Title: Pilgrim v. City of Winona
Citation: 256 N.W.2d 266
Docket Number: 46496
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: June 24, 1977

256 N.W.2d 266 (1977) Richard J. PILGRIM, et al., Respondents, v. CITY OF WINONA, Respondent, v. Russell ROYCE, Intervention Defendant, Intervention Appellant. No. 46496. Supreme Court of Minnesota. June 24, 1977. *267 McMahon, Darby, Evavold &amp; Price, and Michael J. Price, Winona, for appellant. Heard before YETKA, SCOTT, KNUTSON and WINTON, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc. SCOTT, Justice. This is an appeal from a district court judgment finding Winona Zoning Ordinance No. 2138 null and void. The action was commenced by the Pilgrims, who are landholders in the Hillview Subdivision of Winona. They originally sought three forms of relief: (1) A declaration that Ordinance No. 2138 was null and void; (2) an injunction restraining the city of Winona from doing anything with respect to the Hillview Subdivision inconsistent with its being zoned R-1; and (3) an order that the city alter all maps and documents to show that Hillview was zoned R-1. The district court decided the case based upon the stipulated facts and briefs of all the parties, finding Ordinance No. 2138 to be null and void but declining to grant any further relief requested by plaintiffs. The intervenor-appellant, Russell Royce, owner of the property in question, argues on appeal that (1) Ordinance No. 2138 became conclusively valid (under Minn.St. 599.13) 3 years after its enactment; (2) plaintiffs are estopped from challenging Ordinance No. 2138; (3) the procedures used in adopting Ordinance No. 2138 constituted a "bona fide attempt" to comply with Minn.St. 462.357, subd. 3; and (4) Ordinance No. 2138 was validly reenacted by the rezoning procedure in 1974. The basic facts of this case were stipulated to by all parties below, and this stipulation was adopted by the district court. The following excerpts from the stipulation contain the relevant facts on appeal: The specific procedural requirements for a zoning ordinance are set out in Minn.St. 462.357. Subdivisions (2) and (3) of that section specify the general requirements and the "public hearing" requirement for zoning legislation: The following issues are presented: (1) Did Ordinance No. 2138 become conclusively valid (under Minn.St. 599.13) 3 years after its enactment? (2) Is appellant estopped from challenging Ordinance No. 2138? (3) Do the procedures used in adopting Ordinance No. 2138 constitute a "bona fide attempt" to comply with Minn.St. 462.357, subd. 3? (4) Was Ordinance No. 2138 validly reenacted by the rezoning proceedings in 1974? 1. Appellant claims that Ordinance No. 2138 became conclusively valid 3 years after its publication in the official city newspaper on July 23, 1969, due to Minn.St. 599.13, which reads: The important part of the published ordinance itself is Section 1: Appellant's argument is twofold: First, the zoning map is a "book" for purposes of Minn.St. 599.13, or second, the zoning map is an "other form" included under Minn.St. 599.13 by the phrase "such book or pamphlet." The district court found this argument unconvincing, with good reason. It may well be that the zoning map is an "other form" for purposes of the "prima facie" section of the statute, but this matters little since the ordinance was published in the official newspaper. The "conclusive" portion of the statute is explicit in its omission of "newspapers" and "other forms"it refers only to "books" and "pamphlets," and the zoning map is neither of these. Ordinance No. 2138 has never been compiled in any book of Winona ordinances or in any separate document other than the original newspaper publication. It thus retains its prima facie validity, but fails to satisfy the statutory requirement for conclusive validity. Contrary to appellant's assertion, the legislative intent of Minn.St. 599.13 is clear: Until an ordinance is published in book or pamphlet form, it can only acquire prima facie validity. The underlying purpose of this rule is to prevent the conclusive effect until the ordinance is available in permanent form for public circulation. The zoning map, while available for public inspection *270 in the city engineer's office, neither provides the language of individual ordinances (which in some cases may be of uncertain effect) nor is it generally available for circulation to the public. It therefore satisfies neither the express terms nor the legislative purpose of Minn.St. 599.13. Ordinance No. 2138 possesses only prima facie validity, and the regularity of its adoption can be attacked, the burden of proof being on the assailants. 2. As indicated, appellant contends that the plaintiffs are estopped from challenging Ordinance No. 2138 by delay in bringing the action some 5 years after its passage. The district court rejected this argument on two bases: First, the plaintiffs need not have been landowners in Hillview in 1969 when Ordinance No. 2138 was first passed and published and, second, plaintiffs began to challenge appellant's R-3 construction plans as soon as they learned of them. Appellant cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions in which delays of from 4 to 21 years were held to prevent challenge of ordinances on procedural grounds. However, these cases are distinguishable from the present case on two grounds. First, the nature of the defect in the adoption of Ordinance No. 2138 is the lack of notice and public hearing as required by Minn.St. 462.357. This is the type of defect naturally leading to delay in the bringing of a challenge, since those not seeing the newspaper notice of the ordinance might remain unaware of its passage. Second, it appears that there was little delay between the plaintiffs' learning of the R-3 zoning and their beginning of actions to challenge the classification. Finally, estoppel should be applied sparingly to cases of this nature. The legislature, in establishing the detailed procedure set out in Minn.St. 462.357, intended that the rights of landowners would be protected from arbitrary or detrimental zoning by the public hearing process. Only in those cases where it is clear that a landowner has "sat on his rights" should he be estopped from challenging a zoning ordinance passed without public hearing. The facts of this case do not show that the plaintiffs acted in so dilatory a manner that they should be considered to have surrendered their right of challenge. 3. Appellant argues that the procedure followed in passing Ordinance No. 2138 was a "bona fide attempt" to comply with the notice and public hearing requirement of Minn.St. 462.357, subd. 3. The district court held that compliance was insufficient to satisfy the statute. The language of § 462.357, subd. 3, should be carefully noted: "* * * defects in the notice shall not invalidate the proceedings, provided a bona fide attempt to comply with this subdivision has been made." This phrasing presumes that notice of a "public hearing" has been given, that the hearing has been held, and that the only problem is some defect in the notice. For example, if the notice were posted 9 days prior to the meeting instead of the specified 10, or if the notice omitted to specify "place" when public hearings were always held in the same hall, the statute would be satisfied. In this case, however, not only was the notice defectivethe proceedings themselves were not proper under the statute. The only notice of a "public hearing" before the Winona Planning Commission says nothing about zoning, and the notice of the city council's impending consideration of Ordinance No. 2138 says nothing about a "public hearing." As the district court pointed out, regular city council meetings cannot satisfy the "public hearing" requirement unless they are noticed as such and conducted so that the public has the right to speak on the noticed question. Thus, there was no notice of a public hearing on Ordinance No. 2138, nor was such a public hearing ever held. The district court properly concluded that under these circumstances subd. 3 cannot be found satisfied even under the "bona fide attempt" provision. 4. Appellant finally contends that the rezoning proceedings held in 1974 validly reenacted and ratified Ordinance No. 2138, despite its initial defects. The district court rejected this argument, essentially on the basis that an invalid ordinance *271 cannot be vitalized by attempted amendment absent a clear intent to do so. The court, in a detailed memorandum incorporated by reference in its findings, stated: With this we must agree, and suggest that the advice therein be followed in future proceedings where applicable. We therefore must affirm the judgment of the district court. Affirmed. YETKA, Justice (concurring specially). I concur in the opinion, but feel compelled to add that the result of the decision is that the plat of Hillview Subdivision has no applicable zoning ordinance affecting it at all. This is fully explained in the trial court's memorandum made a part of its findings: