "the devil who tells him to destroy himself by 
                                                 
2 Darold A. Treffert, M.D., The MacArthur Coercion Studies:  
A Wisconsin Perspective, 82 Marq. L. Rev. 759 (1999) (discussing 
the balance of the right to be sick with the right to be rescued).   
No.  2018AP145-FT.pdr 
 
3 
 
various actions."  He also reported that he has "learned to ignore 
the devil and is not afraid of the devil."  His assessment in 2016 
evaluated him as a "moderate risk" for suicide and noted that two 
of D.J.W.'s cousins committed suicide.   
¶66 In 2016, D.J.W., with the advice of counsel, entered 
into a court approved settlement agreement, wherein he agreed to 
take all prescribed doses of psychotropic medications and keep all 
psychiatric and psychological appointments.  However, D.J.W. said 
that when the settlement term ended, he would stop complying with 
its requirements.  This resulted in his detention at North Central 
Health Care, in Wausau, Wisconsin.   
¶67 Langlade County petitioned for his commitment pursuant 
to ch. 51.  A hearing on Langlade County's petition was held on 
January 30, 2017.  Dr. John T. Coates, M.D., a psychiatrist, was 
retained by the County to examine D.J.W.  He did so.  
¶68 Dr. Coates filed his report on January 25, 2017, after 
he met with D.J.W., who largely "exercised his right to remain 
silent."  Dr. Coates reported that D.J.W. did "not believe that he 
was mentally ill or in need of medication" and "claims that he is 
the Messiah who has been sent from God to save humanity."  Dr. 
Coates 
noted 
that 
D.J.W. 
was 
hearing 
voices, 
having 
hallucinations, had persecutory delusions and impaired judgment.  
He diagnosed D.J.W. as suffering from schizophrenia and cannabis 
use disorder.  
¶69 In his report, Dr. Coates noted that D.J.W. was a 
"significant risk of dangerousness" to himself, also to others and 
that he is unable to independently care for himself.  He noted 
No.  2018AP145-FT.pdr 
 
4 
 
that D.J.W. had a history of "aggressive behavior and property 
damage."  He recommended commitment in an institution.  However, 
he opined that "eventually" D.J.W.'s care and treatment could be 
provided as an outpatient.  He stated that he had explained the 
advantages and disadvantages of accepting medication or treatment, 
but that D.J.W.'s mental illness was preventing his understanding 
and that he was "substantially incapable of applying an 
understanding" of the advantages and disadvantages of treatment 
due to his mental illness.   
¶70 The County also retained Dr. Nicholas Starr, a 
psychologist, to examine D.J.W.  D.J.W. refused to participate in 
Dr. Starr's examination.  Therefore, Dr. Starr's examination was 
limited to D.J.W.'s medical records.  His report, based on this 
review, concluded that D.J.W. was mentally ill and dangerous 
because there was "[a] substantial probability of physical harm to 
himself . . . as manifested by evidence of recent threats of or 
attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm."  He said D.J.W. was 
dangerous because there was a "substantial probability, as 
demonstrated 
by 
both . . . [his] 
treatment 
history 
and 
[his] . . . recent acts or omissions, that [he] . . . needs care 
or treatment to prevent further disability or deterioration."    
¶71 Dr. Starr noted that D.J.W. was "passively suicidal," 
and that he questioned the point of living.  He, too, recommended 
treatment in a locked institution, but said that when D.J.W. is 
stabilized by medication, he could be released to outpatient 
treatment.   
No.  2018AP145-FT.pdr 
 
5 
 
¶72 At the commitment hearing held January 30, Dr. Coates 
testified consistent with his report.3  He explained that although 
D.J.W. was seriously mentally ill, his condition, schizophrenia, 
is treatable with psychotropic medication, counseling and 
behavioral adjustments.  He said that D.J.W. does not believe he 
is schizophrenic or in need of medications.  He believes that 
others can hear his thoughts, so he has no privacy.  He opined 
that D.J.W. was more of a danger to himself, but due to past 
aggressive behaviors, he was a danger to others as well.  He 
explained that D.J.W. was unpredictable and unable to care for 
himself when in an acute psychotic state.  He testified that at 
the time of the hearing the least restrictive treatment would be 
in an institution, initially. 
¶73 D.J.W. also testified.  He said that he is fully aware 
that he sees and hears things that others do not see or hear.  He 
said that if commitment was not ordered, he would not continue 
outpatient treatment.  He does not believe the medicine or 
counseling helped him.   
¶74 The court concluded that D.J.W. was dangerous due to his 
mental illness and ordered a six month commitment for care and 
medication.   
¶75 On June 16, 2017, in advance of the expiration of 
D.J.W.'s six month commitment, a Petition for Recommitment was 
commenced pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am).  Outpatient 
treatment with community supports in place was requested.  The 
petition did not state whether the County was relying on a 
                                                 
3 The Honorable John B. Rhode presided. 
No.  2018AP145-FT.pdr 
 
6 
 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2. criterion of dangerousness for its recommitment 
petition.  A hearing was set for July 18, 2017.  It is the 
recommitment order that resulted from this hearing that is now 
before us.  
¶76 Dr. John Coates was again retained to examine D.J.W. and 
to file a report at least 48 hours before the hearing.  He did so, 
filing his report on July 3, 2017.  His report explained that 
D.J.W. had a defiant attitude, and that D.J.W. said he saw the 
devil three months ago and last heard voices two months ago.  Dr. 
Coates opined that D.J.W.'s thought process was impaired and 
delusional.  He said that if treatment were withdrawn, D.J.W. would 
be unable to care for himself, and that he has a history of 
aggressive behavior that concerned him.  He recommended extending 
D.J.W.'s commitment for 12 months, with medication, and that 
treatment could be provided outside an institution.  
¶77 Dr. Coates reported that he had explained the advantages 
and disadvantages of accepting treatment and medication to D.J.W., 
but that he was "substantially incapable of applying an 
understanding of the advantages, disadvantages and alternatives 
[due] to his [] mental illness . . . in order to make an informed 
choice as to whether to accept or refuse medication or treatment."  
¶78 At the July 18, 2017 hearing, Dr. Coates testified by 
telephone consistent with his report.4  He explained that D.J.W. 
has "a history of auditory and visual hallucinations.  His thought 
process is illogical and has some grandiose illusions."  He 
repeated in his testimony that D.J.W. had told him that he saw the 
                                                 
4 The Honorable Gregory Grau presided.  
No.  2018AP145-FT.pdr 
 
7 
 
devil four months ago and last heard voices two months ago.  Dr. 
Coates opined that D.J.W.'s schizophrenia is treatable with 
psychotropic medication, and that he was showing a response to the 
medication he has been receiving.   
¶79 When asked if D.J.W. was a danger to himself or to 
others, Dr. Coates said that "the main danger is risk to himself 
if he should go off treatment."  If he does so, his illness will 
be exacerbated and he will lose his ability to properly care for 
himself.  
¶80 Dr. 
Coates 
said 
that 
D.J.W. 
had 
a 
month's 
institutionalization in January because he was very delusional and 
had quit his job because he thought he was the Messiah sent from 
God to save humanity.  He was hearing voices on a daily basis and 
thought others could hear his thoughts.  He also did not believe 
he was mentally ill, but rather, a psychic.  Dr. Coates testified 
that D.J.W. believes that "he can manage his illness in the 
presence of hallucinations" and without medication.  D.J.W. 
believed that Haldol, which he was receiving, is disabling him, 
rather than a mental illness.   
¶81 Dr. Coates said that "dangerousness to others is 
unpredictable."  He explained that, "I don't believe that he's an 
aggressive-type person who is apt to act out, but you can't predict 
the behavior when someone is acutely psychotic."  He also said, he 
is a danger to himself and "unable to independently care for 
himself."  He said that danger "is not suicidal and homicidal 
ideations.  Although those are possibilities.  There is an 
increased risk of suicide in people with schizophrenia."   
No.  2018AP145-FT.pdr 
 
8 
 
¶82 Counsel for Langlade County asked Dr. Coates whether:  
[I]s it accurate to say that if the subject individual 
in the past, there has been no evidence that that subject 
has made a suicidal threat to harm himself or herself, 
that when you do this examination, that you still can 
have a finding or express a medical opinion that that 
individual may present a suicide risk if treatment were 
withdrawn?  
Dr. Coates answered, "Yes."  
¶83 Counsel continued:  
Q. 
Doctor, I note in your report when to the 
question does this individual present a significant risk 
of dangerousness at this time or if treatment were to be 
withdrawn, you've basically checked all the statutory 
criteria 
that 
constitutes 
risk 
of 
dangerousness. . . . [I]f 
treatment 
were 
to 
be 
withdrawn, then he would meet, in your opinion, all of 
those four criteria for dangerousness? 
A. 
. . . [I]f treatment were withdrawn, all four 
of those things would be more evident. . . . [H]e's not 
able to independently care for himself at this point.  
And he would be homeless I think if he wasn't able to 
live with his parents. . . .  His judgment is currently 
still impaired.  He feels that he can manage his illness 
in the presence of hallucinations. 
¶84 D.J.W. testified at the July hearing, as he had in 
January.  He said that he first sought help because he "felt 
suicidal at the time."  He said that he was hospitalized for one 
week, during which time he received medication.  After he was 
discharged he stopped taking the medications.   
¶85 D.J.W. said that his next hospitalization was at North 
Central Health Care, where he stayed for two weeks.  He said that 
after discharge he did continue with medications, but they "didn't 
affect me."  He said that he told his doctor that he "had not 
No.  2018AP145-FT.pdr 
 
9 
 
intended to continue taking the meds after the settlement agreement 
expired."  That's when commitment was proposed.   
¶86 He acknowledged that he had damaged property at his 
parent's residence, but asserted that no person was harmed.  He 
explained that he did not need community services because his 
parents or his sister would help him with food and housing, as 
they had in the past.  He said his current medication, Haldol, 
hurts, rather than helps him.  He said that he was not then hearing 
voices or seeing things others do not see.  That they had "stopped 
recently." 
¶87 In closing, Langlade's counsel argued that the only 
medical testimony that was presented, that of Dr. Coates, provided 
clear and convincing evidence that D.J.W. has a mental illness, 
schizophrenia, which is treatable.  He explained because the County 
is proceeding under Wis. Stat. 51.20(1)(am) for recommitment, 
recent dangerous acts or thoughts are not required, but rather the 
court must look at D.J.W.'s whole record.  Counsel pointed out 
that in regard to dangerousness, Dr. Coates testified that if 
treatment were withdrawn, D.J.W. would become dangerous to 
himself.  
¶88 Counsel for D.J.W. argued that D.J.W. objected to 
medication and that he was fine when he was not on it.  She 
acknowledged that the first time he checked himself into a facility 
for voluntary services he was having suicidal thoughts.  She 
pointed out, however, that he did not act on those thoughts.   
¶89 The circuit court found that D.J.W. suffered from a 
mental illness, schizophrenia, which is treatable.  The court also 
No.  2018AP145-FT.pdr 
 
10 
 
found that D.J.W. does not believe that he suffers from 
schizophrenia.  The court cited D.J.W.'s testimony that recently 
the hallucinations and delusions have decreased.  The court found 
that this seems to evidence a response to the treatment he has 
been receiving.   
¶90 The court found that if the treatment were withdrawn, 
D.J.W. would be a proper subject for commitment because of the 
severity of the hallucinations and delusions he has suffered in 
the past.  If that were to occur, D.J.W.'s judgment and perception 
would be affected such that he would be a "significant danger to 
himself."  The court explained that D.J.W. is "substantially 
incapable 
of 
applying 
and 
understanding 
the 
advantages, 
disadvantages and alternatives to his mental illness to the point 
where he can't make an informed choice as to whether to accept or 
refuse medication or treatment."  The court then continued D.J.W.'s 
commitment as an outpatient, and found that because medication and 
treatment will continue to have therapeutic value, they were 
ordered.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶91 This case presents as a claim that the evidence was not 
sufficient 
to 
recommit 
D.J.W. 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(am) because there was insufficient evidence of 
dangerousness.  In order to evaluate the evidence presented under 
the 
required 
statutory 
standard, 
we 
interpret 
and 
apply 
§ 51.20(1)(am) and § 51.20(1)(a)2.  We interpret and apply 
statutes independently of the court of appeals' and circuit court's 
No.  2018AP145-FT.pdr 
 
11 
 
decisions, while benefitting from their discussions.  Daniel v. 
Armslist, LLC, 2019 WI 47, ¶13, 386 Wis. 2d 449, 926 N.W.2d 710.   
¶92 When the sufficiency of evidence is challenged, we 
sustain the circuit court's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  State v. Anderson, 2019 WI 97, ¶20, 389 Wis. 2d 
106, 935 N.W.2d 285.  Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when 
they are "contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of 
the evidence."  Richards v. First Union Sec., Inc., 2006 WI 55, 
¶12, 290 Wis. 2d 620, 714 N.W.2d 913.  We independently determine 
whether the facts fulfill statutory standards, again while 
benefitting from prior courts' discussions.  Westmas v. Creekside 
Tree Serv., LLC, 2018 WI 12, ¶17, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 907 N.W.2d 68.  
B.  Recommitment 
1.  Civil Commitment Generally 
¶93 The role that the State of Wisconsin has taken in civil 
commitments has moved like a pendulum.  For example, in the early 
1970s, civil commitments of mentally ill individuals in Wisconsin 
were easily obtained, which came to national attention with the 
issuance of Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), 
vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974) (per curiam).  In 
1972, many individuals had been institutionalized without well-
defined procedural standards.  Lessard, a class action, was brought 
on behalf of persons who were being held involuntarily under 
emergency, temporary or permanent commitment provisions of 
Wisconsin statutes.  Id. at 1082.   
¶94 The federal district court panel reasoned that the 
"power of the state to deprive a person of the fundamental liberty 
No.  2018AP145-FT.pdr 
 
12 
 
to go unimpeded about his or her affairs must rest on a 
consideration that society has a compelling interest in such 
deprivation."  Id. at 1084.  The court noted that it is the role 
of courts to review procedural guarantees of due process that 
commitment statutes should provide.  Id. at 1086.  Court review 
was necessary because "the commitment adjudication carries with it 
an enormous and devastating effect on an individual's civil 
rights."  Id. at 1089.   
¶95 The court in Lessard, set out procedural requirements in 
protection of civil rights of civil committees:  notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, id. at 1091; proof that commitment was 
required because the individual poses a serious danger of harm to 
others or himself, id. at 1095; the right to counsel, id. at 1097; 
and the privilege against self-incrimination, id. at 1100, to name 
a few required protections.   
¶96 In 1976, Wisconsin significantly amended its procedural 
standards for civil commitment, accepting most of Lessard's 
conclusions.  Many individuals were released from institutions, in 
part because the amended standards for dangerousness were 
difficult to meet.5   
¶97 While the release of mentally ill persons who did not 
require institutionalization to treat their illnesses was very 
important, the change in the law also created obstacles that 
prevented families and those concerned with obtaining care for the 
mentally ill from being able to do so.  This change resulted in a 
significant increase in homelessness for mentally ill individuals, 
                                                 
5 Treffert, 82 Marq. L. Rev. 759.   
No.  2018AP145-FT.pdr 
 
13 
 
which began to be recognized.6  Accordingly, the pendulum on civil 
commitment for treatment began to swing back toward greater 
intervention and care for the lives of those who were chronically 
mentally ill.7 
¶98 Of importance in the matter before us, is the statutory 
amendment that recognized that mental illness, itself, may render 
the individual incapable of recognizing his or her illness and 
accepting treatment.  Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e. is 
Wisconsin's response to this concern.  It focuses on dangerousness 
to self that can arise when, due to mental illness, the individual 
is incapable of understanding or applying advantages and 
disadvantages of treatment or medication and if left untreated, 
will suffer severe mental, emotional or physical harm.  Also 
important 
here 
is 
§ 51.20(1)(am), 
which 
is 
employed 
for 
recommitments for treatment as addressed below.     
2.  D.J.W.'s Recommitment 
¶99 The matter before us is a recommitment.  To recommit an 
individual, the county is required to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the individual is:  (1) mentally ill; (2) a proper 
subject for treatment; and (3) dangerous.  Portage Cty. v. J.W.K., 
2019 WI 54, ¶18, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509. 
                                                 
6 See generally, Steven K. Erickson, Michael J. Vitacco and 
Gregorgy J. Van Rybroek, Beyond Overt Violence:  Wisconsin's 
Progressive Civil Commitment Statute As a Marker of a New Era in 
Mental Health Law, 89 Marq. L. Rev. 358 (2005).   
7 Darold A. Treffert, 1995 Wisconsin Act 292: Finally, the 
Fifth Standard, Wis. Med. J., Aug. 1996 (explaining that Act 292 
was necessary for individuals who were being disenfranchised from 
treatment and care post-Lessard when they were obviously seriously 
ill and deteriorating).  
No.  2018AP145-FT.pdr 
 
14 
 
¶100 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(am) 
provides 
statutory 
requirements that a county must meet.  They differ from the 
requirements for an initial commitment.  Section 51.20(1)(am) 
provides in relevant part: 
If the individual has been the subject of inpatient 
treatment for mental illness . . . immediately prior to 
commencement of the proceedings as a result of . . . a 
commitment . . . ordered 
by 
a 
court 
under 
this 
section . . . or if the individual has been the subject 
of 
outpatient 
treatment 
for 
mental 
illness . . . immediately prior to commencement of the 
proceedings as a result of a commitment ordered by a 
court under this section, the requirements of a recent 
overt act, attempt or threat under  . . . par. (a)2.c. 
or e., . . . may be satisfied by a showing that there is 
a 
substantial 
likelihood, 
based 
on 
the 
subject 
individual's treatment record, that the individual would 
be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were 
withdrawn.  
As the court of appeals explained, § 51.20(1)(am) avoids "the 
'revolving door' phenomena whereby there must be proof of a recent 
overt act to extend the commitment but because the patient was 
still under treatment, no overt acts occurred and the patient was 
released from treatment only to commit a dangerous act and be 
recommitted."  State v. W.R.B., 140 Wis. 2d 347, 351, 411 N.W.2d 
142 (Ct. App. 1987).  Accordingly, a petition for recommitment 
brings before the court the individual's complete mental health 
record.   
¶101 Under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am), the circuit court was 
not limited to considering D.J.W.'s acts or omissions that occurred 
immediately before the petition for recommitment was filed.  Id.  
The circuit court's findings may be based on acts or omissions 
that occurred prior to the initial commitment and are documented 
No.  2018AP145-FT.pdr 
 
15 
 
in his medical records, as well as psychiatric examination reports 
and testimony presented at hearings.   
¶102 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(am) 
requires 
proof 
that:  (1) the individual has been the subject of either inpatient 
or outpatient treatment for mental illness; (2) immediately before 
the recommitment petition was filed; (3) which treatment was court 
ordered; and (4) based on the subject individual's treatment 
record, there is a substantial likelihood that the individual would 
be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn.    
¶103 In the matter before us, D.J.W. easily meets the first 
three requirements of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am) based on D.J.W.'s 
mental health records.  Furthermore, there is no dispute that 
D.J.W. received inpatient treatment and outpatient treatment for 
mental illness immediately before the recommitment petition was 
filed and that his treatment was court ordered.  Those findings 
are not clearly erroneous.    
¶104 Because 
the 
fourth 
requirement 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(am) directs that there must be "a substantial 
likelihood, based on the subject individual's treatment record, 
that the individual would be a proper subject for commitment if 
treatment were withdrawn," and because commitments require a 
finding of dangerousness, recommitments also require a substantial 
likelihood of dangerousness to self or others if treatment were 
withdrawn.  J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶19.  
¶105 In Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-e., the legislature set 
out five criteria through which dangerousness may be shown in the 
course of a commitment.  Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(1)(am) does not 
No.  2018AP145-FT.pdr 
 
16 
 
directly 
incorporate 
these 
standards 
but 
relates 
that 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-e. are satisfied when there is a "substantial 
likelihood, based on the subject individual's treatment record, 
that the individual would be a proper subject for commitment if 
treatment were withdrawn."  Accordingly, subd. para. 2.a.-e. 
provides an assist to my interpretation of how dangerousness may 
be shown in a recommitment proceeding.  
¶106 Of relevance, given the factual underpinning of the case 
before us, is the fifth criterion for dangerousness, Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.e.  It is my focus because of the effect that 
D.J.W.'s mental illness has had on his ability to evaluate 
treatment and care options and make a rational decision about 
whether to accept them or not.  As we have explained, subd. para. 
2.e. "applies to mentally ill persons whose mental illness renders 
them incapable of making informed medication decisions and makes 
it substantially probable that, without treatment, disability or 
deterioration will result, bringing on a loss of ability to provide 
self-care or control thoughts or actions."  Dennis H., 255 Wis. 2d 
359, ¶33. 
¶107 Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(1)(a) provides in relevant part: 
2.  The individual is dangerous because he or she 
does any of the following: 
. . . . 
e.  For an individual, other than an individual who 
is alleged to be drug dependent or developmentally 
disabled, after the advantages and disadvantages of and 
alternatives to accepting a particular medication or 
treatment have been explained to him or her and because 
of mental illness, evidences . . . [has a] substantial 
incapability of applying an understanding of the 
advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to his or 
No.  2018AP145-FT.pdr 
 
17 
 
her mental illness in order to make an informed choice 
as to whether to accept or refuse medication or 
treatment; and evidences a substantial probability, as 
demonstrated by both the individual's treatment history 
and his or her recent acts or omissions, that the 
individual needs care or treatment to prevent further 
disability 
or 
deterioration 
and 
a 
substantial 
probability that he or she will, if left untreated, lack 
services necessary for his or her health or safety and 
suffer severe mental, emotional, or physical harm that 
will result in the loss of the individual's ability to 
function independently in the community or the loss of 
cognitive or volitional control over his or thoughts or 
actions.   
¶108 In Dennis H., we set out five requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.e.:  First, the person must be mentally ill.  Id., 
¶19.  Second, the person must be "incompetent to make medication 
or treatment decisions" due to his mental illness.  Id., ¶21.  
Incompetence may be shown by a "substantial incapability of 
applying an understanding of the advantages, disadvantages, and 
alternatives" because of mental illness, "after the advantages and 
disadvantages of and alternatives to accepting a particular 
medication or treatment have been explained."  Id.  Third, the 
person must show "a 'substantial probability' that he or she 'needs 
care 
or 
treatment 
to 
prevent 
further 
disability 
or 
deterioration.'"  Id., ¶22.  In a recommitment, these requirements 
can be satisfied by either the person's treatment history or his 
recent acts or omissions.  
¶109 Fourth, "the person must evidence a 'substantial 
probability that he or she will, if left untreated, lack services 
necessary for his or her health or safety,'" or "suffer severe 
mental, emotional, or physical harm that will result in the loss 
of the individual's ability to function independently in the 
No.  2018AP145-FT.pdr 
 
