Title: McCleaf v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 385, 2000
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: December 4, 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ANTHONY McCLEAF, 
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No. 385, 2000
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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v.
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Court Below: Superior Court
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of the State of Delaware
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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in and for Kent County
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Cr.A. Nos. IK99-10-0372
Plaintiff Below,
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through 0374
Appellee.
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Submitted: October 16, 2001
Decided: December 4, 2001
Before WALSH, BERGER, and STEELE, Justices.
O R D E R
This 4th day of December, 2001, on consideration of the briefs of the parties,
it appears to the Court that:
1)      Anthony McCleaf appeals his conviction, following a bench trial, of
shoplifting, forgery in the second degree, and criminal impersonation.  He argues
that (i) the trial court erred in admitting a videotape from the store’s surveillance
camera; (ii) without the videotape, there was insufficient evidence to support a
shoplifting conviction; (iii) signing a false name on an arrest card cannot form the
basis of a second degree forgery conviction; and (iv) his criminal impersonation
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conviction should be overturned because the name he gave police was the name he
had adopted at common law.
2)    Chad Wyble and Stephen Roark work at Strawbridge’s in the loss
prevention department.  On the evening in question, Wyble was monitoring the
surveillance cameras and saw a man, later identified as McCleaf, acting suspiciously.
Wyble instructed Roark to go outside the store entrance to the men’s department.
Shortly after he got there, Roark saw McCleaf leave the store carrying nine pairs of
jeans.  Roark confronted McCleaf, recovered the jeans, and brought McCleaf to the
Strawbridge’s security office.
3)   Dover Police Officer Scott Sealund responded to a call from Strawbridge’s
and, after viewing the security camera videotape of McCleaf, Sealund arrested him.
Sealund asked McCleaf for his name and any identification he might have.  McCleaf
said he had no identification and that his name was Anthony R. Miller.  Sealund
testified that he warned McCleaf that he could be arrested for criminal impersonation
if the name he provided was wrong.  McCleaf insisted that his name was Anthony
Miller.
4)     At the police station, Sealund filled out an arrest card in the name
Anthony R. Miller.  He again warned McCleaf that, if the information was incorrect
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and McCleaf signed the card, he would be charged with criminal impersonation and
forgery second.  McCleaf signed the card in the name Anthony R. Miller.  After
some investigation, Sealund determined McCleaf’s true identity.
5)     McCleaf argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the
shoplifting charge.  He says that the surveillance videotape was inadmissible because
Wyble, the person who was monitoring the camera, did not authenticate the tape.
This argument lacks merit.  A videotape may be authenticated “by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.”  D.R.E. 901(a).  In this case, Roark testified that the tape was made by the
Strawbridge’s security camera, in the normal course of business, on the day of the
incident.  He also stated that he viewed the tape and that it accurately depicts
McCleaf in the men’s department selecting merchandise and walking out of the
store.   Roark’s testimony was sufficient to support a finding that the tape was, as
claimed, a tape of the Strawbridge’s men’s department on the date and at the time
of the incident that led to McCleaf’s arrest.  Accordingly, the trial court acted within
its discretion in admitting the videotape into evidence.  As McCleaf appears to
concede, with the videotape showing that McCleaf never paid for the jeans, there
was sufficient evidence to support the shoplifting conviction.
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6)      McCleaf next argues that he did not commit forgery when he signed the
arrest card in the name Anthony R. Miller.  He points out that, immediately below
the signature line, the arrest card states, “I hereby voluntarily submit my social
security number for supplemental means of identification only.”  McCleaf argues
that, since his signature was provided for that limited purpose, the falsification of his
signature cannot constitute forgery.  
7)     McCleaf offers no authority for his restrictive interpretation of the
forgery statute.  “A person is guilty of forgery when, intending to defraud, deceive
or injure another person, the person ... (2) ...executes ... any written instrument
which purports to be the act of another person, whether real or fictitious....” 11
Del.C. §861(a).  If the written instrument is a public record or a document “issued
or created by a public office ... or governmental instrumentality,” the forgery is
forgery in the second degree.  §861(b)(2).  Nothing in this statute suggests that one
who gives a false signature is somehow exempt from prosecution for forgery if the
signature was given for a limited purpose.  If the signature is false and the
perpetrator intended to defraud, deceive or injure someone by using the false
signature, then the person is guilty of forgery. 
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8)    McCleaf’s last argument relates to both the forgery and criminal
impersonation convictions.  He contends that he was not guilty of either crime
because he adopted the name Anthony R. Miller, as a matter of common law.
McCleaf testified that he started calling himself Miller when he went to live with his
father, Charles Miller, in 1976.  McCleaf testified that, since his police records in
other cases showed his name as “Anthony McCleaf a.k.a. Anthony Miller,” he
assumed the name McCleaf would come up when he gave the name Miller for this
arrest.  In short, he claims that he was not trying to deceive or defraud anyone.
9)     The trial court did not accept McCleaf’s testimony.  Based on the fact
that McCleaf gave Sealund a false date of birth, false social security number and
false identifying scars for “Anthony Miller,” the court found that McCleaf intended
to deceive the authorities as to his identity.  That finding is supported by the record.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice