Title: Alvin Leroy Morton v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC06-2091
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: November 20, 2008

Supreme Court of Florida 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-2091 
____________ 
 
ALVIN LEROY MORTON,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-1201 
____________ 
 
ALVIN LEROY MORTON,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
WALTER A. MCNEIL, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[August 28, 2008] 
CORRECTED OPINION 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Alvin LeRoy Morton appeals an order of the circuit court denying his 
motion to vacate his sentences of death1 filed under Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons set forth below, 
we affirm the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief and deny the petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Court set forth the facts of this case in its direct appeal opinion as 
follows:  
In the late evening of January 26 or early morning of January 
27, 1992, appellant Alvin LeRoy Morton, accompanied by Bobby 
Garner and Tim Kane, forcibly entered the home of John Bowers and 
his mother Madeline Weisser.  Two other individuals, Chris Walker 
and Mike Rodkey, went with them to the house but did not enter. 
Morton carried a shotgun and one of the others possessed a “Rambo” 
style knife.  They began looking around the living room for something 
to take when Bowers and Weisser entered the room from another area 
of the house.  Morton ordered the two of them to get down on the 
floor, and they complied.  Bowers agreed to give them whatever they 
wanted and pleaded for his life but Morton replied that Bowers would 
call the cops.  When Bowers insisted that he would not, Morton 
retorted, “That’s what they all say,” and shot Bowers in the back of 
the neck, killing him.  Morton also attempted to shoot Weisser, but the 
gun jammed.  He then tried to stab her, but when the knife would not 
penetrate, Garner stepped on the knife and pushed it in.  Weisser 
ultimately was stabbed eight times in the back of the neck and her 
spinal cord was severed.  Before leaving the scene, either Garner or 
Morton cut off one of Bowers’ pinky fingers.  They later showed it to 
their friend Jeff Madden. 
                                          
 
 
1.  Morton’s motion also requested that the court vacate his convictions of 
first-degree murder but he has only appealed those issues relating to his sentencing. 
 
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Acting on a tip, police and firefighters went to the victims’ 
residence, where the mattresses had been set on fire, and discovered 
the bodies.  Morton was later found hiding in the attic of his home. 
The murder weapons were discovered underneath Garner’s mother’s 
trailer.  Morton later confessed to shooting Bowers and helping make 
the first cut on Weisser. 
Morton was convicted on both counts of first-degree 
premeditated murder.  The jury recommended death on both counts by 
a vote of 11-1. 
 
Morton v. State, 689 So. 2d 259, 260-61 (Fla. 1997).   On direct appeal, this Court 
affirmed the convictions but reversed the sentences, finding error in the fact that 
the State repeatedly introduced the out-of-court statements of its own witnesses 
during the penalty phase in order to impeach them with prior inconsistent 
statements.  Id. at 261, 264-65.  Based on this impermissible use of impeachment, 
the Court remanded to the trial court for a new penalty phase proceeding.  Id. at 
265.   
 
At resentencing, the jury again recommended the death penalty by an 
eleven-to-one vote on each murder.  The trial court, agreeing that the aggravators 
outweighed the mitigators, sentenced Morton to death.2   
                                          
 
 
2.  In sentencing Morton to death, the court found several aggravating 
factors for each murder.  As to the murder of Bowers, the court found: (1) the 
crime was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP); (2) the crime was committed 
during the commission of, or an attempt to commit, a robbery or burglary or both; 
and (3) the crime was committed for the dominant purpose of avoiding or 
preventing a lawful arrest.  As to the murder of Weisser, the court found: (1) the 
crime was heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); (2) Morton had committed a prior 
capital felony, i.e., the murder of Bowers; (3) the crime was CCP; (4) the crime 
was committed during the commission of, or an attempt to commit, a robbery or 
 
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Morton filed his second direct appeal, raising four claims.3  Morton v. State, 
789 So. 2d 324, 329 (Fla. 2001).  Finding that Morton’s claims were procedurally 
barred, amounted to harmless error, or were meritless, this Court affirmed the 
sentences of death.  Id. at 329-35.   
 
Morton then filed a motion for postconviction relief in June 2002.  In the 
3.851 motion, Morton alleged seven claims.4  Following a Huff5 hearing, the trial 
                                                                                                                                        
burglary or both; and (5) the crime was committed for the dominant purpose of 
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest.  Each factor was given great weight for both 
murders.  In mitigation, the court found the following statutory mitigators: (1) 
Morton’s age (little weight); and (2) Morton’s lack of significant history of prior 
criminal activity (some weight).  In nonstatutory mitigation, the court found: (1) 
Morton was the product of a dysfunctional family (little weight); (2) Morton had 
little physical contact with his mother during the first four weeks of his life (little 
weight); (3) Morton’s family moved frequently, disrupting any stable home and 
social life (little weight); (4) Morton was physically and mentally abused by his 
alcoholic father until he was eight years old (little weight); and (5) Morton 
voluntarily confessed and cooperated with law enforcement (little weight).  Morton 
v. State, 789 So. 2d 324, 328-29 (Fla. 2001). 
 
