Title: PEOPLE OF MI V DANNY LEE KNOX JR
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 123970
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: February 4, 2004

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court  
Lansing, Michigan 48909  
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED FEBRUARY 4, 2004 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 123970 
DANNY LEE KNOX, JR., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
PER CURIAM 
The defendant was charged in the death of his four­
month-old son, Xavier Knox, and convicted of first-degree 
felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), with first-degree child 
abuse, MCL 750.136b(2), as the predicate. He was sentenced 
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. We 
must determine whether the admission of evidence regarding 
defendant’s past anger directed at the child’s mother, the 
child’s prior injuries, and the mother’s good character 
were plain errors affecting defendant’s substantial rights. 
The Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, affirmed the 
 
 
 
judgment of the trial court. 
We reverse the conviction of 
defendant and remand for a new trial. 
I 
On July 22, 1998, defendant was in the apartment of 
LaToya Kelley, the mother of his son. 
The couple argued 
during the evening, and Kelley later fed Xavier a bottle of 
formula and put him to bed. 
Defendant testified that 
Xavier seemed fine at that time. 
After Xavier went to 
sleep, Kelley left the apartment around 9:30 p.m. to visit 
a friend and neighbor. 
According to defendant, he checked 
on Xavier at around 9:45 p.m. and then sent Kelley’s two­
year-old child to the bathroom. When defendant returned to 
the bedroom, he noticed Xavier making gurgling noises and 
saw that his eyes had rolled back into his head. 
Xavier 
would not respond, so defendant ran to the balcony to call 
out for Kelley and then telephoned Kelley’s mother to tell 
her that something was wrong with the baby. Defendant took 
his son to a neighbor, who in turn called 911. 
Emergency 
personnel arrived at the apartment around 10:15 p.m., at 
which point Xavier still had a heartbeat. 
By 10:25 p.m., 
the child’s heartbeat had stopped. 
Medical experts determined that the boy had died from 
being severely shaken and from his head coming into contact 
with an object several times. 
The boy suffered from 
retinal hemorrhaging, subdural and subarachnoid hematoma, 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
and three distinct skull fractures from three separate 
contacts with an unknown object. 
The experts opined that 
Xavier’s injuries were not accidental, that the child most 
likely lost consciousness within one or two minutes of 
being injured, and that it would have been impossible for 
Xavier to consume formula after being injured. 
An expert 
also opined that Xavier’s respiratory problems could have 
stabilized for an hour or more before his heart rate 
collapsed. 
There was also evidence that he had suffered 
prior 
abusive 
injuries, 
including 
recently 
sustained 
factures to the right arm and left leg, as well as healed 
rib fractures that were between three- and six-weeks-old. 
Defendant’s first trial resulted in a deadlocked jury. 
At his second trial, defendant denied killing or ever 
abusing his son and argued that it was Kelley who must have 
abused Xavier before leaving the apartment. 
Kelley 
testified that she and defendant had many arguments, with 
defendant becoming increasingly angry, shouting and kicking 
physical objects. 
On one occasion, he allegedly shoved 
her. 
Kelley also testified that she told defendant to get 
help for his anger and urged him to take anger-management 
classes. 
Defendant claimed that these were, in fact, 
parenting classes, but admitted that he took them at 
Kelley’s urging. 
Kelley admitted that she, too, had a 
temper and that she had thrown items and torn a shower 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
curtain in anger. The prosecutor, however, also elicited 
testimony from her about how she had cared for her eleven 
brothers and sisters from the age of eight, and how she 
loved children in general and treasured her own two 
children. 
Kelley’s parents and friends testified that she 
had a caring nature and loved her children. 
Defendant did not object at trial to the testimony 
regarding his angry confrontations with Kelley, the prior 
injuries sustained by his son, or the testimony regarding 
Kelley’s 
good 
character. 
After 
the 
jury 
convicted 
defendant, defendant appealed of right.1  Defendant accused 
the prosecutor of misconduct in presenting the evidence 
regarding defendant’s prior acts, Xavier’s prior injuries, 
and Kelley’s good character, and accused his trial counsel 
of ineffective assistance in failing to object. 
Defendant 
also 
questioned 
the 
propriety 
of 
his 
felony-murder 
conviction where the acts comprising the predicate felony 
also comprised the murder. 
The Court of Appeals treated defendant’s first issue 
as a purely evidentiary one and, in a divided decision, 
1 Defendant first sought a remand for an evidentiary
hearing on the effectiveness of the assistance of his trial
counsel on the basis of counsel’s failure to challenge the
prosecutor’s submission of this evidence. 
The Court of 
Appeals denied defendant’s motion because it was not 
persuaded that a remand was necessary at that time. 
Unpublished order, entered May 21, 2001 (Docket No. 
226944). 
4 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
affirmed defendant’s conviction.2  In ruling that defendant 
was not entitled to relief, the majority relied heavily on 
this Court’s decision in People v Hine, 467 Mich 242; 650 
NW2d 659 (2002), and the majority’s belief that this 
decision compelled a finding that there was no showing by 
the defendant of plain error affecting his substantial 
rights. 
The majority found the evidence of defendant’s 
angry behavior against Kelley sufficiently similar to the 
alleged abuse of the child to be either admissible or not 
harmful in admission. 
It found the evidence of the past 
abuse of defendant’s son probative of whether the injuries 
the boy suffered were inflicted intentionally. 
It found 
the admission of the evidence of Kelley’s good character 
improper under MRE 608 and 609, as well as MRE 404, but saw 
no showing of plain error affecting defendant’s substantial 
rights because the prosecutor had a reasonable likelihood 
of convicting defendant by demonstrating that defendant was 
alone with the boy when the fatal injuries were sustained. 
The dissenting judge disagreed with the majority’s 
assessment of the effect of Hine, stating that Hine was 
consistent with precedent, and that application of that 
precedent required a reversal in this case. The dissenting 
judge opined that the evidence of defendant’s past anger 
2 256 Mich App 175; 662 NW2d 482 (2003).
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and abuse served the improper purpose of demonstrating that 
defendant must have abused his son, resulting in the boy’s 
death, because defendant had a bad character. 
The 
dissenter agreed that the evidence of past abuse of the 
child was admissible under MRE 404(b), but stated that the 
prosecutor put this evidence to improper use by indicating 
to the jury that the prior injuries were not just 
intentionally 
caused, 
but 
were 
caused 
by 
defendant. 
Finally, the dissenting judge opined that admission of the 
evidence regarding Kelley’s good character prejudicially 
undermined defendant’s credibility and defense. 
The 
dissenter argued that these plain errors were outcome­
determinative and required the reversal of defendant’s 
conviction and a remand for a new trial. 
Although we agree with the Court of Appeals majority’s 
assessment that this matter should be analyzed from the 
standpoint of whether admission of the contested evidence 
discussed 
above 
constituted 
plain 
error 
affecting 
defendant’s 
substantial 
rights, 
we 
agree 
with 
the 
dissenting judge that plain error requiring reversal did, 
in fact, occur. 
II 
In order to preserve the issue of the improper 
admission of evidence for appeal, a party generally must 
object at the time of admission. Because defendant did not 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
object to the admission of the challenged evidence in this 
case, he must demonstrate plain error affecting his 
substantial rights, meaning that he was actually innocent 
or 
that 
the 
error 
seriously 
affected 
the 
fairness, 
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings 
independent of his innocence. 
People v Carines, 460 Mich 
750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 
III 
MRE 404(b) provides in part: 
(1) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. 
It may, however, be admissible for
other 
purposes, 
such 
as 
proof 
of 
motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan,
or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident when the same 
is material, whether such other crimes, wrongs,
or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or
subsequent to the conduct at issue in the case. 
In People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74-75; 508 NW2d 
114 (1993), this Court articulated the factors that must be 
present for other acts evidence to be admissible. 
First, 
the prosecutor must offer the "prior bad acts" evidence 
under something other than a character or propensity 
theory. 
Second, "the evidence must be relevant under MRE 
402, as enforced through MRE 104(b)[.]" 
Id. 
Third, the 
probative value of the evidence must not be substantially 
outweighed by unfair prejudice under MRE 403. Finally, the 
7  
 
 
 
trial 
court, 
upon 
request, 
may 
provide 
a 
limiting 
instruction under MRE 105. 
In People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 385; 582 NW2d 785 
(1998), this Court explained that the prosecution bears the 
initial burden of establishing the relevance of the 
evidence to prove a fact within one of the exceptions to 
the general exclusionary rule of MRE 404(b). “Relevance is 
a relationship between the evidence and a material fact at 
issue that must be demonstrated by reasonable inferences 
that make a material fact at issue more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence.” Crawford, 
supra at 387. 
Where the only relevance of the proposed 
evidence is to show the defendant’s character or the 
defendant’s propensity to commit the crime, the evidence 
must be excluded. 
In People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43; 614 
NW2d 888 (2000), this Court specifically examined the 
exception in MRE 404(b) for evidence showing a “scheme, 
plan, or system.” 
We clarified that “evidence of similar 
misconduct is logically relevant to show that the charged 
act occurred where the uncharged misconduct and the charged 
offense are sufficiently similar to support an inference 
that they are manifestations of a common plan, scheme, or 
system.” 
Sabin, supra at 63. 
We cautioned both that 
“[l]ogical relevance is not limited to circumstances in 
8  
 
 
 
  
which the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single 
continuing 
conception 
of 
plot,” 
and 
that 
“[g]eneral 
similarity between the charged and uncharged acts does not, 
however, by itself, establish a plan, scheme, or system 
used to commit the acts.” Id. at 64. 
These decisions continue to form the foundation for a 
proper analysis of MRE 404(b). 
The case upon which the 
instant Court of Appeals majority placed so much emphasis, 
Hine, 
focused 
very 
specifically 
and 
narrowly 
on 
a 
particular application of the “scheme, plan, or system” 
principles discussed in Sabin to the facts presented. This 
Court concluded in Hine that the Court of Appeals had 
improperly 
imposed 
a 
standard 
of 
a 
high 
degree 
of 
similarity 
between 
the 
proffered 
other 
acts 
of 
the 
defendant and the charged acts. 
Specifically, this Court 
observed that the particular type of assaults on the 
defendant’s former girlfriends were sufficiently similar to 
the method or system that could have caused the marks on 
the child victim to be admissible in that case. 
The trial 
court, 
therefore, 
did 
not 
abuse 
its 
discretion 
in 
determining that the assaults by the defendant on his 
former girlfriends and the charged offenses regarding the 
9  
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
child victim shared sufficient common features to permit 
the inference of a plan, scheme, or system.3 
Contrary to the Court of Appeals majority’s conclusion 
that Hine “presents a formidable obstacle to reversing on 
the basis of a trial court’s error in admitting prior-bad­
acts evidence” and has “reduced the value parties opposing 
prior-bad-acts evidence once derived from the first and 
third prongs of the VanderVleit test,” 256 Mich App 188­
189, Hine merely applied the rule that prior bad acts 
evidence that is probative of something other than the 
defendant’s character or propensity to commit the charged 
crime is admissible. 
Hine neither announced new law nor 
did it signify a retreat from the VanderVliet principles; 
rather, it simply rejected an interpretation of Sabin that 
would 
have 
required 
an 
impermissibly 
high 
level 
of 
3 This Court commented in Hine, supra, on the odd 
circumstance that the Court of Appeals chose to recite the
facts from defendant’s point of view. 
We observed that it 
was not appropriate for an appellate court to discount the
evidence presented to the trial court in support of the
prosecution’s theory. Id. at 251. As the dissenting judge
in the instant case recognized, our concern in Hine was 
that the Court of Appeals had based its analysis on the
erroneous conclusion that the evidence presented was 
insufficient to support the conviction. 
The Court of 
Appeals 
majority’s 
apparent 
interpretation 
of 
this 
criticism found in Hine as the establishment of a new 
appellate standard of review for trial court rulings on
relevancy under MRE 404(b) is not warranted. 
Rather, this
Court in Hine simply stated the unremarkable principle
that, when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting a conviction, the evidence must be considered in
the light most favorable to the prosecution.
10 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
similarity between the proffered other acts evidence and 
the charged acts. 
IV 
With this understanding of the continued validity of 
this Court’s MRE 404(b) jurisprudence, we now examine the 
propriety 
of 
the 
admitted 
prior 
acts, 
injury, 
and 
reputation evidence. 
We conclude that the admission of 
this evidence was erroneous and raises sufficient concern 
about the fairness of the trial and the integrity of the 
jury’s verdict to require the reversal of defendant’s 
conviction and a remand for a new trial. 
The evidence of defendant’s past demonstrations of 
anger were not relevant to any material fact at issue and 
did not meet the requirements set forth in Sabin for 
admissibility. 
Unlike the acts at issue in Hine, none of 
defendant’s 
alleged 
manifestations 
of 
anger 
had 
any 
similarity to the acts that resulted in Xavier’s death. 
The evidence showed that defendant had damaged walls and 
doors and, on one occasion, had shoved Kelley during an 
argument. 
Nothing about the evidence offered demonstrated 
any prior acts by defendant that were similar to the acts 
that were determined to have caused Xavier’s injuries. 
Further, no evidence suggested that defendant was ever 
angry with his son or that he redirected his anger with 
Kelley to either Xavier or Kelley’s other child. 
No one 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
testified to ever seeing defendant harm his son. 
The fact 
that defendant took classes (either for parenting or for 
anger management) showed that he was trying to deal with 
Kelley’s perception that he had an anger problem, not that 
he had committed prior acts similar to those inflicted on 
Xavier. 
Under these circumstances, the evidence of defendant’s 
past anger could only serve the improper purpose of 
demonstrating that he had the bad character or propensity 
to harm his son. 
The prosecutor specifically argued that 
defendant’s 
anger-management 
problem 
was 
a 
plausible 
explanation for what happened to Xavier. As the dissenting 
judge below correctly noted, the prosecutor did not use the 
evidence of defendant’s anger for any other reason except 
to make an impermissible propensity argument. 
In this 
case, in which defendant’s abuse of his son was implied 
from defendant having been the last adult to be alone with 
his son, the improper admission of the evidence was highly 
prejudicial. The trial court committed plain error when it 
admitted this evidence. 
Turning to the evidence of Xavier’s prior injuries, we 
agree with both the Court of Appeals majority and the 
dissent that the signs of past physical abuse of the child 
were relevant to prove that his subsequent fatal injuries 
were not inflicted accidentally. 
We concur, however, with 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
the dissent that the trial court committed error requiring 
reversal in permitting the prosecutor to use this evidence 
for an improper purpose. 
The prosecutor introduced the 
evidence of prior injury not only to show that the earlier 
events were abusive, but also to convince the jury that 
defendant had caused those prior injuries, despite the 
absence of any evidence that defendant had committed the 
past abuse. 
As the Court of Appeals dissent correctly noted, “this 
was a close credibility contest with little hard evidence 
and 
the 
prosecutor 
improperly 
sought 
to 
establish 
[defendant’s] bad character rather than risk an acquittal 
as a result of the slim evidence of his guilt.” 
256 Mich 
App 208. 
The trial court committed plain error in failing 
to prevent the prosecutor from improperly using the 
evidence of prior abuse. 
Finally, we agree with both the Court of Appeals 
majority and dissent that it was plain error to permit the 
introduction of the evidence regarding Kelley’s good 
character. 
We agree with the dissent that this evidence 
improperly undermined defendant’s credibility. 
The prosecution presented this evidence as part of its 
case-in-chief. 
Eight witnesses testified positively about 
Kelley’s background and parenting skills.  This evidence 
was logically irrelevant to the prosecution’s case-in­
13  
 
 
 
 
chief, was improper character evidence under MRE 404(a), 
and did not serve one of the noncharacter purposes listed 
in MRE 404(b). 
Character evidence related to witnesses is 
governed under MRE 404(a)(4) by MRE 607, 608, and 609. MRE 
608(a) limits opinion and reputation evidence to character 
for truthfulness or untruthfulness after the character of 
the witness has been attacked. 
MRE 608(b) then allows the 
trial court to admit evidence of specific witness conduct 
to support the witness’s credibility. 
In this case, the 
evidence of Kelley’s character had nothing to do with her 
truthfulness 
or 
untruthfulness. 
The 
evidence 
was 
improperly introduced to demonstrate that Kelley acted in 
conformity with her alleged good character, in contrast to 
defendant acting in conformity with his alleged bad 
character. 
The improper admission of the evidence of Kelley’s 
good character, like the admission of the evidence of 
defendant’s anger problems and the improper use of the 
evidence regarding Xavier’s prior injuries, created far too 
great a risk of affecting the outcome of the case, given 
the absence of any direct evidence that defendant committed 
the acts that resulted in Xavier’s death. Consequently, we 
14  
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand 
this case to the circuit court for a new trial.4 
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
4 In light of this reversal, we need not address
defendant’s second argument, questioning the sufficiency of
the evidence for a felony-murder conviction.
15