Title: Liu v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 121, 2014
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 27, 2014

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TZE POONG LIU, 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 121, 2014 
 
Defendant-Below,  
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§  
Cr. A. No. 88001915DI  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff-Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
  
Submitted: October 22, 2014 
Decided: October 27, 2014 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, RIDGELY and VALIHURA, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 27th day of October 2014, after hearing oral argument and upon 
consideration of the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Appellant Tze Poong Liu argues that he should receive a new trial because 
the State allegedly violated its duty to disclose impeaching and possibly 
exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland.1  “A Brady violation occurs where 
the State fails to disclose material evidence that is favorable to the accused.”2  
“There are three components of a Brady violation: (1) evidence exists that is 
favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that 
                                                 
1 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 977 (Del. 2014). 
2 Wright, 91 A.3d at 977. 
2 
 
evidence is suppressed by the State; and (3) its suppression prejudices the 
defendant.”3   
(2) 
Here, Liu did not demonstrate two of the elements necessary for there to 
have been a Brady violation.  The supposedly suppressed evidence was a change in 
testimony by an important witness, William Chen, who was the husband, father, 
and son of the victims.  The State had learned about Chen’s change in testimony 
out of court after the second day of trial, a week before he was called to testify.  
Chen changed his story about his relationship with Vicky Chao, Liu’s alleged 
accomplice.  The State informed Liu of the change very soon thereafter.4  There is 
no evidence in the record to suggest any misconduct or unnecessary delay on the 
part of the State, which immediately informed Liu’s counsel of the change in 
testimony.  Liu’s counsel did not object, request a continuance, or do anything to 
suggest that this change would affect Liu negatively in any way.  Seemingly for the 
sake of disposing of this matter on the ground that there was no prejudice to Liu 
for any delayed disclosure, the Superior Court wrote that it would assume Liu 
                                                 
3 Id. at 988 (quoting Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005). 
4 The State learned of Chen’s change in testimony during an interview after the second day of 
trial on Tuesday, March 12, 1991.  There was no trial on Wednesday, Thursday, or Friday 
because Liu’s counsel was sick.  Direct examination of Chen began on Monday, March 18, 1991.  
On Tuesday, March 19, 1991, before the State began a line of questioning that involved Chen’s 
relationship with Chao, the State put on the record that it had learned of the change in testimony 
and had informed Liu’s counsel at some point during the intervening week.  App. to Answering 
Br. at 36. 
3 
 
could show suppression.5  But in our view, there was no delay, much less delay 
that would qualify as suppression under Brady.6  Thus, there was no Brady 
violation. 
(3) 
We also agree with the Superior Court that there was no prejudice to Liu.  
The trial was held over a lengthy period.7  Liu’s counsel had two months after 
learning of the change in Chen’s testimony before Liu’s own case began.  Not only 
that, the change in testimony was helpful to and consistent with Liu’s theory of the 
case.  The change in testimony established a fact helpful to Liu, while giving Liu’s 
counsel a basis to have the jury believe Chen was untrustworthy.  For these reasons 
and the reasons the Superior Court set forth in its decision of February 14, 2014,8 
Liu suffered no prejudice.  Thus, Liu has failed to establish two of the three Brady 
elements, and there is no merit to his appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
                                                 
5 State v. Liu, 2014 WL 605455, at *4-5 (Del. Super. Feb. 14, 2014). 
6 See Rose v. State, 542 A.2d 1196, 1199 (Del. 1988) (holding a delay in disclosure does not 
amount to suppression unless the delay somehow prejudiced defendant); see also Leka v. 
Portundo, 257 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding suppression where the prosecutor disclosed 
evidence three days before trial, despite knowing of it for over two years). 
7 Opening statements were on March 11, 1991, and closing arguments were on May 28, 1991. 
8 Liu, 2014 WL 605455.