Title: Tattis v. Karthans
Citation: 215 So. 2d 685
Docket Number: 45046
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: November 18, 1968

215 So. 2d 685 (1968) Ellen Anthony TATTIS v. N.A. (Nick) KARTHANS and Alec Dennery. No. 45046. Supreme Court of Mississippi. November 18, 1968. Bernard W.N. Chill, Jackson, for appellant. Dan M. Lee, Ray, Lee &amp; Moore, Jackson, for appellees. JONES, Justice. This is a case filed in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, seeking to recover damages under the provisions of our "Actionable Word Statute." A demurrer to the declaration, on the ground "That the alleged statements contained in the amended declaration are not actionable under Section 1059 of the Mississippi Code of 1942, as amended," was sustained by the lower court and the case was brought here. The first part of Section 1059 reads as follows: The declaration charged "That at or about midnight between October 15th and *686 16th, 1966, at Charlotte, North Carolina, defendant in the presence of a number of persons [* * * including among others, the appellee, Alec Dennery * * *] maliciously and with the intent to cause it to be believed that this plaintiff was an immoral and unfit person who used filthy and unbecoming language * * *" spoke certain words, and that the defendant Dennery thereafter published the said words by repeating to various persons what his co-defendant had said. Although the declaration did not contain certain provisions of the statute above quoted, it was charged by the plaintiff that the action was brought under said statute; and it was so treated by the defendant and the court below. The lower court held a demurrer good, finding that the words were not actionable under said section. Though the demurrer was filed as a special demurrer, we are treating it as a general demurrer and considering whether under the law said words, with the allegations of the declaration, are actionable under the Mississippi statute. The statute itself provides that no demurrer shall be interposed to prevent the jury from passing upon the question as to whether said words are within the statute. The purpose of this statute and the reason for not permitting the court to construe the said words are stated in the case of Barger v. Hood, 87 W. Va. 78, 81, 82, 104 S.E. 280, 282 (1920), as follows: *687 In actions brought under this statute, the court has the power to pass on a demurrer where the demurrer is not based upon a construction of the words but on some other ground evidenced by the declaration. In Verner v. Verner, 64 Miss. 321, 1 So. 479 (1886), the declaration showed the defendant was a witness in a judicial proceeding and a demurrer was sustained on the ground of the immunity of a witness in a judicial proceeding from liability to such an action. In Dedeaux v. King, 92 Miss. 38, 45 So. 466 (1907), the declaration stated the defendant was an election manager and that the words were spoken in the discharge of his duties. A demurrer was there sustained not on the construction of the words but because, in view of the defendant's official position, the declaration was fatally defective when it failed to charge malice; to negative the truth of the words spoken; or to show the words were not said in good faith. It was unnecessary in either of these cases to construe the words. In Davis v. Woods, 95 Miss. 432, 437-438, 48 So. 961 (1909), this Court reversed a case where a demurrer to the declaration had been sustained, saying: In Hodges v. Cunningham, 160 Miss. 576, 581, 135 So. 215, 217 (1931), the Court again held that: The cases on which the appellees' rely are such as Cooper v. Davidson, 172 Miss. 74, 157 So. 418 (1935). This was a case where all of the evidence had been taken and it appeared, without doubt, that the words were spoken in a business deal and thus, under the evidence showing the surrounding *688 circumstances, the words could not be considered actionable. In that case, the Court said: It was further held that the statute did not abolish the rule of privilege; and, when it was apparent that this privilege had not been exceeded, the court should say so. The Court held that the appellant's request for a directed verdict, after the evidence, should have been sustained. In Salvo v. Edens, 237 Miss. 734, 743-744, 116 So. 2d 220, 223-224 (1959), a dentist had written a letter concerning a past due account. The testimony was all taken in this case, and the Court said: Although not presented by the briefs, the question arises as to whether our actionable word statute has any extraterritorial effect so as to create a cause of action for words spoken in North Carolina. The declaration charges affirmatively that the original words were spoken in the state of North Carolina. It then charges that the co-defendant repeated the words, but it is not shown whether the co-defendant repeated said words in Mississippi, North Carolina or where. The declaration therefore squarely presents on its face the question as to whether said statute does affect, or apply to, words spoken in North Carolina or outside this State. It is not shown that North Carolina has a statute similar to our Section 1059. As shown by all of the authorities, this type of statute, in those states that have same, was enacted in the hope of preventing duelling and violence. The general rule as to the extraterritorial effect of a statute is stated in 50 Am.Jur. Statutes sections 485 and 487. Section 485. Section 487. This statute, Section 1059, indicates no legislative intention that it shall operate beyond the borders of the state, but is designed to maintain peace within the state. The specific question under consideration was decided by the Virginia Court in Davis v. Heflin, 130 Va. 169, 107 S.E. 673 (1921). A letter written by the appellant in Virginia addressed to a third party in Washington, D.C., contained defamatory statements. It was opened in the office of the third party by another person and a copy sent to the appellee in Virginia. The declaration contained three counts; one for common-law libel, and two for insulting words under the Virginia statute on actionable words. Appellant contended that the evidence showed publication only in Washington, D.C., and not in Virginia, and there being no proof of a statute in the District of Columbia similar to the Virginia statute, there could not be a recovery in this case under the Virginia statute. The Court in passing upon this contention said: 130 Va. at 172, 107 S.E. at 674. The rule is generally stated in 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 4(11), pages 406, 407, and 408. Further, from the same authority: In this case the declaration specifically charges that the original statements were made in the state of North Carolina, but it does not say where the republication of said statements were made. Allegations of the declaration are taken most strongly against the pleader, and we must proceed on the idea that the republication was not in the State of Mississippi, and on the fact that a declaration to withstand a demurrer must state a cause of action. Certainly it was the obligation of the pleader to show that the republication was in Mississippi, but he does not. Under the above authorities, it is essential to the maintenance of this action that the State of North Carolina have an actionable word statute, at least similar to ours. In order to prove same it should be pled, if it exists. Consideration has been given to the case of Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509, 510 *691 (Miss. 1968). In that case, there was an automobile collision in Louisiana, in which residents of Mississippi were killed and all parties to the collision were residents and citizens of this State, and this Court held: There was involved in Mitchell a transitory common-law action based on negligence. Unquestionably an action under Louisiana law arose from what occurred. In the instant case no action arose in North Carolina under the law of that State, and we cannot create by statute a cause of action for another state. In the absence of a showing of a similar North Carolina statute, no cause of action was created by the words there spoken; in the absence of a cause of action, how can there be a choice-of-law or conflict-of-law problem? Further, our Legislature in adoping section 1059 was interested and empowered to act in reducing crime, preventing violence, and maintaining peace within its own borders, and not within other states, recognizing that such matters were within the province and power of each state. The case is affirmed. Affirmed. ETHRIDGE, C.J., and BRADY, INZER, and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur.