Title: Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 89963
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: June 21, 2001

Docket No. 89963-Agenda 24-March 2001.
THE VILLAGE OF BLOOMINGDALE, Appellant, v. CDG 								ENTERPRISES, INC., Appellee.
Opinion filed June 21, 2001.

	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	This case arises from the Village of Bloomingdale's denial of
a zoning petition submitted by CDG Enterprises, Inc., and presents
two issues for our review. First, whether the Illinois Constitution
permits imposition of the common law "corrupt or malicious
motives" exception to certain immunities afforded by the Local
Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act
(Tort Immunity Act or Act) (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West
1998)). Second, whether a claim for quasi-contract is proper under
section 2-101(a) of the Act (745 ILCS 10/2-101(a) (West 1998))
and whether the counterplaintiff alleged sufficient facts for this
court to impose a quasi-contract remedy. For the reasons set forth
below, we hold that the Illinois Constitution prohibits the insertion
of the common law "corrupt or malicious motives" exception into
the immunities provided by the Act. In addition, we hold that,
though section 2-101(a) of the Act, which preserves municipal
liability for contract, does not contemplate the remedy of quasi-contract, the counterplaintiff has failed to sufficiently assert a
claim for that remedy. Accordingly, we reverse the appellate court.



BACKGROUND
	Plaintiff, the Village of Bloomingdale (Village), sued CDG
Enterprises, Inc. (CDG), in the circuit court of Du Page County,
for breach of contract alleging that CDG had not paid for services
the Village had provided in reviewing its petition for rezoning and
site plan approval. CDG, as counterplaintiff, answered and filed
two counterclaims, one for tortious interference with business
expectancy and another for recovery under a quasi-contract theory.
These counterclaims are at issue in this appeal.
	In support of both counts, CDG alleged the following facts,
which we will take as true for purposes of this appeal on the
Village's motion to dismiss. See Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.
v. SEC Donohue, Inc., 176 Ill. 2d 160, 161 (1997). CDG was the
contract purchaser of five parcels of land adjacent to the Village
of Bloomingdale. In March 1995, CDG petitioned the Village's
planning commission to annex the five parcels into the Village and
rezone them so that CDG could build a subdivision. CDG's
representatives met with the Village's land planner and other
officials, including the Village mayor, who allegedly told CDG
that the project would be approved. Between April and October
1995, CDG repeatedly appeared before the Village planning
commission for public hearings on its petition.
	CDG further stated that, in June or July 1995, the Village
allegedly: secretly formed a "task force" in order to pursue the
acquisition and development of a golf course, which was adjacent
to the five parcels; commissioned Planning Resources, Inc., the
Village's consultant in charge of reviewing CDG's petition, to
prepare a plan to redesign the golf course so that some of the holes
would be on the property CDG intended to acquire; and secretly
met with other individuals to create opposition to CDG's plan. In
August 1995, the Village planning commission voted down
CDG's project, with the chairman allegedly pressuring other
members to vote against it. Then, in October 1995, the Village's
board of trustees voted down CDG's petition at a public hearing.
Soon afterward, the Village publicly revealed that it planned to
acquire the golf course, and later did so. In addition, one of the
parcels was allegedly bought by individuals "closely aligned with
certain of the Village's officials." CDG has not claimed that the
Village itself acquired any of the five parcels which CDG had
intended to purchase.
	CDG further alleged that its petition met all the Village's
requirements for rezoning and annexation; that CDG took all the
action the Village required; that CDG had spent heavily in reliance
on its meetings with the Village; and that, after the Village denied
the petition, CDG had to cancel its purchase contracts and forfeit
some of what it had paid. CDG's projected gross profits from the
project were $4.8 million.
	Count I of the counterclaim alleged that the Village
deliberately frustrated CDG's business expectancy by secretly
working to force CDG out of the planned development. While
ostensibly reviewing CDG's petition, the Village allegedly
planned all along to develop the adjoining golf course and help
cronies of certain Village officials purchase one of the five parcels.
Count II alleged that, when CDG filed its rezoning petition and
paid the required fee, the Village became obligated through quasi-contract to process CDG's petition reasonably and in good faith,
which it failed to do. CDG never stated what the Village or any of
its employees gained by their alleged misconduct. Both counts
sought in damages the projected gross profits of $4.8 million.
	The Village moved to dismiss the counterclaims pursuant to
section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code)
(735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 1998)). It asserted sovereign
immunity based on various provisions of the Tort Immunity Act
(see 745 ILCS 10/2-103, 2-104, 2-106, 2-109, 2-201, 2-205
(West 1998)). The trial court dismissed the counterclaims, holding
that both were barred by the Village's sovereign immunity under
the Act. The Village then voluntarily dismissed its complaint, and
CDG appealed.
	Before the appellate court, CDG argued that (1) the Tort
Immunity Act did not bar its counterclaims because the Act does
not immunize governmental actions undertaken for "corrupt or
malicious motives"; and (2) the Act did not bar the second count
for quasi-contract because section 2-101(a) of the Act (745 ILCS
10/2-101(a) (West 1998)) specifically preserves municipal
liability based on contract.
	The appellate court reversed the trial court and held that
CDG's tort claim could proceed under the Act. The court rejected
the Village's affirmative defenses and held that the general grants
of immunity afforded by the Act are limited by the common law
exception for "corrupt or malicious motives." 314 Ill. App. 3d 210,
214-15. The appellate court also reversed the trial court as to the
second count and held that the Village could be held liable in
quasi-contract to process CDG's petition in good faith and
according to its usual procedures, and that that claim fell under
section 2-101(a) and was, therefore, not barred by the Act. 314 Ill.
App. 3d at 215.
	The Village appealed and we granted review of both issues
under Rule 315(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). Since the trial court
dismissed CDG's counterclaim under section 2-619(a)(9) of the
Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 1998)), our review is de
novo. Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 386
(1998).



ANALYSIS
I. The Tort Immunity Act
	Traditionally, a governmental unit in Illinois was immune
from tort liability pursuant to the common law doctrine of
sovereign immunity. In 1959, however, this court abolished the
doctrine in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302,
18 Ill. 2d 11, 25 (1959). Then, in response to Molitor, the
legislature in 1965 enacted the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS
10/1-101 et seq. (West 1998)). Under the Act, Illinois adopted the
general principle that local governmental units are liable in tort,
but limited this liability with an extensive list of immunities based
on specific government functions. Burdinie v. Village of Glendale
Heights, 139 Ill. 2d 501, 506 (1990). Finally, in 1970, the state
adopted a new constitution and with it a new provision regarding
sovereign immunity. Article XIII, section 4, of the 1970
Constitution states: "Except as the General Assembly may provide
by law, sovereign immunity in this State is abolished." Ill. Const.
1970, art. XIII, §4. Today, therefore, the tort liability of a local
public entity or employee is expressly controlled both by the
constitutional provision and by legislative prerogative as embodied
in the Tort Immunity Act. Burdinie, 139 Ill. 2d  at 507.
	The purpose of the Tort Immunity Act is to protect local
public entities and public employees from liability arising from the
operation of government. 745 ILCS 10/1-101.1(a) (West 1998).
"By providing immunity, the legislature sought to prevent the
diversion of public funds from their intended purpose to the
payment of damage claims." Bubb v. Springfield School District
186, 167 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1995). The Tort Immunity Act grants
only immunities and defenses; it does not create duties. 745 ILCS
10/1-101.1(a) (West 1998). "Rather, the Act merely codifies those
duties existing at common law, to which the subsequently
delineated immunities apply." Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 386-88 (1996) (finding that park district owed plaintiff
a common law duty of reasonable care); In re Chicago Flood
Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 192 (1997) ("governmental units are
liable in tort on the same basis as private tortfeasors unless a tort
immunity statute imposes conditions upon that liability"); Bubb,
167 Ill. 2d  at 378; West v. Kirkham, 147 Ill. 2d 1, 14 (1992); Vesey
v. Chicago Housing Authority, 145 Ill. 2d 404, 412 (1991). The
existence of a duty and the existence of an immunity, therefore,
are separate issues. Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d  at 388. Once a court
determines that a duty exists, it then addresses whether the
governmental unit or employee is immune from liability for a
breach of that duty. See Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d  at 388. In other words,
because the Act implicitly recognizes duties which already exist
at common law, we may refer to the common law to determine the
duties a local public entity holds. But to determine whether that
entity is liable for the breach of a duty, we look to the Tort
Immunity Act, not the common law.



II. CDG's Counterclaim in Tort
	This court has already established a significant line of
precedent regarding the existence of common law exceptions to
immunities granted by the Act. The first case relevant to our
discussion is Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378 (1996),
where we considered whether the Act afforded immunity to a park
district from a claim arising from the drowning of a 10-year-old
boy in the district's pool. The district claimed immunity under
section 3-108(a), which provides in relevant part that, "neither a
local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury
caused by a failure to supervise an activity on or the use of any
public property." 745 ILCS 10/3-108(a) (West 1992). The plaintiff
alleged that the boy drowned in the vicinity of six lifeguards
despite requests for help by bystanders and, therefore, the park
district was liable for "willful and wanton misconduct." Barnett,
171 Ill. 2d  at 391.
	In dismissing the plaintiff's claim in Barnett, we held that
though the district owed the child a common law duty of
reasonable care, it was immune under section 3-108 from liability
for breaching that duty. Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d  at 388, 391-92. We
observed that when the legislature intended to limit an immunity
to cover only negligence and not willful and wanton misconduct,
it had "unambiguously done so." Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d  at 391, citing
e.g., 745 ILCS 10/2-202, 2-210, 3-106, 3-109(c)(2), 4-105,
5-103(b), 5-106 (West 1992). Unlike those instances, however,
the plain language of section 3-108 contained no exception for
willful and wanton misconduct. We reasoned that "[s]ince the
legislature omitted such a limitation from the plain language of
section 3-108, then the legislature must have intended to
immunize liability for both negligence and willful and wanton
misconduct." Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d  at 391-92. We concluded,
therefore, that "given the full immunity provided by the legislature
in the unconditional language of section 3-108" of the Act, the
park district was immune from liability. Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d  at 393.
See also West v. Kirkham, 147 Ill. 2d 1, 6-7 (1992) (declining to
insert notice requirement as a "substantial limitation on the
immunity of section 3-104 where none exists").
	Likewise, in In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179
(1997), we held that the City of Chicago was immune under
section 2-201 of the Act for its alleged failure to supervise the
construction work of a contractor on city bridges and for its failure
to warn local residents of the resulting water damage and to repair
the damage. Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d  at 192, 195-97; see 745
ILCS 10/2-201 (West 1998). Section 2-201, which is at issue in
this case, provides that, "a public employee serving in a position
involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion
is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in
determining policy when acting in the exercise of such discretion
even though abused." 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 1998). In
Chicago Flood, we based our holding on the same rationale as set
forth in Barnett and reasoned that since the plain language of
section 2-201 did not contain the common law exception to
immunity for "willful and wanton misconduct," the employee, and
consequently the City, were immune from liability. Chicago
Flood, 176 Ill. 2d  at 196.
	Next, in Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership,
181 Ill. 2d 335 (1998), we addressed sections 2-109 and 2-201 of
the Act with regard to the liability of the City of Chicago and its
employee, a fire marshal. See 745 ILCS 10/2-109 (West 1998)
(providing that a local public entity is not liable "for an injury
resulting from an act or omission of its employee where the
employee is not liable"). The plaintiff in Harinek alleged that the
City of Chicago fire marshal negligently conducted a fire drill and
that the fire marshal's conduct was "willful and wanton." Harinek,
181 Ill. 2d  at 338. We held that the fire marshal's conduct
constituted acts or omissions in determining policy and exercising
discretion under section 2-201. Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at 342-43. We
further held that section 2-201 did not contain an exception for
"willful and wanton misconduct" and, pursuant to Chicago Flood,
therefore, such a claim was barred by the City's immunity under
the Act. Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d  at 347, citing Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d  at 196.
	Finally, in Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381
(1998), we again followed the plain language of the Act and
declined to recognize the common law exception for "willful and
wanton misconduct" in the immunity afforded to local public
entities and employees under section 3-108. Henrich, 186 Ill. 2d 
at 395; see 745 ILCS 10/3-108 (West 1998).
	We turn now to the instant case, where CDG asks that we
impose the common law exception for "corrupt or malicious
motives" onto certain provisions of the Act. Based on the
foregoing precedent, we think it obvious that, just as the Act does
not contemplate an exception to immunity for "willful and wanton
misconduct," unless it expressly provides for such, the Act does
not implicitly contemplate the common law exception for "corrupt
or malicious motives." None of the provisions on which the
Village relies expressly recognize an exception for conduct
inspired by "corrupt or malicious motives." See 745 ILCS
10/2-103, 2-104, 2-106, 2-109, 2-201, 2-205 (West 1998). It is
well settled that "[w]here an enactment is clear and unambiguous
a court is not at liberty to depart from the plain language and
meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or
conditions that the legislature did not express." Kraft, Inc. v.
Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). See also Michigan Avenue
National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 508 (2000);
Henrich, 186 Ill. 2d at 394-95; Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d  at 193;
Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d  at 388-89. Therefore, because the plain
language of these provisions does not contain an exception for
"corrupt or malicious motives," we will not insert one.
	Moreover, if this court were to recognize an exception for
"corrupt or malicious motives" where none exists at all in the Act,
we would be venturing into the province of the legislature and
violating the separation of powers. As we explained in Harinek,
		"[W]hen a court finds *** that the General Assembly has
granted a public entity immunity from liability, the court
may not then negate that statutory immunity by applying
a common law exception to a common law rule. Doing so
would violate not only the Illinois Constitution's
provision governing sovereign immunity (Ill. Const. 1970,
art. XIII, §4), but also the Constitution's separation of
powers clause, which provides that no branch of
government 'shall exercise powers properly belonging to
another.' Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1." Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d 
at 346-47.
See also Michigan Avenue, 191 Ill. 2d  at 522, quoting People v.
Garner, 147 Ill. 2d 467, 475-76 (1992) (" 'Under the doctrine of
separation of powers, courts may not legislate, rewrite or extend
legislation. If the statute as enacted seems to operate in certain
cases unjustly or inappropriately, the appeal must be to the
General Assembly, and not to the court' "). If the legislature had
intended to include an exception for "corrupt or malicious
motives," it would have done so. Indeed, it has recognized
exceptions elsewhere. In section 2-202, for example, the
legislature granted immunity to a public employee for an "act or
omission in the execution or enforcement of any law unless such
act or omission constitutes willful and wanton conduct."
(Emphases added.) 745 ILCS 10/2-202 (West 1998). In section
3-106, the legislature again recognized an exception to liability for
willful and wanton misconduct. 745 ILCS 10/3-106 (West 1998).
The legislature has recognized exceptions to its grants of immunity
and enumerated these exceptions in the plain language of the Act.
See, e.g., 745 ILCS 10/2-202, 2-203, 2-208, 3-106, 3-109(c)(2),
4-105, 5-103(b), 5-106 (West 1998). On the other hand, no
provision of the Act contains an exception for "corrupt or
malicious motives." We will not adopt the legislative prerogative
to insert such an exception and, therefore, decline to impose the
common law "corrupt or malicious motives" exception onto the
immunities claimed by the Village in the instant case.
	The appellate court in this case held that the conduct
complained of by CDG did not even fall within any of the specific
government functions immunized by the Act. It reasoned that
CDG was "not complaining of the denial of its petition per se but,
rather, of the Village's abuse of the governmental process and
power to hijack [CDG's] plans." 314 Ill. App. 3d at 214. CDG's
claim was really about the "corrupt misuse of the Village's power
to steal away the expected benefits of [CDG's] plans to develop
the property." 314 Ill. App. 3d at 215. The "gravamen" of CDG's
claim, in other words, was the "Village's theft of [CDG's]
opportunity." 314 Ill. App. 3d at 213-14.
	The appellate court's characterization of CDG's claim is
mistaken because it ignores the plain language of the Act. Under
section 2-104 of the Act, for example, local public entities are
immune from liability for "injury caused by the *** denial ***, or
by the failure or refusal to issue *** any permit, license,
certificate, approval, order or similar authorization where the
entity or its employee is authorized by enactment to determine
whether or not such authorization should be issued [or] denied."
745 ILCS 10/2-104 (West 1998). The Village's denial of CDG's
rezoning petition is precisely what the legislature intended to
immunize such entities from. CDG attempts to avoid this result by
claiming that it really challenges the process by which the Village
denied its petition, not the mere fact that it was denied. But
whether the Village denied the petition through an "abuse of
official process and power," through "corrupt and malicious
misuse of power," or for "corrupt or malicious motives," as CDG
claims, is wholly immaterial to CDG's claim in tort. It is
immaterial because section 2-104 contains no reference to intent
whatsoever and, again, it certainly does not contain an exception
for "willful and wanton misconduct" or "corrupt or malicious
motives."
	As another twist on the above argument, CDG attempts to
frame its attack on the process by which the Village denied its
petition by labeling the denial a "ministerial task." CDG alleges
that the Village's course of conduct was a "deviation from the
standard of usual and customary zoning procedures," and that the
Village is not immune for its improper performance of this
ministerial task.
	CDG correctly asserts that though a municipality is immune
from liability in its performance of discretionary tasks, it cannot
claim immunity for the improper performance of ministerial tasks.
Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d  at 193-94. In fact, the discretionary
immunity doctrine is codified in sections 2-109 and 2-201 of the
Act, which provide that "a public employee serving in a position
involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion
[and, thereby, the local public entity,] is not liable for an injury
resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when
acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused." 745
ILCS 10/2-109, 2-201 (West 1998); Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d 
at 193-94. As this court has previously explained:
		" 'Official action is judicial where it is the result of
judgment or discretion. Official duty is ministerial, when
it is absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the
execution of a set task, and when the law which imposes
it, prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion of
its performance with such certainty, that nothing remains
for judgment or discretion.' " Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d 
at 194, quoting City of Chicago v. Seban, 165 Ill. 371,
377-78 (1897).
We have never held, however, that the grant or denial of a zoning
petition is a ministerial, as opposed to a discretionary, task under
a tort theory of liability. Therefore, CDG's argument is misplaced.
Moreover, section 2-104 plainly grants immunity for injury caused
by the "denial [of] any permit" and is, therefore, controlling.
(Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/2-104 (West 1998).
	In addition, if there were a "theft of [CDG's] opportunity" by
the Village, as the appellate court found, that "theft" came in the
form of the denial of CDG's petition. That the Village denied
CDG's petition is the reason this matter is before us. Such an
action by the Village falls squarely within section 2-104 of the Act
because the Village and its officials were authorized to either grant
or deny CDG's petition for rezoning and site plan approval.
Clearly, the legislature did not intend to grant an empty immunity
to local public entities when they denied "permits" such as zoning
petitions. See State Farm Fire &amp; Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 541 (1992) ("a court construing the language of a statute
will assume that the legislature did not intend to produce an absurd
or unjust result"). CDG alleged that it was injured by the denial of
the petition; we hold, therefore, that pursuant to the Act the
Village is immune from liability for any injury resulting from that
denial.
	Likewise, the Village is immune from liability for any injury
resulting from the mayor's alleged assurance that the project
would be approved. Under section 2-106 of the Act, the Village
is not liable for an injury "caused by an oral promise or
misrepresentation of its employee, whether or not such promise or
misrepresentation is negligent or intentional." (Emphasis added.)
745 ILCS 10/2-106 (West 1998). And section 2-109 provides that
a local public entity is not liable where its employee is not liable.
745 ILCS 10/2-109 (West 1998). CDG claims that, in reliance on
its meetings with the Village and the mayor, it spent a good deal
of money and, when the Village denied the petition, it had to
cancel its purchase contracts and forfeit some of what it had paid.
Section 2-106, however, immunizes the Village from liability for
any injury resulting from another's reliance on an employee's oral
promises or misrepresentations. 745 ILCS 10/2-106 (West 1998).
In fact, that section expressly immunizes the Village even when
the promise or misrepresentation is "intentional." 745 ILCS
10/2-106 (West 1998). CDG's tort claim falls within the purview
of sections 2-104, 2-106, 2-109, and 2-201 of the Act; therefore,
the Village is immune from liability.
	CDG's heavy reliance on the opinion of the Appellate Court,
Second District, in River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 281
Ill. App. 3d 154 (1996), is misplaced. In River Park, the appellate
court held that a municipality was not shielded from liability for
conduct that was "corrupt, malicious, or otherwise undertaken in
bad faith" under the immunity granted by section 2-104 of the
Act. River Park, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 163. However, not only did the
court in River Park not have the benefit of this court's holdings in
Chicago Flood, Harinek, and Henrich, but the rationale of River
Park was based on a case that originated before the 1970
Constitution. In that decision, Young v. Hansen, 118 Ill. App. 2d
1 (1969), the Second District adopted the common law exception
of "corrupt or malicious motives" as an exception to the Act.
Young held that the "immunity afforded by section 2-201-while
not expressly referring to the question of malice-extends only to
those types of acts not resulting from corrupt or malicious
motives." Young, 118 Ill. App. 2d at 8. Since then, the Second
District has followed the Young holding to recognize the "corrupt
or malicious motives" exception to other grants of immunity by
the Act. See River Park, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 163; Madonna v.
Giacobbe, 190 Ill. App. 3d 859, 868 (1989) (recognizing corrupt
or malicious motives exception to sections 2-103, 2-201, and
2-205); Idlehour Development Co. v. City of St. Charles, 88 Ill.
App. 3d 47, 52 (1980) (recognizing corrupt or malicious motives
exception to sections 2-201 and 2-206 of the Act).
	Since 1970, however, the authority of the General Assembly
to legislate with regard to governmental immunity has derived
directly from the Illinois Constitution. The Constitution was
amended to abolish sovereign immunity "[e]xcept as the General
Assembly may provide by law." (Emphasis added.) Ill. Const.
1970, art. XIII, §4. "Therefore, the tort liability of a [local public
entity] is expressly controlled by constitutional provision and
legislative prerogative as embodied in the [Act]." (Emphasis
added.) Burdinie, 139 Ill. 2d  at 507. Tort liability of local public
entities is no longer controlled by the common law because the
adoption of article XIII, section 4, in 1970 wholly displaced the
common law doctrines of municipal tort immunity. Calloway v.
Kinkelaar, 168 Ill. 2d 312, 335-36, 339 (1995) (Freeman, J.,
specially concurring). See also Michigan Avenue, 191 Ill. 2d  at
519 (reasoning that the "legislature has the inherent authority to
repeal or change the common law and may do away with all or
part of it"). Governmental tort immunity has become a matter of
statute and the "General Assembly [was made] the ultimate
authority in determining whether a unit of local government is
immune from tort liability ***." Burdinie, 139 Ill. 2d  at 510.
	Young was decided before article XIII, section 4, of the 1970
Constitution; therefore, its rationale of drawing from the common
law doctrine of sovereign immunity to interpret the Tort Immunity
Act is improper. Moreover, it appears that the constitutional issue
was never presented to the appellate court in River Park. Young
and its progeny, including River Park, are hereby overruled.
	Based on these considerations, we reverse the appellate court
and affirm the trial court's dismissal of CDG's counterclaim in tort
as barred by the Village's sovereign immunity under sections
2-104, 2-106, 2-109, and 2-201 of the Act.



III. CDG's Counterclaim in Quasi-Contract
	In count II, CDG claims that when it filed its rezoning petition
and paid the required fee, the Village became obligated to process
its petition in good faith. CDG frames it as a claim in "quasi-contract" in order to avail itself of section 2-101 of the Act, which
states that the Act does not affect liability based on contract. See
745 ILCS 10/2-101(a) (West 1998).
	In an action for "quasi-contract" (or, contract implied in law),
a plaintiff asks the court to remedy the fact that the defendant was
"unjustly enriched" by imposing a contract. See People ex rel.
Hartigan v. E&amp;E Hauling, Inc., 153 Ill. 2d 473, 497 (1992). A
quasi-contract exists independent of any agreement or consent of
the parties. Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 Ill. 2d 320,
334 (1977) ("The right to recover on a [quasi-contract], although
phrased in contract terminology, is not based on an agreement
between parties but is an obligation created by law"). In fact, the
intention of the parties is entirely disregarded. A quasi-contract,
therefore, is "no contract at all," but a "rule of law that requires
restitution to the plaintiff of something that came into the
defendant's hands but in justice belongs to the plaintiff." D.
Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies §4.2(3), at 580 (2d ed. 1993).
Such an action is based on the principle that no one ought to
enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another. Liability is based
on the principle of unjust enrichment and the contract is the
remedy.
	Because a quasi-contract is "no contract at all" but instead is
a remedy based upon the principle of unjust enrichment, it follows
that quasi-contract is not a "contract" for purposes of section
2-101(a) (745 ILCS 10/2-101(a) (West 1998)). Consequently,
section 2-101(a), which preserves municipal liability based upon
contract, does not apply to CDG's second count for quasi-contract.
The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding that the second
count of CDG's counterclaim fell within section 2-101(a) and in
finding that the Village could be held liable in quasi-contract to
process CDG's petition in good faith and according to its usual
procedures. Accordingly, we reverse the appellate court and affirm
the trial court's dismissal of count II of CDG's counterclaim as
barred by the Village's sovereign immunity under sections 2-104,
2-106, 2-109, and 2-201 of the Act. Because we find that count
II of CDG's counterclaim was barred by the Village's sovereign
immunity, we need not consider whether CDG properly stated a
claim in quasi-contract.



CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated, we reverse the appellate court's
holding that CDG's count I in tort could proceed against the
Village under the Tort Immunity Act. We also reverse the
appellate court's judgment allowing CDG's count II claim in
quasi-contract to proceed. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of
CDG's counterclaim in tort and quasi-contract.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
	JUSTICE McMORROW, concurring in part and dissenting in
part:
	I am in agreement with the conclusion of the majority that
section 2-101(a) of the Local Governmental and Governmental
Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act or Act) (745
ILCS 10/2-101(a) (West 1998)), which preserves municipal
liability for claims based on "contract," does not contemplate
actions for quasi-contract. An action in quasi-contract is a theory
of recovery which is "totally unrelated to traditional concepts of
contract law." 42 C.J.S. Implied Contracts §4 (1991); see
generally 1 D. Dobbs, Remedies §4.2(3), at 580 (2d ed. 1993).
	I am also in agreement with the majority's analysis of section
2-106 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-106 (West
1998)), which provides that "[a] local public entity is not liable for
an injury caused by an oral promise or misrepresentation of its
employee, whether or not such promise or misrepresentation is
negligent or intentional." (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/2-106
(West 1998). Because intentional conduct is explicitly immunized
in this provision, I concur in the majority's conclusion that the
Village of Bloomingdale (Village) is immune from liability for any
alleged injuries claimed by CDG Enterprises, Inc. (CDG), in its
counterclaim as a result of the assurances made by the Village's
mayor that CDG's development project would be approved.
	I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority's
conclusion that intentional misconduct by a local public entity or
employee is also shielded by the provisions contained within
section 2-104 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-104
(West 1998)). For the reasons more fully set forth in my separate
opinions in Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 402-08
(1996) (McMorrow, J., dissenting), In re Chicago Flood
Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 213-14 (1997) (McMorrow, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), Harinek v. 161 North
Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 354 (1998)
(McMorrow, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and
Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 401-02
(1998) (McMorrow, J., dissenting), I continue to adhere to the
view that where the Tort Immunity Act is silent on the question of
whether intentional government misconduct is exempt from
immunity, it should not be concluded that such silence translates
into a positive intent on the part of the General Assembly to cloak
local governmental entities and their employees with
unconditional immunity.
	The genesis of the instant appeal is the March 1995 filing by
CDG of a petition with the Village's planning commission to
request the rezoning and annexation of five parcels of property
located between the Glendale Golf Course on the west and
Medinah Road on the east. CDG had contracted to purchase this
land with the intent of developing a residential subdivision
consisting of 122 townhomes. In August 1995, the Village's
planning commission voted down the project, and in October
1995, the Village's board of trustees denied CDG's rezoning and
site plan approval request during a public hearing.
	In September 1996, the Village filed a complaint for breach
of contract against CDG, alleging that CDG had breached a
written "application fee agreement" with the Village in which
CDG had promised to pay the costs of the Village's attorney, land
planner, engineer and director of legal affairs in conjunction with
CDG's application for rezoning and site plan approval. The
Village's complaint alleged that CDG had failed to pay the costs
owed to the Village pursuant to this written agreement.
	CDG answered the Village's complaint and filed a
counterclaim against the Village. The circuit court granted the
Village's motion to dismiss CDG's counterclaim pursuant to
section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS
5/2-619(a)(9) (West 1998)), finding that various provisions of the
Tort Immunity Act immunized the Village from CDG's claims.
Because this appeal comes before us on review of a section 2-619
dismissal, we must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in CDG's
counterclaim, as well as all inferences that can reasonably be
drawn in CDG's favor. See Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v.
Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 189 Ill. 2d 200, 206
(2000).
	CDG's counterclaim alleges that the Village tortiously
interfered with CDG's business expectancy in purchasing the five
parcels of land and in developing the intended residential
subdivision. According to the counterclaim, prior to negotiating
the contracts to acquire the land parcels, representatives of CDG
met with the Village's mayor to determine the feasibility of the
subdivision project. According to the counterclaim, the mayor
assured CDG that the "project would be approved" based upon the
Village's desire to encourage further residential development
along the Medinah Road corridor. According to CDG, between
September 1994 and October 1995, its representatives not only
met with various Village officials on numerous occasions to
review CDG's development plans, but also appeared before the
Village's planning commission several times for public hearings
regarding CDG's rezoning and annexation requests. The
counterclaim alleges that while the Village was ostensibly
reviewing CDG's proposals, sometime during June or July 1995
the "Village formed an internal secret 'task force' to pursue the
acquisition and financing" of the Glendale Golf Course. The
counterclaim further alleges that certain Village officials "secretly
met with non-resident property owners along the Medinah Road
corridor in an effort to manufacture opposition" to CDG's
development plans, with the goal of "subvert[ing] and
manipulat[ing] the public hearing process so as to deprive [CDG]
of a fair and impartial hearing so that the Village, or certain
developers favored by certain of the Village's officials, could
acquire the parcels for which [CDG] was the contract purchaser."
	The counterclaim further relates that the Village retained
Planning Resources, Inc., as its consultant for land planning and
development. According to the counterclaim, at the same time that
Planning Resources was reviewing CDG's land plans and petition,
the Village had surreptitiously commissioned Planning Resources
"to prepare a redesign of the Glendale Golf Course so as to
reconfigure the lay-out of various holes" onto CDG's property.
CDG alleges that at no time did any representative of Planning
Resources or the Village disclose Planning Resource's dual
capacity. The counterclaim further alleges that representatives of
Planning Resources "secretly met with the opposition group
created by certain of the Village's officials," and that one
representative of Planning Resources disclosed to CDG that "she
was told by an individual on the Village's board to kill [CDG's]
project."
	According to CDG's counterclaim, during the August 15,
1996, meeting of the Village's planning commission at which time
CDG's petition was declined, one commissioner "voiced objection
over the fact that the chairman of the Village's planning
commission had contacted him at home to discuss [CDG's]
pending petition," while a second commissioner objected to the
fact that "the chairman, prior to the commencement of the hearing,
had circulated a preprinted motion to deny [CDG's] project."
According to the counterclaim, these two members of the planning
commission filed a "minority report" setting forth the improper
acts of the chairman of the Village's planning commission.
	CDG's counterclaim further alleges that after the October 23,
1995, public hearing during which the Village's board of trustees
voted against CDG's petition, "the Village made public its
intention to acquire the Glendale Golf Course by public
referendum." Soon thereafter, CDG alleges, the Village
successfully acquired the golf course. CDG's counterclaim further
alleges that subsequent to the denial of its proposals, at least one
of the five land parcels was "purchased by individuals closely
aligned with certain of the Village's officials."
	In its counterclaim, CDG asserts that its petition met all of the
Village's requirements for rezoning and annexation; that CDG
took all the action the Village required; that CDG had incurred
costs in reliance on its meetings with the Village while Village
officials were "secretly working to sabotage the public hearing
process and [CDG's] development efforts"; and that after the
Village denied its petition, CDG was required to cancel the
purchase contracts and forfeit some of the monies which had been
paid.
	The counterclaim filed by CDG asserts that, based upon the
foregoing facts, the Village "wilfully and with a conscious
disregard for the rights of [CDG], purposefully and with the intent
to prevent [CDG] from obtaining its rezoning, annexation and
development," engaged in a course of conduct which "was
unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious," constituted a "deviation
from the standard of usual and customary zoning authority
procedures," and was "designed to subvert the public hearing
process so as to predetermine the outcome." CDG contends in its
counterclaim that this course of conduct was entered into for
"improper governmental purposes" and "specifically designed to
deprive [CDG] of its reasonable business expectancy." CDG
requested damages in the amount of $4.8 million, the expected
amount of gross profits from its development plans.
	The majority affirms the circuit court's dismissal of CDG's
counterclaim on the basis that the Village is immunized from
CDG's claims pursuant to several provisions of the Tort Immunity
Act. I disagree with the majority's holding that CDG's
counterclaim is barred by section 2-104 of the Act (745 ILCS
10/2-104 (West 1998)). The majority arrives at this conclusion
based on a rationale first employed by this court in Barnett v. Zion
Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378 (1996). In Barnett, this court held
that section 3-108(a) of the Act (745 ILCS 10/3-108(a) (West
1992)) cloaked the defendant park district with absolute immunity
against allegations that the defendant's swimming pool lifeguards
knowingly and willfully ignored pleas to help a drowning minor,
thereby causing the minor's death. The Barnett majority reasoned
that the absence of an explicit exception for willful and wanton
misconduct in section 3-108(a) of the Act meant that "the
legislature must have intended to immunize liability for both
negligence and willful and wanton misconduct." Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d  at 391-92. In the course of my dissent from the majority's
holding in Barnett, I observed that there "are strong reasons why
the policies underlying grants of immunity for simple negligence
should not be impliedly expanded to reach willful and wanton or
intentional misconduct." Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d  at 403 (McMorrow,
J., dissenting).
	More specifically, I explained that "[t]he general rationale for
granting public entities the protection of immunities not enjoyed
by private entities is the significant expense and burdens placed
upon the government" when negligence on the part of local public
entities or officials carrying out their government duties results in
injuries to the public and such negligence lawsuits "are permitted
to flourish unchecked." Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d  at 403-04 (McMorrow,
J., dissenting). It was my view, however, that the "rationale
underlying a grant of immunity for simple negligence is different
in kind from any justification for immunizing tortious conduct that
is intentionally harmful or willful and wanton," and if the
legislature actually intended to bestow absolute immunity for
willful and wanton misconduct, the immunity statute should
positively and unequivocally state such an intention. Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d  at 404 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
	Since Barnett, I have adhered to my belief that the policies
underlying grants of immunity for simple negligence are
distinguishable from any justification for blanketing deliberate
governmental misconduct with immunity. See In re Chicago
Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 213-14 (1997) (McMorrow, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Harinek v. 161 North
Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 354 (1998)
(McMorrow, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Henrich
v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 401-02 (McMorrow,
J., dissenting). I note that my conclusion in Barnett that the
legislature did not intend to immunize willful and wanton
misconduct in the immunity provisions of section 3-108 was
validated when the General Assembly passed Public Act 90-805
(Pub. Act 90-805, eff. December 2, 1998), which amended section
3-108 to exclude willful and wanton conduct from the immunity
granted by the statute. My conviction remains strong that
deliberate acts of governmental misconduct, such as those alleged
by CDG in the instant cause, are not shielded under the Tort
Immunity Act by provisions which remain silent with respect to an
express exemption for such intentional bad acts.
	In the matter at bar, the majority, based upon the Barnett
rationale, interprets section 2-104 of the Act (745 ILCS 10/2-104
(West 1998)) as affording a local governmental entity absolute
immunity against liability for an "injury" caused by a denial of
"any permit" because this section does not contain an express
exemption for willful and wanton misconduct or for corrupt and
malicious motives. In order to fit CDG's counterclaim within the
purview of section 2-104, the majority narrowly construes CDG's
allegations as a complaint against the Village's denial of its
rezoning, annexation and site development petition. As the
appellate court correctly held below, CDG's counterclaim
complains of more than the mere denial of its petition by the
Village. 314 Ill. App. 3d at 214. CDG alleges that the Village
deliberately, maliciously and willfully pursued a course of conduct
and abused its governmental powers in an effort to deprive CDG
of expected benefits and appropriate those benefits to itself and its
favored developers. Specific allegations in the counterclaim,
which must be taken as true, state that while the Village and its
officials gave the appearance that CDG's development and
annexation requests were being validly processed, the Village
secretly formed opposition groups against CDG's plans and had
commissioned the Village's own land planning consultant to work
in a dual capacity with respect to CDG. In addition, CDG alleged
that the chairman of the Village's land planning commission had
attempted to improperly influence the votes of the land planning
commissioners against CDG. Blanket immunity should not be
afforded to acts, such as those alleged by CDG, which are
performed by local governmental entities or government officials
in bad faith or out of corrupt and malicious motives.
	In support of its conclusion that the Village is afforded
absolute immunity against the allegations of CDG, the majority
asserts that "[c]learly, the legislature did not intend to grant an
empty immunity to local public entities when they denied
'permits' such as zoning petitions," and that construing section
2-104 in a contrary manner would lead to an absurd result. Slip
op. at 10-11. I disagree. It is evident to me that the blanket,
unlimited immunity bestowed upon the Village in this case is
unnecessary to protect public entities from liability arising from
"the operation of government," which is the stated purpose of the
Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/1-101.1 (West 1998)).
Construing section 2-104 of the Act to immunize only negligent
conduct would completely fulfill this legislative objective.(1)
	For the reasons stated, I dissent in part from the opinion of the
majority.
	 
1.      1In passing, the majority opinion also indicates that the allegations
of CDG's counterclaim are barred by section 2-201 of the Act (745
ILCS 10/2-201(West 1998)), which provides, inter alia, that a public
official serving in a position involving the exercise of discretion is not
liable for injuries resulting from an exercise of that discretion. However,
in the instant cause, the majority never actually applies section 2-201
as part of its analysis, instead characterizing as "misplaced" CDG's
argument that the process of considering a zoning petition is ministerial.
Nevertheless, I reiterate my view, explained in my dissent in In re
Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 214 (McMorrow, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), that because "good faith is a
component of discretionary immunity," section 2-201 does not
immunize willful and wanton misconduct.