Title: Ex Parte Forrester
Citation: 914 So. 2d 855
Docket Number: 1040235
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: April 8, 2005

914 So. 2d 855 (2005)
Ex parte Howard FORRESTER, as executor of the estate of Louise Forrester.
(In re Susan Louise Phelps Hollis et al.
v.
Howard Forrester, as executor of the estate of Louise Forrester; et al.)
1040235.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 8, 2005.
Rehearing Denied June 10, 2005.
*856 William P. Gray, Jr., and Harry O. Yates, Jr., of Gray &amp; Associates, L.L.C., Birmingham; and Douglas L. McWhorter *857 of Dominick, Fletcher, Yeilding, Wood &amp; Lloyd, P.A., Birmingham, for petitioner.
Charles D. Rosser of Rosser, Marthaler &amp; Rosser, Tuscumbia, for respondents.
LYONS, Justice.
Howard Forrester, as the executor of the estate of Louise Forrester, appeals from the Court of Civil Appeals' reversal of the judgment of the Jefferson Probate Court.[1] We affirm.
The Court of Civil Appeals stated the relevant facts in Hollis v. Forrester, 914 So. 2d 852, 852-54 (Ala.Civ.App.2004):
(Emphasis added.)
The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the probate court and held that the Alabama estate taxes should have been paid from the residue of Emily's estate, rather than from the corpus of the QTIP trust. As a result of the Court of Civil Appeals' ruling, because the corpus of the trust was left to George's three nieces  Susan Louise Phelps Hollis, Ann Lourie Phelps Nichols, and Margaret Jo Phelps Snow ("the nieces")  their bequest was not reduced by the Alabama estate taxes due on Emily's death. We granted Forrester's petition for certiorari review to determine whether the Court of Civil Appeals was correct in its ruling.
"[B]ecause the underlying facts are not disputed and this appeal focuses on the application of the law to those facts, there can be no presumption of correctness accorded to the trial court's ruling." Beavers v. County of Walker, 645 So. 2d 1365, 1373 (Ala.1994) (citing First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Duckworth, 502 So. 2d 709 (Ala.1987)). Appellate review of a ruling on a question of law is de novo. See Rogers Found. Repair, Inc. v. Powell, 748 So. 2d 869 (Ala.1999); Ex parte Graham, 702 So. 2d 1215 (Ala.1997).
Generally speaking, the value of property passing from a decedent to his or her surviving spouse is deducted from the decedent's gross estate for the purpose of calculating federal estate-tax liability. See I.R.C. § 2056 (allowing a "marital deduction" for the value of property passing to a surviving spouse). In certain situations, the Internal Revenue Code allows the marital deduction for the value of property transferred to a surviving spouse even though the spouse receives less than full ownership rights in the property transferred. One such transfer is described as a "Qualified Terminable Interest Property" ("QTIP") trust. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Davis v. Commissioner, 394 F.3d 1294, 1297-98 (9th Cir.2005), briefly described the requirements of the QTIP trust and its relationship to the marital deduction:
(Footnotes omitted.)
While the decedent is afforded the marital deduction for the value of property transferred in a QTIP trust, the value of that property is included in the estate of the surviving spouse when he or she dies. See I.R.C. § 2044. However, I.R.C. § 2207A allows the executor of the estate of the surviving spouse to collect from the person receiving the property formerly held in the trust the amount of federal estate tax resulting from the presence of a QTIP trust:
(Emphasis added.)
Standing in marked contrast to I.R.C. § 2207A is § 40-15-18, Ala.Code 1975, the provision of the Alabama Revenue Code addressing the allocation of the burden of state and federal estate taxes. Section 40-15-18 states:
(Emphasis added.)
While § 40-15-18 purports to address the burden of both state and federal estate taxes, I.R.C. § 2207A preempts § 40-15-18 with respect to allocating the burden of federal estate taxes and allows *860 the executor of Emily's estate to collect, from those who receive the corpus of the QTIP trust after her death, the amount of federal tax liability attributable to the trust. See Cleveland v. Compass Bank, 652 So. 2d 1134, 1137-38 (Ala.1994). Cf. McAleer v. Jernigan, 804 F.2d 1231, 1233 (11th Cir.1986) ("[I]n the absence of congressional enactments to the contrary, state law governs the allocation of the burden of taxes as to property that is part of the estate, and where Congress has spoken, as with life insurance proceeds not part of the estate, federal law governs.").
In addressing the allocation of the Alabama estate-tax burden arising from the inclusion of a QTIP trust in an estate, this Court, in Cleveland, 652 So. 2d  at 1137-38, noted:
(Emphasis added.) Therefore, under Cleveland, the Alabama estate taxes payable by the executor of Emily's estate should have been paid from the residue of that estate.
Forrester argues that Cleveland is distinguishable from the instant case because, he argues, it is clear that Emily's husband, George, intended that all estate taxes payable by reason of the QTIP trust be paid from the corpus of that trust. He contends that none of the wills or trust instruments involved in Cleveland, including the will of the surviving spouse, spoke to the allocation of the estate-tax burden. But even assuming that George had such an intent,[3] the Court of Civil Appeals correctly *861 concluded that "the pertinent testator in this case is Emily, not George." Forrester, 914 So. 2d  at 855. Emily's will does not specify the source from which estate taxes are to be paid, and in the absence of such specification, the default provision of § 40-15-18 controls.
Forrester argues in the alternative that Emily did indeed provide in her will that all estate taxes were to be paid from the corpus of the QTIP trust. He contends that, by failing to expressly disavow the federal default provision contained in I.R.C. 2207A, Emily obviously did not want estate taxes to be paid from the residue of her estate. While Forrester cites evidence indicating that the drafter of Emily's will was aware of the federal default provision, we cannot conclude that he or she was unaware of § 40-15-18, Ala.Code 1975, or was even concerned with Alabama estate taxes that would arise after Emily's death. Section 40-15-18 requires an affirmative directive if the decedent wishes to avoid the default rule applicable to state taxes, and it is not this Court's place to change that requirement.
Forrester also argues that Cleveland was wrongly decided and should be overruled. He contends that, contrary to the holding in Cleveland, federal law, including § 2207A, applies to the allocation of the Alabama estate-tax burden. The Legislature has indeed embraced aspects of federal law in the context of state estate taxes. Section 40-15-2, Ala.Code 1975, in providing the method of calculating the amount payable of Alabama estate tax, refers to federal law:
While the amount of the Alabama estate tax to be paid is based upon the maximum credit allowed by provisions of the Internal *862 Revenue Code relating to federal estate tax, nothing in the provisions of Alabama's estate-tax scheme indicates that, by adopting the foregoing scheme for computation, the Legislature also intended to adopt the scheme set out in I.R.C. § 2207A for allocation of estate-tax liability. As previously noted, § 40-15-18, Ala.Code 1975, expresses precisely the opposite legislative intent than does I.R.C. § 2207A.
The instant case cannot be distinguished from Cleveland. Further, we are not persuaded that Cleveland should now be overruled. The ruling of the Court of Civil Appeals is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
NABERS, C.J., and WOODALL, SMITH, and PARKER, JJ., concur.
[1]  The heirs at law of Emily Barnes Lourie, the decedent whose will is the subject of this appeal, also participated in the litigation in the probate court, and were appellees in the Court of Civil Appeals. They did not, however, file a petition for certiorari with this Court.
[2]  The probate court also addressed issues regarding the disposition of Emily's residual estate. Those issues were waived in the Court of Civil Appeals. Forrester, 914 So. 2d  at 854.
[3]  "Item Four" of George's will states:

"All estate and inheritance taxes which may be assessed or imposed with respect to my estate, or any part thereof, wherever situated, whether or not passing under my Will, including the taxable value of all policies of insurance on my life of which I am owner, and of all transfers, powers, rights or interests in my estate for the purposes of estate taxes, shall, if my said wife survives me, be paid out of the Marital Share of my residuary estate, or, if my said wife does not survive me, be paid out of my residuary estate, and in either event such payment shall be made without apportionment."
(Emphasis added.) The nieces contend that, to the extent George's will is applicable, the Alabama estate-tax liability at issue here results from assets in Emily's estate, not George's estate, and that therefore the reference in George's will as to payment of inheritance taxes imposed with respect to his estate does not speak to the question of taxes due as a result of assets in her estate.