Title: Ray Lamar Johnston v. Edwin G. Buss, etc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC09-2148
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: April 28, 2011

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-496 
____________ 
 
RAY LAMAR JOHNSTON,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-2148 
____________ 
 
RAY LAMAR JOHNSTON,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
EDWIN G. BUSS, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[April 28, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Ray Lamar Johnston appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion filed 
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 to vacate his conviction of first-
degree murder and sentence of death.  He also petitions this Court for a writ of 
 
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habeas corpus.1  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial court’s order 
denying postconviction relief.  We also deny the habeas petition. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Johnston was found guilty of the first-degree murder of Janice Nugent.  
Johnston v. State, 863 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2003).  The evidence presented at trial 
revealed that Johnston and Nugent were acquaintances as regular patrons of a bar 
in Tampa.  Id. at 275.  A few weeks before the murder, Johnston had been to 
Nugent’s house after the two had gone on a date.  Id. at 275 & n.3.  Later, Nugent’s 
dead body was discovered in her home by her son-in-law.  Id. at 274.  Her body, 
clothed only in underwear, was wrapped in a bed comforter and submerged in her 
bathtub.  Id.  She had been manually strangled as well as beaten on her buttocks 
and hips with a blunt instrument.  Id.  There were multiple deep bruises on 
Nugent’s neck and shoulders from being throttled, and there were defensive 
bruises and scratches on Nugent’s arms, hands, and face.  Id. 
 
Johnston’s fingerprints were found on a cup in Nugent’s kitchen and on the 
faucet in Nugent’s bathtub.  Id. at 275.  Shoe tracks consistent with shoes 
recovered from Johnston’s apartment were found in Nugent’s kitchen.  Id.  And a 
stain matching Johnston’s DNA profile was found on a sheet in Nugent’s bedroom.  
Id.   
                                          
 
1.   We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. 
 
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In imposing the death sentence, the trial court found two aggravating 
circumstances, one statutory mitigating circumstance, and numerous nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances.2  Id. at 278 & n.5.  On appeal, this Court affirmed 
                                          
 
2.   The two aggravators were (1) Johnston was previously convicted of a 
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, and (2) Nugent’s 
murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC).  Id. at 278 n.5.  The sole 
statutory mitigator was that Johnston’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially 
impaired.  Id. n.6.  The trial court considered the following nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances:  
 
(1) defendant has a long history of mental illness [slight weight]; (2) 
defendant suffers from a dissociative disorder [no weight]; (3) 
defendant suffers from seizure disorder and blackouts [no weight]; (4) 
defendant did not plan to commit the offense in advance [not proven; 
no weight]; (5) defendant’s acts are closer to that of a man-child than 
that of a hard-blooded killer [not proven; no weight]; (6) defendant is 
haunted by poor impulse control [no weight]; (7) defendant is capable 
of strong, loving relationships [slight weight]; (8) defendant excels in 
a prison environment [slight weight]; (9) defendant could work and 
contribute while in prison [slight weight]; (10) defendant has 
extraordinary musical skills [no weight]; (11) defendant obtained 
additional education while he was in prison [no weight]; (12) 
defendant served in the U.S. Air Force and was honorably discharged 
[slight weight]; (13) defendant received a certificate of recognition 
from the Secretary of Defense for services rendered [slight weight]; 
(14) defendant excelled and was recommended for early termination 
while on parole [slight weight]; (15) defendant was a productive 
member of society after his release from prison [slight weight]; (16) 
defendant turned himself in to the police [slight weight]; (17) 
defendant demonstrated appropriate courtroom behavior during trial 
[slight weight]; (18) defendant has tried to conform his behavior to 
normal time after time [no weight]; (19) defendant has a special bond 
with children [no weight]; (20) defendant has the support of his 
mother, brother, and sister [slight weight]; (21) defendant has been a 
good son, brother, and uncle [no weight]; (22) defendant has a mother, 
 
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Johnston’s conviction and sentence.  Id. at 286.  Johnston subsequently filed a 
motion for postconviction relief in the trial court, which the trial court denied.  
Johnston now appeals the denial of postconviction relief.  Johnston has also filed a 
habeas petition raising several claims. 
II.  JOHNSTON’S POSTCONVICTION CLAIMS 
 
Johnston raises the following eight claims of trial court error and ineffective 
assistance of counsel:  (1) counsel was ineffective for offering the testimony of 
Johnston’s brother; (2) counsel was ineffective in presenting the mental health 
mitigation; (3) counsel was ineffective in allowing the admission of Johnston’s 
confession to a prior murder; (4) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of 
Johnston’s prior murder conviction; (5) counsel was ineffective for failing to move 
to suppress Johnston’s statements to law enforcement; (6) counsel was ineffective 
for failing to inform the jury that Johnston was medicated during a prior, unrelated 
trial; (7) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to erroneous jury instructions; 
                                                                                                                                        
sister, three brothers, three nieces, and two nephews who love him 
very much [slight weight]; (23) defendant maintained a Florida 
driver’s license [no weight]; (24) defendant maintained credit cards 
and a bank account [no weight]; (25) defendant can be sentenced to 
multiple consecutive life sentences and will die in prison [no weight]; 
(26) the totality of the circumstances does not set this murder apart 
from the norm of other murders [no weight]. 
 
Id. n.7.  
 
 
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and (8) the trial court erred in summarily denying several of Johnston’s claims.3  
As explained below, Johnston’s claims of trial court error are without merit.  Also, 
because Johnston has failed to prove that his counsel’s performance was deficient 
or that any alleged deficient performance prejudiced him, we affirm the trial 
court’s denial of relief.   See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).   
A.  Testimony of Johnston’s Brother at Penalty Phase 
Johnston first claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for offering the 
testimony of Johnston’s brother, Max Allen, during the penalty phase.  Johnston 
argues that there could be no rational justification for trial counsel to call Allen as a 
witness and asserts that counsel failed to investigate the potentially damaging 
content of Allen’s testimony.  Johnston claims that these actions by his counsel 
were unreasonable and resulted in the jury’s eleven-to-one vote to recommend a 
death sentence.  We affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim. 
This Court has held that two requirements must be satisfied for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims to be successful under the Strickland standard:  First, a 
defendant must show that counsel’s actions or omissions were deficient; and 
second, the deficiency established must further be shown to have so affected the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  Schoenwetter v. State, 
                                          
 
3.  Because we find Johnston’s individual claims are without merit, we also 
deny his claim of cumulative error.  See Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664, 684 (Fla. 
2010).  
 
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46 So. 3d 535, 545-46 (Fla. 2010).  To prove counsel’s performance was deficient, 
a defendant must ―identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to 
have been the result of reasonable professional judgment.‖  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
690.  A reviewing court must then, in light of all the circumstances, determine 
whether ―the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance.‖  Id.  However, this Court must strongly 
presume that defense counsel’s actions were reasonable at the time of the counsel’s 
conduct.  Id. at 689.  Any such ―strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and 
counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.‖  
Howell v. State, 877 So. 2d 697, 703 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Occhicone v. State, 768 
So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000)). 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate that because of 
counsel’s deficient performance, he was deprived of a fair trial with a reliable 
result.  Bradley, 33 So. 3d at 672 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).  The 
prejudice requirement is satisfied only if there is a reasonable probability that ―but 
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.‖  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  Mere speculation that 
counsel’s error affected the outcome of the proceeding is insufficient.  Id. at 693.  
 
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And to establish ineffectiveness, both deficient performance and prejudice must be 
proven.  Id. at 694. 
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on this claim and determined that 
counsel was not ineffective because the strategic decision to offer Allen’s 
testimony was reasonable.  The record shows that calling Allen as a witness was 
part of the defense strategy to portray Johnston as an individual with an extensive, 
documented history of mental health disorders.  On the stand, Allen testified as an 
eyewitness to Johnston’s mental problems during youth, including his psychiatric 
hospitalization and extremely disturbed behavior.  Defense counsel explained that 
Allen’s testimony was intended to give context to the mental health mitigation and 
to confirm that Johnston showed signs of frontal lobe issues since childhood, 
received shock therapy, and was overmedicated.  The defense trial team had 
extensively discussed the strategy behind calling Allen as a witness.  Further, when 
asked whether he desired the jury to recommend a life sentence for his brother, 
Allen stated, ―I don’t think that it’s right for th[e] state to kill him.‖  For all these 
reasons, counsel’s strategic decision to call Allen to testify in the penalty phase 
was not deficient performance, and we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief on 
this ineffectiveness claim. 
 
 
 
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B.  Presentation of Mental Health Mitigation 
 
Johnston next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present 
significant information regarding his mental health issues.  At the evidentiary 
hearing on this issue, Johnston offered the testimony of forensic expert Dr. Mark 
Cunningham, who testified that counsel did not put mental health mitigation 
evidence before the jury in sufficient detail.  Johnston further argued that counsel 
diminished the significance of the available mitigation by referring to it as ―stuff.‖  
We disagree. 
Counsel may ―rely on the evaluations conducted by qualified mental health 
experts, even if, in retrospect, those evaluations may not have been as complete as 
others may desire.‖  Darling v. State, 966 So. 2d 366, 377 (Fla. 2007).  This Court 
has held that counsel will not be rendered ineffective for relying on a mental health 
expert’s opinion during the penalty phase, even if in hindsight the testimony is 
―somehow incomplete or deficient in the opinion of others.‖  Id. 
Here, Johnston’s counsel relied on the testimony of two qualified mental 
health experts during the penalty phase.  The defense presented Dr. Krop, a board-
certified neuropsychologist, who testified to Johnston’s long history of behavioral 
problems, his frontal lobe impairment, organic brain syndrome, and corroborating 
PET scan results.  The defense also presented Dr. Maher, a board-certified forensic 
psychiatrist, who testified after interviewing Johnston and reviewing the following 
 
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information:  Johnston’s hospital, jail, and prison medical records; Dr. Krop’s 
findings and test results; and examination and test results from two other doctors 
who treated Johnston.  Dr. Maher further explained multiple neurodiagnostic test 
results and testified that Johnston suffered from organic brain injury or frontal lobe 
damage.  Thus, these experts presented thorough analyses for the defense on the 
issue of mental health mitigation, and counsel’s reliance on their testimony cannot 
be second-guessed in hindsight.  See id.  The trial court properly denied Johnston 
relief on this claim. 
C.  Admission of Johnston’s Confession to Prior Murder 
Johnston also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing his 
confession to another murder to be introduced at trial.  During the guilt phase, the 
State read into evidence Johnston’s confession made to the jury during the penalty 
phase of his prior trial for the first-degree murder of Leanne Coryell.4  Johnston 
argues that defense counsel during the Coryell penalty phase should have known 
about the future charge forthcoming for the murder of Ms. Nugent and was 
ineffective for allowing Johnston to confess to the murder of Ms. Coryell without 
warning him that such a confession could be used against him in a future 
prosecution.  We disagree.   
                                          
 
4.  The details of Johnston’s murder of Ms. Coryell are set forth in this 
Court’s opinion affirming his conviction and death sentence for that crime.  See 
Johnston v. State, 841 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2002).  
 
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Johnston raises a claim that is not cognizable and therefore does not merit 
relief.  It is axiomatic that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be based 
on the actions of defense counsel in the trial under review.  Here, Johnston is 
claiming that his defense counsel was deficient under Strickland in a prior, 
unrelated murder trial.  The Coryell and Nugent trials were entirely distinct, 
separated in time by several months, with different juries, different victims, 
different prosecutors, and different defense teams.  Defense counsel’s allegedly 
deficient performance at one trial cannot constitute ineffective assistance at 
another, entirely separate trial.  Johnston has not alleged in this claim that any 
actions taken by defense counsel in the case under review were deficient.  
Therefore, this ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail. 
D.  Admission of Williams5 Rule Evidence of Johnston’s Murder Conviction  
 
At trial, evidence of Johnston’s conviction for the Coryell murder was 
admitted under the Williams rule.  The trial court based its admission of this 
similar collateral crime on various facts, which it set forth in a ―detailed, written 
pretrial order on the issue.‖  Johnston, 863 So. 2d at 281.6  The trial court also 
                                          
 
5.  Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).    
 
6.  As this Court summarized on direct appeal, the similarities between the 
murders included the following:  the physical appearance of the victims; the 
victims’ relationships and familiarity with Johnston; the presence of multiple 
blows from a fist to both victims’ upper bodies and heads; pattern bruises on both 
 
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emphasized pretrial the importance of medical examiner Dr. Julia Martin’s 
testimony regarding the similarity of the pattern bruising on the victims’ buttocks 
to the admission of the Williams rule evidence. 
 
Johnston now argues that the State presented misleading testimony from Dr. 
Martin in order to obtain admission of the Williams rule evidence.  Johnston 
asserts that Dr. Martin offered false opinions regarding the implement used to beat 
Ms. Nugent on the buttocks and that this misleading testimony resulted in the 
prejudicial admission of Johnston’s prior murder conviction.  We disagree. 
 
As the trial court correctly concluded, this claim is procedurally barred 
because it has already been raised and decided on direct appeal.  Before trial, the 
State filed an Additional Notice of Discovery that accurately summarized the 
content of Dr. Martin’s telephone contact log regarding possible causes of the 
bruises on Nugent’s buttocks.  In response, Johnston filed a motion to reconsider 
the Williams rule order allowing evidence of Johnston’s prior murder conviction, 
arguing that the disclosure demonstrated that Dr. Martin no longer believed the 
pattern bruises were caused by a belt.  The trial court considered and denied this 
argument regarding Dr. Martin’s ―true opinions.‖ 
This Court thoroughly discussed and denied this claim on direct appeal.  See 
Johnston, 863 So. 2d at 280-83.  We found no error in the trial court’s admission of 
                                                                                                                                        
victims’ buttocks; the manner of strangulation causing death; and the method of 
disposal of the victims’ bodies.  Id. at 281-82.   
 
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the Williams rule evidence because ―there are unusual and pervasive similarities 
between the Coryell and Nugent murders‖ and ―[t]he dissimilarities between the 
two murders are insubstantial and are partially explained by Johnston’s own 
confession in the Coryell case.‖  Id. at 283.  Specifically regarding Dr. Martin’s 
testimony, this Court stated the following: 
The similar belt pattern injuries on the buttocks of both victims 
are possibly the most unique similarities between the Nugent and 
Coryell murders.  Johnston alleges that the State failed to show that 
these injuries were similar.  However, Dr. Martin, the medical 
examiner in the Nugent case, testified that within a reasonable 
medical probability, one or more of the patterned injuries on Nugent’s 
buttocks came from a belt.  Likewise, the medical examiner in the 
Coryell case testified that Coryell was beaten on the buttocks with a 
belt.  During the penalty phase of the Coryell case, Johnston 
confessed to beating Coryell’s buttocks with a belt. 
 
Id. at 282.  Therefore, because the admission of Williams rule evidence based on 
Dr. Martin’s testimony has already been challenged and upheld, Johnston’s claim 
is procedurally barred.   
 
Moreover, Johnston’s claim on this issue is without merit.  His contention 
that the State committed a Giglio7 violation in presenting Dr. Martin’s testimony is 
unfounded.  A Giglio violation occurs when (1) the prosecutor presents or fails to 
correct false testimony, (2) the prosecutor knows the testimony is false, and (3) the 
false evidence is material.  See Guzman v. State, 941 So. 2d 1045, 1050 (Fla. 
2006).  Here, there was no Giglio violation because Dr. Martin did not give false 
                                          
 
7.  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).  
 
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testimony.  The trial court rejected Johnston’s assertion that Dr. Martin testified 
with false opinions that were contrary to her true opinions, explaining that Dr. 
Martin’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing refuted this allegation.  Indeed, in her 
pretrial contact log and at trial, Dr. Martin opined that some of the bruises on Ms. 
Nugent’s buttocks were consistent with a belt.  And at the evidentiary hearing, Dr. 
Martin testified that she stands by her trial testimony and explained her testimony 
that the pattern bruises were consistent with a belt.  Therefore, as the trial court 
correctly concluded, Dr. Martin’s testimony was consistent throughout the case, 
and nothing indicates that the basis for the Williams rule evidence was unfounded.  
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief on this claim. 
E.  Failure to Move to Suppress Johnston’s Statements to Law Enforcement 
 
Johnston also argues that statements he made to law enforcement were 
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights and that guilt phase counsel was 
ineffective for failing to challenge the admissibility of these statements.  We 
disagree. 
 
First, Johnston’s claim that his statements to law enforcement officers were 
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights is procedurally barred because it 
could have been but was not raised on direct appeal.  See Willacy v. State, 967 So. 
2d 131, 141 (Fla. 2007) (―Claims that could have been brought on direct appeal are 
procedurally barred in postconviction proceedings.‖).  On direct appeal, Johnston 
 
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challenged the admission of particular statements made to Detectives Noblitt and 
Stanton on the basis of relevance and did not raise any challenge to the method in 
which any statements were obtained from him.  See Johnston, 863 So. 2d 278-80.  
Therefore, Johnston is not entitled to relief on his claim that trial court erred in 
admitting the statements at issue because that argument has been waived. 
Johnston’s additional claim that his guilt phase counsel was ineffective for 
failing to move to suppress the statements at issue is also without merit.  
―[S]trategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if 
alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was 
reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.‖  Occhicone, 768 So. 2d at 
1048.  Here, as counsel explained during the postconviction evidentiary hearing, 
there was a strategic reason for allowing the introduction of Johnston’s statements 
regarding his alleged activity in the victim’s house.  Because Johnston did not wish 
to testify at trial, defense counsel wanted an alternative method for getting an 
explanation before the jury as to why physical evidence placed Johnston inside the 
victim’s home.  As counsel testified, he saw the statements to law enforcement as a 
strategic means of introducing an explanation for why Johnston’s fingerprints were 
in the victim’s bathroom, where the victim’s body was found.  And as the trial 
court correctly concluded, counsel’s reasoned strategic decision to utilize 
Johnston’s exculpatory statements to law enforcement does not constitute deficient 
 
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performance.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (explaining that counsel’s 
performance is deficient only if ―the identified acts or omissions were outside the 
wide range of professionally competent assistance‖).  Therefore, counsel’s decision 
not to suppress the statements at issue does not constitute ineffective assistance and 
Johnston is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
F.  Failure to Inform Jury that Johnston was Medicated During Trial 
Johnston next argues that deficient performance occurred during the Coryell 
trial, when counsel did not instruct the jury that Johnston was on psychotropic 
medications at the time of his testimony and confession at trial.   The Coryell trial 
was an entirely separate proceeding from the Nugent case under review here, 
involving a different crime and a different jury.  Therefore, Johnston’s allegations 
of deficient performance are irrelevant to the trial under review, and he is not 
entitled to relief. 
Additionally, the defense’s failure to inform the Nugent guilt phase jury of 
the various medications that Johnston was taking during the Coryell trial and their 
side effects was not deficient performance.  As the transcript from the evidentiary 
hearing reflects, Littman had no reason to believe that Johnston was ―out of his 
mind on drugs‖ when he testified in the Coryell trial.  Furthermore, because the 
defense strategically chose to offer Johnston’s confession during the Coryell 
penalty phase in hopes of obtaining a life sentence, it would be duplicitous for 
 
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defense counsel to turn around and attack that confession as unknowing or 
defective.  Therefore, the trial court correctly rejected this claim.  
G.  Failure to Object to Erroneous Jury Instructions 
 
Johnston next claims he is entitled to relief for counsel’s failure to object to 
a verbal jury instruction containing a one-word misstatement.  We disagree.  
Johnston’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge to the 
jury instructions is without merit because Johnston cannot establish prejudice.  
Even assuming it was deficient for counsel to fail to object, there is no reasonable 
probability that the jury would have voted instead for a life sentence.  Although the 
verbal instructions given to the jury contained one wrong word, Johnston has not 
established that the single word could have misled the jury into believing in an 
incorrect standard for proving the mitigating circumstances.  The word was part of 
a statement by the judge that ―a mitigating circumstance may not be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  If you are reasonably convinced that a mitigating circumstance 
exists, you may consider it as established.‖  This misstatement was made while the 
judge read the jury instructions aloud, but the jury was later provided with a correct 
written copy of the instruction on mitigation, which stated that ―a mitigating 
circumstance need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  If you are reasonably 
convinced that a mitigating circumstance exists, you may consider it as 
established.‖  Thus, the written instructions, which the jury took into the 
 
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deliberation room while reaching a verdict, were completely correct.  Therefore, 
there is no reasonable probability that any error in the verbal instructions could 
have encouraged the jury to vote for death.  Accordingly, there is no reasonable 
probability that any alleged deficient performance in counsel’s failure to object 
undermines confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase, and Johnston is not 
entitled to relief. 
H.  Trial Court’s Summary Denial of Several Claims 
Johnston also argues that the lower court erred in refusing to grant an 
evidentiary hearing on several postconviction claims that required factual 
determination.  We disagree. 
The lower court correctly concluded that Johnston was not entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on various ineffective assistance claims he raised in his 
postconviction motion below,8 because his allegations were facially insufficient.  
                                          
 
8.   Johnston challenges the summary denial of the following claims:  (1) 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move for a change of venue, (2) 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to the State’s improper use of 
a ―golden rule‖ argument, (3) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object 
to the State’s improper burden shifting during closing argument, (4) ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failure to have fingerprint testimony read back to the jury, 
(5) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to jury instructions that 
shifted the burden to Johnston during the penalty phase, and (6) ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failure to argue there was a break in the chain of custody 
of fingerprint evidence.  Johnston concedes that the following claims were not 
suitable for an evidentiary hearing but wishes to preserve them for federal review, 
pursuant to this Court’s instruction in Sireci v. State, 773 So. 2d 34, 41 n.14 (Fla. 
2000):  (1) Johnston’s judgment and death sentence must be vacated in light of 
 
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―A hearing is warranted on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim only where a 
defendant alleges specific facts, not conclusively rebutted by the record, which 
demonstrate a deficiency in counsel’s performance that prejudiced the defendant.‖  
Pagan v. State, 29 So. 3d 938, 955 (Fla. 2009).  Because Johnston presented only 
bare conclusory allegations on these several issues, he was not entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on the claims.  Therefore, the lower court did not err in 
summarily denying these legally insufficient claims, and Johnston is not entitled to 
relief.  See Hannon v. State, 941 So. 2d 1109, 1138 (Fla. 2006). 
I.  Failure to Challenge the Reliability of Fingerprint Evidence 
 
Johnston next alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the 
reliability of fingerprint evidence introduced at trial.  Johnston asserts that counsel 
should have (1) called an expert witness to testify that fingerprinting is unreliable 
science and (2) objected to a question posed to the State’s fingerprint expert.  We 
disagree. 
Johnston specifically argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
consult and present an expert, namely Dr. Simon Cole, to rebut the State’s forensic 
fingerprint evidence.  The trial court denied this subclaim after reviewing Dr. 
Cole’s proffered testimony and finding that the testimony would not have been 
                                                                                                                                        
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); (2) execution by lethal injection is cruel and 
unusual punishment; and (3) counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury 
instruction and present mitigating evidence regarding Johnston’s parole eligibility, 
pursuant to Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994).   
 
- 19 - 
admissible.  See Owen v. State, 986 So. 2d 534, 546 (Fla. 2008) (―Trial counsel 
cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to present inadmissible evidence.‖).  The 
trial court relied on State v. Armstrong, 920 So. 2d 769, 770 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), 
in which the Third District Court of Appeal specifically found inadmissible Dr. 
Cole’s testimony in an unrelated case.9  As in the Third District’s case, Dr. Cole’s 
opinion as to the reliability of fingerprint evidence had no connection to the latent 
fingerprints analyzed in this case and was not based on relevant facts.  The trial 
                                          
 
9.  In Armstrong, 920 So. 2d at 770, the Third District explained that Dr. 
Cole’s proffered testimony was not probative and was therefore inadmissible: 
 
We quash the order permitting Dr. Cole to testify because his 
―informed hypothesis‖ is irrelevant to any material issue.  See Fla. 
Stat. § 90.702 (an expert’s opinion ―is admissible only if it can be 
applied to the evidence at trial‖); Stano v. State, 473 So. 2d 1282, 
1285 (Fla. 1985) (―To be relevant, and, therefore, admissible, 
evidence must prove or tend to prove a fact in issue.‖).  While Dr. 
Cole has raised a general concern about the use of latent fingerprint 
identification analysis in courts across the United States, he has not 
related that concern to the fingerprint identification made in this case.  
Dr. Cole concededly has no formal training in latent fingerprint 
identification analysis; he did not examine the latent fingerprints taken 
from the crime scene in this case; he does not question the latent 
fingerprint analysis actually performed in this case; and he has no 
opinion about the standards or methods used by the fingerprint 
examiner in this particular case.  Dr. Cole’s testimony will, therefore, 
be no more than a general critique of the predicate underlying 
fingerprinting as a method of identification.  His testimony will not be 
probative as to whether the latent prints lifted from the scene match 
Armstrong’s fingerprints, that is, his testimony will not be probative 
of Armstrong’s guilt or innocence.  Consequently, his testimony is not 
admissible. 
 
  
 
- 20 - 
court was therefore correct in determining that the proffered testimony would have 
been inadmissible and that counsel was not deficient for failing to present it.   
Additionally, the trial court did not err in concluding that counsel’s failure to 
object to a particular question regarding fingerprint evidence did not constitute 
ineffective assistance.  Johnston claims defense counsel should have objected to a 
question by the State on redirect on the basis that it addressed lay knowledge not 
proper for expert testimony.  To the contrary, the State’s question clarified 
information the defense elicited from expert Jones on cross-examination and 
properly sought expert opinion about the effect of fingerprint overlays on the 
ability to do a comparison analysis on a given fingerprint—not something that is 
within common lay knowledge.  Therefore, Johnston has not shown that there was 
any basis for an objection by the defense, and Johnston has not established any 
probability that the trial court would have sustained such an objection.  And 
because trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless 
challenge, Johnston did not satisfy his burden to demonstrate deficient 
performance under Strickland.  See Heath v. State, 3 So. 3d 1017, 1033 (Fla. 
2009).  Accordingly, the trial court correctly rejected this claim.  
 
 
III.  JOHNSTON’S HABEAS CLAIMS 
 
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Johnston also filed a petition for habeas corpus raising five issues.  As 
explained below, because all of Johnston’s claims are either without merit or 
procedurally barred, we hold that Johnston is not entitled to relief. 
A.  Challenge to Death Sentence Based on Johnston’s Mental Status 
 
Johnston first claims that his mental disorders constitutionally bar 
imposition of the death penalty.  Citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), 
and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), Johnston seeks relief based on his 
mental status.  Because Johnston’s claim is both procedurally barred and without 
merit, we deny relief. 
 
This Court has repeatedly held that there is no per se bar to imposing the 
death penalty on individuals with mental illness.  See, e.g., Nixon v. State, 2 So. 3d 
137, 146 (Fla. 2009); Lawrence v. State, 969 So. 2d 294, 300 n. 9 (Fla. 2007).  
Specifically, this Court has recently considered and rejected the precise arguments 
that Johnston raises here regarding the evolving standards of decency in death 
penalty jurisprudence.  See Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d 11, 26-27 (Fla. 2010) 
(denying David Eugene Johnston’s claim, based on the reasoning in Atkins and 
Roper, that mental illness is a bar to execution), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 459 (2010). 
And this Court has made clear that we ―find no reason to depart from these 
precedents.‖  Id. at 27.  Accordingly, we hold that Johnston is not entitled to relief 
on this claim. 
 
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B.  Duplicate Claims 
 
Johnston raises four additional claims in habeas that are procedurally barred 
because they are mere duplications of issues raised in his instant postconviction 
motion:  (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to the verbal jury 
instructions, (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to challenge the 
fingerprint evidence, (3) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move to 
suppress Johnston’s statements to law enforcement,10 and (4) trial court error in 
admitting the Williams rule evidence of the Coryell murder.  A habeas petition 
may not be used to litigate issues that have already been raised in a postconviction 
motion.  See McDonald v. State, 952 So. 2d 484, 498 (Fla. 2006).  Therefore, 
Johnston’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Johnston’s 
rule 3.851 motion, and we deny his habeas petition.   
 
It is so ordered. 
 
                                          
 
10.  To the extent that Johnston challenges the admission of his statements to 
law enforcement directly, rather than as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
that claim is procedurally barred because Johnston did not raise it on direct appeal.  
A habeas petition may not be used as a vehicle to address issues that could have 
been raised on direct appeal.  Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1115 (Fla. 2008). 
 
 
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CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County,  
Rex Martin Barbas, Judge – Case No. CR99-11338 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, David D. Hendry and James 
Lawrence Driscoll, Jr., Assistant CCR Counsel, Middle Region, Tampa, Florida 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Katherine V. 
Blanco, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent