Title: RALPH ORMSBY V METROPOLITAN BUILDING SERVICES
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 123289
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: July 23, 2004

________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 23, 2004 
RALPH ORMBSY AND KIMBERLY ORMSBY, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v 
No. 123287 
CAPITAL WELDING, INC., 
Defendant-Appellant, 
and 
MONARCH BUILDING SERVICES, INC., 
Defendant-Appellee, 
and 
METROPOLITAN BUILDING SERVICES 
and RITE AID OF MICHIGAN, 
Defendants. 
RALPH ORMSBY and KIMBERLY ORMSBY, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
V 
No. 123289 
CAPITAL WELDING, INC., 
Defendant-Appellee, 
and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
MONARCH BUILDING SERVICES, INC., 
Defendant-Appellant, 
and 
METROPOLITAN BUILDING SERVICES 
and RITE AID OF MICHIGAN, 
Defendants. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
TAYLOR, J.  
We granted leave to appeal in this case to consider 
the relationship between the “common work area doctrine” 
and the “retained control doctrine,” and to address the 
scope of each doctrine. At common law, property owners and 
general contractors generally could not be held liable for 
the negligence of independent subcontractors and their 
employees. 
In Funk v Gen Motors Corp, 392 Mich 91, 104­
105; 220 NW2d 641 (1974),1 however, this Court set forth a 
new exception to this general rule of nonliability, holding 
that, under certain circumstances, a general contractor 
could be held liable under the “common work area doctrine” 
1 Overruled in part on other grounds Hardy v Monsanto
Enviro-Chem Sys, Inc, 414 Mich 29; 323 NW2d 270 (1982). 
2  
 
 
 
 
and, further, that a property owner could be held equally 
liable under the “retained control doctrine.” 
In this case, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
court’s grant of summary disposition for both defendants, 
holding that these doctrines are two distinct and separate 
exceptions to the general rule of nonliability of property 
owners and general contractors concerning the negligence of 
independent 
subcontractors 
and 
their 
employees. 
We 
disagree with the Court of Appeals and clarify today that 
these two doctrines are not two distinct and separate 
exceptions, 
rather 
only 
one—the 
“common 
work 
area 
doctrine”—is 
an 
exception 
to 
the 
general 
rule 
of 
nonliability 
for 
the 
negligent 
acts 
of 
independent 
subcontractors and their employees. 
Thus, only when the 
Funk four-part “common work area” test is satisfied may an 
injured employee of an independent subcontractor sue the 
general 
contractor 
for 
that 
contractor’s 
alleged 
negligence. 
Further, the “retained control doctrine” is a doctrine 
subordinate to the “common work area doctrine” and is not 
itself an exception to the general rule of nonliability. 
Rather, it simply stands for the proposition that when the 
Funk “common work area doctrine” would apply, and the 
property owner has sufficiently “retained control” over the 
3  
 
 
 
 
construction project, that owner steps into the shoes of 
the general contractor and is held to the same degree of 
care as the general contractor. 
Thus, the “retained 
control doctrine,” in this context, means that if a 
property owner assumes the role of a general contractor, 
such owner assumes the unique duties and obligations of a 
general contractor. 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision 
of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s 
grant of summary disposition for both defendants. 
I. Facts and Proceedings Below 
This case arose out of a construction accident that 
occurred during the construction of a Rite Aid store in 
Troy, Michigan. 
Property owner Rite Aid hired defendant 
Monarch Building Services, Inc. (Monarch), as the general 
contractor for the project. 
Monarch subcontracted the 
steel fabrication and steel erection work to defendant 
Capital Welding, Inc. (Capital), which then subcontracted 
the steel erection work to Abray Steel Erectors (Abray). 
Plaintiff 
Ralph 
Ormsby 
was 
employed 
by 
Abray 
as 
a 
journeyman ironworker on the site. 
Capital delivered the steel for the project, at which 
time a crew from Abray began erecting the building using 
the steel. 
During the unloading process, Abray personnel 
allegedly disregarded an express warning that Capital had 
4  
 
 
 
                                                 
attached to the steel beams that stated, “Under no 
circumstances are deck bundles or construction loads of any 
other description to be placed on unbridged joists.” The 
warning also cautioned against loading bundles of steel 
decking, weighing between two and three tons each, onto the 
unsecured erected steel structure. 
Plaintiff began working on the unsecured joists to 
properly align the joists into position. 
To do so, he 
would strike the unsecured joist with a hammer. 
While 
performing this task, there was a sudden shift in an 
unsecured joist that, coupled with the fact that the joist 
was loaded with decking, allegedly caused the collapse of 
the structure, resulting in plaintiff’s fifteen foot fall 
and subsequent injuries. 
Plaintiff filed suit against Capital, alleging, among 
other 
things, 
that 
Capital 
retained 
control 
of 
and 
negligently supervised the project, and acquiesced to 
unsafe construction activities, including loading unwelded 
bar joists.2
 Plaintiff later amended his complaint and 
added the same claims against Monarch. 
2 Although both Ormsby and his wife filed complaints,
his wife’s suit is wholly derivative. 
Therefore, we use
"plaintiff" in the singular. 
5  
 
 
 
 
Capital 
filed 
a 
motion 
for 
summary 
disposition 
contending that there was no genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether it 
retained control over the project 
because plaintiff failed to present any evidence that he 
was injured in a common work area. 
Plaintiff opposed the 
motion, contending instead that the two doctrines were 
separate and distinct, and thus Capital could be held 
liable under the “retained control doctrine” even if he 
failed to satisfy the elements of the “common work area 
doctrine.” 
The trial court agreed with Capital and granted its 
motion. 
Combining the doctrines of “common work area” and 
“retained control,” the trial court determined that “the 
retained 
control 
theory 
applies 
only 
in 
situations 
involving ‘common work areas.’” 
The trial court further 
stated, “This Court finds that there was no common work 
area that created a high degree of risk to a significant 
number of workers” and “there is no evidence that other 
subcontractors would work on the erection of the steel 
structure.” 
That is, the trial court found that plaintiff 
had failed to satisfy two elements of the “common work area 
doctrine,” and thus no genuine issue of material fact 
existed regarding whether either doctrine applied to 
Capital. 
6  
 
 
 
Following Capital’s successful motion, Monarch filed 
its 
own 
motion 
for 
summary 
disposition 
under 
MCR 
2.116(C)(10), contending that plaintiff had failed to 
provide any evidence to satisfy each of the four elements 
of the “common work area doctrine.” In response, plaintiff 
moved for leave to amend his complaint to assert that 
plaintiff was in fact injured in a “common work area” as 
defined in Funk. 
The trial court granted Monarch’s motion 
for the same reasons that it had granted the earlier 
Capital motion and denied plaintiff’s motion to amend his 
complaint, ruling that the amendment would be futile in 
light of its ruling that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the existence of a common work 
area. 
The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) 
that the “common work area doctrine” and “retained control 
doctrine” are two distinct and separate exceptions and (2) 
that evidence that “employees of other subcontrators would 
be or had been working in the same area where plaintiff’s 
injury occurred . . . create[d] a genuine issue of material 
fact regarding whether plaintiff’s injury occurred in a 
common work area.” 
255 Mich App 165, 188; 660 NW2d 730 
(2003). 
Accordingly, the Court permitted plaintiff’s 
7  
 
 
  
                                                 
“retained control” claim to proceed against Capital,3 and 
permitted plaintiff’s “common work area” claim to proceed 
against both Capital and Monarch. 
Further, the Court held 
that the trial court had erred in denying plaintiff’s 
motion to amend his complaint concerning his allegations 
that he had been injured in a “common work area.”  Both 
defendants filed applications for leave to appeal with this 
Court, which we granted.4 
II. Standard of Review 
Summary disposition under either MCR 2.116(C)(8) or 
(C)(10) presents an issue of law for our determination and, 
thus, "[w]e review a trial court's ruling on a motion for 
summary disposition de novo." Straus v Governor, 459 Mich 
526, 533; 592 NW2d 53 (1999). 
When a trial court grants summary disposition pursuant 
to MCR 2.116(C)(8), or (C)(10), the opportunity for the 
nonprevailing party to amend its pleadings pursuant to MCR 
2.118 should be freely granted, unless the amendment would 
3 Regarding Monarch, the Court of Appeals concluded
that the trial court’s order granting Monarch summary
disposition on plaintiff’s retained control theory was 
proper because no genuine issue of material fact existed
that Monarch had not retained control over plaintiff’s
work. 
4 469 Mich 947 (2003). 
8  
 
 
 
not be justified. MCR 2.116(I)(5). An amendment, however, 
would not be justified if it would be futile. 
Weymers v 
Khera, 454 Mich 639, 658; 563 NW2d 647 (1997). We will not 
reverse a trial court's decision to deny leave to amend 
pleadings unless it constituted an abuse of discretion. 
Id. at 654. 
III. Analysis 
As discussed briefly above, at common law, property 
owners and general contractors generally could not be held 
liable for the negligence of independent subcontractors and 
their employees. However, in Funk, this Court set forth an 
exception to this general rule of nonliability. 
There, 
property owner General Motors (GM) hired general contractor 
Darin & Armstrong (Darin) to expand one of its plants. The 
general contractor, in turn, subcontracted a portion of the 
work to Funk’s employer, Ben Agree Company. 
Funk was 
injured in a fall from a platform and sued GM and Darin, 
alleging that each owed him a duty to implement reasonable 
safety precautions and to ensure that workers on the 
project used adequate safety equipment to protect against 
falls. 
GM and Darin defended on the basis that, under the 
common 
law, neither had a duty to protect plaintiff from 
these types of dangers. 
Departing from established law, 
this 
Court 
set 
forth 
an 
exception 
in 
circumstances 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
     
involving construction projects and affirmed the verdict 
against Darin: 
We regard it to be part of the business of a
general contractor to assure that reasonable 
steps within its supervisory and coordinating
authority are taken to guard against readily 
observable, avoidable dangers in common work 
areas which create a high degree of risk to a
significant number of workmen. 
[Funk, supra at 
104.] 
That is, for a general contractor to be held liable under 
the “common work area doctrine,” a plaintiff must show that 
(1) the defendant, either the property owner or general 
contractor, failed to take reasonable steps within its 
supervisory and coordinating authority (2) to guard against 
readily observable and avoidable dangers (3) that created a 
high degree of risk to a significant number of workmen (4) 
in a common work area. 
Having established that a general contractor could be 
held liable for negligence regarding job safety, the Court 
then addressed the potential liability of a property owner. 
The Court held that, under the new rule, a property owner 
could itself be liable if it had “retained control” in such 
a way that it had effectively stepped into the shoes of the 
general contractor and been acting as such. 
The Court 
first stated: 
This analysis [i.e., the “common work area”
test quoted above in reference to the general 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
contractor] would not ordinarily render a “mere” 
owner liable. 
In contrast with a general
contractor, 
the 
owner 
typically 
is 
not 
a 
professional builder. 
Most owners visit the 
construction site only casually and are not 
knowledgeable concerning safety measures. . . .
Supervising job safety, providing safeguards, is
not part of the business of a typical owner.
[Id. at 104-105 (emphasis added).] 
Then it continued by outlining the circumstances in which 
the ordinary rule would not control, saying: 
[T]he law does not . . . absolve an owner
who acts in a superintending capacity and has
knowledge of high degrees of risk faced by
construction 
workers 
from 
responsibility 
for 
failing 
to 
require 
observance 
of 
reasonable 
safety precautions. [Id. at 106-107.] 
The Court’s use of the word “ordinarily,” italicized above, 
considered in conjunction with its statement that a 
property owner cannot escape liability if that owner acts 
in a “superintending capacity and has knowledge of high 
degree of risk faced by construction workers,” necessarily 
implies that, under certain circumstances, the “common work 
area” doctrine would render a property owner liable.5 
Thus, 
it is clear that this Court was applying the identical 
5 The Court also stated that “[a]n owner is responsible
if he does not truly delegate—if he retains ‘control’ of
the work—or if, by rule of law or statute, the duty to 
guard against the risk is made ‘nondelegable.’” Id. at 101 
(emphasis added). 
11  
 
 
  
     
“common work area” analysis to GM, as property owner, on 
the basis that it “retained control.” 
Applying these new doctrines to the facts in Funk, the 
Court 
noted 
that 
Funk 
had 
largely 
created 
his 
own 
circumstances because he essentially “dug a hole and . . . 
[he] fell into it,” id. at 100. 
The general contractor, 
Darin, was fully knowledgeable of the subcontractor’s 
failure to implement reasonable safety precautions for a 
readily apparent danger where such precautions likely would 
have prevented Funk’s fall. 
Further, the Court held that 
GM had exercised “an unusually high degree of control over 
the construction project,” and thus was also liable for 
Funk’s injuries. Id. at 101. Thus, this Court stated that 
the evidence supported a finding of GM’s tacit, if not 
actual, control of safety measures or the lack thereof “in 
the highly visible common work areas.” Id. at 107. 
Accordingly, we conclude that, on the basis of this 
Court’s analysis in Funk, the “common work area doctrine” 
and the “retained control doctrine” are not two distinct and 
separate exceptions. 
Rather, the former doctrine is an 
exception to the general rule of nonliability of property 
owners and general contractors for injuries resulting from 
the negligent conduct of independent subcontractors or their 
employees. 
Thus, only when the Funk four-part “common work 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
area” test is satisfied may a general contractor be held 
liable 
for 
alleged 
negligence 
of 
the 
employees 
of 
independent subcontractors regarding job safety. 
The 
“retained control” control doctrine is merely a subordinate 
doctrine, applied by the Funk Court to the owner defendant, 
that has no application to general contractors.6 
In her dissent in Funk, Justice Coleman was concerned 
that the “common work area doctrine” would devolve in 
practice into a strict liability regime where general 
contractors would be responsible for any common work area 
injury that an employee of an independent subcontractor 
suffers. 
Id. at 116. 
Although Justice Coleman’s concerns 
have not come to fruition,7 
Funk has morphed from a 
straightforward doctrine conferring liability, under certain 
circumstances, on property owners or general contractors for 
the negligence of independent subcontractors, into a “two 
6 The Funk Court applied the “retained control” 
doctrine to the property owner defendant in that case. The 
owner of the subject property in this case, Rite Aid, was
dismissed early in the litigation, and its liability is not
at issue. 
It is therefore unnecessary to address owner
liability, and we express no opinion regarding the Funk 
“retained control” doctrine as it applies to property
owners. 
7 Neither defendant nor any brief amicus curiae has
urged the Court to overrule Funk, but only to clarify the
nature of the Funk holding. 
13  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
exception” creation. 
Indeed, the instant opinion by the 
Court of Appeals outlined that progression8 and proceeded to 
erroneously conclude that even an entity that is neither a 
8 As the Court of Appeals read the cases, Erickson v 
Pure Oil Corp, 72 Mich App 330, 335-336; 249 NW2d 411
(1976), distinguished the doctrines of “retained control”
and “common work area” and applied them separately; Signs v
Detroit Edison Co, 93 Mich App 626, 632; 287 NW2d 292
(1979), addressed general contractor liability based on
“retained control” even though it found that the plaintiff
was not injured in a “common work area”; Samhoun v 
Greenfield Constr Co, Inc, 163 Mich App 34, 45; 413 NW2d
723 (1987), blended the doctrines of “retained control” and
“common work area”; Johnson v Turner Constr Co, 198 Mich
App 478, 480; 499 NW2d 27 (1993), separately addressed the
two doctrines; Phillips v Mazda Motor Mfg (USA) Corp, 204
Mich App 401, 408; 516 NW2d 502 (1994), addressed the 
doctrines of “retained control” and common work area” 
separately; Hughes v PMG Building, 227 Mich App 1, 8; 574
NW2d 691 (1997), discussed the “common work area doctrine”
without reference to the “retained control doctrine”;
Kubisz v Cadillac Gage Textron, Inc, 236 Mich App 629, 636;
601 NW2d 160 (1999), discussed the “retained control 
doctrine” as a "second main exception" to the general rule
of nonliability for the negligence of an independent
contractor without mentioning the four-part test in Funk or 
addressing whether the plaintiff's injury occurred in a
“common work area”; Candelaria v B C Gen Contractors, Inc,
236 Mich App 67, 74; 600 NW2d 348 (1999), stated that the
“retained 
control 
doctrine” 
applies 
only 
in 
those 
situations involving “common work areas.” 
Unfortunately, 
our 
post-Funk 
decisions 
that 
have 
addressed the “retained control” and “common work area” 
doctrines have been plurality opinions, and, as explained
in Dean v Chrysler Corp, 434 Mich 655, 661 n 7; 455 NW2d
699 (1990), are not binding authority. See Beals v Walker,
416 Mich 469; 331 NW2d 700 (1982), Plummer v Bechtel Corp,
440 Mich 646; 489 NW2d 66 (1992), and Groncki v Detroit 
Edison, 453 Mich 644; 557 NW2d 289 (1996). 
14  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
property owner nor a general contractor (subcontractor 
Capital) can be liable under Funk. 
IV. Application 
To establish the liability of a general contractor 
under Funk, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) that 
the defendant contractor failed to take reasonable steps 
within its supervisory and coordinating authority (2) to 
guard against readily observable and avoidable dangers (3) 
that created a high degree of risk to a significant number 
of workmen (4) in a common work area.9 
Id. at 104. 
9 With reference to element four—a common work area—we 
agree with the following statement from Hughes, supra at 8­
9, in which the court concluded that an overhang on a porch
did not constitute a common work area: 
If the top of the overhang or even the
overhang in its entirety were considered to be a
"common work area" for purposes of subjecting the
general contractor to liability for injuries
incurred by employees of subcontractors, then 
virtually no place or object located on the 
construction premises could be considered not to
be a common work area. We do not believe that 
this is the result the Supreme Court intended. 
This Court has previously suggested that the 
Court’s use of the phrase "common work area" in
Funk, supra, suggests that the Court desired to
limit 
the 
scope 
of 
a 
general 
contractor's 
supervisory duties and liability. 
We thus read 
the common work area formulation as an effort to 
distinguish between a situation where employees
of a subcontractor were working on a unique
project in isolation from other workers and a
(continued…) 
15  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
Funk is simply inapplicable to Capital in this case 
because Capital was neither the property owner nor the 
general contractor. Thus, the trial court’s order granting 
it summary disposition was proper. Accordingly, we reverse 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the 
trial court’s order granting summary disposition for 
Capital.10 
Because Monarch was the general contractor, the 
“common work area doctrine” may be applicable. 
The trial 
court determined that plaintiff had failed to satisfy 
element three, danger creating a high degree of risk to a 
(…continued)
situation 
where 
employees 
of 
a 
number 
of 
subcontractors were all subject to the same risk
or 
hazard. 
In 
the 
first 
instance, 
each 
subcontractor is generally held responsible for
the safe operation of its part of the work. In
the latter case, where a substantial number of 
employees 
of 
multiple 
subcontractors 
may 
be 
exposed 
to 
a 
risk 
of 
danger, 
economic 
considerations 
suggest 
that 
placing 
ultimate 
responsibility on the general contractor for job
safety in common work areas will "render it more
likely that the various subcontractors . . . will
implement or that the general contractor will
himself implement the necessary precautions and
provide the necessary safety equipment in those
areas." Funk, supra at 104 (citations omitted). 
10 Justice Kelly has concluded in her partial dissent
that plaintiffs’ lawsuit against Capital should be allowed
under Funk. 
This deviates from Funk because Funk only
authorized claims against owners and general contractors.
Capital is neither. 
16  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
significant number of workmen, and element four, a common 
work area, and thus granted summary disposition for 
Monarch. 
This approach is consistent with Funk and 
reflects the understanding that a plaintiff’s failure to 
satisfy any one of the four elements of the “common work 
area doctrine” is fatal to a Funk claim.11 
The Court of Appeals, misapprehending the merit of the 
trial court’s approach, reversed the decision of the trial 
court on the basis that it erred in finding that no genuine 
issue of material fact existed regarding element four—a 
“common work area.” 
Regardless of whether a genuine issue 
of material fact existed with respect to element four, 
reversal was erroneous because the Court of Appeals 
overlooked the fact that the trial court’s order was 
premised not just on a deficiency of evidence regarding 
element four, but also on the fact that no genuine issue of 
material 
fact 
existed 
regarding 
element 
three—danger 
creating a high degree of risk to a significant number of 
11 It is potentially confusing and, indeed, may have
misled some courts, that a test with four elements has been
referred to by only one of its elements—the “common work
area.” 
What is commonly referred to as the “common work
area doctrine,” however, has four separate elements, all of 
which must be satisfied before that doctrine may apply. 
17  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
workmen.12
 Inasmuch as Funk requires a plaintiff to 
establish all four elements of the “common work area 
doctrine” to prevail, the trial court ruling should have 
been affirmed. 
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by refusing to allow plaintiff to amend his 
complaint concerning the existence of a “common work area,” 
because 
such 
an 
amendment 
would 
have 
been 
futile. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of 
12 Justice Kelly asserts in her dissent that the Court
of Appeals disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion that
plaintiff had failed to establish a genuine issue of 
material fact that a high degree of risk to a significant
number of workers existed. 
This is incorrect. 
The Court 
of 
Appeals 
specifically 
stated 
that 
it 
limited 
its 
discussion and decision to the question whether plaintiff
was injured in a common work area. 
255 Mich App at 188.
Justice Kelly goes on to indicate that she would find a
genuine issue of material fact whether a significant number
of workers were exposed to danger on the basis that a mason
was right below plaintiff when he fell, and because any
worker at the site would be working in, around and under
the steel structure after it was erected and all such 
workers 
would 
be 
exposed 
to 
an 
extremely 
dangerous
condition if the structure was not competently constructed.
We disagree. 
The fact that one worker was below plaintiff
when he fell certainly does not establish a genuine issue
of material fact regarding whether a high degree of risk to
a significant number of workers existed. 
Justice Kelly’s
vague reference to “any worker” being exposed to danger if
the structure was not competently construed is likewise
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.
The high degree of risk to a significant number of workers
must exist when the plaintiff is injured; not after 
construction has been completed. 
18  
 
 
     
 
                                                 
Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s grant of summary 
disposition for Monarch. 
V. Conclusion 
The doctrines of “common work area” and “retained 
control” are not two distinct and separate exceptions. 
Rather, under the “common work area doctrine,” a general 
contractor may be held liable for the negligence of its 
independent subcontractors only if all the elements of the 
four-part “common work area” test set forth in Funk have 
been satisfied. 
Further, the “retained control doctrine” 
is subordinate to the “common work area doctrine” and 
simply stands for the proposition that when the “common 
work area doctrine” would apply, and the property owner has 
stepped into the shoes of the general contractor, thereby 
“retaining control” over the construction project, that 
owner may likewise be held liable for the negligence of its 
independent subcontractors.13
 Because neither Capital nor 
Monarch satisfies all four elements of the “common work 
area” doctrine, we reverse the judgment of the Court of 
13 We reiterate that we are merely clarifying Funk and 
we express no opinion concerning whether the Funk Court 
properly imposed liability on an owner under the “retained
control” doctrine. 
19  
 
 
 
  
Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s grant of summary 
disposition for both defendants. 
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
RALPH ORMSBY AND KIMBERLY ORMSBY, 
Plaintiffs-Appelleess, 
v 
No. 123287 
CAPITAL WELDING, INC., 
 
Defendant -Appellant, 
and 
MONARCH BUILDING SERVICES, INC., 
Defendant-Appellee, 
and 
METROPOLITAN BULDING SERVICES 
and RITE AID OF MICHIGAN, 
Defendants. 
RALPH ORMSBY AND KIMBERLY ORMSBY, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v 
No. 123289 
CAPITAL WELDING, INC., 
Defendant-Appellee, 
and 
MONARCH BUILDING SERVICES, INC., 
Defendant-Appellant, 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
and 
METROPOLITAN BUILDING SERVICES 
and RITE AID OF MICHIGAN, 
Defendants. 
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in result only). 
I concur in the result reached by the majority. 
However, I write separately because I would reach that 
result regardless of whether the doctrines of retained 
control and common work area are separate doctrines. 
I 
agree with the majority that the trial court’s grant of 
summary disposition to both defendants should be reinstated 
because the dispositive issues in this case are not 
affected by whether the doctrines are separate or one is 
subordinate to the other. 
I, however, cannot join the 
majority because this Court has routinely treated the 
doctrines of retained control and common work area as two 
separate and distinct doctrines. 
See Plummer v Bechtel 
Constr Co, 440 Mich 646; 489 NW2d 66 (1992); Groncki v 
Detroit Edison Co, 453 Mich 644; 557 NW2d 289 (1996). 
Regardless of whether the doctrine of retained control 
is subordinate to or separate from the common work area 
doctrine, it is only applicable to property owners, and 
because neither defendant Capital nor defendant Monarch is 
2  
 
 
 
 
the property owner, the trial court was correct to grant 
each defendant’s motion for summary disposition with 
respect to the doctrine of retained control. 
Further, the common work area doctrine does not apply 
to subcontractors, thus the trial court was correct to 
grant defendant Capital’s motion for summary disposition 
with respect to common work area liability. See Funk v Gen 
Motors Corp, 392 Mich 91, 104; 220 NW2d 641 (1974). 
The 
trial court was also correct to grant defendant Monarch’s 
motion for summary disposition with respect to the common 
work area doctrine. 
Regardless of when the danger to a 
significant number of workers must exist, plaintiff failed 
to show that a genuine issue of material fact existed about 
whether there was danger creating a high degree of risk to 
a significant number of workers. 
Because plaintiff failed 
to establish a genuine issue of material fact and because 
defendant Monarch was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law, the trial court was correct to grant defendant 
Monarch’s motion for summary disposition. 
Thus, I concur 
in the result only. 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
RALPH ORMSBY AND KIMBERLY ORMSBY, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v 
No. 123287 
CAPITAL WELDING, INC., 
Defendant-Appellant, 
and 
MONARCH BUILDING SERVICES, INC., 
Defendant-Appellee, 
and 
METROPOLITAN BUILDING SERVICES 
and RITE AID OF MICHIGAN, 
Defendants. 
RALPH ORMSBY and KIMBERLY ORMSBY, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v 
No. 123289 
CAPITAL WELDING, INC., 
Defendant-Appellee, 
and 
MONARCH BUILDING SERVICES, INC., 
Defendant-Appellant, 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
and 
METROPOLITAN BUILDING SERVICES 
and RITE AID OF MICHIGAN, 
 
Defendants-Not participating. 
KELLY, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
This Court granted leave limited to whether the 
retained control doctrine and the common work area doctrine 
are separate and to a discussion of the scope of each 
doctrine. 469 Mich 947 (2003). The majority holds that the 
doctrines 
are 
not 
separate 
as 
applied 
to 
general 
contractors who utilize subcontractors. Ante at 3-4. 
I respectfully dissent. 
I believe that the retained 
control doctrine and the common work area doctrine are 
distinct theories of liability. 
They are founded on 
different premises. 
Like all common law tort theories, 
they reinforce distinct social norms.1 
The retained control doctrine applies to one who 
engages an independent contractor but retains actual 
control over the manner in which the work is performed. It 
imposes a duty to ensure that the contractor exercises due 
1 See generally, 1 Dobbs, The Law of Torts, Aims,
Policies and Methods of Tort Law, Ch 1, Topic B, p 12 ff. 
2  
 
  
                                                 
 
care for the safety of others. 
See 2 Restatement of Torts 
2d, § 414, p 387. It deters undesirable conduct. 
The 
common 
work 
area 
doctrine 
arises 
from 
the 
characteristics of common work areas and the efficiency of 
imposing 
responsibility 
on 
the 
entity 
that 
has 
responsibility over the entire area. 
Funk v Gen Motors 
Corporation, 392 Mich 91, 104; 220 NW2d 641 (1974), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Hardy v Monsanto 
Enviro-Chem Systems, Inc, 414 Mich 29; 323 NW2d 270 (1982). 
Whether either of these doctrines applies in a given 
case is a question of fact. The majority affirms the trial 
court’s determination that plaintiff failed to create a 
genuine issue of material fact on the third element of the 
common work area doctrine. 
The trial court held that 
plaintiff failed to establish that there was a danger 
creating a high degree of risk to a significant number of 
workers.2 
Ante at 18. 
The Court of Appeals held that 
plaintiff presented evidence that other workers “would be 
or had been working in the same area where plaintiff’s 
injury occurred”. 
255 Mich App 165, 188; 660 NW2d 730 
(2003). 
2 See Groncki v Detroit Edison Co, 453 Mich 644, 662;
557 NW2d 289 (1996) (Brickley, C.J.), citing Funk, supra at 
104. 
3  
 
 
 
Plaintiff testified that a mason was working “right 
below” him when the steel structure collapsed. 
This is 
evidence that other workers were in, around, and under the 
structure while it was being erected. 
It is reasonable to 
infer that other workers would continue to be in, on, and 
around it as construction continued. If the structure were 
not built competently, an extremely dangerous condition 
would exist that the structure would collapse. It is of no 
moment that there happened to be only one worker in the 
area at the time of the accident. 
The Court of Appeals Decision is Correct 
I agree with the Court of Appeals. 
Plaintiff's 
testimony is sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding whether a significant number of 
workers in addition to the mason were exposed to the 
danger. 
Moreover, plaintiff presented evidence that defendant 
Capital Welding retained control over the manner in which 
the work of Capital's subcontractor, Abray, was performed. 
Capital’s field superintendent stated that he instructed 
Abray's ironworkers on proper erection. Plaintiff, Abray's 
4  
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
  
employee, 
testified 
that 
Capital's 
superintendent 
instructed him on particular aspects of the job.3 
The contract between Capital and Monarch obligated 
Capital to undertake safety precautions for the steel 
erection work. 
Capital’s field superintendent stated that 
he had the authority to remove a contractor from the site 
for safety violations. 
Therefore, Capital retained its 
responsibility to ensure that the steel was erected safely 
after 
subcontracting 
the 
work 
to 
Abray, 
plaintiff’s 
employer. 
An analogy between Funk and this case is appropriate. 
Funk did not explicitly limit its reasoning to landowners 
and general contractors. The landowner there was liable to 
its contractor's employee because it retained control over 
the safety precautions implemented on the site. 
See Funk 
at 107-108. 
In this case, plaintiff presented evidence 
that Capital retained control over the methods and safety 
procedures for Abray's erection of the steel. 
Capital 
stands in the identical position to plaintiff as the 
landowner in Funk did as to Funk. 
Accordingly, it was not 
3 Plaintiff was told to fabricate lugs that would be
welded to the structure’s columns. 
5  
 
 
                                                 
 
entitled to summary disposition on the proposition that it 
could not be liable to its contractor's employee. 
However, with respect to Monarch, plaintiff failed to 
establish that Monarch had anything more than general 
oversight of the construction. 
This is insufficient to 
establish liability under either the common work area 
doctrine or the retained control doctrine. 
Johnson v 
Turner Constr Co, 198 Mich App 478, 480; 499 NW2d 27 
(1993). Monarch was entitled to summary disposition. 
Possible Unintended Results of the 
DeShambo and Ormsby Decisions 
DeShambo4 
and 
Ormsby 
read 
together 
could 
have 
unfortunate unintended results in future cases. 
Under the 
tort reform statutes, with few exceptions, liability is no 
longer joint but only several. 
MCL 600.2956. 
It is based 
on fault. 
MCL 600.2957(1). 
The fault of a party is 
determined by the trier of fact regardless of whether the 
party can be held legally liable. MCL 600.6304(1). 
4 This case was argued and submitted together with
DeShambo v Anderson, 471 Mich 
; 
NW2d 
(2004).
DeShambo holds that a landowner is not liable for an 
independent 
contractor’s 
negligence 
that 
injures 
an 
employee of that contractor who is engaged in an inherently
dangerous activity. 
Slip op at ___. 
The analysis in
Ormsby could logically be extended to preclude liability of
a landowner under the combined common work area/retained 
control doctrine as well. 
6  
 
 
 
However, an injured individual can recover only from a 
party that can be held legally liable. 
The trier of fact 
may assign fault to one who engages an independent 
contractor and then negligently directs the actions of that 
contractor. 
But under today's decisions in Ormsby and 
DeShambo, such an employer, landowner or otherwise, could 
not be held liable unless an injury occurs in a common work 
area. 
Hence, employers now can conceivably escape all 
liability for their own negligence in a given accident. 
I believe that this result is not consistent with the 
principles underlying the common law. 
It is inconsistent, 
also, with the intent of the tort reform statutes. 
A 
negligent actor should be legally liable for his actions. 
Because the majority's decision undermines this principle, 
I disagree and would affirm the decision of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Marilyn Kelly 
7