Title: Panpat v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S48419
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: July 11, 2002

Filed:  July 11, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

SOMMUANG PANPAT,
as Personal Representative for the
ESTATE OF ACHARA TANATCHANGSANG,
	Petitioner on Review,
	v.
OWENS-BROCKWAY GLASS CONTAINER, INC.,
a Delaware corporation,
	Respondent on Review,
	and
STANLEY-SMITH SECURITY,
a Texas corporation,
dba Wallace Security,
WALLACE PRINCE,
individually and in his capacity as 
Security Supervisor,
and A. J. CAMPBELL,
individually and in his capacity as 
a Security Officer,
	Defendants.
OWENS-BROCKWAY GLASS CONTAINER, INC.,
a Delaware corporation,
	Third-Party Plaintiff,
	v.
ESTATE OF CHRIS A. BLAKE,
	Third-Party Defendant.
(CC 9708-06234; CA A104501; SC S48419)

	En Banc
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted March 13, 2002.
	Kathryn Hall Clark, Portland, argued the cause for
petitioner on review.  Jana Toran, Portland, and James Patrick
McHugh, Jr., filed the briefs for petitioner on review.
	Lee Ann Huntington, of Morgenstein &amp; Jubelirer LLP, San
Francisco, argued the cause for respondent on review.  With her
on the briefs were Stephen M. Hankins, San Francisco, and Charles
F. Adams and Andrew R. Gardner, of Stoel Rives LLP, Portland.
	DE MUNIZ, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
	*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Michael H. Simon, Judge pro tempore. 172 Or App 470, 21 P3d 97 (2001).
		DE MUNIZ, J.
		The issue in this case is whether the exclusivity
provision of the Oregon Workers' Compensation Law bars
plaintiff's civil action against the decedent's employer.  Chris
Blake killed his former girlfriend Achara Tanatchangsang
(decedent), at their place of employment, Owens-Brockway Glass,
Inc. (Owens).  Plaintiff Panpat, as the personal representative
of decedent's estate, brought a wrongful death action against
defendant Owens.  Owens moved for summary judgment arguing, inter
alia, that Owens lacked notice that Blake was dangerous and that
the workers' compensation statutes provided plaintiff's exclusive
remedy.  The trial court granted summary judgment on the ground
that Owens did not have notice that Blake was dangerous. 
However, the trial court later granted a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence.  Owens appealed from that ruling.  The Court
of Appeals reversed the order granting the new trial and remanded
with instructions to enter judgment in Owens's favor, on the
ground that the workers' compensation scheme provided the
exclusive remedy for plaintiff's claim.  Panpat v. Owens-Brockway
Glass Container, 172 Or App 470, 21 P3d 97 (2001).  We allowed
review, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand
to that court for further consideration.
		We take the following facts from the Court of Appeals'
opinion:
		"Chris Blake and Achara Tanatchangsang worked on
the same shift in employer's Portland manufacturing
plant.  Blake and Tanatchangsang were also involved in
a romantic relationship that ended in November 1995. 
In January 1996, Blake told employer's plant
superintendent that he was having difficulty coping
with the breakup and that he did not want to work the
same shift as Tanatchangsang.  Employer's plant
superintendent approached Tanatchangsang and offered to
transfer her to a different shift.  Tanatchangsang did
not want to be transferred, however.  In January 1996
and again in March 1996, Tanatchangsang reported to her
supervisor that Blake had called her derogatory names. 
At some point after the March 1996 incident, Blake was
placed on medical leave.
		"In April 1996, while still on medical leave,
Blake entered employer's manufacturing plant and shot
and killed Tanatchangsang while she was at work.  He
then killed himself."
172 Or App at 473.
		Plaintiff filed this wrongful death action alleging
that Owens had acted negligently by failing to provide sufficient
workplace security that would have protected decedent from Blake. 
Plaintiff alleges that Owens's negligence had been was a
substantial factor in causing decedent's death.  Specifically,
plaintiff alleged that Owens negligently
	"created a foreseeable risk of harm to Tanatchangsang
in the following particulars:
		"(a) In failing to instruct security officers to
refuse entry to Blake;
		"(b) In failing to provide training to security
officers regarding [Owens'] policies;
		"(c) In failing to provide Tanatchangsang security
despite knowledge that Blake posed a substantial risk
of harm to her;
		"(d) In failing to intervene when notified
Tanatchangsang was being held at gunpoint;
		"(e) In allowing a visibly intoxicated person to
enter the facility; and, or
		"(f) After observing Blake's presence, by failing
to direct him to exit the premises."
Id. at 473-74. 
		Owens moved for summary judgment on two grounds. 
First, Owens asserted that it had no notice of the need to
control Blake and that Blake's criminal act had not been
foreseeable.  Second, Owens maintained that the Oregon workers'
compensation system provided the exclusive remedy for plaintiff's
claim.  The trial court granted summary judgment, concluding that
plaintiff had "failed to present a genuine issue for trial
concerning [Owen's] knowledge of the need to control Chris
Blake."
		Plaintiff then requested a new trial after discovering
that Owens had adopted a workplace violence policy.  According to
plaintiff, Owens had failed to follow that policy when it had
become aware that Blake had called decedent derogatory names at
work.  Under the workplace violence policy, plaintiff argued,
Owens had imposed on itself a policy to take action to prevent
further incidents.  According to Owens, however, the workplace
policy had not been adopted until after the shooting.  Reasoning
that the discovery of the workplace violence policy created a
disputed issue of fact as to the policy's effective date, the
trial court granted plaintiff's motion for a new trial and Owens
appealed from that order.  That appeal led to our review here.
		In the Court of Appeals, Owens argued that evidence of
the workplace violence policy was inadmissable as a subsequent
remedial measure, and that it was error to grant a new trial on
that basis.  Alternatively, Owens maintained that the exclusive
remedy provision of the workers' compensation statutes precluded
plaintiff's wrongful death action because her death arose out of
her employment.  The Court of Appeals agreed with Owens's
exclusivity argument, holding that the parts of plaintiff's
complaint alleging that Owens had played some role in causing
decedent's death meant that her death had arisen out of her
employment, thus triggering the exclusivity provision of the
Workers' Compensation Law.  172 Or App at 477-79. 
		At the outset, we note that the issue in this case --
whether plaintiff's claim involves a "compensable" injury for
which the administrative remedy under the Workers' Compensation
Law is exclusive -- does not require invocation of the doctrine
of "primary jurisdiction."  See Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of
Forestry, 325 Or 185, 191-93, 935 P2d 411 (1997) (discussing
doctrine).  It is true that the Workers' Compensation Board
(board) routinely addresses questions regarding the
compensability of workplace injuries.  However, we see nothing
regarding the board's statutory jurisdiction or adjudicative
responsibilities that makes the board, rather than a court, a
preferable forum, in the primary jurisdiction sense, for the
resolution of the issue presented here.  See Krushwitz v.
McDonald's Restaurants, 323 Or 520, 525 n 3, 919 P2d 465 (1996)
(rejecting dismissal or abatement of wrongful death action to
allow parties to resort to workers' compensation system because
"such a result would serve no constructive purpose"); Kilminster
v. Day Management Corp., 323 Or 618, 624-25, 919 P2d 474 (1996)
(addressing on merits, without referral to Board, question
whether ORS 656.018 precluded wrongful death claim based on
negligence theory).  Consequently, we turn to the merits of
plaintiff's claim and defendant's exclusivity defense.
		Generally, we review for errors of law when a trial
court has granted a motion for a new trial.  Bennett v. Farmers
Ins. Co., 332 Or 138, 151, 26 P3d 785 (2001).  Here, the trial
court reconsidered its order granting summary judgment, believing
that a disputed issue of fact prevented that disposition.  The
Court of Appeals concluded that summary judgment was the correct
result because the Workers' Compensation Law, not tort law,
provided the exclusive remedy.  That holding rendered the
allegedly disputed fact irrelevant.  If the Court of Appeals was
correct, then the trial court erred as a matter of law in
granting a new trial.
When the Workers' Compensation Law provides the basis
for a compensable injury claim, then that remedy is exclusive and
the worker cannot seek a tort remedy instead.  ORS
656.018(1)(a). (1)

  Conversely, if the injury did not arise out of
and in the course of employment, then the exclusivity provision
of the Workers' Compensation Law is not a bar to a civil action
against an employer for personal injuries.  See Krushwitz, 323 Or
at 525 (explaining operation of exclusivity provisions in ORS
656.018(1)(a)).  Therefore, the issue in this case is one of
compensability under the Workers' Compensation Law.
		The legislature has provided an analytical framework,
which this court has interpreted numerous times, to determine
whether a claim should be considered compensable under the
workers' compensation scheme.  Allegations of employer negligence
might or might not be relevant in making that determination,
depending on the context and stage of the proceedings.  See
Newell v. Taylor, et al, 212 Or 522, 530, 321 P2d 294 (1958)
("Negligence plays no part in the injured workman's right to
compensation, * * * while it is of the essence in tort
actions.").  Here, because the issue reaches this court at the
summary judgment stage, it is the factual record that provides
the principal basis for our resolution of the issue.  We now turn
to the question whether decedent's death gave rise to a
compensable claim.
		A compensable injury, for purposes of workers'
compensation is an injury "arising out of and in the course of
employment * * *."  ORS 656.005(7)(a).  This court treats
"arising out of" and "in the course of" employment as "two
elements of a single inquiry," both of which must be satisfied to
some degree.  Redman Industries, Inc. v. Lang, 326 Or 32, 35, 943
P2d 208 (1997).  If one element is met easily, then the other
element must be met at least minimally.  Id.  It is undisputed
that in this case decedent's death occurred "in the course of"
her employment at Owens.  Thus, the sole issue is whether her
death "arose out of" that employment in some way.
		This court has construed the wording of ORS
656.005(7)(a) on several occasions, see, e.g., Redman, 326 Or at
35-42 (construing "arising out of").  In Redman, the court
determined that the "arising out of" requirement is intended to
"test[] the causal connection between the injury and the
employment."  326 Or at 35.  "A causal connection requires more
than a mere showing that the injury occurred at the workplace and
during working hours"; it also "must be linked to a risk
connected with the nature of the work or a risk to which the work
environment exposed claimant."  Redman, 326 Or at 36.  
		This court has categorized risks associated with the
work environment:  Risks "distinctly associated with the
employment" are universally compensable; risks "personal to the
claimant" are universally noncompensable; and neutral risks are
compensable "if the conditions of employment put claimant in a
position to be injured."  Redman, 326 Or at 36 (quoting Phil A.
Livesley Co. v. Russ, 296 Or 25, 29-30, 672 P2d 337 (1983)). 
Unexplained accidents are a "classic example" of neutral risks
where, for example, an unknown person assaults a claimant for
unknown reasons.  Redman, 326 Or at 37.  "[O]ther examples of
neutral risks would include an employee being hit by a stray
bullet, bitten by a dog, struck by lightning, or injured by
debris from a distant explosion."  Id. at 37 n 1.  The foregoing
establishes that decedent's death was not an example of a neutral
risk.  The identity of her killer and his motivation were known. 
See id. at 37 ("Because both the identity and the motive are
known, the assault does not fall into the category of neutral
risks.").
		Putting aside the application of neutral risks in this
case, we must distinguish between risks "distinctly associated
with the employment," and those risks "personal to the claimant." 
Although "the risk of an assault by a coworker in the workplace
is a risk to which the work environment exposes an employee,"
that observation does not lead to the conclusion "that an injury
resulting from an assault by a coworker arises out of employment
per se."  Id. at 40.  As the Redman court explained:
	"The rationale for the 'proximity' test is that a
workplace assault by a coworker is caused by
circumstances associated with the work environment. 
When the motivation for an assault by a coworker is an
event or circumstance pertaining to the assailant and
the claimant that originated entirely separate from the
workplace, and the only contribution made by the
workplace is to provide a venue for the assault, then
the rationale does not apply.  [Professor] Larson
explains this limitation as follows:
			"'When the animosity or dispute that
culminates in an assault is imported into the
employment from claimant's domestic or
private life, and is not exacerbated by the
employment, the assault does not arise out of
the employment under any test.'  1 Larson's
Workers' Compensation Law § 11.21(a) at 3-314.
		"An example would be where two employees had a
romantic relationship outside of work and a workplace
assault by one on the other was based on an event
unique to that relationship and was not fueled, in
part, by any workplace event."
Redman, 326 Or at 40-41 (first emphasis in original; second
emphasis added; footnote omitted).
		The Court of Appeals failed to apply the foregoing
passage, which is controlling here.  Instead, it held that,
because plaintiff alleged in her complaint that Owens' failure to
provide a secure workplace had been a substantial factor in
causing decedent's death, she therefore conceded that the
workplace was not simply the venue for the assault, but had
facilitated that assault. 
The Court of Appeals' emphasis on whether the workplace
"facilitates" the assault, as part of the test for "arising out
of" element of the compensability test, comes not from this
court's case law, but from a treatise.  See 172 Or App at 479
(quoting Arthur Larson and Lex K. Larson, 1 Larson's Workers'
Compensation Law § 8.02[1][c] (2000)).  However, it is this
court's opinions, not the treatise, that controls. (2)  Put
differently, this case does not require some further construction
of ORS 656.005(7)(a) under the template of PGE v. Bureau of Labor
and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), to determine the
legislature's intent; it only requires the application of
precedent.
		The passage from Redman, quoted above, places emphasis
on the motivation for the assault and whether that motivation
"originated entirely separate from the workplace."  Redman, 326
Or at 40.  Stated another way, whether the motivation for the
assault was a workplace event or an "event unique" to the
romantic relationship is determinative.  Id. at 41.  It is
undisputed that Blake's motivation for the killing was that he
was having difficulty coping with decedent's decision to end
their romantic relationship.  Her decision to end the
relationship was not, the parties agree, a "workplace event," but
a personal matter.  In other words, it was a personal risk rather
than a risk "distinctly associated with the employment."  See
Redman, 326 Or at 37 (risks distinctly personal to the employee
do not "arise out of" employment).  It follows that decedent's
death did not arise out of the course of her employment and,
consequently, that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
plaintiff's action is barred by the exclusivity provision of the
Workers' Compensation Law.
		The Court of Appeals decided the case on grounds which
the trial court did not rely.  Those on which the trial court did
rely remain to be considered.  We therefore remand the case to
the Court of Appeals for consideration of those other arguments.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.



1. 	ORS 656.018(1)(a) provides:
		"The liability of every employer who satisfies the
duty required by ORS 656.017(1) is exclusive and in
place of all other liability arising out of injuries,
diseases, symptom complexes or similar conditions
arising out of and in the course of employment that are
sustained by subject workers, the workers'
beneficiaries and anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages from the employer on account of such conditions
or claims resulting therefrom, specifically including
claims for contribution or indemnity asserted by third
persons from whom damages are sought on account of such
conditions, except as specifically provided otherwise
in this chapter."
2. 	We note that the Court of Appeals undertook to modify
the construction of "arising out of" under ORS 656.005(7)(a)
without reference to PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317
Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) or to the legislature's intent.