3.  Morton asserted that (1) the prosecutor made several improper comments 
during penalty-phase closing arguments that entitled Morton to a new penalty 
phase; (2) the trial court failed to find, consider, and weigh mitigating evidence 
that Morton suffered from antisocial personality disorder; (3) the trial court did not 
properly weigh the mitigating circumstances of Morton’s age and history as an 
abused child; and (4) the resentencing judge erred by adopting the original 
sentencing judge’s findings of fact regarding the aggravating and mitigating 
factors.  Id. at 329. 
 
4.  Morton alleged as follows: (1) he was deprived of a reliable adversarial 
testing due to ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt and penalty phases; (2) 
he was deprived of his right to develop mitigating factors because the court-
appointed psychiatrist failed to conduct appropriate tests for organic brain damage 
and mental illness; (3) the State violated the constitutional requirements under 
 
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court conducted evidentiary hearings on this initial motion between October 2003 
and January 2004.  Subsequently, in May 2005, Morton filed an amended motion 
for postconviction relief, incorporating the contents of the initial motion into his 
amended motion.6  The trial court ultimately denied relief on all of Morton’s 
                                                                                                                                        
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny, and such actions and 
omissions by the State rendered defense counsel ineffective and prevented a full 
adversarial testing of the evidence; (4) the Florida death sentencing statute as 
applied is unconstitutional under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution; (5) section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes, is facially vague 
and overbroad and its unconstitutionality was not cured, his death sentence is 
premised on fundamental error, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
litigate these issues; (6) the rules prohibiting Morton’s counsel from interviewing 
jurors to determine if constitutional error was present violates the state and federal 
constitutions and denies Morton adequate assistance of counsel; and (7) 
cumulatively, the combination of errors deprived Morton of a fundamentally fair 
trial and appellate counsel failed to effectively litigate these claims on appeal.   
5.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
6.  The amended motion raised two additional claims: (1) newly discovered 
mitigating evidence proves that Morton’s brain was not fully developed, which 
would have resulted in a sentence less than death; and (2) the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), renders Morton’s 
death sentence unconstitutional.   
 
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claims.  Morton raises three issues for this Court’s review7 and also petitions this 
Court for a writ of habeas corpus, raising three claims for relief.8    
ANALYSIS 
3.851 MOTION 
I.  Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 
Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court has held that for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied.  
First, the defendant must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient.  Bell 
v. State, 965 So. 2d 48, 56 (Fla. 2007) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  
Second, the defendant must establish that counsel’s deficient performance 
prejudiced the defendant.  Id.   
                                          
 
 
7.  These issues are (1) whether the trial court erred in rejecting Morton’s 
claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the penalty phase of 
his trial; (2) whether the trial court erred in declining to take judicial notice of the 
ABA guidelines regarding capital defense counsel and erred in its rulings on expert 
witness testimony; and (3) whether the trial court erred in summarily denying 
Morton’s newly discovered evidence claim based upon Roper.   
 
8.  Morton asserts that (1) appellate counsel failed to raise several 
meritorious claims which warrant reversal of his convictions and sentences; (2) his 
death sentence violates his federal constitutional rights because he did not have a 
constitutional jury verdict on each element of the capital offense; and (3) his 
Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment will be violated as 
he may be incompetent at the time of execution. 
 
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To establish the deficiency prong under Strickland, the defendant must prove 
that counsel’s performance was unreasonable under “prevailing professional 
norms.”  Morris v. State, 931 So. 2d 821, 828 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 688).  To establish the prejudice prong under Strickland, the defendant 
must prove that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”  Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).   
Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law 
and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit 
court’s factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but 
reviewing the circuit court’s legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 
So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004).   
A.  Background Investigation 
 
In his first issue on appeal, Morton alleges that the trial court erred in 
rejecting his claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in (1) failing to 
conduct a sufficient investigation into Morton’s background; (2) failing to 
investigate and present evidence of neglect and abuse; (3) failing to investigate and 
present evidence of sexual abuse; and (4) failing to investigate and present 
evidence of poverty, neglect, and family dysfunction.  Specifically, Morton alleges 
 
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that reasonably competent counsel would have conducted further investigation 
after reviewing the sentencing order from the initial trial in order to counter the 
little weight given to the majority of Morton’s mitigating factors and to improve 
the mitigation presentation upon resentencing.  Morton contends that counsel could 
have discovered records that labeled Morton’s father as “sexually deviant,” 
information that Morton’s family had been repeatedly evicted and had filed for 
bankruptcy, and information that Morton did not have a close relationship with his 
stepfather. 
The trial court denied the claim, concluding that neither deficiency nor 
prejudice had been established.  Specifically, the court stated that the jury had 
heard testimony about the physical abuse suffered by Morton and thus counsel’s 
failure to present cumulative evidence regarding the abuse was not ineffective.  
Further, the court found that evidence of any sexual abuse was “limited and 
unclear” and therefore failure to present such an argument did not “fall below the 
level of reasonably competent representation.”  Moreover, the court noted that 
counsel did not err in failing to present evidence of the alleged alcoholism, 
posttraumatic stress disorder, deafness, or the criminal offense of Morton’s 
stepfather, Lester Stacy, which occurred years before Morton’s birth, because 
Morton did not demonstrate that these disorders or acts adversely affected or had 
any relevance to his childhood home environment.  Finally, the court found that 
 
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counsel’s failure to introduce evidence of the family’s bankruptcy and to dispute 
the portrayal that Morton had a loving home environment after Morton’s mother 
divorced Morton’s abusive father did not establish ineffective assistance.  In 
comparing the testimony presented at the penalty phases and evidentiary hearing, 
we agree with the trial court’s findings and conclude that the court did not err in 
rejecting Morton’s background investigation and mitigation claim.  Our review of 
the facts of this case reveal that Morton has failed to establish either prong of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland and its progeny.    
At the first penalty phase, counsel presented the testimony of eight 
witnesses, all of whom testified as to the abuse Morton suffered as a child and his 
family’s poor background.9  Based on this compelling testimony, the trial court 
                                          
 
 
9.  Six of the witnesses were Morton’s family members.  Morton’s aunts, 
Kathy Dufoe, Paula Trepp, Patricia Boutwell, and Jeannette Baker, testified that 
Morton’s father, Virgil, was a cruel alcoholic who physically and emotionally 
abused him.  Their testimony also indicated that Virgil had criminal convictions for 
manslaughter and arson.  Barbara Stacy, Morton’s mother, testified that Morton 
had poor health at birth and that Virgil was a heavy drinker who “abused 
everybody that was around him.”  He also bragged about how he had killed before 
and would kill anyone in the family if Barbara left him.  Angela Morton, Morton’s 
sister, testified that Virgil sexually molested her and physically abused her, 
Barbara, and Morton.  Additionally, Wilhelmina (Mimi) Pisters, a social worker, 
testified that Morton’s “personality makeup” was a direct result of the abusive 
environment in which he grew up, the lack of parenting skills from his mother, and 
the lack of stability as a child.  Finally, Dr. Donald DelBeato, a clinical and 
forensic psychologist who evaluated Morton, testified that his family was 
dysfunctional and that his personality defects were derived from his background 
and genetic pool.  Ultimately, Dr. DelBeato diagnosed Morton with mixed 
personality disorder with passive aggressive dependence and antisocial traits.  
 
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found as nonstatutory mitigation Morton’s family background and physical and 
mental abuse.  Upon resentencing, except for one witness, counsel chose to present 
essentially the same mitigation testimony.10  The trial court again found Morton’s 
family upbringing and abuse as nonstatutory mitigation.   
At the evidentiary hearing, Gary Urso, Morton’s counsel for both penalty 
phases, testified that he reviewed witness depositions and police reports in order to 
familiarize himself with the guilt phase.  He also testified that the theory of the 
case was the “unattached, unbonded child” and that Morton’s dysfunctional 
personality was a result of his family background and genetic traits.  In support of 
this theory, Urso spoke with Morton’s mother about his problems at birth and 
Morton’s sister about their family life when they were growing up.  He then 
retained Mimi Pisters, who also talked to Morton’s mother and sister and had 
experience in working with unbonded, unattached children.  In consideration of 
Morton’s birth and family upbringing, Urso researched case law and read several 
books, specifically on the subject of the unattached, unbonded child.  Further, Urso 
testified that he obtained Morton’s school records for review and was aware of 
Morton’s juvenile criminal record and his abusive activities with animals.  In 
addition, Urso recalled reviewing the Department of Corrections’ records on 
                                          
 
 
10.  Jeanette Baker, Morton’s aunt, did not testify at the resentencing. 
 
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Morton’s father.  Finally, Urso hired a private investigator, Paul Krisanda, to 
investigate the allegations of sexual abuse.11      
In our analysis of whether counsel conducted a reasonable investigation, we 
recognize that “the obligation to investigate and prepare for the penalty portion of a 
capital case cannot be overstated.”  State v. Lewis, 838 So. 2d 1102, 1113 (Fla. 
2002).   However, we conclude here that counsel’s investigation into Morton’s 
background was not deficient and accordingly deny relief as to this allegation in 
Morton’s claim. 
Regarding the failure to present evidence of physical abuse, neglect, and 
continued contact with a sadistic father, Morton presented testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing from Claudia Baker, who was hired to perform a social history 
investigation on Morton.  Although Ms. Baker reviewed a vast amount of 
documents and performed an extensive investigation into Morton’s background, 
her testimony did not largely differ from the evidence presented at the penalty 
phases.  Ms. Baker testified that Morton suffered physical abuse and that his family 
had a history of mental illness, alcoholism, and abuse.  She further testified that 
Virgil Morton had a manslaughter conviction and that the Department of 
                                          
 
 
11.  Although Urso testified that he could not remember whether he hired 
Krisanda to investigate the allegations of sexual abuse, Urso testified without 
objection that Krisanda confirmed to him that he was hired for that very purpose, 
among other things. 
 
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Corrections had labeled him “sexually deviant.”  She also testified that Morton’s 
stepfather12 did not take much interest in him and that his mother did not have 
much interaction with him.  In essence, the sum of her testimony was that Morton 
was abused and neglected.   
However, substantially similar evidence was presented at both penalty 
phases via the testimony of Morton’s family members.  Although Morton’s contact 
with his father after the divorce was not disclosed at the trials, the evidentiary 
hearing testimony also did not indicate that any physical abuse occurred during 
these later meetings between Morton and his father.   Because Baker’s testimony 
mirrored what was presented at the penalty phase, it was merely cumulative to the 
evidence presented concerning the physical abuse and Morton has failed to 
demonstrate that counsel was deficient on this basis.13 
Morton also asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and 
present evidence of sexual abuse.  When asked about his failure to present 
evidence of sexual abuse, Urso explained that he did not think he could advance a 
position that he did not believe to be true and the client denied being true.  Thus, 
                                          
 
 
12.  Morton’s mother divorced Virgil when Morton was eight years old.  She 
married Lester Stacy about five years later.  Morton’s contact with Virgil was 
minimal after the divorce.     
 
13.  Jerry Baker, Morton’s uncle, also testified at the hearing, stating that 
Virgil once threw Morton into a river before he was able to swim.  This testimony 
is also cumulative as it merely relates to the extent of the abuse Morton suffered.   
 
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the decision made was not to ignore or fail to present sexual abuse, but rather not 
to present evidence that was questionable at best.  In further testimony, Urso stated 
that neither Morton’s mother nor his sister could confirm that Morton had been 
sexually abused by the father, Virgil.14  Likewise, guilt-phase co-counsel John 
Swisher stated that, although Morton denied being physically and sexually abused, 
Angela confirmed that Morton suffered physical abuse but again was unsure of 
whether Morton was sexually abused.  At the evidentiary hearing, counsel also 
presented the testimony of Morton’s aunt, Robin Johnson, who said that she 
observed Virgil touching Morton in an inappropriate manner; however, this 
testimony contradicted statements in her deposition that she had never seen Morton 
being sexually abused by his father.  Thus, we conclude that counsel in the instant 
case was not deficient in failing to present evidence of this abuse, particularly 
when the victim of the alleged abuse denied that he was ever assaulted.15 
Additionally, Morton contends that counsel was ineffective in failing to 
present evidence of his poor upbringing and dysfunctional family life, even after 
                                          
 
 
14.  On the other hand, both Angela Morton and Barbara Stacy were able to   
confirm that Virgil had sexually abused Angela.  Evidence of Angela Morton’s 
abuse was presented to the jury during Morton’s second penalty phase.   
 
15.  As we noted previously, Morton also denied being physically abused by 
his father, but counsel presented evidence of such abuse anyway because there was 
sufficient corroborating testimony from other witnesses.   
 
 
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his mother remarried.  Morton emphasizes that Lester, his stepfather, did not get 
close to people, partly because of his record of aggravated assault with intent to kill 
while in the military.  However, Morton does not demonstrate how this incident, 
which occurred years before Morton was born, affected his home life.  There was 
no testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing that his stepfather physically 
abused him and Morton makes no such allegation now.  In fact, the State brought 
out during cross-examination at the penalty phase that both Kathy Dufoe and Paula 
Trepp, Morton’s aunts, thought Lester was a “good” stepfather to Morton.  The 
strongest evidence Morton presents is that his stepfather was “stand-offish” and 
had hardly any interaction with Morton.  Failure to present such weak mitigation 
does not render counsel ineffective.   
Likewise, the persuasiveness of Morton’s assertion that he was raised in 
poverty and that the family suffered severe financial difficulties is severely 
weakened by testimony from his mother that he received a car, television, and 
video games from his mother and stepfather.  Although the evidentiary hearing 
testimony indicates that much of what Morton received were second-hand items, it 
is difficult to determine that presenting evidence of the family’s financial 
circumstances would have added to the mitigation considered by the court where 
evidence of these gifts was elicited on cross-examination.  Although Morton’s life 
after the age of eight was far from indulgent, it also does not qualify as the 
 
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“dysfunctional” and poverty-stricken existence that counsel would have been 
deficient in failing to present in this case.  Similarly, counsel’s failure to present 
evidence that Morton’s stepfather had filed for bankruptcy and that the family had 
moved several times would not be sufficient to establish ineffective assistance.  
Accordingly, we conclude that no deficiency has been established. 
 Yet, even if Morton demonstrates that counsel was deficient, he must still 
show that counsel’s deficiency caused prejudice to his defense.  See Jones v. State, 
949 So. 2d 1021, 1028 (Fla. 2006) (“[F]or an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim to be successful, the defendant must establish both deficient performance 
and prejudice . . . .”).  We find that he has failed to do so.  Evidence of the abuse 
and neglect, though more detailed at the evidentiary hearing, was merely 
cumulative to the evidence presented at the penalty phases.  Further, counsel’s 
failure to offer evidence of Morton’s poor upbringing and strained relationship 
with his stepfather does not undermine confidence in the outcome of the 
resentencing because it is not more compelling than the evidence of the physical 
abuse Morton suffered at the hands of his biological father, which was presented at 
the penalty phase.  Accordingly, we conclude that Morton has failed to establish 
prejudice under Strickland.  Because Morton has failed to demonstrate either 
deficiency or prejudice in counsel’s investigation and presentation of mitigation 
evidence, we find this claim meritless.   
 
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B.  Mental Health Mitigation 
 
In his next ineffective assistance claim, Morton asserts that counsel failed to 
present sufficient mental mitigation and attacks the mental health evaluation done 
by his expert as inadequate.  Specifically, Morton contends that the tests Dr. 
DelBeato used to screen for brain damage were inadequate and that the total time 
he spent on the case was insufficient to perform an adequate evaluation.  However, 
Morton’s claim that he received an inadequate evaluation is procedurally barred as 
it could have been raised on direct appeal.  See Cherry v. State, 781 So. 2d 1040, 
1047 (Fla. 2000). 
 
Even if Morton’s claim were not procedurally barred, we would still 
conclude that the claim is without merit.  This Court confronted a similar issue in 
Dufour v. State, 905 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2005).  In Dufour, the defendant alleged that 
his mental health examiner failed to perform an evaluation that would have 
revealed brain injury, mental illness, borderline to mentally retarded IQ, and sexual 
abuse.  Id. at 65-66.  This Court rejected the claim, noting that the mental health 
expert from the trial and the expert from the evidentiary hearing arrived at more or 
less the same conclusion regarding the defendant’s mental capabilities.  Id. at 66. 
 
Similarly, the diagnosis of Dr. DelBeato did not significantly differ from the 
diagnoses of the mental health professionals presented at the evidentiary hearing.  
At both penalty phases, Dr. DelBeato testified that Morton had mixed personality 
 
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disorder with antisocial tendencies.  Dr. Arturo Gonzalez, the State’s expert 
witness at both penalty phases, agreed with Dr. DelBeato’s diagnosis that Morton 
suffered from antisocial personality disorder.16  Even the two mental health 
professionals Morton presented at the evidentiary hearing, who arrived at different 
diagnoses,17 conceded that Morton exhibited antisocial traits and behaviors.  
Specifically, Dr. Silva testified that “some of [Morton’s] behavior loads into 
antisocial personality disorder and some of it is explained by the autism 
psychopathology.”  Moreover, when asked whether Morton met the constructs of 
antisocial personality disorder, he stated, “He comes close.  It’s one of those 
situations where it is close.  It’s one of those cases where it’s very close.”  This 
                                          
 
 
16.  Dr. Gonzalez conducted a clinical interview of Morton after the initial 
trial but relied on the testing performed by Dr. Robert Berland, one of Morton’s 
mental health evaluators for the evidentiary hearing, in his evidentiary hearing 
testimony that Morton did not suffer from brain damage.   
 
17.  Dr. Berland testified that Morton had a chronic psychotic disturbance 
even though he did not exhibit any external signs of being psychotic.  However, 
the reliability of this diagnosis is questionable as he stated, “While in some cases 
there may be some evidence of antisocial personality disorder, it’s not something 
that I develop in detail, because that’s not what I’ve been asked to do.”  He also 
agreed that he was unable to testify to a “reasonable medical degree of medical 
certainty that the statutory mitigators apply.”  He testified, “I’m not saying here 
and now that I can say or testify that [the statutory mitigators] exist.  I’m saying 
that there is evidence that raises that possibility.”  However, Dr. Berland did not 
have access to data to corroborate whether the mitigators existed.  Conversely, Dr. 
Jose Arturo Silva testified that Morton had Asperger’s syndrome and was brain 
damaged.  He concluded that there was evidence that Morton’s ability to conform 
his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired.  
 
- 17 -
Court has remanded for a new penalty phase “in cases which entail psychiatric 
examinations so grossly insufficient that they ignore clear indications of either 
mental retardation or organic brain damage.”  State v. Sireci, 502 So. 2d 1221, 
1224 (Fla. 1987).  However, the record here indicates that this is not such a case.   
 
Morton also alleges that counsel failed to provide pertinent background 
information to Dr. DelBeato or Mimi Pisters.  Specifically, Morton states that the 
“most significant breakdown in Alvin’s case was defense counsel’s failure to 
obtain Alvin’s birth records or tell the experts about Alvin’s birth.”  However, 
Urso testified that he was “sure” that he discussed the birth records and potential 
for brain damage with Mimi Pisters.  Moreover, although Urso did not recall what 
he told Dr. DelBeato about Morton’s birth, Dr. DelBeato testified that Urso asked 
him if he thought oxygen deprivation at birth was a significant factor.  Dr. 
DelBeato stated at the evidentiary hearing that based on Morton’s early childhood 
medical records, which detailed a normal, cephalic child, the anoxia did not cause 
any considerable brain damage.  Ultimately, he concluded, “There was nothing in 
the interview, in the testing or anything I’ve reviewed since that would suggest 
anything that would be significant as to organic brain damage.”  Because the 
record indicates that both Dr. DelBeato and Mimi Pisters were aware of the 
circumstances of Alvin’s birth, we reject this claim of deficient performance.      
 
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Further, Morton contends that counsel was ineffective by presenting 
damaging testimony from Dr. DelBeato that Morton suffered from antisocial 
personality disorder.  Morton cites to several cases where this Court has held that 
counsel made a reasonable decision in not presenting mental mitigation where the 
defendant was diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder.  See, e.g., Asay v. 
State, 769 So. 2d 974, 986 (Fla. 2000).  However, as this Court has stated in the 
past, “[t]he issue is not what present counsel or this Court might now view as the 
best strategy, but rather whether the strategy was within the broad range of 
discretion afforded to counsel actually responsible for the defense.”  Occhicone v. 
State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1049 (Fla. 2000). 
 As stated previously, Urso testified during the evidentiary hearing that the 
overriding theory of the case was that Morton “ended up with these personality 
problems as a result of his early environment.”  Co-counsel Swisher confirmed that 
the strategy for the penalty phase was to emphasize that the events leading up to 
the crime demonstrated that Morton should not be at fault for his actions.  Swisher 
testified, “It appeared that what led to Alvin’s condition is something that was a 
combination of his environment and genetic background . . . .”  Dr. DelBeato also 
testified that he “felt that the attachment and the dysfunctional family and things 
might be a consideration.”  Simply put, Dr. DelBeato agreed that his goal was to 
explain “how. . . Morton became the way he was . . . [a]nd how he could commit 
 
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that offense.”  Such a goal was consistent with Urso’s “product of his 
environment” theory for the presentation of mitigation in Morton’s case.  Based on 
the record and the evidence from the evidentiary hearing, it is apparent that counsel 
made a tactical decision to present Dr. DelBeato’s testimony.  Because counsel’s 
decision was based on reasonable strategy and did not result from a failure to 
investigate, we conclude that counsel’s performance was not deficient.18 
In addition, Morton has failed to demonstrate prejudice.  The trial court 
found substantial aggravation in the instant case.  As to the murder of Bowers and 
Weisser, the court found: (1) CCP; (2) the crime was committed during the 
commission of, or an attempt to commit, a robbery or burglary or both; and (3) the 
crime was committed for the dominant purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful 
arrest.  As to the murder of Weisser, the court found the additional aggravators of 
HAC and prior capital felony based on the murder of Bowers.  Each factor in both 
murders was given great weight.  This Court has previously stated that CCP and 
HAC are two of the weightiest aggravators in Florida’s statutory sentencing 
scheme.  Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999).  The trial court’s 
                                          
 
18.  We likewise reject Morton’s claim that his counsel was deficient in 
failing to present evidence that his codefendant, Robert Garner, received a life 
sentence.  We agree that the trial court properly rejected this claim because the 
record failed to establish that either codefendant, Robert Garner or Timothy Kane, 
was equally culpable.  Not only was Kane fourteen years old at the time of the 
crime, but it is clear from the record that Morton was the “ringleader” of the 
murders.  
 
- 20 -
sentencing order details the cold and cruel manner in which the murders were 
carried out.  Several days before the murder, Morton discussed with various people 
his intention of killing someone.  He proceeded to arm himself with a sawed-off 
shotgun and break into Bowers and Weisser’s home while being careful to conceal 
the gun in a towel, put the getaway bikes in a nearby bush, and wear gloves to 
avoid leaving fingerprints.  Morton then shot Bowers after he pleaded for his life 
and attempted to shoot Weisser.  However, when the gun jammed, he stabbed her 
in the neck with a Rambo-style knife; in total, Weisser was stabbed eight times.  
The stabbing was so brutal that it severed her spinal cord, which was deemed to be 
one of the causes of death.     
Based on the substantial aggravation, the additional mental mitigation would 
not undermine confidence in the outcome of the resentencing.  Therefore, we agree 
with the trial court’s finding that Morton has failed to establish prejudice.  As a 
result, we conclude that Morton’s ineffective assistance claims are without merit. 
II.  Miscellaneous Evidentiary Rulings 
Morton claims that the postconviction court abused its discretion in failing to 
take judicial notice of the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance 
of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, which he sought to introduce in order to 
demonstrate counsel’s deficient performance.  Specifically, Morton alleges that 
trial counsel failed to meet the minimum ABA guidelines.  The United States 
 
