Title: State v. Marks
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 103289
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 19, 2013

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 103,289 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
RICKEY MARKS, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
Appellate courts apply a two-step analytical framework for prosecutorial 
misconduct claims. First, the court determines whether the prosecutor's comments were 
outside the wide latitude allowed prosecutors in discussing the evidence. If so, the court 
next considers whether those comments prejudiced the jury against the defendant and 
denied the defendant a fair trial. 
 
2. 
Although prosecutors are given wide latitude in the language and manner of 
presentation during closing arguments, those arguments must still be consistent with the 
evidence. If they are not, the first prong of the prosecutorial misconduct test is met and 
the court must consider whether the misstatement of facts constitutes plain error.  
 
3. 
Appellate courts consider three factors in determining whether a prosecutor's 
misstatement constitutes plain error requiring reversal:  (a) whether the misconduct is 
gross and flagrant; (b) whether the misconduct shows ill will on the prosecutor's part; and 
2 
 
 
 
(c) whether the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning the error 
affected the trial's outcome. 
 
4. 
When the defendant establishes an error of constitutional magnitude, it is the 
State's burden, as the party benefitting from the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error did not affect the defendant's substantial rights. 
 
5. 
It is within a trial court's discretion whether to exclude evidence if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.  
 
6. 
A district court abuses its discretion when its action is:  (a) arbitrary, fanciful, or 
unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial 
court; (b) based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal 
conclusion; or (c) based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does 
not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of 
discretion is based. 
 
7. 
Under the plain language of K.S.A. 22-3212 and K.S.A. 22-3213, the defendant is 
entitled to personal copies of certain discovery upon request.  
 
8. 
K.S.A. 22-3212(e) provides a procedure for limiting access to sensitive 
information.  
 
3 
 
 
 
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; THOMAS L. BOEDING, judge. Opinion filed April 19, 
2013. Affirmed.   
 
Heather Cessna, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant.  
 
Jennifer S. Tatum, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Jerome A. Gorman, district 
attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by  
 
BILES, J.:  Rickey Marks directly appeals his conviction for the first-degree 
premeditated murder of his wife, arguing:  (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct 
during closing arguments; (2) the district court erred when it denied his motion in limine 
to exclude evidence that his wife filed for divorce in the weeks prior to her murder; (3) 
the Wyandotte County District Attorney's open file discovery policy violates K.S.A. 22-
3212 and K.S.A. 22-3213; and (4) cumulative error deprived him of a fair trial. We hold 
the prosecutor misstated the law on premeditation and that Marks was entitled to copies 
of the discovery under K.S.A. 22-3212 and K.S.A. 22-3213. Both errors were harmless in 
this case, and we affirm his conviction. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On October 11, 2008, Rozeta Marks was stabbed eight times in her chest, arm, and 
back while driving to a store with her husband, Rickey Marks. According to a medical 
examiner who testified at trial, Rozeta's wounds were on the left side of her body, 
indicating she was stabbed through the driver's side window. The fatal stab entered 
between Rozeta's ribs and into her heart. Marks was ultimately charged with and 
convicted of first-degree premeditated murder. 
4 
 
 
 
 
At trial, Rozeta's friend Judith Williams testified that a few weeks before the 
stabbing, Rozeta visited her in Tennessee. Williams said that during that visit Marks 
called Rozeta approximately 60 times and accused her of infidelity. He also left 
numerous threatening voicemails and text messages in which he said Rozeta must have 
been scared of him and that she was "dead" when she returned.  
 
Williams testified that Rozeta secretly filed for divorce during the Tennessee visit, 
telling Williams that she did not want Marks to know. Rozeta left the divorce papers in 
Tennessee so that Marks would not find them. After returning home, Rozeta sent 
Williams a text message saying, "He dont believe that i'm getting a divorce. Keep 
begging PLEASE DONT[.] GIVE ME ANOTHER CHANCE." 
 
Before trial, Marks' attorney filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence 
that Rozeta filed for divorce shortly before her death. He conceded the divorce evidence 
would be relevant if there was additional evidence that Marks knew Rozeta had filed but 
claimed there was none and that any divorce evidence was therefore irrelevant and 
extremely prejudicial. The district court denied Marks' motion, which he unsuccessfully 
renewed on the morning of trial. 
 
Sometime after Rozeta returned home, she and Marks drove to the house of one of 
Marks' brothers, Reginald, to pick up some unused tools to return to a store. According to 
Reginald's trial testimony, Marks did not act agitated or angry at the time, and Rozeta 
waved at him from the car. Williams also testified that she spoke to Rozeta before the 
stabbing and that Rozeta sounded "fine."  
 
Reginald further testified that about 15 to 20 minutes after Marks and Rozeta left 
his home, Marks' other brother, Stephen, yelled for him to dial 911. Stephen testified that 
5 
 
 
 
he observed Rozeta stagger in the street, look "wobbly," and ultimately fall down. 
Stephen said Rozeta told him she had been stabbed, and Stephen saw Marks drive off 
"kind of fast" in Rozeta's car.  
 
Several people testified at trial that shortly after the stabbing, Marks telephoned 
them saying that he had stabbed Rozeta. One of them was Williams' husband in 
Tennessee, who testified that Marks said, "I killed the bitch. . . . I stabbed her 20 times." 
Marks was arrested later the day of the stabbing at a sandwich shop. One officer said 
Marks had a contusion on his forehead from falling in the parking lot but did not have 
any other noticeable injuries. Neither the car nor the murder weapon was ever recovered. 
 
Marks testified in his own defense that he could not find the receipt for the tools, 
which he would need to return them. He said once Rozeta learned he lost the receipt, a 
heated argument began during which Rozeta became "irate" because she wanted the 
money and Marks had a bad habit of losing receipts. Marks also testified that Rozeta 
stopped the car and told him to get out and that "pissed [him] off" and he refused. 
 
According to Marks, this was when Rozeta pulled a knife from under the car seat. 
He testified that Rozeta raised the knife like she was going to stab him, and a "tussl[e]" 
began during which he grabbed her hand and wrestled for the knife. Marks said Rozeta 
"lunged" towards him and that was when "this happened." According to Marks, he 
became upset and tearful after the stabbing. He said Rozeta got out of the car and started 
walking down the street. Marks said he told her to get back in so they could go to the 
hospital, but Rozeta refused. When she would not return, Marks said he got in the driver's 
seat and drove away.  
 
After retiring for deliberations, the jury submitted a question to the court, asking: 
"While premeditation has no specific time frame is there a reasonable definition of 
6 
 
 
 
'instantaneous'? In other words, if someone decides to act and then acts is that gap of time 
sufficient to declare pre-med?" The judge replied: "Ladies and Gentlemen, I cannot give 
you a better definition of premeditation than that contained in [the instruction]. Please re-
read the definition of premeditation in [the instruction]."  
 
The jury convicted Marks of first-degree premeditated murder. He was sentenced 
to life in prison with a minimum confinement of 25 years. This court has jurisdiction 
under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3601 (life sentence; off-grid crime).  
 
PROSECUTOR'S CONDUCT 
 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor explained to the jury regarding 
premeditation that "intent can be formed during the act itself." (Emphasis added.) But in 
the district court's instructions for first-degree premeditated murder, second-degree 
intentional murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter, the jury 
received the standard PIK definition for premeditation as follows:  
 
 
"Premeditation means to have thought over the matter beforehand, in other 
words, to have formed the design or intent to kill before the act. Although there is no 
specific time period required for premeditation, the concept of premeditation requires 
more than the instantaneous, intentional act of taking another's life." (Emphasis added.)  
 
Marks argues the prosecutor's comments to the jury about forming premeditation 
"during the act itself" improperly eliminated the distinction between instantaneous 
development of intent to kill, a standard Marks assigns to second-degree intentional 
murder, and actual premeditation in first-degree murder cases. He says these statements 
prejudiced his right to a fair trial. 
 
7 
 
 
 
Standard of Review  
 
Appellate review of prosecutorial misconduct claims involves a two-step process. 
The appellate court first decides whether the comments were outside the wide latitude a 
prosecutor is allowed in discussing evidence and, therefore, improper. Second, if there 
was misconduct, the appellate court determines if reversal is required and must decide:  
(1) whether the misconduct was gross and flagrant; (2) whether the misconduct showed 
ill will on the prosecutor's part; and (3) whether the evidence was of such a direct and 
overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have had little weight in the 
jurors' minds. State v. Raskie, 293 Kan. 906, 914, 269 P.3d 1268 (2012); State v. 
Inkelaar, 293 Kan. 414, 427, 264 P.3d 81 (2011). None of these three factors is 
individually controlling. Inkelaar, 293 Kan. at 427. If the defendant establishes 
misconduct of a constitutional magnitude, the State, as the party benefitting from the 
error, bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect 
the defendant's substantial rights. Raskie, 293 Kan. at 914.   
 
Discussion 
 
Our first step is to determine whether the prosecutor's comments were improper. 
And while a prosecutor has wide latitude in discussing evidence, the remarks must 
accurately reflect that evidence, accurately state the law, and cannot be intended to 
inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury or divert the jury from its duty to decide the 
case based on the evidence and controlling law. 293 Kan. at 917 (citing State v. Tosh, 278 
Kan. 83, 90, 91 P.3d 1204 [2004]). The alleged prosecutorial misconduct occurred when 
the prosecutor stated:  
 
"If you don't want to consider evidence from before October 11th, then consider . . . the 
way she died that day. Eight times. That's not an accident, people. Eight times. She gets it 
8 
 
 
 
here (indicating) and goes through into the top part of her arm. The doctor said her arm's 
like this (indicating), goes all the way through and you've got to pull that out and that's 
just one time, just one time. Then you've got to make the decision to do it again a second 
time. She's cut on her left hand. Gotta make the decision to do a third time. He cuts her 
again up in here (indicating). It goes through her arm again, all the way through. It goes 
through the skin here, the tissue and comes out the other end, then you've got to pull it 
out too, gotta pull it right back out. That's three. Then you've got to make a choice to do it 
a fourth time. Right here (indicating), plunge it in, pull it out. Got to do it a fifth time 
right in here (indicating), move your arm toward her again, pull it back. A sixth time right 
here (indicating). Again, you're choosing to make that motion. You're thinking about it, 
it's not accidental, you're not flailing it around. You're connecting right here by her heart 
(indicating). Then you've got to choose to do it a [seventh] time right here (indicating), 
the one that kills her, right in the chest to the hilt that one. Think about the effort to push 
that through, to go through in between two ribs, cut that right ventricle of her heart, to the 
hilt and then pulling it out and that's a conscious choice. That's a directed movement. 
That is not an accident. You pull it back out and then you do it one more time, the eighth 
time on the back of her neck which, ladies and gentlemen, she's facing him the whole 
time. . . .  
 
       . . . .  
 
". . . Focusing on only that day, that's not considering all the evidence and that's what 
[defense counsel] wants you to do is focus on just that day. . . .  
 
 
"However, if you do that, it still leads us to the same answer because that is intent 
can be formed during the act itself. It can be at some point formed—at some point he 
made a choice he was going to kill her that day. Eight stab wounds, that tells you what he 
was thinking right there. There's nothing that can tell you better than that." (Emphasis 
added.)  
 
Marks argues it was a misstatement to claim premeditation could have been 
formed "during the act itself" in the time it took to stab her eight times. He asks us to find 
9 
 
 
 
the prosecutor's statement that "intent can be formed during the act itself" is the same as 
incorrectly suggesting that premeditation may be formed instantaneously. Marks also 
argues the prosecutor misstated the evidence because there was nothing indicating Marks 
stopped and contemplated each stab before it occurred.  
 
In State v. Warledo, 286 Kan. 927, 947, 190 P.3d 937 (2008), a case involving the 
repeated stomping on the victim as she lay on her kitchen floor, the prosecutor said 
during closing:  
 
 
"'Premeditation can be formed between the first and second stomps, between the 
second and third stomps, at any point during the stomping (attorney stomping). Okay. 
The stomping, what is his desire? To kill his mother. Ultimately it boils down to what's 
going on in the defendant's brain when he's stomping his mother to death. 15 stomps.'" 
 
And on rebuttal the prosecutor further stated: 
 
"'What we're saying is as he stomped, as he knocked her down, he had time to think. As 
he kicked her in the head, he had time to think. As he stomped on her, he had time to 
think. Again, time to think and again, time to think and if that's not enough, ladies and 
gentlemen, you hear him on the tape walk away and then come back (attorney stomping) 
in between saying things. Again he stomped. He came back and then stomped again. Do 
you think he had time enough to think?'"  
 
While acknowledging some prior decisions holding that premeditation cannot be 
formed instantaneously, the Warledo court also recognized that multiple blows may 
afford the defendant an opportunity to think about what he or she was doing, and that the 
infliction of additional blows once the victim was already helpless could show 
premeditation. Accordingly, the statement in that case was found to be consistent with 
PIK instructions and Kansas precedent because the comments merely informed the jury 
that the defendant could have developed the plan to commit murder once the fight started, 
10 
 
 
 
as evidenced by the number of stomps and the 911 tape recording of Warledo telling the 
victim she would die. 286 Kan. at 950. 
 
Similarly, in State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 145 P.3d 1 (2006), a case in which 
the victim was beaten repeatedly with an object, we held it was not misconduct when the 
prosecutor stated: 
 
"'And if you think about it, the two blows that actually killed David Carrington had to 
occur at some point, they may have occurred last and David Carrington went to the 
ground, but if they came last, then there is [sic] at least five blows before them. This 
person is thinking about what they are doing. They know what they are doing. If those 
two blows came first, then David Carrington is unconscious, defenseless on the ground, 
and this person continues to beat him at least five more times. That's premeditation.'" 282 
Kan. at 208. 
 
The Anthony court concluded that the prosecutor's remarks simply pointed out that 
the number and order of blows could have given the defendant the opportunity to think 
about what he was doing, and that inflicting additional blows after the victim was 
rendered helpless could constitute premeditation. 282 Kan. at 209. 
 
In contrast, our decision in State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841, 257 P.3d 272 (2011), a 
case involving a victim killed by a rapidly fired gun, demonstrates when a prosecutor's 
statement regarding the formation of premeditation is a misstatement. In Hall, there was 
no evidence of interaction between Hall and the victim prior to the shooting. Moreover, 
the evidence showed Hall fired three more shots in rapid succession. The prosecutor 
argued that Hall could have formed premeditation after the first trigger pull because he 
shot four times. We found it was error to argue that premeditation could be formed after 
the first trigger pull because it suggested that premeditation could be formed 
instantaneously—a notion we have rejected. 292 Kan. at 852.  
11 
 
 
 
 
The clear difference between Hall on the one hand, and Warledo and Anthony on 
the other, is that in Hall, the homicidal acts occurred in such rapid succession—the time 
between the first trigger pull and the final trigger pull—that we determined the time 
frame was essentially instantaneous. Hall, 292 Kan. at 852. In Warledo and Anthony, the 
evidence indicated a sufficient period between the beginning of the altercation and the 
last stomp or blow for the defendant to form premeditation before the ultimate homicidal 
act, yet during the same period of physical violence.  
 
Marks' case is more analogous to Warledo and Anthony than it is to Hall because 
stabbing someone with a knife eight times is not instantaneous like rapid gunfire. And if 
the jury believed the coroner's testimony that Rozeta was likely stabbed through the 
driver's side window because the wounds were on her left side, then that offered 
additional moments to form premeditation. 
 
But it is unclear from the prosecutor's remarks what was meant by "during the act 
itself." And without that clarity, we conclude that the prosecutor confused the formation 
of premeditation from what was instructed given the particular fact pattern in this case 
and the conflict in the evidence. We need not decide, however, whether this would be 
sufficient to constitute prosecutorial error by itself because another factor adds to our 
analysis. 
 
Marks notes that the deputy coroner did not testify how quickly the stabbings 
occurred, though he did say the fatal stab wound would not have killed Rozeta instantly. 
The coroner labeled the stab wounds A, B, C, etc., to keep track of them but made clear 
these labels were arbitrary and did not indicate the order in which the stabs occurred. But 
the prosecutor nevertheless discussed what she believed was the actual sequence of the 
wounds and did so without medical evidence to support the argument. We hold that 
12 
 
 
 
within the context of the evidence, the prosecutor's variance from the language in the 
instructions given to the jury, coupled with her remarks regarding the sequencing of the 
stab wounds, crossed the line into prosecutorial misconduct. With this holding we must 
next determine whether the error requires reversal. 
 
We consider three factors in determining whether a prosecutor's misstatement 
constitutes plain error requiring reversal:  (1) whether the misconduct is gross and 
flagrant; (2) whether the misconduct shows ill will on the prosecutor's part; and (3) 
whether the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning the error affected 
the trial's outcome. Hall, 292 Kan. 841, Syl. ¶ 14. The State, as the party benefitting from 
this error, bears the burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did 
not affect the trial's outcome in light of the entire record. State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 
Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). 
 
At the outset, we find no evidence suggesting the prosecutor's conduct was gross 
and flagrant or exhibited ill will. In addition, we hold that the State has met its burden to 
show beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct did not affect the trial's outcome 
because the State presented more than sufficient evidence of premeditation. 
 
The State correctly points out a list of factors this court has approved when 
considering whether there was premeditation, including:  (1) the nature of the weapon 
used, (2) the lack of provocation, (3) the defendant's conduct before and after the killing, 
(4) threats and declarations of the defendant before and during the occurrence, and (5) the 
dealing of lethal blows after the deceased was felled and rendered helpless. See State v. 
Cosby, 293 Kan. 121, 134, 262 P.3d 285 (2011); see also Hall, 292 Kan. at 854-56 
(misstatement not reversible error where other evidence at trial showed premeditation). 
Not all factors must be present before premeditation can be inferred. See State v. Morton, 
13 
 
 
 
277 Kan. 575, 581-83, 86 P.3d 535 (2004) (evidence to support second and third factors 
sufficient in finding premeditation).  
 
In Marks' case, the State presented sufficient evidence of premeditation under two 
different theories. The first was that Marks premeditated Rozeta's murder before the 
stabbing occurred. This was demonstrated at trial by the substantial evidence showing 
threatening texts and phone calls to Rozeta while she was visiting her friend in 
Tennessee, just days before the stabbing, including a text from Marks in which he told 
Rozeta she was "dead" when she returned.   
 
Under the second theory, the State presented evidence that Marks formed 
premeditation to kill Rozeta between the eight stabs. Both the deputy coroner and Marks 
said the weapon used was a knife, which is a deadly weapon. And after the killing, Marks 
made numerous phone calls to friends and family members, including telling Williams' 
husband, "[S]ee what you made me do to that bitch?" And the fact that the car and knife 
were never recovered is indicative of a plan to hide evidence. When asked at trial what 
happened to the car, Marks said only that he did not know but remembered what street he 
left it on and that he took the key with him when he got out of it. See State v. Doyle, 272 
Kan. 1157, 1162, 38 P.3d 650 (2002) (premeditation inferred when evidence showed, 
among other things, defendant removed the license plate on his car before driving to 
victim's home). Finally, there were multiple stab wounds to Rozeta's body, including four 
in her chest.  
 
We note also that the jury asked the court for a definition of "instantaneous" and 
whether the gap of time between a person's decision to act and the actual act is sufficient 
for premeditation. The dissent contends this question shows that the jury did not 
understand the meaning of premeditation. But the jury was instructed that premeditation 
means "to have thought over the matter beforehand . . . to have formed the design or 
14 
 
 
 
intent to kill before the act." This definition squares with the State's first theory, which 
was that Marks premeditated Rozeta's murder while she was away in Tennessee.  
 
Looking at the record as a whole, the trial's outcome would not be different if the 
misstatements were omitted. There was sufficient evidence showing a strong inference 
that Rozeta's stabbing was premeditated. And the jury was properly instructed on the law 
regarding premeditation and was also instructed that arguments of counsel were not 
evidence. As a result, the prosecutor's misstatements here do not warrant reversal. 
 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
 
Marks next argues it was prejudicial error for the district court to deny his motion 
in limine to exclude evidence that Rozeta filed for divorce shortly before her death. In 
that motion, Marks argued that because there was no evidence he actually knew about the 
filing, the evidence was irrelevant to the issue of motive. Marks further argued that even 
if the evidence was relevant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial impact. Marks eventually lodged a continuing objection to evidence 
discussing the divorce filing. 
 
Standard of Review  
 
When the admission or exclusion of evidence is challenged on appeal, the first 
inquiry is relevance. State v. McMullen, 290 Kan. 1, 7, 221 P.3d 92 (2009). Evidence is 
relevant when it has "any tendency in reason to prove any material fact." K.S.A. 60-
401(b). This encompasses whether the evidence is probative and whether it is material. 
State v. Martinez, 290 Kan. 992, 1009, 236 P.3d 481 (2010) (citing State v. Dixon, 289 
Kan. 46, 69, 209 P.3d 675 [2009]); State v. Henson, 287 Kan. 574, 578 197 P.3d 456 
(2008). Probative evidence furnishes, establishes, or contributes toward proof. Martinez, 
15 
 
 
 
290 Kan. at 1009. The decision as to whether evidence is probative is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion. Dixon, 289 Kan. at 69. 
 
Material evidence is that which tends to establish a fact that is at issue and is 
significant under the substantive law of the case. State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, 505, 186 
P.3d 713 (2008). The determination whether evidence is material is reviewed under a de 
novo standard. Martinez, 290 Kan. at 1009. 
 
If relevance is established, the evidentiary rules governing admission or exclusion 
of evidence are applied as a matter of law or in the exercise of judicial discretion, 
depending on the applicable rule. If the adequacy of the legal basis is questioned, we 
review the issue de novo. 290 Kan. at 1009 (citing Dixon, 289 Kan. at 70); State v. 
Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 47-48, 144 P.3d 647 (2006). 
 
Discussion 
 
The evidence of Rozeta's divorce filing was both probative and material. The State 
produced numerous text messages from Marks to Rozeta asking her to "tell the truth[]" 
about whether she was really getting a divorce. It also produced text messages from 
Rozeta to her friend Williams that said, "He dont believe that i'm getting a divorce. Keep 
begging PLEASE DONT[.] GIVE ME ANOTHER CHANCE." This permits a 
reasonable conclusion that Marks knew Rozeta had filed for divorce.  
 
In addition, Rozeta's divorce filing was material in that it tended to establish 
Mark's motive and intent to commit murder. See State v. Hughes, 286 Kan. 1010, 1022, 
191 P.3d 268 (2008) (Although motive is not an element of murder, the State may 
nevertheless admit evidence of motive to explain why the defendant may have committed 
16 
 
 
 
the crime.); State v. Drach, 268 Kan. 636, 649, 1 P.3d 864 (2000) (Evidence of marital 
discord is competent as bearing on a spouse defendant's motive and intent.). 
 
When Rozeta returned home from Tennessee, the text messages exchanged 
between her and Williams, as well as between Rozeta and Marks, support a finding that 
Marks learned of the divorce filing. Accordingly, evidence of the divorce filing would 
tend to establish motive and intent—both of which were at issue and significant under the 
substantive law applicable to the crime. See K.S.A. 21-3401(a)(1); Hughes, 286 Kan. at 
1022. For these reasons, we hold that the evidence of Rozeta's divorce filing was 
relevant. 
 
Marks argues next that even if the evidence of the divorce filing was relevant and 
otherwise admissible, it still should have been excluded because it was far more 
prejudicial than probative. This argument is similarly grounded in Marks' contention that 
there was no evidence he knew Rozeta had filed for divorce.  
 
Kansas law favors the admission of relevant evidence. Generally, all relevant 
evidence is admissible, unless excluded by statute. K.S.A. 60-407(f); State v. Miller, 284 
Kan. 682, 690, 163 P.3d 267 (2007). And it is within a trial court's discretion whether to 
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair 
prejudice. K.S.A. 60-445; State v. Shadden, 290 Kan. 803, 817-18, 235 P.3d 436 (2010); 
see also State v. Leitner, 272 Kan. 398, 415, 34 P.3d 42 (2001) (citing State v. Davis, 213 
Kan. 54, 57, 515 P.2d 802 [1973]) (discussing statute's application to probative versus 
prejudicial). A district court abuses its discretion when its action is:  (1) arbitrary, 
fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted 
by the trial court; (2) based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an 
erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent 
evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or 
17 
 
 
 
the exercise of discretion is based. State v. Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, Syl. ¶ 10, 287 P.3d 
245 (2012).  
 
Along with the telephone calls, text messages, voicemails, and other evidence, 
Rozeta's divorce filing showed the couple had a turbulent marriage, with an escalating 
pattern of threats and violence. Evidence that Marks seemed to know about the filing was 
sufficiently probative to explain his intent to kill Rozeta along with a motive for doing so. 
Moreover, the prejudicial effect, if any, was minimal in light of all the evidence admitted.  
 
Having concluded that the evidence of Rozeta's divorce filing was relevant and 
more probative than prejudicial, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying the motion in limine and admitting testimony regarding the divorce filing. 
 
WYANDOTTE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OPEN FILE POLICY 
 
Marks next argues the open file policy of the Wyandotte County District 
Attorney's Office for discovery in criminal cases violates K.S.A. 22-3212 and K.S.A. 22-
3213, which govern discovery, demands for production, and the production of witness 
statements. Marks claims these statutes compel the State to provide him personal copies 
of discovery. He argues further that because he was not provided with these copies, the 
State violated his constitutional right to assist in his defense.  
 
In the district court, Marks filed a motion to produce copies of witness statements 
taken from those who testified at the preliminary hearing, along with scientific test 
results, cell phone records, photographs, video/audio tapes, voicemails or other 
recordings, testimony transcripts of the defendant or anyone else, all exhibits the State 
intended to use at trial, his criminal record, the criminal record of all witnesses, and all 
exculpatory evidence. This motion did not reference any authority for the production and 
18 
 
 
 
did not specify that it sought additional copies for Marks' personal use—only that copies 
were requested "for [the] defendant."   
 
In its written answer to Marks' discovery motion, the State explained its open file 
policy as follows: 
 
"The Wyandotte County District Attorney's Office has an open file policy. The entire 
case file is routinely provided to defense counsel prior to preliminary hearing. This policy 
allows defense counsel to obtain the case file earlier than contemplated by the discovery 
statute. This policy allows defense counsel to obtain parts of the case file that may not 
ever be discoverable pursuant to the discovery statute. The policy is contingent upon the 
file not being provided to the defendant personally. There are no stipulations against the 
defendant being able to view the case file in person, with his or her attorney."  
 
The State's response explained that its goal was to protect "sensitive" personal 
identification information of various witnesses, reasoning that a defendant's access to this 
material could result in financial and personal safety risks to witnesses.  
 
At a hearing on the motion, the district court denied Marks' request, articulating 
that defense counsel had been provided a copy of the district attorney's entire discovery 
file and that Marks was free to review that discovery with counsel and take notes. The 
district court also noted the open file policy was "more generous" than the statute 
requires, though it did not explain which discovery statute it was referring to. 
 
Marks challenges the district court's decision through both a brief filed by his 
appellate counsel and one Marks submitted pro se. He frames the issue pro se as a right to 
"review or study" the State's discovery. But the district court's decision addressed 
whether Marks could review discovery with his attorney, and this was confirmed with 
Marks' counsel. There is no claim this review did not occur. With the issue raised pro se 
19 
 
 
 
resolved in Marks' favor by the district court, our analysis focuses on counsel's arguments 
regarding whether Marks was entitled to personal copies. 
 
Standard of Review  
 
The claim that Marks was entitled to personal copies of certain discovery under 
K.S.A. 22-3212 and K.S.A. 22-3213 raises a question of statutory interpretation. This is a 
question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited review. State v. Arnett, 290 
Kan. 41, 47, 223 P.3d 780 (2010). 
 
When interpreting a statute, an appellate court's first task is to ascertain legislative 
intent through an analysis of the language employed, giving ordinary words their 
ordinary meaning. State v. Coman, 294 Kan. 84, 92, 273 P.3d 701 (2012). When a statute 
is plain and unambiguous, we do not attempt to determine the intent behind it. 294 Kan. 
at 92. As a general rule, criminal statutes must be strictly construed so that any 
reasonable doubt about the meaning is decided in favor of the accused. 294 Kan. at 96. 
But this is subordinate to the rule that judicial interpretation must be reasonable and 
sensible to achieve legislative intent. If the statute's language or text is unclear or 
ambiguous, the appellate court uses canons of construction or legislative history to 
construe the legislature's intent. State v. Trautloff, 289 Kan. 793, 796-97, 217 P.3d 15 
(2009).   
 
Discussion  
 
At the time of Marks' discovery request, K.S.A. 22-3212 provided in pertinent 
part: 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
"(a) Upon request, the prosecuting attorney shall permit the defendant to inspect 
and copy or photograph the following, if relevant:  (1) Written or recorded statements or 
confessions made by the defendant, or copies thereof, which are or have been in the 
possession, custody or control of the prosecution, the existence of which is known, or by 
the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the prosecuting attorney; (2) results 
or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments made 
in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, the existence of which is known, 
or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the prosecuting attorney; (3) 
recorded testimony of the defendant before a grand jury or at an inquisition; and (4) 
memoranda of any oral confession made by the defendant and a list of the witnesses to 
such confession, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may 
become known to the prosecuting attorney. 
 
 
"(b) Upon request, the prosecuting attorney shall permit the defendant to inspect 
and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, tangible objects, buildings or places, 
or copies, or portions thereof, which are or have been within the possession, custody or 
control of the prosecution, and which are material to the case and will not place an 
unreasonable burden upon the prosecution." (Emphasis added.) 
 
K.S.A. 22-3212(d) provided at the time of the discovery motion that "[t]he 
prosecuting attorney and the defendant shall cooperate in discovery and reach agreement 
on the time, place and manner of making the discovery and inspection permitted, so as to 
avoid the necessity for court intervention." (Emphasis added.) And K.S.A. 22-3212(e) 
provided for district court oversight regarding the extent, manner, and method of 
discovery, stating: "Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that the 
discovery or inspection be denied, restricted or deferred or make such other order as is 
appropriate." K.S.A. 22-3212(e). That subsection then establishes a procedure for that 
review, which was not followed in this case. See K.S.A. 22-3212(e). Notably, the 
legislature amended K.S.A. 22-3212 since Marks' trial, but the parties do not argue those 
amendments impact our analysis. See L. 2012, ch. 143, sec. 1; L. 2011, ch. 30, sec. 125; 
L. 2010, ch. 30, sec. 1..   
21 
 
 
 
 
As for K.S.A. 22-3213, which is unchanged, it provides that after a witness at a 
preliminary hearing or trial testifies on direct examination, the court shall, on the 
defendant's motion, order the prosecution to produce any witness statement in the 
prosecution's possession relating to the subject matter on which that witness testified. 
And as to any such statement, "the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the 
defendant for his examination and use." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 22-3213(1)-(2).   
 
Neither K.S.A. 22-3212 nor K.S.A. 22-3213 leave room for interpretation as to 
who "the defendant" is because the meaning can be readily ascertained by the plain 
language—the defendant is the person who is charged with the crime. And this 
interpretation is bolstered by noting the contrast in the statutes between the manner of 
production to the respective parties. One provision requires that when the defendant must 
produce discovery to the prosecution that discovery is to be produced for "the attorney 
for the prosecution" to inspect and copy. (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 22-3212(c).  
 
But a notion that referencing "the defendant" universally encompasses defense 
counsel is dispelled by the language in a similar statute, K.S.A. 22-2302(2), which 
concerns production of the affidavit used in support of probable cause. It states: 
 
 
"Affidavits or sworn testimony in support of the probable cause requirement of 
this section shall not be made available for examination without a written order of the 
court, except that such affidavits or testimony when requested shall be made available to 
the defendant or the defendant's counsel for such disposition as either may desire." 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
While K.S.A. 22-2302 (2) is not at issue, its language indicates the legislature 
recognized the difference between the defendant and defense counsel by explicitly stating 
that each is entitled to a copy of the affidavit. See also State v. Thomas, 273 Kan. 750, 
22 
 
 
 
754, 46 P.3d 543 (2002) ("trial court's ruling that a represented defendant can only have 
access to the documents [identified in K.S.A. 22-2302(2)] through his or her counsel is 
illogical in light of the statutory language"). 
 
K.S.A. 22-3212 and K.S.A. 22-3213 unambiguously require disclosure to the 
defendant. The district court erred to the extent it held that K.S.A. 22-3212 and K.S.A. 
22-3213 do not authorize a defendant to have personal copies of discovery and witness 
statements. We recognize the importance of protecting sensitive information, but we note 
K.S.A. 22-3212(e) provides a procedure for that very issue. The open file policy simply 
placed a larger band-aid over that problem than was necessary or permitted by statute. 
We must decide next whether that error was harmless.   
 
If an error infringes upon a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution, we 
must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the outcome in 
light of the entire record. State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 569-70, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. 
denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). If the error does not infringe upon a constitutional right, 
we apply the harmless error analysis of K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105 to determine 
whether there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the trial's outcome. State 
v. McCullough, 293 Kan. 970, 981, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012). The State, as the party 
benefitting from the error, bears the burden of proof in either instance. 293 Kan. at 983. 
 
Marks claims his inability to retain personal copies of discovery and witness 
statements infringed on his constitutional right to meaningfully participate in his own 
defense. He does not articulate how his participation was actually impeded when he 
otherwise had the opportunity to review the information with his attorney, nor does he 
cite any authority which would support his theory of constitutional infringement.  
 
23 
 
 
 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees in "all criminal 
prosecutions" that "the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence." The Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, § 10, provides in 
pertinent part:  "In all prosecutions, the accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in 
person, or by counsel . . . ." A criminal defendant is entitled to the "assistance of counsel" 
and, if indigent, the defendant may be appointed counsel, who is to represent the client, 
inform him or her fully of the crime charged and the possible penalty, and "fully and 
fairly represent the defendant" in the proceeding. K.S.A. 22-4503.  
 
But, "[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case." 
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S. Ct. 837, 51 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1977). A 
defendant's right to assistance in his or her defense does not translate to a constitutional 
right to personal copies of discovery, particularly when that discovery was already 
provided to his or her attorney. See United States v. Shrake, 515 F.3d 743, 745 (7th Cir. 
2008) (defendants not constitutionally entitled to discovery; federal statute limiting 
pretrial discovery constitutional); People v. Davison, 292 Ill. App. 3d 981, 988, 227 Ill. 
Dec. 75, 686 N.E.2d 1231 (1997) (defendant has no constitutional right to read discovery 
materials; whether to provide personal copies of discovery to defendant is a matter left to 
trial counsel's discretion). 
 
This court has previously declined to find a constitutional violation when a 
defendant claimed a discovery violation. See, e.g., State v. Deavers, 252 Kan. 149, 158, 
843 P.2d 695 (1992) (no constitutional violation when requested discovery files did not 
contain information that would have assisted the defense), cert. denied 508 U.S. 978 
(1993). Marks' contention is similar to that made in Deavers because Marks has not made 
any viable argument regarding how his personal retention of discovery and witness 
statements would have assisted his defense. Stated another way, we are unable to discern 
how Marks' defense was or could have been impaired by the district court's error. In 
24 
 
 
 
addition, the district court's order did not prevent Marks from reviewing and studying the 
discovery and witness statements. To the contrary, the district court instructed counsel to 
allow Marks to review the requested materials and confirmed that those instructions 
would be followed. Specifically, the record reflects: 
 
 
"[The Court]:  . . . [H]ere's what my ruling is going to be: Number one, that 
[defense counsel] can provide to Mr. Marks—can show Mr. Marks any document that he 
has in terms of discovery, that Mr. Marks can look at those documents, he can touch 
those documents and Mr. Marks can take any notes that he wants to from those 
documents in preparation for trial. But in terms of photocopying those documents or 
otherwise leaving . . . the discovery documents with Mr. Marks in the jail after [defense 
counsel] has ceased a meeting, court is going to order that that is not going to be the case 
in this particular situation.  
 
 
"So, Mr. Marks, you're going to have access to all those documents, you can take 
whatever notes that you feel is beneficial to you that you want to remember from those 
documents . . . ."  
 
We are convinced that the district court's refusal to allow Marks to retain personal 
copies of discovery and witness statements did not affect a constitutional right. 
Accordingly, we apply the harmless error analysis of K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105 
to determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the trial's 
outcome. McCullough, 293 Kan. at 981. And on that basis, we hold the error was 
harmless. 
 
Marks' attorney was provided with discovery in accordance with the Wyandotte 
County District Attorney's open file policy, which, as the district court noted, is more 
generous than the discovery statutes require and arguably allows the defense to perform 
more thorough trial preparation. There is no allegation Marks' defense was compromised 
due to his inability to obtain copies of discovery or that counsel failed to review that 
25 
 
 
 
discovery with Marks. Rather, Marks was permitted to review all discovery information 
and take notes if he chose to do so. Marks' counsel informed the court that he would 
allow Marks to review all the discovery information, and there is no suggestion that he 
did not do that. Finally, in viewing the entire record, we cannot discern any impact on the 
proceedings. Accordingly, we hold there is no reasonable probability the district court's 
error in interpreting K.S.A. 22-3212 and K.S.A. 22-3213 affected the trial's outcome. 
 
CUMULATIVE ERROR 
 
Marks asserts that the cumulative error doctrine necessitates reversal. We have 
identified two errors—the prosecutor's misstatement about premeditation and the district 
court's interpretation of the discovery statutes, K.S.A. 22-3213 and K.S.A. 22-3212. The 
test for cumulative error is "'whether the totality of circumstances substantially prejudiced 
the defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial. No prejudicial error may be found 
upon this cumulative effect rule, however, if the evidence is overwhelming against the 
defendant.' [Citation omitted.]" See State v. Edwards, 291 Kan. 532, 553, 243 P.3d 683 
(2010); State v. Foster, 290 Kan. 696, 726, 233 P.3d 265 (2010).  
 
The identified errors do not overtake the strength of the evidence against Marks. 
The evidence of his guilt was overwhelming based in significant part on his own 
statements to Rozeta, friends, and family. There is no cumulative error. 
 
Affirmed.   
 
* * * 
 
26 
 
 
 
JOHNSON, J., dissenting:  I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision on the 
prosecutorial misconduct issue relating to premeditation, in which the majority holds that 
the prosecutorial misconduct is not reversible error. I would reverse.  
 
First, notwithstanding its majority view status in this State, I continue to reject the 
notion that a person can premeditate a murder while committing the murder. In my view, 
concurrent premeditation is an oxymoronic concept that obliterates the distinguishing 
feature of first-degree premeditated murder. See State v. Appleby, 289 Kan. 1017, 1074-
75, 221 P.3d 525 (2009) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(premeditation contemplates that the matter be thought over before commencement of 
homicidal conduct); State v. Warledo, 286 Kan. 927, 956, 190 P.3d 937 (2008) (Johnson, 
J., concurring) (premeditation requires having thought the matter over beforehand; 
"beforehand" must mean prior to commencing the death-causing act).  
 
More specifically in this case, allowing the prosecutor to argue that a premeditated 
intent to kill "can be formed during the act itself" directly contradicted the plain language 
of the jury instruction given in this case, which told the jury that premeditation means "to 
have formed the design or intent to kill before the act." (Emphasis added.) To me, 
arguing that the formation of an intent to kill during the act fulfills the legal requirement 
that the intent to kill must be formed before the act is unequivocally erroneous, regardless 
of the context.  
 
Further, the instruction defining premeditation cautioned the jury that "the concept 
of premeditation requires more than the instantaneous, intentional act of taking another's 
life." Consequently, the jury had to struggle with the nonsensically confusing task of how 
to equate "during" with "before," while excluding "instantaneous." It is not surprising, 
then, that the jurors in this case were apparently befuddled, as indicated by their request 
for a "reasonable definition of 'instantaneous'" and their question as to whether "if 
27 
 
 
 
someone decides to act and then acts is that gap of time sufficient to declare pre-med?" 
The trial court answered the question by instructing the jury to re-read the instructional 
definition of premeditation but did not clarify that the jury could disregard the 
prosecutor's argument on how the jury was to apply that definition to the facts of this 
case. The majority's pointing out that one of the prosecutor's theories of premeditation 
may have comported with the plain language of the jury instruction does not answer the 
question of whether the jury was confused by the prosecutor's other theory of 
premeditation which directly contradicted the plain language of the premeditation 
instruction. I can have no confidence in a jury's conviction for premeditated murder when 
I have no confidence that the jury knew the meaning of "premeditated."  
 
Next, I am not persuaded that State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841, 257 P.3d 272 (2011), is 
distinguishable from Warledo and this case solely on the basis of the time necessary to 
complete the homicidal conduct, i.e., that Hall could fire four successive shots from a 
handgun faster than Warledo could stomp his mother to death or Marks could stab his 
wife eight times. I submit that a human brain can form thoughts faster than the human 
body can translate those thoughts into action, and that Hall's finger would not have pulled 
the handgun's trigger the second, third, and fourth time without being told to do so by 
Hall's brain. I further submit that a person's thought process during an adrenaline-flooded, 
life-endangering crisis does not operate in the thoughtful, contemplative manner 
suggested by some of our prior cases. Here, for instance, the apparently random delivery 
of multiple stabs to nonvital locations on the victim's extremities indicates extreme rage 
more than considered behavior.  
 
Perhaps we should be guided by our double jeopardy jurisprudence, where we 
analyze multiplicity by first determining whether the convictions arise from the same 
conduct. See State v. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, Syl. ¶ 15, 133 P.3d 48 (2006). To 
determine whether a defendant's acts constituted unitary conduct, we look at such factors 
28 
 
 
 
as whether the acts occur at the same time and at the same location; whether the acts were 
separated by an intervening event; and whether some of the conduct was motivated by a 
fresh impulse. 281 Kan. 453, Syl. ¶ 16. I submit that we would not have allowed Marks 
to be convicted of seven additional counts of aggravated battery for the nonfatal stab 
wounds because we would find an absence of a fresh impulse for the multiple acts 
occurring at the same time and the same place. Yet, the majority view would allow him to 
form a fresh intent during the incident, even where no fresh impulse exists. I find that 
logic untenable. The crime of premeditated murder should be reserved for killings that 
are calmly planned or designed prior to the commencement of the murderous act, i.e., 
murder in cold blood, rather than applied to crimes of passion, regardless of the amount 
of time that may be consumed by the killer's rage.  
 
Nevertheless, I do agree with the majority's determination that the prosecutor's 
narrative, giving a blow-by-blow description of the stabbing incident, was not supported 
by the actual evidence the State presented at trial. The prosecutor's story related that the 
defendant methodically and deliberately stabbed the victim five or six times in various 
locations on her arms and hands before delivering the fatal stab to the chest, followed by 
one last stab to the neck. The prosecutor repeatedly emphasized the obvious fact that the 
stabbing was not accidental; arbitrarily declared that the defendant was not "flailing [the 
knife] around"; and unjustifiably suggested that there was a pause between stabs which 
allowed the defendant to "make the decision to do it again." But the coroner did not 
establish the order in which the victim's stab wounds were inflicted or the rapidity or 
precision with which they were delivered. Thus, while the prosecutor's dramatization 
served nicely to support the State's theory of concurrent premeditation, it impermissibly 
argued facts not in evidence. Obviously, the State's suggestion that Marks formed the 
intent to kill during the act of killing is not nearly so compelling if the fatal blow to the 
chest was the first stab he delivered. In that event, the killing would be more closely akin 
to "instantaneous," and the time it took to deliver the subsequent, superfluous, nonfatal 
29 
 
 
 
stabs would only have permitted the formation of retroactive premeditation, which is 
even more ludicrous than concurrent premeditation.  
 
But the bottom line is that, even if I were to surrender to the theory of concurrent 
premeditation, I could not excuse the prosecutor's arguing facts not in evidence in this 
case. This was not a slip of the tongue or an innocuous memory lapse. The prosecutor 
created her own scenario, unsupported by the facts, in order to present a better argument 
in support of the State's theory of the defendant's culpability for premeditation. 
Attempting to convict a person of a crime based on made-up facts is gross and flagrant 
conduct, if it is anything. Such conduct also has to suggest some level of ill will toward 
the defendant. I suspect that most, if not all, litigators wish they could manufacture better 
facts for closing argument, but they understand that justice does not permit that ploy.  
 
Finally, I cannot view the evidence of premeditation in this case as so 
overwhelming as to render the error harmless. The majority contends that the State 
presented sufficient evidence of premeditation under two theories:  (1) that Marks 
premeditated the murder before the act of killing, as evidenced by his threatening texts 
and telephone calls while the victim was in Tennessee; and (2) that "Marks formed 
premeditation to kill [the victim] between the eight stabs." The majority then points out 
that the definition of premeditation contained in the jury instructions—that the design or 
intent to kill must be formed before the act of killing—squares with the State's first 
theory, i.e., "that Marks premeditated [the victim's] murder while she was away in 
Tennessee." The majority then declares that "[t]here was sufficient evidence showing a 
strong inference that [the victim's] stabbing was premeditated." My disagreement with 
the majority's assessment of the strength of the premeditation evidence is not as important 
as my disagreement with the evidentiary test that the majority apparently applies. 
 
30 
 
 
 
As I read the majority opinion, it addresses a sufficiency of the evidence question, 
i.e., whether a rational jury could find the existence of the premeditation element, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, from the evidence presented at trial and from all reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from that evidence. But that is not the question presented 
here. We are considering the third factor of the second step of the prosecutorial 
misconduct analysis:  "'whether the evidence against the defendant is of such a direct and 
overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have had little weight in the minds 
of the jurors.'" State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 715-16, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011) (quoting 
State v. Bryant, 285 Kan. 970, Syl. ¶ 2, 179 P.3d 1122 [2008]).  
 
The evidence that the majority finds compelling on the first theory—the threats 
sent to Tennessee—is neither direct nor overwhelming. The most that can be read into the 
Tennessee texts is that Marks was thinking about killing his wife when she returned from 
Tennessee. That did not happen. In fact, after the victim returned from Tennessee, she 
told her Tennessee friend that Marks was begging her not to divorce him and to give him 
another chance. There has to be some causal connection between the premeditation and 
the act of killing. In other words, "the matter" which must be thought over beforehand is 
the act of murder that actually occurred, not some general homicidal thoughts in the past 
or some earlier design or plan to kill that was abandoned in favor of reconciliation. 
 
Granted, evidence that Marks had previously verbalized a threat to kill his wife 
may support some inference that he once again premeditated murder specifically with 
respect to the stabbing incident. Moreover, that would be a jury question. But we can say 
that the evidence of premeditation of this particular killing is certainly not overwhelming, 
especially in the face of the testimony of the defendant's brother, who saw the defendant 
and victim just minutes before the stabbing. The brother described the couple as 
appearing "normal" at that time and getting along; the brother did not think the defendant 
was agitated or angry. The victim waited in the car while the defendant picked up some 
31 
 
 
 
tools at the brother's house, and the victim waived to the brother. The Tennessee friend 
corroborated that tranquility, opining that the victim sounded "fine" when the friend 
spoke to her just before the stabbing. The evidence that one moment the defendant and 
the victim are normal and getting along and the next moment the victim is staggering 
down the street with eight stab wounds is just as indicative of a sudden quarrel as a 
premeditated killing. 
 
Further, the majority misdirects our inquiry by focusing on the State's first theory 
of premeditation upon which the majority found no prosecutorial misconduct. We should 
be looking at the impact of the prosecutor's misconduct which the majority found to be 
erroneous in this case, i.e., arguing facts not in evidence to prove that the intent was 
formed during the act. The inquiry is whether that misconduct was likely to have had 
little weight in the minds of the jurors. That inquiry is simplified in this case by the jury's 
questions to the trial court, which make it abundantly clear that premeditation was 
weighing heavily on the jury's collective mind. But even without the jury questions, I 
could not declare harmlessness where the prosecutor told the jury a make-believe story to 
support a theory of premeditation that directly contradicted the plain language of the jury 
instruction definition of premeditation. I would reverse and give Marks a fair trial with a 
jury that is properly led to understand the concept of premeditation.  
 
MORITZ, J., joins in foregoing dissent.