Title: The Florida Bar v. Lavenia Dianne Mason
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC00-997
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: August 29, 2002

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
  
____________
No. SC00-997
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
LAVENIA DIANNE MASON,
Respondent.
[August 29, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
The opinion filed in this case on March 14, 2002, is withdrawn, and the
following opinion is substituted in lieu thereof.
We have for review a referee’s report regarding alleged ethical breaches by
Lavenia Dianne Mason in her handling of a client’s trust account funds.  We have
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  For the reasons that follow, we approve
the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations as to guilt and discipline, and
suspend Mason for two years.  
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FACTS
The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Mason alleging that she intentionally
violated rule 5-1.1(a) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar (mandating that
money or property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose be used only for
that purpose) and also violated rule 4-8.4(c) (prohibiting conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).
The parties stipulated to the following facts and submitted the stipulation to
the referee, who adopted them in his report: (1) as a member of The Florida Bar,
Mason is subject to the jurisdiction and disciplinary rules of this Court; (2)
beginning around May 1994, Mason represented Ruby Donaldson in a claim for
damages against the manufacturer of breast implants; (3) in December 1996,
Donaldson’s claims were settled for $50,000, which was paid in three installments
of $5,000, $22,500, and $22,500; (4) the first settlement check for $5,000 was
dated December 30, 1996, from which Mason withheld $2,264.54 in fees and costs
and disbursed $2,735.46 to Donaldson; (5) the second settlement check for
$22,500 was dated August 7, 1997, from which Mason withheld $10,100 in fees
and costs and disbursed $12,400 to Donaldson; (6) on January 8, 1998, Mason
sent Donaldson two checks for $500 and $4,750, representing refunds on
attorney’s fees; (7) the third settlement check for $22,500 was dated December 26,
1.  Donaldson passed away before the hearings, but her daughter testified as
a mitigation witness for Mason.  The daughter stated that Donaldson thought that
she did not have to pay Mason attorney’s fees.
2.  By agreeing to this stipulated paragraph, Mason did not stipulate that all
of the eighty-two transfers were improper, only that they were not designated
properly.
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1997, from which, on April 20, 1998, Mason sent Donaldson a check for
$17,437.50; Donaldson returned that check to Mason and filed a grievance with the
Bar;1 (8) on June 5, 1998, Mason wrote to the Bar, advising that Donaldson’s
settlement proceeds were in Mason’s trust account; (9) an audit was conducted of
Mason’s IOTA trust account; (10) the audit revealed that the $17,437.50 due
Donaldson was not in Mason’s trust account on June 5, 1998, the date of her letter
to the Bar (on that date, Mason’s  trust account balance was $14,544.27, reflecting
a shortage of $2,893.23 just to cover Mason’s obligations to Donaldson); (11) on
June 5, 1998, Mason’s total client obligations were approximately $52,532.15,
indicating a trust account shortage of at least $37,987.88; (12) from January 1,
1996, through July 31, 1998, Mason made eighty-two transfers from her trust
account to her operating account, totaling $252,500, without reference to a client or
matter;2 (13) the eighty-two transfers created shortages in Mason’s trust account;
(14) on July 27, 1998, Mason’s client obligations totaled $53,106.02, but her trust
account balance on that date was $19,164.73, indicating a shortage of $33,941.29;
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(15) Mason violated rule 5-1.1(a); however, she reserved the right to argue that the
trust account shortages were the result of negligence, and the Bar reserved the right
to argue that the shortages were the result of intentional misconduct.
The referee held hearings on October 23, November 21, and December 19,
2000.  Based on the stipulated facts and the evidence presented at the hearings, the
referee found Mason guilty of intentionally violating rule 5-1.1(a) because the record
demonstrated that at least some of the transfers from the trust account were made
to cover shortages in the operating account.  The referee also found Mason guilty
of gross negligence in violating rule 4-8.4(c), finding that there was not sufficient
evidence to support the Bar’s claim that Mason specifically intended to mislead the
Bar about funds in the trust account on June 5, 1998.  
Applying the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the referee
found two aggravating factors:  (1) a pattern of misconduct, because the
misappropriations occurred over a period of fifteen months (standard 9.22(c)); and
(2) through gross negligence, Mason submitted false statements when she told the
Bar that funds were available in her trust account when they were not (standard
9.22(f)).  The referee found six mitigating factors: (1) absence of prior disciplinary
record (standard 9.32(a)); (2) personal and emotional problems because Mason
was going through a bitter divorce when the trust account violations occurred
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(standard 9.32(c)); (3) Mason made a timely good faith effort to correct the
problems (standard 9.32(d)); (4) Mason was inexperienced in handling the
administrative responsibilities of a solo law practice (standard 9.32(f)); (5) Mason
had a good reputation (standard 9.32(g)); and (6) Mason was remorseful about the
problems she created (standard 9.32(l)).
Although the referee acknowledged that disbarment may be the usual
sanction for trust account violations, he recommended suspension for two years
and thereafter until Mason demonstrates rehabilitation.  The referee stated that a
sanction less than disbarment is warranted because of Mason’s personal and family
problems and her exemplary conduct as an attorney for fourteen years.  The referee
also recommended that Mason pay the Bar’s reasonable costs and expenses in the
amount of $7,112.61.    
The Bar petitioned for review of discipline, seeking disbarment.  Mason
cross-petitioned seeking review of the referee’s finding of an intentional violation of
rule 5-1.1(a).
ANALYSIS
First, we consider the referee’s finding of an intentional violation of rule 5-
1.1(a).  This Court has stated that if a referee's findings are supported by
competent, substantial evidence, we are precluded from reweighing the evidence
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and substituting this Court’s judgment for that of the referee.  See Florida Bar v.
Jordan, 705 So. 2d 1387, 1390 (Fla. 1998).  We find that competent, substantial
evidence in the record supports the referee’s finding of intentional misconduct. 
The record demonstrates that some of the eighty-two unidentified trust account
transfers were made at the time operating account shortages had occurred. 
Therefore, we approve the referee’s finding that the resulting trust account
shortages were the result of intentional misconduct by Mason.  We also approve
the referee’s recommendation as to guilt of an intentional violation of rule 5-1.1(a).  
DISCIPLINE
Next, we consider the referee’s recommended discipline of a two-year
suspension.  The Bar argues that the appropriate discipline is disbarment. 
Generally speaking, this Court will not second-guess a referee’s recommended
discipline as long as that discipline has a reasonable basis in existing case law and
the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  Florida Bar v. Temmer, 753
So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).  Although we have held “that misuse of client funds is
one of the most serious offenses a lawyer can commit and that disbarment is
presumed to be the appropriate punishment,” see Florida Bar v. Shanzer, 572 So.
2d 1382, 1383 (Fla. 1991), we find that in the instant case, the referee’s
recommended discipline of a two-year suspension is the appropriate discipline.
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The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the egregious
misappropriation cases that have recently come before this Court.  Mason’s errors
here were due to mistakes in accounting practices.  She was not attempting to
intentionally steal from her clients, and there is no evidence that clients ultimately
sustained any loss.  In comparison, we examine Florida Bar v. Korones, 752 So.
2d 586 (Fla. 2000), and Florida Bar v. Travis, 765 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 2000). 
Korones was disbarred for intentionally and repetitively misappropriating funds
from his uncle’s estate, of which he was the personal representative, for his own
use.  He also intentionally submitted a false final accounting to the other residual
beneficiaries.  This Court found that Korones had “intentionally and wrongfully
misappropriated money from clients and diverted it for his personal use.”  This
Court further found that Korones had affirmatively filed a false accounting with the
beneficiaries of his uncle’s estate and paid his son to intentionally conceal his theft
to avoid being reported to the Bar.  This Court concluded that the “latter actions
clearly indicate that [Korones] was well aware of the wrongfulness of his conduct.” 
Korones, 752 So. 2d at 591.  In a very similar manner, the attorney in Travis was
disbarred for deliberately misappropriating clients’ funds over a substantial period
of time for his personal use.  Travis wrote checks to himself out of the trust
account, purchased a new home, and paid for a trip to Costa Rica.  Travis did not
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even attempt to replenish his trust account and had not made any substantial effort
to do so by the time of the final disciplinary hearing.  This Court stated in both
Korones and Travis that to determine the appropriate discipline, this Court focuses
on the circumstances of the situation.  Further, in the decisions to disbar these two
attorneys, this Court noted that both Korones and Travis knowingly and
intentionally engaged in the misconduct and caused actual harm to clients.  
Unlike Korones and Travis, Mason did not intentionally misappropriate client
funds for her personal use.  Rather, through accounting errors, she inadvertently
transferred proceeds to an operating account without proper records.  Mason
recognized her accounting errors several months before the Bar contacted her and
immediately hired a part-time bookkeeper to provide assistance.  When she learned
the extent of the accounting problems after the Bar contacted her about a grievance,
which really had no reference to trust account procedures, she hired a
CPA/attorney to audit her accounts and advise her on proper bookkeeping
systems.  Mason cooperated fully with the Bar.  Although Mason made very
serious mistakes due to her inexperience in managing trust accounts, she did
everything within her control to immediately address the problems once she was
aware of them.  Mason’s actions were, in large part, the result of negligence, and
the circumstances of the case do not demonstrate the level of egregious intentional
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misconduct found in both  Korones and Travis.  The referee’s recommended
discipline of suspension, rather than disbarment, is firmly supported by Mason’s
lack of intent to steal and case law.
Further support for the referee’s recommended discipline is found in this
Court’s holdings and in the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,
which state that a referee can consider mitigation when determining a
recommendation for discipline, even when the presumption is disbarment.  See
Florida Bar v. MacMillan, 600 So. 2d 457, 460 (Fla. 1992); Fla. Stds. Imposing
Law. Sancs. 9.3 (mitigation).  As discussed above, there are six mitigating factors
in the instant case.  The mitigation supports the referee’s recommended discipline. 
The Bar does not challenge this mitigation.  
In Florida Bar v. Corces, 639 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1994), in which an attorney
intentionally misappropriated money from trust accounts, mitigation was a factor in
determining the appropriate discipline.  The referee in Corces found the respondent
guilty of sixteen rule violations, including, like Mason, violations of rules 5-1.1(a)
and 4-8.4(c).  Unlike the present case, the referee in Corces found only two
mitigating factors:  no client complaint or client loss; and an isolated incident of
trust account mishandling.  This Court ordered a two-year suspension for Corces,
rather than the disbarment sought by the Bar.  In Corces, this Court relied on
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MacMillan, a case with similar facts and a discipline of two years’ suspension in
which the referee found mitigating factors similar to those in the instant case,
including:  absence of a prior disciplinary record; cooperative attitude toward the
proceedings; timely good faith effort to make restitution; and good character and
reputation.  In both Corces and MacMillan, the respondents were found guilty of
using client funds to pay personal bills, then reimbursing the trust accounts for the
amounts improperly withdrawn.  The record in the instant case demonstrates that
Mason made transfers from her trust account funds into her office operating
account, but there is no evidence concerning a further improper use of funds or any
losses sustained by any client.  We conclude that Corces and MacMillan, and the
significant mitigation in the instant case (including Mason’s inexperience in handling
the administrative responsibilities of a solo law practice and her timely good faith
effort to correct the problems even before being contacted by the Bar), support the
referee’s recommendation of suspension instead of disbarment.  
We further decline to disbar Mason because this extreme sanction is
designed to be imposed in cases where rehabilitation is highly improbable and the
conduct egregious.  See Florida Bar v. Kassier, 711 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1998). 
In Florida Bar v. Tauler, 775 So. 2d 944, 948 (Fla. 2000),  a case also involving
misappropriation of client funds, we held that the potential for rehabilitation was a
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significant factor in support of the referee’s recommendation of suspension over
disbarment.  The violations and mitigation found in Tauler are very similar to those
in the instant case.  Like Mason, Tauler was found guilty of misuse of client funds
and the referee found in mitigation “personal and emotional problems, positive
character and reputation, timely and good faith restitution, full and free disclosure,
and remorse.”  Id. at 945.  We note that in the instant case, the referee specifically
stated that “[i]t can hardly be said that the rehabilitation of the Respondent herein is
highly improbable.”  The likely success of rehabilitation further supports
suspension over disbarment. 
We emphasize that we do not condone Mason’s actions.  This Court does
not consider trust account violations as minimal misconduct.  Although we are
troubled by Mason’s gross negligence in replying to the Bar and her mistakes in
managing the trust account, we find that the referee’s recommendation of
suspension has a reasonable basis of support in case law.  Further, the nature of
Mason’s accounting problems, her attempts to resolve the problems even before
being contacted by the Bar, the mitigation, and the potential for rehabilitation also
support the determination of the referee that a significant suspension is the
appropriate discipline in this case.  
CONCLUSION
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Accordingly, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations
as to guilt.  Further, we approve the referee’s recommended discipline.  Lavenia
Dianne Mason is hereby suspended from the practice of law in Florida for two
years and thereafter until she proves rehabilitation.  The suspension will be
effective, nunc pro tunc, April 13, 2002, the effective date of the discipline that this
Court imposed in its March 14, 2002, decision.  In that previous opinion, we
afforded Mason thirty days to close out her practice and protect the interests of
existing clients.  Accordingly, we find that providing Mason with an additional thirty
days is not necessary.  Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 650 Apalachee
Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399, for recovery of costs from Lavenia Dianne
Mason in the amount of $7,112.61, for which sum let execution issue.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
SHAW, J., concurs in result only.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which HARDING, J., concurs.
QUINCE, J., dissents.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION.
WELLS, J., dissenting.
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I do not join in the newly constituted majority’s opinion because I cannot
reconcile the finding of the referee and majority of intentional misconduct by
Mason in respect to “some of the eighty-two unidentified trust account transfers”
and the discipline of a two-year suspension.  This appears to me to be inconsistent
with our recent decision and opinion in Florida Bar v. Travis, 765 So. 2d 689 (Fla.
2000).
In her motion for rehearing, Mason contends that there is a factual
discrepancy with this holding.  The majority appears to accept this contention,
which is an apparent rejection of the referee’s factual determination.  I believe a
better course than to grant a rehearing and then reach a different conclusion based
upon the same record would be to remand the factual issue to the referee for further
review.  I could join the majority in doing that.
HARDING, J., concurs.
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and John Anthony Boggs, Staff Counsel,
Tallahassee, Florida; and Vivian Maria Reyes, Bar Counsel, Miami, Florida,
       for Complainant
John A. Weiss of Weiss & Etkin, Tallahassee, Florida,
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       for Respondent