Title: State v. Spaeth
Citation: 2012 WI 95
Docket Number: 2009AP002907-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 13, 2012

2012 WI 95 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP2907-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Joseph J. Spaeth, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 13, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 18, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago 
 
JUDGE: 
William H. Carver 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (Opinion filed).  
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents (Opinion filed).    
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Shelley M. Fite and Andrew R. Hinkel, assistant state public 
defenders, and oral argument by Shelley M. Fite. 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Sally 
L. Wellman and the brief was filed by Mark A. Neuser, assistant 
attorneys general, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen. 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jake L. Remington,  
Ellen Henak and Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, for the 
Wisconsin 
Association 
of 
Criminal 
Defense 
Lawyers. 
 
 
2012 WI 95
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2009AP2907-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2006CF350) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Joseph J. Spaeth, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 13, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Winnebago 
County, William H. Carver, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.61 (2009-10).1  Joseph J. Spaeth (Spaeth) appealed 
his convictions of four counts of child enticement after the 
Winnebago County Circuit Court, William H. Carver, Judge, 
declined to suppress an incriminating statement Spaeth made to 
Oshkosh police officers who were conducting a follow up 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
2 
 
investigation of incriminating admissions that Spaeth made to 
his probation agent during a compelled polygraph examination.  
Spaeth claims that his admissions to the agent were subject to 
use and derivative use immunity, and that the derivative use 
immunity covered the subsequent statement he made to Oshkosh 
police, even though this statement was preceded by a valid 
Miranda warning and Judge Carver found that the statement was 
voluntary.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
¶2 
The court of appeals certified the case to this court, 
asking us "to clarify if a statement made to law enforcement 
following a probationer's honest accounting to an agent may 
become a 'wholly independent source' under Kastigar [v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972)] and, if so, under what 
parameters."  
¶3 
We hold that the statement that Spaeth made to Oshkosh 
police 
was 
derived 
from 
the 
compelled, 
incriminating, 
testimonial statement that he made to his probation agent.  
Thus, Spaeth's statement to police was not derived from a source 
"wholly independent" from his compelled testimony, as required 
by Kastigar and State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225, 252 N.W.2d 664 
(1977), even though the statement was preceded by a valid 
Miranda warning.  Consequently, Spaeth's statement to officers 
is subject to derivative use immunity and may not be used in any 
subsequent 
criminal 
trial. 
 
Therefore, 
we 
reverse 
the 
convictions of Joseph Spaeth and determine that his compelled 
statement to his probation agent, his subsequent statement to 
Oshkosh police, and any evidence derived from either statement 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
3 
 
must be suppressed in any criminal trial.  This rule does not 
apply to a revocation hearing.   
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶4 
In February 2006 Spaeth was on probation2 for first 
degree sexual assault of a child.  His probation agent was 
Rebecca DeWitt (Agent DeWitt).  On February 15, 2006, Spaeth 
came to Agent DeWitt's office to participate in a polygraph 
examination.  All sex offenders supervised by Agent DeWitt were 
required to take polygraph examinations at least once per year.  
Spaeth was required to take this examination, required to 
cooperate with the examiner, and required to answer questions 
truthfully.  His failure to take the polygraph examination could 
have resulted in revocation of his probation.  His failure to 
answer questions truthfully also could have resulted in a 
serious sanction. 
¶5 
Before taking the polygraph examination, Spaeth signed 
a "consent form" provided by Behavioral Measures Midwest, 
L.L.C., the company administering the polygraph examination.  
The form read in part: 
[P]ursuant to Wisconsin Administrative Code 332.15, my 
Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) Agent has 
requested I take a polygraph examination. 
 
. . . .  
                                                 
2 The parties assert that Spaeth was on probation.  The 
record is not clear whether Spaeth's status was probation or 
parole.  However, the immunity discussed in this opinion 
applies, in the same manner, to individuals on either probation 
or parole.  State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225, 227-28 & 228 n.1, 
252 N.W.2d 664 (1977). 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
4 
 
I understand that I am not required to consent to the 
administration of the examination, and that I can stop 
the examination at anytime that I desire.  In regards 
to any admissions I make concerning offenses for which 
I am not on deferred adjudication, probation, or 
parole, or for which I have not been previously 
convicted by a court of law, I understand I have the 
right to have a lawyer present to advise me prior to 
any questioning and during any questioning.  If I am 
unable to employ a lawyer, I have the right to have a 
lawyer appointed to counsel with me prior to and 
during any questioning.  I have the right to remain 
silent and not make any statement at all and any 
statement I make can and may be used in evidence 
against me at my trial.  I have the right to terminate 
the interview at anytime. 
¶6 
The form given to Spaeth was not an accurate statement 
of the law for this probationer.3  Spaeth's failure to take the 
polygraph examination could have resulted in his revocation, and 
his refusal to sign the "consent form" could have been deemed a 
refusal to take the polygraph examination.  In addition, any 
statements that Spaeth made during the polygraph examination 
were subject to use and derivative use immunity and could not be 
used against him at a criminal trial. Agent DeWitt later 
testified that Spaeth was aware that the polygraph results and 
the statements he made in the examination could not be used in a 
criminal prosecution.   
¶7 
A 
polygraph 
examination 
in 
these 
circumstances 
consists of three parts.  First, there is pretest preparation in 
which the examiner goes through the rules that apply to the 
                                                 
3 The language cited above from the polygraph "consent form" 
should be compared to the language in a probation/parole form 
used in the case of State v. Mark, 2008 WI App 44, ¶5, 308 
Wis. 2d 191, 747 N.W.2d 727 (hereinafter Mark III). 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
5 
 
probationer and the probationer has an opportunity to admit in 
advance to any kind of rule violation.  Second, there is the 
actual polygraph test during which the probationer is asked 
point by point whether he has violated any rule.  Third, there 
is a post-test interview based on admitted rule violations and 
any apparent deception during the test. 
¶8 
On the morning of February 15, Spaeth signed the form, 
went through the pretest preparation, and took the test.  Agent 
DeWitt was not present while the test was administered.  
However, following the test, she was told by the examiner that 
the polygraph showed that Spaeth was being deceptive. 
¶9 
Thereafter, Agent DeWitt discussed the results of the 
polygraph with the examiner in Spaeth's presence.  During this 
interview, 
Spaeth 
admitted 
violating 
his 
curfew, 
having 
unsupervised contact with minors, and engaging in physical 
contact with those minors——all violations of his rules of 
supervision.  Specifically, Spaeth "said that he had been horse-
playing with his nieces and nephews and he knew that to be 
wrong."   
¶10 Believing that Spaeth had violated his supervision 
rules, Agent DeWitt contacted the Oshkosh Police Department to 
pick up Spaeth for a probation hold.   
¶11 Before Oshkosh police officer Joseph Framke (Officer 
Framke) arrived, Spaeth admitted more: that he "may have brushed 
up against his nieces and nephews vaginas or butts or breast 
area."  This admission changed Spaeth's status from someone who 
was about to be held for rules violations to someone who was 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
6 
 
about to be held in connection with a possible criminal offense.  
When Officer Framke arrived, he was told in Spaeth's presence 
that Spaeth had admitted to physical contact with minors that 
"may have been a sexual assault."  Officer Framke later 
acknowledged that the agent told him that Spaeth "had made some 
comments about possibly having inappropriate contact with some 
nephews and nieces" and "having some contact with the vagina, 
breast and buttock area." 
¶12 Officer Framke handcuffed Spaeth and put him in the 
back of his squad car.  He also asked Spaeth "if he would be 
willing to sit down and talk to me about what Agent DeWitt had 
told me, and he told me that he would."  Agent DeWitt was 
present during this exchange, and she immediately told Spaeth 
that he did not need to speak with police and that he could 
speak with an attorney and that he was not compelled to give 
detectives "any kind of statement.  And Joe [Spaeth] said, no, 
he wanted to get it off his chest."   
¶13 Spaeth 
was 
taken 
to 
the 
police 
station 
at 
approximately 1:00 p.m.  At the station he was led to an 
interview room at the Oshkosh Police Department where he met 
with Officer Framke and Detective James Busha (Detective Busha).  
Before the interrogation, Officer Framke told Detective Busha 
about the information he had received that Spaeth may have 
sexually assaulted some children.  In the interview room, 
Detective Busha began to discuss Spaeth's Miranda rights at 1:20 
p.m., and the officers believed that Spaeth understood those 
rights.  Spaeth agreed to speak with the officers and did not 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
7 
 
invoke his Miranda rights.  Spaeth was in custody continuously 
from the time Officer Framke placed him in custody for a 
probation hold until Spaeth gave the statement to officers.  The 
waiver of rights form was signed by Spaeth at 1:24 p.m. 
¶14 During the interrogation, Spaeth gave a statement that 
Detective Busha transcribed.  The statement implicated Spaeth in 
several sexual assaults of his minor relatives, including 
incidents on two dates in mid-February, when Spaeth brushed up 
against the children inappropriately while wrestling with or 
tickling them.  The interrogation was completed by approximately 
2:40 p.m.   
¶15 Oshkosh Police were unaware of any new sexual assaults 
involving Spaeth prior to Agent DeWitt informing them of 
Spaeth's admissions; Agent DeWitt's disclosure led to the 
officers obtaining the statement during the interrogation.    
¶16 After interrogating Spaeth, Detective Busha met with 
the parents of Spaeth's minor relatives who were the victims of 
the alleged crimes.  The parents confirmed that Spaeth had 
contact with the minor relatives but said they were not aware 
that Spaeth had any sexual contact with them.  The minor 
relatives were not able to say that they had been assaulted by 
Spaeth.   
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶17 A criminal complaint was filed on April 25, 2006, 
charging Spaeth with four counts of sexual assault of a child 
under 13 years of age contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02(1), 
939.50(3)(b), 939.62(2m)(b)2. (2005-06).  Spaeth was charged as 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
8 
 
a persistent repeater under Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m)(b)2. (2005-
06) on all four counts.   
¶18 Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress "any and 
all statements obtained by the Oshkosh Police Department, 
Division 
of 
Probation 
and 
Parole, 
and/or 
any 
other 
law 
enforcement 
agencies 
in 
regard 
to 
this 
case, 
as 
well 
as . . . any 
leads 
derived 
from 
any 
such 
statements 
or 
evidence."   
¶19 The circuit court held a hearing on this motion on 
July 5, 2006, taking evidence from Agent DeWitt, Officer Framke, 
and Detective Busha.  The court denied the motion, holding that 
the statement to police was voluntary and thus admissible.  
¶20 The court said: 
 
The issue does come down to this voluntariness of 
Mr. Spaeth in making the statement. . . .  The Court 
is going to find that [the oral statement to the two 
officers and his signed written summary of the oral 
statement] were provided in a voluntary manner . . . . 
[I]t's a fair means of the Probation Department to 
determine whether or not people are complying with 
rules.  And when they come across situations that are 
deemed to be questionable, it certainly is appropriate 
to refer the matter to the police . . . and allow the 
police . . . to conduct further inquiry. 
¶21 Spaeth's 
motion 
to 
suppress 
was 
reconsidered 
immediately before trial and again denied. 
¶22 On June 4, 2007, Spaeth was tried by a jury and found 
guilty on all four counts.  At trial, Officer Framke and 
Detective Busha both testified regarding the oral statement that 
Spaeth gave to them on February 15 at the Oshkosh police 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
9 
 
station; the statement that Detective Busha transcribed (and 
Spaeth signed) also was admitted into evidence.   
¶23 Spaeth 
was 
sentenced 
to 
the 
mandatory 
life 
incarceration required for each count, with the sentences to run 
concurrently.   
¶24 On October 20, 2008, the circuit court filed an order 
vacating Spaeth's sentence because it learned that extraneous 
and prejudicial information was brought into the jury room——
namely, knowledge that Spaeth was already a convicted sex-
offender.  Two days later, the court ordered a new trial. 
¶25 On March 13, 2009, Spaeth was convicted of four counts 
of child enticement contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.07(1) after he 
pleaded no contest to the charges contained in an amended 
information.  Later, the circuit court imposed a sentence of 15 
years 
imprisonment 
on 
each 
count——5 
years 
being 
initial 
confinement and 10 years being extended supervision——with the 
sentences to run concurrently.   
¶26 On July 20, 2009, Spaeth wrote the circuit court a 
letter expressing dissatisfaction with the plea process.   
¶27 With the approval of the court of appeals, Spaeth 
filed a post-conviction motion to reconsider again his motion to 
suppress the statement he made to the two Oshkosh officers at 
the police station.   
¶28 On March 10, 2010, the circuit court held a hearing on 
the motion for post-conviction relief.  The circuit court denied 
Spaeth's motion, determining that use of Spaeth's statement 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
10 
 
would not have violated the derivative use prohibition contained 
in State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225.   
¶29 The court of appeals certified the appeal to this 
court.  The court of appeals noted "the tension between" Evans 
immunity and "the needs and policies of the DOC."  The 
certification requests that we "clarify if a statement made to 
law enforcement following a probationer's honest accounting to 
an agent may become a 'wholly independent source' under Kastigar 
and, if so, under what parameters."   
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶30 In this case, we are reviewing the application of 
constitutional principles to facts.  "To the extent the circuit 
court made findings of fact, we accept those" findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  State v. Mark, 2008 WI App 
44, ¶15, 308 Wis. 2d 191, 747 N.W.2d 727 (hereinafter Mark III).  
We review de novo the application of constitutional principles 
to those facts as questions of law.  Id.; State v. Ward, 2009 WI 
60, ¶17, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
¶31 This 
case 
requires 
the 
court 
to 
reexamine 
the 
fundamental 
principles 
of 
the 
privilege 
against 
self-
incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. 
¶32 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
reads, in part: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself."  This privilege 
has been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to 
the States.  Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).  Wisconsin 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
11 
 
has its own equivalent privilege in Article I, Section 8 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.   
¶33 The 
privilege 
against 
self-incrimination 
is 
"an 
important advance in the development of our liberty——'one of the 
great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized.'"  
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956) (citation 
omitted).  The privilege "reflects many of our fundamental 
values," including an "unwillingness to subject those suspected 
of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or 
contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than 
inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-
incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment 
and abuses;" and the "realization that the privilege, while 
sometimes a shelter to the guilty, is often a protection to the 
innocent."  Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 
52, 55 (1964) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
¶34 The privilege against self-incrimination was carefully 
analyzed in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, in 
circumstances where it collided with the government's firmly 
established, often-critical need to compel testimony.  The Court 
said that the Fifth Amendment privilege was the most important 
exemption to the government's power to compel testimony.  
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 444.  "It can be asserted in any 
proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, 
investigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects against any 
disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
12 
 
in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that 
might be so used."  Id. at 444-45. 
¶35 The Court noted that immunity statutes "seek a 
rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege 
and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to 
testify."  Id. at 446. 
¶36 In upholding a federal immunity statute, the Court 
determined 
that when the government compels incriminating 
testimony, it must grant immunity that is coextensive with the 
privilege against self-incrimination.  Id. at 449.  "We hold 
that . . . immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive 
with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and 
therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the 
privilege."  Id. at 453.  Stated differently, "a grant of 
immunity must afford protection commensurate with that afforded 
by the privilege . . . .  Immunity from the use of compelled 
testimony, as well as evidence derived directly and indirectly 
therefrom, affords this protection."  Id. 
¶37 The Court hammered the significance of the derivative 
use protection.  Immunity must prohibit "the prosecutorial 
authorities from using the compelled testimony in any respect."  
Id.  "This total prohibition on use provides a comprehensive 
safeguard, barring the use of compelled testimony as an 
'investigatory lead,' and also barring the use of any evidence 
obtained by focusing investigation on a witness as a result of 
his compelled disclosures."  Id. at 460 (emphasis added) 
(footnote omitted). 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
13 
 
¶38 Quoting from Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at 
79 n.18, the Court said: 
"Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified, 
under a state grant of immunity, to matters related to 
the federal prosecution, the federal authorities have 
the burden of showing that their evidence is not 
tainted by establishing that they had an independent, 
legitimate source for the disputed evidence." 
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460.  "This burden of proof, which we 
reaffirm as appropriate, is not limited to a negation of taint; 
rather, it imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty to 
prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a 
legitimate 
source 
wholly 
independent 
of 
the 
compelled 
testimony."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶39 The 
principles stated in Kastigar were strongly 
affirmed in New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979), where 
the question was whether a prosecutor could use a person's 
legislatively immunized grand jury testimony to impeach the 
person's credibility when testifying as a defendant in a 
criminal trial.  Id. at 451.  The answer was a resounding no.4  
In its opinion, the Court said that "a defendant's compelled 
statements, as opposed to statements taken in violation of 
Miranda, may not be put to any testimonial use whatever against 
him in a criminal trial."  Id. at 459. 
                                                 
4 Evans had left open the possibility that immunized 
statements could be used for impeachment purposes, 77 Wis. 2d at 
235-36, but Evans predated New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 
(1979), and that part of Evans is no longer valid.  State v. 
Thompson, 142 Wis. 2d 821, 831, 419 N.W.2d 564 (Ct. App. 1987).  
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
14 
 
 
Testimony given in response to a grant of 
legislative 
immunity 
is 
the 
essence 
of 
coerced 
testimony.  In such cases there is no question whether 
physical 
or 
psychological 
pressures 
overrode 
the 
defendant's will; the witness is told to talk or face 
the 
government's 
coercive 
sanctions, 
notably, 
a 
conviction for contempt.  The information given in 
response to a grant of immunity may well be more 
reliable than information beaten from a helpless 
defendant, but it is no less compelled.  The Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments provide a privilege against 
compelled 
self-incrimination, 
not 
merely 
against 
unreliable 
self-incrimination. 
 
Balancing 
of 
interests . . . . is not simply unnecessary.  It is 
impermissible. 
Id. 
¶40 Both Kastigar and Portash involved grants of immunity 
that were slightly different from the immunity at play here.  
But the Supreme Court's decision in Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 
U.S. 420 (1984), explicitly discussed immunity in the context of 
statements to a probation agent. 
¶41 The case involved a probationer, Marshall Murphy, who 
admitted to a third party that he had committed a rape and 
murder unrelated to the offense for which he was on probation.  
Id. at 423.  When this information was brought to his agent's 
attention, she wrote to Murphy to arrange for a meeting with him 
in her office and told him at the meeting of the information she 
had received.  Id.  She suggested that the information showed 
that Murphy needed continued treatment.  Id. at 423-24.  Murphy 
responded angrily, stated that he "felt like calling a lawyer," 
denied the crime he had been convicted of but admitted that he 
had committed the rape and murder.  Id. at 424.  The agent did 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
15 
 
not tell Murphy until after his admission that she had a duty to 
report his admission to police.  Id. 
¶42 The Murphy case turned on the question whether Murphy 
was required to invoke his right not to incriminate himself 
before making his incriminating statements. 
¶43 The Court did not distinguish Murphy's case on grounds 
that he was on probation.  In fact, the Court made clear that 
the privilege against self-incrimination is not diminished by 
the fact that "a defendant is imprisoned or on probation at the 
time he makes incriminating statements, if those statements are 
compelled."  Id. at 426 (emphasis added).  Instead, the Court 
noted that as a general rule, a person is not protected by the 
privilege against self-incrimination unless the person first 
asserts the privilege.  The Court said that 
Murphy was in no better position than the ordinary 
witness at a trial or before a grand jury who is 
subpoenaed, sworn to tell the truth, and obligated to 
answer on the pain of contempt, unless he invokes the 
privilege and shows that he faces a realistic threat 
of self-incrimination.  The answers of such a witness 
to questions put to him are not compelled within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment unless the witness is 
required to answer over his valid claim of the 
privilege. 
Id. at 427.  "[I]n the ordinary case, if a witness under 
compulsion to testify makes disclosures instead of claiming the 
privilege, the government has not 'compelled' him to incriminate 
himself."  Id. (quoting Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 
654 (1976)).  "[A] witness under compulsion to make disclosures 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
16 
 
must assert the privilege in a timely manner."  Murphy, 465 U.S. 
at 428 (citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970)). 
¶44 Having established this general rule, the Court 
acknowledged 
exceptions, 
the 
first 
being 
"custodial 
interrogation."  Id. at 429-30.  The rule does not apply the 
same way when a person is "in custody."  Under Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), incriminating statements obtained 
during custodial interrogation must be suppressed unless a 
suspect fails to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege after being 
warned of the right to remain silent and warned of the 
consequences of failure to assert that right.  Murphy, 465 U.S. 
at 430 (emphasis added)(citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-69, 475-
77). 
¶45 The Court was quick to explain that this exception did 
not apply to Murphy because he was not "in custody" when he was 
in his probation agent's office.  The communication that the 
agent sent to Murphy did not order him to appear at a particular 
time.  He came when it was convenient to both of them, id. at 
433, and he left after he had made his incriminating admission, 
id. at 424. 
¶46 Hence, the critical issue in that case was whether 
Murphy was in a situation that gave rise to a self-executing 
privilege against self-incrimination, that is, a privilege that 
he did not have to invoke. 
¶47 The Court spelled out such an exception:  "The general 
rule that the privilege must be claimed when self-incrimination 
is 
threatened . . . [is] 
inapplicable 
in 
cases 
where 
the 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
17 
 
assertion of the privilege is penalized so as to foreclose a 
free 
choice 
to 
remain 
silent, . . . [thus] 
compel[ling] 
incriminating testimony."  Id. at 434 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
The threat of punishment for reliance on the 
privilege distinguishes cases of this sort from the 
ordinary case in which a witness is merely required to 
appear and give testimony.  A State may require a 
probationer to appear and discuss matters that affect 
his probationary status; such a requirement, without 
more, 
does 
not 
give 
rise 
to 
a 
self-executing 
privilege.  The result may be different if the 
questions put to the probationer, however relevant to 
his probationary status, call for answers that would 
incriminate him in a pending or later criminal 
prosecution.  There is thus a substantial basis in our 
cases for concluding that if the State, either 
expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation 
of 
the 
privilege 
would 
lead 
to 
revocation 
of 
probation, it would have created the classic penalty 
situation, the failure to assert the privilege would 
be excused, and the probationer's answers would be 
deemed compelled and inadmissible in a criminal 
prosecution. 
Id. at 435. 
¶48 The Court concluded, with respect to Murphy, that 
Minnesota did not go beyond requiring him to appear and give 
testimony.  It did not "require him to choose between making 
incriminating 
statements 
and 
jeopardizing 
his 
conditional 
liberty by remaining silent."  Id. at 436.  Requiring him to 
make that choice, the Court said, would constitute an "extra, 
impermissible step."  Id. 
¶49 The result in Minnesota v. Murphy does not govern this 
case.  The parties concede that under the law of Wisconsin 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
18 
 
embodied in statutes, rules, and case law,5 and under the 
particular circumstances facing Spaeth as explained in the sworn 
testimony of Agent DeWitt, Spaeth's participation in all three 
parts of the polygraph examination was compelled, producing 
compelled, incriminating testimonial evidence.6 
¶50 The Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) has 
statutory authority under Wis. Stat. § 301.132 to require sex 
offenders to submit to lie detector tests while they are on 
parole, probation, or extended supervision.  Wis. Stat. § 
301.132(2) provides: 
 
The department may require a sex offender to 
submit to a lie detector test when directed to do so 
by the department.  The department may require 
submission 
to 
a 
lie 
detector 
test 
under 
this 
subsection as a part of a sex offender's correctional 
programming or care and treatment, as a condition of a 
sex 
offender's 
probation, 
parole 
or 
extended 
supervision, or both as a part of a sex offender's 
correctional programming or care and treatment and as 
a condition of the sex offender's probation, parole or 
extended supervision. 
Id.   
¶51 In addition, under Wis. Stat. § 301.132(3), the DOC 
has rulemaking authority to "establish[] a lie detector test 
program for sex offenders."  Id.  Under that rulemaking 
                                                 
5 See Thompson, 142 Wis. 2d at 828-29 (holding, post-Murphy, 
that under Wisconsin law a probationer had been compelled to 
speak and was thus required to receive immunity under Kastigar 
and Evans). 
6 The State forthrightly concedes that "It is undisputed 
that Spaeth's inculpatory statement to his probation agent was 
'compelled' as a matter of law and protected by Evans immunity." 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
19 
 
authority, the DOC has promulgated  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 
332.17 (June 2009), which provides in pertinent part: 
(1) SELECTION 
OF 
PARTICIPANTS. 
 
Upon 
the 
approval of an agent's supervisor, an agent may 
require 
an 
offender 
who 
is 
a 
sex 
offender 
to 
participate in the lie detector program.  The agent 
may require an offender who is a sex offender to 
submit to the lie detector examination process based 
on the following: 
. . . .  
(b) For an offender who is a sex offender and 
who is currently on probation or parole: 
1. 
The 
offender's 
criminal 
record 
of 
sexual offenses. 
2. 
The 
offender's 
adjustment 
under 
supervision, including recent rules violations or 
recent 
consideration 
for 
alternatives 
to 
revocation. 
3. 
The offender's compliance with current 
programming. 
(2) NOTICE. (a) An agent shall provide an 
offender who is a sex offender and who is selected to 
participate in the lie detector examination process 
written 
notice 
of 
the 
lie 
detector 
program 
requirements.  The department may require an offender 
who is a sex offender to participate in the lie 
detector examination process without the offender's 
informed consent. 
(b) An agent shall provide written notice to an 
offender who is a sex offender and who is required to 
take a lie detector test.  The notice shall include 
the following: 
1. 
Date, 
time, 
and 
location 
of 
the 
scheduled test. 
2. 
Instructions 
to 
complete 
any 
preliminary questionnaires. 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
20 
 
. . . .  
(4) TEST ADMINISTRATION.  The department may 
administer lie detector tests or contract with an 
outside vendor to administer the tests. . . .    
. . . .  
(6) SANCTIONS.  (a) If an offender who is a sex 
offender refuses to participate in any portion of the 
lie detector examination process or to pay a lie 
detector fee, the agent shall investigate the refusal 
as a violation of a rule or condition of supervision 
in accordance with ch. DOC 331. 
(b) If an offender who is a sex offender 
discloses a violation of a rule or condition of 
supervision 
during 
the 
lie 
detector 
examination 
process, the agent shall investigate the disclosure as 
a violation of a rule or condition of supervision, in 
accordance with ch. DOC 331. 
(c) If an offender who is a sex offender 
discloses criminal conduct during the lie detector 
examination process, the agent, with the approval of 
the agent's supervisor, shall refer the disclosure to 
law enforcement authorities. 
(d) Revocation of probation or parole of an 
offender who is a sex offender may not be based solely 
on a finding of deception as disclosed by a lie 
detector test. 
(7) DISCLOSURE 
OF 
TEST 
INFORMATION. 
 
The 
department may disclose information regarding a lie 
detector test or information disclosed during the lie 
detector test examination process of an offender who 
is a sex offender only to the following and only for 
purposes relating to correctional programming, care 
and treatment of the offender: 
 
(a) Department employees. 
 
(b) Department vendors. 
 
(c) Another agency or person. 
 
(d) Law enforcement agencies. 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
21 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶52 In 
sum, 
the 
law 
unequivocally 
provides 
that 
incriminating testimony may be compelled but that it may be 
disclosed 
only 
for 
purposes 
relating 
to 
correctional 
programming, care, and treatment of the offender.  These 
legitimate purposes include revocation of probation or parole. 
¶53 Agent DeWitt testified at the suppression hearing that 
DOC requires all sex offenders to take polygraph examinations.  
She testified that she requires all the individuals she 
supervises to take polygraph examinations at least annually.  
These individuals are required to participate in the examination 
process, are required to truthfully answer questions, and must 
sign the "consent form" or face a sanction.   
¶54 As noted, the code itself contains a provision 
limiting the use of statements obtained during a polygraph 
examination to treatment.  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 332.17(7).  
This 
limitation 
on 
use 
of 
the 
compelled 
statements 
is 
constitutionally required. 
¶55 The polygraph statute was first passed in 1995, and 
the administrative code provisions were promulgated in 1998.  
Yet, Wisconsin's history in compelling attendance and compelling 
truthful answers from probationers to agents in the context of 
probation and parole supervision, has a much longer history.  In 
Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225, this court discussed the issue of 
compelled statements in the probation context.  In Evans, the 
probationer was charged with offenses relating to delivery of 
illegal narcotics.  Id. at 228.  The probationer, with the 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
22 
 
advice of counsel, refused to answer subsequent questions about 
his activities posed by his probation agents.  Id. at 228-29.  
The agents sought to revoke probation based upon his silence.  
Id. at 229.  At the revocation hearing, the probationer again 
invoked the privilege and his probation was revoked principally 
due to his silence.  Id. at 230.  The court recognized the right 
of the state to compel answers from probationers and parolees, 
but only if they were granted corresponding immunity as outlined 
in Kastigar.  Id. at 231-35.   
¶56 This court and the court of appeals also have 
recognized, in other contexts, the right of the State to compel 
statements from probationers and the corresponding obligation to 
provide immunity coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege.  
In State v. Thompson, 142 Wis. 2d 821, 419 N.W.2d 564 (Ct. App. 
1987), the court of appeals held that a probationer's statements 
to his agent, after threat of revocation for his silence, were 
immunized against any use in a future criminal proceeding.  Id. 
at 828-32.  Likewise, in State ex rel. Tate v. Schwarz, 2002 WI 
127, 257 Wis. 2d 40, 654 N.W.2d 438, this court held that the 
probationer could not be required to admit to the crime 
committed as part of his treatment unless he was offered 
immunity as described in Evans. 
¶57 The court of appeals' recent decision in State v. 
Peebles, 2010 WI App 156, 330 Wis. 2d 243, 792 N.W.2d 212, 
demonstrates how statements made to probation agents may be 
"compelled by way of probation rules."  Id., ¶19.  The 
probationer did not invoke the privilege before a grant of 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
23 
 
immunity.  However, based upon the probationer's own testimony 
relating his subjective view of the consequences of failure to 
take a polygraph examination and answer truthfully, the court of 
appeals held that the probationer's statements were compelled 
and subject to immunity under Evans because the statements were 
compelled by the rules of probation.  Id., ¶¶5, 20-21.   
¶58 In the present case, Agent DeWitt's own testimony 
revealed that Spaeth was required to take the polygraph 
examination or face a sanction, including possible revocation.  
This compulsion is authorized by statute and rule, demonstrated 
in the cases, and testified to by the DOC agent involved.  All 
parties agree that this case involves compulsion.  As a result, 
we have no difficulty determining that Spaeth was compelled, 
under the rules of his probation, to answer truthfully during 
the polygraph examination. 
¶59 In short, it makes no difference on the facts of this 
case that Spaeth did not invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination.  We see this case as one involving compelled, 
incriminating, testimonial evidence, making it subject to the 
principles of Kastigar, Portash, and Evans.  This case falls 
within one of the stated exceptions to the "invocation" rule in 
Minnesota v. Murphy.  As a result, Spaeth's statement to police 
may not be used in any criminal proceeding because the statement 
was not derived from a source wholly independent from the 
compelled testimony.  It was derived from compelled testimonial 
evidence. 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
24 
 
¶60 The State contends that the court should apply the 
attenuation doctrine to the fruits of compelled statements like 
Spaeth's admissions to Agent DeWitt, when the fruits are 
arguably subject to derivative use immunity.  We disagree.  
¶61 The court of appeals decision in Mark discussed the 
attenuation doctrine in the compelled statement/immunity context 
but did not permit application of the doctrine in Mark's Chapter 
980 trial.  Mark III, 308 Wis. 2d 191, ¶¶19-25. 
¶62 The court of appeals decision was the third published 
decision involving the State's effort to commit Charles W. Mark 
as a sexually violent person under Chapter 980.  The first was 
State v. Mark, 2005 WI App 62, 280 Wis. 2d 436, 701 N.W.2d 598 
(hereinafter Mark I).  The second was State v. Mark, 2006 WI 78, 
292 Wis. 2d 1, 718 N.W.2d 90 (hereinafter Mark II).  The case 
presented 
questions 
about 
the 
admissibility 
of 
various 
statements that Mark, a convicted sex offender, made to his 
probation agent.  This court's decision in Mark II stressed that 
"in order for a statement to be properly excluded under the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination . . . it 
must be [1] testimonial, [2] compelled, and [3] incriminating."  
Mark II, 292 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶2, 42.  The case was remanded to the 
circuit court to determine whether the statements determined to 
be 
"incriminating" 
also 
"were 
compelled." 
 
Mark 
I, 
280 
Wis. 2d 436, ¶51. 
¶63 In the third Mark decision, the court of appeals 
examined 
what 
it 
called 
"involuntary" 
written 
and 
oral 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
25 
 
statements, e.g., statements satisfying the "compelled" prong of 
potentially inadmissible statements.  The court said:  
When an individual has given an involuntary statement, 
a subsequent statement is also considered involuntary 
unless it can be "separated from the circumstances 
surrounding" the earlier statement by a "break in the 
stream of events," between the first statement to the 
second, "sufficient to insulate the statement from the 
effect of all that went before."   
Mark III, 308 Wis. 2d 191, ¶20 (citations omitted).  The court 
of appeals then cited various "factors" that might be relevant 
in deciding whether there was a sufficient break, id., ¶22, 
including "the time that passed between the statements, and the 
change in the identity of the interrogators."  Id. 
 
¶64 The attenuation doctrine——as normally understood to 
include such factors as the passage of time between improper 
police conduct and, say, a confession——is simply inapplicable 
when 
police 
are 
following 
up 
compelled, 
incriminating, 
testimonial 
statements. 
 
The 
attenuation 
doctrine 
has 
application in certain other situations where the police 
ultimately obtain a voluntary admission.  However, we see no 
indication that the Supreme Court has applied or hinted at 
applying the attenuation doctrine to compelled, incriminating, 
testimonial 
statements 
subject 
to 
Kastigar-Portash-Evans 
immunity.  Opening this door would invite the government to 
compel admissions from probationers and parolees, use the 
information 
to 
secure 
their 
revocations 
in 
noncriminal 
revocation proceedings, and then wait long enough to use the 
information again as the basis to investigate the suspects or 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
26 
 
obtain new admissions from them.  The passage of time does not 
sever a clear linkage to compelled, incriminating, testimonial 
evidence.  Such application of the attenuation doctrine would be 
inconsistent with the principles of Kastigar and Portash and 
cannot be entertained by a state court that is bound to follow 
the Supreme Court in interpreting the Fifth Amendment. 
¶65 We are equally skeptical that Montejo v. Louisiana, 
556 
U.S. 
778 
(2009), 
which 
recognizes 
"the 
prophylactic 
protection" afforded to a suspect by Miranda, will ever be said 
to override the derivative immunity that attaches to compelled 
incriminating testimony.  If this ever happens, it must come in 
a directive from the Supreme Court.  Thus, the circuit court's 
finding that Spaeth made a voluntary statement to police, after 
a valid Miranda warning, is not relevant.  
¶66 This 
brings 
us 
to 
the 
question 
posed 
in 
the 
certification, 
namely, 
whether 
"a 
statement 
made 
to 
law 
enforcement following a probationer's honest accounting to an 
agent 
may 
become 
a 
'wholly 
independent 
source' 
under 
Kastigar . . . and, if so, under what parameters." 
¶67 As Minnesota v. Murphy makes clear, not all statements 
made to probation agents are subject to use and derivative use 
immunity. 
 
The 
Constitution 
bars 
the 
use 
of 
compelled, 
incriminating testimonial statements and their fruits in a 
subsequent criminal prosecution.  However, if a statement to a 
probation agent is not compelled, incriminating, or testimonial 
it is not covered by the Fifth Amendment privilege, may be 
shared with law enforcement, and may be used in a criminal 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
27 
 
prosecution. 
 
Probationers 
do 
not 
receive 
immunity 
for 
information "volunteered during a routine interview with a 
probation officer."  Thompson, 142 Wis. 2d at 828.  The Fifth 
Amendment was not intended to permit offenders to "game the 
system" by confessing all past wrongs at any opportunity they 
have, thereby precluding or seriously impairing a future 
criminal prosecution for those wrongs.7   
¶68 Consequently, 
the 
State 
must 
understand 
the 
implications of the system it operates.  Wisconsin's system 
appears to compel truthful answers from its probationers and 
parolees.  The failure to supply truthful information on demand 
                                                 
7 The facts in State v. Mark are worth careful study, 
especially the written and oral statements that Mark made to his 
probation agent about trying to break into a neighbor's bathroom 
in his hotel.  State v. Mark, 2005 WI App 62, ¶7, 280 
Wis. 2d 436, 701 N.W.2d 598 (hereinafter Mark I); State v. Mark, 
2006 WI 78, ¶6, 292 Wis. 2d 1, 718 N.W.2d 90 (hereinafter Mark 
II); Mark III, 308 Wis. 2d 191, ¶6. 
The incident at the hotel occurred on March 27, 2000.  The 
suppressed written report was prepared by the agent and signed 
by Mark on April 28, 2000.  Mark II, 292 Wis. 2d 1, ¶6.  The 
oral statement was obtained "approximately two weeks" later.  
Id., ¶7.  The written statement reads in part: "I went back to 
apologize to [J].  Because [J] threatened to call the police 
this week [a month after the incident] that is why I notified my 
agent & Human Services of the incident. . . .  On Sunday night 
on 4/23/00, [J's] boyfriend . . . told me that they were 
thinking about getting a restraining order against me."  A DOC 
document in the record indicates that Mark "self-reported 
violations." 
These facts suggest that authorities in the Mark case might 
have avoided at least some of the problems from "compelled" or 
immunized testimony by handling things differently. 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
28 
 
can lead to revocation.  Supplying truthful information also can 
lead to revocation. 
¶69 This is precisely what happened to Spaeth.  A 
revocation hearing was held at the Winnebago County Jail on 
April 12, 2006.  In re Spaeth, Wis. Div. Hearings and Appeals, 
No. 022806-235568-A (Apr. 17, 2006).  Spaeth was revoked for the 
entire remainder of his sentence: "two years, four months and 
nine days."  In re Spaeth, Wis. Div. Hearings and Appeals, No. 
022806-235568-A (May 5, 2006).  He was revoked because of his 
sexual contact with minors which "consisted of touching or 
brushing their buttocks, breast and vaginal areas."  In re 
Spaeth, Wis. Div. Hearings and Appeals, No. 022806-235568-A 
(Apr. 17, 2006).  His agent testified against him.  Id. 
¶70 The State cannot compel a probationer to provide this 
kind of incriminating testimonial evidence, which may be used 
against him in the noncriminal revocation proceeding, Murphy, 
465 U.S. at 435 n.7; see also State ex rel. Cramer v. Schwarz, 
2000 WI 86, ¶28, 236 Wis. 2d 473, 613 N.W.2d 591, and then use 
that information again, directly or indirectly, to prosecute the 
probationer criminally.  The State must decide whether to take 
the "impermissible step" of forcing a probationer "to choose 
between making incriminating statements and jeopardizing his 
conditional liberty by remaining silent," Murphy, 461 U.S. at 
436, because forcing that choice will bar future use of the 
incriminating evidence in a criminal prosecution. 
¶71 If 
a 
Wisconsin 
probation 
agent 
obtains 
an 
incriminating admission of criminal conduct under compulsion, 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
29 
 
the agent appears to be required to advise law enforcement, so 
long as the agent has approval from the agent's supervisor.  
Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 332.17(6)(c).  Disclosure should be 
evaluated in every situation where revocation appears to be 
insufficient 
and 
criminal 
prosecution 
appears 
desirable.  
Divulging 
compelled, 
incriminating 
testimonial 
evidence 
to 
police may taint an ongoing or future independent investigation. 
¶72 The certification memorandum observes that  
if Spaeth had initiated his statement to police——by 
going to the station of his own volition the next 
day . . . the statement would satisfy the Kastigar 
'wholly 
independent 
source' 
standard . . . .  
Likewise, if the police had interviewed Spaeth for an 
unrelated reason (without knowledge of his statements 
to 
his 
agent), 
and 
Spaeth 
had 
volunteered 
the 
information to them, use of the statement would not be 
problematic under Kastigar. 
¶73 These comments, along with the suggestions of Justice 
Abrahamson in her Evans concurrence that a probation agent may 
wish to delay compelling statements from or even questioning a 
suspect and possibly delaying a revocation proceeding until 
after a criminal trial, Evans, 77 Wis. 2d at 240-41 (Abrahamson, 
J., concurring), are well-taken.  The Evans case arose in the 
context of statements that were required of a probationer at a 
revocation hearing.  Id. at 229-30.  Therefore, the suggestion 
to delay a revocation proceeding has significance only insofar 
as it results in a delay of statements being compelled.  
Compelled statements may not be used in a criminal proceeding, 
even if the revocation proceeding occurs after the criminal 
proceeding. 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
30 
 
¶74 The State has the burden of proof, after a compelled 
incriminating testimonial statement is obtained by a probation 
agent, of demonstrating that evidence it wishes to use in a 
criminal prosecution is "derived from a legitimate source wholly 
independent of the compelled testimony."  Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 
460. 
¶75 We wonder how frequently the facts before us are 
likely to recur——that is, how often a probation agent has no 
advance warning that a probationer has committed new crimes and 
police have no independent knowledge that these crimes have been 
committed.  If this occurs with any frequency, the authorities 
should develop strategies for dealing with such contingencies. 
¶76 We are mindful that today's decision presents law 
enforcement with very difficult dilemmas.  Law enforcement 
authorities may have to choose in some instances between (1) 
compelling 
statements to support probation revocation but 
effectively giving up on future prosecution; and (2) not 
compelling statements and then never discovering serious crimes.  
Nevertheless, the analysis in this opinion is not new.  The 
result here is required by Kastigar, Evans, Murphy, and Peebles.   
¶77 We note that nothing in this opinion prevents law 
enforcement from investigating offenses it learns of from a 
legitimate independent source, not derived from a compelled 
statement; and nothing in this opinion prevents DOC from using a 
compelled, incriminating statement to revoke probation.  In 
short, compelled, incriminating, testimonial evidence may be 
No. 
  2009AP2907-CR 
 
31 
 
invaluable 
for 
one 
purpose 
but 
worthless, 
even 
counterproductive, for another. 
¶78 It is not our role as a court to develop strategies 
for law enforcement.  That responsibility belongs to the other 
branches of government.  Our role is to assure that the 
strategies employed do not abridge the constitutional rights 
that we have been entrusted to protect. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶79 We hold that the statement Spaeth made to Oshkosh 
police 
was 
derived 
from 
the 
compelled, 
incriminating, 
testimonial statement that he made to his probation agent.  
Thus, Spaeth's statement to police was not derived from a source 
"wholly independent" from his compelled testimony, as required 
by Kastigar and Evans, even though the statement was preceded by 
a valid Miranda warning.  Consequently, Spaeth's statement to 
officers is subject to derivative use immunity and may not be 
used in any subsequent criminal trial.  Therefore, we reverse 
the convictions of Joseph Spaeth and determine that his 
compelled statement to his probation agent, his subsequent 
statement to Oshkosh police, and any evidence derived from 
either statement must be suppressed in any criminal trial.  This 
rule does not apply to a revocation hearing. 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded. 
 
 
No.  2009AP2907-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶80 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion.  I write to address the dissent.   
¶81 The majority presents the constitutional principles 
regarding compelled statements.  I write separately because I am 
concerned that the dissent makes some strong statements of law 
that appear to be a break from precedent and does so without the 
benefit of briefs or argument. 
¶82 The parties agreed in the present case that Spaeth's 
statements to his probation agent were compelled and are subject 
to immunity.  The State asserts:  "It is undisputed that 
Spaeth's inculpatory statement to his probation agent was 
'compelled' as a matter of law and protected by Evans immunity."   
¶83 This court is not bound to accept a party's concession 
of law, but if a court is not going to accept the concession, in 
keeping with our adversarial system the court should ordinarily 
ask the parties to brief the issue.1  In refusing to accept a 
concession of law the court should recognize that, as a result 
of the concession, counsel for either party or for both parties 
may not have developed the facts at the circuit court to resolve 
the question of law.   
¶84 While I would prefer to write with the benefit of 
briefs and argument, I believe the dissent makes some legal 
assertions that are inconsistent with precedent.   
                                                 
1 For 
a 
discussion of the importance of adversarial 
briefing, see State v. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, ¶80 & n.20, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
No.  2009AP2907-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶85 The applicable standard for compulsion is found in 
Minnesota v. Murphy (Murphy II), 465 U.S. 420 (1984).  See 
majority op., ¶¶40-48.  The Murphy II Court instructs that there 
is compulsion when the probationer is required to appear and 
answer truthfully and the State, either "expressly or by 
implication," asserts that the probationer will be penalized if 
he chooses to remain silent.2  Compulsion exists when the 
probationer is required to "choose between making incriminating 
statements and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining 
silent."3  
¶86 In the present case, Spaeth was required to take a lie 
detector test.  And, according to the State, Spaeth's probation 
agent testified that a refusal by Spaeth to cooperate with the 
polygraph examination would have been grounds for revocation.  
¶87 Dissatisfied with the State's concession and without 
the benefit of briefs or oral argument, the dissent arguably 
modifies the standard for compulsion and concludes that Spaeth's 
statements were voluntary,4 despite also acknowledging that the 
                                                 
2 See Minnesota v. Murphy (Murphy II), 465 U.S. 420, 435 
(1984). 
3 Id. at 436. 
As the State explains:  "A probationer's answers to a 
probation agent's question are deemed 'compelled' when the 
agent's 
questions 
are 
designed 
to 
solicit 
incriminating 
responses 
and 
when 
the 
State, 
'either 
expressly 
or 
by 
implication, asserts that invocation of the [Fifth Amendment] 
privilege would lead to revocation of probation.'" (quoting 
Murphy II, 465 U.S. at 435).   
4 See dissent, ¶¶138, 143, 147. 
No.  2009AP2907-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
factual record is insufficient to apply the standard it 
announces.5      
¶88 The dissent appears to modify the standard by adding a 
new element.  It asserts that "only certain types of questions 
have the potential to generate Fifth Amendment concerns," 
dissent, ¶117, and that those are "questions about 'pending 
charges or accusations of particular criminal activity,'" 
dissent, ¶138 (quoting Murphy II, 465 U.S. at 435).   
¶89 In contrast, Murphy II talks about questions that call 
for answers that "would incriminate [the probationer] in a 
pending or later criminal prosecution."6  Murphy II contrasts 
such questions with those questions that are "relevant to [the 
probationer's] probationary status and pose[] no realistic 
threat of incrimination in a separate criminal proceeding."7   
¶90 There need not be a "pending charge" or an "accusation 
of particular criminal activity" for a question to compel an 
incriminating answer.  For example, a probationer could be 
required to answer truthfully a general question such as, "Have 
you committed any crimes lately?"  Under such a circumstance, an 
affirmative answer would be incriminating.  Murphy II instructs 
that if the probationer is required to choose between making an 
incriminating 
statement 
and 
"jeopardizing 
his 
conditional 
liberty by remaining silent," the incriminating statement is 
subject to immunity.    
                                                 
5 See dissent, ¶¶137, 138, 140.   
6 Murphy II, 465 U.S. at 435.  
7 Id. at 435 n.7. 
No.  2009AP2907-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶91 The dissent derives its new element by seizing on 
language in State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225, 252 N.W.2d 664 
(1977), without acknowledging that the Evans language was based 
on the specific facts of that case, in which there was a 
"pending charge" and an "accusation of particular criminal 
activity."  Just because there was a "pending charge" and an 
"accusation of particular criminal activity" in Evans does not 
mean that there always must be a "pending charge" or "accusation 
of particular criminal activity" for an answer to be "compelled" 
and subject to immunity.     
¶92 The second way in which the dissent apparently 
modifies the standard is by requiring that the probation officer 
personally threaten a probationer with revocation.  See dissent, 
¶140.  This requirement is not found in Murphy II.  Rather, the 
Murphy II Court explained:  "[I]f the State, either expressly or 
by implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege [to 
remain silent] would lead to revocation of probation, it would 
have 
created 
the 
classic penalty situation, . . . and the 
probationer's answers would be deemed compelled and inadmissible 
in a criminal prosecution."8 
¶93 After refusing to accept the State's concession and 
setting forth a modified test, the dissent criticizes Spaeth for 
failing to make a record sufficient to satisfy the newly 
                                                 
8 Murphy II, 465 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added). 
Murphy II suggests that a statement may be considered 
compelled if the state actually would penalize the probationer 
for remaining silent or if the probationer reasonably fears that 
remaining silent would result in a penalty.  Id. at 437-38.  
No.  2009AP2907-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
declared modified test.  Nevertheless, the dissent asserts that 
Spaeth's answers "appear[ ] to have been volunteered."  Dissent, 
¶139. 
¶94 The dissent goes too far without briefs or a complete 
factual record.  I write separately to specifically state my 
concerns with the dissent's interpretation of the case law.   
¶95 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶96 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J. 
(dissenting).   I 
conclude that the majority opinion errs in assuming that 
Spaeth's February 15, 2006, statements to his probation agent 
were incriminating, compelled testimony, and then permitting 
that assumption to drive its conclusion that Spaeth's confession 
to Oshkosh police officers must be suppressed.  As I explain 
fully herein, Spaeth's statements to his probation agent were 
not incriminating, compelled testimony and his confession to the 
Oshkosh police officers was voluntarily made.  Therefore, I 
would reverse the court of appeals decision and affirm Spaeth's 
conviction of four counts of first-degree sexual assault of a 
child.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶97 On February 15, 2006, Joseph Spaeth was on probation 
after being convicted of fourth-degree sexual assault of a child 
as a result of Spaeth's 1991 sexual assault of his 11-year-old 
niece, when he was 24 years old.  Spaeth also was convicted of 
first-degree sexual assault of a child in 1993 because of 
Spaeth's sexual assault of his six-and-one-half-year-old niece, 
when he was 26 years old.1   
                                                 
1 Spaeth 
initially 
received 
probation 
for 
the 
sexual 
assaults of his two nieces, but his probation was revoked and he 
was incarcerated due to the sexual assault of his aunt.  On 
February 15, he was on parole after his release from prison.  
However, I use the term "probation" to indicate his status 
because that is the term chosen by the majority opinion.  
Majority op., ¶4 n.2. 
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
¶98 Rebecca 
DeWitt 
was 
Spaeth's 
probation 
agent 
on 
February 15, 2006, and it was she who asked Spaeth to undergo a 
polygraph as part of her supervision of him.  After the test, 
Spaeth was interviewed by DeWitt.  She was questioned at trial 
and said: 
Q 
And based on those communications, did you have 
any concern as to whether or not Mr. Spaeth had 
been involved in any type of inappropriate sexual 
activity? 
A 
After the polygraph examination is completed, the 
examiner will come and talk to me . . . .  So, 
the examiner came and talked to me in my office 
and then we went into the polygraph examination 
room to discuss the statements that Joe had made 
after the exam actually.   
Q 
And was Mr. Spaeth present when you had those 
discussions?  
A 
Yes, he was. 
Q 
And at that point did Mr. Spaeth make any 
admissions 
that he had sexual contact with 
children in your presence?  
A 
At that time he said that he had been horse-
playing with his nieces and nephews and he knew 
that to be wrong.   
Because she believed that "horse-playing" with children violated 
Spaeth's rules of probation, DeWitt contacted the Oshkosh Police 
Department to pick up Spaeth on a probation hold.  In regard to 
the probation hold, she testified: 
Q 
So, at that point you had discussed with Mr. 
Spaeth and with the polygraph examiner——When you 
had that interview, you discussed with him, with 
Mr. Spaeth, that you felt he may have violated 
his rules, correct? 
A 
Yes. 
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
Q 
And, specifically, you felt he may have violated 
his rules by sexual contact with children?   
A 
At that point, no. . . .    
. . . . 
Q 
So, at that point not sexual assault of children 
but at least some other violations with the 
children? 
A 
Correct. 
¶99 Before a police officer arrived and with no indication 
in the record of further questioning by Agent DeWitt, Spaeth 
continued to talk about his interactions with his young nieces 
and nephews.  He told DeWitt that he "may have brushed up 
against his nieces and nephews vaginas or butts or breast area."  
These latter statements were more than a violation of a rule of 
probation; they had the potential to indicate that sexual 
assaults had occurred.   
¶100 When Officer James Framke arrived from the Oshkosh 
Police Department to take Spaeth into custody for the probation 
hold, DeWitt told him the specifics that Spaeth had relayed 
about his interactions with his nieces and nephews.  Officer 
Framke asked Spaeth if he would be willing to talk with him 
about the touching of his nieces and nephews.  DeWitt told 
Spaeth that he did not have to talk to the officer and that he 
could have an attorney, but Spaeth said that he would like to 
talk.   
¶101 Spaeth was taken to the Oshkosh Police Department 
where Detective James Busha joined Spaeth and Officer Framke.  
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
Spaeth was given Miranda warnings by the officers.2  He signed a 
waiver of rights form and the interrogation began.  Spaeth then 
gave the officers a statement, which the officers wrote out and 
Spaeth signed. 
¶102 Spaeth told the officers that on February 11, 2006, 
while at his brother's house, he "brushed against" his niece, 
N.B., who was seven-and-one-half-years-old.  In so doing, he 
said his hand touched her "vagina, buttocks and chest."3  He said 
that he knew what he was doing was wrong, but he just "get[s] a 
'don't care' feeling."   
¶103 Spaeth also told the officers that on February 14, 
2006, while at his brother's house, he again touched N.B. and 
also touched his niece, A.R.B., who was three-and-one-half-
years-old, and his niece T.M.B., who was six-and-one-half-years-
old.  He said he touched the girls' vaginas, buttocks and 
chests, and that his hand would just "rest" there for 30 seconds 
to one minute.  At the time of these assaults, Spaeth was 38 
years old. 
¶104 Spaeth was charged with four counts of first-degree 
sexual assault of a child.  He moved to suppress his statements 
to Officer Framke and Detective Busha.  His motion was denied 
                                                 
2 The warnings arise from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966).  They inform the suspect that he or she has the right to 
remain silent and the right to have an attorney present.  They 
also caution that any statements the suspect makes can be used 
against him or her.  
3 When officers later interviewed family members about 
Spaeth's conduct with their children, N.B.'s mother explained 
that N.B. is cognitively challenged and could not confirm or 
deny whether Spaeth had inappropriately touched her.   
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
because the circuit court concluded that Spaeth's statements 
were voluntarily made. 
¶105 Spaeth was convicted on all counts after a jury trial, 
but the circuit court set aside the verdict and ordered a new 
trial because the jury had considered prejudicial information.  
Subsequently, Spaeth again was convicted on all four counts of 
first-degree sexual assault of a child after he pled no contest.  
He was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment on each conviction, 
five 
years 
of 
incarceration, 
followed 
by 
ten 
years 
of 
supervision.  The sentences were concurrent.    
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶106 Whether Spaeth's statements to his probation agent 
were incriminating and compelled testimony such that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination became 
self-executing is a question of law for our independent review.  
See Minnesota v. Murphy (Murphy II), 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984); 
State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225, 227-28, 252 N.W.2d 664 (1977). 
¶107 Whether Spaeth's confession to police was the result 
of his voluntarily waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination involves the application of constitutional 
principles to facts found.  This also presents a question of law 
for our independent review.  State v. Ward, 2009 WI 60, ¶17, 318 
Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236.  
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
B.  Compelled Testimony 
1.  Fifth Amendment principles 
¶108 In order to receive protection under the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution without personally 
raising the privilege against self-incrimination, a person's 
statement must be testimonial, incriminating and compelled.4  
State v. Mark (Mark II), 2008 WI App 44, ¶10, 308 Wis. 2d 191, 
747 N.W.2d 727.  However, court opinions do not always discuss 
all three components, but will assume that one of the components 
has been met.   
¶109 The case before us is an example of that because the 
majority 
opinion assumes, without analysis, that Spaeth's 
statements to DeWitt were compelled.5  When an incriminating 
statement has been compelled, the Fifth Amendment privilege does 
not have to be raised by the speaker, but rather, Fifth 
Amendment immunity for incriminating, compelled testimony is 
self-executing.  Murphy II, 465 U.S. at 426.  However, not all 
statements that a probationer makes to his probation agent are 
compelled statements.  See id. at 438. 
                                                 
4 The Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part that no 
person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself."  U.S. Const. amend. V.   
5 Majority op., ¶58.  In all fairness to the majority 
opinion, I note that the State conceded that Spaeth's statements 
were compelled.  However, whether the requisite compulsion has 
occurred is a question of law.  See State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 
225, 227-28, 252 N.W.2d 664 (1977) (concluding that certain 
statements were compelled).  Because it is our constitutional 
duty to declare what the law is, we are not bound to accept 
concessions of law.  Lloyd Frank Logging v. Healy, 2007 WI App 
249, ¶15 n.5, 306 Wis. 2d 385, 742 N.W.2d 337.  Therefore, I do 
not accept the concession. 
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
¶110 My discussion of incriminating, compelled testimony 
and whether immunity is a self-executing result of governmental 
questioning begins with Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 
(1972), where the scope of Fifth Amendment immunity was 
explained.  In Kastigar, Kastigar and other petitioners were 
subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury.  Because the 
government believed that the petitioners might invoke their 
Fifth Amendment right to silence, a government officer obtained 
a court order directing the petitioners to give answers to 
certain questions and produce certain documents before a grand 
jury, which order included a grant of immunity pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. §§ 6002-03.  Id. at 442.   
¶111 The petitioners argued that the scope of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 6002-03 was not coextensive with the privilege afforded by 
the Fifth Amendment; therefore, protection under §§ 6002 and 
6003 was not sufficient immunity to compel their testimony.  Id.  
Accordingly, they refused to answer the questions asked and were 
taken into custody.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine whether testimony may be compelled by granting "use 
immunity," as the statute did, or whether it was necessary to 
grant 
"transactional 
immunity" 
before 
testimony 
could 
be 
compelled.6  Id. at 443.   
                                                 
6 "Use 
immunity" 
includes 
immunity 
for 
the 
use 
and 
derivative use of compelled testimony that is incriminating.  
Kastigar 
v. 
United 
States, 
406 
U.S. 
441, 
453 
(1972).  
"Transactional immunity" is absolute immunity from prosecution 
for the crime to which the compelled, incriminating testimony 
relates.  Id.   
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
¶112 The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination "protects against any disclosures that the witness 
reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or 
could lead to other evidence that might be so used."  Id. at 
444-45.  The Supreme Court concluded that the "statute's 
explicit proscription of the use in any criminal case of 
'testimony or other information compelled under the order (or 
any information directly or indirectly derived from such 
testimony or other information)' is consonant with Fifth 
Amendment standards."  Id. at 453.  The Court also explained 
that "[w]hile a grant of immunity must afford protection 
commensurate with that afforded by the privilege, it need not be 
broader" than the Fifth Amendment privilege.  Id.  The Court 
then concluded that transactional immunity was not required by 
the Fifth Amendment privilege.  Id.   
¶113 Kastigar did not delineate the circumstances that 
would cause testimony to be compelled.  It assumed that the 
court order directing answers to certain questions before the 
grand jury was sufficient to show a governmental attempt to 
compel testimony. 
¶114 Evans, decided in 1977 after Kastigar, was the first 
Wisconsin appellate case to undertake a thorough discussion of 
the method by which testimony is compelled.  Evans set out the 
steps necessary to decide whether an incriminating statement had 
been compelled by government action.   
¶115 Evans was a probationer who, during the course of his 
probation, was charged in a criminal complaint with conspiracy 
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
9 
 
to deliver controlled substances.  Evans, 77 Wis. 2d at 228.  
When the charges came to the attention of Evans' probation 
agent, he asked Evans to give an accounting of his activities on 
certain dates relevant to the charged conspiracy.  Evans refused 
to answer, on the advice of counsel.  Id. at 228-29.  The 
probation agent sought revocation based on Evans' refusal.  At 
his probation revocation hearing, Evans again refused to answer 
those questions.  His probation was revoked, and he was then 
returned to court for sentencing on the conviction that preceded 
his probation.  Id. at 229-30.   
¶116 In approving the revocation of probation for asserting 
his Fifth Amendment right to silence, we explained that "[t]he 
liberty enjoyed by a probationer is, under any view, a 
conditional liberty. . . .  His position is not that of the non-
convicted citizen."  Id. at 230.  We went on to explain that 
"the situation in which the probationer fears self-incrimination 
in a criminal proceeding entails another consideration, that, 
'no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself."  Id. at 232.  Therefore, even though 
Evans had a constitutional right to remain silent, his status as 
a probationer permitted revocation of probation for exercising 
his silence.7  
¶117 We described two steps that must be taken before a 
probation agent's question will impact the Fifth Amendment right 
to silence.  First, only certain types of questions have the 
                                                 
7 It is also likely that Evans would have been subject to 
revocation proceedings if the answers he gave incriminated him 
in the commission of a crime. 
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
10 
 
potential to generate Fifth Amendment concerns when answers to 
those questions are compelled.  We said: 
[S]tatements made by a probationer to his probation 
agent or in a probation revocation hearing in response 
to questions which, as here, are the result of pending 
charges 
or 
accusations 
of 
particular 
criminal 
activity, 
may 
not 
be 
used 
to 
incriminate 
the 
probationer in a subsequent criminal proceeding.  
Id. at 227-28 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).  Questions 
asked must be those whose answers would incriminate the 
probationer in the commission of a crime.  Therefore, not every 
question that a probation agent asks a probationer compels an 
incriminating answer.  Stated otherwise, it is the question 
itself that drives the Fifth Amendment inquiry, not the answer 
that is given, or refused to be given, by the probationer.   
¶118 For example, an agent may question a probationer who 
is subject to a curfew about the time he returned home.  A 
probationer is required to answer his agent truthfully, and the 
answer could subject the probationer to a revocation hearing.  
However, because the question does not relate to "pending 
charges" or an "accusation[] of particular criminal activity," 
it does not satisfy the first necessary step of Evans.  That is, 
it is not a question whose answer would incriminate the 
probationer in a crime.  As we said, "Probation conditions may 
proscribe activity which is not in itself violative of the 
criminal law."  Id. at 234.  
¶119 Or, a probationer who is asked a question about 
whether he is adhering to curfew may answer the question asked 
and then continue talking about matters for which no questions 
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
11 
 
had been asked.  If he does so and implicates himself in a 
crime, he will have volunteered incriminating information.  
However, because the probation agent did not ask a question 
about a pending charge or particular criminal activity, the 
probationer's 
incriminating statement would not have been 
compelled by the probation agent's question.   
¶120 Evans also explained that a probationer could be 
subject to revocation proceedings both for failing to answer an 
agent's question about conduct that is not violative of criminal 
law and for refusing to answer questions concerning criminal 
activity.  Id. at 234-35.  We explained, "[I]t would be an 
absurd result to say:  'You may be revoked and sent to prison 
for refusal to answer questions concerning noncriminal but 
proscribed activity, but you may not be revoked for refusal to 
answer questions about possible criminal activity.'"  Id. 
¶121 The second step in Evans requires us to examine 
whether a question, the answer to which would incriminate the 
probationer, compelled the answer given.  Threatened penalties, 
civil or criminal, for refusing to answer will suffice to cause 
impermissible 
compulsion. 
 
We 
explained 
that 
"the 
fifth 
amendment cannot be vitiated by imposing non-criminal penalties 
as a price of its exercise."  Id. at 232.  It is impermissible 
to threaten to impose a sanction that makes the exercise of the 
"Fifth Amendment privilege 'costly.'"  Id. at 233 (citing 
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967)).   
¶122 In Murphy II, decided in 1984 after Evans, the United 
States Supreme Court addressed the criteria that must be met 
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
12 
 
before a court could conclude that questioning by a probation 
agent would cause a violation of the probationer's Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.   
¶123 Murphy was a probationer who was required to "be 
truthful with the probation [agent] 'in all matters.'"  Murphy 
II, 465 U.S. at 422.  As a condition of probation, Murphy 
attended a sex offenders treatment program.  Id.  Murphy's agent 
learned that he had discontinued the program and required him to 
report to her office.  Id. at 422-23.  Murphy admitted he was no 
longer attending the program; however, the agent did not 
commence revocation proceedings because Murphy was doing well in 
other areas.  Id. at 423.   
¶124 Subsequently, the probation agent learned that Murphy 
told a counselor that he had committed a rape and murder in 
1974.  She contacted Murphy and asked him to come in and discuss 
a treatment plan for the remainder of his probation.  Id.  When 
Murphy arrived for the meeting, the probation agent did not ask 
Murphy questions about the 1974 crimes; rather, she told Murphy 
about the information she had been given in regard to the 1974 
rape and murder.  Id. at 423-24.  Murphy became angry at what he 
said was a breach of his confidences to the counselor, and in 
his anger, he admitted the 1974 crimes.  Id. at 424. 
¶125 The agent explained to Murphy that her primary concern 
was the relationship between the crime for which he was on 
probation and the 1974 criminal conduct.  Id.  She encouraged 
Murphy to turn himself in, but he refused.  Id.  She then 
secured an arrest and detention order, and a state grand jury 
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
13 
 
returned an indictment charging Murphy with first-degree murder.  
Id. at 424-25.   
¶126 Murphy sought to suppress his statements to the 
probation agent on the grounds that they were obtained in 
violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Id.  
The trial court found that Murphy was not in custody at the time 
the statements were made and the statements were not compelled.  
Id. 
 
The 
Minnesota 
Supreme 
Court 
reversed, 
holding 
the 
statements were compelled "'[b]ecause of the compulsory nature 
of the meeting, because [Murphy] was under court order to 
respond truthfully to his agent's questions, and because the 
agent had substantial reason to believe that [Murphy's] answers 
were likely to be incriminating.'"  Id. (quoting Minnesota v. 
Murphy (Murphy I), 324 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. 1982)).  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court also reasoned that the agent should have 
warned 
Murphy 
that 
he 
had 
a 
privilege 
against 
self-
incrimination.  Id. 
¶127 In 
Murphy 
II, 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
addressed "whether a statement made by a probationer to his 
probation officer without prior warnings is admissible in a 
subsequent criminal proceeding."  Id.  In reversing the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court focused 
on whether Murphy's statements were compelled.  Underlying the 
opinion is the Supreme Court's conclusion that not every 
statement made by a probationer to his probation agent is 
protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
14 
 
incrimination.  The Supreme Court articulated this in several 
ways. 
¶128 First, the Supreme Court explained that "the general 
obligation to appear and answer questions truthfully did not in 
itself convert Murphy's otherwise voluntary statements into 
compelled ones."8  Id. at 427.  The Court said that although the 
agent could compel Murphy's attendance and the giving of 
truthful answers, that circumstance is no different than the 
expectations of a witness before a grand jury, who is subpoenaed 
to appear and sworn to tell the truth.  Id. at 431.   
¶129 Second, the Court noted that Murphy was not in custody 
when he made his incriminating admissions; therefore, no Miranda 
warnings were required before he spoke with his probation agent.  
Id.  The Court said this lack of a warning was no different from 
                                                 
8 The concurrence asserts, "Compulsion exists when the 
probationer is required to 'choose between making incriminating 
statements and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining 
silent.'"  Concurrence, ¶85 (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy (Murphy 
II), 465 U.S. 420, 436 (1984)).  In so stating, the concurrence 
leaves out the United States Supreme Court's complete statement 
of the premise that the Court was explaining.  For completeness, 
the reader should note that the Court went on to state, 
immediately following the language quoted in the concurrence, 
"Because we conclude that Minnesota did not attempt to take the 
extra, impermissible step, we hold that Murphy's Fifth Amendment 
privilege was not self-executing."  Murphy II, 465 U.S. at 436.   
By 
so 
explaining, 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
emphasized that it took something more than being required to 
appear and give truthful answers to a probation agent's 
questions 
before 
a 
probationer's 
answers 
were 
compelled 
testimony.  Id. at 436-38.  In the case now before this court, 
all that Spaeth was required to do was to appear and to answer 
truthfully.  The probation agent took no extra, impermissible 
step, which is required by Murphy II before Spaeth's statement 
could constitute compelled testimony.   
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
15 
 
a grand jury witness where there is no requirement to warn the 
witness of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.  See id.   
¶130 Third, the Court explained that generally if a 
witness, who is not in custody but is in circumstances where he 
is expected to answer questions, does so instead of claiming the 
Fifth Amendment privilege, the government has not "compelled" 
him to incriminate himself.  Id. at 432.   
¶131 The Court explained that an interview with a probation 
agent was significantly different from a custodial interview.  
The Court said that when a person is in custody, he faces 
"inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the 
individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he 
would not otherwise do so freely."  Id. at 430 (citing Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).  Accordingly, when a 
person is in custody at the time of questioning, he must be 
provided with certain warnings to protect his Fifth Amendment 
right to silence.  Id.   
¶132 The Court concluded that an interview with a probation 
agent was not similar to an in-custody interview with law 
enforcement because one is placed in custody by arrest and is 
not free to leave.  However, interviews with a probation agent 
are arranged by appointment and the person is free to leave.  
Therefore, an interview with a probation agent requires a 
probationer to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege.  Id. at 
433.  Accordingly, the Fifth Amendment does not provide a self-
executing privilege for all probation interviews.  Id. at 434.  
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
16 
 
¶133 The Supreme Court also recognized that the general 
rule for non-custodial probation interrogation is "inapplicable 
in cases where the assertion of the privilege is penalized so as 
to 'foreclos[e] a free choice to remain silent, and . . . 
compe[l] . . . incriminating testimony.'"  Id. (quoting Garner 
v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 661 (1976)).9  The Supreme Court 
classified such cases as "penalty" cases because there was a 
penalty threatened for the exercise of the Fifth Amendment 
right.  The Court pointed out that in each "penalty" case, "the 
State not only compelled an individual to appear and testify, 
but also sought to induce him to forgo the Fifth Amendment 
privilege by threatening to impose economic or other sanctions 
'capable of forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment 
forbids.'"  Id. (citing Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 
806 (1977)).   
¶134 The Court explained that each penalty case also 
contained a threat of punishment for reliance on the privilege 
against self-incrimination.  Id. at 435.  Accordingly, it is 
permissible for a state to require a probationer to appear and 
truthfully discuss circumstances that affect his probationary 
status.  In such a probation interview, without more, the Fifth 
Amendment privilege is not self-executing.  Id.  However, the 
                                                 
9 Murphy had argued that revocation of his probation was 
threatened if he was not truthful upon questioning by his 
probation agent.  Murphy II, 465 U.S. at 434.  The Supreme Court 
held this argument insufficient to prove compulsion.  Id. at 
437-38. 
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
17 
 
Court also explained that the nature of the questions could 
warrant a different analysis.   
The result may be different if the questions put to 
the probationer, however relevant to his probationary 
status, call for answers that would incriminate him in 
a pending or later criminal prosecution.   
Id.  The Court concluded that with questions that sought answers 
that would incriminate the probationer, the state also must 
require the probationer "to choose between making incriminating 
statements and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining 
silent" before there is compulsion under the Fifth Amendment.  
Id. at 436.  The United States Supreme Court concluded that 
Minnesota 
did 
not 
"take 
the 
extra, 
impermissible 
step"; 
therefore, Murphy's statements were not compelled by state 
action.  Id.    
2.  In regard to Spaeth 
¶135 Murphy II and Evans provide the foundation for the 
analysis a court must undertake in regard to whether a 
probationer's statement to his probation agent was compelled.  
Murphy II establishes that in order for testimony to be 
compelled under Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, a person either 
must be in custody when questioned or he must be threatened with 
a penalty if he refuses to answer questions that would 
incriminate him in a crime.  Id. at 430-31.   
¶136 During Spaeth's interviews with DeWitt, he was not in 
custody.  DeWitt testified that Spaeth was asked to come in to 
take a polygraph examination, and he agreed to do so.  Spaeth 
was free to leave the probation interview.   
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
18 
 
¶137 After the examination was concluded, DeWitt talked 
with Spaeth because the test results showed that he may have 
been deceptive in some of his answers.  The record does not 
contain the question that DeWitt asked prior to Spaeth's telling 
her that he had been "horse-playing" with his young nieces and 
nephews and that he knew that was "wrong."   
¶138 Therefore, we don't know if DeWitt's question had the 
potential to elicit incriminating statements under the standards 
explained in Evans.  However, it is very unlikely that it was a 
qualifying question because there is nothing in the record to 
imply that the question she asked related to "pending charges or 
accusations of particular criminal activity," as Murphy II and 
Evans require.  Murphy II, 465 U.S. at 435; Evans, 77 Wis. 2d at 
227-28; see also State v. Mark (Mark I), 2006 WI 78, ¶33 n.12, 
292 Wis. 2d 1, 718 N.W.2d 90 (affirming Evans' delineation of 
the type of questions that have the potential to elicit 
incriminating testimony).10 
¶139 Furthermore, 
Spaeth's 
later 
description 
of 
his 
interactions with his nieces and nephews as to his hands 
                                                 
10 In State v. Mark (Mark I), 2006 WI 78, 292 Wis. 2d 1, 718 
N.W.2d 90, we remanded to the circuit court to determine whether 
Mark's statements were compelled, and we noted that the nature 
of 
the 
questions 
asked 
was 
an 
issue 
in 
making 
this 
determination.  Id., ¶33 n.12.  When the court of appeals 
reviewed the subsequent circuit court decision, it did not 
address the type of question that was asked.  It considered only 
the answers given by Mark.  See State v. Mark (Mark II), 2008 WI 
App 44, ¶¶16-25, 308 Wis. 2d 191, 747 N.W.2d 727.  This led the 
court of appeals to an incorrect analysis because it is the 
question that compels an incriminating answer.  It is not the 
incriminating answer that determines whether the question was 
compelling.   
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
19 
 
touching their breasts, butts and vaginas appears to have been 
volunteered 
without 
any 
additional 
question 
from 
DeWitt.  
Although the record is silent in regard to any of DeWitt's 
questions, we do know that DeWitt called the Oshkosh Police 
Department to come to pick up Spaeth before he described what 
turned out to be criminal conduct.    
¶140 Furthermore, even if I were to assume, arguendo, that 
DeWitt asked Spaeth questions that had the potential to 
incriminate him in a pending charge or were related to specific 
criminal activity, there is nothing in the record to suggest 
that DeWitt threatened Spaeth with revocation if he refused to 
answer.  As the United States Supreme Court has stated, "the 
general obligation to appear and answer questions truthfully 
d[oes] 
not 
in 
itself 
convert 
. . . 
otherwise 
voluntary 
statements into compelled ones."  Murphy II, 465 U.S. at 427; 
see also Mark I, 292 Wis. 2d 1, ¶25 (concluding that "the mere 
fact that an individual is required to appear and report 
truthfully to his or her probation (or parole) officer is 
insufficient to establish compulsion").  Therefore, because the 
State did not take the impermissible step of requiring Spaeth to 
choose between revocation and answering DeWitt's questions, his 
answers were not compelled.  Murphy II, 465 U.S. at 433; see 
also State v. Thompson, 142 Wis. 2d 821, 829, 419 N.W.2d 564 
(Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that Thompson's statements were 
compelled because the State required him to choose between his 
conditional liberty and his Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent).   
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
20 
 
¶141 It is also important to note that nothing in the 
record demonstrates that Spaeth was granted use immunity by 
statute or court order if he answered the questions asked on the 
polygraph test or answered the questions asked by DeWitt.  "The 
power to grant immunity is a legislative power[;] not an 
inherent power of either the prosecutor or the court."  Grant v. 
State, 83 Wis. 2d 77, 89, 264 N.W.2d 587 (1978) (citing Elam v. 
State, 
50 
Wis. 2d 
383, 
392-93, 
184 
N.W.2d 
176 
(1971)).  
Therefore, it is critical that the requirements for concluding 
that a question to the probationer was of a type that would 
elicit incriminating testimony and that the facts necessary to 
show compulsion are present.  If a complete analysis on 
compelled statements is not undertaken, courts may fall into the 
analysis 
employed 
by 
the 
Minnesota 
Supreme 
Court, 
whose 
erroneous analysis caused the United States Supreme Court to 
reverse the Minnesota court's decision.   
¶142 As a reminder to the reader, the Supreme Court quoted 
the erroneous Fifth Amendment analysis of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court:  
[N]otwithstanding the lack of custody in the usual 
sense, Murphy's failure to claim the privilege when he 
was questioned was not fatal to his claim "[b]ecause 
of the compulsory nature of the meeting, because 
[Murphy] was under court order to respond truthfully 
to his agent's questions, and because the agent had 
substantial reason to believe that [Murphy's] answers 
were likely to be incriminating."  In the [Minnesota] 
court's view, "the agent should have warned [Murphy] 
of his privilege against compelled self-incrimination 
before she questioned him and . . . her failure to do 
so, when she had already decided to report his answers 
to police, bars use of [Murphy's] confession at this 
trial." 
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
21 
 
Murphy II, 465 U.S. at 425 (citation omitted) (quoting Murphy I, 
324 N.W.2d at 344).   
¶143 Perhaps because the issue of compulsion to answer a 
question that would elicit an incriminating statement was 
conceded by the State, the majority opinion inadvertently 
expands the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege set out in 
Kastigar and Murphy II.  It does so when it erroneously employs 
Evans by stating, "The [Evans] court recognized the right of the 
state to compel answers from probationers and parolees, but only 
if they were granted corresponding immunity as outlined in 
Kastigar."11  The Evans holding is much more limited.  It 
permitted use immunity for compelled answers only to certain 
kinds of questions: 
[W]e hold that upon timely objection in criminal 
proceedings, the testimony of a probationer or a 
parolee given in response to questions by a probation 
or parole agent or at a probation or parole revocation 
hearing, which questions are prompted by pending 
charges 
or 
accusations 
of 
particular 
criminal 
activity, or any evidence derived from such testimony, 
is inadmissible against the probationer or parolee 
during subsequent proceedings on related criminal 
charges.  
Evans, 77 Wis. 2d at 235 (emphasis added).  Therefore, without 
knowledge of whether the questions that DeWitt asked Spaeth were 
"prompted by pending charges or accusations of particular 
criminal activity" there is no immunity for Spaeth's answers 
pursuant to Kastigar or Murphy II.  Accordingly, Spaeth's 
statements to DeWitt were not compelled.  
                                                 
11 Majority op., ¶55. 
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
22 
 
C.  Spaeth's Statement to Oshkosh Police 
¶144 At the hearing on Spaeth's motion to suppress his 
confession, the circuit court found that Spaeth's confession to 
law enforcement officers at the Oshkosh Police Department was 
voluntary.  Therefore, his confession was not suppressed.12   
¶145 At the suppression hearing, the argument of Spaeth's 
counsel focused on whether there was a sufficient break between 
the polygraph examination and Spaeth's subsequent confession to 
Oshkosh police officers.13  The argument that his confession to 
the officers should be suppressed because it was the fruit of 
incriminating, compelled testimony to DeWitt was not raised for 
the circuit court's consideration.  Therefore, no inquiry was 
made of DeWitt in regard to the questions she asked Spaeth or 
whether all of Spaeth's statements to her were in response to 
her questions, rather than voluntary statements.   
¶146 I note that although the State has the burden of proof 
during a suppression hearing, the defendant has the burden of 
production to establish initial facts showing that his rights 
have been violated.  State v. Jackson, 229 Wis. 2d 328, 336, 600 
N.W.2d 39 (Ct. App. 1999).  Answers to a probation agent's 
questions that would incriminate the probationer are compelled 
if the State attaches an "impermissible penalty to the exercise 
                                                 
12 With new counsel, Spaeth moved for reconsideration.  The 
circuit court denied that motion as well.    
13 Counsel argued, "There wasn't any significant timeframe 
between the time he made the statements to the polygraph 
examiner and the statements to law enforcement, so we're seeking 
to suppress any of those statements made that day." 
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
23 
 
of the privilege against self-incrimination."  Murphy II, 465 
U.S. at 437.  To attach an "impermissible penalty," a defendant 
must be informed "during the crucial meeting with his probation 
officer that an assertion of the privilege would result" in the 
revocation of probation.  Id. at 438.   
¶147 Spaeth made no record from which a court could 
conclude that his statements to DeWitt were anything other than 
voluntary 
statements. 
 
Therefore, 
the 
confession 
to 
law 
enforcement 
should 
not 
be 
analyzed 
as 
the 
fruit 
of 
incriminating, compelled testimony.  Rather, Spaeth's statements 
to law enforcement should be examined under the usual cannons 
applicable to in-custody interrogations.  Statements to law 
enforcement are voluntary "if they were 'the product of a free 
and unconstrained will, reflecting deliberateness of choice.'"  
Ward, 318 Wis. 2d 301, ¶18 (quoting State v. Davis, 2008 WI 71, 
¶36, 310 Wis. 2d 583, 751 N.W.2d 332).   
¶148 In regard to Spaeth's interrogation, DeWitt reminded 
him that he did not have to talk with the officer, before he 
left with the officer.  When they arrived at the station house, 
Detective Busha said that he had been told that Spaeth had a 
matter that he wanted to talk about and Spaeth said he did.  
Detective Busha asked Spaeth if he could understand and read the 
English language, and Spaeth said that he could.   
¶149 At 1:20 p.m., Spaeth was given the Miranda warnings 
form and he read out loud the Miranda warnings set out on the 
form.  Detective Busha asked Spaeth if he understood what he had 
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
24 
 
read. Spaeth said that he did, and at 1:24 p.m., he signed the 
form that he had read.  The interrogation then began.   
¶150 Detective Busha testified that he did not imply to 
Spaeth that his probation status would be affected by whether he 
cooperated in the interview.  He also said that even though he 
knew of the polygraph examination earlier that day, he did not 
mention it to Spaeth.  Detective Busha said that Spaeth appeared 
to understand his constitutional rights and that he did not 
appear to be under the influence of any drugs or alcohol.   
¶151 Spaeth gave a statement about his conduct with his 
young nieces and nephews.  An officer wrote up the statement and 
Spaeth signed it at 2:40 p.m.  Therefore, the interview was not 
overly long.   
¶152 I conclude that the totality of the circumstances 
supports the circuit court's conclusion that Spaeth's confession 
was voluntarily made.  Spaeth was 38 years old.  He could read 
and write English and had experience with law enforcement due to 
his two prior convictions.  He said that he had something that 
he "wanted to get . . . off his chest."  The officers were 
courteous, offering Spaeth's breaks and coffee.  The interview 
lasted only one hour and 20 minutes.  There is nothing to 
indicate that his statements to law enforcement were coerced in 
any way.  Accordingly, the circuit court correctly denied 
Spaeth's motion to suppress his confession. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶153 I conclude that the majority opinion errs in assuming 
that Spaeth's February 15, 2006, statements to his probation 
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
25 
 
agent 
were 
incriminating, 
compelled 
testimony 
and 
then 
permitting that assumption to drive its conclusion that Spaeth's 
confession to Oshkosh police officers must be suppressed.  As I 
explained fully herein, Spaeth's statements to his probation 
agent were not incriminating, compelled testimony and his 
confession to the Oshkosh police officers was voluntarily made.  
Therefore, I would reverse the court of appeals decision and 
affirm Spaeth's conviction of four counts of first-degree sexual 
assault of a child.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from 
the majority opinion.   
 
 
 
 
No.  2009AP2907-CR.pdr 
 
 
 
1