18 
 
community or the loss of cognitive or volitional control over his 
or her thoughts or actions."  Id., ¶¶23, 24.   
¶110 The fifth criterion for dangerousness, by its terms, 
directs that the above requirements be evident to a "substantial 
probability."  This is the applicable degree of proof for 
dangerousness under the fifth criterion set out in Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.e.  Id., ¶26.  D.J.W.'s treatment history and 
current actions evidence that D.J.W. meets the requirements of 
subd. para. 2.e. to a substantial probability thereby showing by 
clear and convincing evidence that he will become dangerous if his 
care and treatment were withdrawn. 
¶111 First, there is no question that D.J.W. is seriously 
mentally ill, as he has been for years.  Second, Dr. Coates's 
reports and testimony show that D.J.W. is incompetent to make 
medication or treatment decisions because of his mental illness.  
His report submitted on June 30, 2017 specifically found that 
D.J.W. was "INCOMPETENT to refuse medication or treatment because 
of mental illness."  Dr. Coates said that D.J.W. "is substantially 
incapable of applying an understanding of the advantages, 
disadvantages 
and 
alternatives 
to 
his . . . mental 
illness . . . in order to make an informed choice as to whether to 
accept or refuse medication or treatment."  
¶112 Third, Dr. Coates explained that D.J.W. needed treatment 
to prevent further disability or deterioration.  He said that if 
D.J.W. goes off treatment "[h]e's apt to have exacerbation of his 
illness.  He's apt to experience, you know, hallucinations to a 
greater degree.  Become delusional."   
No.  2018AP145-FT.pdr 
 
19 
 
¶113 Fourth, Dr. Coates said that without treatment, D.J.W. 
"would be homeless" if his parents could no longer care for him 
because he is "unable to independently care for himself."  
Dr. Starr's report said that without treatment there is a 
"substantial probability" that D.J.W. "will lack the services 
necessary for his [] health or safety, and will suffer severe 
mental, emotional or physical harm that will result in loss 
of . . . cognitive or volitional control over [his] thoughts or 
actions."  There can be no question that D.J.W. has an inability 
to control his delusions or hallucinations on his own.  He has 
seen some recent progress, but that has been due to medication.   
¶114 Based on D.J.W.'s medical record and the reports and 
testimony of Drs. Coates and Starr, Langlade County has met its 
burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that if treatment 
were withdrawn, D.J.W. would be a proper subject for commitment, 
with dangerousness established within the parameters of Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.e.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶115 In conclusion, although I understand why the majority 
chose to evaluate the evidence that was presented under Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c. and 2.d., the majority errs because the evidence 
fully satisfies the "fifth criterion" for dangerousness found in 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.e., which we carefully explained in Dennis H., 255 
Wis. 2d 359.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
No.  2018AP145-FT.rgb 
1 
 
¶116 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Both the 
majority opinion and Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent reach the 
merits of this case.  I write separately without joining either 
opinion because it is imprudent to reach the merits, as well as 
contrary to our established framework regarding the disposition of 
Wis. Stat. ch. 51 commitment cases that are moot.  Because D.J.W. 
died while his case was pending in this court, we should have 
dismissed his appeal.  D.J.W.'s death renders the case moot and a 
disposition unnecessary. 
I 
¶117 The majority acknowledges D.J.W.'s death in a footnote, 
see majority op., ¶26 n.5, but chooses to decide the case using as 
its legal basis the criminal case of State v. McDonald, 144 
Wis. 2d 531, 532, 424 N.W.2d 411 (1988).  Although the court in that 
case fully considered the rationale for reaching the merits when 
a criminal defendant dies with an appeal pending, see id. at 535-
40, the court has never done so in the context of an appealed civil 
commitment.  According to the majority, D.J.W.'s death "does not 
dictate a contrary result [to reaching the merits]."  Majority 
op., ¶26 n.5.  I disagree.  The reasons for reaching the merits in 
a criminal case despite an intervening death do not apply in a 
chapter 51 commitment case. 
¶118 In determining that the court should resolve a case 
involving a committee who dies while his appeal is pending, the 
majority simply asserts that "the same considerations are 
attendant here" as exist in a criminal matter.  Id.  Specifically, 
the majority cites significant deprivations of liberty affecting 
both criminal defendants and chapter 51 involuntary committees.  
No.  2018AP145-FT.rgb 
2 
 
Of course, this consideration evaporates upon the death of the 
defendant or committee.  Regardless, when the McDonald court 
concluded a criminal case was not moot even though the defendant 
died during the appellate process, it did not rely on the 
deprivation of his liberty as its rationale.  See McDonald, 144 
Wis. 2d at 532-40.  Instead, the rationale was two-fold: 
(1) 
[A] defendant has a constitutional as well as a 
statutory right to an appeal.  This right . . . is 
an integral part of a defendant's right to a final 
determination of the merits of the case.  It serves 
as a safeguard to protect a defendant against 
errors in the criminal proceedings.  A defendant 
who dies pending appeal . . . is no less entitled 
to those safeguards. 
(2) 
[B]ecause collateral proceedings may be affected by 
criminal proceedings in which it is alleged that an 
individual took the life of another, it is in the 
interest of society to have a complete review of 
the merits of the criminal proceedings. 
McDonald, 144 Wis. 2d at 536-37 (emphasis added; internal 
citations omitted).  The court identified those collateral 
proceedings affected by a final determination that the defendant 
intentionally took the life of another (the underlying crime in 
McDonald): 
(1) "receiv[ing] money from the victim's estate under 
the intestacy statute"; 
(2) "inherit[ing] under the victim's will"; 
(3) "receiv[ing] any benefit from a contract in which 
the victim is the obligee and which names the 
defendant as the beneficiary"; 
(4) "receiv[ing] any benefit, as a beneficiary, payable 
as a result of the death of the victim"; 
(5) "receiv[ing] a benefit, as a beneficiary, from a 
life insurance policy on the life of the victim"; 
and 
No.  2018AP145-FT.rgb 
3 
 
(6) "receiv[ing] the victim's interest in property held 
in joint tenancy[.]" 
Id. at 537 (internal citations omitted).  The court expressly 
limited its analysis to criminal proceedings:  "society and the 
deceased have a very real interest in a final determination of the 
defendant's appeal from the criminal conviction."  Id. at 539 
(emphasis added). 
¶119 None of these rationales apply to an individual 
challenging a chapter 51 commitment.  Regarding the first reason, 
no one has a constitutional or statutory right of appeal to the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, irrespective of the nature of the case.  
Wis. Stat. § 809.62(1r) (2017-18)1 ("Supreme Court review is a 
matter of judicial discretion, not of right[.]"); cf. Wis. S. Ct. 
IOP III (Sept. 13, 2019).  The second rationale espoused in 
McDonald similarly does not apply to chapter 51 proceedings.  
Unlike a criminal conviction based upon an intentional killing, 
none of the collateral proceedings mentioned in McDonald arise 
from a chapter 51 commitment proceeding.2  The absence of 
collateral proceedings stemming from a chapter 51 commitment 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 While it is possible D.J.W.'s estate may be liable for the 
cost of care he received during his commitment, see Wis. Stat. 
§ 46.10(2) & (11)(b), this court has never concluded that costs of 
care alone represent a collateral consequence sufficient to render 
a case not moot.  See Marathon Cty. v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶25 n.7, 
390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901 ("[W]e need not address whether the 
collateral consequences of costs of care under Wis. Stat. 
§ 46.10(2)-(3) . . . would render [a commitment not moot]."); 
Portage Cty. v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶28 n.11, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 
N.W.2d 509 (not addressing whether cost of care would be a 
collateral consequence sufficient to render a case not moot). 
No.  2018AP145-FT.rgb 
4 
 
proceeding erases any general societal interest in the outcome of 
appeals in these matters. 
¶120 While valid reasons may exist in an appeal of a ch. 51 
commitment to hold it is not moot despite the death of the 
committee while the appeal is pending, appeals from criminal 
convictions are fundamentally different.  In order to decide 
whether a committee's death moots an appeal, this court should 
have ordered the parties to brief the issue after D.J.W.'s death.  
Deriving a legal basis from a criminal case is incongruous. 
II 
¶121 "An issue is moot when its resolution will have no 
practical effect on the underlying controversy."  Portage Cty. v. 
J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶¶1, 11, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509 
(quoted source omitted); see also Marathon Cty. v. D.K., 2020 WI 
8, ¶19, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901 (noting the same).  
"Mootness is a doctrine of judicial restraint[,]" which means we 
refrain from resolving moot cases in the absence of a compelling 
reason.  D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶19.  We recognize certain 
exceptions to this general rule and opt to address moot cases when 
their issues "present . . . a need for an answer that outweighs 
our concern for judicial economy."  Waukesha Cty. v. S.L.L., 2019 
WI 66, ¶15, 387 Wis. 2d 333, 929 N.W.2d 140.  These include issues:  
(1) 
"of 
great 
public 
importance;" 
(2) 
challenging 
the 
constitutionality of a statute; (3) for which "a definitive 
decision is essential to guide the trial courts;" (4) "likely to 
arise again and [that] should be resolved by the court to avoid 
uncertainty;" or (5) "capable and likely of repetition and yet 
No.  2018AP145-FT.rgb 
5 
 
evade[] review[.]"  J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶29 (quoting G.S. v. 
State, 118 Wis. 2d 803, 805, 348 N.W.2d 181 (1984)). 
¶122 D.J.W.'s case is unquestionably moot because no decision 
issued by the court will have any effect on the controversy.  Even 
before his death, D.J.W. was not subject to the original commitment 
order or the subsequent recommitment order.  The firearm 
restriction that survives the expiration of the commitment orders 
ceased to have any legal effect upon D.J.W.'s death.  Cf. D.K., 
389 Wis. 2d 50, ¶25 (holding "a decision in [the petitioner's] 
favor would void the firearms ban and therefore have a 'practical 
effect[,]'" rendering it "not a moot issue").  When we granted 
review of his case, D.J.W. conceded the case was moot but asked us 
to exercise our discretion and review his sufficiency-of-the-
evidence challenge under one of the mootness exceptions. 
¶123 Because D.J.W. died, no issue outweighs our concern for 
judicial economy.  See S.L.L., 387 Wis. 2d 333, ¶15.  None of the 
mootness exceptions apply.  The majority claims exceptions (1), 
(3), and (5) support reaching the merits.  Majority op., ¶26 n.5 
("[T]he question of the necessary evidence to support an 
involuntary commitment is of great importance yet often evades 
appellate review.  Our decision on this case will give necessary 
guidance to circuit courts conducting involuntary commitment 
proceedings.").  I respectfully disagree.  Chapter 51 cases are 
not so rare or procedurally unusual that they will evade appellate 
review.  This term alone the court reviewed four chapter 51 cases.  
Two of those, the present case and D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, dealt 
with sufficiency of the evidence challenges to findings of 
dangerousness under Wis. Stat. § 51.20.  Last term, this court 
No.  2018AP145-FT.rgb 
6 
 
reviewed two chapter 51 cases, both involving sufficiency of the 
evidence challenges.  See S.L.L., 387 Wis. 2d 333; J.W.K., 386 
Wis. 2d 672.  Six cases in two terms indicates appellate review is 
readily available to parties presenting chapter 51 cases.  
Admittedly, resolution of this case was of great importance to 
D.J.W.  However, nothing about the sufficiency of the evidence in 
his extension hearing almost three years ago is of great public 
importance to overcome our customary exercise of judicial 
restraint. 
¶124 The majority also claims a resolution will "give 
necessary guidance" to circuit courts.  The court's only guidance 
commands that "circuit courts in recommitment proceedings are to 
make specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision 
paragraph of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment 
is based."  Majority op., ¶¶3, 26 n.5, 59.  This "guidance" is not 
new.  Just this term, every member of this court detailed the 
importance of making specific factual findings in chapter 51 cases.  
D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶55 (Ziegler, J., joined by Roggensack, C.J., 
and 
Hagedorn, 
JJ.) 
("[The 
record] 
could 
have 
been 
more 
detailed. . . . [T]he circuit court could have made more detailed 
and thorough factual findings and clarified its legal conclusions.  
A commitment is no trivial matter.  Taking more time at the circuit 
court can save years of uncertainty on appeal."); id., ¶68 n.4 
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring, joined by Kelly, J.) 
("Because circuit courts bear the responsibility of determining 
whether the evidence satisfies the statutory standard, [they] must 
expressly make independent factual findings on the record, 
separate from any legal conclusions.  Merely reciting testimony or 
No.  2018AP145-FT.rgb 
7 
 
melding factual findings with legal conclusions can constrain 
appellate review.  Because appellate courts overturn only factual 
findings that are 'clearly erroneous,' there must be distinct 
separation of factfinding from legal conclusions."  (citation 
omitted)); id., ¶¶86, 79 n.2 (Dallet, J., dissenting, joined by 
Ann Walsh Bradley, J.) ("[Wis. Stat. ch. 51] hearings cannot be 
perfunctory under the law.  Attention to detail is important."  
(quoted source omitted); "[T]he circuit court's factual findings 
in this case are scant[.]"). 
¶125 The court has already emphasized that circuit courts 
must make explicit factual findings on the record to support their 
legal conclusions in Chapter 51 cases.  Regardless of the nature 
of the proceeding, a circuit court must always state the facts 
upon which it bases its legal conclusions.  "In all matters tried 
before a court, the trial court must make findings of ultimate 
facts upon which the judgment of the court rests.  Adequate 
findings must be made in order to protect the rights of litigants 
and to facilitate review of the record by an appellate court."  
Termination of Parental Rights of T.R.M., 100 Wis. 2d 681, 687, 
303 N.W.2d 581 (1981) (internal footnote omitted); see also 
Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2) ("In all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury . . . the court shall find the ultimate facts and 
state separately its conclusions of law thereon."). 
¶126 The woefully inadequate record in this case also 
militates against deciding the merits.  See majority op., ¶¶36-
40, 47 (discussing no consistent statutory basis for the initial 
commitment, changing arguments by the County, "conflicting 
messages" by the County and lower courts, and an erroneous standard 
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of review by the court of appeals).  Particularly in light of a 
record that is "quite unhelpful in guiding this court's 
analysis[,]" the court should dismiss this case as moot.  D.J.W.'s 
death eliminates any otherwise applicable mootness exceptions. 
III 
¶127 Given D.J.W.'s death, there is no reason for the court 
to reach the merits.  Resolution of the disputed issue has no 
"practical effect" on the underlying sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
challenge D.J.W. raised.  This fact-specific challenge is of no 
importance to the general public, these challenges commonly 
receive our discretionary review, and the little guidance provided 
by the court does not outweigh the overriding interest in judicial 
economy.  The majority declines to dismiss this case and instead 
analogizes chapter 51 appeals to criminal appeals in its mootness 
analysis, without acknowledging the differences between the two.  
Neither the language nor rationale of McDonald supports reaching 
the merits in a chapter 51 case when the committee dies during the 
appeal.  This case is moot, no exception applies, and the case 
should be dismissed. 
 
 
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