- 21 -
Supreme Court has referred to the ABA standards as “guides to determining what 
is reasonable.”  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (quoting Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 688).  However, Strickland explains:  
In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance 
inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable 
considering all the circumstances.  Prevailing norms of practice as 
reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like, e.g., 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980) 
(“The Defense Function”), are guides to determining what is 
reasonable, but they are only guides.  No particular set of detailed 
rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the 
variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of 
legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal 
defendant.  Any such set of rules would interfere with the 
constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the 
wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions. 
Id. at 688-89.   
Even if we were to conclude that the trial court erred in its ruling, no 
reversible error occurred because Morton was still able to introduce expert 
testimony regarding trial counsel’s alleged deficient performance based on 
prevailing standards for counsel in capital cases.  Cf. Schwab v. State, 969 So. 2d 
318, 322-23 (Fla. 2007) (stating that the trial court abused its discretion in failing 
to take judicial notice of certain evidence but concluding that such error was 
harmless).  During the evidentiary hearing, counsel called attorney Robert Norgard 
to establish the prevailing standards for counsel in capital cases.  Norgard was 
accepted as an expert in the area of capital criminal defense in Florida.  In response 
 
- 22 -
to a series of hypothetical questions, Norgard testified that counsel’s efforts in 
Morton’s case constituted deficient performance.19  Accordingly, any claim 
regarding the postconviction court’s ruling on judicial notice does not require 
reversal for a new evidentiary hearing.20   
III.  Weight Assigned to Age as a Mitigating Factor 
In his final claim for postconviction relief, Morton contends that the trial 
court erred in summarily denying his claim that the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), this Court’s decision in Urbin 
v. State, 714 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1998), and newly discovered evidence call for the 
reweighing of his age as a mitigating factor.   
                                          
 
19.  For example, Norgard testified that it was standard practice among the 
Florida capital defense community to look into birth trauma, medical histories for 
purposes of genetic issues, school records, a family and social history, criminal 
records, and physical or sexual abuse as mitigation.  
20.  We also reject Morton’s claim that the court erred in excluding expert 
testimony from Claudia Baker regarding the prevailing standards in forensic social 
work.  Any exclusion of that proffered testimony, if error, is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt because Baker was able to fully testify as to what actions she 
took in doing a reasonable background investigation, thus highlighting any alleged 
deficiency in the work of Morton’s own social worker, Mimi Pisters.  Moreover, as 
more fully explained above, Baker did not uncover any evidence that was 
substantially different from the mitigation presented at the resentencing.  Finally, 
we reject Morton’s claim of trial court error in allowing Dr. DelBeato to render an 
opinion as to whether Morton had Asperger’s disorder.  See Penalver v. State, 926 
So. 2d 1118, 1134 (Fla. 2006) (“Once the witness has qualified as an expert, the 
trial judge also has broad discretion in determining the range of the subjects on 
which an expert can testify, and the trial judge’s ruling will be upheld absent a 
clear error.”) (citing Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 2002)). 
 
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At the time of the murders, Morton was nineteen and a half years old and, as 
the record shows, possessed at least average intelligence.  The trial court found the 
age mitigator applicable, but assigned it little weight.  We have already rejected 
this claim both as procedurally barred when brought in postconviction proceedings, 
see Farina v. State, 937 So. 2d 612, 626 n.7 (Fla. 2006), and on the merits where a 
defendant was at or above the age of eighteen at the time of the murder.  See 
Kearse v. State, 969 So. 2d 976, 992 (Fla. 2007) (denying Roper claim where 
defendant was eighteen years and three months old at the time of the crime and had 
mental and emotional impairments); see also Stephens v. State, 975 So. 2d 405, 
427 (Fla. 2007); Hill v. State, 921 So. 2d 579, 584 (Fla. 2006).  Similarly, Roper 
has no application here where the facts are undisputed that Morton’s chronological 
age was above nineteen at the time he committed the crimes.  Because it is 
impossible for Morton to demonstrate that he falls within the ages of exemption, 
his claim is facially insufficient and it was proper for the court to deny Morton a 
hearing on this claim. 
Morton also asserts that the trial court erred in denying his claim that newly 
discovered evidence from a 2004 brain mapping study, which establishes that 
sections of the human brain are not fully developed until age twenty-five, warrants 
a reweighing of his age as a mitigating factor.  We have previously rejected 
recognizing “new research studies” as newly discovered evidence if based on 
 
- 24 -
previously available data.  See Schwab, 969 So. 2d at 325 (citing Diaz v. State, 945 
So. 2d 1136, 1144 (Fla. 2006) (concluding doctor’s letter addressing lethal 
injection research was not newly discovered evidence because conclusions in letter 
were based on old data)).  Although this 2004 brain mapping study had not yet 
been published at the time of Morton’s trials, Morton or his counsel could have 
discovered similar research at that time that stated that the human brain was not 
fully developed until early adulthood.  See Jay D. Aronson, Brain Imaging, 
Culpability and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 13 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 115, 120 
(2007) (“In the past few decades . . . neuroscientists have discovered that two key 
developmental processes, myelination . . . and pruning of neural connections, 
continue to take place during adolescence and well into adulthood. . . . [B]rain 
regions responsible for basic life processes and sensory perception tend to mature 
fastest, whereas the regions responsible for behavioral inhibition and control, risk 
assessment, decision making, and emotion maturing take longer (Yakovlev & 
Lecours, 1967).”).  Therefore, the 2004 study would not constitute newly 
discovered evidence and the trial court correctly denied this claim without an 
evidentiary hearing.   
HABEAS PETITION 
We now address Morton’s habeas claims.  First, Morton alleges several 
grounds to support his claim that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance.  
 
- 25 -
Morton first alleges that counsel was ineffective by failing to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence establishing the ownership or possession element of the 
burglary charge underlying his felony murder charge from the initial trial.  In 
response, the State points out that Morton failed to challenge the evidence relating 
to the ownership or possession element at his 1994 trial or 1999 resentencing.  
Accordingly, appellate counsel had no basis to raise this unpreserved issue on 
appeal.21  Moreover, as in all death penalty cases, this Court is required to review 
sufficiency of the evidence.  See F.B. v. State, 852 So. 2d 226, 230 (Fla. 2003); see 
also Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(i).  This Court affirmed Morton’s convictions on direct 
appeal, after concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support Morton’s 
conviction of felony murder based on the burglary charge.  Morton, 689 So. 2d at 
264.  Accordingly, this subclaim is without merit.  See Ponticelli v. State, 941 So. 
2d 1073, 1106-07 (Fla. 2006) (rejecting defendant’s claim that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to challenge sufficiency of the evidence where Court’s 
review on direct appeal found that the verdicts were supported by competent, 
substantial evidence). 
                                          
 
21.  Counsel also conceded that the burglary aggravator was applicable in 
the instant case, stating to the jury at the resentencing, “It would be very difficult 
for me to come before you and argue that [Morton] wasn’t engaged in the crime of 
burglary when these two murders occurred.  He, in fact, was.  That’s what he was 
engaged in, the crime of burglary.” 
 
- 26 -
Next, Morton contends that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance 
by failing to appeal the trial court’s finding of both the CCP and avoid arrest 
aggravators.   However, because each aggravator was already reviewed and each 
aggravator is supported by independent facts, this claim must fail.  As stated by 
this Court in Morton’s initial direct appeal, “no improper doubling exists so long as 
independent facts support each aggravator.”  Morton, 689 So. 2d at 265.  In the 
instant case, the two aggravators focus on different facets of the crime.  Although 
Morton killed Bowers and Weisser to avoid being identified as the perpetrator of 
the crime, the CCP aggravator focuses on the method of carrying out the crime, 
such as the selection of the victims’ house and entering the home with a concealed 
firearm.  Because each aggravator found by the trial court was supported by 
separate facts, improper doubling did not occur.  As appellate counsel cannot be 
rendered ineffective for failing to raise a meritless argument, Morton’s allegation 
fails.  See Sliney v. State, 944 So. 2d 270, 287 (Fla. 2006). 
 
Morton further asserts that counsel failed to raise the claim that his right to a 
public trial was violated at both his initial trial and resentencing.  Our review of the 
record does not indicate that Morton was deprived of a public trial, nor did trial 
counsel raise an objection regarding a public trial at either the initial or 
resentencing proceedings.  Appellate counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise 
an issue that was not preserved at trial unless the claim rises to the level of 
 
- 27 -
fundamental error.  See Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1281-82 (Fla. 2005).  
Such error is not present in the instant case.   
 
Finally, Morton alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise the claim that the trial court improperly denied Morton’s motions to dismiss 
the indictment at the first trial.  In total, Morton raised six separate motions, all of 
which were denied by the court.  Morton concedes that this Court has held that 
these issues have no merit; however, he raises them to preserve the issues for 
federal review.  We agree that we have rejected the claims Morton raises in his 
motions in similar cases and deny habeas relief as to this subclaim.22    
CONCLUSION 
                                          
 
22.  We likewise reject Morton’s remaining two habeas claims that his death 
sentence is unconstitutional pursuant to (1) Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), 
and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because he did not have a 
constitutional jury verdict on each element of the capital offense; and (2) the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment because he may 
be incompetent at the time of his execution.  First, since our decisions in Johnson 
v. State, 904 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2005), and Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 
2005), this Court has consistently held that Ring and Apprendi do not have 
retroactive application in postconviction cases.  See Connor v. State, 979 So. 2d 
852, 868 (Fla. 2007); Trotter v. State, 932 So. 2d 1045, 1053 (Fla. 2006).  Because 
Ring and Apprendi were decided after Morton’s conviction was affirmed by this 
Court on his first direct appeal in 1997, his Ring claim fails.  Second, this Court 
has previously held that an incompetency at the time of execution claim is not ripe 
for review until a death warrant has been issued.  See Jones v. State, 845 So. 2d 55, 
74 (Fla. 2003) (rejecting claim that defendant may be incompetent at time of 
execution where a death warrant had not yet been signed, noting that the claim was 
raised to preserve the issue for federal review).  Because a warrant has not been 
issued in this case, we reject this claim for lack of ripeness.  
 
 
- 28 -
 
- 29 -
 
Based on our analysis above, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Morton’s 
3.851 motion for postconviction relief and deny his petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pasco County,  
William R. Webb, Judge – Case No. 92-308-CFAWS 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Marie-Louis Samuels Parmer, Nathaniel Edwin Plucker, and Maria E. Deliberato, 
Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,  and Scott A. Browne, 
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent