Title: Hinton v. Hill
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S52819
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: December 29, 2006

FILED: December 29, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
SHIRLEY HINTON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
JEAN HILL,
Superintendent,
Eastern Oregon Correctional Institution,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 01C10035; CA A121726; SC S52819)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 8, 2006.
Kathleen Cegla, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause
for petitioner on review.  With her on the briefs were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General,
Salem.
Kevin T. Lafky, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief
for respondent on review.
Before, De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Carson, Gillette,
Durham, Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.**
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed, and the case
is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Jamese L. Rhoades, Judge. 197 Or App 238, 105 P3d 923, on recons, 201 Or App 131, 117 
 P3d 1066 (2005).
**Riggs, J., retired September 30, 2006, and did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case. 
Walters, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision
of this case.
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
In this post-conviction case, the Court of Appeals held
that the post-conviction court erred in failing to void
petitioner's convictions.  Hinton v. Hill, 197 Or App 238, 105
P3d 923, on recons, 201 Or App 131, 117 P3d 1066 (2005).  We
allowed defendant's (superintendent's) petition for review to
determine whether the post-conviction court's alternative remedy
was consistent with the authority granted to the post-conviction
court in the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.  For the reasons that
follow, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision and affirm the
judgment of the post-conviction court.
In the underlying criminal case, the state charged
petitioner with 24 counts of sexual misconduct. (1)  Petitioner
eventually pleaded no contest to six counts of first-degree
sexual abuse.  The plea petition that petitioner signed
erroneously stated that the maximum period of incarceration to
which petitioner could be sentenced was 226 months.  The maximum
lawful sentence, however, was 496 months.  Ultimately, the trial
court sentenced petitioner to a total of 366 months.  
Petitioner appealed her convictions, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed without opinion.  State v. Hinton, 172 Or App
483, 19 P3d 390 (2001).  Petitioner subsequently filed a petition
for post-conviction relief.  Petitioner claimed that she was
denied adequate assistance of counsel under Article I, section
11, of the Oregon Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution because her counsel had failed to
inform her correctly about the maximum possible sentence under
her plea agreement with the state.  Petitioner contended that her
convictions therefore had been obtained unlawfully and that she
was entitled to relief under ORS 138.530(1)(a) (part of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act).
The post-conviction court determined that petitioner's
trial counsel had not informed her that, based on her plea, the
trial court lawfully could impose a sentence that exceeded 226
months.  Nevertheless, the post-conviction court concluded that
petitioner had "failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that trial counsel's conduct and defense of petitioner
was ineffective and inadequate or that her defense was prejudiced
by her counsel's performance * * *."  The court also determined
that petitioner "knowingly, freely and intelligently gave up her
rights and entered no contest pleas to six counts of Sexual Abuse
in the First Degree."  Nevertheless, the court granted petitioner
post-conviction relief.  The court's judgment provided, in part: 
"[P]etitioner's First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief [is] allowed.  Petitioner's sentence
* * * is hereby set aside.  The case is remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings.  If the [state] 
wishes to pursue a sentence greater than 226 months
prison, or if the trial court desires to sentence
petitioner to an incarceration term greater than 226
months, then petitioner shall be allowed to withdraw
her previously entered pleas of no contest and all
parties shall proceed thereafter accordingly.  The
State of Oregon may proceed with the original 24 count
indictment as well as any additional prosecutable
offenses.  If the State of Oregon does not elect to
pursue a sentence greater than 226 months prison, the
trial court may impose sentence accordingly."
Petitioner appealed, asserting that the post-conviction
court had erred by setting aside petitioner's sentences without
also vacating the underlying no contest pleas, after it found
that petitioner had not been informed of the maximum sentence
possible under the plea agreement.  The Court of Appeals
concluded that petitioner's six no contest pleas had been
involuntary because petitioner erroneously had been informed that
her sentence of incarceration could not exceed 226 months. 
Hinton, 197 Or App at 242-43.  Contrary to the post-conviction
court's conclusion, the Court of Appeals further held that
petitioner had established that she had been denied adequate
assistance of counsel.  Additionally, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the remedy that the post-conviction court had
ordered had exceeded that court's statutory authority.  According
to the Court of Appeals, the post-conviction court "could not
merely vacate petitioner's sentences and remand to the trial
court for further proceedings" that may or may not result in her
convictions being vacated.  Id. at 245.  Instead, the Court of
Appeals held that "ORS 138.530(1)(a) required that the post-conviction court * * * vacate [petitioner's] convictions."  Id.
The superintendent petitioned the Court of Appeals for
reconsideration, arguing that the post-conviction court's
election to vacate petitioner's sentences and not her convictions
was appropriate under ORS 138.520.  Hinton, 201 Or App 131.  The
Court of Appeals disagreed.  The court reaffirmed its earlier
decision concluding that the post-conviction court's remedy did
not "place petitioner in her status quo ante but for her
counsel's inadequate representation" and reiterated that the
"state is wrong in suggesting that * * * the constitutional
problem in this case can be remedied without vacating the
conviction."  Id. at 136.  As noted, we allowed the
superintendent's petition for review. 
On review, the superintendent does not challenge
petitioner's entitlement to post-conviction relief.  Instead, the
superintendent challenges the Court of Appeals' conclusion that
ORS 138.530(1) required the post-conviction court to vacate the
underlying convictions.  The issue that we must decide,
therefore, is whether, after a petitioner has established
entitlement to post-conviction relief under ORS 138.530(1), the
post-conviction court may cure the violation of petitioner's
constitutional rights with a remedy other than vacating
petitioner's no contest pleas.  
We turn to the applicable sections of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, ORS 138.530(1), which outlines the
grounds that a petitioner must establish to obtain relief, and
ORS 138.520, which describes the relief that a post-conviction
court may grant after determining that a petitioner has
established a claim.  Specifically, ORS 138.530 provides, in
part: 
"(1) Post-conviction relief pursuant to ORS
138.510 to 138.680 shall be granted by the court when
one or more of the following grounds is established by
the petitioner:
"(a) A substantial denial in the proceedings
resulting in petitioner's conviction, or in the
appellate review thereof, of petitioner's rights under
the Constitution of the United States, or under the
Constitution of the State of Oregon, or both, and which
denial rendered the conviction void.
"(b) Lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose
the judgment rendered upon petitioner's conviction.
"(c) Sentence in excess of, or otherwise not in
accordance with, the sentence authorized by law for the
crime of which petitioner was convicted; or
unconstitutionality of such sentence.
"(d) Unconstitutionality of the statute making
criminal the acts for which petitioner was convicted."
ORS 138.520 describes the relief that the post-conviction court
may grant if it finds that a petitioner has established a claim
for relief: 
"The relief which a court may grant or order under
[the Post-Conviction Hearing Act] shall include
release, new trial, modification of sentence, and such
other relief as may be proper and just." 
(Emphasis added.)
Here, the superintendent asserts that the Court of
Appeals narrowed improperly the range of remedies available to
the post-conviction court under ORS 138.520.  According to the
superintendent, the Court of Appeals decision leaves the post-conviction court powerless to fashion any appropriate remedy,
which, in turn, undermines the text, purpose, and meaning of the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act.  The superintendent argues that the
post-conviction court is not required to vacate the underlying
convictions in all cases where it grants relief under ORS
138.530(1)(a). 
For her part, petitioner argues that, when the error
complained of is the failure to properly inform a criminal
defendant of the correct maximum sentence, and that defendant
enters a plea based on that incorrect information, the only
possible remedy is vacation of the convictions resulting from the
improper plea.  Consequently, petitioner contends that the post-conviction court cannot simply modify her original sentence. 
Instead, petitioner argues that the post-conviction court must
"place petitioner in the position she was in before she entered
the flawed plea."   
As discussed above, petitioner established a
"substantial denial in the proceedings" of her constitutional
rights that "rendered the conviction void."  ORS 138.530(1)(a). 
ORS 138.520 then permitted the post-conviction court to grant
relief, including "release, new trial, modification of sentence,
and such other relief as may be proper and just."  (Emphasis
added.)  For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the
Court of Appeals' interpretation of the phrase "rendered the
conviction void" in ORS 138.530(1)(a) improperly limits the
relief that may be granted pursuant to ORS 138.520. 
This court previously has addressed the issue of
appropriate remedies, pursuant to statute, in post-conviction
cases.  In Shipman v. Gladden, 253 Or 192, 453 P2d 921 (1969),
this court considered whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
authorized granting a delayed appeal to rectify the violation of
a constitutional right.  In Shipman, a jury had convicted the
petitioner of receiving and concealing stolen property and the
trial court had sentenced him to the penitentiary for three
years.  The petitioner sought post-conviction relief based on the
failure of his retained counsel to file a timely notice of
appeal, and the post-conviction court subsequently allowed the
petition and granted a delayed appeal.  
On review, this court held that the petitioner was
deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and
that the state therefore was required to "provide a remedy
adequate to restore the impaired right."  Id. at 203.  In
considering whether the post-conviction court had provided an
appropriate remedy, this court discussed the meaning of the term
"void" as used in ORS 138.530.  In doing so, this court explained
that the term "void" in ORS 138.530 meant that, "unless
appropriate relief is granted[,] the denial of petitioner's
rights that occurred * * * will render his conviction void."  Id.
(emphasis added).  That explanation of the term "void" in ORS
138.530 was significant, because the constitutional denial that
the petitioner in Shipman had experienced had occurred after
conviction.
With regard to the breadth of a post-conviction court's
remedial authority under ORS 138.520, this court in Shipman
stated:
"We concur in the finding of the trial court that
the Post Conviction Hearing Act authorizes the granting
of a delayed appeal when necessary to rectify a
substantial denial of constitutional rights.  ORS
138.520 provides that the relief which a court may
grant includes
"'* * * release, new trial, modification
of sentence, and such other relief as may be
proper and just.  * * *'   
"The phrase 'such other relief as may be proper
and just' conveys the same meaning as ORS 34.670, which
directs a habeas corpus court 'to dispose of the party
as the law and justice of the case may require.'  As we
pointed out in Landreth v. Gladden, 213 Or 205, 324 P2d
475 (1958), these phrases should be construed broadly
to achieve the remedial purpose of the statutes.
"Although the act does not mention a delayed
appeal the drafters intended such a remedy to be
included.  We think the legislature also intended to
provide a delayed appeal in those cases where such a
remedy is 'proper and just.'  The alternatives would be
to discharge the defendant or to grant him a new trial,
either of which would be, from the standpoint of proper
judicial administration, a less desirable result.  If
defendant is now provided with an appeal on the merits
he will be in the same position as if his counsel had
timely filed the original notice of appeal."
253 Or at 204 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
Here, the Court of Appeals concluded that Shipman was
inapposite because, unlike in Shipman, the "prejudice" to
petitioner in this case could be remedied only by giving
petitioner "the choice whether to go to trial and, if she pleads
guilty, the right to argue for a more lenient sentence than the
putative maximum sentence under the plea agreement."  Hinton, 201
Or App at 136.  Instead, the Court of Appeals concluded that this
court's decision in Hartzog v. Kenney, 304 Or 57, 742 P2d 600
(1987), established that the only disposition available to a
post-conviction court when a criminal defendant has received
erroneous advice about the maximum sentence is to vacate both the
sentence and the plea.  Hinton, 201 Or App at 136-37.  We
disagree with the Court of Appeals' characterization of the
"actual prejudice" that petitioner suffered in this case and with
that court's conclusion that Hartzog, rather than Shipman,
controlled the post-conviction court's dispositional authority in
this case.
In Hartzog, the petitioner was not advised by the court
or his counsel, and was not otherwise aware, that his guilty plea
to first-degree manslaughter exposed him to the imposition of a
minimum sentence.  Because the trial court had imposed a minimum
sentence, this court held that the petitioner had been denied
adequate assistance of counsel, that the denial had been
substantial, and that the denial had rendered the petitioner's
conviction "void."  304 Or at 65.
That statement should not be read out of context,
however.  The prejudice that the petitioner suffered in Hartzog
was the actual imposition of a minimum sentence that prohibited
the petitioner's release on parole during the minimum period of
confinement.  Hartzog was concerned only with whether counsel's
failure to advise the petitioner about the potential for a
minimum sentence was a "substantial denial in the proceedings,"
thereby rendering the conviction void.  Id. at 64.  It did not
concern the scope of the remedial authority of the post-conviction court under ORS 138.520.
By contrast, Semmes v. Williard, 247 Or 583, 431 P2d
844 (1967), indicates the correct course to follow in this case. 
In Semmes, this court held that a petitioner was not entitled to
post-conviction relief so long as the actual sentence imposed had
not exceeded the maximum that the petitioner had contemplated
when entering his plea.  In Semmes, this court upheld the
petitioner's convictions and his prison sentence totaling three
years, stating:
"It appears to us that this contention of lack of
knowledge of the full extent of the penalty for the
crime of which he entered a plea of guilty is utterly
immaterial under the facts of this case.  At the time
he entered his plea he was appraised of the fact that
he could receive a sentence of at least seven years and
that such sentence might or might not run concurrently
with his present term."
Id. at 587.  Because the petitioner in Semmes received a sentence
that did not exceed the maximum possible sentence of which he was
aware, the court concluded that the petitioner was not entitled
to post-conviction relief.  Id.
Here, petitioner entered a plea of no contest to six
counts of sexual abuse, with the expectation that her sentence
could not exceed 226 months' incarceration.  Thus, under this
court's reasoning in Semmes, had the court imposed a sentence
that did not exceed 226 months, petitioner would not have
suffered a "substantial denial in the proceedings," thereby
entitling her to post-conviction relief, even though she had been
unaware that a longer sentence was possible. (2)  In this case,
however, when petitioner entered her no contest pleas, she knew
that she could be incarcerated a maximum of 226 months.  Thus,
the actual prejudice that petitioner suffered in this case is
limited to the period of incarceration imposed that exceeds 226
months.  
Under ORS 138.520, as interpreted in Shipman, the post-conviction court has broad authority to fashion a remedy to
correct the actual prejudice suffered by a criminal defendant. 
Here, the post-conviction court decided to remand to the trial
court with instructions either to decrease petitioner's sentence
from 366 months to 226 months or to allow petitioner to withdraw
her no contest pleas.  That disposition is sufficient to remedy
the actual prejudice that petitioner suffered.  The statutory
scheme does not require the more complete remedy chosen by the
Court of Appeals, and that court erred in imposing it.  
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed, and the case
is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. Although the superintendent petitioned this court for
review,  we refer to Hinton, the petitioner in this proceeding
before the post-conviction court, as "petitioner" in this
opinion. 
2. We note, however, that Semmes does not stand for the
proposition that post-conviction relief is never available when a
petitioner pleads guilty after receiving erroneous advice about
the maximum possible sentence but ultimately receives the
promised sentence.  If the difference between the actual maximum
sentence and the promised sentence that the petitioner received
is negligible, then the petitioner may have a valid post-conviction claim that, but for the erroneous advice, he or she
would not have accepted the plea and would have gone to trial,
instead.